Berkeley's Works

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BERKELEY'S MAJOR PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS Notes including • • •

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Life and Background of the Author Introduction to Berkeley's Works Critical Commentaries Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous Alciphron: Moral and Religious Philosophy Siris: Berkeley's Latest Metaphysical Theory Critical Essay Essay Topics and Review Questions Selected Bibliography

by Charles H. Patterson, Ph.D. Department of Philosophy University of Nebraska

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA 68501

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Cliffs Notes on Berkeley's Major Philosophical Works © 1972

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LIFE AND BACKGROUND OF THE AUTHOR Biographies are peculiar in that it is not until after a person has become famous that any great interest is developed in preserving the story of his life. By that time it may not be an easy task to produce an accurate account of even the more important events that took place since no record of them was made at the time when they occurred. Consequently, any biographical material that is obtained must be derived from whatever sources are available. Usually these are of a fragmentary nature and must be assembled in the light of all the relevant facts which are known. The life of George Berkeley is of particular interest at the present time not only for the light which it sheds on an understanding of his philosophical ideas but because of the impact made by him on the cultural life of America. His efforts toward the establishment in America of a college for the training of Indian and Colonial youth, though unsuccessful, is still reflected in a number of different ways. One of these is the frequent use of the quotation "Westward the course of empire takes its way," which first appeared in the poem written by Berkeley under the title "On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America." Again it is of interest to note that it was in tribute to this man that the name was given to the city where the University of California was located across the bay from San Francisco. George Berkeley was born in Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685. His parents were relatively undistinguished persons. They were not wealthy but are said to have been of gentle blood. The father, William Berkeley, was an Irishman by birth, although he was English by descent. The mother came from an Irish family that had been related in some distant way to General Wolfe, the hero of Quebec. George was the oldest of six sons and the only one who became internationally famous. The other brothers were men of good repute and were considered to be successful in the various lines of work in which they were engaged. Concerning George's boyhood and early years, not much has been recorded. We know that he attended school at Kilkenny and that the school has been noted for the many famous persons who at some time during their lives were among its pupils. In the year 1700, when George Berkeley was only fifteen years of age, he entered Trinity College in Dublin. Four years later, he received the Bachelor's degree, and, in 1707, he was awarded the Master's degree. At this time, he was also admitted to a fellowship, which was at that time the highest academic honor bestowed in the kingdom. The years he spent at Trinity College were eventful, especially from an academic point of view. It was a time when new, and in some respects revolutionary, ideas were being discussed in all of the more important centers of learning. Thomas Hobbes had developed a system of philosophy that was essentially materialistic. Francis Bacon had advocated a new method for investigating the phenomena of nature. René Descartes had proclaimed a new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God, and, along with it, a dualistic conception of the nature of the universe. John Locke had published his famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Newtonian physics had come into prominence, and in the field of religion John Toland, regarded as one of the ablest of the socalled freethinkers, had written a book in which he had maintained that matter is eternal and motion is its chief property. It was a time of intellectual ferment and unrest. As a student, Berkeley is said to have been regarded by hasty judges as an idle dreamer, but by the more thoughtful ones he was admired for his intelligence and beauty of character. His familiarity with the new ideas that were being circulated did not cause him to abandon the older ones just because they were old, nor to accept the new ones merely in order to be up to date in his thinking. He was inclined to weigh the evidence in each case as carefully as he could, and once he had formulated his own opinions he was ready to defend them against any arguments which might be presented by those who differed with him. The materialistic doctrines put forth by such men as Thomas Hobbes and John Toland constituted a direct challenge to what Berkeley had long regarded as the essential elements in the Christian religion. This

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www.cliffs.com called for an analysis of the arguments on which materialism was based. The more he pondered over these matters, the more convinced he became that materialism was an erroneous doctrine built on a false foundation. Having discovered in his own mind the fallacies on which the doctrine was based, he was resolved to expose these errors and in this way to help counteract the influence of those ideas which tended to weaken the moral fiber of human society. During his student days, Berkeley had kept a notebook in which he jotted down from time to time a miscellaneous collection of ideas as they occurred to him in connection with the events of the day. Sometime after his death, the contents of this notebook were published under the title Commonplace Book. It is especially valuable for students of Berkeley because it indicates what was going on in his mind during those days when he was a student in Trinity College. In this notebook, we are told that Berkeley believed he could make short work of materialistic atheism. It was in this connection that he wrote, "I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious and amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before." As a prelude to his attack on materialism, Berkeley presented in 1709 his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision. It was dedicated to Sir John Percival, a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council in the kingdom of Ireland. In explaining the purpose of the Essay, Berkeley states that it was meant to prepare the way for disclosure of the "Secret with which he was burdened." The secret, of course, was his conviction that all nature is the expression of an active Intelligence which communicates with human minds through the language of the senses. Among the senses, it is vision which more than any of the others furnishes the basis for our understanding of the world about us. In ordinary seeing, we are always interpreting visual signs, which gives to them the meanings which have been derived from experience. Distance, magnitude, and location of objects are not sensed directly by means of visual perceptions, but they are inferences based upon them. The sensation of touch must be recognized as separate and distinct from that of vision. We do not see things at a distance but read the absent data of touch and the other senses in the language of their visual signs. This enables us to know what is distant in space and gives us some basis for anticipating the future. All of this means that our so-called knowledge of the world about us can be rightly understood only as a kind of communication between our individual minds and the all-pervading active Intelligence upon which all objects are dependent. In other words, the world is real only when it is being realized by active and perceiving minds. A second edition of the Essay appeared in 1710. It contained some. alterations and additions to the original text, including an appendix, in which Berkeley replied to a sermon preached by the Archbishop of Dublin. In the sermon, it had been argued that it is no more possible to affirm the goodness and understanding of God than it is to maintain that he has hands and feet. The reply was an attempt to show that this position is based on an improper analogy. Referring to the Essay concerning vision, Berkeley stated in another letter to Sir John Percival that he hoped within the near future to make it appear that the argument of the Essay was strictly subservient to the ends of morality and religion. For this purpose, he had prepared another treatise, which was now ready. for the press and which was designed to demonstrate the existence and nature of God, furnish proofs for the immortality of the soul, and show how it is possible to reconcile the idea of God's foreknowledge of specific events with that of the freedom of the individual to make his own choices. Consideration of these topics would, he believed, have a tendency to induce men to give more time and attention to the study of religion. It was during the same year (1710) that the treatise referred to in the letter was published under the title A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. The subtitle contained the following words: "wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and Irreligion are inquired into." Although the published material was designated as Part I, no additional parts were ever added to it. The book is now generally regarded as the most important of Berkeley's philosophical works. It contains a full exposition of his spiritual conception of matter and the cosmos. His

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www.cliffs.com beliefs in this regard are unfolded, defended, and applied. Matter is said to be an abstraction which does not correspond to any concrete reality. This does not mean that there are no objects which are independent of human minds. Objects of this kind do exist, but their existence is always dependent on some mind. Furthermore, it is argued that the order and regularity with which these objects appear is not something that can be controlled by individual minds, and for this reason it is logically necessary to postulate an allpervasive Mind for their explanation. This is what he means by the mind of God. The Treatise was dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke, a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council for the kingdom of Ireland. Berkeley had hoped that the ideas which he had presented would receive favorable comment from members of the Council but in this he was disappointed. Lord Percival reported that he had tried to persuade several prominent persons to read the Treatise but without success. It was ridiculed by some and others went so far as to insist that the author must be out of his right mind. Speaking for himself, Lord Percival admitted that the author was an ingenious person who ought to be encouraged, but even so he could not bring himself to believe in the idea of the nonexistence of matter. Berkeley was undismayed by these reports. The fact that his book had not received a more favorable reception was due, in his judgment, to the manner in which the material had been stated. If the same ideas could be presented in a more popular form, it was quite possible not only that more people would read it but that they would be convinced by the arguments contained in it. With this purpose in mind, during the next two years he wrote a work called Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. The use of the dialogue form of writing for the expression of philosophical ideas was not new with Berkeley. It had been used by Plato, Aquinas, and many other noted thinkers. Putting one's ideas in the form of a dialogue has a number of advantages. For one thing, it reveals the way in which one's thinking is developed through conversation with individuals having different points of view. Weaknesses which are present in one person's argument but of which he is not himself aware are bound to be brought to light as other individuals express their reactions to what has been said. This enables one to make whatever changes or modification necessary in order to overcome objections that have been raised. Furthermore, the dialogue form of argumentation is comparatively easy to follow, and it is likely to stimulate interest in the pursuit of an inquiry about questions or issues that have previously been taken for granted. In writing these Dialogues, Berkeley was able to elucidate the same issues that had been discussed in the Treatise. Opposing points of view were set forth in a series of conversations between Hylas and Philonous. Hylas speaks for the view that asserts the existence of matter as a substance which is independent of any mind. Philonous represents the opposite position. He insists that matter is an abstract idea and that it is absurd to believe in the reality of that which is unrealized in the experience of beings who have a capacity for knowledge. As one follows the course of the dialogue, he is led to believe that Philonous has the better of the arguments and that he has made an effective reply to all of the objections raised by Hylas. Shortly after he had finished the writing of these Dialogues, Berkeley moved to the city of London. He wanted to get his work published and hoped to have the opportunity of becoming acquainted with a number of persons whose reputation had become well established in the field of letters. These included such men as Richard Steele, Joseph Addison, Jonathan Swift, and several others. He was asked to accompany Lord Peterborough on a trip to Sicily in order that he might serve as chaplain to the man who had been appointed Ambassador Extraordinary on the coronation of the new king. While traveling on the continent, Berkeley spent some time in France visiting with Father Malebranche, a distinguished French philosopher whose views concerning God and the cosmos had much in common with Berkeley's own ideas. He spent some time in Italy, which contributed much toward the development of his interest in art.

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www.cliffs.com On his return to London in the summer of 1721, Berkeley was deeply moved by the social conditions and sad state of affairs which he found in the city and in the surrounding country. The failure of the South Sea Company, which had promoted a gigantic commercial enterprise having to do with British trade in America, had brought financial ruin to many persons, and the distress and misery which resulted from it all were appalling. Berkeley believed that the unfortunate situation in which the country was involved was due in a large measure to the political corruption, irreligion, and atheism which were widespread in the land. In an effort to counteract these evil influences, he wrote An Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain. In it he addressed the nation in a spirit comparable to the Old Testament prophets, for he was convinced that the welfare of the people in any country is determined primarily by the moral quality of their living and that this is expressed through the policies which are pursued by their political and economic institutions. The Essay was an indication of the social idealism which became a dominant factor throughout the remainder of his life. In the late fall of the same year (1721), Berkeley returned to the city of Dublin, where he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Divinity. He wanted to enter more actively into the services of the church and it was with this purpose in mind that he sought and obtained appointment to the deanery of one of the best districts in his native land. He was not, however, content to do nothing more than the performance of the duties connected with this office. He was anxious to do something that would contribute in a larger way toward the welfare of his fellow men. America was a newly discovered land which offered hope and adventure for the poor and oppressed peoples of the old world. It was conceivable that in this land a new society could come into existence where peace, prosperity, and happiness would be a possibility for all who really desired it. What was needed most of all in order to bring about the realization of this dream was the establishment of a school where leaders could be trained for the proper development of the resources of the country. To meet this need, Berkeley conceived the idea of planting on the island of Bermuda a college for the education of Indian and Colonial youth. The pupils could come from the mainland, and after receiving the instruction which the college could afford, they would return home, prepared to give guidance and leadership for the building of the great society. It was a magnificent project, which he explained to a number of his influential friends, soliciting their moral and financial support. A considerable amount of money was raised in this way, and this fund was supplemented by the addition of a modest sum which Berkeley had inherited from an unexpected source. Still, the cost of the entire project was bound to be considerably higher than the amount that had been raised. He had been advised by his friend Sir John Percival that it would be unwise to launch the project without additional support from the English government. Accordingly, he obtained a charter from King George I, and after canvassing the members of the House of Parliament, he was promised a grant of twenty thousand English pounds to be used in connection with financing the institution which he hoped to establish in the new world. Payment of the grant was delayed by a series of unexpected events, and Berkeley, fearing that people would begin to lose interest in the project, decided to go ahead without it. He hoped that the money would arrive in due time; in the meantime, he could develop still further his plans for the college. In September of 1728, he set sail for Rhode Island. Shortly before this time, he had married Anne Foster, the daughter of Judge Foster, who had been Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. Accompanied by his wife, a number of friends who had become interested in the project, and a good stock of provisions, Berkeley arrived at Newport off the coast of Narragansett Bay on a winter day in the early part of 1729. He was graciously received by the people of the town and during the three months that he lived in Newport gained the confidence and respect of its people. At the end of this period, he moved to a quiet place a few miles from the sea and built a comfortable home which became known as Whitehall. While waiting for the promised grant of money to arrive from England, he devoted much of his time to a further consideration of his philosophical views, giving particular attention to the more affirmative side of his doctrine or, in other words, arguments in support of his belief in the existence and nature of God. During this period, he became acquainted with several of the

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www.cliffs.com men who were most influential in the academic life of the new country. They included such men as Samuel Johnson (the American) and Jonathan Edwards. Both of these men held philosophical views that had much in common with Berkeley's. Frequent meetings and discussions along lines of mutual interest were especially helpful. After living at Whitehall for about three years, Berkeley learned through his friend Robert Walpole in England that the money for which he had been waiting would in all probability not be forthcoming. It was a great disappointment, for it meant the abandonment of his plans for building a college in Bermuda. He disposed of the property he had acquired in Rhode Island, and early in 1732, he returned to London. Soon afterward, he had published a lengthy volume which was called Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher. It was to some extent the result of his meditations on religious and philosophical questions while living in Rhode Island. Before leaving the Old World, he had been deeply moved by the moral corruption which he found to be so prevalent in England and other countries. As he reflected on the cause of this unhappy situation, it became increasingly clear to him that it had been brought about by the deification of matter, with its natural consequences of promoting the life of sensuous pleasure and irreligion. As an example of the influence of philosophical ideas on human conduct, it could be pointed out that Richard Mandeville in his Fable of the Bees (1723) had argued in support of the thesis that private vices were really public virtues. In fact, any conception of morality that is based on a purely materialistic philosophy will find it permissible to do anything that one wants to do. Even the notion that virtue is intrinsically beautiful, which had been advanced by the Earl of Shaftesbury, was insufficient to restrain the selfish impulses of ordinary human beings. Religion, with its belief in God and sincere devotion to the supreme Person who is the source of all goodness, was in Berkeley's judgment the only thing that could save society from social ruin and decay. Alciphron consists of a series of seven dialogues. It was written for the purpose of defending the chief tenets of the Christian religion against the views of the so-called freethinkers, a group of persons who, according to Berkeley, subscribed to a mild form of atheism. It is the longest of Berkeley's philosophical works and from the literary point of view has been claimed that it is the most polished. Philosophically, however, it is not rated so highly. The arguments used in connection with such topics as the existence of God, the nature of God, the foreknowledge of God, human freedom, and immortality of the soul are among the weakest that can be found in any of his writings. They might be acceptable to persons who were already convinced of the theses they were trying to establish, but to those of a skeptical turn of mind, they were far from convincing. Berkeley's critics were not slow in pointing out the defects in his arguments, and many of his discourses and unpublished letters were produced for the purpose of answering them. In the spring of 1734, Berkeley was made Bishop of Cloyne, a small town in the southern part of Ireland less than twenty miles from the city of Cork. His consecration to the bishopric took place in St. Paul's Church in Dublin. The diocese over which he was to preside included the eastern and southern portions of the county of Cork. This meant that the remainder of his life would be spent in quiet seclusion from the turmoil of large cities and the many problems which inevitably occur in connection with them. The appointment was most agreeable to him, for during his last two years in the city of London he had been in ill health, and his new residence with more opportunities for rest and relaxation would give him a chance to recuperate. Then, too, the added amount of leisure time he would have could be used for study and further reflection on those philosophical issues with which he had long been deeply concerned. While living at Cloyne, his duties in connection with the church did not mean any lessening of his interests in academic matters or in trying to do something that would help toward a solution of the social and economic problems in which his country was involved. He participated in a series of discussions with other bishops in the area and continued correspondence with friends in Dublin, Stratford, and other places. Samuel Johnson, who had visited him in America and who served as chaplain at Stratford, was

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www.cliffs.com one with whom he carried on an exchange of ideas. He made frequent public addresses having to do with some of the more important civic and social problems of the day. He wrote articles for the Guardian, the Analyst, the Querist, and other publications. He became involved in a series of discussions having to do with the relationships of mathematics and religion. His articles in the Analyst were intended to show that the mysteries in mathematics were in many respects comparable to the ones in the field of religion. They suggested, too, that there are as many doubts and uncertainties involved in mathematical speculations as one finds in religion. In the Guardian, he wrote with reference to economic and social conditions. In dealing with these topics, he emphasized that individuals as well as governments have important responsibilities for what happens. The Querist consisted of a long series of questions having to do with both local and national conditions. These questions were designed to stimulate more careful thinking on the part of people in general about ways in which these conditions could be improved. The nature of the questions brought to light what Berkeley believed to be true about the close relationship of one's philosophical ideas and the practical problems which arise in the everyday life of human society. After moving from London to Cloyne, he was seriously disturbed by the social conditions which he observed in the surrounding country. It was not just the poverty of the people that troubled him but the fact that they appeared to have little or no initiative to look out for themselves and thus to better their own lot. They had for a long time been governed by those whose interests were foreign to their own, and this had produced an attitude of dependence upon others and a lack of any sense of responsibility for the conditions under which they lived. The gospel of hard work and self-reliance which Berkeley had proclaimed several years before as the means for preventing the ruin of Great Britain was now needed for the people of Ireland. It was this need which prompted the questions that appeared in the Querist. If he could get people to think for themselves, they would become aware of the fact that they are themselves responsible, at least to some extent, for the conditions which prevail. They would realize, too, that it is always possible to improve the situation by doing something about it on their own initiative. In placing so much emphasis on the responsibility of the individual, he did not neglect the fact that magistrates also have a responsibility for the people over whom they rule. This was the major theme of an address given in 1736 under the title A Discourse to Magistrates Occasioned by the Enormous Licence and Irreligion of the Times. The years following 1739 were especially difficult for the people who lived in the diocese of Cloyne. The country had been plagued by famine, and this was followed by widespread disease and suffering. Berkeley believed it was his duty as a churchman to minister to the physical needs as well as the spiritual ones of the people he served. In fact, he regarded these two kinds of needs to be so closely related that it would be quite impossible to serve either of them adequately apart from the other. His experience in Rhode Island had called to his attention the belief on the part of the American Indians in the healing properties of tar-water. It now occurred to him that this might be an effective remedy for the suffering which was so prevalent in his own diocese. He began a series of experiments to determine the effects of tar-water on different kinds of disease. Apparently the experiments must have turned out well, for Berkeley became convinced that he had found the remedy for which he had been searching. In an attempt to understand more fully the curative powers of tar-water, he sought to establish a causal relationship between this substance and the spiritual force which he believed to be present throughout the entire universe. His familiarity with Platonic and Neo-Platonic literature may have influenced his thinking in this respect. At any rate, he came to the conclusion that a relationship of this kind does exist. The results of his thinking along this line were expressed in a little book called Siris. The subtitle contained the following words: A Chain of Philosophical Reflections Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water, and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Arising from One Another. The book appeared in 1744 and is said to have developed at the time more interest and enthusiasm than anything else he had ever published. With the advancement of medical science, the theory was

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www.cliffs.com discredited, and Berkeley was criticized and in some instances even ridiculed for having advocated it. As a matter of fact, Berkeley was not a scientist. He was a churchman and a philosopher. As such, he was not qualified to speak in the name of science. Although Siris has little if any value as a scientific treatise, there are certain aspects of it which do have some significance for an understanding of Berkeley's religious and philosophical ideas. In the first place, it was an expression of his humanitarianism, for it came in response to a sincere desire on his part to do something toward the relief of those who were suffering and in distress in his community. With reference to his religious views, this little book, which was among the latest of his writings, indicates something of a change in his conception of God. In the Principles and in the Dialogues, God is a Person and the world is his creation. He acts upon the world but is transcendent in the sense that his existence is other than the world and not dependent on it. In Siris, God is the great universal Spirit that permeates the entire universe and gives to it whatever power and reality it possesses. In other words, God is immanent in the universe and has no separate or independent existence. This is very much in line with the mysticism that one finds in the writings of the NeoPlatonists. Again, the views that are set forth in Siris appear to have certain implications which question the validity of the empirical method for arriving at any objective truth concerning the nature of the universe. God as the universal Spirit that is present in all things is most certainly not an object of sense perception. Neither can it be regarded as a legitimate inference from what is experienced through any or all of one's sense perceptions. Hence, any belief in the existence of God or the reality of an all-pervading Spirit must be founded on something other than sense experience. This at least suggests the idea that reason is more reliable than sense perception for telling us how things really are rather than merely what they appear to be. In spite of the many objections that might be raised with reference to Berkeley's theory about tar-water as a great panacea for human ills, the idea was accorded a great deal of popularity throughout the remainder of his life. Nor was its acceptance confined merely to the uneducated classes, for Berkeley received many letters from prominent persons commending him for this important discovery and encouraging him with their support. His enthusiasm concerning the merits of tar-water did not cause him to lose interest in other matters. He was first of all a churchman who was deeply devoted to the cause of religion. He is said to have been the foremost religious philosopher of the Anglican church. This may or may not have been true, but that he exerted a powerful influence on the life of the church cannot be doubted. Although he was a person of strong convictions, he was tolerant toward those whose religious beliefs differed from his own. He wrote letters that were addressed To the Catholic Clergy of Cloyne and To the Catholic Clergy of Ireland, expressing views that would now be classified as decidedly liberal for the times in which he lived. In August of 1752, he left Cloyne and went to Oxford in England. He was in ill health and wanted the opportunity to spend his last years in the comparative peace and quiet of an academic atmosphere. His residence in Oxford was of short duration, for he died on January 14, 1753. Six days later, he was buried in Christ Church Cathedral.

INTRODUCTION TO BERKELEY'S WORKS It was George Berkeley (1685-1753), an Irishman living at Trinity College in Dublin, who in his early twenties developed an idea that was bound to have far-reaching consequences for the future of Western philosophy. The argument which he put forth was designed to prove that matter, in the sense in which that term is generally used, does not exist. This was in many respects a very startling idea, for the existence of matter had long been regarded as so obvious that no one in his right mind would ever question it. Not only did people believe in the reality of matter, but among the so-called intellectuals of the day, there were men who, like Thomas Hobbes and others, had insisted that matter is all that can be said to have any real existence in the entire universe. In their judgment, whatever happens in the world of human

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www.cliffs.com experience can be explained as due to the action of material particles coming into contact with one another. This way of viewing things appeared to have particular advantages for the development of the sciences. Matter was something that could be perceived by the senses. It could be measured, and assuming that the cause-and-effect relationships associated with it would remain constant, it was possible to make accurate predictions concerning what would take place under specified conditions. This would eliminate the idea of chance happenings in the world and at the same time would enable people to control within limits the environmental conditions under which they must live. Francis Bacon had developed a number of procedures for investigating the phenomena of nature, and in his book called The New Atlantis he had described in some detail the marvelous world that would be brought into existence when, through the use of these new scientific methods, nature would be brought under control and its resources made available for the satisfaction of human needs. It was a fascinating picture of a possible future and one that was bound to be received with hope and enthusiasm. All of this was based on the assumption that matter exists and that its movements are of a mechanical nature. Once the laws pertaining to matter in motion had been discovered, it was reasonable to believe that they could be used for the satisfaction of human purposes and desires. With all of these advantages associated with the concept of matter, one might wonder why Berkeley should ever challenge its validity. He had many reasons for doing so, but one of his major objections to the popular conception of matter had to do with the implications of the materialistic doctrine with reference to the fields of morals and religion. It seemed quite evident to him that, while the concepts of matter and motion might be regarded as adequate for the development of the natural sciences, something other than these was logically necessary in order to give any meaning or significance to people's moral and religious experiences. It was at least conceivable that a scientific account of natural phenomena could be given in terms of matter and motion, but both morals and religion require the existence of spirit and a kind of freedom of choice that is foreign to all scientific explanations. To be sure, one might accept a materialistic view of both humanity and nature and then regard any references to the areas of morals and religion as purely illusory. However, for Berkeley, this method of procedure would not do at all. From his point of view, morality and religion were of primary importance and could not be brushed aside by any considerations relative to the phenomena of nature. Without the guidance and direction which comes from these areas of experience, there is nothing to determine the uses which shall be made of scientific achievements, and when they are employed for purely selfish ends, the results can be most terrifying. Morality and religion provide restraints from an evil use of means, which is essential if the use of scientific means is to decrease rather than increase the miseries of humanity. Berkeley believed there was a direct relationship between one's beliefs about God and the moral standards by which one lived. Atheism, or a denial of belief in the existence of God, meant for him that man was left free to follow any kind of standard that he might choose, which would allow him with a clear conscience to do whatever he pleased. Because materialism usually led to atheism, he believed it was responsible in no small measure for the low moral standards of his day. He was anxious to do something to counteract this trend and thus to protect society from its evil consequences. The unique thing about Berkeley's attempt to refute atheism was that the attack which he made was along philosophical rather than theological lines. Obviously an atheist would not be influenced by any appeal to sacred scriptures or any so-called divine relationships, but he would pay attention to any rational argument based on the established facts of human experience. Accordingly, Berkeley set out to prove by logical means that the concept of a material substance existing apart from, and independent of, a perceiving mind was without any legitimate foundation. If it could be shown that matter does not exist, and even the word itself is a meaningless one--since no one can ever have even the faintest idea of anything for which it stands--the very foundations on which atheism rests would be destroyed. This would at least prepare the way for establishing a belief in God, and if evidence could be found that would

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www.cliffs.com make the existence of God logically necessary, his purpose would be accomplished. Berkeley believed that this could be done. In that case, the results would not only establish a logical basis for theism but would provide a more adequate interpretation for all the phenomena of human experience, including the most recent developments which had come to light through scientific investigations. There are many different avenues that lead people into philosophical speculations. It may be art, science, politics, or some other interest which needs to be explored for a deeper understanding of its nature and implications. In Berkeley's case, it was morality and religion that led him into philosophy. In this respect, we find him in the company of many of the great thinkers whose works are recorded in well recognized histories of philosophy. St. Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Benedict Spinoza, Blaise Pascal, Friederick Schleiermacher, Jonathan Edwards, and many others could be mentioned in this connection. The fact that these men were interested in religion and pursued this interest into the field of philosophy does not mean that they had their conclusions formulated in advance and delved into philosophy merely for the purpose of finding rational support for what they already believed. Rather, it means that they saw some very definite relationships between what one believes about the nature of the universe and what one believes about right and wrong or the way that people ought to live. Any complete survey of Berkeley's writings will show that he treated many different subjects, ranging all the way from mathematics, the physical sciences, psychology, politics, morals, and religion. In spite of this wide range of subject matter, there was one dominant theme to which all of these topics were very definitely related. The one idea which in importance surpassed all of the others was the spiritual character of the universe. The negative aspect of this conception involved the many arguments which he assembled for the purpose of proving the nonexistence of matter. From one point of view, these arguments constitute his main contribution to the field of philosophy. He wanted to demonstrate that whatever exists is either a perceiving mind or dependent on a perceiving mind. In the famous phrase "esse is percipi," one finds a short epitome of all that he had to say. It was this conviction which formed the basis for his conception of the entire universe. On the affirmative side, he attempted to show that belief in God as the supreme spiritual being was a logical necessity in order to account for the regularities and the orderly occurrences which are found in human experience but are not subject to the control of individual minds. Berkeley's opposition to the materialistic conception of things began in his early years, while he was a student at Trinity College. By the time he had finished his course of study, he was ready to make a public announcement of his views. However, his essential thesis concerning the nonexistence of matter was so contrary to popular opinion and so directly opposed to the teachings of the prominent thinkers of his day that he was fearful lest any general acceptance of the idea would not be forthcoming. For this reason, he decided to present his views in a gradual manner. With this objective in mind, he wrote and published an essay entitled A New Theory of Vision. The purpose of the essay was to explain the manner in which ideas concerning distance, magnitude, and the location of objects are formed. Whatever one believes to be true about the objects in the world of our experience is necessarily an inference from the perceptions which are formed in the mind. Since the mind is unable to get outside of itself, or in other words to contact external bodies, it would follow that all mental states or conscious ideas are bound to be interpreted in terms of their relations to one another. It was Berkeley's hope that an analysis of this kind would prepare the way for a more favorable reception of his general theory of knowledge. Shortly after the appearance of this essay, a more complete presentation of his views was published under the title Principles of Human Knowledge. The book attracted some attention on the part of those who were interested in philosophy, but so far as the general public was concerned, few people paid any attention to it. For the purpose of making a wider appeal and enlisting the interest of more people, a popular presentation of the same views was made in another work called Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. In these dialogues, Philonous argues in favor of the existence of matter, and Hylas not only points out the absurdity of this view but indicates something of the consequences of this position for

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www.cliffs.com the fields of morals and religion. After leaving Dublin, Berkeley spent some time in London and in traveling on the continent. This gave him the opportunity of becoming acquainted with several of the leading men of letters of that time and discussing his views with them. He returned to Dublin and was awarded the degree of Doctor of Divinity. Throughout his life, he was devoted to the work of the church. He was appointed to the deanery of Derry and later served as Bishop of Cloyne. One of his great ambitions was to come to America and found a college in the Bermudas for the education of the Indians and for the training of those who might become leaders in the development of a great society. For this purpose, he secured the promise of a grant of money from the English government and spent three years in the vicinity of Newport, Rhode Island, waiting for the money to arrive. It never came, and Berkeley was forced to abandon the project and return to London. Shortly after his return, he published the longest of his philosophical works called Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher. It was an attempt to refute the so-called freethinkers by setting forth what he considered to be valid arguments for the existence of God and the moral order of the universe. Several more publications appeared during the latter part of his life. Among them were discourses on the subject of Passive Obedience; Siris, which had to do with the merits of tar-water; and The Querist, which consisted of a series of questions designed to stimulate thinking concerning important practical as well as philosophical subjects.

CRITICAL COMMENTARIES ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION The Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was written when Berkeley was twenty-four years of age. In spite of his youth, he had become well versed in the academic issues which were current at the time. Having developed for some time a strong inclination toward independent thinking, he had arrived at a conception of the nature of things which in his judgment was sufficient to overcome the major defects which he believed he had discovered in contemporary views. He was very much disturbed by the pronounced rise of materialism with its tendency to question and in some instances to deny the convictions of morality and religion. It would not be feasible to attempt a refutation of atheism by an appeal to divine revelation or by quoting any of the so-called authorities in the field of religion. The only adequate method for doing this would consist of a critical examination of the arguments on which materialism was based, and this was precisely what he meant to do. If the reasoning that had been used in support of materialism was faulty, it would have been Berkeley's task to expose the fallacies on which the doctrine had been based. His analysis led to the conclusion that the fundamental error involved in atheistic arguments was the false assumption that matter is a substance which exists apart from and independent of any mind that may or may not be conscious of it. In order to expose this error, he saw that it would be necessary to make a careful examination of the knowing process and to show how it is that ideas concerning ourselves and the objects in the world about us are really formed. It seemed most appropriate in this connection to begin with vision since it is through this sense more than any of the others that we gain our impressions concerning the objects in the world of our experience. At the time when the Essay was first published, Berkeley sent a copy of it to his esteemed friend Sir John Percival. Along with it he sent a letter for the purpose of introducing the subject of the Essay and of gaining his friend's opinion with reference to it. The letter contained the following statement: "Of late I have been agreeably employed in considering the most noble, pleasant, and comprehensive of all the senses. . . . My thoughts concerning vision have led me into some notions so far out of the common road that it had been improper to address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius." It was because of his high regard for Percival's judgment that Berkeley sent the Essay to him. It was his hope that the comments made by this prominent official would give strong support to the theory he had proposed.

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www.cliffs.com To understand the Essay, one should bear in mind the limited scope of the subject which is treated in it. It was not intended to set forth Berkeley's entire theory of knowledge nor to indicate what he believed to be the real nature of objects which are external to individual minds. Its purpose was to explain vision by showing its particular function as a part of the knowing process. It is true that he believed this would constitute an appropriate introduction to his views on other subjects, but he felt that it would be wise to present his views gradually and in this way to forestall some of the opposition which his entire system would be bound to arouse. Failure to realize the limited scope of the essay on vision has been responsible for some of the criticism made concerning it. It has been charged that he used language which clearly implies views that are directly in conflict with statements found in his later writings and which are essential elements in his main theory. The reason for this lies partly in the fact that certain words used freely in the Essay, such as idea, notion, sensation, externality, and outness, are ambiguous in their meaning. As they are used in ordinary discourses, they are supposed to have reference to objects that do not depend for their existence on any perceiving mind. This, to be sure, is not in harmony with the main tenets of Berkeley's position, and yet he has made no specific statement to the effect that he has used these words in any other sense than their ordinary meaning. He has made it clear that the objects of vision are dependent on the mind, but the language he has used suggests quite strongly that this is not the case with reference to touch and the other senses. The explanation of this problem can be seen in certain passages found in Principles of Human Knowledge, which was published only a short time after the Essay concerning vision. Referring to the ideas of sight and touch which were discussed in the Essay, he says, "That the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are the images of external things, was shown even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects--not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it, in a discourse concerning Vision." This statement indicates quite clearly that in the earlier publication concerning vision, Berkeley did not want to raise the issue concerning the existence of material substances which are independent of mind but was trying only to establish the subjective character of the objects of vision. The Essay begins with the following statement: "My design is to show the manner wherein we perceive by Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of objects: also to consider the difference there is betwixt the ideas of Sight and Touch, and whether there be any idea common to both senses." The purpose which was back of this design becomes evident when we bear in mind that in Berkeley's opinion, belief in the existence of matter was directly related to a materialistic and, consequently, an atheistic conception of the nature of things. Now the basis for this belief in the reality of matter was the assumption that material objects can be seen directly. It was this assumption that he wished to challenge. His method for doing it consisted in an introspective appeal to human consciousness. He asked that people should examine their own internal visual experiences and from them draw only those conclusions which are warranted by the actual facts. Visual sensations do of necessity belong to the mind, and the real question at issue was whether it is possible for the mind to contact or even become aware of anything that is completely foreign to its own nature. The first point that he attempts to establish is that distance is not something that is seen directly. It is readily admitted, he tells us, that whether an object is near or distant cannot be perceived directly since distance is a line directed endwise to the eye and remains in the same place whether the object is near or remote. It is also admitted that the estimate which is made of any distance is an act of judgment based on experiences rather than sense perception. But, although there is general agreement that distance is not seen directly, it has been maintained by some that it is mediated by an idea that has been perceived directly. For example, it has been held that the position of the two eyes acting in convergence on an object enables one to determine distance immediately or that the breadth of the pupil in one's eye is sufficient to enable him to know at once the distance between himself and the object that he sees. Berkeley finds that

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www.cliffs.com neither of these explanations is adequate to account for the facts which occur in actual experiences. Instances can be mentioned in which the facts are just the opposite of what one would expect on the basis of these suppositions. The lines and angles by means of which men claim they are able to see distance are not perceptions at all. In fact, they are not even thought of by persons who are not skilled in optical phenomena. Actually these lines and angles have no existence in nature, and even if they did, they would not be sufficient to explain the phenomenon of distance. People who work in the field of optics make use of these lines and angles because they want to give a mathematical explanation to experiences of this kind. If distance cannot be perceived directly, neither can it be mediated by some other idea that has not been perceived. Although distance is not seen by the mind, it is suggested through the medium of some other idea which is itself perceived in the act of seeing. In support of this position, Berkeley tells us what can constitute such a medium. For example, he mentions that when we look at an object with both eyes, the interval between the two pupils will vary in a manner that is proportionate as the object either approaches us or recedes from us. The fact that we judge an object to be far away when the pupils are in one position but close to us when they are in another position does not mean that there is a necessary or causal relationship between these factors but rather that the mind has by constant experience found the different sensations to correspond to the differences in distance. Again, it is a familiar fact that a visual image which is clear and distinct will suggest to the mind that the distance between the eye and the object is quite different from what it would be if the image were blurred and confused. But the reason for this is to be found not in any necessary connection between clarity of vision and distance but in the associations which have been formed through a number of actual experiences. If a person who had been born blind were suddenly to receive his sight, the nature of visual sensations would tell him nothing at all about distances. Whatever knowledge he would obtain about distance would have to be gained through the experiences of associating visual sensations with ideas gained from other sources. The determination of the visual signs which suggest externality along with nearness and remoteness is one of the more important elements in Berkeley's theory of vision. Having established the fact that distance is not seen, the argument proceeds to a consideration of magnitude or the amount of space that is occupied by a particular object. Here, again, it must be observed that the size of an object is not something that is seen directly. One does not determine the area of the moon's surface by the size of the image which is formed on the retina of the eyes. Neither do we think that the length and breadth of a building varies with the changes that take place as one's visual image becomes larger or smaller. When an object such as the moon is seen from a horizontal position, it appears to be larger than when seen in its meridian, and yet it would be foolish to suppose that its actual magnitude has been altered by this change in the way that it appears. What takes place in the visual sensation is an awareness of color, which may be seen in greater or less quantity. This, together with different movements of the eyes, is what suggests to the mind the magnitude of the object that is being seen. The sensation of color is a mental experience, and any idea of size or magnitude can be explained adequately only as an inference from it. The visual sensations and the eye movements are interpreted in terms of the tactual sensations that one has learned from previous experiences to have been associated with them. This point can be illustrated from the fact that a person who was born blind and later received his sight would have a very different idea of magnitude from that which occurs to a sighted person. It would not be until after he associated tactual sensations with the corresponding visual ones that his judgment would be regarded as normal. A similar explanation follows with reference to the situation of the objects of sense or, in other words, their relation to one another. How is it that we come to judge the position of one object to be higher or lower than that of another? Or how do we know that one is to the right or the left of another? Attempts have been made to answer these questions by referring to the position of the images formed on the retina of the eyes. For example, it is a well-known fact that the image of an object is always inverted on the

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www.cliffs.com retina so that what appears to be below is interpreted to mean above and vice versa. Those who claim that the situation of an object is sensed directly have maintained that this is the way a person holding two crossed sticks in his hand would understand the position of the objects to which these sticks pointed. This they insist is analogous to the way in which meaning is attached to visual phenomena. Berkeley finds this explanation unsatisfactory since it is not in accord with what actually takes place in the mind of one who forms judgments of this type. He tells us that in his own experience, he has never been aware of the direction of the rays of light or their crossings on the retina of his eyes, and he is quite certain that people in general have not been aware of it either. Certainly little children are not aware of any such complicated process for determining the location of objects, and the probabilities are that, with the single exception of those who have been trained in the field of optics, other people have experienced no such awareness. A person who has been blind since birth would be able to have ideas of upper and lower, or right and left, even though he had never experienced any visual sensations. Whatever judgments he would make concerning the situation of objects would be confined to those that are perceivable by touch. In the case of persons who have not been deprived of the sense of sight, what is experienced in the visual field becomes associated with the sense of touch, which enables the mind to give location to objects. It is in this connection that Berkeley makes the following statement: "All those things that are intangible, and of a spiritual nature--his thoughts and desires, his passions, and in general all the modifications of his soul--to these he would never apply the terms upper and lower except only in a metaphorical sense." It is only when a person has learned by experience the close relationship which obtains between the several ideas of sight and touch that he is able to make a true estimate concerning the situation of those objects which have been indicated by his visual sensations. Having shown that the ideas of distance, magnitude, or situations of objects cannot be perceived directly through the sense of sight but are only suggested to the mind through repeated associations of visual sensations with those that are obtained through the sense of touch, Berkeley proceeds to give consideration to the question of whether there is some common element that is present in the two senses of sight and touch. One of his reasons for doing this was the fact that it had been argued in some quarters that extension is something common to these two senses; therefore, it is possible through this medium that one may perceive directly such things as distance, size, or location of objects. Obviously, this question has an important bearing on Berkeley's theory of vision, and he proceeds at some length to make an examination of the basis on which this claim has been made. He finds that extension is an abstract idea and as such does not correspond to any reality either in the world or in the human mind. His argument is to the effect that when he examines his own mind, he is never aware of anything other than particular ideas or sensations. It is true that we use terms which stand for universals or class names, but when we search our own consciousness, we never find anything that corresponds to them. For example, we can have in our minds the image of a particular man but not the image of humanity. We can sense a particular chair or table, but we have no sensation of chairness or tableness. Words of this kind are pure fictions, which holds for extension as well as for all other abstract ideas. Berkeley refers in this connection to John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which had been published recently and for which he had a great deal of respect. He tells us that if anyone could have persuaded him to believe in the reality of abstract ideas, it would have been the author of this book. Locke had argued at some length to prove that abstract ideas have no existence in the world that is external to our own minds, but he did not deny their reality in the mental world. In fact, he recognized the very important place which must be assigned to them in order to make human knowledge possible. Berkeley, however, goes a step further than Locke, for he denies that abstract ideas have any existence even in human minds. By denying the existence of abstract ideas, he ruled out the possibility of extension as a factor that is common to the senses of sight and touch. There were other reasons, too, for rejecting this claim. One of

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www.cliffs.com them was the fact that space is not only specifically but numerically different in the senses of sight and touch. A man who had been born blind would, upon receiving his sight, find nothing in common between the things he saw and the objects he touched. For him, they would be a completely new set of ideas perceived in a different manner and quite distinct from anything he had ever perceived before. Light and colors are the only objects of sight, and it is freely admitted by everyone that these constitute a species that is entirely different from the ideas of touch, which again makes it impossible for anything to be common to both classes: "Now let anyone try in his thoughts to add a visible line or surface to a tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them making one continued sum or whole. He that can do this may think them homogeneous; but he that cannot must think them heterogeneous." Berkeley insists that he is of the latter sort. Berkeley's theory of vision is thus seen to be an account of a process which takes place within the mind and which has no direct contact with outside or external objects. This is not to deny the existence of such objects. It is merely an assertion that, whatever the nature of these objects may be, they are not perceived directly through the sense of sight. The objects of vision do, however, have an important significance for human knowledge which must not be overlooked. They constitute a universal language of nature, and it is by means of this language that we are able to regulate our daily lives, attaining those things which are necessary for our self-preservation and well-being and avoiding that which is most harmful to ourselves and to others. The manner in which this is done is similar to the use of the words and signs employed in any language. They do not suggest the things which they signify by any likeness or identity of nature but rather by the associations which have been formed through those experiences in which visual sensations were accompanied by other things. In other words, our visual experiences may be regarded as the language used by the Author of Creation and addressed by means of this sense to the intelligence of humanity. The closing sections of the Essay have to do with the notion of space, which is the object of geometry. The question is raised concerning the kind of space with which the geometer is dealing. Is it visible space or is it tactual space? On first thought, it may appear to be obvious that the mathematician is dealing with visible space. He is constantly making use of his eyes, and it would doubtless seem very odd to him to be told that the lines and diagrams which he makes on paper are not the figures or even the likeness of the figures which are the subject of his demonstration. In spite of these appearances, it is pointed out that the space of the science of geometry is not visible space but tactual space. The reasons for this assertion have been stated repeatedly throughout the main body of the Essay. Visible space has no determinate size; consequently, there is no constant correspondence between it and other objects. Measurements are always made by comparing one tangible space with another tangible space. What is perceived through the visual sense amounts to no more than colors with their variations and different degrees of light and shade. Since these do not remain constant but are in a continual state of flux or change, they cannot be used in the manner in which geometrical figures are used. As we have said before, the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision was regarded by its author as no more than a preliminary statement preparatory to a more complete exposition of his entire theory of knowledge. It was written during those early years before his judgment on philosophical matters had reached full maturity. Nevertheless, it was an important piece of work and in a certain sense prepared the way for the future development of empirical philosophy. Although its purpose was to emphasize the subjective character of all that is known through the visual sense, this was bound to raise questions concerning other types of sensation and eventually to consider whether it is ever possible for anyone to know that which is external to his own mind.

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A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE The most systematic and well-reasoned exposition of Berkeley's philosophy is contained in his Principles of Human Knowledge. The first edition of the book appeared in 1710. He was twenty-five years of age and was still living at Trinity College in Dublin. At the time when it was first published, the book was regarded by its author as only a partial statement of a longer piece of work. In fact, what was printed was entitled Part I, thus indicating that additional materials would be forthcoming at a later time. Actually they were never added, and when the book was reprinted in 1734, the words Part I were withdrawn. Berkeley explained at a later time that his original plan called for a Part II and some of it had been written. However, his work on this project had been interrupted by a number of events, and in the meantime what had been written was lost. By the time he had opportunity for finishing it, he had other interests and did not feel inclined to write a second time on the same subject. The book was in one sense a continuation and further development of the ideas presented in the New Theory of Vision. Still a product of his youth, it is characterized by enthusiasm for a new way of looking at things and lacks some of the maturity of judgment which is found in his later writings. Many years after it had been published, Berkeley said, "It was published when I was very young and without doubt hath many defects." Its real purpose, he tells us, was not that of proclaiming the final or absolute truth of the matter: "All I hope for is that they [the Principles] may be an occasion to inquisitive men of discovering truth." Insofar as it was his purpose to stimulate thinking about the problems associated with human knowledge, he has been eminently successful, for what he had to say in this book has been read and criticized by philosophers and other interested persons through the many years that have followed, and it will continue to challenge thinkers for generations to come. Although Berkeley's own theory about vision is in the background of the Principles, his thinking was influenced a great deal by the works of such eminent men as John Locke, René Descartes, and Nicholas Malebranche. He was especially attracted by Locke's empirical method for investigating problems of philosophy, as well as his discussion of the subject of abstract ideas. He was interested in Descartes' quest for certainty and his treatment of arguments concerning the existence of God, and he shared many of the convictions expressed in Malebranche's Vision of God. But Berkeley was not one who accepted readily what someone else had said on a given subject without first subjecting it to a careful analysis of his own. The result was usually some important modification of the views which had been presented. He rarely accepted in toto what any of his predecessors had taught. The Principles of Human Knowledge may for the purpose of a brief analysis be divided into four parts. The first part, or Introduction, has to do with the subject of abstract ideas. The second part contains the arguments which are advanced to prove the nonexistence of matter. The third part is an attempt to answer the objections which are usually offered by those who do believe in the existence of matter. The fourth part deals with the consequences and applications of the principles set forth in the book. It is an interesting observation to note that philosophers are the ones who appear to be most confused about ordinary matters which the untrained layman takes for granted and finds them so clear and simple that he is not disturbed in the least about their meaning. Take, for example, the question of how human knowledge is obtained. The average layman sees no problem in connection with it. To him, it seems perfectly clear that anyone in his right mind understands what it means to know something. Either one knows or he doesn't know, and that is all there is to it. But to the philosopher, knowing appears to be a very difficult subject, and he finds it necessary to examine different theories about it and even then is not sure that his own explanation will be satisfactory in every respect. Why is it that the philosopher is confused and uncertain about matters which are so clear and simple to the layman?

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www.cliffs.com The answer which Berkeley suggests in the introductory section of the Principles is that different criteria of truth are being used. The layman, trusting in the reliability of his sense experiences, finds no occasion for either doubt or skepticism. But the philosopher, viewing the situation in the light of reason, which he regards as a superior principle, discovers errors, prejudices, and inconsistencies in the views that have been so easily accepted, and he is confident that these must be eliminated if one is to arrive at a true or correct understanding of things. Consequently, he searches for an explanation that will not only be in accord with all the known facts of experience but will at the same time correct the errors that have been noted in previous views. The task may become a very long and complicated one. There are different sources of error which must be taken into account, and it must be recognized that the limitations of the human mind are such that it is impossible to arrive at a complete or perfect understanding concerning any of the major problems in human life. These considerations have led some people to abandon the idea that knowledge is possible at all, and they have accepted skepticism as an alternative. But this is not a necessary conclusion to be drawn from the facts which have been noted. It is quite possible that one's understanding of the knowing process which is operative in human experience may be improved to the point where it may be designated as knowledge, even though that knowledge is never able to reach perfection. One may proceed in a direction that is toward perfection, and this will be sufficient to satisfy the demand. This can be brought about by discovering as many of the errors as one can find and taking measures to see that they are avoided. In the area of the natural sciences, the most frequent sources of error are either lack of agreement with known facts or failure to think correctly in drawing inferences from them. In the field of philosophy, one must guard against these same errors, and, in addition, one must examine the assumptions or presuppositions on which an argument has been based. If these assumptions are unwarranted, the conclusions which are dependent upon them will necessarily be invalidated. All thinking is based on assumptions of some kind, and in the field of philosophy it is especially important to note what it is that has been assumed and to see if there are sufficient reasons to support it. This is what Berkeley did in connection with his investigation of the problems associated with human knowledge. The assumption which he believed to be most responsible for the errors involved in popular conceptions of knowledge was the existence of abstract ideas. Accordingly, he finds it necessary to examine the nature of this assumption and then to show why he believes it is an unwarranted one. Anyone who is at all familiar with the history of philosophy will recognize the importance that has been attached to the belief in the reality of abstract ideas. From the age of Plato and Aristotle to medieval times and on into the modern period, these ideas have been regarded as the objects of logic and metaphysics and hence essential for any adequate understanding of either humanity or the world in which we lives. Followers of Plato, including the medieval realists, have held that ideas of this kind are the only genuine realities which exist, and hence particular things such as we experience in the world of our senses can be real only insofar as these ideas are present in them. The doctrine has had a long history, and in Berkeley's judgment it has been responsible for many of the confusions and absurdities which have occurred in philosophical thinking. It was following the implications of this doctrine that led the medieval schoolmen into barren and useless speculations, and in modern times it has given rise to a number of paradoxes and insoluble problems. What could be of greater service to philosophy than to expose the error on which the doctrine of abstract ideas has been based? Berkeley begins by indicating just what it is that the belief in abstract ideas really asserts. Although it is agreed by everyone that the qualities of objects do not exist separately or apart from the objects with which they are associated, it is held that the mind has the power of abstracting any one of these qualities and forming a particular idea of it. For example, it is said that the mind can separate or abstract a quality such as color from all of the other qualities related to it and even from the objects in which it has appeared and thus form the idea of color itself. It can do the same thing with motion or extension by abstracting these qualities from all moving or extended things. Again, it is asserted that one may have an idea of

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www.cliffs.com humanity by abstracting from all particular persons those elements which they have in common. Assuming that these common elements include such items as bodies, minds, stature, and weight, it is argued that one may have an abstract idea of each one of them. Thus it would be possible to have an idea of body that has no particular size, figure, shape, or color, but means nothing other than body by itself. The abstract idea of humanity will have none of the characteristics of any particular person or even of classes of people but will exist by itself apart from any of these qualities. Whether anyone does have this capacity for forming abstract ideas is something that each individual will have to decide, for no one has any direct access into another person's mind. Berkeley, however, insists that he has no such capacity and doubts quite seriously that anyone else possesses it. He says that he can have an idea of a particular colored object, but he cannot have an idea of color that is separate and apart from all individual objects. He can have ideas of particular men, each one of which will possess a number of characteristics such as body, figure, color, size, and ages, but he can have no idea of humanity in general existing apart from these particular characteristics. If one should maintain that these abstractions are the ideas of what a number of particular objects have in common, it should be replied that whenever all of these particular qualities have been excluded, there is nothing left; consequently, if the abstract idea really did exist, there would be nothing for it to denote. In an attempt to see how the belief in abstract ideas has come to be so generally accepted, attention is called to John Locke's famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In this book, the author has stated that the possession of general ideas is what distinguishes man from the lower animals. The brutes, he tells us, have the capacity for possessing ideas of particular things such as are revealed through the senses, but they cannot form general ideas because they do not have the power of abstraction. Apparently Locke identifies general ideas with abstract ideas or, at any rate, includes the former with the latter. Berkeley agrees with Locke's position only in part. He admits that human beings do have the capacity for forming general ideas and this may be one of the things that distinguishes man from the lower animals, but what he does not admit is that general ideas are also abstract ideas. So far as the power to form abstract ideas is concerned, there is no difference between people and the brutes. General, or universal, ideas are a very important factor in the accumulation of knowledge and for the communication of ideas with one another, but it is a great mistake to think of them as abstract ideas. A general idea is one that stands for or represents all of the particular members of a given class of objects. For example, the idea of triangle represents all of the different triangles that are in existence or that may come into existence. But the idea which is present in one's mind when he thinks triangle is not one that has been formed by taking away from all triangles the particular characteristics that belong to each of them. Instead, it is always an idea of some particular triangle which stands for or represents all the members of the entire class of triangles. The same is true when one thinks about humanity. This is another general idea, and when one thinks about it he has in his mind the idea of some particular person with a number of specific characteristics. This idea may represent for him the entire class of humanity. It is true, as Locke has maintained, that words become general in their meaning by being made the signs of general ideas. But it should be noted in this connection that it is not an abstract general idea of which a word is made the sign. It is always a number of particular ideas which have been suggested to the mind. The argument has sometimes been used to the effect that abstract general ideas are necessarily involved whenever it is asserted that what is true of certain members of a class of objects will be true of all the rest of them, including the ones that have not been investigated. For instance, when it has been shown that all the angles of a particular triangle are equal to two right angles, the only basis for asserting that the same will be true for all triangles is that the proof had reference to the abstract general idea of triangle rather than just one specific example. Berkeley's reply to this argument is that the conclusion reached about all triangles is in no way dependent on the existence of an abstract general idea. The reason is that the unique characteristics which belong to the individual triangles, such as the nature of each angle, the length of the

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www.cliffs.com various sides, or the size of the area enclosed, are not in question. The only point under consideration is the relationship which exists between the sum of all the possible angles and two right angles, and this is not affected in any way by the differences which may distinguish one triangle from another. What has been the chief source of this belief in abstract ideas, which seems to have been so universally accepted? Berkeley believes that it has been due to the way in which language has been used. It has been thought that words are the names of things and that every name has one and only one signification. Thus it would appear that the words used to designate general ideas are also the names of specific things. The objects which are named by these general ideas--since they do not correspond to any one of the particular items included in the class--must have been obtained by taking away or abstracting from each one the elements which they all have in common. That the assumptions on which this line of argument has been based are false can be seen quite readily if one will only stop to consider the ways in which language is customarily used. While it is true that words are sometimes used as the names of things, it does not follow that they are always used for that purpose. Words may be used to express one's feelings, desires, questions, commands, intentions, negations, and other purposes which do not include the naming of objects which have existence either in one's mind or in the world that is without. Furthermore, when words are used to name existing objects, it is not true that they are always used to designate the same thing. Actually, the same word may be used to denote a variety of different meanings. What the word means in any given instance must always be determined by the use that is made of it at that particular time. Even in the case of definitions where the meaning of a name remains constant, it does not follow that it will suggest the same idea to different persons. Words may be used in the same way that algebraic symbols are used, in which case a particular quantity may be designated without implying the specific amount for which that symbol stands. Again, one may use the expression "I have good news to report" without specifying just what that good news may be. THE REALITY OF SPIRIT Having dispensed with the idea that abstract terms refer to objects which exist in the world of our experience, Berkeley proceeds to develop the more positive side of his own theory concerning the nature of that which can be known and, along with it, to present an account of the processes by means of which that knowledge can be obtained. All that exists, he tells us, is either ideas or that which perceives them. Objects of knowledge are revealed to us through the senses. We recognize colors, sounds, tastes, and the like by means of the sense organs which are adapted for that purpose. When these sensations are combined in a single object, we give a name to that object. In this way, we are able to designate such things as trees, houses, chairs, apples, persons, and other objects. In addition to these, our knowledge includes ideas that are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind and those that are formed by memory and imaginations based on that which has previously been conceived. Besides all this endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is that which perceives them, and this is what is called mind, spirit, soul, or the self. Our knowledge concerning the reality of that which does the perceiving is no less certain than that of the objects which are perceived. On this point, Berkeley is forced to make an exception to the empirical method which he set out to follow and according to which all genuine knowledge is derived from the senses. Obviously any knowledge that we may have of mind, spirit, or selfhood is not something that is revealed to us directly through the senses. No one can see, hear, touch, taste, or feel his own mind or self. Nevertheless, it is logically necessary to believe in the reality of a self or perceiver of ideas, for there can be no perceptions without a perceiver or any knowledge without a knower. If we ask how it is that we have such sure and certain knowledge of our own existence, the answer is that it is known intuitively. To be sure, intuitive knowledge is private; no one can investigate the intuitions of another person. However, Berkeley believes that all normal persons do have intuitive knowledge of their own existence. Furthermore, it would be meaningless to discuss the question with anyone who claimed that he did not. Nothing appears to be any more self-evident to anyone than that of

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www.cliffs.com his own existence. Even so, it must be recognized that this is not an object of knowledge that is revealed through the senses. We may have rational grounds for believing in our own existence and our intuitions may lend support to this belief, but both of these reasons are quite apart from the evidence that is supplied by the senses. Apparently Berkeley recognizes the difficulty that is involved in asserting the reality of that which cannot be perceived through the senses. Strictly speaking, he tells us, we do not have an idea of the self but we do have a notion of it. This would appear to be nothing more than a play on words or an attempt to avoid self-contradiction by substituting for one word another one which means the same thing. While there may be some truth in this criticism of Berkeley's theory, it does not do full justice to the explanation which he offers. He recognizes a certain distinction between ideas and notions as well as different classes of objects which belong to each of them. Notions have to do with the subject of the knowing process, while ideas are concerned with the objects of knowledge. Ideas are of two kinds, including those that are imprinted on the mind without the consent of a person's will and those that are produced according to one's pleasure by means of his imagination. It is by means of the former that we become aware of the order and coherence which we customarily attribute to the laws of nature. The latter accounts for the way in which we interpret ideas as the cause of actions in the world around us. There are also two kinds of notion, including the awareness of our own minds and those that have to do with the relations of ideas to one another. Both ideas and notions are copies of things, which means that they are in some sense like the things which they represent. Ideas are copies of other ideas. They cannot copy something that is totally unlike themselves, and it is for this reason that Berkeley believes the reality for which ideas stand must be spiritual in nature. Otherwise, it would be impossible for us to know anything other than that which exists in our own individual minds. Notions are copies of the self which does the knowing or of the relations existing between things. In either case, they are composed of the same kind of substance as the realities which they represent. There is another important difference between ideas and notions. It has do to with their activity and their passivity. Ideas, especially the ones that occur without the consent of the will, are passive. There is no power or agency in them. The evidence for this is the fact that when we open our eyes or attend with our ears, we cannot determine what it is that we will see or hear. The order and the regularity with which these perceptions occur is not subject to our control. It is different in the case of notions, which reveal the character of the spiritual substance which is the mind or the self. The spirit or soul is active in the sense that it has the power to initiate action, to make decisions, and to act in a responsible manner. THE NONEXISTENCE OF MATTER In order to understand the knowing process, one must give careful attention to the meaning of the words which are used to describe it. One of the words that is especially in need of clarification is matter, for it is used more than any other term to describe the objects of knowledge. The average person who has not reflected on the subject usually takes it for granted that objects such as trees, houses, rocks, animals, persons are composed of matter, a substance which exists in a manner that is entirely independent of any knowing mind. This way of looking at things is not peculiar to the common or uneducated mind, for it had been held by many of the leading scholars of the day. Thomas Hobbes, for example, was one of the leading materialists of modern times. He had taught that matter is real and has two distinguishing characteristics: It is independent of mind and it occupies space. It is true that he had some difficulty in trying to make clear just what was meant by each of these characteristics. Nevertheless, few people prior to Berkeley's time had ever stopped to question the existence of matter or the description which had been given of it. Berkeley saw more clearly than most of his predecessors the difficulties that would be encountered when one considered the implications that were involved in this conception of matter. He saw, too, the unfortunate consequences of this view for the fields of morals and religion. Berkeley was convinced that this conception of matter was an erroneous one, and it was his purpose to point out the error on which

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www.cliffs.com it was based. He believed that he could show not only that the popular conception of matter was a faulty one but that matter itself does not exist. To accomplish this purpose, he presented a number of arguments which are deserving of attention. The first of these arguments has to do with what it means to say that a thing exists. This in itself should be sufficient to convince anyone that matter is not something that can exist apart from or independent of a perceiving mind. In our ordinary experiences, we say that an object exists if it can be perceived by the senses, but we do not affirm the existence of something if there is no sensory evidence of its being present. If someone should assert that a book or a table or any other object exists at some particular place, we would look to see if it was there. If we see nothing, hear nothing, feel nothing, we simply conclude that the object does not exist. If the one who made the assertion should insist that the object is really there but no one can see it, hear it, or touch it, we would say that he is speaking nonsense. To maintain that perceptions of any kind do not occur and that nothing exists are merely two ways of saying the same thing. This is the doctrine which Berkeley made famous by his celebrated saying "esse is percipi" or "to be is to be perceived." Objects exist if they can be perceived by some mind, for this is exactly what it means to say that a thing exists. The only exception to this statement consists in affirming the existence of that which does the perceiving. In other words, we may say that existence consists either in perceiving or in being perceived: "Some truths there are so near and obvious that a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth . . . have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known." According to John Locke's interpretation of human understanding, the qualities which are associated with objects may be designated as secondary and primary. Secondary qualities include such items as color, taste, sound, and temperature. Primary qualities include size, weight, and motion. Locke had argued that the secondary qualities belong only to the minds that perceive them, but primary qualities belong to the objects and exist in them whether they are perceived by any knowing mind or not. The reason for this distinction was that secondary qualities vary with different individuals, and even for one person they will vary according to the conditions under which they are experienced. An object that will appear to some persons as red or green will not appear that way to someone who is color blind. For the person who is not color blind, the object will not appear the same way if it is seen in a bright light or seen in a darkened room. Sounds will also vary depending on whether the person who hears is slightly deaf or in full possession of the normal ability to hear. It will vary again according to the distance from the object that is heard or the medium through which the sound is communicated. Whether an object is hot or cold will be determined to some extent by what one has been doing before the object is felt. These variations indicated to Locke and to the many persons who had accepted his analysis that secondary qualities could not be in the objects themselves. Their existence must therefore be in the minds of those who perceive them. This, however, was not the case in regard to primary qualities, for these belong to the objects themselves and their existence is in no way dependent on any perceiving or knowing mind. It seemed quite obvious to Locke that the size, weight, and motion associated with any particular thing must belong to the external object rather than to the mind, which is merely the instrument by means of which it can be known. Berkeley was in complete agreement with Locke so far as secondary qualities are concerned, but he did not accept the distinction which Locke had made between primary and secondary qualities. On the contrary, he held that if secondary qualities exist only in the mind, the same must be true of primary qualities. Locke's argument concerning secondary qualities had been based on the fact that these qualities vary with different persons and even for the same person when experienced under different or changed conditions. Berkeley now calls attention to the fact that the same thing is true of the primary qualities. The size of an object does not appear to be the same when viewed at a distance and when seen at close range. The same object may appear to be heavy if one lifts it when he is tired, but it will seem to be considerably lighter if he lifts it when he is feeling fresh and vigorous. Even the motion of an object will appear to vary according to the circumstances under which it is observed. This can be made clear from a modern

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www.cliffs.com example. The motion of a train appears to us to be quite different if seen from a platform which does not move and when it is seen from another train which is moving in the opposite direction. If variations in the way in which things appear is evidence that secondary qualities exist only in perceiving minds, the same should be true of primary qualities. This is the conclusion which Berkeley accepts, and it means that all qualities, including both secondary and primary ones, exist only in the minds that are capable of perceiving them. Another reason for rejecting Locke's belief that objects can and do exist independent of any mind was the impossibility of conceiving of a substance which might remain after the qualities which are admitted to be in the mind have been removed. If one accepts Locke's view that colors, sounds, tastes, and other secondary qualities are only in the mind and then asks what there is left after these qualities have been excluded from the objects, the answer will be that it is nothing at all. Can one imagine an object that has no color, makes no sound, has no taste, and imparts no sense of touch or any other sensory quality? Berkeley says that he cannot, and he believes that he has good reasons for saying that no one else can do so either. In other words, it is his deep conviction that objects are composed of their sensory qualities and nothing more, and since these are in the mind, it follows that all objects must be regarded in the same way. There can be no substance or substratum that remains after all of the sensory qualifies have been eliminated. Those who assert the independent existence of matter are unable to tell us what it is without making some reference to the mind. Thomas Hobbes, for example, had attempted to define matter by naming two of its characteristics. He had said that matter or body is that which exists independent of mind, and it is that which occupies space. The first of these is purely negative apart from the reality of mind, and the second one is likewise dependent on mind, for space is defined as that which is capable of causing the idea of space. In other words, it is impossible to describe matter in terms of anything other than mind. The reason for this is that matter does not refer to anything that really exists. The word is merely an abstraction, and it has previously been shown that abstract terms do not refer to any concrete reality. Once more Berkeley points out that if such a thing as matter did exist, it would be impossible for anyone to know that it existed, for something that is other than mind and composed of a kind of substance that is totally different from mind could not act upon mind in a causal way. If matter is spatial, as those who have asserted its existence have claimed, and mind is something that is non-spatial, it is the height of absurdity to suppose that the one could act upon the other. One material object might act in a causal way on another material object, or that which is spiritual in nature might act on something else that is spiritual, but whatever is non-spiritual or spatial in character cannot move or influence that which is spiritual. Because we do have an awareness of objects that are external to our minds and we do believe that these objects are causally related to this awareness, it seems most reasonable to conclude that these objects are composed of the same kind of substance as our minds. This, according to Berkeley, is the only basis which can provide an adequate explanation for our ability to know anything about objects which are external to our individual minds. If it is assumed that the ideas which exist in the minds of the perceivers are like the objects that are known without being identical with them, one may ask how it would be possible for a spiritual object which is non-spatial to be like a material object which is spatial. Obviously, ideas can be like the objects for which they stand only if they are composed of the same kind of substance. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS Having stated the main arguments in support of his thesis concerning the nonexistence of matter, Berkeley attempts to answer the objections raised by those who are skeptical of the view which he has presented. This is, in one respect, a very important part of his presentation since it was designed to correct many of the misinterpretations of his doctrine as well as to reply to the criticisms which had been offered

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www.cliffs.com against it. The first and most natural reaction to his position relative to the nonexistence of matter was that his view constituted a denial of the reality of all the substantial things that are found in nature. What his critics understood his teaching to mean was that the sun, moon, stars, rivers, mountains, trees, and other objects have no real existence that is external to individual minds. They are nothing more than ideas existing in the minds of those who happen to be thinking about them. This certainly appears to be a ridiculous position which not only contradicts the evidence of the senses, but makes it impossible to distinguish between things that are real and those which are mere figments of the human imagination. Berkeley's reply is to the effect that his doctrine of the nonexistence of matter deprives us of nothing which exists in the order of nature. He is not denying the reality of external objects, nor is he making it impossible to distinguish between that which has a real existence and that which is purely imaginary. All that he has been asserting is that objects do not have an existence that is apart from or independent of some perceiving mind. If it is admitted that objects are composed of their sensible qualities and nothing more, their existence has not been brought into question by asserting their dependence on some perceiving mind. It is generally recognized that colors, sounds, tastes, for example, can exist only in the minds that perceive them. It is when these objects are said to be composed of a corporeal of material substance which cannot be perceived by the senses that their existence is brought into question. In this case, it is not the existence of the objects that is denied but rather the existence of the so-called material substance out of which they are supposed to have been made. Distinctions between things which do have a real existence and that which is pure fantasy can be made by giving attention to the way in which perceptions occur and also the degree of clearness and intensity which characterizes their appearance. Some perceptions can with certain limitations be produced at one's pleasure by merely thinking about them. Others are not subject to control by an act of will but take place in accordance with the laws of nature and in a regular and orderly manner. For example, you cannot shut your eyes and determine by an act of will what you will see as soon as you open them. Neither can you control the taste of an orange or the temperature you will feel when your hand is brought into contact with an object that is hot or cold. You can, however, imagine how an orange will look or taste even though there are no oranges within range of any of your sense organs. The perceptions which are not subject to an act of will are the ones which reveal real objects, and the ones which are produced by an act of will when I choose to think about them are the imaginary or fantastical ones. Again, this distinction is made even more definite by the fact that the perceptions of real objects are clearer and more intense than the ones which are pure fantasy. In fact, the latter may be said to be only ideas or faint reflections of the former. Some critics have insisted that it would have been more appropriate to designate real objects as things rather than ideas. Berkeley's reason for rejecting this terminology is that the word thing is in the popular mind associated with material substance, and this connotation is something that he wants to avoid. The word idea is preferred because it refers only to that which is mental and does not include the something more then mental which is usually implied by the word thing. Another popular objection to Berkeley's theory concerning the non-existence of matter has been urged on the grounds that it is possible to see objects at a distance. It is said that the sun, moon, and stars cannot be in any perceiving mind because they are seen to be far removed in space from the person who is aware of them. This point was discussed at considerable length in A New Theory of Vision, and in reply to this objection Berkeley calls attention to the arguments presented in his earlier publication. He reminds his detractors that sight and touch are two separate and distinct sensations. One does not experience the sensation of touch by means of the organs of vision, nor does one have vision by means of the sensation of touch. Space is not something that can be seen. Neither can it be experienced directly by any one of the senses. What actually takes place when one thinks that he is seeing objects at a distance is a visual sensation which has come to be regarded as a sign of a touch sensation which will occur when a certain course of procedure has been followed. What takes place is a certain sequence of sensations, and it cannot be denied that these are experiences of the mind.

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Does the doctrine concerning the nonexistence of matter imply that real objects are annihilated whenever we stop thinking about them and are created again when once more they enter our minds? Apparently this is what many persons thought that it meant. It must be admitted that many of the statements made in connection with it do suggest this meaning even if they do not necessarily imply it. Sensations do exist in perceiving minds, and it is not unreasonable to suppose they come into being or perish along with the consciousness of the individuals who experience them. But to say that objects are created or annihilated according to what takes place in an individual's mind is not only contrary to common sense, but fails to account for the orderly and systematic manner in which the perceptions occur. If this is the meaning that is implied in Berkeley's doctrine, no one could be blamed for rejecting it. In replying to this objection, Berkeley tries to make it clear that this interpretation of his doctrine is an unwarranted one even though he does not abandon the idea that the existence of objects consists in their being perceived. Since real objects are nothing more than collections of sensations and the sensations of any particular individual come into being or cease to exist according to his states of consciousness, it is important to note that what does not exist at a given moment in one person's mind is nevertheless present in some other mind. In other words, the continued permanent existence of objects does not imply that the sensations of which they are composed remain continuously in the mind of any one person. All that Berkeley wishes to maintain is that the existence of real objects is necessarily dependent on some mind. He mentions in this connection that the person who holds that objects have an independent existence is thereby thinking about them, and at least to this extent they are present in his mind. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that objects such as the sun, moon, stars, and the earth remain in existence when they are not present in the consciousness of any human being. Doesn't this mean that their existence is independent of any perceiving mind? According to Berkeley, it does not, for he tells us that objects which are not present in human minds are still present in the mind of God. By insisting that all reality is dependent on the mind of God, Berkeley was not introducing a doctrine that was entirely new, for this had long been accepted as an essential element in the Christian view of life and the world. By making use of it in this connection, he wanted to make it clear that his position concerning the nonexistence of matter was in perfect accord with a long established Christian belief. That God is a spirit rather than a corporeal organism and that all reality was not only created by him but is constantly sustained by him were beliefs that were in no sense foreign to the Christian tradition. In fact, the doctrine of divine creation was in some instances interpreted to mean that instead of a single act which occurred at a particular time, it is a continual process which is taking place whenever old tissues or cells of one's body are being replaced by new ones. Berkeley was convinced that belief in God was logically necessary in order to account for the processes involved in the acquisition of knowledge. His statement about ideas being in the mind of God when they are not present in human minds did, however, give rise to a number of questions which caused some people to doubt the validity of his entire theory. Why, for example, should it be necessary for all the orderly processes which are found in nature to be used for the accomplishment of a particular end or goal when this could have been brought about just as well by divine fiat or the performance of a miracle? Does not the theory which denies the reality of matter do violence to what the physical scientists have called the laws of nature? The answer which is given to this question is to the effect that the laws of nature remain in full force and are not altered in any way by the view which has been presented. In fact, their operation can be given a more satisfactory explanation on this basis than is possible in any other way. The fact that sensations which are not caused by an act of will on our part do occur in an orderly and systematic manner is an indication that they are governed by some mind and directed toward some end or goal. If they occurred merely by chance and there was no order to their appearance, scientific knowledge would be impossible and the processes of nature could not be used for the satisfaction of human needs. Furthermore, if the objects of nature were composed of a so-called material substance which is not

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www.cliffs.com directed or moved by an intelligent mind, there would be no order in the process. On the other hand, if material substances are moved by some mind, we are faced with the insoluble problem of mind which is non-spatial acting on matter which is spatial. These difficulties are eliminated by the denial of any material or non-perceiving substance. Finally, there is the objection that the belief in the reality of matter is so nearly universal that one can scarcely hold the opinions of so many persons to be entirely wrong. It is true that the opinion of the majority of persons in any given society is no proof that the views which have been expressed are true. We all know of many instances in which false opinions and ill-founded prejudices have been passed on from one generation to another. This is especially true among persons who are not accustomed to reflect deeply on these matters, and this includes the great majority of people in any civilized society. Since the main point at issue is the question of the existence or the nonexistence of an independent substance called matter, it seems appropriate to show how the belief in its existence originated and why it has persisted for so long a time and is still accepted as true by the majority of persons. The explanation which Berkeley offers is that the belief in the existence of matter arose because people knew that they experienced sensations which had not been caused by any act of will on their part. They did not of their own accord determine what sensations they would experience or the order in which they occurred. Since they did not cause the sensations themselves, it seemed most reasonable to conclude that the cause must have been something that was entirely independent of their own minds. Although no one had the faintest idea of what matter by itself would be like, it did serve as a convenient name for whatever might be regarded as the cause of the sensations which they experienced. To be sure, they were not aware of the contradictions and absurdities involved in this description of what was taking place in their own minds, but then people in general do not stop to think about all the implications of the views which they hold at any given time. So long as these ideas appear to be satisfactory and in harmony with the facts of ordinary experience, they do not worry about any of the inconsistencies involved in their way of thinking. While it is true that philosophers have usually recognized that the objects of perception such as color and sound do not exist apart from the mind, many of them have been guilty of a similar error by supposing that objects of some kind do have an existence that is independent of any mind. The reason for this supposition is again the fact of their awareness that the cause of these perceptions is not to be found within themselves. Finding it necessary to assign the cause to something that is independent of their own minds, they have selected the term matter to designate what it is. But like the non-philosophers who have been doing the same thing, they have failed to consider the insoluble difficulties which this supposition involves. They have been unaware of the absurdity that is implied in postulating as the cause of an idea something that consists of an entirely different kind of substance and which for that reason would never have been able to act on the human mind at all. Even if such a thing as matter did exist, it was generally conceded by those who believed in its existence that it had no power to move itself. How then could it act on someone's mind in a way that would produce sensations? If God, regarded as a spiritual being, is the necessary cause of the motion of material bodies-and this is what is usually believed to be the case--why not avoid the absurdity of a non-spatial spirit acting on a spatial matter and explain the whole process of causation in terms of spirit acting on that which is akin to its own nature? By thus eliminating the concept of a non-thinking matter, we are able to give a more consistent account of sensations and the whole knowing process. We can still furnish an adequate explanation for all of the phenomena of nature, and we can do so without becoming involved in the so-called body-mind problem. CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY In order to understand the full impact of Berkeley's theory concerning the nonexistence of matter, it is necessary to take into account some of the more important logical consequences which follow from it. In

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www.cliffs.com the latter part of the Principles, he enumerates several of them and thus brings to light some additional reasons for the acceptance of his view. He first of all calls attention to the rather obvious fact that the denial of matter will automatically eliminate many of the more troublesome questions that have plagued philosophers over the centuries. A great deal of time and energy has been expended trying to solve problems which are really no problems at all. They are not genuine problems because they are based on a false assumption. Supposing that an independent or non-thinking matter does exist, one is faced with a number of questions which must be answered in some way. Such questions as the following are bound to arise. Can corporeal things think? Is matter infinitely divisible? How can matter, which exists in space, act on mind, which does not exist in space? Can God, who is conceived as Infinite Spirit, have any direct contact with a material world? How can one know whether the ideas that are present in his own mind correspond in any reliable manner to the material objects which are entirely independent of that mind? No one has been able to provide a satisfactory answer to these questions, and even if they could it would be of little use to do so since they are not real questions having to do with the facts of human life and the world. Berkeley believes that those who have been dealing with these questions have "raised a cloud of dust and then complained that they could not see." It should be no small gain for philosophy to be rid of those pseudo-problems so that attention can be given to real ones. His most serious objection to belief in the existence of matter is the fact that the implications of the belief are likely to lead to both skepticism and atheism. It leads toward skepticism because of the impossibility of the mind ever knowing anything about that which is utterly foreign to its own nature. It can know that which is like itself in the sense that it is composed of the same kind of substance, but it cannot know that which consists of an entirely different type of substance. Colors, sounds, tastes, and any of the secondary qualities can be known as sensations which are present in the mind, but when these are interpreted as images or even as representing objects which are non-mental in character, there is no way of obtaining information concerning the nature of the objects for which they stand. The existence of matter, which is inert and neither thinks, feels, nor cares, does not furnish any basis for belief in an Infinite Spirit which caused and which now sustains all that really exists. A universe that is conceived to consist of matter and nothing more will have no place for belief in God, souls, or spiritual substance. Skepticism, materialism, and atheism are closely related, and all three of them are directly associated with belief in matter. While denial of the existence of matter may not remove all of the arguments used in support of these three doctrines, it certainly eliminates one of the most important factors on which they are based. One of the best safeguards against skepticism and atheism consists in defining what we mean by such words as thing, reality, existence, idea, and spirit. For the sake of avoiding the confusion which is always a result of the ambiguous use of words, Berkeley indicates the specific meaning which he attaches to each of these terms. By thing he means that which has being or existence. It includes ideas, spirits, relations, and whatever is an object of thought. There is an important distinction between ideas and spirits, and both of them differ in certain respects from relations. Ideas are said to be inert and passive. They are fleeting and perishable, having no existence in and of themselves but are altogether dependent on the minds which perceive them. In contrast with ideas, spirits are active, indivisible, and imperishable substances. We do not have ideas of spirits in the same sense that we do of the objects which belong to the world of nature. In fact, we do not in the strict sense of the word have ideas of spirits because there are no particular sensations through which they may be known. Although we do not have ideas of spirits, we do have notions of them. A notion differs from an idea in that it does not have its origin in a sense perception. Rather it is an immediate awareness or an intuition. We have a notion of our own existence or selfhood, but we do not have an idea of it. Existence refers either to that which perceives or that which is perceived. It is only minds or spirits that can perceive, and apart from them nothing can exist. This, of course, follows from the very definition that has been given to existence. Ideas are said to be real when they are impressed on the mind from without. This means that their appearance is not something over which the mind or spirit has control. The ideas of houses, trees, rivers, are real in the sense that when we open our eyes the objects we see are there whether we wish to see them or not. On the other hand, the ideas which we form at our

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www.cliffs.com own pleasure are fantasies or mere imagination. It is by intuition or immediate awareness that we have a notion of our own existence, and it is through reason that we have a notion of other selves as well as a notion of the existence of God and of the relation of objects to one another. This explains at least to some extent the distinction made between ideas and notions. It is true that the word idea is often used with such a broad connotation that it refers to anything that is an object of thought. However, there are many things that we can think about which are not experienced by the senses, and yet we would not want to deny their existence. By stating that we can have a notion of these objects without having an idea of them, we can affirm their existence and still maintain that ideas consist only of sensations in the minds of those who perceive them. In other words, ideas refer to some of the things that exist but not to all of them. Sometimes it has been argued that we have no right to believe in the existence of God because he has not been seen or experienced through any of the senses. By defining carefully the meaning of the word idea, that error can be avoided. Once the terminology which Berkeley has been using has been made clear, it becomes evident that his theory concerning the nonexistence of matter does not detract in any way from belief in the reality of those particular objects which make up the world of nature as it is experienced in our daily lives. Neither does it deny the reality of our own existence, the existence of other persons, the reality of God, or the relation of objects to one another. All of these can exist without the affirmation of a so-called material substance which is foreign to the nature of mind. By accounting for their reality in terms of a spiritual substance which is akin to the mind itself, we can explain our own experiences in a more intelligible manner, and we remove at the same time the essential basis upon which atheism and irreligion have been built. By denying the existence of matter, we likewise remove one of the main sources of what is known as Idolatry. It seems incredible that people would bow down and worship the sun, moon, stars, or any other physical object if they realized they were only sensations existing in and depending on the minds of those who perceive them. People would not readily worship their own ideas if they knew what they were doing. One consequence of the denial of matter would be the tendency to make the object of their worship something that has permanent significance, and this can be found only in that "Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things." Another advantage of the Berkeleyan doctrine is that it removes some of the major objections which have been urged against articles of faith in the Christian religion. For example, the followers of Socinius have rejected the belief in the resurrection of Jesus, as well as that of a life after death for any of his disciples. The reason for this skepticism lies in the fact that they have interpreted survival of death to mean continuity of the same physical body that one had during the course of his life. Knowing that physical bodies are constantly changing and the elements out of which they are composed are perishable, it was deemed utterly incredible that the same elements which were present before death would continue on into a future life. Had these followers of Socinius realized that the doctrine of the resurrection means a continuation of the form rather than some material substance of a personality, they would have had no occasion for rejecting it. The only point in dispute was that of the identity of material substance which appears under different forms. Take away this so-called material substance and the objections which have been raised concerning belief in the resurrection will vanish at once. It would then be understood that bodies which can be seen and felt are like other ideas which consist of their sensible qualities; for that reason, they belong to the mind. Having a mental rather than a non-mental character, they are not the fleeting and perishable things that would be true if they were composed of a material substance. Another consequence of the denial of matter is a clearer understanding of the meaning of abstract terms. It is only through an erroneous interpretation of these terms that the belief in a material substance has been established. Matter is an abstract term, and the same is true of space, extension, weight, and motion. Because we are accustomed to think of objects existing in space and having weight and motion, it would appear to be impossible for them to be in, or even dependent on, minds, which are non-spatial and which

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www.cliffs.com do not possess either size or weight. Hence, it has seemed necessary to develop the notion of a material substance in which objects having size and weight can have their existence. This type of explanation implies that such terms as matter, space, size, and weight refer to actual concrete objects which belong to the world of nature that is external to any perceiving mind. This, as Berkeley has pointed out on numerous occasions, is a serious error, for abstract terms do not refer to particular things. They are mere signs which refer to future experiences and have to do with all the members of a class of objects, but they have no existence in themselves apart from these particulars. It is in this respect that the understanding of the average layman who has made no serious analysis of the problem is closer to the truth than that of the philosopher who has found it necessary to postulate the reality of things which can never be experienced. The ordinary individual has no difficulty in knowing what is meant when he is asked by a friend to meet him at a certain time and place. He understands that it means he must do certain things in order to keep the appointment. The meaning which he attaches to such terms as time and place is always in terms of past and anticipated experiences. Natural philosophers have long been regarded among the main advocates of skepticism. From their point of view, it has been taken for granted that those who have interpreted reality in terms of a spiritual substance have been guilty of a misunderstanding of the true nature of things. They have, according to the skeptics, been unduly influenced by the mere appearances of things. This, they tell us, is what happens when objects are identified with their sensible qualities. The truth of the matter, they insist, is that back of these appearances there is a reality which gives rise to these appearances. What the nature of this reality is cannot be known, but that it exists independent of any mind that may contemplate it is something that cannot be doubted. It is this unknown something to which they refer when they speak of matter. With regard to this doctrine of the skeptics, Berkeley wishes to show that their assumption of an unknown matter is not only a groundless and unwarranted one but creates far more problems than it solves. He maintains that all of the phenomena included in natural philosophy can be accounted for without the assumption that matter exists, and by so doing one eliminates the many absurdities that are involved when such an assumption is made. One of these absurdities has to do with the cause of motion in these so-called material bodies. In ancient times, it was believed that all material bodies were inert and thus incapable of motion until acted upon by some outside force. In the age in which Berkeley lived, this account of motion had been replaced by the opinion that material bodies contained within themselves the power to move. This power was designated as attraction, and it was held that every body attracts every other body in a manner which can be described in mathematical terms. In connection with this explanation, Berkeley raises a question concerning the nature of that which causes material bodies to attract one another. Is it something that is material? If it is, we may still ask what it is that makes this material cause function in the way that it does. And this leads on into an infinite regress. The only satisfactory answer that can be given concerning the cause of motion is to the effect that this power of attraction is spiritual in nature. The only way we have of understanding what power to move things really means is through an analogy with our own experience. If it is an act of will that enables one to raise his arm when he wishes to do so, it is reasonable to conclude that what causes things to move in the world of nature is something like that which occurs when a person wills to do something. Since the act of willing is spiritual in nature, what better explanation can be given for the power of attraction found in bodies than to say that it too is spiritual in nature? Since Spirit can act only on substances that are of like nature, it follows that the objects which are moved, like the power of attraction that causes them to move, must be composed of a spiritual substance. Berkeley's account of the way in which abstract general terms have been misinterpreted is illustrated again in what he has to say about the science of mathematics and its relation to the objects which belong to the world of nature. Sir Isaac Newton, along with other mathematicians and physicists, had assumed that the concepts used in their investigations refer to things which have actual existence in the external world. Thus they regarded space as an entity which is independent of mind. They taught that the objects of nature which are experienced through the senses are located in this space. Time and motion were

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www.cliffs.com likewise held to be realities that exist in the outside world. All of this tended to support the view that material substance must exist, for it would be absurd to believe that bodies are in space and at the same time to maintain they are in the mind, which does not exist in space. The error involved in this argument was a false interpretation of the meaning of abstract terms. To correct this error, Berkeley calls attention to the fact that neither space, time, nor motion has ever been experienced directly by the senses. It is true that these terms have reference to entire classes of experiences, but they have no existence apart from particular sensations, and these are admitted by everyone to belong to the mind. In the science of arithmetic, reference is made to numbers, and because names are given to these numbers, it is natural to think of them as though they were particular things. But this is a mistake, for there is no such thing as unity or any of the other numbers when taken by themselves. To be sure, the science of arithmetic is very useful because of the way in which it can be applied to things, but it is the particular objects that have existence rather than the numbers which are applied to them. Geometry has to do with spatial relations, which again can be applied to things but which do not have any independent existence. The denial of matter, along with the affirmation of spiritual substance, has the further consequence of supporting a belief in the immortality of the soul. So long as the soul of man is identified with a material body or is in any way dependent on that kind of a substance, it is subject to all the changes, states of decomposition, and decay which are characteristic of objects of that kind. Nothing is more obvious than the fact that physical bodies as we know and understand them come into existence and are also perishable. If souls, like bodies, were nothing more than passive ideas which belong to the mind, they would be subject to all the changes and dissolutions which take place in natural bodies. But souls are not passive ideas. They are not in the strict sense of the word ideas at all. We do have notions of them and know they are active rather than passive. In this respect, they are as different from passive ideas as light is different from darkness. Souls are not only immaterial, as is true of all natural bodies, but active, uncompounded, and therefore indivisible and immortal. Finally, the doctrine of the nonexistence of matter has a most important bearing on one's belief in God. The regularity and the order which characterizes our sensations of the objects which belong to the world of nature is not something that is governed by human or finite minds. We cannot by an act of will on our part change any of the regularities which we recognize as the laws of nature, nor do we suppose for a moment that the objects which we perceive at a given time cease to exist when we are no longer thinking about them. These objects do not depend for their existence on the mind of any particular human being or for that matter any group of individuals. The objects which we see in a room have not been annihilated just because we have given our attention to other things and are no longer perceiving them. The evidence for this can be seen in the fact that we are able to perceive them again when we return to the room after an interval of time. Their existence in the meantime demands a causal explanation. The only adequate cause for the reappearance of these sensations lies in the view that they have been present in the mind of an Infinite Being, who is not only the creator but the sustainer of all that exists. This is in harmony with the Christian doctrine which says concerning God, "In Him we live and move and have our being." Without reference to the mind of God, we cannot explain the variety of phenomena which make up the world of our experience, nor could we account for the moral standards which are essential for any valid distinction between actions which are right and those that are wrong. It has been argued that we have no evidence to support a belief in God because no one has seen him; since we have no sensations of God, we can have no idea of his existence. Now it is true that we have no direct sensation of God, but this does not mean that we have no knowledge about him. We do have a notion of God in the same way that we have a notion of spirits or selves other than our own. We have visual sensations of other persons' bodies and auditory sensations of the words which they speak, but we do not have any sensations of the spirit or selfhood which we identify with the particular individuals that we know. Our knowledge or understanding of these selves is always an inference based on the sensations that

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www.cliffs.com have been observed. A person's body, as well as his actions and the words that he speaks, is partial expression of the spirit that constitutes his real self. We may say that the observed facts are the evidence for his existence. It is in this manner that we arrive at whatever notion we have concerning the nature and existence of God. The whole realm of nature as it is disclosed to us through the senses testifies to the reality of the Infinite Spirit which we call God. His presence in the universe is analogous to that of the spirit which finds expression in the body and actions of a human being. Because the realm of nature is so vast in comparison with the facts that have to do with the life of any individual, we may say that the evidence for the existence of God is far greater than that which we have for the existence of another person like ourselves.

THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS The novelty of Berkeley's thesis concerning the denial of the existence of a material substance was so contrary to the popular conception of things that he did not expect the average layman to understand what he had been saying or to the sympathetic toward the position which he advocated. He did, however, hope for a more favorable reaction on the part of the recognized scholars. He felt sure that they would understand his arguments, and even if they were not convinced of the soundness of his views, they would at least be ready to express their disagreements with him and to tell why they were opposed to his doctrine. With this expectation in mind, he had asked his friend Sir John Percival to obtain for him the opinions of several prominent men of letters concerning the argument of the book. The reply which he received was most disappointing, for he was informed that the book had not only failed to convince anyone that he had presented a sound argument, but men of a scholarly reputation had regarded his thesis as ridiculous. Some of them had refused to read it, and others had insisted that the author must have been out of his right mind and was in need of medical treatment. From the comments that had been made concerning the contents of the book, it was evident to Berkeley that those who had read it did not understand what he had been saying. They had accused him of being a skeptic and of denying the existence of things perceived by the senses. It was said that he denied the creation story recorded in the book of Genesis by insisting that all reality has its existence in the Eternal Mind of God. Berkeley held that these accusations were based on a misinterpretation of what he had written, for he had not denied the existence of the objects of sense, and he still regarded the creation story of the Bible as a reliable account of the manner in which particular objects had been made perceptible to human minds. Even so distinguished a scholar as Dr. Samuel Clarke had refused to discuss the argument of the book with Berkeley, although he did admit in one of his later writings that the nonexistence of matter was conceivable but only on the assumption that the Supreme Being of the universe was a deceiver who took delight in fooling the people whom he had created. Because he was so deeply convinced of the soundness of his own position, Berkeley reasoned that the chief cause of the poor reception given to his book was the manner in which his arguments had been presented. He believed that his style of writing had been too pedantic to attract the interest of the average reader and that it was not suited to stimulate further inquiry on the part of those who were unsympathetic toward his thesis. Accordingly, he decided to present the same views in a new and different form. He would present his ideas in the form of a dialogue and develop the thesis of the book as a series of conversations carried on by two persons who were anxious to explore the various aspects of the problem in order to arrive at the truth concerning it. This manner of presentation would be comparatively easy for anyone to follow, and it would provide ample opportunity for consideration of all the objections that might be raised against the main thesis of the book. It would also be possible to correct any false interpretations of what the doctrine really meant. The dialogues consisted of conversations between Hylas and Philonous. Hylas was a dualist who believed

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www.cliffs.com in the existence of matter as well as that of mind. Philonous, who represented Berkeley's own position, was one who not only defended the idea of the nonexistence of matter but was able to point out the inconsistencies and absurdities involved in the position advocated by Hylas. In the end, he was able to convince him that there is no good reason for believing in the existence of matter. The use of the dialogue as an instrument for the presentation of philosophical views had been used quite effectively by many writers long before the time of Berkeley. It was used by Plato, which was probably one of the reasons why his philosophy had been read with so much interest and by so many people. Berkeley had hopes that the use of this method would have similar results in his case. Then, too, it would enable him to correct some of the false interpretations of his views that had been expressed by his critics. In the first of the three dialogues an attempt is made to explain, with illustrations, the contradictory character and the meaningless implications of the common philosophical opinion that we perceive a material world which is real only insofar as it is independent of a perceiving mind. This is the view expressed by Hylas at the beginning of the dialogues. He remarks that it seems strange to him that the average person who has thought very little about the problem should understand the real nature of things so much better than the philosophers who, with all of their leisure time for thinking about it, have arrived at such confused and absurd notions as to deny the existence of matter. He is referring in this connection to a discourse delivered by Philonous on the previous evening in which the assertion was made that there is no such thing as a material substance in the world. Hylas had been shocked by this statement. It appeared to him that it was utterly fantastic and ridiculous. He regarded it as contrary to the evidence of the senses and a position which was not only repugnant to common sense but an example of skepticism, with all of the unfortunate consequences that go along with it. What, he asks, could be more obvious than the plain fact that material objects can be both seen and felt? Anyone who doubts the existence of sensible objects must be a skeptic, and on this basis one can scarcely maintain that knowledge of any kind is possible. In his reply to these statements, Philonous makes two corrections to what Hylas has just been saying. In the first place, skepticism is not something that can always be identified with belief in the nonexistence of matter. Skepticism does imply doubt, but one may doubt the nonexistence of matter just as much as one may doubt its opposite, the existence of matter. There are two sides to every belief, and whatever it is that one believes to be true, he will necessarily be skeptical or doubtful about the opposite belief. Since this is true, it should be clear that Philonous is no more skeptical than Hylas. They are only skeptical about different things. Second, it is pointed out that Hylas is mistaken when he charges that Philonous does not believe in the existence of sensible things. All that he has insisted upon in this connection is that sensible objects do not exist apart from, or independent of, some mind in which the sensations occur. This does not deny the existence of sensible objects, nor does it imply that they go out of existence whenever one ceases to think about them. As the conversation continues, Philonous attempts to prove that belief in matter not only leads to skepticism but implies a whole series of paradoxes and absurdities. He begins with a discussion concerning the nature of heat. He asks Hylas if there are different degrees of heat and if some of them are painful and others pleasant. When Hylas admits that this is true, he is asked again if it is possible for either pain or pleasantness to exist apart from some mind. Obviously this would be impossible. Since the same object will be hot to one person but cold to another, if one holds that these qualities are in the object, it would follow that the object is both hot and cold at the same time, and this is plainly a selfcontradiction. When Hylas admits that the so-called secondary qualities belong to the mind rather than the object, it is pointed out that the argument which leads to this conclusion applies equally well to the primary qualities. Furthermore, if one imagines that all of the secondary qualities are removed from an object, it is inconceivable that anything would be left to have a separate existence. In spite of the admissions he has been forced to make, Hylas is reluctant to abandon his position. He still

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www.cliffs.com insists that, although the qualities which have been mentioned belong to the mind, there is outside of the mind a material substance which causes these sensations to appear as they do. This is what people in general believe to be true, and he sees no reason why anyone should doubt it. Philonous asks whether this so-called material substance is a sensible thing, and, of course, Hylas must reply that it is not, for otherwise he would be admitting that it belongs to the mind. But if it is not a sensible thing, he is asked how it would be possible for that which is not sensible to be the cause of something that is sensible. Anything of this kind would, if it occurs, be a clear violation of the principle that a cause must be of a like nature with its effect. This principle has generally been recognized as a valid one, and there is no good reason for believing in the existence of something which would necessarily be in violation of it. This, according to Philonous, is one of the absurdities that is involved in the position which Hylas has been trying to defend. Another one which is equally objectionable is implied in the notion that an independent material substance is the cause of sensations which occur in the mind. This can be seen from the fact that matter, in order to be a cause of sensations, must act upon that which comes into direct contact with the sense organs. Since matter is regarded as something that is inert, it does not by itself have the power to put things in motion. Indeed, if there is any power in matter, it should be perceptible by one or more of the senses. Hylas has admitted that this is not the case. Still, he thinks it is possible that power and motion may have genuine existence even though they are not particular things which can be perceived. He suggests that it is power in general or motion in general which produces the sensations. When this suggestion is offered, he is reminded by Philonous that abstract terms which stand for general or universal ideas may be formed by the imagination, but they do not refer to objects which have actual existence. As the dialogue closes, it is evident that Hylas has no way of refuting the arguments which Philonous has presented. However, he is not ready to abandon his conviction that a material substance does exist. He will try again at a later date to find arguments to support his position. In the second dialogue, Hylas states that, in spite of all that has been said in their previous discussions, he finds that he is unable to reject the view that it is material objects external to any mind which cause sensations to appear. This, he maintains, is the view of ordinary common sense, and he sees no good reason why it should be abandoned. According to this view, it is the material objects which produce movements that are transmitted through some medium to the sense organs, and then by means of nerve fibers, these movements are transmitted to the particular part of the brain which gives rise to the sensations that occur. This means that the brain, which is a material object, has been stimulated by other material objects, and it is these movements of physical, or material, things that is the cause of sensations and the ideas that are formed from them. Philonous expresses some surprise at this account of the origin of ideas, and he asks Hylas if the brain about which he has been speaking is a sensible object. Hylas sees at once that he would be trapped if he answered in the affirmative, and in order to avoid this difficulty, he replies that it is not the brain that can be perceived that he has been talking about but rather one that can be imagined. This leads to even greater difficulties, for it seems to imply that Hylas is denying the reality of things that can be perceived, and if this is the case, it means that Hylas is more skeptical than those who have denied the reality of matter. To deny all the order, beauty, and grandeur of the world of nature would indeed be an absurd position. Philonous does not need to deny the existence of any of the perceived objects, for while they are not continuously present in any of the human minds, it is quite possible that they are always present in the mind of God. This last statement brings forth another comment from Hylas, who reminds Philonous that this explanation of objects being present in the mind of God is not anything new. It has been held by the scholastic philosophers and by others who have believed in the reality of matter, for they too have said that it is in God that all things exist since, according to the sacred scriptures, it is in Him that "we live and move and have our being." Philonous replies that there is a real difference between his view and the one

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www.cliffs.com that Hylas has mentioned. The people to whom he referred believed in God first and then accepted the reality of particular things as a consequence of that belief. In his case, the procedure has been reversed since his starting point was the actual facts of conscious experience, including not only the sensations but the orderly and systematic way in which they occur. It is from these facts that he infers the existence of God as the cause and the sustainer of all that exists. He points out, too, that his view differs from that of Malebranche, who taught that all things are present in the mind of God but who also believed in the reality of an external material world and who said that it is our senses that deceive us in regard to the nature of things. After being reminded again of the absurdities involved in supposing that the movements of material bodies can be identified with such sensations as colors and sounds, Hylas still persists in his belief that there must be something external to the mind which causes the sensations to appear. Although he recognizes the difficulties involved in knowing what the nature of this cause may be, he ventures to state that he gives the name matter to whatever it is that produces the sensations. Philonous objects to this way of handling the problem on the grounds that he has no right to use the word matter if he means by it something that is altogether different from what other people have in mind when they use the same word. To mean by the word matter something that is not perceived, nor is even suggested by what is perceived, is both meaningless and absurd. Furthermore, it is not something that can be demonstrated by reason, nor can it be supported as an article of faith, which presupposes an interaction between mind and that which is altogether different from mind. The only consistent view, he says, is the one which maintains that the concrete realities which exist are sensations which are passive and spirits which are active. This is a kind of concrete realism which recognizes the dependence of the whole world on the active living Spirit which is God. In the third dialogue, Hylas has ceased to defend the belief in a material substance, but he now takes the position that it is impossible to know the real nature of things since all that we can ever be sure about is the way things appear to us. The notion of a material substance, he admits, is nothing more than hypothesis, and since this can no longer be defended, he feels equally sure that any hypothesis which Philonous may offer will fare no better. Philonous insists that he is not offering any hypothesis concerning the nature of things. Rather, he accepts the common, or vulgar, notion that things are just what they appear to be. In other words, a red color is just a red color or a loud sound is a loud sound and that is all there is to it. However, these colors and sounds do not cease to exist when a particular person is no longer conscious of them. They may exist in the minds of other persons and are also present in the mind of God. Hylas then asks if it is not just as impossible to perceive the mind of God as it is to perceive a material substance, and if so, why it is not just as valid to believe in the one as it is in the other. Philonous admits that no one can perceive the mind of God any more than he can perceive the active spirit that constitutes one as a person. But one can have a notion of the mind of God just as he may have a notion of himself or of any other person. His refusal to accept the belief in a material substance is not that it would be impossible to have a notion concerning it but rather that the notion would not make sense. It does not provide a consistent interpretation of one's conscious experiences. The notion of a Divine Spirit does provide a consistent interpretation of these experiences, and this is the real test that enables us to distinguish between real objects and the ones that are mere fantasies. Two other points are raised by Hylas, and he asks for an explanation of each of them. The first one has to do with the assertion that sensible objects such as trees and houses have their existence in the mind. Since these objects are generally regarded as having size and occupying space, how is it possible for them to be in a mind that occupies no space at all? This appears to Hylas to be a flat contradiction or, in other words, an inconsistency. How can this be avoided? The reply is that, while the word in carries with it a spatial connotation, this is not the sense in which he is using the word. Furthermore, he is not using it in any unusual sense when he gives it a meaning that is other than its literal meaning. He is only saying that sensible objects are in the mind insofar as they are comprehended by the mind. The other point has to do

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www.cliffs.com with the creation story as it is reported in the book of Genesis. In this story, we are told that objects such as the sun, stars, plants, and animals were in existence prior to the creation of humanity. Does this not indicate quite clearly that the existence of these objects was at one time independent of any perceiving mind? Philonous answers by pointing out that these objects were already in the mind of God before any human beings were created. In addition to this fact, it must be recognized that the creation story was not designed to reveal the ultimate nature of things but rather to indicate the order in which human minds were made conscious of them.

ALCIPHRON: MORAL AND RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY Morals and religion have often been treated by philosophical writers as though they were separate and distinct fields of inquiry, each one of which is entirely independent of the other. Viewed in this way, it has generally been assumed that morality is a purely human product which has been derived from the experiences of the race. Religion, on the other hand, has been regarded as something that has to do with the supernatural and which for that reason cannot be investigated by those methods of procedure which are used in the natural sciences. Accordingly, morality, being a human affair, was a proper subject for philosophy, but since religion was believed to be based primarily on faith, it could not be approached in a rational manner. Although this interpretation of morals and religion had been advocated by many prominent thinkers of his time, Berkeley was of a decidedly different opinion. He believed that these two areas of human experience were so closely related that neither one of them could be understood adequately apart from the other. He did not accept the idea that morality is a purely human product, nor did he believe that religion was in any sense opposed to a rational or consistent interpretation of the nature of things. He regarded morality as essential for the promotion of human welfare, and he was convinced that it could not be sustained apart from those ideas and beliefs that are normally associated with religious experience. In fact, it could be said that the underlying purpose of all of Berkeley's philosophical writings was to provide a reasonable justification for both moral and religious beliefs. This was true of his early as well as his later publications. The chief difference between them was the fact that in his earlier writings he was concerned primarily with a theoretical justification of these beliefs, while in his later works more attention was given to the practical implications which follow from them. Although Berkeley's religious beliefs are to some extent implicit in his New Theory of Vision and the Principles of Human Knowledge, it is in the Alciphron that they are given their most complete expression. This book was published in London in 1731, shortly after his return from Rhode Island, where he had spent about three years while waiting for the money to arrive from England which would make it possible for him to establish a school in Bermuda. The manuscript for the book was written while he was living at Whitehall in Rhode Island. His isolation from contemporary events in Europe and the amount of leisure time at his disposal in the new country afforded ample opportunity for reflection and for writing. His main purpose in writing this book was to set forth in as clear and convincing manner as possible a refutation of the arguments put forth by the so-called freethinkers of the period. These included the ideas that had been popularized by such important thinkers as Thomas Hobbes, Richard Mandeville, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and others who were sympathetic toward their views. The book was written in dialogue form. It is the longest of Berkeley's writings and, for a time at least, was regarded as the most popular of his works. The style of writing is especially clear, even though the arguments used can in many instances be shown to be fallacious. The book consists of seven separate though closely related dialogues. There are five characters in the dialogues. Two of them represent the position of the freethinkers. Two are persons who are opposed to their views, and one serves chiefly as a moderator of the debate. Alciphron, the leading spokesman for the freethinkers, is known as the strong man. However, one should bear in mind that this designation is used in a derisive rather than a complimentary sense. The reason for this is that while Alciphron is strong in his

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www.cliffs.com own opinion of himself, as soon as his arguments are subjected to a careful analysis it becomes evident that they are weak and without any logical foundation. In fact, he is characterized as a minute philosopher, which means that from the intellectual point of view he is a man of very small stature. Lysicles is the other freethinker. He supports the views expressed by Alciphron, but instead of representing the men of letters, as was true of his companion, he illustrates the type of thinking that is more nearly characteristic of the unlettered layman whose primary interest is in the sensual pleasures which one may gain for himself during the course of his life. Euphranor is the chief opponent of the freethinkers. He is a master of argumentation and is especially skillful in bringing to light the weaknesses and inconsistencies involved in the views that are propounded by the freethinkers. Dion, who impersonates Berkeley in the dialogues, is in sympathy with the views held by Euphranor, but he does not speak a great deal. His role is primarily that of the spectator rather than a participant. Crito is the one who moderates the discussion. The arguments which Berkeley has in mind for the purpose of refuting the freethinkers are for the most part to be found in the speeches made by Euphranor. The first dialogue is an introduction to the book as a whole. It consists of an attempt to arrive at some general principles to which all members of the group would be in agreement as a basis for carrying on the discussion. These must include a clear understanding of the points at issue, as well as the methods to be used in resolving them. Alciphron begins by stating that he rejects all of the traditional arguments that have been used to prove the existence of God, for he sees no sense in talking about either a first cause or a final cause of the universe. Neither does he accept the notion of any infallible or authoritative writings as a basis for believing either in miracles or in the immortality of the soul. The only type of argument which he regards as legitimate is that which is natural to humanity. When asked what he means by the term natural, his first reply is that only those beliefs which are universal or common to all human beings can be called natural. As a result of Euphranor's questioning, he is soon forced to amend his original statement. He has to admit that there are many things which he believes to be true that have never been present in the minds of little children or for that matter in the minds of the majority of adult persons. He then explains that these ideas which he holds to be true have been latent in the minds of all persons, although they do not become conscious of them until after certain experiences have taken place. Later in the discussion, Alciphron tries to equate the meaning of the word natural with that which can be experienced through the senses. This, too, is soon shown to be unsatisfactory, and he is forced again to admit that he believes in many things for which there is no direct sensory evidence. Toward the end of the dialogue, Alciphron expresses his agreement with Euphranor and the other members of the group that the real test of moral truth is to promote the good life for all human beings. Having reached this point of agreement, it becomes clear that the subject of the debate will be whether faith in a moral order of the universe, together with a belief in divine Providence and the acceptance of the idea of a future life, is conducive toward promoting the highest good of humanity. Alciphron and his freethinking companion will deny that this is the case, while Euphranor and his associates will maintain that this is true. It is agreed that the question is to be considered on the basis of logical argument alone and without any appeal to some supernatural or non-rational source. The second dialogue is a series of conversations about virtues and vices. Alciphron and Lysicles are attempting a defense of the thesis which had been advanced in Richard Mandeville's book called the Fable of the Bees. In this book, which won the approval of many of the freethinkers of the day, it was asserted that private vices are really public benefits, and for that reason they ought not to be condemned. It was held that a life of sensuous pleasures could be approved not only because of the satisfactions it would bring to the individual and the benefits it would give to society, but because it could be defended in the name of liberty and freedom from the tyranny of coercion by any power which tried to exercise control over the lives of other people. Both Euphranor and Crito ask a number of rather searching questions which prove to be embarrassing to the proponents of this doctrine. Toward the end of the discussion, it is made clear that this manner of living is self-defeating, for it tends to destroy the very values which it sets out to preserve.

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In the third dialogue, attention is given to the ethical views which had been advocated by the Earl of Shaftesbury. According to this writer, the principles of morality are based on the feelings rather than reason. He held that one knows what is good or what is the right thing to do not by any process of reasoning but by a feeling of that which is fitting or appropriate under the particular circumstances in which the judgment is made. We become aware of that which is good in the same way that we become aware of beauty in an object. In both instances, the knowledge is obtained through an intuitive insight and not by a reasoning process. This view concerning the nature of morality had an important bearing on future development of ethical theory, especially among the English philosophers. In Berkeley's day, it was relatively new, and he found it quite unacceptable. In this dialogue, several of the implications of the doctrine are brought to light, all of which seem to indicate that something more than mere feelings is required if one is to explain in a satisfactory manner the demands of the moral aspect of human nature. The fourth dialogue sets forth more of the constructive side of Berkeley's religious philosophy. It is here that he expounds at some length the reasons which constitute the foundation for his belief in the existence of God. Using as an example the type of argument that leads one to believe in the reality of a human person, he shows that this is analogous to the belief in God. In neither case do we have any direct sensory evidence to support the belief, but any reasonable interpretation of that which is sensed leads to a belief in a spiritual existence which acts in a causal way on that which we actually perceive. In the case of a human being, we hear words and we see actions. We interpret the words to be a language spoken by a person, and the actions performed are regarded as an expression of a spirit or mind that is comparable to our own. In the same way, we may think of the world of nature as a kind of language which serves as a means of communication between the Infinite Spirit, or God, and the minds of human beings, who are capable of responding to it. The events which occur from time to time reveal the character of the Supreme Being in much the same way as the actions performed by any individual tell us something about the character of that person. Thus in response to the assertion made by Alciphron and the freethinkers that we have no basis for a belief in God since no one has ever seen him, Euphranor and his fellow theists can say that we have as much reason to support the belief in God as we do for believing in the existence of the soul or personality of a particular individual. In both instances, we infer the existence of an active spirit in order to account for the experiences which come to us through the senses. For this reason, we may say that all nature is an expression of the deity in the same way that one's body and actions constitute evidence for the existence and character of personality. In the three remaining dialogues, the discussion is continued along the lines of specific beliefs that have been associated with the Christian religion and which have often been regarded as essential to it. The question is raised concerning the effects of Christian beliefs upon the conduct of human beings. Have these beliefs promoted or hindered progress toward a greater degree of welfare for society as a whole? The freethinkers are of the opinion that Christian doctrines have been responsible for far more evil in the world than any good which may have resulted from them. They call attention to the bitter conflicts that have taken place between people who differed in their religious beliefs. They mention such items as the persecution of heretics, the so-called holy wars that have been waged, and all manner of superstitious beliefs that have been accepted as a part of the Christian religion. They point out numerous ways in which the intellectual progress of human societies has been hindered by authoritarian sources which have exercised control over the minds of men. The defenders of the Christian faith do not deny that many evil deeds have been carried out by those who have professed a belief in the principles of the Christian religion. Nevertheless, they do insist that deeds of this type are not the necessary consequence of the beliefs to which they have subscribed. The Christian scriptures, as they understand them, set forth the doctrine of love as the basic motive which should govern one's activities in all of his relationships with his fellow men. If the professed followers of the Christian faith have not always lived in accordance with these teachings, the fault is not to be found in the teachings

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www.cliffs.com but rather in the weaknesses of the people who have tried to follow them. The evil deeds have occurred in spite of what the religion has taught but not because of it. Furthermore, the critics of Christianity are reminded of the fact that cruelty, avarice, intolerance, and similar evils are not peculiar to the professed followers of the Christian faith. They have been present to an even greater extent among non-Christians. Even the freethinkers have not been immune to the type of actions which in many instances have been detrimental to the welfare of human beings. When the influence of the teachings of Christianity are compared with that of the so-called pagan nations of the world, it becomes evident that more moral progress has been achieved under Christian influences than has been brought about under any other set of religious beliefs. Alciphron is not silenced by these remarks, and he continues to insist on the evil consequences of Christian beliefs. He charges that many of these beliefs are contrary to reason and the acceptance of them as true means that man has abandoned his proper function as a rational being, and in so doing he has ceased to be the master of his own soul and has become the slave of those who have propagated these false beliefs. More specifically, he launches an attack on such matters as the belief in miracles, the foreknowledge of events which is implied in the fulfillment of prophecies, the doctrine of the Trinity, the notion of divine grace, and the efficacy of such rites and ceremonies as baptism, partaking of the Eucharist, and the making of prayers in order to receive the things that one wants. He holds, too, that such Biblical accounts as the story of the creation, the fall of man by partaking of forbidden fruit, the experiences recorded concerning Jonah and the whale, and many others are so contrary to scientific evidence as to render belief in their validity positively absurd. In the replies which are made to these charges, one finds a statement of Berkeley's own views with reference to many of the beliefs that were generally accepted by the Christians of his day. He was in most respects an orthodox believer, and what he had to say on these points won popular approval among those who were sympathetic with the church and the doctrines which it espoused. However, from the philosophical point of view it must be admitted that his arguments were far from convincing. It is here that one finds the weakest spots in his entire philosophical system. Even in religious circles where Christianity is accepted and belief in the existence of God is not even questioned, the arguments used by Berkeley are not usually regarded as valid. His conception of deity, the nature of miracles, the historical accuracy of Biblical accounts, the meaning of the doctrine of grace, and other elements of the Christian faith have been replaced by interpretations that differ widely from the views that were generally accepted by the Christians of his day. This does not mean that the essential beliefs of Christianity have been rejected because the arguments used by Berkeley have been found to be fallacious, but rather that it was his version of their meaning which is no longer accepted. A few brief illustrations may help to clarify this point. Berkeley's conception of God as set forth in most of his writings is that of a personal Being who is the Creator of the universe, the author of the moral law, the cause of the order and regularity which is observed through the senses, and the one who administers appropriate rewards and punishments for the deeds performed by human beings. His chief argument for belief in the existence of God is what is known as the cosmological argument. This is the argument which affirms that everything which exists must have a cause, and the only adequate cause of the universe is an Infinite Being, which is what is meant by the term God. No other being would be sufficient to account for the beginning of things or for the order which constitutes the laws of nature. This argument was not a new one for Berkeley since it had been used by such eminent thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, John Locke, and many others. The argument is defective in several respects. Some of these defects have been pointed out in the philosophical writings of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and their criticisms have usually been accepted by Christian thinkers of more recent times. From the logical point of view, there is no more reason for saying that the universe had a beginning in space and time than there is for saying that God had a similar beginning. Again, it seems quite evident that the cause and effect relationship, which is perfectly

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www.cliffs.com adequate when applied within the realm of human experience, loses its validity when it is applied to that which lies outside of human experience. This is not a denial of the existence of God but rather a denial of the validity of the argument by which Berkeley sought to prove his existence. Because Berkeley believed that God was an omniscient as well as an omnipotent being, he held that God must know the future as well as the past. This would account for the way in which it was possible for prophecies to be fulfilled. On this assumption, it was conceivable that God could reveal to the prophets events that would come to pass at some future date. The coming to pass of these events in the exact manner in which they had been predicted would be further evidence of the wisdom and power of God. This doctrine would not be so strange if one believed in complete determinism, for on that basis no contradiction would be involved in foreknowledge. But Berkeley was not a determinist. He believed that human beings are free to make choices and that they are responsible for the kind of choices which they make. His task, then, was to harmonize the belief in freedom with the idea that God can tell in advance just what will happen at a given time and place. This obviously involves a contradiction, for if God's foreknowledge concerning specific events is correct and can be predicted in advance of their occurrence, this eliminates the possibility of anything other than these events taking place. In this case, there can be no freedom of action. Apparently Berkeley was aware of this fact, but the only solution which he was able to offer for the problem involved was to say that it is a mystery. To be sure, there are many mysteries which human minds are unable to solve, but if this is one of those mysteries, no one has the right to affirm that God knows in advance what free people are going to do at a specific time and place. It is logically possible that God may have a kind of foreknowledge which is consistent with human freedom, but it cannot be the kind of foreknowledge which Berkeley had in mind. The knowledge that certain consequences are bound to follow a particular course of action does not imply a denial of freedom. For example, you can know in advance of any action that if a person spends all of his income as fast as he makes it, he cannot accumulate a surplus from his earnings. This kind of a prediction is consistent with one's ability to act or not to act in accordance with the condition which is stated. In a similar manner, it is conceivable that God may know in advance what consequences are bound to follow any particular course of action. So long as the predictions are of a hypothetical rather than a categorical nature, they are in harmony with the idea of freedom. However, the categorical predictions which Berkeley had in mind are inconsistent with free choice. If it be objected that this conclusion does not follow since God's foreknowledge of events is not like the foreknowledge which we attribute to human beings, it should be pointed out that the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies in the sense in which these have been interpreted must be either like that pertaining to human beings or it can have no significant meaning for them. A similar objection can be raised in connection with Berkeley's interpretation of the miracle stories which are recorded in the Bible. Having understood that the idea of God's omniscience implies foreknowledge of specific events, he comes to the conclusion that God's omnipotence means that he has the power to work miracles. This was not an unusual position for members of the Christian clergy. The acceptance of the Biblical miracle stories as literal and accurate accounts of events which had actually occurred was usually regarded as an essential part of the Christian faith. To doubt the accuracy of these accounts was to place one on the side of the skeptics and thus to be opposed to the teachings of Christianity. Nevertheless, the opponents of Christianity insisted that the belief in miracles was contrary to reason, for it was understood that a miracle is a violation of the established laws of nature and therefore a denial of the validity of those principles which are based on the evidence produced by the work of the scientists. Furthermore, it would imply a flat contradiction for one to suppose that God was the author of the laws of nature and at the same time to hold that he violates his own laws. If nature's laws could not be depended on to operate in the future as they have in the past, no one could ever tell what might happen under any given set of circumstances, and hence any intelligent planning for the future would be impossible.

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www.cliffs.com Obviously the belief in miracles constituted a real problem for those who held, as Berkeley did, that the laws of nature are constant and that God is the cause of the order and regularity with which they occur. None of the solutions which he suggested for this problem appear under careful examination to be satisfactory, and his arguments in this respect are now generally considered to be quite unacceptable. This, however, does not mean that Christians no longer believe in miracles. Among many Christians of the present day, it means only that the conception of what constitutes a miracle has changed. Instead of defining a miracle as that which violates the laws of nature, it is interpreted to mean that kind of activity in which one recognizes a manifestation of the power of God. This does not imply that it must be contrary to the natural order of things, for it is quite conceivable that God's power can be made manifest in and through the laws of his own creation. Similar explanations could be made with reference to many of the other beliefs which Berkeley accepted as a part of the teachings of the Christian religion. The meaning and significance of Biblical stories, as well as the interpretation of such doctrines as the Trinity, answers to prayers, the meaning of grace, and the conceptions of heaven and hell, have all been modified and reformulated many times since Berkeley gave expression to the way in which he understood them. His arguments were intended to give support to the teachings of Christianity as they were interpreted at that time. However, in fairness to Berkeley, it should be remembered that he lived before the era during which the more important elements of Biblical criticism had been developed. Had he been familiar with the newer interpretations given to the older doctrines, he would probably have accepted many of them. In that case, he would have found it much easier to answer the arguments directed against Christianity by the freethinkers. Berkeley's moral philosophy is so closely related to his belief in God and the ethical teachings of the Christian religion that it is quite impossible to discuss either of them apart from the other. His ethics was grounded in a theistic conception of the universe, and the Christian religion was most meaningful to him because of its bearing on the way that people should conduct themselves in their relationships to their fellow humans. It was, in fact, his deep concern about the moral conduct of human beings that inspired most of his writings. This is true of the ones that were concerned more directly with philosophical issues as well as the ones which dealt more specifically with ethical subjects. Although it is his metaphysical theory that has generally been regarded as his main contribution to the field of philosophy, it is well to bear in mind that it was for the purpose of establishing a rational rather than a theological basis for the principles of morality that he developed his views concerning the nonexistence of matter and the reality of Spirit. Then, too, it should be noted that his interest in morals was not purely a theoretical one. It was the practical application of sound moral principles to the actual problems of the day that was the ultimate goal of all his writings. This is especially evident in such publications as the Discourse on Passive Obedience, which appeared in 1712, and in the Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, written in 1721. Although the practical consequences of his views are not stated so directly in the Alciphron and in Siris, they are implied in what he wrote and to a large extent furnished the purpose for which these were written. According to Berkeley, the two great principles of morality are the being of God and the freedom of man. He has no sympathy with the deterministic views of Thomas Hobbes nor the attempt on the part of Richard Mandeville to justify private vices on the ground that they are public benefits. He is less critical of the views advocated by the Earl of Shaftesbury, for what this writer had insisted that humans ought to do was not necessarily in conflict with the ethics of Christianity. What Berkeley did object to in this connection was the method used by this author for determining what was right or wrong in any given situation. The Earl of Shaftesbury was an intuitionist who held that it is only through the feelings that we are able to obtain any knowledge concerning the requirements of morality. He believed that all normal human beings are equipped with a kind of inner sense that is capable of revealing what is the most fitting or appropriate thing to do under any given set of circumstances. This knowledge would not be adequate to establish any general rule of morality which would be applicable to a whole class of instances, but it

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www.cliffs.com would be sufficient for that one case only. This view has often been referred to as the "moral sense" doctrine and has been interpreted to mean that we have a particular sense which tells us what is the right thing to do at a given time and place just as we have other senses which reveal such information as color, sound, taste, or temperature. Berkeley does not deny that feelings have something to do with ideas of what is right or wrong, but he held strongly to the opinion that something more than feelings alone is required in order to establish the validity of our moral judgments. The ethical views held by Thomas Hobbes were especially objectionable to Berkeley and for many different reasons. In the first place, Hobbes was a materialist who held that all reality is composed of particles of matter which occupy space and which act upon one another in a purely mechanical fashion. This, according to Berkeley, does not make any sense at all, for even if matter did exist, no one could know what it is, and so long as it is regarded as something that is other than mind, it could never be the cause of any of our conscious states. Furthermore, morality and human responsibility necessarily imply freedom of choice, which is an impossibility on the basis of a mechanistic materialism. Accordingly, it seemed evident to Berkeley that Hobbes' views concerning morality were based on an unproved and unwarranted assumption. He could see, too, that his entire argument was characterized by inconsistencies and fallacious procedures. The position advocated in Richard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees was likewise objectionable to Berkeley but not for the same reasons. To argue, as Mandeville had done, that private vices are justified because they make it possible for certain benefits to be gained by the community as a whole was to overlook a number of relevant facts and to draw a conclusion that is wholly unwarranted. Berkeley believed, on the contrary, that we are not justified in doing evil in order that good may come from it. Mandeville's position was in direct opposition to the teachings of the New Testament, and while Berkeley did not accept the teachings of Christianity simply because they were regarded as authoritative, he did so for the added reason that in his judgment they provided a consistent and reasonable interpretation of our moral experiences. He believed that one's love of God is expressed most effectively in what one does to promote the welfare of human beings. This was in a certain sense the basis for all that he had to say about the ethical conduct of persons. He was a humanitarian in spirit. This is well illustrated in the efforts which he put forth for the alleviation of those ills which plagued the society with which he was acquainted during the course of his life. It is especially evident in the Essay Towards Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain, and again in Siris, which had to do with the merits of tar-water as a remedy for the epidemic which broke out in the community where he lived as Bishop of Cloyne. In the Discourse on Passive Obedience, written in 1712, we are given some indication of Berkeley's views concerning the function of law and of the relationship between church and state. The main point at issue was whether one ought to obey the laws of the land when they are in conflict with the dictates of his own conscience. This was a serious question in his day, as it has been for each succeeding generation even to the present time. His method of dealing with this problem has considerable merit even though it must be admitted that the issues involved are too complex for any quick and easy solution. In the first part of the essay, he argues in support of the idea that every one has the right to protect his own life and to safeguard his own private interests. This, as he understands it, is the purpose for which governments have been established, and it is in pursuance of this objective that laws have been enacted for the preservation of order and the securing of justice for all of the people. In order for the government to accomplish its purpose, it is necessary that its laws must be obeyed. This must be done whether individuals in the state believe the particular laws in question are for the best interests of the people or not. Opinions about the value of these laws are bound to be different, but it is far more important for society as a whole to have the protection and security which only a government can give than it is for each individual to have the opportunity to act in accordance with his own private judgment It is for this reason that passive obedience on the part of the citizen is recommended even though he may not be in full accord with the laws that have been enacted by the state to which he belongs.

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This insistence on obedience would seem to indicate that one's own conscience must necessarily be subordinated to the laws of the land no matter what the character of those laws might be. This might protect a country against the dangers of anarchy or of mob violence, but it would not be a course of action that is in harmony with the ethical teachings of Christianity. Berkeley accepts without question the Biblical principle that men ought to obey God rather than men. At the same time, he is aware of the fact that in the New Testament we are told that the powers that be are ordained of God, and hence the Christian is admonished to render unto the civil power the loyalty and obedience that rightly belong to established governments. But this does not include any kind of action which the state may require. When the government demands that an individual shall do that which is in violation of his own conscience, he is duty bound to put his own conscience ahead of any other consideration. So far as the individual is concerned, it is his own conscience that is identical with his understanding of the will of God, and no government or any other power is entitled to set it aside. This is what created the problem with which Berkeley tried to deal in this essay. How can one reconcile obedience to the laws of the land with loyalty to the demands of the individual conscience? Berkeley's answer was to the effect that in the case of conflict between the two one should obey his own conscience even though this may mean acting contrary to the laws of the land. However, in so doing the individual must recognize the right of the government to impose upon him whatever punishment it may see fit to administer to atone for his breaking the law. In this way, the Christian would not be acting in defiance of the law, for he would not try to escape the punishment for what he has done but at the same time would be putting his own conscience ahead of the demands made by any other agency.

SIRIS: BERKELEY'S LATEST METAPHYSICAL THEORY In 1741, Berkeley published a work entitled Siris. The subtitle of the book contained the following words: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water. It was a strange topic for one whose former writings had been of a philosophical nature. It was, from one point of view, a departure from the fields of philosophy and theology and a venture into the area of medical science. From observations which he had made while living among the North American Indians and from experiments carried on among members of his own family, he had come to believe that he had found in the use of tarwater an effective remedy for many of the physical ills with which people of his own day were afflicted. The purpose of the book was not only to make information about this remedy available to people in general, but to make further inquiries concerning the way in which tar-water is related to the various elements found in nature and to the essential character of the universe as a whole. The significance of this book has often been overlooked by historians of philosophy, who have regarded it as offering nothing more than a wild attempt on the part of the author to find a panacea for the many aches and pains which accompany the diseases which all too frequently prevail in human societies. It is true that, from the point of view of medical science, Berkeley's theory concerning the virtues of tar-water has had no lasting significance. His conclusions were not supported by any thorough or accurate scientific procedures but were obtained largely as a result of chance observations and without any complete analysis of the conditions under which they were made. His excursion into this area of science was, however, in accord with his humanitarian spirit, for it indicated an eagerness on his part to do something of practical benefit to the persons with whom he had been associated. Then, too, his earlier writings had been predominantly of a theoretical nature and, consequently, were of little interest to the common people, who possessed only a very meager education. Berkeley was now sixty years of age and in relatively poor health. He was anxious to do what he could to help these persons, and he believed he could do something that would contribute to their physical, as well as their mental, well-being. Although Berkeley's interest in tar-water as a potential remedy for disease provided the stimulus for

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www.cliffs.com writing Siris, the permanent significance of the book has little to do with the medical aspects of the subject. It lies rather in the revised metaphysical theory to which he was led in his attempt to find a satisfactory explanation for those health-giving qualities which be believed were present in tar-water. His inquiries along this line took him into many different areas. They involved investigations in such fields as physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, the relationship between physical things and spiritual substance, and ultimately to a conception of the meaning and purpose of the universe as a whole. A considerable number of years had passed since the publication of his earlier books, in which he had set forth his new theory of vision and developed his arguments concerning the nonexistence of matter. During this time, his own views had been enriched by an extensive amount of reading. The opinions expressed by his critics had been given careful consideration and in several instances had led to some modifications of his earlier positions. He never abandoned his original thesis concerning the nonexistence of matter and the spiritual character of the universe, but he did find it necessary to make some revisions in his interpretation of the mind of God and its relationship to the concrete facts of human experience. One of the important factors in bringing about these changes was his study of ancient philosophy, with particular emphasis on the writings of Plato and the Neo-Platonists. The influence of these writings can be seen most clearly in the change from a more empirical type of philosophy which characterized his earlier works to one that is in many respects both rationalistic and mystical. Instead of following the pattern which one finds in the writings of John Locke and other empirical philosophers, there is a strong tendency to proceed more in the direction of the Neo-Platonic conception of the universe. This is especially evident in the references which are made concerning the nature of God and the relationship which holds between the deity and the objects which exist in the world of human experiences. Instead of a personal conception of God as a being who created the universe and whose existence is at least in some respects quite apart from the order of nature, we now find a more immanental conception in which the divine Intelligence permeates the whole of reality in much the same way that a human personality is present in and through the activities which are carried on through the medium of one's physical body. As a result of these changes, one finds in Siris the elements of a metaphysical system that exhibits several advantages over the one that was formulated in his earlier writings. He remains an idealist and has not changed his views with reference to the existence of a material substance that is independent of mind. He still believes that an Intelligent Mind is the directing force which gives order and harmony to the phenomena of nature and provides for the possibility of moral achievement on the part of human beings. However, this Intelligent Mind, which is called God, is now conceived in terms of immanence rather than transcendence. This new way of viewing the structure of the universe enables him to overcome some of the difficulties that were apparent in the earlier system which was set forth in the Principles of Human Knowledge. For one thing, it gave a new meaning and significance to the entire realm of external nature. It eliminated the conception of a purely subjective character of the objects of human knowledge which had usually been attributed to the earlier writings. Concerning the metaphysical system which is implicit in Berkeley's latest book, A. C. Fraser, who has written one of the most extensive accounts of his philosophy, makes the following statement: "Siris regarded as a philosophical essay, is the consummation, on the basis of Ancient Philosophy, of Berkeley's conception of the concrete universe, past, present, and future, as in necessary dependence upon allconstitutive Intelligence." Speaking further with reference to the same book, he explains that "its chain of philosophical reflexions and inquiries is the most curious and profound of all that he has written." In fact, Fraser is so deeply impressed by the quality of this work that he tells us, "there is the unexpectedness of genius in its whole movement." On the basis of these statements, one is warranted in saying that Siris is a book that should not be taken lightly. It is evidently the product of an active mind which continued throughout the later years of Berkeley's life to assimilate the ideas of the great thinkers of the past and to relate these to the observations made during his own lifetime. In the light of these findings, he continued

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www.cliffs.com to make whatever revisions of his own thinking were regarded as necessary for the pursuit of truth. To gain a proper understanding of this book, one must take into account the circumstances under which it was composed. For many years prior to its publication, Berkeley had lived in comparative isolation from the busy activities of the world. During these years, he had witnessed a great deal of suffering. Some of it occurred among the North American Indians among whom he had lived during the three years that he spent in Rhode Island. Sickness was present again on a rather large scale among the people whom he served after being appointed Bishop of Cloyne. Being anxious to minister to the physical as well as the spiritual needs of his people, he hoped to find some remedy that would alleviate their suffering and add years to their lives. He recalled in this connection the use of tar-water by the North American Indians. They had used it as a kind of medicine to cure a variety of different ills. Apparently it had been used effectively in a number of different instances which Berkeley had observed. Naturally he was curious to find out more about this so-called medicine, and with this purpose in mind he began a series of experiments. When members of his own family or friends who lived in his neighborhood became ill, he prepared quantities of tar-water and had them use it in much the same manner as the Indians had done. The experiments were not always successful, but the results obtained were sufficient to convince him that tar-water possesses some very remarkable qualities, which if properly understood could be used as an effective remedy for a number of different diseases. The thought occurred to him that it might be possible to extract from tar certain ingredients which might not only counteract the ravages of disease in the human organism but would at the same time "carry fresh supplies of the very essence of life into the whole animal creation." Tar-water was made by mixing equal quantities of tar and cold water and allowing them to stand for a period of approximately three days and nights. The heavier portions of the mixture would have sunk to the bottom of the container, and the liquid which remained could then be poured into glasses and given to a patient to drink in amounts that would vary with the nature of the disease and the condition of the patient. This is what had been used in different parts of the American colonies for the prevention of smallpox. Berkeley reports that he had used the same medicine for the treatment of smallpox while living at Cloyne. Of seven children who were afflicted with the disease, all but one of them had recovered. Encouraged by the belief that tar-water had proved to be an effective cure for smallpox, he wanted to find out if it would be equally effective for other diseases. As occasions for experimentation arose, he tried it out for ulcers, distemper, consumptive cough, and for various types of stomach disorders. The results were, in his judgment, quite gratifying, and while he did not claim to have found a panacea for all human sickness, he did believe that the use of tar-water would greatly reduce the amount of sickness in human societies and would add years to the average span of life. As a philosopher, Berkeley was interested not so much in the curative properties of tar-water as he was in the nature of the process which makes these results possible. In order to gain a better understanding of these phenomena, he consulted the writings of ancient scientists and philosophers. He found that the virtues which he had discovered in the use of tar-water were not unknown in ancient times. Pliny, the historian, had reported that among the Romans, products similar in many respects to tar had been used for the purification and preservation of wines. Among the Greeks, Egyptians, Phoenicians, and other inhabitants of the ancient world, tar had been used in a manner that was very much like that which he had observed among the North American Indians. The cleansing and healing properties of such substances as tar, pitch, turpentine, and similar products had been the object of inquiry on the part of many of the great thinkers of the past, and Berkeley made a careful study of their attempts to find a reasonable explanation for what had been observed. Their speculations were for the most part of a metaphysical nature. Berkeley believed he was able to see a close connection between the theories which they had developed and his own conception relative to the spiritual character of the universe. His argument may be summarized as follows. Tar is a product of the vegetable world. Both pine trees and

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www.cliffs.com fir trees secrete an alimentary juice consisting of oily, aqueous, and saline particles. When these particles are mixed with water, they can be taken into the bloodstream and are capable of producing effects which under certain conditions may be highly beneficial to the patient. To understand the action of salts and acids on the different substances with which they are brought into contact takes one into the field of chemistry, and from here one must pursue the further question of the relationship of physical particles to the active spirits which are present in all living things. Descartes had tried to explain the relationship between mind and matter by suggesting that there is an interaction between the two kinds of substance which takes place in the pineal gland at the base of the brain. The difficulties involved in this explanation were so obvious that it never gained any general acceptance among scholars, and apparently Descartes was not very well satisfied with it himself. Berkeley was able to avoid the concept of interaction by eliminating the notion of a material substance. Reality as he conceived it was altogether spiritual in nature. It was easy enough to understand how one thing that is spiritual can act on something else that is composed of the same kind of substance. The only problem that remained was that of showing how physical substances which have the appearance of possessing spatial characteristics could be related to that which is spiritual and which does not appear to exist in space. It was in connection with this problem that Berkeley found the study of Greek philosophy to be most helpful. Among the pre-Socratic philosophers of Greece, it was Heraclitus who called attention to the divine Fire which permeates all things and is responsible for the changes which are constantly taking place. The fire which one sees as he sits before the open fireplace was but a symbol of the cosmic Fire which is the reality that lies back of the changing processes that constitute the world of experience. Empedocles, who taught that the universe was composed of the four substances known as earth, air, fire, and water, had found it necessary to postulate the existence of love and hate as the spiritual forces which kept these elements in motion. Anaxagoras was another one who recognized the impossibility of material things moving by their own power. To account for the movements which take place in things, he introduced the concept of Nous, or Reason. This was a spiritual principle. It was also divine in the sense that it was without beginning or end. It was not only the ultimate cause of the motions in the world but was at the same time the principle of order and harmony which prevailed throughout the cosmos. All of these men had believed that the phenomena of nature could be made intelligible only by reference to a spiritual reality, the power and nature of which were manifested in the way that changes take place in the world of human experiences. It was this particular aspect of their teaching that was especially attractive to Berkeley. The idea that spirit alone has the power to initiate action which can be transmitted through physical bodies was quite in harmony with his own belief in the existence of God as the cause of the order and harmony which is revealed through sense perceptions. In searching for the cause of the way in which the elements contained in tar-water affect the human body, he finds a helpful suggestion in such ideas as the Fire of Heraclitus and the Nous of Anaxagoras. If Berkeley found support for his theory concerning the spiritual character of the universe in the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers, he was able to find even greater support in the writings of Plato. Although many of the pre-Socratics had recognized the reality of spirit, they did not question the existence of material substances. It was Plato who among the philosophers of the western world was the first one to challenge the idea of matter as something which exists apart from mind. He believed that reality is spiritual in nature and belongs to the world of ideas. The objects which are perceived by the senses have only a partial or quasi-reality. They are real only insofar as the ideas are present in them. The ideas are eternal, uncreated, and unchanging. The particular objects of sense perception are only copies or imperfect imitations of the ideas. They have no independent reality and could not exist apart from the ideas of which they are copies. It is easy enough to see that this Platonic conception of reality is in perfect accord with the major thesis which Berkeley had developed in his Principles of Human Knowledge. It involves a denial of the independent existence of matter and asserts that all reality is derived from a

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www.cliffs.com spiritual source. To be sure, there are some points of difference between Plato's conception of the deity and the idea of God which one finds in the writings of Berkeley, but so far as the spiritual nature of the universe is concerned, their points of agreement are sufficient to outweigh their differences. The strange thing about it is the fact that while their conclusions about the nature of reality are very much alike, the methods used for arriving at these conclusions were entirely different. Berkeley had been an empiricist who held that all genuine knowledge is derived from experience. Particular sensations constituted the source of whatever information we are able to obtain about the world. True ideas were verifiable by means of sense perceptions, and only particular things were believed to have any real existence. Plato held an opposite view on all of these points. He was a rationalist who held that reasonableness is the criterion of truth. He believed that clear thinking rather than sense perceptions was the pathway which led to a correct understanding of the nature of things. Reality consisted of universals rather than particulars, and knowledge of these universals is obtained by the intellect rather than by the senses. These considerations bring to light some of the main points of contrast between the methods of empiricism and those of rationalism. In Berkeley's earlier writings, he had accepted the empirical point of view as it had been used in the philosophical writings of John Locke. Now he appears to have shifted his position and to have adopted the Platonic theory of knowledge. Does not this change indicate a grave inconsistency between his earlier and his later views? His critics have certainly insisted that this is true. In one sense of the word they are right. Whenever anyone changes his mind about any important subject, he is guilty of a certain kind of inconsistency. The very fact that he has changed his mind means that what he now believes to be true is inconsistent with his former opinion. But this kind of inconsistency is not something to be disparaged or condemned. Rather it should be encouraged, provided of course that there are good and sufficient reasons for making the change. One who continues to be active and alert will always discover new ways in which his thinking can be improved, and he will not hesitate to make whatever changes and modifications seem to be necessary in the light of the new insights he has gained. That Berkeley was able to make adjustments of this kind was certainly to his credit and argues in his favor rather than against him. The acceptance of the Platonic argument in support of his belief in the spiritual character of the universe did not mean for Berkeley any complete break with the methods used in his earlier writings. He could still hold that the methods of empiricism were adequate for knowledge about some things, while at the same time only rationalistic methods were adequate for knowledge about other things. Sense perception is obviously the main source for knowledge about the way things appear in the world of human experiences. It is this type of knowledge with which the natural scientist is concerned. As a scientist, he has little or no interest in that which lies beyond the realm of experiences, although as a man his interests may include many things which can neither be proved nor disproved by means of scientific procedures. As an empiricist Berkeley found these methods particularly useful for explaining the various phenomena of human consciousness, but the continued pursuit of these methods enabled him to see some of their limitations, and naturally he tried to find some way in which they could be overcome. Experience has to do with particular things and with particular moments of time. It has no way of telling what will happen in the future, nor can it reveal anything about the meaning of the universe when viewed as a whole. Even the existence of a self or soul which is continuous throughout the entire period of one's life is beyond the reach of empiricism. The same thing is true with reference to the idea of God or for that matter any metaphysical interpretation concerning the nature of reality. Unless one is willing to accept the idea that the area of human knowledge is confined to the here and now of individual experience, he must of necessity include something more than that which is provided for in the methods of empiricism. Berkeley had been aware of the limited possibilities of empirical knowledge and yet had found it necessary to believe in the reality of the human soul. He found it equally necessary to believe in the existence of a Divine Being that transcends all human limitations. He had tried to provide for these beliefs by saying that while we do not have any sensations of either God or the human soul, we do have notions

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www.cliffs.com of them. This was scarcely sufficient to support either of these beliefs on purely empirical grounds. Again, the idea of God as the ultimate cause of the world could not be established by empirical methods, for a cause is not something that can be experienced by the senses. But while these beliefs, which were so important for Berkeley, could not be established on empirical grounds, there were good and sufficient reasons for believing in them. This would seem to imply that, while empirical methods are adequate in some areas of knowledge, there are other areas in which reason rather than sense perception furnishes the only sound basis for knowledge. It was in this connection that the study of Plato and other Greek philosophers came to have such a profound influence on Berkeley's later conception of God and the spiritual character of the universe. Plato had made it very clear that it is the function of the senses to reveal the appearances of things but that the true nature of reality can be apprehended only by the use of one's rational faculties. The situation, as he viewed it, is described in the allegory of the cave. It is here that the objects of sense perception are characterized as mere shadows of the true realities. The persons who inhabit the cave have seen nothing but these shadows, and of course they believe they are looking at real things and are quite angry with anyone who tries to tell them that they see nothing but shadows. It is not until the individual who has been in the cave comes out of it and looks with the eyes of reason instead of sense perception that he beholds the objects as they really exist. Even then his vision is not perfect, for he cannot look at the pure light since his eyes are blinded by the brightness of the sun, which in this case symbolizes the ultimate source from which all existence is derived. Even though he looks through the eyes of reason, he is able to obtain only a dim view of the objects as they really exist. Both Plato and Aristotle had recognized that what is usually referred to as matter, or material objects, does not have an existence that is completely independent of mind. Mind or spirit was believed to be eternal and unchanging, while that which is called matter is temporal and transitory. Because it was created in time, it will also perish in time. Plato held that material objects were only imperfect copies of the eternal ideas, while Aristotle maintained that matter is nothing more than the possibility of becoming something when it is joined with the ideas or forms of things. Since both of these men held views that were more nearly in accord with what Berkeley really believed than any of the conclusions that could be obtained from purely empirical methods, it is quite understandable that he should accept at least in part the methods which they used. At any rate, the influence of their teachings is clearly reflected in his later metaphysical views. The influence of Neo-Platonism can also be recognized, especially in the closing sections of Siris. The results of this influence can be seen most clearly in the revised conception of God which one finds in these pages. In contrast with the transcendent personality to which reference is made in the Principles of Human Knowledge and which is further elaborated and defended in the Alciphron, we now find the conception of an immanental God, whose dwelling is not apart from nature but rather a Being that is present in the universe in much the same way that a human personality is present in one's physical body and finds expression in all of the activities of his entire life. To be sure, the analogy does not hold true in every respect, for it must always be recognized that there are some points of contrast between the human and the divine. Nevertheless, the similarities are important, for they provide the only means for making the concept of God meaningful to human beings. A God whose existence is identified with the quality of goodness that is present in the universe means something quite different from that of an individual person whose existence is in no way dependent on the particular objects which make up the totality of things. It is the latter concept against which most of the criticism voiced by the so-called freethinkers had been directed. These criticisms were presented at great length in the Alciphron, and although replies were made to them by the defenders of theism, it would appear that Berkeley was not altogether satisfied with them. Now that a different concept of deity has been set forth in the writings of the Greek philosophers, including both the rationalists and the Neo-Platonic mystics, he finds a more adequate solution to the problems raised by the freethinkers.

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Both Plato and Aristotle believed in the reality of the universal, and a logical consequence of this belief was that particular things are real only insofar as universals are present in them. Since universals are spiritual in nature, it would follow that reality is spiritual, and what is usually designated as matter is nothing more than a negative concept. In Neo-Platonism, the doctrine is carried still further. God is the universal Being and the only one that is completely real. God is the source of all that exists, but he is not the creator of the universe in the sense that creation is an act of will. Rather, the universe proceeds from God through a series of emanations. Using the analogy of a central fire, Plotinus explains that just as heat and light proceed from fire, so the universe proceeds from God. Just as heat and light become less and less the farther they are removed from the central fire, so the farther one is removed from God the less real does he become. The opposite extreme from pure reality is sheer nothingness, and it is in this sense that what is called matter is the essence of non-reality. That which is most like God without being identical with him is the world of intelligence, or that which Plato called the world of ideas. Below this is the world of souls or spirits which do not have physical bodies. On a still lower plane is the world in which spirits have entered into human bodies. Because the body is evil and only that which is spiritual is good, human beings are in need of salvation, which can be accomplished only by a return to the source from which all true being is derived. The return to God takes place in a series of activities. The first of these consists of a disciplinary process in which one learns to control his appetites and desires. A second stage is reached in the search for those principles which are operative in the phenomena of nature. A still higher level is attained in the truths which are grasped by the intellect, but beyond this point there is the mystical experience in which one loses consciousness of worldly affairs and becomes absorbed in contemplation of the deity. It is in this mystical experience that one loses his individuality and becomes one with God. It would not be correct to say that Berkeley accepted everything that he found in either Greek rationalism or Neo-Platonic mysticism, but anyone who reads the entire book called Siris cannot help but be impressed by the way in which ideas from both of these sources came to be included in his later metaphysics. It is in this respect that he may be regarded as the nearest approach in English philosophy of the eighteenth century to the German idealism of the nineteenth. His influence on English Romanticism was remarkable, and one might also observe that in his revised conception of the deity, he anticipated by at least two centuries some of the developments made recently by contemporary theologians.

CRITICAL ESSAY THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY The test of time is probably the most reliable standard by which the worth of a man's ideas may be judged. It is not the degree of popularity given to them at first that determines their true significance but rather the evaluation that is placed on them during the centuries that follow their first expression. It has now been more than two centuries since Berkeley published his views concerning the nature of the universe, and the fact that we are able to look at them from this perspective gives to us a particular advantage. His writings have been studied and criticized by each succeeding generation of students, and their reactions to what he had to say are available to anyone who cares to read them. His admirers, as well as his opponents, have analyzed his arguments and pointed out what seemed to them to be either true or false with reference to his entire system of thought. It would require a considerable amount of space to record even a brief summary of what his critics have written about him. That he holds an important place in the history of Western philosophy is made evident by the fact that neither empiricism nor idealism can be clearly understood apart from some reference to the work which

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www.cliffs.com he did. No textbook in the history of philosophy would be regarded as complete if it did not contain at least one chapter devoted to an exposition of his views. To be sure, he did not find a satisfactory solution for all the problems that occur in connection with the doctrines which he advocated, but he did bring to light a number of important issues that had not been seen so clearly before, and this in itself was an important achievement. Many of the issues raised in his writings are still being debated at the present time. What he had to say concerning them has stimulated a great deal of thought, and in this way it has contributed toward a better understanding of many of the important problems in human life. Although it has been customary in many quarters to refer to Berkeley's philosophy as though it consisted of a single system of ideas which remained constant throughout his entire career, the fact is that his latest publications reveal a number of important changes and modifications of the views presented in his earlier writings. This is an indication of an active mind that was able to learn from critics and to make whatever changes were necessary in order to overcome the defects which had been pointed out to him. The purpose which inspired Berkeley's earliest writings was a strong desire to do something to counteract the rising tide of lawlessness and immorality which had permeated the whole society with which he was familiar. He believed there were two major causes for the unfortunate conditions which he had observed. One of these was primarily intellectual, having to do with what people believed, and the other one was concerned chiefly with the desires and purposes for which people lived. These two causes were closely related, philosophy having to do with the former and religion with the latter. The materialistic philosophy set forth by men such as Thomas Hobbes and his many followers was in Berkeley's opinion one of the main intellectual factors in bringing about the generally acknowledged decline in morals. Atheism, which he regarded as one of the natural corollaries of materialism, was responsible for the decline in religion. Without a belief in God, there was no basis for morality except the feelings and desires of human beings. These are subject to change at any time, and there are no logical grounds for preferring the desires of some people to those of others. The consequence of this way of thinking could be none other than a complete breakdown of any fixed moral standards and the accompanying belief that anything is permissible so long as one is able to get by with it. It was to correct this situation that Berkeley launched his attack on the metaphysical doctrine of materialism. He hoped in this connection to do two things. First, he wanted to present complete proof that matter, which is independent of mind, does not exist. Second, he wanted to demonstrate the logical necessity for believing in the spiritual character of the entire universe. Once these purposes had been accomplished, he believed the cause of religion would be strengthened, which in turn would help to reestablish the basis for a sound theory of morality and provide aid to human beings in their efforts to live in harmony with it. Few people, if any, would want to question Berkeley's motives or the importance of the objectives which he had in mind. It was the character of the arguments used in support of these objectives that was open to attack. The critics of these arguments were right in some respects, for Berkeley was never able to prove beyond any reasonable doubt that matter, apart from mind, does not exist. What he was able to do was to show that there is no certain proof that matter of this kind does exist. This was an important point, for it indicated quite clearly that a materialistic and atheistic conception of the universe is fully as much a matter of faith as is true of any theistic conception relative to the nature of things. It is still possible from a logical point of view to regard materialism as an interpretation of things which is consistent with itself and with known facts, but there is no certain proof that it corresponds with reality. Berkeley's argument concerning the nonexistence of matter has been the object of much criticism. Some of this criticism has been based on a misunderstanding of his views, for it has frequently been asserted by his critics that Berkeley denied the existence of objects which are external to human minds and taught that everything which is experienced by the senses exists only in the minds of those particular individuals who happen to be thinking about them. This would imply that whatever human beings see, hear, or touch are

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www.cliffs.com objects which come into existence the moment anyone starts thinking about them and perish as soon as the person is no longer conscious of them. This would indeed be a strange and absurd doctrine and one that would make no sense at all. It is not what Berkeley taught, nor is it implied in any of the statements which he made. On this point he says, "sensible things have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist . . . as they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation." In spite of this statement, the misunderstanding of his position still persists in many quarters, and it is not at all uncommon to find writers of the present day interpreting Berkeley to be saying that the objects of nature exist only in the minds of human beings. What he did insist upon was the view that all existence is dependent on some mind, but it was the Mind of God rather than human minds which in his judgment constituted the basis for their existence. Critics who have not made the above-mentioned mistake have, nevertheless, found other reasons for doubting the validity of his argument with reference to the nonexistence of matter. John Locke, whose empirical methodology Berkeley had followed, had taught that secondary qualities are in the mind but that primary qualities are in the external object. The reason which he gave for saying that such qualities as color, sound, taste, and temperature are in the mind was their variability according to the circumstances under which they were observed. Primary qualities such as size, weight, and number remained constant; therefore, they are present in the objects rather than in the mind. Berkeley pointed out that the primary qualities are also variable, and since it is admitted that secondary qualities are in the mind, the same must be true of the primary qualities. The weakness of the argument lies in the fact that it assumes a material object, if it existed, would necessarily remain constant, but this assumption is one that need not be granted. Primary qualities may be like secondary ones with respect to their variability but this does not prove that the objects are mental, for that which is material might vary the same as the non-material. Berkeley had placed a considerable amount of emphasis on the argument concerning causality, insisting that a material substance could not be the cause of a mental operation. Ideas are in the mind, and their causes must consist of a mental or spiritual substance, for only that which is like mind can act in a causal way on mind. For this reason, Berkeley had maintained that if matter did exist, it would be impossible for us to know anything about it since it could not be the cause of any of our ideas. But this argument, like the one just mentioned, rests on an unproved and unwarranted assumption. It is another instance of begging the question, for it assumes rather than proves the point at issue. Those who believe in the existence of matter which is independent of mind have always insisted that objects composed of this type of substance are capable of causing the ideas which people have of these same objects. While there is no proof that this is what actually happens, there is still no evidence which makes it certain that this is not what takes place. Again it should be pointed out that when Berkeley refers to the term matter, he evidently has in mind the ancient conception of an inert substance which is incapable of moving itself. This notion or idea of matter would tend to indicate that any causal relationship between external objects and human minds would have to be initiated by something that is non-material or spiritual in nature, for nothing other than spirits have the power to act on things. This conception of matter is no longer held by modern physicists. It has been replaced by a dynamic conception of matter, the natural state of which is motion rather than rest. This new way of thinking about matter tends to weaken still further Berkeley's argument concerning causality. Berkeley, like other idealists who have followed his leadership, took as his starting point the facts of his own conscious experience. His problem, as a philosopher, was to explain how his own conscious states were related to the objects in the world around him. He never appeared to doubt the existence of other persons who were as real as himself, nor was he inclined to question the existence of those objects which belong to the world of nature. What he hoped to do was to give a reasonable account of the way in which it is possible for a human mind to gain any genuine knowledge of that which is external to itself. This is the kind of problem that has troubled a great many thinkers. It has led in some instances to what has been

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www.cliffs.com called the ego-centric predicament. This is the view which holds that it is impossible for anyone to know with complete certainty anything about that which lies outside of his own mind. The technical name for this belief is solipsism, and it is a position which would be hard to refute on the basis of any logical argument. Berkeley, however, was not a solipsist, and the only way he could find for a satisfactory account of the knowing process was to assume that what is external to a person's mind is composed of the same kind of substance as the mind itself. The impossibility of knowing anything other than mind was one of the main reasons why Berkeley rejected the belief in the existence of matter. His critics have charged that he identified the existence of an object with knowledge of its existence. The charge appears to be a well-founded one, and it points out one of the major weaknesses in his argument. It does not follow that an object is nonexistent just because people have no knowledge of its existence. Without doubt there are many things which exist even though the human mind is completely unaware of their existence. On the other hand, it must be admitted that there is no more logical foundation for believing in the existence of matter than there is for believing in its nonexistence. Berkeley's empiricism was in a sense a continuation of the method which had been used by John Locke. This method consisted in a rejection of the belief in innate ideas and a conviction that all genuine knowledge is derived from experience. Locke had attempted to show how it is possible for the entire structure of human knowledge to be derived from ideas and from reflection that is based on these ideas. He did not deny the existence of material objects but held that these were the causes of the ideas which one may have about these objects. Berkeley was aware of at least some of the difficulties implicit in Locke's epistemology, and he thought he could overcome them by denying the existence of matter and putting in its place the notion of a spiritual substance, which in his way of thinking was associated with the mind of God. But neither Locke nor Berkeley was able to complete their explanations of the knowing process on the basis of empirical methods alone. Both of them believed in the reality of a causal relationship, the existence of selfhood, and in the existence of God even though none of these could be established on purely empirical grounds. Berkeley held that we have intuitive knowledge of the existence of selfhood. With reference to the existence of God, he maintained that we know some adequate cause must exist in order to account for the order and regularity with which our sense experiences occur. Since nothing other than an all-wise and allpowerful as well as a good Being would be sufficient to account for this, the belief in the existence of God would seem to be well established. However, he admitted that inasmuch as we have no sensations of either the self or God, we cannot in the strict sense of the word be said to have knowledge of them. But in a less strict sense of the word, we do have notions of them, and that is enough to justify our belief in their existence. This way of dealing with the problem necessarily involved something of a departure from a purely empirical way of knowing. Had he remained true to the method which he had claimed to follow, he would have been forced to deny any valid knowledge of either the self or God. Since both of them were essential for his interpretation of the knowing process, he departed from strict adherence to empirical methods and incorporated elements from both the intuitional and the rationalistic theories of knowledge. If Berkeley was unable to prove the nonexistence of matter, he was likewise unsuccessful in trying to establish with certainty his position with reference to the spiritual character of the universe. It is true that he was predominantly a religious philosopher who believed in the existence of God. He also had a firm conviction that materialism and atheism were the chief enemies of religion and that they were responsible in no small measure for the decline in morals which was threatening the peace and security of the society in which he lived. These facts have led some of his critics to charge that his entire philosophical system was no more than an ill-founded attempt to support and justify the beliefs to which he was already committed. While it is impossible to speak with certainty concerning the motives of another person, the evidence contained in Berkeley's writings as a whole would not seem to support this charge. He was familiar with the intellectual movements which were current in his day, and he wanted to expose the fallacies which he believed to be present in their reasonings. To do this, he refrained from any appeal to a

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www.cliffs.com religious authority and argued against the views to which he was opposed on rational grounds alone. He believed that the idea of matter which is independent of mind was inconsistent with any adequate theory of knowledge and further that the existence of God as a supreme spiritual Being offered the only reasonable account of what actually takes place in human experience. To set forth the reasonable basis for these beliefs was the one major objective of his writings. The arguments used for this purpose were neither sound nor convincing to very many persons who did not already believe in the conclusions which they were designed to prove. Berkeley had argued that the universe must have been caused by something, and nothing Less than God would have been capable of producing that effect. One of the weaknesses of the argument, as pointed out some years later by David Hume, consists in the fact that causality is a way of thinking and as such is a characteristic of the human mind rather than a necessary connection between events in the external world. We call one event the cause of another when one of them invariably precedes the other in the order in which they have occurred in our experiences of them. But although this order of events has taken place in the past, there are no facts to indicate that some other order might not have occurred or that the same relationship will necessarily hold in the future. The causal relation may be a useful way of organizing one's experiences, but when it is applied outside the realm of human experiences, as it is when used to prove the existence of God, it is no longer valid. Indeed, if one were to insist that everything which exists must have a cause, it would follow that God too must have been caused by something other than himself, which would imply a selfcontradiction. If it should be stated in reply to this assertion that God was the cause of his own existence, it could be pointed out that so far as the logic of the situation is concerned, it would be equally possible for the universe to be self-caused. According to Berkeley, God is a spirit, and only spirits have the power to initiate actions. Human ideas, he tells us, are passive and must have been produced by the actions of spirits upon them. This presents another problem for his theory of knowledge. If it be true that only like can cause like, how would it be possible for passive ideas to know what an active spirit is like? If it should be argued that it is not ideas but the soul or spirit of an individual that does the knowing, the problem still remains, for it is only by means of the passive ideas that this knowledge is made possible. This is similar to the problem which arises when one asks how it is possible for human beings to know anything about God so long as he is believed to possess qualities which are other than those that are present in human beings. Evidently Berkeley was aware of these difficulties in connection with his argument, for one finds them expressed by some of the characters used in the Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous and again in the Alciphron. It is true that an attempt is made in the same dialogues to reply to these objections, but the replies given can scarcely be regarded as satisfactory. It seems quite probable that reflection on these matters had something to do with the revised conception of deity which one finds in Siris and other of his later writings. The existence of God was for Berkeley the essential reality upon which the spiritual conception of the universe was based. He believed that the objects included in the natural order of things were an expression of the deity in much the same way that the physical body of a human being is an expression of the soul or spirit of the man. This is a view which is the direct opposite of the materialistic conception of things, in which matter is the essential reality and mind or spirit is but the product of matter. Idealists have been inclined to agree with Berkeley on this point, for it does appear to have certain advantages over materialism in accounting for the origins and validity of human knowledge. Human consciousness is necessarily the starting point from which knowledge of anything must be derived, and on the assumption that reality is spiritual in nature, one escapes the problem of trying to find an explanation for the way in which mind can be produced by that which is totally unlike mind. Materialists have always found this problem a very difficult one. In general, it can be said that the solutions which they have offered have raised more questions than they have answered. While it is true that neither idealism nor materialism can be proven to be the correct interpretation for all the mysteries of the universe, there are good reasons for

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www.cliffs.com believing that idealism as a working hypothesis can account for experiences which cannot be explained in a satisfactory manner on the basis of materialism. For one thing, an idealist can make distinctions between truth and error and between right and wrong, while a materialist who is consistent with his own position can only say that things are what they are and hence it is meaningless to speak of them as normative. It was not Berkeley's failure to develop a valid argument for the existence of God to which people objected most of all. Rather, it was the particular conception of God which he supported that was responsible for much of the skepticism which he encountered. Following the tradition which had been accepted for centuries by both Christians and Jews, Berkeley defended the idea of a God who created the universe at some point in time, works miracles which are contrary to the established laws of nature, and is ever omniscient, omnipotent, and good. Anyone who stops to consider the implications that are involved in these characteristics will soon discover that they lead to conclusions which they are usually unwilling to accept. Take, for example, the problem which arises in connection with the evil that, from the human point of view, is in the world. On what basis could a good God who has unlimited power have created a world that is so filled with evil as the one which we experience in our daily lives? How is it possible for an intelligent person to believe in a God who is at once all-powerful, and good when there is so much injustice and unmerited suffering in the world? If he is all-powerful he could eliminate the evil in the world; if he is good, he would do so. The fact that things remain as they are would seem to indicate either that God is unable to get rid of the evil or that he does not possess the goodness to do it. It is not sufficient to say that much of the unjust suffering which people are forced to endure is but the natural result of the wrong actions of humans, for one must still face the question of why it is that God permits people to perform acts of cruelty and violence against their fellow men. An omnipotent God who is also good would see to it that justice prevails in the affairs of humans, and no one would receive either rewards or punishments which they did not deserve. However, the fact of the matter is that throughout the world, there are many people who do not receive what they truly deserve. In the words of the ancient Psalmist, this is a world in which all too often "the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper as a green bay tree." Does not this indicate that there is something wrong about the traditional conception of God? There have been many people throughout the ages who have thought so. The way in which things good and evil have been distributed in this world of ours has always been one of the chief causes of atheism. Apparently the moral character of an individual has very little if anything to do with determining whether he will have a life of peace and happiness or he tortured with pain and suffering. This is not all that is involved in the problem of evil, for we must take into account the facts of natural evil, as well as the ones which are the result of moral transgressions. In one sense, the problem of natural evil is even more difficult than that of moral evil, for while the latter can be attributed in part to human mistakes, this is not true of the former. What shall we say about earthquakes, typhoons, floods, epilepsy, insanity, premature senilities, bodies that are malformed from birth, famines, pestilences, inherited diseases, and numerous other things which are detrimental to the welfare of human beings? Can we say that these are the result of humanity's sins? Certainly not. Human deeds have brought on many evils, but there have been times when the forces of nature have been even more destructive of life and its values. In view of the tragedies which nature has brought on the human race, it has seemed to many persons that we are more like the toys of some cosmic beast than the children of a kind and benevolent heavenly father. Objections of this kind to the traditional conception of God were common enough in Berkeley's day. That he was well aware of them can be seen from the fact that they are presented in detail in some of the speeches included in the Alciphron and also in some of the other dialogues. It was evidently Berkeley's purpose in writing these dialogues to make adequate replies to these objections and thus to defend the conception of deity which had long been accepted by the majority of those who called themselves

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www.cliffs.com Christian in their beliefs. The replies which were made in the dialogues by the defenders of the theistic position were mainly the ones that had been used before by philosophers and theologians who believed that all existing facts could be shown to be in harmony with the traditional conception of the deity. It was suggested, for example, that evil is not something that exists in its own right but is merely a negative concept which means nothing other than absence of that which is good. Another explanation consisted in the view that what is called evil is in reality only a matter of the perspective from which things are seen. People are accustomed to call anything evil when it is contrary to their own interests and desires. If the same things could be seen from the divine perspective it would be evident that everything which exists has its proper place in the universe as a whole and from this point of view it is all good. Still another attempt to solve the problem of evil calls attention to the fact that moral character is developed only by the overcoming of obstacles, and it is in view of this purpose that the so-called evils of the world are but the necessary means for the achievement of a greater good. Finally, when all other explanations seem to fail, it is always possible to fall back on the notion that there are many mysteries in connection with life and the world that are beyond the comprehension of human minds. Since this is the case, it may be that what appears to be cruel and arbitrary so far as we are concerned is both just and right from God's point of view. Any one of these suggestions, or all of them when taken together, might be enough to satisfy one who is already a firm believer in the omnipotence and goodness of the deity. It is doubtful that they would be convincing to anyone who was fully aware of the implications that are involved when God is conceived in the traditional manner. Although Berkeley was the author of the speeches made in the dialogues, it seems quite likely that he was not completely satisfied with the attempts made to justify the view that had long been accepted by Christian thinkers. This is probably one of the reasons that prompted him in his latest writings to develop a different conception of God in which the difficulties encountered in the older view would be overcome. The problem of evil was not the only one that raised questions concerning the validity of the popular conception of God. There was the matter of miracles, for it was generally believed that the God of Christianity was one who could make things happen that were contrary to the laws of nature, and, further, that on various occasions he would do so in response to the prayers of sincere and devout persons. It was believed that he could raise people from the dead, turn water into wine; feed a multitude of persons with a very small amount of food, and do many other things of a similar nature. The implications of these beliefs are disastrous so far as reverence for the deity is concerned. They make God a respector of persons, subject to the wishes and desires of human beings, and suggest that violation of the laws of nature rather than acting in harmony with them is evidence of divine power. It is no wonder that skeptics and freethinkers could not accept the idea of God as he had been conceived in the popular mind. One of the most important things about Berkeley as a religious philosopher was the fact that he was able to recognize defects in his former beliefs and to make whatever revisions seemed to him to be necessary in order to bring his metaphysical views into harmony with his new insights. This is especially evident in the conception of God which is described at some length in the book called Siris. The most radical change from earlier views which one finds in this book is that which pertains to the idea of a God whose presence is manifested in and through the order of nature rather than that of a particular divine Being who exists apart from nature and who does with it whatever happens to be conformity with his desires. Thinking of God as a universal rather than a particular being is reminiscent of Aristotle's conception of universals. He believed in the reality of universals but maintained that they do not exist apart from particular things. It is true that he did make one exception to this in what he had to say about God, but otherwise he held that the universal was not only present in particular things but it gave to them whatever genuine reality they possessed. Berkeley's conception of God may have been influenced to some extent by his study of Aristotle. It also appears to have anticipated in some respects the idea of God as Being-Itself, which was developed some two centuries later in the writings of Paul Tillich.

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It would not be correct to say that Berkeley's immanental conception of God was sufficient to overcome all of the difficulties that were implicit in the older, or traditional, view. It is true, however, that it did contribute a great deal in that direction. In regard to the problem of evil, it eliminated the idea of God's will as the responsible cause of all the tragedies and misfortunes which have so plagued the lives of human beings. It put in place of this notion a firm conviction that the events which take place are determined by the natural order of things. God is indeed present in the laws of nature, and his omnipotence is interpreted to mean that his power is limited by those conditions which are necessary in order to make possible the moral development of persons. These conditions include the orderly processes of nature and the freedom of individuals to make their own choices between good and evil. Thus God becomes responsible for the possibility of evil choices but not for the choices which are actually made. Miracles are no longer interpreted to mean that which is necessarily contrary to the laws of nature. Rather, a miracle is understood to mean any event in which one recognizes the activity of the power of God. This can refer to events regardless of one's ability to explain them in terms of the laws of nature. It is not at all likely that Berkeley was fully aware of all the advantages which follow from his revised conception of the deity, but it is quite obvious that he did see many of them. Furthermore, it cannot be doubted that what he had to say on these matters prepared the way for some of the further developments which followed. Any fair summary of the significance of Berkeley's philosophy must take into account not only the progress of his thought from those early years when he wrote A New Theory of Vision to the publication of Siris and the essays which were produced during the closing period of his life, but also the influence of his thought on those philosophical movements which have been developed since the period in which he lived. Any complete survey of these influences would be impossible in a relatively brief account of his life and works, but it may be helpful to mention a few of the movements which are especially indebted to him. The attack on materialism did have some far-reaching consequences even though Berkeley did not succeed in his attempt to prove that matter does not exist. He did, however, bring to light a number of important issues that raise some doubt concerning the materialistic doctrine which the defenders of that position have never been able to resolve. In the first place, he made it clear that no one can say what matter by itself really is. Even if it does exist, all that can be known about it is the way it affects human minds. Again no materialist has been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for the way in which a material substance which occupies space can act on a mind which does not occupy space. In fact, matter as a metaphysical substance which is wholly independent of mind was brought into question by Berkeley's arguments, and materialists have not been able to give any actual proof of its existence. Of course, it is equally true that no proof can be given for its nonexistence. Neither is it possible to prove the existence of a spiritual substance. These considerations have led many philosophers to believe that all metaphysical speculation is useless and, therefore, a waste of time. The effect of Berkeley's philosophy on the future development of empiricism can be seen in a number of different ways. One of the first of these was in the direction of skepticism. Following the method which had been used by John Locke, it was shown that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of a material substance. It remained for David Hume to point out that the logic of empiricism furnished no evidence for the existence of a spiritual substance, for a self, or for God. The only genuine knowledge which empiricism will allow is that of the consciousness which one has at a particular moment. Reacting to the skepticism of Hume, Immanuel Kant developed a new type of epistemology in which empiricism and rationalism were joined in a manner which made it possible to have knowledge concerning the world of appearances, although it excluded metaphysical knowledge which goes beyond the bounds of human experience. Berkeley did not pursue the empirical method to its logical conclusion. In order to establish the possibility of knowledge concerning the self and God, he supplemented the empirical method with elements from a different source. In his later philosophy, he incorporated far more of the rationalistic

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www.cliffs.com method than would be allowed by most empiricists. Even so, Berkeley is still regarded as one of the pioneers of modern empiricism, and his influence in this respect can be seen in most of the contemporary schools of philosophy. Berkeley's greatest influence on the future development of philosophy was in the area of idealism. The interpretation of the universe as ultimately spiritual in nature, in contrast to the view that it is merely a collection of material particles, the movements of which are without guidance or purpose, has held a prominent place in the philosophy of the Western world. Idealism has appeared in several different forms, and all of them are in one sense indebted to Berkeley. Subjective idealism is the concept with which his name is usually associated because he interpreted all reality in terms of the type of experience which occurs to knowing minds. He did not teach that there is nothing external to human minds, but he did hold that all reality is spiritual in nature and is in one sense an expression of the mind of God. Objective idealism holds that the so-called material objects of the physical universe and the world of mind or ideas are both expressions of an all-inclusive or absolute mind which gives unity and meaning to all that exists. While absolute idealists do not claim to have any certain proof that metaphysical idealism is the correct key to an understanding of the universe, they do believe it is the one hypothesis which offers the most reasonable explanation for the validity of human knowledge and for judging the rightness and value of human conduct This is the type of idealism which flourished during the post-Kantian period, which began with the work of Fichte and Schelling and culminated in the system of Hegel. Berkeley's later philosophy as expressed in Siris approaches in many respects the developments of this period. Personalistic idealism differs from absolute idealism primarily in its insistence on the reality of individual persons. The personalistic doctrine has much in common with Berkeley's system, for it retains the belief in a spiritual conception of the universe and finds the key to a proper understanding of things by referring to the mind of a knowing subject. Among more contemporary movements in the field of philosophy, the influence of Berkeley is not as direct as it has been in other instances, but neither has it been entirely absent. The tendency to minimize the value of metaphysics or to eliminate it entirely is especially strong in pragmatism and again in what is called linguistic analysis, and as we have noted before, this is a logical outcome of the empirical method to which Berkeley subscribed during the earlier part of his life. There are many places, too, in his writings which suggest the type of thing which linguistic analysts have made the central core of their doctrine. His rejection of the word "matter" because no one knows what it means is one illustration. He did not imply, as some analysts have done, that an examination of the meaning of words is the main business of philosophy, but he did recognize the importance of overcoming ambiguities in the use of terms and of making clear the precise meaning that is intended by them. Perhaps, in conclusion, it is not out of place to suggest that Berkeley is a good example to illustrate the pragmatic doctrine proclaimed by John Dewey when he said that one's ideas should always be held so tentatively that they can be changed or modified in the light of newly discovered facts.

ESSAY TOPICS AND REVIEW QUESTIONS 1. What do you regard as Berkeley's greatest achievement as a philosopher? In what respects did he fail to accomplish what he set out to do? 2. Give a brief account of Berkeley's education, his travels, and the influence of social and economic conditions he observed in Europe on the development of his philosophy. 3. Make a list of Berkeley's most important philosophical publications and indicate the main subject matter included in each of them.

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www.cliffs.com 4. For what purpose did Berkeley come to America? How long did he stay in New England, and why did he return to Europe? What did he accomplish during his stay in America? 5. Describe in some detail Berkeley's theory of vision. In what respect was it a new theory? What did he think was the chief reason why it was not generally accepted? 6. What explanation did Berkeley give concerning the way in which people derive their understanding of the size and distance of objects? What arguments did he give to support his view that distance is not seen directly? 7. Explain the way in which the New Theory of Vision was related to the Principles of Human Knowledge. The Principles contains four parts. What is the subject matter of each? 8. How do you account for the fact that the average layman has no difficulty at all in his understanding of the knowing process, while professional philosophers often disagree among themselves concerning the way in which knowing takes place? 9. According to Berkeley, matter is an abstract idea and as such has no real existence. What argument does he use in support of this position? 10. What is the distinction between abstract ideas and general ideas? What is the function of general ideas in the knowing process? 11. In Berkeley's view, what is it that can be known through the senses? What are some of the objects of knowledge that can be known only by intuition? Give examples for each. 12. Berkeley says that we do not have an idea of the soul or the self, but we do have a notion of it. How does he distinguish between ideas and notions? 13. Why was Berkeley so concerned to prove the nonexistence of matter? What difference did he think it would make in one's everyday living? 14. What logical connection did Berkeley see between one's metaphysical beliefs and his moral and religious beliefs? Tell why you do or do not agree with him on this point. 15. In his attempts to prove the nonexistence of matter, Berkeley begins with an analysis of what it means to say that a thing exists. Give an example to illustrate his position about existence. 16. What reasons did Berkeley give for rejecting John Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities and his insistence that primary qualities are in the object while secondary ones are only in the mind of the subject? 17. What additional reasons were given to support the idea that primary and secondary qualities cannot be separated? 18. Berkeley maintained that if such a thing as matter did exist, it would be impossible to know anything about it. What argument did he use in support of this position? 19. In the first dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, the charge is made that denying the existence of matter leads to skepticism and atheism. How does Philonous reply to this charge?

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www.cliffs.com 20. What additional arguments are used by Hylas in the second and third dialogues to discredit the view that matter does not exist? State briefly the replies which Philonous makes to these arguments. 21. For what purpose did Berkeley write the dialogue called Alciphron? Name the chief characters in this dialogue and indicate the philosophical position held by each of them. 22. Who were the so-called freethinkers of Berkeley's time? Name some of them and tell why Berkeley thought it necessary to refute them. 23. State briefly the central thesis of Richard Mandeville's Fable of the Bees and describe the argument used by Berkeley to refute it. 24. What was Berkeley's criticism of the moral philosophy set forth in the writings of the Earl of Shaftesbury? 25. What evidence did Berkeley present in support of his claim that the doctrine of the nonexistence of matter was in complete accord with the teachings of Christianity? 26. Summarize briefly and in your own words the main thesis of Berkeley's essay entitled Passive Obedience. What does he think one ought to do in the event of a conflict between the dictates of conscience and the demands of the civil government? 27. What was the occasion for the writing of the book called Siris? Some critics have regarded this book as a lot of superstitious nonsense, while others have maintained that it is in many respects the most significant and profound of all of Berkeley's writings. How do you account for these opposite valuations? 28. What reasons did Berkeley have for believing that tar-water is useful in the curing of diseases? To what extent was this belief confirmed by his own experiments? 29. Show how the belief in the medicinal value of tar-water was related to Berkeley's spiritual conception of the universe and to the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers concerning the action of such substances as the fire of Heraclitus, the nous of Anaxagoras, and love and strife in the philosophy of Empedocles. 30. What further confirmation did Berkeley find for his view concerning the spiritual character of the universe in the philosophies of Plato and the Neo-Platonists? 31. Contrast the conception of God which is implied in Siris with the one that is set forth in Berkeley's earlier writings. 32. Show how elements from a rationalistic theory of knowledge were combined with empiricism in Berkeley's latest book. To what extent do you think his philosophical position changed during his later years? 33. How would you evaluate Berkeley's arguments to prove the existence of God and the nonexistence of matter? What, in your opinion, constitutes the permanent significance of his work? 34. To what extent has Berkeley's philosophy been incorporated in the movements known as absolute idealism and personalistic idealism? Do you think that it is correct to regard Berkeley as a subjective idealist in view of the statements made in Siris?

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35. What bearing, if any, does Berkeley's philosophy have on the contemporary movement known as linguistic analysis?

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY CALKINS, MARY W. Berkeley. Modern Students Library. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929. A book of selections from all of Berkeley's major philosophical writings, together with an appropriate introduction to his life and works. FRASER, A. C. George Berkeley. 4 volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901. This is the most extensive account of Berkeley's life and writings. It is the standard work that is always consulted by those who write about his philosophy. HONE, JOSEPH M. George Berkeley. London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1931. A full account of Berkeley's life, his writings, and his philosophy. An introduction to the study of Berkeley by W. B. Yeats is included in the first part of the book. The book is both expository and critical. JESSOP, THOMAS E. George Berkeley. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1959. This is an account of Berkeley's philosophy and reflects the many different ways in which his writings have been interpreted and criticized. JONES, W. T. A History of Western Philosophy. Vol. II, Chap. 27. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952. A very brief but adequate account of Berkeley's life and philosophy, including his arguments against material substance, his critique of abstract ideas, conception of the physical world, and his moral and religious beliefs. LUCE, ARTHUR A. Berkeley's Immaterialism. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1945. A critical account of Berkeley's spiritual conception of the universe, together with an analysis of the arguments used in support of his thesis. MORRIS, C. R. Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Fairlawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, 1931. A book dealing with the philosophy of the English Enlightenment. It contains selections from the writings of each of these men. Its chief advantage for the study of Berkeley is that it shows how his work is related to both Locke and Hume. RITCHIE, A. D. George Berkeley. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1967. One of the more recent expositions of Berkeley's philosophy. It contains a preface by G. E. Davies of Manchester University. The most distinctive thing about this interpretation of Berkeley is the reappraisal that is given to the significance of his work. WARNOCK, G. J. Berkeley. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1953. A comparatively brief but comprehensive account of Berkeley's life and writings, and an evaluation of his work. WHEELWRIGHT, PHILIP. Berkeley, Hume. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Doran & Co., 1935. The book contains an introduction to the study of Berkeley's philosophy, followed by the text of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Berkeley's relationship to the work of Locke and Hume is explained in full.

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