Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect, and Epistemic Modality
Human Cognitive Processing (HCP)
Cognitive Foundations of Language Structure and Use This book series is a forum for interdisciplinary research on the grammatical structure, semantic organization, and communicative function of language(s), and their anchoring in human cognitive faculties. For an overview of all books published in this series, please see http://benjamins.com/catalog/hcp
Editors Klaus-Uwe Panther University of Hamburg
Linda L. Thornburg
Editorial Board Bogusław Bierwiaczonek
Higher School of Economics and Humanities, Poland
Mario Brdar
Josip Juraj Strossmayer University, Croatia
Barbara Dancygier
University of British Columbia
N.J. Enfield
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen & Radboud University Nijmegen
Elisabeth Engberg-Pedersen University of Copenhagen
Ad Foolen
Radboud University Nijmegen
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.
University of California at Santa Cruz
Rachel Giora
Tel Aviv University
Elżbieta Górska
University of Warsaw
Martin Hilpert
Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies
Zoltán Kövecses
Eötvös Loránd University, Hungary
Teenie Matlock
University of California at Merced
Carita Paradis
Lund University
Günter Radden
University of Hamburg
Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez University of La Rioja
Doris Schönefeld
University of Leipzig
Debra Ziegeler
Paul Valéry University, France
Volume 29 Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect, and Epistemic Modality Edited by Adeline Patard and Frank Brisard
Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect, and Epistemic Modality Edited by
Adeline Patard Frank Brisard University of Antwerp
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdamâ•›/â•›Philadelphia
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cognitive approaches to tense, aspect, and epistemic modality / edited by Adeline Patard, Frank Brisard. p. cm. (Human Cognitive Processing, issn 1387-6724 ; v. 29) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Cognitive grammar. 2. Grammar, Comparative and general--Tense. 3. Grammar, Comparative and general--Modularity. 4. Psycholinguistics. I. Patard, Adeline. II. Brisard, Frank. P165.C636â•…â•… 2011 415’.6--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 2383 8 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8521 8 (Eb)
2011014902
© 2011 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents List of contributors Acknowledgments Introduction: Cognitive approaches to tense, aspect, and epistemic modality Frank Brisard and Adeline Patard
vii ix 1
part i.╇ Theoretical foundations The definition of modality Renaat Declerck
21
The English present: Temporal coincidence vs. epistemic immediacy Ronald W. Langacker
45
The organization of the German clausal grounding system Elena Smirnova
87
Grounding in terms of anchoring relations: Epistemic associations of ‘present continuous’ marking in Turkish Ceyhan Temürcü
109
part ii.╇ Descriptive application: Cognitive Grammar Some remarks on the role of the reference point in the construal configuration of “more” and “less” grounding predications Elena Smirnova and Tanja Mortelmans New current relevance in Croatian: Epistemic immediacy and the aorist Mateusz-Milan Stanojević and Renata Geld Aspect as a scanning device in natural language processing: The case of Arabic Lazhar Zanned
137
159
181
Cognitive Approaches to Tense, Aspect, and Epistemic Modality
part iii.╇ Descriptive application: Other cognitive approaches Imperfective aspect and epistemic modality Ronny Boogaart and Radoslava Trnavac
217
Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt and Jiranthara Srioutai
249
The epistemic uses of the English simple past and the French imparfait: When temporality conveys modality Adeline Patard
279
Name index Subject index
311 315
List of contributors Ronny Boogaart University of Leiden
[email protected] Renaat Declerck K.U.Leuven Campus Kortrijk
[email protected] Renata Geld University of Zagreb
[email protected] Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt University of Cambridge
[email protected] Ronald W. Langacker University of California at San Diego
[email protected] Tanja Mortelmans University of Antwerp
[email protected] Adeline Patard University of Antwerp
[email protected]
Elena Smirnova Leibniz University Hanover
[email protected] Jiranthara Srioutai Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok
[email protected] Mateusz-Milan Stanojević University of Zagreb
[email protected] Ceyhan Temürcü Middle East Technical University, Ankara
[email protected] Radoslava Trnavac Simon Fraser University
[email protected] Lazhar Zanned University of Manouba, Tunis
[email protected]
Acknowledgments Some of the contributions included in the present volume were presented during the 7th Chronos conference, held at the University of Antwerp, Belgium, from September 18–20, 2006. Others (Jaszczolt & Srioutai, Patard, Smirnova, Smirnova & Mortelmans, Stanojević & Geld) have been especially commissioned. The theme uniting them, the interaction between tense, aspect, and modality, was also the special topic of this Chronos meeting. We would like to thank the authors involved for the extreme amiability and patience that they exhibited throughout this somewhat laborious project. We are much obliged to all of them, and excited that we are now able to present their work collectively as an important attempt to further the study of time and modality within the domain of grammar in a (more or less) cognitive vein. This publication also owes a great deal to the (once again very professional) services offered by various collaborators at John Benjamins. We are more than grateful to the acquisition editors for the Human Cognitive Processing: Cognitive Foundations of Language Structure and Use book series, Bertie Kaal and particularly Hanneke Bruintjes, who showed enough confidence to continue her unwavering support and encouragements. In the last stages, the assistance provided by the series editors, Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda L. Thornburg, proved invaluable as well. Finally, we wish to thank an anonymous referee for useful suggestions and challenging, though sympathetic, observations. Frank Brisard Adeline Patard Antwerp, February 2011
Introduction Cognitive approaches to tense, aspect, and epistemic modality Frank Brisard and Adeline Patard University of Antwerp
1. Background Various issues of grammatical time, including tense and aspect, are inextricably linked, to varying extents, with concerns of mood and modality, in particular of an epistemic nature. This is not an especially striking or new observation, given the frequent treatment of markers of tense, aspect, and mood/modality in terms of one integrated super-category, usually referred to as ‘TAM’ or ‘TMA’ and covering the three main semantic domains marked on the verb (this holds especially for studies of a typological orientation, where TAM categories are seen as pervasive in the world’s languages and therefore generally considered to be universals of human language; see, e.g., Bybee et al. 1994, Chung & Timberlake 1985, Dahl 1985, Givón 2001). This treatment, however, is more often than not motivated on a purely formal basis, reflecting, if not the regular co-occurrence of such markers, then at least their intricate ways of interacting. At the same time, the three categories, in standard generative work, are not even supposed to be represented at the same syntactic level, thereby failing (a priori) to address the notional parallelisms that unite the meanings expressed by them.1 Notably, the exclusive characterization of tenses as 1. In formal treatments of tense and aspect, reference is sometimes made to a modal analysis, e.g., in Dowty’s (1977) work on the progressive, which is analyzed as a combined temporal/ modal operator (of necessity; see also Portner 1998). Also, Hornstein (1990) deals with tenses, modals, and the perfect as having the same temporal organization. However, the conception of modality in such types of truth-conditional semantics, as a function of possible worlds, is rather far removed the more traditional way in which this category is presented in the present volume, viz., as the grammatical expression of various degrees of (un)certainty. One of the few more philosophically inspired attempts so far to see temporality in terms of epistemic modality seems to be the recent monograph by Jaszczolt (2009).
Frank Brisard and Adeline Patard
indicating (relative or absolute) location in time, i.e., as essentially temporal markers, has inspired many scholars to deal with non-temporal usage types of tense markers, which are abundant cross-linguistically, as either derived pragmatically from a more basic or ‘pure’ temporal semantics (i.e., to treat them as secondary meanings), or to deny the link with their temporal uses altogether and propose an account in terms of homonymy, according to which the two types of usage are semantically unconnected. The same holds, a fortiori, for markers of aspect, it seems.2 Thanks to this tactic, it has been possible to preserve the age-old assumption, backed up by numerous philosophical models dealing with the relation between language and reality, that tense is not a psychological category dependent on the speaker’s subjective choices, but rather an objective property of the world (see Ludlow in preparation for a recent overview of this discussion). At the same time, students of tense have thus largely succeeded in banning concerns of non-temporal uses from the discussion of grammatical time, arguing, quite simply, that calling a tense or aspect modal must boil down to a case of miscategorization (except perhaps in the paradigm of the future, where the link is less obviously denied). Cognitive theories of grammar have suggested an alternative to this mainstream approach to the grammatical marking of time.3 In Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1991), tenses, like moods, are called ‘grounding predications’, because they relate a proposition to the ground or situation of speech. This relation is said to be an epistemic one, since the speaker/conceptualizer, when talking about concrete states of affairs, is primarily interested in the knowledge status that is to be assigned to them: how certain can she be of the state of affairs conjured up in a clause, and how accessible or immediate are the means to verify that status? When referring to tenses in the indicative, this status is necessarily one of certainty, meaning that the speaker presents a state of affairs as belonging to her conception of reality at the time of speaking. The idea, then, is to draw up a typology of various kinds of reality between which speakers of a given language care to distinguish. Thinking about different types of reality might appear something of a contradiction at first, but it is not different from, and basically analogous to, distinguishing different types of non-reality (possibility, probability, counterfactuality, etc.). For instance, the use of a simple present in English to refer to an unqualified or 2. This is so despite various hints in the past regarding the systematic nature of the link between certain aspectual and modal categories (Fleischman 1995, on the connotations of non-reality associated with past imperfectives, is a classic example in this respect; cf. also Barceló and Bres 2006, James 1982, Martin 1991, Mellet 1990, and Patard 2007; for general past-time reference and modality, see Dahl 1997, Fleischman 1989, Hogeweg 2009, Iatridou 2000, Larreya 2003). 3. Not only cognitive approaches present such an alternative. For instance, the French enunciativist tradition treats tense as a linguistic category that touches upon the speaker’s subjectivity by definition.
Introduction
immediate reality (either a constant state or a dynamic process construed generically or habitually) represents another type of reality than with that of a present progressive, which bestows more of an incidental or contingent character upon an (equally real, but qualified) situation. This interaction between tense and aspect may be said to affect the whole of the (English) tense system, and part of the work cut out for those less formally inspired accounts included in the present volume consists precisely in uncovering such differences, which more often than not go beyond the strictly temporal characteristics ascribed to tense and aspect categories. Not much of that has been done yet, it should be noted, though in the wake of Cognitive Grammar a definite start appears to have been taken in the more recent past (see the contributions on TAM in Brisard 2002a and Boogaart & Janssen 2007 for an overview). Relevant studies undertaken in both mental-space theory (e.g., Cutrer 1994, Doiz-Bienzobas 1995) and Construction Grammar (e.g., Michaelis 2004, Croft in preparation) follow up on some of the leads proposed by the discussion of grounding in Cognitive Grammar, or come up with their own functional explanations. More generally, linguists (e.g., in the French tradition) are beginning to grasp the complex interconnections between the domains of tense, aspect, and modality, both at the level of grammar and at that of discourse (see Abraham & Leiss 2008, Barceló et al. 2006, Condoravdi 2002, Declerck 2005, Gosselin 2005, Stowell 2004, and Trnavac 2006). Not all contributions in this volume are strictly to be situated within the theory of Cognitive Grammar, or even within the wider paradigm of cognitive linguistics. However, all of them do subscribe to the view that the choice of grammatical markers of time is motivated by semantic factors. Moreover, these studies also, to varying degrees, present an explicit attempt to unify the different usage types characterizing a particular (set of) construction(s), which is an important point of methodology in the analysis of tense and aspect semantics. In passing, most of the present contributions comment on issues of subjectivity linked with the description of these markers, which ties in neatly with the more general usage-based perspective suggesting that elements of grammar develop out of, and should therefore be seen as, subjectified or speaker-oriented uses of linguistic constructions. 2. Overview of the contributions A first set of chapters, presented in Part I, deals with some fundamental issues in thinking about modality, and how it relates to (the grammatical marking of) temporality. First, Declerck proposes a model that accounts for modality as a notional category and its expression in English, among other means, through the use of modal auxiliaries. In the second chapter, Langacker addresses the contrasting
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modal values of ‘epistemic immediacy’ and ‘epistemic contingency’, suggested by Brisard (2001, 2002c, 2005) to describe the meanings of the two English present tenses (simple and progressive). In the third chapter, Smirnova presents a systematic discussion of temporal and modal grounding in German, which turns out to be quite different from the English system. And in the final chapter of Part I, Temürcü takes up the connection between epistemic immediacy vs. contingency and grammatical present-time reference again, and confronts it with the meaning of the ‘present continuous’ marker in Turkish. He describes and analyzes this meaning within the framework of his own model of ‘anchoring relations’, which exhibits an explicitly cognitive orientation while at the same time challenging the assumption, entertained by students in Cognitive Grammar, that all grounding predications have an epistemic and thus modal, rather than temporal, core meaning. To begin with, Renaat Declerck makes a distinction in his contribution, “The definition of modality”, between different types of world: the ‘factual word’ comprises all the situations that are actualizing at S (the speech time) or have actualized before S, a ‘counterfactual world’ is a world distinct from the factual world, and a ‘nonfactual world’ or ‘theoretical world’ is a possible world that is not interpreted as being the factual world. He suggests a comprehensive and concrete definition of modality according to which a situation ‘is represented as actualizing in a nonfactual world’. Four modalizing devices are observed in English. The first two mechanisms rely on the marked use of a verbal tense instead of the unmarked form so as to produce a tentative or counterfactual interpretation: ‘modal backshifting’ consists in using one or more backshifting form(s) (past and/or perfect tense), and modal conditionalization concerns the use of a conditional rather than a present tense in a non-conditional context. Declerck accounts for the category of ‘nonneutral theoretical’ conditionals, i.e., non-factual conditionals that denote a specific link between the suppositional world expressed and the factual world. This link can be of four different types: closed, open, tentative, or counterfactual, ranging from a full coincidence with the factual world to an asserted divergence from it. Finally, the notion of ‘not-yet-factual at t’ is introduced, characterizing a world that is non-factual/modal at the time in which it is anchored. Declerck further defines the notions of epistemic modality and root modality. Epistemic modality is claimed to establish an ‘epistemic relation’, i.e., a degree of compatibility between the modal world and the factual world. This epistemic relation can be left indeterminate, e.g., in imaginary worlds, or it can be specified and assigned a factuality value. To account for the meaning of English modal auxiliaries (and conditionals), Declerck outlines an epistemic scale of factuality values ranging from ‘factual’ to ‘counterfactual’. Root modality, on the other hand, is concerned with ‘factors that determine the actualization of a [...] situation in a nonfactual world’. Contrary to epistemic modality, root modality does not imply any epistemic
Introduction
relation, but a ‘modal position’ assumed by the speaker as regards the conditions of a situation’s actualization. By way of conclusion, Declerck looks at ‘world-evoking’ lexical verbs and identifies three types of them: ‘factive verbs’ (e.g., know), which automatically refer to a factual world, ‘intensional verbs’ (e.g., believe), which create a specified epistemic modal world, and ‘attitudinal verbs’ (e.g., intend), evoking a root modal world. The chapter by Ronald W. Langacker, “The English present: Temporal coincidence vs. epistemic immediacy”, tackles the question of whether the English (simple) ‘present tense’ is best described as marking tense or modality. Langacker confronts his account of the English present tense as indicating temporal coincidence with the time of speaking (Langacker 1991, 2001) with Brisard’s analysis (2001, 2002c, 2005) in terms of ‘epistemic immediacy’. He first tackles the puzzle of present perfectives in English: in the present, perfective processes are compatible with the progressive construction but not with the simple present (at least if they are to indicate actual coincidence with the present), whereas, in the domain of the past, they can occur with both. The problem is viewed as conceptual (i.e., semantic), with both a durational and an epistemic component: canonically, dynamic events (typically short changes of state, like kicking a ball) cannot both be observed and reported at exactly the same time, and thus do not fall under Langacker’s definition of the English present tense as indicating ‘full and exact coincidence with the time of speaking’. This is so because the time it takes to linguistically report a token event, like kicking a ball, is rarely coextensive with the event itself (durational) and/or the starting point of the event rarely coincides with the moment of its recognition (epistemic) as a type of event, like the ‘kicking a ball’ type – unless, of course, the event in question is in some sense predictable or stereotypical (as with habituals and play-by-play sporting reports, for instance) or is by definition coincident with the speech event (as with performatives). Langacker also examines some non-present uses of the present tense: the ‘historical present’, the present of ‘scheduled future’ and in singular generics. To explain them, he suggests a special viewing arrangement in which the event coincident with the time of speaking is not the actual ‘represented event’, but a virtual (or mental) ‘representing event’ through which the actual process is apprehended. Next, Langacker considers an epistemic account of the present tense in the line of Brisard’s proposal, reinterpreting the semantic contrast in English between the present tense and the past tense as expressing the inclusion of the designated process in the immediate or non-immediate reality of a speaker/conceptualizer. This explicitly modal conception allows him to explain the present perfective puzzle and the non-present uses of the present tense, as well as the combination of the past tense with modals (might, would etc.) to refer to present situations, typically in a more mitigated way. These past modals are shown to indicate that the reality at issue, as the basis of a
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proposition’s modal assessment, is ‘non-immediate’, i.e., distinct from that of the current speaker: it might, as with past-tense conditionals for instance, involve an imagined or virtual conception of an alternative immediate reality, differing only slightly from the speaker’s actual one, viz., in the premises contained by the protasis. Given that the so-called tense marking (past or present) in such cases does not apply to the proposition itself but to the status of the modal assessment, where temporal location is relatively irrelevant, Langacker concludes that ‘epistemic immediacy’ more adequately describes the schematic meaning of the English present tense, including on modals, and that ‘temporal coincidence’ corresponds rather to its prototypical value. In “The organization of the German clausal grounding system”, Elena Smirnova presents a systematic discussion of temporal and modal grounding in German, which for one turns out quite different from the English system. Smirnova starts by discussing the notion of grounding, developed in Cognitive Grammar, as a specific case of deixis or indexicality. She underlines the necessarily relational nature of deictic signs in general, and of grounding predications in particular. Three basic components are suggested in the characterization of grounding predications: (i) the nature of the grounded entity (nominal/clausal) that is related to the ground, as an immanent reference point, (ii) the nature of the grounding relation itself, yielding different concrete grounding values or meanings, and (iii) the different conceptualizations of, or viewing arrangements on, the ground. Smirnova proposes to focus on the third aspect and argues for the possibility of having two alternative deictic construals of the ground. In the default construal, the speaker and the hearer are identified as a common deictic center. The epistemic region that does not coincide with this ground and is thus non-immediate or distal corresponds to a third party. In the second configuration, the ground is construed as a speakerexclusive deictic center, excluding the hearer. In this case, the distal epistemic region also comprises the position of the hearer. The contrast is then applied to the German grounding predications, starting with temporal expressions. According to Smirnova, this system is marked in German by the opposition between the present tense, which situates the profiled event is in the temporal region of the ground, and the past tense, locating the profiled event outside of this region. As for the ground, its construal configuration is characterized by the adoption of a temporal vantage point shared by both the speaker and the hearer (common deictic center). Next, Smirnova deals with the modal grounding system of German, which is founded on the opposition between the indicative and the subjunctive mood. She posits that all indicative markers situate the profiled event within the realm of reality, whereas subjunctive marking locates the profiled event outside of reality. It is further assumed that the present and the preterit subjunctive entail different construal configurations of the ground. The preterit subjunctive is argued to relate
Introduction
the profiled event to the common deictic center, thus locating it outside of the reality shared by the speaker and hearer. In comparison, the present subjunctive relates the profiled event to the speaker-exclusive deictic center and consequently situates the event in a region outside of the speaker’s reality, but which may include the hearer’s reality. Finally, epistemic uses of the German modals are claimed to constitute an altogether different sub-system from that of German mood: they situate the profiled event in various spheres of (the speaker’s) knowledge of reality, and allow for only one configuration of the ground construed as a speaker-exclusive deictic center. The last chapter, by Ceyhan Temürcü, on “Grounding in terms of anchoring relations: Epistemic values of ‘present continuous’ marking in Turkish” explores the association between present-time reference and the evidential category of ‘new information’ (also known as ‘immediate meaning’ (Nichols 1986) or ‘mirativity’ (DeLancey 1997, 2001)). In particular, Temürcü examines the epistemic interpretations of the ‘continuous aspect’ marker -Iyor in Turkish (when used as the only TAM marker on the verb). For the sake of the analysis, he has developed his own theoretical framework of ‘anchoring relations’, inspired both by Cognitive Grammar’s conceptual account of ‘grounding relations’ and by semantic versions of Functional Grammar that deal with ‘underlying clause structure’. He expands on the concept of ‘grounding’ (see, among others, Langacker 1991, 1997, 2002; Brisard 2002b, c) and proposes a set of anchoring relations that are purely semantic in nature and that account for the use of tense, aspect and mood markers in utterances of natural languages. They involve epistemic but also aspecto-temporal categories and, moreover, each of the meanings of so-called grounding predications is decomposed using temporal, epistemic, and volitional ‘building blocks’. Temürcü then gives a comprehensive description of the temporal (present continuous or restricted habitual) and epistemic (‘certainty’ or ‘new information’) uses of Turkish -Iyor. He notices that this marker typically serves to convey epistemic contingency, i.e., “to express information incidental to a certain knowledge state (that of the speaker at the time of utterance or a displaced epistemic center)”. Temürcü departs from Brisard’s (2005) analysis of the English present progressive, semantically a close counterpart of the -Iyor form. Indeed, he adopts a ‘family resemblance’ conception of the polysemy of -Iyor, and, accordingly, does not derive its temporal uses from a more modal ‘schematic meaning’ in terms of epistemic contingency. Instead, he posits a pragmatic relation of metonymy, whereby epistemic contingency most frequently (but not necessarily) arises within the same conditions of use as present-time reference. By way of conclusion, epistemic contingency is identified as a sufficient condition for the use of -Iyor in many temporal contexts: it is what remains after a process of subjectification turns a marker of present-progressive aspect into one with persistent perfect, future, and habitual-gnomic values.
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Part II contains applications of the grounding model proposed in Cognitive Grammar to deal with the meanings of particular tense and mood/modal markers in various languages. The study by Smirnova & Mortelmans argues for a modal characterization of verb forms in German, suggesting specific ‘construal configurations’ triggered by the context. Stanojević & Geld investigate the ‘aorist’ in Croatian, applying the notion of ‘epistemic immediacy’ to the domain of past-time reference. And in his chapter, Zanned analyzes aspectual categories in Arabic (the inflectional indication of perfective/past vs. imperfective/present, but also derivational, syntactic, and lexical marking) against the background of cognitive psychology. The chapter by Elena Smirnova & Tanja Mortelmans, “Some remarks on the role of the reference point in the construal configuration of ‘more’ and ‘less’ grounding predications”, investigates the different degrees of grounding and subjectification exhibited by the German construction würde + infinitive in its different uses. In Cognitive Grammar, a ‘grounding predication’ relates a profiled/designated entity to the ground or situation of speech, thus locating it in a specific epistemic region (e.g. ‘immediate reality’; cf. above). Following Mortelmans (2002, 2006), a gradual view on grounding and on subjectification is proposed. Smirnova & Mortelmans suggest the grammatical relevance of positing intermediate stages between objective construals, which imply no relation to the ground or where that relation is effected in an explicit manner, and subjective construals. They assume that such intermediate configurations can be described by adding a relevant reference point that cannot automatically be equated with the ground or the clausal subject, and that this reference point can be inferred via information present in the surrounding context. This criterion, indicative of an intermediate degree of grounding and subjectification, is tested against the German construction würde + infinitive, which is compared to the preterit subjunctive and the construction werden + infinitive. The preterit subjunctive is argued by Smirnova & Mortelmans to be a grounding predication that locates the profiled situation outside of reality. For them, it involves a ‘true’ grounding relation since it construes the ground as the only relevant reference point to which the profiled situation is linked. However, according to Smirnova & Mortelmans werden + infinitive has only acquired an intermediate degree of grounding and subjectification. Indeed, they demonstrate that, for werden + infinitive to be interpreted in an unambiguous way (as either future or epistemic), it always requires an additional reference point that cannot coincide with the ground. As for würde + infinitive, this construction is analyzed, in line with Smirnova (2006), as a polysemous construction that may function either as an analytical alternative to the synthetic preterit subjunctive or as the preterit counterpart of the indicative construction werden + infinitive. Once again, these two variants show different degrees of grounding and subjectification.
Introduction
The subjunctive würde + infinitive and the preterit subjunctive are both viewed as true grounding predications which construe the ground as the sole relevant reference point, whereas the indicative würde + infinitive entails, just like werden + infinitive, a construal configuration calling for an additional relevant reference point that is responsible for its temporal or epistemic reading. The temporal/ epistemic use of würde + infinitive is consequently not considered an instantiation of a true grounding predication. In “New current relevance in Croatian: Epistemic immediacy and the aorist”, Mateusz-Milan Stanojević & Renata Geld suggest a new and unified characterization of the Croatian ‘aorist’, classically analyzed as an absolute past tense (in narrative sequences), in the light of more recently developed usage types. They first briefly survey the different uses of the aorist traditionally described in grammars: the narrative aorist, the aorist of recent actions, the aorist of proverbs, and the aorist of future actions. These uses and the observation that the aorist predominantly occurs with the first person singular suggest that an epistemic definition of the aorist is more adequate than a temporal one. Stanojević & Geld investigate present-day uses of the aorist by means of a corpus study and a questionnaire. The corpus study consisted in extracting, from the Croatian National Corpus, all the tokens of six highly frequent verbs in the first person singular. Here, it emerges that the aorist in contemporary Croatian tends to behave like a perfect tense insofar as it is typically used without absolute past-time reference (as in contexts of current relevance). As for the questionnaire, its aim was to harvest grammaticality judgments from young native speakers about their uses of the aorist and of other tenses like the Croatian ‘perfekt’. The results show that the aorist is preferred in recent-past and immediate-future contexts, especially in spoken language, and that it is not typical of narrative counter-sequential contexts, which prefer the ‘perfekt’ to refer to events preceding previously mentioned events. To account for these patterns within the framework of Cognitive Grammar, a schematic definition of the aorist is proposed as marking ‘epistemic immediacy [...] and precedence of the action with relation to the moment of speech’. More specifically, Stanojević & Geld posit a specific viewing arrangement according to which the process is construed with extreme subjectivity (Langacker 2003) as immediately preceding the ground on a virtual plane distinct from the actual plane. This description allows them to explain both the recent-past and the immediate-future uses. Finally, a distinction is maintained between two virtual planes V1 and V2, which reflect the usage differences between the aorist and the perfekt but are also suggested to be relevant to the analysis of the Croatian tense system as a whole: V1 is closer to the actual plane, including the speaker within its immediate scope, and is therefore dedicated to epistemically immediate processes marked by the aorist, whereas V2 is further away from the actual plane, characterizing epistemically distant actions signaled
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by the perfekt. Stanojević & Geld thus conclude that the semantic contrast between the aorist and the perfect is one of subjectification, and not necessarily of temporal reference. In the chapter by Lazhar Zanned, “Aspect as a scanning device in natural language processing: The case of Arabic”, the claim is defended that aspect is a device for constructing mental images of processes (states and events), schematically indicating how the process unfolds. In Cognitive Grammar, this is described in terms of an attention-driven scanning operation in processing time, whereby a standard of comparison and a target are related by a conceptualizer as she tracks a stative or dynamic situation, with the corresponding shifts in focal area and often leading to chains of scanning events. Scanning may occur either summarily or sequentially, depending on whether the conception builds up gradually to yield a composite structure with all components simultaneously made available, or whether an evolving scene is followed through its successive stages, resulting in a continuous series of transformations. Zanned puts forward the hypothesis that summary scanning involves no change and is thus said to characterize imperfective processes, while sequential scanning is appropriate for representing the change that is supposed to be implied in perfectives. In addition, for the latter type he introduces a distinction between different types of ‘slicing’ or cutting up a dynamic process: monosequential scanning, profiling a single sequence of the process, vs. polysequential scanning, where more than one sequence and possibly the entire process is being profiled, through chaining. Zanned concludes by pointing out the links between scanning as a general cognitive skill and other mechanisms of attention management, such as scope of awareness and the ability of zooming in. Finally, in Part III, three chapters are devoted to the relationship between the past tense and/or imperfective aspect and modality, mainly the expression of (epistemic) distance. Two of these studies, Boogaart & Trnavac and Patard, derive the value of epistemic modality from the temporal and/or aspectual contributions of tense morphemes in English, Russian and French. In contrast, Jaszczolt & Srioutai argue, for English and Thai, that a temporal interpretation may be arrived at by way of ‘cognitive default’. In their chapter, “Imperfective aspect and epistemic modality”, Ronny Boogaart & Radoslava Trnavac aim at unveiling a general connection that may exist crosslinguistically between imperfectivity and epistemicity or, more broadly, subjectivity. As a starting point, Boogaart & Trnavac present a set of contexts, mainly illustrated by data from English, in which the link between imperfective aspect and epistemic modality is clearly manifested: modal verbs, counterfactual conditionals, and counterfactual wishes. They compare these contexts with ‘perspectivized discourses’ as found in English (e.g., in (free) indirect speech), where imperfectives
Introduction
imply a perspective or point of reference from which the designated situation is viewed (and that is not the actual speaker/writer’s). Both types of context share an element of ‘subjectivity’, in that ‘information is not presented, objectively, as actually being the case in the world, but rather situated in a different ‘space’ (or ‘world’)’. Next Boogaart & Trnavac elaborate the traditional conception of aspect by adopting an anaphoric analysis of imperfectivity in the line of Kamp & Rohrer (1983) and Kamp & Reyle (1993). They assume that ‘simultaneity [of the situation E] with an independently provided reference time (E, R)’ constitutes the basic meaning of imperfective aspect. As for the perfective past, it is claimed to express the strict precedence of a situation E in relation to the point of speech. According to Boogaart & Trnavac, it is the nature of the antecedent reference point R, required by the anaphoric property of imperfectives, that determines the subjective (and epistemic) readings in the mentioned contexts. In perspectivized discourse, the reference time corresponds to a past perspective and conveys ‘character subjectivity’ (Verhagen 2005). On analogy, with epistemic modals and counterfactual wishes the reference point is an epistemic evaluation point provided by the speech time or its ‘equivalent in a counterfactual world’, bringing about ‘speaker-hearer subjectivity’ (Verhagen 2005). To conclude, Boogaart & Trnavac also examine the generality of the link between aspect and modality. In this respect, Russian is said to present some apparent counterexamples, like the modal moč (‘can/could’), the perfective present, conditional imperatives, and dative-infinitive constructions. To explain the lack of a systematic connection, in Russian narrative, between imperfective aspect and the various subjective readings previously discussed for English, it is argued that the semantics of these Russian imperfectives differs from that of their English counterparts, since the former require no anaphoric linking with a contextually provided antecedent time. Lastly, Boogaart & Trnavac underline two structural differences between both languages which further explain the contrast between Russian and English as regards the aspect-modality connection: the absence of a perfect form combining with an imperfective auxiliary, as in Germanic and Romance languages, with only a simple perfective past form in Russian to cover both perfective and perfect (subjective, epistemic) meanings, as well as the absence of sequence of tenses in Russian, with Russian retaining a (relative) present tense in contexts where English and French would have an anaphoric imperfective past form to express simultaneity in the past. Both factors effectively weaken the assumed link between imperfectivity and epistemic modality, though this does not undo the value of the authors’ unified explanation of those imperfective constructions that do exhibit an anaphoric element in their meaning configuration. In “Communicating about the past through modality in English and Thai”, Katarzyna M. Jaszczolt & Jiranthara Srioutai argue that the semantic representation of temporal expressions is best conceived of as involving a type of modality.
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They support this position by offering an analysis, developed in the framework of Default Semantics, of forms expressing past-time reference in English and Thai. The discussion starts with some general considerations on the structure and properties of time as reflected in McTaggart’s (1908) distinction between the A-series and the B-series. Jaszczolt & Srioutai adopt the latter conception, assuming that the linguistic categories of time (tense, aspect) are supervenient on more basic, non-temporal categories. Hence, they argue that the indication of time in utterances boils down to expressing ‘a degree of detachment from the content of the expression uttered’, and so to a type of epistemic modality. The model of Default Semantics is founded on the idea that the meaning of an utterance mainly depends on the pragmatic enrichment of an underdetermined semantic content. Correspondingly, Default Semantics distinguishes four semantic and pragmatic sources of information that interact (‘merge’) so as to produce the meaning of an utterance: (i) word meaning and sentence structure (WS), (ii) conscious pragmatic inference (CPI), (iii) cognitive defaults (CD), and (iv) social/cultural defaults (SCD). Crucially, the third source of information, cognitive defaults, concerns a salient referential interpretation which arises as a shortcut in the inferential process and which is motivated by the cognitive property of (strong) speaker intentionality (or ‘aboutness’). This type of default meaning is considered decisive in the interpretation of temporal expressions. Jaszczolt & Srioutai apply this model to the analysis of two ways (a standard and a nonstandard one) of referring to the past in English: the narrative present (called past of narration) and the simple past. The past of narration, which is viewed as a departure from the default interpretation of the present tense, is said to be derived from conscious pragmatic inference (CPI 1, in the first stage of processing truth-conditional content, or what is said). By contrast, the past use of the simple past is seen as a default interpretation conveyed by cognitive default (CD). Finally, Jaszczolt & Srioutai apply the model of Default Semantics to the Thai modal auxiliary d1ay1II, which can receive different interpretations depending on its position (verb-initial or verb-final) and the context: circumstantial ability/opportunity or dynamic possibility, past or present reference, strong referential intentionality or not. To deal with this polysemy, previous studies treated d1ay1II as a past-tense marker in verb-initial position and as a modal marker in verb-final position. Instead, Jaszczolt & Srioutai propose a unified account of d1ay1II as a marker of dynamic modality. By default, d1ay1II triggers a referential, past interpretation (CD), but it may also give rise to a present-time reading if a pragmatic inference (CPI 1) blocks the past temporal default. Jaszczolt & Srioutai conclude that Default Semantics is a pragmatic framework that may accommodate languages like Thai, in which temporal interpretations do not rely on overt grammatical indicators.
Introduction
The following chapter by Adeline Patard, “The epistemic uses of the English simple past and the French imparfait: When temporality conveys modality”, seeks to account for elements of epistemic modality as observed in some uses of the English simple past and the French imparfait. Patard first argues for a temporal definition of both tenses, against an ‘epistemic’ (Brisard 2010) or ‘inactual’ one (Iatridou 2000). In her definition, she uses the notions of ‘reference point’, ‘topic time’, and ‘viewpoint’ (cf. Reichenbach 1947, Klein 1994, and Gosselin 1996). She describes the basic meaning of the simple past and the imparfait by means of a combination of temporal and aspectual semantic features. The traditional opposition between ‘temporal’ and ‘modal’ uses is then reinterpreted in terms of the speaker’s referential or subjective intentionality. Patard further distinguishes, for the modal usage types, between the ‘epistemic uses’, which express the speaker’s assessment of the probability of the designated situation, and the ‘illocutionary uses’, which convey the illocutionary stance of the speaker, i.e., the degree of commitment to the speech act at issue. Patard’s analysis is essentially rooted in the tradition of ‘dialogism’ (Bakhtin 1977, 1984) and its application to the description of tense uses. Dialogism is defined as an enunciative phenomenon whereby a given utterance exhibits two or more different enunciative sources, with (i) a primary enunciator E1 equated with the speaker and (ii) one or more secondary enunciator(s) whose utterance(s) also contribute(s) to the speaker’s actual utterance (cf. Bres 2001, 2003). Patard demonstrates that the simple past and the imparfait may have dialogic uses in which they evoke the presence of a secondary enunciator e1 in the past. In these dialogic uses, a past reference point, allegedly needed for the description of imperfective past tenses, comes to be identified with e1. Finally, Patard tackles two epistemic uses of the simple past and the imparfait, the counterfactual conditional use and the optative use, paying particular attention to the following points: the sense of lower probability generally associated with these uses, their non-past interpretations, the fact that imperfective morphology is ‘fake’ in these contexts (Iatridou 2000), and the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships with the other tenses in English and French, respectively. Taking into account contextual elements that trigger the counterfactual reading of the simple past and imparfait (conjunctions, the conditional structure [p, q], and the presence of a conditional tense in the apodosis), Patard comes up with a dialogic analysis of the conditional and optative uses. She assumes that these tense forms are used to refer to a past enunciator e1 responsible for the utterance of a proposition and, consequently, to convey an epistemic judgment about the lower probability of the situation designated by that proposition (to which the speaker, in other words, does not fully commit). Patard concludes that, in these epistemic uses of the simple past and the imparfait, modality originates in temporality (the presence of a past enunciator), and that the connection between pastness and counterfactuality is therefore enunciative in nature.
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3. Conclusion The study of markers of tense and aspect in relation to notions of an epistemic nature looks like it is developing into an exciting, if not entirely new, field of research. With this volume, we wish to provide an impetus and thematic unity to this research, and suggest a number of key questions that lie at the heart of it: unification, subjectivity, and, not least, the importance of a clear and precise definition of modality. Most of all, we do not wish to convert any non-believers, neither to Cognitive Grammar nor even to the view (not shared by some of the contributors involved) that epistemic modality is the basic meaning of (all) tense-aspect constructions. However, if it contributes to establishing an awareness that modal meaning elements or usage types are directly relevant to the analysis of the grammar of time, we believe that the volume may have served its main purpose. References Abraham, Werner & Elisabeth Leiss (eds.). 2008. Modality-Aspect Interfaces: Implications and Typological Solutions. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Bakhtin, Mikhaïl. 1977. Le Marxisme et la philosophie du langage: Essai d’application de la méthode sociologique en linguistique. Paris: Minuit. Bakhtin, Mikhaïl. 1984. Les genres du discours. In Esthétique de la création verbale, 265–272. Paris: Gallimard. Barceló, Gérard Joan & Jacques Bres. 2006. Les temps de l’indicatif en français. Paris: Ophrys. Barceló, Gérard Joan, Jacques Bres, & Adeline Patard (eds.). 2006. Aspectualité, temporalité et modalité [Cahiers de Praxématique 47]. Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry. Boogaart, Ronny & Janssen, Theo 2007. Tense and aspect. In The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, D. Geeraerts & H. Cuyckens (eds.), 803–828. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bres, Jacques. 2001. Dialogisme. In Termes et concepts pour l’analyse du discours, C. Détrie, P. Siblot & B. Vérine (eds.), 83–86. Paris: Champion. Bres, Jacques. 2003. Mais oui, il était un joli temps du passé comme les autres, le petit imparfait hypocoristique. Langue française 138: 111–124. Brisard, Frank. 2001. Be going to: An exercise in grounding. Journal of Linguistics 37: 251–285. Brisard, Frank. 2002a. Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Brisard, Frank. 2002b. Introduction: The epistemic basis of deixis and reference. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, F. Brisard (ed.), xi–xxxiv. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Brisard, Frank. 2002c. The English present. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, F. Brisard (ed.), 251–297. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Brisard, Frank. 2005. Epistemic interactions of tense and aspect in the English verb: The paradigm of the present. In Cognitive Linguistics: A User-Friendly Approach, K. Turewicz (ed.), 65–82. Szczecin: University of Szczecin Press.
Introduction
Brisard, Frank. 2010. Aspects of virtuality in the meaning of the French imparfait. Linguistics 48: 487–524. Bybee, Joan, Revere Perkins & William Pagliuca. 1994. The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect and Modality in the Languages of the World. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press. Chung, Sandra & Alan Timberlake. 1985. Tense, aspect and mood. In Language Typology and Syntactic Description, vol. 3: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, T. Shopen (ed.), 202– 258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Condoravdi, Cleo. 2002. Temporal interpretation of modals: Modals for the present and for the past. In The Construction of Meaning, D. Beaver, S. Kaufmann, B. Clark & L. Casillas (eds.), 59–88. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Croft, William. In preparation. Verbs: Aspect and Argument Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cutrer, Michelle L. 1994. Time and Tense in Narrative and Everyday Language. PhD Dissertation, University of California at San Diego, United States. Dahl, Östen. 1985. Tense and Aspect Systems. Oxford: Blackwell. Dahl, Östen. 1997. The relation between past time reference and counterfactuality: A new look. In On Conditionals Again, A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), 97–114. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Declerck, Renaat. 2005. The relation between temporal and modal uses of indicative verb forms. In Crosslinguistic Views on Tense, Aspect and Modality. [Cahiers Chronos 13], B. Hollebrandse, A. van Hout & C. Vet (eds.), 215–227.Amsterdam: Rodopi. DeLancey, Scott. 1997. Mirativity: The grammatical marking of unexpected information. Linguistic Typology 1: 33–52. DeLancey, Scott. 2001. The mirative and evidentiality. Journal of Pragmatics 33: 369–382. Doiz-Bienzobas, Aintzane. 1995. The Preterit and the Imperfect in Spanish: Past Situation vs. Past Viewpoint. PhD Dissertation, University of California at San Diego, United States. Dowty, David. 1977. Towards a semantic analysis of verb aspect and the English ‘imperfective progressive’. Linguistics and Philosophy 9: 37–61. Fleischman, Suzanne. 1989. Temporal distance: A basic linguistic metaphor. Studies in Language 13: 1–50. Fleischman, Suzanne. 1995. Imperfective and irrealis. In Modality in Grammar and Discourse, J. Bybee & S. Fleischman (eds.), 519–551. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Givón, Talmy. 2001. Syntax: An Introduction, vol. 1. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Gosselin, Laurent. 1996. Sémantique de la temporalité en français: Un modèle calculatoire et cognitif du temps et de l’aspect. Louvain-la-neuve: Duculot. Gosselin, Laurent. 2005. Temporalité et modalité. Brussels: Duculot. Hogeweg, Lotte. 2009. What’s So Unreal about the Past? In Tsangalidis, Anastasios and Roberta Facchinetti (eds.), Studies on English Modality – in honour of Frank R. Palmer, 181–208. Bern: Peter Lang. Hornstein, Norbert. 1990. As Time Goes by: Tense and Universal Grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Iatridou, Sabine. 2000. The grammatical ingredients of counterfactuality. Linguistic Inquiry 31: 231–270. James, Deborah. 1982. Past tense and the hypothetical: A cross-linguistic study. Studies in Language 6: 375–403.
Frank Brisard and Adeline Patard Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M. 2009. Representing Time: An Essay on Temporality as Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kamp, Hans & Uwe Reyle. 1993. From Discourse to Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Kamp, Hans & Christian Rohrer. 1983. Tense in texts. In Meaning, Use and Interpretation, R. Bäuerle, C. Schwarze & A. von Stechow (eds.), 250–269. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter Klein, Wolfgang. 1994. Time in Language. London: Routledge. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 2: Descriptive Application. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1997. Consciousness, construal, and subjectivity. In Language Structure, Discourse and the Access to Consciousness, M. I. Stamenov (ed.), 49–75. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Langacker, Ronald W. 2001. The English present tense. English Language and Linguistics 5: 251–271. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002. Remarks on the English grounding systems. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, F. Brisard (ed.), 29–38. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2003. Extreme subjectification: English tense and modals. In Motivation in Language, H. Cuyckens, T. Berg, R. Dirven & K.-U. Panther (eds.), 3–24. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Larreya, Paul. 2003. Irrealis, past time reference and modality. In Modality in Contemporary English, R. Facchinetti, M. G. Krug & F. R. Palmer (eds.), 21–45. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Ludlow, Peter. In preparation. Tensism and Presentism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Martin, Robert. 1991. Types de procès et systèmes hypothétiques: De l’aspect ‘de re’ à l’aspect ‘de dicto’. Travaux de linguistique et de philologie 22: 87–95. McTaggart, John E. 1908. The unreality of time. Mind 17. Reprinted in Philosophical Studies, J. E. McTaggart (1934), 110–131. London: Edward Arnold. Mellet, Sylvie. 1990. Temps et mode en latin: À propos de l’imparfait. Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris XXXV: 161–171. Michaelis, Laura. A. 2004. Type shifting in Construction Grammar: An integrated approach to aspectual coercion. Cognitive Linguistics 15: 1–67. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2002. Wieso sollte ich dich küssen, du hässlicher Mensch! A study of the German modals sollen and müssen as “grounding predications” in interrogatives. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference, F. Brisard (ed.), 391–432. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2006. Langacker’s subjectification and grounding: A more gradual view. In Subjectification: Various Paths to Subjectivity, A. Athanasiadou, C. Canakis & B. Cornillie (eds.), 151–176. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Nichols, Johanna. 1986. The bottom line: Chinese Pidgin Russian. In Evidentiality: The Linguistic Encoding of Epistemology, W. Chafe & J. Nichols (eds.), 239–257. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing. Patard, Adeline. 2007. L’un et le multiple. L’imparfait de l’indicatif en français: Valeur en langue et usages en discours. PhD Dissertation, Paul-Valéry University – Montpellier 3: Montpellier, France. Portner, Paul. 1998. The progressive in modal semantics. Language 74: 760–787. Reichenbach, Hans. 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: Free Press.
Introduction Smirnova, Elena. 2006. Die Entwicklung der Konstruktion würde + Infinitiv im Deutschen. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Stowell, Tim. 2004. Tense and modals. In The Syntax of Time, J. Guéron & J. Lecarme (eds.), 621–636. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Trnavac, Radoslava. 2006. Aspect and Subjectivity in Modal Constructions. PhD Dissertation, Leiden University, The Netherlands. Verhagen, Arie. 2005. Constructions of Intersubjectivity: Discourse, Syntax and Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
part i
Theoretical foundations
The definition of modality Renaat Declerck
University of Leuven This chapter offers a definition of modality that is as concrete and complete as possible. Modality means that there is reference to actualization of a situation in a world that is not represented as being the factual world. All types of modality are pigeonholed, regardless of whether the ‘modalizer’ is an auxiliary, lexical verb, adverb, conditional clause, a morphological operation like ‘modal backshifting’ or ‘conditionalization’, etc. Clear definitions are given of root and epistemic modality, and it is shown that not all epistemic values are modal values. On the basis of a rich modal world typology and a number of possible relations between a modal world and the factual world, different subtypes of modality are distinguished. Keywords: modality, epistemic, root modality, condition
1. Introduction1 The entry for ‘modality’ in Leech’s (2006: 64) Glossary of English Grammar reads: “see modal (auxiliary verb)”. In the entry ‘modal (auxiliary) (verb)’ we read: “a member of a small class of verbs that have meanings relating to modality, that is to such concepts as possibility or permission (can, may), obligation, necessity or likelihood (must, should), prediction, intention or hypothesis (will, would)”. This definition of modality reduces modality to the use of modal auxiliaries and gives us little tangible to go by. This is not surprising, because modality is a most elusive concept, which in pedagogical grammars is usually illustrated (rather than defined) by a list of possible meanings that ‘modal auxiliaries’ can have. Of course, more detailed linguistic treatments of the phenomenon of modality often do offer
1. I wish to thank Ilse Depraetere, Susan Reed, Bert Cappelle and An Verhulst for the fruitful discussions we have had in connection with modality. Special thanks are due to Susan Reed and Caroline Gevaert for their comments on a previous draft of this manuscript.
Renaat Declerck
a kind of definition, but there does not seem to be a standard definition that is widely accepted. The issue is also clouded by the fact that the class of ‘modal auxiliaries’ is usually treated as a waste-paper basket in which all the verbs are put which have the formal and syntactic characteristics of auxiliaries but are clearly not auxiliaries used to build tense forms, aspectual forms or passive verb forms. At least two of the auxiliaries that are often (even in major recent grammars) included in the set of modal auxiliaries, viz. used to and dare, arguably do not belong to that class.2 The meaning expressed by used to is aspectual, not modal: My late uncle used to go to bed early predicates of my uncle the past characteristic (habit) of going to bed early.3 I daren’t do that has exactly the same nonmodal meaning as I don’t dare to do that. Since to dare to is a lexical verb without a modal meaning, the auxiliary dare in I daren’t do that should be treated as what we could call a ‘lexical auxiliary’ – something which to my knowledge nobody has ever suggested doing. A lexical auxiliary combines the morpho-syntactic characteristics of an auxiliary with the lexical meaning of a full verb (rather than with the meaning of an auxiliary expressing tense, voice, modality or aspect). In this article, in which we aim to give a satisfactory definition of ‘modality’, we have to find (among other things) what all the (true) modal auxiliaries have in common, apart from their specific meanings, which mostly have to do with some kind of possibility or necessity. It is this common core that constitutes the essence of modality and thus offers a basis for a definition of modality. As we will see, that common element of meaning is that a situation is represented as actualizing in a nonfactual world. 2. Terminological preliminaries a. We use ‘situation’ as a cover term for the various possible types of contents of clauses, i.e. as a cover term for anything that can be expressed in a clause. According to Lyons (1977), a situation is either a state, an action, a process (=change, development) or an event (=a nonagentive dynamic situation, e.g. a fall). As a cover-term for the various verbs that are typically associated with one of these kinds of situation we use the term actualize. The sentence The 2. Quirk et al. (1985: 137) treat used to and dare as “marginal modals”. Biber et al. (1999: 484) call them “marginal auxiliary verbs”, adding that they “can behave like modals in taking auxiliary negation and yes-no question inversion”. 3. Huddleston & Pullum (2002) recognize that the meaning of used to is “aspectual, not modal” (p. 115) but they still treat the auxiliary dare as a modal auxiliary (p. 110).
The definition of modality
situation is actualizing can thus be said of a state that is holding, an action that is being performed, a change that is taking place or an event that is happening. In all four cases the sentence refers to the actualization of a situation. b. A ‘possible world’ – we are using the term in its linguistic meaning rather than in the way it is used in logic – is always a t-world, i.e. a world which is anchored to a given time t. This means that a tensed proposition can be true at one time but false at another, in other words, that it may be true of one t-world but false of another. Thus, J.F. Kennedy is the President of the U.S. is true of any world holding at (=anchored to) some time in the course of 1961 but is false of the objective S-world, i.e. the actual world holding at S (=speech time) – see section (d) below. By contrast, omnitemporal situations (referred to by generic or universal sentences like A horse is an animal) actualize in every objective world holding at any possible time. The unmarked form of t-anchoring is S-anchoring (where S means ‘speech time’). If the world referred to is an S-world, i.e. a world that is anchored to S, and the sentence referring to it is in the present tense, no anchor time needs to be specified in the sentence, nor in its context. This explains why, unlike The weather was nice (which begs the question “When?”), The weather is nice is fully interpretable in isolation: the hearer assumes that the speaker represents the situation as actualizing at S. It also explains why omnitemporal situations are as a rule referred to in the present tense: this follows naturally from the fact that S is one of the times at which the situation is factual and is the unmarked anchor time in the linguistic mind of the speaker. c. There is no essential difference between saying that a proposition is “true of ” (Lyons 1977: 687) a particular t-world and saying that the situation denoted by the proposition ‘actualizes in’ that t-world. Thus, if the tensed proposition John is walking home is true of (=true with reference to) the objective S-world (=the actual world holding at S), the situation referred to is represented as actualizing in that world. If the untensed proposition ‘John be walking home’ is not true of the objective S-world, as in [I wish] John was walking home, the situation does not actualize in the objective S-world, i.e. it does not belong to the actualizations making up the objective S-world. In this particular case John is walking home is true of a counterfactual S-world (i.e. a world which is just the reverse of the factual world), which means that the situation actualizes in that counterfactual S-world. d. We can distinguish between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ t-worlds. An objective t-world is the unique real world that holds at a given time and which is judged real by an (imaginary) ideal outside observer viewing the world as it is at that given time. A subjective t-world is an alternative world which is not judged real
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by such an ideal outside observer but which is conceived of as real by some consciousness at a certain time. Such a t-world consists of the tensed (=anchored in time by their finite verb form) propositions that are deemed true by the world-creating consciousness at the given time. Thus, the situation referred to by Amsterdam lies in Belgium (which is counterfactual in the objective S-world) actualizes in the counterfactual S-world existing in the mind of a speaker who is convinced that this assertion is true at S. For simplicity, we disregard subjective t-worlds in the discussion below. e. Another distinction we can make is that between ‘narrow t-worlds’ and ‘extended t-worlds’. A narrow t-world is a t-world comprising all the situations that are actualizing at a given time t. Tensed propositions can only be true of such a world if the tense represents the (actualization of the) situation referred to as simultaneous with t. An extended t-world is a world comprising all the situations that are actualizing at t or have actualized before t. Various tenses can be used to represent the actualization of a situation as factual in an extended t-world. Thus, Caesar was Emperor of Rome, There have been many battles between the French and the English and Paris is the capital of France all refer to actualizations that are factual in the speaker’s extended S-world. Since an extended ti-world includes a narrow ti-world, any actualization that is factual in an objective narrow t-world is also factual in the corresponding objective extended t-world. Thus if John is in London now, the tensed proposition John is in London is true not only of the narrow S-world but also of the extended S-world. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the distinction between narrow and extended t-worlds whenever it is not crucial. As regards S-worlds, we use ‘factual world’ in the sense of ‘extended factual S-world’. f. Whether a sentence is positive or negative is irrelevant to the question whether the actualization of the situation is factual or not in a given t-world, or to the question whether the sentence (=tensed proposition) is true or not of that t-world. Thus both London lies on the Thames and London does not lie on the Rhine represent the (positive or negative) situation referred to as actualizing in the factual world, and both sentences are true of the factual world. It follows that we must distinguish between ‘negative sentences’ and ‘counterfactual sentences’, as well as between ‘negative situations’ and ‘counterfactual situations’. London does not lie on the Rhine is a negative sentence, referring to the actualization of a negative situation (i.e. a situation referred to in a negative sentence). That negative situation is represented as actualizing in the factual world. By contrast, If I were you... refers to a situation that actualizes in a counterfactual
The definition of modality
S-world. This clause refers to a counterfactual situation (=a situation that does not actualize in the factual world because it is incompatible with this world). g. There are many different kinds of t-world, such as worlds that are factual, ‘theoretical’ (see below) or counterfactual at t. Situations that are located in such worlds are represented as actualizing in them. Thus, the situations referred to by John is ill, If only John was ill! and John is perhaps ill are each time represented as actualizing in a given S-world, but that S-world is, respectively, the factual world, a counterfactual S-world (=an S-world which is conceived of by the speaker as being incompatible with the factual world) and a ‘theoretical’ S-world which is represented as possibly coinciding with the factual world. If there exist several ti-worlds (=worlds anchored to the same time ti), the situation referred to can only actualize in one of these ti-worlds. Thus, if it is indeed the case that John is ill at S, the sentence John is ill represents the situation of John being ill as actualizing in the factual world. In If only John {was/were} ill!, the situation denoted by ‘John be ill’ is represented as actualizing in the counterfactual S-world evoked by If only (=I wish...). And in John is perhaps ill, the same situation is represented as actualizing in the theoretical S-world evoked by the modal adverb perhaps (=It is possible that...). h. A situation represented as actualizing in a nonfactual world is automatically nonfactual in the factual world. Thus, the situation referred to by If only John was ill! is represented as actualizing in the counterfactual world created by if only, and hence as having the factuality value [+counterfactual] (rather than [+factual]) in the factual world. Similarly, John is perhaps ill refers to a theoretical S-world (created by perhaps) in which the situation of John being ill actualizes. The factuality value of this actualization in the factual world is ‘possibly factual’ (which, as we will see in Section 6.2, is an instance of a ‘relative’ factuality value.) ‘Possibly factual’ is a kind of nonfactuality. i. All nonfactual worlds (i.e. possible worlds that are not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world) are created by some kind of ‘nonfactualworld creating device’. Such a device can be, for example, an intensional verb like believe, an attitudinal verb like intend, a modal auxiliary, a conditional clause, a modal adverb like perhaps, etc. – see also Section 4(a). Since a nonfactual world is by definition a modal world (and vice versa – see Section 3), we call the device in question the modalizer. A proposition underlying a clause containing a modalizer is a modalized proposition. Thus, in Suppose John were here, the modalizer is suppose and the modalized proposition is ‘John be here’. In Bill must leave now, the modalizer is the modal auxiliary must and the modalized proposition is ‘Bill leave now’.
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Huddleston (1984: 167–8) suggests the label ‘residue’ for what is left of a clause with a modal auxiliary when the auxiliary is abstracted from it, viz. the subject plus the (nontensed and nonmodal) proposition that has the form of an infinitival clause. Thus, in Tom must swim, ‘Tom swim’ is the residue proposition or simply ‘residue’. We adopt this terminology. The situation denoted by the residue proposition we call the residue situation. In John may be ill, the residue situation is the state denoted by the proposition ‘John be ill’. The speaker says that that state is actualizing in a nonfactual world that possibly coincides with the factual world, which comes down to saying that the state in question is possibly actualizing in the factual world. The term ‘residue’ corresponds to what we have called the ‘modalized proposition’, but it is a handier term because it is easier to speak of the ‘residue situation’ than of ‘the situation denoted by the modalized proposition’. We therefore adopt the terms ‘residue’, ‘residue situation’ and ‘residue proposition’. Moreover, we extend the use of these terms to those cases in which the modalizer is not a modal auxiliary. In I wish John was here, the verb wish is the modalizer and the proposition ‘John be here’ is the residue proposition. j. The referent of a modalizer is a modal state, i.e. the state of a situation being necessary, possible, permitted, wished for, etc., or the state of it being possible, likely, necessary, etc. that a proposition is true in a given world.
(1) That rumor may be true. (The modal auxiliary asserts the existence of the possibility that the rumor is true. The existence of something is a state. The modalizer “may” thus refers to a modal state.) (2) You must leave now. (The modal auxiliary expresses that it is obligatory for the addressee to leave now. The existence of an obligation is a modal state.) (3) [Don’t go through the woods.] You could get lost. (The modal auxiliary “could” expresses the state of it being possible for the addressee to get lost.)
Like any state, a modal state is a situation actualizing in a particular world. In the above examples, the world in question is the factual world, i.e. the extended S-world – see Section 2(e). When the modal state is thus represented as actualizing in the factual world, we can say that the modal world is grounded in the factual world. This is usually the case, although there are also instances in which one modal world is grounded in another. Thus, in I might have been killed if I had not given in the modal suppositional world (created by if) is grounded in the modal epistemic world (created by might) comprising theoretically possible actualizations: the sentence means ‘It is possible that I would have been killed if I had not given in’. Note that this example shows that grounding is a different phenomenon from anchoring, which is a question of the temporal relation between two worlds
The definition of modality
– see Section 2(b) above – although the time to which a grounded t-world is anchored is usually also the time to which the grounding t-world is anchored. In the above example, ‘It is possible that’ is anchored to S, while ‘I would have been killed if I had not given in’ is anchored to a t earlier than S. Both t-worlds, however, are anchored to the ‘extended S-world’ – see Section 2(e) – which we have agreed to refer to as the ‘factual world’. k. It should be stressed that by ‘nonfactual world’ we do not mean a world that is necessarily different from the factual world but rather a possible world that is not represented and/or interpreted as being the factual world. This is clear from John may be here, which refers to a nonfactual world in which the state of John being here actualizes and which may or may not coincide with the factual world. A nonfactual world could not be represented as possibly coinciding with the factual world if ‘nonfactual world’ were defined as ‘world that is necessarily different from the factual world’. 3. The definition of modality a. Modality can be defined as the phenomenon that a situation is located in a nonfactual world (as defined above). This means that the residue situation is represented as actualizing in a nonfactual world, in other words that the proposition underlying the sentence is ‘true of ’ a modal world. The nonfactual world in question can be related to (grounded in) the factual world in one of several ways. For example:
(4) [For all we know,] John may be dead. (“May” is a modalizer that refers to a present state: “It is possible...”. It creates a nonfactual world in which the state of John being dead is actualizing. This nonfactual world is related to the factual world in terms of the ‘factuality value’ (see Section 6.1.) ‘possibly factual’: the world in which John is dead possibly coincides with the factual world. Hence the interpretation ‘It is possible that John is dead’.) (5) Val must leave town as soon as possible. (“Must” is a modalizer that refers to a present state. It creates a nonfactual world in which the situation of Val leaving town actualizes. This nonfactual world is interpreted as a future world because of “as soon as possible”. This modal world is not related to the factual world in terms of a ‘factuality value’, because “must” here expresses root (nonepistemic) modality – see Section 5(a). But there is a relation between the two worlds because the sentence is interpreted as ‘Actualization of Val leaving town in a future nonfactual world is obligatory’. The modal state thus concerns the obligation of the actualization of
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the residue situation in a nonfactual (more specifically, not-yet-factual) modal world. In other words, the relation between the two worlds is that in the factual world the existence of the nonfactual world in which Val leaves town is deemed necessary.) b. What has been given in the previous subsection is the definition of modality in a nutshell. In the following sections further elements are introduced, which gradually render the definition more detailed and concrete. 4. Kinds of modalizers a. As we have seen, any linguistic device creating a modal world is a modalizer. In English, we can distinguish the following types of modalizer: a modal auxiliary (e.g. can, must, may...), a modal adverb (e.g. perhaps, possibly, duly, obligatorily), an intensional verb like believe, suppose, imagine, an attitudinal verb like intend, want, hope, wish, the subjunctive mood, the imperative mood, a conditional clause creating a ‘theoretical world’ (see Section 4(d)), a tense auxiliary creating a future world (e.g. will, be going to, be about to) or expressing posteriority, an inserted comment clause with an intensional verb (e.g. I think), ‘modal backshifting’ (see Section 4(b) below) or ‘modal conditionalization’ (see Section 4(c) below) or a combination of the latter two. Some of these modalizing devices are well-known, others deserve some comment. The latter are treated in the next subsections. b. ‘Modal backshifting’ (or ‘formal distancing’) is a basic mechanism producing either a tentative or a counterfactual interpretation. It is important to see that this is not the same type of ‘backshifting’ (Jespersen 1931: 151) as occurs in indirect speech, for example when I am ill is reported as She said she was ill. In modal backshifting the conditional tense can be replaced by the conditional perfect, e.g. I would be happy if she came → I would have been happy if she had come. This kind of ‘backshift’ is never possible in indirect speech, where would and would have remain unchanged: I would help him if I could → She said she would help him if she could. Modal backshifting can produce various results. In some cases only the verb is a backshifted form. For example, It is time we leave can be modally backshifted to It is time we left to stress the not-yet-factuality of our leaving. In other cases only the infinitival clause representing the residue proposition is a backshifted form, as in He was to have been in his office. The result of the modal backshifting here is that the actualization of the residue situation is interpreted as counterfactual. Henry was to have been in his office says that there was a past obligation (resulting from
The definition of modality
some kind of arrangement or rule) for Henry to be in his office at a given time, but that he was not there at that time. The existence of the obligation itself is not counterfactual. Another example is the following:
(6) The decision should have been made tomorrow [but now we understand that there is now another week’s grace]. (Google UK)
In this example should be made is modally backshifted to should have been made. This does not affect the existence of the obligation but renders the representation of the actualization of the residue situation counterfactual. In some cases the result of modal backshifting is that both the infinitive and the preceding verb are backshifted forms. Thus, He may be absent, which expresses present epistemic possibility, can be modally backshifted to He might have been absent, which represents the (past, present or future) actualization of the residue situation as counterfactual. Similarly, in I {could/might} have been in Iraq now, both the modal auxiliary and the infinitive are backshifted to create a counterfactual interpretation. The sentence is interpreted something like ‘It would have been possible for me to be in Iraq now, (but I am not)’. In this case, both the modal state (root possibility) and the residue situation are represented as counterfactual. The following are further examples in which both the verb and the verb of the residue are backshifted forms. (It should be noted, however, that not all speakers of British English find such instances acceptable.)
(7) I hoped to sit beside her. → I had hoped to sit beside her. → I had hoped to have sat beside her. (8) I would like to see her tonight. → I would have liked to see her tonight. → I would have liked to have seen her tonight.
There is also the mechanism of double modal backshifting. This means that the same verb form undergoes modal backshifting twice. Examples of this are largely restricted to a highly informal register and may be typical of a particular regional variety of English. For instance:
(9) If he had a car, he would collect us. → If he’d had a car, he’d have collected us. → If he had’ve had a car, he’d have collected us.
c. Another modalizing device is modal conditionalization. This means that the present tense form of a verb is replaced by the corresponding conditional tense form without there being an overt or implicit condition: (10) [What a nice view!] We might be in Switzerland! (This is interpreted as ‘It would be possible for us to be in Switzerland’, hence ‘It would seem as if we were in Switzerland’. This is the conditionalized version of We may be in
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(11) (12) (13) (14)
Switzerland (on the interpretation ‘It is possible for us to be in Switzerland’, i.e. ‘The possibility exists that we are in Switzerland’).) [“John is very happy with his new girl-friend.”] – “It {seems/would seem} so”. (The addition of would renders the reply more tentative or doubtful.) I {wish/should wish} to voice a different opinion. (id.) As a first step to the new life you desperately need, I {suggest/would suggest} assertion training. (id.) I {think/should have thought} he could have left something for us, at least. (Should have thought is an example of double modal conditionalization. It stresses the counterfactuality of the actualization of the residue situation and in doing so changes the sentence from a neutral statement into an expression of criticism.)
d. Another modalizing device is the use of a conditional clause evoking a ‘nonneutral theoretical world’. In Declerck & Reed (2001), conditionals with such a clause are called ‘nonneutral theoretical-P conditionals’. This is because ‘conditional clause’ and ‘head clause’ are abbreviated to ‘P-clause’ and ‘Q-clause’, respectively, given that the standard logical representation of a conditional sentence is ‘if P, (then) Q’. Declerck and Reed (2001) propose the ‘possible-world typology of conditionals’ that is represented in Figure 1. In this typology, P-propositions are either factual or theoretical. The theoretical-P conditionals are subclassified into ‘neutral theoretical-P’ and ‘nonneutral theoretical-P’ conditionals. In the former, the P-proposition represents a mere supposition, while in the latter the supposition is accompanied by a presupposition (assumption) concerning the relation between the theoretical P-world and the factual world. The assumed relation may be that of identity (=closed condition), possible identity (=open condition), likely nonidentity (=tentative condition) or definite nonidentity (=counterfactual condition).
Possible P-worlds Factual
Theoretical (nonfactual) Neutral theoretical Closed
Figure 1.
Nonneutral theoretical Open Tentative
Counterfactual
The definition of modality
In factual-P conditionals, the world referred to in the P-clause is the factual world. This means that factual P-clauses are not modalizers. The following exemplify the type: (15) I (always) avoided her if I could. (16) [Yet according to the government the number of homeless people in the UK has now reached 300,000, over 50% of these are under 25 and this figure is continuing to grow at an alarming rate.] If you add to these those who are at risk or who have been considered as ‘no hopers’, the number of people who need our help is truly of crisis proportions. (Cobuild corpus) A conditional whose P-clause refers to a theoretical P-world – a theoretical-P conditional – may refer to that theoretical world without specifying the relation between the suppositional world and the factual world. In this case we speak of a neutral theoretical conditional clause. A speaker who uses a neutral-P conditional does not convey a specific assumption (presupposition) about the likelihood that the theoretical-P world coincides with the factual world. The following are some examples: (17) If a woman has a history of cancer in her family, she should have herself checked at least once a year. (Because a woman has nonspecific reference, the P-clause refers to a set of people in general. Though the speaker naturally assumes that there are people belonging to this set, he does not assume (nor denies, for that matter) that the hearer (or any other specific person) forms part of the set. There is simply no presupposition that the application of P to a specific person is true, false, unlikely to be true, or a real possibility.) (18) Emergency lighting should be fitted in the hall, if there is no glass in the front door to let in light. (Cobuild corpus) (19) If a shop’s good enough, it’s worth making a little effort to get to. (Cobuild corpus) A nonneutral theoretical P-clause evokes a suppositional world which is epistemic because it stands in a given factuality relation to the factual world. The factuality values can be of four different kinds, which leads to a distinction between closed-P, open-P, tentative-P and counterfactual-P conditionals. In these four types, different factuality relations are assumed to hold between the theoretical P-world and the factual world. To begin with, a P-world is ‘closed’ if it is assumed (or ostensibly assumed) to coincide with the factual world: (20) [“The picture you are now looking at is a Van Gogh.”] – “Well, if this is a Van Gogh, I’m rather disappointed by it.”
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(21) If I’m going to catch the 5.12 train, I’d better be on my way now. (The P-clause presupposes that I want to catch that train.) (22) If (as I am told now) he will come here himself tomorrow, I no longer need to try and get into contact with him today. In an ‘open-P conditional’, the theoretical world called up by the P-clause is assumed to be such that it may or may not turn out to correspond with the factual world or the expected future extension of the factual world. It follows that the Pclause often refers to the future: since the future is unknown, the P-situation and the Q-situation are easily viewed as an ‘open possibility’ (i.e. as neither certain, probable nor unlikely). (23) If the train is late, we will miss our connection in London. (24) [I’ve been told that] it will be worth a lot more if we can get his signature on it. (Cobuild corpus) (25) [I don’t know if Liverpool won their match yesterday.] If they did, they must be top of the League now. The basic meaning of a ‘tentative-P conditional’ is that the theoretical P-world is assumed to be such that it might correspond with the factual world, but that this possibility is considered as rather unlikely (but not impossible) to be (or to have been or to come) true. (26) If he {did/were to do} that, he would be in real trouble. (tentative-P: the Pactualization is contrary to expectation) (27) I would be surprised if that man over there were the man we’re looking for. Finally, in a ‘counterfactual-P conditional’, the theoretical P-world is assumed to be contrary to fact, i.e. to be definitely different from the factual world (or, if the reference is to the future, from what is going to become the factual world). Thus, in I would have been happy if she had come, the P-clause is presupposed to be true of a counterfactual theoretical P-world but false of the factual world. In sum, a P-clause is a modalizer creating an epistemic nonfactual world provided the condition is represented and interpreted as closed, open, tentative or counterfactual. e. Some nonfactual t-worlds can be characterized in terms of a modal concept that has been neglected in the literature on modality, viz. the idea that the tworld in question is envisaged by the speaker but not yet factual at the time t to which the world in question is anchored. This kind of modal world, which we call ‘not-yet-factual at t’, is evoked by any expression that has posteriority as part of its meaning. The clearest cases are those in which the reference is exclusively to a future world. Thus, John will trim the hedge evokes a t-world
The definition of modality
which is nonfactual in the specific sense that it is not-yet-factual at S but is predicted (at S) to become factual at some future time t. The proposition ‘John trim the hedge’ is true of that not-yet-factual t-world (in which actualization is envisaged by the speaker), but the not-yet-factual t-world itself is neither factual nor counterfactual at S: it is an S-world which is partly counterfactual (because there is no actualization at S) and partly theoretical (because actualization at a time later than S is envisaged at S) – see Declerck (2009) for a more detailed analysis.4,5 Another type of example in which a situation is located in a not-yet-factual world is I saw Sam before she had seen me. Here the situation of the before-clause is represented as not-yet-factual at the time of the head clause situation. The sentence is therefore interpreted as ‘I saw Sam at a time when she had not yet seen me’, or ‘When I saw Sam, it was not yet a fact that she had seen me’ (which leaves it vague whether she ever saw me or not). In It’s high time they left and I’d rather they left ‘modal backshifting’ (i.e. the use of left rather than leave – see Section 4(b)) locates the actualization of the guests’ leaving in a world that is not-yet-factual at S: though the situation has not actualized yet, its actualization is envisaged for the future. In I intended to call Bill up when he was at home, both the situation of my calling up Bill and the when-clause situation are interpreted as not-yet-factual at the time when my intention was a past fact. 5. Epistemic modality a. We speak of epistemic modality when the degree of compatibility (or overlap) between the modal world and the factual world is at stake. Epistemic utterances express the speaker’s evaluation of the relation between the modal world in which the residue situation actualizes and the factual world. Thus, Bill may be stuck in a traffic jam expresses that the situation of Bill being stuck in a traffic jam is possibly actualizing in the factual world. 4. Envisage actually refers to something weaker than prediction. It just means that the speaker reckons with the possibility that a situation will actualize. 5. One might object that Rita will do it tomorrow does not rule out that Rita is already doing it at S, as witnessed by the fact that we can say Rita will still be doing it tomorrow. However, the sentences Rita will do it tomorrow, Rita is doing it and Rita will still be doing it tomorrow all refer to different situations. Doing something tomorrow is not the same thing as doing it now or as still be doing it tomorrow. In Rita will do it tomorrow, the situation referred to is located, not in the factual S-world, but in a world that is expected to exist tomorrow. In other words, the situation is counterfactual in the factual S-world, but at the same time envisaged as possible in a future world.
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By contrast, utterances that are interpreted in terms of root modality (or nonepistemic modality) are concerned with factors that determine the actualization of the residue situation, as in the following examples: (28) You may leave tomorrow. (The speaker is granting permission.) (29) You {can/cannot} buy tickets in the office over there. (The addressee’s ability or inability to buy tickets at a certain place depends on a circumstantial factor.) (30) The fugitives must leave the country because their visas expired last week. (The expiration of the visas makes it necessary for the fugitives to leave the country, because it is illegal to remain in the country without a valid visa.) In sum, we can say that an epistemic modal world stands in a particular relation to the factual world or to a future extension of it: there is an epistemic relation between the two of them. This relation concerns the chances that the epistemic world coincides with, or will coincide with, the factual world or its future extension. By contrast, as a rule – see, however, Section 7(b) – a root modal world is not epistemically related to the factual world or to its future extension. It is an ‘epistemically dangling’ world. Thus, The car can be repaired says nothing about the chances that the car will be repaired. b. Within epistemic modality, two major possibilities must be distinguished. In most cases there is specified epistemic modality. This means that the epistemic relation between the modal world and the factual world is specified. For example, the modal world created by may in Dave may be lying is related to the factual world in terms of epistemic possibility: the residue proposition has the factuality value ‘possibly factual’. This means that the situation of Dave being lying is possibly actualizing in the factual world, in other words that the modal world (in which the situation actualizes) possibly coincides with the factual world. When there is specified epistemic modality, one of various ‘factuality values’ on the ‘epistemic scale’ – see Section 6 – is applicable. Specified epistemic modality can be indicated by epistemic modal auxiliaries, epistemic modal adverbs, intensional verbs (believe, imagine...), comment clauses with an intensional verb (e.g. I think), expressions of posteriority (e.g. before in He died before I had seen him), modal backshifting, modal conditionalization and ‘nonneutral theoretical’ conditional clauses. The second type of epistemic modality is indeterminate epistemic modality. In this case the question of the epistemic status of the nonfactual world (i.e. its factuality value vis-à-vis the factual world) is not specified (though it is not irrelevant). Indeterminate epistemic modality is found in conditionals with a ‘neutral
The definition of modality
theoretical’ conditional clause – see Declerck & Reed (2001: 72–80). The following are some illustrations: (31) If a woman has a history of cancer in her family, she should have herself checked at least once a year. (subject NP with nonspecific reference) (32) If water boils, it changes into steam. (general truth) (33) If she has a problem, she goes to her grandmother. (permanent habit) (34) Children are orphans if their parents are dead. (set-identifying conditional clause) (35) If he noticed Brand, he didn’t comment. (Cobuild corpus) (‘anchoring conditional clause’, i.e. the function of the conditional clause is to anchor the head clause into the ongoing discourse) In none of these examples is there an assumption or presupposition on the part of the speaker that the supposition is treated as true, untrue, unlikely to be true, or as a real possibility. There is no specified epistemic relation (=relation in terms of a factuality value) between the suppositional modal world and the factual world. The same is true of imaginary worlds, which form another instance of neutral theoretical suppositional worlds. In the following examples, nothing is specified, implicated or presupposed in connection with the (in)compatibility of the suppositional world with the factual world. For example: (36) In your place I wouldn’t react if he wrote me a threatening letter. (This sentence neither affirms nor denies the speaker’s not reacting to a threatening letter. In other words, the head clause situation is presented neither as factual nor as counterfactual. The utterance is a pure supposition, i.e. a mere thought experiment.)6 (37) [I didn’t go to the party, so I don’t know if I would’ve become as drunk as you all appear to have been. In fact, I’m afraid] I would’ve been drunk too, unless I’d had my wife with me. (38) [It seemed unlikely that such a frail woman would have been capable of strangling her husband. However] if it had been her, the clues that would have been left would have been exactly the same as those we did find. [So we could not cancel her from our list of suspects.] (39) [Suppose the door was actually locked.] If the door had been locked, the burglar would first have tried to open a window, [and that would explain why we found those footprints in the flower-beds] (40) [If you’re naughty, a wild dog might come in and] it would eat you. 6. Unlike Harder (1996: 456), who applies the term “thought experiment” to tentative-P and counterfactual-P conditionals, we speak of ‘thought experiment’ in connection with imaginaryP conditionals only.
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As is clear from these examples, imaginary P-conditionals are not formally distinguishable from counterfactual conditionals. This explains why imaginary P-conditionals have often been mistaken for counterfactuals. 6. The epistemic scale of specified factuality values 1. ‘Epistemic’ has to do with knowledge. We can say that there is ‘specified epistemic’ meaning when either knowledge or a degree of (un)certainty is expressed about whether there {is/was/has been/will be} actualization of a situation in the factual world or in the expected future extension of it. In other words, a clause has specified epistemic meaning if the speaker expresses his opinion on the chances that the nonfactual world in which the situation actualizes coincides with the factual world or its expected future extension. These chances represent different values on an epistemic scale that ranges from ‘factual’ to ‘counterfactual’. This scale consists of a number of factuality values. The exact number of these values is irrelevant: we can split the continuum into as many categories as we wish. However, to account for all the meanings of the modal auxiliaries in English we need to distinguish between (at least) the following values:7 a. factuality: there is no doubt about the actualization of the (positive or negative) situation in the speaker’s factual world because that actualization is affirmed (asserted as being a fact in that world): John is ill./John is not ill.8 b. strong necessity (strong assumption of truth): [John is not here.] He must be ill. c. weak necessity (weak assumption of truth): [The money is not in the till, so] it should already be in the safe. d. probability: John may well be ill. e. possibility: John may be ill./It might be true. f. improbability: It should not be difficult to find his address. g. impossibility: It cannot be true./You cannot be serious! h. not-yet-factuality: John will come tomorrow. [I read the letter] before he had read it. i. counterfactuality: [You shouldn’t have gone through the woods.] You might have got lost. Because a counterfactual world is the opposite of the factual world, 7. The ordering of the values on the scale may be subject to debate, but that need not concern us here. 8. It may be worth stressing that, contrary to what is sometimes claimed, negation is not a modalizer. A negative clause like John is not ill does not express counterfactuality (but rather what we might call ‘the factuality of nonactualization’.) This means that both John is ill and John is not ill represent the actualization of a (positive or negative) situation as ‘factual’ – see also Section 2(f). Both sentences should therefore be treated as nonmodal sentences.
The definition of modality
there is no doubt about the actualization of a (positive or negative) situation in a counterfactual world. (Note that, unlike the actualization of a negative situation, the actualization of a counterfactual situation is not located in the factual world. It is located in a counterfactual world, which is defined in relation to the factual world.) 2. There are some further remarks to be made. Firstly, some of these factuality values can also be expressed by conditional clauses – see also Section 4(d): a. Factuality is expressed by ‘factual’ conditional clauses, as in If I had a problem, I always went to my grandmother. b. Strong assumption of truth is expressed if the conditional clause is ‘closed’, i.e. when the condition is assumed by the speaker to be fulfilled, as in If the work will be done anyhow, I might as well have a lie down or If, as you say, you were late this morning, I would like you to do some overtime this afternoon. e. Possibility is expressed by ‘open’ conditional clauses, as in I’ll be relieved if she phones me. f. Improbability is expressed by ‘tentative’ conditional clauses, as in I’d be relieved if she phoned me, Call the police if someone should try to break in or I’d be very angry if she were to disturb me tomorrow. i. Counterfactuality is expressed by ‘counterfactual’ conditional clauses like If I were you... or If I had been there at the time... Secondly, the factuality values in between the extremes ‘factual’ and ‘counterfactual’ can be referred to as relative factuality values. (In the case of conditionals, they are the nonneutral theoretical values ‘closed’, ‘open’, and ‘tentative’ – see Section 4(d).) Unlike the extremes, they all imply some degree of uncertainty on the part of the speaker: the modal world is represented neither as coinciding with the factual world nor as being incompatible with it. Thirdly, of the values on the specified epistemic scale, only the relative factuality values and the counterfactuality value are modal values. Factuality is an epistemic value, but a world that is represented as factual is not a modal (=nonfactual) world. Obviously, a sentence with the epistemic value ‘factual’ cannot refer to a nonfactual world. In Section 2(i), ‘nonfactual world’ has been defined as a world that is not represented as factual. Fourthly, neutral theoretical conditional clauses, such as those expressing an ‘imaginary’ condition – see Section 5(d) –, do not express a factuality value on the specified epistemic scale, because the relation between the modal world and the factual world remains unspecified (indeterminate). Fifthly, counterfactuality differs from the other values on the specified epistemic scale in that it is not a relative factuality value: it is the only nonfactual epistemic modal value that does not imply a degree of uncertainty about the actualization
Renaat Declerck
Specified epistemic scale Nonmodal = factual
Modal = nonfactual Purely theoretical
Not-yet-factual
Counterfactual
= absolute factuality = relative factuality = relative factuality = absolute factuality value (a) values (b–g) value (h) value (i)
Figure 2.╇ Epistemic Values Nonmodal
Modal Specified
Indeterminate Factual
Neutral theoretical
Purely theoretical
Notyet-factual
Counterfactual
Figure 3.╇
of the residue situation in the relevant modal world. Because counterfactuality is defined in relation to the factual world – a situation is counterfactual if it is located in a ti-world which is the reverse of the factual ti-world – there is no doubt about the absolute factuality status of counterfactual situations. Thus, in [Kim should not have gone through the woods.] She might have got lost, there is a clear understanding that Kim did not get lost when she went through the woods. Unlike She may get lost, the clause She might have got lost does not leave any room for uncertainty. Figure 2 summarizes the conclusions arrived at in this section in connection with the specified epistemic scale. (The indications (a), (b-g), (h) and (i) refer to the examples in Section 6.1.) This chart can be expanded by adding ‘indeterminate epistemic modality’ – see Section 5(b). The result is Figure 3. 7. Root (nonepistemic) modality a. As noted in Section 5(a), sentences that are interpreted in terms of root modality (or nonepistemic modality) are concerned with factors that determine the actualization of the residue situation in a nonfactual world, as in the following examples:
The definition of modality
(41) You may leave tomorrow. (The speaker is granting permission.) (42) You {can/cannot} buy tickets in the office over there. (The addressee’s ability or inability to buy tickets at a certain place depends on a circumstantial factor.) (43) The fugitives must leave the country because their visas expired last week. (The expiration of the visas makes it necessary for the fugitives to leave the country.) In such sentences no idea is evoked of an epistemic world that stands in a particular factuality-value relation to the factual world or to a future extension of the factual world. There is no ‘epistemic relation’ between two worlds, i.e. no relation that concerns the chances that a given epistemic world coincides with, or will coincide with, the factual world or its future extension. In the above examples, the nonfactual world in which the residue situation actualizes is an ‘epistemically dangling’ world – see also Section 5(b). Thus, The car can be repaired says nothing about the chances that the car will be repaired. It follows that we may wonder what is modal about ‘root modality’. Can we not say that My cat can swim is a simple statement of fact, without any reference to a nonfactual world? The answer is no. In My cat can swim, the residue proposition ‘My cat swim’ is true of a world that is not represented as the factual world, i.e. of a nonfactual world. The sentence says nothing about whether the actualization of the residue situation (which actualizes in that nonfactual world) is factual, doubtful, not-yet-factual, counterfactual, etc. in the factual world. The sentence My cat can swim may well be true even if my cat has never swum in its life and is never going to swim. This is because no epistemic relation is expressed between the nonfactual world in which my cat swims and the factual world. It does not follow, however, that there is no relation whatever between the two worlds. In the case of root modality, the relation is expressed by the lexical meaning of the modalizer. In The fugitives must leave the country, it is must that expresses the relation between the factual world and the nonfactual world in which the fugitives leave the country: the link between the two worlds is the modal position assumed by the speaker. In this example, the speaker expresses the modal position that it is necessary for the nonfactual world to coincide with the factual world. Similarly, in This problem can be solved, the speaker expresses the modal position that it is possible for the nonfactual world in which the problem is solved to coincide with the factual world. It follows that there is only a minimal difference between root modality and epistemic modality, whereas there is a lot that the two have in common. Let us start by looking at what they have in common, which is the following:
Renaat Declerck
a. The sentence contains a modalizer, e.g. must. (Compare the nonepistemic John must leave with the epistemic John must be leaving.) b. The auxiliary functioning as modalizer refers to a modal state (e.g. ‘X is necessary’) which is located in the factual world. c. The modalizer creates a world which is not represented as factual, i.e. a nonfactual world. d. The residue situation (denoted by e.g. ‘John leave’ or ‘John be leaving’) is conceptualized as actualizing in the nonfactual modal world. e. The lexical semantics of the modal auxiliary expresses the relation (e.g. necessity, possibility) between the modal world and the factual world. The difference between epistemic modality and root modality is determined by the interpretation-in-context of the auxiliary. It is only when the auxiliary is interpreted as an epistemic modal auxiliary that the modal world is an epistemic world and that the relation between that world and the factual world is an epistemic relation (e.g. ‘necessarily factual’). In the case of root modality, the relation between the nonfactual world and the factual one is not an epistemic relation. For example, John must leave tells us nothing about a factuality relation between the nonfactual world and the factual world, i.e. about the chances that the two worlds coincide. The relation that there is is the modal position (e.g. volition, obligation, possibility) assumed by the speaker. The number of possible modal positions is restricted. The set minimally comprises root necessity (including obligation) and root possibility (including ability and permission), probably also volition (willingness) and possibly some others. The question how many root modal meanings there exist is a moot question, which we will not go into here. b. Root modality and epistemic modality are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Sometimes an epistemic modalizer can be added to a clause expressing root modality. In such a case the root modal world is no longer an ‘epistemically dangling’ world, because the root modality is overlaid by epistemic modality. For example: (44) The soldiers must guard the ammunition bunker. (root modality, viz. obligation) (45) The soldiers must probably guard the ammunition bunker. (Probably expresses a relative factuality value, so that the root modality is overlaid by epistemic modality.) Similarly: (46) According to the arrangement, the decision should be made tomorrow. (root necessity)
The definition of modality
(47) According to the arrangement, the decision should have been made tomorrow. (root necessity overlaid by epistemic modality, viz. a sense of counterfactuality resulting from modal backshifting) c. Root modality can be created not only by root modal auxiliaries but also by root modal adverbs (duly, obligatorily...) and by ‘attitudinal verbs’ like wish, want, etc. (see the next section). 8. World-evoking lexical verbs There are three types of world-evoking lexical verbs: factive verbs, intensional verbs and attitudinal verbs. The latter two are modalizers. a. ‘Factive verbs’ (see Kiparsky & Kiparsky 1970) are verbs like realize, know, acknowledge, etc. which evoke a world (expressed by their complement clause) which is automatically interpreted as being the factual world: (48) I {realize/know/acknowledge} that John is a better player than myself. The world expressed by the that-clause is treated as factual, and hence as nonmodal. Factive verbs are therefore not modalizers. b. ‘Intensional verbs’ like believe, suppose, think, dream, etc. create an ‘intensional’ world which may or may not coincide with the factual world. These verbs thus create a ‘specified epistemic modal world’ – see Section 5(b) – which is related to the factual world in terms of a factuality value. The value in question is mostly one of the purely theoretical values (e.g. what John believes may or may not be true, i.e. has the factuality value ‘possibly factual’). However, those verbs that have an implication of posterior actualization of the residue situation (e.g. I {foresee/predict} that they will soon surrender./I forgot to talk to her.) express the value ‘not-yet-factual’, whereas at least one of them, viz. imagine can imply counterfactuality, as in He imagined he was Napoleon. In sum, verbs like think, believe, etc. can create a world that is not represented as being the factual world. The residue situation is conceived of as actualizing in that nonfactual world. The stronger the intensional meaning of the verb, the less likely it is for the intensional world to coincide with the factual world. In the case of the strongest intensional verb (imagine) the intensional world is even normally interpreted as counterfactual. The semantics of the verb thus has to do with the likelihood of compatibility with the factual world. This means that such an intensional verb expresses a kind of factuality value, so that the intensional world can be called an epistemic modal world. Intensional verbs are therefore epistemic modalizers.
Renaat Declerck
c. ‘Attitudinal verbs’ are verbs like intend, wish, hope, expect, etc. that create a world which is not represented as being the factual world but which has the characteristics of a root modal world: there is little difference of meaning between I want him to do it and He must do it. Attitudinal verbs are thus modalizers creating a nonfactual world that is related to the factual world in terms of root modality. As in the case of root modality expressed by a modal auxiliary, the root modal interpretation of a world created by an attitudinal verb can be supplemented with an epistemic modal interpretation. Most of these nonfactual worlds have the epistemic value ‘not-yet-factual’. Moreover, an epistemic modalizer can often be inserted into the sentence, as in the following: (49) Perhaps John wants to leave. (The epistemic modalizer is perhaps.) (50) I had intended to have left this place earlier. (A counterfactual reading is produced by modally backshifting intended to had intended and by modally backshifting leave to have left.) (51) I wish Jane were here. (The use of the past subjunctive form were creates a counterfactual interpretation of the residue.) 9. Overview of modal worlds A nonfactual world has been defined as a possible world that is not represented as being the factual world. A nonfactual world is by definition a modal world (and vice versa). The world that is evoked by a ‘factive verb’ (realize, acknowledge, etc.) or by a ‘factual conditional clause’ – see Section 4(d) – is the factual world, not a modal world. The world that is evoked is a modal world in the following cases: a. The evoked world is a modal world if the sentence expresses ‘indeterminate epistemic modality’ – see Section 5(b) –, as is the case in ‘imaginary’ and other ‘neutral theoretical’ conditionals. Indeterminate epistemic modality means that the question of the epistemic status of the nonfactual world (i.e. its factuality value vis-à-vis the factual world) is relevant but is not answered because there is no reference to a specific factuality value on the epistemic modal scale. b. The evoked world is also a modal world if the sentence expresses ‘specified epistemic modality’, which means that the question of the epistemic status of the nonfactual world is relevant and is also answered: we know the factuality value (on the epistemic scale) that is applicable. Specified epistemic modality can be indicated by epistemic modal auxiliaries, epistemic modal adverbs,
The definition of modality
intensional verbs (believe, imagine...), comment clauses with an intensional verb (e.g. I think), expressions of posteriority (e.g. before in He died before I had seen him), modally backshifted indicative forms (e.g. [I wish] it was true), modal conditionalization (e.g. I would suggest something different), the subjunctive (e.g. So be it, then./[I wish] it were true) and conditional sentences with a ‘nonneutral theoretical’ conditional clause, i.e. a conditional clause expressing a condition that is ‘closed’, ‘open’, ‘tentative’ or ‘counterfactual’. c. The evoked world is also a modal world if root modality is expressed. The relevant relation between the modal world and the factual world can be specified by a root modal auxiliary, by a root modal adverb (e.g. duly, obligatorily), by an attitudinal verb like want, intend, etc. or by the imperative mood. 10. Conclusion In this article we have attempted to give a definition of modality that is as concrete and as complete as possible. We have argued that there is modality whenever there is reference to actualization of a situation in a world that is not represented as being the factual world. All types of modality have been pigeonholed, regardless of whether the modalizer is a modal auxiliary, a lexical verb, an adverb, a conditional clause, a morphological operation like modal backshifting or conditionalization, etc. Clear definitions have been given of root modality and epistemic modality, and it has been shown that not all epistemic values are modal values: ‘factuality’ is one of the two extremes of the epistemic scale but is not a modal value. On the basis of a rich modal world typology and a relatively great number of possible relations between a modal world and the factual world, many different subtypes of modality have been distinguished, such as ‘indeterminate epistemic modality’ versus ‘specified epistemic modality’, the latter of which can be ‘purely theoretical’, ‘not-yet-factual’ or ‘counterfactual’. ‘Purely theoretical epistemic modality’ has been shown to comprise a variety of relative factuality values, which in the case of conditionals give rise to ‘closed’, ‘open’ and ‘tentative’ P-clauses. It has been shown that root modality and epistemic modality have much in common, in fact everything except the kind of relation existing between the modal world and the factual world. World-evoking verbs, which are usually disregarded in treatments of modality, have been drawn into the picture too. Whereas factive verbs are not modalizers, intensional verbs like believe or imagine can be used as epistemic modalizers, and attitudinal verbs like want or wish as root modalizers.
Renaat Declerck
References Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, & Edward Finnegan. 1999. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd. Declerck, Renaat & Susan Reed. 2001. Conditionals. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Declerck, Renaat. 2009. ‘Nonfactual at t’: A neglected modal concept. In Modality in English, R. Salkie, P. Busuttil, & J. van der Auwera, (eds.), 31–54. Berlin: de Gruyter. Harder, Peter. 1996. Functional Semantics: A Theory of Meaning, Structure and Tense in English. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Huddleston, Rodney. 1984. English Grammar: An Outline. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huddleston, Rodney, & Geoffrey K. Pullum. 2002. The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jespersen, Otto. 1931. A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles. Part 4: Syntax (3rd volume): Time and Tense. London: Allen & Unwin/Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard. Kiparsky, Paul & Carol Kiparsky. 1970. Fact. In Progress in Linguistics, M. Bierwisch & K. E. Heidolph (eds.), 143–173. The Hague: Mouton. Leech, Geoffrey. 2006. A Glossary of English Grammar. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Lyons, John. 1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, & Jan Svartvik. 1985, A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language, London: Longman.
The English present Temporal coincidence vs. epistemic immediacy Ronald W. Langacker
University of California at San Diego Two accounts of the English present are outlined and compared: one that treats it as tense, indicating coincidence with the time of speaking; and one that treats it as modality, indicating epistemic immediacy. Well-known problems with a time-based account are overcome in a conceptual semantic description that makes explicit the mental constructions invoked in non-present uses. With a modal account, the problem is to make the notion of epistemic immediacy sufficiently clear and precise for explicit analysis and comparison to be possible. There is no doubt that the modal account is more general, but for a wide range of central uses the two are effectively equivalent, temporal coincidence providing the basis for epistemic immediacy. The former can be seen as the category prototype, the latter as a schematic (fully general) characterization. Keywords: present tense, Cognitive Grammar, English
1. The issue In line with the theme of this volume, the basic question I address is whether the English “present tense” is best described as marking tense or modality. While this has long been a matter of concern from different perspectives, I will address it specifically in the context of cognitive linguistics and conceptual semantics. Linguists generally agree that the English present does not mark present time, at least not consistently or exclusively. After all, as seen in (1), the simple present cannot be used for present-time events, while it is used for events that are past, future, or time-independent. Nevertheless, I have argued (Langacker 1991: 2001) that the English present can in fact be analyzed quite successfully as marking present time. I have suggested that its “naïve” characterization, as indicating coincidence with the time of speaking, is basically valid. This account has been criticized by Brisard (1999, 2001, 2002), who has argued in general against time-line
Ronald W. Langacker
descriptions of tense, proposing in particular that the English present is best characterized as having a kind of modal import, which I will refer to as epistemic immediacy.
(1) a. *I read a book right now. [present] b. I get home last night and find a note on my door. [past (“historical present”)] c. They leave next week for Darfur. [future] d. Sugar dissolves in water. [time-independent]
I think Brisard would agree that it is not really a matter of choosing between these two accounts. In large measure they are interchangeable, representing alternate perspectives on the same basic vision.1 But while the temporal coincidence account works quite well within its intended scope, i.e. for clauses grounded by “tense” alone, sentences with modals require an epistemic characterization. Thus, if the temporal account is considered prototypical, a schematic (fully general) characterization has to be epistemic. The basic challenge is then to explicate the notion “epistemic immediacy” and how it applies in a broad range of cases. Neither account can be understood without the supporting context of conceptual semantics as developed in cognitive linguistics during the last quarter century. I must therefore start by introducing some basic notions of cognitive semantics and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1990, 1991, 1999a). 2. Prerequisites 2.1
Conceptual semantics
Cognitive semantics starts from the supposition that meaning resides in conceptualization (in a broad sense of the term). Semantic structures are the conceptualizations evoked and symbolized by linguistic expressions. Since the mind is in the loop, linguistic meanings are not determined solely by objective properties of the situations described – what counts is how those situations are apprehended and viewed for linguistic purposes. Crucially, we have the ability to conceive and portray the same situation in alternate ways. This is known as construal. Every expression incorporates a particular way of construing the conceptual content it evokes.
1. “... I have not sufficiently emphasized epistemic immediacy, which I see as the flip side of coincidence with the time of speaking ...” (Langacker 2001: 271 [fn. 6]). My recognition of the need to develop an epistemic account has been reinforced by numerous discussions over the years with Brisard and with Mariko Higuchi.
The English present
Construal is an essential aspect of linguistic meaning, part of the conventional semantic value of lexical and grammatical elements. Among the dimensions of construal are specificity, perspective, scope, and prominence. By specificity I mean the degree of precision and detail at which a situation is characterized. In relative terms, for instance, the noun dove is semantically specific, describing its referent in fine-grained detail, while bird is more schematic, offering only a coarse-grained characterization applicable to a wider range of entities. Perspective includes such factors as vantage point, orientation, and whether a scene is viewed in static or dynamic terms. The expressions in (2) illustrate the contrast between a static and a dynamic construal. The other two factors are exemplified by the phrases next week and last week. As shown in Figure 1, each evokes as its content the conception of an endless series of weeks (w) extending through time (t). They further presuppose a temporal vantage point (VP), located in one of these weeks, as well as an orientation, looking either forward or backward in time, represented by arrows. Given this content and perspective, we can simply describe the expressions as designating the week adjacent to the vantage point (in the direction of orientation). (2) a. We’re very close to Christmas. b. We’re rapidly coming up on Christmas.
[static] [dynamic]
Scope is reasonably viewed as an aspect of perspective, but here it merits separate attention. By scope I mean the extent of the conceptual content an expression invokes as the basis for its meaning – its “coverage” in relevant domains of knowledge and experience. One domain is space, which is central to the conception of physical objects: they exist in space, occupy spatial locations, have a certain spatial extension (size), and manifest a particular spatial configuration (shape). Consider, then, the notion table. We can hardly conceptualize a table without invoking the domain of space. However, it is not necessary to bring the entire universe within our scope of conception; we only need a spatial expanse sufficient for a table to be manifested in it. As shown in Figure 2(a), this vaguely delimited region – invoked to support the concept table – constitutes its spatial scope.
(a) next week W t
Figure 1.╇
W
(b) last week VP
W
W
W
W
W t
W
W
VP W
W
W
Ronald W. Langacker (a) table space spatial scope
(b) next week MS
IS VP
W
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t
Figure 2.╇
From the mental standpoint, considered as a subjective representational space, scope is always bounded – we can only be aware of so much at any one moment. It is like a window on our mental world, with a certain fixed size and bounded by the frame. There is however enormous flexibility in regard to how much of the world appears inside this frame. In particular, we can apprehend most any facet of the world at different scales, and more appears within the frame as scale increases. For example, the following expressions pertain to successively larger time scales, so as their temporal scope (i.e. as the basis for characterization) they invoke successively longer time spans: tomorrow < next week < next month < next year < the next century ... Within a domain, there are often grounds for distinguishing between an expression’s maximal scope (MS), i.e. its overall content, and that portion which is directly relevant for a particular purpose. This I call the immediate scope (IS). Metaphorically, I describe this as the onstage region, the general locus of viewing attention. In the case of next week, the immediate temporal scope is roughly as shown in Figure 2(b), a time span sufficient to support the conception of the designated entity, as apprehended from an offstage vantage point.2 It is however still recognized that the time span being attended to is part of a series of weeks that extends indefinitely. Providing a clearer example are successive terms in a whole-part hierarchy, like the following: body > arm > hand > finger > knuckle. Each expression designates an entity which functions as the immediate scope for purposes of characterizing the next (e.g. a hand is specifically part of an arm, and a finger part of a hand). Of course, the body as a whole still figures in their conception, providing the maximal scope for the part terms. A final aspect of construal is prominence, of which there are many sorts. For instance, onstage elements (those within the immediate scope) are more prominent than offstage elements. For present purposes, the most important kind of prominence is profiling, indicated diagrammatically with heavy lines. We thus 2. I regard the vantage point as being offstage, hence outside the immediate scope, because it remains implicit and is not itself being viewed.
The English present
observe in Figure 2(b) that the phrase next week, for example, profiles a certain week, and not, say, the vantage point or the domain of time overall. An expression’s profile is the entity it designates, or refers to – its conceptual referent (as opposed to its referent in “the world”, if indeed it has one). As such it is the specific focus of attention within the expression’s immediate scope (the general locus of attention). If the immediate scope is like a stage, the profile is like the actor currently being watched. The role of the mind in constructing linguistic meaning is by no means limited to imposing alternate construals on conceptual content. In large measure, that content – and more generally the world we live in and talk about (what counts as “the world” for linguistic purposes) – is mentally constructed. Crucial here are various mental phenomena, reasonably described as imaginative in nature, which have been extensively explored in cognitive linguistics. Among these are mental spaces, fictivity, metaphor, and blending. These give rise to elaborate mental constructions that are often essential for the semantic and grammatical coherence of expressions. Mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Fauconnier & Sweetser 1996) are separate “working areas”, each hosting a conceptual structure representing some facet of an overall conception. Though each has a measure of autonomy, a crucial factor is their configuration: the nature of the spaces, their relations to one another, and correspondences between their elements. Consider the sentence Joe wants to meet an actress. To describe its meaning, we have to distinguish between reality, the space invoked by default, and a space representing the content of Joe’s desire. The difference between the specific and non-specific interpretations is a matter of whether the actress figuring in his desire corresponds to one existing in reality, or is merely imagined, existing only in the desire space. On the non-specific interpretation, the actress referred to is said to be a fictive (or virtual) entity, rather than an actual individual. Of the entities we refer to linguistically, surprisingly many are fictive, even in discussions of actual situations (Langacker 1999b, 2005; Matsumoto 1996a, 1996b; Sweetser 1997; Talmy 1996). In Each boy threw a stone, for example, all the entities mentioned are virtual rather than actual. Each boy is not any actual boy, the stone mentioned stands for the actual stones involved but cannot be identified with any of them, and likewise for the profiled event of throwing that these fictive entities participate in. Still, the sentence is used to describe an actual complex occurrence. Cognitive linguists have amply documented the pervasive importance of metaphor in thought and language (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Lakoff & Núñez 2000; Lakoff & Turner 1989; Turner 1987). A metaphor consists in correspondences established between two domains of experience, a source domain and a target domain, the former providing a means of apprehending the latter. In (2b), the source
Ronald W. Langacker
domain of movement through space is used to apprehend the target domain of time and sequences of events. Metaphor proves to be a special case of blending (Fauconnier & Turner 2002). In blending, selected elements of two input spaces are projected and integrated to form another space, called the blend. The concept robot, for instance, represents a blend of the notions person and machine. A blend has its own, emergent properties and is often purely fictive, something which could not exist in actuality. This happens in metaphor, a special case of blending, where a blend results from using the source domain to apprehend the target domain. Despite its fictive nature, the resulting blend provides the situation described by metaphorical expressions. Thus, just as its form suggests, (2b) describes the virtual process of moving through time as if it were a spatial landscape. This mental construction, involving metaphor and blending, is responsible for the expression’s semantic and grammatical coherence. 2.2
Symbolic grammar
A properly formulated conceptual semantics, strongly justified in its own terms, makes possible an account of grammar which views it as inherently meaningful. More specifically, I claim that lexicon and grammar form a continuum consisting solely in assemblies of symbolic structures. A symbolic structure is the pairing of a semantic structure with a phonological structure (its semantic and phonological poles). The aspect of this approach that most concerns us is doubtless the most controversial, even in cognitive linguistics. It is the claim that basic grammatical categories, such as noun and verb, can be characterized semantically – not just at the prototype level, but schematically, for the classes in general. Standard arguments against their semantic definability are erroneous because they ignore the vital role of conceptualization (considering only objective properties of the entities described), and also because the definitions considered (and rightfully rejected) – notions like ‘object’, ‘person’, ‘place’, and ‘event’ – are too specific to be valid for all instances. Conceptual characterizations have to based on how situations are apprehended and construed, and since the same content is subject to alternate construals, it can perfectly well support expressions representing different categories. Furthermore, characterizations schematic enough to cover all instances cannot be tied to specific conceptual content. They must instead be based on mental operations (or cognitive abilities). A key point is that an expression’s meaning depends on the nature of its profile, not its overall conceptual content. Consider the verb throw, sketched in Figure 3(a). It profiles an event in which an agent exerts force (double arrow) on another participant, thereby causing it to move along a spatial path (single arrow). The same conceptual content figures in thrower, represented in Figure 3(b), which is not however a verb but rather a noun. It is a noun because, with respect to this
The English present
content, it does not profile the event – a complex relationship that unfolds through time – but rather the agent, a kind of thing, in an abstract sense of the term. This difference in profiling is not a matter of the objective situation (which may be the same), or the conceptual content representing it, but rather one of construal, specifically the directing and focusing of attention. The same content also gives rise to the noun throw, a count noun designating one instance of the event (e.g. He hurried his throw). While this noun does refer to the same event as the verb, it is not semantically equivalent, because it construes it very differently: it takes the entire, temporally extended relationship and views it holistically as a single, object-like entity, represented by the ellipse in diagram (c). Throw is a noun because it profiles this abstract, mentally constructed thing. There is no reason to doubt that we have this capacity for conceptual reification. It is no more remarkable than the construal of time through spatial metaphor, as in (2b), or its personification in (3a). I believe it reflects the same mental operations that produce the referents of nouns like the ones in (3b). While it clearly consists of multiple entities, the profile of a noun such as stack is construed as a single, bounded entity at a higher level of conceptual organization. For this reason it functions grammatically as a singular count noun. (3) a. Time creeps up on us and robs us of our youth. b. stack, team, set, herd, flock, orchestra, alphabet, orchard, collection, archipelago ... Thus I define a thing abstractly, in terms of mental operations (Langacker 1987b, 1991: ch. 1). Here I merely suggest that these are basically contractive in nature, producing a unitary entity from constitutive elements. Conversely, I define a relationship abstractly in terms of basically expansive mental operations, which take an entity as the basis for further assessment, usually involving other entities (though it may also be internal). Granted these abstract notions, schematic characterizations can be offered for basic grammatical categories. A nominal expression – a noun or a noun phrase – profiles a thing. Verbs, adjectives, and prepositions profile different kinds of relationships. In particular, a verbal expression – a verb or a finite clause – profiles a process, by which I mean a relationship followed sequentially in its evolution through time. (a) throw (V)
⇒ Figure 3.╇
(b) thrower (N)
→
⇒
(c) throw (N)
→
⇒
→
Ronald W. Langacker
Clearly, the event described by throw evolves through time. There is first the agentpatient interaction, involving the transmission of force, and then the patient’s rapid movement along a spatial path. The verb throw represents the default way of apprehending this event, by simply tracking this relationship as it unfolds through time. As a noun, throw invokes the same event, which develops through time in just the same manner, but represents a non-default way of apprehending it. Instead of tracking it through time, instant by instant, it takes a summary view, construing it as a unitary entity at a higher level of conceptual organization. This is not unlike the summation producing the higher-order things profiled by the nouns in (3b), except that the constitutive elements, instead of being things themselves, are relationships (the successive “time-slices” of the event). Thus an expression is not a verb just because its content involves a relationship with temporal extension – it must further be apprehended and profiled as such. The essential role of construal is further evident in the three-way contrast in (4) among the verb resemble, the preposition like, and the adjective alike. All three expressions profile a relationship consisting in an assessment of similarity, indicated in Figure 4 with a dashed, double-headed arrow. Objectively, this relationship endures indefinitely, without essential change. Linguistically, the three expressions all have a different take on it. Being a verb, resemble specifically views it as continuing through time; this tracking through time is indicated by the bar along the time arrow. But since the relation is constant through time, the assessment can also be made with respect to any single moment during this indefinite time span. The preposition and the adjective construe it in this manner. The relationship they profile is equivalent to any time-slice of the verbal process. They simply present the essential content of the relation, in abstraction from its temporal duration. They do not themselves follow it through time.3 Hence they are not processual in nature, and thus not verbs. The basic difference between a preposition and an adjective is that the former has two salient participants, the latter just one. Within the class of adjectives, alike is atypical because the entity it puts in focus as its one salient participant is a higher-order thing consisting of distinct individuals. It thus takes either a plural or a coordinate subject (e.g. Bush and Putin). This is then a case where the profiled relationship is internal to what is construed (albeit at a higher level of organization) as a single participant. (4) a. Bush resembles Putin. b. Bush is like Putin. c. Bush and Putin are alike. 3. They can however combine with be, as they do in (4). This schematic verb gives them temporal extension at a higher level of conceptual organization.
The English present (a) resemble (V)
(b) like (P)
(c) alike (ADJ)
t
Figure 4.╇
Especially important here is a basic conceptual distinction observable within the noun and verb categories. In the case of nouns, it is manifested in the grammatical opposition count vs. mass. For verbs, the analogous opposition is “active” vs. “stative”, or in my terminology, perfective vs. imperfective. The verb throw, for instance, profiles a perfective process, resemble an imperfective one. Once allowance is made for the inherent difference between nouns and verbs, the count/mass and perfective/imperfective oppositions turn out to be exactly the same (Langacker 1987b). For ease of presentation, I limit my discussion of nouns to the prototypes: physical objects for count nouns, physical substances for mass nouns. We think of these as existing primarily in space – I will say that space is their domain of instantiation. The account, though, is fully general, accommodating nouns with other domains of instantiation (e.g. time for a noun like week). With verbs the domain of instantiation is always time. The parallelism of count nouns and perfective processes is spelled out in (5). With respect to each property, they are polar opposites of substances and imperfective processes, as described in (6). Let us consider each property in turn, starting with objects and substances. (5) An object or a perfective process is: a. conceived as being bounded (in the immediate scope in its domain of instantiation); b. not conceived as being internally homogeneous; c. not contractible (an arbitrary subpart is not itself an instance); d. replicable (combining two instances results in multiple instances).
Ronald W. Langacker
(6) A substance or an imperfective process is: a. not conceived as being bounded (in the immediate scope in its domain of instantiation); b. conceived as being internally homogeneous; c. contractible (an arbitrary subpart is itself an instance); d. not replicable (combining two instances results in a single, larger instance). A physical object, such as a shoe, is conceived as being bounded in space (its domain of instantiation). The boundary and the shape it defines are inherent in the conception of an instance, so they fall within the immediate scope, i.e. the spatial expanse required to support this conception. This is shown in Figure 5(a), where shading represents the material substance constituting the object. Objects in general are not conceived as being internally homogeneous – they have distinguishable parts, often consisting of different substances. From these two properties it follows that an object is usually not contractible, i.e. a subpart is not itself an instance of the same type (part of a shoe is not itself a shoe). Finally, due to bounding an object is replicable: putting two instances together results in multiple instances (not a single, larger instance). Substances, for instance leather, exhibit the opposite properties. Though bounding is not precluded, it is not part of the characterization of a substance. Instead, a substance is characterized in qualitative terms (rather than by shape or observation of a spatial boundary). As such it is conceived as being internally homogeneous (the same qualitative properties hold throughout its spatial extension). From these two properties it follows that any portion of a substance is itself an instance of the same type, i.e. a substance is contractible. Hence the configuration in diagram (b): starting from a large expanse of substance, if we “zoom in” and direct attention to just a subpart – which is thus the immediate scope of conception – that portion is itself identifiable (on qualitative grounds) as an instance of the substance in question.4 Finally, a substance is not replicable, in the sense that combining two instances does not result in multiple instances, but rather a single, larger instance. For example, we talk about the leather in those two shoes – although the leather and the shoes are spatially coextensive, in terms of their linguistic construal there are two instances of shoe but only one instance of leather comprising them both. Turning now to processes, let me first introduce the notational convention of using an elongated box with square corners to represent a perfective process, as in Figure 5(c), and one with rounded corners for an imperfective process, as in 5(d). For either sort of process, the domain of instantiation is time: just as a physical 4. Note that only this portion is profiled, since by definition an expression’s profile is the focus of attention within its immediate scope.
The English present (a) Object
(b) Substance
MS IS
space
(c) Perfective process MS
MS
MS IS
IS
IS space
(d) Imperfective process
t
t
Figure 5.╇
object or substance has spatial extension, a process has temporal extension. To carry the analogy one step further, let us ask what corresponds to the material substance that constitutes a physical thing. With a process, what extends through time (in the same way that substance extends through space) is nothing other than the profiled relationship, as shown in Figure 4(a). And like the material substance of an object, the component states of a process – the relations obtaining at each instant (its “time-slices”) – may or may not be the same throughout. That is, a process may consist in either a change through time or the continuation through time of a stable situation. A perfective process, like throw, is conceived as being bounded in time. And since the bounding is part of the characterization of such a process, something required to identify an instance of the type, it falls within the immediate scope in this domain, as seen in Figure 5(c). A perfective process is not conceived as being internally homogeneous. For instance, throwing has different phases (swinging of the arm, motion of the projectile), and since even a single phase involves a change through time, the constitutive relations (time-slices) differ from instant to instant. Thus a perfective process is not contractive, e.g. swinging the arm is not itself an instance of throwing. And it is of course replicable: successive acts of throwing constitute two instances of this process type. By contrast, an imperfective process like resemble has indefinite temporal extension, in the sense that bounding is inessential to its characterization. This goes along with its being internally homogeneous: the same relationship holds throughout, thus providing a qualitative means of identification. As a consequence, any portion of the overall process is itself an instance of the same type. If the statement Bush resembles Putin is valid throughout their official careers, it is also valid for any part of that time span, e.g. during 2005. So if we limit our attention to that immediate scope, in the manner of diagram (d), the same statement applies to the profiled segment thus delimited. An imperfective process is also non-replicable, i.e. combining two instances yields a single, longer instance. If Bush resembled Putin all during 2004, and all during 2005 as well, we would not say that Bush resembled Putin twice, but rather that he resembled him over the entire period.
Ronald W. Langacker
Obviously, I have provided only the bare minimum in regard to theoretical and descriptive prerequisites. With this background, we can now turn to the main order of business: presenting and assessing alternative accounts of the English present tense. 3. Temporal coincidence What is surprising about the account based on temporal coincidence is that it works so well, given the undeniable facts in (1): normally the present cannot be used for present-time events, but can be used for non-present occurrences (past, future, or time-independent). Nonetheless, I have proposed and defended the following characterization:
(7) The English present tense specifies that an instance of the profiled process occurs and precisely coincides with the time of speaking.
Let us first deal with the problem posed by examples like (1a), *I read a book right now, returning later to “non-present” uses of the present. 3.1
Present perfectives
Linguists recognize the need to posit two basic classes of English verbs – perfective (or “active”) vs. imperfective (or “stative”) – on the basis of grammatical behavior. In particular, perfectives resist occurring in the simple present tense but do take the progressive with be...-ing, while imperfectives do the opposite, as seen in (8). In (8ai) I include the adverb right now to force a “true present” interpretation, as opposed to one of the non-present interpretations (e.g. as habitual). Some linguists might define the two classes on the basis of these and other grammatical behaviors. In Cognitive Grammar, however, I take such behaviors as being merely symptomatic of a conceptual contrast, characterized in (5)–(6). Thus it is not a rigid lexical contrast. Although most verbs have a primary categorization as either perfective or imperfective, numerous factors are capable of inducing an alternate construal resulting in the opposite behavior. I do not attempt to survey these here. (8) a. Perfective: b. Imperfective:
(i) *He mows the lawn (right now). (ii) He is mowing the lawn. (i) He knows Italian. (ii) *He is knowing Italian.
With respect to the classic aspectual categories described by Vendler (1967), perfective verbs subsume three of the four – achievement, accomplishment, and
The English present
activity verbs – while imperfectives correspond to stative verbs. Activity verbs, such as sleep, sit, and swim, behave like other perfectives in regard to the present tense and the progressive. While the processes they designate are easily construed as being internally homogeneous, they are nonetheless conceived as occurring in bounded episodes, and bounding is the critical property for the perfective/imperfective contrast. Note that verbs like these – bounded yet internally homogeneous – are directly comparable to count nouns such as lake, board, or lawn (bounded expanses of water, wood, and grass). Their conceptual characterizations make it possible to explain why perfectives and imperfectives behave grammatically as they do. Why do only perfectives take the progressive? The reason is that the progressive construction serves an imperfectivizing function, so its application to imperfectives would be superfluous. Its effect is sketched in Figure 6. On the conception of a perfective process, it imposes an immediate temporal scope internal to its boundaries, thus confining the profiled relationship to the onstage portion so delimited. Since bounding is no longer evident within the immediate scope, the derived process is imperfective. It is further construed as being internally homogeneous (the constitutive relationships are effectively equivalent, being identified only as time-slices of the original perfective process). Turning now to tense, we observe that the English past tense is compatible with both perfectives and imperfectives (He mowed the lawn; He knew Italian), and that imperfectives occur in the present (He knows Italian). It is only presenttense perfectives that are problematic (*He mows the lawn). To see why we must first describe the tense morphemes. Like the progressive, they impose an immediate temporal scope, i.e. they direct attention to a particular span of time for purposes of viewing the profiled clausal process. Unlike the progressive, which is aspectual, the present and past are deictic elements that identify this time span relative to the speech event. In diagrams, I represent the speech event by means of a box with squiggly lines. Obviously, the past morpheme imposes an immediate scope that is prior to the time of speaking, as shown in Figure 7(a). The profiled Progressive (be Ving) MS IS
t
Figure 6.╇
Ronald W. Langacker (a) Past IS
t
(b) Present MS
IS
t
(c) Performative MS
IS
MS
t
Figure 7.╇
process must appear in this frame. In the case of the present, shown in diagram (b), the immediate temporal scope and the speech event are coextensive. The hypothesis at issue is that the designated process precisely coincides with this time span. Past perfectives are unproblematic because there is no inherent limit on the size of the immediate temporal scope – it need only precede the speech event. Hence it can always be made large enough to encompass a bounded process, as required. Past imperfectives are also unproblematic, but for a different reason. Since they may extend indefinitely, there is no guarantee that a limited immediate scope always contains them in their entirety. But full inclusion is unnecessary, due to contractibility. Any subpart of an imperfective process is itself a valid instance of its type. Suppose, then, that an imperfective process overflows the limits of the immediate scope, as seen in diagram (a). The portion subtended by it, and profiled by virtue of being onstage, itself constitutes an instance of the process type, hence the requirements are met. In just the same way, imperfectives work in the present tense because, as seen in diagram (b), the portion of an imperfective process which coincides with the time of speaking itself counts as an instance of its type. Perfective and imperfective processes are naturally associated with different modes of apprehension. Since bounding is inherent in its characterization, a perfective process has to be observed in its entirety to be identified. But with imperfectives this is not an issue, as there may not be any “entirety”. For a stable situation that extends indefinitely, the usual mode of apprehension is one of sampling some limited portion. A limited sample is sufficient for qualitative identification and may be all that is possible. Why, it may now be asked, are present perfectives problematic? There is nothing conceptually incoherent about a bounded process being coincident with the speech event. Rather than their being semantically anomalous, I have suggested that present perfectives pose problems of use from the pragmatic standpoint. One problem is durational: most bounded events that we might have occasion to talk about happen not to be the same in length as the time required to utter a clause describing them. It takes at most a second to produce the sentence He mows the
The English present
lawn, but the actual mowing is likely to take far longer. There is also an epistemic problem: by the time we observe an event to find out what is happening, it is already too late to initiate a description that precisely coincides with it. Striking confirmation for this explanation comes from a major exception to the non-occurrence of present-tense perfectives, namely performatives (Austin 1962): (9) a. I order you to destroy those files. b. I hereby sentence you to 30 days in the county jail. c. I promise that I will be more careful. Speech act verbs are perfective (note that they take the progressive when used descriptively, e.g. She is ordering him to destroy the files). But when used to actually perform the speech act named, they necessarily occur in the present.5 Performatives represent a special case of language use where the durational and epistemic problems simply do not arise. The durational problem does not arise because, in a performative, the profiled process and the speech event are one and the same, hence necessarily the same in duration, as shown in Figure 7(c). The epistemic problem does not arise because the speaker has prior intention to perform the act in question – she does not have to observe the event in order to identify it. The infelicity of present tense perfectives is therefore not due to inherent semantic anomaly, but rather to the durational and epistemic problems that arise in a particular kind of circumstance. This circumstance does however have defaultcase status. In the default viewing arrangement, the interlocutors are together in a fixed location from which they observe and report on actual occurrences in the world around them. It is on this basis that a sentence like He mows the lawn is judged ungrammatical and given a star, even though it is perfectly acceptable assuming a different arrangement (e.g. to describe a habitual practice). The incompatibility stems from the interaction between the default viewing arrangement (involving observation and description) and the meaning of the present tense. We can therefore predict that present tense perfectives will also be acceptable in other viewing circumstances where the durational and epistemic problems happen not to arise. This will be so when the event in question has the right duration to be made coincident with the time of speaking, and where the speaker is the actor, acting intentionally and with full awareness. We can imagine, for example, a friendly game of chess in which a player describes his move as he makes it. The first clause in (10a) would be uttered while moving the rook, and the second clause 5. I do not consider cases with the progressive, e.g. I am ordering you to destroy those files, to be true performatives. Rather, they represent the politeness strategy of indirectness: the speaker avoids the direct assertion of authority, achieving the same effect by merely describing what he is actually doing. Alternatively, the sentence could be used to reinforce an order already made or merely implied, the explicit description leaving no room for ambiguity.
Ronald W. Langacker
while removing the opponent’s knight. Or, we can imagine a situation where, for some reason, the speaker carries out a series of bodily movements and describes each one as it occurs, as in (10b). Although the situation may be contrived, use of the present with perfectives is perfectly natural in this context. (10) a. I move my rook to QB3, and capture your knight. b. I raise my hand. I lower my hand. I turn to the left. I turn back to the right. A very common use of present-tense perfectives is for the play-by-play description of sporting events, as in (11a). This would seem to be a clear instance of the default viewing arrangement. Why, then, are present-tense perfectives not just acceptable, but the norm? For one thing, the events described do in fact have just about the right duration. A longer event, like the manager walking from the dugout to the pitcher’s mound, would normally not be reported in the simple present. Also, the events in question are highly stereotyped, to the point that they can be identified very quickly and even anticipated. Observe that events that depart from the usual script, like the fight in (11c), are not reported in the present. There is also a certain amount of tolerance in normal language use. If I say, for instance, that All politicians are dishonest, you will not consider me a liar if we both recognize that there are a few exceptions. So given the reality of the situation, we are no doubt prepared to cut the announcer a bit of slack in regard to temporal coincidence. We might also say that the play-by-play style of announcing is based on a fictive viewing arrangement, where the fiction of simultaneous reporting is adopted for sake of convenience and “vividness”. (11) a. He hits it into the hole. Jeter makes a nice stop. He fires to first, and gets him by a step. b. The manager {is walking/*walks} slowly toward the mound. c. A fight {has just broken out/*breaks out} in the stands! 3.2
Non-present uses
Play-by-play reporting represents a transitional case between present and nonpresent uses of the present. To the extent that it relies on scripting or a fictive viewing arrangement, it resembles the latter. Non-present uses of the present are all based on departures from the default viewing arrangement. When these are properly recognized, an account in terms of temporal coincidence can be rescued. As another transitional case, imagine a group of detectives watching a surveillance tape which has caught the commission of a crime. One detective, who has previously viewed the tape, narrates what is happening as it happens, in the manner
The English present
of (12a), describing each event as it appears on the monitor. In another arrangement, the clerk might recall the same events using the “historical present”, as in (12b). In both cases present tense perfectives are perfectly felicitous. (12) a. The suspect enters the store. Now he approaches the counter. He hands the clerk a note. Now he pulls back his coat, and shows her the gun. b. I’m working late last night, just getting ready to close up, when this guy walks in. He comes to the counter and gives me a note. Then he pulls back his coat and I see a gun. Why the present, when the events were in the past? What is crucial here is that both situations involve a special viewing arrangement more elaborate than the default one. It is not just a matter of observing and describing actual occurrences. In (12a), the interlocutors are not observing the events themselves, directly, but are watching a video replay. In (12b), the events once observed directly are being accessed through recall. The historical present is not unreasonably described as a “mental replay”, where previous events are relived by running the tapes of memory. In both cases, a distinction can be drawn between the events themselves and representations of the events. A surveillance video represents events. Memory records experience for later access. We must therefore ask which level the expressions in (12) apply to. It seems to me quite evident that they are directly describing the representations rather than the events themselves. When the detective says He hands the clerk a note, he is directly describing something that happens in the context of the surveillance video. Of course, since the events on the video are representations of actual events, the expressions also describe the latter – but only indirectly, via the description of the video events representing them. Similarly, the historical present consists in describing events that occur as part of a mental replay; only indirectly, via this replay, do the expressions pertain to the original, actual events. I propose, then, that the present perfectives in (12) are based on special viewing arrangements more elaborate than the default arrangement. As shown in Figure 8, these special viewing arrangements involve the distinction between a represented event, which may be actual, and a representing event, which – as a representation – is necessarily virtual. In these arrangements, what is being “viewed”, and directly described linguistically, is the representing event. However, the entire configuration, including the representing event and the relation it bears to an actual one, is part of an expression’s overall meaning. Every expression presupposes a multifaceted conceptual substrate that supports the content overtly expressed and renders it coherent. The viewing arrangement is one facet of this substrate. On this account the present perfectives in (12) do in fact describe events coincident with the time of speaking. In (12a), the detective describes each virtual event as it occurs on the monitor. They are all roughly of the proper length. For
Ronald W. Langacker (a) Default viewing arrangement Expression Direct description Actual event
(b) Special viewing arrangement Expression Direct description Representing event (Virtual) Representation Represented event (actual)
Figure 8.╇
longer events, the detective would probably resort to the progressive: Now he’s walking around the store to be sure there’s no security guard. Likewise, a speaker using the historical present describes events coincident with their successive recall. Or to put it another way, the speaker relives the events by recounting them. And since they are only being recalled (not actually occurring), duration is not a problem: by adjusting the speed of the replay, the representing events can always be made to coincide with the time of speaking. I suggest that Figure 8(b) represents a general scheme for (so-called) nonpresent uses of the present. They are all based on mental constructions involving representations of occurrences. It is these virtual occurrences – rather than the actual ones they represent – that are directly described linguistically and coincide with the time of speaking. The constructions involved are numerous and varied in nature. I consider just a few more (representative?) cases. First is the future use of the present, as in (13a). I call this the “scheduled future”, since it evokes some kind of plan or schedule governing the occurrence of future events. Although it may be physically manifested, in printed form or on a monitor, what matters is the existence of a schedule as a mentally and socially constructed entity – an accepted plan expected to govern the timing and occurrence of future events. Observe that we do not use the scheduled future for events that cannot be planned or controlled, e.g. (13b). Note further that we have to posit this mental construction and acknowledge its linguistic relevance quite independently of the present tense. In (13c), for instance, the second clause still describes a scheduled future occurrence, even though the verb is marked for past tense rather than present. In other words, the scheduled future is not just a meaning of the present tense, but arises from the interaction of the present tense with an independent conceptual phenomenon.
The English present
(13) a. We have to hurry. The plane leaves in ten minutes. b. *A nuclear accident destroys Seattle next week. c. She was rushing through the airport. The plane left in ten minutes. The scheduled future use of the present is sketched in Figure 9. A schedule comprises a series of virtual events, each the mental representation of an anticipated actual event. While the represented events lie in the future, the virtual representing events are presently available whenever the schedule is known and in effect. In expressions like (13a), the speaker is not referring directly to the planned future event. What she is doing, instead, is consulting the schedule and “reading off ” an entry. Reading off an entry consists in activating or mentally reconstituting the profiled representing event. This virtual occurrence, which is just a matter of the speaker apprehending what she is saying, coincides with the time of speaking.6 A script is something like a schedule, one difference being that the represented events can occur at any time – indeed, any number of times – provided that they all occur in the proper (scripted) sequence. In “reading” a script, the virtual representing events are mentally reconstructed from their descriptions, and interpreted as models to be emulated in producing the actual events constituting a performance.7 In the case of scripts, some situations are ambivalent as to whether the events being described are the actual ones of a performance or the virtual ones the performance instantiates. Imagine a cooking show on TV, where the chef describes each step roughly coincident with performing it, as in (14a). Possibly the chef is directly describing the actions themselves, in the manner of (10). However, the chef is also following a script, so despite the first-person pronoun (which I take as reflecting the actual performance), he might also be describing the virtual MS
IS schedule (virtual events) t
t
(anticipated actual events)
Figure 9.╇ 6. A diagram for the historical present would be comparable, except that the represented events are prior to the time of speaking, accessible by recall rather than scheduling. 7. Of course, these “actual” events may themselves be fictive representations of something that may or may not have happened in reality.
Ronald W. Langacker
representing events which constitute it, doing so in sync with the actual events instantiating them. In another style of narration, the chef describes each action before performing it, as in (14b). If the descriptions pertain directly to the actual events, we have to say that this speech genre allows a generous tolerance in regard to simultaneity (more generous than in the play-by-play mode). What I incline to say, instead, is that the expressions directly describe the virtual events of the script. The chef evokes each successive representing event by way of introducing the actual event that will follow. (14) a. First I take an egg. I crack it and empty it into a bowl. Now I take a cup of flour, and put it in the bowl with the egg. I mix them together ... b. First I take six eggs ... I crack them and empty them into a mixing bowl ... Now I measure out two cups of flour ... I put them into the bowl with the eggs ... Next I beat the mixture until it is well blended ... As a final example, consider a singular generic, as in (15a). Generics invoke a cultural model in which certain kinds of events are taken as reflecting the world’s essential nature, which provides a stable structure within which other, incidental events occur (Goldsmith & Woisetschlaeger 1982; Langacker 1997). Accordingly, our knowledge of the world includes a set of structural generalizations, representing how the world is thought to work. These generalizations are not limited to laws of nature or physical matters; part of what constitutes the structure of our “world” is established social practice. Sentence (15a) describes a structural generalization of this sort. As a generalization, it is necessarily a virtual entity, representing what is common to any number of actual occurrences. The process profiled by this clause is thus a virtual event corresponding to an open-ended set of actual ones, as sketched in Figure 10. The man and woman referred to by the subject and object nominals are virtual instances of their types rather than actual individuals. In producing a sentence like (15a), the speaker is “reading off ” an entry in this representation of the world’s essential structure. So while the represented events have no particular temporal location, this virtual occurrence of the profiled representing event coincides with the time of speaking. (15) a. A man proposes to a woman. [That’s how it’s done.] b. In those days, a man proposed to a woman. [Now anything goes.] Once more, this mental construction – the notion of structural generalizations pertaining to the world’s essential nature – is independent of the present tense. It is also invoked in past-tense sentences like (15b), describing what the world’s structure used to be like (before the world went to hell). Thus genericity is not, in and of itself, a meaning of the present tense. Rather, the mental construction provides a particular context in which the present can be used in its normal value.
The English present MS
IS structual generalizations
…
m
w
m
m
w
w
m
w
m
w
…
t
Figure 10.╇
4. Epistemic immediacy The temporal coincidence account of the English present enjoys a considerable degree of descriptive success. To compare it with an account based on epistemic immediacy, the latter needs to be formulated with comparable detail and precision. While not the same in all specifics, the following attempt is in the same spirit as the proposals made in Brisard (2002). 4.1
General considerations
In presenting the temporal coincidence account, I spoke of the “virtual occurrence” of events. For the profiled event and the speech event to temporally coincide they have to both occur, and when the former is only virtual, its occurrence must be virtual as well. What it means to say that a virtual event “occurs” depends on its nature and provenance. A taped event occurs in the sense of appearing on a monitor, where it is subject to observation in much the same manner as the original, actual event. A recalled event consists in a mental simulation, a partial reactivation of the original experience. In the case of scripts, mental schedules, or generalizations about the world’s inherent structure, a virtual event’s occurrence may simply be a matter of its apprehension by the speaker as the essential content of a finite clause.8 While I take this notion as being both coherent and defensible, it has the drawback that words like occur and occurrence suggest the actual realization of events. 8. This too is a kind of mental simulation, granted the view – now prevalent in cognitive semantics – that simulation has a central role in conceptual meaning (e.g. Johnson 1987; Barsalou 1999; Matlock 2004; Bergen 2005).
Ronald W. Langacker
An epistemic approach has the advantage of allowing us to avoid these terms. Instead of saying that an event’s occurrence coincides with the time of speaking, we can simply say that the present indicates epistemic immediacy of the profiled process. This is what Brisard (2002: 263) is getting at with expressions like “immediate givenness”, “present givenness”, “epistemic certainty”, and “immediate certainty”. Of course, I am less concerned with the term than with its import. What does this “immediacy” or “certainty” consist of? And if the profiled clausal process is specified as being immediate, who is it immediate to? And when? Our concern is limited to English tense and the basic modals. These constitute what is referred to in Cognitive Grammar as clausal grounding (Brisard [ed.] 2002; Langacker 2002a, 2002b): grammaticized elements that specify the epistemic status of the profiled process vis-à-vis the ground (the speech event and its participants). To avoid extraneous issues, I will make the standard simplifying assumption that the proposition expressed by a finite clause represents the actual view of the current speaker.9 Assuming this default, the present indicates epistemic immediacy to the speaker at the time of speaking. So as soon as one tries to be explicit about immediacy, the notion of temporal coincidence re-enters the picture. This should come as no surprise, as temporal and epistemic concerns are closely bound up with one another. It has often been observed that present, past, and future are not just locations along a line, but differ in essential respects (Brisard 1999; Evans 2004: 186–188). This is sometimes phrased in terms of mental experience and the kind of access we have to occurrences: we access the present through direct experience, the past through memory, and the future through anticipation. Alternatively, it is sometimes phrased more objectively, with no explicit reference to cognition: the past is fixed and the future undetermined, while the present mediates between them as the ongoing transition from potential to realized. But in either case these are fundamentally epistemic notions. I accept the basic validity of these qualitative distinctions. Moreover, I see in them a motivation for certain aspects of linguistic structure. In and of themselves, however, they cannot serve as an actual characterization of tense. Obviously, for example, the English present cannot be characterized semantically as indicating that the speaker directly perceives or experiences the profiled occurrence – if only because so much of what we talk about is abstract, mentally and socially constructed, or learned through communication or instruction. We cannot simply describe the past tense as meaning that the profiled occurrence is accessed through memory. After all, much of what we describe in 9. The extent to which this oversimplifies matters, and how to approach the full range of cases (not just this special, albeit privileged case), are spelled out in Langacker (2004a).
The English present
present-tense sentences is also retrieved through memory (e.g. Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska). Suppose we base semantic characterizations of tense on the idea that the past is fixed, the present inchoate, and the future undetermined. It would then seem problematic that the present is used for “timeless” statements of general validity, e.g. A triangle is a three-sided polygon. And if the relevant notion is “epistemic certainty”, why does this not point to the past rather than the present? Something that is fixed would seem to be epistemically more certain that something merely inchoate. Simple characterizations of this sort – e.g. defining the present tense in terms of direct experience, and the past tense in terms of memory – might be workable if the use of language were limited to personally witnessed physical occurrences (statements like I see an apple; The apple may fall; The apple fell; The apple is on the ground). But general characterizations have to be more abstract and broadly applicable. An epistemic account has to accommodate knowledge irrespective of its nature and source. In particular, a general description of the English present requires a notion of epistemic immediacy that is elaborate and less than obvious, being based on cognitive models and mental constructions. 4.2
An epistemic model
My account (Langacker 1991: ch. 6; 2004a; 2008) starts from the premise that living creatures are continually striving to gain or maintain control of their circumstances. This striving for control occurs on many levels: physical, perceptual, mental, and social. It includes such varied activities as eating, focusing attention, acquiring possessions, and establishing social relationships. And crucially, at the mental level, it includes our ongoing effort to build up a coherent conception of “the world” (in the broadest sense of that term). The result of this activity, for a given conceptualizer at a given time, constitutes what I refer to as a reality conception.10 As life continues, a conceptualizer is constantly engaged in adjusting and augmenting his conception of reality on the basis of new experience. So reality, for a particular conceptualizer (C), is what C currently accepts as valid or established. At least for the time being, it is a settled matter, as opposed to being merely suspected or simply being considered. It is what C “knows” (rightly or wrongly). Considering an element P for inclusion in reality (R) is to some extent a force-dynamic activity (Talmy 1988), a manifestation of C’s striving for epistemic control. But once the issue has been resolved, P’s inclusion as part of R 10. The word “reality” should not be taken too strictly, since “the world” – in the broadest sense – includes innumerable entities that are not real in any narrow sense, e.g. mental constructions like a schedule or a structural generalization about the world’s essential nature.
Ronald W. Langacker (a) Epistemic striving
⇒
C R
(b) Epistemic control
P
C
P R
Figure 11.╇
represents a locally stable situation, a state of relaxation (rather than mental effort). Note that this abstract characterization makes no reference to the source of knowledge or its means of incorporation in R. It makes no difference whether P’s acceptance in R is based on perception, hearsay, inference, instruction, intuition, etc. This much is sketched in Figure 11, where a double dashed arrow indicates the striving for epistemic control. The English tense-modal system (clausal grounding) is based on this distinction between epistemic striving and epistemic control. The system consists of two binary oppositions: the presence vs. the absence of a modal; and “present” vs. “past”, which – as a general characterization – is better described as “proximal” vs. “distal”, or immediate vs. non-immediate. The presence of a modal indicates epistemic striving, in which case the choice of the modal (may, can, will, shall, must, and their non-immediate counterparts) specifies the degree of force involved (Sweetser 1982; Talmy 1988; Langacker 2008). The absence of a modal indicates epistemic control: the profiled process is part of C’s conception of reality. We will return to the modals. For now, let us concentrate on cases where a modal is absent. Part of C’s reality conception is C herself, her existence, and her current experience. These are taken for granted as the foundation for cognition. Not only that, but – in a very real sense – C and C’s location function as the center of C’s mental universe. For linguistic purposes, they define the deictic center: the I-here-now from which the world is apprehended, and relative to which other entities are situated. At a given moment, C’s experience (E) comprises what C is consciously aware of – internally, through perception, or by thinking about it. Perception (e.g. seeing something) and internal awareness (e.g. feeling pain) are forms of direct experience, which provides the epistemic foundation for our mental world. But obviously, the world we inhabit and talk about goes far beyond what we ourselves directly experience. It includes what others have perceived and credibly reported. Much of it is abstract, being mentally, socially, and culturally constructed, but is nonetheless as real and significant to us as the core layers. I accept it as valid, for instance, that Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska, even though this is not something that can be
The English present
directly perceived. Part of our world, and accepted as part of reality, are mental constructions like schedules, scripts, and structural generalizations about the world’s essential nature. Also part of our world are entities like linguistic theories, and while their content may not be accepted as real, their existence certainly is. As a first approximation, then, our epistemic landscape has the configuration shown in Figure 12(a). Direct experience accounts for only part of what we accept as real, and what we accept as real is only part of our mental world (W). For a second approximation, we have to introduce time. We do not experience the world as a series of discrete time-slices, but as something that is continuously developing. One thing we experience is the passage of time itself, and one thing we know is that the world, and our experience of it, are constantly changing through time. We must therefore elaborate our basic epistemic model to incorporate the temporal dimension, as shown in diagram (b). Part of what we know is that our current experience – or immediate experience (IE), as I call it – is just the latest phase in the ongoing process of experiencing. Likewise, the world itself, as well as that portion of the world we know about (R), have a developmental history, of which the current (momentary) phase is only the latest. Those aspects of our knowledge that pertain to the world as presently constituted will be called immediate reality (IR). Immediate reality is the locus of immediate experience, i.e. one thing we accept (or take for granted) as valid about the current moment is that we are having our current experience.11 (a)
(b)
W
W C
C E R
E
IE
R
IR
Figure 12.╇
11. I should point out a subtle difference in how IR and IE are defined. Whereas IE is the current phase of experience, IR is not the current phase of knowledge – it is rather (what is accepted as) knowledge of the present. At a given moment, we know something about the past as well as the present, but we currently experience only what we currently experience. The past figures in IE only to the extent that we recall or apprehend it. The current phase of knowledge includes all of R, of which IR is only a portion.
Ronald W. Langacker
At a given moment, most of what C accepts as real is only latent, hence not an aspect of immediate experience. I know, for example, that Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska, but this figures in my experience only on those rare occasions when I happen to think about it. The point, of course, is crucial. The distinctive property of the human mental capacity is precisely the fact that immediate experience is not confined to what we currently feel and perceive. We are capable of thinking about anything at all, mentally peering into any corner of our immense conceptual universe, of which reality itself is only a limited portion. When we think about something, we thereby bring it within the scope of awareness, so that – in a sense – it is part of immediate experience. It is not that the object of thought, per se, moves through the epistemic landscape and enters IE; merely thinking about something does not make it real or perceptible. Rather, it is part of IE in the sense that its apprehension is an aspect of our conscious awareness, experienced internally. Thus, in and of itself, thinking about something does not make it real or otherwise change its epistemic status. Its apprehension is however real and directly experienced. In Figure 13(a), the object of thought, X, is shown at an arbitrary location. Its apprehension, X′, is internal to C, an aspect of C’s conscious awareness. To keep the diagrams simple, I abbreviate this as shown in diagram (b), where X′ is left implicit. Instead, a dashed arrow stands mnemonically for the process we conceptualize metaphorically as C “reaching out” and “apprehending” X. As noted, X can be anywhere in the epistemic landscape. It may lie outside reality, e.g. in entertaining future hopes. In thinking about the past, X is real but non-immediate. It may be in immediate reality but outside immediate experience, for instance invoking the knowledge that Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska. In the case of external perception, like seeing a cat on a mat, X – the situation perceived – is part of IE but outside C, X′ being the perceptual experience. And in the special case where X is internal to C, e.g. the experience of pain, X and X′ effectively (a)
(b) MS
X′ C IE IR R
Figure 13.╇
X
IS
MS
C IE IR R
X
IS
The English present
collapse – there is no essential difference between apprehending an internal experience and simply having that experience.12 I will understand “thinking about X” to mean that we are specifically attending to X, as the focus of our conscious awareness. This does not of course imply that we are aware of nothing else. Even if I am focusing on the fact of Lincoln being the capital of Nebraska, I am still aware to some extent of my immediate physical surroundings, of being slightly hungry, etc. In particular, I have some awareness of the overall epistemic landscape and the position of X within it. If I focus attention on a cat being on a mat, I am generally aware as well of the epistemic status of this situation: whether it is purely imaginary, something that happened previously, something I actually see right now, or something I know of by other means (e.g. someone tells me). There are, in short, levels and degrees of awareness. Accordingly, in Figure 13 the box containing X is labeled as the immediate scope of conception (IS), i.e. the general locus of attention (the “onstage region”), and the outer box as the maximal scope (MS), the full extent of awareness.13 For present purposes, C can be characterized as the subjective center of consciousness. We can think of the arrow from C to X as an epistemic path, the path C follows in “reaching out” and “apprehending” X. The path is “longer” or “shorter” depending on X’s position in the epistemic landscape. In the case of internal experience, where X and X′ are the same, the path has a length of zero. Presumably the path is progressively longer as it passes beyond the limits of C, IE, IR, and R. Measured in this way, the path gives a rough estimate of “epistemic distance”. These boundaries are all natural places where a language might choose to make a coding distinction. For example, “evidential” markers might indicate whether or not an occurrence is (or was at some stage) part of immediate experience. English makes coding distinctions at IR and R. This is an epistemic model pertaining to facets of cognitive organization. Inclusion in R does not depend on something being true in any objective sense (i.e. true in the world), but rather on C accepting it as being valid with respect to C’s mentally constructed world. One difference is that C is truly the center of this mentally constructed world, while probably not enjoying this privileged position objectively (in the “real” world out there). Another difference is that past occurrences accepted as part of R can be modified on the basis of new considerations – our conception of previous history is subject to adjustment. We could only wish that the objective course of events were so flexible. 12. Of course, we can also think about the nature of this experience and the fact that we are having it, in which case it also functions as an object of thought, itself being apprehended. I take this as representing another level of conceptual organization. 13. The latter’s apprehension is also an aspect of internal experience. I have not attempted to show this in the diagrams.
Ronald W. Langacker
C1
C0
C2
R2
X
R1 R0
Figure 14.╇
Figure 12(b) shows E as the core of a cylinder, suggesting (not unreasonably) that personal experience has a privileged status. But obviously – and obviously essential for language (though not emphasized here) – we accept as real the existence of other conceptualizers each of whom engages in conceptualization and builds up their own conception of reality. We thus have configurations like Figure 14, where C0 accepts as real the proposition that C1 accepts as real the proposition that X is accepted as real by C2.14 In this case X does figure in C0’s reality conception (R0), but is only indirectly accessible within it. To “reach” X, C0 has to trace along a multi-step epistemic path leading through other conceptualizers and their own conceptions of reality. Reality, then, is a complex affair involving often elaborate mental space configurations, with any number of hierarchical levels. Among the requisite spaces are those corresponding to mental constructions like schedules, scripts, and structural generalizations. These are virtual entities comprising virtual (representing) events. Their existence as such is nonetheless part of reality, as defined. Being based on accepted validity, real vs. unreal is not the same as actual vs. virtual, since even virtual entities can be accepted as valid (cf. Langacker 1999b). If R is conceived as a cylinder, as in Figure 12(b), we can view it metaphorically as “growing” along the temporal axis as time passes and there is more to know about. On this view, future occurrences per se are not (or not yet) part of R. One could argue this on philosophical or general epistemic grounds – since the future has not yet been determined, it cannot yet be real or known. Actually, though, my basis for this position is linguistic. I am not engaged here in a philosophical exercise. Rather, I am trying to explicate the tacit cognitive model underlying English clausal grounding, i.e. its grammaticized tense-modal system. In the basic English system, future is marked by the modal will. A fundamental feature of the model I am proposing is precisely that the presence of a modal indicates 14. An example would be the sentence Cheney knows that Rice is convinced that Bush is a genius.
The English present
epistemic striving, as opposed to epistemic control, and R is simply defined as what is under epistemic control. This is not the only possible way to deal with future occurrences – other languages may handle them differently – but it makes sense and appears to be how English is doing it.15 4.3
Non-modal clauses
That brings us back to tense. Let us start with the simplest case: non-modal clauses describing actual occurrences. The absence of a modal indicates that the profiled occurrence (P) is accepted as real. What, then, is the import of “present” vs. “past”, which I have characterized more generally as immediate vs. non-immediate? Since P is confined to R (due to the absence of a modal), the obvious proposal is that immediate vs. non-immediate is a matter of whether P is located in immediate reality (IR) or its complement, “non-immediate reality”. That is indeed what I propose. This is fundamentally an epistemic characterization, for R is defined as what C (by default, the speaker) accepts as valid (or “knows”). Clearly, though, the distinction is equivalent to a temporal one, since immediate reality consists of those facets of R pertaining to the world at the present time (the locus of current experience). This is the basis for my previous description (Langacker 1991) of present vs. past time as being the prototypical values of the more general immediate vs. non-immediate opposition. The English present and past (for non-modal expressions) are sketched in Figure 15. In both cases, the time of speaking delimits what counts as immediate experience and immediate reality for this purpose. For the present tense, the time of speaking also defines the immediate temporal scope for apprehending the profiled clausal process, P.16 The difference between present and past tense is thus a matter of whether P is found in immediate reality or non-immediate reality. The past tense involves a slightly greater epistemic distance because the epistemic path crosses an additional boundary (IR). These configurations are basically equivalent to those in Figure 7 and yield the same explanation for the distribution of present and past with perfective and imperfective verbs. A non-immediate perfective is always acceptable because the immediate temporal scope can always be long enough to encompass P (e.g. She drove 15. This discussion pertains to the grammaticized tense-modal system. English does have other ways of dealing with the future, e.g. with gonna, is to, or has to, not to mention the scheduled future use of the present. I consider these to represent different ways in which constraints on future occurrences are incorporated as part of present reality. 16. Of course, the time of speaking is actually a temporal interval, not just a point, as the diagrams might suggest. If only time is considered, the box enclosing P can be eliminated in diagram (a), since IS = IR in this domain. Other domains do however figure in P’s conception.
Ronald W. Langacker (a) Immediate (“Present”)
(b) Non-immediate (“Past”)
MS P
MS
IS P
IS C
C R
IR
R
IR
Figure 15.╇
to Michigan). An immediate perfective is usually problematic (*She drives to Michigan) owing to the durational and epistemic problems. Imperfectives can either be immediate (She is in Michigan) or non-immediate (She was in Michigan) because whatever portion of the overall process is put onstage and profiled itself constitutes a valid instance of the process type. And performatives still work, despite being immediate perfectives, because P is the speech event itself, hence an aspect of immediate experience. With some justice, one might argue that I have merely rephrased the temporal coincidence account in terms of whether P is or is not in IR, where IR itself is defined in terms of temporal coincidence with the time of speaking. More charitably, one could say that I have sketched an epistemic approach from which the temporal coincidence account can be derived. Either way, more can be said from an epistemic standpoint. As noted earlier, the temporal characterization of perfective vs. imperfective processes implies a difference in their typical mode of apprehension. Though flexible in size and scale, subjectively the immediate temporal scope is always bounded (like the visual field) – there is a limit to the temporal expanse we can invoke at one time as the locus for focused viewing. Being temporally bounded itself, a perfective process will always fit within IS just by making this large enough. It is therefore possible for a perfective occurrence to be apprehended in its entirety. And since bounding is inherent in the characterization of a perfective process type, full apprehension – including the endpoints – is required to identify an instance of the type. By contrast, an imperfective process with indefinite temporal extension cannot be apprehended in its entirety, for there is no entirety. All we can do is observe that portion of the overall process which happens to fall within whatever temporal scope we adopt for viewing purposes. In other words, the natural mode of apprehension for imperfectives is one of sampling. But since an imperfective process is conceived as exhibiting qualitative uniformity throughout, a sample is enough to identify it and counts as an instance of the process type.
The English present
These contrasting modes of apprehension have different epistemic consequences for what lies outside the immediate temporal scope. Being apprehended in its entirety, within IS, a perfective occurrence tells us nothing about what might occur beyond its limits. On the other hand, since the profiled portion of an imperfective is merely a sample, with no evident bounding, the presumption is that the overall process extends beyond IS in both directions. So at least in local terms, imperfectives correlate with stability both within and beyond the immediate scope of observation. The presumed stability they thereby offer does not necessarily rise to the level suggested by Brisard’s term “epistemic certainty”. It does however amount to a kind of “givenness” (also his term), a local framework with respect to which more transient occurrences can be assessed. On this basis Brisard (2002) describes all imperfective clauses as being “structural” statements. Even contingent situations, stable only when viewed on a very small time scale, qualify as structural knowledge by this definition (e.g. I see it now; The cat is on the mat; He’s straightening his tie). I myself use the term more narrowly, notably for generics, but I acknowledge that we are dealing with a gradation rather than discrete categories (cf. Langacker 1997). Regardless of terminology, we will see that this notion of “givenness”, or “basis for assessment”, is relevant to the meaning of the English present. Let us now extend this epistemic account of the present to so-called “nonpresent” uses. I have described these as involving the distinction between a representing event and a represented event. In these expressions, I propose, what is directly coded linguistically is the virtual representing event, as opposed to the actual event(s) it represents. These uses of the present all conform to the characterization proposed, i.e. the profiled occurrence (P) is found in immediate reality (IR). What differs is the nature of the mental construction in which it figures. I briefly examine three cases: the scheduled future, singular generics, and the historical present. The first point to make about the scheduled future, one already noted, is that the mental construction involved is independent of the present tense. Scheduled future expressions are possible for the past, the present, or even the future, as seen in (16). In the last sentence, the intended interpretation – an entirely possible one – is that will indicates futurity of the schedule (not the actual event itself), i.e. at 3 it is appropriate to say Our plane leaves at 6. (16) First our plane left at noon. Then they rescheduled it, so now it leaves at 3. I’m sure they will reschedule it again, so that when 3 rolls around it will leave at 6. Use of the present in this construction therefore does have to do with the time of speaking, in the sense that it indicates that the schedule being consulted is in effect at the present moment. While it is in effect, the entire schedule can be consulted at any time. A particular expression, e.g. Our plane leaves at 6, is then a matter of “reading
Ronald W. Langacker
off ” (or accessing) one schedule entry, whose apprehension is coded linguistically. This is sketched in Figure 16(a). The schedule is represented as a box labeled V, to indicate its status as a virtual entity (which is not to deny that some schedules have physical or at least visual instantiation). The boxes inside it stand for schedule entries, i.e. virtual events representing anticipated actual events. Among these virtual events is the one profiled by a particular sentence, like Our plane leaves at 6. This situation conforms to the epistemic characterization of the present: that the profiled occurrence (P) is located in immediate reality (IR). This despite its virtual nature – recall that the speaker’s conception of reality includes many virtual entities, not just actual ones. Here the speaker accepts it as valid that the schedule is currently in effect.17 The case of a past-tense scheduled future, e.g. First our plane left at noon, is shown in diagram (b). It is simply a matter of referring to a mental schedule that was in effect at an earlier time. Granted this conceptual configuration, the expression conforms to the epistemic characterization of past tense: P is located in nonimmediate reality.18 What about a future scheduled future, like the last clause in (16)? It simply involves the schedule (hence P) being projected as in effect at a future time, in the manner specified by will or another modal. Singular generics work analogously.19 The mental construction involved is like a virtual plan or schedule, except that its entries – instead of representing specific (a)
(b) MS
MS V
P
IS
V
P
IS C
C R
IR
R
IR
Figure 16.╇ 17. Does P precisely coincide with the time of speaking, as in the temporal account? In this case (as opposed to the situation with actual events), I think the point is moot. P is part of a schedule that is in effect throughout the time of speaking, and its apprehension is taken as coinciding with the time of speaking. However, since I am not (in the epistemic approach) talking about a virtual occurrence of P, the time of such an occurrence is not at issue. 18. Observe that this does not specify whether the scheduled event was anticipated to occur before or after the time of speaking. It merely has to be subsequent to the time when the schedule was consulted (given the very nature of a schedule). This consequence “falls out” from the characterization proposed. 19. Singular and plural generics represent different strategies of generalization (Langacker 1997). To keep things simple, I confine attention to the former.
The English present
actual events – are virtual occurrences taken as representing facets of the world’s essential nature. Each of these structural generalizations projects to any number of actual occurrences for as long as it remains valid. We see in (17) that even these “structural statements” may have a limited shelf life, so that we have to specify the span of time when they are in effect. Actually, the diagrams in Figure 16 work perfectly well for singular generics in the present and past tense. We simply have to interpret the box labeled V as describing the world’s essential structure (i.e. its entries map onto actual events in a different way than with a schedule). (17) In the good old days, a woman obeyed her husband. Now things are all messed up: a man obeys his wife. But in the future, when we put all this craziness behind us, a woman will obey her husband again. The historical present is sketched in Figure 17. It too conforms to the epistemic definition, as it profiles a virtual event located in immediate reality. Here, though, this event is an aspect of C’s internal experience, consisting in the recall (or mental replay) of a previous occurrence, given as P′. Observe that P′ is shown as part of E, i.e. it is something C previously experienced, though generally not internally. On the other hand, the recall is necessarily internal.20 I conclude that the epistemic characterization works for both actual and virtual occurrences, given a proper description of the mental constructions in which the latter figure. In all cases, the English present situates P in immediate reality, the past in non-immediate reality. But we have not yet considered modals, which MS
V IS P
P′
C E
IE
R
IR
Figure 17.╇
20. The case of watching a video replay on a monitor is analogous, except that P is external to C within IE (being apprehended via perception), and P′ need not be part of E (i.e. C may not have witnessed the original event).
Ronald W. Langacker
specify that P has not yet been accepted as real. It is still a target of epistemic striving, the different modals indicating the degree of epistemic force involved. Consideration of modal expressions leads to a more schematic characterization of the immediate/non-immediate opposition. 4.4
Modals
I am only concerned with the core of the grammaticized modal system: the elements may, can, will, shall, and must, and their non-immediate counterparts might, could, would, and should.21 Except as necessary, I will not describe these forms individually, the focus here being their common properties. I am not claiming that the non-immediate forms are fully analyzable or derived in a wholly regular fashion from their basic counterparts; each modal has its semantic peculiarities and its own ecological niche in the epistemic landscape. Still, there are general points to be made. Just a word about the distinction between root and epistemic senses of the modals, exemplified in (18a,b). Involving notions like obligation and permission, root modals exhibit more clearly the force-dynamic character of modals (Sweetser 1982; Talmy 1988; Langacker 1991). Ranging in degree from the absence of a barrier (may) to compulsion (must), the force is generally manifested socially in the case of root modals, mentally with epistemic modals. Both involve what we might call “the evolution of reality”, as well as a striving for control, as sketched in Figure 11(a). The difference pertains to the level at which this occurs (Langacker 2008). Root modals are aimed at effective control – determining what happens in the world itself. And obviously, epistemic modals are aimed at epistemic control – evolution in our knowledge of the world. They register the force subjectively experienced as we mentally simulate reality (R) “growing” in such a way that it comes to encompass the profiled event (i.e. we accept the profiled occurrence as valid). Here we are only concerned with the epistemic modals. (18) a. Root modals: You {may/should/must} report the theft. b. Epistemic modals: It {may/should/must} be hot in Chicago. A key observation is that the morphological distinction immediate vs. non-immediate is manifested on different elements depending on whether or not the clause contains a modal. In the absence of a modal, it is marked on the verb, as present vs. past tense (which I have argued to be a reasonable characterization even in the epistemic approach). With a modal, however, immediate vs. non-immediate is not 21. In Langacker (1991: §6.2.2.3), I give an argument that must simply lacks a non-immediate form.
The English present
marked on the verb, but rather by the form of the modal itself: may vs. might, will vs. would, etc. Semantically as well, so-called “tense” does not apply directly to the verbal process (P), but only indirectly. It is rather the modal, in either its immediate or non-immediate form, which applies to P and specifies its epistemic status. This is one respect in which the epistemic approach is advantageous relative to the temporal coincidence approach. With modals, the “temporal” component of grounding does not even apply to P, so it can hardly be said to specify P’s coincidence or non-coincidence with the time of speaking. And while some modal uses are present-oriented, as in (18b), very often P is future relative to the speech event (e.g. It {may/might} rain tomorrow), in which case immediate vs. non-immediate certainly does not indicate temporal coincidence vs. precedence vis-à-vis the time of speaking. This is not to say that the non-immediate modals are unanalyzable or that the non-immediacy they convey has no connection with past time. They do correlate with past time in the so-called “sequence of tenses” phenomenon, exemplified in (19), where use of an immediate form is subsequently reported with a non-immediate form. Now, English does not actually have a sequence-of-tenses rule (Langacker 1991: §6.2.2.2). It is however important to understand why the nonimmediate form appears in these reports. In the case of (19a), without a modal, it is simply a matter of the situation described being in the past relative to the time of speaking; the speaker describes the reported situation from her own temporal vantage point. But with a modal, in (19b,c), the temporal location is indeterminate – from the perspective of the current speaker, the projected time of helping could be in the past or the future. Why, then, is the non-immediate form of the modal employed?22 (19) a. Tom says “I am tired”. b. Tom says “I may help”. c. Tom says “I will help”.
Report: Tom said he was tired. Report: Tom said he might help. Report: Tom said he would help.
We must first consider immediate forms of the epistemic modals, e.g. the original use of may and will in (19b,c). This is represented in Figure 18(a). I have omitted the arrow for time, since with modals time is clearly secondary. When marked by a modal, P can be located in the present, as in (18b); in the future, as when Tom says I will help; or even in the past, as in Tom said he would help yesterday. The essential factor is that the modal situates P outside reality. Hence the single dashed 22. In all these cases the immediate form can also be used, showing the non-existence of a sequence-of-tenses rule. The epistemic status thus indicated is always appropriate from the speaker’s perspective. For instance, Tom said he may help – where may indicates future potentiality – can only be used if P is still future relative to the current time of speaking.
Ronald W. Langacker (a)
MS C
R
IR
P
(b)
IS
MS
C′ R′
P
IR′
R
IS
C IR
Figure 18.╇
arrow in diagram (a), representing the epistemic path from C to P, crosses the boundary of R. The double arrow indicates the nature or degree of the epistemic force, distinguishing one modal from another. Thus may specifies that the evolution of reality – as mentally simulated by C – has the potential of it “reaching” and encompassing P (there is no barrier to this happening), whereas will specifies that R is projected (or predicted) to reach it. Let us now consider non-immediate forms in reported speech, e.g. might and would in (19b,c). The key factor, clearly, is that the current speaker (C) does not herself assume responsibility for the epistemic assessment, but is rather reporting on the assessment previously made by another conceptualizer, C′. As shown in Figure 18(b), C accepts as real that C′ has previously made this assessment, using his own conception of reality (R′) as its basis. That assessment placed P outside R′, its precise status being indicated by the base form of the modal (may or will). Thus P is not per se part of C’s conception of reality (R). It figures in R only derivatively: C accepts as real the fact that C′ had an epistemic stance in regard to P, namely the stance of not accepting it as real. In short, as shown by the arrows, C reaches P only via a two-step epistemic path leading through the mind of another conceptualizer (C′). We need to be precise about the modal and how it relates to the situation shown. First, it has to be recognized that P is not itself part of R, even though it appears inside R in the diagram, in contrast to Figure 16, where P is understood as being real (albeit virtual). The difference is that, in Figure 16, P is an entry on an accepted virtual schedule which C herself accesses directly, while in Figure 18(b) C only reaches P by apprehending someone else’s epistemic judgment. Given the limitations of a two-dimensional representation, to interpret these diagrams properly we have to consider the epistemic path (not just spatial inclusion). In Figure 16, the epistemic path leads directly from C to P (though it may cross boundaries), whereas in 18(b) the path from C only leads to another conceptualizer, C′, from which a second epistemic path leads to P. We can go even further and isolate the contributions of each path in determining the modal form. Specifically, the first path – anchored by C – is responsible for
The English present
the choice of the non-immediate forms, might and would, instead of may and will. The choice of may or will, as the modal base, reflects the second path, anchored by C′. That is, the modal base (may or will) indicates the epistemic assessment made by C′, on the basis of his own conception of immediate reality (IR′). The speaker expresses this assessment with the non-immediate might or would because the speaker’s own conception of immediate reality (IR) does not support the assessment coded by the modal base. In short, the basis for the modal assessment (may vs. will) is IR′, and IR′ is non-immediate to C. It is non-immediate to C in two respects: first, it is earlier in time; and second, it is the reality conception of another individual. This apportionment is the key to understanding other uses of the non-immediate modals, as in (20). I suggest that in each case the non-immediacy coded by might indicates that IR – the speaker’s conception of immediate reality – is not the basis invoked for the assessment associated with the modal base, may. In each case, the potentiality expressed by may is calculated relative to a conception of immediate reality, IR′, distinct from the speaker’s actual one. Using might (in lieu of may) indicates the non-immediacy of this presumed basis of modal assessment. As shown in Figure 19, the speaker (C) invokes a virtual situation, involving an imagined version of immediate reality (IR′), with respect to which the modal assessment may would be appropriate. Just as in Figure 18(b), might signals the nonimmediacy from IR of the assumed basis for modal assessment (IR′). (20) a. If it weren’t so cloudy it {*may/might} get hot. b. When the clouds disperse it {may/might} get hot. c. Even though it’s cloudy it {may/might} get hot. This is most evident in (20a), a counterfactual conditional. The counterfactual construction invokes a mental space specifically portrayed as being distinct from reality. The import of (20a) is that the modal assessment may would be appropriate given an imagined conception of immediate reality (IR′), namely immediate reality as it would appear to C in the hypothetical situation. There is thus a two-step MS V C
C IR′
IR
Figure 19.╇
P
IS
Ronald W. Langacker
epistemic path: from IR to IR′, and from IR′ to P. It is further presumed that P is only accessible via this path, i.e. it would not occur except in the counterfactual situation.23 For this reason may is not a permissible alternative. In (20b), the when-clause sets up a mental space associated with the specified time (the time when the clouds disperse). Because the situation has not yet been realized, it is still (broadly speaking) a virtual one. Its realization is however anticipated – in contrast to (20a), where the path of evolving reality excludes both the situation and its consequences. Hence there are two different ways of making the modal assessment. On the one hand, it can proceed as shown in Figure 19, resulting in might. As the basis for modal assessment, the speaker invokes the imagined conception of immediate reality (IR′) expected to obtain at the time specified by the when-clause (a reality in which the clouds have dispersed). On the other hand, because that situation is projected as occurring, the potentiality expressed by may is equally appropriate whether IR′ or IR itself is taken as the basis for assessment. With may, in other words, P (it getting hot) is directly accessed from IR via a one-step epistemic path, just as in a single-clause expression (It may get hot). In this case the function of the when-clause is simply to specify P’s temporal location. Finally, in (20c) the adverbial clause does not itself invoke a virtual situation, but merely describes an aspect of IR. The adverbial has no direct bearing on the choice of may vs. might, since either would be appropriate even without it. With may, IR itself is the basis for modal assessment, as in Figure 18(a). What about might? Does it still imply a virtual basis for assessment, as in Figure 19, despite the absence of a clause that explicitly introduces it? I suggest that it does. Choosing the non-immediate form (might instead of may) itself signals that the potentiality normally conveyed by may is not an appropriate assessment from IR as presently constituted. No other mental space being indicated, the basis for assessment may simply be an alternative to IR that differs from it in relatively minor respects. In (20c), for instance, the alternative IR′ could be just like IR except for there being fewer clouds. The assessment It may get hot would then be supported, but since that situation does not in fact obtain, might is used instead to register its non-immediacy. This is essentially equivalent to saying that might expresses a more tenuous potentiality than does may. In (21), I summarize the proposed epistemic description of the immediate/nonimmediate opposition in English. In the absence of a modal, where P is confined to reality (R), immediacy implies that P is in IR. Obviously, then, non-immediacy 23. This feature of the counterfactual construction can however be overridden: If it weren’t so cloudy, it might get hot – but it may get hot anyway. Note that but and anyway indicate the suspension of this feature.
The English present
indicates that P is not in IR. We can take this as being the default situation (the prototype), in which immediate vs. non-immediate is largely equivalent to present vs. past in time. In combination with a modal, where P is excluded from R, immediacy implies that IR is the direct basis for the modal assessment of P. Here non-immediacy indicates that some other basis (IR′) must be found. These two characterizations clearly have a lot in common. From them we can abstract the schematic description in (21c), which covers both modal and non-modal clauses. In both cases, immediacy implies that IR is the direct basis for P’s epistemic assessment – either containing P or providing direct access to it (via a one-step epistemic path). (21) a. In the absence of a modal, where P is confined to R, (non-)immediacy implies that P is (not) in IR. [prototype] b. In combination with a modal, where P is excluded from R, (non-)immediacy implies that IR is (not) the direct basis for the modal assessment of P. c. In either case, (non-)immediacy implies that IR is (not) the direct basis for the epistemic assessment of P. [schema] 5. Conclusion This has been a preliminary attempt at pinning down the specifics of an epistemic account of the English present. While fairly comprehensive, it is certainly not exhaustive. I have not, for instance, considered the use of the present in adverbial clauses, e.g. the initial clause in (20b).24 Two possible advantages over the temporal coincidence account have come to light. First, it avoids the need to talk about the “virtual occurrence” of events, a notion that may be defensible but might be considered dubious. Second, it is readily extended to clauses with modals, whereas temporal coincidence cannot be. That the epistemic approach would prove advantageous is hardly a surprise. My time-based account of the English present (Langacker 2001) was limited to nonmodal clauses, where the label “tense” is not altogether inappropriate. Here immediate vs. non-immediate is essentially equivalent to present vs. past. With modals, however, immediacy vs. non-immediacy requires a non-temporal characterization. Thus, in my overall description of English clausal grounding (Langacker 1991: ch. 6), I characterized it schematically as a “proximal”/“distal” contrast, with present and past tense representing prototypical values.
24. An analysis of this use that conforms to (21) is proposed in Langacker (2007).
Ronald W. Langacker
I conclude that the English present is reasonably described as having “present time” (coincidence with the time of speaking) for its prototypical value, and “epistemic immediacy” as its schematic characterization (valid for all instances). It thus exemplifies a general finding of Cognitive Grammar concerning the meanings of grammatical elements: many such elements have both prototypical and schematic semantic values, the latter consisting in some mental experience inherent in the former. For instance, the schematic import of possessives – that of invoking one element as a “reference point” to mentally access another – is immanent in the possessive prototypes of ownership, kinship, and whole-part relations (Langacker 1993, 2004b). More controversially, I have claimed that nouns are characterized schematically in terms of contractive mental operations inherent in the conception of physical objects, the category prototype (Langacker 1987b). The English present can be seen as another instance of this general pattern: epistemic immediacy is an aspect of the mental experience inherent in the apprehension of present-time occurrences. References Austin, John L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1999. Perceptual Symbol Systems. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 577–660. Bergen, Benjamin. 2005. Mental Simulation in Literal and Figurative Language Understanding. In The Literal and Nonliteral in Language and Thought [Studies in Language 11], S. Coulson & B. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (eds.), 255–278. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Brisard, Frank. 1999. A Critique of Localism in and about Tense Theory. PhD Dissertation, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Brisard, Frank. 2001. Be going to: An Exercise in Grounding. Journal of Linguistics 37: 251–285. Brisard, Frank. 2002. The English Present. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference [Cognitive Linguistics Research 21], F. Brisard (ed.), 251–297. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Evans, Vyvyan (ed.). 2004. The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition [Human Cognitive Processing 12]. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Fauconnier, Gilles. 1985. Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press/Bradford. Fauconnier, Gilles. 1997. Mappings in Thought and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier, Gilles & Eve Sweetser (eds.) 1996. Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. Fauconnier, Gilles & Mark Turner. 2002. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New York: Basic Books.
The English present Goldsmith, John & Erich Woisetschlaeger. 1982. The Logic of the English Progressive. Linguistic Inquiry 13: 79–89. Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George & Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, George & Rafael E. Núñez. 2000. Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics into Being. New York: Basic Books. Lakoff, George & Mark Turner. 1989. More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987a. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequisites. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987b. Nouns and Verbs. Language 63: 53–94. Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. Concept, Image, and Symbol: The Cognitive Basis of Grammar [Cognitive Linguistics Research 1]. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 2, Descriptive Application. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993. Reference-Point Constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 4: 1–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1997. Generics and Habituals. In On Conditionals Again [Current Issues in Linguistic Theory 143], A. Athanasiadou & R. Dirven (eds.), 191–222. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999a. Grammar and Conceptualization [Cognitive Linguistics Research 14]. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999b. Virtual Reality. Studies in the Linguistic Sciences 29 (2): 77–103. Langacker, Ronald W. 2001. The English Present Tense. English Language and Linguistics 5: 251–271. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002a. Deixis and Subjectivity. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference [Cognitive Linguistics Research 21], F. Brisard (ed.), 1–28. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002b. Remarks on the English Grounding Systems. In Grounding: The Epistemic Footing of Deixis and Reference [Cognitive Linguistics Research 21], F. Brisard (ed.), 29–38. Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2004a. Aspects of the Grammar of Finite Clauses. In Language, Culture and Mind, M. Achard & S. Kemmer (eds.), 535–577. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Langacker, Ronald W. 2004b. Possession, Location, and Existence. In Linguagem, Cultura e Cognição: Estudios de Linguística Cognitiva, A. Soares da Silva, A. Torres, & M. Gonçalves (eds.), vol. I, 85–120. Coimbra: Almedina. Langacker, Ronald W. 2005. Dynamicity, Fictivity, and Scanning: The Imaginative Basis of Logic and Linguistic Meaning. In Grounding Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language and Thinking, D. Pecher & R. A. Zwaan (eds.), 164–197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 2007. The Present Tense in English Adverbial Clauses. In Cognition in Language: Volume in Honour of Professor Elzbieta Tabakowska, W. Chłopicki, A. Pawelec, & A. Pokojska (eds.), 179–209. Cracow: Tertium. Langacker, Ronald W. 2008. Enunciating the Parallelism of Nominal and Clausal Grounding. In Du fait grammatical au fait cognitif [From Gram to Mind: Grammar as Cognition], vol. 1,
Ronald W. Langacker J.-R. Lapaire, G. Desagulier, & J.-B. Guignard (eds.), 17–65. Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux. Matlock, Teenie. 2004. Fictive Motion as Cognitive Simulation. Memory and Cognition 32: 1389–1400. Matsumoto, Yo. 1996a. How Abstract is Subjective Motion? A Comparison of Coverage Path Expressions and Access Path Expressions. In Conceptual Structure, Discourse and Language, A. E. Goldberg (ed.), 359–373. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Matsumoto, Yo. 1996b. Subjective-Change Expressions in Japanese and Their Cognitive and Linguistic Bases. In G. Fauconnier & E. Sweetser (eds.), 124–156. Sweetser, Eve E. 1982. Root and Epistemic Modals: Causality in Two Worlds. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society 8: 484–507. Sweetser, Eve E. 1997. Role and Individual Interpretations of Change Predicates. In Language and Conceptualization [Language, Culture and Cognition 1], J. Nuyts & E. Pederson (eds.), 116–136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talmy, Leonard. 1988. Force Dynamics in Language and Cognition. Cognitive Science 12: 49–100. Talmy, Leonard. 1996. Fictive Motion in Language and “Ception”. In Language and Space, P. Bloom, et al. (eds.), 211–276. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press/Bradford. Turner, Mark. 1987. Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Vendler, Zeno. 1967. Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system Elena Smirnova
Leibniz University Hanover This chapter examines the verbal categories of German in terms of grounding predications. Using the broad notion of deixis as a starting point for the examination, it first proposes a unified description of grounding predications as a particular class of deictic expressions. Second, it suggests that three general classification criteria – the nature of the grounded entity, the nature of the grounding relation, and the construal configuration of the ground – constitute a model which may be applied on grounding predications in different languages in order to discover their similarities and differences. The proposed model is applied to the German clausal grounding system, concentrating on German temporal and modal grounding predications. Keywords: grounding, deixis, construal, verbal categories, German
1. Introduction In this chapter, I try to shed some light on the German clausal grounding system. More specifically, I attempt to establish a systematic view of German temporal and modal grounding which I suggest are different in many ways from the English grounding system described by Cognitive Grammar. The chapter starts with some theoretical explorations. First, I discuss the notion of grounding in relation to the broader conception of deixis and deictic signs. I offer general classification criteria that may be applied to every grounding predication insofar as it represents a particular class of deictic expressions. Furthermore, I deal with the notion of construal. I put forward the hypothesis that there exist alternative ways of deictically construing the ground, i.e. the immanent reference point every grounding predication refers to. Albeit remaining unprofiled and implicit, the ground, being differently construed, plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the status of grounding predications.
Elena Smirnova
Applying the theoretical considerations made in the first part of the chapter to German grounding predications, I explore how the German clausal grounding system is organized. In doing so, I focus first on temporal grounding, investigating relevant characteristics of the temporal deictic center and of different temporal values of German tenses. Second, I concentrate on the modal grounding system, arguing that, although being closely connected, the verbal mood markers and the epistemically used modal verbs should be best described as different grounding (sub-)systems in German. 2. Deictic characteristics of grounding predications In Cognitive Grammar, a grounding predication is defined as “a predication that locates a thing or process with respect to the ground in fundamental ‘epistemic’ domains pertaining to reality and speaker/hearer knowledge” (Langacker 1991a: 548). Grounding predications are thus considered a special class of deictic expressions since they anchor a conceptualized entity to the ground, i.e. the speech event, its participants, and the immediate circumstances of the utterance. Grounding predications differ from the overall class of deictic expressions by virtue of some distinct features (cf. Langacker 2002a: 8 ff.). They are indispensable to the formation of a nominal or finite clause from nouns and verbs. They are grammatical, as opposed to lexical, elements. Therefore, their semantics tend to be abstract and schematic in nature. They neither mention the (aspect of the) ground nor the grounding relation explicitly: “rather than being profiled, the ground remains implicit and serves as a reference point” (Langacker 2002a: 10). However, in spite of these differences, both linguistic elements – (the more lexical) deictic expressions like I, here, now and (the more grammatical) grounding predications like tense, mood markers, and demonstratives – share some symptomatic features, since they belong to a common broader class of deictic signs. The notion of deixis comes from Bühler (1934) and rests on the assumption that there is a Zeigfeld, i.e. a deictic space or field, which is made up of the I-herenow orientation of the utterance, including both speaker and addressee(s) who interpret the linguistic symbols (constituting the Symbolfeld) with reference to this field. Therefore, every act of linguistic communication proceeds and is anchored in the Zeigfeld. The Zeigfeld is seen as the actual situation frame, as well as the current mental space of vision, centered on the speaker. The speaker’s vantage point is the origo, or the I-here-now starting point in the centre of the deictic coordinate system. From this ‘point of viewing’, the speaker usually makes his statements, and the hearer succeeds in understanding them, relating what is said to that same zero-point.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
Consequently, deictic signs are generally characterized by their dependence on the communication context, or the current speech situation (cf. e.g. Bühler 1934, Fillmore 1997, Langacker 1991, Hanks 1990). They anchor linguistic contents to the deictic zero-point, which is normally (a certain aspect of) the speech situation. In doing so, they also encode a semantic relation between linguistic contents and the (aspect of the) context. The former function is often considered the relational, or reflexive, aspect of a deictic sign; the latter describes the referential, or denotative, aspect. Hence, the most important feature of a deictic sign is that it is relational in nature. As far as such a relation falls within the scope of investigation, (at least) three aspects are in focus: (i) the entity being related to the origo, i.e. the referent of a deictic sign, (ii) the relation itself, i.e. its semantic value, defining the respective deictic dimension, and (iii) the point of reference, i.e. the origo. For instance, when describing personal pronouns, one needs to define (i) the referent of this sign, which is a person, (ii) the relational content of the sign, which is the specification of the communicative role (of this person), and (iii) the reference point the sign refers to, which is the speaker’s role in the speech event. Likewise, when specifying the spatial deictic here (or there), one has to diagnose that it is about (i) a location (ii) in space relative to (iii) the current location of the speech event. Similarly, in Cognitive Grammar, every grounding predication is claimed to establish a link between a grounded entity and the ground. In practice, it very often coincides with a link to the speaker, who functions as a central point of reference within the ground. The link to the ground, i.e. the grounding relationship, however, is not of the same nature for every grounding predication. Langacker (2003) claims that speaker’s and hearer’s specific conceptualizations, i.e. ‘viewing’, of the profiled entity constitute grounding relationships. The nature of grounding relationship distinguishes one grounding predication from another: [The ground] is implicit and subjectively construed, serving almost literally as the locus of ‘viewing’, from which the speaker and hearer direct their attention to the profiled entity onstage. Although the distinctive semantic value of a grounding element resides in the profile’s status and location with respect to the ground, this grounding relationship is not per se the focused object of conception. Rather, it is inherent in the ‘viewing arrangement’ in terms of which the speaker and hearer conceptualize the nominal or clausal referent. (Langacker 2003: 7)
Thus, linking this to the general aspects of a relational deictic sign, I propose that the aforementioned threefold schema applies to grounding predications: (i) the referent of a deictic sign is the profiled entity, (ii) the deictic relational content and the respective deictic dimension are defined by the grounding relation, and (iii) the deictic center is the (relevant aspect of the) ground. I try to show that, while two of the three proposed levels of classification have been accounted for in the
Elena Smirnova
Cognitive Grammar view of grounding predications, little attention has been paid to the third one, namely the ground itself. It has been assumed that the ground, defined as the situation of speech and very often equivalent with the speaker, builds a homogeneous point of reference. Without being fixed in space or time, the ground is terminologically conceived of as a set of some elements and dimensions. What has been seen to be crucial for the structuring and understanding of a grounding predication are (i) the (semantic) nature of the referent and (ii) the nature of the grounding relation, cf.: The aim of grounding a predication is to establish mental contact with, or direct someone’s attention to, a referent which discourse participants are presumably able to determine, given 1) the semantic content of the “phrase” to which the grounding predication attaches, and 2) the nature of the grounding relation proper. (Brisard 2002: xv)
I suggest, however, that all three aspects of a grounding predication should be integrated. Specifications of these three basic aspects underlie different status of grounding predications: 1. The distinction between clausal and nominal grounding predications resides in the nature of the grounded entity. The basic semantic opposition consists of two linguistic entities: it is either a verb, designating a process, or a noun, designating a thing; 2. Distinctions in the nature of the grounding relationship underlie conceptual distinctions between grounding predications. As I noted above, the grounding relationship defines the deictic dimension in which grounded entities are situated. Moreover, semantic values of single grounding predications specify certain locations in the respective deictic space. Generally, the nominal grounding relationship concerns the accessibility of things, whereas clausal grounding revolves around the existence of processes. For nominal grounding, definite and quantificational grounding predications are distinguished. For English, the demonstratives this, that, these, and those, the articles the, a and some, and certain quantifiers like some, most, all, no, each, every, any are identified as nominal grounding elements (Langacker 2002b). For clausal grounding, modal and temporal grounding predications are distinguished.1 As for temporal grounding, a present tense signals that the designated event is immediate to the ground, whereas a past tense morpheme is associated with non-immediacy, i.e. with some kind of (epistemic or temporal) distance between the 1. As far as I know, the status of evidential markers as grounding predications has not been a matter of discussion so far. I would suggest, however, that evidentials serve as grounding predications of the third type, in addition to temporal and modal grounding predications.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
ground and the profiled event (see Langacker 1991a, b, 2002b, Brisard 2002). As for modal grounding, the absence of a modal indicates that the profiled event is part of reality, whereas the presence of a modal verb locates the profiled event in the realm of non-reality (Langacker 2002b). 3. The third element, which is prominent in every description of a grounding predication, is the ground itself. Albeit the link to the ground is implicit and a grounding predication does not actually profile the ground, different conceptualizations of the ground, as I suggest, may determine different status of grounding predications. This can be seen parallel to the role of the grounding relationship which, despite being not explicitly profiled by a grounding predication, underlies its conceptual status. Similarly, a certain construal of the speech situation, especially regarding conceptualizations of the speaker’s role in it, may influence distinctions between grounding predications. Such distinctions may be found either in specific contextual interpretations, which a grounding predication allows for, or they may be included in language-specific grammatical paradigms. In the following section, I deal with this in more detail. Moreover, I suggest that the construal phenomenon which Langacker (2003: 23) calls “extreme subjectification”, i.e. eliminating “any direct concern with the occurrence of actual events”, may be described according to the threefold schema proposed here. The shift from actuality to virtuality (=“conceptualizer’s mental activity”) in the temporal domain, as well as from reality to the knowledge about reality (=“reality as a mental construct”) in the modal domain may be also understood as implying different ways of the construal configuration of the ground. Since the three components of every grounding predication – the grounded entity, the grounding relationship, and the ground – are distinguished only analytically here, insofar as they form a sign unit, a significant change in the meaning of the sign suggests a shift involving all components of the sign. For the English present tense, there occurs a shift from the actual speech event, which is shared by speaker and hearer, to the speaker’s conceptualization of the speech event whose coincidence with the grounded event is asserted. Consequently, the grounding relationship represents not the domain of actual reality, but rather the domain of virtual reality. As for the grounded entity, it shifts from actual events to virtual ones. And as for modal grounding, the vantage point is extrapolated from actual reality, which is assumed to be common for speaker and hearer at the time of speaking, to the (conceptualizer’s) knowledge about reality, where no identity between speaker’s and hearer’s knowledge about reality can be claimed. In short, “extreme subjectification” touches all components of the sign: it pertains to the construal (i) of the grounded entity (from the actual process to its representation or conceptualization), (ii) of the grounding relationship (from reality to the knowledge about
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reality, from actuality to virtuality), and (iii) of the ground itself (from the speech event to the conceptualization event, where the speaker’s role in the actual communication process is interpreted as the conceptualizer’s role in the actual conceptualization process). 3. Two basic kinds of construal configurations of the ground As I have argued in the previous section, there are three basic criteria for the description and classification of grounding predications: they correspond to the three components of every deictic sign and thus consist of (i) the nature of the profiled entity, (ii) the nature of the grounding relationship, and (iii) the nature of the ground’s conceptualization itself. In the following, I focus on the third criterion in more detail. Notice that I am not concerned with the idea of the ground in terms of the context of every actual speech situation, which is essentially dynamic and created through linguistic and non-linguistic actions. In that view, the ground is basically sociocentric, not egocentric; it is something that is jointly created by the participants and that is constantly shifting in interaction, as it is not only maintained but also created and modified by the participants. This point has been made by, inter alia, Goffman (1981), Hanks (1990), and Laury (2002). Without denying the fact that the ground, i.e. the context of speech, is permanently shifting in processing communication, I nonetheless agree with Langacker (2002a: 20) that “the speaker and hearer need to establish a coherent view of a complex situation...”, which is organized around a certain deictic center. Thus, I am not concerned here with the problem of how the ground is established in every communication process. Instead, assuming that there is a stable point of reference that is implicitly referred to by using grounding predications, I attempt to provide a more differentiated view on the structuring of the deictic center. In so doing, I take up the idea of construal and apply it to the perspectival structuring of the speech situation itself. The concept of the (current) speech event plays the essential role in the linguistic phenomenon of deixis (and grounding). I argue that there are two basic alternative ways of deictic construal being inherent in every deictic and grounding process. At this point, I explicitly refer to the definition of the ground, claiming that it is the speech event together with its participants, i.e., both speaker and hearer. Therefore, the speaker, who without any doubt plays the pivotal role in every speech situation, is notwithstanding (merely) a part of the ground. Relating linguistic expressions to the speaker as the central entity of the speech event, grounding predications can and do distinguish between different conceptualizations of the speaker’s role in the current communication process.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
I suggest that a closer look at the conceptualization of the ground itself, as it makes difference between two basic ways of construing the speaker’s role in it, allows for better understanding of the phenomenon of grounding. Two alternative ways of the fundamental cognitive structuring of the ground may be described in terms of deictic construal: On the one hand, the construal of the ground is based on the immanent coincidence of the mutual communicative roles of speaker and hearer. Indeed, the speech event necessarily consists of two participants (otherwise it would not be a speech event). This is the default structural configuration of the speech situation: speaker and hearer are identified as a communicative whole, which is accompanied by immediate circumstances of the speech situation. The configuration that implies coincidence of the discourse roles, or “coordinating cognition” (Verhagen 2007), in a speech situation serves as the default viewing point. Speaker and hearer share among other things a common point of reference, which is the coincidence of their communicative roles. This common point of viewing may be internalized by the speaker when using deictic expressions. Therefore, using deictic elements, among them grounding predications, the speaker identifies this viewing point as the point of reference. In the following, I call this kind of the ground construal common deictic center (other terms are “basic construal configuration” (Verhagen 2007), “first-person-inclusive” (Janssen 2002)), since the hearer’s role is part of the common vantage point in this viewing arrangement. On the other hand, the deictic construal of the ground may be dominated by only the speaker’s role. As far as the speaker concerns himself as individual conceptualizer, the hearer is separated from his internal cognitive world. Thus, the hearer belongs to the external world, albeit part of the current speech event. The ground is then coincident with the speaker’s role and excludes the communicative role of the hearer. In this case, only the speaker serves as the point of viewing and thus defines the deictic center. Using deictic expressions including grounding predications, the speaker may relate what is being said to this point. I use the term speaker-exclusive deictic center to name this kind of the ground construal, since the role of the hearer is excluded from the vantage point of this viewing arrangement (other terms are “first-person-deixis” (Verhagen 2007) and “first-person-exclusive” (Janssen 2002)). I prefer this term because it refers to the communication situation in general, whereas other terms pertain rather to the category of person, which is a deictic category of its own and encompasses only the distribution of the discourse roles of the participants in communication. Note that the so called “second-person-deixis” (Verhagen 2007), where the situation is presented from the hearer’s point of view, i.e. where the reference point of the addressee is explicitly adopted by the speaker and thus serves as deictic center, cannot be considered the third kind of the ground construal, in my view.
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Instead, in such cases the speaker-exclusive construal configuration is shifted from the speaker to the hearer. The positions of the speaker and hearer are reversed: adopting the hearer’s point of view, the speaker gives up his own central position and is thus excluded, at least as linguistically coded, from the deictic center. To summarize, while the first type of the construal configuration of the ground – the common deictic center – favors the coincidence of the mutual communication roles of speaker and hearer, the second one – the speaker-exclusive deictic center – is based on the distinction between those roles and foregrounds the role of the speaker only. As I show below, German tenses and the preterit subjunctive mood employ the first construal configuration of the deictic center in their prototypical uses. On the other hand, grammatical expressions of such epistemic notions as knowledge and experience, which normally differ from one person to another, are predominantly based on the second construal of the viewing arrangement. For German, e.g., the epistemically, or deictically (cf. Diewald 1999), used modal verbs fall into this category of grounding predications. The following general rule is valid, irrespective of which type of the construal configuration of the ground is involved. A particular deictic space (or epistemic domain), in which the grounded entities (processes or things) are situated, is “divided” into regions in respect to the ground. There are at least two discrete regions of the deictic space: one including the ground and the other excluding it. The first one is defined positively in respect to the ground; every entity located in this (epistemic) region is situated within the same deictic space where the deictic center is located (in other words: this region is proximal to the ground). The second deictic region is defined negatively in respect to the ground; every entity located in this region is situated outside the region that includes the ground (in other words: this region is distal). The distribution of proximal (including the ground, coincident with the ground, overlapping with the ground, etc.) and distal (i.e. non-proximal, noncoincident, non-inclusive, non-overlapping, etc.) deictic values, however, may be based on the two alternative deictic construals of the ground respectively. Consequently, the distal deictic values around the shared vantage point, i.e. the common deictic center, lie outside the shared viewing point of speaker and hearer and refer typically to third party(-ies). On the other hand, the organization of the deictic space around the speaker-exclusive deictic center implies that the position of the hearer is included in the distal deictic region with respect to that vantage point. Therefore, combining the general rule of the value distribution (positive vs. negative with respect to the ground) with the distinct construal configurations of the ground, we get different formations of the deictic space for each configuration. Covering to a great extent identical realms of a deictic space, these formations
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
differ in regard to whether the hearer is situated in the same region in which the speaker finds himself or not, i.e. whether the hearer’s position belongs to the ‘inside’ or to the ‘outside’ region of the deictic space. As I show below, due to the overlapping of the deictic spheres organized around different deictic centers, there are correspondences between particular values of grounding predications. Because of this, they are interchangeable to some degree, as is the case for the German verbal mood markers. To briefly illustrate the binary distinction between two alternative ways of construal configuration of the ground made above, I would like to allude to the idea of the twofold perspectival structure of the cognitive framework of the speech situation presented in Janssen (2002). Janssen (2002: 158 ff.) summarizes the twofold conceptualization of the discourse roles in the speech situation in the following manner. The figure shows that “the framework of the speech situation is divided into an inner dimension forming the 1/2-perspective, and an outer dimension forming the 1/3-perspective” (Janssen 2002: 158). The first-person discourse role may be filled by the speaker (possibly with one or more associates differing from addressee), which corresponds to the exclusive ‘we’. The first-person discourse role may be filled by a party consisting of both the speaker and the hearer, which corresponds to the inclusive ‘we’: “Whoever the speaker’s possible associate(s) may be, the discourse role of the speaker is primordial or central in both systems” (Janssen 2002: 159). Applying the proposed framework of the speech situation to the English demonstratives, Janssen convincingly shows that this and that allow for two interpretations which are closely related to the twofold perspectival system presented in Figure 1 (examples (1) to (3) are taken from Janssen 2002: 170). II – 1/3-perspective II – 1/2perspective
1 protagonist party
2 antagonist party
[party initiating the current conversational turn]
[party participating in the current conversation]
1 protagonist party (incl. antagonist party) [party constituting the current conversation] 3 third party [party not constituing the current conversation]
Figure 1.╇ Double interactive perspective of the roles in the speech situation (Janssen 2002: 160)
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(1) (2) (3)
I can see everything from this window. And you? Do you have a good view from that window? Do you also find it so awfully hot in this room? Did you also find it so awfully hot in that room?
In (1), by using this window, the speaker refers to the window he is looking through. On the contrary, using that window, the speaker refers to the window the addressee is looking through. In this interpretation, the use of this and that is determined by the 1/2-perspective. Thus, the opposition this-that in (1) differentiates between speaker and hearer, defining the speaker only as a reference point. In (2) and (3), on the other hand, the use of this and that is based on the 1/3-perspective. Here, the addressee is conceptualized as part of the (current) speech situation, his role being equated with the role of the speaker. Their shared current position serves as the common point of reference, to which the entity room is related. The twofold cognitive frame of reference of the speech situation proposed by Janssen (2002) is in line with my distinction between two alternative ways of the ground construal. The viewing arrangement, which Janssen centers on the ‘1/2perspective’ or ‘the first-person-exclusive’, corresponds with the deictic construal of the speech situation, whereby the individual role of the speaker is set up as the point of reference. The other possibility, in Janssen’s words, the ‘1/3-perspective’ or ‘the first-person-inclusive’ vantage point, can be consider equivalent to the deictic construal of the speech situation, whereby the coincidence of the mutual speaker and hearer roles is set up as the reference point. To sum up, I propose that there are two basic alternative ways in construing the ground, therefore resulting in two different settings of the deictic centre. I suggest that these two possibilities of the deictic construal configuration of the vantage point often cause ambiguous interpretations of grounding predications. In processing communication, the addressee mostly receives sufficient hints from the context that enable him to establish the deictic centre of the current utterance correctly. In the next section, I argue that certain grounding predication types are generally associated with the certain construal configuration of the ground, whereas others allow for both interpretations in different contexts. 4. German grounding predications German grammatical devices have not been extensively investigated from the Cognitive Grammar point of view. Sporadically, modal grounding predications have been the focus of attention. In the chapter on subjectification, Langacker (1991b: ch. 12.6) claims that the German modals, in contrast to their English
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
counterparts, are main verbs rather than grounding predications. As a reaction to this, a lot of research has been done on this topic by Tanja Mortelmans (1999, 2001, 2002, and 2004). She has convincingly shown that the German modals in their epistemic use have acquired a high degree of subjectification and thus function as grounding predications. However, the investigation of the overall German grounding system including tense, mood and other grammatical categories is still to be done. This chapter presents the first attempt to describe the system of the German clausal grounding. It focuses particularly on the temporal (4.1.) and modal (4.2.) grounding, while also considering the relations between verbal mood (4.2.1.) and epistemic modality (4.2.2.). 4.1
Temporal grounding
For English, temporal grounding is said to be prototypically manifested as “present” versus “past tense” (Langacker 1991a, 2002a,b, 2003 etc.). The contrast between present and past tense marking is identified with the deictic opposition proximal vs. distal, i.e. by virtue of temporal (non-)coincidence or (non-)overlapping with the moment of speech. Additionally, this contrast may be understood in terms of epistemic (non-)immediacy of the event in respect to the ground (Brisard 1999, 2002). What tenses do (in the absence of a modal) is “locate the profiled process within the realm of reality, where the proximal and distal morphemes are susceptible to a temporal construal” (Langacker 1991a: 250). In my view, a similar distribution of temporal grounding values can be assumed for German. The basic opposition within the temporal grammatical domain is represented by the overtly morphologically marked opposition between present (Präsens) and past tense (Präteritum).2 Using the unmarked, neutral present tense form, the speaker locates the profiled process in the same temporal region of actuality in which he finds herself. Thus, the present tense indicates the (temporal) overlapping of the actual event with the ground. On the contrary, the 2. I do not include the German periphrastic tense forms in my discussion for several reasons. First, the forms Perfekt and Plusquamperfekt are formed with the auxiliaries haben and sein, manifesting aspectual rather than temporal values. The increasing tendency of the Perfekt to be used synonymously with the Präteritum, especially in the South German regions, however, does not influences, in my view, the genuine conceptual temporal opposition I propose here. Instead, the Perfekt is gradually overtaking the place of the Präteritum in the temporal grounding system of German by losing its aspectual characteristics and favoring merely its temporal value. Second, the German Futur II form (werden + infinitive perfect) is no longer considered temporal but modal. Third, it is still a matter of intense debate whether the verbal periphrasis werden + infinitive (Futur I) serves as future tense form in German.
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overtly marked past tense (Präteritum) locates the profiled actual event outside the temporal region of the speaker. However, there is a crucial difference between temporal grounding in English and in German. The difference, as I suggest, lies in a ‘more objective’ status of the temporal grounding relationship in German (which also means that the stage of “extreme subjectivity” of temporal grounding predications has not (yet) been reached). Moreover, this difference supposedly originates from the overall structuring of the clausal grounding system of German. While English does not exhibit verbal mood distinctions (anymore), German still possesses the highly grammaticalized mood markers indicative and (present and preterit) subjunctive. As a consequence, German temporal grounding is not necessarily restricted to the epistemic dimension of reality (which by definition “extends no farther than the present” (Langacker 2003: 13)). The German prototypical temporal values do not essentially adhere to the domain of reality, i.e. they do not imply that the grounded entity necessarily belongs to reality. Instead, temporal grounding predications in German only situate the profiled event in the actuality that extends along the time line. They instantiate the actual (=not conceptual) occurrence of a process stating that the process pertains to the external developments ‘out there in the world’. Assuming that (dynamic) processes occur running along the horizontal line, which evolves from past to future, and that the conceptualizer’s direction of gaze following the occurrences of such processes coincides with the direction of time evolving, the binary distinction between ‘behind now’ and ‘not behind now’ mirrors the German temporal opposition between past and non-past. Following the general rule of the distribution of deictic values, the non-past region of the temporal deictic dimension is defined positively with respect to the ground, i.e. the events located in this region are situated in the same temporal sphere in which the speaker finds himself. The processes grounded by the present tense carry the neutral temporal value that can be termed as coincident, overlapping with, proximal to, or including the ground. In contrast, the ‘past’ region of the temporal deictic space is defined negatively with respect to the ground, i.e. it is the ‘outside’ region, valued as non-coincident with, non-overlapping with, non-immediate with, distal to, or exclusive of the ground. The temporal deictic dimension is thus identified with these two regions, and the temporal grounding relationship is identified with the location of the profiled event within one of the two described regions.3 3. Further specifications in the temporal domain are made by aspectual marked forms Perfect and Plusquamperfect. The perfect tense (Perfekt), as opposite to the simple past (Präteritum), specifies a past event as bounded. The Plusquamperfect indicates that a bounded past event is located relative to the ground which is shifted further to the past along the time line (often called Vorvergangenheit).
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
The view of German temporal grounding proposed here allows e.g. for the explanation of an important difference between the German and English present tense: the German present tense, unlike English, is usually employed for referring to future events. In English, the use of the present tense for future events is “infelicitous unless there is some indication of when the event is expected to occur. It is also problematic for events not amenable to scheduling” (Langacker 2003: 22). On the contrary, the reference to past events is not problematic (historical present). For German, however, both options are felicitous, cf.: (4) (5)
Meine Mutter fliegt (morgen/in zwei Wochen) nach Australien. ‘??My mother flies (tomorrow/in two weeks) to Australia’ Vor zwei Tagen, meine Mutter kommt zu mir. ‘Two days ago, my mother comes to my place’
Such uses of the German present tense are in line with the description given above. The non-prototypical, i.e. future and past, uses of the (unmarked) present tense may now be explained by suggesting a shift in temporal vantage point along the temporal line. In German, unlike English, the vantage point allows movements in both directions. As the shift of the temporal vantage point (deictic center) does not imply a shift with respect to reality, there are no restrictions in degree or direction of temporal shifts. Moreover, the reality status of the profiled events remains untouched, thus these events are usually considered actual events occurring either in the past or in the future. Importantly, the ground, or the way that it is construed in the case of temporal grounding, allows only for one construal configuration. In order to suffice in communication of temporally grounded clauses, the speaker and the hearer always need to share a common deictic center. This common temporal point of reference is usually provided by the position of the speaker. In other words, the hearer always has to adopt the vantage point of the speaker to understand the temporal location of the profiled process properly. I suggest that such a restricted configuration of the deictic center in the case of temporal grounding originates in the relatively ‘objective’ character of our conceptualization of time. We are accustomed to the (shared) view of time as a line which is evolving from past to future. This line is built of points that are strung together. Furthermore, processes usually take time to proceed, and they proceed by arriving at and departing from chronologically situated points on the time line. Moreover, if one experiences temporally evolving processes, he usually presupposes that other persons who are present at the same time and place would experience the occurrence and duration of these processes in the same manner. The exact location of the occurrence of the events in time is traditionally anchored in our knowledge about the world, supported by means of numerous mechanisms for calculating time (e.g. calendar, watch).
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Thus, this “objectively” conceptualized picture of time influences the linguistic coding of temporality. Even if the speaker is able to imagine his own time, mentally scanning through the constitutive phases of a process, a common reference point is needed to communicate the temporality of events to the addressee. To summarize, the German temporal grounding system is prototypically represented by the unmarked present tense vs. the marked past tense, which manifests the opposition between the grounding values ‘non-past’ vs. ‘past’. The temporal grounding relationship in German concerns only the actual occurrence of the evolving processes or their phases along the time line. Thus, the temporal grounding relation may be interpreted in terms of reality of the described events, but does not inherently pertain to the epistemic domain of reality. In the next section, I deal in more detail with modal grounding, which is exclusively oriented upon the epistemic domain of reality. Furthermore, the German temporal grounding system uses only one construal configuration of the ground, i.e., it always establishes the common deictic center. The adoption of the shared temporal vantage point by both the speaker and hearer in the particular speech event is to a larger extent anchored in our ‘objective’ and conventionalized conceptualization of temporality: it is not possible to establish such vantage points as “in respect to my time” and “in respect to your time”, which are independent from each other and do not coincide in a particular speech situation. As I show below, modal grounding predications allow for both construal configurations of the ground. This, in my view, is the crucial difference between temporal and modal clausal grounding, at least in languages like German and English. 4.2
Modal grounding
4.2.1 Verbal mood markers The German modal grounding system is represented by the overtly marked opposition between the indicative and the (present and preterit) subjunctive mood (see also Mortelmans 2001). The status of the imperative mood is controversial. Following Donhauser (1987), who convincingly demonstrated that the imperative is a semi-finite category which lacks relevant semantic as well as formal features to be incorporated into the system of German verbal mood, I exclude the imperative from the present discussion. The highly grammaticalized German verbal mood markers, i.e. the indicative (Indikativ) and subjunctive (Konjunktiv), are grounding predications. They modify whole propositions, i.e. they locate the profiled events with respect to the ground. The modal grounding relationship comprises the reality status of the profiled event, thus the modal grounding operates in the epistemic domain of reality.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
The unmarked neutral indicative mood situates the profiled event in the realm of reality, whereas the subjunctive locates the profiled process outside of reality, cf.: (6) (7)
Sie lobt deine Arbeit. ‘She praises your work’ Sie würde deine Arbeit loben (, wenn sie sie sähe). ‘She would praise your work (, if she saw it)’
The German preterit subjunctive is generally associated with irrealis, potentialis, non-factual, and counterfactual functions. In this respect, it is uncontroversial that the profiled event does not belong to reality. It is however problematic to integrate Konjunktiv I (the present subjunctive) into the reality-based conception of modal grounding in German. The default meaning of the present subjunctive is said to be “less concerned with epistemic than with personal matters: it does not indicate a shift as far as the epistemic region (reality > irreality) is concerned, but signals a change with respect to the personal perspective (speaker > third person) on the SoA [state of affairs]” (Mortelmans 2001: 7). The function of the present subjunctive consists of signaling indirect speech, cf.: (8) (Er sagt,) er habe sich getäuscht. ‘(He says,) he has-KONJI erred’ In this connection, Mortelmans (2001) claims: [T]he indicative generally marks a positive attitude of the speaker, whereas the past subjunctive – apart from its use as a marker of indirect speech – generally marks some kind of negative attitude of the speaker. The present subjunctive, then, could be regarded as marking a neutral speaker attitude: the speaker presents a SoA from the viewpoint of a third person, she neither commits herself to it nor distances herself explicitly from it. (Mortelmans 2001: 9)
In her view, then, German verbal mood is not necessarily concerned with the location of the profiled event within the realm of (non-)reality, but is rather characterized as signaling the speaker’s attitude. In my view, however, the German mood markers are concerned with the reality status of the proposition. They set up the link between the profiled event and the ground, whereby the event is positioned with respect to a modal deictic center. Thus, the grounding relationship shared by the German mood markers describes the reality status of the designated event. Albeit being unprofiled, the grounding relationship specifies the epistemic dimension in which the profiled event is situated – the domain of reality. The vantage point of this dimension is centered on the speaker – he evaluates the reality-status of the profiled event. But, as I suggest, it is
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not primarily the speaker’s positive, negative, and neutral attitude that is indicated by the German mood markers (cf. Mortelmans 2001), though such an interpretation is possible in most cases. Rather, it is the status of the profiled event that is marked by the mood markers indicative and subjunctive. The basic modal opposition consists in the contrast between whether the described event is located in the region in which the ground is situated, i.e. within reality, or outside this region, i.e. outside of reality. While the indicative modal value encompasses the realm of reality, the subjunctive extends through the realm of non-reality. In this connection, the unmarked, neutral indicative mood is opposite to the marked subjunctive mood in terms of (non-)reality of the event presented in the clause. The distinction between the values of present and preterit subjunctive lies in the different construal configurations of the ground, which trigger prototypical interpretations of these markers. The preterit subjunctive relates the profiled event to the common deictic center, identified with (the default conception of) reality shared by speaker and hearer in the speech situation. Using the preterit subjunctive, the speaker claims that the profiled event is not real, i.e. irreal, potential, counterfactual etc., without specifying the exact location of the event within the realm of nonreality. In other words, the speaker situates the profiled event outside the reality of the actual speech situation (shared by the speaker and hearer). That the preterit subjunctive is often used to express wishes corresponds with its prototypical function, as the event is considered not real with respect to the speech situation. The present subjunctive, on the other hand, relates the profiled event to the speaker-exclusive deictic center, identified with speaker’s (conception of) reality. Thus, the addressee with his (conception of) reality is seen as part of the region outside the speaker’s reality. Therefore, using the present subjunctive prototypically as a marker of indirect speech, the speaker locates the profiled event outside the region of reality in which he finds himself. However, the region outside speaker’s reality may include the hearer’s reality. Thus, claiming that the designated event does not belong to reality as internalized by the speaker, the present subjunctive allows for interpretations where the neutral attitude of the speaker towards the (universal) reality status of the event can be assumed. Foregrounding the non-real status of the proposition with respect to the ground construed as “my reality”, the speaker does not claim the general non-real status of the proposition. He only states that the profiled event does not belong to his own (conception of) reality. It has been suggested that the present subjunctive shifts the deictic center from the speaker to another (cited or reported) speaker (see e.g. Diewald 1999) without locating the profiled event within the realm of non-reality. In this view, the present subjunctive locates the reference point, not the profiled entity. Here I argue for the analysis of the present subjunctive presented above, as it provides a more integrated view on subjunctive vs. indicative mood markers.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
Moreover, the main function of modal grounding, which is to locate the profiled event with respect to the (modally defined) ground, remains the same for all mood markers. Furthermore, the following interrelation between the preterit and present subjunctive values could be explained on the basis of the proposed analysis. The preterit subjunctive also appears in indirect speech, being able to replace the present subjunctive without considerable change in utterance meaning. It has been suggested that the speaker marks greater distance with regard to the truth of the utterance using the preterit subjunctive instead of the present subjunctive. However, as is correctly pointed out by Fabricius-Hansen (1997), Diewald (1999) and Mortelmans (2001), this cannot be assumed for every use of the preterit subjunctive in indirect speech. Rather, the preterit subjunctive should be seen as a second (and in many cases unambiguous) means to indicate indirect speech. In the view of the analysis proposed here, the interrelation between the values of the preterit and present subjunctives could be explained in terms of great overlapping of the regions in which the profiled events are located by these mood markers. Despite the construal configuration of the ground, which both subjunctive mood markers are based on, the epistemic domain in which they locate the profiled events is the same. Moreover, this epistemic domain of (non-)reality is divided into the same distinct regions by both present and preterit subjunctives – the region defined positively with respect to the ground, i.e. including, overlapping with, coincident with, proximal to the ground, and the region defined negatively with respect to the ground. Consequently, for both the present and preterit subjunctive markers, the epistemic regions that exclude the ground, albeit depending on which construal configuration of the ground is chosen, are equivalent to a great extent. For the past subjunctive, however, this region is defined in less specific terms than for present subjunctive (“reality” vs. “my [speaker’s] reality”). The less specifically a value is defined, the more extensive the region which accommodates this value. Hence, the epistemic region represented by the present subjunctive is included in the epistemic region referred to by the preterit subjunctive. This overlapping, then, explains why the preterit subjunctive form can replace the present subjunctive in most cases (note that the reverse situation does not hold for German). 4.2.2 Epistemic modals In the following, I do not address the question of the grounding status of the German epistemic modals in detail (for this see Mortelmans 1999, 2001, and 2004). Instead, starting from the hypothesis that the highly grammaticalized German epistemic modals do function as grounding predications, I attempt to determine the place of the German epistemic modals in the modal grounding system of German. Mortelmans (2001) proposes that German mood and epistemic modals can be integrated in one consistent model that provides an application of Langacker’s
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dynamic evolutionary model (1991a: 277). The German modal können ‘can’ is said to locate the profiled process within potential reality, whereas müssen ‘must’ locates the profiled process within projected reality. Dürfte (which is the preterit subjunctive form of dürfen ‘may’) “expresses a degree of likelihood somewhere between mere possibility (können) and near certainty (müssen)” (Mortelmans 2001: 13). The modals sollen and wollen (like the present subjunctive mood) are said to typically mark a shift of the origo, since they are used to introduce reported speech. (9) Er kann/muss/dürfte/will/soll deinen Geburtstag vergessen haben. ‘He may/must/has probably/claims to/is said to have forgotten your birthday’ I agree with Mortelmans that the epistemically used German modal verbs, similar to the German subjunctive mood markers, affect the location of the profiled event outside reality, i.e. outside the epistemic domain in which the speaker finds himself. Situating the process outside reality, they also specify the region of non-reality in which the process is situated (potential reality, projected reality). I suggest, however, that there is a crucial difference between the German verbal mood markers and the epistemically used modal verbs. The difference lies in different nature of the grounding relationship. Whereas the verbal mood markers refer to reality, the epistemic modals imply a cognitive transfer into the knowledge of reality, the difference pointed out for the English epistemic modals by Langacker (1991b): This usage reflects a shift in the domain where the notion of “momentum” is manifested: this conception is transferred from the evolution of REALITY ITSELF to the evolution of our KNOWLEDGE OF (PRESENT) REALITY. [...] reality is largely external, while knowledge of reality lies wholly within the province of the conceptualizer, the notion of evolutionary momentum is construed more subjectively when applied to the latter. (Langacker 1991b: 336f.; original emphasis)
I suggest that the epistemic domain ‘reality itself ’ applies to the German verbal mood markers, while the domain ‘knowledge of reality’ is occupied by the epistemic modals. In contrast to English, where, due to the absence of the verbal mood markers, these two options are simultaneously used by the modals, there is a clear distinction between the verbal mood markers and the epistemic modals in German. There is another important aspect of the German epistemic modals that distinguishes them from the mood markers. As I mentioned above, the semantic mood distinctions are built upon the basic deictic binary opposition ‘real’ (the epistemic region positively defined in respect to the ground) vs. ‘non-real’ (negatively defined region). For German epistemic modals, however, the distribution of their grounding values does not follow such binary distinctions. Resting on
The organization of the German clausal grounding system
the basic modal distinction ‘real’ vs. ‘non-real’ (in respect to the knowledge of reality), they characterize only the ‘non-real’ region. They represent the respective region as a scale where less or more (non-)real spheres of knowledge are distinguished, in which the profiled events are situated. Thus, the scale of the epistemic values of müssen (müsste) – dürfte – können (könnte) represent a scale from the near certainty (=less non-real) to mere possibility (=more non-real). Sollen and wollen, on the other hand, express a neutral non-real status of the profiled event in respect to the speaker’s (present) knowledge of reality.4 As for the alternative construal configuration of the ground, I propose that the epistemically used modal verbs allow only for one configuration, namely that they are oriented around the speaker-exclusive deictic center. Due to the highly subjective status of the modal grounding represented by epistemic modals, they refer to the internal mental world (=knowledge) of the conceptualizer. In this connection, it is quite unlikely that the speaker and hearer share the same knowledge about reality, even if they share the same speech situation. Therefore, epistemic modals are traditionally understood in terms of a speaker’s evaluation (of the truth) of a proposition, of a speaker’s personal attitude towards a proposition, or of a speaker’s degree of commitment to the truth of a proposition. Using epistemic modals, the speaker unambiguously signals his own view of the profiled event. This interpretation enables the addressee’s knowledge to be separated from the viewing arrangement and thus to be represented explicitly as knowledge which the speaker does not (need to) share. 5. Conclusion In this chapter, I have examined the verbal categories of German in terms of grounding predications. I have taken the broader notion of deixis as a starting point for an examination of German clausal grounding. I first proposed a unified explanation and classification of grounding predications being a particular class of deictic expressions. I suggested that three main aspects are relevant in distinguishing grounding predications: (i) the nature of the grounded entity, defining the (nominal vs. clausal) status of grounding; (ii) the nature of the grounding relation, defining the epistemic domain including different grounding values; and (iii) the construal configuration of the ground, defining the viewing arrangement (on the epistemic domain).
4. I am not further concerned with the values of wollen and sollen here, since their epistemic modal status is somewhat problematic and currently a matter of considerable debate.
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Then, employing the prominent idea of construal, I showed that there are two different ways in which the ground may be construed. The ground is either represented as the common deictic center, which is normally shared by the speaker and hearer in a current speech situation, or as the speaker-exclusive deictic center that favors only the speaker’s role in communication. Grounding predications differ from each other in the way in which construal configuration of the ground is prominent. For German, the common deictic center is prominent in the case of temporal grounding, anchoring the grounded processes to the time of speaking, which has to be shared by speaker and hearer. As for German modal grounding, different construal configurations underlie the distinction between the past and the present subjunctive, both being opposite to the unmarked verbal mood indicative. The common deictic center, defined as (the conception of present) reality of the speech event, serves as the vantage point of the preterit subjunctive, whereas the speaker-exclusive deictic center, identified with speaker’s (conception of present) reality, functions as the vantage point of the present subjunctive. German epistemic modals, however, relate the grounded processes in respect to the ground construed as the speaker-exclusive deictic center, anchoring the profiled event to the speaker’s internal knowledge of reality. References Brisard, Frank. 1999. A critique of localism in and about tense theory. PhD Dissertation, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Brisard, Frank (ed.). 2002. Grounding: The epistemic footing of deixis and reference. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Bühler, Karl. [1934] 1999. Sprachtheorie. Jena: Fischer. Diewald, Gabriele. 1999. Die Modalverben im Deutschen: Grammatikalisierung und Polyfunktionalität. Tübingen: Niemeyer. Donhauser, Karin. 1987. Mood and Morphology: An alternative Approach to the Syntax and Semantics of German Moods. Lingua 73: 53–77. Fabricius-Hansen, Cathrine. 1997. Der Konjunktiv als Problem des Deutschen als Fremdsprache. In Aspekte der Modalität im Deutschen – auch in kontrastiver Sicht, Debus Friedhelm & Oddleif Leirbukt (eds.), 13–37. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms. Fillmore, Charles. 1997. Lectures on Deixis. Stanford: CSLI. Goffman, Erving. 1981. Forms of Talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hanks, William F. 1990. Referential Space: Language and Lived Space among the Maya. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Janssen, Theo A.J.M. 2002. Deictic principles of pronominals, demonstratives and tenses. In F. Brisard (ed.), 151–193. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991a. Foundations of Cognitive Grammar 2. Descriptive application. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
The organization of the German clausal grounding system Langacker, Ronald W. 1991b. Concept, image, and symbol. The cognitive basis of grammar. Berlin/ New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002a. Deixis and subjectivity. In F. Brisard (ed.), 1–28. Langacker, Ronald W. 2002b. Remarks on the English grounding systems. In Brisard (ed.), 29–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 2003. Extreme subjectification: English tense and modals. In Motivation in Language: Studies in honor of Günter Radden, Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas Berg, René Dirven, & Klaus-Uwe Panther (eds.), 3–26. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Laury, Ritva. 2002. Interaction, grounding and third-person referential forms. In Brisard (ed.), 83–111. Mortelmans, Tanja. 1999. Die Modalverben sollen und müssen im heutigen Deutsch unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihres Status als subjektivierter ‘grounding predications’. PhD dissertation, University of Antwerp, Belgium. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2001. An introduction to Langacker’s grounding predications: Mood and modal verbs in German. In Modalität und mehr/Modality and more, Heinz Vater & Ole Letnes (eds.), 3–26. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2002. ‘Wieso sollte ich dich küssen, du hässlicher Mensch!’: A study of the German modals sollen and müssen as ‘grounding predications’ in interrogatives. In Brisard (ed.), 391–432. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2004. The status of the German auxiliary werden as a ‘grounding redication’. In Modalität und Übersetzung, Heinz Vater & Ole Letnes (eds.), 33–56. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier. Verhagen, Arie. 2007. Construal and perspectivisation. In Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens (eds.), 48–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grounding in terms of anchoring relations Epistemic associations of ‘present continuous’ marking in Turkish Ceyhan Temürcü
Middle East Technical University This chapter aims to contribute to the understanding of the connection between ‘present time reference’ and ‘epistemic contingency’ (including the evidential category ‘new information’) by investigating the epistemic associations of the Turkish ‘continuous aspect’ marker -Iyor (when used as the only TAM marker on a verbal predicate), with analyses based on the framework of anchoring relations developed in Temürcü (2007). Similar to Brisard’s (2002b, 2005) analysis of the English present progressive construction, -Iyor is shown to be associated with ‘epistemic contingency’. The treatment is then compared to the epistemic account of tenses and aspects in Cognitive Grammar. It is argued that temporal and epistemic categories should be taken as distinct but interacting components of sentence meaning and that the connection between present time reference and epistemic contingency is best explained in terms of metonymy. Keywords: epistemic contingency, epistemic immediacy, mirativity, continuous aspect, present time reference, grounding, anchoring, metonymy
1. Introduction Cross linguistically, certain types of tense and aspect markers are known to be connected with certain epistemic values.1 For instance, markers of ‘past tense’ are often associated with ‘epistemic distance’ (e.g., ‘counterfactuality’ or ‘unreality’) (Fleischman 1989, Dahl 1997, Iatridou 2000, Palmer 2001: 203–221), markers of ‘perfect aspect’ with ‘inference’ (Comrie 1976: 108–110, Anderson 1982, Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca 1994: 95–97, Johanson 2000a: 121–123), and markers of ‘future’ 1. The term ‘epistemic’ is used in this chapter as a cover term for both specifications of probability (‘epistemic modality’) and evidential dependency (‘evidentiality’).
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with ‘uncertainty’ (e.g., ‘irrealis’, ‘epistemic modality’, or ‘indefiniteness’) (Lyons 1977: 677, Yavaş 1982b, Comrie 1985: 45, Givón 1994, Mithun 1995: 385, Palmer 2001: 104–105). What is less commonly investigated is the relation between the present time reference (as expressed by markers of ‘present imperfective’, ‘present progressive’ or ‘present continuous’) with the evidential category most often called ‘new information’ (also called ‘immediate information’, ‘immediate evidence’ and sometimes subsumed under ‘mirative’).2 Nichols (1986: 254–255) asserts a universal covariance between ‘perfective’ and ‘inference’ on the one hand, and between ‘imperfective’ and ‘immediate’ on the other, on the basis of data from Chinese Pidgin Russian, Turkish (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986), Tibetan (DeLancey 1986) and Sherpa (Woodbury 1986). DeLancey (2001) supports Nichols’s generalization by illustrating the association between ‘mirative’ and ‘imperfective’ and that between ‘inferential’ and ‘perfective’ with data from Hare, Sunwar, Korean (citing DeLancey 1997) and Tadzhik (citing Lazard 1996). Brisard (2002b, 2005) presents a comparable analysis for the English ‘present progressive’ construction. Using the account of epistemic grounding in Cognitive Grammar, he identifies the schematic value of this construction as ‘epistemic contingency’. This characterization includes ‘new information’, as it covers the expression of unexpected and surprising events. For instance, the ‘imperfectivization’ of the verb in the example below indicates that the subject’s behavior “is not what one would expect, given what is known about the subject, but that it constitutes something of a surprise” (Brisard 2002b: 270):
(1) You are being silly.
(Brisard 2002b: 270)
This chapter investigates epistemic associations of the Turkish marker -Iyor as used on its own on a verb (henceforth designated as -Iyor#, # showing that no further TAM marker is attached), which then typically expresses ‘continuous aspect’ in present tense.3 Section 1 outlines the theoretical background, which is based on 2. ‘Present time reference’ is distinguished here from ‘present tense’, which is a grammatical category. Present time reference involves designating an event or state as ongoing or obtaining at the time of utterance. Markers labeled as ‘present tense’ in many languages, including English, do not consistently refer to the present time. 3. Turkish markers are referred to in the text using abstract morphemic representations, which are underspecified as to phonetic alternations conditioned by morphoâ•‚phonological rules, such as vowel harmony and consonant assimilation. The letters used for abstract phonemes and their phonetic realizations (in the Turkish orthography) are listed below. A: I: X: D: G:
a, e ı, i, u, ü a, e, ı, i, u, or ü d, t ğ, k
Grounding in terms of anchoring relations
the framework of anchoring relations developed in Temürcü (2007). Section 2 presents an analysis of temporal and epistemic values of -Iyor# and concludes that it is strongly associated with ‘epistemic contingency’, which is taken as covering both ‘new information’ and ‘personal certainty’. Section 3 compares the results of this analysis with Brisard’s (2002b, 2005) epistemic characterizations of English present tense and present progressive construction. It then expands on how the present account differs from the epistemic model of grounding in Cognitive Grammar in approaching the connection between temporality and epistemicity. 2. Temporal and epistemic categories within the framework of anchoring relations The framework of anchoring relations (Temürcü 2007) is a cross-linguistically applicable, semantic-pragmatic theory of tense, aspect, and mood (TAM). It motivates and defines purely semantic categories that are meant to comprise the building blocks of aspecto-temporal and modal values. This section depicts the semantic space of anchoring relations and expands on the temporal and epistemic categories that will be needed in the analysis of -Iyor in Section 3. 2.1
Anchoring relations in three semantic domains
The framework of anchoring relations imports insights and tools from various frameworks within the cognitive linguistics tradition. The very idea of ‘anchoring’ is inspired by the account of ‘grounding’ in Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1991: 315–342, 1997, 2002a, b, 2004; Brisard 2002a, b). Anchoring relations are conceived as purely semantic components of grounding predications in three semantic domains.4 These are called the temporal, epistemic and volitional domains and coincide, to a certain extent, with what Sweetser (1990) called the ‘content’, ‘epistemic’, and In morpheme representations, parentheses indicate buffer phonemes, and a hyphen (â•‚) marks a bound morpheme. The hash sign (#) at the end of a marker is used to indicate that no further TAM marker is attached to it in the given context. 4. ‘Grounding’ in Cognitive Grammar accounts for the deictic nature of tenses and grammatical modality markers in finite clauses, and of demonstratives, articles, and certain quantifiers in fully specified nominal expressions. Grounding predications “indicate the relationship of a designated entity to the ground or situation of speech, including the speech event itself, its participants, and their respective spheres of knowledge” (Brisard 2002a: xi). While grounding predications are grammatical elements, anchoring relations are defined in purely semantic terms. As such, they can be expressed not only by grammatical strategies, but also by lexical items, independent particles, sentence types, intonational distinctions, a combination of these, or with zeroâ•‚marking. As a consequence, while grounding predications always express offstage (nonâ•‚focal, backgrounded) and general (schematic) meanings, anchoring
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‘speech act’ domains. The temporal domain includes meanings typically expressed by viewpoint (or, relational) aspects and tenses, the epistemic domain those expressed by markers of epistemic modality and evidentiality, and the volitional domain those expressed by volitional (deontic) and illocutionary moods.