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BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ANGLICAN CHURCH
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British Foreign Policy and the Anglican Church Christian Engagement with the Contemporary World
Edited by TIMOTHY BLEWETT, ADRIAN HYDE-PRICE & WYN REES Launde Abbey, University of Bath, and University of Nottingham, UK
© The contributors 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. The contributors have asserted their moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hampshire GU11 3HR England
Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA
Ashgate website: http://www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data British foreign policy and the Anglican Church : Christian engagement with the contemporary world 1. Church of England – Influence – Congresses 2. Christianity and international affairs – Congresses 3. International relations – Moral and ethical aspects – Congresses 4. Great Britain – Foreign relations – 1997 – Congresses I. Blewett, Timothy II. Hyde-Price, Adrian G. V. III. Rees, Wyn, 1963– 261.8’7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data British foreign policy and the Anglican Church : Christian engagement with the contemporary world / edited by Timothy Blewett, Adrian Hyde-Price & Wyn Rees. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-7546-6035-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-7546-6037-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Church and state – Church of England – History – 20th century. 2. Christianity and politics – Church of England – History – 20th century. 3. Church of England – Doctrines. 4. Great Britain – Foreign relations. 5. Christianity and international affairs. I. Blewett, Timothy. II. Hyde-Price, Adrian G. V. III. Rees, Wyn, 1963– BX5157.B74 2007 261.8’708828342–dc22 2007010219 ISBN 978-0-7546-6035-4 (HBK) ISBN 978-0-7546-6037-8 (PPK) Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.
Contents List of Tables List of Figures Notes on Contributors
PART 1 1
2
4
5
6
7
8
3
Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy Adrian Hyde-Price
9
THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT
The Continuing, Crucial Relevance of Just War Criteria Richard Harries
31
Balance of Consequences: Towards an Ethical Standpoint on the Iraq Intervention of 2003 Richard Bonney
37
Three Parables About War Charles Jones
55
British Military Intervention Since 1990 Tim Cross
73
The Church and the War on Terror Richard Lock-Pullan
89
UK Arms Sales and the Church of England Wyn Rees
PART 3 9
THE ETHICAL CONTEXT
Introduction Tim Blewett
PART 2 3
vii ix xi
105
BRITAIN AND THE LESS DEVELOPED WORLD
Waiting for Jubilee: The Campaign for Debt Cancellation Timothy Jones
119
vi
10
Index
British Foreign Policy and the Anglican Church
The Challenge of Aid Fletcher Tembo
135 155
List of Tables 9.1
Long-term external government debt
120
9.2
Comparison of debt payments and education spending in eight African countries, 1996
121
The impact of trade liberalisation in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 1987–1989 to 1997–1999
122
9.4
IMF and World Bank voting shares
125
9.5
Donor contributions to the International Development Association
127
9.6
The history of debt relief
129
9.3
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List of Figures 10.1
Aid volumes from 1983 to April 2004
136
10.2
The long-term trend in aid as a percentage of GNI for the United Kingdom
137
10.3
Battles for more and better aid from taxpayer to the child
138
10.4
The old and new poverty reduction agendas
139
10.5
Accountability in the Poverty Reduction Strategy context
152
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Notes on Contributors The Reverend Tim Blewett is Warden of Launde Abbey, the Retreat House for the Diocese of Leicester. He is currently a member of the Royal Army Chaplains Department and has served as a chaplain in Bosnia and Iraq. Richard Bonney is a Professor of History at the University of Leicester and Chairman of the Europe–Islamic World Organisation. Tim Cross recently retired as a Major-General in the British Army. The Right Reverend Richard Harries has recently retired from being the Bishop of Oxford. Adrian Hyde-Price is Professor of International Politics in the Department of European Studies and Modern Languages at the University of Bath. Charles Jones is a Reader in Politics at the University of Cambridge. Timothy Jones works for the World Development Movement. Richard Lock-Pullan is a Research Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. Wyn Rees is Professor of International Security in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham. Fletcher Tembo works for World Vision.
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PART 1 The Ethical Context
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Chapter 1
Introduction Tim Blewett
There are people who regard it as frivolous, as some Christians think it impious for anyone to hope and prepare for a better earthly future. They think that the meaning of present events is chaos, disorder, and catastrophe; and in resignation or pious escapism they surrender all responsibility for reconstruction and for future generations. It may be that the day of judgement will dawn tomorrow; in that case, we shall gladly stop working for a better future, but not before. Dietrich Bonhoeffer1
In this collection of essays the reader will be introduced to a number of key issues within the ethics of international relations and within the relationship between the Church and British foreign policy. The essays arise out of a conference held at Launde Abbey, the beautiful Tudor – Elizabethan Retreat House belonging to the Diocese of Leicester. It was sponsored by the University of Leicester and convened under the leadership of Professor Adrian Hyde-Price (University of Leicester), Professor Wyn Rees (University of Nottingham) and the Reverend Tim Blewett (Warden of Launde Abbey). The conference brought together politicians (most notably Hilary Benn, MP, Secretary of State for International Development), church leaders, military personnel, members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and nongovernmental organisations, academics and others to discuss the ethics of British foreign policy and how far it is shaped by the underlying influence of Christian values and, more directly, by the influence of the Church of England. The engagement of the Church of England with British society is central to the way that this Church has come to understand itself. The Church of England has often seen itself as the conscience of society and has been looked to in this guise throughout history to a greater or lesser extent. For the Church, faith cannot be compartmentalised because that would be mere religion with nothing to say, as it would see God anaesthetised and made powerless to speak into a world of history. The faith of the Church demands therefore that the Church should be fully integrated into society, helping society both to think through the ethics of what it is doing and also to act upon a higher ethical teaching. For the Church of England to fail to speak into the milieu of the political stage – including into the world of Britain’s international relations and foreign policy – would be to fail to fulfil its own vocation. The Church of England has this voice by being both intimately involved with society as the national Church, with its geographic networks of parishes across the country and a stake in every community, and by being ‘in touch’ with the various arms of 1
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (SCM, 1971), pp. 15–16.
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4
the State from Government and Members of Parliament to the military, from local government to British embassies. The Church of England, like other Christian churches, has also published reports and made statements on a wide range of international issues from globalisation to Darfur, from international social justice to Israel–Palestine and the rights of Christians throughout the Middle East. With its ‘excellent relationships with development agencies such as Christian Aid and CAFOD, and with those mission agencies active in development’2 not to mention its relationships with the international Church, both Anglican and of other denominations, what the Church of England says has to be taken with some seriousness by the British government of the day. However, with the decline in Church attendance, the influence of the Church has been reduced and to a certain extent marginalised by some sections of society except at moments of heightened international tension or national crisis. There has also been, amongst some areas of society, the desire to sideline the Church on the understanding that private beliefs should not enter public debate. Thus, over the last 50 years or so, the level of seriousness with which the Government of the day needs to listen to the Church has reduced. Added to the decline due to the growth of secularism, the Church itself has sometimes lacked confidence in voicing its opinion, due to the way in which the Church has understood its own history. With hindsight the Church has sometimes perceived itself as having become a vehicle for supporting oppression by the British state rather than for furthering the liberation of those in need. It has been said the Church has ‘often ended up as the [midwife] of exploitation’.3 This, however, is not a reason for the Church to stay silent now, for if it fails to speak then it may also end up supporting oppression and, by leaving a moral vacuum, allow foreign policy to become self-serving by default. It is also not what the nation wants as, even in the recent past, the Church of England has been looked to for a moral lead or as a focus for feelings and emotions at times of national crisis or tension. Indeed when the Church has not been perceived to give a moral lead in times of crisis it has been criticised. For instance, at the time of the First Gulf War the Bishops of the Church of England were accused by a number of commentators of having nothing important to say.4 The need for the Church of England to speak out to the nation can be seen sharply through three events within the last 25 years. Firstly, in 1982 Robert Runcie, then Archbishop of Canterbury, is said to have annoyed Margaret Thatcher by preaching a sermon that was not sufficiently triumphalistic at the service of thanksgiving for Britain’s victory in the Falklands, held at St. Paul’s Cathedral. At one level there was no need for such a service, yet the nation wanted it and it gave Robert Runcie the opportunity to speak of the long term view: ‘War is a sign of human failure, and everything we say and do in this service must be in that context’.5 The sermon caused difficulties between the Church and Government ‘for though he did praise 2
Charles Reed, Development Matters: Christian Perspectives on Globalisation (Church House Publishing, 2001). 3 M. Taylor, Not Angels but Agencies: The Ecumenical Response to Poverty – A Primer (SCM/WCC, 1995), p. 30. 4 The Guardian, 1 November 1990, p. 6. 5 Robert Runcie, Sermon preached at St Paul’s Cathedral, 26th July 1982.
Introduction
5
the courage – and the restraint – of those who fought, he angered some Conservative members of Parliament by not sounding a fanfare of triumph’.6 Secondly, the Jubilee 2000 Campaign against world poverty brought the relationship between the Church of England and British society clearly into focus. The raising of awareness of issues around debt relief and the impact of debt upon individuals in the developing world came primarily out of the Church or church organisations. Thirdly, the present Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, objected to the Iraq War in 2003 adding to the pressure upon Tony Blair and his government. His voice helped to swell the numbers of those protesting against the possibility of war and the numbers of those involved in debating the morality of the Iraq War and war in general. The Church has thus been able to act as a focus for both church and secular organisations, giving their voice added weight when addressing the media and other areas of British society. The relationship between the Church of England and British society can, however, be a difficult one on occasions as there are no set rules and there is great potential for ambiguity and misunderstanding. The ambiguities within the relationship can create tensions on both sides, especially in a world of politics that calls for media statements and quick responses. The Church tries to take a longer term approach in which the will of God can be discerned. Archbishop Rowan Williams looks with other Church leaders and theologians to the ‘priority of divine freedom and divine initiative, God’s capacity to be anywhere and everywhere. And if that is so’, he goes on to say, ‘it is also God’s freedom to show who and what God is, not in religious places but in the stuff of human relation, and in the stuff of the material world’.7 This desire is often a far cry from the world of Realpolitik in which self-interest can often be more important than any ethical stance. The Church of England, along with the other Christian denominations in Britain, has been able to give both a lead and a continued response to questions within the public realm. This is possible as it can draw upon a long historical tradition in which ethical questions have been debated. History has shown how both the world of politics and international relations would benefit from listening attentively to what Christian tradition has to offer. Indeed this ability to take the long term view is in itself a reason why the Church should engage in both foreign policy and international relations issues. It should, however, be understood that the Church of England does not necessarily speak with one voice even at moments of national crisis or tension. It does have an underlying voice of consensus which informs the day to day decisions of individual politicians through political lobbying by the Church or church agencies. This can be seen in the many reports that the Church of England has published over the years. For instance, the Church of England has contributed to the debate on war and peace and the use of force on the international stage in the following reports: Force in the Modern World, Christians in a Violent World, The Church and the Bomb and Peacemaking in a Nuclear Age. The direct influence of the Church has been enhanced by its indirect effect through the personal faiths of individual politicians. This can be seen most recently in the ‘conviction politics’ of Margaret Thatcher; in such politicians as Tony Blair 6 7
M. Duggan, Runcie: The Making of an Archbishop (Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), p. 226. Rowan Williams, Christian Imagination in Poetry and Polity (SLG Press, 2004), p. 41.
6
British Foreign Policy and the Anglican Church
or Gordon Brown and their response to the Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History campaigns; or in Tony Blair’s approach to the Iraq War. Although modern politicians no longer use biblical imagery in the way that Lloyd George did,8 Margaret Thatcher, along with some of her closest colleagues, tried to relate policies to principles which involved reference to theory and also to religion as she ‘took religion seriously, read her Bible and enjoyed discussion of theological themes’.9 The Labour government of the late 1990s, and Robin Cook in particular, called for an ethical foreign policy in which human rights for all were put centre stage.10 Tony Blair justified the NATO bombing of the Yugoslav Republic in the spring of 1999 as a ‘just and moral cause’ and the war as ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values’.11 Also, at the Chicago Economic Club at the height of the Kosovo conflict in 1999 Tony Blair outlined his justification for military action largely by setting out criteria and conditions that drew heavily upon the just war theory.12 It is obviously difficult to say whether such statements come out of Britain’s Judaeo-Christian heritage or whether they are underpinned by the politicians’ own faiths and belief systems actively supported by the Church. It should though be recognised that, at the very least, a number of politicians of different political parties have been influenced by Christian thinking and ethics and this influence seems to go beyond mere appropriation of Christian ethical ideas to suit political necessities. The personal faith of leading politicians underpinned by a historic JudaeoChristian influence on society has helped the Church of England to influence British foreign policy and its international relations to some extent. This can be seen in how the Church has helped push development issues up the agenda of the British government. These policies are informed by a continuous debate between Church and society that, if it is to be sustained, needs the Church to maintain its confidence in the wealth of Christian tradition. It needs to recognise that it has the support of allies amongst leading politicians whilst maintaining a distinctive voice on the political issues of our day. It is hoped by the editors that this book will help in that on-going debate, encouraging the Church of England to continue its critique of British foreign policy and its role in international relations. This is important if the nation is to move beyond a ‘culture of suspicion’, to use Onora O’Neill’s phrase,13 to a greater understanding of the ethics and moral justification of what we do as a country on the international stage and if British foreign policy is to avoid slipping into a moral and spiritual vacuum. This development in understanding will not be achieved by lobbying or by report writing – even though these activities are important – so much as by the Church being involved in society and expressing its views. By the Church’s presence amongst policy 8 A. Wilkinson, Dissent or Conform? War, Peace and the English Churches 1900–1945 (SCM, 1986), pp. 26–9. 9 D. Forrester, Christian Justice and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 27. 10 ‘British Foreign Policy’ opening statement by Robin Cook, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Mission Statement Daily Bulletin, 12 May 1997, p. 2. 11 The Sun, 4 June 1999, p. 1. 12 T. Blair, Doctrine of the International Community speech, 22 April 1999, p. 3. 13 Lecture 1, Point 5, Some New Suspicions of the Reith Lectures, 2002.
Introduction
7
makers, practitioners and all those who are affected, it will have a direct impact upon British foreign policy. It is hoped that this book will add to that impact as it will encourage people of different backgrounds to think through the Church’s role in the evolution of British foreign policy and in its moral and ethical underpinning. In doing so people will be encouraged to have a vision for a better future for Britain, and for the world, that goes beyond just solving the problems of this country, to a future order where we do justice, love kindness and walk humbly with our God: He has told you, O mortal, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?14
14
Micah 6.8, New Revised Standard Version.
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Chapter 2
Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy Adrian Hyde-Price
The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states. Their duty is first so to deal with other nations as to avoid strife and war and to eschew aggression in all its forms, whether for nationalistic or ideological objects. But the safety of the State, the lives and freedom of their own fellow countrymen, to whom they owe their position, make it right and imperative in the last resort, or when a final and definite conviction has been reached, that the use of force should not be excluded. If the circumstances are such to warrant it, force may be used. And if this is so, it should be used under the conditions which are most favourable. There is no merit in putting off a war for a year if, when it comes, it is a far worse war or one much harder to win. These are the tormenting dilemmas upon which mankind has throughout its history been so frequently impaled. Winston S. Churchill1
This chapter explores the ‘tormenting dilemmas’ facing Christians as they seek to formulate foreign and security policy in a world still disfigured by war, conflict, oppression and injustice. International politics is a realm of tragedy, in which moral and ethical dilemmas abound, and secular or religious schemes for a perpetual peace conflict with the ‘self-help’ logic of a competitive international system. Christianity offers an eschatological vision of the transcendence of state rivalry and the arms race through the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. The problem, however, is what role Christian ethics can play in shaping foreign and security policies in an unredeemed world. This chapter outlines five Christian responses to the ethical and moral dilemmas of political action in an unredeemed world: pietism, the ‘theology of hope’, pacifism, liberal Catholic and Protestant theology and Christian Realism. Arguing that the Christian Realism of Reinhold Niebuhr provides the firmest conceptual foundations for an ethical foreign policy in an anarchic international system, the chapter concludes by outlining a non-eschatological ethics drawn from Realist international theory, the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr and the political philosophy of Michael Oakeshott. The Tragedy of International Politics Any discussion of contemporary foreign and security policy must begin with the unhappy observation that war and conflict have been perennial features of the human 1
p. 320.
Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948),
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condition. The vision of peace with justice has burnt brightly in the hearts of men and women over the millennia, but the recurrence of war has repeatedly mocked these dreams and aspirations. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the prospects for a stable peace are, at best, uncertain and, at worst, illusory: this is the tragedy of international politics.2 Faced with the tragic realities of international politics, many individuals have responded by giving voice to humanity’s deep-seated longing for peace, harmony and cooperation. Western political thought is replete with utopian and reformist schemes for taming war and building a stable peace order. The Christian Just War tradition sought to constrain and ‘civilise’ the conduct of warfare in Medieval Christendom; at the time when the modern states’ system was still in its infancy, Grotius looked to international law as the foundation of an international society of states; the Eighteenth Century ‘Age of Reason’ witnessed a veritable profusion of schemes for perpetual peace, most notably Kant’s advocacy of a foedus pacificum; the nineteenth century saw a number of attempts to establish a Concert of the great powers and to curb the arms race; and in the twentieth century, ambitious proposals for a cooperative international order based on law and institutions were drawn up after both world wars. Whilst Christians were often influential in advocating and supporting these pragmatic schemes for a more cooperative international order, however, the JudeoChristian tradition offers a much more radical solution to the ‘tormenting dilemmas’ that so pre-occupied Churchill. Biblical prophecy embodies a radical eschatology that promises a resolution and transcendence of the tragedy of international politics through the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. The most powerful and poetically moving expression of this radical eschatological can be found in the Book of Isaiah, in which the prophet offers an irenic vision of a world in which, ‘in the days to come’, nations and peoples shall ‘beat their swords into plowshares’ and their ‘spears into pruning hooks’. Isaiah’s irenic vision continues to inspire and unsettle us because of its poetic imagery and because ‘it is totally out of harmony with the reality of our world, yet fully in harmony with what we would like the world to be’.3 Erich Fromm, a leading member of the Frankfurt School who sought to integrate Freudianism and Marxism, wrote that he had been deeply touched by the Jewish messianic traditions of the ‘end of days’ he had grown up with. ‘The vision of universal peace and harmony between nations touched me deeply when I was 12 or 13 years old’.4 We live in a world in which fear, conflict and insecurity are pervasive and yet yearn for a world of harmony, cooperation and trust. The gap between the realities of power and our dreams of cooperative harmony is a reflection of the tragedy of international politics. Isaiah’s glorious vision of the future of Judah and Jerusalem is one which shall come to pass ‘in the days to come’ (‘in the latter days’). In the Old Testament, this phrase tends 2
Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 3 James C. Craigie, Twelve Prophets, vol. 2 (St. Andrews: St. Andrews Press, 1985), p. 32. 4 Quoted in James Bentley, Between Marx and Christ. The Dialogue in GermanSpeaking Europe 1870–1970 (London: Verso, 1982), p. 85.
Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy
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to denote ‘an unspecified future time, a prolonged period rather than an actual date, when situations that have remained in place for years, if not for centuries, will be reversed or replaced’.5 It is therefore clearly grounded on the Judeo–Christian eschatological tradition that sees history as a process leading inexorably to a specific end. The vision is thus one of future transformation in an unspecified time to come and not necessarily a call for political action today. It is also a vision of divine realities outside of human history or human possibilities (a theme developed in the writings of Niebuhr). The agency for this eschatological vision is not mankind, but God. In the days to come, ‘the mountain of the LORD’s house shall be established as the highest of the mountains, and shall be raised above the hills’. The vision is thus of the Kingdom of God on earth. This act will be followed by a mass pilgrimage to ‘the house of the God of Jacob, that he may teach us his ways and that we may walk in his paths’. In the latter days, Jerusalem will become the place to worship, thus establishing the Lord God of Israel as the God of the nations. Other gods and other forms of worship will be discarded, and with the spread of the ‘word of the LORD from Jerusalem’, the established structures and procedures of international politics will be transformed. God shall ‘judge between the nations, and shall arbitrate for many peoples’. As the nations and peoples place themselves under the authority of God, a deep and pervasive peace will spread over the earth: they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.
This peace will not be a negative peace, the mere absence of war, but will be a positive, perpetual and stable peace. It will be based not on unilateral or even multilateral disarmament, but rather on omnilateral disarmament, covering the whole spectrum of instruments of war. In Micah (4.4), the passage ‘nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more’, is followed by the promise that: … they shall all sit under their own vines and under their own fig trees, and no one shall make them afraid; for the mouth of the LORD of hosts has spoken.
This deep and lasting peace will make it possible for the humble peasant and the ordinary citizen to produce their crops in a secure environment, in which fear will no longer drive the search for security. This promise of a peaceful and secure world is given by God, using his military title ‘The LORD of hosts’ (‘hosts’ being Angels arrayed for battle).
5
David Prior, The Message of Joel, Micah and Habakkuk (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1988), p. 148.
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If the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth will be the final and irrevocable guarantee of a just and durable peace, it is clear from other prophets that the ‘end of days’ will be a time of violence, suffering and pain. Indeed, Joel reverses Isaiah and Micah’s irenic prophecy and calls for the nations to prepare for a holy war by total mobilisation of all: Prepare war, stir up the warriors. Let all the soldiers draw near, let them come up. Beat your plowshares into swords, and your pruning hooks into spears; let the weakling say, ‘I am a warrior’.
Political Action in an Unredeemed World Despite the promise of a divine peace to come, the problem for Christians remains: how can Christian ethics and biblical prophecy serve as a guide to foreign and security policy in an unredeemed world prior to the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth? Few today would rely on the Bible to provide answers to contemporary international problems such as nuclear proliferation, conflicts in the Middle East or failed states. This was not always the case, however. In our overwhelmingly secular age, it is worth reminding ourselves that there was once a time when Biblical prophecy was widely used to diagnose – and more importantly, prescribe solutions to – the ills of the world. This was mid-seventeenth century England, a time of revolution, social turmoil and civil war. By the late sixteenth century, the translation of the Bible into vernacular English and the invention of the printing press had broken the power of the established Church hierarchy and made possible the widespread study of the Holy Scriptures by previously marginalised social groups such as artisans and women. In an age wracked by acute social and political conflict, these groups and individuals looked to the sacred texts to provide them with concrete solutions to their own immediate problems. Biblical images provided the language with which most people comprehended the world around them. By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the Bible had become central to all intellectual life, providing a point of reference not just for religious questions but also political, economic and social issues, as well for discussions of as the arts, literature and science. In the words of the radical separatist Robert Browne in 1590, ‘the word of God doth expressly set down all necessary and general rules of the arts and all learning’.6 The problem, of course, was how to interpret the scriptures. During the Civil Wars which swept the British Isles in the mid-seventeenth century, the Bible was used to justify a range of political actions, from the divine right of kings to regicide and
6
Quoted in Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1993), p. 31.
Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy
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radical social egalitarianism.7 However, there was also a strong belief in providence and God’s active intervention in the daily lives of individuals and nations. God’s work was seen as being carried out by human agency. Cromwell himself was probably the first and last British ruler to be widely compared to Moses. Cromwell’s ‘New Model Army’ was seen as an instrument of God’s work, its victories a sign of God’s blessing. Hence the Roundhead admonition, ‘Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition’. With the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, this belief in divine providence became harder to sustain. Which human agency was doing God’s work? How were Biblical prophecies to be correctly interpreted? The result was a weakening of the authority of the Bible as a guide to concrete political action. Passages that served as a radical call for action in the 1640s and 1650s were now taken to refer to the afterlife. Christ’s Kingdom was not to be the work of human agency in the here and now, but was to come through divine intervention at the ‘end of days’. ‘Because the Bible could be all things to all men, a book for all seasons’, Christopher Hill has written, ‘it ultimately lost its usefulness as a guide to political action’.8 As Michael Oakshott has written, the declining utility of prophetic vision as a guide to concrete action arises from the fact that ‘Scripture is an artifact’: It is, in the first place, an arbitrary selection of writings called canonical by the authority that recognised them. And secondly, it is nothing apart from interpretation … Nothing can be more certain than that, if the law of God is revealed in Scripture, it is revealed only in an interpretation of Scripture. And interpretation is a matter of authority; for, whatever determines everything is the decision, whose reasoning shall interpret?9
In the light of the ambiguity that surrounds many Biblical passages and given the absence of a legitimate interpreter of the Holy Scriptures, the question remains: how should we respond to Isaiah’s irenic vision? Does it have relevance to our lives and to the world in which we live? Or is it no more than a beautiful dream and a promise for a time to come in the dim and distant future? Religions, Reinhold Niebbuhr once wrote, fall into two broad categories, the ‘mystical’ and the ‘prophetic’. The former emphasises humility before a transcendent God and is spiritually inwardlooking and pietistic; the latter is out-ward-looking, emphasises the immanence of God, and celebrates the eschatological implications of prophecy.10 The mystical and the prophetic represent ‘ideal types’: in reality, theological responses to Biblical prophecy are much more diverse. In the following section, we shall examine five 7
It is also significant that reference was made primarily to the Old Testament rather than the new. Cromwell himself was often seen as a latter-day Moses leading the ‘chosen people’ – the English-speaking Protestant nation – to the promised land. This point was made by Karl Marx in The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte who noted that ‘Cromwell and the English People … borrowed speech, passions and illusions from the Old Testament ... When the bourgeois transformation had been accomplished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk’. Quoted in Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, p. 40. 8 Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, p. 415. 9 Michael Oakshott, ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, p. 269. 10 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (London: Continuum, 2005), p. 43.
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broad approaches: pietism, the theology of hope, pacifism, liberal Christianity and Christian realism. Interestingly, these theological positions have their counter-parts in the major schools of International Relations theory. Christians and Political Action ‘Render unto Caesar …’: Pietism and the Separation of Religion and Politics One approach to Biblical prophecy is to argue the vision of a transcendental peace is grounded on an eschatological understanding of history. In Isaiah, the establishment of the Lord’s house in the ‘highest of the mountains’ in the ‘days to come’ is the catalyst for complete and universal disarmament. God will ‘judge between the nations and shall arbitrate for many peoples’, and consequently ‘they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks’. The point of this argument is that the agency for this radical transformation in international politics is seen to be spiritual not human. In theological terms, this has given rise to the belief that the Kingdom of God is a transcendent ideal outside of human history.11 The statement attributed to Jesus, ‘My Kingdom is not of this world’ (John 18.36) does not mean that Christians should abandon politics altogether, but it does suggest that concrete political programmes should not be based on Biblical prophecies about the coming of the Kingdom of God.12 The German Protestant theologian Karl Barth, for example, refused to identify the work of God with the work of men. Political and social evils, he maintained, were the necessary product of man’s sinful nature and the human effort to eradicate them was therefore futile.13 God himself, not men, would inaugurate his Kingdom. This did not, however, mean that Christians should not espouse a social programme or even endorse the socialist project.14 The eschatological character of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, coupled with the conviction that the agency for mankind’s redemption is spiritual not human, can lead to the conclusion that religion and politics should be separate. The well-known injunction of Jesus to ‘render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s’ implicitly suggests a necessary
11
See Michael Cartwright, ‘Biblical Argument in International Ethics’, in Nardin and Mapel, (eds), Traditions of International Ethics, pp. 270–96 (p. 287). 12 Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 162. 13 ‘Asceticism and movements of reform have their place as parables and as representations, but in themselves they are of no value. In no sense can they ever be even a first step towards the Kingdom of Heaven. There is but one good and one evil, one pure and one impure. Before God everything is impure; and therefore nothing is especially impure’. Karl Barth quoted in Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 44. 14 Quoted in E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, second edition (New York: Palgrave, Macmillan), p. 94. Niebuhr commented that Barthe’s theology was ‘too “eschatological” and too transcendent to offer any guidance for the discriminating choices that political responsibility calls us to’. Quoted in Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 79.
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separation between the religious and the moral on the one hand and the political on the other. Kaiser Wilhelm II expressed this view in his letter to a ‘troublesome priest’, Adolf Stöcker, in 1896: ‘Pastors should concern themselves with the souls of their parishioners, should promote charity, and should keep out of politics’.15 British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin expressed the same sentiment in 1926 when he asked a group of bishops who were attempting to mediate a coal strike whether they would like it if the Iron and Steel Federation attempted a revision of the Athanasian Creed.16 Niebuhr noted that Martin Luther ‘turned on the peasants of his day in holy horror when they attempted to transmute the “spiritual” kingdom into an “earthly” one by suggesting that the principles of the gospel had social significance’.17 The view of the nineteenth-century liberal German pastor who argued that ‘We do not consult Jesus when we are concerned with things which belong to the domain of the construction of the state and political economy’18 finds its contemporary echo in the words of Alaistair Campbell (Tony Blair’s former spin doctor) who told reporters that New Labour didn’t ‘do God’.19 A similar separation of politics and religion was made by Friedrich Naumann, an influential German liberal nationalist. He consciously broke with the Christian socialist beliefs of his youth and adopted a more hard-nosed morality which separated Christ and Christian teachings from the realm of politics altogether. ‘One cannot wish to construct the whole of human development on sympathy and brotherly love. There are things that elude the grasp of the Christian religion. The world remains the world and power comes before compassion’. Naumann became a passionate enthusiast for the German navy, a position he justified in terms of his citizenship of the German state rather than his Christian values. Although Christians individually were called on to love their enemies, he argued, ‘the struggle for existence has taught the nations to be armour-plated beasts’.20 A more principled pietism was developed around the same time by the influential Protestant theologian of Wilhelmine Germany, Adolf Harnack. He argued strongly that the Christian gospels were essentially non-political. The gospel of Jesus was: the joyous news to the poor and with them to the peaceable, the meek, and those who are pure in heart; it is the news that the kingdom of God is near, that his Kingdom will soothe the sorrows of the distressed, bring justice and establish their childhood in God in addition to giving all good things.
15
Quoted in Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 28. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 105. 17 Niebuhr quoted by Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 94. 18 Quoted by Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 94. 19 Quoted in ‘Abortion is suddenly an issue in British Election’, International Herald Tribune, 24 March 2005. On the relationship between Tony Blair’s political and religious convictions, see Antony Seldon, Blair (London: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pp. 515–32. Seldon notes that few British Prime Ministers ‘have been so influenced by their faith’ and that his ‘relationship with God is more important than any other’ (515). 20 Quoted in Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 22. 16
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The gospel brought with it a new order of life ‘above the world and politics’.21 The problem with such attempts to separate politics and religion, as E.H. Carr noted, was that ‘it is not ultimately satisfying’. The attempt ‘to keep God and Caesar in watertight compartments’, he argued, ‘runs too much athwart the deep-seated desire of the human mind to reduce its view of the world to some kind of moral order’.22 The view that religious belief is a private matter that is best left out of the political arena runs up against the view that religious conviction should inform an individual’s behaviour towards his fellow human beings. This in turn suggests that religious understandings of morality will shape one’s approach to the dilemmas and choices of political life, a view exemplified in the ‘theology of hope’. The ‘Theology of Hope’ A second response would be one inspired by a ‘theology of hope’, which has been described as ‘one of the most fruitful intellectual concepts of the twentieth century’.23 The ‘theology of hope’ involves the conviction that faith in the future kingdom of God must manifest itself in concrete political and social action in the present. This view echoes the spirit of mid-seventeeth-century England in its belief that the Bible prescribes clear courses of action to do God’s work in the here and now. It is a belief that sees human agency as the instrument of God’s will to redeem the world and bring about His Kingdom on earth. In some versions, this involves prefiguring the Kingdom of God on earth by using political action and the force of moral example to bring about Christian-Judeo teachings such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’. The ‘theology of hope’ emerged in its modern version as a response to the social question generated by industrial capitalism. In some countries, this gave birth to a reformist Christian socialism; in others, to a socially-orientated ‘Christian democracy’. In Germany, however, as James Bentley has argued at length, it generated a distinctive intellectual cross-fertilisation between Christians and Marxists. It is this German dialogue between the two traditions that gave rise to an eschatological vision of Christianity that saw the poor and oppressed as the instruments of God’s will. Jürgen Moltman for example, paraphrasing Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerback, articulated this perspective in the following formulation: ‘The theologian is not concerned merely to supply a different interpretation of the world, of human history and of human nature, but to transform them in expectation of a divine transformation’. For Moltman, reconciliation with God did not involve merely individual and personal salvation, but ‘the realisation of the eschatological hope of justice, the humanising of man, the socialising of humanity, peace for all creation’.24
21 22 23 24
Quoted in Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 37. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 94–5. Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 59. Quoted in Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, p. 59.
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Pacifism At its most radical, the Christian Gospels can be seen implying a pacifist response to war and armed conflict: this is the interpretation of the Historic Peace Churches, including the Quakers. There had been individual pacifists before them, but the Quakers, or Society of Friends, were the first organised body to proclaim pacifism and abstention from politics as a principle.25 This rejection of the ‘carnal sword’ came about primarily as a reaction to the 1660 Restoration, and was accompanied by a rejection of politics and a retreat into nonconformist pietism and dissent. But it is important to note that many of the early Quakers and Puritans advocated military force not only to overthrow the Monarchy and advance the protestant cause at home, but also as an instrument for intervention to support protestants abroad. Radical Puritans called on Cromwell to lead his victorious armies abroad to defeat the Antichrist (the Pope), to burn Rome and to liberate Palestine from the Turks for the Jews.26 The New Model Army, it was claimed, was ‘bound by the law of God … to aid the subjects of other princes that are either persecuted for true religion or oppressed under tyranny’.27 The basis of a principled pacifism is the belief that in an unredeemed world, all political options involve doing evil to a greater or lesser sense.28 Because of original sin, it is impossible to achieve goodness by human agency. The only agency to achieve the Kingdom of God is spiritual, not human. Rather than becoming implicit in political choices in ‘Babylon’, the duty of Christians is to focus on spiritual redemption and await the coming of God’s Kingdom by divine intervention.29 Despite their very different attitudes to the use of military force, the Historic Peace Churches and liberation theology share one attribute in common: this is the belief that the scriptures call for radical and life-changing responses which generate a new way of being. The case of the Quakers illustrates this: either revolutionary politics and military intervention abroad, or a renunciation of politics and pacifism. Either way, what both positions share is a rejection of the status quo and existing institutions and practices. Reinhold Niebuhr captured this duality well in this observation that ‘Religion draws the bow of life so taut that it either snaps the string (defeatism) or overshoots the mark (fanaticism and asceticism)’.30 In this sense, Quaker pacifism and Christian Liberation Theology share a common attribute: despite their very different approaches to the use of coercion and force, both involve a rejection – either by defeatism or fanaticism and asceticism – of what they regard as an unjust, 25
Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, p. 422. Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, pp. 302–3, 310–11. 27 Quoted in Hill, The English Bible and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, p. 303. See also p. 313 for a justification of the conquest of the Spanish West Indies by Cromwell’s navy in terms of ‘avenging the blood … of the poor Indian … so unjustly, so cruelly and so often shed by the hands of the Spaniards … All great and extraordinary wrongs done to particular persons ought to be considered in a manner done to all the rest of the human race’. 28 See Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 93. 29 On the metaphor of ‘Babylon’, see Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 163. 30 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 47. 26
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violent and unredeemed world. Both deny the legitimacy of the existing status quo and both seek to overcome it by denying its accepted institutions and practices. This way of thinking has its corollary in both Peace Studies and Critical International Relations theory. In Robert Cox’s terms, it amounts to a rejection of ‘problem-solving theory’ in favour of ‘critical theory’. Ken Booth’s notion of ‘security as emancipation’ is a prime example of this pattern of thought. Yet this notion of seeking to change reality and not to work within the parameters of the status quo is also found in more radical versions of liberalism. Indeed, critical theory shares much more in common with neo-conservatism than either school of thought would care to admit. Both seek to use radical means to transform the status quo. Liberal Catholic and Protestant Theology If both pacifism and liberation theology represent radical responses to Biblical prophecy, the mainstream Catholic and Protestant churches have responded in a much more moderate, ‘reformist’ manner. The liberal Christian perspective seeks reform not revolution, gradual solutions rather than radical manifestos promising dramatic change. It seeks to ameliorate injustice through piecemeal social engineering, rather than the draconian measures to root out and eradicate the perceived causes of injustice. This ‘Constantinian’ theology, as José Miguez Bonino characterises liberal Catholicism, suggests in effect that ‘whenever an alternative emerges, the Christian ought to work for the best possible solution, the most just and generous one, short of endangering the existing order’.31 In terms of international politics, mainstream liberal Christianity identifies with policies that seek to strengthen the UN system and international law, and to work for arms controls and gradual disarmament. Christian churches are often active in efforts to mediate international conflicts and to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties. Above all, liberal Christian perspectives seek to strengthen the influence of normative and ethical principles in international politics and to constrain the operation of Realpolitik. This approach rests on the implicit assumption that there are no fundamental or ineluctable causes of conflict in the international system: consequently, peace and cooperation are possible if states act reasonably and try to accommodate the interests and identities of others. Mainstream liberal Christianity’s approach to issues of war and peace is epitomised by the tradition of ‘Just War’ thinking. Rather than rejecting war per se, as do the Historic Peace Churches, liberal Catholicism and Protestantism have developed a set of principles governing the use of force. These cover both Jus ad bellum, or just recourse to war, and Jus in bello, or just conduct of war. In Niebuhr’s view, Liberal Christianity embodies much of the ‘evolutionary optimism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century’, and has resulted in a ‘religious idealism … saturated with sentimentality’. He was critical of the liberal-idealist view that social justice could be achieved by the religiously-inspired philanthropy of the wealthy, or that peace could be brought about by international organisations and agreements – which in his time meant the League of Nations and the Kellogg 31
Quoted in Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 213.
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Pact. ‘In spite of the disillusionment of the World War’, he argued, ‘the average liberal Protestant Christian is still convinced that the kingdom of God is gradually approaching, that the League of Nations is it partial fulfilment and the Kellogg pact its covenant …’. Liberal Protestantism, Niebuhr maintained, was ‘on the whole, the religion of the privileged classes of Western civilisation’, and its failure to recognise and acknowledge the ‘cruelties of economic and political life’ left it with a taint of hypocrisy and sentimentality. It was therefore not surprising, Niebuhr argued, that liberal Protestantism’s ‘espousal of the ideal of love, in a civilisation reeking with social injustice, should be cynically judged and convicted of hypocrisy by those in whom bitter social experiences destroy the sentimentalities and illusions of the comfortable’.32 Given his disillusionment with liberal Christianity, Niebuhr devoted his life’s work to developing and articulating a more ‘realist’ interpretation of scripture. Christian Realism Christian Realism emerged from the reflections of Protestant theologians in the US on the social forces that shape and limit human possibilities, and on the gap between the Biblical vision of God’s Kingdom and the realities of modern industrial society. It draws on, and seeks to integrate, three distinct sorts of ‘realist’ thinking: political realism, moral realism and theological realism. Although it did not originate with him, Christian Realism has come to be associated almost exclusively with the work of Reinhold Niebuhr.33 Christian realism can be seen as an attempt to address the tension between good and evil in the world, between the love of God and original sin. Unlike either the Historic Peace Churches or Liberation Theology, it does not seek to escape from the complex demands of collective life by either pietism or fanaticism, but rather to engage with the moral and ethical dilemmas of an unredeemed world. It regards the human condition as essentially tragic, and seeks to engage with the dimensions of tragedy. It is also an attempt to address the tension between the individual moral codes of Christianity and the dynamics of social life. It recognises the limits of purely moral solutions to political problems, and argues that Christian behaviour must take into account not just religious norms and ideals, but the broader social, economic and political factors that offer resistance to the implementation of the religious imperative of altruistic love (agape). Above all, it is about how to live in the time before ‘the end of days’, in other words, before the coming of the Kingdom of God on earth. A central plank of Christian Realism is the argument that the ethics of the Gospel cannot provide a social ethics for human collectivities such as classes or nations:34
32
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 52. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 1–31, 241. 34 In doing so, Christian Realism draws heavily on the teachings of Martin Luther: ‘Hence a man who would venture to govern an entire country or the world with the Gospel would be like a shepherd who should place in one fold wolves, lions, eagles and sheep together and let them freely mingle with one another and say, Help yourselves, and be good and peaceful among yourselves; the fold is open, there is plenty of food; have no fear of dogs or clubs. The sheep, forsooth, would keep the peace and would allow themselves to be fed and governed 33
20
British Foreign Policy and the Anglican Church The ethic of Jesus does not deal at all with the immediate moral problem of every human life – the problem of arranging some kind of armistice between various contending factions and forces. It has nothing to say about the relativities of politics and economics, nor of the necessary balances of power which exist and must exist in even the most intimate social relationships.35
‘The gospel’, Niebuhr argued, ‘is something more than the law of love. The gospel deals with the fact that men violate the law of love. The gospel presents Christ as the pledge and revelation of God’s mercy which finds man in his rebellion and overcomes his sin’.36 Contrasting the classical Reformation emphasis on the sinfulness of humanity with the ‘Renaissance faith in man’, Niebuhr argued that: The New Testament does not … envisage a simple triumph of good over evil in history. It sees human history involved in the contradictions of sin to the end. That is why it sees no simple resolution of the problem of history. It believes that the Kingdom of God will resolve the contradictions of history; but for it the Kingdom of God is no simple historical possibility. The grace of God for man and the Kingdom of God for history are both divine realities and not human possibilities.37
The significance of this is that Niebuhr locates the Kingdom of God as a transcendent ideal outside human history.38 Niebuhr was particularly concerned to reject idealist claims that the Christian Church should be pacifist. He argued forcefully that ‘there is not the slightest support in Scripture for this doctrine of non-violence’.39 He also argued that conflict was inevitable in the world given human nature and original sin. Pacifists, he argued, do not seem to realise that ‘sin introduces an element of conflict into the world and that even the most loving relations are not free of it’.40 He argued that ‘The injunction “resist not evil” is only part and parcel of a total ethic which we violate not only in war-time, but every day of our lives, and that over conflict is but a final and vivid revelation of the character of human experience’.41 Niebuhr’s towering intellectual achievement was to confront the realities of political life and the dilemmas facing states in an anarchical international system. He recognised that powerful nations, at times, could ‘prevent anarchy by effective imperialism’, but the peace so gained ‘is always an uneasy and an unjust one’. Powerful nations could also ‘organise a crude society of nations’, in the same way that ‘powerful classes organise a nation’, but in each case, ‘the peace is a tentative one in peace, but they would not live long; nor would any beast keep from molesting another’. Luther quoted in Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 165–6. 35 Niebuhr quoted in Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 6. 36 Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist’, in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr. Selected Essays and Addresses, edited by Robert McAfee Brown (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 102–19 (p. 111). 37 Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist’, p. 113. 38 Cartwright, in Nardin and Mapel (eds), Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 287. 39 Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist’, p. 107. 40 Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist’, p. 109. 41 Niebuhr, ‘Why the Christian Church is not Pacifist’, p. 108.
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because it is unjust’. The conclusion he drew from this analysis was bleak: society, he argued, ‘is in a perpetual state of war’ and no amount of ‘moral goodwill’ or rational ‘social intelligence’ could bring about peace with justice.42 Consequently: … it is safe to hazard the prophecy that the dream of perpetual peace and brotherhood for human society is one which will never be fully realised. It is a vision prompted by the conscience and insight of individual man, but incapable of fulfilment by collective man. It is like all true religious visions, possible of approximation but not of realisation in actual history.43
The Ethics of Christian Realism Niebuhr’s pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for a perpetual peace might be seen as providing a justification for an amoral, if not immoral, Realpolitik. Nothing could be further from Niebuhr’s aim, however. Christian Realism does not suggest that moral imperatives have no place in international politics; rather, it seeks to identify the constraints on political action, and therefore the scope for moral and ethical choices. Christian Realism eschewes idealist reflections on a utopian world order in preference for an examination of ‘the extent to which moral behaviour is heavily constrained by the dynamics of political life’.44 Acting effectively requires knowledge of existing circumstances together with the power to act. A clear understanding of the nature of international politics is thus a necessary precondition for making informed moral choices between alternative courses of action. Christian Realism seeks to base ethical action on a clear understanding of the constraints of political, economic and social structures in an unredeemed world. From this starting-point, a Christian realist approach to moral and ethical behaviour can be developed. Morality involves choice. Where there is no choice, where behaviour is predetermined, there can be no morality. To make moral decisions, one must have choices between alternative courses of action. The moral life, Oakshott argues, ‘appears only when human behaviour is free from natural necessity; that is, when there are alternatives in human conduct’.45 In international politics, the range of alternatives is constrained by the structure of the international system. ‘Men make their own history’, Marx famously argued in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, ‘but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past’.46 Much the same can be said for the state as an international actor, which makes its own history under circumstances directly 42
Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 14. Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 16. 44 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Norms and Ethics in International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 137–54 (p. 137). 45 Michael Oakshott, ‘The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 295–350 (p. 295). 46 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works in One Volume (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 96. 43
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encountered, given and transmitted from the past’. In this sense, states are ‘situated actors’ located within distinct structural contexts that define the range of potential strategies and opportunities available to them.47 Foreign policy options are either enabled or constrained by the ‘strategic selectivity of structure’ which thereby ‘shapes and shoves’ – but do not determine – state behaviour. Anarchy and the Tragedy of International Politics The task of political analysis is to identify the ‘parameters of the possible’, i.e., the structural constraints of the international system which ‘shape and shove’ state behaviour. Within the discipline of International Relations, Realists argue that it is difficult, if not nigh on impossible, to transcend the structural limits of anarchy. The only conceivable means of achieving this is through one state emerging as a global hegemon – a development highly improbable because of what John Mearsheimer terms the ‘stopping power of water’48 – and one which, as Kenneth Waltz has argued, would be a recipe for global civil war were it to arise.49 Realists thus assume that states will remain the primary actors in the international system for the foreseeable future and that, consequently, anarchy not hierarchy will remain the dominant ordering principle of the international system. Anarchy and the unequal distribution of power in the international system place constraints on projects to achieve perpetual peace, international harmony and institutionalised cooperation. ‘To achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy – be they people, corporations, states or whatever – must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves’.50 Because international politics is a self-help realm, Realists remain sceptical about liberalidealist claims that international organisations, international law or democratic governments can provide durable and dependent foundations for a stable peace order, regardless of the structural distribution of power. Nonetheless, realist scepticism about the prospects for transcending the structural constraints of a self-help system is not incompatible with a political and ethical commitment to limiting aggression, conflict and injustice. Realists are certainly sceptical about ambitious projects for large-scale social and political engineering and of ‘rationalist’ schemes to establish utopian peace orders designed without reference to the structural dynamics of the international system.51 They are also 47
The concepts of ‘situated actors’ and the ‘strategic selectivity of structure’ are taken from critical realism. See Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 116–17, 122–6. 48 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 44. 49 ‘The prospect of world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 112. 50 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 111. 51 A prime example is the ‘political reformers of the time of Louis XIV’, who invented rational plans for European peace based on pure intelligence but no practical understanding of diplomacy and statecraft. Michael Oakshott, ‘Rational Conduct’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 99–131 (p. 113).
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painfully aware of the often tragic nature of international politics, and of the danger that noble intentions can generate unintended outcomes.52 They are not therefore favourably disposed towards radical political programmes based on abstract ideals such as ‘emancipation’, cosmopolitan order or perfect justice. As Reinhold Niebuhr observed, the concern of ‘collective man’ cannot be ‘the creation of an ideal society in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent to prevent his common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster’.53 ‘Policy’, in Michael Oakshott’s words, ‘will not the imagination of some new sort of society, or the transformation of an existing society so as to make it correspond with an abstract ideal; it will be the perception of what needs doing now in order to realize more fully the intimations of our existing society’.54 Whilst the anarchic nature of international politics places constraints on utopian schemes to transcend the existing global order and ‘domesticate’ international relations, this does not absolve statesmen and women from weighing ethical issues in the balance when they consider alternative policy options, however constrained. Realists draw attention to the enduring constraints of structure on the behaviour of states. But structures ‘shape and shove’, they do not determine behaviour and outcomes – not only, Waltz argues, because ‘unit-level and structural causes interact, but also because the shaping and shoving of structures may be successfully resisted’. ‘With skill and determination’, he continues, ‘structural constraints can sometimes be countered’.55 As ‘situated actors’, states are constrained by structural pressures, but their behaviour is not determined mechanically by systemic forces. Because they can chose between alternative courses of action, states can still make moral choices. In this light, Niebuhr’s admonitions concerning the implications of political realism for individual moral behaviour have resonance for states’ ethical choices: ‘No political realism which emphasises the inevitability and necessity of a social struggle, can absolve individuals of the obligation to check their own egoism, to comprehend the interests of others and thus to enlarge the areas of cooperation’.56
52 ‘How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended up by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired?’. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, brief edition, revised by Kenneth Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 6. 53 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 16. 54 Oakshott, ‘The Political Economy of Freedom’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 384–406 (p. 397). 55 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critics’, in Robert Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322–46 (pp. 343–4). 56 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 180.
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Non-Teleological Ethics and the Idioms of Moral Conduct Within the discipline of International Relations, liberals are optimistic about the inevitability of progress; critical theorists, as heirs to the secular eschatology of Marxism, believe in the ‘utopian realism’ of ‘emancipation’. Whether in its more moderate ‘English school’ guise, or in the more radical form of critical theory, liberalidealists share a common belief that moral behaviour is associated with ‘rationalist’ politics and teleological political action.57 Realist ethics, by contrast, are non-teleological in character; realists seek to examine ‘the extent to which moral behaviour is heavily constrained by the dynamics of political life’, rather than musing on abstract schemes for a ‘just world order’. Given the assumption that anarchy will remain the dominant ordering principle of international politics and that tragedy is inherent in the structure of the international system, a realist ethics cannot be based on a conception of moral behaviour that consists in working to achieve a particular telos (a ‘single substantive purpose’) – whether rationally determined or revealed by religious prophecy.58 Realists follow Michael Oakshott in rejecting ‘the illusion that in politics there is anywhere a safe harbour, a destination to be reached or even a detectable strand of progress’.59 This non-teleological ethics implies a distinctive approach to statecraft: one that seeks to navigate the shifting tides of international politics, conscious of the ebb and flow of systemic forces, rather than seeking to transcend the tragic dilemmas of a self-help realm through the establishment of a world government or a cosmopolitan political order: In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion.60
What is the basis of morality in this non-eschatological and non-teleological understanding of international politics? Here Michael Oakshott’s reading of Hobbes is apposite. Oakshott argues that there are three ‘idioms of moral conduct’: a morality of communal ties; the morality of the common good; and the morality of individuality. The third idiom of moral conduct is the one most appropriate to a Realist ethics – a ‘morality of individuality’. This involves give and take, mutual accommodation and a pursuit of ‘enlightened’ self-interest. ‘In general’, Oakshott argues, ‘moral activity may be said to be the observation of a balance 57
See for example, Mervyn Frost, ‘Tragedy, Ethics and International Relations’, International Relations, vol. 17, no. 4 (2003), pp. 477–95. 58 Oakshott, ‘Logos and Telos’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 351–60 (p. 358). Oakshott defines ‘rational’ activity as ‘behaviour in which an independently premeditated end is pursued and which is determined solely by that end’; ‘Rational Choice’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 99–131 (p. 102). 59 Michael Oakshott, ‘Political Education’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 43–69 (p. 66). 60 Michael Oakshott, ‘Political Education’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 43–69 (p. 60).
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of accommodation between the demands of desiring selves each recognised by the others to be an end and not a mere slave of somebody else’s desires’.61 It corresponds to Max Weber’s ‘ethic of responsibility’, which specifies that one should consider the consequences of one’s actions for others and behave accordingly.62 In Oakshott’s ‘morality of individuality’, the agents are individual human beings, but the moral sentiments expressed apply equally well to international politics where the primary actors are states;63 in the morality of individuality, he argues: human beings are recognised … as separate and sovereign individuals, associated with one another, not in the pursuit of a single common enterprise, but in an enterprise of give and take, and accommodating themselves to one another as best they can: it is the morality of self and other selves. Here individual choice is pre-eminent and a great part of happiness is connected with its exercise. Moral conduct is recognised as consisting in determinate relationships between these individuals, and the conduct understood to be characteristic of human beings. Morality is the art of mutual accommodation.64
A ‘morality of individuality’, applied to the realm of international politics, thus provides the basis for a non-teleological ethics characterised by three principles: prudence, scepticism and reciprocity. Christian Realist ethics are prudent in that they are circumspect and modest; they seek not perfection but the lesser evil, the familiar to the unknown, the tried to the untried, ‘present laughter to utopian bliss’.65 Prudence entails not only restraining those of evil intent, but also those who intend only good, yet whose pursuit of justice and the summum bonum threatens to destroy what order, security and justice does exist in the international system.66 Realist prudence thus seeks to guard against the zealous pursuit of utopian visions at the expense of order and security. This prudence gives rise to scepticism about the human capacity 61
Oakshott, ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 488–542 (p. 502). 62 In his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber distinguished between an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’ and an ‘ethic of responsibility’. The former linked ethical behaviour to a distinctive teleos, and believed that if ‘an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil’. An ethic of responsibility involved the consideration ‘of precisely the average deficiencies of people’ and an unwillingness to burden others with the results of their actions as far as they could be foreseen. Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter-Vision’, Survival, vol. 47, no. 4 (Winter 2005–2006), pp. 19–38 (p. 22). 63 Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 140, 226. 64 Oakshott, ‘The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 295–350 (p. 297). 65 Oakshott, ‘On Being Conservative’, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, pp. 407–37 (p. 408). 66 ‘There can be no political morality without prudence; that is, without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence – the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences’. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 12.
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to achieve universal peace or perfect justice through political action.67 Christian Realists are sceptical about the possibilities of, and potential for, political action to produce the ‘good life’ in an unredeemed world, and sceptical about the prospects for progress in the human condition, either through scientific and technological innovation, economic interdependence or ‘rational’ political action. For Christian Realists, politics more often than not involves choosing between the lesser of two evils.68 Finally, realist ethics are based on reciprocity in that they call for compromise, restraint, mutual accommodation and ‘give and take’ between sovereign political communities, each with their own vision of the summum bonum. This conception of international politics as an arena for competitive interest-based politics accords with Weber’s ‘ethic of responsibility’.69 By emphasising the importance of reciprocity, statesmen and women ‘may save themselves from the temptation to believe that they have a special commission for the reform or punishment of a recalcitrant world’.70 Conclusion This chapter has argued that the Christian Realist tradition provides firm ethical and moral foundations for addressing the dilemmas facing British foreign policy in the early twenty-first century. Contrary to received opinion, realism does indeed provide firm foundations for ethical thinking about international politics. It is not, as its critics allege, amoral or immoral. Liberals imply that an ethical foreign policy must involve a commitment to strengthening international society, the rule of law and multilateral institutions; critical theorists maintain that an ethical approach involves seeking to transcend international anarchy and achieve security through ‘emancipation’; cosmopolitan theorists identify ethical action with the pursuit of a cosmopolitan global order. All three variants of liberal-idealism associate ethical behaviour with teleological and ‘rationalist’ politics, and hold to a ‘morality of the common good’ and an ‘ethic of ultimate ends’. Realist ethics, on the other hand, are based on a ‘morality of individuality’, not a morality of communal ties or of the common good. They incorporate an ‘ethics of responsibility’ and are characterised by prudence, scepticism and reciprocity.71
67
Michael Loriaux, ‘Realism and Reconciliation: France, Germany, and the European Union’, in Ethan Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 354–84 (pp. 375–9). 68 ‘We are men, not God; we are responsible for making choices between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, illuminating the human scene, makes it quite apparent that there is no pure good in history; and probably no pure evil either. The fate of civilisations may depend on these choices’. Niebuhr quoted in Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 73. 69 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Europe After Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), pp. 144–5. 70 David Clinton, The Two Faces of National Interest (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994) p. 258. 71 Lawrence Freedman notes that the pragmatic approach embodied in Weber’s ‘ethic of responsibility’, which embodies ‘a concern for the foreseeable consequences of actions,
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Christian Realists therefore recognise that ethical behaviour will always be constrained by the ‘strategic selectivity of structure’ and that there is no easy escape from Churchill’s ‘tormenting dilemmas upon which mankind has throughout its history been so frequently impaled’. ‘Politics’, as Reinhold Niebuhr observed, ‘will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises’.72 The role of the moral teachings of the Judeo-Christian tradition is thus to act as the ‘regulative principles’ of moral and political choice.73 Although, for the most part, they cannot be met in practice, they establish the parameters of ethical behaviour and, more importantly, pull the choices in certain directions. Prophetic injunction can thus serve to ‘shape and shove’ international outcomes. ‘The prophetic stance’, Glenn Tinder has written, ‘presupposes a disposition to attack concrete, visible injustices. To pursue the ideal of perfect justice is to ignore our fallenness; but to attack injustices in the world around us – injustices we must either attack or tacitly accept – is essential to the integrity of prophetic hope’.74 Biblical prophecy, epitomised by Isaiah’s irenic vision, is thus an injunction to work for peace and justice in an unredeemed world. As Niebuhr observes, it is ‘like all true religious visions possible of approximation but not of realisation in actual history’. For some time to come, therefore, the concern of ‘collective man’ cannot be ‘the creation of an ideal society in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent to prevent his common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster’.75 Niebuhr, however, leaves us with one further paradox: in order to mobilise the energy and enthusiasm necessary to overcome entrenched vested interests and achieve the desired reforms that can approximate the prophetic vision, it is necessary to nurture and encourage a ‘sublime madness in the soul’ that only an illusory belief in perfect justice and universal brotherhood can ignite. ‘Nothing but such madness will do battle with malignant power and “spiritual wickedness in high places”’. But such sublime madness generated by an illusion can result in ‘terrible fanaticisms’.76 This is the paradox with which Niebuhr leaves us, a paradox with no obvious resolution and which underscores the enduring tragedy of the human condition.
represents the best traditions of statecraft’. Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter-Vision’, Survival, p. 22. 72 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 5. 73 See Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 26. 74 Glenn Tinder, quoted in Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 167–8. 75 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 16. 76 Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 181.
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PART 2 The Military Instrument
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Chapter 3
The Continuing, Crucial Relevance of Just War Criteria Richard Harries
The phrase ‘Just War criteria’ is unfortunate and gives rise to understandable antagonism in those who see war as the worst of all possible evils. In fact, what it is trying to suggest is that in a tragic world war may sometimes be a tragic necessity as the least bad of possible courses of action. It is to be sharply contrasted with a crusade mentality that works on the assumption that one side is fighting God’s enemies on behalf of God. Those who properly understand the spirit of Just War thinking will not think like that. Reinhold Niebuhr captured that spirit very well in the prayers he wrote during World War II. They lacked any sense of self-righteousness and expressed a consciousness that though evil had to be fought evil was not confined to one side. For example: We pray for the victims of tyranny, that they may resist oppression with courage. We pray for wicked and cruel men, whose arrogance reveals to us what the sin of our own hearts is like when it has conceived and brought forth its final fruit.1
The Duke of Wellington also understood that tradition when he remarked after the Battle of Waterloo that there is only one thing sadder than winning a battle and that is losing it. However, often misunderstood or misused, the criteria remain of crucial, continuing relevance. For, unless one is an absolute pacifist, judging that war under all circumstances is wrong, we all have to make judgements about particular wars. We say that some are morally justified and others not. The criteria on the basis of which we make that judgement will, whether we are consciously aware of it or not, be Just War criteria. We will be like Monsieur Jourdin in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme who suddenly realised he had been speaking prose all his life without knowing it. This crucial, continuing relevance has received striking vindication in the recent and authoritative UN document, The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Whilst continuing to affirm the right of national self-defence under article 51, it argued that other uses of military force need to be authorised by the Security Council and that the Council must always take into account at least the following basic criteria of legitimacy: seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort,
1
Quoted in Richard Harries, Praying Round the Clock (Mowbray 1983), p. 96.
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proportional means and balance of consequences.2 These, in only slightly different terminology, are the traditional criteria of Just War thinking. At the time of the 2003 Iraq war, the American Roman Catholic George Weigel fiercely criticised certain church statements for what he considered their wrongful appropriation of the tradition, one which, he argued, was primarily there for those who are responsible for a nation’s security.3 It is indeed true that those who bear office have the awesome responsibility of making decisions about the use of military force and sometimes they will be possession of facts not publicly available. Nevertheless, the Christian churches have a clear responsibility to draw attention to the criteria and urge that they be taken fully into account. Moreover, it is also right that in appropriate ways the church expresses a judgement about whether or not those criteria have been met. For George Weigel to claim that ‘There is a charism of political discernment that is unique to the vocation of public service’ is, as Rowan Williams has pointed out ‘A startling theological novelty’.4 Those called to public office may indeed have a vocation to serve in that way and they can certainly pray for the grace, or charism of the spirit in order to have the gift of discernment, but this is in no way guaranteed by the calling itself. The ‘Just War’ tradition falls into two main parts, the moral considerations that have to be taken into account before a military action is launched in the first place and secondly, the moral conduct of the action once it has been initiated. The principle criteria for the second part, the principles of proportion and discrimination, were the key ones that needed to be considered at the time of the nuclear stand off during the Cold War.5 These remain of the utmost significance, nevertheless in this essay it is only part one which is being considered, because it has been these criteria which were relevant when considering the two recent wars against Saddam Hussein and the military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The first criterion that has to be considered is that of lawful authority. In Christian tradition, this is the highest appropriate authority. During the Middle Ages it meant that war between two local princes could not be regarded as legitimate, because there was a higher authority, the emperor to whom appeal could be made. Over the last two centuries in Europe it is the nation state that has reigned supreme, and each nation has had to be judge and jury in its own cause about the moral legitimacy of war. Since World War II however, there has been the United Nations with its growing authority, at least in theory if not always in practice. If we take seriously the rationale behind traditional Christian thinking on this criterion, it is to the UN we must look for final legitimacy. George Weigel has written about the Security Council of the UN: What kind of moral logic is it to claim that the US government must assuage the interests of the French foreign ministry and the strategic aims of the repressive Chinese government – both of which are in full play in the Security Council – in order to gain international 2
Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, a Report to the UN General Assembly (New York, December 2004), p. 57. 3 George Weigel, ‘Moral Clarity in a Time of War’, Ethics and Public Policy Center, p. 10. 4 Rowan Williams, ‘Just War Revisited’, lecture to the Royal Institute for International Affairs, Chatham House, p. 8. 5 Richard Harries, ‘Application of Just War Criteria in the Period 1959–89’, in Richard Sorabji and David Rodin (eds), The Ethics of War (Ashgate 2006), chapter 12.
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moral authority for the war against terrorism and the defence of world order against outlaw states with weapons of mass destruction?6
But no one has ever suggested that the Security Council operates in the stratosphere above the play of national interests. It is an arena in which national interests are played out in relation to one another in order that a consensus might be arrived at which is truly in the interests of the international order as a whole. No one pretends that the present work of the UN is satisfactory. But this should be taken not as a call for its abandonment but for its strengthening so that it can perform its proper task. It is in relation to this criterion that we can see that law and morality do not always neatly overlap. A course of action might be construed to be legal, on a particular interpretation of the law, but still not morally legitimate. In relation to the 2003 Iraq war for example, a case was made by both the US and British governments that it was legal on the basis of previous UN resolutions. However, the failure to achieve a second UN resolution, and in particular the refusal of France and Germany to see military action at that stage as morally legitimate, indicated a lack of that wider international consensus which alone gives moral authority to military action. The converse can be seen if we examine the 1999 Kosovo operation. This did not have a specific authorisation from the Security Council but, as Michael Quinlan has pointed out, it differed from the Iraq instance in at least four pertinent respects: It was directed to halting an immediate and manifest humanitarian outrage in full swing; it was not a regime changing invasion; it was supported by the great majority of countries in the region, and a wide international grouping of major countries, and validated soon afterwards by the United Nations itself; and the UN Secretary General, not long before, had publicly recognised that the Kosovo situation was a threat to international peace and security (was thrusting huge numbers of destitute refugees out into neighbouring countries which already had formidable ethnic and economic problems of their own).7
The second criterion is that there must be just cause. Just cause in the Christian tradition has never been confined to wars of self-defence and easily encompasses the idea of international humanitarian intervention if properly authorised by the Security Council. The great Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century, one of the founders of the Just War tradition wrote that ‘There is a single and only just cause for commencing a war, namely a wrong received’.8 He also stressed that the war had to be waged for the common good, not just the good of an individual nation. It is also true that the concept of punishment of wrong was also to the fore in the Just War tradition and recently Oliver O’Donovan has revived this element.9 However, it does not seem apparent or helpful to think of conscripts in Saddam Hussein’s army being rightfully punished by the US and coalition forces military action against them. Morally based military action is not essentially dissimilar from 6
George Weigel, ‘Moral Clarity in a Time of War’, p. 9. Michael Quinlan, ‘Justifying War’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, March 2004, p. 10. 8 Francisco de Vitoria. 9 Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge 2003). 7
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the action of the police within a nation. The police take action, sometimes action with the use of force, in order to maintain public order. The question as to whether people are in fact guilty and deserve to be punished comes later and is the responsibility of the judicial system. This distinction has, rightfully, come to the fore in recent years in the international sphere, with the way that political and military leaders can now be bought to trial by the International Criminal Court or other international tribunals. They can be rightly punished, but they are in a very different category from ordinary soldiers who abide by military law and the Geneva Conventions. The key issue under just cause in the modern world is the legitimacy or not of pre-emptive or preventative military action. The terms are sometimes used interchangeably and there is some confusion over terminology. However, here we distinguish pre-emptive military action when the threat is immediate and serious, from preventative war, when the threat is less serious and not immediate. As Hugo Grotius, another great founder of the ‘Just War’ tradition, as well as international law, argued ‘The danger must be present and ready instantly to fall upon us’.10 The example he gives is of a drawn sword or a weapon snatched up. Clearly these are matters of judgement so the recent report of the High Level Panel of the UN rightly stressed that ‘If there are good arguments for preventative military action, with good evidence to support them, then the case should be put to the Security Council, which can then authorise such action if it chooses to’. They recognise that the changed security environment following 9/11 might make it necessary to ‘Adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’. But they stressed that responding to this threat should not be done unilaterally but with the support of the wider international community focused in the Security Council. The third criterion, of last resort, is clearly also very much a matter of judgement and is closely linked into the discussion about pre-emptive and preventative military action. Clearly what counts as last cannot be understood in a purely temporal sense. Britain could have gone on pursuing the issue of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands with the UN for a great deal longer. But if they had done this, there is no doubt that the Argentineans would have strengthened their hold on the islands and dislodging them would have been even more difficult, if not impossible. As Michael Quinlan has put it: It would be unreasonable to demand that every conceivable non-military instrument must have been exhaustively tested irrespective of judgement about ethicacy. The coalition could not be expected, for example, to spend six months on a trial of dropping exhortatory leaflets on Baghdad. The second aspect is that in conflict settings time is rarely neutral. As it passes options with their consequences will often change, becoming narrower, more difficult, more costly in several ways, or not available at all. The early application of force may do more good and less harm than delay until the situation has grown worse, as in the middle 90s in former Yugoslavia.11
10
Hugo Grotius, Rites of War and Peace, as quoted in James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason and the Limitation of War. Religion and Secular Concepts (Princeton, 1975), p. 215. 11 Michael Quinlan, ‘Britain’s War Since 1945’, in The Ethics of War, Chapter 13, p. 235.
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George Weigel has again criticised church leaders, in particular American Roman Catholic Bishops, for interpreting the Just War tradition as expressing a presumption against violence. He argues, that it should be understood as a tool of statecraft for public officials, guiding them in their proper use of force. It is indeed the latter when properly informed by Christian statements as argued above. However, the criterion of last resort certainly indicates that there is presumption against violence. In other words, if it is possible to solve the conflict by non-violent means, there is a strong moral obligation to do so. The fourth criterion is that a judgement must be made that the evils unleashed by war do not in fact outweigh the evils that would have to be endured if the military action was not initiated. This is very much a matter of political and military judgement and church leaders certainly have no monopoly of wisdom in this sphere. All kinds of questions arise, for example about the timescale. When a Chinese official was asked whether he thought the French Revolution was a good thing he apparently replied, ‘It’s too early to say’. Then there is the question about from whose point of view the consequences for good or evil are to be evaluated. Vitoria stressed, as mentioned above, that war must be waged in the interests of the common good, the international community as a whole, not simply the interest of a particular state. The Christian tradition has always emphasised also that it’s not enough to see war as a matter of righting an injustice, it must also be waged in the name of a better order. In other words is not just jus ad bellum but jus post bellum. One of the conspicuous failures of the 2003 Iraq war, as now pointed out by many informed people, is the total failure to plan properly for the situation after the invasion. The last criterion, in fact an extension of the previous one, is that there must be a reasonable chance of success. A great deal depends on what we regard as success. This is particularly crucial in relation to counter terrorism. In recent years some people have argued that the whole Just War tradition is outmoded in the struggle against terrorism. This is certainly not the case if military force has sometimes to be used, as it is being used at the moment. The traditional criteria apply whether the threat is a traditional nation state or an international terrorist group. However, the crucial point is that combating terrorism is only secondarily a matter of using appropriate military force. Primarily, it is a battle to win hearts and minds. A terrorist group will only succeed if it succeeds in winning and retaining the loyalty of that wider constituency in whose name they claim to act. They cannot win great military victories. They can threaten, bomb and disrupt but the nature of their operations makes it impossible for them to gain and retain control of a whole nation. They can only do that if they can stay in existence long enough and be enough of a nuisance until their political goals are achieved. That depends on retaining the loyalty of that wider constituency. This was a lesson which was proved time and again in the struggle of liberation movements and guerilla bands after World War II and it is no less relevant now in the struggle against fundamentalist terrorism. This is why situations like that of Guantanamo Bay or abuse of prisoners in Iraq is so disastrous, as are unsolved political tragedies, like that of Israel and Palestine. They all tend to politicise moderate opinion and to give at least tacit support to terrorist groups. Success in the long struggle against terrorism is a matter of winning hearts and minds and whether a military action is appropriate or not must always bear that in mind.
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It is for considerations such as these that those most versed in the Christian ‘Just War’ tradition both in Britain and the US, who on the basis of it supported the 1992 Gulf War which expelled Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, and which supported the intervention in Afghanistan, where the Taliban had taken hold and were sponsoring international terrorism, found that they could not support the 2003 Gulf War. Whilst it is almost inevitable that military action of one kind or another will be needed against terrorist threats in the future, it must never be forgotten that the primary strategic objective is to win hearts and minds. This was the thrust of a report by a working party of Church of England bishops, Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence and Democracy Post 9/11.12
12
Church of England, Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence and Democracy Post 9/11 (Church House, London).
Chapter 4
Balance of Consequences: Towards an Ethical Standpoint on the Iraq Intervention of 2003 Richard Bonney
The December 2004 Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled A more secure world: our shared responsibility argued that ‘in considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address – whatever other considerations it may take into account – at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy’:1 1. Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? 2. Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? 3. Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? 4. Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? 5. Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? In their own report of September 2005 entitled Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence and Democracy Post 9/11, the Bishops of Oxford, Coventry, Worcester and Bath and Wells argue, in effect, that these five principles provide a Christian just war theory in modern dress: ‘it is difficult to find a more ringing endorsement by a body
1
A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (Dec. 2004: A/59/565), para. 207, pp. 57–8. <www.un.org/secureworld/> All URLs consulted in 2006, mostly in July 2006.
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that is multi-cultural and multi-religious’, they argue, ‘of the continuing validity of Christian thinking about the morality of warfare’.2 Though the four Bishops provide a short paragraph in their report on what they term ‘the dilemma posed by post-conflict Iraq’,3 they fall short of a full consideration of the issues arising from a Christian ethical consideration of Jus Post Bellum. It has been argued elsewhere that these need to include the principle of repentance, requiring a sense of humility and remorse by the victors for the suffering and death that was brought about even in a just struggle; the principle of honourable surrender (not demeaning the vanquished or being punitive in intent); the principle of restoration (the removal of the instruments of war from the fields of battle and assistance to the losing nation in repairing the basic infrastructure of the society); finally, the need to re-establish civil society (extending the principle of restoration to encompass not merely the basic infrastructure but also the human infrastructure for peaceful communal life).4 In the tenth of their 13 Christian principles for ‘a world characterised by power and violence’, the four Bishops argue that: the churches have a special responsibility in the area of reconciliation. In a world where right is rarely wholly on one side, the Churches have a particular role to play in articulating the faults, wrongs and inconsistencies of all parties to a dispute, including those of the country to which the Church belongs.5
On any one of the UN High-Level Panel’s five basic criteria of legitimacy, it is possible to argue that the Iraq intervention was illegitimate. The first four principles have been considered in much of the literature on the subject. What has escaped attention is an adequate discussion of the principle of ‘balance of consequences’. Were the proponents of intervention in 2003 entitled to believe that the consequences of action were likely to be no worse than the consequences of inaction? It is clear that they deluded themselves on the seriousness of the threat by claiming that it was ‘actual or imminently apprehended’. We must assume that because of this mistaken threat perception, they decided that inaction posed an unacceptable danger for mankind. Within a year of the Iraq intervention, Samuel Berger (National Security Adviser to President Bill Clinton from 1997 to 2001) argued that: Iraq … will require a generational commitment by the international community. Regardless of whether the war was justified, everyone now has a profound stake in Iraq’s success. The disintegration of that country along ethnic and religious fault lines would destabilise the Middle East and energise radical movements that threaten the world. A stable and democratic Iraq, on the other hand, would stimulate reform throughout the region. Attaining the latter outcome will require continuous involvement in Iraq’s reconstruction and political development, as well as a proactive military posture that does not leave 2
Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence and Democracy Post 9/11 published by the House of Bishops of the Church of England (September 2005), 21. <www.cofe.anglican.org/ news/pr6305.html>. 3 Ibid. pp. 26–7. 4 Richard Bonney, ‘Impossible to reconcile? Christian Just War Theory and the Second Iraq War’, Encounters. Journal of Inter-cultural Perspectives, 9 (March 2003), pp. 69–91 at p. 81. 5 Countering Terrorism: Power, Violence and Democracy Post 9/11, p. 74.
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foreign troops hunkered down in bases and barracks, delegating security to an ill-prepared Iraqi security force. But that level of involvement will be unsustainable – and will be considered illegitimate by ordinary Iraqis – unless it is viewed as a truly international, rather than exclusively American, effort.6
This was a year after the Iraq intervention. What was known in 2003 itself? In February of that year, three State Department officials warned the Under Secretary of State that ‘a failure to address short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation internationally’.7 From January to April 2004, Larry Diamond served as a Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. He is thus well informed to assess what went wrong in Iraq.8 The State Department’s plans for post-war Iraq were brushed aside by ‘a small group of Pentagon officials’ who, ‘instead of preparing for the worst’, assumed that Iraqis would welcome the invasion as a liberation. Diamond continues: … with Saddam’s military and security apparatus destroyed, the thinking went, Washington could capitalise on the goodwill by handing the country over to Iraqi expatriates such as Ahmed Chalabi, who would quickly create a new democratic state. Not only would fewer US troops be needed at first, but within a year, the troop levels could drop to a few tens of thousands. Of course, these naive assumptions quickly collapsed, along with overall security, in the immediate aftermath of the war … Administration officials repeatedly deluded themselves into believing that the defeat of the insurgency was just around the corner – just as soon as the long, hot summer of 2003 ended, or reconstruction dollars started flowing in and jobs were created, or the political transition began, or Saddam Hussein was captured, or the interim government was inaugurated. As in Vietnam, a turning point always seemed imminent, and Washington refused to grasp the depth of popular disaffection.
The Present Reality: Partition or Sectarian Civil War? One of the saddening, maddening and ultimately catastrophic verdicts on the Iraq intervention in 2003 was revealed by a little-noticed news story in the New York Times published on 17 July 2006. ‘In an about-face’, the headline reads for the story covering sectarian strife in Iraq, ‘Sunnis want [the] US to remain in Iraq’.9 The article argued that the pleas from Sunni Arab leaders had been growing in intensity since the eruption of sectarian violence in February. The Sunni Arab leaders still sympathised with the anti-US insurgency and considered that the Americans had helped strengthen the power of Iran, which backs the ruling Shi‘ite parties; but they 6 Samuel Berger, ‘Foreign Policy for a Democratic President’, Foreign Affairs (May–June 2004): <www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501faessay83306-p30/samuel-r-berger/ foreign-policy-for-a-democratic-president.html>. 7 <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/index.htm>. 8 Larry Diamond, ‘What went wrong in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs (Sept–Oct. 2004): <www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faessay83505/larry-diamond/what-went-wrong-in-iraq.html>. 9 http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/17/world/middleeast/17sunnis.html?_r=1&th&em c=th&oref=slogin>.
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at least considered American military power in Iraq a ‘bulwark’ against Iranian intervention. Put another way, the news story virtually admitted that the Americanled intervention in Iraq had made matters so bad that, although everyone wanted American troops to leave, there was simply no prospect of an early withdrawal without either sectarian civil war breaking out, or the partition of Iraq, or both. In late July 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, visited London and Washington and made it clear that there had been a failure to contain the spiralling violence in Baghdad, which was claiming approximately 100 fatalities a day: 2,669 civilians had been killed in May and 3,149 in June 2006 alone. President Bush acknowledged that the ‘violence in Baghdad is still terrible’ and that more troops were needed, which would be moved from other, more peaceful, areas of Iraq. Analysts talked freely of ‘chaos’ in Baghdad, with a battle needed to retake the city neighbourhood by neighbourhood. Former Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry called the revised security plan for Baghdad ‘a stunning sign that the administration still isn’t being candid about Iraq’s escalating civil war and the failure of Iraqi security forces to stand up on schedule’. The Iraqi Prime Minister closed his address with the acknowledgement that he was most concerned about continuing sectarian violence but that ‘God willing, there will be no civil war in Iraq’.10 While President Bush has been prepared to concede that there remains an insurgency,11 but not a civil war, other American commentators in 2006 have had no compunction in talking about civil war in Iraq. For Stephen Biddle, writing in Foreign Affairs, most of the lessons of Vietnam are irrelevant for the Iraq conflict, since that conflict was a Maoist ‘people’s war’, not a communal civil war. In contrast: the pattern of violence in Iraq … is strongly correlated with communal affiliation. The four provinces that make up the country’s Sunni heartland account for fully 85 per cent of all insurgent attacks; Iraq’s other 14 provinces, where almost 60 per cent of the Iraqi population lives, account for only 15 per cent of the violence. The overwhelming majority of the insurgents in Iraq are indigenous Sunnis, and the small minority who are non-Iraqi members of al-Qaeda or its affiliates are able to operate only because Iraqi Sunnis provide them with safe houses, intelligence, and supplies. Much of the violence is aimed at the Iraqi police and military, which recruit disproportionately from among Shiites and Kurds. And most suicide car bombings are directed at Shiite neighbourhoods, especially in ethnically mixed areas such as Baghdad, Diyala, or northern Babil, where Sunni bombers have relatively easy access to non-Sunni targets.12 10 Jim Rutenberg, ‘Baghdad chaos pushes Bush to shift US troops’, New York Times (26 July 2006): , Michael R. Gordon, ‘Battle for Baghdad boils down to grabbing a slice at a time’, ibid.: Ewen MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Iraqi PM admits failure to contain growing violence’, The Guardian (25 July 2006): . 11 George W. Bush, speech to Freedom House, 29 March 2006. . 12 Stephen Biddle, ‘Seeing Baghdad, thinking Saigon’, Foreign Affairs (March–April 2006): . Though there was reasonable agreement with Biddle’s analysis, the
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Others, most notably, Daniel Pipes, have argued that while the six-week ‘victory [in 2003] remains a glory of American foreign policy’, the goal of achieving a ‘free and democratic Iraq’ is unachievable. ‘Fixing Iraq is neither the coalition’s responsibility nor its burden’, Pipes argues. ‘The damage done by Saddam will take many years to repair. Americans, Britons, and others cannot be tasked with resolving Sunni–Shiite differences, an abiding Iraqi problem that only Iraqis themselves can address.’ To the consternation of many, Pipes goes further, arguing that an outright ethnic and religious war would be ‘a humanitarian tragedy but not a strategic one’.13 Rejecting any notion of a Jus Post Bellum, Pipes argued on Australian television: Post-World War II, the American and other victors did not extract money from Germany and Japan [as had the victor powers in Europe in 1918], but gave them money and it worked. Germany and Japan were rehabilitated. Since 1945, 60 years now, the notion that the victor pays, rehabilitates has become an assumption. I have nothing against it. It worked very well in 1945 but I don’t believe it’s a legal and moral obligation. I believe when one goes to war, one goes to defeat one’s enemy, not to rehabilitate them … the Iraqis are adults they are not our wards. They will define their future. We can help them but it is not our burden to re-establish, to rehabilitate Iraq on a new basis … 14
Unlike analysts in the West, some Arab commentators deny that the US and British have made ‘mistakes’ in Iraq. On the contrary, they argue that the intervening powers have been relatively successful in achieving their long-term aim, which was to divide and rule and then partition the country. In the short term, sectarian tensions escalated to such a degree following the invasion that the Americans could justify their continuing presence on the grounds of acting as impartial arbiters. According to al-Jazeera, Hasan Nasr Allah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, has stated: the US has driven the situation in Iraq to a state where they offer themselves to Shi‘a as a guarantee [of protection] against Sunni, and offer themselves to Sunni as a guarantee against Shi‘a. They present themselves to Arabs as a guarantee against Kurds, and present themselves to Kurds as a guarantee against Arabs. Their plot is doing just fine. Look at the situation in Iraq nowadays: what could possibly happen that is more appropriate for separatists to say [than] that they have to split from Iraq to protect their community?15
Some commentators, such as Gareth Stansfield, go further and argue that partition, or ‘radical decentralisation’, should not be seen as a problem. ‘It is centralised Iraq
roundtable which followed predictably produced no consensus on what to do about Iraq. Larry Diamond, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, Leslie H. Gibb and Stephen Biddle, ‘What to do in Iraq: a roundtable’, Foreign Affairs (July–August 2006): . 13 Daniel Pipes, ‘Civil war in Iraq?’, New York Sun (28 Feb. 2006): . 14 Tony Jones, ‘Civil war likely in Iraq: Pipes’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2 March 2006): . 15 .
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– starting with Britain’s creation of the modern state in 1921–1923 and reaching its nadir in nearly three decades of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship – that has failed and should be allowed to die’.16 The Wrong Choice of Paradigm: The remodelling of the Japanese Constitution in 1945 chosen as the exemplar for post-war Iraq ‘Let Freedom Reign!’17 President George W. Bush’s euphoric verdict on the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq back to the Iraqi people at the end of June 2004 no doubt reflected his view that the removal of a repressive dictatorship justified the invasion in 2003 on a quite different pretext. After all, he had completed his father’s unfinished business in the Gulf War of 1991. The Shi‘ites and Kurds, who had notoriously been abandoned to their fate after what had appeared a rallying call from President Bush senior to rebel, had finally gained their revenge on the Sunni majority who had exercised power with such brutality under Saddam. But what sort of freedom had the Coalition brought to Iraq and, in particular, had the consequences of military intervention been accurately predicted? Bob Woodward’s account of the drive towards regime change in Iraq has George W. Bush seeking to implicate Saddam Hussein in the 9/11 atrocity.18 In reality, there was little opportunity for freelance terrorist structures in Baathist Iraq and this issue failed as a casus belli, rapidly to be replaced by fear of Iraq’s potential to create weapons of mass destruction and, later, the assertion that Saddam’s alleged possession of WMD presented an imminent danger to the security of the Western powers. (In fact, as became clear after the occupation, even had Saddam possessed WMD, his preoccupation was almost exclusively directed eastward, towards Iran.) As the coalition forces were being assembled, Zalmay Khalizad, the president’s special assistant for Near East affairs (among others), presented a plan, modelled on the post-war occupation of Japan, to install an American-led military government once Saddam was toppled. David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt covered the story for the New York Times on 11 October 2002, stressing the parallelism with MacArthur in 1945 and the need for military control to prevent anarchy: Administration officials said they were moving away from the model used in Afghanistan: establishing a provisional government right away that would be run by Iraqis … Instead … the administration is studying the military occupations of Japan and Germany. But they stressed a commitment to keeping Iraq unified, as Japan was, and avoiding the kind partition that Germany underwent when Soviet troops stayed in the eastern sector, which
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accessed 19 July
2006. 17 ‘US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice gives confirmation of Iraqi sovereignty to US President George W. Bush (“Iraq is sovereign”), who then wrote, “Let Freedom Reign!”, during the opening session of the NATO Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, on 28 June 2004.’ Image at . 18 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York, 2004).
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set the stage for the cold war. The military government in Germany stayed in power for four years; in Japan it lasted six and a half years … 19
So MacArthur’s role in Japan was to become the model. Yet even a cursory reflection on the historical experience of the US military administration of defeated Japan, ought to have prompted the advisers of the President to appreciate that the differences between Japan in 1945 and Iraq in 2003 were so overwhelming as to vitiate any comparison except in the most superficial respects. Firstly, Japan had been at war since 1941 against the US and was exhausted and traumatised after two atomic bombs had been dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was no prospect of any military resistance, formal or informal, to the American presence. Secondly, Japan was united under the Emperor Hirohito. Regime change there might be for the Japanese, but they were absolutely determined to retain their ruler in some form or other. The fate of the emperor was the central issue for Japanese politicians and led directly to a far-reaching discussion of Japanese national identity and the all-important question of where sovereignty would reside. Thirdly, the Japanese politicians were ethnically and culturally homogenous, as was the society which they sought to govern. Consequently, they were able to evade awkward or bizarre American proposals, such as MacArthur’s wish to have the Emperor convert to Christianity. It is still the case today that Japan remains a monocultural society unaffected by mass immigration in a way which is quite different from Western Europe or the US. Fourthly, Japanese politicians accepted a degree of accountability for the aggressive militarisation of the 1930s. This consensus with the occupying power meant that the pacifist provisions within Article Nine of the Constitution were of secondary importance. The debates on this issue were not as contentious as might have been expected. There was a degree of optimism in a future world organised on the basis of negotiation and alliance systems rather than the naked exercise of force. Fifthly, and unexpectedly, MacArthur did not have the free hand for which he would have wished. The US agreed to share ultimate decision-making authorities with other allied powers in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC), which included France, Britain and the USSR. Each of these had veto power and the FEC itself was charged with setting policy for the post-war occupation of Japan. Thus, while MacArthur had a free hand on the ground, he ultimately had to answer to the FEC. These limitations compelled MacArthur to move as quickly as possible to establish a Japanese Constitution that suited the US MacArthur and his staff used a degree of duplicity that enabled them to present the FEC with a constitutional fait accompli. Finally, the conclusion to be drawn from the drafting of the Japanese constitution in 1946 is deeply ambiguous. One response might be triumphalism: according to this view, Americans, following the providential victory of their armed forces, brought democracy to Asia. As Moore and Robinson express this response, American power 19 , , , .
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might be said to have benevolently served the cause of universal democratisation. But as the two authors recognise, the constitution imposed in 1946 was largely drafted by American military officers. Virtually everyone in Tokyo suspected’ this in 1946. ‘It has also been generally known ever since. The Japanese people have had to live with this embarrassing reality. It has made their constitution vulnerable to right-wing fulminations, and it has left a sour taste.20
Moreover, institutional arrangements ‘cannot be transported from one culture or country to another with predictable effects’. It was thus by no means inevitable that the commitment to parliamentary government would have ‘the effect in Japan desired by the American framers’.21 Though Japan has lacked a competitive twoparty system for most of the last half century, the system has survived well: ‘that this transformation of ideas was ultimately accomplished was a major achievement, and it was profoundly a joint achievement. Neither side could have produced this constitutional revolution alone.’22 The Wrong Paradigm Demonstrated Post-invasion Iraq in 2003–2005 diverged from each of the six elements comprising the Japanese experience. Firstly, although Saddam’s forces were quickly dispersed by the coalition’s rapid military victory, this did not mean that they had been defeated. George W. Bush declared the ‘end of major combat operations’ while aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln off Iraq on 1 May 2003. In retrospect, this statement seems premature. Even as the Ba’ath party organisation disintegrated, elements of the secret police and army began forming guerilla units, since in many cases they had simply gone home rather than openly fight the invading forces. These began to focus their attacks around Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah. In the autumn the jihadis began using ambush tactics, suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices, targetting coalition forces and checkpoints. Saddam Hussein himself was captured on 14 December, but in the Spring of 2004 there were fierce uprisings based on Fallujah and Najaf. The insurgency has continued since, varying in severity. None of this is comparable to the acquiescence of the Japanese with US occupation following the surrender in 1945. There is little doubt that the strength of the insurgency, and the fact that at various times it has comprised both Sunni and Sh‘ia elements, took the Coalition by surprise. Presidential Envoy to Iraq Paul Bremer III admitted ‘the insurgents have proven better organised and more difficult to penetrate than we had expected’. Secondly, though regime change was relatively swiftly accomplished in Iraq, in the sense that the Ba’athist regime was swept aside, this did not confer legitimacy on the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) or the Iraq Interim Governing Council it appointed. The Emperor Hirohito had been retained, but his powers curtailed; 20 Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, Partners for Democracy. Crafting the New Japanese State under MacArthur (New York and Oxford, 2002), pp. 336–7. 21 Ibid. pp. 335–6. 22 Ibid. p. 337.
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this had secured Japanese compliance. In contrast, the whole purpose of the intervention was to oust Saddam Hussein, while his two sons were killed in July 2003. In all, over 200 top leaders of the former regime were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel. A pre-invasion Iraqi intelligence document had called for a strategy of organised resistance to be put into effect if and when Saddam’s regime collapsed. Before leaving for Iraq in May 2003, Bremer sent the Defence Secretary a copy of a RAND report estimating that 500,000 troops would be needed to stabilise post-war Iraq – more than three times the number of troops then deployed. In his memoirs of his 14 months in power,23 Bremer argues that the former Iraqi army had disbanded and could not be other than formally dissolved: ‘when Iraqi draftees had seen which way the war was going in 2003, they simply deserted and went home to their farms and families.’ Bremer left the de-Ba’athification policy to Iraqis on the Governing Council such as the former exile and Pentagon favourite Ahmed Chalabi. ‘Our de-Ba’athification policy had targeted only the top 1 percent of the party’s members’, he writes, ‘but under Chalabi’s direction, the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council had broadened the policy, for example, depriving thousands of teachers of their jobs’. In retrospect, Bremer adds, he ‘had been wrong to give a political body like the Governing Council responsibility for overseeing the de-Ba’athification policy’. The unwarranted extension of de-Ba’athification not only deprived the interim governing regime of administrative experience; it also unnecessarily created Iraqis with a grievance against the new administration. Peter W. Galbraith writes: Contrary to the optimistic expectations of the war’s planners, the Iraqi police and government did not remain on duty, ready to report to the Americans. They vanished. This left the way open to looters, who stripped every significant public institution in Baghdad – with the exception of the US-protected Oil Ministry – of whatever they could carry away and set many on fire. Without orders or plans, the US occupation forces simply watched. The looting probably doomed the occupation before it started. With the ministries destroyed, the government could not function. The looting so much damaged the electrical system and other infrastructure that essential government services were not restored for most of the occupation period. This in turn provoked anger at Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority and helped foster the growth of the insurgency. As Iraqis watched their capital being destroyed, many concluded either that the US was too weak to prevent the looting or that it was so evil as to want Iraq destroyed, or both. If the US was weak, then resistance could succeed. If it was evil, resistance was imperative.24
Thirdly, whereas the Japanese politicians in 1945 were in ethnic and cultural terms united, as was the society which they sought to govern, nothing could be less true of the Iraq ruled by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003, which was hopelessly split between Shi‘ites and Kurds seeking revenge for their treatment under Saddam, and the Sunni minority, largely left out in the cold during the American administration 23 L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq. The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York, 2006). 24 Peter W. Galbraith, ‘The Mess’, review of Bremer, My Year in Iraq and George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq in New York Review of Books, 53/4 (9 March 2006), .
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and pursuing an insurgency which amounted to a continuing war of attrition. The old Iraqi army had been a Sunni Arab army. To reconstitute it would, as Bremer argued, have provoked strong reactions from Iraq’s Shi‘ite and Kurds; and it was in any case unlikely to have been loyal to Iraq’s new Shi‘ite-dominated political order. But since the Ba’athist army had already dispersed, Bremer’s decree dissolving it was quite unnecessary; to Sunni Arabs – including former officers who had no intention of returning to military service – it was an added, and gratuitous, humiliation. This sense of having no stake in the new regime was accelerated by the perception that the provisional authority was not even handed: such rebuilding of Iraq as has taken place – and this much less than was expected, with the end now in sight25 – has overwhelmingly been in Shi‘ite areas, not in the Sunni triangle. Unlike MacArthur in Japan, Bremer knew nothing about Iraq. He had never been there, did not speak Arabic, had no experience in dealing with a country emerging from war, and had never been involved in ‘nation-building’. During the two weeks he was given to get ready, he recruited a senior staff including several retired ambassadors, a former assistant secretary of state for administration and a high-powered Republican Washington lobbyist. Only one of his recruits had any background in the region. Crucially, when he flew into Baghdad on 12 May 2003, the capital had been without police or government for over a month and had largely been left in the hands of the looters. General Anthony Zinni, who had doubted the wisdom of the Iraq war, had wanted a much larger occupation force and a much larger administrative infrastructure. In a speech given on 12 May 2004, Zinni outlined ten mistakes underlying the military intervention and occupation of Iraq: • • • • • • • • • •
the belief that [the previous strategy of] containment as a policy doesn’t work the [new] strategy was flawed a false rationale for [obtaining] … public support [failure] to internationalise the effort we underestimated the task propping up and trusting the exiles, the infamous ‘Gucci Guerillas’ from London lack of planning the insufficiency of military forces on the ground the ad hoc organisation we threw in there a series of bad decisions on the ground.
In conclusion, the former commander of CENTCOM stated that he failed to understand: why there was an underestimation when you look at a country that has never known democracy, that has been in the condition it’s been in, that has the natural fault lines that it has, and the issues it has. And to look at the task of reconstructing this country, not only 25 Ellen Knickmeyer, ‘US Has End in Sight on Iraq Rebuilding. Documents show much of the funding diverted to security, justice system and Hussein inquiry’, Washington Post, 2 Jan. 2006: .
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reconstructing it, but the idea of creating Jeffersonian democracy almost overnight, is almost ridiculous, in concept, in the kind of time and effort that was given as an estimate as to what it would take.26
Balancing the Consequences: The Failure of Reconstruction and the Potential for Destabilisation in the Middle East What were the challenges of the Jus Post Bellum in the case of Iraq? In late August 2002, Vice-President Cheney spoke optimistically about a post-Saddam Hussein world. Regime change in Iraq would bring about a number of benefits to the region. When the gravest of threats are eliminated, the freedom-loving peoples of the region will have a chance to promote the values that can bring lasting peace … Our goal would be an Iraq that has territorial integrity, a government that is democratic and pluralistic, a nation where the human rights of every ethnic and religious group are recognised and protected.27
In contrast, former White House counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke stated on 26 June 2004 that the invasion of Iraq was an ‘enormous mistake’ that was costing untold lives, strengthening al-Qaida and breeding a new generation of terrorists. ‘We did exactly what al-Qaida said we would do: invade and occupy an oil-rich Arab country that wasn’t threatening us in any way’, Clarke commented, adding that ‘the hatred that has been engendered by this invasion will last for generations …’28 The UK government produced ‘A vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ in the eventuality of military action in 2003.29 This committed the UK government (and presumably the Coalition) to support the Iraqi people in their desire for: • • •
•
• 26
Peace: a unified Iraq within its current borders living at peace with itself and with its neighbours Prosperity: all Iraqis sharing the wealth created by its economy and its oil reserves, drawing on the talents and skills of its people Freedom: an Iraq which respects fundamental human rights, including freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the dignity of family life, and whose people live free from repression and the fear of arbitrary arrest Good Government: an independent Iraq respecting the rule of law, whose government reflects the diversity and choice of its population and helps rebuild Iraq’s security and provides its people with food, water and high quality public services, especially health and education International Respect: an Iraq respected by its neighbours which plays its full
. Speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, 26 Aug. 2002: Cf. John Donnelly and Anthony Shadid, ‘Iraq War Hawks have plans to reshape entire Mideast’, Boston Globe (10 Sept. 2002): . 28 . 29 The document was published on 17 March 2003: . 27
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role as a member of the international community. The UK Government committed itself to help by: • • • • • • • • • •
Working to ensure any military campaign is as swift and carefully targeted as possible Working with the UN and international community to help meet the humanitarian needs and prioritise resources to feed and care for the people of Iraq Enabling Iraqis to establish their own effective representative government and encouraging UN involvement in the process Achieving a swift end to sanctions as soon as Iraq is in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions Supporting Iraq’s re-integration into the region and the wider international community, with actions including the reopening of land borders Seeking a fair and sustainable solution to Iraq’s debt problems Promoting increased aid from the international community Supporting an international reconstruction programme and helping Iraq make the transition to a more prosperous and dynamic economy Promoting investment in Iraq’s oil industry, managed transparently and fairly, and trade in open world markets, for the benefit of the Iraqi people Encouraging the renewal of cultural and educational exchanges with other countries.
In retrospect, the agenda looks more like a wish list than a serious programme for government. Most of the commitments have been found wanting. The Prime Minister stated that: we will help Iraq rebuild and not rebuild because of the problems of conflict, where if it comes to that we will do everything we can to minimise the suffering of the Iraqi people. But rebuild Iraq because of the appalling legacy that the rule of Saddam has left the Iraqi people.
The ‘pledge to the people of Iraq’ seems disingenuous. Tony Blair lacked the authority to prevent the abuses in the award of contracts which placed Halliburton and other US companies with which prominent members of the Bush administration had longstanding financial interests in the driving seat for Iraq reconstruction. In a speech on 8 August 2003, President Bush claimed that ‘in a lot of places, the infrastructure is as good as it was at pre-war levels, which is satisfactory, but it’s not the ultimate aim. The ultimate aim is for the infrastructure to be the best in the region’. US officials at the time promised a steady supply of 6,000 megawatts of electricity and a return to oil production output of 2.5 million barrels a day. However, the Washington Post reported on 2 January 2006 that oil production remained at 2 million barrels a day, still below the pre-invasion figure, while national electrical grid had an average daily output of 4,000 megawatts, about 400 megawatts less than its pre-war level. Iraqis nationwide received on average less than 12 hours of power a day. There was talk of a ‘reconstruction gap’, the difference between what Iraqis and Americans expected from the reconstruction effort at first and what was visible by 2006. Significant budget reallocations had occurred, including additional projects costs of nearly 25 per cent to
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provide for security. At least 1 billion dollars earmarked for electricity was shifted to the budget to build up Iraq’s army and police.30 There can be little doubt that the task of rebuilding Iraq has also been impeded by the frequency of government change and the failure of each interim regime to deliver on its promises for reconstruction,31 while the task of occupation, providing security and enabling reconstruction has lacked sufficient co-ordination on the American side, creating a vacuum in which abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib prison could occur.32 The promise to support Iraq’s re-integration into the region and the wider international community looks increasingly problematic in view of fears expressed in some quarters in the Middle East as to the emergence of a ‘Shi‘ite crescent’, which provides Iran with a potential coalition of international allies and potentially threatens a more general Sunni–Shi‘ite conflict.33 As Le Monde pointed out in an editorial on 19 July 2005, normalisation of relations between Iraq and Iran was imposed on the American occupation regime by al-Sistani.34 Though former president Khatami of Iran has denied the existence of a ‘Shi‘ite crescent’,35 the potential danger of such a realignment of forces has been argued by King Abdullah of Jordan. Abdullah told the Washington Post that the creation of a new Shi‘ite crescent would particularly destabilise Gulf countries with Shi‘ite populations. ‘Even Saudi Arabia is not immune from this. It would be a major problem. And then that would propel the possibility of a Shi‘ite–Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it [beyond] the borders of Iraq’, the king argued.36 There is no doubt that, although al-Zarqawi’s ferocious extremist assault on Shiites accelerated the breakdown of community relations between Sunnis and Shi‘ites in Iraq, the advent of majoritarian democracy has been a crucial factor. Political leaders played upon ethnic and sectarian identities to gain election in Iraq. As the Indian sub-continent discovered in the 1930s and 1940s, once this particular genie is unleashed, it cannot be put back in the bottle, though contrary to Egyptian 30 . 31 Kenneth M. Pollack, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, ‘Saving Iraq’, Testimony to US House of Representatives SubCommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 11 July 2006: . 32 Daniel L. Byman, ‘Iraq: the march of folly’, Washington Post, 30 July 2006: . 33 Though he denies the likelihood of a ‘Shi‘ite crescent’, Kamran Taremi argues that important consequences follow from the Shi‘ite-dominated government in Iraq. Taremi, ‘Is a Shi‘ite crescent soon to slice through the Middle East?’, Daily Star (7 February 2005): http:// www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=12425>. 34 Translated at . 35 Ghassan Charbel, ‘Former Iranian President Khatami to Al-Hayat: “The Shi‘ite Crescent Doesn’t Exist …”’, Al-Hayat (19 June 2006): . 36 Robin Wright and Peter Baker, ‘Iraq, Jordan see threat to election from Iran. Leaders warn against forming religious state’, Washington Post (8 Dec. 2004): .
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President Hosni Mubarak’s comments in April 2006, most experts consider that Shi‘ite Arabs remain more loyal to the country in which they live than to Iran.37 Balancing the consequences: The Need to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities in advance to plan for a Jus Post Bellum In his collection of essays entitled Arguing about War, Michael Walzer argues that ‘we need criteria for a Jus Post Bellum that are distinct from (though not wholly independent of) those that we use to judge the war and its conduct’. Discussing the intervention in Iraq more specifically, he argues that having fought the war ‘we are now responsible for the well-being of the Iraqi people; we have to provide the resources – soldiers and dollars – necessary to guarantee their security and begin the political and economic reconstruction of their country’.38 In constructing a Jus Post Bellum, David E. Kellogg has stressed the importance of war crimes trials;39 in contrast, Kenneth R. Himes in essence argues for reconciliation and mutual forgiveness,40 both of which are extremely difficult to achieve when there have been substantial civilian casualties and the normal ordering of society has been permanently disrupted. Writing in the Journal of Social Philosophy in 2000, Brian Orend discusses the application of the concept of the Jus Post Bellum to a specific situation, the aftermath of the first Gulf War of 1991, concentrating on: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
just cause for termination of the war; right intention; public declaration and legitimate authority; discrimination; and proportionality.41
However, the difference between the first and the second Gulf Wars centres on the question of regime change and the consequences which flow from this; on this point, understandably, Orend is silent.
37
Lionel Beehner, ‘Shiite Muslims in the Middle East’, Council on Foreign Relations (16 June 2006): http://www.cfr.org/publication/10903/; ‘… the Shia are experiencing a revival fired by the interventions of the West in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have unleashed historic religious forces to fuel an age-old antagonism between the two sides [Sunni and Shia] that had not been anticipated by Washington or London. It is an antagonism that will determine the politics of the region for sometime to come as, long marginalised from power, the Shia are now clamouring for greater rights and more political influence’ [author’s italics]. Anthony O’Mahony, ‘The rise of Shia’, The Tablet (26 July 2006): . 38 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven and London, 2004), pp. 163–4. 39 Davida E. Kellogg, ‘Jus Post Bellum: the Importance of War Crimes Trials’, Parameters (Autumn 2002), pp. 87–99: . 40 Kenneth R. Himes, ‘The case of Iraq and the Just War tradition’, Washington Theological Union: . 41 Brian Orend, ‘Jus post bellum’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 31 (2000), pp. 117–37.
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Recently, Dr Timothy L. Challans of the US School of Advanced Military Studies has taken up the issue precisely in the area of regime change.42 He argues that: there is a general trend in the Just War Tradition to assign political leaders the responsibility of jus ad bellum and military leaders the responsibility of jus in bello. The Just War Tradition along with its temporal division of jus ad bellum and jus in bello perpetuates this problem, because the former concerns itself with those matters occurring before the war (and hence remain political issues alone) and the latter with matters once the conflict begins (and hence remain military issues alone) …
There is a temporal continuum for a regime change operation – before, during and after – broken into phases … there is also a hierarchical continuum, spanning the different levels of conflict from the highest strategic level to the lowest tactical level and including the operational level in between that links the other two … The political and military domains overlap so significantly today that it no longer makes sense to view their overlapping as anomalous, but following Kühn the interdependency between the two should signal the need for a new paradigm. Political and military leaders influence ethical matters in both the political and military realms. Therefore, political and military leaders share moral agency in both the political and military realms at all stages of a regime change operation. Following this state of affairs, it may be time to address the issue of also assigning them moral responsibility … After a conflict begins, military leaders can continue to influence the political realm, and they often are a large part of the political realm during Phase IV of an operation – known as the post-conflict phase. The military is shouldering more of the moral burden of regime change operations than it deserves. It is taking on more of the moral responsibility without the commensurate moral agency. We are in this unfortunate situation right now because political leaders are not taking responsibility for the moral agency they are exercising. So, since agency crosses the traditional line between political and military leaders, then so should responsibility. Moral agency and moral responsibility should correspond. It is the planning system itself that needs improvement. The military leaders are doing the best they can with the system they are given. But the military should spend some time rethinking and retooling their planning systems so that America can better ensure that her military operations match the high moral standards in her rhetoric. The analysis is penetrating, but offers no solutions. Instead we have to turn to the discussion by Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello, who specifically addresses the moral responsibilities of victors in war and provides the most thorough discussion of the dimensions of post-war needs to date.43 Had this analysis been taken seriously by the military planners in 2002 and early 2003, many of the mistakes in Iraq would have been avoided. Iasiello distinguishes various tasks:
42 Timothy L. Challans, ‘Birth of a Nation: Planning for Regime Change Operations’, 2005 at: . 43 Louis V. Iasiello, ‘Jus post bellum. The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War’, Naval War College Review, 57 (Summer/Autumn 2004): .
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British Foreign Policy in the Anglican Church A HEALING MIND-SET American military personnel are well prepared to fight wars and fulfil their responsibilities as warriors, but perhaps less so for their potential involvement in the highly sensitive and specialised post bellum environment. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that it is not sufficient to train only specialised units (military police or civil affairs teams) for their critical role in the post bellum. All warriors should be trained for these post bellum operations. JUST RESTORATION While each post bellum operation must be crafted to address the specific challenges generated by a particular conflict, most scenarios appear to progress through three general, yet interrelated, stages: protectorship, partnership and ownership … Just restoration is complete when full sovereignty is returned to a once-defeated people and former enemies become allies. SAFEGUARDING THE INNOCENT The victors in war should focus special attention on children in the post bellum phase of war. Of equal importance is the direction of post bellum care to other at-risk groups and those who cannot easily care for themselves, most notably the sick, the elderly and some groups of women. RESPECT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT While some progress has been made in protecting the environment in war, the issue still begs our attention in post bellum planning. All sides in a conflict should assume responsibility for the protection of the environment in war and they should be held accountable for both the treatment of the environment during hostilities and the subsequent restoration of the environment after the fighting has ended. POST BELLUM JUSTICE If reconciliation is an essential of post bellum healing and the establishment of a just peace, is it better to offer alleged criminals amnesty or immunity from prosecution or to try them in tribunals or courts of law? The prosecution of suspected war criminals and political regimes should be treated as a critical dimension of any successful post bellum dynamic to further post bellum healing. WARRIOR TRANSITION Proactive programs [are needed to] ensure that those returning from war are physically, emotionally, and spiritually equipped to handle the responsibilities of citizenship outside the combat environment. THE LESSONS OF WAR Current geopolitical realities make it plain that the time has come to establish and develop a new major category of just war – jus post bellum. Just war theorists will eventually benefit greatly from an in-depth study of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, and specifically the post bellum dimension of these complex operations. Outlining the moral guidelines or criteria for this dimension of warfare may ultimately save lives and enhance chances to secure a just and lasting peace for all.
Given the deeply pessimistic conclusions of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that America ‘can never make a total political withdrawal, though the size
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and location of the military presence [in Iraq] will vary’,44 Rear Admiral Louis V. Iasiello provides us with an appropriate conclusion, which does not pretend that the lessons have been perfectly learned to date, but argues the need for a continuing effort to learn them: Exploring the lessons learned may help nations avert future conflict and build a culture of peace. Warriors benefit from the experience of others who have been tried and tested in battle; their study of the action and decisions of others facing the fog and inhumanity of war may help them retain a moral and humane focus when they are called to serve in war.
44
Henry Kissinger, ‘How to Exit Iraq. At First, Iraqi Soldiers Should Augment US Forces, Not Replace Them’, Washington Post (18 Dec. 2005): .
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Chapter 5
Three Parables About War1 Charles Jones
The ‘just war’ tradition provides a robust and comprehensive framework for argument about war. It offers guidance on the declaration and conduct of war; it has exerted a profound influence on the law of armed conflict; it has been remarkably resourceful in accommodating the moral dilemmas arising out of irregular warfare, nuclear weapons and precision-guided munitions. Most of all, it appears to offer an arena within which those of many faiths and of none can meet on equal terms. The tradition, it is often said, is just that: a tradition and not a theory. Marked disagreements persist on particular questions, including the identification of legitimate authority, double effect and conditional deterrence. It is all too often reduced to a mere box-ticking exercise, to justify some specific instance of resort to force or military episode, when it ought rather to be thought of as a space for moral reflection. But at least the parameters of debate are secure, with pacifists and advocates of the unconstrained use of force consigned to the fringes. Something along these lines appears to be the dominant view in Britain and the US. It is mistaken. Indeed it is pernicious. It encourages complacency and shuts the door on a wide range of moral experience, both personal and collective, intrinsic to modern warfare. It leaves the Christian churches with some of their biggest guns in fixed emplacements, pointing the wrong way. It dissuades the secular mind from any profound consideration of its moral predicament by encouraging it to ride in the Christian slipstream. It allows pacifists and nihilists alike too easy a dismissal of rational approaches to warfare. Those engaged in the planning, authorisation and conduct of contemporary armed conflict are to limit the moral harm that they commit, and to which they – let alone their enemies – are exposed, just as they now routinely seek to address psychological and physical damage arising from the trauma of war. But if this is to be achieved, the silken warp of love, justice and authority with which ‘just war’ discourse has traditionally been woven needs an altogether tougher weft, spun from the full range of modern political and military experience rather than the more limited range of concerns that preoccupied St. Thomas Aquinas at the dawn of the modern international system. For it is in a version much indebted to Aquinas and his Spanish Dominican successors that the tradition is most often presented. They wrote at a time – broadly 1 Earlier versions of parts of this chapter have been read to the Imperial and Commonwealth Seminar of the Cambridge History Faculty (2004) the June 2005 conference on War and Cinema at the Centre for Research in the Arts and Social Sciences, Cambridge and published in Cambridge: the Magazine of the Cambridge Society, No. 57 (New Year 2006), pp. 8–10. I am grateful to all those who posed questions or offered comments.
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between 1200 and 1650 – when the monarchs of France, England, Spain and several other European countries were steadily establishing sovereign authority over consolidated territories at the expense of Pope and Emperor. The discovery, in the second half of this period, of orderly political communities in the Americas that had neither accepted nor – like the Ottomans – rejected the gospel, merely aggravated the position by confirming the autonomy of international relations from any single faith, and its technical anarchy, or lack of any supreme temporal authority capable of arbitrating between princes. In these circumstances, a doctrine of how armed conflict between sovereigns could be contained within the moral realm was sorely needed and this is what the later scholastic theologians attempted. Reduced to its bare bones, it runs like this. Justification of resort to war requires a formal declaration of hostilities – all other remedies having been exhausted – by a proper authority with a reasonable prospect of victory, moved by right intention to make good an injury or wrong of sufficient importance to outweigh the unavoidable evils that will result from the conduct of hostilities. Once engaged in warfare, combatants are enjoined not to attack non-combatants and to use no more force than is needed to achieve their objectives. Some of the bread-and-butter issues that constitute contemporary debate within the tradition leap from the page. They are daily on our lips. Where does legitimate authority reside in a world where many states have long since lost control of large tracts of their territory and armed groups flourish without any clear political programme or aspiration to secession or control of the state while permanent alliances or regional unions such as NATO or the European Union begin to acquire a measure of autonomy, even from their most powerful members, and uncertainty about the authority of the UN Security Council is aggravated by the pretensions of the US to a quasi-imperial regulatory role? How are we to regard collateral damage? Is it justified by the outcome of a military operation, or must it be the unintended outcome of attack upon a legitimate target, as in the Scholastic doctrine of double effect? And what of nuclear deterrence? May it be right to threaten to do wrong if by so doing one minimises the chance of ever having to carry out the threat? It is here, or hereabouts that the first step of a critique of the tradition might be taken. For St. Thomas, the very idea of legitimate authority was embedded in an Aristotelian concept of the perfect political community. By this he did not mean a polity without error, but one that was complete, in that it provided the conditions for individuals to live the good life. Within such a polity every adult had responsibility, by the exercise of prudence, for the conformity of behaviour to natural law; but the prudence of prince in this respect was uniquely important, for he alone was not subject to the regulatory check of positive law and he alone took responsibility for the whole polity rather than just a household, estate, or city. Few people today think in quite this way. Opinion is divided about both the extent of the perfect political community and the location of legitimate authority, whether in the United Nations Organisation, the multiplicity of sovereign states, a smaller number of great powers or regional hegemons, or the single remaining superpower. Double effect and conditional threat raise further problems for the secular mind. Christian thought about moral issues has always been more concerned with intention than outcome. War is no exception. Right intention, just as much as just cause, is a
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precondition of just resort to force. There is more. War was treated in very different ways by St. Thomas and by St. Augustine, who first introduced the concept of the just war into Christian thought at the turn of the fifth century, but both located their discussion of armed conflict within a broader discussion of love or charity. Oliver O’Donovan puts it most succinctly, remarking that it is ‘[I]n the context of war [that] we find in its sharpest and most paradoxical form the thought that love can sometimes smite, and even slay’.2 In short, legitimate authority and right intention, central concepts in the just war tradition, are deeply embedded in Christian theology and in one very specific, albeit central strand of theology. And since Western liberalism generally consigns religious belief to the private realm while seeking legitimate authority in the secular state or the UN, while the law of armed conflict deriving from the just war tradition has become universally applicable through a series of international conventions, the grounding of contemporary thought about war in Christianity prompts two urgent questions: ‘Can the tradition be successfully secularised?’ and ‘Is this all the Church has to say about war?’ Each of these questions is addressed to a quite distinct group: the first primarily to disbelievers and the second to the faithful. Natural law theorists may reason their way to a view of common morality, universal in incidence, providing a ground for the regulation of warfare. But for those who cannot quite swallow a secular version of legal naturalism there is a second, more secular route, which is to ground value in community, whether it be the national community or a universal community of humankind. The trouble with such views is that they seem constantly to be seeking some substitute for the divine authority that was once held to underpin political authority, whether it be through Hegelian recognition or organic nationalism; and such attempts look ever less convincing in the face of Nietszchean and post-modern critiques of metaphysics and social constructivist exposures of the imagined or invented character of supposedly organic or primordial nations. Worst of all, the vision of a single global community that might harbour a secular ethics of armed conflict is inchoate and poorly institutionalised, while any lesser form of communitarianism, such as that of Michael Walzer, can hardly avoid privileging the state of which one is a citizen, thereby admitting arguments from national interest or supreme emergency which run counter to the spirit of Augustine and Aquinas, substituting expediency for justice.3 Even if the problem of legitimate authority and political community can be solved, the secular thinker faces a second problem: the balance between intentions and outcomes. Recall Augustine’s maxim: ‘Love, and do what you will!’ If a Christian accepts this injunction, consequences are subordinated to virtue. To repeat, even war may be undertaken in a spirit of love. For the non-believer consequences may seem to be just about all there is and certainly not lightly to be disregarded. Conversely, there is no Lord to know the secrets of our hearts. Once again, separation of the tradition from its implicit theology poses problems. The question faced by the secular thinker wishing to deliberate within the just war tradition is how long the locomotive will go on running once the tender has been uncoupled. Will it reach some convenient downward slope where gravity takes over? 2 3
Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge 2003). Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, 1977).
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(What kind of buffers lie ahead?) The question addressed to the Christian is very different. To continue the railway metaphor, the Christian needs to consider whether it might be prudent to send some goods by way of branch lines rather than entrust the whole lot to the express, just in case the main line gets blocked. For Christianity has many other resources for thinking about war besides the high discourse of justice and charity. Consider just three: trusteeship, the Passion and pilgrimage. Rather than develop this last thought in abstract terms it may be more helpful to do so within the framework of a strategy that offers a first step along the road to a new ethic of warfare, encompassing a wider range of experience, both political and personal, than the just war tradition. And this is to look to representations of warfare, in the novel and other literary genres, in cinema, in graphic art, through which modern creativity has sought to express the emotional and moral experience of warfare and combat. To do this is to encounter a wider range of virtues, vices and broader matters of value – such as secrecy, alienation and personal identity – than is customarily considered in contemporary debate about the ethics of war. As an empirical method, study of the representation of war and the development of the modern imaginarie is neutral in principle. It offers resources to both the religious and the secular thinker. This said, the remainder of this chapter is addressed primarily to Christians and explores some ways in which they might think about war outside the framework of the Just War through three parables. First, the way in which warfare engages and sometimes compromises human responsibility for the natural world and exposes tensions between nature, passion and discipline is considered through some narratives of the South African War of 1899–1902. Next, a treatment of the Passion narrative as metaphor for popular anti-colonial insurrection is offered through Gillo Pontecorvo’s film, The Battle of Algiers. The chapter then concludes with a narrative of war as pilgrimage in the third and least known of John Buchan’s Richard Hannay novels, Mr. Standfast. The Horses Part of the case advanced here is that modern representations of warfare, both factual and fictional, have extended the moral vocabulary in ways that foster serious deliberation of the dilemmas of military service and command; part, that legalistic, formulaic and narrowly secular approaches to the ethics of war have been gaining ground over the past century in ways that threaten that ethical deepening. Narratives of the Boer War help advance both these claims. Contemporary accounts and some later histories light upon the disregard with which the British and their allies denuded farmland and squandered horses. Yet the 1978 Australian film Breaker Morant reduces a broader account of the experience of one Australian combatant to courtroom drama, editing out one of the most striking features of the book on which it was based, George Witton’s, Scapegoats of the Empire, in which lassitude, illhealth, the horses and the sheer wastefulness of war figure prominently. Who, aside from those personally engaged in hunting, racing, or eventing, gives much thought to horses these days? Part of the political force of the Countryside Alliance and most of the surprise it evoked in Whitehall stemmed from sharply contrasting answers to this question in Blair’s Britain. Horses are no longer involved
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in mundane transportation or warfare. More broadly, warfare has been mechanised to the point where mechanical and biological adaptation or enhancement even of the human body is now routine.4 Think only of night vision. As to landscape, it is far from inconsequential. Deserts and mountains still challenge human endurance and mechanical reliability. Yet technological ingenuity in the form of novel means of surveillance, protection of personnel and precision-guided munitions have done much to minimise the significance of the ground over which wars are fought. There has been, in short, a diminution in the natural limits to warfare and a corresponding growth in the risk of permanent harm to the environment from combat. All this must seem to Christians in stark contrast with God’s injunction to Adam, when He placed him in the Garden of Eden ‘to dress it and to keep it’.5 It was not yet so a century ago. The Second Boer War (1899–1902) was almost certainly the last war in which the British suffered far greater casualties among their horses than among the troops. When Field Marshall Lord Roberts, Commander in Chief of the imperial forces in South Africa, invaded the Orange Free State, 500 mounts of the 8,000 strong cavalry division commanded by Lieutenant-General John French were dead or useless after the first two days, before ever the enemy were ever engaged. By the time French reached the capital, Bloemfontein, two-thirds of the horses at his disposal were dead.6 In his authoritative history of the war, Thomas Pakenham estimated that 21,942 out of a combined force of 448,435 imperial and colonial troops died in the war: 5,774 in combat and a further 16,168 from their wounds or from disease. Compare this with an estimated loss of between 400,346 and 513,320 horses, mules and donkeys, ‘turning South Africa into [an] … imperial knacker’s yard’.7 Fatalities among the horses were a serious military issue. In the absence of mechanised road transport, and with the few railways that there were increasingly targeted by Boer irregulars, British logistics depended on them. Moreover the innumerable corpses, not easily gathered and burnt, posed a serious health risk, polluting watercourses.8 To make matters worse, the logistical and combat aspects of the horse shortage worsened as the war progressed. Initial Afrikaaner successes during the first two months were soon reversed as British and Dominion forces reached Cape Colony in strength. By August the major cities of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had been taken. Unable to match the British in conventional warfare, the Dutch or Afrikaaners fell back on irregular means. Raids on British communications and outposts increased in frequency toward the end of 1900. In October 1899 the British had ‘barely 14,000 mounted men’.9 Over the next two years hundreds of thousands of mounts were imported from as far afield as Argentina and Hungary.
4
Christopher Coker, The Future of War (Oxford, 2004). Genesis 2.15. 6 Byron Farrell, The Great Boer War (London, 1979), pp. 240–41. 7 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London, 1979), p. 572; Farrell, The Great Boer War, pp. 240–41. Pakenham’s is the lower estimate. 8 Ibid. 9 Bill Nasson, The South African War, 1899-1902 (London, 1999), p. 150. 5
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Lord Kitchener’s response to the operations of the lightly armed and highly mobile Boer commandos was twofold. The first step was to drain the water in which they swam by moving civilians into concentration camps. But it was also in this late phase of the war that special mounted units were formed, designed to beat the Dutch at their own game by operating deep in hostile territory. The war became a highly mobile irregular struggle in which horses and their care were vital to success. One of these units, the Bushveldt Carbineers, was raised in Capetown early in 1901 to serve in the Northern Transvaal, working out of Pietersberg. Nominally commanded by British officers, it was in essence an Australian force, relying on the much more widespread familiarity of colonials than urbanised British recruits with life in the saddle and on the range. While it may be true that ‘the British, a horse-loving people, were horrified by the dreadful treatment of horses in South Africa’, they were also largely responsible for them.10 Those from Indian and colonial units were appalled. A recent official history quotes Captain Laurence Maxwell, of the Second Bengal Lancers, writing in March 1900 to his sister, about the conditions under which the remounts he had brought from India were being moved up to the front. ‘The horses are shoved into trucks just like cattle – he wrote – and with room enough to turn around and get mixed up higgledy-piggledy and kick and do all sorts of mischief.’11 The Australians, as is evident from Scapegoats, did not kill their horses by neglect or carelessness. They cared about them and cared for them. Not for them the heavy iron-framed English cavalry saddle. Indeed, the men of the Bushveldt Carbineers had been selected for the skill and familiarity with horses. George Witton, who served as a Lieutenant and was one of the three officers from the Carbineers sentenced to death in February 1902 for killing prisoners and a German missionary, had originally embarked for South Africa with the Royal Australian Artillery. All recruits had been subjected to a riding test before leaving Australia. Those that failed had been rejected. Witton’s memoir (his sentence was commuted) shows a consistent interest in and regard for horses. He describes the embarkation and rather precarious disembarkation of his unit’s 700 horses; he comments on the Hungarian re-mounts at Beira and notes the admiration of the Portuguese Governor for the condition of the Australian horses; he criticises the quality of the saddlery issued at East London by the British as ‘just the kind of equipment to cripple the rider and ruin the horse at the same time’; on arrival at Pietersberg, his principal duty was to oversee the care of the horses.12 Not only does Witton evidently care about the horses; so also 10
Farwell, The Great Boer War, pp. 240–41. H.S. Gaskell, who interrupted his medical studies at Edinburgh University to serve in South Africa in the Imperial Yoemanry, pays close attention to the horses (pp. 41, 42, 44, 51, 61, 66–7, 79, 81, and passim) and provides a horrifying description of the burden carried by the small American horses on which his unit was mounted and the incompetence of many of his fellow-soldiers. Loading the horse was two hours’ work. H.S. Gaskell, With Lord Methuen in South Africa (London, 1906), pp. 31–3. 11 Field Marshall Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book of the Boer War (London, 1999), p. 140. 12 George R. Witton, Scapegoats of Empire: the Story of the Bushveldt Carbineers (second edition. Melbourne, 1907), pp. 5, 9, 10, 19, 40, 43; see also 16, 71 and passim. The history and development of this text is problematic in the extreme. Very few copies of a first
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did those who stood trial with him and were later shot by firing squad. Lieutenant Handcock had been a farrier. In the Bushveldt Carbineers he served as a Veterinary Lieutenant.13 Lieutenant H.H. ‘Breaker’ Morant, eponymous anti-hero of the film based on Witton’s book, was a breaker of horses. He took wild horses and brought them to the point where they were rideable. So much time has been devoted to the prominence of the horse in the Boer war and the contrast between British and colonial attitudes to the horse, because this theme, present in scholarly historical accounts of the war and in contemporary memoirs, is virtually absent from the later film. Breaker Morant, like the antecedent novel and play, is as much a gloss on Australian participation in the two World Wars and Vietnam as the literal treatment of events in the Boer War that it purports to be. Australian resentments bubble under the surface: Gallipoli, the loss of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales in December 1941, and the yet more ignominious fall of Singapore in February 1942, which resulted in the captivity thousands of Australians and left the country scarcely defended. When the condemned Australians in Breaker Morant are temporarily released to help the British regulars to repel a Boer raid on Fort Edward their valour earns no mitigation. High politics, it is suggested, trumps humanity and moral obligation among the British commanders. The contemporaneity of its implicit political target surely guided the editing of Scapegoats into Breaker and its relative neglect of opposition between natural Australian and artificial Briton. The horses fade into the background. Emphasis moves from the natural Australian of Witton’s almost certainly ghosted narrative to the passion of the film’s eponymous anti-hero. Passion and reason contend in Morant and the former triumphs. Nature precedes both and receives less attention in the industrial cultural product of a largely urban Australia than it did in Witton’s simpler (though hardly simple!) testimony of 70 years before. In formal terms, the courtroom frames the film but is merely the central episode in the book. The film gives an account of a harsh guerrilla war in which it was impossible to take prisoners. Though this had become routine, sanctified by direct orders from the British commanders, the eponymous hero, Lieutenant Harry Morant, and two other officers in the Bushveltd Carbineers are court marshalled in January 1902 for the unlawful killing, the previous August, of prisoners and of a German missionary who had witnessed some of the killings. Fearing German intervention and anxious to reach a negotiated settlement of an expensive and costly conflict, the British take steps to ensure conviction and subsequently execute Morant and Handcock. edition have survived. The memoir and the incidents to which it refers were little regarded by historians until a novel (Kit Denton, The Breaker) was published in 1973. This led in turn to a play (Kenneth Ross, ‘Breaker’ Morant (1978)), a film under the same title directed by Bruce Beresford in 1980 and starring Edward Woodward and a new edition of Witton’s memoir in 1982. There is still no agreement on the facts of the case and British official records have not been found. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breaker_Morant. 13 The word ‘farrier’ is little known these days, as much because of the rise of professional vets as because of the marginalisation of the horse, but denotes a common horse doctor. In a statement to the court, Handcock declared: ‘I am a Veterinary Lieutenant. I have had a very poor education. I never cared much about being an officer; all I know about is horses, though I like to fight’. Witton, Scapegoats, p. 114.
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Witnesses who might have exonerated the accused are posted elsewhere; others with personal grudges against them are brought forward. A British officer denies under oath that orders to kill prisoners have been issued. The film takes the conventional form of a courtroom drama, exercising numerous tensions in the Witton narrative between law, morality and expediency. It has two main arguments. The first, and more legalistic, is that the British, having chosen to pursue the war by irregular means, were duplicitous in holding those who were the instruments of their policy to the standards appropriate to conventional warfare. The second argument is concerned with passion and morality rather than law. Morant, Handcock and Witton are unjustly condemned, yet they may be thought guilty men.14 Though Morant may indeed have been obeying orders, there is a strong suggestion that he was also motivated by revenge and moved by anger. What sparked the whole episode off was the death, on August 5th 1901, of Captain Percy Hunt, Morant’s senior officer and friend. Acting on false intelligence, Hunt had attacked what he believed to be a lightly defended farmhouse 80 miles from base. Encountering a force more than four times more numerous than his own patrol of 17 men, he nevertheless persisted until he fell wounded on the veranda of the farmhouse. When his body was subsequently recovered for burial, it was found to have been stripped and mutilated. This convinced Morant – so Witton tells his readers – that his brother officer and best friend had been brutally murdered; he vowed there and then that he would give no quarter and take no prisoners. He had ignored his orders [to this effect] in the past, but he would carry them out in the future.15
Australians are natural; the British are simply expedient; Morant ineffectually guards the passes between nature, discipline and passion. In manipulating the trial, the High Command bring to bear the passions of those involved like so many pieces of artillery. They rely on the resentment felt towards Hunt and Morant by those whom they alienated while restoring discipline among the Carbineers. They move key witnesses for the defence into administrative dead ground. More broadly, British vulnerability and failure in the war, just as much as the cynicism of military justice, arise from the distance of an industrialised Britain from nature. The poor state of health of British recruits, their ignorant mistreatment of horses, the removal of the Boer non-combatants
14 Opinions on this point still differ. Pakenham gives short shrift to the Bushveldt Carbineers. There is no suggestion in his brief account of any miscarriage of justice or British kow-towing to German diplomatic pressure. The episode is seen as simply the worst case of a process of reciprocal brutalization that characterised the later stages of the war (Pakenham, Boer War, pp. 538–9). Wallace quotes a letter of 21st October 1929 from Witton to his erstwhile defence lawyer, from which it appears that Witton believed that Handcock murdered the German missionary and that Morant knew of his intention. It may be, then, that Handcock and Morant were condemned and executed for a crime (killing prisoners) of which they were technically innocent, but acquitted of a capital crime of which they were guilty and that a kind of justice was done, though Wallace himself is unconvinced: R.L. Wallace, The Australians at the Boer War (Canberra, 1976), p. 370. 15 Witton, Scapegoats, p. 55.
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from their natural surroundings and the consequent desolation of the countryside all bespeak a gulf between the British and their natural environment, the consequence of more than a century of sustained urbanisation and industrialisation. Australians, on this reading, are not so much undisciplined as natural and passionate by turns. It is perfectly true that Harry Morant was a man who tamed or ‘broke’ horses. It is also emblematic and perhaps accounts for the perennial appeal of this episode – the merest detail in most of the general histories of the war – that his calling gives Morant a Janus-like character, looking both ways. He was English and set to marry an Englishwoman, Hunt’s sister-in-law-to-be, yet thoroughly at home in the Australian bush after 14 years working there. He is a poet and a reader, yet also a man of action. He stands literally at the point where the wild horse is brought into subjection – ‘the only Englishman capable of riding a buck-jumper like a native-born Australian’ – while, metaphorically, he ‘breaks’ the men under his command as one of those responsible for restoring discipline among the Bushveltd Carbineers shortly before the death of Captain Hunt. Yet Morant fails wholly to break himself, allowing revenge to supplant discipline when push comes to shove. And with Morant gone, in later mythic readings of the story, the bridge between natural Australia and artificial Britain is broken. By a further irony, the success of the film occludes Witton’s narrative, substituting courtroom for Veldt and passion for nature. The British, Witton told us, were no longer fit to watch over the Garden of Eden. The Australians, we come to suspect, may have been more Cain than Adam, more Jacob than Esau. The Thief at Christ’s Side Among the most celebrated of twentieth-century war films, winner of the Leone d’oro at the Venice film festival in 1966, banned until 1971 in France and not shown on network television there until 2004, Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1965 film is an ItalianAlgerian co-production made less than a decade after the events it portrayed, when wounds were still raw and many of the participants still active.16 Over the years, the film has acquired a curious and ironic didactic life, adopted by the Black Panthers for training purposes and more recently shown to members of the security and intelligence communities of the US, Israel and Northern Ireland to prompt discussion of how best to respond to contemporary insurgency and terrorism.17 Identification of The Battle of Algiers with the Christian Passion narrative is neither unprecedented nor speculative. Some interpreters have hinted strongly at it, yet perhaps been restrained from any clearer statement by the secular Marxistnationalist thought world of the period. Irene Bignardi, for example, writes of Pontecorvo’s identification with ‘the choral nature of the [Algerian] struggle’ but rapidly elides this into the banal Leftism of ‘sentiments and emotions felt in unison 16 Joan Mellen, Filmguide to ‘The Battle of Algiers’ (Bloomington and London, 1973) is still a good starting point. The literature has grown since and continues to grow. 17 Donald Reid, ‘Re-viewing The Battle of Algiers with Germaine Tillion’, History Workshop Journal, 60 (Autumn 2005), p. 110; for the detail about the Black Panthers see Irene Bignardi, ‘The Making of The Battle of Algiers’, Cineaste 25:2 (2000), p. 16.
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with the masses’.18 Mellen also notes Pontecorvo’s concern with the interplay of individuals and collective, but expresses it in exclusively Marxist dialectical terms.19 Closer to a religious interpretation was Joseph Morgenstern, reviewing the film in Newsweek, who commented that ‘rather than playing God … Pontecorvo and his team have chosen the scarcely less difficult role of witnessing angels’. True: and they explicitly cast the audience, too, in this role. However, The Battle of Algiers is not simply open to interpretation; there is also direct evidence of authorial intention in this matter of narrative structure and analogy with the Passion. The film opens with a lengthy quotation from Johann Sebastian Bach’s St. Matthew Passion.20 This immediately marks it out, for all its Leftist sympathy with the Algerian nationalist cause and for Islam, as a narrative firmly embedded in the Christian tradition. Brought up in a cultivated middle-class household, persecuted as a Jew during the Second World War, a man of the secular Left who had hoped to become a composer in his youth and chose the music for his films with great care, Pontecorvo recognised the need for a more than secular approach to the Algerian struggle.21 There is a hint here of the motivation behind Otto Klemperer’s brief conversion to Christianity: necessary – he felt – if he were to conduct the St. Matthew.22 The quotation ends before the entry of the choir, so that the words remain implicit: ‘Come ye daughters, share my mourning. See him! – Whom? – The bridegroom, Christ.’ Yet the effect of these few bars is to establish not only a passion narrative but also a chorus to bear witness to the narrative, or perhaps two choruses: those daughters of Zion – the unnamed Arab women of the city of Algiers – and ourselves, the audience, who become witnesses through our implication in this form, with its conventional use of the chorale. It may assist an appreciation of the shape of the film to keep those opening bars in mind – prelude to a monumental and meticulously structured baroque masterpiece – and cut to an image from the very end of the film, when the battle for Algiers has been fought and won by the French and the film has traced the passion of freedom fighter and terrorist Ali La Pointe (the thief at Christ’s side?) and the Arab nation to its explosive conclusion. Two years have passed. Suddenly, no one knows quite why, not even the Arab leadership, Algiers explodes. The French have defeated the insurgency in the capital but are now about to lose the war and, with it, the country they have regarded as part of their own for more than a century. While the battle was fought between rational men, tacticians, presented to the viewer as bound by mutual respect amounting almost to collusion, the war is won by nameless women, those daughters of Zion: ululating insistently, witnessing without 18
Bignardi, ‘The Making’, p. 15. Mellen, Filmguide, pp. 9–13. 20 The film and the St. Matthew Passion. 21 For the care that Pontecorvo devoted to choice of music for the soundtrack see Bignardi, ‘The Making’, pp. 18–19 and Mellen, Filmguide, pp. 13–14 and pp. 24–32. 22 Daniel Barenboim interviewed Klemperer, ‘who became a Christian to conduct Bach’s St. Matthew Passion but eventually returned to Judaism’, reported in Nextbook: a gateway to Jewish Literature, Culture, and Ideas. http://www.nextbook.org/cultural/digest. html?date=2004.03 (accessed 5th April 2006). 19
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argument, ‘a presence of all voice rather than an absence of all words’.23 The war is won by an unstructured multitude, invisible through the fog, with whom communication is impossible. Demonstrations stream through the streets. A bewildered gendarme stands, megaphone to his mouth, shouting at the fog of tear gas into which the protesters have vanished. ‘Go home!’ he exclaims. (But it is our home!) ‘What is it you want?’ (How can you not know by now?) By this point we have moved from battle, with a clear competitive logic, to the more cosmic opposition of two forms of reason, instrumental and existential, which constitutes warfare proper. It would be quite wrong to contend that Pontecorvo’s film is solely or even principally a Passion narrative. Alongside the Passion of Ali la Pointe a quasi-Marxist dialectic unfolds in which stereotypically masculine clarity serves as thesis, equally stereotypically feminine deception and transgression as antithesis and complicity as a synthesis which immediately comes into fresh opposition with something in that fog and wailing which is no more than suggested: certainly not un-reason; perhaps the multitude, perhaps right, perhaps becoming, perhaps salvation.24 Take clarification first. The film shows a steadily escalating definition of European and Arab spaces within the city of Algiers and of the roles of the major protagonists. As attacks on the police and terrorist bombings increase, the Casbah is cordoned off. Barbed wire and checkpoints appear. The civil police give way to French paratroopers. Within the Casbah the revolutionaries respond by purifying their own ranks, securitising the rituals of everyday life and eliminating gangsters and drunkards. After clarification comes transgression. The barriers have been set up; the checkpoints manned. To continue the terrorist campaign the FLN must penetrate these clear lines. To do this, they must transgress in other ways too. Using women to carry bombs into the European quarter they not only breach traditional conventions about the distinction between combatant and non-combatant and women as nurturers but also break trust by exploiting the supposed respect of the French for women. One French soldier reprimands another in the very first checkpoint scene for having started too rough a search of the white shrouded figure, who, moments later, hands the pistol she had concealed about her to an assassin. ‘You must not touch their women’, he insists. More than this, these women who carry bombs must ‘pass’ in the sense of diminishing or concealing their Arab identity. One, the young woman who passes most convincingly, is first seen at home with her two companions, dressing to kill. Abandoning traditional clothing for the flared cotton skirts of the time, she next sets about dying and perming her hair. Her cover is a trip to the beach. Passing though the checkpoint, a carefree peroxide blonde, she flirts easily with a young French soldier as he and his companions eye the crowd for those who look suspicious. She is not out of place among the other young people in the Milk Bar. She begins to move with the music, almost dancing to the music of French youth, but uneasily, as she plants the bomb that will kill or maim those who could so easily have been her student friends had things gone differently.
23
Personal communication: Sara Crangle, 26 May 2005. This dialectical structure is spelt out and illustrated in some detail in my ‘Film as Struggle in an Algerian Passion: Gillo Pontecorvo’s The Battle of Algiers’, forthcoming. 24
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Clarification-as-thesis is contradicted by transgression-as-antithesis. So, finally, comes complicity-as-synthesis: politically the most problematic and theologically intriguing aspect of this Italian-Algerian co-production. In the opening scene, the Judas figure who has just betrayed Ali La Pointe, the last remaining FLN leader in the city, is immediately comforted, protected and clothed. When he attempts suicide, he is restrained. Pontecorvo argues strongly for a traditional bond between warriors, rooted in their shared understanding of necessity, even in a new kind of war. The more likely outcome in fact, if General Paul Aussaresses is to be believed, would have been summary execution.25 The fictional Lieutenant Colonel Mathieu, orchestrator of the French operation, shares a bond with the tortured, but also with the enemy leadership and most of all Ben M’Hidi. Mathieu understands the logic of asymmetric warfare and the necessity of terrorism; it is the mirror image of the torture that he must employ against the FLN. Many French officers who served in Algeria had themselves taken part in irregular Resistance operations against the German occupying forces in the 1940s, not long before. Pontecorvo himself had fought as a partisan in Milan during the Second World War, as commander of the Third Brigade.26 This mutual understanding of a new breed of warrior is reinforced most strongly and repeatedly through the character of Mathieu: Mathhew, the apostle who had served Herod’s puppet state. His ambivalence is once again pointed up as he tells the journalists, Pilate-like, following the faked suicide of Ben M’Hidi in captivity: ‘You must ask the spokesman of the Minister of the Interior’. Pontecorvo suggests complicity between opposing forces. Then, finally, the audience is made complicit in the film in a number of ways. Three examples will do: the first two very specific, the third more general. Remember that young woman with the peroxide perm? The transformation scene, where she and her companions groom themselves for the triple bomb attacks on the French quarter, is shot from an oddly high angle. The audience look down on the three women, changing modestly because they are in each other’s company and only at the end of the scene as the youngest starts to treat her hair, looking directly at camera, does it become apparent that the audience is behind the mirror. The intrusion into the intimacy of the home and the scene of changing is not simply that of the self-effacing camera, but is suggestive of the two-way mirror, cliché of police interrogation scenes and almost Delphic emblem of false truth. ‘Mirror, mirror, on the wall …’ The trick is repeated. Mathieu, newly appointed leader of the French paratroops brought in to suppress the insurrection after the police are deemed to have failed, shows his men a recently made police film. His ostensible aim is to demonstrate errors made by the police in the management of checkpoints. It is hard to watch that clip without darting to that familiar figure, picking her out as with a Judas kiss: the slight eye movement enough to betray her to an experienced observer watching you. In this way an audience comes to understand the temptation to inform, a little like the desire to jump from a high place. Finally, for evidence of the more general complicity of the audience, one must go back to the very start of the film once more. The hegemony of the Christian narrative is immediately established by the quotation from Bach. As audience, we are assumed 25 26
Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah (New York, 2002). Mellen, Filmguide, p. 12.
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to recognise this just as surely as we recognise the blonde terrorist, and, in doing so, to bring into play the entire imaginary resources of the Passion. The purpose is no longer transgression but the fusion of enemies: the implication of the audience in the representation they are witnessing, which becomes less entertainment than liturgy. A Presbyterian Pilgrim If Pontecorvo blends Marxist dialectic with the Passion narrative, John Buchan, his senior by a generation, blended established Romantic tropes with one of the most celebrated narratives of Christian pilgrimage, John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.27 Best known for the first of his Richard Hannay adventures, the thrice-filmed Thirty-Nine Steps, Buchan had serious political ambitions, served as a Member of Parliament and was later to die in office as Governor-General of Canada. He wrote the third of the Hannay novels as World War I and with it his war-work as a propagandist in the British Ministry of Information and a chronicler of the conflict for the Daily Mail, drew to a close. Mr. Standfast takes its title from a character in John Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress, perhaps – alongside the King James Bible, Waverley, and Robinson Crusoe – the most widely read narrative in English during the nineteenth century. Its central argument is that the outcome of conflict is now determined through the secret and shameful war of espionage and deception rather than the open and honourable war of the battlefield. The narrative device he employs to press home this message is the modelling, of what presents superficially as a thriller or novel of espionage, on Bunyan’s devotional text. In Pilgrim’s Progress Pilgrim himself first leaves home and family to travel through a world of temptations and dangers to salvation. In the second half of the book his wife and children follow. Adopting the same, two-part structure and playing with the stereotypes of his day, Buchan embarks on a game of Romantic inversions worthy of his literary hero, Sir Walter Scott, with Pilgrim-Hannay, adrift in the feminine secret world in the first half of the book and his male yet feminised opponent, the German spy von Schwabing, unable to survive in the masculine world of the battlefield in the second. The analogy between journeying, salvation and narrative and its attendant themes of landscape, identity and deception, or pretence, are immediately evident in the novel. Suddenly called back to England from the Western Front, Richard Hannay journeys from the Somme, by way of London, to the Cotswolds. There he meets Mary Lamington, a young woman who is able to give him orders in this secret war and with whom he falls in love. Like the novel as a whole, his initial journey is from the ‘real’ war of the Western Front, through the frustrations of the secret war, to embodiments of the ideal of England which alone can justify a new style of warfare. The same analogy between warfare and pilgrimage is pursued through abundant references throughout the novel to Pilgrim’s Progress, which has been adopted as a code book by the British agents, providing a secret language through which Mary
27
Buchan’s debt to and use of Pilgrim’s Progress is explored in Jeremy Idle, ‘The Pilgrim’s Plane-Crash: Buchan, Bunyan and Canonicity’, Literature and Theology, 13/3 (September 1999), pp. 249–58.
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and Hannay are able to filter their shared experience of the covert struggle.28 As Idle so elegantly puts it: the Progress in Standfast is a prize, a code-book, a good read, a fortune-telling device, a timeless anatomy of human folly, and inspiration to fight and die, a source of moral and theological comfort, and an English classic and reminder of the glory of the English countryside.29
For Buchan, with his Free Church background, it is not the rational public discourse of Thomistic readings of the ‘just war’ tradition, but the private confessional tradition of Baxter and Bunyan that provides the better context in which to consider the nature of modern warfare and its significance for the individual as personal struggle, akin to jihad. Yet any literal application of the analogy poses problems, as Buchan surely knows. To raise just one: the first part of the novel deals with the secret war, in which women as well as men are participants while the distinction between combatant and non-combatant is intentionally obscured. The second part deals with the open or ‘real’ war of front-line combat, still at that time an exclusively male preserve. Yet the first part of Pilgrim’s Progress relates the path to salvation of a man, Christian: the second, that of his wife and children. It is not simply that there is a conflict between secret and open war, but that there is doubt about which is more privileged in modern warfare, the feminine or the masculine. Buchan follows another of his literary heroes, Sit Walter Scott, when he sews doubt by inconsistent and contradictory inversion of the binary oppositions with which he constructs the symbolic world of his novel. The book is full of inversions – of sanity and madness, youth and age, male and female, clothed and naked, innocence and guilt. Yet constant inversion means that all are trumped by the master-themes of initiation, secrecy and identity. As faith moved from the public to the private sphere with the Reformation, so now, it seems, war moves from the public and rational world of Aquinas and the battlefield to an esoteric world in which nothing can be relied upon and everything is at risk in a struggle for salvation. Hannay despises pretence. He hates having to pretend to be opposed to the war as he works under cover as Cornelius Brand, an Afrikaaner pacifist, testing the moral temperature of Middle England and infiltrating the enemy intelligence network. ‘I detested my new part and looked forward to naked shame’, he declared (3). There is nothing worse than a fake. ‘The mass of faked china fruit’ at Fosse Manor comes under Hannay’s disapproving scrutiny as, much later, does the desk of his German arch-enemy, the Graf von Schwabing: ‘It’s a bad piece of fake empire and deserves smashing’ (162). Arriving in the oxymoronic Garden City of Biggleswick, Hannay finds a whole sub-culture that is incomplete or unreal because of its lack of contact with the reality of war (13). Its people ‘shut out the war from their lives’ (21). ‘It was their fashion – he noted – never to admire anything that was obviously beautiful, like a sunset or a pretty woman, but to find surprising loveliness in things which I thought 28 John Buchan, Mr. Standfast (London, 1919), pp. 14, 75, 81, 130, 135, 160, 168, 184, 185, 190, 196–7 and passim. My page references, the remainder of which are given in brackets in the text to avoid a string of ‘Ibids’, are to the 1994 Wordsworth Classics edition. 29 Idle, ‘Pilgrim’s Plane Crash’, p. 254.
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hideous’(19). His hosts, the Jimsons, dress inappropriately and appear younger than their age (16). The city is in one sense a wholly public place ‘where people lived brazenly in the open and wore their hearts on their sleeves’. But finding his room has been searched Hannay realises that this pretence of transparency conceals a mystery (18). In Biggleswick, the German spy-master, the Graf von Schwabing, who passes for an English pacifist, Moxon Ivery, is a pretence in several ways. He is identified by Hannay’s American comrade, Blenkiron, as ‘the superbest actor that ever walked the earth [with a face that] isn’t a face, it’s a mask’ (34). He is more specifically false in allowing Hannay and his companions to believe themselves to be manipulating him and his channels of information when, as Hannay suddenly discovers in the course of a London air raid, the reverse obtained (120–121). Pretence is associated with unreality and the unreal cannot be fought by ‘real’ or honest methods of combat, but only in its own terms. Thus even Fosse Manor, the Cotswold Manor House where Hannay is commissioned into the secret war and falls for Mary Lamington, is at heart unreal, even though placed in the most ‘real’ of landscapes, the Cotswolds being central to the idyll and ideal of Englishness for which Hannay is fighting. Hannay is repelled by the inappropriately young dress style of the over-intellectual Miss Wymondhams and the heavy make-up of Claire Wymondham, representative members of the disengaged haute bourgeoisie whom he encounters there (8–9). Mary herself is obliged to change out of her VAD uniform the moment she arrives home. ‘She may masquerade as she likes out-of-doors, but this house is for civilized people’; but the masquerade – the role of military nurse – is more real, though of course it is at the same time a pretence: the cover for Lamington’s intelligence work (9). Fosse Manor is a pretence, then, because the war has been shut out and because those within it who are really engaged in the war must pretend that they are not. Meanwhile Buchan plays with a second related inversion of innocence and guilt, as guileless pacifists are innocently drawn into the enemy espionage network and are therefore guilty even though, being unaware of what they are really doing, they remain innocent (117). Real and covert war are constantly juxtaposed in this most didactic and complex of Buchan’s novels, and in one of the few moments of sheer inventive brilliance in the book, fleeing from the police on the outskirts of the northern city of Bradfield, Hannay suddenly stumbles out of the covert war of Part 1 of the novel into a real battlefield in the middle of Yorkshire, only to perceive, moments later, that it is a re-enactment of combat for the cine-camera, though like enough to real warfare for the experienced officer that he is to take over direction and reduce the carefully planned mock battle to sheer chaos, covering his escape (112). Soon afterwards, finally reaching London, Hannay heralds the conclusion of Part 1 and the move back to the ‘real’ battlefields of Flanders. ‘The day of disguises is past’, he declares (125). And the first chapter of Part 2 is headed ‘I become a combatant once more’, as though the first part had not related a story of combat, albeit clandestine. Finally, the novel as a whole is an inversion, the two parts being reversals or mirror images of each other: the covert war and the war of the battlefield. The battlefield presents a mortal threat and the ultimate test of character. The climax of the book is the final massive German attack of the war: the Ludendorff Offensive, in which the physical cowardice of von Schwabing is exposed. Yet Hannay accepts
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that it is no longer battle but intelligence that holds the key to victory (167). This is to prove the very root of the twentieth-century spy novel, above all during the Cold War. Von Schwabing is ‘the big enemy, compared to whom the ordinary Boche in the trenches was innocent and friendly’. The burden of the tale is that in modern warfare ‘the whole world [is] one battlefield and every man and woman among the combatant nations … in the battle line’ (168). By his use of Pilgrim’s Progress Buchan fixes the attention of his reader on questions of salvation and identity, both personal and national. War is less about the implementation of justice by sovereigns than about the exercise of judgment by individuals under conditions of radical uncertainty. His is a profoundly Protestant response to Aquinas. Conclusion Christians can hardly remain indifferent to the discourse of nature, discipline and passion in the Morant episode or to the ambiguities of colonial sensitivity toward the disregard shown by industrialised warfare toward the natural world for which humankind was given responsibility in Genesis. They are surely bound to dwell upon, if not to accept, the audacious and considered analogy between Christ’s passion and the Algerian war of liberation as drawn by Pontecorvo. They should find no difficulty in accepting that war, for many individuals – Buchan’s Hannay, but also Waugh’s Guy Crouchback, Stephen Crane’s Henry Fleming, or even Henry Williamson’s largely forgotten John Bullock – is a pilgrimage: a journey towards salvation or self-discovery, in which the distinction between innocents and combatants has gone and the mantle of responsibility fallen upon every individual caught up in the dreadful process.30 To have made possible moral deliberation about war and inspired contemporary law of armed conflict is no mean achievement and not lightly to be discarded. Yet would not Aquinas himself have been open to the argument that a discourse of justice comes nowhere near exhausting what the Christian tradition has to say on the question of war, and that overtly rational discourse can never entirely displace parable in deliberations about war. A treasure house of material lies barely touched by those historians, strategists and ethicists who study war professionally and has yet to be felt in the peculiarly limited, legalistic and literally scholastic public discourse on war with which we are trying to steer our way through dangerous times. The three narratives examined here have been selected to explore how Christians might broaden the scope of their deliberation about modern warfare. Other texts which may appeal more readily to the secular mind include Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 (1961), Powell and Pressburger’s film The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp (1943), Jean-Luc Godard’s Le petit soldat (1963), Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s Pilote de guerre (1942), James Fennimore Cooper’s Last of the Mohicans (1826) and Sir Walter Scott’s Rob Roy (1817). The list is a long one and each reader will have favourites. Lately, officers and defence officials in the 30
Evelyn Waugh, Men at Arms (1952), Officers and Gentlemen (1955) and Unconditional Surrender (1962); Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage (1895); Henry Williamson, The Patriot’s Progress (London, 1930).
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United States and the British Isles have been watching The Battle of Algiers. What do they make of it? To some, at least, it will seem to depict breaches of the legal and moral constraints within which they aspire to operate, yet cannot. Yet its torturers and tortured, its terrorists and soldiers, do not stand outside the moral realm and more than Buchan’s implicit statement of war aims or his concern with deception do, or George Witton’s regard for innocent horses. If the objections of self-styled realists who throw up their hands and claim that all’s fair in love and war are to be overcome and war brought more firmly within reason, then the imaginative resources of modernity, both religious and secular, need to be more effectively deployed, perhaps to flank, perhaps to replace the just war tradition.
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Chapter 6
British Military Intervention Since 1990 Tim Cross
Introduction The world has changed enormously since 1990, yet in one sense at least nothing has changed; military campaigns continue in the same old places. A British Serviceman has been killed on operations every year since 1945, except one; 1969, just as the most recent troubles in Northern Ireland erupted. Of the 3,500 killed since 1945, around 380 have died since 1990 (as of October 2006). British military forces have been involved in the planning or execution of over 30 separate operational deployments since 1990 – in the preceding 45 years they were involved in only seven. And the tempo in the last few years has increased. The current Labour Government has deployed British troops to seven different countries for one reason or another; British servicemen and women find themselves back in Afghanistan and Iraq, as they were back in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and they are still present in the Balkans after more than a decade and the Falklands Islands after 25 years. In the years following the end of World War II large numbers of British Forces continued to police the globe, deployed across the Middle and Far East as well as Africa and Europe. Economic and political pressures convinced British governments of all shades to steadily withdraw from Empire; from the Jewel, India, in 1947 after partition, followed by Macmillan’s ‘Wind of Change’ in Africa in the 1950s/1960s and the Wilson government’s decision in 1967 to pull out East of Suez. British engagements in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Suez were all in one sense fighting withdrawals as Britain handed over to national governments. Others, like Korea and the Oman, were more about assisting governments resisting take over by insurgents or external forces. The result was that by the 1970s the defence effort of the UK was focussed almost exclusively on Western Europe, on deterring the Warsaw Pact (WP) from crossing the Inner-German border (IGB). There was of course Northern Ireland and a small retained ‘out-of-area’ capability, with a presence in Hong Kong, Cyprus and the Falkland Islands; but the vast bulk of British combat power was configured for the Cold War. The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) was deployed in garrison towns across the plains of North-West Germany. First British Corps, part of the 493,000 strong regular and reserve UK Army, stood at the heart of the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG); Dutch, Belgian and German Corps stood alongside the British, who commanded the whole group. To the South, American and further German Corps operated under CENTAG, the Central Army Group. Both NORTHAG and CENTAG were supported by the Air Forces of all the NATO partners, with the Royal Air Force deployed in various ‘clutch’ airfields around the Rhine area of Germany and further
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forward at Gutersloh, all part of the Second Allied Tactical Air Force. Large, in-place forces, all preparing to fight a clearly defined enemy; mass, Clausewitzian, attritional warfare. In 1990 NATO had 23,000 main battle tanks and 4,884 combat aircraft ready to engage the estimated 51,714 tanks and 6,206 combat aircraft of the WP. Moving rapidly out of their garrisons and stations the intent was to respond immediately to any incursion across the IGB, fighting a covering force battle as far forward as possible and then conducting a main defensive battle from within defensive positions along the length of Western Germany – the General Deployment Plan (GDP). If required, a counter-stroke, to either destroy the WP forces or at least stop them moving up across the Rhine and into France and the Benelux countries, would be launched. If all else failed, then tactical nuclear weapons would be used – probably leading to an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction – the ultimate and essential intent of deterrence theory. The British Military focus in 1990 was thus still on industrial scale war-fighting, essentially in Europe where operations would have been conducted as part of a war of national survival. The Post-Cold War Landscape All this changed as events unfurled at the end of the decade. The collapse of Communism and the WP in Europe saw the end of all the Cold War certainties, freeing the nation from the immediate threat of nuclear war and opening up an era of unpredictability. The prospect of large scale, inter-state warfare receded, to be replaced by what became known as ‘Wars of Choice’, with governments free to choose whether or not to get involved in military action rather than have it imposed upon them through direct threat to their homeland. Foreign policy began to evolve into a far more complex and detailed ‘ethical’ business1 and military commanders saw the relative freedoms they enjoyed in the way they would have conducted their operations in a high intensity, war fighting battle-space slipping away. The intrusion of the media, numerous non-military players and domestic public opinion would quickly become a major factor in the planning and conduct of relatively small to medium scale ‘expeditionary operations’. Whilst there had been impassioned debate during the Cold War about the ethics of assured destruction, there were few who argued for anything other than the necessity for the West to defend itself against communism and the WP; many, including within the Church, were now released to debate the legitimacy of military intervention. The changes also freed the military from the tyranny of blinkered and narrow thinking. Seeing the world through the tainted glasses of BAOR military ‘practice’ – how operations were to be conducted in that one particular theatre at that particular time – had resulted in other, hard fought for operational doctrine being ignored. Training, which had concentrated on simply implementing the GDP, and equipment programmes, which had procured weapons geared to the nature of operations in Europe, had to be re-assessed. The military needed to think through the implications of a post-Cold War world, particularly how to train and prepare for a wide range of possible options. The time honoured ‘principles of war’ had
1
British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s call for an ‘Ethical Dimension’ to foreign policy being the most notable example.
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to be re-learnt and practised and the procurement programmes moved away from large ‘just-in-case’ stocks of materiel to a more responsive and flexible approach. These changes were immediately interrupted as the first ‘War of Choice’ erupted. The British military found itself deploying around 50,000 service personnel as a part of an international coalition to fight not a defensive campaign, in a temperate climate falling back over relatively short lines of communication in a well found and sophisticated infrastructure, but an offensive campaign against an unknown enemy in the harsh and unforgiving deserts of the Middle East. In many ways the 1990/1991 Gulf War was a classic large-scale war. An invader crossed an international border under the pretext of securing additional territory and resources. There was a clear-cut enemy, with defined borders and boundaries and an objective – the removal of the enemy from Kuwait. Justice and righteousness demanded that something be done; and it was. Most serious analysts saw the Iraq invasion as an unprovoked attack and a breach of international law. The United Nations Secretary General, the Security Council and the General Assembly found no difficulty in supporting military action and they responded surprisingly quickly; resolutions were passed demanding Iraqi withdrawal – if not, the use of necessary force was authorised. The vast majority of the British public, indeed world, opinion was supportive of military action and the Church generally was too; any objective analysis of the ‘Just War’ criteria concluded that the use of force was justified, albeit some argued for more time. Saddam Hussein achieved strategic surprise in Kuwait on 2 August 1990, leaving the West and the rest of the world flat-footed. Control of Kuwait’s oil and gas fields was worrying enough, but even more so was the implied threat to Saudi Arabia. The world united in its condemnation and reacted with speed. Within hours of the invasion the first United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) had been adopted and on 8 August President Bush (senior) announced the deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia. The UK duly confirmed that it too would play a part in an international coalition – Operation GRANBY was thus born, one of the largest British military operations since the end of the Second World War. In the autumn of 1990 a large force of coalition troops, under US overall command, moved into the north of Saudi Arabia to establish a defensive posture. Operation DESERT SHIELD was designed to ensure that Iraqi forces could not move further south into Saudi Arabia to occupy the oil fields there; Operation DESERT STORM was designed to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The coalition was a collection of nations, including full NATO members, France, several Arab nations and contributions from as far away as Australia and New Zealand. The Royal Navy (RN) and Air Force responded quickly.2 The RN ARMILLA patrol, which had been deployed in the Gulf since the beginning of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war, was strengthened and the RAF deployed Tornado F3 air defence fighters, Jaguar ground attack and Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft. By early 1991 the Army fielded a powerful armoured division, commanded by the then Major General Rupert Smith. There were strong RN and RAF contributions to both support 2
The Royal Navy in 1990 was 98,900 strong while the RAF had a complement of 130,300 – Regulars and Reserves.
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the land component and to fight the sea and air campaigns. First British Armoured Division consisted of two armoured brigades, the fourth and seventh and a very strong artillery group, all supported by logistic, engineering, communications and medical assets. On paper the Iraqi army was not only numerically strong but also battle hardened from a brutal eight year war with Iran and the general feeling was that they would fight hard and that the threat of high casualties would not deter them; there was also widespread concern about their chemical and biological capability. In the event they proved battle-weary and both operationally and tactically inept. The air campaign began on 17 January 1991. The ferocious bombing, with the latest precision-guided weapons, had a devastating effect on the Iraqi forces and it was followed by a blitzkrieg-type lightning land assault, launched on the 24 February. US marines moved into Kuwait from the South to fix the Iraqi forces in the occupied country, whilst the bulk of the coalition combat power swept through Iraq, by-passing Kuwait itself. The US and the UK armies, with a French flanking guard, all of which had moved inland from their initial positions along the coast of the Persian Gulf, broke through the thin crust of Iraqi defences to the west of Kuwait and moved to force an engagement with the Iraqi Republican Guard. Some serious fighting ensued but the coalition secured the Euphrates and, after 100 hours, the fighting ended. The War itself was thus relatively uncontroversial, although there was a debate about how far to go in dealing with Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military. The coalition air force dealt severely with the Iraqi forces streaming north out of Kuwait City on the Basrah road – carrying with them the loot they had pillaged. Pictures of the carnage were beamed around the world and disquiet set in. With coalition forces hard up against the Euphrates and the bulk of the Iraqi forces encircled there was an impassioned plea from many to gainsay further killing. Bowing to the pressure the US President ordered a cessation of hostilities. This left Iraq free to re-assemble its forces and Saddam able to re-assert his power. The coalition disbanded, its job done. Although in the North a humanitarian force was assembled under the title of Operation Haven to help the Kurdish refugees who fled to the mountains as Saddam re-exerted his grip, a subsequent up-rising in the South of Iraq was brutally crushed with no intervention from the coalition. All in all this was unfinished business. Gathering the British contribution back in the UK, replacing equipment and other materiel, took more than a year and the British government began to seek the benefit of a peace dividend. As they did so, further debates ensued on the ethical issues associated with the idea of ‘Wars of Choice’; concerning the legitimacy of intervention and the real meaning of the concepts that emerged. The previous lexicon of military language – ‘Counter Revolutionary Warfare’, ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ and ‘Operations other than War’ – was now joined by ‘Peace Keeping’, ‘Peace Support’ and ‘Peace Enforcement’. It was against this backcloth that conflict developed in the Balkans. Events there had been obscured by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War; and not least by the war against Iraq. But by the early 1990s Yugoslavia was in the process of disintegrating and this would have enormous consequences for the security of the rest of Europe.
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The Challenges of Peace-making and Peace Enforcement The death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980 was the catalyst for the break up of Yugoslavia. Freed from his control, and with no natural successor, an increasingly ineffective presidency rotated among the six semi-autonomous republics. Slovenia – Catholic, western orientated and the smallest but wealthiest republic – made noises about cessation and Kosovo teetered on the edge of revolt. Slobodan Milosevic seized his opportunity. Taking up the cause of Serbian nationalism he gave a now notorious speech in 1989 before one million Serbs. It was delivered on the 600th anniversary of the Serb defeat by the Ottoman Turks at Kosovo Polje – the Field of Blackbirds. This was a site of deep spiritual significance to all Serbs; as they saw it, this was where they had held back the tide of the spread of the Muslim faith. Tensions rose and in June 1991 the US Secretary of State, James Baker, made his only visit to Belgrade. He wrongly concluded that there was no immediate danger because within four days both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence and on June 27, Yugoslavian troops moved into Slovenia. This, the first of the Balkan Wars, was the shortest. Slovenia held out and secured her independence. Milosevic appeared to have decided that the secession of Slovenia would help facilitate a long-held dream of Serbia – namely a Yugoslavia under Serbian control. Croatia was not prepared to go along with such a plan. Notwithstanding the fact that there were hundreds of thousands of Serbs living inside Croatia, in long established areas like the Krajina, President Franjo Tudjman was determined to gain Croatian independence. The second Balkan War followed, with Ratko Mladic, the Serb military commander, launching an attack in August 1991 on Kijevo, an isolated Croat village in the Krajina. Germany pressed the EU for formal recognition of Croatia as an independent state.3 The ensuing debate was not well handled by the rest of the EU – the British did not even send their Foreign Secretary to the meeting. The US was largely uninterested, being content to leave things to the Europeans. Although they initially opposed the idea of an independent Croatia they did not do so with much vigour and indeed recognised the state themselves a few months later. Many now argue that the West’s collective decision hastened the outbreak of the wars that followed between Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The initial fighting between Croats and Serbs was brought to an end in early 1992, and the UN voted for its second largest peacekeeping force, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). But the tensions remained and UNPROFOR, composed of troops from 30 different nations – including a British infantry battalion and support troops – proved powerless. On 3 March 1992 Bosnia declared itself an independent nation, recognised as such by the US, EU and UN. Backed by Belgrade, the Bosnian Serbs demanded independence be rescinded; the Bosnian President, Izetbegovic, refused and brutal ethnic cleansing followed. Sarajevo the capital, a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural city often held up as a model of stability was besieged. All over the country check points went up as the ethnic groups barricaded themselves in. The 3
Links between Germany and Croatia went back to the Second World War, with harrowing incidents of brutality conducted by the Croats in death camps against both Jews and Serbs on behalf of the Nazis.
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UNHCR convoys, protected by British Forces amongst others, ran the gauntlet of fire as they attempted to keep the city and many other towns re-supplied. The fighting continued to escalate. At the end of November 1994 the Serbs attacked Croat and Muslim positions in western Bosnia using aircraft flown out of military airfields in Serb controlled parts of Croatia, breaking the UN ‘no-fly’ provisions and in early 1995 they resumed the shelling of Sarajevo and so called UN ‘Safe Areas’. NATO responded by bombing Bosnian Serb positions and UN peacekeepers were then held hostage as human shields. Srebrenica, one of three UN Safe Areas, along with Zepa and Gorazde, was captured by Mladic and thousands of Muslims were killed, many of them by cold blooded execution – the single biggest mass murder in Europe since 1945. Vicious ethnic cleansing escalated – 250,000 Serbs were ‘cleansed’ by the Croats in just three days from the Krajina in August 1995; Bosnian towns were placed under siege and massacres abounded. British officers found themselves commanding in impossible positions as Europe and the US disagreed on appropriate responses, and British forces, along with the other UN contingents, became increasingly frustrated and angry with their inability to seriously engage with those carrying out a continuous stream of war crimes. Finally, even the politicians realised that things could not continue. The UN announced in New York that serious NATO combat power would be used to support the land forces. After months of hard bargaining in the late summer and early autumn of 1995, the US envoy Richard Holbrooke finally brokered an accord, known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. NATO agreed to send 60,000 troops to Bosnia – the largest troop movement in Western Europe since World War II, supported by thousands more in countries like Italy and Hungary and off-shore in the Adriatic Sea. The order by SACEUR, General Joulwan, was the first troop-deployment order since NATO had been formed in 1949. As part of this movement some British troops simply changed their berets from the UN-blue to their normal regimental headdress and re-painted their vehicles from white to green/brown; they were re-assigned from the UN to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). But additional forces, including heavy weapons, main battle tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers were shipped in from the UK to reinforce the troop already there. The three (UK) Division, led by Major-General Mike Jackson, assumed command of a multi-national area of operations that stretched from the air and sea-ports of entry at Split on the Croatian coast right up into the heart of Bosnia via Kupres and Sipovo. The move north followed the rapid entry of the heavy weapons and a clear brief from General Jackson to the various Bosnian faction commanders that this was a force equipped with substantial military fighting power and that he was prepared to use it. In the jargon of the day this was no longer a peace keeping but a peace enforcement force, prepared to conduct whatever operations were necessary to enforce the Dayton Accord. This was no easy task. Richard Holbrooke acknowledges that Dayton had weaknesses.4 Two opposing armies were effectively left in place, one Serb the other the Croat-Muslim federation. No attempt was made to create a single army, or disarm the warring parties. The Serb portion of Bosnia retained its name – Republika Srpska – and, not for the first or last time, there was no real plan within Dayton to pull together a cohesive political or 4
Richard Holbrook, To End a War (Random House, 1998).
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civilian authority. Finally, there were two arbitrary time limits set for the military deployments; 12 months for the initial (IFOR) deployment, 18 months for the follow-on stabilisation force (SFOR). There were reasons for these weaknesses, but taken together they encouraged the Serbs to delay significant change and, perhaps, laid the foundation for what was to follow in 1998–1999 in Kosovo. The Fallout British troops thus deployed to the Balkans in the early 1990s with UNPROFOR, in 1995 as part of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and then returned again in 1996 with SFOR. They remain in place today, albeit in reduced numbers, as a part of the European Union-led mission (EUFOR). They, like others, quickly began to realise that these operations were a completely different business to earlier deployments: these were so-called ‘Complex Emergencies’. Importantly the military began to engage widely with associated actors such as UN Agencies – the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP); bi-lateral agencies like USAID and the Department for International Development (DFID) and of course non-governmental aid organisations such as OXFAM, CARE and World Vision. These players are an important part of modern campaigning, a complex web of actors that needed to be better understood. Nor was there a single entity of ‘baddies’ – rather a mix of uniformed soldiers along with militias and civilian groups, many of whom seemed to change allegiance on a regular basis! The deployment of UK forces was generally supported by the public and by the Church. The decision to move from a UN to a NATO force was driven largely by moral and humanitarian perspectives. After the massacres at Srebrenica and the fighting around Sarajevo and Mount Igman in late 1994 and early 1995, the world could no longer escape the truth of what was happening. There was an outbreak of moral outrage as the evidence of ethnic cleansing was displayed for all to see on the TV screens in their homes. The fear of taking casualties in someone else’s war was overtaken by a groundswell that ‘something must be done’. The inadequate responses from the United Nations were finally recognised for what they were, and public opinion led, as was becoming the norm, by an extremely vocal media, demanded more serious engagement in order to deal with the vicious and brutal ethnic cleansing. Yugoslavia had highlighted the dangers associated with disintegrating states that had been held together artificially. The UN clearly did not know how to respond, being unable to keep peace where none had been established and NATO took time to come to terms with the new demands being placed on it. As far as the UK was concerned, such situations were unpredictable events and were susceptible to media coverage that could sway Government policy and override common sense. The Challenge of Kosovo British forces continued to be deployed throughout the late 1990s in Bosnia, but by 1998 events elsewhere in the Balkans were to take centre stage. As noted above, Kosovo holds a special place in both Albanian and Serbian history, not least because of
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the significance of Kosovo Polje. Although it had enjoyed a large measure of autonomy under Tito, Milosevic asserted Serbian control over the province and imposed direct rule from Belgrade in 1989 after violent conflict had erupted between the Albanian Muslim majority and the Serb minority. Kosovar Albanians were removed from important appointments and Serbs assumed both political and military control. The Kosovar Albanians set up a shadow administration under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova and a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged. In March 1998 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160, which imposed an arms embargo on all sides, but Belgrade’s use of indiscriminate and disproportionate force eroded any sympathy for their case and alienated the international community. The KLA, unstructured and disparate though it was, attracted growing support and weaponry from within Albania in particular, which was itself in turmoil with the collapse of the government in March 1997 and widespread looting of state buildings, including armouries. Milosevic rebuffed international diplomatic efforts and by mid-1998 NATO Defence Ministers had called for a range of options to support the diplomatic process. The violence escalated throughout 1998. Serbian forces conducted large scale ‘search and destroy’ operations against the KLA, who had effectively occupied Kosovo as a ‘liberated’ province. Between 23 August and 5 September major offensives took place in Suva Reka, Lipljan, Stimljne, Malisevo, Glogovac and Prizren with significant Kosovar Albanian casualties and population movements. By September something like a quarter of a million people had left their homes and 50,000 were facing winter in the open. On 23 September the UN Security Council adapted Resolution 1199, which noted the events, demanded a ceasefire, a withdrawal of those forces involved in the repression of civilians and the start of a constructive dialogue. Milosevic agreed to the deployment of an unarmed verification mission by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a NATO aerial verification mission. Both of these activities were aimed at verifying compliance with UNSCR 1199. The UK played a leading role in both, with key individuals deploying with the OSCE, RAF aircraft assigned to the air mission and a military team moving into Macedonia. Notwithstanding this, the violence continued to escalate, reaching new levels by December 1998–January 1999. On 28 January NATO issued a ‘solemn warning’ to Milosevic and the Kosovo Albanian leadership, and international diplomatic and military pressure increased. On the 29th the ‘factions’ were summoned to talks at Rambouillet in France and the next day NATO was authorised to commence air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory if necessary. On 11 February 1999 the UK announced the deployment of troops to contribute to a NATO peace implementation force (KFOR). The aim was to move quickly into Greece and Macedonia, receive, stage, onward move and integrate (RSOI), the UK’s contribution to the NATO led KFOR, and then move on up into Kosovo itself in order to implement whatever came out of Rambouillet. Events, as they so often do, were to overtake them. By mid-February 1999 British troops were settled into a number of locations around Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, and they had begun the process of bringing in large elements of both 101 Logistic Brigade and Fourth Armoured Brigade. As the armoured vehicles of the first battle group were being off-loaded at the port of Thessaloniki in Greece, the Rambouillet talks began to falter. By the end of
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February, over 2000 military personnel and several hundred vehicles were in theatre, but with the situation deteriorating it was clear that the operation was not going to be anything like as straightforward as originally thought. Ships and aircraft continued to flow into theatre, but by the end of March the NATO bombing campaign had started, following the complete breakdown of the talks. Reports indicated that the fighting inside Kosovo was escalating. By mid-March over 200,000 Internally Displaced Person’s (IDPs) were reportedly on the move. Several thousand people had also crossed Kosovo’s international borders into Albania and Macedonia; the refugee flows had started in earnest and the bombing campaign served only to exacerbate matters. There could be no doubt that the refugee crisis would get worse, so contingency plans were produced by the UK logistic brigade staff, who would be best placed to react to developments. On Thursday 1 April, the brigade commander drove out to look at several sites that the Macedonian Government were intending to develop as refugee camps. They were small and in poor locations, very close to the border with Kosovo. The governmentled reconnaissance was badly organised and chaotic, but the brigade commander was able to meet with some UN officials, in particular the head of the UNHCR mission to Kosovo, Jo Hegenauer and a representative from the US State Department, David Scheffer, appointed as an Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues. In essence, the commander explained that there was a need to construct major refugee camps around a grass airfield and range complex that had been discovered alongside the main road running from Pristina to Skopje, 10km south of the border crossing at Blace. The location was big enough to create manoeuvre space to deal with the refugees; it had a good river source for water and an excellent site for a logistics base. In the meantime, it was agreed, the Macedonian Government needed help to construct a small camp at Bojane, some 20km away. The following day, 2 April and Good Friday in the UK, the commander was contacted by the head of the UNHCR. Large numbers of Kosovar Albanians had been arriving at Blace over the last few days, by road and by train, and things were getting extremely serious; there was no shelter, food or medical cover and the tired and hungry people were in a bad way, indeed some were beginning to die. The UNHCR did not have the resources to do anything effective; could the British forces help? The commander immediately established a tactical headquarters (Tac HQ) at a location near the airfield and implemented the initial elements of the contingency plans. The initial task was to establish a focal point where they could work with the UNHCR, ferrying food, blankets and medical supplies up to the border. Field kitchens were starting to prepare chicken and rice; fresh food and operational rations were released and food was being moved forward by about 2300 hours, some nine hours after the call for help, on UNHCR vehicles loaded at the UK logistic base. The temperature was not much above freezing and it had been raining or sleeting for 36 hours. Images of the thousands of people crammed into the fields around the border crossing were beginning to be shown around the world; the scenes there were disturbingly chaotic, with no evidence of any co-ordinated response. Pressure was mounting on the Macedonian Government, from the US and the UK, as well as on the UNHCR, whose small team was self-evidently going to be overwhelmed. The Macedonian government still needed convincing that the situation
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at Blace could not be allowed to continue. There was a great deal of uncertainty but it was clear that the dam at the border would break at short notice and when it did a torrent of refugees would be released. No other organisation apart from the British brigade was in a position to help. There were two imperatives: a moral and a politicomilitary one. It was clear that the Macedonian Government needed KFOR’s strength, otherwise it would fall and NATO needed them to maintain their resolve if they were not to find themselves in the midst of a civil war and unable to deal with Milosevic. After a night of detailed planning construction work on the refugee camp started. The brigade engineers pulled aside the crop-spraying Antonov 1 aircraft, built a bridge across the fast flowing stream which ran alongside the airfield, opened up access tracks from the logistic base out onto the range and airfield and began to dig deep trench latrines. Elsewhere, amongst a myriad of other tasks, the logistic regiment, working with the UNHCR, continued to move supplies forward to the border; the medics began to prepare their reception centres and the first tents were set up. All of this was being done in a vacuum, as no specific orders had been received. Finally, at 0800 hours on UK’s Easter Sunday morning, the Macedonian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Boris Trajkovski, rang to say that they should indeed implement their plan. International pressure, particularly from the US, had worked. The tempo of work increased. Water purifying and pumping systems were set up, reception and registration areas were established. General Mike Jackson, now the KFOR Commander, visited and authorised assistance from other KFOR nations and small attachments from the German and Italian contingents arrived to help put up tents. At 1700 hours Macedonian police announced that the first refugees would be allowed across the border at 1900 hours. One of the sites, eventually known as Stenkovic 1, was ready to accept some and overnight several hundred arrived; around 30,000 were, however, estimated to be crammed into no-man’s land at Blace and the situation there continued to deteriorate. On Monday, 5 April, the dam broke. The UK Secretary of State for International Development, Claire Short, arrived with the UK Ambassador and a number of other officials; a large media presence was also gathering. Authorising DFID support, which was to prove absolutely invaluable, she asked to look around. As they were approaching the main airfield site, Stenkovic 2, a number of buses arrived crammed to bursting point with refugees. The pictures of Claire Short helping them off the buses became worldwide prime-time news. Work continued but no more refugees arrived. Then a large number of buses arrived after dark, each bus containing 80–100 refugees. As dawn broke the flow stopped, but by then around 20,000 refugees had been deposited. All through the night soldiers from the brigade put up tents, helped families into them, issued food and blankets and provided medical support; some, including a tiny baby, died but many other refugees, both young and old, were successfully treated by the multi-national medical facility. Night after night the buses arrived. It was only later that they realised that during the day these buses were being used to ferry children in Skopje to and from school and adults to and from work; as soon as it got dark they moved to the border to play a different trade. By 9 April, there were around 40,000 refugees in the two major camps; whilst some were being flown out there was little space left.
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Over 2,800 tents had been erected, 1,600 meters of water pipeline had been laid, tens of thousands of meals had been cooked and distributed, along with over 103,000 jars of baby food, 11,000 loaves of bread, 264,000 litres of bottled water and 430,000 bars of chocolate; 400 deep trench latrines had been dug and thousands of refugees had been treated in the medical facilities. Initially the NGO presence on the ground had been minimal. OXFAM arrived first and quickly became effective, playing a key role in the development of the water and sanitation systems. Other organisations arrived more slowly. The UN became more effective as the weeks progressed and the UNHCR and WFP teams were strengthened. For a few days the flow of refugees slowed and the various NGOs began to get organised. On Sunday 11 April, most of the medical support was handed over to Medicin sans Frontieres (MSF) and the Red Cross. Although British forces began to plan the hand-over of all aspects of the camps, the following week was still a demanding one. The camps had to be extended as more refugees arrived, policing and security became a problem and the temperatures began to soar. The ability of the various agencies to cope remained suspect and the UNHCR asked the military to stay on for a few more days. Finally, they withdrew over the period of the 17–19 April, leaving behind a military liaison team. After a gap of about 8 days, during which time the logistic brigade was immersed in the RSOI of the Second Battlegroup and the training programme of Fourth Armoured Brigade, their attention was directed back to the humanitarian aspects of the situation once again. Inside Kosovo, further waves of Kosovar Albanians were being rounded up and moved to the borders. The camps in Macedonia were full and the ones in Northern Albania, where NATO had deployed a further force, AFOR commanded by a British general, were overflowing. The Macedonian government was adamant that it would not allow additional camps to be built in their central and southern regions and so attention focused on southern Albania. Numerous meetings were held and reconnaissance trips conducted. Finally, UNHCR and headquarters KFOR agreed that the British should use their logistic brigade assets to establish a series of camps in the Korce region of Albania, around 40km south of Lake Ochrid. Dividing the brigade and the HQ, over such a distance – they would now have elements of the brigade in three countries, Greece, Macedonia and Albania – was far from ideal. The main HQ was heavily involved with military support to KFOR, particularly Fourth Armoured Brigade, and their primary mission was to support the UK move into Kosovo; nonetheless there seemed little likelihood of any such move in the short term – indeed they were beginning to plan forced entry options, which would inevitably take weeks to prepare and implement. The lead elements of the brigades Tac HQ thus deployed to Albania on 8 May. The problems were very different to those encountered in Macedonia over Easter. Although there was a time imperative it was not as urgent as before. The UNHCR and NGO presence was considerable and the emphasis was on developing sustainable camps, suitable for refugees to live in throughout the winter if necessary. It was, however, a demanding few weeks. Local politics was rife with corruption and there was criminality in abundance. The first few ‘situation reports’ back to HQ KFOR read more like a John Le Carré novel than a military update – particularly when rival gangs in Korce began open warfare and anti-corruption officials, appointed from
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Ti