145
Chris Bobonich
NE VII 7: Akrasia and Self-Control
The picture that Aristotle may be suggesting (which is, I think, plausible) is that for something worse than X, e.g. Y, the self-indulgent will feel a strong desire for Y and act on it from choice, while the akratk will not feel (such) a strong desire for Y and will not do Y. For example, the self-indulgent feels a weak desire for a fourth glass of whisky at a party, thinks it good to take it, and does so; the akratic feels a strong desire for that whisky at a party, thinks it best not to take it, but does so anyway. The self-indulgent will also feel a strong desire, e.g. to spend a weekend binge drinking, and will do so; but the akratic will not feel a strong desire for this. nor will he do so. Such a pattern of desires and actions (including counterfactual ones) would plausibly make it seem obvious 'to everyone' that the self-indulgent is worse, without, at any rate, an explicit appeal to the comparative corruption of his principle.
this point that is one of Cook Wilson's main reasons for thinking that book VII is a composite. A narrow construal, according to Cook Wilson, is suggested by the passages on moderation in the unique books of the NE and the EE.
144
(3) Finally, 115oa26~7 seems to display a narrow understanding of the pains relevant to these dispositions (Le. it is the pain of frustrated desire), and I take up the general issue in the next section.
The self-controlled is opposed to the akratic, and the enduring to the soft; for endurance (to karterein) depends on resisting (antechein), but self-control depends on being stronger (kratein). And to resist (antechein) and to be stronger (kratein) are different, just as not being weaker (to me hettasthai) is different from winning (nikan). For this reason, self· control is more choiceworthy than endurance.
Section 4 returns to the issue presented at the beginning of this chapter: that is, the relation between the self-controlled/the akratic, and the enduring/the soft. In Section 1 at 11Soa13-15, these pairs are distinguished by their objects: the former are concerned with pleasures, the latter with pains. Commentators sometimes wonder whether l1S0a32-6 is intended to be a supplement to l1S0aB-IS, or whether it supersedes 1150a 13-15 so that, e.g., the self-controlled is one who is stronger than either pleasures or pains, while the enduring (onlyJresists pleasures and pains. On the whole, I think it is better to regard 1150a 32-6 as supplementing 1150aI3~15. Both before and after 1150"32-6 (e.g. llSOb2-8, 17~19) Aristotle distinguishes akrasia and softness in terms of their different objects-pleasure and pain,· respectively-and it is unlikely that he adopts a very different conception here without marking it in some way. This is the most controversial section of our chapter, since, first, it is not clear exactly how Aristotle intends to distinguish self-control from endurance (indeed, several commentators think that Aristotle's claim that the former is more choiceworthy is simply unfounded), and, secondly, it brings to a head the issue of what sorts of pains are relevant to these dispositions. I begin with the latter issue. Assuming that being enduring is a matter of resisting pains, and being self-controlled is a matter of being stronger than pleasures, what pains does Aristotle have in mind here? It is what he finds to be the text's inconsistencies on
Excess about pleasures, then, is clearly self-indulgence and blameworthy; as for pains, one is not, as in the case of courage, called moderate for facing them nor self-indulgent for not doing so, but the self-indulgent is so called because he is pained more than he should at not getting pleasant things (even his pain is caused by pleasure), and the moderate man is so called because he is not pained at the absence of what is pleasant and at his abstinence from it. The self-indulgent... is pained both when he fails to get them [pleasant things} and when he is desiring them (for desire is with pain). (NE 1118h Z? -1119"4)29
The EE texts are, I think, less dear. The man in such a condition as to be deficient in the pleasures which all must in general share in and enjoy is insensible ... the man who is excessive is se1f-indulgent. For all naturally enjoy these objects and conceive desires for them, and neither are, Dor are called self-indulgent; for they neither exceed by enjoying them more than they should when they get them, nor by feeling greater pain than they should when they do not get them. (EE 1231a 26-32)30
The Eudemian Ethics' brief discussion of moderation is focused more on pleasure, and we should not conclude that Aristotle means to restrict the relevant pains to only those arising out of the frustration of desire. In particular, in the above passage, Aristotle seems more concerned to show that one can enjoy many pleasures without being self-indulgent. So his attention is on the differences between the moderate and the self-indulgent, both when they attain the pleasures they seek and when they faiL If VII. 4 and VII. 7 broaden the pains associated with moderation, they are slightly more compatible with the EE passages, I think, than with the NE passages. Cook Wilson also claims in support that in both the Nicomachean and the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle associates endurance and softness with the objects of courage and cowardice (deilia) and may, e.g., see softness as a form of cowardice.31 But this evidence is weaker than Cook Wilson suggests. NE 11163 12-14 does see softness as a form of cowardice, but this is very much a remark in passing, and it does not seem to be an attempt to make the notion of softness precise. It certainly Cook Wilson also cites 1117b 24-7 and 1119"24-5. It is probab1y wrong to think that the BE's claim (1230b 36-8) that moderation concerns the sensory obiects that other animals enjoy and are pained by entails that its conception of moderation's objects is less restrictive than the NE. The NE (especially III. 10) also emphasizes that moderation's objects are shared by non-human animals, and BE 1231"26-32 mentions only the pains of frustration. Otberpassages are more important (1) NE 114Sa35-6linkssoftness (malakia) and daintiness (trIlphi) and promises a later discussion. The only NE passage that this could refer to is 115fi' 1 if., where the pains include more than those of frustration. Would followers of Cook Wdson delete 1145"35-6 or dismiss it as part of the Eudemian strata of NE book VII? (2) EE 1221'28-9 and 1221"9 clearly have the broader conception of pain fur daintiness (d. Rh. B84a l-2), allhough 1221"9 seems to make 31 Cook Wilson (1912, 33). endurance a virtue distinct from moderation. 19 30
147
Chris Bobonich
NE VII. 7: Akrasia and Self-Control
does not exclude the possibility that in the same work Aristotle offers a more precise or strict understanding of softness. But Cook Wilson also claims that the same picture is found in the following passage:
heat and cold (although these are still said to be pleasures of touch and taste).34 Second, and more controversially, it may allow in quite generally, the pains of hunger and thirst and heat and cold. The worry here is that, as noted above, some have thought that Aristode in the unique books of the Nicomachean Ethics (and more questionably the Eudemian Ethics) restricts the relevant pains to those associated with the frustration of desire. But the pain offrustrated desire is distinct from these expanded pains: when I am freezing, it is no doubt usually the case that my desire to be warm is (painfully) frustrated, but it seems also that being cold is painful in itself. Burnet (followed by Gauthier and 10lif and contra Cook Wilson) argues that such broadening is acceptable, and citing the claim at Parts of Animals 646"16 that wet and dry and hot and cold are the matter of 'composite bodies', infers that the pleasures of warmth and coolness arc thus on 'exactly the same footing as the pleasures of nutrition and reproduction' .35 Yet we might have several worries. First, with respect to the gourmand, Ar"istotle is concerned to localize the relevant pleasures of touch to certain body parts, and Burnet's inference threatens to let in all tangible pleasures. Burnet's idea might be that if we first restrict (on some independent grounds) the relevant pleasures of touch to certain parts of the body, then, because the objects enjoyed with those parts are composites of wet and dry and hot and cold, we can see them as pleasures taken in warmth, coolness, and so on. But this, too, seems problematic: if aU sensible composite bodies were in some way composed out of prime matter and form, would this show that these are pleasures taken in prime matter and form? To put it anachronistically, even if the composition claim is true, it does not show that the composite things are desired or enjoyed under that description. 36 But Aristotle does specify hotJcold and dry/wet as objects of touch, and such a claim may rest on some of his basic views about the nature of the elements and of perception. 37 We might also restrict these pleasures in the way suggested above so that they are, more or less, those shared with other animals. The details would still need to be worked out, but we can perhaps see the beginning of a story that would allow pleasures of warmth and coolness to be pleasures of touch. But there is a more basic worry. Aristotle remarks:
146
But fear only occurs in connection with the expectations of pain whose nature is to be destructive oflife. Therefore men who are very soft as to some things are brave, and some are hard (:kJeroi) and enduring are cowards ... For if a man were such as to be patient as re~<;o~ requues towards heat and cold and other similar, not dangerous pains, but weak and tllrud about death, not for any other feeling, but just because it brings destmclion, while another was soft in regard to these but unaffected in regard to death, the former would seem cowardly, the latter brave. (BE 1229'39- b lO) This passage, however, makes precisely the opposite point from that suggested by Cook Wilson. Softness here is certainly not seen as a kind of cowardice: one can be both soft and brave and enduring and cowardly. Although the relations alIlong virtues may be so strong that it is not, strictly speaking, possible for one to be genninely brave, but also soft, the basic point seems dear. Endurance and softness are not concerned with the objects of courage, and their own objects at least include some pains connected with hunger and cold (cf. EE 1229b 13-21). To begin to. sort tllis issue out, let us first consider what the pains directly rel~te~ to a deSIre for pleasure would be. Most straightforwardly, (a) just having a deslfe Itself may be (at least sometimes) painful, and (b) the frustration of desire is painful.:u Aristotle seems to broaden this account substantially, however, in VII. 4. But ?f those having to do with bodily enjoyments, (with which we say the moderate and self-mdulgent man arc concerned), he who pursues the excesses of things pleasant and shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and cold and all the objects of touch and taste, not by choice but contrary to his choice and his judgement, is called a.kratic, not with the qualification 'in respect of this or that', e.g. of anger, but just without qualification. (NE 1148a 4-11)JJ This passage might constitute a broadening in two ways. First, it may allow in as concerning moderation, quite generally, the pleasures of hunger and thirst and 32
The relation between pain and desire is too complex to discuss here, but d. NE 1119" 1-5 and
1154b 9-14 (I am grateful t.o.Darid Charles for pointing these out). Sometimes relevant might also be, e.~., (c) the .pam ?f the ~ntJClpauon of frustration, (d) the pain of having conflicted desires, or pain at bemg conflicted m one s desrres, and (el the frustration of a desire for an orderly character, although these may not be generally shared by other animals. ." Again~ Ramsauer's and Rassow's emendations at 1148"7, see Stewart (1892), ad lac. I agree With Gauthier and Jolif and Stewart that it is wrong to assume that 114S' \l-13 states Aristotle's own account of softness (which is given in VII. 7); such a reading overlooks the difference between iegomen at a 5 and legetai at a 10. An interpretation of I 14;rh 2 I ..~ 3 resting on such an assumption is thus insecure. Since 1148" 11-13 is not discussing softness in Aristotle's strict sense, tautas at aI2 need not be restricted to pains (as opposed 10 pleasures or pleasures and pains). Outside Aristotle, softness is not confined 10 pains, e.g. Plato Resp. 556b7-cl, and the note on 1150'13-14 in Gauthier and Jolifis useful. Finally, it is wrong to think that Cook Wilson's Version A (1l4?23-1I48' 13) ofv11. 4 relates akrasia without qualification to pleasures and pains, while Version B (Il4S"28- b I4) relates it only to pleasures. 1148"9-14 holds that akrasia and self-control have the same objects as moderation and selfmdulgence, and that these are pleasure and pain (II46 b 10-11,19- 22).
it. is for facing what is painful, then, as has been said, that men are called courageous. Hence courage also involves pain, and is justly praised; for it is harder to face what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant. (NE 11173 32-5; d. 1119a 21-33) • The pains relevant to courage are those of wounds or death, especially on the battlefield. Nevertheless, there is something in the general point apart from these qualifications. First, certain sorts of resistance to pain seem more difficult, and thus perhaps finer, than refraining from pleasures (and this may present a difficulty for 34 This might be avoided jf we lake pantOn at 1148'8 to be limited by tOniuperiin at '7. Perhaps 35 Burnet (1988,308). I II 9" 16-18 suggests some broadening ofthe relevant pleasures. 36 Worse is the suggestion that heat gets in because 'digestion depends on it' (Burnet 1988,308). All sensible bodies depend on the Unmoved Mover too. 31 Cf. De an. II. II and the useful discussion ofJohansen (1998,178-225).
LSl
Chris Bobonich
NE VII. 7: Alcrasia and Self-Control
be drawn here. Before turning to their specific worries, let us consider some of the constraints on an interpretation.
This passage-at least on one plausible interpretation which takes it to claim that one who acts rightly with pain overall is self-indulgent42 -seems to classify the enduring as self-indulgent, and, a fortiori, the soft: as self-indulgent as well. There are ways to try to disarm NE 1104b3 - 7. 43 In any case, I do not think that we should allow this passage to control our interpretation of book VII, so Let us accept the above characterization of endurance. Finally, we should note that the above characterizations make no reference to time, and time might be relevant: e.g. perhaps the self-controlled can bring it about that his desires are less pressing before action. Commentators have raised a number of objections to the cogency of Aristotle's distinction here and the conclusion that he draws. Let me focus on what I take to be the most important. Cook Wilson objects to Aristotle's distinction between the akratic and the soft, and thus between the self-controlled and the enduring, that there is no way to distinguish acting for gaining pleasure (akratic) and acting to avoid the pain of frustrated desire (soft).44 But as David Charles rightly points out, Aristotle does draw a distinction between acting from pleasure and acting to avoid pain at 1150"25t145 Moreover, it intuitively seems quite reasonable to think that people might act on one rather than the other, even if both are present. I might sometimes act against choice and smoke a cigarette for pleasure (e.g. at a party) while still having the pain of a frustrated desire until I give in, and sometimes to avoid pain (e.g. when I am bothered by my desire for a cigarette when stressed), although I still get pleasure from the cigarette. So what are the options in understanding how the self-controlled is stronger than or is victorious over pleasure?
150
( 1) The positive characterization of the self-controlled cannot be strong enough to turn him into the moderate man; nor can the negative characterization of the soft tum him into the self-indulgent. This constraint should be uncontroversial, but, as we shall see, it is not without some bite. (2) There are further constraints on how far the self-controlled 'is stronger than' pleasure: (a) He has strong (ischurai) and bad (phaulai) desires (1146 3 9-10). (b) The self-controlled man has bad desires, but the moderate man has none; and the moderate man is such as to take no pleasure contrary to the prescription (logos), but the self-controlled man is such as to take pleasure contrary to the prescription, but is not led by it (NE 1152a l-3). So to begin, the self-controlled has strong and bad desires, but still makes and acts upon the right choice. What, exactly, is the meaning of he 'is such as to take pleasure contrary to the prescription?' It will certainly be the case that he actually takes pleasure in this kind of thing when it is not contrary to the prescription; e.g. he may enjoy a glass of wine with dinner. (But then so might a moderate man.) When the self-controlled has chosen not to take a fourth glass of wine, what is true of him with respect to pleasure? He will still have a strong desire to take the drink; he may take pleasure in imagining taking the fourth glass, and it might be the case that ifhe were to drink it, he would find it pleasant. We might also ask whether he would merely find it pleasant by itself, or whether he would also find it pleasant overall, since, e.g., he will presumably feel regret. One attractive line of interpretation holds that he would find it pleasant overall. 41 If this is right, it suggests a corresponding account of the enduring: he has strong and bad desires (or avoidances), but still makes and acts upon the right choice. Let us add that he is such as to take pain in things contrary to the prescription. So, when faced with a choice in which the good option has the appropriate pains, the enduring makes and acts upon the good choice, but feels pain overall (here we do not have to evaluate the pleasure and pain in counterfactual situations; cf. NE 1179b 32-3). An important worry about this characterization is provided by a passage noted earlier. The pleasure or pain that supervenes on actions should be treated as a sign of dispositions; for someone who refrains from bodily pleasures and takes pleasure in doing so is moderate, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent. (NE 1104°3-7) ., The best discussion of the general problem is Charles 1984, 168-77; I have learned much from his interpretation even when r am not in full agreement.
(I) The simplest account would be that the self-controlled's previous habituation and previous virtuous (or semi-virtuous) al."tivities have shaped his desires so that they are weaker, less intense, less likely to come into play, and so on than those of most people. The self-controlled might have strong and bad desires, but those of most people are worse. It is reasonable to think that this is at least part of what is going on. But, as we shall see, 1150b 22-5 suggests some more active measures that a person might take in closer temporal proximity to the possible temptation. 4>
Charles 1984, 169-il.
.. We might con&'true the passage not in terms of pleasure and pain overall, but in pleasure or
pain taken in abstaining. Cf. Dent 1984,144-6, and Pears 1978, 284. But 1152"2-4 may provide further reason for preferring an overall notion. Here the moderate do not take pleasure contrary to the prescription, but it is plausible that in some cases the moderate would feel physical pleasure if they acted contrarily (e.g. taking one extra drink). The point seems to be that the moderate do not feel pleasure overall, becalL~e of regret, etc. 'Not taking pleasure contrary to the prescrip~on' ~ere should not be construed instead as merely denying that the moderate do not take pleasure m acttng agamst the prescription as such: none of the self-controlled, the akratic, or the self-indulgent does that. I am much indebted to David Charles for his suggestions on this point. .. Cook Wilson 1912,47. 45 Charles 1984, 171.
Chris Bobonich
NE VII. 7: Akrasia and Self-Control
them. (This again requires that the pains not be too great.) If the enjoyments of the self-controlled can be more insulated from his ends and judgements of what is worth taking seriously, this gives some additional sense to the idea that the self-controlled is stronger and is victorious.
be stronger than (or resist) them if possible, failure to do so does not disqualify one from the positive disposition (self-control, endurance) or place one in the negative disposition (akrasia, softness). Aristotle makes this point by reference to the idea that certain pleasures and pains are strong and excessive or overpowering, rather than by appeal to what the many would do, but the two are presumably intimately related (excessiveness is especially important, since, as we have seen, the akratic has strong bad desires). The reference to pain at b6 complicates the otherwise tidy division between endurance/softness and self-controlfakrasia, since Aristotle goes on to consider cases that are not primarily, if at all, of akrasia. Further, these examples are somewhat puzzling in their own right. 48 But it may not be necessary to see each of these as even an instance of one of the dispositions related to moderation and self-indulgence, but only as some sort of pardonable overcoming. The case of Philoctetes is perhaps especially problematic. There is no difficulty in allowing that he was not displaying softness when he finally gave in, but ifhe displayed endurance for a time, then such endurance seems to be a fairly impressive accomplishment. 49 Aristotle's comment about amusement is perhaps primarily of interest in so far as it is an instance of his willingness to distinguish acting for pleasure and to avoid pain (even when both are present).
154
Section 5: 1150h l-19 The one who is deficient with respect to those things that the many struggle against (antiteinausi), and successfully, is soft and dainty; for daintiness too is a kind of softness. 47 Such a man drags his cloak so that he will not suffer tne pain of lifting it up, and while imitating a sick person does not think he is miserable, although he is like a miserable man. Similar things hold about self-control and akrasia. For if someone is weaker than strong or excessive pleasures or pams, it is not surprising; rather it is pardonable if he struggles against [them], just as Theodectes' Philoctetes does when bitten by the viper or Cercyon in the Alape of Carcinus, and just like those trying to hold their laughter who burst out laughing all at once, as happened to Xenophantus. But [it is surprising], if someone with respect to those things which the many are able to resist (antechein), is defeated by them and is not able to struggle against them, unless it is on account of his congenital nature (physin tou genous) or on account of disease, as there is softness in the kings of Scythia on account of heredity (genas), or as women differ from men. 'The man fond of amusement also seems to be self-indulgent, but is soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest. And the man fond of amusement is among those who exceed with respect to this.
Presumably, 'those things' that the many struggle against at 1l50b l are pains, since this is a characterization of the soft. Aristotle reapplies here the criterion of what 'most people' would do that opened the chapter at 1l50a 9-15. He perhaps shifts now to 'resist' (antiteinein), instead of 'be stronger than' (1150"12, kreittous, kratein) to avoid, in light of 1150"32-bl, saying that those who succeed with respect to pain are stronger than the pain. Aristotle's example here of such a case of softness is the cloak-dragger who imitates the sick. This person mayor may not be a hypochondriac, but is probably fussy about drafts, spicy food, etc. This case is a good illustration of softness, in that it emphasizes the pettiness of the pains involved (and the pettiness of mind of the corresponding character). It is also much easier to see these as minor bodily pains than as pains arising from frustration of desire. In this man, there is not much sense of inner conflict or struggle, but it is not clear how much struggle is required for all cases of akrasia. In any case, the description does not, I think, suggest that this person straightforwardly acts on a bad choice. (1150b 5 need not m~an that he is confident that he is acting for the best.) Having restated his criterion for being soft (and implicitly for being enduring), Aristotle turns to self-control and akrasia at l1S0b S-6. Here the general point is that there are pleasures and pains so great that although it would be good to b 47 On the basis of 1150 12-13, we might understand antechein with dunantai at b2: •... those things that the many struggle against and are able to resist'.
155
Section 6: 1150b 19-28 Of akrasia, one kind is impetuosity (prapeteia), the other, weakness (astheneia). For some, having dehberated, do not abide by the results of their deliberations on account of their affections (to pathos); others, on account of not having deliberated, are led by their affections. For some people (just like those who tickle first are not tickled), ifthey have seen it coming, and looked out for it, and have roused themselves and their calculative faculty (logismon), are not weaker than the affection, whether it is pleasant or painful. Those who are keen and melancholic are especially prone to impetuous akrasia. For it is on account of their quickness in the one case, and on account of their intensity in the other that they do not wait for reason, because they are prone to follow appearances (tei phantasiai).5IJ 4l! (a) Cercyon fits awkwardly into the sphere of moderation, since his pain is at his daughters bearing a child to Poseidon. This is not a pain shared with all animals; nor does it seem to be one of touch (even if his daughter failed to control the pleasures of touch). Nor does it even seem to be true that Cercyon's pain is primarily the pain of the frustration of any desire, although, no doubt, a desire of his was unsatisfied. On this story, see Harrison (1890, pp. cv-cix). (b) We could see Xenophantus as a case of being overcome by the desire for pleasure or becoming overcome by the pain of restraint, but it may be fine ju<;t to see it as some sort of pardonable overcoming. (c) On the kings of Scythia, commentators send us to Herodotus 1.105 and Hippocrates On Airs, Waters, and Places 21-2. But neither story gives an explicit place to avoidance of pains, although one can see how the Hippocrates story could be developed in that way. (d) On women, d. 1148b31-4. .9 Cf. Cicero Tuse. II, esp. 7. 19, on the fear of pain.. 5<> On 11501'22, Stewart and Gauthier and Jolifhave useful notes. I follow Burnet, Bywater, Stewart, and Susemihl in readingprogargaloontes at b22; Gauthier and Jolif prefer progargalisthentes, which hali some manuscript support. On this description of impetuous akrasia, it seems that the affection that leads is not responsible for the lack of deliberation; rather, the lack of dehoeration allows the affection
160
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (1 151 b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
we listed Ihe problems: 8 it is the fonner who is incurable, and the latter that is curable; for badness of character resembles diseases like dropsy or consumption, wnile akrasia resembles the sort involving seizures; for the one is a continuous, the other a non-continuous way of
can be sure of something-for example, that such-and-such is the be-all and end-all of life-~without having been brought to this by reasoning or argument, there is no logical ground for imagining that the single-minded :olupt~ary ~ou~d be reasoned away from his devotion to pleasure. rn fact, as ArIstotle unphes m our passage, the only reasoning effective with the voluptuary ~u:t ~ conducte.d from within the framework of that basic ethical outlook of hIS. [hiS outlook IS the starling point (archei in him, controlling wh~t he recogniz~s a~ reasons. for doing one thing rather than another, and cOl1trolJmg also the welghtIngs he gives to his various reasons. On the formation of this starting point, Aristotle has these words:
being as one shouldn't be.
(1150b29-35)9
\'\'hether the argument of the aporia was proposed as an amusing paradox or as a point which some found actually plausible, the gap in it is glaring: granted, the single-minded voluptuary wauld, were he to be so persuaded, change his mind in a way that would effect his moral cure; but why should one suppose that getting him thu, persuaded is remotely likely or even possible? In much the same way, determinists, in the modern debate about free will and determinism, have claimed to make room for free will on the ground that determinism certainly allows that an agent who chose to do, and consequently did, so-and-so, would have done otherwise ifhe had so chosen; to which the classic modern reply is: 'How can this show that he could have chosen otherwise?' To the corresponding question about the pcrsuadabiJity of the single-minded voluptuary, one answer that the proponents of our aporia might have given is this: 'The single-minded voluptuary is rational because consistent--his behaviour matches his prohairesis. But the rational are those who can be moved by reasoning, i.e. by persuasion as opposed to force-which is the only other way of moving people.'lo But this is hopelessly loose. True, reasoning with the acratic is not a way to cure him, since his own prohairesis or reasoned decision is already in place, yet is inefficacious; but it does not follow that the other sort of bad person, the kind of which it seems l l right to say that his reasoned decision is efficacious, can be reformed by reasoning. Let us grant that his reasoning, or the rational decision in which it concludes, controls his behaviour: then the only way to curc his behaviour would be to cure. his reasoning: but why should we suppose that rensoning with him can do that? This question too has its specious answer. 'One who behaves in a certain way because he is persuaded (fiji pepeisthai, 1146 a 31; cf. 1146b 1-2) of the goodness of the conduct must have gotten persuaded to that effect. That is to say: the only way to be in the state in which one is persuaded, i.e. convinced, that so-and-so, is to have entered it, and the only way of entering it is through being argued, or at any rate talked, into it by some process of persuasion.' Add to this the perhaps genuinely plausible thought that what you can be talked into, you can in principle be talked out of, and the specious account is complete. But the account works by trading on an ambiguity in pepeisthai, which can mean 'to have gotten persuaded' but can also mean no more than 'to be sure', 'to have the conviction', that something is so. If, as this second sense allows, one
161
... excellence and badness respectively keep healthy, and corrupt, the fundamental starting point, and in action this is that for the sake of which. just as in mathema~ca1 arguments the initial posits are starting points. Neither in that case, then, does reasorung teach us ~he starting points, nor does it in the present one; instead it is e~cellenceP mnate or resuh~g from habit-training (e physike eethiste), that gIves liS correct /udgement U about the starung point. (I151 u I5-19) So even if it is correct to say that the voluptuary carries on as he does because persuaded that this is good, this state (at least in so far as it involves adheren~ to a general principle) corresponds only to the second ~n~ weaker .of the meanmgs distinguished above. Thus at 1151" 13 the voluptuary lS mdeed saId to. be a person persuaded that what he does is fine, but (as we see from the passage ~ust quot~d) this perspective is not one to which he has been led through :easomng or bell1g reasoned to: it is nOlhillg but his first or second nature commg through. He IS persuaded that it is fine to pursue excessive and wrongful pleasure:
b
the ischurogoomones (llSl S-16) and Neoptolemus (1151;18-21). The emphatica1lyplaced pas at llSoV31 (translated 'always' by Rowe) may signal that the is now akrasiain the broad sense, in which case ho akolastos at 115oV29 and 1151'24-5 is a for vice in general (as it dearly is at D 1151 22), and ho sophron at 115J a l9 forvirtl1c in Vice and virtue are, however, referred to in general terms at llSOb32, 35, 36; 1151'5, IS, 18. a Thisrefers to the passage just quoted. 9 II
See n. 16 for a discussion of this text.
10
Cf. EEl II, 1224"38.
The reason for this qualification will appear presently.
11 The remark: Oliff •• • ho Iog.,s didaslmliko; ... all' arete is a deliberate oxymoron, as was pointed out in the Symposium discussion. " .,
13 I do not think any difference is intended here between 'ha\'mg the correct starting pomt and 'having correct judgement about (ortho.iuxein peri) the starting point'.. . ..., 14 Of course Alistotle does not think that all moral convictions are the Ideologte$ of an mdMdual s practical bent, ~ven that the akratic's practical bent is out of kilter at times with his conviction••
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (115I b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
so. But before we turn to look into this possibility, let us pause to remark the rabid intellectualism of the pair of assumptions just mentioned. Intellectualism is a description often applied to the Socratic denial of the very possibility of akrasia, since the denial assumes that an intellectual conviction about how one should act automatically generates the corresponding action. But we just now have been viewing an intellectualism that allows for akratic behaviour and also for the possibility of a character disposed to such behaviour, but maintains that persuasion through reasoning is the key, and the only key, to ethical improvement. The first of the two assumptions stokes an absurd optimism about reasoning's power to bring about good-it can lead men from vice to virtue-while the second denies all hope of improvement to the matic: since reasoning cannot mend his behaviour and character, nothing can. Aristotle cuts through the latter of these sophistries by pointing to the power of akratic regret to spark refonn. The akolastos's lack of regret, his self-satisfaction (1150b 29-30; cf. l1Soa21-2), is the corollary to that consistency of action with decision which made him seem so much more rational, and therefore at first sight persuadable and curable, than the akrates.15 Straying a little beyond Aristotle's discussion, one can do some table-turning here: one can point out that the matic's bad conscience shows rationality, consistency, and constancy on his side too, as well as self-awareness. First, he needs no Socratic-style elenchus to bring him to recognize that he is guilty of an inconsistency-between what he voluntarily did and what he had rationally decided he should do. The conflict is self-evident to the agent involved, even (in paradigm cases) at the moment of action (he men gar kakia Jrmthanei, hed'akrasia ou lanthanei, 11S0h36 t6 ). Secondly, it is of course a mark of rationality to be disturbed or chagrined by such a dissonance in oneself. Thirdly, whereas a conceivable harmony-restoring move would be to endorse the action and go back on the de("-ision, the akrates does the opposite. He does not reject the
decision, because (as he rightly thinks) nothing has happened to give him reason to change his mind. The decision was reached in the light of various considerations, and (as he sees it) these and their relative importances remain the same. Whether this agent cannot, or out of loyalty will not, ditch his reasoned conclusion for no good reason, his refusal to do so is another great mark of rationality. Fourthly, if the matic's self-castigation takes the somewhat theoretical form (which it may, though it need not) of rationalistic distress at havingjlouted his own rational part, he is clearly manifesting respect for the authority of reason. On several counts, then, matic regret merits the extremely vague accolade 'rational', even though it is not a state of mind into which he was led by reasoned persuasion from a different view.n One might wonder aL Aristotle's easy assumption that the matic agent immediately detects something wrong with his behaviour (llSOb36). For such behaviour betokens a conflict in the soul, and don't we now know that conflicts in the soul can occur buried deep below the threshold of self-awareness? But Aristotle's is not a gratuitous assumption, because he is talking about not just any conflict in the soul but about that between matic action and prohairesis. Consider the way in which, in unconflicted cases, a prohairesis or rational decision functions to guide action. We know what we have rationally decided and why, not merely so that we can justify our actions (an obsession with some philosophers), but, more basically, so as to carry out our ends effectively. For this to work, we need, as we act, to be able to tell when what we are doing departs or is about to depart from what we had decided (taken along with the reasons why we decided on it), Likewise, we need to be able to tell when we have enacted the decision, if only SO as not to go on mindlessly trying to complete an action already complete. We need, therefore, to be able to bring to mind the decisions relevant to our most recent bout of action, even if sometimes in the heat of the action itself we might lose sight of them momentarily. Thus any discrepancy between decision and performance must lie on or very near the surface. Furthermore, if we consider the agent purely in terms of efficient co-ordination, the agent is perfectly entitled to assume that, where action is unfolding in accordance with decision, there is nothing wrong. We could not get along at all if we were always wondering whether we were doing the right thing even when nothing has brought us up short. It is precisely because nature (first nature) has designed us for basic practical efficiency that vice blindly enjoys
162
15 The akratic may feel bad about his akratic behaviour even when actually engaged in it; but regret ( for one's own behaviour, ie. metame1eia) typically involves the retrospective rejection (and would-be undoing) of a previous doing (d. EE VII, 1240b 22-3). Thus here too the notion of ethical change is at work. Regret's notional 'withdrawal' of the regretted actio!1 is one sort of change, which can lead to others such as alteration of behaviour patterns and disposit ions. , 16 Several translators and commentators assume that this is just an observation about the respective agents' self-awareness and lack of it; however, Aristotle may be miling the broader point that akratic malfunctioning is obvious to everyone, whereas with a vice proper you would have to be free of it yourself to detect it as a vice in another. Thus there may be a glance here at the coropariron with diseases at 11501'33-4: liability to seizures clearly cannot go medically undetected for long in the way in which consumption might. The natural translation of 1150b32-4 (rendering gar as 'for') is unsatisfactory, since it implies what Aristotle and his readership would not haye believed: that epilepsy or the like is more curable than consumption and dropsy. Perhaps this can be avoided by (i) treating he men gllr s1.Ineche.s ktl (34-5) as the sentence that gives the immediate reason for ho men aniatos ho d'iatos (32), lind (ii) taking the comparison with the diseases simply as a preliminary way of presenting the point about continuity and its opposite. (Then gar at 32 would mean no mOTe than 'I say this [&c. ho men amatos ktl] because ... '.) The difficulty could also be removed by emending gar at 32 to de (interestingly, several translations read as if this were in fact the text), or by placing the sentence eoike gar ... rois epiIeptikois after ponerill (35) or after kIlkills (36). (In these remarks I am indebted to the discussion at the Symposium.)
11
163
At 1151 a 14 Aristotle says that the split between the akratic's conviction and his action makes him
eumetapristos, <easy to persuade otherwise'. Taken literally, this means that the akratic's reform is or includes a switch to a new persuasion. But elsewhere throughout the passage "being persuaded' seems to refer to one's b&ic and general evaluative outlook, whereas in the akratic's case this is just what he should not and does noh'witch from. Accordingly, eumetapeistos at 1151'14 must have the more general meaning of 'easily reformed' or 'ea.ily <.-ured' (euiatos; d. 11501'32, where Lb has euiatos as the contrary of Ilniato$). See 1146'33-4, where the vicious character is aporetically said to be euit.ltoteros dia to metapeisthmai an: Aristotle could just as well have written euiatoteros hon eumaapeistoteros. Alternatively, eumetapeistos at 1151"14 is tantamount to metameJetikos ('inclined to regretfulness'). Either way, the fulse picture that generated the aporia has carried aveT into Aristotle's wording of hl~ reply (cr. Stewart, ad loc.)
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (115I b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
so. But before we turn to look into this possibility, let us pause to remark the rabid intellectualism of the pair of assumptions just mentioned. Intellectualism is a description often applied to the Socratic denial of the very possibility of akrasia, since the denial assumes that an intellectual conviction about how one should act automatically generates the corresponding action. But we just now have been viewing an intellectualism that allows for akratic behaviour and also for the possibility of a character disposed to such behaviour, but maintains that persuasion through reasoning is the key, and the only key, to ethical improvement. The first of the two assumptions stokes an absurd optimism about reasoning's power to bring about good-it can lead men from vice to virtue-while the second denies all hope of improvement to the matic: since reasoning cannot mend his behaviour and character, nothing can. Aristotle cuts through the latter of these sophistries by pointing to the power of akratic regret to spark refonn. The akolastos's lack of regret, his self-satisfaction (1150b 29-30; cf. l1Soa21-2), is the corollary to that consistency of action with decision which made him seem so much more rational, and therefore at first sight persuadable and curable, than the akrates.15 Straying a little beyond Aristotle's discussion, one can do some table-turning here: one can point out that the matic's bad conscience shows rationality, consistency, and constancy on his side too, as well as self-awareness. First, he needs no Socratic-style elenchus to bring him to recognize that he is guilty of an inconsistency-between what he voluntarily did and what he had rationally decided he should do. The conflict is self-evident to the agent involved, even (in paradigm cases) at the moment of action (he men gar kakia Jrmthanei, hed'akrasia ou lanthanei, 11S0h36 t6 ). Secondly, it is of course a mark of rationality to be disturbed or chagrined by such a dissonance in oneself. Thirdly, whereas a conceivable harmony-restoring move would be to endorse the action and go back on the de("-ision, the akrates does the opposite. He does not reject the
decision, because (as he rightly thinks) nothing has happened to give him reason to change his mind. The decision was reached in the light of various considerations, and (as he sees it) these and their relative importances remain the same. Whether this agent cannot, or out of loyalty will not, ditch his reasoned conclusion for no good reason, his refusal to do so is another great mark of rationality. Fourthly, if the matic's self-castigation takes the somewhat theoretical form (which it may, though it need not) of rationalistic distress at havingjlouted his own rational part, he is clearly manifesting respect for the authority of reason. On several counts, then, matic regret merits the extremely vague accolade 'rational', even though it is not a state of mind into which he was led by reasoned persuasion from a different view.n One might wonder aL Aristotle's easy assumption that the matic agent immediately detects something wrong with his behaviour (llSOb36). For such behaviour betokens a conflict in the soul, and don't we now know that conflicts in the soul can occur buried deep below the threshold of self-awareness? But Aristotle's is not a gratuitous assumption, because he is talking about not just any conflict in the soul but about that between matic action and prohairesis. Consider the way in which, in unconflicted cases, a prohairesis or rational decision functions to guide action. We know what we have rationally decided and why, not merely so that we can justify our actions (an obsession with some philosophers), but, more basically, so as to carry out our ends effectively. For this to work, we need, as we act, to be able to tell when what we are doing departs or is about to depart from what we had decided (taken along with the reasons why we decided on it), Likewise, we need to be able to tell when we have enacted the decision, if only SO as not to go on mindlessly trying to complete an action already complete. We need, therefore, to be able to bring to mind the decisions relevant to our most recent bout of action, even if sometimes in the heat of the action itself we might lose sight of them momentarily. Thus any discrepancy between decision and performance must lie on or very near the surface. Furthermore, if we consider the agent purely in terms of efficient co-ordination, the agent is perfectly entitled to assume that, where action is unfolding in accordance with decision, there is nothing wrong. We could not get along at all if we were always wondering whether we were doing the right thing even when nothing has brought us up short. It is precisely because nature (first nature) has designed us for basic practical efficiency that vice blindly enjoys
162
15 The akratic may feel bad about his akratic behaviour even when actually engaged in it; but regret ( for one's own behaviour, ie. metame1eia) typically involves the retrospective rejection (and would-be undoing) of a previous doing (d. EE VII, 1240b 22-3). Thus here too the notion of ethical change is at work. Regret's notional 'withdrawal' of the regretted actio!1 is one sort of change, which can lead to others such as alteration of behaviour patterns and disposit ions. , 16 Several translators and commentators assume that this is just an observation about the respective agents' self-awareness and lack of it; however, Aristotle may be miling the broader point that akratic malfunctioning is obvious to everyone, whereas with a vice proper you would have to be free of it yourself to detect it as a vice in another. Thus there may be a glance here at the coropariron with diseases at 11501'33-4: liability to seizures clearly cannot go medically undetected for long in the way in which consumption might. The natural translation of 1150b32-4 (rendering gar as 'for') is unsatisfactory, since it implies what Aristotle and his readership would not haye believed: that epilepsy or the like is more curable than consumption and dropsy. Perhaps this can be avoided by (i) treating he men gllr s1.Ineche.s ktl (34-5) as the sentence that gives the immediate reason for ho men aniatos ho d'iatos (32), lind (ii) taking the comparison with the diseases simply as a preliminary way of presenting the point about continuity and its opposite. (Then gar at 32 would mean no mOTe than 'I say this [&c. ho men amatos ktl] because ... '.) The difficulty could also be removed by emending gar at 32 to de (interestingly, several translations read as if this were in fact the text), or by placing the sentence eoike gar ... rois epiIeptikois after ponerill (35) or after kIlkills (36). (In these remarks I am indebted to the discussion at the Symposium.)
11
163
At 1151 a 14 Aristotle says that the split between the akratic's conviction and his action makes him
eumetapristos, <easy to persuade otherwise'. Taken literally, this means that the akratic's reform is or includes a switch to a new persuasion. But elsewhere throughout the passage "being persuaded' seems to refer to one's b&ic and general evaluative outlook, whereas in the akratic's case this is just what he should not and does noh'witch from. Accordingly, eumetapeistos at 1151'14 must have the more general meaning of 'easily reformed' or 'ea.ily <.-ured' (euiatos; d. 11501'32, where Lb has euiatos as the contrary of Ilniato$). See 1146'33-4, where the vicious character is aporetically said to be euit.ltoteros dia to metapeisthmai an: Aristotle could just as well have written euiatoteros hon eumaapeistoteros. Alternatively, eumetapeistos at 1151"14 is tantamount to metameJetikos ('inclined to regretfulness'). Either way, the fulse picture that generated the aporia has carried aveT into Aristotle's wording of hl~ reply (cr. Stewart, ad loc.)
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (1151 b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
its harmony of thought and action, while akrasia's malfunction cannot escape its own notice. In NE VII, however, the important point is that where, and only where, there is regret over what one has done, can there be reform or 'cure' (l1S0a21-2, b29-32).I 8 The vicious person, then, is the hopeless one of the two cases, since neither argument nor regret can pierce his moral hide. How would the cure of the akratic be concretely achieved? The answer, presumably, lies in common sense: by making greater efforts to resist temptation when it hits one; by being more intelligent about avoiding it in the first place; by taking more care to be on guard against it beforehand. Aristotle hints at a diversity of 'cures' when he distinguishes two kinds of akratic person: the 'weak', who are mentally prepared but give up because they dislike the pain of resisting, and the 'impulsive', who are caught off guard (lISObI9-2S; l1Slal-3).
attitudes is no doubt morally important, but how can it bear on the question of where to locate the actions in a rational taxonomy of what is voluntary and what is not? For whether it is correct to say of an action (under the relevant description) that it was voluntary or not surely depends on the agent's condition when it was done. It is therefore hard to see how the different retrospective attitudes can justify a distinction between different types of nonvoluntary agency as such. Still, given this gratuitous distinction in NE III as we actually have it, we can imagine a (non-actual) possible world where the distinction was tried out but then discarded by Aristotle under pressure from a certain puzzle, belonging to that world, about akrasia. The non-actual puzzle (which is not much feebler than some of those actually confronted by Aristotle) goes like this:
164
Actions done from appetite (epithumia) or temper (orge) are voluntary,22 and akratic actions are done from appetite or temper. 23 Hence, on the one hand, akratic actions are voluntary. But, on the other hand, this conclusion goes against a certain reputable view. Consider someone who acts under a misapprehension and afterwards, on learning the truth, regrets that he did what he did: the view says that, because of the regret, the action should be classed as in-voluntary, i.e. not merely as non-voluntary, but as lying at the furthest extreme from the voluntary. On this basis, the akratic's typical regret tells us that akratic actions too are very far from being voluntary.24
III
In this bout with the aporia at 1146a31- b2, the idea of regret-of wishing one had not done something-does good work. For the assumptions about it underpinning Aristotle's solution are surely important though familiar truths: that regret follows failure to be controlled by one's rational decision, and that such regret can lead to reform.I 9 By contrast, Aristotle's other memorable use of regret is less platitudinous, but more questionable. It occurs in his NE III discussion of actions that are non-voluntary through ignorance. Here he draws what he clearly regards as an important distinction between the ignorant agent of some disaster who on finding out afterwards is distressed and wishes (though surely not with a bad conscience) that he had not done what he did, and the ignorant agent who on finding out does not care (l 1lOb IS-24).20 Aristotle labels the regretful agent akon, 'in-voluntary' or 'counter-voluntary, whereas the other is merely 'non-voluntary'.21 The difference between the agents' retrospective 18 Elsewhere he speaks in Platonic vein of the bad person as hating himself and 'full of regret' (IX, 1166b6-26), but without any suggestion that the regret might lead to reform. This regret is a global rejection of what one is (of one's arche in the sense of VII, 1151'15 ff.), as distinct from a selective repudiation of particular episodes or strands of one's behaviour. Thus it could be that the self-hater's practice always accords with his decision at the time, but that every so often he steps back from both and hates himself as decision-maker as well as agent. Hence there is no contradiction between the doctrines of the two books; but there seems to be no co-ordination either. b 19 The first ofthese points holds also for shame (aidiis; d. NE IV, 1128 lO ff.), with the difference that shame can also be forward-looking. However, Aristotle does not give shame the role of stimulating the akratic towards greater firmness about sticking to his prohairesis, for shame is one of the qualities 'without prohairesis' (BE III, 1234'23-33). It is a concern about how one's action would appear to others (NE IV, 1128b ll-12; EE III, 1233b26-9), whereas akratic regret focuses on the action itself as foolish or wrong. 20 It is assumed that the ignorance is blameless in both cases. b 21 I bypass here the subtlety-or confusion-imparted by the perfect at 1110 21, hekiin men oun peprachen, ho ge me eidei, oud' au akiin. This description of the merely non-voluntary ignorant agent implies that the regretful one peprachen akiin, i.e. (on a natural translation) 'is now counter-voluntarily
165
To which Aristotle, in the possible world in question, replies by saying what, in my opinion, he ought to have said in the actual world about actions that are involuntary because done in factual ignorance: The case where the regretted action was genuinely non-voluntary is one where it was done25 because the agent was factually mistaken about what he was doing. It is this mistakenness alone that makes for the non-voluntariness, and the regret afterwards in no way makes it the case that the agent was more factually mistaken at the time of acting than if he had been regretless later. Since regret later does not add to the factual mistakenness at the time, it does not add to or heighten the non-voluntariness of the non-voluntary action. in the state of having done'. Here Aristotle momentarily lapses into the colloquial usage whereby akiin merely indicates repudiation. I have discussed the passage in detail in Broadie (1991), 138-41. NEllI, III 1'27- b 3; BE II, 1224'4-1225'35. NE III, 11l1 b 13-14; VII, 1147'15; 1149'24 ff. 2. In the actual dialectical situation the thesis that akratic action is not voluntary was quite popular. One defence of it used the premisses: 'Only action guided by reason is voluntary', which Aristotle rejects at NE III, 1111'24- b3 and denies at VII, 1152'15- b l (c£ 1146'5-7); another, the premisses: 'Forced action is involuntary; akratic actions are due to force of appetite (or: temper)" the latter of which is rejected at BE II, 1224'30-b I5; c£ NE III, 1110b9-17. Thus it is perhaps surprising that, as far as we know, there was no defence premissed on akratic metameleia. 25 We would add, although Aristotle probably would not, 'under the relevant description'. 22
23
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (1151 b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
such. As to the former, Aristotle did say back at 1146b 4 that 'no one has all the akrasiai'. As to the latter, one may be surprised that it is not noticed at all, even a, a notion, given that logical space is marked out for it by the fact of its being the proper contrary of the opinionated type. So the discussion of the third aporia focuses not on some sort of 'universal akrasia', but on what the aporia presented as a worthy or admirable type of akrasia (tis spoudaia akrasia, 1146"19). with Neoptolemus as the illustration. Aristotle responds:
element in the psychological structure of akrasia in any sense. But, crucially, young Neoptolemus iii not torn by regret at going against a supposed better judgement of which he had been rationally persuaded. To the extent that he had such a judgement, he simply rejects it. 39 He is not an ancient version of that other young man, Huckleberry Finn, who gave in to his generosity and helped the runaway slave while remaining persuaded that this was wrong. Neoptolemus, on the contrary, ardently identifies with his noble revulsion from the plan to trick Philoctetes. For he discovers, from his actual encounter v.'ith the wounded hero, that going along with the plan is unacceptable. An ethical realist would say that Neoptolemus discovers the ethical truth about the situation, and recognizes it as such. Minimally, we can say that he takes himself to be seeing the ethical truth. This logically could not be the case if, like Huck. he retained a bad conscience about his new course. The persuasion instilled by Odysseus not only fails to guide Neoptolemus, but has lost it~ authority over him. That authority has been washed away, not by counter~ persuasion from any quarter, or a full set of reasons worked out by Neoptolemus himself, but by his interaction with philoctetes. 40 Thus Neoptolemuswas not (by the end) in conflict with anything he considered his better judgement; rather, he changed or developed in respect of his ethical arche (1151 a 15-16). So why does his case appear in Aristotle's discussion of akrasia at all? Because it had been put forward by others as a puzzle specifically about akrasia. But then why didn't Aristotle dismiss this puzzle (at least in so far as it was generated by the Neoptolemus story) by saying: 'Neoptolemus's case lacks the essential structure of akrasia. It is tme that Neoptolemus changed course not because of reason but because of his feelings: because of pleasure at the thought of dealing honestly with Philoctetes, and pain at the thought of lying to him. So it is true that in this his switch resembles that of an akrates or a malakos (cf. 115(Jll 3-15). But the resemblance is superficial: his impulsive change was not akratic (either per se or per accidens) because it was not at odds with a concurrent and subsequent judgement of his about what he should do or have done.' Instead, Aristotle says in effect that what stops the young hero's conduct from drawing the charge 'akratic' is the same a~ what protects him from the charges phaulos and akolastos: namely, the fact that the motive was noble-not just 'noble in a way', as might be said about Huckleberry Finn's self-censured generosity-and the conduct itself correct (the latter being merely implied). This explanation may seem beside the point to philosophers today. To us, the fundamental reason why Neoptolemus is not an example of akrasia is likely to be that he 'abandoned his decision' not in the sense of going against it, but in the sense of ditching it in a change of mind about what he should do. But that is because we
170
There are abo some who fail to stick to what has seemed right to them not because of akrasia, e.g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctf!tes: true, it was because of pleasure that he departed from his judgement, but the pleal>llre was a fine one-~telling the truth was, to him, a fine thing, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie. Not everyone who does
something because of pleasure is akolastos, or bad (phaulos), or akrates; only the one who does it because of a shameful pleasure.
(1151 b 17 - 22)
So Neoptolemus avoids the slur akrates, just as the opinionated fail to win the accolade enkrates; Aristotle's conclusions in response to the second and third aporiai show symmetry to that extent. But we are about to see an asymmetry. After introducing the per selper accidens distinction at 1151 a 33-b 4, Aristotle went on to discuss the opinionated ischurognomon, whom he contrasted with the (true) enkrates. He did not tell us explidtly38 that the opinionated person can properly be called an enkrates per accidens; but it seems that no harm is done by acn~pting that result. As we saw, it means that the term enkrates in this context functions only deslTiptively, i.e. without implying commendation. The description by itself implies that the subject is in a certain complex psychological state: one in which he carries out his decision, which he assumes to be correct, despite some inclination or pressure to the contrary. So, when the opinionated type was shown to be definitely and importantly other than the enkrates (despite the resemblance), the point could have been put by saying that the fonner is indeed enkrates, but only per accidens or in a qualified sense. Now, one might expect the corresponding point to be made about akrasia, and hence one might momentarily expect it to be made concerning Neoptolemus, since he has been put forward as the illustration. But any such expectation has to be disappointed, if Neoptolemus is to remain the illustration. For the opinionated character is enkratic per accidens because the decision he refuses to abandon may as ea.,>ily be wrong as right, and because his adherence to it comes from self-will rather than from loyalty to right reason as such. Correspondingly, then, to call someone akrates per accidens would be to attribute a psychological state with the same structure as that of the akratic per se, but where the abandoned decision is a bad one, or where at least there is no implication that it is good. Now regret-indeed, what we call a sense of guilt, whether concurrent with the action or springing up in its immediate wake-is an essential 38 Ibis omission to spell out this specific application of the distinction could be taken as eviden.::e of different versions, as could some other features of the text studied in this chapter.
171
39 In Sophocles' play, Neoptolemus in fact ha.~ doubts from the first about the honourableness of Odysseus's plan, although initially he accepts it as a practical necessity. It could therefore be said that he was never strongly enough 'persuaded' in the first place for his change of course to resemble a cla.';sic case of akrasilL Tbis aspect of the SloT)' is Simply overlooked in the present dialectical fucus on Neoptolemus as a putative example of'admirable akrasia'. 40 Parts of the complex diS'-'IlSsion ofluex and virtue in EEvlIl. 2 apply to Neoptolemus' s impulsive change.
Sarah Broadie
NE VII. 8-9 (1151 b22): Akrasia, enkrateia, Look-Alikes
such. As to the former, Aristotle did say back at 1146b 4 that 'no one has all the akrasiai'. As to the latter, one may be surprised that it is not noticed at all, even a, a notion, given that logical space is marked out for it by the fact of its being the proper contrary of the opinionated type. So the discussion of the third aporia focuses not on some sort of 'universal akrasia', but on what the aporia presented as a worthy or admirable type of akrasia (tis spoudaia akrasia, 1146"19). with Neoptolemus as the illustration. Aristotle responds:
element in the psychological structure of akrasia in any sense. But, crucially, young Neoptolemus iii not torn by regret at going against a supposed better judgement of which he had been rationally persuaded. To the extent that he had such a judgement, he simply rejects it. 39 He is not an ancient version of that other young man, Huckleberry Finn, who gave in to his generosity and helped the runaway slave while remaining persuaded that this was wrong. Neoptolemus, on the contrary, ardently identifies with his noble revulsion from the plan to trick Philoctetes. For he discovers, from his actual encounter v.'ith the wounded hero, that going along with the plan is unacceptable. An ethical realist would say that Neoptolemus discovers the ethical truth about the situation, and recognizes it as such. Minimally, we can say that he takes himself to be seeing the ethical truth. This logically could not be the case if, like Huck. he retained a bad conscience about his new course. The persuasion instilled by Odysseus not only fails to guide Neoptolemus, but has lost it~ authority over him. That authority has been washed away, not by counter~ persuasion from any quarter, or a full set of reasons worked out by Neoptolemus himself, but by his interaction with philoctetes. 40 Thus Neoptolemuswas not (by the end) in conflict with anything he considered his better judgement; rather, he changed or developed in respect of his ethical arche (1151 a 15-16). So why does his case appear in Aristotle's discussion of akrasia at all? Because it had been put forward by others as a puzzle specifically about akrasia. But then why didn't Aristotle dismiss this puzzle (at least in so far as it was generated by the Neoptolemus story) by saying: 'Neoptolemus's case lacks the essential structure of akrasia. It is tme that Neoptolemus changed course not because of reason but because of his feelings: because of pleasure at the thought of dealing honestly with Philoctetes, and pain at the thought of lying to him. So it is true that in this his switch resembles that of an akrates or a malakos (cf. 115(Jll 3-15). But the resemblance is superficial: his impulsive change was not akratic (either per se or per accidens) because it was not at odds with a concurrent and subsequent judgement of his about what he should do or have done.' Instead, Aristotle says in effect that what stops the young hero's conduct from drawing the charge 'akratic' is the same a~ what protects him from the charges phaulos and akolastos: namely, the fact that the motive was noble-not just 'noble in a way', as might be said about Huckleberry Finn's self-censured generosity-and the conduct itself correct (the latter being merely implied). This explanation may seem beside the point to philosophers today. To us, the fundamental reason why Neoptolemus is not an example of akrasia is likely to be that he 'abandoned his decision' not in the sense of going against it, but in the sense of ditching it in a change of mind about what he should do. But that is because we
170
There are abo some who fail to stick to what has seemed right to them not because of akrasia, e.g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctf!tes: true, it was because of pleasure that he departed from his judgement, but the pleal>llre was a fine one-~telling the truth was, to him, a fine thing, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to lie. Not everyone who does
something because of pleasure is akolastos, or bad (phaulos), or akrates; only the one who does it because of a shameful pleasure.
(1151 b 17 - 22)
So Neoptolemus avoids the slur akrates, just as the opinionated fail to win the accolade enkrates; Aristotle's conclusions in response to the second and third aporiai show symmetry to that extent. But we are about to see an asymmetry. After introducing the per selper accidens distinction at 1151 a 33-b 4, Aristotle went on to discuss the opinionated ischurognomon, whom he contrasted with the (true) enkrates. He did not tell us explidtly38 that the opinionated person can properly be called an enkrates per accidens; but it seems that no harm is done by acn~pting that result. As we saw, it means that the term enkrates in this context functions only deslTiptively, i.e. without implying commendation. The description by itself implies that the subject is in a certain complex psychological state: one in which he carries out his decision, which he assumes to be correct, despite some inclination or pressure to the contrary. So, when the opinionated type was shown to be definitely and importantly other than the enkrates (despite the resemblance), the point could have been put by saying that the fonner is indeed enkrates, but only per accidens or in a qualified sense. Now, one might expect the corresponding point to be made about akrasia, and hence one might momentarily expect it to be made concerning Neoptolemus, since he has been put forward as the illustration. But any such expectation has to be disappointed, if Neoptolemus is to remain the illustration. For the opinionated character is enkratic per accidens because the decision he refuses to abandon may as ea.,>ily be wrong as right, and because his adherence to it comes from self-will rather than from loyalty to right reason as such. Correspondingly, then, to call someone akrates per accidens would be to attribute a psychological state with the same structure as that of the akratic per se, but where the abandoned decision is a bad one, or where at least there is no implication that it is good. Now regret-indeed, what we call a sense of guilt, whether concurrent with the action or springing up in its immediate wake-is an essential 38 Ibis omission to spell out this specific application of the distinction could be taken as eviden.::e of different versions, as could some other features of the text studied in this chapter.
171
39 In Sophocles' play, Neoptolemus in fact ha.~ doubts from the first about the honourableness of Odysseus's plan, although initially he accepts it as a practical necessity. It could therefore be said that he was never strongly enough 'persuaded' in the first place for his change of course to resemble a cla.';sic case of akrasilL Tbis aspect of the SloT)' is Simply overlooked in the present dialectical fucus on Neoptolemus as a putative example of'admirable akrasia'. 40 Parts of the complex diS'-'IlSsion ofluex and virtue in EEvlIl. 2 apply to Neoptolemus' s impulsive change.
172
Sarah Broadie
primarily think of akratic behaviour as contradicting the better judgement: tbis for us ios the philosophically most interesting thing about it. Obviously, this aspect is of central importance for Aristotle too. However) the portion of NE VII which has been discussed here is also shaped by another interest. This is a concern with ethical switching and ethicalsamerless understood as a single broad topic for investigation, the inquiry being governed by the question of which kinds of switching and which kinds of sameness are praiseworthy and which deplorable (whether or not they are due to or in accordance with rational persuasion). From this point of view, the fact that Neoptolemus's switch did him moral credit is a more salient ground for withholding the pejorative 'ahatic' than the fact that it did not transgress a concurrent dictate of his reason.
7 Nicomachean Ethics VI I. 9 (11 SIb 23 ) - 1 0 : (In)Continence in Context TEUN TIELEMAN
Introduction Pages 1151 b23, 1152a 36, marked off-not unreasonably -by the editors (or at least Bekker and those who follow him in this regard)l as chapter Il, show Aristotle wrapping up his discussion of continence, incontinence, resistance, and softness that takes up the first half of NE Vll.2 This chapter takes the form of a collection ofloosely related observations designed to fit some of the main results of his preceding inquiry into the wider context of the moral theory expounded in books I-VI) These few pages have remained somewhat marginal to most modern interpretations of Aristotle's account of incontinence. But since one of the exegetical issues is precisely that of the definitive position taken by Aristotle, it seems ill-advised to leave aside this concluding chapter. It is well worth trying to establish which information of wider relevance may be elicited from this stretch of text, if pressed anew. Chaptet 11 can be subdivided as follows:
1. 1151 b23-32: the linking of the theory of (in)continence to the doctrine of the mean 2. 1151 b32-1152a 6: the relation of (in)continence to (in)temperance 3. 1152a 6-15: the relation of (in)continenc£ to practical wisdom as distinct from cleverness 4. 1152a l5- 24: the relation of (in)continence to wickedness and injustice
I Note that according the alternative division printed by Bywater (alongside Bekker's chapter numbers) in his ocr edition our text covers the last part of ch. 9 and the whole of ch. JO. Only Bywater's numbering .~ystem is used in Barnes's revised Oxford translation of the complete works of Aristotle (1984). 2 See esp. the chapter's dosing lines, 1152'34-6. 3 As my references will bear out; d. the characterization of the chapter by Gauthier and Jotif
(1970),652.
Teun Tieleman
NE VII. 9 (1151 b23)-1O: (In)Coritinencein Context
5. 1152a 25-33: practical note: the actual condition of people and the possibility of curing their incontinence 6. ll52 a34-6: concluding statement
with reason prevailing only in the case of continence. In each triad of attitudes towards pleasure, there are two incorrect ones and one correct one. Deficient susceptIbility to pleasure, whether of the 'A' or 'B' variety we have dubbed 'insensitivity' and 'under-indulgence' respectively, does not seem very important to Aristotle. He does not analyse this rare phenomenon further.7 As we can all see on a daily basis, people in general are prone to pleasure. Indeed, feeling disgust for pleasure is so exceptional as to seem hardly a human condition at all (cf. 1119a 6-7). In presenting their condition as the true opposite of incontinence, there must be a systematic reason involved: Aristotle wants to present continence as a correct mean and as such occupying a position analogous to temperance.1I Considered in this light, this mean-cum-opposites triad smacks of undue predilection for schematism on the great philosopher's part. Even so, Aristotle's trifold analysis effectively brings home the status of continence as what one might call a semi-virtue typical of someone progressing toward virtue but still lacking a perfect mind in which appetite operates in harmony with reason.!) As Aristotle notes a little further on (II52 a25-7), the behavioural pattern exhibited by most people in actual practice situates them somewhere between the continent and the incontinent type. They do not side with reason against desire as consistently as the continent person does. On the other hand, they perform on the whole better than the incontinent person, who always allows desire to prevail. At 8, ll5Q315-17 Aristotle had made the same observation on people's actual performance in responding to both pleasurable and painful stimuli. With regard to the former, the attitude of most of us lies between incontinence and continence, and with regard to the latter the disposition of most lies between weakness and endurance. Here, however, he is a little bit more precise, in that he specifies that they are more inclined to the bad pole of each pair, viz. to incontinence and weakness. As has often been remarked, the subject of moral progress receives little emphasis in the Aristotelian ethics as compared with his determination of ideal and so fixed types. Indeed, this can even be said to hold for the incontinent and continent. Our chapter, however, does contain a few things of relevance to Aristotle's ideas on how to cure and improve people with a view to attaining
174
1. Incontinence as a mean
In section I, according to the above division, Aristotle introduces a new point: viz. that there is another way in which appetite and reason may not be attuned to one another, i.e. a way different from incontinence. Some people take less delight in bodily pleasures than they should and do not abide by (right) reason when it orders them to pursue these pleasures. In so far as they fail to put reason's wish into action, their case is like that of the incontinent. The two types differ in their respective dispositions towards pleasure, i.e. as either deficient or excessive in this regard. Aristotle's analysis in terms of the deficiency/excess opposition permits him to position continence as the right mean between these two forms of incorrect behaviour. Thus, continence is analysed in a way analogous to the moral virtues in books II - V and in particular temperance, sliphrosune (III. 13). Aristotle takes continence to be primarily concerned with normal physical pleasures (VIl. 6, 1l47b 20-114Sa 14); so temperance is the excellence most closely corresponding to continence. 4 Likewise, Aristotle had noted that temperance is not the opposite of intemperance, but an intermediate state between the latter and a very rare fault that lacks an established name but may be called 'insensitivity' (anaisthesia), viz. to physical pleasure (Ill ~ 1-20, esp. 7 -II). Here too, then, Aristotle had maintained the reality of the rare and nameless condition of being insensitive (or insufficiently sensitive) to bodily pleasure. Because of the sheer rarity of this one opposite, people often speak of incontinence as if it were opposed to continence, just as they wrongly speak ofintemperance as the opposite oftemperance (ll51 h30- 2). But clearly, the correct state of rationally counteracting deficient pleasures is not continence, but, it appears, something else that is as unknown and nameless as insensitivity to pleasure itself.6 Aristotle's analysis can be tabulated as follows: A B
Deficiency 'insensitivity' 'under-indulgence'
Correct mean temperance continence
Excess intemperance incontinence
The three conditions in row A have in common that reason and appetite act in harmony in responding to physical pleasure, whereas it is common to the three conditons listed in row B that reason and appetite act in opposition to each other, 4 Aristode at m. \3, 1117b 28- 36 tells us that the tenns 'temperance' and 'intemperance' pertain to behaviour with regard to physical pleasure and pain. 5 That is to say, forcing one's desire to go after more food or sex-which does not seem an easier thing to do than inhibiting one's desire. Aristotle may be thinking of a process of habituation through which normal impulses towards physical pleasure are gradually restored. 6 Cf. Broadie (I991), 307 n. 3.
175
7 Cf. Aspasius, ad loc. (= In Anst. EN, pp. 139.28-140.1, Heylbut), who raises the question of whether we should take Aristotle to mean that the behaviour of the under-indulgent person can be analysed in tenns of a practical syllogism featuring the (inconect) universal 'One should not indulge in pleasures', which would yield two competing reasonings in a way analogous to that characterizing the predicament of the matic person as offered at VII. 3 (see also further infra, p. 181). Alternatively, Aspasius suggests (but the transmitted text seems unreliable), the under-indulgent behaves as he does under the influence of 'some wish or inational impulse', but he does not further explain this suggestion, which (if the transmitted tr.xt can be relied upon) seems more implausible than the fonner, and in a typical way motivated by Aspasius's bid to retain 'the cleanest possible division of labour between the rational and the iTrational soul' (Sedley 1999,171). 8 Similarly Aspasius, In AnsI. EN p. 139.12-25, Heylbut; Aquinas, In An>1. EN pp. 1146, 1148 Spiazzi (= 451 Litzinger). b 9 Thus at NE IV. 15, 1128 33-5 Aristode observes that not ~en continence may count as a virtue, but rather is a kind of blend, of good reason and suboptimal (because indocile) appetite.
Teurl Tieleman
NE VII. 9 (1151 b23)-1O: (In)Corltinence in Corltext
excellence and happiness. In fact, he is talcing ~p again the fifth .puzz~e raised at the outset, viz. the one found at 1l46a31- 2. Here he had IdentIfied the problem that the intemperate person is better off than the incon~incnt one with a view to their respective chances of being cured (as he calls It). The former acts in line with his rational, albeit incorrect, convictions. These then need to be replaced by correct ones. So he may still be cura~le, and .more easily so than the incontinent person. The latter presents a more dIffIcult, If not hopeless, case in that his correct beliefs have already proved to be insufficiently effective when it comes to mastering his desires. But clearly this is paradoxical. The solution suggested by chapter II is that the road towards mental ,health and excel1e~ce leads for most of us via continence, starting from incontmence or a st.ate lymg close'to it That is to'say, (near- )incontinence is preferable to intemperance after alL Intemperance has been ingrained through habit, all the mor~ so be,cause of the collaboration behveen reason and desire it presupposes. Contmence IS better, since it at least involves reason seeing what the correct course of action is. As we shall see a little further on, Aristolle will have more to say that is relevant to therapy and habituation (see Section 5 below). Here the inc?ntine?t of the fifth puzzle makes his appearance again as one of two types of mcontment that are distinguished: i.e. the type that is contrasted with the impulsive sort. A~ we s~all see, his predicament is presented as more worrying from a therape~tIcal. pOl.nt of view precisely for the reason employed by Aristo~le in cons~ctmg h.IS fifth puzzle: namely, the fact that his correct deliberation IS of proved meffectlveness with a view to correct action.
3. Incontinence, wisdom, and inteUigence
176
2. (In}continence and (in)temperance
The difference between temperance and continence is further explained in the second section according to the above division. This distinction is blurred by what people sometimes say: viz. the fact that they call a temperate person con.tinent. To a degree, this is understandable given the outward aspect of the b~havlOur of the two types, since it is typical of both the temperate an~ t?e ~ontment .never to side with physical desire against reason (51 b 34-6). A snmlanty (homolOteta, Sl b 33) like this leads to terms for different things being used indiscriminatcly.lO The difference is that the temperate person no longer experiences strong and bad appetites, whereas the continent still does. ll ]n fact, Aristotle is here repeatin.g a point made in regard to the second puzzle he raised at the o~tset of hIS treatment (3, 1146a 9-16). Likewise, both the intemperate and the mcontment follow ilieir desire, but the former approves of what he is doing, whereas the latter typically does not. Here too, then, the difference lies in reason and desire being attuned or not. to Aristotle had earlier remarked upon the confusion between terms for (in)continence and (in)tcmperance, at least among a number of people; see NE V]L 1, 114Sb 14-16. b 11 See al'lQ NE L 13, 1102 25-9.
177
The third section considers the question as to how far (in)continence and practical wisdom (phronesis) are related, taking up some of the conclusions reached. in book VI, most notably chapter 13 (but cf. also chs. 5 and 9; the correspondmg puzzle is found at the outset of the inquiry, viz. in ch. 2, 11 45 b 17 -19). The same person cannot be practically wise and incontinent, 'for it has been demonstrated that the practically wise man is at the same tinle good with respect to character' (1152a 6-8; the reference is to VI. 13, 1144b30-3; cf. 1144a 36-7.) Again Aristotle pretends to be removing a common mistake due to the similarity between the two types of behaviour involved, as in the case of continence and temperance. Here,' then, the mistake is that of confusing two intellectual states, viz. being clever (deinos) and being wise (phronimos). Nothing prevents a clever person from being incontinent, which is why people mistakenly suppose that an incontinent person can be wise. However, wisdom and cleverness are two different things. In book VI cleverness had been defined as an intellectual virtue: namely, as the power to find the means towards a certain end that one has chosen (VI. 13, 1144"23-6)-a section he is clearly taking up here, as is clear from his reference to his 'first discussion', sc. of this subject (VI. 13, 1144a 23- b 14). Cleverness, it had been argued there, is instrumental to both practical wisdom and crookedness. So aliliough it is presupposed by wisdom, it is itself morally neutral, unlike of course 'wisdom, which involves not only the morally correct decision (prohairesis, 1152a 14) but acting upon it (cf. VI. 13, 1144'126-9; III. 4-5).12 Another way of putting it would be to say that wisdom adds to cleverness a moral dimension; viz. it wishes the correct moral goal in addition to its ability to reason correctly about the means to attain iL13 Aristotle repeats what he believes is the kind of knowledge characteristic of the incontinent person: he is not like ilie man who 'knows and attends to' (eidos kai theoron)14 a truth, but rather like someone who is asleep or drunk (I 152a 14-15; cf. ch. 5, esp. 1147a 10-15, b7 -8).
4. Wiclrednes.~ and injustice
The above should not be taken to mean that the incontinent person is bad, even if he acts voluntarily (he acts voluntarily because he knows 'certain things, viz. what he does and for which end', which is in keeping with III. 3, 1111'120, saying that knowledge of the relevant aspects is the mark of voluntary action). Because his decision (prohairesis) is decent (though not put into effect), he is not wicked, b~t rather half-wicked (I 152a 17 -19). But if the incontinent person is half bad, tlus 12 Cf. Gauthier and Jolif, ad loc. Of course, the continent person, unlike the uncontrolled one, also acts upon his prohairesis: see e.g. NE lll. 4, 1111 b 13-15. 13 Cf. Aquinas, ad loc. (1458, 1461 Spiaci 454 Litzinger). l4 On the verb theorein as used bv Aristotle in this moral connection, see Broadie (1991), 295, who persuasively argue. that it conn~tes 'using one's knowledge' as opposed to merely possessing it; cf. Sedley (1999), 169 n. 12.
Teun Tieleman
NE VII. 9 (1151 b23)-1O: (In) Continence in Context
means he or she is also only half good, since, as we have just noticed, one is wise not only through knowledge but through action (l1S2 a8-9); that is to say, the wise person always acts impeccably.1 5 That an agent moved by emotions such as desire or anger acts involuntarily had been denied in book III (2, 11lOb 9-1S; 3, 11l1 a 24- b 3).I 6 (In)continence is considered from the perspective of free will at somewhat greater length at EE II. 8, 1224a8-122Sa 1. The phenomena of continence and incontinence provide a puzzle in regard to the voluntary and its opposite, since in either case the agent can be, and often is, said to act either voluntarily or involuntarily or both at once (cf. e.g. EE II. 8, 1224 b 36-122S a l). Strictly, Aristotle explains there, the expression 'being under constraint' (or acting 'involuntarily') applies not to the agent but rather to the psychic faculty that is being forcibly dragged along by the other: reason by appetite in the incontinent, appetite by reason in the continent person. But the soul as a whole, and hence the agent, acts truly voluntarily, since in any case the moving principle is internal (with the additional prerequisite of full knowledge of the relevant data: cf. EE 11.9, 122S b l-2, and above, p. 177). Apparently, the same position underlies Aristotle's treatment at NE VII. 11. Since he does not act with malicious intent, the incontinent is not unjust either, whether he is the deliberative or the passionate ('melancholic') variety of incontinent. Under the influence of desire, the first does not stick to the conclusion of his deliberation; that is to say, his decision is good, albeit too weak to be put into action. The second is the rash type who does not deliberate at all (lIS2 a 17 -19; cf. 7, l1S0b I9-28). These two kinds are once again distinguished with respect to therapy at the end of the chapter (see Section 5 below). Here the point is that incontinence in its two varieties differs from moral vice, just as continence differs from the virtue of temperance. In fact, both the continent and the incontinent find themselves in an intermediate position between virtue and vice (though obviously at different distances from either), being, in principle, capable of moral progress (see below). What we have here then is another example of how Aristotle fits his theory of (in)continence into the overall structure of his moral theory. Still, this does not explain why he introduces the aspect of volition and voluntariness in a bid to dissociate the incontinent from moral vice. In fact, this passage is not a completely isolated one. One may compare EE II. 6, 1223 a36- b 38, where the incontinent's supposed injustice is similarly considered in the light of his acting voluntarily or not, and this is made into a touchstone of his being wicked or not. The idea rejected by Aristotle, viz. that the incontinent person is unjust, cannot fail to bring to mind Plato's position in the RepublicY In other words, Aristotle is correcting Plato on this particular point. Further, he compares the
incontinent person who knows the right thing but fails to do it with a city that has all the right decrees and laws but makes no use of them, quoting a line by the comic poet Anaxandrides in illustration (lIS2 a I9-23): 'The city willed it-she that disregards her laws.' This sort of general illustration of the condition of the incontinent is suitable at the conclusion of the discussion, but it involves an analogy between individual and social (in)justice which suits the anti-Platonic thrust of the passage. Aristotle adds that the wicked person is like a city that both has bad laws and lives by them (lIS2 a24). Aristotle's point about the incontinent not being unjust appears to be incongruous with what he says about the relation between appetite and injustice at NE VII. 7, 1149 b 13-23. 18 In our present chapter, as we have noticed, Aristotle is taking malicious intent, or being a plotter (epiboulos) to be the criterion for being unjust. It does not apply to the incontinent, for either his initial decision was good (though characteristically not translated into action because of the influence of appetite) or (in the case of the impulsive type) there was no decision at all. Being no schemer, then, the incontinent cannot be unjust (lIS2 a17-19). In the context of VII. 7, 1149b 13-23 Aristotle offers a comparative evaluation of incontinence about appetite and that about anger in terms of badness. The argument he advances here runs as follows:
178
15 See the definition arrived at at NEVI. 5, 1140b4-6: 'It remains, then, that it [Sc. practical wisdom] is a correct and rational disposition to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.' 16 Similarly, EE II. 9,1225'20-36. On Aristotle's notion of the voluntary see Furley (1997). 17 On (in)justice in the individual see esp. Resp. lV 434c-444e (e.g. 444b: 'Injustice is a kind of strife between these three things [Sc. the soul-parts reason, spirit and appetite], an interfering with each other and meddling in one another's affairs ... ') with Annas (1982), lO9-52. On the use of the term akrasialakrates in the Platonic dialogues, see Ch. 3 above.
179
The more plotting people do, the more unjust they are. Now the irascible person does not plot and neither does temper, but is open; whereas appetite is a plotter, just as they say Aphrodite is: For of the weaver ofguile, Cyprus-born ...
And Homer's description of her 'embroidered girdle'Bemusernent, stealing thought from wisest minds. 19
So, if it is true that this kind of incontinence is more unjust and shameful than the kind relating to anger, it will also be incontinence without qualification and, in a sense, badness. As is clear from the last sentence, Aristotle takes incontinence relating to appetite as incontinence in the strict or primary sense. In fact, incontinence as applied to anger (i.e. irascibility, losing one's temper) is used metaphorically (VII. 7, 1149a21-5). Now irascibility, being impulsive, typically excludes plotting, operating as it does in a transparent way. So it is not unjust. Appetite, by contrast, is pictured as a natural schemer, and hence unjust. At 11, l1S2a 19, we have seen that Aristotle, having distinguished an impulsive type of incontinence relating to appetite, similarly uses precisely its impulsivity to infer that it cannot be plotting and unjust. But that leaves the deliberating kind of appetite-related incontinence. Is there a real contradiction between what he says about it in the two passages? Broadie and Rowe in a concise note have pointed out that in the former Aristotle calls not incontinence about appetite but appetite a plotter, whereas in the latter the incontinent person as a whole is at issue: he is said not to be a constitutional plotter, but he can be in the grip of an uncontrolled plotting appetite. 20 This must 18 20
Also noted by Broadie and Rowe (2002), ad lac. (p. 399). Broadie and Rowe (2002), 399.
19
See Hom. II. XIV. 214-17.
Teun Tieleman
NE VII. 9 (1151 b23)-1O: (In) Continence in Context
means he or she is also only half good, since, as we have just noticed, one is wise not only through knowledge but through action (l1S2 a8-9); that is to say, the wise person always acts impeccably.1 5 That an agent moved by emotions such as desire or anger acts involuntarily had been denied in book III (2, 11lOb 9-1S; 3, 11l1 a 24- b 3).I 6 (In)continence is considered from the perspective of free will at somewhat greater length at EE II. 8, 1224a8-122Sa 1. The phenomena of continence and incontinence provide a puzzle in regard to the voluntary and its opposite, since in either case the agent can be, and often is, said to act either voluntarily or involuntarily or both at once (cf. e.g. EE II. 8, 1224 b 36-122S a l). Strictly, Aristotle explains there, the expression 'being under constraint' (or acting 'involuntarily') applies not to the agent but rather to the psychic faculty that is being forcibly dragged along by the other: reason by appetite in the incontinent, appetite by reason in the continent person. But the soul as a whole, and hence the agent, acts truly voluntarily, since in any case the moving principle is internal (with the additional prerequisite of full knowledge of the relevant data: cf. EE 11.9, 122S b l-2, and above, p. 177). Apparently, the same position underlies Aristotle's treatment at NE VII. 11. Since he does not act with malicious intent, the incontinent is not unjust either, whether he is the deliberative or the passionate ('melancholic') variety of incontinent. Under the influence of desire, the first does not stick to the conclusion of his deliberation; that is to say, his decision is good, albeit too weak to be put into action. The second is the rash type who does not deliberate at all (lIS2 a 17 -19; cf. 7, l1S0b I9-28). These two kinds are once again distinguished with respect to therapy at the end of the chapter (see Section 5 below). Here the point is that incontinence in its two varieties differs from moral vice, just as continence differs from the virtue of temperance. In fact, both the continent and the incontinent find themselves in an intermediate position between virtue and vice (though obviously at different distances from either), being, in principle, capable of moral progress (see below). What we have here then is another example of how Aristotle fits his theory of (in)continence into the overall structure of his moral theory. Still, this does not explain why he introduces the aspect of volition and voluntariness in a bid to dissociate the incontinent from moral vice. In fact, this passage is not a completely isolated one. One may compare EE II. 6, 1223 a36- b 38, where the incontinent's supposed injustice is similarly considered in the light of his acting voluntarily or not, and this is made into a touchstone of his being wicked or not. The idea rejected by Aristotle, viz. that the incontinent person is unjust, cannot fail to bring to mind Plato's position in the RepublicY In other words, Aristotle is correcting Plato on this particular point. Further, he compares the
incontinent person who knows the right thing but fails to do it with a city that has all the right decrees and laws but makes no use of them, quoting a line by the comic poet Anaxandrides in illustration (lIS2 a I9-23): 'The city willed it-she that disregards her laws.' This sort of general illustration of the condition of the incontinent is suitable at the conclusion of the discussion, but it involves an analogy between individual and social (in)justice which suits the anti-Platonic thrust of the passage. Aristotle adds that the wicked person is like a city that both has bad laws and lives by them (lIS2 a24). Aristotle's point about the incontinent not being unjust appears to be incongruous with what he says about the relation between appetite and injustice at NE VII. 7, 1149 b 13-23. 18 In our present chapter, as we have noticed, Aristotle is taking malicious intent, or being a plotter (epiboulos) to be the criterion for being unjust. It does not apply to the incontinent, for either his initial decision was good (though characteristically not translated into action because of the influence of appetite) or (in the case of the impulsive type) there was no decision at all. Being no schemer, then, the incontinent cannot be unjust (lIS2 a17-19). In the context of VII. 7, 1149b 13-23 Aristotle offers a comparative evaluation of incontinence about appetite and that about anger in terms of badness. The argument he advances here runs as follows:
178
15 See the definition arrived at at NEVI. 5, 1140b4-6: 'It remains, then, that it [Sc. practical wisdom] is a correct and rational disposition to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man.' 16 Similarly, EE II. 9,1225'20-36. On Aristotle's notion of the voluntary see Furley (1997). 17 On (in)justice in the individual see esp. Resp. lV 434c-444e (e.g. 444b: 'Injustice is a kind of strife between these three things [Sc. the soul-parts reason, spirit and appetite], an interfering with each other and meddling in one another's affairs ... ') with Annas (1982), lO9-52. On the use of the term akrasialakrates in the Platonic dialogues, see Ch. 3 above.
179
The more plotting people do, the more unjust they are. Now the irascible person does not plot and neither does temper, but is open; whereas appetite is a plotter, just as they say Aphrodite is: For of the weaver ofguile, Cyprus-born ...
And Homer's description of her 'embroidered girdle'Bemusernent, stealing thought from wisest minds. 19
So, if it is true that this kind of incontinence is more unjust and shameful than the kind relating to anger, it will also be incontinence without qualification and, in a sense, badness. As is clear from the last sentence, Aristotle takes incontinence relating to appetite as incontinence in the strict or primary sense. In fact, incontinence as applied to anger (i.e. irascibility, losing one's temper) is used metaphorically (VII. 7, 1149a21-5). Now irascibility, being impulsive, typically excludes plotting, operating as it does in a transparent way. So it is not unjust. Appetite, by contrast, is pictured as a natural schemer, and hence unjust. At 11, l1S2a 19, we have seen that Aristotle, having distinguished an impulsive type of incontinence relating to appetite, similarly uses precisely its impulsivity to infer that it cannot be plotting and unjust. But that leaves the deliberating kind of appetite-related incontinence. Is there a real contradiction between what he says about it in the two passages? Broadie and Rowe in a concise note have pointed out that in the former Aristotle calls not incontinence about appetite but appetite a plotter, whereas in the latter the incontinent person as a whole is at issue: he is said not to be a constitutional plotter, but he can be in the grip of an uncontrolled plotting appetite. 20 This must 18 20
Also noted by Broadie and Rowe (2002), ad lac. (p. 399). Broadie and Rowe (2002), 399.
19
See Hom. II. XIV. 214-17.
184
Dorothea Frede
these expectations are not fulfilled in the chapters dedicated to pleasure. Instead of the promised systematic treatment of the three points, Aristotle focuses almost exclusively on the objections by certain philosophers to pleasure as a good or as the ultimate good. Only in passing does he bring in some bits and pieces of information concerning his own conception of pleasu re, which shed a certain light on his reply to the three questions. It must be of some importance for a political philosopher to see why different arguments against hedonism fail. But this does not alter the fact that the promise of a comprehensive treatment of pleasure and pain is not really fulfilled. . That Aristotle should address the question of the nature of pleasure and pam via a critique of philosophical arguments against hedonism is quite an anomaly in the NE. In the earlier books Aristotle pays little attention to rival philosophical theories, with the exception of Plato's conception of the Good in I. 6 and a few references to Socrates' intellectualism here and there. His list of reputable opinions (endoxa) at the beginning ofthe discussion oflack of self-control (akrasia) in VII. 1 may seem like a parallel, but (pace Cooper in Chapter 1 above) it is not. Aristotle does not here list reputable opinions on the nature of pleasure and pain as such, or try to elucidate their nature by solving certain puzzles (aporiai) that emerge f~om those endoxa, as he did in the case of akrasia. Instead, he concentrates exclUSIvely on philosophical theories that deny that pleasure is a good, let alone the highest good. In addition, the arguments against hedonism that Aristotle attacks clearly have a common source: Plato and the Academy. This character of the treatment of pleasure is shared to some degree by its quasi- Doppelganger in X. 1-5, but it is notably absent in the rest of the NE.J Several possibilities might explain this peculiarity. First, Aristotle may originally have intended to give a more comprehensive treatment of the nature of pleasure and pain in a way that would at the same time be relevant to political questions. 1 If the discussion of the anti-hedonist positions was initially meant as an overture, Aristotle may have changed his mind, because he came to regard his remarks on the nature of pleasure as sufficienl 5 In any case, the resume at the end of chapter 14 indicates that Aristotle (if he is the summary's author) regarded his remain open questions. Little attention has also been paid to physical pain or mental distress. Some consequences of the effects of Aristotle's step-fatherly neglect of these questions will be taken up later. J A comparison of the two essays on pleasw'e would exceed the limits of this article. as would a discussion of the issues raised by G. E. L. Owen's (1971-2) plea for a 'divisjon ofIabour' between the two essays. • There are repeated references in NE to the statesman as the 'architect' who is in cbarge of the good ofthe community (d. I. 1-2, 1094a 18- b 11; 13, 1102'7-26), most specifically to II. 3,1105'10-16: 'Por this reason too the whole concern both for virtue and for political expertise (palitike) is with pleasure and pain ... ' As 1152b 1-2 indicates, Aristotle here speaks in the name of the political philosopher; d. b his promise to complete 'the philosophy of human nature' in X. 9, 1181 12-15. , Some enlightenment on (a) the relationship between pleasure and the overall end of human life can be extracted from Aristotle's stipulation that pleasure is an unimpeded activity of a natural b disposition, in contradistinction to accidentally pleasant restorations in 12, 1152 33-115Y7: The b explanation in ]3, 1153 9-19 on the 'interweaving' of pleasure and activity in the happy life mdkales what the answer to question (c) concerning the relationship of pleasure and happiness would be, but
NE VII. 11- 12: Pleasure
185
mission as accomplished ( 1154 b32- 5). Second, the discussion of the anti-hedonist arguments may originally have been a separate treatise that Aristotle appended at a fairly late stage to the rest of book VIL6 In order to indicate that the perspective of the treatment of pleasure and pain differs significantly from that in the preceding chapters on akrasia et al., he somewhat overstates the importance of his refutation of hedonism by claiming political dimensions for its content. Third, a later editor may have looked for a suitable place for certain 'loose leaves' containing the anti-hedonist discussion and inserted them-faute de mieux-at this place.? Whatever the truth of the matter may be, the fact that Aristotle nowhere in his subsequent treatment of the deficiencies of certain kinds of pleasure refers back to the kinds of perverse or morbid pleasures discussed in the·preceding elucidation of akrasia, brutishness, self-indulgence or softness, speaks in favour of the assumption that the little treatise on pleasure was a fairly late addition. What strengthens this impression is the marked difference in the discussion's character. The short treatise seems to reflect a debate within the Academy, a debate 'On pleasure and the good', where Aristotle locked borns with Academic opponents who were critical of the claim that pleasure was a good, or the ultimate good. 8 That the purpose of the discussion of pleasure is to defeat a set of arguments against hedonism is confirmed by the methodical procedure. In chapter 11 Aristotle first presents three different anti-hedonist positions, followed by a summary of the justifications for each ofthem. Chapter 12 contains Aristotle's counter-arguments to the anti-hedonist rejection of pleasure as althe good. Chapters 13 and 14 offer further support for these counter-arguments. In chapter 13 Aristotle argues inter alia that the badness of pain is a proof that pleasure must be good, and in chapter 14 he explains that undue preoccupation with the pleasures of the body is responsible for pleasure's overall undeserved bad reputation. Aristotle's own conception of the nature of pleasure emerges only now and then in his retorts to his opponents. He does not elaborate on what appears to be his own definition of pleasure as an 'unimpeded natural activity>.9 Thus he does not comment on the relationship between the different types of pleasure that are implied in his discussion of the virtues and vices, and of virtuous and vicious actions, found in the NE's earlier books. This is a serious omission, because the different roles assigned to pleasure and pain in those books represent a kind of conundrum. On the one hand, pleasure and pain seem to function as the the relationship of pleasure and pain to virtuous and vicious actions (b), a central issue in the NE, is not explicitly discussed . 6 A book 'Peri hedones' is mentioned in Diogenes Lacrtius's list of Aristotle's works (V. 24). The chapters inserted here may well have been part of that book. 7 If an editor composed the introduction, he may not have realized that the chapters on pleasure do not really JUlfil the promise of further treatment of this issue in II. 3, 1105'10-16 (see n. 4). • The imperfect tense in the reference to Speusippus in 13, 1153b S (l:7T"Ua'7T7TO~ lA1Jf') suggests that Aristotle refers to a historical event (on this issue see Ch. 9 below). Natali (1999). nn. 790, 791, 793, 797, treats Speusippus as the prime target of Aristotle's main points of criticism. • The definition is introduced in passing and without comment in 12, 1153"14-15 and referred to again in 13, 1153b9-12.
Dorothea Frede
186
subject matter of certain virtues. Temperance, for instance, consists in the proper co~portment towards corporeal pleasure, while courage is the right attitude towards fear and confidence with respect to injury and death in battle, i.e. towards physical pain. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are also integral parts of virtuous (or vicious) activities: while they are not their ultimate aims, they are important concomitants. Aristotle explicitly treats it as a sign of virtue if the .age~t does what he does not only willingly but also with pleasure. Thus, he explams m NE 1. 8, 1099a 10-12: ' ... and in the same way what is just is also pleasant to the lover of justice, and generally the things in accordance with virtue to the lover of virtue'. If a person does not enjoy such actions, that is an indication. tha~ he or .she does not possess the virtue in question: 'no one would call a person Just Ifhe failed to delight in acting justly, or open-handed if he failed to delight in open-handed actions; and similarly in other cases' (1099 a 18-20»)O In his discussion of the virtues of character in book II, Aristotle expands on this issue. As he explains at length in chapter 3, the pleasures and pains that supervene on the respective activities are crucial indicators of an agent's virtuous or vicious disposition of character (I 104b 3-11OSa 16). Aristotle's comments on temperance suggest that it can hardly have escaped his notice that there are two sorts of pleasures (and pains) involved in certain kinds of moral actions: 'Someone who holds back from bodily pleasures (aw/WTtKWV r,oovwv) and does so cheerfully (Xa{pwv) is a temperate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent' (l104 b S-ll). The pleasures involved here dearly represent two different types. One type is the physical pleasure from which the temperate person abstains. This kind of pleasure is the subject matter of this particular virtue. The other type is the 'moral' pleasure. he or she tak~s in acting with temperance, which concerns the mode of the actIOn. Although It is dear that Aristotle is aware of the difference between the physical and the moral pleasure involved in the actions, since he uses chairein in connection with the activity, he does not comment on their difference. A similar duplication of pleasure and pain is involved in the case of courage and cowardice: 'Someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully (Xatpwv), or anyway without distress (IL~ AV710VILEVOC;) , is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed (aXeOILEIlO,» at them is cowardly' (II. 3, 1104b7-8). \'\'hat is pleasant or at least satisfying to the agent is his courageous comportment itself. These pleasures must be of the sort that characterize the activities themselves and n?t their objects, because not all virtues are concerned with ei~her ple~sure or p.am as their subject matter.!! Concerning the objects of the actIOns, ArIstotle claIms quite generally: 'For virtue of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things and because of pain that we hold back
'Ibe translation follows (with some modifications) that of Broadie and Rowe (2002). In the case of open-handedness, e.g., the object is money (1107b S-16), and in ~e case of greamess of soul it is honour (l107 b ZI-7); perhaps 'love ot. .. ' could be supplemented ill an appropnat.e1y modified way in those cases, but the object of the virtue concerned with anger is painful, just. as is the 10
II
object of collIage.
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
187
from doing fine things' (l104b 8-11). The twofold use of pleasure and pain in an 'adverbial' and an 'adjectival' sense l2 is also manifest in the survey of the virtues in II. 7, where Aristotle indicates the subject matter that is characteristic for each virtue and its respective excess and defect. Apart from temperance and courage, there are certain social graces like wittiness and friendliness that are associated with pleasure or agreeableness (1108 a 23-30). Though pleasure in its 'adverbial' sense is an integral part of the action, it dearly is not its ultimate end. The just person does not act justly for the sake of the pleasure that it gives her or him, but because it is the right thing to do-and that is why it pleases her or him. A closer inspection of the analyses of the different virtues and vices in books III and IV would confirm that this is Aristotle's basic assumption for all virtuous or vicious aciions. The discussion of courage, for example, confirms that the pleasure of aCiing courageously is neither its ultimate aim nor its subject matter. Aristotle does not regard the opportunity to die for the fatherland as a matter of sheer delight. Instead, he thinks that the virtuous person, though dying nobly,13 is distressed more by an untimely death than a less worthy person because he has more to lose.t 4 The pleasure in question concerns only the noble comportment in facing up to injury or death itself. While in the case of courage we are not tempted to confuse the feeling accompanying the action with its subject matter, because the latter is painful and the former pleasant or at least satisfying, in the case of temperance it is harder to separate the two kinds, because both the activity and its object are pleasant. However, the situation is the same in principle. On the one side, we find pleasure as the object, the physical pleasure with which temperance is concerned, and on the other side, we find the 'adverbial' pleasure of acting temperately. The latter is due to the fact that I enjoy what I enjoy in the right way, by the right means, to the right degree, etc)5 The case of temperance, then, involves both the enjoyment of food, drink, and sex as such and the moral pleasure of comporting oneself in the right way towards these enjoyments. 16 While the former pleasures are open to children and animals as well, the latter are not. The pleasures and pains that constitute the subject matter of certain virtues like courage and temperance are right or wrong, depending on their consistency and measure. The same condition also holds, mutatis mutandis, in the case of those virtues that are not directly concerned with pleasure or pain. The open-handed person's actions, for instance, consist in open-handedness towards others. The pleasure that such a person takes in his or her own generosity is an integral part of the activity, but it is neither its subject matter nor its end. In the same way, all virtuous or vicious activities display the 'adverbial' type of pleasure or pain as their 12 The choice of these grammatical tenns to distinguish between the action (pleasantly/painfully) and its subjeli matter (what. is pleasant/what is painful) may seem clumsy, but teems like 'subjective' or 'subjectival' etc. would bring in quite unsuitable associations. b 13 Cf. III. 6,1115'24-35; 7, 11lSblO-24 ctpassim. 14 Ill. 9, I1l7 7-16. 15 Cf. III. 11, 1119" 11-18, b IS-IS: skapos gar to kalon. ,. Analogous conditions apply in the case of the 'minor virtues' of friendliness (IV. 6) and wittiness (IV. 8).
Dorothea Frede
186
subject matter of certain virtues. Temperance, for instance, consists in the proper co~portment towards corporeal pleasure, while courage is the right attitude towards fear and confidence with respect to injury and death in battle, i.e. towards physical pain. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are also integral parts of virtuous (or vicious) activities: while they are not their ultimate aims, they are important concomitants. Aristotle explicitly treats it as a sign of virtue if the .age~t does what he does not only willingly but also with pleasure. Thus, he explams m NE 1. 8, 1099a 10-12: ' ... and in the same way what is just is also pleasant to the lover of justice, and generally the things in accordance with virtue to the lover of virtue'. If a person does not enjoy such actions, that is an indication. tha~ he or .she does not possess the virtue in question: 'no one would call a person Just Ifhe failed to delight in acting justly, or open-handed if he failed to delight in open-handed actions; and similarly in other cases' (1099 a 18-20»)O In his discussion of the virtues of character in book II, Aristotle expands on this issue. As he explains at length in chapter 3, the pleasures and pains that supervene on the respective activities are crucial indicators of an agent's virtuous or vicious disposition of character (I 104b 3-11OSa 16). Aristotle's comments on temperance suggest that it can hardly have escaped his notice that there are two sorts of pleasures (and pains) involved in certain kinds of moral actions: 'Someone who holds back from bodily pleasures (aw/WTtKWV r,oovwv) and does so cheerfully (Xa{pwv) is a temperate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent' (l104 b S-ll). The pleasures involved here dearly represent two different types. One type is the physical pleasure from which the temperate person abstains. This kind of pleasure is the subject matter of this particular virtue. The other type is the 'moral' pleasure. he or she tak~s in acting with temperance, which concerns the mode of the actIOn. Although It is dear that Aristotle is aware of the difference between the physical and the moral pleasure involved in the actions, since he uses chairein in connection with the activity, he does not comment on their difference. A similar duplication of pleasure and pain is involved in the case of courage and cowardice: 'Someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully (Xatpwv), or anyway without distress (IL~ AV710VILEVOC;) , is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed (aXeOILEIlO,» at them is cowardly' (II. 3, 1104b7-8). \'\'hat is pleasant or at least satisfying to the agent is his courageous comportment itself. These pleasures must be of the sort that characterize the activities themselves and n?t their objects, because not all virtues are concerned with ei~her ple~sure or p.am as their subject matter.!! Concerning the objects of the actIOns, ArIstotle claIms quite generally: 'For virtue of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things and because of pain that we hold back
'Ibe translation follows (with some modifications) that of Broadie and Rowe (2002). In the case of open-handedness, e.g., the object is money (1107b S-16), and in ~e case of greamess of soul it is honour (l107 b ZI-7); perhaps 'love ot. .. ' could be supplemented ill an appropnat.e1y modified way in those cases, but the object of the virtue concerned with anger is painful, just. as is the 10
II
object of collIage.
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
187
from doing fine things' (l104b 8-11). The twofold use of pleasure and pain in an 'adverbial' and an 'adjectival' sense l2 is also manifest in the survey of the virtues in II. 7, where Aristotle indicates the subject matter that is characteristic for each virtue and its respective excess and defect. Apart from temperance and courage, there are certain social graces like wittiness and friendliness that are associated with pleasure or agreeableness (1108 a 23-30). Though pleasure in its 'adverbial' sense is an integral part of the action, it dearly is not its ultimate end. The just person does not act justly for the sake of the pleasure that it gives her or him, but because it is the right thing to do-and that is why it pleases her or him. A closer inspection of the analyses of the different virtues and vices in books III and IV would confirm that this is Aristotle's basic assumption for all virtuous or vicious aciions. The discussion of courage, for example, confirms that the pleasure of aCiing courageously is neither its ultimate aim nor its subject matter. Aristotle does not regard the opportunity to die for the fatherland as a matter of sheer delight. Instead, he thinks that the virtuous person, though dying nobly,13 is distressed more by an untimely death than a less worthy person because he has more to lose.t 4 The pleasure in question concerns only the noble comportment in facing up to injury or death itself. While in the case of courage we are not tempted to confuse the feeling accompanying the action with its subject matter, because the latter is painful and the former pleasant or at least satisfying, in the case of temperance it is harder to separate the two kinds, because both the activity and its object are pleasant. However, the situation is the same in principle. On the one side, we find pleasure as the object, the physical pleasure with which temperance is concerned, and on the other side, we find the 'adverbial' pleasure of acting temperately. The latter is due to the fact that I enjoy what I enjoy in the right way, by the right means, to the right degree, etc)5 The case of temperance, then, involves both the enjoyment of food, drink, and sex as such and the moral pleasure of comporting oneself in the right way towards these enjoyments. 16 While the former pleasures are open to children and animals as well, the latter are not. The pleasures and pains that constitute the subject matter of certain virtues like courage and temperance are right or wrong, depending on their consistency and measure. The same condition also holds, mutatis mutandis, in the case of those virtues that are not directly concerned with pleasure or pain. The open-handed person's actions, for instance, consist in open-handedness towards others. The pleasure that such a person takes in his or her own generosity is an integral part of the activity, but it is neither its subject matter nor its end. In the same way, all virtuous or vicious activities display the 'adverbial' type of pleasure or pain as their 12 The choice of these grammatical tenns to distinguish between the action (pleasantly/painfully) and its subjeli matter (what. is pleasant/what is painful) may seem clumsy, but teems like 'subjective' or 'subjectival' etc. would bring in quite unsuitable associations. b 13 Cf. III. 6,1115'24-35; 7, 11lSblO-24 ctpassim. 14 Ill. 9, I1l7 7-16. 15 Cf. III. 11, 1119" 11-18, b IS-IS: skapos gar to kalon. ,. Analogous conditions apply in the case of the 'minor virtues' of friendliness (IV. 6) and wittiness (IV. 8).
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
theory on the nature of pleasure. In the Philebus, Socrates starts his attack on hedonism with the broad challenge: 'While most of them are bad but some are good, as we hold ... ' (13b; d. 12c-d). This stance agrees with Plato's position in Republic IX (583b-587a), where he extols the philosophers' pleasures as true, good, and pure in contradistinction to all others, which are deemed as mere 'bastard pleasures' because they involve pain and do not have pure and true being as their objects. 35 But since it is a common rule of prudence that some pleasures are to be avoided as base or harmful, Aristotle need not be thinking of Plato at all. Whether there was a separate group arguing that pleasure cannot be the best thing even if all pleasures are good (3) is unclear, because both positions share the premiss of position (1) that pleasure is not an end but a genesis (J 152b22-3).36 The fact that Aristotle introduces this position with a concessive conditional 'even if' (1l52 b ll: €Z KUC) may indicate that the argument was originally used for dialectical purposes only. But it is also possible that certain members of the Academy accepted Plato's explanation that pleasure is a genesis but took exception to the inference that it is therefore not a good, while agreeing that it cannot be the highest good. 37 That they were Platonists is suggested by the fact that in his refutation in chapter 12 Aristotle attributes to them the definition of pleasure presupposed in position (1) that pleasure is a 'perceived process of coming to be' (1153 a 12-15). If there was such a parly, their conciliatory attitude towards pleasure may be based on Plato's treatment of the purf' pleasures in the Philebus. Not only does he accept them in the final mixture of the good life and give them a place on the final scale of goods (66c), he also associates them with health, temperance, and the pursuit of virtue (63e). The conciliatory tendency in the last part of the Philebus clearly encourages such a lenient stance. In conclusion, although Aristotle's list of arguments against hedonism in chapter 11 shows that his main target is the conception, advocated in Plato's Philebus, that pleasure is a process of becoming, an examination of the general character of Aristotle's treatment of these arguments suggests that it is unlikely that his discussion directly relies on Plato's text. Aristotle shows no interest in a full assessment of the finer points of the Platonic position, but rather confines himself to the ontology of pJeasure as a process. In addition, he takes up some more general objections to the view that pleasure is a good or the ultimate good, which do not presuppose that pleasure is a genesis but represent an amalgam of philosophical objections to the aforementioned view.
3. The rebuttal of arguments against hedonism in chapter 12
The first move against the denial that pleasure is a good (1), both as such and accidentally, is to show that even if one accepts the view that pleasure is a genesis (which Aristotle does not), the denial that it is good is mistaken. Such a denial ignores that what is good is so in two ways: either good without qualificatimi or good for someone. Similarly. there are processes of change or generation that are bad as such but good for a particular person in special conditions and for a short period of time and not always.39 Because Aristotle does not elaborate on this distinction and does not provide examples, it remains unclear whether the distinction between 'good as such' and 'good for someone' applies only to processes of change and forms of generation or also to the things' own nature and dispositions. Perhaps Aristotle means to support only the conditional that if the distinction between 'good as such' and 'good for someone' applies to a thing's nature and dispositions, it must also apply to the kind of change and generation that are their cause. Thus, if being healthy, ambitious, or tall is good as such or good for someone, so is getting healthy, acquiring an ambitious character, or
The passage in the Republic claims that pleastue is a form of kinesis, a motion either from the middle up, or fwm the bottom to the middle point of neither pleastue nor pain (5B3e; 5B4d; 585d-e; 586a), as well as a 'filling' (585a-586b: pleriisis), but not that it is a getlesis or a restoration (katastasis). Plato holds that a motion or filling can be a good per se because his philosopher's pleasure consists in filling himself with tnle and pure being. 36 Gauthier and Jolif (2002, 785) suggest that the third position may be only a 'fausse-fenCtrc' placed here for symmetry's sake, on the ground that three arguments look better than two. 37 Some members of the 'genesis-party' even held that pleasure i5 good in the primary sense (12, 1153"15-17).
'" To get a coherent view of the Aristotelian conception of pleasure, one has to paste together his scattered remarks. At first, Aristotle states that some fonns of good are activities (energeiai: I 152b 33) and uses this notion to explain what is pleasant in processes of replenishment (1l52 b 35-7). In 1153"2-4 he points to the difference between pleasures of restoration and the pleasures ofthe 'restored nature', In 1153"10-11 he claims that not all pleasures are gmeseis, but some are energeiai, and in 1153" 14-15 he finally introduces his own definition of plea~ure as the 'unimpeded activity of the subject's nattual di<>position', a definition he repeats in 13, 1153b 10- 14. 39 Because Aristotle is concerned here with what is good in a relative sense quite generally, I prefer in 1152b 3 Susemihl's adoption of Rassow's supplement of 'dEt' to Bywater's adoption of 'a1T'\w~', following Aspasius.
192
35
193
While this chapter's main objective is to refute the arguments of the cntICs of pleasure proposed in chapter 11, it also includes some information about Aristotle's own conception of pleasure.38 He does not strictly follow the order of the arguments in the previous chapter, but focuses on what for him is clearly the crucial ontological claim in the debate: that pleasure is a process of generation. As he announces at the outset, he wants to refute the conclusion of position (1) that pleasure is not a good and also of (3) that it cannot be the highest good. Little attention is paid to position (2), because it makes no claim about the nature of pleasure, whereas the supplementary arguments for position (1) are met quite briefly in the last section of the chapter. The order and the amounl of space devoted to the different arguments show the significance that Aristotle attributes to them: argument I flI52 b25-33): argument 2 (1152 b33-1153"S): argument 3 (1153'8-17): argument 4 (1153'17 -20): argument 5 (1153"20-3): argument 6 (1153"23-7): argument 7 (1153'27-35):
against (1) against (1.1) against (Ll), (3,1) against (2.2) against (1.4) against (1.5) against (1.6), (1.2), (1.3)
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
growing. But it is hard to extend this explanation to the negative conditional, i.e. that a bad disposition and natUTC cannot be good and worthy of choice for anyone: only a process of liberation from such a state can be good ior that person and under these particular circumstances. That Aristotle confines the 'bad cases' to forms of change (kineseis) and processes of generation (geneseis) only is suggested by the way he leads over to a third type of change, the kind that involves pain and consists in the cure of sickness. Such CUTes are clearly processes-and Aristotle excludes them from being pleasUTes at all. This move must be designed to put out of court the most troublesome types of '(re) generation' in Plato's Philebus: the pleasures intrinsically mixed with pain. 40 Because Aristotle here denies that they are pleasUTes at all, the semblance of pleasure must be due to the fact that-as he is going to explain in the next section-processes of restoration are accidentally pleasant. In what follows he does not consistently stick to that exclusion;41 and it should be noted that if processes connected with pain like those in medical cures arc not pleasures, it is undear what pleasures Aristotle has in mind as 'bad unconditionally but good for some persons under certain circumstances'. Perhaps laborious, but not physically painful, processes like some of Odyssws's tribulations would fill the bill. Given that Aristotle rejects the conception of pleasure as a genesis, it seems curious that he troubLes himself with tlle conditions of the goodness of processes of generation at all. He may, however, be concerned to state with precision the reasons for and the extent of his disagreement with the Platonist position: that is, that he rejects the conception of pleasure as a genesis for reasons not connected with it~ claim to goodness. It should be noted, however, that if Plato is the addressee of counter-argument (I), this argument ignores the fact that Plato explicitly acknowledges that pleasure under certain circumstances is a good: namely, as a replenishment of a deficiency, and that he does not regard all such pleasures as mixed with pain. For Plato, pure pleasures are processes that are not mixed with pain but are based on an 'unfelt lack' .42 Argument (2) explains why Aristotle rejects the Platonic conception that processes of restoration (kathistasai)43 are pleasures. He does so, on the grounds that because the good is either an activity (energcia) or a disposition (he.xis), processes of restoration are pleasant only incidentally. This narrow conlinement of pleasure to eTlergeia has the curious consequence that Aristotle attributes the pleasure of restoration to the activity of a part that has remained unaffected by the condition that causes pain and desire: 'The activity (energeia) in the case of the appetites belongs to the disposition and nature that has been left unimpaired'
(I 152b 35: T7j,> lmo'Ao17rol1 €'6:w,> Kal ¢vaEw,». His reference to painless activities like theorizing (1153 a 1) does nothing to vindicate his attribution of pleasure to an unimpaired faculty. That certain pleasures, like those ofthinking, involve neither pain nor desire nor any kind of deficiency does not show that in the case of restorations an unimpaired part accounts for the pleasure. 44 Surely, Aristotle does not want to claim that in the case of the restoration of a desire it is the concurrent activity of the theoretic mind that makes that process appear pleasant. That the reference to the activity of some unimpaired part is neither a slip nor a momentary Geistesblitz of Aristotle's is confirmed by the fact that in chapter 14 he mentions it again,4:' and twice repeats the claim that in cases of regeneration the pleasures are only accidentally good or accidentally pleasant. 46 This gives rise to the question of the relationship he assumes between the process of restoration and the pleasant activity of the unimpaired part of soul and body. It is uniikely that he wants to assign them to two separate parts, because there would then be no connection between the restoration of the impaired part and the pleasure in the unimpaired one. Jf he assigns them to the same capacity, so that, for instance, the faculty of touch is involved both in the filling of an empty stomach and in the pleasant tasting of the respective food, it would seem quite artificial to treat these experiences as only accidentally connected. Unfortunately, the text provides no further information on this question.4'l It would seem that Aristotle is forced to adopt this contrived solution because (a) he favours the definition of pleasure as an 'unimpeded activity of one's unimpaired nature' and (b) he does not want to rule out that certain restorations are pleasant-at least in a way. The 'sign' (semeion) that Aristotle treats as a confirmation of his theory (ltS3" 2-7) does not justify his claim that in the case of pleasant restorations it is an unaffected part that does the enjoying. That we enjoy quite different things when we are completely healthy and fully active from when we are sick or recovering is, of course, a well~known phenomenon. We may relish extra sour pickles, herring, or hot chilli peppers while recuperating from a hangover, but detest them when we are well. But this clearly indicates that we lake pleasure in different things under different conditions. If the pleasure was due to the activity of the part that has remained intact ~while we recuperate, it should be caused by the same objects
194
.., Cf. Phlb.44d-47c. At the end of this chapter Aristotle claims that the phTOnimos avoids the connected with desire and pain, but he does not deny that they are pleasures (I15:\·31-~). the present point he wants to deny only that there are pleasures involved in 'medicalcascs' in the strict sense, In 14, 1154'26-31, however, he treats the remedial pleasures as particularly intensive because they arc antidotes to pain, a pointthat be further elaborates in 1154b 2,5. 42 C[ Phlb, SIb. .., The nouns to which the participle KalJwroom in 1152 b34 refers cannot be (vip),au or l{;.<:; in line 31, but must be the KWJ)OH~ and yt'ViOHS in the previous sentence 41
195
... Gauthier and Jolif (2002), 780, the pleasure of contemplation as the activity on which Aristotle focuses in his discussion of pleasure in book VII. But thi~ assumption is clearly due to their general hypothesis that throughout the NE Aristotle holds the contemplative life to be the highest form of activity. 4., Thu.~, at II54 b 17 - 20 Aristotle says that 'What makes a thing seem pleasant in this case is that one happens to be cured, thank., 10 the activity of the part that remains healthy trw 1mOl1iVOVTO~ uywV\:' npU1"7'OVTO<; n).' .6 1154b 1-2, 17-19. 41 Broadie and Rowe (lOO:!, 401 ), suggests that what is active is some 'residual healthy part', but they do not specify what unimpeded pleasant activity of a nonnal kind they have in mind. If, for example, I suffer from an ailment of the liver, does the pleasure of getting well consist in the activity of some other part of the liver or of some different organ! On their part. Gauthier and Jouf (2002, 794) mention the 'facultl" nutritive' that assimilates nourishment bUlleave unspecified what part, precisely, does the enjoying. Nor, to take another example, do they explain why, according their inte:rpretation of Aristotle, we enjoy food only when we are hungry.
ce.
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
In his treatment of the supplementary arguments, Aristotle shows with more or less sophistication why they constitute no serious objections to the goodness of pleasure as he understands it. Against the position that the prudent person (saphran) avoids pleasure (1.2), Aristotle argues that only 'alien' pleasures constitute an impediment to prudence (1l53 a 22).56 The specific pleasures enhance rather than impede the activities in question, as in the case of thinking and learning. Aristotle is clearly presupposing here that pleasure is an unimpeded, natural activity and that each pleasure is attached to its respective virtue. This premiss allows him to distinguish between proper and alien pleasures without claiming that the latter are bad as such. The saphron, we are to conclude, will refrain from all those pleasures that interfere with his conditionY Objection (1.5) that there is no art (techne) of pleasure, but that all good things are the products of an art is shown to be irrelevant. Aristotle agrees with the objection's presupposition that there is no techne of pleasure, but he denies that art is needed for its production. The point is well taken, if its contention is that a techne is by definition not concerned with pleasure because activities are not the products of any art. That Aristotle does not elaborate on this point may be due to his reliance on his readers' familiarity with the distinction between production (poiesis) and action (praxis) established in VI. 4. But he also does not take up his own contention that art is about generation (1140a l0-16). Nor does he comment on the question of whether or not pleasures are involved in an artist's activities in view of the fact that such productions do not contain their own ends. 58 Instead of turning to these substantial questions, Aristotle merely mentions in conclusion that there are some arts, like the perfumer's or the cook's, that do seem to aim at pleasure. 59 Since this is presented as a common opinion (dokei), it is unclear whether Aristotle accepts cooking as an art, in opposition to Plato, or whether this is just an aside. At any rate, he seems unconcerned with the fact that perfume and food -and not pleasure-are the specific products of the perfumer's and the cook's arts, and that pleasantness is an attribute of the products of other arts as well. The remaining objections to pleasure are dealt with quite summarily. Against the arguments that the wise refrain from pleasure and confine themselves to the painless state (1.3), that pleasure is an impediment to thought (1.4), and that children and animals seek pleasures as well (1.6), Aristotle refers to his distinction between pleasures that are good in themselves and those that are bad in certain
ways. It is the latter that children and animals pursue, while the wise person avoids them and prefers a state of painlessness. Aristotle did actually concede-without offering any examples - that some pleasures are unqualifiedly bad (1152b 29-31), with the proviso that they are worthy of choice to some persons either as such or in a particular situation. The 'bad' pleasures that Aristotle refers to here (1153 a 33) are those that involve desire and pain. Aristotle's characterization of these items as 'pleasures' contradicts his earlier denial that such restorations should not be regarded as pleasures at all (1152b 35-1153 a 1). Ifhe now accepts them as pleasures, it must be because he is concerned with pleasures of the body quite generally. Because temperance has pleasures of the body as its object, Aristotle cannot want to rule them out wholesale. Not all physical pleasures involve both base desires (epithymiai) and pain anyway. Only their excessive forms do so. There is an ambiguity in Aristotle's restriction of the temperate person's pleasures, because the demonstrative pronoun 'these' (tautas, 1153a 34) can be taken to refer either to excesses 'hyperbolas' in the previous line or to the pleasures of the body as a whole. The latter possibility would be incompatible with the fact that the pleasures of the body are the subject matter of the temperate person as well as that of the self-indulgent and the boorish one. At any rate, the emphasis that 'there are pleasures of temperance too' (1153 a 35) suggests that Aristotle treats the pleasure of acting with temperance as a separate thing. If so, this would be a sign that he is concerned here with the' adverbial' type of pleasure of the temperate person's comportment towards physical pleasures, i.e. towards the 'adjectival' type. The temperate person enjoys eating, drinking, and sex (aphrodisia) in the right way, to the right extent, on the right occasion, etc. This type of pleasure clearly is based on acting in the way one should (has dei). This raises the question of whether Aristotle regards the sensuous pleasures as activities and how he conceives of their relationship to the respective virtuous or vicious praxeis. Thus, we are back with the' conundrum of pleasure'; to what extent was Aristotle conscious ofthe distinction between the adverbial and the adjectival aspect of pleasure? It remains to be seen in what way his definition of pleasure as an 'unimpeded activity of a natural disposition' can apply to both sides of the distinction.
56 That every activity contains its specific pleasure (oikeia hedone) and is disturbed by alien pleasures (allotriai) will be a central point in the discussion of pleasure in book X (cf. esp. 5,1175'30-°33). 57 These must be the accidental pleasures, which mayor may not be bad in themselves, but would clearly be bad as impediments to activities proper. In the Philebus Socrates distinguishes between the pleasures of the phronimos and those of the fool in his first attempt to convince Protarchu~ of the plurality and variety of pleasures (Phlb. 12c-d). 58 Whether or not a craftsman's or artist's productions aTe unimpeded activities or mere kineseis that do not contain their own ends will not be discussed here, because it would presuppose, inter alia, a lengthy discussion of the distinction between kinesis and energeia in Metaph. El. 6, 1048b 18- 35. a 59 In Ill. 10, I 118 11-13, the smells of perfume and food are singled out as causes of sensual pleasures that can be subject to licence because they recall the respective physical pleasures of sex and food. It is unclear whether this is why Aristotle refers to them here.
There are major difficulties to be resolved. Besides the problem of the relationship between the adverbial and adjectival kinds of pleasure, we are confronted with the question of why Aristotle is so dead set against the acceptance of 'remedial' types of pleasures. We shall take up the second point first. The previous inspection of the two chapters leaves no doubt that Aristotle regards the notion that pleasure is a kind ofgenesis as fundamentally mistaken. Though this seems undeniable, we need some further explanation of why he rejects them out of hand, instead of admitting that pleasure is 'said in more than one way' and assigning them to a secondary kind of pleasure besides pleasure in the primary sense of 'unimpeded natural activity'. Aristotle's reje<.;tion is problematic for three reasons. First, his uncompromising
198
199
4. The conundrum of pleasure once again
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
attitude forces him to adopt the explanation that pleasant forms of regeneration are the activities of a part that has remained unaffected by destruction. Second, in his comments Aristotle more than once seems to grant that there actually are remedial pleasures of the Platonic type. Finally, in his discussion of the emotions in the Rhetoric Aristotle adopts the position that pleasure is a form of restoration or regeneration. There can be no doubt about the last point, for in the Rhetoric Aristotle advocates the very conception of pleasure that he rejects in his <essays' on pleasure in the NE. The definition in Rhetoric I. II, 1369b 33-1170a 5, runs as follows:
states there that the pleasures of the body, cherished by most people, involve desire and pain, and that they are therefore also the most intensive ones because they are sought as an antidote to pain. Furthermore, people who cannot enjoy the higher kinds of pleasure must create in themselves a constant 'lack', a 'thirst' for the lower kinds that requires replenishment. They therefore live in a state of constant irritation and desire, and have a tendency to succumb to intemperance (1154b ll-15). If Aristotle presupposes a difference between remedial processes and activities proper, the question arises of why he calls such processes only 'accidentally pleasant' and attributes the pleasantness of the experience, once again, to the activity of an element that has remained intact (1119-20). Given that he regards the pleasures of the body as the tempters to excess and antidotes to pain, it might seem a much better solution to assign to them the status of remedial pleasures as he does in the Rhetoric and to distinguish them from the pleasures of unimpeded natural activities. This would at the same time have provided him with the opportunity to resolve the 'conundrum' of pleasure by classifying the adverbial pleasures of action as primary, the adjectival pleasures as secondary kinds of pleasure. The problem with this seemingly neat solution is that it comes at too high a price. Both physical and moral pleasures presuppose desires (orexeis), albeit of a different type, and it would not do to base the distinction between them on the degree of desire, so that strong (and perhaps painful) appetites are fulfilled by a genesis and mild ones by an energeia. 63 What separates a process of generation from an activity proper is not just a matter of degree, but the fact that the aim or end of a genesis consists in making up for the respective deficiency, and that this process is not sustainable beyond its end-point. More importantly, Aristotle clearly regards both the physical and the moral kinds of pleasures as activities proper, perhaps with the exception of pathological cases. Physical pleasures are activities of the senses, as Aristotle makes sufficiently clear in his discussion of temperance and intemperance: they are concerned with the pleasure of touch and consist in the exercise of that sense with respect to food, drink, and sex.64 Now, given that an act of temperance at first blush is nothing but the exercise of that sense in the appropriate natural and unimpeded way, Aristotle may have seen no reason to take this activity apart and to assign one activity to the senses, another activity to the character disposition of activating sensual touch in the right way, to the right degree, on the right object, etc. In carrying out one's actions, the two factors are so intimately intertwined that they seem to constitute only different aspects of one and the same activity.65
200
We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement of the soul, a movement of intensive and perceptible restoration to its normal state of being (K[V1)U{V Twa nj<; ljJuxi/<; Kal KaTl:l.araaW aOp6av Kal aia01jTTtv €is T~V U1Tapxol1uav f!Jvaw) and that pain is the opposite. If that is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or causes the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. It must therefore be pleasant for the most part to move towards the natural state of being, particularly when a natural process achieves the complete recovery of that natural state. 60
The fact that Aristotle adopts the Platonic 'medical explanation' of pleasure in the Rhetoric in contradistinction to the NE is not news and has received different kinds of treatment by different commentators.61 Since this is a side-issue in our context, I want to be brief. The explanation that in the Rhetoric Aristotle does not state his own view but adopts a 'popular position' on the nature of pleasure and pain, as suggested by some commentators, must be mistaken. The Platonic position was not popular; nor would an explanation of the emotions that he regards as mistaken suit Aristotle's purpose in the Rhetoric. GiVen that he wants to teach the rhetorician how to deal with the emotions, how to arouse or to appease them in their audience, he must elucidate the true nature of the emotions, at least in outline. So why does Aristotle reject in the NE what he accepts in the Rhetoric? The point must be that the emotions in the Rhetoric are all based on desire. Hence there is in each case a deficiency or lack that needs to be assuaged (or stirred up, as the case may require), as in anger, longing, love, envy, etc. But does not this diagnosis also apply to some of the pleasures that Aristotle addresses in NE VII? In particular, the pleasures that are the objects oftemperance and its defects (e.g. those concerning food, drink, and sex) presuppose desire and therefore a lack. 62 In his further comments on pleasure in chapter 14 Aristotle clearly acknowledges them as remedial pleasures in contradistinction to the pleasure of the activities enjoyed by the well-balanced person (1l54a 25-31). In fact, Aristotle quite emphatically The translation follows (with some modifications) W. Rhys Roberts in Barnes (1984). Cf. Frede (1996). See also Striker (1996). For a more recent treatment of this issue d. Rapp (2002),457 -74. 62 In III. 11 Aristotle acknowledges that 'natural desire' is concerned with the filling of a lack (anapli:roru endeias). Whether or not this definition is an inadvertent lapse into Platonism is hard to say, but Aristotle seems not to be aware of it in either books VII or X. Some comments on the nature of the 'vulgar' pleasures would have been helpful, especially given that Aristotle blames the pleasures of the body for its overall bad reputation in 14, 11543 8-18. ,64)
61
201
3 b M Cf. I. 13, l102 2S-31; Ill. 3,1113 9-14, as well as the discussion of the good as the object of wishes (the bouJeton agathon) in 1l1. 4. 64 NE 1lI. 9, 111S"25- b 1. 65 The anonymous reader for the Press has pointed out that the moral pleasure may last much longer than the sensual activity, and is thus clearly separable from the physical pleasure, and that the same can be claimed for anticipations of moral pleasures (and pains). I have neglected both aspects for simplicity's sake, but it is surely right that both the memory and the anticipation of moral actions make obvious the separability of the moral and the purely sensual activities.
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
attitude forces him to adopt the explanation that pleasant forms of regeneration are the activities of a part that has remained unaffected by destruction. Second, in his comments Aristotle more than once seems to grant that there actually are remedial pleasures of the Platonic type. Finally, in his discussion of the emotions in the Rhetoric Aristotle adopts the position that pleasure is a form of restoration or regeneration. There can be no doubt about the last point, for in the Rhetoric Aristotle advocates the very conception of pleasure that he rejects in his <essays' on pleasure in the NE. The definition in Rhetoric I. II, 1369b 33-1170a 5, runs as follows:
states there that the pleasures of the body, cherished by most people, involve desire and pain, and that they are therefore also the most intensive ones because they are sought as an antidote to pain. Furthermore, people who cannot enjoy the higher kinds of pleasure must create in themselves a constant 'lack', a 'thirst' for the lower kinds that requires replenishment. They therefore live in a state of constant irritation and desire, and have a tendency to succumb to intemperance (1154b ll-15). If Aristotle presupposes a difference between remedial processes and activities proper, the question arises of why he calls such processes only 'accidentally pleasant' and attributes the pleasantness of the experience, once again, to the activity of an element that has remained intact (1119-20). Given that he regards the pleasures of the body as the tempters to excess and antidotes to pain, it might seem a much better solution to assign to them the status of remedial pleasures as he does in the Rhetoric and to distinguish them from the pleasures of unimpeded natural activities. This would at the same time have provided him with the opportunity to resolve the 'conundrum' of pleasure by classifying the adverbial pleasures of action as primary, the adjectival pleasures as secondary kinds of pleasure. The problem with this seemingly neat solution is that it comes at too high a price. Both physical and moral pleasures presuppose desires (orexeis), albeit of a different type, and it would not do to base the distinction between them on the degree of desire, so that strong (and perhaps painful) appetites are fulfilled by a genesis and mild ones by an energeia. 63 What separates a process of generation from an activity proper is not just a matter of degree, but the fact that the aim or end of a genesis consists in making up for the respective deficiency, and that this process is not sustainable beyond its end-point. More importantly, Aristotle clearly regards both the physical and the moral kinds of pleasures as activities proper, perhaps with the exception of pathological cases. Physical pleasures are activities of the senses, as Aristotle makes sufficiently clear in his discussion of temperance and intemperance: they are concerned with the pleasure of touch and consist in the exercise of that sense with respect to food, drink, and sex.64 Now, given that an act of temperance at first blush is nothing but the exercise of that sense in the appropriate natural and unimpeded way, Aristotle may have seen no reason to take this activity apart and to assign one activity to the senses, another activity to the character disposition of activating sensual touch in the right way, to the right degree, on the right object, etc. In carrying out one's actions, the two factors are so intimately intertwined that they seem to constitute only different aspects of one and the same activity.65
200
We may lay it down that pleasure is a movement of the soul, a movement of intensive and perceptible restoration to its normal state of being (K[V1)U{V Twa nj<; ljJuxi/<; Kal KaTl:l.araaW aOp6av Kal aia01jTTtv €is T~V U1Tapxol1uav f!Jvaw) and that pain is the opposite. If that is what pleasure is, it is clear that the pleasant is what tends to produce this condition, while that which tends to destroy it, or causes the soul to be brought into the opposite state, is painful. It must therefore be pleasant for the most part to move towards the natural state of being, particularly when a natural process achieves the complete recovery of that natural state. 60
The fact that Aristotle adopts the Platonic 'medical explanation' of pleasure in the Rhetoric in contradistinction to the NE is not news and has received different kinds of treatment by different commentators.61 Since this is a side-issue in our context, I want to be brief. The explanation that in the Rhetoric Aristotle does not state his own view but adopts a 'popular position' on the nature of pleasure and pain, as suggested by some commentators, must be mistaken. The Platonic position was not popular; nor would an explanation of the emotions that he regards as mistaken suit Aristotle's purpose in the Rhetoric. GiVen that he wants to teach the rhetorician how to deal with the emotions, how to arouse or to appease them in their audience, he must elucidate the true nature of the emotions, at least in outline. So why does Aristotle reject in the NE what he accepts in the Rhetoric? The point must be that the emotions in the Rhetoric are all based on desire. Hence there is in each case a deficiency or lack that needs to be assuaged (or stirred up, as the case may require), as in anger, longing, love, envy, etc. But does not this diagnosis also apply to some of the pleasures that Aristotle addresses in NE VII? In particular, the pleasures that are the objects oftemperance and its defects (e.g. those concerning food, drink, and sex) presuppose desire and therefore a lack. 62 In his further comments on pleasure in chapter 14 Aristotle clearly acknowledges them as remedial pleasures in contradistinction to the pleasure of the activities enjoyed by the well-balanced person (1l54a 25-31). In fact, Aristotle quite emphatically The translation follows (with some modifications) W. Rhys Roberts in Barnes (1984). Cf. Frede (1996). See also Striker (1996). For a more recent treatment of this issue d. Rapp (2002),457 -74. 62 In III. 11 Aristotle acknowledges that 'natural desire' is concerned with the filling of a lack (anapli:roru endeias). Whether or not this definition is an inadvertent lapse into Platonism is hard to say, but Aristotle seems not to be aware of it in either books VII or X. Some comments on the nature of the 'vulgar' pleasures would have been helpful, especially given that Aristotle blames the pleasures of the body for its overall bad reputation in 14, 11543 8-18. ,64)
61
201
3 b M Cf. I. 13, l102 2S-31; Ill. 3,1113 9-14, as well as the discussion of the good as the object of wishes (the bouJeton agathon) in 1l1. 4. 64 NE 1lI. 9, 111S"25- b 1. 65 The anonymous reader for the Press has pointed out that the moral pleasure may last much longer than the sensual activity, and is thus clearly separable from the physical pleasure, and that the same can be claimed for anticipations of moral pleasures (and pains). I have neglected both aspects for simplicity's sake, but it is surely right that both the memory and the anticipation of moral actions make obvious the separability of the moral and the purely sensual activities.
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 1] -12: Pleasure
Under normal circumstances the adverbial and the adjectival aspects of a particular pleasant activity are indeed hard to separate. Hut what may seem farfetched in practice is not necessarily so in philosophical analysis. Given Aristotle's conception of praxis, it is indisputable that the pleasure of acting temperately is not identical with the physical pleasure of eating, drinking, and sex to a moderate degree. The latter kind of pleasure can be shared by children and animals. A praxis, by contrast, involves the recognition of an overall good end and deliberation and decision on the appropriate means in the given situation. It is therefore important to realize that there are two activities going on at the same time in the person's soul: (a) the sheer sensuous pleasure of tasting and touching and (b) the moral pleasure of doing the touching and tasting in the right way. That there should be such a distinction is less obvious in the case of temperance than it is in the case of courage. The case of courage is in fa(.l even more complex than was indicated in my preliminary elucidation. There is (a) the physical pain which consists in the expectation and in the actual suffering of injury and death in battle: 66
is morally pleasant. It is only the consciousness of serving a noble end that makes the activity pleasant, because it consists in doing the right thing in the right way, as Aristode affirms in what follows:
202
It is by virtue of withstanding what is painful, then, as has been said, that people are called courageous. Hence courage is also something that brings pain with it, and it is justly an
object of praise; for it is harder to withstand what is painful than to hold back from what is pleasant. 67 Besides the physical affliction or the expectation of such an affliction, there is (b) a moral pain involved in courageous actions. Death is a painful perspective for the virtuous person, because his life is a particularly happy one: And the greater the extent to which he possesses virtue in its entirety, and the happier he is, the more will he be pained at the prospect of death; for to such a person, most of all, is living worth while, and this person will knowingly deprive himself of goods of the greatest kind, which is something to be pained at. (III. 9, 1117b 9-17) Because of the twofold pain, it is in fact difficult even to recognize that there is any kind of pleasure involved in courageous actions at all, because the pleasure seems to be provided only by the anticipated end: All the same, the end that accords with courage would seem to be pleasant (hedy), but this is obscured by the circumstances, as also happens e.g. in athletic competitions .... If, then, it is like this with courage too, then while death and wound.~ will be painful to the courageous person ... he will withstand them because doing so is fine or because not doing so is shameful. (Ibid.)
As this explanation shows, matters are complicated. Courage has a subject matter that is painful in two different ways, physical and moral, and an ultimate end that 6(j The disrussion of courage in III. 6-9 centres narrowly on the military vinue; not even a sailor's coping with danger is included. IN III. 9, 1117"32-5; cf. also III. 7, 111Sb17-21: 'So the person who withstands and fears the things one should and for the end one should, and in the way and when one should, and is bold in a similar way, is courageous; for the courageous person feels and a.:t.s as the occasion merits, and following the correci prescription, however it may direct him:
203
But he is no less courageous because of that, and perhaps even more courageous, because he chooses what is fine in war in place of these other goods. So not all the virtues give rise to plea.~ant activities (TO ~&'WS' fVEpy<:iv lnrripXEI), except to the extent that it touches on the end (7TAijv f.(f>'ouov TOl) TIAous il/>ri7TTETm). (Ibid.) As these comments show, the dichotomy of 'adverbial' versus 'adjectival' pleasure is still too crude to do justice to the complexity of this phenomenon: pleasure and pain may be contained in both the subject matter (injury and death in battle) and the mode of action (acting courageously while forgoing the pleasures of a good life). Though acting courageously can be quite painful, and though courageous warriors may not live to see the end for which they fight, the painful activity contains an element of pleasure, or at least the satisfaction of acting courageollsly. Given all these complications that stand in the way of making a clean separation between the pleasure of the action and the pleasures provided by its subject matter, which are most prominent in the case of courage, but which also extend to other kinds of virtuolls activities,68 one cannot help wondering to what extent Aristotle's definition of pleasure as a natural unimpeded activity can do justice to moral actions. What, we may ask, is natural and unimpeded about acts of courage? It is time to turn to that question by way of coming to a conclusion.
5. Unimpeded natural activities The problems presented by Aristotle's simple-seeming definition of pleasure are not limited to moral activities: they also concern the explanation of sensual pleasures. What is problematic in their case can be stated very briefly. First, the actualization of sense perception is often not pleasant but neutral, despite the fact that there is neither an impediment nor anything unnatural about it. It would be question-begging to claim that in the case of a pleasant taste the object is 'more natural' andlor that the activity is unimpeded, while in the case of a neutral or an unpleasant taste either the object is neutral or unnatural and the activity is impeded or at least not as unimpeded as it should be to be experienced as pleasant. Second, sense perceptions, especially in their pleasant or painful aspect, seem to be affections rather than a(.lions. They are the kind of experience that is better explained as a pathesis in the sense indicated in the De anima, where Aristotle explains sense perceptions as affections of the soul,69 and in the Physics where he states that all processes-including alteration-take 68 This is not the place to give an analysis of Aristotle's depiction of the specific activities of the different virtues. While the acts of temperance are relatively simple cases, the acts of liberality and munificence (N. 1 and 2), of greatness of soul (megalopsuchiaJ (3 and 4) or those dealing with anger (5) are more complex. 6. De an. III. 2,426°8-11
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
place in the pa.<;sive objecUO For this very reason sensual pleasures are not 'performances', but immediate impressions. If something tickles our palate in a pleasant way, it is not because we perform a natural and unimpeded activity, unless we happen to engage in wine- or food-tasting. But these are 'cultural' activities that differ substantially from sense perceptions pure and simple. In the case of physical pains, it is even more obvious that they are not explicable in terms of activities. Suffering an injury is unnatural, and it constitutes an impediment, but it clearly is not an unnatural impeded activity.7 1 The same is true of unpleasant tastes, sights, and touches. Physically painful experiences clearly are detrimental processes, not impeded or unnatural activities. That pleasure and pain are not as symmetrical as their traditional pairing suggests is acknowledged by Aristotle in chapters 13 and 14, where he argues that pain is always an evil and should be avoided. Unfortunately he does not explain what precisely he takes its nature to be.72 That Aristotle should refrain from a closer examination of these phenomena in the Nicomachean Ethics should not come as a surprise. He is concerned here with activities in the sense of praxeis, and only marginally with affections. Though he often speaks as if everything that applies to a praxis also applies to a parhos,n he gives no further analysis of the affections and their conditions. This is true of the emotions proper (like anger, longing, etc.), as well as of the experience of being subject to someone else's praxeis, not only as a victim but also, for example, as the beneficiary of another's act of liberality.74 Though Aristotle no doubt assumes that such experiences are connected with pleasure and pain, he does not comment on their character. Thus, it remains an open question whether he presupposes that his account of active states also applies to their passive counterparts, i.e. that all natural unimpeded affections are pleasant.7 5 When speaking about pathe, Aristotle seems to be thinking for the most part of the emotional desiderative states that he enumerates in n. 5, but he never raises the question of how far his account of pleasure is apt to include pleasant pathe. In the case of activities proper there are problems with respect to both the condition of being 'natural' and the condition of being 'unimpeded'. To take the latter point first. The only example to which Aristotle refers in the chapters on pleasure in book VII is the pleasure of reflection (theorein). This kind of activity indeed fulfils the condition of being 'natural' and 'unimpeded' in the fullest sense, provided that we are intelligent people, that thinking comes naturally to us, and
that nothing disturbs us. For this very reason Aristotle extols thinking as the best of all human activities in NE X. 6 and 7. 76 But it is at least questionable whether the requisite conditions can be fully satisfied by the virtuous person's praxeis. In what sense are praxeis, as defined earlier in that work, cases of 'natural unimpeded activities'? Moral actions, it would seem, not only involve different stages, but their end is often attained only in various and laborious ways. As Aristotle's explanation of deliberation and decision in book III makes explicit, complex considerations are involved in moral decision making.7 7 Moreover, the activities may not attain their telos, or they may do so only with difficulty, so that these kinds of activities are not as 'unimpeded' and complete as the example of theoria suggests,?8 If we don't labour under the assumption that Aristotle simply overlooked the problems presented by this complex combination of pleasure and pain in moral actions, then what explains his neglect of this issue? It is likely that Aristotle proce.eds on the basis of the following assumption: moral actions, however complex they may be, in a certain way contain their 'end' right from the beginning, because it is the wish for the good that starts the process of deliberation and decision. Thus, an act of generosity, once deliberated and decided on, is an act of generosity throughout, because it is motivated by the noble end it serves. So even if the agent should die before carrying it to completion or be thwarted by some unforeseeable impediment, it remains an act of generosity at every moment. Hence, the virtuous person will enjoy it as an act of generosity right from the beginning, and will enjoy it through thick and thin. It is the anticipation of the end that makes it an act of generosity, even if it involves certain additional steps, such as asking for other people's assistance, and may not be as 'unimpeded' as Aristotle's condition seems to require. Given that we do not know what kinds of impediments and unnaturalness Aristotle has in mind, such reconstructions must remain speculative. His theory of pleasure would have benefited greatly in that respect from a discussion of the nature of the 'bad pleasures' of the vicious man's activities. But this is an aspect Aristotle hardly touches upon, despite the fact that he does mention bad pleasures. 79 The question is whether such actions are enjoyable for the bad person
204
Ph. III. 3, 202'21- b 15. That Aristotle does not, in general, assume that bad aL1:ivities are unimpeded, and therefore enjoyable, may be indicated by hi~ assertion in Metaph. e. 9, 1051'15-21, that bad activities (energeia) are inferior to the power (dunamis). As Ross remarks in his commentary, Aristotle seems not to distinguish here between the ontological status and the moral worth of the activities, which conflrms the suspicion that he has not given much consideration to the condition of badness, quite generally. 72 ct: 14, 1I51"19-21. b b 73 Cf.II. 3, 1l04 13-17; 6, Il06 I6-18 etp=im; 8, 1l08b17-19; 9,1109"22-4; III. 1, llO~30. 7< For certain omissions in Aristotle's account of pleasure and pain d. Frede (2006), csp. 263-71. b 15 Passive counterparts of actions are rarely mentioned; d. N. 3, 1124 II-IS; V. 4, 1132"7-14. 70 71
205
76 In his discussion of friendship Aristotle also gives preference to the sinIple activities of thinking and perceiving as constituents of tlte happy life (IX. 9, 1170'13- b13). b TI On the procedure of practical analysis and the decisions that result from it cf.lII. 3, 1112 11-24; 1113'2-7. It is clear from this description that what leads up to the end (ra '"po, ro rEAD,) can he quite elaborate, and may in fact lead to inIpossibilities. 78 At X. 7, 1177"4-26, Aristotle questions whether activities other than the philosopher's are compatible with leisure
Dorothea Frede
NE VII. 11-12: Pleasure
in the same way as virtuous actions are lor the virtuous person. Aristotle's model of the acquisition of character traits would lead one to expect that the bad person's actions could be as unimpeded as those of the good person, so that once he has acquired his character traits, his nefarious activities come as natural to him as temperate or magnanimous actions do to a good person. Aristotle nowhere denies that the gourmand's stuffing himself with food and drink, or the libertine's over-indulgence in sex, is pleasant. Given that such persons act from the general principle 'everything sweet should be tasted' (VII. 3, 114]'\29), their actions should be just as pleasant to them as the virtuous person's are to her. Aristotle may, of course, insist that the vicious disposition is unnatural, so that the corresponding activities cannot be as unimpeded as the pursuits that agree with the (good) human nature. This point has a larger scope. It raises the further query of whether 'the happy (eudaim{m) rascal' is a contradicrio in adiecto for Aristotle as he is for Plato-or whether he believes that living in the fulfilment of bad acquired dispositions and tastes is as happy-making in the case of the evil person as charitable behaviour is gratifying in the case of the good one. However, the ergon argument in I. 6, 1098"7-12, strongly suggests that the alleged symmetry between the good and the bad character and their respective activities is misleading. If doing good things is natural and constitutes being happy, then doing bad things must bring unhappiness and therefore also pain. That the fulfilment of one's proper human function is the condition of well-being is emphasized in even stronger terms in II. 6, 1106a 14-24. This would suggest that the vicious character cannot act unimpeded in the long run or lead a satisfactory life. In the discussion of pleasure in book VII Aristotle unfortunately confines himself to the bald remark that bad people are not capable of simple and steady pleasures but always desire change. so Because Aristotle's diatribe in book VII is geared to a refutation of the antihedonist arguments of Academic origin, it should come as no surprise that he refrains from opening the various cans of worms mentioned in this discussion. If the assumption that the discussion was part of a live controversy is correct, then the exclusion of secondary pleasures more Plntonico was not just one more anti-Platonic move on Aristotle's part, but an attempt to oppose a tendency that he regarded as mistaken: the tendency on the part of certain members of the Academy to treat comings to be as perfect human actions. If this idea was gaining momentum around the time that Aristotle worked on his account of pleasure, then he, at least in his own eyes, had to oppose such tendencies. If the information provided by our text leaves much to be desired as regards Aristotle's own position, this complaint is not confined to the discussion of pleasure. All commentators on Aristotle have long 'wish lists' concerning points that he could and should have worked out with more precision and in greater
detail. In the case of pleasure the narrow confinement to his critical purpose is particularly unfortunate because it leaves Aristotle's own conception of pleasure largely unexplained; and the supplemeut in book X, 1-5, does little to fill the gaps in our understanding and assessment We just find intimations here and there that indicate why Aristotle is not really vexed with the problems of his conception of pleasure. Not only does he seem to presuppose that the best element in human nature is simple rather than complex, he also presupposes that living as such is a pleasurable activity for all creatures~and living the life in accordance with the best in human nature is therefore by itself the most pleasurable state,81 if it is a life lived in a natural and unimpeded way. But this remark is hidden ill the discussion of friendship, and not taken up in the discussion of pleasure. It is clear that we would have greatly profited from a more substantive and differentiated treatment of pleasures and pains that would have pointed out with more clarity what types of pleasures Aristotle recognized and in what sense they are or are not subject to moul evaluation.
206
l1l53b 17-20) or are pursued to e.'!:ces.s (J 153"33-5; ]4, 1lS4']5-18); but some are also due to a bad character (l4, 1154"31-4), all
Cf. 14, 1154b Z8-31. That the bad man's life is an unhappy life is argued forcefully in the books
on lnendship (VIII. 8,1159"7-10; IX. 3, 1165b B--22; espA, II66b1-29; 8, 1169"13-16).
207
81 Cf. the depiction of the pleasure of the sheer awareness of being alive in community with friends in IX. 9, 1170') 3-23 and lhe comments on the sweetness of living as such, despite great misfortune, ill Pol. 1IJ. 6, 1278 b Z5-30.
NE VII. 13··14 (J154a 21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
ChristofRapp
210
The argument from the contrary Pleasure is good since it is agreed that its contrary, pain, is bad. In NE X. 2, lln b 18-20, more or less the same argument is attributed to Eudoxus. Nevertheless there are some indications that Aristotle himself has a certain sympathy for this sort of argument. Above all, the general scheme for arguments from th~ contr~ry is frequently found in Aristotle's own writings. 1 Often they are combmed with d ' , 'b ad' , 'b etter," worse,, (moreIIess des~ra ' ble' .2 . evaluative predICates such as 'goo The very scheme of Eudoxus's argument-that the contrary of somethmg bad must be good-can be found among the 'specific' topoi of Rhetoric J.3 ~Is~, when arguing against Speusippus's rejection in X. 2, Aristotle reaffirms the slgmficance of this kind of argument in his own voice. The premiss, that pain is bad, is introduced as a general!y accep~ed (O/LOAOYEi:Tar) conviction; however, it is remarkable that the formulatIOn of thiS agreed-upon premiss includes the two predicative nouns fWKOV and ifJEVKT.OV, and that the following lines jump from KaKoF to ifJEVKTfJF and back. The bnef remark about the two kinds of pain in lines b 2-3 might be seen as the attempt to secure or consolidate the premiss that all pain is bad. The distinction between two sorts of pain is introduced with a yap; hence we expect that th~ di.stinctio~ ~ves. us a reason for thinking that till pain is bad. Most translators mdlcate a dlstmctJon between two kinds of pain, but it is also possible that the sentence (7) /LEV yap a7TAWS' IWKOV, 7] 8£ Tip 7Tfj ~P7TO{jLUT1K~) is about two ways in which pa~n can be bad. That pain can impede is clear without further comment; what a7TAwS' KaKov means can be inferred from the use of a7TAwS' dya80v at the beginning of the previous chapter. The only problem is that a7TAwS' would require something like TLVL or 7Tjj as its opposite. 4 That pain can be impedi~g seems to .he o.nly.one arbitrarily chosen way of being not a7TAwS'. An attractive explanatIOn IS given by Burnet: all pain is a7TAwS' KaKov, though some pai~ can b~ ~Ya.8ov TWL- for example, the pain of a surgery. But even the sort of pam that IS mCidentaUy good is bad in so far as it somehow impedes our activities.
Speusippus's way out The general idea is that, if pain has more than just one contrary, then we are. n~t committed to thinking that pleasure is good-even if we concede that pam IS bad. 5 Our passage, however, does ~ot literally .sp~ll out what ~ind of co~trar!es is meant, it just offers the companson that pam IS related to Its contraries like I
Rh. II. 23, e.g., starts with a topos from contraries: it must be proved whether we can attach
contrary predicates to contrary subjects (1397"7-19). b 2 With respe~t to being 'belter/worse' and 'more/less desirable' respectively, cf. Top. Ill. 2, 117 6-7: fL yap ... TO EVOVT'OV ,pEVKTtJTCpOV, OiTTO Oip not as the defimte a.rtlde, but as an mhmte pronoun, as Marko Malink suggested to me. . . , . . Unlike the parallel section in X. 2, the report about Speuslppus s attempted rebuttal ill secno~ is formulated in the imperfect. Philippson (1925,449) and Kramer (1971,208 n.), condude tram thIS
5
Our
211
(wa7TEp) the larger that is contrary to the smaller and to the equal. l,ea~ing aside for a moment the question of whether the quantitative character of the triplet larger-equal--smalkr is crucial or not, the straightest way to apply the comparison seems to be this: pain is opposed not only to pleasure, but also to the neutral state. If, therefore, the conceded badness of pain requires the goodness of one of its contraries, it is entirely possible that not pleasure but the neutral state is the good one. Since, according to other sources,6 Speusippus claimed that happiness consists in a certain neutral state-namely, the freedom from disturbances (doXA1Jaia)-it would make good sense to assume that Speusippus actually postulated a neutral state between pleasure and pain, and that it is e~actly this neutral state which he regarded as desirable and good. Consequently, If the absence of pleasure and pain occupies the role of the good and pain is agreed to be bad, it remains possible for pleasure to be either bad or neither good nor bad. Giving a philosophical justification for the latter possibility (pleasure as neither good nor bad) could become difficult once we regard the absence of pain and pleasure as good. Hence the first possibility, that there are two KaKu and that pleasure is one of them, is much more plausible. This is also the reading of Aulus Gellius,? who assumes that, for Speusippus, pleasure and pain were two mutually opposed evils, and that the good must be something in between.8 Against this interpretation it could be objected that, on this reading, pleasure becomes something bad, while Aristotle rejects Speusippus's attempted AOOtS' precisely by saying that even Speusippus would not say that pleasure is essentially or intrinsically bad. But, as we will see, this difficulty can be overcome. In principle, all commentators who interpret Speusippus's argument in the light of Aristotle's doctrine that ethical virtue is a mean 9 use the same scheme of two evils and one good, but it is worth noting that the doctrine of the mean sees the two evils as imEpfjOA~ and l.MC'LI/fL'>, which is more specific than what is required in our passage: The triplet larger--equal-smaller can be seen as a comparison, by which the general idea is introduced that not everything in the world has just one counterpart; as an example or comparison, it does a good job as it stands, because one does not even have to fill in the details in order to illustrate that Eudoxus's argument seems to be too simple in a way. But some authors insist that this is more than just a comparison and regard the quantification given in this example as one of the crucial steps of the argument. that the tcxt refers to an oral discussion that mns1 have taken place in the Academy and have been witnessed by Aristolle. 6 Clement of Alexandria, Strom. n. 22, 133 (= frg. 57 Lang). The neutral ftln<; which is located betwcen the life of pleasure and the life of pain is also defended in Plato's Philebu5 42< -44d; whether or not it is Speusippus who is pictured here is aquite controversial questio~: cf. Frede. (1997),267 ff. 1 Aulus Gellius, NA IX. 5. -1 (frg. Wi Lang): SpeuslPpUS vetusque omm.' Academw voluptatem et dolarem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum ramen esse, quod utriusque medium foret. a This would also fit the familiar scheme that one good state or ap£T~ is located as raov or J.1.EaOV between two KaKa.: cf. BE II. 3, 1220b31 f. 9 Cf: Michael of Ephesus, e.g.. In Eth. Me. Comm. 539. 5 ff.: avnlmTat yap Tii IJPaaV-r1JT! KaK~ ovn '1 &""-'a Ka, OUK lany ayallov r, &,)"a aMu. KaKOv, Ka, Til iiAJluYr1)Tt K
212
NE VII. 13-14 (I 154a 21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
ChristofRapp
One reason for thinking that the quantification is crucial is the assumption that among the logical rules that were acknowledged in the Academy, there was a rule that one objectionable (rjJEVKTOV) thing cannot be thought to be the contrary of another, unless the one refers to an excess (lmEp/3Of.....q), and the other to a deficiency (E'VllEta).lO Obviously, excess and deficiency are the types of evil that are needed for a quantificational reading, but it is less obvious how to read the aspects of excess and deficiency into pleasure and pain; Kramer's explanation that pain as a sort of K€VWaU; represents the extreme of 'too little', while pleasure, relying on 7Tf...7}pWat<;, represents the opposed extreme, because it is too much in comparison with the balanced neutral state,lOa is not overwhelmingly persuasive, since (1) he must presuppose that Speusippus's conception of pleasure can be directly imported from Plato's Philebus and (2), even if we grant that it is the model of replenishment that is at issue here, pleasure is, according to this model, characterized by the process leading to the balanced slate and not as its excess. If the rule mentioned in Topics II. 7, that the contrariety of two objectionable things is only possible in the case of deficiency and excess, has any relevance in our context, it would be more plausible to think that Aristotle regarded SpeusippllS'S f...llat<; as a violation of this rule, just because pleasure and pain are not opposed like deficiency and excess. This would go well with the equivalent argument in NE X. 2, where Aristotle begins by acknowledging that the opponents of Eudoxus are, in principle, right when they urge opposing not only good to bad, but also bad to bad, and both of them to something else; but then he argues that the respective scheme cannot be applied to the things under discussion, namely pleasure and pain.
Why Speusippus's AVaL<; does not work Aristotle introduces Speusippus's argument with the remark that his attempted rebuttal does not work; but there is only one very short sentence explaining why it does not work: namely, the sentence au yap av rjJu{T) 07TEP K(IKOV n Elvm TT]V ~lloV~Jl. If we assume, as is natural, that 'Speusippus' is the subject of u.v rjJu{T), the argument would be that the application of the special three-position scheme KUKov-ayuOov-KUKOV would commit us to saying that pleasure is a KUKOV, while Speusippus himself, having a more positive attitude to pleasure, would not admit that. Hence it would be inconsistent for him to apply dIe three-position scheme to the present discussion. Now, if the introduction of a three-position scheme were closely connected with the idea that something bad is opposed not only to what is good but also to something else which is bad, it would not have been very far-sighted for Speusippus to introduce such a scheme, unless he is prepared to call pleasure something bad. This is the main reason why commentators became suspicious about the assumption that Speusippus is the subject of av rjJu{T). Other
213
authors assume that Speusippus is a renowned critic of pleasure, and hence they expect that he would not hesitate Lo admit that pleasure is bad. 'illerefore several commentators suggested reading the text as if we have a TIs as subject, translating 'one would not say .. .' or 'they would not say .. .', witll the same intention as Aspasius's paraphrase ouSE/s yap «IV> ":l7T0l KaKDV TT]V ~&w7}v. Some think that we can understand the solitary qnJa{v or rjJa{'q this way, even without emending the text. Then we would get the argument that Speusippus's rejection would lead to the consequence that pleasure is bad or even essentially bad, which obviously nobody would ever accept. There are two types of objection to this reading. The linguistic objection is that this reading is impossible without emendation of the text; Dirlmeier, for example, admits that there are solitary uses of q)'qalv in Aristotle, but he also insists that this usc would require another type of subject. The philosophical objection is that in the face of someone who vigorously holds the view that pleasure is bad, it would be 'very lame' to reply that one would not say this.ll T am not sure whether the latter type of objection is really so bad, that 'they would not say' or 'people would not say' could be a way to refer to certain generally accepted opinions, with which Speusippus's argument. conflicts; hence Speusippus would be accused of using an argument with paradoxical implications. And since the premiss of our paragraph, that pain is bad, was intrinsically connected with the truth that people avoid it, the present statement iliat people would not agree with the idea that pleasure is essentially bad could be seen as relying on the implicit observation that people do not avoid it or that they even pursue it. And to say that Speusippus's three-position scheme is misplaced here, because its implication that pleasure is essentially bad can easily be proved wrong, since people do not avoid it but rather even pursue it, would not be an entirely vain argument. And again, this would have a parallel in the equivalent section of NE X. 2, where Aristotle concludes the discussion of Speusippus-like objections by saying that obviously people avoid pain as something bad and pursue pleasure as something good. Nevertheless, as long as we leave the Greek text unemended, it is more plausible iliat Speusippus, rather than any manifestation of ilie vox populi as 'they' and 'one', is the subject of this sentence. At the same time we want to avoid the problem involved in the idea that Speusippus applied the three-position scheme to the analysis of pleasure and pain while being aware that this would lead to a consequence he would never accept: namely, that pleasure is bad. Hence the following interpretation seems to be preferahle: although Speusippus may have assumed that pleasure is bad or that some pleasure is bad or that it is not the supreme good (and hence worse than doxA7Ja{a or OAmr{a), he would never say iliat pleasure is OrrEP KaKov n, i.e. essentially or intrinsically12 bad. Why is this difference significant?13 First of all, the application of the KUKov-ayaOov-Ka/(OV
C£ Gosling and Taylor (1982),231. .. For this meaning of w£P cf. LSJ OCrnfp § II. 5. b,andH. Bonitt, Index Arisl. 533b 36-534'23, and Bonitz (1848-9),176-7. 13 It is, I think, pace Gauthier and Jolif, who regard this sort of interpretation as quite arbitrary. II
10 Cf. Top. II. 7, 113'5-8. Hambrucb (1904) undertook to show how the topoi of Aristotle's Topics were used by members of Plato's Academy. loa Ci. Kr.uner (1971), 20g f.
-----
..
_-
Christof Rapp
NE VII. 13-14 (1154a 21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
scheme could be seen as implying that if pleasure is bad, it must be bad in the same sense that pain is; now, that pain is bad cannot be dissociated from the fact that people tty to avoid it, and it would certainly be absurd to claim that the same is true of pleasure. Further, far from claiming that pleasure is essentially bad, one could state that it is bad because of its accidental features-for example, because of its bad effects; ample evidence for the latter part of this position can be found in VII. 12, where Aristotle lets the anti-hedonists argue that pleasure is bad because it impedes thought, sometimes causes diseases, etc. Also, cribbing from the Philebus, we could easily construe a position in which pleasure is always intermingled with pain in one way or another, so that we could sum up pleasure as being rather bad than good without saying that it is intrinsically bad. In this respect the words aoXA1]ULU and aAmrCa are instructive: they indicate freedom from pain and disturbances as the dominant goal, while pleasure is not excluded per se, but only in so far as it is connected with pains and disturbances. Finally, if the formula 'x is essentially bad' excludes the possibility that x can become good in any sense, just as the number 3's essentially being odd in the Phaeda excludes the possibility that it will ever become even, then even the hard-boiled anti-hedonist would hesitate to call pleasure CYrr€P KUKOV n, although he may have many good reasons for regarding pleasures as bad or worse than other goals. To sum up, the point of the final sentence seems to be that there is a generally held conviction, and that this conviction is even shared by Speusippus: nobody would assume that pleasure is CYrrcp KUKOV TL and that it is equally bad as pain, and not even Speusippus, who attempts to prove the badness of pleasure, would go so far. Hence his A1JULS' is bound to fail. 14
statement: though he acknowledges the value of pleasure and its contribution to the good life in many ways, he could still hold that happiness and not pleasure is the supreme good. This may even be thought to be the decisive difference between hedonism and Aristotelian eudaimonism-and there is a bundle of good reasons that could be given in favour of this assumption: the highest good is desirable in itself and never because of something else, but we choose pleasure partly because of itself and partly for the sake of happiness;15 the self-sufficiency of the highest good requires that it cannot be increased by the addition of an extra quantity of good, but the total amount of pleasure can be increased by adding extra portions of pleamre. But all this is only theory; in reality our sec-rion clearly states that pleasure (or a certain kind of it) is the supreme good, which is in direct contradiction to the anti-hedonistic statement that it cannot be the supreme good.
214
Pleasure as the supreme good (1l53 b 7-13) Obviously, this section tackles the anti-hedonistic statement that pleasure cannot be the supreme good. By now, it has been proved only that the main support offered in favour of this statement (that pleasure is always a YEVWLC; and hence cannot be an end, let alone the supreme end) relies on a false or too narrow account of what pleasure is. Having rejected the false premisses of the anti-hedonistic statement, Aristotle could, as some interpreters suggest, still accept a version of the same I. What I have been defending here is more or less the 'traditional' account. This traditional reading has heen challenged by Gauthier and Jolif: they argue that for Speusippus pleasure was neither good nor bad since he regarded it as a process of becoming between pain and the painless state; hence, pleasure is opposed to two things: the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quem. First, I do not share their criticism of the traditional account; secondly, they have to presuppose that Speusippus's theory is the same as we find in Phlb. 44'-< (which is possible, but not uJlcontroversial); thirdly, though their accOlmt ofSpeusippus's theory may seem more elegant than on the traditional interpretation, the analysis of Speusippus's failure hecomes more difficult, but less persuasive: on their reading, Speusippus failed to acknowledge that pleasure and pain are opposed as contraries. Fourthly, it becomes more difficult to explain t.he parallel section in NE X. 2, where the opponents of Eudoxus argue' aI'T
215
The argument Strictly speaking the section consists of two steps or two arguments in favour of the thesis that pleasure is the supreme good: one preparatory and one main argument. The first, preparatory argument reminds us of a simple logical truth: even if some pleasures or some kinds of pleasure are bad, it is, from a logical poin.t of view, still possible that other kinds of pleasure are good or even the best; the wording ov8€v KwAlIEl, 'nothing rules out the possibility that ... , nothing prevents us from assuming that ... ', indicates this logical possibility.lb The main argument, however, is marked by the wording 'raw, of. KaL ci~tay/(aiov',17 which implie~ that the subsequent lines include a logically necessary argument for the intended conclusion, while the caution or uncertainty expressed by 'rawc;' is due to the status of one of its premisses. IS The main argument itself is that if there are unimpeded activities (EVEPYELat) of each slate or disposition (Ett,),19 and eudaimonia is the activity either of one certain disposition or of all of them, then the unimpeded b 15 Cf.NEI. 5, I097 l-5. 16 This possibility is illusnated by the comparison with kinds of knowledge (hTWTfjJ.tUl). The
possibility that pleasure is still the supreme good results from some logical features of particular statements, and the standard paradigm for the discussion of particular statements in Top. III. 6 is precisely the question whether some pleasures or some kinds of knowledge are good. Similarly, the treatment of pleasure in Magna moralia takes up the case of bad kinds of knowledge, arguing that the badness of some forms of knowledge (as the /MI'avao,) docs not inlPly the badness of knowledge in general (IL 7, 1205'31-4). In the present context, the example ofknowiedge is introduced in order to show that a logical rule that undoubtedly holds in the less controversial field of knowledge (and the opponents are more inclined to accept that knowledge is good than to accept that pleasure is: Top. III. 6, 119b 19-20), must also hold in the heavily debated field of pleasure. 17 This division is paralleled by GC I. 7. 324'30-2: 'To,.uv,wI' 7rp(i)7oV KLVOfv ",;,xl' KUlA"",iv pl" KU"}UH aK[vTJTOV £'lvut*
E7T' EVLWV O€ Kat clvaYKuLov*.·
Cf. the parallel in De Spiritu 483"4: 'rJxa (,€ Kat avaYKaLo,? 19 I assume that [f" here refers to t.hose stales or dispositions that are virtuous, i.e. it refers to apoaL. In all of Aristotle's ethical writings it is clear that he regards afX.TaL as certain [f(t~. In the frrst chapter of EE II Aristotle even prefers the [f',-X)1fia" terminology before he introduces the apenj-iv€pyua terminology. In NE VII. 13, 1153'14-15, he defined plea~ure as activity of a natural state or disposition. The attribute 'natural' does not recur in our context; I think, however, that it 18
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13-·14 (l154a21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
activity is most desirable, and hence is the supreme good. But since 'unimpeded activity' is just what we found in NE VII. 13, 1153 a 14-15, to be the definition of pleasure, pleasure must be the supreme good. The crucial consequence-that due to the given premisses and the definition of pleasure, pleasure turns out to be the supreme good-is formulated with a weakening potentialis. These are relatively clear indications that Aristotle wants to state his point cautiously; but it does not necessarily imply that he himself regards the result as only hypothetically true or even as false. Possibly he just wants to indicate that this conclusion-its formulation and the way he derived it-is somewhat rough and arbitrary and would need further elaboration. In principle it is clear that the conclusion of this section-namely, that a kind of pleasure is the supreme good-is somehow reached by the introduction of some features of eudaimonia which we know from the discussion and definition of eudaimonia in NE I or EE II. However, one might be puzzled by some peculiarities in the wording of the argument in question: first, one of the decisive premisses-namely, that the unimpeded activity of some lb:te; is eudaimonia-is introduced by the 'either ... or' clause in lines b 10-11, which could be understood as a mere parenthesis. Second, given that the idea of unimpeded activities has already been introduced in lines b9-1O, the clause' av avqJ:1TO&OTOC;' in line bII seems to be redundant. Third, a strong emphasis is given to the conclusion in lines b 11-12, 'aip£TCdTaT1]v Etvm', though it is not clear how this conclusion can be derived. I will return to these peculiarities soon; first I would like to propose the f~llowing reconstruction of the argument. Because of the intermediate conclusion 'aipETWTaT1]V £lvm', we need two successive argumentative steps, which can be represented as follows:
The first premiss, that a certain unimpeded activity is the most desirable thing, is the conclusion of our first step. The second premiss can be imported fTOm the last chapter, where Aristotle defined pleasure as unimpeded activity of a natural {be;. The remark 'TOlJTO ~' EOT/,V ~~ovf obviously refers back to this definition, where 'TolYrO' refers to the unimpeded ness of activities. And the conclusion is explicitly given in WOTE EL1] av Tt<; ~oov~ TO aptOTOv, where we just have to replace 'the best' by 'the most desirable'. The weakest point of this argument (and perhaps the reason why Aristotle formulates it so cautiously) might be seen in the definition of pleasure: this definition was introduced in chapter 13 in the middle of the refutation of an anti-hedonistic argument; there Aristotle merely said that instead of calling pleasure a )livwts we should 'rather' (fLiiAAoV) say that it is a natural activity, and instead of saying that it is perceptible, we should say that it is unimpeded. We could hardly introduce a definition more carelessly. Without the reference given in our present argument, we would not even be able to ascertain that it was meant as a definition. At any rate, the final sentence of NE VII states in summary that it has been said what pleasures and pains are and how some of them are good and some bad,20 and there is no better definition of pleasure in our text than the one just stated. Now we are in a position to comment on the two peculiarities of our argument that are unresolved thus far. First the function of the 'either ... or' clause: most commentators explain this by referring to passages 21 where Aristotle distinguishes between ordinary virtues and the perfect virtue, and states that happiness is the activity either of all of them or of the best and perfect one. This explanation, I think, is entirely reasonable, for this recurring formula allows him to describe the good life as the actualization of certain states without being committed to either the exclusive view that eudaimonia consists in the activity only of the best virtue or the more encompassing view that eudaimonia is the activity of various virtues. On the other hand, this explanation presupposes that we speak of virtuous lfEte;, but the sentence in lines b9-10 does not explicitly restrict the lfEL<; that are at stake here to the virtuous ones. But even if there is no restriction to virtuous {fEts, the argument remains sound: either we take the 'either ... or' clause to mean that it would not matter if we included the activity of all possible {fEL<; into the concept of eudaimonia, as perhaps some hedonists would do. Or we take it as an implicit restriction to the virtuous {fE'S, reading 'if 1Tuawv Evipy€LCi' as 'the activity of aU relevant lb,t<;, as defined elsewhere'. Finally, the clause 'all ft civ€fL7TOOWTO<;' in line bU: Obviously, Aristotle felt the need to emphasize that he is speaking of unimpeded activities. It is not clear whether the 'either ... or' clause itselfis restricted to unimpeded activities, because
216
n
First step: Since a certain unimpeded activity is eudaimonia, and eudaimonia is the most desirable thing, a certain unimpeded activity is the most desirable thing. The phrase 'a certain unimpeded activity' here is used as a shortened form of 'an unimpeded activity of at least one or even all {tEL';'. The conclusion that a certain unimpeded activity is the most desirable thing is given in lines b11-12 by aipETwTan]V Elvm. The second premiss, 'and eudaimonia is the most desirable thing', is either taken for granted or can be inferred from NE I. The first premiss is an abbreviation of the 'either ... or' clause 'no matter whether the activity of one certain lfts or the activity of all of them is eudaimonia' - i t is important, then, that 'eudtlimonia' is not the subject of this sentence, but the predicative noun. Second step: Since a certain unimpeded activity is the most desirable thing, and all unimpeded activity (of a efts) is pleasure, a certain pleasure is the most desirable thing, i.e. the best. is possible to regard virtues as natural di!'positions, not because they are innate, but because we are naturally able to develop them (d. NB 11.1, 1l03"25).
217
2. Cf. NE VII. 15, 1154 b 32-4. A similar summary is given in EEVllI. 3, 1249"17-21, which can, hut need not, refer to our present passage. 21 Cf. NE 1. 9, 1099"29- 31, or I. 6, 1098"16-18: ifour remark aboutthe two ways in which happiness can be related to dispositions is meant to be a oock reference, it is quite plauSl'ble to regard these two quotations or something equivalent as the target of this reference. In a corresponding definition in EE II Aristotle mentions only one pOSSl'bility: viz. that happiness is the activity of a perfect life in accordance with perfect virtue (II. 1.1219"38-9).
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13-14 (1154a21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
(as in the NE X account) to saying that this unimpeded activity is pleasure qua being unimpeded (as in the NE VII account). Of course, it would be futile to deny the differences between the two accounts-in NE VII pleasure is explicitly identified with the activity in question, whereas in NE X it is not. However, the completeness argument in the present passage reveals a clear similarity between the two accounts: according to this argument, it is clear that wherever we speak of a complete activity, the idea that the same activity must be unimpeded is not very far away, since the latter is a sort of precondition for the former one.35 In the theory of book X, pleasure comes in when certain criteria of success are fulfilled; the failure to fulfil these criteria makes the activity an impeded one. Conversely, the successful and unhindered activity is rewarded and completed by pleasure. In book VII, the activity of a natural state is pleasure when it is unhindered: just as in book X the relevant activity must fulfil some criteria of success in order to become a pleasure. The wording of the completeness argument in book Vll would even allow us to think that it is pleasure that finally brings about the completeness of an unimpeded activity.36
Good fortune (€lrrvx{a) is defined as 'getting and keeping those good things of which chance (7VX7J) is the cause'. 42 Since good fortune therefore always brings us other good things (some of which can also be brought about by art or nature), a more appropriate understanding of good fortune must take into account the goods that typically occur together with good luck. One defining description of luck (7VX7/) enumerates three typical goods ('by fortune I mean good birth, wealth, power, and their opposites ... '43); another description mentions additional types of goods (health, beauty, and stature) and broadens the realm of luck to all goods that typically incur envy.44 Luck is equally responsible for misfortunes (ov(17])x{m), so that, in a sense, the absence of misfortune can also be counted as Elrrvx{a. What misfortune consists in is explained at one point by a reference to Priamus;45 but at any rate, it is clear that only great and repeated instances of misfortune can affect the quality of an entire life,46 i.e. the question of whether someone is happy or not. Those who insist that men are happy even under the greatest of misfortune, as long as they are virtuous, are talking nonsense (aVl>EV AEyOlJotlf'l7) either voluntarily or involuntarily. The first book of the NE formulates the same point as follows: ' ... and, furthermore to sufter, and to meet with the greatest misfortunes; and no one would call the person who lived this kind of life happy, unless to defend a counterintuitive thesis (8Eot<;)',48 where 8iot<; is used in the sense defined in Topics!. 11:49 namely, as paradoxical assumptions of individual philosophers.
222
Non-internal goods Aristotle sometimes refers to the threefold division bctween goods of the soul, goods of the body, and' external' goods. 37 The goods of the soul and the body are somehow 'in us', while the other goods are external. Virtucs or excellences are goods of the soul; health, beauty, strength, athletic abilities, and large stature are goods of the body; while reputation, honour, power, wealth, good fortune or luck, good birth, good and numerous children, and good and numerous friends are all externa}.38 In our present passage, it seems as if good fortune defines a class of its own; but, possibly, this is only a question of emphasis; and one reason to highlight the role of good fortune could be that, as already mentioned, some other external goods are typically brought about by luck. Instead of the threefold scheme, Aristotle sometimes, as Cooper observed,39 uses a twofold division in which the bodily and external goods are grouped together as 'external' goods in the broader sense40 and are contrasted to the goods which are 'in our soul'.41 Though we are partly responsible for the condition of our body, the equation of bodily and external goods in the two-class division is justified by the fact that the two classes of goods-the bodily and the external ones-are not under our control in the same sense as the virtues are. " In the ProtreptiL-us both features are simultaneously applied to describe pleasant activity: cf. BB7.1 (DUring): "AAAd /L~l' ~ )It TfN.La £1'ipy.;:Ul Kat aKwAUTO, £1' ial'TTi €x€, TO Xa1p€w'. 30 Most probably, the similes that describe the rdation betwf>en pleasure and activity in book X do not amount to the assertion that pleasure is a second activity which exists over and above the activity it completes. The point of these comparisons is rather that pleasure is not on an equal footing with those criteria of success on whicb the occurrence of pleasure relies. 3 b '7 Cf. NE I. 8, 1098b 12-16; Rh. I. 5, 1360 25-7; Pol. VlI. 1, 1323 23-6, etc. 38 According to the catalogue of Rh. L 5, the status of lriends is, of course, more complicated, because good lriendships require certain virtues and abilities in us. 39 Cf. Cooper (1999),295. a • 0 Cf. NE I. 9, !099 jl; Pol. "11. I, BDb24-6. 41 Cf. EE II. 1, 121Sb31.
223
Why non-internal goods are needed On the one hand, Aristotle agrees with those philosophers who made virtues somehow a constitutive part of happiness. But once we adopt a non-contingent relation between virtue and happiness, it becomes more and more difficult to explain how it is possible that the happiness of virtuous persons can be affected by misfortunes. Hence it would be consistent to say that not even the greatest misfortune can dislodge the virtuous one from his happy state. 50 On the other hand, Aristotle wants to do jmtice to the common-sense view that the proverbial person who is 'being broken on the wheel, etc.' cannot be called 'happy', even if he or she is perfectly virtuous. Faced with this dilemma, Aristotle's way out is not without ingenuity: if virtue as a disposition is not happiness, but only activity in accordance with the virtues, then one can argue that external obstacles Cf. Rh. L 5, 1361b 39-1362· L H Cf. Rh. II. 12, I3B9"1. .. Cf. Rh. I. 5, 1362'5-6. Cf. NE 1. 10, 1l00"B. •• Cf. N£ I. ll, llOOb 25-6. 47 That is to say, either that they say nothing of relevance, or that their assertion cannot be regarded as a meaningful sequence of words (similarly: KO'oAoy~,v, Melaph. 991"21,1079'>26), or that their words have meaning, but the speakers do not mean what they say. b 48 Cf. NE I. 3, I095 33-IO%'2. 4' Cf. 'fop.!. II, 104b I9-22: A thesis is an assumption contrary to opinion (imoAl).p,~ 7rtlpa8c{o~) held by someone famous for philosophy, e.g. that contradiction is impossiDle (as Antisthenes used to say), or that everything moves (according to Heraclitus), or that what is, is one (as Mdi<>sus says). so Cf. IVE 1. I 1, 1101'9: EK T7jS d>ila'llovCa, KLl'1/Ih/UCTaL. 42
45
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13-14 (1154a21): Pleasure and eudaimonia
(as in the NE X account) to saying that this unimpeded activity is pleasure qua being unimpeded (as in the NE VII account). Of course, it would be futile to deny the differences between the two accounts-in NE VII pleasure is explicitly identified with the activity in question, whereas in NE X it is not. However, the completeness argument in the present passage reveals a clear similarity between the two accounts: according to this argument, it is clear that wherever we speak of a complete activity, the idea that the same activity must be unimpeded is not very far away, since the latter is a sort of precondition for the former one.35 In the theory of book X, pleasure comes in when certain criteria of success are fulfilled; the failure to fulfil these criteria makes the activity an impeded one. Conversely, the successful and unhindered activity is rewarded and completed by pleasure. In book VII, the activity of a natural state is pleasure when it is unhindered: just as in book X the relevant activity must fulfil some criteria of success in order to become a pleasure. The wording of the completeness argument in book Vll would even allow us to think that it is pleasure that finally brings about the completeness of an unimpeded activity.36
Good fortune (€lrrvx{a) is defined as 'getting and keeping those good things of which chance (7VX7J) is the cause'. 42 Since good fortune therefore always brings us other good things (some of which can also be brought about by art or nature), a more appropriate understanding of good fortune must take into account the goods that typically occur together with good luck. One defining description of luck (7VX7/) enumerates three typical goods ('by fortune I mean good birth, wealth, power, and their opposites ... '43); another description mentions additional types of goods (health, beauty, and stature) and broadens the realm of luck to all goods that typically incur envy.44 Luck is equally responsible for misfortunes (ov(17])x{m), so that, in a sense, the absence of misfortune can also be counted as Elrrvx{a. What misfortune consists in is explained at one point by a reference to Priamus;45 but at any rate, it is clear that only great and repeated instances of misfortune can affect the quality of an entire life,46 i.e. the question of whether someone is happy or not. Those who insist that men are happy even under the greatest of misfortune, as long as they are virtuous, are talking nonsense (aVl>EV AEyOlJotlf'l7) either voluntarily or involuntarily. The first book of the NE formulates the same point as follows: ' ... and, furthermore to sufter, and to meet with the greatest misfortunes; and no one would call the person who lived this kind of life happy, unless to defend a counterintuitive thesis (8Eot<;)',48 where 8iot<; is used in the sense defined in Topics!. 11:49 namely, as paradoxical assumptions of individual philosophers.
222
Non-internal goods Aristotle sometimes refers to the threefold division bctween goods of the soul, goods of the body, and' external' goods. 37 The goods of the soul and the body are somehow 'in us', while the other goods are external. Virtucs or excellences are goods of the soul; health, beauty, strength, athletic abilities, and large stature are goods of the body; while reputation, honour, power, wealth, good fortune or luck, good birth, good and numerous children, and good and numerous friends are all externa}.38 In our present passage, it seems as if good fortune defines a class of its own; but, possibly, this is only a question of emphasis; and one reason to highlight the role of good fortune could be that, as already mentioned, some other external goods are typically brought about by luck. Instead of the threefold scheme, Aristotle sometimes, as Cooper observed,39 uses a twofold division in which the bodily and external goods are grouped together as 'external' goods in the broader sense40 and are contrasted to the goods which are 'in our soul'.41 Though we are partly responsible for the condition of our body, the equation of bodily and external goods in the two-class division is justified by the fact that the two classes of goods-the bodily and the external ones-are not under our control in the same sense as the virtues are. " In the ProtreptiL-us both features are simultaneously applied to describe pleasant activity: cf. BB7.1 (DUring): "AAAd /L~l' ~ )It TfN.La £1'ipy.;:Ul Kat aKwAUTO, £1' ial'TTi €x€, TO Xa1p€w'. 30 Most probably, the similes that describe the rdation betwf>en pleasure and activity in book X do not amount to the assertion that pleasure is a second activity which exists over and above the activity it completes. The point of these comparisons is rather that pleasure is not on an equal footing with those criteria of success on whicb the occurrence of pleasure relies. 3 b '7 Cf. NE I. 8, 1098b 12-16; Rh. I. 5, 1360 25-7; Pol. VlI. 1, 1323 23-6, etc. 38 According to the catalogue of Rh. L 5, the status of lriends is, of course, more complicated, because good lriendships require certain virtues and abilities in us. 39 Cf. Cooper (1999),295. a • 0 Cf. NE I. 9, !099 jl; Pol. "11. I, BDb24-6. 41 Cf. EE II. 1, 121Sb31.
223
Why non-internal goods are needed On the one hand, Aristotle agrees with those philosophers who made virtues somehow a constitutive part of happiness. But once we adopt a non-contingent relation between virtue and happiness, it becomes more and more difficult to explain how it is possible that the happiness of virtuous persons can be affected by misfortunes. Hence it would be consistent to say that not even the greatest misfortune can dislodge the virtuous one from his happy state. 50 On the other hand, Aristotle wants to do jmtice to the common-sense view that the proverbial person who is 'being broken on the wheel, etc.' cannot be called 'happy', even if he or she is perfectly virtuous. Faced with this dilemma, Aristotle's way out is not without ingenuity: if virtue as a disposition is not happiness, but only activity in accordance with the virtues, then one can argue that external obstacles Cf. Rh. L 5, 1361b 39-1362· L H Cf. Rh. II. 12, I3B9"1. .. Cf. Rh. I. 5, 1362'5-6. Cf. NE 1. 10, 1l00"B. •• Cf. N£ I. ll, llOOb 25-6. 47 That is to say, either that they say nothing of relevance, or that their assertion cannot be regarded as a meaningful sequence of words (similarly: KO'oAoy~,v, Melaph. 991"21,1079'>26), or that their words have meaning, but the speakers do not mean what they say. b 48 Cf. NE I. 3, I095 33-IO%'2. 4' Cf. 'fop.!. II, 104b I9-22: A thesis is an assumption contrary to opinion (imoAl).p,~ 7rtlpa8c{o~) held by someone famous for philosophy, e.g. that contradiction is impossiDle (as Antisthenes used to say), or that everything moves (according to Heraclitus), or that what is, is one (as Mdi<>sus says). so Cf. IVE 1. I 1, 1101'9: EK T7jS d>ila'llovCa, KLl'1/Ih/UCTaL. 42
45
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13-14 (115411 2]): Pleasure and eudaimonia
is different for different kinds of beings. If this reading is correct, it would mean a major revision of Eudoxus's original argument, since the best states in his argument are simply defined by what the creatures pursue. In comparing the two readings, it i~ important to include the subsequent remark about the divine in us. The allusion to the divine in us includes a 'yap', as if the sentence were referring to the previous sentence about people who do not pursue what they say they pursue. In reading (A), it would be pointless to assume this connection, because the third step concerns people who refuse to concede that they pursue pleasure. In this case, it would be more plausible to say that the final sentence concludes the entire section by emphasizing that we must not neglect the evidence of the natural tendency toward pleasure. There is a similar remark in EE VIII. 3, saying that it cannot be !-LaT1Jv when all people pursue the pleasant life. 68 If, on the contrary, reading (B) is correct, the fmal sentence would perfectly fit the description of the third step: there are depraved people who do not know that they are ultimately seeking the good life, but even these people have something divine that pushes them in the direction of happiness. This is more or less what Aristotle says in the parallel section of NE X. 2: 'And perhaps even in inferior creatures there is some natural element of goodness that transcends what they are in themselves and has as its object their own proper good.'69
be good, or even the best in a way. If this is the function of the final sentence, it would express something like the idea that nature does nothing in vain and that, if nature equips all animals with a tendency toward pleasure, this cannot be something bad. Reading (B) would require a slightly different sense: as rational deliberating animals, human beings are free to choose things that do not really promoLe the best state that is peculiar to their species. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that if they only made use of their natural sense of orientation, they would easily come to understand that there is something better that they should pursue. In other words, the fact that people pursue different goals does not prove that there is a genuine plurality of goals; it rather proves that some people make no use of their natural capacities.
228
There is something divine in all of us Some commentators refer us to De anima II. 4,41S a 29, where Aristotle explains that animals participate in the everlasting and divine existence precisely in so far as the species conLinues to exist. This is perhaps not particularly helpful in our context, since what is at issue here is not the reproduction of the species. Some refer to Plato, Laws 9S0 b: '8ELOV OE TL Kut El'UTOXO/l EVEUTL Kat TOLULV KaKols', which is actualJy closer to our context, but does not explain why Aristotle makes use of this formula. Other commentators stress that it is the voD, that represents the divine aspect in us. It can hardly be denied that this is Aristotle's view, but our section is not about rational beings, but about animals in general. To this one could object, referring to Protrepticus B 29 (During), that there is a gleam of wisdom in all creatures. A relatively speculative explanation is given by Stewart, who says that the Aristotelian God is the abstract of all the various modes of the organizing nisus in nature. Since he (God) is described as an eternal function, and this eternal function is said to be pleasure, all creatures are particular cases of this one eternal function, which is divine. To find a deflationary interpretation, we should instead start by asking what is actually required to conclude our section. And this, again, depends on whether we prefer reading (A) or (B). Reading (A) would require a conclusion that reaffirms that if all animals pursue pleasure, it is legitimate to conclude that pleasure must 68
EE VIII. 3, 1249'21.
69
NE X. 2, 1173"4-5.
229
Taking bodily pleasures for the only ones (llS3b 33-11543 I)
After having associated pleasure with the supreme good and the tendency toward pleasure with the divine in us, Aristotle may have felt the need to explain where the negative reputation of pleasure comes from. Actually, most of the anti-hedonistic statements in VII. 12 were directed against kinds of pleasure that are entirely different from the phenomenon on which Aristotle is focusing. In this situation, he could easily declare 'pleasure' to be a 7ToAAuXW' AEyOI-'EVO/l, and that it is good in one sense, but bad in another. But this is too easy for at least the following two reasons. First, Aristotle does not merely aim at the distinction between good and bad, pure and impure, bodily and mental pleasures; to a certain extent, bodily pleasures are also desirable and good. Second, Aristotle's rejection of anti-hedonism repeatedly refers to common sense and to what people actually pursue and avoid; in this context, it would be inconsistent to dismiss the most prominent class of pleasures either as bad or as irrelevant. Thus he chooses a different approach: the gap between the thesis that some kind of pleasure is intrinsically connected with the supreme good (or even is the supreme good) and the negative reputation of pleasure, which is reflected in the anti-hedonistic statements, can be explained by the fact that bodily pleasures have almost entirely taken over the name of 'pleasure', while the phenomenon with which the last sections were concerned is hardly known under the description of 'pleasure'. This is why many philosophers would not even think of associating pleasure with the supreme good. Hence, Aristotle has to reclaim the label of pleasure for the desirability of the good and happy life. But isn't this a revisionary approach to the phenomenon of pleasure? The present section offers a different story: instead of saying that Aristotle attached a new meaning to 'pleasure', one should rather emphasize that the prominence of bodily pleasures has led to a situation in which people have restricted the meaning of pleasure to the bodily ones, not recognizing that there are other types of pleasure, too, and that they implicitly acknowledge this broader sense of pleasure by saying that the happy life must be a pleasant one.
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13-14 (115411 2]): Pleasure and eudaimonia
is different for different kinds of beings. If this reading is correct, it would mean a major revision of Eudoxus's original argument, since the best states in his argument are simply defined by what the creatures pursue. In comparing the two readings, it i~ important to include the subsequent remark about the divine in us. The allusion to the divine in us includes a 'yap', as if the sentence were referring to the previous sentence about people who do not pursue what they say they pursue. In reading (A), it would be pointless to assume this connection, because the third step concerns people who refuse to concede that they pursue pleasure. In this case, it would be more plausible to say that the final sentence concludes the entire section by emphasizing that we must not neglect the evidence of the natural tendency toward pleasure. There is a similar remark in EE VIII. 3, saying that it cannot be !-LaT1Jv when all people pursue the pleasant life. 68 If, on the contrary, reading (B) is correct, the fmal sentence would perfectly fit the description of the third step: there are depraved people who do not know that they are ultimately seeking the good life, but even these people have something divine that pushes them in the direction of happiness. This is more or less what Aristotle says in the parallel section of NE X. 2: 'And perhaps even in inferior creatures there is some natural element of goodness that transcends what they are in themselves and has as its object their own proper good.'69
be good, or even the best in a way. If this is the function of the final sentence, it would express something like the idea that nature does nothing in vain and that, if nature equips all animals with a tendency toward pleasure, this cannot be something bad. Reading (B) would require a slightly different sense: as rational deliberating animals, human beings are free to choose things that do not really promoLe the best state that is peculiar to their species. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that if they only made use of their natural sense of orientation, they would easily come to understand that there is something better that they should pursue. In other words, the fact that people pursue different goals does not prove that there is a genuine plurality of goals; it rather proves that some people make no use of their natural capacities.
228
There is something divine in all of us Some commentators refer us to De anima II. 4,41S a 29, where Aristotle explains that animals participate in the everlasting and divine existence precisely in so far as the species conLinues to exist. This is perhaps not particularly helpful in our context, since what is at issue here is not the reproduction of the species. Some refer to Plato, Laws 9S0 b: '8ELOV OE TL Kut El'UTOXO/l EVEUTL Kat TOLULV KaKols', which is actualJy closer to our context, but does not explain why Aristotle makes use of this formula. Other commentators stress that it is the voD, that represents the divine aspect in us. It can hardly be denied that this is Aristotle's view, but our section is not about rational beings, but about animals in general. To this one could object, referring to Protrepticus B 29 (During), that there is a gleam of wisdom in all creatures. A relatively speculative explanation is given by Stewart, who says that the Aristotelian God is the abstract of all the various modes of the organizing nisus in nature. Since he (God) is described as an eternal function, and this eternal function is said to be pleasure, all creatures are particular cases of this one eternal function, which is divine. To find a deflationary interpretation, we should instead start by asking what is actually required to conclude our section. And this, again, depends on whether we prefer reading (A) or (B). Reading (A) would require a conclusion that reaffirms that if all animals pursue pleasure, it is legitimate to conclude that pleasure must 68
EE VIII. 3, 1249'21.
69
NE X. 2, 1173"4-5.
229
Taking bodily pleasures for the only ones (llS3b 33-11543 I)
After having associated pleasure with the supreme good and the tendency toward pleasure with the divine in us, Aristotle may have felt the need to explain where the negative reputation of pleasure comes from. Actually, most of the anti-hedonistic statements in VII. 12 were directed against kinds of pleasure that are entirely different from the phenomenon on which Aristotle is focusing. In this situation, he could easily declare 'pleasure' to be a 7ToAAuXW' AEyOI-'EVO/l, and that it is good in one sense, but bad in another. But this is too easy for at least the following two reasons. First, Aristotle does not merely aim at the distinction between good and bad, pure and impure, bodily and mental pleasures; to a certain extent, bodily pleasures are also desirable and good. Second, Aristotle's rejection of anti-hedonism repeatedly refers to common sense and to what people actually pursue and avoid; in this context, it would be inconsistent to dismiss the most prominent class of pleasures either as bad or as irrelevant. Thus he chooses a different approach: the gap between the thesis that some kind of pleasure is intrinsically connected with the supreme good (or even is the supreme good) and the negative reputation of pleasure, which is reflected in the anti-hedonistic statements, can be explained by the fact that bodily pleasures have almost entirely taken over the name of 'pleasure', while the phenomenon with which the last sections were concerned is hardly known under the description of 'pleasure'. This is why many philosophers would not even think of associating pleasure with the supreme good. Hence, Aristotle has to reclaim the label of pleasure for the desirability of the good and happy life. But isn't this a revisionary approach to the phenomenon of pleasure? The present section offers a different story: instead of saying that Aristotle attached a new meaning to 'pleasure', one should rather emphasize that the prominence of bodily pleasures has led to a situation in which people have restricted the meaning of pleasure to the bodily ones, not recognizing that there are other types of pleasure, too, and that they implicitly acknowledge this broader sense of pleasure by saying that the happy life must be a pleasant one.
Christo! Rapp
NE VII. 13 ·····14 ( 1154rJ 21); Pleasure and eudaimonia
proper sen5(.'.74 If, however, we combine 'good' with 'desirable' and 'bad' with 'to be avoided', the idea that something is good in a sense between 'desirable' and 'to be avoided' is somehow awkward; it seems as if the introduction of the non-bad class amounts to the assumption of an indifferent category; such a category could be useful if we assume that we can neither be praised nor blamed for pleasures that naturally occur together with the satisfaction of bodily needs. But the entire passage seems too ad hoc to introduce such a weighty distinction. This may be the implicit reason why some commentators (Burnet, Stewal"t) suggest that only the second proposal represents Aristotle's point of view. ii. Pleasures are good up to a point. One has to distinguish between two types of pleasures: in the case of states and movements that do not allow of excess, there is no excess of the corresponding pleasure, either. This is certainly true of the pleasures we take in contemplation and philosophizing; and it seems to be true of all the pleasures we take in the activities of our virtuous states. The situation is different in the case of bodily pleasures: they do allow of eXcess. Now, what defines the bad person is not her attitude toward necessary pleasures (as already indicated in the first proposa17S ), but precisely her pursuing the excess of these bodily pleasures. Aristotle resumes the distinction between necessary and excessive pleasures with the example that everybody enjoys the pleasures of the table, wine, and sex in one way or the other, but some do not enjoy them as they should: i.e. they enjoy them excessively. The concept of necessary pleasures implies that there is a relatively clear threshold value up to which tht' occurring pleasures are innocent because they are proportiunal to the satisfactiun of our bodily needs. This is perhaps too simple if we take into account the fact that, for example, the threshold value between necessary and excessive sex is difficult to define, and that excess in the Aristotelian account of virtue is not only a quantitative question: we also fail to enjoy it as we should if we do it at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with inappropriate tools, with inappropriate people, etc. But if we concede all of this, the result of this proposal is relatively clear: necessary pleasures are good or, at least, not bad, while excessive pleasures or all pleasures that we enjoy in an inappropriate way are bad. Nevertheless, we should note a change ill the meaning of 'good' and 'bad': while the first part of our chapter tended to equate those tenns with 'desirable' and 'to be avoided', the last paragraphs use these terms rather in the sense of Ka.\oL' and alu)(pov; the latter use is, of course, similar to 'desirable for the virtuous' and 'to be avoided by the virtuous'.
excess--except for the person pursuing excess. Besides the fact that this remark is extremely elliptical, there are two main obstacles to an adequate understanding: first, it is not clear which is the subject of'¢£lIYEL'; it is pussible, but not necessarily the case, that '0 ¢avAo<;' in line 16 is the subject; but other commentators and translators understand an implicit T{" as the subject. Second, it is difficult to decide whether the three occurrences of 'u7TEpf3oA~' refer to an excess of pleasure or an excess of pain. However, the fint sentence is relatively clear: it is the contrary with pain, because ill the case of pain it does not hold that only excessive pain is bad or to be avoided (as in the case of pleasure); rather, we avoid pain in general. This is just a case of the general Eudoxean premiss that we pursue pleasure and avoid pain. If, on the othel" hand, '0 <pavAo>' is the subject, it would mean that '0 <pavAos' even avoids those pains that he should bear, as in the case of the coward. The following sentence is more difficult: pain is not contrary to the excess of pleasure, i.e. the excess of pleasure would be something good if it were the contrary (since pain, in any case, is bad, and the bad is contrary to the good); but it is not, except for those who pursue the excess of pleasure. Thus it is not the excess of pleasure, but simple pleasure, that is contrary to pain, and hence good.
232
It is the contrary with pain The situation with pain is different or even contrary: one does not avoid excessive pain, but pain in general, since pain, Aristotle says, is not contrary to ,. Joachim, ad loc., explains 'i.c. they are opposed to the bodily pains and are good qua absence of bad'. I doubt that this is the sense of the predicate 'non-bad'. 15 The suggestion that the necessary pleasures are irrelevant for the assessment of one's virtue or vice comes quite dose to the first proposal. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to say that the second proposal in some way develops the first one.
233
Some teneative conclusions
In the piece of text discussed here there is no clear demarcation between Aristotle's criticism of anti-hedonistic arguments and the defence of his own positive account of pleasure. It seems nonetheless that some of the arguments Aristotle offers here are based on his own ethical views (e.g. eudaimonia as unimpeded activity of at least one or even all {tELS, the need for some non-internal goods, the completeness requirement for eudaimonia, etc.). Also we can cautiously draw some conclusions concerning Aristotle's views about the nature of pleasure (that it is the unimpeded activity of certain states) and his assessment of the value of various types of pleasure (e.g. that bodily pleasures are not intrinsically bad, but are good up to a point, etc.). However, the picture we get must remain fragmentary and tentative, since the chapter aims primarily at refuting the evaluative system of the anti-hedonists and not at developing a positive account. As for the general strategy that Aristotle adopts here, it is most remarkable that at least two arguments operate with Eudoxean assumptions. Most notably, it is Eudoxus's definition of the good as what is desired that plays a crucial role in the argument of chapters 13-14. However, we should not jump to the conclusion that Aristotle would have adopted Eudoxus's principle as a proper definition of the good. First, Eudoxus's principle would have conflicted with the idea of an apparent guod (rpaWOjLEVOV aya86v) that is factually desired, but not actually good. 76 Second, and more generally, Aristotle sometimes expresses concerns about the possibility of giving a general definition of what is good, and it is at least not obvious that the Eudoxean definition would be immune to these concerns. On the
7. NE III. 6, 1113'20.
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (1154 u22- b34): Pain of the Living
aimed at is opposed to the variety of modes of this aiming. The quest for pleasure may be universal, but it has various objects, whose variety can nevertheless be reduced to that of natures and dispositions, or even led back to the unity of one and the same object. These propositions sketch a research programme, whose successive points would be: to identify this object (and show how it is correlated with a 'divine element'); to understand how it can be concealed (and examine the two reasons given, viz. the diversity of natures and the urgency of bodily pleasure). Our passage announces thai it will fulfil a part of this programme: to uncover the reason for the urgency, and the prevalence, of bodily pleasures (1154"26). In so doing, it will focus on understanding why, when one seeks pleasure, these are the pleasures that are sought, and why, when one speaks of pleasure, it is they that are spoken of. In other words, it is governed by both a question of fact and a question oflaw, dealing no longer with the attitude of the common man, but with philosophical debate, and which aims to denounce an error common to hedonists and anti-hedonists. The point is thus to understand why we choose the wrong pleasure, and why we make mistakes about pleasure: why we speak badly about it and enjoy it poorly. With this goal in view, an attitude will be adopted toward bodily pleasure that is different from both the common one of seeking and the philosophical one of reprobation. We will seek to understand what it is good for, and how it works. Bodily pleasure then reveals itself as a remedy or a compensation for pain-the only compensation, one must add, for the neutral state cannot be substituted for it. To those who condemn it, it can therefore be objected that it is not bad, but 'good by accident'. To those who seek it, in contrast, it will also be shown that it is not really a pleasure, for as a remedy, it is a genesis, whereas pleasure, for its part, is energeia. Thus, to identify bodily pleasure as a remedy is both to render it otl limits to blame and to disqualify it as pleasure. 1t is, in one fell swoop, to reduce the common illusion and the discourse of the sages. However, it is also to gain a better understanding of how the relation to pleasure may be deviant-~-and therefore, this time, subject to condemnation: the deviance consist.s in the fact that pleasure is sought for itself, and no longer as a compensation. More than on akrasi(j and ako/asia, however, interest will be focused on pathological cases. More precisely, we shall be working on the border between the normal and the pathological ( for instance, that which separates youth from melancholy), and on that between pathology and ethics (which separates melancholy from akolasia). Yet it is to discover that in man, the normal is pathological, and that human nature is constitutionally unbalanced. Man is that living being whose nature is to be made up of two natures, each of which is, for the other, contrary to nature. And since he has two natures, man is also capable of two energeiai, and therefore of two pleasures, which fight with or cancel one another. Far from being a divine privilege, the neutral state is thus the result of human imbalance. Pleasure, by contrast, cannot only be said to be divine, but also to be proper to the god: the god is that living being which, because his nature is simple and non-conflictual,
can have true enjoyment; that is, both enjoy the same pleasure and enjoy it continuously. Having started out from the attitude of the common man, we thus arrive, via the melancholy, young people, and the perverse, at the god. Having started out trying to understand the urgency of bodily pleasures, we have come to show, in the first place, that while they are remedies, they are not genuine pleasures, and then that they are an obstacle to genuine pleasure. In man, therefore, what is blameable is not so much the fact that he seeks bodily pleasure in order to enjoy it as the fact that he is unable to enjoy one and the same pleasure. One might be surprised that the text (and book VII along with it) ends with this observation: that the conflict. between the phuseis that are constitutive of man, and between the pleasures associated with them, is simply raised and not solved. This will not be the case in book X where, beyond the diversity and potential conflictuality of pleasures, the principle of a hierarchy will be postulated: so that, ultimately, divine pleasure can be assigned to man as a model and an end, precisely by virtue of the theion ti that is within him (1177 b28). Is this a sign that the text functions in another register, descriptive rather than normative? Does it raise questions about its belonging to book VII, or even about its authenticity, which has sometimes been suspectedP It seems to me that one can, on the contrary, wonder whether the inability to resolve this conflict is not the sign of an uncertainty proper to book VII, triggered by the very definition of pleasure it proposes. Indeed, this definition leaves open the question of whether pleasure- and happiness-are the energeia of all the hcxeis or only of one. It is as if the real pressing need consisted in demonstrating, against Plato, the identity of pleasure with energeia rather than with genesis, much more than in establishing a hierarchy of pleasures and energeiai.
238
239
L Bodily pleasure as pleasure remedy
a. The problem (1154"22-6) The text opens with a consideration of a methodological nature, which, at the same time, indicates its object: And since we must say not only the tme, but also the cause of the error-for this contributes to persuasion, for when the cause for which that which is not true seems true appears reasonable, this makes us more persuaded by the true-we must therefore state why bodily pleasures seem to be more choice worthy. (l154a22~6)
Two propositions are thus to be confronted, whose value is indicated immediately, but whose content, as well as their status, remains to be specified. The method is not the same as the dialectical one whose rules were formulated at the beginning of book VII: it is not proposed to pass in review the phainomena and the principal endoxa in order to resolve disagreements and discriminate between acceptable 3
Particularly by Anton. who objects to its lack of coherence. See Festugiere (1960), 66, n. 21.
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (1154 u22- b34): Pain of the Living
aimed at is opposed to the variety of modes of this aiming. The quest for pleasure may be universal, but it has various objects, whose variety can nevertheless be reduced to that of natures and dispositions, or even led back to the unity of one and the same object. These propositions sketch a research programme, whose successive points would be: to identify this object (and show how it is correlated with a 'divine element'); to understand how it can be concealed (and examine the two reasons given, viz. the diversity of natures and the urgency of bodily pleasure). Our passage announces thai it will fulfil a part of this programme: to uncover the reason for the urgency, and the prevalence, of bodily pleasures (1154"26). In so doing, it will focus on understanding why, when one seeks pleasure, these are the pleasures that are sought, and why, when one speaks of pleasure, it is they that are spoken of. In other words, it is governed by both a question of fact and a question oflaw, dealing no longer with the attitude of the common man, but with philosophical debate, and which aims to denounce an error common to hedonists and anti-hedonists. The point is thus to understand why we choose the wrong pleasure, and why we make mistakes about pleasure: why we speak badly about it and enjoy it poorly. With this goal in view, an attitude will be adopted toward bodily pleasure that is different from both the common one of seeking and the philosophical one of reprobation. We will seek to understand what it is good for, and how it works. Bodily pleasure then reveals itself as a remedy or a compensation for pain-the only compensation, one must add, for the neutral state cannot be substituted for it. To those who condemn it, it can therefore be objected that it is not bad, but 'good by accident'. To those who seek it, in contrast, it will also be shown that it is not really a pleasure, for as a remedy, it is a genesis, whereas pleasure, for its part, is energeia. Thus, to identify bodily pleasure as a remedy is both to render it otl limits to blame and to disqualify it as pleasure. 1t is, in one fell swoop, to reduce the common illusion and the discourse of the sages. However, it is also to gain a better understanding of how the relation to pleasure may be deviant-~-and therefore, this time, subject to condemnation: the deviance consist.s in the fact that pleasure is sought for itself, and no longer as a compensation. More than on akrasi(j and ako/asia, however, interest will be focused on pathological cases. More precisely, we shall be working on the border between the normal and the pathological ( for instance, that which separates youth from melancholy), and on that between pathology and ethics (which separates melancholy from akolasia). Yet it is to discover that in man, the normal is pathological, and that human nature is constitutionally unbalanced. Man is that living being whose nature is to be made up of two natures, each of which is, for the other, contrary to nature. And since he has two natures, man is also capable of two energeiai, and therefore of two pleasures, which fight with or cancel one another. Far from being a divine privilege, the neutral state is thus the result of human imbalance. Pleasure, by contrast, cannot only be said to be divine, but also to be proper to the god: the god is that living being which, because his nature is simple and non-conflictual,
can have true enjoyment; that is, both enjoy the same pleasure and enjoy it continuously. Having started out from the attitude of the common man, we thus arrive, via the melancholy, young people, and the perverse, at the god. Having started out trying to understand the urgency of bodily pleasures, we have come to show, in the first place, that while they are remedies, they are not genuine pleasures, and then that they are an obstacle to genuine pleasure. In man, therefore, what is blameable is not so much the fact that he seeks bodily pleasure in order to enjoy it as the fact that he is unable to enjoy one and the same pleasure. One might be surprised that the text (and book VII along with it) ends with this observation: that the conflict. between the phuseis that are constitutive of man, and between the pleasures associated with them, is simply raised and not solved. This will not be the case in book X where, beyond the diversity and potential conflictuality of pleasures, the principle of a hierarchy will be postulated: so that, ultimately, divine pleasure can be assigned to man as a model and an end, precisely by virtue of the theion ti that is within him (1177 b28). Is this a sign that the text functions in another register, descriptive rather than normative? Does it raise questions about its belonging to book VII, or even about its authenticity, which has sometimes been suspectedP It seems to me that one can, on the contrary, wonder whether the inability to resolve this conflict is not the sign of an uncertainty proper to book VII, triggered by the very definition of pleasure it proposes. Indeed, this definition leaves open the question of whether pleasure- and happiness-are the energeia of all the hcxeis or only of one. It is as if the real pressing need consisted in demonstrating, against Plato, the identity of pleasure with energeia rather than with genesis, much more than in establishing a hierarchy of pleasures and energeiai.
238
239
L Bodily pleasure as pleasure remedy
a. The problem (1154"22-6) The text opens with a consideration of a methodological nature, which, at the same time, indicates its object: And since we must say not only the tme, but also the cause of the error-for this contributes to persuasion, for when the cause for which that which is not true seems true appears reasonable, this makes us more persuaded by the true-we must therefore state why bodily pleasures seem to be more choice worthy. (l154a22~6)
Two propositions are thus to be confronted, whose value is indicated immediately, but whose content, as well as their status, remains to be specified. The method is not the same as the dialectical one whose rules were formulated at the beginning of book VII: it is not proposed to pass in review the phainomena and the principal endoxa in order to resolve disagreements and discriminate between acceptable 3
Particularly by Anton. who objects to its lack of coherence. See Festugiere (1960), 66, n. 21.
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (1154 a 22 - b34): Pain of the Living
the latter is characteristic not of bodily pleasure itself, but of a deviant relation to it: it is the phaulos who seeks hyperbole (a IS). This analysis thus echoed the definition of those two (unequally) deviant behaviours known as akrasia and akolasia: the akrates is 'he who, without having so decided, pursues an excess of pleasure and flees that of pain' (1l48 a6-7); while the akolastos is he who 'pursues an excess of pleasure by virtue of a decision' (11S(1119-20; 1153a 33-4). We are still in the register of behavioural analysis-of an attitude (&'wKovm, i5UVKOJlTaL, l1S4a28, 30), and of the appearance that founds it (w,
in the fact that it treats pleasure and pain as relative terms. The value (moral, this time) of the life they characterize is deduced not from their nature, but from their relation. And the moderate and healthy life is made up not of the absence of pleasure and pain, nor of their equilibrium, but of an excess of pleasure over pain. Self-indulgent pleasures and pains are distinguished by one essential feature: their intensity (u
242
12 See 1153"4, as well as Ph/b. 35a. In [Pr.] I, 859"3, illness is defined as being either a defect (ww/ns), or else an excess (ImEpfjo.\i]).
L3 One text, 1148'20-2, could be interpreted as suggesting that the akrates, unlike the akolastos, seeks pleasure in excess not for itself, but as a remedy for excessive pain. What would the akolasto.< do, it is asked, ifhe were subject to juvenile desire or to the intense pain linked with the lack of necessary pleasures (7T£pL Til, TWV avaYKa[lLW ,:v&ias )"m1] Laxopa)? It seems, however, that these lines must be read as an argument a fartiori (when we see what an akolastos can do without even experiencing desire, of what would he be capable ifhe were subject to a \iolent desire?), rather than as contributing a new criterion for discriminating between akrasia and ako/asia.
243
14 The Greek is elliptical, and has given rise to multiple translations. The main divergences turn on the meaning to be given to y[v'WTa. ("29) and to 7Tapa ("30). See, e.g., the translations by Barnes: 'Now curative agencies produce intense feeling-which is the reason why they are pursued-because they show up against the contrary pain'; and by Grant: 'Now remedies are naturally violent, and they are adopted because they seem to match their opposites' (my emphasis). Stewart suggests that alpua", be understood after fjJu£veaOu., which does not seem necessary. 15 To adopt the distinction formulated by Owen 0971- 2). 16 'This is noted by the Anonymous (457, 20-2) more clearly than by Aspasius (155, L5), for whom the question still bears upon the appearance of pleasure. !l aI. J>f.V ~oova, 7iapa TO AIJ7T1)pOV /Jk4,OIlS 'Pa'VOI'Ta, Ka, a'POopOT€pm, Aima., 0' a~ Sui TO Trap' ~oova~ TOVVUVT[OV fXE{Vat~. In the Republic, the appearance due to contrast explains why the neutral state may be confused with pleasure (X, 584a).
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (1154a22- b34): Pain of the Living
development took as its object the possible lack of measure, quantitative and then qualitative, that is introduced into bodily pleasures, or rather into behaviour with regard to them, it did not refer it to a moral deviance, like that of the weak or the self-indulgent, but to a pathologic.al state. Here, the (quantitative) excess is given in the domain of compensation, as (qualitative) intensity is in that of contrast. We are still \\-ithin a physiological logic of pleasure as a mean and of restoration, and not in a deviant logic of pleasure as an end-although the text does suggest that the slippage from one to the other is elL
either an original detect or else a process of denaturation. Yet this typology was said to be external to vice: lEw r
244
c. The problem of evaluation (1154il 31 - b 2) The economic analysis of bodily pleasure has achieved it~ goal: it has uncovered the basis of the common attitude towards this pleasure. If it is sought, it is for what it is, either as a restoration or as a compensation. Yet it also enables us to distinguish between this common behaviour and deviant behaviour, which, for its part, seeks pleasure no longer as a compensation for suffering, but for itself and for its intensity. And because we have provided ourselves with the means for this distinction, we can henceforth reconsider the question of the value of pleasure. No more than as a faulty insertion, therefore, the following lines cannot be considered a simple parenthesis that interrupts the course of the reasoning. Is If one GIn judge that pleasure is ou u7To1Joaiov, not good, or ignoble (" 31), it is, says Aristotle, for two reasons: because 'some (a'i pkt/) are the acts of a vile nature', while 'others (at OE) are the remedies of a defective nature' (a32 and 34).1 9 Each of these reasons refers the negative value of pleasure to that of its substrate: that is, to a nature designated either as vile or else as defective. Aristotle, however, does not deal with them in the same way. The first onc is not discussed, but simply made explicit: a bad nature can be such' either by birth, like that of a beast, or else by habit, like that of bad men' (a32--4).20 Here we find a summary of the development of VII. 5, 1148b 15, which took its place in a classification of pleasures, distinguishing between natural pleasures and non-natural pleasures. Although less nuanced, the text of chapter 14 preserves the essential points: what makes a nature bad may be Jolif transpose the passage aftt'I 1153'7, to which, according to them. the wmrEp dpy/Tat of 1154'32 refers. They see it as a mef!? note written after the fact by Aristotle, a simple summary of 1152 b 26-1153'7, which an 'embarrassed editor' inserted here because of the mention of pleasure remedies at lJ54a 28 and 30 (1970, 812). Suspected by ZeI!, the text is brackt>ted by Ramsauer, 18 Gauthier and
Rackham. Ross, and Barnes. 19 With Bywater and Burnet, I suppress OTt at L 34. I understand tpoo£w, before l,,&of'J>, as in '32 (d. also 1153'1). We thus respect the parallel:i5rn between the two propositions introduced by p.tl' and ai O€. Ifwe maintain on, we must understand ,mp"la; flaw after it, as:is done by Festugii>re, who translates: 'those which are remedies because thev cure it defective state', 20 We may wonder to what noun the
a'
~45
21 This term does not necessarily pertain to the ethical register: it simply indicates an inferior quality or class (one may speak of a l"aiJ~OS' 17rnOS', a bad horse). 22 I believe it is better, following Rowe, to mainlain the general value of this phrase, which almost sounds like a maxim, rather than to specify. as mosl translators do (Festugiere, Rackham, Tricot), 'to be in a good state'. This implies giving the verb lx'w a technical sense, in which it designates actual possession, as is the case in the Theaet£tus (197b f.), where it is opposed to K~Oat. In this case, its use would be close to that oCthe verb xpr;a(Jcu, which, at l1S3a lO-ll, functions in opposition to yiyvoj1.m. We should note that in the Protreptic, by contrast, lx;el.l' and KEIcr'fJa{}m togetheT are opposed to xpr,(JOm (ef fr. 14, Ross). 23 Cf. Phlb., 54c-d. We should stress that what justifies the devaluation of pleasure is not only its designation as genesis, but the tact that this genesis is ordered to an end that is dilFerent from it. 24 There is a play on words in Greek that is hard to render, between cro!J.{law(1lJOI., which [ translate hy 'are encountered', and KaHr OlJp.p..PTJKO~.
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (11S,[l22- b34): Pain aIthe Living
perfection). Nothing, therefore, justifies its devaluation. In fact, its ethical value is quite precisely deduced from its ontological status, such as it has just been described: it is not bad because it accompanies a telos, but it is good only by accident, since it merely accompanies it. Of the two propositions analysed here, the second is, in a way, the ethical translation of the ontological vocabulary of the first: uvp.{3aLI'Ovm! J
plenitude of the life of order and temperance: a 'life of stone', as he says (Grg. 493e-494b ). Faced with the Platonic text, the approach is the same as above: the observation can be accepted, but the condemnation is refused. For before making a value judgement on the fact, one must give the reason. Yet here, once again, the reason is of a pathological order: the quest for genesis for genesis's sake, or intensity for intensity's sake, proceeds from an inability to enjoy other pleasures. \\"hat should determine the value judgement, therefore, is not the mere fact of the search for pleasure, but the nature of the pleasure sought: 'Indeed, when the pleasures are innocent, there is no reason to censure them, but when they are damaging,26 they are something vile' (l154b4~5). The notion of innocent pleasure may well be Platonic,27 but this does not make the opposition to Plato any less violent. For what is said here is that one can perfectly well lead the life of a DanaId (or of a plover) without thereby deserving blame-that one can be Callides in an innocent way. Thus, just as its character of being a remedy and a genesis does not suffice to justifY the devaluation of bodily pleasure, so the quest for intensity is not always worthy of condemnation: everything depends on the nature of the pleasure sought, and on that of the lack for which it compensates, according to whether it is or is not natural, and does or does not proceed from a healthy organism. There is nothing wrong with working up an appetite by doing gymnastics;28 there may be, in contrast, in sucking salt in order better to taste tequila. At the same time, however, what the text emphasizes is the necessity of pleasure. for the individuals in question here seek genesis and intensity both for themselves and by default, through their inability to find their pleasure elsewhere. Aristotle thus refers the artificial character of their behaviour (fabricating desires for oneself) to a kind of necessity. for some people, the fabrication of artificial needs is a means for fulillling the necessary and natural need for pleasure. It is this necessary character of pleasure that must now be shown. This implies that we broaden our discussion. We thus move from 'some people' Twis) to 'most' (1TOMOLS, b6), and then to the living being in general ({q:,oy, argumentation seems to be spinning its wheels, but in fact marks progress: we no longer say merely that the aficionados of bodily not know other kinds of pleasure, but that they do not know any to pain than pleasure. At the same time, it will be shown that the (TO P.YJOETEpOl.J, b6), which is neither pleasant nor painful, which one mi~ is such a remedy, is itself 'painful to most because of their nature'19 (1154 6)... text thus carries out a reduction of the neutral state to pain: at the end of this
246
d. The necessity ofpleasure and the question of tile neutral state (1.l54 b2-15) There is thus no reason to condemn bodily pleasure as such. The reason why it is pursued is the same one that justifies it: it is sought for what it is, that is, as a remedy or a compensation. Yet this thesis provides room for an objection that the text does not formulate, but to which it replies: is pleasure the only remedy for pain? Can the neutral state-neither pleasant nor painful-not also function as such? The problem of the neutral state will be approached by an apparent detour: by returning to the notion of intense pleasure and, more precisely, by considering the case of those individuals who pursue bodily pleasures 'because of their intensity', and because they are 'incapable of enjoying other pleasures: these people, for instance, place themselves in a state to enjoy certain thirsts' (1 154b2-4).25 Here, pleasure is no longer pursued as a remedy for pain, hut pain as the occasion for pleasure. The quest for pleasure now obeys not so much a physiological logic of compensation as a pathological quest for intensity. What is sought is not the state of equilibrium that results from compensation once it is obtained, but the I intensity of the feeling of pleasure that accompanies the process of compensation I as it is realized: a search for intensity, therefore, more than for equilibrium, and of the process more than its end. From this viewpoint, the text does indeed follow I· upon the preceding development on pleasure-genesis, which is a supplementary Iargument in favour of the coherence of the argumentation. : Here again, however, this argumentation can be better understood if we bear Ithe Philebus in mind: for it is just after having characterized pleasure as a genesis •(and, as such, not good), that Socrates described those individuals who 'take their \jOY in that genesis in which they wish to see a pleasure, and declare that they •could not bear to live without experiem~ing hunger, thirst, and without feeling a11 the cravings implied by such appetites' (54e). Such is also the language of Callicles, who prefers the life of pleasures, 'where one pours and re-pours as much las one can into one's cask' ~-the life, therefore, of the akolt.stos-to the state of
l
I
b Z5 This case is distinct from the onc evoked at 1151 23, of individuals capable of enjoying pleasure, but 'less than they should', and who, together with the weak and the intemperate, constitute the two extremes with regard to which the temperate person can be ccnsid"red a mesOl1.
I
2.
247
I translate {311&/xpm (found in Lb)~ Cf. Re;p. II, 357b7:ljllovai cif3l1u{3€is; Le:<. II, 667e5. Cf. also Pol. VIII. 5, J33~25; 7, 1342'16. Ul Cf.Aspasius, 156,6-7 . . 29 &d 'T~vqr6aUJ. We might wonder if the nature in question is nalurein general (Grant speab oh 1aw of nature'), or of a particular constitution (which, for Stewart, is that of melancholic.s). It seems simpler to connect these words to the immediately preceding 7ToMoIS, and to understand, therefore, that the nature in question is that of the greates1 number, i.e. of the ordinary man who is the subject of 27
250
Gwenaelle Aubry
and also the most polemical, for it works against Speusippus as much as against the Philebus: that according to which the remedy for this pain, the state which is both the most desirable and the most divine, and which the god himself enjoys, is not the neutral state but pleasure. Against the proponents of the neutral state, it is thus maintained that only pleasure is a remedy for pain. As such, it is necessary for human nature, just as ponos seems to be, not for the reason identified by Anaxagoras (the pain of sensing) but for one that may, although we scarcely know anything more at this point, have to do with the incarnate condition. This necessary character of pleasure will be illustrated by two case studies: that of the young and that of the melancholy.40 And just as the young, because of growth, are in a disposition similar to that of drunkenness-and youth is a pleasant thing-those who are melancholy by nature always (cift) have need of a remedy. Indeed, their body, by its constitution, is constantly bitten, and they are always (dEn subject to \;olent desire. But pleasure chases away pain, whether it is the contrary pleasure or any kind of pleasure, as long as it is powerful: and this is why they become self-indulgent and vile.41
Here, young people and melancholy are compared as two cases of organic lack of balance, one of which, however, is a source of pleasure, the other of suffering. In the first case, that of youth, the cause of this imbalance is growth (auxesis)-a phenomenon given as an example in the Philebus of those imperceptible changes that cause neither pain nor pleasure, and are at the origin of the neutral state (43a-c). In the Rhetoric, Aristotle speaks of them otherwise, as a state in which bodily heat is intense, as it is in drunkenness, except that here it is a natural phenomenon (lrrrO 77]<; >j/lv . Ross and Festugiere adopt another solution, more economical and more satisfuctory, which consists in transfonning the point after v€(lT~ into a comma; the melancholy thus become the compamndum, young people the comparatum, and the proposition concerning the pleasure of youth a simple parenthetical clause. This solution also has the advantage of respecting the balance between J1.€V Ill<. (b9hll. 41 For Aspasius, this remark does not apply specific-allyto melancholies (who are not the subject of commentary, any more than young people are), but to men in general (156, 16-21). 42 Rh. II. 12, 1389'3 f. They are also subject to akrasia, and are inconstant (eumetabolvi). Tbe thirtieth Problem also articulates together youth, dIUnkenness, and melancholy (954b 35-955 a 22).
NE VII. 14 (1154 U 22- b34): Pain of the Living
25}
a. c?~stitutio~ (krasis, b 13) in which black bile is predominant (p.EAawa XOA~). 1 hIS III turn IS a complex mixture, in which pneuma, the hot, and the cold are ~ound.43 It provokes modifications of the thumos, a changeable humour, in which JOY follows upon depression ([Pr.] XXX. 1, 953a33). Thus, the melancholic is an u~stable, .mobile, i~cons.tant (anomalos) being, simultaneously ecstatic and plastIC, as qUIck to project hImself outside himself as he is to model himself after others, which can also make him a highly gifted being.44 The melancholic ha.s already been the subject of discussion previously, in book VII, as someo?e partICularly inclined to akrasia, and, more specifically, to the form of a~rasta whose cause is rashness: carried away by his imagination, the melancholIc does not take the time to deliberate (7, 1150b25).45 For this reason his akrasia is easier to cure than that which follows deliberation (1l52 a 28). Here: however, melancholy is associated with the more serious form of deviance known as ak?lasia. ~o.be sure, .the melancholic, unlike the disturbed person, is subject to genu me suffenng. He IS therefore in search of a pleasure remedy, or a pleasure capable of 'chasing away the pain' (l154b 13-14). However, the result of the incessant and, in the proper sense, constitutive character of ~is pain is that the man dominated by black bile is not only in a logic o~ compensatIOn: he seeks not only the pleasure opposed to this pain, but any kind of pleasure, KaL7] 7vxoooa, as long as it is powerful enough (bI4). . From a physiologic~llogic of compensation-susceptible of a medical descriptIon: but not of. et1ll~al blame-the melancholic can thus easily fall into a s~lf-~.ndulg~nt .lo~c of mtensity and pleasure for pleasure's sake ('pourvu qu'on 31t 1IVTesse ), mdIfferent to the very principle of the distinction between good pleasures and bad pleasures.16 The s~udy ?f th~ melanch~lic doses the first part of the text, whose main goal ~as the IdenhficatI?n of bodily pleasure with pleasure as a remedy. At the same hme, we have conSIderably reduced the principle of the condemnation to which this kind of pleasure is subject in Plato: its primary field of study is not ethics but physiology, even if interest has also been focused on tracing the frontier and the points of passage from one to the other. The quest for pleasure corresponds above all to. an organic nee.d for compensation, although it may also deviate (for reasons whIch, moreover, m the case of the melancholies, are also organic) into a quest for pleasu~e for pleasu~e's sake, and intensity for the sake of intensity. As a reme?y, bodIly ~l~asure IS not bad, but good accidentally. Yet it is also neces~ary, m so far as It IS, to the exclusion of the neutral state, the only remedy for pam. ., On the krasis of black bile, see [Pr.] x..xx. 1, 953 b24; 954'13; b34. See also [Pr.] I, 861 b20, and the commentary of the Anonymous, 459, 1-6; black bile is a residue or deposit from that which is not ~o~ked by digestion, and thus remains vehement within the body. It is this excess or superfluity (ptTI.~soma) that makes the melancholy person an exceptional being (perittos); see Pigeaud (1988). 44 [Pr.] XXX, .954'28- b9. 45 On the intensity of the melancholic's representations, see Mem. II,453'19. 40 Whereas young people are moved above all by the desire for necessary pleasures and hence by the logic of compensation; d. 1148"22. '
254
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE VII. 14 (1154 C1 22- b34): Pain of the Living
would therefore have one and the same action, which would admit a twofold description, as genesis and as energeia 55 (in this case, one would have to give a causal value to the genitive absolute, and translate: 'they happen to be cures because the healthy part is in activity ... ')? Or do we indeed have two distinct, but concomitant actions, one of which, the curative process, has an end that is external to itself, while the other, the activity of the healthy part, has no end other than in itself? The opposition at work in the text favours the second option: unlike things that are pleasant by nature, remedies do not provoke the activity of the healthy part; they are effective at the same time as this part is in activity (and also, no doubt, beca~~ it is so: try administering a tonic to a corpse), but they trigger a process that IS lfreducible to this praxis precisely in so far as it has the cure as its end. Thus, water appeases thirst only on condition that it is assimilated by the vegetative dunamis,56 which indeed presupposes that the latter is in good working order, carries out its proper activity, and nothing but such activity, but also on the condition that the just equilibrium between the dry and the moist be re-established in the entire organism, which presupposes a genesis. The verb sllmbainein thus indicates not the accidental effect (external to a given finality) of one and the same action susceptible of a twofold description, according to whether it is considered as the cause of this effect or as self-finalized, but rather the coincidence of two distinct actions, one of which is a genesis and the other an energeia. . To say that remedies are pleasant only by accident (kata sumbebekos) is thus, in fact, to say that they only seem pleasant; or else, as was said at 1152b 31, that they are not pleasures. It is not a question of saying that the quality of being pleasant is at:ached .to ~hem not qua genesis but qua energeiai, but quite simply to deny them thIS qualIty.'7 If they are pleasant by accident, it is because the effect of pleasure is misleadingly attached to them as its cause, whereas it occurs at the same time as them, but not through them. Indeed, the pleasure felt is not due to their action, which is a mere genesis, but to that of the healthy part which, for its part, is an energeia. The illusion, therefore, or the appearance, concerns not so much the feeling of pleasure (which, as long as it is felt, cannot be placed in doubt 58 ), as the identification of its cause.
Things that are pleasant by accident must be opposed by those that are sllch by nature: their action is not only concomitant to that of the healthy part, but provokes it. In order to be pleasant by nature, the agent must therefore be the cause of an energeia and not of a genesis: things that are pleasant by nature have as their effect an activity that is its end in itself, and that, as such, is the source of an authentic pleasure. Since this distinction overlaps with that between pleasures meta lupon and aneu /upon, with and without pain, one might think of the effects on the senses of sensibles which are the occasion for their full actualization. 59 Yet the description would also be valid for the action of the intelligibles on the passive intellect. 60 If the distinction between pleasures with and without pain can still be operative in the midst of bodily pleasures, it also opens the way to the consideration of other pleasures in which, this time, the body no longer has a share. This analysis marks the conclusion of the preceding one: it makes clear that bodily pleasures, since they are reducible to pleasure remedies, are the simple appearances of pleasures. This does not mean, however, that they are bad: pleas,mt by accident, bodily pleasllres are also good only by accident (I154b l).
This is the thesis of Owen (1971-2), who therefore interprets kata sumbebekos in the sense that it is not qua genesis that the phenomenon would be the source of pleasure, but qua energeia. However, Aristotle, as is quite clear at 1152 b 31-2, not only says that it is not qua A but qua B that remedies are sources of pleasure, but also that they are not (in any way, in any aspect) pleasures, since pleasure, by defimtlOn, IS not genesIs but energeia. Owen's imerpretation has given rise to a debate over the question of the degree to which an energeia can be descnbed as a genesIs, and on the criteria of distinction set forth in book X. See particularlv ' Ackrill (1965) and Rorty (1974).
5. See the Anonymo~s (459,27- 38): if drinking and eating seem pleasant, it is because the dunamis
threptike is active.
S7 In so doing, as is noted by Rorty (l974), Aristotle conserves the heart of the anti~hedonist thesis: one does not desire a process for its own sake. 50 Whence, as Owen notes, the need to modify the definition of pleasure, and to avoid making its being felt a definitional feature (avT' Il€ TOU ala8."Tijv ci."
255
3. The conflict of pleasures (1154b 20-31)
Line 1154b 21 inaugurates a new moment: in the first place, there is no longer any question of the nature of pleasure, or of its value, but of its continuity (there are three occurrences of aEl in lines 21-6). Secondly, there is no longer any question of particular cases, on the border of the pathological, or of the living being in general, as in 1154b 7, but of man: more particularly, of man's specificity with regard to that other living being known as the god. Yet the last lines of chapter 14 will also contribute a final answer to the question of the urgency of bodily pleasure, as to that of the value of pleasure in general. This answer is unexpected: we will discover that the proper feature of man is not to seek bodily pleasure in order to enjoy it but, far rather, to be unable always to enjoy the same pleasure. Man is that living being who, because he is made up of two natures, is also capable of two pleasures, each of which is contrary to nature for the other, and which fight or cancel each other out. The neutral state is therefore not the divine state, as the Philebus claimed, but the effect of this contlict of pleasures in man. In contrast, b 59 Cf. De an. II. 5, 417 20, where a similar formulation is found: sensible things are said to be TU 7TO<1(TlKU T1j;;- il'EpyEtas. 6Q Thus, Aspasius judges that pleasures that are good by nature are those of the better nature (157, I). Following him. Gosling and Taylor (\984, 339-40) emphasize the normative character of this distinction. However, it seems to me that their analysis holds for the nearby text at 11533 5 f., but not for this one: in the first case, things are considered that are neither pleasant by nature nor even absolutely (hap/os, "6), as for instance the bitter and the spicy, to explain how they can appear to be pleasant to a sick person, in so far as they are accompanied by a curative process. Here, the question is no longer the same: the point is to show how that which accompanies such a process, and in so far as it accompanies it, cannot be genuinely pleasant.
256
Gwenaelle Aubry
NE Vll. 14 (1154 a 22~b34): Pain of the Living
the proper feature of the god, because he is simple, is to enjoy a genuine pleasure, or an energeia that is unimpeded and without rivals.
The question then arises ofwhat they areto be identified with. The commentators differ widely on this point, and their interpretations often seem dependent on book X. No doubt one can derive assistance, a contrario, from the continuation of the text, which opposes to the duality of human nature the simplicity of the divine nature. However, this opposition still leaves various possibilities open, since the second element-present in man, but absent from the god-can be assimilated either to the body62 or to matter,63 or again to dunamis. It therefore seems safer to refer to the general anthropology that is at work in the Nicomachean Ethics, as in the Eudemian Ethics. This anthropology relies, of course, on a fundamental duality, which nevertheless operates not between the soul and the body lmuch less between form and matter, or between energeia and dunamis), but between the rational and the irrational parts of the 80U/.64 In book I of the NE, this opposition is presented in terms that are very close to the ones found here: the irrational part is also designed by the term phusis, and as the site of a possible conflit:t with the rational part. 65 The explanation of the various types of relationships between these two phuseis is, moreover, immediately articulated with the figures of the enkrates and of the akrates (11 02 b 14). If we interpret the passage as referring to this basic duality, then light is shed on the problem raised above. We understand how two phuseis and two praxeis can be spoken of: for, as the preceding passage reminded us, bodily pleasur~s themselves, although they a~e geneseis, do in~eed imply the praxIs or the energela of a part of the soul (the phutlkon or else (1152 35) the epithumetikon). Thus, the opposition is displaced from that between bodily pleasures and non-bodily pleasures to that between the energeia of the irrational soul and the energeia of the rational souL 66 It is therefore not the same one we find in the text, apparently parallel and often cited in this context, in book X (1175 a 4), which explains the discontinuity of pleasure by fatigue (the cause of which is ultimately dunamis, although the text of the NE does not say so ).67 However, this is also because the initial problem is different: the question with which our text is concerned is not only that of the discontinuity of pleasure, but also that of the alternation of pleasures; the point is not to know why we do not enjoy a given
a. The two natures (1154 b20-4) It has been shown that bodily pleasure is both necessary as a remedy and illusory as a pleasure. It has thus been opposed to these pleasures, which mayor may not
be bodily, and which, in so far as they are not the process of curing suffering, but the occasion of an activity, are pleasant by nature. The initial distinction, between bodily and non-bodily pleasures, has thus been displaced: the opposition is henceforth between pleasures by accident and pleasures by nature. The initial question may therefore also be reformulated: if bodily pleasures are merely appearances of pleasure, why should one seek them in preference to authentic pleasures? The answer to this question is as follows: Yet there is nothing identical that is continuously pleasant to us, since our nature is not simple, but there is something else in it, by which we are perishable things,61 so that if one of the two does something, it is contrary to nature for the other nature ... (1l54b 20-3)
Man is thus characterized as a living being destined not only for the alternation of pleasure and pain, but for the alternation of pleasures, in so far as his nature is not simple, but composed of a second element, immediately designated as being a 'second nature' (b24). This answer raises new problems. The preceding passage already mentioned a duality of natures; but the distinction then took place between the healthy nature, capable as such of a praxis or of an energeia, and the sick nature, the subject of curative genesis. Here, the 'other nature' is designated as the cause, for human nature, of its corruptibility. The paradoxical character of this formulation must be conserved: the proper feature of human nature is to be composed of two natures. Yet the descriptive approach that is adopted here consists in observing a conflict between these two natures, at the same time as a kind of equality: a relationship of forces. Each one is capable of a praxis (whence it must be deduced, by virtue of the identity of praxis, energeia, and hedone, that each one has its own pleasure attached to it), and this praxis is, for the other, contrary to nature. Man is therefore that living being whose nature is to be constituted of two natures, each of which is contrary to nature for the other. This point is eminently problematic: until now, in fact, the notion of phusis, like that of praxis, has had a normative value. Pleasures by nature have been opposed to pleasures by accident, and pleasures leading to the re-establishment of the hexis phusike (remedies) to pleasures with the value of the energeia of the hexis kata b phusin (1152 34/1153 a 14). We now discover that there are conflictual natures and activities. 61 Bywater, like Aspasius, the Anonymous, and the Periphrast, read
257
62 See the Anonymous (460,4) and Gauthier (p. 814), with the criticism ofDirlmeier(p. 507), who, following Aspasius (157, 7), understands that the reference is to the primary eiementl. In the __ sense, see also Joachim (p. 240). 63 Stewart (ii. 259); van Riel (2000, p. 65). 64 We have here a fundamental duality, but the irrational part may in tum be divlded into the phutikon, on the one hand, and the epithumetikon kai orektikon, on the other hand (1102b29-30). Since this latter part, unlike the former, has a share in reason, we may also consider that the divialon takes place in the midst ofthe rational part, between the rational principle itself and that which is liable to submit to it (1l03 a 2).ln the same sense, see EE II. 1, 1219b 28 f. 65 iiMTJ Tt~ rpOOt~, 1102b 13; iiMo Tt 7fapa TOV AO'I'OV 7fE
258
Gwenaelle Aubry
pleasure continuously (be it of the mind or the senses: cf. the example of sight in X. 4, 117Sa9), but why we do not continuously enjoy the same pleasure. The problem is therefore that (which will, moreover, also be addressed in book X, 117Sb f.) of the conflict between pleasures and activities. We may be surprised, however, that Aristotle remains at the level of the observation and description of this conflict, and that he does not propose a principle of hierarchy and of choice among the conflictingpraxeis. This point is all the more surprising in that such a hierarchization of energeiai is at the basis of the ethical project of the NE,68 and that its necessity is indicated right at the outset by the definition of happiness not only as the energeia of the soul, but as energeia kat' areten teleian, or according to perfect virtue (1. 13, II 02a S-6). Book I thus proposed to hierarchize the dunameis, or constitutive faculties of man, so as to determine the faculty, properly human, whose energeia should constitute the good and the end for man, as well as virtue, which, as hexis, must make this energeia possible/i9 What manifests itself here, it seems to me, is one of the limits of book VII, and of the definition of pleasure proposed in it. The object of book VII was above all to establish, against the partisans of pleasure as genesis, the identity between pleasure and energeia, but not to determine in which energeia the most desirable pleasure consists. The question is indeed raised in the course of the extremely dense definitional statement of 1153b lO, and in relation to the definition of happiness (is it the energeia of all dispositions, or rather of just one of them, ETe' TJ 1Tauwv EV€PYEul EUTLV EWaLILOv{a EITE TJ TLVOS am-wv?), but it remains in suspense. In contrast, book X will propose an explicit hierarchization of pleasures, in relation to that of the energeiai to which they are appropriate, and linked, as in book I, to the notion of ergon (1l7S b 24-31). However, the text will manifest the weakness of the definition of pleasure as an energeia in still another way. Here, in fact, we also hear of a state not of conflict, but of equality, between man's two constitutive natures, and their activities: 'and when they are in an equal state, what is done seems neither pleasant nor painful' ( 1154b23-4). Here again, we hear of the neutral state, neither painful nor pleasant. This time the vocabulary is the same as in the exposition of the thesis of Speusippus (iuo{O (1l54b24)ltucp (1l53b6)),7° yet the neutral state is referred not as it is in the latter to a hexis, but to an equilibrium of energeiai. If ourhypothesis is correct, we must understand that the activity of the soul's rational part is painful for the irrational part, and reciprocally: thus, the pleasure taken in music prevents one from enjoying a philosophical discussion. If the pleasure proper to each energeia increases it, then, conversely, an alien pleasure acts as an impediment. This is why book X, which analyses this case, can claim that its effect is comparable 68 ,It is also present in the BE (II. I, 1219"31-4, 38-9), as well as in the Protreptic, where it is associated With a hierarchy of pleasures: see fro 6 and 7 Ross, as well as fro 14 (= lamblichus, Protr. 58, 15 P.): 'aMa p,'lj1l1l YE TtA€W. illlpyHa I; ill iaVTjj 'XU TO xalp<w, uKn-' all .r1) lj fJHI)P1)TIJ('Ij and justify ivipY'ta 7TQcrwlIljstf1'Tr( and fro 15 (= Iambl., Protr. 60,4 P.). 69 On the question of the choice of definitional dunamis, see Aubry (2002). 10 See also Leg. V, 733b.
NE VII. 14 (1154a22- b34): Pain of the Living
259
to that of pain (1l7Sb 16 f.). The neutral state must therefore be attnbuted to a reciprocal neutralization of energeiai. The pleasures attached t? ~ac~ one c~cel one another instead of accumulating. By definition, such a state IS neIther pamful, nor pleasant'; one may wonder, however, since the result is a double im~e~iment, if it does not tend more towards pain than towards pleasure.71 ThlS IS what book X suggests, but in our text, similarly, it was said above that the neutral state is painful to most because of their nature (1l54b 6). Much more than a. st~te of equilibrium, therefore, which would be desirable as such, we must see m It t?e effect of an imbalance which, however, is not, as in the young or the melancholIc, a physiological anomaly, but is truly constitutive of human nature, in so far as it is essentially dual.
b. Divine pleasure (1154 b24-8) Another living being suddenly appears on the scene, which had previ~usly been evoked only at the beginning of book VII: god. 'For if we suppose a bemg whose nature is simple,n the same action will always (aE£) be maximally pleasant. That is why the god always enjoys a pleasure that is unique and simple.' . Here the divine nature is summoned in contrast to human nature: while the latter is'dual, the former is simple. From its simplicity are deduced the identity of its praxis, as well as the continuity, the unity, an.d the sim~l~c!ty of its pleasure. Far from being doomed, as man is, to the alternation of actlVlties and pleas~es, the simple being always enjoys the same activity and the pleasure attached to It. . We hear nothing more of this activity, or this divine p!"axis..Wha: co~ts I~ :he attribution of pleasure to god, and, in the process, its artIculatIOn ~Ith sImphCIty. As it had been from the category of genesis, pleasure here finds Itself removed from the category of the mixed, to which the Philebus had consigned it. Once again, the text seems governed much more by the ontological pro~lem of the nature of pleasure than by the ethical one of the hierarchy and C~Olce betw~en the various kinds of pleasures and energeiai. In this, moreover,.Aristotle rem~I~s largely tributary to the Platonic tradition. On this precise. pomt, however, It .IS the better to oppose it: for in the Philebus it is the neutral life, exem~t from pam and pleasure, which was presented as the divine life,7' rather than a hfe co~fuse~ with an immutable and continuous pleasure. At the moment of concludmg hIS first reflection on pleasure, then, Aristotle sides with Eudoxus and against Plato. He had already rendered homage to Eudoxus as early as book I, for having affirmed that pleasure is superior to praiseworthy things, as are god and the good (1l0lb27-30). But henceforth he goes further, for he intimately associates god, pleasure, and the good. . . . . The question arises, however, of the preCIse artIculation between these dIfferent terms: book VII contents itself with noting that a certain pleasure-and therefore 11 Just as virtue although it is a mean, may incline more towards the side of excess or oflack (see 12 Cf. Resp. 380dS, 382e8 (Dirlmeier). e.g.) at NE IV. 5, II' 2Sb28 ) the case of sweetness). 13 Phlb. 33b. See also Epist. III, 31Sc; Epin. 98Sa7.
270
Bibliography
PEARS, D. (1978), 'Aristotle's Analysis of Courage', in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, iii (Morris, Minn.), 274-85. PHILIPPSON, R. (1925), 'Akademische Verhandlungen tiber die Lustlehre', Hermes, 60: 444-8L PRICE, A. (2006), 'Acrasia and Self-Contra!', in R. Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford), 234-54. PRIMAVESI, O. (1996), Die Aristotelische Topik (Munich). RAssow, H. (1862), Beitrage zur Erklarung und Textkritik der Nikomachischen Ethik (Weimar) . (1874), Forschungerr iiber die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles (Weimar). RICHARDS, H. (1915), Aristotelica (London). RIEL, G. V AN (2000), Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists (Leiden). ROBINSON, R. (1977), 'Aristotle on Akrasia', in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.), Articles on Aristotle, ii: Ethics and Politics (London), 79-92. ROMEYER DHERBEY, G. (1999), 'Vne conception tragique du sentir: Anaxagore, fragments A 92, 94 DK', in idem, La parole archa/que (Paris), 14-39. RORTY, A. O. (1974), 'The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics', Mind, 83: 481--97. (1980), 'Akrasia and Pleasure: Nicomachean Ethics Book 7', in idem (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley), 267-84. ROWE, C. J. (1971), The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development ofAristotle's Thought (Cambridge). SAARINEN, R. (1994), Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought (Leiden). SEDl.EY, D. (1999), 'Aspasius on akrasia', in Alberti and Sharples (l999), 162-75. SHERMAN, N. (1997), Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge). SMITH, R. (1989), Aristotle's Prior Analytics (Indianapolis). ___ (1999), 'Dialectic and Method in Aristotle', in M. Sim (ed.), From Puzzles to Principles? (Lanham, Md.), 39-55. SORABJI, R. (I 993), Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, NY). STEWART, J. A. (1892), Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols. (Oxford; repr. Bristol, 1999). STRIKER, G. (1996), 'Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the Rhetoric and his Moral Psychology', in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays 011 Aristotle's Rhetoric (Berkeley), 286- 302. VIANO, C. (2002), 'Passions, desirs et passions de rivalite chez Aristote', in G. Romeyer Dherbey and G. Aubry (eds.), L'excellence de la vie. Sur l'Ethique Nicomaque et I'Ethique a Eudeme d'Aristote (Paris), 237 - 52. (2005), 'Pourquoi un acces de colere est-il moins honteux qu'un acte de hubris (Aristote, Eth. Nic. VII, 7)', in E. Vegleris (ed.), Cosmos et psyche, Melanges ... Frere (Hildesheim), 251-62. WOODS, M. J. (2001), Four Prague Lectures (Prague). YOUNG, C. M. (I988), 'Aristotle on Temperance', Philosophical Review, 97: 521 ~42.
a
INI>F.X 1.0CORUMI
Aetills IV. 9,16: 248 n. 35 Alexander of Aphrodisia, in Aristotelis AnaJytica priora 10, 10-19: 67 12, 25 If.: 67 in Aristotelis Topica 116,2: 105 n. 5
Problemata Ethica 6-7: 252 n. '18 Anonymous in Ethica Nicomachea VII 408,20: 105 n. 5 428,17: 110 n. 23 428,20-28: 110, n. 25 430,17-18: 116,n.46 432, 12-13: 120 n. 59 433, 17: 123 n. 67 448, 5~9: 124,74 457,20-22: 243 n. 16 458,28- 31: 249 n. 37 459, 1-6: 251 n. 43 459,27-28: 254 n. 56 460,4: 257 n. 62 Aquinas, Thomas
Sententia libri Ethicorum 1146-48 (SpiazziJ: 175 n. 8 1458-1461 (Spiazzi): 177 n.13 Aristophanes Clouds 1247: 119 n. 56 Aristoteles
de Tnterpretatione 20b4: 67 20b22 If.: 67
Analytica Priom 24a16: 67 24a30: 67 24bl If.: 69 24bl6 ff.: 67 25al-3: 67 25a6-25: 67 25a26-b25: 67 27b35: 68
17b812: 68 321\6: 68 J2R6 --'l: 68 32a9-1I: 68 c
321111: 32aI7: 32b25: )2b35:
:n.. 15:
OR 61\ M OIl fl8
34a4: 61\ 36b25··.H: 68 36b26-7: 611 41b28: 56 41b36 ff.: 63 n. 39 42a24-5: 53 42a31: 68 42a32: 68 42a35 ff.: 68 42a36: 68 42bl ff.: 68 42b2-3: 68 42b4: 68 42b7: 68 ·12b12: 68 42b17: 68 42b26: 68 59a35: 56 n. 26 59bl-60aI4: 56 n. 26 60aI5-34: 56 n. 26 61a5: 56 n. 26 67b3: 47 n. 12, : 48 n. 12 67b5: 66 67b7: 48 67b9: 58
Analytica Posteriom 71b13-16: 46n.8 72alO: 67 73a21: 46 n. 8 74b5-6: 46 n. 8 77bl8 ff.: 50 n. 16 94a6 ff.: 47 n. 11
Topim 100b21: 24 n. 34
, The editor is grateful to Francesca Guadalupe Masi and Stefano Maso for their invaluable assistance in compiling the indexes.
294
General Index
intellectualism 162,184 intemperance 121, 17,1-6.201 incontinence and 176 intensity 143,152-5,190.242-4.246-7, 251 ischurognomon (stubborn) 158,167-8 judgement 14,35,43-4,51,65,79, 115, 131,111. 14}, 157, 161, 169-72,240, 245-7 conflicting 141 public 127
karteria (endurance) 3-5,130-2,137, 144-6,148-9,151,155,175,183 and self-control 3-4,131,144, 147-8, 152-3,183 kinesis (motion) 197,261,192,197,248, 253,260-1 knowledge, see episteme lack of control, see akrasia logos (reason) 15, 16,21,57,60,61,64,65,
87,91,113-8,121, 123, 125, 140, 146, 161,164-5,168-72,174-8,180-\, 183-4, 188, 190-1, 194, 196, 199, 201, 204-5,210.,212,214-5,217-8,220, 222, 224,229- 30, 232, 234, 237 - 8, 240,243, U5-7, 250-2, 257, 260 \prescription) 150 and control 31- 2 sensual desire and 60, 64, theoreticalJpractkal 52-7 luck 220-3,225 and virtue 171
malakill (softness) 4, 13,21,38,76,92,99, 130, 132,137 -8,141, 145-6, 149-51, 154-5,173,182-5 mean, doctrine of 159,173-5,205,211, 217 -8, 223-4, 228, 233-4, 244, 249, 255,259 melancholia 180-1,250-1 lnoderation 50, Ill, 131-8, 141-2, 145-6, 14,8-9,155 moral vocabularY 126-8 motion, see kine,;is neutral state 177,258--9,211-2,238, 246-8,250 I, 255, 258-9, 263 pleasure and 246-51 opinion (reputable), see mdoxa opinionated cbara,,"ter J68 -170
pain 3-4,24,38,59,72-4,76,77,79, 81-3,91-6,99,120,127,132,134, 137-155,159,164,169,171.174-5, 183-190,192,194-5,197,199-206, 209-214,230,232-4,237-8,241-4, 246-252,255-6,259,263 animals and 83 badness of 210-11 and de3ire 146 as evIl 204 pleasures without 252 - 5 parts 186,195,257
pathema 36 parousia (immediate presence) 63 pathos (passion) 63 n, 41,155,158,204 and knowledge 30,62-3 persuasion 6,33,140, 159-61, 163, 168, 171-2,239,240,262-3 phainomena (appareances) 9-10.13, 19-28,32-6,38,155,176 reputable opinions and 23-6 phronesis (practical wisdom) 21 - 2, 29, 32, 35,173,177-8,182,228,248 and (in)oontinence 177 cleverness and 177 pain 38,63,72-4,76,79,81-3,86,91-2, 94-6,99,120,127,131-42,144-55, 164,169,171,174-5,182 pleasure 1-7,10,17-8,36,38,43-4,63, 72-9,81-4,86-90,106-8, 115, 119-20, 183-207,209-222,224-235, 237-263 of acquiring/possessing property 72 eating, dcinking 78,82-3,93,95, 100, 136,199,202,227,254 of sex 78,82-3,93,95-8, 100, 110, 134, 136,148-9,153,174,187,190,198, 200-2,206,227,232 akra5ia and 34-5,72-4,76-7,81-2 animaJsand 83,107,191,198--9,225-9 and art 198 andpain 3-4,26,74,83,94,96,131-3, 141-55,159,169,174,182,248-251 bad 141,152,205-6 children and 191,198-9 conflict of 255-63 definition of 185,193,200 and desires 201 and disease 197 di,ine 259-62 economic analysis of 241-4 and energei.a 194,196,201, 239, 252-5, 258 evaluation of 98,244-6 kinds of 5,7,77.83,91-8,100-1,121, 159, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 199,
or
General Index 201,202,215,216,218,219,227, 229,235 andgenesis 246,253-5,258 gods and 238-9, 250, 255-6, 259-62 goodness of 209-14,230-3 necessity of 231-2.246-51 and neutral state 246-51 remedial 190,194,199-201,252-4 restoration as 7, 194-6 source., of 75-6,78,81-90, 91-S, 101 supervening 97 as supreme good 214- 20 as unimpeded natural activities 203-7 unnatural 6,107-13,121-2,125-6, 129 without pain 252-5 see also bodily pleasures, hedonism panos (effort, fatigue) 156, 164,249-250, 257 practical knowledge 64-6 failure of 65-6 practical syllogism 55, 117, 125, 175, 180-1 practical wisdom, see phronesis prevention: desire and 54-5 procedure, ISS, 188,205 profit 73. 76,79,81,84,85,86,90-1, 100 love of 169 profligacy 87 prohairesis (rational decision,) 158, 160, 163-4,168,177 proper knowledge: and passion 63 property 72,79,81,84,86-90,91,94. 167, 191 propeteia (impetuosity, rashness) 14,131, 155-6,178,180-1,251 protasis (proposition, premiss) 5,41,47, 53,55-8,61,67,69-71, 115-8, 125, 156,165,192,198,209-10,213, 216-7,225, 233, 240 and knowledge 46- 7 meaning and reference 67-9 practical 117 puzzles, see aporiai rashness, see propeteia rational decisions, see I'rohaire.sis reason, see logos and desire 125, 176 reasoning 16.21,23,29,32,38,47.52,54, 56-7,58, 62, 67, 69, 71, 73, 160-4, 188, 191. 234, 244 rebuttal, 193,209,210,112,230 regret 131,139,140,141,150,152,162, 164-6,170-1 remedial 190-1, 194, 199-201
295
reputable opinions, see endoXil resistance 11,13,21,38,76,92,99,147-8, 173,182 enkrateia and 38 restoration: pleasure as r. 194-6,192-5, 200,241,243-4,248 revenge 77,79,91,115-7,129,188 self consciousness Ill, 125 self-control, see enkrateia self-indulgence, see akalasia sense 78,94-7, 100, 132, 135-6, 187, 192-4,199,201,203-5,207,211,214, 219-224,229,230-2,234,240,243, 245,249,251,2534,257, 262 of dignity 114 of humour 169 perceptions 203-4 sex 187-202,206,232 shabbiness 87-8 shame 113,127,164 sight 94, 133-6, 162, 181,252,258 smell 6, 94, 135~6, 252 softness, see malakia akrasia and 11,21,38 as cowardice 145-6 sophrosune (temperance) 21- 2, 25, 30, 31, 36,77,78,82-3,90,92-3,96-8, 174-8,182,186-7,192,199203,247, 252 continence and 176-7 and self-control 21-2,25, "10,31 soul 4-7,52,53-4,56,59-60,117,122, 159,163,175,178,186,190,195-6, 200, 202 - 3, 222, 225, 253, 257-8 human 125 parts of 114, 182,257 impulses of 115 stubbornness, stubborn (ischurognoman) 158, 167-8 taste 6,83,98.100,118,131-6,146,203, 240,242,247.262 impurity of 98 pleasures of 6.108,113,147,202-4 temperance, see sophrosune therapy 176,178,180-1 theriotes (beastliness) 11, 12, 16-8, 103-13,122-9 thinking 54,192,195,197-8,2045,210, 212,234 thirst, thirsty 82,92,146-7,149,153,201, 246,254 thumos 6, 114-21, 125-6, 129,251
