Yearbook of Muslims in Europe
Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 1 Edited by Editor-in-Chief
Jørgen S. Nielsen Editors
Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Brigitte Maréchal Christian Moe Editorial Assistant
Nadia Jeldtoft
LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009
Published with the support of
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
ISSN 1877-1432 ISBN 978 90 04 17505 1 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands
CONTENTS The Editors ................................................................................. Editorial Advisers ........................................................................ Foreword .....................................................................................
ix xi xiii
PART I
COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet AlibašiÆ and Brigitte Maréchal Introduction ................................................................................ On Defining Muslims, by Nadia Jeldtoft ................................... Country surveys: Albania .................................................................................... Austria ..................................................................................... Belgium ................................................................................... Bosnia and Herzegovina ......................................................... Bulgaria ................................................................................... Croatia .................................................................................... Cyprus ..................................................................................... Czech Republic ....................................................................... Denmark ................................................................................. Estonia ..................................................................................... Finland .................................................................................... France ...................................................................................... Germany ................................................................................. Greece ..................................................................................... Hungary .................................................................................. Ireland ..................................................................................... Italy ......................................................................................... Kosovo ..................................................................................... Latvia ...................................................................................... Lithuania ................................................................................. Luxembourg ............................................................................ Macedonia ..............................................................................
3 9 15 25 35 49 61 69 75 89 97 111 117 127 141 151 161 167 179 193 199 205 211 221
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contents Malta ....................................................................................... Montenegro ............................................................................. Netherlands ............................................................................. Norway .................................................................................... Poland ..................................................................................... Portugal ................................................................................... Romania .................................................................................. Serbia ...................................................................................... Slovakia ................................................................................... Slovenia ................................................................................... Spain ....................................................................................... Sweden .................................................................................... Switzerland .............................................................................. Turkey ..................................................................................... United Kingdom .....................................................................
229 237 243 257 267 277 285 295 305 311 319 331 343 351 363
PART II
ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe Turkey-EU relations: The impact of Islam on Europe ............. Ayhan Kaya European Muslim youth: Towards a cool Islam? ...................... Miriam Gazzah Muslim veiling controversies in Europe ..................................... Dominic McGoldrick Media and Muslims in Europe .................................................. Isabelle Rigoni Freedom of expression and religious feelings ............................ Niraj Nathwani
377 403 427 475 507
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PART III
BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Christian Moe and Samim Akgönül Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence. By Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Christian Moe) ................................................... The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. By Alison Pargeter. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008 (Marc Sageman) ................................................................................. The Study of Religion and the Training of Muslim Clergy in Europe: Academic and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century. By W.B. Drees and P.J. van Koningsveld (eds). Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008 (Martha Frederiks) ............................................... Islam and Muslims in Germany. By Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielmann (eds). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008 (Gerdien Jonker) ..................................................................................... Young, British and Muslim. By Philip Lewis. London: Continuum, 2007 ......................................................................................... Young British Muslim Voices. By Anshuman A. Mondal. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2008 (Claire Dwyer) ............. The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse. By Brigitte Maréchal. Leiden: Brill, 2008 (Lena Larsen) ......................... Penser l’islam dans la laïcité. Les musulmans de France et la République. By Frank Frégosi. Paris: Fayard, 2008 (Thierry Zarcone) ..... Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. By Katherine Pratt Ewing. Stanford/California: Stanford University Press, 2008 (Nikola Tietze) .....................................................
535 538
539 542 545 545 550 553 560
THE EDITORS Jørgen S. Nielsen is a Danish National Research Foundation Professor of Islamic Studies and Director, Centre for European Islamic Thought, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about Islam in Europe since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd edn 2004). Samim Akgönül, is Associate Professor at Strasbourg University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University and International Relations at Galatasaray University. Among his recent publications are Religion de Turquie, religions des Turcs: nouveaux acteurs dans l’Europe élargie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006), and, as editor, Laïcité en débat: principes et représentations du concept de la laïcité en France et en Turquie (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008). Ahmet AlibašiÆ holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences, and Islamic Civilisation from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations. Brigitte Maréchal is Professor, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, and Director, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. She is in charge of the programme ‘Religious Sciences: Islam’. She is editor, with Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen, of Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Christian Moe is a PhD candidate in the history of religion, University of Oslo, and works as a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights, and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).
EDITORIAL ADVISERS Dr Xavier Bougarel, Etudes Turques et Ottomans, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Prof. Felice Dassetto, ANSO, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Prof. Silvio Ferrari, Faculty of Law, Universities of Milan, Italy, and Leuven, Belgium Dr Franck Frégosi, Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France Prof. Fikret KarÆiÆ, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Assoc. Prof. Talip Küçükcan, Adviser to the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), Ankara, Turkey Dr Lene Kühle, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Dr Nico Landman, Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Erfurt, Germany Prof. Tariq Modood, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom Dr Ferid Muhic, University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk, Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland Prof. Alexandre Popovic, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (EHESS), Paris, France Dr Nina Clara Tiesler, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal Dr Kari Vogt, Associate Professor, Institute of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway Dr Antonina Zheliyazkova, Director, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria
FOREWORD The presence of Muslims in Europe has attracted increasing attention over the last two decades. Researchers started devoting attention to the subject during the mid- and late 1980s. During the following decade it attracted growing political attention, sparked especially by the ‘affairs’ of 1989—Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in Britain and the foulards (head scarves) in France—and sustained by the critical geopolitical focuses on Islam and Muslims through crises in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya added to existing ones—Palestine, Sudan, Kashmir—where Islam was an ever more forcefully expressed dimension. The events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC followed by a number of other terrorists attacks, especially those in Madrid and London, raised the profile in Europe yet further, now often driven by security considerations. That smaller countries could not escape the attention was demonstrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004 and the international impact of the cartoons of Muhammad published in Denmark at the end of September 2005. Throughout these events it has become clear that researchers, policy makers, journalists and other opinion formers have found it difficult to obtain with ease reliable information about the situation of Muslims in individual European countries. Nowhere has it been possible to find answers to the simple questions such as “How do other countries deal with Muslim burial?”, “In which countries are there Islamic schools, and how do they function?”, “Do any other countries make space for Islamic family law?”, etc. An attempt to establish an overview of both the data and the research was undertaken almost ten years ago at the behest of the Presidency of the European Union.1 This project was expanded into a major publication, which set out to take stock of both the state of research in the field and the data.2 The country data
Dassetto, F., B. Maréchal and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Convergences musulmanes: aspects contemporains de l’islam dans l’Europe élargies (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2001). 2 Maréchal, B., S. Allievi, F. Dassetto and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 1
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were synthesised and published separately3 in a format which was later updated for the European Parliament.4 It was rapidly becoming clear that events were moving fast and published data was quickly becoming out of date. At the same time, it was also clear that much data was being interpreted without reference to the context to which it belonged. In particular, too much authority was being given to statistics that, by their very nature, were unreliable. So when the publishers Brill approached the editors of their book series Muslim Minorities, which had started appearing in 2003, with the suggestion that a Yearbook of Muslims in Europe would be timely, the response was positive. A new editorial team was assembled which took on the project both positively and with trepidation, knowing very well how much work would be involved, especially in the first year. But as the project has progressed, we have become convinced of the value and necessity of its publication. To meet our assessment of the needs of the users, the volume is divided into three main parts. The largest is the Country Reports, which cover 37 countries in western and central Europe, including all the members and prospective members of the European Union. In the light of the experience of this first year, it is our intention to reorganise the material slightly for the next volume, as well as to include one or two further sections. The editors welcome suggestions to help improve the usefulness of the country reports. It is also our intention over the next two years to expand the coverage with the goal of including all the member countries of the Council of Europe. The volume will then stretch eastwards into the Russian Federation and the southern Caucasus. Detailed information on how the reports are organised can be found in the introduction to that part. The second part comprises analytical articles on topics which in one way or another are of current interest, while the third part—which we expect to see expanding in future years—collects reviews of important books published during the period overviewed in the volume. Our thanks are due to the many researchers who have contributed to the volume—some of the authors of the country entries have in
3 Maréchal, B. (ed.), L’Islam et les musulmans dans l’Europe élargie: Radioscopie (Louvainla-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002). 4 Dasetto, F., S. Ferrari and B. Maréchal, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education (IP/B/CULT/IC/2002_061), 2007), pp. 81–175.
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effect produced here the first account in English of the situation of Muslims in their countries. We are particularly indebted to staff at Brill, who first had the idea and then supported it actively all the way through: Nicolette van der Hoek, Sasha Goldstein, and Joed Elich, and to Carol Rowe for her as ever meticulous copy editing. In Copenhagen, student assistants Niels Valdemar Vinding and Line Stæhr have been enthusiastic and committed in helping to ensure that the process has gone surprisingly smoothly. We can now but hope that the volume will be found useful. The Editors Copenhagen, Ljubljana, Louvain, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, May 2009
PART I
COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet AlibašiÆ and Brigitte Maréchal Editorial assistant Nadia Jeldtoft
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this first main part of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe is to provide essential data about the place of Muslims within each of the countries covered, in principle for the year 2008. Initially, the intention was to cover only the member countries of the European Union and those countries in various stages of entry or association. But as this left occasional geographical anomalies, it was decide to expand the coverage to include all the other countries of western and central Europe. In the end, it was not possible to find anyone to provide a report on Iceland—next year, we hope. As it is, this section includes 37 countries stretching from Portugal to Cyprus and from Norway to Malta. The information is structured in the same way for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2008, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2009 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of May 2009. It is in the nature of such a presentation of data that some of the information acquires a rather more authoritative character than is justified. This is particularly problematic in a volume which seeks to present ‘facts’ about Muslims in Europe. For a start, the mere use of the term ‘Muslim’ begs questions. Both the research tradition and much public debate on the subject tend to start from an assumption that anyone from a Muslim cultural tradition is Muslim—e.g. if their names are Muhammad or Fatima, and they are Turkish of origin, they must be Muslims. As many of the country reports indicate, this is too simplistic: there are ‘Muslims’ who have no practical relationship to Islam, its rites, institutions or organisations. The term ‘cultural Muslims’ has come into use to deal with this, while ‘practising Muslims’ is then intended to cover those who engage in some form of Islamic
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practice. Nadia Jeldtoft discusses this problem in her article preceding the country reports; the authors of the country reports have seen a draft version of this paper. The problem is reflected in the attempts to ascertain demographic data in section 1 of each of the reports. In a very few countries, official statistics register religious adherence, usually self-defined, but in most countries researchers have had to use data on nationality and/or ethnicity to deduce some form of reasonably reliable estimate. In a few countries, the law on civil associations requires that a register of members be kept, and this can also be a source of statistics on religious allegiance. Occasionally, Muslim organisations themselves give figures, but their reliability is also often open to question. Each country report sets out the nature of the basis for the demography provided. We have deliberately not tried to provide any summary statistical table, as this is liable to acquire an unjustified authority. So we apologise to those users who thought they might get some quick answers! As a matter of interest, adding the minimum and maximum estimates given for each country suggests a total Muslim population for the countries covered, excluding Turkey, of between 23.8 million and 25.1 million (of which some 16–18 million are in the former western Europe) out of a total population of about 450 million, i.e. somewhere around 5.5% of Europe’s population has some kind of Muslim background. It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries differ enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of individual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the presentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what information to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3 where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller populations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–15, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the
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country in question and which especially impact on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful: 1. Muslim populations: Muslim populations including their history within the country and ethnic composition, including overview statistics covering current numbers and ethnic and geographical distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any statistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the state: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including contact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shi’i, Sufi, and other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, political parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4. Mosques and prayer houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local practice. Relevant legal issues, especially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curriculum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or managed schools. 6. Higher and professional education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the provision of private or public professional training for imams.
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7. Burial and cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries. 8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in state institutions: Provision of Muslim religious counseling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly recognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrangements. 10. Halal food: Access to halal food, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is available in public institutions. 11. Dress codes: How far—and where—is Muslim dress, especially for women hijab (head scarf ) and niqab (face covering), permitted and practised. 12. Publications and media: A survey of the main Muslim print and electronic media. 13. Family law: The practice of elements Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Public opinion and debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 15. Major cultural events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others. The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the country authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. It is also worth noting that, in many cases, the country authors were able to refer to previously published surveys, which were placed at the disposal of the authors of the country reports. The surveys which have been used are: Brigitte Maréchal (ed.), L’Islam et les musulmans dans l’Europe élargie: Radioscopie (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002).
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Roberta Aluffi B.-P. and Giovanna Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 290–318. Felice Dasetto, Silvio Ferrari and Brigitte Maréchal, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education (IP/B/CULT/IC/2002_061), 2007), pp. 81–175. A final comment is necessary regarding the order of the countries. Rather than trying to be legalistic or carefully diplomatic, we have decided to use the names of the countries that are in common use in English as the basis for the alphabetical order. In the light of the experience of this first year, it is our intention to reorganise the material slightly for the next volume, as well as to include one or two further sections. The editors welcome suggestions to help improve the usefulness of the country reports. It is also our intention over the next two years to expand the coverage with the goal of including all the member countries of the Council of Europe. The volume will then stretch eastwards into the Russian Federation and the southern Caucasus.
ON DEFINING MUSLIMS Nadia Jeldtoft 1 A yearbook deals with data. This publication is of course no exception, but as already touched upon in the introduction to the country reports section, we are concerned not to give any quick answers to questions on the complex empirical situation in the 37 countries covered by the country reports. I will discuss how we have attempted to deal with the presentation of the data in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, whilst suggesting some caveats about how the data accumulated in this publication can be used. Data are often thought of as ‘hard facts’ that inform us about something on the basis of numbers and which we use to provide descriptive details about the world. Even though numbers and data may seem ‘objective’, statistics can be seen as a reality-producing process related to question of how we produce, reproduce and navigate in the social worlds that we inhabit. Basic statistics are arrived at by counting and this is by no means a neutral activity, because it involves identification, which is a power-related act of categorisation. In other words, acts of identification are simultaneously acts of naming, separating, and distilling some concepts from others by virtue of certain characteristics which are defined by the people doing the identifying. The process of counting and identifying is therefore neither objective nor neutral, because it is always dependant on contextual and relational circumstances. When we count things or people, we do so on the basis of certain premises, and we need to ask the relevant questions: Who is counting? Who is being counted? How is the counting taking place? Why is the counting taking place? And most importantly: is counting a sufficient description of the counted object? In most cases the answer to the last questions will
1 Nadia Jeldtoft is a PhD Fellow at the Centre for European Islamic Thought at Copenhagen University. She works on minority issues and religious identity with regard to Muslim minorities in Europe and is currently focusing on everyday forms of Islam among non-organised Muslim minorities. She has recently published “Andre Muslimske Identiteter—et studie af ikke-organiserede Muslimer (Other Muslim Identities—a study of non-organised Muslim minorities)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 1 (2008), pp. 59–82.
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be no, and we therefore need to complement the descriptive counting with other perspectives, or at least make it clear that there are other aspects which could possibly tell us other things about the individuals being counted. When it comes to counting people, it becomes highly relevant to explain the statistics have been generated in a transparent manner—i.e. how the data have become data. This Yearbook deals with Muslim minorities—a very heterogeneous group that we nonetheless choose to describe under a single category—‘Muslims’. The Yearbook therefore seeks to acknowledge the diversity of Muslims as a complex empirical reality, while at the same time wishing to describe Muslims in Europe by the use of data, because we find that this information provides a useful tool for a variety of possible uses. This apparent gap (between the apparent simplicity of the data and the complexity of the situations they describe) does not mean that we have to fudge completely the complicated realities we are facing. Rather than regarding this gap as an obstacle for the Yearbook, it is possible to see the issues it raises as generating a critical platform from which to conduct our research and perhaps develop policy. One way of creating a transparent critical platform is to distinguish between a ‘category’ and a ‘group’,2 such that a ‘category’ refers to the collection of data about Muslims. From this perspective, ‘Muslims’ can be viewed as a category with reference to the interest of our respective fields of research. It is thus an analytical construction which we use as an instrument that enables us to say something about the empirical reality of Muslim minorities. The term ‘group’, as an analytical category, takes into consideration the heterogeneous nature of Muslim minority groups in Europe. This concept points to the fact that Muslims might self-identify as Muslims but not necessarily in the same way that the very general categorization does, and that they do not see themselves as belonging to the same group. Nor does it mean that being Muslim is equally important or relevant for them at all times or in all situations. This means that we are attempting to describe a category, which is an analytical construction, to enable a platform for empirical studies of the complex realities of Muslim minorities groups in Europe.
2 Jenkins, R., “Rethinking ethnicity: Identity, categorization and power”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 203.
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It follows that the question of counting Muslim minorities is also related to processes of self-identification vs. categorisation. While selfidentification is an internal process of naming and defining one’s own group, categorisation is an external process, whereby one is defined by others.3 This latter process is dynamic and related to power relations and representation. When it comes to studying the identity processes of minority groups, it is particularly relevant to look at how power relations are exercised by both majority and minority actors. Even though some European countries have a long history of Muslim presence, and a few European countries have Muslim populations who are numerical majorities, Muslims in Europe can largely be described as minorities that are being and have been described mainly by the majority.4 The very wish to count and thus describe others systematically, as is the case here, is often connected to majority wishes about mapping, and it is therefore important to realise that the categorisations of Muslims as such for the purpose of this Yearbook is the result of a majority perspective. Counting Muslims is not the same as wholly adequately describing Muslims minorities, because Muslim minorities, as much as all other groups in society, can be approached from other angles that will tell us other things about them. Concepts such as identity, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality are particularly ambiguous and dependent on relational issues, and as such they are dynamic and contingent.5 These concepts are contested categories used by everyone to make the world meaningful. In order to navigate in our social worlds, we need categories to define ourselves and others, and researchers are no exception. When we, in this Yearbook, categorise (and thereby identify) Muslims in Europe, this expresses a categorisation of ‘Muslims’ who can be distinguished from other social groups by virtue of their ‘Muslimness’. This categorisation reflects a use of the contested categories—Muslims are not simply and only ‘Muslims’. Some, but not all, of the members of the minority group of Muslims will fit into the scholarly understanding and categorisation of what it means to be a Muslim. However, not all Muslims think of themselves Ibid. Obvious exceptions to this are Turkey and certain regions of the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia. In latter years, many scholars who are themselves Muslims have contributed to the research on Muslims in Europe and some of them are contributors in this publication. 5 Baumann, G., The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities (London: Routledge, 1999). 3 4
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as distinctly Muslim but rather in ethnic, national or cultural terms or in a mixture of, for example, ethnic and religious terms, while others do wholly self-identify as Muslims and actively articulate their Muslim identity as separate from their ethnic/national identity. Although all categorisations are ambiguous, it is relevant to draw attention to this fact when it comes to definitions of any social group, because of the implication that categorisations per se are problematic when studying heterogeneous (minority) groups. In addition to these questions of representation, the Yearbook covers a very large and varied context: 37 countries which have very different histories as regards their Muslim populations and different political systems, and thereby also very different ways of counting (and not counting) Muslims. In some countries, such as France, it is illegal to register people according to their religion while in other countries people may voluntarily register as Muslims in the national census. We lack information on what exactly this quantitative and descriptive ‘ticking the box’ actually means to the people who actively register as Muslims. Does it mean that they understand themselves more as Muslims than, for example, as Dutch, Pakistanis or Palestinians? Not to mention issues related to level of practice and denominational affiliation—does ‘ticking the box’ capture whether people are Sufis or Shi’ites? The figures used in various demographies of religion are extremely problematic. They are often biased because they are frequently based on the assumption that migrants of certain ethnic origins are Muslims. We need to be cautious with these figures as they contribute to what we might term the ‘ethnification of Islam’, which does not adequately describe these Muslim groups, because there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnicity/nationality on the one hand and religion on the other.6 Other figures come from Muslim organisations themselves and this presents problems related to whether Muslims can be described in terms of ‘organised’ vs. ‘non-organised’. The estimates provided by Muslim organisations are problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, they may simply be estimates based on a very weak and sometimes wishful foundation. So, for example, before the 2001 census in the United Kingdom asked a question on religion, some Muslim organisations were suggesting a figure as high as three million for the
6 Barth, F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).
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number of Muslims resident in the UK. On the other hand, figures may be based on membership of or affiliation to organisations, none of which can be regarded as fully representative or inclusive of all Muslims in the country concerned. These figures are also biased in that they describe only ‘organised’ Muslims and consequently exclude Muslims who are not active in Muslim organisations,7 a dimension which is further complicated by the fact that ‘organised’ means different things in different countries, reflecting differences in, for example, the laws governing associations. Being organised or non-organised should not be used as descriptive markers for Muslim minorities, because there is a wide variety of different attitudes and motivations for being or not being involved in a Muslim organisation for the individuals concerned. As a Muslim, you can be organised at some points in your life, while you are not at others, and the description ‘organised’ may cover very different types of affiliation, ranging from formal membership to loose and informal association. This means that we must be careful not to use only representatives of Muslims organisations as the representatives of Muslims in our research, because they—like all other groups—will have certain agendas in presenting issues as they do. With regard to the Yearbook, these facts are relevant because, when we attempt to systematise information on Islam and Muslims in Europe, a critical approach to the methodology used in the generation of the figures published in this volume is pertinent. In the country reports, the terms ‘practising’ and ‘cultural’ Muslims have occasionally been used in order to work with applicable analytical categories that will enable better navigation in the complex empirical realities of Muslim minorities in Europe. These categories are related to questions of how we can understand the various attitudes of Muslims. The description of Muslims in categories of ‘practising/observing Muslims’ and ‘cultural/nominal’ Muslims can be problematic because the descriptions are ambivalent and reflect contestation. They are often used as opposites and as such are in some contexts used politically to distinguish between ‘good’ (‘non-practising-and-therefore-secular and integrated/assimilated’) and ‘bad’ (‘practising-therefore-fundamentalist’) Muslims. In our use of these terms in this Yearbook, we therefore emphasise that, when it comes to describing Muslim minorities in
7 Jacobsen, B., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35.
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Europe, it is relevant not to make matters of practice the only standard description for Muslims, because it is possible to self-identify strongly as a Muslim while, for example, not observing fasts or participating in any Islamic rituals. When it comes to the categories of ‘organised’ and ‘non-organised’ Muslims, these should equally not be used as equivalents for ‘practising’ and ‘non-practising’. Although many Muslims may be adequately described as either ‘practising’ or ‘cultural’, self-identification as Muslim may correlate with other issues than practical ones. It may express attitudes towards the majority, or other ethnic and national groups, it may be related to gaining minority rights as a ‘group’, or it may express attitudes and feelings of belonging to cultural, religious or ethnic or national communities that are not dependant on practice. Further, we cannot presume that the Muslim identity is equally important in all situations. A ‘practising Muslim’ or a ‘cultural Muslim’ is not restricted to being so at all times—depending on context, it may be relevant for a ‘cultural Muslim’ to accentuate his or her religious identity while a ‘practising Muslim’ might choose (more or less explicitly) to tone down his or her religious identity. And above all, Muslims have other identities as mothers, fathers, students, mechanics, teachers, Turks, Tartars and Lebanese, Lithuanians, British, etc. as well, which are not necessarily detached, i.e. self-understood separately, from being Muslims, but which might very well be understood as intrinsic elements of what it means to be Muslim. Particularly in Western Europe, where some of the third and fourth generation descendants of immigrants of Muslim background are articulating senses of global Islam and the Muslim umma, it is important to constantly evaluate and reality check the categories we use to describe these groups. All this is not to say that Muslim minorities are vague and indefinable concepts which can only be grasped theoretically, but only that we need to demarcate very carefully what we mean when we are describing Muslims. This Yearbook attempts to isolate information on these minority groups, which is a classical scholarly discipline. At the same time, it has been our wish to expose and critically evaluate and discuss some of the processes that are behind the analytical language employed so as to establish a conceptual framework for the users of the Yearbook.
ALBANIA Olsi Jazexhi1 1
Muslim Populations
There are no reliable statistics about religious affiliation in Albania at the present time. During the past decade a number of intellectuals have called for a national survey on the subject, but Albanian politicians have so far refused. As a result, the only official statistics available are from 1937, when Muslims were estimated to be 69.3% of the total population, and from 1945, when they made up 72%.2 After the fall of Communism, figures on the percentages of Muslims have been disputed by some Christian organisations, clergy and academics, as well as by Muslim organisations.3 Christians claim that Muslims no longer constitute the majority in Albania, but Muslims dispute this.4 The best contemporary source for population distribution by religion in Albania is the US Department of State Committee on Religious Freedoms report (17 September 2006), which estimates that citizens of Muslim background make up the largest traditional religious group in
1 Olsi Jazexhi is a PhD researcher on Islam and modern Albanian identity at the European University Institute, in Florence, Italy. He holds degrees in Communication and Islamic Civilisation and has researched on Muslims in Albania from the time of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Tirana: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 3 For the debates over the number of Muslims in Albania see the Press Release of the Muslim Forum of Albania: “MFA denounces the intrigues of evangelist organizations with the religious percentages of Albania”, at http://forumimusliman.org/english/ encyklopedia.html, accessed 7 March 2009; the interview with the Christian Orthodox Archbishop Yanolatos, “Janullatos: Nuk jeni komb tipik musliman”, Gazeta Shekulli, 18 May 2007, available at http://www.shekulli.com.al/news/44/ARTICLE/10080/200705-18.html, accessed 7 March 2009, etc. 4 In a number of polls in recent years, the people who defined themselves as Muslims made up around 63% of the population, Orthodox Christians 15%, and Catholics 13% (see Hysniu, Jeton, “Përbërja e fetare e Shqipërisë: rezultatet e tre sondazheve”, Gazeta Start, 26 January 2007.
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Albania, amounting to 65% to 70% of the population.5 Most of them are Sunnis and there is a minority of Bektashis. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as ethnic Albanians. However, after the fall of Communism, many Muslims have defined themselves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma and Egyptians. During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usually concentrated in the towns, particularly in Gegëria, in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated in the south,6 but since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have moved towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modernday Albania in the ninth century,7 while the real Islamisation of Albania started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges that the Albanian-speaking populations gained from the Ottomans.8 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the numbers and positions of Muslims changed markedly and when Communism was established after World War II and Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991), the religious identity of both Muslims and Christians was suppressed. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, the majority of the citizens of Albania today are secular in orientation. No reliable data are available on active participation in formal religious rites, but estimates range from 25% to 40%.9 2
Islam and the State
Albania is a secular parliamentary republic, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Constitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state is neutral in
5 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (17 September 2006), available at http://tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 6 Jazexhi, Olsi, “The Bektashi Tarikah of Dervishes”, paper presented at the Colloque International ‘soufisme-culture-musique’, Centre National de Recherches Préhistoriques, Anthropologiques et Historiques. Algiers, September 2007. 7 Basha, Ali M., Nëpër gjurmët e Islamit (Tirane: no publisher stated, 2005), pp. 48–52. 8 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 9 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (September 17, 2006), http:// tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009.
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questions of faith.10 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslimanët), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijtë), Catholic Christians, and Orthodox Christians are ‘recognised’ as the four traditional religious communities and are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations. Other faith communities include the Protestants, mostly associated with the Albanian Evangelical Alliance (VUSH), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Bahais, the Holy Waqf of the Holy League,11 and other minor groups. Like the other traditional communities, Muslims do not receive any funding from the state. The present government has indicated its desire to fund the religious communities,12 but nothing has so far been done in this direction. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë (Muslim Community of Albania, Rruga “Punëtorët e Rilindjes”, nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 42 269123/ 04 22 37 01/23 04 92) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania, and is recognised by the state as a national organisation. It administers most of the mosques and is perceived to be the main representative of Sunni Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Sunnis of Albania were officially separated from the Caliphate in Istanbul.13 After being abolished during Communist era, the Muslim Community was reorganised in 1991. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (World Headquarters of Bektashism, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 4 355 227/ +355 4 355 090, http://www.komunitetibektashi.org/. email: info@ komunitetibektashi.org) is the largest Sufi tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane is recognised by the state as a national organisation, and as a separate religious community. The Bektashis claim that their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis living outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane
10 Constitution of Albania/ Chapter I General Provisions/ Article 10, available at http://www.parlament.al/dokumenti.asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008. 11 The Holy Waqf of the Holy League is an indigenous Albanian sect, headed by Eleonora Bregu, who calls herself the Lady of the Soul. 12 Kryeministri Berisha merr pjesë në ceremoninë e nënshkrimit të marrëveshjes mes qeverisë shqiptare dhe komuniteteve fetare në Shqipëri, dated 24 October 2008, available at http://www .keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=9609, accessed 7 March 2009. 13 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, pp. 24–27.
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was transferred from Turkey to Albania in 1931, after the prohibition of the order in Turkey in 1925.14 In 1946, the tariqa was separated from mainstream Islam and became a separate religious community.15 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of others are also active. The most important is the Sufi Union “Drita Hyjnore” (Divine Light) which is an umbrella organisation for the Sufi tariqas of Rifa’is, Qadiris, Sa’dis, Khalwatis and Tijanis. The Muslim Forum of Albania (Rruga Sami Frasheri, P. 20/3, Ap. 1, 1010, Tirana, Albania, http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/, email: info@forumimusliman .org) was established in 2005 as a lay Muslim organisation with the aim of combatting racism, Islamophobia and xenophobia. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
In 2007, the Muslim Community of Albania reported that some 498 mosques existed in the country. As of 2008, this number has increased by another four or five.16 Apart from the mosques, a small number of prayer houses, masjids (small mosques without minarets), operate throughout Albania. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana. The Rifa’i tariqa also has one masjid in Tirana.17 The Bektashis have some 137 tekes (Sufi lodges) throughout Albania,18 and the Sufi tariqas (Rifa’i, Qadiri, Khalwati, Tidjani and others) have altogether an estimated 285 tekes, turbes, maqams and zawias.19
Jazexhi, “Bektashi Tarikah”. Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Tirana: KOHA, 1999), pp. 228–229. 16 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults, August 2008. 17 The exact number of mosques and masjids IN Albania is difficult to establish. In an interview on 16 August 2008, the deputy head of the Muslim Community declared that 568 mosques operate in Albania, but this contradicts data obtained from the State Committee on Cults, which also relies on the Muslim Community of Albania for its information. For more see “Raport ekskluziv / Në Shqipëri ka 638 xhami dhe 1119 kisha”, Gazeta Tirana Observer, 16 August 2008. 18 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults. August 2008. 19 Ibid. 14 15
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Children’s Education
Religious education was prohibited in Albania under Communism, and religion was attacked by the educational system. After the fall of Communism, school textbooks have adopted a more positive stance towards religion, but Islam is not always portrayed in very positive terms.20 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the Muslim Community of Albania and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the Muslim Community include seven high schools, two primary schools and five others.21 Mosques and some Muslim NGOs also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and the Sufi organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The Islamic institutions of Albania have no institute of higher learning and are dependent on institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world for training their staff. Since the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher learning, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised in Albania since 2005.22 The Muslim Community has repeatedly asked the state for permission to open an Islamic university and have received positive responses, but no university has yet been established. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Due to the Communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not common in Albania. In graveyards built during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, Christians and Muslims are buried together.
20 Jazexhi, Olsi, “Depicting the Enemy: the Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s High School Textbooks”, Islam in South East Asia Forum ISEEF, Paper No. 1, July 2008. 21 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. 22 Kulla, Ilir, “Pse-te e universitetit islam!”, Gazeta Korrieri, 23 January 2005.
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However, a number of cemeteries exist outside Tirana, where Muslims are buried separately from the Christians. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, but religious preachers may have access to prisons for teaching religion to inmates. However, religious chaplains are strictly prohibited in public schools. 9
Religious Festivals
The state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ‘Id al-Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Qurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ‘Id al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims celebrate the month of Ramadan and five especially sacred nights. In recent years the Muslim Community has celebrated the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in the third week of April by organising a big concert in Tirana.23 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Sultan Nawruz’ on 22 March, celebrated by the Bektashis in memory of the birth of Imam Ali. In addition, Bektashis keep the day of ‘Ashura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, and some other local festivals such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs. 10
Halal Food
Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania. Halal food is available in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities of the country. However, there is no central institution for halal certification in Albania.
The birthday of Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated in the third weekend of the month of April and the organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The initiators and organisers of this concert are the Nurcu Tariqah, which, since 2005, has developed a strong influence among the Muslim Community of Albania. 23
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Dress Codes
There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in school. However, there have been a number of incidents in recent years involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their headscarf. The latest case occurred in March 2008 when two girls were expelled from a middle school in Tirana.24 Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing hijab, in most state and public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations, or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. 12
Publications and Media
The main Muslim newspapers and magazines in Albania are: Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), journal of the Muslim Community of Albania; Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Qadiri tariqa; Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Rifa’i tariqa; Paqja (Peace), magazine of the Bektashi Community; Njeriu (The Man), periodical magazine of the Divine Light League of the Sufi tariqas; Besimtari (The Believer), journal of Shkodra’s Charitable Society; Drita e Dijes (The Light of Knowledge), journal of Drita Cultural Club of Shkodra; Familja (The Family), a magazine published by the ‘Women’ association—Shoqata Kulturore “GRUAJA”. Apart from the above newspapers, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organizations, which produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arab and Turkish. The most prominent are
24 “Mbanin ferexhe, drejtoresha përzë dy vajza nga shkolla”, Gazeta Shqip, 5 March 2008, available at http://gazeta-shqip.com/artikull.php?id=37966, accessed 7 March 2009.
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the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, “Prizmi” Publishing House, Jehona Association, Tradita Association, Future’s Youth Organization, the ALSAR association and the Ardhmëria association. 13
Family Law
Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical practice. The Sunni Muslim community recognises the practice of nikah (religious marriage), but this is not often practised and few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam. 14 Public Opinion and Debate A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2008. The most controversial was related to the novel, Living on an Island, by the socialist politician Ben Blushi, which was condemned in April 2008 by ten Muslim organisations who claimed it was racist and Islamophobic.25 The deputy head of the Muslim Community of Albania, Saimir Rusheku, alleged that it undermined religious harmony in Albania.26 The indignation of the Muslims was followed by many debates in the Tirana media and the Albanian public was divided. One side perceived the novel as being Christian fundamentalist and insulting to Islam, the Roma, the Turks and the Muslims of Albania in general, while others defended it. The Muslim Forum of Albania, one of the main organisations that promoted public discussion about the novel, appealed to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to take note of the increase in Islamophobia and racism in Albania.27
25 “The Muslim Forum and other Muslim associations are annoyed by the racism and Islamophobia of Ben Blushi”, Press Release 28 April 2008, available at http:// forumimusliman.org/english/blushi.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 26 Rusheku, Saimir, “Romani i Ben Blushit minon harmoninë fetare në Shqipëri”, Gazeta Shqiptare, 25 April 2008, available at http://balkanweb.com/sitev4/index .php?id=19968, accessed 26 April 2008. 27 “Letter to Ambassador Robert Bosch, Head of the OSCE Mission in Albania: The Muslim Forum of Albania appeals to OSCE to help fighting Islamophobia and racism in Albania”, 3 June 2008, available at http://forumimusliman.org/english/osce .html, accessed 7 March 2009.
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Another issue that attracted media attention was the Muslims’ desire to build a major mosque in the centre of Tirana. The issue of the mosque was raised by the mufti of Tirana, Shaban Salihaj, during the Bayram sermon of 30 September 2008 when he asked Tirana’s municipality to grant the Muslim community permission to construct a central mosque, just as the Christians were allowed to build their cathedrals.28 The mufti’s request was widely publicised by the media and a local imam in Kavaja asked Prime Minister Berisha to intervene and do something for the Muslims since they were being discriminated against by Tirana’s mayor Edi Rama’ and his Socialist Party. The permission to construct a new mosque has not yet been granted. 15
Major Cultural Events
Major annual cultural organized by Muslims in Albania are: – the concert for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad organised on the weekends around 20 April in Tirana by the Muslim Community of Albania; – public celebrations and prayers organised during the Bayrams and Ramadan throughout the country; – the celebrations of Sultan Nawruz on 22 March by the Bektashi Community; – Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shi’i saint Abbas Ali.
28 Mahmutaj, Fatos, “Bajrami, Myslimanët kërkojnë xhaminë”, Gazeta Panorama, 1 October 2008, available at http://www.panorama.com.al/index.php?id=19656, accessed 7 March 2009.
AUSTRIA Ednan Aslan and Petra Heinrich1 1
Muslim Populations
Groups of Hungarian Muslims settled in Austrian territories from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.2 With the peace treaty of Passarowitz (16 August, 1718), subjects of the Ottoman Empire received full permission to establish settlements and factories.3 In 1878, the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austrian troops and were annexed in 1908. For the first time, the Habsburgs then assumed authority over a large consolidated Muslim population. With the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, most of the Muslims emigrated from Austrian territory because of the insecurity of economic and political conditions and only around 100 unorganised Muslim individuals stayed. After World War II, the number of working immigrants (‘guest workers’) from Yugoslavia and Turkey grew as a result of special agreements with Turkey in 1964, with former Yugoslavia in 1966 and because of a shortage of labour in Austria. Austria also received political refugees and students from Islamic countries. Immigration reached its peak during the 1960–1970s4 when most of the workers came as ‘tourists’ and then registered as migrant workers and worked hard for low wages. After the first oil crisis in 1974, a stop was put to the arrival of migrant workers because of the worsening economic situation. This
Dr. Ednan Aslan is Professor of Islamic Education in the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Vienna. Petra Heinrich is a PhD Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Institute for Educational Sciences, Department for Islamic Religious Education, Vienna. 2 Aslan, E., “Muslime und ihre Zukunft in Österreich”, in Kohl, A., S. Karner and D. Halper (eds), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 258–272. 3 Potz, R., “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich”, in J. Schwartländer (ed.), Freiheit der Religion: Christentum und Islam unter dem Anspruch der Menschenrechte, Forum Weltkirche, vol. 2 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1993), p. 135. 4 Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in Schneiders, T. and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime im Rechtsstaat. (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). 1
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changed in the 1980s when diplomats, businessmen and students, as well as OPEC and UN employees came to Austria. In 1986, a second wave of migrant workers began to arrive as a result of new economic and political problems in Yugoslavia and with the outbreak of war there in 1990. In the 2001 census, about 339,000 Muslims were registered, representing 4.3% of the total population of 8,032,926.5 The biggest group of Muslims in Austria have Turkish citizenship (123,000), followed by Austrians (96.000), Bosnians (64,628), Yugoslavs (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) (21,594), Macedonians (10,969) and Iranians (3,774). According to the 2001 census, 71.7% of the Muslims in Austria have foreign citizenship and Muslims constitute about half of the total number of foreigner residents. Their distribution across Austria’s states varies according to the local employment and economic conditions. The figures are: Vorarlberg 29,334, Vienna 121,149, Salzburg 23,137, Upper Austria 55,581, Tyrol, 27,117, Lower Austria 48,730, Kärnten 10,940, Steiermark 19,007 and Burgenland 3,993.6 2
Islam and the State
The law concerning the recognition of religion of 1874, RGBl Nr 68, included the Islamic religion in the Austrian Empire.7 Today Austria is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute the majority (73.6% according to the latest [2001] census) of the population. The Muslim population is today the third largest religious community in Austria. The current equal status of Muslims in Austria rests on the Staatsgrundgesetz (Basic Law of the State) of the Austrian Empire of 1867 (art. 14, 15, 17) concerning freedom of faith, freedom of culture and freedom of knowledge and education. The Islamgesetz of 1912 recognises adherents of Islam as a religious community according to the ‘Hanafite rite’. The Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, 5 See http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_1971_bis_2001_nach_ ausgewaehlter_staatsangehoerigkeit_und_bun_022887.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008); http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_nach_dem_religionsbekenntnis_ und_bundeslaendern_1951_bis_2001_022885.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008). 6 Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006), available at http://www .bmi.gv.at/downloadareas/asyl_fremdenwesen/Perspektiven_Herausforderungen.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008). 7 Potz, “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft”, p. 135.
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Islamic Religious Community in Austria)8 is responsible for the Mufti (in Vienna) and for imams, who work voluntarily. Islamic religious teachers are paid by the Stadtschulrat (School Agency) and are governed by a special section of the Stadtschulrat, the Islamisches Schulamt.9 There is no public funding for Muslim religious associations, but the state does provide funding for certain projects and for cooperation between, for example, the Muslimische Jugend Österreich (Muslim Youth Organization —MJÖ)10 and the Catholic Youth Organization. The MJÖ generates money through membership-fees and private sponsors. A major MJÖ project is the ‘umra (pilgrimage to Mecca) in April as well as current projects for sports, summer and winter camps, Arabic courses, etc. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The main Islamic organisation is the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ)11 which was recognised by the government in 1979 as a corporation under public law on the basis of the 1912 Act. The affairs of the Muslim Religious Community are governed by: 1. the local council; 2. the regional committee; 3. the first Imam; 4. spiritual counsellors; then, specific to the IGGiÖ: 5. the Shura Council; 6. the Supreme Council; 7. the Advisory Committee; 8. the Mufti of the IGGiÖ; and 9. the Arbitration Tribunal. The Muslim Community is lead by a president, elected every five years, who is at the same time the chairman of the Supreme Council (Executive Body) of the IGGiÖ. The current president is Anas Schakfeh. The Supreme Council consists of twelve people who are elected by the Shura Council every five years. This is an important Islamic legislative body which also elects the Mufti. The Shura Council consists of a minimum of sixteen members who are elected by the chairmen of the regional committees. These regional committees, which have six members, are elected by the local councils in the provinces of Austria.12 Financial affairs are regulated by the Shura Council and the income of the IGGiÖ is a combination
www.derislam.at. www.schulamt-islam.at. 10 www.mjoe.at. 11 www.derislam.at. 12 http://www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa=showpage&pid=3 (accessed 12 May 2009). 8 9
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of donations, membership fees and Solidarbeitrag (solidarity fee) paid by teachers. Muslim associations exist throughout Austria,13 with approximately 260 being registered. There are no reliable details about the number of Muslims since this is not covered by the census statistics. The Alevis are represented by the Alevi Federation in Austria (Föderation alevitischer Kulturverbände), the Sunnis are united under the IGGiÖ, and the Shi’ites are represented by the Ahl-ul-Bayt Österreich. The number of Turkishspeaking associations (e.g, Islamische Föderation in Österreich (Milli Görus); Türkisch Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit in Österreich-ATIB,14 Union islamischer Kulturzentren;15 Dachorganisation Türkischer Kultur und Sportgemeinschaft) is presumably the highest, followed by Arab16 associations (e.g., Gesellschaft für Zusammenkunft der Kulturen; Liga Kultur; Schura Moschee) and a number of transcultural, supra-regional Muslim associations (e.g., Initiative muslimische ÖsterreicherInnen IMÖ,17 Kulturverein Al-Andalus,18 Liga Kultur Verein für Multi-Kulturellen Brückenbau).19 Bosnian Muslims are represented by the “Dachverband der Bosniaken in Österreich and Verein Bosnischer Muslime der hamefitischen Rechtsschule Gazi Husrevbeg. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are two mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district; Telfs, Tyrol) and a third is due to be finished in 2009 close to Vienna in Bad Vöslau (NÖ).The approximate number of prayer rooms is 250 spread throughout Austria, most of them in private buildings often combined with a tea room. The biggest mosque, with a minaret 32m high, was built in the 1980s in Vienna, financed by the king of Saudi Arabia. The construction of mosques and prayer rooms is an entitlement under the principle of freedom of religious practice, but is also subject to local building regulations. The construction of minarets
13 Schmiedinger, T., “Islam in Österreich”, in Kohl, A., S. Karner and D. Halper (eds) Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), p. 242. 14 www.deutsch.atib.at. 15 www.uikz.org. 16 www.aawleague.org. 17 www.islaminitiative.at. 18 www.andalus.at. 19 www.alnur.at.
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is regarded in law as a form of worship.20 Two Austrian provinces (Kärnten and Vorarlberg) have tightened their building regulations in such a way that, although there is no explicit prohibition on building mosques, in practice, applications face many legal difficulties and interminable negotiations. 5
Children’s Education
Under the Religious Education Act 1949 (sections 4.1 and 6.1), the state pays for Islamic education in state schools. Islamic education is taught in Austria in 2,109 schools by 381 teachers. There are eight inspectors who control and supervise the teachers in schools. The Religionsunterrichtsgesetz of 1949 (with additions and renewals) says that religious education (§ 2. (1)) is conducted in cooperation with and under the supervision of the specific recognised religious community. The curricula for religious education (hours of teaching and content) are announced by the federal minister but recognised religious communities have responsibility for content (Art § 7 d). Only teaching materials that do not conflict with civic education are permitted. There are six private Islamic schools in Vienna, which are financed by Islamic associations,21 According to research by the Islamic Schools Agency, about 47,000 pupils go to Islamic religious classes in schools, of whom 83.3% (39,160) attend primary and lower secondary schools for at least nine years, 8% (3,770) attend high schools and 8.7% (4,075) go to professional schools (BMHS, Berufsbildende mittlere und höhere Schulen). Most of the pupils follow an apprenticeship and only a very low and statistically untraceable percentage go to university. The Private University for Islamic Education (IRPA, Islamische Religionspädagogische Akademie)22 was founded in 1998 in Vienna by the IGGiÖ and is also paid for by the state. The curriculum lasts six semesters, leading to in a Bachelors degree, and the course can be attended by primary school teachers. The number of students who currently attend the IRPA is 120, and the number of graduates since
20 http://diepresse.com/home/recht/rechtallgemein/327607/index.do?_vl_ backlink=/home/recht/index.do (accessed 16 March 2009). 21 SOLMIT (Solidarisch miteinander, ‘solidarity with each other’) is an association for the integration of citizens of foreign origin and acts as sponsor of private Muslim schools. http://www.igwien.com/. 22 http://www.irpa.ac.at/ (accessed 10 December 2008).
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its establishment is approximately 100.23 After graduation they work as teachers of Islamic religious education in primary, secondary and special schools. The secular system in Austria means there is a strict separation between state and church and for this reason religious establishments are not expected to become public or state-run. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The University of Vienna has had a tradition of teaching Oriental Languages since 1535 and in 1674 Giovanni Podesta was permitted to teach the Turkish, Persian and Arabian languages there, as well as ‘Qur’anic law’.24 Since 2006, the University of Vienna has offered a Masters degree in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP)25 and this will be a required qualification for teaching religious education in Austrian high schools. The Masters course is linked to the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Science. The course lasts for four semesters and is currently attended by 50 students, six of whom are preparing to present their Masters thesis. Most of the students are either alumni of the IRPA, students from abroad (Turkey, Germany, Egypt) or students who grew up in Austria/Germany and attended high school. A Masters degree for imams will be offered by the University of Vienna from 2010. The target group are imams who have already trained in their homeland and want to come to Austria to work in the religious community there. In cooperation with the IGGiÖ, the imams will be taught mosque management, European politics, and financial and educational skills. A qualification in German language is a prerequisite. The courses will last for four semesters and will be accessible by full-time study or through evening classes. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The historic cemetery close to Graz provides evidence of an early encounter of Eastern and Western attitudes and respect for diversity.
Information provided by the IRPA, 20 December 2008. Aslan, E., “Islamunterricht und Europa”, in Heidrich-Blaha, R., M. Ley and R. Lohlker (eds), Islam in Europa. Favorita Papers 01/2007 (Vienna: Diplomatische Akademie, 2007), pp. 77–99. 25 http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/ (accessed 10 December 2008). 23
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For three decades, a section of the main Vienna cemetery has been reserved for Muslims where approximately 500 burials have taken place. A high proportion of most Turkish families still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland for burial, but every year some 100 Muslims are buried in Austria and, as burials according to the Islamic rite are permitted, this number will increase. An Islamic cemetery has recently been established in the 23rd district of Vienna and another is due to be opened in Vorarlberg.26 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Catholic religious services are provided in state institutions and the right to practise one’s faith freely extends to chaplaincy services in state institutions for all religious communities. The Islamic chaplaincy service is provided and governed by the IGGiÖ and the chaplains (SeelsorgerInnen) are selected by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ. Islamic chaplains are required to have a qualification from an Islamic higher education establishment or adequate practical experience in chaplaincy work recognised by the IGGiÖ. Islamic chaplains have free access to state institutions, such as prisons, hospitals and the army. There is no permanent imam for the army, but two volunteer imams work in Vienna and Salzburg. Since 2004 there has been a prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna27 and the Austrian army seeks to ensure that Muslims do their military service there. The Islamischer Besuchs—und Seelsorgedienst (IBS, Islamic Visit and Chaplaincy Service) was founded in 2000 by the (IGGiÖ). It coordinates chaplaincy issues (for the army and prisons, as well as hospitals) and the 2006 census shows that 6,160 patients in the Vienna General Hospital made use of its services. There are two permanent IBS posts, in the Vienna General Hospital and the Franz Josef Hospital, and other medical institutions are visited by request. Members of IBS staff must be theologically and personally qualified and are obliged to attend courses of instruction and continuing professional development. The organisation now has three regular members of staff, six on call and many volunteers. In prisons,
http://www.derislam.at/ (10 December 2008). http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/index.do?direct =351928&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index.do&selChannel= (accessed 13 March 2009). 26
27
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chaplaincy is increasingly in demand and there are ongoing efforts to formalise the presence of an imam responsible for state prisons. The total number of prisoners in Austria is 8,248, of whom 1,198 (14.5%) declare themselves to be Muslims.28 9
Religious Festivals
Islamic festivals have no legal status in Austrian law and there are no state regulations concerning daily prayers, Ramadan or Hajj. Where necessary, employees must make private arrangements with their employers to make it possible for them to fulfil their religious obligations. Since April 2006, the IGGiÖ has been negotiating with labour market partners about the recognition of Islamic holidays but no satisfying compromise has yet been found. School pupils may apply for days off at school for Islamic festivities. 10
Halal Food
As yet there are no halal abattoirs, but in Turkish and Arab stores it is possible to buy halal food. Ritual slaughter is legally connected to the fundamental right of freedom of religious practice and thus comes under Article 14 StGG, article 63, paragraph 2 Staatsvertrag of St. Germain and article 9, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 1999, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment that halal slaughter was not forbidden, referring to both Austrian law and Article 9 of the ECHR. According to federal legislation on animal protection passed in 2004, an official licence is required for ritual slaughter including the provision that the animals are stunned instantly before.29 11
Dress Codes
The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in employment or public service has not yet been the subject of a legal ruling. Concerning schools, the Federal Ministry for Education,
Information provided by the prisons directorate on 1 December 2008. Potz, R. and B. Schinkele, Religionsrecht im Überblick (Vienna: Facultas Verlag, 2007). 28
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Arts and Culture has decided that wearing a headscarf for religious reasons comes under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion and is therefore permitted. Dress in physical education and swimming lessons may also comply with religious rules and regulations.30 12
Publication and Media
There is no Islamic newspaper in Austria, but the IGGiÖ sends information bulletins to its members. There is a monthly Turkish newspaper named Yeni Vatan Gazetesi which focuses on Turks living in Austria and discusses Austrian affairs as well as global events. The Islamic presence on radio and television is uneven and centres around certain topics, such as Ramadan, the Islamic headscarf debate and festivals, but there is no Islamic radio station. No specifically Muslim television programmes are broadcast on Austrian television (ÖRF). Islamic matters are covered by religious programmes such as Orientierung, Kreuz und Quer, and current topics are discussed in various debates, news and reports, such as Zeit im Bild, Offen Gesagt, Bundesland heute, Thema and Im Zentrum. A study of the Austrian Islamic Internet presence shows that the websites can be classified under the following headings: 1. 2. 3. 4.
Information about how to lead an Islamic life Communicating a coordinated Islamic stance. Teaching Islamic education, knowledge and tradition The views of specific associations, individuals or institutions.31
Examples are: http://www.kismetonline.at/; http://www.carima.at/; http://www.derislam.at/; www.ummah.net; www.ibikuz.net; www .ahmadiyya.at (all accessed 14 December 2008).
Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in Schneiders, T. and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime im Rechtsstaat (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). 31 http://www.arabic-islamic.org/documents/islam_in_internet_islam_in_austria .pdf (accessed 17 December 2008). 30
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Family Law
The majority of legal decisions relevant to Islam concern family law. Since a fundamental decision of the Supreme Court (SZ59/128/1986), the ban on forced marriage or polygamy is seen as part of the ordre public, and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law is not recognised. Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, but this is a traditional rather than a legal act. Marriage contracts must be signed in a civil registry office in order to be legal. The legal and court system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in any litigation. 14 Public Opinion and Debate The most important public discussion concerning Islam was about the building of a mosque close to Vienna in 2008, and compromises were found which all parties could accept. Recent polls show that Austrians have a mostly positive or neutral attitude towards the integration of Muslims, while 24% express sceptical opinions and 16% disapprove of attempts at integration efforts. There is a generally high level of acceptance of religious symbols in public places (only 20% against), but there is a clear dislike of ‘religious clothing’, with 40% of those interviewed disapproving of, for example, wearing hijab in public buildings.32 15
Major Cultural Events
There are no typically Austrian-Muslim events, but the major Muslim festivals such as ‘Ashura (Martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn), Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), Laylat al-Isra (the Prophet’s ascension), Ramadan, Laylat al-Qadr (the night of refection), ‘Id al-Adha and al-Hijra (New Year) are celebrated partly in public with the participation of public figures and politicians. For example, the mayor of Vienna is invited to iftar (fast breaking) at the end of Ramadan. 32 Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich. Studie im Auftrag des BMI. und SIAK (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006).
BELGIUM Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz1 1
Muslim Populations
During its colonial period Belgium had little contact with the Muslim world. The Muslims in Belgium are primarily the descendents of the migrant workers who began to arrive from the Mediterranean basin from the 1960s. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their families lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000 by 1985. The exact number of people of Muslim culture or Islamic faith living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the population’s ethnic and religious ties. Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approximation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign nationals. Between 1990 and 2002, however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim population now have Belgian citizenship. The latest generally accepted estimates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s population.2 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim population. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendents) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans, and Iranians), and Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Senegal and Mali).
1 Dr Ural Manço is a senior researcher at the Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, in Brussels, where he leads the research team “Migrations, multiculturalité et appartenances ethnoreligieuses”. Meryem Kanmaz has finished her PhD in political and social sciences at the Centre for Islam in Europe, University of Ghent. 2 The estimate is based on data from the National Institute of Statistics (foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data of naturalisations by country of origin).
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The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis. The Shi’is are very much in the minority, but there is evidence that some Sunnis have been converting to Shi’ism since the 1990s. With regard to the Sunnis, those from Morocco belong to the Maliki rite, whereas the Turkish Muslims are Hanafis (although some Kurds follow the Shafi’i school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds (Alevism is a form of heterodox Shi’ism specific to Anatolia). The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the BrusselsCapital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brussels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for 17% of the Brussels Region’s population. This makes Brussels, which is the capital of both Belgium and the European Union, one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flanders are Muslims. This northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country contains some 39% of the country’s Muslims, who are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wallonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). The average age of Belgium’s Muslim population is lower than the national average and it is generally estimated that a third are under the age of 18. Despite a noticeable improvement in the socio-economic situation of some of members of the Muslim community since the turn of the century, when it comes to higher education, home ownership and self-employment, a large proportion of Muslims continues to grapple with social problems such as failing at school and unemployment (a corollary of discriminatory hiring practices). Those immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a strong population of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels. As a result, candidates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all the political parties and in all the elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, several ministerial positions in regional governments and
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several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life. However, none of these politicians favour their religious identity over their ethno-national identification (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that the Muslim members of the electorate tend to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade, but none of these initiatives has succeeded in getting an official elected.3 2
Islam and the State
Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on constitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitution establishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions actually reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality towards religious affairs, which differs from the concept of laïcité or secularism that assumes a strict separation between the State and religion(s). Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance various religions. Six denominations (in addition to the non-denominational Ethics Movement) are recognised today. They are the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam, and Judaism. Belgium granted Islam official recognition through a law passed on 19 July 1974. In order for a religion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated, who will become its spokesman with regard to the religion’s secular administration and the representative of its followers. The federal government takes responsibility for the salaries of the recognised faiths’ ministers, including those of its chaplains in the prisons and the army. The upkeep of religious buildings is borne by the municipalities or regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital). The state broadcasting networks set aside time slots for religious broadcasts, while public schools must provide religious education in the recognised religions. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are on the payrolls of the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose powers include education and cultural affairs. 3 The best known of these Islamic political parties is the Brussels based Parti des Jeunes musulmans led by the convert Jean-François Abdullah Bastin: http://www.mvjm.be/.
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The need to develop a new form of organisation for Islam, which does not have a structured clergy, that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant factor in relations between the state and its Muslim communities. Another difficulty is the need to find a balance amongst the many ethnic and philosophical strands represented in the Muslim population. Because they lacked a ‘representative’ head of the faith, the Muslim communities could not access state financing until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed. In 1998, the government gave the latter the right to hold elections to set up a definitive executive body for the Islamic faith, which was called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium or EMB (Executif des Musulmans de Belgique/Executief van de Moslims van België). However, the creation of this body did not put an end to the search for recognition. The EMB has gone through various internal crises, the causes of which are linked as much to repeated attempts by the Belgian government and foreign (Turkish and Moroccan) diplomatic authorities to meddle in its affairs as to personal friction and competition between ethnic groups (Moroccan and Turkish) and ideological movements. The second election imposed on the Muslim community by the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in March 2005 to elect a new EMB (which was largely boycotted by Belgium’s Moroccan Muslims), and its political and legal aftermath, have led to a situation where the recognition process is totally paralysed. As a result, the salaries of the imams of the recognised mosques are not being paid and the budget allocation for the Islamic faith, which rose from €500,000 in 2001 to close to €7 million in 2006, is likely to be frozen in 2009. The Federal Government’s slowness to take account of these developments has forced local authorities to take palliative and ad-hoc management measures, and the municipal administrations have filled the political and legal vacuum left by the Belgian state. As a result, the municipalities have dealt with certain matters concerning the organisation of Islamic religious practices (mosque settlement, cemeteries, religious festivals such as ‘Id al-Adha, halal food in public schools, etc.). Some policies have been driven by electoral motivations and others even reflect a certain populist demagoguery and Islamophobia.4 For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence, see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “De la pathologie au traitement: La gestion municipale de l’islam et des musulmans de Belgique”, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, no. 33 (2002), pp. 57–88; Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From 4
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Main Muslim Organisations
Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, the EMB (Place Rouppe, 16/3, 1000 Brussels, tel. +32 2 648 35 60, fax. +32 2 626 15 99, http://www.embnet.be/), there are a great many associations and federations of all sizes making up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.5 These associations are organised mainly along ethnic lines. Among the Turks there is a small number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) expressing competing ideological and religious tendencies, and among the Moroccans there is a host of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denominational associations, that cater, for example, for young people or Islamic teachers of religion. The best-organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement is the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet (Chaussée d’Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 218 57 55, fax. +32 2 223 01 52, http://www.belcikadiyanet.be). The Presidency was founded in 1923 to promote a modern, national vision of Hanafi Sunni Islam subordinate to Kemalist secularism. Today, Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turkish Islamic group is the religious political movement Millî Görüs (lit. ‘denominational vision’) represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federasy onu) (Chaussée de Haecht, 125, 1030 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 219 80 79, fax. +32 2 218 20 49, http://www.fibif.be), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973. Millî Görüs maintains ties with non-Turkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium
conflict to co-operation between Muslims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaerbeek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123; Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra [Muslims in Ghent: the Development of worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres] (Ghent: Academia Press, forthcoming 2009). 5 For an overview of the different networks, movements and organisations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fondamentalistes en Belgique”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/2008/issue1/jv3no1a5.html (accessed 16 May 2009); Kanmaz, Moslims in Gent.
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belong to this group. There are some other Turkish Islamic communities, but they are markedly smaller. The Islamic reform movement known as the Gülen movement (Boulevard Auguste Reyers 207–209/3, 1030 Brussels, tel. +32 2 736 90 11, fax. +32 2 742 30 11, http:// www.idp-pdi.be) is the third major group. It runs six primary or secondary schools (the Dutch-language Lucerna Colleges and French-language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres. Its vision centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic’. The Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations (Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) forms the heterodox Shi’i variant of Turkish Islam in Belgium and presents a humanist culture. Moroccan religious associations and mosques in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. Groupings do exist, but it is more a matter of individual practising Muslims who identify with these religious and ideological orientations than lines taken by the mosques that they attend. The majority of Belgium’s immigrants from Morocco and their descendents feel close to the Moroccan monarchy and its form of traditional Islam. Some Moroccans subscribe to the principles of the pietistic Tabligh movement. Other believers—as a rule educated second-generation immigrants—identify with what they call the ‘reformist’ tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood,6 fewer with Wahhabism or the more recent strictness of Salafis with roots in Morocco. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques have formed federations by province. The Antwerp union, Unie des Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA) (Plantin Moretuslei 202, 2018 Antwerp, Belgium, tel.+32 3 235 48 33, umiva.vzw@antwerpen. be) for the Dutch-speaking part and the Brussels-Brabant union, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles-Brabant Wallon (UMBB) (rue François-Joseph Navez, 6064, 1000 Brussels, Belgium,
[email protected]) for the French-speaking part of the country, are the oldest. In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (FUM). The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique (ICC) (Parc du Cinquantenaire, 14, 1040 Brussels, Belguim,tel. +32 2 735 21 73, http://www.centreislamique. be), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brussels 6 For a recent analyse of this movement in Belgium and in Europe, see Maréchal, B., (2008), The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
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since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’s Arab Islamic stage. It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. Although no longer officially recognised by the Belgian authorities, the ICC continues to have religious authority within certain parts of the North African population, and also for the majority of converts. The Centre is asked by these groups to provide statements of religious advice (fatwa), grant conversion certificates and organise Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium, all self-financed and having the formal legal status of non-profit associations.7 Flanders accounts for half of the houses of worship, with 167 mosques or prayer houses. There are 89 in Wallonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half of the mosques are attended and managed by Moroccans. The Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other Muslim groups. Only four Islamic houses of worship in Belgium are purpose built or retrofitted with the classical architecture of a mosque, with one or two minarets and a dome. The others are prayer houses converted from shops or industrial premises. Municipal regulations prevent the amplified broadcasting of calls to prayer. In 2005, the authorities published certain criteria for the official recognition of local Muslim communities. To be eligible for state support, a mosque must have at least 250 members and observe the Belgian constitution and human rights, and the Belgian security services must investigate the activities of the house of worship in question. In June 2007, the Walloon regional government recognised 43 mosques (26 Turkish and 17 Moroccan) on the basis of these criteria out of a total of 48 admissible applications. The mosques that failed to gain recognition were allegedly rejected after receiving an unfavourable report by the state security services. Recognition by the Walloon Region entails the regional authorities’ commitment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for
7 http://www.kbs-frb.be/publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033 (accessed 16 May 2009).
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paying the salaries of the 50 imams who officiate regularly in these 43 mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). At the end of 2007, the Brussels-Capital Region accepted nine out of 28 admissible applications for mosques to be recognised and the Flemish government recognised seven of the 32 admissible applications filed at the end of 2007 and in early 2008. The Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flanders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’ (inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the official language of the mosque’s administration. 5
Children’s Education
The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer the possibility of taking two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions, or non-denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and French-speaking public education since 1975. The teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training (they did not have the requisite training) and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutch-speaking and three French-speaking inspectors) were not appointed until 2003 and, even today, close to 700 Islamic religion teachers do not have a clear occupational status. One can thus assume that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments and pensions compared with other teachers within the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools. These courses are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body). Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools that are eligible for public financing provided that they meet certain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School run by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels, founded in 1989. At the time, its creation triggered caused major political and media reaction. A second initiative was taken in September 2007 with the opening of the Avicenne Islamic Secondary
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School for only a score or so of pupils in a borough of Brussels (Molenbeek) with a large Muslim population. Besides the Islamic religion classes given in public schools, and sometimes even in Flemish Catholic schools in areas with large Muslim immigrant populations, and these rare cases of Islamic schools in Brussels, all the Belgian mosques offer Qur’anic study classes in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Dutch on Wednesday afternoons or Saturdays. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Almost all the imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. Whilst their level of religious training is satisfactory, their French or Dutch language skills are very poor and, most importantly, they are not familiar with the socio-cultural context of Belgian society or the economic, social, and cultural conditions in which the Muslim populations of immigrant descent live. The situation of the imams in the Moroccan mosques is more complex. Some imams from Moroccan rural areas do not necessarily have indepth religious training, while those who are theologically well-trained received their training in Saudi or other institutions that preach a strict form of Islam and this can create problems with regard to adapting to the European context. More and more voices from the ranks of the younger generations of Moroccans are calling for imams trained in Europe. The public authorities became aware of this reality after the events of 11 September 2001.8 Since then, a few small pilot projects to train Islamic religious personnel have been run. In the French-speaking part of the country, the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) has been offering courses since 2007 for anyone who is interested—Muslim and non-Muslim. In the first year, most of the 50 students who attend the courses were teachers of Islamic religion in public schools.9 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organized Secularity and the State’10 organised training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of
8 http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/05)_Pictures,_documents_ and_external_sites/09)_Publications/PUB_1694_TrainingImamsEurope.pdf (accessed 16 May 2009). 9 http://www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 10 http://oracle.cifop.be/.
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federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.11 In Flanders, the minister of education has commissioned research from Antwerp University’s Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies (Centrum voor Migratie en Interculturele Studies) into Muslim theological training and retraining for Islamic officials, as well as for imams from abroad (this research was ongoing in 2008). The Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Bruxelles) has long offered theology courses in Arabic in order to train Islamic personnel. More recently, a certain number of Islamic academies have been created in both Arabic and Turkish-speaking circles, but none of these initiatives is likely to receive official recognition.12 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are sent back to their homelands for burial. In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by the municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine such cemeteries in Flanders,13 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are of the Muslim faith) for years. The prison chaplains have enjoyed recognised legal status since 2005 and eighteen of them draw salaries for this work. The hospital counsellors are not paid by the state.
http://oracle.cifop.be/#form (accessed 16 May 2009). For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), http://www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.alkhayria.com/index.htm. 13 http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. 11 12
belgium 9
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Religious Festivals
Muslim religious holidays are not observed officially. The most problematic issue when it comes to Islamic holidays is that of the sacrifice. Slaughtering animals at home is strictly illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Muslims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of ‘Id al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where EMB-approved halal butchers officiate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ carcasses to be collected, but organisational set-backs emerge in certain municipalities each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The political and media debate about giving Muslims an official holiday to celebrate the sacrifice of Ibrahim arises every year with no decision being reached. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, and this is tolerated by the authorities to a certain extent. Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of the two main Islamic holidays (‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr). 10
Halal Food
The halal label for food only partially reflects the reality. The EMB is allowed to grant a certificate to Muslim butchers who request it, but does not have the resources or the authority to issue a halal label for food products (meat and others), or to control the supply chains or the production processes. 11
Dress Codes
The issue of wearing headscarves in school has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and discussions continue to be passionate. The wearing of a headscarf or hijab still is not regulated in the country’s constituent parts (Communities and Regions) and the governments leave school principals and employers free to decide in this matter. Women in white-collar positions are banned from wearing headscarves on the job in both the private and public sectors, with the
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exception of some rare cases where hijab is tolerated, but one finds female factory workers and cleaners wearing headscarves. Three major towns in Flanders (Antwerp, Ghent, and Lier) explicitly banned the wearing of the headscarf in 2007 and 2008 by female civil servants working in contact with the public. In the French-speaking part of the country, the school rules of 90% of public secondary schools and subsidised Catholic schools prohibit hats, hijab and ‘obvious’ signs of religious affiliation on school premises. Yet, according to national legislation and the international human rights conventions that Belgium has ratified, the wearing of headscarves may be prohibited only for safety reasons or to avoid proselytising. Private sector employers and the Flemish- and French-speaking public authorities alike hide behind the risks of proselytism to justify their prohibition of hijab. Wearing hijab for photographs for identity documents is allowed by the Belgian authorities if the face is visible between the forehead and the chin. 12
Publications and Media
There are several Islamic publishing houses and book stores in Belgium which sell mostly traditionalist or Salafi publications. They include AlImen (Brussels), Editions al-Hadith, Al Iqra, etc. In addition, some French publishers also distribute publications such as Editions le Savoir, Editions Tawhid or Maison d’Ennour in French-speaking areas. They are various Belgian Muslim websites, including www.islambelgique.com, http://islamic-events-belgium.blogspot.com and http://www.hadith.be. A quota of time for Muslim programming is legally available on Flemish and French language state radio and television channels, but this is not used to the full by the Muslim population. The paralysis and the disorganisation of the EMB and the difficulty in finding qualified Muslim professionals undoubtedly go a long way towards explaining this situation. 13 No data.
Family Law
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14 Public Opinion and Debate The image of Islam and Muslims remains negative in Belgian society. According to an investigation carried out by the Institute for Social and Political Research (ISPO) of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) and published in January 2008, 48% of the Flemish population believe that the values of Islam constitute a threat to Europe, and 37% believe that the majority of Muslims do not respect the European culture and lifestyle. 15 No data.
Major Cultural Events
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Mirnes Kovač 1 1
Muslim Populations
According to the last official census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves to be ‘Muslims’ by nationality.2 Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent, this figure is usually taken as indicative of the number of adherents of Islam. Similarly, most Croats are usually considered Roman Catholic while most Serbs are considered Orthodox Christians. ‘Muslims’ were recognised as one of the Yugoslav nationalities in the late 1960s. The name ‘Muslims’ was replaced by ‘Bosniaks’ as the national name for Bosnian Muslims from 1993, although before the 1992–95 war, a significant number of Muslims declared themselves to be ‘Yugoslavs’. Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within B&H have significantly changed. A new census proposed for 2011, which msy include questions on ethnicity, religion or language, is a sensitive political issue and is opposed by some Bosniak and Croat politicians. They fear that it would put an official stamp on the new ethnic map resulting from the killings and expulsions of the 1992–95 war and the obstruction of refugee returns, thus ‘legitimising’ ethnic cleansing particularly in the Republika Srpska entity, where many areas were completely cleansed of non-Serbs. Estimates of B&H’s current population range from around 3.8 million up to 4.6 million people, and suggest that more than one million
1 Mirnes Kovac is the editor of the bi-monthly Preporod Islamic Magazine, published by the Supreme Council of Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH). He graduated in Islamic Studies from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and has an MA in International Relations from the University of Sussex, UK. He is the author of Islam: Globalni izazov? (Islam as a Global Challenge) Zenica: IPA, 2004. 2 Federal Office of Statistics of Federation of B&H, available at http://www.fzs.ba/ Dem/Popis/PopisiStanB.htm (accessed 16 May 2009).
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Bosnians now live abroad.3 The CIA World Factbook estimates that in 2008 B&H had a population of 4.6 million people, of which 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others.4 While some sources indicate that there were sporadic contacts with Muslims before the Ottoman conquest, it is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies. Bosnian Muslims are mainly descended from Christians (Catholics, Orthodox, or adherents of the extinct Bosnian Church) who converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman rule from the mid-fifteenth century. Bosnia was under the Ottomans until 1878, and then became part of the AustroHungarian Empire until 1918, and later a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45), and then Communist Yugoslavia (1945–92).5 A referendum on independence from Yugoslavia, already declared by Slovenia and Croatia, was held in Bosnia in February 1992 and boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs whose forces, assisted by Belgrade, initiated a bloody war in 1992–95. For about a year during 1993–94, the army of B&H also had to fight Croat forces on most fronts. In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats signed an agreement creating a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of B&H. After the Srebrenica genocide6 ( July 1995), the Dayton peace agreement was signed in December 1995. The Dayton Agreement institutionalised the division of B&H into a Bosniak and Croat dominated entity, the Federation of B&H (51% of the territory), and a Serb dominated entity, Republika Srpska (49%), with the strategic town Brčko in the north as a constituent district. Estimates of the death toll of the war have ranged from 25,000 to 300,000, with about 200,000 being the accepted figure until recently
3 Agency for statistics of B&H, Estimated data as of 30 June 2007. See http://www .bhas.ba/new/ (accessed 16 May 2009). 4 World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/print/bk.html (accessed 16 May 2009). 5 Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999). 6 According to the ruling of the International Court of Justice the crime committed in Srebrenica in July, 1995 was named genocide in the article 5 which states: “[The Court] finds that Serbia has violated the obligation to prevent genocide, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in respect of the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995.” See: ICJ, Press Release 2007/8, February, 27th 2008, “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)”, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1 (accessed 19 May 2009).
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(2007), when a three-year investigation put the total number of victims at 97,207, of which 64,036 were Bosniaks, i.e., Muslims.7 The study revealed that more than 83% of civilian deaths were Bosniaks, rising to nearly 95% in Eastern Bosnia. During the conflict, more than two million people fled their homes (including over one million to neighbouring states and the West).8 Refugees and displaced persons, mainly Muslims, faced many obstacles when returning to their pre-war homes. Refugee NGOs say that, though more than 300,000 accommodation units have been rebuilt, there are still 145,000 families without housing, some 43,000 families still wish to return to their pre-war places of residence, and 7,000 persons still live in collective centres in B&H.9 Bosnian Muslims are Sunnis who follow the Hanafi school. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known but is estimated to be a few thousands. Contrary to general belief, they control no mosques. There are very few Shi’a Muslims and no Shi’a mosques, although there are pro-Shi’a associations. For many secular Bosniaks, their Muslim identity has much more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. There are no reliable data on active religious practice. 2
Islam and the State
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state has defined its relations with the churches and religious organisation in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in B&H passed in 2004.10 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal 7 Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Research Results, Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, June, 2007, available at http://www.idc.org.ba/prezentacija/ nacionalnosti.htm (accessed 16 May 2009). 8 Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Research Results (Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civilians — killed and missing by ethnicity, PPT presentation, page 36.), Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, June, 2007, available at http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/ research_results.htm (accessed 16 May 2009). 9 RTV Mostar, “Još oko 145 hiljada porodica nema krov nad glavom”, 27 October 2008, available at http://sirlbih.org/Mediji%2027-10-08.html (accessed 7 April 2009). 10 The complete text of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations is available at http://www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/ file/Biblioteka/zakoni/bh/ZAKON%20O%20SLOBODI%20VJERE/ZAKON%20 o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf (accessed 23 March 2009).
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status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. The Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church have signed agreements with the state. The Islamic Community in B&H (hereafter ICBH), after initial hesitation, is preparing to sign a similar agreement. The ICBH takes active part in the Inter-religious Council of B&H (MRV BiH), formed in 1997 to promote inter-religious dialogue, justice, peace and reconciliation. The MRV BiH only recently (in 2008) started receiving regular financial support for its activities from the government. Individual religious communities, including the ICBH, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are however regularly supported by public funds. However the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding for other expenses too. In post-war Bosnia the greater presence of religion in the public arena is clearly seen. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state. This process has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the post-war period, the ICBH has been strongly and regularly criticised by the media, often in a manner it finds unacceptable. Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the ICBH are regularly invited to attend official meetings, state ceremonials and celebrations on all levels. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The main Muslim organisation in the country is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH) (Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel.: +387 33 533 000, www.rijaset.ba). The ICBH is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own. The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”11
11
Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina, ed. Rijaset Islamske Zajednice
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The ICBH is recognised by the state as the institution that has traditionally represented Islam in B&H. It is independent in the regulation of its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly through waqfs, membership fees, zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, qurban, the revenue of its profit-generating agencies, gifts, legacies, etc. The organisational structure of the ICBH consists of jama‘ahs (community of at least 100 households), majlises (usually a group of not less than seven jama‘ahs in one municipality or city), muftiates (mufti offices, eight in Bosnia and three in Slovenia, Croatia and Sanjak), the Riyasat (Rijaset, main executive body of the ICBH), Rais al-ulama (the President of the Riyasat and the Grand Mufti or supreme authority in the ICBH), the Council of the ICBH (Sabor or the ICBH’s assembly) and the Constitutional Court. Since 1993 the ICBH has been headed by Dr Mustafa Cerić.12 The Riyasat comprises legal, financial, and faith and education departments, the El-Kalem publishing centre, the Preporod bi-weekly Islamic newspaper, Zakah Office, the Waqf Directorate, the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, MINA (Muslim news agency), the Gazi Husrev Bey Library, etc. The Association of Ulama (Ilmija) runs activities that directly affect the work and social status of imams and teachers of Islamic religious classes in public schools. The Association publishes its own quarterly magazine, Novi Muallim, and organises seminars, symposiums and lectures. Several Sufi orders are active, mainly Qadiris and Naqshbandis. The Tariqah Centre (Tarikatski centar) in Sarajevo is in charge of the coordination of Sufi orders as part of the ICBH. In addition to the ICBH, there are many relatively small faith-based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others are cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim charitable society Merhamet (founded in 1913, banned 1946, and re-established 1990). During the war, it opened many branches throughout the Bosnian diaspora and collected humanitarian aid. Two of the main Muslim women’s NGOs are Nahla (founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, www.nahla.ba) and Kewser, (founded 1994 in Zenica,
u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Articles 1–4, available at http://www .rijaset.ba/en/images/stories/Constitution.pdf (accessed 16 May 2009). 12 See Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561.
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www.kewser-zehra.com.ba). The latter publishes the Zehra monthly family magazine (circulation ca. 3,000).13 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are approximately 1,700 mosques and masjids14 in B&H, all run by the ICBH. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslims communities have a mosque or masjid either dating from Ottoman times or constructed by the local residents. In larger towns such as Sarajevo, Zenica, Bugojno, etc., a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after being destroyed or damaged during the war, while others are new builds. The ICBH reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs, 4 zawias, 37 turbes and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.15 In at least one case (Divič), an Orthodox church was constructed on the site of a destroyed mosque and the ICBH recently paid the Serbian Orthodox Church to move it. The first attempt to start reconstruction of the sixteenth-century Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka on 7 May 2001 ended tragically with one of the attending Muslim believers being stoned to death by violent Serbian youths who were trying to stop the reconstruction. During the last ‘Id al-Adha, a mosque in south eastern Republika Srpska was completely burned. The Republika Srpska authorities claimed that this was due to faulty electrical installations, while the Muslim community believes that it was arson. 5
Children’s Education
Confessional religious education is optional in public schools and is offered, to all practical purposes, in primary schools for only the three main religious communities. In secondary schools, it is offered only in
13 Magazine circulation figures are either stated in the magazines or obtained through direct telephone inquiries to editors. 14 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid ) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part-time service and in most cases without a minaret. 15 Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476.
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the Federation of B&H, usually in the first and second year for one hour per week. Islamic teachers are trained and approved by the ICBH but employed by public schools. For years some local and international organisations led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been trying to introduce a one-year mandatory non-denominational religious studies course, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, with limited success. Progress is being made but the course is still at an experimental stage. Religious education has also been recently introduced as an option in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo. The ICBH runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behram-bey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko; Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Kara¶oz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions of imam and religious instructor training into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools, and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10–15% opt for Islamic studies. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The Islamic Community has three major higher educational institutions. The Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fin.ba) in Sarajevo (founded in 1977) today offers three different study programmes: Islamic theology, Religious education teacher training, and Imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. The faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools, and in 2006 acquired the status of university faculties. The Faculty in Zenica (www.ipf.unze.ba) now
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offers three-year programmes in three different departments, leading to BAs in Islamic Pedagogy, Social Pedagogy and Pre-school Education. The Faculty in Bihać (www.ipf.unbi.ba) has developed similarly. The faculties in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać are associate institutions of the universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.16 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Separate cemeteries for the different religious communities have been standard practice for a very long time. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new Shahid graveyards were designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military service for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is headed by the military mufti (established in 1999), who is nominated by the Rais al-ulama. The military mufti, appoints the military imams and chief imams, subject to the approval of the Rais al-ulama. While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly visits and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centers, mainly by the local branches of the ICBH. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available. 9
Religious Festivals
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet have a law pertaining to public holiday, but two ‘ids or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catholic and 16 For more on Islamic education in Bosnia see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009).
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Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in B&H. Both religious and secular media cover the celebrations of bayram. State television broadcasts live from the Begova mosque in Sarajevo, where ‘id prayers are led and the khutba is delivered by the Rais al-ulama or his deputy and local TV stations often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayram and traditional celebrations. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram receptions for public and diplomatic personalities. The second day of Ramadan bayram is also designated the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’ ) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion martyrs’ cemeteries are visited, flowers laid, and commemorative programmes organised by the local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ‘id celebration is famous for its rich Bayram meal (tur. Bayram sofra). 10
Halal Food
There are a number of halal abbatoirs throughout B&H. In February 2006, the ICBH established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turali-begova 39, 75000 Tuzla, http://www.halal.ba), which certifies the compliance of processes and products with Islamic rules and the Halal Standards Rulebook. Generally speaking, consumer awareness of halal obligations is low. 11
Dress Codes
There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, although there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in employment. After the 1992–95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who incline to the Salafi interpretation of Islam, wear niqab, although it is has not traditionally been very common in Bosnian Muslim tradition since its ban in 1949. 12
Publication and Media
The oldest printed periodical is Glasnik (the Herald), a bi-monthly official journal of the ICBH (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the ICBH biweekly Preporod
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(founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www.preporod.com), which covers all the activities of the ICBH as well as Muslim affairs in the wider European region and world news concerning Islam and Muslims. The ICBH publishes the annual Takvim, a hijri calendar with accompanying articles on current issues in religion, culture and society. The Association of Ulama publishes its own education quarterly magazine, Novi Muallim. The Islamic faculties and madrasas have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). Two independent Islamic magazines are published in Zenica: Novi Horizonti (founded in 1997, circulation around 3,000) and pro-Salafi Saff (founded in 1998, circulation around 5,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishes Zbornik FIN-a, an annual scholarly collection of papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of over 10,000 oriental manuscripts) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which included studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodical, Šebi arus (first published in 1982). 13
Family Law
Since the abolition of the Shari’a courts in 1946, only civil marriages are valid in law, and the usual practice is that after a civil marriage contract is registered with the municipal authorities, a religious marriage, or so-called Shari’a marriage, is conducted in the presence of a local imam, usually in the mosque. This procedure is recommended by the ICBH authorities at all levels. The same applies to inheritance: only civil courts have jurisdiction in the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon the death of an individual. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The recent introduction of Islamic education in kindergartens in Sarajevo sparked heated debate in the secularly oriented media, even though the law provides for religious education in kindergartens. Similar debates
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were raised when plans for building of a new mosque in Sarajevo were revealed. The issue of Salafism and Wahhabism has been a regular subject of debate since the mid-1990s, but the controversy has recently subsided and given way to a debate on Islamophobia. 15
Major Cultural Events
Certain religious festivals attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbouring countries at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer linked in local legends to miraculous events. The most important frstival is Ajvatovica, a yearly gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s cave) near Kladanj, Lastavica near Zenica, and the Musalla plateu near Sanski Most. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and nasheeds are organised throughout the country by associations such as Selam and Kewser on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov (the Musk of the Prophet) is organized annually by the women’s association, Kewser, in memory of Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, who is very much revered by pious Bosnian Muslim women. The Sufi orders have their own central annual gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj, at the spring of the Buna river, in early May. Since the Bosnian war of 1992–95 and the genocide in Srebrenica, 11 July is commemorated as Srebrenica day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayers ( janazah) are said at the Memorial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.17
17 As a sign of recognition of Srebrenica massacre as genocide the European Parliament passed the Resolution on January, 7th 2009., proclaiming 11th July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0027&language=EN (accessed 19 May 2009).
BULGARIA Ina Merdjanova1 1
Muslim Populations
At the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans conquered the disintegrating medieval Bulgarian kingdom. Subsequently, Islam spread through the mass resettlement of Anatolian Turks, on the one hand, and through the conversion of the local Christian population, on the other. Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when Bulgaria gained territorial autonomy. A mass exodus of Muslims followed. In 1881, an estimated 578,000 Muslims still lived in Bulgaria, comprising 28.8% of the total population.2 In 1900, the number of Muslims was 643,300, or 17.18% of the population, while in 1946 the number of Muslims had risen to 938,418, although in terms of percentage of the population, they were only 13.3%.3 According to the 2001 census, there are 966,978 Muslims in Bulgaria, comprising 12.2% of the population.4 The majority Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanafi school. An earlier census (1992), which also included data on the population by ethnic and sectarian affiliation, indicated that 7.7% of Muslims were Alevis (also called Aliani or Kizilbashi), a heterodox sect considered by some authors to be Shi’ite. In terms of ethnic affiliation, the Turks are concentrated in the south-east and north-east of Bulgaria and account for 75.3% of all Muslims in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule), also known as Pomaks, are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope mountain in southern Bulgaria and make up 13.5%; the Roma (dispersed throughout the whole country) amount to 10.5%, some 40% of whom are Muslims. The tiny Tatar community has some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. 1 Dr Ina Merdjanova is Director of the Centre for Interreligious Dialogue and Conflict Prevention at the Scientific Research Department of Sofia University “St. Kl. Ohridski”. She holds a PhD in philosophy of religion and publishes on religion in eastern Europe. 2 Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 71. 3 http://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. 4 http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm, accessed 17 May 2009.
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The 2001 census indicated that Muslims are the majority population in Kurdzhali district in south-east Bulgaria (69.9%) and in Razgrad district in north-eastern Bulgaria (53.7%). Most Muslims live in rural areas, and have been seriously affected by the economic crisis following the collapse of Communism. The results of the two censuses showed that between 1992 and 2001 the number of Muslims decreased by 143,317. This has been explained by the emigration of Muslims to more prosperous countries (Turkey and various Western countries, and very rarely to Muslim countries) and, to a much lesser degree, by the conversion of some Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity and to various Protestant denominations.5 2
Islam and the State
Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion, although the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion (82.64% of the population belong to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, although the number of regular church-goers is extremely low). Each year, the Religious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to several denominations with a longer historic presence, mainly for the renovation of their religious sites, and the Islamic community is one of these. In 2008, a new association, the National Council of the Religious Communities in Bulgaria, was established on the initiative of the Religious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers. The Council includes the leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Islamic community, the Central Israeli ( Jewish) Spiritual Council, the Catholic Church and the United Evangelical churches. The Council pledges to represent the Bulgarian model of religious tolerance to Europe and to the Balkans, and to develop interreligious dialogue as a means of improving understanding, preserving religious peace and the preventing intolerance, but it has not yet begun to function. Overall, Muslims are well represented in the public atena both religiously, through the Muftiate, and politically, through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. This party, established
5 Eminov, Ali, “Social construction of identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria” (2007), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/2-2007-Eminov.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009, p. 6.
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in 1990, has been represented in every parliament since 1990. It has drawn support primarily from Turks and other Muslims, although its political leaders have been careful to preclude any identification with Islamist or pan-Turkist ideas. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The Bulgarian Muslim community, called officially the Muslim Confession (Musulmansko izpovedanie) is very well organised. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Vissh Duhoven Savet), with its core institution, the Head Muftiate (Glavno Muftiistvo) (Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel.: ++359 2 981 60 01, http://www.genmufti.net/). The Head Muftiate presides over all the Muslims in the country, irrespective of their ethnic or intra-Islamic divisions. Twelve regional muftis are responsible for the administration of the community at the provincial level. The current Head Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are 1,217 mosques, where Friday prayers are conducted, as well as 240 masjids, and some 50 tekes and turbes, most of which date back to Ottoman times. Around 350 of the mosques have been constructed since the fall of Communism. 5
Children’s Education
Optional classes in Islam were introduced in public schools in 2000. Students use textbooks proposed by the Muftiate and approved by the Ministry of Education. The classes are conducted in Bulgarian once a week and are supported by the Muftiate. There are three Islamic secondary schools, in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad, which follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes in Islam. The graduates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any discipline they choose. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education in the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. Apart from these three state accredited schools, there are several Qur’anic schools for young adults supported by various foreign organisations,
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such as Turkiye Diyanet Vakfu and the Ahmed Davudoglu Foundation, operating under the control of the Muftiate. The number of students in these schools has gradually decreased and two of them (in Surnitza and Ustina) recently closed down. In additionally, the Head Muftiate organises Qu’ran courses for children every summer. Earlier activities sponsored by certain Arab foundations have been curtailed. 6
Higher and Professional Education
About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no religious training was available under Communism. The younger imams were educated in the three secondary schools mentioned above, and very few of them were trained in the Qur’anic schools. Some of the imams have diplomas from the Higher Islamic Institute or from various Islamic schools in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. According to the Muftiate, around 100 students sent by them have graduated from various Islamic schools abroad. The number of students who have pursued studies abroad through private channels outside the Muftiate, seems to be very limited. The Islamic Institute was founded in 1991 as a semi-higher institution, and became a higher institute in 1998. It offers courses in Islamic theology and is currently working towards state accreditation. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Middle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Muslims are free to perform the traditional funeral rites, and separate cemeteries, or separate burial plots allocated for Muslims, are available. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Imams have access to prisoners and may also visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulations exist. Imams (as well as Christian clergy) are not allowed in the armed forces, as military law bans any religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces.
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Religious Festivals
Muslims regularly celebrate their religious festivals. The chief mufti announces the beginning and the end of the month of Ramadan on national television and greets the believers at Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr). Greetings are also offered on television on the occasion of Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha). Muslims are officially entitled to a day’s holiday for these festivals. 10
Halal Food
Muslims have access to halal food through local shops, which are supplied by two local firms that perform ritual slaughter. Private slaughter is not forbidden. Halal food is not available in public institutions. 11
Dress Codes
There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, in public places. There have been occasional bans on the hijab in state schools that require school uniform. 12
Publication and Media
The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal Musulmani (Muslims) in Bulgarian and Turkish. The Fethüllah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman (in Bulgarian and Turkish), some 20% of the content of which is devoted to religious issues. Other publications have occasionally appeared, but these have either been short-lived or achieved limited circulation. There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. Since the 2000 introduction of daily Turkish language programmes on national television and radio, national radio broadcasts a three-hour programme on Islam every Friday. Religious programmes are also available on some commercial television channels.
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Family Law
Under Communism, Muslims could only hold religious weddings privately, usually without a certificate being issued. Islamic marriage was practised mainly in the villages, after the couples had been married according to the civil law. At the present time, imams can issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage, but the state recognises only marriages contracted in a civil registry offices. The Islamic regulations on marriage, divorce, and inheritance are followed unofficially, and the function of the spiritual court at the Muftiate is limited to hearing cases of clerics’ misdemeanors. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
In February 2008, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination rejected complaints filed by three Muslim students from Devin who claimed that their headmaster had warned them not to wear hijab in class, even though the school did not require school uniform. The Commission found insufficient evidence to confirm the headmaster’s alleged warnings. In November 2008 the head mufti met with the mayor of Sofia to streamline plans for the construction of a new Islamic compound in the country’s capital (where there is only one functioning mosque, the sixteenth-century Banya Bashi mosque.) The compound will include a new mosque, a cultural and a conference centre, as well as a building and a dormitory for the Higher Islamic Institute. Occasional debates surround sensationalist and mostly unverified press releases about alleged extremist Islamic organisations and activities on the territory of the country. A few cases of vandalism against mosques (offensive graffiti on the walls of the mosques in the cities of Pleven and Yambol, and a fire in the mosque in Kazanluk) also stirred some debate. The opinion seems to prevail that these incidents do not reflect any substantial change in the relaxed relations between people of different faiths in general, or in the attitude towards Muslims in particular.
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Major Cultural Events
The week of the Prophet’s birthday is celebrated annually with both religious sermons and various songs, plays and conferences. There is an annual Islamic Education Week in the last week of Ramadan. Both events are organised nation-wide by the Head Muftiate and are very well attended.
CROATIA Jasmin Džaferović1 1
Muslim Populations
According to the last available census (2001), the Republic of Croatia has a Muslim population of 67,401, representing 1.52% of the total population of 4,437,460. The largest Muslim ethnic groups are Bosniaks (0.47% of the total population), followed by Albanians (0.34%), Roma (0.21%), Turks (0.01%), and others (0.49%), most of whom declared themselves to be Muslims (Muslimani). (For the controversy over the names Bosniak and Musliman, see section 14 below). Most Albanian Muslims in Croatia come from Kosovo and Macedonia. Muslims are mostly concentrated in the capital Zagreb, and the provinces of Istarska and Primorsko-goranska. The fifteenth-century Ottoman advances into what is today Croatia led to Muslim settlement. Having taken Belgrade a few years earlier, the Ottomans marched on Hungary through Slavonia, an eastern province of Croatia, in 1526, capturing the city of Osijek. By the end of the sixteenth century, Slavonia had 110,000 Muslim inhabitants. The Ottomans took control of the province of Lika in 1527. The local population fled from the area, and by the 1530s the Ottomans had established settlements of Muslims and Orthodox from Bosnia. The Catholics who remained in Lika accepted Islam. By the 1680s, the Muslims in Lika were an absolute majority, numbering more than 300,000 inhabitants. However, the Habsburg victories over the Ottomans in the late seventeenth century made the Muslims leave Slavonia and Lika and move to Bosnia. Muslims started to return to Croatia only two centuries later, from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire took control of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and Muslims had more contacts with Zagreb,
1 Mr. Jasmin Džaferović holds an MA in Strategy and Diplomacy from the National University of Malaysia and is currently Marketing Officer, Embassy of Malaysia, Zagreb.
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Croatia at that time also being under Austro-Hungarian rule.2 The monarchy recognised Islam as an official religion in 1912 while the Croatian parliament did the same on 27 April 1916. In the period between the two world wars, Muslims in Croatia started to organise by establishing the Islamic Office for Croatia in 1919, the Mufti’s Office in 1922 and, in 1935, the first Shari’a Court, which adjudicated in matters relating to Muslim marriage, family law and inheritance. An initiative to build a mosque in Zagreb was announced in 1938, but was not realized until 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime with which some Muslim leaders collaborated, making the period after World War II even more difficult for Muslims in Croatia. In 1945, when the Communists came to power, the Mufti of Zagreb, Ismet Muftić, was arrested and killed and other imams were arrested and imprisoned or killed. In 1948, the Zagreb City authorities closed the mosque built in 1944, destroyed the minarets and demolished the interior. The Muslims organised themselves again in 1957. The Community made a decision in 1961 to build a new mosque and began construction twenty years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia.3 2
Islam and the State
Croatia is a parliamentary democracy. According to the Constitution, all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41). The government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the Islamic Community in Croatia was signed in 2002 and stipulates the rights of the Islamic community in terms of mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financing, and chaplaincy in prisons, the armed forces, the police, etc. It also gives the Islamic Community the right to register marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pension fees are paid in full by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities.
Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878–1945: Doba utemeljenja (Muslims in Zagreb, 1878–1945: The Period of Establishment) (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), p. 31. 3 For more see Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj (Islam and Muslims in Croatia) (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj, 1999). 2
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Main Muslim Organisations
The Islamic Community in Croatia (ICC) (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, Gavellina street bb, 10000 Zagreb, http://www.islamska-zajednica .hr) is the main Islamic organisation in the country. It consists of a Parliament (Sabor), an executive body called Mešihat, the Muftiate of Zagreb, and the Zagreb Islamic religious school named after Dr Ahmed Smajlović (founded in 1992). The current mufti of Zagreb and president of the Mešihat is Ševko Omerbašić. The ICC is the only Muslim organisation that has relations with the government, city and municipal authorities and other religious communities. The ICC is in practice a quite independent religious institution, despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby the ICC recognises the Rais al-ulama in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader while the Rais al-ulama confirms the mufti as the head of the ICC. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are two purpose-built mosques in Croatia, one in Zagreb and the other in the town of Gunja. The mosque in Zagreb comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. There are prayer facilities in fifteen other cities. Construction of the new mosque in the city of Rijeka should start in summer of 2009. 5
Children’s Education
Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more Muslim pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school since 1992. In 2006, due to the low enrolment of new pupils, it was converted into a general Islamic high school. The school’s curriculum conforms with that of state high schools. It includes Islamic subjects, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.4
4 See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Ankica Marinović Bobinac, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehungin Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 239–258.
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Higher and Professional Education
Universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Studies Faculty have been initiated, but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rituals. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section at Mirogoj cemetery. In other cities, burial places are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayer in all public institutions including the police, armed forces, prisons and hospitals (Article 17 of the Agreement). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food, and to be taken to the nearest mosque on Fridays to perform the prayer. 9
Religious Festivals
Muslims have the right to a take a holiday on both ‘ids, but in practice, private companies are unlikely to grant this right. Both ‘id prayers are broadcast live on the national television and radio stations. On the day of ‘id, prominent politicians usually visits a mosque to greet the Muslims. On ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the prime minister of Croatia, Dr Ivo Sanader, paid his first visit to the Zagreb mosque. 10
Halal Food
The Halal Quality Agency of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far awarded 22 Croatian companies the halal quality certificate. (The full list is on the Agency’s webpage: http://www .halal.ba.) However, not all companies have all their products halal certified, and certified products still do not have halal logo on them, which makes them difficult to identify. Companies are required to label their halal certified products with the logo by 1 July 2009. Dining and
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fast food restaurants are not halal certified. The Islamic Community opened a butcher’s store on the mosque premises in Zagreb, but due to low revenues it had to be closed because most Muslims live too far from the mosque for it to be practical to shop there often. Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited, while qurban slaughter is organised by the Islamic Community in cooperation with a local meat company. 11
Dress Codes
Civil law does not prohibit women from wearing hijab, though only few Muslim women wear it. Wearing hijab for ID photos is permitted. 12
Publication and Media
The Islamic Community is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to the Muslim heritage in Croatia. The Cultural Association of Bosniaks publishes the journal Preporod with the financial help of the government. Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams have regular slots for sermons on national television and radio. 13
Family Law
All family legal issues, except registration of marriage, are referred to the civil courts. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Before the last parliamentary elections in Croatia in 2007, the Party of Democratic Action Croatia (Stranka demokratske akcije Hrvatske, SDAH) left the ruling coalition led by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) because the government of Croatia did not comply with the request of SDAH to change the status of 20,000 ethnic Bosniaks who were registered as ethnic ‘Muslims’ in the national population register. The government replied that they could not change the ethnic status of an individual by decree, but each individual could change her/his ethnic affiliation in the national register from ‘Muslim’ to Bosniak before each parliamentary election. According to Bosniak
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representatives, changing people’s status from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Bosniak’ would increase the number of Bosniaks to 41,000, and they would then be entitled to a separate electoral district and three members of parliament. Currently, Bosniaks have one MP who also represents twelve other minorities. After the HDZ won in the last parliamentary elections in 2007, the SDAH re-joined the HDZ-led coalition. The post-election HDZ-SDAH agreement refers to reinstating Bosniaks into the Preamble of the Constitution when it is next amended, and the government undertakes to give an “interpretation regarding the change of the national term for Muslims” which will enable the updating of the voters’ register.5 15
Major Cultural Events
The Islamic Community organises an annual European competition in Qur’an recitation in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque in September 1987.
5 “Postizborni (ne)sporazum” (editorial), Preporodov, nos. 106–107 (December 2008–January 2009), p. 3.
CYPRUS Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay1 1
Muslim Populations
The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised in the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was formed. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and Greeks of the island, each community dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek-sponsored coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. By 1979, there were only around 1,000 Greek Cypriots remaining in the north (out of an original 142,000) and only 150 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south (out of an original 55,000).2 After the division of the island, the RoC, under Greek-Cypriot control, in the south, became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains to this day unrecognised by any country other than Turkey.
1 Ali Dayıoğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bulgaria and Greece and the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Mete Hatay is Project Leader at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. 2 Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, PRIO Report 3/2006 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2006), pp. 3–4.
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Although the RoC is constitutionally a bicommunal state, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union without its Turkish Cypriot partners. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the EU’s acquis communitaire. According to the 2006 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Service department, the current population in the south, under the RoC-controlled area, is 778,700. Of these, 118,100 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Some reports also claim that there are 20,000–30,000 illegal or unrecorded foreigners living in the south.3 Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to UNHCR, 900 refugees and more than 10,000 asylum seekers are currently living in Cyprus, the majority of whom are Muslims. Cyprus is also home to a number of private universities and colleges which attract international students, many from Bangladesh and Pakistan.4 Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 European Union accession. However, according to a recent study, the Muslim population of Turkish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.5 In the north, the total population, according to the 2006 census, is 256,644, although this census does not include the rotating population of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. Of the total recorded population, 178,031 are citizens of the TRNC, although 27,333 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey. Although religion was not listed on the census, and even though the majority of the population is fundamentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially 3 Trimikliniotis, Nicos and Corina Demetriou, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus, Cyprus Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, (Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg, 2005), p. 8 (www.uni-oldenburg .de/politis-europe). 4 Statistical Service of Republic of Cyprus, Statistics of Education 2005/2006, Nicosia 2007, available at www.mof.gov.cy. 5 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, IP/B/CULT/IC/2006_061.
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considered to be Muslims. There are also 70,525 immigrants who are nationals of the Republic of Turkey who are recorded in the census, almost all of whom are Muslim. The majority of this group are either studying in the universities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s growing construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group there are many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi or Shafi’i schools. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, approximately half of them Kurdish and half Turkish. The president of the largest Alevi association has claimed that they number around 4,000–5,000. The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, but there is also a small population of Alawites or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining 8,088 foreign residents are listed in the census as being of other nationalities, including the UK, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslim.6 2
Islam and the State
Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of waqf and the Laws and Principles of awqaf (Ahkamül Evkaf ). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically the Evkaf was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institutions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belongs solely to the Evkaf, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish
6 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the EthnoDemography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census, PRIO Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007).
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Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turkish Cypriot deputies. Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no confiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government subsidies. However, after 1974, the Evkaf lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Evkaf property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management Service, an institution established after the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. Despite the provisions in the Constitution, many complaints have been lodged pertaining to violations in the form of acquisitions made by the RoC in respect of waqf properties. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution by referendum. Article 1 of the TRNC Constitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guarantees freedom of faith and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating to waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relating to acquisitions and requisitions of waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Principles of Evkaf. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of waqf or any Muslim religious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are the Evkaf (Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, PO Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and the Müftü (or Mufti) (KKTC Din
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İ leri Ba kanlığı, Müftü Raci sokak No. 24, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, http://www.kktcdinisleri.com/baskanligimiz.html), who is the official spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as representative of Muslims in Cyprus, the Evkaf Administration, currently called Vakıflar ve Din İ leri Dairesi (Evkaf and Religious Affairs Office), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). As explained above, following the 1974 division of the island, the Evkaf lost control of all holdings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the Mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974 his office moved to the north, and he is effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, is currently being met by the World Islamic Call Society, an organisation based in Libya. As explained above, the Evkaf was the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. The Mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community was increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the Mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the Director of Religious Affairs (DRA) under the control of the Evkaf Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the Prime Minister. In addition, the DRA has authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and nonrecognition of the north, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel, and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, two associations, the Evrensel Sevgi ve Karde lik Derneği (Association of Universal Love and Brotherhood) and the Kıbrıs Türk İslam Cemiyeti (Cyprus Turkish Islam Association) sponsor various activities and programmes, mainly for students from Turkey studying in the island. The former was founded by the former Mufti, who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a particular interpretation of Islam that emphasised universal peace. The latter was influenced by the Turkish-Islam Synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam. Certain tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbendi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım
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Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers from Europe and the Americas. His main dergah is based in the small town of Lefke, where he regularly receives disciples visiting from abroad. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associations, whose members are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, Hacı Bekta i Veli Derneği, has recently acquired land from the government to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gatherings. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either during the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. According to a 2006 report prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, 16 of these mosques have been completely destroyed, only 25 are in good condition, and the rest are neglected or partially ruined. Of the cemeteries, 43 have been totally destroyed; three are in good condition, and the rest are in a very poor state.7 Since the island’s division, these properties have been under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974. Although there is provision in this department’s budget for the repair and management of Muslim religious sites, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. Until 1990, only €206,120 had been spent on the upkeep of Muslim religious sites. During the RoC’s EU accession process between 2000 and 2003, this amount was increased to approximately €100,000 per year. This increase followed the publication of a Council of Europe report that cited these religious sites’ disrepair.8 The amount then increased significantly in 2004, following the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the EU. From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties, and this was estimated to have 7 Erasing the Past: Turkish Cypriot Culture & Religous Heritage under the Control of the Greek Cypriot Administration (Nicosia: Political and Cultural Researches Department of the TRNC Presidency, 2006). 8 http://moi.gov.cy/new/admin/sections/filedepot/uploaded/file/PDF_FILES/ PDF_1st_OP_Cyprus.pdf, accessed 17 May 2009.
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increased further in 2007, to approximately €750,000.9 A more recent (2008) UNDP-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were in good condition after repairs.10 Today, only five of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol are maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limassol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam travels from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque. Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. The authors observed that the one operational mosque is not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially during Friday prayers. The one functioning mosque accommodates 750 worshippers, according to the mosque’s imam, but during Friday prayers the authors observed that at least that number had overflowed to fill the mosque’s garden and even its car park, where worshippers used rolls of paper to cover the ground for prayers. In the north, according to data provided by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) in 2007, there are 164 active mosques, of which 84 existed before the island’s division, while 24 were built after 1974. In addition, 52 churches have been converted into mosques, and four mosques are building previously used as cinemas or schools. There are 41 residential areas with no mosque.11 In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and international reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. Mosques in north Cyprus belong in law to the Evkaf Administration. Although the Evkaf collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 10% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical 9 http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_doha.nsf/misc_en/8367AC21D 2B39069432572E400246FC3?OpenDocument, accessed 17 May 2009. 10 See http://www.cyprustemples.com. 11 Atalay, Talip, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Yaygın Din Eğitimi ve Cami Hizmetleri: Kurumsal Yapılanma ve Din Görevlileri (Widespread Religious Education and Mosque Services in North Cyprus: Institutional Formation and Religious Staff ) (İstanbul: Seçil Ofset, 2007), pp. 203–204.
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salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 90% comes from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Turkey, so the cost of mosque maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastructure in the north, is provided by Turkey. 5
Children’s Education
There are no state-supported Islamic schools in either of the two parts of Cyprus. In the south, instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a written request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turkish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must, however, be noted that despite the provisions of the Constitution of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United Nations Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.12 According to the TRNC Constitution, “Religious education and instruction shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Until 2005, primary and secondary schools had compulsory religious instruction under the title Religious Culture and Morality (Ethics). Lessons included instruction about monotheist religions in general with concentration on the Hanafi branch of Sunni Islam. However, most schools had for years suffered from a lack of competent teachers and so these lessons were often neglected.13 New regulations in 2005 allowed each school management committee to decide on the provision of religious instruction at the secondary level of primary education. Following this decision, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curricula. Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of
12 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Okullar Sorunu II: Limasol Türk İlkokulu” (The School Problem in Cyprus II: The Limassol Turkish Primary School), Kıbrıs Yazıları, No. 2, (Bahar 2006), pp. 56–69. 13 Atalay, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Yaygın Din Eğitimi ve Cami Hizmetleri, p. 240.
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controversy, twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach. Until 1997, these courses were given in mosques where more qualified imams were employed, especially from Turkey. Following reactions in Turkey against the rise of the Islamic-based Refah Party, these courses were prohibited in north Cyprus, but as a result of heavy demand by families, especially in areas of the north primarily occupied by immigrants from Turkey, courses were re-instituted in 2004, with the support of the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. In all probability, this may be attributed to the 2002 rise to power in Turkey of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has a conservative religious base. However, opposition to these courses continued amongst Turkish Cypriots, and they have been periodically prohibited since. 6
Higher and Professional Education
There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA, under the control of Evkaf ), which is an institution of the TRNC, and the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. There are no faculties of theology or imam-hatip lycées. Only one university, the Anadolu University, a Turkish university, which also has a campus in north Cyprus, has an Open Faculty, where there is a theology department at the undergraduate level. Most of the imams and muezzins attached to the DRA have received their education in private or official Qur’an courses run by the DRA. The education level of the 270 mosque employees under the DRA is therefore quite low, and only 10% of them are full-time employees, with the rest working on a temporary or part-time basis. However, since 2007, 64 imams from Turkey have been employed in north Cyprus mosques on four-year contracts, through auspices of the Religious Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy. They are at least imam-hatip lycée graduates, and quite a number are graduates of theology faculties.14
14
Ibid., p. 162.
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Burial and Cemeteries
As noted above, only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good condition. In April 2005 a Turkish Cypriot cemetery in Larnaca, which had recently been rehabilitated under a US-funded project aimed at improving bi-communal relations, was vandalised. In 2005, there were also reports of Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the south being destroyed for the construction of roads and other development. In the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Evkaf Administration, which also provides for services conducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, prisons or the armed forces on either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. The armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, especially during the month of Ramadan. 9
Religious Festivals
While no Islamic festivals are recognised in the south, all Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals of Ramadan and ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with the bayrams. Beginning approximately ten years ago, Turkish Cypriots began to celebrate the Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as Kutlu Doğum Haftası, or the Week of the Holy Birth. Mevlid-i Nebi, the
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Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal ) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated before, under the influence of trends coming from Turkey, this one-day event became a week-long festival, with religious educational activities, including conferences and seminars. In addition, clergy employed by the DRA are requested to visit the homes of people within their communities and to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad. Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s conception, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent into heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. Alevis also freely celebrate their festivals such as Ashura and qurban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or minstrels, are brought from Turkey. 10
Halal Food
Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim population. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat at this government-monitored area. He estimates that he slaughters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is halal. 11
Dress Codes
There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibitions on the hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about headscarves in private schools. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear headscarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the headscarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public
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institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified from 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the headscarf come to north Cyprus to study. 12
Publication and Media
The media operate freely in the south, though the local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to radio stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fridays for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programs. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available on sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. 13
Family Law
Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Muslims. With the RoC’s accession to the European Union, however, this law has been changed, and inter-faith marriage is technically allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Muslims in the north do choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recognised. Most of those who choose religious ceremonies are immigrants to the north, primarily from Turkey. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conjugal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents.
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14 Public Opinion and Debate According to the 2008 US State Department report, an NGO in the RoC reported that Muslim asylum-seekers in the south had experienced difficulty finding employment because of their religion. The report states that the NGO “alleged that the ‘general climate’ was not amenable for asylees from countries where Islam is prevalent, and that citizens in general demonstrated ‘aggressive behaviour’ towards Muslim asylees”.15 In 2008, a number of families in the north chose to send their children to summer courses in Turkey. Approximately 400 pupils between the ages of 11 and 16 travelled to Turkey, and this was subsequently heavily criticised in local newspapers and by the teachers’ union. Newspapers presented the event as a violation of the society’s presumed secularism and as a reactionary move against the secular state.16 15
Major Cultural Events
In November 2008, the Church of Cyprus held an international conference under the title The Civilization of Peace: Faiths and Cultures in Dialogue, in cooperation with the Saint Egidio Community of Rome. The meeting was attended by representatives of many different faiths. Although there were numerous Muslim representatives, there were no Turkish Cypriot participants. A report by the Cyprus News Agency, the official news agency of the RoC, suggested that the reason Turkish Cypriots were not represented was that securing their representation through official bodies would have implied recognition of the state in the north.17
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108441.htm. Yalman, Sevgi, “Kızlar Bursa’ya, erkekler İstanbul’a (Girls to Bursa, boys to Istanbul)”, Kıbrıs, 28 August 2008. 17 http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2008/08-11-16.cna.html, accessed 17 May 2009. 15
16
CZECH REPUBLIC Štîpán Macháček1 1
Muslim Populations
In the last Czech census in 2001 about 3,700 individuals indicated Islam in response to the option to enter their religious affiliation.2 However, the actual number of Muslims is higher, estimated at around 10,000,3 for many of them feel uncomfortable about identifying with the Islamic faith in official documents. No newer official figures on believers of different faiths are available. The territory that is today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim community. Three categories of Muslims in the Czech Republic can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic with permanent or temporary residency permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, but they are very active in Muslim organisations. The second group consists of former students who came from then socialist-oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation and married and obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries, particularly Syria, Libya, Democratic Yemen, Iraq and Sudan. Muslims from the third category mostly arrived after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs, mainly from Arab countries (especially
1 Štîpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 A figure given by the Český statistický ú®ad (Czech Department for Statistics), available at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110-03--obyvatelstvo_hlasici_ se_k_jednotlivym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 18 May 2009. 3 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Daun, Holger and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ost®anský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007), p. 408).
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Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia), but also from other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan etc.). Muslims are also represented among asylum seekers. According to Ministry of Interior figures, out of 3,016 applicants in 2006, several hundred came from Muslim countries, the most numerous being Egyptians (422 persons). Other applicants were from countries including Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria and Sudan. Muslims were relatively more successful than non-Muslim asylum seekers in being granted asylum, the highest numbers of successful applicants being Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Kazakhs.4 2
Islam and the State
Until 1918, the territory of today’s Czech Republic was subject to the laws of the Habsburg Empire (see Austria). Today the Czech Republic has no state religion and the constitution provides for freedom of religion. In comparison with other European countries, a high proportion of Czechs do not profess any religion, 59% according to the 2001 census.5 Since religious affiliation was an optional entry in the 2001 census forms, all figures are only approximations. Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Ministry of Culture as cultural or social organisations. As such, they are not granted any public funding. In 2004, the umbrella organisation Úst®edí muslimských náboženských obcí (Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities, UMO) succeeded in registering as a religious community and, for the first time since the end of World War I, Czech Muslims were officially recognised as such by the state. For more privileges, such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, there are requirements that the UMO is unlikely ever to be able to fulfill (for example, established believers must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,000 for the Czech Republic). The UMO and other Muslim activities are funded by local and foreign believers’ contributions and donations.
Mendel et al., Islám v srdci Evropy, pp. 408–410. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/p/4110-03, last accessed 21 May 2009. 4 5
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Main Muslim Organisations
The UMO is a Muslim umbrella organisation. Its chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and symbol of Czech Muslims. The organisation is now led by another Czech convert Dr Vladimír Sáõka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community) and Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin). The core of the UMO is an executive council on which every Czech Muslim organisation is intended to have a representative. The UMO is now based in the Prague mosque (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, islamcz@ islamcz.cz), having moved there from the town of T®ebíč. Before the UMO was registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and become members of UMO. Islámská nadace v Praze (Islamic Foundation in Prague) has developed since 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room between from 1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in Prague in 1999 (
[email protected], www.praha.muslim.cz). Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an Information Centre in the centre of Prague (Politických vîzõ% 14, 110 00 Praha 1) and since 2004 it has managed the Islamic Centre, with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. Islámská nadace v Brnî (Islamic Foundation in Brno) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic. The Islamic Centre, with a mosque, was opened in 1998 and was the first mosque to be built in the country. The Islamic Foundation is based at the mosque (Vídeõská 38a, 693 00 Brno,
[email protected], www.mesita.cz). Svaz muslimských student% v ČR (Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic) was established by a Sudanese student, Muhammad Abbas al-Mu‘tasim, and it provides a platform for foreign Muslim students studying in the Czech Republic. It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories and publishes the web magazine Muslimské listy (Muslim News, www.muslimskelisty.cz). The Svaz has its own website www.svazmuslim.cz. Muslimská unie (Muslim Union) is another Muslim organisation in Brno (Chmelová 2893, Brno,
[email protected]). It has a good informative website at www.muslim-inform.cz.
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The Muslim organisations listed above do not have specific ethnic, national or religious affiliation. Apart from the Union of Muslim Students, they welcome both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin. Members of the Union of Muslim Students are foreign students, or former foreign students, from various Muslim countries. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Since 1989, Czech Muslims have had several mosque-building projects. Most projects were rejected by the local authorities who ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants (based on protest petitions against a mosque in a neighbourhood or a city and supported in some cases by the stance of local church representatives). Such was the fate of two projects for mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates. There are always tens or rather hundreds of patients from Arab countries staying in Teplice for treatment at the spa. Another mosque project in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although it attracted less attention, was rejected by the local authorities in 2004. Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic in 1996. It was inaugurated in 1998. One year later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar University and the Islamic University in Medina. Since 2006 there has been a Bosnian imam, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in Amman), and Sheikh Ahmad (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in San‘a). In addition to these two mosques there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construction of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but also in consideration of opposition by local people. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications—for ‘aesthetic reasons’, for example. The approval of Brno mosque project,
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for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architecture”, i.e. a minaret. 5
Children’s Education
The are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. According to the 2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which the UMO was finally registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to establish their own, state-recognised schools ten years after their registration and only then if they prove to have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. The UMO does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in primary and secondary schools. Courses in Islam and Arabic are organised in the two Czech mosques by the Islamic Foundation in Prague and the Islamic Foundation in Brno. The courses in Islam (similar to catechism) are attended by several dozen children at weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). The Arabic courses are open to the non-Muslim public. 6
Higher and Professional Education
There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifications abroad. Arabic and Islamic Studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the religious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish and Persian language courses are also available there. In recent years, Arabic and Islamic Studies have been introduced at the Faculty of Arts at Západočeská univerzita (Western Bohemian University) in Plzeõ and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programme at the Masarykova univerzita (Masaryk’s University) in Brno. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town
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of T®ebíč, where the UMO had its former headquarters. Ten years later, another Muslim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places, was established in Prague in a section of the large cemetery in the suburb Olšany. The ritual washing of the deceased are organised by the Islamic Foundations in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the relatives. Prayers for the deceased are also be performed. No other special burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer room in the prison of Ruzynî in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clientele of the spas. 9
Religious Festivals
Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their celebration is limited to private homes, embassies, and mosques in Prague and Brno. In 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague had to hire a sports hall in Riegrovy sady for the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attended. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to the celebrations to greet the Muslims. On average, 30 Muslims from the Czech Republic every year perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. Typically, the pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialist travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. In 2008, exceptionally, about 65 people traveled to Mecca as a result of the offer by the king of Saudi Arabia to cover pilgrims’ expenses.
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Halal Food
There are few opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. In Prague and Brno, several grocery shops and butcheries sell halal products and meat. Since its registration in 2004, the UMO has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is particularly exercised for ‘Id al-Adha. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules to limit Muslim dress in public or in schools. Although some Muslim women (including Czech converts) regularly wear hijab, no dress code incidents have been recorded. There is as yet no record of Muslim women wearing niqab in the Czech Republic. 12
Publications and Media
The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is Hlas (The Voice), the magazine of the UMO, published in Czech three or four times a year. Hlas was revived in 1991 after first being published from 1937 to 1945. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque and the members of the editorial board are Dr Vladimír Sáõka, Muneeb Hassan, Jalal Atassi and Lazhar Maamri. It is registered with the Ministry of Culture under the number E 11633. There are several Czech Islamic websites. The UMO runs www .islamweb.cz to provide practical information for believers and Muslimská unie has its own website, www.muslim-inform.cz. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.muslimskelisty.cz, which presents world news from an Islamic standpoint, and www.infomuslim.euweb.cz which provides practical information. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets aimed to bring more information about the faith to Czech Muslim believers. There are three Czech translations of the Qur’an, and translations of works by the Bosnian Muslim intellectual Ali Izetbegović, as well as few booklets promoting Islam, have also been published by Czech Muslims in recent years.
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Family Law
Just as Muslim schools are not permitted, Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage in order for it to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranged and registered about fifteen Islamic marriages in 2008 and keeps copies of all Shari’a marriage contracts in its archive. 14 Public Opinion and Debate No data. 15 No data.
Major Cultural Events
DENMARK Brian Arly Jacobsen1 1
Muslim Populations
The earliest information we have on Muslims in Denmark is from the census in 1880, when eight ‘Mohammedans’ were counted.2 Subsequent censuses (the last was in 1970) have not referred to Muslims, either because there were none or because they were part of the category ‘other faiths’. Data summaries extracted from the central person data registry (Folkeregisteret) and published since 1970 only give figures for members of the official Lutheran church. As a result of active mission in Denmark, Ahmadis from a Pakistani background succeeded in establishing an Ahmadiyya community, which in 1966–67 constructed the first purpose-built mosque in Denmark, the Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre (Copenhagen). The present Ahmadiyya community in Denmark consists mainly of Pakistani immigrants and their descendants and numbers around 600 according to their own estimates.3 From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark became more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s people came to Denmark as migrant workers from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey, and then, from the mid-1970s till today, immigrants have been mainly refugees and the families of migrant workers already in the country. The waves of refugees have had various causes: the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90), the civil war in the
1 Brian Arly Jacobsen, is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of History of Religions, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. He holds a degree in sociology of religion. His publications include Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Dry Numbers on Faith: Demography of Religion in the 21st Century), co-edited with Margit Warburg (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007) and “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 2 Statistiske bureau, Det (1883), Folkemængden i kongeriget Danmark, den 1ste februar 1880 [The statistical Bureau (1883) The Population in the Kingdom of Denmark, 1st of February 1880] (Statistisk Tabelværk IVR Serie A3 [Statistical Table Work IV R, Serie 3]). 3 Cf. www.islam-ahmadiyya.dk.
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former Yugoslavia (1991–2001), the war in Afghanistan (2001-present) and the wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003-present).4 The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980—from 0.6% of the population (29,284 people) in 1980, to 4.0% (221,800) in 2009.5 The Danish authorities do not register individual religious beliefs, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research conducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 92% of Turkish immigrants and their descendants regard themselves as Muslims.6 The largest ethnic group is Turks (24.7% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (12%), Lebanese (10.8%), Pakistanis (8.2%), and Somalis (7.6%). The calculation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Muslim immigrants. Estimates of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, which can be reasonably calculated to 2,100–2,800.7 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shi’ites and Sunnis. A survey from 2007 distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as follows: 49% Sunnis, 13% Shi’is, 19% ‘Islam, other’, which may include Ahmadis, Alevis and Sufis.8 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%–25% of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 44,400–55,400 people) are associated with a mosque association,9 although formal membership numbers are much lower.
4 Colemann, David and Eskil Wadensjö, Indvandringen til Danmark (Immigration to Denmark) (Viborg: Spektrum, 1999), and Jacobsen, Brian, “Muslimer i Danmark: en kritisk vurdering af antalsopgørelser (Muslims in Denmark: A critical assessment of estimations)”, in Warburg, M. and B. Jacobsen (eds), Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 143–165. 5 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both the immigrants and descendants (Statistics Denmark 2008, www.dst.dk). 6 For background data, see Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2004 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2004) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2004). 7 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omvendelser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f. 8 Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1999–2007 (The status on integration 1999–2007) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2008), p. 12. 9 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006), pp. 39, 47.
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Islam and the State
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privileges not available to other religious groups. The national church is the only religious organisation that can receive state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of eleven religious communities were ‘recognized’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ more than 100 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Minister of Justice can authorise clergy within non-recognised religious communities to conduct marriages. In February 2009, 22 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious communities’.10 In April 2007, the Liberal-Conservative government passed legislation that would require all foreign religious workers (missionaries, imams, etc.) to pass a Danish language test within six months of entering the country. The intention of the law is said to be to restrict the entry of Muslim clerics, whose number had already been restricted under a 2004 ‘Imam Law’ that requires the number of religious residence visas to be reasonably proportionate to the size of the religious community in question.11 3
Main Muslim Organisations
There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of members and number. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often related to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and finally there is a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade some Muslim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice 10 Alevis are not included in this category. The six current Alevi associations are categorised as ‘other congregations’ (see www.familiestyrelsen.dk/11/godkendtetrossamfund (accessed 10 March 2009). 11 See “Integration: Omstridt danskprøve til præster og imamer skaber splid i Venstre (Disputed Danish test of imams and priests create conflicts in Venstre)”, Politiken, 8 January 2007.
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on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as the establishment of burial grounds. 3.1
The ethnic-religious associations
Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation) is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.diyanetvakfi.dk). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organisation in Denmark and almost two out of three Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 31,000 members). It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s 27 local mosque associations were recognised as religious communities in 2006. In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the DMGT (Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Tekilatı, Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations, www.dmgt .dk). The DMGT runs six Turkish mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement.12 Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran Denmark (www .minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,200 members, including children. Its current Chairman is Muhammad Sarwar. Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj-ul-Quran movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities. 3.2
Religious organizations
The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its current Chairman is Bakan Feramuz Acar and there are today seven local associations and a national youth association. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at about 6,500.13 Six local Alevi associations were approved as religious communities by the state in 2007.14 Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing success, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. They largely keep to themselves. Examples Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 138. 14 See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, PhD dissertation, Aalborg University, 2006, pp. 195–218. 12 13
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are Tariqa Burhaniyya, Al-Murabitun and Sufi-oriented Turkish groups such as Nurcu groups and Dialog Forum (www.dialogin.dk) which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. Islamisk Trossamfund (Islamic Religious Community) or Wakf (www.wakf .com) was founded in 1996, when Palestinians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its current Chairman is Bilal Assaad and the association is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various countries and has approximately 800 paying members, according to its own figures. Around 1,000 people attend the khutba every Friday. Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Muslimske Unge i Danmark (Young Muslims in Denmark, MUNIDA, see www.munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members and its current Chairman is Imran Shah. There are also a number of Shi’i oriented organisations. Salam (www .salam.nu) is an association established in 2005, headed by young women of various ethnicities and educational backgrounds with the aim of promoting Islam. The number of its members is not known. The first Shi’is in Denmark were Twelvers and Isma’ilis of Pakistani descent. The Isma’ilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque from 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaffariya (Rådmandsgade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. The massive migration of refugees with Shi’i backgrounds fleeing from civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid-1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. 3.3
Politically oriented associations
Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk) is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. It gets a lot of media coverage but is difficult for outsiders to contact. Its spokesperson is Fadi Abdullatif. Its members are estimated to number somewhere between 200 and 500.15 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted
15 Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003.
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crowds of about 1,000. Demokratiske muslimer (Democratic Muslims, www.demokratiskemuslimer.dk) is a political movement founded by the Danish conservative politician Naser Khader and other Muslims in February 2006 after the escalation of the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy. Its spokespersons are Adel Sadek and Sally Khallash Bengtsen. The association has democracy and human rights as fundamental principles and its purpose is to challenge fundamentalist Muslims in public debate. In 2007, the association claimed a membership of about 1,100, plus around 14,000 supporters, but membership has declined steeply since then. 3.4
Muslim network organisations
Muslimernes Fællesråd (United Council of Muslims, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006 born of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisations in Denmark. Its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain and it currently acts as an umbrella organisation for 14 assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 40,000. Dansk Muslimsk Union (Danish Muslim Union, www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of approximately 30 Danish Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokesperson is Osman Öztoprak. Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue, www.m-i-d.dk) was formed by a breakaway group from Minhaj ul-Quran in 2003 and organises dialogue activities between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain and it is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures. Det danske Islamiske Råd (Danish Islamic Council) is an independent charitable institution, which is co-founder of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to lobby on joint Islamic issues. Its instigator was the politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. In 2001, a practising Muslim woman and a male non-Muslim social researcher took the initiative in forming the association Forum for kritiske Muslimer (Forum for Critical Muslims, www .kritiskemuslimer.dk). According to its website, the association describes its purpose as to “work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to Islam, with particular focus on the visibility of women as agents and public figures in Islam”. According to its spokesperson, Sherin Khankan, it currently has around 130 members.
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A survey in 2006 showed the following support for various major Muslim associations among Muslims in general: Islamisk Trossamfund: 5.4%; Demokratiske muslimer: 8.9%; Diyanet: 9.1%; Muslimer i Dialog: 6.0%, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: 0.7%, Milli Görüs: 2.9% and Forum for kritiske muslimer: 0.9%.16 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Denmark, eleven of them being Shi’i.17 The Shi’ite Isma’ilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamisk Kulturcenter (Islamic Cultural Centre) in Brønshøj (Copenhagen) in 1972.18 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose-built, namely the mosque by the Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svendborg in 2000.19 Several more local groups are planning to build mosques. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that for a central mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Ærværdige islamiske komité (Honourable Islamic Committee). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)—a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement
Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2006 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2006) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2006), p. 39. 17 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 18 Ibid. 19 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. 16
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with the Committee for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.20 5
Children’s Education
Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is termed ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’ which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.21 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. In the school year 2006–2007, there were 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of approximately 3,600 pupils, all with Muslim backgrounds.22 This means that the majority of Muslim pupils go to public school. The Ministry of Education carried out a study in 2006 which showed that 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school whereas the national average was only 26%.23 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours.
20 Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 21 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserklæringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. 22 Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Traditioner, idealer og politikker (Power, Citizenship and Muslim Free schools in Denmark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. 23 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school)”, Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007.
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Higher and Professional Education
Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark. Discussions about possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years but have not led to any formal proposals. In May 2008, a meeting of Muslim organisations from Norway, Sweden and Denmark took place in Copenhagen to consider possible common approaches to imam training. During 2008 Islamisk Trossamfund reached an agreement with Al-Azhar University, Cairo, to offer accredited courses. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Sections within fifteen existing municipal cemeteries (all Christian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Religious groups also have the right to acquire land for the purpose. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs also gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of other faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after some years of lobbying. According to a committee member, about 200 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.24 In April 2008, the municipality of Herning agreed to sell a plot of land for the establishment of a Muslim cemetery in the town, and in October 2008 the municipality of Roskilde also agreed to the establishment of a Muslim cemetery near the city. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but
24 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice”, Jyllands-Posten, 22 September 2006.
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only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.25 In 2008, the state budget allocated an amount of 1.5million kroner per year in 2008 and 2009 and 2million per year thereafter for special approval procedures for imams and closer supervision of religious activities in prisons, with the hiring of up to 20 ‘prison imams’.26 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was appointed at Rigshospitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first hospital imam began to provide pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated with hospitals in major cities in Denmark. 9
Religious Festivals
The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities which have a large number of pupils from ethnic minorities either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. In recent years, Shi’is have organised parades with 500 to 1,000 participants through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ‘Ashura. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against disease and war. 10
Halal Food
Halal slaughter is permitted. Halal food is widely available and Denmark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world. There have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.27 25 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting (Imam Hansen from Hatting)”, Nyt fra Kriminalforsorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no. 3 (2002). 26 See “Flerårsaftale for Kriminalforsorgen 2008–2011 (Multi-year agreement for The Prison and Probation Service for 2008–2011)” at the Prison and Probation Service homepage: http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk. 27 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesættelser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The
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Dress Codes
Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retailers and others to insist on uniform codes without the female headscarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the headscarf in Parliament in the spring of 2007, but failed. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority figures should be allowed to wear the headscarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘headscarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban Muslim women from wearing headscarves when acting as judges or jurors. The government and Danish People’s Party announced that they would pass the act at the beginning of 2009, but the proposal has met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. 12
Publication and Media
There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites in which Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer (Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims), formed in 1998, which currently (January 2009) has 455 members (cf. http://uk.dir .groups.yahoo.com/group/dfc/). This forum is related to one of the oldest websites established to inform Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There are also Muslim publishing firms, the oldest of which, Alif Bogforlag, began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.
construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206.
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Family Law
Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shari’a is practised in some Muslim communities in Denmark in, for example, matters of family law, divorce cases and cases of child custody. There are no official Shari’a courts in Denmark.28 14 Public Opinion and Debate In February 2008, youths in immigrant neighbourhoods in major cities engaged in seven uninterrupted nights of rioting, which began the night after the alleged beating of an immigrant man by Copenhagen police on 9 February and continued after the 13 February re-publication of the Muhammad cartoons in several Danish newspapers. The events again focused attention on Muslims and formed part of the background to a number of minor subsequent debates, including responses to the question of free speech and Islam, Geert Wilder’s film Fitna (see Netherlands) and the question of Muslim women wearing headscarves in public. Questions about the Muslim presence in Denmark are a frequently and eagerly debated topic in the Danish media. A series of studies show a population that is very sceptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence with Muslims. Some opinion polls from 2008 showed that only 38% of Danes would have a positive attitude towards their children marrying Muslims, while 48% of Muslim parents would welcome their children marrying Danes. The same survey shows that 24% of members of immigrant groups say that they feel reasonably or fully Danish. Finally, the investigation also revealed that 54% of Muslim immigrants in Denmark would consider voting for a democratically founded Muslim party, if one were formed.29 A report published in January 2008 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) showed that 79% of Danes see greater interaction with the Mus28 Cf. “The executioners of Sharia” (editorial), Jyllands-Posten, 31 October 2008, and “Religion and Law: The legal system must move with the community”, an interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 29 See “Muslims want religious policy”, review of Catinét Research and Analysis Denmark, Ugebrevet A4 (Weekly Letter A4), 30 June 2008.
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lim world as a threat. The Danes are the most sceptical of the nations surveyed. Jyllands-Posten’s Muhammad cartoons published in the autumn of 2005 are mentioned repeatedly in the report as an event that had a major impact on Danish respondents’ views on dialogue between the West and Islam.30 On the other hand, a study in June 2008 showed that 54% of Danes did not have anything against female colleagues wearing the Muslim headscarf at work, while 39% were opposed to headscarves. Nearly half of those polled would not care whether a judge, a police officer or other persons with executive authority wear the headscarf, while a further 39% were undecided.31 15
Major Cultural Events
Since 2004, Islamisk Viden- og InformationsCenter (Islamic Knowledge and Information Centre, IVIC, www.ivic.dk), a cross-ethnic association founded by Muslims in Aarhus in 2002, has held an annual ‘Day of the Mosques’, when mosques across the country open their doors to the community.
“Scepticism: Danes feel threatened by Islam”, Berlingske Tidende, 22 January 2008. 31 Cf. “Danes have nothing against headscarves”, survey by Catinét Research for the think tank Cepos, Newspaq, 19 June 2008. 30
ESTONIA Egdunas Racius1 1
Muslim Populations
The total number of ‘cultural’ nominal Muslims in Estonia in 2008 may be as high as 4,500, but regularly practising Muslims hardly exceed several hundred. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are said to be located in and around the capital city Tallinn (the Estonian Institute, February 1997). The official census in 2000 recorded 1,387 inhabitants of Estonia as Muslims, of whom 754 identified themselves as Tatars (the total number of Tatars in Estonia according to the same census was 2,582, of whom only 760 were Estonian citizens, while 681 were Russian citizens), 83 as Estonians, and 79 as Russians, while 455 came under the category ‘other ethnic nationalities’. The number of those who identified themselves as Azeri (Azerbaijani) was 880 (of whom only 162 were Estonian citizens), but there are no figures for Azeris who identified themselves as Muslims. After the Tatars, Azeris are the second largest community with a Muslim background. Up to 500 persons (132 Uzbeks, 127 Kazakhs, 48 Chechens, 24 Turks, 19 Arabs, 15 Kurds and others) identified themselves as being from ethnic groups traditionally associated with a Muslim background. Despite the fact that, in the official census, a large number of Estonia’s inhabitants with a Muslim background (more than 70% of Tatars and all(!) Azeris) did not indicate their affiliation to Islam, many if not most of them could potentially be considered to be at least nominal Muslims. This particularly applies to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Islam but who might, nonetheless, be observant. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Estonia should have increased somewhat as a result of the arrival of several hundred immigrants of Muslim background, and conversion. Several public
Egdùnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He has a PhD in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. 1
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sources provide unsubstantiated estimates of 10,0002 or even 20,0003 Muslims in Estonia but these are evident exaggerations. A more likely figure of 4,000 is indicated in Islam in Estonia published with the active participation of Estonia’s Muslims in 2008.4 The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. On the other hand, there was in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia a nascent Muslim community (around 170 strong according to a 1934 census), composed mainly of Tatar immigrants from Russia. 2
Islam and the State
Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion and no dominant faith. Traditionally, Estonians were Lutheran but today only a small percentage of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal in the eyes of the state and there is no formal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ faiths. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts (until 2002 through the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Interior). Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as it does not violate public morals and/or disturb public order but have neither the status nor the rights of a legal personage. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, the right to conduct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions and there is no public funding for their activities, although the state may fund the cultural activities of ethnic minority groups, such as Tatars and Azeris. 2 Huang, Mel, “A mosque with a view”, Central Europe Review, 2001, available at http://www.ce-review.org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 4 March 2009. 3 Muslims in Estonia, Muslim American Society, 2003, available at http://www.masnet .org/news.asp?id=687, accessed 4 March 2009. 4 Abiline, Toomas (compiler), Islam Eestis. Islam in Estonia. (Tallinn: Huma, 2008).
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Main Muslim Organisations
The first Muslim congregation was officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 by the Soviets. Eesti islami kogudus (Estonian Islamic Congregation, Muhu str. 4-75, Tallinn), which is composed mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was officially registered in 1994. In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus (Estonian Muslim Sunni Congregation), was formed. Alongside these Tallinnbased registered organisations, there are other informal groupings of Estonian Muslims: the Azeri dominated Nur Center of Islamic Religion and Culture in Maardu (established in 2001), mainly preoccupied with preserving Azeri cultural traditions, and the Islamic Crescent in Estonia (established in 2000), about which there is unfortunately virtually no information available. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Between the world wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the congregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Currently, a rented apartment at J. Poska str. 45-15, converted into a prayer hall, serves as the main Tallinn mosque. Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. However, there have been announcements, and reactions to them, on proposals to build a mosque in either central Tallinn or one of its suburbs by the sea. In the early 2000s, a local Azeri businessman declared his intention of raising funds to build a mosque but has failed do so. The current chief Imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation in late 2008 confirmed that Sharjah, one of the principalities of the United Arab Emirates, had in the previous March communicated its intention of financing the building of an Islamic religious and cultural centre (housing a mosque) in Tallinn. The official reply from the Tallinn city council and the Estonian government was still pending as at December 2008.
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Children’s Education
Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general ethos is Christian. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. A class of no fewer than fifteen pupils can ask for confessional religious education conducted by a clergyman of the denomination, but till now there are no classes with this number of Muslim pupils. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular, offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn, Maardu). 6
Higher and Professional Education
Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at the University of Tartu (covering Arabic language, and an introduction to Islamic studies, both at the Department of Theology). Recently Tallinn University has started offering some instruction in the Arabic and Turkish languages, as well as introduction to Turkish culture. Elsewhere (Tartu Theological Seminary) teaching about Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the four active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the other two are self-taught. It is unlikely that there will be any need for local imam training in the near future. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
During the tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Russia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the early years of the Soviet occupation, these were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries, where a separate section is allocated. No need for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet arisen.
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‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as an imam in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons or hospitals to perform rites. 9
Religious Festivals
There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, open to the public, in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva. The ‘Id al-Fitr communal prayer in Maardu in September 2008 was attended by a hundred or so Muslims. ‘Id al-Adha is attended by up to 500 perople every year. 10
Halal Food
No halal butchers have yet been opened. Some individual Muslims (among them the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers, and then sell the meat and this practice is not prohibited by law. Some imported ‘halal’ food (mainly sweets and other baked goods from the Middle East) is available at the only Tunisian-owned food store in Tallinn. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer, and no Muslim females have yet been observed wearing niqab. Since 2002, women have been legally permitted to wear the headscarf when photographs are taken for submission for official purposes. 12
Publications and Media
There are no Muslim printed media in Estonia and www.islam.pri.ee (in Estonian and Russian) is the only website run by Estonian Muslims. However, information on the site is static and old and its on-line forum is apparently unused (since autumn 2008). A multilingual website
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http://azeri.ee is run by the Eesti Aserbaidžaani kultuurikeskus (Azerbaijan Cultural Centre of Estonia) but this is only indirectly related to Islamic issues (mainly through the history of Muslim presence in Estonia). 13
Family Law
Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques (nikah), which are then registered with a municipal civil registry office. An imam wishing to serve as a state official must obtain official certification after attending special training, and no Estonian imam has yet been certified to serve as a state official. Up to five marriage contracts a year are signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the creed of the litigants is irrelevant. 14 Public Opinion and Debate There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally local Muslim leaders are approached to comment on events and processes involving Muslims around the world or in Estonia itself. There have been recent reports on the initiative by the ruler of Sharjah to build an Islamic centre, including a mosque, in Tallinn. In September 2008, the Estonian daily Postimees conducted an on-line poll on the opinion of Estonians regarding the building of a mosque in Tallinn. Almost 76% of the 2,900 respondents were against it. As a result, a marginal radical political party, the Estonian Christian Democrats, has openly voiced its objection to the prospect of a mosque being built in Tallinn. 15 No data.
Major Cultural Events
FINLAND1 Tuomas Martikainen2 1
Muslim Populations
The annexation of Finland from Sweden by imperial Russia in 1808 led gradually to the permanent settlement of Muslims. From the 1830s at the latest, there were Muslim soldiers, including Kazakhs and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons. They practised their religion and were served by an imam. Since the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migration ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.3 Muslim migration remained low, but the population grew gradually due to marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post-World War II period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of migration. Currently, the largest groups are Somalis, Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Kurds, Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth Shi’i.4 By 2007, an estimated 45,000 Muslims were 1 I would like to thank the following people for commenting this article: Okan Daher, Anas Hajjar, Kristiina Kouros, Isra Lehtinen, Antero Leitzinger, Tuula Sakaranaho, Marja Tiilikainen and Kirsti Westphalen. 2 Tuomas Martikainen is a postdoctoral researcher at the Academy of Finland in the Department of Comparative Religion, Åbo Akademi University. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku (Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004). 3 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimiyhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Community Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books, 2006). 4 Sakaranaho, Tuula and Heikki Pesonen (eds), Muslimit Suomessa (Muslims in Finland) (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 1999); Martikainen, Tuomas, “Muslims in Finland: Facts
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living in Finland, that is, 0.8% of the total population of 5.3 million.5 The Muslim average age is very young and about half are under the age of 20. This estimate of the total number of Muslims in Finland is conservative, and higher figures can be suggested. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts. (1) The majority (about 30,000) of Finnish Muslims are first generation migrants. This number is based on country of birth data of migrants from Muslim majority countries,6 reduced by a fifth to exclude non-Muslim migrants.7 (2) The second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number at least 10,000. This figure is based on parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (migrant-migrant parents) or half (migrant-native parents) deducted from the number (data from
and reflections”, in Nils G. Holm (ed.), Islam and Christianity in School Religious Education: Issues, Approaches, and Contexts (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 2000), pp. 203–247; Sakaranaho, Tuula, “Finland”, in Maréchal, Brigitte (ed.), A Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2002), pp. 61–68; Tiilikainen, Marja and Isra Lehtinen, “Muslim women in Finland: Diversity within a minority”, Tidsskrift for Kirke, religion og samfunn, vol. 17, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–64; Sakaranaho, Tuula, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Martikainen, Tuomas, Tuula Sakaranaho and Marko Juntunen (eds), Islam Suomessa: Muslimit arjessa, mediassa ja yhteiskunnassa (Islam in Finland: Muslims in Everyday Life, Media and Society) (Helsinki: SKS, 2008). 5 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of staterecognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Muslims, and there is no survey or census data (the last census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation migrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehensive statistical data on the second generation are still missing. See Martikainen, Tuomas, “Maahanmuuttajat ja uskonto: tausta, jäsenyys, yhdyskunnat (Immigrants and Religion: Background, Membership, Communities)”, in Laitinen, Aappo (ed.), Kristinusko Suomessa (Christianity in Finland) (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura), pp. 205–240. 6 The estimate includes the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Ethiopia, former Yugoslavia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. StatFin online service, Population Structure, http://pxweb2 .stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_en.asp. 7 The proportion of non-Muslims varies significantly between countries of origin, thus to deduct one-fifth is somewhat arbitrary, but the intention is to avoiding the temptation to overestimate the number of Muslims and also to provide a general rule for estimates.
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Statistics Finland).8 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be 1,000.9 (4) The two Tatar congregations have 660 members, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as a Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communities. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Muslims, but it has been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the capital region and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different. 2
Islam and the State
Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) provides more detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran and Finnish Orthodox Churches enjoy a special status as religious organisations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bodies, or under the Association Act as voluntary associations.10 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there also are informally organised groups. In 2007, there were 25 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active.11 Altogether, there are about 40 mosque associations and 20–30 other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Local organisations have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria from 2008 onwards. Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland, SINE, www.sine.fi)
8 These reductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 7) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 9 Personal communication 20.1.2008. 10 Heikkilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Martin Scheinin, “State and Church in Finland”, in Robbers, Gerhard (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 11 Ketola, Kimmo, Uskonnot Suomessa (Religions in Finland) (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008).
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receives its funding from the Finnish state. Muslim organisations have very little national, public visibility, although they are often consulted by the local authorities in many issues.12 Nevertheless, Muslim organisations are and have been represented on Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, ETNO), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Until recently, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. SINE was established in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In December 2008, SINE had eighteen member and one support organisation and it is currently funded by the Finnish state. The activities of SINE are still developing, but the society is working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, Islamic law, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shi’i, and the Sunnis are further divided between Tatars and newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities, but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is also prominent in some mosques. In 2007, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (Finnish Islamic Party, www .suomenislamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded, but by the end of 2008, it had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are around 40 mosques in Finland, of which two are purposebuilt and owned by the Tatar community. A wooden mosque was built in Järvenpää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque
Martikainen, Tuomas, “The governance of Islam in Finland”, Temenos, vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265. 12
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in downtown Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New Sunni mosques exist in Espoo, Helsinki, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, Kajaani, Kotka, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lahti, Lohja, Oulu, Pori, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Vantaa. New Shi’i mosques are to be found in Helsinki, Lempäälä, Tampere and Turku. Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communities have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations, but so far these have failed because of the lack of funding. 5
Children’s Education
Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In general, Tatars have participated in regular school education. Religious education (RE) in Finnish schools is nonconfessional, but instruction is given in the religion of the pupils. This means that RE is focussed on providing information about religion, but religious practice in schools is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic RE in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise RE in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic RE is already well established in all the larger cities. The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Helsinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some Muslim kindergartens. Issues related to the practice of Islam have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and this is only gradually becoming more systematic, but diverse local guidelines have been created. The City of Helsinki guidelines are the most comprehensive and provide detailed recommendations on how to deal with many issues.13 13 Lehtinen, Isra, “Miten viranomaiset huomioivat muslimit” (How the authorities take into account the needs of Muslims), in Uskonnontutkija 1/2007, available at www .uskonnontutkija.fi/arkisto/2007_1/lehtinen.pdf, accessed 18 May 2009.
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Higher and Professional Education
Islamic theology and law cannot be studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic Studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found in several disciplines in Finnish universities, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No discussions about imam training in higher education have taken place, but education of minority faith RE teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, has been on-going since 2007. This consists of both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an RE teacher in Finland. In autumn 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) organised a course entitled “Integration: A Multifaith Approach”, which aimed to improve the integration of foreign-born religious leaders and their communities. Several Muslims participated in the course. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Finland. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion of the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s, but no long-term solution has been found. Practices have varied between municipalities and a process involving the Ministry of Education, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and SINE is taking place to solve the problem. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which also has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. In addition, the Finnish Orthodox Church and other minority Christian religions have been active. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systematically in these institutions. Several state institutions, including the police, the armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly
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funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are followed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable. 9
Religious Festivals
Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Apart from Muslim organisations, various ministries have arranged invitation-only iftar dinners during Ramadan since 2001. All these events have been open either to Muslims only or, by personal invitation, to non-Muslim friends, researchers and others. Public access to religious festival celebrations is not guaranteed in state and other organisations. 10
Halal Food
In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki, and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Helsinki, where three halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultaneously with the slaughter. 11
Dress Codes
So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school, even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers are increasingly having to face the issue and some have provided guidelines regarding acceptable clothing at work, for instance in public health care.
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Publications and Media
The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives a violent and aggressive impression of Islam, as has been noted in many studies over the years. This is applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented in a multicultural framework. Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics relating to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times (1942, 1957 and 1995). Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. There are two small Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni journal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Finland since 1994 and a Shi’i journal, Salam, by Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta (the Resalat Islamic Community) since 2007. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals including religious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and discussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including Sunnapolku (The Path of Sunna, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam Suomessa (Islam in Finland, www.tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. In addition, a global, high-volume and non-religious site for Muslims, Muxlim—Enhancing the Muslim Lifestyle (www.muxlim.com), has been run in Finland by Mohamed El-Fatatry since 2007. 13
Family Law
The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. Mosques and imams provide consultations in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish NGOs as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural
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reasons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out at home, with consequent medical complications.14 Cases concerning the difficulty women face in obtaining an Islamic divorce have been reported. In 2007, the Finnish League for Human Rights published a survey of the relationship between Finnish and Islamic laws,15 according to which the majority of Finnish Muslims view Shari’a as a general moral guideline, but in practice follow national legislation. Only a small minority view Shari’a as the primary normative code. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Finnish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to general attitudes towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Scientology. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seem to have stabilised over the years. The latest opinion poll was conducted in 2006 and found that 56% of Finns view Islam negatively and 9% positively.16 15
Major Cultural Events
Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major national cultural event on Islam, the Minareetin kutsu (Call of the Minaret), was organised with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004–2005. It was part of a campaign called Tuhat
14 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo, Tuomas Martikainen and Marja Tiilikainen, “Religion in migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Puuronen, Vesa, Antti Häkkinen, Anu Pylkkänen, Tom Sandlund and Reetta Toivanen (eds), New Challenges for the Welfare Society ( Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139. 15 Kouros, Kristiina, Suomessa asuvien muslimien suhtautumisesta perhearvoihin ja perhelainsäädäntöön (The Relationship of Muslims Living in Finland to Family Values and Family Law) (Helsinki: Ihmisoikeusliitto, 2007). 16 Monikasvoinen kirkko: Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko vuosina 2004–2007 (The Church with Many Faces: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland in 2004–2007) (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008).
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ja yksi askelta (A Thousand and One Steps) that aimed to inform Finns about global Islam. The first major event organised solely by Finnish Muslims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland in Helsinki put on a two-day “Islam-Expo”. This included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products, and attracted around 200 visitors.
FRANCE Anne-Laure Zwilling1 1
Muslim Populations
Figures concerning the numbers of Muslims in France are very difficult to provide. Since 1872, it has been forbidden for a census to identify people according to religious affiliation. Article 8 of the revised law of 6 January 1978 forbids the collection of any data providing personal information on racial or ethnic origin, or philosophical, religious or political belief or affiliation.2 The French National Institute of Statistical Information (INED) therefore provides no such information and it can only be obtained from surveys carried out by companies such as BVA (www.bva.fr), IFOP (www.ifop.com/europe), CSA (www.csa-fr.com), IPSOS (www.ipsos.fr) and TNS-Sofres (www.tns-sofres .com) for newspapers or magazines, and from European surveys that include sections on France. Since the methods and techniques used in these surveys are diverse, results can sometimes vary significantly, and are always difficult to compare. It is also a sensitive issue as there are sometimes political, religious or personal motives for exaggerating or downplaying figures about Muslims. For all these reasons, only a general picture of the Muslim presence in France can be given. In 2000, the High Council for Integration estimated the number of Muslims in France to be 4million.3 Other estimates followed, the figures steadily increasing, up to 6 or 7 million. In 2003, the demographer Michèle Tribalat criticised the lack of serious work in this field, and provided
1 Anne-Laure Zwilling is research assistant at the research centre PRISME—Société, Droit et Religions en Europe (Societies, Law and Religions in Europe), Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Strasbourg. She holds degrees in philosophy, theology and religious studies and works in the field of religious minorities in Europe. 2 “Il est interdit de collecter des données à caractère personnel qui font apparaître, directement ou indirectement, les origines raciales ou ethniques, les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou l’appartenance syndicale des personnes, ou qui sont relatives à la santé ou à la vie sexuelle de celles-ci.” 3 L’islam dans la République (Islam in the French Republic), November 2000, available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000017/0000.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009.
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her own result, based on a demographic analysis taking into account the ethnic origins of the population: 3.7million (or 4.1million if one includes the Harkis—Muslim Algerians who sided with the France during the Algerian war of independence), although she underlines that, like all the other statistics about Muslims in France, this can only suggest the number of ‘possible Muslims’, not of ‘actual Muslims’. There is currently a generally agreed estimate that there are 4.5million Muslims in France, predominantly Sunnis, representing 7.1%4 of a total population of 63,392million.5 France remains a very Catholic country: 69% of French people aged over fifteen say they have a religious affiliation—59% claim to be Catholics, 3% Muslims, 2% Protestants, 1% Jews and 1% Buddhists.6 The Muslim presence in metropolitan France is mainly the result of immigration. The starting point for the noticeable presence of Muslims in France is the end of World War I. Men from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia served in the French army and this led to the arrival in France of immigrants from these countries. These immigrants were estimated to number 120,000 in 1920, of whom 100,000 were from Algeria, which was then a French colony, Tunisia and Morocco being only French protectorates. From then on, with a marked increase after World War II,7 Muslim immigrants were mostly men, responding to a French demand for cheap labour. During the Algerian war of independence, up to 160,000 Algerians were soldiers in the French army. When the war ended in 1962, there were widespread reprisals against those who remained in Algeria, and many tried to find refuge in France. It is usually estimated that the number of these ex-soldiers, called Harkis, and their families who arrived in France between 1962 and 1968 amounted to 91,000. Unfortunately, not much effort was made to welcome them: they were lodged either in settlements near existing urban centres, in isolated purpose-built hamlets in the rural
4 French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), 2007, available at http://www.insee .fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm, accessed 19 May 2009. 5 INSEE, 2008. 6 TNS-Sofres survey, “Les enjeux du quotidien”, 2007, available at http://www .tns-sofres.com/etudes/pol/050407_religion.htm, last accessed 9 December 2008. 7 Blanchard, Pascal, Éric Deroo, Driss El Yazami, Pierre Fournié and Gilles Manceron, “L’immigration: l’installation en métropole des populations du Maghreb”, in Blanchard, Pascal and Sandrine Lemaire, Culture impériale 1931–1961 (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2004).
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south, or in so-called temporary camps, some of which had formerly housed refugees and political prisoners. After France and the Turkish government signed a labour agreement in 1966, a large number of Turks began to migrate to France—18,000 in 1970, 200,000 in the early 1990s and 450,000 by 2005. Finally, a number of immigrants came from former French colonies and other countries with a Muslim population, such as Senegal and India. After the 1970s the immigration from Morocco and Turkey began slowly to increase and in 1974 the government passed a law allowing the families of immigrants to join them, so many children and wives moved to France. As a result of all these factors, the Muslim population in France is currently made up predominantly of people from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa and their children born in France. There are also South Asians and people from the Middle East and, since the Yugoslav wars (1991–2001), Bosnians and Albanians. The high concentration of the Muslim population in socially deprived areas, major urban centres and suburbs (Paris, Lyon and Bouches-du-Rhône), and former industrial and mining areas such as the North or Haut-Rhin is the result of immigration, which also explains the Muslim presence along the Mediterranean coast, geographically close to North Africa. Turkish people living in France are mostly concentrated in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine and the region of Nord-Pas de Calais, where they live mainly in the cities of Calais, Lille and Roubaix.8 Very few Muslims live in rural areas.9 The first generation of Muslim immigrants, now retired from the workforce, often applied for French nationality before retiring in France. However, many live alone in housing estates, and have lost their ties with their countries of origin. The second generation, and now a third generation, of Muslims find integration difficult, though this may be highly dependent on their family origin.10 In 1975, the Harkis protested publicly against what they described as years of official amnesia, neglect, and marginalisation by the French authorities: in 1974 more than 14,000 8 IFOP survey on the geographical repartition of religions in France, 2006, http:// www.ifop.com/europe/docs/religions_geo.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. 9 Cartographie des musulmans et des sans religions en France http://www.lemonde .fr/societe/infographie/2007/03/02/l-islam-affiche-une-presence-moyenne-de-3–dansde-nombreux-departements_878171_3224.html, accessed 19 May 2009. 10 Alba, Richard and Roxane Silberman, “Decolonization immigrations and the social origins of the second generation: The case of North Africans in France”, International Migration Review, vol. 36, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1169–1193.
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Harkis were still living in the camps set up as a ‘temporary solution’ in the 1960s. The second generation, being born in France, are French citizens, but a reform of the nationality laws in 1992 delayed the granting of French nationality until it was applied for in adulthood (where previously it was automatically granted). According to the 2005 data from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies,11 unemployment among people of French origin was then 9.2% while for those of foreign backgrounds, the rate was 14% (statistics adjusted to take account of educational qualifications). Furthermore, there was a 5% overall unemployment rate for graduates of French origin, but 26.5% of university graduates of Northern African origins were unemployed. All this has led to growing dissatisfaction among second and third generation Muslims.12 According to a CSA survey in 2006, 88% of people claiming to be Muslims fast during Ramadan; 43% pray five times a day; 20% read the Qur’an at least once a week; 17% go to the mosque at least once a week, and 8% at least once a month.13 Religious practice seems to be on the increase: a different survey conducted in 2007 showed that 23% of Muslims claimed to attend the mosque regularly, compared with 16% in 1989; 70% said they fasted during Ramadan, compared with 60% in 1989; and 6% had performed pilgrimage to the Mecca, compared with 4% in 1989.14 2
Islam and the State
The main religious regime in France, that of separation between religion and state, is defined by the law of 9 December 1905.15 It stipulates that the French Republic “guarantees freedom of conscience” and “the free exercise of religion”. But the state “does not recognise,
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/IP1042.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. Lopez, Alberto and, Gwénaëlle Thomas, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: le poids des origines socioculturelles”, in Données sociales—lasociété française, Paris: INSEE, 2006, pp. 293–305. 13 “Portrait des musulmans (Portrait of Muslims)”, available at http://www.csafr.com/dataset/data2006/opi20060823b.htm, accessed 19 May 2009. 14 IFOP survey for La Croix, 8–17 December 2007, “Evolution de l’Islam en France”. 15 Text available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT 000006070169&dateTexte=20090401, accessed 19 May 2009. 11
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pay a wage to or subsidise any religious denomination”. This law did not establish any kind of religious status or regime, but does provide for support mechanisms such as the possibility of creating religious associations, tax exemptions, chaplaincies in the army, financial support for the maintenance of places of worship. These were to be granted to churches and religions that requested them. Because of their previous legal status as “recognised religions”, Catholic dioceses and, to a lesser extent, Protestants and Jews, automatically enjoyed the advantages provided for in this law. This regime does not apply in the Rhine and Moselle departments (Alsace and Moselle), which were part of Germany in 1905, where recognised denominations are organised within the framework of public law and financed by the state and the towns. Non-recognised religious groups are organised within the framework of private law. Local law also applies to the organisation of religion in the overseas territories and one of the overseas departments. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Muslim groups and associations are organised according to the law of associations (1901) and a large number of Muslim associations are therefore registered. The majority of them are small and of only local interest, but a few associations are of national importance. The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF, www.uoif-online.com), often said to have links with the Muslim Brotherhood, aims at bringing together all French Muslims, but many of the main Muslim organisations in France reflect countries of origin: Algerian Islam is represented by the Grande Mosquée de Paris (www.mosquee-de-paris.org), and the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF) is the organisation of Moroccan Islam. After an internal dispute, the FNMF split in 2007 and a second organisation of Moroccan Islam, the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France (RFM), was then created. Turks are grouped in the Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France. There are also youth associations, the main one being Jeunes Musulmans de France (Young Muslims of France, www.jmf.asso.fr), founded in July 1993 with the support of the UOIF. The Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Religion, (CFCM, www.cfcm.tv) was founded in 2002 at the request of the French authorities as a body whose aim is to
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represent Muslims to the government and communicate the views of the state to Muslims. It has concerns regarding issues such as the construction of mosques, sections for Muslim burial in cemeteries, halal slaughter, nomination of chaplains and the training of imams, but it has neither real prerogatives nor any executive power. It was set up to represent Islam on a national level and is recognised by the French government,16 but its real capacity to represent French Muslims has often been questioned by Muslims themselves. The main challenge is that seats on the Council are granted according to the ground area of each mosque, which benefits affluent groups and is therefore not viewed as very democratic. The last elections took place in 2008, when 43 delegates elected Mohammed Moussaoui, vice-president of the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, as president of the CFCM. In March 2005, the Fondation pour les Œuvres de l’Islam de France (Foundation for the Works of Islam in France) was established to be responsible for collecting all donations and distributing funds for the construction and renovation of places of worship and to support the training of imams, as well for financing the CFCM. There are substantial numbers of Sufi orders in France, including groups such as the Murid tariqas (www.acrim.org) from Senegal and Mali, the Naqshbandis (www.naqshbandi.fr, mostly Turkish) and the ‘Alawiyya tariqa, which is of Algerian origin. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There were around 2,150 places of Muslim worship in France in 2006, about twenty of which can accommodate more than 1,000 people. Eight are mosques with minarets, the eldest being the Grande Mosquée de Paris. Some 120 buildings are dedicated solely to Muslim practice and activities, but most are not, being either private houses or sometimes former factories and the like, often a simple garage, that are used for worship.17 The number of building projects is on
16 See the report of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Muslim faith in France, September 2007, available at http://www.ambafra-pk.org/IMG/pdf/muslim_faith.pdf, last accessed 19 May 2009. 17 http://www.la-croix.com/illustrations/Multimedia/Actu/2006/10/25/carte1 .jpg, accessed 19 May 2009.
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the increase and mosques are being built in Marseille, Strasbourg, Nantes, Paris, Tours, Villeneuve d’Ascq. Cultural centres, which can also host meetings and worship, are also planned.18 The mosque in Créteil, which can accommodate 2,000 people, opened its doors in December 2008 and is now the biggest mosque in the Paris region. 5
Children’s Education
State education, which in France means all public schools, does not include the teaching of Islam. This is because the French school system, with the principle of separation, does not allow any religious instruction in state schools. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of school in France:19 private schools without contract with the state (écoles privées hors contrat), private schools with a contract with the state (écoles privées sous contrat d’association avec l’Etat), public school (écoles publiques). Private schools without contract receive no financial assistance from the state and they are free to organise as they wish (law Debré of 31 December 1959; code of education L 442). When private schools do have a contract with the state, they can receive public funding to cover up to a tenth of their costs, and possible official recognition of their curriculum and diplomas. They then have to comply with the Code of Education, Article L141–3 and Article R442–36, which states that religious education can be given either outside normal hours of schooling, or else as the first or last hour(s) of teaching of the day. Religious education must remain optional, and the school cannot discriminate about which students it accepts. Nearly all these private schools (90%) are Catholic schools. The same rules apply to primary and secondary education. Chaplaincies can be created at secondary level (collèges and lycées), but not in primary schools. In Alsace and Moselle, where the legal status of religions is different, state primary schools and secondary and technical education establishments are secular, but all must include religious instruction in their 18 “La création de mosquées se banalise en France”, Le Monde, 3 December 2008, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2008/12/03/la-creation-demosquees-se-banalise-en-france_1126275_0.html, accessed 19 May 2009. 19 For a more detail, see Peiser, Gustave, “Ecole publique, Ecole privée et Laïcité en France”, Cemoti, no. 19—Laïcité(s) en France et en Turquie, available at http:// cemoti.revues.org/document1699.html, accessed 19 May 2009.
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curriculum. Students’ parents can have their children exempted from these classes upon request and, in primary schools, such pupils have classes in ethics. The content of religious instruction is left to the discretion of the relevant religious authorities. In reality, however, Christianity and Judaism are almost always the only possibilities, although the Archbishop of Strasbourg stressed in an interview with the Christian journal La Croix (12 December 2003), the necessity of allowing Islam to be taught in public schools along with the two other major religions. Three private Muslim secondary schools (receiving no public funding) have opened in France in the recent years: Aubervilliers, Lille (2003), and Lyon (2008). A private Muslim school with a contract with the state has existed since 1990 in La Réunion (French overseas department). On 10 March 2008, the Muslim private school Éducation et Savoir opened its doors in Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne, Paris suburban region). Muslim children often attend Christian private schools to receive religious instruction, and some of these schools allow Muslim teachers for their Muslim pupils. In 2006, 317,000 pupils attended private schools for kindergarten, 565,000 at primary level, 655,000 in the first years of secondary school (collège) and 410,000 in the second part of secondary school (lycée).20 Outside school, Muslim religious education in France is delivered in mosque associations and is therefore very much connected to the country of origin. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Muslim higher education and imam training is currently organised in France only by private institutions: l’Institut Français des Etudes et Sciences Islamiques (Ile de France, www.ifesi.fr); l’Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines (Lille, www.avicenne.eu); and l’Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (close to Nevers, www.iesh.fr). A specific programme for imams opened in September 2008 in the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Institut Catholique de Paris, a private Catholic faculty. It is a Diplôme Universitaire course, meaning a two-year study programme at higher education level, with the course
20 See the budget of the Ministry of National Education, available at http:// www.performance-publique.gouv.fr/farandole/2007/pap/html/DBGPGMPRESPGMACTPGM139.htm, accessed 19 May 2009.
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title: Interculturalité, Laïcité et Religions (Interculturalism, Secularism and Religions). Although the Grande Mosquée de Paris is sending its imams there for further training, not all Muslim institutions find this situation acceptable. A Masters in Law and Religious Studies with a specialisation in Islamic Studies, is due to start at the University of Strasbourg, in September 200921 and this will be the first degree programme in Islamic studies to be offered in a state university in France. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Even though, with the exception of Alsace, creating separate places in cemeteries according to religions is generally considered illegal, around 70 Muslim sections in cemeteries have nevertheless been opened in major cities such as Montpellier and Marseille and 23 are located around Paris.22 Circulars issued in 1975 by the Ministry of the Interior recommended that prefects and mayors should reserve specific areas for Muslims in cemeteries, while avoiding any physical separation of the allocated space. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
The French law codes of education and health and the penal code permit the provision of chaplains. These people mostly work on a voluntary basis and have no real legal status. The CFCM has nominated head chaplains for hospitals, schools and prisons, but this remains an internal recognition. Chaplaincy has legal status only in the army. Since March 2005, a Muslim head chaplain has been appointed by the Minister of Defence, along with the three existing head chaplains (Catholic, Protestant and Jewish). The head chaplains nominate and manage the military chaplains of their own religious groups. 9
Religious Festivals
Religious festivals or feasts are never organised by the state. Muslim religious holidays are not recognised by the state and public holidays, 21 22
http://master-islamo.mineurel.info/, accessed 19 May 2009. Aggoun, Atmane, Les musulmans face à la mort en France (Paris: Vuibert, 2006).
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given the historical importance of Catholicism in France, follow the Christian calendar (Easter, Christmas, etc.). Official departments and agencies, state schools and employers nevertheless grant leave of absence to Muslims who wish to attend religious ceremonies on occasions such as ‘Id al-Adha, ‘Id al-Fitr and Mawlid. 10
Halal Food
Halal food is nowadays commonly found in supermarkets. Specialist shops also exist and halal business seems to work well.23 As in most European countries, exceptions for ritual slaughter have been made to the Rural Law Code, and the state has given official consent for this to the Paris Mosque (1994) and Lyon and Evry (1995). The local authorities usually try to facilitate the organisation of halal slaughter. Private associations such as A Votre Service (AVS, www.halal-avs.com) make sure that halal processes are properly monitored and provide information concerning halal food. 11
Dress Codes
The headscarf issue suddenly emerged in the public arena during the 1980s with the increased use—or at least increased visibility—of different types of head coverings worn by young Muslim girls in public places. Because of some local difficulties, the French President set up an investigative committee known as the Commission Stasi in July 2003. This Commission released a report on 11 December 2003, stating that wearing conspicuous religious symbols violated the secular principle of the French school system. On this basis, the law on secularism and religious symbols in state schools was passed in February 2004. Article 1 of the law states: “The wearing of symbols and apparel by which a student conspicuously expresses religious affiliation in public schools is prohibited. The rules of procedure provide for concilia23 See Bergeaud Blackler, Florence, “L’Etat, le culte musulman et le halal business”, Colloque Droits, libertés et obligations du culte musulman, available at http://hal. archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/19/05/PDF/papierhalal.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009; Bergeaud Blackler, Florence, “De la viande halal à l’halal food. Comment le halal s’est développé en France ?”, Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 21, no. 3 (2005), pp. 125–147; Brisebarre, Anne-Marie, “L’Aïd el kébir, entre bricolage et encadrement”, Pouvoirs locaux, vol. 69, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 78–83.
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tory dialogue before disciplinary action is taken against an offending student.” This decision was followed by extensive debate as to its interpretation and application, but passions have nowadays settled. Another report was issued in 2004, on the manifestations of religious affiliation in schools.24 New regulations concerning photos used for passports and national identity cards required that the head must appear without any kind of cover, decoration or scarf; there are no exceptions. There were some protests, arguing that a woman wearing a veil should not appear without it, even on a photo, but this did not really lead to an intense public debate. 12
Publications and Media
The broadcasting of religious programmes on public television stations is covered by the law on the freedom of communication No. 86–1067 of 30 September 1986, article 56: France 2 shall schedule religious programmes devoted to the main religions practised in France on Sunday mornings. Said programmes shall be produced under the responsibility of the representatives of said religions and be presented in the form of the live transmission of cultural ceremonies or religious comments. The company shall bear the costs of production within the limit of a maximum amount set in the annual provisions of the terms of reference.
A 30-minute programme on Islam, Connaître l’islam (Knowing Islam) (France 2, 7 Esplanade Henri de France, 75907 Paris cedex 15), is broadcast every Sunday. A very large number of Muslim television channels are accessible by satellite. A number of print publications concerning Islam have existed in France for some time but have now ceased: La Médina, Hawwa-Magazine, Réflexions-Reflets de l’Islam en France, Colombus, Actualis (UOIF), Sézame, Islam de France. They all closed down for financial reasons. The future may lie with electronic publications such as Hanut-ul-muslim (http:// blog.hanut-ul-muslim.com/).
Obin, Jean-Pierre, “Les signes et manifestations d’appartenance religieuse dans les établissements scolaires”, Rapport au ministre de l’éducation nationale, 2004, juin 2004 (2004–115) ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/syst/igen/rapports/ rapport_obin.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. 24
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Family Law
The French legal system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is not relevant in legal matters. However, jurisprudence does sometimes take into account questions of religious affiliation and practice (in matters such as holidays for religious festivals, for example). In 2005, the French government raised the legal age of marriage for girls to 18 (it had been 15 for nearly 200 years). This was to counter the practice of arranged marriage. Chantal Brunel, a right-wing deputy (UMP—Union pour un Movement Populaire), proposed a law against polygamy in June 2004,25 and the issue regularly arises in public debate. This question will certainly have to be dealt with if Mayotte, which recognises polygamy, becomes a French department since Muslim family law applies there. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Public opinion has mostly focused on the question of religious symbols, specifically clothing. For example, the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality—HALDE) recently had to deal with questions of wearing the burka, and pupils’ parents wearing a headscarf when taking part in school outings. Issues related to gender always lead to discussion (special opening hours in swimming pools for women or men only, for example). The question of religious practice regarding food is also an issue, especially in schools, but the debate is not very intense. However, signs tension between Muslims and non Muslims are noticeable. In a 2007 poll, 57% of French people said they would rather “not have a Muslim as neighbour”.26
25 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/propositions/pion1645.asp, accessed 19 May 2009. 26 Borooah, V.K., K. Vani, and J. Mangan, “Love thy neighbour: how much bigotry is there in western countries?”, Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences, vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 295–317.
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Major Cultural Events
The UOIF organises an annual meeting of French Muslims (Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France) and 120,000 people from across France, are expected for the 26th annual meeting in April 2009. Some 115,000 people participated in 2008. In Marseille, the Muslim community has organised a festival, l’Aïd dans la Cité (‘Id in the city) just before ‘Id.
GERMANY Gerhard Robbers1 1
Muslim Populations
There are about 3.1 to 3.4 million Muslims in Germany, of whom 1.0 to 1.1 million are of German nationality.2 These figures (from 2006) are based on rough estimates, since there is no register. The numbers are calculated primarily on the basis of immigration from Muslim countries such as Turkey (about 2.5 million), Bosnia-Herzegovina (190,000), Iran (130,000), Morocco (124,000), Afghanistan 96,000), Iraq (95,000), Lebanon (70,000), Pakistan (50,000), Tunisia (44,000) and Syria 43,000). About 2.5 million are Sunni, between 400,000 and 700,000 Alevis, 200,000 Twelver Shi’is, and according to their own statement, 40,000 Ahmadis. The Muslim population is spread throughout Germany, but in some major cities such as Berlin (220,000), Cologne, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Munich there are substantial Muslim concentrations. While there has been a small Muslim presence for centuries, immigration of large numbers of Muslims as ‘guest workers’ began in the 1960s. Initially expected to return home after finishing work, many of them have stayed in Germany. 2
Islam and the State
Muslim organisations are mostly structured as associations registered under the general association law. It is a matter of controversy whether these associations are religious communities in the sense intended by the constitutional law, which is a precondition for having 1 Gerhard Robbers is Professor of Public and Church Law and Constitutional History at the University of Triers, Germany. He heads the Institute of European Constitutional Law and has been a judge in the Constitutional Court of RheinlandPfalz since 2008. 2 BT-Drs. 16/5033-Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die große Anfrage der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2007; Lemmen, Thomas, Muslime in Deutschland: Eine Herausforderung für Kirche und Gesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001; en, Faruk and Hayrettin Aydın, Islam in Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 2002).
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confessional religious instruction in public schools. In 1998, the High Administrative Court of Berlin established that the Islamische Föderation Berlin (Islam Federation in Berlin) is a religious community, and the Alevi Community in North Rhine-Westphalia has similarly been recognised as a religious community. Various other court cases are pending. No Muslim organisation has as yet been acknowledged as a religious community under public law (Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts), although a number have applied for this status, which gives a number of specific rights, such as the right to levy ‘church taxes’ on their members. Donations to religious communities and charitable associations are tax deductable up to a certain amount and this also applies to Muslim associations. Charitable organisations are in general exempt from corporation tax, trade tax, real estate tax and inheritance tax. Muslim organisations can and do receive public funding for cultural activities, like any other charitable organisation. Five Muslim organisations have been banned (Kalifatstaat, Al-Aqsa e.V., Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, YATIM-Kinderhilfe e.V., Yeni Akit GmbH ) on the grounds that they carry out anti-constitutional activities. The most important Muslim organisations and individual Muslims who are representative of the variety of Muslim life in Germany participate actively in the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference), which was set up by the German federal minister of the interior and discusses issues related to Muslim life in Germany. It is meant to improve the integration of the Muslim population in Germany and has produced recommendations for, inter alia, a basis for common values, the building of mosques, the introduction of Muslim religious instruction in public schools and improved media coverage. Muslim organisations actively participate in inter-religious dialogue and several inter-religious initiatives have been subsidised from public funds. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The local mosque community is the smallest organisational unit. These communities are usually structured as associations in private law and most are made up of members with the same national background. The majority of mosque associations are members of larger associations active on a national level and there are more than a dozen such
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associations.3 Among the most important are the Milli Görüs (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs (IGMG), 26,500 members, 274 mosque associations, Boschstrasse 61–65, 50171 Kerpen, www.igmg.de) and the Nurculuk (Nurculuk-Vereinigung, 12,000 members, Jamaat-un Nur—Deutsche Provinz, Neustr. 11, 51063 Köln, www.jamaatunnur.de). Some of these larger associations have combined in umbrella organisations and alliances of Muslim organisations have been formed in some of the sixteen federal Länder. The largest umbrella organisations at the federal level are: – Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion: Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V. (DITIB), 150,000 members (Subbelrather Str. 17, 50823 Köln; www.ditib.de). DITIB is under the guidance and supervision of the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and is regarded as its representative in Germany; – Central Council of Muslims in Germany: Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V. (ZMD) 12,000 members and incorporates nineteen umbrella organisations with their mosque associations (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, http://zentralrat.de. Members of the ZMD are predominantly non-Turkish Muslims; – Islam Council for the Federal Republic of Germany: Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 136,000 members (Osterather Str. 7, 50739 Köln, www.islamrat.de). Its largest member group is Milli Görüs; – Union of Islamic Cultural Centres: Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e. V. (VIKZ) 20,000 members (Vogelsanger Straße 290, 50825 Köln, www .vikz.de)—a Sunni organisation. These four organisations have formed the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinierungrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM)) which is developing as an important interlocutor with the German public. The various organisations often compete with one another, but also cooperate in questions of common interest, such as Islamic religious instruction in public schools. Estimates suggest that about 10%–15% of the Muslims in Germany are involved in these organisations.
There is also the Federation of European Alevites: Föderation der europäischen Alewiten (AABF); 20.000 members, Stolberger Str. 317 50933 Köln; www .alevi.com.4 It is reported that Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and Iran provide funds for some Muslim organisations in Germany. 3 Wunn, Ina, Muslimische Gruppierungen in Deutschland: Ein Handbuch (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2007). 4 See Sökefeld, Martin (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008).
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There is no specifically Muslim political party and individual Muslims are members of all of the larger political parties. However, Muslim voters tend to support the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party) in elections. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are an estimated 2,600 Muslim mosques and prayer houses, of which about 150 are traditional mosques with minaret. About 100 more are being planned or are under construction. In addition, there are more than 120 teaching centres (madrasahs). There are more than 100 Alevi associations, which run a number of places of meeting and worship (cems), although there are no exact figures. The call to prayer is regarded as part of the free practice of religion, and it is legal for loud-speakers to be used. The interests of both the worshipers and the general population have to be taken into consideration in each case in order to determine what is an acceptable sound level. Urban planning law takes into account the religious needs of the local population and the views of religious associations have to be heard in order to establish the for constructing places of worship. 5
Children’s Education
There are some 700,000 Muslim pupils in public schools and a great variety of initiatives have been taken to introduce Muslim religious instruction.5 In Germany, the general system of religious instruction in public schools according to the Basic Law is confessional. This makes it difficult to introduce Muslim religious instruction in a way that is compatible with the constitution, the most important problem being the lack of representative associations that qualify as religious communities that can determine the content of Muslim religious instruction. In the meantime, Islam is usually taught in classes where the mother tongue and culture of the specific community’s country
5 See Dietrich, Myrian, Islamischer Religionsunterricht: Rechtliche Perspektiven (Frankfurt a. Main: P. Lang, 2006); Coumont, Nina, “Islam und Schule”, in Muckel, Stefan (ed.), Der Islam im öffentlichen Recht des säkularen Verfassungsstaates (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008), pp. 440ff.; Bock, Wolfgang (ed.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht? Rechtsfragen, Länderberichte, Hintergründe, 2nd edn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).
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of origin dominate. Some Länder work with the Turkish authorities to determine the content of this religious instruction and others with local mosque associations. The situation is very variable because schooling is governed by the sixteen Länder. In Berlin Muslim religious instruction in German is provided for about 4,300 pupils by the Islam Federation and for about 190 pupils by the Cultural Centre of Anatolian Alevis. Also in Berlin, foreign consulates are permitted to offer Muslim instruction under their own auspices, but only the Turkish consulate takes up this option. In Bremen, some schools offer courses in Islam and, since 1988, Bavaria has offered a course of Islamic instruction in Turkish for pupils of Turkish origin which some 13,000 pupils attend, and in 2001, Islamic instruction in German was introduced and some 1,700 pupils attended these classes in the school year 2005–2006. The intention is that this will eventually replace classes in Turkish. In Lower-Saxony Islamic instruction is provided within Turkish and Arabic language classes for pupils for whom these are their mother tongues. A similar situation exists in North Rhine-Westphalia, where classes are also given in Bosnian and Albanian; two of the five permitted hours of language study can be devoted to Islamic instruction. About 700 teachers in public schools in North Rhine-Westphalia teach Turkish, Arabic, Bosnian or Albanian and, since 1999, there have been experimental courses in Islamic studies in German in which about 8,700 pupils participate. In Rhineland-Palatinate, mothertongue courses in Turkish, Bosnian, Arabic and Albanian, which are taught under the oversight of the state authorities, are permitted to include Islamic instruction. In Saarland, this is done in the Turkish language classes, and this is the case in Schleswig-Holstein, where the courses are taught by teachers employed by the Turkish Republic via the Consulate General in Hamburg, and the Land has no influence on the curriculum. Alevi religious instruction under Article 7 Subsection 3 of the Basic Law (Constitution) has, since 2008, been the subject of pilot projects in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen. A similar process was followed previously in Baden-Württemberg, where Islamic instruction has been provided in German since 2006–2007 in twelve elementary schools, ten of them Sunni and two Alevi. These courses are coordinated with parents associations and local mosque associations. In Lower-Saxony, about 1,030 pupils in 2006–2007 attended Muslim religious instruction coordinated with the main Muslim religious
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associations in the Land. In Rhineland-Palatinate, an experimental religious instruction programme has been introduced in an elementary school in cooperation with the Turkish Women’s Initiative, ChristianIslamic Discussion Circle, and a Muslim scholar working as voluntary imam at a mosque. In Schleswig-Holstein, Muslim religious instruction was introduced in a number of elementary schools in the year 2007–2008, from grade 1 onwards, in cooperation with the Turkish Community Schleswig-Holstein, the Islamic Religious Community Schleswig-Holstein and DITIB. There are seven public Muslim-run kindergartens (Berlin, Karlsruhe, Munich, Münster, Rüsselsheim, Frankfurt, and Wiesbaden) and many private initiatives for child care. In 2005, the Muslim kindergartens in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden received a public subsidy of around €34,000 in 2005, and Bavaria provided around €30,000 to fund the Munich kindergarten. Three private Muslim schools are functioning. In Bavaria, there are six Muslim childrens’ homes. 6
Higher and Professional Education
At the University of Frankfurt there is a chair and a visiting professorship in Islamic Studies. At the University of Münster there is a chair in Islamic Studies. These chairs train teachers for Muslim religious instruction. The professor of the University of Münster has faced severe criticism from Muslim associations recently because of his questioning of the nature of the Qur’an. In response the government of North Rhine-Westfalia has promised to establish another chair for Muslim religion at the university. Programmes for teachers of Islam are also offered at the universities of Osnabrück, Erlangen-Nüremberg and Erfurt. There is a growing federal and state interest in training for imams, although no programmes yet exists. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Most first-generation Muslims who die in Germany are buried abroad in their former home countries. German burial law has been largely amended to meet the needs of Muslim burial practice. Several Länder have repealed the former obligation to use a coffin, as well rules about the minimum period that can elapse between death and burial. In many cemeteries, including those operated by Christian churches,
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areas for Muslims have been set aside where it is possible to arrange the graves to face Mecca. However, there remain problems in a number of Länder. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Subject to negotiations in individual cases, imams may be allowed into prisons, health care institutions and the police departments to provide for Muslim religious needs. There are about 700 Muslims in the armed forces, but no military ‘chaplaincy’ equivalent to those provided for other religions has yet been established. 9
Religious Festivals
Muslim religious festivals are not explicitly or specially protected in the same way as Christian and Jewish religious holidays are. However, holidays that are not explicitly protected by the holiday laws enjoy protection under the right to freedom of religion or belief: believers in the religion in question have the right to take leave from their employment to attend the services, provided this is compatible with the needs of the employer. There are laws that cover the amount of time pupils and teachers in schools may be away from school to attend the services of their religious community. The range of protection differs in detail between the various Länder, but where there is no legally defined specific protection, a balance must be struck between the religious needs of the believers and the needs of their employer or institution. 10
Halal Food
Halal slaughter is permitted under legally defined conditions. The animal protection law provides for exceptions from the requirement of stunning animals before killing them, but some state authorities try to make ritual slaughter more difficult. No problems have been reported with respect to other types of halal food. In public institutions such as prisons, the armed forces, etc., halal food is available on request.
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Dress Codes
In general, people are free to wear religious clothing or symbols. The headscarf as a religious garment is not prohibited, and this applies to students in public schools and universities. However, covering of the whole face in school is not permitted for educational reasons. An employer must accept the right of a Muslim woman employee working, for example, as a sales person in a perfume shop, to wear the Muslim headscarf. Following intense public debate, a number of Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, Bremen, Berlin, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia) have introduced specific laws to prohibit teachers and other public officials from wearing specific religious symbols. This is in practice aimed at the Muslim headscarf in public schools, and in Berlin and Bremen it also covers other religions and fields of public service. The law in Baden-Württemberg reads: Teachers in public schools are not allowed to express political, religious, ideological or similar views or actions that may endanger or undermine the neutrality of the state towards pupils or parents or the political, religious or ideological peace of the school. Particularly prohibited is behaviour by a teacher that can appear to pupils and parents to contradict human dignity, non-discrimination, the rights of freedom or the free and democratic order of the constitution. The exercise of the task of education and the respectful presentation of Christian and western educational and cultural values or traditions does not contradict the duty of behaviour according to section 1.
The Federal Administrative Court has ruled that all laws prohibiting the wearing of religious clothing in public schools must be interpreted in a way that treats all religions equally while respecting the German cultural tradition. However, this issue remains a challenge to the establishment of an adequate balance between religious freedom for Muslims and restrictions on that right. 12
Publications and Media
The major Muslim organisations issue their own print media. Newspapers and other print media from abroad, including Muslim countries, are also available. There are no specific Muslim broadcasting media. The radio provider Radyo Metropol FM offers a 24-hours, predominantly Turkish-language
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programme in Berlin, Mannheim, and Ludwigshafen. Muslim issues are covered broadly in the general media and public and private broadcasters allow room for Muslim ideas. Muslim organisations are not represented on the supervisory boards of the state media unlike Christian and Jewish religious communities. 13
Family Law
Only civil marriage is recognized in law. Exceptions apply for marriages contracted abroad between non-Germans. Everyone is free to contract their marriage through a religious institution, but such a marriage has no legal standing. There are no legal effects for divorce conducted outside the procedures laid down by state law. Child custody is governed exclusively by state law and is based on the equal rights of the spouses. Inheritance law is exclusively governed by state law. However, the extent to which people follow their own cultural traditions in their private and social lives is another matter. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Intense public debate6 has focused on the construction of the main mosque in Cologne, where building permission was granted despite opposition. In Duisburg, on the other hand, a large mosque has been inaugurated without much public debate. Inter-religious dialogue has continued; the Protestant Church in Germany has issued a hotly debated paper on its relationship with Islam.7 The Islam Conference called by the federal minister of the interior has continued its work. Some 30 Muslim organisations with about 33,000 members are under observation by the security services because they are suspected of anti-constitutional activities.
6 For general background information see Bielefeldt, Heiner, Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2003). 7 EKD, Klarheit und gute Nachbarschaft, available at http://www.ekd.de/download/ekd_texte_86.pdf, accessed 20 May 2009.
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Major Cultural Events
As there is such a variety of Muslim organisations and so many Muslims, there are innumerable Muslim cultural events, but none that could be called countrywide. Every year there is an ‘Open Mosque Day’ on 3 October, organised by the major Muslim associations.8
8
http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=9&sid=50&lang=de, accessed 20 May 2009.
GREECE Konstantinos Tsitselikis1 1
Muslim Populations
At the establishment of Greece as an independent state (1830), Muslims constituted a very small group with almost no institutional special protection. By 1881 and with the annexation of Thessalia, Muslims communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of Constantinople. In effect, the Ottoman system of millet (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved and the local muftis acquired quasi-juridical authority in personal status matters. Muslim schools and pious foundations (waqfs) were recognised in Greek law and were administered by local Muslim Community Councils. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who opted to stay and become Greek citizens. The legal status of the Muslim Communities was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a mutual population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey. As an exemption, 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish-speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus.2 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) became Greek citizens. Today, Muslims 1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre of Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402).
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with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and Rodos and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each island. Another 15,000 have emigrated from Thrace for economic reasons to Athens or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated from Thrace to Turkey and Germany too (more than 120,000 are estimated to live abroad).3 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and express Turkish national feelings. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (Bulgarian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace became controversial insofar as Turkish nationalism, backed by Turkey, attempts to absorb the Muslim minority into a Turkish identity, and Greek policies attempt to foster internal divisions. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in national census after 1951, all the above figures are roughly estimated. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since 1990 as part of the general flow of migration resulting from global political destabilisation and regional wars, and Greece’s geographical position.4 Muslim immigrants come from African and Asian countries, and from Albania. In 1998, 14% of Greece’s immigrants in the area of metropolitan Athens were Muslims from these regions. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Arab countries. Shi’ism is far less widespread, existing mainly among Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. In the 2001 census, immigrants exceeded 820,000, or 8% of the overall population. Around 200,000 of them were Muslims, not including Albanians, the majority of whom are of Muslim background, 3 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie), (Political motivations, co-governmentality and ethnic building: Sociology of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Turkey, Germany)), PhD thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007. 4 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata); Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006).
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but without strongly expressed affinities with Islam.5 Among the communities with an Islamic affiliation, the largest are the Pakistani (15,000–35,000), Egyptian (15,000–35,000), Bangladeshi (8,500– 20,000), Nigerian (2,000–3,000) and Algerian (1,000). Altogether, about 2,000 immigrants are from the Maghrib.6 Other communities have fewer than 300 members. The estimated Muslim population in 2008 (Greek and non-Greek citizens) was 350,000, making 3.1% of the total population of 11,000,000. 2
Islam and the State
According to the Greek constitution (art. 3) the dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three Muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political confrontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.7 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace should be contracted by the government under Act 3536/2007, but the act has not so far been implemented so the imams (hired in each mosque of Thrace) are appointed and paid (out of the waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis who are granted financial support from Turkey. The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by management committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for elections of these committees, has not so far implemented.
5 13% of the immigrant population of metropolitan Athens come from Muslim Asian and African countries (Kavounidou, Tz. and A. Hatzaki, Αλλοδαποί που αιτήθηκαν προσωρινής άδειας παραμονής (Aliens who applied for temporary stay permit) (Athens: Ethniko Institouto Ergasias, 1999). 6 On the Nigerian, Maghrib and Sudanese communities of Greece, see the contributions of P. Onde, S. Ali and M. Ahmet in Marvakis, et al., Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα. 7 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols, PhD dissertation, University of Bergen, 2000. Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www.muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www.iskecemuftulugu.org).
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When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations of Muslims of Greek citizenship as well as of immigrant Muslims. Very limited contacts is observed between minority and immigrant associations, and that only in Athens. In Thrace, there is a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in character, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and one Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi/Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are: – Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği (Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace); president: Ahmet Kara (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel: 0030 25310 29705). – Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği (Turkish Union of Xanthi), not yet registered, president: Ozan Ahmetoglu (P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel: 0030 25410 23614). In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immigrant communities, such as the Pakistanis (Ελληνο-πακιστανικός μορφωτικός σύλλογος/Pakistano-Greek Cultural Association), the Egyptians, etc. Two interrelated associations attempt to express a common Islamic identity for all Muslims, both immigrant and Greek: – Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο (Arab-Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilization) (Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel: 0030 2106910492); – Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας (Association of Muslims in Greece); president: Naim Elghandour (9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel: 0030 2106916055).
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Intra Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear discourse is articulated, but they are all united by concern about practical problems regarding places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideology, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) character of the minority. Internal divisions regarding fundamentalism, the application of Shari’a, Sunni and Shi’a Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 September 2001 event. With regard to Islam in Thrace, theological dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shari’a, or other subjects, are very weak. Religion is entrapped in Greek-Turkish politics. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rodos are officially open and more than 80 unofficial mosques are functioning in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities) for immigrant Muslims.8 According to Act 2833/2000 (art. 7), a mosque should have been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this law was not implemented, the new Act 3512/2006 provided for the construction of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state) through state funding, but this has still not been implemented. 5
Children’s Education
Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. There are 208 elementary, two high schools and two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and are funded primarily by the state and also partially out of waqf income.
8 Tsitselikis, K., “Religious freedom of immigrants: The case of the Muslims” (in Greek), in Christopoulos and Pavlou, Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης, pp. 267–302.
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These schools, as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.9 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups, and on Kos (Platani), the local imam has also been offering kuran kursu since 1994. Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace (487 in 2007–2008).10 A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 (the “7th April School”) caters exclusively for pupils from Arabic countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rodos and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship. The construction of an Islamic cemetery is planned on the outskirts
9 Baltsiotis. L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status,
problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds), Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι Διαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Intervention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87. 10 Hellenic Committee for Human Rights, Ετήσια έκθεση 2007 (Annual Report 2007) (Athens: National Printing House, 2007), p. 367.
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of Athens following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Voluntary initiatives are permitted. 9
Religious Festivals
In Thrace, all Islamic religious festivals (bayram, kandil, etc.) are celebrated and led by official and elected muftis. Minority schools also officially mark Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations and halal slaughter. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right to free time for prayer and religious festivals, but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslims immigrants face practical restrictions in the celebration of religious festivals, as there are not sufficient mosques, but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can using their own resources. 10
Halal Food
Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make qurban (the slaughtering of animals for ‘Id al-Adha) socially acceptable. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food relies on personal networking. 11
Dress Codes
There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress codes. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic dress, especially as far as the wearing of the headscarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population is very limited, cases of intolerance have not been reported.
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Publications and Media
There are about seventeen Turkish newspapers and magazines and about seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish which are run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such as Akide, edited by the Muftiate of Komotini,11 have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem,12 have a pro-Turkish orientation. There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish magazine, Azinlikca.13 Paratiritis, a Greek newspaper, contains some pages in Turkish. Local state radio broadcasts a limited news report in Turkish. In Athens, about five newspapers are published in Arabic and one in Urdu. Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters) circulate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation in Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets. Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ comes up, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices regarding celebration held by Muslim immigrants in Athens, for example. The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has much more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek-Turkish relations. 13
Family Law
In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s international commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotyho). The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law disputes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa)
www.muftikomotini.com. www.gundemgazetesi.org. Among others: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet.gr, www.batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info. 13 www.azinlikca.net. 11 12
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and custody14 and their decisions are ratified by the Greek courts. Although Muslims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic courts, the overwhelmingly majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Women rarely apply to the Greek courts while men overwhelmingly opt for the Mufti. There are no rules to deal with conflict of jurisdiction. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims from an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far. 14 Public Opinion and Debate In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indifferent if not hostile to Islam, which is strongly linked with Turkey. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immigrants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity. As regards Muslim immigrants, a discussion took place after 2000 on the construction of the mosque and the cemetery in Athens. The reserved mainstream attitude of the Church of Greece is very often reflected by the media too.15 15
Major Cultural Events
Events are mostly related to traditional religious festivals. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include the wrestling contests in the mountain areas, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar.
14 Ktistakis, Y., Το ιερό Δίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens. Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132. 15 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, 2009, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Prodromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009).
HUNGARY Gyorgy Lederer1 1
Muslim Populations
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman rule over a part of Hungary was the country’s main contact with the world of Islam although a number of ‘Ismaelite’ immigrants, also known as ‘Káliz’, had served as the eleventh-thirteenth-century Hungarian kings’ taxcollectors, money-minters and guards. The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 was the next major encounter with Muslims. This and the World War I alliance with Turkey led to the recognition of Islam by the Hungarian Parliament in Act 17 of 1916. Very few Hungarian Muslims are known from that period. The Bosniak refugees of the 1930s tried unsuccessfully to have their community legally registered. Currently, the majority of Muslims in Hungary are Arab and Turkish immigrants, including some naturalised Hungarian citizens, but the number of ethnic-Hungarian converts has grown. In the 2001 national census, 3,201 residents declared themselves to be Muslims, most living in or around the capital, Budapest. There are some much higher estimates, such as the widely suggested figure of 20,000, but these are difficult to prove. 2
Islam and the State
Hungary is a secular republic. The role of its few Muslims in public life has been limited in practice to their leaders’ declarations on matters such as international terrorism, perceived Islamophobia, the Muhammad cartoons and inter-religious dialogue. Religious communities can register, i.e., obtain recognition in court that they are covered by Act 4 of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience and Religion. Religious communities
1 Gyorgy Lederer is a Hungarian-Canadian Arabist. He has a PhD from the University of Budapest, where he currently runs a private foundation focusing on dialogue with, and research on, Muslims in post-socialist Eastern Europe.
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as such receive no direct public funding, although Hungarian residents can transfer 1% of their income tax to the religious community or church of their choice. A department of the Ministry of Culture is responsible for formal relations between government and religious leaders in general. 3
Main Muslim Organisations 3.1
Registered organisations
There are three registered Islamic religious communities, none of which has more than a few hundred active members: Zoltán Bolek, an ethnic-Hungarian who resides in Zala County, is the current national Chairman of Magyar Iszlám Közösség (MIK, www .magyariszlam.hu), founded in 1988 by Balázs Mihálffy. Its membership is primarily ethnic Hungarian. Its prayer house is run by Imam György Jakab at 104 Róbert Károly Körút, Budapest. It emphasises its Hungarian patriotism and strong disapproval of what it views as extremist ideas. MIK has been notably involved in national and international charitable activities. It cooperates closely with the Hanif Cultural Foundation (www.hanif.hu), led by the local representative of the Turkish Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Foundation (the Topbas tariqa), Ahmet Bariscil. Two further separate Islamic communities are registered under Act 4 of 1990, both led mainly by people of Arab or part-Arab origin: in 2000, Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza (MME, www.iszlamegyhaz.net), and, in 2003, Iszlám Egyház (IE, www.iszlam.hu), following a split within MME. IE is headed by Salafi-oriented Palestinian-Hungarian Tayseer Saleh, who also manages a charity, the Al-Rahma Iszlám Jótékonysági Alapítvány. MIK has contested the legality of his control. The charity was founded in the early 1990s by the Sudanese Elfatih Ali Hassanein, a well-known regional representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Zoltán Sulok, an ethnic-Hungarian, serves as Chairman of MME. MME is member of, and ideologically associated with, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. IE’s Dar as-Salam prayer house is located at 29 Bartók Béla Út, while MME’s is at 43 Sáfrány Utca, both in Budapest. MME has branches in Szeged, which is the second city as regards the number of Muslims, and in Pécs.
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Civil organisations
The country’s largest prayer room is maintained by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim at 21 Dobozi Utca, Budapest. He and his foundation are practically independent of the three registered communities. There are two tariqas in Budapest, the Süleymanci (6 Makk Utca) and the Fethüllahci (7 Nagydiófa Utca, www.dialogusplatform.hu). In cooperation with MIK, the Süleymancis also have a centre in Pécs, at 3 Borostyán Utca. On Fridays, the Muslims of Pécs are allowed to pray in the Yakovali Hassan Pasha Djami, a sixteenth-century Turkish historical building. The same applies to the Malkoch Bey Djami Museum of Siklós, Baranya County. The independent Aluakf Foundation operates its own prayer house in Miskolc, at 30 Huba Utca. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Apart from the few Ottoman historical buildings, there are no purpose-built mosques in Hungary, only ambitious projects envisioning an Islamic centre in the capital. MME, IE and the civil organizations each rent private facilities for prayer, about ten altogether in the whole country. MIK owns its own centre, which it purchased from the Municipality of Budapest. It is assumed that MME, IE and Sheikh Abdu receive financial support from the Arab Gulf States, while MIK does not. Hungary has a large Saudi visa quota for the Hajj pilgrimage. This has been administered separately by the three registered communities. 5
Children’s Education
There are no Muslim religious schools. 6
Higher and Professional Education
MIK, MME and IE offer lectures on Islam and free Arabic language courses. There are no Muslim institutions of higher education. A few Hungarian Muslims study religion in the Middle East and Turkey. Oriental languages and cultures are taught at several Hungarian universities, particularly Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem (ELTE) in Budapest.
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Burial and Cemeteries
Over the last twenty years, MIK has buried a number of Muslims near the World War I Turkish war cemetery, which it restored in Budapest’s Kozma Utca Cemetery. There is no separate Muslim cemetery. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
On the basis of agreements with various government authorities, MIK has regularly arranged visits Muslims in refugee camps and prisons. Chairman Bolek of the MIK has been invited to explain Islam to the Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries. Upon request, MME also arrange visits to Muslim refugees and prison inmates. 9
Religious Festivals
All communities offer iftar meals at Ramadan and celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. MME and IE do this together. 10
Halal Food
In Budapest, several Muslim-run shops and restaurants sell halal meat and one shop does so in Szeged. Halal slaughter has been arranged privately in the Hungarian countryside. 11
Dress Codes
Hijab is still a rare phenomenon in Hungary. The female members of IE and MME reportedly wear it and many female members of MIK do so too, although this is only expected when attending prayer. 12
Publications and Media
The magazines of MIK (Hívó Szó) and MME (Új Gondolat) appear irregularly, sometimes with long interruptions. In addition to the websites referred to above, www.iszlam.com is another forum of Hungary’s
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online Muslim scene. All communities print proselytising literature, mostly leaflets of varying quality. The series of books published by the Hanif Foundation, including those of Sheikh Osman Nuri Topbas, are translations by Zsuzsanna Kiss Halima, the Head of MIK’s Women’s Section. The national press rarely reports on Hungary’s Muslims, apart from some coverage of MIK’s humanitarian activities abroad. 13
Family Law
Religious marriage, affiliation and belief have no relevance in civil law. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
Public interest in Islam is limited. Most Hungarians discover it through the popular books of the late orientalist Hajj Abdul-Karim Julius Germanus (1884–1979). Post-9/11, anxieties have been obvious. In February 2007, someone shot into MIK’s then empty prayer house, through a window, from the street. IE Chairman Tayseer Saleh’s 70-day arrest in 2004 drew some public attention. He was wrongly accused of preparing to bomb the Budapest Jewish Museum. In 2008, the court awarded him rather modest compensation, with no formal apologies. Arabophobia has been noticeable, due mainly to racism and some immigrants’ earlier criminal activities. Anti-Islamic sentiment has been much weaker. Despite the 150-year Ottoman occupation of unpopular memory, some level of Turcophilia has emerged with time. This is rooted in other, more recent periods of Hungarian history, especially the late nineteenth century. Many Turks and some Hungarians regard each other as sister nations. 15
Major Cultural Events
In addition to the ‘Id celebrations, community summer camps were held in 2008 by MIK in Uzsa, Veszprém County, and by MME near Szeged. In 2008, the Hanif Foundation invited MIK members to Istanbul for a summer course on Islam.
IRELAND Victoria Montgomery1 1
Muslim Populations
Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2006, showed that there were 32,539 Muslims in Ireland, which was a massive 69% increase on the 2002 census.2 However, Imam Hussein Halawa, Chairman of the Irish Council of Imams, has put the figure at closer to 45,000, made up of 50 nationalities.3 Unlike the UK and France, where the Muslim communities are linked to their former colonies, there is no dominant national or ethnic background within the Muslim community in Ireland. The census does, however, show that the majority of Muslims are non-Irish, which obviously correlates to high levels of immigration.4 The vast majority of Muslims in Ireland are Sunni; in 2007 the Shi’i Muslim community in Ireland was estimated to number approximately 5,000.5 While Muslims are found in every county in Ireland, more than half of the community live in Dublin county and city, with Cork home to Ireland’s second largest Muslim community.6 There are no exclusively Muslim residential areas even within Dublin or Cork. Muslim communities in Ireland are comparatively well-off financially, which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland. Sustained
1 Victoria Montgomery is the administrator of the Centre for Advancement of Women in Politics and a teaching assistant within the School of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. She has recently completed her PhD entitled Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland, and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catholic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland”, in Rehman, J. and S. Breau (eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 489–519. 2 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), available at www.cso.ie. 3 McGarry, P., “Muslim community in plea for more burial grounds”, The Irish Times, 30 August 2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/ 2008/0830/1220023440449.html, accessed 5 September 2008. 4 Those citing an Irish nationality in the 2006 census numbered 9,761 while nonIrish numbered 21,613. 5 Interviews with members of the Shi’i community in Ireland in 2007. 6 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), www.cso.ie.
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Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or those wishing to set up businesses. Thus, they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) for example, estimates that there are more than 2,000 Muslim doctors in Ireland.7 However, Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversified the face of Muslim immigration. The early 1990s saw groups of Muslim refugees arrive from Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Growing numbers of Muslim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.8 Therefore, it is likely that the socio-economic make-up of the community may alter in the coming years. There is a dearth of research and literature relating to the active participation of all minority ethnic groups in Ireland, although a report from 2005 did indicate that there was evidence of a growth in activism among immigrants in Ireland.9 While there are currently no Muslims in political office in Ireland, a new group called the Muslim Community Lobby was established in May 2007 to encourage Irish Muslims to use their vote.10 Furthermore, the main Muslim organisations do participate in government consultations on a wide range of issues.11 2
Islam and the State
Ireland is an independent republic based on representative democracy. Although the Irish constitution originally contained a clause (Article 44) which made explicit mention of the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, this was removed by referendum in 1973. The constitution now guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and moralThe Islamic Foundation of Ireland, www.islaminireland.com. Flynn, K, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 223–238 (231). 9 Ugba, A., Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Ireland (Oldenburg: POLITIS, 2005), available at http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Ireland .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 10 The Muslim Community Lobby: www.muslimcommunitylobbyireland.blogspot .com. 11 See Islamic Foundation of Ireland: www.islaminireland.com and Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland: www.islamireland.ie. 7 8
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ity) to every citizen. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any religion or impose any penalties for religious belief.12 Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland with the exception that the state will fund denominational schools. However, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. The IFI, for example, has been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious (and other) grounds and aim to promote equality, while incitement to hatred legislation also applies to religious communities. In addition to these laws there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equality Authority, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism and the Garda Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO). Indeed the GRIO has intervened in two cases where Muslim women were refused passports due to wearing the hijab and resolved the cases in their favour.13 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Society, was established in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) (163 South Circular Road, Dublin, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 4533242, www.islaminireland.com, email:
[email protected]). The IFI established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and other branches of the IFI have been established throughout Ireland. The IFI has a written constitution and an elected council. Membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Muslim is an honorary member. The IFI, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) (19 Roebuck Road, Clonskeagh, Dublin 14, tel: +353 (0)1 2080000, www.islamireland.ie, email contact via a contact form on the website) with a large purpose-built Mosque
Irish Parliament: http://oireachtas.ie. Islamic Human Rights Commission, “Briefing: Good practice on the headscarf in Europe”, 9 March 2004, available online at http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1030, accessed 20 May 2009. 12 13
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and Islamic Centre, which regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland.14 The ICCI was established in 1996 with funding from Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the deputy ruler of Dubai. It performs a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, a library, a gymnasium and a women’s section. A community welfare office was established in 2005, which facilitates conferences and workshops for service providers. There are no significant differences between the ways in which the IFI and the ICCI publicly represent Islam in Ireland, and while clearly the leadership of the two organisations differs, many Muslims tend to pray at both centres, depending on which is most convenient on a particular day.15 Other Muslim organisations include the Galway Islamic Society established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel: +353 (0) 91 751621; alternatively this society may be contacted via the IFI), the Cork Muslim society established in 1984 (Unit D, Sitecast Industrial Estate, Togher, Cork, tel: +353 (0)21 4320301, www.corkmosque.org, email:
[email protected]), and the Waterford Islamic Society, established in 1999 (Waterford Mosque, 1 Viewmount, Waterford; alternatively this society may be contacted via the IFI). Like the IFI and ICCI, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. The Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland (163 South Circular Road, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 8218485, email:
[email protected]) is an organisation set up by Sheikh Shaheed Satardien. However, Satardien’s unpopularity with the main organisations has meant that the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland has not been particularly successful in establishing itself as an umbrella group for Muslims in Ireland.16 The most recent Muslim organisation established in Ireland is the Irish Council of Imams, which was set up in September 2006. (The council can be contacted via its secretary Ali Selim at the ICCI.) It represents all fourteen imams in Ireland, both Sunni and Shi’i. The various universities in Ireland have vibrant Islamic societies.
Flynn, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, p. 226. Interviews with members of the Muslim community in Ireland, 2006–2007. 16 Sheikh Satardien has been vocal about what he perceives as growing extremism among Ireland’s Muslim communities, something which has been disputed by the IFI and ICCI. He has also accused the ICCI of inviting hard-line extremist clerics to preach: Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland Press Release, 29 October 2007. 14 15
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Mosques and Prayer Houses
Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques. The first, the Ballyhaunis Mosque in Co. Mayo was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman. The ICCI in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque, which was opened in 1996. Both ICCI and Ballyhaunis are Sunni mosques. Also in 1996, Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Commonly referred to as Husseinia, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for the Shi’i community and is the only Shi’i mosque in Ireland. Shi’i Muslims outside Dublin tend to pray in private or rented houses or apartments. In addition to these, there is also the large Dublin Mosque and Islamic Centre which is run by the IFI and is currently raising money for an extension, for which planning permission has been granted. There are also rented or purchased houses used as mosques throughout Ireland.17 There has been some opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork for example, the mosque was forced to shut in 2001 over a lack of planning permission for it to be used as a mosque. The community have been praying in rented houses and warehouses ever since, but they are raising funds for a purpose-built mosque. In addition to the mosques, there are also prayer rooms or halls in many hospitals and universities such as the Royal College of Surgeons and Roscommon County Hospital. It is quite difficult to quantify the number of prayer rooms in Ireland, as the number is continually increasing and the locations may change according to circumstance. While the main mosques, particularly in Dublin, are attended by Muslims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there are growing numbers of prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language.18 The Blackpitts Mosque in Dublin is a Deobandi mosque with preaching in Urdu while the Tablighi Jamaat group are based around a mosque in Lucan (Dublin), and the Nigerian community worship in a business park in Dublin preaching what they term ‘African Sufism’.19 In addition
17 The IFI website lists mosques in Galway, Dundalk, Carlow, Portlaoise, Mullingar, Waterford, Limerick, Kerry and Clare. 18 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, The Irish Times, 10 October 2006), available at http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/identity.htm, accessed 11 December 2006. 19 Ibid.
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to these groups, there have been unconfirmed links between the ICCI and the Muslim Brotherhood. While Sheikh Satardien, the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland, has made many such allegations in his publicised criticisms of the ICCI,20 this link may also be explained by the fact that the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) is based at the ICCI. The ECFR is a group that was established in March 1996 with the aim of guiding and meeting the needs of Muslims in Europe.21 The president of the ECFR is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He is seen as one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he claims to no longer be a member, and in fact was offered the leadership of the Brotherhood in 2004, although he declined it.22 5
Children’s Education
There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin, which are funded by the Department of Education. The Muslim National School was set up by the IFI in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Qur’anic studies. There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland, so most Muslim children in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. Religious education is a part of the school curriculum in Ireland, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for communion. However, parents do have the legal right to exempt their children from religious education. There are also many weekend schools for Muslim children run by the mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The ICCI established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and have since extended it to two areas outside Dublin. There is currently a waiting list to attend the school. It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum
20 Satardien, S., “Combating extremism in religion worldwide” Metro Eireann, 8 and 15 November 2007, available at http://www.metroeireann.com/article/ combating-extremism-in-religion,791, accessed 20 May 2009. 21 The European Council for Fatwa and Research: www.e-cfr.org. 22 Belen Soage, A., “Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Portrait of a leading Islamic cleric”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 51–68 (55).
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recognised throughout the Arab world. The IFI runs the Al-Falah Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa. There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education. For a discussion on the hijab in Irish schools please refer to section 14. 6
Higher and Professional Education
University College Dublin offers modules in Islam and the Crusades and Politics of the Middle East. Middle Eastern Politics is also offered in the Limerick University as part of its MA in Peace and Development Studies. Studies in Contemporary Islam form part of the Religions and Global Diversity Programme at University College Cork. Also at University College Cork, political Islam is studied within the Decolonization and Revolution module in the MA Politics programme, and the history department offers a course on the Crusades. The Near Eastern and Jewish Studies course at Trinity College Dublin charts the development of the Islamic religion and cultural traditions, while Medieval Islam is offered as part of the Religions and Theology course. The School of Ecumenics at Trinity also offers courses in MuslimChristian relations. There is no institution offering imam training in Ireland. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin are appointed by the Department of Education. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the school, and whose salaries are not met by the state. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
In 1976 the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. The IFI and ICCI both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. There are no Muslim burial plots or cemeteries outside of Dublin.
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‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are currently no Muslim chaplains within the state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains in the universities in Ireland, although many universities do have Muslim prayer rooms. 9
Religious Festivals
The main mosques in Ireland organise their ‘Id celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The ICCI, for example, has a large hall which is used for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside of Dublin the largest ‘Id al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where in 2006 more than 2,000 people attended. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers.23 Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools or adults working for the Muslim organisations, Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be negotiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached. 10
Halal Food
Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland and there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities. Frozen and tinned halal meat is also widely available. Indeed, in the recent past Ireland had a thriving halal industry which exported halal meat and dairy products to Muslims countries outside Ireland.24 However, the foot and mouth epidemic has negatively impacted on the halal slaughter industry in Ireland, although lamb and increasing amounts of halal diary produce, which are certified by the IFI, are still exported from Ireland.
Fitzgerald, “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”. Halal Certification Information is available on the Islamic Foundation of Ireland website, www.islaminireland.com. 23 24
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Dress Codes
Issues to do with religious dress in schools are currently a matter for each individual school board, although the government is in the process of drawing up an intercultural education policy, which may include guidelines on this issue. There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public institutions although in organisations such as the Gardaí (police) which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly the hijab and jilbab; women wearing the niqab on Ireland’s streets are still quite rare. 12
Publications and Media
No data is available on Muslim newspapers and magazines published in Ireland. However, foreign newspapers, including some in Urdu and Arabic, are widely available. The main organisations each have their own websites which contain extensive articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. There is also a website dedicated to the Shi’i community in Ireland, Shia Muslims in Ireland (www.shiamuslimsinireland.com). In addition to these, an Irish based website, Quran (www.quran.ie), has been recently set up, which provides abundant material on Qur’anic studies. 13
Family Law
Marriages can be conducted by an imam at a mosque which has been registered with the state; the married couple sign the official marriage register which the mosque returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area. However, beyond marriage, the legal system in Ireland is almost entirely secular. Catholicism did play a central role in the identity and politics of post-independence Ireland and Catholic teachings became enshrined in law. Divorce, contraception and abortion were all made illegal in Ireland.
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Public Opinion and Debate
In spite of the Gardaí’s denial that Islamist extremism is rife in Ireland, there have been several negative newspaper articles in recent years linking the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with extremism.25 However, in general the Irish media are rather indifferent towards the Muslim community. Indeed the only poll taken with Irish Muslims was in 2006. While a minority of young Irish Muslims took a more negative view of Ireland, the poll found that overall more than two thirds of Muslims felt Islam to be compatible with Irish life and 77% felt accepted.26 The main debate concerning Muslims in Ireland in 2008 has been the issue of hijab in schools, which has gained international media attention. Most schools in Ireland have to date adopted an accommodative approach where, as long as the hijab was in school colours, it was permitted. However, following a school principal’s request for proper guidelines, the education spokesmen from the two main opposition parties have stated that public schools should not allow hijab.27 As a result of this, the Irish Hijab Campaign was set up. The Department for Education has asked the Minister for Integration to address this issue in the new Intercultural Education Strategy that the government is currently compiling. In a poll for the Irish Times conducted by TNS mrbi research consultants, almost half the respondents said that Muslims students should be allowed to wear hijab in state schools, with a clear majority of young people in favour.28
25 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (2006), “Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland”, available at http://www .nccri.ie/pdf/ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 30 August 2007. 26 Lansdowne Market Research (2006), “RTE Primetime investigates Muslims in Ireland” available at www.lmr.ie/Muslims%20in%20Ireland%20-%20Prime%20Time%20 Investigates.htm, accessed 29 January 2007. 27 Heimani, Z., (2008) “Opposition in Ireland calls for headscarf ban”, The Muslim News (online), www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=3580, accessed 10 October 2008. 28 O’Brien, C., (2008), “Pupils’ right to wear hijab is backed by almost half surveyed”, The Irish Times, 9 June 2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/ 2008/0609/1212947712727.html, accessed 20 May 2009.
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Major Cultural Events
The ICCI hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hundred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. The event is hosted by the Al Maktoum Foundation.
ITALY Stella Coglievina1 1
Muslim Populations
The history of Islam in Italy dates back to the seventh and eighth centuries, when the general expansion of Islam in Europe took place. In the ninth century, Muslim Arabs invaded Sicily and some regions in Peninsular Italy, and Arab dynasties ruled Sicily until the Norman conquest (eleventh century). Arabic and Islamic art and science continued to be heavily influential in Sicily and some Arabic-speaking communities have survived in Sicily from that time (especially near Mazara del Vallo). Thereafter, Islam was almost absent in Italy until the 1970s. By the 1970s (and more consistently by the 1980s), Italy had begun to attract migrant workers, among them Muslims from North Africa (especially Morocco) and Albania. Today, Islam is the second largest religious presence in Italy, after Catholics (an estimated 87% of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic).2 There is no official census of religious communities and little reliable data on the Muslim population in Italy. Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, are an estimated 2.4% (about 1.42 million) of a population of over 59 million3 (data from 2008, www .islamicpopulation.com).4 According to a survey conducted in 2004,
1 Stella Coglievina holds a Ph.D. in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law from the Catholic University of Milan and is research assistant in the Faculty of Law at the Catholic University of Piacenza and the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Florence. Her research activity is focused on antidiscrimination law in the EU and on the status of religious denominations in the European Union. She is the editor of The Protection of Religious Freedom in Europe. Experiences and Challenges (CUSL,University of Florence, 2008). 2 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 (Italy), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108453.htm, accessed 21 May 2009. 3 The total population, according to the official census, June 2008, was 59,829,710 (Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), www.istat.it). 4 Religious Intelligence, a research agency based in London, indicates 1,375,149 adherents (http://www.religiousintelligence.co.uk/country/?CountryID=181, accessed 20 March 2009). Caritas Migrantes, indicates 1,202,396 Muslim immigrants and about 10,000 Italian Muslim citizens (Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007 (Immigration Statistical
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Muslims, defined by nationality, make up about 33% of immigrants; the main countries of origin in that year were: Morocco (253,238), Albania (177,185), Tunisia (68,287), Senegal (52,598), Egypt (48,724), Pakistan (34,253), Bangladesh (33,525), Algeria (20,311), Nigeria (14,903), and Turkey (10,003) (estimates provided by Caritas Migrantes 2004).5 Muslims in Italy are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship. Only about 40,000–50,000 Muslims have Italian citizenship (among them, about 10,000 converts from Christianity).6 Italian citizenship laws are very strict, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier; so many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years cannot obtain Italian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society: as immigration is a quite recent phenomenon in Italy, most foreign Muslims are still first-generation immigrants, living in poor socio-economic conditions. They rarely participate in public life and the number of family reunifications is still small. Muslims are often perceived as an extremely diverse community, without ties to Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy, but those in the major Italian cities such as Milan and Rome are the most known and visible. Recently, Muslims have begun to make a place for themselves in Italian politics, mostly at the local level, while there are two Muslim members of parliament.7 In contrast, even though they are a small group, Italian Muslims are very active in Islamic organisations and in political, cultural and social life and they contribute towards making Islam visible in public opinion and public policies. Dossier 2007) (Rome: IDOS, 2008), pp. 192ff. The chapter “Il panorama multireligioso in Italia (The religious framework in Italy)”, is available at http://www.db.caritas. glauco.it/caritastest/informiamoci/Riviste_e_pubblicazioni/Sussidi2007/Libri/ dossierimmigrazione2007/materiale/panorama_multireligioso.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 5 “Le religioni degli immigrati all’inizio del 2004: gli effetti della regolarizzazione. Ricerca del Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, (Immigrants’ Religions at beginning of 2004: the consequences of regularization. Research of the Immigration Statistical Dossier Caritas/Migrantes”), available at http://www.db.caritas.glauco. it/caritas/dati/news/2004-05/25/Scheda.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 6 Open Society Institute, “Rapporto di monitoraggio della protezione delle minoranze nell’Unione Europea: la situazione dei musulmani in Italia, (Monitoring report on the protection of minorities in the European Union: the situation of Muslims in Italy)” (2002), available at http://www.abuondiritto.it/liberta/religiosa/pdf/rapporto_osi_ italia.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 7 See http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/, accessed 20 March 2009. (Euro-Islam is a Research Network Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University.) It should be noted that immigrants who do not have Italian citizenship have no voting rights.
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Islam and the State
Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority (an estimated 87%) of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority, that are not available to other religious groups. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements between the state and each confession: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese) with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a religious group’s right to worship freely, but a religious community without an accord cannot benefit from direct financial support or obtain certain specific rights (such as automatic access by ministers of religion to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on Recognised Religions. Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim immigrant groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities. A decree of 10 September 2005 established a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)8 at the Ministry of Interior, which has a consultative role in discussing the status of Islam in Italy and the process of reaching an agreement with the state, but it seems that the work of this Council has slowed down considerably since the initial meetings. In 2007 (decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007), the government published in the Official Gazette a charter of shared values for citizenship and integration, prepared by the Minister of the Interior and presented to the members of the Consultative Council, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and freedom of religion.9 A Declaration
8 Web page at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/religioni/ sottotema003.html, accessed 15 January 2009. 9 An English translation is available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration .pdf, accessed 20 March 2009.
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of Intent (Dichiarazione di intenti per la federazione dell’Islam italiano),10 prepared by representatives of Muslim groups and professors of law and presented on 13 March 2008, tries to pave the way for the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an agreement with the state. Despite the absence of an accord with the state, all religious communities, including the Muslim community, are eligible for access to public funds for the construction of places of worship. According to Italian legislation, it is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as publicly owned land for their construction. There are no consistent data about what is happening at the local level: many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding11 because of political concerns (mistrust of some Muslim organisations; concerns about the improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship in order to preserve the ‘identity’ of Italian towns, etc.; see also below, section 4). Sometimes, funds for building mosques come from the governments of Muslim countries.12 3
Main Muslim Organisations
As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The relationships between them are not close and are sometimes even characterised by disagreements, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. The main Muslim organisations are: – Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy, UCOII, via Quattro Fontane 109, 00184 Roma, e-mail:
[email protected], www.islam-ucoii.it),
10 Text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/15/0679_DICHIARAZIONE_DI_INTENTI.pdf, accessed 15 January 2009. 11 See for example: “Italy: Bologna’s mayor backtracks on mosque”, ADN Kronos International, 29 April 2008, available at http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/ Religion/?id=1.0.2117752207, accessed 20 March 2009. 12 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States (2007), p. 41, available at http://www .csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009.
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established in 1990 and promoted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, USMI), created in 1971 by the first Muslim Sunni groups in Italy. UCOII is the main Muslim organisation in Italy and the best known, being connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate). Its leadership includes politicians, professionals and other well-integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian) is different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel.: +39-(0)6-8082258, fax: +39(0)6-8079515; e-mail:
[email protected], www.lega-musulmana. it). This is the Cultural Centre of the Mosque of Rome, connected with the embassies of Muslim states and with the Muslim World League. It has a central role in the organisation of cultural and prayer centres and in establishing relations with public authorities. Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Islamic Religious Community, Co.Re.Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel: +39-(0)2-8393340, fax: +39-(0)2-8393350, email:
[email protected], www.coreis.it) is made up of Italian converts to Islam and active in the public debate. Unione Musulmani d’Italia (Union of Italy’s Muslims, UMI, c/o Edizioni Alethes, via Lago di Garda 46, 00030 Carchitti (Roma), tel. and fax: +39-(0)6-9586760, e-mail:
[email protected]). Its aim is to constitute a sort of political party for Muslims in Italy. Its leader, the Italian convert Adel Smith, is famous for his radical opinions and often provocative speeches (especially his polemic against the crucifix and some lawsuits against Italian writers and scholars.13 Associazione Musulmani Italiani (Italian Muslims Association, AMI, Casella postale 7167, 00100 Roma, e-mail:
[email protected], www.amimuslims.org) was established by Italian converts to Islam. Its importance has recently diminished.
There are also many other smaller organisations (a review is available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/islam.htm), such as the organisation of young Muslims in Italy (Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, GMI, www .giovanimusulmani.it) and, in several cities, centres connected with the main mosque. There are 628 Islamic associations, concentrated in
See Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), Le religioni in Italia, available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_09.htm, accessed 10 January 2009. 13
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northern and central Italy, according to the US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008). The majority of Muslims, however, participate only in the cultural and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house, and participation in the activities of the various organisations is not widespread. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are over 200 places of Islamic worship (258, according to US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008), mainly ‘garage’ mosques. There are only three ‘great mosques’: in Segrate (Milan), Rome, and Catania (Catania is infrequently used). Another mosque, in the municipality of Colle Val d’Elsa (near Florence) is under construction, despite continued vocal opposition by the Northern League political party and others.14 Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (basements and garages). According to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security (AISI) there are up to 774 Muslim places of worship, including prayer houses and associations (data of 2007).15 With regard to future construction, there are problems with funding and planning, often due to the lack of representation of Islamic communities and opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrustworthy. During 2008, there was debate at a political level and extensive media coverage of plans to enlarge the Islamic Centre in Milan (the so-called ‘mosque of viale Jenner’): a huge number of Muslims, affiliated to that Centre, had to pray in the street because of the lack of an adequate prayer house and complications with building permits. In April 2008, the mayor of Bologna suspended plans for the construction of a new mosque on the grounds that the application did not satisfy construction regulations. In particular, they were unable to identify adequate sources of funding or to create a responsible organising body independent from the UCOII, which he alleged was affiliated
14 Many right-wing Italian politicians often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. See, among others, Brown, S., “Italy’s right to curb Islam with mosque law”, Reuters, 16 September 2008, available at http://www.reuters .com/article/worldNews/idUSLG21402720080916?pageNumber=1&virtualBrand Channel=0, accessed 20 March 2009. 15 http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/ 033/004_RS/INTERO_COM.pdf, accessed 10 January 2009.
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with the Muslim Brotherhood, although members of the UCOII have denied this. In December 2008, plans for a mosque were approved in Padova and discussions started in Florence.16 5
Children’s Education
As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during this period. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons (around 9%, varying between regions and schools),17 but there is no data about their religious affiliation. Neither is data available on the school attendance of Muslim pupils: estimates by Caritas-Migrantes indicate that in 2006/2007 they were 184,861.18 All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (art. 23 of decree no. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are paid by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this option has never been taken up by Muslims. Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state funding. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of foreign states, including Libya (in Rome and Milan), Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).19 These schools are authorised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may hinder
16 See: http://www.minareti.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 534&Itemid=9, accessed 20 March 2009. 17 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops, available at http://www.chiesacattolica.it/ pls/cci_new/consultazione.mostra_pagina?id_pagina=328, accessed 20 March 2009. 18 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007, p. 201. 19 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146.
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the integration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.20 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported. According to media reports (not official data) Muslim children sometimes attend this type of school instead of public schools.21 6
Higher and Professional Education
There is no provision for imam training. In 1996 the Muslim Universities League approved a project to run a school to prepare imams and female social workers. The UCOII has also planned the establishment of an educational centre in Bologna to train imams, leaders of the Islamic community and teachers of Islam. However, none of these initiatives has come to fruition. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Special and separate sectors of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Florence, Turin and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In May 2008, a 20 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian s confronting multiculturalism)”, in Ferrari, A. (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff.; about the Tunisian school of Mazara del Vallo, see “Mazara e la scuola tunisina: ‘È un disastro’ ”, Il Corriere della Sera, 13 July 2004, available at http:// www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2004/07_Luglio/13/mazara.shtml, accessed 20 March 2009. 21 The Ministry of Interior have reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Viminale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, available at http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88-scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 20 March 2009. Some of these cases were reported in Parliamentary Hearings on 14 February 2002 (http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/lavori/odg/cam/allegati/20020214 .htm, accessed 20 March 2009) and 13 July 2006 (http://legxv.camera.it/resoconti/ resoconto_allegato.asp?idSeduta=25&resoconto=bt47¶m=n4-00543#n4-00543, accessed 20 March 2009); see also “Scuola araba di Milano: stop anche dal prefetto”, Il Corriere della Sera, 13 October 2006, available at http://archiviostorico.corriere .it/2006/ottobre/13/Scuola_araba_Milano_stop_anche_co_9_061013092.shtml, accessed 20 March 2009.
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proposal to create a Muslim section in some cemeteries in the municipality of Arezzo (Tuscany) was approved, despite strong opposition by some Italian residents. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Ministers of the religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, have access to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to barracks to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provisions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Florence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community to arrange better provision for Muslim patients,22 and in Turin hospital a ‘silent room’ for prayer exists, open to patients of all religions. 9
Religious Festivals
Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals and Sunday as day of rest. Two of the agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic confessions (the Jewish community and the SeventhDay Adventist Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for religious observance, with the proviso that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allow pupils to be absent from school. Because there is not yet an accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the specific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions (mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.23
22 Text at http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=2226, accessed 20 March 2009 (OLIR.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose—Observatory for Religious Freedoms and Institutions, law research database, headed by professor Anotnio Chizzoniti, Catholic University of Piacenza). 23 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_ Document=4357 (accessed 20 March 2009).
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Halal Food
School menus often include special meals for Muslim pupils. At work, menus can be decided by agreement between employer and employees. In prisons, religious practices are to be taken into account, including the preparation of meals. According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by Muslim (and Jewish) communities. 11
Dress Codes
There is no ban on wearing headscarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their headscarves in identity document photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti-terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as the burka, that can hide their identity. In August 2008, controversy broke out over the decision by a museum guard in Venice to deny admission to a Muslim woman who was wearing niqab.24 A recent judgement of the Tribunal of Cremona (November 2008)25 has recognised the right to wear niqab or a burka in a public place, on condition that the woman can be required to have her identity checked. 12
Publication and Media
There are several publications about Islam, mainly in Italian. There is little data on Muslim media, often referring to old publications. There is an Islamic publishing house (www.edizionidelcalamo.com) in Milan (connected with UMI and the Mosque of Segrate, which has published several books and puts out a journal, Quaderni Islamici. Other periodicals include:
24 http://www.religiousintelligence.co.uk/news/index.php?NewsID=2635, accessed 10 January 2009. 25 “Cremona, in tribunale con velo integrale moglie di imam assolta dopo tre anni”, La Repubblica, 27 November 2998, available at http://www.repubblica.it/2008/11/sezioni/ cronaca/velo-islamico/velo-islamico/velo-islamico.html, accessed 10 January 2009.
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– Rivista islamica, www.lega-musulmana.it/Rivista_Islamica/islamica. htm, published by the Italian office of the Muslim World League; – Il Messaggero dell’Islam, published by the Centro Islamico di Milano e Lombardia; – Il puro Islam, http://digilander.iol.it/ahlalbait/ilpuroislam-menu1.htm, published by a Shi’i association in Naples, Ahl al Bait; – Azad, a Pakistani review written in Urdu (director: Ahmad Ejaz); – Assadakah, www.assadakah.it, published monthly by the League of Arab States in Italy: from 1999 to 2001, it included a supplement edited by Co.Re.Is., L’Islam in Europa; – La porta d’Oriente (director: F. Cardini), ed. Pagine, Via G. Serafino 8, 00136 Roma, tel. +39-06-45468600, e-mail:
[email protected]; – Yalla Italia, a supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-forprofit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims (secondgeneration immigrants). In addition, Co.Re.Is. has published various books about Islam in Italy (see www.coreis.it/pubblicazioni). Websites include: – Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by UCOII); – Geovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy); – Minareti, www.minareti.it, a website that offers information and news on Islam; its director is Khalid Chaouki, a Muslim journalist, former president of Young Muslims in Italy; – Mondo Arabo, www.mondoarabo.it. 13
Family Law
Religious marriages, recorded in the civil status registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (art. 8 of the Agreement of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a minister of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by ministers authorised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (articles 7–12 of Law n. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and
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repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. However, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under private international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in cases concerning inheritance.26 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (INPS) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.27 Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognized as a form of adoption.28 The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
There is good coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy in newspapers and other media and many issues have been recently taken up by the media and public discussion, such as the building of mosques, the issue of religious symbols and the headscarf, and the status of Islamic communities in major Italian cities. The media often create erroneous ideas and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists. Some Muslim organisations (UCOII) are alleged to be connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and to support fundamentalism and terrorism. This view leads to a widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population and, in some cases, to Islamophobia. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Those who succeed in being seen often represent a politicised and sometimes controversial Islam. For example, some members of UMI
26 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, pp. 150–155. 27 See http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=3927, accessed 10 January 2009. 28 See, among others, Judgement of Court of Cassation, 2 July 2008, at http://www .olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=4749, accessed 20 March 2009.
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have became famous for their negative attitude towards Catholics and towards some Italian politicians and scholars.29 14.1
Significant polls
Perceptions of the Muslim-West relationships were measured in a poll conducted in 2007 by Gallup and World Economic Forum. A majority of Italian respondents (67%) saw the interaction between the West and the Muslim world as a threat and only a 40% considered Islam compatible with democracy and Western life.30 A 2005 poll was conducted for the Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (Union of Jewish Communities in Italy—UCEI) by ‘La Sapienza’ University in Rome to look at intolerance among young people. More than 50% of the sample (sample size: 2,000, aged 14–18, from more than 100 different towns in Italy) stated that Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric laws”.31 15
Major Cultural Events
No data.
29 See section 3 above. Some Italian scholars have been cited by the leader of UMI, Adel Smith, for their opinions about Smith and his actions (see for example Guolo, Renzo, “Io, processato per una fatwa”, La Repubblica, 27 May 2007, available at http:// www.repubblica.it/2007/05/sezioni/cronaca/fatwa-adel-smith/fatwa-adel-smith/ fatwa-adel-smith.html, accessed 20 March 2009), including Professor Stefano Allievi, who was sentenced for libel to six months’ imprisonment and fined €3,000 in 2007 (see the judgement at http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=4339, accessed 20 March 2009). 30 World Economic Forum, Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue, January 2008, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009 (World Economic Forum is an independent international organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland). 31 See http://www.ucei.it/uceinforma/rassegnastampa/2005/marzo/unita/210305. asp (website of UCEI, accessed 20 March 2009) and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 2006, p. 37, available at website of EU Fundamental Rights Agency: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf (accessed 20 March 2009).
KOSOVO Xhabir Hamiti1 1
Muslim Populations
Achieving independence in 2009, Kosovo is the newest independent state in the Balkans. Kosovo was taken from the Ottomans by Serbia in the Balkan wars 1912–13 and became, with its fast-growing Albanian-majority population, an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia within the federation of socialist Yugoslavia. Its autonomy was suspended in 1989 by the Milošević regime and, after a decade of repression, an escalating armed conflict that started in 1997 between Kosovo Albanian insurgents and Serbian forces was ended by NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999. Kosovo came under UN administration pending talks on its final status and then, in February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. By April 2009, independent Kosovo had been recognised by 57 UN member states, including all but five EU members. No census has been carried out since 1981, and estimates of the total population vary widely, from 1.8 to 2.2 million.2 The majority of the population, about 90%, are ethnic Albanians, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. The largest minority are Orthodox Serbs. Other communities, Bosniaks, Gorans, Turks, Roma, Ashkalis and Egyptians, make up a small part of the total population.3 Islam in Kosovo dates
1 Dr.sc.Xhabir Hamiti is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, and the President of the Assembly of the Islamic Communty of the Republic of Kosovo. 2 The CIA World Factbook estimates that the population will be 1,804,838 by July 2009 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos /kv.html#People), while the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates it at 2,153,139 (http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/, accessed 14 April 2009). 3 These are the ‘other communities’ recognised by the international administration. Bosniaks identify in national terms with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gorans live in the Gora region south of Prizren; they are Muslims and speak a local Slavic dialect. Roma, Ashkalis and ‘Egyptians’ (often grouped as ‘RAE’ to avoid the pejorative ‘gypsies’) differ in their use of Romani or Albanian language and their narratives of origin.
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back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire.4 The majority of the urban population, particularly the Albanians, became Muslims between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The majority of the Muslims of Kosovo are Sunnis.5 The Community of Dervish Orders recognises 12 ‘authentic’ tariqas, of which nine were active before the start of the war in former Yugoslavia: the Rifa’i, Qadiri, Khalwati, Sa’di, Bektashi, Naqshabandi, Sinani, Mawlawi and Shadhili. Among them, the Khalwati, Sa’di, Qadiri and Rifa’i have large memberships with thousands of followers and wide networks of Sufi lodges.6 The Community in the early 1980s claimed to represent more than 50,000 dervishes mainly in Kosovo, and in the late 1990s, a figure twice as large was cited.7 2
Islam and the State
Kosovo is a secular republic with no state religion.8 Although the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) is the main religious community in the country, it is still not officially registered as either an NGO, a foundation or a private organisation. However, even without a clear legal status, it is recognised as a legal entity by the state. The ICK continues to function within the framework of its legal status from the time of the former Yugoslavia, though ironically, even that old status is not officially recognised by the government. Apart from the ICK, many other Islamic organisations have been registered by the state since the 1999 war. The ICK has its headquarters in Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo and is led by the Presidency of the ICK, which is chaired by the Grand Mufti of Kosovo. The Grand Mufti and other religious leaders of the Islamic Community are regularly invited to official meetings and celebrations at the Presidential Palace and the Parliament. The budget of the ICK is mostly made up of donations by the Muslim population, such as zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, and qurbans (hides that
Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998). Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans (London: Hurst, 1993). 6 Duijzings, Ger, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 114. 7 Ibid. 8 “The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 8). 4 5
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are collected from sacrificed animals during the ‘Id al-Adha), and other forms of contribution. Since the ICK does not receive any support from the state budget, it depends on donations from the people in order to function. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The main national Muslim organisation is the ICK (Rr. Bajram Kelmendi Nr. 84 Prishtine, 10000 Kosovo, www.bislame.net), currently headed by Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava, which has 25 branches around Kosovo (called regional Islamic councils).9 The ICK is the only independent religious community for all Kosovo Muslim believers, whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad, and it represents Islam vis-à-vis the state. The ICK is the main institution responsible for the organisation and control of Islamic educational institutions and other Islamic issues, and all mosques, imams and muezzins are under the ICK’s authority. There are other small Islamic foundations and organizations, but they do not officially represent Islam. They are privately owned and operated, and deal mostly with minor religious activities. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Kosovo today has more than 600 mosques. In the major cities, such as Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova and Peja, there are several monumental mosques built during the time and in the style of the Ottoman Empire. The biggest mosque with the highest minaret in Kosovo is the seventeenth-century Sinan Pasha mosque in Prizren; and the most beautiful is Xhami e Hadumit in Gjakova, built in the fifteenth century.10
Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ICK, 2003). 10 Drançolli, Fejaz, “Xhamia e Hadumit në Gjakovë (Hadum Mosque in Gjakova)”, Arkivi i Kosovës Vjetari, vol. 18–19 (Prishtina: Sh. Botuese Rilindja, 1984). 9
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During the 1997–1999 conflict, Serbian paramilitary and military forces destroyed and burned 215 mosques across Kosovo, most of which were historical monuments.11 After the war several mosques have been reconstructed and new ones built, particularly in the areas where the old Communist regime did not allow Muslim believers to have mosques, including major municipalities, such as Skenderaj, Gllogovc, Lipjan, Malisheve, Kline, Istog, etc.12 5
Children’s Education
Neither Islamic nor Catholic religious education is permitted in public schools in Kosovo. There is one Islamic high school, the Alaud-din Madrasa, established in 1952 (during the communist regime). It is based in the capital, Prishtina, and has two branches, one in Prizren and one in Gjilan, and provides education for both boys and girls. The curriculum combines religious and non-religious subjects and more than 1,300 students graduated from 1952 to 2008. The ICK has repeatedly asked the government to include Islamic education in the public school curriculum, but the government has not responded positively to this request. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fsi-ks.org) was established in 1992 with the aim of giving the young an opportunity to study Islam in their mother tongue and in their own country. Students apply to this faculty from various parts of the Albanian territories in the Balkans, such as Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and the Presheva Valley, as well as Kosovo. The teaching staff are Albanians who have completed their studies either in Kosovo or overseas. A four-year programme is offered. By the end of 2008, the Faculty had produced 140 male and female graduates. Both of the main Islamic educational establishments in Kosovo, the
11 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) (Prishtina: Kryesia e Bashkesise Islame te Kosoves, 2000). 12 Ibid.
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Alaud-din Madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies, are under the jurisdiction of the ICK. The diplomas of the graduates are accepted and recognised by the Kosovan Ministry of the Education and they are usually employed as imams and teachers of Islamic education. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Most of the Muslim cemeteries in Kosovo are located alongside mosques. Cemeteries are under the control of municipalities and Muslim cemeteries are separate from those of other religious communities (Catholics and Orthodox). 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
‘Chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. 9
Religious Festivals
‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are organised every year and both are recognised as official holidays by the state. All public institutions are closed during these periods. 10
Halal Food
Halal meat is available in supermarkets in Kosovo since the majority of the population is Muslim and is not an issue that is raised in daily life. 11
Dress Codes
There are some restrictions on Muslim dress in the public arena. The law does not strictly prohibit hijab but women wearing it are generally not allowed to attend public schools or to work in public institutions. There are hardly any cases of women wearing niqab.
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Publications and Media
The Presidency of the Islamic Community has published the monthly religious, cultural and scientific review Dituria Islame (Islamic Knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic Education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Takvim, since 1970. Beside these official Islamic publications, there are some newspapers and magazines, such as Paqja (Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), published by private organisations. Muslims from the non-Albanian minorities do not have Islamic periodicals in their own languages (Turkish, Bosnian, Serbian or Romani) published in Kosovo, but literature is received from abroad. 13
Family Law
Muslims may conclude marriage contracts in mosques, but the certificate of marriage which they obtain from the officials of the Islamic Community is not accepted by the state authorities, so they must obtain a civil marriage certificate too. 14 Public Opinion and Debate The public media in Kosovo devote little space to Islamic religious matters. Television stations do cover the main annual Muslim celebrations, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha, and during the month of Ramadan national television and other privately owned stations provide some space for religious scholars to speak about religion. Apart from that, it is very rare that they are invited to publicly discuss contemporary religious issues. Kosovo daily newspapers rarely report the activities and concerns of the ICKosovo. 15
Major Cultural Events
Besides the two most important Muslim festivals, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha, the dervishes also celebrate two big annual festivals: Sultan Nawruz at the vernal equinox, and the day of ‘Ashura. The celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is another significant day for Kosovo Muslims and is celebrated in mosques in various parts of the country.
LATVIA Egdūnas Račius1 1
Muslim Populations
Though Muslims (mainly Tatar immigrants and other Muslims decommissioned from the Russian tsarist army) started arriving and settling in the then Russian-ruled Latvia in the second half of the nineteenth century, the first Muslim congregation in Riga was established only in 1902. By World War I, it had grown to around a thousand members but during and immediately after the war (by 1920), the Muslim community in the now independent Latvia had shrunk to a mere 150 and further declined to less than 70 by 1935. Today most Latvian Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people with Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although the majority of them did not practise Islam. It appears that the greater part of them chose to leave Latvia after it regained independence in the early 1990s. A small (less than 70 members) Muslim congregation in Riga was re-established in 1993. In 1994, a congregation in Daugavpils founded Daugavpils islāma centrs (Daugavpils Islamic Centre). These were soon followed by other congregations, including splinter groups. As the last official census did not include a question on religious identity, no official number of the size of the Muslim community in Latvia is available. Unsubstantiated estimates of Muslims in Latvia range between 500 and 10,000,2 but none of them distinguish between
1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He has a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim community in Lithuania. 2 Banks, Elena, “Latvia’s Muslim community reaches out”, The Baltic Times, 2004, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9385/, accessed 4 March 2009.
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nominal (‘by background’) and practising Muslims. Islam in the European Union3 gives a figure of 5,000. The head of the Latvian Islamic Community estimated the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 5,000 in 2001—indeed, according to the latest statistics, there are some 2,800 Tatars, 1,700 Azeris, and 300 Uzbeks currently living in Latvia—but added that only 10% were practising. The total number of nominal Muslims in Latvia for 2008 (taking into account the steady emigration of Russian-speaking Muslims from Latvia and conversions to Islam by Latvians) could be as high as 5,000 (of whom only a tenth are Latvian citizens), but Muslims practising on a daily basis would hardly exceed a few hundred. Religious festivals are said to be regularly attended by between 300 and 400 worshippers and occasionally attract up to 500. The overwhelming majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around capital city Riga and Daugavpils. 2
Islam and the State
Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutherans and Orthodox nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) and the ‘new’ faiths; Islam falls into the latter category. Under the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organisations nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in the governing of the state. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organisations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and more rights and privileges than those that choose to remain unregistered, but there is no compulsion for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisations of ‘nontraditional’ denominations are required to re-register annually for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that particular religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association can register per religion. Currently Muslims in Latvia are in the process 3 European Parliament, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future (2007), available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1582.html, accessed 4 March 2009.
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of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association. 3
Main Muslim Organizations
The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia records sixteen registered independent Muslim religious congregations as of 2007. Latvijas islama kopienas (Latvian Islamic Community, including an Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall) (Brivibas 104, Riga, www.islam.lv) is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian-speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian republics). It has several affiliated congregations established, which are aiming to form a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least twenty members. There are several rival congregations with minuscule memberships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community. The second largest congregation is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre, also dominated by Russian speakers. In Riga, there is also a quasi-Muslim (its members in fact deny they are Muslims) Hazrat Inayat Khan Sufism Study Circle, a syncretic new-age-type offshoot of the traditional Chishtiya Sufi tariqa, brought to the Baltics by an Englishman, James Burgess, in the mid-1990s. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. A new mosque (prayer hall) in purchased premises in an apartment, at Brivibas Street 104, was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls. Since the early 1990s, there has been much talk of building a purposebuilt mosque in Riga, but no practical steps have been taken towards achieving this goal, and the leader of the Latvian Islamic Community acknowledged that for the time being there is no need for a new purpose built mosque.
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Children’s Education
Elective religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the public school system. Islamic education (formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in public schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils provide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal weekend ‘schools’. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Languages). There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams (a Sudanese at the Brivibas Street prayer hall and several Russian-speaking Tatars elsewhere) are self-taught. Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and or religious doctrine have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates, but no specifically Islamic education. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Muslims have a separate cemetery in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still kept up by the Latvian Islamic Community. Muslims have been assigned separate sections in cemeteries in Riga and other major urban cnetres. So far no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams in these institutions owing to the very small number of Muslims. The acting imam of the Latvian Islamic Community is occasionally asked to visit hospitals and prisons.
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Religious Festivals
The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. They are open to the public and attended annually by between 300 and 500 people. During ‘Id al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas. 10
Halal Food
Halal meat can be purchased from Halal Chicken in the Plavnieki neighbourhood of Riga. Though Muslim ritual slaughter is prohibited by law for health and safety reasons, it is practised by Muslims privately and halal meat is available through individual members of the Latvian Islamic Community. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photographs for official documents. In fact, only a small number of Muslim women wear hijab (and even fewer niqab), mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. 12
Publications and Media
There are no printed Muslim publications in Latvia, though ethnic minorities, including those of Muslim background (e.g., Tatars and Azeris), do occasionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam.lv (in Russian). It has an on-line forum (also in Russian), but this is apparently rarely used and the site seems not to have been updated since 2006). Another website is www.islammuslim.lv (in Latvian, run by Latvian converts to Islam), which is still under construction but already has a much more active forum. There is another website in Latvian at www.islamlv.netfirms.com.
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Family Law
Muslims, like others, have to register their marriages at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. Several marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of the imam in Riga. Inheritance can follow Islamic regulations if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious faith of the litigants is irrelevant. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Latvia in the local media. Local Muslim leaders are occasionally approached to comment on international events involving Muslims. Muslims generally avoid controversial issues and stay out of politics and even shun publicity. No current opinion polls on Latvians’ attitudes toward Muslims are available, but there is a consensus among Latvian social scientists that Islamophobia in Latvia is on the rise. 15
Major Cultural Events
Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious event, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.
LITHUANIA Egdūnas Račius1 1
Muslim Populations
The most recent official census (2001) included a question on religious identity and produced the following figures: 2,860 Sunni Muslims (no data on Shi’is available), or 0.1% of the total population, 1,679 (or 58.7% of all Sunni Muslims) of whom were ethnic Tatars, 362 (12.6%) Azeris, 185 Lithuanians, and 74 Russians. Tatars have been living in Lithuania (the eastern part of today’s republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as mercenaries and political immigrants. They were given land by the Lithuanian rulers they served. Though over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethnocultural yet well integrated group. Most of the other Muslimst are descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Lithuania has probably increased due to immigration (around 700, mainly Chechens (Department of Migration data)) and conversion (between 150 and 250, mainly resulting from marriages Muslims).2 In the official census, a substantial number (around half of Tatars and Azeris) of Lithuania’s inhabitants from a Muslim background did not indicate their affiliation to Islam but might potentially be considered nominal Muslims. This especially applies to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Sunnis but may still be observant. The total number of cultural or nominal Muslims
1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He earned his Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim community in Lithuania. 2 Data from observations of on-line Muslim Internet forums and personal experience of the author.
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in 2008 could be as high as 7,000, but Muslims who actively practise on daily basis are unlikely to exceed 500. The Lithuanian media and Lithuanian Muslims usually accept the official number, while foreign (Muslim) sources sometimes produce unfounded numbers exceeding 10,000—(Islam Online in 2004 even gave a figure of 110,000!3 Almost two-thirds (over 64%) of Lithuania’s Muslims are concentrated in the capital city Vilnius, the second largest city Kaunas, and the districts surrounding them. 2
Islam and the State
Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority of the population (79% according to the 2001 census). Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognised by a law adopted in 1995 as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths, and the Muslim community through its official representative institution, the Muftiate, is entitled to a modest annual state subsidy to be spent on the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. The Muftiate was first established in the inter-war period in Vilnius by the Polish authorities, who then controlled the eastern part of Lithuania, including Vilnius. It was disbanded in the Soviet period, and re-established in 1998. Both the Muslim community in general and the Muftiate in particular are dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. Leaders of the Muslim community (the mufti and the imam of the Kaunas mosque) are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the presidential palace and the parliament. Other Muslim denominations (such as the Shi’is) have the right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. So far there is no specifically Shi’i religious congregation. Registered quasi-Muslim groups, such as the Sufism Study Circle, enjoy legal rights and protection. Religious organisations of non-traditional denominations may seek state recognition after being registered for 25 years.
3 Ahmed, Damir. “Lithuanian Muslims Fearful After ‘Terror’ Arrests”. IslamOnline.net, 22 July 2004. http://islamonline.net/English/News/2004-07/22/article01.shtml, accessed 4 March 2009.
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Main Muslim Organisations
There are almost a dozen registered Muslim organisations throughout Lithuania. The main one is the Vilnius-based Lietuvos Musulmon’ Sunit’ Dvasinis Centras —Muftijatas (The Spiritual Center of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate, Vivulskio str. 3, Vilnius), (re)established in 1998 and dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. The mufti is elected for a five-year term by representatives of local Muslim (until today exclusively Tatar) congregations. Most other Muslim organisations (which are also dominated by Lithuanian Tatars) are subordinate to the Muftiate. The Muftiate has close relations with the Turkish embassy which supplies imams (appointed as cultural attachés at the Turkish embassy) for the Vilnius congregation. They are paid by the Turkish state and each remains in post for four years. The current imam is the fourth to be appointed under this arrangement. However, a much more active organisation is the Arab dominated Kaunas-based Lietuvos musulmon’ jaunimo bendrija (Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society, Totori’ str. 6, Kaunas), which is engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, and organises and takes part in the religious education of local Muslim young people. There are no other Muslim organisations of note, though some are engaged in the propagation of Islam on the Internet (e.g., a congregation called al-Tauhyd registered in Klaipëda). 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Although a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, only four of them remain (three wooden, built in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one brick, built in early 1930s), of which only the Kaunas (brick) mosque is regularly used, by both local Tatars and foreign (mainly Arab) students. In addition, in the capital city Vilnius there is one official prayer hall adjacent to the Muftiate, which is used by Tatars, Turks and others. A purpose-built mosque is expected to be erected in the near future on the outskirts of Vilnius, as the Vilnius City Municipality has finally allocated a plot for that purpose in 2008. However, the Muslim community has not yet formally accepted the offer. It is known that some Muslim groups (presumably ethnically/nationally orientated) gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (both in Vilnius, and in Klaipëda and Panevëžys).
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Children’s Education
Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Catholic (in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox); non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious instruction is entirely extra-curricular, and is provided by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools. There are around eight of these in Vilnius, Kaunas and the traditionally Tatar villages of Nemëžis, Keturiasdešimt totori’ (data from the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania). Such schools have no official status and their curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education or any other state agency. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at Vilnius University (in the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, and the Centre of Oriental Studies) and the Lithuanian Military Academy. The Centre of Oriental Studies temporarily (between 2000 and 2006) offered a BA in Arabic Studies but abandoned it because of a shortage of academic staff. Elsewhere (at Vilnius Pedagogical University and Vilnius Theological Seminary), classes on Islam tend to be offered on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. All acting imams received their formal education abroad (in Lebanon, Russia or Turkey). 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Tatars have had separate cemeteries since the first began settling in Lithuania. Most Muslim cemeteries have been traditionally located next to mosques. A dozen cemeteries (in Nemëžis, Raižiai, on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the present time and some still serve as burial sites for the community. A fair number of non-religious Tatars use general cemeteries for burial. no need has yet arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery.
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‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no imams in either the armed forces, prisons, or hospitals as there is virtually no need for their services. Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. Muslims can make use of these for private prayer. 9
Religious Festivals
The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas and Raižiai (Alytus district) are open to the public. ‘Id al-Adha is attended annually by up to 500 people with several dozens of animals sacrificed in Raižiai. No permission to sacrifice animals near the mosque in Kaunas is given. 10
Halal Food
No halal abattoirs have yet been opened. Frozen halal meat (mostly chicken) is available in several supermarkets. Several individual Muslims perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers and they sell this halal meat to their coreligionists. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules restricting the wearing of Islamic dress in public or by pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays when attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim females (Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public and on daily basis. There have been no reports of Muslim women wearing niqab. 12
Publications and Media
The sole printed Muslim periodical (with an on-line version) is a 32page monthly, Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars, circulation 800), in Lithuanian with inserts in Polish and Russian, published by the Lietuvos totori’ bendruomeni’ s[junga (Union of Lithuanian Tatars’ Communities). It
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is ethnically focused with occasional articles on religion. The two main websites in Lithuanian run by Muslims for the benefit of Muslims and those wishing to get acquainted with Islam are www.islamas.lt (administered by Lithuanian converts to Islam residing abroad) and www .musulmonai.lt (run by Arabs residing in Lithuania). The former has an extensive on-line forum. The Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society has published a range of translated books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice, which are distributed at Kaunas mosque. There is a separate Shi’ite website at www.freewebs.com/shia_lt. 13
Family Law
Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques, which are then registered with a municipal civil registry office. In the past decade a dozen or so marriage contracts have been signed under the supervision of the imam. Wills can stipulate that inheritance be apportioned according to Islamic rules if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the litigant is irrelevant. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Occasionally local Muslim leaders are approached to comment on international events involving Muslims, but otherwise Muslims tend to avoid publicity. The most recent though little discussed matter that was publicly reported was the allocation of a plot for the construction of a mosque on the outskirts of Vilnius. The media reported this but there was little public reaction. Recent polls show, however, that Lithuanian public opinion is slowly but steadily turning against Muslims: representative surveys (conducted by the Centre of Ethnic Studies) report that some 45% of Lithuanians would not want to have Muslims as neighbours. 15
Major Cultural Events
Sabantujus is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports) and there is an annual youth summer camp which includes some religious instruction.
LUXEMBOURG Sylvain Besch1 1
Muslim Population
It is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since it is forbidden to register the religious affiliation.2 In May 2004, the Muslim population was estimated at 8,898 persons (1.48% of the total population).3 This estimate is based on the numbers of people whose nationality indicates that they from a predominantly Muslim country (source: Répertoire Général des Personnes Physiques (RGPP, the civil register) and on estimates from the Centre Culturel Islamique de Luxembourg (CCIL, Luxembourg Islamic Cultural Centre), especially of people of various nationalities who have converted to Islam. According to this estimate the ‘European’ Muslim population accounts for 79% of the total Muslim population in the country. Using nationality as a basis, the biggest Muslim groups as of 1 January 2008 were: Bosnians (2,974), Moroccans (427), Turks (386), Albanians (339), Iranians (294), Tunisians (207) and Algerians (207) (RGPP). In addition, there would have been many Muslims among the 7,206 Serbian-Montenegrins and 1,602 Yugoslavs, especially people from Sandjak and Kosovo.4 Muslims are concentrated in the urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups5 live in the city of Luxembourg and 43% in the four biggest cities of the country (RGPP). The municipality of Wiltz in the north of the country has a significant Bosnian community (5.4% of the total population).
1 Sylvain Besch is head of research at the SeSoPI-Centre Intercommuntaire and a member of the Consultative Commision on Human Rights in Luxembourg. 2 Article 15 of the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning the activities and opinions of persons in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 3 Estimates by SeSoPi-CI and the Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg (CCIL), Besch, Sylvain, Lucile Bodson, Nénad Dubajic, Claudia Hartmann, Michel Legrand, Discrimination à l’emploi (Discrimination in the workplace). Complete version. CEPS/INSTEAD, December 2005, Cahiers PSELL, no. 151, pp. 91–92. 4 Estimated to number 2,985 in 2004. 5 I.e., the seven nationalities listed above.
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The majority of the Muslims in Luxembourg arrived in Luxembourg in the 1990s as refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnians from Bosnia, Albanians and Muslims from Kosovo, and Serb and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By the municipal elections in 2005, 13% of the Bosnians aged 18 or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote. Currently, about 300 adults attend Friday prayer regularly in the mosques. 2
Islam and the State
There is no official church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catholic Church is the most important. The constitution provides for freedom of religion, the freedom to exercise religion in public and the freedom to express religious opinions (Art. 19). The constitution allows the state to enter into agreement with the various religions (Art. 22),6 which regulate the relationship between the state and those religions.7 The various agreements confer the status of legal personality on religious communities. On 6 July 2007, the government approved a proposal for an agreement to regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community.8 In order to come into force, the agreement must be passed in law. Before that can happen, the Muslim Community must, within half a year of signing the agreement, adopt rules to regulate, among other things, the internal organisation of the religious community and the recruitment of members. These rules must be approved by the minister of religion on the recommendation of the government. The bill must then be presented in parliament within a month of approval being given. Religious communities, whether recognised or not, always have the possibility of creating profit-making and not-for-profit associations, and these associa6 A number of conventions were agreed upon on 31 October 1997 by the state and the following religions: the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece. These agreements came into force by law on 10 July 1998. Since then, two more churches have obtained an agreement: the Romanian and Serbian Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church of Luxembourg. These agreements came into force by law on 11 June 2004. 7 “The intervention of the state in the nomination and appointment of the leaders of religious communities, the procedures or nominating and dismissing priests, the possibility for the above mentioned to correspond with their superiors and to publish their documents, as well as the relationship between State and Church.” 8 The proposal was presented to the press by the minister of religion on 24 July 2007.
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tions can obtain subsidies from the state and the municipality. Some of the Muslim associations so formed have already benefited from this for the organisation of public events, especially from the state (Ministry of Family—Commissariat du Gouvernement aux Etrangers). The proposed agreement foresees that the employed priests should be appointed on equal terms with civil servants. In the case of Islam it will be a mufti, whose nomination will be approved by the minister of religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him, five imams and a secretary. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (CCIL), in Mamer (2, rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel: 31 00 60, fax: 26 31 04 26, e-mail:ccil@ pt.lu) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was established on 1 February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 600 paying members of 30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,500 people when their families are included). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (Association Islamique et Culturelle du Sud ) in Esch/Alzette (44, rue de Luxembourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel/fax: 26540784, e-mail:
[email protected]) was established on 1 March 2002, and its members are mainly Serbian and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North (Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord ) was established on 26 December 2006 and was initially named the Cultural Centre of Sandjak (Centre Culturel du Sandjak). Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rte de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel. 26950680, fax: 26950681) and it is mainly frequented by Serb Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Religious and Cultural Centre in the West (Association Cultuelle et Culturelle Islamique de l’Ouest) in Differdange-Niederkorn (64, rue de l’Eglise, L-4552 Niedercorn) was established on 15 June 1999, when it was called the Association of Muslims in Luxembourg (Association des Musulmans du Luxembourg). Its members are first and foremost Bosnians from Bosnia and Kosovo and Montenegrins from Sandjak. These four cultural centres are organised within the framework of the Shoura, the Grand- Grand-Duchy Council of the Muslim Cult, established in 2003. An association called Le Juste Milieu (LJM, the Middle Way, also called in Arabic Al Wassat) was established on 1 February 2008 and
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is based in Luxembourg-Bonnevoie (32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel: 621491979, e-mail:
[email protected]) and its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are five mosques/prayer houses and they are situated in buildings in Mamer, Differdange, Esch/Alzette, Mamer, Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, Wiltz (Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord) of the five mentioned associations. There are currently two imams employed and paid by the community. 5
Children’s Education
The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.9 The Catholic Church organises the religious education in primary school, and the Archbishop of Luxembourg is the employer of the teachers who teach religious education and is responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in post-primary school. The students can choose in both primary and post-primary school to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third possibility. The educational programme in primary schools for lessons in religion and ethics anticipates that they will cover intercultural and interreligious topics.10 The major religions are covered in the classes on religion, ethics and civics and in history classes in post-primary school. All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults. At present, around 370 children are taking Islamic education courses in the five mosques. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Education in Islam is part of the basic instruction provided by the Institute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (basic theology and history). In 2008/09 the further education programme for teachers Memorandum A No. 67, 21 August 1998. Erzdiözese Luxemburg, Rahmenrichtlinien für Religionsunderricht in der Primärschule, August 1998. 9
10
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of religion provides, among other things, for religious instruction in the framework of religious pluralism and dialogue between Christians and Muslims.11 The Archbishop of Luxembourg has organised a day of diocesan training in pastoral service for priests, the deacons and laypeople, and a week of study on the theme “Together before God?!? Possibilities for interreligious dialogue in Luxembourg, especially with Islam”. A further education course has been organised by the ethics committee at the Kirchberg Hospital on the theme “The end of life in various religions”. Both of the imams serving in Luxembourg were educated abroad. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim community has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxembourg City, where they can bury according to the Islamic ritual. They will also be offered another parcel of land at the Esch-Lallange cemetery in Esch-Alzette. The CCIL established a mutual insurance company in 200112 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of a funeral service carried out with the assistance of the imam from CCIL. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased person can also be met. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell- room’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff try to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. In Schrassig prison, Islamic prayers can be organised and the imam visits regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre for people without a residence permit, specifically stipulates that the religious conviction of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities for them.13 11 Cf., Kirchlicher Anzeiger für de Erzdiözese Luxemburg, No. 6, July-August 2008, p. 96 and 101. 12 Memorandum B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 13 Se articles 3(1) and 12(2) in: Document parlementaire No. 5947 of 4 November 2008.
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Religious Festivals
Before the holiday of ‘id/bayram the Minister of Education has informed the class teachers of the date of this holiday, and asked them to accept the letters of the parents asking for a day off for their children. Labour legislation does not anticipate any specific arrangements. It is up to the employee to ask for a day of absence to participate in the religious holidays. A study of discrimination at the workplace shows that in some cases the employers have paid attention to the religious practice of the employees and established facilities for them to practice their religion or to respect the religious diversity of the workforce.14 In the public sector the flexible work hours give a better opportunity to combine work with certain religious practices for example the fast. 10
Halal Food
There is one Islamic butcher’s shop and about ten Balkan grocery stores and a supermarket in Auchan in the city of Luxembourg, where halal meat is available. Halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg.15 Muslims also buy halal meat in Belgium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition on ritual slaughter, Muslims sometimes send a gift of money to their native country so that people there who are less well off can make the sacrifice. This is especially the case at ‘Id al ‘Adha. 11
Dress Code
As far as the dress code for students is concerned, the Minister of Education drew attention in 2004 to the regulations in force,16 which prescribe that “the dress of the students must be correct” and that “special clothes may be required for lessons of gymnastics, art and manual and practical classes”.
Besch et al., Discrimination à l’emploi, p. 99. Article 8 in the law of 15 March 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without anaesthesia, cf. Memorandum A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 16 Article 10 of the regulation of 29 June 1998 on order and discipline in secondary and secondary professional schools. 14 15
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There have been no cases of students refusing to participate in sporting activities because of their religious conviction. The amended version of the law on education17 provides that, with the exception of teachers in religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by way of conspicuous dress or signs. 12
Publications and Media
Al-Qalam (The Pen), the journal of the Muslims in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg has been edited by the CCIL and published six times a year since 1990. The existing websites are: – The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand Duchy, www.islam.lu, in French and German, has existed since 1 September 1997; – The Islamic Cultural Center in the South http://dzematesch.zap. lu, in Bosnian; – The Islamic Cultural Center in the North www.ccin.lu, in five languages (French, German, English, Bosnian and Arabic). 13
Family Law
Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Polygamy is forbidden.18 The laws in Luxembourg provide the legal basis for the annulment of forced marriages.19 The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an EU directive are subject to a formal process of recognition before they can be legally accepted in Luxembourg.20 Divorce by repudiation is considered to be a violation of public order. It is possible for partial legal recognition to be given; for example, a
Document parlementaire No. 5758, 11 September 2008. Article 147 in the civil code stipulates: A second marriage is not allowed before the dissolution of the first. 19 Article 180 in the civil code. A bill has been put forward with the aim of fighting forced marriages or partnerships. 20 Article 678 in a new code on civil procedures. 17 18
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divorce may be recognised but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
In 2008, there was no public debate on Islam. In 2007, the planned agreement with the Muslim community provoked a debate about the separation between state and church and led to criticism of the planned agreement.21 The Luxembourg Socialist Party (LSAP) formally opposed the idea of teaching Islam in schools.22 Individuals and organisations have specifically criticised the ill treatment of animals in ritual slaughter.23 A public opinion poll carried out in October 2003 by l’Institut Luxembourgeois de Recherches Sociales et d’Etudes de Marché (ILRES) among 1,000 people on the perception of Islam showed both positive and negative opinions on Islam.24 According to a representative opinion poll on religious education in Luxembourg,25 49% of the population thought that living in a multicultural and multireligious society was an important subject in religious education.
21 The association Liberté de conscience (Freedom of conscience) mind has opposed the agreement with the Muslim community and this kind of agreements in general, cf. Zeitung, 3 October 2007, p. 10. 22 Cf., “Cours de religion à l’école: Interroger le CVS”, Quotidien, 4 October 2007, p. 3. 23 The Association Luxembourgeoise pour la Protection des Animaux (APA, Association for the Protection of Animals) has published its position concerning ritual slaughter: “Betrifft: Schlächten in Luxembourg”, Tageblatt Leserforum, 13 September 2007, p. 6. 24 Of the Islamic traits thought of positively, the diversity of Islam (88%), modesty and discretion (74%), the Muslim presence as an opportunity for cultural enrichment (64%), hospitality (56%) were among those that got the highest score, except that almost 90% of respondents thought that Islam sees women as inferior to men. Negative aspects of Islam expressed by less than 50% of respondents included: the strangeness of Muslims (48%), the various threats that Islam and Muslims represent: imposition of their laws (41%), temptation to terrorism (39%), inclination to violence (38%), threat to fundamental freedoms (36%), and threat to Christian religions (25%). In contrast, the contributions of Islam to culture and science were only recognised by 38% of respondents. Overall, there was a perception that Muslim dress was strange and a perception that physical and political violence were related to Islam (cf., Legrand, Michel, Les perceptions de l’Islam et des musulmans par les habitants du Luxembourg, in Forum No. 241, 2004. 25 Opinion poll on religious education in Luxembourg, TNS-ILRES, Luxembourg, July 2008.
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Major Cultural Events
The Islamic Cultural Centre in Mamer took part in a friendship party organised by the parish of Mamer in July 2008 . The Centre organises celebrations at the end of the school year and since 2006 has arranged pilgrimages to Mecca. In 2007, the ICCL organised open-door events to inform the public about Islam in Luxembourg.
MACEDONIA Muharem Jahja1 1
Muslim Populations
The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.2 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started to become Muslims with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from Ottoman times. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Macedonia has probably increased due to a high fertility rate (around 2.5%). Conversions are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.3 In the official census, Macedonian-speaking Muslims, as they are officially labeled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to call themselves Turks or Albanians), are classified under the ‘other’ category of the census and are not included among the country’s Muslims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2008 might be in the vicinity of 700,000. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000 and another 300,000 might pray on Fridays and fast in Ramadan.4 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the
1 Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje. He holds a BA in Islamic Law and an MA in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia, and include his most recent paper, “The municipality of Gostivar in the period 1318–1900 according to the Salname (Yearbook) of the Vilayet of Kosovo”. 2 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). 3 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 4 Interview with representatives of the IRCM in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009.
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second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities. 2
Islam and the State
Macedonia’s Constitution describes it as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the population, 66% according to the 2002 census, counting the ethnic Macedonians, Serbs, and Vlachs who are Orthodox Christians. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija (Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia, IRCM).5 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid for out of the private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the presidential palace, the parliament and the government but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastructure or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and Shi’a, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis there are Sunni Sufi tariqas, such as the Khalwatis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa’is (mainly in the capital Skopje).6 The IRCM and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure.
5 6
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 55.
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Main Muslim Organisations
The main Muslim organization is the Skopje-based Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija (Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia, IRCM, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, tel: +389-2-3117410, fax: +389-2-3117883, www.bim.org.mk), (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The IRCM, which follows the Hanafi legal school,7 is organised into thirteen separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the IRCM is known as Rais al-ulama. Other active organisations are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature include the Skopje-based Logos-A (www.logos-a.com.mk). The main charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal. There are tens of political parties affiliated to the Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the Parliament by more than 30 MPs. Their politics are ethnic rather than religious. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Currently, there are around 600 purpose-built mosques,8 some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Yahya Pasha, Isa Bey, Mustafa Pasha, Murat Pasha, and Sultan Murat. Other famous mosques include: in Tetovo, the Painted Mosque (Aladja Mosque), and the Saat Mosque (Clock Mosque); in Bitola, the Isaac Mosque, Haydar Kadi Pasha and New Mosque; in Prilep, the Charshi Mosque; in Gostivar, the Saat Mosque; in Ohrid, the Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha Mosque. The languages used for preaching include Albanian, Macedonian, Turkish, Bosnian and Roma. There are also tekes that are used for prayer. Purpose-built mosques continue to be constructed in a number of places. A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the IRCM were nationalised with the advent of Communism after World War II.
7 8
The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 1. Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, January 2009.
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Despite the de-nationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. 5
Children’s Education
Religious education in public schools, introduced in 2008, is optional and is offered in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only; non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘history of religions’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. Due to language differences, ethnic groups attends separate classes in public schools, based on their native language, from elementary to secondary level. There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa), established in 1984 and run by the IRCM. It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the IRCM, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the IRCM. However, the Ministry of Education and Science decided in 2009 that Isa Bey Madrasa will become a publicly funded school from 2010 and will be under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The school will receive finance from the state budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes will also entail changes in the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. In addition, Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or maktabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teachings as an extra-curricular voluntary activity. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The main higher educational institution for Islam is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Sciences, established in 1997 by the IRCM (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, www.fshi.edu.mk). In 2008, parliament enacted the law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be transformed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Faculty will receive funding from the state, in addition
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to donations from other sources. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological universities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. There is no separate institution for imam training in Macedonia. All the imams who are in post received their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Faculty of Islamic Sciences and/or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Syria). 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cemeteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. Though provided for by legislation, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the religions in the country. There are efforts to build or allocate separate spaces for prayer in prisons. 9
Religious Festivals
There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in major Muslim towns such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo. The first day of ‘Id al-Fitr is an official holiday for all citizens of the country and the first day of ‘Id al-Adha is an official holiday for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of the Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the president or prime minister (who are usually Orthodox Christians). ‘Id al-Adha is celebrated around the country with thousands of Muslims attending qurban sacrifice. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, Mi’raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra.
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Halal Food
No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Brazil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of restaurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using meat from animals they slaughter themselves. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. There are rules that ban the use of photographs taken in hijab for ID cards. Approximately half of Muslim women, mainly the older ones, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab under Wahhabi influence. 12
Publications and Media
The main periodical is the monthly El Hilal (Hena e re in Albanian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the IRCM; its main focus is on Islamic religion. The main Albanianlanguage print and broadcast media occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or other Muslim festivities. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. The Asr publishing house produces Dritarja (Window), a children’s journal with Islamic religious content. Websites such as www.bim.org.mk (administered by the IRCM), www.fri.org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and www .makislam.info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for a Muslim public and for interested non-Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM TV and TV2 Macedonian National Television.
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Family Law
Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or muftiates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Muslims continue to conduct nikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recognised by the local court. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The rules for the appointment of the Head of the IRCM and other changes made in the constitution of the IRCM were a major point of public debate during 2008, and the media devoted substantial attention to the issue. The discussion rested on the confrontation between imams of various mosques and the head of the IRCM. Recent polls show that overall public opinion about Muslims is positive: a representative survey (conducted by Gallup Balkan Monitor, www.balkan-monitor.eu) shows that some 70% of ethnic Macedonians trust their Muslim neighbours. The results showed that the people of the country trust their religious organisations. 15
Major Cultural Events
There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cultural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated only by Bektashis.
MALTA Martin R. Zammit1 1
Muslim Populations
The National Statistics Office (NSO) of Malta has never conducted a census concerning the Muslims in Malta.2 According to the estimate of Malta’s main imam, there are about 5,000 Muslims in Malta, amounting to 1.2% of the total population of 410,290.3 The majority of Muslims in Malta are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’is worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Corradino Hill Islamic Centre (Paola). Around 1,000 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. The same imam reports that around 300 native Maltese have converted to Islam. Muslim illegal migrants housed in detention centres and open centres are estimated to number 2,000. Islam reached Malta in 870 CE with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. During the ensuing Norman rule from 1091, the Muslims coexisted peacefully with the other inhabitants. The Muslims were expelled by the Hohenstauffen King Frederick I Sicily sometime before 1250. During the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam made a return to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close political and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Muslims from various Arab countries settled in Malta, and in 1982 the Islamic Centre at Paola was established. The 1992 United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie issue led to Malta being Libya’s only gateway to the world, and the number of Libyans in Malta increased substantially. Since Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the number of Libyan visitors has fallen dramatically as a result of visa restrictions. In general, Arab Muslims in 1 Dr Martin R. Zammit is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Arabic and Near Eastern Studies, University of Malta. 2 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (316km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. 3 NSO figures published in September 2008.
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Malta retain Arabic as the language of communication among themselves, but switch easily to Maltese or English with other members of Maltese society. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims in general integrate well with the Maltese context. They live in various towns and cities on the island of Malta, with a minority living on the second island, Gozo. 2
Islam and the State
Malta’s constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.4 The Imam is on very good terms with state and religious authorities and has regular access to them. In 2008, the Catholic Archbishop of Malta visited the Islamic Centre and prayed with the Imam inside the mosque. However, Islam is not recognised by law, the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, and Muslims do not enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges. The state does allocate money to Catholic schools, which has prompted the Muslim community to make representations to receive similar treatment. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) in Tripoli, Libya, established the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola PLA 9037, Malta, tel. 00356-21-697203, fax. 21697574; e-mail: islamicsociety@ waldonet.net.mt). The Centre aims to provide services for the Muslim community, to acquaint the Maltese public with Islam, and to foster interfaith dialogue. The Centre offers religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for around. 500 worshippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers Arabic and English courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, it contains a conference hall, a library, offices, a playground, and the Imam’s residence. The Centre is responsible for the translation and publication religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the Hajj, and promotes a number of cultural and
4
About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics.
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social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. The Imam is appointed by the WICS, his appointment is endorsed by the Maltese state, and he has diplomatic status.5 He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community and is the official point of contact between the Muslim community and the Maltese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the WICS and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy diplomatic immunity. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School was established within the Islamic Centre’s precincts. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. There are no Muslim political parties in Malta and migrant communities are not officially organised on an ethnic basis. A number of Muslims endeavour to integrate into Maltese political life. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Apart from the official mosque at Paola, Muslims use five other unofficial places of worship. In addition, Maltese prisons and illegal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim worship, and a space has been allocated for interfaith worship at the Mater Dei Hospital. The mosque at the Islamic Centre is regularly frequented by local and foreign Muslims, including students. In 2007, the Malta Environment and Planning Authority requested the closure of a space used for Muslim prayer in the town of Sliema, citing violations of the local planning code. 5
Children’s Education
Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is compulsory and neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students are given the option of either attending religious education class or following alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. It was opened in 1997 and is situated within the precincts of the Islamic Centre, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under
5
The Imam is Sheikh Muhammad el-Sadi and he is of Palestinian origin.
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Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese National Curriculum, the school also offers an Islamic programme of studies which supports Islamic values and maintains the Islamic identity of the students. The school accepts students from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds and in 2008–2009 the number of students enrolled reached 200, mostly Maltese nationals. It employs around 20 members of staff, mostly Catholics of Maltese nationality. Mariam Albatool School operates on a strictly charitable basis, receiving no government support, and fees are kept to a minimum. For this reason, the school has often faced financial difficulties and applications for subsidies have been made to the Ministry of Education. The School is constantly expanding, which has prompted the WICS to request the Maltese government to allocate to it additional land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. These matters are still under government consideration. In addition, the Libyan Secretariat for Education maintains the Al Fateh Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students and follows the Libyan educational curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Academic courses on Islam and the Near East are offered at the University of Malta within the Department of Arabic and Near Eastern Studies (Faculty of Arts). This department offers degrees in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies at BA, MA and PhD levels. Courses covering Islamic philosophy are also offered in the Faculty of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the library of the University of Malta. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Palestinian students and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. Imams currently serving in Malta have received their formal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future.
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Burial and Cemeteries
In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish cemetery’. It replaces an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any other mosque, the Turkish cemetery was used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006 a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile the Maltese government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in Paola to the WICS for burial purposes. The first burials there took place in 2007. The land occupied by the cemetery belongs to the Maltese state. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. The Imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Malta prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar. The Mater Dei state hospital has a separate non-denominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Imam participates regularly in interfaith meetings, including prayer meetings for peace, and other similar occasions. 9
Religious Festivals
‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese government, as well as by representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ‘Id al-Adha is also attended by a substantial segment of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered in local farms. 10
Halal Food
There are at least four halal butchers in Malta, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. Some Muslims purchase
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livestock from local farmers, perform ritual slaughter privately, and sell the meat to their co-religionists. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are also available in most supermarkets and shops. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and public schools. The hijab is worn quite commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab. 12
Publication and Media
The WICS weekly newspaper Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (‘The Islamic Call’) and the periodical Al-Tawāsul (‘The Contact’) are regularly available at the Islamic Centre.6 The Centre has published a number of books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an.7 In addition, the Centre has regularly participated in the annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Imam and other members of the community often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. Neither the Islamic Centre, nor Muslim residents manage any internet websites. The e-mail address of Mariam Al-Batool School is:
[email protected]. 13
Family Law
Maltese law does not recognise Muslim marriages contracted at the Islamic Centre, nor does it recognise documents pertaining to such marriages or divorces. It only recognises legal documents issued by states, and subject to such documents being in compliance with the laws of Malta. On the basis of a special agreement between Malta
www.daawaislamia.org and www.at-tawasul.info. Zammit, M.R. and el-Sadi, M., Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008). 6 7
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and the WICS, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre. Later, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises this civil marriage. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular state law. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The local media cover the situation of Muslims in Malta sporadically. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. The Islamic Centre organises regular interfaith dialogue seminars on a variety of topical issues. For example, one such recent seminar (in 2008) discussed the protection of the foetus. The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim community is, in general, quite normal. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune (especially the Libyans) to some negative prejudice and racism. Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are appear in court on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands in dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention centres on the island. In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situation, believing it to have negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of the Malta’s limited size and resources. 15
Major Cultural Events
During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night. The cultural activities include talks on various topics by local and foreign guest speakers, and poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the Muslim community.
MONTENEGRO Omer Kajoshaj1 1
Muslim Populations
The last official census held in Montenegro was in 2003, three years before the independence referendum, at a time of political and social turmoil. Its results are therefore contested today by many actors, including the Islamic community. The first results of the census showed that 21% of a total population of 680,000 were Muslims, but after several reviews and corrections, the number dropped to 17.7% of a total population of 620,145. Some Muslim estimates put the current number at more than 150,000 Muslims. They are divided into three main groups: Albanians, Bosniaks and Muslims ‘by nationality’. Albanians live mostly in the south-east of the country while Bosniaks live mostly in the north. The smallest group—those who are called ‘Muslims’ because of their nationality—a concept created in Tito’s Yugoslavia—are found mostly in the south-east and central regions of the country. Although the nationalities of the majority of Montenegrin Muslims are associated with the neighboring countries, Albania and Bosnia, they are indigenous people who embraced Islam, mostly during the time of Ottoman Empire. The history of Muslims in Montenegro can be divided into five periods: the first contact with Islam during the eighth and ninth century, when African-Arab sailors reached the coast of Montenegro for trade; the coming of the Ottomans and the Islamisation of the Balkans (fifteenthth century); the expansion of the Montenegrin state to Muslim-inhabited areas in the 1876–78 war and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1917–1920); the
1 Omer Halil Kajoshaj is Director of the Foreign Affairs Department, Islamic Community in Montenegro. He is also the Chairman of NGO “Horizonti-Center for Cross Cultural Understanding”. He is a graduate of the International Islamic University, Malaysia, Department of Communication, and is currently completing a Masters degree at the International University in Novi Pazar, Serbia. He has published several articles on religion, society and politics, in local and foreign newspapers.
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Communist period (1945–1990); and the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia (1991–1995), finally resulting in Montenegrin independence in 2006. The end of the nineteenth century and the whole of the twentieth century was tragic for the Muslims of Montenegro. They went through persecution, exodus, assimilation, anti-religious policies, and continuous discrimination. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the establishment of independent Montenegro are considered by many local Muslims to be a new beginning; more than 90% of the Muslim population are believed to have voted for independence in the referendum in 2006. 2
Islam and the State
Montenegro is a secular state. There is no state religion, religion is separated from the state, and religious communities have equal status (Montenegrin constitution, art. 14). Although the government assists religious communities financially, the assistance is insignificant when compared with their needs, especially in the case of the Islamic community, all of whose waqf properties were confiscated during the Communist period. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The Muslims of Montenegro are organised as one community through Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (the Islamic Community in Montenegro, Ul. Gojka Radonjića 54, PF 42; 20000 Podgorica, Montenegro, tel: +38220622408, fax: +38220623812, email:
[email protected], www.islam .org.me), which is divided into fourteen regional committees. The headquarters of the Community is in Podgorica, the capital. Mešihat Islamske zajednice (the Mashihat of the Islamic Community) is the main administrative body which coordinates the activities of all fourteen regions. The Chief Mufti (Reis) is the President of the Islamic Community and is elected every six years. The current Chief Mufti is Rifat Fejzić, elected in 2003 at the age of 29 and the youngest Mufti in the Balkans.
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Mosques and Prayer Houses
On the territory of present-day Montenegro, over five centuries of Muslim rule, 162 mosques were built,2 out of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century. During the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 48 new mosques had been built by 2008. Today there are 124 mosques, including one of the most beautiful in the Balkans, the Husein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja, and the biggest mosque, the Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. One of the oldest mosques in the Balkans was the Mariner Mosque in the city of Ulcinj, said to have been built by African Arab traders in the fourteenth, which was completely destroyed in 1931 and is now under reconstruction. 5
Children’s Education
The teaching of religion is not included in the public education system in any form. One reason may be the ongoing conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, a conflict in which the government is trying not to be publicly involved. The primary teaching of Islam in Montenegro is performed by local imams in maktabs, classrooms close to mosques or in mosques, and is attended on a voluntary basis. 6
Higher and Professional Education
8 October 2008 was a special date for all Muslims of Montenegro as it saw the opening day of the first contemporary Islamic middle school, the Madrasa. The last school of its kind was closed by the Montenegrin authorities in 1918. In the new Madrasa, 64 pupils enrolled in the first year of the four-year course of study. The curriculum is comparable to the state curriculum, with additional religious subjects. The school is regarded as the most important project of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The school is recognised by the government but is still in the process of full integration into the governmental education
2 Agovic, Bajro, Islamic Community in Montenegro, Historical Evolution and Organization (Podgorica: Mesihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71.
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system. It grants a high school diploma allowing graduates to enroll in any faculty at state or private universities. Currently, it has only male pupils, but the Islamic Community is working on extending the building to establish a girls’ school. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Almost all Muslims practise traditional Islamic burial. However, in some cemeteries, especially in towns, where religion was weakest during the Communist period, Muslim graves look more like Christian tombs or mausoleums. Generally, in all villages, towns and cities where Muslims live there are separate Muslim cemeteries. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Generally speaking, there are no ‘chaplaincies’ in state institutions. However, some exceptions have been made in recent years and, in the main state prison, for instance, an imam nominated by the Mashihat has led the ‘Id (bayram) prayer. 9
Religious Festivals
The two ‘Ids (bayrams) are official holidays, with two days’ leave for each in both the public and the private sector. 10
Halal Food
Gradina Company, in Rožaje, is the only meat company that produces halal meat. The company, established in 1989, is privately owned by a local Muslim family. Its production capacity meets the needs of the Muslim population of Montenegro, but it is not the only provider of halal meat, because private slaughter is widely practised. In the main cities and towns where Muslim live, several restaurants provide halal meals. However, no company or restaurant has a recognised halal certificate.
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Dress Codes
Although there are no specific rules which limit or prohibit Muslim female dress, whether in the public or private sector, including universities and schools, there are so far no known cases of women wearing it, so it cannot be said what the reaction of the relevant authorities would be. However, there are positive indications that upcoming laws and regulations respect the rights of Muslim women. In 2007, after several discussions between the Islamic Community and relevant state authorities, the new law on personal identity documents provided that “every citizen who because of national or religious reasons wears a hat or a headscarf as a part of his/her dress can have the photo for ID taken wearing the hat or headscarf.”3 12
Publications and Media
The main Muslim publication is Elif, the periodical of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The first nine issues were published in 1990–1992. Twelve years later, in October 2004, the Islamic Community resumed publishing it and by February 2009, 58 issues had been published in all. It is a 24-page bilingual monthly with nineteen pages in Bosnian and five pages in Albanian. In addition, the Islamic Community has published several religious books, both original and translated, by prominent Muslim scholars. 13
Family Law
The law is secular and all family matters are referred to the civil courts. Marriage is legally acknowledged only after civil registration, but Muslims do carry out a parallel religious marriage ceremony (which is not recognised by the state). The religious marriage ceremony, with the fixing of the mahr, takes place before a local imam in the presence of relatives of the groom and bride.
3
Službeni list Crne Gore (Official Gazette of Montenegro), No. 12, 2007.
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Public Opinion and Debate
In 2007–2008, one of the main public issues of importance to the Muslim population was a set of lawsuits over the deportation of Muslim refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina a decade and a half earlier. In 1992, a number of such refugees were rounded up and deported to captivity or death at the hands of Bosnian Serb forces. In December 2008, the government of Montenegro announced that a settlement had been reached and damages would be paid to survivors and next of kin. The media reported in positive terms on the opening of the Madrasa, which took place in the presence of the president of Montenegro and other prominent persons. The participation of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in the construction of the Madrasa, and the attendance of a Turkish government minister, were greeted as a sign of strengthening diplomatic relations between Montenegro and Turkey. 15
Major Cultural Events
At the time of the two ‘Ids, in several towns (such as Rožaje and Ulcinj), events are held in the local cultural centres. On 3 July 2008, the Islamic Community organised a major event in Rožaje to mark the achievement of its first hafiz (someone who has learned the Qur’an by heart), Asmir Abdurrahman ef. Kujević. The event was attended by prominent Muslim representatives from neighbouring countries.
NETHERLANDS Martijn de Koning1 1
Muslim Populations
After the independence of the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam, a large number of immigrants came to the Netherlands. However, the largest groups of Muslims are migrants from Turkey and Morocco who were recruited as labourers during the 1960s and 70s, and their descendants. A large number of those from Turkey are Kurds. Other large Muslim groups have arrived later from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. Most of them are asylum seekers who were persecuted in their home country and/or fled because of violence there. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria; five of them continue their activities in the Netherlands and are considered to be ‘radical’ imams. In 1994, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands was estimated to be 944,000 (5.8% of the total population).2 The methodology of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) was based upon an estimation of the proportion of Muslims in the immigrants’ country of origin. This led to unreliable statistics for Iraqi, Iranian, Somali and Afghan migrants. In 2005 and 2006, a new methodology was introduced that was based upon selfidentification surveys.3 This has led to a new assessment of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. According to the 2007 figures, there are 857,000 Muslims of whom 318,000 are Turkish-Dutch, 297,000 are Moroccan-Dutch, and 12,000 native Dutch converts.4 1 Martijn de Koning is a post-doc researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He has studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. In 2008, he defended his PhD on “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. 2 Phalet, Karen and Jessika Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004). 3 Herten, Marieke van and Ferdy Otten, “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland (Towards a new estimation of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands)”, Bevolkingstrends, 2007, pp. 48–57. 4 Statistics Netherlands, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/
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Besides Sunni Muslims, there are also Shi’is, Alevis and Ahmadis in the Netherlands. The Shi’i Muslims are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora, but it should be noted that they often have a secular outlook with little sympathy for the Islamic regime in Iran.5 The Alevi Muslims form an important section of the Turkish-Kurdish community. Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi-Lahore community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews which present them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are also divided along other lines: the Milli Görü movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant-areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have relatively large Muslim populations (usually with either MoroccanDutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims dominating), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Since 1986, non-nationals have voting rights in municipal elections if they have been legally resident in the Netherlands for five or more years. The migrant turn-out rates at municipal elections are very diverse. The turn-out of immigrants in Rotterdam has increased in every election since 1994, while in Amsterdam it declined between 1994 and 1998 but seems to have recovered in 2006.6 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democraten (Islam-Democrats,ID), represented on the municipal council. However, Muslim organisations have been involved in trying to protect specific rights, such as the wearing of headscarves by women and the establishment of Islamic schools.7 publicaties/artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2278-wm.htm, accessed 10 March 2009. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam: A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuwkerk, K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120. 5 Hessels, Thomas, Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel (Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at http://www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74-38879_tcm34-18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 6 Heelsum, Anja van, “Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Netherlands”, 2006, available at http://users.fmg.uva.nl/avanheelsum/paperelections2006 .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 7 Koning, Martijn de, “Understanding the ‘others’: Salafi politics in the Netherlands”, in Boubekeur, Amel and Olivier Roy (eds), Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam (London: Hurst, forthcoming).
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Islam and the State
The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relationship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by extensive involvement of the state with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the settlement of the ‘education struggle’ meant the passage of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, establishing complete state funding for schools with a religious (Christian) identity, while safeguarding the freedom of those schools to determine their curricula. With this settlement, the foundation for what is known as the Dutch ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.8 Under this system, society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually antagonistic religious and ideological groups. Because of overarching cooperation at the elite level, and by allowing each group as much autonomy as possible, a stable democracy was made possible.9 Muslim immigrants were able to make use of the remnants of the ‘pillar’ model according to which religious organisations were still considered to be a legitimate form of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same right as other religious groups and, if they rely on the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition for their claims (although often after considerable struggle). However, the gradual shift in the Netherlands towards a more secularised society from the 1960s on has led to the emergence of opinion makers and politicians defending the secular outlook of Dutch society, making ‘secular’ not only a descriptive term but also a normative way of referring to part of identity politics in Dutch society. In recent years, Islam has become increasingly politicised, affecting relations with the state in the public arena. In particular, the rise of the populist leader Pim Fortuyn in 2001 and 2002 contributed to making a hard line position on Islam more salient.10 Instead of pacifying Islam,
8 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in Donk, W.B.H.J. van de, A.P. Jonkers, G.J. Kronjee and R.J.J.M. Plum (eds), Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the public domain: Explorations of a double transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338. 9 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 10 Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the Netherlands (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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several opinion leaders such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali argued for a more confrontational style in the public Islam debate, by claiming the right to insult Muslims’ religious convictions and feelings, for example, and, together with director Theo Van Gogh, made the film Submission I.11 Hirsi Ali received numerous death threats and lived in hiding for several weeks after van Gogh’s murder. Muslims’ attempts to participate in public life have become increasingly difficult after 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, with controversies over the building of large mosques in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the wearing of niqab, and other issues that are seen as symbols of the Islamisation of the public life. This has not, however, led to policy measures forbidding the building of large mosques.12 3
Main Muslim Organisations
There have been several attempts by both Muslims and the Dutch to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in Netherlands. Most of them have failed because of internal religious differences among Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and between Sunni and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with such attempts, considering them not representative enough of the entire Muslim population. After several incidents in which imams gave controversial opinions about homosexuality, for example, and in particular after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim, the pressure from the Dutch state on Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella grew significantly. First, the Contact Moslims Overheid (Muslim Contact Agency, CMO, Koninginnegracht 63, 2514 AG Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 CE Den Haag, http://www.cmoweb.nl) was established but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organisations excluded the Ahmadiyya organisations. The CMO unites five Turkish organisations: Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Islamic Foundation Netherlands, ISN, Javastraat 2, 2585 AM Den Haag, www .diyanet.nl), Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie (Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation, TICF, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 EC Rotterdam, www.ticf.nl), 11 Leeuw, M. de and S. van Wichelen, “ ‘Please, Go Wake Up!’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘war on terror’ in the Netherlands”, Feminist Media Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (2005), pp. 325–340. 12 Maussen, Marcel, “Constructing mosques. The governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands”, PhD thesis, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 2009.
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both sections of the Milli Görü movement, and the Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands, SICN Suleymanci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 AA Utrecht, www.sicn.nl). The CMO also includes the Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties Nederland (Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations The Netherlands, UMMON, Weesperzijde 74, 1091 EH Amsterdam, Postbus 94384), the SurinameseHindustani World Islamic Mission (WIM, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 CN Amsterdam, www.wimnet.org, www.worldislamicmission.nl), and the Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging (Sjiite Association, OSV,—mainly Iraqi Shi’a, Postbus 1113, 3260 AC Oud-Beijerland, www.shiaparlement .com). These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later the Contact Groep Islam (Contact Group Islam, CGI, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 HK’s-Gravenhage) was established, which included Sunni, Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims, together with the Nederlandse Moslim Raad (Dutch Muslim Council, NMR)—a national Sunni organisation, Ahmadiyya Muslims and Alevi Muslims. The CMO and the CGI now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Integration and Immigration. The Dutch government consults and informs these organisations about their plans in this way. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ film Fitna, the CMO and CGI and their various member organisations played an important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and with local and national authorities. However, the CMO, CGI and their member organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth who regard them as cliques of first generation men and see them as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politicians.13 There are several other national organisations including Al Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 AA Utrecht, http://www.alnisa.nl), and the Vereniging van Imams in Nederland (VIN—Association of Imams in The Netherlands), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent 13 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindingen en identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008).
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(Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 CG Den Haag, www.imamonline.nl). Both are Sunni. Hizb ut Tahrir (www.kalifaat.org) aims at uniting Muslims in one state and reviving the caliphate, but does not seem to be a strong organisation, although they do get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ film Fitna. Stichting Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-Sunnah (Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu Sunnah) is a Salafi foundation including As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (As Soennah Mosque, Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 KE Den Haag, www .al-yaqeen.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (El Tawheed Mosque, Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 SV Amsterdam, www.eltawheed.nl). Together with other Salafi networks these organisations have become the most important targets of counter-radicalisation.14 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
The general policy framework regarding mosques is usually set by the state, but its execution is a local matter and this means that there are big differences between municipalities. For example, some municipalities have funded social and cultural activities run by mosques whereas in other cities such activities receive no funds.15 Plans to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate.16 14 NCTb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding (National Coordinator Counterterrorism)), Salafisme in Nederland (Salafism in the Netherlands) (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service)), Violent jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat (Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Roel (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372–392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home grown warriors: Radical and democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 15 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands), Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij; Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen. De hulpverlening van RCJ/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries. The social work of RCJ/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 16 Roose, Eric, “50 years of mosque architecture in the Netherlands”, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies, vol. 8, no. 5 (2005), pp. 1–46; Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies
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Resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.17 Of the 453 mosques in the Netherlands, 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, the Milli Görü with 35 mosques and the Suleymancis with 38 mosques). The second group are 150 mosques organised by Muslims of Moroccan descent. The Surinamese community has 25 mosques controlled by the World Islamic Mission, which has its headquarters in Bradford, UK, and is led by Shah Ahmad Noorani Siddiqi. These mosques have a Hanafi Barelvi orientation. In the past they have been hostile to the Ahmadiyya Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organisations and have 62 mosques.18 5
Children’s Education
There are 41 Islamic schools that are part of the public education system: two are secondary schools and the others are primary schools. This is 0.6% of all primary schools in the Netherlands with a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin in the Netherlands). Like public schools and all other schools established by religious groups, these schools are funded by the state and come completely under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between confessional schools and public schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in an Islamic ethos such as Islamic instruction courses, Muslim festivals, prayer rooms and so on. The school curriculum is the same as in other confessional and public schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: ASSR, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam: Ayasofia stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva terrein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofia City area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, ISIM [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23. 17 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. 18 Douwes, Dick, Martijn de Koning and Welmoet Boender, Nederlandse moslims. Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/ Amsterdam University Press, 2005).
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with regard to the educational regime and in some cases problems with anti-integration content and suspicions of financial mismanagement.19 6
Higher and Professional Education
There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (associated with the Gülen movement) and the European Islamic University (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as universities. After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two mainstream academic centres for imam training were established in 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) University Amsterdam, and the Theology Department of the University of Leiden.20 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (HBO) programme for teacher training. All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, the CMO and CGI. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle East studies are given at Utrecht University, Leiden University, University of Amsterdam and Radboud University Nijmegen. Several universities, such as VU University Amsterdam and Radboud University, have set up their own institutes for religious studies. Besides the two Islamic universities, Muslims have also set up several other institutes for higher learning, such as the Sunni Dar al Ilm in Amsterdam and Al Islah in Lochem (affiliated to Tabligh Jama’at). It is not clear how many people follow courses in these institutes. These courses are intended for people who want to increase their knowledge of Islamic traditions and use it in their personal lives.
19 Driessen, Geert and M.S. Merry, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or marginalization”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and P. Valkenberg, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26 20 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrapportage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministery of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, European Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007).
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Burial and Cemeteries
In 1991 the Wet op de Lijkbezorging (Law on Disposal of the Dead) was adjusted in order to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and without a coffin.21 There are about 70 Islamic cemeteries, usually taking up part of public cemeteries. Many burial funds exist whose purpose is to help with the repatriation of the bodies of the dead for burial in their home countries. With the numbers of elderly Muslims on the increase, it is to be expected that there will be a need for more burial places in the future. The Stichting Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen (Foundation of Islamic Funeral Services, IBW, www.stichtingibw.nl) provides information on Islamic burials and lobbies for more burial sites. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are Muslim chaplains ( geestelijk verzorgers) in the Dutch army, several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly. Several universities have their own prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. 9
Religious Festivals
The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are widely celebrated within Muslim circles. ‘Id al-Fitr has in recent years become a public event since most mosques have opened their doors to celebrate the iftar meal with non-Muslims. Several of these iftar events take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival. The Ramadan Festival is a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, coupled with the iftar meal. There have been several discussions about making ‘Id al-Fitr a national holiday, but there are as yet no serious plans to implement this. The different dates of ‘Id for the various Muslim ethnic groups make it difficult to set one date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, labeling them as the ‘(self-)islamisation of Dutch society’.
21 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Muslims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001).
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Halal Food
Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butchers’ shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade association estimates that there are about 3,500 butchers shops in the country, of which 10% are halal butchers. Under Dutch law, animals must be rendered unconscious before being slaughtered, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups. There are many shops selling halal food and restaurants offering halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. There have been attempts to produce a single certification for halal food, but they have not so far been successful and there are currently a variety of certifications, such as Halal Voeding en Voedsel (Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority, HVV/HFFIA, Postbus 16786, 2500 BT Den Haag, www.halal.nl) and Halal Correct Certification (HCC active in the Netherlands and France, P.B. 179, 2300 AD Leiden, www.halalcorrect.com). 11
Dress Codes
The headscarf is an important issue in public debate and with regard to Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.22 Muslim girls and women are allowed to wear hijab in public schools. Apart from the police force and law court officials, the headscarf is allowed in public institutions (including for lawyers) and companies. Under certain conditions, Christian
22 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit, MI: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (‘One daughter is better than a thousand sons’: Arabic women, symbols and power constellations between the sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en—praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands—Brabant) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf ”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61.
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schools may forbid the wearing of hijab by pupils and staff. There are cases of women who have been refused jobs because of wearing a headscarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usually regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the commission are not binding; they are to be seen as advice based upon its interpretation of the law. In recent years, the headscarf issue has been linked with concerns over social cohesion, integration and national identity.23 There have been discussions about dress codes pertaining to women wearing niqab or the burka. There are plans to ban both from school campuses, and staff in state education institutions are not allowed to wear them. 12
Publication and Media
There are two Islamic broadcasting companies: Nederlandse Moslimomroep (NMO, Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company, Postbus 418, 1200 AK Hilversum, www.nmo.nl) and Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (NIO, Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company, Sumatralaan 45 1217GP Hilversum, www.nioweb.nl). They are both so-called ‘39f-broadcasters’, meaning that the state has allocated time to specific religious institutions based upon their (estimated) constituency. There are several small circulation magazines, such as the Al Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, www.alnisa.nl), produced by the Al Nisa women’s organization, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over sixteen). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishing agencies in the Netherlands that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such as Boekhandel Nour (Bookstore Nour) and Islam Boeken (Islam Books, www .islam-boeken.nl), which sells books on the internet, as do several others. Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Movement) publishes Zaman Nederland (www.zamanhollanda.nl), is a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, universities, Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (www.ahmadiyya-islam.nl). Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (Explicit, www.expliciet.nl) four times a year.
23 Saharso, Sawitri and Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480.
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There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and sites from mosques on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay, www.wijblijvenhier.nl) and another important meeting place for discussions about Islam and Muslims is Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl).24 13
Family Law
Dutch family law does not allow individuals to settle disagreements or make particular arrangements without judicial consent. There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic family law for Muslims. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, which are not sanctioned by law. Although no imam is required under Islamic law for a marriage to be contracted, it has come about in the Netherlands that imams, particularly Salafi imams, play a central role. Since these marriage contracts are not recognised by law, there is no right to alimony in the case of separation, and people do not automatically inherit if one of the spouses dies. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although it has happened that polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands have been registered. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he must divorce all his wives but one. It is possible for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. It is possible to deal with inheritance in the same way, by registering a will.25 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The film Fitna made by the populist anti-Islam and anti-establishment politician Geert Wilders attracted much international attention. The
24 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Transition. Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transformations (ISET), 2008), available at http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/londonmet/library/c52116_3 .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 25 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands”, Mens en Maatschappij (People and society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of birth, circumcision, marriage and death; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, ISIM Newsletter, no. 31 (2002).
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film was meant to be a complaint against the Qur’an which, according Wilders, is a fascist book that incites believers to violence and hatred. Wilders is one of the most outspoken Dutch politicians on issues concerning security, immigration, the EU and matters related to Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. He has warned against a ‘tsunami of Islamisation’ as a result of leniency towards Islam and the demands made by Islamic organisations and has proposed a ban on the Qur’an (comparing it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf ). Three themes have dominated the debate: the right to freedom of speech, the anxiety that angry Muslims might react violently to the film, and Fitna as a form of blasphemy or insult. Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burka or niqab. They are seen as a sign of lack of integration (or even refusal to integrate), demeaning to women, and a threat to safety in the public domain. 15
Major Cultural Events
The most important cultural event is the Ramadan Festival held throughout the country during the month of Ramadan (www.ramadanfestival.nl).
NORWAY Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik1 1
Muslim Populations
The first wave of immigration from Muslim countries to Norway arrived at the beginning of the 1970s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immigrants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population. In 1980, only 1,000 out of around 10,000 immigrants had registered as members in a Muslim organisation. In 1990, the number of registered Muslims had risen to 19,000 out of an estimated total of 36,000 immigrants with a Muslim background. Recent estimates (2007) indicate that more than 150,000 Norwegian residents have a Muslim background. This means that Muslims (according to the widest definition) constituted 3% of a total population of 4.6 million.2 In 2008, 83,600 people (i.e., some 55% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately half of these are resident in Oslo, which means that about 6%–7% of Oslo’s population (560,000) are now members of a Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in 2006 among pupils in 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 17.6%
1 Christine M. Jacobsen is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, and a researcher with IMER (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) at Unifob Global. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Bergen, and has researched and published on Muslims in France and Norway. Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theology, Univesity of Oslo. He has specialised in the field of Islam and ChristianMuslim relations, and his publications include Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-damir (London: Routledge, 2006). 2 These figures are based on estimates that consider immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration. Statistics of this kind are highly problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they are increasingly made the basis of competing political arguments. For updated statistics about Islam in Norway, see the website edited by Oddbjørn Leirvik: “Islam i Norge. Oversikt, med bibliografi” (http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html). This page also contains an updated bibliography of relevant studies and research on Muslims in Norway.
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gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.3 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunification and growth in Norway, by far the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2006 amounted to 28,000. In the same year, Turks numbered 14,000 and Moroccans 7,000. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Iraqis (20,000) and Somalis (18,000) were the most numerous in 2006, followed by Bosnians (15,000), Iranians (14,000) and Kosovo-Albanians (10,000).4 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.5 The entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)6 and Turkish (Diyanet, Süleymanci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas the Bosnians and the Somalis represent radically different popular traditions.7 In 2006, 27% of Muslim respondents said in a Gallup opinion poll that they attended ‘religious ceremonies together with others’ on a monthly basis or more frequently, while 31% stated that they never took part in such activities.8 In a different survey of the frequency of attending religious meetings organised by faith communities, Pakistanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a year, whereas the corresponding figure reported by Iraqis were 7 and for Bosnians and Iranians 2.9
3 Øia, Tormod and Viggo Vestel, “Møter i det flerkulturelle (Multicultural encounters)”, NOVA Rapport 21/07, pp. 162f. 4 These figures refer to country background and not to citizenship. Statistics Norway includes both people who themselves migrated to Norway and their children, regardless of their actual citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394). 5 Roald, Anne Sofie, New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 6 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges —Old Strategies: Themes of Variation and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropological Society, 1990). 7 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwegian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]). 8 “TV2, Holdninger til integrasjon og internasjonale konflikter blant muslimer i Norge og den norske befolkningen generelt (Attitudes towards integration and international conflicts among Muslims in Norway and the Norwegian population in general)” (Oslo: TNS Gallup, Politikk & Samfunn, April 2006), available at http://pub.tv2.no/multimedia/TV2/ archive/00248/TNS_Gallup_-_muslim_248757a.pdf, accessed 25 May 2009. 9 Statistics Norway (SSB), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living conditions among immigrants in Norway)”, SSB Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendents of immigrants.
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Islam and the State
Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a state church whose status in the Constitution (where Evangelical Lutheran Christianity is stated as the public religion of the state) is currently being reviewed. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, which comprises 83% of the population, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for priests and much of the running costs for the parishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under compensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers itself is entitled to public funding, including registered Islamic organisations.10 3
Main Muslim Organsiations
The Islamic Council of Norway (Pb. 658 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, tel: +4722357613, email:
[email protected], www.irn.no), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella-organisation comprising the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.11 As of 2008, it comprised the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communication with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communities and their umbrella organisations), and since 2007 the Council has also received a financial grant from the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general secretary. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intra-Muslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Council for Religious and Registration is easy and does not require a minimum number of members. See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious pluralism. Diversity, conflict and dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and interfaith dialogue”, in Malik, Jamal (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. 10
11
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Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn.no) in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and visible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Muslim Brotherhood, several different Shi’ite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. Since the mid-1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organisations have been formed, largely independent of national background.12 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.13 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but three are purpose-built mosques, all of them established Norwegian-Pakistani organisations. There have been no major problems with permissions. There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo, but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and Drammen). In 2006, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 120. 5
Children’s Education
Private schools are relatively few in Norway, and took in only around 2.2% of primary school pupils in 2006 (up from 1.7% in 2000), which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ system (enhetsskolen). The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo, but there are currently no Muslim private schools. 12 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Tilhørighetens mange former: Unge muslimer i Norge (The many forms of belonging: young Muslims in Norway) (Oslo: Unipax, 2002), and Jacobsen, Christine M., “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Cesari, Jocelyne and Sean McLoughlin, European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 13 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag (Institue for Comparative Research in Human Culture), 2001).
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Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruction.14 In public primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course in religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).15 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against this because of the strong emphasis on Christianity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics”) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper secondary/high education, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate subject. In addition, both the ability to dialogue about religion and ethics and familiarity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims. Any qualified teacher, of any background, may teach religion and ethics. 6 Higher and Professional Education No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the possibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the university in 2007 by a committee which included representatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the University of Oslo’s Faculty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading of “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society”. The largest groups in these courses have been imams, but no imams have received their basic training in Norway.16
14 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education see for instance Østberg, Sissel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). 15 Cf. the articles by Skeie, Geir, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krogstad, in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003). 16 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.),
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Burial and Cemeteries
Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance for Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Muslim funerals in large parts of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau AlKhidmat is a member of the umbrella association the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group looking into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of emigration, but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.17 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
A study in 200318 concluded that, in spite of the fact that a growing number of prisoners and military personnel either are not members of any religion, or belong to other faiths, the Church of Norway retained its dominant position in military and prison chaplaincies. Up till now, state institutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy also for minority religions has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a voluntary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams in the Field Corps, but this has not been followed up politically. The possibility of employing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed, but not yet implemented.
Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 17 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: en migrasjonsstudie (NorwegianPakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). 18 Furseth, Inger, “Secularization and the role of religion in state institutions”, Social Compass, vol. 50 no. 2 (2003), pp. 191–202.
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Religious Festivals
‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Norway. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Norwegian Church two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. No permission to sacrifice animals is given, and some Muslims send their qurban to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations. 10
Halal Food
The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughter houses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Norwegian regulations have been developed, and halal meat (including beef, lamb and chicken) is now available on the Norwegian market. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (for instance, in state universities), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons etc. 11
Dress Codes
Occasional calls have been made to ban religious headgear and the niqab from (parts of ) public space, but there are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions have so far decided against the need to implement a ban. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law, but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Working Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow religious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system and customs officers, and in a few work places (notably IKEA, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) hijab is now offered as a variation to work uniforms. In 2008/2009 a debate occurred over whether religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force.
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Publications and Media
Some Muslim organisations19 in Norway (including notably the Islamic Information Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, and the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran) publish books and leaflets in Norwegian, most of which are translations. The Muslim Student Society has published the magazine Salam (previously Tankevekkende) since 1997 and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice. There are a number of online forums, of which the most significant is www.islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Several other mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. As for national broadcasting, the issue of allowing other religions than Christianity access to broadcast devotional programmes is now being discussed. 13
Family Law
By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Office (byfogdembete) or the District Court (tingrett). The Norwegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce, but marriages may still not be seen as dissolved according to religious law or the law in other countries. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the problem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,20 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move which upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility has also been discussed of establishing a Shari’a
19 For contact information, see Islam i Norge, http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 25 May 2009. 20 For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’ see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk Tidsskrift for Migrasjonsforskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and “Shari’a-råd til diskusjon (Shari’a councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2, (2008), pp. 58–72.
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council or a Muslim divorce council as options for dealing with these issues, but this has met with considerable resistance. Currently, several non-governmental organisations offer counselling on family related conflicts, including limping marriages. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inheritance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves agree on a distribution, for example by Islamic principles, but regulations covering minimum inheritance have to be observed. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical. From the mid1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Muslim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the headscarf.21 A particularly controversial theme in 2007 and 2008 has been the situation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.22 This issue has partly come to the fore in connection with the gender neutral Marriage Act that was enacted on 1 January 2009, but also reflects a strong focus on gay rights in the general media as well as the emergence of a few gay Muslims who have decided to go public. Another significant debate has been on secularism and public religious expression, partly following a much debated essay about ‘secular extremism’ which was published by a young Muslim in one of the mainline newspapers. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with mounting anxiety with regard to Islam and Muslims. In 2007, a liberal think-tank launched a report23 based on a survey conducted by Gallup to find out what the general public thought
21 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway see, for example, Roald, Anne Sofie, Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim Women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 22 Gressgård, Randi and Christine M. Jacobsen, “Krevende tolerance; Islam og homoseksualitet. (Demanding tolerance: Islam and homosexuality”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32 no. 2 (2008), pp. 22–39. 23 Rapport/Report 02/2007: Hva vet vi om hverandre? (What do we know about each other?), Martin E. Sandbu for Liberalt Laboratorium, October 2007.
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Norwegian Muslims’ attitudes would be on a number of ethical, social and political issues. According to the think-tank, the survey demonstrated that most people think that Muslims are less liberal and less positive towards integration than a survey (conducted by TV2 the previous year) had shown them to be. The report and its results were criticised on a number of methodological and political grounds. According to another survey, underlying the so-called ‘Integration barometer’ (IMDi 2007),24 eight out of ten respondents thought that the authorities should not further facilitate Muslim religious practices in Norwegian society. Half of the respondents opposed the building of mosques, and a clear majority the wearing of headscarves in public. Several dimensions in the ‘Integration barometer’ point towards a growth in negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the 2008 report European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Norway was for the first time urged to take action against mounting Islamophobia. The report strongly recommends that the Norwegian authorities monitor the situation as concerns Islamophobia in Norway and take swift action to counter any such manifestations as necessary. It encourages the Norwegian authorities to cooperate with representatives of the Muslim communities of Norway in order to find solutions to specific issues of their concern.25
15
Major Cultural Events
Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) attracting around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popular nasheed (Islam-oriented songs) artists. There is also a yearly ‘multicultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world.
24 IMDi Rapport/Report 7/2007, Integreringsbarometeret 2006, Om befolkningens holdninger til integrerings- og mangfoldsspørsmål (Integration barometer 2006, On the population’s attitudes to questions concerning integration and diversity). 25 ECRI Report on Norway, 2008 (published 2009), paragraphs 91–92, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Norway/NORCbC-IV-2009-004-ENG.pdf, accessed 25 May 2009.
POLAND Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław GrodΩ1 1
Muslim Populations
The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of fourteenth/ fifteenth centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the thirteenth century)2 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).3 By the sixteenth century, they had lost their mother tongue, but they retained their religion and customs.4 In the second half of the seventeenth century a new wave of Tatar settlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).5 After World War and the move of Polish state borders westward, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the Tatar settlement territories remained within the new Polish state. Post-war migrations dispersed the Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, or Gorzów Wielkopolski, places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (in the north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally revoke recognition of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.6
1 Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Dr Stanisław GrodΩ teaches at the Department of the History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Lublin in Poland. 2 Borawski, Piotr and Dubiński, Aleksander, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrz\dy, legendy, tradycje (Polish Tatars: History, Legends, Traditions), (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 17. 3 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 4 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Commonwealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: LSW, 1986), pp. 199–202. 5 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Ksi\stwie Litewskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), Warszawa-Poznań: PWN 1984, pp. 34–38. 6 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: the past and the present”, Islamochristiana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234.
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Muslim foreign students began to arrive in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed in Poland. After the changes towards democracy in the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals.7 Some of the immigrants have become Polish citizens and some have resident permits. They come from the Arab countries (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in cities that are academic centres (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, ŁódΩ, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iraq.8 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Constitution [sect. 7, art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates given by various offices and organisations place the number within the range 15,000–30,000 (0.04–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny (Muslim Religious Union—MZR) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123s.9 The Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim League in the Republic of Poland—LM) claims about 120 registered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are available. 2
Islam and the State
The republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of parliament regulate relations between the state and the main religious organisations.10 Other religious organisations must be registered in the government register of churches and religious associations. The MZR is the only Muslim organisation that operates on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 which gives Islam official recognition. The act was not repealed by parliament after the World War II or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 9 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: GUS, 2003), pp. 135–137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on MZR membership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. 10 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions). 7 8
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regulations (relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of the MZR, and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it11). The Act gives the MZR the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state. The state does not fund religious organisations but they can obtain public funds for specific projects. For example, the MZR has reported on its website the acquisition of national and local government funds for cultural projects (e.g. workshops, social events for the genreal public on Muslim feast days, printing of calendars). The legal regulations created in consultation with Polish Muslims in the 1930s made provision for only one official organisation to represent Muslims in Poland. However, according to current Polish law, any religious group with at least 100 members can register with the government. The MZR ceased to have the monopoly but has retained its privileged position.12 New legal regulations after 1989, ignoring the 1936 Act, made provision for the registration of new religious organisations (including Muslim ones). Two small Shi’i groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni organisation called Liga Muzułmańska (Muslim League—LM) was registered in 2004.13 3
Main Muslim Organisations
In 1921, 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cemeteries, enjoyed full freedom of religion within the borders of the new, independent Poland. The Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny (Muslim Religious Union—MZR) was founded in 1925 as an officially recognised autonomous organisation representing all Muslims in Poland.14
11 The Communist regime put an end to financing any religious bodies from public money. Vilnius, before World War II located within Polish state borders, was the official seat of the MZR. Compulsory membership of the MZR for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims before the state authorities. 12 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal Status of Muslims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 ( January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73). 13 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów Polsce i jego wpływ na organizacj\ ich życia religijnego (Legal Status of Muslims in Poland and its Influence on the Organisation of Their Religious Life)”, in A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. 14 Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal Situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197.
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A Muslim religious leader (Mufti) was elected by democratic vote. In 1936, Islam gained official recognition from the Polish state in an act of parliament that defined relations between the state and the MZR, and confirmed the legal status of the latter.15 It stated that the Mufti, imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.16 Registered religious communities (zwi[zki wyznaniowe): Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland—MZR): Sunni; established 1925; address: 15–052 Białystok, ul. Grzybowa 42; tel. +48 85 664 3516; website: www.mzr.pl; e-mail:
[email protected]; Mufti, Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board—Tomasz Miśkiewicz. The Mufti was elected by the council of imams in March 2004 (the first council since World War II); apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of official representative of Muslims. Membership of the MZR is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.17 Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim League in the Republic of Poland—LM): Sunni; established 2001; address: 01-046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, registered 6 January, 2004; website http://www.islam .info.pl; Chairman of the General Council: Samir Ismail. Membership is open to Polish Muslims, Muslims with Polish citizenship, and Muslims holding a permanent or temporary residence permit.
15 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. 16 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 17 MZR has been traditionally considered as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of the members are non-Tatars (i.e. immigrants and converts). This fictitious exclusiveness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including the Muslim students’ cultural organisations listed below. Formation of the new religious organisation, the Muslim League (LM), was a step taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) at the beginning of the present decade. Both cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between the MZR and the LM is amicable. The Mufti takes part in events organised by the LM. Some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities.
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Two registered Shi’i organisations (membership in each is less than 100): Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułmańskiej (Association of Muslim Unity): registered 31 January 1990; address: 02-679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91; leader: Zbigniew Żuk; website: http://www.al-islam.org.pl. Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt (Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly); registered 17 December 1990; address: 05–840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a; chief imam: Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak; website: http://www.abia.pl/; e-mail:
[email protected]. Muslim cultural organisations:18 Stowarzyszenie Studentów Muzułmańskich (Muslim Students Society): website: http://www.islam.org.pl; e-mail:
[email protected]. Muzułmańskie Stowarzyszenie Kształcenia i Kultury (Muslim Association for Education and Culture): websites: http://www.islam.com.pl and www.mskk-islam.8m.com; e-mail:
[email protected]. Zwi[zek Tatarów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland): established 1992: president: Stefan Korycki; address: Bohoniki 24, 16–100 Sokółka. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north-eastern Poland dating from the eighteenth-nineteenth century. and one opened in 1990 in Gdańsk). There are plans to build new mosques in Cracow and Warsaw. This was briefly announced in the local media and gave rise to hardly any discussion. Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic centres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls) and small ‘prayer houses’ (places for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. Islamic Centres exist in Białystok (one running, and a second under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań, Katowice. Prayer Houses exist in Białystok, Suchowola, ŁódΩ, Katowice, Poznań. (http:// www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16). The total number of prayer houses is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named
18 They are mostly involved in organising religious education for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics).
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on the official websites of the MZR and LM are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. 5
Children’s Education
The MZR, as a religious organisation operating under an act of parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education classes to be provided. The curriculum must be approved by the educational authorities. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is given to Muslim children in public schools. In other part of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system. At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. 6
Higher and Professional Education
There are no facilities to train imams locally. Muslims do not run any schools or institutions of higher education. Islam features in the academic curricula of several universities in Poland, but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language, and some aspects of Muslim doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad (formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (at Bohoniki, established in the second half of the eighteenth century; at Kruszyniany, established in the seventeenth/eighteenth century; and in Tatarska St., Warsaw, opened from 1868). Two more in existence from the late seventeenth century have been closed (Lebiedziew after World War I and Studzianka after World War II). Two more disused cemeteries still exist at Bohoniki (from the late seventeenth century in the village—the Bohoniki cemetery that
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is in use is located outside the village) and Młynarska St., Warsaw (used 1838–1868) (http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18). Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies’. This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met on a communal basis, rather than to any official obstacles. 9
Religious Festivals
Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can have a day off provided that they make up for their absence. Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) is celebrated by MZR members in one of the north-eastern locations. It is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though the LM started a practice of organising so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evenings), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non-Muslims. 10
Halal Food
An Act of 17 May 1989 (art. 2, act 9) allows for exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughtering (i.e. permits for not stunning animals prior to slaughter). The Council of Imams of the MZR traditionally (according to the Act of 1936) has the sole right to issue halal certificates for food products in Poland (in agreement with the Chief Veterinary Officer) (www.halalpoland.pl). 11
Dress Codes
There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab or niqab. Some young Muslim women (mainly converts of Polish origin) wear hijab in public.
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Publication and Media
Muslim periodicals treat various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters: Świat Islamu (in Polish)—published by the MZR till 2006 Rocznik Tatarów Polskich (in Polish)—published by the Polish Tatar Union Życie Tatarskie (in Polish; 96 issues since 1934, including 19 of the new edition since 1998)—published by Lokalna Grupa Działania ‘Szlak Tatarski’ (Local Action Group ‘Tatar Trail’) As-Salam—(in Polish, 15 issues between 2004 and 2008)—published by the LM Al-Hikmah—(in Polish, 59 issues between 1993 and 2006)—published by the Muslim Students Society Internet sites: www.mzr.pl—the website of the MZR http://www.islam.info.pl—the website of the LM www.muzulmanie.pl—official site of the Polish unit of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) http://www.tatarzy.tkb.pl/—a Polish Tatar site about their history, religion and culture www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by the members of the LM www.islam.net.pl—Muslim Cultural and Educational Centre, Wrocław (LM) www.arabia.pl—run by an association of alumni and staff of the Oriental Institute (now Faculty), University of Warsaw www.islamweuropie.info—a private site about Islam in Europe administered by a doctoral candidate in the Department for European Islam Studies, Oriental Faculty, University of Warsaw www.muzulmanka.pl—a site for Muslim women run by the LM www.bw.swps.edu.pl—periodical ‘Middle East’ published by Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS) www.islamic.org.uk/polish—Polish version of the UK site
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Family Law
Since marriage must be officially registered in a state civil ceremony at a state registry office, it is followed by a Muslim ceremony at Muslim premises. Marriages of people with non-Polish citizenship are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
Coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce. Local media reported on Muslim plans to build mosques in Warsaw and Cracow. Matters have been debated locally. The Warsaw case has a pre-World War II history. The MZR had a plot of land to build a mosque but funds collected for the construction were donated to the National Defence Fund in 1939 in preparation for the imminent war. After the war, the plot was confiscated by the Communist government. Recently, the MZR has been trying to regain ownership of the plot but the process is complicated. Other instances of local reporting on Islam in Poland are linked to interreligious encounters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland—26 January). 15
Major Cultural Events
Dni Kultury Muzułmańskiej (Muslim Culture Days)—a series of cultural events organised occasionally (so far) in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław); Encounters in Kruszyniany, Białystok region (in June; including prayer for peace with representatives of other religions);19 Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (songs, dances, games and sports); Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe (Bayram Days in Podlasie Region—Białystok region); Summer Academy of Tatar Lore.
If we consider only the number of people involved compared with the size of the population, the interreligious encounters may seem unimportant. However, the events organised by Muslims are their own initiatives and are not instigated by the Christians. This is an important fact that should be underlined. 19
PORTUGAL Nina Clara Tiesler1 1
Muslim Populations
Portugal has a rather small Muslim population which has grown mostly since decolonisation in 1974. Estimates of the communities themselves and by researchers suggest around 38,000–40,000 people, among whom are around 10,000 Isma’ilis, but who are mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin, from Mozambique and, in greater numbers, from Guinea-Bissau. Other Muslim groupings from Morocco and Bangladesh have arrived more recently (noticeably since the early 1990s). Small numbers (500–1,500) of Muslims come from Iran, Senegal, India and Pakistan. While smaller Muslim communities are established in the north (mainly in Porto and Coimbra), the south (in the Algarve) and on the island of Madeira (the majority of Moroccan Muslims live in and around Porto and on the Algarve), the overwhelmingly majority live in and around the capital city Lisbon. In and around Lisbon, there is a certain (but not massive) geographical concentration in particular neighbourhoods, such as Laranjeiro and Odivelas (both having well established mosques). The ‘official’ figures from the immigration control/monitoring service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, SEF) and the census2 do not reflect realities, and give numbers much lower than the estimates of researchers and the communities themselves. According to the 2001 census, Portugal’s total population was 10,356,117, of whom 12,014 were declared to be Muslims.3 The reasons for these low numbers are, first, that religious 1 Nina Clara Tiesler is a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-Afro-Brazilian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (MEL-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Religion and has researched on Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is the author of Muslime in Europa: Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006), and editor of “Islam in Portuguese-speaking areas”, Lusotopie, vol. 14, no. 1 (special issue, 2007). 2 National Institute of Statistics, www.ine.pt. 3 Leitão, J., “The new Islamic presence in Portugal: Towards a progressive intregration”, in Aluffi Beck-peccoz, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Peeters: Leuven, 2004), p. 180.
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affiliation is not an obligatory question in the census, so not everyone answers it, and, second, that Portuguese citizenship is quite widespread and so basing estimates from citizenship are unsatisfactory. In addition, in many cases the proportion of Muslims in the population of the countries of origin cannot be simply applied to the immigrants from those countries in Portugal, especially not in the cases of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL) has a register of official members and supporters of the community (Muslims and non-Muslims), who number around 4,180 (according to a spokesman in December 2008). It also aims to monitor the total number of Muslims living in the country and confirms the broadly accepted estimates of 38,000–40,000. The main mosques are frequently attended by 1,500 people on Fridays and up to 15,000 (at special festivities). 2
Islam and the State
The Constitution, which recognises freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the state and religious denominations. However, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys privileges not granted to other religious groups.4 A decisive change came with the Religious Freedom Act of 22 June 2001, most of whose improvements for religious minorities were implemented from the year 2006. Before the implementation of the new law, the CIL, as well as smaller Islamic communities and other religious minorities, could only be officially recognized as ‘associations in private law’. In 2006, the CIL took advantage of the new rights by becoming a registered religious community, thus obtaining a legal status substantially equal to that of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the state with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary consignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax, but no public funding. Several inequalities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of the religious groups and on the period of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required (the CIL was founded 40 years ago). In practice, the CIL can benefit from tax concessions, for example, on
4
Ibid., p. 291.
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buildings expenditure, etc. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Isma’ili) celebrate an anniversary or special occasion, the Portuguese state is often represented at the highest level. In addition, at least one of the ex-presidents of the Republic is an honorary member of CIL, and the current CIL president was one of the advisers of the president of the republic during his last visit to India. During the visit of the Dalai Lama in 2007, the CIL organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama as guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been facing the same problems as other governments as regards to official relations. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The role of a small group of Muslims from Mozambique (a Portuguese colony until 1975), who were studying at the faculties of law, medicine and economics in the metropolis was decisive in laying the foundations of Muslim organisations. Most of these community founders, as well as other Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin, had already been Portuguese citizens under colonial rule. Consequently, they did not perceive themselves as ‘immigrants’. Many African Muslims gather around their Sufi leaders, and Muslims from Bangladesh have recently founded a prayer hall closer to their workplace. However, the vast majority of at least 30,000 Sunnis and their local communities are linked to and occasionally take part in the life of the central Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL). The CIL, founded in 1968, acts as an umbrella organisation for Sunni Muslims, both formally and informally. The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, Lisbon Central Mosque, founded1985 (Av. José Malhoa (à Praça de Espanha), 1000 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 21 387 41 42 / 21 387 91 84, fax: (+351) 21 387 22 30, email:
[email protected], www.comunidadeislamica.pt) has as its imam Sheikh David Munir. It is also the home of the Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa (Islamic Community of Lisbon, CIL). Alongside common religious, cultural and social infrastructures (including a bookstore, chatrooms or the community website), three types of association were founded in the 30-year-old Central Mosque at the heart of Lisbon: the Women‘s Association, several groups of Guinean Muslims, and the Commissão de Jovens da Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa (Youth Association of the Islamic Community, CILJovem) which is organised and attended mainly (if not only) by young people of South Asian origin, including some Isma’ili Muslims.
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The other main Muslim organisations are: Colégio Islâmico, Ensino e Actividades Educativas, Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel: 21 211 05 30, fax: 21 211 05 39, email:
[email protected]. Centro Português Árabe Pullar e C. Islâmica, Rua José Estêvão, 3-A—r/c, Reboleira, 2720 Amadora, director: Prof. Bubacar Balde, tel: (+351) 21 496 47 12. Centro de Estudos Islâmicos de Portugal, Av. da Liberdade, 73, 3 Esq., 1200 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 211-558544. Centro Cultural Ismaili, Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600–001 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 217 229 000, fax: (+351) 217 229 045, email:
[email protected]. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Besides the Central Mosque mentioned above, there are two other mosques near Lisbon (in Odivelas and Laranjeiro) and another in Coimbra, and there are a total of 33 cultural centres and prayer halls across the country (but mainly near Lisbon), and around twelve madrasas, as well as the Jamatkhana of the Shi’a Imami Ismaili Muslim Community. 5
Children’s Education
A recognised private Islamic secondary Islamic school exists in Palmela (near Lisbon). Among the approximately 100 pupils, only 5 or 6 are non-Muslims. Most young Muslims receive their Islamic education in one of the madrasas. The Law of Religious Freedom allows Islamic instruction in public schools, if there are enough pupils/parents who require it (a minimum of ten). In practice, there is currently no public school in Portugal which has enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age who could benefit from this offer. Parents do not complain about the lack of such provision, as their children attend instruction in the madrasas. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) governs the role of imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal
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status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.5 As a higher institution for the training of imams has not yet been founded, imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school of Palmela. Some imams have received their education abroad (mostly in the UK or in Pakistan). 7
Burial and Cemeteries
There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several municipal cemeteries reserve areas for Muslims and their communities. Such an area has existed in the cemetery of Lumiar (a district of Lisbon) since 2005, donated by the City Hall and open to Muslims from all over Portugal. It has become the most important cemetery for both Sunni and Isma’ili families, and is called ‘our cemetery’. With the existence of these facilities and probably due to the fact that most Muslims in Portugal are either Portuguese citizens or in other ways deeply attached to the country, it is very rare that families prefer to arrange for relatives to be buried abroad. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) grants the Islamic and other communities the right to exercise of freedom of religion in special situations (such as during military service, on admission to public hospitals, and in prison). In practice, there are no imams working on a regular basis in such institutions due to the lack of demand. If the need arises (mostly in hospitals), the Commission of Social Affairs (Commissão de assuntos sociais) of the CIL provides special care and support for the individuals and their families, including, of course, the visits of an imam. 9
Religious Festivals
The state does not officially recognise Islamic festivals or holidays but permits absence from work and school for the main occasions on request. On these occasions, the CIL distributes information to the public, the Ministry of Justice, schools and employers and provides the appropriate
5
Leitão, “The new Islamic presence in Portugal”, p. 300.
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forms for applying to the authorities for leave of absence. Workers and employees are expected to maintain a flexible schedule and to make up time lost. Students may sit examinations on alternative dates. 10
Halal Food
According to a spokesman of CIL, ritual slaughter according to Islamic rules has been permitted since 1975. Nevertheless, most ritual slaughter for Muslims was performed by the rabbi of the Lisbon synagogue until first halal butcher shops were established from 1982 on. Today there are at least six halal butcher shops in Lisbon, and three in Odivelas, one in Martim Moniz Square in the city centre, one in Laranjeiro, and another (owned by a non-Muslim) in the city centre. Halal chicken is available in the major shopping malls/supermarket chains (Continente and Jumbo). There are at least nine halal restaurants in the main cities. 11
Dress Codes
The wearing of the headscarf and other distinctive clothing at school and work has not caused any conflict or controversy, but it is not a very common practice in public places. 12
Publications and Media
There are two or three small edited journals. Along with other religious groups, Muslims take part in two television programmes on the public channel RTP2, where the presentation time is divided between the communities according to the numerical strength. In practice, the time is mostly occupied by the Roman Catholic Church and, second, by Protestant and Pentecostal churches. A radio programme put out by a public broadcasting station (Antena 1) is expected to be inaugurated in 2009. The CIL runs a website (www.comunidadeislamica.pt) and some younger community members have activated a chatroom (www.aliasoft .com/forumislam) where questions can be submitted to be answered by the imams. This chatroom is also frequented by Portuguese-speaking Muslims from outside Portugal (mainly from Brazil, but also from Mozambique and the UK).
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Family Law
As noted above, since Islamic communities (and other religious minorities with long-standing tradition in the country) can register and be recognised as religious communities (and not only as associations of private law, as was the case until 2006), they can perform religious marriages which, by submission of the appropriate declarations, will be accepted in civil law. According to a spokesman of CIL, the organisation is currently making the necessary legal preparations for this process, while the Jewish community has already solemnised at least two such marriages in 2008. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The historically recent ‘new’ Muslim presence (as distinct from the historical presence on the Iberian Peninsular before the fifteenth century) did not attract much attention before 11 September 2001. The rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ now puts Portuguese Muslims in a very strange situation, leaving them quite alienated in response to questions arising from a new kind of public ‘interest’. Their spokesmen deal with such questions (and sometimes insults) in their normal, patient and calm way. Researchers and Muslims know about harassment, but public Islam in Portugal always stresses that “Muslims in Portugal are not suffering from discrimination. They are well integrated citizens and members of society.” The media mainly cover or mention special occasions (anniversies and famous visitors to the communities) and festivals (especially the beginning and end of Ramadan). 15
Major Cultural Events
In 2008, the major event was the fortieth anniversary of CIL, with the President of the Republic among the guests of honour.
ROMANIA Irina Vainovski-Mihai1 1
Muslim Populations
The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in northern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as a Romanian territory. As a result of the deteriorating economic conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey.2 Since its establishment as an independent state, the constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians, who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denomination issued in 1923 lists the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.3 The establishment of the Communist regime (1948) did introduce many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds. After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed. Today, the majority of Muslim communities live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups. The most recent official 1 Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Lecturer in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 2 Bara, Maria, “Relaflii interetnice dintre cre tinii ortodoc i i musulmani în Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia i Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassyensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (94). 3 Gillet, Oliver, Religie i naflionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Compania, 2001), p. 6.
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census (2002) recorded 67,257 Muslims (0.3% of the total population of Romania), of whom 31,118 were ethnic Turks, 23,641 Tatars, and 3,310 Romanians.4 As regards levels of education, out of the total Muslim population over the age of ten (i.e., 57,687 individuals), 2,637 have a university degree.5 The main Muslim ethnic groups, the Turks and the Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. In the official census, a relatively small number of Turks and Tatars declared themselves to belong to religions other than Islam, to be atheists or to have no religion (980 Turks out of 32,098, and 294 Tatars out of 23,641).6 The total number of Muslim families is 16,807, out of which there are 12,584 families in which both spouses following the Muslim faith.7 By 2008, the number of Muslims in Romania should have increased slightly due to immigration from Middle Eastern countries, and conversion (mainly consequent on marriage). Updated estimates for 2008 vary: 70,000 according to the muftiate in Romania, with 87% living in the south-eastern county of Constanza,8 approximately 67,300 according to the Scretariatul de State pentru Culte (State Secretariat for Religious Affairs),9 and around 120,000 according to local Islamic associations and their websites such as Islamul azi (Islam Today).10 After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Muslims groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before 1989, and refugees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds (from northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians.
4 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 5 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t13.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 6 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 7 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t30.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 8 Muftiate of Romania figures available at http://www.muftiyat.ro/index.php?option= com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=26, accessed 1 February 2009. 9 Figures from the Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, available at http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 1 February 2009. 10 http://www.islamulazi.ro/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed 1 February 2009.
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These new communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Romania, the two groups live almost parallel lives.11 2
Islam and the State
Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority (86.8% according to the 2002 census).12 The Islamic faith, as one of the eighteen religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is considered a public-utility legal entity. Expenditures are financed primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recognised national leadership and representative body (the muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for the maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the muftiate is the only religious institution which represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the muftiate’s approval.13 The Synodal Council (Romanian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: ura-i Islam), headed by the mufti, takes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. The Synodal Council is comprised of the mufti, four members nominated by Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România (UDTTMR, Democratic Union of the Turkish-Muslim Tatars in Romania), four members nominated by Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România (UDTR, Turkish Democratic Union of Romania), the principal of the Liceul Teologic Musulman i Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk (Kemal Ataturk Muslim Theological and Pedagogical High School) and fifteen clerics. The UDTTMR and the UDTR are two of the nineteen political parties and cultural associations representing ethnic minorities in the Romanian Parliament. The mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided
11 Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, ISIM Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34, available at http://www.isim.nl/files/newsl_3.pdf, accessed 30 March 2009. 12 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 13 Cf. Chapter III, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Goverment Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June, 2008.
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his qualification is recognised by the Romanian state). As the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the mufti is confirmed by a decree of the President of the Republic. Although the muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution representing the Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constanfla), was elected to this position in 2005. He studied in Romania and Turkey, holds an MA from the Faculty of OrthodoxChristian Theology (University of Târgovi te)14 and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox-Christian Theology (University of Constanfla).15 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The traditional Muslim denomination (Sunni) engages in public activities mainly through the muftiate (www.muftiyat.ro) together with the UDTTMR (President: Amet Varol; Constanfla 900613 , Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel.: (+40241) 61 66 43; (+40241) 52 01 86, http://www .tatar.ro) and the UDTR (President: Osman Fedbi; 900613 Constanfla; Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel./fax: (+40241) 55 09 03, http://www .udtr.ro). However, newly established associations and foundations dominated by immigrants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in public activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are: Fundaflia Centrul Cultural Islamic Semiluna (Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation, str. Munflii Gurghiului nr. 50–52, sector 6, Bucharest, www.scoala-araba.ro), Fundaflia Taiba (Taiba Foundation, os. Colentina, nr. 373, sector 2, Bucharest; str. Maior ofran, nr. 11, Constanfla, www .islamulazi.ro) and Asociaflia Musulmanilor (Association of Muslims, at the same address as the Taiba Foundation, www.associatiamusulmanilor.ro), Fundaflia Tuna (Tuna Foundation, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, Bucharest, www.tuna.ro), Liga Culturală i Islamică din România (Islamic and Cultural League in Romania, str. Fabrica de Gheaflă, nr. 14, sector 2, Bucharest,
http://ftl.teologie.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 (Faculty of Theology, University of Târgovi te), accessed 31 March 2009. 15 http://www.univ-ovidius.ro/teologie/ (Faculty of Theology, University of Constanfla), accessed 31 March 2009. 14
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www.islam.ro). The most active of them appears to be the Taiba Foundation, with several websites, blogs, and Internet discussion groups in Romanian, publication of Islamic handbooks in Romanian, participation in book fairs, charitable activities, and a weekly two-hour television programme (see Section 12 below). Under the Law of Denominations (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic NGOs, associations and foundations will need to be re-confirmed with the endorsement of the mufti. The mufti considers that many of these associations are harmful because of their insistent propaganda and radical views, and that they have taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education after the collapse of Communism.16 The Taiba Foundation voices its contempt for this opinion, accusing the mufti and the Synodal Council of libel.17 The case is pending. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are 73 purpose-built mosques in the region of Dobrudja and one in Bucharest (built in 1960).18 Ten of them are historical monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. Although the muftiate can receive financial aid from the Romanian state, the costs of new buildings and maintenance of historical monuments are mainly provided by the Turkish state and/or foreign Muslim citizens with businesses in Romania. For example, the cost of restoring the sixteenth-century Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Medgidia, amounting to €1,000,000, were covered by the muftiate, the Consulate of Turkey in Constanfla and a Turkish businessman,19 and the erection of a new mosque in Constanfla, with an area of 500 m2 and a 33 m. minaret, was sponsored by a Palestinian businessman.20 Besides the 16 “There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an”, interview with the mufti on the muftiate website, available at http://www.muftiyat.ro/ index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=140), accessed 30 March 2009. 17 See http://www.islamul.ro/stire.php?id=11, accessed 30 March 2009. 18 See Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 1 February 2009. 19 See http://www.muftiyat.ro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 237&Itemid=75, accessed 27 March 2009. 20 “O noua geamie pentru musulmani”, Stiri Constanta, 17 November 2008, available
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main mosque, it is estimated that there are fifteen other mosques in Bucharest funded by foreign residents.21 In fact, they are prayer halls adjacent to the associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns. 5
Children’s Education
The Law of Education adopted in 1995 introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. A national curriculum is set for the legally recognised denominations, including Islam. National curricula for religion are set by each denomination and submitted first to the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs and then to the Ministry of Education for approval. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in a particular religion, those under sixteen being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious or if the school cannot provide instruction in the religion requested. The basics of Islam are also introduced in classes on the history and traditions of the Turkish-Tatar Minority, which are part of the national curriculum for the Turkish and Tatar minorities. According to the Law of Education (Law 4/1995, Ch. XII, Art. 120.4), each legally recognised ethnic minority can draw up a curriculum for special subject teaching on their history and the traditions. The curriculum and textbooks are approved by the Ministry of Education. Islam is taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associations on an extra-curricular and private basis, mainly in weekend schools, or within an Arabic language programme. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at the state University of Bucharest (as well as BA and MA degrees in Arabic and Turkish Studies), two private Universities (Dimitrie Cantemir Chris-
at http://www.stirilocale.ro/constanta/O_noua_geamie_pentru_musulmani_ IDN682242.html, accessed 27 March 2009. 21 Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007 (p. 155, available at http:// www.fnst-freiheit.org/uploads/974/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 1 July 2008.
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tian University and Spiru Haret University), the National Defence University, Ovidius University in Constanfla among others and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation and history of Arab literature. In 1996, an Islamic secondary school (Liceul Teologic Musulman i Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with the support of the Turkish government.22 A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967. All the holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas issued abroad are subject to the recognition by the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the mufti. In 2007, disputes emerged after the mufti refused to endorse diplomas obtained from Islamic theological institutes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. The mufti officially requested the Ministry of Education not to recognise diplomas obtained by seven Tatars on the ground that they had studied a radical form of Islam23 and recognition of their diplomas was denied. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constanfla, there is need for additional provision. The issue of creating a cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constanfla (250 km away) for burial. The matter seems to have been settled recently after the Muslim community was allotted land for this purpose on the outskirts of Bucharest.
22 Cf. a protocol signed by the Romanian and Turkish ministries of foreign affairs on 22 December 1999, valid until 2010 (see the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mae.ro/index.php?id=5746&unde=doc, accessed 29 March 2009. 23 “Teologi musulmani in ‘razboi’ cu muftiul”, Evenimentul zilei, 24 April 2007, available at http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/439826/Teologi-musulmaniin-quotrazboiquot-cu-muftiul/, accessed 29 March 2009, and “Plangere catre Sura-i Islam”, Clubul român-arab de presă i cultură (Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture), 19 April 2007, available at http://www.ana-news.info/index.php?option=com_conte nt&task=view&id=440&Itemid=171, accessed 29 March 2009.
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‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no imams in the armed forces. On request of an inmate, the muftiate can assign an imam to visit him in the prison at the muftiate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there are a significant number of Muslims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards. 9
Religious Festivals
The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations take place in the main cities (with pop music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. In Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arabic restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence (as in Dobrudja) they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Muslim, being cautious that they may behave inappropriately. 10
Halal Food
In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and Arabic and Turkish television programmes, and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by Romanian halal slaughter houses. 11
Dress Codes
There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear hijab. No women have yet been observed wearing niqab.
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Publication and Media
The main printed media are the monthly periodicals Hakses (The Authentic Voice, published by UDTR (Director: Prof. Dr Nuredin Ibram; Editor in Chief: Chiulten Abdulah, Constanfla 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. SO, ap. 3, tel./fax: +40241)55 09 03), Karadeniz (The Black Sea, Director: Memet Faruc; Editor in Chief: Osman Niat, Constanfla 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel./fax: +40241)61 66 43) and Cas (The Youngster, same directorship and address as Karadeniz), both of the latter published by the UDTTMR. The website www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers also extended articles on the Muslims in Romania, in general. In March 2009, UDTR, UDTTMR and the muftiate opened a broadcasting station (Radio T, Director General: Ervin Ibraim) in Constanfla with programmes in Romanian, Turkish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune (Romanian Broadcasting Society, SRR). DDTV (a television channel broadcasting from Bucharest nationally, although with a small audience, Director and Owner: Dan Diaconescu), hosts a weekly programme, Islamul azi (Islam Today) presented in Romanian by the Taiba Foundation. In March 2008, DDTV was penalised by Consiliul Naflional al Audiovizualului (National Audiovisual Council), an autonomous public institution that monitors the media, for infringements in the content of three programmes (the insinuation that Muslim women are superior to women of other faiths and the presentation at an inappropriate hour of a film comprising scenes of violence. See Decision 147/04.03.2008).24 13
Family Law
According to the Family Code, marriages are only recognised if they are performed and registered at a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. The Romanian legal system is secular. In litigation,
24 National Audiovisual Council, http://www.cna.ro/Decizia-nr-147-din-04-032008.html?var_recherche=%22Islamul%20azi%22, accessed 30 March 2009.
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a non-denominational premarital contract may be taken into account. The Family Code prohibits polygamy, but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Generally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
With regard to the Muslims in Romania, media coverage on the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, ethnic festivals and public performances). The regional media (in Dobrudja) cover in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by new-comers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim population and not understood by them. Events and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, researchers in Middle Eastern Studies and ad-hoc analysts. Probably as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as a familiar Other, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Balkan countries) are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.). So media focus on Islam tends only to be related to international events. 15
Major Cultural Events
Nevruz, the annual spring celebration, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurdish immigrants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension.
SERBIA Ahmet Alibašić1 1
Muslim Populations
Muslims are one of the traditional religious communities that have been present in Serbia for centuries. Serbian Muslims are almost all Sunnis following the Hanafi school of Islamic law. Islam started to spread in the territories of today’s Serbia with the Ottoman conquest of the late fourteenth century and some parts of Serbia remained under the Ottomans for three to five centuries. The conquest started with two battles in Kosovo in 1389 and 1448, followed by the capture of the mediaeval Serbian capital Smederevo in 1459, and was completed after the conquest of Belgrade in 1521. After the incorporation of the medieval Serbian state into the Ottoman Empire, Islam over time became the majority religion in a number of regions mainly due to the voluntary conversion of local population, as well as migration. The Ottomans withdrew from the territories of today’s Serbia slowly over centuries starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699. The withdrawal process was completed after the Balkan wars in 1912–13, when Serbia doubled its territory by taking over the Ottoman regions of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia. At that time there were about 500,000 Muslims in Serbia. In the territories left by the Ottomans, Muslims were in various ways very quickly reduced to insignificant numbers. Soon after the first phase of Ottoman withdrawal in 1834, only 12,000 Muslims remained in the then Serbia (much smaller than today’s Serbia), and by 1866 there were only 5,000 Muslims, mostly Roma. Many of the expelled Serbian Muslims settled in Bosnia and Sandžak, which were then still under the Ottomans. Some migrated all the way to Anatolia, where there is today a significant Bosniak community. The migrations continued after World War I but on a smaller
Ahmet Alibašić holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences, and Islamic Civilization from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations. 1
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scale, so that most Muslims in the territories acquired by Serbia after 1912 and 1913 stayed where they were.2 According to the latest census of 2002, there are 239,658 Muslims among a total Serbian population of 7.4 million. As 3.2% of the population, they constitute the third largest religious group in Serbia after Orthodox (6,371,584) and Catholics (410,976).3 As a result of historical developments, the Muslim population today is concentrated mostly in south western Serbia, known as Sandžak (where there are 142,685 Muslims, or 60.67% of the local population) and in south eastern Serbia, Preševo Valley (municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac i Medve¶a, where there are 58,903, or 66.2% of the local population). In addition to these two regions, significant Muslim communities are present in Belgrade (20,366 or 1.3%), central Serbia (10,000 or 0.3%) and Vojvodina (8,000 or 0.4%). Sandžak is home to 60% and Preševo Valley to 25% of Serbia’s Muslims. They are a majority in the municipalities of Tutin (97%), Sjenica (83%), Novi Pazar (80%), and Prijepolje (51%) in Sandžak, and Preševo (89%) and Bujanovac (55%) in south eastern Serbia. If Belgrade Muslims are added to those of Sandžak and Preševo, it appears that around one ninth of Serbian territory hosts over 90% of its Muslim population. Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks make up 56% (136.087), Albanians 25% (61.647), Roma 8%, and ethnic ‘Muslims’ 7%, of the total Muslim population, which amounts to about 96% of all Muslims in Serbia. Most of the few thousand Arabs living in Serbia, mostly in Belgrade, are also followers of Islam. Conversions to Islam today are rare but do happen. Some Muslim representatives question the accuracy of 2002 census data and refer to much higher number of Muslims, up to 700,000. However they do not provide any evidence except that they claim that a much higher percentage of Roma are Muslims than is indicated in the census of 2002. There are no surveys on levels of practice but, generally speaking, the Muslims of Sandžak and Preševo Valley are more much more
2 Zirojević, Olga, Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459 –1804 (Serbia under Turkish Rule 1459– 1804) (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2007); Bandžović, Safet, Iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća (Migration of the Muslim Population from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century) (Sarajevo: no publ, 1998); Avdić, Hakija, Položaj Muslimana u Sandžaku (The Status of Muslims in Sandžak) (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991); Karčić, Fikret, Muslimani Balkana ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX vijeku (Muslims of the Balkans: The ‘Eastern Question’ in the Twentieth Century) (Tuzla: Behrambegova medresa, 2001). 3 See the details at http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd//en/popis.htm, accessed 22 April 2009.
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religious than those in other parts of the country. Of all ethnic groups Roma practise the religion least. 2
Islam and the State
The Constitution of Serbia states that religious communities are equal and separate from the state. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006)4 has regulated the issue of state-church relations. The law distinguishes between seven traditional religious communities, including the Islamic community, and all other communities. These seven enjoy the privilege of having inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia which Yugoslavia automatically recognised. This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community (see below). Furthermore, the law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national identity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
The most important Islamic organisation in Serbia is the Islamska zajednica u Srbiji (Islamic Community in Serbia, ICiS, Ul. 1. maja 70/b, 36300 Novi Pazar, tel: 020/331-620, fax: 020/331 622, email: mesihat@ptt .yu, www.islamskazajednica.org) with its headquarters in Novi Pazar, headed by the chief mufti Muamer Zukorlić. The competing Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia, ICoS) was established in 2007 (see below). Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1991–92 the united Islamic Community in Yugoslavia dissolved too. A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mešihat islamske zajednice 4 http://www.mv.sr.gov.yu/cir/images/stories/pravna_akta/zakon_o_crkvama_ i_vz.pdf, accessed 22 April 2009. For the history of church state relations in Serbia, see Bremer, Thomas, “Relations between the church and the state: The case of the Serbian Orthodox Church”, in Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Religion and Democracy in Moldova (Maribor-Chisinau: ISCOMET and ASER, 2005), p. 88; Bašić, Goran, “Status of churches and religious communities in Serbia”, in Silvo Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 143–157.
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Sandžaka) was established on 30 October 1993, while the Muslim community in the rest of the country remained organised only at regional and local level. Since the Law on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006 envisages the registration of only one organisation, with the words ‘in Serbia’ in its name, for each of the seven traditional religious communities, the unification assembly of the ICiS was held on 27 March 2007 and the ICiS was registered by the state in the registry of religious organisations on 30 July 2007.5 The ICiS is organised into four muftiates, which are currently headed by three muftis: the Sandžak muftiate with Mufti Muamer Zukorlić as the chief mufti of all Serbia, Preševo muftiate with Mufti Mumin Tahiri, and Belgrade and Novi Sad muftiate with Rešad Plojović as its mufti. Its executive body is called the Mešihat, headed by chief mufti. Its main institutions are the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Isa Bey’s madrasa in Novi Pazar, a monthly newspaper Glas Islama (Voice of Islam), El-Kelime publishing house, the International Humanitarian Organization (IHO), a media centre, an agency for halal quality certification, and two kindergartens. It also has three associations: for women, Islamic scholars (ulama) and youth. All contact details can be found on the main website of the ICiS given above. However, this united community was opposed by the then long-time mufti of Belgrade, Hamdija Jusufspahić and his two sons, both imams. In October 2007 the family was joined by personal opponents of the chief mufti Zukorlić from within the ICiS and supported by his political opponents gathered around the Bosniak political leader from Sandžak, Sulejman Ugljanin, a Bosniak nationalist who is currently in alliance with Serb nationalists and radicals. The state joined in the dispute by supporting the Jusufspahić family, widely seen as compromised by the positions it took under the Milošević regime. Despite the fact that the Law on Churches and Religious Communities stipulates the registration of only one organisation for each religious community, the state recognises this alternative Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia, ICoS, www.rijaset.rs, www.mesihatsandzaka.rs) under the formal leadership of Adem Zilkić. The real mover of events is assumed to be the current self-proclaimed mufti of Belgrade Muhamed Jusuf-
5 Bećirbegović, Edah, “Organizacija Islamske zajednice u Srbiji”, in Karčić, Fikret et al., Organizacija islamskih zajednica u regionu (Sarajevo: Udruženje ilmijje IZ u BiH, 2008), p. 39.
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spahić. The website of the Serbian Ministry of Religions has weblinks to both communities on its homepage (www.mv.sr.gov.yu/cir/). Only the ICiS enjoys the support of the Islamic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia.6 The two communities have been disputing each other’s legality and legitimacy since 2007. The dispute has on several occasions erupted into violent conflict on the ground. The ICiS controls most of the mosques and other Islamic institutions in the country, and is by far the better organised and more active, but the following of the ICoS is not insignificant. At the core of the dispute seem to be the relationship with Sarajevo, personal ambitions and animosities, and the ambition of some local Muslim politicians and the Serbian government to control the community. The ICiS would like the Islamic Community in Sandžak to stay formally connected to the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and in the case of Preševo with the Islamic Community in Kosovo)7 while the ICoS wants complete independence. As of the moment no easy solutions seems to be possible soon. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
According to the very thorough research conducted by Divna ÎurićZamolo, before the Great Vienna War (1683–99), Belgrade had at least 73 mosques and some sources give higher figures.8 However, after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, they were all destroyed, apart from the Bajrakli Mosque, which was torched in March 2004 in revenge for the burning of the Kosovo churches. Today, there are some 190 mosques in Serbia: about 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern Serbia, and one in each of Belgrade, Niš, Mali Zvornik and Subotica. A number of mosques are under construction. In some cities, including Novi Sad, Muslims gather in unmarked premises, presumably out of fear of attack.
6 Jusić, Muhamed, “The split within the Islamic community in Serbia”, paper presented at the conference “Administration of Islamic Affairs in Secular States: SE European Experience”, Sarajevo, 17–19 April 2009. 7 Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia. 8 Îurić-Zamolo, Divna, Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima 1521–1867: Arhitektonskourbanistička studija (Belgrade: Muzej grada beograda, 1977), p. 62. See also: Djurdjev, B., art. “Belgrade”, in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn, vol. 1, pp. 1163–1165.
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Children’s Education
Religious education in public schools was introduced in 2002 following joint lobbying by the Orthodox Church and other churches and communities, including the Islamic community. The law guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools (Art. 40). In public schools Islamic religious education is an ‘optional-compulsory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may then not later withdraw. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by the Islamic community and paid by the state. The subject is offered once a week in all the grades if there are seven or more interested pupils.9 Islamic religious instruction for Muslim children is also organised within the Islamic community’s mosques and maktabs. The ICiS also runs two kindergartens. 6
Higher and Professional Education
The ICiS is founder of the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies. The madrasa (http://medresa.net/) is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990 while the section for girls was established in 1996. Another girls’ section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty (www.fis.edu.rs) was established in 2001 as a two-year Islamic Pedagogical Academy. Today, it provides four-year training for imams and Islamic religious education teachers for schools. Programmes are offered at undergraduate, MA and PhD levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Sarajevo. In addition to these two institutions, the ICiS runs the International University of Novi Pazar (www.uninp.edu.rs), which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in a number of towns throughout Serbia which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students.
9 Savić, Svenka, “Some notes on Islamic education in Serbia”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe, Wiener Islamisch-religionspädagogische Studien, 1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), pp. 449–456. See also Kuburić, Zorica and Milan Vukomanović, “Religious education: The case of Serbia”, in Kuburić, Zorica and Christian Moe (eds), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), pp. 107–138.
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Burial and Cemeteries
As the status, history, problems, ethnic and social composition of the Muslim community differs from one region to another, so does the situation with cemeteries. In Sandžak, Preševo Valley and some other parts of the country, Muslims have no difficulty in carrying out burial according to Islamic tradition. In some towns where there are no Muslim cemeteries, Muslims choose to be buried in the nearest city where there is one. Belgrade Muslims have been complaining for a long time about the need for a new cemetery, but to no avail. During the socialist period, most cemeteries were taken over from the Islamic community and are now managed by the municipal authorities. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There are no chaplains in state institutions in Serbia. Recently there have been statements suggesting that this may be introduced and legally regulated. 9
Religious Festivals
The two ‘Ids/Bayrams are the two main Muslim festivals in the country. On the occasion of both holidays the chief mufti holds an official reception. The manner in which the bayrams are celebrated varies significantly between Muslim majority and Muslim minority areas. In addition, Muslims in Serbia celebrate the beginning of the New Hijri year, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, and the two sacred nights that fall in Ramadan. 10
Halal Food
Halal slaughter is permitted. In cooperation with the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICiS has started its own Halal Quality Certification Agency which operates on a commercial basis. Halal products can be found in some supermarkets. In addition, Muslims often slaughter animals privately following the halal practice.
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Dress Codes
There are no legal restrictions on wearing hijab, but few women would do so outside the Muslim majority regions of Sandžak and Preševo Valley. Hijab is now allowed in photographs for personal documents. 12
Publications and Media
Most of the Muslim media in Serbia are religious. Glas islama (Voice of Islam, www.glas-islam.info) is a biweekly newspaper published by the ICiS since 1996. The Faculty of Islamic Studies issues an annual collection of articles in Islamska misao (Islamic Thought) while students at the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa publish their own magazine called Softa. A private Sandžačke novine (Sandžak Newspaper) has been issued with various degrees of regularity depending on the financial resources of the owners. It is difficult to brand any of the electronic media as strictly Bosniak or Muslim, apart from the private Bosniak television station in Novi Pazar, which broadcasts no news or cultural programmes. There are three other television stations: regional Radio and TV station of Novi Pazar owned by the municipality, the private TV station Jedinstvo, and in 2008 the International University in Novi Pazar started an experimental radio and television station, Universa. There are several other private radio stations in Novi Pazar. In Preševo Valley the municipal radio and television station Preševo and two private radio and television stations (Spektri and Aldi ) broadcast in Albanian. There are no printed publications in Albanian in this region. 13
Family Law
Only marriages conducted by a public registrar are legally valid. Both the rival Islamic community associations encourage ‘Shari’a weddings’ administered by an imam. Such weddings have no legal standing and are usually performed after the civil ceremony. Divorce is usually formalised only by the civil authorities. This is also true of inheritance; families may agree privately to divide an inheritance according to the norms of Islamic law but they must still go to the civil authorities to make it official. There have been cases of polygamy, including some
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involving officials of the ICiS. No formal ‘Shari’a divorce’ procedure has been adopted. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The dispute between the ICiS and the ICoS, and related violence and verbal attacks, has dominated public discourse on Islam and Muslims in Serbia during the last two years. In addition, the issue of Muslim extremism has been on and off the public agenda. Two groups of socalled Wahhabis are currently on trial in Belgrade for illegal possession of arms and planning terrorist attacks. In November 2008, a Belgrade publishing house, Beobuk, published the Serbian translation of The Jewel of Medina (Dragulj Medine) by Sherry Jones, which the Islamic authorities in Serbia considered insulting to the Prophet Muhammed. The book was briefly withdrawn from circulation at the request of Chief Mufti Zukorlić, but is now on sale again and has featured at the Sarajevo book exhibition in neighbouring Bosnia, where it has also provoked sporadic protests, although this did not stop retailers selling it at the exhibition. 15
Major Cultural Events
Most Muslim cultural events take place in Sandžak, which is the centre of both religious and cultural life. The most common of these are concerts of religious songs (ilahije), literary evenings, the traditional days celebrating Bosniak culture, various exhibitions, and book promotions.
SLOVAKIA Štîpán Macháček1 1
Muslim Populations
The last census in Slovakia in 2001 did not offer the respondents the option of stating they were Muslims because the Islamic community has not yet been registered as a religious community and so Islam has not been recognised by the state as a Slovakian religion. Those respondents who indicated Islam were classified in the official results of the census as belonging to ‘other churches and religious societies’ and those Muslims who did not indicate any religion were classified as of ‘unknown’ religion.2 Figures for the number of Muslims in Slovakia are therefore only estimates. It is generally accepted that there are about 5,000 Muslims in Slovakia, including foreigners living temporarily in the country. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.3 According to these estimates, Muslims constitute about 0.09% of the population of Slovakia. Despite the fact that some Muslims came to present-day Slovakia as early as the tenth century and today’s southern Slovakia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly 150 years, there is not (and most likely has never been) an ‘authentic’ Slovak Muslim population and the overwhelming majority of today’s Slovak Muslims are people of foreign origin. Similarly to the Czech Republic, there are Muslims from mostly Arab countries who came to the former Czechoslovakia to study and
1 Štîpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 Figures provided by the Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky (Department for Statistics of the Slovak Republic), available at http://portal.statistics.sk/files/Sekcie/sek_600/ Demografia/SODB/Tabulky/tab13.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009. 3 An estimate given in an article published 11 May 2007 in the influential Slovak daily Hospodárske noviny (Moravčík, Roman, “Posledná krajina bez mešity”), available at http://hnonline.sk/c6-10157090-21127090-kL0000_detail-posledna-krajina-bez-mesity, accessed 27 May 2009.
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stayed, and often also married. In the 1990s, they were joined by Muslim refugees from the Balkans (mostly Bosnians, but also Kosovan and Macedonian Albanians) and the former Soviet Union. Afghan refugees also form a significant component of the Slovak Muslim community. The number of Slovak converts is estimated only at about 200 persons, mostly Slovak women married to Muslims of foreign origin. Most Muslims and Muslim activities are concentrated in the capital Bratislava, with small numbers living in the cities of Košice and Martin and the spa town of Piešt’any. 2
Islam and the State
Slovakia has no state religion and the Constitution provides for religious freedom. The prevalent faith is Roman Catholicism, professed by an estimated 70% of the Slovak population. Registration of churches and religious communities is not obligatory. However, religious communities that do not register are not granted the right to public funding, or allowed to build places of worship for public religious services. The last restriction also applies in prisons and hospitals. The Muslim community has never been registered in Slovakia as a religious community and would probably not be able to meet the strict requirements for registration. The 2007 amendment to the 1991 Law on churches and religious communities registration requires that communities wishing to register must have a minimum of 20,000 members permanently resident in Slovakia, and information must be provided about members’ personal details and their knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith. These regulations make it impossible for Slovak Muslims to become a recognized religious community in the foreseeable future. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Islamská nadácia na Slovensku (Islamic Foundation in Slovakia, (POBox 247 Bratislava 814 99, email:
[email protected]) is generally regarded as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Mohamad Safwan Hasna (who is Syrian by origin). Its activities are limited to organising religious and cultural events and worship, providing information on Islam, giving interviews in the media and helping Muslim asylum seekers with their problems. It runs an informative website at www.islamweb.sk.
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Všeobecný zväz moslimských študentov na Slovensku (General Union of Muslim Students in Slovakia), sometimes also Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku (General Union of Muslims in Slovakia) was founded in 1993 as a civil association. Its declared aim is to help Muslims living in Slovakia and to provide ‘objective’ information on Islam and its culture. Its activists overlap with those of Združenie priatel’ov islamskej literatúry (Association of Friends of Islamic Literature, Žabotova ulica č.2, 811 04, Bratislava, email:
[email protected]), whose goal is to inform the Slovak public about the Islamic culture and traditions. A leading person in both organisations is Abdulwahab Al-Sbenaty, a Slovak-Syrian, and the translator of the only Slovak version of the Qur’an. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Bratislava is probably the only European capital without a mosque, and Slovakia the only European country without an Islamic shrine. All efforts to establish an Islamic centre in Slovakia, including a mosque, have so far been unsuccessful. In Bratislava, the Muslim community uses a hired space as a prayer room (Staré grunty 64, Karlova Ves, Bratislava). No information on other such places is available. 5
Children’s Education
Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in Religious Education, which are organised by officially registered churches and religious communities. Islam is not registered so no Islamic Religious Education can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes on an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘Ethics’ are provide, which include some coverage of History of Religions. This is the option chosen by Muslim children. 6
Higher and Professional Education
There is a Department of Classical and Semitic Philology at Komensky University in Bratislava, which includes a programme on Arabic Language and Culture.4 At the Slovak Academy of Sciences, there is an Institute of Oriental Studies with several specialists in Islamic history 4
http://www.fphil.uniba.sk/index.php?id=kksf, accessed 27 May 2009.
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and religion.5 Arabic language is also taught at Nitra University in the Faculty of Political Sciences and European Studies. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The only burial place assigned for Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery Slávičie údolie in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are about 200 burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a general problem in the capital, which is not specific for the Muslim community. Members of The Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services. 9
Religious Festivals
No data. 10
Halal Food
Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they are not allowed to assist or slaughter in slaughterhouses, or to issue halal certificates. However, Vienna is only about 50 km away and this helps Muslims in Bratislava and elsewhere in Slovakia to have easy access to halal food. In Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities, there are fast food stalls serving imported halal meat. 11
Dress Codes
There is no law prohibiting or limiting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab andr niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported.
5
http://orient.sav.sk.
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Publications and Media
The only printed Islamic periodical publication is Al-Islam magazine, published irregularly, (usually several times a year) by the Islamic Foundation. It was originally, from 1994, published by Všeobecný zväz moslimských študentov. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), which is regarded as an official medium of the Slovak Muslim community. Združenie priatel’ov islamskej literatúry and Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku have a common website (www.islam-sk.sk), where the abovementioned Slovak translation of the Qur’an is also available. 13
Family Law
Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state because Muslims are not registered as a religious community. Muslims can (and do) perform Islamic marriage ceremonies, but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. However, some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The 2007 amendment of the Law on church registration increased the requirements for registration. This aroused dissatisfaction in the Muslim community and gave rise to the view that the amendment was specifically intended to prevent them from registering. The construction of an Islamic Centre in Bratislava is discussed in the Slovak media but does not attract much public interest. 15 No data.
Major Cultural Events
SLOVENIA Christian Moe1 1
Muslim Populations
According to the last census, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population (2002). Though markedly higher than in the 1991 census, the figure may be low, as the 23% of the population whose religion is not known probably includes some Muslims. Census data on (ethnic) nationality, however, do not suggest that there are many more people of Muslim cultural background. The figure does not include guest-workers. The Islamic Community does not provide membership figures, as it has not yet centralised its records and no data are available on active participation in religious practice. For centuries, Slovenes encountered Muslims primarily as Ottoman armies, though in World War I, Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal migrants from other parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meet the need for low-skilled workers in the growing economy of the most-developed Yugoslav republic. Consequently, nearly all Slovenian Muslims are urban dwellers, concentrated in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by thousands of refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic Community began to organise itself in the early 1960s, and the first local Islamic community council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967.2 Census data on the ethnic makeup of Slovenia’s Muslims are open to interpretation, as some categories are contested, fluid, or overlapping. Of those who declared themselves Muslims by confession, some 74% declare themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav-era 1 Christian Moe (PhD candidate, History of Religion, University of Oslo) is a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 2 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji [Islam and Muslims in Slovenia], Sarajevo: Emanet, 2002, pp. 103–106.
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category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);3 they originate mainly from northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They are followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Montenegrins, Macedonians, and others (ca. 1% each).4 2
Islam and the State
Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. The new Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Communist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Religious communities (including two Islamic ones) are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities. In 2007, the Islamic Community concluded a separate agreement with the state detailing its legal status and rights, becoming the fifth Slovenian religious community to do so.5 The state contributes part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. Under the new law, the state will also directly or indirectly employ some religious personnel as providers of spiritual care in institutions (but see section 8 below). The Islamic Community has received symbolic sums from the Office for Religious Communities, but has so far not managed to benefit from the opportunities for religious communities to apply for state funding for social programmes (probably because of limited capacity) or for maintaining cultural heritage (as they have little material heritage to maintain).
3 On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing Contexts and Redefinitions of Identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia,” Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 149–171. 4 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo [Immigrants: Studies on immigration and inclusion into Slovenian society], Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007, p. 536 (Table 10). 5 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008), available at http://www.uvs.gov.si/fileadmin/uvs.gov.si/pageuploads/razni_dokumenti/ DRZAVA_IN_VERA_V_SLOVENIJI_THE_STATE_AND_RELIGION_IN_ SLOVENIA.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009.
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Main Muslim Organisations
The Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji (Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia, IC, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386(1)2313625, fax: +386(1)2313626, email:
[email protected], www.islamska-skupnost.si), headed by Mufti Dr. Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the religious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims. It is a branch of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school (see Bosnia-Herzegovina for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks. A very small Slovenska muslimanska skupnost (Muslim Community of Slovenia, MCS, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386 1 430 4866, fax: +386 1 430 4866, email:
[email protected], www.smskupnost. si) was registered in 2006 by Osman Îogić, the former mufti of the IC, who broke away after internal conflict blocked his re-appointment.6 The MCS is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the IC in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Slovenia still has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret. Muslims have sought to build a mosque in Ljubljana since 1968 and have stepped up their efforts in the last decade. At the very end of 2008, major steps were taken: a new urban area plan provided for a definitive location for an Islamic Cultural Centre and mosque, and the IC bought most of the necessary land from the city, which turned down an anti-mosque referendum initiative. Local congregations have prayer-houses; standards vary. The IC recently acquired a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana for meetings, prayers, and a halal restaurant.
6 Îogić has given a detailed polemical account of the developments in the IC that led to his ousting. Îogić, Osman, Zaustavite IZlazim (Stop I’m Getting Off ) (Prozor: Fondacija Makljen, 2006).
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Children’s Education
There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An elective non-confessional Religions and Ethics subject exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state funding if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited capacity this is not on the agenda of the Islamic Community. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding-schools (medresa) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to children in mekteb classes organised in about a dozen towns by local congregations of the IC. Classes take place outside school hours and sometimes in inadequate facilities. The IC is developing a Slovenian curriculum and textbooks to replace the Bosnian ones currently in use. Some adult religious instruction is also offered.7 6
Higher and Professional Education
Slovenian imams typically get their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see that section). The IC holds some internal training courses, and the Egyptian embassy arranged a shortterm scholarship to Al-Azhar in 2008. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Studies, let alone Islamic Studies, though some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theology. Teacher training for the elective school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims ( Jesenice, Maribor, Krško, Tržič), most, including the capital, have not.
7 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia,” in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008).
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A heritage site, the graves of Muslim soldiers fallen in World War I, was marked with Muslim tombstones in 2007. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiritual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police and the army. When there is sufficient demand, the relevant authorities should provide religious personnel. This right to provide such care is also stated in the IC’s agreement with the state. However, Muslim spiritual care in state institutions has not yet been implemented. 9
Religious Festivals
No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays has in recent years seen more public recognition, with official greetings and a nationally televised short address by the mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. Some qurban sacrifice is discreetly carried out in private, limited by cost, practicalities and concerns over legality (see section 10). Mevluds (mawlids) and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., New Hijri Year, holy nights). 10
Halal Food
A new initiative to institutionalise the certification of halal meat was taken by the IC in 2007, and the first butcher’s shop so certified opened in Ljubljana in 2008. Previously, demand had mainly been met through informal arrangements, if at all. Several food companies have long held halal certificates, chiefly for export. The law requires the animal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but veterinary authorities may grant exceptions for ritual slaughter. Private slaughter, common on farms and formerly the occasion of a folk holiday, is allowed (regulated in 2004) for the personal consumption of one’s own animals, but as there are hardly any rural Muslims, the legality (and social acceptance) of private Muslim ritual slaughter is unclear.
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Dress Codes
While some older women may wear traditional headscarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young women in the 1990s, most Muslim women go uncovered. The law does not regulate this or other religious attire. Hijab in schools has not been an issue, but some women who wear the headscarf report difficulties in job-seeking. A major contribution to the ethnography of Islam in Slovenia was a monograph on Muslim dress and identity published in 2007.8 12
Publications and Media
The Islamic Community operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), has started an internal bulletin, and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. A small independent group has produced a magazine, Iqre, oriented towards globalised, Arab-centered and revivalist discourses rather than local tradition. Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious, but reach a Muslim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community, include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and the monthly Bošnjak magazine. 13
Family Law
Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have a religious ceremony in addition to this. The IC encourages Islamic marriages (‘Shari’a weddings’) performed by imams, and has recently begun to register them. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,9 though the IC discourages the practice.
8 Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I am not a Barbie doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, 2007). 9 Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66.
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Public Opinion and Debate
Public debate on Islam has continued to centre on the plans for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana, which are opposed by a few politicians on plainly xenophobic grounds. The main representatives of the Islamic Community were positively portrayed inter alia in a European context (see section 15). Muslims are not very visible in the media, but both their visibility has increased and the quality of reporting has improved over the last decade. 15
Major Cultural Events
During the Slovene presidency of the EU in the first half of 2008, the Mufti took part in high-level events connected with the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. In autumn 2008, the City Museum of Ljubljana held a pioneering exhibition on the life of Muslims in Slovenia. There are several ethnic cultural societies and Muslim women’s associations active in arranging cultural events and festivals, including religious content.
SPAIN Jordi Moreras1 1
Muslim Populations
For Spanish society, the memory of the splendour of the culture and civilisation of Al-Andalus is acting to some extent as a burden and an interference with the present. There is no connection between the past (although it is officially claimed as part of Spanish identity), and the present of the new Muslim immigration. The new Islamic presence is recovering the image of a historical cultural otherness. The contemporary Muslim presence in Spain is the result of waves of migration that started in the 1970s, but Spain has also had its own Muslim populations in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla since at least the fifteenth century. Today, Islam is one of the major religious minorities of Spanish society, although the majority of Muslims are of foreign origin. Article 16.2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, according to which “no one can be forced to declare their ideology, religion, or beliefs”, makes it very hard to establish a statistical census of religious faiths in Span. For this reason, all that can be done is to attempt to develop a series of estimates of the Muslim population, estimates that may at times be biased and may not have an objective basis. The main source for these estimates is the statistics on foreign residents from countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, as well as figures for the granting of Spanish nationality to such residents. These data provide a trustworthy approximation, at least for drawing a rough outline of the Muslim population. However, despite the attempts made to interpret these data, the religiosity of these groups can in no way be inferred from them. The following four categories succinctly summarise this presence:
1 Jordi Moreras is Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), and member of Research Group on Social and Organizational Analysis (ASO-URV). He is the author of Els imams de Catalunya (Barcelona: Editorial Empúries, 2007) and Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008).
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1. People with Muslim roots (including residents of Muslim origin in Ceuta and Melilla, around 70,000 and 80,000 people); 2. Naturalised Muslims (between 1960 and 2006, 80,235 people of Muslim origin—mostly Moroccans, but also Arabs from the Middle East and Pakistanis- acquired Spanish nationality);2 3. New Muslims (Spaniards who choose the Muslim faith; the size of this group is always difficult to establish, although the last report of the Observatory Andalusí, UCIDE states that there are 33,750 Muslim converts in Spain,3 probably an overestimate);4 4. Foreign residents (including both people who are just passing through Spain, such as businessmen and students, and especially immigrant workers, mainly Maghrebian, African and Pakistani workers, whose migratory cycles began in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Data from 2008 indicate that they number some 860,755 people, the majority natives of Morocco. It is necessary to add a certain percentage to this figure to account for people whose legal situation is irregular). This gives a total of between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Muslims (representing 2.2% of the Spanish population).5 The regions where Muslims live in greatest numbers are Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia and Valencia.
2 Foreigners may apply for Spanish nationality after living in Spain for ten years, while those born in Spanish overseas territories may apply after one year. In recent years there have been cases of refusal of citizenship to people who follow Islamic religious practises but, when challenged, the refusals have been overturned in the Supreme Court on the basis of the principle of religious freedom. 3 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2007 Demographic study of the Muslim population. Statistical analysis of the census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2007) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2008). 4 Muslim converts are an active minority within Islam in Spain in areas such as community representation, publishing and promotion of cultural activities. Their doctrinal spectrum is very different from the Sufi communities, progressive Islam or the doctrinal literalism. 5 1,145,424 Muslims in Spain according to the estimation of the Observatorio Andalusí.
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Islam and the State
The Spanish state is defined by a principle of non-confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations (Spanish Constitution, Art. 16). There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. The General Directorate for Relations with the Confessions (Ministry of Justice) is responsible for relations with these religious denominations. At the regional level, there is in Catalonia a Department of Religious Affairs. The Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es), established in October 2004, is the public body responsible for promoting religious freedom and establishing a line of financial assistance to minority religious communities. In 2007, this public funding amounted to €4,500,000, markedly less than the financing that Spanish government provides for the Catholic Church, through agreement with the Holy See of 1979.6 The Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992 between the Spanish State and the Islamic Commission of Spain establishes the framework for the recognition of Islam as a religion rooted in Spanish society.7 Seventeen years later, many aspects of this agreement have yet to be developed, which impedes the development and organisation of Islam in Spain.8
6 In September 2006, the Spanish government agreed to change the system by which the Catholic Church is financed. The new model is based on allowing the Catholic faithful voluntarily to allocate a portion of their taxes. It was estimated that the church would receive €175,000,000 in 2006. The Spanish state is also committed to eliminating the payment of VAT by the Catholic Church. 7 Motilla, Agustín (ed.), Los musulmanes en España. Libertad religiosa e identidad cultural (The Muslims of Spain. Religious freedom and cultural identity) (Madrid: Trotta, 2004). 8 There are four reasons for the non-implementation of this agreement: 1) the internal disputes between the two Islamic federations (FEERI and UCIDE), which limited the role of the Islamic Commission of Spain as a representative body; 2) the development of a centralised organisational model (the Islamic Commission) disregarding communal geographical distribution; 3) the lack of political will among the political authorities to promote the development of this agreement, due to distrust of the demands of Muslim communities; 4) the lack of interest expressed by Muslim communities because of their ignorance of the contents of the agreement. Representatives of the two federations have been unable to mobilise these communities in order to bring about the implementation of some aspects of the agreement, such as religious education and Muslim burials.
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Main Muslim Organisations
In 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, made up of the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, La Unión 47, Málaga 29006, tel: +34. 629559273) and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE, Anastasio Herrero 5, Madrid 28020, tel: +34.915714040, fax: +34.915708889, http://es.ucide.org). Both federations are very heterogeneous with regard to both the national origins of their members and the doctrinal guidance they provide. However, FEERI have always had larger numbers of converts, while the UCIDE attracts mostly Muslims from the Middle East, especially Syria, and its board is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. There are currently 651 Islamic religious institutions registered with the Ministry of Justice. Of these, 70% are affiliated to UCIDE and 10% to FEERI, while the rest are not affiliated. As a result of the stagnation of the Islamic Commission, new Muslim regional federations have asked the Spanish government to allow them to become part of it, which would necessitate a change to its statutes. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
It is estimated that in Spain has some 450 Muslim places of worship (there is no official record), in addition to twelve major Muslim centres (4 in Ceuta and Melilla,9 Marbella, 1981, Madrid 1983, Madrid, 1992, Valencia, 1992; Fuengirola 1994, La Puebla de Don Fadrique 2001, Granada, 2003, Málaga, 2007). These mosques have been financed by Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In some cases, the Spanish authorities have granted land for their construction. There are other projects still under discussion in Seville and Barcelona. Most of them are Sunni mosques. In 1982, the Ahmadi Mission opened a mosque in Pedro Abad (Cordoba). The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslims to open places of worship, but since 1990 (the date of the first protest against the construction of a mosque in Vic, Barcelona), there have been 50 conflicts concerning the
During the Protectorate period in Northern Morocco before 1956, the Spanish colonial administration built mosques, prayer halls and other Islamic religious buildings. The two main mosques in Ceuta (the Sidi M’barik Mosque) and Melilla (on Garcia Cabrelles Street) are good examples of this. 9
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opening of mosques, 35 of them in Catalonia.10 The Catalan regional parliament is debating a law on places of worship to establish conditions regarding their location.11 5
Children’s Education
The only Islamic school in Spain is in Madrid. This is the Umm alKura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex and was founded in 1992. It provides pre-school, primary and secondary education and is a school accredited by the Spanish state. According to the Islamic Centre, the school had 400 pupils in the year 2006–2007. Previously, there was an Iraqi school, attached to the Iraqi embassy, attended by the children of Arab consular employees. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic religious education in the national educational system.12 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–04 school year, when the education began in some Autonomous Communities (regional/provincial authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia, and Madrid). Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious education, the communities themselves
10 See Moreras, Jordi, Una mesquita al barri. Conflicte, espai públic i integració urbana dels oratoris musulmans a Catalunya (A local mosque. Conflict, public space and urban integration of Muslim places of worship in Catalonia) (Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2009). The reasons for these objections are related to the increasing visibility of the Muslim presence. The protests against mosques include arguments about the status of immigrant groups, as well as the ‘problematic nature’ of Islam. A latent Islamophobia generates social legitimacy for these protests. The fact that protests arise more in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain is due to the prolonged and extensive settlement of Muslims in Catalonia (with more than 180 mosques), and the challenges this represents to the development of a social and political debate on the pluralisation of Catalan society. 11 It is expected that this law will be approved during 2009. Basically, the law deals with the administrative regulation of the places of worship of religious minorities (i.e. not the Catholic Church) the provision of public land for the construction of religious buildings. 12 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in Alvarez Veinguer, A., G. Dietz, D.-P. Jozsa and T. Knauth (eds), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009).
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have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, youth and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (kuttab, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be complementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside of the structured, formalised school environment. According to the Observatorio Andalusí, in 2006 there were 119,994 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and 41 teachers of Islamic religious education.13 6
Higher and Professional Education
As a result of the history of Al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Spanish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Sevilla and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new lines of training and interdisciplinary research in other academic fields. The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the International University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, but today closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support, after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. This university offered Arabic language and Islamic sciences taught by Muslim teachers. More recently, since 2006, the UNED (Spanish public university for distance education) with the Junta Islámica14 has run a course on Islamic culture and religion.15 With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiatives began in the 1980s. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. No projects were completed because 13 Observatorio Andalusí, Informe anual 2006. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Madrid: UCIDE, 2007), p. 10. No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the rejection by various regions of the implementation of these programmes. This is the case in Catalonia, which has a Muslim student body of over 30,000 but no teachers of Islamic religious education. 14 Junta Islámica was one of the founders of FEERI in 1989. 15 “Experto Profesional en cultura y religión islámicas (Professional expert in Islamic culture and religion” (www.ciberuniversidad.com/islam/, accessed 27 May 2009).
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of internal disagreements. In Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has run a training programme specifically for imams since 2006, coordinated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. In January 2009, the UNED, sponsored by the Pluralismo y Convivencia (Pluralism and Coexistence) foundation,16 initiated another training programme for Islamic religious leaders, under the title “Islam and democratic principles”.17 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The need to provide space for the Muslim population in municipal cemeteries has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Muslims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were either those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the different communities in both cities), or historical cemeteries (like those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), or cemeteries that belonged to the governments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained by personal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. There are reserved spaces in Ceuta and Melilla, Seville, Granada, Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Benalmádena, Zaragoza, Palma de Mallorca, Manresa, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Terrassa. However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased 16 “Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation is a foundation of the public sector, created by agreement of the Council of Ministers of 15 October 2004, at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. Its purpose is to contribute to the implementation of programmes and projects of cultural, educational and social integration of minority faiths that have concluded cooperation agreements with the State or striking roots in Spain, as well as promoting the full exercise of religious freedom” (text taken from their website, www .pluralismoyconvivencia.es/). 17 Website: http://www.fundacion.uned.es/cursos/derecho/diploma-actualizacionprofesional/islam-principios-democraticos/index.html, accessed 27 May 2009.
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to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no contravention of other legal principles which among other matters require the use of a coffin. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 2002 regulates Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the Spanish government has developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Muslim patients, especially in the treaty of the bodies of the deceased. In prisons, fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit prisoners has led efforts to control pastoral care there. Prison authorities, with the help of the Spanish National Intelligence Centre, have drawn up lists of imams who are considered suitable for this task. 9
Religious Festivals
Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and religious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha is becoming increasingly visible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or the use of public streets for these celebrations. 10
Halal Food
The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal products is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concentrated, a good number of halal butchers’ and grocers’ shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initiatives are in response to an incipient demand for these
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products on the part of the Muslim community, which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica has promoted the creation of the Instituto Halal (Halal Institute, C/Arco, Nº13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, tel: +34 902431937, www.institutohalal.com/), which since 1999 has for the first time in Spain certified and regulated the use of the halal label.18 Carrying out the ‘Id al-Adha sacrifice by families is banned on health grounds, but the practice continues discreetly in some Muslim communities. 11
Dress Codes
There is no legal restriction prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. However, since 2002 there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photograph Muslim women with hijab when preparing identity cards. In January 2007, the nationalist party Plataforma por Cataluña in the municipal town of Vic (Barcelona) put forward a motion at the council plenary to ban the wearing of the burka (regarded as including niqab). This motion was rejected, but served to include the concept of burka/niqab in the political debate, as being synonymous with radicalisation. In the 2007 elections, two Muslim women who wear hijab were elected to the assemblies of Ceuta and Melilla. 12
Publications and Media
Ever since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish journals. Some have had a very short life span, and others have been irregular. They include:
18 The Halal Institute is a proposal for companies to certify their products as halal, but not to organize trade between the Muslim halal.
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– País islámico (1983–1985, quarterly, edited by the Islamic Community in Spain-Murabitun in Granada—one of the first Muslim journals in Spain); – Al-Yama’a (1994–1997, monthly, edited by the Islamic Commission of Melilla); – Insha Allah (1994–2002, quarterly, bulletin of the Insha Allah Association of Muslim women in Barcelona); – Verde Islam (1995–2002, quarterly, edited by the Centre for Documentation and Publications of the Junta Islamica in Almodovar del Río, Cordoba); – Islam (1999–?, irregular, edited by the Islamic Community of Valencia). Muslim community leaders appear only occasionally in the media, in the context of conflicts that arise involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Moroccan journalist Mohamed Chakor. More recently, Catalan public television has broadcast live the final prayer of Ramadan in 2006 and the ‘Id al-Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discontinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television, but are sometimes consulted on certain topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been the alternative adopted by the Spanish Muslim community to express their views. There is a significant Muslim blogsphere, while the web portal of reference is Webislam (www.webislam .com) (created in 1997 by Junta Islámica). UCIDE also has its own website (http://es.ucide.org) and a blog (www.islamhispania.blogspot.com). 13
Family Law
The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of a marriage celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law. To ensure full legal recognition, the marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths.19 Polygamy is not recognised in Spanish family law, although some instances of polygamy have
19 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español (Islamic marriage and its validity in Spanish law) (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003).
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occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious difficulties for divorced women. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
A long history of accumulated stereotypes explains the routine use of a derogatory term such as moro. This historical stereotype is combined with the current perception that Islam in Spain is the result of recent immigration, which reinforces the presumption that Islam and Muslims are ‘foreign’. Many people in Spain only discovered the existence of Muslim communities and prayer halls in their cities after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Public interest in Islam and Muslims grew, particularly concerning their presence on Spanish soil. This interest made these spaces for religious practice more visible and consequently anxiety about them began to be publicly expressed. The 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were a real blow to the public consciousness because they were so unexpected and so indiscriminately brutal. Perhaps it was in response to what was felt as blind and senseless hate that there was such a powerful and shocked reaction, although just a year before there had been public demonstrations in the streets against the war in Iraq. In the weeks after the attacks, there were innumerable actions, demonstrations, initiatives and religious ceremonies, in which the representatives of the Muslim community openly expressed their rejection of these events. The media gathered the statements of the main Muslim bodies, which unanimously rejected the vindication in the name of Islam that had been proclaimed by the authors of the attacks. Coinciding with the first anniversary of the atrocity, the FEERI published a fatwa in which it declared the material and intellectual authors of the attacks to be apostates for having gone against the main principles of respect for life that Islam proclaims. However, after the impact of 11 March 2004, the old stereotypes were replaced in people’s minds by a sense of vague and unpredictable threat. The Observatorio Andalusí has reported and condemned the increasing Islamophobia among the Spanish public.20 The report of the European
Observatorio Andalusí, Informe anual 2006. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Annual report. Institute 20
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Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006)21 has also provided data on Islamophobia. During the year 2008, as in previous years, various controversies have included a clearly xenophobic discourse in relation to Muslims. New conflicts have arisen against the background of mosques being opened. Some statements by politicians in relation to certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab, have contributed further to reveal a latent bias against the Muslim presence that is historically rooted in the use of the pejorative term moro. Police actions against suspected Islamist activists has further contributed to a widespread perception of mistrust and threat in relation to the presence of Muslims in Spain. However, according to a survey of 2,000 Muslims prepared by the Ministry of Interior in December 2007, only 28% of respondents said that the Islamic religion is rejected in Spain. 15
Major Cultural Events
Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicultural rather than specifically Islamic, initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)22 in Madrid has organised a musical and cultural festival during the month of Ramadan. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival “Nights of Ramadan” in 2008.
to observe and monitor the status of Muslim citizens and Islamophobia in Spain) (Madrid: UCIDE, 2007). 21 Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia (EUMC, 2006) available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/home_en.htm, accessed 27 May 2009. 22 Casa Árabe (www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and as a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, the Government of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba.
SWEDEN Göran Larsson1 1
Muslim Populations
The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930 and fifteen individuals were recorded as Muslims in that year.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of 9,000,000. This estimate is not supported by hard data as it is against the law to collect personal data on religious belief in order to protect individual freedom, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include data that could be sensitive in relation to the personal integrity of the individual. The figures are therefore necessarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute 1.8%–3.5% of the population.3 According to the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 100,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.4 The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to Sweden as both economic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational 1 Göran Larsson is Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009). 2 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organiserad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence”, in Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund (eds), Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 3 Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 101–120 (102). 4 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008).
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background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish group was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group dominates the Swedish Muslim scene and it is incorrect to analyse, present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phenomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of converts to Islam in Sweden at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered problematic.5 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.6 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally problematic and uncertain.7 2
Islam and the State
Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitution, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Culture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and describes its grants as being divided into three categories: – An organisational grant enabling parishes to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education. – A working grant to support specific areas that the state wishes to subsidise, e.g. the Hospital Church, and theological training at certain seminaries.
Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism”, p. 102. Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: teachings and life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 7 Larsson, G., Muslims in the EU. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), available at http://www.eumap.org/ topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 27 May 2009. 5 6
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– Project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation. In 2007 the five Muslim organisations recognised by the SST received SEK4,880,000 in organisational grants, SEK258,000 in project grants and SEK113,000 in educational grants).8 The SST also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2007 granted SEK5,100,000 to be distributed among the religious communities they have recognised. Out of this sum, the five Muslim organisations received only a small sum (around SEK110,000).9 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that religious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious communities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups have to guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Registration also makes it possible to use the taxation system to collect levies from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state will automatically reduce the economic support that the organisation can receive from the SST. In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citizenship10 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.11 On the basis of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, it is possible for the child to apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish.
8 Figures available at http://www.sst.a.se/bidrag/utbetaldabidrag2007.4.34203c0 511c3ec0b58580004945.html, accessed 10 March 2008. 9 SST, Årsbok 2008 (Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund), p. 18. 10 See, for example, Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’ ”. 11 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5.
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Main Muslim Organisations
Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along political, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the formation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are five umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substantiate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the opinions of these five organisations. The first national Muslim organisation, the Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (Union of Islamic Congregations in Sweden, FIFS, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Sveriges Muslimska Förbund (Swedish Muslim Union, SMF, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisation called the Sveriges Muslimska Råd (Swedish Muslim Council, SMR, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organisations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the SMR. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres, IKUS, Bergsbovägen 15, SE-191 35 Sollentuna) was established, an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Svenska Islamiska Församlingar (Swedish Islamic Assemblies, SIF, Moränvägen 13, SE-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. Islamisk Shiasamfund (Islamic Shi’a Communities in Sweden, ISS, Box 690, SE-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund.se/sida1 .html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi’a Muslims in Sweden. In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both locally and nationally. For example, Bosnian, Shi’a, Ahmadi and Sufi organisations have been established in various locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing all Muslims in Sweden (especially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Sveriges Unga Muslimer (Young Muslims of Sweden, SUM), but it is also impor-
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tant to mention the Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer (Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden, SEUM) and the Bosnien-Hercegovinas Muslimska Ungdomsförbund (Muslim Youth Organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, BEMUF). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. Among many other things, Ibn Rushd organises courses in the field of religion, culture and language. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim community and inform non-Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
There are six purpose-built mosques in Sweden (four Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, and two in Stockholm), one Shi’a mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, being started in 1975/1976). In Gävle and Västerås, Muslims have adapted old churches and turned them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Växjö, Umeå, Göteborg and Örebro, and a mosque is already under construction in Skövde. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building permit. In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of basement mosques is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö. As in other European countries, the building of mosques in Sweden has given rise to public debates and strong anti-Muslim reactions. For example, on ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the building site of a new mosque in Göteborg was desecrated with pigs’ heads. This specific building was attacked because it was supported and funded by Saudi Arabia (see, for example, the anti-Muslim website www.ramberget.com). 5
Children’s Education
Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but the subject is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and
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pupils should not be indoctrinated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Nevertheless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.12 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. Besides the traditional Islamic communal education which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinguishing characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and economic subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society”.13 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way”, and pupils must follow the national curriculum for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.14 Permission to start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2006, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 72, of which nine were Islamic, Muslim and/or Arab.15 The first Muslim
12 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. 13 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in Daun, H. and G. Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191. 14 On the content of the religious education in Muslim independent schools in Sweden, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). 15 Berglund, J., and G. Larsson (eds), Religiösa friskolor i Sverige. Historiska och nutida perspektiv (Religious free schools in Sweden. Historical and contemporary perspectives) (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007), p. 10. See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Aslan, E. (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421.
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independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the great majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools. 6
Higher and Professional Education
A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in the History of Religions, Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic studies of Islam and Muslims.16 Currently, the Ministry of Education is considering starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams, the final decision being expected in mid-2009. However, it is unlikely that the Ministry of Education will start a confessional educational programme for Muslim theologians, especially since the Church of Sweden was separated from the state in 2000. Nonetheless, the educational programme may focus on how to facilitate the work of imams by helping them and making their work in Sweden easier (i.e. by teaching them more about the Swedish system and its laws and by improving the language skills they need). 7
Burials and Cemeteries
For Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities, there are no problems in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden through the Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen (Cemetery Administration). According to statistics from 2000, approximately 111 municipalities in Sweden provided burial grounds for Muslims.17 There is no prohibition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administration, as in Malmö, specifically permit Muslims to be buried in this way. See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and academic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/36), 2006. 17 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 16
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‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
No Muslim religious leaders or theologians are employed by the state in the health service, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the SST and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and religious leaders receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services.18 Nonetheless it is clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there is a great imbalance between non-Christian denominations and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations, which have a long history and an established platform for such work. 9
Religious Festivals
Even though the major religious festivals are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, such holidays are not recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ‘Id/bayram religious festivals, and it is up to the employer to decide whether the employee should be given the day off to attend. However, in 2008 the end of Ramadan was celebrated by the Museum of World Culture in Göteborg, which organised a party, lectures and a concert for the ‘Id (see www.eidfirande.se). The party was highlighted by the media, and part of the concert was broadcast by Swedish national television. The Muslim community in Gothenburg appreciated this initiative, and the Ramadan celebration was attended by a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims. The children were able to participate in games (for example, riding an electric bull), lectures and dialogue meetings were arranged, and the cafeteria served traditional Muslim food from various countries. 10
Halal Food
Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue, but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving
18
SST, Årsbok 2008, p. 18.
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the animal an anaesthetic before it is killed), but this method is far from accepted by all Muslims. Today there is no problem in finding halal food in Sweden, and access to imported meat is good. The prohibition against halal slaughter is of symbolic importance for Muslims living in Sweden. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available. 11
Dress Codes
There is no law that prohibits Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab in the health-care sector, in schools, and in relation to police uniform, etc. In 2006, the National School Authority intervened to protect a student who had been banned from a school in Umeå because she wore hijab. These debates have been focused on health issues and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab as being coloured by Islamophobia and xenophobia. Figures published by the Board of Integration suggest that women who wear hijab have greater difficulty in finding jobs, and that it is often associated with negative opinions about Muslims. 12
Publications and Media
Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Muslims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discussion lists, etc.), and the number of Swedish Islamic webpages, such as www.islamguiden.com, is probably over 50. The journal Minaret: Tidskrift för Svensk muslimsk kultur is published by a group of Muslim intellectuals, while the al-Ghazali institute (http://al-ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and English books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad). Besides journals and books published by Sunni Muslims, the Ahmadi community has
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published and translated a large number of Ahmadi books into Swedish (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community). In 2008, three young Muslim women were given the opportunity to record a television series and broadcast it on national television. The series is called Halal-TV and it addressed questions of equality, gender, Muslim identities and generational differences within the Muslim community. The series has received both critical and positive reviews from both Muslims and non-Muslims and, according to the critics, has contributed to presenting the Muslim community in a stereotypical way. One of the programme’s leaders was also severely criticised for her opinions about Shari’a penalties and for not taking a stand against those that conflict with Swedish law, such as the stoning of women. 13
Family Law
No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims have to follow. Consequently, Islam has no particular legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a so-called double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic marriage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available. The chairperson of SMF, Mahmoud Aldebe, sparked a row in the Swedish media in 2006, when he proposed that the Muslim community should be exempted from Swedish law and be governed by specific rules and regulations. This suggestion was primarily an attempt to start an advisory board for a so-called Shari’a council to protect Muslim interests, but Muslims and non-Muslims alike generally dismissed it.19
19 See, for example, Kihlström, S., “Muslimskt förbund kräver egna lagar” (Muslim association demands its own teachers), Dagens-Nyheter, 27 April 2006.
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Public Opinion and Debate
Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and preconceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Although it is very difficult to measure Islamophobic attitudes and incidents, mainly because of the lack of a clear definition, it is clear that many Muslims perceive that they are viewed as a problem, and that Islam is seen as something negative or even un-Swedish by many ethnic Swedes. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2007, 200 incidents (6% of the 3,500 reported) were included in this category.20 15
Major Cultural Events
In 2008, the celebrations of both Ramadan and ‘Id al-Fitr were highlighted by the Swedish media, and some of the festivities were broadcast on national television (this celebration was organised by WAMA, a Muslim cultural and event company). The 700th anniversary of the Sufi poet Jalal al-Din Rumi was also celebrated, and cultural events (e.g., readings and lectures organised by the cultural body ReOrient in Stockholm) were staged in various places in Sweden. In 2008, the Mediterranean Museum in Stockholm exhibited a selection of blue and white porcelain from the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul. This museum has also held a photographic exhibition called Los Otros/The Others, depicting religious and cultural minorities in Spain, Morocco and Turkey. In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions ( Jews, Christians and Muslims) organised lectures and a football match for peace on 11 September. Similar activities were also organised in other cities in Sweden.
Hatbrott 2007. En sammanställning av anmälningar med främlingsfientliga, islamofobiska, antisemitiska och homofobiska motiv (Hate crimes. A survey of reported incidents with xenophobic, islamophobic, antisemitic and homophobic motives) (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2008), p. 10. 20
SWITZERLAND Stéphane Lathion1 1
Muslim Populations
Prior to 1960, the presence of Muslims within the Swiss population was rare. That changed with three waves of immigration: one economicbased, one family-based, and one politically-based. The first wave, in the late 1960’s, was mainly caused by economic factors and consisted chiefly of men coming to work in Switzerland with no particular intention to stay permanently in the country. These immigrants were mostly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The second wave came in the late 1970’s after Switzerland changed its legislation concerning foreigners to allow family regrouping. This decision had direct implications: from this point on, Islam was no longer only an ephemeral, male social factor in Switzerland but, with the presence of families, had become a reality. The last wave is a political one consisting of foreigners seeking asylum from oppressive dictatorships, various civil wars, famines and other situations. More accurately, this is not so much a wave as much as an ongoing movement, since it started in the 1960s (mainly from the Middle East) and continues today with the exodus of people from the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, North Africa and other African countries. According to the 2000 census, the total Swiss population numbers 7,288,010. For the first time, a question related to religious belief was included in the census. So, of this number, 310,807 are Muslims, meaning Muslims represent 4.3% of the total population of Switzerland. Muslims of Swiss nationality made up only 0.6% of the total population of Switzerland. The fact that statistics reveal the presence of 169,726 Muslim men compared with 141,081 Muslim women demonstrates that the Muslim presence has evolved and is no longer merely due to labour migration. Some estimates suggest that the number of Muslims 1 Dr. Stéphane Lathion heads GRIS (Research Group on Islam in Switzerland) and is a researcher at l’Université de Fribourg.
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today is much closer to 400,000 than the number indicated in the last census. It is a young community with about half under the age of 25. The great majority live in the urban cantons of Basel, Bern, Zürich, St Gallen, Vaude and Geneva. Automatic Swiss nationality is by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory. In general, foreigners must have lived a total of twelve years in Switzerland before they may apply for Swiss nationality, even if they were born in Switzerland. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. The majority of Muslims in Switzerland (58%) are from the former Yugoslav republics, followed by Turks (21%), Swiss (11%), North Africans (4%), Subsaharan Africans (4%) and Middle Eastern immigrants (2%). For more details, see www.gris.info. Muslim communities in Switzerland are 75% Sunnis, 7% Shi’is, 10%–15% Turkish Alevis, and some members of Sufi orders. 2
Islam and the State
Switzerland is a secular state, but the Swiss state recognises both Catholicism and Protestantism as official religions and relations with religious communities are based on the fundamental rights to freedom of religion and philosophy and to equality before the law (Swiss Constitution). However, since Switzerland is a federation of states, all matters of religion fall under the competence of the cantons, within the limits of federal (constitutional) law. That means that a canton is permitted to support a recognised religion. The only two cantons that have clearly separated the state and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel.2 Muslims in Switzerland must abide by all Swiss laws and regulations. In general, no Swiss laws exist that directly interfere with any Islamic obligation. For example, no Swiss laws forbid Muslims from exercising their religious beliefs or practices, such as the five pillars. The issue of official recognition of non-Christian religions is a continual debate and was the subject of a referendum in the canton of Zürich in 2003. All the main political parties developed a strategic paper on the place of Islam in Switzerland during 2007–2008.
2 Mahnig, Hans, “L’intégration institutionnelle des Musulmans de Suisse: L’exemple de Bâle-Ville, Berne, Genève, Neuchâtel et Zurich”, in Tangram: Bulletin de la Commission fédérale contre le racisme, Berne: EKR, vol. 8 (2000), pp. 102–111.
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Main Muslim Organisations
At present, there are 35 Muslim associations, four Muslim youth associations, three Muslim women’s associations and four Muslim aid associations. It should be noted that most of the established Muslim associations have substructures for their youth, and women are also often organised within the framework of the main association.3 Muslim associations are generally locally organised, but they are also starting to organise themselves within the frame of the cantons. In most cantons, the associations are gathering themselves into unions (for example, the Union of Muslim Associations of the canton of Fribourg), which gives them more weight in discussion on important issues (e.g., cemeteries, swimming pools, construction of mosques, etc.). At the national level, there are three main bodies: Musulmans et Musulmanes de Suisse (MMS) www.islam.ch, La Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (LMS) www .rabita.ch; and the Fédération des Organisations Islamiques de Suisse (FOIS, c/o Dr. F. Afshar, Kappelenring44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen), but there is no official representation as in France.The Ligue and the MMS were both founded in 1994 with the aim of helping Swiss Muslims to find ways of integrating and participating constructively in Swiss society. Their wish to develop some form of Swiss federation of Muslim organisations has not so far met with success. However, since 2002, in most cantons, united bodies have started to emerge: Union des organisations musulmanes de Genève (UOMG) in Geneva, Union vaudoise des associations musulmanes (UVAM) in Vaud, Union des associations musulmanes de Fribourg (UAMF) in Fribourg, Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zürich (VIOZ) in Zürich, Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Luzern (VIOL) in Luzern, for example. 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
Switzerland has registered more than 100 mosques and/or prayer halls. Only four have the features of Islamic architecture needed for them to be considered mosques: in Geneva (financed by Saudi Arabia),
Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, Etre musulman en Suisse romande, une enquête qualitative sur le role du référent religieux dans la construction identitaire (Being Muslim in the Suisse Roamnde, a qualitative enquiry into the religious dimension of the construction of identity). PhD thesis, University of Fribourg, 2006. 3
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Zurich (Ahmadiyya), and more recently in Winthertour (Albanians) and Wangen (Turks). The rest are mainly prayer halls without any outward indication of their Islamic activity. Some have facilities such as a library and/or cafeteria, but these are few and almost invisible from the outside. In the autumn of 2009, the Swiss population will vote on whether it accepts the referendum initiative against the building of any minarets in Switzerland, put forward by a right-wing political populist party, the Union Democratique du Centre (UDC). 5
Children’s Education
The question of religious studies falls under the competence of the cantons. Each canton’s department for public education decides what weight to give to religion in its schools’ programmes (usually offering no more than one hour per week). In order to provide religious education for their children, Muslims must therefore organise it themselves. Religious socialisation takes place through families and Muslim organisations that offer various classes, such as introduction to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which often take place on Saturdays or in the early evening. At the Swiss primary school level, religious education often takes the form of catechism. However, this type of education is evolving and is slowly being replaced with non-religious and inter-religious classes. In secondary school, only an introduction to the history of religions is offered and is most often taught in a non-dogmatic or non-confessional fashion. Enbiro (Enseignement Biblique Romand) has developed a new pedagogy for teaching religion in school. This new programme gives an introduction to the world’s most influential religions and has been generally welcomed in French-speaking Switzerland, although not in the canton of Wallis, where a controversy erupted in November 2003. Some conservative Christian parents removed their children from the religious education class when they learned that Muhammad was presented as a prophet who received messages from God and the Qur’an as a holy book. These parents were concerned that Islamic teachings conflicted with the religious education that they wanted to provide for their children. All the objections to this new kind of religious education were related to Islam, and not to the other religions taught.
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With regard to Islamic religious instruction, there is so far one exception. In the canton of Lucerne, two communes decided to introduce Islamic religious classes for their Muslim pupils in the autumn of 2002. This class is given in German to all nationalities together and is optional. After a difficult start, this decision has now been accepted. 6
Higher and Professional Education
In Switzerland, there are a small number of chairs in Islamic studies (Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Basel, for example) but they do not present a contemporary view of the Islamic world, concentrating more on the historical , civilisational and sometimes political aspects. Only occasional courses at Lucerne University (about Islam in Bosnia, for example) and at Fribourg University (Islam and Modernity, Islam in Europe) present a more contemporary picture. A training course for Muslims association leaders will be starting in Fribourg in 2009. A related case, considered on 7 May 2003, in Wallis, a Catholic canton, concerned an imam from Macedonia. He was denied a work permit (to work as an imam in Switzerland) largely due to the fact that he had studied in Medina (Saudi Arabia) and the cantonal authorities considered him to be a potential threat to religious harmony. As a result, the issue of imam training became a political issue and a study group was established which will be reporting its findings in May 2009. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The situation with regard to cemeteries for Muslims in Switzerland varies. As a federation of states, Switzerland has left this issue to the competence of the cantons. The cantons usually allow the individual communes to find the solution that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cemeteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978, followed by Basel and Bern (2000), Lugano (2002), and Zurich (2004), but it was not till January that a law to make confessional cemeteries legal was proposed. In Neuchâtel and Fribourg, requests for Muslim sections to be allocated in existing cemeteries, or for a Muslim cemetery to be
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established, have recently been made but no official response has so far been given. As for funeral rites, Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When no local regulations exist regarding details of funeral rites, parishes usually try to do their best to find a solution that is acceptable to the family. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
No chaplaincy arrangements are formally organized for Muslims, and what services there are depend exclusively on the good will of institutions and individuals. 9
Religious Festivals
No particular arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim religious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic difficulties for the employer. There is no legal right to a reduction of working hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. One unofficial regulation that exists concerns gymnastics at school during Ramadan. Students fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration. 10
Halal Food
Halal slaughter is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. This is not a serious problem maybe because halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, and Austria is readily available. 11
Dress Codes
There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Switzerland, but emotions have been higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. Hijab is permitted in school for students and pupils but prohibited for teachers.
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Two cantons have had to deal with legal cases concerning hijab. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to rule that public officials may not wear ostentatious religious symbols, such as hijab. In theory this ruling could become a precedent for the whole of Switzerland, but the decision remains with the individual canton. 12
Publications and Media
Muslims do not have their own programmes on either television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Themes such as creation, death, health and fundamentalism are examples of subjects discussed. Similar topics are raised on the Internet, where Muslims are particularly active. Some of the Muslim websites that show how well organised the associations are becoming are: Islam en Suisse (http://www .islam.ch/); Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (http://www.rabita.ch/); Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève (http://www.mosque.ch/); Association Culturelle des Femmes Musulmanes de Suisse (http://www .femme-musulmane.ch/); Centre islamique de Genève (http://www .cige.org/); Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zürich (http://www.islamzh.ch/); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (http://www .islamtoplumu.ch/). Er-Rahma—Die Barmherzigkeit: unahängige Zeitschrift von Muslimen in der Schweiz (Er-Rahma—Mercy: Independent journal of Muslims in Switzerland) is a quarterly bulletin. The articles can be read online at http://www.barmherzigkeit.ch/home.htm. Bulletins du Centre Islamique de Genève is a report produced three times a year. It can be read online at http://www.cige.org/bulletins/Bulletin_24.htm. 13
Family Law
In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal. Conflicts may arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.4
4 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Erwin Tanner (eds), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002).
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Public Opinion and Debate
To date, there are no Islamic or Muslim political parties in Switzerland. Only a few Swiss Muslims are involved politically and the few Muslims elected to office have not made Islam their cause. On the contrary, their religious affiliation usually remains unspoken. Similarly, no Swiss political party has directed its political views against Islam, even the far right Swiss parties, which tend to take a hard line against foreigners in general and are gaining in popularity. Note that the controversy referred to in section 5 was largely instigated by the UDC, a political party often identified as far right. The UDC initiated a similar popular movement in November 2003. The canton of Zurich was preparing a vote on the modernisation of relations between state and church and the recognition of new confessional communities. This project was intended to give some religious communities an official status that would allow them to receive religious taxes and organise religious education; it was rejected by a popular vote in 2004. In 2008, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ambassador Orhun visited Switzerland to analyse the extent of discrimination against Muslims after this was identified as a problem in a report by the Federal Commission Against Racism. 15 No data available.
Major Cultural Events
TURKEY Ahmet Yildiz1 1
Muslim Populations
The census conducted by the Turkish Statistics Institution (TÜİK) on 31 December 2008 recorded the population of Turkey as 71,517,100.2 Following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, the nationbuilding process envisaged a thoroughly homogeneous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some significant surveys, the most important of which was conducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-KONDA company.3 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the population), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks comprise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi’is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in Eastern-Southeastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (4,500,000 people), of whom 43% are Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8% being made up of various ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central
1 Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms and the role of Islam as a socio-political actor in Turkish democracy, and contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Cizre, Ümit (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 2 Turkish Institute of Statistics (TÜİK) figures available at http://tuikapp.tuik.gov .tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul, accessed 2 March 2009. 3 See Milliyet-KONDA, “Biz Kimiz?” Toplumsal Yapı Ara tırması 2006, MilliyetKONDA (Survey on the Social Structure 2006, “Who are We?”).
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Anatolia and the Mediterranean region. The Ja’faris are the country’s principal Shi’a community and number between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi’is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scientists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate yourself in the continuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identified themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meaning ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5 2
Islam and the State
Under its 1982 Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for freedom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) prescribes not only a separation between religion and the state but also requires that religion be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf. Article 219 of the penal code prohibits imams, priests, rabbis and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there are legal restrictions against insulting any religion, interfering with that religion’s services or damaging its property. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, administers Sunni Muslim
4 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008, http://20012009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/index.htm, accessed 2 March 2009. 5 Source: Ali Çarkoğlu-Binnaz Toprak, Deği en Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), pp. 29–31 and 38–39.
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religious facilities and courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants, and also covers the cost of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, particularly some Alevis, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diyanet of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the cost of utilities at ‘Alevi cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
Sufi and other mystical, religious-social orders, brotherhoods (tariqas) and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Dervish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925, but tariqas and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Demands for the lifting of this ban are part of the on-going agenda of Turkish politics. On the other hand, Kemalists and neo-Kemalists are firmly against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Apart from unofficial Islamic groupings, the most important organisation is the Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs, Eski ehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel: +90 312 295 70 00; http://www .diyanet.gov.tr), an official institution established by Law 429 on 3 March 1924, the same day as the abolition of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. According to Article 136 of the Constitution: “the Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” It is empowered to regulate issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and providing society with religious guidance. Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows: The Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs, Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak no. 89, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel. +90
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312 417 12 35, fax +90 312 418 19 00 www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax-exempt foundation and has the right to collect donations without prior permission and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the Directorate of Religious Affairs in its activities, to enlighten and guide the people in religious matters, to build mosques and to provide means of improving social solidarity. The prestigious Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of the Islami Ara tırmalar Merkezi (ISAM, Islamic Studies Centre, İcadiye Bağlarba ı Cad. 40, Bağlarba ı 34662, Üsküdar-Istanbul, tel. +90 216 474 08 50, fax +90 216 474 08 74, http://www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. The Türkiye Gönüllü Te ekküller Vakfı (TGTV, Foundation for the Turkish Volunteer Associations, Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. no. 134050, Edirnekapı/Eyüp/İstanbul, tel. +90 212 534 04 07, fax +90 212 534 04 08, http://www.tgtv.org) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the controversial Fethullahçi or neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by Fethullah Gülen now living in the USA, including the Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı ( Journalists and Writers Foundation, Cumhuriyet Cad. no. 129/5, 34230 Harbiye-Istanbul, tel. +90 (212) 232 17 10, fax +90 (212) 232 15 88, e-mail:
[email protected], http://www.gyv.org.tr/bpi .asp?caid=159&cid=230), established on 29 June 1994. The Foundation has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: The Dialogue Eurasia Platform, the Abant meetings and the Intercultural Dialog Platform.6 Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (Anatolia Youth Association, Hükümet Cad., Hilal Sokak no. 10, Kat: 1, Ulus-Ankara, tel. 0312 309 59 27, fax 0312 311 56 71, e-mail:
[email protected], http://www.agd.org .tr) is the successor of the National Outlook Foundation (Milli Görü Vakfı), the most important social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the country. It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, Necmettin Erbakan.
6
http://www.gyv.org.tr/bpi.asp?caid=157&cid=226.
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Charitable Associations
There are many socially and financially powerful Islamically oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphan, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associations are: International Humanitarian Help (IHH, www.ihh.org.tr), Kimse Yok Mu Solidarity and Aid Association (www.kimseyokmu.org.tr), Deniz Feneri (Sea Lighthouse, www.denizfeneri.org.tr),7 Cansuyu (www .cansuyu.org.tr) and Aid Hand (Yardımeli, www.yardimeli.org.tr). 4
Mosques and Prayer Houses
The number of mosques in Turkey in the year 2007 was 79 096. The most famous mosques are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultans, called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important one built in the Republican period. 5
Children’s Education
The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military government in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduction to Alevism. Only the Diyanet is authorised to provide religion courses (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine/unofficial private courses do exist. Students who complete the first five years of primary school may enrol in Diyanet Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older may legally register for official Qur’an courses, which include 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. Since 1997, it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of secular education, after which those who wish to receive Islamic
7
This NGO also operates in Germany, where it has been accused of corruption.
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religious education may continue their studies at İmam-Hatip high schools (lycees). They cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. Imam-Hatip high schools are classified as vocational, and graduates of vocational schools face an automatic reduction in their university entrance examination grades if they apply for university programmes outside their vocational specialisation. This reduction effectively bars most İmam-Hatip graduates from enrolling in university programmes other than in theology. Many religiously devout citizens criticise the religious instruction provided in state schools as inadequate. Most families who enrol their children (especially girls) in İmam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic communities. These schools are not designed as Islam religious schools but they provide a more conducive environment for Islamic socialisation. Many of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated with the Gülen community. Both sexes are usually taught together in the education system, both public and private. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the headscarf in both primary and secondary schools. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Although they date back to 1924, İmam-Hatip Schools were named İmam-Hatip High Schools in 1973 and authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education of 1973. During the process of military intervention, the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary schools of İmam-Hatip Lycees were closed down and the high schools part was made four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the space of five years. There are currently 444 İmam-Hatip schools in Turkey. In addition, there are twenty-two theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes. No new ones have not been opened since the 28 February 1997 military coup and the
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student numbers in these schools have radically diminished, although this has recently begun to slowly change.8 7
Burial and Cemeteries
The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals in accordance with Islamic practice, including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems at all in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries. All relevant services are provided by the municipalities in accordance with the relevant legislation.9 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
There is no hospital, army10 or prison chaplaincy in Turkey.11 However, according to a protocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate of Religious Affairs on 15 May 2001, Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly.12 Religious services in prisons date back to 1974, but are not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy’. No religious services or moral guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services
8 See http://www.tihmed.org/kontenjan 3.htm, accessed 9 March 2009. This site is maintained by graduates of İmam-Hatip Schools. 9 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393. html, accessed 16 March 2009. 10 Although there is a core army chaplaincy structure, this is reserved for times of war, and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus. See, Acar, Erkan, “Din İ leri Subayı Ataması Yapılmıyor”, Zaman, 11 May 2005. 11 See Akbıyık, Nur, “Dünya Ordularında Din Subaylığı”, ÖNDER-İmam Hatip Liseleri Mezunları ve Mensupları Derneği, 2007, available at http://www.onder.org.tr/projeleroku .asp?ID=6, accesssed 10 March 2009. 12 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Ba kanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religion Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol.2 (Ankara: Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. Also see http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090312/Diyanettencezaevlerinde-irsad-hizmeti.php, accessed 12 March 2009.
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began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals, but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism.13 9
Religious Festivals
Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fıtr) as religious national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and second 4.5).14 In addition to the usual religious holidays, there are other holidays known as Kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, but not offically recognised. Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Muslims and all prepare a special kind of dessert known as Ashura to share with their neighbours. Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası). The first day of this week is named as the day of the rose, which symbolises the Prophet. 10
Halal Food
Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Standards is working towards a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.15 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regula-
See Ba ar, Serpil, “Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dı ı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı,” in T.C. Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Ba kanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religion Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1, Ankara: Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Yayınları, 2008, pp. 621–23; also see, İlhan, Dr. Ay egül, “Dünya Hastanelerinde Din Hizmetleri,” ÖNDER-İmam Hatip Liseleri Mezunları ve Mensupları Derneği, 2007, accesssed 10 March 2009 in http://www.onder.org.tr/projeleroku.asp?ID=7. 14 For the relevant legislation regarding the religious holidays, see: Law on the National and Public Holidays (Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun) (Law no. 2429,) Official Gazette, 19/3/1981 No. 17284. 15 See Malatyalı, Kenan, “Helal Gıda Nedir, Ne Değildir,” TSE Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 13
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tions, provided that the place should be allocated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.16 11
Dress Codes
A ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities and by civil servants in public buildings has been in force for a long time. The debate on this question revolves around whether headscarf is a religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to protect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly banning the wearing of headscarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the headscarf, while in February 2008, the Parliament passed constitutional amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing headscarves on university campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.17 Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of religious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of non-Muslim communities and the President of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.18
16 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov .tr/html/1386.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 17 entop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban:A quest for the solution”, SETA Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at www.setav.org. For the relevant legislation see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 18 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879.
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Publication and Media
There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most sold daily newspaper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated with the Gülen community. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni afak, Milli Gazete, Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya and Türkiye Gazetesi are known to be affiliated to religious groups. Also there are ‘Islamist’ columnists writing in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies. Among the national Muslim television channels, Samanyolu is among the top five most watched national television channels. Kanal 7, Ülke TV, Kanal A, TV NET, Ses TV, TV 5, Hilal TV, Dost TV are known to be affiliated to Muslim religious groups. There are, of course, various representations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (CHA) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İHA), are among the most important news agencies in the country. Burç FM, Dünya Radyo, Radyo 15, Akra FM, Moral FM, TGRT FM may be listed as national radio stations with Islamic orientation. 13
Family Law
The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role sharing within marriage, although the husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. officially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The civil code does not recognise religious marriage contracts and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a religious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, nor are men of religion (imams) entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early marriages still occur. Adultery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce suits. According to the civil code, and contrary to the Islamic precepts, men and women are equal in term of their entitlement to inherit. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant
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in litigation. However, in practice, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
The case for closing down the religiously based government party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), and two important decisions of the Constitutional Court (one about the parliamentary quorum needed for choosing the President, and the other the annulment of the constitutional change aimed at lifting the headscarf ban in universities) were the most important foci of public debate in 2008. A field study concerning the impact of conservatism on individual liberties led by a prominent academic, Binaz Toprak, provoked a heated discussion in the media about so-called ‘community oppression’ (mahalle baskısı) in Turkey. The law suit filed against the German-based Deniz Feneri e.V. about the misuse of donations collected by appealing to religious altruism, created important repercussions in Turkish politics. 15
Major Cultural Events
The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colourful, often military-style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ‘Id al-Fitr creates a special ambiance every year throughout the country, and book fairs organised by Diyanet have become a complementary part of this. The Hajj, occurring at the same time as ‘Id al-Adha also creates a very special country-wide awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated in the third week of April under the auspices of the Diyanet, the Hacı Bekta Festival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, especially marked by Shi’ites, may also be cited as important cultural events.
UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND Tahir Abbas1 1
Muslim Populations
Islam is the second largest faith group in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The census of April 2001, which included a question on religion for the first time since 1851, determined a total of 1,591,000 Muslims in the UK. There were approximately 1,540,000 in England and Wales, forming around 3% of the total population; 42,557 in Scotland, representing 0.84% of the population; and 1,943 in Northern Ireland, which is less than 1% of the population in that province. Taking into account approximations of natural increase and continuing immigration, estimates for 2009 suggest a total of around 2,200,000 Muslims in the UK. The first significant group of Muslims started arriving in the eighteenth century and were ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors), initially employed by the British East India Company, who gradually began to settle with British wives in or near port towns. They were later followed by Yemeni sailors employed after 1869 in Aden who came to cities such as Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some also migrating to major industrial cities such as Birmingham and Sheffield.2 Soon after the end of World War II, there was significant migration to the United Kingdom from the former colonies, especially the islands of the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. As a result, significant numbers of Muslim were found in a number of British towns and cities in the 1960s and 1970s. At present, Muslims remain concentrated in urban areas; around 40% of all Muslims are in London, forming around 8.5% of the citiy’s population, with concentrations in the boroughs of
1 Dr Tahir Abbas took his PhD at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick. After a period as a researcher at the Home Office he is now Associate Professor (Reader) in Sociology and Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, Department of Sociology, University of Birmingham. Information on Northern Ireland has been supplied by Victoria Montgomery (see Ireland). 2 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992); Ansari, Humayan, The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004).
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Tower Hamlets (36.4% of London Muslims), Newham (24.3%) and Waltham Forest (15.1%). Outside of the London, Blackburn (19.4% of UK Muslims) and Bradford (16.1%) have even more significant Muslim populations.3 Today, most Muslims living in the UK are migrants or descendants of immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Pakistanis, at 43% of the Muslim total based on the 2001 census, form the dominant Muslim sub-population. Other smaller communities come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenth-century Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya and Uganda), Cyprus and across the Middle East. Many Muslim communities, especially those of Bangladeshi origin, are acutely marginalised and generally suffer from critical social and economic deprivation. They experience low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited education and relatively high unemployment for men and low participation in the labour market for women.4 On the other hand, the East African Asians tend to be better off, and London is also host to a high number of often very wealthy Arabs from the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia and Iraq. The varieties within majority Sunni Islam, particularly those emerging in South Asia, are all to be found: key Sunni constituents are the Barelwi, Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat and the Jamaat-i-lslami movements.5 2
Islam and the State
There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the UK: each of the constituent countries has its own regime. Although the UK has no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, most recently the Human Rights Act 1998, guarantees freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order as determined by the courts. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland; although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head 3 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655. 4 Peach, Ceri, “Britain’s Muslim population: An overview”, in Abbas, T. (ed.), Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure (London/New York: Zed Books, 2005), pp. 18–30. 5 Nielsen, Jorgen, Muslims in Western Europe, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
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of the Church of England (Anglican) and, through the Prime Minister’s Office, appoints its bishops, some of whom are ex officio members of the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. Each of the other main traditional churches of England, various Protestants (including the Quakers) and the Roman Catholics, as well as Jews, have their own particular status established by legislation. Other smaller and more recently arrived religious communities, including Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and various ‘black-led’ churches mostly of Caribbean origin, tend to register as private associations, or ‘companies’ under the Companies Acts, as well as registering as ‘charities’ with the Charities Commission. Most Muslims in Britain have arrived with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth, countries which were previously British colonies of one category or another. Commonwealth citizens, once they had entered the UK, had full political rights and could thus vote and stand for local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire UK citizenship (the UK allows multiple citizenship), and their children born in the UK acquired citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in the UK are UK citizens. The exceptions are those who have arrived as refugees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. The official UK response to migrant communities was for many years formulated in terms of ‘race’ and then more refined in terms of ‘ethnicity’, but seldom in terms of religion. The Race Relations Act (1976) was designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin, but the courts were never able to interpret it to cover discrimination on religious grounds (although Jews and Sikhs are protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). An Act of 2006 finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’. Socio-economic and cultural exclusion have had a negative impact upon some young Muslims, especially men. Many young Muslims who live in poor inner city areas are underachieving in educational spheres. This results in many being unable to participate in mainstream British society as effective economic and cultural citizens. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, young men emphasise that increasing Islamophobia in the media, negative policing and regressive government policy have made them feel further excluded, even vilified.6 In relation to the ever stronger anti-terror legislation, there are
6 Amin, Ash, “Multi-ethnicity and the idea of Europe”, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 21, no. 2 (2004), pp. 1–24; Kundnani, Arun, “Integrationism: The politics of antiMuslim racism”, Race and Class, vol. 48, no. 4 (2007), pp. 24–44.
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concerns about the negative impact it is having and how it may result in young people moving even further towards more radical identity politics. In particular, international issues are emphasised, with much reference made to suffering in Muslim lands. 3
Main Muslim Organisations
In England, there are a number of umbrella organisations that claim to represent British Muslims at national and international fora. Formed in 1997, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, PO Box 57330, London E1 2WJ) has asserted that the centre of Muslim self-identity in Britain is a faith rather than ‘race’, and partly as a result of MCB lobbying, the government agreed to include religion as an identity category in the 2001 census. The MCB is committed to democracy in a practical way and not only urges Muslims to take part in elections but stresses that it is a religious obligation to do so. In 2007, Scottish Muslims announced the establishment of an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (MCS, email:
[email protected]), which brings together an assortment of Scotland’s mosques and Islamic organisations. There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff CF24 1PU), which aims to carry out similar work for Muslims in Wales. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, 124 Harrowdene Road, Wembley, Middlesex HA0 2JR) was founded in 1997, largely by people of Arab origin. One issue that distinguishes the MAB from other groups is its emphasis on political activism and interaction within wider civil society in Britain and one of its key objectives is to campaign for changes in British policy towards the Muslim world. The MAB became an important member of the Stop the War Coalition, formed in 2002 to campaign against UK involvement in the war in Iraq. It had a central role in the emergence of a Muslim-Leftist alliance with RESPECT (Respect, Equality, Socialism, Peace, Environmentalism, Community and Trade Unionism coalition). The differences within and between variant forms of political Islam can be illustrated by the way Finsbury Park Mosque in London, for a long time a hub for militant political Islamist groups under the infamous imam, Abu Hamza, was taken over by supporters of the MAB in 2005. The British Muslim Forum (BMF, PO Box 7517, Derby DE1 0HS) claims to embody the largest agglomeration of Barelwi Muslim groups and organisations in Britain. Formally launched in 2005, it represents
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nine sections of the Sunni Barelwi community. As well as providing national representation and structure for the Barelwi community, the setting up of the BMF is an attempt to counter the perceived outside influences on British Islam and on young people in particular. There remains a strong feeling in the Barelwi community that the MCB has not adequately represented the mosques or the (Azad) Kashmiri and Pakistani communities from the inner cities. Furthermore, the BMF is critical of the more ‘literalist’ interpretations of Islam promoted by certain Islamic reform movements, including the Salafi trends, and there is concern over the influence that this might be having on young Muslims. The BMF does acknowledge there is a key problem in relation to Barelwi imams not being able to speak English and in explaining the disaffection of many young people from the religion of their parents. The Sufi Muslim Council (SMC, PO Box 414, Rochdale OL11 5ZU) was established in 2006. It represents another attempt to counter the dominance and influence of certain schools of thought and ideologies among British Muslims, particularly from the more puritanical Salafi movements. Launched in 2007, the Quilliam Foundation (QF) describes itself as “the world’s first counter-extremism think tank”. It is based in London and was set up by ex-activists of the hard-line Hizb ut-Tahrir. It takes its name from William Abdullah Quilliam, an English convert to Islam during the 1880s. A major Shi’ite group, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, NW6 6TN) is a global organisation working for the betterment of predominantly Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas. It manages two educational establishments in the UK, which provide education according to primary and secondary level national curriculum guidelines and stipulations. The main Muslim organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ireland in the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC), established in 1978 (38 Wellington Park, Belfast, BT9 6DN; +44 (0)2890 664465). It is not only a place of worship, but also performs social and cultural functions. The Irish Council of Imams (see Ireland), although based in Dublin, also includes imams from Northern Ireland. Established in September 2006, it not only deals with purely religious issues but also aims to encourage the positive integration of Muslims into Ireland. None of these main Muslim organisations are related to any specific ethnic or national group and they include both Sunni and Shi’i Muslims (although Sunni Muslims are the most numerous and this is reflected in the organisations). In addition, there is also the Islamic Student Society of NI and Muslim Youth NI, both of which have close links to the BIC.
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Mosques and Prayer Houses
Unofficially, there are around 2,000 mosques and Islamic centres in the UK, but it is estimated that as many as 600 may not have full planning permission. This has been a contentious issue over the years, with research highlighting the fact of disproportionately low approval rates for planning applications for mosques compared with the experiences of other faith groups in the UK.7 The first mosque in the UK was founded in 1860 at 2 Glynrhondda Street, Cathays, Cardiff. This was followed by the Shah Jahan Mosque, built in Woking, Surrey, in 1889. In the 1960s, mosques largely met the needs of Muslims of all the different sects and ethno-religious characteristics, but as these different Muslims began to raise their levels of confidence and as aspirations grew, they were able to delineate and advance their own unique and separate religious identities. These new mosques began to reproduce the various regional, linguistic and ethnocultural diversities found in the sending regions more generally. Before 1964, a mere seven new mosques were registered throughout the UK, but in that year alone an additional seven were registered and over the next ten years there were approximately eight new registrations every year. From 1974, registrations were found to be around 25–30 per year. The development of these mosques was indeed a function as well as an outcome of greater Muslim adherence to their faith as well as increasing levels of self-confidence. Originally, many of these mosques were developments to existing structures, but since the 1980s a growing number are purpose-built.8 5
Children’s Education
Religion and religious communities have a place in the education system in various ways, based mainly on the Education Acts of 1944 and 1988 with some later amendments. Religious education (RE) is a 7 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birmingham, UK”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2006), pp. 1161–1179. 8 Cesari, Jocelyn and Sean McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Lancashire Council of Mosques, Muslims in Britain (2009), available at http://www.lancashiremosques.com/discovery_muslims_in_britain.asp, accessed 13 May 2009.
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compulsory subject on the school timetable, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents and teachers can decline to teach the subject. Since the 1970s, the RE syllabi, set by a process under the local government, have had a multi-faith content, which since 1988 has had to include Christianity and has guaranteed a proportion of time for the main world religions, including Islam. Teachers of the subject are ordinary, professionally trained teachers and do not require the approval of religious authorities, nor do they need to belong to any particular religion. Especially at the primary school level, a large number of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England (ca. 4,700) and the Roman Catholic Church (ca. 2,100) with very few Jewish and Methodist schools. Since 1998, a small number of Muslim schools have been admitted to this arrangement in England, currently totalling seven, and decisions are expected soon on the first such schools in Wales and Scotland. There are none in Northern Ireland. There are a large number of privately funded and managed Islamic schools. These require government approval, which depends on their being able to provide an education that meets the minimum expectations of the national curriculum. Over the years, most schools have accumulated experiences to make the necessary arrangements for the special needs of a variety of ethnic and religious groups. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local governments have adopted flexible approaches. More contentious, but usually solved, are issues around dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Muslim groups have opposed music teaching), and religious holidays. 6
Higher and Professional Education
Islamic studies are offered at a number of universities, usually in the context of religious studies departments or departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies. The main such programmes are at the universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Cardiff, Durham, Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Lampeter, Leeds, Manchester, Oxford, Queen’s University Belfast and the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London). The Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies is a privately financed centre for research and publication, whose staff offer teaching in some of the Oxford University colleges. A number of other universities also
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offer Islamic studies components in professional training degrees, especially in the training of teachers and youth workers. There is no imam training as such at publicly funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses leading to the status of imam, often completed by taking a full degree at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Most of these private colleges are established on the model of the dar al-‘ulum of the Deobandi networks of the Indian subcontinent. The Islamic Foundation, near Leicester (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), has conducted research and teaching since 1973, particularly in the field of Islamic economics. In 2000, it set up the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (www.mihe. org.uk), which offers postgraduate degrees in Islamic studies awarded by the University of Gloucestershire, as well as short courses on Islam for various professional groups. 7
Burial and Cemeteries
Many local authorities are able to provide for Muslim burial needs, which require that the deceased be washed in a certain way and laid in the ground facing Mecca. A particular problem has been the religious obligation for Muslims that the deceased be buried within 24 hours of death, but negotiations locally have usually led to a resolution. Most British cities and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslim burials, although it is also the case that they are rapidly filling up. In 1993 a group of Muslims purchased an area of a cemetery just outside Belfast for Muslim use, which is now almost full. This year a section of another cemetery within Belfast has been reserved for Muslim use. 8
‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions
Prison Services UK now employ a number of full-time and part-time imams in prisons. In November 2005, Imam Asim Hafiz was appointed as Muslim chaplain to the British Armed Forces.9 A growing number of hospitals and regional National Health Service (NHS) trusts also employ part- or full-time imams, as do some universities.
9 Rollins, Karen, “Armed forces Imam ‘doing duty’ ”, BBC News Online, 1 May 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6592031.stm, accessed 13 May 2009.
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Religious Festivals
Annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are held throughout the UK, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the significant number of people attending. There have been tendencies for different sectarian groups to hold the same celebrations on different days, but in some cities there have been attempts to coordinate the religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals off, usually as part of their statutory holiday entitlement. 10
Halal Food
Halal food is widely available across the UK. Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have on several occasions campaigned for legislation to abolish the right of exemption from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but have failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and Sikh lobbies, as well as sectors among anti-racist groups. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109 Fulham Palace Road London W6 8JA), a voluntary organisation, was initiated to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the UK. Similar initiatives had been taken before but had failed due to the extra cost that the certification process imposed. 11
Dress Codes
There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public institutions, although questions of uniform in schools are a matter for individual school managers (see section 5 above). There have been a number of court cases in which schools, local authorities and employers have been sued for imposing dress codes which are alleged to have been discriminatory. Such complaints have usually been supported by the courts on the basis that they are a form of direct or indirect racial discrimination. The key case was the case of Mandla in the House of Lords in 1983 in which a Birmingham school was found guilty of racial discrimination against a Sikh boy because he wanted to wear a turban. A recent House of Lords decision (Shabina Begum, 22 March
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2006) appears to have determined that there are limits to this right. It is becoming more common to see women wearing hijab across the UK, and niqab is also becoming a familiar sight in most parts of the country although in Northern Ireland it remains virtually unheard of. Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women, as they have for the turban in relation to Sikh men. 12
Publications and Media
There are a number of Muslim newspapers and magazines in circulation. The two longest running are Q-News (PO Box 4295, London, W1A 7YH, www.q-news.com) and The Muslim News (www.muslimnews .co.uk). A more recent addition is EMEL Magazine (4th Floor, Barakat House, 116 Finchley Road, London NW3 5HT, www.emelmagazine .com), which focuses on culture and lifestyle for professional Muslims. There are currently no printed periodicals or magazines by or aimed at Muslims in Northern Ireland. A number of local community radio stations, authorised by the Radio Authority operate to serve a Muslim audience, particularly around the annual festival of Ramadan. The main organisations all have their own websites. 13
Family Law
Successive cases and legislation have limited the application of some aspects of Islamic law, in particular polygamy and talaq. The persistence of Muslim cultural practices in some sections of the Muslim community regularly creates conflict with the English legal system. One response has been the establishment of ‘Sharia councils’, voluntary bodies which seek to provide solutions to family conflicts that satisfy both Islamic requirements, as viewed by the parties, and the requirements of English law. In 2008, it was announced that a number of such councils had been set up to offer family conflict solutions under the arbitration processes of the Arbitration Act 1996, which would give legal validity to solutions which were not otherwise available from normal family courts. Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the
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Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, and those that do not have often had the building registered for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the UK. Thus the imam of BIC has recently been registered as an Officiant under the provision of Article 10 of the Marriage in Northern Ireland Order 2003. 14
Public Opinion and Debate
Muslim opinion is frequently sought in matters of schooling, identity, political allegiance and voting, and surveys are administered by large polling companies such as NOP, MORI and YouGov on a regular basis. The picture often painted is one of Muslims who somehow live separate lives or do not wish to integrate into majority society. However, official government research, the Home Office Citizenship Survey, points to instances of wider friendship networks among Muslims and greater trust and participation in public institutions as compared with non-Muslims.10 15
Major Cultural Events
Islamic Awareness Week in England and Wales takes place during late November every year. It began in 2004, to “raise awareness and remove misconceptions surrounding Britain’s second largest faith group”. Many locally organised events, positive media and inter-faith and inter-cultural activities occur across the country. Islam Expo is now also an annual event, held at the Olympia in Earls Court, London, and attended by upwards of 30,000 Muslims and non-Muslims. First held in 2006, it has now become a regular feature of the Muslim calendar and a range of social, cultural and education and intellectual events and functions are laid out as part of the activities over a four-day period.
10 Communities and Local Government, 2005 Citizenship Survey: Active Communities Topic Report (London: CLG, 2006).
PART II
ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON EUROPE Ayhan Kaya1 1
Introduction to the Context
The European Union (EU) project has recently attracted the support of a large portion of the Turkish public. The public polls register ongoing public support for the EU in the range of 60%–80%.2 Public support is likely to fall during times when EU circles become harsh on Turkish Cypriots, who actually said “Yes” to a federal Cyprus in the 2004 referendum, or when European countries, express their opposition to Turkey’s full membership, as France and Austria have done, and their support instead for the ambiguous proposals for a “privileged partnership” and “Mediterranean Union”. Such debates also prompt the Turkish public to see the EU as a ‘Christian club’, and harsh criticisms of its policies on minorities encourage some Turks to believe that the EU is actually willing to divide the country. However, rising political, social, economic and cultural interaction between the EU countries and Turkey has already begun to dismantle prejudices and stereotypes on both sides. For example, emerging European Studies programmes in Turkey have come to grips with the actual meaning of the EU project, and are disseminating this information to the Turkish public.3
1 Dr Ayhan Kaya is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations and Director of the European Institute, Istanbul Bilgi University. His most recent publication is Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009. 2 For further information see Yýlmaz, Hakan, “Euroscepticism as a type of political conservatism”, paper presented at the Third Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics of the European Consortium for Political Research, the Standing Group on the European Union, Istanbul, Turkey (21–23 September, 2006). 3 Several graduate and undergraduate EU programmes have recently been established in Turkey. For example, a BA programme in European Union Relations aims to train experts needed for the negotiation process. EU Institutes at Marmara University and Istanbul Bilgi University also host specialized graduate programmes on the Union, and several other universities have graduate programmes and research and documentation centres.
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Another relevant factor is the perception of the EU by Turkish migrants in the West, or ‘Euro-Turks’.4 The majority (55%) of the approximately 5 million Euro-Turks predominantly perceive the EU as an economic integration project; and only around 20% of them believe that the EU is a ‘Christian club’. Hence, the increasing volume of interaction not only between EU citizens and Turkish citizens, but also between Euro-Turks and Turkish citizens, is expected to contribute to dismantling dominant stereotypical images of the EU among the Turks. The increasing level of interaction between the EU public and the Turkish public is also due to the Socrates academic and student exchange programmes, EU Framework projects and other EU projects, by which Turks are prompted to internalise cooperation and interaction with diverse individuals, institutions, cultures and traditions. These programmes are certainly prerequisites for the creation of a transnational European space, based on the Habermasian assumption that Europe should be defined by the common commitment of peoples to the principle of diversity, but not to the construction of a homogenous European culture.5 This article has been written against a background of sometimes heated discussions about Turkey’s membership of the EU in both Turkey and the EU member states, as well as some political unrest in Turkey and neighbouring countries. However, Turkey has been reaping the benefits of its own relatively quiet revolution over the last decade, which has witnessed a transformation of its economic, political and judicial environment. The major catalyst for much of this silent revolution was the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, when European heads of state and government offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the EU, four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959 and just two years after the EU had rejected Turkey’s application for membership during the 1997 Luxemburg summit. The prospect of EU membership offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the political establishment in Turkey, opening up new possibilities for a multitude 4 For further information see Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005); and Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Belgian-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007). 5 Habermas, Jürgen, “February 15, or, what binds Europeans together: Plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in core Europe”, in J. Habermas and J. Derrida (eds), Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe (London: Verso, 2005).
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of ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists, Circassians, Armenians and other groups have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The EU has provided an incentive for such groups to coexist in harmony, moving from a stance dominated by a retrospective past, coloured by ideological and political disagreements, to an environment in which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are democratically embraced as part of a prospective future. The ‘peace project’ discourse has become quite popular and political in Turkey. The EU as a ‘peace project’, which has been able to settle deep-rooted animosities between Germany and France and, more recently, between Germany and Poland, has also been debated in the Turkish media, with the EU being characterised not only as a peace-making political union, but also as one that exports peace.6 The vision of Europeanisation for Turkey has also been welcomed not only by Greece but also by other neighbours such as Syria, Iraq, Georgia, Armenia and Bulgaria. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and some North African countries have also expressed their support for Turkey’s membership in the Union. The EU vision, then, has provided Turkey with a chance to be a source of stability in the region. In other words, the EU has become a beacon for Turkey, lighting her road towards democratisation, liberalisation and Europeanisation. It is also interesting to see that the timing of Turkey’s European bid partly coincided with the aftermath of September 11, when Turkey, with her orientation to moderate Islam, began to be instrumentalised by the USA and the EU as a model for Muslim nations. Turkey was pointed out as a bridge not only between continents but also between civilisations. The moderate Islamic state of Turkey was praised by Western countries in a way that also embraced the pro-Islamist ruling party in Turkey. The instrumentalisation of Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries was also welcomed by the Turkish political elite. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan and several other politicians, as well as academics, worked on the implications of this new role, expecting that it would bring Turkey into a more favourable position in the European integration process. Turkey’s role as a mediator between the Muslim On her latest visit to Ankara (10 June 2006), the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyani, expressed her wish to see Turkey and Greece take the same path as France and Germany had once taken towards peace and stability (see http://www .basinkonseyi.org.tr/lang_tr/news_detail.asp?newID=62 (accessed 11 May 2009). 6
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world and the non-Muslim world was also bolstered by the United Nations, as Erdoğan, together with the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was appointed by the UN to launch the Alliance of Civilizations initiative. However, the momentum set in motion by the Justice and Development Party embracing moderate Islamic discourse as a bridging instrument between the Judeo-Christian world and the Islamic world has been challenged by Islamophobia, increasing the risk of Euroscepticism in Turkey. These two cuturally defined elements, which have made Turkey at the same time the model of moderate Islam and the object of Islamophobia, have placed Turkey’s candidacy on a very fragile ground. One should also consider the ways in which the structure of the EU could influence the form and the content of Islamic expression. The fortification of the European borders with the neighbouring countries through the Schengen Treaty (1985) reinforced the political and cultural borders separating Europe from its southern and eastern neighbours. The rise of the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse has also deepened the boundaries between the lifeworlds of Europeans and non-Europeans. At the same time, social issues such as the controversy surrounding the Gulf War, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iran, the publication of The Satanic Verses in Britain, the killing of the provocative Dutch film director, Theo van Gogh, in the Netherlands, the cartoon debate in Denmark, and the provocative intervention of Pope Benedict XVI7 regarding the violent character of the Prophet Muhammad, have all brought European Muslims together in protest, provoking hostile reactions from Europeans who viewed Europe’s immigrant Muslims as a unified whole. Even though the visit of the Pope to Turkey (27 November–1 December 2006) was presented by the mainstream European media as an attempt to revitalise dialogue between Christianity and Islam, it was rather implicitly aiming at easing the tension between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. In other words, it was an attempt to unite Christianity. “The divisions among Christians are a scandal to the world,” said the Pope after an Orthodox ceremony on 30 November. All Christians, he said, should
7 During a theological lecture at the University of Regensburg (12 September 2006), in Bavaria, Pope Benedict XVI criticised the idea of jihad, quoting Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, who said, “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” For the text of the Pope’s lecture, see http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_09_06_pope.pdf (accessed 11 May 2009).
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“renew Europe’s awareness of its Christian roots, traditions and values”.8 All these events led to both the questioning of the significance of Muslims’ collective presence in Europe and the radicalisation of European Islamic identity. One should also note that recent debates in EU countries reveal that the European form of secularism is not yet equipped to accommodate Islam, which has recently become very visible in the public space. Interestingly, what has happened is that the Western secular left and the Christian Right seem to have set up an alliance against Islam.9 Analysing the contemporary transformation of Turkey—EU relations as well as the impact of Islam on Europe, this article will also reveal that the paradigms of ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘alliance of civilisations’ are actually not different from each other in that they are both based on a religious world view. Relying on recent political changes in Turkey and EU countries, the article will propose that Turkish membership has the potential to turn the culturally and geographically defined EU into a politically defined post-national, post-civilisationalist vision and post-Western Union. 2
European Union: A Peace Project for Turkey
Despite being surrounded by the several political, ethnic, and religious predicaments of her neighbouring countries, Turkey went through one of the steadiest periods in the history of the Republic in the first half of the 2000s. At the Helsinki Summit (December 1999), the European heads of state and government for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the EU, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic
Popham, Peter, “Pope ends Turkey trip with visit to mosque”, http://news.independent .co.uk/europe/article2029284.ece (accessed 11 May 2009). Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, had in 2004 already expressed his willingness to see Europe reasserting its “Christian roots”. In the same speech, the Cardinal also stated that Turkey should seek partners elswhere because its Muslim faith was in “permanent contrast” to Europe’s Christian legacy. His call for the Christianisation of Europe was even affirmed by secularist politicians. For an elaborate discussion on this issue see Silvestri, Sara, “Does Islam challenge European identity?”, in L. Faltin and M. Wright (eds), The Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), pp. 14–28 (15). 9 Roy, Olivier, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. xii; and Silvestri, “Does Islam challenge European identity?” 8
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Community in July 1959. The decision made in Helsinki was in almost direct opposition to the decision made at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. The Luxembourg summit decision was designed to crush Turkey’s hopes of membership of the EU and the public response in Turkey was remarkably immediate and harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, Occidentalism and Euroscepticism all reached their peak in the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit. Thanks to the December 1999 Helsinki summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long. One should also bear in mind that the EU perspective delivered to Turkey in Helsinki owes a lot to the letter sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in May 1999. The letter was essential in the sense that Turkey was expressing her willingness to undertake structural reforms in the political, social and economic spheres of life in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. These commitments were optimistically interpreted by the political elite of the EU countries, and especially by the German Greens and Social Democratic Party. The date of the letter corresponds to the immediate aftermath of the arrest of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Öcalan in January 1999. As one might imagine, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan boded the end of a traumatic reign of terror for both the political establishment and the nation in general. “If, in December 2004, the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” states the conclusion of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen in December 2002.10 However, both the political establishment and the public in each of the EU countries are aware of the fact that Turkey’s membership of the Union will stimulate further the discussions of ‘European identity’ and ‘the limits of Europe’. Recently, there have been heated public debates in several countries on Turkey’s membership of the Union, mostly discouraging the membership of a large country like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions below the European average.11 Some put forward the socio10 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, available at http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf. 11 Kubicek, Paul, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and opportunities”, World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–78.
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economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline the Islamic character of Turkey, some emphasise Turkey’s undemocratic and patrimonial political culture, and some even raise the clash of civilisations in order to reject Turkish membership.12 The decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit brought about a stream of reforms. Indeed, Turkey has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the previous decade. Several laws were immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, such as right to education and to broadcast in one’s mother tongue, freedom of association, limiting military influence on the judiciary, strengthening civilian control over the military, bringing the extra-budgetary funds to which the military had access under the general budget of the Defence Ministry, removing the military members of the High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK)13 and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK),14 abolishing the State Security Courts (DGM),15 extending the civil rights of officially recognised minorities (Armenians, Jews and Greeks), reforming of the Penal Code, abolishing death penalty, releasing political prisoners, abolishing torture by the security forces, and providing greater protection for the press.16 Furthermore, strict
For a detailed account of the Turkey-sceptic discourses see Aydin-Düzgit, Senemn, “Discursive Construction of European Identity in the EU’s Relations with Turkey”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2008. Aydýn-Düzgit elaborately discusses the forms of Turkey-scepticism displayed by various members of the European Union Commission and the Parliament as well as the EU representatives of the four major countries, Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 13 Established with the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts Law No. 3984 of 20 April 1994, RTÜK is a public institution responsible for the supervision of all broadcasting in Turkey. 14 Established after the military coup of 1980, YÖK is is a fully autonomous national board of trustees without any political or governmental affiliation. The Council is a 22-member corporate public body responsible for the planning, coordination and supervision of higher education within the provisions set out in the Higher Education Law. 15 DGMs were established in 1973 and enshrined in law in 1982 in order to control Turkish political life. However, the revised Turkish Penal Code (TCK) included a new version of the former article 159, prohibiting the “public degrading” of ‘Turkishness,’ the Republic, the armed forces, and other institutions of state on pain of six months’ to three years’ imprisonment. A prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, was sentenced to six months’ inprisonment for “insulting Turkishness”. (On the assassination of Dink, see below.) See Article 301 of the new Türk Ceza Kanunu, available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html (accessed 11 May 2009). 16 Hitherto, there have been nine series of harmonisation reforms based on the Copenhagen political criteria, on 19 February 2002, 9 April 2002, 3 August 2002, 11 January 2003, 23 January 2003, July 2003, and August 2003, and two reforms dated 10 December 2003. For a detailed description of the reforms see Özbudun, Ergun 12
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anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) directives, institutional transparency and liberalism have been endorsed,17 and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been partly dealt with. However, there is still a lot to be achieved. The EU perspective has also provided the Turkish public with an opportunity to come to terms with its own past, a Turkish ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’.18 Controversial and polemical conferences on Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire and The Kurdish Question were eventually organised at Istanbul Bilgi University on 25–26 September, 2005 and 11–12 March 2006 respectively. Although the judiciary19 and Yazýcý, Serap, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (Ýstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2004); Akagül, Deniz and Vaner, Semih, L’Europe avec ou sans la Turquie (Paris: Editions d’Organisation, 2005), pp. 130–136; Benhabib, Seyla and Iþýksel, Türküler, “Ancient battles, new prejudices, and future perspectives”, Constellations, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006); and Aydýn-Düzgit, Senem and Carkoglu, Ali, “Turkey: Reforms for a consolidated democracy”, in Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino, International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law:Anchoring Democracy? (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 121–154. Özbudun and Yazýcý rightly state that “of the eight constitutional amendments, the one with the most far reaching effects on the fundamental rights and liberties was that of 2001”. However, one should note that harmonisation reforms actually date back to the 1993 constitutional amendment, which abolished the state monopoly on radio and TV broadcasting. Another wave of harmonisation took place in 1995, when the ban on political activities by NGOs was also lifted. Eventually, in 1999, State Security Courts were placed under civilian control, and the privatisation of public enterprises was recognised (Özbudun and Yazýcý, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, p. 15). 17 IMF policies have never before received such strong public support in Turkey. It is claimed that the main reason for this is the way the economic reforms have been presented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) elite, who publicly announced that the reforms were required by the EU harmonisation process. This political tactic has sucessfully softened the reception of historically disputed IMF regulations in the country (see, Çoban, Güney, “Yeni sosyal politikalar: Neoliberal paradigmadan avrupa paradigmasýna (New social policies: From neoliberal paradigm towards a European paradigm)”, Centre for European Studies Bulletin, available at http://www.bilgi. edu.tr/+OtherSites/docs/CESBulletin6.pdf, no. 6, February 2006. 18 For a detailed overview of the German ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ (coming to terms with the past) see Nolte, Ernst, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986; Habermas, Jürgen, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung”, Die Zeit, 11 July 1986, and Habermas, Jürgen, “Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie”, Die Zeit, 7 November 1986. 19 As regards the independence of the judiciary, the European Commission has criticised the inadequate separation between the judiciary and the executive in Turkey, pointing out the supervision of judges and prosecuters by the Ministry of Justice, which is charged with their appointment, promotion and discipline. Despite all the changes mentioned above, the judiciary remains the only branch of government that is still very much devoted to the principles of the Republic, aiming at the protection of the state against the individual.
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accepted the lawsuits brought by some ultranationalist lawyers, both conferences paved the way to public discussion on two of the taboo issues of contemporary Turkish history. A similar conference, called Meeting in Istanbul: Past and Present, was also organised by the Greekorigin minority in Istanbul (30 June–2 July 2006) to bring together the intellectuals of the Anatolian-Greek diaspora and the Greeks of Istanbul. Not only can such conferences be organised in contemporary Turkey without encountering any major public intervention, but the last conference was even hosted by the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-affiliated Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Despite all these reforms and good will, the public in the EU countries remain unconvinced concerning prospective Turkish membership. The latest Eurobarometer 69 (November 2008) public surveys indicate that only 31% of the European public supports Turkey’s entry into the Union, while 55% are against. However, there are strong indications that the image of Turkey in the West has changed for the better after 3 October 2005, when the Council of Ministers decided to start accession talks with Turkey. It is needless to underline that the decisions made by the EU countries concerning Turkey’s membership have had a strong impact on the democratisation process in all walks of life within the country. Since the military coup in 1980, Turkey has never been so politically polarised. Especially since 1999, the main faultline dividing Turkey in all spheres of life has been the EU debate. The debate has taken place between pro-Europeans (liberals, social democrats, moderate Muslims, ethno-cultural and non-Muslim minorities) and Eurosceptics (nationalist right, nationalist left, patriots, Kemalists and Muslim fundamentalist groups). One should note that every time any negative or pessimist statement has been made in EU circles or by individual EU countries, it has strengthened the position of the Eurosceptics. The debates on Cyprus, the Armenian ‘massacre’/‘genocide’/‘deportation’, Islamophobia, Kemalist values, decentralisation and devolution have always reinforced the position of the Eurosceptics in one way or another.20
20 For a detailed account of the Eurosceptics see, Güne -Ayata, Ay e, “From Euroscepticism to Turkey-scepticism: Changing political attitudes on the European Union in Turkey”, Journal of South Europe and the Balkans, vol. 5, no. 2 (August 2003), pp. 205–222; and Bilgin, Pinar, “Turkey’s changing security discourses: The challenge of globalization”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44, no. 1 (2005), pp. 175–201.
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Rising Euroscepticism in Turkey
Euroscepticism, nationalism and parochialism in Turkey have been triggered by disapproval of the American occupation of Iraq, limitations on national sovereignty posed by the EU integration, the wave of feeling aroused by the ninetieth anniversary of the Armenian ‘deportation’/‘genocide’ among the Armenian diaspora (2005), the perceived risk that Turkey would recognise Southern Cyprus for the sake of the European integration, anti-Turkish public opinion in the EU countries (e.g. France and Austria) instigated by conservative elements, and Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in 2006. All these external factors were strong enough to revive a Eurosceptical and occidentalist discourse in Turkey. On the other hand, some internal developments also played a role in triggering this parochial reaction. For instance, the summer of 2005 was marked by debates about the sale of the country, piece by piece in the form of real estate, to foreigners, especially Israelis and Syrians. The Constitutional Court subsequently issued a decree banning the sale of real estate to foreigners. It did not then take long for the pro-Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi ) and similar groups to make a correlation between the sale of real estate to foreigners and the ‘sale of the country’ or the so-called “Second Treaty of Sèvres”.’21 This is why many Turks, demoralised by poverty, insecurity, unequal political representation, uncertainty and ambiguity about the future, could not resist drifting back into the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, i.e., the perception that they are surrounded by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state. Debates and even offensive disputes took place within the framework of the assessments of the Progress Report before the EU summit of 17 December 2005, which identified the Kurds and the Alevis as ‘minorities,’ and the vicious public debates revolving around the critical report of Human Rights Commission, appointed by the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister, brought the discourse of ‘external enemies trying to divide our country’ to the forefront once more.22 It is possible to say that 21 The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) was the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Allies at the end of World War I. The Treaty was designed to colonise the remaining boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, the Treaty was not implemented, but always remained as a tool to be used by Turkish nationalists obsessed by the fear of the partition of the country and the nation. 22 The Human Rights Commission appointed by the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister was composed of prominent Turkish scholars, led by İbrahim Kaboğlu, a
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the concept of ‘minority’ that is occasionally used in the EU Progress Report to identify the Kurds and the Alevis was misunderstood by the public. Not only were non-Alevis and non-Kurds attracted by the nationalist, parochial and Eurosceptical discourse, but the Alevis and Kurds also rejected their “alleged minority status”, and they underlined “their being a constitutive element of the Republic”. The massive celebration of the ninetieth anniversary of the Çanakkale (Gallipoli) Victory on 18 March 2005, as a kind of retaliation for the ninetieth anniversary activities of the Armenian exodus held by diaspora organisations, added to the rise of a Eurosceptical and nationalist wave. The sudden revival of the memory of long-forgotten Ottoman military officers, murdered by British soldiers in the police station in ehzadeba ý, a district of Istanbul, during the occupation of Istanbul in 1920, added different shades to the ethnocentric and nationalist texture of everyday life in Turkey.23 Furthermore, when two Kurdish children in Mersin allegedly set the Turkish flag on fire during 21 March Newroz celebrations in 2005, the country was outraged. The day after the incident, some public figures initiated flag campaigns in the name of “responsible statesmanship”; others, in full uniform, read statements on national unity to the world.24 The “waved and unwaved flags”25 made the country look red, despite the opposing regulations of the Turkish Flag Law.26
professor of Law, and gave a critical view of the contemporary human rights record of Turkey. The Commission resigned on 7 February 2005. Ibrahim Kaboglu stated at a press conference: “We weren’t pushed out for neglecting our work, we were pushed out for performing our work properly. Some circles reacted negatively when we made a certain decision or became angry when we proposed something they did not like.” Turkish Daily News, 8 February 2005. 23 See http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/17/614827.asp (accessed 20 August 2008). 24 Similarly another flag campaign was widely organised in June 1996, after a young man of Kurdish origin climbed a pole from which the Turkish flag was flying to untie it and pull it down. The scene took place during a public meeting organised in Diyarbakýr of the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), a political party founded by Kurdish intellectuals and activists. For further information, see Navaro-Yashin, Yael, Faces of the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 127–130. 25 “The reproduction of the nation-state depends upon a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting, and on imagination and unimaginative repetition. The unwaved flag, which is so forgettable, is at least as important as the memorable moments of flag waving” (Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995, p. 10). 26 The fundamental rules for the Turkish flag were laid down by Turkish Flag Law No. 2994 of 29 May 1936. Popular flag campaigns mostly disregard the law, which lays down the size of the flag and the places that can be covered by flags.
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Regrettably, the rapid population increase in Mersin from 200,000 to 800,000 within the last twenty years, and multiplying problems such as poverty, unemployment and urban tension resulting from the internal displacement of people caused by the violence in south-east Anatolia, has not drawn the attention of the media, local administrators, political parties or state institutions. The attitude of the former Minister of Interior of the AKP, who talks about the security problems resulting from internal migration rather than the reasons for it, is a typical example of the overall position of the government vis-à-vis the migration issue.27 Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s January 2007 statement about the option of issuing visas to those seeking to migrate to Istanbul is another indicator of how the recent government interprets the act of domestic migration.28 When the possibility arose that a decision of the European Court of Human Rights would require the re-trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, it did not take long for the media, taking advantage of the rise in nationalist sentiment, to revisit the issue. Ethnonationalism reared its head again, and the public were again exposed to PKK attacks in eastern and southeast Anatolia. Before 3 October 2005, when EU leaders decided to start negotiation talks with Turkey, the country experienced growing violence. In the meantime, a number of (highly unscientific) nationalist and ethnocentric books about Sabetaists,29 Zionism, Masonry and missionaries, reached millions of readers. Bookstores were filled with these kinds of books, including Mein Kampf, which was printed in a few hundred thousand copies. Metal Storm, a science-fiction novel in the same category, fuelled the rise of the anti-Western and antiAmerican nationalist wave with its stereotypical, racist and xenophobic discourse. Furthermore, the Armenian Conference—delayed upon the lynching attempt in Trabzon,30 and the sabotage of the activities
27 Aksu, Abdulkadir, “Keynote speech on migration and Turkey”, in Proceedings of the International Migration Symposium (8–11 December 2005), Zeytinburnu Municipality Culture Press, Istanbul (2006): 387–389. 28 For further details, see http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/396867.asp (accessed 11 May 2009). 29 Sabetaists are the followers of a self-proclaimed Jewish Messiah, Sabetai Sevi. His popularity alarmed the Ottoman authorities who arrested him and condemned him to death in 1666. In order to save his life, Sabetai Sevi converted to Islam. 30 While the social tension created by the flag burning incident in Mersin was still going on, on 6 April 2005 four representatives of the leftist journal Labour and Justice were threatened with lynching in Trabzon city centre while delivering a declaration
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marking the anniversary of the 6–7 September 1955 incidents,31 and obstructed for the second time by the judicial authorities—was finally realised in late September 2005. Despite all the handicaps, the only negative memory of the conference that remained was the throwing of tomatoes and eggs at some of the participants. Perhaps the most important outcome of all these experiences was to see that Turks could actually talk about some of their taboos. The Armenian question was then discussed and no unusual incidents occurred afterwards (25–26 September 2005). This Eurosceptical and nationalist discourse generated by the political parties seems to coincide with the reaction of urban middle-class and upper-middle-class groups who have suffered recently from dramatic social change in the cities as a result of insecurity, violence, crime, honour crimes, domestic violence, street children, poverty, unemployment, internally displaced people and other migration-related problems. Middle-class and upper-middle-class groups react to social changes that are likely to threaten the status quo at their expense. The securitisation of domestic migration by the government and other political parties triggers popular Turkish nationalism directed against the Kurdish population, which is becoming more visible in the major cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, Adana and Bursa. As these deeprooted social changes are taking place during the process of European integration, it is likely that middle-class and upper-middle-class groups will equate the rising social disorder with European integration. This is why Euroscepticism has become more widespread among such groups than among the poor. The contemporary xenophobia and racism prevailing in the urban space and cyberspace are aspects of what Ralph D. Grillo calls “cultural fundamentalism” or what Paul Gilroy calls “ethnic absolutism”,32 which is embodied in Article 301 of the reformed Turkish Penal Code with the aim of preventing the denigration of state institutions and of ‘Turkishness’. The discussions revolving around Article 301 refer to the intensification of an ethno-cultural anxiety that seems to be entitled, “There is death in isolation” prepared by TAYAD (Association for Solidarity with the Relatives of Arrested and Sentenced People) (Radikal, 7 April 2005). 31 Non-Muslims were attacked in Turkey’s three major cities (Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara) on 6–7 September 1955, and the attacks compelled thousands of Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin, particularly Greeks, to leave their native areas. 32 See Grillo, Ralph, “Cultural essentialism and cultural anxiety”, Anthropological Theory, vol. 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 157–173; and Gilroy, Paul, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1987).
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a reaction to the destabilising effects of globalisation, Europeanisation and expanding modernity. To put it differently, the state’s distrust of its citizens may also refer to what Arjun Appadurai calls “the anxiety of incompleteness” of nationhood and the nation-state.33 One can easily see that the anxiety of incompleteness is still imbedded in the minds of the conservative political elite in Turkey. The Minister of Defence, Vecdi Gönül, stated in a speech given in Brussels to commemorate the anniversary of Atatürk’s death on 10 November 2008 that Turkey could not have become a nation-state if Armenians and Greeks were still in the country: The most important step during the establishment of the nation was the exchange of populations. Just imagine, would it have been possible for us to become a nation state, if the Greeks had continued to live in Aegean region and the Armenians in many parts of Anatolia?34
Apostles of purity—religious, ethnic, or linguistic—are everywhere. The search for purity arises from the assumed impossibility of managing diversity. A similar line of argument was taken by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan after his notorious visit to Hakkari, a south-eastern province of Turkey with a Kurdish majority, on 3 November 2008. In his statement, Erdoğan criticised the Kurdish protest in the city and recalled the slogan “one state, one flag, one nation”. “Those who are against these, have no place to live in Turkey. They can go anywhere they want,” he said (Milliyet, 4 November 2008). His statement was later condemned by the intelligentsia for its similarity with the racist discourse of “love it or leave it” previously coined by the ultra-right wing groups. The ruling AKP has also generated a Eurosceptical discourse since the debates on the latest electoral cycle started in late 2005. However, it was not only the nationalist surge in the country that turned the AKP into a Eurosceptical party; it was also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the headscarf case of Leyla ahin v. Turkey (2005). It was a monumental development that the Grand Chamber of the EctHR agreed to hear ahin’s case at all, since two previous applications concerning the Turkish headscarf had been ruled inadmissible. In ahin’s case, however, the outcome was a temporary
33 See Appadurai, Arjun, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 34 Radikal, 11 November 2008, translation mine.
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defeat for headscarf supporters. The court ruled that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2, Protocol No. 1 (right to education). In short, the Grand Chamber concluded that in the case of the headscarf, the interference/with fundamental rights might be necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others and maintain public order. While the Chamber recognised that the ban interfered with ahin’s right to publicly manifest her religion, it stated that the ban was acceptable if it was imposed to protect the rights of third parties, to preserve public order, and to safeguard the principles of secularism and equality in Turkey. The decision of the ECtHR was not at all welcomed by the AKP leadership, who actually perceived the European Union as a liberating force with respect to lifting the ban on the headscarf, as well as to the freedom of religion. The AKP’s disappointment immediately turned its elite and clientele Eurosceptic, revealing that the AKP had actually perceived the EU as an instrument. Besides, Euro-skepticism within the AKP had been fed by rising Islamophobia and Turcophobia in the aftermath of September 11, internal crisis within the EU, and the increasing prominence of the ethno-culturally and religiously motivated conservative political forces in the major EU countries such as France, Germany, Denmark and Austria. With the AKP becoming outspokenly Eurosceptic, all the political parties in the country competed in both Euroscepticism and nationalism. The competition between the AKP and the secularist political parties, backed by the army, crystallised during the presidential election in May 2007. Preceding the presidential election, tension arose between the government and the General Staff of the armed forces, which became known as the ‘e-Coup’ affair. Just before midnight on 27 April 2007, the General Staff posted a declaration on its website cautioning the Prime Minister against nominating his right-hand man, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, for the presidency. Erdogan did the unthinkable and publicly warned off the military the following day. It was later argued that the ‘e-Coup’ strengthened the AKP in the subsequent general elections to the tune of an additional 10% of the vote. However, Mr Gül did not fit the expectations of Turkey’s traditional political and military establishment, and he failed to reach the required two-thirds majority in the Parliament. This failure resulted from the fact that the presidential post has a rather symbolic importance in Turkey since it
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was first occupied by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. The establishment argued that, as someone with pro-Islamist values and a wife who wore a headscarf, Mr Gül was an inappropriate candidate for the office of president. However, the nationalist-military alliance against the AKP was unsuccessful in the general election, and on 22 July 2007 the party won a landslide victory, with 47% of the votes cast. Following the elections, Abdullah Gül was also elected to the office of president. 4
Landmarks of Contemporary Turkish Politics: The Agony of Democratisation
Turkish politics has been through a tremendous change since the beginning of the accession negotiations in December 2005. The landmarks of this change are: the assassination of the journalist Hrant Dink, the failure of the AKP to incorporate the Kurds and the Alevis, constitutional change to lift the headscarf ban in the public institutions, the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the lifting of the headscarf ban, the prosecution of the AKP with the aim of closing the party down, and the Ergenekon case. All these landmarks seem to reveal that the AKP leadership has so far instrumentalised the European cause in a way that has led the liberals and EU circles to question the AKP’s commitment to the European Union. 4.1
The assassination of Hrant Dink
Hrant Dink was a prominent journalist of Armenian origin, who was assassinated on 19 January 2007. He had earlier been sentenced to six months’ conditional imprisonment on the charge of ‘insulting Turkish national identity’. In an article published in early 2004, Dink had called for Armenians to “renounce the hatred towards the Turks that poisons their blood”. Article 301 (1 June 2005) of the Turkish Penal Code states that: A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years; A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organisations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years; In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country, the punishment shall be increased
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by one third; and expressions of thought intended to criticise shall not constitute a crime. This notorious article has been critically debated in various circles in and outside Turkey. Several charges have been brought against various intellectuals, among whom there are popular figures such as Hrant Dink, Orhan Pamuk, the 2006 Literature Nobel Prize Winner, Perihan Magden, a journalist, Ragip Zarakolu, a publisher, and even Joost Lagendijk, a European MP from the Netherlands, and Noam Chomsky. The court hearings against Hrant Dink and the others were accompanied by various public demonstrations by liberals on the one hand and ultra-nationalists on the other. The latter were later revealed to have had links with the illegal para-military organisation called Ergenekon. The hearings reflected a deep social divide, again between liberals and Euro-sceptics. Eventually, on 30 April 2008, a series of changes were made to Article 301, including an amendment which requires the approval of the minister of justice for a case to be filed. However, the AKP has not given up its nationalist position in keeping the very parochial and racist character of Article 301 intact. 4.2
Kurds
As stated earlier, the Helsinki summit led to the moderation of the official political discourse in Turkey regarding the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity. Mesut Yilmaz, president of the Motherland Party back in 1999, has openly stated that “The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir”, i.e., through resolving the Kurdish question: Democracy is the right of both the Turks and Kurds . . . We cannot transport Turkey into a new era with a nation offended by the state, with a system that views the society as a threat, with a bureaucracy that belittles the citizen, with a republic that ousts the individual, and with a political system that is impotent in the face of these adversities.35
Along the same line, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, announced that “broadcasting in other mother tongues should be allowed”.36 At this time, too, the issue of national security was opened up for public discussion. Yilmaz publicly criticised Turkey’s conception
35 “Yilmaz: Road to EU passes through Diyarbakir”, Turkish Daily News, 17 December 1999. 36 “Interview with Ismail Cem”, CNN-Turkey, 12 December 1999.
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of national security for being far too broad compared with its EU counterparts, and for being defined behind closed doors. In a speech he delivered at a meeting of the Motherland Party’s Chairmanship Council (15 August 2001), Yilmaz stated that “national security is an issue that concerns everyone in Turkey, therefore it should be discussed not only by the political parties, but by the public as well”.37 It has been a recurring pattern in Turkey since the early 1990s that Turkish political leaders have addressed the importance of the Kurdish question before the democratisation process. Süleyman Demirel was the first Prime Minister to publicly declare that the government recognised the “Kurdish reality” (1992); similarly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime Minister also stated that his government was aware of the “Kurdish question” (2005). In spite of his positive messages until the July 2007 election, Erdoğan has not done much to improve the situation since then. Even worse, he has reversed his position and started using increasingly militaristic and nationalist language towards the Kurds, starting with his notorious visit to Hakkari as explained above. However, the ruling party has successfully taken further steps to extend the cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey. Turkey’s state-run radio and television network TRT’s new TV channel, TRT 6, officially started a 24-hour broadcast in Kurdish language on 1 January 2009.38 In addition, it has been stated by the President of the Board of Higher Education (YÖK) that a Department of Kurdish language and letters will be established at two leading universities in Turkey.39 4.3
Alevis
The AKP leadership is generally known to be critical of Alevism, which is seen as a deviation from the mainstream Sunni Islam. However, the AKP tried to correct this Alevi-sceptical image by inviting a prominent Alevi-origin novelist and journalist, Reha Çamuroğlu, to be a parliamentary candidate in the July 2007 elections. After being elected to Parliament, Çamuroğlu was appointed as an advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to establish a bridge between Cited in Bilgin, “Turkey’s changing security discourses”, p. 191. “Turkey launches TV station in once-banned Kurdish language,” http://www .dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215_cid_3915390,00.html (accessed 11 May 2009). 39 See, “Turkey plans to start Kurdish language education in universities” available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10685024.asp?gid=244 (accessed 11 May 2009). 37
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the AKP and the Alevis.40 This initiative was not accepted by most of the Alevi organisations, whether in Turkey or in the Alevi diaspora. Çamuroğlu was declared a traitor by such organisations. There was an initiative to persuade the Alevis, who are ethnically and religiously quite heterogeneous, to set up a representative liaison association to communicate with the Directorate of Religious Affairs attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. However, the AKP has not ceased to consider Alevism a deviant faith, and it still does not recognise the Cemevis (Alevi communion houses) as equal to mosques. Furthermore, the AKP has tried to ‘Sunnify’ the Alevis by denying the heterogeneity of their rituals, customs and orientations. Some Alevis have also been concerned about their children being subject to Sunni-Islam based religious classes, which are compulsory for all Turkish students. Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik has stubbornly insisted on all Alevi children attending these classes, despite a decision by the European Court of Human Rights that this form of mandatory religious education was in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ruling in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey urged Turkey to conform with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which covers the right to education. The protocol reads: In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.41
Against this background one could argue that the AKP’s European cause has so far been limited to furthering the demands of its own electorate. The Alevis have failed to make their claims heard. Thus, the aim of accommodating Alevis has not lasted more than a year. 4.4
The headscarf issue
The headscarf issue has been one of the tools by which the AKP has sought from time to time to win the public over. There were a few
40 For further information on this initiative see the Turkish Daily News webpapge, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80103&contact=1, accessed 10 December 2007. 41 See the Judgement Decision in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=23448506&skin=hudoc-cc-en (accessed 11 May 2009).
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attempts by the AKP in the previous term between 2002 and 2007 to lift the ban on the headscarf. However, these attempts were repelled by secularist institutions, such as the Constitutional Court. The AKP’s landslide victory in the 2007 elections resulted in the return of the headscarf issue with a stronger resonance. This time, the AKP decided to change Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution to lift the ban on the headscarf. The constitutional changes were drawn up by the AKP government with the support of the right-wing opposition MHP (Nationalist Action Party) on 29 January 2008 and passed by the Turkish Parliament on 6 and 9 February. On 22 February, President Abdullah Gül approved the changes. In response, the opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party) applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of these changes on the grounds that they violated the principle of secularism in Article 2 of the Constitution. The amended Article 10, which deals with equality before the law, reads as follows: “State organs and administrative posts have to abide by the rule of equality before the law in all public procedures and public services.” Article 42, which relates to the right to education, has been amended thus: “Nobody can be deprived of exercising their right to higher education for a reason not specified in the law. Restrictions that apply to this right are to be stated by law.” Immediately after the constitutional change, on 24 February, the newly elected head of YÖK, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, made a statement to the universities, interpreting the constitutional changes. In his written statement, he said that the changes in the Constitution lifted the ban on the headscarf in the Turkish universities.42 Some of the universities complied with the interpretation of the president of YÖK, but some others preferred to wait for the interpretation of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court made a decision to annul these amendments in June 2008, at a time when there were massive demonstrations against the lifting of the ban as well. The Constitutional Court was also on the verge of making another decision, regarding closing down the AKP.43
42 For a detailed analysis of the headscarf debate see the Turkish Daily News webpage, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95065, accessed 8 January 2008. 43 For further information on the decision of the Constitutional Court banning the headscarf in public institutions, see http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/ turkey19050.htm (accessed 11 May 2009).
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The trial for the closure of AKP
The chief public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals filed a complaint against the AKP on 14 March 2008 and asked the Constitutional Court to close the party down, arguing that the party had become “a focus of anti-secular activities”. Yalçinkaya requested that 71 politicians be banned from politics, including Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül. The Constitutional Court made its decision in the case on 30 July 2008, only about four and a half months after the chief prosecutor had filed the case. Under pressure at home as well as from the international community, the Constitutional Court felt the need to take immediate action to conclude the case. The Constitutional Court rejected the chief prosecutor’s demand: The party escaped closure and having 71 of its leading figures banned from politics for five years. However, the court did rule that the AKP had shown signs of being “a focal point for anti-secular activity” and recommended the party be deprived of 50% of the financial aid it received from the state treasury.44 The closure case was perceived both in Turkey and by the international community as a test case for Turkish democracy. The Court decision was a relief not only for Turkey but also for the European Union. 4.6
Ergenekon plot
Ergenekon is alleged by the Attorney of the Republic to be an illegal nationalist organisation intent on overthrowing the government and bringing in an isolationist dictatorial regime under the guise of regaining national sovereignty. It is claimed that the plot was set up by senior former generals in collaboration with secret intelligence service personnel and members of the media, extremist politicians and even some academics.45 When the Chief Prosecutor filed the lawsuit in the Constitutional Court demanding the closure of the AKP in March 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan immediately responded with a midnight roundup of new Ergenekon suspects. Whereas previous suspects arrested had been largely fringe figures, this time the net was widened to
44 For further details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7533414.stm (accessed 11 May 2009). 45 Ergil, Doğu, “Turkey’s Crisis and Future”, The Audit of Conventional Visdom 08, No. 11, (available at) http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_08_08_Ergil.pdf August 2008, accessed 7 January 2009.
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include some of the most prominent secular intellectuals in Turkey, such as Dogu Perincek, leader of the Workers’ Party; the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet, Ilhan Selcuk; and Kemal Alemdaroğlu, a former president of Istanbul University. It appears that Erdoğan also put the offending judges under surveillance. A scandal erupted in May 2008 when the vice-president of the Constitutional Court complained that he was being followed. Uniformed police responding to his complaint found that his pursuers were undercover officers.46 It was later discovered that surveillance by the National Intelligence Service (MIT) was very common. This caused an uproar in Turkey revealing further allegations with regard to new suspects within the framework of the Ergenekon case file, which was made ready on 25 July 2008, immediately prior to the Constitutional Court decision regarding the closure of the AKP. Eventually, after a long process of filing, Turkish prosecutors issued a 2,455-page indictment detailing an alleged plot to overthrow Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by an elaborate network of retired military officers, journalists, academics, businessmen, and other secular opponents of the ruling AKP.47 Although the precise facts of the case are not yet clear, the so-called Ergenekon conspiracy appears to be a largely fictionalised construct, with an ongoing investigation geared mainly to warding off constitutional challenges to the ruling party, rather than coups. It is also claimed that the moderate Islamist Gülen movement was also somehow linked to the Ergenekon plot, but so far no allegation has been made in this regard. However, the file has very serious charges concerning the killing of Hrant Dink, several murders whose perpetrators are unknown, nationalist and jingoist agitations which pop up from time to time, attempted military coups, and cooperation between the members of the Ergenekon, the PKK and the radical Islamist Hizbollah group, leading to constant instability in the country, particularly in the southeast. The police also uncovered documents that revealed plans for a sustained campaign of terror and intimidation against the Islamist government due to begin in early July 2008. A perfect storm of
46 See Jenkins, Gareth, “Alleged surveillance of senior judges raises questions about politicization of Turkish police”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 May 2008. 47 See Rubin, Michael, “Erdogan, Ergenekon, and the struggle for Turkey”, Mideast Monitor, 8 August 2008), available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1968 (accessed 11 May 2009).
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disruption was to be whipped up, beginning with a groundswell of popular protest, followed by a wave of assassinations and bombings, culminating in an economic crisis and army coup. Turkey’s moderate Islamist government would be ousted in favour of a right-wing secular dictatorship. The documents appeared to identify a 30-member assassination squad targeting judges and other prominent figures.48 When they made their decision regarding the closure of the AKP, the judges of the Constitutional Court were apparently influenced by the recent political events taking place in the country, as well as by the statements of the major political figures coming from within the European Union circles and the USA. Against the background described above, one could claim that the AKP is likely to win the battle for power. However, this is not an absolute certainty for the AKP, since lately, its culturalist, nationalist and religious discourse has been questioned by the Turkish public as well as the European Union. It has become clear that the AKP’s perseverance with the headscarf issue and religious references have become disturbing to the moderate seculars and liberals as well. It is also becoming clear that the AKP is no longer able to pursue the European Union integration project with its ‘alliance of civilisations’ thesis. 5
Conclusion: A Chance for a Paradigm Shift in Europe as well as in Turkey
It is evident that the continuation of the democratisation process in Turkey depends upon the path the EU is likely to take in the foreseeable future. One could also easily argue that Turkey’s EU bid strongly shapes the internal discussions within the EU concerning the identity of the Union. A pro-Turkey mood in the EU is likely to contribute to the disavowal of the cultural/civilisational/religious discourse, which has become dominant since the war in Bosnia in the early 1990s. Not only the native European public, but also Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are highly tuned, in one way or another, to the debates regarding Turkey’s candidacy. It seems that most of those who are for or against Turkey are persuaded by the cultural/civilisational/
48 Robert Tait, “Turkish coup plot awakens fear of violent nationalism,” The Observer (6 July 2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/06/turkey.
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religious paradigm; that is, it seems that the debates regarding Turkey revolve around the religious and cultural domains. Furthermore, Euro-Turks have also become more vocal in their concerns about the recent European scepticism towards Turkey. Euro-Turks have become more resistant to the integrationist attempts of the European states in a time when Turkey is being neglected and rejected by European leaders.49 Thus, one could say that Turkey’s European bid has come to be about more than only Turkey’s candidacy alone. It has rather become a matter of a civilisational bridge between the EU and the Islamic world. However, the work of Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez and Ignacio Torreblanca Payá, based on the Eurobarometer surveys, reveals that neither the instrumentalisation nor the culturalisation of the Turkish membership creates a positive image of Turkey for the European public.50 Neither has the emphasis on the civilisation-bridging capacity of Turkey and the compatibility of European and Turkish identities so far made a substantial impact on the Turkish public’s support for the EU. Apparently, instrumentalist and culturalist perspectives do not bring the EU and Turkey closer to each other. It seems that the only way to re-envision Turkey-EU relations is to break up the hegemony of civilisationist/religious/culturalist discourse, which has so far paved the way to nationalist, religious, parochial and local divides inside the EU as well as in Turkey. The European public should be reminded that the EU is a project of integration and peace, but not of division. The magnetic potential of the Union should be restored not only for the European public but also for the neighbouring countries and the world. This can only be done through efforts to construct a post-national and post-Western Europe, the boundaries of which are always in the making and transcend the retrospective, civilisational, cultural and religious contours of essentialist projects for the EU. It is such a political, postcivilisational, post-cultural, post-Judeo/Christian and prospective EU that both Turkey and the world need. A politically defined Europe that is subject to the developmental logic of enlargement is also what the EU needs in order to overcome ongoing structural problems in the Union.
49 For further dabate on this issue see Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Euro-Turks, Brussels: CEPS Publications, 2005; and Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Belgian-Turks, Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007. 50 Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia M. and Torreblanca Payá, Ignacio, European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession (Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), 2007).
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The debate on Turkish membership seems to provide the EU with the required tools to generate a post-national and post-Western Europe. It is clear that the Turkish democratisation process may be expected to be persistent in the case of a liberal, political and post-civilisational European project, which would be ready to welcome Turkey. On the other hand, a culturally and religiously defined Europe might abstain from welcoming Turkey, and this would certainly interrupt the democratisation process. Turkey’s democracy is highly linked to the ways in which the EU is being constructed and reconstructed. There are at least two definitions of Europe and the EU. The first is that proposed by the conservatives, which defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist and culturally prescribed entity. The second is that proposed by the social democrats, liberals, socialists and greens, which emphasises the understanding that ‘Europe’ is a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a cultural project, the latter definition welcomes a political project. Civilisational Europe
Post-Civilisational Europe
Communal
Societal
Cultural
Political
Retrospective
Prospective
Essentialist
Non-essentialist
Heterophobia
Heterophilia
Physical geography
Political geography
Communal
Societal
Cultural
Political
Retrospective
Prospective
Essentialist
Non-essentialist
Heterophobia
Heterophilia
Accordingly, the conservative civilisational idea aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the Ancient Greek and/or Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. Civilisational Europe
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does not intend to include any other culture or religion outside of this European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. This is why Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitution regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, the progressive post-civilisational idea proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity, and heterophilia. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam, and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace and integration project. Joschka Fischer, Michel Rocard, and Gerhard Schröder are some of the leaders emphasising the secular character of the EU. Hence, Turkey’s future in the EU depends on the weakening of the civilisational and cultural idea of the EU, which divides the world into religiously defined clusters. A post-civilisational, post-national, post-Western, post-religious and secular idea of Europe would strengthen pro-European sentiments in Turkey.
EUROPEAN MUSLIM YOUTH: TOWARDS A COOL ISLAM? Miriam Gazzah1 1
Introduction
This article focuses on the role of music (in the broadest sense of the word) in Dutch-Moroccan youth culture. It explores the way DutchMoroccan Muslim youth appropriate particular kinds of music in order to express a specific kind of identity. How do they bring music consumption and conviction together—or not—and why? For DutchMoroccan youth, Islam is an important element in their lives, but other factors, such as ethnicity, are equally important. Before going into detail about Muslim youth culture in the Netherlands, this article will give a short outline of what youth culture is and the importance of (popular) music in it, and will then turn to the specific case of the Netherlands and, in particular, to Dutch-Moroccan youth. Youth culture is nothing new. From the early twentieth century until more recent times, youth culture in Western-Europe and the Western world has received much media and academic attention from sociological, anthropological and psychological perspectives. However, youth cultures evolving among European youth with non-European ethnic backgrounds, and especially among European Muslim youth, have not yet been covered by the same level of study as the ‘traditional’ youth cultures, such as the punks, the mods or the ravers. European Muslim youth are the children and grandchildren of immigrants and guest workers who moved to Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and came from Turkey and Northern Africa to Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands to work. Even though most of them dreamed of returning to their home countries, the majority stayed and in due course, were joined by their wives and children. These
Dr. Miriam Gazzah has a PhD from the Radboud University in Nijmegen and is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Amsterdam School for Social science Research (ASSR), working on the research programme ‘Islamic Cultural Performances: New Youth Cultures in Europe’. 1
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families form the core of most of the Muslim communities in Western Europe. Their different ethnic background and their religion, Islam—or, in short, their ‘otherness’—has given rise to considerable mistrust and caution among the Europeans. At present, the second and third generation offspring of the first Muslim immigrants are aged between 18 and 30 and these young people have been born, raised and educated in Europe. They are living in a post-migration situation; the myth of return is long gone. A great number of them (not all) have little or no ability to speak Turkish, Arabic or Berber, but are fluent in Dutch, French, German or English. Above all, they have as much mastery as any other young people of the language of youth culture. Popular culture, including pop music and the mass media, often serve as important reservoirs of images, expressions, loyalties and discourses, from which young people draw inspiration in the way they present, represent, articulate and express processes of identification. Popular culture and youth culture are intrinsically linked. Islam is often seen as having a tense relationship with many aspects of popular culture such as the arts, music, popular entertainment, or, as some say in one word: ‘fun’, but in the past decade, we have witnessed the emergence of forms of artistic and popular entertainment and consumer culture that find their inspiration in Islam. In particular, after the events of 11 September 2001, Muslim youth in Europe as well as in the US have become more involved in creating their own niches and markets, in music, fashion, food, leisure time activities (nightlife and dating events), humour, literature and a range of commodity goods. In Europe, styles and fashion are often inspired by American aesthetic standards or are simply a copy of them.2 Some examples: In the autumn of 2007, the Dutch daily newspaper Spits published a story on the first ‘Muslim singles-night event’ in the Netherlands.3 This first-ever dating event organised specifically for Muslims in search of a life-partner was, according to the reporter, a big success. Another Dutch daily newspaper De Volkskrant reported on “a Muslim comedy tour”, referring to the debut performance of three 2 Boubekeur, A., “Cool and competitive: Muslim culture in the West”, ISIM Review, vol. 16 (2005), pp. 12–13 (12). Muslim youth in the Muslim world are also in the process of creating new cultural practices. See for example Marc LeVine’s Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008). The focus of this article, however, is on Muslim youth in Europe and especially on Dutch-Moroccan youth. 3 Karimi, A., “Eerste singlesnight moslims”, Spits, 22 October 2007.
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American-Muslim comedians in the Netherlands.4 The same newspaper that same day also contained a short item on “the production of an Islamic car”, about a Malaysian car-factory that wanted to produce an Islamic car, including a compass to find the direction of Mecca and special storage compartments for the Qur’an and headscarves. The Islamic mobile phone was introduced in the Netherlands as early as 2005. Invented and produced in the Middle East, it has several applications for Muslims: it reminds you of the call to prayer five times a day, it automatically points you in the direction of Mecca (qibla), it contains an English translation of the text of the Qur’an, and during Ramadan it presents a special calendar which reminds you of the times for breaking the fast. A Dutch company called Little Muslim recently introduced ‘Fulla’, a play doll for girls, which, according to the website (www.fullashop.nl), is the answer to Barbie. Fulla likes to shop, play and cook and also to pray. Beneath her clothes, Fulla always wears a bathing suit, so that she will never be completely naked. Fulla stimulates young Muslim girls to learn ‘Muslim’ values and norms, such as modesty, modest dress and respect for the elderly, but also motivates them to become teachers, doctors, lawyers or dentists. On the level of popular culture, Islamised consumer commodities are slowly but steadily becoming more common on the Dutch market. Besides commodity goods, in recent years ‘Islamic’ music, or Islamically inspired music, is also gradually surfacing. Islamic music is not completely new: Islamic hip-hop has already occupied a place in the American and British hip-hop scene and industry, but it appears to be still in its infancy in the Netherlands and has not yet reached the level of popularity it has attained in the UK and the United States. Islamic American hip-hop artists Native Deen and Soul Salah Crew, the British-Asian band Fun-da-mental, the British rap-band Mecca II Medina and the French rap-crew Médine have become known as Islamic hip-hop acts.5 Other examples of Islamic popular music acts 4 Henfling, M., “ ‘Moslims hoeven niet te beledigen’. Drie Amerikaanse stand-up comedians doen met ‘Allah made me funny’—tournee Nederland aan”, De Volkskrant, 12 November 2007. 5 Popp, M., Hip-hop, Islam and Islamic rap: hip-hop as a tool in identity politics for Muslims, unpublished paper (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University, 2004); Swedenburg, T., “Arab ‘world music’ in the US”, Middle East Report, vol. 31, no. 2 (2001), pp. 34–37; Solomon, T., “ ‘Living underground is tough’: authenticity and locality in the hip-hop community in Istanbul, Turkey”, Popular Music, vol. 24, no. 1 (2005), pp. 1–20; Solomon, T.,
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are the contemporary Islamic pop singers Sami Yusuf, with roots in Azerbeidjan, born and raised in London, and Cat Stevens, who converted to Islam in 1978 and changed his name to Yusuf Islam. They have both been active for several years in creating anasheed music in pop style that is popular among Muslim youth in both Europe and the Arab world. Traditionally, anasheed music is performed with a limited number of instruments or a cappella, because of the assumed prohibition of certain musical instruments in Islam. Anasheed is usually performed with a choir made up of either male or female performers. Pop idols such as Sami Yusuf and Yusuf Islam, however, perform with a band that uses (Western) instruments and they are the only performers around whom a fan-culture has emerged. In the UK, the all-girl band Pearls of Islam make music (rap, anasheed, poetry and spoken word) with percussion instruments and vocals. Their lyrics often praise Islam and the Prophet Muhammad.6 Of all Islamised popular culture, music is one of the most controversial. The tense relationship between Islam and music dates back to the early years of Islamic history. Ever since, Islamic scholars and laymen have been discussing the compatibility of Islam and music (i.e., the production or consumption of music). The combination of music and Islam is not accepted and appreciated by all Muslims, but in youth culture music is often a driving force. There are several reasons for this, the most important being that music and its related social activities are probably the primary form of leisure for most young people worldwide. In addition, since music is a relatively democratic cultural phenomenon, it is easily accessible to youth and it is far-reaching,
“Hardcore Muslims: Islamic themes in Turkish rap in diaspora and in the homeland”, in S. Pettan and J.P.J. Stock (eds), Yearbook for Traditional Music, 38 (International Council for Traditional Music/Unesco, 2006), pp. 59–78; Abdul Khabeer, S., “Rep that Islam: The rhyme and reason of American Islamic hip hop”, The Muslim World, vol. 97, no. 1 (2007), pp. 125–141. 6 Islamic music is also popular in Indonesia. A vibrant popular music culture of bands inspired by the success of Western boybands in the style of Backstreet Boys and Take That has emerged there. Barendregt reports on the superstar status of anasheed bands such as S’Nada, Raihan, and Rabbani in Indonesia and Malaysia (Barendregt, B., “The art of no-seduction: Muslim boy-band music in Southeast Asia and the fear of the female voice”, IIAS Newsletter, vol. 40 (Spring 2006), p. 10). A kind of (female) fan-culture familiar in the West, idolising boy bands like Take That, has also arisen around the Southeast-Asian Muslim boy bands, leading to heated public debates. Many have considered the bands too commercial and found that they focused their performance too much on the visuals (the good looks of the singers), rather than on the music and the vocals.
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being widely available and accessible through radio, television and the Internet.7 Moreover, music, as a cultural practice, is very open to influences from outside. It is easily mixed with new and/or other cultural practices and is consequently able to innovate and thus to articulate new identities, and this is at the heart of most youth cultures.8 Since the 1970s, the study of pop music has often been incorporated into research on youth, youth culture and identity from a wide range of scholarly perspectives. A noteworthy idea that stands out in many of these studies is how strongly pop music and identity are interconnected. Many ideas and theories within the study of youth culture, music and identity derive from the famous work Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1976) edited by the sociologists Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham, which indicated that there is a connection between certain music styles and youth (sub-) cultures. Their pioneering study explained how British youth subcultures constructed and expressed their identity by means of clothing, lifestyle and music. The post-war period brought about a destruction of the traditional social structures of British society: changes in youth leisure patterns and the processes of modernisation and industrialisation resulted in unequal socioeconomic development, leading to a wide discrepancy between the social classes and between generations (youth and their parents). Researchers at the CCCS regarded youth subcultures as ‘magic solutions’ for the economic and social contradictions experienced by British middle- and lower-working-class youth. Hall and Jefferson’s ‘resistance through rituals’ may not, however, be the most appropriate term for the new youth culture(s) emerging among European Muslim youth. In their case, it may be better to speak of ‘resistance through consumption’, or ‘distinction through consumption’.
7 Bennett, A., Popular Music and Youth Culture: Music, Identity and Place (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 1; Huq, R., (2006) Beyond Subculture: Pop, Youth and Identity in a Postcolonial World (London: Routledge), pp. 4, 42; Carrington, B. and Wilson, B., “Dance nations: rethinking youth subcultural theory”, in A. Bennett and K. Kahn-Harris (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 65–78 (65). 8 Baily, J. and Collyer, M., (2006) “Introduction: Music and migration”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (2006), pp. 167–182 (174).
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The Study of Music and Youth Culture in Europe
During the 1970s and 1980s, the studies and ideas produced by the CCCS on youth cultures dominated the field. Style, including fashion, behaviour, language and music, and the mixing and matching of all of these elements, were seen as a form of resistance to the hegemonic ideology of British society. This ideology consisted of the promotion of the nuclear family, as opposed to the extended family that was part of the lower- and middle-working-class ideology, and the imposition of media and school systems ruled by the bourgeoisie. By having recourse to alternative styles (in dress, language, behaviour and musical preferences), British youth tacitly and subtly expressed dissatisfaction with and resistance to the dominant middle-class ideology. The establishment of a youth culture was regarded as a claim to a symbolic space in which young people could freely express their powerlessness and discontent with the status quo, without the interference of parents or the authorities. However, as a result of exaggerating their concentration on these ideologies that lay hidden behind style, the CCCS did not investigate the reasons why certain groups used certain kinds of style, fashion, language or music to express this resistance.9 In due course, the CCCS’s concept of youth subculture was used as an all-encompassing term for whatever social aspects in the lives of youths were related in one way or another to some kind of music, style or fashion.10 Critics accused the CCCS of assuming that behind each youth subculture there were latent ideologies of resistance towards the hegemony of British bourgeoisie.11 In addition, the CCCS’s supposition that youth subcultures comprise a fixed group of people was criticised because it overlooked the possibility of fluidity and turnover of membership.12 Finally, the CCCS was criticised for attributing too much value to the role of class, and neglecting the role of gender and ethnicity, in the formation of youth subcultures. After a spate of publications in the 1980s and 1990s on youth and subcultures and the role of style and bricolage, still following for a 9 Bennett, A. and Kahn-Harris, K. (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 4–6. 10 Ibid., p. 1. 11 Huq, R., Beyond Subculture, p. 14. 12 Martin, P., “Culture, subculture and social organization”, in A. Bennett and K. Kahn-Harris (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 21–35 (30–31).
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large part the CCCS’s track,13 a new wave of studies dealing with the meaning and social significance of pop music entered the debate. The ongoing critique of the CCCS eventually resulted in the emergence of new perspectives on youth (sub-)cultures, the use of the term subculture gradually being replaced by new terms and concepts. Instigated, among other things, by flows of migrants into Europe and by the increasing popularity of African-American and Caribbean music genres such as reggae and hip-hop in Europe and the US during the 1990s, there surfaced new interests in the role of ethnicity, race and music in youth culture.14 In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s, there occurred a shift in the methodology of youth culture studies. The focus shifted from an ‘outsider’s’ perspective that analysed youth cultures from the outside, presupposing a resistance to political and socio-economic circumstances, with little attention given to the discourse by youth themselves about the reasons why they did the things they did, to an ‘insider’s perspective’ that focused more on the discourses of youth culture participants and their motivations, with an eye to external influences and changing circumstances. This renewed insight resulted in interesting studies in France, the UK and Germany on the role of ethnicity and the impact of post-migration situations on the emergence of youth culture among North African, Asian and Turkish youth. In France, since the 1990s, studies on the second-generation North Africans (in France often called beurs) have appeared regularly. For example, Gabriele Marranci’s articles15 show how raï music and its corresponding youth culture are significant in the identity construction processes of second-generation North African immigrants. Raï music is an Algerian genre that is known for its rebellious, taboo-breaking lyrics
Hebdige, D., Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979); Thornton, S., Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995); McRobbie, A., In the Culture Society: Art, Fashion and Popular Music (London: Routledge, 1999). 14 Carrington, B. and Wilson, B., “Dance nations”, p. 71; Huq, R., Beyond Subculture, pp. 12, 24, 33–38. 15 Marranci, G., “Le raï aujourd’hui: Entre métissage musical et world music moderne”, Cahiers de Musiques Traditionelles, vol. 13 (2000), pp. 139–149; “A complex identity and its musical representation: Beurs and raï music in Paris”, Journal of Musical Anthropology of the Mediterranean, vol. 5 (2000), available at http://www.umbc.edu/MA/ index/number5/marranci/marr_0.htm (accessed 10 May 2009); “Pop-raï: from a ‘local’ tradition to globalization”, in G. Plastino (ed.), Mediterranean Mosaic: Popular Music and Global Sounds (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 101–121. 13
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in Algerian dialect and its fusion of Arab and Western music. Its most famous exponent is (Cheb) Khaled (born in 1960 in Oran). According to Marranci, raï music offers beurs the opportunity to construct and express identities that are distinctly different from the identities of their parents and other ethnic minority youth in France. Other scholars contributing to this field are Bouziane Daoudi and Hadj Miliani. They wrote one of the first studies on Algerian raï music16 and they have recently written on North African influences in French culture.17 Anthropologist Ted Swedenburg has also published on raï music and Arab music in general with varying focuses, ranging from an analysis of raï music in France to an examination of the link between hip-hop and Islam in Europe.18 His work often deals with ethnic minority youth in post-migration situations and music in European contexts. France and its North African youth have frequently been studied in relation to raï music and more recently in relation to hip-hop. A great many of these studies describe how, through the use and production of these types of music, youth try to escape their marginal position by striving for more acceptance in wider French society, but all the while maintaining and giving expression to their ‘otherness’. This becomes particularly clear in Marranci’s analysis of the case of singer Faudel, born to Algerian parents in 1979 in France (Mantes-la-Jolie, near Paris). He is a successful singer of modern raï music, including North African rhythms and melodies, but who increasingly sings his lyrics in French and also adds French translations of his Arabic lyrics in his CD-booklets, in order to reach a wider audience and get more airplay on French radio and television.19 Faudel’s 2006 album Mundial Corrida is predominantly sung in French. In Germany, Turkish youth are widely researched, the focus often being the vibrant German-Turkish hip-hop scene.20 Andy Bennett,
Daoudi, B. and Miliani, H., L’aventure du raï: Musique et société (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996). 17 Daoudi, B. and Miliani, H., Beurs’ melodies: Cent ans de chansons immigrés du blues berbère au rap beur (Paris: Editions Séguier, 2002). 18 Swedenburg, T., “Arab ‘world music’ ”; “Islamic hip-hop versus Islamophobia: Aki Nawaz, Natacha Atlas, Akhenaton”, in T. Mitchell (ed.), Global Noise: Rap and Hip-hop outside the USA (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), pp. 57–85; “Raï’s travels”, Middle East Association Bulletin, vol. 36, no. 2 (2003), pp. 190–193. 19 Marranci, G., “A complex identity”, p. 11. 20 Kaya, A., “Aesthetics of diaspora: Contemporary minstrels in Turkish Berlin”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, no. 1 (2002), pp. 43–62; Soysal, L., “Diversity of experience, experience of diversity: Turkish migrant youth culture in Berlin”, 16
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has done work on hip-hop in Frankfurt-am-Main21 and included the views and roles of ethnic youth within the German hip-hop scene in his study. Bennett’s work demonstrates how American hip-hop is not simply imitated, but is applied to a local context, Frankfurt in this case. Hip-hop made by German-Turks in Frankfurt, mostly deals with racism and citizenship. Bennett describes how hip-hop for German-Turkish youth is a very local expression; through rapping about local experiences and sensibilities and performing in ‘the right way’, the rapper offers a credible expression of a social connection to this local environment. In addition, hip-hop has become a means by which German-Turkish youth can act out their ‘coolness’, i.e. it becomes a way to express a certain authentic identity and to set oneself apart from others who are ‘not cool’.22 Authenticity and ‘coolness’ are important elements in all youth cultures throughout the world. 3
Dutch-Moroccan Youth Culture: Religion, Ethnicity and Politics
Being true to oneself is important for many young people. Credibility is often a synonym for authenticity; this means to be true to oneself and to make a credible presentation of this authentic identity. For young people who find themselves in a post-migration situation, it is often not all that easy to know who you are. Terms such as ‘living in two cultures’, ‘living in-between cultures’, ‘hybrid identities’, ‘multiple identities’ and so on, have been used to describe their often complex situation. For Dutch-Moroccan youth, music is an important tool for self-expression—to express their multitude of identities and to articulate which are the worlds to which they feel connected. Islam is an important aspect in the lives of Dutch-Moroccan youth. They often use it as a frame of reference around which they build up Cultural Dynamics, vol. 13, no. 1 (2001), pp. 5–28; El-Tayeb, F., “Kanak Attak! Hip-hop und (anti-)identitätsmodelle der ‘Zweiten Generation’ ”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Jenseits des Paradigmas kultureller Differenz: Neue Perspektiven auf Einwanderer aus der Türkei (Bielefeld: Transscript Verlag, 2004), pp. 95–110; Ça
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their identities.23 But Islam is not their only point of reference. This becomes particularly clear in the music genres that are prominent in Dutch-Moroccan youth culture. Ethnic background, socio-cultural imagery and the Dutch political situation, as well as Islam, affect the nature and content of the Dutch-Moroccan musical youth culture. A trend towards the privatisation of Islam among young Dutch Muslims has been detected, meaning that although participation in religious rituals and mosques is decreasing among second-generation Turks and Moroccans, their identification with Islam remains.24 Ethnic background also remains an important frame of reference in the identity construction processes of Dutch-Moroccan youth. Many attribute great value to the preservation of what they perceive as Moroccan cultural traditions. This is reflected, for example, in the way they organise and celebrate weddings and religious holidays. The desire to conserve what they perceive to be Moroccan traditions, including Moroccan food, dress, music and art, has triggered the establishment of a Dutch-Moroccan retail network in many Dutch cities. This network includes shops owned by Dutch-Moroccans selling fruit, vegetables and halal meat, and also businesses that sell Moroccan art, hand-crafts and furniture, and Moroccan traditional and fashionable clothing. There are also several music shops in the larger Dutch cities, such as Utrecht, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, selling Moroccan and Arab music. The way Dutch-Moroccans present themselves to the outside world is also influenced by the way they are perceived by others. The way migrants in the Netherlands have been labelled has changed considerably in the past 30 years. Whereas during the 1980s, the country of origin was considered the most important marker, and immigrants were simply labelled as guest workers from Morocco or Turkey, or as ethnic minorities on a more abstract level, nowadays religion has become one of the most important identity markers. The immigrants themselves have also activated an increased self-identification based on religion: while the first generation of immigrants often did not emphasise their religious identity, second-generation Moroccans and Turks have
23 de Koning, M., Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ Islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008). 24 Phalet, K. and Ter Wal, J. (eds), Moslim in Nederland (2004): Een onderzoek naar de religieuze betrokkenheid van Turken en Marokkanen (samenvatting onderzoeksrapport 2004/9) (Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004), p. 39.
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gradually started to present themselves more as Muslims, rather than as Turks or Moroccans. In fact, the rising visibility of Muslims in the Netherlands is the result of two trends taking place simultaneously. On the one hand, large numbers of second-generation immigrants prioritise their Muslim identity over their cultural or ethnic background, while on the other, government policies and public debates in the media on the position of Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands have also triggered this inclination to present oneself as Muslim. Overall, Dutch-Moroccan youth consider themselves Muslims, although variation exists in the way they practise Islam in daily life. In Dutch-Moroccan youth culture, Islam is used to give music, fashion, food, style or cultural imagery in general an Islamic touch. 4
History of the Dutch-Moroccan Community
Dutch-Moroccans have been part of Dutch society for over 30 years. The first generation of Moroccans arrived in the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers with the intention of staying in the Netherlands only temporarily. However, in the 1980s it became clear that their return to Morocco would not take place. At the present time, the Moroccan community consists of approximately 335,000 people, which is around 2% of the total Dutch population. The Moroccan community is the third largest minority community in the Netherlands, after the Turkish and the Surinam population. Of this 335,000, approximately 168,000 people are second generation Moroccan immigrants,25 born and raised in the Netherlands and often having only Dutch nationality. Nevertheless, public opinion continues to consider them as ‘foreigners’,26 a term nowadays frequently associated with being Muslim, and they are often considered a problem group. Dutch society went through some major changes in past decades as a result of national and international political developments. Before 9/11, the Dutch political and media debate mainly focused on the disadvantaged position of the Dutch-Moroccan community. The worries expressed concentrated on the supposed oppression of women, the
Figures taken from Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), www.cbs.nl, accessed 24 January 2009. 26 The Dutch term used in this context is ‘allochtonen’, related to the word ‘allochthonous’ meaning of foreign origin. 25
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rising crime rates among boys, and high drop-out rates. All in all, it was feared that the integration of the Moroccan community into Dutch society had failed totally. However, after 9/11 the focus of the debate shifted to Islam and the Muslim community in the Netherlands, and especially to the fear of Islamic radicalism among Dutch-Moroccan youth. Over time, and especially since 9/11, a trend has developed in the media to label all Muslims, whether of Moroccan, Turkish, Iranian, Dutch or whatever other descent, as simply ‘Muslims’. In addition, several events, of which the murder of Dutch TV director Theo van Gogh by a young second-generation Dutch-Moroccan was the most important, have transformed the debate on the position of Muslims in the Netherlands into a debate on the position of the Dutch-Moroccan community. Young Dutch-Moroccans have received much bad press in Dutch politics and the media. Many face racism and stereotyping, not only because of their often difficult economic, social and cultural position, but also because of the rising fear of global Islamic terrorism. However, these obstacles have not prevented them from expressing themselves creatively and musically. Often excluded from public debate, groups of Dutch-Moroccan youth have created their own cultural and musical spaces, in which a subgroup of young Dutch-Moroccans actively participates. These musical spaces and places reveal a vibrant Moroccan musical culture in which Dutch-Moroccan youth are active both as producers and as consumers. 5 Dutch-Moroccan Musical Youth Culture Today’s Dutch-Moroccan musical youth culture is built on the foundations of a musical network that goes back to the late 1980s, when some small organisations started to arrange music festivals and other activities dedicated to Moroccan (and Berber) music.27 In the early 1990s, raï music was becoming increasingly popular internationally, due to the success of the Algerian raï singer Khaled, and it gradually spread from the Maghrib to Europe. In the Netherlands, raï music found a fan base first and foremost among the Dutch-Moroccan community. This resulted in the creation of several raï music bands and acts, some of which eventually became very successful in the Netherlands, such 27 Bousetta, H., “Kunst, cultuur en literatuur in de Marokkaanse gemeenschap in Nederland”, Migrantenstudies, vol. 12, no. 4 (1996), pp. 182–194 (186).
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as Raïland, Noujoum Raï and Cheb Ashraf. It was at this time that so-called ‘raï parties’, often day-time parties, became very popular and were organised all over the Netherlands. However, from the late 1990s, the international hype around raï music settled down and gradually disappeared, while other musical genres came to the fore. Inspired by the success of the raï-parties, some organisations began to stage one or two events a year targeted at Dutch-Moroccan youth. Gradually, these became several events per year and resulted in the creation of different kinds of events, ranging from mega-concerts to small lounge events, from concerts to festivals, from student parties to women-only parties. The Dutch-Moroccan musical scene does not only consist of concert and party organisers, but is also supported by a retail trade in Moroccan and Arab music. The four major Dutch cities, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague, have music shops that specialise in Arab and/ or Moroccan music. Undoubtedly, the Internet has also enlarged the possibilities for buying and downloading music from all over the world and gives people the opportunity to search for very particular music goods on a global scale. The continuity of Dutch-Moroccan musical youth culture is also supported by numerous websites enabling users to download, share and provide music and video clips. Peer-to-peer programmes such as Kazaa and LimeWire provide the opportunity to share and exchange music and Dutch-Moroccans make intensive use of these kinds of networks. Other sites such as www.marokko.nl have several forums where music and events are central topics. In addition, sites such as www.soundclick.com offer (amateur) artists the possibility to make their music accessible on-line and available for others to download (after registration). Internet-users now have the opportunity to create a ‘web space’ (MySpace), where users can build up a profile and add all kinds of personal information, including music. These web spaces are often ideal promotion opportunities for new artists. Finally, the YouTube website has become very popular worldwide and serves as both a resource for watching music videos and a platform for amateur artists to put their musical skills on view. The Internet is thus a major factor in the permanence of an on-line Dutch-Moroccan musical world, which also contributes to the expansion and development of the real, off-line Dutch-Moroccan scene. The Dutch-Moroccan musical scene consists of events targeted at a young Dutch-Moroccan audience. By providing the opportunity to listen and dance to Arab and Moroccan music, these events have become
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excellent meeting places for Dutch-Moroccan youth and offer them the opportunity to express and construct a Dutch-Moroccan identity through dance, dress and socialising with other Dutch-Moroccans. At these events, one can often literally taste the Moroccan atmosphere: Moroccan tea and food is served, and sometimes there are stalls that sell books on Morocco or music, handcrafts and jewellery. By visiting these events, Dutch-Moroccan youth can clearly distinguish themselves from their Dutch peers, since the average Dutchman does not visit these events. Often, no alcohol is served during these events and in this sense, they comply with an Islamic norm. The scheduling is also different from regular Dutch events, as these Dutch-Moroccan events often start in the late afternoon. This gives more girls the opportunity to attend because a large number of Moroccan girls are not permitted or do not want to go out late at night. As the parties start and end ‘early’, Dutch-Moroccan girls can conform to the socio-cultural norms set by the Dutch-Moroccan community. Recently, women-only events have become increasingly popular. These women-only parties offer girls the chance to go out and have fun without the presence or interference of men; something that many Dutch-Moroccan girls love. They much appreciate being able to go out without either being bothered by the intrusive or intimidating looks of boys they do not know, or having to be chaperoned by their brothers, neighbours or cousins. This musical youth culture thrives on the desire to spend leisure time with peers and like-minded people, without the interference of parents. It pays regard to Dutch-Moroccan youth’s ethnic, socio-cultural and religious identities by focussing on music through which they celebrate their Moroccan roots, and complying with certain Islamic and Moroccan social norms, such as the absence of alcohol, early starting and ending times, and sometimes gender segregation. Two musical genres play a prominent role. Shaabi (popular Moroccan folk music) and hip-hop are both important in the creation of an ingroup or in-crowd feeling among Dutch-Moroccan youth. In the end, youth culture is all about setting boundaries between the ‘in-crowd’ and the outsiders. Each of these genres are used to draw boundaries in specific ways. Shaabi music is a symbol for Morocco and Moroccan tradition and culture and therefore serves as a tool to evoke a sense of nostalgia, solidarity and unity among Dutch-Moroccans. During shaabi events the central focus is on defining an in-group feeling and being
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recognised as a young Dutch-Moroccan. Hip-hop music is also used to differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’, although the significance of the genre and the identities associated with it are much more open to individual interpretations. Whereas shaabi is predominantly a genre that is consumed rather than actively produced by Dutch-Moroccan youth, the Dutch hip-hop scene is one where many rappers, producers and DJ’s with a Moroccan background play a prominent role. 5.1
Shaabi: a feeling of Dutch-Moroccanness
Shaabi is a central genre in Moroccan family celebrations, such as weddings, but has also acquired a central place in more public events. The word shaabi is Arabic for ‘of the people’; when used to describe music, it refers to popular or folk music. In the specific context of Morocco, shaabi represents a category of music consisting of different genres from different regions including, for instance, reggada music from Oujda and Berkane and rewaffa music from the Rif. Moroccan musicologist Aydoun writes about a contemporary Moroccan urban genre (‘la chanson populaire citadine’) characterised by its festive character; fast, danceable rhythms and the use of Moroccan instruments, such as the oud, qamanji and derbouka, as well as Western instruments such as keyboards, guitars and drums, which results in a bombastic mosaic of sounds.28 This urbanstyle shaabi is influenced by several other Moroccan genres, and its emergence dates from the 1940s, when the gramophone and later the cassette encouraged new artists to tap into new commercial markets.29 Shaabi is sung in the Moroccan-Arabic dialect and sometimes in a Berber language. In the past century, the shaabi song has broken through regional boundaries and has become a nationally known genre and is considered part of a national Moroccan music culture.30 New means of distribution of music, such as cassette players and radio, instigated the dispersal of the genre throughout Morocco.31 Shaabi music is nowadays filled with new mixing techniques and electric instruments. Aydoun
28 Aydoun, A., Musique du Maroc (Casablanca: Editions EDDIF/Autres Temps, 2001), pp. 141–142. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 143. 31 Ibid.
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stresses that shaabi focuses on the festive experience of dancing, singing and being together with friends and family. The primary social context where shaabi plays a dominant role is ‘the private party’ during which the audience can participate in the performance.32 He also emphasises the randomness of the lyrics and the ability of its performers to improvise lyrics and keep the audience interested by constantly changing melodies, rhythms and lyrics during a performance.33 Aydoun concludes that a successful shaabi performance depends on the performer’s skill to captivate the audience and secure its participation.34 Many shaabi artists improvise lyrics during performances, singing about all kinds of topics. Today, some of the well-known Moroccan artists performing this urban style shaabi are, to name but a few, Khalid Bennani, Tahour, Daoudi, Najat Aatabou, Mustapha Bourgogne and many, many others. In the Netherlands, several bands and small orchestras, mostly made up of Dutch-Moroccan musicians, also perform shaabi. Ismaïlia is one of the oldest and best-known Dutch-Moroccan shaabi bands, while others are Al Kanar and Anghaam. Note, however, that most Dutch-Moroccan shaabi bands have a varied and mixed repertoire and specialise in more than one genre. They often play whatever is in demand. Performances by famous shaabi artists, such Najat Aatabou, Senhaji, Daoudi and Mustapha Bourgogne, can attract audiences of thousands. Shaabi’s danceable beats and its festive character are the elements that Dutch-Moroccan youth like about this music. Its popularity also relates to the fact that Dutch-Moroccan youth consider it to be part of Morocco’s cultural heritage. A great number of Dutch-Moroccan musical events are aimed at providing a space in which one can identify with (other) Dutch-Moroccans. The events are often full of symbols (flags, food, dress, music and stalls selling jewellery and books about Morocco) referring to Morocco’s traditional culture—‘traditional’ at least in the eyes of the participants. The prevalence of shaabi music has to do with the fact that this music represents a link with Morocco and is perceived above all as Moroccan music. In addition, these events enable visitors to incorporate elements from their parents’ culture, of which shaabi music is a prominent component, into their own youth
32 33 34
Ibid. Ibid., pp. 141–142. Ibid.
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culture, without parental interference or the intrusion of non-DutchMoroccans. These events represent a space where young people can freely be ‘Moroccan’ and can behave, dance, sing and interact in the way they perceive to be ‘Moroccan’. Infused with nostalgia for Morocco, shaabi and its attendant events play a significant role in the assertion and preservation of ‘Moroccanness’ among Moroccan-Dutch youth, some of whom have never even been to Morocco. Afterwards, when playing shaabi music in the privacy of one’s room, for example, one can relive the experience of the event, reinforcing the solidarity expressed there. A large number of Dutch-Moroccan youth value their Moroccan background and want to give explicit expression to this feeling during these events, but they do this in their own youthful way, without the interference of elders or other authority figures. These shaabi events are their own spaces, in tune with their specific musical preferences and their socio-cultural background. Moreover, these events have also become partly adjusted to their religious needs. A trend is growing towards the Islamisation of Moroccan musical events in the Netherlands. This trend involves both the consumers and producers of these events, who are adding Islamic elements to what are essentially non-religious activities. Party promoters and concert organisations try to tune in to the needs of Dutch-Moroccan youth. The role of Islamic norms and Dutch-Moroccan social norms, implicitly linked to Islamic norms, thus manifests itself in the way Dutch-Moroccan youth have created a musical youth culture. In regular Dutch nightlife, drinking alcohol and the mixing of men and women are the norm. As a consequence, Dutch nightlife is not an option for those Dutch-Moroccan young women (and men) who want to spend their leisure time in a way that is Islamic, at least in their eyes. This explains the popularity of Dutch-Moroccan events that are attuned to their needs. The growing popularity of the women-only parties indicates that Dutch-Moroccan youth have a need to spend leisure time together in an environment of fun, music and entertainment. They prefer to do this in their ‘own’ specific leisure time spaces and with activities tuned into their specific religious and socio-cultural tastes. As a result, a large part of the Dutch-Moroccan scene remains peripheral in relation to ‘regular’ Dutch nightlife, and is an unfamiliar and ‘underground’ phenomenon for most Dutch people.
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Hip-hop: records of resistance
Dutch-Moroccan youth have recently become more active and visible in the Dutch hip-hop scene. Hip-hop music is an eclectic type of music, known for its mixture of sounds and beats, and also for its bricolage of text fragments. Thus, a distinctive feature of hip-hop music is the extensive use of sampling. Hip-hop music often incorporates bits and pieces from different sources, such as songs, films, TV, commercials and street sounds. It originally came from the United States, specifically New York. In the 1970s, young African-Americans started rapping, that is talking in a rhythmic and melodic way, over drumbeats and hip-hop fans and experts generally refer to Kool Herc and Africa Bambaata as its founders. Hip-hop culture is often considered to have three focal points: music, graffiti art and break-dancing, but in everyday speech, the term ‘hip-hop’ often refers to hip-hop music, which is often rap music. Music critics and hip-hop fans often make a rough distinction between two kinds of hip-hop music, based on lyrical themes. On the one hand there is the materialistic type of hip-hop. To this category belong songs about fast cars, money and jewellery. In this kind of hip-hop—also called ‘brag & boast rap’—materialism, being rich, or in hip-hop terms ‘living large’, and also being attractive to women, are glorified. The message is that getting rich is an ideal way of life. But there is another kind of hip-hop—often labelled ‘message rap’—that is characterised by political awareness, social engagement and expression of social criticism. Minority groups worldwide have found in message rap a way to articulate their frustration about their (often difficult) position in society. The volume edited by Tony Mitchell, Global Noise: Rap and Hip-Hop outside the USA (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001) shows in detail how hip-hop has been appropriated by minority groups worldwide. In general, scholars and music critics agree that what attracts minority groups to this kind of music is its ability to express dissatisfaction and social engagement. Dutch-Moroccan youth did not randomly choose to make hip-hop. A number of underlying conditions facilitated this choice. First, hip-hop is an accessible and widely accepted genre because it has international recognition. It has become one of the most commercially successful genres in the last decade.35 A second reason is that making hip-hop 35 Watkins, S.C., Hip Hop Matters: Politics, Pop Culture, and the Struggle for the Soul of a Movement (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2005), p. 209.
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music does not have to be an expensive activity. It is in fact a very low-budget genre. All a rapper needs in order to make hip-hop is a voice, a feeling for rhythm, a computer with music software and a microphone. A third element that makes hip-hop accessible is the fact that Dutch music culture and the media have today wholeheartedly accepted rap in Dutch, which was not the case in the past. To be more precise, Dutch-Moroccan rappers usually rap in street slang, which is a mix of several languages such as Moroccan Arabic, Berber, English, Papiamento and Sranan.36 Dutch-Moroccan youths have recently become more visible on the Dutch music scene and in the media. The rapper Raymzter’s 2002 hitrecord Kutmarokkanen (Fucking Moroccans) put Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop on the musical map. Raymzter, a half Dutch-half Moroccan rapper, 25 years old at that time, wrote this song in reaction to a Dutch politician’s controversial remark, a slip of the tongue referring to Dutch-Moroccan youth as ‘those fucking Moroccans’. A microphone picked up his words and a controversy was born. In reaction to this, Raymzter rapped: They wanna denigrate us, when they talk about us. We didn’t do anything wrong, but still they wanna hate us. They wanna denigrate us when they talk about us. It’s time to change this, don’t you realise it?37
Eventually, this song became a big hit and cleared the way for other Dutch-Moroccan rappers and since then Dutch-Moroccan youth have been more active and particularly more visible, in the production of a growing hip-hop scene. Ali B. has since become the most famous DutchMoroccan rapper and the most famous rapper in the Netherlands. He released two successful albums in 2004 and 2006.38 The recurrent themes in the repertoire of Dutch-Moroccan rappers include local, national and international themes. The songs report on the personal biographies of the rappers and their experiences in
36 Papiamento and Sranan are languages spoken on the Dutch Antilles and in Surinam. See de Koning, M., “ ‘Dit is geen poep wat ik praat’: De Hirsi Ali Diss nader belicht”, ZemZem: Tijdschrift over het Midden-Oosten, Noord Afrika en Islam, vol. 1 (2005), pp. 36–41. 37 Original Dutch lyrics are: “Ze willen ons zwart maken als ze over ons praten. We hebben ze niks gedaan en alsnog willen ze ons haten. Ze willen ons zwart maken als ze over ons praten. Tijd dat dit verandert, heb je dat niet in de gaten” (from the song Kutmarokkanen [Fucking Moroccans] by Raymzter, from the album Rayalistisch, released 2003 by Top Notch/Virgin). 38 Ali B. is Ali Bouali, born in 1981 in Zaanstad, the Netherlands and currently Holland’s most famous rapper.
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a local neighbourhood and their battles with other rap crews in rival towns. By using a typical vocabulary, accent and speech, and addressing specific local topics, rappers are able to present the sensibilities and affinities they feel with regard to their Dutch social surroundings, concretely placing themselves in these local places, and simultaneously expressing a connectedness to both their local Dutch hometowns and the worldwide hip-hop community. A considerable number of the lyrics, but certainly not all, are attempts to undermine stereotypes by presenting alternative points of view, including personal biographies of experiences with stereotypes. Dutch-Moroccan rappers aim to subvert stereotypical ideas about Dutch-Moroccans with raps like Raymzter’s Fucking Moroccans. Stereotypes that Dutch-Moroccan youth often feel imposed upon them are the assumptions that they are criminals, radical Islamists, terrorists, un-integrated, anti-authoritarian and homophobic. The lyrics talk of escaping these imposed labels, or else create narratives that invalidate or reverse these stereotypes. At times, the lyrics are aggressive and violent, at other times they are humorous or sarcastic. Other songs reveal a political awareness and deal, for example, with international politics. The war in Iraq, 9/11 and especially the Israel-Palestine conflict, the situation in the Middle East, or US foreign policy (in Afghanistan or Iraq) are popular song subjects. Like the songs about national themes, these songs indicate considerable political awareness among these rappers. For example, Omar and El Moro’s track Palestijnse strijders (Palestinian fighters) is a song that talks about the Israel-Palestine conflict: Palestinian fighters, they’re fighting for their country / Abbas and Sharon when will they finally shake hands? / When will there be peace / Yo, I wanna know now
In this type of song, one can find signs of a (pan-)Islamic identity among the rappers, since they express a sense of affiliation with Muslims worldwide. Through these songs, Omar and El Moro and DHC have created a musical space connecting to Palestinian youth, going beyond their own local boundaries of hometowns and rival towns, and going beyond the borders of Dutch society by affiliating themselves to their Muslim brothers in the Middle East. This clearly reveals that their thought frameworks extend beyond their own local situation. The rappers identify strongly with their ‘Palestinian brothers’.
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Concerning the vernacular, various languages are juxtaposed. The refrain is sung in a mix of Arabic and Dutch, and consequently creates a link between the rappers, their Dutch background, Palestine and the rest of the Arab world. By singing in Arabic, the rappers express a link with ‘their Palestinian brothers’ as well with the whole Arabic-speaking world. Besides, by claiming that Palestine should be Arab and Islamic, they put forward a clear political statement, supporting the end of the Israeli occupation in Palestine and the domination of Islam. Rappers respond to the Dutch socio-political climate and international events and the contents of their lyrics are clear signs of this. Hip-hop music functions as a channel through which they can air their frustrations regarding the political debate on integration, the stereotypes about Dutch-Moroccans, international political events such as 9/11 and the war in Iraq, and so on. The music reflects their way of perceiving, interpreting and representing the world. Through hip-hop, rappers respond to processes of categorisation to which they feel subjected. The stereotypes Dutch-Moroccan youth feel are imposed upon them play a significant role in many of the lyrics of Dutch-Moroccan rappers. These imposed category labels have negative connotations (criminal, terrorist, radical) and their lyrics play on these labels and repudiate them, sometimes attacking them with an aggressive tone, at other times humourously mocking them. Dutch society’s categorisation of DutchMoroccans has a clear effect on the way rappers identify themselves, through their lyrics, with allochtonen—Muslims, Palestinians, Arabs and other Dutch-Moroccans. In their repertoire, Dutch-Moroccan hip-hoppers constantly change their perspective, affiliate themselves with different musical worlds and social groups, and escape imposed labels. 6
Conclusion
Popular culture, including pop music and the mass media, often serve as important reservoirs of images, expressions, loyalties and discourses, from which young people draw inspiration in the way they present, represent, articulate and express processes of identification. This article has shown how music is used as in instrument in the production of a youth culture and hence serves to symbolise the identification processes of second-generation Dutch-Moroccans in a post-migration context. It shows that music and youth culture are inherently linked to all kinds
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of social, cultural and political processes taking place within the society these young people inhabit. Through an investigation of the youth culture and musical preferences of post-migration youth, we gain insight into how they position themselves in society and how their music, their leisure time and musical activities are affected by socio-political events and their own social, religious and cultural backgrounds. The shaabi events are venues where Dutch-Moroccan youth feel free to express their Moroccan roots in their own youthful way without interference from outsiders and without feeling the imposition of all kinds of negative stereotypes. Being together, dancing and interacting with ‘like-minded’ people in surroundings embellished with their favourite music, their favourite artists and DJ’s, makes these events an important environment in Dutch-Moroccan youth culture. Even though these events are often not Islamic by design, it is not unusual for some Islamic norms and values to be incorporated, such as the absence of alcohol and the segregation of the sexes. Whereas shaabi music symbolises for Dutch-Moroccan youth a link with their common past and shared ancestry, hip-hop music is used as a tool to express opinions and frustrations about their current position in Dutch society. Rap lyrics by Dutch-Moroccan hip-hoppers are ongoing dialogues between rappers and their audiences (including fans and other ‘enemy’ rap crews), but also between rappers and the society at large. Hip-hop’s articulation of alternative points of view about the ‘true’ nature of Dutch-Moroccans, which reject public opinion about them, are a form of criticism of the way Dutch-Moroccans are represented by some Dutch politicians and media. Rappers create a musical space in which they can safely subvert current power structures. Making rap music offers them a possibility to become symbolically more powerful, gain prestige as artists, and escape their marginal status. In sum, the significance of Dutch-Moroccan hip-hop lies in the fact that it enables its producers and consumers to transgress the imposed, stereotypical boundaries of what it means to be Dutch-Moroccan. By becoming involved in hip-hop, Dutch-Moroccan youth can retaliate and counter-attack the stereotypical and imposed labels, either by forthright dissociation from these stereotypes, or by articulating and prioritising alternative identities that are significant and meaningful for them. At times, Islam plays a prominent role in Dutch-Moroccan youth culture, although its importance and significance vary from time to time. At times, Islamic discourse is used to determine whether one
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can listen to certain music or watch certain TV channels and at others Islam is presented as a tool by which to connect oneself to the world of Palestinians in the Middle East or to the world wide umma, the community of Muslims worldwide. Considering the growth of Islamised commodities, such as mobile phones, toys, food, fashion and music appearing on the Dutch and European markets and their increasing popularity, it seems that Islam is also becoming a style in itself. Being Muslim has become ‘cool’ and expressing yourself as a ‘cool Muslim’ can be achieved by including these Islamised commodities in your style. So, besides choosing to be a hip-hopper, a skater, or a goth, one can also choose to be ‘Muslim’.39 A number of Dutch politicians and Dutch media continue to stress the ‘problem of Islam and Dutch-Moroccans’ and frequently refer to Islamic terrorism, the prevention of Islamic radicalism among DutchMoroccan youth and fear of the Islamisation of Dutch society40 and many other issues related to Islam and Dutch-Moroccans. As this article has shown, how one is categorised by others affects the way one identifies and presents oneself to the outside world. If this constant labelling of Dutch-Moroccans as Moroccans and Muslims rather than as Dutch is taken into consideration, it may not be surprising that new Islamic youth cultures are surfacing.
39 Cf. Buitelaar, M., “De islamisering van identiteit onder jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst”, in M. Ter Borg, E. Borgman, M. Buitelaar, et al. (eds), Handboek religie in Nederland (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2008), pp. 239–252 (243–244). 40 Dutch politician Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) particularly expresses this fear of the Islamisation of Dutch culture and society.
MUSLIM VEILING CONTROVERSIES IN EUROPE Dominic McGoldrick1 1
Introduction
Muslim women in Europe who wear Islamic head and face coverings encounter social and practical problems on a day to day basis while they go about their ordinary lives. The headscarf/hijab is a complex communicative symbol but some see it as ‘the’ symbol of the Islamisation of Europe.2 It has become the subject of political controversy and legal challenges in jurisdictions across the continent. Veiling issues can be analysed from a variety of perspectives, but the focus here is predominantly a legal one, aimed at presenting an overview of how the Muslim veiling issue is developing across Europe.3 In particular, it examines the wearing of the Islamic headscarf/hijab and variants thereof.4 Developments on the veiling issue continue to take place across a number of European states,5 and it is not possible to cover the details of all of them here. Rather the aim is to comment on what appear to have been the most significant national and pan-European legal developments and proposals during 2006–2008.6 Section 2 briefly Dominic McGoldrick is Professor of Public International Law, University of Liverpool. His publications include Human Rights and Religion—The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe, Portland OR: Hart, 2006. He has been a Fulbright Distinguished Scholar and Human Rights Fellow at the Harvard Law School. 2 Another symbol of this has become the spread of new mosques, some on a massive scale. These have engendered significant political disputes in, for example, Germany (over 180 mosques planned) and Italy. See Boyes, R., “Mosques are ‘land grab, not a place of prayer’ ”, The Times (UK), 6 December 2008; Owen, R., “Muslims ‘not welcome’ at interfaith prayer centre in Genoa”, The Times (UK), 6 August 2008. 3 Using ‘veiling’ in a wide sense to include provisions concerning different forms of veiling, as well as clothing and religious symbols. 4 See McGoldrick, D., Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2006). 5 For developments see http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/ category/hijab. As of 7 January 2008 it had 550 entries relating to hijab. 6 Given the time frame, it has been necessary in some cases to rely on materials from the Internet and in the news media. For helpful sources see Seidle, L., “Comparative research and analysis country profiles, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and USA” and Fourot, A.-C. on “France”, www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-2–seidle-leslie.pdf 1
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considers Muslim veiling in general. Section 3 examines how veiling cases have been considered by national courts and international human rights bodies, concentrating on developments between 2006 and 2008. For comparative purposes there is some reference to non-Muslim cases that raise analogous issues. Section 4 notes the role of the margin of appreciation in explaining different legal and human rights outcomes. Section 5 locates the important themes in the debates on veiling, and locates them within broader contemporary political and philosophical debates.7 Section 6 contains some concluding comments. 2
Muslim Veiling
The wearing of the Islamic headscarf/hijab can be seen as part of an individual’s expression of cultural or religious identity.8 Some Muslim girls and women clearly regard wearing the hijab as part of their individual and group identity.9 In the leading case of ahin v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights noted that, “[t]hose in favour of the headscarf-hijab see wearing it as a duty and/or form of expression linked to religious identity . . .”.10 Philosophical justifications for freedom of religion in terms of self-development, self-determination, and individual autonomy may parallel those for freedom of expression. However, there is arguably a weaker philosophical argument for its contributing to the democratic process.11 The act (accessed 7 January 2009); VEIL Project, equality and difference in Europe—Muslim headscarves, http://131.130.1.78/veil/Home3/index.php?id=12,6,0,0,1,0 (accessed 7 January 2009); “Islamic dress controversy in Europe”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Islamic_dress_controversy_in_Europe (accessed 7 January 2009). 7 For the argument that the debates are procedural rather than ‘real’ see Adelman, H., “Rights and the hijab: Rationality and discourse in the public sphere”, Human Rights and Human Welfare, vol. 8 (2008), pp. 43–78. 8 See Mullally, S., Gender, Culture and Human Rights: Reclaiming Universalism (Oxford: Hart, 2006); Coomaraswamy, R., “Identity within: Cultural relativism, minority rights and the empowerment of women”, George Washington International Law Review vol. 34 (2002–3), pp. 483–512. 9 See Mernissi, F., The Veil and the Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1991); Henley, J., “Europe faces up to Islam and the veil”, The Guardian, 4 February 2004. 10 Leyla ahin v. Turkey, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 44 (2007), No. 5, pp. 99–146, para. 35. 11 “[ T ]here are significant problems with identifying a coherent and subjectively appropriate philosophical rationale for the right to religious freedom” (Lewis, T., “What not to wear: Religious rights, the European Court, and the margin of appreciation”, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 56 (2007), pp. 395–414 (405).
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of wearing or not wearing an Islamic headscarf can be a political and symbolic one.12 Where religious veiling is associated with conveying an element of political speech or as part of a political process, it might be expected to benefit from the high protection afforded to political speech and so restrictions on it would be difficult to justify.13 However, as we shall see, such religious expression via veiling has not been as highly protected and restrictions have been more readily accepted as justified in a variety of situations. The context for veiling controversies is normally rather different from those concerning expression, but the rationale can be similar. Veiling can be repressed or regulated because of the relationship between the particular ‘religious dress’ and certain values which are considered to be ‘extreme’: viz, religious fundamentalism. However, the relationship can be a very diffuse one in which there is no suggestion that the particular individual is advocating fundamentalism. Similarly in the French14 and Turkish15 contexts the veiling is ‘extreme’ only in the sense of being ‘other’ to the state values of secularism or neutrality. The French headscarf affair (l’affaire du foulard ) has been premised on the place of secularism in French history and society.16 The most recent expression of this was the Law of 2004 prohibiting the wearing of signs or dress by which school pupils overtly display a religious affiliation.17 In Turkey in 12 The veil was a symbol of colonial resistance in Algeria and Egypt and of Communist resistance in Afghanistan. 13 ‘There is little scope under Article 10(2) of the [European] Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest’, TV Vest AS & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, Appn No. 21132/05, para. 59 (11 Dec. 2008). See also The Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Application No 72881/01, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 44 (2007), No. 46, pp. 912–37 (on the importance to democracy of associations, including religious associations). 14 See Robert, J., “Religious liberty and French secularism”, Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2 (2003), pp. 637–660; Baubérot, J., “Secularism and French religious liberty: A sociological and historical view”, Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2 (2003), pp. 451–464 and Troper, M., “French secularism, or laïcité”, Cardozo Law Review, vol. 21 (2000), pp. 1267–1284. 15 See Denli, O., “Between laicist state ideology and modern public religion: The head-cover controversy in contemporary Turkey”, in T. Lindholm, W. Cole Durham and B.G. Tahzib-Lie (eds), Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 497–511. 16 See Bowen, J.R., Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Service (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Scott, J.W., The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 17 Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, Loi No 2004–228 du 15 mars 2004, (17 March 2004), Journal Officiel, vol. 17, pp. 51–90.
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2007, a million people marched in defence of a secularist, democratic philosophy they perceived as being challenged by a proposed Islamist President whose wife wears the headscarf.18 In a context where the state’s values are much weaker or non-existent, the same dress does not carry the same degree or connotation of ‘extremity’ but may still be repressed or regulated in particular contexts and spaces because of its perceived symbolism.19 Given the widespread practice in Europe of wearing the Islamic headscarf, it will be treated an as aspect of religious belief that is at, or close to, the core or essence of the right, but not part of the “inviolable core, of freedom of religion”. This does not preclude the possibility of this display of religious belief being limited, but it puts a heavier burden on the state to justify the limitation as being, in the language of Article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), “necessary in a democratic society”. Of the permissible grounds of limitation, the ones that are most commonly invoked are the “protection of public order” and the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. In this context ‘public order’ includes the prevention of public disorder but also extends to the wider concept of the ordering of public affairs in the state, which the French refer to as l’ordre public.20 3
Veiling Issues in European States 3.1
Turkey
Turkey is one of only three Muslim states in the Council of Europe. Its national courts have upheld headscarf bans as consistent with the Turkish Constitution. The emphasis has been on the principle of secularism and the equality of women. In applications against Turkey concerning the wearing of Islamic headscarves by university students, the European Commission on Human Rights found no violations of the ECHR. In Karaduman v. Turkey21 the Commission acknowledged that the manifestation of the observances and symbols of the religion 18 See Fletcher, M., and Erdem, S., “Is this just a headscarf—or really a threat to democracy?”, The Times (UK), 1 June 2007, pp. 41–42. 19 See Renteln, A.D., “Visual religious symbols and the law”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 47, no. 12 (2004), pp. 1573–1596. 20 The expression ‘l’ordre public’ was used 14 times in the Stasi Report in France which led to what became the Law of 2004, see section 3.2 below. 21 Decisions and Reports, vol. 74 (1993), p. 93, para. 108.
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of the great majority, without restriction as to place and manner, might constitute “improper pressure on students who do not practice that religion or those who adhere to another religion”. In contrast to most other European countries, the restrictions on the headscarf in Turkey affect the majority population. The European Court of Human Rights addressed the issue of a university student, as distinct from a school teacher, being prohibited from wearing a headscarf for the first time in 2004 (Chamber) and 2005 (Grand Chamber) in Leyla ahin v. Turkey.22 Neither the Chamber nor the Grand Chamber found a violation of any of the provisions of the ECHR. ahin is the leading jurisprudential exposition on approaching the headscarf issue from a human rights perspective. Subsequent cases before the Court and in national courts in Europe all follow the jurisprudential approach in ahin. The Grand Chamber held that the paramount consideration underlying the ban on the wearing of religious symbols in universities was the principle of secularism. It accepted Turkey’s two central contentions, namely that secularism (i) was consistent with the values of the ECHR and (ii) was necessary to protect the democratic system in Turkey, which was required to support the ECHR.23 The decisions under the European Convention concerning the headscarf in Turkish universities and in Swiss primary schools (see below) have essentially focused on freedom of religion. In ahin, the Grand Chamber also considered it in terms of the right to education, but found no violation. Restrictions on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf are also challenged on the basis that the restrictions are directly or indirectly discriminatory against Muslims or against religions which attach a particular importance to aspects of dress.24 In ahin, one of the complaints was put forward in terms of Article 14 (non-discrimination), taken individually or together with Article 9 of
Only one judge dissented. See Marshall, J., “Freedom of religious expression and gender equality: Sahin v. Turkey”, Modern Law Review, vol. 69 (2006), pp. 452–461. 23 See Belelieu, C.D., “The headscarf as a symbolic enemy of the European Court of Human Rights’ democratic jurisprudence: Viewing Islam through a European legal prism in light of the ahin judgment”, Columbia Journal of European Law, vol. 12, no. 2 (2006), pp. 573–624; Nathwani, N., “Islamic headscarves and human rights: a critical analysis of the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 25 (2007), pp. 221–254. 24 See Baines, C.D., “L’affaire des foulards-discrimination, or the price of a secular public education system?”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 29 (1996), pp. 303–327; Riley, A., “Headscarves, skull caps and crosses”, available at http://www.muslim-lawyers .net/news/index.php3?aktion=show&number=248 (accessed 7 January 2009). 22
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the Convention (freedom of religion) or the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol 1 (right to education). The Court found that the regulations on the Islamic headscarf were not directed against the applicant’s religious affiliation, but pursued, among other things, the legitimate aim of protecting order and the rights and freedoms of others and were manifestly intended to preserve the secular nature of educational institutions. Consequently, the reasons which led the court to conclude that there had been no violation of Article 9 or Article 2 of Protocol 1 “incontestably also apply to the complaint under Article 14, taken individually or together with the aforementioned provisions”.25 There has also been one inadmissibility decision in 2006 by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding a complaint against Turkey holding that the applicant had not exhausted her domestic remedies.26 The headscarf remains a controversial issue in Turkish politics. As noted, in 2007, a million people marched on the streets of Turkey in defence of secularism. The context of the marches was the nomination by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamic roots, of Abdullah Gül for the post of President. His wife wears the headscarf. The Turkish Army, which sees itself as having a central role in the defence of the secular republic and has overthrown four previous governments, issued an ominous public statement that could be read as threatening intervention if necessary.27 After a rebuff in the parliament, the ruling party called an early general election and was returned to power. Gül was re-nominated and elected President. In 2008, the Turkish Parliament approved (by 411 votes to 103) an amendment to the Turkish Constitution that would have seen a relaxation of the headscarf ban in universities. The government-sponsored measure would have amended two articles of the Constitution relating to access to education to ensure that no student was prevented from going to state-backed universities because of his or her style of dress.28
ahin, para. 165. Rahime Kayhan v. Turkey in 2006, Communication No 8/2005, UN. Doc. CEDAW/ C/34/D/8/2005, Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/docs/Case8_2005 .pdf (last accessed 18 May 2009). 27 The text, attributed to General Yasar Buyukanit, the head of the army, and posted on the military’s web site, stated: ‘Our nation has been watching the behaviour of those separatists who can’t embrace Turkey’s unitary nature and centres of evil that systematically try to corrode the secular nature of the Turkish Republic’. 28 See “Secularists’ lament”, The Economist, vol. 384, no. 8548 (29 September 2007), 25 26
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President Gül approved the changes. Opinion polls reportedly showed that a majority of Turks backed an easing of the ban.29 However, the opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party) applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the changes on the grounds that they violated the principle of secularism in Article 2 of the Constitution. On 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court, by nine votes to two, ruled the amendments unconstitutional because they conflicted with the principle of secularism in Article 2 of the Constitution.30 Even if the reforms had survived constitutional scrutiny, women professors as well as civil servants would still have been prohibited from wearing the headscarf. The fear of opponents was that this was the first step in an Islamisation of Turkey. Once again, tens of thousands of people staged protest rallies against the changes. Such developments at the national political level highlight a point that is often forgotten, namely that a judgment of the European Court finding no violation returns the matter to the domestic political and constitutional forum. 3.2
France
There are an estimated two million Muslim women in France. The French headscarf debates date back to at least 1989. The Report of the Commission de reflexion sur l’application du principe de la laïcité dans la République (Stasi Commission)31 recommended what became the Law of 2004. It prohibited the conspicuous display of religious clothing and signs.32 In December 2008, the French headscarf issue was considered for the first time by the European Court of Human Rights in Dogru v. France.33 On
pp. 53–54; De Bendern, P., “Secular Turks rally against Muslim headscarf reform”, International Herald Tribune, 2 February 2008. 29 See Boland, V., “Turkey moves to ease headscarf ban”, Financial Times, 7 February 2008; Turner, J., “Islam and the great cover-up”, The Times (UK) (2), 18 July 2008, pp. 4–6. 30 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Constitutional Court ruling upholds headscarf ban” (7 June 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/ turkey19050.htm (accessed 7 January 2009). There is no English translation of the judgment. 31 http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/034000725/0000.pdf (accessed 23 July 2008). 32 See Idriss, M.M., “Laïcité and the banning of the hijab in France”, Legal Studies, vol. 25 (2005), pp. 260–295; Scott, J.W., Politics of the Veil; McGoldrick, D., Human Rights and Religion, ch. 2. 33 Application No.27058/05, European Court of Human Rights, 04 December
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seven occasions in 1999, D, then aged 11, went to physical education and sports classes wearing her headscarf and refused to take it off despite repeated requests to do so by her teacher, who explained that wearing a headscarf was incompatible with physical education classes. The school’s pupil discipline committee decided to expel D from the school for breaching the duty of assiduity by failing to participate actively in physical education and sports classes. D submitted that her expulsion from school for wearing the headscarf had amounted to a violation of Article 9 of the ECHR. The Court unanimously rejected her claim. The Court reiterated its case-law that wearing the headscarf may be regarded as, “motivated or inspired by a religion or religious belief ”.34 It considered that the ban on wearing the headscarf during physical education and sports classes and the expulsion of D from the school on grounds of her refusal to remove it constituted a “restriction” on the exercise by D of her right to freedom of religion. After an extended discussion the Court held that the interference was “prescribed by law”.35 It reiterated that it was not for it to express a view on the appropriateness of methods chosen by the legislature of state to regulate a given field. Its task was confined to determining whether the methods adopted and the effects they entailed were in conformity with the Convention. The Court accepted that a certain difference of treatment could be perceived between pupils according to the school concerned insofar as the principles laid down by an opinion of the Conseil d’Etat of 27 November 1989 specifying the legal framework relating to the wearing of religious signs in schools invited school principals to make their assessment on a case-by-case basis. However, the scope of the notion of foreseeability depended to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in question, the field it was designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it was addressed. However clearly drafted a legal provision might be, its application involved an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. A margin of doubt in relation to borderline facts did not by itself make a legal provision unforeseeable in its application. Nor did the mere fact that a provision was capable of more than one construction mean that it failed to meet the requirement of “foreseeability” for the purposes of 2008, [2009] Education Law Reports 77–99. The judgment recounts the history of the headscarf debate. 34 Citing Sahin, para. 78. 35 Dogru, n. 32 above, paras 49–59.
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the Convention. The role of adjudication vested in the courts was precisely to dissipate such interpretational doubts as remained, taking into account the changes in everyday practice. In the light of the relevant case-law of the domestic courts, the European Court observed that, despite a case-by-case approach in the field, the administrative courts, exercising their powers of review of decisions by the disciplinary authorities, had faithfully applied the principles established in the opinion of the Conseil d’Etat. They had thus systematically upheld disciplinary penalties imposed on pupils who had breached the duty to attend classes regularly by refusing to remove their headscarf during physical education and sports classes or refusing to attend these classes. D’s case was an application of the relevant case-law. In these circumstances, the interference in question had a sufficient legal basis in domestic law. The relevant rules were accessible since they consisted mainly of provisions that had been duly published and confirmed case-law of the Conseil d’Etat. The Court also pointed out that, by signing the internal rules when she enrolled at the secondary school, D was made aware of the content of those rules and undertook to comply with them, with her parents’ agreement.36 The Court therefore considered that D could foresee, to a degree that was reasonable, that at the material time the refusal to remove her headscarf during physical education and sports classes was liable to result in her expulsion from the school for failure to attend classes regularly. Accordingly, the interference could be regarded as having been “prescribed by law”. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and the terms of the decisions of the domestic courts, the European Court accepted that the interference complained of mainly pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and protecting public order. As so often in the European Court’s jurisprudence, the critical issue was whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve the aims concerned. The Court unanimously held that it was. The reasoning followed closely the decision in the ahin case. Where questions concerning the relationship between state and religions were at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably Citing Köse and 93 Others v. Turkey (dec.), Appn No.26625/02, Admissibility Decision, European Court of Human Rights, 24 January 2006, available on HUDOC database http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/ HUDOC+database/. 36
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differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body had to be given special importance. This was notably the case when it came to regulating the wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions, in respect of which the approaches taken in Europe were diverse. Rules in this sphere consequently varied from one country to another according to national traditions and the requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others and to maintain public order. The Court reiterated that the state may limit the freedom to manifest display a religion, for example by wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashed with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety.37 Accordingly, compelling a motorcyclist, who was a practising Sikh wearing a turban, to wear a helmet was a safety measure and any resulting interference with the exercise of his freedom of religion was justified on grounds of the protection of health.38 Likewise, security checks enforced at airports39 or at the entrance to consulates40 and consisting in ordering the removal of a turban or a veil for submission to such checks did not constitute disproportionate interferences with the exercise of the right to religious freedom. Nor did the regulation of student dress or the refusal to provide administrative services, such as issuing a diploma, constitute a disproportionate interference when the individual concerned failed to comply with the rules that required a student wearing the Islamic headscarf to appear with her head uncovered on a passport photo, regard being had to the requirements of the secular university
37 Citing Sahin, para. 111, and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], Appn Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 35 (2002), p. 3, para. 92. 38 Citing X v. the United Kingdom, 7992/77, Decisions and Reports, vol. 14 (1978), pp. 234–7. See also now Mann Singh v. France, Appn No.2008, 27 November 2008 (identity photographs for use on driving licenses which showed the subject bareheaded were needed by the authorities in charge of public safety and law and order, particularly in the context of checks carried out under the road traffic regulations, to enable them to identify the driver and verify that he or she was authorized to drive the vehicle concerned. Checks of that kind were necessary to ensure public safety within the meaning of Article 9(2). The detailed arrangements for implementing such checks fell within the respondent state’s margin of appreciation, especially since the requirement for persons to remove their turbans for that purpose or for the initial issuance of the license was a sporadic one. It therefore held that the impugned interference had been justified in principle and proportionate to the aim pursued). 39 Citing Phull v. France, Appn No.35753/03, ECHR 2005–I, 11 January 2005. 40 Citing El Morsli v. France, Appn No.15585/06, 4 March 2008, ECHR 2008–00.
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system.41 In the case of Dahlab v. Switzerland 42 the Court had held that prohibiting a teacher from wearing her headscarf while teaching a class of young children was “necessary in a democratic society”, having regard, among other things, to the fact that secularism, which presupposes denominational neutrality in schools, was a principle laid down in the Constitution of the canton of Geneva. The Court stressed the “powerful external symbol” represented by wearing the headscarf and also considered the proselytising effect that it might have, seeing that it appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept which was hard to square with the principle of gender equality. In Dogru the Court recounted its approach in ahin and particularly its view that the principles of secularism and neutrality at school and respect for the principle of pluralism were clear and entirely legitimate grounds justifying refusing pupils wearing the headscarf admission to classes when they refused—despite the relevant rules—to remove the Islamic headscarf while on the school premises. It observed that the purpose of that restriction on manifesting a religious conviction was to adhere to the requirements of secularism in state schools, as interpreted by the Conseil d’Etat in its opinion of 27 November 1989 and its subsequent case-law, and by the various ministerial circulars issued on the subject. It reaffirmed that it was for the national authorities, in the exercise of their margin of appreciation, to take great care to ensure that, in keeping with the principle of respect for pluralism and the freedom of others, the manifestation by pupils of their religious beliefs on school premises did not take on the nature of an ostentatious act that would constitute a source of pressure and exclusion. In the Court’s view, that concern appeared to have been answered by the French secular model.43 The Court noted that in France, as in Turkey or Switzerland, secularism was a constitutional principle, and a founding principle of the Republic, to which the entire population adhered and the protection of which appeared to be of prime importance, in particular in schools. It reiterated that an attitude which failed to respect that principle would
41 Citing Karaduman v. Turkey, 16278/90, Decisions and Reports, vol. 74 (1993), pp. 93–110. 42 Appn No.42393/98, Admissibility Decision, 15 February 2001, available on HUDOC database http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/ HUDOC/HUDOC+database/. See text to nn. 140–142 below. 43 Cf. the view of the Human Rights Committee, text to n. 53 below.
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not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the freedom to display one’s religion and would not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the ECHR.44 Having regard to the margin of appreciation which had to be left to the member states with regard to the establishment of the delicate relations between the churches and the state, religious freedom thus recognised and restricted by the requirements of secularism appeared legitimate in the light of the values underpinning the Convention. The Court considered that the conclusion reached by the national authorities that the wearing of a veil, such as the Islamic headscarf, was incompatible with sports classes for reasons of health or safety was ‘not unreasonable’.45 That is a low standard and below the standard of necessity demanded by the Convention. The disciplinary proceedings against D fully satisfied the duty to undertake a balancing exercise of the various interests at stake. The teachers made requests and gave explanations for those requests. The authorities concerned made many unsuccessful attempts over a long period of time to enter into dialogue with D and a period of reflection was granted her and subsequently extended. Furthermore, the ban was limited to the physical education class, so could not be regarded as a ban in the strict sense of the term. Moreover, the events had led to a general atmosphere of tension within the school. Lastly, the disciplinary process also appears to have been accompanied by safeguards—the rule requiring conformity with statute and judicial review—that were apt to protect the pupils’ interests. As regards the choice of the most severe penalty, where the ways and means of ensuring respect for internal rules are concerned, it was not within the province of the Court to substitute its own vision for that of the disciplinary authorities which, being in direct and continuous contact with the educational community, were best placed to evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular training. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, and taking account of the margin of appreciation that should be left to the States in this domain, the Court concluded that the interference in question was justified as a matter of principle and proportionate to the aim pursued. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 9. D also alleged that she had been deprived of her right to education contrary to Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. The Court reiterated that the
44 45
Citing Refah Partisi, para. 93. Dogru, para. 73.
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right to education did not, in theory, exclude resorting to disciplinary measures, including temporarily or definitively suspending someone from an establishment in order to ensure compliance with the internal rules. The imposition of disciplinary penalties was an integral part of the process whereby a school sought to achieve the object for which it was established, including the development and moulding of the character and mental powers of its pupils.46 The Court considered that no separate question arose under this provision, the relevant circumstances being the same as for Article 9. Dogru clearly followed the approach in the ahin case. The 47 European states party to the Convention clearly have a substantial margin of discretion (i) to take steps to ensure that the manifestation by pupils of their religious beliefs on school premises does not take on the nature of an ostentatious act that would constitute a source of pressure and exclusion; (ii) to establish the delicate relations between the churches and the state and (iii) to evaluate local needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular training. The principles of secularism and neutrality can justify restrictions on religious dress.47 Disciplinary measures can be enforced in order to ensure compliance with the internal rules. The Law of 2004 was not directly in issue in the Dogru case but it seems clear that the result would be the same. The Court referred to the 2004 Law in its recounting of the relevant national legal provisions. That Law has been extensively critiqued because it was directed at school children and had the effect of obstructing dialogue.48 There is value in children experiencing diversity in schools and the meaning of neutrality in schools can be questioned.49 Moreover, tolerance develops through experience and interaction.50 Critics of French schools in 46 Citing Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 4 (1982), pp. 293–312, para. 33; Yanasik v. Turkey, Appn No.14524/89, Commission decision of 6 January 1993, Decisions and Reports, vol. 74 (1993), pp. 14–28; Sulak v. Turkey, Appn No.24515/94, Commission decision of 17 January 1996, Decisions and Reports, vol. 84–B (1996), pp. 98–110. 47 Evans, M. and Petkoff, P., “A separation of convenience? The concept of neutrality in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, Religion, State and Society, vol. 36, no. 3 (2008), pp. 205–223. 48 See Magnion, F., “Muslim headscarves and French secularism” (2003), http:// www.francismangion.btinternet.co.uk/headscarf.htm (accessed 7 January 2009). See also http://www.headscarf.net/index2.htm (accessed 7 January 2009). 49 Pew Forum, n. 171 below. 50 Levinson, M., “Liberalism versus democracy? Schooling private citizens in the public square”, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, no. 3 (1997), pp. 333–360 (341, 358). See also Bell, J., “Religious observance in secular schools: A French solution”,
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particular have argued that the absence of religious symbols in school means that an important opportunity is being missed that could provide a focus for discussing various religions and cultures.51 Some of these critiques of the French approach have been reflected in international human rights bodies. In 2004, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its Concluding Observations on France, expressed concern that the legislation might be counterproductive by neglecting the principle of the best interests of the child and the right of the child to access to education. It recommended that France continue closely to monitor the situation of girls being expelled from schools as a result of the new legislation and ensure that they enjoyed the right of access to education.52 In 2008, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966), expressed concern that, both elementary and high school students are barred by Act No. 2004/228 of 15 March 2004 from attending the public schools if they are wearing so-called ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols. The State party has made only limited provisions—through distance or computer-based learning—for students who feel that, as a matter of conscience and faith, they must wear a head covering such as a skullcap (or kippah), a headscarf (or hijab), or a turban. Thus, observant Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh students may be excluded from attending school in company with other French children. The Committee notes that respect for a public culture of laïcité would not seem to require forbidding wearing such common religious symbols (Articles 18 and 26). The State party should re-examine Act No. 2004/228 of 15 March 2004 in light of the guarantees of Article 18 of the Covenant concerning freedom of conscience and religion, including the right to manifest one’s religion in public as well as private, as well as the guarantee of equality under Article 26.53
The HRC’s observations are not legally binding. They are nonetheless interesting in that the HRC appears much less sympathetic than the European Court to France’s interpretation of secularism. An individual application could be brought against France under the first Optional
Education and the Law, vol. 2, no. 3 (1990), pp. 121–128, who argued that, in an educational context, the “State has to err on the side of diversity” (p. 127). 51 See Killian, C., “The other side of the veil: North African women in France respond to the headscarf affair”, Gender & Society, vol. 17, no. 4 (2003), pp. 567–590 (578–579). 52 UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add 240, paras 25–6 (30 June 2004). See also CRC/C/SR 967 and 968, para. 33 (2 June 2004). 53 UN Doc. CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4, para. 22 (France) (emphasis added).
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Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR (1966). In its jurisprudence, the HRC makes a point of not employing the concept of a margin of discretion that is so central to European jurisprudence. Indeed, the only finding to date of international human rights law being violated by a headscarf ban is that of the HRC in Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, which considered the compatibility of a headscarf ban in state universities in Uzbekistan with Article 18 (freedom of religion) of the ICCPR.54 Extensive veiling may be part of the evidence used to justify a denial of French citizenship. In June 2008, the Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, upheld a decision to deny citizenship to Faiza Silmi, aged 32, on the ground that her ‘radical’ practice of Islam was incompatible with French values such as equality of the sexes.55 Her request was denied because of her “insufficient assimilation” into France. There was no evidence that she wished to integrate into French society. Emmanuelle Prada-Bordenave, the government commissioner who delivered the ruling, said S had presented herself for interviews with immigration officials attired from head to toe in the clothing of women from the Arabian peninsula, with a veil covering her hair, forehead and chin and a piece of cloth over her face. Her eyes could only be seen through a small slit. She lives virtually as a recluse, disconnected from French society. She has no concept of laïcité . . . nor the right to vote. She lives in total subservience to the men in her family.56
The Silmi case is understood to be the incidence of a French court judging someone’s capacity to be assimilated into France on the basis of their private religious practice, taking laïcité from the public sphere into the home. Hitherto, citizenship had been denied on religious grounds in France only when applicants were believed to be close to fundamentalist groups. Restrictions on the headscarf are also apparent in the private sector in France. In September 2008, the French anti-discrimination agency 54 UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (18 January 2004). However, that decision was very much a default decision in the absence of proper justification by the state. It constitutes a very limited precedent. The views of the HRC under the first OP are not legally binding. 55 “Une Marocaine en burqa se voit refuser la nationalité française”, Le Monde, 11 July 2008; Bennhold, K., “A veil closes France’s door to citizenship”, New York Times, 19 July 2008. 56 Cited in Kay, M., “No French citizenship for veiled ‘radical’ Islamic wife”, The Independent (UK), 12 July 2008.
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(Halde) called the burqa a symbol of “female submission that goes beyond its religious meaning” and ruled that it was not “unreasonable, for public security requirements . . . or the protection of civil liberties” to bar it from the publicly funded language classrooms.57 In September 2008 there were reports of a bank and a driving school refusing to provide services to women wearing a headscarf.58 By contrast, in October 2008, the appeals court in the city of Nancy confirmed a decision against the owner of a bed and breakfast guesthouse who had refused accommodation to two veiled women. The court had ordered Yvette Truchelut, the proprietor, to pay over €7,000 in fines and costs concerning an incident in 2007. Several polls in 2003 suggested that a large majority of French Muslims (78%) favoured the principle of laïcité, on the basis that it was supportive of religious freedom.59 However, some French Muslims perceived the headscarf ban as one of many examples of religious discrimination.60 They considered that it was racist,61 motivated by anti-Islamic sentiment, and constituted part of the general ‘post 9/11’ Islamophobia. It was argued that the Law of 2004 was an attempt to curb Islam.62 Some members of the French Muslim community also considered that the headscarf issue was being used for political manipulation when the “real issues for us are high unemployment in the Muslim community, violence and harassment, discrimination in jobs, and housing”.63 French Muslims face extensive discrimination, poverty, alienation, and economic
See Barchfield, J., “France bans immigrants wearing burqas in state language classes”, USA Today, 9 October 2008. 58 “Paris: Bank, driving school reject women with headscarf ”, available at http:// islamineurope.blogspot.com/2008/09/paris-bank-driving-school-reject-women.html (accessed 7 January 2009). 59 Cited in Vaïsse, J., “Veiled meaning: The French law banning religious symbols in public schools” US-France Analysis Series (March 2004), no. 9, available at http://www .brookings.edu/fp/cusf/analysis/vaisse20040229.pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). See also Bowen, J.R., “Why did the French rally to a law against scarves in school”, Droit et Société, vol. 68 (2008), pp. 33–52. 60 As did the Sikhs when they were affected by it. 61 Using the term ‘racist’ in a more general political sense, rather than in a necessarily legal one. 62 Caldwell, C., “Veiled threat: Can French secularism survive Islam?”, The Weekly Standard, 19 January 2004, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/ Public/Articles/000/000/003/583lxmcr.asp (accessed 7 January 2009). 63 Karim Bouzid, a Muslim leader, cited in Henley, J., “French MPs reappraise plan to outlaw veils”, The Guardian, 20 January 2004, p. 11. See Keaton, T.D., Muslim Girls and the Other France: Race, Identity Politics and Social Exclusion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 57
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and social exclusion.64 The French Government, however, vehemently denied that the Law of 2004 discriminated on religious grounds and recalled that the 1905 Law on Separation prohibited discrimination on the basis of faith.65 Some commentators have expressed a more general fear that the French prohibition on headscarves might ultimately cause more harm than good.66 Even those who might have been persuaded of the case for the ban are concerned at the possibility that it will stigmatise and polarise the Muslim community, be perceived as persecution, and in turn promote Islamic extremism and fundamentalism. 3.3
United Kingdom
The UK has no written constitution expressly establishing fundamental principles. It has not specifically sought to ban headscarves in any particular context. However, the UK courts have accepted that schools and employers may, consistently with the ECHR and European Union directives on religious discrimination, be able to justify drawing a line on certain aspects of Islamic dress.67 The locus for many of the controversial cases has been the educational context.68 In the UK, some 400,000 Muslim pupils are in school education, 96% of them in state schools. There are only a handful of private Islamic schools. The earliest headscarf controversies in schools date back to 1989. From a child rights perspective, the starting point is whether there has been an ‘interference’ with the right to freedom of religion and their right to education.69 There may not have been, if there is alternative provision which the child can be expected to access even at the cost of 64 See Willms, J., “France unveiled: Making Muslims into citizens?”, Open Democracy, available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_1753.jsp (accessed 7 January 2009). 65 See Law of 9 December 1905, Journal Officiel, 11 December 1905, p. 7205; McManners, J., Church and State in France 1870–1914 (London: Church Historical Society, 1972). 66 See Freedman, J., “Secularism as a barrier to integration? The French dilemma”, International Migration, vol. 42, no. 3 (2004), pp. 5–27. 67 See Knights, S., Freedom of Religion, Minorities, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 117–120 (on education) and 149–151 (on employment); Hill, M. and Sandberg, R., “Is nothing sacred? Clashing symbols in a secular world”, Public Law, vol. 3 (2007), pp. 488–506. 68 See Knights, S., “Religious symbols in the school: Freedom of religion, minorities and education”, European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5 (2005), pp. 499–516. 69 See Brems, E., “Above children’s heads: The headscarf controversy in European schools from the perspective of children’s rights”, International Journal of Children’s Rights, vol. 14, no. 2 (2006), pp. 119–136.
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some inconvenience. This was the view of the majority of the House of Lords in the Begum case in 2006.70 Begum sought to wear a jilbab (a loose fitting cloak) but the school refused as this was inconsistent with its uniform policy. The majority found no interference because she could have attended a school which would have permitted her to wear the jilbab.71 If there is judged to be an interference (for example, where the child is expelled or refused access to school and there is no alternative provision), the state has to justify the limitation on rights.72 This was successfully done in the Begum case where all five members of the House found that, in the circumstances, B’s expulsion was not a violation of her rights to religion and education.73 Again, the ahin Case was determinative of the jurisprudential approach followed. Although Begum lost her case, it attracted worldwide publicity and attendant public discussion of Muslim integration, respect for religious beliefs, and multiculturalism. However, it was arguably a poor test case. The challenge was made in the context of a strongly multicultural school, clear sensitivity to Muslim issues, and cross-cultural and cross-gender support for an agreed school uniform. Indeed, some of the responses to the case questioned whether there had been too much accommodation of non-Christian religious beliefs in a historically Christian state. The approach in Begum was followed in 2007 by R (on the application of X) v. Headteacher of Y School 74 which, on the facts, represented a better test case. X sought judicial review of the decision of the headteacher and governors of her school refusing to allow her to wear the niqab to school. The niqab covered her entire face and head save for the eyes. The school was a selective all-girls grammar school. X’s three elder sisters had attended the school and been permitted to wear the 70 R. (Begum) v. Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 Appeal Cases 100–135. See Gibson, N., “Faith in the courts: Religious dress and human rights”, Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 66, no. 3 (2007), pp. 657–697; Davies, G., “The House of Lords and religious clothing in Begum v. Head Teacher and Governors of Denbigh High School ”, European Public Law, vol. 13 (2007), pp. 423–432. See also Leader, S., “Freedom of futures: personal priorities, institutional demands and freedom of religion”, Modern Law Review, vol. 70, no. 5 (2007), pp. 713–730. 71 The Begum non-interference approach was followed in R (on the application of X) v. Headteacher of Y School, (2007) England and Wales High Court (EWHC) 298 (Admin); [2008] 1 All England Reports 249, considered below. 72 For the argument that this is the better jurisprudential approach, see Hill and Sandberg, “Is nothing sacred?”. 73 See Gies, L., “What not to wear: Islamic dress and school uniforms”, Feminist Legal Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (2006), pp. 377–389. 74 (2007) England and Wales High Court (EWHC) 298 (Admin); [2008] 1 All England Reports 249.
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niqab. They had all been successful academically. The sisters left the school before X attended. Upon reaching puberty, X started wearing the niqab at school on a permanent basis. The school told X and her parents that the niqab did not conform to its school uniform policy and asked X to remove the veil or be excluded, but X refused and did not return to school. The school arranged and paid for her to receive tuition in certain subjects and she was offered a place at an alternative school of similar standing where she could wear the niqab. The local education authority agreed to provide X with transport to and from the alternative school and this journey from home would have taken about 25 minutes. X refused the offer. X’s application failed. As in Begum, there was no interference because X chose to attend the school but could have moved to the alternative school. X did not adduce any evidence or make any submission to indicate that this school was unacceptable to her. Different schools were entitled to adopt their own rational policies. Even if the school had interfered with X’s Article 9 rights, again following Begum, that interference had been justified where the school’s policy to prohibit the wearing of the niqab had been “in the interests of public safety or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” and was not disproportionate. A claim based on X’s legitimate expectation claim also failed because there had not been a practice, let alone a regular practice, amounting to a representation that the school would permit X to wear a niqab at school. Even if there had been such a representation, the school had departed from it for good reasons that were a proportionate response, having regard to the legitimate aims pursued by the school in the public interest. Finally, the school had not acted irrationally. X had not been entitled as of right to the same treatment as her sisters, when she had entered the school many years after them. During the interval there had been many changes in Y, including a change of head teacher and justified changes in policy. The decision in X’s case repeatedly referred to Lord Bingham’s statement in the Begum case that in relation to decisions on school uniform, it would be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, background and detailed knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors to overrule their decision on a matter as sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to them for the compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it . . .75
75
Begum, para. 34.
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Thus the ‘margin of appreciation’ afforded to states by the European Court is translated in a wide ‘margin of discretion’ for schools to make their own decisions and judgments. A teacher is an employee, often of the state (civil servant). The European Court of Human Rights has accepted that voluntary employment can carry with it limitations on rights.76 Restrictions on teachers’ right to display their religion may be justifiable if there is evidence that it has a qualitative effect on their work.77 This was the situation in Azmi v. Kirklees MBC.78 Mrs Azmi had been suspended from her school teaching assistant role after persistently refusing to follow an instruction not to wear a full-face veil when in class with pupils, assisting a male teacher. Central to the outcome of the case was that observations of her work by the local authority had led to the conclusion that her performance of her duties when veiled was less effective because the children were deprived of non-verbal signals, which were an important part of communication. Azmi’s proceedings against the council alleging direct and indirect discrimination on the grounds of her Muslim religion failed. Rather than receiving support, Azmi was criticised by members of the Muslim community, Muslim politicians and even the then head of the Commission for Racial Equality, Trevor Phillips. The case arguably engendered an anti-Muslim backlash directed at their perceived refusal to integrate and complaints of the lack of comparable protection for Christian beliefs.
76 See Kalac v. Turkey, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 27 (1999), p. 552, para. 28 (military judge who was alleged to have adopted unlawful fundamentalist opinions); Ahmed and Others v. United Kingdom, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 29 (2000), pp. 1–49 (restriction of political rights of public servants at municipal authorities); Stedman v. United Kingdom, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 23 (1997), Commission Supplement, Commission Decisions, pp. 168–70 (complaint inadmissible because of acceptance of contractual obligations in the private sector). 77 The position can be the same for someone exercising another profession. In 2006, a Muslim solicitor, Shabnam Mughal, was asked by an immigration judge to remove her niqab because he could not hear her. She refused, left the court and was later taken off the case. A subsequent practice ruling accepted that niqab could be worn as long as it was consistent with the administration of justice. Presumably it is not so consistent if the judge cannot properly hear the advocate. See Britten, N., ‘Lawyer in a veil is taken off case’, The Telegraph (UK), 15 November 2006; ‘Guidance on the wearing of the full veil, or niqab, in Court’ in Judicial Studies Board, Equal Treatment Bench Book (March, 2008), available at http://www.jsboard.co.uk/downloads/ettb_veil .pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). 78 [2007] Industrial Cases Reports 1154–1174; [2007] Education Law Reports 339–62, Employment Appeal Tribunal.
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In 2007, the Department for Children, Schools and Families published guidance to schools on school uniform.79 It correctly noted that any case would always depend on the circumstances of the particular school. So the judgments in cases like Begum did not mean that banning such religious dress would always be justified, nor that such religious dress could be worn in any school in England. It was for a school to determine what sort of uniform policy was appropriate for it. The guidance stated: In fulfilling its obligations, a school may have to balance the rights of individual pupils against the best interests of the school community as a whole. Where a school has good reason for restricting an individual’s freedoms, for example, to ensure the effective delivery of teaching and learning, the promotion of cohesion and good order in the school, the prevention of bullying, or genuine health and safety or security considerations, then the restriction of an individual’s rights to manifest their religion or belief may be justified.
The school might decide that the needs of individual groups are outweighed by factors relating, inter alia, to teaching and learning. More specifically, if a pupil’s face were obscured for any reason, the teacher might not be able to judge their engagement with learning, and to secure their participation in discussions and practical activities. With respect to Muslims, the guidance stated that, “Young women are appropriately modestly dressed if they are wearing salwar kammez or jilbaab with headscarf without the need to wear niqab in school.”80 Of course, not all Muslim women would share that view. A 2007 Report on the UK by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Asma Jahangir, welcomed the case-by-case approach by the authorities and courts on religious symbols.81 Adverse comparisons with the allegedly favourable treatment received by Muslims in terms of religious dress were drawn with what was 79 See http://www.teachernet.gov.uk/management/atoz/u/uniform/ (accessed 7 January 2009). 80 Ibid. It is interesting to consult a report by the Muslim Council of Britain in 2007, “Meeting the needs of Muslim pupils in state schools”, which called for special considerations for Muslims in almost every aspect of school life including collective worship, PE, dance, swimming, exams, school meals, sex education and parents’ evenings; available at http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/Schoolinfoguidance.pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). 81 UN Doc A/HRC/7/10/Add.3 (7 February 2008). See also the set of general criteria concerning religious symbols outlined in her 2006 report to the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/5, paras 51–60.
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perceived to be the scant regard paid to Christian values in two cases. First, in Playfoot,82 Miss P applied for judicial review of a decision of the defendant governing school body not to permit her to wear a purity ring while a pupil at the school. She wore the ring as a symbol of her commitment to celibacy until marriage. The school was a maintained, non-denominational girls’ secondary school. Under the school uniform policy, there was a general ban on the wearing of jewellery, although the school had previously granted an exemption to some pupils to wear certain items on the grounds that they were considered to be requirements of their faith. This included the hijab. P asserted that she had worn the ring to school because she was a committed Christian with a genuine belief that she should remain sexually abstinent before marriage and that the ring was a sign of that belief. Relying on the policy, the school had asked P to cease wearing the ring on school premises. The governing body endorsed this view and decided not to grant P an exemption from the policy. It found no evidence or explanation linking the belief in sexual abstinence to wearing the ring so that it could conclude that wearing it was a manifestation of P’s belief. P submitted that the governing body’s decision not to permit her to wear the ring breached Article 9 of the ECHR and that she had been discriminated against in breach of Article 14, as girls of other religions at the school were permitted to wear items that fell outside of the policy (including the hijab for Muslim girls and the kara bangle for Sikhs). The application was refused. P was under no obligation, by reason of her belief, to wear the ring. The act of wearing a ring was not intimately linked to the belief in chastity before marriage. Accordingly, she was not manifesting her belief by wearing the ring and Article 9 was not engaged. Following the approach in Begum, her Article 9 rights were not interfered with as she voluntarily accepted the uniform policy of the school, which did not accommodate the wearing of the ring, and there were other means open to her to practise her belief without undue hardship or inconvenience. The uniform policy was prescribed by law and served a number of important functions, including fostering the school identity and an atmosphere of allegiance, discipline, equality and cohesion, and allowing children to learn in an environment R. (Playfoot (A Child)) v. Millais School Governing Body [2007] England and Wales High Court 1698 (Admin), [2007] Human Rights Law Reports No. 34, pp. 1058–71. See Bacquet, S., “School uniforms, religious symbols and the Human Rights Act 1998: the ‘purity ring’ case”, Education Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 11–18. 82
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which minimised the pressures that resulted from marking difference on grounds of wealth and status. Those functions were in similar terms to those previously upheld as legitimate and proportionate. The school was fully justified in acting as it did. It recognised exceptions to its general ban on jewellery where the imposition of the strict rule would impose a disproportionately harsh result on a pupil. However, none of those exceptions applied in the instant case, including the exception where enforcing the policy would be likely to result in an unlawful breach of a pupil’s human rights. Finally, there was no evidence that the school unlawfully discriminated against P in breach of Article 14. Instead, the evidence suggested that it reached carefully considered decisions on each occasion it was called upon to permit exceptions to the uniform policy. The result may be explicable in Convention terms, but the public perception of it was that Muslims and other religious groups were once again being accorded rights that were being denied to the Christian community.83 While substantial decision making is delegated to schools and there are no binding national guidelines, there will inevitably be more litigation on religious dress in schools. A second case related to religious dress in a Christian context drew wide publicity and again adverse comparisons were drawn with the allegedly favorable treatment received by non-Christian religions.84 In the Eweida case, E challenged a British Airways policy which had the effect of banning workers from wearing visible symbols of Christianity.85 E wished to wear a small Christian cross on a chain around her neck. She lost her case before an employment tribunal, but the company attracted severe public criticism from politicians, including the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, church leaders,86 and even from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It was again presented as a situation in which the Christian community was being disadvantaged. The wearing of hijab, turbans, and Sikh bracelets was
83 See Aston, J., and Gordon, C., “Teenager loses ‘purity ring’ legal battle”, The Independent (UK), 16 July 2007. 84 “Cross row stokes Christian anger”, BBC News, 15 October 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6051486.stm (accessed 7 January 2009). 85 There is no published report of the decision of the employment tribunal, but its terms are recorded in the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, n. 91 below. 86 The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, threatened to sell the Church of England’s £9 million worth of shares in the company if it did not change its policy.
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permitted by the company.87 Eventually, the airline announced that it was climbing down from its policy, which banned workers from wearing visible symbols of Christianity, after conducting what it described as a comprehensive review. The review concluded that the uniform policy should be amended to allow a lapel-pin symbol of faith, such as a Christian cross or a Star of David, with some flexibility for individuals to wear a symbol of faith on a chain.88 In January 2008, after rejecting an out of court settlement, E lost her case. It was rejected on the grounds that she had breached the firm’s regulations without good cause. The tribunal’s report highlighted several other issues regarding her conduct at BA. It rejected all her claims of religious discrimination and harassment, and criticized her for her intransigence, saying that she “generally lacked empathy for the perspective of others . . . her own overwhelming commitment to her faith led her at times to be both naive and uncompromising in her dealings with those who did not share her faith”.89 The Employment Tribunal had held that there was no such discrimination because there was no evidence that a group of Christians were put at a particular religious disadvantage when compared with non-Christians. E appealed but lost.90 The Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) dismissed the appeal and held that the Tribunal had reached a cogent and justified conclusion displaying no error of law. Given that decision, there was no need to decide the issue of justification. Interestingly, however, the Tribunal had been satisfied that the requirement was not proportionate because, it fails to distinguish an item which represents the core of an individual’s being, such as a religious symbol, from an item worn purely frivolously or as a piece of cosmetic jewelry. We do not consider that the blanket ban on everything classified as ‘jewellery’ struck the correct balance between corporate consistency, individual need and accommodation of diversity.
The EAT upheld that finding on proportionality. Historically, UK law has provided stronger protection against race discrimination than against religious discrimination. In legal terms, it
See McCaffrey, J., “If a Muslim can wear her veil to work why is my cross forbidden?”, The Mirror (UK), 16 October 2006. 88 See Foster, P., “BA backs down and ends ban on crosses”, The Times (UK), 20 January 2007. 89 Sanderson, T., “A cross to bear”, The Guardian (UK), 17 January 2008, available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/terry_sanderson/2008/01/a_cross_to_bear .html (accessed 7 January 2009). 90 See Eweida v. British Airways, [2009] Industrial Cases Reports 303–18. 87
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is more difficult to analyse the Islamic headscarf ban in terms of racial discrimination unless the terms ‘racial or ethnic origin’ are interpreted very widely. Muslims are followers of the religion of Islam, but they are not a race as such.91 By contrast, in R (Watkins Singh) v. Governing Body of Aberdale Girls’ High School and Rhondda Cynon Taf Unitary Authority,92 WS, a Sikh schoolgirl, successfully claimed indirect racial discrimination on the basis of the school’s refusal to allow her to wear a kara, a plain steel bangle, which she regarded as a manifestation of her religion of exceptional importance. The result is explicable in terms of legal categorisations, but not in terms of policy or principle. It is hard to explain the difference in results between Muslim cases: Begum—pupils can wear shalwar kameeze and hijab but could not wear jilbab; X Case (pupils could wear hijab but not the niqab); Amzi (employee could not wear niqab, and the Christian cases: Playfoot (Christian girl could not wear a chastity ring); Eweida (employee could not wear Christian cross—but BA changed its practice because of the outcry), on the one hand, and the Watkins Singh case (Sikh girl can wear a kara bangle), where there is protection on racial grounds. The expansion of EU discrimination directives to cover religion may partly remedy such inconsistencies. As for discrimination in the private sector, in 2008 Bushra Noah, a young woman with a headscarf who wanted to be a hairdresser, was awarded £4,000 by an employment tribunal for ‘injury to feelings’. The tribunal ruled that she had suffered indirect discrimination when she was rejected for a job at a pink punk hairdresser called Wedge. At a brief interview with the sole owner, Noah explained that she would not take her scarf off if she were given the job. The owner thanked her for coming and said she would soon contact her about the vacancy,93 but she did not contact her. Difficulties faced by wearers of the headscarf in the private sector are often hidden. However, an
91 See Mandla v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 Appeal Cases 548–70. As a result (before the 2003 Regulations see nn. 95–98 below), Muslims in the UK had to argue that discrimination against them was indirectly against them as Asians and thus racial; see JH Walker v. Hussain [1996] [1996] Industrial Cases Reports 291–301. For a fascinating case on a successful religious discrimination challenge concerning the establishment of a ceremonial award in Trinidad and Tobago entitled the Trinity Cross of the Order of Trinity see Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabna on Trinidad and Tobago and Others v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, [2009] UKPC 17 (Privy Council), 28 April 2009, available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page540.asp (last accessed 18 May 2009). 92 [2008] England and Wales High Court 1865 (Admin), [2008] Education Law Reports 561–602. 93 See Rentoul, J., “The punk hairdresser is a natural Lib Dem”, The Independent (UK) 22 June 2008.
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alarming case was made public in December 2008.94 A Muslim barrister, Saleca Faisal-Parkar, who wore the headscarf, was called ‘tent head’. She was harassed, overlooked for jobs and training and was even branded lazy after she became seriously ill while pregnant. The abuse was led by Stephen Jones, then head of litigation at the leading law firm Shakespeares. She was awarded £75,000 in damages. Jones was also a deputy district judge and a member of the Solicitors Disciplinary Panel, but resigned both positions in the light of the scandal. He was demoted and fined a five-figure sum by the company. Religious discrimination claims in both the public and private sector can now be brought under the European Union’s 2000 Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation.95 The directive provides protection for school teachers, university staff or civil servants as employees,96 but does not extend to pupils or students.97 A teacher could complain of indirect religious discrimination, the test for which has been relaxed under Article 2 of the Directive. In a UK context, it has been agued that under this more modern test, a prohibition on a teacher wearing the jilbab (the issue at stake in the Begum case, but there involving a pupil) would probably always raise a prima facie case of religious discrimination.98 In that case, the school or local education authority would have to show that the measure was justified, that is, a “proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”.99 The standard of justification required in cases of alleged religious discrimination could be a high one. However, the justifications that have been accepted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights for restrictions to the Convention rights would be likely to be given very significant weight.100 94 See Britten, N., “Muslim barrister wins £75,000 over ‘Mother Teresa’ and ‘tent head’ jibes”, Daily Telegraph (UK), 5 December 2008. 95 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, OJ L303/16, 2 December 2000. See Addison, N., Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (London: Routledge, 2006). 96 It would also cover a member of university staff as an employee. 97 See Blair, A. and Aps, W., “What not to wear and other stories: Addressing religious diversity in schools”, Education and the Law, vol. 17, nos. 1–2 (2005), pp. 1–22 (16). 98 Ibid., p. 14. For the UK’s implementation, see the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief ) Regulations 2003, 2 December 2003 (2003 Regulations). 99 Regulation 3(b)(iii) of the 2003 Regulations. 100 It has been argued that France may well be found to be in breach of the directive because its courts interpret discrimination in general (and indirect discrimination and positive action in particular) much more narrowly than other EU states and, perhaps more importantly, than the ECJ, see Berthou, K., “The issue of the voile in
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Certain criminal offences can be aggravated if there is a racial or religious element.101 In 2008, a 79-year-old man approached a Muslim woman as she shopped in a South Tyneside supermarket. He asked her to remove her veil and started to question her religion. When she refused to take off her veil, he ripped it from her face. He was detained in the store and police were called. Interestingly, he was reported as receiving a police caution for racially aggravated assault rather than religiously aggravated assault.102 Also in 2008, the High Court held that it was legitimate and proportionate to ban the wearing of clothing as part of an anti-social behaviour order.103 In 2006 in the United Kingdom, a wide and controversial public debate was occasioned by comments by the then leader of the House of Commons, Jack Straw, that he found speaking to a veiled woman uncomfortable. He described the veil as a “visible statement of separation and difference”.104 The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, expressed general support for Mr Straw’s views.105 An interesting aspect of the responses was that even the value of a public debate was put at issue. Some questioned Mr Straw’s motives and expressed concern that the comments would fuel extremism and fundamentalism. Others considered that the debate was a proper part of wider discussion of multiculturalism and British identity. In 2008, the new Immigration Minister stated that veils should not be worn at school because it made their wearers more cut off.106 In a poll of UK primary and secondary school teachers in 2008, 46% percent suggested that allowing pupils
the workplace in France: Unveiling discrimination”, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law & Industrial Relations, vol. 21, no. 2 (2005), pp. 281–320. 101 See Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The aggravated offences carry higher maximum penalties than the offences upon which they are based. 102 “Pensioner rips veil from Muslim woman’s face” available at http://www .shieldsgazette.com/news/OAP-ripped-off-Muslim39s-veil.4289071.jp (accessed 7 January 2009). The reference to ‘racial’ may simply be a reporting error. 103 See R (B) v. Greenwich Magistrates Court, The Times (UK), Law Reports, 22 December 2008. It is interesting to speculate whether the same order would be imposed on a Muslim woman who wore hijab. 104 See Taylor, M., and Dodd, V., “Take off the veil, says Straw—to immediate anger from Muslims”, The Guardian, 6 October 2006. 105 Blair, T., “The duty to integrate: shared British values”, Our Nation’s Future, lecture given on 8 December 2006, available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page10563 (accessed 7 January 2009). 106 See Thomson, A. and Sylvester, R., “Phil Woolas: lifelong fight against racism inspired limit on immigration”, The Times (UK), 18 October 2008.
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to wear religious symbols went against British values.107 The poll was commissioned after a Sikh schoolgirl’s (Watkins Singh) victory in her discrimination case.108 The acute sensitivities of affording greater legal accommodation and recognition to Islamic customs and practices (Sharia law) within the law of the land was exemplified by the extremely hostile reaction to a such a suggestion by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, in a lecture in 2008.109 At least part of the hostility was founded on the view that such a step would inevitably lead to some members of religious communities, and women in particular, having their national and international human rights restricted to a much greater extent than at present.110 Further controversy followed after support for this approach from Lord Phillips, the then Lord Chief Justice (and future President of the Supreme Court).111 3.4
Recent developments in other European states
3.4.1 Belgium The government and the courts have tended to deal with the veiling issue on a case-by-case basis.112 Several Belgian municipalities have
107 Kenber, B., “Ban Muslim headscarves, say teachers”, Daily Telegraph (UK), 3 October 2008. 108 See Watkins Singh, [2008] England and Wales High Court 1865 (Admin), [2008] Education Law Reports 561–602, text to n. 91 above. 109 Archbishop of Canterbury, “Civil and religious law in England: A religious perspective”, 7 February 2008, available at http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (accessed 7 January 2009). 110 See Gadher, D., Taher, A. and Morgan, C., “Rowan Williams faces backlash over sharia”, The Sunday Times, 10 February 2008; Editorial, “Wounded and wiser”, The Guardian, 12 February 2008. There are situations in which Muslim women could benefit. In 2008, Baroness Butler-Sloss, the former head of the Family Division, called for judges to stop granting civil divorces to separating Muslim couples unless they had already been through a religious divorce. She submitted that the move would end the injustice of women being left unable to remarry if their husband refused to grant them a divorce, because under Islam only men have the power to end marriages. See Beckford, M., “Butler-Sloss urges courts to recognize sharia divorces”, The Daily Telegraph, 27 December 2008. 111 See his speech on “Equality before the law’, East London Muslim Centre, 3 July 2008, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/lcj_equality_before_ the_law_030708.pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). See also Taher, A., “Revealed: UK’s first official sharia courts”, The Sunday Times (UK), 14 September 2008. 112 Dumont, H. and Delgrange, X., “Le principe de pluralisme face à la question du voile islamique en Belgique (The principle of pluralism and the Islamic headscarf in Belgium)”, Droit et Société, vol. 68 (2008), pp. 75–108.
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used municipal by-laws on face-covering clothing to ban the public wearing of the niqab and burka on pain of a fine. A proposal in 2006 to ban the burka in all public places and not only in state offices or institutions, is the most extreme proposal that has yet been publicly aired in a European context. It is notable that the arguments made in its support related to public safety and security rather than to the specific rights and freedoms of others. In 2007, the Conseil d’État ruled on the case of a Muslim teacher who was fired for wearing the hijab outside the religion classes she taught in a school in Flanders. She had been previously allowed to wear a headscarf when she was teaching the classes. It declared her dismissal unlawful, stating that an individual school or district might not impose a general ban on religious symbols.113 In 2008, the decision of a Catholic school in Brussels, where Muslims comprised some 85% of the students, to deny Muslim girls the right to wear hijab led to a protest campaign. The ban on the hijab was scheduled to start in the 2009–10 academic year.114 3.4.2 Denmark In 2006, Asmaa Abdol-Hamid, a Palestinian Muslim social worker who sat as a city councillor, caused controversy when she hosted a television show wearing hijab.115 The show was discussing the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.116 Her statement that she would continue to wear her headscarf in parliament if elected engendered a wide public debate.117 In 2008, there was more controversy after the Court Administration held that it had no legal grounds to exclude Muslim women who wore headscarves from becoming judges.118 The Danish government, which relies on the Danish People’s Party’s (DPP) support to stay in power, decided that a new law was needed to ban the
The decision did not affect similar rules applying to students. See “School ban sparks Belgian hijab campaign”, 28 May 2008, available at http://www.islamonline.net (accessed 7 January 2009). 115 “Hijab-clad Muslim TV host sparks Danish furor”, available at http://www .islamonline.net/English/News/2006–04/05/article01.shtml (accessed 7 January 2009). 116 See Keane, D., “Cartoon violence and freedom of expression”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 30 (2008), pp. 845–875. 117 See “Headscarf in the House pledge Danes battle the veil”, The Copenhagen Post, April 26, 2007, available at http://www.cphpost.dk/get/101443.html (accessed 7 January 2009). 118 See “The government will introduce a bill making it illegal for judges to wear religious apparel”, The Copenhagen Post, 15 May 2008. 113
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wearing of all religious symbols by judges. As well as headscarves, the law would cover Christian crosses, Jewish skullcaps and Sikh turbans.119 The DPP has been campaigning for a wider ban on public employees wearing Islamic headscarves. 3.4.3 Germany In the leading case of Ludin120 in 2003, the focus was on the principle of neutrality and the distribution of powers in a federal state.121 Once the Constitutional Court had confirmed that restrictions could be constitutional, half of the Lander (8 out of 16) moved to pass the necessary legislation.122 Three federal states have a ban on all ‘visible’ religious signs and clothes, which mirrors the strictly secular approach of France.123 The other five federal states distinguish between, on the one hand, religious signs that might cause a danger to neutrality, the peace of the school or the principles of equality and human dignity, and, on the other, signs of other religions or denominations that are not considered to cause any danger. In these five states, the Muslim headscarf is banned although the nun’s habit, the Jewish skull cap and Christian crosses are permitted. This follows from an ‘exception clause’ related to Christian-occidental values and traditions. These five states are governed by Christian-conservative political majorities. The situation can be critiqued for not complying with state religious neutrality
119 “The Islamic headscarf in Denmark: Covering up”, The Economist, 29 May 2008. The judiciary considered that it had always successfully managed the issue itself. 120 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 (24 September 2003), available at http://www .bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20030924_2bvr143602.html (accessed 7 January 2009). See Fogel, R.S., “Headscarves in German public schools: Religious minorities are welcome in Germany, unless—God forbid—they are religious”, New York Law School Law Review, vol. 51, no. 3 (2006–2007) pp. 618–653. 121 See von Campenhausen, A.F., “The German headscarf debate”, Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2 (2004), pp. 665–699; Schiek, D., “Just a piece of clothing? German courts and employees with headscarves”, Industrial Law Journal, vol. 33 (2004), pp. 68–73; Gerstenberg, O., “Germany: freedom of conscience in public schools”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 3 (2005), pp. 94–106; Mahlmann, M., “Religious tolerance, pluralist society and the neutrality of the state: The Federal Constitutional Court’s decision in the headscarf case”, German Law Journal, vol. 4, no. 11 (2003), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=331 (accessed 7 January 2009); Skach, C., “Leyla Sahin v. Turkey and ‘Teacher Headscarf Case’ BverfG Case No.2BvR 1436/02”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 100 (2006), pp. 186–195. 122 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, Lower Saxony, the Saarland, Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia and the city-state of Berlin. 123 See Section 3.2 above.
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and the equal treatment of all religions.124 In 2006, the state courts in Baden-Württemberg ruled that the state could not ban headscarfwearing public school teachers from public schools while nuns were permitted to teach in full habits. The state appealed the decision. By contrast in 2007, a Munich court upheld Bavaria’s ban on teachers wearing hijab in schools under a law that states teachers’ attire must be in line with “western Christian” values. Roman Catholic nuns have continued to wear their habits in Bavarian schools. In the German headscarf context, it has been argued that the environment in schools can be a crucial one for learning tolerance.125 In a 2003 decision, the Constitutional Court ruled that women might wear hijab in private business and the service sector. 3.4.4 Ireland Ireland is historically a country of emigration and over 90% of its schools are catholic. Religious symbols worn in Irish schools include the Sikh kara (a bangle), the Sikh patka (a scarf worn by boys and young men), the Jewish kippah or skullcap and Christian crosses. The pioneer badge, the sacred heart and crosses are worn by some teachers.126 Controversy over the hijab has occasionally surfaced but, in a poll in 2008, almost half of respondents agreed that the wearing hijabs by Muslim students should be allowed in state schools.127 One source of controversy arose from events in a school in Gorey, Wexford, where the headmaster refused to adjudicate in the case of some Muslim girls wearing hijab not only in class, but also under their helmets when they played camogie (hurling).128 The headmaster wrote to the department of education for guidance. The young schoolgirl involved, Shekinah Egan, was allowed to continue wearing the headscarf. Her father stated: “It is time the world witnessed the true face of Ireland. The issue of the
On the German neutrality principle see Amir-Moazami, S., “Muslim challenges to the secular consensus: A German case study”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 13, no. 3 (2005), pp. 267–286. 125 See Gerstenberg, “Germany: freedom of conscience in public schools”. 126 See MacCormaic, R., “Intercultural adviser warns hijab ban may cause tensions”, The Irish Times, 10 June 2008. 127 O’Brien, C., “Pupils’ right to wear hijab is backed by almost half surveyed”, The Irish Times, 9 June 2008. 128 See “Irish Hijab Campaign”, available at http://www.hijab.ie/ (accessed 7 January 2009). The situation on Gorey was featured on the Al Jazeera English channel. See “Al Jazeera TV focus on Irish family who want hijab in schools”, Evening Herald, 16 September 2008, available at http://www.herald.ie (accessed 7 January 2009). 124
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hijab is a reflection of how Ireland treats its minorities.”129 The Egans were an Irish family that had converted to Islam. Liam Egan converted to Islam at the age of 28 and his wife was British born. Liam Egan argued that it was not therefore an immigration issue. It was about freedom to practise religious beliefs and the importance of tolerance. To the argument that he should assimilate, he responded that he was Irish and Muslim.130 In 2008 two opposition political parties called for public schools to ban the hijab. The Labour Party’s spokesman on education and science said immigrants who came to Ireland needed to conform to the culture of this country, “If people want to come into a western society that is Christian and secular, they need to conform to the rules and regulations of that country.”131 His comments came amid controversy over guidelines on the wearing of hijab. The spokesman for the Fine Gael party stated that it made sense for there to be one uniform for everyone. Immigrants should live by Irish laws and conform to Irish norms, “Nobody is formally asking them to come here. In the interests of integration and assimilation, they should embrace our culture.”132 He commented that, “Irish girls don’t wear headscarves. A manifestation of religious beliefs in such a way is unacceptable and draws attention to those involved. I believe in a public school situation they should not wear a headscarf.”133 He also said Ireland should not be going down the route of multiculturalism. The government’s response was clear. A spokesperson for Integration Minister Conor Lenihan said he had no problem with students wearing hijab: ‘For those that wear the hijab, it’s an issue of modesty. It’s not so long since Irish women wore headscarves to church, so we have to respect that.”134 The Minister of State for Integration wrote to the principals of 4,000 primary and secondary schools in the state to seek their views on the wearing of the Islamic hijab headscarf by pupils. The context was of the Minister for Education wishing to examine whether national guidelines were required on the wearing of certain types of clothing for religious reasons at school. Hitherto it had been accepted that the situation did not require the Ibid. Ibid. 131 McDonagh, P., “Muslim anger at opposition calls for school ban on hijab”, Irish Independent, 2 June 2008. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 129 130
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development of national guidelines on this specific issue. There had, however, been requests from some quarters for the development of such guidelines, and these requests prompted the examination. In September 2008 the relevant ministers jointly agreed recommendations on school uniform policy.135 They were as follows: 1. The current system, whereby schools decide their uniform policy at a local level, is reasonable, works and should be maintained; 2. In this context, no school uniform policy should act in such a way that it, in effect, excludes students of a particular religious background from seeking enrolment or continuing their enrolment in a school. However, this statement does not recommend the wearing of clothing in the classroom which obscures a facial view and creates an artificial barrier between pupil and teacher. Such clothing hinders proper communication; 3. Schools, when drawing up uniform policy, should consult widely in the school community; 4. Schools should take note of the obligations placed on them by the Equal Status Acts before setting down a school uniform policy. They should also be mindful of the Education Act, 1998. As previously mentioned, this obliges boards of management to take account of ‘the principles and requirements of a democratic society and have respect and promote respect for the diversity of values, beliefs, traditions, languages and ways of life in society.
The recommendations that clothing which obscures a facial view and creates an artificial barrier between pupil and teacher not be worn would exclude the wearing of the burka and the niqab. The reasoning that such clothing hinders proper communication parallels the basis of the Azmi decision in the UK and the recommendations of the UK’s Department for Children, Schools and Families.136 The “Irish Hijab Campaign” welcomed the recommendations, although it would have liked to have seen more explicit legislation to protect the hijab. 3.4.5 The Netherlands The Netherlands has traditionally had a reputation for being an open, liberal and multicultural state. The Dutch parliament has voted for a general prohibition on veiling faces but this has not been brought in effect for constitutional reasons. In September 2008 the Dutch government announced its intention to ban the wearing of garments that cover
Text of Department of Education and Science press release, available at http:// www.tui.ie/TUI_Welcomes_School_Uniform_Policy_Recommendations/Default.332 .html (accessed 7 January 2009). 136 See nn. 78–80 above. 135
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the face in all primary and secondary schools, secondary vocational colleges, and adult education centers with the intention of introducing a bill to this effect in the House of Representatives by mid-2009. The rationale was that good education depends on teachers and students being able to see each other. If one of them wore a face-covering garment, good communications would become impossible. The ban is expected to apply to all school premises, including outdoor areas, and to anyone on those premises, including visitors, parents, school personnel, and delivery personnel.137 The Education Minister stated in Parliament that the planned ban was initially intended to apply only to the compulsory school system. The rationale was that, “Freedom of religion must be weighed against the freedom of children to go to school in an environment where they can see each other’s faces.”138 The ban was not intended to apply to tertiary education institutions because that level of education was not compulsory and the students were adults. However, a majority in the parliament insisted that the ban be extended to tertiary education. Thus in November 2008, the Dutch Education Ministry announced that it planned to ban face coverings as worn by some Muslim women from universities, and the ban is to apply to pupils, teachers, cleaners and parents—in fact, to all women who come through the gates of such institutions.139 A spokesman stated: “It will forbid any kind of garment that covers the face. The intention is to ensure that all people who communicate with each other on school grounds are able to look each other in the eye, to see each other’s faces.”140 If enacted, the prohibition will apply to the burka and niqab and will extend to adults in universities and colleges. A final point of interest is that law court staff in the Netherlands are also forbidden to wear Islamic headscarves on the grounds of “state neutrality”. 3.4.6 Switzerland In Switzerland, the main emphasis has been on the principles of neutrality, secularism, and gender equality. In Dahlab v. Switzerland,141 the 137 See “Face-covering garments to be banned at school”, available at http://www.government.nl/News/Press_releases_and_news_items/2008/September/Face_covering_ garments_to_be_banned_at_school (accessed 7 January 2009). 138 Ibid. 139 “Netherlands plans to ban burkas from university—Ministry”, 26 November 2008, http://www.easybourse.com/bourse-actualite/marches/netherlands-plans-to-banburkas-from-university-ministry-569218 (accessed 7 January 2009). 140 Ibid. 141 Appn No 42393/98, Admissibility Decision, 15 February 2001, available on HUDOC
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European Court of Human Rights considered the issue of a schoolteacher in a primary school who was prohibited from wearing an Islamic headscarf when teaching. It found no violation. It stressed, inter alia, the impact that the “powerful external symbol” conveyed by her wearing a headscarf could have. Switzerland was entitled to place restrictions on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf, as it was compatible with the pursued aim of protecting pupils by preserving religious harmony. In Dahlab v. Switzerland142 the Court considered that the prohibition was not directed at her as a member of the female sex but pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the neutrality of the state primary education system. Such a measure could also be applied to a man who, in similar circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identified him as a member of a different faith. The court also noted that the headscarf “appeared to be imposed on women by a precept laid down in the Koran” that was “hard to square with the principle of gender equality”.143 This was again stressed in the ahin case.144 The advancement of the equality of the sexes is a major goal of the 47 member state Council of Europe.145 4
Explaining Differential Legal/Human Rights Outcomes: The Margin of Appreciation
It is evident that a legal/human rights approach embodies a certain set of concepts, boundaries and discourse. Within each legal/ human rights categorisation, there can be found a complex balancing of claims and interests. The balance is very context-dependent and may reveal tensions that pull in different directions.146 The legal/human rights outcome for a headscarf dispute may thus vary from one European state to another. Within the ECHR system, the European Court will explain
database http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/ HUDOC+database/. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid., 13. 144 ahin, para. 111. 145 See Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, European Human Rights Rights Reports, vol. 7 (1985), pp. 471–511. 146 See Verhaar, O. and Saharso, S., “The weight of context: Headscarves in Holland”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, vol. 7, no. 2 (2004), pp. 179–195 (arguing that a contextual approach which reinterprets general principles in the light of the circumstances attends to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights).
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this by reference to the “margin of discretion’ By stressing the special importance of the national decision-making body, the absence of any uniform European conception of the significance of religion in society, the varying national traditions and requirements, and the dependence of regulations on the domestic context, the court is affording states a wide margin of discretion.147 Domestic courts may apply analogous doctrines by reference to which they accord a significant degree of deference to democratic legislative decisions or domestic political institutions such as schools, universities and hospitals, on how to resolve conflicting human rights claims.148 The inevitable result is a variation in rights between one institution or organisation and another. We have also seen that different results emerge because some cases are limited to arguing human rights grounds (e.g. Begum, Playfoot) while others have a race discrimination ground (Watkins Singh). The resulting differences may make legal sense but may not necessarily accord with common sense and public perceptions of fairness. There is no Europe-wide legal instrument on veiling. The Council of Europe (covering 47 European states) has not adopted any legal texts nor made any specific recommendations on this issue, due to its complexity and to the European Court’s approach that it is necessary to assess each situation carefully and in the light of the overall context. In February 2007, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts for the Development of Human Rights published a report on the issue entitled Human Rights in a Multicultural Society: The Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas.149 In the report, the committee did not find that a normative instrument would be appropriate at this stage. However, it drew principles and factors from the relevant case law of the Court in order to offer guidance on how to approach such questions. This served as a basis for the Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas, published in 2008, which aimed to clarify this concept and provide guidance to policy makers, experts and others on the criteria used by the European Court of Human Rights in its case law.150
Ibid., para. 110. See, in particular, Lord Hoffman in Begum, [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 Appeal Cases 100–135, paras 62–64. 149 Council of Europe Doc GT-DH-DEV B (2006)004. 150 See Evans, M., Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Manuals/Brill, 2008). 147 148
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The Themes of the Debates on Veiling
The importance of veiling issues, and in particular that of the Islamic headscarf, has to be located within broader contemporary political and philosophical debates. Religiosity has not withered on the vine in the face of secularism and modernity.151 In Europe, the issue of veiling and has become a microcosm of wider debates on integration,152 tolerance,153 cultural pluralism, and diversity154 and multiculturalism generally,155 but specifically with respect to Muslims.156 The veiling debate is thus part of broader debates.157 The sites of those debates in different European states can be located primarily in the political sphere, the media or in the legal system or combinations thereof. The debates on veiling in European states are always context specific. Prohibitions and restrictions in European states are always limited in scope. For example, they cover only particular individuals who occupy certain positions or offices or who possess certain statuses or are engaged in particular activities or particular places or particular contexts, and they are therefore to be analysed by reference to those contexts. Such analysis may differentiate between public and private
151 See Habermas, J., “Religion in the public sphere”, European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14 (2006), pp. 1–25. 152 See Mirza, M., Senthilkumaran, A. and Ja’far, Z., Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism (Policy Exchange, 2007), available at http:// www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/libimages/246.pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). 153 On the effects of seeing differences as opposites, see Brown, W., Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in an Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 176, in his chapter on “Tolerance in civilizational discourse”. 154 See Benhabib, S., The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Harris, N., Education Law and Diversity (Oxford: Hart, 2007), especially chs 1 and 7; Kymlicka, W., Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Phillips, A., Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 155 Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. and R. Zapata-Barrero, R. (eds), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European Approach (London: Routledge, 2006); McGoldrick, D., “Multiculturalism and its discontents”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (2005), pp. 27–56; Modood, T., Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Themes for the Twenty-first Century) (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 156 See Fetzer J.S. and Soper, J.C., Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 157 See also Amiraux, V., “The headscarf question: What really is the issue?”, in S. Amghar, et al. (eds), European Islam Challenges for Public Policy and Society (Brussels: Centre For European Policy Studies (2007), pp. 124–143, who focuses on the elements of religion, gender and identity.
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spaces or domains, between adults and children, between employees and non-employees, between public office holders and those in the private sector, between educational and non-educational contexts, and between majorities and minorities. Contextual factors are always relevant to the aim and proportionality of the measures adopted. Both sides of the debate in particular contexts base their stand on human rights standards.158 However, the underlying debates tend to coalesce around certain overlapping themes: 5.1
Veiling as repression
There is a pervasive gender theme in the debates on prohibitions and restrictions on veiling, which includes gender repression, gender discrimination and the regulation of female sexuality.159 It is widely held in Europe that the headscarf is offensive to liberal thinking because of its repressive symbolism in terms of relations between the sexes.160 The headscarf was sometimes compared to the yellow star worn by Jews during the Nazi era.161 Symbolism is historically significant in French political and social thinking, but is also relevant in many other European states.162 Veiling is troublesome for modern European states because it
See McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion, chs 9–10. See Lyon D. and Spini, D., “Unveiling the headscarf debate”, Feminist Law Review, vol. 12, no. 3 (2004), pp. 333–345; Duits L. and van Zoonen, L., “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13 (2006), pp. 103–117; Malik, M., “Complex Equality: Muslim Women and the ‘Headscarf ’ ”, Droit et Société, vol. 68 (2008), pp. 127–152. For an argument based on gender equality in the French Constitution, see Coq, G., “Foulard islamique: pour un retour à la loi république”, Liberation, 6 November 1996. 160 See Poulter, S., “Muslim headscarves in school: Contrasting legal approaches in England and France”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 17 (1997), pp. 43–74, (69–72); Grayling, A.C., “Tradition and religion forge shackles of oppression for women”, The Guardian (UK), 7 August 2008; Devlin, M., “If Muslim men like the veil so much, let them wear it”, The Irish Independent, 22 May 2008 (“I don’t regard the hijab as a harmless expression of religious and cultural diversity. A veiled woman carries regressive connotations. If we accept it in schools, we open the door to other practices in the Muslim world even more repressive to women, among them arranged marriages and female circumcision.”) See also the Dahlab case, Appn No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001, Admissibility Decision, available on HUDOC database http://www.echr.coe .int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database/. considered in section 3.4.6 above. 161 See Silverstein, P., “Headscarves and the French Tricolor”, Middle East Report Online, 30 January 2004, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero013004.html (accessed 7 January 2009). 162 See Renteln, “Visual religious symbols and the law”. 158 159
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suggests a belief system in which women are inferior to men.163 There is concern that arguments based on individual voluntarism or consent are false in the sense that Islamic teaching is perceived to be dominated by conceptions of submission and duty rather then freedom and choice.164 Many women in the West find veiling deeply problematic. Feminists are conflicted over veiling.165 It raises a complex interplay of oppression, religion and patriarchy alongside fundamental principles of equality, toleration, self-determination, autonomy and choice.166 Western feminists generally tend to be hostile towards the veil, although some view it more positively as preserving culture and symbolising resistance to Westernisation.167 French feminist communities have been and are still divided on the headscarf issue.168 Most appear to regard the headscarf as a symbol of the oppression of women.169 In December 2003, 60 prominent French women issued a petition urging a ban on “this visible symbol of the submission of women2.170 In general, most women’s groups were on the side of the secularists and in favour of the Law of 2004.171 Their support was generally based on a conceptualisation
Marrin, M., “Comment: Cry freedom and accept the Muslim headscarf ”, The Times (UK), 1 February 2004. 164 See Hirschmann, N.J., “Western feminism, Eastern veiling, and the question of free agency”, Constellations, vol. 5, no. 3 (1998), pp. 345–368. 165 Malik, “Complex Equality”; Vakulenko, A., “ ‘Islamic headscarves’ and the European Convention on Human Rights: An intersectional perspective”, Social and Legal Studies, vol. 16 (2007), pp. 183–199. 166 See Marshall, J., “Conditions for freedom? European Human Rights Law and the Islamic headscarf debate”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 3 (2008), pp. 631–645; Killian (in “The other side of the veil”) provides evidence that age and education were significant determining factors in women’s responses and whether they used a discourse of rights and equality or an essentially religious one. See also the discussion in ‘Voile ou foulard’, available at http://sisyphe.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=49 [French] (accessed 23 July 2008). 167 See Hirschmann, “Western feminism, Eastern veiling”, p. 349. 168 See Scott, J.W., “Symptomatic politics: The banning of Islamic headscarves in French public schools”, French Politics, Culture & Society, vol. 23, no. 3 (Winter 2005), pp. 106–127. 169 See Femmes Publiques, “Être féministe, ce n’est pas exclure!”, 23 October 2003, available at http://sisyphe.org/article.php3?id_article=677 (accessed 7 January 2009) [French]. For a more general argument, see Okin, S.M. (ed.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 170 The magazine Elle sponsored a petition against the veil, signed by several intellectuals and politicians, which described it as “intolerable discrimination” and the “visible symbol of the submission of women in public”. See Louet, S., “Chirac stokes Muslim veil debate”, Human Rights without Frontiers, 8 December 2003, available at http://www.hrwf.net/ (last accessed 13 May 2009) 171 This included the group called “Ni putes, ni soumises”. See Pew Forum’s The Veil 163
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of the headscarf as a disempowering instrument for the oppression of women. Some French Muslim women’s groups were in favour of the headscarf ban specifically because of the phenomenon of increased violence against, and social domination of, Muslim women.172 Critics of this view see the various restrictions more as examples of nationalistic, hegemonic, colonial and patriarchal mentalities. Prohibitions on wearing the veil are no better than compulsion to wear it because both afford the Muslim woman no choice.173 Muslim girls and women who want to participate in the community via employment, education or public service are inevitably excluded to some degree or forced to contravene their religious beliefs.174 They see an irony in norms of rights and equality being invoked to effect their exclusion.175 Instead of focussing on integration, the ban reflects a fixation with assimilation. For them, the headscarf has been given an exaggerated political importance. The real issues for Muslim women in most European states are socio-economic. Poverty, discrimination, unemployment, housing, domestic violence and sexual harassment continue to be systemic problems. 5.2
Veiling as segregation
For some, veiling symbolises and evidences the refusal of Muslims to assimilate and integrate.176 The most dramatic legal expression of this was the French decision in the Silmi case to deny citizenship to a Muslim woman on the ground of her “insufficient assimilation” into France
Controversy: International Perspectives on Religion in Public Life (2004), available at http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=55 (last accessed 7 January 2009) (hereinafter cited as Pew Forum). See the evidence to the Stasi Commission (cf. n.30 above) and http://www .ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/brp/notices/034000725.shtml (accessed 7 January 2009). [French] (last accessed 23 July 2008). 172 For a feminist critique of the origins and interpretation of the headscarf, see Mernissi, F., Women and Islam: A Historical Theological Enquiry (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). See also Sunder, M., “Piercing the veil”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 112 (2003), pp. 1399–1472. 173 A study by a Commission in Quebec, Canada in 2008, found that there was nothing wrong with the hijab and that it was no real threat to Quebec values. Most women there wore it by choice, not because of coercion. See Heinrich, J., “Enough about the hijab”, The Montreal Gazette, 22 May 2008. 174 See Simons, M., “Muslim women in Europe claim rights and faith”, The New York Times, 29 December 2005; Malik, “Complex Equality”; Vakulenko, “ ‘Islamic headscarves’ and the European Convention on Human Rights”. 175 See Freedman, J., “Women, Islam and rights in Europe: Beyond a universalist/ culturalist dichotomy”, Review of International Studies, vol. 33 (2007), pp. 29–44. 176 See “Special report on Islam, America and Europe”, The Economist, 24 June 2006, pp. 29–31; Blair, “The duty to integrate”.
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and the absence of evidence that she wished to integrate into French society.177 In a number of European states, such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium, the line is being drawn at face veiling (niqab and burka). Indeed, it has been suggested that a consensus is emerging that the face must not be covered.178 The rationales relate to security, the value of face-to-face communication as a pedagogical need, and an asserted European cultural norm of seeing people’s faces. This theme of segregation was highlighted by Jack Straw’s description of the headscarf as a, “visible statement of separation and difference”.179 However, the context of those remarks was a wider concern and fear concerning the segregation of Muslim communities on the basis that this was neither in their interests nor in the interests of the rest of the community. The fact that the four London suicide bombers in July 2005 were British-born and had been radicalised while living in Muslim communities in the UK was used to support such concerns.180 Evidence of Muslim women in particular living in segregated communities has led to further debate on whether policies of multiculturalism have failed and thus need to be dropped or substantially revised.181 Physical and cultural segregation is symptomatic of, but also exacerbates, the social and economic problems that Muslims face across Europe.182 5.3
Immigration and racism
In some situations, veiling is the focus of the debate but the real issues relate to concerns at levels of immigration and the effect they are having
See text to nn. 54–55 above. Berghahn, S., “Judicial expertise on current regulations as well as on explanations for varieties in regulations and in the framing of European headscarf debates”, VEIL Project, Equality and Difference in Europe: Muslim headscarves, available at http:// 131.130.1.78/veil/Home3/index.php?id=12,6,0,0,1,0 (accessed 7 January 2009). 179 Taylor and Dodd, “Take off the veil, says Straw”. 180 In the post 9/11 terrorist context there are some situations where security risks have been the asserted ground for restricting the wearing of hijab in particular places (e.g. airports) and contexts (e.g. airports, ports). However, in most situations discussed in this essay, security has not been the central issue. 181 See Mirza et al., Living Apart Together; C. Joppke, C., “Limits of integration policy: Britain and her Muslims”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, forthcoming (2009); Kymlicka, W., “Multicultural odysseys”, Ethnopolitics, vol. 4, no. 4 (2007), pp. 585–597. 182 See the essays on “Status and discrimination”, in S. Amghar et al., European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (2007), pp. 61–167; Amir-Moazami, S., “Muslim challenges to the secular consensus: A German case study”, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 13, no. 3 (2005), pp. 267–286 (on the headscarf as a sign of cultural segregation). 177 178
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on the rest of the community.183 In an immigration context, the first generation Muslims may have sought to be invisible so as to gain acceptance, while the second and subsequent generations seek to be visible so as to gain recognition. In recent decades immigration has been used to fuel economic expansion in many European states. However, the debate is now shifting and there is much more open discussion of immigration limits.184 Mainstream politicians have been hesitant to discuss immigration issues because of their reluctance to be perceived as racist. However, in some states the gains by anti-immigrant political parties are forcing them to address the issues. Part of that debate relates to pressure on social security systems, health services and labour markets. But part of it is generated by concern at the growth of nonintegrated communities, particularly Muslim ones, that have different value systems from the majority. The argument is that if, as the European Court of Human Rights has held, the application of Sharia law is inconsistent with European democracy,185 the continuing immigration of large numbers of Sharia-supporting Muslims into European states is not an intelligible policy.186 Debates on the Muslim veil have also been transferred to different social and political contexts. For example, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), an anti-immigration political party in Switzerland, has forced a nationwide referendum to ban minarets on mosques.187 The party chose minarets because they were “symbols of political-religious imperialism” rather than simply traditional architecture.188 Dominique Baettig, an SVP MP, said, “It is like the veil, it is a symbol of non-integration.”189 If approved by the referendum, the Swiss Parliament would have to
183 See Kymlicka, “Multicultural odysseys”, p. 619 (Muslims immigrants in some countries seen as disloyal and illiberal); and the debate in Ireland considered in section 3.4.4 above. With the exception of the UK, Muslims account for the largest religious immigration bloc within Europe. 184 The financial crisis that began in 2008 will bring the issues to the fore again, particularly if, as expected, unemployment in European states rises substantially. 185 See Refah Partisi, paras 123–125. See Cumper, P., “Europe, Islam and democracy: Balancing religious and secular values under the European Convention on Human Rights”, European Yearbook of Minority Issues, vol. 3 (2003–04), pp. 163–180. 186 See Finnis, J., “Endorsing discrimination between faiths: A case of extreme speech?”, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 187 Charter, D., “Racism row in Switzerland over minaret ban referendum”, The Times (UK) 9 July 2008. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid.
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pass a law enshrining a construction ban on minarets in the constitution. Doudou Diène, the UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, stated in 2007 that there was “a dynamic of racism and xenophobia” in Switzerland.190 The underlying causes were a ‘deep-rooted cultural resistance within Swiss society to the multiculturalisation process’ and ‘the growing prevalence of racist and xenophobic stances in political programmes and discourse, particularly during elections and various votes’.191 There have been similar campaigns across Europe against minarets being built with mosques in Sweden, France, Italy, Austria, Greece, Germany and Slovenia. 5.4
The national defence of secularism/ neutrality against religiosity
With respect to France and Turkey, the basis for the prohibitions on the headscarf is the maintenance of the fundamental organisational principles of the state—laïcité/secularism.192 Indirectly, this can serve to contain Muslim fundamentalism. In Germany, the central governing principle is neutrality. However, in each case the real substance of the human rights argument is that the restriction is necessary to protect the human rights system in general and thereby to protect the human rights of others. In the ahin case, the European Court of Human Rights accepted this systemic human rights protection argument with respect to the headscarf ban in Turkish universities. Turkey had starkly warned the court that secularism was the basis of its human rights system and, indeed, was the only way it considered that it could ensure compliance with the ECHR. Turkey did not base its restriction of the rights of Leyla ahin on her as an individual harming anyone, pressuring anyone, or engaging in proselytism.193 Some see the veiling
Report by Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, “Mission to Switzerland”, UN Doc A/HRC/4/19/Add.2, 30 January 2007. 191 Ibid. 192 See Asad, T., ‘Reflections on laïcité and the public sphere’, Social Science Research Council, Items and Issues, vol. 5, no. 3 (2005), pp. 1–3, available at http://www.ssrc .org/publications/items/v5n3/index.html (accessed 7 January 2009); Gökariksel, B. and Mitchell, K., “Veiling, secularism, and the neoliberal subject: National narratives and supranational desires in Turkey and France”, Global Networks, vol. 5, no. 2 (2005), pp. 147–165. 193 See Evans, C., “The ‘Islamic scarf ’ in the European Court of Human Rights”, Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 7 (2006), pp. 52–73. 190
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debates as European states seeking to defend a Christian tradition and a territorial and blood-based national identity.194 The German approach certainly looks more difficult to justify as in some federal states it is only defending its neutrality against Islam, not against Christianity.195 At least the French approach is outwardly non-discriminatory. Apart from the complexity of multiple identities, one particular challenge in the area of identity politics is that while the European states can be critiqued for their conceptions of nationality and citizenship, there is not necessarily an engagement on the Muslim side.196 As Uriya Shavit has explained, “[f ]or mainstream Muslim jurists, Islam is not a culture, a religion, or a tradition, but rather an alternative type of nationality which claims jurisdiction over all aspects of human activities.”197 In addition, it seems very difficult to engage in a constructive and reasoned public debate if the Muslim perspective is presented as one in which they are simply being guided by Islamic dictates for those living in foreign (i.e. non-Muslim) lands.198 5.5
Identity politics
Group identities have become increasingly politicised in many European states. It has been argued that policies of multiculturalism have encouraged, enforced and legitimised forms of solidarity by emphasising differences at the expense of any shared national identity.199 The degree of recognition of a particular group reflects its power relationship with the state.200 The headscarf issue is thus often conceived of in
194 For a discussion and critique of these views see Joppke, C., “Liberalism and Muslim integration: Through the prism of headscarf restrictions in Europe”, available at http://131.130.1.78/veil/Home3/index.php?id=36,79,0,0,1,0 (accessed 7 January 2009). (and the literature cited). 195 Joppke refers to “the Länder’s resurrection of an ethnic nationalism that does not dare to speak its name”, ibid., p. 20. 196 See The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other (2006) Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, available at www.pewglobal.org (accessed 7 January 2009). 197 Shavit, U., “Should Muslims integrate into the West?”, Middle East Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007), pp. 13–21. 198 See Joppke, “Liberalism and Muslim integration”. 199 See Mirza et al., Living Apart Together; El Hamel, C., “Muslim diaspora in Western Europe: The Islamic headscarf (hijab), the media and Muslims’ integration in France”, Citizenship Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (2002), pp. 293–308. 200 See Kastoryano, R., Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 138.
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terms of identity recognition.201 Identity is also an aspect of individual human dignity, autonomy, and self-determination. It is thus an aspect of privacy that allows individuals to function freely and to enjoy the possibility of self-definition and self-determination. However, a report on British Muslims in 2007 entitled Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism only served to illustrate how complex issues of identity are and how difficult it is to frame policies around them.202 It revealed growing religiosity in the younger generation, and a more politicised interest in religion: 62% of 16–24-year-olds felt they had as much in common with non-Muslims as Muslims, compared with 71% of over-55s. Further, 59% of Muslims would prefer to live under British law, compared with 28% who would prefer to live under Sharia law; 37% of 16–24-year-olds preferred Sharia compared with 17% of 55+ year-olds; and 74% of 16–24 year-olds preferred Muslim women to choose to wear the veil, compared with only 28% of over55s. There was considerable diversity amongst Muslims, with many adopting a more secular approach to their religion: 21% of Muslims had consumed alcohol; 65% had paid interest on a normal mortgage; 19% had gambled; 9% admitted to taking drugs; 59% felt they had as much, if not more, in common with non-Muslims in the UK as with Muslims abroad. The Report argued that there was a conflict within British Islam between a moderate majority who accepted the norms of Western democracy and a growing minority that did not. The undermining of Britishness and the decline of working-class politics had led to a feeling of disengagement amongst young people more generally. Some Muslims were therefore turning to religion as part of a search for meaning and community. Despite widespread concerns about Islamophobia, 84% of Muslims believed they had been treated fairly in UK society. Interestingly, 28% of Muslims believed that the authorities in Britain went over the top in trying not to offend Muslims. The Report recommended the, “need to work together, as a society, to develop a renewed sense of collectivity that asserts our shared British 201 See Galeotti, A.E., “Citizenship and equality: The place for toleration”, Political Theory, vol. 21, no. 4 (1993), pp. 585–605 (599–600); Köker, L., “Political toleration or politics of recognition: The headscarves affair revisited”, Political Theory, vol. 24, no. 2 (1996), pp. 315–320. 202 See Mirza et al., Living Apart Together. See also Ismail, S., “Islamism, re-Islamization and the fashioning of Muslim selves: Refiguring the public sphere”, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 1 Article 3, (2007), http://www.bepress .com/mwjhr/vol4/iss1/art3/
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identity and Western values in a way that will inspire the younger generation”.203 However, as Joppke has argued, nation-building in Western states in the twenty-first century is more difficult than it has been historically because it occurs in the context of highly pluralistic and individualised societies, where individual and group particularism is protected under the flag of ‘diversity’ and “States find it ever more difficult to instill national particularism through their immigrant and minority integration policies”.204 Such diversity is, “now the master rhetoric of all Western states”.205 5.6
The Islamicisation of Europe
Related to the previous theme is the broader one of defending Europe against a creeping Islamicisation.206 While prohibitions on the headscarf can always be seen as insignificant and trivial, they do represent a line in the sand against, and a rejection of, an Islamic perspective that does not regard or treat women as equals. The argument is that, if the line is not drawn at the headscarf, more extensive veiling will follow, and then a more general claim for the application of Sharia law.207 The headscarf debates are only one element of creeping Islamicisation, but because of their increasing visibility they have been one of its most public and controversial elements.208 Some see the issue in apocalyptic terms. In The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam’s Threat to the West (New York: Basic Books, 2007), Lee Harris argued that most Western attempts to address the problem of radical Islam are doomed to fail. During the debate on the hijab in Ireland in 2008, the Irish Independent published a letter from a US reader in support of a ban that exemplifies this theme: “Like it or not, the hijab is a symbol of a culture that promotes the murder
Ibid. Joppke, “Liberalism and Muslim integration”, p. 18. 205 Ibid., p. 17. 206 “Stop the Islamification of Europe” (SIOE) is an alliance of people from across Europe with the single aim of preventing Islam from becoming a dominant political force in Europe. See http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.com (accessed 7 January 2009). 207 The European Court of Human Rights has held that individual advocacy of the introduction of Sharia law is protected by Art 10 of the ECHR: the mere fact of defending Sharia, without calling for violence to establish it, could not be regarded as hate speech, Gunduz v. Turkey, European Human Rights Reports, vol. 41 (2005), No. 5, pp. 59–78. 208 See also texts to nn. 1 and 187 above on the building of mosques and nn. 108–110 on suggestions for incorporating elements of Sharia law and courts into national legal systems. 203 204
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of innocents and mutilation. . . . The culture of the hijab is against the liberal principles of Western culture. . . . Ireland has an opportunity to take an early stand against a culture that threatens the West with violence and aggression.”209 Similarly, Bruce Anderson has argued that, “There are widespread fears that Muslim immigrants, reinforced by political pressure and, ultimately, by terrorism, will succeed where Islamic armies failed and change irrevocably the character of European civilization.”210 Perhaps symptomatic of the current debate was the title of a conference held in Vienna in 2008: “Post-Christian Europe and resurgent Islam”.211 Most Muslims in Europe could not be described as political Islamists or religious fundamentalists. That is, they do not support a political ideology that aims to create a state in strict conformity with Islamic religious doctrine.212 This includes many women who veil. However, Turkey successfully argued before the European Court of Human rights that veiling had taken on a political meaning or significance and was associated with political Islamists or religious fundamentalists.213 The Court accepted that it should not lose sight of the fact that there were extremist political movements in Turkey which sought to impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and the conception of a society founded on religious precepts. Each state, based on its historical experience, could, consistently with the ECHR, take a stance against such political movements seeking systemic change.214 6
Concluding Comments
This essay has sought to identify the important themes in the debates on Muslim veiling and to locate them within broader contemporary political and philosophical debates. The veiling debates are thus part of the grander narratives. Among the bigger questions that the debates point to are: Are European states good for Muslims as their permanent 209
2008.
Leonard, F., “Symbolism of hijab has altered”, Irish Independent, 12 December
210 Anderson, B., “We are destroying the very values which could save us in our battle against Islam”, The Independent (UK), 2 June 2008. 211 See http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=hudson_upcoming_events& id=574 (accessed 7 January 2009). 212 Cf. though the views of Joppke, in his “Liberalism and Muslim integration”. 213 Sahin, paras 55, 111. 214 Ibid., para. 115, citing Refah Partisi, para. 124.
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homelands and not just as tolerated foreign lands?215 Are Muslims good for Europe?216 Are European Muslims becoming actively engaged as citizens and political actors in governance activities and other participatory activities in liberal democratic states?217 Can they conceive of themselves as having an identity which is both European and Islamic? To what extent does the management of the future of the European project depend on a Europeanisation of Islam218 via some degree of Islamic transformation or reformation?219 Or does the future of the European project lie in a perpetual struggle against those seeking a Muslim Europe? Part of the continuing widespread interest in, and importance of, the veiling debates is that the themes in them are a microcosm of these grander narratives and questions. The national and European debates and public dialogues on veiling thus provide a crucial forum or theatre for articulating matters that will ultimately determine the shape and character of the complex construct that is Europe.
From a broad perspective, and certainly from a comparative perspective, it would seem self-evident that the answer is in the affirmative. However, the more strongly religious a person is, the more difficult it may be for them to accept generalised notions of fair balance, reasonableness and proportionality that are central to European human rights jurisprudence. 216 See Finnis, “Endorsing discrimination between faiths”. 217 See POLITIS: Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries, Final Activity Report, available at http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe/download/POLITISFinalReport.pdf (accessed 7 January 2009). 218 Amghar, S. et al., European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007) (arguing that “European Islam is already a reality for Muslims”, p. 6). 219 See Cavanaugh, K., “Islam and the European project”, Muslim World Journal of Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 1 (2007), article 6, available at http://www.bepress.com/ mwjhr/vol4/iss1/art6 (accessed 7 January 2009); Pigott, R., ‘Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts’ BBC News Channel, 26 February 2008 available at http://news .bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7264903.stm (on suggestions of reinterpretations of Islam in Turkey); Adelman, H., “Rights and the hijab” (on transforming Islam into its European manifestation). 215
MEDIA AND MUSLIMS IN EUROPE Isabelle Rigoni1 The mainstream media has been noted for being a powerful adversary to minority groups. Its role in perpetuating stereotypical images of disabled people, ethnic minorities, women and young people, for example, is well documented. Although Islam is the second religion in many Western European countries, Muslims are not spared a culturalist approach and are facing deep misunderstanding. Islam is often portrayed as being associated with violence and fanaticism, whereas Muslims associate their religion with notions of justice and democracy. The confrontation between these two conceptions has reinforced defensive attitudes on both sides. However, although it is true that stereotypes have been reinforced since September 11, this has also given rise to a very strong voice in favour of civil liberties for Muslims and this voice is increasingly heard in the Western European media. Like other ethnic minorities throughout Europe and the world, Muslims have developed their own media, and new communications technologies have clearly facilitated unlimited access to these new Muslim arenas. Thus, the media are playing a very significant role, communicating the debates on the social and political inclusion of Muslims in European countries. In this context, changes in the media landscape present new challenges for multicultural and multi-faith nation-states. The two first sections of this article aim to draw up a report on the discourse on Islam and Muslims in the mainstream European media, and to consider the changes taking place in the perception of Islam and Muslims in the political context of the recognition of Islamophobia and the promotion of diversity or of the visibility of minorities. The two last chapters are devoted to the Muslim media. Like other ethnic media, Muslim media can offer a forum in which to speak, a political platform, a space in which to present new images and representations 1 Dr. Isabelle Rigoni is the team leader of the EU Marie Curie Excellence Team MINORITYMEDIA hosted at Migrinter, University of Poitiers, France. She holds a PhD from the University Paris 8, and has been a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations (University of Warwick) and at the Centre Marc Bloch (Berlin).
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of misunderstood or previously silenced minorities. After drawing a portrait of these media, their contribution in terms of media coverage, especially in the area of gender relations will be considered. Although the article will cover the main tendencies throughout Europe, its focus will be mainly on the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. 1
Mainstream Media Discourse on Islam and Muslims
Islam is one of the subjects on which a lot of ink has been spilt in the Western media in recent years. Most mainstream print media have published ‘special issues’ devoted to the subject. The audio-visual media, have played their role too, and broadcasts of ‘debates’, the favoured format of radio and television, are frequently related to this topic. Islam is often presented from a perspective that sees it as threatening, dangerous or subversive,2 or at least as ‘other’ and alien, and very rarely as a legitimate, personal belief, or as coming under the umbrella of the freedom of thought guaranteed by a legally constituted state. This tendency has been particularly remarkable at the times of the debate on the Islamic veil in French schools France,3 at the urban violence in France in October–November 2005,4 and the controversy over the Danish cartoons. As I have explained elsewhere,5 general tendencies have become apparent throughout Europe, and France and Great Britain constitute two typical examples.
2 Open Society Institute, Monitoring de la protection des minorités dans l’Union européenne: La situation des musulmans en France. (Budapest: OSI, 2002). 3 Isabelle Rigoni, “De hoofddoek ter discussie. Een nieuwe islamitische identiteit voor de vrouw in seculier-burgerlijk Frankrijk” [The Veil in Debates. A New Feminine Islamic Identity in Secular France], in Eigen Emancipatie Eerst? Over de rechten en representatie van vrouwen in een multiculturele samenleving [On Rights and Representation of Women in a Multicultural Society], ed. Gily Coene and Chia Longman (Gent: Academia Press, 2005), 95–111. 4 Isabelle Rigoni, ed., Qui a peur de la télévision en couleurs? La diversité culturelle dans les médias (Montreuil: Aux Lieux d’Être, 2007). 5 Several elements of this paper have been published in: Isabelle Rigoni, “Access to Media for European Muslims”, in European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy, ed. Michael Emerson, Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2007), 107–23; “Women Journalists and Women’s Press: Western Europe”, in Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures, ed. Alice Horner and Seteney Shami (Leiden: Brill, 2007), vol. 5, 182–4; “Challenging Notions and Practices: The Muslim Media in Britain and France”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 31(3) (2005), 563–80 (issue on “Media and Minorities in Multicultural Europe”, guest-edited by M. Georgiou & R. Silverstone).
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In France, the topic of religion6 and, more particularly, that of Islam,7 made a real breakthrough in media discourse on immigration at the end of 1990. However, this development took place gradually. In his book L’Islam imaginaire, Thomas Deltombe analyses how the words and images dominant in the media, and political speech, gradually built a Muslim frame of reference by which to identify the French population who originated in the former colonies: Au cours des années 1980, avec l’abandon des grilles de lecture marxiste et l’émergence de la ‘deuxième génération d’immigrés’ sur la scène publique, on assiste à une première évolution: le registre ‘islamique’ a tendance à être de plus en plus mobilisé par les media pour parler d’‘immigrés’ qui ne sont plus, comme c’était le cas dans la décennie précédente, décrits d’abord comme des ‘travailleurs étrangers’.8
Thus, when the question of ‘integration’ is placed at the centre of the debate, recourse to an ‘Islamic’ frame of reference makes it possible to symbolically perpetuate the distancing of a segment of the population which everyone agrees in principle is no longer ‘foreign’. If the media want to be alarmist, they do not need an extreme event in order to raise the subject of Islam.9 Research shows that, generally speaking, the French media depict Islam as a threat to the laws of the Republic, secularism, freedom of expression, women’s rights and, via the terrorism often associated with it, the safety of the country or ‘the West’ as a whole. Cédric Housez stresses that Islam est souvent associé à l’islamisme, qui est présenté pour sa part, suivant une rhétorique importée des cercles néo-conservateurs aux États-Unis, comme un nouveau totalitarisme, comparable au nazisme ou au stalinisme. Cette analogie s’appuie sur des amalgames [improbables] et sur une vision unifiée d’un fondamentalisme musulman et même du monde musulman, qui dénote une méconnaissance totale de l’islam.10
Pierre Pierre and Jean-Paul Willaime, eds, Média et religions en miroir (Paris: PUF, coll. Politique d’aujourd’hui, 2000). 7 Thomas Deltombe, L’islam imaginaire: La construction médiatique de l’islamophobie en France, 1975–2005 (Paris: La Découverte, 2005); Rabah Saddek, L’islam dans le discours médiatique (Beirut: Al-Bouraq, 1998); Alain Gresh, L’islam dans les média (Paris: Centre socio-culturel de la rue de Tanger, 1997). 8 Available at http://oumma.com/article.php3?id_article=1712 (accessed 30 March 2009). 9 Mathieu Rigouste, Les cadres médiatiques, sociaux et mythologiques de l’imaginaire colonial: La représentation de «l’immigration maghrébine» dans la presse française de 1995 à 2002, Mémoire de maîtrise (Nanterre: Université Paris 10, 2002). 10 Cédric Housez, “L’obsession identitaire des médias français”, www.voltairenet.org, 9 March 2006. 6
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Despite a very low tendency towards popularization in the press, some media have maintained the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’. At the time of the controversy over school girls and students wearing hijab, the wellknown weekly L’Express printed banner headlines, such as ‘Hijab: the plot. How Islamists infiltrate us’. In the same magazine, the philosopher André Glucksmann, writing on the situation in Iran and Algeria, declared that ‘Hijab is a terrorist operation. [. . .] In France, the zealous pupils know that their hijab is covered with blood’. The violence of these positions is not isolated and, although they reflect part of public opinion, they also affect the political arena, which is mesmerized by the concept of security. The columnist and chronicler at the weekly Le Point, Bernard Henri Lévy, has used the term ‘fascislamist’ and the leader-writer of the daily Le Figaro, Yvan Rioufol, has written for his part about ‘nazislamist’. These two journalists are not the only ones in France to play these games with language. The satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo, which takes pride of place in the French media for denouncing the ‘islamist threat’11 and distinguished itself at the time of the controversy over the Danish cartoons, published on 1 March 2006 a proclamation entitled “Together against the new totalitarianism”, which also gives credibility to the amalgam between Islamism and Nazism. In Britain, the contribution of Elizabeth Poole12 provides a systematic and thoroughly researched analysis of the ways in which Muslims are represented in the British national press. By examining representations of British Muslims in sections of the mainstream British media and the ways Muslims are identified by different audience groups, Poole shows that coverage is not homogenous. Muslim voices appear mainly in the margins of the papers “while the bulk of coverage shared the news values, constructions and categorizations of its conservative counterparts”.13 Indeed, since the Rushdie affair, the Gulf and Iraqi wars, and September 11, British journalists have put out a number of articles against Islam. Although some dailies such as The Guardian sometimes enlist the cooperation of Muslim journalists, many of them
11 Cédric Housez, “Charlie Hebdo et Prochoix. Vendre le « choc des civilisations » à la gauche”, www.voltairenet.org, 30 August 2005. 12 Elizabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson, Muslims and the News Media (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 13 Poole, Reporting Islam, 249.
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focus on the question of whether Islam is a progressive/rational or a barbaric/irrational religion. Media coverage of global terrorism now sits uneasily alongside that dealing with ordinary British Muslims, whose views are currently in the spotlight. In Spain, issues relating to the wearing of headscarves in schools and the proliferation of satellite dishes have not led to public controversies as in other European countries. However, this does not mean that Islam is more ‘integrated’ into Spanish society or that it does not awaken old fears, sometimes going back to the Moorish conquest. José Bodas and Adriana Dragoevich14 highlighted what Edward W. Said15 demonstrated a few years later: the idea that, in the hegemonic media discourse, Islam and Muslims are often reduced to a series of generalizations and stereotypes that perpetuate the image of an irrational and violent religion that constitutes a threat to the West. Fourteen years later, Laura Navarro returns to this theme by focusing her analysis on the discourse of two mass media: television and the cinema.16 The analysis of many news broadcasts and television debates on international terrorism, the war in Iraq and the Palestinian–Israeli conflict have enabled her to highlight how the ‘hegemonic informative discourse’ feeds the theory of the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ and Islamophobic discourse.17 Similarly, news items relating to, for example, discrimination against women in Arab countries or the controversy over the Danish ‘Mohammed cartoons’ tend to project a culturally biased perspective that presents Islam as the main explanatory factor to the detriment of political, economic and historical factors. The work of Laura Navarro reveals the discursive strategies through which the mass media—specifically Spanish television—(re)construct a radical and conflictual otherness related to Arabs and Muslims—an otherness that has the ring of alarm, and even portends catastrophe. In Italy, as throughout Europe, the discourse on Islam took a new turn after September 11, as Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg explains:
14 José Bodas and Adriana Dragoevich, El Mundo Arabe y su Imagen en los Medios (Madrid: Comunica, 1994). 15 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (London: Vintage, 1997). 16 Laura Navarro, Contra el Islam. La visión deformada del mundo árabe en Occidente (Cordoba: Almuzara, 2008). I particularly thank Laura Navarro for having provided information on Spain for this article. 17 Laura Navarro, Interculturalidad y comunicación: la representación mediática del mundo árabe-musulmán, PhD thesis, Valencia, Universitat de Valencia, 2007.
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isabelle rigoni After September 11, graffiti against Islam and Muslims in Italian cities have replaced those on politics or soccer. In bookshops the translation of Huntington’s work on the clash of civilisations is sold out, while studies on the Arab world are selling well. Classics on Islam are dug out and transferred from the highest bookshelves to the window displays, while studies quickly thrown together are popping out everywhere. In bars and on TV exotic words like ‘jihad’ and ‘mullah’ have become common language.18
As in many European countries, the discourse on Islam and the discourse on immigration are closely linked. In this context, the discourse of the Italian mainstream media is itself closely linked to political debates on the subject.19 Despite national differences, the mainstream media are acting quite similarly across Western Europe, siding from time to time against Islam and Muslims. Due to the processes involved in its production, news tends to be a limited, conservative and consensual product. Journalistic practices in gathering and selecting news are subject to the organizational constraints shaped by their institutional context being embedded in a capitalist system—in other words, attract large audiences with sensational issues. Gradually in the Western world, one thus sees emerging the dualistic image of a bipolar Islam with ‘integrated’ or ‘modern’ Muslims, presented as the majority although they are under-represented when it comes to Islam in the media, opposed to ‘Islamism’, presented as the minority view, while being the position upon which attention is focused. Public discourses of exclusivity, separatism and loyalty are prominent. Based mainly on official formulations, the articles published in the mainstream media represent the strategic, discursive construction of the nation, its identity and culture, in a bid to protect this construction from deteriorating in the interests of the in-group by marginalizing the out-group. Little by little, the figure of the terrorist joins that of the Islamist, legitimating the hardening of immigration policies in both old and new immigration countries. Islam is thus one of the prisms through which populations originating in former colonies are presented and by which is possible to stigmatize them as a group.20 Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg, Building the Enemy: Islamophobia in Italy, http:// inhouse.lau.edu.lb/bima/papers/Ottavia.pdf. 19 Carlo Marletti, Televisione e Islam: Immagini e stereotipi dell’Islam nella comunicazione italiana (Turin: Nuova Eri, 1995); Giulio Soravia, L’immagine dell’Islam nei media italiani, working paper no. 7 (Rome: Commissione per le politiche di integrazione degli immigrati, Dipartimento per gli affari sociali, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, May 1999). 20 Vincent Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie (Paris: La Découverte, 2003). 18
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The Question of Islam and Muslims in the Context of Political Discourses on Diversity 2.1
Recognizing and conceptualizing Islamophobia
Vis-a-vis this situation, and in spite of the diversity of the groupings within Islam, much public discourse put forward by the Muslim communities would like to present Muslims as a unique group, victims of discrimination and inclined to assert certain rights in terms of their status as a minority. In this, the case of Great Britain is typical in Europe. Attempts by Muslims to maintain their faith and practices have sometimes been interpreted as separatism and a threat to ‘traditional British values’, and have led to a questioning of the loyalty of Muslims within Britain’s boundaries. These questions/responses have in turn clearly sharpened the sense of Muslim identity (or identities), and resulted in the politicization of Muslims in Britain, who have put forward numerous demands, including a demand to be recognized as a religious minority, on a par with Jews or Sikhs, rather than as an ethnic minority. However, although Muslims enjoy a significant number of rights as an ethnic group, a report by the Runnymede Trust, which gathered data on instances of ‘Islamophobia’ in the United Kingdom, argued that several events beginning in the early 1980s, such as the Rushdie affair and the Honeyford affair, as well as issues such as halal meat in schools and the Gulf War, pushed debates about Islam into the national public arena. Islamophobia. The word is launched. In the late 1990s, the Runnymede Trust report21 restricted the still limited use of this term to the Anglo-Saxon countries. It was to be imported with a few years into other European countries and continues to be the subject of intense political and scientific debate. For more than ten years, but especially after 11 September 2001, European Muslims have stated that they receive unjust treatment as consequences of educational policies and practices that remain insufficiently sensitive to their culture. This is the case in France, even though it has more Muslim citizens than any other European country: the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants dates back to the 1920s, when 90,000 Muslims migrated to France. Their number has grown quickly from the 1950s, when it stood at one million after
The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia. A Challenge for Us All (London: The Runnymede Trust, Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, 1997). 21
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the Algerian war of independence, to between 4.5 and 5 million today; that is, 8 per cent of the population. However, the fact that France is a secular country and a republic presents several complications for the Muslim population. School girls wearing hijab have been extensively targeted and have become a ‘national problem’.22 One finds similar examples in the area of employment (discrimination in recruitment, in the workplace, in access to training). Little research is available concerning the treatment of Muslim patients in the public health system, even though the media tends to give more and more publicity to this aspect. The two French leitmotifs of secularism and integration have led to ambiguous relations with Islam in general and French Muslims in particular. However, it often remains difficult to provide evidence of discrimination against Muslims: few data are collected which include religion among the indicators. How, then, can one talk about Islamophobia? Does Islamophobia demonstrably exist in social practices, or is it rather racism towards migrants from former colonies? It is relevant to observe the situation in a country such as Spain, whose history is closely tied to the Muslim world. Although the Muslim population in Spain has tripled in the space of a decade to reach 1.5 million in 2008, relations with Islam have a clear historical background. The negative image of Arabs and Muslims in the Spanish social imaginary is intimately linked to the history of the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa—a history characterized for centuries by the constant flow of migration between the two sides of the Strait of Gibraltar (with the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the eighth century until the Reconquista in 1492, and then the expulsion of Muslim converts to Catholicism in the seventeenth century)—and has also contributed to the vision of Islam as a threat. Since the mass exodus of Muslims from Spain to Morocco and other North African territories, life in the Christian kingdom remains dominated by the opposition between Christians and Moors.23
22 Jocelyne Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religious Minority”, in Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbek Haddad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 36–51; Jocelyne Cesari, Musulmans et républicains: Les jeunes, l’islam et la France (Brussels: Complexe, 1998); Françoise Gaspard & Farhad Khosrokhavar, Le foulard et la République, Essais et Documents (Paris: La Découverte, 1995). 23 Gema Martín Muñoz, “El imaginario español sobre el Islam y el Mundo Árabe y su influencia en los medios de comunicación”, in El Mundo Arabe y su Imagen en los Medios, ed. José Bodas and Adriana Dragoevich (Madrid: Comunica, 1994), 279–83.
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Despite often conflicting debates on Islam, the Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia (Spanish Racism and Xenophobia Watch) has not so far made a study of this specific form of racism—Islamophobia. There are no other official reports that provide evidence of the presence and/or development of Islamophobic violence in Spain, although such violence is known to exist. For example, after the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, reports of attacks on mosques appeared in the mass media. Thus, it is difficult to assess the amount or intensity of Islamophobic discrimination in Spain. However, several surveys and studies attest that Islamophobic perceptions exist among the Spanish population. In fact, according to the polls on immigration and racism carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Centre for Sociological Research) and studies such as Calvo Buezas’ work,24 ‘Arabs’ appear as the immigrants most rejected by the Spanish society. Moreover, although Spain is one of the first European countries in which a Cooperation Agreement was signed (in 1992) between the State and the Comisión Islámica de España (ICE, Islamic Commission of Spain), in which a very liberal legal framework was adopted for the exercise of religious freedom by Muslims, the main Muslim associations denounced it as ineffective, especially as regards the right to teach Islam in schools. The Spanish vice-president, Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega, recently announced the reform of the Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa (1980) to better meet the rights of religious minorities in Spain and to mitigate the discrimination against them in relation to the Catholic Church in terms of funding, religious education in schools and legal protection of places of worship.25 In Italy, although the country was largely free of anti-Muslim sentiment during the 1970s and 1980s, perceptions started to change from the 1990s. Growing resentment against immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, and the first racist attacks, targeted the more visible, among whom were migrants from the Maghrib. However, the transition from racism to Islamophobia has not been immediate and depends on several trends, as Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg shows:
24 Tomas Calvo Buezas, Inmigración y universidad. Prejuicios racistas y valores solidarios (Madrid: Complutense, 2001). 25 Juan G. Bedoya, “Las otras religiones piden paso. Musulmanes, protestantes o budistas captan nuevos conversos y rompen el monopolio católico en España”, El País, 9 May 2008.
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isabelle rigoni Islamophobia Italian-style has three trends that interact and feed into each other: the first is the visceral and popular trend, incarnated by the Lega in the North, while in Latium or Tuscany, it is sometimes linked to soccer clubs. A second one is the secular liberal-reactionary trend represented by some editorialists and political scientists. The last one is the Catholic-Crusade trend, headed by some editorialists and by some exponents of the local Church.26
More generally, in Western countries, several studies have shown that the events of September 11 caused an increasingly broad association between Islam, terrorism and fundamentalism. In several countries of the EU, a rise in harassment and violence directed against Muslims and those perceived to be like Muslims was observed after September 11. In France, while the number of racist acts fell overall, the majority of those that took place were related to September 11. In Western Europe, racist violence often includes a clearly religious dimension: places of worship (mosques as synagogues) are often the targets of attacks, and have been partially or totally destroyed. The media, especially the press, sometimes relay information, but the journalistic treatment of policies against discriminations does not manage to counterbalance the often negative reporting of the flow of Muslims migrants to the suburbs (described as no-go areas because of urban violence), which frequently refers to clandestine refugees without papers. This comes before all the Muslim media which, as we shall see, are mobilized against it and denounce this double game of the violence in actions and words. 2.2
Representing Muslims as a ‘visible minority’?
In 1983 in Tampere and then again in 1986 in Cologne and 1988 in the Hague, the Council of Europe organised three conferences around the theme of “media and migrations”, particularly drawing attention to the difficulty for television of taking social plurality into account. These various meetings would stimulate debate at the European level and lead to several recommendations relating to migrants and the media being adopted by the Parliament or the committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe.27 Other parallel recommendations will be
Schmidt di Friedberg, Building the Enemy. Conseil de l’Europe, Recommandation relative aux migrants, aux minorités ethniques et aux médias, no. 1277 (Strasbourg: Conseil de l’Europe, Assemblée parlemantaire, June 1995); Conseil de l’Europe, Recommandation du comité de ministres aux états membres sur les médias et la promotion d’une culture de tolérance, no. R(97)21 (Strasbourg: Conseil de l’Europe, 30 October 1997). 26 27
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aimed at the development of ‘codes of good conduct’ to be adopted by several European television channels in Scandinavia and the AngloSaxon countries. Committed positive actions at the supranational level made it possible to inject dynamics at national levels. However, in spite of the multiplication of fora for debates and exchanges of practice at the European level, initiated by governments, intergovernmental authorities or nongovernmental organizations, some European states, such as France, very often remain unengaged. Admittedly, well-intended voluntary policies aimed at taking into account communities of immigrant origin have existed within the French media for about thirty years,28 initially at the instigation of the Fonds d’Action Sociale (FAS).29 More recently, other public organizations, in particular the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) and the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI), have also intervened in this field; but this very often as a result of various pressures from civil society organizations. Two major periods characterize the evolution of the audio-visual policy of the FAS. In its first initiatives, the FAS gave priority to support for broadcasts (Mosaïque, Rencontres, Premier service) that specifically targeted immigrants and their families, hoping also to sensitize the mainstream. Then the participation of the FAS in financing the broadcast of Saga-Cités between 1991 and 2002 began new strategic era for its television policy: for the first time, the FAS was supporting a broadcast that it had not itself initiated. Fifteen years on, this new strategy has been confirmed as successful, and the FAS and its successors no longer finances specific programmes with a particular public service intention. The FAS now wants to give priority to mainstream programmes (telefilms, documentaries, etc.) to strengthen their role in bringing about more sensitive relations between the various sections of society. In carrying out this strategy, by supporting specific targeted broadcasts, then by widening its strategy with more diversified support for programme production and, finally, by making France 3 its privileged but not exclusive partner, the FAS was the precursor of many initiatives appropriate for increasing the visibility and representation of immigrants within the media.
28 Claire Frachon and Virginie Sassoon, eds, Médias et diversité: De la visibilité aux contenus. Etat des lieux en France, au Royaume-Uni, en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis (Paris: Karthala, Institut Panos, 2008). 29 FAS then became the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (FASILD), and in 2006 the Agence nationale pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances (Acsé).
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However, the extension of the debate on the visibility of people of immigrant origin could not have taken place without the involvement of new actors, initially from civil society, and then extended to public institutions. Although these organizations cannot themselves be defined as institutional actors, their on-going initiatives will make it possible to create awareness among various institutional actors. This development will have a double consequence: on the one hand, it will take the debate about the representation of minorities on television into the public arena, and, on the other, it will cause new actors, directly involved in public policy related to integration or the media, to act in favour of a more balanced media representation of minorities. Among the first actions undertaken by civil society groups was the press conference, organized in September 1999 by the Collectif Egalité, founded by the writer Calixthe Beyala, which brings together mainly artists and intellectuals of African and West-Indian extraction. The message was clear: it intended to denounce the under-representation of blacks in television30 and to call for the application of quotas. Parallel to the Collectif Egalité, and continuing from it, other meetings took place thereafter, calling for better representation of minorities in the media. The Club Averroès, taking a different approach, also played a prominent part in the movement for the representation of minorities in the media. Created in 1997 and chaired by Amirouche Laïdi, it brings together media professionals of any origin as well as elected officials and business leaders. The Club meets with top personnel of the TV channels and launches specific proposals for a different level of representation both on and off the screen. Other movements31 also call for social and media recognition of minorities in society, claiming that this can be brought about, above all, by television. The Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) raised for the first time in public the question of the representation of minorities on television
30 In the view of Marie-France Malonga, there is an ‘overrepresentation’ of Blacks on French TV channels: Marie-France Malonga, “La représentation des minorités dans les séries télévisées françaises: entre construction et maintien des frontières ethniques”, in Qui a peur de la télévision en couleurs?, ed. Rigoni, pp. 221–240. 31 The Collectif des Antillais, Guyanais, Réunionnais created in 2003 by Patrick Karam; the Cercle d’Action pour la Promotion et la Diversité en France (CAPDIV) created the same year by Patrick Lozès to be a voice for Black people; the Club du XXIe siècle, created in 2004 by prominent people of immigrant origin, such as Hakim El-Karoui and Radicha Dati, close adviser of the Minister of the Interior, to develop diversity by promoting equal opportunity.
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in February 1999, but it was particularly following the Collectif Egalité press conference that it began in October of that year to become definitively engaged in action. It was then that the president of the CSA publicly called for a modification of the obligations imposed on the public television channels, France 2 and France 3, to encourage them to take into account the multiethnic and multicultural reality of French society. In 2000, it published the results of a study carried out within its services on the representation of minorities.32 The same year, the Rapport d’activités du CSA included for the first time a section headed ‘Representation of minorities’. In 2004, the CSA wrote to the TV channels instructing them to include in their annual balance sheet a report on initiatives related to these new requirements, in order to make it possible to the evaluate progress in comparison with initiatives undertaken abroad. From January 2006, the CSA began to consider how these new measures could be adapted for radio, for community or confessional TV channels, and for local and overseas television channels, such as the current and future terrestrial and digital television channels. After having contributed to the debate, the CSA today works in alliance with other public organizations, such as the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (HCI), so that declarations and other recommendations are translated into concrete and visible actions. Created in 1989, the HCI is a think-tank which responds to requests from the Prime Minister or interdepartmental committees by giving opinion on the whole range of questions relating to the integration immigrants. As a result of the initiative of one of its members, Zaïr Kedadouche, the HCI became interested in the question of the representation of the immigrants in the media as a factor related to their integration in France. In 2004, the HCI decided to organize with the CSA a conference entitled “Pale Screens? Cultural diversity and common culture in the audio-visual”, following which it proposed to the Prime Minister some principles and recommendations that would advance cultural diversity in the media and increase knowledge of other civilizations.33 In addition, the HCI invited the government to re-examine the legal position concerning the obligations of public television channels, which it considered less explicit than the stipulations planned for private networks. Marie-France Malonga, ed., Présence et représentation des minorités visibles à la télévision française (Paris: CSA, 2000). 33 Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, La diversité culturelle et la culture commune dans l’audiovisuel, Avis du HCI au Premier ministre (Paris, 17 March 2005). 32
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The time for so-called ‘specific’ programmes was over and the authorities, apart from the FASILD, seemed no longer to be interested in producing or broadcasting programmes by and for communities of immigrant origin. It would be necessary to wait for the beginning of the new millennium for politicians, as a result of promptings and even pressure from civil society organizations, to confront again the question of the representation of the whole of French society in the media. Then urban violence of November 2005 brought about even more important political involvement, with the direct intervention of President Chirac. However, the media experienced relatively few repercussions from these various actions. In comparison with the French situation, the British model is quite different. The very significant questions of the British colonial past and its dark periods of violence and domination of its ‘colonial’ subjects influenced migration and integration policies.34 Thus, the official ideologies of ‘inclusion’ and integration were reflected in national legislation which has not only allowed but protected religious and linguistic diversity. In this direction, the British model of tolerance and ‘inclusion’ is very different from the French Jacobin model founded on secularism and the German model based on descent.35 The concerns of the British state around the questions of race and ethnicity are expressed in various public and private organizations (the Commission for Racial Equality, the former Independent Television Commission, the Press Complaints Commission, the National Union of Journalists), which have as a particular objective the promotion of methods, such as codes of good practice, aimed at fairer representation of ethnic minorities in the media. However, whatever their official position, these organizations come up against major limitations on the implementation of their resolve, and thus on their impact. Indeed, while codes of good practice or the opinions these organisations present may influence media practice, none of these tools ultimately has enough authority to make the media act positively in favour of a better representation of ethnic 34 Charles Husband, Liza Beattie and Lia Markelin, The Key Role of Minority Ethnic Media in Multiethnic Societies: Case Study, UK (Brussels: International Media Working Group Against Racism and Xenophobia (IMRAX) and the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), 2000). 35 Marieke Blommesteijn and Hans Entzinger, “Appendix: Report of the Field Studies carried out in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom, 1999”, in Medien und multikulturelle Gesellschaft, ed. Christoph Butterwerge, Gudrun Hentges and Fatma Sarigös (Opladen: Leske und Budrich Verlag, 1999).
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minorities. However, in 2003, the creation of the Office of Communications (OFCOM), a new independent regulatory organization to monitor competition in the communication and audio-visual sectors in the UK, represented the evolution of the British government’s political strategy for the sector. Marking the decline of the legislative approach (policies of positive action), OFCOM has the right to oversee the way in which the media represent or account for the diversity of the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, and in particular of the various ethnic communities. Parallel to this change, the British government engaged in similar initiatives launched by the media industry itself, as its support for the Cultural Diversity Network (CDN) testifies. Created in 2000 on the initiative of the principal operators of audio-visual networks, the CDN aims first to evaluate, and then to self-control, the policies and practices of the various audio-visual operators as regards representation of minorities on screen; it is the organization that best symbolizes the new strategy that is preached today by the British government. In Spain, there is no institutional policy of positive discrimination towards ethnic minorities in the media, such as has existed in Britain. Nor is there any civil society organization, like the Collectif Egalité in France, which could be followed up by public institutions, or a body, like the CDN in Britain, to implement self-regulation and evaluate the policies and practices of the various audio-visual operators with regard to the representation of minorities on the screen. The Spanish government does not have a National Audiovisual Council, and only a few regions such as Catalonia, Navarra and Andalusia, have a broadcasting council, whose function is to advise but not to penalise bad practice. The Conseil Audiovisual Català is one of the most active: it has published several studies on the representation of ethnic minorities in the media36 as well as recommendations on the coverage of immigration in news reporting.37 Neither this type of literature, nor the many codes of conduct developed for journalists, appears to have had a significant impact and Spanish screens continue to offer an under-representation of immigrants and stereotyping of minorities in general. However, it
36 VVAA, “Televisió i immigració”, Quaderns del CAC, 23–24, September 2006; CAC (Servei d’Anàlisi de Continguts), Informacions sobre immigració aparegudes en els teleinformatius d’àmbit català durant els anys 2002, 2003 i 2004 (Barcelona: CAC, 1 April 2005); VVAA, “Mitjans de comunicació i immigració”, Quaderns del CAC, 12 ( January–April 2002), pp. 36–48. 37 http://www.audiovisualcat.net/.
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must be noted that since the 2000s, radio and public television have included in their programme scheduling specific content on immigration and multiculturality.38 In this context, since 2003 Spanish public television has had a slot aimed at Muslims: ‘Islam hoy’. Despite these initiatives, the mainstream media has not really been a vehicle for the views and interests of minorities. Last but not least, in Europe, an increasing number of non-governmental organizations created during the 1990s have shown great a capacity for initiative and invention concerning the representation of minorities in the media. The European network of journalists OnLine/ More Colour in the Media, specialist training centres and various multicultural organizations have been set up in Western European countries with the aim of improving the representation of cultural minorities in media programmes. National experiments also exist, in particular in the Netherlands: Mira Media, an independent organization created in 1986 by the largest migrant organizations; Migrants and the Media, a working group which aims to ensure greater diversity in media coverage and fights for more recruitment of journalists of foreign origin; Multiculturele Televisie Nederland (MTNL), which produces multicultural programmes, etc. In Britain, apart from official and semi-official organizations, several independent ones have arisen such as Migrant Media, a training centre and production company created in 1989 by descendants of immigrants. In France, the Panos Paris Institute has developed the Mediam’Rad programme on ‘diversity media’, whose main objectives are to broaden plurality of opinion and reinforce the diversity of standpoints in the media by promoting diversity media as an alternative source of information and by encouraging lasting partnerships with the mainstream media. In Spain, the centre of research-action XenoMedia works to promote diversity in the media. Based in Barcelona, they are part of the European project ‘Xenoclipse’. Globally, the project aims to gain greater visibility and recognition for ethnic media in Europe and the role they can play to vitalize information on international, intercultural and development issues. We could multiply these examples of good practice. Many European states have adopted various measures in favour of better representa-
38 Laura Navarro, “Los medios de comunicación de las nuevas migraciones”, in III Anuario de la Comunicación del Inmigrante, (Madrid: Etnia Comunicación, 2008), pp. 108–142.
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tion and more representativeness of immigrants in the media. Many non-governmental organizations have played and continue to play a major part in the matter. Nevertheless, it is still immigration that is the dominant issue. In addition, semantic slips are significant, as for example, when lists of ethnic groupings in society are listed without making reference to Muslims. It is in this context that a specifically Muslim media has appeared, as early as the 1970s in the UK and since the 1990s in most of the rest of Europe. 3
Muslim Media in Europe: Emerging Actors
In the past few decades, all the countries of Western Europe have seen the development of media directed specifically at Muslims. These ‘Muslim media’ are both written media—including online and offline—and radio and television stations or broadcasts targeted at the ‘Muslim community’. The European excellence team Minoritymedia39 has listed 89 Muslim media in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands in 2007. Most of them are websites or print media and television is well represented, while radio broadcasts are less important although there are some interesting experiments in Britain, France and Spain (graph 1). The presence of the Muslim media in Britain is older and more visible than in any other European country. The first titles appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, and then increased from the 1970s till today. British Muslim newspapers and magazines such as The Muslim News, Q-News, Crescent International, Impact International, Emel, Trends; media committees such as The Muslim Council of Britain and the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR); and radio stations such as Radio Ummah and Radio Ramadan have taken advantage of emerging communication and information opportunities to produce alternative views to the mainstream. While the older generation of immigrants
39 Minoritymedia is a Marie Curie Excellence Team financed by the European Union, directed by Isabelle Rigoni, and hosted by the Migrinter research centre at the University of Poitiers. Its research focuses on the study of ethnic media in a comparative and multidisciplinary perspective (see http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/migrinter/ minoritymedia/index_eng.html). I thank here particularly Souley Hassane, Laura Navarro Garcia, Eugénie Saitta and Marleen de Witte for their census of the Muslim media in Britain, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands respectively. I myself researched the situation in France and included some information about Germany.
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35
Number of Media
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 webzines
printed press
radio webradio Type of Media
TV
webTV
Graph 1. Number of Muslim Media per Type in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (2007)—Minoritymedia
has given the Muslim media the benefit of their own experiences, the younger generation has brought new blood and new ideas. Although they are all written in English and most are distributed free of charge in bookshops and associations, many of the British Muslim media are also distributed in countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Malaysia and sometimes too in Canada and the United States. The situation is very different in France where Muslim media as such have developed very recently. Until the late 1990s, ethnic and religious media were much more oriented towards a specific community of immigrants (i.e., Algerians, Moroccans, Turks, etc.) than towards a community of believers. Some Muslim magazines—Hawwa and La Medina (the best known); Réflexions (Saphir-Médiations group), Columbus, Actualis (the magazine of the Union of Islamic Organisations in France)—were created between 1998 and 2003 but they have all disappeared, while La Medina became a website (sezame.info). Some Internet magazines such as oumma.com, Saphirnews.com and Aslim Taslam still struggle to make their voices heard. There are no exclusively Muslim radio stations, although some radio stations, such as Beur FM and Radio Méditerranée, attract large Muslim audiences. In Spain too, the Muslim media are newer than in Britain. The first appeared in the second half of the 1990s, shortly after the signing of the Cooperation Agreement between Spain and the Comisión Islámica de España (1992). The first media were in print (Verde Islam, founded in 1995) and the online press (Revista Amanecer del nuevo siglo, established in 1997), but little by little, the portals and blogs have become the
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most numerous. The most visited portal is webislam.com, created in 1997 by Andalusian converts to Islam; it receives hits from 112 countries. According to the media, 50% of these are from the United States, 20% from Spain and the rest from Latin America (especially Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil). This website seeks to become a reference for the Spanish-speaking Muslim community throughout the world. Most recently, online radio stations have appeared, such as radio Inforislam, created in 2006 by the Islamic association Badr in Melilla, an association composed mainly of Spanish converts who are very active in the Muslim mediascape. Although the majority of the Muslim media have been created by Spanish Muslims (whether converts or Muslims by birth), some have been established by Muslim immigrants, most of Moroccan origin, as well as some Middle Easterners. These media resulting from Muslim immigration are mainly located in Madrid and Valencia. In Italy, Islam is the second religion in terms of numbers of adherents, and the majority of them are immigrants. Growing opposition to Islam in Italian public opinion and some unpleasant statements by leaders of various organizations have led some Muslims who used to keep silent to take sides. As Ottavia Schmidt di Friedberg points out: For some Muslim intellectuals of a secular background, it is precisely the existence of prejudice against Islam that forces them to ‘come out’. They have sometimes built very sophisticated and wide-ranging social networks and they are deeply rooted in the local environment. Today they perceive the national discourse against Islam as a threat to a lifetime of adaptation, learning and compromise. They react by suddenly activating their religious identity and by using it to re-negotiate their position within their Italian social network.40
In this context, Italian Muslims have started since the mid-2000s to create and use Muslim media, such as Musulmaniditalia.com—Il portale della socità civile dei musulmani d’Italia. In Germany,41 the monthly magazine Die Islamische Zeitung plays a prominent role in the Muslim media scene. Die Islamische Zeitung was
Schmidt di Friedberg, Building the Enemy. For an outline of the themes of media, migration and Islam in Germany, based on the case of people originating from Turkey, see Rainer Geissler and Horst Pöttker, eds, Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005); Rüdiger Lohlker, Islam im Internet. Formen muslimischer Religiosität im Cyberspace (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 2004); Kai Hafez, ed., Media and Migration: Ethnicity 40 41
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created in 1994 mainly by German converts to Islam, such as Abu Bakr Rieger (director) and Sulaiman Wilms (chief editor). As in several other Western European countries, the role of converts is very important for the development of Muslim media, but in Germany they have played an even more prominent part in the public arena than has been the case in most other countries.42 Die Islamische Zeitung defends a position often considered conservative and considers Islam to be not a culture but a religion for everyone. Its influence on politics seems less important than The Muslim News in Britain, for example, but it remains one of the leading Muslim media in Germany. Besides media put out by associations, other Muslim media are Al-Raid (Islamischer Informationsdienst e. V.), Dunia (Teblig), Enfal (Turkish language web magazine), Huda (Netzwerk für muslimische Frauen e. V.—network for Muslim women). 3.1
Between acculturation process and lobbyist strategies
In contrast to several transnational theses, Muslim media and medialinked pressure groups in civil society are showing through their actions and demands that they have a respect for the state, which is considered to be the repository of normative power.43 In Western European countries, the Muslim media and most Muslim solidarity movements are working for full inclusion in the European nation-states. Acting from within, they fully recognize the legitimacy of the state. In the same way, most (69%) Muslim media use the dominant language of the country/region in which they are established as their only language (graph 2). This figure seems to contradict the alarmist discourse on communitarianism. As language is a strong cultural vector, the use of the language of the majority at the expense of the languages of countries of origin is an expression of a process of acculturation. The reasons for the use of the language of the majority are numerous. It and Transculturality in the Media Age (Schwerpunktheft der Zeitschrift NORD-SÜD aktuell 4, Göttingen, 2001); Heribert Schatz, Christina Holtz-Bacha and Jörg-Uwe Nieland, eds, Migranten und Medien (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000); Kira Kosnick, “Building Bridges: Media for Migrants and the Public-Service Mission in Germany”, European Journal of Cultural Studies, 3 (2000), 319–42. 42 Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, Konversion zum Islam in Deutschland und den USA (Frankfurt/M: Campus, 1999). Another significant example, the convert Murad Hofmann, former German ambassador in Algeria and Morocco, and director of information at NATO, is an important member of the Central Council of the Muslims which supported the recent adoption of the Islamic Charter of the German Muslims. 43 Jürgen Habermas, Droit et Démocratie: entre faits et normes (Paris: Gallimard, 1997); M.W. Foley and B. Edwards, “The Paradox of Civil Society”, Journal of Democracy, 7(3) (1996), 38–52.
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69% 70% 60% Percentage
50% 40% 30% 12%
20%
12% 7%
10% 0% majority
majority + minority majority + minorities
minority
Languages
Graph 2. Languages used by the Muslim media in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (2007)—Minoritymedia
may result from a choice to open up to society and thus a decision to go beyond the immediate community to reach a multicultural audience for a didactic purpose. The language of the majority, often language of the colonizer, is also a shared language for the majority of Muslims living in the country and is the native language of Muslim nationals. Finally, the choice of language sometimes reflects a strategy on the part of media actors who wish to make their voices heard at the political level. The example of Spain and the case of Catalonia where Catalan is the language used by most Muslim media is particularly illustrative. In this autonomous community—as in Andalusia—most of the Muslim media have been created by converts to Islam. In these media, it is interesting to see how the discourse to defend Islam is linked to the Catalan nationalist discourse. Consider this extract from the blog of the Junta Islamica Catalana ( JIC): “Among the objectives of the JIC is the promotion of Catalinita of Muslim immigration, work for the recovery of the Islamic memory of Catalonia and the consideration of Islam as a component of the national identity of Catalonia”.44 By contrast, 19% of the Muslim media listed by Minoritymedia combine majority and minority languages (usually a language of a country of origin, except for some Spanish Muslim media that are bilingual Spanish and English) and 12% use only one minority language (almost exclusively in Britain).
44
http://islamcatala.wordpress.com.
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In addition to a majority use of the dominant language of the various European countries, the Muslim media choose a rather national circulation/broadcast range. Apart from web media, Muslim newspapers and broadcasts are primarily aimed at national dissemination (85%) rather than local (13%) or international (2%) (graph 3). This trend is particularly clear in the cases of Britain and the Netherlands, while local and international broadcasts tend to be more prevalent in France and Spain. As well an objective for many Muslim media actors and a consequence of these rather national-oriented media, Muslim media are challenging concepts of citizenship in Western European countries. The consequent upheavals in the relations to boundaries and territory lead to the reinterpretation of political questions (e.g., the representation of minorities/Muslims in the public arena) and juridical issues (e.g., the status of Islam). In some cases, Muslim media have changed Muslim perceptions of Muslim citizens (Britain) or Muslim nationals (France, and have made clear the involvement of British and French Muslims in the home affairs of the two countries. In Britain in particular, the Muslim media have become skilled and demanding discussion partners, who (try to) exert significant pressure on local and national authorities. In the European countries studied by Minoritymedia, most of the Muslim media show deep concern for the notions and practices relating to citizenship and inclusion in multicultural and multi-religious societies. For young Muslims, the challenge is to show that they can be Muslims and Republicans in France, or Muslims and British in Britain. 30 30
Number
25 20
16
international national local
15 10 5 5
1
4
3
1
0 printed press
radio Type of media
television
Graph 3. Type of diffusion of the Muslim media in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (2007)—Minoritymedia
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For young Muslim women in particular, the challenge is to show that they can ‘fit their citizenship with their femininity’, as the journalist Saïda Kada wrote in the French Muslim magazine Hawwa.45 3.2
Media oriented towards Muslims and the Muslim world
Despite strong involvement at the national, and to a lesser extent the local, level, the Muslim media in Europe are strongly oriented toward Muslims and the Muslim world. Nearly 70% of Muslim media target only the Muslim population, while 30% target both Muslims and a multicultural or undifferentiated population. A more accurate reading by country (graph 4) shows that the Muslim media are specifically targeting the Muslim population in Britain (98%) and France (75%), while they are directed at both Muslims and society as a whole in the Netherlands (60%) and particularly in Spain (85%). Monitoring of media content confirms that a substantial majority of Muslim media focus is on a productions dedicated to and dealing with the Muslim minority. Whether they cover news, politics, economy, culture, history, or practical information, they deal mainly with the Muslim minority in Europe or in Muslim countries. So almost 70% of the Muslim media target a Muslim audience, and almost all of them deal almost exclusively with the minority they aim to represent. 98%
100% 85%
90%
75%
Percentage
80% 70%
60%
60%
50%50%
50%
40%
40% 25%
30% 20%
Série1 Série2
15%
10%
2%
0% Spain
France
Britain Countries
Italy
Netherlands
Graph 4. Target populations of Muslim media in France, Britain, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (2007)—Minoritymedia
45
Hawwa Magazine, no. 2, 2000, p. 22.
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The Muslim media mostly appeal to the Muslim minority, and they help to redefine its collective identity. This ‘neo-communitarianism’ takes on several aspects. (Re-)Construction of a collective identity can be established through a discourse on memory (classicly analysed by sociologists of immigration) or discrimination (a very recent scheme, which can be illustrated by the positions taken by some Muslims vis à vis the discourse on Islamophobia). But this ‘neo-communitarianism’ can also lead to the construction of a transnational community gathered around a unifying diasporic discourse on a global identity, as is the case for other ethnic media such as Roma and Armenian media, and some Afro-Caribbean media. 4
Engendering Muslim Media
The Muslim younger generation is becoming increasingly involved in the Muslim media in several European countries. They notably insist on the need to go beyond generational as well as national conflicts between Muslims of different backgrounds. They also aim to go beyond the postcolonial ideologies adopted by the European states towards Islam, and rather emphasize dialogue with national and European institutions. Last but not least, the younger generation seems open to women’s participation. 4.1
Access to production and management positions
In several Western countries, Muslim women have access to prominent roles as heads of magazines and associations or as conference organizers.46 This is particularly striking in Britain where women are newsreaders or produce programmes on Islam Channel, Radio Faza, or Radio Whitechapel Mosque. Britain still remembers political programmes by Yvonne Ridley, who converted to Islam after her detention by the Taliban. Her spell on the Islam Channel and Al Jazeera has opened up many opportunities for female Muslim journalists. In particular, there 46 The following portraits have been more extensively described and analysed in Rigoni, “Women Journalists”; Isabelle Rigoni, “Islamic Features in French and British Community Media”, in Muslims and the News Media, ed. Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 74–86; Isabelle Rigoni, “Médias musulmans britanniques. Les voix de la jeune génération”, in Faire figure d’étranger: regards croisés sur la production de l’altérité, ed. Claire Cossée, Emmanuelle Lada and Isabelle Rigoni, coll. Sociétales (Paris: Armand Colin, 2004), 281–300.
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are women at the head of lifestyle magazines which present a ‘positive image of the Muslim community’. This is the case with Emel, a chic ‘urban’ magazine created by Sarah Joseph, whose team is predominantly female and which shows Islam beyond doctrinal affiliations. Sarah Joseph was the first woman to become editor-in-chief of a Muslim magazine in Britain. Of Jewish origin, she converted to Islam at the age of sixteen and studied religion at university. After her experience at the helm of Trends in the second half of the 1990s, she reoriented her career towards consulting in Islamic affairs and teaching training courses. However, she is still a presence in the media, with appearances on televised programmes such as Panorama and Dimbleby. Other pioneers include Sara Kahn, the president of Young Muslim Sisters, and Rehana Sadiq, who played a key role in the creation of the female branch of Young Muslims UK at the end the 1980s, and then became an active member of the Islamic Society of Britain, a lobbying group associated with Muslim media organizations, which broadcasts on the Internet. Since then, other young women have risen to production and management positions. Shagufta Yaqub became the editor-in-chief of the news and analysis monthly Q-News in 2000 at the age of 24. She was replaced in 2004 by Fareena Alam, another recent university graduate. These young women often come from families who immigrated in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of them say they ‘rediscovered’ faith during their adolescence or in the transition to adulthood. Their religious commitment is intellectualized and their Islamic practice is reinterpreted. Particularly telling is the case of young British women who grew up in families where the practice of Islam was not always common and who started to wear the hijab as adults, sometimes after a stay in a Muslim country in the Middle East or the Maghrib. In a Western context and in a country where Islam is not the religion of the majority, the decision to wear the hijab is an especially strong statement. Some of these young women explain it in terms of a personal quest for spirituality, others as proof of their political engagement in a world where they consider Islam to be under threat, and for some, both reasons are equally relevant. Other young women active in the Muslim media came from families who were more religious and they benefited from this spiritual heritage or, more simply, from the religious values and morals passed on to them from their parents. Although these women reinvent and adapt religious practices, their personal development does not constitute a rediscovery of their faith. The vast majority of these women have a strong academic background, and are active
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and often unmarried and without children. They are part of this trend reported by two journalists at Q-News: Emerging statistics show numbers of Muslim women in university outweighing Muslim men, and marrying ages among degree-educated Muslim women are rising. [. . .] They challenge the ‘married as soon as possible’ stereotypes and are functions of a wider emerging culture of university entry [. . .]. Such women play an important role in paving the way for younger siblings and women in their families and communities.47
In contrast to their mothers and sometimes their older sisters, they have always preferred the public arena to the domestic sphere. The knowledge, lightness of touch and aesthetic content in their work, especially as it is not affiliated with transnational Islamic movements, is likely to attract a British non-Muslim audience. In programmes such as Yvonne Ridley’s and in Emel Magazine or Q-News, these women present a positive message on the status, place and situation of women in Islam. The role of young women in the Muslim media in other European countries is also worth noting, despite its more recent and limited development. In France, Hawwa, a print magazine specifically targeting young Muslim women was founded in 2000. Its staff, mostly female, was directed by Dora Mabrouk, a young woman of Maghribi heritage. In launching it, she intended to create a platform for the ‘women’s struggle’ and to “allow women to brighten up through social engagement, which is what is needed for her own poise as well as that of her family and society”.48 Hawwa addresses women who wish to assert themselves as women, both French and Muslim. More recently, in 2008, the French Muslim website oumma.com has created Oumma pour Elle (Umma for her) with a webTV broadcast and dedicated blog ‘Hijab and the city’ (and its subtitle ‘don’t believe the hype!’) launched by six young ‘urban’ women. The targets are “(Veiled) women, charming and trendy, charming and distinguished, intelligent and on the lookout for any news, annoyed by the assigned image of neglected woman”.49 The blog is attractive and intends to offer “a space that allows the (veiled) women her femininity! With its ace hostesses, and its social elite sections, this blog would like to offer you, (veiled) women from all walks of life, (veiled) women and unmarried, (veiled) women and married,
47 48 49
Fauzia Ahmad and Imran Tyrer, Q-News, 364, November 2005. Hawwa Magazine, no. 1, 2000, p. 3. http://www.hijabandthecity.com.
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(veiled) women and mothers, the opportunity to live your femininity as Muslim and Western women.”50 The founders of and contributors to Hawwa and Oumma pour Elle are almost all educated Muslim women who were born or have grown up in France. Both ‘puritan and rebellious’,51 these young Muslim women discover and promote innovative practices in everyday life. In Spain and Italy by contrast, Muslim women only create blogs and are less involved in more traditional media such as newspapers or radio. While some women mention the difficulties they have faced in finding a place in the mainstream media, their strong commitment to and participation in Muslim media is the result of a personal choice closely tied to their religious activism. This choice does not prevent them from occasionally contributing to the mainstream media, particularly since September 11, 2001. These contributions are considered complementary to their involvement in the Muslim media, and at the same time, serve both pedagogical (i.e., presenting information about Islam) and advertising purposes (i.e., by providing exposure to Muslim media). 4.2
Renewed media contents?
Some socio-historical studies have shown that in the mainstream media, women are able to innovate with new editorial styles and give a voice to different topics of particular interest to women. The emergence of ‘women’s pages’ in the US press in the early twentieth century has not only contributed to the increase of women in the profession, but has also provided a forum for disseminating feminist debates.52 Created by newspaper editors to attract women readers and advertisers targeting women, they have admittedly enabled middle-class and educated women to emerge from the domestic sphere, but they were set to produce ‘human stories’ and sensationalism, covering ‘people’, changes in fashion or domestic issues, and they were therefore not considered ‘serious’ journalism. Nevertheless, they have given rise to new ways of doing journalism. For example they subverted the conventional values of the 1950s by introducing discussions on the inequality of opportunities for men and women in employment and wages, education of children,
http://www.hijabandthecity.com. Nadine Weibel, Par-delà le voile: Femmes d’islam en Europe (Brussels: Complexe, 2000). 52 Deborah Chambers, Linda Steiner and Carole Fleming, Women and Journalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 50 51
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divorce, abortion, etc. Similarly, new practices, such as involving readers by answering their mail or treating the lives of ‘ordinary’ people as newsworthy, were born in these pages. In the Anglo-Saxon alternative press produced by and for women (born in the early nineteenth century in the United States and Britain), women journalists had a vision of the political, cultural and social role of women largely different from that which was broadcast in the dominant mass media. They have also promoted and supported the social movements of women (suffragettes, and later the feminist movement). The ethnic media field, particularly that established by Muslims, also includes its ‘women’s pages’, which have helped to introduce new topics or, in some cases, a different treatment of information. Our study of Muslim media focused on a series of questions related to gender relations. Do the media spaces invested in by women allow them to propose a different image of Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular? How have they been able to promote different topics or question differently themes related to women? Furthermore, how does respect for Muslim identity in a process of collective self-representation in the public arena propose (or not) a gender dimension to this definition of the self? How, for example, could women be guarantors of the culture and collective memory of the minority group which they belong? Does it produce role expectations? Are issues such as the obligation of girls to retain their virginity until marriage, or the banning of marriage to non-Muslims, often presented as crucial matters, discussed in the Muslim media? What are the consequences for inter-generational relations? Finally, how is the aspiration to universalism undermined by differential and even essentialist positioning? The feminization of journalism, which the Muslim media has not escaped, seems to go hand in hand with a certain ‘Islamic feminism’ of globalized type,53 which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, and was promoted by educated urban women who sometimes went as far as contesting the male monopoly on the defence and practice of Islam.54 These young women are fighting for a new and theorized practice of Islam. Their adherence to Islam is often a reaction to that of their parents, which they view as an archaic form of religion, where simply
53 Fariba Adelkhah, Etre moderne en Iran (Paris: Karthala, 1998); Nilüfer Göle, Musulmanes et modernes: Voile et civilisation en Turquie (Paris: La Découverte, 1993). 54 Farhad Khosrokhavar, L’Islam des jeunes (Paris: Flammarion, 1997).
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belonging to the group motivates and justifies the adherence. It is also a reaction against a sexist reading of Islam. These ‘new Islamist women intellectuals’ often possess a university degree and experience their faith as a means of self-affirmation. Their involvement also reflects an attempt to combine more gender equality with religious practice, engagement on the public arena, and the defence of a minority identity. Far from being a British phenomenon, this trend has been observed in continental Europe.55 This stream of thinking, in which femininity and feminism are intertwined, is particularly apparent in several publications of the European Muslim press. It allows the creation of new sections on topics such as children’s books, singles issues, and marital problems. Women’s concerns and the medical aspects of sexuality are no longer taboo: for the first time since the end of the 1990s, a number of Muslim magazines such as Q-News in Britain, Hawwa in France and others in Spain address questions pertaining to sexuality, contraception, infertility, sodomy, and lesbian relations. Likewise, the general theme of interpersonal relationships between men and women is discussed with greater regularity. Classified ads have started to appear in the print media as well as on the websites of some Muslim organizations, such as the Islamic Society of Britain, in which single and divorced Muslims, converts included, look for their soulmates within the shelter of their common faith. Beyond these changes related to media sections, a discourse notably promoted in the editorial written by women shows the depth of restatements related to religion. This is certainly the most obvious change. These young graduate women dream of a ‘purer Islam’—a version of Islam that they deem original, unencumbered either by some of the constraints of patriarchal societies or by cultural deviations that mar its universalist mission. Their discourse sometimes evokes the nostalgia of an Islam of the past which they represent as egalitarian between men and women. Veiled or not, they are fighting for a redefinition of the ‘Muslim female identity’, with a shift of emphasis from the object (Islam) to the subject (themselves as individuals). For them, changes will be brought about by individuals and not by groups or by the system. They strive to rid themselves of the image of traditional femininity,
55 Valérie Amiraux, Acteurs de l’islam entre Allemagne et Turquie: Parcours militants et expériences religieuses (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001); Isabelle Rigoni, Mobilisations et enjeux des migrations de Turquie en Europe de l’Ouest (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001); Weibel, Par-delà le voile.
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in order to acquire a social identity. These young, religiously active, urban women no longer look to Islam as a promise of a collectively egalitarian way of life, but rather as a means to attain personal and individual affirmation or even liberation. Farzina Alam, a 22 years old journalist, speaks about her own experience at Q-News: I was surrounded by lovely, intelligent and fun—and most important for me, women who had all made the active choice to wear the hijab during their adulthood, rather than through family pressure. These women were cool. They travelled, they appreciated the arts, they were articulate and they were strong. They didn’t wear the hijab and immediately shrivel up into homely wives whose only passion was to cook a different cuisine everyday. These women were out to inspire others and to change the world.56
In this context, the hijab is more like a choice a constraint. Most young journalists from Q-News began working for the magazine when they were not veiled. In many cases, the hijab is chosen during adulthood, by personal conviction or in response to an unfavourable socio-political context (i.e. Islamophobia).57 Often, wearing the hijab brings young women additional resources in terms of moral legitimacy vis-à-vis the family and/or the Muslim population as a whole. However, these women’s discourse cannot be limited to communitarianism, as illustrated by Farzina Alam: I was raised a Muslim and considered myself a practising one—but faith as a public identity marker was alien to me. It was my religion but not so much my community.58
Finally, other women have chosen not to wear the hijab, like some journalists at the monthly Hawwa or the webTV Oumma pour Elle in France. Last but not least, women have contributed to the renewal of the Muslim media discourse related to the fight against discrimination. The issue of discrimination, often linked to that of Islamophobia, is frequently mentioned by Muslim journalists. Young women journalists have particularly contributed to highlighting the theme of antidiscrimination insofar as some are perceiving a double discrimination against them: as women in a patriarchal society and as Muslims in a
56 57 58
Q-News, issue 366, May 2006. The Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia; La Nouvelle islamophobie. Q-News, 366, May 2006.
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predominantly non-Muslim society. Fareena Alam’s words illustrate well this state of mind: Islam ‘liberates’ women, but for how long will we hide the very real inequalities in our communities, behind this cliché? I love my hijab, but how can I go along with the wishful-thinking that hijabis are automatically de-sexualised just because their cover their hair? How can I feign ignorance of the fact that the hijab has, sadly, not proven to be a barrier to teenage pregnancy or drug and alcohol abuse, so rife in Pakistani and Bengladeshi communities in Britain?59
For this young Muslim journalist as for others, faith liberates the feminine ‘individuality’ but cannot hide the fact that women are still victims of flagrant inequalities, both within and outside the Muslim community. Conclusion The combination of different socio-political factors described in this article raises questions about the formation of a ‘new religious public sphere’, in our case Muslim, in Europe. Like the new perceptions of identity and territory that, according to Benedict Anderson,60 the development of the printed press has contributed to raising among their ‘imagined communities’ of readers, we can consider that the new media—particularly the ethnic, and in this case Muslim, med—and the dynamics they carry and help create, are about to produce ‘new areas’ where still changing borders are already meeting with social actors associated with the sense of sharing, in confidence, a common language.
59 60
Q-News, Editorial, 361, March 2005. Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, Verso: New York, 1991.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RELIGIOUS FEELINGS Niraj Nathwani1 1
Introduction
On 30 September 2005, Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper based in Aarhus, published a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. The newspaper had invited members of the Danish Newspaper Illustrators’ Union to draw the Prophet Muhammad as they saw him. Of about 40 invited cartoonists, twelve responded to the invitation and the drawings were published under the illustrators’ names.2 An accompanying text read: “Some Muslims reject modern, secular society. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with secular democracy and freedom of expression, where one has to be ready to put up with scorn, mockery and ridicule.” The publication of the cartoons caused a major crisis in Denmark and later in the world. The chronology of the crisis is well known and there is no need to repeat it here. The crisis raises the following human rights questions: • What are the limits of the freedom of expression? • Can the freedom of expression be limited to protect religious feelings? • If so, is the protection of religious feelings mandatory or just optional? All these questions will be approached with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
1 The author is programme manager of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna, Austria, and author of Rethinking Refugee Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003). The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author and should not be attributed to the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2 These facts were established by the Danish Director of Public Prosecution in his decision of 15 March 2006, File No. RA-2006–41–0151.
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niraj nathwani 2 Freedom of Expression and the Right to Offend, Shock or Disturb
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has consistently held in a long string of cases that the freedom of expression protected by Art 10 of the ECHR protects not only “the information or ideas that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also those that offend, shock or disturb; such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broad-mindedness without which there is no democratic society.”3 Monica Macovei observes that it is characteristic for Article 10 to protect expression which carries a risk of damaging or actually damages the interests of others. Usually, the opinions shared by the majority or by large groups do not run the risk of interference by the states. This is why the protection afforded by Article 10 also covers information and opinions expressed by small groups or one individual even where such expression shocks the majority.4
The protection of freedom of expression is especially important for individuals or groups who voice views or attitudes which do not correspond to dominant views. Thus, it is especially such individuals or groups who most need and benefit from the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression would be quite hollow if it were limited to the expression of opinions that correspond to dominant views. Such a limited freedom of expression would most likely not be needed because, as historical experience even during oppressive regimes indicates, opinions which correspond to dominant views are likely not to be in danger of being prohibited or censored anyway. The enabling of the expression of views which are not dominant is the very core purpose of Article 10 ECHR. This includes also the right to offend, shock or disturb.
3 Judgments of the ECtHR in: Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Appn. No. 5493/72, 7.12.1976, Series A, No. 24; Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, Appn. No. 6538/74, 26.4.79, Series A, No. 30; Lingens v. Austria, Appn. No. 9815/82, 8.7.86, Series A, No. 103; Oberschlick v. Austria, Appn. No. 11662/85, 23/05/1991, Series A, No. 204; Jersild v. Denmark, Appn. No. 15890/89, 23/09/1994, Series A, No. 298; Dichand and Others v. Austria, Appn. No. 29271/95, 26/02/2002 http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view. asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&source=tkp&highlight=dichand&sessionid= 9886926&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 8 May 2008). 4 Macovei, Monika, Freedom of Expression: A Guide to the Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), p. 15.
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The right to offend, shock or disturb is important to prevent any “chilling effect”5 on the freedom of expression. The speaker should feel at ease and confident that he/she is at liberty to speak freely; otherwise, there is a risk that something important and valuable will not be said, out of fear.6 What is offensive, shocking or disturbing is more subjective than objective. It is not clearly foreseeable for the speaker what will be seen as offensive, shocking or disturbing. Thus, it is better to protect all offensive, shocking or disturbing expressions to avoid a chilling effect on otherwise important and valuable expressions. Another consideration is that the protection of offensive, shocking and disturbing expressions offers especially protection to minorities, whose expressions could otherwise easily be construed as offensive, shocking and disturbing by the majority, whose values and preferences are reflected in what is acceptable in a society. For example, a dominant religious majority could define any deviation from its religious orthodoxy as offensive insult to its religious sensibility; thus, religious minorities could not practise or voice their beliefs without ‘insulting’ the majority religion. If offensive, shocking and disturbing expressions could be limited per se, minorities would find it more difficult to express themselves or their protest against the norms created by the majority. Thus, the protection of offensive, shocking and disturbing expressions tends to protect minorities and their expressions. 3
Content-based Restrictions on the Freedom of Speech
As a principle, the freedom of expression extends to any expression, regardless of its content.7 Limitations of the freedom of expression must be viewpoint neutral.8 This principle is important to protect individuals from censorship of their ideas. 5 This term comes from US constitutional doctrine: see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The term was used by the ECtHR in the grand chamber judgment in the Case of Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania, App No. 33348/96, 17/12/2004, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004–XI, para. 114. 6 See Frowein, Jochen, “Meinungsfreiheit und Demokratie”, Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, vol. 35, nos. 6–9 (2008), pp. 117–121. 7 Macovei, Freedom of Expression, p. 7. 8 The US Supreme Court decided in the landmark case of R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, (90–7675) 505 U.S. 377 (1992), that a prohibition of racist symbols was unconstitutional because it violated the freedom of expression protected under the US
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This principle can be traced back to the ideas of Voltaire and John Stuart Mill. S.G. Tallentyre summed up the thinking of Voltaire on this matter as follows: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”9 In the same spirit, John Stuart Mill stated: “If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”10 This principle is also the reason why the US Supreme Court did not accept the prohibition of racist symbols.11 One exception to this principle, in the form of a content-based restriction on the freedom of expression, applied by the European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) and the ECtHR, is the dissemination of ideas promoting racism and the Nazi ideology, and incitement to hatred and racial discrimination.12 There are historical reasons for this exception, which is based in international law (Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).13 The ECtHR has stated that there is no doubt that expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection afforded by Art 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression. But the ECtHR added that only statements that call for a certain level of violence qualify as hate speech.14 According to Macovei, this is the only content-based restriction of the freedom of expression under the ECMR.15
Constitution. The main argument delivered by Justice Scalia was that prohibitions of speech need to be content-neutral and that the emotive impact of speech is not sufficient to justify a limitation. 9 Tallentyre, S.G., The Friends of Voltaire (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific 2003), p. 199 (originally published 1906). 10 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty (London: Penguin Classics, 1985), p. 76 (originally published in 1859). 11 See n. 8 above. 12 Macovei, Freedom of Expression, p. 7. 13 ECmHR, Kühnen v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Application No. 12194/86, 12/05/1988, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&port al=hbkm&action=html&source=tkp&highlight=k%FChnen&sessionid=9890097&ski n=hudoc-en (accessed 8 May 2008); ECmHR, D.I. v. Germany, Appn. No. 26551/95, 18 October 1995 (unpublished); Jersild v. Denmark, 23/09/1994, Appn. No. 15890/89, Series A no. 298; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23/09/1998, Appn. No. 24662/94, Reports 1998–VII. 14 ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, Appn. No. 35071/97, 4 December 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003–XI, para. 51. 15 Macovei, Freedom of Expression, p. 7.
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However, the ECtHR has also established another content-based limitation of the freedom of expression, which serves the purpose of protecting the feelings of religious believers.16 The decisions of the ECtHR that established this content-based limitation will be analysed briefly in the following section. 4
The Protection of Religious Feelings and Freedom of Expression
Three leading cases in the ECtHR deal with this issue: Otto-PremingerInstitut v. Austria, Wingrove v. the United Kingdom and more recently I.A. v. Turkey. 4.1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria17 The case concerned the film Das Liebeskonzil directed by Werner Schröter. The film, released in 1981, portrays God, Jesus Christ and his mother Mary in a sexually offensive manner. The Austrian public prosecutor became active at the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic Church on the basis of a section of the Austrian penal code on “disparaging religious doctrines”. The film was intended to be shown in an arts cinema at late night showings but was seized before its first showing. The question before the Court was whether the seizure of the film had violated freedom of expression under the ECHR. The Court confirmed its previous decisions that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. It is applicable not only to expressions that are favorably received or
16 The ECmHR dealt with the protection of religious feelings as early as 1982. The facts in the case X. Ltd. and Y v. UK were as follows: the applicants were publisher and editor of a journal for homosexuals and were found guilty of the common law offence of blasphemous libel in connection with the publication of a certain poem. The applicants complained that this conviction amounted to an unjustified interference with their freedom of expression under Art. 10 ECHR. Their complaints were considered inadmissible by the ECmHR because manifestly ill-founded. The ECmHR observed that the offence of blasphemy was necessary for the protection of rights of others, including protection of religious feelings, in a democratic society. See X. Ltd. and Y v. UK, Appn. no. 8710/79, 7/5/1982, D.R. 28, pp. 77–89, at p. 83. 17 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Judgment of the ECtHR, 20/09/1994, Appn. No. 13470/87, Series A no. 295.
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regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector of the population. However, according to the Court, the ECHR permits states to create legislation limiting freedom of expression to avoid as far as possible expressions that are “gratuitously offensive to others” and which therefore do not contribute to any form of public debate capable of furthering progress in human affairs. Freedom of expression also needs to be balanced against other human rights, including freedom of religion. Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is a matter which may engage the responsibility of the state to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the freedom of religion to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines. The Court stated that in extreme cases the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them. According to the Court, respect for the religious feelings of believers can legitimately be thought to have been violated by “provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration”, and such portrayals can be regarded as a malicious violation of the spirit of tolerance. The Court did not find that a violation of freedom of expression had occurred. 4.2
Wingrove v. United Kingdom18
The case concerns a short film, 18 minutes long, entitled Visions of Ecstasy, produced in 1989. The film contains no dialogue, but only music and moving images. The action of the film centres upon a young female character dressed as a nun in various scenes with erotic content and one scene involves her and the recumbent body of the crucified Christ engaged in a sexual act. From the cast list which appears on the screen for a few seconds, the viewer can deduce that the person dressed 18 Wingrove v. UK, Judgment of the ECtHR, 25/11/1996, Appn. No. 17419/90, Reports 1996–V.
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as a nun in the video is intended to be St Teresa. No attempt is made in the video to explain its historical background or meaning. The film was submitted to the British Board of Film Classification for classification. The Board refused to grant a distribution certificate on the ground of blasphemy. Consequently, the film could not be legally sold, hired or otherwise supplied to the public. Mr Wingrove, the producer and director of the film, complained to the ECtHR that his freedom of expression had been infringed. British law on blasphemy defines blasphemy as any “contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible . . . It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion” if the publication is “decent and temperate”. The question is not one of the matter expressed, but of its manner, i.e., “the tone, style and spirit”, in which it is presented. It is stated in the decision that in Britain the offence of blasphemy is committed if a video work treats a religious subject (in particular God, Jesus Christ or the Bible) in such a manner as to be calculated to outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy towards and support for the Christian story and ethic, because of the contemptuous, reviling, insulting, scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit in which the subject is presented. The Court agreed that the refusal to grant a distribution certificate was intended to provide protection against a seriously offensive attack on matters regarded as sacred by Christians. The Court did not find that a violation of freedom of expression had occurred. 4.3 I.A. v. Turkey19 This case concerned the proprietor and managing director of a publishing house which in November 1993 published a novel entitled The Forbidden Phrases. The book conveyed the author’s views on philosophical and theological issues in a fictional style and contained a section on the Prophet Muhammad which contained the following statement: “God’s messenger broke his fast through sexual intercourse, after dinner and before prayer. Muhammad did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or a live animal.” The Turkish Criminal Code
19 Judgement of the ECtHR, I.A. v. Turkey, Appn. No. 42571/98, 13/09/2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005–VIII.
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contained at the time of the decision20 an article which stipulated that blasphemy against God, one of the religions, one of the prophets, one of the sects or one of the holy books was an offence punishable by six months’ to one year’s imprisonment and a heavy fine. The Istanbul Court of First Instance convicted the applicant and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment and a fine. It commuted the prison sentence to a fine, so that the applicant was ultimately ordered to pay a total fine equivalent to 16 US dollars. This conviction was upheld by the higher courts. The ECtHR reiterated the fundamental principles underlying its previous judgments relating to freedom of expression—that it is not only applicable to information or ideas that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.21 The ECtHR also pointed out that the exercise of freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities and amongst them, in the context of religious beliefs, may legitimately be included a duty to avoid expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and profane. The ECtHR stated that it may be considered necessary to punish improper attacks on objects of religious veneration.22 The ECtHR confirmed that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”. Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith.23 According to the ECtHR, the case in I.A. v. Turkey concerned not only comments that offend or shock, or a “provocative” opinion, but also an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. Believers might legitimately feel themselves to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks. The ECtHR therefore considered that the measure taken in respect of the statements in issue was intended to provide protection against offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims and that
The new Turkish Penal Code of 2004 does not include this crime. Judgement of the ECtHR, I.A. v. Turkey, Appn. No. 42571/98, 13/09/2005, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005–VIII, para. 23. 22 Ibid., para. 24. 23 Ibid., para. 28. 20
21
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it might reasonably be held to have met a pressing social need. As to the proportionality of the measure, the ECtHR was mindful of the fact that the domestic courts did not decide to seize the book, and accordingly considered that the insignificant fine imposed was proportionate to the aims pursued.24 The ECtHR held by four votes to three that there was no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The judges Costa, Cabral Barreto and Jungwiert submitted a joint dissenting opinion. According to the dissenting judges, the line of case law of the ECtHR on the protection of religious feelings was the subject of much controversy at the time (and the ECmHR, for its part, had expressed the opinion by a large majority that there had been a violation of Article 10 in both Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria and Wingrove v. United Kingdom). In the view of the dissenting judges, the time had come to revisit this case law because it seemed “to place too much emphasis on conformism or uniformity of thought and to reflect an overcautious and timid conception of freedom of the press”.25 4.4
Summary of the case law of the ECtHR on protection of religious feelings
From a consideration of the case law of the ECtHR regarding the protection of religious feelings, it emerges that the ECtHR has created a content-based restriction on freedom of expression. Even though freedom of expression as a general rule protects expressions that shock, offend or disturb, a restriction was accepted by the ECtHR to protect the religious feelings of believers. The ECtHR is careful to stress that criticism of religion is still possible. The Court stresses that religious believers must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, the manner in which religious beliefs and doctrines may be opposed or denied is not unlimited. Provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration and abusive attacks on prophets and other leading figures of a religion, who are venerated in a religion, can be legitimately banned, according to the ECtHR. States may choose to limit freedom of expression
Ibid., para. 32. Ibid., annexed joint dissenting opinion of judges Costa, Cabral Barreto and Jungwiert at para. 8. 24
25
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accordingly, but they are not obliged to do so. If states make use of their prerogative to limit freedom of expression to protect religious feelings, only limited scope for shock, offence and disturbance remains with regard to religion. 5 Critical Reflections: The Case Against Protection of the Feelings of Religious Believers 5.1
Neutrality of the state in matters of religion and belief
The neutrality of the state needs to be understood as the counterpart to citizens’ freedom of thought, conscience and religion.26 In its landmark decision Refah Partisi v. Turkey,27 the ECtHR made a pronouncement on the place of religion in a democratic society and a democratic state. The Court reiterated that, as protected by Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the ECHR. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. This freedom entails, amongst other things, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion. The Court has frequently emphasised the state’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society.28 Guaranteeing freedom of thought, conscience and religion assumes state neutrality; thus state neutrality is mandatory under the ECHR.29
The German Constitutional Court deduced the duty of state neutrality from the freedom of religion guaranteed in the German Constitution. See decision of the German Constitutional Court in the case Kirchenbausteuer, 14 December 1965, BVerfGE 19, 206, p. 216. 27 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, Refah Partisi v. Turkey, Appn. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13 February 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003–II. 28 Ibid., para. 90–91. 29 “Nevertheless, the Court considers, like the Commission, that facts demonstrating a failure by the authorities to remain neutral in the exercise of their powers in this domain must lead to the conclusion that the State interfered with the believers’ freedom to manifest their religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the Convention.” 26
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Respect for different beliefs and convictions is a basic obligation for a state, which must accept that individuals may freely adopt convictions and, in some cases, change their minds subsequently, and must take care to avoid any interference with the exercise of freedom of religion.30 The state can only credibly guarantee the religious freedom of citizens and protect them from religious discrimination, if the state is neutral in religious matters. 5.2
Freedom of religion, atheism and religious competition
Article 9 ECHR does not protect only religious beliefs, but also atheism and other nonreligious beliefs (e.g., humanism). The point is that the restriction of free speech for the protection of religious feelings, which the ECtHR has invented, is not neutral; it protects only religious believers and not atheists. Since its main focus is the protection of certain beliefs (veneration of religious objects, sacredness of certain people), atheists cannot benefit from this protection to the same extent. Thus, this restriction favours religious believers in their competition against atheists. Whereas atheists are limited in their means of attacking and undermining religious beliefs, religious believers need fear no similar limitation when attacking atheism. Religious believers can continue to mock and scorn atheism, whereas atheists are limited when they mock and scorn religious believers. In this light, the reasoning of the ECtHR in the Otto-PremingerInstitut case is not convincing. The ECtHR had stated that, in extreme cases, the effect of particular methods of opposing or denying religious beliefs can be such as to inhibit those who hold such beliefs from exercising their freedom to hold and express them. However, this extreme scenario was not relevant in any case before the ECtHR. The OttoPreminger-Institut case concerned a film which was shown in a specialist cinema; nobody was forced to watch it. The case Wingrove v. UK concerned a video film which was denied classification and could therefore not be legally sold or rented in the UK. Again, nobody would have been forced to watch the film, and more lenient measures could have been taken to restrict the possible audience (such as age requirements
Judgement of the ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000, Appn. No. 30985/96, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000–XI, para. 78. 30 Renucci, Jean-François, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights File No. 20 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2005), p. 22.
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or limitation on sale or rental in certain shops). The case I.A. v. Turkey concerned a book which, again, no believer would have been forced to read. In all these cases, the extreme scenario the ECtHR uses to justify the limitation seems far-fetched and almost absurd. It was rare in European history (with the exception possibly of the Soviet Union under Stalin and France under Robespierre, to name just a few possible examples) that believers of the majority religion were in danger of needing to deny their faith. The historical record demonstrates that victims of forced spiritual and ideological self-denial in Europe were almost always followers of minority religions or atheists. The ECtHR completely fails to reflect on actual historical experience. There certainly is no danger for believers in the majority religion in today’s Europe, and the ECtHR fails to adduce any evidence to support its claim. The ECtHR also does not sufficiently consider the history of blasphemy laws in Europe. In 1484 during the Spanish Inquisition, which was set up under royal rather than papal control, the grand inquisitor of Spain, Tomas de Torquemada, promulgated 28 articles for the guidance of inquisitors, whose competence was extended to include not only crimes of heresy and apostasy but also blasphemy, amongst other offences.31 This close historical connection between the legal enforcement of blasphemy laws and the Inquisition indicates a close connection between blasphemy laws and a pre-modern conception of the state, in which no separation between state and religion exists and no freedom of religion is granted. State and religion form a symbiotic unity, in which the state depends on religion for legitimacy and religious authorities use the instruments of the state to enforce their orthodoxy. It is noteworthy that the Inquisition in Europe generally only investigated heresy or blasphemy and gave its verdict; the punishment was as a rule executed by the state, not by the Church.32 Under modern conditions characterised by a professed (if not always lived) separation of state and religion and a clear human right to freedom of religion for individuals, blasphemy laws appear as relics of a bygone age. They do not make any sense today. The reasoning of the ECtHR would make much more sense if religion were a duty under the ECHR as it was a duty during medieval times. How-
31 Art. “Inquisition”, Encyclopaedia Britannica, from Encyclopaedia Britannica Standard Edition 2004 CD-ROM, 30 May 2003. 32 Ibid.
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ever, under the ECHR, religion is a right, not a duty. Human beings have a right to have a religion under the ECHR, but equally they have a right not to have any. It is therefore difficult to reason that, under freedom of religion, religious feelings deserve or merit special protection against those who do not share them. At the UN Human Rights Council, a worrying trend can be recognised which clashes with the neutrality of states in religious matters and the separation of state and religion. In a resolution, the UN Human Rights Council voted in March 2008 in favour of combating defamation of religions.33 This resolution does not distinguish sufficiently between religions and individuals as religious believers (only individuals can be defamed, not religions themselves) and ignores the freedom of expression of those who wish to protest against religion and who have, in principle and within limitations, the right to offend, shock and disturb. 5.3
Is it a role of the state to protect religious feelings?
Why is it the role of the state to protect religious doctrines from criticism, mockery or scorn? A look across the Atlantic might prove helpful. The landmark case Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson in the US Supreme Court concerned the constitutionality of a statute in New York on the banning of motion pictures on the ground that they were “sacrilegious”. Justice Clark declared that “from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them” and that “it is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine”.34 The respective New York statute was held to be unconstitutional. A specific freedom generally does not give others the duty to value the exercise of the freedom. If person X has the freedom to express her opinion, this does not give person Y the duty to consider this expression of opinion as valuable. Such a duty to consider certain opinions as valuable per se and to respect them would arguably amount to a violation of the freedom of thought, which is an absolute right. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that freedom of religion gives others the duty to consider a certain religion as valuable. It is difficult to understand why
UN Doc A/HRC/7/L.15 dated 20 March 2008. Justice Clark in the decision of the US Supreme Court, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 26/5/1952. 33
34
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somebody should be able to impose ideas of sacredness on others and demand respect. These ideas, which in the final analysis cannot be proven, are simply matters of arbitrary belief. There cannot be any legal obligation in matters of religion as this would constitute a violation of the negative freedom of religion, the freedom not to participate in religious practices or beliefs.35 Nobody can be forced to participate in the teachings of a religion. Who is or is not holy or sacred is a key issue for religion, but not for the state. To oblige somebody who does not share the beliefs of a certain religion to participate in the veneration of a person who for one or the other reason is believed by that religion to be holy amounts to a violation of the negative freedom of religion. The obligation not to mock or scorn certain historical personalities who happened to found religions amounts to a duty to show respect for these personalities and arguably constitutes a duty to participate in a religious practice. In philosophical debates, ad hominem arguments36 are frowned upon. The reason for this is that the correctness of a person’s statement can be distinguished from the character traits of that person. Thus, it is not a valid argument in a philosophical debate to question the correctness or validity of a statement on the basis of the character of the author. While ad hominem arguments are not permissible in philosophical debates, their value may need to be reassessed in religious debates. The point is that religious ‘truths’ are often based on the character of a religious personality; religious believers to a large extent depend on the character of the person to whom they are ascribed. It is the special character of religious founders which for many believers serves as the ultimate proof of validity of these religious ‘truths’. It is this connection between the character of a religious founder or prophet and religious beliefs which justifies the use of ad hominem arguments in a religious context. It is not reasonably understandable why it should not be pos-
35 See judgment of the ECtHR in Buscarini and others v. San Marino, Appn. No. 24645/94, 18 February 1999, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1999–I. In this judgment, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 9, when two newly elected parliamentarians were ordered to take oaths on the gospel. 36 “An ad hominem argument, also known as argumentum ad hominem (Latin: ‘argument to the man’, ‘argument against the man’) consists of replying to an argument or factual claim by attacking or appealing to a characteristic or belief of the source making the argument or claim, rather than by addressing the substance of the argument or producing evidence against the claim. The process of proving or disproving the claim is thereby subverted, and the argumentum ad hominem works to change the subject” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem (accessed on 16 March 2009)).
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sible to mock somebody who lived many hundreds of years ago and who still has a great deal of influence today simply because that person happened to found a religion. Mocking or scorning such a religious founder is actually a valid means of undermining religious authority; this authority might be experienced as oppressive and pervasive. The value of religious influence on society is open to scepticism and cannot be taken as self-evident. States have a duty to remain neutral and should not take sides in the ideological competition between religions and other ideologies. In this light, the statement of the ECtHR that provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration are not capable of furthering understanding of human affairs37 is completely unfounded. In fact, the historical record demonstrates that a critical stance to religious beliefs and a deeper understanding of the limitations of religious beliefs and the mechanisms of their production is important for human and social development. Mockery of objects of religious veneration and of the lives of religious founders cannot per se be considered to be without value; it remains a potentially important instrument in the argumentative arsenal to fight religious fundamentalism in today’s world. The point is that gratuitously offensive expressions might be needed and justified as an expression of dissent or protest against a dominant group, ideology or religion. As Justice Roberts of the US Supreme Court put it beautifully in the landmark case Cantwell v. Connecticut in 1940: In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained, in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlighten opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. The essential characteristic of these liberties is that, under their shield, many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own country, for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.38
37 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Judgment of the ECtHR, 20/09/1994, Appn. No. 13470/87, Series A no. 295, para. 49. 38 US Supreme Court, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296, 20/3/1940, per Roberts, J.
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5.4 Two kinds of content-based limitations of freedom of expression compared: Religious extremism and protection of religious feelings In the case law of the ECtHR, two kinds of content-based limitations of freedom of expression related to religion can be detected: one aimed at countering religious extremism, the other at protecting religious feelings. It is interesting to compare the standards developed by the ECtHR in both cases. In Gündüz v. Turkey,39 the ECtHR dealt with statements made by Mr Gündüz, a leader of an Islamic sect, during a live television discussion. Mr Gündüz had stated: 1) that anyone calling himself a democrat or secularist has no religion and that democracy in Turkey is despotic, merciless and impious; 2) that anyone born after a marriage by a council official was a ‘piç’ (a pejorative term referring to children born outside marriage and/or born of adultery and used in everyday language as an insult designed to cause offence); 3) that he wanted to establish a regime based on Sharia. These expressions were qualified by the Turkish courts as incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction founded on religion, for which he was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 Turkish liras.40 The applicant submitted that his conviction had infringed Article 10 of the Convention enshrining the freedom of expression. The ECtHR observed that the case was characterised by the fact that the applicant was punished for statements classified by the domestic courts as hate speech.41 The ECtHR stressed that there can be no doubt that concrete expressions constituting hate speech, which may be insulting to particular individuals or groups, are not protected by Article 10 ECHR. According to the court, there is no doubt that, like any other remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values, expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention. However, the Court considered that the mere fact of defending Sharia, without calling for violence to establish
Judgment of the ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, Appn. No. 3507/97, 4 December 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003–XI. 40 Ibid., para. 13. 41 Ibid., para. 40. 39
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it, cannot be regarded as hate speech.42 According to the ECtHR, the Turkish courts did not consider the means by which the applicant intended to set up a Sharia regime based on religious rules.43 Moreover, the court attached importance to the context of the statements. The aim of the programme in question was to present the sect of which the applicant was the leader; second, the applicant’s extremist views were already known and had been discussed in the public arena and, in particular, were counterbalanced by the intervention of the other participants in the programme; and lastly, they were expressed in the course of a pluralistic debate in which the applicant was actively taking part. Accordingly, the ECtHR was not convinced that the need for the restriction in issue had been established.44 It is open to speculation how the Court would have decided if these statements of what amounted to religious extremism (advocacy of Sharia) had been made in writing or in another setting. Comparing the EctHR’s case law on the protection of religious feelings and its case law countering religious extremism, it is noteworthy that the Court seems to be more lenient towards religious extremism than towards statements which offend religious feelings. In the context of religious extremism, the ECtHR seems to be ready to uphold the protection of statements which might be offensive and shocking, but which do not directly call for violence, as decided in Gündüz v. Turkey. Concerning protection of religious feelings, however, the ECtHR is prepared to accept the prohibition of offensive and shocking statements, even though they do not call for violence. This observation is shared by Judge Türmen in his dissenting opinion, in which he expresses his concern that the decision of the ECtHR in Gündüz v. Turkey might be interpreted by the outside world to mean that the Court does not grant the same degree of protection to secular values as it does to religious values.45 The content-based limitation of freedom of expression to counter religious extremism is different from the content-based limitation of freedom of expression to protect religious feelings in one important
Ibid., para. 51. Ibid., para. 50. 44 Ibid., para. 51. 45 Dissenting opinion of Judge Türmen, Judgment of ECtHR, Gündüz v. Turkey, Application no. 3507/97, 4 December 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003–XI. 42 43
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aspect: countering religious extremism falls readily within the aim of protecting democracy, whereas the protection of religious feelings is difficult to place under this banner. According to the ECtHR, democracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the ECHR. That is apparent, firstly, from the Preamble of the Convention which establishes a clear connection between the ECHR and democracy. Secondly, Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR require that interference with the exercise of rights they enshrine must be assessed by the yardstick of what is necessary in a democratic society. The only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to spring from ‘democratic’ society. Democracy thus appears to be the only political model contemplated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it.46
In the landmark case Refah Partisi v. Turkey,47 which turned on the question of whether a party could be lawfully dissolved because of statements made by leading party members, the court fleshed out its concept of a militant democracy. The court stated that, in view of the very clear link between the Convention and democracy, no one should be authorised to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society. Pluralism and democracy are based on a compromise that requires various concessions by individuals or groups of individuals, who must sometimes agree to limit some of the freedoms they enjoy in order to guarantee the greater stability of the country as a whole. In that context, the ECtHR considers that it is not at all improbable that totalitarian movements, organised in the form of political parties, might do away with democracy, after prospering under a democratic regime, there being examples of this in modern
Judgment of the ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998–I, pp. 21–22, para. 45. 47 Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, Refah Partisi v. Turkey, Appn. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13 February 2003, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2003–II. The case turned on certain statements of party members and leaders which were deemed to be imputable to the Refah party. These statements revealed a long-term policy of setting up a regime based on Sharia within the framework of a plurality of legal systems and that Refah did not exclude recourse to force in order to implement its policy and keep the envisaged system in place (ibid., para. 132). The Court decided that the dissolution of the party and the temporary forfeiture of certain political rights imposed on the applicants did not violate Article 11 of the ECHR. 46
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European history.48 This reasoning makes perfect sense as an argument for limitations on freedom of expression in order to counter religious extremism. Religious extremism is arguably just as much a threat to democracy as national-socialism historically was. But this reasoning does not serve to justify the protection of religious feelings because the importance of religious feelings for democracy remains questionable. Given the importance which the preservation of democracy enjoys, it is odd that the ECtHR grants more protection against statements which offend religious feelings than against statements which express religious extremism. Religious extremism arguably poses a greater danger to democracy than offence to religious feelings ever could under present conditions. In addition, there is no evidence that religious believers of majority religions are under pressure to deny their faith in Europe. 5.5
Majority religion versus minority religion
The ECtHR construed the protection of religious feelings of believers invented by the Court as a permissible basis for the limitation of freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR in connection with Article 9 ECHR. This construction, together with the standard margin of appreciation granted to states by the ECtHR in questions of permissible limitations of Article 10 ECHR, favours majority religions as against minority religions and atheism. Restrictions on freedom of expression, according to Article 10/2 ECHR, are optional and not mandatory. This means that states that are signatories to the ECHR may regulate by law proportionate limitations on freedom of expression for one of the grounds listed, but they are not obliged to do so. It is noteworthy that the ECtHR differs on this point from global international standards: for example, according to Article 20/2 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights,49 any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.50 The ECtHR could have construed the protection of religious feelings under Article 9 ECHR, which enshrines freedom of religion. If the Court had chosen this option, the protection of the religious feelings of all believers, whether they adhered to the Ibid., para. 99. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 1976. 50 See also General Comment No. 11 of the UN Human Rights Committee, 29/07/83. 48 49
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minority or majority religion, or even to atheism, would have been guaranteed. The Court did not choose this option. Under democratic conditions based on majority rule, laws limiting freedom of expression are more likely to reflect the values of the majority and not the values of the minority. Therefore, such a limitation of freedom of expression for the protection of religious feelings is more likely to protect the majority religion and not the minority religion. Indeed, in all cases before the ECtHR concerning protection of religious feelings versus freedom of expression, it was the majority religion that was protected (Christianity in Austria in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, and in Britain in Wingrove v. UK; Islam in Turkey in I.A. v. Turkey). Because of the construction of the restriction, it is unclear whether believers in minority religions or atheism can benefit from it. The crucial question is: do states that are signatories to the ECHR have a duty to protect the religious feelings of believers in minority religions under Article 9 ECHR, which enshrines freedom of religion? From the existing case law of the ECmHR, it seems that members of minority religions whose religious feelings are grossly offended do not have a case under Article 9 ECHR for a mandatory limitation of the freedom of expression of those who grossly offend their religious feelings. In 1991, the ECmHR decided in the case Choudhury v. United Kingdom and declared his application inadmissible.51 Mr Choudhury, a Muslim from the UK, had applied for a criminal prosecution for blasphemy to be brought against Salman Rushdie on the grounds that the author unlawfully and wickedly published in the book The Satanic Verses blasphemous libels against Allah and the Prophet Muhammad. The application was dismissed on the basis that the offence of blasphemy in UK law at the time related only to Christianity. Mr Choudhury complained to the ECmHR that the UK had not given the Muslim religion protection against abuse or scurrilous attacks, and that without that protection there would inevitably be a limited enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. The ECmHR found no connection between the offence to religious sensitivities and the freedom of religion enshrined in Article 9, ECHR and dismissed the application.52
51 Choudhury v. United Kingdom, Appn. No. 17439/90, 5/3/1991, http://cmiskp.echr. coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Choudhury& sessionid=7918335&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 21 May 2008). 52 In another case, Ben el Mahi against Denmark, the ECtHR declared as inadmissible the complaint of a Moroccan national against the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet
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Article 9 ECHR gives individuals the freedom to choose their religion or belief, to change their religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest their religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance, but the wording of Article 9 ECHR does not explicitly give anybody the right to be protected in their religious feelings. All cases of the ECtHR concerning the protection of religious feelings have so far concerned an optional limitation of freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. States, in general, make use of this possible but not mandatory limitation only in order to protect majority religions, and the ECtHR has not so far dealt with a single case in which this possibility of limiting freedom of expression under the ECHR was utilised to protect the religious feelings of religious minorities. Minority religions, especially those religions that are associated with ethnic minorities, need protection much more than the majority religion. The reason is that offensive speech concerning minority religions which are closely associated with ethnic minorities closely resembles speech that expresses racism and/or xenophobia. The ECmHR and the ECtHR have reaffirmed time and again that racist and xenophobic statements may be lawfully proscribed by law under the ECHR.53 Ethnic minorities can be harmed directly by racist statements or they can be harmed indirectly by statements which vilify their religion. Religion in these cases often serves as a symbol for ethnic identity. Whereas racist statements are prohibited in many states following Article 4 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, similar statements concerning minority religions which have detrimental effects similar to those of racist statements are often not covered by this legislation. In 1983, the House of Lords ruled in the case Mandla v. Dowell Lee54 that a Sikh boy who was refused admission to a school based on the Christian faith because he insisted on wearing the turban was
Muhammad because the Moroccan national did not fall under the jurisdiction of Denmark: ECtHR, Ben el Mahi against Denmark, Appn. No. 5853/06, 11/12/2006, http://cmiskp .echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=5853/ 06&sessionid=7942529&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 22 May 2008). 53 Kühnen v. the Federal Republic of Germany, Appn. No. 12194/86, 12/05/1988, http:// cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight= K%FChnen&sessionid=7937298&skin=hudoc-en (accessed 22 May 2008); Jersild v. Denmark, Appn. No. 15890/89, 23/09/1994, Series A 298; Lehideux and Isorni v. France, Appn. No. 24662/94, 23/09/1998, Reports 1998–VII1998. 54 House of Lords, 24 March 1983, [1983] 2 AC 548.
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discriminated against on ethnic grounds. The headmaster had attempted to justify the ‘no turban’ rule by pointing out that he sought to run a Christian school and that he objected to the turban on the ground that it was an outward manifestation of a non-Christian faith. The court qualified this justification as unacceptable because the justification in the final analysis related to the ethnic origins of the person affected. The House of Lords thus accepted the argument that sometimes discrimination on religious grounds amounts to ethnic discrimination. Thus, the refusal to accept a religious symbol (turban) was interpreted as racial discrimination because of the close proximity between the Sikh religion and the ethnic community of Sikhs. This line of argumentation interprets religious discrimination as racial discrimination, especially in those cases that concern mono-ethnic religions, where a particular religion is a characteristic of an ethnic group and mainly limited to it. In the UK, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 200655 has been adopted in parliament. This act creates a new offence of stirring up of religious hatred. It applies to comments made in public or in the media, as well as through written material. The Home Office, in the Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill as laid before parliament,56 explained that existing legislation defined offences against stirring up racial hatred. As a result of developments in case law, these offences have been applied to the incitement of hatred against mono-ethnic religious groups, such as Jews and Sikhs. But this protection does not apply to all faith communities. The new act closes this gap by extending the protection offered to mono-ethnic religious groups to all religions. This legislation highlights the close resemblance that exists between racist statements and derogatory statements about minority religious groups. In this light, it is especially regrettable that the protection offered by the ECtHR for religious feelings is more designed for majority religions and not for minority religions, especially those minority religions that are associated with ethnic minorities living in Europe.
55 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga_20060001_en_1 (accessed 21 May 2008). 56 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/011/2006011 .htm (accessed 21 May 2008).
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Considerations in the Cartoon Affair
The case of the cartoon affair is different from the cases before the ECtHR described above. The cartoons were originally published in a Danish newspaper. The Danish Criminal Code includes a section which prohibits the mocking or scorning in public of religious doctrines or acts of worship of any lawfully existing religious community in Denmark. In a decision dated 15 March 2006, the Director of Public Prosecutions decided to discontinue investigations with regard to violation of this section of the Danish Criminal Code. The main argument of the Danish Director of Public Prosecutions was that, even though the cartoons could be taken to “depict the Prophet Muhammad as a violent person and as a rather intimidating or scary figure”, this is “not entirely incorrect because the historical descriptions of the Prophet’s life show that while propagating their religion, he and his followers were involved in violent conflicts and armed clashes”.57 Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, criticised the Danish government for failing to show commitment and vigilance in combating Islamophobia and deplored the general increase in defamation of religions, and notably the conflation of Islam with violence and terrorism.58 The report of the Special Rapporteur was criticised by the International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), an international NGO.59 Whereas the three cases referenced above (Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Wingrove v. United Kingdom, and I.A. v. Turkey) concern cases in which legislation in Austria, in the UK and in Turkey was applied to protect the feelings of religious believers in majority religions, the same cannot be said in the cartoon affair. In the cartoon affair, existing legislation protecting religious feelings was not applied. On the contrary, 57 Decision of the Director of Public Prosecutions of Denmark on possible criminal proceedings in the case of Jyllands-Posten’s article “The face of Muhammad”, File No. RA-2006–41–0151, 15 March 2006. 58 Report of Doudou Diène, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, on Situation of Muslims and Arab peoples in various parts of the world, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/17, 13 February 2006, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/107/32/PDF/ G0610732.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 17 April 2007). 59 UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/NGO/244, 27 March 2006, available at http://www .iheu.org/system/files/iheu+statement+244.pdf (accessed on 17 April 2007).
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the publication of the cartoons was treated as a matter of protection of freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the cartoon affair shares some features with the above mentioned cases. Like the three cases in the ECt HR, the cartoons depict the founder of a religion, a person of high symbolic status for a religious community and commonly thought to be deserving of veneration by believers. Even though the cartoons do not implicate a religious figure in sexual scenes like the three cases discussed above, Muhammad is shown in some of the cartoons to favour violence, especially terrorist violence. There is no reason to believe that the connotation that the Prophet Muhammad favours terrorist violence or is part of terrorist activity is less offensive to Muslims than the connotation that Jesus Christ engaged in sexual acts is offensive to Christians. Religious feelings could be hurt in all these cases equally. The fundamental question remains of whether religious feelings should be protected at all and if all religious feelings should be treated in the same way. The central question raised by the Danish cartoons case concerns the value and protection of religious sensitivities under human rights law in Europe. Under the ECHR, religious believers have a right to believe and practise their religion, but others have the right not to believe or practise the same or any religion. Under this regime, religions compete with other religious ideologies that may be openly hostile to them and each other. In this setting, it is difficult to justify special protection for believers in Islam because of their special religious sensitivity. The point is that no religion can demand special protection which is not given to other religions or other belief systems. As long as believers are free to believe and practise their religion, there is little need to protect them from the statements of others who may belittle, mock or scorn their beliefs. States have a duty to remain neutral and should not take sides in the ideological competition between religions and other ideologies. In my opinion, a minority religion connected to ethnic identity deserves more protection than a majority religion, because a minority religion often serves simply as a proxy for ethnic identity. However, who is the majority and who the minority might be difficult to establish in a global affair such as the matter of the Danish cartoons. Another consideration to be drawn from the Danish cartoons case is the link between ethnicity and Islam in Europe. Demographic data suggest that the Islamic populations in Europe are ethnically diverse and include populations with North African, Turkish, Arab, South Asian and other ethnic heritages. However, the demographic data also suggest that Islam in Europe is mainly the religion of immigrants and
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their descendents, not predominantly the religion of converts of European ethnicity. Thus, Islamophobic statements in Europe tend to have a xenophobic background, as they did in the Danish cartoons affair. It is this xenophobic background which underpins the development and application of legislation fighting xenophobia in Europe to also cover manifestations of Islamophobia. 7
Conclusions
The crisis that arose around the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad could be the trigger that will persuade the ECtHR to reverse its case law on the protection of religious feelings. This protection of religious feelings of believers in majority religions is no pressing social need because there are no signs that religious believers in the majority religions are in need of protection. In order to level the playing field between believers in majority religions and believers in minority religions and atheists, this special protection for believers in majority religions should be dismantled in the interest of state neutrality. A state which offers protection to some religious beliefs but not others, including atheism, is not neutral in matters of religion and belief. Believers in majority religions must accept that freedom of expression extends to all expressions, including those that offend, shock and disturb, and that the neutrality of the state in matters of religion and belief does not permit an exception from this important principle to protect believers in majority religions in the absence of evidence that their exercise of their religion is in danger. An exception from this principle could be contemplated only for believers in minority religions which are associated with ethnic minorities living in Europe. In these cases, negative propaganda about minority religions could be seen as a strategy to circumvent legislation which prohibits incitement to racism and xenophobia. The minority religion here often functions as a symbol of ethnic identity. Incitement to religious hatred often only hides incitement to racial hatred, which it thinly camouflages. Religious provocation in these cases could serve the purpose of reinforcing racial and ethnic stereotypes against the minority. Initially, the case of the Muhammad cartoons in Denmark demonstrated this mechanism well before it developed into a global affair. Incitement to religious hatred against minorities should be prohibited as much as incitement to racial hatred in these cases of overlap between religion and ethnicity. However, this prohibition of religious
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hatred should not be justified by reference to the protection of religious feelings, but by reference to the fight against racism and xenophobia, which has a legitimacy and support in the theory of democracy which the protection of religious feelings cannot claim. The cause of ethnic minorities would be strengthened if their protection were justified on the basis of the fight against racism and xenophobia instead of invoking the protection of their religious feelings and sensibilities, for which the normative basis and grounding in democratic theory remains doubtful. This protection from religious hatred needs to be limited because it is possible that discourse with a religious background might serve itself to incite discriminations or hatred in certain circumstances from the minority towards the majority or towards other minority groups. Protection from religious hatred should not serve to protect religious discourse from critical opposition. Once the Danish cartoons affair was a global affair, it was no longer so clear who was the minority and who was the majority, so it then became less justifiable to limit the right to freedom of expression, including expressions which offend, shock and disturb.
PART III
BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Christian Moe and Samim Akgönül
REVIEWS Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence. By Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xi + 223. ISBN: 978-0-521-67751-6 (pbk), 978-0-521-86011-6 (hbk). £45 (hbk), £17.99 (pbk). This volume stems from a project on Christian-Muslim relations in twenty-first-century Europe, based at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. It is interdisciplinary, though the approaches mainly fall under sociology and international relations. The geographical scope ranges widely across Europe on national and transnational levels. The varied topics include the problematic notion of ‘Euro-Islam’, the factors shaping Muslim identities in Europe, generational transformations among Turks abroad, ideological divides in Bosnia, the European Commission’s engagement with Islam, effects of EU integration and regional change in Southeast Europe, and the EU reluctance to admit secularised Muslim Turkey as a member. With all this variety, it might at first sight be mistaken for just another incongruous collection of workshop papers. However, these papers are framed as representing nothing less than “a consensus amongst all the contributors in terms of their shared aim for the literature on Islam in Europe” (p. xi). In the introduction, Effie Fokas describes this aim as “methodological rigour” in order to counter “cultural differentialism” and “monist conceptions of identity” ( p. 2), seeking to locate the study of Islam in Europe within the study of religious change in Europe in general. In the afterword, Aziz Al-Azmeh warns against culturalism and exaggerating the role of religion in the lives of Muslims, rampant tendencies in both non-Muslim and Muslim representations of the otherness and alienation of Muslim communities (e.g., the French riots of 2005). The watchwords are diversity, identity, and specificity. These admonitions, multiplied in the individual chapters, will by now be familiar to any student in the field and “somewhat boring” (Werner Schiffauer, p. 69), but they bear repeating; even with the most rigorous of intentions the researcher can all to easily fall into what Jocelyn Cesari calls the “snare of exceptionalism”. Moreover, the contributors
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demonstrate by example how these principles can be applied, whether in acute criticism of current debates or in original research. Several contributions warn against simplistic notions of a ‘good’ European Islam that risk displacing and perpetuating rather than resolving dangerous dichotomies in which certain Muslim groups by implication are ‘bad’. Jørgen Nielsen, problematising the idea of a ‘Euro-Islam’, notes that “there is more than one way of being a European when it comes to cultural and religious practice and identity” (p. 34); in laïcist projects for a Euro-Islam, such as that of Bassam Tibi, “not only are Muslims being asked to be more European than the Europeans, but other Europeans are asked to become like the French!” (p. 37). There is also more than one way to be a French or a Bosnian Muslim. Xavier Bougarel questions the well-intentioned presentation of Bosnian Islam as a homogeneous “tolerant and European” Islam, tracing instead three different understandings of Islam in relation to Western modernity—as individual faith, as common culture, and as a discriminatory political ideology—through the writings of three Bosnian Muslim intellectuals in the 1990s. The distinction between the first two understandings is not sharp, and their exponents probably saw themselves as engaged in the same project, but the analysis is still compelling. Attention is called to the multiplicity of Muslim identities (or better: ‘identifications’) in Europe and the interplay of the multiple factors that condition them. As outlined by Jocelyne Cesari, the latter include dominant meta-narratives, local and national political and cultural frameworks, globalisation, the links between ethnicity, religion, and poverty, and different modes of religious revival. The diachronic dimension of generational change is present in Werner Schiffauer’s account of Turkish immigrants’ debate on their place in European society. Arguing that there has been a turn from a discourse of ‘exile’ to one of ‘diaspora’ and towards a differentiation into ultra-orthodox, orthodox, and individualised positions, Schiffauer sticks his neck out to raise theoretically provocative questions about the Jewish experience as a model for the Muslim one. Widening the focus of ‘Islam in Europe’ beyond immigrant communities in Western Europe, the book has substantial coverage of Southeast Europe, with chapters on Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Greece, and Turkey, but, avoiding another kind of exceptionalism, it does not treat the region in isolation.
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It also has a supranational dimension. One awkwardly feels that the European Union must somehow be an important framework for Islam in Europe, despite the present inability of its members to agree on any significant policy in the religious field. A useful history is provided (by Bérengère Massignon) of the EU’s developing institutional relationship with Islam, the early stages of which came across to this reader as a remarkably haphazard venture into dialogue with, essentially, whatever Muslims were readily at hand. Unsurprisingly, the greatest impacts of the EU traced in this book (by Dia Anagnostou) are the unintended consequences of EU policies on regional development and minority protection for the long-marginalised Muslim regional minorities of Bulgaria and Greece. A separate chapter (by Valérie Amiraux) brings out the gulf between European discourses on ‘Muslim’ Turkey and the realities of secularised Turkey under its current post-Islamist government. Over all this hangs the shadow of Europe’s own insecurities about its cultural and religious identity and its widely divergent positions on the proper place for religion in public life. Fokas’s introductory suggestion (drawing on Casanova and Habermas) that Europe needs to become not only post-religious, but also post-secular, seems worth pursuing in this context, but it is left hanging in the abstract. The book is nicely produced and edited, with the unfortunate exception of a handful of garbled sentences here and there. Authors have wisely been allowed to keep their own preferred terminology and spelling, but a few interventions would have been in order: Shaykh Qaradawi is less recognisable as a “Qardai” whose best-known work is titled in French (p. 130), and referring to Sufi tariqas as “Islamic-brotherhood religiosity” (p. 73) is apt to confuse. For the record, the Norwegian state church is not yet disestablished (p. 39). The contributions, while all of high quality, do not uniformly embody the particular virtues of the book as a whole. The chapter on ChristianMuslim relations (by Tarek Mitri), for example, makes profound observations on the reconstruction and distortion of historical memory, but lacks the referencing of specific examples that animates other contributions. On the whole, though, the book succeeds in its ambitious aim and sets a high standard for discussions of Islam in Europe. Christian Moe Reviews editor
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The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. By Alison Pargeter. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008. Pp. xi + 244. Hbk. ISBN 978-1-84511-391-9. £18.99. $34.95. Alison Pargeter has succeeded in writing a long-awaited study on political Islam in Europe. She traces the political awakening of young people from Muslim background in Europe, and clearly shows how this was embedded inside the various political debates in the Middle East. Far from being a separate phenomenon, the ideas and debates inspiring the new activists came from more global debates within the larger Muslim community. She demonstrates the importance of the Muslim Brothers who found refuge in Europe, in fueling these discussions, first in support of Islamist opposition movements in the Middle East and then in support of the various wars or civil wars in Bosnia, Algeria, Chechnya and Afghanistan. With the spill-over of the Algerian civil war to France in 1994, Western Europe too became a target of Middle Eastern radical Islam. The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the involvement of European nations in Iraq further globalised the theatre of operations to Europe. Pargeter demonstrates this ‘Europeanisation’ of the conflict with an analysis of the Madrid and London bombings. She ends her study by discussing the significance of radical converts to Islam and the Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoon affair, demonstrating the dilemmas of mainstream Muslims. The great contribution of this book is its moderate tone and its dispassionate analysis of the phenomenon of Islamist terrorism, which up to now has been the subject of much alarmist opinion which has simply selected facts to bolster one ideological position. Alison Pargeter succeeds in debunking much of this hysteria about ‘Eurabia’, the ‘Muslim threat to Europe’ or the ‘clash of civilizations’. By viewing all the disconnected events in their context, she provides a necessary counterweight to the shrill warnings of the European anti-immigrant Right. At a time when unscrupulous politicians are willing to exploit the politics of fear for narrow political gains, this book is the voice of reason and realism, and provides a welcome alternative perspective to cynical power politics. Like all books, it is not without its weaknesses, which this should not detract from its overall quality. After a good summary of the developments of militant Islam in Europe in the 1990s, the book does not provide a comparable survey of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The two case studies of London and Madrid are inadequate
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to show that terrorism, like all politics, is mostly local. There is a wide variation in Islamist militancy across Europe, and I would have liked to see this developed further. Pargeter’s account of the Madrid bombings is not accurate, as she relies too much on inaccurate secondary or tertiary sources. She does quote from selected videos at the trial, but does not cite the extensive discovery material provided by the prosecution. Had she actually visited the various neighbourhoods in question, she would not have relied on dubious sources to mischaracterise them. This book is a must read for anyone interested in the wave of Islamist terror that threatens Europe. It is a good introduction to the subject and should especially inform policy for decision-makers concerned about security. Alison Pargeter has done us a great service by writing such a balanced and reasonable account of a topic so full of hysteria. Marc Sageman Scholar-in-Residence, New York Police Department The Study of Religion and the Training of Muslim Clergy in Europe: Academic and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century. Ed. W.B. Drees and P.J. van Koningsveld. Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008. Pp. 502. Pbk. ISBN 978-908-72-8025-3. €47.50. The Study of Religion and the Training of Muslim Clergy in Europe is a collection of papers, the majority of which were originally presented at a 2007 Leiden conference on “Academic and Religious Freedom: Tensions and Compromises in the Coexistence of Two Fundamental Rights”; the training of Muslim clergy featured as a sub-theme at the conference. The two main parts of the book follow this dual track. Several contributions are enlivened by pictures and a substantial number of appendices provide the scholarly reader with additional, primary-source material on the subjects. In the introduction, Drees and van Koningsveld observe that political responses to the growing presence of Islam in Western Europe fall into two main categories: some countries and/or parties emphasise freedom from religion (e.g., political secularism or laïcité) whilst others advocate the freedom for religion, i.e. the freedom to express one’s own identity (p. 13). The contributions in the book further elaborate how—in the present and the past—these two positions, in various guises and nuances,
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have featured recurrently in the debates about academic and religious freedom and the training of Muslim ‘clergy’. Part one of the book, the first 250 pages, focuses on academic freedom with regard to the study of religion. This part includes contributions on Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and presents a variety of themes, such as: freedom of thought in Judaism with regard to the philosophies of Spinoza and Mendelsohn (Reinier Munk), historicalcritical approaches to the Bible and the Qur’an (by Henk Jan de Jonge and Nasr Abu Zayd respectively), and the impact of 9/11 on the study of Islam in the USA (Beshara Doumani). Parallel cases of academics becoming entangled in media polemics and political snares are presented by Umar Ryad and Tim Jensen respectively. Ryad discusses the intrigues surrounding the appointment and subsequent dismissal of the Dutch Islamologist Arent Jan Wensinck from the Royal Arabic Languages Academy in the 1930s in Egypt, using the case of Wensinck as an example to highlight the rising tensions between Muslim scholars and orientalists in the colonial era. Jensen narrates his own clashes with the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, caused by his comments on the cartoons published by the paper. The newspaper accused Jensen of promoting his own personal political preferences concerning Islam and Muslims under the guise of an academic stance. Muhammad Machasin outlines the situation of academic freedom in the study of Islam in Indonesia. He sketches on the one hand the obligation of scholars to critically study and advance religious traditions, and on the other hand the stance of Muslim activists who wish to guard Islam and Islamic doctrines against questioning. Machasin then states that, though academics should be given the freedom to do their research, “[a]cademic freedom needs to be operative within the ethical framework of a given society” (p. 182), implying that academics should be careful and wise in their formulations, thus showing that they are sensitive and respectful toward the valued beliefs of people in the society where they live. Activists on the other hand should refrain from rash and angry responses, as “faith and academic freedom should not collide in a civilized society” (p. 189). The second 200 pages, which form part two of the book, focus on the academic training of Muslim clergy in Europe. Again there is a strong historical component in the contributions. Mustafa Cerić, in his article on the training of imams in Bosnia-Herzegovina, shows how the Ghazi Husrev-bey Madrasa over the course of several centuries (with an interlude in Communist times) has endeavoured to combine
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studies in Islamic sciences with “all other things that the custom (or time) and the place require” (quoting from the school’s 1537 waqfiyyah [endowment document], p. 285), thus considering the need for Islam to adapt to its contemporary surroundings. In an interesting article, van Koningsveld discusses the development of a curriculum for the training of imams in Nazi Germany, which was meant to boost political propaganda amongst orthodox Muslims, provide for the spiritual needs of Muslim soldiers in the army, and enhance good relations with Germany’s ally Turkey. His conclusion on why the programme was developed—because of a political role the Nazi authorities assumed the imam to play, and because of the total absence of an educational infrastructure and recognised Islamic authority that could function as a representative forum and an interlocutor for government—links his article to those on contemporary training programmes. Mohammed Ghaly and Yahya Pallavicini show how, in the Netherlands and Italy respectively, academic programmes for the training of imams and for Islamic theology were developed first of all because of demands from the government, seeking integration and a gradual reduction of ‘foreign’ influences in society, and only secondly because of the aspirations of the Muslim community itself, seeking to contextualise Islam in the new environments. Though the articles are interesting and merit reading, quite a number of them do not fit the category ‘21st century’, and many of those in the first part do not fit the category ‘Europe’ either. In that sense, the title of the book is somewhat misleading. The choice of the word ‘clergy’ in the title is remarkable, as it carries a clear Christian hierarchical connotation; a more neutral term, such as ‘religious leadership’, might have been more appropriate. Only a very thin red thread, spun out in the introduction, ties the two parts of the book together, which leaves the reader to speculate why the editors decided to publish the contributions in one (generous) tome, rather than two separate volumes. But that same reader should probably not complain too loudly; now all the material is available at a moderate price. Martha Frederiks Utrecht University
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Islam and Muslims in Germany. Ed. Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielmann. (Muslim Minorities, 7). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008. Pp. xx+596. Hbk. ISBN 978-90-04-15866-5. €145. US$215. This is an impressive volume that offers fresh empirical insights into the landscape of Muslim minorities in Germany. The case studies stem from a wide range of disciplines including anthropology, sociology, geography, history, law, economics, Christian theology and Islamic studies. Although the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islam’ in the title invoke the narrow lens of Islam as a religion and Muslims as predominantly religious beings that dominates European public perceptions, the twenty-two contributions open a window on a much more diversified landscape. They address a group of people who share a Muslim background and a minority status—no more, no less—and who currently struggle to find their footing and to position themselves in German society, in their national, religious or artistic communities, and as individuals. What the contributions have in common is a concern with identity politics, although the perspectives differ. The seven parts of the volume nicely illustrate this. Let me start with those that have been placed towards the back of the book (parts 4–7). A range of contributions, all by relative newcomers in German research on Muslims and Islam, addresses questions of culture and the media, including ethnic film, music, literature and press productions in Germany. The reader makes acquaintance with film makers and writers who appear not to embrace religion as their first identity, but who, like Jewish writers in New York at the turn of the twentieth century, turn the petty struggles of ‘their’ people into artistic portraits with an audience or readership that far surpasses their own ethnic community. Among others, the reader meets a popular German Turkish filmmaker and Arab authors who use German as their medium. These encounters are flanked by analyses of the presentation of Islam in the German media, the ways Arab youths consult these media, and the role of popular Turkish music. Between them, these contributions give insight into the difficulties involved in (re-)defining in public space the perceptions and hopes of an ethnic minority group which majority society considers as ‘not us’. In line with this, the following part, on gender, does not reify gender as the conflict field that in German public perception commonly typifies ‘what Islam is about’. Rather, it approaches gender as a multi-faceted
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resource for women positioning themselves in society as women, as members of an ethnic minority, as entrepreneurs and as religious beings. These entries sit nicely with contributions that address Islamic economies, Turkish entrepreneurs and Turks as a target group of marketing and financing. On another footing, the book opens with three fields of study (parts 1–3) that have been formulated with current theoretical discussions in mind: “Framing Muslim life worlds (Lebenswelten)”, “Islam and social practice”, and “Communities and identities”. Ten of the contributions placed in these sections address religion. The authors make clear that religion plays a large role in Muslim identity politics, whether through practices of the body, celebrating the community or stressing difference. At the end of a quantitative study on “Religiousness among young Muslims in Germany”, Eilers, Seitz and Hirschler conclude that “religiousness (. . .) remains a decisive feature for the identity of Muslims with a recent history of migration” (p. 114). Likewise, in his highly informative contribution on “The debate on Alevism and Islam in Germany”, Martin Sökefeld explains that positioning oneself as religious—irrespective of whether one understands Alevism as the bearer of ‘real Islam’ or as a different religion independent of Islam—is the main strategy of Alevi integration. Against these conclusions, the sociologist Levent Tezcan holds that migration issues are increasingly translated into cultural questions, “a tendency which would ultimately lead us to assuming religion is the code of culture” (p. 131). The differing viewpoints indicate a tendency that in all probability will keep our minds busy in the years ahead. Over the last decade, German society has increasingly defined its Turkish and Arab minorities as essentially religious. Simultaneously, youth groups have appeared that, while breaking with the (religious) traditions of their parents, have re-defined their identity as part of ‘real Islam’. To my mind, a closed circuit is installing itself in which the statements of one party reinforce the perceptions of the other. This may create a new situation in which widening the scholarly horizon to matters of culture and money will simply not be enough to stop the spiral. The volume under scrutiny does not add to the theoretical unravelling of this and like phenomena. Instead, it presents an interdisciplinary approach to a group of stakeholders who, while struggling with their minority status, turn their assets into advantages. Though nowhere written in the introduction, the underlying thesis of the book seems to be that one cannot be choosy if one wishes to position oneself in
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a society that is critical of and excludes its Muslim minority. In line with this thesis, the research brings into focus stakeholders who adopt whatever it takes to draw attention and gain respect—religion, tradition, national pride, difference, sameness, economic shrewdness, novel artistic approaches or criticism of majority society. In their introduction, the editors sum up the prevailing paradigms that have so far framed perceptions of and studies on Islam in Germany: religion as an obstacle to integration, oppressed women as a sign of Islam as a pre-modern religion, and Islamic fundamentalism and radicalisms as a ‘proof ’ of the incompatibility of Islam with modernity. Over recent years, scholarship has counteracted these negative paradigms with positive ones, such as individualisation strategies as a sign of compatibility with (Western) modernity. Are the editors offering us yet another paradigm in defence of Muslims and Islam? Some clarification of their point of departure surely would have enhanced their endeavour. However that may be, through its multi-faceted and fresh approach, Islam and Muslims in Germany offers a wealth of empirical descriptions, methodological tools and theoretical insights that also help us to formulate next steps. Reading through this book, I perceived several points of departure that, when developed, could act as a corrective to the reification of the Muslim subject. Still open to research is the huge field of discourses in which groups and individuals reify each other as different and ‘not us’. Research might: address the way(s) in which religious communities perceive and recreate German society; collect and analyse the history of scholarly discourses on Muslims in Germany; look into the construction of migrants in the educational media; and question discourses on modernity that seem to be taken for granted as the yardstick for measuring progress. Gerdien Jonker Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Braunschweig, Germany
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Young, British and Muslim. By Philip Lewis. London: Continuum, 2007. Pp. 160. ISBN 978-0-8264-9730-7 (pbk), 978-08264-9729-1 (hbk). £12.99 (pbk), £55.00 (hbk). Young British Muslim Voices. By Anshuman A. Mondal. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2008. Hbk. Pp. 198. ISBN 978-1-84645-019-8. $49.95. £19.95. In the wake of the London bombings in July 2005, there has been a torrent of books and articles about young Muslims in Britain, a group upon which the media spotlight has been relentless and the reporting often unfair or inaccurate. These two new books, seeking to contribute to this debate, are eagerly and provocatively marketed by the publishers—the cover of Lewis’s book features the image of a young man wrapped in the Union Jack, while Mondal’s has a photograph of Shabina Begum, the school girl who took her case for wearing the jilbab at school to the High Court in 2002. To some extent both books share some common themes, which will be familiar to many readers. They focus on issues of intergenerational conflict and tension, problems of educational underachievement and social marginalisation (particularly acute for young men), and the gap in accessible religious education and spiritual learning for young British Muslims. Both books are keen to emphasise the diversity of experiences among young British Muslims and to challenge sensationalist concerns about widespread radicalism. However, there are also important differences between the two books in their structure and approach. The two authors come to their subjects from somewhat different backgrounds. Philip Lewis’s Young, British and Muslim is a sequel to his highly regarded Islamic Britain (2002), one of the most important accounts of issues facing Muslims in contemporary Britain and written out of his longstanding engagement with ChristianMuslim relations in Bradford, where he works as an advisor to Anglican bishops and is a university lecturer. Anshuman Mondal’s Young British Muslim Voices is an opportunity for the author, of part-Muslim heritage but brought up in a middle-class secular family “far removed from the social environments of most young British Muslims” (p. xiii), to talk to young Muslims like those he encounters as a lecturer in literary theory and post-colonial history at Brunel University. As he reflects in the preface, Lewis’s earlier book was written against a tradition of race and ethnicity theory which did not take religion seriously. In this book, however, his concern is with “the privileging [of ]
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‘Islam’ as an explanation for quite disparate phenomena, whether riots, disaffected inner-city youth, political radicalization or violent extremism” (p. xiii). He seeks both to emphasise how religious identifications intersect with other identities (ethnic, class, or professional), and to challenge the way that ‘Islamism’ is often presented as an “undifferentiated phenomenon”. He wants non-Muslims to understand, or at least “overhear”, the “anguished and passionate intra-Muslim debates now exercising their communities” (p. xv) as a new generation of young, British-born Muslims consider their role in religious, communal and political/public life. As Lewis explains, the challenges are considerable, and it is important to see them within the context of the dislocations of migration, as a community learns to live as a religious minority within an environment “perceived as either indifferent or hostile” (p. xvi). In particular, he highlights the challenges of developing religious literacy and of producing Muslim leaders who can engage both with a young British-born population and in the secular public sphere. The first two chapters of Lewis’s book set out the context with an overview of the diversity and dynamics of Britain’s Muslim population. He writes clearly and accessibly, drawing from both academic and media sources (which are well documented at the end of each chapter). I liked the knitting in of examples, such as the biography of Olympic boxer Amir Khan. The comparison between Bradford, Leicester and Brent emphasises the specificity of local geographies against aggregate data which illustrate worrying trends of disadvantage. Lewis shapes his account of intergenerational conflict from a range of sources including novels, mosque sermons and the views of those who work on the Muslim Youth Helpline (MYH). He highlights concerns about drugs, gaps in parental understanding and between madrasa and secular educational spaces, and gender inequalities. He also traces the enduring significance of biradari networks, particularly in marriage patterns. While there is a focus on the challenges, Lewis also wants to showcase the constructive progress being made and the level of debate within Muslim fora. He uses the example of the MYH, who through websites, events and telephone counselling try to provide spaces for young British Muslims to gain a better understanding of how they might participate in British life in ways that are consistent with their faith. This focus on initiatives by young professionals who are seeking to engage with issues by taking a distinctive British Muslim perspective is continued in the next chapter, which profiles the work of City Circle, an influential, Londonbased debating group with a high web presence, the Muslim newspaper
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Q-News, and the Birmingham initiative Muslim Youthwork Foundation. Another positive example described is an educational programme for teaching citizenship produced by the Bradford Council of Mosques. The final two chapters deal with the question of religious leadership. Underlying the intergenerational tensions discussed earlier is the significant problem of religious education and leadership. Lewis acknowledges the difficulties of communication between young British Muslims and mainly foreign-born imams, who are poorly paid and lacking in influence. Again, he describes some pioneering work being done, both by inspirational ‘ulama who have taken a more proactive role in establishing educational and outreach programmes or prison chaplaincies, and in the best Islamic colleges. However, he is also mindful of the tensions “between those who are urging a wide-ranging engagement with a non-Muslim society and those who seem content to keep their spatial, social and intellectual distance from an infidel (kufr) society, often painted in lurid colours” (p. 89). He emphasises the influence of the well-funded Saudi Wahhabi/Salafi tradition, with its separatist and sectarian impulses. The challenge of religious leadership is significant and there is clearly a need for Islam-based institutions to generate a leadership that “is able to connect socially, intellectually and linguistically” (p. 92) with the majority of the British Muslim population. Competing for attention are well organised radical groups, such as Hizb al-Tahrir, who are active on university campuses with websites which provide an easily accessible source of information in English. Drawing on other scholarship, notably the anthropologist Pnina Werbner, he highlights the attraction to radical rhetoric and politics in a context of distrust of Western media, political failures in Israel/Palestine, Iraq, and Bosnia, and the appeal of “periodic utopian projects” (p. 125). As in previous chapters, Lewis illustrates attempts to undercut the appeal of radicalism, profiling the work of a Muslim chaplain at the University of London. First and foremost, Young, British and Muslim is an accessible and well written overview of some of the key issues facing British Muslims. It draws on a range of sources, not only academic and media sources, but also music and novels, supplemented with the author’s own observations from attending mosque sermons and participating in debates. This is an account which does not flinch from detailing the challenges or criticising some Muslim approaches, but is ultimately informed by the author’s hopeful enthusiasm for “the creativity of a new generation of young British Muslim professionals who, weary of the paralysis of
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many of their elders, have independently sought to plug gaping holes in provision” (p. 151). It deserves to be read widely by politicians and policy-makers as an important source of information on the diversity of Islamic traditions in Britain and as a corrective to narrow or essentialist depictions of ‘Islam’. The book is shaped largely by discussions with educated Muslim professionals, and perhaps a few more examples of ‘grass roots’ youth projects or young peoples’ voices would have been a welcome addition (although Thwarted Dreams, an account from a young people’s project in Bradford, is quoted extensively). One issue which particularly interested me, and which was brought up in the introduction but not taken much further, was the provocative comparison between the majority of British Muslims with a Pakistani migrant heritage and other religious minority groups, such as the Irish migrants of the nineteenth and twentieth century. There is some interesting work to be done, perhaps, on how the Catholic tradition “anticipates many of the challenges confronting Islam” (p. xviii), which might also provide pointers for shared engagement in the secular public sphere. Mondal’s book is very different in many ways. At the outset he argues that his own book is not an ‘academic’ or even a ‘scholarly’ work like others he cites, including Lewis. Instead he argues that he is not seeking ‘objectivity’ but instead presents “a record of many conversations with young British Muslims from a variety of ethnic, cultural and regional backgrounds” as an attempt to “bring what they have to say into the public domain” (p. xiv). Although he does not tell us how he recruited his interviewees, he does explain that he interviewed more women than men and included both working-class people and professionals. He says that all were “practising and self-confessed” Muslims, but he does not elaborate on these definitions. There are some overlaps with Young, British and Muslim: like Lewis, he speaks to members of City Circle, and he also talks to professional youth workers in different parts of the country. Most of the young people he talks to are in their early thirties, most have a university education and many have recently become more active or ardent in practising their faith. Mondal’s book is divided into seven chapters with broad themes including “Identity”, “Politics”, “Generational conflict”, “Being Muslim” and “Women”. This last is important, with some poignant accounts of the struggles faced by young women as they negotiate questions of marriage and particularly the issue of marriage partners chosen for them by their parents. Yet separating “Women” as a category for a
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chapter heading also seems somewhat surprising since gender identities and gendered ideas permeate so many of the other chapters. The book is written in a conversational style, which is quite engaging, but is also sometimes a struggle to follow. Certainly, the overall narratives of each chapter could have been aided by clearer signposting to the reader and more rigorous editing. It is often not clear where the argument is going. Another difficulty with the accounts presented here is the author’s reticence to subject them to a more sociologically framed analysis. A range of different Muslim voices are presented, but we are given little context for them. I found this frustrating and would have preferred the author to have given a more nuanced framing of his findings in the context of the not inconsiderable literature on some of these questions. His own reflections sometimes stray uncomfortably into the psychological as respondents are described as raising issues ‘unconsciously’. Nevertheless, Mondal does make some interesting arguments. At the outset he reflects on the unhelpful opposition between ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Islamisation’ and instead suggests that all his informants narrate stories of self-empowerment, often seeking to escape parental authority. Throughout the book there is much evidence for some of the themes raised earlier in this review—young people seek authoritative accounts of Islam and encounter a range of different alternatives. There is a recurrent theme of the diversity of Islamic views—“twenty-first-century Islam is riven by internal conflict, debate and dissension” (p. 44), and this “polychrome texture” of contemporary Islam makes the challenge for young people seeking religious authority that much more difficult. There are some powerful and engaging narratives presented here, particularly from young women. If in Lewis’s book young professional women are presented as in the vanguard of change and reform, they are also heard here as experiencing the brunt of patriarchal practices. There is little to disagree with in Mondal’s account. He presents a story which is familiar to many who have studied young Muslims in Britain. It is commendable to want the voices of young British Muslims to be heard and this account may reach new audiences beyond academia. Ultimately, however, I was left somewhat frustrated with a book from which I found it difficult to extract a convincing narrative. While both books may ultimately tell similar stories, I suspect that Lewis’s may pay greater dividends and may offer the uninformed reader a more coherent understanding of the current debates. In his introduction, Lewis reflects that “amidst a cacophony of Muslim voices, I hope to render
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. . . constructive interventions audible” (p. xviii). For this reader, at least, his accessible and scholarly approach proved more successful. Claire Dwyer University College London The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse. (Muslim Minorities, 8). By Brigitte Maréchal. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Pp. x+354. Hbk. ISBN: 978-90-04-16781-0. €104. $162. Brigitte Maréchal’s study on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Europe is based on extensive research conducted between 2001 and 2006, when she interviewed leaders and activists, and participated in conferences, congresses, and seminars connected with the movement. Her project is ambitious and demanding. She aims to contribute substantially to a field where “very little research of high quality exists” (p. 7). Maréchal is well aware that she is dealing with a controversial topic, noting that as soon as one speaks about Islamism “the organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood. . . draws fire because of popular stereotypes” (p. 1). She refuses, however, “. . . to allow the many prejudices that cloud the issue to continue to go unchallenged” (p. 11). Intended to present ideological aspects of the MB, the book “analyses the manner in which a certain heritage has been appropriated and even actualized by members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement” (p. 10). The book has three parts. The first is a historical survey from the founding of the MB to its migration and implantation in Europe. Part two deals with the role played by various important personalities within the MB, and the contribution made by individuals, from the founding period up to the present day. Part three analyses MB discourses “[. . .] to display the lines of tension that exist with regard to certain important topics, such as global Islam, the necessity of a militant attitude, a quest for recognition, etc.” (p. 11). The book, then, covers a number of topics in MB discourse. Maréchal has focused mainly on the movement’s ‘timeless’ questions, not on the development of its thought on how to face the European reality. Notably, gender is not included as a separate issue, even though, since the Fiqh Conference at Chateau Chinon in 1992, women’s issues have developed from being considered a secondary matter to being a core question to be dealt with in Western Europe. As it stands, Maréchal
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limits herself to topics linked to a certain image of the ‘Muslim woman’ as presented in the Islamist literature. Exploring the issue more fully, by looking, for example, at perceptions of women, gender relations, marriage, divorce and child custody, and women’s political participation, would risk exceeding the limits of this work, but could have given interesting insights into how the European context gives rise to fresh interpretations of Islamic texts.1 To advance this field requires a willingness to get close to the subject, to mingle with the movement’s followers and listen to them in the field, through participant observation, interviews and follow-up over time, in order to learn their actual concerns and the trends of thought among them. This is the particular strength of this book. It also requires fresh analytical angles; Maréchal has found a promising one in her structuring of the discussion around key personalities as points of reference in present discourses, and she nicely describes the MB tradition as a “reservoir of repertoires of meaning” based on “a line of descent of witnesses” (p. 168). Finally, it requires precision and accuracy both in definitions and of descriptive accounts, but in this regard there are some weaknesses. A definitional question that must be addressed in order to give an account of MB discourse is which speakers belong to the movement, to what extent, and how do we know this. Maréchal distinguishes between sympathisers and actual members, and often identifies a speaker as one or the other. One wishes, however, that she had discussed the criteria applied and the non-trivial problem of a membership that in principle is secret. With regard to living figures of reference for the MB, Maréchal identifies three categories: those outside Europe, who form “the referential framework in the largest sense”; those within Europe, who have “the most concrete effect upon the European scene”, and those personalities who “take on the role of a bridge between two worlds” (p. 144). In a passage that alludes to the notions of the MB as an organisation (tanzim) and as a trend of thought ( fikr)—a terminology widely used among insiders that oddly is not discussed in the book—Maréchal Anne Sophie Roald’s Women in Islam: The Western Experience (London/New York: Routledge, 2001) could have been a useful reference both in this context and because Roald, drawing on her previous research on the MB’s educational programme in Jordan, develops useful concepts to describe trends such as the ‘post-ikhwan’ (former members of the MB who remain within ikhwan thought). 1
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rightly notes the importance of intellectuals who stand “outside the organisational movement of the Muslim Brotherhood but not its ideas” (p. 144, emphasis added). It is surprising, however, that the examples mentioned include names such as Abdelkarim Soroush, Nasr Abu Zayd and Mohamed Arkoun, each of whom represents in his own right a trend of thought quite distinct from the MB, even if they do influence those MB members “who are most open to innovation”. One gets the impression that the fikr of the MB includes almost all Muslim reformist thinkers. When the author also says that some Muslim Brothers are “sensitive to doctrines like the monist idea developed by Ibn ‘Arabi” (p. 44), the MB universe of thought seems limitless. With a more clearly defined sample, it would be easier to assess the author’s important conclusions that the MB lacks not only a “real political program” (p. 269) but also agreement on a “clearly defined corpus” of tradition, though few members realise this due to an “apparent consensus” concealing internal divergence (p. 171). In several places, I would question the accuracy of the descriptions. My own research has involved observing sessions of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which Maréchal describes as follows: “They get together usually once a year, at least, and debate the development of a minority jurisprudence ( fiqh al-aqalliyyat). This is understood as Muslim law, which contains a group of legal obligations applicable to Muslim practices when the Muslims involved are part of a minority” (p. 235). Describing fiqh al-aqalliyyat in terms of positive “law” and “legal obligations” is problematic: rather, it serves as a framework that includes a number of principles for fatwa-giving, and as a basis for the legitimacy of the ECFR vis-à-vis other fatwa councils. The ECFR meets not to debate the development of this fiqh, but to discuss and resolve specific questions within this framework. The MB is described as having “first appeared in Egypt at the beginning of the 1930’s” (p. 15), not as founded in 1928. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth is said to be based in Kuwait (p. 65), not Riyadh; Tariq Ramadan is described as French (p. 158), not Swiss; and Ahmed Yassin is said to have “disappeared” in 2004 (p. 146), not been shot to pieces. Whatever the MB influence on the traditionalist group behind the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, this influence should not be deduced from the fact that “they were
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nicknamed the ‘new ikhwan’ ” (p. 47), as the author cited in support2 used the term ikhwan with reference not to the Muslim Brotherhood but to the Bedouin ikhwan forces of Ibn Saud. The author oddly finds it noteworthy “that the Prophet himself is called Al-Ma‘sum, without fault, by Hassan Al-Banna” (p. 101, n. 23), although it is elementary Islamic knowledge that this is indeed an epithet of the Prophet. Marginal though these points may be to the central topics of Maréchal’s account, they do mount up. Such concerns aside, the author and her work deserved a better translation into English. The original French is often followed word by word, and the book does not seem to have undergone proper language editing (or even a basic spell check in some parts). Some frequently used terms such as “militants” and “partisans”, which seem to mean respectively “activists” and “members” of the MB, carry the clearly unintended connotations of an armed movement. The reader must substitute “body” for “organism”, “talks” or “lectures” for “conferences”, and so on. Some French spellings are kept (CEFR for ECFR, Sadate for Sadat, etc.). One expects better from Brill. This pioneering monograph on the MB in Europe will be of interest to a wide academic audience, and it will be a central reference for researchers in the field. For the reasons pointed out, however, it needs to be critically read and used. Lena Larsen University of Oslo Penser l’islam dans la laïcité. Les musulmans de France et la République. By Frank Frégosi. Paris: Fayard, 2008. Pp. 497. Pbk. ISBN 978-2-213-62149-4. €20.90. Penser l’islam dans la laïcité (Understanding Islam in Laicity) is the result of about fifteen years of research on the question of Islam, laicity (laïcité), and Muslim law in France by one of the country’s leading experts. Frégosi states his main interest as being to demonstrating that “beyond the tensions between Islam and the idea of laicity in the
2 Al-Rasheed, Madawi, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 145 uses the term ‘neo-ikhwan’ for “. . . the successors of those who staged the rebellion against Ibn Sa‘ud between 1927 and 1929”.
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French context, we can see that an agreement is coming” and that French Islam is “plural, i.e. composed of a plurality of trends, and that the interpretation of laicity by the Muslims is manifold” (p. 12). These questions are investigated in the first part of the book. The second part deals with the stance of Islam vis à vis secularisation in general, and in the French context in particular, including the organisation of Islam in the country. The third part deals with the policy of the French state toward Islam. The fourth and last part focuses on the contemporary challenges faced by French Muslim institutions and the divisions and dialogue between its various trends. Islam and Laicity: The Quest for a Harmony The first chapter inquires into some stereotypes concerning Islam and laicity: the “political character of the Quran”, holy war ( jihad ), the relation between politics and religion in Islam, and the status of the Shari’a. Frégosi argues that Shari’a originates in two complementary sources: revelation and jurisprudence, of which only the former is considered divine, while the latter is based on human construction. Hence the political implementation of the Shari’a, as defended by Muslim radicals, is questionable. Frégosi considers four interpretations of the relations between Islam and laicity in the Muslim world: an adamant rejection of laicity, seen as opposed to Islam and as the historical consequence of the struggle against a hegemonic and authoritarian Church; a ‘neo-laicist’ interpretation of laicity as a universal principle and a political necessity, postulating an ‘Arabic laicity’ linked to an ‘Arabic reason’ inspired by philosophy and Mu’tazilite theology; a radical reformism seeking a laicity compatible with Muslim teachings; and a modernist advocacy of a democratic and secular state which is respectful of religious values. These various attitudes to laicity indicate the problems of the organisation of such communities in a state where laicity is established by law. Frégosi says that the major challenge faced by French Muslims is “understanding Islam in laicity rather than laicity in Islam” (penser l’islam dans la laïcité plutôt que la laïcité dans l’islam, p. 85). Frégosi considers three major attitudes of religious Muslim intellectuals to the social role of their religion: concentrating on its inner dimension and promoting faith rather than law (citing Leïla Babès); developing an Islamic normality which guarantees a minimal orthodoxy
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in a secular society (citing Tareq Oubrou); and reaffirming that the Muslim faith requires a political engagement on behalf of the marginalised and the victims of liberal globalisation (citing Tariq Ramadan). Thus Islam in France has produced “divergent intellectual postures, which denotes that Islam is actively remodelling itself in relation to secularisation” (p. 104). Muslim Pluralism in France Dealing with the position of French Muslims towards secularisation, Frégosi notes that the orthodox behaviour defended by several trends of this religion is only one way among others to experience Islam. Religiosity varies among French Muslims, with the Sub-Saharans far more devout than Moroccans, Turks and Algerians. Frégosi also notes indications that, for example, the month of Ramadan may hold a cultural and ethnic significance rather than a purely religious one, and may transcend the cleavage between believers and unbelievers. Frégosi proposes a sevenfold classification of believers in plural French Islam. The ‘ethnic believer’, legalist and legitimist, respects his own Maliki or Hanafi school of law. The ‘devout believer’ respects Muslim ritualism or orthopraxy, is a proselytiser or a missionary, and stands above the ethnic and cultural divides. The ‘intransigent puritan’, exemplified in the Salafi movement, believes in one version of Islam only, and fiercely criticises Muslim pluralism. The ‘neo-orthodox’ aims to practise a very orthodox Islam and refers to Muslim law in all circumstances. The ‘mystic’, usually linked to Sufism, advocates an inner Islam beyond dogma and rituals, which leads him to a detachment from the world and to interreligious dialogue. The ‘public activist’ (engagé) gives his religious practice a political or civil-society framework (according to the ideas developed by Tariq Ramadan) and endeavours to incarnate the Muslim ethic in French society. The ‘liberal’ cultivates a private, non-politicised Islam regarded as moderate, and advocates a critical approach to the religious sources. It should be mentioned that the ‘mystic’ in Frégosi’s classification belongs only to those of Sufism’s many various trends that are flexible, not to say antinomian. However, there also exist austere and rigorist forms of Sufism, such as the Turkish Naqshbandiyya, which would have to be classified elsewhere.
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Following this classification, Frégosi investigates the nature of Muslim religious authority in France. He points to three figures as authoritative references of French Islam: the ‘imam’, trained in Islamic dogma, rituals and law; the ‘lecturer’, a young charismatic leader like Tariq Ramadan, who bases his authority on his civic commitment rather than on booklearning; and the ‘jurisconsult’, competent to interpret the Qur’an and the Muslim tradition in order to give juridical advice ( fatwa). Frégosi notes that some innovations have developed in the minority context of Muslims in Europe. The “restricted theory of the Shari’a” (théorie restreinte de la sharia) is a response to the question how Muslims can practise their religion as a minority in a secularised society. The aim of this theory is to fix a minimal threshold, both social and legal, below which the believer would cease to live as a Muslim. In sum, the believer is offered four different possibilities for the practice of Islam, expressing the vast scope of Muslim pluralism: a spiritual, civic, normative and ritualistic, or ethnicised Islam. How is Islam to be Managed in France? The organisation of Islam in a secularised society, and particularly in the French laic society, is a sensitive question. Frégosi first recalls that, though the French authorities recognised Islam in 1881 as the fourth religion of France, in Algeria the French colonial power did not implement the law on the separation of state and religion from 1905, but put Islam under direct supervision, developing a more liberal policy only in 1940: The laic Republic did not “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s” (p. 220). Next, Frégosi examines the management of Islam by the French authorities since 1980, noting that French Islam is divided between the Mosque of Paris, which considers itself the French government’s natural partner, and other Muslim associations such as the UOIF (Union of French Muslim Organisations) and the FNMF (National Federation of French Muslims), who criticise the Mosque of Paris as an institution under the control of the Algerian government. A succession of attempted institutional solutions have sought, as Frégosi puts it, “to finalise the process of the integration of the Muslim cult in accordance with the 1905 law and to favour the emergence of an organisation which can legitimately speak in the name of French Muslims” (p. 237): the CORIF advisory body (1989–1993); Chevènement’s
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project of a “cultural management of Islam” stressing research and the cultural dimension (1997); the “Consultation of the French Muslims” (1999) representing the major French Muslim organisations, mosques, and regional centres; and finally the National Assembly of the Muslim Religion (Conseil français du culte musulman, CFCM) elected in 2003. Frégosi describes this organisation as the first real representative body of the Muslims of France and a major turning point in the history of French Islam. Frégosi distinguishes some aspects of the management of Islam in France with regard to their tacit underlying ideas: The ‘external or diplomatic management’ in which authorities yield influence over religious activities to the embassies of certain Muslim countries; the ‘security management’ which focuses solely on the political aspect and tends to confuse radicalism with Islam in general; the ‘cultural management’ inspired by the management of French Judaism and Protestantism; and the ‘legalist management’ with a ‘prohibitionist’ wing, which proposes to solve the problems of French Islam through a revision of the religious law. Islam in France: What Future? Major questions on the future of Islam in France concern the destiny of the CFCM, the tricky issue of imam training, the quarrel between the two Islams (laic versus traditionalist), and Islam in the eyes of the French law. Frégosi states that “the process of institutionalisation of Islam is unfinished” despite the establishment of the CFCM (p. 293). Its first members were elected in 2003, by 4,000 mosque delegates, giving no Muslim organisation an absolute majority, but clearly advantaging rigorist organisations. The Mosque of Paris suffered a reversal, though it gained the presidency of the CFCM due to political connections; the ‘neo-fundamentalist’ UOIF did well, but the ‘traditionalist’, Moroccanmajority FNMF came in first, and won 44% of the seats in the second (2005) CFCM elections. Frégosi traces the shifting rivalries and alliances between these groups, their ambivalent ideological positions and their relations with French authorities. So far (2008), Frégosi remarks, the CFCM has not had a great impact. It has no commission on theology and is unable to intervene in this field. The Muslim population see it only as “an organisation set up by
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the authorities in order to bring Muslim radicalism under their control” (p. 324), and indeed, Frégosi states that the authorities plainly continue to act as the guardians of Islam, a religion they seem to consider immature. Can we imagine, asks Frégosi, the Interior Minister inviting the French Catholic bishops’ council to discuss the tricky questions of celibacy or of female ordination, as he invited CFCM representatives to reach agreement on the headscarf in 2003? The need for an imam-training school has long been agreed on by the French authorities, noted scholars and intellectuals, and the presidents of the Muslim communities. Instead of importing imams trained in non-laic Muslim societies, who are feared to be fundamentalists or agents of foreign states, imams trained in France should be prepared for the local Muslim communities and for the secular milieu. This issue is the more salient because in France, imams are not just preachers but are also more active in the fields of education, culture, and social mediation than they are in their countries of origin. In 1992–1993, three relevant private institutes were set up: the European Academy for Islamic Studies, frankly oriented toward orthodox theology, fatwa-giving, and the Muslim Brotherhood; the High Institute of Theology of the Great Mosque of Paris, Algerian-controlled and with no teaching about French society; and the Islamic University of France (later the Institute of Islamic Studies of Paris), not favouring any one Muslim school of thought but offering some study of the European and national context. Frégosi notes that all three generally offer courses for students, rather than for future imams; give little place to contemporary Islamic studies, historical and critical exegesis, and the profane sciences; and favour Muslim law over theology and the other spiritual and philosophical traditions in Islam. Some other educational projects have failed; as an explanation, Frégosi points to the paradox that some French people categorically object to foreign financial support for French Muslim institutions while others object as vehemently to French government support, in effect denying Muslims help to resist radical influences. According to Frégosi, the CFCM process and the headscarf debate have revealed an internal division in the Islam of France between religious Muslims and secular Muslims. He subdivides the latter into culturalists, berbers, radicals, atheists, freethinkers, feminists and integrationists. The secular Muslims may denounce an “Islamist plot” and regard Islam as a “dangerous religion”, and present themselves as “sceptical or disobedient Muslims” (p. 406). Unified in their opposition
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to Islam in general, they are divided over the possibility of modernising it. Some endeavour to “culturalise” Islam and to valorise it as a cultural heritage; Frégosi states that they build a counter-communitarianism based on an ethnic reference to Islam. In his conclusion, Frégosi returns to his opening observation that Islamic pluralism makes it difficult for the French Republic to find a single interlocutor able to speak in the name of the country’s Muslims, and suggests that the debate on the harmonisation of Islam with laicity might lead to intra-Islamic dialogue. It is regrettable, however, that Frégosi’s research does not go more deeply into the particular case of the Turkish Muslim community, which has two features of interest that are both absent in Arab Islam. The first is the presence of the Alevi community (around 100,000 people), who are neither Sunni nor Shi’ite, and might be classified among the “liberals” in Frégosi’s classification of the believers, though radical Muslims frequently refuse to recognise the Alevi community as Muslim. The second is the experience of Kemalist laicity that the Turkish Muslims had in their country of origin—a “laicity” which places Islam under its control. It would have been interesting to learn about their views on both laicities. Finally, the book gives new insights—and this is, in my view, one of the virtues of Frégosi’s book—into the near impossibility of thinking about Islam in general, and French Islam in particular, as a whole. French Islam appears as a house divided over either the ethnic origin of its members (Algerian, Tunisian, Turkish, Indian, etc.) or the theological, political and social reading of the Qur’an and of the Islamic tradition. Frégosi’s analysis will no doubt be of great help to the French administration and to intellectuals confronted with Islam. It will also give scholars and students clues and keys to a better understanding of the varied ways Islamic pluralism is adapting to a particular European secular society. Thierry Zarcone École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris
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Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. By Katherine Pratt Ewing. Stanford/California: Stanford University Press, 2008. P. 282. Pbk. ISBN 978-0-8047-5900-7. $21.95. €13.83. Constructions of masculinity that can be observed among Muslims of Turkish descent in Western Europe and especially in Germany are the focus of this book. Katherine Pratt Ewing considers these constructions both as ascriptions, on the one hand, and as self-descriptions, on the other. On the basis of Foucaultian discourse theory, she traces the stigmatisation of Muslim men in Germany and points out their ‘abjection’ (in Judith Butler’s phrase). The author argues that these processes serve to affirm specific German political and cultural values and enforce the German national imaginary. The double perspective, on men’s struggle with stigmatised representations of masculinity, and on the German national imaginary, structures the book into two parts. The first part addresses representations of masculinity that have been shaped by anthropological research on the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century travel literature, films, and expert opinions of social advisors and scholars about the situation of Turkish immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany. Pratt Ewing then examines how these stereotypes are handled in contemporary society by youths and families of immigrant descent, filmmakers of the so-called ‘neo-neo’ German film, and Islamic organisations. The author focuses on the concept of honour and the discourse on the oppression of women in Muslim and Turkish families. Utilising a variety of empirical data, she is able to draw interesting parallels between the work of Turkish scholars and modernisation as a political project in the Turkish Republic, on the one hand, and discursive practices in Germany, on the other, with respect to how both sides reify the traditional Turkish man. Furthermore, the study offers a convincing account of how what is stereotypically referred to as an “unbridgeable gap” between tradition and modernity (p. 67), and between Turkish manhood and the German gender order, affects stigmatised persons, and how it affects what she calls their ‘classifications’, their ‘misrecognitions’, and their ‘scripts’ for action. Pratt Ewing points out that this dichotomy between tradition and modernity is at times reproduced, but she also demonstrates efforts (for example by filmmakers or Islamic reformist circles) to resist and overcome the patterns of action linked to this ‘gap’, and she retraces micropolitics in families and their capacity to negotiate solutions in conflict situations. More-
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over, she describes (on the basis of interviews) how young men struggle with their stigmatised masculinity and deal with issues of reputation and self-respect. Readers will discover the power that these stereotypes wield over actors, whether they are first or second-generation, and women or men of Turkish descent (though in different ways), but will also become aware of how these actors can contribute to shaping the meaning of stereotypes. In this context, the author highlights the fluid nature of the concept of honour and how it intertwines questions of self-respect, education, sexuality, consumption, reputation, respect for parents, and gender organisation. The second part of the book focuses on public debates in Germany that, in the author’s opinion, contribute to the abjection of Turkish men and Islamic notions of gender. This section also includes a discussion of interpretations of universalistic principles that predominate in German society. Pratt Ewing retraces public debates about so-called honour killings, which emerged after a young woman was murdered by one of her brothers in Berlin in 2005. She describes the controversies over the so-called Muslim Test, which the government of Baden-Württemberg unsuccessfully tried to implement for applicants for German citizenship in 2006. She summarises the ongoing debate about and legislation against teachers wearing Islamic headscarves in the classroom, and public controversies over the exemption of Muslim girls from physical education classes (gym and swimming lessons), which began in the 1990s. The author also addresses hegemonic discourse on security in the context of Islamist terrorism and on protecting the constitution, German national identity, and collective memory. This last is mainly analysed on the basis of an interpretation of the so-called Leitkultur controversy. According to the author, analysis of debates which deal explicitly with the problems of youths of Turkish descent, or with Muslim religious practices, reveal that Muslims are constantly represented as a threat to constitutional and cultural values in Germany. Rather than perceiving Muslim concepts of gender relations and practices related to the body simply as culturally-shaped alternatives to those that are currently predominant in German society, they are constructed as violations of universal human rights and democratic principles. Pratt Ewing concludes therefore, that “ ‘Protection of the Constitution’ and ‘protection of the Muslim woman’ become rhetorical and institutional mechanisms for enforcing German cultural values” (p. 199). According to her analysis, German ideas of ‘good’ masculinity and bodies arise from an Enlightenment language that has
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been distorted by nationalistic concerns related to body politics. These nationalistic concerns are outcomes of an ambivalent link between the repudiation of militarism and Nazi-era representations of masculinity, on the one hand, and a continuing emphasis since the beginning of the twentieth century on public nudity, cultivation of the body, and purity, on the other. In my opinion, the book loses some of its analytic quality in the second part. Negotiations of meaning—their continuities, discontinuities and contradictions—are brilliantly shown in matters of masculinity and honour relating to Muslims of Turkish descent in the first part of the book but do not figure as issues in the second part. As a result, the reader is left with the impression that concepts of the national imaginary are beyond the reach of the kinds of processes in which actors transform meanings. The actors in the second part of Pratt Ewing’s study are, so it seems, merely capable of parroting the concepts that signify a reified, coherent German national imaginary. Moreover, existing contradictions within the institutional order (for instance, between the federal Office of the Protection of the Constitution and the German courts) are not addressed. Nevertheless, Stolen Honor will be stimulating reading for all those interested in how societal issues, class conflicts, and political deficits are reframed as cultural or, indeed, ‘Muslim’ issues and for those who wish to understand the politics of national identity. N. Tietze Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung / Hamburg Institute for Social Research
