A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

A Commentary on

Cicero, De Officiis

A Commentary on

Cicero, De Officiis

ANDREW R. DYCK

Ann Arbor

T H E UNiVERsrrr OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1996 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America @ Printed on acid-free paper 1999

1998

4

3 2

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Publication of this volume was supported in part by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dyck, Andrew R. (Andrew Roy), 1947A commentary on Cicero, De Officilis / Andrew R. Dyck. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 0-472-10719-4 (acid-free paper) 1. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De officilis. 2. Ethics, Ancient. 3. Panaetius. 1. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De officilis. Π. Title. PA6296.D5D93 1996 17Γ.2—dc21 96-45128 CIP

Dis Manibus Friderici Solmsen

Contents Preface ix Works Cited by Author

xiii

Introduction 1 1. Καθήκοντα and Their Place within Stoic Ethics 2 2. Title 3 3. The Composition: Date, Circumstances, Consequences 8 4. The Addressee 10 5. Panaetius, nepi τοΰ καθήκοντος, as Source for Books 1-2 (1) A Note on Source-Criticism 18 (2) Date of Composition 21 (3) Why Panaetius May Have Left irepi του καθήκοντος Unfinished 23 (4) The Intended Audience for Trepi τοΰ καθήκοντος 24 (5) Cicero's Use of His Model 28 (6) The Subsequent Fate of ircpi τοΰ καθήκοντος 28 6. Politics in de Officiis 29 7. Cicero philosophus (?) 36 8. Influence through the Centuries 39 9. Language and Style 49 10. The Text 52 Commentary on Book 1 57 Commentary on Book 2 353 Commentary on Book 3 483 Addenda et Corrigenda

665

INDICES

Index Index Index Index Index Index

of of of of of of

Topics 657 Latin Words 664 Greek Words 671 Grammatical and Stylistic Features Authors 677 Proper Names 708

674

17

Preface

As early as 1932 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff called for a com­ mented edition of Cicero, de Officiis,1 a call repeated, so far as the commen­ tary is concerned, by Olof Gigon in 1969. 2 Indeed the aids in existence when Wilamowitz wrote, consisting mostly of school commentaries from the end of the previous century (C.F.W. Miiller, O. Heine, H.A. Holden), though useful for grammatical or stylistic points and providing some parallels and background information from ancient sources, are inadequate for anyone seeking to follow closely the train of thought or place the argument within the history of philosophy. De Officiis abounds in tricky distinctions, defini­ tions that appear arbitrary or opaque, and examples that sometimes seem to contradict, rather than illuminate, the argument. Little wonder that a schol­ arly commentary has remained so long unattempted. It is true that, shortly after Wilamowitz's call for a commented edition, two monographs appeared from the pen of M. Pohlenz: Antikes Fuhrertum: Cicero De officiis und das Lebensideal des Panaitios, which includes a detailed discussion of Books 1-2, and a separate study of Book 3. Pohlenz's work helps to provide philosophical context for the doctrines of de Officiis but is no replacement for a modern commentary. The writer of a monograph has the license, denied to a commentator, to concentrate on points of per­ sonal interest and to pass over other matters, however important or problem­ atic, a license that Pohlenz did not hesitate to use. Moreover, Gigon was perhaps not too harsh in saying that, while including many learned details, "Pohlenz largely confines himself to a paraphrase of the content, and this paraphrase rends to be superficial and betrays an occasional tendency toward homemade edification. The result is such as to frighten the reader away from de Officiis, rather than encourage him to study it more closely."3 Finally, Pohlenz underrates, I think, the degree to which Cicero has allowed his own 1. Wilamowitz, 1932, 2, 396, n. 1; sim. Otto Ricth, Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik, Problemata 9 (Berlin, 1933), 19. 2. Gigon, 267. 3. Ibid.: " . . . so beschrankt sich Pohlenz doch auf weite Srrccken hin auf eine Paraphrase dcs Inhalts, deren Oberflachlichkeit und gelegentlicher Hang zu hausbackener Erbaulichkeit den Lescr von nahcrcr Bcschaftigung mit De officiis ehcr abschreckt, als dap sie ihn dazu aufmuntcrt."

χ

Preface

iudicium to set the emphasis in Books 1-2 by attributing, for instance, even the attacks on the Gracchi to his Greek source, Panaetius, as well as the degree to which Cicero, rather than Pohlenz's putative Greek source, Athenodorus Calvus, has shaped the direction of the argument of Book 3. 4 The separation of Greek and Roman elements has needed rethinking with greater attention to the personal and political agenda of Cicero at the time of composition. The years since Pohlenz's work have seen publication of school commen­ taries on Book 1 by S. Prete (1951), on Books 2 and 3 by G. Schiassi (1967, 1954), and on Book 2 alone by P. Cugusi (1994), as well as M. Testard's twovolume Bude edition with translation and notes (1965-70). English readers have reason to be grateful to M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins for their recent annotated translation (1991); similar works for the German market have been produced by K. Buchner (2d ed., 1974) and H. Gunermann (rev. ed., 1992). Though all these books have their uses, their format severely limits the scope of the exegesis. Meanwhile K.B. Thomas and W. Heilmann have pro­ vided observations that help to clarify Cicero's meaning and/or train of thought in particular passages.5 I take it that the edition desiderated by Wilamowitz has now been sup­ plied by M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1994), which, in view of its more broadly based recensio, clear presentation of evidence, and judicious han­ dling of problems, is likely to remain standard for the foreseeable future (see further the introduction, § 10). There remains, however, the need for a modern scholarly commentary to de Offtciis. In trying to supply such, I am well aware that no commentary, except perhaps one that sets no higher goal than to collect the relevant ancient testimonia, can claim to be definitive. Each generation will pose its own questions to the text. I have tried to bear in mind that nowadays commentaries are not (if indeed they ever were) read for their own sake but serve merely as an aid to the understanding of the author. A note of excessive length and prolixity can actually block a reader's approach to the text. I have tried to come quickly to the point by citing the relevant ancient evidence, often verbatim, so that the reader can judge a question independently, and then draw conclusions as appropriate. I have not tried to create a repertory of miscellaneous learning attached to the text; instead I have referred the reader to standard works where such background information can be found. To orient the reader, I 4. See further the introduction to that Book. 5. On Heilmann's work cf., however, Griffin, loc. cit. introduction, n. 142; Dyck, 1984, 216, n. 2.

Preface

xi

have provided introductory notes to each of the three books; I have also included headnotes for cohesive groups of chapters (e.g., 1.1-6) to help the reader grasp the organization of the essay and the direction of the developing argument (in the event of overlapping groups the order is from larger to smaller), as well as notes on individual chapters and lemmata. For grammati­ cal points I have ordinarily contented myself with citing exempli gratia one or rwo parallels. I am acutely aware that I am standing on my predecessors' shoulders: most of the parallels are drawn without special acknowledgement from the serviceable school commentaries of Heine, Muller, and Holden or the great variorum edition of J.G. Graevius; for points of grammar and style more detailed treatment can be found in Muller's commentary. This work owes a great deal to many benefactors, instititutional and personal, living and dead. I was first introduced to de Officiis as an under­ graduate in a seminar taught by Friedrich Solmsen at the University of Wisconsin, who encouraged my plan to produce a commentary and read and commented on some specimens of the work in its earliest phase; the dedica­ tion expresses a debt that can never be repaid. My work began to take real shape during the academic year 1991 - 9 2 thanks to the generous support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the University of California President's Fellowship Program in the Humanities, and the School of Histor­ ical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. The National Endowment for the Humanities also provided a subvention to help defray printing costs. The Institute for Advanced Study as well as das Philologische Seminar of Bonn University provided me ideal working conditions from the fall of 1991 through the end of the calendar year 1992. The Academic Senate of the University of California, Los Angeles, has over many years generously provided for my research expenses. David Blank, Glen Bowersock, the late Charles Brink, Bruce Frier, Sander Goldberg, Christian Habicht, Michael Haslam, Brad Inwood, Catherine Schlegel, Christine Schmitz, and Michael Winterbottom have laid me under great obligation by reading the manuscript in whole or in part and giving me the benefit of their comments; they have saved me from numerous errors of fact and interpretation. The last-named also very generously allowed me to see a copy of his new critical edition prior to publication. I would like to express special thanks to D.R. Shackleton Bailey, who put me deeply in his debt by reading the manuscript with meticulous care far beyond what anyone has a right to expect from a reader for the Press; he has saved me from many errors and enriched the work with many good suggestions. The work would probably never have been published at all and surely not in this form but for the intervention of Ellen Bauerle of the University of Michigan Press, for whose unflagging encouragement and help at every stage I am profoundly

xii

Preface

grateful, as well as to an anonymous reader for the Press for valuable com­ ments. Last but by no means least, my wife Janis provided support, under­ standing, and encouragement throughout the long process of gestation. For remaining defects I bear sole responsibility.

Works Cited by Author

Editions of de Officiis Atzert1 Atzert2 Atzert3 Atzert* Baiter, 1861 Baiter, 1865 Beier Buchncr Cugusi Facciolati

Fedeli Gernhard Graevius

Griffin and Atkins Gruber Gunermann Heine Heusinger

Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1923. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1932. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1949. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1963. Baiter, I.G., I.C. Orelli, and C. Halm, eds. Opera omnia. 4 vols. (Off. in vol. 4). Zurich, 1861. Baiter, I.G., and C.L. Kayser, eds., Opera omnia. 11 vols. (Off. in vol. 8, 1865). Leipzig, 1860-69. Beier, Carolus, ed. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1820-21. Buchner, Karl, ed. and tr. Vom recbten Handeln. 2d ed. Zurich-Stuttgart, 1964. Cugusi, Paolo, ed. De officiis Libro II con antologia dai libri I e III. Milan, 1994. Facciolati, J., ed. De Officiis libri tres, de Senectute, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis et Paradoxa, accedit Q. Fratris Commentariolum Petitionis. Venice, 1747. Fedeli, P., ed. Milan, 1965. Gernhard, A.G., ed. Leipzig, 1811. Graevius, I.G., ed. De Officiis libri tres, Cato maior, Laelius, Paradoxa, Somnium Scipionis. Leiden, 1710. Griffin, M.T., and E.M. Atkins, trs. Cicero, On Duties. Cambridge, 1991. Gruber, J. von, ed. Leipzig, 1856. Gunermann, Heinz, ed. and tr. De Officiis. Vom pflicbtgemafien Handeln. Rev. ed. Stuttgart, 1992. Heine, Otto, ed. 6th ed. Berlin, 1885 (1st ed. Berlin, 1857). Heusinger, I.F., ed. (post I.M. Heusinger). Braun­ schweig, 1783.

xiv

Work» Cited by Author

Holden Lambinus Langius Miller Muller Pearce Prete Sabbadini Schiassi Stuerenburg Testard Unger Winterbottom

Holden, Hubert Ashton, ed. New ed. Cambridge, 1899. Lambinus, D., ed. Paris, 1565 {non vidi). Langius, C , ed. Antwerp, 1563 (nott vidi). Mi I lee, Walter, ed. and tr. Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913. Muller, C.F.W., ed. Leipzig, 1882. Pearce, Zacharias, ed. London, 1745. Prete, Sesto, ed. De Officiis, libro primo. Flo­ rence, 1951. Sabbadini, Remigio, ed. Turin, 1889 (rp. 1956). Schiassi, G., ed. De Officiis liber tertius, liber secundus. Bologna, 1954, 1967. Stuerenburg, Rudolphus, ed. 2d ed. Leipzig, 1843. Testard, Maurice, ed. and tr. 2 vols., Paris, 1 9 6 5 70. Unger, G.F., ed. Leipzig, 1852. Winterbottom, M., ed. Oxford, 1994. Other Works of Cicero

Att.

Div.

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fr. orat. fr. phil.

Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. M.T. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum. 2 vols. Stuttgart, 1987 (for Latin text). Or Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. Cicero's Letters to Atticus. 7 vols. Cambridge, 1965-70 (for commentary). Pease, Arthur Stanley, ed. M.T. Ciceronis De Divinatione libri duo. University of Illinois Stud­ ies in Language and Literature 6 and 8. Urbana, 1920-23; rp. Darmstadt, 1963. Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. M.T. Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares. Stuttgart, 1988 (for Latin text). Or Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1977 (for commentary). Crawford, Jane W., ed. Cicero, The Fragmentary Speeches. 2d ed. Atlanta, 1994. Gabarino, I., ed. M.T. Cicero, Fragmenta ex libris philosophicis, ex aliis libris deperditis, ex scriptis incertis. Milan, 1984.

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xv

See Crawford under "Modern Authors." Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. and tr. Cicero, Philippics. Chapel Hill and London, 1986. Other Ancient Authors and Works

Anon. lamb.

Aristippus Mannebach Bion of Borysthenes

Carneades M.

Carneades W.

Cato Jordan Cirenaici Hecato G.

Metrodorus Muson. Ruf. Panaetius fr. Socr. Solon fr. West

Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 11th ed. 3 vols. Zurich-Berlin, 1952, no. 89. Mannebach, Erich, cd. Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta. Leiden-Cologne, 1961. Kindstrand, J.F., ed. Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary. Uppsala, 1976. Mette, Hans-Joachim. Weitere Akademiker heute: von Lakydes bis zu Kleitomachos. Lustrum 27, 39-148 at 5 3 - 1 4 1 , 1985. Wisniewski, Bohdan, ed. Karneades, Fragmente. With commentary. Wroclaw-Warsaw-Cracow, 1970. Jordan, Henricus, ed. M. Catonis praeter librum de Re Rustica quae extant. Leipzig, 1860. Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. / Cirenaici. Florence, 1958. Gomoll, Heinz. Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton. Seine Begriffswelt und Nachwirkung unter Beigabe seiner Fragmente. Diss. Borsdorf-Leipzig, 1933. Korte, Alfred, ed. Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta. Leipzig, 1890. Hense, O., ed. C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiae. Leipzig, 1905. van Straaten, M., ed. Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta. 3d ed. Leiden, 1962. Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae. 4 vols. Naples, 1990. West, M.L., ed. Solon is fragmenta. In Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Vol. 2. 2d ed. Oxford, 1992.

xvi

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Solon test. Martina SVF Theophrastus Fortenbaugh, 1984 Theophrastus Fortenbaugh, 1992 Var. Men. Cebe

Martina, Antonius, ed. Solon, Testimonia veterum. Rome, 1968. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Ioannes ab Arnim, ed. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903-24. Fortenbaugh, W.W. Quelle» zur Ethik Theophrasts. Amsterdam, 1984. Fortenbaugh, W.W., et aJ., eds. Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. 2 vols. Leiden, 1992. Cebe, Jean-Pierre, ed. Varron, Satires menippees. Paris, 1972-. Modern Authors

Abel Adams, 1978 Adams, 1982 von Albrecht

Alexander

Allen Altheim Andreau

Annas, 1989

Abel, Karlhans. 100 Jahre Hekaton-Forschung. Wurzburger Jahrbucher N.F. 13, 101-20, 1987. Adams, J.N. Conventions of Naming in Cicero. CQ 72, 145-66, 1978. Adams, J.N. The Latin Sexual Vocabulary. Lon­ don, 1982. von Albrecht, Michael. Meister romischer Prosa von Cato bis Apuleius. 2d ed. Heidelberg, 1983 = Masters of Roman Prose from Cato to Apuleius, tr. Neil Adkin. Leeds, 1989. Alexander, Michael C. Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC. Phoenix Suppl. 26. Toronto, 1990. Allen, Walter, jr. Cicero's Provincial Governorship in 63 B.C. TAPhA 83, 2 3 3 - 4 1 , 1952. Altheim, Franz. Romische Religionsgeschichte. 2 vols. 2d ed. Berlin, 1956. Andreau, Jean. La vie financiere dans le monde romain. Les metiers de manieurs d'argent (IVe s. av. J.C. -///' 5. ap. J.C.). Bibliotheque des Ecoles ί^ηςβϊβββ d'Athenes et de Rome, 265. Paris, 1987. Annas, Julia. Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property. In Philosophic Togata: Es­ says on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. M. Griffin and J. Barnes. Oxford, 1989, 151-73.

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Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York-Oxford, 1993. Astin, A.E. Scipio Aemilianus. Oxford, 1967. Atkins, Margaret. 'Domina et regina virtutum': Justice and societas in de Officiis. Phronesis 35, 258-89, 1990. See also Griffin and Atkins under u Editions of de

Officiis.n Austin ad Cael. Barrett ad Hipp. Bauman, 1983

Bauman, 1985

Beeson Bernert Beseler

Bickel Blattler Bonhoffer

Bonitz

Botermann

Austin, R.G., cd. M.T. Ciceronis Pro M. Caelio oratio. 3d ed. Oxford, 1960. Barren, W.S., ed. Euripides, Hippolytos. Corr. rp. Oxford, 1966. Bauman, Richard A. Lawyers in Roman Republi­ can Politics: A Study of the Roman Jurists in their Political Setting, 3Ί6-82 BC. Munich, 1983. Bauman, Richard A. Lawyers in Roman Transi­ tional Politics: A Study of the Roman Jurists in their Political Setting in the Late Republic and Triumvirate. Munich, 1985. Beeson, Charles H. The Collectaneum of Hadoard. CPh 40, 201-22, 1945. Bernert, Ernestus. De vi atque usu vocabuli officii. Diss., Breslau, 1930. Beseler, Gerhard von. De iure civili Tullio duce ad naturam revocando. Bullettino dell'lstituto di Diritto Romano 39, 295-348, 1931. Bickel, E. Die Schrift des Martinus von Bracara Formula Vitae Honestae. RhM 60, 505-51, 1905. Blattler, P. Pirmin. Studien zur Regulusgeschichte. Diss., Fribourg, 1945. Bonhoffer, Adolf. Epictet und die Stoa. Ontersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophic Stuttgart, 1890. Bonitz, Hermann. Index Aristotelicus. In Aristotelis Opera ex rec. Immanuelis Bekkeri, ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Ed. alt. quam curavit Olof Gigon. Vol. 5. Berlin, 1961; orig. 1870. Botermann, Helga. Ciceros Gedanken zum "gerechten Krieg" in de officiis 1, 3 4 - 4 0 . Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 69, 1-29, 1987.

xviii

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Bringmann Brink

Broggini

Bruser Brunt, 1973 Brunt, 1975 Brunt, 1978

Brunt, 1986 Brunt, 1988 Buchheit

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Burkert, 1962

Bringmann, Klaus. Vntersuchungen zum spaten Cicero. Hypomnemata 29. Gottingen, 1971. Brink, C O . Okeiuxjis and OIKCIOTT^: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory. Phronesis 1, 123-45, 1955-56. Broggini, Gerardo. ludex arbiterve. Prolegomena zum Officium des romischen Privatrichters. Forschungen zum romischen Recht 10. CologneGraz, 1957. Bruser, Werner Josef. Der Textzustand von Ciceros Biichern de officiis. Diss., Cologne, 1951. Brunt, P.A. Dio Chrysostom and Stoic Social Thought. PCPhS 199, N.S. 19, 9-34, 1973. Brunt, P.A. Stoicism and the Principate. PBSR 43, 7-35, 1975. Brunt, P.A. Laus Imperii. In Imperialism in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1978, 159-91 = Roman Imperial Themes. Oxford, 1990, 288-323. Brunt, P.A. Cicero's officium in the Civil War. JRS 76, 12-32,1986. Brunt, P.A. The Fall of the Roman Republic. Ox­ ford, 1988. Buchheit, Vinzenz. Ciceros Kritik an Sulla in der Rede fur Roscius aus Ameria. Historia 24, 5 7 0 91, 1975. Buchner, Karl. Studien zur romischen Literatur, 6: Resultate romischen Lebens in romischen Schriftwerken. Wiesbaden, 1967. Buchner, Karl. Zum Platonismus Ciceros. Bemerkungen zum vierten Buch von Ciceros Werk De re publica. In Studia Platonica. Festschrift fur Hermann Gundert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag am 30.4. 1974, ed. K. Doring and W. Kullmann. Amsterdam, 1974, 165-84. Burkert, Walter. Weisheit und Wissenschaft. Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon. Niirnberg, 1962 = Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, tr. E.L. Minar, jr. Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

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CAH Carney Carter

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Burkert, Walter. Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker. Gymnasium 72, 175-200, 1965. Busolt, Georg. Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht hex Chaeroneia. 4 vols, in 3. Gotha, 1893-1904. The Cambridge Ancient History. 2d ed. Cam­ bridge, 1984-. Carney, Thomas Francis. A Biography of C. Marius. Chicago, 1970. Carter, J.M. Cicero: Politics and Philosophy. In Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, ed. J.R.C. Martyn. Amsterdam, 1972, 1 5 36. Cataudella, Quintino. Sulle fonti del u De officiis" di Cicerone. Atti del I Congresso intemazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 2, 4 7 9 - 9 1 , 1961. Champlin, Edward. Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250. Berkeley, 1991. Chaumartin, Fra^ois-Regis. Le De beneficiis de Seneque, sa signification philosophique, politique etsociale. Lille-Paris, 1985. Clark, Mark E., and James S. Ruebel. Philosophy and Rhetoric in Cicero's Pro Milone. RhM 128, 57-72, 1985. Cole, Andrew Thomas, jr. The Anonymus lamblichi and His Place in Greek Political Theory. HSPh 65, 127-63, 1961. Cole, Andrew Thomas, jr. Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology. American Philo­ logical Association. Philological Monographs 25. Cleveland, 1967; rp. with appendix Atlanta, 1990. Review of M. Winterbottom's ed. of Off. CJ 91, 78-79, 1995. Crawford, Jane W. M. Tullius Cicero: The Lost and Unpublished Orations. Hypomnemata 80. Gottingen, 1984. Crawford, Michael H. Roman Republican Coinage. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1974.

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Dihle, 1973 Dirlmeier ad EN Dorandi Douglas Drerup

Dahlheim, Werner. Struktur und Entwicklung des romischen Volkerrechts im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr. Munich, 1968. Daremberg, C , and E. Saglio, eds. Dictionnaire des antiquitis grecques et romaines d'apres les textes et les monuments. 5 vols. Paris, 18771914. D'Arms, John H. Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, Mass., and Lon­ don, 1981. De Lacy, Phillip. Stoic Views of Poetry. AJPh 69, 241-71, 1948. De Lacy, Phillip. The Four Stoic Personae. ICS 3, 163-72, 1979. D'Elia, Salvatore. Echi del u De officiis" nell' "Ars amatoria" ovidiana. Atti del I Congresso internazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 2, 127-40. Rome, 1961. Denniston, J. D., ed. M.T. Ciceronis In M. Antonium Orationes Philippicae prima et secunda. With introduction, notes (mostly historical) and appendices. Oxford, 1926. Diehl, Hermann. Sulla und seine Zeit im Urteil Ciceros. Beitrage zur Alrertumswissenschaft 7. Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, 1988. Dihle, Albrecht. Die goldene Kegel. Eine Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der antiken und fruhchristlichen Vulgarethik. Gottingen, 1962. Dihle, Albrecht. Posidonius' System of Moral Phi­ losophy. JHS 93, 50-57, 1973. Dirlmeier, Franz, tr. Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik. With commentary. 7th ed. Berlin, 1979. Dorandi, Tiziano. Contributo epigrafico alia cronologia di Panezio. ZPE 79, 87-92, 1989. Douglas, A.E., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis Brutus. With commentary. Oxford, 1966. Drerup, Engelbert. Demosthenes im Vrteile des Altertums. Wurzburg, 1923.

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Drexler, Hans. Review of Fedeli's ed. of Off. Gnomon 38, 558-63, 1966. Driefien, J.G. Observations in Ciceronis de officiis librorum locos quosdam difficiliores. Clebe, 1865. During, Ingemar. Aristoteles. Darstellung und In­ terpretation seines Denkens. Heidelberg, 1966. Dyck, Andrew R. On the Composition and Sources of Cicero, De officiis 1.50-58. CSCA 12, 77-84, 1979. Dyck, Andrew R. The Plan of Panaerius' Tkpi τοϋ καθήκοντος AJPh 100, 408-16, 1979. Dyck, Andrew R. Cicero, De officiis 2.21-22. Philologus 124, 201-11, 1980. Dyck, Andrew R. Panaerius' Conception of μεγα­ λοψυχία. ΜΗ 3 8 , 1 5 3 - 6 1 , 1981. Dyck, Andrew R. Notes on Composition, Text and Sources of Cicero's "De officiis." Hermes 112,215-28,1984. Edwards, Catharine. The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, 1993. Ernesti, J.C.T. Lexicon technologiae Latinorum rhetoricae. Leipzig, 1797. Ernout, Α., and A. Meillet. Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots. 4th ed. Paris, 1967. Erskine, Andrew. The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action. London, 1990. Fantham, Elaine. Comparative Studies in Republi­ can Latin Imagery. Phoenix Suppl. 10. Toronto and Buffalo, 1972. Fedeli, Paolo. Sul "De officiis." Ciceroniana 3 - 4 , 33-104, 1961-64. Fedeli, Paolo. Un problema di tradizione indiretta: Nonio e il "De officiis" di Cicerone. Ciceroniana 3 - 4 , 105-154, 1961-64. Fedeli, Paolo. II "De officiis" di Cicerone. Prob­ lem! e atteggiamenti della critica moderna. ANRW 1.4, 357-427, 1973.

xxii

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Finger

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H. Frank T. Frank Frederiksen Freyburger

Frier

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Rosenstein, 1990

Rotondi Rudberg Sailer de Sanctis Sandbach Schmekel Schmidt

Schmitthenner

Schofield, 1991 Schofield, 1995 1 Schofield, 1995 2 Schofield-BurnyeatBarnes Schofield-Striker

Scholz Shackleton Bailey

Rosenstein, Nathan. Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic. Berkeley-Los AngelesOxford, 1990. Rotondi, Giovanni. Leges publicae populi Romani. Milan, 1912. Rudberg, Gunnar. Ein Cicero-Konzept. Zu De officiis I. Symbolae Osloenses 9, 1-27, 1930. Sailer, Richard R Personal Patronage under the Early Empire. Cambridge, 1982. de Sanctis, Gaetano. Storia dei Romani. 4 vols. Turin, 1907-64. Sandbach, F.H. The Stoics. 2d ed. Bristol, 1989; orig. 1975. Schmekel, August. Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa. Berlin, 1892. Schmidt, Peter Lebrecht. Die Abfassungszeit von Ciceros Schrift Uber die Gesetze. Collana di studi Ciceroniani 4. Rome, 1969. Schmitthenner, Walter. Oktavian una das Testament Casars. Eine Untersuchung zu den politischen Anfangen des Augustus. 2d ed. Zetemata 4. Munich, 1977. Schofield, Malcolm. The Stoic Idea of the City. Cambridge, 1991. Schofield, Malcolm. Two Stoic Approaches to Jus­ tice. In Laks-Schofield, 191-212. Schofield, Malcolm. Cicero's Definition of Res Publica. In Powell, 63-83. Schofield, M., et al., eds. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford, 1980. Schofield, Malcolm, and Gisela Striker, cds. The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics. Cambridge/Paris, 1986. Scholz, Udo W. Der Redner M. Antonius. Diss. Erlangen, 1962. See under "Other Works of Cicero" s.vv. Att.t Fam., and Phil. Without other specification = manuscript notes placed at my disposal by D.R. Shackleton Bailey.

Works Cited by Author Shackleton Bailey, 1995 Shatzman Shaw Shewring Shtaerman

Skutsch Skutsch ad Enn. Ann, Smith

Solodow Soltau

Sorabji

Steidle, 1984 Steidle, 1985

Stein ad Hdt. Steinmetz, F.

xxxvii

Review of M. Winterbottom's ed. of Off. BMCR 6,259-60,1995. Shatzman, Israel. Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics. Brussels, 1975. Shaw, Brent. Bandits in the Roman Empire. Past and Present 105, 3 - 5 2 , 1984. Shewring, W.H. Prose Rhythm and the Compara­ tive Method. Π. CQ 25, 12-22, 1931. Shtaerman, E.M. Die Bliitezeit der Sklavenwirtschaft in der romischen Republik, tr. M. Brauer-Pospelova. Wiesbaden, 1969. Skutsch, Otto. Studia Enniana. London, 1968. Skutsch, Otto, ed. The Annals of Q. Ennius. Oxford, 1985. Smith, Philippa R. " Ά Self-Indulgent Misuse of Leisure and Writing'? How Not to Write Philoso­ phy: Did Cicero Get It Right?" In Powell, 301 23. Solodow, Joseph B. The Latin Particle Quidem. American Classical Studies 4. Boulder, 1978. Soltau, Wilhelm. Eine annalistische Quelle in Cicero de officiis III. Wochenschrift fur Klassische Philologie 7, 1239-45, 1890. Sorabji, Richard. Animal Minds and Human Mor­ als: The Origins of the Western Debate. London, 1993. Steidle, Wolf. Beobachtungen zu des Ambrosius Schrift De officiis. VChr 38, 18-66, 1984. Steidle, Wolf. Beobachtungen zum Gedankengang im 2. Buch von Ambrosius, De Officiis. VChr 39, 280-98,1985. Stein, Heinrich, ed. Herodotos. 5th ed. 5 vols. Berlin, 1893-1901. Steinmetz, Fritz. Staatengriindung—aus Schwache oder narurlichem Geselligkeitsdrang? Zur Geschichte einer Theorie. In Politeia und Res publica. Beitrdge zum Verstandnis von Politik, Recht und Staat in der Antike dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet, ed. P. Steinmetz. Palingenesia 4. Wiesbaden, 1969, 181-99.

xxxviii

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Sreinmerz, F.-A.

Stockton Strasburger, 1956

Strasburger, 1965 Strasburger, 1990

StraumeZimmermann Striker Stroh

Stroux, 1927 Stroux, 1933 Stroux, 1949 Sumner

Swoboda

Syme Tatakis

Steinmetz, Fritz-Arthur. Die Freundschaftslebre des Panaitios nach einer Analyse von Ciceros "Laelius De amicitia." Palingenesia 3. Wiesbaden, 1967. Stockton, David. The Gracchi. Oxford, 1979. Strasburger, Hermann. Concordia Ordinum. Eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros. Amsterdam, 1956. Strasburger, Hermann. Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman Empire. JRS 55, 4 0 - 5 3 , 1965. Strasburger, Hermann. Ciceros philosophisches Spatwerk als Aufruf gegen die Herrschaft Caesars, ed. G. Strasburger. Spudasmata 45. Hildesheim, 1990. Straume-Zimmermann, Laila, ed. Ciceros Hortensius. Europaische Hochschulschriften XV, 9. BernFrankfurt am Main, 1976. Striker, Gisela. Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics, OSAP 9, 1-73, 1991. Stroh, Wilfried. Taxis und Taktik. Die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden. Stuttgart, 1975. Stroux, Johannes. Summum ius summa iniuria. Leipzig, 1927. Stroux, Johannes. Die stoische Beurteilung Alex­ anders des Grofien. Philologus 88, 2 2 2 - 4 0 , 1933. Stroux, Johannes. Romische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik. Potsdam, 1949. Sumner, G.V. The Orators in Ciceros Brutus: Prosopography and Chronology. Phoenix Suppl. 11. Toronto, 1973. Swoboda, Michael. De proverbiis a Cicerone adhibitis. Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu. Pracc Wydzialu Filolog.-Filoz. 14, 3. Torun, 1963. Syme, Ronald. The Roman Revolution. Oxford, 1939. Tatakis, Basile N. Panetius de Rhodes, le fondateur du moyen stoicisme. Sa vie et son oeuvre. Paris, 1931.

Works Cited by Author Taylor Testard, 1974

Thilo

Thomas

TLL Tsekourakis

Unger

Veyne Wacht van Wageningen Wagner

Walbank Walbank ad Plb. Walcot Wallace-Hadrill

xxxix

Taylor, Lily Ross. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. Berkeley, 1949. Testard, Maurice. Ciceron, bourreau de soimeme? LEC 42, 149-62, 1974. See also under "Editions of de Officiis." Thilo, Ralf Michael. Der Codex accepti et expensi im romischen Recht. Ein Beitrag zu Lehre von der Litteralobligation. Gottinger Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte 13. Gottingen, 1980. Thomas, Klaus Bernd. Textkritische Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De offtciis. Orbis antiquus 26. Miinster, 1971. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae. Leipzig, 1900-. Tsekourakis, Damianos. Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics. Hermes Einzelschriften 32. Wiesbaden, 1974. Unger, G.F. Zur Textkritik von Ciceros Schrift De officiis. Philologus, Suppl. 3. Gottingen, 1867, 1 106. See also under "Editions of de Officiis." Veyne, Paul. Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique. Paris, 1976. Wacht, Manfred. Privateigentum bei Cicero und Ambrosius. JbAC 25, 2 8 - 6 4 , 1982. van Wageningen, Iacobus. De Ciceronis libro Consolationis. Groningen, 1916. Wagner, Herbert. Studien zur allgemeinen Rechtslehre des Gaius. Ius gentium und ius naturale in ihrem Verhdltnis zum ius civile. Studia Amstelodamensia ad epigraphicam, ius antiquum et papyrologicam pertinentia 15. Zutphen, 1978. Walbank, F.W. Aratus ofSicyon. Cambridge, 1933. Walbank, F.W. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. 3 vols. Oxford, 1957-79. Walcot, P. Cicero on Private Property: Theory and Practice. G & R 22, 120-28, 1975. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum. Princeton, 1994.

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Walzer

Wankel ad Dem. 18

Watson, Law Making Watson, Obligations Watson, Persons Watson, Property Wegner

Wehrli ad Aristox., et al. Weidauer Weidner Wendt Westlake White Widmann

Wieacker

Wilamowitz, 1923

Walzer, Richard. Magna moralia und aristotelische Ethik. Neue philologische Untersuchungen 7. Berlin, 1929. Wankel, Hermann. Demosthenes, Rede fiir Ktesiphon tiber den Kranz. 2 vols. Heidelberg, 1976. Watson, Alan. Law Making in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1974. Watson, Alan. The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1965. Watson, Alan. The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1967. Watson, Alan. The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1968. Wegner, Michael. Untersuchungen zu den lateinischen Begriffen socius und societas. Hypomnemata 21. Gottingen, 1969. Wehrli, Fritz, ed. Die Schule des Aristoteles. 10 vols. + 2. 2d ed. Basel-Stuttgart, 1967-78. Weidauer, Frank. Der Prinzipat in Senecas Schrift de dementia. Diss. Marburg, 1950. Weidner, A. Die Interpolationen in Ciceros Officien. Magdeburg, 1872. Wendt, Wilhelm. Ciceros Brief an Paetus IX 22. Diss. Giefien, 1929. Westlake, H.D. Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. London,1935. White, Nicholas P. Two Notes on Stoic Terminol­ ogy. AJPh 99, 111-19, 1978. Widmann, Susanne. Untersuchungen zur Ubersetzungstechnik Ciceros in seiner philosophischen Prosa. Diss. Tubingen, 1968. Wieacker, Franz. Romische Rechtsgeschichte. Quellenkunde, Rechtsbildung, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsliteratur. Vol. 1. Munich, 1988. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Stoat und Gesellschaft der Griechen. 2d ed. Berlin-Leipzig, 1923.

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Wilamowitz, 1932 Wilamowitz ad Eur. Heraci Wilkins on de Orat. Wilkinson, 1963 Wilkinson, 1979 Winterbottom Winterbonom, 1990 Winterbottom, 1993 Winterbottom, 1995 Wirszubski Wiseman Wissowa Wolfflin

Wood Zetzel ad Rep. Zielinski Zucker

xli

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Panaitios. In Reden und Vortrdge. 4th ed. Berlin, 1926, 190-215. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Der Glaube der Hellenen. 2 vols. Berlin, 1932. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von, ed. Euripides, Herakles. 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1895. Wilkins, A.S., ed. M.T. Ciceronis de Oratore libri tres. Oxford, 1892. Wilkinson, LP. Golden Latin Artistry. Cam­ bridge, 1963. Wilkinson, LP. Cbssical Attitudes to Modern Is­ sues. London, 1979. See under "Editions of de Officiis.1* Winterbottom, M. New Light on the X Tradition of Cicero's De Officiis. MD 2 4 , 1 3 5 - 4 1 , 1990. Winterbottom, M. The Transmission of Cicero's De Officiis. CQ 43, 2 1 5 - 4 2 , 1993. Winterbottom, M. The OCT de Officiis: A Post­ script. CQ 45, 265-66, 1995. Wirszubski, C. Cicero's cum dignitate otium: A Reconsideration. JRS 44, 1-13, 1954. Wiseman, T.P. New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.-A.D. 14. Oxford, 1971. Wissowa, Georg. Religion und Kultus der Romer. Munich, 1912. Wolfflin, Eduard von. Krieg und Frieden im Sprichworte der Romer. Sitzungsberichte der philosoph.-philol. Classe der konigl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Munich, 1888, 197-215. Wood, Neil. Cicero s Social and Political Thought. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1988. Zetzel, James E. G., ed. Cicero, De Re Publica: Selections. Cambridge, 1995. Zielinski, Thaddaus. Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte. 4th ed. Leipzig, 1929. Zucker, Fricdrich. Βάθος i\t\tep\ov. Philologus 93, 31-60, 1938.

Introduction

A well-known scholar has confessed having a harder time achieving a per­ sonal relation to de Offtciis than to any of Cicero's other philosophical works. 2 The fact is not surprising. The work is difficult to categorize. It was not part of the ambitious series of essays by which Cicero proposed to "rouse up" philosophy, long neglected by his countrymen.3 It was an afterthought composed when the planned cycle was complete.4 It was written in uncertain and troubled times, with a tyrant recently killed but his legacy beckoning others to imitate him (2.23 ff.). The previous year Cicero had suffered per­ sonal misfortune in the death of his beloved daughter Tullia. His remaining offspring, a son also named Marcus, aged rwenry-one, was living away from home and studying philosophy at Athens; he was at a critical stage of life; there were worrisome signs about his development (see § 4 below). Cicero's first impulse was to devote himself to personal matters, to sail to Athens and take young Marcus in hand. After considerable hesitation, however, he aborted the trip and returned to Rome, called back by urgent senatorial business (Att. 16.7). After a bitter exchange of speeches between himself and Antony, Cicero withdrew from Rome in late September, 44, and began writ­ ing. The Second Philippic, de Amicitia, and de Offtciis were products of the following weeks. Work on de Offtciis is first attested 28 October (ibid., 1. The names of Greek authors and works arc abbreviated as in LSJ (or occasionally in a slightly less abbreviated form), classical Latin authors as in OLD (works of Cicero arc generally cited by title only, Off by book and section only), postclassical Latin authors as in TLL (hence, for instance, the Ciceronian de Officiis is Off., Ambrose's de Officiis Ministrorum, off.; 1 ordinarily cite Var. Men., Sen. Dial., and Plut. Mor. by the title of the individual work. Quota­ tions are given according to standard editions with no attempt to regularize spelling or punctua­ tion (Aristotle's Politics is cited from the second edition of Otto Immisch [Leipzig, 1929] with slight modifications). Names of journals are abbreviated as in L'annee philologtque. All dates arc B.C. unless otherwise indicated. 2. Wilhelm Suss, Cicero. Eine Einfiihrung in seine philosopbischen Scbriften {mil Ausschlufi der staatsphilosophischen Werke), Abh. d. Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur, Mainz, Geistcs- und Sozialwisscnschafrlichc Kl., 1965, 5 (Wiesbaden, 1966), 143: "es fallt mir am schwersten, zu ihr (sc. de Officiis] cin lebendiges Vcrhalmis zu gewinncn." 3. Tusc. 1.5: philosophta iacuit usque ad banc aetatem nee ullum babuit lumen litterarum Latinarunt; quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est. . . 4. Cf. Div. 2.1 ff.

2

A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

15.13.6), with completion of the first two books announced 5 November (ibid., 16.11.4). On 9 December he was again in Rome committed to the struggle with Antony (Fam. 11.5.1). What resulted was not and could not be a highly polished work. Nev­ ertheless it has value of several sorts: it provides a continuous account of an approach to Stoic ethics (based on the καθήκοι/ or "appropriate action," which Cicero has chosen to render as officium) otherwise known to us only from meager excerpts; and it yields insight into Cicero's thinking at a crossroads in his career, as he prepared himself to enter the lists for his final struggle on behalf of the republic. There is some indication that around this time Cicero was growing aware of his mortality and thinking about his legacy and place in history: the composition of de Gloria the previous sum­ mer, the remark abesse banc aetatem longe a sepulcro negant oportere [Att. 16.7.7), and the renewed work on the άν€κδοτον or "secret history" of his times, containing explosive charges against Caesar and Crassus (cf. ad 2.84). Moreover, the work is at the same time Cicero's last extant communication with his son. It contains observations relevant to the life-choices facing the young man, including an emphasis on the importance of a paternal legacy in providing focus and creating expectations (1.116 ff., 2.44-45), and it re­ affirms Cicero's own choice of civilian statesmanship above military glory (1.74 ff.) and policy of protection of property interests (2.72 ff.). It also impugns the moral and political record of Pompey (3.82), Crassus (1.25, 3.73-75), and, especially, Julius Caesar (1.26,43,2.23,27-29, 84,3.82 ff.). De Officiis, then, stands at the confluence of several agenda, personal and political, a fact that has made it hard to evaluate. It has proved difficult for modern scholarship to separate the strands and determine where we hear the voice of the Rhodian philosopher Panaetius or other philosophical sources, where the voice of Cicero himself (see $$ 5 and 7 below). The text has raised its own set of problems: it is less polished than the other philosophica, but how much less so, and did Cicero leave things in the manuscript which he would, on subsequent polishing, have banished or destined for other uses (see § 1 0 below)? The following introduces the problems of this peculiar but uniquely precious document. 1. Καθηκοιτα and Their Place within Stoic Ethics For the Stoics appetency (opefts) has as its object καθηκοι/τα, appropriate acts that any person can perform; they have their origin (αρχή) in the "natu­ ral advantages" (τά κατά φύσιιΟ, more or less equivalent to the "external

Introduction, $$ 1-2

3

goods." 5 For this reason evidently the subject of the καθήκον is said to be subsequent to (ακόλουθο?) the doctrine of the preferred indliferents (SVF 3, 134.18-19); and the emphasis lies on the result of the action, which can be obtained merely by following precepts; correct intent is not implied. A subset of καθήκοντα are the κατορθώματα (also called τ^λαα καθήκοντα; cf. ad 1.8), or correct acts performed by the sage for the right reason; they are directed toward good things (αγαθά), i.e., for the Stoa, the virtues; τα κατά φύσιν provide the material (ϋλη) with which the intelligent moral agent works. 6 Cicero describes his approach to the subject as consisting in praecepta "by which human life can be formed in all directions'* {quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit: 1.7). Elsewhere, too, teachings about καθή­ κοντα are linked with praecepta; cf. Sen. Ep. 95.45: M. Brutus in eo libro quern περ'ι καθήκοντο? inscripsit dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus.7 Precepts on officia were directed, not toward the sage, who, being able to arrive at the correct action through use of λόγο?, had no need of them, but to the προκύπτων (cf. ad 3.13b-17). However, not all praecepta need have been of the simplistic form hoc uitabis, hoc fades which Seneca says may be needed for "weaker natures" (inbecilliora ingenia: Ep. 94.50). Indeed, Cicero/Panaetius carefully connects the recommended right actions with τα κατά φύσιν (cf. ad 1.11 ff., 97-98, 100-103a, 126-32, 127, etc.); such procedure befits an ethic that defines officium as an action for which a persuasive rationale can be given (1.8; the definition was added by Cicero). 2. Title When Panaetius composed his essay περί του καθήκοντος,8 philosophical writers were already accustomed to providing titles for their own works. 9 5. Cf. Long, 1967,62 and 65-66. When Cicero speaks ο(κα9ήικοντα themselves as if they were classed among the indiffercnts (sc. Fin. 3.58: ex quo mtetlegitur officium medium quiddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis), he appears to be departing from strict Stoic terminology (possibly he is extrapolating from the term medium officium, on which cf. ad 1.8). 6. Cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1069e = SVF 3,134.5: και τίνα λάβω του καβήκοιτο? αρχήν και υλην ττ\ς αρετής άφε'ι? τήν φύσιν και τό κατά φύσιΐ'; Cic. Fin. 3.22: . . . non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; Kidd, 1955, 184-86; Inwood, 1985, 117. 7. On Brutus' essay cf. also Gelzer, RE 10.1 (1917), 1006.57 ff. 8. For the form of the ride cf. Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 34. 9. Cf., e.g., the long list of sober titles arrested for Chrysippus {SVF 2,4.37 ff.); contrast the fact that the book that Heraclitus deposited in the temple of Artemis of Ephesus was only later titled ire pi φύσεω?; cf. E. Wellmann, RE 8.1 (1912), 505.25 ff.; one of Democritus' works, possibly the μικρό? διάκοσμο?, seems likely to have begun in the traditional form: τάδί rrepl τώι/

4

A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

The same title is attested for Zeno (SVF 1,14.31 = D.L. 7.4), Cleanthes (SVF 1, 107.10 [three books] = D.L. 7.174), Sphaerus (SVF 1, 139.31) and Chrysippus (SVF 3, 197.34 ff. [in at least seven books]), as well as for Panaetius* pupil Hecato (frr. 10 ff. Go moll) and Posidonius (frr. 39 and 40 E.-K. = 430 and 429 Th. [the latter gives the title as περί καθηκόντων]; more than one book). Only Chrysippus is known to have written περί κατορθωμά­ των (ibid., 200.38-39 [in more than one book]). Now the ability to evaluate a translation depends upon one's knowledge of both languages in question. From this perspective Cicero's friend T. Pomponius Atticus, a Roman long resident at Athens and a quasi-native speaker of Greek,10 was a formidable judge. In fact, he expressed reservations about the rendering of καθήκον as officium (Att. 16.11.4 [5 November 44] and 16.14.3 [one week later; quoted below]). To evaluate Cicero's title it will be necessary to analyze the sense of both the Greek and Latin terms; the sketch­ ing of a certain amount of semantic history on both sides will clarify the range and elasticity of each. The earliest frequently attested sense of καθήκω is geographical: "come down, reach to" (LSJ 1.2), as at Hdt. 7.22.2: ό γαρ "Αθω? έστι όρος μέγα Τ€ και όνομαστόν, ές θάλασσαν κατήκον . . . A common sense of κατά in com­ position is "back" or "back again" (LSJ s.v., E, citing κάτειμι. καταπορεύομαι, καταπλέω II); hence the use of our verb for regularly recurring events, as with the time of the holy months manipulated by the Argives according to X. HG 4.7.2: . . . χρηστηριαζόμενο? (sc. ό Άγησίπολι?) έπηρώτα τον θεόν εί όσίω? άν εχοι αΰτώ μη δεχομενω τάς σπονδά^ των Άργείων, δτι ούχ οπότε καθήκοι ό χρόνο?, άλλ' οπότε εμβάλλει^ μελλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ί/πεφερον του? μήνας; sim. Arist. HA 568al7 on the spawning of carp εν τη συμτται/τωΐ' λέγω (if so, the title μικρό? διάκοσμο? may have been added later); cf. H. Diels, "Herodot und Hekataios," Hermes 22 (1887), 436, n. 1. When Andronicus of Rhodes edited Aristotle's writings, he found some already supplied with serviceable titles; for the πραγματάαι he invented titles, somerimcs with greater success (e.g., πολιτικά, φυσική άκρόασι?), sometimes with less (μεταφυσικά); cf. During, 591-92. On Greek practices in titulature cf. in general Egidius Schmalzriedt, ilcpl ΦύοΈω?. Zur Fruhgeschichte der Buchtitel (Munich, 1970); on Aristotle, ibid., 96 ff., as well as Paul Moraux, Les listes anciennes des outrages d'Aristote (Louvain, 1951), 7, n. 17; cf. also R. Blum, Kallimachos und die Literaturuerieichnung bei den Griechen, Archiv fur Geschichte des Buchwcscns 18.1-2 (Frankfurt a.M., 1977), 218 = Kalli­ machos: The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography, tr. H.H, Wcllisch (Madison, 1991), 147. 10. On Atticus' residence at Athens cf. R. Feger, RE Suppl. 8 (1956), 505.17 ff.; on his knowledge of Greek Nep. Att. 4.1: sic enim Craece loquebatur, ut Athenis natus viderelur . . . ; at Att. 1.19.10 Cicero appeals to Atticus to correct any solecisms in die account of his consulate he composed in Greek.

Introduction, $ 2

5

καθηκούση ώρα. With reference to religious festivals the phrase ό καθήκων χρόνος could be understood as denoting the "fit" or "proper" time, a usage that doubtless led to the general sense of καθήκω as "be fitting, proper** (LSJ s.v. II); cf., e.g., Dem. 4.35: . . . ώ άνδρας 'Αθηναίοι, νομί£€Τ€ τήν μέν των Παναθηναίων €ορτήν καΐ την των Διονυσίων άβ του καθήκοντος χρόνου γίγνβσθαι . . . , with OT 75, where Oedipus speaks of Creon being gone to consult the oracle "more than the proper time" (πλβίω τού καθήκοντος χρό­ νου). Hence the common impersonal construction καθήκα μοι for that which it is fitting or proper for one to do by virtue of office or official charge (Lys. 26.12: . . . I'lkrrc υμΐν καθήκαν π€ρΐ ταύτης της αρχής άκριβ^στβραν την δοκιμασίαν. . .ποΐ€Ϊσθαι;Χ. An. 1.9.7:. . .στρατηγόςδ€ και πάντωνcnreoeiχθη οι ς καθήκα α ς Καστωλού πβδίον άθροίζ€σθαι . . . ; id. Cyr. 1.2.5: είσι δέ και των γ€ραιτ€ρων προστάται ήρημένοι, ο'ί προστατίύουσιν δπως και ούτοι τα καθήκοντα άποτβλώσιν) or in general (Men. fr. 532 K.-Th.: συ μέν παραιν€Ϊς ταύτα foaa σοι πρέπει, / *μέ δέ ποίΕΐν τό καθήκον ούχ ό σος λόγος, /eu ισθ* ακριβώς, ό δ* ίδιος π€ΐθ€ΐ τρόπος). The extant Greek evidence suggests, however, that the felt need to be κόσμιος, rather than to do one's καθήκον, is the norm likely to add moral tension to a Menandrian plot, 11 but this im­ pression may be deceptive: see the passages of Terence cited below in which officium is used. In any case, the καθήκον was taken over as an ethical term by Zeno; what precise content he gave it is not clear. An etymology was adduced, charac­ teristically, in support (whether by Zeno or a successor): cf. D.L. 7.108 (= SVF 1, 55.9): κατωνομάσθαι δ' ούτως υπό πρώτου Ζήνωνος τό καθήκον, άπό τού κατά τινας ήκαν τής προσονομασίας €Ϊλημμ€νης12 (might the phrase κατά τινας point to a variation in appropriate action according to social relation, as in Epictetus' σχέσεις [cf. ad 1.149]?). The well-known Stoic definition, τό άκόλουθον ev ζωή, ό πραχθέν βύλογον άπολογίαν έχει {SVF 3, 134.20; cf. 1.8; D.L. 7.108: καθήκοντα μεν ούν elvai Οσα λόγος aipd ποια ν . . .), emphasizes the role of reason, though the term could still apply to animals and plants if the rationale is supplied by an observer (cf. ad 1.8). Like the substantivized participle καθήκον, officium was connected with a verb; and the etymology from facere/efficere long continued to be felt; cf. Don. ad Ter. An. 236 {hoccin officium patrisf): 'officium' dicitur ab efficiendo, ab eo, quod quaeritur in eo, quid efficere unum quemque conveniat pro condicione personae; Aug. c. lul. 4.21: officium est autem quod facien11. Cf. H.-J. Metre, "Moschion ό κόσμιος," Hermes 97 (1969), 432-39, « p . 439. 12. Kilb, 42, should, however, have separated more carefully etymology and usage, since, in spite of the connection commonly assumed by the ancients, the latter can develop quite differently.

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

dum est. By Cicero's day the word had undergone a semantic evolution similar to that of καθήκον prior to its appropriation by Zeno. Thus officium occurs repeatedly in Plautus with reference to an individual's role as a result of belonging to a given social group, e.g., at Cas. 585-86 (Cleustrata to Lysidamas): non matronarum officiumst, sed meretricium, I viris altents, mi vir, subblandtrter, with other passages cited by Bernert, 4 ff.13 In Terence, however, the term broadens beyond social roles to a general moral sense similar to that of καθήκον at Men. fr. 532 quoted above: cf. Ad. 4 6 3 - 6 4 (Hegio to Demea of Aeschinus; cf. also 514, 593, 980): . . . neque boni I neque Itberalts functus officiumst viri; Ph. 138-39: (Geta): quod fors feret feremus aequo animo. (Davos): placet: I em istuc virist officium, where, as Goldberg points out, "the irony of the slaves' posturing depends on a recog­ nizable moral sentiment appropriate to their superiors."14 With this background in mind let us examine Atticus' objection to Cicero's rendering of καθήκον as officium, which must be inferred from Cicero's rejoinder (Att. 16.14.3):. . . mihi non est dubium quin quod Graeci καθήκον, nos 'officium'. id autem quid dubitas quin etiam in rempublicam caderet? nonne dicimus consulum officium, senatus officium, imperatoris officium? praeclare convenit; aut da melius. If, however, Atticus had objected in general terms that officium was inappropriate for the respublica, he is not likely to have had in mind a problem as easily disposed of as Cicero thought to do by reference to the officio of various officials. Perhaps he had observed that one would scarcely speak of a citizen's officium to the state as such (cf. 1.58), 15 but ordinarily of the officia of individuals in various social relations to each other.16 Another innovation entailed by Cicero's deployment of officium - καθήκον is its use with reference to the enemy in wartime (cf. ad 13. Similarly officium appears as the "proper activity" in a professional role at Inv. 1.6, with reference in particular to physicians and orators: . . . id, quod facere debet, officium esse dicimus . . . ; and Seneca {Ben. 3.18.1) would later distinguish beneficium, officium, ministerium (all three could be called munera; cf. Vat L. 5.179, who speaks of munera given officii causa), nor by the content of the deed, but by the relationship of the agent to the recipient: beneficium esse, quod alienus det. . . ; officium esse fili, uxoris, earum personarum, quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem lubet; mmisterium esse servi. . . 14. For the erotic sense of officium and its exploitation in poetry cf. Charles L. Platter, "Officium in Catullus and Propertius: a Foucauldian Reading," CPh 90 (1995), 211-24. 15. Though one might speak of various obligations, such as that of giving testimony, serving as tutor, or the like within the framework of the state and its laws; cf. Oomes, TLL 9, 521.4 ff. 16. Cf. Sen. Ben. 3.18.1 (cited n. 13 supra) and in general on the "caractere subjectif" of officium, which tends to be defined by the person of the individual performing the officium (as opposed to the more objective term munus) Hellegouarc'h, 153.

Introduction, $ 2

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1.34). However, καθήκον in Panaetius' essay doubtless diverged from ordi­ nary Greek usage in this latter respect as well. Or was Atticus' doubt per­ haps, as Goldberg moots, less narrow than Cicero's reply suggests and, in fact, an objection to using this familiar Latin moral term in a technical Stoic sense? If so, this fact may explain why Cicero was keen, at the very outset, to insert a definition of terms even though he had to find it in another source (1.8). In selecting officium to render καθήκον Cicero surely chose the nearest Latin equivalent to the Greek term (the discussion of the matter ends in the preserved correspondence with Cicero's challenge da melius, which evidently went unanswered). Whatever his rendering, however, he would have faced the problem of having to fill it with a content derived from Stoic reflection about the nature of the human being and the appropriate action thereby entailed. The problem is not, as formulated by Kilb and O'Regan, 17 a divergence in sense of officium from καθήκον per se, but rather the special Stoic sense of καθήκον, directed toward fulfilling the rational nature of the human being, with officium made equivalent by Ciceronian fiat in this sense; cf. ad 1.142, where, because modestia is equivalent to ευταξία in the sense "orderly behavior," Cicero wants, by fiat, to make the Latin word equivalent to the Greek in another sense, viz., ordinis conservatio. The problem, then, was inherent in any translation project of this kind, in which one had to find a Latin equivalent for a special term already developed in Greek. In our case Cicero's innovation was more successful than his rather arbitrary manipula­ tion of modestia, the Latin officium being proved by later usage to have been analogously extensible to the Greek καθήκον; cf. Gel. 1.13.1: in officiis capiendis, censendis iudicandisque, quae καθήκοντα philosophi appellant. . . ; Serv. auct. ad Aen. 1.548 (with reference to the nontechnical sense): officium autem est quod Graeci TO καθήκον appellant.1* From the foregoing it is clear that "duty" and its equivalents in modern European languages are rather different from the ancient terms καθήκον/ο/"ficium. "Duty" is used of an a a that is ethically required and the omission of 17. Kilb, 63; Daphne O'Regan, "Officium and kathekon in Cicero's De Officiis," AAPhA 1990, 123. 18. Seneca, too, wrote a treatise de Officiis, though the surviving fragment gives little notion of the approach taken (3, 423 Haase).—Cicero diverges from the title of his Greek source, Panaetius' essay TTCpi του καθήκοντος, in using the noun in the plural; I take it that this is because of the Greek idiom whereby the neuter singular of adjectives and participles is often deployed in a collective sense (cf. Kiihner-Gerth 1,14), whereas in Latin thecolleaive singular for plural is tied to specific semantic categories (cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,67 ff). But Greek could also use the plural in such cases; cf. Posid. fr. 40 E.-K. = 429 Th.

8

A Commentary on Cicero, De Officii*

which is ethically forbidden. This description would, however,fitonly offtcia derived from justice (cf. 1.23b), not offtcia in general. Καθήκον is a much broader term than "duty" and can apply even to plants and animals (D.L. 7.107). Therefore I have used "appropriate action" as equivalent to KdQf\Kovfofficium in the following commentary; 1 hope that this strategy will also help avoid confusion with Kantian and other modern conceptions.19 3. The Composition: Date, Circumstances, Consequences On 17 July 44 Cicero took ship from Pompeii, the goal of the trip being a visit to his son in Athens (Att. 16.3.4 and 6). A week later he had reached Sicca's house at Vibo and was pondering the further route (ibid., 16.6.1). News from Rome that reached him at Leucopetra about the senate meeting called for the first of September, to which all consulars had been summoned by letter and at which Antony was expected to make concessions, caused him to alter his plan and start back to Rome (An. 16.7.1 [19 August]). Though he arrived at Rome just prior to 1 September, putting forward the fatigue of the journey, he kept clear of the meeting in view of death threats. But Antony took this as an insult and threatened to have Cicero's house destroyed {Phil. 1.12 and 5.19). At the senate meeting the following day Cicero rejected Antony's threats and passed scathing judgment on the consuls' conduct of office; he immediately published the speech, the First Philippic. On 19 Sep­ tember Antony replied in a speech blaming Cicero for the misfortunes of the past twenty years. Meanwhile he began to move closer to Octavius, and his entire policy tended, in Cicero's view, toward avenging Caesar's death (Fam. 12.3.2, quoted ad 3.82b-85). Shortly after writing from Rome the letter to Cassius just cited, Cicero departed for his estate at Puteoli, where inter alia he began writing de Officiis.20 The letters addressed to Atticus at this period attest a breathtaking 19. Cf. Graescr, 175; ad 1.8. Indeed "duty" is unfitting in rendering such a phrase as expositis adulescentium officii* quae valeant adgloriam adipiscendam (Off. 2.52), where what is clearly meant is the actions appropriate to attaining glory. 20. Long, 1995', 220 emphasizes that "there is no necessity to date his first thoughts about Off. by his first mention of it to Atticus." That is true enough. However, it should be borne firmly in mind that Off. has its raison d'etre as an ersatz visit to his son after the voyage to Greece was aborted (cf. Off. 3.121) and that the choice of subject is intimately bound up with the addressee (Att. 15.13a.2; see next section of this introduction). Therefore one doubts mat Cicero "may have been thinking about Off. immediately after he despatched De gloria to AMICUS" (SC. 11 July [Att. 16.2.6J; so Long, 1995», 224). What, if anything, lies behind Cicero's claim to have interrupted writing about maiores res in order to compose the Topica for Trebarius (Top. 1)—Long, loc. at., thinks of Off.—must remain a mystery. Was this perhaps

Introduction, J 3

9

speed of composition. Cicero first mentions the project in a letter dated ca. 28 October (Att. 15.13.6 = 15.13a.2 S.B.); already on 5 November he reports completion of the first two books (Att. 16.11.4); the last reference to it is in a letter dated by Shackleton Bailey with a question mark to 13 November (Air. 16.14.3-4). On 9 December Cicero arrived back in Rome (Fam. 11.5.1); flung» in the final year of his life, back into the vortex of politics, 21 he surely could not have found leisure, even if he wanted to, 2 2 for revision of de Officiis.™ Nor was de Officiis the only thing on his mind at this time. The letter of 5 November announcing completion of the first two books also discusses Atticus* reaction to both the reply to Antony's speech of 19 September, the Second Philippic, which must have been composed at around the same time, 24 and de Senectute, and Cicero promises to polish and send off a third book (Att. 16.11.1-3; the άνέκδοτον) cf. ad 2.84); note also the crossreference to the Laelius at Off. 2.31. 2 5 Around this time he was also follow­ ing closely Octavian's efforts to outbid Antony for the support of Caesar's veterans and was preoccupied with the possibility of another civil war (Att. 16.8.1, dated 2 or 3 November), a concern which spills over on occasion into Off. (see § 6 below). In these troubled times Cicero had to fight free of

merely a literary topos} Cf. Ov. Am. 1.1-2: arma grain numero violentaque bella parabam I edere. . . The aim of Long's argument is to counteract the opinion that in view of die speed of its composition Off. 1-2 of necessity presents merely a translation of Panaetius. I agree with Long in finding inclusion of a fair amount of Ciceronian political reflection in these books (and less of Panaetius' political reflection than has been thought: see $ 5 [2] below). But Cicero was always reflecting on politics. The words exstabit opera peregrinationis huius in the letter announcing the project to Atticus clearly refer to Off. and are most plausibly connected with his sojourn from villa to villa in October and November (Att. 15.13a.2; 28 October). It was the combina­ tion of his simultaneous rcinvolvcmcnt with politics and wish to communicate with his son in fall, 44, that gave this work its peculiar character. 21. At the senate's meeting of 20 December he already delivered the Third Philippic (Fam. 10.28.2; 11.6a.2). 22. Att. 15.13a.2:. . .τάττ€ρι τοΰκα$(τ\κ)οντος magnifice explicamus... does not encour­ age the notion that Cicero was dissatisfied with the work. 23. Pace E. Ciaceri, Cicerone e i suoi tempi, 2 (Genoa, Rome, Naples, Citta di Castcllo, 1941), 369, who surmises that Cicero returned to Off. in summer, 43, but offers no supporting textual or other evidence. On the date of composition cf. also Karl Atzert, ed., Markus Tullius Cicero, De officiis (Limburg-Lahn, 1951), 7-8; M. Fievez, " 'Opera peregrinationis huius' ou lesetapesde la composition duDe Officiis," Latomus 12 (1953), 261-74; Testard's edition, 1,7 ff.; Gelzer, 357. 24. See the citations in the Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), Philippicae orationes.^ csp. ad 2.23-29. 25. On the dating of the Laelius to this period see ad 2.31.

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Qfficiis

interruptions in order to work on Off. at all; note the remark in the letter first announcing the project: ego autem in Pompeianum properabam, non quo hoc loco quicquam pulchrius, sed interpellatores illic minus molesti (Att. 15.13a.2, written at Puteoli or Cumae). The transmitted text of Off. needs to be evaluated against the background of the lack of time and the distraaions to which Cicero was exposed during its composition. Hence, the losing of the thread of argument (cf. ad 2.19b-20, 29, 39-42a) the presence of "after thoughts" not integrated into the text where one would have expected (cf. ad 2.19b-20 and 35 and the cause celebre: the divisio of Book 3 added only at $ 96) or the fact that the letters are sometimes the appropriate tertium comparationis for its Latinity.26 There is also the question whether Ciceronian marginalia have en­ tered the text without proper integration into context (cf. §10 below). 4. The Addressee27 In publishing and dedicating his works Cicero followed policies dictated by an amalgam of personal and political factors. One of his concerns was to strengthen his influence with the younger generation and thus secure his posthumous fame. Hence his claim that the enthusiasm of the youth of Rome spurred him to publish his consular speeches (Att. 2.1.3:. . . nos. . . adulescentulorum studiis excitati. . .). 28 Similarly, the youthful participants Sulpicius and Cotta, though they contribute nothing of substance, constitute an appreciative audience for the conversation of de Oratore and are the catalyst for its continuation [de Orat. 1.96-102), an indication that discourse of this kind, too, was to be thought of as existing for the sake of its educative value for youth. The years of renewed literary activity beginning in 46 saw Cicero still more concerned about the waning of his influence on the younger generation 26. Cf. Thomas, p. 52, n. 157, and 55; Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.w. Colloquialism, sermo cotidianus. 27. L. Doderlein, Reden und Aufsatze, 2 (Erlangen, 1847), 242, already remarked "Cicero hat sie (sc. de Officiis\ seinem Sohne Marcus nicht Ehren halber dediciert, sondern ganz eigenrumlich fur ihn ausgearbeitet. . ."; cf. K. Arzcrt, Die nationalpolitische Bedeutung von Ciceros Werk iiber die Pflichten (Breslau, 1933); R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 (1943-48), 1282.1 ff; M. Testard, "Lc fits dc Ciceron destinatairc du De Officii*," Bulletin de {'Association Guillaume Bude, 1962, 198-213. 28. Cf. other testimonies cited by Stroh, 52, and literature, ibid., n. 93; the motives for the publication of the speeches were, however, no doubt more complex than Cicero's words indi­ cate; we should probably reckon with unexpressed or unconscious Ciceronian motives in the realm of personal self-advertisement; cf. Crawford, 3 ff.

Introduction, $ 4

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of orators and politicians. Most of his literary projects of these years aimed to secure the allegiance of one of the leading members of the younger genera­ tion, M. Brutus; hence the dedication to him of Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, and Orator in 46 and de Finibus, Tusculanae Disputationes, and de Natura Deorum in 45; cf. Rathofer. Similarly, in the aftermath of Caesar's assassina­ tion he dedicated de Fato to Hirrius, consul designate for 43, as part of a strategy to win him over.29 Another member of the younger generation, C. Trebatius Testa, received the dedication of the Topica. Interspersed were dedications of a few works to members of his own generation, the second edition of the Academici libri to Varro, to whom he owed a dedication (Att. 13.12.3, quoted ad 1.48), de Divinatione to his brother Quintus, and de Senectute and de Amicitia to Atricus. Προσφωνώ autem Ciceroni filio; visum est non άι/οίκ€ΐον, so Cicero wrote to Articus with reference to Off. (16.11.4). The Romans made it no secret that ties of the flesh were important to them. Their literature reflects this fact, both thematically30 and in the dedication of works by fathers to their sons (for M. Brutus cf. ad 2.50), including works offering praecepta of various sorts (on Cato's works offering advice on medicine, agriculture, and rhetoric to his son cf. Jordan's ed., pp. XCIX ff. and 77 ff.). After all, a father was responsible for his son's education, a matter that Cicero took seriously, not only by appointing a series of tutors for young Marcus and his nephew Quintus, but also by taking on the role of tutor himself on various occasions (24 October 54: QF 3.4.6; 22 February 49: Att. 8.4.1). 31 Cicero had already written for the benefit of the eleven-year-old Marcus the Partitiones Oratoriae (autumn, 54). But since then he had reached years of discretion. Rote learning being no longer apposite, at some points in Off. Cicero attempts a kind of dialogue, with the possibility of different premises on the other side ostensibly left open (cf. ad 1.2, 3.33). Moreover, there was now, since the death of Tullia in February of the preceding year, more at stake in the rela­ tionship. Cicero was still concerned, as he had been since 46, with his per­ sonal and political legacy, of which young Marcus was now the sole custodian. 29. Cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1161.59 ff. 30. For treatment of the theme in literature cf. M. Owen Lee, Fathers and Sons in Virgil's Aeneid: turn genitor naium (Albany, 1979); AJf Onnerfors, Vaterportrats in der riimischen Poesie unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Horaz, Statius und Ausonius (Stockholm, 1974); IxMoine. 31. Cf. M. van den Bruwaenc, "M. Ciceron cducarcur dc scs enfants," Nova et vetera 15 (1933), 53 ff. Note also that in his letters Cicero rook care to correct his son's diction (Quint. Inst. 1.7.34).

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

Marcus iunior was far from being a model student. Born in the summer of 65 (Att. 1.2.1), he received elementary instruction from Tyrannio as early as March, 56 (QF 2.4.2), later tuition from the rhetor Paeonius (ibid., 3.3.4), from Cicero himself (ibid., 3.4.6), and then from Atticus' freedman M. Pomponius Dionysius (Att. 4.15.10; 4.18.5; 8.4.1). Even at this early stage, however, his son's lack of enthusiasm for his studies did not escape Cicero's notice {Att. 6.1.12: Cicerones pueri amant inter se, dtscunt, exercentur; sed alter, ut Isocrates dixit in Ephoro et Theopompo, frenis eget, alter calcaribus; cf. de Orat. 3.36). After the brief participation of father and son on the Pompeian side in the civil war and Caesar's pardon of both, Cicero pressed young Marcus to pursue studies in Athens, as he himself had done at a similar age. Though tempted instead to rent a house in Rome [Att. 12.32.2), young Marcus finally decided to go to Athens. Here Atticus was to keep an eye on the young man and pay him an allowance derived from rental of maternal property on the Argiietum and the Aventine (ibid.). Before very long, how­ ever, Cicero received word that his son was not taking his studies seriously enough; he had Atticus write him a warning letter (ibid., 13.1.1). Reports of better progress ensued, but the father remained suspicious (ibid., 16.3.2). To keep Marcus' expenditures under control it proved necessary for Atticus to order Xeno to pay the young man his allowance in very small installments (ibid., 16.1.5). Moreover, Gorgias, who was supposed to be tutoring him in rhetoric, was, in fact, inciting the younger Cicero to pleasures and to drink (Plut. Cic. 24.8: Γοργίαυ . . . αΐτι.ώμ€ΐΌ? πρό$ ήδοΐ/άς προάγβιν και πότους το μ€ΐράκιοι> . . . ; cf. Sen. Suas. 7.13; Plin. Nat. 14.147); his father had Gorgias fired as soon as he found out {Fatn. 16.21.6; Plut. loc. cit.). Hence the planned trip that would take him out of Italy, where he could find no activity worthy of his rank (cf. 3.1 ff.), to visit his son in Athens (cf. Att. 16.3.4: aut proderimus aliquid Ciceroni aut quantum profici possit iudicabimus). The trip was aborted, however, on political grounds (see previous section). As we learn only in the epilogue, the three books de Officiis were intended to replace that planned visit: . . . ut, si ipse venissem Athenas, quod quidem esset factum nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset, aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis temporis quantum poteris . . . (3.121). He had found himself in mid-August faced with a conflict of personal and political officia. Perhaps he thought inter alia that the treatment of such problems in Off. would set his own decision to return to Rome into context for young Marcus and help him better understand his father's reason for so acting. De Officiis was never part of Cicero's earlier philosophical project, and its dedication is not merely an interchangeable literary formality. This work, from the very outset conceived

Introduction, $ 4

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with young Marcus and his needs in mind, is deeply embedded in the fatherson relation. It was meant as a call to order, an emphatic reminder of his responsibilities to himself, his family, and his society. As a father-son communication, Off strikes an intimate tone unique among the extant philosophica. Thus though each of the three proems begins with the more formal mode of address Marce fili, this later melts to mi Cicero (1.1 and 3; 2.1 and 8; 3.1 and 5). The increasingly somber meditation on otium in the last two proems, which betray the elder Cicero's growing impa­ tience to return to the political arena, could hardly have been addressed to anyone else except Attic us himself. Other personal touches are the inclusion of ager Arpinas and ager Tusculanus, places of personal and familial signifi­ cance, among the earliest examples in the tract (1.21), such references as de patre nostro (3.77), noster Gratidianus (3.80), occasional attempts to in­ volve Marcus jr. in the discussion as if it were a dialogue (cf. ad 3.33), and the particularly warm and personal epilogue (3.121). The person of the ad­ dressee also frees Cicero, so he claims, from certain constraints in speaking of his own achievements, since to him belongs, as he puts it, hereditas huius gloriae et factorum hnitatio (1.78). The intimate tone reappears when Cicero uses his son as an example of the fact that military service is a promising road by which young men can win glory. Like some other examples in the essay, this one misfires, however, since, though young Marcus was put in command of a wing of cavalry at Pharsalia,32 his glory, as Cicero phrases it, collapsed along with the free commonwealth. At this point he perceives a danger that his remarks are becoming too personal, reminds himself and his addressee that he is writing, not de te, but de toto genere» and returns to the subject (2.45;cf. J ^ / O C ) .

Aged twenty-one, young Marcus faced the choice of the career he wished to pursue. The question had exercised Cicero's Greek source for Books 1-2, Panaetius of Rhodes, who had carefully analyzed the moment when such decisions are taken and had offered some relevant precepts, which Cicero fleshed out with Roman examples (cf. ad §$ 115-21). Such a choice is usually made at the beginning of adolescence, a time of maxima imbecillitas consilii (1.117). One can compensate for this weakness, however, by follow­ ing parentium praecepta, though some manage to find the correct path of life sine parentium disciplina (1.118). The stress thus lies on the positive role parents can play at this critical juncture in their children's lives. In this 32. On Pharsalia, not Pharsalus, as the name of the battlefield cf. J.P. Postgate, ed., M. Annaei Lucani De bello cwili liber VIII (Cambridge, 1917), xcvii-xcviii; cf., however, R.T. Bruere, "Palaepharsalus, Pharsalus, Pharsalia," CPh 45 < 1951), 111.

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

instance the illustrations, Roman and Greek,33 precede the rationale (1.116); and they are illustrations, not so much of the process of fathers giving their sons counsel, as of the common practice of following in the father's foot­ steps, as did Quintus Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) in the civil law and the younger Scipio Africanus in military affairs. Another possibility is for the son to add a further distinction to that inherited from his father, as in the case of the younger Africanus, who added eloquence to military prowess (might Cicero have hoped that his son would, contrariwise, add military prowess to eloquence? See below). Cicero does point out, however, that some— especially those of humble birth—have managed to carve out a successful career without a parental example to imitate (ibid.; was he perhaps thinking of his own case?). Cicero admits, however, that nature may not allow a son to follow his father's career, as in the case of the son of the elder Africanus: though his constitution precluded a military career, he could practice the other virtues (ibid.). It is to Cicero's credit, however, that, much as he would evidently like young Marcus to follow in his footsteps (cf. the argument for the greater importance of civil than military leadership at 1.74-78, culminating in the very personal remarks already mentioned at 1.78), he does (apparently after Panaetius) allow scope for individual interests and tastes. Elsewhere, too, the chosen examples tend to reinforce paternal auctontas. Thus the advice of fathers to sons cited in this essay is always well taken, as when the elder Cato warns his son Marcus, recently discharged from military service, not to engage in combat (1.37), or Philip upbraids Alexander for trying to bind the Macedonians to himself by means of the dole (2.53). Besides the father as good counselor, other models of father/son relations appear, including the contrasting picture of good father/bad son(s). There is, for instance, the case of M. Brutus, one of the founders of the civil law and his son, who likewise pursued a legal career, though, never seeking office, he earned the hated name accusator (2.50). In the case of the Gracchi, too, the sons are unfavorably compared to the father, a tactic Cicero used in his speeches as well (2.43 [cf. ad loc.\ and 80). On the other hand, there is the case of T. Manlius Torquatus, permdulgens in patrem, acerbe severus in filium (3.112), the closest approach in this essay to a bad father (though the incident involving severitas is merely alluded to thus in passing, not narrated). The personal agenda of Off., then, lies close to the surface. In this aspect the essay, as an ersatz visit, responds to Cicero's felt need to take his son in 33. Cf. the (presumably Panaetian) Greek example, the distinguished Athenian generals Conon and Timothcus; for a similar collection of empirical observations cf. 1.108 ff.

Introduction, $ 4

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hand and help give him a sense of direction at a critical juncture in life. The son had a taste for military activity, as his service at Pharsalia and desire, in the sequel, to join the Caesarian side show (cf. ad 2.45), a taste that Cicero did not want to discourage altogether (cf. 2.45: prima est. . . adulescenti comtnendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest) but which he wished to temper by showing the limitations of military achieve­ ment, however superficially glamorous (1.74-78). The emphasis on appro­ priate action toward parents at 1.58 and 1.160, 34 on sons following in their fathers' footsteps or at least attaining equal distinction in another line, on Cicero's own political views and successes (cf. § 6 below), and the doctrine that paternal achievements constitute a legacy to be imitated, not dishonored (1.121 ), 3 S are clearly orchestrated to galvanize the younger Cicero to achieve something on his own. In the preface to Book 3 Cicero tries strenuously to dissuade young Marcus from breaking off his studies prematurely. In fact, those studies would soon terminate, probably before the end of the year 44; for the youn­ ger Cicero left Athens to take up a cavalry command in Brutus' army, a decision that evidently met with his father's approval (cf. ad 3.5-6). A letter to Brutus dated April, 43, requests that his son should spend as much time as possible in his company {ad Brut. 2.5.6). Brutus for his parr was pleased with the young man and praised him as a hater of tyrants (μισοτύραιηΌς: Plut. Brut. 24.3, quoted ad 2.45), an attitude Marcus clearly imbibed from his father and not least from Off. (see § 6 below). The remainder of the younger Cicero's biography matches his father's description tua bus pariter cum republica cecidit (2.45). He contemplated launching his political career with a candidacy for the pontifical college {ad Brut. 1.6.1 and 1.14.1); with this in view he was discharged by Brutus and returned to his father in Rome in June, 43 (Cic. writes ad Brut. 1.12.3 in imminent expectation of his arrival). When, however, Antony and Octavian combined forces and he and his father were placed on the proscription list, he returned to Brutus and fought on the losing side at Philippi. Fleeing in the aftermath to the coast of Asia Minor, he joined Cassius of Parma, who still commanded troops loyal to the republic (App. BC 5.7); he later joined Sextus Pompey on Sicily (ibid., 4.220). The conclusion of hostilities by the treaty of Misenum (39) brought him back to Rome, where he enjoyed the favor of 34. At 1.58 patrta ct parentes hold first place; in the non-Panaetian account at 1.160 the gods are added at the top, the patrta takes second place and the parentes rank third; according to the casuistry of 3.90, only in the extremity of a conflict between salus patriae and salus patris should the latter give way. i5. Cf. also 2.76: imttatus patrem Africanus mhilo locuplettor Carthagine eversa.

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Octavian, born in his father's consular year. He was given a priesthood and even rose to suffect consul for the year 30 and—a small consolation for his father's murder—was permitted to read from the rostra the report of An­ tony's death (ibid., 4.221). Later he served as imperial legate and proconsul in Asia. But these posts were really honors for his dead father;36 for, reverting to the bad habits of his student days at Athens, Cicero jr. became a notorious alcoholic. A characteristic anecdote has it that, while serving in Asia, in his cups, he had the rhetorician Cestius flogged for calling his father an ignoramus.37 In imperial writers he figures primarily as an example of de­ generacy. Should one regard the role taken by Cicero the father in this work as nurturing or stifling? The relations of fathers and sons as regulated by Ro­ man law and custom could be fraught with tension, insofar as the son re­ mained under the father's potestas as long as the latter remained alive; even in Cicero's day this power of life or death over offspring was occasionally still exercised; cf. SaJ. Cat. 39.5. Cicero was surely well within the parame­ ters of normal parenting in his society, perhaps indeed, in granting a certain leeway in choice of a course of life (while at the same time providing re­ minders of family traditions), on the more lenient side of the spectrum. Their close cooperation for the rest of his life and the fact that Marcus iunior evidently revered his father's memory after his death tends to confirm this judgment.38 On the other hand, with the suggestion that the one-way com­ munication of the treatise could be a satisfactory substitute for a conversa­ tion in Athens, Cicero is a bit more authoritarian than a parent in an indus­ trial society today would ideally be. While addressed to his son, de Officiis was, however, also clearly meant for public circulation; the self-reminder that he is writing non de te, sed de totogenere (2.45), makes it unmistakably clear that, though the relation with young Marcus provided the causa efficiens for composition (as well as an excuse for dwelling on his own policies and achievements), it was intended, as the consular speeches ostensibly were, for an entire category of young readers in need of similar advice, as they sought, not merely a career, but a set of guiding principles for life. 36. Cf. Sen. Ben. 4.30.2: Oceronem filium quae res consulem fecit nisi paterf 37. Sen. Suas. 7.13; cf. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, "More on Seneca the Elder," Philologus 13711993), 52. Cestius wrote replies to speeches from famous trials of the past, including an In Milonem; cf. Sen. Cow. 3 praef. 15; Quint. 10.5.20. 38. On the Roman family cf. now Richard P. Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death tn the Roman Family (Cambridge, 1994); Judith P. Hallert, Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women in the Elite Family (Princeton, 1984), esp. 331 ff., adduces evidence for tensions in the father-son relation.

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5. Panaetius, πβρι του καθήκοντος, as Source for Books 1-2 This is not the place for a full-scale biography of the Stoic philosopher from Rhodes.39 In 1892, on the analogy of the periodization of the Academy in the ancient sources, Schmekel, VI, hypostatized a Middle Stoa and made Pan­ aetius its founder. However, this division docs less than full justice to Chrysippus, of whose significance the ancients were well aware (cf. the fa­ mous epigram ei μη γαρ ην Χρύσιππος, ούκ αν ψ Στοά: SVF 2, 3.38), and overstates the importance of Panaetius, whose positions were mostly antici­ pated by his predecessors. Panaetius did, it is true, take an individual stand in asserting the eternity of the world and denying afinalconflagration (frr. 64 ff.) and in his agnostic attitude toward the mantic arts (frr. 70 ff.). In ethics his originality lay primarily in shifting the focus of argument from the sage to the problem of persons trying to make progress toward virtue (οί προκύπ­ τοντας; cf. Gill, 1994, 4605; ad 2.35); he may, in the process, have modeled his presentation of καθήκοντα on Chrysippus' handling of κατορθώματα (see introduction to Book 1). His innovations include the redefinition of the second virtue so as to add to the essentially negative virtue of just treatment of others in property questions the positive value that Cicero calls Uberalitas/ beneficentia (cf. ad 1.20-60 and 42-60); the revision of the third virtue to emphasize the mental constituents over physical courage (cf. ad 1.61-92 and 79-81); and the broadening of the fourth part of the honestum to subsume not only the traditional virtue moderation (σωφροσύνη), but appropriate behavior in general (cf. ad 1.93-151). The decision to write at length not only on factors contributing to the καλόν, his term for moral goodness, but also on the συμφέρον, as he did in the portion of his essay serving as a model for most of Cicero's second Book, was likewise pathbreaking for a Stoic and sent him in search of mostly Peripatetic sources (see introduction to Book 2). Cicero never explains his reasons ioi choosing Panaetius as his model for Off.; but they surely had to do with both the person of the author and the approach taken. Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, with whom, after assuming the toga virilis, the young Cicero discharged the patrocinium fori (Lael. 1), was an important influence on his young charge, and as a son-in-law of C. Laelius he was an important link between Cicero and the great men of the previous generation, including both Scipio and Panaetius. Scaevola, who, according to Cicero, acknowledged himself a Stoic (de Orat. 1.43: Stoici 39. Cf. most recently M. Pohlenz, RE 18.3 (1949), 418.63 ff., who, however, overempha­ sizes Panaetius* experiences involving Rome and the Romans (see below); cf. also Modestus van Straaten, Panotitis. Sa vie, ses ecrits et sa doctrine avec une edition des fragments (AmsterdamParis 1946).

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wosfri), is said to have sat at Panaetius' feet (cf. the words quae a Panaetio acceperam [de Orat. 1.75] and Panaeti illius tui addressed by Crassus to Scaevola \de Orat. 1.45]); that such personal connections were important to Cicero in philosophicis as in other matters is clear from the choice of Cratippus as his son's philosophical tutor (cf. ad 1.1), even though Cratippus, a personal friend, was a Peripatetic, rather than an Academic. Apart from the personal tie via Scaevola, Panaetius' method in ethics was evidently con­ genial to Cicero, since he showed concern with ordinary people, rather than focusing on theoretical problems involving the Stoic sage (cf. ad 1.46), used popularia verba et usitata (2.35), and generally favored a down-to-earth approach (cf. 2.51); in particular the argument that statesmen render greater service than generals will have appealed strongly (1.74-78). While inserting some material of interest to himself (see introduction to Book 1), Cicero probably revised extensively only the first virtue and the place of the vita contemplativa under the third virtue (cf. ad 1.18-19 and 72). The testimonies for Panaetius' essay περί του καθήκοντος are few and owe their preservation mostly to Cicero. The work comprised three books (Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 34); the plan that it should deal not only with the καλόν and συμφέρον but also with their apparent conflict remained unexecuted (ibid.), even though Panaetius lived thirty years after completing the three books used by Cicero (3.8 = fr. 35, citing Posidonius Τ 7 = F 432 Th. = Τ 8 = F 41c E.-K.; cf. introduction to Book 3). In addition, Gellius 13.28 preserves in Latin rendering a fragment of the work (fr. 116) with no precise equivalent in Cicero's text. Following a note on source-criticism in general (1), I will deal with the major problems that have exercised modern scholarship on Pan­ aetius, περί του καθήκοντος, namely (2) the date of composition, (3) the reason why Panaetius may have left the work unfinished, (4) its intended audience, and (5) the use Cicero made of his model, including the passage from which the fragment quoted by Gellius might derive; to these is added (6) some remarks on the fate of περί του καθήκοντος subsequent to Cicero's adaptation.

(1) A Note on Source-Criticism

There is a recent trend observable in Anglo-American studies of Roman philosophical texts away from an approach based on source-criticism. This is to a degree understandable. Such studies from earlier generations often give the impression of being arbitrary or based on opaque or impressionistic

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criteria;40 and where only internal evidence is at play the method can easily lead to a circular argument, passage y being assigned to author a because passage χ had been, etc. Also, source-criticism seems unsatisfying if it is practiced as an end-result of interpretation, as though the finding of the source were itself the all-sufficient explanation of a passage. In studies of Off. in particular the method may have come into disrepute because of its associa­ tion with Max Pohlenz, whose work most scholars today probably do not find attractive.41 I want to explain why I have thought it desirable to use a source-critical approach in a commentary of this type. For Off. 1-2 we are in the fortunate position of possessing clear external evidence as to the main source Cicero was using, namely Panaetius, nepi του καθήκοντος [Att. 16.11.4). He also provided clear indications of some mate­ rial he was adding to Panaetius' treatment (1.7b-8 and 152 ff.; 2.86 ff.; 3). We likewise have evidence about the duration of work on the treatise (intro­ duction § 3)· From the rapid rate of composition it seems reasonable to infer that Cicero followed his source fairly closely (on the different view of Long, 1995·, 221-22 and 224, cf. pp. 8-9, n. 20 supra). He supplemented it, so far as we can tell, from materials that he had readily to hand, including political commentary such as always flowed freely from his pen (in this essay often showing points of contact with the Philippics, especially the Second, on which he was at work around this same time; see above p. 9 and n. 24), anecdotes or examples he had stored away in his memory (see Index of Authors, s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius [the orator], de Officiis, memory, composi­ tion from"), or materials he had worked up in preparing other works, espe­ cially de Republica and de Finibus (cf. ad 1.152-61; 3.116-20). A bit more research went into the third book, for which he had to seek different philo­ sophical sources and consult historical texts (see introduction to Book 3). Where Cicero's named source is preserved, we find him following it fairly closely (cf. ad 3.113-14). I think that we have a right to insist on the attested source-relations and to press their implications. At the same time, Cicero was not a slave of his exemplar and emphasizes the play of his own tudiaum in the final product (1.6). Within the indicated parameters Cicero does not engage in a great deal of explicit signaling of where he is or is not following a source. On a couple of occasions he indicates that Panaetius quoted or praised the younger Africanus (1.90,2.76) or took a line one might not have expected on the role of 40. Cf. 4 propos assumptions used in the source-criticism of Sen. Ben. Brad Inwood, "Politics and Paradox in Seneca's De beneficHs" in Laks-Schoficld, 245-46. 41. Cf. the characterization by Gigon, 267, cited in the preface; both Atkins and Long, 1995', prefer to leave source-questions to one side in their discussions of problems in Off.

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counsel in litigation (2.51). At 2.60 Panaetius' cited disapproval of certain types of public expenditures is in line with the main argument in the text, of which Cicero adds at this point a slight modification for obvious personal motives {theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprendo propter Pompeium . . . : cf. ad loc). Source-criticism can come to the aid of the text in this regard. By close study both of the philosophical argument and of Cicero's own personal agenda as seen in his other writings of the time, the source-critic can add light and shadow to the seemingly flat and uniform text. A commentary is, I think, the appropriate place for exploring such questions since a decision as to provenance often involves a grasp of the larger architecture of the treatise. Inasmuch as previous commentators have not taken advantage of their sys­ tematic vantage point but have devoted themselves mostly to elucidating grammatical/stylistic matters and historical background, I have tried to be alert to potentially interesting source-critical problems and have offered, for whatever they may be worth, my opinions and their basis for the reader to consider; in such judgments the risk of subjectivity is, however, always pres­ ent: caveat lector! I have tried to make the case that passages that fall out of the expressed plan, are illustrated exclusively by Roman examples, or seem at odds with the approach of other passages in a way that would fit Cicero's own agenda at this point in his career are, in fact, Ciceronian additions to his model. To take first an example where several indices point in the same direction: paragraphs 138-40 of Book 1 handle the topic of houses unmentioned in the divisio at 1.126, contain praise of the first consul of the family of the Octavii at a time when Cicero was cultivating the friendship of the young Octavius, and criticism of the incongruity of house and owner (a point directed against Antony in the Second Philippic) and of the excessive scale of Roman villas since Lucullus. In spite of Pohlenz's attempted Greek comextualization, this material can hardly fail to be a Ciceronian addition to Panaetius (cf. ad loc). Similarly the sudden introduction at 1.92 of a third type of μεγαλόψυχο? who qualifies for inclusion in the category, not by virtue of great deeds but by generous use of his estate, is likely to have been invented by Cicero ad hoc, possibly to include such a person as his friend Atticus (see ad loc). Again 1.150-51 have long been assumed to be of Panaetian provenance; if so, we have a Panaetius speaking, as nowhere else, on the basis of commonly held social prejudices, not the criterion of commensurability with nature as else­ where in the treatment of the virtues. Surely this passage, too, is a Ciceronian addition (see ad loc). Perhaps the most remarkable case of this kind is 1.38, where the whole concept of a war fought for the glory of empire plays havoc

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with the preceding precepts about the conditions and goals of warfare (1.34b-35). If we recognize that there are two distinct trends at work within the text, a Panaetian strand presenting Stoic doctrines and precepts trans­ parently derived from them, and a Ciceronian, which seeks to take some account of Roman realities (albeit, as Heilmann has argued, to a lesser degree than one might have expected; cf. ad 2.51), the apparent contradictions of this text become at least intelligible. As to Pohlenz's work, it represented progress in its day by drawing Off. more closely into the orbit of studies of Hellenistic philosophy, which within his lifetime began to be pursued with intensity and sophistication. It needs modification, however, as I have argued at $5 5 (2) and (4) below and at various points in the commentary. But it would be a mistake to ignore AFand Off. Ill or to impugn the source-critical approach to Off. generally because of their inadequacies. It will be clear that source-criticism is practiced here not as an end in itself but as one of several ways of shedding light on the background of de Officiis as we have it. The essay operates simultaneously on several levels: as a response to earlier thinking on sociopolitical problems, as a means of ad­ dressing the mores and political problems of the day, and as a response to the need of Cicero jr. and other young Roman nobles like him for guidance in a world of shifting values. It is worthwhile to take note of where the doctrines of de Officiis came from, since, at least for Books 1-2, we can establish this with greater as­ surance than in Cicero's other philosophies. Given that earlier Stoic writings survive only in miserable fragments, Books 1-2 of Off., together with Fin. 3, supply what would otherwise be completely missing, viz., some sense of how a Stoic approach to ethics could at this period be constructed to form a coherent whole. But the exploration of this aspect is only one step in the larger task of interpreting de Officiis. (2) Date of Composition The most probable assumption is that πβρί του καθήκοιτος was written by ca. 138/39 or very shortly thereafter.42 The evidence consists in Posidonius* declaration that Panaetius lived for thirty years beyond the composition of Off. (see ad 3.8) together with L. Crassus' statement at de Orat. 1.45 that on his visit to Athens in 109/8 he heard lectures of various philosophers, includ­ ing the auditor Panaeti . . . Mnesarchus. Presumably Cicero would have wanted to represent him as having heard Panaetius if he were still lecturing. 42. Cf. Tarakis, 33; Garbarino, 1973, 389-90; Dorandi, 92; ad 2.72-85.

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Panaetius' birth is generally placed ca. 185, and there is no evidence requiring him to have lived beyond 109/8. 43 Several scholars have pointed out that Panaetius, though having stopped giving public lectures, could well have lived beyond this date. Thus Pohlenz, AF, 125, adduced the Academics Lacydes and Carneades, both known to have retired from the post of scholarch before their deaths; he moots that Panaetius may have done likewise. Philippson, 1929, 338, points to the fact that Panaetius exercised the duties of scholarch during the lifetime of Antipater and suspects that Mnesarchus may have done the same for Panaetius. These are possibilities, but nothing more. A different approach is based on the tense of some Ciceronian reports of Panaetius* statements. Thus Philippson, 1929,338, argued for a date subse­ quent to Scipio's death (129) on grounds of the perfect tenses at 1.90 (Pan­ aetius quidem Africanum. . . solitum ait dicere) and 2.76 {laudat Africanum Panaetius quod fuerit abstinens). Pohlenz, AF, 125, however, countered that the timeless presents ait and laudat allow the perfects to be understood as seen from Cicero's point of view (for another possibility see below). Pohlenz, however, follows the late dating of the essay on other grounds: he argues, after Philippson, loc. cit., that it would have been tactless for Panaetius to praise the abstinentia of Africanus (2.76) during his lifetime; and he believes that the references to the Gracchan reforms at 2.72 and 80 go back to Panaetius (cf. his review of Heinemann, 2, at GGA 192 (1930], 151;Nicolet, 157). Whether tactlessness was involved in the praise of a living man would depend on the occasion and the phrasing. Personal presence could be an inhibiting factor; thus Cicero states that he would praise C. Aquilius timidius if he were present in court (Caec. 77). However, laudes Crassi are inter­ spersed at a number of points by the speakers of de Oratore with L. Crassus himself present (cf., e.g., 1.76 and 95; 2.227, 233, 364: nihil dicam de ingenio, cut par nemo fuit; cf. also the praise of Antonius, ibid., 1.171-72). In general it should not be assumed that ancient and modern sensibilities, the latter influenced by the Christian ideal of humility, are identical in this mat­ ter.44 In any case, Panaetius was not praising Africanus to his face, but in 43. Philippson, 1929, 339-40, suggested that the Apollonius whom Cicero recommended to Caesar in 45 (ham. 13.16.1) should be identified with the pupil of Panaetius
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writing. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that we have access, not to the ipsissima verba of Panaetius, but only to his thoughts as passed through a Ciceronian filter. Cicero's use of the perfect, rather than the imperfect tense {quod fuerit abstinens), would be consistent with Panaetius having tied the praise to particular circumstances (cf. a few sentences later: imitatus pattern Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa), whereas Cicero, writing long after Africanus" death, would naturally have eliminated any such re­ striction. Thus the internal evidence need not indicate that Panaetius wrote his essay after Scipio's death. Underlying Pohlenz's efforts to bring the date of composition of rrepl τοϋ καθήκοντος down to the time of Scipio's death or later is his belief that the commentary on the Gracchi in Off. derives from Panaetius, rather than Cicero. But even if Panaetius did write the work that late, it does not follow that he commented on the Gracchan revolution. It is clear that the recent death of Julius Caesar and related moral questions, such as whether the murder was justified and whether those who had accepted offices and other benefits from Caesar ought to have participated, were much on Cicero's mind as he wrote Off. (cf. esp. ad 2.23-29, 3.19, 82b-85). It is also clear that the case of the Gracchi was in some respects parallel (cf. Amic. 36 ff. on Tiberius Gracchus' abandonment by his friends). The similarity to Cicero's own views on the Gracchi expressed elsewhere and to his views on Caesar ought to have given Pohlenz pause (cf. ad 1.109; ad 2.43 for Cicero's description of the death of Caesar and of the Gracchi in similar terms). The testimony that Panaetius replied to those eager to make him a citizen of Athens, τφ σώφρονι μίαν πόλιν αρκαν (fr. 27), does not encourage the notion that he took a stand on controversial issues of Roman politics; cf. also the precepts at 1.125: peregriniautem atque incohe officium est nihilpraeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena republica curiosum. (3) Why Panaetius May Have Left nepl του καθήκοντος· Unfinished Gartner, 1974, 14-15 and 63, thought to eliminate the problem of the incompleteness of π€ρ'ι του καθήκοντος by assuming that Cicero mistook the Panaetian list of topics about which people tend to deliberate regarding appropriate actions for the divisio of his work. In view of the way he con­ ceived the καλόν and συμφέρον, Panaetius would, according to Gartner, have regarded any discussion of their conflict, even if only apparent, as super­ fluous. This interpretation seems unlikely, however, in view of the fact that

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not only Cicero but also Posidonius and P. Rutilius Rufus spoke of π€ρΐ του καθήκοντος as an incomplete work (cf. ad 3.9). One can only speculate as to why Panaetius never returned to the problem of the conflict of the καλόν and apparent συμφέρον. Various possibilities exist. After pursuing other interests for a time, he may have decided, on returning to the problem, that in order to supply the missing part of πβρί του καθήκον­ τος he would have had to rewrite the first three books. 45 Alternatively, he may never have arrived at a solution to his satisfaction or have discovered that problems of casuistry were simply not to his taste. 46 (4) The Intended Audience for περί τού καθήκοντος Though not the first to argue that Panaetius wrote π€ρΐ του καθήκοντος for a Roman readership (and that Cicero's role in Books 1-2 is correspondingly negligible),47 Pohlenz has done so in most detail (cf. AF, esp. 3 5 , 5 1 , 8 0 , 1 1 1 , 119, and 143). This view is, however, part and parcel of his notion that Panaetius was propagating a "Fuhrerideal,w the most dubious element of his reconstruction and, not coincidentally, the one conditioned most strongly by the time and place in which Pohlenz wrote his work; cf. AFt 143: "Soil ein Fuhrerideal fur eine Vasallenwelt verkundet sein, die keine Fuhrer mehr brauchen konnte?" To subsume Panaetius* ethical system under the rubric "Fuhrertum" is a severe distortion, however. Panaetius' ethic aims to insure a harmonious social order in which people can realize their potential qua human beings. The vita actwa46 is a role that can fulfill one's own potential and at the same time create a framework within which others can do the same. In his treatment of μ€γαλοψυχία Panaetius recommends that those able 45. Note thac Heidegger never supplied the promised second half of Sein und Zeit, an omission he explained as follows: "Die zweite Halfte laGt sich nach eincm Vierteljahrhundert nicht mehr anschlicSen, ohne daS die erste neu dargestellt wiirde. Deren bleibt indessen auch hcutc noch notwendiger, wenn die Frage nach dem Sein unser Dasein bewegen soil" (Martin Heidegger San una Zett. 16th ed. [Tubingen, 1986], "Vorbemcrkung zur 7. Auflagc 1953"); 1 owe this parallel to the kindness of Walter Burkert. 46. Both of these alternatives were formulated by Striker, the former at Striker, 47, the latter suggested orally. 47. Cf. F.G. van Lynden, Disputatio historico-critica de Partaetio Rhodio phihsopho Stoico (Leiden, 1802), 82; Eduard Schwartz, "Vertheilung der romischen Provinzen nach Caesars Tod," Hermes 33 (1898), 237, n. 3. 48. It is presumably this to which Pohlcnz's loaded word "Fuhrertum" refers; but an equivalent to "Fuhrer" such as dux is, except with reference to natura (1.22, 100, 129; 2.73>, notably absent from Off 1-2; nor is there an antidemocratic thrust, Solon being, in fact, one of the statesmen Panaetius most admires (1.75).

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to do so should participate in the political process (1.72); but the vita activa was not the only option he allowed (cf. 1.71). Panaetius clearly admired the μ€γαλόψυχο9, but he was also acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the phenomenon (cf. 1.62-65) and probably valued the vita contemplativa more highly than our text betrays; cf. ad 1.18-19, 72, and Johann, 25 ff. And he was, of course, concerned with appropriate actions in private, no less than public life. Hence it is misguided to describe, as Pohlenz does in his preface, "das Fuhrertum des hochgesinnten Mannes" as the highest element in the Panaetian system. He must have thought Cicero very stupid indeed to have chosen precisely this system of ethics as the vehicle for his criticism of Caesar's ambitions (see § 6 below). Pohlenz was intelligent and knew Off. well but projected onto it (unconsciously) some of the political thinking of his own time and place—or, to be more precise, of the Hohenzollern mon­ archy under which he grew up: the emphasis on a strong leader or political fighter, the view that such a leader could only be conceived for a large empire, not for small Greek (or German) states, etc. 49 49. At AF, 14.3, he expressly rejects the application to Panaetius of a more recent concep­ tion of polirical leadership: uSein Fuhrcr ist kein jugendlicher Sturmer, Icein Revolutionar, der einen Wunschstaar grunden oder sein Voile von innen heraus erneuern will." Though a national­ ist and critic of the Weimar Republic, Pohlenz was never a member of the Nazi Party. Neverthe­ less polirical opportunism led him to entitle his 1934 book as he did, although this would, almost inevitably, suggest the wrong connotations. (The words Antikes Fuhrertum, in the meantime an embarrassment, were dropped from the title of the Italian translation: L'ideale di vita attiva secondo Panezio net de officiis di Cicerone [Brescia, 1970].) The ritulature of his monograph is in line with his general tendency to read ancient history as a set of positive and negative paradigms for the present, sometimes with strange results; readers will be struck by his reference to "der demagogische Feind der burgerlichen Ordnung" (AF, 118), the "nationale Wehrkraft" of the Romans (ibid., 120), etc.; he was doubtless unaware of the degree to which he was reading the concerns of his own time into the ancient text. However, in view of his lack of Party membership and his fight in behalf of beleaguered colleagues Hermann Frankel and Ulrich Knoche, the Ministry declined to allow him to continue to hold his professorship after he reached the age of 65 in 1937, even though his university (Gottingen) requested an exception; likewise the plan to name Pohlenz in fall 1938 to the Italian Institute for Roman Studies was blocked by the Party. On Pohlenz cf. H. Dorrie, Gnomon 34 (1962), 634 ff.; Otto Skutsch, "Recollections of Scholars I Have Known," ed. A. Bierl and W.M. Calder III, HSPh 94 (1992), 399-400; Cornelia Wcgelcr, Die Selbstbeschrdnkung der Wissenschaft. F.in Beitrag zur Geschichte der Klassischen Phitotogte sett dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, untersucht am Reispieldes lmtitut fur Altertumskunde der Umversitat Gottingen (1921-1962), (diss. Vienna, 1985), 59-65, 164-69, and 183-88; it is misleading, however, for her to speak (164) of a "Lehrvcrbot" for Pohlenz under National Socialism; though forced into retirement for polirical reasons, he was hindered from continuing his teaching as an emeritus not by his politics, but as a result of a charge of betrayal of confidence that was later withdrawn, so that he did resume teaching in winter 1939.

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In other respects, too, Pohlenz's arguments that TTcpi του καθήκοντος was written for a Roman audience appear misguided. In view of the evidence reviewed in (2) above, the attempts of Pohlenz, AF, 119, and others 50 to connect the work with opposition to the Gracchi should be treated with reserve. In attributing 1.138-40 to Panaetius rather than Cicero's own in­ vention Pohlenz ignores the points adduced above (p. 20). His citation (AF, 35) of the standing commission formed in 149 to investigate complaints of extortion lodged by provincials is not helpful in explaining Panaetius' pre­ cepts about liberalitas.51 Panaetius' work was written in Greek, strewn with citations of Greek authors and, apart from his friend the younger Scipio (cf. 2.76 and the citation at 1.90), Greek examples (cf. ad 2.16). There was nothing to prevent a Roman philhcllene like Cicero from reading it (and indeed adapting it to his own uses), but there is no reason to suppose that in composing the work Panaetius had primarily Roman conditions or a Roman readership in mind. Pohlenz stresses in general the place of Rome and the people he met there in Panaetius' life and work, a policy that leads to some strained interpreta­ tions of the sources. Though he admired Scipio (cf. 2.76) and though his acquaintance with Scipio and other statesmen may in a general way have influenced Panaetius to write extensively about the συμφέρον, as well as the καλόι> (cf. introduction to Book 2), it is not clear, pace Pohlenz, that his acquaintance with Scipio was "decisive" ("entscheidend") for Panaetius' life. 52 We know that Panaetius lived for a time at Scipio's house in Rome (frr. 8, 9,11), but it is uncertain for how long. There he will have met the already elderly Polybius (cf. Rep. 1.34 = fr. 119); but Polybius need not have substan­ tially altered Panaetius' view of Rome, especially if Panaetius' father had already been sent to Rome as part of a pro-Roman embassy.53 He accom-

50. Erskine, 159 ff., follows Pohlenz here. 51. Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, already protested against the "grotcsken lrrtum . . . , dafi er [sc. Panaetius) geschricben hatte, urn die Romcr zu erzichen . . ."; cf. also ad 1.88 (precepts evidently framed with monarchs in mind). 52. Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 422.1: "Enrscheidend fur sein Leben wurde die Bekanntschaft mit Scipio." 53. Ibid., 423.45: MIhm (sc. dem Polybius] danktc cr die Oberzeugung, daft Roms Wcltherrschaft eine geschichtliche Notwendigkeit sei und seine Starke auf der gemischten Verfa&sung bcruhc" (but what is his evidence that Panaetius actually held this view?); on the identification of Panaetius1 father as the Nicagoras on a pro-Roman embassy in 169, ibid., 420.59 ff. For possible connections between Panaetius and Polybius cf. ad % 111, p. 354, n. 5, and Gartner, 1981.

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panied Scipio on an embassy to Egypt and Syria (fir. 2 4 - 2 5 ; cf. fr. 15). 5 4 But surely Tusc. 5.107 = fr. 32 should be taken to mean what it says, viz,, that once he left Rhodes Panaetius never returned, not interpreted out of exis­ tence so that Scipio can have visited Rhodes in Panaetius1 company.55 Nor need a fragment of the Stoic Index imply that Panaetius divided the decade following the embassy between Rome and Athens. 56 The surviving evidence about his works and their chronology is insufficient to establish that his experience of Rome and Romans fundamentally altered his worldview. What is clear is that his residence at Rome and contacts made there were of impor­ tance for his posthumous influence.57 These observations suggest that the "Kampfnatur" that Pohlenz, AF, 47, saw behind Off. may not be Panaetius so much as Cicero himself. He was, after all, about to enter the fray for the fight against Antony. In Off. we see him, most clearly in the parts written independently of Panaetius, steeling himself for the task by holding up in the appendix to Book 1 the vita activa as the ideal to be striven for and by promulgating in Book 3 a heroic ethic of self-abnegation in the interest of the state. If Panaetius has appeared to be a 54. On the dating of the embassy to 140/39 cf. Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 422.54 ff., with literature. Exactly when or how long he lived in Rome is impossible to determine in view of the habit evidently described at Stoic. Ind. Hercul. LXIII, ed. Tiziano Dorandi, in Filodemo, Storia dei filosoft. La stoa da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. J0J8), Philosophia Antiqua 60 (Lcidcn-New York-Cologne, 1994>, 112 a Panaetius fr. 1: Tkrre μέ|ν) ef 'Ρώμ[ηι Tkrre 6C ev 'Αθήναις; the fact that Rutilius Rufus was born ca. 154 need not, pace Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 423.40 ff., show that Panaetius still was active in Rome ca. 135; Rutilius may have been a Panaeti auditor (Brut. 114) at Athens. 55. At Rep. 3.48 Scipio alludes to a visit to Rhodes on which Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 423.5 ff., wants Panaetius to have accompanied him; for the argument that Tusc. 5.107 is "merit wortlich zu nehmen" cf. Pohlenz loc. cit., 425.16 ff. 56. Quoted n. 54 supra; likewise misleading is Pohlenz's statement (n. 39 supra), 423.60 ff., "die lateinische Sprache beherrschte er (sc. Panaetius] so gut, daft er vor Romern ein Urteil ubcr das Gcdicht des Ap. Claudius abgab, Cic. Tusc. IV 4"; in fact, Panaetius praised the poem (presumably for its content) in a letter to Q. Tubero; clearly he knew some Latin; but probably he, no more than Plutarch (Dent 2.4-3.1), allowed himself an opinion in questions of Latin style. 57. In attributing so much of Off. 1-2 to Panaetius {and so little to Cicero) Pohlenz doubtless reflected the Hellenophile attitudes of German scholarship of his generation. Might he also have been (unconsciously) trying to recreate a figure who could claim equal interest to Posidonius, whose philosophy had recently been reconstructed with such brilliance by Karl Reinhardt (whose studies of that philosopher Pohlenz had critically reviewed \GGA 1922 and 19261)? Such, at any rate, is the suspicion of Gigon, 267, who remarks of Pohlenz's monographs on Off.: ulhr Ziel ist es vor allem, Panaitios . . . gegen Karl Rcinhardts Poseidonios in die Schrankcn rretcn zu lassen; . . ."

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

"Kampfnatur," it is perhaps because we see only a Panaetius retouched by Cicero. 58 (5) Cicero's Use of His Model De Officiis, we must assume, presented a considerably shortened version of Panaetius; this would already follow from the fact that he compressed Pan­ aetius' three books to two of his own. One of the methods was to reduce greatly the amount of illustrative matter, a practice he makes explicit at 2.16 (cf. ad be); I have suspected similar curtailment ad 1.18-19, 51, 73b, 102, 107,122-25,149, and 2.43. The one external control that can be applied to Cicero's handling of his model is the report of Panaetius' comparison of the statesman to the pancratiast, ever ready to face a new challenge (fr. 116 = Gel. 13.28). Alien to the experience of his Roman readers, this passage too fell victim to the Ciceronian ax; its original home will surely have been somewhere within the section on magnitudo animi (Dyck, 1979 2 , 412-15; ad 1.73a and b). In that case, since this fragment is cited from Panaetius' second book, it would seem likely that the first book of his essay comprised the first two virtues, the second the remaining two, and the third the συμφέ­ ρον. If this is so, it would follow that the first virtue, which occupies a mere two paragraphs in Cicero's treatment (1.18-19), suffered major reduction at his hands, especially in view of Panaetius' known interest in the sciences (cf. Scipio's remark at Rep. 1.15 = fr. 77: 'quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera turn haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere'). Cicero's specifically attested addition to the two Panaetian books consists of the two appendices (1.152-61 and 2.86-90), the former dealing with the comparison of honesta, the latter with a critique of Panaetius by Antipater of Tyre and the comparison of utilia. The former is, however, problematical in its ignoring of the connections drawn by Panaetius between the virtues (see ad loc.). For other aspects of this topic see (1) above ("A Note on SourceCriticism"). (6) The Subsequent Fate of π€ρι τού καθήκοντος Panaetius' three books of popularizing ethics π€ρί του καθήκοντος59 might have been expected to have exercised considerable influence in subsequent centuries, but it is not clear that this was the case. It is cited only by Cicero 58. Cf. ad 1.18-19 and 69b-71; Johannt 25 ff. 59. For this characterization cf. ad 2.35.

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and Gellius (fr. 116; see above); and what may underlie the convivial meet­ ings of Παΐ'αιπασταί alluded to by Athenaeus (5.186a = fr. 29) remains obscure. There are, it is true, traces of similar doctrines, whether known at first or second hand, in such imperial writers as Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Clement of Alexandria, and Isidore of Pelusium, 60 but, generally speaking, it was the problem of the sage as explored by the older Stoa that fascinated later writers.61 6. Politics in de Officii*62 In a sense Cicero conceived de Officii*, not just with young Marcus in view, but for the youth of Rome, for whom he intended his writings in general.63 At Div. 2.4, written earlier the same year, Cicero spoke of his philosophical writing in these terms: quod enim munus reipublicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refrenanda ac coercenda sitf Such a goal explains certain features of our work, such as the repeated emphasis on restraint of the passions (1.101 ff., 132a, 141), the discussion of proper models in choosing a career (1.116 ff.), or the plea for the vita activa (1.72,153 ff.); on the last-named point Cicero proba­ bly went beyond the precepts of his model (cf. ad 1.18-19 and 72). But in addition to such general advice Cicero surely had a specific political program that he wanted to place before the youth of Rome. In view of the awareness he expressed around this time that his death could not be far off,64 it is not 60. Cf. Index of Authors s.vv. (for Plutarch esp. ad 2.33 and 75); Brunt, 1975, 32 ff. 61. Cf., e.g., Bonhoffcr, 33, who notes, with evident approval, the growth of the view "wonach . . . bei den Jungstoikem, schon bci Seneca, insbesondcre abcr bci Musonius und F.pktet, eine kraftige Reaction gegen die von Panatius und namentlich von Posidonius vorgenommene Vcrmcngung der stoischen Lehre mit akademisch-peripatetischen Elementen zu bemerken ist." 62. Many of the topics broached in this section are dealt with in detail by Long, 1995·; apart from the question of the date of the beginning of composition of Off. (see pp. 8-9, n. 20 supra) and some differences in emphasis, I find myself in substantial agreement with his approach. 63. Cf. $ 4 but also the caveat at p. 10, n. 28 supra. 64. Att. 16.7.7: sed abesse banc aetatem longe a sepulcro negant oportere; cf. Phil. 1.38: miht fere satis est quod vixi vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam (an echo of Caesar's statement quoted at Marc. 25: satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae). Worth remarking in this context is Cicero's emphasis at certain points in the essay on the deaths of good men (1.112; 2.2 and 20; cf. also Fam. 12.5.3, cued ad 2.65, as well as the similar attitude of Philoctetes in Sophocles1 play, vv. 402 ff.>.

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too bold to call his message on this subject in our essay Cicero's political legacy.65 Once Caesar had established his dictatorship in the aftermath of the vic­ tory at Pharsalia in 48 (cf. MRR 2, 272), Cicero largely withdrew from politics but did speak several times before the dictator to beg pardon for Caesar's senior surviving opponent, M. Marcellus, for Q. Ligarius, and then for the King Deiotarus. However, the letters from 45 and early 44 in which he calls him a king (rex)66 show just how bitterly he resented Caesar's rule and his own exclusion from any real political role. His philosophical essays from this period, too, contain some veiled criticism of Caesar's tyranny (though not as much as found by Strasburger, 1990; cf. p. 397, n. 32; ad 3.29). The political landscape of Rome was radically altered by Caesar's as­ sassination. Immediately after the deed, Brutus cried out the name of Cicero, a potent symbol of the free republic he was trying to restore (Phil. 2.28 and 30; cf. Dio 44.20.4 and 46.22.4). Yet the situation remained ambivalent and fluid. The ringleaders Brutus and Cassius did not dare to show themselves in public in Rome; they went to various cities of Italy, where they received moral support but little money. In a meeting on 17 March the senate con­ firmed all the acts of the slain dictator, whose loyal lieutenant, Marc Antony, remained in office as consul. To complicate matters further, Caesar's nephew and heir, Octavius, emerged, an ambitious young man eager to claim the allegiance of Caesar's followers. On 1 August, while Cicero was on Sicily en route to visit his son in Greece, there was a meeting of the senate at which Antony read a sharp edict against the Liberators and threatened force; with so many of the bravest senators already killed in the civil war, only Caesar's father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58) dared to speak against him. Later that month Brutus and Cassius finally agreed to accept the prov­ inces of Cyrene and Crete, an honorable name for exile. 67 Meanwhile in his writing Cicero could now give free vent to his pent up anger and frustration, first in references to Caesar's assassination which, together with at least the second half of the proem to Book 2, he added to the otherwise complete manuscript de Divirtatione.68 Then when he wrote his essay de Gloria in June and July, the case of Caesar was surely a major concern, though this work survives only in such pathetic scraps that we 65. Cf. Long, 1995', 214. 66. Alt. 13.37.2, Font. 6.19.2, and 11.27.8. 67. For the aftermath of the assassination cf. Syme, 97 ff.; for the departure of the Libera­ tors from Italy, etc., ibid., 118-19 and 140; Cicero's comments at Att. 16.7.5 and 7; Phil. 1.10 and 14. 68. 1.119; 2.23, 99, 110, 112.

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cannot say exactly how the argument developed.69 The decision to return to Rome for the meeting of the senate called for 1 September and take up the oppositional line marked out by Piso on 1 August (cf. Phil. 1.10 and 14; § 3 above; Gelzer, 346) was a new departure for Cicero, who had since 58 been shut out of any meaningful role in politics. As the confrontation with Marc Antony took shape in the fall (see § 3 above), he was counting on the willingness of young nobles to defend the Republic (cf. Phil. 2.113: babet quident certe respublica adulescentis nobilissimos paratos defensores). This was evidently the intended audience for the political message of de Officiis. The first step in the genesis of Off. was when Cicero read Panaetius' work and decided that his way of writing about politics and ethics was congenial (cf. Leg. 3.14, quoted ad 1.124) and worth applying to Rome (cf. ad 1.14). In writing on this subject at this time Cicero aimed at reforming the political culture at Rome, which he saw veering dangerously from the ideals of tradi­ tional patriotism toward the kind of egotistical quest for glory and selfaggrandizement that had brought ruin upon Greek city-states and could lead to the permanent establishment of tyranny (cf. the presumably Panaetian examples which Cicero retained because they fined his purpose: the Spartan general Callicratidas |1.84|, Sparta's mistreatment of her allies (2.26a], the reforms of Agis and Lysander at Sparta (2.801). He expounds an essentially four-pronged approach to Rome's political problems: (1) to fill the ideals honestum/honestas/honestus, rarely used and of vague significance in the Roman political vocabulary (Hellegouarc'h, 387-88; cf. 462-63), with a content derived from the Stoic theory of the virtues (Book 1); (2) to rein in the search for glory so that it is strictly subordinate to justice and no threat to social values (1.62, 2.33-34, 38, as well as the references to Caesar); (3) to reaffirm the values of Roman civil society, including oratory and a knowl­ edge of the civil law and the right to be unmolested in one's person and property (Book 2 and the casuistic cases of Book 3); (4) to inculcate the identity of an individual's interest with the common interest, in particular with the reipublicae utile (especially Book 3). Panaetius' theory of the virtues required a certain amount of tailoring, especially to make his first virtue fit the dimensions appropriate to the life of a Roman gentleman (cf. ad 1.18-19). Even in Book 1, however, Cicero manages to make certain points about Roman politics; here we find his excoriation of Caesar's overweaning ambition (1.26), his condemnation of the violation of property rights by Sulla and Caesar as unjust and illiberal (1.43), or his criticism of the architectural excesses of L. Licinius Lucullus 69. Cf. introduction to Book 2; ad 2.31.

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(1.140); there are also vaguer innuendos, such as the barb directed at Antony, as the Second Philippic makes clear, about homes too grand for their owners (1.139). The pursuit of glory, especially that based on military achievements, was traditionally the motor that drove a Roman political career (cf. Harris, 17 ff.). The Stoa classed glory among the indifferents, albeit the preferred indifferents (cf. ad 2.31). The proper attitude of the μβγαλόψυχος· was therefore to despise glory rather than to seek it. Cicero repeats this doctrine (1.65 70 ), but he admits that, in practice, vix inventur qui laboribus susceptis periculisque ad it is non quasi mercedem return gestarum desideret gloriam (ibid.). On the other hand, Book 2, dealing with the utile, accepts the desirability of glory (albeit as an instrumental rather than a per se value; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 2 2 8 33); indeed the attainment of glory can be seen as the subject of this Book as a whole (see its introduction below). Cicero offers, however, two distinct approaches, never integrated: (1) summa . . . et perfecta gloria predicated upon the opinio iustitiae and aiming at the approval of the many (2.31 b-38) and (2) vera gloria involving the approval of the boni and directly connected with the honestum (2.42b-43). Of these the former is built into the divisio and overall argument of the Book, whereas the latter, with its appeal to the judgment of the boni and use of the examples of the Gracchi, is clearly from the realm of political argument; possibly it suggests a line taken in the re­ cently completed de Gloria. The case of the Gracchi illustrates what Long, 1995 1 , 216-17, calls the instability of such an ideal as the honestum; for what is praiseworthy may easily be confused with what is actually praised. Cicero addresses this problem both in theory (1.14) and with reference to specific cases: to his attacks on the Gracchi add those on the reputation of Sulla and Caesar, as well as his strictures on the tendency to overrate military glory (1.74 ff.). The conflict of values between the old and new Roman political culture is largely personalized as a conflict between Cicero and Caesar. When Cicero praises the traditional methods of problem solving, the ius civile and oratory, a propos the former he eulogizes Serv. Sulpicius Rufus (2.65), but he can scarcely avoid mentioning himself under the latter (2.66). When he comes to property disputes, Cicero invokes the case of Arams of Sicyon, who, after expelling a long-entrenched tyranny from his native city, managed to solve the ensuing property disputes by peaceful means. Cicero contrasts the sale of confiscated property by Sulla and Caesar. Two other forms of injustice in70. But with a slight twist: qui ex errore impentae multitudmts pendet, hie m magnis viris non est habendus; this leaves room for a role for the boni in allotting vera gloria; see below.

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volving property form the next topic: the remitting of rents to tenants and cancellation of debt. The former was one of Caesar's policies, put in effect probably for the year 48 (cf. ad 2.83). But Cicero goes beyond what most of his contemporaries would have accepted in claiming that Caesar both sup­ ported Catiline's conspiracy and continued to favor novae tabube (but con­ trast BC 3.1.2-3, which outlines efforts to avoid cancellation of debt). The scarcely credible portrait of Caesar that emerges is the result of the attempt to present himself and Caesar as representing two fixed and diametrically op­ posed principles (cf. ad 2.84). But perhaps Cicero's major contribution to Roman political thought is his radical identification of honestum and utile, with the consequences worked out in detail in Off 3. Particularly far-reaching in its implications is the argument at 3.21-28 that the Militates of the individual and of the com­ munity coincide. This proves to be the controlling principle in deciding the casuistic cases handled in the body of this Book, though in practice, for Cicero, the state interest simply replaces that of the human community as a whole. In Book 3 the Roman examples increasingly take on a life of their own and shape the direction of the argument. In this way he contrives within eleven paragraphs to impugn the morality of the conduct of all three of the so-called triumviri, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus (3.73 ff.). He also attacks Romulus, the founder and first king of Rome, whom Caesar had exploited in his propaganda, for killing his brother Remus (3.41), while approving the elim­ ination of a colleague by L. Junius Brutus, the founder of the republic and ancestor of Caesar's assassin M. Junius Brutus (3.40). Here we find also, in a crescendo of invective, the most virulent attack on Caesar: ecce tibi qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit, idque perfecerit etc. (3.83). De mortuis nil nisi bene vel sim. was an ancient no less than a modern proverb (cf. ad 3.82b-85). Some have found these attacks on the dead Caesar unseemly. But that is only so if one ignores the immediate political context of a work written when the right or wrong of Caesar's assassination was a heatedly debated political issue, one that would soon lead into yet another civil war. Cicero was trying to warn against the tendency of adven­ turers like Caesar and now Antony to strive for tyrannical powers and, once they had achieved them, to liquidate their opponents and confiscate their property. Cicero wanted to convince his readers that this is not the route to happiness or glory (cf. Phil. 1.35: quern [sc. Caesarem] qui beatum fuisse putant, miseri ipsi sunt; see further ad 3.83). Of all the examples of de Officiis (or indeed any of Cicero's writings), the

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one that is developed most elaborately appears toward the end of Book 3, it, too, a Roman example, the case of M. Atilius Regulus, a Roman general in the First Punic War. It is clear from Cicero's letter to Atticus of 5 November 44 that at the time he began writing Book 3 the case of Regulus was in his mind as an appropriate example. 71 According to the traditional version followed by Cicero (cf. ad 3.97-115), Regulus was sent to Rome bound by oath that he would return to Carthage unless successful in negotiating an exchange of prisoners. Once arrived, he argued against the offer on grounds that it was not in Rome's interest to return several younger Carthaginian commanders in exchange for himself; when the senate accordingly rejected the proposal, Regulus returned to Carthage to face torture and death. Cicero makes it plain that in Book 3 he is attempting to fill out along the same lines the portion of Panaetius' plan that the Stoic philosopher left incomplete. 72 But the example of Regulus sits oddly here in several respects. First, appropriate actions, for Panaetius, are relative to circumstances; the same act could be correct or incorrect depending on when it was performed. There was no absolute responsibility to keep one's oath; a promise could be ignored if it would harm the person who made the promise more than it would help the person to whom it was made (cf. 1.32); nor need an oath extracted by force be kept (ibid.), and Regulus' oath to return to Carthage surely was extracted by force. Cicero never squarely faces this problem with the example; the reason is that in Rome of the third century the oath was regarded as sacrosanct; Regulus simply could not have done anything but return if the exchange of prisoners did not go forward.73 The argument that the Ciceronian Regulus propounds against the exchange could also be ques­ tioned in light of Panaetius' teachings: Panaetius had argued that in warfare it is not strength of body but mental powers that are decisive;74 hence Regulus, an experienced general and twice consul, could be seen as the far greater 71. Att. 16.11.4: τα π€ρι του καθήκοιτος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus. illius tres sunt; sed cum initio divisisset ita, tria genera exquirendi offici esse, unum, cum deliberemus honestum an turpe sit, alterum, utile an inutile, tertium, cum haec inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli, redire honestum, manere utile, de duobus primis praeclare dissent, de tertio pollicetur se deinceps scripturum, sed nihil scripsit. 72. 3.33: eiusmodi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus out occupatio eius consilium peremisset. . . . sed quontam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto, tamquam fastigium imponimus, . . . 73. 3.111: sed ex tota hoc laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, illis quidem lemporibus aliter facere nan potuit. 74. 1.80: qua re expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi forti· tudo. . .

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prize. Finally, Cicero represents the case of Regulus as a conflict between bonestum and apparent utile; but it is really, as Cicero presents it, a conflict of two utilia—what was utile for the state (i.e., for the exchange to be rejected and for Regulus to return to Carthage) and what would have been utile for Regulus personally (for the exchange to be carried out and for him to remain at Rome), since, as we have seen, the third possibility of him remaining in Rome without having effected the exchange of prisoners simply did not exist. Thus the case of Regulus, which had seemed to Cicero as he wrote to Atticus so clear-cut an illustration of the problem to be posed in Book 3, proves on closer inspection problematical. Surely, however, in cap­ ping the main argument of the final book of his treatise75 with this luminous example of a Roman subordinating his apparent personal interest to that of the state, Cicero wanted to put forward a counter-example to the unbridled ambition of a Caesar that he so often excoriates. The political lesson of Off., then, is largely subsumed in the rhetorical question (3.101): potest autem quod inutile reipublicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile essei Cicero's approach has its limitations, however. The career of Cato Uticensis shows that in Cicero's day Stoicism could be a sharp tool for criticizing Roman practices.76 This tool becomes dull, however, in Cicero's hands, its power not exploited as one might have expected. Thus Long, 1995 1 , 239, finds that "human solidarity in Off, for all the rhetoric with which Cicero invests it, proves to consist primarily in respecting strict justice about prop­ erty rights and business transactions"; the possible egalitarian implications of Stoic teachings are ignored {sunt. . . privata nulla natura: 1.21), and the sanctity of private property is waived only in the case of someone who can do great good for human society and the state (3.30). Similarly Stoic doctrines about war (1.34-35) are diluted so that Roman practice is unaffected (1.38). This character is attributable to Cicero's mood at the time of composition, more inclined to defend institutions in danger of slipping away than to criticize them (cf. ad 3.44), as well as his generally conservative bent (to what degree this last quality was shared by Panaetius we can no longer say with certainty; on Panaetius' political precepts see further ad 1.21 and 2.72-85). At the beginning of Book 3 Cicero reflects on otium in connection with a statement by the elder Scipio Africanus—the same words that Cicero had quoted toward the beginning of the first book of his first philosophical essay, 75. The sequel highlights the contrasting case of the perjury of one or more of the prisoners Hannibal captured after Cannae (3.113-15); then follows another attack on the the qualifica­ tions of the Epicureans and other schools of similar standpoint to teach about the virtues <3.116-20) and a personal coda to the addressee (3.121). 76. Cf. Taylor, 125 ff.

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de Republics (sc. 1.27). Africanus said that he was never less at leisure than when he was at leisure nor less alone than when he was alone. Cicero goes on to contrast the otium of Africanus with his own to the former's advantage. Unlike other prefaces to Cicero's philosophical books where similar themes are sounded, ours contains no mention of the benefits that Cicero's writing on philosophy in Latin provides to his countrymen.77 Indeed he claims to prefer investigations, like those he attributes to Scipio, which leave no con­ crete result. This plangent meditation, tinged with self-pity and betraying that for him leisure is, after all, either an adjuna to or a surrogate for political activity, foreshadows Cicero's imminent surrender of his otium and resumption of his political war with Antony by direct, rather than purely literary means (see further ad 3.1-4). 7. Cicero philosophus (?) At the time of the composition of de Officiis, then, Cicero was caught be­ tween familial and state crises. In both cases he hoped to perpetuate his influence and secure his personal and political legacy. Young Marcus was of an age when he needed to make fundamental decisions about his course of life; Cicero's belief that he required firm parental guidance at this stage is reflected both in the general remarks at 1.117-18 and the planned trip to visit Marcus in Greece, aborted in mid-August (Att. 16.3.4; 16.7). At the same time the future course of the Roman state itself was an open question, Cicero's decision to return being motivated by the hope that he could help restore senatorial rule. At this juncture Cicero evidently saw Panaetius' essay on appropriate actions as a vehicle which, with some modification (cf. 1.6), could be used to convey messages appropriate to the time, both to his son about his choice of career and to his fellow Romans about the proper form of the state and its role, above all vis-a-vis the property of the individual. The precepts offered in our essay are, Cicero claims (2.7-8), compatible with his general stance as an adherent of the Skeptical Academy. He is dealing in this essay at a level of appropriate action (καθηκο») requiring no higher standard than that a ratio probabilis could be offered for the given action (1.8); he argues that the Academy allows him to "follow" probabilia (2.8), a position explained in greater detail at Luc. 99, where it is made clear that the exigencies of daily living impose some such procedure on the Skeptic {quae nisi probet omnis vita tollatur). Nevertheless his project in Off. is different from that in his dialogues in ways that Cicero, in his eagerness to affirm his philosophical consistency, scarcely acknowledges; for here there is no rebut77. Ci.Tusc. 1.5, N.D. 1.7.

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tal of the dogmata espoused. 78 Nor is the philosophical position occupied by Off. adequately described as "an attempt on the pan of an Academic to work out in Stoic terms the solution to the Stoic difficulty that Books I and II have raised" (Annas, 1989, 172; her emphasis). The problem of finding precepts to guide one in daily living (Book 1) or of winning glory and influence (Book 2) are not specifically Stoic. Other approaches could have been chosen. Cicero states sequimur igitur. . . Stoicos (1.6) but never explains why he has chosen to follow a Stoic source in Books 1-2 (the previous discussion had eschewed the claims of the Epicureans, Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus to au­ thority on this subject but had left intact that of the Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics). More enlightening is the explanation of the adoption of the Stoic position at 3.20: . . . splendidius haec ab Us disserentur quibus quidquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nee utile quicquam quod non honestum . . . , which makes it clear that a rhetorical criterion has governed Cicero's choice of approach. 79 He thus spares himself having to descend to argumentative subtleties. This is, I think, characteristic of Cicero's procedure in this essay, written with speed and with the argument not seldom deline­ ated in broad strokes. Book 1 is anchored in a Stoicism of an allencompassing and humane variety, which freely quotes Plato and Aristotle and in which the interscholastic debates seldom appear (the polemic at 1.89 against the Peripatetic view of anger being the exception); Book 2, in which one of the external goods (glory) is assumed to be worth striving for (albeit for instrumental reasons specified at 2.31), can virtually be said to be more Peripatetic than Stoic (cf. introduction to that Book). Ironically, it is in Book 3, where Cicero boasts of his independence of sources (§ 34) and where the scale of values can ostensibly be either Stoic or Peripatetic (3.33), that the rigor of the older Stoa reasserts itself (cf. ad 3.62-63, 97-115, 119). In spite, then, of the skeptical pose Cicero adopts at 2.7-8 to save his reputation for philosophical consistency, Off. cannot be adequately ex­ plained as the exercise of a Skeptic who has allowed himself to explore Stoic problems. A further indication is that in this essay Cicero speaks, not in a persona of philosophical detachment, but as a moralist with a program; note the repeated gerundives: efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant (1.102). . . appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse (103). . . in omni autem actione susciptenda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut appetitus 78. Cf. P. Steinmetz, "Planting und Plananderung der philosophischcn Schriftcn Ciccros," Beitrage zur hellenistischen /.iterator und ihrer Rezeption in Rom, ed. P. Stcinmcrz, Palingcncsia 28 (Stuttgart,!990), 152. 79. Cf. ad U>c.; in this connection it is perhaps worth remembering that Cicero numbered his rhetorical works along with the philosophical (Div. 2.4).

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rationi pareat (141); the approving comment . . . rectissime praecipitur ut perturbationes fugiamus (136); or again the strong disapprobation con­ tained in such remarks as Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum (148). Here is no weighing of arguments pro and contra, no sitting on the fence; Off. is, as befits a set of precepts written by a father for his son, a deeply engaged work. It is no less engaged on the political level (see § 6 above). 80 Cicero's probable modifications of his Panaetian source fit with the pro­ grams that he is advancing both with his son and the Roman people. The fact that the first virtue is much more narrowly circumscribed and given much shorter shrift than Panaetius is likely to have done is in accord with Cicero's conception of the limited scope of the vita contemplativa in the life of the Roman statesman he wants his son to become (cf. ad 1.18-19). One suspects that similarly under the third virtue Cicero has given the vita activa an exclusive claim to be the fulfillment of magnitudo animi, contrary to Pan­ aetius (cf. ad 1.72). Likewise the list of sordid and liberal professions (1.15051) and all the passages in which dignitas is emphasized under the fourth virtue seem likely to be Cicero's attempts to draw out in more concrete and specifically Roman terms the values latent in Panaetius' account, which was probably argued from phenomena observed in nature to a greater degree than our text suggests (cf. ad 1.127). Finally the critique of Panaetius for omissions from his divisio and supplementation of these topics as appendices to Books 1 and 2 was surely contrived by Cicero in order to provide a ranking whereby the vita activa is placed firmly (and with quite wearying repetition) above the vita contemplativa (1.152 ff.). The subject of Book 3, the conflict of the honestum and apparent utile, had been mooted but never executed by Panaetius (cf. § 5 |3] above). Cicero is familiar with the view of P. Rutilius Rufus that, just as, in view of the beauty of the face, no one had dared to complete Ape lies' Coan Venus, so no one had ventured to complete Panaetius' work on appropriate actions be­ cause of the excellence of what he had left (3.10). In spite of the initial diffidence with which he had recommended this work merely on stylistic grounds to a son studying with Cratippus (proem to Book 1), Cicero seems to gain confidence as he goes, so that at 3.7 he speaks of having followed Panaetius correctione quadam adhihita and by 3.121 it is hoped that the younger Cicero will benefit from the content, not just the style. In any case, Cicero proceeds undeterred by the praestantia of Panaetius' work (3.10) and in the event produces a dilation on the topic, treated briefly at 1.31 ff., of 80. Cf. the similar conclusion of Long, 1995', 220, n. 16.

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officia ex tempore. For him the solution lies not in a deeper exploration of the concepts honestum and utile, which cannot diverge, but in the applica­ tion of terms to individual cases; for, since hard and fast rules do not apply, the same action may shift from one category to another depending on cir­ cumstance. The execution is driven largely by examples dictated by Cicero's current political concerns, as indicated in the previous section. Cicero was a lifelong student of philosophical texts and was genuinely interested in pursuing, in the amateur way he considered suitable to a Roman gentleman and statesman, philosophical questions. After de Republica and de Legibus Cicero resumed writing on philosophy late in life under pressure of personal misfortune and conceived the plan of a systematic introduction to Greek philosophy written in the Latin language. Off. was, however, never part of that plan. Like de Consolatione it had a personal occasion—as a replacement for the aborted visit to his son in Athens (3.121). It was dashed off at a remarkably quick rate; besides reading Panaetius' essay and a tract of Posidonius on circumstantial appropriate action and a work of Hecato and examining some historical texts, he evidently did little specific preparation. His reliance on memory is betrayed on occasion by such a phrase as nihil habeo praeter auditum (1.33). It shows us less of Cicero the philosopher than Cicero the father and politician. 8. Influence through the Centuries If de Officiis was composed in some haste and conceived with reference to a particular set of personal and historical circumstances, it has had neverthe­ less a remarkable influence and resonance over many centuries. A full study of its Nachleben lies beyond the scope of this introduction. But the student of what has been called the most influential of Cicero's philosophical works 8 1 should at least be acquainted with the main lines of development. 82 Whether or not Cicero intended it to be such, its potential as a school text appears to have been recognized early on; 8 3 that it was viewed as a suitable model of Latinity gave Off., in the Renaissance, additional cachet. 84 As late as the 81. Ziclinski, 66. 82. In default of a needed updating Zielinski's study retains its usefulness (though his interpretation of Off. cannot be relied upon in detail; cf. ad 1.7b); Gunermann, 440 ff., presents a brief sketch; one looks forward to publication of the Cologne Habilitarionsarbeit of Irene Frings, Ciceros de officiis. Studien zur Rezeption von Horaz bis Petrarca, mil einem Anhang ztt Matteo Palmieri, Delia vita civile. 83. See p. 42, n. 98 infra. 84. Sec pp. 45-46 infra.

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eighteenth century the text retained sufficient standing to be taken seriously by major thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Kant, who found in it inspira­ tion or something to react against, modify, and incorporate in forming their own views on society and ethics, whereas, at a lower level of culture, Off. continued to be recycled more or less unmodified.85 It was only the discredit­ ing of Cicero's philosophical originality in the nineteenth century that brought a fundamental change, which, followed in our century by an altered attitude toward the traditional classical curriculum in many Western coun­ tries, has reduced the influence of Off. to perhaps its lowest point since the Dark Ages. The exact circumstances of the publication of this text elude us. Wilamowitz thought, in light of Rudberg's study, "dai? Tiro aus einem unfertigen Konzept, aus verschiedenen Entwurfen und Notizen, die vorliegenden Bucher hergestellt hat";86 some passages of the text as transmitted certainly raise the possibility that it lacks the summa manus and was published posthumously (see § 10 below); 87 but with the evidence at hand it is futile to try to identify the editor or characterize, as Wilamowitz does, the manuscript Cicero left (uversehiedene Entwiirfe und Notizen n ). The terminus ante quern for publication is the Augustan principate if echoes are rightly detected in Horace and Ovid. Carm. 3.5.41 ff. (the Regulus Ode) can be explained as taking Off. 3.100 as its starting point (see ad he. and ad 3.114); and the allusion to unflappable behavior at Carm. 3.3.1 ff. (lustum et tenacem propositi virum . . .) might have been inspired by Off 1.80. 88 Ovid's Ars Amatoria may also depend on our work, though not all of the echoes so far claimed are equally convincing.89 By the reign of Tiberius the indications are more definite: Off. was read and ransacked, along with 85. Cf., e.g., The Letters of Lord Chesterfield to His Son (London-Toronto-New York, 1929), 111 (10 August Old Style 1749): "A certain degree of exterior seriousness in looks and motions, gives dignity, without excluding wit and decent cheerfulness, which arc always serious themselves. A constant smirk upon the face, and a whiffling activity of the body are strong indications of futility. Whoever is in a hurry, shows that the thing he is about is too big for him. Haste and hurry are two different things. . . . Pray read frequently and with the utmost attention—nay, get by heart, if you can—that incomparable chapter in Cicero's Offices upon the τΰ np^now |$ic), or the Decorum. It contains whatever is necessary for the dignity of manners." 86. Wilamowitz, 1932, 2, 390-91, n. 87. On the other hand, Cicero would scarcely have wanted to hold back for very long a work with this kind of political program (cf. $ 6 supra), as Thomas, 6, already noted. 88. Cf. D'Elia, 130. 89. Cf. E.J. Kenney, "Nequiiiae poeta," Ovidiana, ed. N.I. Hcrcscu (Paris, 1958), 201-9 at 207 n. 2; Atzcrf·, VI, and D'Elia; ad 1.129.

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the other Ciceronian philosophica, for the handbook of rhetorical examples that Valerius Maximus dedicated to that emperor.90 The first panegyric of Off comes from the pen of the Elder Pliny, who praises Cicero's candor in naming his source and in his dedication to the Emperor Titus calls our work volumina ediscenda, non modo in manibus cotidie habenda (praef 22 ). 91 The first passage expressly quoted is Cicero's rendering of the Euripidean verses so often cited by Julius Caesar (3.82: Suet. Jul. 30.5). The early fourth-century lexicon de Compendiosa Doctrina of Nonius Marcellus contains a number of quotations from Cicero's works, including de Officiis. Fedeli has emphasized that Nonius does, on occasion, preserve the true reading against the entire medieval tradition;92 elsewhere, however, he is sometimes guilty of banalization typical of excerptors;93 nor, since he himself may sometimes have had to rely on corrupt texts, will it be easy to sort out his own errors from those of his manuscript tradition. In any case, since his readings are not aligned with one or the other of the branches of the medieval tradition,94 it remains unclear whether these do, in fact, go back to antiquity (see § 10 below). 95 Cicero's essay was a force with which Christian authors, too, had to reckon, whether by way of polemical opposition or adaptation. Writing for pagans with the intent of trapping pagan philosophers in self-contradiction, Lactantius alludes to de Officiis, as to other Ciceronian philosophical works, in a number of passages. 96 But it was left to St. Ambrose to provide in his de 90. As was suggested by F. Zschech, De Cicerone et Livio Valerii Maximi fontibus (diss. Berlin, 1865), 6 and 16 if.; cf. also W. Thormcycr, De Valerio Maximo et Cicerone quaestiones criticae (diss. Gottingen, 1902}, 87 ft.; the borrowings are conveniently listed in the apparatus testimoniorum of Fedeli and Winterbottom. 91. Pliny's nephew, too, shows signs of having been influenced by Off. (cf. ad 1.58 and 107-22). 92. Fedeli, 1964 2 and 1973, 386; I am, however, less confident than he that at 1.56 Nonius1 quod Pythagoras ultimum in amicilia putavit (417.26) is preferable to quod Pythagoras vuh in amicitia of the Ciceronian tradition. 93. E.g., at 1.114 bonorum et malorum (Non. 241.3) for bonorum et vitiorum or the insertion of necesse est following the verb and substitution of subjunctive for future in the phrase dissolvetur ontnis bumana consortia (3.26; Non. 196.15). 94. Fedeli 1975, 387.—Fedeli cites (ibid.) some passages to show that Nonius used an already interpolated exemplar; but none of these passages (viz.. 2.22, 3.81, and 3.112) seems likely to be interpolated (cf. ad locos). 95. Some allusions to Off. in the Panegyria Latini are pointed out in D. Lassandro's new edition (Turin, 1992); cf. Michael Winterbottom's comments at Gnomon 67 (1995), 560 and n. I; cf. also citation of Off. 1.10 at RLM 571.22 (Emporius). 96. Forty-two according to L. Cacli Firmiani Lactanti Opera omnia, ed. S. Brandt-G. Laubmann, 2.2 (Prague-Vienna-Leipzig, 1897), 248-49 (index auctorum); cf. Franz Fessler,

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Officiis Ministrorum the most thorough rethinking of Cicero's subject based on a reading of de Officiis preserved from antiquity.97 The best indication we have that Off. was a school text, knowledge of which could be presupposed in an educated reader of late antiquity, consists in Ambrose's allusion to it by praeteritio at 3.66, 70, and 71. 9 8 Perhaps the availability of Ambrose's essay in a new critical edition will stimulate further study of it and its relation to its Ciceronian model." Current scholarship tends to stress Ambrose's indepen­ dence and the importance of his examples drawn from the Old Testament, which often lend a quite different emphasis from Cicero's.100 There follows a relatively fallow period in the influence of de Officiis. Direct use of our text in the sixth century Formula honestae vitae by Martin of Bracara has been denied by £. Bickel; but to uphold this view one would evidently have to posit a lost work of Seneca as the source for the sententia 'nee dominum esse velis a domo, sed domum a domino' (4, p. 69; cf. Off. 1.139). 101 A fragment written in the first half of the ninth century at Tours (Q) is the earliest extant medieval text of Off.;102 and Tours influence has been suspected in another early witness. 103 Winterbottom conjectures that a borrowed German copy may have been the source used about this time by Hadoard of Corbie for his Florilegium (K) and in related manuscripts.104 The restricted availability of Off. at this period is suggested by the fact that it was evidently inaccessible to Lupus of Ferrieres.105 In general the early ζ Benutzung der philosophischen Schriften Ciceros durch Lactam (Leipzig-Berlin, 1913), csp. 89 and 43 ff.; Nelson, 64 ff. and 155-56. 97. For the effort of Gellius (1.13) in that direction cf. ad 1.32.—On the date of the treatise (subsequent to 386 and prior to 394) cf. Testaxd (n. 99 infra) 1, 44 ff.; see Wintcrbottom's edition (170-72) for a list of dependent passages. 98. Cf. Stcidle, 1984, 58, n. 5, and 1985, 294-95; another indication is the fact that the youthful emperor Severus Alexander (208-35; regn. 222-35) was much occupied in its study (cf. SHA 18.30.2), as the elderly German statesman Otto von Bismarck was to be (Gunermann, 445). 99. Saint Ambroise, Les devoirs, ed. M. Tesiard, 2 vols. (Paris, 1984-92). 100. Cf. most recently Steidle, 1984 and 1985; on the surprisingly small number of citations of Off. in St. Augustine's writings (four) cf. Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Ociron, 1 (Paris, 1958), 214; influence need not, however, take this form; sec Tcstard's index locorum s.v. Ciccron, De officiis, and for the influence of Off. 1.96 ff. on die treatise de Pukhro et Apto cf. J.M. Fontanicr, "Sur le traite d' Augustin De pulchro ct apto. Convenance, beaute et adaptation," RSPh 73 (1989), 413-21 at 417-18. 101. Bickel, 525-30; cf. Nelson, 78. 102. It comprises 2.72 necessaria— 3.11 non potest. 103. Sc. Paris. 6601 (= P), s. IX/X; cf. Beeson, 221. 104. Winterbottom, 1993, 216, n. 8; on Hadoard's excerpts cf. Nelson, 82 ff. 105. Beeson, 219.

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manuscripts show both German and French affiliations, so that the point of origin remains uncertain.106 From the twelfth century onward copies of Off. are much more common, and the tract becomes, for the first time since late antiquity, part of the bloodstream of Western culture. An indicator of the increasing influence of Off. during the twelfth century is the fact that, though omitted from the list of curriculum authors drawn up in the first half of the century by Conrad of Hirsau, it takes its place in the similar list dated to the latter half of the century and attributed to Alexander Neckham. 107 It is to this period, too, that the origin of the vulgate text, presenting a debased form of the ζ tradi­ tion, has been traced. 108 Moreover, authors begin to plunder our essay for ideas and examples or rethink the problems it raises. Such use is found especially in works that breathe the spirit of the Cathedral school at Chartres, such as the influential Moralium dogma philosophorum ascribed in a thirteenth-century manuscript to William of Conches, an attribution now in doubt, 109 as well as the historical works of Otto of Freising, and, most creatively, the Policraticus of John of Salisbury.110 Though moralists of the earlier thirteenth century show a preference for Seneca and though in the latter part of the century the hegemony of Aristotle sets in, the idealism tempered with realism of de Officiis remains a force, especially on the subjca of justice and liberality. Thus the extensive and fairly representative borrowings from Off. in the Speculum doctrinae of the Dominican reader at the court of Louis IX, Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1264), point to "a larger absorption of pagan ideas than is commonly credited to the thirteenth century" (Nelson, 117); and a full digest of Off. appears in the same author's Speculum historiale (6.7-10). Themes from Off. are likewise prominent in the Summa de regimine vitae humanae sive Communiloquium of the Franciscan theologian active in Paris, Joannes Gallensis (fl. 1260-85). Within his Christian-Aristotelian framework Aquinas, too, especially in the sphere of justice and social thought, shows influence of the views and exam­ ples he found in our treatise; and Cicero's third Book became via Thomas a 106. Winterbottom, 1993,219.—On the (inaccurate) allusion to Off. 3.8 or 12 by Gcrbcrt of Aurillac (d. 1003; Ep. 44 = PL 139, 214) cf. Nelson, 87-88. 107. Cf. Ernst Robert Curtius, Europdische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter, 3d ed. (Bern-Munich, 1961), 59 = European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. W.R. Trask (Princeton, 1953), 49-50. 108. Winterbottom, 1993, 220; knowledge of the ξ form at any period is unusual; excep­ tional cases arc noted ibid., 228 ff. 109. Cf. L Rauner, Lexikon des Mittelalters (Munich and Zurich, 1992), 827. 110. Cf. Nelson, 89 ff.

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major influence on the ethics of trade and commerce in the High Middle Ages. 111 Cicero's potent thrusts at tyranny could be an unsettling political force; they were used by ecclesiastics in their attacks on secular power but are absent from the works of such Italian patriots as Giovanni Nanni, Brunetto Latini, and Albertano Bescia—evidently because their knowledge of Off. was filtered through the Moralium dogma, where the attacks on tyrants are diverted to criminals. 112 If the neglect of Cicero prior to Petrarch (1304-74) is sometimes over­ stated,1 13 it is certainly true that this enthusiast, who called Virgil and Cicero "gli occhi de la lingua nostra,**114 moved the orator to a place at the center of interest that he had not occupied since St. Jerome had dreamed of being reproached at the Last Judgement: Ciceronianus es, non Christianus (epist. 22.30); and Petrarch's personal relation to and emulation of the ancients, in contrast to the medieval reverence for the authority of the "auctores," is a harbinger of the modern approach. 115 The popularity of de Officiis in the early Renaissance is shown by the enormous number of copies made (almost 700 are extant, the overwhelming majority dated to the fourteenth or fifteenth century 116 ); thus it is hardly surprising that, after the invention of movable type, de Officiis, together with the Paradoxa Stoicorum, was the first printed Latin text (Fust and Schoeffer, Mainz, 1465). Its influence can be traced on works as diverse in subject and purpose as Machiavelli's // principe and Castiglione's // cortegiano.117 Among the early editors of de Officiis was no lesser figure than Erasmus of Rotterdam. He announces imminent publication of his annotated edition (Paris, John Philippi, n.d.) in a letter to James Batt dated 5 April 1 5 0 1 . n 8 111. For Joannes Gallensis and Aquinas cf. Nelson, 118 ff. and 157. 112. Ibid., 158. 113. E.g., by Zielinski, 137, and John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 2 (Cambridge, 1908), 6. 114. Trhnfo della Fama (3.21) in Francesco Petrarca, Le rime sparse e i trionfi, ed. E. Chiorboli (Ban, 1930). 115. Cf. in general P. de Nolhac, Petrarch and the Ancient World (Boston, 1907), csp. 108 ff. 116. Cf. Winterbottom, 1993, 215 and 234 ff. 117. Off. was also the second classical Latin text printed (Cologne, Ulrich Zell, ca. 1466): cf. Sandys (n. Mi supra), 103. On MachiavclliandCasriglionccf. MacKcndhck, 262 ff. Forthe influence of Off. on the architect Leon Battista Albeni (1404-72) cf. Onians. Polirian, too, devoted study to our work; for his uncharacteristic error in attempting to emend the transmitted κατόρθωμα to κατορθωμίΜΗ' (sic) in Off. 1.8 cf. Jill Krayc, "Cicero, Stoicism and Textual Criticism: Poliziano on κατόρθωμα," Rinasamento scr. 2, 23 (1983), 79-110, csp. 89-91. 118. Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, ed. P.S. Allen, 2d ed., 1 (Oxford, 1906), 355.

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During his stay in Paris (1503-7) Beatus Rhenanus acquired one of the two known extant copies. 119 Erasmus likewise alludes to this project in a letter of 28 April 1501 to James Voecht, reproduced in reprints of Erasmus' edition (Froben, Basel; August, 1520, and later) and including a remarkable en­ comium of our work, of which the following may serve as a specimen: " . . . tres illos M. Tullii de Officiis libellos vere aureos 120 relegimus, incertum maiorene voluptate an fructu. Quos quoniam Plinius Secundus negat unquam de manibus deponi oportere, 121 voluminis magnitudinem quoad licuit contraximus, quo semper in manibus enchiridii vice gestari et, quod scripsit idem, ad verbum edisci possint;. . . Hie fons ille divinus honestatis in quattuor rivulos se dividit, qui potus non solum vocaiem, ut Aonius ille, verum etiam immortalem faciat; cuius undis, si subinde mentis anus tinxeris, velut Achilles alter ad omnia fortunae tela impenetrabilis evades." 122 On the other hand, the spirit not only of humanism but also of the refor­ mation animates the work of the Wittenberg Greek professor Philipp Schwarzerd (1497-1560), who signed his works with the Greek caique of his surname, Melanchthon. A series of grammars and commentaries on classical authors, including one on de Officiis, as well as his work in organizing or reorganizing several schools, earned him the title "praeceptor Germaniae." 123 In the prefaced explanation "quid conferat lectio librorum de Officiis M. Tulli Ciceronis" he compares Off. with St. Ambrose's reworking in such a way as to leave little scope for a reading of the Milanese bishop: "Civilis vitae consuetudo a Cicerone describitur, cum qua religio nihil pugnat. scripsit de Officiis etiam divinus Ambrosius, credo ut pueris inculcaret religionem, de qua videbat in Ciceronianis nihil praecipi. verum ego religionem ex divinis litteris censeo hauriendam esse, de civilibus moribus malim audire Ciceronem . . ." After fleeing his native France in the face of charges of heresy and immor­ ality, Marcus Antonius Muretus (1526-85) pursued a teaching career in Italy that culminated in his professorship in Rome (1563-84). If the moral and 119. Ibid. 120. The epithet was taken up in Muretus' lectures on Off. (cf. M. Antonii Mureti Opera omnia ex MSS aucta et emendata, cum brevi annotatione D. Ruhnkemi, 1 [Leiden, 1789), 250) and became traditional; cf. die qualification made by Wilamowitz, 1923, 190: "In Ciceros goldcncm Buchc von den Pflichten stammt das Gold von Panaitios . . ." 121. Cf. p. 41 supra. 122. Opus epist. (n. 118 supra), 356-57; cf. G. Vallese, "Erasmo e Cicerone: Ic Icttercprefazioni crasmianc al De officiis e alle Tuscolane," Le parole e le idee 11 (1969), 265-72. 123. Cf. K. Hartfclder, Philipp Melanchthon als praeceptor Germaniae, Monumenta Germaniac paedagogica 7 (Berlin, 1889), esp. 382 (his views on Cicero).

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political content of the treatise had been at the center of interest of Erasmus and Melanchthon, it is not surprising that, when lecturing on de Officiis, Muretus, who, centuries after his death, was still regarded as a model of neoLatin style, 124 should have listed its style as the first reason for valuing the essay (though he may have exaggerated its degree of polish); next is cited the fact that Off. was written as "prope ultimus illius praestantis ingenii fetus"; and finally that the precepts were carefully collected, since the aim was to counsel his son on his course of life. 125 In the following century the labors of humanist commentators were sub­ sumed in the great variorum edition of J.G. Graevius (first edition, 1688), an unrivaled collection of ancient parallels. On the other hand, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), to whom Wilamowitz attributed u das Zeug, Scaliger cbenburtig fortzusetzen,"126 because of the vicissitudes of the vita activa into which he was drawn, appears in these pages, not as a commentator on Off, but as one who made use of it in his own writings. Thus in the de lure Belli ac Pacts he cites Cicero's condemnation of self-aggrandizement [Off. 3.21-22) and his warning against exposing oneself to danger without cause [Off. 1.83). 127 But it was during the eighteenth century that De Officiis achieved what was surely the high-water mark of its influence on modern thought. 128 "Le traite Des Offices de Ciceron m'avait enchante et je le prenais pour mon modele"; so Montesquieu (1689-1755) explained many years later to Mgr. de Fitz-James his decision to embark on his first serious large-scale work. 129 He goes on to give his reasons for abandoning the projected Traite des devoirs: " . . . la division de Ciceron, qui est celle des Stoiciens, etait trop vague; surtout je craignais un rival tel que Ciceron et il me semblait que mon esprit tombait devant le sien." 130 It is not altogether clear what division Montesquieu found wanting (between honestum and utile} of the honestum into four parts?). In any case, the magnum opus De I'Esprit des lots itself breathes the spirit of de Officiis. Thus its analysis of the laws prior and 124. Cf. Pfeiffer, 113. 125. Muretus (n. 120 supra), 251-52. 126. Wilamowitz, Geschichte der Philologte (Leipzig, 1927), 31. 127. Respectively de lure Belli ac Pacts 1.1.3.1 and 2.24.5.4; cf. also ad 3.52 and 61. 128. Besides the French and Prussian examples cited in the text note that the Phanariorc Nicolas Mavrocordatos published in 1719 in Bucharest a book ncpi καθηκόντων, which includes a fairly close backtranslation into the Atricizing Greek of the rime of Off. 1.11-17; at some points one feels he may not be too far from what Panactius might have written; cf. Panagiotis Noutsos, "Nicolas Mavrocordatos et Ciceron," Dodoni 11 (1982), 235-43. 129. Correspondence de Montesquieu, ed. F. Gebelin and A. Morize, 2 (Bordeaux, 1914), 304. 130. Ibid., 305.

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superior to any written code is inspired by Off. 1.11-12, just as "sociabilite" in the sense of the second virtue of Off. becomes the basis for his analysis of the forms of government, the treatment of despotism ringing changes on Cicero's denial that there can be any societas with a tyrant (3.19, 32, and 82).» 3 ' Meanwhile in Prussia Frederick the Great pronounced de Officiis "le meilleur ouvrage de morale, qu'on ait ecrit et qu'on ecrira"*32 and inspired Christian Garve's German translation.133 This version, soon followed by Garve's Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen zu Ciceros Buchern von den Pflichten (Breslau, 1783), appeared while Kant was at work on the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. For a time early in 1784 Kant considered publishing his ethical views in the form of a critique of Garve. Though he decided to broaden the scope, the resulting Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten defined its project in opposition to the "populare sittliche Welrweisheit" largely represented by de Officiis as translated and interpreted by Garve. Thus the first section includes a critique of the attempt to ground ethical norms on natural instincts, as at Off. 1.11 ff. (Kant, 395; cf. further ad 1.11); and Kant's rejection of a derivation of "Pflichten" from a "Natureinrichtung" is evidently directed against Cicero's use of naturae ratio at 3.23 (translated by Garve as "Einrichtung unserer Natur"). In spite of the fact that he chose to base ethics on reason ("Vernunft") rather than nature, two of the formulations of the categorical imperative in the second section of the Grundlegung show the influence of Kant's reading of de Officiis. The first formulation of the categorical imperative, "handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daft sie 131. Cf. J. Chomarar, "Le 'Dc officiis* ct la pensee de Montesquieu," Presence de Ciciron. Hommages au R.P.M. lestard (Paris, 1984), 195-206, esp. 200 ff. 132. Frederick the Great, De la Utterature allemande. Franzosisch-Deutsch mix der Moserschen Cegenschrift, ed. Chr. Gutknecht and P. Kerner (Hamburg, 1969), p. 64,5 55 (orig. Berlin, 1780). The reaction was not long in arriving; in an address dated 18 January 1811 Johann Friednch Herbart pronounced de Officus "in wissen&chaftlicher Hin&icht . . . das Schlechtcstc . . . . was der grossc Mann uns hintcrlassen hat"; he complains, with some justice, of a composition uohne Sorgfalt" and adds this by no means inapposite characterization: "Der Sohn soil sich uberzeugen, dass der Nutzen nut der Tugend nicht streite; daher verlasst den Vater die Ruhc und Unbcfangcnhcit, womit er in den Buchern vom hochsten Gut cine jcde Sache fur sich selbst hatte reden lassen. Diese Biicher vom hochsten Gut waren schon geschrieben, und der Sohn Icrnt in Athen; daher eilt der Vater fur diesmal iiber die Principien hinweg, er wird ausfiihrlich nur an den Stcllen, wo ihm daran liegt, irgend cine unmittclbar praktischc Wahrheit scinem Sohnc dcutlich zu machen und cinzupragen." (J.F. Herbart, Samtliche Werke. cd. G. Hartenstein, 12 (Leipzig, 1852J, 172). 133. Ciceros Abhandluttg iiber die menschlichen Pflichten in drei Buchern . . . , tr. Christian Garve (Breslau, 1783); cf. Melches Gibert, esp. 55 ff.

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

ein allgemeines Gesetz werde" (Kant, 421), presupposes a community of all people; this Stoic cosmopolitanism Kant imbibed from de Officiis (3.28). The second formulation of the categorical imperative reads: "handle so, daS du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals blofi als Mirtel brauchst" (Kant, 429). This concept of the humanity in onself and others derives from Off. 3.26:. . . qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam... 5/ nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras qui omnino hominem ex homine tollatt (Garve's translation of the underlined clause: "So verdient er keine Widerlegung, da er im Menschen die Menschlichkeit aufhebt"). 134 The nineteenth century brought a fundamentally altered approach to Cicero both as a philosophical authority and as a politician. 135 The first serious attempt to set de Officiis into context in terms of the history of philosophy was the dissertation that F.G. van Lynden wrote under the guid­ ance of Daniel Wyttcnbach.136 If as early as 1697T. Graevius' (posthumous) edition of Callimachus had been adorned by 420 fragments collected by Bentley, fragmentarily preserved philosophical texts had to wait longer for such careful philological treatment. Van Lynden, however, made a good start in collecting Panaetian testimonia and fragments and raised such fundamen­ tal questions as the readership that Panaetius addressed and the reasons Cicero might have been drawn to this source. 137 Such work on the philo­ sophical sources of Off. was continued notably by R. Hirzel 138 and, in our century, by M. Pohlenz. The Panaetian testimonia and fragments have since been edited on modern principles by M. van Straaten.139 This century, with Cicero's place in school curricula still secure but his influence on high culture waning, 140 also saw a flowering of philological work on Off., including the 134. For chc influence of Off. on Kant's Grundlegung cf. in general Melches Gibert, 77 ff. 135. For the latter point with particular reference to Mommscn cf. Habicht, csp. the "Epilogue." 136. F.G. van Lynden, he. cit., n. 47 supra. 137. For rhc former point cf. he. cit., n. 47 supra, for the latter 86 ff. 138. Hirzel, 2, 721-36. 139. Albeit without a strict division between testimonia and fragments or assignment of fragments to books. 140. Cf. the apparent allusion to Off. 1.15 by Goethe, Kunsttheoretische Schriften una Obersetzungen. Schriften zur btldenden Kunst, 1, Berliner Ausgabc 19 (Berlin-Weimar, 1973), 26, where he calls a remark in J.G. Sulzer's Die scbonen Kiinste in ihrem Ursprung, ihrer wahren Natur una besten Anwendung "so halb und miSvcrstanden und in den Wind geschlagen als der Wunsch Ciceros, die Tugcnd in korperlichcr Schonheit seincm Sohnc zuzufuhrcn" (I owe this reference to the kindness of Christine Schmitz).

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best grammatical and stylistic commentary, written by CF.W. Miiller, and Ernst Popp's work in sorting out the relation of manuscripts, which forms the basis of all subsequent editions. 141 Whereas the nineteenth century called Cicero's philosophical originality into question, it remained for the twentieth, with its ideological Sturm und Drang, to expose and challenge the political assumptions which underlie the work. This goal has been pursued, now with greater, now with lesser sub­ tlety, ever since Robert von Pohlmann called attention to the classist views latent in Cicero's treatment of honorable and sordid professions {Off. 1.15051; see ad /oc). Certainly Cicero's own background, his class, and political affiliations, as well as his intended readership, were factors in determining his program and procedure in de Officiis to a greater extent than previous scholarship had delineated; hence it was a useful corrective for these elements to be brought out. On the other hand, Cicero's unique achievement can be lost sight of if emphasis is placed too exclusively on his position as a repre­ sentative of a given social group. 142 Apart from interruptions in the Dark Ages and in our own century, de Officiis has had a long history as a school text. Over the centuries it has had its admirers, those who have paid it the compliment of imitation, emulation, or outright plagiarism, and, especially of late, its critics. If it has provided a civilized model for the relations of human beings within society (1.20-60) and of different states one to another (cf. ad 1.34), quotable protests against absolutist oppression (2.23-24 and 3.82-85), and a vision of a society cmbracing under a common interest the entire human race (3.26-28), it has perhaps exerted as salutary an influence as can be expected of any text of the now much maligned "canon"; its critics should be sure they have something better to put in its place. 9. Language and Style Since philosophical writing generally falls into the aequabile et temperatum genus of the Middle Style (cf. 1.3), shifts of tone of the kind found in the 141. De Ciceronis de offiais librorum codiabus bernensi 104 eique cognatis (diss. Erlangen, 1883); De Ciceronis de officiis librorum codice palatino 1531 (Erlangcn, 1886); De Ciceronis de officiis librorum codicibus vossiano Q 71 et parishto 6601 (Hof, 1893). 142. Cf. Hcilmann, with M. Griffin's review, JRS 75 (1985), 311-13. Extreme examples of this type of approach: Horst Dieter, Ciceros Werk 'De Officiis'—cine ideologische Tendenzschrift (diss. Potsdam, 1960); cf., e.g., 53: "Der vir bonus entpuppt sich als rrcuer und gehorsamer Untertan bzw. als ergebener Anhanger dcr aristokratischen Sklavenhalterrepublikw; Wilfned Lorenz, Virtus und res publico. Untersuchungen turn Verhaltnis von Moralitat und Gesellschaft im philosophischen Werk Ciceros (diss. Leipzig, 1987).

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

speeches are not to be expected. De Officiis shows no lack of liveliness, however, but includes exclamations—helpfully marked as such in Winterbottom's text—, epigrams (e.g., nee domo dominus sed dominus domo honestanda est: 1.139; cf. 2.69), quoted remarks by imaginary objectors (cf. ad 3.76), the give-and-take of (imaginary) debate (3.49b-57, 89-92, 100 ff.), occasional attempts to involve young Marcus in the argument as if it were an actual dialogue (cf. ad 3.33), and a mini-philippic directed at the dead Caesar (3.83-85). Nor has Cicero lost the power of vivid narrative that enables him to sketch character in a few deft strokes (3.58-60). As sometimes in Aristotle's πραγματάαι, 143 the proems to the individual books are more carefully worked up; so, too, the conclusion of the main argument of Books 1 and 2 falls into the anaphoric pattern characteristic of hymns, and each is rounded off with a ditrochaic clausula (1.151, 2.85). Elsewhere, however, there are lapses into formulaic writing (see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v.) or occasions when the examples do not quite fit the argument (cf. ad 1.25). The generally loose organization allows Cicero to repeat himself (1.136 and 141 after 1.100-3a; 1.153 ff.; for verbal repetition see Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Repe­ tition"), to add topics not foreseen by his divisio (cf. ad 1.138-40), or indeed to paste on an improvised divisio three quarters of the way through a book (cf. ad 3.96). Even in the speeches composed after the Civil War the periodic structure is simplified and much less embellished than earlier;144 all the more so in our essay. De Officiis consists of definite opinions emphatically expressed. The praecepta that Cicero promises will play so large a role here (1.7b) often take the form of a gerundive instruction (the officii forma according to 1.103; for examples see % 7 above). Also frequent are the emphatic nominal sentences expressing a value-judgment (e.g., sed Mud maximum: 3.114; for other ex­ amples see Index of Latin Words s.v. Sum, ellipsis of). Exposition or narra­ tive relies heavily on simple parataxis (cf. 1.12; at 3.38 the naive narrative of Gyges' ring relies mostly on parataxis with some use of relative connection and cum clauses 145 ). As in other works of Cicero's late period, the parti­ ciple, including its verbal properties, is exploited extensively, occasionally in parallel with a subordinate clause (cf. 3.2:. . . qui in maxima celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes conspectum sceleratorum . . . ; see Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Par143. The first seven chapters of ££ 1 are, for instance, free of hiatus; cf. Dirlmeier ad EN, p. 265. 144. Cf. Gotoff, xli-xlii. 145. Cf. von Albrecht, RE Suppl. 13 (1973), 1262.33 ff. a propos Fin. 5.42.

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ticiples**). Word-order is, of course, skilfully managed to produce the desired emphasis (e.g., nee veto histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est ut its haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta: 1.129; ita duae res, quae languorem adferunt ceteris, ilium acuebant, otium et solitudo: 3.1; see also ad 3.119). Attention to prose-rhythm was second nature to Cicero and is found even in his infor­ mal letters. 146 It is not absent from Off. either, though I have called attention to it only in a few places where it serves to underscore a point or plays a role in deciding a textual problem (besides the cases mentioned above cf. ad 1.14 and 15a; 2.48; 3.3). The diction is, of course, not that of the courtroom. Greek words are allowed (καθήκον, κατόρθωμα, πρέπον, ορμή, ευκαιρία, σοφία, φρόνησι?) but are immediately explained. Cicero also takes care to see that the Latin ex­ pressions used as technical terms (e.g., magnitudo animi, decorum) are, when first introduced, clarified with a congeries of words of related signifi­ cance. A Greek word used in the letters to Atticus like βαθύτη? is eschewed in favor of the Latin equivalent, altitudo animi, evidently not widely used (note the quae dicitur attached at 1.88; see ad loc). Cicero sometimes allows a Greek-derived technical term like orichalcum (3.92) or scalmus (3.59), but not cothones, for which he prefers portus manu facti at 2.14. Moreover, technical terms can be repeated here within a brief compass; thus, medicamentum recurs four times within 3.92b; see ad loc. A colloquialism such as plecti in the sense ttbe punished," ordinarily excluded from speeches before the bar or the senate, is found here (1.89; see ad loc), as at Amic. 85 (see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.vv. "Colloquialism," "Sermo cotidianusn). Far from following here Caesar's advice to avoid the unusual word tamquam scopulum {apud Gel. 1.10.4), Cicero, a great linguistic inno­ vator in his philosophical works, 147 uses various words in Off., to our knowledge, for the first time {praegressus: 1.11b; consociatio: 1.100; archi­ tectural 1.151; derivatio: 2.14), for the first time in prose (consortio: 3.26), or for the first time in the given sense {ratiocinator: 1.59; actio: 2.3; distractio and spiritus: 3.32; converro: 3.78; fugio: 3.91; see ad locos); for the quasipoetic solivaga cf. ad 1.157. Figures are used sparingly in Off. as befits a work in the Middle Style. Perhaps most notable are the personifications of various qualities for vivid­ ness, e.g., non recipit istam coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur repellit (3.119), which also includes a feature rare in this essay, the piling up of 146. Cf. Eduard Fraenlccl, Useproben aus Reden Ciceros una Catos «Rome, 1968), 164 ff. 147. Cf. N.D. 1.8; but norc the different emphasis of J.G.F. Powell, "Cicero's Translations from Greek," in Powell, 273-300, esp. 296.

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synonyms for emphasis; see Stylistic Index s.v. "Personification** for more examples. Similes play an important role; indeed that of the poets at 1.97-98 really controls the subsequent presentation of the fourth virtue. For minor figures such as anaphora, asyndeton, chiasmus, litotes, oxymoron, and παρονομασία, see the Stylistic Index s.vv. As a version and emulation of the down-to-earth approach of Panaetius (cf. 1.6 and 3.33; 2.35 and 51), de Officiis claims, at least initially, nothing more than to provide young Marcus with a model of the Middle Style (1.3). In spite of some flaws in the execution (cf. ad 2.21-22, 3.96), it aims to be clear and businesslike, providing definitions of terms at critical junctures, marking the ends of sections with clear signposts, 148 and resorting on occa­ sion to strict syllogistic form or διαίρεσις to lay out the argument (cf. ad 2.10 and 11-16). There was little time or scope for flights of fancy, the imagery used of the passions suggestive of undisciplined soldiers {nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant [1.1021) or frisky animals (tamquam exsultantes |ibid.|) being a rare exception. Nevertheless Cicero's patrocinium has saved Stoic discourse from being thought necessarily exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum {de Orat. 3.66). 10. The Text Though almost 700 manuscripts of de Officiis are preserved,149 only a hand­ ful are of use for reconstructing the original. They derive from two hyparchetypes, now designated by Winterbottom ζ and ξ (formerly Ζ and Χ)Λ<ο There are three independent witnesses to£: Β = Bamberg, Class. 26, s. Χ; Ρ = Paris, lat. 6601, s. IX med., French; V = Leiden, Voss. lat. Q.71, s. IX^. The preferential treatment accorded to Β by Fedeli seems unwarranted; cf. Win­ terbottom, 1993, 219-20, and his edition, p. viii and n. 10. Winterbottom*s work alters the basis for reconstructing ξ. Its most impor­ tant representative remains the lacunose codex L = British Library, Harley 2716, s. X, (West?) German, which is now established as having been the elusive codex Anemoecii (Winterbottom, 1993, 222-23). But in those pas­ sages where L is now lost (except 2.25-51) two late Munich manuscripts, Μ 148. Cf. ad 1.20 and 92, though more orientation at the beginning of a new topic would sometimes have helped; cf. ad 1.11-17. 149. Seen. 116 supra. 150. A third hyparchetype, Y, reconstructed from four manuscripts of twelfth to fourteenth century date, was posited by Atzert, but has been rejected by Fedeli as a conflation of ζ and C; cf. Fedeli, 1973, 378-79; Winterbottom. 1993, 229 ff.

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= Munich Clm 7020, s. XV ex., and S = Munich Clm 650, s. XV, can now be used to reconstruct it with some reliability, c = Berne 104, s. XIII, remains an essential check on L and is the only witness to ξ in the gap in L in the middle of Book 2. ρ = Palatine 1531, s. XIII is now shown to be too contaminated to be of use; cf. Winterbottom, 1990, and 1993, 224-26. The traditional view of the relation of the two branches was summed up as follows by Testard (1, 88): uTout en se rattachant au meme archetype ω, Ζ et X se seraient separes, le premier representant une transmission fiddle et le second une transmission corrigee." Even before Winterbottom's study of ξ, this distinction was found to be overstated by Fedeli, 1973, 384-85, who concluded: "In futuro . . . bisognera dare un peso maggiore, nello scegliere tra lezioni divergent! delle due famiglie, al iudicium piuttosto che alia ratio codicum." In light of Winterbottom's work one can add that the lower valuation of ξ may also have been related, where L is missing, to its recon­ struction from unreliable witnesses (see above). In any case, ad 1.40 and 3.53 I have argued for the authenticity of material present in ξ but absent from ζ; and I have used the text presented by ξ, rather than ζ, at 2.23,26, and 3.99; see ad locos and ad 1.128. On the other hand, C's text forms the starting point for Winterbottom's emendation adopted at 3.74, and I have preferred C's in otio over tj's inicio (i.e., initio) at 2.41. The problem most discussed with reference to the text of de Officiis is that of interpolations. Such testimonies as we have suggest that this work was written in haste (see § 3 above). It is not clear whether or not the text ever received the author's summa manus.151 The laxer standard of the letters may sometimes be the apposite yardstick of its Latinity (cf., e.g., Thomas, 55, n. 174). Now Off. is not alone among the philosophica in bearing traces of hasty composition; Div., for instance, betrays an unevenness that has led to doubts that the author completed and published it. 152 On the other hand, even Thomas, who has undertaken to defend a number of passages that 151. How much weight should be attached, for instance, to Cicero's statement τά aepi του καθήκοντος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus . . . [Alt. 16.11.4)? On this testimony see further ad 2.86-87. 152. Cf. C. Sander, Quaestiones de Oceronis libris quos scripsit De divtnatione (diss. Gortingcn. 1908), 5 ff.; he even anticipates solutions offered to some problems in Off. by suggesting (20-21) that at Dw. 2.143 the words dicitur qmdam—effecent constitute a marginal note by Cicero never integrated into context; similar problems of repetition attributed to a conflarion of two versions have been detected in the Tusc. by M. Giusta, "Due edizioni originali delle Tusucutaner ΑΛΤ 103 (1968-69), 437-99; cf. pp. LXII ff. of his edition (Turin, 1984). Cf. also the observation at Att. 12.52.3: απόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfem, quibus abundo, sometimes referred to the philosuphica (howevei; the preceding sentence is corrupt, the reference uncertain); cf., in general, Div.. ed. Pease, pp. 18-19.

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have, in his view, been wrongly suspected, admits that the transmitted text is on occasion marred by interpolation.153 While I have marked some matter, ranging in length from a single word to several sentences, as inter­ polated, 154 I have also defended a number of other passages previously suspected. In individual cases it is sometimes difficult to draw the line be­ tween faults that may have resulted from Ciceronian haste on the one side and from the interference of another writer on the other. As a much-studied school text (see $ 8 above), de Officiis is likely to have been exposed to the marginal comments of ancient readers in a higher than average degree. I assume that such interpolations as the medieval tradition contains were undertaken for fairly transparent reasons; there is no need to see behind any of them the machinations of an ancient editor (cf. ad 1.41). The question of author's doublets is raised anew by Winterbottom's re­ vival of the use of double-square brackets (cf. Atzert2) to distinguish such material {viz., at 1.82, 2.22, 3.29 and 83). In view of the external circum­ stances that may have prevented him from revisiting the text, if he intended to do so, and Cicero's own testimony about the state of one of his autograph manuscripts,155 it is possible that the archetype of Off. contained such mate­ rial. However, with the criterion of relevance to context excluded a limine and this work standing on a lower stylistic level than most of the other formal treatises, I have ordinarily felt insufficiently confident of my ability to discriminate between the words of Cicero and those of a learned reader possibly falling in with or imitating his tone to make much use of this category (cf., however, ad 1.109 and 2.21-22). In addition, the attempt to determine what Cicero might have written with a view to working it into the text is linked with the problem of how extensively he was prepared to recast what he had already written. On the whole the student of Off. might be better advised to attempt to reconstruct, with minimal adjustments, an in­ telligible text rather than to be drawn into an άπειροι' of uncontrollable speculation about an ideal text that Cicero could have constructed out of the transmitted materials; and from the point of view of the text as we have it such notes, whether of Ciceronian or other provenance, are inter­ polations.

153. Thomas, 105 ff., recognizes five instances (1.31, 36, 59, 147; 3.68). 154. Viz., 1.28,31,32,33,36,59,73,93,101,142[bis), 146,151,2.11,45,48,50,66,86; 3.15, 19,29,39,68,81,82a. 155. . . . dpxcTimov ipsum crebrts loos inculcatum et refectum (Att. 16.3.1).

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The text cited in the lemmata below is my own; for handling of punctua­ tion, spelling, etc., cf. p. 57, n. 1; the following are my variations from the readings printed in Winterbottom's text: 156 Winterbottom 1.28 31 32 33 fnimis callida sedf 40 [[Secundo autem—cum scelere approbavit.]] 51 sit constitutum 69 nimia 73 76 (partum) 82 [[de evertertdis—crudeliter.]) 92 turn quatn plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat, deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia 101 104 (gravissimo) 109 t Q . Much Mancia] [ne Xenocratetn quidem severissimum philosophorum] 111 121 possint 128 ab omni quod abhorret 132 quoniam 135 \utcumque aderunt\ 142 144 146

Dyck [iustitiae genus) [ea cum tempore—non semper est idem.] [vel ei qui promiserit] [nimis] callida sed

est constitutum animi [maioraque efficiendi] (prolatatum) deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia, turn quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat [ita fit ut—descrtptio officii.] {vel gravissimo) {remissi) Q. Mucio [Mancia] (Q. f.) \\ne Xenocratem quidem severissimum philosophorum]] -[notus possit omne quod abhorret quae [locum autem] [opportunitatis] {verba) [magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis]

156. The list takes account inter alia of readings and interpretations offered, in part by Winterbonom himself, since the appearance of his edition (cf. under 1.76, 104 [the second change], 109 [the first change], 128, and 135 and 3.74).

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1.147 2.11 2.33 [et fidis) 35 subtilitas 37 obiecta totos 41 initio 48 56 (quaeratur) 74 (dicere) 86 3.15 19 28 \etiam ipsius animi\ 29 [[minime veto—gratia]] 32 humanitate corporis 39 74 ο \turpe notam temporum nomen illorum\ 81 [species] 82a [[quid enim—gerat beluaef]] 99 domui

\eligenda [apes]

et t/W«t subtili obiecta est totos{que) (. . .) post rapit in otio [orationis] (capiatur) (. . . dicere) [corporis tuendi—voluptatibus] alt. [idem] [secuta est] etiam ipsius animi (...) [minime vero—gratia] humanitatis corpore [quamquam] ο turpem notam temporum nostroruml [forma] [quid enim—gerat beluaef] domi

Commentary on Book 1 homo homini deus est, si suum officium scial. Caec. com. 2 6 4 . . . singularum virtutum sunt certa quaedam officia ac munera . . . Cic. de Orat. 2.345

Of the three Books of Off., the first is the longest and most varied.! After a personal introduction (S$ 1-3), some comments on the scope of the project and its differentiation from the seemingly similar de Finibus ($$ 3 - 6 ) , Cicero launches into a definition (§$ 7-8) and division of the subject (§§ 9-10). Book 1 is to deal with (a) the honestum and its parts (§§ 11-151) and (b) with a comparison of the parts among themselves (§§ 152-61). The main source for (a), we are told obliquely (§§ 6-7), is the Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes; no source is named for (b); internal evidence suggests that Cicero devoted little specific research to it but pieced it together from mate­ rials which lay ready to hand (cf. ad §§ 152-61). The major sub-divisions of (a) are as follows:

I. Derivation of the 'parts' of the honestum from drives natural to the human being; their division into theoretical virtues and virtues of action (SS 11-14; 15-17) II. Cognitio (§S 18-19) 1. In spelling and punctuation of Cicero's text I mostly follow Winterbottom, who, on the former point, regularizes after Merguet. Capitalization is used in lemmata for the initial letter of a paragraph. I have indicated deletions by modern scholars (with {)) in quotations from Off. only, not in other ancient texts cited, i.e., I have ordinarily omitted such matter without indica­ tion; rhc reader should therefore have recourse to the current editions for textual details. MS readings are cited after Winterbottom. Sections of the particular book of Off. under discussion are referred to simply with $ preceding the paragraph number, with book number preceding for the other books. In lemmata (and quotations) I have used "—" for an ellipsis to indicate that the intervening words were also included but". .." when the reference was only to the cited words and not the omitted matter. When there is a paragraph break within a section (or other break in sense which I expressly indicate), for greater precision, I have often referred to section numbers with "a" or "b" attached to indicate matter before or after the break. 57

58

A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis III. The second virtue, unnamed by Cicero (cf. ad $§ 20-60), consist­ ing of: A. lustitia[%% 20-41) B. Beneficentia et liberalitas ($S 42-60) IV. Magnitudo animi {%% 61-92) V. Decorum {$$ 93-151).

See under the individual sections for their organization; for the theory that Cicero added §§ 31-41 from Posidonius, see ad loci for problems of over­ lapping with Book 3 see introduction to that Book. On other theories of Ciceronian divergence from Panaetius in our Book cf. ad §§ 5 0 - 5 8 , 9 2 , 9 3 151. The length of treatment of the several virtues has given rise to specula­ tion about the apportionment of matter among Panaetius' three books περί τοΰ καθήκοντος, covered in only Off. 1-2; cf. Gartner, 1974. Such attempts are based on the assumption that Cicero's proportions reflect fairly accu­ rately those of his Panaetian model, an assumption which is by no means safe; and the one piece of external evidence we have on this point evidently contradicts the hypothesis that has been proposed; cf. introduction, $ 5 (5). Gomoll, 33, called attention to the argument about the κατόρθωμα at­ tested for Chrysippus* essay περί δικαιοσύνης: πάν κατόρθωμα και εύνόμημα και δικαιοπράγημά έστι* το δε ye κατ' εγκράτειαν ή καρτερίαν ή φρόνησιν ή άνδρείαν πραττόμ€νον κατόρθωμα έστιν ώστ€ και δικαιοπράγημά (SVF 3, 73.14 ff. = Plut. St. Repug. 1041a). On this basis he suggested that the disposition of treatises of the Older Stoa π*pi κατορθωμάτων may have served as the model for Panaetius' dividing up of the καθήκον among the four cardinal virtues. However, we are, as Gomoll himself admitted, ignorant of the Older Stoa's division of treatises π*ρ! του καθήκοντος. In addition, the διαίρεσις of Chrysippus' treatise περί κατορθωμάτων (the only one attested; cf. introduction, $ 2) remains obscure, even in light of the cited passage; for although a κατόρθωμα is said to be an act performed in accord with several of the traditional cardinal virtues (φρόνησις, ανδρεία, and, by inference, δικαιοσύνη), it is unclear why εγκράτεια substitutes for σωφροσύνη, to which it is elsewhere subordinated {SVF 3, 64.23), and why καρτ€ρία, elsewhere subordinate to ανδρεία (ibid.), appears on the same level as ανδρεία etc. If this was the diuisio of Chrysippus' treatise περί κατορθωμάτων one wonders how he justified it; or was it perhaps rather merely an ad hoc formulation in the περί δικαιοσύνης? This passage, then, merely proves a general connection of the κατορθώματα with virtuous actions. What little is known of Chrysippus' treatise πεpi τού καθήκοντος suggests a different approach from Panaetius, for he dealt with such matters as the

Commentary on Book 1, Introduction

59

burial of parents (SVF 3, 186.42 ff.), the random acceptance of indifferents (Plut. St. Repug. 1045e-f partially reproduced at SVF 3, 41.34 ff.), and the willingness of the sage to play at dice if he is in prospect of gaining a talent {SVF 3 , 1 7 3 . 8 - 9 , quoted ad% 21); one thinks of the treatise π€pi καθήκοντος of M. Brutus, in which dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus (Sen. Ep. 95.45). When Cicero says of the appropriate actions inculcated by praecepta, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet. . . , this characterization may apply more aptly to praecepta of the Older Stoa; Panaetius, in deriving appropriate actions from natural drives, ties them much more closely to the Stoic τέ\ος formula, "life according to nature." The most one can say is that the connection established with the virtues would be compatible with Panaetius* approach being based on the argumentative structure of a treatise Tf€pt κατορθωμάτων. Besides presenting Panaetius' doctrine of the virtues, Book 1 inaugurates Cicero's practice of supplementing the Greek examples of his source with exempla Romana (cf. ad 2.16), which provide inter alia commentary on currently significant political topics. The recent civil war, Caesar's policies and murder were still reverberating in the political debate, as the Second Philippic, contemporary with Off., shows; hence the transference of prop­ erty to new owners by Caesar (and Sulla) in the aftermath of civil war (§ 43), the suicide of Cato (§ 112), and in general Caesar's temeritas in the pursuit and use of power (§26) receive mention. Cicero's approval of the assassina­ tion, which becomes explicit in Book 2 (§§ 23-24; cf. 3.19), is adumbrated in the approval of P. Scipio Nasica's slaying of Ti. Gracchus (§§ 76 and 109; cf. 2.43). In Off. Cicero also takes the opportunity to settle scores with other members of the so-called triumvirate, which effectively excluded him from a political role through most of the 50s; hence the portrayal in an unflattering light of M. Crassus (§ 25 and 3.73). 2 One of the charges Cicero had to answer in the Second Philippic was that he was responsible for Rome's misfortunes over the past twenty years; Antony had also subjected to ridicule the verse he had written describing his consulate cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudt; hence the spirited defense of that verse, not only at Phil. 2.20 but also % 77 (see ad loc). Finally, in a passage that he evidently added suo Marte to the discussion of decorum Cicero was able both to pay a compliment to the first consul of the family of the Octavii (at a time when Antony had been casting aspersions on Octavian's mother [cf. Phil. 3.15-17 and ad §§ 138—40)) and at the same time repeat in generalized form a lamentation over the wrongful occupancy of other people's houses, a charge 2. Cf. also the denunciation of Pompey at 3.82.

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rehearsed at length a propos Antony's occupation of the estates of Pompey and M. Terentius Varro in the latter part of the Second Philippic (cf. ad S5 138-40). 1-6 The proem of Off. falls into two parts: a) personal and literary, including justification of the topic with reference to the addressee's circumstances (§§ l-4a—contempsit alterum)\ b) a justification of the topic by virtue of its scope and importance within philosophical doctrine generally (4b-6: sed cum statuissem—). Cicero thus moves from matters regarding his son and his own place in literature (the personal and literary part of the proem culminates in a differentiation between his own contributions as both orator and philosophical writer and those of Greek predecessors) to more general concerns. l - 4 a —suo studio delectatus contempsit alteram.] In spite of the relatively "official" form of address, Marce fili (see below), the proem is more intimate than that to Cicero's other extant rhetorical or philosophical essays. Only the first sentence of de Oratore with its Quinte frater is comparable. Cicero presents in our proem an elaborate apologia for the choice of topic and addressee. Though it might seem at first redundant to be addressing a philo­ sophical essay to his son studying philosophy in Athens with Cratippus, Cicero contrives to make his enterprise seem worthwhile without impugning either his son's teacher or his philosophical school (the Peripatos). He does so by stressing the desirability of pursuing Greek and Latin studies in tandem as well as the prospective stylistic benefits young Marcus would enjoy from study of his father's prose. This latter point leads Cicero to lay more stress than in his strictly rhetorical essays on the importance of mastering philo­ sophical as well as oratorical discourse and to digress on authors who, like himself, have, or could have, excelled in both genres. The proem to Orator likewise shows concern about topic and addressee, but in a different sense: there he is writing on a topic requested by the addressee (Brutus) but to which Cicero professes himself unequal. Here the choice of topic is his own; it is the choice of addressee that requires justification. 1 . . . Marce fili . . .] This is the first of thirty-two passages in which young Marcus is addressed, though not always by name (cf. Gelzer, 357). This more solemn form of address is encountered at the beginning of each book of the essay, though later in this same preface (1.3) Cicero goes over, as in the two later books (2.8, 3.5), to the more familiar mi Cicero (cf. also 2.44, 3.33; Josef Svennung, Anredeformen. Vergleichende Forschungen zur indirekten Anrede in der dritten Person und zum Nominativ fur den Vokativ, Acta Societatis Litterarum Humaniorum Regiae Upsaliensis, 42 [Lund, 1958], 413 ff.; Adams, 1978,148); both forms appear in the concluding paragraph

Commentary on Book 1, Section 1

61

(3.121). We find also the simple second person address without a name (1.151, 2.87, 3. 11, and 81). The more solemn form has the force of em­ phatically calling attention (1.15: formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tarnquam faciem honesti vides . . .); it is particularly apt when Cicero speaks officially as father to son, reminding young Marcus of his legacy: licet enim mihi, Marce fili, apud te gloriari, ad quern et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet (1.78). . . . te . . . annum iam audicntem Cratippum . . .] The younger Cicero had departed for Athens by 21 May 45 {Att. 12.52.1 and 53; Att. 13.1.1). We first hear of work on de Officiis ca. 28 October 44 (Att. 15.13.6 = 15.13a.2 S.B.); and by 5 November the first two books are already complete {Att. 16.11.4). Taken by itself, our passage would point to late spring or early summer of 44 as the terminus post quern for the beginning of composition (but see further introduction, § 3). On young Marcus' career as a student see the introduction, § 4.—Cratippus' contacts with Cicero went back at least to summer, 5 1 , when he travelled from Mytilene to Ephesus to greet Cicero, who was then en route to take up proconsular duties in Ciiicia; Cicero made the meeting of the two of them together with P. Nigidius Figulus, who was returning from a legatio in an eastern province, the occasion for a dialogue on physics of which only a part of the introduction and a partial translation of Plato's Timaeus survives; here Cicero calls Cratippus Peripateticorum omnium, quos quidem ego audierim, meo iudicio facile princeps [Tim. 2). He was also in touch with other leading Romans of the day. After Pharsalia Pompey visited Cratippus at Mytilene and received consolation from him; and at Brutus 250 (dated 46) Brutus reports that M. Marccllus recently received tuition from Cratippus in that city. Thus Cratippus changed his residence from Mytilene to Athens some time between 46 and the beginning of young Marcus' studies in late spring or summer of 45 (cf. H. v. Arnim, RE 11.2 [1922], 1659, 2 ff.). He received citizenship from Caesar as a result of Cicero's intervention (Plut. Cic. 24.7) and was henceforth known as M. Tullius Cratippus. Cicero jr. valued Cratippus for his kindness and spent time with him outside the classroom as well as in (Fam. 16.21.3). Of Cratippus' philosophical views we know only that he defended prophetic dreams and prophetic utterances by madmen, though he rejected all other methods of divination (cf. Cic. Dm 1.5 and 70-71 (71 preserves our one verbatim quotation|). He had a homonymous son, priest of Rome and of Salus (= Τγί€ΐα), and a daughter Tullia, who married T. Aufidius Spinter, military tribune of the legio IV Macedonica in Spain {CIL 3.399). Both branches of the family are attested at the upper levels of Pergamene sociery into the second century; cf. E. Boehringcr, ed., Altertumer von Pergamon, 8.3: Die

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

Inschriften des Asklepieions, ed. Chr. Habicht (Berlin, 1969), 164-65, with literature. . . . propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scienria augere potest, altera exemplis . . . ] Cicero memorably conjures up the philosophical genius loci of Athens at Fin. 5.2 ff.: naturane nobis hoc, inquit |sc. PisoJ, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamusf velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mibi Platonis in mentent, quern accepimus primum hie disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hie Speusippus, hie Xenocrates, hie eius auditor Polemo, cuius ilia ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. There still more vividly than in our passage Cicero uses the intellectual heroes of the past as a protreptic goad; cf. H. Dorrie, "Summa virorum vestigia. Das Erlebnis der Vergangenheit bei Cicero leg. 2,4 und fin. 5,1 - 8 , " GB 7 (1978), 207-20. For invocation of the auctoritas loci at the beginning of a speech cf. Man. 1 (with reference to the rostra). . . . semper cum Graecis Latina c o n i u n x i . . . ] Together with C. Gracchus (cf. orat.i p. 188), Cicero was one of the first Roman statesmen openly to espouse Greek learning and set it on an equal footing with Latin. This re­ mains an ideal for the Roman nobility, as seen, for instance, in the separate Greek and Latin libraries in Trimalchio's establishment, which reflects the pretensions of the nouveaux riches of the Neronian age [Sat. 48.4: . . . // bybliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam), or Hadrian's villa at Tivoli. Though satisfied that the place and the instructor will provide a sufficient educational experience for his son, Cicero argues the utility of pursuing Greek and Latin studies in tandem; this policy provides the pretext for composing a philosophical work for young Marcus even though he is already receiving philosophical instruction. . . . neque id in philosophia solum sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci. . .J Cf. Brut. 310: commentabar declamitans—sic enim nunc loquuntur—saepe cum M. Pisone et cum Q. Pompeio aut cum aliquo cotidie, idque faciebam multum etiam Latine sed Graece saepius, vel quod Graeca oratio plura orrtamenta suppeditans consuetudinem similiter Latine dicendi adferebat, vel quod a Graecis summis doctoribus, nisi Graece dicerem, neque corrigi possem neque doceri. . . . idem tibi censeo faciendum . . .] He did, in fact, according to Fam. 16.21.5 (Marcus, jr., to Tiro, perhaps August, 44): praeterea declamitare Graece apud Cassium institui, Latine autem apud Bruttium exerceri volo.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 1-2

63

. . . ut par sis in utriusque orationis facilitate.] I.e., Greek and Latin; for oratio in this sense cf. $ 2: . . . orationent autent Latinant efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem; for the expression cf. M. Dubuisson, "Utraque lingua," AC 50 (1981), 2 7 4 - 8 6 . quam quidem ad rem . . .] Probably a reference to the pursuit of philosophy in general, rather than the merging of Greek and Latin studies; cf. the next note for parallels. . . . magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris . . .] Cicero con­ ceived his philosophica as filling a gap in Latin literature; he describes his role in more detail at Tusc. 1.5: philosophia iacuit usque ad banc aetatem nee ullunt babuit lumen litterarum ijitinarum-, quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi; cf. also Fin. 1.10: . . . debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives met, nee cum istis tantopere pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant ilia ipsa, ne simulent, et its servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. In the proem to Book 3, on the other hand, this educational task no longer appears; Cicero rather sees the use of his leisure to write on philosophy as a sign that he is weaker than the elder Africanus (3.4: nos autem, qui non tantum robons babemus ut cogitatione tacita a solitudine abstrahamur, ad banc scribendi operam omne studium curamque convertimus; cf. ad loc). . . . ut non modo Graecarum litterarum nides sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad discendum et ad iudicandum.] Dicendum is a weakly attested variant for discendum here (Monac. 13095, s. XII). A suffi­ cient defense for discendum is provided by N.D. 1.8 (eoque me minus instituti met paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim), which makes it plain that he would have written scribendum if he had meant the stylistic benefits to be gained from his writing on philosophy; the variant surely arose under the influence of the foregoing dicendi.—In Fin., written in March through June, 45 (cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 119391, 1135.11 ff.), Cicero had thought it necessary to defend his philosophical writing against learned critics who thought it better to read the Greek originals (Fin. 1.4 ff.); the reception of his philosophical books in the interim has evidently changed the position (cf. also ad 2.2). 2 . . . tu quidem . . .\ Correlative with sed tamen, not autem. . . . a principe huius aetatis philosophorum . . .] Cicero attested his high regard for Cratippus by using his influence with Caesar to obtain Roman citizenship for him and at the same time causing the Areopagus to ask him to continue teaching at Athens (Plut. Cic. 24.7). Cf. also Div. 1.5: . . . Cratip-

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis

pusque, familiaris noster, quern ego parent summis Peripateticis iudico . . . , as well as Tim. 1, cited ad § 1. Such expressions should not, however, be taken to imply that Cratippus, rather than Andronicus, was head of the Peripatos at this time; cf. H.B. Gottschalk, "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World," ANRW 2.36.2 (1987), 1096-97. . . . disces quam diu voles (tarn diu autem velle debebis quoad te quantum proficias non paenitebit);. . .] This offer of support for his son's studies also mentions lack of progress as a possible motive for breaking them off; he thus discreetly alludes to what was, in fact, the younger Cicero's problem (cf. introduction, § 4; the parental admonition is more pointed at 3.6). As re­ cently as May, 44, he was planning a trip to Asia Minor, albeit in the com­ pany of Cratippus, so that his father would not suppose he was on holiday (Fam. 12.16.2). In the event, he did not continue his studies much beyond the completion of de Officiis. After Caesar's assassination, Brutus went in exile to Athens, where he visited Cratippus and listened to his lectures; at this time he made contact with young Cicero, won his sympathy, and recruited him, probably before the end of 44, as a cavalry officer for his army; cf. Plut. Brut. 2 4 . 2 - 3 ; Cic. 45.3; App. BC 4.220; R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 (1948), 1285.19 ff. . . . nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus e s s e , . . . ] One of the bonds between Cicero and Cratippus was the fact that the latter was originally a pupil of the Academic Aristus, brother and successor of Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero's own teacher (Cic. Brut. 315). In our passage Cicero reproduces Antiochus' view that the Stoa and Peripatos merely present refinements in the position of the Academy, not a new doctrine of their own [Acad. 1.43, quoted ad 3.7; cf. also ad § 6). . . . de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio),. . .] Cf. ad 3.33. . . . orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem.] With reference to our passage Forcellini s.v. plenus II.2.a) explains plena oratio as "copiosa, rebus et ornamentis instructa et referta n (less satisfactory the treatment at OLD s.v., 14, where plenus of orators and of style should not have been lumped together under the definition "covering the whole range" suitable rather to the former). Cf. esp. Ernesti, 289: "Plena oratio, metaphora ducta ab iis rebus vel corporibus, quae vel succo et came, vel alius massae ambitu abundant, dicitur ea, in qua est quaedam ex ubertatc re rum vel copia et ornatu elocutionis grata rotunditas, opponiturque dictioni tenui, exili, iciunae, aridac" etc.—Cicero here makes the very quality for which he had recently undergone attack from the Atticists a point of pride and a thing to be imitated (cf. Quint. Inst. 12.10.12: quern . . . isc. M. Tullium] et suorum homines temporum incessere audebant ut tumidiorem et Asianum et

Commentary on Book 1, Section 2-3

65

redundantem et in repetitionibus nhnium et in salibus aliquando frigidum et in compositione fractum, exultantem, ac paene . . . viro molliorem). "Full­ ness" is unexpected in philosophical writing, especially on Stoic subjects, and the ability to achieve it the mark of a great stylist; cf. Antonius' eulogy of Crassus at de Orat. 3.51: . . . de horridis rebus η itι da, de ieiunis plena, de pervulgatis nova quaedam est oratio tua, as well as the charaaerization of Stoic writing by Crassus, ibid., 3.66: . . . orationis etiam genus habent [sc. Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum, sed ut in oratore exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum . . . . . . quod est oratoris proprium apte distincte ornate dicere,.. .] Cf. de Orat. 1.144: audieratn etiam quae de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur: in qua praecipitur primum, ut pure et Latine loquamur, deinde ut plane et dilucide, turn ut ornate, post ad return dignitatem apte et quasi decore . . .—Wilkins on de Orat. 3.53 distinguishes distincte from plane in that the former denotes u the clearness which comes from skilful arrangement." . . . quoniam in eo studio actatem consumpsi, si id mini adsumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.] Cicero defends himself against possible charges of arrogantia by setting himself up as a stylistic model for his son, not a model philosopher; he can point to a life devoted to oratory, though he was, as he knew, subject to the charge that he had turned suddenly and late in life to philosophical writing (cf. N.D. 1.6-7). Though Plutarch {Comp. Cic. et Dem. 2) and others have found Cicero's self-glorification offensive, his actual claim in our passage is moderate enough (cf., however, ad §$ 77-78).— Cicero's philosophical writings would surely, on stylistic grounds, have com­ pared favorably with those of his Greek predecessors; Chrysippus, for in­ stance, who is said to have composed 500 lines per day (Diodes apud D.L. 7.181), is rated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as the worst stylist among famous authors (Comp., p. 21.10-15 Us.-Rad.; cf. also de Orat. 1.50). Cicero is critical of carelessly written Latin philosophical books at Tusc. 1.6; on his tendency to judge philosophical writing according to stylistic criteria cf. Smith. 3 . . . hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt. . .] This claim is likely to be exaggerated, but perhaps not by as much as one might think at first glance. According to the latest study, in addition to the 58 preserved speeches, Cicero published 17 speeches extant only in fragments and possibly five other fragmentary speeches; hence the possible total of published speeches would stand at a maximum of 80, a minimum of 75: cf. Crawford, 12. The philosophica (including the rhetorica; cf. Div. 2.4) num­ bered at least 56 books; the following figures are, in default of other indica­ tion, according to Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1104.1 ff. (I ignore the

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planned but never completed σύλλογος πολιτικός and Ήρακλείδαοι/,3 as well as the volume of proems never intended for publication): Oeconomicus (3), 4 Inv. (2), de Orat. (3), Rep. (6), Leg. (at least 5), 5 Part. (1), Brut. (1), Or. (1), Cons. (1), Hort. (1), Ac. (4), 6 συμβουλβυτικόν for Caesar (1), Fin. (5), Tusc. (5), Prof. (1), Tim. (1), N.D. (3), Div. (2), Far. (l),5e«. (1), Amic. (1), G/or. (2), Top. (l) f O/jf. (3)7 vis. . . dicendi] = δίΐνότη?; cf. Antonius' remarks at de Orat. 2.72-73; on vis as a special characteristic of Demosthenes, ibid., 3.28; cf. in general Ernesti s.v. vis. That the speeches display a greater vis dicendi than the philosophical essays comes as no surprise, since they, unlike philosophical discourse (sec next note), can rise to the High Style, in quo profecto vis maxima est (Orat. 97). . . . sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus.] Here, as at Orat. 95, Cicero places philosophical discourse in the genus temperatum of the Middle Style; the Stoics, whom Crassus assigns to the genus subtile at de Orat. 3.65-66 (quoted in part ad $ 2 above), are a special case. M. Winterbottom, "Cicero and the Middle Style," Studies in Latin Literature and Its Tradition in Honour of CO. Brink, PCPhS, Suppl. 15 (Cambridge, 1989), 125 ff., has shown that Cicero presents a fully developed doctrine of the Middle Style, very likely to be his own innovation, only at Orat. 91-96; the forensic use that he found for the Middle Style (Orat. 96: hoc totum e sophistarum fontibus deftuxit in forum . . .) would account for Cicero's injunction in our passage that it must be cultivated, et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum dispu3. On this cf. Hafner, 54 ff.; Long, 1995', 222-23. 4. Macr. Sat. 3.20.4 (. . . Cicero Oeconomicon libra tenia . . . ) ; cf. D.A. Russell, An· tonine Literature (Oxford, 1990), 8 and n. 14. 5. Cf. Macr. Sat. 6.4.8. 6. Second edition. 7. Whether a separate book de Virtutibus should be added is very dubious; St. Jerome asserts that in addition to Off. Cicero wrote a separate book on the subject (in Zacb. 1.2 = PL 25.1429 = test. I Atzert); but Aug. trin. 14.11.14 (= PL 42.1047 ■ test. 2 Atzert) refers not to a treatise on the virtues but a treatment of the virtues and should be referred to Inv. 2.160; and the fragments from the fifteenth century essay La Satade by Antoinc de La Sale cannot be convin­ cingly assigned to Cicero; cf. G. Garbarino, / presunti frammenti del 'De virtutibus'di Cicerone nelle opere di Antoine de la Sale, Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze morali, storichc e filologichc, ser. S.S (Turin, 1981). Evidently a commentarius de Virtutibus circulated under Cicero's name in late antiquity from which Charisius (p. 270 Barwick) derived the fragment illud neutiquam probantes; but if he wrote such a treatise, it is surprising that Cicero does not refer to it in Off.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 3-4a

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tandi genus: . . . ] Cicero assumes the desirability of combining philosophy and rhetoric, a lifelong concern of his; cf. Long, 1995 2 , 50, with passages cited ibid., 39, n. 6, to which add de Orat. 3.142-43 (partly cited ad § 156). . . . Demetrius Phalereus . . . disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.J Demetrius had come to Cicero's mind as a representative of the Middle Style at Orat. 92; his characterization in our passage, as elsewhere, 8 is as a master of that Style, which has as its goal delectare (Orat. 91 and 94). Our passage suggests that Cicero saw a certain affinity with Demetrius as one who also essayed both philosophy and oratory (the two were similar also, in Cicero's view, as vic­ tims of unjust exile; cf. fin. 5.53 = fr. 62 Wehrli);cf. Heldmann, 111 and 114; for another point of similarity between the two (moderation in expenditures to please the public) cf. ad 2.60. Was Cicero also aware that Demetrius was ούκβύγεί'ής (D.L. 5.75 = fr. 2 Wehrli), and, if so, did he find here a parallel to his own novitas? In any case, Cicero makes clear the chasm separating him­ self from Demetrius the orator {orator parum vehemens).—No verbatim quotations survive among the remains of Demetrius' speeches (frr. 174-86), but the two Latin paraphrases (frr. 185-86) tend to confirm some of Cicero's observations through their concinnitas and the piling up of parallel or anti­ thetical Gorgianic clauses (cf. Wehrli ad loc).—Theophrastus is similarly characterized to Demetrius at Brut. 121: quis Aristotele nervosior. Theophrasto dulciorf Cf. also Orat. 62: quanquam enim et philosophi quidam ornate locuti sunt—si quidem et Theophrastus divinitate loquendi nomen invenit . . . ; see also ad 4a (et Platonem existimo—). nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium . . . ] Cf. Quintilian's famous judgment of Cicero the orator (10.1.112): qua re non inmerito ab hominibus aetatis suae regnare in iudiciis dictus est, apud posteros vero id consecutus ut Cicero iam non hominis nomen sed eloquentiae habeatur. hunc igitur spectemus, hoc propositum nobis sit exemplum, Me se profecisse sciat cut Cicero valde placebit. 4a . . . et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere . . . ] Cf. Orat. 62, where Cicero praises Plato as et gravitate {et suavitate) princeps but then adds (of Plato, Theophrastus, Aristotle, and Xenophon): tamen horum oratio neque nervos neque aculeos oratorios ac forensis habet. . . . et Demosthcnem, si ilia quae a Platone didicerat tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse . . .] In his comparison of the 8. Cf. Brut. 38: suavis, sicut fuit, videri maluit quam gravis; Orat. 94, where Cicero calls Demetrius' rhetorical figures dulcissima; de Orat. 2.95: omnium istorum . . . politissimus.

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two orators (§S 1-2), Plutarch notes that Demosthenes, unlike Cicero, con­ fined himself to oratory alone, whereas Cicero also left philosophical works. The story of Demosthenes' study with Plato was evidently common coin in the rhetorical schools of Cicero's day; letters of Demosthenes were even adduced in support of it; cf. de Orat. 1.89:. . . sive Me [sc. Demosthenes] hoc ingenio potuisset sive, id quod constaret, Platonis studiosus audiendi fuisset . . . ; Brut. 121 (a passage that takes an opposite view from ours toward the possibility of Plato and Demosthenes exchanging genres): lectitavisse Platonem studiose, audivisse etiam Demosthenes dicitur—idque apparet ex genere et granditate verborum; dicit etiam in quadam epistula hoc ipse de sese—, sed et huius oratio in philosophiam translata pugnacior, ut ita dicam, videtur et illorum [sc. Platonis, Aristotelis, Theophrasti] in iudicia pacatior; Orat. 15: quod idem de Demosthene existimari potest, cuius ex epistulis intellegi licet quam frequens fuerit Platonis auditor . . . ; [Plut.j Wit. X Orat. 844b: Δημοσθένη? . . . ίηλών θουκυδίδην και Πλάτωνα τον φιλό­ σοφοι, ω n v e s €ΐποι> προηγουμένως αυτόν σχολάσαι; Drcrup, 68. uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alteram.] Compendious for contempsit alterius studium.—In fact, of course, as Cicero well knew, Aristotle did offer rhetorical teaching; cf. Top. 1; F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," CPh 33 (1938), 396 ff. = Kleine Schriften, 2 (Hildesheim, 1968), 222 ff.; where he differed was evidently with Isocrates' method. Idem, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Neue philologische Untersuchungen 4 (Berlin, 1929), 2 0 4 - 5 and 215 ff., has argued that Aristotle criticized Isocrates' approach in the Gryllus and at Rhet. 1354a 1 Iff. Certainly Cicero in our passage, as else­ where, reflects stories current in the rhetorical schools of a personal rivalry between the two; cf. de Orat. 2.160: [Aristoteles] . . . haec quoque aspexit quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant; ibid., 3.141: itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocraten nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae versumque quendam de Philocteta paulo secus dixit, ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hie autem, cum Isocraten pateretur dicere (cf. Eur. fr. 796 Nauck*); Orat. 62; Tusc. 1.7. 4b Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui quod et aetati tuac esset aptissimum et auctoritati meae.] The choice of subject is dictated by what is appropriate to both the writer and the recipient; το πρέπον is the implicit criterion; cf. Att. 15.13a.2: . . . τα TTfpl του καθ(ήκ)οντο5 magnifice explicamus προσφωνούμε vque Ciceroni, qua de re enim potius pater filiof The intention of composing other

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 4a-4b and 5-6

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works for his son (expressed also in the letter after the words just cited: deinde alia) was, of course, forestalled by Cicero's own death the following year.—Here is the first instance in which the division of paragraphs in some recent editions (Fedeli, Atzert) obscures the train of thought. The editor should, like Holden, Testard, and Wintcrbottom, begin a new paragraph with sed cum statuissem . . . , since Cicero now proceeds from a justification of his undertaking in writing to young Marcus on philosophical matters in general to an explanation of the choice of the specific subject of appropriate action. nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt, nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forcnsibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid neque si cum altera contrahas, vacare officio potest. . .] It is taken for granted that the subject must be grave et utile, i.e., trivial subjects or ones of merely theoretical interest are excluded a limine. The broad scope of the concept of officium and its applicability in both the private and public sphere (cf. Att. 16.14.3) evidently attracted Cicero to the subject (and to the term officium as a translation of the Stoic καθήκον); cf. 3.5 and introduction, 5 2. Cicero's examples, especially in Books 2 - 3 , illustrate the full range of the term (cf., for instance, for res contractae 3.49b-67). . . . in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitudo.J Honestas or, more commonly, honestum is Cicero's rendering of the term καλόν evidently (in view of the magnetism he attributes to it; cf. %% 15 and 55) used by Panaetius. Sacrificing the implication of an inherent aes­ thetic attractiveness, the Latin term, with its connection with honos, derives instead from the sphere of public standing (for a similar transference of terminology from the aesthetic to the social sphere in the process of translat­ ing from Greek to Latin cf. ad %% 93-99). Both the καλόν and the honestum, however, have as their opposite a term that can mean either "ugly" or "disgraceful" (αίσχρόν, turpe). As the opposite of honestas, turpitudo be­ comes an important criterion for choosing actions: cf. ad 3.35-37, as well as ad 1.90 and 1.159. 5 - 6 Cicero continues to steer his discussion from the more general to the more specific aspects of the subject. He has mentioned appropriate actions as one of the problems dealt with by philosophers. But which philosophers? He claims that appropriate action is a question dealt with by all philosophers in common. Indeed, he wants to make teaching about appropriate actions a criterion for inclusion in the ranks of philosophers. However, certain philo­ sophical sects, by uncoupling ευδαιμονία from virtue, undermine appropri-

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ate action. He refers the reader to another passage (sc. Book 2 of ft».), where he has dealt with such views. Indeed our passage reads like a reminiscence, with less doxographical detail, of Fin. 2.35: ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. Cicero is prepared to recognize the credentials only of the Stoa, the Academy, and the Pcripatos to teach about appropriate actions, since they all recognize, if not the all-sufficiency, at least the importance of virtue for the attainment of euoaipouia. With a frankness later admired by Pliny (Nat. praef. 22), Cicero then declares his plan to follow Stoic sources (i.e., Panaetius), albeit without suspending his own judgment. This passage puts the reader on notice that in Cicero's mind there is an indissoluble link between officium and moral goodness such that the former cannot subsist without the latter. 5 quis est enim qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere?] The phrase nullis officii praeceptis tradendis should be taken as ablative of attendant circumstances (cf. Heine ad he.; Kiihner-Stegmann, 2, 752); the absolute construction of the gerundive occurs only in Late Latin (when the gerundive itself has taken on a future meaning) as a substitute for the future passive participle; cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 139 Zus. a). sed sunt nonnullae disciplinae quae propositis bonorum et malomm finibus officium omne pervertant.] Cf. Fin. 5.22: quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nee officio nee virtutes in ea ratione nee amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id efficit turpe. Cicero discusses such views of the summum bonum in greater detail at 3.116-19.—The earliest instance of disciplina used for a philosophical school appears to be Ter. Eun. 263-64 (Gnatho loquitur): . . . tamquam philosophorum habent disciplinae ex ipsis / vocabula, parasiti ita ut Gnathonici vocentur; OLD s.v. disciplina 2b. nam qui summum bonum sic instituit ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur,.. .J Cf. the similar characterization of the Epicureans at 3.18 {qui. . . omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis . . .), as well as the still more vivid . . . omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertineant ventre metiri... at N.D. 1.113. . . . hie, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit nee iustitiam nee liberalitatem;...] Cf. Fin. 2.85: vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate mettare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede

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superari; ibid., 3.70 = SVF 3, 85.19 (sim. Fin. 2.78-79): etenim nee iustitia nee amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur; Leg. 1.49: ut enim quisque maxume ad suum commodum refert quaecumque agit, ita minime est vir bonus, ut qui virtutem praemio metiuntur, nuliam virtutem nisi malitiam putent. ubi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facitf . . . ubi ilia sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus per se amatur toto pectore ut dicitur? For the type of argument cf. also N.D. 1.3: sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nuliam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas quae sanctitas quae relight Cf. ad § 56, where amicitia is not used of relationships born of opportunity.—The reference to the bonitas naturae forestalls the doctrine that humans have a natural tendency to form societies and cultivate the social virtues, including justice and liberality (cf. ad $§ 12 and 20 ff.). fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.] For fortitudo cf. Fin. 2.56; ibid., 3.29: negarine ullo modo possit (numquam) quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quern fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem? Cicero dilates on the point at 3.117.—For participles governing a case cf. ad 3.1. . . . sunt a nobis alio loco disputata.] $c. Fin. 2. 6 . . . neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis qui solam aut ab iis qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum Academicorum Peripateticorum . . .1 A reference respectively to the Stoics {solam: cf. SVF 1, 84.31 lAristo]; 3, 11.38, 12.32, 13.12) and the Peripatetics, whose cases Cicero had stated respectively in Books 3 and 5 of Fin.; cf. ad 3.11. Cicero follows Antiochus' tendency (in the wake of Carneades) to reduce the differences among Academy, Peripatos, and Stoa on €ύδαιμοιήα: cf. ad $ 2; Carneades frr. 135, 137, and esp. 146 W. (this last = Fin. 5.16-23); cf. (a propos the views of Zeno and Antiochus on the summum bonum) Luc. 134: distrahor, turn hoc mihi probabilius turn illud videtur, et tamen nisi alterutrum sit virtutem iacere plane puto; also Gorier, 1974,198 ff.; Glucker, 1988, 64, n. 81. . . . quoniam Aristonis Pyrrhonis Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset.] These three philosophers are often combined by Cicero, or rather his doxographic source(s), as here; cf. loppolo, 1980, 176, n. 13. The phrase iam pridem explosa sententia est will refer to Chrysippus' polemic; ibid., 172, n. 1. Aristo of Chius (fl. ca. 250)

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was a student of Zeno and friend of Cleanthes; cf. remains at SVF 1, nos. 3 3 3 - 4 0 3 (our passage = 363); for new material since SVF cf. loppolo, though the separation of the Chian from his slightly younger homonym from Ceus requires further study (cf. J.G.F. Powell's review of loppolo, CR 32 [1982J, 102). The views of Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 365/60-275/70), spread by his student Timon of Phlius, became the inspiration for the Skeptical school. Our passage, together with de Orat. 3.62, raises the question why Cicero fails to take note of the revival of Pyrrhonianism by Aenesidemus of Cnossus, if the latter was indeed the orator's contemporary and a friend of his friend L. Aelius Tubero. F. Decleva Caizzi, "Aenesidemus and the Academy,n CQ 42 (1992), 176-89, esp. 188-89, while upholding the traditional identification of the dedicatee of the eight books of Πυρρωΐ'ίωι> λόγοι with Cicero's familiaris L. Aelius Tubero (Phot. Bib. 169b31 ff. and Cic. Lig. 21), argues that Aenesidemus met Tubero at Aegae in Asia Minor (cf. Phot. Bib. 170a39-41) during the latter's term as legate of the proconsul Q. Cicero (61-58; Q. fr. 1.1.10; Plane. 100) and that the book then dedicated to Tubero was the starting point for the development of a philosophical sect not yet in ex­ istence; cf. also Glucker, 1978, 116-17, n. 64. On Pyrrho cf. in general K. von Fritz, RE 24 (1963), 89.18 ff.; on Aenesidemus, the sketch by David Sedley at Schofield-Burnyeat-Barnes, 16-17. For the scanty remains of the third-century Stoic Herillus of Carthage cf. SVF 1, nos. 409-21; loppolo, 1985, argues that Herillus emphasized the ties of the Porch to Socrates and the Cynics and opposed the introduction of Aristotelian elements; cf. in general von Arnim, RE 8.1 (1912), 683.20 ff. Cicero had stated his position more fully at Fin. 5.23: iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in bunc orbem, quern circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de ftmbus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus Us, in quibus nihil aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nee inter eas res quicquam omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. In both passages Cicero argues that these three philosophers eliminate any basis for choice (negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur; si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent) and thus should be eliminated from discussion about the summum bonum or appropriate action. C. Levy, ttUn probleme doxographique chez Ciccron: les indifferentistes,,, REL 58 (1980), 247, by ne­ glecting full context of the two passages, creates a dichotomy between the

Commentary on Book 1, Section 6

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Chrysippcan stance of Off and the Carneadea divisio of Fin.; in fact, the Carneadea divisio is likely to underlie both (I take it that in 1.6 as in 3.116 ff. Cicero is following an Academic doxography). Cicero summarized Aristo's τέ\ος formula as αδιαφορία [Luc. 130 = SVF 1, 83.34), i.e., for him the summum bonum consisted in being indifferent to the things that are neither good nor evil; cf. Ioppolo, 1980,162 ff. Herillus, who made knowledge the summum bonum (cf. D.L. 7.165 = SVF 1, 9 1 . 2 4 25), held a similar doctrine about the terms intermediate between good and evil: τα 6e μεταξύ άρ€τής και κακία? αδιάφορα elvai (D.L. 7.165 = SVF 1, 91.32). Hence, as Cicero sees it, Herillus eliminates any basis for discussing actions (sim. Fin. 2.43 and 4.36). At Fin. 3.31, while still rejecting their views along the same lines as in our passage, Cicero does distinguish between the positions held by Aristo and Herillus. Cicero's source in our passage is probably Chrysippus via Carneades (via Antiochus); when he introduced the doctrine of οίκ6ΐωσΐ£ Chrysippus thought Herillus* teachings were thereby superseded, a view that Cicero reproduces; cf. Ioppolo, 1985, 6 9 - 7 0 . Iop­ polo, 1980, 179, sees some justification for Cicero's lumping of Pyrrho to­ gether with Aristo in the influence of Cynicism on both men. For the Greek equivalent of the phrase officii inventio [viz., του καθήκον­ τος tupeois) cf. ad § 93. sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur hauriemus.] As an Academic, Cicero carefully hedges his allegiance to the Stoa, which he will follow on this one question; he thus leaves himself free to follow another school on another occasion. Though at this point the reader remains in doubt as to Cicero's reasons for preferring the Stoic position on officiay cf. introduction, § 7, and ad 3.20. On interpresfinterpretari as referring to a close, literal translation cf. J.G.F. Powell, "Cicero's Translations from Greek," in Powell, 278. In empha­ sizing the use of his own iudicium, Cicero is following a method, described in more detail at Fin. 1.6, that he thinks will insure his philosophical writing a raison d'etre and a readership: quid? si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta suntab its, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant its, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecisf Perhaps, as Jonathan Barnes has suggested ("Cicero's de Fato and a Greek Source" in Histoire et structure. A la memoire de Victor Goldschmidt, ed. J. Brunschwig, C. lmbert, and A. Roger (Paris, 1985], 230-32), Cicero's state­ ments about his own iudicium coming into play in his philosophica need to be taken more seriously than they often have been.

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7a Placet igitur . . . ante definire quid sit officium. quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror; omnis enim quae |a) ratione suscipitur de aliqua re insatutio debet a definitione proficisci. . .] Pohlenz, AF, 17 (cf. Gigon, 270), suggested that Panaetius had good reasons for omitting at this point a gen­ eral definition of appropriate action and developing it only in the course of the discussion (§ 101, if the definition is genuine; see ad loc). Since for Panaetius certain appropriate actions derive from each of the four άφορμαί of the human being (cf. ad 11-14 and § 15: . . . ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur), it might merely have confused matters for him to offer a definition of appropriate action before explaining the άφορμαί. Alternatively, in view of the previous Stoic literature on the subject, he may have assumed that the term was too familiar to require definition.9 In insisting on a defini­ tion of the subject at the outset of the inquiry, Cicero is, however, trying to play, as sometimes elsewhere (cf. ad 2.8, 3.18), the part of a good Academic: cf. Rep. 1.38 (Scipio is the speaker): faciam quod vultis ut potero, et ingrediar in disputationem ea lege, qua credo omnibus in rebus disserendis utendum esse si errorem velis tollere, ut eius rei de qua quaeretur si nomen quod sit conveniat, explicetur quid declaretur eo nomine; quod si convenerit, turn demum decebit ingredi in sermonem; numquam enim quale sit illud de quo disputabitur intellegi potent, nisi quod sit fuerit intellectum prius. quare quoniam de republica quaerimus, hoc primum videamus quid sit id ipsum quod quaerimus; de Orat. 1.209 ff., 2.108; Part. 41; Top. 9 and 26 {definitio est oratio, quae id quod definitur explicat quid sit). Perhaps his correspon­ dence on the subject with Atticus convinced him of the need to define the term carefully, since he will be using officium in a technical Stoic sense unfamiliar to most Roman readers; cf. introduction, § 2.—Though Pliny Nat. praef. 22 praised Cicero's candor in naming his source, it is remarkable—and perhaps a sign of the haste with which Cicero wrote Off.—that, though he elsewhere praises Panaetius highly (cf. 2.51 and 3.7; Mur. 66: eruditissimus homo; Leg. 3.14: . . . a magno homine et in primis erudito Panaetio . . . = respectively frr. 60-61), he first mentions him here as if in passing (in a subordinate clause) and with implicit criticism of a pro­ cedure less systematic than the one Cicero will follow. Even the more gen­ erous references to his relationship to Panaetius contain some reservation (Panaetius, quern multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus: 2.60;

9. Cf. also Long, 1967, 59, who notes that "from the time of Panaetius Stoics concen­ trated attention on practical ethics, and interest in their logical basis and the desire for precise definitions languished."

Commentary on Book 1» Section 7a-7b

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. . . qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita . . . secuti sumus: 3.7). 7b The reader is prepared to expect here a definition of appropriate action in view of Cicero's critique of Panaetius for not offering one (7a). Instead Cicero provides a classification into two groups of questions relating to appropriate action; this move proves to be a way of narrowing the subject of this essay, which will deal with one group, but not the other. Cicero's attempt to characterize the difference between the two classes is initially unsatisfactory; he defines the first class as that which pertinet ad finem bonorum but then has to admit that the second class, too, has bearing on the final good, though less obviously so. It is the examples of questions handled under the first category (omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliudalio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem) and the character­ ization of the second (magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur) that make it clear that he intends a distinction between what we would call theoretical and practical aspects of appropriate action. In light of 7a one assumes that this material had no counterpart in Pan­ aetius. As he began Off., the similar problems handled the previous year in Fin. were in Cicero's mind (cf. ad § 5-6). Thus 7b is evidently Cicero's own attempt to differentiate his current project from the treatment of officium at Fin. 3.58 ff. (see below). Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio. unum genus est quod pertinet ad fincm bonorum, alterum quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae con form a ri DOSSIL] "The whole of [OLD s.v. omnis la] the in­ quiry regarding appropriate action is twofold," says Cicero. He distinguishes those parts of the subject that bear upon the question of ευδαιμονία and are therefore relatively remote from everyday life, from the precepts u by which the practice of life [usus vitae] can be molded |on the text see belowl in all directions." This last point takes up the emphasis laid on the scope of the topic at § 4.—For the imagery of molding (conformari) cf. the description Persius gives of his education at the hands of Cornutus: . . . turn fallere sollers /adposita intortos extendit regula mores Ietpremitur ratione animus vincique laborat I artificemque tuo ducit sub pollice voltum (5.37 ff.). unum genus est quod pertinet ad finem bonorum . . .] As perfect appropriate actions, κατορθώματα form a subset of καθήκοντα (cf. introduction, § 1; Long-Sedley, 3 6 6 - 6 7 ) ; l 0 hence one would expect the investigation of them to form a subset of that of καθήκοντα, not for the two to be juxtaposed at the 10. By the time of Epktetus, however, this relation no longer obtained; rather the two terms appear side by side as objects of different kinds of impulse (cf. Inwood, 1985, 117}.

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same level. Though Seneca alludes to a pars praeceptiva of philosophy (Ep. 95.1), it is unclear what other partes were envisioned in his divisio, and there is no reason to associate the construct with Posidonius; cf. Kidd ad Posidon. fr. 176 against Dihle, 1973, 50. The distinction sits particularly oddly here, prefaced to an account of officium that takes its initium a natura (§§ 11 ff.) and thus implicitly connects the subject with the Stoic τέλος formula convenienter naturae vivere (3.13), even though the present project is classed with the other type of inquiry quod positum est in praeceptis . . . In fact, Cicero winds up admitting that the distinction is not hard and fast: quorum . . . officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad ftnem bonorum, tamen minus idapparet. . . Moreover, the question num quod officium aliud alio maius sit is, in fact, raised several times in the sequel (§§ 5 0 - 6 0 , 1 5 3 ff., 2.88), contrary to the expectation created by our passage. This distinction has, then, been grafted on by Cicero without close regard for the sequel and, I think, for a fairly transparent reason, viz., in order further to differentiate his current project from the treatment of officia in de Finibus (esp. 3.58-59). The examples clarify what he has in mind: he sees the account in Fin. as more theoretical in orientation, the current one as more practical. A more cogent distinction could have been drawn between questions pertaining to καθή­ κοντα άνευ περιστάσεως and καθήκοντα περιστατικά; cf. D.L. 7.109; White, 111. . . . alterum quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit.J The underlying idea is that the precepts provide a standard against which to form one's thoughts and decisions (cf. Fin. 3.60: sed cum ab bis omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes). Similarly, M. Brutus wrote an essay περί καθήκοντος in which dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus (Sen. Ep. 95.45); rules for "weaker natures" take the form hoc vitabis, hoc fades (ibid., 94.50). As Kidd, 1955, 185-86, points out, the attitude of the agent is unaffected. Cf. ad § 60, where Cicero shows awareness of the limita­ tions of this approach.—Conformari is rightly restored from the twelfth century codex Ambros. H. 140 inf. instead of the otherwise attested confirmari. For the phrasing cf. Fin. 4.5: quarum cum una |sc. philosophiae pars] sit, qua mores conformari putantur . . . superioris generis huiusmodi sunt exempla, omniarie officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem.] The first example (omniane officia perfecta sint) is handled at Fin. 3.59: quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit etiam inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito 'iuste'

Commentary on Book 1, Section 7 b - 8

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fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. For a condition under which a deposit should not be returned cf. 3.95 and the transmitted text at $ 31; in the former passage, however, the term iuste is not used, Cicero merely stating officium non reddere; thus in Off. he appears to reject (or ignore) the distinction between officium and perfectum officium. In spite of what he implies in our passage, Cicero does, in fact, establish a hierarchy of officio (see the next to last note). quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; . . .] This distinction is rather opaque. The aim is evidently again to differentiate this project from the similar de Finibus. Vita communis, though it includes politics, 11 goes beyond it and encom­ passes the activities of one who enriches the community through works of scholarship (§$ 18-19,71), as well as leisure activities ($$ 103-4), social life (SS 134-35), domestic architecture (§§ 138-40, though this could have political implications!), etc. Panaetius was dealing with issues about which human beings deliberate (§ 9); and, as Aristotle remarked, βουλ€υόμ€θα δ' ού π€ρι τώι> τζλών άλλα π€ρι τώι> -προς τά τβλη (£Ν 1112bl 1-12; cf. 33-34; J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics I London, 1973 J, 27); hence the subject is inevitably one step removed from the finis bonorum. Panaetius' treatment is grounded, however, in the Stoic τκλος- formula ("life according to nature"; cf. fr. 109; § 22 and ad §$ 11-15 and 3.13; Philippson, 1936 2 , 778); hence Cicero's ea . . . pertinent ad finem bonorum. Accepting Cicero's distinction uncritically and in isolation from his practice in Book 1, Zielinski, 65, arrives at the misleading conclusion "seine Pflichtenlehre hat der romische Philosoph mit vollem BcwuGtsein von der Giiterlehre losgelost. . .M (sim. Gred Ibscher, Der Begriff des Sittlichen in der Pflichtenlehre des Panaitios. Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der mittleren Stoa [diss., Munich, 1934], 5). . . . magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur, . . .] Institutio appears here in the sense "method of arrangement, organization, system" {OLD s.v., 1; sim. Kroner-Schmalz, TLL 7.1 s.v., I.l.b; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 233), in contrast to the sense "instruction, education" found at § 7a {pace Atkins). 8 In spite of the difficulties of this paragraph one should not, pace Unger, 1 3 18, cut the Gordian knot by athetizing it. It offers the definition(s) expected

11. Cf. Long, 1995', 233, n. 30, whoremarksof our sentence: "We shall not go far wrong if we take Cicero to be making a distinction between ethics and politics."

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since 7a (cf. Giusta, 1,158). 1 2 This fact is obscured, however, by the way this material is introduced as a "second division of appropriate actions," even though the prior division was rather of "questions concerning appropriate action" (omnis de officio duplex est quaestio); cf. Pohlenz, AF, 17-18. Note also that, in default of subtler connection, the argument is strung together with at que etiam, also used, e.g., to join the problematic material at 2.22. As in the previous division, the material not to be treated in our essay receives a less satisfactory explanation. Here we meet again the perfectum officium, alluded to but not explained in 7b; it is here paraphrased as rectum {officium) in view of the Greek term for it, κατόρθωμα (in Greek, too, however, one could speak of τελειον καθήκον: cf. SVF 3,134.23 [Stob.]; sim. 136.9). But it is only at 3.14 that we are told its differentia specified ( . . . nee praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest; cf. Fin. 4.15 = SVF 3, 5.28). Other Stoic texts make it clear that this distinction as to who can perform either kind of officium corresponds to the kind of λόγο? demanded by each, with the κατορθώματα requiring ορθός λόγο? (cf. Tsekourakis, 21 ff.). The defini­ tion offered in our passage is a mere shuffling of terms and inelegant to boot (atque ea sic definiunt, ut rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant . . . ). Without some further explanation Cicero's term commune officium also remains obscure; it is possible that, if not Cicero's own invention, the term originally denoted this officium as common to the sage and to others (so Arzert ad loc; cf. Fin 3.59 = SVF 3, 136.6: ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur versari in its, quae media dicamus; Tsekourakis, 10). In our treatise, however, Cicero explains it differently (3.14): haec enim officio, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent, quae et ingenii bonitate multi adsequuntur et progression discendi, i.e., such appropriate actions are "common" in the sense that they are within reach of the ordinary human being (cf. 3.15: haec. . . officia . . . non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia). The commune officium at least is given a palpable content ( . . . quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit). That the commune and medium officium are the same is made clear only if after commune officium one supplies medium (Unger, 1867) or, better, to match the Greek term κατόρθωμα used of the other type, μέσον (Winterbottom). Moreover, Cicero offers no guidance as to the sense in which such 12. The definition takes the form of a partitio; cf. Top. 28: atque etiam definitiones aliae sunt partitionum aliae divisionum; partitionum, cum res ea quae proposita est quasi in membra discerpitur . . .·, cf. B. Riposati, "La genesi e la tccnica definitoria ncllc operc di Cicerone," Studi di filologia classica in onore di Giusto Monaco, 1 (Palermo, 1991), 837-38.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 8

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appropriate actions are called "middle" (he may have been confused about this himself; see above p. 3, n. 5); on the use of μέσα or τα μεταξύ by philosophical schools for terms between good and evil, and the Stoic designa­ tion of children as μέσοι, cf. Tsekourakis, 12 ff. The term κατόρθωμα has a history predating the Stoa. Κατορθούν was commonly used of succeeding in general, as in the epigram on the fallen at Chaeronea: μηδέν άμαρτεΐν έστι θεών και πάντα κατορθοϋν / έν βιοτή (apud Dem. 18.289); Aristotle seems to have been the first to use κατορθούν/κατόρθωσις in an ethical context, as when he says of such acts as μοιχεία, κλοπή, άνδροφονία,ούκέστινούν ουδέποτε περί αυτά κατορθοϋν,αλλ' αεί άμαρτάνειν (ΕΝ 1107al4); cf. £ £ 1247a4 (the subject is persons who enjoy good luck): άφρονες γάρ όντες κατορθοϋσι πολλά, έν οίς ή τύχη κυρία; hence the MM, close in tendency to Dicaearchus,13 can speak of κατορθώ­ ματα as follows: τά γάρ άνευ τοϋ λόγου του κρίνοντος γινόμενα κατορθώματα ευτυχήματα έστιν (1199al2). Thus in the Peripatos a κατόρθωμα was the correct outcome of an act; its precondition was that the act itself not be bad. As a technical term in ethics (for earlier usage cf. introduction, § 2), καθήκον was a Stoic coinage. Diogenes Laertius 7.107-8 (= SVF1,55.6-10) attributes the term in the sense in which it occurs in our passage to Zeno: έτι δε καθήκον φασιν είναι δ πραχθεν ευλογον ϊσχει άπολογισμόν, οίον τό άκόλουθον έν τη ζωή. όπερ καΐ επί τά φυτά και ζψα διατείνει. όράσθαι γάρ κάπι τούτων καθήκοντα, κατωνομάσθαι δ' ούτως υπό πρώτου Ζήνωνος τό καθήκον, άπό τοϋ κατά τινας ήκειν της προσονομασίας εΐλημμένης. Arius Didymus formulates similarly: ορίζεται δε τό καθήκον **τό άκόλουθον έν ζωή, δ πραχθεν ευλογον άπολογίαν έ χ ε Γ (Stob. 2.8 [= 2, 85.13 ff. W.-H.| = SVF 1, 55.1314). Chrysippus is the only Stoic known to have written περί κατορθωμάτων (SVF 3, 200.38); probably it was he who gave that term its peculiar Stoic twist: κατορθώματα . . . πάνθ' όσα κατά τον ορθόν λόγον πράττεται (ibid., 3, 136.19-21). However, his contemporary Arcesilas, who changed allegiance from the Peripatos to the Academy, still using κατόρθωμα in its Peripatetic sense, set it in relation to ευδαιμονία and to the ευλογον (S.E. M. 7.158): άλλ* έπει μετά τούτο έδει και περί τής τού βίου διεξαγωγής ζητεΐν, ήτις οΰ χωρίς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν άποδίδοσθαι, άφ'ού και ή ευδαιμονία, τουτέστι τό τού βίου τέλος, ήρτημένην έχει την πίστιν, φησίν ό Άρκεσίλαος ότι ό περί πάντων επέχων κανονιεΐ τάς αιρέσεις και φυγάς και κοινώς τάς πράξεις τφ εύλόγω, κατά τούτο τε προερχόμενος τό κριτήριον κατορθώσει · την μεν γάρεύδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διά τής φρονήσεως, την δε φρόνησιν κεϊσθαι έν τοις κατορθώ13. Cf. Walzcr. 77, 170.190-91, 202-3, 231-32; cf. also n. 20 infra.

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μασιν, το δέ κατόρθωμα €ΐναι όπβρ πραχθέν €υλογον €\€ΐ την άπολογίαν. ό προσεχών ου ν τώ βύλόγω κατορθώσει καΐ βύδαιμονήσο. It seems likely that, as a skeptic, Arcesilas took over the term εύλογον from Zeno's definition of the καθήκον for purely elenctic purposes, i.e., to show that "the Stoics possessed a criterion for action which did not entail certain or absolute knowledge";14 cf. Long-Sedley, 1, 456-57; on the elenctic project of Arcesilas cf. Long, 1986, 446 ff. ,s If Off. 1-2 is a fair representation of Panaetius, πβρί του καθήκοντος·, then the emphasis on καθήκοντα at the expense of κατορθώματα looks as though it might be a response to criticism of the kind that Arcesilas put forward of Stoic epistemology: while not surrendering altogether the operation of ορθός λόγος, Panaetius found it advisable to lay emphasis on the βύλογον as the criterion for most human actions (on the different kinds of knowledge in­ volved in κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα cf. Tsekourakis, 27). On the importance of πραχθεν in the definition of the καθήκον cf. Tsekourakis, 25 ff.: **in order to decide whether an act is καθήκον or not, we must have its external results present, because they are of primary impor­ tance in the sphere of appropriateness, where what must count is the material of an act and not the disposition of the agent." On the formula εύλογος απολογία (= "a probable defense": ibid.), see Glucker, 1995,127. Note that the εύλογος απολογία need not be supplied by the agent (otherwise καθήκοντα could not apply to animals and plants); it can be provided by an observer if the relevant criteria are met; cf. Inwood, 1985, 201. Cicero had used probabile as a rendering of εϋλογον at Fin. 3.58 {est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile et quidem ita ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit (on the possible relation of this definition to ours cf. ad $ 101]); but it also does duty for πιθανόν at Luc. 32 and later, including Off. 2.7-8 (see ad loc.)\ cf. Claudio Moreschini, "Osservazioni sul lessico filosofico di Cicerone," ASNP sen 3, 9.1 (1979), 117. In 14. So George E. Ryan, Ratio et oratio: Cicero, Rhetoric and the Sceptical Academy (diss. Princeton, 1982), 81. 15. loppolo, 1980, 145 ff., has argued that Arcesilas went beyond a critique of Zeno's epistemology and put forward the «ύλσγον as a criterion of action in an attempt to defend the suspension of judgment (Ιττοχή) against critics who asserted that it led inevitably to complete inaction. If loppolo is right, the * ύλίχγον was adopted by the Stoa under Arcesilas' influence but unhistorically retrojected to the school's founder, and Arcesilas' own philosophical stance has been assimilated too much to the purely elenctic Cameades. But Long, 1986,446 ff., is probably right to distinguish between Cameades' method in utramque partem disputare and the contra omnia disputare of Arcesilas; cf. also ad 2.8.

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our work the ratio would justify a given action as in accord with nature; such rationales are offered from time to time; cf. introduction, § 2, ad $§ 126-32, 127, and 150-51; Heilmann, 2. Within moral theology, probabilism, according to which it is licit in the face of uncertainty about obligation to follow the probable opinion, was formed under the influence of our sentence; cf. Zielinski, 3 0 3 - 4 , and on this doctrine in general, which flourished in the last quarter of the sixteenth century before coming under attack in the seventeenth, cf. S.V. Rovighi, Enciclopedia cattolica 10 (Vatican City, 1953), s.v. probabilismo. 9 Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio.] The igitur is resumptive, bringing us back to Panaetius, from whom we had diverged at 7 b - 8 (cf. Hand, 3, 192 ff.; Skutsch-Rehm, TLL 7.1 s.v. igitur IIB2bl). Panaetius distinguishes three types of question about which people deliberate: 1) is an action καλόν [honestum)} 2) is it συμφέρον (utile)} 3) what should one do in the event of a conflict between the καλόν and an apparent συμφέρον? Note that the καλόν and συμφέρον are two of the three σκοποί. . . της· έφέσ€ω9 των ανθρωπίνων όρέξίων of Arius Didymus (Stob. 2.7 = 2.51.18 ff. W.-H.), the third being TO ηδύ, which, as a Stoic, Panaetius could ignore. Gartner, 1974, 14, argues that Panaetius' questions are an "empirische Bestandsaufnahme" and were misunderstood by Cicero as an editorial divi­ sion. But although the questions are here presented as ones that arise in the course of deliberation (aut bonestumne factu sit art turpe dubitant etc.), Panaetius surely did not arrive at them by polling opinion. Moreover, Cicero is unlikely to be wrong in his explicit statement in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum [Off. 3.9; cf. also Att. 16.11,4), whether this was to have been in the treatise π€ρί τοΰ καθήκοντος or in a separate essay (if Panaetius indicated his intentions in this regard, Cicero does not report them); even Gartner has to admit that Panaetius changed his mind and decided not to write on this topic (cf. introduction, § 5 [3|; ad 3.710). tertium dubitandi genus est cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id quod vi­ detur esse utile.] The videtur here is critical; on it Cicero bases his defense of Panaetius at 3.34; indeed, throughout Book 3 Cicero insists that there can be no actual conflict between honestum and utile, since the true utile coincides with the honestum (for the one exception cf. ad 3.39). Heinemann, 2, 45, n. 3, and 328, compares the modification of the traditional definition of μαν­ τική as praesensio et scientia rerum futurarum (Div. 1.1) to earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio (Div. 1.9; note, how­ ever, that Heinemann's attribution of the latter definition to Posidonius is followed neither by Edelstein-Kidd nor Theiler).

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cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus adferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.] For the personification of honestas and utilitas as rival claimants cf. 3.19b; for the image ad se rapere 2.37. 10 Cicero now proceeds to add two topics to Panaetius' list, namely the potential conflict between two honesta and two utilia, and criticizes Pan­ aetius for omitting these. Pohlenz, AF, 6, assumed that "die Schulpedanten" (i.e., others within the Stoic school) put forward this critique. One piece of evidence points in a different direction, however. At Part. 61 ff. Cicero sets forth, according to the doctrine of στάσι?, the division of types of question (finitum genus, infinitum), the types of propositum (defined as pars causae), viz., cognitio and actio, and under the former the three types sit necne sit et quid sit et quale sit (62). In the discussion of the quale sit Cicero notes a complication: atque in hoc eodem genere, in quo quale sit quaeritur, exoritur aliud quoddam disputandi genus, non enim simpliciter solum quaeritur quid honestum sit, quid utile, quid aequum, sed etiam ex comparatione quid honestius, quid utilius, quid aequius, atque etiam quid honestissimum, quid utilissimum, quid aequissimum . . . (66); sim. de Orat. 2.335: controversia autem inter hominum sententias aut in illo est, utrum sit utilius . . . Else­ where {viz., Stoa, 2, 128) Pohlenz finds that the passage cited from Part. treats a uber utile und honestum ganz mit Panaitios' Problemstellung . . ."; but, in fact, the example of Part, goes beyond Panaetius1 statement of the problem in precisely the way Cicero does in our passage of Off. This can hardly be an accident. At the end of the work Cicero described the content of Part, this way: expositae tibi omnes sunt oratoriae partitiones, quae quidem e media ilia nostra Academia effloruerunt. . .(139). Surely, then, the critique of Panaetius' divisio was suggested to Cicero by his rhetorical training in the Academy; the pedantry noticed by Pohlenz would also be consistent with that milieu. Moreover, Cicero's execution of the desiderated topics (§§ 1 5 3 61 and 2.88-89) betrays little fresh research into Greek sources of the kind one would have expected had he had a Stoic critique of Panaetius to hand (see ad locos). . . . cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo sit. . .] Cf. de Orat. 2.83:. . . ut genera rerum primum exponerentur, in quo vitium est, si genus ullum praetermittitur; . . . 11-17 It is characteristic of this essay that at this critical juncture the reader is given no pointer as to where the argument is going or what method will be used. The first of Panaetius' issues that arise in decision making was hon­ est umne factu sit an turpe ($ 9); and Cicero has indicated that his treatment will focus on praecepta, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit

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(7b). Hence one expects some criteria for distinguishing good and bad ac­ tions. Instead Cicero/Panaetius provides an analysis of the elements given to the human being by nature. Only toward the end of $ 14 is the relation of these elements to the main subject clarified (quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum); this technique of retrospective clarification is sometimes encountered in the speeches (cf., e.g., Clu. 164). The connected discourse de dolore patiendo of the Stoic Taurus begins sim­ ilarly with an analysis of τά πρώτα κατά φύσιν (Gel. 12.5.7). 16 It is hardly surprising that after this opening Cicero felt the need to subjoin a systematic account (§ 15: sed omne quod est honestum—) to insure that the main points, which are at the same time the major topics to be treated in Off. 1, have emerged clearly.17 On the other hand, the division into theoretical and practical virtues at §§ 16-17 is probably Panaetian; cf. the abbreviated account at fr. 108 (= D.L. 7.92): Παναίτιο? \ikv ουι> δύο φησιν άρετά^, θεωρητικής και πρακτικήν (cf. Grilli, 45); cf. also ad 2.18. 11-14 Οίκείωσι? is the process whereby one recognizes something as belong­ ing to oneself. The conception of the newborn animal accepting itself and then the elements that will provide it sustenance and protection while reject­ ing elements that threaten it is a starting point of several ancient accounts of Stoic ethics (sc. Fin. 3.16-21; D.L. 7.85; Hierocles col. 1.1 ff.). Whether or not Epicurus himself did so, Cicero has the Epicurean speaker Torquatus begin his ethical teaching with a version of οίκείωσις in which the πρώτον οίκεΐον is pleasure {Fin. 1.30). 18 Both schools recognized "life according to nature" as the goal of the human being and an analysis that begins with the first impulses of the newborn as a method of distinguishing what is natural. The Stoic analysis, however, did not stop there but continued to follow moral development through to the time when the human being possesses reason. 19 In its fully developed form as presented by Hierocles (2d century A.D.) the network of human bonding is described as a series of concentric circles corresponding to the different stages of οίκ€ίωσι?, with the individual him­ self in the innermost circle, which includes his own body and the satisfaction of its needs; in the next circle are parents, siblings, spouse, and children; in 16. Pohlcnz, AF. 18, n. 1, and Cole, 1967,196, regard this material as based on Panaetius; cf. ihe detailed argument at M. Pohlenz, "Das zwcite Buch dcr Tusculanen," Hermes 44 (1909), 36-38. 17. Cf. Gartner, 1974, 24, 53, 60. 18. Cf. Jacques Brunschwig, "The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in Schofield-Striker, 115-16. 19. Cf. ad$ 117; on the conflict in the sources over whether reason was complete in the human being at the end of the first or second hebdomad cf. Schofield, 1991, 33-34, n. 21.

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the third circle uncles, aunts, cousins, etc; in the fourth the more distant relatives; next one's demesmen; then the members of one's φυλή; then one's fellow citizens; the inhabitants of neighboring cities; the members of the same έθνος; and finally the entire human race. One should, Hierocles adds, contract the circles so as ultimately to regard all human beings as brothers and sisters; cf. Stob. 4.84 = 4, 671-72 W.-H. For the Stoa the analysis of οΐκίωοΊ? served to create space for reason within the sphere of nature. The doctrine of οίκείωσις seems unlikely to have been developed within the Peripatos,20 nor is there sufficient evidence definitely to connect it with Zeno. 2 i A definition of οίκ€ίωσΐ£ is attested for Chrysippus {SVF 2, 206.18 ff.), as well as the fact that he criticized the Epicurean version of oiiceiuxns (in his first book π€ρι τ€λώι>: cf. SVF 3,43.9 ff. = D.L. 7.85). The former passage is attested for his first book π€ρί δικαιοσύνης but does not betray how Chrysippus used the fact that one accepts oneself and one's children in the larger context of justice. Our passage perhaps gives a notion of some of the stages by which such an argument might have proceeded, with ingeneratque |sc. natura] praecipuum quendam amorem in eos qui procreati sunt followed by the more general human bonding: impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ($ 12); cf. Schofield, 1995 1 , 198. Possibly the role of oiKtiuxjig in grounding justice and the other social virtues helps explain why they are here placed ahead of the other virtues (§ 12), contrary to the fact that in the body of the treatise they are the second "part" of the honestum discussed ($§ 20-60). Whether Chrysippus already con­ nected the other virtues with his argument about natural drives is not alto20. There may have been some tendencies in that direction, however; cf. MM 1206b! 7 ff.: απλώς δ'ούχ.ώσικροϊοιται οι άλλα. της αρετής αρχή και ήγίμώΐ'έστινόλόγος.αλλά μάλλον τα πάθη. δ*ΐ γαρ προς το καλόν όρμήι/ άλογόν τίμα πρώτοι/ ίγγίκσθαι (ο και γίκται). fΐθ* ούτως τον λάγον ucrrtpoi' ^ψηφι^οντα ίίναι και δι α κρίνοντα, unless indeed, as Α.Α. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," BICS 15 (1968), 83, notes 10-11, has suggested, MM itself presents a version of Peripatetic ethics designed to make converts from Stoicism and showing some Stoic influence. 21. For the former thesis cf. F. Dirlmeier, Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts. Philologus, Suppl. 30.1 {Leipzig, 1937); contra Pohlenz, Grundfr.; Brink. Pohlenz, loc. cit., saw Zeno as the originator of the doctrine; but the positive evidence consists merely in the information that he wrote, like Polemo before him, wept το& κατά φύσιν βίου (SVF 1,14.28 = D.L. 7.4; SVF 1,48.36 ff., with von Arnim's note, and 198 = fin. 4.45; cf. K. von Fritz, RE 21.2 |1952), 2527.38 ff.). This is not the place for a full discussion of the doctrine of oikeiosis; recent studies include Hcrwig Gorgemanns, uOikeiosis in Arius Didymus," in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. W.W. Fonenbaugh
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gether clear; SVF 2, 288.10 ff., suggests, however, that he may have framed his argument more broadly:. . . ε πει έν τη φύσει του λόγου ει σι ν άφορμαι του θεώρησα ι το καλόν και τό αισχρό ν, αϊ 9 επόμενοι θεώρησα ντε 9 το καλόν και τό αίσχρόν. αίρούμεθα μεν τό καλόν, έκκλίνομεν δε τό αίσχρόν; cf. Striker, 1983, 163. Among the various other passages that make use of οίκείωσις material, ours stands closest to Fin. 2.45-47, which has the same function of deriving the four "parts" of the honestum from natural drives and presents them in the same order, viz*, 1) the social virtues, 2) the cognitive virtues, 3) the desire to rule, 4) ordo et moderatio. It is tempting to suppose that the two passages derive from the same source (cf. also the citation of [PI.] Ep. 358a at both § 22 and Fin. 2.45), presumably Panaetius22 in view of his characteristic formulations regarding the fourth virtue.23 Panaetius carefully ordered the drives so that the (for him) all-important drive toward social integration appears first, the rational drive before the irrational one, with the aesthetic drive last. Cf. his plan in the treatment of the συμφέρον to give priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt (2.22, evidently altered by Cicero in the execu­ tion; cf. ad 2.23-29). On the differences between the versions of Off. and Fin. cf. also Cole, 1967, n. 3,199-200; points of contact with other versions of the doctrine are discussed in the following notes. The derivation of morality from natural instincts in our passage was rightly understood at a later date as the basis for Panaetius* ethics and as such set beside the τέλος formulae of his Stoic predecessors: cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 2.129: πάλιν δ' αυ Ζήνων μεν ό Στωικός τέλος ηγείται τό κατ' άρετήν ζην, Κλεάνθης δε τό ομολογουμένως τη φύσει £ήν (Διογένης δε τό τέλος κεΐσθαι ήγεΐτο) εν τω εΰλογιστεΐν. ό έν τη τών κατά φύσιν εκλογή κεΐσθαι διελάμβανεν. ο τε 'Αντίπατρος ό τούτου γνώριμος τό τέλος κεΐσθαι έν τιο διηνεκώς και άπαραβάτως εκλέγεσθαι μεν τα κατά φύσιν, άπεκλέγεσθαι δε τά παρά φύσιν ύπολαμβάνει. . . . προς τούτοις έτι Παναίτιος (fr. 96) τό ζτ\ν κατά τάς δεδομένος ημΐν έκ φύσεως άφορμάς τέλος άπεφήνατο; cf. also ad 3.13. Note that Panaetius employs the term αφορμή contrary to normal Stoic usage (cf. LSJ s.v., 11; Grilli, 31 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 224 ff.) in the sense "starring 22. Via Antiochus in Fin., according to Pohlcnz, Grundfr. 73-76; F.-A. Steinmctz, 19 ff.t supposes that rhc two passages both go back to Chrysippus (who is cited at Fin. 2.44), Fin. through an Antiochcan, Off. through a Panaetian filter; but there is too little evidence ro connect all of these doctrines with Chrysippus (cf. Stetnmetz, 21, n. 85, citing Plut. Stoic. Repug. 10.19c; the καλΰΐ' as έπαιι*τόΐ', however, is by no means confined to Chrysippus; cf. ad S 14). 23. With 5 Η cf. Fin. 2.47: cuius [sc. ordinis et moderations] simtlitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factotum.

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point" (LSJ s.v., 1.2); Philippson, 1930 1 ,364-65, sees this usage as a mark of Panaetius' accommodation of the συνήθεια; cf. ad 2.35. Panaetius' τέλος formula was, however, as Sandbach, 58, pointed out, u a novelry in its word­ ing rather than its content." Wilamowitz, 1926, 207 note, mooted the following backtranslations for Panaetius' άφορμαί: κοινωνικόν (cf. Stob. 2, 109.17 W.-H.), φιλομαθή (or φιλόσοφοι/), φίλαρχοι/, φιλόκαλον (cf. also Wilamowitz, 1932, 398-99 = 2d ed. 393), sometimes used in the following notes. 11-12 A similar train of thought by which λόγος distinguishes human from animal and results in recognition of the social virtues and establishment of communities is found at Arist. Pol. 1253a9 ff.—Schofield, 1995 1 , 2 0 3 - 4 , contrasts the use of οίκείωσις and stress on reason as a foundation for justice in our passage with the emphasis on the requirement to treat another human being in a certain way on grounds of shared humanity at 3.27. 11 This paragraph moves from the general drives that the human being shares with animals {viz., self-preservation, procreation, care for children) to the specific attribute reason {ratio, λόγος), which sets man apart from beast. Principio—eiusdem.] On the use of natura as an equivalent for φύσις, al­ ready well established in Cicero's day, as well as its common personification by Cicero, cf. Ernst Zellmer, Die lateinischen Worter auf -ura, new ed. (Frankfurt a.M., 1976), 23 ff.—The drive for self-preservation is common to the various statements of the doctrine of οΐκείωσις; our passage is the most concrete in describing the process involved (ut pastum, ut latibula . . .); cf. Fin. 3.16; Chrysipp. SVF 3, 43.4 ff. = D.L. 7.85. After prefacing a lengthy discussion of conception, birth, and the newborn's self-perception, Hierocles remarks (VI.51 ff.): . . . τό £ώ(οι>), τ(ήν) πρώτη[ν (αϊ)σθησιν εαυτού λαβόν, ευθύς ώ[κ]ειώθ[η πρ(ός) έ]αυτό κ(αι) την εαυτού σύστασιν, . . . ουχί δ(έ) κ(ατά)] την εαυτού δυναμιν εκαστον ποιεί τ[ό ε(πι)β(άλ)λ!ον ύ(πέρ) τ(ής) εαυτού συντηρήσεως, έκκλΐ[νο]ν μ(έν) πάσαν έ(πι)βουλήν πόρρωθεν κ(αί) δ(ια)μ[(εν)ειν] μηχανώμ(εν)ον απαθέςέκ τ(ών) σφάλερω[(ν), 4]ττον δ* (έ)πι τα σωτήρια κ(αι) παντα[χ]όθεν [πορι]£όμ(εν)ον τά πρ(ός) δ(ια)μονήν;24—Kant would distinguish between the natural tendency toward self-preservation and the duty of self-preservation, which he also recognized; but because he grounded his ethics in reason, rather than nature, it is the will, rather than the tendency, to preserve oneself which for him has ethical value; cf. Melches Gibert, 57. 24. Ed. Guido Bastianini and A.A. Long in Unione Accadcmica Nazionalc, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria," Corpus dei papiri filosofia greet e latini, 1.1 (Florence, 1992), 340.

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commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sint.] For the coniunc­ tionis appetitus procreandi causa cf. Arist. EN 1162a 16 ff.: άνδρί δε και γυναικι φιλία δοκεΐ κατά φύσιν υπάρχει ν άνθρωπο? γάρ τη φύσ€ΐ συνδυαστικόν μάλλον ή πολιτικόν, οσω πρότερον καΐ άναγκαιότερον οικία πόλεως, και τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοις £ωοι?; Pol. 1252a26-28: ανάγκη δή πρώτον συνδυά£εσθαι του? άνευ αλλήλων μή δυνάμενου? είναι, οίον θήλυ μεν και άρρεν τη? γεννήσεως ένεκεν . . .; PIb. 6.6.2: πάντων γάρ προ? τά? συνουσία? όρμώντων κατά φύσιν . . . ; ad § 54 below.—The desire for intercourse and the concern for children were combined at PI. Smp. 207a7 if. (Diotima as re­ ported by Socrates): ή ούκ α'ισθάνη ώς δεινώ? διατίθεται πάντα τά θηρία έπειδάν γεννάν έπιθυμήση, και. τά πε£ά καΐ τά πτηνά, νοσοϋντά τε πάντα καΐ ερωτικώς διατιθέμενα, πρώτον μεν περί το συμμιγήναι άλλήλοι?. έπειτα περί την τροφήν του γενομένου, και ετοιμά έστιν υπέρ τούτων και διαμάχεσθαι τά ασθενέστατα τοΐ? ισχυρότατοι? και ύπεραποθνήσκειν . . . ; unlike Plato, Panaetius does not, however, go on to connect this tendency in man with a desire for immortality. The ancients made various observations about the care of animals for their offspring, such as those that Aelian HA 9.9 reports about seals. However, in the οίκείωσι? toward children Chrysippus made an exception for fish; cf. SVF 2, 206.19 ff. (on parents and children in Chrysippus' doctrine of οίκείωσι? generally cf. Pembroke, 123). For the general Stoic doctrine on such matters cf. SVF 3,172.19-20: και γάρ γαμήσειν και παιδοποιήσεσθαι (sc. κατά τον προηγούμενον λόγον), άκολουθεΐν (γάρ) ταύτα τη του λογικού ζώου και κοινωνικού και φιλάλληλου (φύσει); for the special feelings parents have for their children see Hierocles IX.6: καΟάπερ ούν στερκτικώ? μεν κατά τούτο οίκειούμεθα τοΐ? τεκνοι? . . . Sorabji, 124, calls attention to the irony that, although the Stoics observed that animals care for their children—the origin of justice in humans—, they nevertheless excluded them from a share in justice. On care for children as an inborn characteristic that only comes into play later in life cf. Annas, 1993, 265; Schofield, 1995 1 , 194.—Cicero shows awareness of the doctrine as early as Sex. Rose. 63:. . . cum etiam feras inter sese partus atque educatio et natura ipsa conciliet; he glances lightheartedly at οίκείωσι? at Att. 7.2.4 (26 November 50): filiola tua te delectari laetor et probari tibi φυσικήν esse την (στοργήν την) προ? τά τέκνα, etenim si hoc non est, nulla potest homini esse ad hominem naturae adiunctio; qua sublata vitae societas tollitur. sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest—sentiens praeteritum aut futurum.] For Aristotle perception was the defining characteristic of animals as opposed to plants (cf. PA 666a34 and other passages cited by Bonitz s.v. αϊσθησι? init.). He also distinguished λογιστική and αισθητική φαντασία and

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granted animals a share of the latter, but not the former (cf. de An. 433b29 ff., esp. 434a5 ff.; HA 488b24; Sorabji, 12-16, provides further references). The Stoics generally distinguished eight parts of the soul (SVF 2,226.14 ff.), Panaetius only six (fr. 85; cf. ad % 101); the highest (presumably for both Panaetius and the orthodox Stoa) was the ήγεμονικόν (also called λογισμός; cf. Cicero's ratio), which gives rise to φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέσεις, αισθήσεις, and όρμαί (SVF 2, 227.22 ff.). For the Stoics, as for Hume, the human mind begins as a tabula rasa; perceptions (αισθήσεις) are first written upon it; the result is memory (μνήμη); a collection of many similar memories constitutes experience (εμπειρία; ibid., 28.17-18). Like humans, irrational animals re­ ceive presentations (φαντασίαι), but they lack λεκτά with which to clarify them; their "appropriate actions" are therefore responses to stimuli accord­ ing to their interests; cf. lnwood, 1985, 8 4 - 8 5 ; Sorabji, 20 ff. The Stoics deny animals the process of assent, the basis of free will and a moral life among human beings; cf. Sorabji, 4 1 - 4 2 . While not asserting that animals have a share in reason, Cleanthes was moved to ponder the question when he observed ants accept a grub as if in ransom for the corpse of one of their kind {SVF 1,116.6 ff.; cf. Sorabji, 165). Chrysippus discussed the question whether a dog could be said to have performed the fifth indemonstrable syllogism if it followed a trail to a fork in the road on the other side of which was a ditch; then, after finding no scent on either branch of the road, leaped over the ditch in pursuit of its quarry. His conclusion: . . . rationalis habitus necesse est ilia nullam habere participationem. rationalis autem habitus est syllogismus ex apprehensione entium, quae minime adsunt; ut intellectus de deo, de mundo, de lege, de patrio more, de civitate, de politica—quorum nihilpercipiunt bestiae (SVF 2, 206.33 ff., esp. 207.11 ff. [= the quoted passage); cf. also SVF 2,302.4 = Cic. N.D. 2.16; Sorabji, 2 1 , 26, and 89). Panaetius, like Chrysippus, attributes to animals merely reaction to immediate sense-perceptions (quantum sensu movetur)\ like other Stoics, but unlike Aristotle, he denies them memory; cf. Sorabji, 51-52; ad%% 105-6. 11-12 sed inter hominem et beluam—ad rem gerendam facit.] For the con­ nection of λόγος and the social virtues cf. Arist. Pol. 1253a9 ff.: ούθεν γάρ, ως φάμε ν, μάτην ή φύσις ποιεί- λόγον δε μόνον άνθρωπος έχει των £ψων. ή μεν ούν φωνή του λυπηρού και ήδέος εστί σημείον, διό και τοις άλλοις υπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γάρ τούτου ή Φύσις αυτών έλήλυθε, του έχειν αϊσθησιν του λυπηρού και ήδέος και ταϋτα σημαίνειν άλλήλοις), ό δε λόγος έπι τω δηλούν έστι τό συμφέρον και τό βλαβερόν, ώστε και τό δίκαιον και τό άδικον τοϋτο γάρ προς τά άλλα ζψα τοις άνθρωποις ίδιον, τό μόνον άγαθοϋ και κακού και δικαίου και αδίκου και τών άλλων αϊσθησιν εχειν; ibid., 1332b3 ff.: τά μεν ουν άλλα των

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ζώων μάλιστα μεν τη φύσει £ή. μικρά δ' ένια και τοις έθεσιν, άνθρωπος δε και λόγω· μόνον γάρ έχει λόγον.—The account of the origin of the notions of appropriate action and justice at Plh. 6.6.1 ff. is similar in emphasizing the importance of reason as a factor distinguishing man and beast (6.6.4); but for Polybius society is based purely upon a rational calculus of self-interest, whereas Panaetius adds the natural gregariousness of human beings (eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini. . .). Polybius, then, is closer to the Epicureans in his emphasis on enlightened self-interest. Our passage, on the other hand, combines human weakness and necessity with natural gregariousness as motive forces behind the formation of society (cf. ad 2.73; in the non-Panaetian § 158, however, Cicero emphasizes the latter); cf. von Fritz, 54 ff.; Griffin, 1976, 203, n. 1; David E. Hahm, "Polybius' Applied Political Theory," in Laks-Schofield, 20-21. 11 . . . ad id solum quod adest quodque praesens est se accommodat, paulum admodum sentiens practeritum aut futurum.J Chrysippus had al­ ready formulated the difference in status between past and future on the one hand and present on the other: μόνον δ* ύπαρχε ι ν φησί τον ενεστώτα, τον δε παρωχημενον και τόν μέλλοντα ύφεστάναι μεν, ύπάρχειν δε ουδαμώς φησιν . . . (SVF 2, 164.26). Cf. ad §$ 105-6.—The substantivized futurum (= the future) is common in Cicero's later works; cf. § 81 and 2.33; Laughton, 123, and next note. homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cerntt, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit fu­ tures . . .] For man as the only rational animal cf. Leg. 1.22; Sen. de Ira 1.3.7: nulli nisi homini concessa prudentia est, providentia diligentia cogitatio . . . ; Sorabji, 7-16. For the iunctura rationis particeps cf. H. Frank, 345.—Chrysippus began his περί ειμαρμένης by laying down that TO μηδέν άναιτίως γίγνσεσβαι αλλά κατά προηγούμενα? αιτίας . . . (SVF 2, 264.6; cf. 281.23 and 282.33). Cf. also N.D. 2.147 (on consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et conprehensio as an exercise of reason). In the famous refutation of the Stoics on signs, S.E. M. 8.276 distinguishes human from animal on the basis of the human use of transitive and com­ pound presentation: διύπερ ακολουθίας· έννοιαν έχων [sc. ό άνθρωπος] ευθύς καΐ σημείου νόησιν λαμβάνει διά τήν άκολουθίαν καΐ γάρ αυτό τό σημεΐόν έστι τοιούτον, "ει τόδε, τόδε."—In this passage we have perhaps an illustra­ tion of what Cicero meant when he boasted . . . tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur (N.D. 1.8; see further ad §142). Antecessio seems to have been a Ciceronian coinage; it appears in the literal sense as a translation of προχώρησις at Tim. 37; at Top. 53, written a

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few months prior to Off., he had applied it metaphorically to time and causality, as in our passage; there, however, the sense had been clarified by the preceding participle:. . .est locus diabeticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus . . . cum tripertito igitur distribuatur locus hie, in consecutionem antecessionem repugnantiam,... In our passage the meaning is clarified by the preceding causas rerum; but the conjoined praegressus is attested here for the first rime in extant literature. Neither praegressus nor antecessio gained currency, however, the latter unattested after Cicero, the former recurring only at Amm. 21.5.13; cf. Bannier, TLL 2, 146.61 ff.; Morano, ibid., 10.2 (1987), 668.42 ff.; Widmann, 133-34.— Cicero uses the future participle, usually of the verb sum and as an attribu­ tive, frequently in the years after his exile; our passage is the one instance in Off. and is clarified by the corresponding rebus praesentibus; cf. Jacob Wackernagel, Vorlesungen uber Syntax, 1 (Basel, 1950), 34 and 286-87; Laughton, 118 ff., esp. 122. . . . facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.] This observation will have seemed less overstated to the an­ cients than it does in an age of rapid technological and sociopolitical change. Panaetius, however, goes still further in arguing that one should not merely see but maintain a consistent course throughout one's entire life; cf. §§ 111 and 119. Cf. also Fin. 2.45:. . . omnemque complectatur vitae consequents statum.—The emphasis on planning in advance is characteristic of Pan­ aetius; cf. S§ 19, 73, 81, and possibly Plut. Dem. 9.2 (cf. Dyck, 1981, 161).—In discussing hope and fear Seneca sees the gift of human foresight as deeply ambivalent (Ep. 5.8): maxima autem utriusque causa est quod non ad praesentia aptamur sed cogitationes in longinqua praemittimus; itaque providentia, maximum bonum condicionis humanae, in malum versa est. 12-13 The transposition of these two chapters proposed by J. Richter, u Z u Cicero de officiis," Jahrbiicher fur classsische Philologie 19 (1873), 379-80, is not helpful. He should have seen (but did not) that the subject eadem(que) natura refers back to a natura tributum of the first sentence of $ 11; and the order of topics is guaranteed by Fin. 2.45-47 (cf. also ad § § 18-19 below). It is true that his text yields u eine recht markierte Hervorhebung des Unterschiedes zwischen Instinkt und Intellect"; but the doctrine of οίκ€ίωσι? forms the basis of the social instinct; the contrast of instinct and intellect is incidental. 12 eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem . . .] On the natural tendency of human beings to form communities cf. Fin. 3.65 = SVF 3, 83.38 ff., and ad S 54 and 2.73 below. Possibly the double sense of λόγο? ("reason," "speech") may have assisted

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Panaetius' argument at this point. 25 Cicero had emphasized the role of ratio and oratio in the civilizing process at Inv. 1.2-3; cf. Leg. 1.27.—For the personification of natura cf. ad $ 11. . . . ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos qui procreati sunt. . .] Though he expressed grave doubts about their authenticity, Facciolati did not {pace Atzert) athetize these words. He found that this material interrupts the train of thought and suggested that they might have been interpolated on the basis of Fin. 2.45 (eademque ratio fecit bominem hominum adpetentem cumque its natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius . . .). Certainly in that passage {and in § 54 below) the relationship of love for children to the social impulse in general is worked out in greater detail and with greater clarity than in our passage (cf. also Fin. 3.62 = SVF 3,83.18 ff.). On the other hand, these passages serve as a warning that the idea of the love for children is expected per se in such a context and should not be lightly banished. Another problem with the words in question is that they do not sufficiently distinguish between the human love for children (and the role played in it by reason: cf. vi rationis) and the cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sunt common to humans and animals; does, for instance, the human preparation of quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum for children go further than what animals provide their offspring? Schofield, 1995 1 ,202, supposes that Cicero a has in mind e.g. the sort of provisions in legacies that are produced as evidence of the altruistic character of the concern shown by human parents for their children at Fin. 3.65." This is one of several passages of Off. that leaves the reader feeling that Cicero has included all the elements necessary for his argument (reason, love of parents for children, the social instinct) but has lacked the time and/or power of concentration to delineate their relations clearly. . . . impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit, ob easque causas studeat parare ea quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nee sibi soli, sed coniugi liberis ceterisquc quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit.] With the establishment of human society, the development takes an unexpected turn. This is most clearly seen by comparison with Polybius, who gives a similar account of the origin of the concept of justice beginning with the drive for sexual union and the begetting of children (6.6.1 ff.). But whereas Polybius offers a version of the theory that society arises from the weakness of individuals (esp. 6.6.6 ff.; sim. Lucr. 5.1011 ff.), for Panaetius society— 25. For a possible trace of the double sense of πόλι^ (β state and city) cf. ad 2.73.

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and not just that of the family—becomes a value in itself such as to motivate action; cf. Cole, 1967, 196 ff., esp. 199-200; ad 2.73. Presumably it is here that ratio operates (cf. previous note), in seeing that the well-being of the individual and the community are indissolubly bound together. The opera­ tion of ratio in this instance is, however, not merely a "tenuous and superfi­ cial link" with the ratio of l i b {pace Cole, 1967, 199, n. 3); it is precisely because human beings can analyze cause and effect that they understand and value the benefits that society confers. Cf. also ad § 20. 13 The mention of animi. . . maiores could have provided a transition to μεγαλοψυχία. If Panaetius included at this point the quotation of the Letter to Archytas attributed to Plato, as at Fin. 2.45 (cf. ad §§ 11-14 and 22), Cicero departs a bit from the wording of his source. In Fin. 2.46 human φιλομαθία is presented as a further quality given by nature [et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi. . .). The transition is thus a bit smoother than in our passage, where, as Richter saw (cf. ad §§ 12-13), the words in primisque hominis est propria would link up more neatly with the end of § 11 than of S 12. In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio.) Cf. the famous opening sentence of Aristotle's Metaphysics: πάΐ'τες άνθρωποι του €ΐδ€ΐ>αι ορέγονται φύσει, with Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles (Berlin, 1923) = Eng. tr., 2d ed. (Oxford, 1948), 68 ff., who argued that the topic was treated at greater length in the Protrepticus (cf. Iamb. Protr. 43.20-27 and 4 4 . 9 27), whence Panaetius may have taken the idea. Cicero only explains why this activity is proper to the human being at § 105 (. . . hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit, videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur). itaque cum sumus nccessariis negotiis curisque vacui, turn avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere . . . ] Is the restriction {cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui) perhaps Cicero's own addition? To judge from the setting of his rhetorical and philosophical dialogues during festivals,26 this statement accords with the accepted place of intellectual activity in Roman life; sim. Tusc. 1.44, in the context of a discussion of what the soul might do in the afterlife: . . . quodque nunc facimus, cum laxati curis sumus, ut spectare aliquid velimus et visere, id multo turn faciemus liberius totosque nos in contemplandis rebus perspiciendisque ponemus, propterea quod et natura inest in mentibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam cupiditas veri videndi... An insatiable drive that one has u by nature" would presumably not come into 26. De Orat. during the Ludi Romani (1.24), Rep. and N.D. during the feriae Latinae (Rep. 1.14 and 33; N.D. 1.15 and 2.3).

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play only in moments of leisure; cf. the reference at $ 19 to agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit, as well as Fin, 3.17, where the point is empha­ sized as nowhere else in Stoic sources: rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. Cicero perhaps narrows and intellectualizes the φιλομαθία of the human being beyond what Panaetius had in mind. . . . cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus.] As an activity of the rational part of the soul which distinguishes the human from the animal, the pursuit of knowledge has value in itself; hence Panaetius had to recognize both theoretical and practical virtues (cf. ad §§ 11-17), even though his emphasis, if Off. 1 is any indication, was on the latter group. Aristotle was prepared to go even far­ ther; cf. EN 1177al2 ff.: εί δ 1 έστ'ιν ή ευδαιμονία κατ' άρετήν ενέργεια, εΟλογον κατά την κρατίστην αυτή δ* αν εϊη του αρίστου, είτε δη νους τούτο είτε άλλο τι, ό δη κατά Φύσιν δοκεΐ άρχειν καΐ ήγεΐσθαι και εννοιαν έχειν περί καλών και θε ίων, είτε θείον ον καΐ αυτό εϊτε των εν ήμΐν το θειότατον. ή τούτου ενέργεια κατά την οΐκείαν άρετήν εΐη αν ή τελεία ευδαιμονία, δτι δ' έστ'ι θεωρητική, εϊρηται; ad § 153. ex quo intellegitur, quod verum simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum.] This is evidently intended to mark, by ringcomposition (cf. in primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio)y the conclusion of the treatment of φιλομαθία. Hence we have the first instance of a mannerism of Cicero in this essay, to phrase a proposition as a consequence (ex quo intellegitur) without taking care to see that a logical nexus exists (the aptness of truth to human nature by no means following from the human love of hearing novelties); see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lacking." In general, this sentence stands apart from the rest of the argument in that it deals with speaking the truth, rather than the theoretical virtue of discover­ ing the truth (speaking the truth should rather fall under the second virtue; cf. § 63, where the subject is the nexus binding the second and third virtues: itaque viros fortes (et) magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae). One suspects that Cicero has added on his own this moralizing interpretation of the virtue, huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus . . .J

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How are the two joined? Merely in being two of the drives basic to the human being, or is some subtler relationship implied? Probably we have to do with a fairly pat transitional formula (cf. the preceding note, on ex quo intelligitur). huic veri videnti—et legitime imperanti;. . .1 Once the virtues were con­ ceived as behavior in accord with the basic drives of the human being, the traditional ανδρεία which, in the older Stoa, appears to have retained its place as one of the four cardinal virtues (cf. SVF 3, 63.36 ff.), had to be radically redesigned. It was one of Panaetius' major innovations to see that μεγαλοφυχία, which had in the Stoa been a virtue subordinate to ανδρεία, really provides the psychological substrate for ανδρεία (cf. the words bumanarum rerum contemptio) and can be connected with a basic human drive (the appetitio principatus); hence in his system it takes the place of ανδρεία; cf. Dyck, 1981, 153 ff. The underlying psychological observation is implicit at EN 1168bl 5 ff. (οι μεν ούν el? όνειδο? άγοντε? αυτό φίλαυτου? καλουσι του? έαυτοΐ? απονέμοντα? το πλεΐον έν χρήμασι και τιμαΐ? και ήδοναΐ? ταΐ? σωματικαΐ?· τούτων γάροί πολλοί ορέγονται . . .) and MM 1212a34 ff. (αλλ* όρμώσι μεν άπαντε? έπι τάγαθά, και οϊονται αΰτοΐ? δεΐν μάλιστα ΰπάρχειν). Note that, like Panaetius, Posidonius held that magnanimos nos natura produxit, et ut quibusdam animalibus ferum dedit, quibusdam subdolum, quibusdam pavidum, ita nobis gloriosum et excelsum spiritum . . . (T 81 E.K. = Τ 38c Th. = Sen. Ep. 104.23). Galen, de Viae. 437.1 ff., preserves a critique of Chrysippus* doctrine of οικείωσι? based on the observed behavior of children, who are guided not by reason, but, like animals, by irrational impulses; he argues in particular (14 ff.): όρώμεν δε αυτά (sc. τά παιδία) κα! θυμούμενα κάί λακτίζοντα και δάκνοντα και νικάν έθελοντα και κρατεί ν τών τοιούτων, ώσπ€ρ ε νια τών £ι£ων, οΰδενό? άθλου προβαλλομένου παρά το νικάν αυτό. φαίνεται δε έναργώ? το τοιούτον επί όρτύγων καΐ άλεκτρυόνων και περδίκων ίχνεύμονο? Τ6 και άσπίδο? και κροκοδείλου κα! μυρίων έτερων, οϋτω? ούν ΐι!>κ€ΐώσθαι και τά παιδία φαίνεται και προ? ήδονην και προ? νίκην . . . Whether or not this passage derives from Posidonius (= fr. 416 Th.), such considerations (developed at greater length than by Cicero?) doubtless lay behind Panaetius' inclusion of μεγαλοψυχία among the drives basic to hu­ man nature. Did he also connect it with φιλαυτία (cf. § 30) in the same way as Plut. Tranq. An. 471 d (αίτιον δ' ή φιλαυτία μάλιστα, φιλόπρωτου? ποιούσα και φιλονίκου? εν πάσι και πάντων επιδραττομένου? άπλήστω?)? . . . ut nemini parere animus bene informants a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti;... J The drive itself is irrational, but the animus bene informants a natura acknowledges certain legitimate claims to obedience (cf. § 102); the concept may be com-

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pared to the animus bene constitutes at Amic. 47. The text has caused difficulty because aut is used in two different ways, first in its weak, almost copulative sense, then as a disjunctive; Thomas, 85, saw the former point (though not the latter) 27 and aptly adduced Sen. 17 (non viribus aut velocitate aut celeritate corporum res magnae geruntur) to defend the transmitted text against the athetesis of praecipienti by H. Sauppe, Conjecturae tullianae (Gottingen, 1857), 19. Praecipere and docere are really synonymous terms (cf. Bulhart, TIL 1.7,1750.57; Baumgartner, ibid., 10.2,441.79; Rep. 1.70: . . . quasi praecipientis cuiusdam et docentis . . .), but, both words being so common, it is hard to imagine a time when a reader would have felt tempted to add cither of them as a gloss on the other.—The exercise of authority is justified on two levels, natural and societal, though in this discussion of "natural* drives one might have expected only the former (utilitatis causa). . . . ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio.J The innate human competitiveness gives rise to a positive and a negative quality, which are related as effect and cause; cf. ad §§ 6 6 - 6 7 . 14 The older Stoa retained σωφροσύνη as one of the four cardinal virtues (cf. SVF 1, 49.23; 3, 64.14-16); its replacement by the more inclusive πρέπον was one of Panaetius' major innovations; cf. North, 220 ff. Here he could build upon observations of his teacher Diogenes of Babylon, who, in his books π€ρι μουσική?, remarked that a response to music is universal in human beings and appears before the use of reason (SVF 3,222.14-17). He differentiated, however, between innate perception (αυτοφυής αϊσθησι?), which distinguishes hot and cold, and scientific perception (επιστημονική αϊσθησι?), which distinguishes harmonious and discordant (SVF 3, 222.34 ff.; cf. S H 5 ) . Since he seems to characterize the former as an αυτοφυή? και άλογο? δύναμι? (SVF 3, 223.11), the other would implicitly be a function of λόγο?, as in Panaetius* conception of aesthetic perception in our passage (ratio); cf. Pohlenz, πρέπον, 78-80. Though music was Diogenes* proper subject, he did bring in other arts by way of comparison (SVF 3,222.4 ff.), so that it is unclear whether Diogenes himself or Panaetius was the first to apply what Diogenes says of scientific perception to the perception of beauty in general.—Here ratio, which did not need to be emphasized undeΓφιλoμαθία and was only involved in limiting μεγαλοψυχία [nisi praecipienti aut docenti)y receives explicit mention for the first time since the κοινωνική αφορμή 27. Here he follows Fedcli, 1964', 47; for the two uses of aut cf. Kuhncr-Sregmann, 2,100 ff., « p . 103 (negation preceding); Thomas fails to see that praecipienti and docenti are syn­ onymous and appeal to reason, whereas imperanti is different and needs the restriction utilitatis causa iuste et legitime (to exclude tyrannical abuse of power of the kind Cicero later excoriates in Caesar and Sulla).

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(beginning of $ 12); like φρόνηση, the fourth αφορμή is said to be peculiar to man {unum hoc animal). nee vero ilia parva vis—qui modus.] For the sense oi vis (= influence) cf. OLD s.v., 12b and 2.19 below.—The human sense of order is conceived as the result of the combination of natura and ratio, which, for the human being, are virtually identical; cf. H. Frank, 352.—The deletion of quid sit quod dec eat, in factis dictisque, proposed by Weidnec, 25, revived by Briiser, 68, and adopted by Atzerr 4 , would reconstruct a train of thought as at Fin. 2A7; however, there is no reason why in our passage Cicero should not begin by stating the general position and then trace the transference from the physical to the mental realm; cf. Ambr. off. 1.99; Thomas, 86 ff.—On in factis dictisque to be taken, by the "law of waxing members," with qui modus, not quod deceaU cf. Thomas, 86, n. 304, and 88, n. 309.—For modus as a Panaetian ideal cf. ad % 93. itaque eorum ipsorum quae aspectu sentiuntur nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium scntit; . . .J The convenientia partium corresponds to one of the kinds of beauty at Arist. Met. 1078a36 ff.: τοΰ δε κάλου μέγιστα είδη τά£ΐ£ και συμμετρία και τό ώρισμένον. Cf. also ad % 130.—Aristotle would not have agreed with Panaetius here; at HA 488b24 he gives the peacock as an example of animals that are φιλόκαλα. Cf. Sorabji, 92 and n. 112. quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem constantiam ordinem in consiliis factisque conscrvandam putat. . . ] Cicero is careful to make the three terms from the physical realm {pulchritudo, venustas, convenientia partium) correspond to three from the mental sphere {pulchritudo, constantia, ordo). This descrip­ tion of the transference of the notion of the beautiful from the physical to the moral realm was surely inspired by PI. Smp. 21 l b 7 ff. (Diotima, as reported by Socrates): τούτο γάρ δή έστι τό όρθώ? έπι τά ερωτικά Ιέναι ή ΰπ' άλλου αγεσθαι, άρχαμε νον άπό τώνδε τών καλών ε κείνου 'έν^κα του κάλου άει έπα νιε ναι, ώσπερέπαναβασμοίς χρώμενον, άπό ένΟ£ έπι δύο και άπό δυοΐν έπι πάντα τά καλά σώματα, και άπό τών καλών σωμάτων επί τά καλά επιτηδεύματα, και άπό τών επιτηδευμάτων έπι τά καλά μαθήματα . . . Cicero applies to oratory the notion of an ideal image abstracted from the phenomena of the world at Orat. 9 (cf. ad 3.18).—For the a fortiori form of argument (multo etiam magis) cf. ad § 48; the example at § 145 likewise moves from the physical to the moral realm. . . . cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve f a c i a t . . . ] Though Panaetius takes care to emphasize the positive aspects of this as of the other άφορμαί (cf. Sandbach, 127), the negative corollary is inevitably added. As the πρέπον

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in literary criticism involves the appropriateness of the words or action to the character portrayed (cf. § 97), so in the moral sphere the πρέπον involves suiting one's actions to one's persona. In the context of male society viola­ tions of decorum would ordinarily take the form of effeminate actions or gestures (at § 129, however, Cicero also opposes such behavior to the other extreme, the durum et rusticum). Hence the emphasis of moralists, beginning with Plato, on "manly" harmonies and rhythms (cf. R. 399a and 399e, after Damon 37 Β 7 ff. D.-K.). Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon referred approvingly to the discussion by Heraclides Ponticus ire pi πρέποντος μέλους και άπρεπους και ά[ρρ)ενων κα[ι] μαλακών ηθών και πρ[άξ]€ων άρμοττουσών κΐα'ι ά]ναρμόστων το[ίς] ύπ[ο]κ€ΐμ€νοις προσώπ[οι]ς (SVF 3, 234.6 = fr. 162 W.). Cf. also ad $$ 1 3 0 - 3 1 ; Edwards, ch. 2. . . . cavetque ne. . . in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet.] Here is our first indication that the fourth virtue does inter alia subsume the older virtue of σωφροσύνη (cf. 3.117: temperantia libidinum inimica)\ cf. North, 222 ff. As presented in Off., it is both a virtue to be cultivated per se (cf. 3.38) and a social virtue, distinguished from iustitia in that its content is non offendere, rather than non violare ($ 99). It is espe­ cially important in the case of young people (§ 122). That control is to be exercised even over thoughts {ne. . . cogitet) is unusual in pagan, as opposed to Christian (cf. Matt. 5.28), ethics (cf. S 102). quibus ex rebus conflatur—natura esse laudabile.] It is generally assumed that Cicero's honestum corresponds to το καλόν in Panaetius (cf. ad § 4b). Certainly the καλόν was regarded as praiseworthy in itself; cf., e.g.,. . . καλά 6e και επαινετά τάς άρετάς και τάς κατ' αύτάς εν€ργ€ΐας . . . (Arist. fr. 113 Rose = 622 Gigon), where έπαιν€τά appears to be a nearer specification of καλά. The view that the καλόν is^aivtTOv is attested for Chrysippus (SVF 2, 296.1 and 297.17; SVF 3, 9.26-27); similarly that those who perform such actions are praiseworthy (SVF 2, 288.10-13, SVF 3, 20.18-19). The hon­ estum, too, can be said to be praiseworthy per se (cf. Leg. 1.37; Fin. 2.45; other testimonies cited by Klose, 109-10); hence its appropriateness as a translation, even though it is drawn, not from the aesthetic realm, but from the sphere of public recognition ("worthy of honos"). It is helpful that both the καλόν and the honestum have the disgraceful as their antonyms (turpitudo, το αισχρόν), since at 3.36 ff. the absence of the turpe becomes a test for the honestas of an action; cf. Klose, 104 ff. and 118. . . . etiamsi a nullo laudctur, natura esse laudabile.] Cf. Aristotle's distinction between what is prior or familiar "to us" and what is so by nature (APo. 71b33 (i.);de Ο rat. 2.343: virtus . . . quae est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudaripotest. . . ; Part. 87:. . . honestate [sc. expetuntur\ ea quae

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proficiscuntur ab his virtutibus de quibus paulo ante est dictum, quae sunt laudabilia ipsa per sese. . . This distinction is, in Cicero's hands, an "attempt to detach 'the honourable* from the traditional honour code and to concep­ tualize it in terms of what is intrinsically or naturally good** (Long, 1995', 218). In the sequel Cicero cites a few examples of the reverse phenomenon— actions that were thought to be honestum but were not in fact (cf. 3.80-81, including the words et ea rest si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit; cf. also 2.43, where vera gloria rather than the honestum is under discussion; in this latter passage the opinion of the boni weighs in to counter that of the masses). Cicero thus uses his moral standpoint to contradict the communis opinio to a limited degree. This decoupling of the honestum from actual honor proves useful in the third book, where it is argued that the possibility of concealment does not alter the evaluation of an act (3.37-39). Long, loc. cit., finds that in this essay "Cicero*s honestum is very much his own remodeling of a tradi­ tional Roman concept.** I would add that the remodeling is specifically along lines suggested by Panaetius' καλόν and involves an experiment in the appli­ cation of a Greek conceptual framework to Roman politics (cf. the brief adumbration of the approach at Att. 7.11.1, cited ad $$ 83-84).—Note the fine clausula (equivalent to a double cretic) with which this introduction of the honestum concludes. 15-17 These chapters comprise a protreptic coda to the preceding account of the derivation of the virtues from the natural drives, then a systematic presentation (Cicero*s own? cf. ad $§ 11-17) of the four "parts" of the honestum in the order in which they will be treated in Off. 1 (i.e., with reversal of the investigation of truth and the social virtues; cf. ad §§ 18-19 below). This list does not merely repeat the material in §5 11-14, however, but in some cases is more specific and gives the first hint of the argument that follows, namely that specific appropriate actions arise from each of the four. Thus, we are told that the first virtue involves not only perspicientia veri but also sollertia (here used, as at § 157 below, in a good sense, though the term can have negative connotations: cf. § 33); and there is the first indication that the preservation of human society involves concretely giving to each his own and observing one's contractual obligations {in . . . tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide: cf. further ad $ 23); similarly, modestia et temperantia are clearly appropriate actions implied by the fourth "part" of the honestum. It is surprising that Cicero here merely alludes in passing to their interrelations {quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt. . .; cf. Fin. 5.67, cited ad § 95 below). We learn more about the connections only under the individual virtues: thus those engaged in research and those who cultivate magnitudo animi—both potentially antisocial

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pursuits—must be careful not to offend against iustitia (cf. $§ 28 and 62 as well as the non-Panaetian § 152); Cicero delimits verecundia (which falls under the fourth virtue) from iustitia at § 99; and a type of decorum is found in each of the other virtues ($$ 94-96). Finally, the first virtue is differenti­ ated from the other three in that whereas it has truth as its subject matter, the others involve the actio vitae, i.e., there is a distinction between the theoreti­ cal virtue on the one hand and the practical ones on the other, a distinction which, in simplified form, is attested for Panaetius (cf. ad $$ 11 -17). Though he emphasizes that in ethics το τέλος εστίν ού γνώσις άλλα πραξις (ΕΝ 1095a5), Aristotle similarly distinguishes the ήθικαΐ άρεταί from the διανοητικοί (ibid., 1103a3 ff.). 15a Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides . . .] This is a form for concluding an exposition familiar from Cicero's dialogues, with the direct address added for liveliness; cf. Fin. 2.48: habes undique expletam et perfectam. Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur; ibid., 4.19: habes, inquam, Cato, formam eorum, de quibus loquor, philosophorum; and, more remotely, ibid., 5.41: cum igitur ea sit, quam exposui, forma naturae . . . Similarly, at the conclusion of our essay: habes a patre munus, Marce fili,. . . (3.121). Our passage, however, is bolder in its striving for concreteness (tamquam faciem . . . vides). . . . quae si oculis cemeretur» mirabiles amores, at ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae.] An adaptation to the honestum (καλόν) of what PI. Phdr. 250d says of φρόνησις, which, unlike beauty (κάλλος), is not accessible to human sight: όψις γάρ ήμΐν οξυτάτη των διά τοϋ σώματος- έρχεται αισθήσεων, ή φρόνησις ουχ όράται —δεινούς γάρ αν παρείχε ν έρωτας, ει τι τοιούτον εαυτής εναργές εϊδωλον παρείχετο εις όψιν ίόν—και τάλλα όσα έραστά· . . . ; cf. the closer rendering at Fin. 2.52: 'oculorum', inquit Plato, 'est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam ilia ardentis amores excitaret sui!' In speaking of "seeing* (vides) the "form" and "face" of the honestum (before even getting to the hypothesis si oculis cerneretur)y Cicero blunts the contrast between the intellectual and physical realms. 28 —Fedeli, 1 9 6 4 1 , 4 7 49, revived Gernhard's athetesis of sapientiae (already omitted in Vaticanus Reg. lat. 1481, dated to 1418) on grounds that it is a concept alien to this context, in which it is clearly the honestum that is under discussion. The 28. I do not see why one need assume, with Gartner, 1974, 23, that "das Zitat diirftc so schon von Panairios aus Plato umgeformt sein." If used by Panaetius, the citation will have served to show that the καλόν in the moral realm was even more splendid than in the physical. If that is so, then an alteration as in the latin text will not have helped the Panactian argument cirhcr; and there is no reason to suppose that Panaetius was writing in haste.

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mere athetesis of sapientiae cannot be right, however; one expects an object for amores to be expressed, as at Fin. 2.52; and, as in that passage, the object should be the reflexive pronoun sui (already conjectured here by Faernus), presumably ousted by the gloss sapientiae. The process posited (replacement of sui by sapientiae) would assume, however, that the interpolator had Fin. 2.52 in front of him. Or was it Cicero himself who had Fin. 2.52 in mind as he wrote these words and intended sapientiae again to function as a surro­ gate for the four virtues (cf. Gartner, 1974, 2 0 - 2 1 ; Madvig ad Fin. 2.52; Pohlcnz, AF, 2 1 , n. 1)? But in that passage all four virtues are named in the immediately preceding sentence and are discussed individually in the follow­ ing paragraphs, so that there is no chance to mistake the meaning. In our passage, on the other hand, where the term honestum already stands for all four virtues, there is some risk of confusion with the first virtue [in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus [§ 15bl), though Ciceronian carelessness can, in this essay, never be ruled out. Also in favor of the emended text is that we expect at this point a good clausula to round out the introduction of the honestum (see the last note on § 14); excitaret sui provides a double cretic, whereas excitaret sapientiae (Isllsslsl) is not a clausula sought by Cicero. However, it would be a mistake to regard our text merely as a surface distortion of Fin. 2.52 (cf. also ad § \4 nee vero ilia parva vis—). It has a different, protreptic purpose, the aim being to win young Marcus over to the study of philosophy. I suspect therefore that neither is sapientia a surrogate for the four virtues nor sui to be substituted for sapientiae; rather sapientia has the sense of "wisdom as the study and goal of philosophers" {OLD s.v., 3a; cf. Homeyer, 306), it being assumed that sapientia in that sense leads to an understanding of the honestum. sed omne quod est honestum, id quanuor pardum oritur ex aliqua.] The sed correlates with the preceding quidem (our passage is cited by Solodow, 55, as an example of "feeble contrast").—In this essay the virtues are commonly referred to by the periphrasis partes honestatis, a usage which, Platonic in inspiration, has the advantage of emphasizing that the virtues form a unified whole and that their separation is merely an analytical convenience; cf. PI. Men. 78d (Socrates is the speaker): δ€ΐ άρα, ώ? eoiKC, τούτω τω πόρω δικαιοσύνης ή σωφροσύνης ή όσιότητα προσβΐναι, ή άλλο τι μόριον αρετής' . . . ; ibid., 79c:. . . okmep €ίρηκώ$ οτι άρίτή €στιν τό όλον και ήδη γνωσομένου εμού, και έάν συ κατακ£ρματί£ης αυτήν κατά μόρια; cf. ad SS 15b, 152-61,2.35. aut cnim in perspicientia veri sollerdaque versatur, aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rcrum contractarum fide . . .] This paraphrase of the "parts" of the honestum avoids technical terms (except

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when, in the case of magnitude» animi, they are clarified by modifiers in context (cf. also ad § 61]) and begins by emphasizing the actions associated with the virtues [perspicientia veri. . .in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique . . .).—The defense of the societas of humankind could take various forms; at 3.25 Cicero speaks of undertaking, like Hercules, labors pro omnibus gentibus. . . conservandis aut iuvandis; it might take the form of defending human commoda (cf. § 153), in which case, since the state was founded especially for this purpose (cf. 2.73), it would take place within a specific state (the context assumed by most of the precepts of Off.).—On tribuendo suum cuique cf. ad § 21; on fides ad $ 23a. 15b Quae quattuor quamquam inter se conligata atque implicata s u n t . . . ] Philippson, 1930 1 , 3 6 2 - 6 3 , suspects here a translation of αχώριστους and compares the discussion of the separability of the virtues at Arist. EN 1144b30 ff. and Stob. 2.7.5 b 5 = 2, 63.6 W.-H. (πάσα? δε τάς άρετά?, δσαι έπιστημαί εϊσι και τέχι>αι, κοιι>ά Τ€ θεωρήματα εχειν και τέλο? . . . το αυτό, διό και αχώριστου? εΐΐ'αι). Within the early Stoa the thesis of Aristo, namely that there is a single virtue, identified as the health of the soul, and that the various virtues were merely shapes (σχέσεις: Long-Sedley 61C) assumed by the single virtue, was contradicted by Chrysippus, who nonetheless defended the inseparability of the virtues; cf. Long-Sedley 61B-D with commentary 1, 384. On the interconnectedness of the virtues in Panaetius cf. the important remarks of Gill, 1994, 4605. See ad $$ 62, 93-99, and 152-61. . . . in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus . . .] Did Cicero avoid using sapientia previously of the first virtue to reduce the ambiguity of the Platonic citation (see above)?—For prudentia and its distinction from malitia cf. 3.71. 16 ut enim quisquc maximc pcrspicit quid in re quaque verissimum sit quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare ration em, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet.] Young Marcus' slowness was apparent from an early age; cf. introduction, § 4, esp. Att. 6.1.12 there cited. Cf. 3.81 {explica atque excute intellegentiam tuam, ut videos, quae sit in ea species {formal et notio viri honi), where one senses a certain fatherly eager­ ness and impatience for young Marcus to display intellectual prowess. 17 reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque quibus actio vitae continetur . . .] The actio vitae of the gods appears as a topic dealt with by theologians at N.D. 1.2; the Epi­ curean account is criticized, ibid., 103 (see Pease ad locos). ordo autem et constantia et moderatio. . . versantur in eo genere ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum mentis agitatio.] Actio could, of course, refer to purely mental activity; cf. Var. L. 6.42: actionum trium

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primus agitatus mentis, quod primum ea quae sumus acturi cogitare debemus, deinde turn dicere ac facere. However, Varro adds at once: de his tribus minimeputat volgus esse actionem cogitationem; tertium, in quo quid facimus, id maximum. Cicero is using actio in this "vulgar" sense and/or is relying upon the previous actio vitae to clarify what he means; the exclusion of thought from actio rerum becomes critical to his argument in preferring the social to the intellectual virtues (§ 153). In spite of its different subject matter and different relation to the activities comprised under the actio vitae there is no indication here (unlike § 153) that the first virtue is therefore inferior. 18-19 The presentation of the first virtue is curious. In the first place, it is not easy to figure out what the subject is. Elsewhere in this work Cicero does not hesitate to cite the Greek terms he is translating (cf. $§ 8,93,142,153; 2.18), but there is no such indication here, where it would have been unusually helpful. Only at the very end of the discussion does he state that there are actually two types of thought (cogitatio motusque animi), involving (a) deci­ sion making de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum and (b) pure research {in studiis scientiae cognitionisque). But the prior category is surely too narrow; one does not make decisions only about ethical questions but also about questions in the realm of the utile, as Cicero himself has just pointed out (§§ 9-10). The introductory sentence suggests that (b) alone is to be the topic {qui in veri cognitione consistit); and the strictures against expending excessive effort on obscure and difficult subjects and against being drawn away from public service by such pursuits, as well as the indication that this is the type of activity that one pursues in one's leisure time, provide apparent confirmation that (b) is in question. On the other hand, Cicero has praised this virtue as the one that is especially hominis propria (§ 13), which touches human nature most closely (maxime naturam attingit humanam: $ 18), and which involves an unresting mental aaivity (agitatio mentis^ quae numquam adquiescit: $ 19), as an activity therefore that touches the human being qua human being, not just the scholar, the scientist, or the Roman statesman on his day off. There seems, then, to be a tension between two different conceptions never fully acknowledged, let alone resolved, in the text. Nor is the precept cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduct contra officium est (ibid.) consistently maintained in Off.; cf. the concession at § 71 exempting from state service those qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt. The confusion and inconsistency to which this section gives rise, as well as its much shorter length than the treatment of each of the other three virtues, suggest that this passage is a striking example of the operation of iudicium

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arbitriumque nostrum which Cicero held in prospect ( § 6 ) . Possibly this section contained an exposition of Stoic psychology and epistcmology that Cicero found too theoretical for his present purposes (cf. § 7b); such an exposition would have been helpful prior to the reference to anger and other passions at § 23b (for another possible placement of such material cf. ad § 114). Since he is writing this treatise after a series of other philosophical works» Cicero thought to save time and space in view of his previous treat­ ment of kindred topics; thus he could omit the type of question concerning appropriate action quod pertinet ad ftnem bonorum in view of Fin. (cf. §§ 5 7) and friendship in view o( Antic. (2.31). Similarly, he had treated epistemology in the way he thought appropriate in the Academica and in our context merely alludes to one typically Academic concern in this area: ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus (§18; cf. ad 2.7-8). He does offer a brief treatment of Stoic psychology at $$ 101-3a. In writing for his son and others like him Cicero was concerned in the first instance with the role of his subject in the life of a Roman statesman; hence the tendency to confine the subject to intellectual pursuits that might fill out one's otium and to warn against becoming involved with these to the point of endangering one's public career; cf. Luc. 6: . . . profecto eius |sc. philosophiae] tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nee quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu conlocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. The position arrived at is not dissimilar to that put into the mouth of Antonius at de Or at. 2.156: ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint. Panaetius, who was interested in scientific questions (at Rep. 1.15 Scipio expresses the wish that Panaetius were present to discuss with them the alleged appearance of two suns), will have conceived the subject and its possible role in life more broadly (hence the concession of § 71); cf. also Johann, 30. Moreover, at this stage of Stoicism one would have expected φρόι^ησις to be the cardinal virtue in question and to pertain to decision making on moral and other questions (cf. ad § 153). That this was, in fact, the virtue treated by Panaetius is clear from the broader definition of the first virtue presupposed at § 94 (see ad loc.)\ cf. also § 143, where Cicero reproduces Panaetius* cross-reference to his discussion of φρόνηση even though he has altered the virtue so drastically as to make it unrecognizable as such ( . . . prudentiae definitio, de qua principio diximus; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 25). Similar to the narrowed scope of the first virtue in our passage is § 151, where Cicero includes (his own? see ad he.) praise of professions like medicine and architecture, which involve prudentia maior, but adds a saving clause: eae sunt its, quorum ordini conveniunty honestae, so that there can be no question of their being recommended

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for senators' sons. The truncated treatment in our passage is fleshed out by a few more observations on those who pursue the vita contemplativa at $§ 2 8 29, 71, and 92. A further problem is whether the veri cognitio was also the first "part" of the honestum handled by Panaetius, who was very particular about the order in which topics were to be treated (cf. ad 2.22). In favor of its priority is that, as a theoretical virtue, it is set apart from the other three (§§ 16-17); also some attention to psychology would have facilitated the exposition of the following virtues insofar as these involve the curbing or redirecting of appe­ tencies. On the other hand, it is limited by the second virtue in a way that can be explained only after that virtue has been introduced (cf. § 28); the same is true of the third "part" of the honestum ($§ 69b ff. and 92). In the introduc­ tion of the four "parts'* of the καλόν (§§ 11-15) Panaetius placed it after the social instinct, which he evidently regarded as fundamental (cf. $ 157, which, though from a non-Panaetian section, is perhaps not at odds with the spirit of Panaetius:. . . homines . . . natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam); the order is changed only in the systematization (§ 15: added by Cicero?). It is thus not impossible that Cicero has altered the order of topics and placed φιλομαθία first in order to get it quickly out of the way before proceeding to the virtues he intends to focus on, in accord with his policy of using his own judgment and emphasizing precepts pertaining to life (SS 6-7). 18 Ex quattuor autem locis in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus . . .] For the sense of vis (= essence) cf. OLD s.v., 17, and Forcellini s.v., II. 1. omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem . . .] Cf. Arist. Met. quoted ad § 13. . . . in qua excellere pulchnim putamus . . . ] Pulchrum as predicate with an a a i o n as subject is evidently a poetic usage taken over in late works of Cicero; cf. Phil. 2.117 and other passages cited at OLD s.v. pulcher 3b; Forcellini s.v., II. 1.9. . . . in qua excellere—turpe ducimus.] Cf. Luc. 66: sed ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. . . . ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus hisque temere adsentiamur . . .] A typically Academic concern; cf. Ac. 1.45: . . . neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere and ad 2.8. 19 alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias.] Note that C. Sulpicius' pursuit of astronomy resulted in practical benefits (see below). Cicero once contrasted the Greek and Roman attitudes

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toward mathematics as follows: in summo apud illos (sc. Graecos) honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius; at nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate hums artis terminavimus modum {Tusc. 1.5). It seems doubtful, however, that Sex. Pompeius' study of geometry would have bene­ fited the agrimensores; was the fact that he pursued it merely as a hobby what saved it, in Cicero's eyes, from the predicates "obscure, difficult, and unnec­ essary"? The position here is similar to that which M. Antonius adopts toward philosophy at de Orat. 2.156 (ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint), but one wishes Cicero had offered an example of the kind of inquiry he deprecates. Panaetius is likely rather to have expressed the kind of approval for astronomy and geometry found at Isoc. 11.23 and 12.26-27.— For the iunctura cf. de Orat. 2.18, where Crassus declares that there is perhaps no greater ineptia than ut illi [sc. Graeci] solentt quocumque in loco quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necesssariis argutissime disputare. In our passage Cicero is clearly applying what he conceives to be the standards of a Roman gentleman. . . . ut in astrologia C. Sulpicium audimus . . .] C. Sulpicius Gaius accom­ panied L. Aemilius Paullus on his Macedonian campaign and won celebrity by explaining the causes of the eclipse of the moon in the night of 21 - 2 2 June 168, prior to the battle of Pydna; he later wrote a book on the subject; cf. Plin. Nat. 2.53 and in general Munzer, RE 4A1 (1931), 809.35 ff., and 811.42 ff., partly superseded by Sumner, 37-38; cf. also Elizabeth Rawson in CAH 8 2 ,443; in 166 he became M. Marcellus* colleague in the consulate (cf. MRR, 1, 437). Cf. Rep. 1.21-22 (Philus is the speaker):. . . nam memoria teneo C. Sulpicium Galium, doctissimum ut scitis hominem, cum idem hoc visum diceretur et esset casu apud M. Marcellum, qui cum eo consul fuerat, sphaeram quam M. Marcelli aims captis Syracusis ex urbe locupletissima atque ornatissima sustulisset, cum aliud nihil ex tanta praeda domum suam deportavisset, iussisse proferri; cuius ego sphaerae cum persaepe propter Archimedi gloriam nomen audissem, speciem ipsam non sum tanto opere admiratus; erat enim ilia venustior et nobilior in volgus, quam ah eodem Archimede factam posuerat in templo Virtutis Marcellus idem, sed posteaquam coepit rationem huius operis scientissime Galius exponere, plus in illo Siculo ingenii quam videretur natura humana ferre potuisse iudicabam fuisse.—For astrologia encompassing both astronomy and astrology cf. LSJ and OLD s.v.; Ihm, TLL 2, 965.55 ff.; Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) deserves credit for establishing the modern distinction; cf. Louis MacNeice, Astrology (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 150-51. . . . in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus . . .] Cf. Brut. 175: dicebat etiam L. Scipio non imperite Gnaeusque Pompeius Sex. f. aliquem numerum

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obtinebat. nam Sex. frater eius praestantissimum ingenium contulerat ad summam iuris civilis et ad perfectam geometriae rerumque Stoicarum scientiam; F. Milrner, RE 21.2 (1952), 2059.55 ff. cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium e s t ; . . . ] Contrast 5 7 1 , where those qui excellent! ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt are given leave from state service. This statement, according with the view put forward in the non-Panaetian appendix to this Book (§§ 153 ff.), is surely a Ciceronian addition. Cf. Johann, 30. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit.] Cf. Arist. EE 1219b8: oi έπαινοι τή? αρετή? δια τά έργα and passages cited by Pease ad N.D. 1.110. 20 ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.] The explicit marking of the ends of sections in this way is useful in a treatise meant to be reproduced without modern typographical aids. I prefer to see them treated as the end of the previous paragraph rather than the beginning of a new one (the latter Winterbottom's practice here and elsewhere); see ad 2.8 {sed tarn ad instituta pergamus).—On the transitional formula ac . . . quidem cf. KiihnerStegmann, 2, 23. 2 0 - 6 0 Cicero has, at least initially, no name for the second virtue as such (note the paraphrase ea ratio qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur: § 20); ή κοινωνική αρετή would be a possible Panaetian designation (cf. ad §§ 11-14); at $ 100 he designates the virtue as hominum consociatio, at § 149 as communis generis hominum conciliatio et consociatio, at § 153 (non-Panaetian) simply as communitas. This virtue is derived from the social instinct of the human being, which is prior to the other three drives corresponding to virtues (§ 12). Δικαιοσύνη had, of course, for the older Stoa, as for Greek moralists generally, been one of the four cardinal virtues. But here, as in the case of the fourth virtue (cf. ad § 14), Panaetius chooses to emphasize its positive aspect as a drive toward a goal, rather than define it purely negatively as the avoidance of certain actions. Hence he divides the second virtue into two parts by adding to δικαιοσύw\liustitia the Aristotelian virtue έλευθεριότης (respectively 2 0 - 4 1 and 4 2 60). The second virtue is thus not merely the avoidance of acts that under­ mine the community [iustitita as the avoidance of agression against others and their property) but the performance of acts that help bind the com­ munity together (t\zv(kp\.o-n)gJbeneficentia/liberalitas); cf. Atkins, 263. From another point of view the two halves of the second virtue correspond to the distinction between the possession of property (made secure by δικαιοσύ­ νη) and its use (cf. Arist. Pol. 1263bl3: εν τη γάρ χρήσει τών κτημάτων τό τη? έλευθεριότητο? έργον εστίν). 2 0 - 4 1 In accord with the principle εσθλοΐ μεν γάρ απλώς, παντοδαπώς· δέ

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κακοί (adesp. eleg. fr. 3 West apud Arist. EN 1106b35), the treatment of iniustitia extends to greater length than that of iustitia proper, as the follow­ ing plan of this section indicates: I. iustitiae munera {§§ 20-23a) A. tie cut quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria B. ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis II. iniustitia A. genera 1. eorum qui inferunt; motives ($$ 23b-27): a) metus b) avaritia 2. eorum qui ah Us quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam; motives ($$ 28-29): a) inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt (sim. neglegentia, pigritia) b) suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve impediuntur B. A rule of thumb for avoiding injustice {§ 30) C. Change of appropriate actions κατά -περίστασιν (§§ 31-32) D. Injuries through interpretation of the law (§ 33) Ε. Appropriate actions toward those a quibus iniuriam acceperis (SS 3 4 - 4 0 ) , in particular, enemies in wartime F. Justice toward slaves (5 41). When the various virtues were derived from natural impulses (§§ 11-14), our virtue was presented as a general tendency of the human being to form social groups and direct concern and effort toward others as well as oneself (§ 12). Just behavior was mentioned for the first time in the discussion of magnitudo animi, where it was said that the mind well formed by nature would obey someone giving orders iuste et legitime. That the second virtue involves justice became clearer in § 15 [in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide). Finally $ 20 states explicitly that iustitia is an important component of the social virtue. Perhaps Panaetius avoided connecting justice with the doctrine of οίκίίωσι? in view of arguments such as those presented in the papyrus commentary to Plato's TbeaetetuSy to the effect that there would then be various kinds of justice depending on one's relation to the agent: κή&ται μέν και Κυρηι>αίωι>, κατά τον αυτόν δ€ λόγον και ώντινωνουν άιΌρώπωΐ'· ψκ€ΐώμ€θα γάρ τοΐ? ύμοειδίσι · μάλλον μ€ΐ>τοι φκ€ΐωται το[ϊ? εαυτού πολίται[?· €πιτ€ίι>ΐ€ται γάρ και dfineTJali] ή οίκβίωσις" ο[σοι TO][VW από τη? οίκ€ΐώσ€ω? είσάγουσι την

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δικαιοσύνης, ει μέν λέγουσιν ΐσην αύτοΟ Τ€ προς αυτόν και προς τ[όν] ε[σ]χατον Μυσών. τεθέντος μέν τούτου σώζεται ή δικαιοσ[ύ]νη, ού συγχωρείται [δ]ε [εΐ]ναι ϊσην παρά γά[ρ την] ένάργειάν εστίν κα[ι] την συναίσθησιν. ή μέν γάρ προς εαυτόν οίκείωσις φυσική εστίν και άλογο?, ή δε προς του? πλησίον φυσική μέν και αυτή, ού μέντοι άνευ λόγου. 29 Hence when οΐκείωσις appears again under the second virtue it is in the section on liberalitas and beneficentia and at precisely the point where a criterion is needed for drawing up a hierarchy of beneficiaries (§§ 53-54). 20 Dc tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur.] For ratio as = "system," "Prinzip," or the like cf. OLD s.v., 11 (where our passage is cited); H. Frank, 284. On societas as the abstract to socius and the use of the latter to denote a person who stands in the same relation with another to some third person or thing (and sometimes therefore implies reciprocal relations among the socii) cf. Wegner, 30. On Cicero's paraphrase of the name of the second virtue see ad §§ 2 0 - 6 0 . The scope of officio {latissime patere) was one of the features that attracted Cicero to this subject in the first place (§ 4); within the doctrine of appropriate actions the social virtue has a similar advantage of scope. The implications of the ratio of human society go beyond this virtue to limit what is acceptable behavior under the cognitio return (§19), magnitudo animi (cf. SS 62-65), and the other virtues generally (§§ 153 ff.) and play the major role in deciding the problems of casuistry in Book 3 (see esp. 3.21-32). cuius panes duae—appellari licet.] Not dissimilar is the distinction at §§ 6 6 67 of externarum despicientia and the performance of great deeds as compo­ nents of magnitudo animi. There splendor omnis (as well as amplitudo and utilitas) is said to reside in the latter. The applicability of splendor in that passage is clear: the performance of great deeds casts an eye-catching glitter; iustitia, on the other hand, would seem an inward quality. Evidently, how­ ever, what Cicero has in mind is the reputation for justice; his failure to distinguish sharply between the quality and the "image" is less understand­ able here than at 2 . 3 9 - 4 3 , where glory, not virtue, is the (instrumental, not final) goal; cf. introduction to Book 2. On the division into two parts cf. ad SS 2 0 - 6 0 . . . . ex qua viri boni nominantur . . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1130a8-10: αυτή μέν ούν ή δικαιοσύνη ού μέρα? αρετή? αλλ' δλη αρετή έστιν, ουδ' ή εναντία αδικία μέρος κακίας άλλ' όλη κακία. The epithet bonus is used here, as ordinarily in 29. Ed. D. Seel ley in Unione Accademica Nazionale, Accadcmia Toscana di Scicnzc c Lcttcre "La Colomharia," Corpus dei paptri filosoficigreci e latini, 3 (Florence, 1995), 272 and 274. col. V.14 ff. {ad Tht. 143d).

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this essay (cf. § 3 1 and ad 2.33), as in common parlance and not with reference to the Stoic sage (on Panaetius' general practice in this regard cf. 2.35); cf. 3.17. For vir bonus used in sponsio formulae in Roman litigation cf. 3.70 and 77. Sed iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessirus inju­ ria . . .J Munus is used here by variatio for officium, with which it is, in one of its senses, identical; cf. Paul. Dig. 50.16.18: 'munus' tribus modis dicitur: uno donum, et inde munera diet dart mittive. altera onus, quod cum remittatur, vacationem militiae munerisque, inde immunitatem appellari; tertio officium, unde munera militaria et quosdam milites munificos vocari. . . ; Lumpe, TLL 8, s.v. munus 1662.76 ff. and 1663.25 ff.; p. 6, n. 13, and ad 3.4 and 121. However, in spite of Atticus' doubts about officium as a translation for καθήκοί' (Att. 16.14.3), de Muneribus would hardly have served as a title for our essay (see introduction, § 2).—On the proviso (sim. 3.76) cf. Dihle, 1962, 13 ff., who traces the lex talionis in ancient legal texts and popular ethics; inevitably it caused difficulty for St. Ambrose in preparing his Christian version: dicunt enim illi earn pnmam esse iustitiae formam ut nemini quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria; quod Evangelii auctoritate vac· uatur; vult enim Scriptura (sc. Luke 9.51-56] ut sit in nobis spiritus ftlii hominis, qui venit conferre gratiam, non inferre iniuriam {off. 1.131). But even pagan philosophers provided examples of a higher standard corre­ sponding to the Christian "turning of the other cheek"; cf. D.L. 6.33 (Diogenes) and 89 (Crates); a similar anecdote is told of Socrates at Basil Ad adulesc. 1. . . . deindc uc communibus pro communibus utatur, privaris ut suis.] An aliquis as subject is, of course, to be extrapolated from the preceding quis.— This formulation ("that one should treat common goods as common, and private ones as one's own" in Atkins' rendering), with its insistence on observing the distinction between public and private property, is a bit odd; it ignores the fact that in practice the major cause of injustice is the violation of private property held by others (as Cicero, of course, knew; cf. § 24: maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam adgrediuntur ut adipiscantur ea quae concupiverunt; § 42: . . . in eadem sunt iniustitia ut si in suam rem aliena convertant)\ and, in fact, apan from $$ 51-52 below, this essay has hardly anything to say about property held in common. No less odd is the paraphrase at § 31 [ut communi uttlitati serviatur), where one would have expected some mention that the communis utilitas includes respect for the private property of others, if that is what was meant. 21 sunt autem privata nulla natura . . . ] When not read closely in context, this statement has given rise to misunderstanding, especially in light of the

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general tendency in this essay naturam . . . ducem sequi (§ 22). Cicero is far from wishing to call existing property relations into question, as a careful study of relevant passages in Off. and the other philosophical works shows (cf. Wacht, 34 ff.). Rather, as he says in our passage, he recognizes two types of property, res communes and respnvatae. But he needs to explain how this situation arose; this he does by describing the original situation {sunt. . . privata nulla natura) and the means by which it was modified [vetere occupa­ tion . . . victoria . . . lege pactione condicione sorte). At the same time, the picture of early society and its evolution at 2.11-15 does not encourage the idea that Cicero/Panaetius wanted to turn back the clock to primitive condi­ tions. Cicero explicitly states there is nothing wrong with the just acquisition of property (§ 25: nee vero ret familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est. . .). As a part of the natural human instinct to provide for oneself, one's family, and for the future, it would be in accord with the foundations of Panaetian ethics (§§ 11-12). The possession of property is, however, to some degree limited by the obligation to use it in socially benefi­ cial ways; cf. Arist. Pol. 1263a37: bavtpov τυίι/υι> οτι βελτιον €Ϊναι μο> ιδία? τάς· κτήσεις, τη δ€ χρήσβι ποΐ€Ϊν κοινός; ad § 92; Wacht, 48.—The doctrine sunt. . . privata nulla natura derives from the early Stoa and had a different significance for Zeno, who advocated the community of women and aboli­ tion of coinage (cf. D.L. 7.33; Schofield, 1991, 12-13), than for Cicero/ Panaetius. Chrysippus, however, already took a positive view of the acquisi­ tion of property (cf. SVF 3,172.5 ff., esp. 173.8-9:. . . και κυβιστήσεις τρις |sc. τον σοφόν] επ'ι τούτψ λαβόντα τάλαιτον; Pohlenz, Stoa, l , 140; Schofield, 1991, 18-19), as Seneca was later to do (cf. Griffin, 1976, 298-99).— Ambrose saw clearly the discrepancy between the professed following of nature and the acceptance of private property (off. 1.132). He, too, however, was far from wishing to disturb existing property relations; but whereas for Cicero (and presumably Panaetius) the statement sunt . . . privata nulla natura has lost its power to criticize existing property relations, Ambrose at least uses it as an argument to encourage the wealthy to contribute to the church and its charitable works; cf. Wacht, 50 ff. . . . sed aut vetere occupations ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege pactione condicione sorte;. . .] This is evidently meant to be a fairly complete list of methods by which property could be acquired. An example of the establishment of a community on previously vacant land would be the founding of a city on the site where Aeneas discovered the sow with a litter of thirty piglets (cf. Aen. 3.389 ff., 8.43 ff. and 81 ff.). The Gracchi and other reformers used lex as a method of transferring common land to private ownership. Pactio is a broad term for

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an agreement and could be used both in interstate relations (cf. 3.108) and in those under civil law; it is a virtual synonym of conditio (cf. Frohlke, TLL 10, 24.63 ff.). Sors was used to allot land, not only in saga, as in the allot­ ment of their conquests among the Heraclidae, but also in historical times to the Athenian κληροϋχοι and Roman veteran-colonists. Cicero glosses over a problem when he speaks of acquisition of land by victory in war; as he himself was aware, there were different types of war, not all just (cf. ad §§ 34 ff.); what about the unjust acquisition of property in war? Cf. Annas, 1993, 311. . . . ex quo fit ut ager Arptnas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; . . . 1 Cf. Varro's allusion to the division of land after the Golden Age at Men. 17 (with commentary by Cebe, 1, 77 ff.): terra culturae causa attributa olim particulatim hominibus, ut Etruria Tuscis, Samnium Sabellis. Cicero has chosen examples of personal and familial interest (the former being the orator's birthplace, the latter the site of one of his villas), another indicator that this is the most personal of Cicero's extant philosophi­ cal works; cf., besides the three proems, §§ 7 7 - 7 8 , 2.45, 3.121 (however, Leg. would be a close second; cf. esp. 2.3). Besides the personal connection, these examples are of places which have taken their names after the occupy­ ing peoples and therefore, as Wacht, 33, notes, were doubtless intended to make the process seem quite normal. They are evidently cited as examples of vetus occupatio. . . . similisque est pnvatarum possessionum discriptio.) For the spelling and sense of discriptio cf. ad § 124. ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat;. . .] For the idea of taking possession of originally common property cf. Chrysippus' simile of the theater [SVF 3, 90.30 ff. = Fin. 3.67): . . . quern ad modum, tbeatrum cum commune sitt recte tamen did potest eius esse eum locum, quern quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuius­ que sit. Erskine, 105 ff., tries to deny the Chrysippean provenance of this simile, but see above (on sunt autem privata nulla natura . . .). As Seneca (Ben. 7.12.4-6) pointed out in discussing seating in the theater, in the asser­ tion me habere in equestribus locum, habere is equivocal and can refer either to possession or occupancy; Chrysippus' use of the theater simile suggests the latter, rather than an unrestricted right to dispose of property as one wishes; cf. Wacht, 4 7 - 4 8 ; Annas, 1989, 167-68. Cicero's text, however, does not encourage one to look for a distinction between occupancy and ownership.—The definition of justice offered by Simonides FMG 642 apud PI. Rp. 331e (το τα όφ€ΐλόμ€να έκάστψ αποδίδομαι δίκαιον έστι) was adopted

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in essentials by the Stoa (e.g., SVF 3, 63.27: δικαιοσύνης 6e έπιστημην άποι^μητικήν ττ\ς άξιας έκάστψ) and was well known to Cicero; cf. Fin. 5.67, where justice is said to consist in suo cuique tribuendo. The formula­ tion was later taken up and modified by Ulpian {Dig. 1.1.10 pr.: iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi; cf. Wieacker, 1, 510 and n. 44) but, unlike suum cuique (sc. placet or the like), did not achieve proverbial status in ancient, as opposed to modern, times. 30 In our passage the injunction quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat is a variation of that definition with an emphasis characteristic of Off. (cf. esp. 2.73), not on transfer, but retention of property; see next note. . . . fe quo si quisf sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.] Ε [or ex) quo seems very likely to be a dirtography of the previous ex quo; hence Winterbottom's suggested deletion; following quis we shall surely need quid, as Muller proposed after Lambinus.—Appetitus (= ορμή: cf. 5 101), a drive which the human being shares with animals (cf. 2.11), is, of course, not bad per se (cf. § 11: coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa). However, the fourth virtue is charged inter alia with keeping wandering appetites under the control of reason (§§ 102-3). For the corresponding adverb used specifi­ cally regarding designs on another's property cf. l-abeo's warning to the Nolans and Neapolitans: ne cupide quid agerent, ne appetenter . . . (§ 33). The ius humanae societatis is a variatio for iustitia; cf. $ 60. It is no accident that Cicero's first example of wrong-doing involves the violation of property rights, a topic that will receive extensive coverage in this treatise (see esp. 2.72-85 and much of the third book). PereUi, 3 0 2 - 3 , contrasts the formula­ tion at 3.21: si enim sic erimus adfecti ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est earn quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem, which he sees as more Stoic (certainly it is explicitly tied to the Stoic TeXos formula; cf. ad 3.13). Our sentence presupposes that property rights are to be respected, but that does not necessarily make it a one-sided precept in favor of property owners (it would be so only if the premise were a conflict of rights). Therefore it is not clear, as PereUi argues, that Cicero grossly deforms Panaetius* views; the emphasis may be Cicero's, however. Cf. ad 2.72-85. 22 This material, joined with the weak connector sed (cf. ad § 15 and 2.87), takes us without warning beyond justice proper. We are told that others have claims upon us, that human beings have been created for the sake of others of 30. Cf. Orto, 337-38, esp. 338, n. 1; Georg Biichmann, Geflugelte Worte una Zitatenschatz, new cd. (Konstanz and Stuttgart, 1950), 216, citing Titus Andronicus 1.1.280 and its use as a motto by Frederick the Great.

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their kind, indeed, to benefit each other as much as possible; the paragraph concludes with the statement that we "ought" by various means to bind human society together. One might actually have expected this paragraph, or part of it, as the beginning of the discussion of beneficentia, which begins oddly, not with a definition or explanation of the importance of the subject, but with a list of cautioner (cf. ad § 42). Our paragraph, if oddly placed, is important in that it shows why Panaetius has subsumed tustitia and benefi­ centia under a single virtue: they are two sides of the same coin; abstaining from injustice to others and their property involves overcoming the desire for self-aggrandizement at all costs; one should develop instead the conviction that the human community has value and deserves to be promoted and maintained. For some of the problems inherent in this disjunctive conception of the second virtue cf., however, Annas, 1989, 168-69. . . . ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici. . .] (PI.] Ep. 9.358a (to Archytas): αλλά κάκάνο oei oe ένθυμ€ΐσθαι, δτι 'έκαστος ημών ούχ αυτώ μόνον yiyovzv, αλλά της yeveoeiog ημών το μέν τι ή πατρίς μ^ρί^ται, το δέ τι οι γεννήσαντε?, το δέ οί λοιποί φίλοι, πολλά δέ και τοις καιροί?δίδοται τοΐς τον βίον ημών καταλαμβάνουσι. Cf. Dem. 18.205: ήγεΐτο γάρ αυτών 'έκαστος ούχι τιΐι πατρ'ι και τη μητρι μόνον γβγενήσθαι, αλλά και τη πατρίδι; cf. the similar attitude Cicero attributes to his client at Clu. 43 (where, in view of the characterization of Sassia, the reference to parents is discreetly dropped):. . . pro eo quod se non suis commodis sed etiam suorum municipum ceterorumque necessariorum natum esse arbitrabatur . . . This quotation may originally have belonged to the introduction of the κοινωνική αφορμή at § 12, as at Fin. 2.45; avoidance of juxtaposition of Platonic citations would not alone, however, be sufficient explanation for its transference to this spot in view of §§ 2 8 , 6 3 - 6 4 , and 85.—Ortus = -γένζσις does indeed appear here u sensu dilatato" (Bohnenkamp, TLL 9.2,1069.66); Miiller (ad loc.) finds latent γίγνεσθαι not merely in the sense of being born but of existence. The connection with -que following a negation where other languages such as English or German would use an adversative is common; Muller counts some twenty instances in Off.—It is odd that Cicero omits parents (unless one assume that partem parentes has fallen out through saut du mime au meme before partem amici)^ especially in view of the emphasis on them in the ranking of claimants to officia at §§ 58 and 160. . . . atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terns gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari . . .] This is, of course, the thesis that Balbus puts forward at N.D. 2.154 ff.; cf. Chrysipp. 5VF2,332.38 = N.D. 2.37 and SVF 3,90.24 ff. = Fin. 3.67.

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. . . homines autem hominum causa esse generates, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent. . .] The point is argued in detail at 2.11-16; cf. also Sen. de Ira 1.5.2: homo in adiutorium mutuum genitus est. . . . . . in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi . . .] Though nature had been the source of the drives giving rise to the "parts" of the honestum at §§ 11-15, this is the first explicit allusion to the Stoic τέλος· formula; cf. $ 100 and ad 3.13; hoc, of course, is defined by the following infinitives. Cf. $ 129, 2.73; Leg. 1.20: . . . repetam stirpem iuris a natura, qua duce nobis omnis est disputatio explicanda. . . . communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, turn artibus, turn opera, turn facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.) The prescription is, by exchange of officia, to add mutual advantages "to the common stock" (for this sense of in medium cf. OLD s.v. medium 4b) and thus strengthen the social bond (for a different interpretation of in medium cf. Nickel, 66); cf. the similar injunction at § 52: . . . semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem adferendum. That such be­ havior is "according to nature" has already been established at § 12. This precept has several corollaries: in general the principle hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse (3.25; non-Panaetian); in particular efforts expended in hominum commodis tuendis are approved (§ 153; nonPanaetian), whereas the pursuit of private interests at the expense of the commonality is deprecated (§ 62); cf. §5 11-12 and 3.21 ff. Long, 19951, 239, sees this argument as the basis for Hecato's view of property cited at 3.63. 23a Fides, mentioned already in the periphrasis of the second virtue at § 15, is a term of some importance in the Roman value system, although its coun­ terpart πίστις has less prominence among the Greeks prior to Epictetus. Heinze, 164 = 79-80, thus describes the role of fides in our treatise: "Wenn Cicero rein aus seinem romischen Bewufitsein de officiis geschrieben hatte, so ware der fides cin ragender Thronsitz zugefallen:31 aber er bindet sich zunachst an das griechische System undfindetso fur die Tugend derfides,die er doch nicht ubergehen kann, einen notdurftigen Unterschlupf im Kapitel uber die iustitia." The expected prominence of fides in a treatise de officiis has to do, of course, with officium in the sense of "favor" being the concrete expression of fides in social relations; cf. Sailer, 15. If, however, iustitia consists in not violating (a) the person or (b) the property of others, then the relevance of fides to both is apparent, so that its treatment under iustitia 31. Fraenkel, TLL 6, 675.74 ff., has collected some passages in which fides appears in enumerations of the virtues.

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seems natural rather than "notdiirftig"; the other references to fides in our Book, apart from its mention in connection with magistrates in § 124, fall within the section on justice (§§ 31,35,40; cf. also 2.26,3.87). On the other hand, πιστις- in the sense of the trust of one's fellow citizens (as opposed to "trustworthiness," as in our passage) was a factor dealt with by Panaetius under the utile (sc. 2.33-34; cf. 2.21); bona fides, on the other hand, a large factor in Roman litigation, receives attention at 3.58 ff. (devoted again to the topic of justice; cf. ad 3.96); cf. Heinze, 147, n. 1, and 164, n. 1. fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictomm conventorumque constanria et Veritas.] Cicero's encomium of fides as the fundamentum iustitiae appears to be an ad hoc invention; in any case, it does not prevent him (after Panaetius?) from calling something else (sc. utpro dignitate cuique tribuatur) the iustitiae fundamentum at § 42.—For the terms of the defini­ tion cf. Freyburger, 134-35. ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur fonasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat quod dictum est, appellatam fidem.] Cicero pretends to offer this etymology of fides reluctantly and merely in imitation of Stoic practice; cf. fr. phil., p. 62, no. 1, where someone quotes an etymology ut . . . imitetur ineptias Stoicorum.31 Cicero has, however, been propounding this particular etymology, in public and private, since the 50s; cf. Rep. 4.7: fides enim nomen ipsum mihi videtur habere, cum fit quod dicitur; Fam. 16.10.2 (to Tiro; 18 April 53): nostra ad diem dicta(m) fient; docui enim te fides €τυμοι> quod haberet; for the later etymological tradition cf. R. Maltby, A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies (Leeds, 1991), s.v. fides. Moreover, the dissem­ bling of our passage should not obscure Cicero's own keen interest, often inspired by Varro, in finding etyma for both divine names and Latin words, an interest put on display especially in N.D. 2; cf. the material collected by Carolus Adolphus Benecke, De Cicerone etymologo (diss. Konigsberg, 1835). 23b Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum qui infemnt, alteram eorum qui ab iis quibus infertur, si possum, non propulsant iniuriam.] Not only is retaliation for wrongdoing allowed (cf. § 20: nisi lacessitus iniuria)t but counteraction against iniuria is required; cf. further ad §§ 27-28. In the speech he attributed to the Corinthians at Sparta Thucydides laid stress on the responsibility of the party who overlooks injustice (1.69.1): ού γαρ ό δουλωσάμενο?, αλλ' ο δυι>άμ€ΐ>05 μέι> παΟσαι. περιορώι/ δέ αληθέστεροι' αυτό 32. On rhc Stoic interest in etymologies cf. A. Dyck, "John Mauropus of Euchaita and the Stoic Etymologikon," JOB 43 (1993), 116-17; Var. fr. 130, p. 238.13 Goctz-Schocll.

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6pg . . . Democr. 68 Β 256 D.-K. formulates more generally: δίκη μέν eoriv ep6eiv τά χρή €Οντα, άδικίη δέ μη Ιρδβιν τά χρή €Οντα, άλλα παρατρ€π€σθαι; sim. 261: άδικουμενοισι τιμωρεΐν κατά δυναμιν χρή και μή παριέναι· το μεν γάρ τοιούτον δίκαιον και αγαθόν, το δέ μή τοιούτον άδικον και κακόν (cf. J.F. Procope, "Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul," CQ 39 [1989J, 317-18); cf. Arist. EN 1113b8-10: ώοτ' ei το πράττίΐν καλόν δν €φ' ήμΐν εστί, και το μή πράττ€ΐν έφ' ήμΐν έσται αίσχρον όν . . . ; Plut. Tranq. An. 466a. Similarly Christian theologians treat "sins of omission" as a separate class; cf. Th. Deman, Dictionnaire de theohgie catholique 12.1 (Paris, 1933), 154 ff. nam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua perturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus adferre videtur s o c i o ; . . . ] The same is presumably the case for premeditated crimes, which are distinguished from crimes of passion only at § 27.—Anger is par excellence the passion that leads to violence; cf. Arist. EN 1130a31; Pol. 131 l a 3 3 - 3 4 ; Sen. de Ira 1.1.1: ceteris (sc. adfectis) enim aliquid quieti placidique inest, hie totus concitatus et in impetu est, doloris armorum, sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana furens cupiditate, dum alteri noceat sui neglegens, in ipsa inruens tela et ultionis secum ultorem tracturae avidus; ibid., 2.3.5: numquam dubium est quin timor fugam habeat, ira impetum. The general Stoic doctrine, which Panaetius probably explained under the first virtue (cf. ad $5 18-19), was that the φαντασίαι that present themselves to the mind give rise to drives (όρμαί) that require, in the human being, assent before they can be acted upon; through a weakness in the soul a ορμή may, however, pass beyond the control of reason and become one of the four passions (on which cf. ad $ 69); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 142; Sandbach, 6 0 - 6 1 ; Inwood, 1993, 164 ff. For the doctrine of the perturbationes animi in general cf. §$ 100-3a, on anger in particular ad §§ 88-89.—Miiller ad he. asserts that aut aliquis is common in the sense "oder uberhaupt" or "oder irgend ein anderer" and cites § 71 as parallel ( . . . aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa . . . [he also cites 3.30 by mistake)), where the parallelism to our passage depends upon graviore not being a true comparative with valetudinis imbecillitate as the point of reference. He is probably right in this interpretation; cf. also, with M. Winterbottom, Tusc. 3.29 [aut mortem acerbam aut exili maestam fugam I aut semper aliquam molem meditabar mali) with Kiihner's note ad he. adducing Tusc. 1.74 ( . . . a magistratu aut ah aliqua potestate legitima . . .).—Elsewhere in Off. Cicero generally refers to passion as perturbatio animi, rather than perturbatio alone as at Tusc. 3.24 et Λ/., perhaps to avoid ambiguity (§§ 27, 66 and 102); cf. § 1 3 6 where perturbationes appears without qualifier but is glossed in the context as motus animi nimios

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rationi non obtemperantes; similarly, in our context the preceding aut ira was surely felt as a sufficient limitation.—The "laying of hands on a sociusn is inferred from the societas hominum inter ipsos (§ 20; cf. ad loc.)y further delineated at $S 50 ff. and 3.21 ff. (non-Panaetian). qui autem non defendit nee obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tarn est in vitio quam si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserac] Parentes and patria are the principal claimaints on one's officia according to § 58 ($ 160 adds the gods at the top of the hierarchy); the amid, though mentioned in context, are not placed in the hierarchy; cf. ad §§ 5 0 - 5 8 . The doctrine is similar to 3.28 (nonPanaetian), where it is argued that there is no point within the chain of humanity at which one can sanction self-aggrandizement at another's ex­ pense without destroying the humani generis sodetas (see ad he). 24 Atque illae quidem iniuriae—in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.] The analysis of the causes of iniuria seems truncated; the items named, fear and greed, the latter subdivided into greed for money and for power, correspond to three of Aristotle's seven causes of revolution, though others, such as καταφρόνηση, would also have been apposite (cf. Pol. 1302a34 ff.); cf. also Sen. Ep. 105.1: considera quae sint quae hominem in pernidem hominis instigent: invenies spent, invidiam, odium, metum, contemptum.—Metus reappears as a (rejected) means of propping one's rule over subjects at 2.23 ff.—Greed is also given as a motive for wrongdoing at EN 1130a31 (ει δ' tKfpoavev, έπ' οϋδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν αλλ' ή επ' άδικίαν [sc. γίνεται ή επαναφορά|); in Book 2 Cicero repeatedly warns the would-be statesman against it (§$ 64, 75, 77). 2 5 - 2 6 expetuntur autem divitiae—.] The rather odd organization of this material has caused difficulties. The statement expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, turn ad perfruendas voluptates receives two different sequels: 1) the contrast to those in quibus maior est animus, who see money as a tool with which to achieve power; 2) delectant etiam magnifici apparatus . . . ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset, a further amplification of ad perfruendas voluptates. Furthermore, after the simple declaration that the innocent accumulation of property is unobjectionable, the point follows that imperiorum honorum gloriae cupiditas lures the majority {plerique) to ne­ glect justice, without any reference to the implications of the Crassus exemplum. Rcinhardt, 1885, 5-6^ wanted to transpose delectant etiam magnifici—ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset after ad perfruendas volup­ tates. But this transposition is difficult to explain as a mechanical defect in transmission and brings, at best, only marginal improvement, since the Crassus exemplum still cannot function as a transition from pursuers of the βίο? απολαυστικό"? to the μεγαλόψυχοι (since nee vero ret familiaris

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amplificatio—iniuria est intervenes), and the oddity of the lack of reference to Crassus in the sentence beginning maxime autem adducuntur plerique is increased if the allusion to him is moved still closer. The athetesis of the Crassus exemplum would also be ill advised, however. Cicero's preoccupation at this period with evaluating Crassus' career is clear from 3.73-75 and Parad. 4 5 - 4 6 ; 3 3 and the anecdote is unlikely to have been invented out of whole cloth by an interpolator in view of the oblique allusion to it at Parad. 4 5 - 4 6 (see ad § IS). Our passage is rather evidence of the mechanical way in which Cicero added examples in this work without mak­ ing the adjustments one would have expected. Heilmann, 103-4, complains that Cicero fails to provide an example here of how a striving for possessions leads to injustice. Perhaps he thought the point obvious. In any case, a number of such examples, both hypothetical and historical, appear at 3.49b ff. 25 cxpemntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, turn ad perfniendas voluptates.] Although in Stoicism ηδονή bears a double sense (cf. ad 5 69), here the bodily sensation is clearly meant. in quibus autem maior est animus—cuius fmctibus excrcitum alere non posset.J Opes in this sentence probably refers specifically to political power, a usage that crept into Latin during the Ciceronian age; cf. Kuhlmann, TLL 9, 810.22 ff.; OLD s.v. ops 2.—Cf. Parad. AS: multi ex te audierunt cum diceres neminem esse divitem nisi qui exercitum alere posset suis fructibus, quod populus Romanus tantis vectigalibus iam pridem vix potest, ergo hoc proposito numquam eris dives ante quam tibi ex tuts possessionibus tantum reficietur ut eo tueri sex legiones et magna equitum ac peditum auxilia possis. iam fateris igitur non esse te divitem, cut tantum desit ut expleas id quod exoptas. This passage is part of a longer attack on Crassus a propos the paradox quod solus sapiens dives. RE. Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire (Cambridge, 1966), 22, connected the six legions of this passage with the legions which Crassus recruited during Spartacus' revolt; in view of Rome's heavy commitment on other fronts [viz., Spain, Asia Minor, and the Bal­ kans), it would hardly be surprising if he had been largely responsible for equipping and sustaining them as well, perhaps, as Adcock suggests, on the understanding that he would be reimbursed in future; on the whole episode cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 303.15 ff. Thus in setting the maintenance of an army as a prerequisite for a position as princeps in the state, Crassus would have been thinking of his own case (he was elected consul for 70, the year following the suppression of the revolt). D. Whitehead, "The Measure of a 33. Dated before Cato's death in mid-April 46 (2-3).

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Millionaire: What Crassus Really Said," LCM 11 (1986), 71-74, leaves open two possibilities: either (a) Crassus was speaking purely hypothetically or (b) in Parad. Cicero combined statements made by Crassus at different times—the complaint (presumably made at the time of Spartacus' revolt) of the difficulty of maintaining the six legions and a later dictum (cf. nuper in our passage) that has an undertone of boastfulness (presumably Crassus alone would qualify). Probably the two Ciceronian passages refer to a single statement of Crassus. What Crassus said originally was probably something to this effect: nullam satis magnam alicui pecuniam esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non possit, with Cicero supplying the person to suit his context in either case. Thus in Parad., where Cicero was concerned to define the term dives, the ability to support an army on the yield of one's property is made a prerequi­ site for being called dives; in our passage, on the other hand, the concern is with injustice in the use of property, a topic that soon causes Cicero to think of political examples, Crassus here and Caesar in the following paragraph. He is preparing in particular to excoriate the tatter's striving for principatus (§ 26:. . . propter eum quern sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum); hence in our passage Crassus* statement is made to apply to the would-be princeps. Note that the specification of six legions is part of Cicero's reply, not of Crassus' statement; it might simply be given as a figure for an averagesized army; there is no need to assume that Crassus' statement involved reference to the six legions he recruited to face Spartacus (he had charge, in addition, of two legions from the former consular army: App. BC 1.549). It is not prima facie clear on what basis Cicero elicits Crassus' "confes­ sion" of his inability to support such an army. Nuper is a word notoriously relative in application (cf. also 2.20 and 3.47a; ad 2.58); but if it is to be taken seriously at all, it makes it easier to set Crassus' dictum into the context of the operation against the Parthians than against Spartacus. The efforts of Pompey and Crassus to recruit Italian soldiers for the planned war in the east were met with determined resistance by the tribunes, who hauled the recruit­ ing officers before a popular tribunal; the consuls responded by putting on mourning clothes and ultimately by threatening the tribunes with force (cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 11927], 320.63 ff.). Crassus surely spoke the words quoted by Cicero during the time when his recruitment of troops was being thwarted; the statement that only a man who can support a private army on his income has enough money gave vent to his exasperation over political roadblocks; but the fact that he continued his recruitment effort in the nor­ mal way, rather than raising a private army, is evidently what Cicero uses as Crassus' implicit confession that he is not dives.

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Allen Mason Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (Co­ lumbia and London, 1977), 6 8 - 6 9 , argues that in evaluating Crassus* mo­ tives scholarship has not taken our passage seriously enough, the implication being that political ambition drove Crassus' accumulation of wealth. Note, however, Cicero's phrase et ad gratificandi facultatem. Also, if the above reconstruction is correct, Cicero has taken Crassus' remark out of context and used it for his own purposes as a sinister foreshadowing of Caesar's striving for principatus. Too much weight should perhaps therefore not be attached to these words, though they can be seen as a symptom of the breakdown, even at the highest levels, of respect for the rule of law (cf. also 3.73-75). Crassus' condemnation by Gelzer, he. cit., 330.42 ff., does nor, in light of Cicero's judgment in Off. and Parad.t seem too harsh, nee vero rci familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est. . .] Cf. A. Pers. 168: €στι γάρ πλούτο? γ ' άμ€μφής· . . .; Plut. de Gen. Soc. 584b (Theanor to Epaminondas): και τίς αν . . . λόγος άπίίργοι την CK καλών και δικαίων κτήσιν (sc. τοΟ πλούτου) . . . ; $ 92 (. . . quaeprimum beneparta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso . . .) and ad §§ 2 1 - 2 2 and 2.73. 26 Maxime autem adducuntur plerique ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio cum in imperiomm honorum gloriae cupiditatem inaderunt.] This sentence does not contradict the statement made shortly before (§ 24), maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam adgrediuntur ut adipiscantur ea quae concupiverunt, since cupiditas for power and the like is a subset of cupiditas in general; hence we need not excuse the two sentences on grounds of hasty composition (as does Thomas, 21). quod enim est apud Enniura 'nulla sancta societas / nee fides rcgni est', id lathis patet.] Cicero presents remains of two Ennian trochaic septenarii (seen. inc. 404 = trag. 381 = 320 Jocelyn; cf. also Otto, 296; Ribbeck conjecturally assigned them to the Thyestes; cf. ad 3.104 34 ). There were certainly Greek verses of similar purport that Panaetius could have cited, such as Eur. Pho. 5 2 4 - 2 5 (of which Cicero supplied his own version at 3.82). In the following sentence Winterbottom rightly prints sanctam societatem, as an Ennian allusion, in inverted commas. On problems of the same citation (with regni transposed after nulla) as transmitted at Rep. 1.49, cf. Skutsch, 30.—In this passage fides has, of course, the sense "good faith, honesty, honor" {OLD s.v., 6); regni is probably best taken as "genitive of the sphere" (cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 74 ff. ["Genitiv des Sachbetreffs"!; OLD s.v. societas l b , citing our passage; Wegner, 31). Cf. the paraphrase at Luc. 1.92-93: nulla 34. Cf. also Sen. Thy. 424-25 (Thyestes is rhe speaker): rebus irtcerttssimis, I fratrt atque regno, credis . . . f

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fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas I impatiens consortis erit; cf. the similar description of the tyrant's life at Amic. 52: haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benivolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana perverrJt propter eum quern sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum.] This is the first of the thrusts at Caesar, initially mentioned όνομαστί (here and at § 43); in the later, more emotional attacks the name is omirted (cf. 2.23 ff., 3.36, and ad 3.82-83). Under iura divina Cicero was surely thinking of the decision to honor Caesar with a statue in the temple of Quirinus with the legend "to the unconquered god** (cf. Att. 12.45.2, 17 May 45: eum owvaov Quirino malo quam Saluti), perhaps also of the pulvinar, the flamen, and the adding of a day to the Ludi Romani in his honor, all of which he discusses at Phil. 2.110 (where see Denniston's notes). Cicero himself was among those who proposed honors for Caesar in the aftermath of the civil war, but honors on a human scale, which were soon outbidden by others (cf. Plut. Caes. 57.2); Cicero's references to superhuman honors have been col­ lected by W. Leschhorn in an appendix to A. Alfoldi, Caesar in 44, 1, Antiquitas 3.16 (Bonn, 1985), 387 ff. Under iura humana Cicero has in mind above all Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in defiance of the senate; cf. Hermann Strasburger, Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen, 2d ed. (Darmstadt, 1968), 31 ff., on Caesar's (weak) legal case. On Caesar's ambi­ tion for principatus under the old form of the Roman state, ibid., 5 2 - 5 3 ; cf. also ad § 124.—Fingere sibi appears in the sense "conjure up in the mind, visualize**: cf. Vollmer, TLL 6.1,775.67; OLD s.v., 8a. The note of condem­ nation in opinionis errore is striking in light of § 18: labi. . . errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus. Here as elsewhere in this essay Cicero presents his (by no means uncontroversial) political judgment as fact; cf. ad 2.43. est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque exsistunt honoris imperii potentiae gloriae cupiditates.] Cf. further ad § 65. 27 Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogjtata fiat iniuria.J PI. Lg. 866e ff. accords lighter penalties to those who kill in anger and without premeditation, though he still regards such acts as voluntary. Similarly, Aristotle observed: οργιζόμεθα . . . και φοβούμ€θα άπροαιρέτω? (ΕΝ 1106a2-3), but he nonetheless regarded action on the basis of the passions as voluntary (ibid., l l l l b l - 3 ) ; for a general sketch of Aristotle's doctrine of the will and passions cf. Anthony Kenny, Aristotle s Theory of the

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Will (London, 1979), esp. 3 5 - 3 7 . In spite of Panaetius' general emphasis on the importance of acting only after proper deliberation (viz., so that the reason will check, rather than assent to, any improper φαι/τασία; cf. §§ 49a, 82, and ad §$ 11 and 23b above), the position taken in our passage does not correspond to any Stoic distinction (in either case one would be yielding to πάθος) but is in line rather with the kind of argumentation that Cicero might have used before the bar (cf. Top. 64: cadunt etiam in ignorationem atque imprudentiam perturbationes attimi; quae quamquam sunt voluntariae— obiurgatione enim et admonitione deiciuntur—tamen habent tantos motust ut ea quae voluntaria sunt aut necessana interdum aut certe ignorata videantur). Only later, however, did it become a principle of Roman jurisprudence; see Marcianus, Dig. 48.8.1.3: divus Hadrianus rescripsit eum, qui hominem occidit, si non occidendi animo hoc admisit, absolvi posse, et qui hominem non occidit, sed vulneravit, ut occidat, pro homicida damnandum; et ex re constituendum hoc: nam si gladium strinxerit et [in] eo percusserit, indubitate occidendi animo id eum admisisse; sed si clavi percusserit aut cuccuma in rixa, quamvis ferro percusserit, tamen non occidendi animo. leniendam poenam eius, qui in rixa casu magis quam voluntate homicidium admisit; similarly Antoninus Pius allowed a mitigated penalty for a man who killed his wife discovered in adultery (ibid., 5). Similar, too, is the scholastic distinc­ tion between the incontinens, who sins from passion, and the intemperatus, who sins from disposition (Thorn. 5. Th. II.2 q. 156 a. 3).—In characterizing passion (perturbatio animi) as of brief duration Cicero is evidently thinking, as at § 23b, above all of anger, sometimes called a brevis insania (cf. Sen. de ha 1.1.2). 2 8 - 2 9 Cicero lists various factors that might cause one to desert appropriate action and not resist wrongdoing (sc. to a third party). The two groups are respectively those who 1) inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt and who 2a) aut. . . neglegentia pigritia inertia 2b) aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve . . . impediuntur . . . Now 1) and 2a) really amount to the same thing. What interests Cicero is 2b), which he further divides into those who put forward as a hindrance either (i) their studies or (ii) their other occupations; the balance of the discussion of the problem will be devoted to these two types. Cicero's handling of (i) forestalls his com­ parison of the first and second virtues at §$ 152 ff. 28 nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt—desertos esse patiantur.] The excuses are of several types: either one is unwilling to undertake the action because of certain entailed disincentives {aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt) or one lacks motivation [ne­ glegentia pigritia inertia) or one prefers to engage in other activities instead

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(suis studiis quibusdam occuptionibusve. . . impediuntur . . .). As he wrote these lines was Cicero perhaps thinking of those who failed him at the time of his exile? itaque videndum est—propterea iustos esse.] Panaetius was an avid admirer of Plato (ισχυρώς φιλοττλάτων: fr. 57); even considering the dialogues from a philological point of view, he commented on how many times Plato reformu­ lated the beginning of the Republic (fr. 130) and entertained doubts about the authenticity of the Phaedo (frr. 126-29); cf. in general E. des Places, u Le platonisme de Panetius," Melanges d' archeologie et d'histoire 68 (1956), 8 3 - 9 3 . The passage Panaetius had in mind is evidently the satire of philoso­ phers at Tht. 173d ff. (note the phrase in philosophos; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 28, n. 4), in particular 1 7 3 e : . . . τω όντι τό σώμα μόνον ev τη πόλ€ΐ κ€ΐται αυτοϋ και έττιδημβΐ, ή δέ διάνοια, ταΰτα πάντα ήγησαμένη σμικρά και ουδέν, άτιμάσασα πανταχή ττετ€ται κατά Πίνδαρον (fr. 292) "τά? τ€ -γάς inrevepOe" και τά βττίπβδα γ€ωμ€τροΰσα. "ουρανού θ' imcp"· άστρονομούσα, καΐ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν έρ€υνωμένη τών όντων έκαστου όλου, εις τών έγγϋς ουδέν αυτήν συγκαθΐ€Ϊσα. The claim to justice {propterea iustos esse) is inferred, rather than explicit. Cicero reverts to the topic at SS 69b ff.—Not attested before Cicero, digladior is a verb he likes to apply, as here, to philosophical con­ troversies; cf. Ac. 1 fr. (p. 20.10 Plasberg): quid autem stomachatur Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibusf or Tusc. 4.47: Peripateticis respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur Hit per me li­ cet . . . ; Gudeman, TLL 1.7, 1131.50 ff. nam altcrum (iustitiae genus) adsequuntur, in inferenda ne cui noceant inju­ ria, in alteram incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent deserunt.] Pearce's athetesis of iustitiae genus, evidently inserted by a careless reader who thought to clarify the meaning (in contradistinction to the genera iniustitiae of § 29), is all that is needed to put this passage right (so Pohlenz, AFt 29; Atzert 3 ; Thomas, 81-84; Fedeli [apart from positing a lacuna before in alterum; see belowj; Testard and Winterbottom retain the transmitted text 3S ), not the extreme solution of bracketing the entire sentence, as Unger, 20, followed by Bruser, 49, and Atzert 4 (in the text, though his apparatus carelessly retains the third edition's approval of Pearce's solution). The nam alterum—deserunt is needed as an explanation of the assertion that what Plato says against the philosophers is insufficient (sc. because it fails to make

35. Winterbottom adds in the critical apparatus that the text can stand if in alterum incidunt can bear the same sense as offendunt; he seems to be reckoning, in other words, with Ciceronian carelessness of expression, a phenomenon that can never be altogether ruled out in this essay.

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clear the injustice of their position). For the form of the thought cf. de Orat. 2.101: ita dum inertiae vituperationem, quae maior est, contemnunt, adsequuntur etiam Mam, quant magis ipsi fugiunt, tarditatis. Note that a prover­ bial saying (quoted by Panaetius?) underlies this: cf. com. adesp. fr. 424: ποταμόι> δέ φ€υγων αγνοείς / εις τήι> θάλατταν έμπεσών; Cic. fn orat., Pro Cornelio I, no. 4: eiusmodi mihi duos bqueos in causa esse propositos, ut, si me altero expedissem, tenerer altera.—The asyndeton before in alterum incidunt is [pace Fedeli) not such as to demand a lacuna; for the type ("asyn­ deton adversativum") cf. Hofmann-Szanryr, 830; von Albrecht, 129 = Eng. tr. 104. itaque eos ne ad rempublicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos.] The idea of public service under compulsion first occurs at Pi. R. 347c 1: δ€Ϊ δη αύτοΐς ανάγκην προσβΐναι και ίημίαν, ei μβλλουσιν εθέλβιν άρχβιν . . . , where the reference is to the good in general, not just philosophers. It is applied to philosophers and contrasted with the ordinary struggle for power, ibid., 520a6 ff. and c6 ff.: σκβψαι τοίνυν, εΐπον, ώ Γλαυκών, ότι ούδ' άδικήσομ€ν τους παρ' ήμΐν φιλοσόφους γιγνομίνους, άλλα δίκαια προς αυτούς έροϋμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες των άλλων έπιμελεΐσθαί Τ€ και φυλάττ€ΐν. . . . και ούτω ϋπαρ ήμΐν και ύμΐν ή πόλις οίκήσίται αλλ' ουκ όναρ, ως νυν α'ι πολλαΐ ύπό σκιαμαχουντων Tt προς αλλήλους και στασια£όντων π€ρι του άρχαν οικούνται, ώς μεγάλου τινός αγαθού όντος. For the usual Stoic view of public service cf. ad § 71, where Cicero offers the learned a reprieve, albeit grudgingly. Cf. also Fam. 9.6.5 (quoted ad 2.3-5).—In view of the fact that Cicero/Panaetius is reproducing, not a continuous argument, but observa­ tions culled from several Platonic works, Winterbottom's idemque for itaque is attractive (but for the loose use of inferential particles cf. ad § 13). aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est quod rccte fit, si est voluntarium.] The goal is still to refute their claim to justice [aequius . . . erat); cf. Arist. EN 1106a2-4: . . . όργιζόμ^θα μέν και φοβούμ€θα άπροαιρίτως, αϊ δ' άθ€τα! προαιρέσεις τινές ή ουκ άνευ προαιρέσεως; cf. ad § 27. For the point that just action is so only when practiced for its own sake cf. ad 2.42. 29 The two types of άπράγμονες discussed in this paragraph have even less excuse to withdraw from public affairs than the philosophers. Those who put forward the need to attend to their own property correspond to the piscinarii whom Cicero excoriates in his letters (cf. ad 3.73). The mis­ anthrope figures as a butt of satire in Menander's Dyskolos, Plautus' Aulularia, Lucian's Timon, etc.; on Timon cf. also Amic. 87. 3 0 - 4 1 Cicero begins by reviewing the immediately preceding topics, viz., the two types of injustice and their causes (§§ 23b-29), as well as the constitu-

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ents of justice itself (§§ 20-23a). The general factor that might hinder clear judgment is dealt with first, self-love {$ 30), and a rule of thumb is offered to counteract it, viz., to abstain from action in doubtful cases. Other circum­ stances might, however, tempt one to commit injustice. The focus now shifts to the possibility of a change of appropriate action being entailed by special circumstances (officia κατά π€ρίστασιΐ'); cf. White, 111-15. We are told that there are circumstances in which one need not keep one's word; one must calculate whether fulfilling the promise may do more harm than good to the recipient or may prevent one from discharging a still more important obliga­ tion (§ 32). Hence to insist on the letter of an agreement in spite of changed circumstances is a form of injustice. Again, promises need not be kept that have been extracted by deceit or force ($$ 33 ff.). This last point raises the question whether promises made to the enemy in wartime are to be regarded as extracted by force or need to be honored; the result is a general discussion of bellica officia (the phrase occurs in 5 41). Finally, being of higher status (i.e., free, rather than a slave) may tempt one to injustice; hence the relations of masters and slaves demand clarification ($ 41a). That this material still falls within the larger discussion of injustice begun in § 23b is shown by the conclusion: the worst kind of injustice is that which clothes itself in the appearance of justice (§ 41b). Characteristic of this section is, apart from Theseus and Hippolytus (§ 32) and Cleomedes (unnamed in § 33), the exclusive use of Roman examples—a sign that Cicero is closely involved in the argument. Johann, 107 and 504, n. 32, has argued that in §§ 3 1 - 4 0 the underlying philosophical doctrine derives from Posidonius, who is known to have writ­ ten on officia κατά περίστασιν (Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 41a E.-K. = 431a Th.). Though this is not impossible, it is far from certain, and various consider­ ations tell against it. Thus, Cicero's own announcement τά π€pi τοϋ καθήκον­ τος, quatcnus Panaetius, absolvi duobus in the same letter in which he reports having sent for Posidonius1 "book" and the κεφάλαια περί του κατά ττ€ρίστασιι> καθήκοντος suggests that at this writing he regarded the first two books as complete (ibid.). Nor is there any need to assume that Cicero revised Book 1 extensively in light of material received later, since Panaetius, too, given his interest in problems and praecepta connected with ordinary life, would probably have dealt with the topic; what can be inferred from internal evidence about Cicero's compositional practice in adding material to this essay does not suggest large-scale insertions to the draft (cf. ad 2.19b20a and 3.96). The overlapping of material, viz., the exemplum of Theseus and Hippolytus, which appears both at $ 32 and 3.94, as well as those of Regulus, Fabricius, and the ten Romans captured after Cannae (cf. §§ 3 9 - 4 0

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and 3.86 and 99-115) should be explained by Cicero's extensive reuse in Book 3 of material from Book 1, with use of Posidonius in Book 3, in any case, unlikely to go beyond thefirstthirty-seven chapters (see introduction to Book 3). Finally, the philosophical doctrines underlying $§ 34 ff. are fully compatible with Panaetius' views (see following notes); hence I have as­ sumed that Panaetius still continues to be the source, although his doctrines are here interpenetrated with Roman attitudes toward imperialism. 30 . . . facile quod cuiusque temporis officium sit poterirnus, nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare.] In fact, however, it is not so simple; for the generally applicable rules may be altered by changed circumstances; hence in S§ 31 ff. an additional set of guidelines is provided. For a similar instance of Cicero's impatience to get to the end being at odds with the subtlety of the argument cf. on the end of § 99.—Tempus is equivalent to ττβρίστασις in the sense "circumstance**; cf. Att. 16.11.4.—On the problem of φιλαυτία cf. ad 3.31. est enim difficilis cura rerum a lien am m. J The implicit assumption is that justice is someone else's good (άλλότριον αγαθοί': Arist. EN 1130a3).—The connection with enim has caused difficulties; though it is omitted by b, it should be retained as connecting with nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus; in the following clause one would expect nam before quamquam to clarify the relation of ideas (cf. Muller ad he). . . . Terentianus ille Chremes 'humani nihil a se alienum putat';.. .] It has been debated whether this corresponds to a quotation of Menander in Cicero's source.36 In fact, Hau. 77 (also quoted at Leg. 1.33) is not adduced in favor of a main point in the argument but provides a possible counterindication; therefore neither a Panaetian citation nor a Ciceronian insertion can be excluded. On the meaning of the tag in its original context cf. Jocelyn, 29 ff.—Other poetic citations in the Panaetian part of Off. occur at $$ 48, 51b-52 and 65. If they correspond to Panaetian citations in the original, the Rhodian may have been influenced by Chrysippus, who was not sparing in the citation of poets, especially to exemplify the nature of the soul; cf. SVF 2, nos. 906 and 908; De Lacy, 1948, 264; Christopher Gill, "Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?" Phronesis 28 (1983), 136-49. 36. F.-A. Steinmetz, 149 ff., suggested that each time Cicero quotes Terence in this treatise (cf.
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sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt quam ilia quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus . . .] Cf. § 90 and ad 3.30. quocirca bene praccipiunt qui vetant quicquam agere quod dubites acquum sit an iniquum.] This precept derives, not from the Greek philosophical schools, but from Roman street-wisdom; cf. Plin. Ep. 1.18.5: . . . si tutius putas Mud cautissimi cuiusque praeceptum 'Quod dubites, ne feceris'; 3.18 and 37.—Aequum appears as a synonym of iustum as early as Plautus; cf. Am. 16: aequi et iusti hie eritis omnes arbitri; on the other hand, aequitas in the sense of iustitia (as in the next sentence; cf. also § § 3 6 and 62; 2.18, 7 1 , and 78) is unattested before Cicero; cf. Hey, TLL 1, 1034.41 ff.; Ausfeld, ibid., 1014.27 ff.; OLD s.v. aequitas 4. 31 Sed incidunt saepe tempora cum ea quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine eoque quern virum bonum dicimus commutantur fiuntque contraria, ut reddere depositum (etiamne furioso?}, facere promissum, quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem . . .] Presumably the author of the transmitted text had in mind, as specified at 3.95, the deposit of a sword or the like with which the madman could do himself mischief, a standard exam­ ple of the alteration of appropriate actions κατά ττ€ρίστασιν (see ad 3.95). The words etiamne furioso? were evidently already read in this place by St. Ambrose {officium est igitur depositum senate ac reddere. sed interdum commutatio fit aut tempore aut necessitate ut non sit officium reddere quod acceperis:. . . si insanienti gladium depositum non neges quo se Hie interimat, nonne solvisse contra officium est? [off. 1.254J). However, against the authenticity of the phrase is the way it is introduced as a parenthetical rhetorical question 37 and its lack of precision, the text failing to clarify why returning a deposit to a madman is a problem. Hence a consensus has developed for Langius' deletion of the suspect phrase: Atzert, Fedeli, and Winterbottom bracket it; this is one of the few atheteses accepted by 37. The problem is not well formulated by Thomas, 108-9, who adduces Div. 1.12 as a parallel, and notes that in that passage rherc are two corresponding elements, and each has a parenthetical clause inserted after it. He then concludes that in our passage each member of what he calls a tricolon would have to be followed by a parenthetical insertion. In the first place, the material in question (reddere depositum . . . facere promissum quaeque pertinent ad ver­ itatem et ad fidem) is not a tricolon; what we have are two infinitives, the first with a single, the second with a double object—already an incomplete parallelism. But even if it were a tricolon, Thomas' argument would nor prove what he thinks it docs. Elsewhere Thomas makes effective use of Ciceronian parallels to support suspect constructions; in such cases one cogent parallel can indeed turn the tide. But one dissimilar passage docs not constitute a case for athetosis.

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Thomas, 109. Even Testard thinks the transmitted text untenable, though his own solution, etiamnunc furioso, is unlikely to find followers. Now the following example of Neptune keeping his promise to Theseus illustrates the case of promises and "things which relate to truth and to keeping faith" (Atkins' rendering), but fails to clarify how it can sometimes not be an appropriate action to return a deposit. In view of the abrupt, elliptical character of this text and its Ambrosian attestation, Rudberg, 16, regards it as an old addition and leaves open the question whether it was entered in the margin by Cicero as a note to himself about a topic to be added or as a query by some ancient reader familiar with the school-example. In support of Rudberg's second alternative, I suspect that Cicero thought of the acceptance of a deposit as a species of promise and therefore not necessarily in need of separate illustration. 38 . . . deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur.j On the oddity of this as a para­ phrase of the second appropriate action under justice cf. ad $ 20; on the other hand, at S 153 the entire actio rerum is said to manifest itself in bominwn commodis tuendis. {ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper est idem.}] These words were rightly athetized by Bruser, 83, who was followed by Atzert4 and Fedeli. We are told ea quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine . . . ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum, but next that the criterion remains the fundamenta iustitiae, primum ut ne cut noceatur etc. Then follows our sentence. Inevitably a reader would take ea of our sentence to refer to the fundamenta iustitiae of the preceding one, which, amid the flux, were to have been the fixed point. This is, of course, nonsense; the fundamenta iustitiae cannot be said to change. Thomas, 6 4 - 6 6 , thought to vindicate the suspect sentence for Cicero with the argument that ea refers back, not to the fundamenta iustitiae, but to the precepts ut ne cut noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur. It seems very doubtful that a Roman would have read the sentence this way; but it makes no difference whether the grammatical reference is to the fundamenta iustitiae or to their constitu­ ents; if cither changes according to circumstance, Cicero and his reader are left within a shifting environment without a fixed standard of reference. Note also the asyndeton of the suspect sentence, as well as the following connec­ tion with enim: potest enim accidere promissum . . . serves to clarify how keeping a promise can violate the principle ut ne cui noceatur; in that case it would connect, not with the suspect sentence, but the one preceding. Perhaps 38. Atzert's suggestion that both Ambrose and an interpolator independently added the idea nf returning a deposit to a madman multiplies entities beyond necessity.

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our lemma began as a marginal note to clarify ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum (in both ea has the same point of reference) or was inserted by a reader who missed the subtle connection of the enim clause with the precept ut ne cut noceatur and was, in later copying, inserted into the text. 32 This passage is, even by standards of Off., poorly constructed. Thus the sentence (a) potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum ut id effici sit inutile vel ei cut promissum sit vel ei qui promiserit (S 32) is partially repeated and partially corrected in the sequel (b): nee promissa igitur ser­ vanda sunt ea quae sint its quibus promisens inutilia, nee, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint cut promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori . . . Also, both (a) and (b) contain mention of both cases, sc. (1) inexpediency for the person making the promise and (2) for the person to whom the promise is made, although (a) is followed by an illustration of (2) alone and (b) by an illustration of (1) alone. 39 potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum ut id effici sit inutile vel ei cui promissum sit (vel ei qui promiserit).] Keeping a promise is presum­ ably always inexpedient for the person who made the promise, but that fact does not entail the right to opt out. Hence I have adopted Shackleton Bailey's deletion of vel ei qui promiserit (the remaining vel to be taken as = "even").—The consecutive clause follows upon promissum, not accidere, the relative adjective tale being, as often, suppressed; cf. § 159: . . . non potest accidere [sc. tale] tempus, ut intersit ret publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem-, Kuhner-Stegmann, 2,248-49.—Gellius (1.13) arrived at a different solution to this problem on the basis of the example of P. Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131), who, during a siege, punished a soldier who used his own judgment in fetching the smaller of two fruit trees, as more suitable for a battering-ram and easier to transport, rather than, as ordered, the larger, nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus quod Theseo promiserat non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto film non esset orbatus. ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium quod de Hippolyti intcritu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus incidit.] According to the extant Euripidean Hippolytus, however, this was the first, not the third, of the wishes: αλλ* ώ πάτερ Πόσα δον. άςέμοί πυτ€ /αράς* ύπεσχου τρεΐς. μις κατεργασαι /τούτων €μόν παΐδ', ήμβραν δε μη φύγοι / τήι>δ\ einep ήμιν ώπασας σαφείς αράς (νν. 887-90). However, scholium NAB ad Hipp. 887, like Cicero, evidently knows a version in which the death of Hippolytus was Theseus* third wish: αλλ' ώ πάτ€ρ, μιςΙ τούτων των κατάρων κατέργασαι τον €μον παΐδα. ποίων oe; άς αράς έμοι ύπεσχοιτ το άνελθεΐν έξ Αϊδου, το ύποστρεψαι από τοΟ λαβυ39. I owe this observation to David L. Blank.

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piνθου, το πεμφθήναι τώ υίώ αΰτοϋ θάνατον; Sen. Ph. 949, too, follows such a version. As Barrett explains ad Hipp. 887-89 (see also pp. 3 9 - 4 0 of his introduction), the version known to Cicero and the scholiast is likely to be original (the possibility of reversal being thereby eliminated). Euripides al­ tered this point, however, so that Theseus, uncertain of the efficacy of the curse, would behave in the following debate with his son as though exile, which he could enforce, was the one penalty in question.—In writing ut in fabulis est was Cicero/Panaetius thinking of the treatment of the subject in Euripides' Ιππόλυτο? καλυπτόμενος (frr. 428 ff. Nauck 2 ) and extant Hippo­ lytus, as well as Sophocles' Phaedra (frr. 677 ff. Radt)? In any case, no corresponding Latin play is known prior to Seneca's Phaedra; Juvenal (1.2) alludes to a Theseis, a tragedy by one Cordus (cf. sch. ad /oc), surely a near contemporary of the satirist (whether it dealt with the curse on Hippolytus is unknown). One wonders which Greek version made the curse on his son the last of Theseus' three wishes.—This example treats Neptune implicitly as if he were any other individual who had granted a promise the fulfillment of which is presumed to hurt the person to whom the promise has been made. However, Neptune is not a human being, but a god, and his divine status alters the case; for the question arises whether it is not his office to punish Theseus for his gullibility, irascibility, and rashness in some other way than by the death of the innocent Hippolytus. The example thus raises questions about divine providence 40 that the text does not address. . . . nee, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint cui promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori:...] Since the fulfillment of a promise is presumably never in the interest of the person who has made the promise, further clarification should have been added. Presumably what Panaetius advocated was a careful prioritization of claimants and of actions; for the former guidelines are offered at §§ 50 ff.; prioritizing actions would also involve calculation of the proper place and time for each action 41 (cf. §§ 142 ff., where ευταξία and ευκαιρία are discussed from the standpoint of το πρέπον, though they have bearing on just actions as well; cf. § 59). In the case of several actions that have deadlines (as in the example given of an appear­ ance at court), performing one appropriate action may preclude another. . . . ut, si constitueris cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris . . .] This exemplum of a father's solicitude for his 40. Panaetius wrote an essay on the subject, of which, sadly, only the title is known (fr. 33). 41. Cicero/Panaetius wants the reader to become a bonus ratiocmator officiorum |cf. $59).

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son's welfare is, of course, in line with a general tendency of Off. to highlight and solidify father/son relations;42 it is also, however, in line with the hier­ archy of appropriate actions established at § 58, where, after patria et parentes, liberi totaque domus occupy second place. iam illis proraissis standum non esse quis non videt quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo promiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, nonnulla legibus.] Legal remedy against contracts concluded as a result of the use or threat of force was provided by the formula of Cn. Octavius, praetor in 79; cf. Bruce W. Frier, "Urban Praetors and Rural Violence: The Legal Background of Cicero's pro Caecina," TAPhA 113 (1983), 222, n. 3, and 232; Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,212 ff.; for praetorian remedies against dolus malus cf. ad 3.58-60; for an example of legislation against fraud cf. ad 3.61 {lex Laetoria).—At 3.103 it is objected to Regulus' return to Carthage that this act ratified an agreement extracted by force {quod per vim hostium esset actum). In the sequel, however, Cicero insists that agreements made with a legitimate enemy are not to be violated and adapts the precept of the older Stoa that the sage alone is free {Parad. no. 5) to argue that force cannot be brought to bear on a brave man (3.107-10). 33 For the exempla cf. Everett L. Wheeler, "Sophistic Interpretations and Greek Treaties," GRBS 25 (1984), 269-70. For their order (first Greek, then Roman) cf. ad 2.26. Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et (nimis) callida sed ma­ litiosa iuris interpretatione.] The words nimis callida sed malitiosa have caused difficulty, since the contrast (cf. sed) is lacking:43 an interpretation of law that is too clever {nimis callida) is already negatively characterized, whereas we expect a positive attribute to contrast with malitiosa. The adjec­ tive callidus can, however, be positive in itself, as Thomas, 106, n. 4, remarks, citing N.D. 3.25; therefore the required contrast can be restored merely by deleting nimis (a possibility raised by Muller ad /oc), which could have been added with intent of clarification by a reader concerned to make callida . . . interpretatione parallel with calumnia rather than to preserve the contrast between callida and malitiosa.—Cf. S.E. M. 2.38, who attributes a tenden­ tious interpretation of laws to the pnropes. ex quo illud 'summum ius summa injuria* factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium.] The first reference to this proverb occurs at Ter. Hau.; the words are spoken by Syrus to his master Chremcs as part of an intrigue to 42. Cf. introduction, $ 4. 43. Fcdcli, 1964', 60, argues that sed need not imply a contrast and cites in support Kiihner-Stegmann, 1,76-77; but note that they are speaking of sed at the beginning of a clause, not, as our case, when individual words are divided by sed.

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enable Chremes' son Clitopho to pay 1,000 drachmas to the courtesan Bacchis, whom he loves; the pretext is a loan for which Chremes' recently identified daughter is supposed to have been given in surety. Syrus anticipates possible objections as follows: neque tu scilicet I illuc confugies: 'quid meaf num mihi datumstf I num tussi? num ilia oppignerare filiam I meant me invito potuitf verum illuc, Chreme. I dicunt: 'ius summum saepe summast malitia' (792-96). The phrase verum illuc . . . dicunt shows that Syrus al­ ludes to an already well-known proverb (cf. Cicero's iam tritum sermone proverbium); the thought is paralleled at Men. fr. 545 K.-Th.: καλοί' οι νόμοι σφόδρ' €Ϊσίν ό δ' όρων τους νόμους / λίαν ακριβώς συκοφάντης φαίνεται; cf. Otto, 179; Swoboda, 110. The Ciceronian testimonies are collected and discussed by H. Komhardt, "Summum ius," Hermes 81 (1953), 7 7 - 8 5 . Surely, however, summum ius summa iniuria has a reciprocal sense, i.e., what for party A is summum ius, viz. A's right pushed to the maximum (cf. OLD s.v. summus 9, esp. 9c), is an iniuria for the other party (B) or indeed, for the sake of symmetry, summa iniuria. The consequence would be that ius in this phrase has the sense "rights over others (conferred by the law)" (cf. OLD s.v. ius1 13), so that the proverb was hardly, as Komhardt, 83, after Stroux, 1927,49, thought, u eine Art von Scheltwort fur das alte ius civile"-,44 hence, too, the original, positive sense that Komhardt posited for the phrase sum­ mum ius (79) seems implausible. I agree, however, with Komhardt, 8 1 , that iniuria is likely to have been the original formulation, malitia a poetic variatio.—For the ellipsis of esse in such sententiae cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1, 10-11.—For Cicero's position on summum ius vs. aequitas cf. 2.71, ad 3.61, and A. Zamboni, UH aequitas in Cicerone," Archivio Giuridico 157 (1966), 167-203, esp. 183 ff. For the famous causa Curiana see ad 3.67. . . . ut ille qui, cum trigima dierum ess en t cum hoste indutiae factac, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, non noctium indutiae.] Panaetius will surely have mentioned by name the Spartan king Cleomenes 111, whose tactic resulting in the capture of Argos occurred during the Nemean festival of July, 225: cf. Lenschau, RE 11.1 (1921) 705.12 ff. Cicero presum­ ably suppressed the name as being without interest for his Roman readers. Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 223a-b: άνοχάς be έφθημβρους προς Άργβίους ποιησάμενος (sc. ύ Κλεομένης), φυλάξας αυτούς, τη τρίτη νυκτι κοιμωμ€νοις διά το ττεποιθεναι ταϊς σπονδαϊς €ΐΤ€θ€το· και τους μέν άπ€ΚΤ€ΐν€, τους δέ 44. Stroux, 1927, argued that the summum ius was essentially the traditional approach of the Roman jurists, aequitas a concept introduced along with Greek rhetoric. Although there were rhetorical influences on legal interpretation, Stroux's scheme is oversimple, as A. Burge, Die juristenkomtk in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena. Ubersetzung una Kommentar (Zurich, 1974), 46-69, has shown.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 33 and 34-40

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αιχμαλώτους IXafcv. όν€ΐδι£όμ€νος be em τη παραβάσα των όρκων, ουκ Ιφη προσομωμοκβναι ταΐς ήμέραις τάς νύκτας" . . . ne noster quidem probandus,—populo Romano adiudicavit.] Cicero has, of course, added this exemplum of Q. Fabius Labeo from his own well-stocked memory, as the phrase nihil enim habeo praeter auditum indicates.45 On Labeo, consul of 183 (cf. MRR, 1, 378), cf. Miinzer, RE 6.2 (1909), 1775.4, who accepts the historicity of the incident on the basis of our passage; cf. also V. Max. 7.3.4.—For the atque of atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent cf. ad § 22 (on -que). quocirca in omni est re fugienda talis sollertia.] Sollertia, a positive quality elsewhere in this treatise (viz., §S 15 and 157), is ironic, the talis adding, in this context, the negative valence. 34-40 For the connection of this material to its context cf. ad $$ 31-41. The stages in the argument are as follows: I. Punishment and vengeance: goals (§ 34) A. Regret on the part of the aggressor (qui lacessierit iniuriae suae paenitere) B. Deterrence of aggression by others II. The iura belli (§ 35) A. Circumstances in which war can be undertaken B. Goal of warfare C. iustitia in hostem 1. The fetial law of the Roman people: fairness in the commencement and goals of warfare (S 36) 2. Cato's letter cautioning his son not to engage in combat once he has been discharged from the army (§37) 3. The early meaning of Latin hostis (= peregrinus) interpreted as a euphemism (lenitate verbi ret tristitiam mitigatam) 4. Distinction of two types of wars (S 38) a) Those fought for survival b) Those fought for glory of empire 5. Promises made to the enemy in wartime ($ 39) a) Example of Regulus b) Example of ten prisoners captured after Cannae ($ 40) 6. Fabricius as the greatest example of iustitia in hostem. 45. For auditum as a substantive meaning "something heard" as early as PI. Merc. 903 (in our passage facilitated by the preceding nihil) cf. Laughton, 71.

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The general principle announced at the onset of discussion (est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus—ad iniuriam tardiores) surely applies throughout; thus, for instance, II.B.-C. represent an application of this gen­ eral principle to the special circumstances of war. Though § 35 already discusses a Roman military policy, § 36 is specifically marked as Roman. Like other Roman authors,46 Cicero had great respect for the ancient ius fetiale, which apparently fell out of use after 171 but was revived in symbolic form in 32 by Augustus for the war against Cleopatra (Harris, 167); 47 cf. Rep. 2.31 (of Tullus Hostilius):. . . constituitque ius quo bella indicerentur, quod per se iustissime inventum sanxit fetiali religione, ut omne bellum quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque inpium iudicaretur. An early Italic institution for regulating relations between states, the fetials appeared in pairs: the verbenarius, who carried a sack filled with herbs picked on the citadel, which was both a symbol of their office and for protection against wounds, and the pater patratus, who was entrusted with the execution of mandates; for the magical significance of his woollen head­ gear cf. Ogilvie ad Liv. 1.32.6; on the iron-tipped or cornel-wood spear, ibid., 1.32.12. They would conclude treaties with the fetials of other communities and lodge formal complaint against the violation of existing treaties. In the event of a declaration of war the pater patratus, with at least three adult male witnesses, would proceed to the border of the offending community and hurl across a lance dipped in blood. Cf. Wissowa, 550 ff.; Rich, 104; Harris, 166 ff., esp. 169 and 171, on the technical nature of the justice involved and its function of providing the Romans with "self-reassurance"; C. Saulnier, "Le role des pretres fetiaux et I'application du *ius fetiale' a Rome," Revue historique de droit franqais et etranger 58(1980), 171-93; Alan Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion (Baltimore and London, 1993), esp. 10 ff., is unconvincing in his «interpretation of the position of the gods as testes, which he insists means "judges." It has been argued on the basis of the phrase bella disceptanto at Leg. 2.21 that Cicero adduced the fetiales in our passage as an illustration of negotia­ tion (Botermann, 16 and n. 61). This seems unlikely, however. Leg. 2.21 reads as follows: foederum pads belli indotiarum ratorum fetiales iudices non(tii) sunto, bella disceptanto. Here disceptanto does not mean "negotiate or debate over" {discepto is not used transitively in this sense), but "judge" (cf. the previous belli . . . iudices . . . sunto; OLD s.v., 3; Hey, TLL 1.7, 46. Cf. Var. L. 5.86, cited n. 48 infra; Harris, 169, compares and discusses Plain. Am. 244-47. 47. Cf. the boast. . . nulli genti bello per iniuriam mlato (Anc. 5.13-14).

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1295.16 ff.). Also, in that case, one would have expected the fetiales to be named in conjunction with the observation nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem at $ 34; and, as Harris, 167-68, points out, the fetials essentially presented Rome's nonnegotiable demands set at a maxi­ mal level; only rarely, in the event that the other side had to give in, did the demands they presented provide the basis for a peaceful settlement. The fetials will rather have occurred to Cicero in this context as an institution that Romans regarded as preserving belli aequitas,48 even though the aequitas in question was of a formal and ritualized kind. Thus citizens of the foreign power did not need to be present when the spear was launched across the border in formal token of the outbreak of war; and this rite was later performed, not on the border, but outside the temple of Bellona at Rome (cf. Rich, 106). The example of the fetiales leads Cicero (ex quo)t however, to a concep­ tion of the helium iustum that is more concrete (out rebus repetitis geratur) and formalistic (aut denuntiatum ante sit et indicium) than the Panaetian precepts.49 The remainder of this section consists of several Roman exam­ ples loosely strung together. Cato's letter to his son 5 0 is, like the ius fetiale, an example of Roman insistence on observing the proper forms, even in dealing with an armed enemy, and thus is relevant to the general topic of appropriate actions toward the enemy in wartime, but is not sufficiently integrated into the developing argument. The same can be said of the (quite unconvincing) analysis of the allegedly benign implications of the early usage hostis = peregrinus (it would more plausibly illustrate the hostility of the early Romans to outsiders). § 38 puts forward a distinction between wars fought for sur­ vival and those fought for imperii gloria and the thesis that the latter should be less bitterly contested. Cicero states that even the latter presuppose the previously stated iustae causae bellorumy but the Roman notion of imperii gloria fits with difficulty into the Panaetian system (see ad $ 38). Examples given of both types of wars culminate in Pyrrhus* speech from Ennius as an example of the nobility proper to wars fought for empire. $ 39 brings a new (Panaetian?) precept that promises to the enemy are to be kept (evidently an 48. Cf. Var. L. 5.86: fetiales, quod fidei publicae inter populos praeerant: nam per bos fiebat ut iustum conciperetur bellum et finde desitum, ut f{o)edere fides pads constitueretur. One wonders whether this passage in a Book dedicated to him may have inspired Cicero to add the fetiales to Panaetius' account of justice to the enemy; cf. ad $ 37. 49. The connection with ex quo is emphasized in view of Botermann's denial (28) that the ius fetiale "bildet. . . den Ausgangspunkt der Erorterung." 50. On the authenticity of the second, not the first, exemplum of Cato and his son cf. ad S36.

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exception to the principle of § 32), illustrated by the positive exemplum of Regulus and the negative one of the Romans taken captive after Cannae. The section concludes with Fabricius, the crowning example of iustitia in hostem. For a different analysis of the relation of ideas in these chapters cf. Botermann, 1 ff. (on which cf. further ad §§ 36 and 38). Several of the exempla Romarta of this section recur in Book 3: Regulus (S 39 and 3.99 ff.), the ten Romans taken prisoner at Cannae (§ 40 and 3.113-15), Fabricius and the would-be assassin of Pyrrhus (§ 40 and 3.8687), the destruction of Corinth (§ 35 and 3.46). Soltau, 1240, n. 1, thought that Cicero had merely transferred these examples from Book 3 to Book 1; but this is most unlikely, since, in the case of the ten prisoners at Cannae, Cicero has clearly consulted a documentary source for the account in Book 3, but not yet for that of Book 1 (on Cicero's apparently linear Arbeitsweise in this work cf. passages cited in the Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius |the orator], de Officiis, afterthoughts"). Rather Cicero has evidently used Book 1 as a quarry for topics and examples for those portions of Book 3 for which he was without a philosophical source; see the introduction to Book 3. Whether, in light of this practice, he would, in final revision, have altered the examples as given in Book 1 is an interesting, but moot, question. Such a similarity of topics or examples unites parts of Off. 3 with other Ciceronian works as well: cf. N.D. 3.74-76 and Off. 3.61, 7 1 , 73, and 94 (cf. Pease's commentary, 1,21, n. 6, and 52 [contra Pohlenz, AF, 8, n. 2j), as well as Off. 3.61 and Top. 66; use of examples ready to hand is, of course, characteristic of a writer working in haste (cf. introduction, § 3; Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Formulaic writing"). 34 Sunt autera quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda a quibus iniuriam acceperis.] Even those who have wronged us belong to the societas hominum coniunctioque adumbrated at §§ 11-12 and described in detail at SS 50 ff.; hence there are certain actions appropriate to them, as to other human beings. But although our passage takes a large step toward recogniz­ ing the rights of others qua human beings (cf. also 3.21-28), Cicero is not quite consistent, even in Off., in this regard. Thus in trying to refute those who argued that Regulus could have ignored an oath extracted by force he finds that such an oath is binding if sworn to an enemy like the Carthagi­ nians, but not to pirates (3.107); and the justification of tyrannicide is ex­ plicit (3.19 ff.; cf. 1.109,2.43).—The use of officium here is not singled out as unusual by Oomes, TLL s.v., by Bernert, or by the commentators I have seen; it is, however, revolutionary. As is shown by Oomes, TLL 9, 518.36 ff. (here cited in parentheses by section), officium is originally used of the tasks of individuals in certain relations: the officia of relatives or friends, patrons

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or clients (ΙΑ1α2); the term is then transferred to interstate relations for behavior imposed by a client-patron relationship {in officio manere and the like: IB1)); it can also be used of the service an individual owes to others within the context of the laws and the state (IB2; cf. introduction» §2). From the standpoint of ordinary Roman usage Cicero might be said finis officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse (Mur. 65, of Cato's Stoic teachers). est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; . . .] At § 14 Cicero/Panaetius noted that alone of animals the human can determine . . . in factis dictisque qui modus. Retribution is allowed under the proviso at § 20: ut ne cut quis noceat, nisi bcessitus iniuria; cf. also § 35: ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur. On the puniendi modus cf. further ad §§ 83 and 89 and on Panaetius' general preference for deliberation ad § 11; on modus as a Panaetian ideal generally ad S 93. Atque in republica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli.] For in republica referring to matters of state generally, including interstate relations, not merely matters internal to the Roman state, cf. $ 33 and 3.46.—The iura belli appear in a different (more cynical) sense at Liv. 31.30.2: esse enim quaedam belli iura, quae ut facere ita pati sit fas . . . nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alteram per vim, cumquc illud proprium sit hominis, hoc bcluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius si uti non licet superiore.) It is a commonplace in ancient literature that humans and animals have distinct methods of settling differences; cf. Hes. Op. Ill ff.: ΐχθύσι μέν και θηρσΐ καΐ οιωνοί ς π€Τ€ηνοΐς· / eaOeiv αλλή­ λους, enet υύ δίκη €στι μ*τ' αυτοΐς· / άνθρώποισι δ' έδωκε δίκην, ή πολλόν άριστη /γίνεται - . . . ; Lys. 2.19:. . . ήγησάμενοι θηρίων μέν έργον είναι υπ' αλλήλων βία κρατεΐσθαι, άνθρωποι^ δε προσήκει νόμω μεν όρίσαι το δίκαιον, λόγω δε πεΐσαι . . . ; cf. Skutsch ad Enn. Ann. Hi (pp. 242-43), a passage which, though sometimes cited in this context (cf. Fuchs, 1955,203), proba­ bly recommends that a leader possess shrewdness rather than mere physical force. This passage is surely the centerpiece of Panaetius* doctrine of warfare; it incorporates, like his ethical system as a whole, reason as the characteristic distinguishing man and beast (cf. $11) and recognizes disceptatio (based on reason) as the legitimate method of settling disputes between human beings. Though Panaetius' analysis of the sources of the καλόν {honestum) begins with drives shared by human and beast (§ 11), the behavior proper to the human being is based on specifically human traits (§$ 97, 107). It would therefore be surprising if he readily gave humans license to behave like ani­ mals. Moreover, being φιλοττλάτων (cf. ad §§ 28, 84, 104), Panaetius may

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well have been influenced by the unflattering portrait of the "hater of λόγο?" at PI. R. 411d-e: μισόλογο? δη οΐμαι ό τοιούτο? γίγνεται καλ άμουσο?, καϊ πειθοΐ μέν δια λόγων ουδέν έτι χρήται, βία δέ και άγριότητι ώσπερ θηρίον προ? πάντα διαπράττεται . . . Moreover, the preceding general rule, which allows for the use of violence only in punishing aggression and only to the point of causing the aggressor to repent of his act and deter others, surely still applies. Therefore Panactius presumably meant that if one party denied his rational nature, viz., by attacking, then the other would have to use force in self-defense. This interpretation would likewise accord with the doctrine about the conduct of the μεγαλόψυχο? in wartime at $ 81: temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. This latter passage is similar to Aristotle's first reason for military training (ίνα . . . αυτοί μή δουλεύσωσιν έτεροι?: Pol. 1333b40-41). The alternative interpretation is that si uti non licet superiore refers to the failure of negotiations (so, e.g., Finger, 10; Botermann, 17). The question arises, however, whether, under this interpretation, attack would be justified "if negotiations fail." If so, this interpretation accords less well with Panaetius* general view of human nature and what he says about vengeance, punishment, and, in § 8 1 , the circumstances in which one should fight (see above); if not, this interpretation hardly differs from the other, which like­ wise sees warfare as justified only in self-defense. If, then, our passage and $ 81 taken together provide what can be known of Panaetius' doctrine of when it is appropriate to wage war, it is hard to see how the distinction at § 38 between wars fought for glory and those fought for existence can go back to him (see ad loc); if my reconstruction is correct, he recognized the latter only (loss of libertas or imposition of disgraceful conditions being a far cry from the desire to win glory); cf. Dyck, 1981,21920. 35 quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causara, ut sine injuria in pace vivatur,. . .] Cf. PI. Lg. 628d7 ff.:. . . OUT' άν νομοθέτη? [sc. γένοιτο) ακριβή?, ει μή χάριν ειρήνη? τά πολέμου νομοθετοϊ μάλλον ή τών πολεμικών ένεκα τά τη? είρήνη?; Arist. EN 1177b4-6: δοκεΐ τε ή ευδαιμονία έν τη σχολή είναι· ασχολούμεθα γάρ'ίνα σχολάζωμεν, και πολεμοΰμεν ΐν' είρήνην άγωμεν; Pol. 1 3 3 4 a l 4 - 1 6 : τέλο? γάρ, ώσπερ ειρηται πολλάκι?, ειρήνη μεν πολέμου, σχολή δ' ασχολία?; the words cedantarma togae (§ 77) according to Cicero's exegesis at Pis. 73 {helium ac tumultum pact atque otio concessurum)\ Fuchs, 1955,203, n. 12.—As to the connection with quare, note that peace as the goal of war would follow from the fact that disceptatio is

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the human way of settling disputes; hence peace would be the "normal" condition, war an aberration. . . . ut maiores nostri Tusculanos Aequos Volscos Sabinos Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt. . .] This is a list of unlike entities, with the residents of Tusculum, a municipium, being juxtaposed with a series of peoples (all, however, are of Italian stock). Tusculum is named first both as the earliest recipient of civitas among those mentioned (ca. 381, according to Roman tradition; cf. G. McCracken, RE 7A2 [1943-48], 1467.55 ff.) and for personal interest (cf. ad § 21); also no one would think of accusing the Tusculani, who were suspected of making common cause with the Praenestini but then received without resistance the army despatched under Camillus (D.H. 14.6.1-2; V. Max. 7.3.9 ext.; Plut. Cam. 38; D.S. 7.28), of crudelitas or immanitas in war. The inability of the Aequi to wage warfare cruelly was evidently inferred from their name (cf. the supposed borrowing of the ius fetiale from the Aequicoli or aequi Falisci, doubtless also motivated by etymology, as Wissowa, 5 5 0 - 5 1 , n. 5, suspected); their juxtaposition with the Volsci will have resulted from the fact that they often appeared together in early historical records (e.g., Fast, triumph, under 462 B.C. on the victory of L. Lucretius Tricipitinus de Aequeis et Vobceis . . . : Inscriptiones Italiae, Academiae Italicae consociatae ediderunt, 13.1: Fasti consulates et triumphales, cur. A. Degrassi [Rome, 1947], 537). The Aequi received citizenship shortly after 304, the Volsci ca. 338 (the western branch) or 329 (the eastern branch); cf. Hiibner, RE 1.1 (1893), 597.32 ff., and G. Radke, ibid., 9A1 (1961), 819.43 it The list concludes with the Sabini and Hernici, both of whom made common cause with the related Samnites around the turn of the third century and were duly subjugated (ca. 290 and 306 respec­ tively); cf. Philipp, ibid., 1A2 (1920), 1578.1 ff. and Weiss, ibid., 8.1 (1912), 909.10 ff. The grants of citizenship were, however, not, as Cicero implies, proferred merely out of Roman kindness but had, in general, strategic signifi­ cance; thus, for instance, it was in Rome's interest to secure a pro-Roman government in the Volscian city Privernum to serve as a buffer against the Samnites; cf. Liv. 8.20.12; Radke, he. cit., 821.20 ff. . . . at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulemnt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bell urn faciendum locus ipse adhortari. mea quidem sententia pad quae nihil habitura sit insidiamm semper est consulendum.] Carthage and Cor­ inth were of topical interest as recent recipients of Caesarian colonies (earlier in 44: cf. D.S. 32.27.3 |Corinth]; Dio 43.50.3-5). Here Cicero takes an intermediary position, disapproving, but with some understanding for the decision taken by the respected maiores (cf. the unqualified condemnation of

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3.46: sed utilitatis specie in republica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri). At 2.76, where Mummius and the younger Scipio are paired as destroyers of cities who nevertheless maintained their personal integrity, no moral judgment is passed on the destruction itself. However, Cicero does use the destruction of Corinth as a precedent for action against Mithridates at Man. 11-12: . . . Corinthum patres vestri totius Graeciae lumen exstinctum esse voluerunt . . . videte ne, ut Hits pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse; cf. R. Feger, "Cicero und die Zerstorung Korinths," Hermes 80 (1952), 4 5 4 - 5 5 . Cicero dilates on the advantages of the site of Corinth (as of Carthage) at Agr. 2.87: Corinthi vestigium vix relictum est. erat enim posita in angustiis atque in faucibus Graeciae sic ut terra claustra locorum teneret et duo maria maxime navigationi diversa paene coniungeret, cum pertenui discrimine separentur. haec [sc. Carthage and Corinth] quae procul erant a conspectu imperi non solum adflixerunt sed etiam, ne quando recreata exsurgere atque erigere se possent, funditus, ut dixi, sustulerunt. Heilmann, 5 0 - 5 1 , is right to point out that Cicero's apologia for the destruction of Corinth in our passage is weak inasmuch as he has not made the case that the Corinthians waged warfare cruelly, the only justification allowed for not preserving the losers; nor would insidiae of the inhabitants necessarily follow from the strategic advantages of the site. Contrast Cicero's praise of Marcellus' moderate treatment of con­ quered Syracuse at Ver. 2.4.120 (though here, too, possible future danger is an element in the calculus, as also in the destruction of Numantia and Carthage as described at Amic. 1 1 ) : . . . non putavit ad laudem populi Romani hoc pertinere, banc pulchritudinem, ex qua praesertim periculi nihil ostenderetur, delere et exstinguere . . . On the other hand, Cicero has ac­ cepted uncritically the optimate doctrine that the destruction of Carthage and Numantia was necessary and does not cite Scipio Nasica's opposition to the destruction of the former; cf. ad § 79; Strasburger, 1965,52; Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1500.50 ff. Possibly Cicero's distinction has to do with the fact that the Corinthians were Greeks, perhaps also with the experience he nar­ rates at Tusc. 3.53: Karthaginienses multi Romae servierunt, Macedones rege Perse capto; vidi etiam in Peloponneso, cum essem adulescens, quosdam Corinthios. hi poterant omnes eadem ilia de Andromacha deplorare: 'haec omnia vidi. . . \ sed iam decantaverant fortasse. Cf. also § 82 (on authen­ ticity cf. ad loc): de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. in quo si mihi esset obtemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rempublicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus.] This sentence may stand as an

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example of the associative method of composition sometimes found in Off. (cf. ad 226y 3.70,77,86-88, but also 112; Thomas, 23). The words pad. . . semper est consulendum deployed in the first place as part of the apologia for the destruction of Corinth evidently triggered in Cicero's mind his own recent efforts to mediate peace between Caesar and Pompey: he, too, had tried to forestall a future war, but without success; the sequel was the present condition of the Roman state, here characterized for the first time in our essay (cf. ad 2.29). As early as mid-December, 50, he observed: pace opus est. ex victoria cum multa mala turn certe tyrannus exsistet [Att. 7.5.4; cf. Att. 8.11.2: uterque regnare vult). This analysis of the situation explains his willingness in the subsequent negotiations (on which cf. Gelzer, 243 ff.) to accept peace at any price [Fam. 6.6.5: . . . cum vel iniquissimam pacem iustissimo bello anteferrem; cf. his appeal reported in a letter to Tiro of 29 January 49: nihil esse bello civili miserius \¥am. 16.12.2]). Similar to our passage in its assessment of the situation but with greater pathos is the nearly contemporary passage at Phil. 2.37: quo quidem tempore si, ut dixi, meum consilium auctontasque valuisset, tu hodie egeres, nos liberi essemus; . . . dolebam, dolebam, patres conscripti, rempublicam vestris quondam meisque consiliis conservatam brevi tempore esse perituram; cf. Heilmann, 51 52. et cum iis quos vi deviccris consulendum est, turn ii qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi.] Our passage suggests that what Caesar calls "his custom" was, in fact, the general practice; cf. BG 2.32.1 (reply to the Atuatuci): se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si priusquam murum aries attigisset, se dedidissent. . . For an example of deditio in fidem cf. Bell. Al. 32.3-4; Dahlheim, 9-10, n. 15.—The policy described corresponds to that of Cato, as depicted at Luc. 9.298-99 (siege of Cyrene): exclusus nulla se vindicat ira, Ipoenaque de victis sola est vicisse Catonem.— For imperatorum fides and similar phrases cf. Fraenkel, TLL 6, 664.52 ff. in quo tantopere apud nostras iustitia culta est ut ii qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.] The patrocinium, which included the protection of their rights, passed to the general who received the deditio of the group in question and to his heirs; cf. Mommsen, Staatsn, 3.1, 65 and n. 1; Meyer, 212-13; Dahlheim, 5 ff.; Freyburger, 142 ff. The use of in fidem in this sentence and ad imperatorum fidem in the preceding one serves the obvious purpose of emphasizing that those who have surrendered pass into a network of social relations based on trust, rather than mere military force; cf. Botermann, 14; whether the act is called in fidem or in potestatem venire or accipere does not alter the legal

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position; cf. Dahlheim, 25 ff. and 43. Freyburger, 150 ff., collects early testimonies for entrusting oneself to another'sfides;the concept was trans­ ferred from private intrastate relations to international ones; cf. Heinze, 152 = 69. At 2.27 Cicero emphasizes the benevolent character of the Roman empire in former times by calling it a patrocinium orbis terrae; see ad loc. 36 Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est, ex quo intellegi potest nullum belium esse iustum nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.] On belli aequitas as "just or humane laws of war" cf. OLD s.v. aequitas 4b; for the sense of aequitas ad % 30.—On the fetiales in general cf. ad §$ 34-40.—Botermann, 15 (after a suggestion by U. Schindel; sec 1, n. 1), proposes to leave the first aut untranslated and to translate the second one as "und." She cites Hofmann-Szantyr, 499, and Kiihner-Stegmann, 1, 105, for examples of aut used as a copulative particle after a negation. However, she overlooks the fact that in such cases the second element stands to thefirstin the relation of a wTeil oder nahere Besrimmung" (ibid.); this is, however, clearly not the case in our passage, where the declaration of war can hardly be called a part or nearer specification of the fact that war is being waged for the recovery of property. With the aufs therefore taken as disjunctive we shall have to bur­ den Cicero with a piece of carelessness which, if the extant citation is a safe guide, he managed to avoid at Rep. 3.35: nullum belium iustum habetur nisi denuntiatum, nisi indictum, nisi de repetitis rebus (Isid. etym. 18.1.3); cf., however, Rep. 2.31, where he omits res repetitae:. . . constituitque ius quo bella indicerentur, quod per se iustissime inventum sanxit fetiali religione, ut omne belium quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque inpium iudicaretur.—The principle of rerum repetitio in interna­ tional affairs seems likely to have been modeled on the legis actio Sacramento of Roman private law. But in interstate relations there was, of course, no authority to decide which party had the better causa vindicandi. Cf. Herbert Hausmaninger, u'Belium iustum* und 'iusta causa belli* im alteren romischen Recht," osterreichische Zeitschrift fiir offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 11 (1961), 340.—The influential conception of a just war51 that follows from the ius fetiale (ex quo) overlaps with the preceding precept to 51. Cf. Frederick Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (New York, 1975), 62 and 302. The insistence at Thorn. S. Th. II.2.40.1 that the belium iustum be waged on the authority of a prince (auctoritas prinapis) can perhaps be regarded as a remnant of the role of the fetiales in insuring control "from the top"; his further specifications that there should be a causa iusta and intentio bellantium recta have their counterpart in the res repetitae as the goal of military action (as well as, in $ 35, the goal of living in peace sine iniuria) and in Cicero's strictures against cruelty in $ 35.

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the degree that res repetitae represent a specific type of iniuria; the emphasis on the proper form for declaring war is purely Roman. (Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam—adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.}] The juxtaposition of two accounts (neither of which be­ trays any awareness of the other) of Cato's insistence that his son retake the military oath if he were going to resume campaigning after he had been dismissed has long roused the suspicion of editors. Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 273e-f, clearly read the latter: "δια τί τοις μη στρατβυομίνοι? μβν €ΐ> στρατοπ€δω δ' άλλω? άναστρίφομβνοι? ουκ εξήν άνδρα βαλεΐν πολέμιον ουδέ τρώσαι;" και τούτο Κάτων ό πρ^σβύτη? €ν επιστολή τινι δβδήλωκ^, γράφων προ? τον υίόν και κ€λ€ύων, ei παρεθίίη τη? στρατα'α? αποπλήρωσα? τόν χρόνον, υπόστρεφαν ή προσμ^νοντα λαβαν παρά του στρατηγού το έξείναι τρώσαι και άν€λ€Ϊν πολ€μιον. It is true that some of the linguistic oddities of the former version are not as severe as has sometimes been supposed. Thus the asyndeton with which it begins (called by Thomas, 112, "fur die Echtheitsfrage wichtig") is actually a very common method of introducing exempla in this essay; cf. § 133, 2.47, 48, 58, 72, 83 (a hypothetical exam­ ple), 3.45,48,49, 7 3 , 7 7 , 7 9 , 9 4 , 9 7 , 9 9 , 1 1 2 ; cf. also the notable asyndeta at § 38 and 2.51. Likewise the omission of praenomina for Popilius, Cato, and his son is paralleled in the nearly contemporary Philippics (cf. Adams, 146), as well as 3.114, a passage suspected by no one. Nevertheless the wrong sequence of tenses in obliget is worrisome (B1 alone offers the correct obligaret) as is the fact that the iunctura sacramentum militiae is not otherwise attested until Cypr. epist. 74.8.3 (cited by Thomas, 113, n. 31: si sic honor Deo datur, si sic a cultoribus eius et sacerdotibus timor Dei et disciplina servatur, abiciamus arma, . . . divinae militiae sacramenta solvantur . . .). Further objections are to the poverty of expression betrayed by dimitterel dimisit, remansissetlremanere (cf. Heine ad /oc), the vagueness of Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam (unspecified), the fact that the author of this exemplum, unlike the following one, evidently did not know the praenomen of Cato's son, and the improbability of an entire legion having been discharged. In fact, the military service of Cato's elder son (who died as praetor designate ca. 152) in Macedonia under his future father-in-law the consul L. Aemilius Paullus is independently attested, for he fought with distinction at Pydna (168; cf. V. Max. 3.2.16; lust. 33.2.1), but had to return thereafter, presumably because of wounds. Our passage is the sole evidence for his service under a Popilius, surely in Liguria; the commander in question is assumed to have been M. Popilius Laenas (cf. F. Miltner, RE 22.1 [1953], 167.54 if. [s.v. Porcius no. 14]), who, as consul in 173, defeated the Ligurians near Carystum; cf. Volkmann, ibid., 61.42 if.; but his brother C. Popilius

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Laenas, consul the following year, who also held command against the Ligurians, is not excluded; ibid., 57.36 ff. Whether the theater was Mac­ edonia or Liguria, the discharge of an entire legion seems most unlikely: hostilities continued after Carystum; and Paullus could hardly have discharged a legion prior to Pydna. If, then, Madvig was probably right in athetizing Popilius—pugnare non poterat,51 should we also delete (as he did) adeo—movendo} Reinhardt, 1885, 6 - 8 , and Thomas, 110 ff., have urged the retention of the suspect sentence; their restored text would read: ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est, ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo. "Fairness in war has been prescribed by the fetial law of the Roman people; hence it can be understood that no war is just unless it is either fought for redress of grievances or has been declared in advance; so supreme was the vigilance in beginning war.*' Cicero thus uses the ius fetiale as the basis for a statement about the just war (present tense). But adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo is no fit conclusion to this train of thought; and it seems very dubious that Cicero would have deliberately called attention to the ius fetiale having fallen out of use (a possibility mooted with a question mark by Botermann, 19, n. 66). Hence Harder, 1933, 489, suspected that Cicero originally planned to add a historical example before it. However, this sevenword sentence contains several serious problems of Latinity. In the first place adeo thus used is post-Ciceronian; one expects usque eo; cf. K.F. Nagelsbach, Lateinische Stilistik, ed. Iwan Mullet, 9th ed. (Nurnberg, 1905), 759-60. Again, the iunctura adeo summa is nonsensical.53 Finally our text would be the first instance of observatio in the sense "careful observance, punctilious­ ness"; cf. OLD 3b; Lumpe-Szantyr, TLL 9, 197.55 ff., where Quint. Inst 11.1.38 is adduced as parallel to our passage: negat se magni facere aliquis poetarum Jsc. Catul. 93] utrum Caesar ater an albus homo sit: insania; verte, ut idem Caesar de illo dixerit, adrogantia est. maior in personis observatio est apud tragicos comicosque: multis enim utuntur et variis. The accumu­ lated linguistic problems make it very doubtful that this text can stand. 37 Marci quidem Catonis senis est epistula ad Marcum filium,. . .] = p. 84, fr. 4 Jordan; Plut. Cat. mat. 20.11 cites a passage from a letter about 52. Apud Lund, 26.—While following Madvig here, Winterbottom (p. xii) raises the pertinent question: "Si Tullius haec non scripsit, cui curae esse poterat ut adderet?" 53. Even Thomas, 114, who otherwise defends the Latinity of the sentence admits that this feature raises suspicions ("Srurzig macht nur eines, die durch adeo summa in das Epiphoncm gehrachte Steigerung").

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military matters to his son (the same letter? = p. 84, fr. 3 Jordan): . . . Κάτωνος αΰτοϋ φέρεται τις επιστολή προ? τον υίόν ύπερφυώς έπαινοΰντος την περί τό ξίφος φιλοτιμίαν αύτου και σπουδήν. No other addressee is known for Cato's letters; cf. F. Miltner, RE 22.1 (1953), 164.41 ff.; one wonders whether they were published during his lifetime. This is one of the few places where, apart from Panaetius, Cicero cites the documentary sources he used in composing Off.; cf. 3.89 and 113-15.—Although this version of the Cato exemplum, unlike the one transmitted immediately be­ fore, is connected by a particle with what precedes (on "extending quidenT introducing fairly extensive material cf. Solodow, 112 ff.), the nature of the relation is primo aspectu far from evident. What Cicero is doing becomes clear here, as elsewhere (cf. ad §$ 11-17), only ex post facto: he has added to general precepts on the subject a series of exempla iustitiae in hostem a maiorihus nostris constituta (cf. 5 40). Cicero is evidently proceeding here, as elsewhere when not closely following Panaetius, by association, as the loose connectives would suggest ($ 37: equidem etiam Mud animadverto; % 39: atque etiam; § 40: autem . . . autem). Common to the Cato exemplum and the institution of the ius fetiale is the insistence upon punctilious observation of the correct legal forms in contacts with the other side; just as the pater patratus had to aver, under oath, the justice of the Roman claim (cf. Liv. 4.30.14: iurati repeterent res)y so the soldier had to be bound by oath before engaging the enemy. But the military sacramentum had two aspects: it made the soldier's service a sollemnis et sacrata militia in the course of which killing the enemy was allowed; and, like any other Roman oath, the sacra­ mentum included a curse in the event of its violation, so that it was also a means of reinforcing the soldier's obedience; cf. Klingmuller, RE 1A2 (1920), 1667.56 ff. (s.v. sacramentum). Neither of these functions of the sacramen­ tum was for the protection of the enemy, however, but then neither was the ius fetiale (cf. ad $§ 34-40). The mention of this anecdote involving the two Catos, father and son, has, however, a certain aptness in Off.; the exemplum is one of a father's solicitude for his son; the son had been carefully educated by his father, evidently with good results (Cic. Sen. 68: in optimo filio; cf. Miltner, loc. cit., 167.31 ff.), and was destined for military glory, which was perhaps important to the younger Cicero as well (cf. 2.45). hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur quem nunc peregrinum dicimus.] Cf. Var. L. 5.3: . . . multa verba aliud nunc ostendunt, aliud ante significabant (ut hostis: nam turn eo verho dicebant peregrinum qui suis legibus uteretur, nunc dicunt eum quem turn dicebant perduellem). Note that Book 5 was among the six books of L. on the impositio verborum dedicated to Cicero, who is addressed as still alive; it seems likely that at least this Book

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had reached him by the autumn of 44 and that he has drawn this information thence. Cf. also Paul. Fest. p. 102M: hostis apud antiquos peregrinus dtcebatur, etqui nunc hostis, perduellis (scripsi: -to cod.); Serv. auct. in Aen. 4.424; Macr. 1.16.14-15. However, this semantic shift is also susceptible of less benign interpretation: the generalization of the word for foreigner in the sense "enemy" shows that the prevailing attitude toward foreigners in early Rome was anything other than friendly; cf. Walcot, 124. indicant duodecim tabulae: AUT STATUS DIES CUM HOSTE . . . ] = Lex XII 2.2; the phrase is explained at Fest. p. 314M: status dies (cum hoste) vocatur qui iudici causa est constitutus cum peregrino; eius enim generis ab antiquis hostes appelfobantur, quod erant pari iure cum populo Romano, atque hostire ponebatur pro aequare (quotation of PI. Cure. 5-6 follows). As boys Cicero and his brother had learned the Twelve Tables by heart (cf. Leg. 2.9 and 59); he includes an encomium on them at de Orat. 1.195. . . . itemque ADVERSUS HOSTEM AETERNA AUCTORITAS.] = Lex XII 6.4. This provision is an exception to the general rule of the Twelve Tables (6.3; cf. Caec. 54; Top. 23) that usus resulted in ownership over land after two years, over moveable property after one; the foreigner always had to prove that he had legally acquired the property; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1, 136-37. 38 This section distinguishes two types of war, viz., wars fought for glory of empire and those fought for survival, and the behavior appropriate to each. By placing the Carthaginians in the former category Cicero is able to con­ demn them for inappropriate behavior in contrast to other such adversaries, called iustiores. This procedure is in line with the doctrine at the beginning of S 35 whereby milder treatment is to be accorded to those qui non crudeles in be\\oy non hnmanes fuerunt, a category excluding Carthage, the destruction of which is mentioned without dissent. Finger, 9-10, has shown (against Pohlenz, AF, 31) that the two categories recognized in this passage can hardly go back to Panaetius, whose attitude toward gloriae cupiditas, as indicated in $§ 26, 65, and 68, was far from positive; he clearly despised a man qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet (S 65) and realized that such an attitude can lead one into wrongdoing; and, writing as a Greek for Greeks, S4 he will have been little interested in ea bella quibus imperii proposita gloria est. Moreover, our passage is, I think, the only one in Off. which, contrary to Stoic doctrine, assigns per se value to glory as a goal of action (cf. Long, 1995 1 , 233, who had looked for such a passage; ad 2.42). If not likely to be Panaetian, the distinction in our passage of two types of warfare and of the behavior appropriate to each is plausibly 54. Cf. introduction, $ 5 (4).

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Ciceronian. The topos of the glory of winning an empire appears in his public speeches; cf., e.g., Man. 12: videte ne% ut Hits fsc. maioribus] pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse. Moreover, the distinction of our paragraph is already latent in Cicero's judgment on the destruction of Corinth on the one hand and of Numantia and Carthage on the other (§35); and he is steering toward the exempla of Pyrrhus and Fabricius (respectively end of §$ 38 and 40) and needs a rationale for the milder warfare waged then on both sides. In an attempt to clear the way Cicero prefaces the following remark: causas omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum; the cross-reference is evidently to § 35 (quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causam, ut sine iniuria m pace vivatur) and § 36 ( . . . nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod . . . rebus repetitis geratur . . . ; the attempt of Botermann, 23 ff., to find here a reference, not to § 36, but to the general observations about how one should respond to injustice at the beginning of $ 34 is unconvincing). Some have thought to infer that even wars fought de imperio should be defensive in character;55 Cicero was certainly capable of thinking in such terms (cf. Man. 14: . . . propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt. . . ; Rep. 3.35: noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum mm omnium potitus est). But it is by no means clear that Panaetius would have accepted this attempted harmo­ nization of his theory with Roman practice. For the very concept of imperium implies conquest of foreign territories; how should an imperium have been established in the first place on Panaetian principles?56 In spite of his

55. M. Gelzer, "Die Anfangc des romischen Wclrrciches," in Vom romischen Staat. Zur Politik una Gesellschaftsgeschichte der romischen Republik, 1 (Leipzig, 1943), 26, thinks of opponents "die Rom das Imperium raubcn und das ihrige aufzwingcn wollten"; cf. Botermann, 23. 56. Anti-Roman feeling found covert expression among Greek intellectuals in criticism of the Romans' treatment of slaves; cf. Shtaciman, 192 ff. Panaetius belonged, of course, to the upper class, which, by the mid-second century, had largely come to terms with Roman rule; cf. J. Dciningcr, Der polttische Widerstandgegen Rom in Griechenland. 217-86 v. Chr. (Berlin-New York, 1971), 267; such an attitude was made easier in his case, as in that of Polybius, by friendships with leading Romans (frr. 8 ff. van Straatcn); whether he would have tried to make room in his ethical system for imperialism in general is, however, another question. Certainly the Greek philosophical tradition had little sympathy with imperialism (at least as applied to Greek communities); cf. PI. R. 348d: TH κα\ φρόιημοί σ<κ. ώ θρπσύμαχ*, δοκοϋσιι> eiwii και αγαθοί οι άδικοι; Cft yt TCXCLJS. ίφη. οίοι τ€ άδικάΐ'. πάλας TC και έθνη δ ί ν ο μ α ι οΜρώπωΐ' ύφ' εαυτούς ποίίϊαθαι·. . . Cf. also Brunt, 1978, 176 = 307: "It was particularly hard for others to concede that Rome were merely fighting in defence of her friends and allies if (as was sometimes the case)

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best efforts Cicero cannot bring Roman practice and Panaetian precept fully into line. Elsewhere in Off., we see some Ciceronian ambivalence where Greek precept and Roman practice collide (cf. ad 2.55b ff., where Cicero faithfully reproduces Panaetius' strictures against short-lived public benefits but then allows himself to be carried away in praising the splendor aedilitatum); and we see the positive view of the Roman imperium implicit in our passage even more clearly in 2.85 (rempublicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus; see ad loc). Although he sometimes shows a keen sense of the injustice suffered by Rome's allies (cf., besides the prosecution of Verres, 2.27-28 and 3.87b-88), Cicero never found for interstate relations an ideal corresponding to vera gloria in internal affairs (cf. ad 2.43). . . . cum cive aliter contendimus si est inimicus, aliter si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae) . . . ] The text printed here is that of L, whereas the other witnesses offer cum civiliter contendimus aliter. . . Now civiliter contendere as opposed to com­ peting in armed struggle is paralleled in Caelius' letter at Fam. 8.14.3 ( . . . quam diu civiliter sine armis certetur . . . ); also a separate process of altera­ tion would be needed to account for the insertion of aliter after contendimus; hence Goldbacher, 2, 13-14, wanted to retain the much better attested text and merely insert a second contendimus immediately after the first. How­ ever, with Goldbacher's text it is a problem to find a referent for inimicus and competitor (is qui cum nobis contendit}); thus recent editors are unanimous in preferring the text of L. . . . cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum uc cum inimicis gerebatur, utcr esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis Sabinis Samnitibus Poems Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur.] The Latini, Sabini, and Samnites are expected follow­ ing the observations at § 35 on the mild treatment, including grants of citizenship, to such peoples; so, too, is Pyrrhus in light of the sequel. The surprise is that the Celtiberi, who under Viriathus (see ad 2.40) waged a stubborn guerrilla war against Roman armies, but hardly one in which Rome's very existence was in doubt, are placed in the more severe category, the Poeni among those with whom Rome fought for glory of empire but not existence, especially odd in view of the acceptance without criticism of the she admitted states to her friendship and offered them protection at a time when they were already threatened or under attack; it was all too obvious that she was then acting for her own interest, and of course victory would give her control of the conquered iure belli, and justify mass-enslavements, heavy indemnities or annexation, at her own discretion" with examples, including Saguntum, cited, ibid., n. 61 (on Saguntum cf. also Lazenby, 22-29); for an instance of Roman provocation leading to war cf. ad 3.86.

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destruction of Carthage at $ 35 (see ad loc). Fuchs, 1955, 204-5, n.15, suspects that our text presents a crossing of two classifications, a Roman one involving distinction of wars fought de gloria and de salute (cf. Sal. Jug. 114.2; Tac. Agr. 31.3; Curt. 4.14.9; for the distinction transferred to "bat­ tles" in the lawcourts cf. Cael. 47) and the distinction at Pi. R. 469b ff. according to which wars of Greeks against Greeks should follow different norms from those fought against barbarians; this would account for the inclusion of the Celtiberi in the prior category. On the other hand, the placement of the Carthaginians, along with Pyrrhus, in the second group may be a reminiscence of Antic. 28: cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; there, too, however, the initial jux­ taposition quickly becomes a study in contrasts (see next note), when Cicero adds: ab altera propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.—OLD s.v. sum A1 cites our passage in the sense "to be (continue) among the living**; here sum borders on the sense of supersum {OLD s.v., 5: u to remain alive, survive**).—Cicero loses sight of the possibility that one side's war fought de imperio might be the other's fight for survival (cf. Sal. Jug. 94.5). 'Poeni foedifragi', crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.] This sentence pro­ vides a needed corrective to the previous inclusion of the Carthaginians among those with whom the Romans struggled de imperio (see previous note). Note, too, that, as W.H. Friedrich, uZur altlateinischen Dichtung," Hermes 76 (1941), 116, observed, the first two words are a hexameter quotation, perhaps from Ennius* Annales (this provenance is accepted by Skutsch, pp. 781 -82 of his edition). This fact should also defend the sentence against Weidner's athetesis, since such learned citation is beyond the powers of interpolators as ordinarily conceived;57 on the asyndeton cf. Thomas, n. 28, 112-13, who rightly adds that without this sentence Cicero would con­ tradict his tacit approval of the destruction of Carthage in § 35; see also the next note.—Punica fides was, of course, a proverbial designation of treach­ ery among the Romans; cf. Otto, 291; Freyburger, 224. Cicero dilates on the topic in the course of impeaching the testimony of Sardinian witnesses at Scaur. 42.—The charge of cruelty is leveled against Hannibal, not only at Amic. 28 (quoted in the previous note), but also, e.g., at Liv. 21.4.9 (inhu57. See below p. 153, n. 65.—Skucsch, loc. cit.. thinks that there may have been some "critical interchange" between Off. and Rep.; but the only evidence for occurrence of our quotation in Rep. is sch. Hor. Carm. 4.8.17: Cicero in dialogts (an inaccurate reference to our passage?) foedifragos dixit Afros; and the Ennian citation at Off. 1.26 and Rep. 1.49 <see ad the former) would be an instance of a scribe of Rep. being influenced by Off., but not vice-versa.

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mana crudelitas) and other works dependent on Roman sources, such as D.S. 26.14.1-2, App. Harm. 2 7 - 2 8 , 59-60, etc.; but cf. the apologia at Plb. 9.22.7 ff.; Lenschau, RE 7.2 (1912), 2351.1 ff.; Lazenby, 255. Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis ilia praeclara: . . .] Solodow, 125-26, classes our passage among others in which "no other examples do follow, but quidem vaguely suggests that they could be supplied; we might translate quidem 'for one.'" Our sentence, then, is introduced to illustrate the asser­ tion reliqui iustiores, so that athetesis of the preceding sentence would rob ours of its raison d'etre (besides the fact that, in the absence of the previous transmitted sentence, one would have expected the connection cuius quidem or the like with the immediately preceding cum . . . Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur; cf. Thomas, 112, n. 28).—For the ellipsis of esse cf. ad $ 63. 'nee mi aurum posco—cum magnis dis\] The reply to an embassy sent by Fabricius to ransom prisoners after the battle of Heraclea (280) = Enn. Ann. 6, fr. **xi, 183-90; see Skutsch ad loc, as well as H. Frankel, "Griechische Bildung in aJtromischen Epen, II,M Hermes 70 (1935), 66 ff. These verses are probably to be restored at PHerc. 2IE; if so, the verse preceding 183 began with nam; cf. K. Kleve, "Ennius in Herculaneum," CrErc 20 (1990), 12-13. Note also that in v. 184 Skutsch prefers p's non to the better attested nee. Ennius' adaptation of the characterization of Parthenopaeus at Septem 5 4 5 46 (ελθών δ' €oucei> ου καττηλεύοΈΐν μάχηΐ', / μακράς κίλ^ύθου δ' ού καται­ σ χ ύ ν ε ι πόροι>) has often been remarked (likewise the portrayal of Spartan behavior during the Corinthian War, in contrast with that of Philip, at Dem. 9.48 may have been influenced by the Aeschylean passage). regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sentential] On Pyrrhus' lineage, which he traced back to his namesake, the son of Achilles, cf. Dietmar Kienast, RE 24.1 (1963), 112.42 ff., with stemma, 113. Cicero is surely thinking of Achilles' return (albeit for ransom) of Hector's corpse in Iliad 24. Pyrrhus' magnanimity wins an expression of approval rare for a non-Roman in this essay; cf. 2.83 (of Aratus of Sicyon): ο virum magnum dignumque qui in republics nostra natus esset! 39 Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda . . . ] Perhaps this is meant as an exception to the doctrine of § 32, since it would never be in one's interest to keep a promise made to the enemy. . . . ut primo Punico bello Regulus—quam fidem hosti datam fallere.] Cf. ad 3.99b-100. 40 Secundo autem Punico bello—cum scelere approbavit.] This account of those captured by Hannibal after Cannae was stricken from a part of the transmission prior to the ninth century. Thus the ζ family omits secundo

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autem Punico bello—cum scelere approbavit.5* However, ζ surely cuts into living flesh by deleting the example of C. Fabricius. Cicero is unlikely to have mentioned the nobility of Pyrrhus ($ 38) without likewise paying fining tribute to his great adversary, as he does in our passage as transmitted in the ξ tradition, calling this the maximum. . . exemplum. . . iustitiae in hostem. A different matter altogether, though lumped together with £'s procedure in most recent discussions of the problem, is the omission from c (cod. Bern. 104, s. XIII) of the words secundo autem Punico—re non erat; this excision leaves the moral of the exemplum of the ten prisoners dangling, since the words semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum est can scarcely refer to the exemplum of Regulus, which, in c, immediately precedes; surely c's omission is a simple case of saut du meme au meme (secundo autem to semper autem).59 Was the omission in C, which cannot be explained as a mechanical fault in copying, based on the interpretation of a marginal sign? This idea was suggested by the presence of "DM" in the margin of L (s. X), which Atzert4, XXIV (sim. Atzert3 app. crit. ad /oc), interpreted as = dolus malus; but the less sinister interpretation, dignum memoria, seems preferable.60 Perhaps as a result of Atzert's interpretation of u D M n G. Jachmann saw the omissions as the result of the activity of an ancient διασκβυαστής who produced an edition of this text equipped with critical signs (and presumably would have marked our passage with an obelus). 61 Now in 1845 Bergk published a brief tract de Notts preserved at cod. Paris. B.N. lat. 7530, foil. 28 r , line l-29 r , line 6, which, together with the chapter de notis sententiarum in Isidore's Origines, comprises our surviv­ ing ancient evidence about the critical signs used in Latin texts; the statement in the former his solis in adnotationibus fhennii Luciif et bistoricorum usi sunt fvarrus hennius, haelius aequef et postremo Probus, qui illas in Virgilio et Horatio et Lucretio apposuit, ut Homero Aristarchus does not encourage the view that Cicero, or indeed any Latin prose text, received such treat-

58. The agreement of ρ (Palat. lar. 1531, s. XIII) of the ξ family is scarcely worth mention­ ing; cf. Winterbottom, 1993, 225-26. 59. The possibility is raised by Wimcrbortom, 1993, 228. 60. So Winterbottom, 1993, 223, n. 42, with reference to "Notes and News," The Bodleian Library Record 3 (1951), 121, where the "D.M." found in a group of eleventh· and early twelfth-century manuscripts in the Salisbury Cathedral is so interpreted. 61. Cf. also the occurrence in φ 2 of the letter η beneath semper ($40). For interpretation of η as non and of DM as dolus malus cf. A. Cappelli, Lexicon abbreviaturarum (Milan, 1973), 103 and 229 respectively. Such signs may have motivated the omission of secundo autem Punico—re non erat in c; bur nothing is thereby indicated about the transmission of the passage in antiquity.

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ment. 62 Jachmann's hypothesis should accordingly be treated with reserve, as should, in general, the hunt for interpolations in the text of Off., which, in the sequel, Jachmann's pupil W.J. Bruser pursued with a fervor bordering on fanaticism. The transmitted text evidently contains some interpolations, as is virtually inevitable in the case of a work as much studied in antiquity as was Off.; but there is no evidence to support the notion that the text was sub­ jected to systematic interpolation of the type posited by Bruser. The omission of this material from the ζ tradition may have resulted from a comparison with the corrected account of 3.113-15, probably by an ancient reader rather than Cicero himself, since, as noted above, the excision alone is rhetor­ ically unsatisfying.63 Other considerations likewise argue for the authenticity of the material transmitted in ξ. We know from 3.113-15 that Cicero thought of the cases of Regulus and the ten Cannae captives together as positive and negative exempla of the behavior of persons who have sworn oaths to an enemy;64 an interpolator could, of course, have known and made use of the later passage. But the content of the account of the prisoners after Cannae in our passage differs from that given in 3.113-15 (hence it was not simply lifted from that place by an interpolator). In the later passage the versions of Polybius and Acilius are cited and kept scrupulously distinct. Our paragraph, on the other hand, conflates two versions: like Polybius, our passage knows of only one captive, who returned to the camp on the pretext of having forgotten some­ thing; like Liv. 22.61.7-9, our passage has all ten remain at Rome and receive censorial punishment. This conflation of two accounts is typical of an author relying on memory, as we see Cicero doing elsewhere in this essay (cf. ad SS 33,147). On the other hand, Off. 3.113-15 is clearly based on a recent rereading of the sources there named (see ad he). Finally, Pyrrhus' noble release of the prisoners of Heraclea without ransom in 280 appeared in the historiographical tradition as a foil for Hannibal's greed after Cannae; thus Livy makes the captives' spokesman twice appeal to the example of Pyrrhus (22.59.14 and 18); on echoes of the Ennian passage just quoted by Cicero in the same context cf. Kornhardt, 1954,98-99, n. 1; if Livy has taken over this comparison from an annalistic predecessor, a natural association of ideas 62. On rhc whole question of editions equipped with Probian critical signs cf. CO. Brink, Horace on Poetry. 2 (Cambridge, 1971), 36-38; H.D. Jocclyn, "The Annotations of M. Valerius Probus," CQ 78 (1984), 464-72 and 79 (1985), 149-61 (esp. 158) and 466-74. 63. One could, of course, reply that Cicero may have intended other adjustments, which he never lived to execute.—For another case where ξ preserves apparently genuine matter omitted by ζ cf. ad 3.52. 64. For the censors responsible see on the next lemma.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 40-4la

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65

would have led Cicero from the exemplum of Pyrrhus to the prisoners taken in the aftermath of Cannae. . . . eos omnes censores, quoad quisque eomm vixit, quod peierassent in aerariis reliquerunt. . . ] The battle of Cannae took place in August, 216, the censorial action in 214; Cicero's quoad quisque eorum vixit suggests that one or more of the perjurers may have died in the interval (he is evidently relying on memory rather than written sources). Gel. 6.18.8 6 6 gives the legal basis for this action as follows: turn octo ex his postliminium iustum non esse sibi responderunt, quoniam deiurio vincti forent . . . The censors in question were M. Atilius Regulus, son of the consular who would have been in the same legal position as Hannibal's erstwhile prisoners had he remained in Rome after the failure of his mission (hence perhaps Cicero's linking of the two cases both here and at 3.113), and P. Furius Philus (cf. MRR, 1, 259). For the ex-captives' subsequent fate cf. ad 3.115.—The aerarii were a class of citizens who lacked membership in a tribus and the voting rights thereby entailed (cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 3, 285) but were nonetheless subject to taxation (ibid., 2, 392, n. 2); on the power of the censors civem tribu movere et aerarium facere, ibid., 2, 402, n. 2. Maximum autem exemplum—Pyrrho dedit.J Cf. ad 3.86. 41a Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. est autem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt qui ita iubent uti ut mercennariis, operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.] As at Rep. (3.34-35/36-37), the discussion of slaves follows upon that of the helium iustum. There Philus' argument that conquest of foreign peoples and slavery are unjust was answered by Laelius. Our passage, unlike Rep., does not attempt a justification of slavery as such but merely offers precepts on the humane treatment of slaves. One wonders, however, whether, influenced by the train of thought in Rep. 3, Cicero may have inserted the topic at this point in Off., for our passage is oddly placed between precepts warning against deceit (see ad § 41 b). On the other hand, the inferior position of slaves might tempt one to commit injustice; hence the topic fits generally with the tempta­ tions to injustice discussed at §S 31 ff. (cf. ad 30-41), though, if this is the connection, an author less pressed for time than Cicero would surely have made it explicit. Like the example of Crassus at § 25, then, our passage should have been integrated more carefully into context. In any case, Testard rightly begins a new paragraph at this point, the subject of hellica officio 65. Less likely an interpolator, interpolators being in general casual readers whose inter­ ference with the text is motivated by a desire for clarification or amplification but who are not prepared to undertake any very laborious research into sources. 66. It is unclear whether Marshall is right in including this material in Nepos fr. 12.

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begun at § 34 (atque in re publica—) being now concluded.—Our passage presupposes the Old Stoic doctrine άνθρωπο? γάρ έκ φύσβω? δούλο? ouoei? [SVF 3, 86.18-19); cf. Griffin, 1976,459, contra Will Richter, "Seneca und die Sklaven," Gymnasium 65 (1958), 205; and it implicitly approves Chrysippus' doctrine servus . . . perpetuus mercennarius est [SVF 3, 86.1213 = Sen. Ben. 3.22.1; sim. SVF 3, 86.20-21: ο'ι oe δεσπόται τοΐ? αργυρώνη­ τοι? μη ώ? φύοΈΐ δούλοι? αλλ' ώ? μισθωτοί? προσφ€ρωνται). Chrysippus had also provided a definition for freedom and slavery (ibid., 86.30 ff. = D.L. 7.121: eivai γάρ την €λ€υθ€ρίαν έξουσίαν αύτοπραγία?. την δέ δουλ€ίαν στ€ρησιν αύτοττραγία?). At Rep. 3.36-37 Cicero, while rejecting Aristotle's view that there are "slaves by nature" {Pol. 1254bl9-20), argued that slavery is of common benefit to slave and master; cf. Jean Christian Dumont, "Conquete et esclavage chez Ciceron. De republica HI, 3 6 - 3 7 , " Ktema 8 (1983), 1 1 3 28, esp. 117; Erskine, 196-98. When at 2.24 Cicero (after Panaetius?) speaks of saevitia as the normal method of controlling slaves, he may have meant this merely as an empirical observation, as Griffin, 1976, 460, sug­ gests; cf. also L. Huchthausen, "Cicero und die Sklaverei. Zur Auswertung indirekter Aussagen," Klio 67 (1985), 4 8 2 - 8 3 . Seneca later provided a more elaborate plea for humane treatment of slaves (£p. 47), as well as a detailed discussion of the question raised by Hecato (fr. 18 G.), whether a slave can confer a benefit on his master [Ben. 3.18 ff.).—On the mercennarii cf. § 150. . . . operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.] These are the two terms of the master-slave relation in accord with the principle of justice ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur (cf. $ 42). This particular precept was easily accepted since it corresponds to the commonsense view long recommended by Greek and Roman writers (with sufficient food understood under the iusta); see Arist. Oec. 1344b2-4: λ€ίπ€ται δη €ργα παρ^χβν και τροφήν Ικανήν αμίσθων γάρ ούχ οίον τ€ άρχ€ΐν, δούλω oe μισθό? τροφή; Cato Agr. 5.2 (under vilici officio): familiae male ne sit, ne algeat, ne esuriat. For a casuistic problem arising from this appropriate action cf. 3.89 [sitne viri boni in maxima cantate annonae familiam non alere). In paying his own slaves for fish that they had caught (cf. Ath. 6.274d), P. Rutilius Rufus was, no doubt on Stoic princi­ ple, 6 7 unusually generous in his interpretation of the iusta. 41b Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore.] This material connects, not with § 41a, but with §S 3 3 - 4 0 (on deceit); the oddity of the placement of $ 41a (on slavery) may have to do with a reminiscence of the order of topics in Rep. (see the next to 67. On his career in general cf. ad 3.10.

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last note).—The lion and fox as two fixed and contrasting types make an early appearance in Greek gnomic literature; besides the Aesopian fables (nos. 10 and 147 Hausrath-Hunger [with the latter cf. Hor. Ep. 1.1.73 ff.|) cf. Pi. O. 11.19-20: το γαρ έμφυες OUT' αϊθων άλώπηξ / οΰτ' έρίβρομοι λέ­ οντες διαλλάζαιντο ήθος (for the fox cf. Suet. Vies. 16.3: vulpem pilum mu­ tate, non mores); the contempt for the latter displayed in our passage (see below) is foreshadowed at Pi. fr. 237: όπισθεν δε κεΐμαι θρασ€ΐάι> αλωπεκών ξανθός λέων; see also Ar. Pax 1189-90: όντες οϊκοι μεν λέοντες, / έν μάχη δ' αλωπεκές (with sch. ad loc: οϊκοι λέοντες: παροιμία παρά τους εν τη Ασία Λάκωνας άτυχήσαντας- "οϊκοι λέοντες, εν Έφέσω δε Λάκωνες"). The appli­ cation to the Spartans will, however, have been secondary; it presumably reflects the feeling of 394, when the Ephesians drove out their Spartiate harmosts and joined with Rhodes, Samos, Cnidus, and Iasus in a proAthenian alliance; cf. Paus. 6.3.15-16; Burchner, RE 5.2 (1905), 2791.45 ff.; there was a corresponding Latin proverb (Petr. 44.14: nuncpopulus est domi hones, foras vulpes). The use of the diminutive in our passage surely conveys an undertone of contempt. 68 Cicero, no less than Sallust {Cat. 10.5), was, of course, well familiar with the human type to which he allegorical I y alludes; cf. his remarks a propos Hortensius at QF 1.3.8 (quoted ad 3.73). totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam eorum qui turn cum maxime fallunt id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur.] The section concludes, like $ 27, with a ranking of phenomena (cf. also $ 58); cf. PI. R. 361a: εσχάτη γαρ αδικία δοκεΐν δίκαιον είναι μή όντα; Pohlenz, AF, 34. 4 2 - 6 0 Liberalitas/beneficetttia appears under the second virtue as the posi­ tive complement to iustitia. These terms render the Greek έλευθεριότης, properly the behavior appropriate to a free man, but in practice an aristocra­ tic ideal of liberality in matters of money (the exemplum of Cimon's hospi­ tality to his fellow Laciads 12.64] gives some notion of the original aristocra­ tic tincture); so it appears already in its first attestation (προς τήν τών χρημάτων ελευθεριότητα: PI. Tht. 144d). As in the case of μεγαλοψυχία, Aristotle incorporated a virtue drawn from the moral code of the archaic aristocracy in his ethical system, where it appears as a mean between the vices ασωτία and άνελευθερία (£Ν 4 irtit.). At Rome, however, the acceptance of money from another was a mark of the inferior position in a patron-client relationship (cf. 2.69); hence in the republic the ideal was freedom {libertas), and liberalitas tended to be in bad odor as too similar in character to largitio (hence perhaps Cicero's apparent lack of interest in the topic? see below); cf. 68. On rhc form vulpecula as pointing to an original fifth declension -e stem vulpes cf. Leumann, 306 and 344.

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Kloft, 5 ff.; Manning, 73 ff. Under the empire, of course, liberalitas became an ideal, just as €λευθ€ριότη? had been in the Hellenistic monarchies; cf. Kloft, 73 ff. While elsewhere in this essay Cicero's use of definitions sometimes borders on the pedantic (cf. $§ 7-8, 95-96,142), he fails to provide one for liberalitas.69 He would have had to differentiate it (presumably on the basis of intent; cf. $ 44: ab ostentatione magis quant a voluntate; 3.118; Kloft, 41, n. 25) from prodigalitas70 and/or largitio. But in practice the various forms of public generosity were hard for the observer to distinguish, a fact which, as counsel for such defendants on ambitus charges as L. Murena (63) and Cn. Plancius (54), Cicero himself had turned to advantage (cf. de Orat. 2.105:. . . raw illud datur, ut possis liberalitatem ac benignitatem ab ambitu atque brgitione seiungere; Kloft, 42 ff.). So instead of defining the term Cicero begins with cautiones (cf. ad $ 22 and under the third virtue §5 68 ff. [though there a definition of the subject has preceded]). The unusually clear organization of these paragraphs presumably shows that Cicero is, at least in outline, closely following his Panaetian model (or a part of it): I. ne obsit benignitas et Us ipsis quibus benigne videbitur fieri et ceteris (SS 42-43) II. ne benignitas maior sit quant facultates (§ 44) III. dilectus sit dignitatis (§ 45) 7 1 A. mores (§46) B. animus erga nos et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata (§S 4 7 49) C. communitas ac societas vitae 1. General precepts ($§ 50-58). 2. Changes κατά π€ρίστασιι> (§§ 59-60). However, the paucity of illustration (only the political examples of Sulla and Caesar in § 43, the [Panaetian? see ad loc] citation of Hesiod [Op. 349-501 in § 48, and the verses of Ennius in $$ 51-52) suggests that Cicero is according perfunctory treatment to material that did not interest him greatly. Moreover, comparison with Seneca, de Beneficiis, heavily indebted to the 69. There is no definition of beneficium either; it is often used in this section interchangea­ bly with officium; cf. ad $ 48. 70. Cf. Arist. EN U19b27 ff. and U21al0 ff. (€λ£υθ€ριότης/άσωτία); Sen. Ep. 120.8. 71. The choice is made according to different criteria (the standard being utilitas) in Book 2;d. ad 2.61-62.

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treatise ncpl καθηκοι/το? by Panaetius* pupil Hecato (cf. Griffin, 1976, 300), shows that certain topics that might have been expected in this context have been omitted, viz.» the distinction between the matter of a benefit and the benefit itself {Ben. 1.5.2); a discussion of the receiving of benefits (ibid., 2.18.1 ff.); or a reflex of the Stoic problem of whether one can confer a benefit on oneself (ibid., 5.7.2 ff.); cf. also ad 2.63 (ingratitude). 72 Even allowing for the probability that Hecato elaborated on his teacher's discus­ sion of benefits, one cannot but wonder whether Cicero has not effeaed considerable economies of space in this section (cf. also ad 2.63). 42 Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de benefkentia ac de liberalitate dicatur: qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas cautioner.] The two operative terms {beneficentia, liberalitate) are closely bound together (ac), since, as Manning, 73, phrased it, uliberalitas . . . is the disposition from which the act of conferring a beneficium is derived**; cf. de Orat. 2.105 {liberalitatem ac benignitatem); cf. also the relation of the two constituents of the third virtue [rerum externarum despicientia and the per­ formance of great deeds) as described at §§ 66-67.—For the description qua . . . nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius cf. $ 1 3 : quod verum simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. It is doubtful, however, that Cicero intends some subtle distinction between what is accommodatum and what is aptum; as elsewhere in this essay, he has perhaps not thought through and compared the terms in which he praises the different qualities; cf. ad S§ 55-56.—For the procedure of beginning, not with a definition, but rather cautiones cf. ad §$ 4 2 - 6 0 . . . . turn ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur, id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia.] Cicero's dilectus dignitatis ($$ 45 ff.) turns out not to have the obvious sense of social status, as at Sen. Ben. 2.15.3 (aestimanda est eius persona, cut damus; quaedam enim minora sunt, quam ut exire a magnis viris debeant etc.; cf. also Ben. 2.16.1-2 and ad 2.69 below).—For the formula ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur to be called the iustitiae fundamentum comes as something of a surprise; after all, fides had received this predicate at 5 23a (see ad loc); for the Stoic formula for justice "giving to each his own** cf. § 15 and ad § 2 1 ; Sorabji, 142-43.—For the relation of iustitia and beneficentia cf. SVF 3, 64.24-25 and 4 1 , where χρηστότης, defined as επιστήμη εΰττοιητικη, is subordinated to δικαιοσύιτι; Kloft, 40, n. 20. 72. On the other hand, in view of the way the project has been delimited at $$ 7b-8, it is understandable that Cicero does not discuss the conferring of benefits between sages, mentioned at Sen. Ben. 7.17.1.

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. . . qui gratificantur cuipiam quod obsit illi cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberates sed perniciosi adsentatores iudicandi sunt. . .] Plato gives the following description of όψοποιική at Grg. 464e2 ff.: κολακείαν μεν ουν αυτό καλώ, και αΐσχρόν φημι είναι το τοιούτον . . . δτι του ήδεο? στο­ χάζεται άνευ του βέλτιστου . . . Seneca dilates on this point at Ben. 2.14.1: sunt quaedam nocitura impetrantibus, quae non dare sed negate beneficium est; aestimabimus itaque utilitatem potius quam voluntatem petentium. saepe enim noxia concupiscimus . . . quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum impetus Hie flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos malorum munerum auctores. On the figure of the κόλαξ in ancient comedy and philosophy down to Lucian's time cf. H.-G. Nesselrath, Lukians Parasitendialog. Untersuchungen und Kommentar (Berlin-New York, 1985), 92 ff.; Cicero had dealt in detail with the adsentator at Amic. 88-100; cf. also ad § 91 and 2.63. . . . qui aliis nocent ut in alios liberates sint in eadem sunt iniustitia ut si in suam rem aliena convertant.] Cf. Arist. EN 1120a31-33: ουδέ λήψεται δε (sc. ό ελευθέριος] δθεν μη δει- ου γάρ εστί τοϋ μη τιμώντο? τά χρήματα ή τοιαύτη λήψις; ibid., 1121a30 ff.: άλλ' οι πολλοί των άσωτων, καθάπερ ειρηται, και λαμβάνουσιν όθεν μή δει, καΐ είσΐ κατά τούτο ανελεύθεροι. . . . διόπεροΰδ'ελευθέριοι αϊ δόσειςαύτώνεΐσίνούγάρκαλαί,ούδέ τούτου ένεκα, ουδέ ως- δει. Imperial propaganda would later emphasize the pure methods used to obtain the material of benefactions; cf. Kloft, 148, n. 311. 43 sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis quod aliis largiantur,... id autem tantum abest (ab> officio ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium.] This is a point on which Cicero insists throughout Off., namely that iustitia is universal and cannot be obtained at the expense of another's rights; cf. § 2 1 , 2.73 ff., 3.21 ff., 42, etc.; de Orat. 2.172 (example of an argument ex pari): est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicam largiri pecunias; cf. also the deprecation of political activity in the interest of a single faction only at $ 85; sim. Plin. Ep. 9.30.2: sunt ingenio simili qui quod huic donant auferunt illi, famamque liberalitatis avaritia petunt.—This first mention of personal glory in Off. (as opposed to the gloria belli of 5 38) already emphasizes that its pursuit is fraught with dangers to the community; cf. introduction, p. 32.—Largitio is more com­ monly used in the republic, as here, in view of its corrupting tendency, with a negative, rather than positive or neutral coloring; cf. Montefusco-Buchwald, TLL 7.2, 971.1 ff.; ad 2.53; under the impact of imperial propaganda, however, the positive sense comes to prevail (cf. Kloft, 159 and n. 355), as reflected in modern derivatives (French largesse or English largess). How-

Commentary on Book 1, Section 42-44

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ever, Pliny, himself a philanthropist, takes a more discriminating view of benefactions (see above and ad 2.69). quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet libcralis videri; . . .] Catul. 29.15 already refers to Caesar's sinistra liberalitas. Cicero, however, is surely thinking above all of the disposition of the property of the proscribed, a topic much on his mind at this time as Phil. 2.64 ff. (on Antony as purchaser of Pompey's property) attests; cf. Kloft, 51 ff., and ad 2.29; Sallust's Cato remarks (Cat. 52.11): iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus: quia bona aliena largiri liberalitas . . . vocatur, eo respublica in extremo sita est. Cicero could, however, if so minded (cf. ad § 88: . . . nihil enim laudabilius . . .), have used Caesar as a positive exemplum of liberalitas; cf. Fam. 1.9.18 (to Lcntulus, December, 54): . . . commemoranda quaedam et divina Caesaris in me fratremque meum liberalitas, evidently a reference to Caesar's loan to Cicero of 800,000 sesterces (first expressly attested at Att. 5.5.2 [15 May 51]), a cause of some embarrassment as Cicero drifted toward Pompey's side in the civil war; cf. Shatzman, 416-17. Cf. also Caesar's statement of policy to Oppius (5 March 49, apud Cic. Att. 9.7C.1): . . . quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam, quern imitaturus non sum. haec nova sit ratio vincendi ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus. 44 Alter locus erat cautionis ne benignitas maior esset quam facilitates . . . ] Aristotle's ελευθε piοτης· still betrays its origin in the moral code of the archaic nobility: ελευθερίου δ' εστί σφόδρα και το ύπερβάλλειν εν τη δοσει, ώστε κατάλειπε ι ν έαυτφ ελάττω' το γαρ μη βλεπειν εφ' εαυτόν ελευθερίου (ΕΝ 1120b4-6); he does, however, recognize the corresponding vice of excess, namely ασωτία. Our passage, on the other hand, suggests the transformation of ελευθερωτής· into an ideal within reach of all; cf. 2.59, where moderation in view of one's financial position is clearly what Cicero understands under the mediocritatis regula (cf. Kloft, 141). Seneca takes a similar line (Ben. 2.15.1): dabo egenti, sed ut ipse non egeam; succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream . . . ; he does, however, also add a proviso at the other end of the scale (Ben. 2.15.3): respiciendae sunt cuique facultates suae viresque, ne aut plus praestemus, quam possumus, aut minus (cf. SVF 3, 135.10, where τήν κτησιν διαρρίπτειν is given as a κατά περίστασιν καθήκον). Liberalitas so conceived contrasts not only with the earlier Adebethik but also with the Christian morality of the following era (cf. Zielinski, 69); for Lactantius' critique of measured charity cf. inst. 6.11; Nelson, 66. . . . qui benigniores volunt esse quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant,

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quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos;...] Cf. Arist. EN 1120b2-3: ούδ' αμελή­ σει των ιδίων, βουλωμένος- γε δια τούτων τισίν επαρκεί ν; § 5 2 : . . . Μ/ facultas sit qua in nostros simus liberates; 2.64 {habenda autem ratio est ret familiaris . . .); Hecato's position reported at 3.63. The Twelve Tables prohibited a prodigal from handling his own affairs; he later received a curator on the analogy of the lunatic; cf. FJRA 1, 5.7c = Dig. 27.10.1 (Ulpian), Ulp. 12.2; Watson, Persons, 156-57; Edwards, 180 ff. inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas pierumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae.) Such behavior is only called liberalitas by a corruption of usage according to the Sallustian Cato {Cat. 52.11), quoted ad $ 43; cf. also ad 2.52-64. videre etiam beet plerosque, non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria duaos, ut benefici videantur facere multa quae proficisci ab ostentarione magis quam a voluntate videantur.] In some sense the desire to put one's generosity on display can be called a voluntas. But Cicero evidently uses the Latin word in the technical sense of the Stoic βούλησις·,73 defined as εύλογοςόρεξις· (SVF 3.41.33; 105.20 and 27) and the opposite of επιθυμία (ibid., 105.20). Cf. Tusc. AM (= SVF 3, 106.45 ff.): quam ob rem simul obiecta species est cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eiusmodi adpetitionem Stoici βούλησι ν appellant, nos appellemus voluntatem. earn illi putant in solo esse sapiente, quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. Cf. also Sen. Ben. 1.6.1: quid est ergo beneficium? benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo; Marc. Aurel. 9.42.11-12: προδήλως· γάρ σον το αμάρτημα, . . . είτε την χάριν διδούς* μη καταληκτικώς έ'δωκας μηδέ ώστε έξ αυτής- της* σής- πράξεως· ευθύς· άπειληφεναι πάντα τον καρπόν. τί γάρ πλέον θέλεις- ευ ποιήσας- ανθρωπον; οΰκ άρκεΐ τούτο, δτι κατά φύσιν την σήν τι επραξας·, αλλά τούτου μκτθον ζητείς; (sim., ibid., 1.16.25). On right intent as a prerequisite for virtuous action cf. ad 2A2a. Glory is recognized as an instrumental value in Book 2; cf. the introduction to that Book. In practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish between those whose benefactions are prompted by "nature" and those who desire glory (cf. ad §§ 42-60). talis autem simulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.] "Such pretence is closer to sham than either to liberality or honorableness" (Atkins). The characterization as simulatio brings this behavior 73. Not to be confused with modern concepts of will; cf. Inwood, 1985, 96 ff.

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into the realm of dolus tnalus; cf. Aquilius* definition of the latter, which turns upon simulation (3.60). Vanitas ("untruthfulness, insincerity": cf. OLD s.v., lb) is a somewhat euphemistic designation; cf. $ 150, where middlemen in commercial transactions are said to be likely to fall into it. 45 Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; . . .J Cf. ad SS 42, 4 2 - 6 0 , and 2.61-62. . . . et animus erga nos, et communitas ac societas vitae, et ad nostras utilitates officia ante conlata.] Unger, 28, suggested transposing et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata after et animus erga nos; certainly these two are treated together prior to communitas ac societas vitae at SS 4 7 - 4 9 , and an omission of et ad nostras . . . through saut du meme au meme {et. . . *f), its insertion in the margin and then in the wrong place in the text is not impossi­ ble; but in this essay such a transposition may well be a correction of the author; cf. ad $ 125 and Pohlenz, AF, 36, n. 2. quae ut concurrent omnia, optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.] Besides the factors mentioned here, there are also considerations of special circumstance (S 59); hence one will need to be a bonus ratiocinator officiorum (ibid.) to do justice to one's responsibilities. 46 Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis . . . ] The realism of Panaetius contrasts markedly with the Older Stoa's concentra­ tion on the sapiens-, cf. fr. 114 = Sen. Ep. 116.5: eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset. 'De sapiente* inquit 'videbimus: mihi et tibi, quiadhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancupatam, vilem sibi\ H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge, 1965), 182, comments: a The question of the wise man's conduct can be postponed. It is 'you and Γ who are our immediate concern"; cf. ad 3.13-16.—For the phrasing cf. Fam. 4.14.1 (to Cn. Plancius, January, 45): . . . sin autem in eo dignitas est si quod sentias aut re efficere possis aut denique libera oratione defenderey ne vestigium quidem ullum est reliquum nobis dignitatis agiturque praeclare si nosmet ipsos regere possumus ut ea quae partim iam adsunt, partim impendent, moderate feramus. . . . nemincm omnino esse neglegcndum in quo aliqua significario virtutis appareat. . .] While using character as a criterion, Cicero/Panaetius is pre­ pared to cast his net widely (see previous note). As at $ 13\,significatio is an "outward sign, expression, intimation" (cf. OLD s.v., 2a). On the sense of apparere (= be noticed, show itself) cf. OLD s.v. appareo lb. . . . colendum autem esse ita quemque maxime ut quisque maxime virtutibus

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his lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, . . . iustitia. nam fortis animus et magnus—bonum virum videntur potius attingere.] A different division of virtues from § § 15-17 or §$ 153 ff.: the danger of the potentially antisocial third virtue is explicitly recognized for the first time (cf. §§ 68 ff.); the first virtue is ignored; cf. also ad 2.33 and 3.24. acque haec in moribus.] For in = u in the matter of," virtually equivalent to de, cf. OLD s.v., 42; Wilkins on de Orat. 2.96. 47 . . . sed benivolentiam non adulescenmlorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus.] As elsewhere, Cicero/ Panaetius values stable relations; cf. $§ 74 ff.; 2.55b; ad § 49; similarly Seneca a propos amicitia (Ep. 9.11): non dubie habetaliquidsimileamicitiae adfectus amantium; possis dicere ilbm esse insanam amicitiam. nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium esc] Indeed lack of reciprocity was grounds for dissolving friendship; cf. Sailer, 14. Consider­ ations of this kind informed Cicero's decision in 49 to follow Pompey rather than Caesar in the civil war; cf. Brunt, 1986, esp. 16; Mitchell, 1991, 253 (cf., however, on Caesar's loan to Cicero ad § 43 above). Cf. also 2.63.—This is an isolated instance of the gerundive as an ablative of comparison; cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, § 203, IV.A). 48 quod si ea quae utenda acceperis maiore mensura, si modo possis, iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus?] Cf. Op. 349-50: €υ μει> μετρεΐσθαι παρά yeiTovos, eu δ' άποδοΟναι, / αύτω τψ μ^τρω, και λώϊον αϊ κ€ δύι/ηαι, a passage well known to Cicero, who refers to it on his own several times in 4 6 - 4 5 with reference to literary dedications owed to Atticus and Varro; cf. Brut. 15: quae |sc. the contents of the Liber annalis] cum studiose tractare coepissem, ipsa mihi tractatio litterarum salutaris fuit admonuitque, Pomponi, ut a te ipso sumerem aliquid ad me reddendum teque remunerandum si non parit at grato tamen munere: quamquam illud Hesiodium laudatur a doctis, quod eadem mensura reddere iubet qua ac­ ceperis aut etiam cumulation, si possis; Att. 13.12.3 (23 June 45): . . . iam Varro mihi denuntiaverat magnam sane et gravem προσφώνησα'. . . . ego autem me parabam ad id quod tile mihi misisset ut "αύτω τφ μετρώ και λιοιοί'," si modo potuissem; nam hoc etiam Hesiodus ascribit, **αΐ κε δύι>ηαι." Cf. ad § 30. etenim si in eos quos speramus nobis profuturos non dubitamus officia conferre, quales in eos esse debemus qui iam profuerunt?] Cicero adds a second argument of the a fortiori type not seldom met with in this treatise; cf. ad$$ 14,103,114,119,131,145,157,2.29,40,3.29-32,74,84,105.This sentence contradicts the distinction whereby beneficium is used for the first gesture establishing a /J
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kindness (cf. also the next sentence: nam cum duo genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi. . .); in practice the two terms were often used interchangeably; cf. Sailer, 19-20. . . . non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine iniuria.] Aristotle, too, gave high priority to returning benefactions; cf. EN 1164b3132: και τάς μέν eucpyeoi ας άνταποδοτεον ώς em το πολύ μάλλον ή χαριστέον εταίροι?, ώσπβρ και 6άν€ΐον,(ρόφ€ίλ€ΐ αποδοτέου μάλλον ή έταίρωδοτεον. On vir bonus as an equivalent to vir iustus cf. ad 2.33; for its use in Roman sponsiones see 3.77. The saving clause modo id facere possit sine iniuria is in accord with §S 31 ff., as well as §§ 4 2 - 4 4 . 49 . . . nee dubium quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur.] Sc. beneficio. multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio fvel morbo in omnes velf rcpentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; . . .] Cicero's beneficentia is indeed "more rule-bound and less spontaneous than our 'generosity'" (Atkins, 266). As one should avoid rashness in such mat­ ters oneself (cf. § 47), so when practiced by others a spontaneous act carries less weight than a carefully considered one; so, too, premeditated wrongdo­ ing is more serious than a crime of passion (cf. ad § 27). The articulation as well as the text of this sentence is unresolved. T. Stangl in a review of C. Atzert, De Ciceronis librorum de officiis quibusdam codicibus I (Osnabruck, 1914), in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 35 (1915), 46, defends the transmitted text with the argument that "morbus und furor, wie i w o s und μανία, klassische Vertreter sind fur 'mafiloser Hang, krankhafte Passion, Sucht, Manic*" In support of this assertion he adduces two Ciceronian passages, Ver. 2.4.1 and Fin. 1.59 (I leave aside the post-classical testimonies, which would in any case prove nothing for Cicero­ nian usage). In the former passage we read: venio nunc ad istius, quern ad modum ipse appellat, studium, ut amici eius, morbum et insaniam, ut Siculi, latrocinium; but here surely the juxtaposition with insaniam and the fact that it is one of three designations for the same state of affairs is what makes Cicero's meaning clear, as morbus alone (as in our passage) would not. Likewise at Fin. 1.59 it is the context and the specification animi morbi that rule out any possible ambiguity: quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates inmensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. Earlier attempts to defend the transmitted text along similar lines have been sufficiently refuted by A. Tittler, "Restaurationsversuche . . .," Jahrbucher fur Phil. u. Pad. 99 (1864), 500. Two different types of ill-advised giving are contrasted, the former a prodigality that fails to discriminate between objects (sine iudicio), the latter

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a sudden impulse to give; cf. the similar distinction at Sen. Wit. Beat. 24.1: errat si quis existimat faeilem rem esse donare: plurimum ista res habet difficultat is, si modo consilio tribuitur, non casu et impetu spargitur. By its nature this second type of giving must have an individual, not omnes, as its object (hence a comma is needed after omnes). The latter is compared to a (gust of) wind, the former surely to a disease in the sense that the individual loses control over his life (cf. ad § 44 for the handling of the prodigal under Roman law). Since, as we have seen, morbo without a qualifier can hardly denote a "krankhafte Sucht" or the like, surely Beier's velkutl is needed. But the text still needs another verbal idea for the prior type of benefac­ tion, rather than having to rely on incitati, more appropriate for the sudden impulse (repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi). Hence Pohlenz, AF, 36, n. 3, comparing for the thought $ 44 and 2.54-55, proposed sine iudicio vel modo keffusil velkutl morbo in omnes {modo appears as a weakly attested variant for morbo); for effusi Pohlenz compares farad. 2 1 : an virum . . . dices . . . temperantem qui se in aliqua libidine continuent, in aliqua effuderitf (his reference to Att. 5.9.3 is in error, however); for the participle effusus used for an adjective in the sense largus, prodigiosus cf. Leumann, TLL 5, 219.71 ff. However, vel modo . . . velkutl morbo seems an unneces­ sary expansion. Surely either after Pohlenz velkutl morbo in omnes keffusil or after Holford-Strevens {apud Winterbottom) velkutl morbo in omnes kprodigil would restore the probable sense. For the former type of misguided benefaction {sine iudicio) cf. Sen. Ben. 1.14.1: beneficium si qui quibuslibet dat, nulli gratum dat... In the case of the latter the problem (not addressed in our text) might arise of the agent later regretting his action; cf. Plin. Ep. 1.8.8:. . . postremo ut subitae largitionis comitem paenitentiam caveremus; Plut. Tim. 6.2 ff. (after Panaetius?): δβΐ γάρ οΰ μόνον . . . την πράξιν καλήν €ΐναι και δικαίαν, άλλα και την δόξαν, άφ' ης πράττβται, μόνιμο»; και άμίτάπτωτον, 'ίνα πράττωμίν δοκιμάσαιτίς . . . αίσχρόν γάρ ή μ€τάνοια ποΐ€Ϊ και το καλώς π€πραγμ€νον, ή δ' έξ επιστή­ μης ώρμημξ'νη και λογισμού προαίρεσις ούδ' αν πταίσωσιν αί πράξ€ΐς μ€ταβάλλ€ται. sed in conlocando beneficio—tamen ei potissimum inserviunc] The phrase conlocare beneficium, like conlocare pecuniam, suggests again that this is an act requiring careful deliberation; cf. Sen. Ben. 1.1.1: sequitur enim, ut male conlocata male debeantur. For the contrast of conlocare and effundere cf. ad 2.54; for the phrase conlocare pecuniam and the metaphor of "investing" glory cf. ad 2.42b.—Heilmann, 86, points out that, given the unconditional requirement of returning favors and the restriction si cetera paria sunt, in practice little scope would ordinarily remain for helping the needy; cf. also

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§ 52. However» Cicero/Panaetius inveighs at length at 2.69 ff. against the practice of helping those from whom one expects to gain, rather than those in need.—The hope of benefit appears likewise as a motive both for those who contribute to or augment a person's standing or power at 2.21-22 5 0 - 5 8 This is among the most disputed passages of Off. in respect both of text and source-analysis. Its presence is motivated by the third (according to the transmitted text) of the criteria for the dilectus dignitatis in conferring officia at § 45: the communitas ac societas vitae. Hence our section begins with the general precept: optime . . . societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plunmum conferetur. Next we are put on notice that a digression will follow: sed quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius. But there is no indication of why such an explanation is needed at this point; one might well have thought the matter to have been already disposed of at § 12. In any case, we are warned that the following discussion will exceed the modest parameters within which the preceding parallel points have been handled: no. 1 = § 46; nos. 2 and 4 = §§ 4 7 - 4 9 . The sequel in §§ 50b-52 is a description of the society that subsists among all humankind by virtue of their being human: it is based on λόγο?, and the benefits deriving from it are such as to entail no loss to the giver, such as giving free access to flowing water, allowing a person to light fire from one's fire, etc. As one expects in a treatise emphasizing practical precepts (§ 7b), this section con­ cludes with practical guidelines {vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad ilium Ennifinem 'nihilo minus ipsilucet*. . . : § 52). § 53 then offers a systematic survey of societies from broad to narrow: 1) the human race; 2) the gens, natio, lingua; 3) fellow citizens; 4) relatives. Anyone expecting that for nos. 2), 3), and 4) guidelines would be issued similar to those for no. 1) will be disappointed, however. For § 54 begins an analysis of the principia com­ munitatis et societatis humanae from a different perspective: it traces the genesis of the state from the primum coniugium of sexual partners. Here we enter an altogether different realm. The goal of §§ 4 2 - 5 3 has been to deter­ mine principles by which liberalitas and beneficentia should be directed to­ ward individuals: hence the precept that benefits be in proportion ut quisque erit coniunctissimus at the beginning of $ 50 and the subsequent delineation of degrees of coniunctio. In §§ 5 4 - 5 8 , however, Cicero uses the digression on quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae as an excuse to introduce successively the family, the state, and friendship as kinds of society. In the process he loses sight, however, of the original goal of the discussion and speaks as if a σύγκρισις oisocietates and their claims on one's officia, not recipients of beneficia, were in question. Note that in § 59, when

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Cicero evidently returns to the Panaetian model that was his starting point, the old premise of individuals as objects returns (although Cicero now speaks of officia, rather than beneficia, as in § 58: quibus plurimum tribuendum sit

officii7*). As is clear from the foregoing, §§ 50-53 fit with the overall plan of the section on liberalitas/beneficentia,75 whereas §§ 5 4 - 5 8 deal with the similar but really distinct question of ranking officia owed to different societies;76 the use of officium in this section with reference to the state may have been the problem perceived by Articus when he objected to officium as a transla­ tion of καθήκον (cf. introduction, § 2). It seems likely, then, that Cicero, who criticizes Panaetius several times in the course of Off. (at % 7a for the omis­ sion of a definition of officium; at 2.16 for the multiplication of unnecessary examples) and speaks of following his model iudicio arbitrioque nostro (§ 6) and correctione quadam adhibita (3.7), has parted company from Panaetius in §S 5 4 - 5 8 . Cicero was evidently not content to reproduce a ranking of benefits owed to individuals only; he wanted the state to play some role in the ranking, even though this entailed breaking out of Panaetius' framework; and he doubtless felt that Panaetius had given short shrift to friendship since familiares rank below propinqui in 5 53, contrary to the argument that Cicero had recently developed at Amic. 19-20. Hence Cicero conceived SS 5 4 - 5 8 , dealing not with benefits, but in general with appropriate actions, and involving a ranking not of individuals, but types of society. For executing §§ 5 4 - 5 8 , Cicero used some philosophical materials. The section emphasizes the importance of the state and of friendship. He had dealt with the former in the lost introduction to de Republica, which in­ cluded a σίτγκρισι? of patria and parens to the advantage of the former (fr. la, quoted ad $ 57); and he is known to have been reading about πολιτέΐαι as recently as April, 46 (cf. ad 3.69); cf. also ad $ 54. For friendship, on the other hand, he had to hand materials recently used in Amic. (see ad $$ 54 and 55-56J. 7 7 But what Cicero evidently lacked was the time and power of 74. On the imerchangeability of the terms cf. ad $ 48. 75. Note also that in $ 53 the stages of human bonding, albeit somewhat simplified and given in the reverse of the normal order, correspond to other Stoic versions of the doctrine of oiiceiwOT·?; cf. ad loc. 76. Thomas, 15 if., contributed important observations leading to this conclusion; how­ ever, he regarded only the patria in SS 57-58 as a Ciceronian "Einschub" and failed to see that the encomium of amicitia at $$ 55 ff. really docs not fit with the Panaetian scheme at S 53. 77. Johann, 85 ff., argues that in SS 57-59 Cicero has enlarged Panaetius with Posidonian materials; for SS 57-58 this notion rests upon a very slippery argumentum ex silentio, viz., that Cicero has removed mention of the gods from S 58 (but why should he have done so, when he included it at S 160?). For SS 59-60 see ad loc.

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concentration that would have enabled him to combine these entities in a coherent whole without seams showing. Thus, after a warm encomium of the familiaritas of viri boni he appends, apparently for completeness' sake, a note on the importance of friendship based upon exchange of beneficia (§ 56b), which, however, would really have belonged under the utile in Book 2. Then in S 57 we find an encomium of the patria as subsuming all other loved ones; we are told that for the patria one should be prepared even to die. The plethora of superlatives, or rather, negated comparatives, in §$ 55-57 (sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior. . . nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius . . . sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior . . .) might well leave the reader in doubt as to the precise ranking Cicero has in mind. Hence in S 58 he undertakes to systematize the relations among the different claimants ac­ cording to this hierarchy: 1) patria et parentes, 2) liberi totaque domus, 3) bene convenientes propinqui. Once again, friendship is omitted, and so Cicero adds another encomium of friendship to the end of § 58. Thus we have the juxtaposition, without any explanation, of two analyses of societies in SS 50-53 and § 54, then in SS 55-57 encomia of several types of friend­ ship and then the patria, in which each seems to be outbidding the last, then finally a systematic scheme that surprisingly omits one of the societies most praised in the preceding paragraphs, which is then added as an afterthought. The resulting text, for all its untidiness, seems likely to be in essentially the state in which Cicero left it. Certainly the bracketing in SS S5-56 of sed omnium societatum—id maxime efficit by Bruser, 122, does not go to the root of the problem; see ad loc. 50 sed quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius.] The reader is put on notice that this is not going to be merely a schematic account of the degrees of human coniunctio, though the reason why such a digression is needed at this point is never explained (see preceding note). It will penetrate more deeply into the natural origins {quae natura principia sint78) of human fellowship and society; principium appears here in two senses: at $$ 50-53 the principia constitute the most rudimen­ tary society, whereas in § 54 principia - άρχαί (cf. principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae); on τά πρώτα κατά φύσιν as a basis for Panaetian ethics cf. ad SS H - H . est enim primum quod cemitur in universi generis humani societate. eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio—naturali quadam societate . . .] Ratio et oratio, of course, = λόγος; cf. ad S 12 above. On the Stoic conception of a 78. c's natura = φύσο is surely to be preferred to the otherwise attested naturae.

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prescriptive reason which instructs its possessors "how to treat each other as social animals" and thereby enables them to constitute a community cf. Schofield, 1991, 67 ff., esp. 72. . . . neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam aequitatem bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.] It was commonly accepted in antiquity that animals could possess courage; thus at PI. Lg. 963e the Athenian stranger distinguishes ανδρεία and φρόνησι? and assigns animals and young children a share in the former, but not the latter (cf. Sorabji, 10-11); sim. Sen. Ep. 76.9: in homine quid est optimumf ratio: hac antecedit animalia, deos sequitur. ratio ergo perfecta propnum bonum est, cetera Mi cum animalibus satisque communia sunt, valet: et leones. However, in Plato's Laches Nicias developed a definition of bravery as knowledge of things that give rise to fear and confidence (196d), a definition that would, he admits, contrary to ordinary usage, exclude animals, women, and children (197b-c).—The idea of justice as a quality distinguishing man and beast is implicit in Protagoras' myth, in which animals prevailed over humans by brute force before the latter developed the πολιτική τβχνη (PI. Prot. 322b); at R. 588e the beast and the human are conceived as elements within each person; he who argues for the profitability of injustice fattens the beast but starves the human. Arist. EN 1161a35 ff. formulated in general terms: ωφελείται μεν γαρ πάντα ταύτα ύπό των χρωμένων, φιλία δ' ουκ έστι προ? τα άψυχα ουδέ δίκαιον. . . . δοκεΐ γαρ εΐναί τι δίκαιον παντι άνθρωπω προς πάντα τον δυνάμενον κοινωνήσαι νόμου και συνθήκης . . . Cf. also Chrysippus' view that there is no justice between humans and other animals because of their dissimilarity (SVF 3, 89.27 ff.). For the general distinction between humans and animals based upon the former's possession of reason, which includes a community-building function, cf. ad §§ 11-12. 51 ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est. in qua omnium rerum quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit est servanda communitas, ut quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur ut est constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia.] The latter sentence raises various problems of the text and its articulation. Atzert 2 enclosed the words ut quae—observentur in double square brackets as a Ciceronian marginal note that crept into the text; though Atzert abandoned this policy in later editions in view of the critique of Bruser, 7 ff., this material is bracketed as an interpolation by Gunermann. Tempting as this solution may appear at first glance (the subject of the passage as a whole being, not

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private property, but the property held in common by users of reason), it is surely a correction of the author; for Cicero/Panaetius is evidently at pains to contain within the fixed bounds of the ius civile Stoic doctrines about prop­ erty that nature meant for the common use of humankind (quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit); cf. Erskine, 109. The early Stoa, on the other hand, had allowed greater scope for common property, with Zeno advocating, for instance, like Plato in the Republic, the community of women; cf. ad § 21 and, for Cicero's view of the Cynically colored early Stoa, ad § 128. Cicero has accordingly added after the precept. . . est servanda communitas a consecutive clause (an ita before servanda would have been helpful) to clarify his meaning—actually two consecutive clauses in asyn­ deton to provide both negative and positive clarification. Discripta (PV), not descripta (BP2[?1£), is clearly needed for the function of setting into system­ atic order; cf. Leg. 3.44 discriptus {de- codd.) enim populus censu ordinibus aetatibus . . . ; Vertec, TLL 1.7,1354.72 ff.; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89; cf. ad § 1 2 4 . The text ut est constitutum legibus ipsis contains Pearce's est for the universally transmitted sit, a change which, in spite of the possibility of attraction of indicative to subjunctive, seems likely in view of the parallel clause ut in Graecorum proverbio est. . . ; in addition, legibus (before ipsis) is the conjecture of Gulielmius (accepted by Madvig ad Fin. 4.13) for the transmitted e(x) quibus.—For κοινά τα φίλων cf. PI. Pbdr. 279c6 and Lg. 739c2-3; the words are already cited as a proverb at Arist. EN 1159b31 and 1168b7-8 and Pol. 1263a30; they are attributed to Pythagoras by Timaeus {FGrHist 566 F 13b) apud D.L. 8.10; cf. Zenob. 4.79 (cum test.); Diogen. 5.76; Otto, 20; Swoboda, 95. The Stoics applied the proverb to the wise; cf. Stob. 2.7 = 2, 101.21 W.-H.: τά δ' αγαθά πάντα κοινά el ναι τών σπουδαίων . . . 5 1 - 5 2 omnium autem communia hominum—ex quo sunt ilia communia: . . .] Cicero cites verses from an unknown play of Ennius (= seen. 398-400 = trag. 366-68 = 313-15 Jocelyn) 79 to illustrate what is meant by omnium . . . communia hominum. He presents the doctrine that one should grant even to a stranger whatever can be provided without loss as if it were a precept abstracted from Ennius' example (una ex re satis praecipit. . .). It is conceivable that Panaetius offered a similar poetic citation at this point in the argument, e.g., αγνοείς ev ταΐς άραΐς / δ τι εστίν, eli τις μη φράσει' ορθώς 79. Cicero likewise quotes qui errantt comiter monstrat viam in the course of refuting the prosecution's interpretation comiter = communiter in the provision maiestatem populi Ramant comiter conservanto at Balb. 36.

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όδόν / ή πΐιρ έναύσει\ ή διαφθείρει* ύδωρ, / ή δειπνιεΐν μέλλοντα κωλύσαι τινά; (Diphilus fr. 62 Κ.-Α.)· 80 If Panaetius had cited this passage, this fact might help explain the apparent allusion to it by his student Hecato in an argument given to Antipater of Tarsus (cf. ad 3.54).—For quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat cf. Ov. AA 3.93: quis vetet adposito lumen de lumine sumi. . . f 52 non prohibere aqua profluente, pari ab igne ignem capere . . .] Cf. Mer­ cian. Dig. 1.8.2.1: et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt ilia: aer, aqua profluens et mare et per hoc litora maris; for ab igne ignem capere cf. preceding note. The aquae et ignis interdictio was originally imposed upon persons accused of a capital offense who did not present themselves for the reading of the verdict; later, when the individual quaestiones received juris­ diction over capital offenses, the aquae et ignis interdictio replaced capital punishment: cf. Hartmann, RE 2.1 (1895), 308, 25 ff. s.v. aquae et ignis interdictio. Cf. also Paul. Fest. p. 2M: Aqua et igni tarn interdict solet damnatis, quam accipiunt nuptae, videlicet quia hae duae res humanam vitam maxime continent. Therefore at PI. Aul. 91-94 the miser Euclio's instruc­ tions to his servant Staphyla to extinguish the hearth-fire, so that no one will ask for a light, and deny that she has any water are the ultimate antisocial acts: cf. David Konstan, Roman Comedy (Ithaca and London, 1983), 36 and n. 5; cf. also Ov. M. 6.349 (Latona loquitur): quid probibetis aquisf usus communis aquarum est. Since Panaetius was not averse to multiplying examples (cf. 2.16), one wonders whether he offered still more of them (cf. in permultas); cf. Ar. Did. apud Stob. 2.7 = 2, 121.3 ff. W.-H.: τίνα γαρ ουκ αν έξελεΐσθαι θεασάμενον άνθρωπον ύττό θηρίου καταδυναστεύαμε νον, ei δύναιτο; τίνα δ' ούκ αν όδόν πλανωμένω μηνύσειν; τίνα δ' ούκ (άν) έπαρκεσειν υπ' ένδεια? άπολλυμένψ; τίνα δ' ούκ άν έπ' έρημία? άνυδρου νάματι περί τυχόντα γνωρίσμασι διαδηλώ­ σει ν τοΐ? την αυτήν όδόν βαδίζουσι; Still more extensive is the list of άγραφα εθη και νόμιμα that Eusebius ΡΕ 8.7.6-8 cites after Philo, υποθετικά 7.6 (= 9, 426 Colson), which includes the provisions about fire and water given in § 52; W. Schulze, Kleine Schriften, cd. W. Wissmann, 2d ed. (Gottingen, 1966), 191, n. 3, suggested that Philo depends on Panaetius. Wilamowitz, 1923, 192, regarded Panaetius' view that u der Mensch als solcher nicht mehr fremd oder feind ist, sondern in dem Rechts- und Freundschaftsverhaltnisse steht, das die gemeinsame Menschennatur begriindet" (cf. § 107) as the foundation of the conception of human rights. 80. For the theory that quotations of Terence correspond to ones from Menander in Panaetius cf. ad $ 30; even the quotation of Hesiod at $ 48 need not have been Panaetian, however; see ad loc. but also ad $ 59.

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The points discussed in our passage are, however, appropriate actions and not enforceable rights (cf. ad 3.49b-57); accordingly one cannot yet speak of human rights in any meaningful sense. Sen. Ben. 4.29.2 even denies the name of beneficium to actions of this type: quis beneficium dixit quadram panis aut stipem aeris abiecti aut ignis accendendi factam potestatemf One can, in general, only speak at this period of enforceable rights within the framework of the ius civile (cf. ad §§ 20-21 on the right not to be molested in one's person or property). Indeed there is a marked contrast between the Greek proverb that serves as a model (amicorum esse communia omnia) and the restricted precepts that result (cf. danti non molesta); cf. Heilmann, 77-78; Nickel, 57; Sorabji, 138 ff. Though 3.21 ff. is more visionary than our passage (cf. Sorabji, 144-45; ad 3.28), even there a restricted set of precepts is derived from a sweeping principle; cf. ad 3.26. quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem adferendum.] Cf. ad § 22; Sen. Vit. Beat. 24.3: ubicumque homo est, ibi benefici locus est. scd quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem qui his egeant iniinita est multitudo, vulgaris libcralitas referenda est ad ilium Enni finem 'nihilo minus ipsi lucet', ut facultas sit qua in nostras simus liberales.] This particular cautio is unnecessary, since the premise has been all along that the actions in question are ones that bring no loss to the agent; nevertheless Cicero, evidently for fear of being misunderstood, reverts to the point al­ ready made at $ 44 (see ad loc). On the restricted scope of aid to the needy cf. ad $ 49. 53 On this scheme of degrees of oiiceiuxns from broad to narrow, its relation to other accounts of οίκβίωσι?, and its deficiency in specifying beneficia entailed cf. ad §§ 50-58. A similar ranking of societies from broad to narrow appears at Amic. 19. Both passages read like a somewhat simplified version in reverse order of a standard Stoic presentation of οΐκβίωσις such as that of Hierocles apud Stob. 4, 671.7 ff. W.-H. (= 57G Long-Sedley). Pembroke, 125, complains that in our passage the relations "are simply catalogued, not organised into a scheme of temporal development either individual or histor­ ical"; but, of course, Cicero was not intending to provide a temporal development in our passage (he had already done so, to the degree required for his purposes, at §§ 11-12). The content of our passage is briefly sum­ marized at 3.69, albeit with the propinqui omitted. . . . propior est eiusdem gentis nationis linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur.] The role of language in the formation of human communities has already been stressed in §§ 12 and 50. interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis;. . .] At Rep. 1.41 Scipio defines the

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civitas as the constitutio populi; on the differentiation of civitas from respublica cf. Wood, 126: u In thinking of the state not so much in terms of the common interest and right, as in consisting of laws, courts, and magistrates, he [Cicero] chooses civitas.'" multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia—res rationesque contractae.] E. Remy, ttDu groupement des peuples en etats d' apres le De officiis de Ciceron I, 5 3 , " Melanges Paul Thomas (Bruges, 1930), 587, sees the fourteen items listed here as constituting the goods that the state guarantees its citizens, in particular: I. Use of public space A. Meeting places: forum, farm B. Places for movement: porticus, viae II. Juridical ties among citizens A. Leges, iura B. Their use: iudicia, suffragia III. Private relations A. Relations based upon personal inclination: consuetudines et familiaritates B. Relations based on shared interests: multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. ab ilia enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur.] Cf. the similar phrasing at Amic. 20: . . . ex infinita societate generis humani quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contractu res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis cantos aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur, where, however, the narrowest society is that based on amicitia, not propinquitas. 54 The point of departure is an explanation of why (cf. nam) the societas propinquorum is closer (artior) than other relations; since it is based upon natural impulses [cum sit hoc natura commune animantium; cf. $$ 11—12), the "first society" is that of sexual partners {prima societas in ipso coniugio est), which in turn is the foundation of the family. This connection with the foregoing should not, however, obscure the fact that $§ 54 ff. really take the subject in a fundamentally different direction. Whereas §§ 5 0 - 5 3 comprised a systematic presentation of human societies from broadest to narrowest, S 54 explores the principia communitatis et societatis humanae (§ 50) from a different, evolutionary perspective (on this evolutionary bent cf. Cole, 1967, 140, n. 29), the aim being to establish how natural drives lead to the founda-

Commentary on Book 1, Section 53-54

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tion first of the household, then, through various degrees of kinship, to the state. The method, with its application of the doctrine of οίκαωσις, is similar to that of § 12 (cf. Fin. 2.45 and 5.6S)y except that, whereas $ 12 contents itself with a vague reference to hominum coetus et celebrationes, our passage is concerned specifically with the establishment of the respublica {quasi seminarium retpublicae, origo est return pub\icarum)\ cf. ad 2.73. So well known was this view that at Rep. 1.38 Scipio prefaces his remarks on the common­ wealth with: nee vero . . . ita disseram de re tarn inlustri tamque nota, ut ad ilia elementa revolvar quibus uti docti homines his in rebus so lent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar . . . Plato already has the analogy of the founding of new households to the sending out of colonies; cf. Lg. 776a: ων δή χάριν μητρί και πατρι και τοις ττ\ς γυναικός οικείοι? παράτας χρή τάς αυτών οΐκήσ€ΐς, οίον €ίς άποικίαν άφικομ€ΐ>ους . . . The more striking Peripatetic parallels, however, seem to assure some Peripatetic influence on the treatment of this subject. Brink, 138, sees Theophrastus* view of οίκ6ΐότη5 at work, whereas Cole, 1967, 140, n. 29, thinks of Aristotle himself. It is true that Aristotle presents a similar account of the genesis of the state from the household and village.81 How­ ever, our passage, in common with the later Peripatetics, ignores the village as an intermediary step; and it shares with them the metaphor of the house­ hold as the seedbed of the state. 82 In arguing that marriage is no impediment to philosophizing Musonius rings changes on the interconnection of marriage, household, and state, not found in this form in earlier Stoics. 83 It thus seems likely that this strand of 81. Pol. 1252a 26-28, b9-10,15-16,27-29: ανάγκη δή πρώτον συνδύαζεσθαι του? άνευ αλλήλων μή δυναμένου? είναι, οίον θήλυ μεν και dppev τής γεννήσεως ένεκεν . . . έκ μεν οΰν τούτων των δύο κοινωνιών οικία πρώτη . . . ή δ' έκ πλειόνων οικιών κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ένεκεν μή εφήμερου κώμη. . . . ή δ' έκ πλειόνων κωμών κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις . . . 82. Dicaearch. fir. 52 W. apud Steph. Byz. s.v. Πάτρα:.. . ώστε πάτρα μεν δνπερ εΐπομεν έκ της συγγενείας τρόπον έγε'νετο μάλιστα τής γονέων συν τέκνοις και τέκνων συν γονεϋσι . . . ; Ar. Did. apud Srob. 2.7 ■ 2,148.5 W.-H.: πολιτεία δε πρώτη σύνοδος ανδρός και γυναικός κατά νόμον επ'ι τέκνων γεννήσει και βίου κοινωνία, τούτο δε προσονομάζεται μέν οίκος, αρχή δε πόλεως έστι· περί ου δή και λεκτέον. μικρά γάρ τις Ιοικεν είναι πόλις ό οίκος, εί γε κατ' εΰχήν αύξομένου τοΰ γάμου και τών παίδων έπιδιδόντων και συνδυαζόμενων άλλήλοις έτερος οίκος υφίσταται και τρίτος ούτω και τέταρτος, έκ δε τούτων κώμη και πόλις. πλειόνων γάρ γενομένων κωμών πόλις άπετελέσθη. διί> και τά σπέρματα καθάπερ τής γενέσεως Tfl πόλει παρέσχεν ό οίκος, ούτω και τής πολιτείας; ci. Moraux I, 420. 83. Muson. 73.10 if.: αρχή δε οίκου περιβολής γάμος, ώστε ό άναιρών έξ ανθρώπων γάμον αναιρεί μεν οικον. αναιρεί δε πάλιν, αναιρεί δε σύμπαν τό άνθρώπειον γένος, ού γαρ άν διαμένοι μή γενέσεως ούσης, ούδ' άν γένεσις εΐη μή γάμου όντος. ή γε δικαία και νόμιμος, ότι μεν γάρ

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Peripatetic political philosophy has been received into the Stoa.84 Cf, ad SS 50-58. . . . prima societas in ipso coniugio est. . .] Cf. D.L. 6.72 (Diogenes of Sinope): €λ*γ€ δέ κα\ κοινά? elvai δβι> τάς γυναίκα?, γάμον μηδέ ονομάτων, αλλά τον πβίσαντα τη πβισθείση85 συνεΐναι; Luce 5.962-65: et Venus in silvis iungebat corpora amantum; I conciliabat enim ve\ mutua quamque cupido I vel violenta viri vis atque impensa libido I velpretium, glandes atque arbuta vel pira lecta; ad % 11. id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae.J Because of the double sense of πόλις (= city and state) Cicero's Greek source may have been more compressed; cf. Arius Didymus' αρχή πόλ€ω£, cited n. 82 supra; ad 2.73.—Seminarium = a nursery of young trees; its metaphorical applica­ tion was evidently pioneered by Varro (Men. I l l ) and soon taken up by Cicero (Cat. 2.23 ai); cf. OLD s.v. . . . quae propagatio et suboles origo est renim publicanim.] It is surprising to see this point repeated so soon after id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae, a sign perhaps of hasty composition (Facciolati had thought both references to the respublica interpolated); cf. ad $§ 55-56.— Suboles is, according to de Orat. 3.153, an archaic word more readily deployed in poetry, rarely to be used in oratory; cf. Marc. 23 with reference to the prospective rebuilding of the state: constituenda iudicia, revocanda fides, comprimendae libidines, propaganda suboles, omnia quae dilapsa iam diffluxerunt sevens legibus vinciendae sunt, with other instances of suboles cited by Lebck, 29, who comments on our passage: "suboles nach propaga­ tio erleichtert oder Selbstreminiszenz?" sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines (et) caritate.] It can have that effect, but cf. Amic. 19:. . .ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benivolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. 55-56 Sed omnium sociecatum nulla praestantior—id maxime efficit.] This text has, in part or in whole, been disputed among philologists ever since οίκος ή ττόλις οϋτ' €κ γυναικών συνίσταται μόνον ούτ' {ζ ανδρών μόνον, αλλ* ^κ της προς αλλήλους κοινωνίας. δηλον ανδρών 6ί και γυναικών κοινωνίας άλλην ουκ άν ίϋροι τις ούτ* άναγκαιοτ^ραν οΰτ€ προσφιλ^στ^ραν. The earlier Stoa defined the relation of the state to erotic and other kinds of love differently; cf. Schofield, 1991, ch. 2. 84. I leave open, however, the question whether Cicero obtained it from a Stoic or Pe­ ripatetic source. 85. Or should one, with Schofield, 1991, 12, n. 21, retain the transmitted ποσάση? He attributes Stephanus' πεισθείση. generally accepted by modern editors, to "conventional sexist ideology rejected by Diogenes."

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 54 and 55-56

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Goldbacher, 2, 17 ff., wanted to athetize et quamquam omnis—id maxime efficit. Atzert2 placed sed omnium societatum—amicos facit as well as nihil autem est amabilius—ut unus fiat ex pluribus in double square brackets as alternative Ciceronian versions. Then Bruser, 118-25, followed by Atzert4 and Fedeli, athetized our text, whereas Thomas, 115 ff., attempted to refute him, without carrying conviction; cf. P. Fedeli, Gnomon 45 (1973), 654-55; W.-W. Ehlers, Gymnasium 82 (1975), 477. Bruser raised several objections: (1) our passage contradicts sed . . . omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior. . . ($ 57); cf. Reinhardt, 1885,11-12; (2) the use of etiamsi Άηά tamen, which he found disturbing; (3) for illud . . . honestum quod saepe dicimus one expects de quo saepe dicimus. (1) Praestantia, firmitas, gravitas, and caritas are by no means syn­ onymous terms; but though in strict logic a contradiction is thereby obvi­ ated, the result is hardly satisfying; why should a societas that is supreme in gravitas and caritas not be so also in praestantia and firmitas}96 Even if such a thing may be (barely) conceivable, argumentation would be re­ quired to establish that it is the case; but no such argument appears in the text. Even the elimination of the suspect material would, however, not altogether eliminate the problem of the encomia of various societates each seeming to try to outbid the last with a resulting confusion of criteria and results (cf. nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum [§ 56) vs. omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea quae cum republica est uni cuique nostrum [§ 57]; why should one societas be carior, another amabilior}). (2) Others, too, have been disturbed by etiamsi and tamen; how indeed could the honestum move us unless seen in another? Hence Unger deleted tamen and Goldbacher, 2, 18, etiam. Yet it is hard to think what motive there could have been for two such interpolations. On the other hand, Muther, 127, suggests, in light of what has just been established for the propinqui, etiamsi in ali(en)o cernimus, tamen nos movet. . . But surely the propinqui are by now too distant for such a connection to be plausible. The implicit point of reference is rather the doctrine of οίκείωσι? and one's tendency to accept oneself first and foremost; hence etiamsi and tamen; the logic, if not impeccable, is at least understandable. (3) For the phrase honestum quod saepe dicimus, cf. Lommatzsch, TIL 5, 979.21 ff. 86. In explaining Cicero's text as the result of hasty composition Thomas, 20-21, im­ plicitly recognizes this; sim. Reinhardt, 1885, 11-12.

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But beyond a mere refutation of objections there is a positive case to be made that our passage is needed in this context, which deals with friendship based on morum similitudo bonorum; for it explains in terms of the action of the honestum the process by which friendship arises among viri boni moribus similes. This explanation is irreplaceable, since in the sentence beginning nihil autem est amabilius the process is described in its external aspect only and in endoxic terms not specific to the Panaetian system {idem velle, idem nolle: cf. Otto, 19; . . . ut unus fiat ex pluribus: see ad § 56); from the standpoint of content one would rather suspect nihil autem est amabilius— ut unus fiat ex pluribus. In general, the ideas of our passage are unlikely to have been invented by an interpolator as ordinarily conceived (p. 153, n. 65 supra). Thus the superiority of amicitia to propinquitas in terms oipraestantia and firmitas is found at Amic. 19 (sed ea [sc. cum propinquis societas) non satis habet firmitatis. namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest etc.); the operation of the honestum in winning over others is described at 2.32; and the preference for the social virtues iustitia and liberalitas as criteria for entering into social relations with others appears at $ 46; for the thought cf. also Fam. 9.24.3 (perhaps January, 43): et mehercule, mi Paete, extra iocum moneo te, quod pertinere ad beate vivendum arbitror, ut cum viris bonis, iucundis, amantibus tui vivas, nihil est aptius vitae, nihil ad beate vivendum accommodatius. Is an interpolator likely to have hit the mark every time? One suspects that the text owes its current condition to the desire of Cicero, recalling a similar train of thought at Amic. 19 (cf. ad § 5S)y to superimpose that societas on a context from which it had originally been excluded, a project that entailed seemingly conflicting encomia of various societates never brought into sharp focus (for similar seemingly conflicting encomia cf. ad $ 42). At the same time amicitia is a societas of a fundamentally different kind from and incommensurable with the others discussed in this section. Panaetius may well have thought it would be more appropriately dealt with in another context (cf. 2.31). Was it perhaps the recollection of the handling of οίκβίωσι? in relation to friendship at Amic. 19 8 7 that suggested to Cicero the idea of superimposing a discussion of friendship on material probably derived (as argued ad §§ 50-58 and 57) from Rep. 1 and originally involving a comparison only of family and state obligations? In any case, Cicero does not succeed in finding a place for the amici within the hierarchy. 55 Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti.] Antisthenes had held 87. On the date of Amic. see ad 2.31.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 5 5 - 5 6

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thatoi σπουδαίοι φίλοι (D.L. 6.12), Zeno indeed that the σπουδαίοι "alone" are friends {SVF 1, 54.3 ff. = D.L. 7.33; cf. Amic. 18 and 65). 8 8 The "alone" does not, however, appear in our context and should not be read into it {pace Thomas, 19). Nor is it likely that Cicero is here invoking vir bonus, contrary to his normal usage in this essay (cf. 3.14-17, but also 3.29 and 89-91), of the Stoic sage; see next note and (for the terms praestantior and firmior) ad 55 55-56. illud enim honestum quod saepe dicimus, etiamsi in alio cernimus, tamen nos movet atque illi in quo id inesse videtur amicos facit;. . .] The meaning is likely to be essentially the same as in 3.16 (where the context makes clear that he is talking about secunda honesta): itaque its omnes in quibus est virtutis indoles commoventur; sim. Amic. 48: cum autem contrahat amicitiam ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se shnilis animus adplicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.— Cf. the papyrus commentary on Plato's Theaetetus he. cit. ad$$ 2 0 - 4 1 and on the formulation ad §§ 55-56. 56 nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt. . . , in iis fit ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso . . . ] Cf. Clu. 46: iam hoc fere scitis omnes quan­ tum vim habeat ad coniungendas amicitias studiorum ac naturae similitudo; Nep. Att. 5.3. . . . efficiturque id quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus.] Cicero evidently alludes to this saying at Leg. 1.33 {unde enim ilia Pythagorea vox de amicitia? flocus ***); the attribution to Pythagoras also appears at sch. Pers. 5.22; cf. other testimonies at Otto, 25-26. magna etiam ilia communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et euro datis acccptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt firma devinciuntur societate.] It may not be the highest form of friendship (cf. § 58 and ad § 5; PI. Lys. 219c ff.; SVF 3, 24.22: τριχώς- δέ λίγομ^νης* της* φιλία?, κα& eva μβι> τρόποι της· κοινής- CVCK' ώφίλίίας-, καθ' ην φίλοι εΐναι λέγονται, ταυτηΐ' μέν οΰ φασι των αγαθών είναι . . . ; Cic. Amic. 51: non enim tarn utilitas parta peramicum quam amid amor ipse delectat. . . ; Fin. 2.72), but this, too, is a type of society to which the ancients attached importance—and not just the Romans, as Pohlenz, AF, 39, implies in calling it "die romische amicitia"; cf. Arist. £ N 8.13; for the longevity of such relationships, ibid., 1159bl0 ff.: οι χρήσιμοι be καΐ ήδ€ΐς· em πλάον διαμένουσιν €ως* γαρ άν πορίζωσιν ήδονάς- ή ώφίλβία? άλληλοις. In our passage Cicero does not, 88. One of rhc points Cotta raises against the inactive gods of the Epicureans is the notion of caritas naturalis inter bonos [N.D. 1.122).

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however, call such a relationship amicitia, for good reason; cf. N.D. 1.122: quam [sc. amiatiam) si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda quern diligemus, non erit ista amicitia sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum; sim. Sen. Ep. 9.10: ista quam tu describis negotiatio est, non amicitia, quae ad commodum accedit, quae quid consecutura sit spectat. He was, however, less precise (but closer to normal, as opposed to philosophical usage) when referring to such relations in the courtroom or in correspon­ dence; cf. Ciu. 117 (nam mihi cum viris fortibus qui censores proxime fuerunt [sc. for 70; cf. MRR, 2,126] ambobus est amicitia; cum altero vero . . . magnus usus et summa utriusque officiis constituta necessitudo est); Fam. 5.2.3-4 alibi. Cf. Sailer, 13-14, who connects the "instrumental nature of Roman friendship" with "the underdevelopment of rational, impersonal institutions for the provision of services" and concludes (15) that "the Ro­ mans could hardly conceive of friendship without reciprocal exchange." 57 can sunt parentes, can liberi propinqui familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est. . .1 This formulation suggests that Cicero may here have adapted material from de Republica, which likewise gave priority to the patria over the parentes (cf. 1, fr. la: sic, quoniam plura beneficia continet patria, et est antiquior parens quam is qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti debetur gratia; ad $5 50-58 and 160). For the thought cf. the verse φιλώ τεκν\ άλλα πατρίδ' εμήν μάλλον φιλώ (tr. adesp. fr. 411 Ν. 2 = Eur. *fr. 51 Austin apud Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. 809d, attributed by Porson to Praxithea in Euripides' Erechtheus); PI. Cri. 51a7 ff.: ή ούτω? ει σοφό? ώστε λεληθεν σε Οτι μητρός τε και πατρός και των άλλων προγόνων απάντων τιμιώτ€ρόν έστιν πατρίς και σεμνότερον και άγιώτερον και εν μεί£ovt μοίρα και παρά θεοΐς και παρ1 άνθρώποις τοις νουν εχουσι, και σεβεσθαι δει και μάλλον ύπείκειν και θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλ€παίνουσαν ή πατέρα, καΐ ή π€ίθ€ΐν ή ποΐ€Ϊν ά αν κελεύη, και πάσχειν έάν τι προστάττη παθ€ΐν ήσυχίαν άγοντα, έάντε τνπτεσθαι έάντε δεΐσθαι, έάντε εις πόλεμο ν άγη τρωθησόμενον ή άποθανούμενον, ποιητεον ταύτα . . . ; § 22 (citation of letter to Archytas). . . . pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere si ei sit profuturns?] Cf. lsoc. Ep. 2.4: χρή δε μη καλάς άπάσας ύπολαμβάνειν τάς εν τοις πολέμοις τελευτάς, άλλα τάς μεν υπέρ της πατρίδος και τών γονέων και των παίδων επαίνων άξιας . . . Cicero attributes such a willingness to Milo (Mil. 104); cf. Balb. 26; Sest. 47: cum esset omnibus definita mors, optandum esse ut vita, quae necessitati deberetur, patriae potius donata quam reservata naturae videreturt Leg. 2.5; Phil. 14.31: ο fortunata mors quae naturae debita pro patria est potissimum reddita! Our passage, with its stress on the personal bond to the homeland, has been used to help explicate the famous verse duke

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et decorum est pro patria mori by S.J. Harrison, "Dulce et Decorum: Horace Odes 3.2.13," RhM N.F. 136 (1993), 91-93. quo est detestabilior istonim immanitas, qui laceranint omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuenint] The reference to An­ tony's current and past activities would be unmistakable (the latter including particularly his role as tribune in fleeing to Caesar and providing the pretext for civil war; cf. ad $ 26), even if we did not have Phil. 2.52-53: quid autem agebatur nisi ne deleri et everti rempublicam funditus vellesf . . . tu, tu, inquam, M. Antoni, princeps C. Caesari omnia perturbare cupienti causam belli contra patriam inferendi dedisti. Cf. also Long, 19951, 225. 58 Is the hierarchy established in this chapter likely to be Panaetian? It is different from the hierarchy established in Rep. 1 and § 57. It would be hard to account for the fairly blatant contradiction of $$ 57 and 58 except on the hypothesis that § 57 still reproduces arguments drawn from Rep., whereas $ 58 tries to accommodate Panaetius' views. Thomas, 21-22, has argued that the state did not share the pinnacle in Panaetius* system. He is right in saying that the patria is nofitresponse to the problem as originally posed (sc. to determine who is coniunctissimus); as argued above (ad §§ 50-58), SS 54-58 surely did not form part of the treatment of benefactions in Pan­ aetius' text; but the hierarchy itself might yet be either drawn from elsewhere in Panaetius' treatise or abstracted from his ideas; and Thomas' arguments against Panaetian provenance based on the general attitudes of Greeks and Stoics are easily contradicted; cf. Dyck, 19791, 82-83, n. 11. While not fully conclusive, certain indices suggest a relation of the hierarchy to Panaetius' thinking: the criteria used, namely obligation (quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus) and dependency (quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium), are those that bind together the societas and thus seem to be at least in the spirit of Panaetius.89 In addition, Hecato of Rhodes wrestled with casuistic problems involving a conflict between parents and the state (3.90), as one might have expected if his teacher, Panaetius, had left open the question of which has greater claim.—In listing patria, propinqui, and adfines amid as those to whom liberalitas is owed, Plin. Ep. 9.30.1 was surely influenced by our passage. 89. On returning beneficia cf. $ 48:. . . non reddere viro bono non licet. . . ; on binding society together by exchange of benefits $ 22: quae m terris gignanturad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse pos· sent. . . ; on the "natural" impulse to care for those who depend on one $ 12:. . . ur.. . studeat parare ea quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nee sibi soli, sed coniugi liberis ceterisque quos earns habeat tuerique debeat;. . .

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Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii . . .J Georg Picht, Die Grundlagen der Ethik des Panaitios (diss. Freiburg i.B., 1943), 175-76, points out that the phrase contentio et com­ paratio recurs at § 152, where Cicero explores the problem of choosing between different types of the honestum, and adds that this type of norma­ tive approach based on juristic thinking is characteristic of Cicero, rather than Panaetius. Indeed, it seems likely that the following scale has been added by Cicero to dispel possible confusion arising from his previous en­ comia of several types of society; the content may, however, pace Picht, still reflect Panaetius* views (see above). . . . principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus . . . ] Cf. Lucil. fr. 1337-38 M. = 135354 K.: commoda praeterea patriot prima put are, I deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra; Cicero's liberi totaque domus can be seen as the functional equivalent of Lucilius' nostra. Lucilius should perhaps be seen as representing, not Panaetian influence, but an independent (though similar) Roman tradition; cf. Wendy J. Raschke, "The Virtue of Lucilius," Latomus 49 (1990), 352-69, esp. 352-53.—It is bold to speak of beneficia conferred by the state; the term was ordinarily applied in private life or, if used in a public context, referred to an office, a benefit conferred by a law, privileges granted to allies, etc.; this term, then, is being stretched in a fashion similar to officium itself (cf. introduction, $ 2; ad $ 34; Sinko, TLL 2, 1879.15 ff.). Perhaps Cicero has in mind advantages such as those enumerated at § 53. For the hierarchy here established cf. the note on this section as a whole. . . . necessaria praesidia vitae debentur his maxime quos ante dixi . . .] Thomas, 22, suggests that this characteristic would not apply to the patria; but cf. the advantages enumerated in § 53, as well as 2.15 {urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent nee aedificari nee frequentari, ex quo leges moresque constitute. . .) and 73 {banc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, respublicae civitatesque constitutae sunt). . . . vita autem victusque communis, consilia sermones cohortationes consolaciones, interdum ctiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime . . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1172a6 ff.: συζψ γαρ βουλόμ^νοι μ*τά τώι> φίλωι/, ταύτα ποιοΰσι και τούτων κοινωνοΰσιν ois οΐοιται συζτ\ν. γϊΐΈται ούν. . . ή 6e (sc. φιλία] τώι> €ΐτΐ€ΐκώι> έττιβικης, συναυξανομέντ] ταΐς όμιλίαις· δοκοΟσι δέ κα\ βελτίου? γίΐ'εσθαι ei'epyouuTes και διορθοΟι>τ€ς· αλλήλους' . . . ; cf. also Fam. 9.24.3 cited ad §§ 5 5 - 5 6 above.—For consolationes EN 1171a24 ff. (the argument that friendship is more needful in times of misfortune).—For criticism of a friend cf. PI. Trin. 23 ff.: amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam Iinmoene est facinus, verum in aetate utile I et conducibile; § 1 3 6 and ad 3.83.

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. . . estque ea iucundissima amicitia quam similitudo morum coniugavit.] The value-judgment iucundissima betrays that in his successive encomia of friendship Cicero strays ever further from the subject at hand. 59 This chapter relativizes the hierarchy of claimants on our offtcia just established; just as justice itself can change κατά περίστασιν (SS 31-32), so, too, circumstance (καιρό?, tempus) can alter one's priorities in granting beneficia. Johann, 87, would derive this material from Posidonius* treatment of the κατά τκρίστασιν καθήκον; but cf. Λί/ SS 3 1 - 4 1 ; for the connection of this chapter with the previous premise cf. ad §S 50-58. . . . ut vicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut familiarem . . .] Cf. Hes. Op. 342-45 (perhaps cited by Panaetius in the corresponding passage of nepl τοϋ καθήκοντος?): τον φιλέοντ' em δαϊτα καλεΐν, τον δ' έχθρόν έάσαι · / τον δε μάλιστα καλεΐν όστις σεθεν εγγύθι ναίει · / 6ί γαρ τοι καΐ χρήμ' έγκώμιον άλλο γ€νηται, / yeiToves άζωστοι eiaov, £ώσαντο δε πηοί. . . . at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam vicinum defcnderis.J On representation of a client at court as a beneficium cf. ad 2.66.—Early in his career the young Cicero, in need of all the clients he could find, came to regret taking on a case at the behest of neighbors. In 74 he had yielded to a request from citizens of Aletrium, a community just west of Arpinum, and undertaken the defense of the freedman Scamander on charges of attempting to murder Aulus Cluentius Habitus of Larinum. The defen­ dant, however, was convicted on eye-witness testimony; and in the sequel his patron C. Fabricius and Cluentius' stepfather Statius Albius Oppianicus were accused and convicted of participation in the plot. Cicero's role in Scamander's case caused him further embarrassment when, as praetor eight years later, he defended Cluentius on charges of having bribed the jury in the trial of Oppianicus; cf. Crawford, 39 ff.; Gelzer, 3 0 - 3 1 . haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio, (et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda} ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus, et addendo deducendoque videre quae reliqui summa fiat. . .] The bracketed words are unwelcome, since they forestall § 60, which begins with the adver­ sative sed; but removal or replacement of sed still leaves awkwardness; hence Facciolari's athetesis is generally accepted today (even by Thomas, 105 ff.).— Ratiocinator may have been a Ciceronian coinage (first attested Att. 1.12.2 [1 January 61] as accountant"); here it is used for the first time in a figura­ tive sense but with an explanation following {addendo deducendoque . . .); cf. OLD s.v. This conception of the moral agent as an accountant keeping an eye on debits and credits in prioritizing the officia owed to each claimant (note the play on several senses of debere—to owe money but also to be

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obliged to do something or owe an officium; cf. Sailer, 15) is unique. It seems more likely to reflect the perspective of the shrewd Roman paterfamilias (which reappears at 2.87 and 89; cf. the anecdote cited ad 3.63: neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus—) than the Rhodian aristocrat; certainly it is quite different from Chrysippus' εκλογή of the first things according to nature {SVF 3, 46.28 ff.) and involves different values from the Epicurean calculus of pleasure and pain. Cicero's words should not be taken too liter­ ally to imply that one should only provide services for which the recipient could be expected to provide adequate return; indeed a precise measure of value in such cases is rarely possible; cf. Sailer, 16-17; ad § 45. 60 sed ut nee medici nee imperatores nee oratores, quamvis artis praecepta perceperint, quicquam magna laude dignum sine usu ct exercitatione consequi possum . . . ] A similar point is made a propos orators by Antonius at de Orat. 2.28 ff.; cf. Muson., 22.9: δεΐ ούν ώσπερ τον ϊατρόν και τον μούσικόν μη μόνον άνειληφεναι τά θ€ωρήματα της αύτοϋ τέχνης έκάτερον, άλλα και γ€γυμνάσθαι πράττε ι ν κατά τά (δωρήματα, οϋτω και τον έσόμενον αγαθόν άνδρα μη μόνον έκμανθάνειν όσα μαθήματα φέρει προς άρετήν, άλλα και γυμνά£εσθαι κατά ταΟτσ φιλοτίμως και φιλοπόνως. . . . sic officii conservandi praecepta traduntur ilia quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed ret magnitude usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat.] Cicero here shows himself aware that the approach based on praecepta has its limita­ tions. Since praecepta cannot be given for every conceivable case, practice is needed in adapting the praecepta to specific circumstances; cf. also 2.87. Sen. Ep. 95 presents a much more detailed critique of praecepta. At 95.12 he notes explicitly their partial character: quid quod facienda quoque nemo rite obibit nisi is cut ratio erit tradita qua in quaque re omnis officiorum numeros exsequi possitf quos non servabit qui in rem praecepta acceperit, non in omne. inbecilla sunt per se et, ut ita dicam, sine radice quae partibus dantur. Moreover, they do not enable one to perform actions with the proper mental attitude, which is essential to virtue (ibid-, 40; cf. ad % 7): deinde praestabunt tibi fortasse praecepta ut quod oportet faciat, non praestabunt ut quemadmodum oportet. . . Finally, it is a mistake to divorce them from the larger question of the finis bonorum (ibid., 45): M. Brutus in eo libro quern περί καθήκοντος inscripsit dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus: haec nemo faciei quemadmodum debet nisi habuerit quo referat. pro· ponamus oportet finem summi boni ad quern nitamur . . . (Cicero perhaps thought that his previous essay de Finibus excused him from dwelling on the connection of practical ethics with the summum bonum; cf. ad § 7b). atque ab iis rebus quae sunt in iure societatis humanae quemadmodum ducatur honestum, ex quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus.] Cf. $ 15

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(. . . ex singulis certa offtciorum genera nascuntur . . .); on the ius societatis humanae cf. $ 21 and ad § 52 above. 6 1 - 9 2 The treatment of the third pan of the honestum, magnitudo animi, can be outlined as follows: I. The most radiant of the virtues ($ 61) II. Tied to justice (§5 62-65); warnings: A. Perversion of bravery to a vice ($§ 62-63) B. Excessive desire for power (§§ 64-65) III. Two constituents (§§ 66-67): A. The despising of external goods B. The performance of great deeds IV. Magnitudo animi and tranquillitas animi (§§ 68-73) A. Freedom from perturbationes ($ 68-69a) B. Avoidance of public service acceptable only in exceptional cases (SS69b-71) C. Statesmen more exposed to the verbera fortunae ($§ 72-73a) D. On undertaking actions (§ 73b) V. Comparison of military and civilian achievements (§$ 74-78) VI. Precepts for wartime A. Emphasis on the mental constituents of magnitudo animi even in warfare ($$ 79-82a) B. Attitude of the μεγαλόψυχο? toward risk-taking (§$ 82b-84) VII. Precepts for the statesman in peacetime ($$ 85-87) A. Government should be conducted for the benefit of the governed B. Government should aim to benefit the entire citizenry, not a single faction only C. Leaders of government should respect one another, not settle differences under arms VIII. Relation of μεγαλόψυχος to anger (§§ 88-89) A. The proper course is placabilitas and dementia, not anger against inimici B. Punishment is to be carried out without anger IX. Practical advice for the man of action (resumed from § 73b): need for constantia in good and evil fortune ($§ 90-91) X. Precepts for the μεγαλόψυχο? who owns an estate but contributes to the public good through neither research nor state service {§ 92). From this outline it is apparent that Panaetius has subsumed several different concepts under the term μεγαλοψυχία: there is the old virtue άν-

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δρεία, which is used to introduce the subject (SS 61-63), but is played down thereafter (SS 74-82a); there are also the desire for independence and the despising of external goods, which are characteristic of the Aristotelian μεγα­ λόψυχο?, who in turn is a relic of the ethic of the nobility of the archaic age. Of these two qualities Panaetius emphasizes the latter as the causa efficiens of μεγαλοψυχία (§ 67) and is at pains to confine the desire for independence within bounds that do not endanger the social order (SS 64-65). The vita activa and vita contemplativa, contrasted since Euripides* Antiope,90 appear as alternative channels for the independence of the μεγαλόψυχο? (§§ 6 9 b 73a). There follow practical precepts which, with the exception of the final chapter (§ 92), focus on the man of affairs, since he stands in greater need of them (§ 73b); these are soon divided into separate groups for wartime (SS 79-84) and peacetime (SS 85-91); a comparison of military and civil achievements—to the advantage of the latter—precedes their respective pre­ cepts. Pohlenz, AF, 48, regarded SS 7 4 - 7 8 as an "Einschub." Note the absence of a transition between SS 73 and 74. Probably this material origi­ nally belonged to S 79, where the point. . . non minorem uttlitatem adferunt qui togati reipublicae praesunt. . . forms an organic part of the argument, but has been anticipated in accord with a tendency observable elsewhere to give prominence to themes of political interest to Cicero (cf. ad 2.23-29). One wonders whether the "Einschub" is still more extensive, however, since S 73 b on preserving tranquillitas animi in undertaking actions would seem to connect with the further precepts on preserving tranquillitas animi at SS 9 0 91. The last chapter, giving precepts on how one can be a μεγαλόψυχο? by making one's estate available to friends and to the commonwealth, assumes a different definition of μεγαλοψυχία from that of SS 6 6 - 6 7 and therefore seems likely to be a Ciceronian addition (cf. ad S 92). In taking over μεγαλοψυχία from the traditional ethics of the Greek no­ bility Aristotle pressed it, not without some violence, into his ethical scheme (cf. Dyck, 1981,161). 9 1 Among the consequences of the career of Alexander the Great92 seems to have been a reexamination of μεγαλοψυχία. Although the approach of Demetrius of Phalerum remains unclear, the mere title of a treatise περί μεγαλοψυχία? surviving (fr. 78 W.2), the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades 11 takes aim at the excesses to which μεγαλοψυχία can lead and 90. Though perhaps less sharply than might appear on the surface; cf. S.R. Slings, "The Quiet Life in Euripides1 Antiope," in Fragmenta Drama tica, ed. A. Harder and H. Hofmann (Gottingen, 1991), 137-52. 91. For Cicero magnitude animi remained "erne eigentumliche Tugend der Nobilitat"; cf. Knoche, 1935,68. 92. Cf. ad S 90.

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classes it as the finest of the names for folly (140c, 150c; Kirsche, 34; Dyck, 1981,155). Perhaps in light of such attacks Aristo of Ceus thought it neces­ sary to differentiate sharply between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (fr. 13 VI, II. 23 ff. W.2, quoted ad $ 90). Meanwhile the older Stoa retained μεγαλοψυ­ χία as a virtue, albeit one subordinate to ανδρεία (SVF 3, nos. 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 2 6 9 70, and 274-75). Panaetius has restored to μ€γαλοψυχία some, though not all, of its former glory. In his system it appears as one of the four cardinal virtues, replacing ανδρεία (cf. ad § 62); this reform is in line with Panaetius' aim of emphasizing the rational component at the expense of mere animal courage (cf. §$ 79-81), since he wants all four "pans" of the καλόν to be based on drives peculiar to the human as opposed to the beast (cf. § 11 ff., $ 5 0 ) . On the other hand, μεγαλοψυχία has ceased to be, as it was for Aristotle, the κόσμος of all the virtues {EN 1124al); the similar status of ornatus vitae is assumed instead by the fourth virtue (§ 93). This section focuses generally on the attitudes and activities of the states­ man; perhaps Panaetius had accorded a larger place to the μεγαλοψυχία of the private citizen devoted to research (cf. § 72). In any case, these chapters disclose Panaetius* reading of history, whereby the statebuilding activities of a Solon or a Lycurgus weigh far heavier in the balance than the ephemeral achievements of military leaders, however brilliant (§§ 75-76: a point some­ what muddled by Cicero's exempla Romana). Precepts on preserving tranquillitas animi form a major concern of this section (cf. §§ 6 8 - 7 3 , 90-91); hence the many points of contact with advice περί ευθυμίας; Panaetius' essay on the subject (fr. 45) was perhaps partly inspired by Democrirus (cf. ad §§ 66 and 68) and was in turn a major source of Plutarch's extant treatise;93 parallels with the latter suggest that Panaetius may have fallen back on some of this material in περί του καθήκοντος (or possibly, since the chronological relation of the two treatises is not fixed, he elaborated in περί ευθυμία? some points adumbrated in περί τοϋ καθήκοντος). Our section likewise shows reception of important elements of Plato's conception of statesmanship (§§ 85-87) and a rejection of the Peripatetic doctrine of the naturalness and usefulness of anger (§§ 88-89). 61 Έπαινος accrues to bravery and ψόγος to its absence, a sign that this quality deserves status as a virtue (cf. ad § 62). Note Cicero's caution in introducing the term magnitudo animi, which, as a virtue, was evidently not well known to Romans of his day. As in the case of the fourth virtue ($93), Ciccro/Panaetius begins with familiar phenomena before going on to philo93. Cf. Zicglcr, RE 21.1 (1951), 787.49 ff. with literature, on Plutarch's use of Panaetius here.

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sophical definitions (cf. § 66). Thus he uses the term animus magnus twice before magnitude» animi itself; and each time animus magnus appears with a nearer specification, first in the phrase animo magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente, then quae gesta sunt magno animo et fortiter excellenterque, as though animus magnus alone would be insufficiently clear.94 Intellegendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri quod animo magno ela­ toque humanasque res despiciente factum sit.] But at $ 20 it was claimed that in iustitia virtutis splendor est maximus. Possibly a distinction is intended between a splendor which presents itself to the casual observer {splen­ didissimum videri)—the examples given of the splendor of magnitudo animi being drawn from speeches and public monuments—and true splendor (cf. the distinction at 2.43 between vera gloria and sham glory).—On the jux­ taposition of magnus animus with clarifying terms see the preceding note. itaque in probns maxime in promptu est. . .1 The expeaed sequence of the two halves of the argument is reversed: one would have expected its promi­ nence in encomia to be adduced as a consequence [itaque) of the fact that this quality is splendidissimum videri, then, as a negative reinforcement, the fact that its absence provokes reprimand.—The point is illustrated by the declamations of Polemo, in which the fathers of Cynaegirus and Callimachus vie for the right to deliver the funeral oration over the fallen at Marathon, an honor reserved for the father of the most valiant of the victims; the following aspersion cast on Cynaegirus' valor may stand as representative (2.43): Kwaiyeipos μέν ούν ούτ€ θάρρος φίλοι? ούτ€ δ€0? τοΐ? πολ€μίοι? έγένίτο, ος δράσας ουδέν αλλά άποτμηθεις την χείρα eneaev ςίβυς ώσπερ ετέραν ούκ έχων αλλ' έν τη δίζιςί της ψυχής αύτψ κβιμένης· . . . 'vos enim iuvenes animum geritis muliebrem, ilia virgo viri'. . .1 Lachmann ad Lucr. 4.211 identified the trochaic septenarius {trag. inc. inc. 210) and thus put an end to attempts to emend virgo to virago. Ribbeck assigned the verse to the Meleager of Accius; if this is correct, the virgo will be Atalanta (cf. trag. p. 224, vv. 446-47). 'Salmacida spolia sine sudore et sanguine'.] Two interpretations of this verse (Ennius, seen. 36 = trag. 338 = 347 Jocelyn, referred by Ribbeck to the Ajax) compete even in the most recent editions: (1) that Salmacida is vocative and spolia imperative (so Testard, who punctuates after Salmacida and renders: 94. Cf. Knoche, 1935,46: **Aus dem aJrromischen Sprachgcbrauch allein laSt sich nach all dem schwcrlich cine IZntwicklung verstchen, durch welche die magnitudo animi in den Kreis der hochsten Tugenden eintritt"; on Cicero's use of magnitudo ammt in speeches beginning in the year 63, at first, as if in need of such contextual clarification, in company with other virtues, ibid., 13-14.

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"Salmacide, ravis des depouilles sans verser ni sueur ni sang"; cf. Winterbottom, who likewise punctuates after Salmacida but places a query after Salmacides in his index); (2) that Salmacida has adjectival force and spolia is a substantive (so, presumably, those who, like Atzert and Fedeli, omit the comma). The term Salmacis is explained by Festus, p. 329M: SALMACIS nomine nympha, Caeli et Terrae filia, fertur causa fontis Halicamasi aquae appellandae fuisse Salmacidis; quam qui bibisset vitio inpudicitiae mollesceret. ob earn rem ique idi eius adit us, angustatus parietibus, occasionem largitur iuvenibus petulantibus antecedentium puerorum puellarumque violandarum, quia non pate{t re)fugium. Ennius: 'Salmacida spolia sine san­ guine et sudore'. A morphological problem is prior to the interpretive one. Under interpre­ tation (1) the form Salmacida cannot, pace Lewis and Short, s.v., II, be vocative to Salmacis in the sense "a weak, effeminate person," since then one would expect Salmaci or, in earlier Latinity, Salmacis (cf. KiihnerHolzweissig 1, 370-71); nor can it be vocative to Salmacides, taken in a similar sense; in that case one would expect Salmacide or Salmacides (ibid., 371); there appears to be no parallel for a Greek patronymic taken over into the first declension (ibid., 981-82). Under interpretation (2), to begin with the Greek form, as an adjective from the quasi-patronymic Σαλμακίδη? one would have expected Σαλμακίδ€ 109, on the analogy of Άσκληπιάδη?, Άσκληπιάδ€ΐο9, and correspondingly in Latin Salmacideus. However, a Greek noun can function in certain set phrases as a quasi-adjective; cf. Kuhner-Gerth, 1, 271 ff.; cf., with CF. Feldhugel, Dissertatio, qua cum aliorum scriptorum Romanorum, turn maxime Ciceronis loci aliquot vel explicantur vel emendantur (Magdeburg, 1871), 11-12, ΣκυθΙ? γυνή or the phrase ττ\ν γήν την Σκυθίδα at Arr. An. 4.15.3 (by variatio where ττ\ς Σκυθική? χώρα? has preceded). Alternatively, the Ennian Salmacida may have been formed ad hoc metri causa for Salmacidea, perhaps on the analogy of adjectives of material, where one finds forms both in -eus and -us; cf. Leumann, 287; or did Ennius actually write Salmacidea, to be read by synizesis as quadrisyllable but then corrupted in the subsequent tradition? One suspects that the longevity of interpretation (1) is connected with the fact that this verse, like the previous one, is quoted as evidence of the promi­ nence of magnitudo animi in insults (in probris). Under that interpretation the insult presumably resides in the application of Salmacides (granting for the moment that it can mean u a weak, effeminate person" and that Salmacida can be its vocative; see above) to the addressee, and the command, presumably uttered on the field of battle, is quite literally meant. But then what would be the sense of the addition sine sudore et sanguine) If the task

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remaining is that of despoiling the (evidently already defeated) enemy and it can be performed effortlessly, why would the speaker have felt it necessary, in the same breath, to insult the recipient of the command? When a commander insults soldiers on the Held of battle, it is ordinarily rather, as in the previous verse, to shame them into fighting in a crisis (cf., e.g., Verg. A. 11.732 ff.). The one piece of ancient learning that bears on the problem (from Festus, cited above) points rather to interpretation (2) and suggests that Salmacida spolia is a phrase parallel to the Greek proverb Μυσών λβία (invoked in this place by Panaetius?). Festus' gloss would suggest that Salmacida spolia refers to the boys and girls who could be so easily violated at the fountain Salmacis; like Μυσών λ€ΐα it might have been applied generally in the sense "easy pickings," "Siegesbeute der Wollust" (Goldbacher, 2, 20), or the like. Like Μυσών λεία, the Latin phrase will have implied a scathing condemnation of those to whom it was applied (for Μυσών Xcia cf. Arist. Rh. 1372b31 ff.; Dem. 18.72; Harp, μ 46 K. = 130.3 Bk.; Zenob. 5.15 cum test.). Our frag­ ment is too meager to permit us to see how Salmacida spolia sine sudore et sanguine functioned as an insult in context; one could picture some such context as "(are you going to defend yourselves or become) Salmacid spoils (to be had) without sweat and blood?" concraque in laudibus quae magno animo et foititer excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescioquo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus.] On the use of syn­ onyms for magnus animus see the headnote to this section.—Forcellini s.v. plenus 1.7.f) well explains pleno ore laudare "quantum potest, impense, liberaliter, large." hinc rhetonim campus de Marathone Salamine Plataeis Thermopylis Leuctris . . .J These were, of course, commonplaces of patriotic speeches, Mar­ athon (September, 490) and Salamis (September, 480) especially at Athens, Thermopylae (summer, 480) at Sparta, and Leuctra (summer, 371) at Thebes; Plataea (fall, 479) could count as a panhellenic victory. Thus, Mar­ athon, Salamis, and Plataea appear in succession in the επιτάφιο? λόγο? that Aspasia allegedly composed (PI. Mx. 241a-c).—Campus has, of course, its metaphorical sense of "the subject-matter or sphere of an orator or writer" [OLD s.v., 5b); at § 104 it appears in the literal sense.
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with the war against Lars Porsenna, since he mentions it immediately after C. Mucius* plot against the king's life at Parad. 16. Cicero's fullest account is at Leg. 2.10: . . . nee quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnis hostium copias in ponte unus adsisteret, a tergoque pontem intersemdi iuberet, idcirco minus Coclitem ilium rem gessisse tantam fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus . . . Livy (2.10.2-11), in contrast to Polybius, allowed the hero to escape alive. There was an archaic statue, identified as that of Horatius, in the comitium, which was struck by lightning and transferred to the Area Vulcani; cf. Ver. Fl. apud Gel. 4.5.1; it apparently depicted a lame man and gave rise to the legend that he was lamed when he swam the Tiber and hence could hold no public office (cf. D.H. 5.25.3). Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome have insured the hero's modern renown. Cf. Miinzec, RE 8.2 (1913), 2331.62 ff. (Horatius no. 9); Ogilvie ad Liv. 2.10. . . . hinc D e c i i . . .] The Decii Mures (Cicero usually omits the cognomen), father and son, heroes of the wars for hegemony in Italy of the fourth and early third century, were for later ages types of Roman patriotism; cf. Verg. A. 6.824. They appear in Cicero's philosophica inter alia as a counter­ example to the fear of death (cf. Tusc. 1.89 and 2.59; Sen. 75). Notable, too, is Cicero's comparison of himself to them at Dom. 64: . . . audieram et legeram clarissimos nostrae civitatis viros se in medios hostis ad perspicuam mortem pro salute exercitus iniecisse: ego pro salute universae reipublicae dubitarem hoc meliore condicione esse quam Decii, quod illi ne auditores quidem suae gloriae, ego etiam spectator meae laudis esse potuissem? (cf. Nisbet ad loc). P. Decius Mus Q. f. is said in 343 during the first Samnite War to have saved the army of the consul A. Cornelius Cossus Arvina, caught in a pass by the Samnites. Decius volunteered to lead a small band to occupy a height that commanded the position of the enemy army so that Cossus could withdraw in safety (cf. Liv. 7.34.3-36.13). In 340 he became the first consul of his (plebeian) family. Though he may have died three years later in battle with the Latins, his devotio (cf. Cic. Fin. 2.61; N.D. 3.15; Div. 1.51 and 2.136; Parad. 12) was probably modeled on that of his son; cf. Stein, RE 4 (1901), 2279 ff.; MRR, 1,135. As consul for the fourth time in 295 P. Decius P. f. Q. n. Mus went to Etruria with his colleague to face a coalition of forces of the Samnites, Gauls, and Etruscans at Sentinum; his devotio and death in battle played an important part in the Roman victory; his action became legendary, the subject of triumphal songs sung by Roman soldiers and of Accius' patriotic drama Aeneadae or Decius (trag., pp. 326-28); cf. the narrative at Liv. 10.26-30; Stein, RE 4 (1901), 2283.6 ff.; MRR, 1, 177. . . . hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones . . .] A reference to the two brothers Cn. Cor­ nelius Scipio Calvus and P. Cornelius Scipio, consuls respectively in 222 and

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218, who died within a month of each other in battle against the Carthagi­ nians in Spain, probably in 211. As consul Gnaeus and his colleague M. Claudius Marcellus waged successful war against the Insubrians. Less lucky was his brother's consulate, which fell in the year of Hannibal's invasion of Italy; partly because of the treachery of his Gallic auxiliaries Publius suffered defeat against Hannibal at the Ticinus, where he was wounded; and he vainly warned his colleague Ti. Sempronius Longus against a pitched battle prior to Trebia. Meanwhile Gnaeus was sent to Spain; he was able to defeat and capture Hanno at Cissa (218); the following year he defeated Hasdrubal in a naval battle at the mouth of the Ebro. Upon receipt of this news in Rome Publius was despatched as proconsul to Spain to wage war in coordination with his brother. Cf. Henze, RE 4.1 (1900), 1438.66 ff. (Cornelius no. 334: Publius) and 1491.8 ff. (no. 345: Gnaeus); Lazenby, 53 (battle of the Ticinus) and 125 ff. (Spain); Richardson, 35 ff. (with literature). . . . hinc M. Marcellus . . .1 As consul for the first of five times in 222 M. Claudius Marcellus distinguished himself in battle against the Insubrians (killing their leader Virdumarus with his own hand, he won the spolia opima) and celebrated a triumph. After Cannae (216) he was entrusted with the remnants of the Roman army. He was able to arrive in time to prevent Nola from falling away from Rome, an act that, though significant psychologically rather than militarily, later Roman patriotism regarded as the turning-point in the Hannibalic War (Sil. 12.161 ff. and 295 ff.; cf. Cic. Brut. 12: . . . post Cannensem Mam calamitatem primum Marcelli ad Nolam proelio populus se Romanuserexit. . . 'y\erg.A.6.&57-SS:hicremRomanammagnoturbante tumultu I sistet). Cicero had inserted as a foil for Verres' depradations a notable encomium of Marcellus' moderation as victor over Syracuse in 211 at Ver. 2.4.115 ff. In 208 he was killed in ambush by Hannibal; hence his inclusion on this list of commanders who fell in battle. On his career in general cf. Munzer, RE 3.2 (1899), 2738.6 ff.; on the expectation that a general would expose himself to danger in a crisis cf. Rosenstein, 1990,117 ff. . . . maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnirudine excellit.] The application of μίγαλόψυχος/μ^γαλοψυχία to the attitude of a people or state, rather than an individual, seems to have been pioneered by the orators of democratic Athens: cf. Dem. 20.142, 23.205; Hyp. Eux. 33; Lycurg. 100; Kirsche, 36 ff. Cicero took up the topos at Man. 7: . . . semper appetentes gloriae praeter ceteras gentis atque avidi laudis fuistis . . .—Cicero has ar­ ranged his examples carefully from negative to positive and within the latter has built a climax from Greek achievements to those of individual Romans and finally to the populus Romanus itself, an example of whose magnitudo animi he reserves for 3.114.

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6 2 - 6 5 Once the reader has been introduced, by positive and negative exam­ ples, to the sphere of the virtue, Cicero/Panaetius proceeds at once to hedge it about with restrictions. Aristotle, on the other hand, mentions briefly at the outset that cowardice and injustice are unfitting for a μεγαλόψυχο? {EN 1123b31-32) and that he must possess all the virtues (ibid., 1 1 2 4 a l - 3 and 20 ff.) but offers no such detailed warnings of possible danger to society at large. It is likely that Panaetius, in common with Aristotle and other Stoics, held the doctrine later called the άντακολουθία τών αρετών, whereby the possession of one of the virtues implies the possession of all (cf. ad 55 1 5 2 61). Nevertheless he was evidently at pains to establish, as our section at­ tests, a nexus between μεγαλοψυχία and the social virtues, including iustitia and a regard for the utilitas communis. Perhaps this increased attention to the risks inherent in μεγαλοψυχία is connected with the figure of Alexander the Great as interpreted by philosophers beginning with Theophrastus, and this emphasis coincided, in view of his recent experience with Caesar and now Antony, with Cicero's own concerns; cf. ad %% 61-92 and 90. But in spite of the emphasis of this essay on down-to-earth precepts (cf. § 7b), Cicero/Panaetius, while describing the problem, offers no practical way of dealing with the negative qualities of pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus; cf. Heilmann, 6. 62 Sed ea animi elatio quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; . . .] Iustitia is thus constitutive of magnitudo animi and cannot be removed from it without destroying the virtue itself. Panaetius has already indicated that the virtues are interconnected (cf. ad % 15); hence the Ciceronian appendix to Book 1, in which he attempts to create a hierarchy of the individual virtues, is problematical; cf. ad 55 152-61.—Under those who fought pro suis com­ modis perhaps Panaetius had in mind (and mentioned?) Achilles and Alcibiades, who are given as examples of μεγαλοψυχία by Aristotle at APo. 9 7 b l 8 ; if so, this is an early indicator of his plan to challenge conventional rankings of leaders; cf. 55 74 ff. and 90. Cicero surely had Caesar in mind, whom he has already twice criticized by name (55 26 and 43); cf. Sal. Cat. 54.1, where there is said to be magnitudo animi par in Caesar and Cato. . . . non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis.] The use of immanitas strengthens the suspicion that Caesar is the target; cf. 55 26 and 157, 2.23 and 3.32; Heilmann, 4.— Here, as at 2.51, humanitas stands for the interest of the human community; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 140; Ehlers, TLL 6, 3080.8 ff. itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo cum earn virtutem esse dicunt propugnantcm pro aequitate.J This definition, not attested elsewhere, is likely to

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be Panaetius' own; cf. § 6 {sequimur . . . Stoicos)^ where the reference is likewise to Panaetius; Pohlenz, AF, 43, 2.—For aequitas = iustitia cf. ad § 30.—Hirzel, 2, 507 n., is correct in stating "Cicero ordnet nicht die Tapferkeit dem Hochsinn unter. Vielmehr wechselt er mit beiden Bezeichnungen oder verbindet sie . . ." But Knoche, 1935,52, n. 227, goes too far in trying to transfer this observation to Panaetius (though he does leave open the possibility that Cicero is being imprecise in his terminology). The description of the drive from which this virtue originates (§ 1 3 : . . . appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit. . .) makes it clear that the broader term is in question and that fortitudo, as defined in our passage, can only be a species of magnitudo animi; cf. also the distinction at § 80 between decernendi ratio and decertandi fortitudo and deliberate emphasis on the former. Surely the usage whereby Cicero speaks of fortis animus et magnus (§ 66; sim. 5 65) or magnitudo animi et fortitudo (3.99) or uses fortitudo alone as a designation for the third virtue (3.117-18) results from a desire for variatio as well as the fact that magnitudo animi was a relatively new expression felt to need some elucidation; cf. ad $ 6 1 . quocirca nemo qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia laudem est adeptus; . . .] Laus (έπαινος) is an attribute of the honestum (though it need not be, in fact, praised; cf. ad § 14) and plays a special role under the fourth virtue ($ 98). Malitia was said to be incompatible with justice at § 33 (malitiosa iuris interpretatio); insidiae are the special subject of 3.49b ff. (the term is used at 3.68). 63 praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: . . .] The ellipsis of esse lends emphasis to such judgments; cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1, 11. Such formulations are par­ ticularly common in this section of Off.: cf. § 61 (hinc rhetorum campus. . . (hinc no)ster Codes, hinc Decii. . .), $ 84 (atque haec quidem {de Lacedaemoniis) plaga mediocris . . .), § 86 {hinc apud Athenienses magnae discordiae), 90 (itaque alter semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus). praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: *—quam fortitudinis'.] PL La. 197b: αλλ1 οϊμαι το άφοβοι* και το άνδρεΐον ού ταΰτόν έστιν. εγώ δε ανδρείας* μεν και προμηθίας* πάνυ τισΐν ολίγοις οΐμαι μετεΐναι, θρασύτητος* δέ και τόλμης* και τοϋ άφοβου μετά άπρομηθίας* πάνυ πολλοίς* καΐ ανδρών και γυναικών και παί­ δων και θηρίων, ταϋτ' ούν ά συ καλείς* ανδρεία και ο'ι πολλοί, εγώ θρασεα καλώ, ανδρεία δε τά φρόνιμα περ'ι ών λέγω. Note that the contrast of motives between sua cupiditas and utilitas communis is absent from Plato; it is also a point emphasized in the non-Panaetian appendix to Book 1 (cf., e.g., § 154: quis enim est tarn cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura ut, si ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit adhtum penculum discrimenque patriae cui subvenire opitularique possit, non ilb

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omnia relinquat atque abiciat. . .) and was an important concern of Cicero at the time of the composition of Off. (cf. introduction, $ 6). itaque viros fortes (ct) magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritaris amicos minimeque fall aces esse volumus;...] Contrast §§ 108-9 and 113, where, to illustrate the variety of human temperaments, the callidi are con­ trasted with the simplices et aperti, but without any value judgment.—Cf. Arist. EN 1127a21 ff., where the αύβέκαστος appears as the mean between the άλά£ων and the €Ϊρων, and ad § 13. 64 Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur.] Appetitio quaedam principatus was the natural drive that formed the basis of the third virtue; cf. § 13 (with note); but here, as under iustitia (cf. 5 26), the concern is that this tendency can be taken to extremes {nimia). ut enim apud Platonem est omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi . . .] PI. La. 182e-183a: λβγω oe ταύτα ττερί αυτού [sc. τουόπλιτικού] eis τάδ^ άποβλβψας,οτι οΐμαι €γώ τούτο.ei fsc. μάθημα] TL ην, ούκ αν λελη&'ναι Λακ€δαιμον(ους, οι ς ουδέν άλλο μ€λ€ΐ ev τψ βίω ή τούτο £ητ6ΐν και €πιτηδ€ύειν, οτι αν μαθόντ£ς και 6ττιτηδ€ύσαντ€9 πλ€ον€κτοΪ€ν των άλλων nepi τον πόλ€μον; cf. Sen. Ben. 5.3.1: Lacedaemonii vetant suos pancratio aut caestu decernere, ubi inferiorem ostendit victi confessio. . . . ut quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellet, ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse.] Cf. Soph. Ant. 739 (Haemon to Creon): καλώς έρημης γ ' αν συ γης άρχοι ς· μόνος; ad % 13. difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria.] Stiff competition is licit as long as aequitas is preserved; cf. ad 3.42 (Chrysippus); sim. $ 26 (where the Ennian sancta societas substitutes for aequitas). . . . exsistuntque in republica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam maximas consequantur et sint vi potius superiores quam iustitia pares.] In thus translating the concept into Roman terms, Cicero is evidently thinking above all of Caesar (note: ut. . . sint vi. . . superiores; for the refusal to obey ius cf. § 26). Caesar certainly engaged in the distribution of property to his supporters (§ 43; 2.27-29), but the phrase largitores et factiosi also calls to mind the armed strife of factions that marred the public life of Rome in the 50's; cf. Lintott, 74 ff.; passages in which Cicero criticizes the contiones conductae of P. Clodius are collected by Christian Meier, RE Suppl. 10 (1965), 615.13 ff.—For the negative sense of largitor cf. MontefuscoBuchwald, TLL 7.2, 972.24 ff. (for the corresponding connotations of largitio ad § 43); for opes in the sense of "political power" cf. ad § 25. . . . nullum enim est tempus quod iustitia vacare debeat.] What constitutes a

194 A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis just act may vary according to circumstance (κατά ττερίστασιν; cf. §$ 31-32) but not the obligation to be just. 65 fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam.] This precept, too, establishes ties between iustitia and magni­ tude* animi, since the failure to ward off wrongdoing is itself unjust; cf. ad SS 23, 28, and 62. vera autem et sapiens—desideret gloriam.] The first two sentences (—non est habendus) comprise a theoretical description of behavior expected of the μίγαλόψυχος. Then follows the empirical observation facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate . . . ; on the importance of glory for a Roman aristocrat in building a political career cf. Harris, 17 ff. The upshot of this confrontation of theory and practice is indeed a locus lubricus; nor is the problem resolved in our passage (cf. p. 32 supra). vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat...] Μεγαλοψυχία, unlike magnitudo animi, was used in common parlance (cf. ad SS 61-92), some­ times in the debased sense "generosity" (cf. LSJ s.v.), besides being applied to morally dubious characters such as Alcibiades (cf. ad $ 62); hence perhaps Panaetius' need for a stricter sense of the term.—At $ 68 Cicero explains that the lust for glory reduces one's freedom; but a more basic reason for disregarding glory has to do with the Stoic valuation of the external goods; cf. ad 2.31; another reason for despising glory, viz., the transitory nature of what passes for glory in this world, is given at 2.43, where the concept of vera gloria is similar to that of vera. . . animi magnitudo in our passage (see ad he). . . . principemque se esse mavult quam videri.] Cf. Aesch. Sept. 592 (of Amphiaraus, who bears no device on his shield): ου γαρ δοκ€ΐι> άριστος αλλ' eii/αι Θέλα, a verse perhaps cited by Panaetius (cf. Pohlenz, AF, 43, n. 5); on appearance and reality cf. also § 41. Cf. Sallust's comment on Cato (Cat. 54.6): non divitiis cum divite neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente abstinentia certabat; esse quam videri bonus malebat: ita, quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis ilium se~ quebatur. I suspect that in his entire συγκρισι? of Caesar and Cato Sal lust has our passage in mind; note the comment its . . . magnitudo animi par, item gloria, sed alia alii. Caesar beneficiis ac muniftcentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato . . . Cato nihil brgiundo gloriam adeptus est (ibid., 54.1-3). The topics magnitudo animi and gloria and the means of attaining these, whether by virtus or largitio, are common to both passages; that Caesar represents one method is implicit in our passage (and explicit else-

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where in Off.; see ad § 64). It is not impossible, however, in view of his use of bonus, rather than Cicero's princeps, that Sallust may have had some knowl­ edge, direct or indirect, of the Aeschylean context; cf. R. Renehan, u A Tradi­ tional Pattern of Imitation in Sallust and His Sources, n CPh 71 (1976), 9 7 99. . . . qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hie in magnis viris non est habendus.) In the Gorgias Callicles is said to be a lover of the δήμος (481d; cf. 513c); but Socrates argues that those who speak before the δήμο? do not so much educate as flatter it (502d-e). Similarly, Arist. EN 1124a4 ff. em­ phasizes that the μεγαλόψυχο? is independent of public opinion; cf., ibid., 1125a6-8; EE 1232b4-7; ad § 147; supra p. 32 and n. 70. facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate;. . .] Cf. Long, 1995 1 , 227 ff.; § 26; Arch. 26: trahimur omnes studio laudis, et optimus quisque maxitne gloria ducitur. . . . qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenirur qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi merccdem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.] Cf. Arist. EN 1134bl ff.: εστί δ* ό άρχωι> φύλαξ του δικαίου.€i oe του δικαίου, και τοΰ ίσου. επ€ΐ δ' ούθέν αύτω πλέον είναι δοκεΐ, εϊπερ δίκαιο? . . . ■ μισθό? άρα τι? δοτεο?, τούτο δε τιμή και γέρα?· δτψ δέ μη ικανά τά τοιαύτα, ούτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.—Cicero stated his public position in a letter to Cato dated to late 51 or early 50: si quisquam fuit umquam remotus et natura et magis etiam, ut mihi quidem sentire videor, ratione atque doctrina ab inani laude et sermonibus vulgi, ego profecto is sum. testis est consulatus meus, in quo, sicut in reliqua vita, fateor ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam (Earn. 15.4.13); with his familiars, however, he was more candid about his own fondness for glory; cf. Shackleton Bailey ad loc. (= 110.13.4-5 of his edition) as well as ad 2.31 and 43.—For lubricus in the sense "liable to lead to false steps, hazardous, ticklish," or the like cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Heus, TLL 7.2, 1689.34 ff. 6 6 - 6 7 Cicero/Panaetius distinguishes carefully between the achievements that constitute the glamor and usefulness (sc. to society) of magnitudo animi and its psychological substrate, which is the real concern. 66 . . . una in rerum extemarum despicientia ponirur, cum persuasum est nihil hominem nisi quod honestum decorumque sit aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere, nullique neque homini neque perturbation! animi nee fortunae succumbere.] The Aristotelian μεγαλόψυχο? despises other persons (EN 1124a29 ff.) or their false opinions {EE 1232a38-bl0); hence indeed το όλίγωρον is said to be his πόθο? ϊδιον (ibid., 1232b9-10); hence, too, Aristo of Ceus, who succeeded Lyco as head of the Peripatos, felt the need to draw a

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firm distinction between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (fr. 13 VI, p. 3 5 , 2 3 27 W.; see ad § 90). The despising of external goods is, of course, a specifi­ cally Stoic attitude (cf. introduction to Book 2). For the ability of the μεγαλό­ ψυχο? to surmount evil cf. Democ. 68 Β 46 D.-K.: μεγαλοψυχίη το φερειν πραεω? πλημμέλειας Arist. ΑΡο. 97b21-22; ΕΝ 1100b30-33; (Arist.] VV 1 2 5 0 a l 4 - 1 5 and 1250b34 ff.;*« [Plat.] Def. 412e9; SVF 3, nos. 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 269-70,274-75. 67 id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id quod honestum sit bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis.] Though this sen­ tence repeats the content of the first sentence of 5 66, Cicero is by no means averse to recapitulations and repetitions in this essay (cf. ad§§ 132 and 141; Thomas, 29); and it does not, pace Atzert, disturb the train of thought; hence his athctesis has not been followed by Fedeli, Testard, or Winterbottom. nam et ea quae eximia—magnaeque constantiae.J Muson. 25.14 ff. recom­ mends this practice as a training for the soul.—For the first clause {nam et ea—magnique ducendum est) cf. 2.37. . . . et ea quae videntur acerba, quae muha et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitatc sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae.] The behavior described here, no less than the martial exploits listed at $ 6 1 , formed the subject of encomia; cf. de Orat. 2.346: magna etiam ilia bus et admirabilis videri solet tulisse casus sap tenter adversos, non fractum esse fortuna, retinuisse in rebus asperis dignitatem. The emphasis, here and elsewhere (cf. § 80: . . . nee tumultuantem de gradu deici. . .), on the dignified appearance appropriate to the μεγαλόψυχο? (cf. Arist. EN 1125a 12 ff.) approaches some of the advice about comportment offered under the fourth virtue (esp. § 131). Cf. in general Arist. EN 1124al2 ff.: μάλιστα μεν ow εστίν, ώσπερ εϊρηται, ό μεγαλόψυχο? περί τιμά?, οΰ μην άλλα και περί πλούτοι/ και δυναστείαν καΐ πάσαν εύτυχίαν και άτυχίαν μετρίω? εξει, όπω? άι> γίνηται, και OUT' ευτυχών περιχαρή? έ'σται οΰτ' άτυχων περίλυπο?.—For the phrase robustus animus cf. SVF 3, 23.28, where μεγαλοψυχία is said to consist in ρώμη και ίσχυ? ψυχή?. Sandbach, 7 6 - 7 8 , gives the background in Stoic physical theory for robustus animus (its firmness saves the sage's soul down to the final con­ flagration). For the iunctura robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae cf. Sest. 99: . . . magni animi est. . . magnaeque constantiae. 6 8 - 7 3 These paragraphs have as their subject the relation of the μεγαλό­ ψυχο? to tranquillitas animi. The perturbationes animi form the subject of $§ 68-69a (—turn etiam dignitatem); here it is laid down that cupiditas, 96. On this work cf. I. During, RE Suppl. 11 (1968), 317.58 ff.

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whether the object be pleasure, wealth, or glory, is incompatible with the independence (libertas) for which the μεγαλόψυχο? strives. Then $§ 69b-71 consider one strategy for securing both independence and tranquillitas animi, namely withdrawal from public affairs to one's own estate. But Cicero will grant leave from public service only in special cases (physical weakness is the example given); 97 otherwise those who withdraw from public affairs are only μεγαλόψυχοι, as it were, by halves; their contempt for glory wins ap­ proval, but they are under grave suspicion of lacking constantia ($ 71). It is admitted, however, that a commitment to public life exposes one in a greater degree to the whims of fortune. The section concludes with some general precepts about undertaking actions. 6 8 . . . nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre.] In the EN Aristotle's formula for the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος· to wealth (and other external goods) is not "despising" but "moderation" (EN 1124al3 ff.: . . . περ'ι πλουτον και δυναστείαν καΐ πάσαν εύτυχίαν και άτυχίαν μετρίως έξει . . . ). The use of wealth for benefactions (cf. Arist. Pol. 1263bl3, cited ad §§ 20-60) was probably a factor in this attitude. Closer to our passage is £ £ 1232bl0 ff.: πάλιν περί τιμή? και του £ήν και πλούτου, περί ων σπουδά­ ζει ν δοκοϋσιν οι άνθρωποι, οΰθεν φροντίζειν περ'ι των άλλων πλην περί τιμής. In placing wealth among the αδιάφορα, albeit as a προηγμένοι/, the Stoa left the way free for the despising of wealth; cf. SVF 1, 47.24-25; 3, 17.20-21 etc.; ibid., 3, 31.5 (as a προηγμενον); Chrysippus held both a concern and a lack of concern for wealth to be folly (ibid., 33.27 ff.). nee vero imperia expetenda, ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda nonnumquam.] This is for the sake of ευθυμία, Panaetius' essay (fr. 45) on which was inspired in part by Democritus;98 cf. 68 Β 3 D.-K.: τόν ευθυμεΐσθαι μέλλοντα χρή μη πολλά πρήσσειν, μήτε ίδίη μήτε ξυντ\, μηδέ άσσ' αν πράσση, ύπερ τε δύναμιν αίρεΐσβαι την έωυτοϋ και φύσιν . . . ; Arist. EN 1124b25 describes the μεγαλόψυχος as ολίγων μένπρακτικόν, μεγάλων δε και ονομαστών.—Deponenda would, of course, be an implicit thrust at Caesar's refusal, entailing the recent civil war; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 226. In general, the laying down of office was not common in Rome, though Cicero himself had renounced the province of Cisalpine Gaul, a hotbed of conspiracy likely to entail military action, which he had obtained by exchange with his consular 97. For Panaetius' position cf. ad $ 72. 98. Note, however, that the title π*ρϊ ^ύθυμίης may have been inferred from the first sentence of Democritus' treatise; cf. introduction, n. 9, and Schmalzriedt, there cited, 125-26. For a reconstruction of Panaetius1 approach to the subject and relation to Democritus cf. Gill, 1994, 4614 ff.

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colleague C. Antonius, who received instead the more lucrative Macedonia (cf. Cat. 4.23, Pis. 5, and other testimonies discussed by Allen); an arrange­ ment whereby Cicero shared in the profits seems likely; cf. Shatzman, 4 Π ­ Ι 3; Gelzer, 82-83; T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 363. Some other instances: three praetors of 176 excused themselves from accepting provinces [MRR, 1, 400); Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) declined the command against the Cretan pirates (ibid., 2,131), and L. Lucceius (pr. 67) refused the province of Sardinia (ibid., 143). Rather different is the case of Cn. Cornelius Scipio, whose praetorship is usually dated to 109 and whom, in light of his bad character, the senate forbade to go, according to the allotment, to Spain (ibid., 1, 546). Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Pontifex, is said to have laid aside a province to stay clear of debt (Asc. Pis. 13); the incident should perhaps be referred with F. Miinzcr, RE 16.1 (1933), 438.30 ff., to the fact that he governed Asia for only nine months [Att. 5.17.5); for the date cf. ad 3.10. 69a vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, rum etiam aegritudine et voluptate animi et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae adfert cum constantiam rum etiam dignitatem.] The text has caused difficulty: after voluptate the archetype reads animi; but scholars have wondered why voluptas animi should be singled out as op­ posed to other voluptates. Animi has been suspected of being a dittography from earlier or later in the sentence, and nimia, a reading reported by Pearce, has been adopted by Orelli, Pohlenz, AF, 45, and Winterbottom. To this Thomas, n. 230, 68-69, objected that voluptas is always negatively charac­ terized in the Stoa. Here one needs to distinguish between two senses of ηδονή, one the bodily sensation, the other the passion; cf. Inwood, 1985, 144-45. The former is acceptable in moderation; cf. § 106: ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia earnque contemni et reici oportere, sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum, as well as the reference to voluptas nimia at § 102; see also ad 3.119, as well as the reference to mala mentis Gaudia at Verg. A. 6.278-79 with Norden's commentary, p. 214. In our passage, however, the passion is in question; animi has been added to clarify this sense (cf. the limitation by corporis in § 106). The words et iracundia (bracketed, along with the immediately preceding animi, by Briiser, 84) have formed another stumbling-block, since the ortho­ dox Stoa knows the four πάθη επιθυμία, φόβο?, λύπη, and ηδονή, and treats anger as a species of desire (SVF 3, 96.14 ff.); in regarding anger as as an independent expression of the θυμό? Panaetius would, however, be in accord with Plato (and Posidonius): cf. Pohlenz, AF, 45, n. 2; Stoa, 1,199. Note that the same five-fold scheme is found in a discourse of Herodes Atticus against

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the Stoic doctrine of απάθεια apud Gel. 19.12.3: in ea dissertatione, quantulum memini, huiuscemodi sensus est: quod nullus usquam homo, qui se­ cundum naturam sentiret et saperet, adfectionibus istis animi, quas πάθη appellabat, aegritudinis, cupiditatis, timoris, irae, voluptatis, carere et vacare totis posset . . . Note, too, that anger was singled out from among the perturbationes at $ 23b as an example of a potential cause of injustice and is an emotion that the μεγαλόψυχος in particular must master; hence the homily on the subject at SS 88-89.—The phrase tranquillitas animi et securitas surely renders the Panaetian ευθυμία (cf. ad §§ 61-92, 73a).— Dignitas is a concept of much wider application than αξίωμα; in this regard τιμή would be its Greek counterpart. The adjective dignus, derived from decet," tends, like honestum, to have reference to worthiness in terms of public esteem; hence the common use of dignitas, like honos, of public office; for the connection with honos cf., e.g., Don. ad Ten Hec. 212 (2,229.7 W.): dignum: sic dixit 'dignum', ut honoris sit genus accipere uxorem meruisse; Klose, 45 ff. On Cicero's political ideal cum dignitate otium [Sest. 98 al.) cf. Strasburger, 1956, 73. One cannot but wonder whether Panaetius was not content with ευθυμία as the goal of the process of controlling the πάθη and whether constantia (which has no equivalent in Greek prior to Philo's ευστά­ θεια; cf. Burger, TLL 4, 504.5 ff.; LSJ s.v.) and dignitas are not Cicero's interpretatio Romana (for the role of dignitas under the fourth virtue cf. ad § 94). However, since bearing good and evil fortune with equanimity was part of Panaetius' conception of μεγαλοψυχία (cf. $ 90), the mention of constantia in this sense is certainly in the spirit of Panaetius.—Constantia, like dignitas, rules out certain types of unbecoming behavior (cf. § 80: fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis . . .); hence its prominence under the fourth virtue; cf. § 98 and ad $ 111. 69b-71 The earlier Stoa had distinguished three προηγούμενοι βίοι, the royal, the political, and the life devoted to knowledge (επιστημονικός; SVF 3, 172.15). Apart from a passing allusion at $ 70 {his idem propositum fuit quod regibus . . .), the life of a monarch has been omitted here, no doubt because Cicero found it unnecessary for his purposes. The essential distinc­ tion in this section, then, is between two groups, both of which have the same goal, namely independence of external authority (αυτάρκεια), but propose to attain it by different means. The members of the first group pursue otium and are contenti. . . et suo et parvo (% 70); the second group comprises those who engage in the political life of the community. The resulting contrast between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa is a theme traceable as far back as 99. Cf. Ernout-Meillct s.v. decet.

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Euripides» Antiope (frr. 179 ff. N.*); cf. also Arist. Pol. 1324a25 ff. The two groups are said to benefit both society and themselves: the life of the otiosi is minus aliis gravis aut molesta, whereas that of statesmen is fructuosior. . . hominum generi (§ 70); on the other hand, the men of leisure enjoy a life facilior and tutior for themselves, the politicians one that is ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior (ibid.; cf. Johann, 473, n. 48). The rating of the two alternative βίοι in our passage has caused difficulty. Pohlenz claims that this passage shows that "das Freiheitsstreben des apolitischen Philosophen ebenso unsozial ist wie die Herrschsucht des Tyrannen" (AF, 47). In fact, the contrast in our passage is not between philoso­ phers and tyrants, as Buchner, 1967, 61, saw. However, the overall contrast here is not between philosophers and kings either (pace Buchner, loc. cit.t and Johann, 37): the kings are cited in the first sentence of $ 70 merely as an example of the type of libertas the otiosi are striving for. The contrast is rather between men of leisure in general and men of affairs in general; and neither is condemned (so, rightly, Johann, 37; in quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est: % 70). Political life in a free commonwealth is presupposed (. . . qui se ad rempublicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt: ibid.). Pohlenz was also mistaken in finding sarcasm in the first sentence of § 70, which states that the otiosi pursue the same goal as kings; the goal in question is tranquillitas animi; and Cicero expressly notes that their approach to obtaining it is not to be despised (see above). In $ 71 Cicero subjects the otiosi to closer scrutiny and is prepared to afford leave from government service to two types: those who have a talent for scholarship or are hindered by ill health or other serious cause 100 (qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et Us qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a republica recesserunt). Others are under suspicion of putting forward contempt for glory as a pretext to cover their unwilling­ ness to take on the hard work or face the possibility of defeat inherent in political life. It is only at this point in the argument, not at the beginning of § 70, that a certain amount of irony is directed at those who for the wrong motives and (presumably) without the proper qualifications seek the life of otium. It seems likely that Panaetius recognized the legitimacy of both the vita activa and the vita contemplativa (sim. Sen. Tranqu. An. 7.2, cited ad % 110 below); the former is, however, said to be the prerequisite for μεγαλοψυχία (cf. ad § 72). In his appendix to this Book (§§ 153 ff.) Cicero argues in detail the superiority of the former over the latter (note, too, that the criticism of 100. For the interpretation cf. ad $ 23.

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philosophers at 5 28 involves the special situation in which they do not intervene to hinder injustice); cf. also introduction, $ 5 (4). 70 his idem proposimm fuit quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere ut velis.] Cf. SVF 3, 158.34 ff.: οΰ μόνον δε ελευθέρους είναι του? σοφούς, άλλα και βασιλέας, της βασιλείας ούσης αρχής άνυπευθύνου . . .; Farad. 34: quid est enim libertasf potestas vivendi ut velis; Epict. Diss. 4.1.1: ελεύθερος έστιν ό ζών ώς βούλεται, ον οϋτ' άναγκάσαι εστίν ούτε κωλύσαι ούτε βιάσασθαι, ου αί όρμαι ανεμπόδιστοι, αί ορέξεις έπιτευκτικαί, αί έκκλίσεις άπερίπτωτοι.—For Pohlenz's interpretation of this sentence as ironic see the previous note. quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum his quos dixi otiosis . . .] In fact, this has not been established, but rather that this is a feature shared by the otiosi with kings. Cicero thus none too subtly shifts the basis of comparison to accord with the political circumstances of the Roman republic. For Panaetius, however, it was natural to discuss kings, like Philip and Alexander, or philosophers, such as Socrates, as claimants to μεγα­ λοψυχία (cf. ad SS 88 and 90). 7 1 . . . et iis forsitan concedendum sit rempublicam non capessentibus.. . et iis qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a republica recesserunt. . .] The fragments on the subject attested by name for Chrysippus present a contrast that fuller context would doubtless clarify. On the one hand, he maintained a kind of right to live at leisure (Sen. de Otio 8.1: adice nunc quod e lege Chrysippi vivere otioso licet: non dico ut otium patiatur, sed ut eligat). On the other hand, he is said, while not having engaged in public affairs himself, to have sent all others to do so (id. Tranqu. An. 1.10: promptus, compositus sequor Zenona, Cleanthem, Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accesstt, nemo non misit; both frag­ ments at SVF 3,174.30 ff.). Perhaps the former point was qualified in some such way as in our text. The general Stoic doctrine was that the sage takes part in politics αν μή τι κωλύη (SVF 3, 175.4; cf. 173.17 ff.). In this connec­ tion Cicero may have thought of his own father (cf. Leg. 2.3: banc vides villam, ut nunc quidem est lautius aedificatam patris nostri studio, qui cum esset infxrma valetudine, hie fere aetatem egit in litteris); a similar case was that of his friend M. Marius (cf. Munzer, RE 14.2 (1930], 1819.32 ff.). Under the empire the parameters for otium ex causa were evidently widened (on the basis of the theory oipersonae; cf. $ 110; Griffin, 1976,341); cf. Sen. de Otio 3.3: alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa; causa autem ilia late patet. si respublica corruptior est quam (ut) adiuvari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens in supervacuum nee se nihil profuturus inpendet; si parum habebit auctoritatis aut virium nee ilium erit admissura

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respublica, si vaktudo ilium inpediet. . .—For the use of the participle after a concessive verb, evidently patterned on Greek usage, cf. Holden ad he, who cites Tusc. 2.19; cf. also Cael. 25.—For the interpretation of aliqua graviore causa cf. ad § 23 b. quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere se dicant ea quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non modo non laudi venim etiam vitio dandum puto.] Yet in the following sentence Cicero has to qualify this: quorum iudicium in eo quod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent difficile factu est non probare. . . Perhaps Cicero's text is a surface distortion of a Panaetian thought similar to Arist. EN 1124b5-6: ό μεν γαρ μεγαλό­ ψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεί (δοξάρι γάρ αληθώς), οί δέ πολλοί τυχόντως. sunt enim qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint mo Hi ores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur infamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter.] Aristotle, too, knows pseudo-μ€γαλόψυχoι who fail to qualify for the title because they are unable to bear good fortune {EN 1124a30 ff.). An unflattering portrait of such enervated persons is likewise painted by Herod. Att. apud Gel. 19.12.10 (a passage which elsewhere agrees with Panaetian doctrine; cf. ad § 69 above).—On divergence of precept and practice cf. Servius Sulpicius Rufus' letter on hearing of the death of Tullia {Earn. 4.5.5-6; ca. mid-March, 45). 72 Sed iis qui habent a natura adiumenta renim gerendarum abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus et gerenda respublica est; nee enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest.] Our passage is pre­ sumably the principal foundation for the notion of Pohlenz, AF, 47, that for Panaetius "hohen Sinn tragt. . . nur, wer sich ins Kampfgewiihl begibt und auch d o n als Fiihrer seine Ataraxie und die Sicherheit des Handelns wahrt." Our passage indicates that those fitted by nature for it should take part in public life, but did Panaetius really regard only those who performed great deeds in state service as μεγαλόψυχοι (cf. the words nee enim aliter . . . potest)} If so, why discuss philosophers at all in this context, grant them leave from public service, and compare them with statesmen in terms of their ability to bear changes of fortune (§§ 7 1 , 73, 90)? Why state in § 92 esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam . . . ? Perhaps there are more kinds of "great deeds" than appear in our passage (cf. the reference at § 66 to res arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum). Certainly Aristotle had mentioned So­ crates along with Lysander, Achilles, and Ajax as a person considered μεγαλόψυχος (ΑΡο. 97b21). One suspects that the formulation of §$ 66 and 72 reflects Cicero's own predilection (common, it must be said, to most Romans) for public service over the vita contemplativa but that Panaetius*

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more evenhanded treatment of the claims of the philosopher and statesman underlies the comparisons of the two spheres and the statement quoted from $ 92.' 0 1 73a quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in eorum vita quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus e g e n t . . . ] Cf. Plut. Tranqu. An. 475d-e (perhaps after Panaetius, περί ευθυμία?) on the limited vul­ nerability of the philosopher's life to assault by fortune: όθεν ού δει παντάπασιν έκταπεινοϋν ουδέ καταβάλλειν την φύσιν. ώς μηδέν ίσχυρόν μηδέ μόνιμον μηδ' Οπερ την τύχην εχουσαν, άλλα τουναντίον είδότας δτι μικρόν έστι μέρος τοΰ άνθρωπου τό σαθρον και έπίκηρον, ψ δέχεται την τύχην, της δε βελτίονος μερίδος αύτοι κρατοϋμεν, εν η τά μέγιστα των αγαθών Ίδρυθέντα, δόξαι τε χρησται και μαθήματα και λόγοι τελευτώντες είς άρετήν, άναφαίρετον έ'χουσι την ούσίαν και άδιάφθορον, άνεκπλήκτους προς τό μέλλον εΐναι και θαρραλέους, προς την τύχην λέγοντας, α Σωκράτης δοκών προς τους κατ­ ηγόρους λέγειν προς τους δικαστάς ελεγεν, ώς άποκτεΐναι μεν "Ανυτος και Μέλητος δύνανται, βλάψαι δ' ού δύνανται.—On the verbs suggestive of sword-play {patent, feriat)—a faint reminder of Panaetius' simile of the pancratiast, which surely occurred in the vicinity (see introduction, $ 5 |5J and ad § 73b)—and similar to metaphors in Caelius* letters (Fam. 8.8.3 and esp. 8.17.2), cf. Fantham, 31, n. 22. . . . maiores motus animorum concitantur (maioraque efficiendi} rempublicam gerentibus quam quietis . . .] For the sense of motus animorum (= πάθη, perturbationes) cf. Tusc. 3.7: num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines iracundiaef haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant;. . . nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec om­ nia morbos Graeci appelbnt, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem bos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus ...; Wieland, TLL 8.10, 1536.9 ff. The transmitted maioraque efficiendi is retained by Testard and Winterbottom, whereas Atzert4 follows Briiser, 87 ff., in bracketing maioraque efficiendi, and Pohlenz, AF, 46, n. 2, and Fedeli adopt the conjecture pro­ posed by Unger, 75, maioraque studia efficiendi. Briiser, 88, condemned the transmitted maioraque efficiendi as corrupt or syntactically incomplete. On the other hand, Thomas, 100-1, argued that motus animorum should be supplied from the preceding clause. The sense would then be that those who 101. Albeit the third type of μεγαλόψυχο? introduced there seems likely to be Ciceronian, rather than Panaetian (cf. ad loc); Rist, 193, claimed that Panaetius attributed equal value to the vita activa and vita contemplative and that the preference for the former (presumably at SS 153 ff.) was purely Ciceronian, bur without specific discussion of the obstacles posed by SS 66 and 72.

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engage in public affairs have motus animorum that are greater and try to achieve greater goals (sc. than the otiosi).wl This interpretation entails, however, not merely a very bold transference from the viri magni animi to their motus animorum but the difficulty that, according to $ 66, the great achievements of the μεγαλόψυχοι are the result of the absence of the πάθη (= motus animorum; see above); hence our suspect text can hardly be correct in stating without qualification that the πάθη themselves achieve or try to achieve great deeds. Pohlenz, be. cit., argued that the suspect text should be retained for its reference to the sphere of practice and refers to the following efficiendi facultatem. But, in fact, at this stage in the argument the concern is exclusively with the mental constituents and the possible danger to tranquillitas animi (see the following conclusion: quo magis its el magnitudo est animi adbibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus). The question of efficiendi facultas arises only in the following sentence introduced by the contrasting formula ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit. . . The suspect text was surely interpolated by a reader who failed to appreciate this fact and missed a reference to the second element of magnitudo animi (cf. § 66) without seeing the problems posed by its introduction in this form. 73b Ad rem gerendam—adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.] The general advice to the man of affairs prior to the introduction of the distinction between the general and the statesman ($§ 74-89) is remarkably brief, though it is taken up again in §§ 9 0 - 9 1 . I suspect that Cicero may have considerably shortened his Panaetian model at this point (cf. ad 2.16). The corresponding Panaetian passage has been suspected as the likely home for fr. 116 (= Gel. 13.28), which likewise contains advice for the man of affairs in general; cf. Bringmann, 269-70; ad 73a; introduction, § 5 (5). Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat ne id modo considered quam ilia res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; . . .J A characteris­ tic concern with practical aspects (cf. § 7b); Book 2 offers detailed precepts. . . . in quo ipso considerandum est ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatem.) Cupiditas and metus are, of course, two of the πάθη (cf. § 69); they must be dealt with even at the planning stage. 7 4 - 7 8 In introducing μίγαλοψυχία, Cicero/Panaetius had used military ex­ amples to show that this is the splendidissimum of the four types of the honestum (§§ 61-62). Now, however, the plan is to combat the common opinion that attaches such importance to military exploits. This program is 102. Thomas, 101, n. 32, should not have compared Lucr. 4.1011-12 (porro bominum mentes, magnis quae motihus edunt I magna), where motus refers to the atomic movements of the mens (cf. C. Giussani ad 4.1004 in vol. 3 of his edition [Turin, 1897)).—Mullen's conjecture is sufficiently refuted by Bruser, 89.

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in line both with Panaetius' emphasis on the rational constituents of μεγα­ λοψυχία (cf. ad §S 79-81) and Cicero's own talents and preferences; he may also have thought that, given his military interests, his son needed to be shown this perspective (cf. introduction, $ 4; ad 2.45). Panaetius presents a σύγκριση of two Athenians, Themistocles and Solon, one noted for his military success at Salamis, the other for his contributions to civil government. Solon, we are told, laid out the entire framework for Athenian political life, including the establishment of the Areopagus (but cf. ad § 75), from which Themistocles benefited as well, whereas Themistocles' victory at Salamis, important as it was, was a single event, not a perpetual legacy {Mud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati: $ 75). 1 0 3 The same argument is then repeated with the substitution of Spartan examples, the generals Pausanias and Lysander versus the lawgiver Lycurgus. When Cicero sets about adding Roman examples, however, he distorts the clarity of the Panaetian argument, for he compares, not a general with a lawgiver, but generals and politicians of his own time or the previous genera­ tion or two. Moreover, one of the politicians, P. Scipio Nasica, contributed, not so much through legislation as violence, so that Cicero has to append to this example a rather labored apologia [quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione—attingit etiam be Hicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est—sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu [§ 76]). Here is an instance where the issues that are really on Cicero's mind obtrude themselves even at the expense of the clarity of the argument (cf. ad 2.21 -22). What lies behind this allusion becomes a bit clearer at 2.43, where he refers again to Tiberius Gracchus' assassination: Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tarn diu laudabitur dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit, at eius filii nee vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum obtinent iure caesorum. The numerus iure caesorum has recently been augmented by one, Julius Caesar, to whom Cicero so often adverts in this treatise, whether by name (1.27,43, and 112), obliquely (2.24,27-29, and 3.82-83), or by surrogate, as in these two passages on the Gracchi; cf. the observation at Amic. 41 [Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses; cf. also 2.80). Our passage culminates, by way of comparison of his achievements with Pompey's, in an allusion to Cicero's own role in crushing the Catilinarian conspiracy. Here by using Pompey's own pronouncement ( . . . frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse nisi meo in rempublicam beneficio ubi triumpharet esset habiturus [§ 78]) and by his refer103. One may query, however, whether Salamis does not receive short shrift here, for if the battle prevented the enslavement of the Greeks, its long-term implications were incalculable.

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ence to the fact that the addressee, his son, shares in the legacy of his father's glory, Cicero mitigates somewhat the odium that ordinarily attaches to selfpraise (cf. Plut. de Laude Ipsius 540b and f; Quint. Inst. 11.1.17 ff.). It is nonetheless clear that Cicero is here constructing the same type of com­ parison to his own advantage as at Cat. 3.26 ( . . . unoque tempore in hac republica duos civis exstitisse quorum alter finis vestri imperi non terrae sed caeli regionibus terminaret, alter huius imperi domicilium sedisque servaret) and 4.21 (erit profecto inter horum fsc. Africani, Paulli, Marii, Pompeii] laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur). 74 Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiorcs esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio.] The assumption that warfare is the true test of one's worth was widespread in antiquity; cf., e.g., the person derided at com. adesp. fr. 451: άνηρ άριστος τάλλα πλην iv άσπίδι; Verg. A. 11.338-39 (of Drances): lingua melior, sed frigida bello I dextera. Plutarch devoted an entire essay (de Gloria Atheniensium) to defending the thesis (perverse as it seems to the modern mind) that Athens' military glory surpassed its achieve­ ments in the cultural sphere. The attack Panaetius evidently launched on such views was, of course, particularly congenial to Cicero; cf. Brut. 255 ff. multj enira bella saepe quaesiverunt propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plenimque contingit. . . ] Cicero (Panaetius, too?) speaks empirically and simply assumes that the μεγαλόψυχο? is moti­ vated by gloriae cupiditas (cf. ad § 65), in spite of $ 66 (his attitude toward the external goods; cf. § 71) and the specific warning of § 68. Soldiers no doubt often spoke in such terms; cf. the words of the centurion M. Perronius quoted at Caes. BG 7.50.4:. . . vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. 75 The confusion in this passage of the Council of the Areopagus (which antedated Solon) with the βουλή that he created is also found in Greek sources and may thus have been Panaetian. But is the clause est. . . bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, with its ignoring of the εκκλησία, perhaps a piece of Ciceronian interpretatio Romana? Rawson, 467, suspects that the analogy of the senate's leadership during the Punic Wars may be at the back of Cicero's mind. Cf. test. nos. 298 ff. Martina (our passage = no. 301); for composition and competence of the deliberative body cf. P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (corn rp., Oxford, 1985).—On Themistocles' ruse prior to Salamis cf. ad § 108. 76 licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis (prolatatum) putatur, tamen ne minima

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quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi s u n t ; . . . ] On Lysander, who was among Aristotle's examples of μβγαλοψυχια (cf. APo. 97b21), cf. ad § 109. As victor at Plataea Pausanias is coupled with Lysander, the great Spartan general of the Peloponnesian War, as the two men "by whose deeds . . . the Spartan empire . . . is thought to have been expanded" (on the text see below); the problematic aspects of his career, including his condemnation for medism and conspiracy with the helots, are thus swept aside; cf. Hans Schaefer, RE 18.4 (1949), 2563.51 ff.; D.M. Lewis in CAH 5 2 , 100-101. For Lysander's role in the development of the Spartan empire cf. H.W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," JHS 50 (1930), 37-79; D. Lotze, Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg, Abh. d. sachs. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 57.1 (Berlin, 1964); for discussion of some problems cf. A. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix IS (1971), 206-26.—The transmission is defective; dilatatum has been sup­ plied before Lacedaemoniis in L [post correcturam) and c and is probably nothing more than a conjecture; Lambinus's partum, which could easily have disappeared by saut du meme au meme before putatur, is adopted by Winterbottom; also palaeographically attractive and perhaps superior in sense is prolatatum, conjectured by Courtney, 79.—Cicero/Panaetius shares the gen­ eral assumption of ancient sources since Herodotus 1.65 that, in spite of Hellanicus' contrary view (FGrHist 4 F 116), Lycurgus was responsible for the Spartan constitution; cf. Kahrstedt, RE 13.2 (1927), 2442.26 ff. mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum versaremur in republica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur;. . .] On M. Aemilius Scaurus, whom Cicero admired in his boyhood, cf. ad § 108.— Perhaps Cicero has paired Catulus with Pompey because of their wellknown rivalry. The consuls of 78, Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, were both despatched to Etruria to put down a rising of the former owners against the new colonists installed by Sulla. A quarrel between the two turned into a military confrontation the following year when the senate issued its consultum ultimwn authorizing Catulus as proconsul together with Pompey to deal with the rebellious Lepidus. The senate's forces were victorious; but the affair contained the seeds of future political quarrels, for Pompey offended Catulus by refusing to disband his army as he had ordered, in the hope of receiving an imperium to fight Sertorius in Spain (Plut. Pomp. 17.3; Gelzer, Pompeius, 4 6 - 4 9 ) . Hence Catulus' opposition to the Gabinian and Manilian laws and subsequent loss of auctoritas (cf. T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 328); thus after losing the election for pontifex maximus to Julius Caesar (63; ibid., 353), in 61 he was asked his opinion in the senate after two men who were his juniors (Att. 1.13.2); cf. Munzer, RE 13.2 (1927), 2082.30

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ff. (Lutatius no. 8); for Cicero's oft-repeated regard for him, ibid., 2086.3 ff.; on his qualities as an orator cf. ad% 109 and 133. Both Scaurus and Catulus were senior optimate leaders not particularly known for military exploits; Cicero perhaps saw them therefore as the leading representatives of the senatorial establishment that provided the basis for the successful warfare waged by Marius and Pompey on foreign soil (cf. the clause est. . . helium gestum consilio senatus of the Areopagus and at $ 76 quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habueruttt exercitus et fortiores); the parallel is imper­ fect, however, since, of course, neither Scaurus nor Catulus was the founder of the Roman constitution and thus both truly parallel to Solon or Lycurgus and of unarguably greater significance than any general, however brilliant. . . . parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.] As Wolfflin, 204, pointed out, this is probably an allusion to a trochaic tetrameter that had as its original form nisi sit consilium domi. Although the thought is paralleled at Euphro fr. 4 K.-A. (ό γάρ τον ίδιον οικονόμων κακώς βίον, / πώς ούτος αν σώσ€ΐ€ των έξω τινά;) and V. Max. 2.9 praef. (quid enim prodest foris esse strenuum, si domi male viviturf expugnentur licet urbes, corripiantur gentes, regnis manus iniciantur, nisi foro et curiae officium ac verecundia sua constiterit, partarum rerum caelo cumulus aequatus sedem stabilem non habebit), it seems not to have attained the fixed form of a proverbial phrase; cf. Otto, 120, n. 2.—Cicero seems to have taken this sentence as the theme to be illustrated and thereby weakened considerably the argument of his Panaetian source; cf. the previous note and ad §§ 74-78. nee plus Africanus—consilio urbano sine exercitu.] On Cicero's oft ex­ pressed approval of P. Nasica's deed cf. ad § 109 below; for the historical reconstruction of the event itself cf. Stockton, 75 ff. Cicero realizes that this example is not fully apt and quickly adds some qualifiers; cf. Gaillard, 523. Nevertheless he did not wish to renounce it, since it is a station on the way to the comparison of himself with Pompey toward which he is building (Cicero had compared Nasica's murder of Ti. Gracchus with his own actions against Catiline as early as Cat 1.3; cf. Mil. 8).—For Africanus' career cf. ad § 116. 77 Dlud autera optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio: 'cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi'.] This verse from the poem de Consulatu Suo (fr. 16 Traglia = 11 Buchner = 12 Courtney) is never cited by book or set in a larger context. The (correct) reading laudi is transmitted in our passage and appears at Pis. 74; it has been expelled, however, by linguae in a part of the tradition of our text (the recentiores and the contami­ nated witnesses Υ and p) and in subsequent works beginning with [Sal.] Cic. 6 and [Cic] Sal. 7; as antithesis to the laurels of the military victor the reward

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of the civilian statesman, laus, is surely wanted; cf. Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1246.17 ff. The verse was a target for Cicero's detractors beginning with L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58), who claimed that it alienated Pompey and precipitated Cicero's exile; Cicero replied that the sense of the verse was general and no comparison of himself with Pompey was entailed; or even if Piso's reading of it was correct, the single verse could hardly have carried more weight with Pompey than Cicero's extensive panegyrics of him (Pis. 72-75). Our passage, as well as the comparison of his achievements with Pompey's at Cat. 3.26 and 4.21 (cf. ad §S 74-78), makes one hesitate to take the disclaimer at Pis. 75 at face value, however; cf. Plutarch's condemnation of those who are not merely content with their own honor but seek to rival that of others (de Laude Ipsius 540a-b and 545d). Of greater immediate concern as Cicero composed Off. was Antony's ridicule of the verse in a speech delivered in the senate on 19 September and published immediately thereafter; cf. Cicero's reply (Phil. 2.20): at etiam quodam loco facetus esse voluisti. . . . 'cedant arma togae'. quid? turn nonne cesserunt? at postea tuts armis cessit toga, quaeramus igitur utrum melius fuerit libertati populi Ro­ man! sceleratorum arma an libertatem nostram armis tuts cedere. Though cited demonstratively at Laus Pis. 36, the verse was an embarrassment to Cicero's later admirers; cf. Quint. Inst. 11.1.24 (in carminibus utinam pepercisset, quae non desierunt carpere maligni, followed by citation of our verse and the even more notorious ο fortunatam natam me consule Romam!); Plut. Comp. Dem. et Cic. 2.—As early as Cat. 2.28 and 3.23 Cicero had emphasized that he had played his part in foiling Catiline and his followers while dressed in the toga (togatus). neque enim periculum in republica fuit gravius umquam nee maius otium: . . .1 Cf. ad 2.S4.—For otium in the sense "peace, freedom from war" cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Baer, TLL 9, 1177.26 ff. and 1179.21 ff. ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimomm civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt.] The image of the dagger or sword slipping or being rested from Catiline's hand appears as early as Cat. 1.16 and 2.2; cf. also Pis. 5: ego tela . . . de coniuratorum nefariis manibus extorsi. Certainly Cicero's vigilance was decisive in forestalling the plans of the conspirators in the city of Rome itself; but he perhaps forgets too readily that an armed conflict had to be fought in Etruria the following year (between Catiline and senatorial troops led by the proconsul Q. Metellus and, nomi­ nally, by another proconsul, Cicero's former colleague C. Antonius Hybrida, but really by his legate M. Petreius) before the conspiracy could be laid to rest; cf. [Sal.] In Cic. 6: quasi vero togatus et non armatus ea quae gloriaris

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confecsris . . . ;Klebs,R£ 1.2 (1894), 2579.29 ff.; Allen, 240; T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9*, 360.—ipsa = "of their own accord": cf. Tietze, TLL 7.2,335.75 ff. qui triumphus conierendus?] See next paragraph, and on the superiority of civil recognition to military triumph in general cf. the letter that Cato ad­ dressed to Cicero in the latter part of April, 50 (a propos the awarding of a triumph for Cicero's work as governor of Cilicia): . . . triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris provinciam quam vi militum aut benignitate deorwn retentam atque conservatam esse . . . (Fam. 15.5.2; for Cicero's private view of Cato's attitude cf. An. 7.2.7 and 7.3.5). 78 licet enim mihi, Marce fili, apud te gloriari, ad quern et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet.] Cf. 2.42; ad 1.1; introduction, § 4; Knoche, 1934,109; Long, 1995 1 ,227: "Cicero's boasting at this p o i n t . . . is interesting as an indication of his own deep involvement in the value system he is trying to reform.** mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus, hoc tribuit, ut dicerct frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse nisi meo in rempublicam beneficio ubi triumphant esset habiturus.] At Cat. 4.21 after a catalogue of the achievements of Roman worthies culminat­ ing in Pompey, Cicero adds: erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur. Such is the similarity of the two passages that they can hardly be indepen­ dent. Probably in preparing the Catilinarians for publication in 60 he in­ serted an allusion to the comment Pompey had made in the meantime (cf. Att. 2.1.6: quern |sc. Pompeium] de meis rebus, in quas eum multi incitarant, multo scito gloriosius quam de suis praedicare; sibi enim bene gestae, mihi conservatae rei publicae dat testimonium; note that this is the same letter in which Cicero promises to provide drafts of his consular speeches [§ 3]). In view of multis audientibus it seems much less likely that in our passage Cicero has misremembered the statement as having been made by Pompey rather than himself. Phil. 2.12 reports a similarly positive assessment of Cicero's consulate: maxhne vero consulatum meum Cn. Pompeius probavit qui, ut me primum decedens ex Syria vidit, complexus et gratulans meo beneficio patriam se visurum esse dixit. In fact, however, Pompey's reaction to Cicero's quashing of the Catilinarian conspiracy was far more complex than Cicero indicates; cf. Denniston ad Phil. loc. cit. Cicero's attitude toward Pompey was also more complex than appears from our passage; cf. ad 3.82b. 79-81 In this section Cicero/Panaetius takes a stand on the question, accord-

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ing to Sallust (Cat. 1.5) long a topic of debate, whether physical or mental powers are decisive in warfare. The thesis that prudent counsel is of supreme importance is, of course, well adapted to an argument emphasizing the role of old men. In our passage, however, this aspect is not emphasized, 104 whether because Panaetius chose not to do so or Cicero altered the emphasis in view of his youthful addressee and the fact that he had dealt with the subject at Sen. 17; cf. also Plut. An Seni 788c ff. and 789d. 79 The distinction between behavior appropriate to the general and to the common soldier can be traced as far back as Isoc. Ep. 2.3 and 9 (to Philip): οΰδειςγάρέστιν όστιςού κατέγνω προπετέστερόνσε κινδύνευε ι ν ή βασιλικώτερον και μάλλον σοι μέλειν των π€ρι την άνδρ€ίαν επαίνων ή τών όλων πραγμάτων, εστί δ' ομοίως αίσχρόν περιστάντων Τ€ τών πολεμίων μη διαφέ­ ροντα γενέσθαι τών άλλων, μηδεμιάς τε συμπεσούσης ανάγκης αυτόν έμβαλεΐν εις τοιούτους αγώνας, εν οΐς κατορθώσας μεν ούδεν αν ήσθα μέγα διαπεπραγμένος, τελευτήσας δε τον βίον άπασαν άν την ΰπάρχουσαν εύδαιμονίαν συνανεΐλες. . . . ων ένθυμούμενον χρή μη τιμάν την άνδρείαν την μετ' άνοιας αλόγιστου και φιλοτιμίας άκαίρου γιγνομένην. μηδέ πολλών κιν­ δύνων ιδίων υπαρχόντων ταΐς μοναρχίαις έτερους άδοξους καΐ στρατιωτικούς αύτψ προσεξευρίσκειν, μηδ' άμιλλάσθαι τοις ή βίου δυστυχούς άπαλλαγήναι βουλομένοις ή μισθοφόρος ένεκα μείζονος εΐκη τους κινδύνους προαιρουμένοις . . . Cf., however, the defense of Philip's practice by E. Meyer, Kleme Schriften, 2 (Halle [Saalel, 1924), 110 ff., and F. Geyer, RE 19.2 (1938), 2297.14 ff; for an overall assessment of Philip's generalship cf. George Cawkwell, Philip ofMacedon (London-Boston, 1978), 157-60. Cf. also ad § 34 above. exercendum tamen corpus et ita adficiendum est ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando.] The body, like the appetitus (cf. 1.100-1), is to be trained to obey reason; cf. Muson., 24.14: δει γάρ δη και το σώμα παρεσκευάσβαι καλώς προς τά σώματος έργα τό του φιλοσοφούντος, ότι πολλάκις αϊ άρεταί καταχρωνται τούτω όντι όργάνω άναγκαίω προς τάς τοί) βίου πράξεις. Contrast the Stoic source followed by Seneca Ep. 15, which rejects the training of the body altogether. 7 9 - 8 2 itaque eonim consilio saepe aut non suscepta—recta atque honesta rerinere.] Johann, 4 2 - 4 3 , argues that this passage is an "erratic block" in which Cicero has departed from the train of thought of his Panaetian model. It docs contain one indubitably Ciceronian element, namely the exemplum of M. Cato's influence on the third Punic War; and there is the peculiarity that 104. There may be a hint of the original tenor of the argument in the phrase in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas (S 79).

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the point made in the first sentence of § 80 . . . sed cavendum ne id bellandi magis fuga quant utilitatis ratione faciamus is repeated without explanation in the first sentence of § 83 {numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est ut imbelles timidique videamur . . .). 1 0 5 However, the doctrines it con­ tains are in general very likely to be Panaetian, viz.» that it is characteristic of the brave and steady mind praecipere cogitatione futura, a translation of the Stoic term προλαμβάνεu' (cf. ad § 81 below), or that physical combat is bestial but may be necessary κατά π6ρίστασιι> (cf. $34). 79 itaque eorum consilio—mortui vaJuit auctoritas.] In the senatorial debate over war-aims (151), Cato had spoken for destruction of Carthage, whereas P. Scipio Nasica had seen its continued existence as a means for maintaining discipline in Rome (Plut. Cat. mat. 27.2 ff.). The war continued after Cato's death in fall, 149, and concluded, as he had recommended, with the destruc­ tion of Carthage (146; note Cicero's phrase confecta bella sunt); cf. Gelzer, RE 22.1 (1955), 140.58 ff. For an example of mortui auctoritas not to Cicero's liking cf. 2.23. 80 quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortirudo . . .] Here a hierarchy is created involving two of the virtutes imperatoriae quae vulgo existimantur listed at Man. 29. Decernendi. . . decer­ tandi are a nice example of Ciceronian παροι/ομασία. bellum autem ita suscipiarur ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur.] Cf. § 35: quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur . . . ; Phil. 7.19:. . . sipacefrui volumus, bellum gerendum est. fords vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis . . .] On constantia in both prosperity and adversity cf. $ 90. . . . nee tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur,...] Cf. Arist. EN 1123b31:ουδαμώςτ'άνάρμό^ι μ€γαλοψύχψ φ€ iry€ ι ι>παρασ€ίσαιτι . . .The idea of "losing one's head" is expressed by the image of a soldier or gladiator forced from his place; cf. Cic. Att. 16.15.3 (12 November 44): Leptae litterarum exemplum tibi misi, ex quo mihi videtur Stratyllax ille deiectus de gradu, where Stratyllax is a comic designation for Antony formed from στρατηγός with diminutive and pejorative suffixes (cf. Shackleton Bailey ad 426.3 of his edition); Tert. resurr. 2.10 (cf. adv. Marc. 3.13.4): deiectus enim unusquisque vel motus de gradu eius spei quam susceperat apud Creatorem» facile iam declinatur ad alterius spei auctorem etiam ultro suspicandum. per diversitatem enim promissionum diversitas insinuatur deorum.—The 10.5. The repetition can be explained by the fact that the two subjects, behavior in wartime (SS 79-82a) and the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος to risk-taking, overlap; the absence of indica­ tion that the point had already been made should surely be set down to hasty composition; cf. the repetitions at $$ 153 ff.

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use of the adverbial present participle agreeing with the subject is character­ istic of Cicero's late style; cf. Laughton, 147, with other examples there cited. . . . sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nee a ratione discedere.] One should supply aliquem with non perturbari etc.; hence the locution fortis veto animi et constantis est non perturbari. . ♦ sed praesenti animo uti... is tolerable; cf. ad % 101.—For nee a ratione discedere note the characterization of Panaetius' position as "konsequenter Rationalismus" (Wilamowitz, 1926, 201; sim. as early as 10 January 1914 apud W.M. Calder ΠΙ and Sven Rugullis, "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on Wilhelm Dilthey: His Letters to Georg Misch [1914-19281," ICS 17 [19921, 341). 81 quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni e s t . . . ] Constantia in adversity (as just described) is characteristic of the vir magni animi; the following description of advance planning for various contingencies belongs rather to magnum ingenium (the latter in the sense of "intellect, mental powers"; cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Hofmann, TLL 7.1, 1527.24 ff.) and thus falls strictly under the first virtue. . . . praecipere cogitatione furura—'non putaram'.J Armed with foreknowl­ edge, the Stoic sage is able to confront all things, including death: cf. Sen. Ep. 76.33, who quotes Verg. A. 6.103-5 {non ulla laborum I. . . nova mi fades inopinave surgit: I omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi) and interprets Aeneas' words in a Stoic sense (rightly, according to E. Norden ad loc). Praecipere in our passage and in A. 6.105 appears in the sense of the Stoic term προλαμβάνει ν (Norden, loc. cit.)\ cf. also Tusc. 3.29 and the detailed argument in Sen. Ep. 24. As applied to warfare in particular this doctrine is anticipated by the rational calculus advocated by the Thucydidean Pericles (2.40.2-3):. . . και αυτοί ήτοι κρίνομε γε ή ενθυμούμεθα ορθώς τα πράγματα, οΰ τους λόγους τοις έργοις βλάβην ηγούμενοι, αλλά μή προδιδαχθήναι μάλλον λόγω πρότερον ή επί ά δεΐ έργω έλθεϊν. διαφερόντων γάρ δη και τόδε εχομεν ώστε τολμάν τε οί αυτοί μάλιστα και περί ων έπιχειρήσομεν εκλογί£εσθαι· 6 τοις άλλοι? άμαθία μεν θράσος, λογισμός δε όκνον φέρει, κράτιστοι δ* άν ψυχήν δικαίως κριθεΐεν οί τά τε δεινά και ήδεα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καΐ διά ταϋτα μή άποτρεπόμενοι εκ των κινδύνων. Cf. also Plut. Tranq. An. 474d-e: εξεστι γάρ την Άναξαγόρου διάθεσιν, άφ' ης επί τη τελευτή του παιδος άνεφώνησεν, "ήδειν θνητόν γεννήσας," μή θαυμάζοντας μόνον αλλά και μιμούμενους έπιλεγειν έκάστω των τυχηρών, "οΐδα τόν πλοΰτον εφήμερον έχων και οΰ βέβαιον"· "οΐδα τήν αρχήν άφελέσθαι δυνάμε­ νους τους δεδωκότας"· "οΐδα τήν γυναίκα χρηστήν γυναίκα δ* ούσαν και τόν φίλον άνθρωπον όντα, £φον φύσει εύμετάβολον, ως ό Πλάτων εΐπεν." αι γάρ τοιαυται παρασκευαί και διαθέσεις, εάν τι συμβη των άβουλήτων μεν ουκ

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απροσδόκητων δε, μή δεχόμενοι τό "ουκ άν φμην" και τό "αλλ' ήλπι£ονΛ και τό **ταϋτ* ού προσεδόκων." οίον πηδήματα καρδία? και σφυγμούς άφαιρούσι και ταχύ πάλιν τό μανιώδες και ταραττόμενον Ίδρύουσιν. (That this material is Panaetian is made likely, both by its similarity to our passage and by Panaetius fr. 115 apud Plut. de Cohib. Ira 463d-e: δει δ*, ως που και Παναίτιος εφη, χρήσθαι τφ Άνα^αγόρου, και καθάπερ εκείνος έπι τη τελευτή τοΰ παιδος εΐπεν, "ήδειν οτι θνητόν έγέννησα," τούτο τοις παροξύνουσιν έκα­ στοι* έπιφωνεΐν άμαρτήμασιν, "ήδειν ότι σοφόν ούκ έπριάμην δούλον," α ήδειν δτι άναμάρτητον φίλον ούκ έκτησάμην," **ήδειν δτι την γυναίκα γυνάΐκ' εΐχον.") Similarly Tranqu. An. 476c: ό γάρ ειπών, "προκατείλημμαί σ', ώ Τύχη, και πάσαν την σην άφήρημαι παρείσδυσιν,*1 ού μοχλοί ς ούδε κλεισίν ούδε τείχεσιν εθάρρυνεν εαυτόν, αλλά δόγμασι και λόγοις . . .—For *ΛΟ« putararri cf. Sen. de Ira 2.31.4: turpissimam aiebat Fabius imperatori excusationem esse *non putavi\ ego turpissimam homini puto; cf. the view similar to Fabius' attributed to (surely the younger) Scipio Africanus at V. Max. 7.2.2. . . . temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est;. . .] Cf. ad §§ 34, 79-82a. . . . sed cum tempus necessitasque postulate decertandum manu est et mors servituti tuφitudinique anteponenda.] Note the personification of tempus necessitasque (which, by εν διά δυοΐν, form a single concept: "the exigencies of circumstance" or the like); similarly $ 84: republics postulante.—Cf. Phil. 2.113: pax est tranquilla libertas, servitus postremum malorum omnium, non modo hello sed morte etiam repellendum. 82a de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. idque est viri magni rebus agitatis punire somes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere.l Bruser, 53, revived the athetesis of these two sentences by Campe. 1 0 6 The objection is that the topic of the destruction of cities and treatment of the defeated interrupts the discussion of risky actions that precedes. Likewise the ambiguity of rebus agitatis has been adduced against authenticity; the com­ monly accepted interpretation **in troubled times" or the like (so, e.g., Miiller, Heine) has been called a banality in this context (Thomas, 51). Thomas, 52, accordingly proposes either to assume hasty composition on Cicero's part or to resort to emendation to establish the meaning of agitare, which Cicero does not elsewhere use in the sense of deliberare without further limitation in context (cf. Bruser, 57; OLD s.v., 17); he suggests rebus 106. (J.C.F.) Campe, Zur Kritik des Cicero (Greiffenberg in Pommern, 1865), 15 (not cited by Briiscr).

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agitatis (atque deliberatis) after the model of Ac. 1.4: rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam.*07 In his second edition Atzert followed the via media of enclosing the sus­ pect text in double square brackets as an author's addition to his draft never integrated into context; he was converted to Br user's diagnosis in subsequent editions, however. Winterbottom follows Atzert2 for the first sentence but says of the second "pertinet ad hunc contextum." The question of relevance depends on how one defines the subject. I suspect that it is not risky actions per se but the general principle expetenda quidem magis est decemendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo (§ 80). The following discussion elaborates some of the implications of this point, such as the importance of not giving the impression of being unwarlike, of stead­ fastness in crisis, and of forethought. Risky actions in the field of battle, though beast-like rather than expressive of the highest human qualities, may be nonetheless needed κατά π€ρίοτασιι\ There may be times when the gen­ eral must play the part of a common soldier, but these will be the exception. Usually he will engage in decision-making on a higher level. Cicero next turns to problems of such a kind (note the contrasting autem): de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. This counsel to follow a humane course is what we have come to expect from Cicero/Panaetius:. . . parta autem victoria conservandi ii qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt (§ 35). It does not hurt for it to occur in similar form both under bellica officia and in the context of the proper behavior of the μ€γαλόψυχος (for the ease with which Cicero repeats himself in this essay see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Repetitions"). Bruser, 55, revived the view of Rudberg, 17, that the mention of Cato and the Third Punic War in § 79 provoked these thoughts de ever­ tendis . . . diripiendisque urbibus109 and goes on to argue that, in light of Cicero's approval of the destruction of Carthage at 5 $5* the cautionary advice must be non-Ciceronian. However, our words need not imply a con­ tradiction of the previous judgment about Carthage but merely enunciate a general principle applicable to the case of any city being considered for destruction. The following sentence goes hand in hand with its predecessor, for the description of the recommended behavior punire sontes, multitudinem con107. For the thought see Agapetus, PG 86.1, 1172C: βυυλίύου μΐν τά πρακτέα Ppnoe'w? . . , επ<1 Xiav 4m\ σφαλςρόν τό 4ν τοις πράγμπσιν απερίσκεπτον. 108. For parallels cf. rhe Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Association of ideas {as a principle of composition}."

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servare gives the principle underlying the warning to caution in the destruc­ tion of cities. Note the connection with -que, appropriate enough if the preceding sentence is there, with its contrasting autem, to restore the normal perspective of a general, less so if immediately preceded by the precept that circumstances may force one onto the line of battle. The problem of Latinity raised by Briiser is, I think, no grave obstacle. Agitare could mean "turn over in the mind, think about, ponder, consider" in Cicero's day; elsewhere he uses the verb in this sense with secum or other limitation in context; but surely he felt that the valde considerandum est of the preceding sentence and indeed the whole tenor of this passage sufficient to eliminate ambiguity. N/7 mutandum. 82b-84 The relation of the μεγαλόψυχο? toward risks and risk-taking had received some, but, it seems, not much attention prior to Panaetius. Arist. EN 1124b6-9 conceived the μεγαλόψυχο? as a runner of great risks (ουκ έστι δε [sc. ό μεγαλόψυχο?) μικροκίνδυνος ουδέ φιλοκίνδυνος' διά τό ολίγα τι μα ν. μεγαλοκίνδυνο? δε, και όταν κινδυνεύη, άφειδή? τοΰ βίου ώ? οΰκ άξιον δν υάιηως £ήν); in this he may perhaps have been influenced by views such as that of the Thucydidean Pericles that great risks can lead to great honors (είδε να ι δε χρή . . . εκ τε των μεγίστων κινδύνων ότι και πόλε ι και ιδιώτη μεγιοται τιμα'ι περιγίγνονται (Thuc. 1.144.3)). Panaetius takes the sensible view that risky actions are not desirable per se (cf. Aristotle's ούδε φιλοκίνδυνος) and that the degree of risk should be proportional to the expected benefit. He likewise points out that it makes a difference who or what is at risk. Panaetius establishes a hierarchy among the external goods, with honor et gloria at the top (cf. ad § 83). However, even the highest external goods must yield to the demands of the public interest, as is illustrated negatively by the cases of Callicratidas (on him see also § 109) and Cleombrorus, positively by the apt exemplum Romanum of Q. Fabius Maximus. 82b Ut enim sunt, quemadmodum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperias multos quibus periculosa et calida consilia (et) quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur.] Once again Cicero/ Panaetius steps forth as advocate of the less superficially attractive alterna­ tive but the one that the reflective person may prefer. The enim denotes this sentence as the reason the preceding cautions were needed: there are those who prefer periculosa et calida consilia. Note that the plundering or destruc­ tion of a city or mass-executions can be dangerous if they lead to reprisals. For a similar use of nam cf. ad 2.47. 83 . . . consuctudo imitanda medicorum est, qui levitcr aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibcre coguntur.] This procedure of physicians is described in greater detail

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at Sen. de Ira 1.6.2: nempe medicus primo in levibus vitiis temptat non multum ex cotidiana consuetudine inflectere et cibis potionibus exercitationibus ordinem inponere ac valetudinem tantum mutata vitae dispositione firmare. proximum est ut modus proficiat. si modus et ordo non proficit, subducit aliqua et circumcidit; si ne adhuc quidem responded intercidit cibis et abstinentia corpus exonerat; si frustra molliora cesserunt, ferit venam membrisque, si adhaerentia nocent et morbum diffundunt, manus adfert; . . . — For curatio as the mot juste for treatment by physicians (as opposed to cura, used of other types of care) cf. Don. ad Ten An. 30 (1, 50.7 W.). . . . subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis . . .] Panaetius was, if not a "Kampfnatur" (cf. introduction, § 5 [4]), certainly close to what nowadays would be called an activist; cf. ad §§ 2 8 - 2 9 . . . . si plus adipiscare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali.] " . . . if you gain greater good when the matter has been brought to a conclusion than evil when it has been hesitated over" (cf. OLD s.vv. explico 9a, addubito 2b). 83-84 Periculosae autem rerum actiones—sine suo dedecore non posse.] Callicratidas' engagement with the Athenians at Arginusae in August, 406, was fatal to himself (he fell overboard and drowned when his ship collided with an enemy vessel: cf. X. HG 1.6.2-34, esp. 33), but merely a plaga mediocris for the Lacedaemonian state, since, although 70 Spartan ships fell into enemy hands, Sparta was, in fact, able to rebuild its fleet and regain the support of Persia (cf. ad § 109); hence Lysander's decisive victory at Aegospotami in autumn, 405, followed by the Athenian capitulation in April of the next year. On Lysander cf. ad § 76 and, in general, Kahrstedt, RE 13.2 (1927), 2503.29 ff.; on Callicratidas Lenschau, RE 10.2 (1919), 1641.10 ff.; A. Andrcwes in CAH 5 2 , 491-92. The criticism of Callicratidas' placing of his own honor ahead of the interests of Sparta would also apply to Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon; cf. Att. 7.11.1 (22 January 49), where, as Narducci, 1989, 138, notes, the critique of Caesar is phrased in strikingly Panaetian terms: utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimurf ο hominem amentem et miserum, qui ne umbram quidem umquam του κάλου viderit! atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa, ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestasf honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico consilio, occupare urbis civium quo facilior sit aditus ad patriam, χρ€ώι> αποκοτιάς. Φυγάδων καθόδου?, sescenta alia scelera moliri, "την θβών μ^γίστην ώστ' e'xeiv τυραννίδα"? 83 prompriores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia, dimicareque paratius de honore et gloria quam dc ceteris commodis.] The first half of this sentence prioritizes the relations referred to in the next to last sentence [periculosae autem rerum actiones partim its sunt qui eas susci-

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piunt, partim reipublicae). The doctrine that one should endanger oneself more readily than the state 1 0 9 is a bit surprising in view of the importance of the instinct for self-preservation in Panaetius' system (cf. $ 11) but is implicit in 5 57 (. . . patria . . . . pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere si ei sit profuturus?) as well as in the exemplum of Regulus (3.99 ff.).—For the older Stoa τιμή was a relative good (5VF 3,26.40, where there is no indication that it was rated above others of its class). Εύδοξία/δόξα was classed among the indiffercnts {SVF 3, 28.7 and 31), albeit the "preferred" ones (προηγμένα; ibid. 31.5); see further p. 357 and ad 2.31. Panaetius* preference for honor and glory above other external goods harks back to Arist. EN 1123bl8-20: μέγιστοι 8c [sc. των έκτος αγαθών] TOUT' αν θβίημεν δ τοις· θεοΐς άπον^μομ^ν. και ου μάλιστ* έφίβνται οι έν άξιώματι, και το em τοις κάλλιστοι? άθλοι/· τοιούτον δ' ή τιμή; for Panaetius as φιλοαριστοτελης see p. 357 below. 84 . . . idem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re­ publics quidem postulante,.. .] For the personified subject of postulare cf. $ 8 1 {cum tempus necessitasque postulate for patria et parentes as supreme claimants on our officia § 58. The personification of the patria at 3.121 involves a greater intensity of emotion than that of the respublica here; see ad be. . . . ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie,. . . ] Elected admiral in mid-summer 406 under the banner of the party opposed to Lysandec, Callicratidas departed at once for Ephesus; there, on no good terms with his predecessor, he assumed command of the Spartan army and navy. Once he had secured the necessary financial support (cf. ad $ 109) and had overcome morale problems stirred up by Lysander's supporters, he conquered Delphinium and Teus; proceed­ ing to Lesbos, he stormed Methymna, where Conon lay at anchor with 70 Athenian ships. After defeating Diomedon and Conon, he trapped the latter in the inner harbor of Mytilene; for literature cf. ad §§ 83-84. . . . vertit ad extrcmum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nee cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant.] Upon learning of Conon's plight the Athenians armed another fleet of 110 ships, which, after reinforcement at Samos, attained a strength of 150 ships. When word reached him of the Athenians' approach, Callicratidas left be­ hind 50 ships to guard Conon and set forth to meet them with his remaining 120 ships; Lenschau, loc. cit. ad $S 83-84, 1641.38 ff.—Extremus can, of course, in its metaphorical application be an extreme either for good or bad; 109. Cf. OLD s.v. promptus 5 (with ad * ace): "quick (to favor a given course of action).*'

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in practice, however, it is very commonly used "in ma lam partem"; cf. Hiltbrunner, TLL 5.2, 2003.46 ff., including the meanings "periculosissimus, desperatissimus"; cf. also 2.29. quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios dasse ilia amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse.] Cf. X. HG 1.6.32 (a reply to his Megarian steersman Hermo, who advised him that the Athenian fleet was numer­ ically far superior): Καλλικρατίδας δε εΐπεν δτι ή Σπάρτη οΰδεν κάκιον οικείται αυτού αποθανόντος, φεύγειν δε αίσχρόν είναι. Xenophon's version, focusing on Sparta's general condition in light of Callicratidas' loss, is doubt­ less closer to the original; the mention of specific military consequences has the air of a vaticinium post eventum. On the Spartan attitude toward victory and defeat cf. ad § 64. atque haec quidem |de Lacedaemoniis} plaga mediocris, ilia pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruenint.] Installed as king in 380, Cleombrotus undertook his first expedition to Thebes two years later in response to the massacre of the troops occupying the Cadmea; he contented himself, how­ ever, with a stay of 16 days on Theban territory and suffered losses of pack animals and weaponry when he encountered a storm on the way home. A second expedition to Thebes in spring 376 was aborted when he found the passes of Cithaeron occupied by Athenians and Thebans. Thus when in 371 he was ordered to proceed against Thebes for the third time, he was under considerable pressure to show results. X. HG 6.4.5 depicts Cleombrotus' friends as warning him ώ Κλεόμβροτε. ει αφήσεις τους Θηβαίους άνευ μάχης, κινδυνεύσεις ύπό της πόλεως τά έσχατα παθεΐν, whereas his enemies said: νυν δή . . . δηλώσει ό άνήρ εί τω όντι κηδεται των Θηβαίων, ώσπερ λέγεται. The result at Leuctra was, of course, fatal, both to himself and to the Spartan hegemony; cf. Lenschau, RE 11.1 (1921), 677.54 ff.; ad 2.26a.—For the haec. . . ilia structure cf. the first sentence of § 81. On our evidence Cicero is the first author to use plaga in the metaphorical sense (evidently modeled on the usage of the Greek source-word: cf. LSJ s.v. πληγή 6); cf. Mur. 48; Forcellini s.v., II; OLD s.v., 1 b; for opes used of political power cf. ad § 25. quanto Q. Maximus melius . . .] The policy of Q. Fabius Maximus (cos. 233, 228, 215, 214, 209) does indeed form a sharp contrast with that of Cleombrotus. In the aftermath of the disaster of the consul Flaminius at Trasimenus (217) Fabius was appointed dictator and entrusted with the war against Hannibal; he pursued the tactic of shadowing the Carthaginians and being always ready to strike whenever an enemy weakness was exposed but never offering a pitched battle. The tactic was controversial, both in the army

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and at Rome; hence M. Minucius Rufus, the master of the horse, was made Fabius' equal in imperium and given the same sphere of responsibility; with the army divided in half, Minucius offered battle, and Fabius had to intervene to save him. Nonetheless pressures for a large-scale victory in battle, stoked by Varro and other demagogues, continued the following year until Cannae (216) left the Romans little choice but to adopt "Fabian tactics" until 205; cf. de Sanctis 3.2,45 ff. and 211 ff.; John Briscoe in CAH 8 2 , 50-51 and 68 ff. Cicero places a warm appreciation of his character (doubtless idealized) in the mouth of Cato at Sen. 10 ff. unus homo—claret.] These verses, which Cicero also quotes at Sen. 10, are from Book 12 of the Annates (so Macrob. 6.1.23); since, however, the death of the Cunctator (203 B.C.) would have been narrated in Book 9, the context of this retrospective encomium remains unclear (cf. Skutsch ad vv. 363-65 of his edition). On the reading non enim, attested both here and at Sen. 10 (as opposed to noenum, restored on metrical grounds by Skutsch), cf. Powell ad loc.—Though Cicero develops the contrast between vera gloria and the transient variety only at 2.43, the point is clear that Fabius renounced the chance for immediate personal glory in favor of what was utile for the state and thereby earned lasting glory. sunt enim qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audent dicere.J As a parallel to the "fear of envy" that was fatal to Cleombrotus and the Spartan hegemony, Cicero may be thinking of the behavior of Roman senators at the time of his own exile (cf. ad §§ 28-29) and especially of the recent inclination of most senators to avoid confronta­ tion with Antony (see supra p. 30). 8 5 - 8 7 Following the treatment of warfare (§§ 79-82a) and risk-taking (§§ 82b-84) Cicero/Panaetius adds precepts about civil government. 110 These amount to three points, each buttressed by one or more citations from Plato: (1) government should be conducted in the interest not of the gover­ nors but of the governed; (2) the state should be governed for the benefit of the whole, not a part only, i.e., factional politics should be eschewed; (3) the relations of the leaders of government should be marked by mutual respect; there should be no resort to arms to settle differences. These paragraphs distill the political message of Off., which is developed at greater length in Books 2 and 3, with point (2) reinforced particularly in the discussion of private property toward the end of Book 2 and point (1) by the exemplum of Regulus toward the end of Book 3. Though Cicero could, of course, have 110. Cicero could, had he chosen, have connected this material with the preceding via the point obliti commodorum suorum (5 85).

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offered these observations on his own authority, he chose instead 111 to cite his beloved Plato; cf. in general Burkert, 1965, 177 ff. 85 . . . ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur ut quaecumque agunt ad earn referant obliti commodorum suorum . . . ] This is perhaps abstracted from the following dialectical exchange centered on Thrasymachus' proposition that justice is the advantage of the stronger (Pi. R. 342e; Socrates to Thrasy­ machus): Ουκ άρα γ€ τοιούτος κυβ€ρνήτης τε και άρχων το τψ κυβερνήτη συμφέρον σκέψεταί τε και προστάξει, άλλα το τψ ναύτη τε και άρχομένω. Συνέφησε μόγις. Οΰκουν, ην δ' εγώ, ώ θρασύμαχ€, ουδέ άλλος ούδεις έν ούδεμιφ αρχή, καθ' 'όσον άρχων εστίν, το αύτφ συμφέρον σκοπεί ούδ' έπιτάττει, άλλα το τφ άρχομένω και ω αν αυτός δημιουργη, και προς έκεΐνο βλέπων και τό έκείνω συμφέρον και πρέπον, και λέγει ά λέγει καΐ ποιεΐ ά ποιεί άπαντα. The precept corresponds to Cicero's own attitude as described at Cat. 4.19: habetis ducem memorem vestri, oblitum sui. . . . . . alteram ut totum corpus reipublicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tucntur, reliquas deserant.] Cf. PI. Lg. 715b: ταύτας δήπου φαμέν ήμεΐς νΰν ουτ' είναι πολιτείας, ουτ' ορθούς νόμους δσοι μη συμπάσης της πόλεως €ν€κα του κοινοϋ ετέθησαν όϊ δ' ένεκα τίνων, στασιώτας άλλ' ού πολίτας τούτους φαμέν . . . ; cf. also R. 420c and 421b-c from Socrates' reply to Adimantus' objection that the Guardians would not be happy (εΰδαίμονες): the aim should be the ευδαιμονία of the whole state.—For the metaphor rofwm corpus reipublicae cf. ad 3.22 (the fable of Menenius Agrippa).—The policy pursued by Sulla and Caesar of rewarding their followers from their oppo­ nents' property would, of course, be an example of the tendency Cicero deprecates here; cf. § 43; 2.27-29. ut enim tutela, sic procuratio reipublicae ad eorum utilitatem qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus commissa est, gerenda est.] For the provisions under Roman law of the period for the tutela of minors, women, etc., cf. Watson, Persons, 103 ff. This institution provides a good analogue for the kind of administration in the interest of the governed that Cicero demands for the state; cf. § 124; Wood, 134-35; Schofield, 1995 2 ,79 and 81, compar­ ing Plb. 8.2-3, who uses the verb έπιτρέπειν of the people entrusting their affairs to the nobles after the overthrow of monarchy. For Cicero's com­ parison of the governing of foreign peoples to a patrocinium cf. ad 2.26b27. qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam 111. After Panacrius, who was also φιλοπλστωΐ· (fr. 57; cf. fir. 55, 56, and 59}?

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in civitatem inducunt, sedirionem atque discordiam;. . . ] On Cicero's slogan concordia ordinum and its political and intellectual roots cf. Strasburger, 1956. . . . ex quo evenit ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videanmr, pauci universorum.] At Sest. 96 ff. Cicero had provided a sketch of the two parties and their principles; on the origin of largitores et factiosi in the cuptditas principatus cf. § 64; the stand on property rights at 2.78-85 entails a critique of the policies of the Populares. 86 h i n c . . . in nostra republics... pestifera bella dvilia; quae gravis et fords civis et in republica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit. . .] This corre­ sponds to Cicero's stand as civil war approached in 49; cf. ad § 35 and the meditation on civil war at 2.27-29. On the other hand, this description stands in marked contrast with Caesar's behavior ($ 26). . . . totamque earn sic tuebitur ut omnibus consulat.] Cf. Carbo's etymology of consul from patriae consulere reported at de Orat. 2.165 (= orat., p. 155); Gaillard, 526, n. 2. nee vero criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit. . .] Cicero certainly felt that such behavior had precipitated his exile; cf. ad §$ 3 and 2 8 - 2 9 . He also considered himself to have been recently the victim of such treatment at Antony's hands; cf. ad § 77; Phil. 2.11 ff. . . . omninoque ita iustitiae honestatique adhaerescet ut, dum ea conserves quamvis graviter offendat, mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat ilia quae dixi.] As at some other points in Off. (cf. ad% 112, pp. 35-36, and ad3A4), Cicero seems here to adumbrate his future political course (note the phrase quamvis graviter offendat, apt for the man at work on the Philippics). When he joined the struggle against Antony he was well aware that his own life might well be entailed in the outcome; cf. Phil. 2.118: quin etiam corpus libenter obtulerim, si repraesentari morte mea lihertas civitatis potest. . . ; ibid., 119: etenim si abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo negavi posse mortem immaturam esse consulari [cf. Cat. 4.3, as well as the reflec­ tions at Sest. 47-48J, quanto verius nunc negabo seni? mihi vero . . . iam etiam optanda mors est, perfuncto rebus eis quas adeptus sum quasque gessi. 87 miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio . . .] On the despising of office cf. ad %% 28 and 71; Rep. 6.20. . . . similiter facere eos qui inter se contenderent uter potius rempublicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent quis eorum potissimum guberaaret.] Cf. PI. R. 4 8 8 a - b : νόησον γαρ τοιούτον! γ€νόμ€νον eiT€ πολλών νεών περί €ΪΤ€ μια?· ναύκληρον μ^γεθα μέν και ρώμη υπέρ του? ev τη νηι πάντα?, υπόκωφοι* δέ και όρώντα ώσαύτω? βραχύ τι και γιγνώσκοντα περ'ι ναυτικών €T€pa τοιαύτα, του? δέ ναύτα? στασιάζοντα? προ? άλλήλου? π€ρΐ τή? κυβερνήοΈω?,

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έ'καστον οίύμ€νον δίΐν κυβερνάν . . . Plato's contrast of the many sailors striving to control the rudder and the one steersman who has the requisite knowledge for the task is, however, implicitly a plea for an enlightened monarchy, whereas traditional Roman politics involved a competition be­ tween representatives of the different established political families, as Cicero recognizes, with reference to the aedileship, at 2.57 ff. Hence Cicero elimi­ nates the implications favorable to monarchy and uses the passage to depre­ cate political squabbling; cf. Schmekel, 34; Heilmann, 2 7 - 2 8 . idemque praecipit ut eos adversarios existimemus qui arma contra ferant, non eos qui suo iudicio tueri rempublicam velint: . . .] There appears to be no precisely corresponding locus Platonicus; possibly we have a conflation of two passages, namely Lg. 856b: δς άι> άγων «is αρχήν ανθρώπων δουλώται μέ ν τους νόμους, εταιρίας δέ την TTOXLV ύπήκοον ποιή, καΐ βιαίως δη ττάν τοΰτο πράττων και στάσιν έγα'ρων παράνομη, τούτον δή διανοασθαι δ€Ϊ πάντων πολβμιώτατον δλη τη πόλει* . . . and Χ. Mem. 2.6.25, where the question is raised: ei oe τις ev πόλα τιμάσθαι βουλόμ^νος, δπως αυτός TC μή άδικηται και τοΐς φίλοις τά δίκαια βοηθεΐν δύνηται, και αρξας αγαθόν τι ποΐ€Ϊν τήν πατρί­ δα π€ΐράται, διά τί ό τοιούτος άλλω τοιούτω ούκ αν δύναιτο συναρμόσαι;— The thought is similar to the remarks at Phil. 1.27 made with reference to Antony's tactics of intimidation: sin consuetudinem meam quam in republics semper habui tenuero, id est si libere quae sentiam de republica dixero, primum deprecor ne irascatur; deinde, si hoc non impetro, peto ut sic irascatur, ut civi. armis utatur, si ita necesse est, ut dicit, sui defendendi causa: eis qui pro republica quae ipsis visa erunt dixerint ista arma ne noceant. quaJis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio.] Q. Caecilius Metellus received the epithet Macedonicus, as well as a triumph, for his victory as praetor in 148 over Andriscus, pretender to the Macedo­ nian throne; as propraetor in 146 he distinguished himself in battle against the Achaeans prior to the arrival on the scene of the consul L. Mummius; cf. P.S. Derow in CAH 8 2 , 3 2 3 . Despite these services he twice suffered electoral defeat before attaining the consulate for 143. As a champion of the optimate cause, he was a determined opponent of the Gracchi. 112 In spite of his agreement with Scipio on this point, other policy disagreements drove the two men apart {Amic. 77; note the allusion to the invidi Sctptoms at Rep. 1.31, a passage in which inter alios Metellus is mentioned). Thus when in

112. Cf., however, Andrew Linton in CAH 9 2 , 74, who suggests, in view of his speech as censor in 131 urging compulsory marriage to raise the birthrate (orat., pp. 107-8), that Metellus sympathized with the aims of the Gracchan program but not the methods used to advance it.

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138 1 1 3 Scipio prosecuted L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 144) for extortion, Metellus spoke for the defense (in the sequel the bribed jury acquitted the defendant); cf. Cic. Mur. 58 (where the acquittal is ascribed to the jurors' unwillingness to appear to be overly impressed by the authority of the pros­ ecutor) and Brut 81; App. BC 1.92; Miinzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1456.41 ff.; Alexander, no. 9 with literature. After Scipio's death, however, Metellus gave evidence that he appreciated the greatness of his former adversary;114 cf. Miinzer, RE 3.1 (1897), 1213.60 ff. (Caecilius no. 94). Cicero's picture of these two Optimates as a model of how to handle political differences is doubtless idealized and based upon Metellus* reaction to Scipio's death; 115 he wants to mark a contrast to the pestifera bella civilia just mentioned. At Phil. 2.38 Cicero describes his relation to Pompey in similar terms: quod quidem erat magnum, de summa republica dissentientis in eadem consuetudine amicitiae permanere. 8 8 - 8 9 These sections on the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος to anger form, surely correctly, a separate paragraph in most recent editions. The topic was an obvious one considering that Aristotle's list of μ€γαλόψυχοι (ΑΡο. 97b 18), doubtless reflecting commonly held views, had included Achilles and Ajax. This material complements $ 87 on the proper relations of leaders of state; here, however, the state forms the major, but not the exclusive focus; cf. the reference in the first sentence to anger against inimici, which would not necessarily involve public activity; but with the sentence beginning in liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda . . . attention centers once again on the state, 116 with particular emphasis on the role of anger in punishment. Another difference from §§ 85-87 is that there Plato was re­ peatedly cited with implicit approval, whereas Cicero/Panaetius now moves on to a critique of Peripatetic teachings. Here we have one remnant of

113. Daie as in Liv. Per. Oxy. 55; cf. Alexander, no. 9. 114. Cf. V. Max. 4.1.12: acerrhne cum Scipione Africano Metellus Macedonicus dissenserat, eorumque ab aemulatione virtutis profecta concitatio ad graves testatasque mimicitias progressa fuerat: sed tamen, cum mteremptum Sdpionem conclamari audisset, in publicum se proripuit maestoque vultu et voce confusa 'concurrite, concurrite', inquit, 'cives! moenia nostrae urbis eversa sunt: Scipioni entm Africano intra suos penates quiescenti nefaria vis allata est'. . . . idem filios suos monuit ut funebri eius lecto humeros subicerent, atque hmc exequiarum ilium honorem vocis adiecit, non fore ut postea id officntm ab illis matori viro praestari posset; Plut. Rom. Apophth. 202a: . . . TOIS 6e fcots ίφη |sc. Metellus] χάριν €χαν ίτττέρ ττ\ς 'Ρώμη?, οτι παρ' άλλοι? owe cytι*το Σκιττίων. 115. Cf. Astin, 312 ff. 116. Though Panaetius may have meant the preceding encomium of placabilitas atque dementia to refer to monarch*; cf. ad % 88.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 87-88

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Panaetius' teachings on magistrates (alluded to at fr. 48 = Leg. 3.14; cf. Griffin, 1976, 167; ad$ 124). 88 Nee vero audiendi qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magnanimi et fords viri esse censebunt;. . . ] Here begins a polemic against Peripatetic views of the μεγαλόψυχος and of anger. Aristotle had said of the μεγαλόψυχος [EN 1124b26-27): αναγκαίοι/ δε και φανερομιση εΐναι . . . , a trait which would be compatible with free expression of anger, and had called both Achilles and Ajax μ€γαλόφυχοι (see previous note); for the in­ dulgent Peripatetic view of anger cf. MM 1202b21-22: ή μεν ούν τοιαύτη ορμή προς όργην, ή δοκεΐ άκρασία είναι οργής, ου λίαν ^πιτιμητεα εστίν (cf. also ad § 89). The seeds of a connection between anger and the μεγαλόψυχος, already present in Aristotle, may have been developed in ways we can no longer trace in subsequent Peripatetic writings on the subject, such as the essay περί μεγαλοψυχίας of Demetrius of Phalerum (the title alone is at­ tested: fr. 78 W.); cf. Sen. de Ira 1.20.1: ne Mud quidem iudicandum est, aliquid iram ad magrtitudinem animi conferre and his following refutation of the notion.—The Ciceronian Crass us had poked a bit of gentle fun at the Stoic view of anger at de Orat. 3.65 [Stoicos autem, quos minime improbo, dimitto tumen nee eos iratos vereor, quoniam omnino irasci nesciunt).—For the Peripatetic and Stoic views of anger cf. now Nussbaum, 391-92. . . . nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque dementia.] Here Cicero falls into the anaphoric pattern of encomia; cf. $ 151 sub fin. The abstract placabilitas is attested only here in classical Latin and does not recur until the fourth century (Hilary of Poitiers, Symmachus, Jerome; cf. Weidauer, 8 7 - 8 8 , on the basis of material from the TLL archive); hence its resumption one sentence later by mansuetudo. Scholars have tried to line up each Latin term with a single Greek counterpart; but perhaps Cicero was not so pedantic. Thus Weidauer, 88 and 109, thought that placabilitas and dementia correspond respectively to φιλανθρωπία and επιεί­ κεια, whereas Griffin, 1976, 166, n. 4, supposed that πραότης would have figured for placabilitas in Panaetius, since it is the opposite of anger, which plays so large a role in our passage. Note also the greater appropriateness of the following mansuetudo as a rendering for πραότης, a quality much praised and encouraged in monarchs; cf., e.g., X. Ages. 1.20:. . . έπεμελετο ού μόνον τοϋ βία χειροϋσθαι τους εναντίους, αλλά και του πραότητι προσάγεσθαι; Isoc. 3.32: προς τε γάρ τους πολίτας μετά τοιαύτης πραότητος προσηνεχθην ώστε . . . ; 5.116 {Philippus): . . . πειρώμαι προτρεπειν επί τε . . . πραότητα και φιλανθρωπίαν; πραότης appears as a quality that Philip V lacked at Plb. 5.11.9 and 10.26.1-2. Clementia, on the other hand, is a peculiarly Roman concept with no one-

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for-one equivalent in Greek; cf. Inv. 2.164: dementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius inferioris [Lebreton: iniectionis M: invectionis P3J] concitati comitate retinentur; Sen. CI. 1.11.2: in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia. It corresponds to a congeries of Greek terms: επιείκεια, ήμερότης, ήττιότη?, πραότη?, φιλανθρωπία; cf. Κ. Winkler, RAC 3 (1957), 207 (s.v. dementia). Whether in our passage dementia corresponds to επιεί­ κεια (so Weidauer, 108, citing EN 1143a21: τον γάρ επιεική μάλιστα φαμεν εΐναι συγγνωμικόν) or φιλανθρωπία (so, with a query, Griffin, 1976, 166, n. 4), the term is naturally applied to one who possesses monarchical or quasimonarchical powers; cf. Scipio's praise of the dementia of Numa Pompilius at Rep. 2.27. During his governorship Cicero describes the reaction to his arrival in Cilician towns: et mehercule etiam adventu nostro reviviscunt, iustitia, abstmentia, dementia tui Ciceronis (cogn)ita, . . . (Att. 5.16.3); cf. the association of επιείκεια with a display of το φιλάνθρωπον at Agap. PG 86.1, 1176C. Hence it seems likely that Panaetius' remarks on πραότης· and anger were framed primarily with monarchs in mind (see also the note on the following sentence); cf. Weidauer, 86. It is a bit surprising that dementia is handled under the third virtue, rather than the fourth; for it elsewhere appears as a part of temperantia (cf. Inv. 2.164: temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi ftrma et moderata dominatio. eius partes continentia, dementia, modestia; cf. also Sen., cited above). On Cicero's "Umdeutung der magnitudo animi in der Richtung der dementia1* during Caesar's dictatorship cf. Knoche, 1935, 66 ff. In line with the general political tendency of Off., Cicero refrains from naming Caesar as an example here (cf. ad § 43,2.23, and 57). For his view of Caesar's dementia during the civil war cf. Att. 8.16.2 (insidiosa dementia)\ cf. also Curio's interpretation reported, ibid., 10.4.8 (. . . ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quod (putaret) popularem esse dementiam); Weidauer, 85. The theme of the dementia Caesaris was sounded, however, in the speeches Cicero gave before the dictator; cf., e.g., Lig. 6: ο dementiam admirabilem atque omnium laude, praedicatione, litteris monumentisque decorandaml On dementia in the Caesarian speeches in general cf. Sabine Rochlitz, Das Bild Caesars in Ciceros "Orationes Caesarianae." Untersuchungen zur "dementia" una "sapientia Caesaris" (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), who finds that dementia plays a large role in pro Ligario and pro Rege Deiotarot whereas sapientia is more prominent in the pro Marcello. For a realistic assessment of Caesar's policy of dementia cf. Max Treu, "Zur dementia Caesars," MH 5 (1949), 197-217. in liberis vero populis ct in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et

Commentary on Book 1, Section 88

227

altitudo animi quae dicitur, ne si irascamur aut intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus.] The transitional formula in liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate sug­ gests that the preceding argument for placabilitas atque dementia was directed (by Panaetius) toward monarchs; see the previous note and ad SS 88-89. Here the subject-matter diminishes in degree of intensity in that the offenses that fall under facilitas et altitudo animi are milder than those requiring placabilitas atque dementia. In view of the nature of the shift it was an unfortunate choice of words when Zucker, 3 9 - 4 0 , called our sentence a "Steigerung" vis-a-vis the preceding. At Man. 41 Cicero praises the faciles aditus that allowed private citizens to voice their grievances to Pompey. Cf. also Cicero's characterization of his attitude during the unfolding of the Catilinarian conspiracy: ego multa tacui, multa pertuli, multa concessit multa meo quodam dolore in vestro timore sanavi (Cat. 4.2); during his governorship of Cilicia, his subjects were im­ pressed by Cicero's affability (facilitas) and accessibility (cf. Att. 6.2.5). Altitudo animi, like the Greek βαθύτης, which Cicero substitutes in his correspondence with Atticus (Att. 4.6.3, 5.10.3, 6.1.2), is the ability to re­ press anger or resentment. He had used the term already at Part. 77, where altitudo animi in capiendis incommodis et maxime iniuriis appears (along­ side liberalitas in usu pecuniae) as a species of magnitudo animi, as well as a letter to Appius Pulcher (cos. 54), toward whom Cicero had exercised βαθύ­ της according to Att. 6.1.2, dated to the first half of April, 50 (with reference to Pompey's attitude toward himself): . . . haec in eo gravitas, haec animi altitudo fuit . . . ut . . . ne summorum quidem hominum malevolis de me sermonibus crederet (Fam. 3.10.10), where the preceding gravitas helps to clarify, as does facilitas in our passage. The appended phrase quae dicitur suggests that the expression is not yet in general use. This concept is already included under μεγαλοψυχία in the set of Academic-Peripatetic definitions at [Arist.J VV 1250b34 ff. (μεγαλοψυχίας δ' έοτι το . . . έχειι> δε τι βάθος της ψυχής . . .); hence Panaetius certainly is the source here (as one would expect in any case). The concept recurs in the characterization of Sulla at Sal. Jug. 95.3:. . . adsimulanda {ac dissimulanda) negotia altitudo ingeni incredibilis; Liv. 4.6.12: banc modestiam aequitatemque et altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae turn populi universi fuit? Tac. Ann. 3.44.4 (on the al­ titudo animi of Tiberius); Apring, TLL 1, 1769.34 ff.; Zucker, 36 ff.—Sen. Ben. 1.1.5-6 offers a more concrete picture of the way a person lacking altitudo animi reacts to a request for a favor (quis non, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem adduxit, vultum avertit. . .). et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque dementia, ut adhibeatur re-

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ipublicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest.] Even the sphere of mansuetudo (here substituting for the previous placabilitas117) atque dementia may be restricted by raisons d' etat, as the consecutive clause with limiting force indicates; cf. 2.24, where it is conceded that not merely severitas bur saevitia may be necessary to control subjects vi oppressos.—At Leg. 2.37 Cicero cites as an example of the severitas maiorum in preserving the reputation of women the fact that in 186 the Bacchanals were curbed by use of a consular army and punishments meted out by a special court (several thousand men and women were put to death); cf. Rep. 4.6 (evidently a reference to the severitas of the censors). omnis autem et animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet, neque ad eius qui punitur aliquem aut verbis castigat sed ad reipublicae u til i tat em referri.] Gellius' philosophic teacher, the Middle Platonist L. Calvenus Taurus, developed in his commentary on Gorgias 525b a theory of three types of punishment (Gel. 7.14): 1) κόλασις/νουθεσία {cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia), 2) τιμωρία {ea causa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius, in quern est peccatum, tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et bonorem levet) and 3) παράδειγμα or punishment which, by its example, should serve to deter. Plato recognized only the first and third (Grg. 525b and in general, apart from Lg. 862e, where capital punishment for the incurably wicked is justified not only as a deterrent but also as ridding the state of bad men; cf. Hoi fordStrevens, 70). Plato did, however, provide in certain cases for offenders to be subjected to insult (he presumably would have justified this punishment as an example to deter others); cf. Lg. 855b5 ff.: ζημίας· Se αν τις ττλ€ονο$ d£ios elvai δοκη, eav άρα μη τιν€5 έθίλωσιν αυτόν των φίλων €γγυάσθαί τ€ και συν€κτίνοντ€9 dneXeuGepouv, δβσμοΐς· τε χρόνιοι? και €μφαν€σι καί τισιν προττηλακισμοΐ? κόλαζαν . . . Contumelia was, of course, not among the punishments provided for under Roman law; cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 905-6. In private dealings, too, Cicero/Panaetius recommends ut et severitas adhibeaturet contumelia repellatur (§ 137).—The point has already been made that those who administer the state should do so obliti commodorum suorum (S 85); and the immediately preceding observation that severitas may be brought to bear reipublicae causa helps prepare for the reipublicae utilitas as the standard used here; it assumes a much larger role in Book 3 (cf. the introduction to that Book). 117. Cf. its juxtaposition with dementia in the encomium of his brother's governorship of Asia at QF 1.1.25: toto denique imperio nihil acerbum esse, nihil crudele, atque omnia plena clementiae, mansuetudinis, humamtatis; also Cacs. BG 2.14.5: petere . . . ut sua dementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 8 8 - 8 9

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89 cavendum esc etiam ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem.] The proportionality of the penalty to the crime (or, in Platonic terms, the degree of injustice in the soul) is, of course, the premise of the various grades of punishment set forth in Plato's Laws (cf. 857b, where Clinias balks at the thought that there should be a single penalty for theft, whether the object stolen be of great or little value, sacred or profane, etc.), as well as in historical legislation and jurispru­ dence; cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 1038 ff.—Plecto "beatM probably spawned the sense "punish," perhaps originally a colloquialism used by slaves (cf. its first attestation at PI. Merc. 826-27; Syra is the speaker:. . .si itidem plectantur viri, /si quis clam uxorem duxerit scortum suam . . .). Cicero used it before the bar only once 118 in citing a definitio iudiciorum aequorum quae nobis a maioribus tradita est, sc. ut in iudiciis et sine invidia culpa plectatur et sine culpa invidia ponatur {Clu. 5); he did, however, use it several times in the philosophica (cf. 2.28; Leg. 3.46; Amic. 85).—For appello in the legal sense ("charge, accuse") cf. OLD s.v., 5b. prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo—utiliter a natura da tarn.] Cicero describes a situation in which the person who administers justice also fixes the penalties; for even though the quaestio system of trial by jury prevailed in his day, the cognitio-type jurisdiction by a magistrate was used for rare and minor offenses as well as by provincial governors for cases involving peregrini and noncapital offenses (and sometimes even capital ones) by Roman citizens; Cicero praised himself as clemens in handling iuris dictio in Cilicia (Att. 6.2.5) and lectured Quintus on the need to avoid orationis acerbitas et iracundia {QF 1.2.7); cf. Griffin, 1976, 167; on the personality of Quintus and the relationship of the brothers cf. in general William C McDermott, "Q. Cicero," Historia 20 (1971), 717; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero (London, 1971), 179 ff.—For the Peripatetic defense of anger as given "usefully" (sc. as a catalyst for punishment and selfdefense) sec Philodemi Epicurei de Ira liber, ed. T. Gomperz (Leipzig, 1864), p. 107, XXXI.24 ff. (evioi γούν τών Π€ριπατητικώι>, ως που και πρότβρον παρίμνήσθημβν, +διά προσώπων t βκτβμνειν τά νεϋρα ττ\ς ψυχής φασι τους την όργήΐ' και τον θυμοί' αύτη? εξαιρούνται, ών χωρίς ούτ^ κόλασιν ουτ' άμυναν eivai . . .), with other passages cited by Rose under Arist. fr. 80. Cf. the similar formulation with which Cicero introduces the topic at Tusc. 4.43: quid, quod idem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos extirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datasf In the further course of the argument Cicero denies that either P. Scipio 118. He never used it in a deliberative speech.

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Nasica was moved by anger in taking up the sword against Ti. Gracchus or his own public actions (he is doubtless thinking of the execution of the five Catilinarian conspirators) were done in anger (ibid., 4.52: nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fort iter in republica fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus). One wonders whether Cicero has shortened a more detailed Panaetian discussion; cf. Sen. de Ira 1.5 ff., where the propositions that anger is natural to man and that it is useful receive separate refutation. For the Stoic argu­ ment that anger inevitably goes beyond bounds cf. Nussbaum, 396-98.—In spite of the attack on the Peripatos here, Panaetius found uses for Peripatetic doctrines elsewhere; cf. ad § 93 and the introduction to Book 2. ilia vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est, optandumque ut ii qui praesunt reipublicae legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia sed aequitate ducuntur.] Here we have an echo of the Stoic concept of the ruler as νόμος έμψυχος; cf. Sen. Ep. 90.4 = Posidonius F 448.4 Th. (of early peoples): eundem habebant et ducem et legem; Muson., 36.23 ff.: καθόλου be τόν μέν βασιλέα τον αγαθόν ανάγκη πάσα και λόγψ και έργω eivai άναμάρτητον και τελειον, €Ϊπ€ρ δεΐ αυτόν, ώσπ€ρ €δόκ€ΐ τοΐς παλαιοΐς, νόμον έμψυχον eivai . . . This topos was adumbrated by Aristotle, who said that rulers are not bound by law, αύτοι γάρ ασι νόμος (Pol. 1284al4). G.J.D. Aalders, "Νόμος έμψυχος," in Politeia und res publica. Beitrage . . . dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet, ed. P. Steinmetz, Palingenesia 4 (Wiesbaden, 1969), 315— 29, explores the origin of the concept and its history in antiquity; cf. Lester K. Born, "Animate Law in the Republic and the Laws of Cicero," TAPhA 64 (1933), 128-37; for its later use, H. Hunger, Prooimion. Elemente der byzantiniscben Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden (Vienna, 1964), 117 ff.—On the inappropriateness of inflicting punishment in anger cf. Sen. de Ira 1.15.3.—On aequitas cf. ad $§ 30 and 32. 9 0 - 9 1 These sections, loosely connected with the preceding (atque etiam), advise moderation in times of prosperity, as of adversity; in the former situa­ tion one should avoid arrogance and flatterers and bear in mind the muta­ bility of fortune. The examples, with the probable exception of Laelius, 119 are surely all Panaetian. Stylistic infelicities toward the end suggest that Cicero was hastening to conclude this section; cf. p. 184 (relation to argument). 90 Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium adrogantiamque fugiamus.] In view of Α Γ­ Ι 19. Panaetius had evidently departed Rome prior to Scipio's death (he seems to have taken over as scholarch of the Stoa at Athens before 129) and hence would not have been able to observe the equanimity with which Laelius (with whom he was, however, personally ac­ quainted: fr. 10) bore it; cf. Pohlcnz, RE 18.3 (1949), 424.20 ff.; introduction, $ 5 <4).

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istotle's doctrine that το όλίγωρον is the characteristic πάθος of the μεγαλό­ ψυχος ( £ £ 1232b9-10), it is not surprising that Aristo of Ceus (fr. 13 VI, p. 35, II. 23 ff. W.) found it necessary to distinguish between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (along lines similar to Arist. EN 1124b2 ff.): καΐ διαιρειν μεγαλοψυχίαν ϋπερηφα[ν]ίας, αλλά μη συμφύρειν ώς εν και ταύτόν διαφ[έ]ρει γαρ όσον και [έ]πΙ τοϋ σώματος οιδήσεως ευεξία, και έστιν τοϋ μεν μεγαλοψ[ύ]χου το καταφρονεί ν των τυχη(ρ)ών υπερέχοντα τφ της ψυχής ογκω, τοϋ δ* υπερήφανου το διά κουφότητα ταύτης έκπνευματούμενον υπό κτήσεως ϋπεροραν έτερους. nam ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est. . .] Cicero himself was far from possessing the equable temperament he holds up as an ideal; cf. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Cicero the Man," in Cicero, ed. T.A. Dorey (London, 1964), 195-96. . . . praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque irons, ut de Socrate idemque de C. Laelio accepimus.] For this trait as characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος cf. Democ. 68 Β 46 D.-K. (cited ad § 66); Arist. APo. 9 7 b l 5 - 1 7 , 2 0 - 2 2 : . . .ει τί εστί μεγαλοψυχίαίητόΐμεν,σκεπτεον επί τίνων μεγαλόψυχων, ους ΐσμεν, τί εχουσιν εν πάντες ή τοιοϋτοι. . . . πάλιν εφ' έτερων, οίον Λυσάνδρου ή Σωκράτους, ει δή το αδιάφοροι εΐναι εΰτυχοϋντες και άτυχοϋντες . . . For Socrates' consistency of mood cf. also Tusc. 3.31: hie est enim Hie voltus semper idem, quern dicitur Xanthippe pmedicare solita in viro suo fuisse Socrate: eodem semper se vidisse exeuntem ilium domo et revertentem, with other testimonies at Socr. fr. IC 65. Seneca, after describing the vicissitudes of Socrates' life, comments (Ep. 104.28): haec usque eo animum Socratis non moverant ut ne vultum quidem moverint. (o) illam mirabilem laudem et singularem! usque ad extremum nee hilariorem quisquam nee tristiorem Socraten vidit; aequalis fuit in tanta inaequalitate fortunae. On the moderation with which Laelius bore Scipio's death cf. Amic. 7 - 9 , a passage that likewise makes him in point oisapientia into a kind of Roman Socrates; cf. ad3A6; Miinzer, RE 12.1 (1924), 407.29 ff.; on his hilaritas ad § 108. As part of his strategy of depicting Milo as a μεγαλόψυχος in contrast to himself, Cicero asks that if the jurors sec his client's visage unchanged they should nonetheless exercise mercy {Mil. 92: nolite, si in nostro omnium fletu nullam lacrimam aspexistis Milonis, si voltum semper eundem . . . videtis, hoc minus ei parcere . . .). The Furstenspiegel sometimes counseled behavior of this sort; cf. Agap. PG 86.1, 1173D: . . . άτρεπτον έχε τον νουν εν πράγμασι τρεπτόίς, μήτε εν ταΐς ευθυμίαις έξυψούμενος, μήτε εν ταΐς άθυμίαις ταπεινούμενος. Philippum quidem Macedonum regem rebus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse. icaque alter semper

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magnus, alter saepe turpissimus . . .] The conjecture tumidissimus for turpissimus proposed by Stroux, 1933,233-36, is attractive at first glance, sed nil mutandum; for turpissimus provides the better antithesis to magnus; cf. also A. Grilli, "Plutarco, Panezio e il giudizio su Alessandro Magno," Acme 5 (1952), 452, n. 5. §$ 90-91 correspond to $$ 7 2 - 7 3 insofar as the earlier advice on preparing oneself to meet evil fortune is here balanced with advice on how to behave in times of good fortune. In spite of his successes, Philip displayed facilitas et humanitas. With this is contrasted the case of Alex­ ander, who allowed himself to be carried away by good fortune. 120 — Contemporaries often mentioned Philip's affability (φιλανθρωπία); cf., e.g., Aesch. 2.39; Dem. 19.102 and 140 and 18.231 (where it is said to have been feigned). Cf. also the comparison of father and son at Justin 9.8, esp. 9.8.8 ff.: bland us pariter [sc. Philippus] et insidiosus, adloquio qui plura promitteret quam praestaret; in seria et iocos artifex. amicitias utilitate, non fide colebat. . . . huic Alexander filius successit et virtute et vitiis patre maior. . . . tram pater dissimulare, plerumque etiam vincere; hie ubi exarsisset, nee dilatio ultionis nee modus erat. . . . Alexander non in hostem, sed in suos saeviebat. . . . hie [sc. Alexander] amicorum interfector convivio frequenter excessit (the case of Clitus is cited at Sen. de Ira 3.17.1). . . . ut rccte praecipere videantur qui monent ut, quanto superiores simus, tamo nos geramus submissius.] Cf. Arist. EN 1 1 2 4 b l 8 - 2 0 : . . . και προ? μά' τους έν άζιώματι και εύτυχίαις μεγαν elvai, προς δέ τους μβσους μ€τριον . . . ; Sen. Tr. 254 (Agamemnon to Pyrrhus): quo plura possis, plura patienter feras.—Sen. Ben. 1.9.2 describes the opposite behavior and the hatred and envy it entails. . . . ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate exsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenacos sibique praefidentes tamquam in gyrum rationis et doctrinae dud oportere, ut perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque forrunae.] = Panaetius fr. 12; cf. § 13: . . . ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti. . .\ad 2.76.—Here in the context of a simile comparing human beings to horses the metaphorical use of effreno is especially apt, but Cicero was generally fond of applying this verb (usually, as here, in the perfect participial form) as a negative characterization for human beings or their emotions; cf. Tusc. 3.11: itaque nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum 120. For this point cf. Sen. Ben. 1.13.1: Alexandra Macedoni, cum victor Orientis animos supra humanos tolleret, .. . ; Plut. ad Princ. Inerud. 782a-b, who quotes Alexander's state­ ment €ΐ μη ΆΧέξανόρος ήμην, ΔιογίΐΉ^ αν ήμην with the comment ολίγου &ωΐ> f ϊττ£ϊι\ τήΐ/ ncpi αΐιτόΐ' ίΰτυχίαι> και λαμπρότητα και δύναμιι/ ώς κώλυσιι/ άρ€τής και άσχολίαν βαρυνόμεννς . . .

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exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui ecfrenati feruntur aut Ubidine aut iracundia. . . and other passages cited by Bannier, TLL 5.2,201.27 ff.—The Greek γύρο? was taken over into Latin originally as a term for the "circular course on which horses were trained" (cf. OLD s.v. gyrus, Blatt, TLL 6.2,2386.43 ff.). 121 Hence by apt simile (cf. tamquam) the gyrus rationis of our passage is the training ground for the cyclical pattern of human affairs; cf. Hdt. 1.207.2 (Croesus to Cyrus):. . . εκείνο πρώτον μάθε, ως κύκλος των άνθρωπηίων έστι πρηγμάτων, περιφερόμενος δε ούκεφ αίει του? αυτού? εύτυχεειν; Greg. Naz. or. 17.4, PG 35, 969B: κύκλος τίς εστίν, αδελφοί, των ανθρωπίνων πραγμά­ των, και παιδεύει διά των εναντίων ημάς ό θεός . . . ; Agapet. PG 86.1, 1168C: κύκλος τις των ανθρωπίνων περιτρέχει πραγμάτων, άλλοτε άλλως φέρων αυτά και περιφερών και τούτοις άνισότης εστί <διά) το μηδέν τών παρόντων έν ταυτότητι μένει v. Fantham, 163 n., compares our passage to Propertius 3.3.21 (Apollo to the poet straying from love-poetry: cur tua praescriptos evecta est pagina gyros?) and suggests that in both passages u gyrus symbolizes a desirable limitation or controP (cf. also de Orat. 3.70: . . . ex ingenti quodam oratorem immensoque campo in exiguum sane gyrum compellitis)\ one might add that whereas Scipio's moral gyrus is in­ tended as a buffer against the vicissitudes of fortune, the gyrus of Propertius' poem presumably represents insurance against poetic disaster. This view of fortune helps explain Scipio's response to the fall of Carthage, when he is said to have wept and quoted the verses εσσεται ήμαρ δτ' άν ποτ' όλώλη Ίλιος ιρή /και Πρίαμος καΐ λαόςέϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο (Horn. //. 4.164-65 = 6.448-49); cf. Walbank ad Plb. 38.21.1-3; Astin, 282 ff. 91 atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio amicorum, iisque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas.] Viz., because, unaffected by φιλαυτία (see below), they can see things in perspective; hence the importance of not alienating them by haughtiness (cf. $ 90). Cicero/ Panaetius also recommends consulting the advice of others in questions of το πρέπον; cf. §§ 146-47. . . . cavendum est ne adsentatoribus patefaciamus aures . . .] Aristotle al­ ready distinguished between the φίλος and the κόλαξ (EN 1108a26 ff.; cf. 1159bl2 ff.); besides offering a memorable sketch of κολακεία (Char. 2), Theophrastus took up the topic in his three books περί φιλίας (frr. 5 3 2 - 4 6 Fortenbaugh, 1992) and the essay περί κολακείας (frr. 547-48 Fortenbaugh, 1992); he in turn served, whether directly or indirectly, as the main source for Plutarch's Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur (cf. K. Ziegler, RE 121. Though Blatt, loc. cit., 2386.21, states "vocabulum exstat inde a Cicerone," our passage suggests its use by Scipio.

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21.1 [1951], 802.53 ff.) and probably also for the advice on the topic at Antic. 89-104 (see further ad 2.31); cf. ad § 42 and 2.31. This is a common topos of the later Fiirstenspiegel; cf., e.g., Agap. PG 86.1, 1168C: αποστρό­ φου των κολάκων του? απατηλού? λόγους . . . ; sim. 1172Α, 1181 Α. . . . neve adnlari nos sinamus . ..] Since, apart from his own translation from Aeschylus' Προμηθεύς λυόμβίΌ? at Tusc. 2.24 (pinnata cauda nostrum adulat sanguinem), Cicero never uses adulare,122 we should supply eos (sc. assentatores) as subject and take nos as object. tales enim nos esse putamus ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata . . . ] Cf. § 30 for the point that φιλαυτία can cloud one's judgment in questions of iustitia. . . . cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter inridentur et in maximis versantur erroribus.] The imprecise relation of ideas betrays flagging concentra­ tion; the fact that these persons become the butt of humor is surely the consequence of their error; and the idea of error is unnecessarily repeated (peccata. . . in. . . erroribus); one would have expected (after Heine) some­ thing like ex quo homines inflati opinionibus in maximis versantur erroribus; unde fit ut turpiter inrideantur.—Turpiter inridentur = "expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule" (W. Miller). sed hacc quidem hactenus.] This is the first appearance in Off. (cf. §§140 and 160) of a formula for separating subjects that is found both in the philosophica of 45-44 and frequently in Cicero's letters. 92 This section comes as a surprise.123 It begins as a ranking of different types of μεγαλόψυχοι, in accord with Cicero's occasional practice elsewhere in this Book of concluding a section with a ranking of the phenomena discussed (cf. §S 58,141, and, on a smaller scale, § 27). But in the case of the third virtue such a ranking seems superfluous in light of what has been said at §§ 66,69b ff., and especially § 72, where the vita activa is made prerequisite. In our passage, however, the claims of the representatives of the vita contempbtiva to a share in magnitudo animi are also recognized (as in Panaetius? see ad § 72). The process of ranking provides, moreover, the oppor­ tunity (or excuse) to introduce another class of μεγαλόψυχοι interiecti inter philosophos et eos qui rempublicam administrarent. There is nothing in Aristotle's treatment of μεγαλοψυχία corresponding to this third group, the qualifications for which involve having acquired one's property correctly and making use of it to benefit society (the closest analogue might, however, be 122. Cf. Oertel, TLL 1, 877.58 ff. 123. It should surely form a separate paragraph (beginning with Mudautem sic est tudicandum), as in Tcstard's edition.

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μεγαλοπρέπεια at EN 1122al8 ff.). Does this material really belong here? Is it a Ciceronian appendix that would have been more appropriate under 2.86-87 [curatio pecuniae; cf. Thomas, 62)? In favor of the Ciceronian provenance would be the connections with $$ 138-40, which themselves seem likely to be a Ciceronian addition (see ad loc); note also the similarity of quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso and deinde augeatur rat tone diligentia parsimonia to the (non-Pa naetia η) pre­ cepts on the acquisition and augmentation of property at 2.87. On the other hand, note that (1) though no Greek examples are cited, the behavior described corresponds to that of Cimon, whom Panaetius admired (cf. 2.64), and (2) the advice to benefit the community is certainly in the spirit of Panaetius. Neither of these arguments is, however, decisive for the prove­ nance of this material from the corresponding passage of περί τοϋ καθήκον­ τος. In view of the definition given at § 66 [altera est res, ut, cum ita sis adfectus animo . . . res geras magnas ilbs quidem et maxime utiles, sed vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum . . .), Panaetius can hardly have seen the behavior of the propertied man here described as that of a μεγαλόψυχο?; nor, according to § 7 1 , would he have granted him exemp­ tion from state service. 124 Why was Cicero so keen to create room for a μεγαλόψυχο? who was neither a politician nor engaged in philosophical/ scientific inquiry? Was he perhaps thinking of his friend Atticus (cf. Att. 1.17.5, a reference to his friend's magnitudo animi and honestum otium)}125 Similar to our passage is the definition of the man who can be called truly wealthy at Parad. 42 (for the contrasting picture of Crassus cf. ad § 25): quern enim intellegimus divitem aut hoc verbum in quo homine ponimus? opinor in eo, cut tanta possessio est ut ad liberaliter vivendum facile contentus sit, qui nihil quaerat, nihil adpetat, nihil optet amplius; cf. Kloft, 69, n. 142. esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam seseque suarum rerum fuiibus con124. Rudberg, 14, already saw this paragraph as "cm adespoton, das am Ende der Behandlung dcr bctrcffcndcn Tugend scinen Platz erhielt." 125. On the personality of Titus Pomponius Atticus cf. Shackleton Bailey, Att. 1, 5-58; on the recent study by Olaf Perlwitz, Titus Pomponius Atticus, Hermes Einzclschriften 58 (Stutt­ gart, 1992), cf Shackleton Bailey, AJPb 115 (1994), 470-71. Atticus had a marked aversion (connected perhaps with the experience of civil war in his youth) to taking risks in either commercial or political matters. On his mostly behind-the-scenes political aaivitics cf. Perlwitz, 125 ff. He was generous in allowing his friend use of his estates, including the splendid one that he acquired in 68 near Buthrotum in Epirus; cf. Perlwitz, 66-78, and R. Feger, RE Suppl. 8 (1956), 506.54 ff., 509.25 ff. and 51-52.

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tinerent. ..] This would follow from the somewhat grudging concession at § 71:. . .etiis forsitan concedendum sit rempublicam non capessentibus qui excellent! ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt. . . . . . aut interiecti inter philosophos et eos qui rempublicam administrarent delcctarentur re sua familiari . . .] But at § 71 the only other group besides those with talent for intellectual pursuits given leave from state service were those hindered by ill health or some other weighty cause,126 and it is not claimed that such persons are μεγαλόψυχοι; in our passage there is no men­ tion of ill health or other such hindrance, and the predicate μεγαλόψυχοι seems unwarranted in light of the definition at § 66 (see above). . . . et amicis impertientes et reipublicae, si quando usus esset.] Vitr. 6.5.2 similarly justifies large-scale houses for men of rank on grounds that deliberations on questions of public policy may take place there; cf. Ed­ wards, 152-53. quae prim urn bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso, deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia, turn quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat, nee libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati ct bencficentiae pareat.] The guidelines for use of one's estate given in the previous sentence are here amplified; proper acquisition is added (quae prhnum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso)\ under expansion the negative prescription non earn quidem omni ratione exaggerantes is rein­ forced with a positive precept (deinde augeatur ratione diligentia par­ simonia). Now the foregoing provision for sharing the estate with others (neque excludentes ab eius usu suos, potiusque et amicis impertientes et reipublicae, si quando usus esset) contains both negative and positive pre­ cepts specifying the categories of beneficiaries with whom the estate is to be shared (viz., family, friends, and the state). The amplification presented by the transmitted text (turn quam plurimis,*17 modo dignis, se utilem praebeat)) specifies the number who should benefit (viz., as many qualified persons as possible); this is, in fact, an important point and one needed to establish that the estate is in the service of liberalitas and beneficentia rather than libido and luxuria and that its owner lives in a truly philanthropic manner (on vere fhominum amice\ see below); hence the athetesis of turn quam plurimis—se utilem praebeat by Briiser, 73, fails to satisfy.128 How126. Cf.a<*S23. 127. For this idea cf. fin. 3.65: inpellimur autem natura, ui prodesse velimus quam pluri­ mis . . . 128. The motive that he suggests for the interpolation, viz., that after clauses introduced by primum and deinde a reader felt the need for a /wm-clause, is likewise unconvincing, since the sequence primum . . . deinde without turn is commonly found; cf. Fcdeli, 1964', 79.

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ever, as transmitted between the discussion of acquisition and expansion, these words are evidently out of proper sequence; one expects this topic to be treated, as in the previous sentence, after expansion of the estate; hence Ungers transposition (here adopted) of this clause to a place immediately after parsimonia. Briiser, ibid., argued against the transposition on grounds that the suspect words could not have fallen out through a mechanical defect in transmission, and he won the support of Thomas, 6 1 , n. 102. But surely the initial three letters of parsimonia and praebeat are similar enough that a scribe could have skipped from one word to the other, then noticed his mistake, and inserted the missing words in the margin, whence the next copyist would have reinserted them into the text in the wrong place.—On the relation of liberalitas to magnitudo animi cf. Part. 77: cuius [sc. magni­ tudes animi] est liberalitas in usu pecuniae . . . quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso . . . ] Plb. 6.56.1 ff. compares attitudes toward gain of the Carthaginians and Romans and finds that among the latter. . . ουδέν αΐσχιον του δωροδοκεΐσθαι καΐ τοΰ πλεονεκτεί άπό τών μη καθηκόντων καθ' δσον γαρ cv καλώ τίθενται τόν άττό τοΰ κρατιστου χρηματισμον, κατά τοσούτο πάλιν βν όνείδει ποιούνται την βκ τών άπβιρημένων πλεονίξίαν. For examples of turpis quaestus cf. § 150. D'Arms, 2 1 - 2 3 , cites other Ciceronian evidence to show that in our passage he would have regarded commerce as a proper method of acquiring wealth. On the home as a means of conferring benefits cf. in general Sen. Virf. Beat. 24.3: quid? domus ipsa divitis viri quantam habet bene faciendi materiam! . . . mm quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat . . .] Cicero speaks of his home being filled with morning callers (Λ/ί. 1.18.1; 20 January 60); cf. Edwards, 151-52 (where the reference should be to Att. 1.13.6). . . . nee libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat.] On libido cf. Phil. 2.104 (cited ad $ 139); on luxuria ad S 140; for liberalitas in the use of one's property 2.64. Such use of property appears in a list of topics of encomia at de Orat. 2.342:. . . non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se praetulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunae, ut opes et copiae non superbiae videantur ac lubidini, sed bonitati et moderationi facultatem et materiam dedisse. . . . nee libidini—amicef.] Cf. the similar contrast of approved and disap­ proved lifestyles at § 106 (. . . quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere, quamque honestum parce continenter severe sobrie). haec praescripta servantem licet magnifice graviter animoseque vivere, atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter, vere fhominum amicef.] Amice is not elsewhere construed with a case (cf. Hey, TLL 1,1914.20 ff.); hence the reading of the archetype, vere hominum amice, is evidently corrupt (c presents vere homi-

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nibus, an obvious correction, the second hand of the Tricassensis 532 vitae hominum). In structure our passage is similar to Phil. 4.6: nee solum id animose et fortiter sed considerate etiam sapienterque fecerunt, where like­ wise two sets of adverbs are juxtaposed, the former more outwardly impres­ sive, the latter more inward. In our sentence Cicero evidently aims to show that by following the foregoing precepts two tendencies can be reconciled (note the particularly sharp contrast between the first member of each set, magnifice and simpliciter, pointing to a possible conflict between the desires of the individual or exigencies of one's social position on the one side and the demands of philosophy on the other). Stroux, 1933, 235, suspected that the last three words of our sentence conceal a translation of the Greek φιλα^θρώπως, an echo of the common characterization of the way Philip of Macedon conducted himself (cf. ad % 90). 1 2 9 In Latin terms, the sense will have been similar to humaniter at Fam. 7.1.5 (to M. Marius):. . . te ipsum, qui multos annos nihil aliud commentaris, docebo profecto quid sit humaniter vivere or the underlined words in Lucil. 1335-36 M. = 1351-52 K.: contra defensorem hominum morumque bonorum, Ihos magni facere, his bene velle, his vivere amicum. Lund's vere generi hominum amice would be satisfactory in point of sense; its syntax, however, is unparalleled. Fedeli's vere (erga) hominem amice is better in this latter regard (cf. erga nos amice at Fin. 1.34); but homo seems not to be used as a collective noun for mankind in classical Latin (cf. OLD s.v. homo 1). Another possibility would be erga genus hominum amice (with vere omitted as a corruption of erga)y which would be syntac­ tically unobjectionable and would also account for the transmitted hominum. 93-151 To πρέπον as one of the four cardinal virtues is found in the ethical system of no other philosophical school and is not found in the Stoa prior to Panaetius (Philippson, 1930 1 ,393); it has been regarded as one of Panaetius' chief innovations in ethics (cf. ad § 14). This section may be outlined as follows (I have placed probable Ciceronian additions in square brackets, material probably moved to its present location by Cicero in double square brackets [see below]): I. quale sit ($$ 93-99) II. Derived officia ($$ 100-51) [JA. Subordination to reason of the motus animi ($§ 100-103a) B. What is appropriate in the matter of ludus et iocus (§§ 103b-4)]] 129. This could be the case whether or not Cicero was following a Greek source in our passage, since, as his letters to Atticus show, when he wished, he was well able to think and write in Greek terms.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 92 and 93-151

239

C. The determination of the persona of the agent (SS 105-25; cf. $125) 1. The theory of the four personae a) Natura hominis and its implications (first persona: §§ 105— 6) b) One's individual nature, its variety, and the precepts that flow from it (second persona: §§ 107-14) c) The (third) persona imposed by chance {% 115) d) The (fourth) persowa of one's own choosing (SS 115-17 [— complecti animo et cogitatione debemus])y including choice of profession and its problems (SS 117 [In primis autem constituendum est—]-121) |(2. Appendix on special circumstances a) aetates (1) Youth (S 122) (2) Old age ($ 123) b) tempora (1) Magistrates (S 124a) (2) Private citizens (S 124b) (3) Foreign residents (S 125)]] D. From the point of view of the subject matter of actions 1. The body (SS 126-32a) 2. Speech (SS 132b-37) [3. One's house (SS 138-40)] E. Appendix: placement of actions according to time and circumstance (SS H l - 5 1 ) 1. General precepts (S 141) 2. ζύταξία and ευκαιρία (SS 142-49), including proper behavior in the community (SS 148-49) [3. Liberal and illiberal professions ($S 150-51)]. The structure of this section is not easy to grasp, the parts often lacking clear articulation and the contents sometimes overlapping. The problems of the text reflect not only the difficulty of combining two rather different approaches to the problem of social relations, based respectively on the traditional virtue of σωφροσύνη and on an analysis of social roles subsumed under the heading τό -πρέπον, but also Cicero's own preferences as to inclu­ sion and order of topics; and in this section more than any other of Off Cicero labors under terminological difficulties (cf. ad SS 9 3 - 9 9 and 142). The excursus on Stoic psychology at SS 100-3 (= II.A. above) would have

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been expected under the first virtue (which Cicero accords very short shrift; cf. ad SS 18-19) or could have been accommodated under the first persona, that of the human being as such, on grounds that human beings, as opposed to animals, subordinate the appetites to reason (cf. SS H a n d 105); the transplantation of this material to SS 101-3a and 105-6 would partially explain why Cicero otherwise has so little to say about the first persona (S 107). The subordination of the appetites to reason receives emphasis not only through this positioning but also through repetition later on (cf. SS 132, 141). Surely Cicero wanted to drive home the point to young Marcus, who had recently been introduced by Gorgias, his teacher in rhetoric, προ? ήδονάς . . . και πότους (Plut. Cic. 24.8; cf. introduction, S 4). One suspects that, similarly, the immediately following discussion of ludus et iocus owes its placement to Cicero jr.'s interests and, presumably, perceived need for advice (the topic of restraining one's speech recurs, in the expected place, under sermo, at S 134; cf. ad SS 103b-4; and S 122 touches on leisure activities for young people). The treatment of the appropriate house (sc. for a leading citizen) at U.D.3., ignored in the list of topics at § 126 and dealing with a problem that became acute in Roman society from the time of Lucullus and with clear parti pris pro Octavio, contra Antonium, is surely a Ciceronian addition (cf. ad SS 138-40); it would not be surprising if the appendix on liberal and illiberal professions, not otherwise integrated into the plan or connected with what precedes, were likewise of Ciceronian rather than Panaetian provenance (see ad loc). After correction for probable Ciceronian additions and rearrangements, the balance discloses a fairly clear and coherent pattern. To πρέπον is a concept without a content of its own; it merely sets up a proportional rela­ tion between two terms. 130 On one side of the equation is the person who performs the action; the role or roles that the agent has to play, whether of his own choosing or imposed by external circumstance, will determine ap­ propriate actions. On the other hand, within certain spheres certain actions are appropriate or inappropriate per se. The result is, as in the case of the second virtue, a bipartite division of the subject. Moreover, as under the second virtue, each of the "halves" is followed by an appendix dealing with 130. Cf. SWF 3,214.18 (Diogenes of Babylon: πρέπον &e έστι AcfrsoiKeia τψπράγμα"π),β5 well as the anecdote recounted at Sen. Ben. 2.16.1: urbem cuidam Alexander donabat, vesanus et qui nihil ammo nisi grande conaperet. cum ille, cui donabatur, se ipse mensus tanti muneris invidiam refugisset dicens non conventre fortunae suae, 'non quaero' inquit 'quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare', animosa vox videtur et regia, cum sit stultissima. nihil enim per se quemquam decet; refert, qui det, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, sine quibus facti ratio non constabit.

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special circumstances { $ § 3 1 - 4 1 and 59-60; I1.C.2. and II.E. in the outline printed above). In several ways Panaetius contrives to give this virtue a content and direc­ tion based upon the older virtue σωφροσύνη: he includes it in his definition of the nature of the human being under the first persona (. . . nobis autem cum a natura constantiae moderationis temperantiae verecundiae partes datae sint. . . : § 98; cf. §§ 101-3, 105-6); and in the second part he builds verecundia into the precepts about the body (§§ 126 ff.) and speech (esp. § 134). The approval of other persons is cited in justification (cf. $ 126:. . . ut probemur Us quibuscum apud quosque vivamus . . . ; cf. $S 98, 147); presumably Panaetius made it clearer than Cicero does that the virtue is to be practiced for its own sake and not because of the approbatio thereby entailed (cf. 2.42a; Philippson, 1932*, 392). 9 3 - 9 9 This introduction of decorum is perhaps the most difficult section in the entire essay. The subject itself is not an easy one; for here a term from the aesthetic sphere (το πρέπον) is adapted to ethical uses and made to subsume the older virtue σωφροσύνη. At the same time the attempt to distinguish this new virtue from the honestum as a whole proves to be difficult. Moreover, the subject is bedevilled by the lack of a fully adequate Latin translation for το πρέπον and other terminological difficulties. Finally the order of presenta­ tion is confusing. To begin with the last point, viz., the order of presentation: Cicero first introduces the subject as a congeries of themes related to the traditional virtue σωφροσύνη (§ 93) and invokes the term decorum and its Greek equiv­ alent πρέπον for this group as if it were merely a generic term for the particu­ lar phenomena modestia, temperantia, etc.; his introduction of magnitudo animi by using terms from common parlance before philosophical terminol­ ogy is comparable. However, the emphasis on temperantia, sedatio perturbationum, etc., is in line with Cicero's tendency elsewhere in this section and may be related to his addressee (cf. ad §S 93-151). Next, in view of the doctrine that the decorum is the manifestation of action in accord with each of the virtues, Cicero launches into a discussion of the distinction between the decorum and honestum {§§ 94-95) which is implicitly based, not on what has just been said of decorum, but on a definition that will be given only in § 96 (quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat)y which is hardly distinguishable from the definition of the honestum which, though never expressly formulated, was implicit in its derivation from the natural drives of the human being at SS 11-14. The upshot is that in §§ 94-95 the reader is presented with various accidentia of decorum, viz. that it is an €πιγ€νόμ€νον of the ho-

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nestum, that it is something readily perceptible {in promptu) and manifest in the other three virtues, and that it is distinguishable from the honestum theoretically but not in practice, before he comes upon an actual definition of decorum. The Greek πρέπω means la) "be conspicuous" (e.g., Horn. //. 12.104: ό δ* €πρεπ€ και δια πάντων), often with some attributes specified (e.g., Aesch. Ch. 10-12 [Orestes is the speaker]: τίς ττοθ' ήδ' όμήγυρις / στίίχα γυναικών φάρ€σιν μ€λαγχίμοις / πρέπουσα;) and hence lb) "shine forth, show oneself"; 2a) "be conspicuously like" and hence 2b) "be conspicuously fit­ ting, beseem"; cf. LSJ s.v. Similarly, Latin decorum can be used in the senses 1) "€υ€ΐδής, ώραΐος, pulcher, gratus, speciosus, ornatus, formosus, egregius," in which it refers to external appearance, but also 2) "βύπρεπης, κόσμιος, aptus, conveniens, concinnus, dignus, accommodatus, decens," where, in­ stead of having a content of its own, it sets up a relationship between two terms as proportional or suitable to each other; cf. Leissner, TLL 5.1, s.v. decorus LA and B. The translation of πρέπον as decorum, however, involves several prob­ lems. For instance, one gets a much more vivid sense of the meaning of the statement huius [sc. decori] vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari (§ 94) by substituting the Greek terms: αυτή ή δύναμις του πρέποντος, δτι του καλοΰ έστιν αχώριστον. Το καλόν πρέπ€ΐ ("is distinguished, attracts the eye"); on the other hand, the Latin terms decorum and honestum suggest social pro­ priety and public standing; these, too, may be interconnected, but the thought was first formulated with the Greek terms in mind, and they give it a power and prima facie validity lacking in the Latin equivalent. Similarly, on several other occasions the Latin terms are meant to, but really cannot fully bear the burden of the Greek πρέπ€ΐ in the stronger sense "shine forth," as when Cicero describes decorum as the manifestation of action in accord with the virtues (§ 94-95), offers the analogy that decorum is to virtue as beauty is to health ($ 95), speaks of hoc decorum quod elucet in vita (§ 98), or says that constantia and moderatio will "shine forth" (elucehit) when the ap­ petites are calm (5 102); cf. Philippson, 1930 1 , 388. Among the presentations of the four "parts" of the honestum this intro­ duction of decorum is unique in discussing the relationship of the "part" to the whole—not an easy problem. The relation of the πρέπον to the καλόν receives attention in the Platonic Hp. Ma. 293d ff.,131 where it is mooted that the πρέπον is the quality which, inhering in beautiful things, makes them 131. On the problem of the authenticity of this dialogue cf. Paul Friedlander, Platon. 2, 3d ed. {Berlin. 1964), 284, n. 1 = Engl. tr. by H. Meycrhoff (New York, 1964), n. 1, 316-17.

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beautiful; when the problem of the difference between apparent and real arises, however, Socrates concludes that the πρέπον might lend a merely specious beauty (294a-b). In view of the Stoic context it is not surprising that our passage fails to take up the claim that the πρέπον is the "form" of the καλόν. As in the Hp. Ma., however, it is taken for granted that the πρέπον is in the realm of appearance; but, unlike Plato, Panaetius evidently regards the πρέπον as an infallible sign of the presence of the καλόν ($ 94: quidquid est enim quod deceat, id turn apparet cum antegressa est honestas); cf. Arist. Top. 135al3: ταΰτόν γαρ έστι το καλόν και πρέπον. On the different implica­ tions of the analogy of the relation of beauty to health cf. ad $ 95. Moreover, unseemly behavior would, according to $ 94, appear to be a sure sign of the absence of the καλόν. The basic Stoic conception was that virtue was unitary and was simply given different names in the different spheres of activity; cf. 6 IB Long-Sedley = Plut. de Virt. Mor. 440e ff. = (in part) SVF1,86.8 ff. and 49.30 ff., of which I quote the latter: εοικε δε και Ζήνων εις τοϋτό πως ύποφέρεσθαι ό Κιτιεύς, οριζόμενος την φρόνησιν εν μεν άπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, εν δ' α'ιρετεοις σωφροσύνην, έν δ" ύπομενετέοις άνδρείαν. άπολογούμενοι δ' άξιοΰσιν έν τού­ τοις την έπιστήμην φρόνησιν Οπό τού Ζήνωνος ώνομάσθαι. The general prac­ tice of referring to the four cardinal virtues as "parts'* of the honestum suggests that Panaetius similarly viewed his καλόν as an organic unity (cf. also § l i b : quae quattuor. . . inter se conligata atque implicata sunt, with note; fr. 109; ad §§ 152-61). The point of Cicero/Panaetius in % 94 seems to be that the πρέπον is an epiphenomenon of the καλόν in each of its spheres of operation; see below. Another analogue to Panaetius' treatment of the relation of the πρέπον to the καλόν has been sought in Hecato's doctrine of the relation of the nontheoretical to the theoretical virtues. Cf. fr. 6 G. = D.L. 7.90-91: φησί γαρ ό Έκάτων έν τω πρωτω περί αρετών έπιστημονικάς μεν είναι και θεωρηματικάς τάς έχουσας την σύστασιν έκ θεωρημάτων, ως φρόνησιν καΐ δικαιοσύνην αθεώρητους δε τάς κατά παρεκτασιν θεωρούμενος ταΐς έκ των θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυίαις, καθάπερ ύγίειαν και ίσχύν. τη γάρ σωφροσύνη τεθεωρημένη ύπαρχούση συμβαίνει άκολουθεΐν και παρεκτείνεσθαι την ύγίειαν, καθάπερ τη ψαλίδος οΐκοδομία τήν ίσχύν έπιγίνεσθαι. καλούνται δ' αθεώρητοι ότι μή έχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, αλλ' έπιγίνονται και περί φαύλους γίνονται, ως ύγίεια, ανδρεία. (ttFor Hecato says in the first book O n Virtues' that there are scientific and theoretical virtues that consist in thoughts, such as prudence and justice, as well as nontheoretical ones, such as health and strength, which are found alongside the ones made up of thoughts. Thus health happens to follow upon and extend beside the theoretical virtue moderation, just as

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strength follows upon the construction of an arch. They are called nontheoretical because they do not depend upon acts of assent but are superad­ ded and are possessed by ordinary persons, as are health and bravery.") Philippson, 1930 1 , 365 ff., discussed both this passage and the similar doctrine at Stob. 2.7.5 b4 , where the nontheoretical virtues are called δυνάμα?. Note, however, that his view that the eXeye at Stob. 2.7.5 b5 ( 2 , 6 3 . 2 5 26 W.-H.) = Panaetius fr. 109 points to Hecato as the source (on grounds that the imperfect tense implies a student's report) should, like some of his other attributions to Hecato, be treated with reserve. In fact, H. von Staden, "Jae­ ger's 'Skandalon der historischen Vernunft': Diodes, Aristotle, and Theophrastus," in Werner Jaeger Reconsidered, ed. W.M. Calder III (Atlanta, 1992), 252, has shown that, in the fourth century (B.C.) and later, the imper­ fect is often used to cite persons whom the author could not possibly have known. Moreover, it is misleading to claim to find in our passage, as Philippson, he. cit., 385, did, traces ("Spuren") of Hecato's doctrine of the nontheoreti­ cal virtues. The point of contact is the concept of thee πι yc νόμε vov or the like (the Greek term employed by Panaetius being not altogether clear; see below) of a (particular theoretical) virtue (Hecato) or virtue in general (i.e., the honestum or καλόν: Panaetius). What Philippson failed to note, however, is that Panaetius offered a rather different account of theoretical and practical virtues at §§ 16-17 (on the assumption that Cicero there follows his main source). The analogy to Hecato thus does not lead very far.132 There was, however, in existence in Panaetius1 day a body of Greek lore that attempted to draw conclusions from external phenomena to the state of the human soul, namely the literature on physiognomy. One of the methods followed by physiognomists was to make a classification of superficial characteristics and the character-traits that go along with them (ot bi rives ^κ των ηθών των επιφαινομένων, οία διαθέσβι βπβται εκαστον ήθος, τω όργι£ομ€νψ, τφ φοβουμενω. τφ άφροδισιάζοντι . . . : [Arist.J Phgn. 805a28-30 1 3 3 ). Panaetius1 project in treating το πρέπον as an έπιγ* νόμ€ vov or έπιφαινόμενον of the καλόν is not dissimilar and involves inter alia alert observation of details of physical behavior on the premise that these disclose the state of the 132. Gartner, 1974, 42-43, n. S3, had thought ro solve the problem of the two definitions of decorum in $ 96 on the assumption that Cicero had lifted them from Hecato's doctrine of the nontheoretical virtues; see below. 133. On this treatise, likely to be based on Aristotelian organization and viewpoints, cf. Johanna Schmidt, RE 20.1 (1941), 1070.48 ff., followed by During, ibid., Suppl. 11 (1968), 314.49 ff.

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soul (cf. esp. SS 1 2 8 - 3 2 , 1 4 5 - 4 6 ) . Panaetius, then, shares with the physiog­ nomists an asumption about the relation of the seen and the unseen; he was also, like them, interested in different character-types (cf. the brief sketch at §§ 108-9). It is therefore tempting to suppose that theories of physiognomy influenced his thinking in some degree. At the same time, physiognomy, with its assumption of fixed character-types, is implicitly anti-ethical. At the core of Panaetius' treatment of the πρέπον is the idealistic notion that the human being is basically good (cf. §§ 97-98) and that what is needed are instruc­ tions to modify behavior to bring it into line with the beautiful soul within, i.e., to achieve consistency [constantia) of one's behavior (in words and actions) with one's true nature and avoid any divergence (discrepantia) be­ tween appearance and reality. The discussion of two types of decorum in § 96 has caused difficulty. The text has been thought to be unintelligible through Cicero's interference with his Panaetian model (Miiller ad /oc), in particular his insertion of material from another source. 134 The distinction drawn is between the decorum ge­ nerate {quod in omni honestate versatur) and the subordinate decorum (aliud huic subiectum). Such a bifurcation is found also in the case of the second virtue, which includes both iustitia and liberalitas/beneficentia; and indeed the two areas are there given separate treatment (corresponding to $$ 20-41 and 4 2 - 6 0 respectively). But a closer analogy than Panaetius' own treatment of the second virtue is provided by Aristotle's discussion in EN of justice and injustice.135 After ascertaining that in common parlance the terms "justice" and "injustice" are used for the whole of virtue and vice, 136 he determines that there is a special sense in which this "justice" can be said to be one among a plurality of virtues and that το πλεονεκτεί ν can serve to distinguish injustice in the narrower sense from other vices (EN 1130al4 ff.): ίητοϋμεν δε γε την εν μέρει άρετη? δικαιοσύνην έστι γάρ TL?, ώ? φαμεν. όμοίω? δε και περί αδικία? τη? κατά μέρο?. σημεΐον δ' δτι εστίν κατά μεν γάρ τά? άλλα? μοχθηρία? ό ενεργών αδικεί μεν, πλεονεκτεί δ' ουδέν, οίον ό ρίψα? την ασπίδα διά δειλίαν ή κακώ? ειπών δια χαλεπότητα ή ού βοήθησα? χρήμασι δι' άνελευθερίαν δταν δε πλεονεκτή, πολλάκι? κατ' ούδεμίαν τών τοιούτων, αλλά μην ούδε κατά πάσα?, κατά πονηρίαν δε γε τινά (φέγομεν γάρ) και κατ' άδικίαν. εστίν άρ' άλλη τι? αδικία ώ? μέρο? τη? δλη?, και άδικόν τι έν μέρει 134. See n. 132 supra. 135. 1 owe this observation to the kindness of Giscla Striker. 136. On the latitude with which &ίκαιο9/άδικο>? were used in ordinary speech in fourthcentury Athens cf. K.J. Dovec, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974), 180 ff. (cf. also 2.38>.

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τού δλου αδίκου του παρά τόι> νόμοι\ Similarly Zeno made φρύνησι? both a virtue in its own right and a quality inhering in the other virtues (cf. ad%\ 53: φρόνησα . . . quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarutnque scientia . . .). In our case there is a sense in which the πρέπον is hardly distinguishable from the καλόι> in general because it is a quality that results from virtuous action; there is another sense, however, in which the πρέπον can be seen as one of the other virtues which form part of the καλόν, i.e., it has a content of its own corresponding in essentials with that of the older virtue σωφροσύνη. The relation of the two types of decorum as described in § 96 (viz., generate and huic subiectum or subiectum generi) is problematical, however. The two are not, as one might have thought, related as genus and species, for the "general" decorum is so by virtue of its manifestation in the honestum in general {quod in omni bonestate versatur)y whereas what is called the subor­ dinate decorum has its own content and, just like each of the other three virtues, is subordinate to and forms part of, not the decorum generate (in spite of the phrase aliud huic subiectum), but the honestum. Indeed, in a sense, the decorum generate could be said to be subordinate to it, since it is an €ττιγ€ΐ'όμα'υΐ' of action in accord with it, as of action in accord with each of the other virtues. Perhaps this inexactitude should be laid to Cicero's account (for other terminological infelicities in this section cf. ad § 142). The definitions themselves (still in § 96) are not free of difficulties. One supposed difficulty can be readily disposed of, however: the words with which the definitions are introduced {viz., sic fere definiri solet and sic definiunt) should not be used as a basis for arguing that Cicero is here departing from Panaetius {pace Gartner, 1974, 32); for Cicero elsewhere refers to his model vaguely in the plural (5 6: sequimur igitur. . . Stoicos); and the phrase sic definitur a Stoicis at $ 142 surely likewise refers to Panaetius. One prob­ lem is rather the omission of the idea that decorum is the visible manifesta­ tion of the quality named (cf. Philippson, 1930 1 , 388-89)—surprising in view of the terms of the preceding differentiation of honestum and decorum. Thus, unless the term apparet or the like can be convincingly supplemented to the text, we shall have to suspect Cicero of careless reproduction of his source. Another problem involves the incommensurability of the descriptio of the first sentence of § 96 with the definitions which then follow. From the descriptio one would assume that the statement honestum decet would fall within the decorum generate, whereas magnitudo animi decet or the like would be an example of the aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. This appears to have been Ambrose's understanding of the passage; cf. off. 1.222: est igitur decorum quod praeeminet, cuius divisio

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gemina est. nam est decorum quasi generale quod per universitatem funditur honestatis et quasi toto spectatur corpore; est etiam speciale quod in parte aliqua enitet. The first of Cicero's following definitions, that of the decorum generate, would not be at odds with this view. However, the subordinate type of decorum is defined only in terms of action in accord with moderatio et temperantia etc., so that Cicero appears to lose sight of the other three virtues. A. Dietrich, "Zu Cicero de officiis," Jahrbiicher fur Philologie und Pddagogik 89 (1864), 527-29, sought to solve this problem by substituting ad singubrem partem for ad singulas partes, so as to read: est autem eius descriptio duplex; nam et generale quoddam decorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad sin­ gubrem partem honestatis. However, the transmitted text receives support at this point from the paraphrase of the subordinate decorum at § 98 (hoc quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis); it strains credulity to suppose that this text, too, has been corrupted independently so as to yield the same sense as our passage (as transmitted), the assumption of those who, with Beier, followed by Dietrich, would read in § 98 in uno quodam (or aliquo) genere virtutis or, more elegantly, with Unger, 34: in uno suoque genere virtutis. An alternative is to assume that both passages owe their form to a misunderstanding on Cicero's pan ("delirat Cicero [similiter 1.98 in uno quoque genere]n Winterbottom ad he). The problem will reside, however, not in the formulation ad singubs partes honestatis, which is confirmed not only by $ 98 but also by the catalogue of decorous actions in § 94, but in the definition of the subordinate type of decorum itself, which ought to have been framed more broadly; as M.W. Haslam (to whom I am generally in­ debted for clarification of this passage) points out, in Greek an dei attached to the equivalent of quod naturae consentaneum sit would do. Did Cicero perhaps formulate as he did because he felt the subordinate type of decorum as manifested under the other virtues had been sufficiently described at § 94? Finally, even if one otherwise accepts the definition of the subordinate decorum, what is the point of the added prepositional phrase cum specie quadam liberalii Surely the emphasis on moderatio et temperantia is all that is needed to indicate the tendency of this virtue. What Cicero evidently has in mind becomes clearer in § 141, where the phrase recurs, coupled with dignitas (ea quae pertinent ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem). Now dignitas could, like decorum or the πρεπορ itself, be a relative term ("fitness [for a task, etc., stated or implied]": OLD s.v., 1); it could, however, also be an absolute term ("excellence** or, in particular, "standing, esteem": ibid., 2 and 4). I suspect, then, that the stipulation cum specie quadam liberali has been

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added by Cicero to anchor the conduct he is advocating to the social context appropriate to his addressee and other intended readers,137 i.e., to exclude moderatio et temperarttia being taken to extremes of servility. Panaetius may well have been content with nature as his guide and not have felt the need for an external, social prop; cf. ad $ 96. The simile of the poets is introduced ostensibly to clarify the preceding definitions {haec ita intellegi possumus existimare ex eo decoro quod poetae sequuntur . . . : $ 97), but it also serves to adumbrate elements of the personae theory. We are shown by example that to put a wicked sentiment into the mouth of a good character would be a violation of poetic decorum, whereas such a thought spoken by a wicked character would give rise to applause. The poet and the moral agent thus have two points in common: both judge decorum ex persona and both strive for approval.138 But the expected com­ parison of the poets to "us" as moral agents is implied rather than stated. What ensues instead is a dilation on the role of "nature," which is said to fix the persona of human beings in several ways, viz., a) by making it far better than that of other animals, b) by assigning roles of constantia, moderatio, temperantia, verecundia, and c) by instilling a concern with how we bear ourselves toward others, where b) and c) are, however, essentially two ways of stating the same thing. As a conclusion to this simile one expects "there­ fore we can act only a good part" or the like. Instead, however, Cicero twists the conclusion so that it forms an illustration of the scope of the two types of decorum defined in § 96. Now the simile of the poets is actually a better illustration of the way a moral agent should choose which persona is appro­ priate to himself—a use to which it is, in fact, put at 5 114—than of the distinction between the two types of decorum, since both of these perform an essentially similar function in limiting the roles available to the individual (cf. further ad § 97); nor is the scope (quam late fusum sit: $ 98) of the two types of decorum the obvious goal of the argument.139 The theme of approbatio, though touched on in the simile of the poets [Atreo dicente plausus excitantur: § 97), was there in danger of being lost and thus had to be reinforced in a following simile comparing the decorum in its effect on the observer to physical beauty. The section concludes with a comparison of the two social 137. Cf. Cael. 6, where his client is said to have a liberalis species; as Austin remarks ad loc., it often denotes merely a "well-bred appearance." 138. Cf. the comparison of the tragic actor and the moral agent at Epict. 1.29.41-43 to make the point that the mere costume/externals should not be confused with the art of acting/ behaving. 139. Questions of the scope of the subject matter have, however, been of concern to Cicero from the beginning; cf. $ 4.

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virtues, iustitia and verecundia (§ 99). Hasty adaptation of material origi­ nally put to different use and the attempt to make too many different points at once would account for the state of our text. 1 4 0 At the end of $ 99 Cicero remarks: his igitur expositis quale sit id quod decere dicimus intellectum puto. In fact, however, it is not so. The nature of το πρέπον reveals itself only slowly and indirectly, and important stations are yet to come, including the curbing of the passions (§§ 100-3), the aequabilitas universae vitae (§ 111), and the musical simile (§§ 145-46). 93 Sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecun­ dia et quasi quidam ornarus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cemitur.] Cicero evidently wants at first to emphasize familiar aspects of this topic; only gradually does he intro­ duce difficult distinctions (cf. ad §§ 93-99). Verecundia, temperantia, and modestia were all qualities well known to Cicero's readers; temperantia and modestia, which already figure in the paraphrase of the fourth virtue at § 15a (cf. also the end of § 96), were treated as synonyms as early as PI. Mer. 54, where intemperans is paraphrased as non modestus; cf. North, 2 6 2 - 6 3 , and, for the equivalence of verecundia and modestia, 267 (a propos PI. Mos. 120 ff., esp. 139). For temperantia and modestia as an omatus vitae cf. Soph. Aj. 293 (as well as PI. R. quoted below): -γυναιξί κόσμον ή σιγή 4>cp€i; for the terms in Roman ethical discourse cf. North, 2 6 2 - 6 3 ; cf. also ad 2.46. Cicero subsumes temperantia and modestia under the term frugalitas, which he applies to his client, at Deiot. 26; the two terms appear as possible equiv­ alents for σωφροσύνη at Tusc. 3.16: . . . qui sit temperans—quern Graeci σώφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant% quam soleo equidem turn temperantiam, turn moderationem appellate, non numquam etiam modestiam; . . . For the Stoics generally beginning with Chrysippus one of the major divisions of ethics was that dealing with the passions (cf. SVF 3, 3.3 = D.L. 7.84); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,141 ff. Cicero associated temperantia with control of the passions as early as Inv. 2.164: temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. eius partes continentia, dementia, modestia; cf. also Fin. 2.60: . . . temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi oboediens. For a Roman rerum modus would be an obvious complement to modestia (Cicero 140. Labowsky, 20, suggests that **. . . wir es hier mit einem vorlaufigen und eiligen Exzerpt aus dcr Panairischen Vorlagc zu tun ha ben . . ."; however, Att. 16.11.4 (τά irepi τοΰ κπθηκυιττο^, quatenus Panaettus, absolvi duobus) tells against the notion that Cicero regarded this pan of the work as provisional ("vorlaufig"). She also made the text more difficult than it had to be by retaining the ut presented in $ 97 by the C tradition but omitted in ζ; Atzert, whose 1932 edition she follows here, bracketed ut in later editions.

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alludes to the latter's etymology at $ 142; cf. also North, 263); although this connection did not exist in the Greek, Panaetius was sufficiently φιλοαριστοτεΛης (fr. 57) to favor moderation in various spheres (cf. ad §S 14, 34, 89, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 141; 2.59). In this series of terms one misses, however, the critical word constantia, the achievement of which was a goal of the sedatto perturbationum animi (cf. $ 137). Moreover, the mere listing of items rather than careful attention to their relations is, of course, characteristic of someone writing in haste. verecundia] Cf. [PI.) Def. 412c: αιδώς τολμήσεως ύποχώρησις εκουσία δικαί­ ως· και προς το βελτιστον φανεν καταλαβή εκουσία του βέλτιστου* ευλάβεια όρθου ψόγου. The Peripatos subordinated αιδώς to σωφροσύνη; cf. Arist. £ £ 1234a30-32:o μεν ουν φθόνος· είςάδικίαν συμβάλλεται. . . και ή νεμεσιςείς δικαιοσύνην, ή (δ') αιδώς εις σωφροσύνην; [Arist.] VV 1250bll—12: παρεπεται δε τη σωφροσύνη ευταξία, κοσμιότης, αιδώς, ευλάβεια. The older Stoa offered these definitions: SVF 3, 101.34: αιδώς δε φόβος έπι προσδοκία ψό­ γου; ibid., 105.40: αίδώς μεν ουν εστίν ευλάβεια όρθοϋ ψόγου. In our text verecundia will play a role under the first persona (handled in effect proleptically at §§ 105-6) and in the discussion of the body (§§ 126 ff.). . . . quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia . . .] Cf. PI. R. 430e: κόσμος πού τις . . . ή σωφροσύνη εστίν καΐ ηδονών τίνων και επιθυμιών εγκράτεια, ώς φασι κρείττω δη αυτού άποφαίνοντες- ούκ όΐδ* δντινα τρόπον, και άλλα άττα τοιαύτα ώσπερ ϊχνη αυτής λέγεται. Cf. ad $§ 61-92 on the Aristotelian status of μεγαλοψυχία as the κόσμος of all the virtues. . . . sedatio perturbationum animi. . .] Cf. SVF 3,64.44 ff. = Stob. 2,62.7 ff. W.-H. (a passage claimed for Hecato by Philippson, 1930 1 ,364-65; he notes the use of άφορμαί thought to be characteristic of Panaetius; cf. ad §§ 1 1 14): πασών δε τούτων τών αρετών το τέλος είναι το ακολούθως τη φύσει £ήν έκάστην δε τούτου διά τών ιδίων παρεχεσβαι τυγχάνοντα τόν άνθρωπον. εχειν γαρ άφορμάς παρά της φύσεως και προς την του καθήκοντος ευρεσιν και προς την τών ορμών εύστάθειαν και προς τάς ύπομονάς και προς τάς άπονεμήσεις. The topic, handled in detail at §§ 101-103a, will recur at SS 132 and 141. hoc loco continetur id quod did Latine decorum potest, Graece enim πρέπον dicitur {decorum}.] Γίρεπειν replaced the older Greek idiom κόσμον φερειν (cf. Hdt. 8.60 and 142.2) as a term for appropriate behavior. The Latin decorum, attested in a corresponding sense as early as PI. As. 701 (si verum quidem et decorum erum vehere servum, I inscende), was indeed an obvious equivalent for the Greek πρέπον and appears as such as early as Orat. 70 (from the year 46): ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre: πρέπον appellant hoc Graeci, nos dicamus sane decorum.

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de quo praeclare et tnulta praecipiuntur et res est cognitione dignissima. huius ignoratione non modo in vita sed saepissime in poematis et in oratione peccatur. It is likewise used for πρέπον in the translation of the Timaeus on which Cicero was at work in 45 (viz., %% 17 = 33b and 30 = 38e). 141 —The second decorum is rightly ousted by recentiores beginning with Bibl. Brit. Reg. 15.A.XX (s. XII). 94 huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari; nam et quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet.] On Panaetius' general doctrine of the inseparability of the virtues cf. § 1 5 ; for the analogy to Aristotle's treat­ ment of justice cf. ad §§ 93-99.—Cicero will later rake a similar line for the utile (cf. 2.10 and Book 3 in general), though this fact should not be invoked in favor of Gartner's thesis that the πρέπον occupied the second book of Panaetius' treatise (cf. introduction, § 5 (5] with literature); cf. SVF 3,21.42 (= Stob. 2, 69.11 W.-H.): πάντα δε τάγαθά ωφέλιμα είναι και εύχρηστα και συμφέροντα και λυσιτελή και σπουδαία και πρέποντα και καλά και οίκεΐα; Fin. 3.14:. . . unum tstud, quod honestum appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum . . . (sim. Tusc. 2.30).—For vis = "sense" cf. OLD s.v., 18a. quaJis autem differentia sit honesri et decori, facilius imellegi quam explanari potest.] Cicero himself uses the two as synonyms at Fin. 2.35 (quoted ad SS 5-6) and 2.9 (addecus honestatemque). Both terms apply to actions that enjoy approval in society. On the effect of the honestum see $ 55, as well as Book 2 in general, especially 2.17 and 32 ff. For the approval generated by the decorum cf. § 98b. quidquid est enim quod deceat, id turn apparet cum antegressa est honestas.] Panaetius evidently claims, not merely that decorum always accompanies the honestum, but that it is an external signal to the inner presence of the ho­ nestum since the hierarchically superior honestum is the condition for its manifestation {antegressa; cf. Graeser, 185); see further ad § 95. Panaetius' doctrine contrasts with the Hippias Maior (294a), where το πρέπον is not an infallible sign of an inner καλόν, but may be delusive. itaque non solum—sic indecorum.] That action in accord with the other virtues is decorous was not mentioned when they were discussed previously, surely because the decorousness of such action is an έπιγενόμενον rather than the essential nature of each virtue. Gartner, 1974, 36, sees this passage as the beginning of an empirical presentation of the subject, presumed to be Panaetian. Panaetian it surely is; but one should not ignore itaque, which indicates that this material follows from the preceding analysis of the relation 141. For rhc dare cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1150.57 ff.

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of the honestum and decorum. Cicero/Panaetius proceeds to work out for each of the three prior parts of the honestum the way in which decorum comes into play. It turns out that in each case action in accord with the virtue decett its neglect dedecet; indeed for the second and third virtues the stronger term turpe is deployed. Similarly, when Cicero/Panaetius comes to derive officia from the fourth virtue at § 100, the first recommendation is for action in accord with the first three virtues. Note in our passage the (surely Panaetian) broader interpretation of the first virtue as that of the use of λόγος generally, as opposed to the narrower version offered at §5 18-19 (see ad he). Furthermore for the first two virtues decet is used without specification of the person so that it seems to apply generally; the third virtue is different, however, since not everyone can (or would wish to) aspire to it; hence the limitation applied (with the unfortunate, tautological formulation quod ertim viriliter . . . fit, id dignum viro . . . videtur). nam et rarione uti—et mente esse c a p t u m ; . . . ] Cf. ad $ 18 above, where Cicero does not hesitate to use the term turpe of the opposite of intelligent and informed action; X. Mem. 3.9.6: μανίαν ye μην εναντίον μέν €*φη €Ϊναι σοφία, οΰ μέντοι ye την άν^πιστημοσύνην μανίαν ένόμιζ*' το δέ άγνοεΐν εαυτόν και ά μη οΐδε δοξά£€ΐν τε και οϊεσθαι γιγνώσκειν ίγγυτάτω μανίας€λογί£6το αναι; Fabio Stok, Omnes stultos insanire. La politica del paradosso in Cicerone, Akroamata 2 (Pisa, 1981), 14 ff. similis est ratio fortitudinis; quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit, id dignum viro et decorum videtur . . . ] Note the use of dignum viro in this context as a paraphrase for decorum; the adjective is critical to the explica­ tion of decorum in the simile of the poets at § 97: quod quaque persona dignum est; digna persona oratio. Contrast with our passage the deprecation of omnis viro non dignus ornatus at § 130. Erymologically connected with decet (cf. Ernout-Meillet s.v. decet)^ dignusldignitas play in general a promi­ nent role in Cicero's discussion of decorum (eighteen occurrences); dignitas figures as a designation for masculine comeliness corresponding to the femi­ nine venustas (§§ 107, 130) but also, as we have seen, as a paraphrase for decorus in the sense "appropriate to" (§§ 97, 104, 106, 144, 151); finally dignitas sometimes has its absolute sense of "public standing" (§§ 138,139, 141; cf. § 124: dignitas civitatis); one suspects that emphasis on this last point may be Cicero's; cf. ad $$ 9 3 - 9 9 , 9 6 {cum specie quadam liberalitatis), and 150-51. 95 est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod deceat;. . .] The shift to virtus here might merely be stylistic variatio (cf. also ad 2.18). However, the ambiguity {in omni virtute could mean "in every virtue" or "in the whole of virtue") might pave the way for the distinction in § 96 between

Commentary on Book 1, Section 94-96

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quod in omni honestate versatur and quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis.142 . . . quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari.] Cf. Fin. 5.67: atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur; ad 2.10, as well as the definition of the decorum generale given in 5 96 (sc. id. . . quod consentaneum sit hominis exceUentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat), hardly distinguishable from that of the honestum, based on drives that differentiate the human being from the beast (cf. §5 11-14). ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerai non potest a valetudine, sic hoc de quo loquimur decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.] Chrysippus had already constructed an analogy between body and soul, whereby a συμμ€τρία of elements or parts was characteristic of beauty in the one and health in the other; cf. SVF 3, 122.14 ff. (partly quoted ad $ 98); Philippson, 1930», 370-71. Our analogy does not "run on all fours" insofar as health is a condition, but not a suffi­ cient condition, of beauty, whereas Cicero/Panaerius presumably wants vir­ tue to be a sufficient condition for the decorum; cf. Graeser, 185. It also suggests that the absence of the πρέπον would not necessarily imply the absence of the καλόν; but this implication is contradicted by the reversability of § 94 init, [quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet). 96 On the definition of the two types of decorum cf. ad §§ 93-99. Est autcm eius descriptio d u p l e x ; . . . ] For descriptio as a "description serv­ ing to identify or define" or the like cf. OLD s.v., 3b and Vetter, TLL 4, 666.53 ff.; sim. $ 101. atque illud superius [sc. decorum generale] sic fere definiri solet, decorum id esse quod consentaneum sit hominis exceUentiae in eo in quo natura cius a reliquis animantibus differat.J This definition, too imprecisely phrased, shows why there was such difficulty over the distinction between the ho­ nestum and decorum {see ad §S 93-99); Philippson, 1930», 388-89, located the deficiency in the absence of apparet, expected in light of § 94 to make it clear that decorum is the manifestation of the honestum in action. quae autem pars subiecta generi est, earn sic definiunt ut id decorum velint esse quod ita naturae consentaneum sit ut in eo moderatto et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.] The subordinate πρέπον involves the manifestation of σωφροσύνη cum specie quadam liberali. Here the πρέπον receives a distinctive content (cf. § 93); but Cicero never explains how or why this definition pertains to the other three parts of the καλόν. In fact, in 142. I owe this observation to M.W. Haslam.

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$ 94 we were led to believe that the πρ€ποι> of each of the other three virtues was simply the manifestation of action in accordance with that virtue (see ad SS 93-99). . . . cum specie quadam liberali] The phrase was oddly misunderstood by Philippson, 1930 1 , 389 (cf. Philippson, 1936 2 , 777, n. 6) as the eioos eXeuGepias instead of the eloos €\eu6epiou; for the sense of liberalis "worthy of a free man . . . decent" cf. OLD s.v., 2a and Meijer, TLL 7.1, 1290.39 ff.; Gartner, 32 and n. 31; Kloft, 38 and n. 11; the πρβπον, of necessity, is confined to the realm of species ("outward appearance": OLD s.v., 5); the phrase recurs at S 141. Its implications appear more clearly perhaps in the disapprobation of the ilUberale genus iocandi at SS 103b-5 and the list of illiberales etsordidi quaestus at S 150, as well as the remark that there is nihil hotnine libero dignius than agriculture (S 151).—It is tempting to believe that it was Cicero himself who felt the need for an external, social standard as a prop and added this phrase accordingly (cf. the view attributed to C. Lucilius at de Orat. 1.72:. . . neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus Us artibus quae sunt libero dignae perpolitus; ibid., 137: . . . quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum . . .); but one's view of whether Panaetius was content with nature as a sufficient standard for moderatio and temperantia and would have regarded this qualifier as a threat to the integrity of the virtue may be bound up with one's judgment as to whether a Panaetian original lies behind SS 150-51 (see ad loc). 9 7 - 9 8 Pohlenz, πρεποι>, has investigated the history of the term and its application to literary studies. In itself empty of content, it merely denotes the commensurability of two phenomena; cf., with reference to benefactions, Sen. Ben. 2.16.1, cited n. 130 supra. It was invoked by the Alexandrian scholars as a criterion in textual criticism; e.g., Aristonicus reports the athe­ tosis (sc. by Aristarchus) of //. 20.180-86 on the grounds that they are vulgar in construction and sense and the words unsuitable (ου πρεποιτέ?) to Achilles' person (προσώττω; the speech, addressed to Aeneas, suggests several materialistic motives for him to want to face Achilles in battle: the prospect of reigning in Troy—dismissed in view of Priam's progeny—or of a choice piece of property); cf. sch. Τ ad 11. 20.180-86a with Dietrich Luhrs, Vntersuchungen zu den Athetesen Aristarchs in der Ilias und zu ihrer Behandlung im Corpus der exegetischen Scholien (Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, 1992), 191, n. 153; other passages cited at Scholia Graeca in Homeri lliadem (scholia Vetera), ed. H. Erbse, 6 (Berlin, 1983), 459 s.v. πρίπβιν. For the term in Zenodotus' textual criticism cf. K. Nickau, Untersuchungen zur textkritischen Methode des Zenodotos von Ephesos (Berlin-New York, 1977), 183 ff.; for Aristarchus D.M. Schenkevcld, "Aristarchus and "Ομηρος φιλό-

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τΈχΐ'ος," Mnemosyne ser. 4,23 (1970), 167-70. 1 4 3 For the Stoics the general criterion for judging a poem was that its various relations be "appropriate" (πρέποντα; cf. De Lacy, 1948, esp. 271). The two similes of poetic decorum ostensibly illustrate the two types of πρέπον (albeit without further clarifying their relation to the other virtues). As the poet's text must be appropriate to the character represented, so must the life-role played by the individual be appropriate to that person's charac­ ter; but "nature" at once intervenes to place limits on the agent in two ways, each corresponding to a type of decorum: it provides a character greatly excelling that of other animals and one that is σώφρων. Panaetius thus imme­ diately bars the gate against the use of his theory to promote immoralism; cf. Gill, 1988, 179-80. The similes help to move the discussion ahead by adumbrating the doctrine of the four personae of the moral agent developed at §§ 107 ff. (the rational character given by nature in contradistinction to other animals being the first of the four), as well as by its explicit reference to a concern for quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus (implicit in the notion of σωφροσύνη), which will be developed in § 99. Cf. also ad §§ 93-99 and 97-98 [sed poetae—in uno quoque genere virtutis). 97 Haec ita intelligi possumus existimare ex eo decora quod poetae sequuntur, de quo alio loco plura dici solent.] Perhaps a vague reference to hand­ books on poetics; see Hon Ars 92 ff., based on a Peripatetic treatise of the type Cicero may have in mind. 144 Cicero had dealt with decorum in oratory zxOrat. 7 1 - 7 4 . sed turn servare iilud poetas quod deceat dicimus cum id quod quaque per­ sona dignum est et fit et dicitur . . .] The implicit premise is Aristotle's con­ ception of poetry as imitation [Poet. 1447al3 ff.), so that the characters should conform to what would be expected from such a character in real life; cf. De Lacy, 1948, 2 5 6 - 5 7 . For the πρέπον in characterization see Hor. Ars 119-24 and 309-16. For the πρέπον in style cf. Arist. Rhet. 1 4 0 4 b l - 2 , 3 - 5 , 12-18 and 1408a 1 0 - 1 1 ; it was later one of Theophrastus' four excellences of style; cf. loannes Stroux, De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi (Leipzig, 1912), 16-18; Kroll, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1073.17 ff. . . . ut si Aeacus aut Minos diceret 'oderint dum metuant' aut 'natis sepulcro ipse est parens* indecorum videretur—est enim digna persona orario.] The two verses correspond respectively to Accius, trag. 2 0 3 - 4 and 226 (from the

143. For Panaetius* interest in (Platonic) philology cf. ad $ 28 above; for his admiration of Aristarchus, whom he called a μάι>τι? for his ability to divine the sense of poetry, fr. 93. 144. On Ncoptolcmus of Parium and his relation to the Ars poetica cf. CO. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cambridge, 1963), 43 ff.

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Atreus); Cicero cites Ennius* treatment of the subject at 2.23. Cf. Tusc. 1.98, where Aeacus and Minos appear, together with Rhadamanthys and Triptolemus, 145 among the judges of the dead; a sharper contrast to the wicked Atreus could hardly be imagined. Cf. in general Plut. Aud. Poet. 18d: . . . οικεία δε και πρέποντα τόϊ? αισχροί? τά αισχρά.—For another example of a lapse of poetic decorum cf. Orat. 74: . . . peccat etiam [sc. poeta] cum probam orationem affingit improbo stultove sapientis; . . . Cf. also Att. 13.16.1, where Cicero concedes that the earlier version of his Academica had seemed to depict Lucullus, Catulus, and Hortensius engaged in philosophical controversy παρά το πρέπον and altered accordingly to introduce more learned speakers, namely Varro, Atticus, and himself (cf. Att. 13.18).—For digna cf. ad § 94. 9 7 - 9 8 sed poetae—in uno quoque genere virtutis.] The comparison of "us** as moral agents with poets, carried further, becomes a contrast: the poets "see" (and represent) what befits {quid. . . deceat) all characters, good and bad; Panaetius rules out the possibility that "we" have (and should act in accord with) a bad character; this latter point is made in two steps, each presented as a provision of nature: nature has given (a) a character excelling that of beasts; (b) more particularly it has provided a character marked by consistency and σωφροσύνη (to the latter is appended what is really a defini­ tion of the attitude of the σώφρων, viz., a concern for quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus, which is presented as a teaching of nature). The expected conclusion ("therefore we can act only a good part") is, however, elided. Instead Cicero presents the broad scope (quam late fusum sit) of the two types of decorum, which correspond to restrictions (a) and (b) on the character of the agent, as the consequence [efficitur ut); cf. ad § 13. The relation of ideas is oddly expressed; thus the fact that under (b) two actions of "nature" are presented in parallel somewhat obscures the fact that (a) corresponds to the decorum generate, which Cicero had, by definition, set in relation to the natura hominis, (b) to the subordinate type of decorum. A further problem is that what were first presented as two types of decorum now appear in a different function as two limitations on the moral agent prior to action; they could thus be more truly said to be predeterminants of decorous action. In general, the Stoics regarded an individual human deci­ sion (or, in Stoic terms, an assent (συγκατάθεση] to a presentation [φαντασίαΐ) as part of a chain of causes determined by various factors, e.g., heredity, education, past decisions, etc.; cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,106; Sandbach, 103; SVF 2, 291.33 ff. and 293.22 ff.; ad $S 107-21. Chrysippus used the 14.5. Cf. Cicero's encomium of the Eleusinian mysteries ar Leg. 2.36.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 97-98

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analogy of a cylinder that rolls down an incline not only because it has been given a push but also because of its own nature {SVF 2,282.20 ff.). Panaetius has chosen to emphasize that, in the case of human beings, one's nature is determined by the endowment of intelligence and verecundia. Panaetius was evidently at pains to show that the comparison of "us" as moral agents with poets is imperfect; "we" do not have an unlimited number of characters to choose from; rather the parameters for "our" behavior have been set by "nature." However, to identify, as Cicero does, the two proper­ ties imposed on the human character by nature with two types of decorum is to commingle cause and effect; in terms of the logic of the simile, too, the conclusion, in which the two types of decorum figure {efficitur ut et il~ \ud . . .), gives the impression of having been pasted on. Cf. also ad S§ 9 3 99, 114, and, on the simile of the poets determining the whole presentation of the fourth virtue, ad §§ 126-49. 98 . . . nobis autem cum a natura constantiae moderations temperantiae verecundiae partes datae sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus . . .] This distinction, intro­ duced ostensibly as a paraphrase for the two types of decorum, is more apparent than real, since moderatio, temperantia, and verecundia all involve regard for the feelings of one's fellow humans; cf. $ 99. ut enim pulchritudo—dictorum omnium atque factotum.] The simile eluci­ dates {enim) the point just made, viz., the importance of hoc decorum quod elucet in vita by virtue of its ability to arouse the approval of others. This material also serves as a kind of (implicit) conclusion to the comparison with poets: as the proper observance of poetic decorum gives rise to ovations in the theater [plausus excitantur), so the observance of decorum in life wins approval; cf. also ad § 94. . . . pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos . . .] Cf. Arist. Top. 116b21: το δε κάλλος των μελών τις συμμετρία δοκεΐ είναι; SVF 3, 122.19 (sim. 154.34): . . . τό δε κάλλος εν τη |sc. συμμετρία] των μορίων; Clem. ΑΙ. Paed. 272.7-8 and 17 ff., cited ad $ 130 {formae autem dignitas—). . . . hoc decorum quod elucet in vita movet approbationem eorum quibuscum vivitur ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.] For elucere cf. ad % 94; for constantia ad §§ 93, 103, and 111; the ordo of actions corresponds, of course, to the symmetry of the beautiful {apta compositio membrorum; cf. S 14: convenientia partium; cf. further 5 142 a propos ευκαιρία). The doctrine of approbatio of the honestum without reference to decorum appears at $ 55 and Fin. 5.62 {quis est tarn dissimilis homini, qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et com-

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probatione honestatisf). The approbatio of one's fellows is that consequence of virtuous action which gives it weight in the realm of the utile; it thus forms the pivot of Panaetius' doctrine of appropriate actions; cf. Gartner, 1974,55 ff. On the basis primarily of our passage, Gartner, 1981, 98 ff., suggests that the outline of political theory at Plb. 6.3-9 with its emphasis on the multi­ tude's agreement with the ruler may have been influenced by Panaetius (cf. also 2.23 ff.); on Panaetius and Polybius see further p. 354, n. 5. 99 Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquomm.] Another elliptical connection (cf. $ 1 3 ) , since the need to have regard for others* feelings does not strictly follow from the fact that decorous action meets with approval (igitur); cf. Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lack­ ing"; it might rather be said to follow from the next argument (neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat. . . est. . . omnino dissoluti); it is, however, taken for granted that decorous action is to be sought. The genitives optimi cuius­ que et reliquorum depend, of course, on reverentia; the distinction is likely to have been introduced by Cicero, rather than Panaetius; cf. ad 2.43, where the appeal to the opinion of the boni undercuts the previous analysis of mass psychology. nam neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat non solum adrogantis est sed etiam omnino dissoluti.] This observation provides negative confirmation of the importance of seeking the approval of one's fellows. Contrast § 65: etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hie in magnis viris non est habendus. The μεγαλόψυχο? certainly borders on adrogantia; but if con­ fronted with the two passages, Cicero/Pa η aeti us would presumably have distinguished between pendere and non neglegere and have emphasized that in the earlier passage the judgment was explicitly false.—Cf. Thphr. Char. 9.1: ή δέ άμαισχυιτία έστ\ μέν, ώς ορφ \afklv. κσταφρόνησι? δόξτ\ς . . . ; the topic comes in for detailed discussion at §§ 126-28 (cf. ad loc). est autem quod differat—in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.] Finally Cicero has found a formula for differentiating decorum from, at any rate, one of the other virtues (. . . non offendere, in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori; cf. his groping efforts in §§ 93-95). In the case of the second virtue it is the person or property of others that is violated, in the case of our virtue, their feelings. For non offendere within the realm of the utile (with reference to the conferring of benefits) cf. the precepts at 2.68. his igitur expositis quale sit id quod decere dicimus intellectual puto.] Per­ haps Cicero is too optimistic here; for various aspects of the decorum con­ tinue to emerge as it were guttatim in the following chapters; cf. ad §§ 9 3 99.

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100-3a Officium autem—neglegenterque agamus.] This section on the derivation of appropriate actions from the fourth "part" of the honestum begins by repeating (cf. S 94) that action in accord with the other three virtues is decorous; then the discussion focuses on what is specific to the fourth "part," the testing of the animi motus to see that they accord with nature. The basis is a twofold division of the animus, into appetituslop\ii\ and ratio. For the early Stoa the passions (πάθη) are a rational impulse, but a wrong one; one of the tasks of philosophy was therefore to combat them; hence in addition to the three books nep! παθών Chrysippus wrote a fourth θ€ραπ€υτικο£, evidently directed toward a wider readership (SVF 3,202); cf. Pohlcnz, Stoa, 1, 141 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 127 ff. Our passage alludes to all four passions generally recognized by the Stoa (cf. ad S 69; licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt {$ 102]); the program, however, is not to eradi­ cate them, as in the earlier Stoa (cf. SVF 3, nos. 444 and 447; Tusc. 4.43, cited ad § 89 above), but merely to subordinate them to reason; on this project as an engagement of the problem of the Stoic προκύπτων cf. Gill, 1994, 4605-6. In Panaetius' treatment the simile of the poets may perhaps have been positioned to lead more directly into the personae theory; if so, SS 101-3a may originally have been subsumed under the first persona but promoted to their present, more prominent position by Cicero (indeed he does not tire of hammering home the need to control the passions; no doubt he thought his son in need of this admonition; cf. SS 132a and 141, ad SS 103b-4, perhaps also promoted by Cicero to their present location, and ad$ 114). 100 Officium autem quod ab eo ducitur . . . ] Cf. S 15 (sed omne quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua) and 2.1 (quemadmodum officio ducerentur ab honestate . . . satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore). Our passage provides, however, the clearest distinction of the two aspects of the problem: establishing a) the quid sit of the "part" of the honestum (SS 93-99) and b) the officia derived from it (SS 100 ff.). . . . hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conscrvarionemquc naturae; . . .J Again decorum is difficult to distinguish from the honestum as a whole (cf. SS 94-95 and next note).—Labowsky, 21, notes the imprecision of the expression: "nicht die Pflicht als solche 'hat ja einen Weg' (μέθοδος), sondern es gibt einen solchen fur ihre Ableitung und um diescn handelt es sich im folgenden." . . . quam si sequemur ducem . . .] A slight variatio of the Stoic τέλος for­ mula of "life according to nature" (cf. S 22 and ad 3.13); the sequel amounts to a synopsis of SS 11-14.

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. . . sequemurque et id quod acutum et perspicax natura e s t . . . ] The origi­ nal (albeit late attested) sense "having keen or penetrating sight" gives rise by easy transference to "attentive to what is going on, observant"; the further shift to "intelligent** is assisted at Ten Hau. 874 (as in our passage) by a preceding synonym: ego me non tarn astutum neque ita perspicacem esse id sciot at trag. inc. 58 by the limited noun: Palamedi perspicax prudentia; our passage is the earliest attestation in prose; cf. OLD and Forcellini s.v. . . . id quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum . . .] Though the correlative verb consociare occurs already at PI. Rud. 551, consociatio here makes its first appearance in extant Latin literature. In fact, Cicero shows a notable fondness for the word (his coinage?) in this sector of Off. (cf. §§ 149 and 157); cf. Probst, TLL 4, 474.68 ff. . . . neque enim solum corporis qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi . . .] For the argument advancing from body to mind, where order is still more important {multo etiam magis), cf. $ 14. Note that in the sequel the motus animi are given prior treatment to the motus corporis (taken up at § 126), just as in Book 2 quae Jsc. res] virtuti propiores sunt (2.22) arc, at least theoretically, given priority to other means of win­ ning the support of one's fellows; cf. the introduction to Book 2. 101 duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: . . .] Similar to Panaetius' procedure here is Socrates' argument at Phdr. 271a that the intending rheto­ rician must study the soul to determine πότεροι» h> και δμοιον π€φυκ€ΐ> ή κατά σώματος μορφή»' πολυ€ΐδ€ς· τούτο γαρ φαμ€ΐ> φύσιΐ' αι>αι δεικνύναι. duplex est enim—fugiendumque sit.] The basic Stoic view of the soul as material and consisting of fire and breath (π^υμα) continues to be the prem­ ise (cf. SVF 1, 38.3 ff.; Sandbach, 60, n. 1, and 82 ff.). The later Stoa attempted some refinements within this scheme, however; thus Tertullian (anim. 14) reports that Chrysippus distinguished eight parts of the soul (SVF 1,90.16-17; 2,234.31 ff.; cf. Inwood, 1985,29), Panaetius six (fr. 85). Both men accepted the ηγεμονικοί*, located in the heart (cf. SVF 2, 228.1 ff.), as one of these parts and as comprising the powers 1 4 6 ορμή and λόγος (cf. SVF 2, 227.23-25: οί Στωικοί φασιΐ' eivai της ψυχής άι>ώτατον μ^ρος το ήγ€μοι>ικόι>, το ποιούν τάς φαντασίας καΐ συγκαταθίσας και αίσθήσ€ΐς καΐ ορμάς· και τοΰτο λογισμοί* καλούσιν). Panaetius differed from the older Stoa in recognizing the ορμή as an irrational element (quae hominem hue et illuc

146. Cicero would have been more accurate to speak of vires (= δυκΐμίΐς) of the soul, as Panaetius doubtless did after Chrysippus; cf. SVF 2,230.23:. . . ούτω και η ψυχή ολη δι' όλου δύο ί χ α τάςάιτιπαρηκούσαςάλλήλαις δυναμό. ώι> ή μέι>€στι λογικη,ήδέ άλογος . . . ;Philippson, 1930', 382; Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 100 (ad p. 198, last paragraph).

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rapit) independent of λόγος; cf. Philippson, 1929, 358-59; Grilli, 72 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 2 9 2 - 9 3 , η. 19. 1 4 7 Cf. the famous simile of the soul as a charioteer controlling two horses: και πρώτον μέν ημών ό άρχων συνωρίδος ήνιοχίΐ, €Ϊτα τώνϊτπτων ύ μέν αΰτφ καλός Τ€ και αγαθός και έκ τοιούτων, ό δ' έξ εναντίων Τ€ και ενάντιος (PI. Phdr. 246b); cf. also $ 132a and, in general, Inwood, 1985, ch. 2. (ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetims obtemperet. omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia, nee vero agere quicquam cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere descriptio officii.}] Facciolati sug­ gested that these sentences were stitched together from Fin. 3.58 and that their removal from our passage would restore a proper connection of thought (however, though Fin. 3.58 does include the definition est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit, the author of these words could have found a similar formulation nearer to hand at § 8: medium autem officium id esse dicunt quod cur factum sit ratio probabilis reddi possit (though Cicero may have taken this definition in rum from ft». 3.58 or its source]). Indeed our passage, as transmitted, does present a strange juxtaposition of dogmatic and hortatory elements (ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet . . . efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant. . . ) connected very loosely (Winterbottom ad he. notes that one might rather expect igitur for the underlined autem). Facciolari's athetesis was revived by Jachmann, 215, n. 1, and justified in detail by his student Briiser, 126 ff. Not all of the arguments that have been adduced in its favor are equally cogent, however. Thus, for instance, no one who pays close attention to the connections of thought throughout Off. and Cicero's other philosophical works will be greatly troubled by the loose connective ita fit ut (cf. below p. 349, n. 212), which, like ex quo efficitur (cf. 3.25), is a common Ciceronian formula: cf. $ 142 (sicfitut), § 160, Amic. 97, Fin. 5.68, Tusc. 2.16, 3.1, N.D. 1.37, 88, 121, Leg. 1.58, etc.; cf. also ad S 13.»4* More problematic, however, is that actio should, according to the trans­ mitted text, be the subject of agere. Thomas, 48, attempts to defend the transmitted text on this point by appeal to similar inadvertances at §§ 80, 134, and 3.37 in order to show that "Cicero kann das eigentliche Subjekt aus den Augen verlieren." He can indeed, but only where a substantial body of 147. Appetitus and appetitio alternate as Cicero's rendering of ορμή; cf. 2.18 and other passages cited by Gtuckcr, 1995, 118, n. 18. 148. In his defense of the transmitted text Thomas, 45-46, fails to distinguish clearly between the cause (γαρ) and the result, so that the "parallels" he adduces lack relevance.

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text intervenes, as in Thomas' first two examples: (1) fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nee tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti. . . (§ 80), where one would have expected fortis vero viri. . . ; (2) sit ergo hie sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos. nee vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios. . .(SI 34), where the sermo itself substitutes for the person engaged in such conversation. In both of these cases, however, the shift to a personal subject is at a greater distance from the original subject than in our passage. On the other hand, Thomas' third example, 3.37, is not truly relevant: quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant utrum id sequantur quod honestum esse videant; here there is no analogous problem since qui deliberant refers back to hoc deliberantium genus by a common type of constructio ad sententiam: cf. Kuhner-Sregmann, 1, 30. In spite of Thomas' attempted defense, then, the problem of mala Latinitas (characterization of Atzert4 ad loc.) remains. Other arguments both for and against authenticity are less than decisive. It is true, as Briiser notes, that several points made in the suspect passage are taken up in the sequel; in particular ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet presents in dogmatic form the precept efficiendum . . . est ut appetitus rationioboediant. . . (S 102) and omnis. . . actio vacaredebet temeritateet neglegentia is similar t o . . . excitandamque animadversionem et diligentiam, ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus (S 103). Here the problem is not the repetition per se, for in this essay devoted to moral praecepta Cicero is by no means averse to repeating himself (cf. exam­ ples offered in another connection by Thomas, 29 1 4 9 ), but rather the jum­ bling together of dogma and exhortation (see above). Another argument in favor of authenticity has been drawn from the description of qui appetitus longius evagantur at S 102: relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nee rationi parent, cut sunt subiecti lege naturae, the argument being that the subjection of the appetites to reason lege naturae presupposes the point ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet, since, if the suspect matter is removed, the subordination of the appetites is presented merely as something to be striven for (efficiendum . . . est ut appetitus rationi oboediant. . .), not a fixed state; cf. Thomas, 4 3 - 4 4 . But the primacy of reason in decisionmaking is sufficiently indicated in the characterization of ratio as quae docet et explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque sit {% 101). 149. He should not, however, have termed 3.27 {atque etiam—esse communem) a recapitulation.

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On the whole, in view of problems of style and integration into context, the suspect matter seems likely to be an interpolation, albeit an early one (attested already at Ambr. off. 1.229). 102 efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant, eamque neque praecurram nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant. . . ] Cf. Pi. R. 44 le (Socrates to Glaucon): ούκοΰν τω μεν λογιστικώ άρχει ν προσήκει, σοφψ όντι και εχοιτι τήν υπέρ άπάσης τής ψυχής προμήθειαν, τω δε θυμοειδεΐ ύπηκόω είναι και συμμαχώ τούτου; Socrates goes on to describe how the irrational part of the soul will otherwise attempt to achieve dominance (442b).—The verb oboedire used of the appetitus is developed by images suggestive of undisciplined soldiers [praecurrere, ignavia, deserere), perhaps designed by Cicero to appeal to the imagination of a son with known military interests (cf. 2.45).—On the problem of the connection with autem see the previous note. qui appetitus . . . sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur . . . ] Cf. SVF 3, 92.4: ορμή μεν ούν φορά διανοίας επί τι ή άπό του· . . . . . . ex quo elucebit omnis constantia omnisque moderatio.] Cf. ad $ 94. nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt.] Zeno defined πάθος as ή άλογος και παρά φύσιν ψυχής κίνησις, ή ορμή πλεονάζουσα (SVF 1, 50.23); cf. SVF 3, 92.5: πάθος δε πλεονάζουσα ορμή ή ΰπερτείνουσατά κατά τον λόγον μέτρα* . . . ;sim. 95.14,113.14-15; ibid., 130.12: υπερβαίνουσα γάρ τον λόγον ή ορμή και παρά τούτον αθρόως φερομένη οικείως τ' αν πλεονάζειν ρηθ^ίη . . . \ cf. ad §§ 100-103a.— Kostermann, TLL 5,1948.16 ff., cites evidence for exsultare used of hooved animals; cf. § 90 above (horses); was Cicero perhaps thinking of the famous horse-simile at Phdr. 246 (cf. tamquam and ad § 101)? relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nee rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae; . . .] The military metaphors continue. Cf. Seneca's meta­ phor of the passions as disobedient soldiers at de Ira 1.9.4, on which see In wood, 1993, 171. On the basis for subiecti lege naturae cf. ad § 101. For lex naturae cf. ad 3.27. licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium vultus voces moms statusque mutantur.] Plut. de Cohib. Ir. 456a-b makes the same point: έμοι δ' ει τις εμμελής και κομψός ακόλουθος ην, ούκ αν ήχθόμην αύτοϋ προσφεροντος ε πι ταΐς όργαΐς εσοπτρον, ώσπερ ^νίοις προσφερουσι λούσαμενοις έπ' οϋδενι χρησίμω. το γάρ αυτόν ίδεΐν παρά φύσιν έ'χοντα και συντεταραγμενον ου μικρόν εστίν εις διαβολήν του πάθους. He follows this with the citation from a satyr play of Marsyas' rebuke to Athena for her distorted

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features while playing the flute: ούτοι πρεπα το σχήμα· του? αυλούς μ€&ς Ι και θωπλα λά£*υ και γνάθους€υθημόν€ι (TrGF, adesp. 381 Kn.-Sn. = sat. inc. F 35 Steffen). One wonders whether this was among the Panaetian examples curtailed by Cicero (cf. 2.16); for the distortion of the features of a person in anger cf. Sen. de Ira 1.1.7; 2.35.3 and 36.1; 3.4.1-2.—On voluptas nimia cf. ad 3.119.—In the sequel Cicero offers some precepts for motus statusque (sc. §S 126-32b) and speech (§S 132b-37); he warns against distortion of the facial expression as a result of over-exertion at $ 131 and alludes to the importance of decorum in facial expression in general at S 146 (see ad loc). 103a ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam revertamur, appetitus omnes contrahendos . . .] The phrase officii forma refers to the gerundive form of expression that has preceded (efficiendum autem est...: $ \02) and now ensues (appetitus omnes contrahendos etc.), not to the definition of officium at S 101 {pace Thomas, 44, n. 116, with predecessors whom he cites). 103b-4 Neque enim ita generati a natura sumus—.] The new topic 1 5 0 (ludus et iocus) is not introduced or connected to the preceding argument as one would have expected. A similar train of thought occurs at Arist. Pol. 1333a 16 ff., which begins with a division of the soul into two parts, one rational, the other capable of obeying reason. Then (after a further analysis of the rational soul) follows a division of βίος into ασχολία and σχολή (ibid., 30 ff.). But whereas Aristotle states that ασχολία is chosen for the sake of σχολή (ibid., 35-36), Cicero/Panaetius wants to emphasize the greater im­ portance of ασχολία in human life. Moreover, apart from the observation that the human being is not born for levity but that there is room for it when the serious business of life has been handled, the distinction of these two phases of life plays no role in the sequel. Note, too, that the topic of jokes would rather be expected under $134 (where this point is made: ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem. in primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus; quod maxime turn solet evenire cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per ridiculum aut severe maledice contumelioseque dicitur). Now Cicero jr. was evidently fond of jokes (cf. Fam. 16.21.4 [to Tiro; August, 44], in which he praises the iuncundissima convictio of Bruttius and adds: non est enim seiunctus iocus a philologia et cottidiana συζητή­ σει; ibid., 3, he tells of Cratippus' changed demeanor over dinner:. . . sublataque severitate philosophiae humanissime nobiscum iocatur). One 150. Surely a new paragraph should begin at this point (so, among recent editors. Testard and Winterbottom, but not Atzcrt4 or Fcdcli).

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wonders whether this fact, as well as an association of ideas after mentioning the need for diligence ut tie quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus (jokes being notoriously an outlet for just such thoughtless behavior 151 ), may have led Cicero to promote the subject for emphasis to this place. Wit was in any case a topic congenial to the orator, as the discus­ sion of the subject in his rhetorical writings, as well as his own practice (cf. ad 103b, 104), shows. For other suspected Ciceronian changes in the order of topics (to lend emphasis to Roman political concerns) cf. Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), de Offtciis, Topics, order of." 103b ludo autem et ioco uti illo quidem licet—sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet.] Cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 17.4: nee in eadem intentione aequaliter retinenda mens est, sed ad tocos devocanda. cum puerulis Socrates ludere non erubescebat etc.; Phil. 2.39-40, where Cicero defends himself against An­ tony's criticism of his witticisms in Pompey's camp (on which see Plut. Cic. 38.2 ff.) on grounds that, even in such times, there were moments of relaxa­ tion when jokes were in order, and that the fact that he was criticized both for gloom and jokes is proof of his moderation in both. 104 duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum inliberale petulans flagidosum obscenum, alterum elegans urbanum ingeniosum facetum . . .] S. Halliwell, "The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture," CQ 85 (1991), 2 7 9 - 9 6 , distin­ guishes between playful and consequential laughter (corresponding respec­ tively to Cicero's elegans, urbanum, etc. and inliberale, petulans, flagitiosum, etc.) and cites (284) evidence for the humor especially of the young assuming "irreverent or uncontrolled forms" (cf. Cic. Sen. 36: ut petulantia, ut libido magis est adulescentium quam senum . . .); hence the warnings of moralists such as Cicero/Panaetius.—Cicero had, of course, dealt in detail with the use of humor in oratory, at de Orat. 2.216-90 (a section sometimes singled out for separate treatment, as in Cicerone, Uexcursus de ridiculis, ed. G. Mon­ aco, 2d ed. [Palermo, 1968]) and Orat. 87-89. Ethical aspects of the ques­ tion are not ignored in de Orat. either; cf. 2.236-39 with Leeman-PinksterNelson-Rabbie, 2, 206 ff.; cf. in general Kroll, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1077.29 ff.—For petulantia cf. further ad § 127. . . . quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti s u n t . . . ] Panaetius evi­ dently shared the positive judgment of Old Comedy which prevailed in the Hellenistic age (cf. F. Quadlbauer, "Die Dichtcr der griechischen Komodie im literarischen Urteil der Anrike," WS 73 [1960], 45-51), as did Cicero (cf. Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy [New York, 1922], 9 1 151. Sec ad S 104 below.

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92); cf. also Hor. 5. 1.4.1 ff. Cicero has added Plautus; cf. Crassus' commen­ dation of the Latinity of Plautus and Naevius at de Orat. 3.45 (perhaps under the influence of Aelius Stilo's judgment [as reported by Varro apud Quint. Inst. 10.1.99 = gramm., p. 70, fr. 50 = p. 329, fr. 3211 that if the Muses should wish to speak Latin they would use the language of Plautus). In the archaizing second century, appreciation of Plautus reached its highwater mark; cf. Holford-Srrevens, 157-58. A work περί Σωκράτους is attested for Panaetius (fr. 50), as are judgments on the authenticity of various Socratic writings (ibid., frr. 123, 126 ff.); he also discussed Arisrippus' doctrines in a work titled περί αιρέσεων (ibid., fr. 49). Schmekel, 9 and 231 ff., posits a work περί Σωκράτους καΐ των Σωκρα­ τικών, of which the περί Σωκράτους would have formed a part, separate from the περί αιρέσεων. But our evidence is insufficient to support SchmekePs firm distinction between a historical study on the one hand (sc. περί Σωκράτους και των Σωκρατικών) and a doxographical study (περί αιρέσεων) on the other (Panaetius would, for instance, on SchmekePs theory, have had to treat Aristippus twice, once for his doctrine and once for the critical study of his writings [cf. frr. 49 and 123 respectively]). It is perhaps safer—and certainly more economical—to assume that the large work περί αιρέσεων included all the Socratic material. In any case, Panaetius had, in the course of his re­ search, to familiarize himself with the various Socratici libri, a task that our passage (= Socr. fr. IH 21) shows him to have enjoyed; cf. also 5 134. . . . multaque multorum facete dicta, ut ea quae a sene Catone conlecta sunt, quae vocant αποφθέγματα.] It has been supposed that Cato's compilation consisted of the bons mots of others and the collection of Cato's own witti­ cisms known to Plutarch (Diet. 97 ff. J.) was a later product; cf. Plut. Cat. 2.6; Cato, CVI-VII J.; F.Miltner, RE 22.1 (1953), 164.46 ff. Possibly Cicero was mistaken in thinking that Cato had collected them himself,152 but surely the anecdote cited at 2.89 is the kind of thing he had in mind. On Cicero's fondness for witticisms cf. ad § 108. alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, (vel gravissimo) homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpirudo adhibetur aut verbonim obscenitas.] Contrasted with liber should be, not merely homo, since a liber, too, is a homo, but a specific type of homo; hence such conjectures as gravissimo (Miiller) or vel severissimo (Atzert).—Cf. de Orat. 2.252 (in a listing of types of the risible): quartum, obscenitas, non modo non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum. 1 52. Note, however, that Cato did publish speeches of his own in the Origines (and not of others); cf. Leo, 283.

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ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis (remissi) omnia profundamus elatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur.] Un­ ger, 4 0 - 4 1 , is probably right to suppose that in ne omnia profundamus Cicero has in mind the possibility of losing control over one's substance and person; for profundere used of money cf. $ 84 and 2.55 (in classing our passage under the sense "to express without restraint, give free play to [a feeling, desire, etc.]," OLD s.v. profundo 6a perhaps takes too little account of the change of subject from jokes to games). Under Unger's interpretation the various dangers of games would be brought out, the danger to person and property as well as the moral danger; cf. Arist. EN 1176bl0: βλάπτονται γαρ άπ' αυτών [sc. των παιδιών] μάλλον ή ώφίλούνται, άμ^λοΟντ^ς τών σωμά­ των και τη? κτήσ€ω?. Finally the transmitted nimis can hardly be right, nor, pace Atzert 4 ad / o c , does Quint. Inst. 1.3.11 153 suggest otherwise. Unger, he. cit., put forward the conjecture ne in istis (presumably = in ludis, though the antecedent would have to be supplied out of ludendi). Courtney, 79, would insert remissi, which yields good sense in itself and could easily have dropped out through homoeoteleuton; our sentence would then make the point that the remissus animus of the preceding sentence can go too far. suppeditant autem et Campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi.] What Cicero has in mind under Campus noster can be inferred from Ovid's discussion of pastimes enjoyed by men but denied to women (Ars 3.383 ff.): sunt Mis celeresque pilae iaculumque trochique / armaque et in gyros ire coactus equus; I nee vos Campus habet. . .—Here Cicero offers no examples of the recreational activities of which he disapproves, though such are plentiful enough in the Second Philippic (e.g., §§ 63, 67); cf. also passages from other Roman moralists cited by Edwards, 190 ff., as well as X. Mem. 3.9.9 (with Friedrich Solmsen, "Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State," RhM 107 (19641,203 = Kleine Schriften, 2 IHildesheim, 1968], 11). 105-6 These paragraphs reaffirm a fundamental principle of Panaetius' doctrine of καθήκον, the great gulf separating man and beast. A similar point had been made in § 11 about the beast being attracted to the immediately perceptible object (cf. ad loc.)\ here that object is specified as pleasure (voluptas). The analysis of human mental activity is similar to that at $$ 13 and 19 (see ad locos). The excellentia of the human being compared to the beast had been a part of the definition of the decorum generate (§ 96) and of the first persona given by nature in the comparison with poets ($ 97); here Cicero/Panaetius begins to work out the consequences: voluptas, common to 153. modus tamen sit remissionibus, ne aut odium studiorum faciant negatac out otti consuetudinem nimtae.

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man and beast, should be enjoyed in moderation; any excessive propensity toward it should be concealed. 105 . . . modo ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re sed nomine) . . .] To call a human being a pecus was to deliver an insult; Cicero hurled the term at various political enemies, including Antony (Phil. 2.30; cf. other examples collected by Hillen, TLL 10.1, 956.17 ff.). Cf. the application of the term to the human being at Fin. 2.40: . . . ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal Jsc. hominem] ortum esse voluerunt [sc. Cyrenaici] . . . . . . sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et dissimulat apperitum voluptatis propter verecundiam.] In the phrase 5/ quis est paulo erectior (opposed to si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior) erectior refers to the upright posture which distinguishes human beings from beasts and gives access to higher realms; cf. N.D. 2.140: qui [sc. di] primum eos [sc. homines] humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituerunt, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet; Ov. Met. 1.84-86 (the creation): pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, I os homini sublime dedit caelumque videre I iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus; Sen. Ep. 65.20-21: vetas me caelo interesse, id est tubes me vivere capite demissof maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim met corporis . . . ; ibid., 90.13; Gorier, 1974, 99, n. 9. For the general thought cf. Muson. 64.12 ff.: το γαρ μη νόμιμον μηδ* βύπρεπές των συνουσιών τούτων αίσχος" τ€ και oveioos1 μ€γα τοΐ? θηρωμ^νοις· αντάς· ofkv ούδξ πράττειν φαν^ρώ? ουδέν άνεχβται των τοιούτων ουδείς, καν €π' ολίγον έρυθριάν οΐός- τε ή. έπικρυπτόμ€νοι δέ και λάθρα οι γ€ μη τβλβως άπ€ρρωγότ€9 ταύτα τολμώσιν. καίτοι τό γ€ παράσθαι λάνθαναν *φ' οίς· πράτΤ6ΐ τι? όμολογοϋντο? άμαρτάναν εστί. 106 ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia eamque contemni et reici oportere . . . ] Hence, for instance, Panaerius' concern (frr. 132 and 133) with defending Socrates against charges of bigamy and his praise of Africanus for being abstinens (fr. 13 = Off. 2.76).— On dignus as a paraphrase for decorus cf. ad § 94. . . . sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum.] Cf. ad 3.119. itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem—severe sobrie.] Cf. 5 92 (sub /?«.), 2.88 (ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur)t and Muson., 104.12 ff.: καίτοι καν έττ' ίσον ή TC πολιπΈλή? και ή €ΰτ€λή? τροφή ρωννύη τό σώμα, όμω$ αΐρ€Τ€ον βστί την

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ευτελή, ότι αϋτη σωφρονικωτερα και πρέπει άνδρι άγαθψ μάλλον, ή και τό εύπόριστον τουδυσπορίστου, και τό άπραγμάτευτον του μετά πραγμάτων, και τό ετοιμον τού ανέτοιμου προ? τροφή ν πρεπωδεΌτερον τοΐς επιεικεσιν.ϊνα δε συνελων εϊπω περί τροφής τό πάν, φημί δεϊν σκοπόν μεν αύτη? ποιεΐσθαι ύγίειάν τε και ίσχύν, ώ? τούτων μόνον ένεκα βρωτεον, α δή δεΐται πολυτέλεια? ουδεμιάς· . . . 107-21 The simile of the playwright ($$ 97-98) suggested that the moral agent should suit actions to his/her persona. To his credit Panaetius realized, however, that no simple formula for the persona would do justice to the complexity of the human character.154 He distinguishes, in fact, four perso­ nam 1) the persona common to all human beings as users of reason; 2) the individual nature of each; 3) the persona imposed by chance or circumstance; 4) the persona we choose for ourselves. 155 The doctrine is structured so that it begins with the characteristic shared by all human beings and narrows by gradual stages; similar in development is Panaetius* analysis of who is coniunctissimus (as reconstructed ad §$ 50-58). Thus thefirstpersona is defined by the differentia specifica of the human being and involves the basic division of living things into rational and nonrational (with the gods left out of the picture; cf. 2.11). The second persona is based upon a broad typology of human characters, the cited examples being of severitas vs. hilaritas and calliditas vs. simplicitas; on the Stoic view heredity played some part in this formation (SVF 1, 116.32 ff.; Panaetius fr. 83 = Tusc. 1.79). The circum­ stances into which one is born and other factors not predictable by the human being will, however, further limit the individual's options (the third persona). Within the successive limitations of one's status as possessor of reason and of a certain type of character and of the circumstances of one's birth and other such accidents, the final stage is the individual's own decision as to career; this, like other "assents" (συγκαταθέσεις) to φαντασίαι, is vol­ untary (cf. SVF 1,19.1 ff.; 2,35.15,282.23,283.27,291.1;cf. $ 115: iudicio nostro; ipsi autem quam gerere personam velimus, a nostra voluntate pro-

ISA. De Lacy, 1979,170, raises the problem whether this pluralization of roles destroys the "individuality" (but surely he means "unity") of the moral agent. On the other hand, moral decisions are complex, and one might question whether even the Panaerian quadripartite divi­ sion is not an oversimplification. A further problem is that, in spite of his sensitivity to the possibility of conflicting precepts elsewhere in this treatise (cf. SS 9-10 and the consequent augmentation of Panaetius at SS 152 ff., 2.88-89, and the whole of Book 3), Cicero only once (in a single sentence of $ 120) discusses the possibility of a conflict of personae (and only between two of them at that). 155. I here assume that all four personae are of Panaetian origin; for a different view cf. ad 5 115.

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ficiscitur). However, Panaetius* system of progressively limiting personae makes it clear that, as in the case of other assents, there are factors that tend to predetermine this choice. 156 The personae theory, then, can be regarded as an analysis of the different aspects of the human character and how they fit together to yield the final result. As an antecedent to the doctrine of the fourth persona, Gill, 1994,4608, points to the analysis in Plato's Republic (Book 4, esp. 433a-434c) of the various roles in the state appropriate to the exercise of the particular virtues of individuals. A more comprehensive analogue has been found in the analysis of the origins of action at MM 1.11-15; cf. 1187^4-16:άρχήδ'έστΙ πράξεως και σπουδαίας και φαύλης προαίρεσις και βούλησις και το κατά λόγον πάν; De Lacy, 1979, 169-70. The factors limiting these άρχαί may be viewed as analogous to the personae; thus φύσις, in spite of προαίρεσις, may limit one's chances of achieving preeminence (1187b25 ff.; cf. the second persona); then, after a discussion of voluntary action and the problem of άκρα σία (1.12-13), the passage concludes with a discussion of βία and ανάγκη (1188a38 ff.; cf. the third persona). In spite of these points of contact the differences are, however, as De Lacy, 1979,170, notes, "so great that a direct connection seems most unlikely." Since the whole theory of personae presupposes an analogy between the moral agent and a stage-actor, there seems greater likelihood that the Cyn­ ically colored analogies of the moral agent to an actor put forward by Bion of Borysthenes and Aristo of Chios provide a link to Panaetius* conception. Thus Bion compared τύχη to a ποιήτρια imposing upon one now this πρόσ­ ωπον, now that (fr. 16; cf. ad § 115)—a striking anticipation of Panaetius* third persona. Aristo's comparison of the sage to an actor makes a similar point: . . . όμοιον τον σοφόν τφ άγαθφ υποκριτή, ός αν τ€ θερσίτου αν Τ€ 'Αγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον άναλάβη, έκάτερον υποκρίνεται προσηκόντως (SVF 1, 79.9 ff. = D.L. 7.160); this report of Aristo's view fails to specify how it comes about that one "takes up" this persona or that; possibly τύχη again lurks in the background. In any case, such observations may have constituted one of the starting points for Panaetius* personae theory, though, in the context of the πρέπον, he limited the number of personae suitable to a pos­ sessor of reason (unlike Aristo, he would surely not have found the role of Thersites acceptable for a possessor of reason, let alone a sage; cf. §S 9 7 - 9 8 , ad % 135), and he broadened the analysis beyond τύχη to include other

156. For factors conditioning assents in general, cf. ad SS 97-98.

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factors involved in the formation of the human persona. Panaetius' theory may also have been developed in part under the influence of the older Stoic praecepta for persons in various social relations; but he will have transferred these teachings from justice to the fourth virtue and added a concern for the individual's aptitudes (cf. ad §§ 122-25). Influences of the personae theory have been traced in various authors. Thus Seneca's definition of a happy life, with its addition of "one's own" to the standard Stoic τέλος formula [beata est ergo vita conveniens naturae suae: Vit Beat. 3.3), may have been influenced by Panaetius' second persona with its recognition of individual differences; cf. Elizabeth Asmis, "Seneca's On the Happy Life and Stoic Individualism," Apeiron 23 (1990), 2 1 9 - 5 6 , esp. 224 ff. For other reflexes of the doctrine in Seneca cf. ad §§ 71 and 110. Epictetus' doctrine of the σχέσης or relations in which human beings stand to one another and to the deity also bears comparison with the theory of personae; cf. De Lacy, 1979,171; Brunt, 1975, 33. Several of the relevant passages mention the σχέσεις in the context of καθήκοντα, e.g., Diss. 3.2.4 (similar in this regard 4.4.16; 4.12.16; Ench. 30): δεύτερος έστιν [sc. τόπος περί όν άσκηθήναι δεΐ τον έσόμενον καλόν και αγαθόν] ό περί το καθήκον ού δει γαρ μ€ είναι απαθή ως ανδριάντα, αλλά τάς σχέσεις τηροΰντα τάς φυσικάς και έπιθέτους ώς ευσεβή, ως υ'ιόν. ώς άδελφόν, ώς πάτερα, ως πολίτην. The doctrine of the σχέσεις was evidently known to Epictetus from a work or works περί καθηκόντων and surely originated with Panaetius or a student of his (note in the cited passage the specific rejection of the Older Stoa's ideal of απάθεια). Epictetus' description of the σχέσεις as either φυσικαί οΓέπίθετοι, i.e., cither imposed by nature or added (sc. by individual choice: cf., besides the passage quoted, Diss. 2.14.8), would correspond to Panaetius' distinc­ tion between the first three personae and the fourth. One suspects that Epictetus' σχέσεις may be an elaboration (whether by Epictetus himself or an intermediary) of Panaetius 1 personae theory together with an (older Stoic?) analysis of aetates and tempora similar to that at §§ 122-25 (cf. ad be. and ad $ 149). Some elements of the theory of personae as well as the advice about magistrates ($ 124) recur in Pliny's letters; cf. 1.23.5 {sed tu . . . plurimum interest quid esse tribunatum putes, quam personam tibi imponas; quae sapienti viro ita aptanda est ut perferatur) and other passages cited by H.-P. Butler, Die geistige Welt des jiingeren Plinius (Heidelberg, 1970), 21, n. 3. 107 . . . una (sc. persona] communis est ex co quod omnes parcicipes sumus rationis—et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exqutritur . . .] On the human possession of ratio as the foundation of Panaetius' doctrine of officia cf. ad §S 11 ff. Its parallel role within the fourth part of the honestum was adum-

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brated in the simile comparing the moral agent to a poet ($ 97: . . . nobis autem personam imposuit ipsa natura magna cum excellentia praestantiaque animantium reliquarum) and has just been sketched (§S 105-6). Cicero therefore mentions it here only to turn to the second persona, which, appear­ ing now for the first time, calls for detailed discussion.—For the phrase ratio inveniendi officii cf. ή του καθήκοντος εϋρεσις at Stob. eel. 2.7.5 b 3 = 2, 62.9 ff. W.-H., cited ad $ 93 above, a passage that Philippson, 1930 1 , 365, at­ tributes to Panaetius. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt—sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates.] The body is deployed as an analogue in discussing the soul and its properties by the Platonic Socrates (cf. ad § 101) and else­ where by Panaetius (§ 95; cf. § 14). At Phdr. 271 c-d Socrates recommends that the intending rhetorician study the types of souls: επειδή λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία ούσα, τόν μέλλοντα ρητορικοί* εσεσθαι ανάγκη είδεναι ψυχή δσα εϊδη έχει. εστίν ούν τόσα και τόσα, και τοΐα και τοΐα . . . , a pro­ gram carried out in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The sequel offers similar observations detached from rhetorical application. The individuals endowment of qualities by nature is simply a given; no precepts are possible here; cf. Arist. EN 1179b21 - 2 3 : τό μεν ουν της φύσεως δήλοι* ως ουκ έφ* ήμΐν υπάρχει, άλλα διά τινας θείας αιτίας τοΐς ώς αληθώς εύτυχεσιν υπάρχει. The Epicureans, too, recognized a variety of temperaments, which they explained by reference to the character of the constituent soul-atoms (cf. Lucr. 3.288 ff.). The present project, however, is simply to illustrate the diversity of the human personality. The point is made, as usual, by reference to well-known individuals; it is not that the qualities discussed in themselves necessarily served to make their bearers distinguished (pace Gill, 1988, 180-81; cf. Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate |S 1081, where the absence of a socially desirable quality was no hin­ drance to advancement). If there is a pattern to the presentation it is in the pairing of opposite qualities and of examples, whether by way of similarity or contrast. In spite of Cicero's emphasis on the greater variety of types in the mental than the physical realm (sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam vari­ etates) and the relatively large number of examples (28, of which 16 are Roman), the analysis in §§ 108-9 and 112-3 really turns upon only two sets of contrasting qualities: (1) leposthilaritas : severitaslgravitaslambitio and (2) calliditas: simplicitas. These are, it emerges later, offered merely exempli gratia with no effort made at exhaustive coverage (end of § 109: innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque . . .). Might Cicero perhaps here, as elsewhere (cf. ad 2.16), have curtailed a more extensive set

Commentary on Book 1, Section 107-8

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of examples in his model? As a reader of Theophrastus (cf. 2.56 and 64), Panaetius could, of course, have found ample material in the Characteres. . . . itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem . . .] On the distinction cf. further § 130. 108 Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos . . . ] Cicero begins the series of examples by contrasting the light-hearted and severe temperaments, as evidently Panaetius, too, had done (cf. Socrates contrasted with Pythagoras and Pericles). The topic of wit was of special interest to Cicero, who was celebrated for it himself (Caesar is said to have been able to distinguish genuine and spurious Ciceronian borts mots [Fam. 9.16.4] 157 ) and who once confessed to his friend Paetus: ego autem . . . mirifice captor facetiis, maxime nostratibus . . . [Fam. 9.15.2).—On Crass us in general see ad 2.47. Cf. the description at Brut. 143: erat summa gravitas, erat cum gravitate iunctus facetiarum et urbanitatis oratorius, non scurrilis lepos . . . ; cf. also the discussion (with examples) of Crassus' wit at de Orat. 2.220 ff., including Antonius* handsome admission of having given the palm to Caesar in this field (see below) because of jealousy of Crassus (2.228).— After stressing that L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91) was a distant third to Crassus and Antonius among orators active around the turn of the century, Cicero offers this characterization {Brut. 173): sed tamen erant ea in Philippo quae, qui sine comparatione illorum |sc. Crassi et Antoni] spectaret, satis magna diceret: summa libertas in oratione, multae facetiae; satis creber in reperiendis, solutus in explicandis sententiis; erat etiam in primis, ut temporibus tllis, Graecis doctrinis institutes, in altercando cum aliquo aculeo et maledicto facetus. Cf. also the specimens of Philippus' wit cited at de Orat. 2.245 and 249. On his political career cf. ad 2.59 and 73. . . . maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. f . ; . . . ] On C. Julius Caesar L. filius Strabo (cur. aed. 90) cf. Antonius* judgment: in quibus |sc. in ioco et facet its] tu longe aliis mea sententia, Caesar, excellis . . . (de Orat. 2.216); hence in the sequel Caesar becomes the main speaker on the subject of humor; cf. Brut. 177: festivitate igitur et facetiis, inquam, C. Iulius L. f. et superioribus et aequalibus suis omnibus praestitit oratorque fuit minime ille quidem vehemens, sed nemo umquam urbanitate, nemo lepore, nemo suavitate conditior. Cicero preserves a specimen of his humor at Brut. 216: motus [sc. Curionis] erat is, quern et C. Iulius in perpetuum notavit, cum ex eo in utramque partem toto corpore vacillante quaesivit, quis loqueretur e 157. On collections of Ciceronian bans mots cf. K.Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1272.63 ff.; cf. the short collection at Plut. Rom. Apophtb. 204c ff.; a collection is appended to fr. phil.

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luntre . . . ; cf. also ad § 133; on his prosecution of T. Albucius ad 2.50; Diehl, RE 10.1 (1918), 428.53 ff., esp. 430.31 ff. at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas . . .] M. Aemilius M. f. L. n. Scaurus (cos. 115), father of Cicero's client, of noble but impoverished family, was a self-made man (cf. Asc. Sc. 2 0 : . . . Scauro aeque ac novo homini laborandum fuit)\ hence, perhaps, his severitas. Cf. the characterization at Brut. I l l s m Scauri oratione, sapientis hominis et recti, gravitas summa et naturalis quaedam inerat auctoritas, non ut causam, sed ut testimonium dicere putares cum pro reo diceret. As princeps senatus he was long a bulwark of the optimate cause; hence Cicero's uniformly encomiastic public references to him. In private he tempered his stature somewhat in allowing that Q. Caecilius Metellus L. f. Numidicus (cos. 109) excelled him in constantia and gravitas (Fam. 1.9.16, though this may have been an ad hoc judgment connected with Cicero's selfidentification with Metellus in this letter; cf. ad 3.79); cf. Rawson, 22 ff., with literature, and § 76.—M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112) died in 109 as Scaurus' colleague in the censorship, with Scaurus forced out of office in the sequel; hence perhaps the juxtaposition of the two here. The characterization at Brut. 109 is similar: M. Drusus C. f., qui in tribunatu C. Gracchum conlegam iterum tribunum fregitt vir et oratione gravis et auctoritate . . . This severitas found expression in his criticism of the extravagance of C. Gracchus; cf. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.4:. . . oi περί Δρουσον ήλεγχον Οτι δέλφινας· αργύρους επρίατο τιμής εις έκάστην λίτραν δραχμών χιλίων και διακοσίων πεντήκοντα. Cf. Munzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 856.31 ff. . . . in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior.] According to Cicero (Rep. 1.18; Amic. 15), C. Laelius (cos. 140) was older than his friend the younger Scipio, born in 184. His public career appears to have gotten off to a slow start, however, his first attested office being that of legate to the consul Scipio during the Third Punic War (147). In the following year he and the troops under his command were the first over the wall defending the military harbor of Carthage (App. Pun. 606); he received the reward for his bravery in the praetorship for 145 (on his service in Spain, 145-44, cf. ad 2.40). Hence the ambition of Scipio, who was elected consul in 148 at roughly age 36, might well be called maior; cf. Astin, 2 1 - 2 2 . The phrase vita tristior refers to his sudden death, the cause of which was never clarified, in 129; cf. Astin, 2 3 8 - 4 1 . On his military and oratorical achievements cf. ad § 116; on his abstinentia ad 2.75. Cf. Munzer, RE 12.1 (1924), 404.41 ff. and 4.1 (1900), 1439.4 ff. For an example of the diver­ sions of Laelius (and Scipio) at leisure cf. the famous description of them gathering shells on the beach at de Orat. 2.22.

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de Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festiviquc sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quern εΐρωνα Graeci nominarunt, Socratem acccpimus . . .] Precious little has survived of Panaetius' essay περί Σωκράτους (cf. ad SS 104 and 106); it is thus good to have at least this brief appreciation of his personality; cf. also Luc. 15:. . . Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat is quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter utisolitus est ea dissimuhtione quam Graecielpiuveiav vacant, which, together with our passage, constitutes Socr. fr. IC 439. A Roman example would have been possible here as well; for C. Fannius' characterization of the younger Africanus as an εΐρων cf. hist., p. 140, fr. 7. Was it perhaps this connection that caused Cicero to insert Socrates at pre­ cisely this point in the series of examples? Note that Panaetius in general regarded the civilized repartee of the Socratic dialogues as a model of sermo, a matter in which he took a particular interest (surely as one of the bonds connecting the societas generis humani; cf. ad $$ 132b-37); similarly Cicero uses the capacity in sermonibus. . . quamvis praepotens sit, efficere ut unus de muitis esse videatur as a characteristic feature of P. Scipio Nasica as well as another Roman (perhaps Q. Mucius Scaevola, "the Augur"; see ad loc.) mentioned in the corrupt portion of 5 109.—Occasionally characters in the Platonic dialogues impute ειρωνεία to Socrates: cf. R. 337a (Thrasymachus), Crg. 489e (where Callicles and Socrates exchange charges of ειρωνεία), Symp. 216e4 (Alcibiades' description of Socrates), as well as Apol. 38al (the supposed view of an imaginary objector); Arist. EN 1127b22 ff. likewise cites Socrates as an εΐρων: οι δ' είρωνες επί το ελαττον λέγοντες χαριεστεροι μεν τά ήθη φαίνονται' ού γαρ κέρδους ένεκα δοκούσι λέγειν, άλλα φεύγοντες το όγκηρόν μάλιστα δε και ούτοι τά ένδοξα απαρνούνται, οίον και Σωκράτης έποίει. On Socratic irony cf. in general the first chapter of Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca-New York, 1991), esp. 33 ff. (on the Symposium). . . . contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate.] For the former's character cf. D.L. 8.56:. . . τον δε Άναξαγόρου διακοϋσαι και Πυθαγόρου· και τοϋ μεν την σεμνότητα ζηλώσαι τοϋ τε βίου και τοϋ σχήματος, τοϋ δε τήν φυσιολογίαν; for his authority, cf. the proverbial αυτός έφα with which his school cited him (cf. Otto, 292, n. 2). For the lat­ ter cf. Plut. Per. 5.1: . . . ό Περικλής . . . ού μόνον . . . το φρόνημα σοβαρον και τον λόγον ΰψηλόν εΐχε και καθαρόν όχλικής και πανούργου βωμο­ λοχίας, αλλά και προσώπου σύστασις άθρυπτος εις γέλωτα . . . ; Fritz Schachermeyr, Perikles (Stuttgart, 1969), 91-92. callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum . . . ducibus . . . accepimus . . .] Han­ nibal might well be cited to illustrate calliditas, not necessarily a bad quality

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(cf. ad 5 33); however, the juxtaposition with Q. Fabius Maximus does less than full justice to the great Carthaginian, whose generalship was on a far higher level; cf. ad $ 38. . . . ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus—praeripere hostium consilia.] Cf. ad S 84. in quo genere Graeci Themiscoclem et Pheraeum lasonem ceteris anteponunt. . .] Themistocles' notable stratagems include sending to Xerxes on the eve of Salamis a message urging that the opportunity was favorable for attack since the Greek fleet was about to withdraw (cf. Aesch. Pers. 355-60; Hdt. 8.75; Plut. Them. 12.2) and the embassy to Sparta during which he stalled negotiations long enough for the fortification of Athens to be com­ pleted and left instructions that the Spartan ambassadors were not to be allowed to return until he and his fellow ambassadors had safely departed Sparta (cf. Thuc. 1.90.3 ff.; Plut. Them. 19); cf. U. Kahrstedt, RE 5A2 (1934), 691.12 ff. and 1692.27 ff.—By threats and promises made to Polydamas, commander of the citadel and administrator of its public money, Jason of Pherae (f370) was able to win the bloodless submission of Pharsalus and hence the title of ταγό? of all Thessaly; cf. Polydamas' detailed descrip­ tion to the Spartans of Jason's talent and resources at X. HG 6.1.4-16; one wonders whether Panaetius might have been influenced by this passage, especially the words: €υ γάρ ϊστβ, ότι προς τ€ μ€γάληι> έσται ρώμηι> ό πόλ€μος\ και προ? άι>δρα ος φρόνιμος· μέι> ούτω στρατηγό? €στιι> ως οσα τ€ λανθάι^ιΐ' και οσα φθάνειν και οσα βιάζ€σθαι έπιχ€ΐρ€ΐ ού μάλα άφαμαρτάΐΌ (6.1.15); cf. Labowsky, 40 and n. 77. He was also shrewd enough to broker peace between the Thebans and Spartans after Leuctra (summer, 371), rather than join with the Thebans in storming the Spartan camp, as he was invited to do; he thus maintained a balance of power favorable to his own plans for expansion; cf. X. HG 6.4.22 ff.; Stahelin, RE 9.1 (1914), 775.32 ff.; Westlake, 119 ff.; Robin Seager in CAH 6\ 175, 184-85. . . . in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto reipublicae prodesset, furcrc sc simulavit.J A reference to a famous incident: when it had been forbidden on pain of death to advocate the recovery of Salamis, Solon feigned madness, rushed into the marketplace, and recited a poem urging just that course of action; cf. Plut. 5o/. 8.1-3; Solon, test., nos. 237-55 Martina (our passage = no. 242); Solon frr. 1 - 3 West. The motive quo . . . plus . . . reipublicae prodesset evidently made this action acceptable; on the utilitas reipublicae as a criterion cf. the introduction to Book 3. 109 Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque

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alii qui quidvis perpetiantur . . . ] Cf. the characterization of the just man at PI. R. 361b6-7 (άνδρα άπλοϋν και γενναΐον). Did Panaetius perhaps insert the exempla of Odysseus and Ajax ($ 113; see ad he.) at this point, then reinforce them with the historical examples Lysander and Callicratidas? Cicero's qui quidvis perpetiantur surely renders πανούργοι in his model.— For the colloquial comparison of an adjective by addition of multum cf. KieSling-Heinze ad Hor. Carm. 1.25.3-4.—For the iunctura simplices et apertid. N.D. 1.27. . . . cuivis deserviant, dum quod velint consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus.J For the unscrupulousness of Crassus cf. ad 3.73-75, as well as the extended attack on him tacito nomine at Parad. no. 6; for Sulla cf. ad 2.27. quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit.l The difference in temperament is illustrated by their respec­ tive dealings with Cyrus: Lysander won his financial support for the Spartan cause (X. HG 1.5.2-7), whereas, when Callicratidas called upon him and was asked to wait for two days, he lost patience and elected to support his fleet instead with money collected from Sparta's subjects (ibid., 1.6.6 ff.); cf. A. Andrewes in CAH 5 2 , 4 8 9 ff. Lysander as characterized by Theopompus [FGrHist. 115 F 20) was bound to appeal to Panaetius (cf. 2.76 a propos Scipio Africanus): φιλόπονος τε ην καΐ θεραπεύειν δυνάμενος και ίδιώτας και βασιλείς, σώφρων ων και των ηδονών άπασών κρείττων. γενόμενος γουν της 'Ελλάδος σχεδόν άπάσης κύριος εν ούδεμιςΙ φανήσεται των πόλεων ούτε προς τάς αφροδισίους ήδονάς όρμήσας ούτε μέθαις και πότοις άκαίροις χρήσα­ με νος. From the point of view of a Callicratidas, however, he would appear quite different, as Plutarch (based perhaps on Cicero's Panaetian model?) saw (Lys. 7.5; cf. 2.4): τοις δε τον άπλουν και γενναΐον άγαπώσι των ηγεμό­ νων τρόπον ό Λύσανδρος τω Καλλικρατίδα παραβαλλόμενος έδόκει πανούργος είναι και σοφιστής, άπάταις τά πολλά διαποικίλλων του πολέμου και το δί­ καιον έπι τφ λυσιτελουντι μεγαλΰνων, ει δε μη, τω συμφεροντι χρώμενος ώς καλώ, και το αληθές ού φύσει τοΰ ψεύδους κρε'ιττον ηγούμενος, άλλ' έκατερου Τ ΓΙ Χί*ι'
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never explained.—For the phrase unus de multis cf. Otto, 358. To appear to be unus de multis was necessary, of course, in canvassing for office; to some it came more naturally than to others; perhaps the more typical reaction is the feeling of being ineptus, which Cicero attributes to Crassus at de Orat. 1.112. . . . quod in Catulo, et patre et filio,. . . vidimus.] The affability of the elder Q. Lutatius Catulus did not spare him three defeats in consular elections (for 106,105,104) before he finally was elected as Marius* colleague in his fourth consulate (102); for a specimen of his wit cf. de Orat. 2.278; cf. also § 133, where the Catuli, pere et fits, are likewise mentioned together. The career of the younger Catulus culminated in the consulate of 78; cf. ad § 76; Munzer, RE 13.2 (1927), 2072.24 ff. and 2082.30 ff. . . . idemque in Q. Mucio {Mancia} (Q. f.) vidimus.] As Winterbottom re­ marks ad he, a Mancia could hardly be regarded as a vir praepotens. Surely, as Shackleton Bailey, 1995, 259, suggests, this name, lacking a praenomen, should be thrown out altogether as a rewriting of Much. He points out that the description would fit Q. Mucius Scaevola ("the Augur"),158 called hculator senex at Att. 4.16.3, and adds, probably rightly, (Q. f.) to distinguish the Augur from the Pontifex of the same name (cf. $ 116). audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, ilium qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis . . . ] The salient characteristic of P. Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) was inflexibility, a quality that his apparent ad­ herence to Stoic principles (cf. Tusc. 4.51) hardly diminished. V. Max. 7.5.2 retails the anecdote, generally referred to our man, that a P. Scipio Nasica, in the course of campaigning for curule aedile, clasped the gnarled hand of a farmer and inquired whether he was in the habit of walking on his hands (the upshot is said to have been electoral defeat). Similarly, in a contio the tribune C. Curiatius demanded measures against inflation of the price of grain; when Nasica as consul responded negatively, he managed to quiet the unruly mob with the proud assertion that he knew the state interest better than they (V. Max. 3.7.3; A.E. Astin in CAH 82,193); hence the characterization at Brut. 107:. . . ilium Scipionem, quo duce privato Ti. Gracchus occisus esset, cum omnibus in rebus vehementem turn acrem aiebat (sc. L. Accius] in dicendo fuisse; cf. orat., pp. 157-59. Cicero likewise expresses approval of Nasica's murder of his cousin Ti. Gracchus (their mothers were sisters) at Dom. 91, Plane. 88, and Brut. 212, as well as $ 76 above (sec ad he. and ad $ 116 and 2.43); cf. also Cat. 1.3; Gaillard, 523 ff.; Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1501.47 ff. 158. Sec also Winterbottom's index nominum.

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(Cornelius no. 354).—When his son died as consul in 111, he left insufficient money to pay for his funeral; but such was his popularity that the people gave pennies to defray the expense and strewed the city with flowers (Plin. Nat. 21.10 refers the story, as has long been recognized, by mistake to the elder Serapio); no doubt his wit helped endear him to the public (cf. Brut. 128:. . . omnis sale facetiisque superabat)\ cf. Miinzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1504.37 ff. (Cornelius no. 355). . . . [[ne Xenocratem quidem severissimum philosophorum]] . . .] The fol­ lowing characterization (. . . magnum et clarum fuisse) refers to Nasica. Yet the veracity of the content of this lemma is confirmed by D.L. 4.6 (sim. Plut. COM/. Praec. 141 f, Amat. 769d): σεμνός δε τά τ' άλλα Ξενοκράτης και σκυθρωπός αεί, ώστε αύτώ λέγειν συνεχές τον Πλάτωνα, "Ξενόκρατες, θύε ταΐς Χάρισι"; cf. Η. Dorrie, RE 9A2 (1967), 1514.54 ff. Hence Pohlenz, AF, 69 n., viewed these words as a Ciceronian addition never integrated into context; cf. introduction, § 10, and ad 2.21-22. Or must we posit a learned interpolator (cf., however, p. 153, n. 65 supra)} 110-11 These sections draw the practical consequence from the diversity of character types just sketched, viz., that one must use one's own nature as a yardstick in making choices. In claiming that the interest of the ruling class in pressing young nobles into a sufficient number of conventional roles pro­ vides the key to understanding the Panaetian/Ciceronian personae theory, Fuhrmann, 101-2, perhaps gives this passage too little weight; see also ad § 115. 110 Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen pro­ pria, quo facilius decorum illud quod quaerimus retineatur.] The formula tenenda sunt sua cuique has, of course, been transferred from the treatment of justice (cf. ad%2\). The phrase non vitiosa is added to prevent an immoralist application of the theory, as likewise the following reference to the universa natural cf. ad §§ 97-98 and 120. . . . ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur;. . . ] The image of the rule {κανών) had been applied to the good man (σπουδαίος) by Aristotle {EN 1113a29 ff.; cf. 1176a 17); Karl-Hermann Rolke, Die bildbaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios, Spudasmata, 32 (HildesheimNew York, 1975), 4 7 2 - 7 3 , suggests that Panaetius may have used the term (= regub) under Aristotle's influence. If so, it is notable that nostra natura has replaced the good man (σπουδαίος) as the standard (cf. ad § 46). The treat­ ment of the utile is likewise Aristotelian in spirit in making mediocritas the regula (2.59); cf. also the use of the term at 3.81 (non-Panaetian); Herbert Oppel, ΚΑΝΩΝ. Zur Bedeutungsgescbicbte des Wortes und seiner la-

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teinischen Entsprechungen (regula-norma), Philologus, Suppl. 30.4 (Leipzig, 1937), 8 8 - 9 0 . For Panaetius' willingness to allow a great variety of ways of achieving ευδαιμονία cf. his simile comparing the moral agent to an archer who may hit any of several differently colored areas of his target (fr. 109).— The idea expressed here is, of course, assumed in the priamel form used in poetry from early times; cf. Ulrich Schmid, Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen von Homer bis Paulas (Wiesbaden, 1964); William H. Race, The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius, Mnemosyne Suppl. 74 (Leiden, 1982). neque enim artinet naturae repugnare nee quicquam sequi quod adsequi non queas.] Seneca offers similar advice (Tranqu. An. 6.3): aestimanda sunt deinde ipsa quae adgredimur, et vires nostrae cum rebus quas temptaturi sumus comparandae. debet enim semper plus esse virium in actore quam in opere: necesse est opprimant onera quae ferente maiora sunt, as well as in the misplaced passage, ibid., 7.2: considerandum est utrum natura tua agendis rebus an otioso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinandum quo te vis ingenii feret: Isocrates Ephorum iniecta manu a foro subduxit, utiliorem componendis monumentis historiarum ratus. male enim respondent coacta ingenia; reluctante natura inritus bbor est; cf. also de Otio 3.3 (cited ad § 71 above); sim. Plut. Tranqu. An. 471 d. ex quo magis emergit quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura.] The nature of decorum must needs continue to emerge given the muddled way in which the topic was introduced (cf. ad § 99).—Invita Minerva was, according to [Aero] on Hor. Ars 385, a proverbium artificum; see further Otto, 225; Swoboda, 8 2 - 8 3 . I l l omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, turn singularom actionum, quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam.] At $ 11 Cicero/Panaetius made the point that the possession of reason makes one capable of surveying and making material provision for the whole course of one's life: homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, . . . similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. Here, however, he turns to the "much more important" (cf. ad $ 14) provision for the whole of life in the mental realm. Aristotle had used Solon's famous admonition to "look to the end" in making judgments about happiness (Hdt. 1.32-33) as the starting point for reflections on appropriate use of the term ευδαιμονία; he objected that such a conception yielded an unstable ευδαιμονία too much subject to changes of fortune; he substitutes a stable ευδαιμονία by emphasizing that

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activities in accord with the virtues are its source (EN HOOalO ff.); cf. Gill, 1994,4608 and n. 34. Panaetius, on the other hand, like Solon, is interested in judging a human life, 159 and has taken over an emphasis in the Solonic manner on the whole human life, but he has used it as part of his concept of the πρέπον, not ευδαιμονία. Moreover, because of his acceptance of the Stoic valuation of the external goods and those of the body, his emphasis is not on changes of fortune but on consistent behavior. Now the Stoics held that all the sage's individual actions were correct (cf. SVF1,53.13-14: πάντα . . . εύ ποιήσει ό σοφός . . . ; sim., ibid., 3, 148.37-38, 149.4, 163.12, etc.) and hence self-consistent; cf. SVF 1, 52.27-29: καΐ τό μεν των σπουδαίων διά παντός του βίου χρησθαι ταΐς άρεταΐς, τό δε των φαύλων ταΐς κακίαις. Hence the self-consistency that Panaetius seeks under the πρέπον is evidently mod­ eled upon that of the sage. The aesthetic emphasis is, however, all his own, the shaping of one's life being implicitly compared to the shaping of a work of art (cf. S§ 97-98, 1 1 4 , 1 4 5 - 4 6 , 1 4 7 ; Gill, 1994,4606-7). — Cf. Polybius' observation that in spite of the growing corruption of Roman society Scipio was at pains to lead a self-consistent life (. . . ο γε Σκιπίων όρμήσας επί την εναντίον άγωγήν του βίου και πάσαις ταΐς έπιθυμίαις άντιταξάμενος και κατά πάντα τρόπον ομολογούμενον και συμφωνον εαυτόν κατασκευάσας κατά τον βίον . . . [31.25.81); cf. $$ 119 and 125; Labowsky, 45, n. 92. at enim sermone eo debemus uti qui fnotusf est nobis, ne ut quidam Graeca verba inculcantes iure Optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus.] When he wrote these words Cicero may have been thinking of the case of T. Albucius (praetor ca. 105), whom Q. Mucius Scaevola ("the Augur"; cos. 117), praetor in 120, greeted in Athens as follows: ''Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, I municipem Ponti, Tritani, centunonum, I praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, I maluisti diet. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, I id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: I "chaere," inquam, "Tite." lictores, turma omnis chorusque: I "chaere, Tite." hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus' (Lucil. vv. 89-95 K. = 88-94 M.f quoted at Fin. 1.9; cf. w . 74-76). On the incident cf. Miriam Griffin in CAH 9 2 , 698. The parading of foreign words is an apt illustration (perhaps introduced by Cicero himself, since Panaetius would have been hard pressed to find an analogue to Graeca verba inculcantes) of how one can make oneself absurd by imitating something alien. This is after §§ 97-98 a second passage with a simile illustrating what is meant by decorum (cf. also $ 114); if in the previous case it was the content 159. Cf. S 114: bonorum el vitiorum suorum iudicem; $ 146: si acres ac diligentes (tudices) esse volumus animadversuresque vitiorum.

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of the words that was inappropriate to the speaker, here it is their form or language. The transmitted notus is problematic; a T. Albucius presumably in some sense "knows" Greek (cf. Pohlenz, AF, 69, n. 2). Natus, attributed by Heusinger to the Leipzig edition (1516), even as emended to innatus (Baiter), is no improvement, since the latter is post-Ciceronian in the sense of nativus and Tusc. 4.80, cited by Atzert, is hardly a convincing parallel for the former; cf. Fedeli, 1964 1 , 86. W.S. Wan's vemaculus is perhaps the best solution so far offered ("Tulliana," CJ 83 11987], 37); it could have been glossed notus and then ousted by its gloss. The theme of the need to avoid any discrepantia, however small, is taken up and illustrated further at SS 145-46. 112 Cicero/Panaetius has spoken of the change of officia with a change in external circumstances (SS 31-32). Here external circumstances are the same {num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri... f) but a different decision is justified by a difference in the nature of the individuals. It would have been inconsistent with the rest of his life for Cato to have reconciled himself with a tyrant (the word appears here for the first time in this essay; it is used implicitly of Caesar also at 2.23 and 3.19; cf. also 3.83; ad 2.43), whereas others' suicide might have been an imitation of what was πρέπον for Cato but not for themselves. 160 Cf. Fin. 3.61: nam neque virtute retinetur (ille) [sc. sapiens] in vita, nee its, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et saepe offtcium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatisshnus . . . , as well as the case of Socrates cited ad% 114. Though Cicero limits the comparison to ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt, he, too, was in essentially the same position after Pharsalia (and at the time of his exile some had put to him the proposition that he ought to commit suicide [cf. Sest. 47]). This indis­ putably Ciceronian example, though superficially in agreement with the Panaetian argument and examples that surround it, implicitly holds up the con­ sistency and moral rigor of Cato's life for admiration, just as Cicero does Regulus in the non-Panaetian Book 3; thus Gill, 1988, 186-87, rightly sees here a harbinger of a Ciceronian style of moral discourse fundamentally different from the Panaetian and more fully delineated in Book 3 with its excoriation of deceit in business dealings and political activity directed to­ ward selfish ends. In addition, our passage, together with Tusc. 1.74, perhaps gives some notion of the tone of the lost encomium of Cato which, at Brutus' urging, Cicero composed shortly after Thapsus; cf. Gelzer, 276; Gelzer, Caesar, 279-80 = Engl. rr. 301-2; Griffin, 1986, 202, n. 18; K. Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1272.2 ff. 160. Cato may have made this distinction himself; cf. Griffin, 1986, 201, n. 14, as well as the advice Cato gave to Cicero upon his arrival in Pompey's camp (Plut. Cic. 38.1).

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113 This paragraph, which lacks a connection with the foregoing, offers further examples of affabilitas and severitas such as those encountered in SS 108-9, this time from literature, rather than history. Note that the begin­ ning of ξ 114 (suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium . . .) would connect equally well with the end of $ 112. One wonders whether Cicero has here found a home for several Panaetian examples he had previously omitted. However, the contrasting characters of Ulysses and Ajax were well known to Romans from the treatments of the Armorum iudicium by Accius and Pacuvius (see ad § 114); in view of Ovid's handling of the theme in Met. 13, it would not be surprising if it had become a staple of the rhetorical schools; cf. ad 3.97-99a. quam multa passus est Ulixes . . . cum . . . in omni sennone omnibus adfabilem et iucundum esse se vellet.. .] On the possibility that the words et iucundum, omitted from the ζ MSS, constitute a gloss cf. Thomas, 108, n. 13.

. . . domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillammque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando quod cupiebat veniret!] References to the insults of Melantheus (Od. 17.212 ff.) and Melantho (18.321 ff., 19.65 ff.). 114 Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat . . .] A variation of the command γνώθι σ€αυτόν variously ascribed to Solon, Chilo, or the Delphic oracle and in­ scribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi; cf. Otto, 245. Seneca offers similar advice to those undertaking a task at Tranqu. An. 6.2. For the iunctura iudex vitiorum cf. § 146 (as emended). . . . ne scaenici plus quam nos—non videbit sapiens vir in vita?] At §§ 97-98 Cicero had compared the moral agent to a playwright who must produce a text to fit the nature of characters known from saga. Here the comparison is with aaors who must judge themselves in order to know what roles they are bestfittedto play; cf. Socrates' refusal of the speech written in his defense by Lysias on grounds that, though good per se, it was inappropriate for him (cf. de Orat. 1.231; Quint. Inst. 11.1.11; D.L. 2.40: καλός μέν λόγο?, ώ Λυσία, ου μην άρμόττων γ' €μοί). This second version is more apt in several ways: it includes the point that the judgment needed is, at least in part, self-reflexive and that the judge is to be at the same time the performer of the chosen role. On the other hand, both comparisons assume that the roles cannot be freely created but are conditioned either, for the playwright, by the expectations of an audience familiar with preexisting saga or, for the aaors, by the plays existing in the repertory; this limitation corresponds to the fact that what Cicero actually discusses in the sequel are roles conventional in society. Im­ plicit, too, in both comparisons is the importance of a successful outcome—

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the applause of the public corresponding to the approbatio eorum quibuscum vivitur ($ 98). As Gill, 1988, remarks (192), **a sensible man takes the good actor as his model, because the latter knows how to deploy and exhibit his own special qualities." The similes at SS 97-98 had prepared the way for the persona theory (albeit Cicero perhaps retarded the develop­ ment of thought by inserting the digression on games and jokes [103b-4]; and one wonders whether, in Panaetius' treatment, SS 101-3a were not placed either under the first virtue [cf. ad SS 18-19] or the first persona; cf. ad SS 93-151); so, too, our simile, with its emphasis on the actors' choice of role, leads to the next major topic, the persona that the individual chooses. Note finally the a fortiori form of argument often met in this essay (cf. ad S 48).—The plays in question are the Epigoni of Accius (trag., pp. 200 ff.), Pacuvius' Medus (118 ff.), Ennius' Mehnippa (57-58), Accius* Clutemestra (161 ff.), Pacuvius' Antiopa (86 ff.), and any of the several plays in which Ajax appeared: Ennius' Aiax (19-20) or the Armorum iudicium of Pacuvius (90 ff.) or Accius (178 ff.). 161 Rupilius, evidently a tragic actor famed during Cicero's youth, is known only from our passage; cf. Miinzer, RE 1A1 (1914), 1229.23 ff. Cicero was personally acquainted with Aesopus, a favorite actor of his invalid relative M. Marius, to whom Cicero reports on a disastrous performance {Fam. 7.1.2 and 4; September, 55); Cicero alludes [Att. 11.15.3; 14 May 47) to some anguish caused him by the actor's son (possibly his affair with Caecilia Metella: cf. Shackleton Bailey ad Att. 226.3).—Sapiens vir is used, of course, in the vulgar, not the strict Stoic, sense; cf. S 46 and 3.16. ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in us potissimum elaborabimus.] Cf. Hor. Ep. 1.14.43-44: optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus: I quant scit uterque libens, censebo, exerceat artent. sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura meditatio diligenria ut ea, si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus . . .] Before engaging in any activity Cicero/Panaetius has recommended praeparatio diligens ($73); but the point receives special emphasis here. Seneca Tranqu. An. 10.6 offers more specific counsel for those whom an unkind fortune has placed in a difficult position but then emphasizes (11.1) that such advice is for ordinary persons, not for the sage, who need nor tread gingerly. Ibid., 4.2 ff. Seneca treats from a different point of view from our passage the problem of what to do \ifortuna limits one's options: one can always find some role in which one can be utilis civitati.—Necessitas is not the €*ιμαρμ€νη or fatum of the Stoics, which 161. 1 assume that Livius* Aiax mastigophorus (trag., pp. 2-3) was no longer in the repertory.

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Cicero/Panaetius never directly mentions, but evidently rather a condition imposed by external circumstances as described in the next paragraph under the third persona (quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit); sec ad $ 115. That one should yield to such pressures was already recommended by Democritus (68 Β 289 D.-K.: άλογιστίη μη ξυγχωρέβν ταΐσι κατά TOf βίον άνά-γκαις).— This passage suggests that one's role in life, including one's profession, can be at least partly predetermined and, once fixed, in turn determines one's ac­ tions (cf. ad §S 107-21). . . . nee tarn est enitendum, ut bona quae nobis data non sint sequamur quam ut vitia fugiamus.] This point is likewise emphasized by Bion of Borysthenes fr. 16A (cited ad $ 115); cf. Panaetius' reaction to the thought of becoming an Athenian citizen (introduction, § 5 [2]). 115-21 The third and fourth personae come as something of a surprise, since they were not mentioned when the first two were introduced at $ 107; also, the influence of necessitas on one's actions, corresponding to the third persona, had already been discussed in § 114; see ad loc. Moreover, the third and fourth personae differ from the first two in not being moral determi­ nants. The choice of career involved in the fourth persona could have been described equally well as the result of the action of the second persona within limits imposed by universal human nature (the first persona) and external circumstances (necessitas or the third persona); cf. the beginnings of such a treatment at § 110; Schmekel, 40. Hence Schmekel, 3 9 - 4 1 , argued that the third and fourth personae were added by Cicero. However, the echoes of the third and fourth personae in later Greek moralizing (see next notes; Gill, 1988, 175 and n. 27) suggest that Panaetius was the common source of that tradition and Cicero, and the fourth persona is buttressed by Greek examples (Timotheus and Conon), a feature typical of material borrowed from Pan­ aetius (cf. ad 2Λ6). Belief in fortune and in an all-encompassing determinism of the Stoic variety are mutually exclusive (cf. SVF 2,281.45 = Serv. ad Aen. 8.334: nihil tarn contrarium est fato quam casus). Panaetius* use of casus as the basis of the third persona in conjunction with the emphasis on the individual's own choice under the fourth persona might suggest that he is breaking with Stoic determinism in general (cf. Puhle, 101; for Panaetius* skepticism of the mantic arts cf. frr. 70 ff.). However, Panaetius does hold that through reason and its apprehension of causal connections the course of an entire human life is calculable ( § 1 1 : homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam conse­ quent ia cernit, causas rerum videt. . . facile totius vitae cursum videt. . .); would he have gone so far as to assert, with Chrysippus, that even the tiniest details of human behavior, such as the turning of the neck, stretching of a

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finger, etc., are predetermined (SVF 2, 268.33 ff.)? Again, through his doctrine of assent (συγκατάθεση) Chrysippus had, at least to his own satis­ faction, reconciled Stoic determinism with the instinctive feeling that the human being enjoys free will in decision making; cf. ad §S 97-98; Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 104-6, and 2, 60; hence in positing a persona quant nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus (§ 115) Panaetius would not necessarily be at odds with orthodox Stoicism (cf. also ad §§ 107-21). Finally, the Stoa ex­ plained fortune as a construct that covered human ignorance of causal rela­ tions {SVF 2, nos. 965 ff.); hence in invoking τύχη Panaetius may merely be using, as elsewhere, popularia . . . verba . . . et usitata (2.35). The third persona is despatched in a single sentence, for it provides a framework, rather than involving a decision, whereas various precepts and examples are offered under the fourth, the persona of one's own choosing, which rapidly boils down to choice of profession (se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant: S 115). S 116 propounds three models of behavior in making this choice: 1) to cultivate the same field in which one's father or ancestor excelled; 2) to do not only that but also add distinction in another profession; 3) to excel in a wholly different field. Each of the first two options is illustrated with two exempla, the third with no specific case; it is simply said to be characteristic of ii qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. These appear to be empirical observations, as also at § 118: plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur. In Cicero's mind, however, if not in the written text, what was being offered was the praeceptum imitandos esse maiores (§ 121). After beginning with concrete cases Cicero 162 turns to the situation of the adolescent making his life's choice, characterized as deliberatio . . . omnium difficillima (S 117). We are told that the difficulty resides in the time of life, namely adolescence, the state of the maxima inbecillitas consilii, and the lack of time in which to reflect. The exemplum of Hercules is invoked as an ideal, for he had both the solitude and the leisure [exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse . . .) as well as clear alternatives. The empirical mode sets in again at the end of § 118, where he describes what ordinary mortals wind up doing. Again three possibilities appear, though there could have been more: the first combines following parental precepts and following in the parent's footsteps; the second, based upon the 162. Panaetius, too? Or has Cicero perhaps altered the order of presentation to give empha­ sis to his (mostly Roman) examples? If inserted within the argument, the content of $ 116 would have been expected at $ 118 in connection with the observation plerumque . . . parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur.

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judgment of the many, implicitly leads to the wrong choice; the third involves finding, whether by luck or natural endowment, the right path without pa­ rental guidance. The criteria for selection finally appear at §§ 119-20a (— pugnare videatur)^ namely fortuna (= the third persona) and natura (i.e., one's own individual nature = the second persona)^ with far greater impor­ tance assigned to the latter. The discussion concludes with two appendices, the first comprising praecepta on change of career (§ 120b), the second some caveats on the imitation of ancestors (§ 121). If the asymmetry of the personae categories has caused difficulty, so, too, has the speed with which the entire machinery is made to focus on the choice of a career; hence Fuhrmann's critique (101) that a die Identitat, um die es hier geht, ist, wie ersichtlich, keine subjektive Kategorie, kein aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehenes Ich, keine Einheit des Erlebens und Bewufitseins—sie ist eine vom 'Stellenplan' der Gesellschaft aus betrachtete Grofse, eine konventionelle Gegebenheit, ein 'pattern*, kurz: die perpetuierte soziale Rolle." But Panaetius' subject is not "das aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehene Ich," but rather the πρέπον, a quality that one displays (or not) in society. Moreover, the choice of profession is perhaps a human being's major act of social self-definition (cf. § 1 1 7 : quos nos et quales esse velimus); hence Cicero/Panaetius is right to lay as much stress upon it as he does in this context. 1 * 3 However, the process of choice is presented in excessively narrow and schematic terms, as can be seen from comparison with de Orat. 2.88 ff., a description of the orator's selection of a stylistic model, where the possibility is raised that among the characteristics of one's model orator one may have to discriminate between those worthy of imitation and those that ought rather to be avoided; no procedure of comparable subtlety is envisioned in our passage, where the subject is the still more complex problem of finding a model for one's life. 115 . . . tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit. . . ] Cf. Bion of Borysthenes fr. 16A: 6el ώσπ€ρ τόν ayaQov ύποκριτήν δ τι αν ό ποιητής πβριθή πρόσωπον τούτο άγωνί^σθαι καλώ?, ούτω και τόν αγαθόν άνδρα ο τι αν π6ριθή ή τύχη. και γάρ αϋτη, φησιν ό Βίων. ώσπερ ποιήτρια, ότέ μέν πρωτολόγου, ότέ δέ δβυτβρολόγου πβριτίθησι πρόσωπον, και OTC μέν 163. In addition, if it is true that the specialization of professions was characteristic of Hellenistic society (cf. Carl Schneider, Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus, 2 (Munich, 1969], 70 ff.), the resulting complexity of the problem may have moved Panaetius to devote to it as much attention as he docs (though if Cicero's version is a reliable reflection of the original, Panaetius failed to do full justice to this complexity); Panaetius was writing, in any case, probably for a Greek, rather than, as Fuhrmann, 98, supposes, a Roman readership; cf. introduction, $ 5 (4).

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βασιλέω?, ότβ be άλήτου. μη ουν βούλου δειττερολόγος" ών τό πρωτολόγου πρόσωπο^· ei be μη, ανάρμοστοι' τι ποιήσεις. nam regna iraperia nobilitas honores divitiae opes eaque quae sunt his contraria in casu sita temporibus gubernantur;. . .] Interesting, as Brunt, 1975, 34, n. 6, notes, that Panaetius assigns such variations to chance, not the deity; this is in line with the rather perfunctory remarks on appeasing the gods at 2.11; cf. also the following report of Panaetius' views: . . . τό πβρί Ββών λβγόμενα άνήρει. eXeye γαρ φλήι>αφον €Ϊναι τον TTCOI 6eou λόγοι> (fr. 68). The divine element plays a somewhat larger role in the non-Panaetian por­ tions of this Book (cf. § § 1 5 3 and 160). . . . ipsi autem quam gerere personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur.] This, rather than predetermination by fate, is clearly what Pan­ aetius wants to stress (cf. ad § 114). This emphasis did not, however, neces­ sarily place him at odds with the general Stoic view that events are predetermined by fate, since Chrysippus had attempted to find a via media between fate and free will in order to assure that one would bear responsibil­ ity for one's own actions (cf. ad §$ 97-98; 115-21). It would be interesting to know what line Panaetius took on πρόνοια (cf. p. 130, n. 40 above). 116 quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plemmque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari—cloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam . . .] What is here presented as the ordinary goal (student plerumque) appears at Rab. Post. 2 as virtually an endowment of nature: . . . praesertint, iudices, cum sit hoc generi hominum prope natura datum ut, si qua in familia laus aliqua forte floruerit, banc fere qui sint eius stirpis, quod sermone bominum ac memoria patrum virtutes celebrantur, cupidissime persequantur. . . (he goes on to instance Scipio's imitation of the military glory of Paullus and of his grandfather).—As in § 108, the Roman examples precede the Greek. P. Mucius Scaevola's career fell largely within the u storm and stress" period of the 130s and 120s. He was elected consul for 133 on the same winds of change that carried Tiberius Gracchus into his tribunate of the plebs; the crisis came to a head while his colleague L. Calpurnius Piso was putting down a slave revolt in Spain; when Scaevola refused to take action, P. Scipio Nasica uttered the famous words reported by Cicero [Tusc. 4.51) qui rempublicam salvam esse vellent, se sequi iussit and proceeded to the fatal deed (cf. ad $ 109; Andrew Lintott in CAH 9\ 69 and 72). In 130 he succeeded his brother P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131) as pontifex maximus; though in the modern literature he is often credited with the eighty-book edition of the priestly chronicles (Annates Maximi), this is more plausibly dated to the Augustan age; cf. B.W. Frier, Libri Annales Pontificum

Commentary on Book 1, Section 115-16

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Maximorum: The Origins of the Annalistic Tradition, PMAAR, 27 (Rome, 1979), 179-200. Only party spirit kept the Optimates from acknowledging him as the leading jurist of the day (cf. Rep. 1.20). Cf. F. Munzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 425.47 ff. (Mucius no. 17); Bauman, 1983, 230 ff. His son Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) was the author of the libri XVIII iuris civilis, the first attempt to reduce the subject to an organized system. He advocated the correctness of the summum ius in the celebrated causa Curiana (cf. ad 3.67), in which he appeared, according to the Ciceronian Antonius, as paterni iuris defensor et quasi patrimonii propugnator sui [de Orat. 1.244; sim. Brut. 197). Upon his father's death he succeeded him in the pontifical college; cf. ad 2.57 and 3.62-63; F. Munzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 437.1 ff., and, on his work as a jurist, B. Kubler, ibid., 442.7 ff.; Bauman, 1983, 340 ff.; Wieacker, 596 ff.; ad 3.70-71—L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182, 168) was decreed a supplicatio for his victory over the Lusitanians (after an initial defeat) at the end of 190 or beginning of 189 and a triumph for his defeat of the Ligurians in 181; the defeat of Perseus at Pydna on 22 June 168 brought him a second triumph; on his moderation following this victory cf. 2.76; cf. Klebs, RE 1.1 (1893), 576.44 ff., as well the darker portrait of the conqueror painted by Reitcr. P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus was his son by his first marriage with Papiria and as a boy was given to P. Cornelius Scipio, eldest son of Africanus, for adoption. He participated in the battle of Pydna and distinguished himself in the fighting as military tribune in Spain in 151 and in Carthage in 149; elected consul by special dispensation though underage in 147, he took command of the war against Carthage and presided over its destruction in 146; elected consul for the second time in 134, he brought the Numantine War to successful conclusion the following year; for a com­ prehensive study cf. Astin. . . . ut hie idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam . . . ] For Africanus' military glory' see the previous note; Cicero assigns him the predi­ cate eloquens at de Orat. 1.215 and Brut. 82; ibid., 83-84, he compares him to Laelius and finds the latter the more distinguished in oratory, as Africanus was in war; cf. also Brut. 258 and 295; orat., pp. 122 ff. . . . quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad earn laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit.] At Aegospotami Conon observed Lysander's approach, signaled it to his colleagues, and was able to escape to Cyprus with eight ships. In the years following the war he pursued with considerable success Lysander's game of ingratiating himself at the Persian court. In 399 with the aid of Evagoras and Pharnabazus he was able to win approval for the building on Cyprus of a Persian fleet of 100 vessels, of which he was to be admiral. His

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subsequent devastating defeat of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus (August, 394) broke the Spartan naval hegemony established at Aegospotami. Then on a voyage with Phamabazus along the coast of Asia Minor he was able to move a number of islands and coastal cities to expel their Spartan harmosts and garrisons; in early 393 they paid a visit to Corinth to strengthen the coalition at war with Sparta. Then Conon brought the Persian fleet to anchor off Athens, where he drove forward the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the walls of the Piraeus. When on a visit in 392 Antalcidas won Tiribazus over to the Spartan cause, Conon, who was on a mission in Sardis at the time, was imprisoned; though he escaped, he died shortly thereafter. He received lavish honors at Athens, including statues before the temple of Zeus Eleutherios, in the marketplace, and on the Acropolis. Cf. Swoboda, RE 11.2 (1922), 1319.19 ff.—Especially the brilliant victory won over the Spartan fleet at Alyzia at the end of June, 375, demonstrated Timotheus' comparable skill in naval warfare. In his efforts to strengthen the Second Athenian Naval Con­ federacy he was, however, hampered by lack of funds, which, for instance, prevented him from sailing in summer 374 to help the democrats on Corcyra, as the Athenian assembly had directed, with the result that he was removed from office and, when put on trial, narrowly acquitted. On his subsequent career cf. Karl Klee, RE 6A2 (1937), 1324.42 ff. The fact that he was the pupil of Isocrates, who drew a sympathetic portrait of his late friend at 15.101-39, accounts for Cicero placing him in parallel with the younger Scipio as a representative oidoctrina et ingenium as well as military prowess; cf. de Orat. 3.139; Isocrates is even said to have accompanied him on his travels and to have composed the letters Timotheus sent back to Athens ([Plut.J Wit. X Orat. 837c). 117-21 In primis autem constiruendum est—] A new paragraph probably should begin with In primis, since it is here that the topic of how one should go about making the choice of profession, and what factors need to be considered and in what proportion, really begins (the preceding being rather a series of examples and empirical observations of what people in practice do); of recent editors Arzert and Fedeli continue the paragraph begun at § 1 1 5 , whereas Testard and Winterbottom introduce a new paragraph with the preceding summary haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus quid deceat. . .— The passage highlights a structural problem in the way most people go about choosing their profession, namely that the decision is taken ineunte . . . adulescentia, cum est maxima inbecillitas consilii. . . The upshot is that each chooses quod maxime adamavit and is already entangled in that choice before reaching years of mature judgment. Contrasted with this practice is the picture of Hercules at the crossroads, who, albeit also quite young (cum

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primum pubesceret), nevertheless makes a choice based upon considerable deliberation [diu secum multumque dubitasse; cf. in § 119 the mention of the fortunate circumstance of having spatium . . . deliberandi). 117 ineuntc cnim adulescemta, cum est maxima imbecillitas consilii.. .] An exaggeration, since the formulation maxima imbecillitas consilii would strictly apply to infancy according to Stoic doctrine. The Stoics held that the child gradually gathers προλήψεις ("preconceptions"), of which enough are assembled by about the seventh year that one can speak of λόγος; then by around the fourteenth year λόγος reaches its maturity (τελειότης) in the human being; cf. SVF 2,215.6 ff., with other passages discussed by Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 33; cf. also p. 83, n. 19 above. . . . turn id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit quod maxime adamavit;. . . ] The prefix ad- intensifies the simplex amare, as, for instance, at Sen. Ep. 71.5: hoc si persuaseris tibi et virtutem adamaveris (amare enim parum est). . . The compound, nor attested before Cicero and seldom found in other than the perfect tense, can denote an enthusiastic or excessive love characteristic of adolescents, as in our passage and Quint. Inst. 2.5.22 (on dangers to be avoided in education): alterum . . . ne recentis hums lasciviae flosculis capti voluptate prava deleniantur, ut praedulce illud genus et puerilibus ingeniis hoc gratius quo propius est adament.164 118 nam quod Herculem Prodicus dicit—utram ingredi melius esset. . .] Virtually a literal translation of X. Mem. 2.1.21: φησ'ι γαρ [sc. ό Πρόδικοςΐ Ήρακλεα, επεί εκ παίδων €Ϊς ήβτμ> ώρμάτο, έν ή οι νέοι ήδη αυτοκράτορες γιγνόμε νοι δηλουσινεϊτε τήι>δι'αρετήςόδόν τρέφονται επί τον βίονείτε την δια κακίας, εξελθόντα εις ήσυχίαν καθήσθαι άποροϋντα ποτεραν των οδών τράπηται· . . . Possibly the passage conveys some notion of what Cicero's youthful version of the Oeconomicus might have been like (cf. 2.87). . . . hoc Herculi, 'Iovis satu edito',—rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.] This passage contrasts the deliberate method of Hercules just described and that of "us," qui imitamur quos cuique visum est atqueadeorum studia institutaque impellimur. Two examples are given of this: (1) the imitation of par­ ents, 1 6 5 (2) the reliance upon multitudinis iudicium. Now this passage is implicitly a plea for following the parentium praecepta in view of the im­ becillitas consilii of youth, since ordinary mortals cannot, like Hercules, 164. Cf. OLD s.w. ad-, adamo; Vollmer, TLL 1, 567.4 ff. 165. Initially it is vaguely said to be an imitation of "those whom each thought best" (sc. to imitate: quos cuique visum est), then that "for the most part" (plerumque) we arc drawn to the "habits and character" {consuetudinem moremque) of parents; parentes figures (twice) in this section, where moral influence is in question, whereas $ 116 focuses on patres aut maiores as models for career and achievement.

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deliberate at length and in isolation. 166 On the other hand, Cicero/Panaetius is, in general, no friend of the multitudinis judicium, reliance upon which can easily lead one into error; cf. 1.65 and 2.37 (§ 147 and 3.19 pose special problems; cf. ad locos), as well as the Stoic argument that the pravitas opinionum can lead one away from nature at Tusc. 3.2-3. Hence the follow­ ing clause [nonnulli tamen—) connects adversatively only with the latter of the two common methods of choosing a profession:167 in spite of youth's susceptibility to influence in the wrong direction (viz., through the multi­ tudinis judicium), some do actually manage to hit upon the right career. Cicero does not seem at this point to envision the possibility that, in view of the precept in qua deliberatione (i.e., choice of profession) ad suam cuius que naturam consilium est omne revocandum (§ 119), imitation of a parent or ancestor might actually lead one astray. Only in § 121 does he backtrack and clarify (in view of 5 116) that one should not imitate an ancestor's vices or follow his example si natura non feret.—In view of the diction, Winterbottom ad he. is surely right in suspecting that *Iovis satu edito' derives from a tragedy.168 nonnulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae sine parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.] Cf. de Orat. 2.98: atque esse tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur et suapte natura, quod velint, sine cuiusquam similitudine consequantur.—Sine is Stuerenburg's (necessary) correction for yet a third sive. 119 . . . turn in tota vita constituenda multo est cius rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet ipsis . . . ] Cf. ad S i l l and for the a fortiori form ad § 48. 120 ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habec, fortuna proximam—cum immortali natura pugnare videatur.] This is among the passages that exemplify Panaetius' role as the "Wiederentdecker der Ethik Demokrits" (Philippson, 1929,337; cf. ad $$ 23b, 66y 68,90,114; introduc­ tion to Book 2; 2.11-16). For the characterization of natura as multo . . . et firmior . . . et constantior cf. Democr. 68 Β 176 D.-K.: τύχη μεγαλόδωρο^, αλλ'αβέβαιος·.φύσιςoc αυτάρκης- διόπ€ρ WKQ τφ ήσσοιη και β€βαίω τό μ€Ϊ£οΐ' της ελπίδος. Not dissimilar to Panaetius' picture of fortuna engaged in an unequal struggle with the stronger natura is the struggle of τύχη and φρόι>ησις at Democr. 68 Β 119 D.-K.: άνθρωποι τύχης εΐδωλον επλάσαντο πρό166. Labowsky, 50, is surely mistaken in chinking chat in our passage "von dcr Nachahmung dcr Elrem chcr abgcratcn wird." 167. This connection, howevet; caused (unnecessary) difficulty for Rcinhardt, 1893, 16 ff. (hence his Draconian athetesis of nonnulli tamen—viam). 168. For satus cf. Ace. trag. 618: profecto hauquaquam est ortus mediocri satu.

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φασιν ίδίης άβουλίη?. βαιά γάρ φροι>ήσ€ΐ τύχη μάχίται, τα oe πλ€Ϊστα έν βίφ ξύξύνςτος όξυδβρκείη κατιθύνβι; Puhle, 106-7. The doctrine of our passage is, of course, in line with Panaetius' general tendency to give preference to the more permanent over the more transitory (cf. ad §§ 74 ff. and 2.55 b ff.); cf. ad § 115.—One wonders whether Panaetius might have made the simile (ut fortuna. . . tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur) more vivid by comparing the struggle of Apollo and Hercules over the Delphic tripod.—This is the only passage in which Cicero/Panaetius raises the possibility of a conflict of the different personae, a problem explored by Seneca and Epictetus; cf. Gill, 1994, 4633. . . . sensim erit pcdetemptimque facienda, ut amicitJas quae minus delcctent ct minus probentur magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere.] Antic. (78), recently completed, offered a corresponding precept: quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. cavendum vero ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se ami­ citiae . . . Cf. F.-A. Steinmetz, 134 ff.—Here an example might have helped to clarify how a change of profession could be achieved with elegance (one is, in fact, given at § 151; see ad loc.)\ cf. Heilmann, 57; for further cases where an example would have been helpful cf. ad $§ 18-19,159, juxtaposed with 3.93. 121 Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores . . .J In fact, that is not what was said in $ 116, but rather that this is what people tend to do if they have distinguished forebears (. . . it student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere . . .). Presumably the reason for this counsel is that one is likely to have inherited some of the same ingenium (on relevant Stoic doctrine cf. ad §§ 107-21). Cf. the personal application of this precept to the addressee at 3.6: s us tines enim non parvam exspectationem imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, nonnullam fortasse nominis. . . . primum illud exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda . . . ] One would have expected ne vitia imitemur; the construction is assimilated to that of verbs of striving and the like; cf. 2.74: danda . . . opera est ne . . . tributum sit conferendum. . . . deinde si natura non feret ut quaedam imitari p o s s i t . . .] Imitare ap­ pears as early as Livius Andronicus but occurs in Cicero only in the par­ ticipial form at Tim. 8 (cum autem ingressa est imitata et efficta simulacra)^ cf. O. Prinz, TIL 7.1, 432.63 ff. Hence possit of Londinensis Add. 11937 (anno 1416), adopted here after Pearce et al., for the transmitted possint, an easy mistake for a scribe writing after deponent forms had fallen out of the spoken language (surely during the fifth century; cf. B. Lofstedt, Kratylos 20

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[1975], 120, in a review of P. Flobert, Les verbes deponents latins des origines a Charlemagne [Paris, 1975]); one must supply, somewhat awkwardly, "the individual" or the like as the subject, but the following words poterit . . . debebit require that anyway. Atzert's athetesis of ut quaedam imitari possint is a cure too radical for the ailment. . . . (ut supcrioris Alius Africani—quo minus ab eo id quod desit requiratur.] Frail health kept Africanus' son out of the cursus honorum, though he was augur in 180. Cf. Sen. 35: quam fuit imbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulb potius valetudinel quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud exstitisset lumen civitatis; ad paternam enim magnitudinem animi doctrina uberior accesserat; cf. the similar comment on his health and favor­ able judgment of his literary style in oratiunculae and a history written in Greek at Brut. 77; the epitaph at CIL 1 2 .10 is sometimes assigned to him; cf. K. M. Moir, CQ 36 (1986), 264-66. Cf. Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1437.23 ff. . . . ilia tamen praestare debebit quae erunt in ipsius potestate . . .] Good Stoic doctrine; cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 4.2 ff. optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rcrumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas et vitium iudicandum est.] The Romans liked to boast in such terms as in the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (pr. peregr. 139): virtutes generis mieis monbus accumulavi, I progeniem genui, facta patris petiei. I maiorum optenui laudem, ut sibei me esse creatum I laetentur: stirpem nobilitavit honor (CIL 1 2 .15). For the conception of glory as a legacy cf. § 78, as well as the letter congratulating Dolabella on his destruction of an altar to Julius Caesar and a pillar set up to him as pater patriae, as well as the punishment of the worshippers; in the course of the letter Cicero mentions that many had assumed (wrongly) that Dolabella was acting on his own advice and adds jokingly: a te autem peto ut me banc quasi falsam hereditatem alienae gloriae sinas cernere. . . (Fam. 9.14.4; 3 May 44); cf. V. Max. 4.4.10: idem senatus Fabricii Luscini Scipionisque filias ab indotatis nuptiis liberalitate sua vindicavit, quoniam paternae hereditati praeter opimam gloriam nihil erat quod acceptum referrent; on the gloria nominis of the gens as an important factor in Roman thinking (and a burden for the individual) cf. Knoche, 1 9 3 4 , 1 0 9 10. With the optima hereditas of our sentence contrast Caesar's legacy as described in 2.28.—The shame attached to wasting ancestral property and repute emerges vividly in the exchange of the spendthrift youth Lesbonicus and his friend Lysiteles at PI. Τήη. 641 ff.: LY. . . . itan tandem banc maiiores famam tradiderunt tibi tut, I ut virtute eorum anteperta per flagitium perderesf . . . LE. omnia ego istaec quae tu dixti scio, vel exsignavero, I ut rem patriam et gloriam maiorum foedarim meum: I scibam ut esse me deceret,

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 121 and 122-25

295

facere non quibam miser . . . (642-43, 655-57).—Though recent editors (Atzert4, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom) agree in retaining the transmitted text, it is dubious whether the anticlimactic nefas et vitium is Ciceronian; the choice lies between a) Baiter's deletion of et vitium and b) flagitium (for vitium), conjectured by Driefien, 11. The latter seems more probable, it being otherwise hard to explain how et vitium could have arisen; for the iunctura Goldbacher, 2, 37, adduces nefarie flagitioseque (Ver. 37). 122-25 These sections deal with social roles imposed by external circum­ stances (tempora; see below); on the relation of this material to teachings of the Older Stoa cf. Brunt, 1975, 33. The first topic is age, under which separate sets of precepts are given for young and old (§§ 122-23; cf. the virtues associated with different ages and social roles at PI. Men. 71 e); the middle years as such are not discussed, presumably since here one's civic status comes into play, treated in the following section on tempora (§§ 1 2 4 25), including precepts for those holding public office, private citizens, and resident aliens. Surely a new paragraph should be marked at § 122: Et quoniam officio . . . , as is done, among recent editors, by Fedeli, Testard, and Winterbottom, but not Atzert4. Griffin, 1976, 342 n., finds this transition "cu­ rious." What is odd is not the formulation169 but the lack at this point, as elsewhere in the essay (cf. ad%% 11-17,150-51), of a clear indication of the relation of this material to what has preceded; the reader is thus left without orientation until a dispositio is finally inserted at $ 125 (for a similar case cf. ad 3.96). This material was omitted by Cicero where one would have ex­ pected it, under the third persona (cf. $ 115: tertia. . . quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit, where tempus has the broad sense of "external circum­ stances" [cf. OLD s.v., 10-111 and ad % 125).l7<> Griffin, loc. cit., sets this material into the context of an older Stoic set of precepts, criticized already by Aristo of Chios (cf. Sen. Ep. 94.2 and 18), which offered advice for those acting in various public or social roles, e.g., husband, father, brother, friend, citizen, etc., which would have found their place under "justice" (ibid., 94.11: 'Sic amico utere, sic civet sic socio'. 'Quaref 'Quia iustum est'.). She supposes that Panactius has taken over these older Stoic precepts and inte­ grated them imperfectly into his own personae theory, which, unlike its predecessor, took account of the individual's own aptitudes and was sub­ sumed under the fourth, rather than the second, virtue. This hypothesis is 169. Labowsky, 50, n. 103, cites the similar formulations ar $S 126 and 132b as well as Arist. EN 1148b 15 and U51b23. 170. Not just SS 124-25a, as Labowsky, 51, supposed, since aetas, too, belongs under tempus in the broad sense.

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possible but still leaves unexplained why this material was postponed to this point and not dealt with under the third persona. Another possibility worth considering is that Cicero himself is responsible for the imperfect juncture, a state of affairs observed elsewhere in Off.wl Pointing out that Panaetius is known to have dealt with magistrates (cf. ad $ 124), Labowsky, 51, supposes that Cicero had originally meant to eliminate the entire treatment of the third persona but then changed his mind and added the discussion of civil officia in SS 124-25, a topic of special interest to him, as an appendix. This, too, is possible. A third possibility would be that Cicero did not care for the treat­ ment of the third persona that he found in ntpl τοΟ καθήκοντος and therefore omitted it in sequence but added an appendix on the subject from another source, whether Panaetian172 or non-Panaetian. Besides the problematical relation to its larger context, the want of examples in this section is also striking; one wonders whether here, as elsewhere (cf. 2.16), Cicero has cur­ tailed those of his model. The precept est igitur adulescentis matures natu vereri, exque its deligere optimos et probatissimos quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur is, however, illustrated at 2.47; and perhaps Cicero touched so briefly here on old age in view of Sen. and on magistrates in view of his treatment of the topic at Leg. 3; if so, however, one would have expected an explicit indication, as at 2.31. 122 Hippias is said to have produced a discourse on the noble pursuits of youth (PI. Hp. Ma. 286a-b). Cf. ad 2.46, where similar topics are treated. . . . ineuntis enim aetatis insciria senum constituenda et regenda pmdentia est.] Ci. ad § 123. maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est...] Cf. Polybius' charac­ terization of Scipio's youth cited ad $ 111. 123 senibus autem labores corporis minuendi. . .] Cf. Plut. An Sent 793b-c. . . . danda vero opera ut et amicos et iuventutem et maxime rempublicam consilio et pmdentia quam plurimum adiuvent.] For the old advising the young cf. the example of Sparta at Plut. An Sent 795f-796a. For Aristotle what is old and complete is "more worthy of rule" (ήγ€μοι>ικώτΈροι>) than what is young and incomplete (Pol. 1259bl ff.). For the role of the elderly as teachers cf. the advice of Sen. de Otto 2.2. That the old should continue to help the state is, of course, the thesis of Plutarch's An Sent Respublica Gerenda Sit as a whole; the examples shared with Sen. have led scholars to posit the essay π€ρι γήρως of Aristo of Ceus as common source (cf. Sen. 1.3 = 171. Cf. ad S$ 24-26, 74-78, and 2.19b-20a, to name only a few flagrant examples. 172. In the event that Panaetius1 own discussion of magistrates occurred in a work other than ntp'i tw καθήκοντος.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 122-25 and 122-24

297

Aristofr. 12 [see Wehrli *d/o<;.];Ziegler, RE21.1 [1951], 821.51 ff.; Powell, pp. 26 and 28 of his ed. of Sen., is skeptical). nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat; . . .] Contrast the description of Appius Claudius at Sen. 37: . . . tantas clientelas Appius regebat et caecus et senex; intentum enim animum tamquam arcum habebat, nee languescens succumbebat senectuti. Cicero evidently took to heart such reflections, which he found in the philosophical tradition (cf. Plut. An Sent 784a: πολλών δέ κακιών ούδεμιά? ήττον άπραζία και δ€ΐλία και μαλακία καταισχυνουσιν άνδρα πρ^σβύτην . . .); for in the very personal preface to Book 3 he notes that otium and solitudo can induce languor but denies that he is allowing his solitude to languish (3.1 and 3); such thoughts doubtless helped propel him back into politics. . . . luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, turn senectuti foedissima est.] Cf. Plut. An Sent 785e-f, including Pompey's reply to Lucullus' criticism of his fondness for holding office: άωρότερον civai γεροντι το τρυφάν ή τό άρχε ι ν. 124-25 The applicability of the term officium to both public and private activities commended it to Cicero as a translation for καθήκον: cf. ad § 4 and introduction, § 2. 124 est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam civitatis . . .] The Roman public official was supposed to lay aside personal inclinations and interests when acting officially; cf. Cic. Mur. 6 (in answer to the charge that his leniency in handling the case of Murena is inconsistent with the severitas with which he forced Catiline out of Rome): ego autem has partis lenitatis et misericordiae quas me natura ipsa docuit semper egi libenter, Mam vero gravitatis severitatisque personam non appetivi, sed ah republica mihi impositam sustinui. . . ; Tac. Agr. 9.3: iam vero tempora curarum remissionumque divisa: ubi conventus ac iudicia poscerent, gravis intentus, severus et saepius misericors: ubi officio satis factum, nulla ultra potestatis persona; tristitiam et adrogantiam et avaritiam exuerat. Cf. also 3.43: ponit enim personam amici cum induit iudicis; Wood, 135. est igitur proprium munus—ea fidei suae commissa meminisse.] Cicero al­ ludes to Panaetius' treatment of magistrates (possibly corresponding to our passage) at Leg. 3.13-14 (= Panaetius fr. 48): MARCUS:. . . sed huius loci de magistratibus sunt propria quaedam, a Theophrasto primum, deinde a Dio(ge)ne Stoico quaesita subtilius. ATTICUS: Ain tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista tractata sunt? MARCUS: Non sane, nisi ab eo quern modo nominavi et postea a magno homine et in primis erudito, Panaetio. nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem, de republica disserebant. Cf. the advice to magistrates regarding the punish­ ment of offenders at §§ 88-89, especially $ 89 fin.:. . . ut it qui praesunt

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reipublicae legum similes sintf quae ad puniendum non iracundia sed aequitate dueuntur. Interesting that the magistrate's charge is conceived in terms of fides; cf. Freyburger, 209. Viewing these matters as the magistrate's trust, Cicero was inevitably offended at the behavior of Caesar, who, in his view, omnia iura divina et humana pervertit. . . (§ 26). . . . iura discribere . . .] MSS generally show much fluctuation between describere/descriptio and discribere/discriptio; their authority is correspon­ dingly slight. Indeed the two groups are not easy to distinguish semantically, especially as applied to iura or the like; a symptom of the difficulty is the fact that Vetter, TLL 5.663.13 ff. and 1354.80-81, lists our passage under both describo and discribo1. In general the basic distinction seems to be between the writing out or initial prescribing of laws by a lawgiver or the like (describere; cf. OLD s.v. describo 5) and the setting of laws and rights into a proper order, i.e., with a view toward their application to specific cases, by a magistrate [discribere). To give a few instances, at de Orat. 1.33, which refers to the first act of establishing laws, surely describere is wanted, as also de Orat. 3.76 [vis . . . eloquentiae tanta est, ut . . . mores leges iura describat), whereas the function of setting in order for application prevails at Quinct. AS {quis tandem nobis ista iura tarn aequa discribit? quis hoc statuit, quod aequum sit in Quinctium, id iniquum esse in Naeviumf), where discribit is Biicheler's conjecture. If that is so, then in our passage Baiter's discribere is surely the form wanted; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89. Similarly, the form discriptio is evidently correct for "systematic distribution" of property at § 2 1 ; cf. also ΛΛ S 51 and 2.15. privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque submissum et abiectum neque se efferentem . . .] The mean is the implicit ideal here, as so often under the fourth virtue, of which modus was a defining characteristic as early as S 14; cf. SS 102,130-31,140,andd
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 124-25 and 126-49

299

peccatorum suorum conscii, novos motus conversionesque reipublicae quaerant, aut qui propter insitum quendam animi furorem discordiis civium ac seditione pascantur, aut qui propter implicationem rei familiaris communi incendio malint quam suo deflagrare. On the term bonus/boni cf. p. 425, n. 50. 125 peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena republica curiosum.] Those engaged in politics were held to be πολυπράγμονες (Arist. EN 1142a2); even an Athenian citizen was well advised to keep clear of that predicate (cf. Lys. 24.24; Isoc. 15.99 and 230 wards off the charge that his students and fellow sophists are πολυπράγμονες). Foreign residents, who could by definition play no political role, are here advised to avoid πολυπραγ­ μοσύνη and keep a low profile, presumably since they are easy targets in troubled times (cf. Lys. 12.6; ad 3.47). PI. Lg. 952dl stipulates the death penalty for a foreign visitor εάν γ ' εν δικαστήρια) άλφ πολυπραγμόνων τι περί την παιδί ίαν και τους νόμους. ha fere officia reperientur cum quacretur quid deceat et quid aptum sit personis temporibus aetatibus.] This summary comprises the dispositio of the preceding section; cf. ad $$ 122-25. Personae is a reference to §§ 1 0 7 21; tempora to civic status, office, and the like, discussed at §§ 124-25a (cf. $ 115: nam regna imperia nobilitas honores divitiae opes eaque quae sunt his contraria in casu sita temporibus gubernantur)\ aetates to the discussion of youth and old age at §§ 122-23. The fact that this summary fails to list the topics in the order of treatment has no particular significance; cf. the dispositio at $ 126 as discussed ad $S 126-49; ad § 45. Cf. Labowsky, 5 1 ; for a different view Griffin, 1976, 342 n., modified in her note ad he. nihil esc autem quod tarn deceat quam in omni re gerenda consilioque ca­ piendo servare constantiam.] Cf. ad § 111. 126-49 § 126 provides a dispositio for the rest of the Panaetian portion of this Book. These chapters deal with some aspects of the πρέπον considered by the older Stoa (in the sequel they are handled in reverse order of their presentation here): (1) corporis motus et status ($§ 126-32a); (2) dicta (§§ 132b-37); (3) facta (§$ 141-49). Topic (1) corresponds to κοσμιότης, defined as επιστήμη περί το πρέπον εν κινήσει καΐ σχεσει (SVF 3, 66.43). Dicta (2) are expected, since the πρέπον originally had reference to diction (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1404bl ff.; ad $ 97; it was still recognized by Diogenes of Babylon as one of the five άρεται λόγου: SVF 3,214.11-12 and 18). The one passage that does not fit into this scheme, that dealing with the house of a great man {hominis honorati et principis: $§ 138-40), is inserted without reference to the original plan (cf. the general rationale given at the beginning

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of $ 138: quoniam omnia persequimur) and illustrated exclusively with Roman examples; it is thus very likely to have been added (with transparent political subtext) by Cicero himself (cf. ad loc. and Schmekel, 41). Note that all the items of this divisio are points that apply both to human beings in daily life and to actors upon a stage, so that the simile of the playwright (S§ 97-98) really controls the whole presentation of decorum, the first half comprising the determination of the persona of the individual (SS 105-25), the second half the actions, words, or movements that are to be matched to that persona. 126-32a These sections deal with corporis motus et status under three head­ ings: 1) formositas, 2) ordo, 3) ornatus ad actionem aptus; these three topics receive, however, rather perfunctory treatment at SS 130-3 la (—non adesse constantiam). Cicero prefaces, however, surely after Panaetius (cf. SS 9 8 99), some remarks about showing concern for the feelings of one's fellow humans, i.e., about the avoidance of obscenity. Panaetius' defense of αιδώ? takes as its primary target Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the cult of άναί&ισ (cf. D.L. 6.69: eitoGei δέ πάντα ποΐ€Ϊι> iv τφ μίσψ, και τα Δήμητρο? και τα 'Αφροδίτη?; for a sexual act performed in public see also D.L. 6.46). Panaetius' argument takes, as so often, an initium a natura. It was Diogenes who first made "life according to nature" the means for attaining ευδαιμονία (cf. D.L. 6.71). Panaetius, however, contrives to turn the tables on Diogenes by invoking "nature" on the side of convention. He does so by pointing to the tendency of civilized peoples to conceal certain parts of the body. Αιδώ? therefore can be said to "imitate" nature in this respect; or, put another way, αιδώ? is commensurate with (πρέπουσα) nature. Panaetius also cites the ap­ probate of others when obscenity is avoided ($ 128: nos autem naturam sequamur et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus173). Zeno seems to have followed Diogenes in his willingness to call a spade a spade: ό σοφό? ^υθυρρημονήσβι (SVF 1, 22.28); hence Cicero's si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici (S 128). In a witty reply to a letter in which his friend L. Papirius Paetus had evidently used the term mentula17* (Fam. 9.22, dated by Shackleton Bailey between 46 and 44), Cicero deals more fully with the topic of verecundia in language. From this it appears that Zeno held, like Heraclitus, that objects and their names are related φύσει, rather than Oeoei, and that things should therefore be called by their proper names, not cuphe173. On the text, with omne restored for ab omni after Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 cf. Winrerbottom, 1995, 265-66. 174. Cf. S 4: quam multa ex uno verbo tuo! with Adams, 1982, 9-10, and Wendt, 24.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 126-32a and 126

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misms. Zeno also posed the dilemma that obscenity must reside either in the name or the thing and proceeded to argue against both possibilities; this is a variant of the debate as to whether truth or falsity resides in the thing signified, the sound, or the movement of the mind (cf. S.E. M. 8.11). At both the beginning and end of the letter Cicero makes it clear that, while reporting Zeno's views, he is far from accepting them: $ 1: . . . Zenoni. . . homini mebercule acuto, etsi Academiae nostrae cum eo magna rixa est; $ 4: te adversus me omnia audere gratum est; ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. Zeno also held that no part of the body should be concealed (sc. in doing athletics: D.L. 7.33; cf. Schofield, 1991, 13). On the Roman rejection of Cynicism in general cf. Griffin, 1976, 297, n. 6. 126 . . . decorum illud in omnibus factis dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cemitur . . .] Cf. Muson., 34.18 ff.: τίς μεντοι επιστήμη προς σωφροσύνης άγ€ΐ πλην φιλοσοφίας, ούκ εστίν ειπείν αυτή γαρ δίδασκα μεν επάνω ηδονής είναι, διδάσκει δ' επάνω πλεονεξίας, διδάσκει δε αγαπάν εύτελειαν, διδάσκει δε φεύγειν πολυτελειαν, εθίζει δ* αιδώ εχειν. εθίζει δε γλώττης κρατεΐν, τάξιν δε και κόσμον και εύσχημοσύνην περιποιεΐ και δλως το εν κινήσει και σχεσει πρέπον. . . . in his autem tribus continetur cura etiam ilia, ut probemur iis quibuscum apud quosque vivamus . . .] The approbatio of one's fellow humans was a point first made in the simile of the playwrights (§$ 97-98a) and then immediately amplified (§§ 98b-99); it is now revived, since in the following discussion of the body it will play an important role both in its own right (S 128: . . . omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus) and in terms of the attitude/behavior that gives rise to it {verecundia: § 127) and the opposite attitude (petulantia: ibid.). . . . quae partes autem corporis ad naturae necessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas contexit atque abdidit.] The organs of reproduction and of elimination are placed in the same aesthetic category here (Heinemann, 2, 211, notes that in the construction of the human body Panaetius attributes to Nature the same kind of aesthetic sense that he found in the human being [§ 14]). The teleological/aesthetic interpre­ tation of the placement of the excretory organs is found already at X. Mem. 1.4.6: προς δε τούτοις ού δοκεΐ σοι και τάδε προνοίας εργοις έοικε ναι. . . έπει δε τά αποχωρούντα δυσχερή, άποστρεψαι τους τούτων οχετούς ή δυνατόν προσιυτάτω από των αισθήσεων . . . ; cf. Arist. ΡΑ 681b26: επί δε της μύτιδος το έντερον έξωθεν, κα'ι ό θολός προς τφ έντερω, όπως οτι πλείστον άπέχη τής εισόδου και το δυσχερές άποθεν ή τοϋ βελτίονος και τής αρχής. Perhaps Panaetius had in front of him a Stoic teleology of the kind repro­ duced at N.D. 2; cf. N.D. 2.141: atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab

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oculis naribusque dominorum ea quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensibus with further parallels cited by Pease ad loc. A negative valuation of the sexual organs was not inevitable, however, nor are they, in the male, "concealed" by nature as are the excretory organs; cf. PI. Smp. 191b5 ff.: έλεήσας δε ό Ζευς άλληι> μηχανήν πορίζεται, και μετατίθησιν αυτών τά αίδοΐα εις το πρόσθεν, together with PI. Tim. 45a3: τοϋ δ' όπισθεν τό πρόσθεν τιμιώτερον και άρχικώτερον νομί£οντες . . . 127 hanc naturae cam diligentem fabricam imitata est hominum verecundia.] By making verecundia an imitation of nature Cicero/Panaetius contrives to enlist "nature" on the side of codes of dress conventional in society; cf. Fantham, 165. For the phrase naturae fabrica with reference to the human body cf. N.D. 2.138 [incredibilis fabrica naturae); cf. also Luc. 86: iam ilia praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura . . .—Did Panaetius perhaps connect the following precepts more closely with the imitation of nature than Cicero's text indicates? Nature might have provided a rationale for the recta et simplicia in movements or the mediocritas in clothing, just as, after Zeno, Muson. 115.4 ff. based his recommendation of shorter rather than longer hair on nature: ευ γάρ εΐρηται, εφη, τό τοϋ Ζήνωνος, δτι τούτου ένεκα καρτεον ού και κομητεον, τού κατά φύσιν, 'ίνα μη βαρούμενός τις υπό της κόμης μηδ' ενοχλούμενος ή προς μηδεμίαν ένεργειαν. ή γάρ δη φύσις τό μεν ενδεές μάλλον φαίνεται φυλαξαμενη, τό δε περιττόν ήττον, επί τε φυτών και επ'ι {ώ­ ων, ότι της πρόσθεσε ως του ενδεούς ή άφαίρεσις τού περιττού πολύ ρ
Commentary on Book 1, Section 126-29

303

ruborem suum verborum turpitudine et rerum obscenitate vitanda. Cicero had offered at Rep. 4.6 {apud Non. p. 23M) the etymology a petendo petulantia later taken up by Festus p. 206M: petulantes etpetulci etiam appellantur qui protervo impetu et crebro petunt laedendi alterius gratia, where the emphasis on injury to another is in accord with the trend of our passage (cf. § 126); for petulantia as one step removed from insanity (see the preceding qui sana mente sunt) cf. de Orat. 2.305:. . . Mud adsequor, ut si quis mihi male dicat, petulans aut plane insanus esse videatur; cf. ad §§ 104-5. For orationis obscenitas cf. ad 3.32. 128 Nee vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici.. .] = Socr. VB 515. Zeno's Republic, a σκάνδαλον to some later Stoics (cf. Schofield, 1991, 8 ff.), was said to have been written "on the dog's tail" (em της τοϋ κυνος ουράς: D.L. 7.4); on frankness in speaking of sexual matters as characteristic of mainstream Stoicism through the time of Chrysippus cf. Erskine, 14. latrocinari fraudare adukerare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum;. . .] Cicero elaborates this paradox in the letter cited above, where he adduces scenes from a comedy and three tragedies in which the matter, if expressed in other terms, would be obscene. There he includes the similar observation: 'liberis dare operam' quam honeste dicitur; etiam patres rogant filios. eius operae nomen non audent dicere (Fam. 9.22.3).175 Quintilian demands a higher standard of the orator: obscenitas vero non a verbis tantum abesse debet, sed etiam a significatione (6.3.29). Cf. also Hieron. in Is. 47.3.: disputant Stoici multa re turpia prava hominum consuetudine verbis honesta esse, ut parricidium, adulterium, homicidium, incestum et cetera his shnilia. rursumque re hon­ esta nominibus videri turpia, ut liberos procreare, inflationem ventris crepitu digerere, alvum relevare stercore, vesicant urinae effusione laxare. denique non posse nos, ut dicimus a ruta rutulam, sic ύποκορ<στικόι> mentae facere.— Against adoption of the chiastic order honestum est re, nomine obscenum attested at Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 (cf. Winterbottom, 1995,265) is the fact that the ditrochaic rhythm of re honestum est (with elision assumed) would have to give way. nos autem naturam sequamur et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus;...] Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 now joins with ξ in support of omne for ab omni (£), better anyway before abhorret; cf. Winterbottom, 1995, 265-66. 129 This section presents a nicely coherent argument beginning with a pre175. On liberis dare operam cf. Adams, 1982, 157; Wendt, 29.

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cept {quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda . . .)»followed by its exten­ sion to actors and orators, for whom no double standard is to be counte­ nanced (nee vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est. . .). Two arguments in favor of this position are then introduced, each based on mos and connected with quidem (of the type called "begriindend oder erganzend" at Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,803). A final sentence draws the conclu­ sion (retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce [this latter an allusion to § 127 into.]). quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit.] Here decorum appears again as a mean between extremes (cf. ad § 93). Ov. Ars 3.305-6 was perhaps influenced by our passage (cf. D'Elia, 136): sedsit, ut in multis, modus hie quo que: rusticus alter I motus, concesso mollior alter erit; cf. Ep. 20.61 Dorrie (from Acontius' description of Cydippe): et decor et vultus sine rusticitate pudentes; Quint. Inst. 1.11.16 (directions for gestus motusque): . . . ne indoctae rusticae manus, ne status indecorus, ne qua in proferendis pedibus inscitia . . . The former violation of decorum appears already at $ 14 (see ad loc.).—For an example of rusticitas of the type Cicero evidently has in mind cf. Thphr. Char. Α Α (αγροικία?): και άναβ€βλημ€νος· άνω του γόνατο? καθιζάνω 11>, wore τά γυμνά αΰτοϋ φαίν€σθαι. nee vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta.] Perhaps this stricture is aimed inter alia at the mimeactresses* practice of stripping naked at the Floralia (cf. Lact. inst. 1.20.10); it is said that in 55 Cato had the tact to withdraw from the theater so as not to inhibit the proceedings (V. Max. 2.10.8; Mart. 1 proem); cf. also Procop. Arc. 9.14; Edwards, 128-29.—For emphasis histrionibus oratoribusque is anticipated from the subordinate clause in a manner more characteristic of Greek than Latin style (cf. Kuhner-Gerth, 2, 598); their placeholder iis thus also forms a more effective contrast to nobis. Haec are presumably violations of decorum in either direction. scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim ne, si quo casu evenerit ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspidamur non decore.] The subligaculum was a loincloth corresponding to the π€ρίζωμα or διάζωμα, which athletes are sometimes depicted wearing on Greek vases. The Romans wore it under the toga and, if not nude, in bathing. Cf. Schuppe, RE 4A1 (1931), 481.65 ff.; E. Saglio in Daremberg-Saglio, 4.2, 1550 (with illustra­ tions); Wilkinson, 1979, 98; Norma Goldman, "Reconstructing Roman Clothing," in Judith Lynn Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante, eds., The World of Roman Costume (Madison, 1994), 233-34.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 129-30

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nostra quidem more cum parentibus puberes ftlii, cum soceris generi non lavanmr.] Cf. Plut. Cat. mat. 20.8: και τοΟτο κοινόν εοικε 'Ρωμαίων εθο? είναι· και γαρ πενθεροι γαμβροί? έφυλάττοντο συλλουεσθαι, δυσωπουμενοι την άποκάλυψιν και γύμνωσιν; de Orat. 2.224 (a joke of Crassus at the expense of M. Brutus [see ad 2.50] that turns upon this custom); Wilkinson, 1979, 100, compares the story of Moses and his sons at Ge. 9.20 ff. retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia . . . ] The sense of good old customs or institutions having slipped or being in danger of slipping away is met with elsewhere in Off.; cf. 3.44: itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT; 2.27 and 29; 3.110. 130-3 la—non adesse constantiam.] On the plan of this section cf. ad SS 126-32. 130 Similar but much expanded precepts on many of these topics (inter­ spersed with Biblical citations) appear at Clem. Al. Paed. 3.11 (see the fol­ lowing notes). If, as seems likely, Clement used Panaetius as one of his sources, Cicero may have considerably compressed his model in this sector. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera siM, quorum in altera venustas sit, in altera dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere deberaus, dignitatem virilem.] For this sense of dignitas cf. Cael. 8 with Austin's note. For possible influence of this doctrine on L.B. Alberti's concepts gravitas and festivitas cf. Onians, 99-100. ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus . . . ] In his essay u O n Shaving," after invoking nature as a model Musonius deprecates effeminacy in a way similar to our passage: όθεν και καρτεον μόνη? 'ένεκα τή? άφαιρεσεω? του περιττού και ουχί κόσμου χάριν, όπερ οΐονται δεΐν ενιοι τα μεν γενεια λεαινόμενοι και μιμούμ€νοι του? άγενείου? ή νή Δία του? άρτι γενειάσκοντα?, την δε κεφαλήν ούχ όμοίω? κειρόμενοι διαφόρω? δε τά πρόσω των οπίσω, και γαρ τοι δοκών είναι κόσμο? ουτο? πολλήν άκοσμίαν έχει και διαφέρει ουδέν του καλλωπισμού του τών γυναικών (115.15 ff.). In the follow­ ing detailed discussion of ornaments by Clement (Paed., 266.26 ff. and 267.8 ff. Stahlin-Treu) note the recommendation of moderation and of re­ straint of the irrational part of the soul, the citation of poetic authority, and the assumption that σωφροσύνη is the ideal, all characteristic of Panaetius: δια τοϋτο και τό χρυσοφορεΐν και το εσθήτι μαλακωτερα χρήσθαι ού τελεον περικοπτέον. χαλινωτεον δε τά? άλογου? τών ορμών, μη ει? τό αβροδίαιτον ήμά? ενσείσωσιν φερουσαι υπό πολλή? τη? άνεσεω? έξαρπάσασαι- δεινή γάρ ή τρυφή ci? κόρον εξοκείλασα σκιρτήσαι και αναχαιτίσαι και τον ήνίοχον, τον παιδαγωγόν. άποσείσασθαι, ό? πόρρωθεν ανακόπτων τά? ηνία? άγει και φέρει προ? σωτηρίαν τόνϊππον τον άνθρώπειον, τό άλογον μερο? τη? ψυχή? τό περί

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ήδονά? και όρεζει? έπιψόγου? και λίθου? και χρυσίον και έσθήτα ποικίλην και τήν άλλην χλιδήν έκθηριούμενον . . . άβροδίαιτον όνειδίζων νεανίαν ό Σοφοκλή? λέγει (fr. 769 R.)· "γυναικομίμοι? έμπρεπει? έσθήμασιν." ώ? γαρ στρατιώτου και ναύτου και άρχοντο?, ούτω? δε και σώφρονο? έστιν οικεία στολή ή άπερίεργο? και ευσχήμων και καθάριο?. nam et palaestrici moms sunt saepe odiosiores . . .] I.e., before they have been trained; hence Horace's invocation of Mercury {Carm. 1.10.2-4) qui feros cultus hominum recentutn I voce formasti catus et decorae I more palaestrae. Cf. Quintilian's description (1.11.16) of palaestrici:. . . a quibus gestus motusque formantur, ut recta sint bracchia, ne indoctae rusticae manus, ne status indecorus, ne qua in proferendis pedibus inscitia, ne caput oculique ab alia corporis inclinatione dissideant. Hence in Cicero the pa­ laestra is ordinarily a metaphor for polish, as in the description of Coelius Antipater at Leg. 1.6 (. . . paulo inflavit vehementius habuitque vires agrestis ille quidem atque horridas, sine nitore ac palaestra . . .). . . . et histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non vacant, et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et simplicia laudantur.] Our passage has been thought to betray "the suspicion and reserve with which in ordinary life the Romans viewed the athletic and performing arts" (Fantham, 165), on which cf. in general Edwards, ch. 3. Cicero's goals here are modest, however; he is merely concerned with the degree to which such very public gestures can serve as a model for the ordinary citizen; elsewhere he makes it clear that he respects the taste of certain actors (§ 114). The Ciceronian Crassus recommended that the intending orator study actors to learn to avoid deformitas pravitasque {de Orat. 1.156); cf. Quint. Inst. 1.11.3 (in a passage discussing the comic actor as a model for the intending orator): ne gestus quidem omnis ac motus a comoedis petendus est. quamquam enim utrumque eorum ad quendam modum praestare debet orator, plurimum tamen aberit a scaenico. nee vultu nee manu nee excursionibus nimius. nam si qua in his ars est dicentium, ea prima est, ne ars esse videatur; Clem. Al. Paed. 273.30 ff. Stahlin-Trcu: έπανορθωτέον δέ δτι μάλιστα και τά σχήματα και τα βλέμματα και τά βαδί­ σματα και τά? φωνά?. ού γαρ ώ? τινε? την ύπόκρισιν ζηλοϋσαι τη? κωμωδία? και τά? κατεαγυία? τών όρχηστών κινήσει? παραφυλάττουσαι παρά τά? ομιλία? σκηνοβατοϋσιν, αύτοϊ? τοΐ? κινήμασιν τοΐ? άβροΐ? καΐ τοΊ? υγροί? βαδίσμασιν και φωναΐ? ταΐ? πεπλασμέναι?, κλαδαρον περιβλεττουσαι, δέλεαρ ηδονή? έξησκημέναι. formac autem dignitas colons bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis.] Ibid., 272.7-8 and 17 ff. Stahlin-Treu: έπειτα και το σωματικόν κάλλο? ήσκήσθω, "συμμετρία μελών και μερών μετ* εύχροία?.*' . . . άνθο? δε τή? υγιεία?ελευθεριον το κάλλο?· ή μεν γάρ ένδον του σώματο? εργάζεται, τό

Commentary on Book 1, Section 130-31

307

δε εις το εκτός του σώματος έξανθησαν φανεράν ενδείκνυται την εϋχροιαν. αϊ γούν κάλλιστοι και υγιεινότατοι άγωγαι διαπονούσαι τά σώματα το κάλλος τό γνήσιον και παράμονον εργάζονται . . . adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam neglegentiam.] Here, too, a mean is recommended between mollitia and rusticitas (cf. 5 129); the malodorous Rufus of Catullus' acquaintance would, for instance, have fallen under the ban against agrestis et inhumana neglegentia (Carm. 69); cf. E.S. Ramage, Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement (Norman, Okla., 1973), 176, n. 45. Cf. Clem. Al. Paed. 268.6 ff. Stahlin-Treu: καθάριος δε και αφελής ή σωφροσύνη, επει ή μεν καθαριότης έξις έστιν παρασκευαστική διαίτης καθαρός και αμιγούς αίσχροΐς, ή δε αφέλεια εζις αφαιρετική των περιττών. eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.] On the πρέπον in clothing cf. Arist. Rhet. 1405a 13: άλλα δεΐ σκοπεΐν, ώς νεω φοινικίς, οϋτω γεροντι τί · ού γαρ ή αυτή πρέπει έσθής. Cf. the detailed instructions about (mostly women's) clothing at Clem. Al. Paed. 268.9 ff. Stahlin-Treu. 131 cavendum autem est ne aut tarditatibus utamur—aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates . . .] Catiline, as depicted by Sallust [Cat. 15.5), exceeded the mean on both sides: . . . citus modo, modo tardus incessus; cf. also Hor. S. 1.3.9-11: saepe velut qui I currebat fugiens hostem, persaepe velut qui I lunonis sacra ferret (perhaps an allusion to the Greek proverbial expression βαδί£ειν <είς> Ήραΐον έμπεπλεγμενον attested at Ath. 12.525e); passages cited by Maud W. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 1995), 61 and n. 26.—At Fin. 5.35 Cicero gives a more vivid description of the movements he deprecates on grounds of "unnaturalness":. . . etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt. . . ; on the Roman construction of mollitia cf. in general Edwards, ch. 2 (on Cicero, pp. 63 and 90), and Gleason, loc. cit., 62 ff.; cf. SS 14 and 146. . . . ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur . . . ] The phrase pomparum fercula, referring to the frames used to convey sacred objects in procession, betrays Cicero's satirical streak, ordinarily kept in check in Off. but given free vent around this time in the Second Philippic; it was picked up by Ambr. off. 1.73: sunt etiam qui sensim ambulando hnitantur histrionicos gestus et quasi quaedam fercula pomparum . . . and Hieron. epist. 125.16 (a passage satirizing those whose monastic vows involve a change of habit but little else): pomparum ferculis similes procedunt ad publicum, ut caninam exerceant facundiam; cf. David Wiesen, 5/. Jerome as a Satirist (Ithaca, 1964),

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88. Cf. also Hon 5. 2.8.13: ut Attica virgo I cum sacris Cereris procedit, an allusion to the κατήφορο? at the Eleusinia; cf. L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin, 1932), 91. . . . ne . . . in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias edentates, quae cum fiunt anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur. . . ] Cf. ad §§ 102 (effects of anger on one's features) and 145; Ter. Hau. 3 5 - 4 0 : adeste aequo animo, date potestatem mihi I statariam agere ut Uceat per silent ium, I ne semper servo' currens, iratus senex, I edax parasitu\ sycophanta autem inpudens, Iavaru' leno adsidue agendi sint sent I clamore sum mo, cum labore maxumo. Here L. Ambivius, the prologus, pleads with his audience to allow him to perform without interruption the stataria of Terence so that he may not always have to perform roles unsuited to an old man. Even though Terence and Panaetius were both acquainted with Scipio Aemilianus, it is necessary to assume only that both were influenced by similar rhetorical doctrines of the πρέπον, rather than that Panaetius influenced Terence.— Gill, 1988, 197, n. 101, compares our passage to Aristotle's "notorious" description of physical traits (slow gait, low voice, steady speech) of the μβγαλόψυχος at EN 1125a 12 ff. and adds that Aristotle, however, "does not claim that such characteristics are in themselves natural'." But 1 take it that what has made that passage notorious is that Aristotle has otherwise described the virtues in terms of mental constituents and that, in spite of some attempt to link these physical traits to mental ones (ούγάρσπβυστικός ό π€ρΙ ολίγα σπουδάζων κτλ.), given the general lack of correlation between physical and mental traits, it seems arbitrary to fasten on particular physical attributes. 176 On the other hand, the πρβπον of Cicero/Panaetius is man­ ifested in the physical events of life (cf. § 9 8 : . . . hoc decorum quodelucet in vita . . .), and our passage is not the first or the only place where specific behaviors are recommended; hence it does not stand out in the same way as a μ£τάβασΐ5€ί?άλλογ€ΐΌ£. Also, "nature" in Panaetius'claim that the πρέπον and the other virtues are "according to nature" has the sense of "the higher nature of the human being" as opposed to animals, not the sense in which "nature" and "natural" are commonly used today. Typically, the behavior advocated by Panaetius represents, as here, a mean between extremes (both tarditationes and festinationes being deprecated); cf. ad $$ 93 and 126-32. . . . ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. sed multo etiam magis elaborandum est ne animi moms a narura recedant. . .] The relation of ideas is somewhat oddly expressed, since surely the point of avoiding a change of vultus was that an inconsistency in the soul would be thereby 176. Why, for instance, should a μεγαλόψυχο? nor have a high voice?

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 131-32a and 132b-37

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revealed; cf. § 145; de Oral. 3.221: animi est enim omnis actio et imago animi voltus, indices oculi. nam haec est una pars corporis, quae, quot animi motus sunt, tot significationes et commutationes possit efficere. A connec­ tion between external and internal characteristics is assumed in the Iliad, and its absence is a cause for blame or embarrassment; cf. H. Bernsdorff, Untersuchungen zur Rolle des Aussehens im homerischen Menschenbild (Gottingen, 1992), esp. 115 ff.; for Plato's cautionary note at Hp. Ma. 294a cf. ad $ 94. Dionysius Thrax, περί εμφάσεω? (fr. 52 Linke), had perhaps explored the relation between outward appearance (this is surely the sense of εμφασι? in question; cf. LSJ s.v., 1.2.) and meaning. Such inferences from the external to the internal continue in the following section ($ 134: ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet); cf. ad SS 93-99; on constantia cf. ad § S 93,98, and 111; for the a fortiori form ad § 48. 132a Maler, 2 0 - 2 1 , athetized motus autem animorum—praebeamus on grounds that they are not needed to conclude the section on corporis motus et status and may have been interpolated from $$ 101-2. But the joint between the different announced subjects is particularly vulnerable to receiv­ ing Ciceronian insertions (see ad §§ 126-49 a propos $§ 138-40); and in this book of moral precepts Cicero elsewhere is by no means averse to repeating himself (for this point as well as for the content see ad $ 101). Hence the general practice of editors in tolerating these words is probably right. 132b-37 Sermo among friends was for Cicero an important component of a happy life; cf. Fam. 9.24.3: nee id |sc. the company of good men bound to one by ties of affection; cf. the immediately preceding matter quoted ad §§ 55-56J ad voluptatem refero sed ad communitatem vitae atque victus remissionemque animorum, quae maxhne sermone efficitur familiari... It is therefore tempting to suppose, with Reinhardt, 1885, 9, that Cicero himself added this section. On the other hand, Schmekel, 233-34, suggested that we have, apart from the Roman examples of § 133, a Panaetian comparison, which also left traces at 2.48, of conversation with public speeches. Panaetius may have wanted to develop the thesis that the Socratic dialogues should be regarded as a model in the former genre. Panaetius' interest in offering precepts for sermo rather than contentio in our passage may have been rooted not merely in the fact that he found the latter, but not the former, already covered in rhetorical handbooks (see the following notes) but, as David Blank suggests, in the distinction between άγωι>ίζ€σθαι and διαλεγεσθαι developed at PI. Tht. 167e ff., whereby the latter leads to the pursuit of philosophy, the former away from it; the remark at 2.48 difficile dictu est quantopere conciliet animos comitas adfabilitasque sermonis is in much the

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same vein; cf. also § 12. This section may therefore, like §§ 7 4 - 7 8 , be an instance in which Panaetius" views corresponded closely to those held by Cicero (cf. also 2.51). It is, however, pace Schmekel, not clear that, if he is the source here, Panaetius argued the general superiority of sernto over contentio (in view of 2.48:. . . non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio (oration is} maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam), merely that he thought it better adapted to certain pur­ poses {viz., persuasion). To what degree Cicero's exempla Komana have displaced or distorted the Panaetian argument can no longer be made out with certainty (see ad § 133). Thus though it is said that C. Julius Caesar Strabo could use sermo successfully even in the forensic sphere against the contentiones of others ($ 133), 1 7 7 this example, as Schmekel himself pointed out (234), contradicts the context (. . . contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum contionum senatus, sermo in circuits, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia: § 132b). On the possibility of the remarks on jokes having been transferred from this section, which may have contained several sets of special precepts of which only obiurgatio ($$ 136-37) remains, cf. ad §§ 103b-4. In general the emphasis in this passage is on the smooth functioning of relaxed sermo in small circles of friends; one should make a winning impression and avoid disclosing flaws of character; unpleasantness can be forestalled by seeing to it that conversa­ tion is not monopolized by one party, sticks to certain licit topics, but allows for some variety, etc.; in the event of conflict anger is, on Stoic principle, to be eschewed, though it may be feigned (the feigning has, of course, not a Stoic, but a rhetorical purpose; cf. Tusc. 4.55: oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet). One cannot, of course, expect every conversational situation to be pro­ vided for in a set of precepts such as this. Thus Heilmann, 119 ff., shows that this approach fails to deal with emotionally charged conversations, such as the consultation over strategy among Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, and others that took place in early June 44 at Antium (Att. 15.11), which would fall outside both the precepts for placid conversations among friends at §$ 1 3 2 36a and obiurgatio at §§ 136b-37. Such a situation might be said to resem­ ble the give-and-take of senatorial discussion or between witness and at­ torney in a court of law and to that degree would, though not involving a setspeech, be closer to contentio. 177. On him cf. ad $$ 108 and 133.—Cf. the similar testimony about Cicero, who in pro Flacco is said toct opportunitate to have freed his client de mamfestissimu criminibus (Macr. 2.1.13), though the passage, unfortunately, does not survive.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 132b-37 and 132b-33

311

132b contention is praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio an possint haec quoque esse.] There is no obstacle to Panaetius having known the πραγματεΐαι of Aristotle (cf. ad 2.52-64); he might there­ fore have been expected to mention the advice on social intercourse at EN 1126bll ff. . . . quae verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.] In the sequel, after introductory remarks on vox ($ 133), the precepts all have to do with sententiae, not verba; no doubt Cicero thought the treatment of diction in de Orat. 3 sufficient. 133 Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis . . .] One would have expected cogitationis, rather than orationis here. Cf. Sextus* famous discussion of the Stoic theory of signs: και δη τη? μεν πρώτη? δόξης (i.e., that truth resides in the thing signified) προεστήκασιν ο'ι από τη? Στοά?, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεΐν άλλήλοι?. τό τε σημαινόμενον και το σημαίνον και το τυγχάνον, ών σημαίνον μεν είναι την φωνήν. οΐον την Δίων. σημαινόμενον δε αυτό τό πράγμα τό υπ' αύτη? δηλούμενον και ου ήμεΐ? μεν αντιλαμβανόμεθα τη ημέτερα παρυφισταμενου διάνοια, οι δε βάρβαροι ουκ έπαΐουσι καίπερ τη? φωνή? άκούοντε?, τυγχάνον δε τό εκτό? ύποκείμενον, ώσπερ αυτό? ό Δίων (Μ. 8.11-12). On the Stoic definitions of φωνή/fox cf. in general Wolfram Ax, Laut, Stimme una Sprache. Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie (Gottingen, 1986), 151 ff. Similarly to our passage Cicero had discussed the importance of vox for expressing ideas clearly at de Orat. 3.41 (under Latinitas, the first requisite of elocutio) and had differentiated this concern from problems of delivery: nam de voce nondum ea dico, quae sunt actionis, sed hoc, quod mihi cum sermone quasi coniunctum videtur. Clara is one of the predicates for the voice that falls under vocis qualitas at Quint. Inst. 11.3.15. For suavis or dulcis sonus see the next note. nihil fuit in Catulis—sine contentione vox nee languens nee canora.] In giving a series of examples of the vocal production characteristic of great Roman orators of the previous generation, is Cicero not, perhaps contrary to his model, carrying what seemed to begin as a Stoic discussion of dialectic (see previous note) into the sphere of applied rhetoric? If so, this process was perhaps triggered by a reminiscence of de Oratore 3.41-42. Thus Crassus' discussion of Latinitas includes a similar appreciation addressed to the elder Catulus (3.42): me autem tuus sonus et subtilitas ista delectat, omitto ver­ borum, quamquam est caput; verum id adfert ratio, docent litterae, confirmat consuetudo et legendi et loquendi; sed banc dico suavitatem, quae exit ex ore; quae quidem ut apud Graecos Atticorum, sic in Latino sermone huius est urbis maxime propria. Similar to our passage is also Crassus* list of

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deprecated qualities (ibid., 41): nolo exprimi litteras putidius, nolo obscurari neglegentius; nolo verba exiliter exanimata exire, nolo inflata et quasi anbelata gravius. The suavitas of Catulus and the similarity of father and son in this regard receive emphasis likewise at Brut. 133: fuit igitur in Catulo semto Latinus; quae laus dicendi non mediocris ab oratoribus plerisque neglecta est. nam de sono vocis et suavitate appellandarum litterarum, quoniam filium cognovisti, noli exspectare quiddicam; similarly, ibid., 259: Catulus erat ille quidem minime indoctus, ut a te paulo est ante dictum, sed tamen suavitas vocis et lenis appellatio litterarum bene loquendi famam confecerat. On the Catuli in general cf. ad § 109. uberior oratio L. Crassi nee minus faceta . . .] On Crassus' wit cf. ad § 108; for his ubertas cf. Antonius' characterization at de Orat. 3.51, cited ad § 2. sale vcro et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris frater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones aliorum sermone vinceret.j Caesar was not the germanus but only the half-brother of the elder Catulus, both sons of a Popilia, Catulus by her first marriage, to a Q. Lutatius Catulus, Caesar by her second, to L. Julius Caesar (RE s.v. Iulius no. 141); cf. Volkmann, ibid., 22.1 (1953), 64.49 ff.—Cf. ad § 108, as well as Crassus' remarks at de Orat. 3.30: quid, noster hie Caesar nonne novam quandam rationem attulit orationis et dicendi genus induxit prope singulare? quis umquam res, praeter hunc, tragicas paene cornice, tristis remisse, severas hilare, forenses scaenica prope venustate tractavit atque ita, ut neque iocus magnitudine rerum excluderetur nee gravitas facetiis minueretur? In our passage Cicero identifies this special "light touch," which Caesar could apply successfully to the most varied themes, with the sermo (perhaps = το διαλ^γίσθαι.? [cf. ad S§ 132b37]) of Panaetius; but it is not clear that these can be brought under a common denominator in view of the following precept for sermo (§ 134): ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem; cf. also ad §§ 132b-37. 134 Sit ergo hie sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos.J A clarification of what is meant by sermo. On Panaetius' interest in the Socratics cf. ad $ 104; for Socrates excelling in a certain type of sermo § 108. nee vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus turn in scrmonc communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet.] The person engaged in conversation is easily supplied as subject, though the previous subject had been sermo itself; cf. ad % 101 (§ 151, a personification of mercatura, is a bit different).—Thphr. Char. 7 (\α\ίας) confirms that the person who monopolizes conversation was as resented in ancient as in modern times; cf. also TrGF adesp. lb, (c) 4 - 5 Kn.-Sn.: άι/ήρ

Commentary on Book 1, Section 133-35

313

γάρ 'όστις ηδεται λίγωΐ'ά€ΐ, /λ€ληθ€ΐ> αυτόν τοΐ?£υνοϋσιι>ών βαρύ?; Clem. ΑΙ. Paed. 192.19-20 Stahlin-Treu: ούτε γάρ μακρολογητ€ον ποτέ ούτε πολυλογητ€οι> οϋτ« άδολ€σχητ€θΐ' . . . ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeac, si iocosis, leporem.] This description makes the matter seem simple, but con­ trast Orat. 70 ff., where Cicero expatiates on the difficulties: ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre. . . . non enim omnis fortuna non omnis honos non omnis auctoritas non omnis aetas nee vero locus aut tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum . . . Cf. Hon S. 1.10.11: et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso . . . in primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus; quod maxime turn solet evenire cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa . . . dicitur.J On the inference from behavior to character in general cf. ad §S 9 3 - 9 9 , 131. Seneca develops the topic talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita at Ep. 114. For the deprecation of backbiting cf. Hor. 5. 1.4.81-85: absentem qui rodit, amicum I qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos I qui capiat risus hominum famamque dicacis, I fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere I qui nequit: hie niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto. 135 danda igitur opera est ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio, sed utcumque aderunt;...] The clause utcumque aderunt has caused much difficulty. Recentiores and some early editors added res as subject; when it became clear that this was not the transmitted text, Lambinus wanted to delete the entire clause. Facciolati, on the other hand, printed a full stop after oratio, joined sed utcumque with the sequel and explained "qualescumquc res sint, de quibus loquimur . . . ," surely wrongly. Heine 6 still explains the clause "je nach der Eigentumlichkeit der Anwesenden," an interpretation that had been rightly exploded by Miiller, who suggested utcumque {adfecti erunt, qui) aderunt, whereas Winterbottom obelizes utcumque aderunt. But perhaps the transmitted text can stand; cf. Shackleton Bailey, 1995,260: "Conversation has certain staple topics. It may diverge to others, but must come back to these, 'but in whatever way they crop up.* They will not always present themselves {aderunt) in the same form." neque enim isdem de rebus nee omni tempore nee similiter delectamur.] Literature, however, is an exception according to the famous panegyric at Arch. 16: nam ceterae neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium neque locorum; at haec studia adulescentiam acuunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt forts, pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.

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animadvertendum est etiam quatenus sermo delectationem habeat, et ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit dcsinendi modus.] After pronouncing the stric­ tures already cited ad S 134 against speaking at excessive length, Clem. Al. Paed. 192.25 Stahlin-Trcu goes on to adduce the characterization of Thersites from Horn. //. 2.212-14 (also cited by PanaetiusPJ^eTpoeTrriseKoXuia, / ος p' errta φρ^σ'ιν vpw άκοσμα TC πολλά τ€ ήδη, / μάψ, άτάρ ου κατά κόσμον. 136 Sed quomodo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur ut perturbationcs fugiamus . . . sic eiusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare . . .] Cf. ad%% 1 0 0 3a; § 132. . . . maximeque curandum est ut eos quibuscum sermonem conferemus et vereri et diligere videamur.] The theme of regard for others, first broached at SS 98-99 and then revived beginning at § 126 (see ad /oc), reappears, obiurgationes etiam nonnumquam incidunt necessariae—videamur irati.) For the sense of obiurgatio in relation to its parasynonyms cf. ad 3.83.— What is described here is a type of role-playing for a temporary and limited purpose as opposed to the choosing and playing of a role for life as described in the personae theory ($§ 105-21). On the orator's imitation of anger cf. de Orat. 3.217: nullum est enim horum generum, quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur. hi sunt actori, ut pictori, expositi ad variandum colores. aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro incidens . . . aliud miseratio ac maeror . . . sed ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus, nee umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina;. . .] A similar gradation according to medical model is recommended for actions at § 83 (, . . in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur). For the medical procedure urere et secare = u to cauterize (a diseased part, wound, etc.)" cf. OLD s.v. uro 2b, citing inter alia Phil. 8.15: in corpore si quid eius modi est quod reliquo corpori noceat, id uri secarique patimur ut membrum aliquod potius quam totum corpus intereat. As he wrote these words Cicero surely thought of his break with Antony in the Second Philippic, on which he was at work more or less simultaneously (cf. introduction, § 3). . . . sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest.] Cf. ad SS 88-89. 137 magna(m) autem parte<m) dementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen adiuncta, ut et seventas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur . . .] See ad S 88, where the recommendation of dementia and the discountenancing of contumelia are forestalled and severitas is to be used reipublicae causa. rectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus quae cum inimicissimis fiunt,

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 135-37 and 138-40

315

etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere, iracundiam pcllere;. . . ] Though not personally present in the senate when Antony at­ tacked him in his speech of 19 September (cf. Gelzer, 350), Cicero must have felt the need for restraint in its aftermath. quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione hunt, ea nee constanter fieri possunt neque iis qui adsunt probari.] Cicero has described appetitus per se {hominem hue et illuc rapit . . . : $ 101), depicted appetitus under the sway of the passions {perturbationes animi)^ and made clear that freedom from passion gives rise to constantia (efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi ohoediant . . . sintque tranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo elucebit omnis constantia . . . : $ 102). At Tusc. 4.52 (quoted ad J 89) Cicero denies that his services to the state were performed in anger. The approval of one's fellows was introduced as an ideal early in this section (§S 98-99) and has received special emphasis since $ 126 (see ad loc). deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa praesertim, et cum inrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.] On the entire topic see Plutarch's essay de Laude Ipsius; on its likely origin in his work on the biographies of Demosthenes and Cicero and its contacts with rhetorical doctrine cf. K. Ziegler, RE 21.1 (1951), 784.29 ff., with literature.—As he wrote these words Cicero, who attested his fondness for Plautus at § 104, surely had in mind the Plautine Miles Gloriosus after a Greek original (Άλά£ωι>) by an unknown playwright, so that Panaetius might have offered a corresponding example; on the character-type cf. O. Ribbeck, Alazon. Ein Beitrag zur antiken Ethologie und zur Kenntnis der griechisch-romischen Komodie (Leipzig, 1882). 1 3 8 - 4 0 The building of a house being an action, this section might have been expected under that rubric (§§ 141-49). Instead, introduced with the hyper­ bolic et quoniam omnia persequimur, not mentioned in the plan given in § 126, illustrated with exclusively Roman examples, and driven by a fairly transparent political agenda (see below), it is likely to have been added by Cicero himself (cf. ad §§ 126-51). Note, too, that the subject, the type of house appropriate to a leading statesman, represents a change of premise, since the previous types of decorum were ones to which anyone could aspire; concomitant with this change is the fact that dignitas now appears as a standard [dignitatis diligentta, plenam dignitatis domum, ornanda enim est dignitas domo); here the dignum is not merely a paraphrase for the decorum (cf. ad §§ 93-99) but an external, social measure, whereas natura is the implicit or explicit standard elsewhere in this section (except for §§ 150-51, probably of Ciceronian provenance; see ad loc). In the course of the argu­ ment Cicero cites the case of two Romans, Cn. Octavius and M. Aemilius

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Scaurus. The splendid house built by Octavius on the Palatine was thought to have contributed to his election, the first in his family, to the consulate of 165. On the other hand, when Scaurus removed that building to make room for an addition to his own house, he suffered both electoral reverse and ealamitas. The moral Cicero draws is this: ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nee domo dominus sed domino domus honestanda est. Shackleton Bailey observes: "Cicero's meaning (badly expressed) I take to be that in spite of the magnificence of Scaurus' house he came to grief. A fine house may help (as in Cn. Octavius* case), but only if the owner's dignitas has other props, nee. . . honestanda est takes this a step further: the owner should make the house respected rather than vice versa. Cicero cannot mean to deny outright what he has just implicitly admitted (that domo dominus honestatur), but the important thing (he means to say) is the other way round. For the sake of his epigram he overstates." On our passage as a guide to Roman attitudes toward domestic architecture cf. Wallace-Hadrill, 4 if. Finally, a political agenda probably underlies the passage; with Octavius and Antony competing for the support of veterans (cf. ad 3.84) Cicero takes the opportunity to praise the first Octavius to attain the consulate (note that ignobilitas was among the charges Antony leveled against Octavius [and against which Cicero defends him; Phil. 3.15] 178 ) and to criticize the appro­ priation in "these times" (i.e., in the aftermath of the civil war with its attendant confiscations and sales) of houses by unworthy persons, a charge that Cicero brings against Antony with reference to the property of Pompey {Phil. 2.64-75) and Varro (ibid., 103-5). 138 . . . dicendum est etiam qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat esse;. . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1123a6-10: μεγαλόπρεπου? δε και οίκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντω? τω πλούτω (κόσμο? γάρ τι? και ούτος), κα! περί ταϋτα μάλλον δαπανά ν οσα πολυχρόνια των έργων (κάλλιστα γάρ ταύτα), και εν έκαστοι? τό πρέπον ού γάρ ταύτα αρμόζει θεοί? και άνθρωποι?, ούδ' εν ί€θφ και τάφω. 178. At pains to establish the emperor's noble pedigree» Suet. Aug. 2 asserts that the family was enrolled in the senate by Tarquinius Priscus, transferred to the patricians by Servius Tullius, but then reverted to the plebs, from which they were raised once again to patrician status by Julius Caesar. He goes on to distinguish two branches, each descended from the quaestorian C. Rufus. Whether Octavian was related to the noble Octavii, who favored the praenomma Cn. and M., is, however, very dubious in light of Augustus* own testimony (apud Suet., loc. cit.) that his family was merely equestrian until his father entered the senate. Nevertheless Cicero's attention at this period to the noble Octavii (cf. Phil. 9.4) was surely intended as a compliment to Octavian; cf. Shackleton Bailey, PhtL, 239, n. 3.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 138-40 and 138-39

317

Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex ilia familia consul factus est—putabatur.] The day after Paullus* renowned triumph for Pydna (cf. ad 2.74), Cn. Octavius celebrated his naval triumph (also over Perseus). The building of the house, probably on the northeastern slope of the Palatine,179 was surely financed with the spoils of war; for the contrast to Paullus cf. ad 2.76. In the sequel he was elected consul for 165 with T. Manlius Torquatus. Following the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, he was despatched in 163 on an embassy to elimi­ nate the Syrian military potential; the destruction of the warships and mutila­ tion of the war-elephants provoked a popular outcry, which led to his murder early the next year in Laodicea by one Leptines. His memory was honored at Rome with a statue on the rostra (cf. Phil. 9.4). Near the Circus Flaminius he built (doubtless also from spoils of war) a porticus Octavia, which Augustus restored. Cf. F. Munzer, RE 17.2 (1937), 1810.68 ff.; Shatzman, 256. banc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit aedibus.] The reference is to M. Aemilius Scaurus (pr. S6)y son of the princeps senatus whom Cicero admired in his boyhood (§ 76). Cicero successfully defended him on charges of extortion {repetundarum) after his term as propraetor of Sardinia. When, however, he was prosecuted for corrupt practices in his consular campaign for 53, in view of Pompey's enmity he was forced into exile; hence the reference to his ignominia. Scaurus demolished the house built by Cn. Oc­ tavius in order to build an addition to his own mansion; the atrium con­ tained, for instance, colossal marble columns that had stood in the temporary theater built for his aedileship (Plin. Nat. 36.6 and 114); Clodius later pur­ chased it for 14.8 million sesterces (ibid., 36.103). Cf. also ad 2.57. 139. . . nee domo dominus sed domino domus honestanda est. . .] Note the handsome chiastic arrangement of nouns, as well as alliteration and polyptoton. . . . ut in ceteris habenda ratio—cura est laxitatis.] The laxitas ("spacious­ ness") of the great man's house is justified on grounds that it will benefit others as well; cf. ad § 92. odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur: Ό domus antiqua fetf quam dispari / dominare domino'; quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.] Both author and play are unknown (trag. inc. inc. 184-85 |p. 3031). The situation would fit the Erigona (either the same as or confused in the later tradition with the Agamemnonidae) of Accius, with Clytemnestra and Aegisthus installed in the palace of the murdered Agamemnon (ibid., 53, p. 164). Cicero cited part of the prior verse in the nearly contemporaneous 179. Cf. H. Jordan, Topographic der Stadt Rom im Alterthum, 1,2d ed. rev. by Ch. Hud sen (Berlin, 1907), 56 and n. 49.

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Second Philippic (104) a propos Antony's occupancy (and attempt to claim ownership) of Varro's farm at Casinum: at quam multos dies in ea vilk turpissime es perbacchatus! ab bora tertia bibebatur, ludebatur, vomebatur. ο tecta ipsa misera, 'quam dispan domino*—quamquam quo modo iste dominus—sed tamen quam ab dispart tenebantur! studiorum enim suorum M. Varro voluit Mud, non libidinum deversorium. The confiscations follow­ ing Caesar's civil war victory account for the many instances of incongruous possession. Cf. also ad §§ 138-40. 140 cavendum autcm est—villamm magnificentiam imitati!] Under the virtus of L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74), who was, prior to Pompey's eastern command, Rome's richest citizen after M. Crassus and a loyal servant of Sulla and his order, Cicero surely understood his qualities as a personally brave and tactically circumspect general during his eight-year imperium over several eastern provinces (74-66), which decisively weakened Mithridatcs prior to Pompey's victory. Another merit was his mild treatment of his Asia­ tic subjects, which resulted in him often being remembered in their wills (cf. Fbc. 85). The enmity of the popular party hindered, however, his celebration of a triumph until Cicero's consulate (summer 63). At Leg. 3.30 Cicero reports that, when reproached for the magnificence of his Tusculan villa, Lucullus replied that the villas of his neighbors, one a Roman knight, the other a freedman, were also grand, so that he could surely have a fine villa, if even members of the lower orders could. Similar to the point in our passage that multum mali in exemplo est is Cicero's comment (ibid.): non vides, Luculle, a te id ipsum natum ut Mi cuperentt quibus, id si tu non faceres, non liceret? Veil. 2.33.4 likewise emphasizes that Lucullus' villas marked a depar­ ture: . . . et Lucullus, summus alioqui vir, profusae hums in aedificiis convictibusque et apparatibus luxuriae primus auctor fuit, quern ob iniectas moles mart et receptum suffossis montibus in terras mare baud infacete Magnus Pompeius Xerxen togatum vocare adsueverat (the sea water channeled in­ land refers to his celebrated fishponds; cf. ad 3.73). Horace repeatedly assails extravagant building projects such as those pioneered by Lucullus: cf. Carm. 2.15.1 ff.; 2.18.17 ff.; 3.1.33 ff.; 3.24.1 ff.; cf. also Sen. Ep. 114.9. On invective against luxurious buildings in general cf. Edwards, ch. 4. On his career in general cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 376.50 ff., and Keaveney (cf. also ad 2.50 and 57b); on his villas Gelzer, 411.10 ff., Keaveney, 144 ff.t and Shatzman, 380; on the spread by example of the mores and luxuries culti­ vated by the upper class cf. Wallace-Hadrill, 143 ff. Elsewhere, however, Cicero speaks approvingly of the senator as a role-model; cf. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "The Social Structure of the Roman House," PBSR 56

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(1988), 45.—Cicero had similarly stressed the role of adults in forming the character of adolescents at SS 122-23. quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque revocandus. eademque mediocritas ad omnem usum culmmque viue transferenda est.] For the quasi-Peripatetic emphasis on the mean in this sector (cf. extra modum just above) cf. ad $ 93. 141-49 The section on actions can be outlined as follows: I. Undertaking actions (§ 141) A. Appetites to be subordinated to reason B. Effort to be in proportion to the goal C. Account to be taken of dignitas and liberalis species II. The proper deployment of actions A. Definition of terms (SS 142-43) B. Unseasonable actions (S 144) C. Need for alertness to small discrepancies (SS 145-46a) D. Correction of one's own faults through observation of others (S 146b) E. Consultation of others' opinions (S 147) F. Civil institutions to be respected (S 148) G. Proper behavior toward various social groups (S 149). One might well query whether G., to which F. forms a kind of prologue, belongs here or should form a separate category. In fact, this subject, too, belongs with the others, all being actions that pertain ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem quibuscum vivimus and are controlled by the corre­ sponding type oiprudentia (S 143). 141 This chapter, actually an introduction to the topic of facta or actio (see ad SS 93-151 and 126-49), begins by emphasizing a point Cicero is not averse to repeating, viz., utappetitus rationi pareat (cf. SS 101-3a and 136), not only in the subordinate clause quo nihil est ad officia conservanda accomodatius, but also by the final statement horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi; it is nevertheless not to be athetized {pace Stuerenburg); cf. Thomas, 29. . . . deinde ut animadvertatur quanta ilia res sit quam efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur quam causa postulet.] Cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 6.3 {aestimanda sunt deinde ipsa quae adgredimur . . .), where the comparison is with "our powers** rather than a calculation of whether the effort is in proportion to the causa; cf. SS 73b, 110.

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modus autem est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nee progredi longius.) Decus is a transparent variatio for decorum; cf. the imagery of transgression at § 102. horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi.] For Cicero's tendency to provide a ranking at the ends of sections see ad SS 92 and 151. 142 An action that is good in itself can be bad if done in the wrong time or place, just as it is not an appropriate action to fulfill a promise at the wrong time (cf. S§ 31-32; 3.95). Here we find Cicero laboring under the kind of terminological difficulty Lucretius had complained of (1.832 and 3.260: patrii sermonis egestas; cf. also Caec. 5 1 : . . . in nostra lingua, quae dicitur esse inops . . .; Cicero claims to have overcome the problem at N.D. 1.8). Since ευταξία has no precise Latin equivalent, Cicero falls back on modestia, even though, as he admits, the basic idea underlying the Latin word is modus (cf. ad § 93 and the following notes). haec autem scientia continentur ea quam Graeci ενταξίαν nominant, non hanc quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed ilia est ευταξία in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio.J Two different senses of εύταjiqa are in question, the first equivalent to modestia (cf. LSJ s.v. ευταξία 2: "orderly behavior"; for modestia in its normal Latin sense cf. § 93 and 2.46); this is the sense in which it was ordinarily associated with σωφροσύνη; cf. SVF 3,27.7-8: άλυπίανδέ και εύταξίαντά? αυτά? είναι τη σωφροσύνη . . . ;ibid., 3, 64.22: τη δε σωφροσύνη εύταξίαν, κοσμιότητα . . . |sc. ύποτάττεσθαι); ibid., 3, 73.5-6: τη δε σωφροσύνη |sc. έπονται] ευταξία και κοσμιότη?. For the other, more literal sense of "good arrangement w cf. LSJ. s.v., 1. . . . modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest. . .] Cf. Paul. Fest. p. 127M: (a) modo fit. . . modestia . . .; Non. p. 30M (with reference to our passage). itaque, ut eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia sit scientia rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlocandarum.] Cf. SVF 3, 64.31: εύταξίαν δε έπιστήμην τοΰ πότε πρακτέον και τί μετά τι και καθόλου τη? τάξεως των πράξεων . . . ; cf. also SVF 3, 67.1: ευταξία δε εμπειρία καταχωρισμοϋ πράξεων ή περί τάς π ρ ά ξ ε ι έχουσα το βέβαιον ή του? καταχωρισμοϋ? των πράξεων; SVF 3, 68.12: ευταξία εστί . . . δύναμι? τεταγμένη βεβαία των έξη? άλλήλοι? κείμενων εν έργω καλώ? απο­ δοτική, κατ' άρετήν ανυπέρβλητο?. Our definition evidently conflates the first two quoted (Jungblut, 1, 7 1 , had thought that Cicero's model corresponded to the second only, but note scientia = επιστήμη, and see next note). Perhaps Cicero was not well advised to impose, by fiat, upon modestia the more literal definition of ευταξία simply because the two correspond in the other sense ("orderly behavior"); fortunately, however, this piece of terminological

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legerdemain plays, apart from the next sentence and the first sentence of § 143, no role in the sequel. ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et conlocationis fore; nam et ordinem sic definiunt, compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis.] This sentence has caused considerable difficulty. It is bracketed by Atzert4 and Fedeli (though not Testard or Winterbottom); Reinhardt, 1885,12-14, supposed that conlocationis had displaced modestiae so that the point would be the identity of the preceding and following definitions.180 The argument makes sense, how­ ever, if one considers closely what Cicero has just said. He has just given a description of ευταξία which acknowledges the inherent difference of this term from the word modest us, viz., in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio, i.e., not \itTpov/modus but τάξις/ordo, and a definition of ευταξία/Latinemodestia, viz., scientia rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlocandarum. Therefore he is now at pains to harmonize the description and definition: the ordo of the former and the conlocatio implicit in the latter are really the same; he could have clarified this point had he mentioned that the Greek τάξις both figures in the definition of ευταξία (see previous note) and is used as the technical term for the arrangement of arguments in rhetoric (see next note). The identity of the terms is also clear from de Orat. 2.307 (Antonius is the speaker): itaque nunc illuc redeo, Catule, in quo tu me paulo ante laudabas, ad ordinem conlocationemque rerum ac locorum.181 . . . nam et ordinem sic definiunt, compositionem rerum aptis et accom­ modatis locis.] The subject of this sentence is still the Stoics, i.e., Panaetius (cf. 1.6: sequimur . . . Stoicos), who, as in his formulation of το πρέπον generally (cf. ad § 97), has here drawn upon Hellenistic rhetorical manuals, no Stoic definition of τάξίς/ordo being otherwise a nested. Τάξι? (ordinarily rendered in this technical sense as dispositio, not ordo Ibut cf. de Orat. 2.307, quoted in the preceding note]) was, of course, among the five έργα του ρήτορο
180. Respectively ut modestia sit rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlo­ candarum and nam et ordinem sic definiunt. . . 181. I am grateful to Michael Haslam for help in formulating this note and in interpreting this chapter generally.

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app. crit. ad loc. Atzerr 4 reports Reinhardt, 1885, 12-14, as expelling this text along with the following tempus—occasio; in fact, however, Reinhardt excised only the latter. Our sentence, as transmitted, can scarcely be right, however. That the topic is the temporal arrangement of events is announced in the sentence with which our section is introduced {de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum) and is made clear beyond any doubt by SVF 3, 64.31, cited in full ad itaque, ut eandem—above (πότε και τί μετά τί). Indeed, one would naturally refer any discussion of the order of actions to temporal, not spatial order. The point in § 144 about the appropriateness of an act being occasion-dependent involves a slight shift, but even there the essential point is about timing or ευκαιρία. Surely Shackleton Bailey is there­ fore right to delete locum autem and interpret "they say that the opportune­ ness of an action depends upon the timing." The transmitted text, with its confusion of the categories of time and place, may have resulted from the intervention of an ancient reader who thought that the second genitive needed to limit a second noun and supplied locum in view of the immediately preceding aptis et accommodatis locis. tempus autem actionis opportunum Graece ευκαιρία, Latine appellatur oc­ casio.] Occasio = ευκαιρία is also a virtue derived from rhetoric; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1408a36: το δ' εύκαίρως ή μή εύκαίρως χρήσθαι κοινον απάντων των ειδών εστίν. Cf. Ιην. 1.40: occasio autem est pars temporis habens in se alicuius ret idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem. At Fin. 3.45 Cicero renders ευκαιρία instead as opportunitas. sic fit ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur ut dixi, scientia sit | ο poorrun itatis) idoneomm ad agendum temporum.] Oportunitatis and idoneorum ad agendum temporum surely should not stand side by side; one or the other would be enough (cf. $ 144: inscitia temporis). I suspect that oportunitatis has been introduced either on the basis of the first sentence of this section [de opportunitate temporum) or as a gloss. 143 sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio diximus . . .] It could indeed be the same as the definition of φρόνησι?; cf. ad S 153. However, at SS 18-19 (cf. S 17) Cicero had treated the first virtue as purely theoretical (cf. ad locos); φρόνησι? in the sense of practical intelligence is illustrated rather under the third virtue (cf. ad SS 73b and 81), where, however, the term prudentia is not used. . . . quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae pertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem quibuscum vivimus, nunc dicenda sunt.] Cicero offers, as at § 93, a paraphrase of the fourth virtue without use of technical terms; once more verecundia and the approbatio of one's fellows are juxtaposed, even though these two concepts are so similar (cf. ad S 98), but constantia is omitted.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 1 4 2 - 4 4

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144 Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus ut, quemadmodum in oratione constant!, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia;. ..] The actions of one's life should form a coherent whole, like a well-crafted speech; cf. § H I and Horace's demand for consistency in characterization (sibi convenientiafinge:Ars 119). . . . turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa (verba) convivio digna aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem.] Though accepted by none of the most recent editors (Atzert4, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom), verba of the recentiores is needed for balance {verba convivio digna: delicatum. . . sermonem; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2) and can easily have fallen out after severa.— Delicatus here clearly has the sense "luxuriosus, libidinosus, lascivus, mollis," as indicated by the following example; cf. Simbeck, TLL 5, 444.65 ff. bene Pericles, cum haberet conlegam in praetura Sophoclem poetam . . .] For Panaetius' interest in the offtcia of magistrates cf. ad $ 124 above. For the modern reader there is some irony in the choice of Sophocles, whose art of plot-construction was so admired in antiquity182 (and modern times), to illustrate want of βύταξία. Panaetius may have found this anecdote in the Έπιδήμιαι of Ion of Chios, who met Sophocles on Chios (FGrHist 392 F 6) at the time of the campaign to put down the Samian revolt during Sophocles' first στρατηγία (441/0), to which our anecdote (= Τ 74c R.) evidently refers; on the character of the Έπιδήμιαι, evidently organized by the personalities Ion had met, cf. M.L. West, "Ion of Chios," BICS 32 (1985), 71-78, esp. 75. V. Max. 4.3. ext. 1 depends on our passage. at enim] Pericles calls his colleague sharply to order; for this collocation of particles (= άλλα γαρ) cf. ad 3.79. atqui hoc idem Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione caruisset: . . .] Atqui (Val. Pal. lat. 1527, anno 1467; Victorius) for the transmitted atque is accepted by Atzert4, Fedeli, and Winterbottom, not by Testard; the two are often confused. Other passages in which atque joins a contrasted idea have been cited in support of our text as transmitted, viz. 3.13 and 48. In the first of these, however, the conjunction follows a negative sentence, where such usage (with et and -que, as well as aclatque) is common in Latin, unlike most modern languages; cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 28; ad § 22. At 3.48, on the other hand, Victorius' atqui deserves serious consideration, the test uter in utrumf telling both there and here in favor of atqui. Cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 22-23, who want to retain atque in our passage. 182. Cf. Scholia in Sophoclis Oedipum Coloneum. rec. V. dc Marco (Rome, 1952), ad v. 28 (with note).

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ut si qui, cum causam sit acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio facial, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.) Indeed such a person could be called ineptus; cf. Cic. de Orat. 2.17: qui aut tempus quid postulet non videt. . . is ineptus esse dicitur; Don. Ten An. 257: ineptum est, quod a quovis reprehendi potest. . . Contrariwise it was the humanitas of the host Crassus at de Orat. 1.27 that freed the evening's dinner from the cloud of political troubles discussed that afternoon. On the use of inhumanus = insociabilis cf. Pfligersdorffer, TLL 7.1, 1607.68 ff. 145 . . . ut si qui in foro cantet aut si qua est alia magna perversitas . . .] For dancing in the forum as a disgraceful act cf. 3.75 and 93; for the equally disreputable dicing in the forum cf. Phil. 2.56. . . . facile apparet nee magnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat;. . .] Did Panaetius nevertheless provide such (cf. ad 2.16)? 1 4 5 - 4 6 ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadvert! solet, sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepct, vel multo ctiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est. itaque ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt, sic nos, si acres ac diligentes (iudices) esse volumus animadversoresque vitiorum, (magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis} ex oculorum optutu, superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis, ex submissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte fiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrcpet.J The juxtaposition of these two similes has caused difficulty;183 for complaints of want of a clear train of thought cf. Muller ad loc. and Pohlenz, 82, η. 2 . 1 8 4 Atzert thought it necessary to athetize the first [ut in fidibus—concentus est) on grounds that it merely duplicates the content of the second. However, the two similes are not identical in content, as Thomas, 23 ff., showed. More­ over, the first simile is for several reasons likely to be genuine: the a fortiori argument from the realm of physical perception to that of actions (or thoughts) that have moral significance is used elsewhere in the essay (see $ § 1 4 , 100, and 131); and the need for attentiveness to small details rein­ forced by the first simile likewise appears in the preceding sentence, sus-

183. For the subject matter see the simile comparing a symphonic performance with con­ cord in the state at Rep. 2.69, where the idea of the expert's sensitivity to discord is also met {. . . concentus est qutdam tenendus ex dtstmctts sonis, quern inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre non possunt . . .). 184. "In 145.146 ist die Gcdankcncntwicklung unscharf und nicht endgiltig geformt. Das zeigen die zwei gleichen Satzanfange Ut in fidibus."

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pected by no one (quae autem parva videntur esse delicto—ab its est diligentius declinandum)y as well as § 111 (omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, turn singularum ac­ tionum . . .). It seems doubtful, in fact, that anyone would ever have thought of bracketing the first simile if it were not followed by the similarly intro­ duced {ut in ftdibus) second simile; but note the comparison of the moral agent to a poet twice formulated at $§ 97-98, where likewise the second formulation is introduced with an inferential particle (sed poetae quid quernque deceat ex persona iudicabunt, . . . quocirca poetae in magna varietate personarum etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat videbunt. . .). Whether Cicero would in revising the work have eliminated this repetition (e.g., by deleting sic videndum est in vita—musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt) is an interesting, but moot, question. What really ails this passage is something else. Thomas, 24, already pointed out some of the problems of the clause magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis as a conclusion to the second simile. Especially in light of the preced­ ing emphasis on parva in the first simile and the prior sentence (for further examples of such parva cf. § 131) it is odd for the parva to be thrust into the background and the stakes suddenly raised to magna, especially when the term is not clearly defined here (or susceptible of ready inference from con­ text; contrast N.D. 2.145, quoted below); what are the magna that "we" are supposed to learn? Again how is the learning of magna, of whatever sort, a fitting conclusion to the fact that the ears of musicians pick up even the subtlest nuances (vel minima sentiunt)} Is it a matter of learning at all or rather one of perception? In view of these problems it is hard to avoid the conclusion that magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis has been interpolated on the basis of the preceding simile (vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est) by a reader who misunderstood the structure of the long period and thought something missing. The premise of both similes is that the ear of the musical specialist (sciens, musici) can make subtle discriminations (presumably of tone: quamvis paulum discrepent is explicit in the former). This accords with the distinction of αυτοφυής αΐσθησις and επιστημονική αϊσθησις by Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon, according to whom in the course of musical training one strives for subtler perception; cf. Philodemus* riposte (SVF 3,223.31 ff.): και δια τούτο £ητών (ό) μουσικό·? την τοιαύτης συνεσιν, ή δυνήσ€ται διαγινώσκ€ΐν, αί ποΐαι των αΐσθησ€ων πώς διατβθήσονται, των ανύπαρκτων έττιστήμην Cnjei . . . ; cf. ad § Η . For the notion that details of behavior disclose the state of the soul cf., besides §§ 102 and 131, N.D. 2.145:. . . venustatem atque ordinem et ut ita

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dicam decentiam oculi iudicant atque etiam alia maiora: nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscunt, iratum propitium, laetantem dolentem, fortem ignavum, audacem tumidumque cognoscunt, with Heinemann, 2 , 2 1 1 ; Sen. £p. 52.12: omnia rerum omnium, si observentur, indicia sunt, et argumentum morum ex minimis quoque licet capere: inpudicum et in cess us ostendit et manus mota et unum interdum responsum et relatus ad caput digitus et flex us oculorum; inprobum risus, insanum vultus habitusque demonstrat; Ed­ wards, 89-90. 145 . . . sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepet. . .] The discrepancy would presumably be, as in the case of Sophocles just cited, between the given action and the social role one was assuming; on the need to avoid any discrepantia cf. § 111. . . . maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.j Cf. D.L. 6.27 (sim. 6.65): και μην κα\ του? μουσικού? [sc. έθαύμα£ε ό Διογένη?] τα? μεν εν τη λύρα χορδά? άρμόττεσθαι, ανάρμοστα δ' εχειν τη? ψυχή? τά ήθη; Sen. Ep. 88.9 (the famous letter de liberalibus studiis): ad musicum transeo. doces me quomodo inter se acutae ac graves consonant, quomodo nervorum disparem reddentium sonum fiat concordia: fac potius quomodo animus secum mens consonet nee consilia mea discrepent. 1 4 6 . . . sic nos, si acres ac diligentes (iudices) esse volumus animadversoresque vitiorum . . .] Cf. $ 114 (where, however, it is "our" behavior that is to be judged): suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat. . .—Animadversor is a άπαξ, presum­ ably coined by Cicero for this place, the coinage facilitated by the fact that he had used the corresponding verb several times recently (§ 135: animadvertendum est etiam quatenus sermo delectationem habeat; $ 141: ut animadvertatur quanta ilia res sit quam efficere velimus)\ cf. Klotz, TLL 2, 74.26. . . . ex . . . superciliorum aut remissione aut contractionc . . . ] Cf. Quint. Inst. 11.3.79: ira . . . contractis [sc. superciliis], tristitia deduetts, hilaritas remissis ostenditur. . . . ex . . . superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione—quid ab officio naruraque discrepet.] Cf. Sex. Rose. 37:. . . id quod praeclare a sapientibus dicitur, voltu saepe laeditur pietas. . . Reminiscent of our passage (and based on the corresponding place in Panaetius?) in assuming the importance of even tiny details of comportment is the letter Isidore of Pelusium directed to a soldier named Isaiah who had, by his αλαζονεία, aroused the saint's wrath: . . . ρύθμιζε σαυτόν προ? τό πρέπον άνδρΐ ε πιει κει σχήμα, καΐ μήτε δι' οφθαλμών μήτε δι* οφρύων μήτε δια γλώττη? μήτε δια βαδίσματο? ϊχνο? τι τη? τοιαύτη? έμφαινεσθω νόσου {PG 78, 721C). quo in genere non est incommodum quale quidque eorum sit ex aliis

Commentary on Book 1, Section 145-47

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iudicare, ut si quid (de)deceat illos, vitemus ipsi.] Deceat is transmitted in the 9th-10th century MSS (PVL) and was surely the reading of the archetype; it is also impossible. We have our choice between two conjectures, non deceat of Β or dedeceat of P 2 ; Atzerr 4 , Fedeli, and Testard have chosen the former, presumably because Β is the older witness; but given that both are conjec­ tures, that hardly matters. Dedeceat, adopted by Winterbottom, is surely the original and was corrupted through haplography (so already Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2); cf. also de Orat. 1.132. fit enim nescioquo modo ut magis in aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis si quid delinquitur.] On φιλαυτία, which creates a gulf separating one from others, cf. ad $ 30; for this piece of popular wisdom cf. Ten Hau. 503-5 (sim. 210): ita conparatam esse hominum naturam omnium I aliena ut meliu' videant et diiudicent I quam sua; Cic. Tusc. 3.73: est enim proprium stultitiae aliorum vitia cernere, oblivisci suorum; Sen. de Ira 2.28.8: aliena vitia in oculis habemus, a tergo nostra sunt; Matt. 7.4 (sim. Luke 6.42): ή πώς €ρ€Ϊς τω ά&λφψ σου· άφ€ς €κβάλω το κόρφος *κ του οφθαλμοί» σου, και ιδού ή δοκός έν τω όφθαλμφ σου; Otto, 209 (s.v. mantica). Similarly Plutarch (de Laude Ipsius 547d) recommends the observation of others' self-praise as a cure for one's own. itaque facillime corriguntur in discendo quorum vitia imitantur emcndandi causa magistri.] Cicero perhaps has in mind his own master of rhetoric, Molo of Rhodes; cf. Brut. 316: quibus \sc. rbetoribus Asiae] non contentus Rhodum vent meque ad eundem quern Romae audiveram Molonem adplicavi cum actorem in veris causis scriptoremque praestantem turn in notandis animadvertendisque vitiis et instituendo docendoque prudentissimum. 147 Nee vero alienum est ad ea feligenda quae dubitationem adfemnt, adhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos, et quid iis de quoque officii genere placeat exquirere (maior enim pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura ipsa deducitur).] As Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2, pointed out, (d)eligenda hardly fits quae dubitationem adferunt; it is not a question of choosing matters that cause doubt but rather of discriminating among them the good and bad actions. In point of sense one might expect diiudicanda (cf. 3.19: itaque, ut sine errore diiudicare posshnus, si quando cum illo quod bonestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur quod appellamus utile . . . ; sim. 3.56). 185 On the basis of Lp's reading dirigenda Pohlenz suggested dirimenda. Cf. OLD s.v. dirimo 4b: "impose a decision, settle"; but in this sense dirimo would 185. For its transitive use cf. Ciceronian and other examples at Gudcman, TLL 5,1156.33 ff.

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require controversiam, litem, or the like as object; cf. Tafel, TLL 5, 1259.10 ff. The other sense that might come into question would be "separate" (OLD s.v., 3); but in this sense Cicero uses the word not of a systematic division but of a separation of a societas (cf. 3.23, where it is used of the avium coniunctio, and other examples at TLL, loc. cit., 1258.45 ff.). Hence, appar­ ently, Pohlenz's conjecture has not found favor with Fedeli, Testard, or Winterbottom, all of whom print eligenda (without a crux), or Atzert4 (who brackets deligenda). Another possibility worth considering would be digerenda, which, unlike dirimenda, can be used of a systematic division or classification; cf. OLD s.v. digero 4b: "arrange, organize, classify,** where inter alia de Orat. 2.79 is cited (on the classification of the parts of eloquence: . . . aliter ab aliis digeruntur).—The words here set in parentheses, maior enim pars—deducitur, form a problem of their own. If the majority is guided by nature, it does well according to Panaetius* system, since he recognizes the Stoic TeXog formula "life in accord with nature" (cf. ad 3.12-13). But this sentence has clearly been written in the intent, not of praising, but of deprecating the behavior of the maior pars; it is given as the reason {enim) for consulting the learned or experienced, an unnecessary procedure if the maior pars could trust their instincts; for Panaetius' general distrust of the majority cf. ad % 118.1 suspect that we have here an instance of Cicero lapsing into nontechnical language without considering the possible philosophical im­ plications (cf. ad § 114 a propos sapiens). Pohlenz's supposition (AF, 83, n. 2) that Cicero added this sentence to the margin in light of the following simile (ut enim pictores—corrigenda sunt) is both uncontrollable and unnec­ essary. It is true, as Atzert4, XXX-XXXI, states, that the following in quibus videndum— connect with what precedes maior enim pars—deducitur; but this by no means rules out the possibility of a parenthetical insertion by Cicero himself.186 in quibus videndum esc non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque senoat atque etiam qua de causa quisque sentiat.] For the distinction between what one says and what one feels cf. $ 40 [semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum est; cf. ad 3.108) and § 124 (talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem et dicere), as well as Luc. 15, quoted ad § 108 (de Graecis autem—); cf. also Mil. 105: vos oro obtestorque, iudices, ut in sententiis ferendis, quod sentietis, id audeatis.—Attention to the rea186. The reference of the relative connector in quibus over the parenthetical matter is no great problem; cf. S. Lundstrom, Vermeintliche Glossemc m den Tuscuhnen (Uppsala, 1964), 47 ff. (on Tusc. 1.3: qui fuit maior natu quant Plautus et Naevius, which refers, not to the immediately preceding Ennhtm, but to the previously mentioned Livius).

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 147 and 148-49

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sons as well as the judgments will presumably enable one both to evaluate the judgments and have a basis for forming judgments in future, ut enim pictores—corrigenda sunt.] As Reinhardr» 1893, 12 ff.» saw, the process described in the prior part of the simile really applies only to Apelles, not to painters in general, let alone sculptors and poets. In question is the famous anecdote recounted at Plin. Nat. 35.84-85 (cf. V. Max. 8.12 ext. 3): Apelli fuit alioqui perpetua consuetudo numquam tarn occupation diem agendi, ut non lineam ducendo exerceret artem, quod ab eo in proverbium venit. idem perfecta opera proponebat in pergula transeuntibus atque, ipse post tabulam latens, vitia quae notarentur auscultabat, vulgum diligentiorem iudicem quam se praeferens; feruntque reprehensum a sutore, quod in crepidis una pauciores intus fecisset ansas, eodem postero die superbo emendatione pristinae admonitionis cavillante circa crus, indignatum prospexisse denuntiantem, ne supra crepidam sutor iudicaret, quod et ipsum in proverbium abiit. If there are problems with the terms in which the example is presented, its adaptation to context generally leaves much to be desired, as Thomas, 115, saw. Cicero has recommended consulting doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos, but not the opinion of the vulgus, which indeed is depre­ cated both in the sentence maior enim pars—deducitur and elsewhere in Off. However, lest anyone be tempted to delete this passage, it can be said that it does not actually recommend consulting the opinion of the vulgus but merely uses a case of this to make the point that one needs aliorum iudicium, which is in line with the larger argument. Cicero was unlucky in his choice of the example of consulting the vulgus (on Panaetius' opinion of which see the first note on this section); and, evidently relying on memory here, as sometimes elsewhere in Book 1 (cf. ad SS 33 and 40), he made the phenomenon more widespread than it actually was and omitted Apelles' name. Our passage is in part a reminiscence of the theme that appears at de Orat. 3.195 (a propos prose rhythm): omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava, diiudicant; idque cum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, turn multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum vocumque iudicio . . . (on which passage see D.M. Schenkevcld, u ludicia vulgi. Cicero, De oratore 3.195 ff. and Brutus 183 ff.," Rhetorica 6 [1988], 291-305). Perhaps Cicero would have mended these defects in sub­ sequent revision. For other problems of adaptation of exemplum to argu­ ment cf. ad SS 25, 7 4 - 7 8 , and the introduction, S 6 (Regulus). 148-49 Cicero fails to take the opportunity to use nature as a yardstick for measuring and criticizing conventional society. Social critics are either ex­ traordinary persons such as Socrates and Aristippus who can exercise such

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license (but what are the criteria for admission to this category?) or arc Cynics, whose hostility to verecundia disqualifies them from discussing the honestum; cf. ad § 128. 148 Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de his nihil est praecipiendum; ilia enim ipsa praecepta sunt.] Sc. by parents or the like. nee quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sine, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam adsequebantur.] An example of Socrates* behavior being at odds with societal convention would be his standing rapt in thought for a considerable time in a neighbor's portico rather than coming immediately to Agathon's dinner (PI. Smp. 174e175a); when he alludes to Socrates' speaking contra morem consuetudinem­ que civilem Cicero may be thinking of the attack on Athenian democracy and the arts that minister to it at Grg. 502dl0 ff. The contrast between the respectful treatment of Aristippus in this Panaetian section of Off. (our passage = fr. 115 Mannebach = Cirenaici it. IA 65 = Socr. IVA 83; one would have expected it also under the testimonies for Socrates [IC]) and the dismis­ sive tone of 3.116 (evidently based on an Academic doxography; see ad loc.) is striking. On Panaetius' studies of Aristippus cf. ad § 104. Pohlenz, AF, 83, n. 4, suspected that it was Aristippus' motto € χω, ούκέχομαι that appealed to Panaetius (cf. $S 6Sy 70). In any case, the implicit distinction in our passage is between behavior appropriate to the sapiens and to the ordinary person, with the former relegated to the past. As at $ 21 {sunt autem privata nulla natura . . .) an opportunity for criticizing the existing order of things is ignored.187 Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.] Our passage = Socr. VB 515; cf. ad%% 126-32. 149 Having cleared the way in the previous section, with its acceptance of the mores and institutions of conventional society, Cicero/Panaetius can now lay down customary precepts for behavior toward those who play various roles within the community (as opposed to behavior in those roles, discussed at $S 124-25). Cf. Epict. Ench. 30: ούτως oui> άπό του yeiTovos, άπό του πολίτου, άπό του στρατηγού το καθήκον εΰρήσας, έάν τάς σχέσεις έθί£η θ€ωρ€ΐι>. On the place of this material within the section on actions cf. ad SS 141-49. 187. Cf. Heilmann, 87: "Hatte man hier nicht folgcm Iconncn, daS mos und institura civilia in sich fragwiirdig scin konnen?"

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 148-49 and 150-51

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ad summam, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis hominum conciliationem ec consociationem colere tueri servare debemus.] Here it becomes clear that the two social virtues (the second and fourth) do indeed overlap (cf. SS 50 ff. on the communitas et societas humana); cf. hominum consociatio as a paraphrase of the second virtue at § 100 (cf. ad he). Does the phrase ne agam de singulis hint that Cicero has curtailed a longer treatment of the theme in Panaetius (cf. l.\6\ad%% 102,107,122-25)? The summary nature of this concluding sentence following upon the more detailed prescriptions of behavior toward various ranks and social groups within the polity has suggested to Heilmann, 87, that in this version of Stoic ethics "das historisch Gewordene gewinnt . . . ein Ubergewicht gegenuber dem von der Natur hergeleiteten MaSstab." The similarity to the earlier phrase observare et colere debemus suggests that Cicero is hastening to bring this topic to a close. 150-51 This list of acceptable and unacceptable professions 188 stands in a long aristocratic tradition; and Greek and Roman views on such questions often coincided (see below). Hence the disagreements as to the audience addressed, the realities reflected, and, ultimately, the provenance. Though Pohlenz and Wilamowitz both regarded this material as Panaetian, the for­ mer thought it written for a Roman, the latter for a Greek readership. 189 In his extensive commentary on this passage Finley, 5 0 - 5 8 , assumes it to be an accurate reflection of Roman attitudes, but allows (187, n. 42) for some "Greek influence." 190 The previously assumed Panaetian origin is defended by Brunt, 1973, 27 ff. The section on actions has just included advice about proper behavior toward officials, citizens, and foreigners (5 149). Our sec­ tion deals not with choice of profession (if so, we should have expected it to fall under Il.C.l.d. in the outline ad %% 9 3 - 1 5 1 , i.e., the fourth persona) but the amount of respect that representatives of various professions can claim in society. It is introduced rather abruptly without a connection to what has preceded and follows rather oddly upon the point. . . totius generis hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere tueri servare debemus (such distinctions as are here drawn being potentially invidious and not tending to promote the totius generis hominum conciliatio; see ad § 150). 1 suspect that it has been appended as an explication of the first sentence of $ 149 or rather 188. Surely the formulations improbantur, inliberales et sordidi, sordidi, in sordida arte versantur. and minime probandae arc an example of variatio; no graded scale of values is being drawn up in $ 150. 189. Cf. Pohlenz, AF, 83-84; on his view that Panaetius wrote for a Roman audience esp. 51 and 118 ff. (sec introduction, $ 5 [4\); Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, n. 1. 190. On Finley's method in general cf. D'Arms, 13 ff.

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that that sentence has been formulated with a view to this material following {eos . . . quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magrtis est, . . ♦ observare et colere debemus); note that the honestum has been used as a criterion throughout Book 1, but the scale of activity (in rebus . . . magrtis) becomes such, apart from the treatment of magrtitudo animi (§§ 61-92), where the element of greatness inheres in the subject ex vi termini, only in § 151 (apart from §§ 138-40, surely of Ciceronian provenance). Moreover, such a formula as haec fere accepimus is not used elsewhere in this treatise to introduce an argument (as opposed to an example, as at § 108); it seems likely to lead into a rehearsal of traditional views; cf. sic a patribus accepimus at Amic. 39, where a Roman tradition is in question. Brunt, 1973, 27, supposes that Cicero has merely reproduced haec fere accepimus from Panaetius; but it is not in Panaetius' manner simply to report commonly ex­ pressed views for their own sake; he would attack them (cf. §S 74-78), question their sincerity (2.69), or the like; he admires the man who rises above and despises popular values (§§ 65y 147, 2.37). Now the lack of an explicit connection to what precedes or of Greek examples is not an infallible index of non-Panaetian provenance (cf. ad SS 11-17,122-25); but the lack of a connection to the overall argument and a method different from that of the indubitably Panaetian portions of this treatise is. The fourth virtue involves establishing a fitting relation between two terms, one's persona and one's actions; apart from Ciceronian distur­ bances in the topics and their order (cf. ad $$ 93-151), the first half of this section explored the determination of one's persona (§§ 105-25), the second half the character of actions (§§ 126-49), including those involving the body (§§ 126-32a), and speech (132b-37), and how they are affected by time and circumstance (§§ 141-49); throughout the section the implicit or explicit criterion is nature. On the other hand, $$ 150-51 are not about actions but attitudes; and there is no process of reasoning from nature to the particular recommendation; rather the appeal is to tradition (haec fere accepimus) and to appropriateness to one's social rank (eae sunt its quorum ordini conveniunt honestae; nihil homine libero dignius); this latter concern is, I think, specifically Ciceronian; cf. ad §§ 93-99 and 94 (with reference to dignitas) and 96 (cum specie quadam liberali). It may well be, as Brunt, loc. cit., has suggested, that Panaetius, a Rhodian aristocrat who probably refused pay­ ment for teaching, 191 thought no differently on this subject than Cicero (cf. 191. There is no evidence that Panaetius accepted money for his teaching (cf. Brunt, 1973, 11)\ and his pupil Posidonius mocked Athcnion, who did accept such payment (F 253.45 if. E.K. = F 247 Th. = FGrHist 87 F 36 = Ath. 5.212c-d); see also ad $ 150.

Commentary on Book 1, Sections 150-51 and 150

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also on § 150 inliberales autent—); but would he have seen fit to introduce his views on the subject in this place and on the basis of reasoning here presented! The similar Greek tradition of approved and disapproved professions is reflected in the list at Pollux 6.128 of βίοι εφ' οΐς αν τις όνειδισθείη. When discussing the occupations worthy of a free man [EN 1121 b31 ff.), Aristotle had placed such conceptions within the framework of his ethical system: di δ' αυ κατά την λήφιν υπερβάλλουσι τφ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν και πάν, οίον οι τάς ανελεύθερους εργασίας έργα£όμενοι. πορνοβοσκοί και πάντες οί τοιούτοι, και τοκισταί κατά μικρά και ε πι πολλψ. πάντες γάρ ούτοι όθεν ού δει λαμβάνουσι, και όπόσον ου δει, κοινόν δ' επ' αυτοί ς ή αισχροκέρδεια φαίνεται. Our ac­ count, on the other hand, is moralizing in tendency (note the use of vanitas as a criterion for judging merchants) but can hardly be called philosophical (see next note). Finally note that the end of a Panaetian argument or the interstices be­ tween such arguments are points at which matter is regularly inserted (whether from elsewhere in Panaetius' treatise, another source, or suo Marte) by Cicero (cf. ad §§ 4 1 , 5 4 - 5 8 , 1 0 0 - 3 a , 1 0 3 b - 4 , 1 2 2 - 2 5 , 138-40, 2.23-29). 150 lam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberates habendi, qui sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus.] The following doctrine is more endoxic than philo­ sophical in character; thus the first item, those occupations that incur peo­ ple's hatred, makes no attempt to distinguish justified from unjustified odium (cf. Cato [2.89] for the same attitude toward usury; on the other hand, Aristotle [EN 1121b34] specifies τοκισταί κατά μικρά και επί πολλώ), nor is there a philosophical distinction, only a social one, between those who en­ gage in commerce on a small or large scale (§ 151); and there was certainly no moral stigma attached to the portitor (corresponding to the τελώνης in the list at Pollux 6.128); he was merely unpopular because of his habit of poking his nose ex officio into the property of others (see the next note). primum improbantur ii quaestus qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratomm.] The customs officer owed his unpopularity, of course, to his having to scrutinize closely the cargo of all vessels entering or leaving port; cf. Plut. de Cur. 518c: . . . τους τελώνας βαρυνόμεθα και δυσχεραίνομεν, ούχ όταν τα εμφανή τών εισαγομένων έκλεγωσιν, αλλ' δταν τα κεκρυμμενα £ητοϋντες iv άλλοτρίοις σκεύεσι και φορτίοις άναστρεφωνται· . . . , as well as the metaphorical use of portitor at PI. Men. 114 ff. (Menaechmus I to the parasite Peniculus): nam quotiens foras ire volo, me retines, revocas, rogitasjquo ego earn, quam rem agam, quid negoti geram, I quid petam, quid feram, quid forts egerim. I portitorem domum duxi, ita

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omnem mihi I rem necesse eloqui est, quidquid egi atque ago.—For the Roman attitude toward moneylenders see Cato Agr. 1.1: maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt, furem dupli condemnari, faeneratorem quadrupli. quanta peiorem civem existimannt faeneratorem quant furem, hinc licet existimare; cf. also the caricature at Sen. de Ira 3.33.3: quid si propter usuram vel milesimam valetudinarius faenerator distortis pedibus et manibus ad computandum non relictis clamat ac per vadimonia asses suos in ipsis morbi accessionibus vindicatf192 inliberales autem et sordidi quaestus mercennarionim omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servirutis.] For the general thought cf. PI. R. 371 e: di δή πωλούι>τ€9 την ττ\ς ισχύος· xpeiav, την π μην ταύτην μισθόν καλοΟντ€?, κ€κληνται, ως €γψμαι, μισθωτοί.—Auctoramentum = recompense, reward {OLD s.v., 3); on payment as a criterion for judging an activity cf. O. Diliberto, Ricerche sull' "auctoramentum" e sulla condizione degli "auctorati," Universita di Cagliari. Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Giurisprudenza I 24 (Milan, 1981), with literature at 32, n. 89; Sen. Ep. 88.1: de liberalibus studiis quid sentiam scire desideras: nullum suspicio, nullum in bonis numero quod ad aes exit. The breakdown in the distinction between slave and free operated to the advantage of slaves (cf. ad § 41a on Chrysippus* formula servus . . . per­ petuus mercennarius est) but the disadvantage of free laborers, who are now conceptually (though perhaps not yet in reality; cf. Brunt, 1973, 29, n. 3) degraded to little better than slaves.—According to Panaetius, a beneficium that consists in opera is more valuable than one involving pecunia (cf. 2.5264). Thus on his scale of values the moneylender should rank at the bottom, next the mercenarii, then those who practice the liberal arts. Agriculture and commerce fall outside this scheme since they involve the production or sale of commodities. A moral criterion is applied to them, viz., vanitas (perhaps = άλα£ον£ία), which is also deprecated elsewhere (cf. the next note); it was evidently seen as a special temptation for merchants (S 150 of retailers: nihil 192. Brunt, 1973, 30, wrongly supposes that Cicero would not have introduced such views into his essay because of his personal acquaintance with Brutus, who engaged in usury (cf. Gelzer, RE 10.1 [19171,979.12 if.); nor is herightin saying (ibid.) that "the relative position of the merchant and the publican in our text's scale of values is un-Roman" (his emphasis) if by publican he means faenerator. Finley, 54-55, juxtaposing our passage with Cicero's efforts, as governor of Cilicia, to collect loans, with interest, owed to M. Brutus asks "Did not Cicero the practical man make a mockery of Cicero the moralist?" He defends our text, however, by pointing out that Cicero does not call the faeneratores unnecessary and would hardly have called such statesmen as Brutus, Crassus, and Caesar faeneratores, even though they did lend money at interest.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 150

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enim proficiant nisi admodum mentiantur; nee vero est quicquam turpius vanitate; and at § 151 the merchant wins approval if he deals on a large scale and sine vanitate).—At Rome the mercennarii, like the opifices, were ex­ cluded from the senate; cf. O'Brien Moore, RE Suppl. 6 (1935), 691.56 ff.— Latent in ipsa merces auctoramentum est servitutis is the Marxist analysis of the worker's alienation; for Cicero, however, this observation leads to no desire to reform the existing system. 193 Robert von Pohlmann, Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt, 2, 3d ed. (Munich, 1925), 3 5 9 - 6 1 , subjects our passage to a Marxist critique. With some justice he faults Cicero for failing to accord respect to every honest form of work. On the other hand, in claiming that these chapters aim to sharpen tensions already present in the workplace, he seems to assume a modern industrial society in which books are mass-produced and relatively cheap, and literacy and the study of literature spread through various levels of society; cf. William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Mass.London, 1989), who emphasizes that in antiquity literacy was largely cir­ cumscribed by location and class, though his thesis is controversial; cf., e.g., the critical review by James G. Keenan, AHB 5 (1991), 101-6. Cicero is writing in a pre-industrial society for an aristocratic readership; and in this passage he shows that he accepts a great many of the assumptions, indeed prejudices, of that constituency. Though here he may be operating largely within its parameters, his project of reforming aristocratic behavior shows through clearly above all in his treatment of the second and third virtues and in the attempt to channel the competitive impulse on a more humane course there and in Book 2; and 3.21-28 is truly visionary, sordidi etiam putandi qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod statim vendant;— nee vero est quicquam turpius vanitate.] Cicero's lack of sympathy with profit-making in commercial transactions is likewise evident in his remarks on some of the casuistic cases in Book 3 (cf. ad 3.49b-57).—For vanitas as a cause of inaccuracy cf. Rhet. Her. 2.35: vitiosa ratio est quae ad expositionem non est adcommodata vel propter infirmitatem vel propter vanitatem; cf. also $$ 137, 151, and 3.58. opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantun nee enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina.J The same point is made in detail at X. Oec. 4.2: και γάρ αϊ ye βαι>αυσικα'ι καλούμα ναι και emppnjoi €ΐσι, και €Ϊκότω9 μβντοι πάι/υ άδοξοϋνται προ? των πόλεων, καταλυμαίνονται γάρ τά σώματα τώι> τε εργαζο­ μένων και των έπιμελομενων, άναγκά£ουσαι καθήσθαι και σκιατραφείσθαι, eviai δέ και προ? πΰρ ημερεύει μ. τών δέ σωμάτων θηλυνομενων και α'ι ψυχαι 193. I owe this observation to Rebecca Rezinski.

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πολύ άρρωστότ€ραι γίγι>οι>ται. Hence the sting in Cicero's portrayal of the shop that Verres established in the palace at Syracuse for making golden vessels: ipse tamen praetor, qui sua vigilantia pacem in Sicilia dicit fuisse, in hac officina maiorem partem diet cum tunica pulla sedere solebat et pallio {Ver. 2.4.54) or his contemptuous reference at Flac. 18 to opifices et tabernarios atque Mam omnem faecem civitatum . . . minimeque artes eae probandae quae ministrae sunt voluptatum, 4cetarii lanii coqui fartores pi sea tores', ut ait Terentius. adde hue, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque ludum talarium.] The reference is to Eun. 257 (the parasite Gnatho describes a scene at the market); Seneca dismisses such providers of unnecessary pleasures with contempt at Ep. 88.18. Cicero fails to mention the leno, even though the πορι>οβοσκό$ appears in this connection in both Aristotle and Pollux. At Grg. 464b ff. Plato had examined the arts that minister to pleasure and found them to be a species of flattery and αισχροί;; cf. ad § 42. As at Att. 1.16.3 the ludus talarius is the gaming house, which one might have expected to see mentioned at § 104. 151 quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honest arum, eae sunt iis quorum ordini conveniunt honestac.] The liberal arts in general were more highly esteemed among the Greeks than the Romans (cf. Tusc. 1.3 ff.), an imbalance which, at least in philosophy, Cicero was keen to redress (ibid., 5). On the other hand, one Stoic tradition, traceable to Zeno and the Cynics, regarded a liberal education as useless; cf. D.L. 7.32; Schofield, 1991, 10-11; Seneca, too, sometimes emphasized its limitations {Ep. 88; but con­ trast Vit. Beat. 20.1).—Note the restriction iis quorum ordini conveniunt; such professions would not, of course, come into question for a senator's son. Hence there is no question of our text recommending that noble Ro­ mans become physicians, architects, or teachers, pace Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, n. I.194—The term architectura as equivalent of ή άρχίτοττοΐΊκή (sc. -ΐΈ'χΐ'η) isfirstattested here; cf. Ausfeld, TLL 1.2, 464.73 ff. The ninth book of Varro's Disciplinae, apparently composed after Off., was entitled de Ar­ chitectura; cf. H. Dahlmann, RE Suppl. 6 (1935), 1255.42 ff.; hence, writing under Augustus, Vitruvius did not hesitate over what to call his discipline (title, 1.3 et saepe). mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; . . .] Euripides was mocked in comedy because his mother was a greengrocer (cf. Aristophanes, Frogs, ed. Kenneth Dover [Oxford, 1993] ad 840; γένος· Εύριπίδου, ed. 194. On the social respectability of architecture as a profession at Rome cf. Brunt, 1973, 30 and n. 2; on physicians' fees, ibid., 32.

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Schwartz, sch. Eur. 1, 3.15; he is defended against the charge at Su. ε 3695). Plato Lg. 918d gives greed as the reason shopkeepers and tradesmen were held in contempt: τά δε τών ανθρώπων πλήθη . . . δεόμενά τε άμε τρως δείται και εξόν κερδαίνειν τά μέτρια, άπλήστως α'ιρεΐται κερδαίνειν, διό πάντα τά περί την καπηλείαν και έμπορίαν και πανδοκείαν γένη διαβεβληταί τε και εν αισχροί? γε>ονεν όνείδεσι ν; hence the law that only foreigners should engage in such commerce (ibid., 920a; cf. 849b). The inclusion in Pollux's list of such items as κάπηλος, όπωρώνης, and άλλαντοπώλης attests to the per­ sistence of this particular prejudice. . . . sin magna et copiosa—non est admodum vituperanda;. . .] The stigma is reduced, but not eliminated altogether, if the named conditions are fulfilled. Senators, too, were tempted to engage in commerce; hence the law passed (ca. 218) by plebiscite, despite senatorial opposition, on the initiative of the tribune of the people Q. Claudius, which prohibited senators or their sons from owning a ship with capacity to store more than 300 amphorae (Liv. 21.63.3; Rotondi, 249-50; MRR, 1, 238; C. Nicolet, CAH 9*, 643), a provision often circumvented in practice (E. Gabba, ibid., 8 2 , 204); cf. D'Arms, 31-34.—Mercatura is personified for vividness; cf. the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Personification." . . . atque etiam, si sariata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, sic ex ipso se portu in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure Optimo posse laudari.] As D'Arms, 23, pointed out, the implication is that only when transferred to the land is commercial gain regarded as fully legiti­ mate. Cf. the discussion of change of profession at § 120; on the standing of agriculture cf. the next note. omnium autem rerum ex quibus aliquid adquiritur nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine {nihil} libera dignius.] This is the traditional Roman attitude, reflected in Cato's response recorded at 2.89 (cf. ad loc.)y as well as at Colum. 1 praef. 10 (after considering the claims of warfare, overseas commerce, moneylending, etc.: quae si et ipsa et eorum similia bonis fugiettda sunt, superest, ut dixi, unum genus liberate et ingenuum rei familiaris augendae, quod ex agricolatione contingit). But some Greek authors held similar views; cf. X. Oec. 5.17: καλώς δε κάκεΐνος είπε ν δς εφη τήν γεωργίαν των άλλων τεχνών μητέρα και τροφόν είναι; Muson. 57.6: εστί και έτερος πόρο? ούδεν τούτου κακίων, τάχα δε και άμείνων νομισθείς αν οΐικ άλόγως άνδρί γ ' εύρώστω το σώμα, ό άπό γης . . . This attitude led inter alia to the creation of the latifundia (on which cf. Shatzman, 36-37). Contrast Seneca's condemnation of excessive land-purchases at Ep. 89.20; cf. Griffin, 1976, 298. In calling agriculture and hunting servilia officia {Cat. 4.1) Sallusr no doubt meant to be provocative; cf. Stockton, 7, n.

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6; A. Cossarini, "II prestigio dell' agricoltura in Sallustio e Cicerone," Atti deW Istitutο Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Artit Classe di scienze morali, lettere ed arti, 138 (1979-80), 355-64.—At the end of such a survey of various possibilities Cicero shows a tendency to systematize or at least con­ clude with a clear indication of which deserves primacy (cf. $$ 58 and 141); so here.—Cicero makes sparing use of figures in this essay; evidently, how­ ever, he thought that the anaphora characteristic of liturgical language was warranted here to set the dignity of agriculture apart from other occupations (cf. also 2.5); the solemnity is further enhanced by the double cretic clausula. Cf. also ad 2.85. de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim adsumes quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt.] Cf. Sen. 51 ff. 152-61 Here Cicero fulfills his promise ($ 10) to make good what he re­ garded as a defea in Panaetius' treatment of the καλόν. Since Panaetius had distinguished four "parts" of the καλόν, the possibility suggested itself to Cicero 195 of having to choose one "part" over another 196 or rather an action dictated by one over an action dictated by another. Panaetius, however, surely did not see this as a problem; like Socrates (?), 197 Plato, 198 Aristotle (EN 1144b30 ff.), and the Stoa in general he held the doctrine later called the άντακολουθία των αρετών (SVF 3, nos. 295-304, with Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,127; Off. 2.35: qui unam haberet omnes habere virtutes, as well as Seneca's phrase comitatus virtutum consertarum et inter se cohaerentium [Ep. 90.31); in part he defined the virtues in such a way that they implied one another (cf. ad § 62; for other Panaetian hints about the interconnection of the virtues cf. $ 1 5 with note). Cicero's observation a propos magnitudo animi (§ 157; see ad be.) might have led him to confront this problem, but he did not. This passage is disappointing in several other respects. 199 We were led to expect a comprehensive comparison, if not of the individual appropriate actions derived from each of the virtues, at least of the individual virtues one with another. What we are given instead is essentially a comparison of the claims 195. Pohlenz, AF, 85, supposes that Cicero here follows a critique of Panaetius that origi­ nated within the Stoic school; but see below on the άντακολουθία τών αρετών, as well as a
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 151 and 152-61

339

of the second virtue, which is here called simply communitas, with those of the first;200 the upshot is a defense of activity directed toward the common good as more valuable than purely intellectual pursuits, a theme developed (along the same lines?) in the lost introduction to Rep. I. 2 0 1 The third virtue, magnitude* animi, is dismissed in one clause of $ 157; the fourth virtue, too, is raised as a problem only to be dismissed (§ 159). Besides the less than comprehensive scope, another defect in this section lies in the inconsistency between the treatment of certain subjects here and in the Panaetian portion of the Book. Thus in § 157 bees are cited as an example of things that are sociable by nature; but at $$ 11-12 the social instinct had been presented as something that reason develops in the human being. Furthermore the gods play a larger role here than they do in the Panaetian portions of Off. Thus at § 153 Cicero speaks of the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos, whereas Panaetius was con­ cerned merely with the societas hominum coniunctioque (§ 50). Moreover, the gods have taken their place at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of appropriate actions at § 160, whereas they were omitted altogether at § 58 (note also how parents in the later passage have been demoted to a place below the patria). In addition one wonders whether the treatment of the first virtue in our section does full justice to its description in $ 18 as a desire for knowledge to which all are drawn (see ad § 153). Other oddities include the fact that in §155 Cicero invokes himself among other examples, but in such a way as to obscure the point of the argument (see ad loc.) and that, according to the transmitted text, Cicero announces that the second virtue is preferable to the first no fewer than five times (end of § 153,157 [see ad loc], 158, and in the first and second sentences of $ 160). Cicero might have been warned, if not by the Greek forerunner of Horace's Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam /iungere si velit. . . , at least by the remark of P. Rutilius Rufus (cited at 3.10) against trying to fill out what Panaetius had left untouched. Pohlenz, AF, 89-90, suspected Posidonius to be Cicero's source for this section. However, as Theiler [ad Posidon. fr. 433) noted, the point for which Posidonius is cited (5 159) runs counter to the general trend of the argument to grant primacy to the communitas;202 and one would hesitate to burden 200. Here he presents variations on the theme of PI. Mx. 246e7: πάσα τε επιστήμη χωριζομοΐΉ, δικαιοσύνη? και ττ\ς άλλη? άρ€τή? πανουργία, ού σοφία φαίνεται. 201. Cf. Philippson, RE 7Α1 (1939), 1110.54 ff. 202. Pohlenz, AF, 89, perhaps reads too much into optimus quisque at $ 154 in seeing a reference to "die άριστοι . . . . in denen die Stimme der Natur am reinsten spricht"; from the context it seems clear that optimus quisque refers rather to those engaged in the vtta con­ templative, from whom Cicero wants to elicit evidence of the superiority of the social virtues.

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Posidonius with the kinds of arguments that appear in $ 153 (see ad loc). On the other hand, the critique of the theory that humans formed societies because of weakness (§ 158) could derive from Posidonius (see ad loc). I suspect that, apart from consulting Posidonius for $ 159 and possibly § 158,203 Cicero did little specific preparation for the writing of this section. The basic argument appears already at § 153, perhaps taken over in essen­ tials from the proem to Rep. I; 204 he then dilates on it, partly on the basis of materials from de Orat. (see ad $5 155-56), not, unfortunately, without repetitions (cf. ad $§ 157, 158, and 160).2<>s 152 . . . potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus honestis utrum honestius: . . .] The agonistic approach adumbrated here is somewhat disappointing in the execution (cf. ad $ 159); it inevitably poses the questions num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem, which, we were told at § 7, belonged to the first type of enquiry into appropriate action not to be handled in Off. (cf. ad loc). 153 Cicero advances several arguments in favor of the superiority of communitas to cognitio: (1) the life of total contemplation cut off from all human society is unbearable; (2) σοφία, distinguished from φρόι>ησι.9, is identified with the first virtue and defined as the rerum . . . divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; this last, however, is said to be the greatest (sc. type of knowledge) there is and therefore the appropriate action derived from it will be the greatest appropriate action; (3) the first virtue is said to be incomplete if divorced from the actio rerum, which consists in the guarding of human goods; therefore the societas generis humani is superior to pure contem­ plation. The solution at which Cicero arrives—that social officia take precedence over theoretical ones—is certainly defensible; indeed one of the main prob­ lems which has of late exercised students of Aristotle EN 10.6-8 is that the championing of the life of contemplation there seems to entail an amoralist political and social ethic.206 It is the way Cicero goes about arguing this position that causes difficulties. No doubt the pressure of time and other 203. Also for the hierarchy of appropriate actions at $ 160, as Pohlenz, AF, 90, assumes? See ad loc. 204. This may have depended in turn on Dicaearchus: cf. An. 2.16.3; Walzcr, 190. 205. For further instances of Cicero's use of materials from other works in Off. cf. p. 364, n. 16. 206. For a recent approach that acquits Aristotle of maximizing egoism cf. Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 1989), « p . ch. 2; cf. also Gavin Lawrence, "Aristotle and the Ideal Life," The Philosophical Review 102 (1993), 1-34.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 152-53

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concerns (see introduction, $ 3) explains why Cicero is so "eager to move from the statement of the issue to its resolution" (as Gill, 1988, 171, n. 13, remarked a propos another Ciceronian supplement to Panaetius, Book 3; cf. also ad § 159). In any case the arguments presented are less than fully satisfying. Cicero's first argument is based, reasonably enough in view of the preced­ ing Stoic system, on determining which officia are aptiora naturae. Aristotle had, of course, already made the famous observation ότι των φύσο ή πόλι? 6στί. και οτι ό άνθρωπο? φύσει πολιτικόν ζφον, και ό άπολι? δια φύσιν και ού δια τύχην ήτοι φαύλο? €στιι> ή κροττων ή άνθρωπο? [Pol. 1253a2 ff.), a view essentially shared by Panaetius ($ 12). In positing the natural sociability of the human being, then, Cicero is on safe ground. But on the other hand, as Cicero himself pointed out, there is also a natural human craving for knowl­ edge: omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem . . . ($ 18; the natural attraction to intellectual activity appears as early as § 13 within the presentation of the doctrine of οΐκ€ίωσι?). Cicero argues that if one could devote oneself exclusively to theoretical pursuits but be cut off from contact with one's fellows, one would not choose to go on living. In spite of his profession at $ 7 to be offering practical precepts in this essay, Cicero here allows himself to follow an all-or-nothing approach that involves the positing of a highly artificial situation, since in order to engage exclusively in studies one would have to have one's other needs for food, shelter, etc., provided for—presumably by other human beings. Even if one would not choose a life in Cicero's sense exclusively devoted to contempla­ tion (if that were a human option), one might still prefer a life mostly devoted to contemplation over the other available alternatives. Hence for some a life devoted primarily to intellectual pursuits might well be "more suited to nature" in the sense of their individual nature, the claims of which Cicero/ Panaetius explicitly recognized ($$ 107 ff.: the second persona). Moreover, we have a right to ask whether the other equally artificial situation of being constantly in contact with other human beings but never able to learn or satisfy one's curiosity for knowledge would be any more satisfying. But this first argument put forward by Cicero surely mistakes the problem; it is not a question of choosing one's ideally circumstanced life, with the theoretical life and the social life as the alternatives; rather the problem is that of choosing within a life, however circumstanced, between appropriate actions recom­ mended by the human drive toward knowledge and the other drive toward joining in activities that benefit society. Cicero's second argument for the stronger claim of social over theoretical officia is no better. Miller ad § 153 states the problem this way: "Cicero is

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guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue, and (2) the officia derived from the highest virtue are the highest officia, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then it can only follow that the officia derived from wisdom are the highest officia. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise that the "bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man' are derived from wisdom, and therewith side-tracks wisdom and gives the appropriate actions derived from the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been shunted." 207 Evidently Cicero is adapting—albeit not very subtly or cogently—an argument which originally served rather different ends. Note, too, that Cicero has not shown that the deorum et hominwn communitas et societas inter ipsos is the only item contained within the rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia. But even if this were shown, it could still be argued that the appropriate actions derived from rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia itself, as standing higher in the hierarchy, take precedence over those derived from the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos. Cicero's third argument is that pure contemplation is defective unless followed by actio rerum. This latter term is then said to be seen especially in hominum commodis tuendis (why not also inveniendi$})\ the conclusions that this too pertains to the human community and that the latter is therefore superior to pure contemplation are then quickly stated. But why is pure contemplation defective if not followed by actio rerum} If indeed omnes. . . trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem (§ 18), the satis­ faction of that desire would appear to be an end in itself; uses for the results of research may not, even in the long run, be found, but the research may be a valuable activity in itself. Contrast with Cicero's view Aristotle's description of the life of the mind (EN 1177al2 ff.): ει δ' έστιν ή ευδαιμονία κατ* άρετήν ενέργεια, εύλογον κατά τήι> κρατίστην αϋτη δ* αν €Ϊη του αρίστου. είτε δη νους τοΟτο εϊτε άλλο τι, ό δη κατά φύσιν δοκεΐ άρχειν καΐ ήγεΐσθαι και ε ννοιαν εχειν περί καλών και θείων, είτε θεΐον δν και αυτό είτε τών εν ήμΐν το θειότατον. ή τούτου ενέργεια κατά τήνοίκείαν άρετήν εϊη αν ή τελεία ευδαιμονία, δτι δ* έστι θεωρητική, εΐρηται. Indeed he goes on to show that each of the other virtues is deficient since they depend on persons toward whom justice, moderation, etc., can be exercised (ibid., 1177a27 ff.). 207. R.R. Wellman, "An Argument in de Officiis," CJ 60 (1965), 271-72, attempts to defend Cicero against this critique, unconvincingly; for he mistakes the basis of the second argument and thinks to introduce commensurability with Nature as a criterion; thus he argues (271) "to claim that duties derived from the social instinct are more in accordance with Nature, however, is not to affirm that they are necessarily the 'highest'"; but cf. Cicero's words ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 153

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Cicero had spoken at $ 19 of. . . vert investigatione . . . cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduct contra officium est. It is, as I have said, a defensible position; but only at § 154 does he adduce a convincing argument that this is so (quis enim est tarn cupidus . . . f). If paragraphs are to correspond to divisions of the argument, then a new paragraph should begin at $ 153, not at $ 154, which continues the argument pro communitate contra cognitionem (of recent editors Testard and Winterbottom, but not Atzert4 or Fedeli, begin a paragraph at $ 153; all four begin one at § 154). Placet igirur aptiora esse naturae ea officia quae ex communitate quam ea quae ex cognitione ducantur;. . .] In the material that Cicero appends to Panaetius' treatment the criterion remains the Stoic one of what is "in accord with" or "fits with" nature (cf. ad 3.13 and, on the criteria secundum or contra naturam, ad 3.19b-32); cf. also § 159: apta naturae. . . . si solitudo tanta sit ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita.] Cf. Arist. EN 1169b 16 ff.: άτοπον δ' ίσως και το μονώτην ποιεί ν τον μακάρι ο ν ουδείς γαρ ελοιτ* αν καθ' αυτόν τά πάντ' έχειν αγαθά- πολιτικόν γαρ ό άνθρωπο? και συζήν πε φυκός, as well as the view that Cicero gives as his own opinion at 2.39; Fin. 3.65; Amic. 55. princepsque omnium virtutum ilia sapientia quam σοφίαν Graeci voc a n t . . .] Cicero never explains in what sense wisdom is "first" of the vir­ tues; but he clearly means something more than that it was the first in the order of presentation at §§ 18 ff.; Aristotle regarded its exercise as the most pleasurable (EN 1177a23 ff.: . . . ήδίστη δε των κατ* άρετήν ενεργειών ή κατά την σοφίαν ομολογουμένως εστίν . . .). . . . φρόνησιν . . . quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque sdentia . . .] Cf. MM 1197al ff.:... ή δε φρόνησις περί τά πρακτά, έν οι ς αϊρεσις και φυγή και εφ' ήμΐν εστίν πράξαι και μή πράζαι (at 1198a32 ff. the author goes on to argue that φρόνησις, as the αρχιτέκτων of the other (practical) virtues, is itself πρακτική); on the general Aristotelian conception of φρόνησις as the ability to evaluate human action, as opposed to επιστήμη, which pertains to the unchangeable, cf. During, 4 5 0 - 5 1 , n. 118. Zeno made φρόνησις not only a virtue in itself but a quality inherent in the other virtues, in which sense later Stoics used επιστήμη: . . . Ζήνων . . . οριζόμενος την φρό­ νησιν έν μεν άπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, έν δ' α'ιρετέοις σωφροσύνην, έν δ' υπομένετε οι? άνδρείαν. άπολογούμενοι δ* άξιοΰσιν έν τούτοις την έπιστήμην φρόνησιν υπό τοϋ Ζήνωνος ώνομάσθαι {SVF 1,49.30 ίί.); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 72. Our text is evidently at the stage of SVF 3, 23.27-28, where φρόνησις, along with the other virtues σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and ανδρεία, are called έπιστήμαι and τέχναι; cf. SVF 3, 7 3 . 3 - 4 : . . . τήν φρόνησιν περί τά ποιητέα

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και μη καΐ ουδέτερα . . . ; sim., ibid., 63.39,69.8,70.6; closest to our passage is perhaps 156.1-2:oi δε Στωικοί και άντικρύςφασι τήνφρόνησιν,έτΓίστήμην ούσαν αγαθών και κακών και ουδέτερων . . . ; Cicero omits (as too pedantic?) the category of things neither to be sought nor avoided (i.e., the αδιάφορα). . . . ilia autem sapientia . . . rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia . . .] Cf. Homeyer, 307 (less accurate, 306); ad 2.5. etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque in­ choate sit si nulla actio rerum consequatur. ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur;. . .] A similar point about action as a complement of thought is made in the suspect sentence of § 160 {etenim cognitionem—cogitare prudenter)\ see ad he. Even though ενέργεια is given as one of the definitions oi actio by Klotz, TLL 1, 438.16, Cicero evidently understands under actio rerum something different from Aristotle's ενέρ­ γεια, since Aristotle regards contemplative activity as an ενέργεια; cf. EN 1177a 12 ff., cited in the headnote to this section; nor is our passage alone in this usage: cf. other parallels from Cicero's philosophica cited by Klotz, loc. cit.t including $ 17, which distinguishes between actio quaedam and mentis agitatio. At §§ 16-17 Panaetius had distinguished the first virtue as a the­ oretical virtue from the other virtues involving actio vitae without any hint that the first virtue was thereby inferior.—For use of etenim to introduce a new argument, as here in the connection between (2) and (3) (cf. the headnote to this section), cf. Hand, 2,542; Madvig ad Fin. 1.3; Friedrich, TLL 5, 920.61 ff.—In this sentence the bracketing of naturae by Unger, 47, has been followed by Atzert 4 and Fedeli, surely wrongly, since natura is evidently thought of as the object of investigation; cf. § 154: . . . in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura . . . ; nor is rerum a necessary complement (it was conjecturally supplemented to our passage [following naturae) by Carolus Scheibe, "Coniecturae Tullianae," Jahns Jahrbiicher fur Philologie und Pddagogik 81 [1860], 374); cf. cognitio naturae at Fin. 4.8 and other passages cited at Merguet 2, 643.—Cicero could never have anticipated the much more problematical relationship between cognitio rerum and action consisting in hominum commodis tuendis that has arisen in modern times; cf. Nickel, 6 0 - 6 1 : "Als Glieder einer Informationsgesellschaft verfugen wir iiber eine permanent expandierende cognitio rerum. Aber je mehr wir wissen, desto spurbarer wird unsere Unfahigkeit zur actio in hominum com­ modis tuendis . . . " 154 quis enim est tarn cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque—non ilia omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se Stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur?] Might Cicero have been thinking of the renowned Syracusan scientist Archimedes, whom he so greatly admired (cf.

Commentary on Book 1, Section 153—55b

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Tusc. 1.63, 5.64)? On his calculation of the diameter of the sun, the moon, and the fixed stars, as well as of the distances of the planets from the earth cf. Hultsch, RE 2.1 (1895), 537.27 ff.; on his war-engines, deployed during Marcellus' siege of Syracuse in 212, cf. Plb. 8.5-7; Liv. 24.34; Plut. Marc. 14-17.3; E.J. Dijksterhuis, Archimedes, tr. C. Dikshoorn (Princeton, 1987), 26 ff.; A.G. Drachmann, The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Copenhagen, 1963), 202.—Note the alliterative sonority of the phrase metiri mundi magnitudinem, which seems to imitate the grandeur of the project itself. 155a . . . utilitatem, qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.] ξ offers caritatem for utilitatem, a reading surely of Christian provenance;208 a pa­ gan writer would presumably acknowledge the attractions of the utile; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1366b3-5: ανάγκη δε μέγιστα? είναι άρετάς τάς τοις· άλλοις χρησιμιοτάτας, είπε ρ εστίν ή αρετή δύναμι? ευεργετική; 3.35: cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis ohiecta est, commoveri necesse est; 3.101: omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur, nee facere aliter ullo modo possumus.—As Fronto, p. 160.1-2 van den Hout, phrased it, volgo dicitur, quod potius sit, antiquius esse; the usage is first attested at Cato, orat., no. 8, fr. 178, the (implicitly) negativized form first at Inv. 1.69 (quid . . . anti­ quius . . . ?); cf. Bannier, TLL 2, 180.9 ff. 155b-58 Atque illi ipsi—] Here Cicero begins to ramble; thus he inserts at the end of § 156 a quite irrelevant encomium of eloquentia; and § 158 essentially repeats the argument from § 153 that the purely contemplative life in isolation from human contact would be intolerable. Note that this material is loosely strung together, with new points introduced by atque in the second sentence of § 155 and the first sentence of § 157 and nee at the beginning of § 158. The main stations of the argument are as follows: (1) even a scientist would instinctively help his country, a parent, or friend in trouble; (2) the learned have often helped to educate statesmen either person­ ally or, through their writings, posthumously; (3) in the human being the social impulse is primary, the impulse to thought secondary; (4) even one who did not have to procure the necessities of life would not be content to live in pure contemplation without human contact. 155b The argument is designed to show that even those devoted to the contemplative life value the social virtues as well. nam ec erudierunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresquc rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagorcus, Syracosium Dionem 208. Cf. E. Popp, De Ciceroms de officiis librorum codicibus bernensi 104 eique cognatis. diss. (Eriangen, 188.3), 39, and ad 3.29.

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Plato multique multos . . .] At some point not before 450 the Pythagorean leaders were killed when the followers of their opponent Cylon set fire to the house of Milo, in which they were meeting; the only survivors were Lysis and Archippus, who, because of their youth, were not present. After this disaster Lysis went first to Achaea in the Peloponnese, then to Thebes, where he taught Epaminondas. Such was the Theban's reverence for his teacher that he called him "father" and supported him in his old age; Lysis died not long before 379. Cf. Aristox. fr. 18 with Wehrli's note; Plut. de Gen. Soc. 579e and 583c; Burkert, 1962, 181-82 = Eng. tr. 115-16.—During his stay in Syr­ acuse in 388/87 Plato met Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I, and won him over to his political ideas. Twenty years later the philosopher revisited Syracuse on Dio's invitation as part of a joint effort to influence Dionysius II, son and successor of Dionysius I. In the sequel Dio liberated Sicily but allowed the assassination of his coadjutant Hcraclides and died himself by the sword soon thereafter; cf. Kurt von Fritz, Pbton in Sizilien und das Problem der Philosophenherrschaft (Berlin, 1968); H.D. Westlake in CAH 6 2 , 695 ff.; Kai Trampedach, Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenossische Politik, Hermes Einzelschriften 66 (Stuttgart, 1994), 102 ff.—Plato's teaching of Dio and Lysis* of Epaminondas are among the exam­ ples cited at de Orat. 3.139 (see ad $ 156). . . . nosque ipsi, quidquid ad rempublicam attulimus, si modo aliquid actulimus, a doctoribus atque doctrina instructi ad earn et ornati accessimus.] When Cicero adds a Roman example—himself—the emphasis shifts insofar as he names no specific teacher. Rather Cicero places his own person in the foreground and allows the doctores to stand merely in a hazy background, presumably as being of lesser importance than himself (cf. his similar practice in the speech pro Archia poeta209), even though his source was developing an argument in which the role of the teachers was stressed. Cf., however, N.D. 1.6-7: . . . et principes Mi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. In addition, Cicero evidently mentioned P. Nigidius Figulus (pr. 58) as a source for the policies of his consulate; cf. Plut. An Sent 797d, who gives Laelius' advice to Scipio as a parallel example, and Kroll, RE 17.1 (1936), 201.1-5; on Nigidius in general cf., ibid., 200.53 ff.; Eliz­ abeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore, 1985), 291-92; Miriam Griffin in CAH 9\ 708-10. Might he also have had 209. Cf. Arch. 12: art tu existimas aut suppetere nobis posse quod cotidie dscamus in tanta vartetate rerum, nisi animos nostros doctrina excolamus . . . ?

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L. Lucceius in mind? Cf. Fam. 5.13.4. On Cicero's relation to his political mentors at Rome cf. in general Mitchell, 1 9 7 9 , 1 0 - 5 1 , as well as Rawson, 16 ff. 156 neque solum vivi atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt ac docent, sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum adsequuntur.] Cf. the posthumous influence attributed to the elder Cato at $ 79. ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam intellegentiam prudentiamque potissimum conferunt; . . .] The description fits Crassus as presented in de Orat. and, still better, Cicero himself. Sapientia here has a broader sense than in § 153, hardly differing from doctrina; cf. examples of this usage cited by Homeyer, 156, who, however, defines the term in our passage too narrowly ("Beschaftigung mit philosophischen Gedankengangen"), I think. . . . eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acuussime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus.] Eloquentia is adduced as a special case of actio vitae, the result being a reminiscence of Crassus* train of thought at de Orat. 3.139 ff. (see ad § 155), especially 142: nunc sive qui volet eum philosophum, qui copiam nobis rerum orationisque tradat, per me appellet oratorem licet; sive hunc oratorem, quern ego dico sapientiam iunctam habere eloquentlae, philosophum appellare malet% non impediam; dummodo hoc constet neque infantiam ems, qui rem norit, sed earn explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cut res non suppetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam;... Cf. also ad § 3 and 3.4. 157 Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,—natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam.] The social instinct is prior to the exercise of skill or intelligence and therefore presumably in a higher degree "according to nature." Aristotle, too, had recognized the gregariousness of bees {Pol. 1 2 5 3 a l - 3 , 7-9): εκ τούτων ουν φανεροί' οτι των φύσει ή πόλι? εστί, κα\ οτι ό άνθρωπο? φύσει πολιτικόν ζωον . . . διότι δε πολιτικόν ό άνθρωπο? ζψον πάση? μελίττη? και παντό? άγελαίου ζώου μάλλον, δήλον; cf. Plut. An Sent 783f: άλλα και τό τοϋ θουκυδίδου (2.44.4) παράγειν έπι τό βέλτιον, μη τό φιλότιμον άγήρων μόνον ηγουμένου?, άλλα μάλλον τό κοινωνικόν και πολιτικόν, 6 και μύρμηζιν άχρι τελου? παραμε­ ίνει και μελίτται?· . . .—For atque as a transition to a comparison cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 23 (where our passage is cited).—Sollertia appears here, as at § 15, in a positive sense (contrast § 33).—For the form of argu­ ment cf. ad § 48. . . . solivaga cognitio . . .] Solivagus looks as though it belongs among the poetic -vagus compounds like nemorivagus (Carul. 63.72) or noctivagus

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(Lucr. 5.1191); cf. other examples cited by Otto Gradenwitz, Laterculi vocum iMinarum (Leipzig, 1904), 485; cf. also Leumann, 268, and, on the type of which our word is a variant, 394. But it first appears in Ciceronian prose, and no poetic attestations are cited in the OLD or Forcellini s.v. At Tusc. 5.38 Cicero calls the beasts that walk the earth partim solivagas, partint congregatas . . . ; but he denies that the human race can be called solivagum {Rep. 1.39). As in our passage, Cicero deploys the epithet meta­ phorically in the sense "solitary" at Tim. 20, where solivagus translates μόνος έρημος; cf. Widmann, 177, as well as Mart. Cap. 1.40: ac tunc septem radiorum coronam solivaga virginitas renudavit, ne feturarum causis et copulis interesset. . . . itemque magnitudo animi remota communitate coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et immanitas. ita (it ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum acque communitas.] Stuerenburg's athetesis of these words 2 1 0 was revived by Jachmann, 215, n. 1. (1) itemque—immanitas: From the introductory remarks to this sec­ tion (§ 152) one would have expected a much more comprehensive com­ parison of the four virtues among themselves, rather than each of them merely with communitas hominum (see above). Once this limitation is accepted, one expects some comparison of magnitudo animi with com­ munitas; but if the suspect sentence be expelled, the third virtue alone would go unmentioned. Cf. with our sentence the similar thought at § 62: sed ea animi elatio quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. The problem of the separability of the virtues presents itself unmistakably. Panaetius has defined magnitudo animi so as to be bound to the community (cf. §$ 62-65); that element cannot be removed without destroying the virtue itself (albeit at § 46 Cicero/ Panaetius speaks as though a person can possess fortis animus et magnus without the other virtues); hence the problem of comparing the com­ munity and magnitudo animi cannot arise for Panaetius; they are indissolubly intertwined. The suspect sentence makes this point, just as it had been made at § 62. This observation ought to have thrown into relief for Cicero the problematic nature of his project at §§ 152 ff. In § 159 he confronts a similar problem with regard to the fourth virtue and decides 210. Pearce had already suspecred itemque—immanitas.

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that it is not a problem at all . . . quod non potest accidere tempus ut intersit reipublicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem, i.e., the second and fourth virtues likewise are bound together in such a way that they could not pose conflicting demands (cf. also $149 fin.). It is only the first, purely theoretical, virtue that lacks any necessary social dimension. The athetesis of our sentence would therefore not do very much to save Cicero's philosophical reputation; he would really need to have thought through the whole problem much more carefully than he evidently had been able to do within the brief period in which he composed this essay (cf. introduction, $ 3). A further problem is the placement of itemque— immanitas within the discussion of the first virtue, cognitio. It is true, as Thomas, 3 4 - 3 5 , points out, that one type of μ€γαλόψυχο? is devoted to learned pursuits ($$ 69b ff. and 92) and that this type would be essentially independent of the community; hence this type may have suggested itself to Cicero within this context. Had it not been for the haste that reveals itself elsewhere in this passage, some further elaboration or clarification would surely have been offered. Sabbadini suggested that our sentence is a marginal note added by Cicero with a view toward later elaboration (cf. Rudberg, 19; Atzert2); this is one possible explanation but by no means the only one. In the circumstances athetesis would run a grave risk of correcting the author. (2) ita fit ut—atque communitas: These words, bracketed by Atzert4, form, in the text as transmitted, a premature conclusion to the com­ parison of cognitio and communitas. But surely Cicero wrote these words; why indeed would an interpolator have added them? What we have are evidently alternative endings for the comparison of cognitio and com­ munitas: a shorter version ending in 5 157 and a longer one continuing to the end of § 158. Whoever edited de Officiis for publication (Tiro? 211 )— the essay may have been published posthumously from Cicero's papers— allowed both to stand side by side. There are thus two possibilities: either Cicero wanted to continue the argument as in § 158 and neglected to strike ita fit ut—communitas (but would presumably have done so in revision), 212 or he intended to delete § 158, which merely duplicates an argument of § 153, and indicated this fact by entering ita fit ut— communitas (in the margin?) at this point. 211. Cf. Wilamowitz, 1932, 390-91, n. 1. 212. Jachmann's argument, lot. at., that ita fit ut . . . is an "Interpolatorcnflosker is, however, wide of the mark; cf. Thomas, 33, and ad $ 101.

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158 This paragraph repeats in essence the first argument of 5 153, prefaced by a critique of the theory advanced notably at Plb. 6.5.4 ii. that humans formed social units out of weakness. Posidonius evidently criticized this view (F 448.4 Th. = Sen. Ep. 90.4; cf. F. Steinmetz, 188-89); hence Cicero may have drawn upon him even before § 159. Panaetius, in contrast to the author followed by Cicero here, allowed that both the natural social instinct of the human being and a calculation of self-interest lay behind the founding of societies; cf. ad §§ 11-12 and 2.73. Note the speed with which, for Cicero, haec communitas, presumably the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos (§ 153), is equated with the respublica (non suscipiet reipublicae causa, ne respublica quidem pro se suscipi volet). Cicero's un­ willingness or inability to distinguish these two is also a problem in Book 3; cf. introduction to that Book. . . . quodsi omnia nobis quae ad victum cultumque pertinent quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, mm Optimo quisque ingenio negotiis om­ nibus omissis torum se in cognirione et scientia conlocaret.] The u magic wand" characteristic of Northern European witches entered Greek folklore with Circe (ράβδο? at Od. 10.238, 319, 389); cf. A. Heubeck in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homers Odyssey, 2 (Oxford, 1989), ad 10.234-43; it exercised a no less potent influence on the Roman folk imag­ ination; cf. Verg. A. 4.242 ff.; Otto, 373.—In Book 3 the hypothesis of magical powers comes into play several times—Gyges' ring (§§ 38-39) or a magical snap of the fingers (§ 75). 159 This section deals with the second and fourth virtues. It is curious that Cicero, both here and in Book 3, raises the possibility of competition of principles (cf. also § 152: contentio) only to deny that it can, in fact, arise (. . . ne respublica quidem pro se suscipi volet). Cicero's denial is in this case particularly surprising, since he knows that the question was taken seriously and investigated by Posidonius, and in 3.93 he cites the case of an action conventionally regarded as turpe that might nevertheless be undertaken in behalf of the state. Cicero reveals in our passage, then, not so much an interest in exploring casuistic problems as in solving them speedily by asser­ tion and bringing this Book to a quick conclusion. non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservcndae quidem patriae causa sapiens factums sit. ea Posidonius conlegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia.] At 3.93 Cicero declares that even dancing in the forum, if it be done to collect money for the patria, is no disgrace; cf. § 145, where he describes singing in the forum as a magna perversitas. His prudishness in refusing to cite examples in our passage thus leaves one in doubt as to exactly

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where he would draw the line. He follows a similar policy both in private correspondence (cf. the passage in the letter to Paetus [9.22.4] cited ad SS 126-32a) and in public speeches and essays (cf. flac. 34: . . . exstant Acmonensium litterae, qua$ ego . . . propter turpissimam obscenitatem verborwn praetereundas puto; Phil. 2.47 (of Antony's misdeeds): sunt quaedam quae honeste non possum dicere; . . .; N.D. 1.111: non arbitror te veile similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus Hie testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnis nominatim). In general for turpitudo attaching to speech cf. § 128.—Posidonius was evidently interested in testing the boundaries of the kinds of praecepta offered by Panaetius; hence his exploration of the change of appropriate actions κατά τκρίστασιι> [Att. 16.11.4 = F 41a E.-K. = F 431a Th.) and interest in our passage (= F 177 E.-K. = F 433 Th.) in showing that even officio to the community have their limits. Note, however, that with Cicero's change of source the premise for the discussion is also (implicitly) changed; Panaetius had not been concerned with the sapiens (cf. ad S§ 7b and 46), who, however, in Posidonius becomes once again the center of interest (as sometimes in Book 3: cf. 3.29 and 50, but also 45); cf. Pohlenz, AF, 89, n. 1. . . . non potest accidere tempus ut intersit reipublicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.| For the syntax cf. ad § 32. 160 quare hoc quidem effectual sit. . .] For effectum sit and the like used of the desired outcome cf. Gorier, 1974, 127, n. 87. etenim cognitionem pnidentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit ut agere considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.] These words, offering an argument for the primacy of the social virtues just when, in light of the previous sentence, one had thought the topic concluded, have roused the suspicion of editors since Facciolati and are bracketed by Atzert4 and Fedeli; note, too, that the argument they present hardly differs from (3) under 5 153 (see ad loc). On the other hand, though the formulation has been faulted for failing to specify that the actio in question has been undertaken for the sake of the community, surely this is to be assumed from context (cf. Thomas, 56). This matter could be omitted without loss (and might well have been in subsequent revision), but, given the general tenor of the passage, any exci­ sion would be likely to correct the text as the author left it. in ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum,—ut prima dis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur.J One would have expected some reference to, if not explanation of, the difference of this scheme from that at % 58 (cf. ad §§ 152-61). The

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explanation may lie in the use of a different source (Posidonius, according to Pohlenz, AF, 90) or of traditional Roman views (cf. Lucil. 1337-38 M. = 1353-54 K., cited ad $ 58); the resulting inconsistency apparently escaped Cicero as he hastened to complete this Book; cf. also ad $ 159.—For the gradus officiorum within the community cf. the Hierocles passaged cited ad $53.

161 sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.] Cf. ad 2.8.

Commentary on Book 2 Cuius opes tantae esse possunt aut umquam fuerunt quae sine multorum amicorum officiis stare possintf —Cic. Plane. 81 nee vero neglegenda est fama nee mediocre telutn ad res gerendas existimare oportet benivolentiam civium . . . —Amic. 61 You must be sensible that you cannot rise in the world without forming connections and engaging different characters to conspire in your point. You must make them your dependents without their knowing it, and dictate to them while you seem to be directed by them. Those necessary connections can never be formed or preserved but by an uninterrupted series of complaisance, attentions, politeness, and some constraint. —Lord Chesterfield to his son, 14 November O.S. 1749

Prior to Panaetius the σύμφοροι' or ώφελιμον (= utile) played only a very minor role in Stoic philosophy. No treatises περί τοΟ συμφεροιτο? or the like are attested. The burden of Stoic teaching on the subject was the paradoxical assertion of the identity of the good (or virtue) with the expedient, evil with the inexpedient (cf. ad 3.11); in such contexts τά συμφεροιτα as a predicate for τάγαθά sometimes appears in the company of other terms popularly approved or regarded as desirable (cf. 5VF 3,21.42 ff., quoted ad 1.94). This position was buttressed with an etymology (ibid., 50.4: συμφέρον, φέρειν γαρ τοιαύτα α συντείνει προς το εύ ζτ\ν). A curious testimony indicates that the sage will lie "without assent" (άνευ συγκατάθεσε ως) κατά την του συμφέρον­ τος προόρασιΐ' (ibid., 148.7-10). The Stoics' policy on the expedient, then, was to accept it as desirable but to annex it to the good; 1 we do not know whether prior to Panaetius the implications were ever worked out in detail. But it seems clear that Panaetius found precedent within his school for the general tack he chose to take on the συμφέρον.2 1. Cole, 1961, 136, has suggested that Panaetius distrusted the utile; but this point de­ pends upon rhe utile bearing a non-Stoic sense. 2. The term was used by Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon, though the interpretation of the context remains in doubt; cf. the discussion at Obbink-Vander Waerdt, 374.

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Panaetius' bold departure was to treat the συμφέρον, as in Off. 2, as a criterion for judging actions. The view is attested for Chrysippus' first book On perfect appropriate actions τοΐ? φαύλοι? ουδέν είναι χρήσιμον (SVF 3, 168.27-28). Tackling the subject in the way he did for the benefit of ττροκότττοντες involved Panaetius in an exercise in the use of terms in their popular senses (cf. ad § 35). For members of the political class generally, as for the actors in Thucydides* History,3 the criterion of action was the συμφεpov/utile.* Now Panaetius had contacts with statesmen such as Scipio and Laelius, had observed political careers, and had developed views about the foundations on which such a career should rest. He recognized the need to speak to would-be statesmen in a language they understood; and in general he wrote on political topics in a down-to-earth way that Cicero found useful (Leg. 3.14 = Panaetius fr. 48, quoted ad 1.124). Moreover, he believed, like a good Stoic, that even the path to the συμφέρον would lead to virtue. In recognizing this possibility latent in the συμφέρον he may have been influ­ enced by Socrates* description of the method by which Themistocles won the affection of his fellow-citizens, in contrast with that of Pericles:. . . ήκουσα μεν ότι Περικλής πολλάς [sc. επψδά^Ι έπίσταιτο, ας επωδών τή πόλει έποίει αύττ\ν φιλεΐν αυτόν. Θεμιστοκλή? δε πώς έττοίησε τήν πόλιν φιλεΐν αυτόν; Μά Δί' ουκ επωδών, άλλα περιάψας τι αγαθόν αυτή (Χ. Mem. 2.6.13, cited by Pohlenz, AF, 113). The entire second book of Off. is in effect an extended commentary on this passage (for Panaetius' use of Xenophon cf. also § § 1 6 and 43, 1.84, 108,118, and possibly $ 33). Panaetius' goal, then, is to win over members of the ruling class to the honestum, if not for its own sake, then on grounds of utilitas, or, as Cicero puts it a propos iustitia, omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est, cum ipsa per sese [i.e., as argued in Book 1 ] (nam aliter iustitia non esset) turn propter ampliftcationem honoris et gloriae [as argued in Book 2) ($ 42; cf. ad loc.).5 In order to advance this case Cicero/Panaetius follows a careful strategy: 3. Cf. the rich testimonies assembled by E.-A. Bctant, Lexicon Thucydideum (Geneva, Ι847)δ.ν.ξυμφ^ρ€ΐν. 4. To be sure, Cicero claims that among the maiores the utile prevailed over consuetudo only in wartime {Man. 60); bur consuetudo itself, of course, laid down principles that were in general utile for the political class. 5. Cf. the empirical observation of Polybius (6.6.9): έξ ov πάλιν €ϋλογον ύττογϊι^σθαϊ τίνα θίωρίαν παρά τοΐς· ττολλοΐ? αίσχροΰ και καλού και τής τούτων ιτρός άλληλα διαφορά?, και τό μ«ν ίήλου και μιμήσΐω? τύγχαναν διά τό συμφέρον, τό 6c φυγ%; in general for possible Panactian influence on the political theory at Plb. 6.3-9 cf. ad 1.98. For Polybius1 use of the Stoic terms καλόν and συμφέρον at 21.32c cf. von Fritz, 57-58; for the agreement of Panaetius and Polybius in their judgment of Aratus of Sicyon ci.ad$ 81; on the relation of Polybius and Panaetius see further introduction $ 5 (4), ad 1.111.

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first, the discussion focuses on the man engaged in a political career; second, it is argued that such a man obtains the utile by means of glory but glory by means of virtuous action. Hence glory, though its pursuit was disapproved under the honestum (cf. 1.26,65,68,74), is the link whereby the officio that fall under the utile correspond to those of the honestum; cf. Garbarino, 1980, 201-2. Thus, although Book 2 begins with a general classification and analy­ sis of the utilia at the disposal of the human being and what it is that renders them utile ($§ 11-15), Cicero/Panaetius soon orients the term toward a specific goal, namely glory.6 Not that Cicero/Panaetius recommends in this Book that glory should be pursued for its own sake; virtue remains the human goal; the topic is rather handled as if, like Socrates' response quoted at $ 43, in answer to a young person's question, "How can I obtain glory?"7 The central position of glory in this Book is somewhat obscured, however, in Cicero's execution. Cicero states that he will skirt the topic of friendship since he has recently dealt with it in de Amicitia but that he will deal with glory even though he has written two books on that subject (5 31). Cicero never explains this difference in approach. In fact, the attainment of glory is the real subject of our Book, as the following outline makes clear: I. Proem A. The plan (S 1) B. Reply to the boni (SS 2-6) C. Reply to learned critics (SS 7-8) II. The honorable and expedient distinguished by a deplorable trend of usage (SS 9-10) III. Classification of elements beneficial and harmful to the human being (SS H - 1 7 ) A. Inanimate B. Animate 1. Nonintelligent 2. Intelligent a) Gods b) Humankind IV. Other factors A. Virtue (SS 18-19a) B. Fortune (SS 19b-20) 6. Cf. Leeman, 180; Long, 1995», 228. 7. Cf. Tatakis, 233; one apparent exception is the evidently non-Panactian use made of the concepr of martial glory at 1.38; cf. ad loc.

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V. Division of the subject ($$ 21-22) VI. Whether to be loved or feared is a better means of proteaing one's interests ($$ 23-29a) VII. Number of friends needed is relative to one's type of life ($$ 2 9 b 30) Vffl. Glory (S 31) A. Love of the many ($ 32) B. Trustworthiness ($$ 33-34) C. Digression on the use of terms in their popular sense ( $ 3 5 ) D. Admiration ($$ 36-38) E. Reputation for justice (§5 39-42) F. officia that enable the young to attain glory ($$ 43-51) G. Liberality and the conferring of benefits 1. Comparison of money vs. services as a means of bestowing benefits ($$ 52-54a) 2. Largesse a) A limit should be observed ($$ 54b-55a) b) Prodigality ($$ 55b-60) c) Liberality ($$61-64) 3. Benefits that consist of services, not largesse a) Benefits conferred on individuals (1) The civil law ($ 65) (2) Ability in speaking ($$ 66-68) (3) Character, not wealth, to be the criterion in choosing recipients ($$69-71) b) Benefits that pertain to the state ($72) (1) Each to possess his own property ($$ 73-74) (2) Suspicion of avarice to be avoided ($$ 75-77) (3) Excessively liberal grain laws not in the public inter­ est ($$ 78-83a) (4) Contra remission of rents ($ 83b) (5) Against accumulation of debt ($ 84) (6) Final precepts for governing ($85) IX. Care for one's health (non-Panaetian; $ 86) X. Care for one's money (non-Panaetian; $ 87) XI. Comparison of expedient things (non-Panaetian; $$ 88-89). In the divisio ($ 21), however, Cicero paraphrases the idea of glory [quaecumque . . . homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum), perhaps deliberately, in order not to detraa from his own de

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Gloria, completed the preceding summer (see below). As elsewhere in this essay the goal is more clearly stated at the end than the beginning of the exposition (cf. § 85: . . . haec genera officiorum qui persequuntur cum summa utilitate reipublicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam; ad 1.11-17, § 11,3.89-95). The decision, then, to write about the utile/συμφέρον and to do so in this way inevitably entailed treating in detail a subject [gloriaJei&otia) that was one of the external goods of the Peripatos but that the earlier Stoa had classed among the αδιάφορα (cf. ad $ 31). Fin. 3.57 = SVF 3, 37.33 ff., attributes a Stoic transvaluation of ευδοξία following Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon to Carneades' critique. The question also arises whether the treat­ ment of ευδοξία might be related to the higher valuation of the external goods generally which is attributed to Panaetius and Posidonius (but cf. ad 3.12). In general, to the degree that achieving one's aims in the sphere of the utile involves use of external goods, the subject would be taken seriously by the Peripatos (see below), much less so by the earlier Stoa (cf. SVF 1, 47.19 ff. and 3,28.4 ff.; Off. 3.35). Panaetius is thus unlikely to have found much that he would have wanted to use in earlier Stoic writings on the subject of property, which Zeno may have banned altogether from his republic (cf. ad 1.21-22; however, Diogenes of Babylon apparently took a more positive view; cf. ad 3.49 ff.). On the other hand, Aristotle had, of course, justified private property as an institution that allowed scope for the exercise of €\eu8epiOTris among friends {Pol. 1263b5 ff.) and had offered advice on c\eu0epiOTn£, μ^γαλοπρ^πβια, and ασωτία (EN 1119b22 ff., I122al8 ff., and 1121a8 ff. respectively), a tradition followed by later Peripatetics. In fact, the Peripatetic citations in this Book tend to cluster in the section on largitio, including both prodigalitas and liberalitas (§$ 5 4 - 6 4 ; see outline printed above): Aristotle ($$ 56-57), Theophrastus, πβρι πλούτου (§§ 56,64 [bis]), and Demetrius of Phalerum (§ 60). 8 This fairly extensive use of Per­ ipatetics in our Book 9 accords with Panaetius1 attitudes as known from other sources (cf. fr. 55 = Dicaearch. fr. 3 Wehrli2 = Fin. 4.79: . . . semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant; and the characterization as φιλοαριστοτ€λη
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largely on Peripatetic material; Cicero could thus, while following a single source for most of Off. 1-2, recreate some of the effect of philosophical works such as de Finibus and de Natura Deorum, which devote different books to arguing (or refuting) the positions of various schools. The Peripa­ tetic emphasis of Book 2 would likewise make it a more apposite gift to his son, who was studying philosophy at Athens under the Peripatetic Cratippus (see introduction, § 4; ad 1.1 and § 8 ) . But the decision to give the treatment of the utile a particular focus on glory also accords well with Panaetius' other known predilections, including whatWilamowitz, 1926,201, called his "konsequenterRarionalismus.wThe exploitation of beast by man exhibits the superior intelligence of human beings as such; but what really interests Panaetius is the exploitation of man by man as the ultimate exercise of intelligence in the sphere of the συμφίροί' (cf. § 46: ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur gratiores sunt quam Mae quas viribus). In this regard the treatment of the utile in Book 2 parallels the handling of magnitudo animi in time of war in Book 1 (§§ 79 ff.). 10 So too the emphasis on glory as a goal and criterion of action is adumbrated in the treatment of approbatio as a criterion of the decorum (1.99). Hence there is truth in the thesis of Gartner, 1974, that the decorum serves as a link and transition between the "halves" of Panaetius' ethical system, focused respec­ tively on the honestum and utile (though one need not accept the redactional consequences he would draw; cf. ad 1.73b, 94, 3.9). If the Peripatetic material behind the teachings of Off. 2 is readily identifi­ able through explicit citations, the question remains whether some other source may also have influenced Panaetius' view of the συμφεροι>. Q. Cataudella and AT. Cole have pointed to parallels between the Anonymus Iamblichi and Off. 2, with Cole, 1961, 131, suggesting that "the whole concept and structure of Book 2 derive either from the Anonymus or from a work closely resembling his." He goes on to propose Democritus' nepl avδραγαθίης11 as the common source of Panaetius and Anon. lamb. (156). However, although influence of Democritus on Panaetius is likely elsewhere (cf. ad 1. 23b, 6 1 - 9 2 , 66, and 68), caution seems advisable on several grounds: nothing is known of this work apart from the title (in full: nepl άνδραγαθίη? ή περί αρετή? [fr. 68 Β 2a D.-K.]); and though Cicero/Panaetius is by no means averse to citing Greek sources, Democritus is nowhere cited 10. Cf. the remark of Cole, 1961,136, that "the useful, in so far as it is a principle worthy of being admitted into his (Panaetius') philosophy alongside the honorable, must be the useful as conceived by a superior intelligence." 11. The title will surely have been in Ionic, in spite of Diogenes Laertius' Atticization.

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by name in Off. (though it might be urged that, as sometimes happens, the name of the main source is suppressed but subsidiary sources named). Then, too, we will need, on occasion, to draw finer distinctions; thus, fr. 68 Β 146, which Cole compares to Anon. Iamb. 5.2 and 2.7, seems more likely to derive from the treatise Trepi βύθυμίης (by abstinence one shows α τόν λόγον" ϊντας ήδη τρεφόμβνον και ρι£ούμ€νον ev €αυτω και κατά Δημόκριτου "αυτόν έξ έαυτοϋ τάς Τ€ρψια$ €θι£όμίνον λάμβαναν") than τκρί άνδραγαθίη?. Now the detailed examination of the proposed parallels between the Anon. Iamb, and our Book in the following commentary yields no firm support and at best a non liquet on the question of a genetic relationship between the source of Anon. Iamb, and Panaetius (cf. below ad $ $ 1 1 - 1 6 , 3 6 - 3 8 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 5 2 - 6 4 , 72-85). The absence of truly striking parallels to Anon. Iamb., together with positive indications of the influence of other, mostly Peripatetic, authors on Panaetius' thinking on the συμφέρον, makes it unlikely that Panaetius, how­ ever unoriginal here, took his approach over wholesale from Democritus, though 2.11-16 may have been directly or indirectly inspired by him; see ad loc. In Off. 2 we have, however, not Panaetius pure and uncompounded, but Panaetius as seen through a Ciceronian lens (cf. $ 60:. . . Panaetius, quern multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus . . , 1 2 ). Cicero's own contribution thus requires careful consideration. He has added at the begin­ ning a proem ($$ 1-8) much less personal in tone than those to Books 1 and 3; probably indeed $$ 2 - 6 , an answer to critics of his philosophical writing similar to the proems to Tusc. 1 and N.D. 1, derive from the collection of ready-made prooemia to which Cicero elsewhere refers {Att. 16.6.4); see further ad SS 2 - 8 . In spite of his critique of Panaetius at 1.9-10, Cicero seems not to have fully appreciated the importance, in philosophical writing, of providing at the outset of each Book and sticking to a clear divisio (see also introduction to Book 3 and ad 3.96). Thus the divisio of Off. 2 is obscured by having appended to it a second, similar list of topics without explanation of the differences or consequences (cf. ad $$ 2 2 - 2 3 , 29, 31, and 55b-60). In addition, the announced plan to give prior treatment to quae virtuti propiores sunt ($ 22) is twice violated: 1) $$ 2 3 - 2 9 , which discuss metus as an inferior means of securing obedience as compared with caritas; 2) $$ 55b-60 on largitio precede liberalitas ($$ 61-64). Certainly a comparison of metus and benevolentia as means of promoting one's interests would be expected in this Book, but rather just prior to the discussion of beneficentia and libe12. Cf. ad 1.6 and 3.113-15.

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ralitas at §$ 52 ff.; one suspects that here the political topics uppermost in Cicero's mind have obtruded themselves at the expense of logical sequence (cf. ad S§ 23-29). Similarly, in §S 55b-6O the expected order is altered to give priority to examples from Roman public life, whereas, to preserve a certain balance, the Greek examples tend to illustrate private relations (cf. ad S$ 61-64). Since in this Book of advice for would-be statesmen Panaetius himself was inspired, not only by the Peripatetic writings noted above, but also by the literature of advice to kings or on the ideal kingship (cf. ad $§ 17, 33, and 55b), Cicero found here still better opportunity than in Book 1 for pursuing his political ends by other (viz.y literary) means. Thus he deprecates the methods of tyrants, including intimidation and tampering with the property of citizens ($5 2 3 - 2 9 and 73-84), and praises instead the arts of peace, including knowledge of the ius civile, eloquence (§5 65-68), and negotiated settlement of civil differences (see ad §§ 81-82). Carter, 20 ff., noting that the other extant philosophica written after the Ides of March, viz., Div. 2, Amic, and Fat., do not approach the rancorous tone of our work, 13 sus­ pected that this fact had to do with the current political situation in Rome, in particular the law providing for veterans' benefits (commoda veteranorwn)^ carried, in spite of a thunderstorm and ill omens, in early June by Antony and Dolabella (cf. Fam. 11.2.3). Cicero, according to Carter, feared that this law signaled another round of expropriation of property and awarding it to clients, and he hoped by speaking out strongly to put an end to such measures. Such circumstances may have played a pan in determining the direction of some of the political commentary in Off. But the protection of private property is not Cicero's sole concern; the hindrance of future civil wars was certainly a part of his agenda (esp. at SS 27-29), and the redistribu­ tion of private property was only one of the evil consequences of civil war;14 the same may be said for the hindrance of future tyranny at Rome (§§ 2 3 24). De Gloria, too, composed between 27 June and 11 July, contained a sharp attack on Caesar and his followers (cf. Bringmann, 198-99). Hence our work should be seen in the broader context of a coming to terms with Caesar and his legacy,15 but also as an attempt to justify Cicero's own pol13. Cf. Strasburger, 1990, 87-89. 14. Cf. Att. 10.8.2: nam caedem video si vicent et impetum in privatorum pecunias et exsulum reditum et tahulas novas et turpissimorum honores et regnum non modo Romano homini sed ne Persae quidem cuiquam tolerabile. 15. The exempla Romano, with the exception of that of Scipio Africanus, specifically attributed to Panaetius ($ 76), but including the references to the Gracchi ($$ 43 and 80), should surely be taken as Ciceronian, rather than Panaetian; cf. introduction $ 5 (2) and (4).

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icies, even though he may in the process have placed greater emphasis than he found in his source on the importance of maintaining property holdings (cf. ad SS 72-85). Finally Cicero has appended a reply to the critique of Panaetius' handling of the συμφέρον by the recently deceased Stoic Antipater of Tyre ($§ 86-87) and a quite perfunctory comparison of utilia ($ 88). 1 This paragraph combines a summary of the contents of the previous book with a general plan for Book 2, which will be similar to its predecessor in comprising first a determination of what falls under the subject (quid utile, quid inutile) and then a comparison of relevant items (turn ex utiiibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile). The latter topic is given only summary treat­ ment, however (§ 88). Quemadmodum officia ducerentur ab honestate, Marcc fili, atque ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore.] As in Book 1, Cicero begins with the more formal mode of address (Marce fili), and later (1.3; § 8) switches to the familiar mi Cicero (see ad 1.1). This summary of the content of Book 1 is curious in that it ignores the second topic, which he himself had insisted upon so firmly, namely duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius (1.10; cf. 1.161), treated at 1.152-60, and thereby leaves the parallel to the organization of Book 2 incompletely stated. The procedure is understandable, however, on the assumption that a shorthand for the main content rather than a precise catalogue was wanted.—On the use of atque "connecting a more particular or emphatic term or sentence" cf. OLD s.v., 1. On the apparent identification of virtus and the honestum cf. on § 18 below. sequitur ut haec officiorum genera persequar quae pertinent ad vitae culrum et ad earum rerum quibus utuntur homines facultatem, ad opes, ad copias; in quo turn quaeri dixi quid utile, quid inutile, turn ex utiiibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile.] At 1.7 Cicero announced that he planned to deal in this treatise with appropriate actions that magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; hence the specification of types quae pertinent ad vitae cultum is unsurprising here. Beginning in his third edition (1949) Atzert inserted, after homines, the words commoditates ad, thinking thereby to restore the divisio of Book 2 (he finds a progression from commoditas at 14b to opes at 23, copiae at 57b, and facultas at 75); he thereby betrays a serious misunderstanding of the broad divisions of the Book (see its introduaion). Note that in § 9, which he likewise cites in support, the wording (. . . quarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae, copias opes facultates . . .) suggests that terms have been chosen, not systematically, but ex­ empli gratia (otherwise it is inexplicable why the other three "parts" of the

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honestum are unmentioned); cf. also 3.22, where the terms of our passage recur, albeit in a different order (facultates copias opes). Our sentence rather gives a broad definition of the "useful" by connecting it with the idea of "use" (quibus utuntur homines) and presenting it as a means to an end {fa cultas opes copiae) but as yet leaving that end undefined (in the course of SS 11-17 it will emerge as specifically political). For the introduction of a concept with a congeries of synonyms cf. 1.61 and 93. The clause beginning in quo turn quaeri dixi has been suspected since Langius' edition (1563), cited by Fedeli; in his second edition Arzert placed it in double square brackets as a Ciceronian marginal note falsely inserted here instead of after libro superiore of the previous sentence. Fedeli also brackets it; but Testard and Winterbottom are surely right to allow the text to stand. The dixi refers back to 1.10, but the clause need not, on that account, be placed after our Book's first sentence.—The superlative quid maxime utile was a possibility not raised in 1.10. 2 - 8 These paragraphs comprise an answer to two charges (de institute ac de iudicio meo: § 1), leveled by two distinct groups of critics. (SS 2-6) The first group, evidently comprising members of the senatorial class with no particular interest in—possibly even a positive hostility to— philosophy (vereor ne quibusdam bonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum: $ 2), express surprise that Cicero spends so much time in writing on this subject. Cicero explains with reference first to the condition of the state: as long as the institutions of the respublica operated freely, he engaged fully in the life of the state and had for philosophy only so much time as was left over after the claims of state business and friendship had been satisfied; and this time was only enough to read, not to write on the subject. Once the respublica had ceased to function and Cicero was excluded from a real political role, however, he found writing on philosophy far preferable to the alternatives, namely to give himself over to angores or voluptates (inactivity was not an option, since the mind always craves activity (§ 4; cf. 1.191). The argument of §§ 2 - 4 (ego autem, quam diu—si me ad philosophiam ret· tulissem) is structured in a clear pattern of a-b-a-b, where (a) has reference to Cicero's previous practice of giving priority to the work of the courts and the state, (b) to possible means of filling in the void created by the withdrawal of these activities. At Tusc. 1.1 Cicero had depicted his outsider status as a liberation (cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus). At Div. 2.6-7, however, Cicero had made it clear that philosophy served for him at this juncture as a surrogate for politics (cf. Habicht, 3): id enim tpsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut

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eae turn a principibus tenerentur, turn a populis, aliquando a singulis, quod cum accidisset nostrae reipublicae, turn pristinis orbati muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris, qua re cumque possemus. in libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro reipublicae procuration substitutam putabamus. In the aftermath of the Ides of March, however, in our proem and, with greater pathos in the proem to Book 3, Cicero was free to state his true attitude toward his enforced otium. (SS 4b-6) Upon this personal defense follows a description of Cicero's previous involvement with philosophy and then a brief encomium of phi­ losophy based upon protrepric topics from the Hortensius, to which he soon refers the reader. (SS "7-8a) In contrast to these critics, the second group comprises learned men who, upon hearing that Cicero was writing on appropriate actions, complained that such a project was inconsistent with his general philosophi­ cal stance of Academic skepticism. Cicero replies that the Academy distinguishes certa and incerta, probabilia and improbabilia; and he adds that surely there is no reason why he should not follow what he regards as probabilia as long as he avoids the arrogance of positive assertion; he thus proposes to have a vivendi ratio while avoiding the dogmatists' adfirmandi adrogantia. (S 8b; Tibi autem—) Cicero turns back briefly to Marcus jr. and the relation of the present project to his current studies. For the proem as a vehicle for answering critics cf. the still more elaborate apologia at Fin. 1.1 ff., with answers to four sets of critics, three of which are similar to the critics of our passage: nam quibusdam, et Us quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet, philosophari. quidam autem non tarn id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrabantur. . . . postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent {Fin. 1.1; in our passage this last point may be lurking behind the phrase mirenturque in ea tantum me operae et temporis ponere [§ 2]). However, the third group of Fin. 1.1, who prefer to read philosophy in Greek, not Latin, are not represented here. Private motives, such as the death of Tullia, are touched on obliquely (cf. ad §4); rather, the turn to philosophy is presented mainly as a response to the condition of the state and the desire to turn his enforced otium to account (maximis igitur in malts hoc tamen boni adsecuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima [S 5J). Graff, 58, has spoken of Cicero's "need" to explain and defend his

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philosophical writing; it may have been both an inner need, insofar as here, as in other aspects of his career, Cicero was motivated by a desire for public recognition, and a need imposed from outside, in that the Roman senatorial class in general had to be persuaded that expenditure of time on such pursuits was, in fact, worthwhile. At Att. 16.6.4 Cicero mentions a slip by which he had affixed to de Gloria one of the specimens from his book of ready-made proems that he had already used for the third book of the Academici posteriores; cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1127.67 ff. Heine (ad%\) brings our proem as well as others from the works of this period into connection with that testimony. Certainly the topics dealt with in §§ 2 - 6 have a stereotypical ring; there is on occasion a more direct and personal cast than elsewhere (see on § 4), though less so than one might have expected given that the addressee is his son. This im­ pression is reinforced by the numerous verbal echoes of N.D. 1.1 and 1.612, presumably also from the book of proems, listed by Pease ad N.D. 1.1. On the other hand, the problem dealt with in §§ 7-8 is specific to de Officiis as a treatise based on a model from dogmatic philosophy; the echoes here of N.D. 1.12 may therefore have a different explanation; Cicero may simply have borrowed a part of the critique [nee habeat umquam quid sequatur: § 7; cf. N.D. loc. cit.: nee tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur) and the reply (§ 8: quid est igitur quod me impediat ea quae probabilia mihi videantur sequi. . .) from N.D. loc. cit. (. . . multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur)y just as he has elsewhere drawn upon phrases and arguments from de Orat., Fin., N.D., Rep., and Top. in our essay.16 2 . . . libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi sed etiam ad scribendi studium excitaverunt. . . ] In Div., completed ca. March, 44 (cf. Gelzer, 335), Cicero had asserted only the former point: nee vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentes se ad haec studia convertant. pauci utinam! quorum tamen in republica late patere potent industria. equidem ex Us etiam fructum capio bboris mei, qui iam aetate provecti in nostris libris adquiescunt; quorum studio legendi meum scribendi studium vehementius in dies incitatur; quos quidem plures, quam rebar, esse cognovi (2.5). Straume-Zimmermann, 33, suspects a reference inter alios to Brutus, who composed a book, dedicated to Cicero, on the 16. For Fm. ad 1.5-6, 3.116-20; for N.D. cf. ad $$ 7-8, I2K-15; for de Orat. ad 1.133, 147, and 156; for Rep. ad 1.41b and 152-61; for Top. ad 3.61b and 75-76.

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sufficiency of virtue to guarantee happiness (Tusc. 5.1); cf. Gelzer, RE 10 (1919), 987.50 ff. 2 - 5 ego autem, quam diu respublica per eos gerebatur . . . nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cf. the more compressed and more circumspect—Caesar was still alive!—expression of this thought at N.D. 1.7-8: nam cum otto langueremus et is esset reipublicae status ut earn unius consilio atque cura gubemari necesse esset, prhnum ipsius reipublicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tarn gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri. eoque me minus instituti met paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. 2 cum . . . socios denique tuendae reipublicae summos viros amisissem . . .] He was perhaps thinking of Pompey (called summus vir at $ 45), Cato Uticensis (cf. 1.112), and M. Marcellus (cos. 51; cf. Marc. 2), as well as the list of deceased statesmen who had approved his consular policies at Phil. 2.12; cf. above p. 29, n. 64. 3 atque utinam respublica stctisset quo coeperat statu, nee in homines non tarn commutandarum quam evertendarom rerum cupidos incidisset!] Cicero had himself employed the expression commutatio reipublicae for Caesar's rule in a letter of the year 46 to Brutus: deinde versatus [sc. M. Terentius Varro | in utrisque subselliis optima et fide et fama iam ante banc commutations reipublicae petitioni sese dedit. . . (Fam. 13.10.2). primum enim, ut stante republica facere solebamus, in agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poncremus, deinde ipsis scriptis non ea quae nunc sed actiones nostras mandaremus . . . ] Although Klotz, TLL 1, 440.73 ff., does not recognize actio in the sense "speech" as Ciceronian, a majority of recent translators so interpret the word in this passage (Miller, Gunermann, Atkins; Testard, however, renders "mes propres aaions"); this may be the first extant passage in which the word is so used (as is suggested by OLD s.v., 5), but the usage is assisted by the preceding in agendo. 3 - 5 cum autem respublica, in qua omnis mea cura cogitatio opera poni solebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt forenses et senatorial nihil agere autem cum animus non posset—quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cf. the similar thought at Fam. 9.6.5 (to Varro, latter part of June, 46): quod [sc. Varro's use of his time for his studies] nos quoque imitamur, ut possumus, et in nostris studiis libentissime conquiescimus. quis enim hoc non dederit nobis, ut, cum opera nostra patria sive non possit uti sive nolit, ad earn vitam revertamur quam

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multi docti homines, fortasse non recte sed tamen multi, etiam reipublicae praeponendam putaverunt? quae igitur studia magnorum hominum sententia vacatiortem habent quondam publici muneris, Us concedente republica cur non abutamur? as well as Fam. 4.4.4 (to Servius Sulpicius; October, 46): nam etsi a prima aetate me omnis ars et doctrina liberalis et maxime philosophia delectavit, tamen hoc studium cottidie ingravescit, credo, et aetatis maturitate ad prudentiam et Us temporum vitiis ut nulla res alia levare animum molestiis possit.—He pronounces a similar judgment on the state of the senate and courts at 3.2.—On the loss of the respublica cf. ad § 29a. 4 nihil agere autem cum animus non posset. . . ] Cf. 1.19 (agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit) and ad 1.13. . . . existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi. . .] Contrast the pre­ ceding charaacrization of voluptates as indignae homine docto.—For the oblique allusion to Tullia's death cf. Pease ad N.D. 1.9. cui [sc. philosophiae] cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum reipublicae tradidi,—scribcndi otium non erat.J Cf. the presentation of the return to philosophy in briefer, more literary, and less personal terms at Tusc. 1.1, quoted ad $§ 2 - 8 . 5 maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni adsecuti videmur, ut ea linens mandaremus quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cicero took a dim view of his Latin predecessors; cf. Tusc. 1.6,2.7; he had, for instance, no high opinion of the style of the Epicurean C. Amafinius (Ac. 1.5), in spite of his popularity and influence (Tusc. 4.6-7); cf. J. Kwapiszewski, "Roman Philosophers in the Philosophical Works of Cicero," Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium 1 (1973), 65-75; Miriam Griffin in CAH 9\ 718. 5 - 6 quid cnim est, per deos,—sed hacc cum ad philosophiam cohortamur accuratius disputari solent, quod alio quodam libro fecimus.] = Hort. fr. 5 Grilli. Straume-Zimmermann's suggestion (34) that the following reply to the charge of philosophical inconsistency in combining dogmatism and skep­ ticism may likewise derive from the Hortensius should be treated with re­ serve, however; the problem has no obvious connection with the protreptic theme of that work and arises rather out of the specific situation of Cicero writing first as a skeptic and now propounding doctrines on appropriate actions; cf. 2.7: . , . hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. The eulogy of philosophy here is a bit less intense than in the famous passage analyzed by Hildebrecht Hommel, Ciceros Gebetshymnus an die Philosophic, Tusculanen V 5, SHAW, philos.-hist. Kl. (Heidelberg, 1968), no. 3, and less developed than that at Leg. 1.58-62, on which see P. Boyancc,

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"Ueloge de la Philosophic dans le De Legibus I,w Ciceroniana n.s. 2 (1975), 21-42.—For the use of anaphora cf. ad 1.151.—This eulogy of sapientia is conventional (see above ad §S 2-8) and need not, pace Marianne Kretschmar, Otium, studia litterarutn. Philosophic und βίος θεωρητικός im Leben und Denken Ciceros (diss. Leipzig, 1938), 138-39, be the result of Cicero's political disappointment between the composition of Div. and Off. 5 sapientia autem est — rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque quibus eae res continentur scientia.j In attributing this view to veteres philosophi Cicero perhaps has Socrates and Plato in mind; for the former cf. X. Mem. 4.6.7: επιστήμη άρα σοφία εστίν; for the latter, D.L. 3.63: ίδιαίτατα μεν σοφίαν ηγείται [sc. Plato] είναι την τών νοητών και όντως όντων επιστήμην . . . ιδία δε σοφίαν και την φιλοσοφίαν καλεί, όρεξιν ούσαν της θείας σοφίας, κοινώς δε λέγεται παρ* αύτω σοφία και ή πάσα εμπειρία, οίον όταν σοφον λεγη τονδημιουργόν;cf. also Arist. ΕΝ 1141 b 2 - 3 (sim. 114la 18-19): . . . δήλον ότι ή σοφία εστί και επιστήμη καΐ νους τών τιμιωτάτων τη φύσει. The doctrine was taken up by the Stoa (Aet. de Viae. Phil. 1 proem 2 = S VF 2, 15.3-5; sim. ibid. 11-13 and 304.25): οι μεν ούν Στωικοί εφασαν την μεν σοφίαν εΐναι θείων τε και ανθρωπίνων έπιστήμην, την δε φιλοσοφίαν άσκησιν επιτηδείου τέχνης. The inclusion of knowledge of causes is not attested before Cicero (and not included, e.g., at 1.153; see ad be.) but surely had its origin in the Greek philosophical schools; cf. Arist. Met. 1025b5-7 (et alibi): . . . και όλως δε πάσα επιστήμη διανοητική ή μετέχουσα τι διανοίας περί αιτίας και αρχάς έστιν ή ακριβεστέρας ή απλουστέρας; Phil, de Congr. 79 (3, 87.19 Cohn-Wendland): και μην ώσπερ τα έγκύκλια συμβάλλεται προς φι­ λοσοφίας άνάληψιν, οϋτω και φιλοσοφία προς σοφίας κτήσιν. εστί γαρ φι­ λοσοφία επιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δε επιστήμη θείων και ανθρωπίνων και τών τούτων αιτίων, on which see A.-M. Malingrey, "Philosophia." Etude d'un groupe de mots dans h litterature grecque, des Presocratiques au IVe siecle apres J.-C. (Paris, 1961), 7 9 - 8 1 . Seneca, however, thought the causes no necessary part of the definition (because they are implied by the other terms; cf. £p. 89.5: sapientiam quidam ita finierunt ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam; quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas. supervacua mihi haec videtur adiectio, quia causae divinorum humanorumque pars divinorum sunt). Cf. also Tusc. 4.57: . . . sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; Off. 1.153: . . . ilia autem sapientia . . . rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia . . . ; S.E. M. 9.13, partially reproduced at SVF 2, 15.11-13: ό περί θεών λόγος πάνυ αναγκαιότατος είναι δοκεί τοις δογματικώς φιλοσοφουσιν. εντεύθεν την φιλοσοφίαν φασίν έπιτήδευσιν είναι σοφίας, την δε σοφίαν έπιστήμην θείων τε και ανθρωπίνων πραγμάτων; Aug.

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c. acad. 1.6.16: itaque a me nihil aliud habebis quam definitionem sapientiae, quae nee mea nee nova est, sed et priseorum hominum et quam vos miror non recordari. non enim nunc primum auditis sapientiam esse return humanarum divinarumque scientiam; Anon, in Rhet. Gr., ed. Walz, 7, 696.8: . . . σοφία δε επιστήμη των πρώτων αιτίων . . .—For a different definition of sapientia cf. Leg. 1.22. 6 nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest qui semper aliquid anquirunt quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum?] The theme that studies in general provide delight and relaxation appears as early as Arch. 16 (62), cited ad 1.135; cf. QF 3.7.2 (December, 54). In October, 46, even before Tullia's death, Cicero finds the hold of philosophy upon him growing (cf. Fam. 4.4.4, quoted ad SS 3-5). But perhaps closest in spirit to our passage are the words put into Atticus' mouth at Ac. 1.7: totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi, nee ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est |sc. Tim. 47b), maius aut melius a diis datum munus homini. . . sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino— cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris?] The question whether virtue can be taught, i.e., is a τενη or ars, arises in several Platonic dialogues and forms the subject of the Meno, which begins with the question (70a) έχεις μοι είπεΐν, ώ Σώκρατες, αρα διδακτοί/ ή αρετή; and leads to the conclusion: ει δε νυν ημείς εν παντι τφ λόγω τούτω καλώς εζητήσαμεν τε και έλέγομε ν, αρετή αν εϊη ούτε φύσει ούτε διδακτόν, άλλα θεία μοίρα παραγιγνομενη άνευ νοΰ οι ς άι> παραγίγνηται . . . (99e; cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1099b9). Cf. also Prt. 319a ff., with its com­ parison of virtue to other arts that can be taught, and the equation of philoso­ phy with the cultivation of virtue (αρετής επιμέλεια) at Euthd. 275a.—It is a bit surprising to see constantia and virtus placed on the same level here; but perhaps constantia is thought of as the outward manifestation of virtus, as is implicit in the discussion of the fourth virtue (cf. ad 1.93,103,111); cf. also Tusc. 5.13, quoted ad 3.116, and Farad. 16. 7 Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis, quaerentibus satisne constanter facere videamur qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus . . .] Cf. Luc. 66 (Cicero is the speaker): visa enim ista cum acriter mentem sensumve pepulerunt accipio Usque interdum etiam adsentior. nee percipio tamen: nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. non enim sumus ii quorum vagetur animus errore nee habeat umquam quid sequatur.] Cf. the similar denial at N.D. 1.12: nee tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur. Who are the unnamed persons here criticized? The description fits no one so well as

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Pyrrho, who, as depicted (after Antigonus of Carystus [p. 36 Wil.]) at D.L. 9.62, required the help of friends to stay clear of dogs, carts, precipices, etc., so little reliance did he place on the evidence of his senses; on this portrait cf. M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987), 181-82. In spite of his own adherence to the Skeptical Academy, Cicero fails to evince any sympathy for Pyrrho (cf. ad 1.6). In a different mood Cicero confesses at Luc. 66 (where he is himself the speaker): ego vero ipse et magnus quidam sum opinator (non enim sum sapiens) et meas cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,. . . sed Helicen et clarissimos Septentrtones, id est rationes has latiore specie non ad tenue limatas; eo fit ut errem et vager latiuSy on which passage cf. Gorier, 1992, 168. 7 - 8 quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius, non modo disputandi sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata?—sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter.] Cicero's combination of skepticism in some questions and dogmatism in others has, since the eighteenth century, damaged his philosophical reputation. Therefore his own attempt to justify his position deserves close attention. The skeptic, no less than the dogmatist, needs to arrive at a vivendi ratio. The skeptic differs from the dogmatist, however, in seeing not certa, but, in Ciceronian terminology (cf. ad § 8), probahilia and accordingly engaging in suspension of judgment (€ποχή; cf. Luc. 59). The chief argument against ancient skeptics was the charge of απραξία, i.e., that their suspension of judgment rendered them incapable of carrying on the business of everyday life (cf. Luc. 62: sublata enim adsensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt). In our passage Cicero adopts a strategy of Carneades reported (via Clitomachus) in greater detail at Luc. 99 (= Carneades F 5, p. 86, 98 M.): duo placet esse Carneadi genera visorum; in uno hanc divisionem, alia visa esse quae percipi possint (alia quae non possint), in altero autem, alia visa esse probahilia, alia non probahilia. itaque quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem, contra posteriorem nihil diet oportere. quare ita placere, tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio multa. etenim contra naturam esset, (si) probabile nihil esset; sequitur omnis vitae ea quam tu Luculle commemorabas eversio. itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo Mud, non inesse in is quicquam tale quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit—sic quidquid accident specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. etenim is quoque qui a vobis Isc. Stoicis] sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probahilia non conprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa sed similia vert, quae nisi probet omnis vita tollatur. Similar to the brief reply of

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our passage is N.D. 1.12:. . . multa esse probabilia quae, quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam baberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur. Cicero proposes to follow {sequi) the probabilia, i.e., to use them as a basis for daily living, the way a dogmatist uses his certa, and to disapprove of non-probabilia so used; the substitution of probabilia for certa and of sequi17 for adsentiri enables the skeptic to take a position at one level while reserving judgment at another. Cicero's critics might, how­ ever, while conceding the skeptic's right to an everyday life like other per­ sons, still query the appropriateness of the skeptic offering advice to others on important matters, an aspect of the problem that he does not address. Cf. R. Bett, "Carneades' Pithanon: a Reappraisal of its Role and Status,'' OSAP 7 (1989), 5 9 - 9 4 , and "Carneades' Distinction between Assent and Ap­ proval," Monist 73 (1990), 3 - 2 0 , esp. 3 - 6 , with literature cited at 17, n. 1; Neuhausen, 104-5. 8 . . . atque adfirmandi adrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapienria dissidet plurimum?] Cicero similarly expresses the appeal of skep­ ticism at Div. 2.1: . . . quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus. contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio.] This pas­ sage, like Luc. 7 (neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliudagunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo et audiendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat) and Quint. Inst. 12.1.35 and 12.2.25, involves a confusion of Arcesilas' method of contra omnia disputari (de Orat. 1.43, N.D. 1.11) with no positive doctrine ex­ pected to emerge18 and the Peripatetic method of ex utraque parte disputari so that the probabilia may become apparent (cf. Arist. Top. 163a36-bl2; de Orat. 1.158); cf. Douglas ad Brut. 119; M. Ruch, "La 'disputatio in utram­ que partem' dans le Lucullus' et ses fondements philosophiques," REL 47 (1969), 310-35, esp. 329. The confusion may have been abetted by Cicero's choice of probabile, with its connotations of positive acceptance (note rela­ tion to probus, probare), to render the more neutral πιθανόν, a move that has sown confusion to quite recent times; cf. M. Bumyeat, "Can the Skeptic Live his Skepticism?" in Schofield-Burnyeat-Barnes, 28-29; Gorier, 1992, esp. 165 ff. 17. For the use of κατακολο\&1νίέ·πζο0αι fsequi in skeptical arguments cf. passages cited by Gorier, 1992, 164. 18. The result of the iooofitveia of arguments is rather the suspension of belief (εποχή); cf. Long, 1986, 446 ff.

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Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris, iis simillimo qui ista praedara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra, finitima vestris, ignota esse nolui.] A brief resumption of themes from the proem to the first book—an apologia for writing on phi­ losophy when his son is already studying philosophy with a teacher and for writing in a Stoic vein though Cratippus is a Peripatetic; cf. ad 1.1-2. On Cicero's tendency to reduce the distance between the Academy/Peripatos and the Stoa cf. Gorier, 1974,198 ff. On change in the form of address from the more formal Marce fili cf. ad 1.1.—Glucker, 1988, 39-57, argues against what he sees as the misuse of this passage, in particular the phrase haec nostra, in combination with Inv. 2.10, to construe a lifelong affiliation of Cicero with the Skeptical Academy (he does not dispute the reference of haec nostra to Academic teachings, merely the continuity); but note that with autem Cicero has now turned from his response to critics back to Marcus jr.; the words haec nostra, finitima vestris, ignota esse nolui should therefore be read in parallel with 1.2 {tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia) as justifying his present project as something akin to Peripatetic teachings. Against Glucker's thesis cf. also Miriam T. Griffin, "Philosophi­ cal Badinage in Cicero's Letters to His Friends," in Powell, 3 3 4 - 3 5 , and Woldemar Gorier, "Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus 1.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Skepticism," ibid. 85 ff. sed iam ad instituta pergamus.) Such markers of the ends of sections play an important role in articulating the structure of Off.; cf. 1.161 fin.: sed iam ad reliqua pergamus. In such cases I would treat the marker as the end of the previous argument, not as a paragraph in itself or the beginning of a new paragraph, as does Winterbottom (a false emphasis, I think); cf. also ad 1.20. 9 - 1 0 These sections comprise some preliminary observations on the terms honestum and utile and on their relation to each other and to the iustum. One can err either, as pointed out in our passage, by differentiating honestum and utile (and using the utile as a criterion of action instead of the honestum) or, a possibility mooted several times in Book 3, by allowing conceptions of the utile to define the honestum, rather than the reverse (cf. 3.81, 103 [. . . quidquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum], and 110). 9 igitur] Resumptive of § 1 after the "digression" of §§ 2 - 8 has intervened. This ultimately goes back, of course, to the quinquepartite scheme of 1.10. u t i l e . . . in quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sensimque eo deducta est ut honestatern ab militate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid quod utile non essct et utile quod non honestum, qua nulla pernides maior hominum vitae potuit adferri.) Underlying this is the common ancient con­ ception of usage {consuetudo = συνή&ια) as deviating from an original norm,

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whether that original state is assumed to have existed φύσει (as commonly by the Stoics; cf. De Lacy, 1948, 256) or θέσει (cf. the νομοθέτης of Plato's Cratylus [388eJ); cf., in general, J. Wackernagel, De pathologiae veterum initiis (diss. Basel, 1876), esp. 25 = Kleine Schriften, 3 (Gottingen 1979), 1451; D.L. Blank, "The Etymology of Salvation in Gregory of Nyssa's De virginitate," JTS N.S. 37 (1986), 8 7 - 8 8 . Like όνομα and ρήμα themselves (cf. R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford 1968], 59-60), συνήθεια was.evidently on its way to becoming a technical term in Plato's time; note that at Tht. 168b-c the genitival limitation is still felt as necessary: και εκ τούτων επίσκεψη είτε ταύτόν είτε και άλλο επιστήμη και αΐσθησις, αλλ' ούχ ώσπ€ρ άρτι εκ συνή­ θειας ρημάτων τε και ονομάτων, α οι πολλοί οπη αν τυχωσιν ελκοντες απορίας άλλήλοις παντοδαπάς παρεχουσι. For Varro (L. 5.6) observation of the effects of consuetudo abets the study of etymology. One would expect in the original state of affairs to find a one-to-one correspondence of word and thing. For a single reality to have two different names, honestum and utile, points to a deviation by consuetudo (here personified; cf. 3.71 \malitia\). Cicero sup­ poses that this confusion of terminology has sown moral confusion. He has the cart before the horse, however, since usage follows mores rather than vice-versa. What he found in his source was probably a statement about Socrates cursing the first person to introduce the distinction, as at 3.11; cf. also SVF 1, 127.20 ff. = Clem. Al. Strom. 2.131: διό και Κλεάνθη? εν τω δευτέρω περί ηδονή? τον Σωκράτην φησί παρ' έκαστα διδασκειν. ώς ό αυτό? δίκαιο? τε και ευδαίμων άνήρ, και τω πρωτω διελόντι το δίκαιον άπό του συμφέροντος καταρασθαι, ώς άσεβες τι πράγμα δεδρακότι- ασεβείς γάρ τφ δντι οι το συμφέρον άπό του δικαίου του κατά νόμον χωρί£οιτες; Leg. 1.33: ius igitur datum est omnibus, recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat qui primus utilitatem a iure seiunxisset; id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium. 10 summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec ttria generaf confusa cogitatione disringuunt: quidquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum, ex quo efficitur ut quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile.] A much disputed text. In particular, scholars have found difficulty with tria, since the preceding discus­ sion contrasted two terms, honestum and utile. Furthermore in a treatise where honestum and utile are on the same level but the iustum subordinate to the honestum, it seems odd for the three terms to be treated as on a par in the following clauses quidquid enim iustum sit—idem sit utile. Hence Beier suspected tria to be a gloss; cf. J. von Gruber (1874 ed.); Charles Knapp, "Cicero De officiis 2.10," AJPh 31 (1910), 6 6 - 7 3 . In addition, Unger's

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bracketing of quidquid enim iustum sit—idem sit utile won the support of Miiller, von Gruber, Heine, and others. Finally Hottinger (as reported by Beier) proposed simply emending tria to duo (i.e., Ill to II). (1) Goldbacher, 2, 49, pointed out that the version of our passage St. Ambrose read certainly included the material bracketed by Unger and his followers: liquet igitur quod honestum est utile esse, et quod utile honestum; et quod utile iustum, et quod iustum utile (off. 2.25); but this fact would, of course, not rule out an early interpolation. (2) Heine attempted to extract the following three categories from § 9: (1) honestum without the utile; (2) utile without the honestum; (3) honestum and utile together. In fact, however, $ 9 deals with usage, whereby the utile came to be seen as something different from the honestum (see above), not with three objective categories. In default of a referent for haec tria in % 9, if tria is authentic, it evidently refers, not to what pre­ cedes, hut to what follows (either deixis is possible per se: cf. HofmannSzantyr, 180-81). (3) Though iustitia/iustus stood in common parlance for the whole of virtue (cf. ad § 38), it is odd and contrary to the usage of Book 1 for iustitia to be so deployed when the honestum itself is mentioned in the same context, with the result that the iustum stands on the same level as the honestum and utile, nor in the following syllogism is the iustum placed on the same level as the other terms (see [4b] below). (4a) Tria, then, seems indefensible; either it may have been corrupted from duo, or some ancient reader may have inserted it, with intent of clarification, on the basis of the following syllogism. But there remains the problem of the sequel. The best attested reading is genera (C), printed by Testard and, together with tria within cruces, by Winterbottom; genere is read by c and adopted by Atzert4, Fedeli, and Cugusi, whereas L offers genera e(con-)\ hence Lambinus's genera {re) confusa (adopted among recent editors by Schiassi) would account for the phenomena of the wit­ nesses. The sense will surely be not dissimilar to 3.11, where reference is made to eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxissent. If that is so, then the reading genere cannot be right; they are not jumbled together "in respect of kind"; rather it is the classification in distinct genera that is referred to with the words cogitatione distinguunt. Genera is surely correct: honestum and utile are distinct types that are jumbled together. One feels, however, the need for some further qualification along the lines of, but less cumbersome than, Pohlenz's (etsi re eadem esse dicunt). Surely Lambinus's re, besides its palaeographical attractiveness

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(see above), fills the bill admirably by showing in what sense the two classes are confusa and creating a contrast of res and opinio used by Cicero elsewhere; cf. 1.95: quod lsc. quod deceat] cogitatione magis a virtute potest quant re separari.19 (4b) The fact that young Marcus is studying philosophy with Cratippus may have to do with Cicero's (exceptional) willingness to use the un­ disguised syllogistic form of argument; cf. Luc. 67 and ad $ 48 and 3.27. The syllogism should therefore probably not be deleted. However, the argument does not proceed the way one would have expected, for the equivalence of the iustum and the utile should be the final outcome, not the first premise, as at SVF 3, 76.16-18: πάν δίκαιον καλόν, πάν καλόν αγαθόν πάν άρα δίκαιον αγαθόν αλλά μην και το αγαθόν τφ συμφίροντι ταύτόν πάν άρα δίκαιον συμφέρον, lustitia will play a dominating part in Books 2 (SS 52-84) and 3 (really the whole down as far as $ 116), since those who push the utile too far will offend above all against iustitia, rather than against prudentia, magnitudo ammi, or decorum; cf. Cicero's later description:. . . iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur . . . (S 38) and haec [sc. iustitia] enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum (3.28), as well as the transmitted text at $ 33: iustis autem etfidis hominibus, id est bonis viris . . . (see ad loc.).zo The key point, then, is to establish the identity of the iustum and the utile. The syllogism just quoted from SVF 3, 76.16-18, or something very similar, is surely what Cicero found in his Panaetian source at this place; for it involves reasoning from the Stoic premise of the identity of the αγαθόν and συμφέρον (cf. introduc­ tion to this Book), not the emergence of this identity as the final out­ come. 21 The disturbance in the Latin text could possibly result either from Ciceronian or scribal error; Ambr. off. 2.25, cited under no. (1) above, would argue for the latter; 3.19, where the logic of the passage has fallen victim to the inattentiveness of scribes (see ad loc.)y could be adduced as parallel. However, since the identity of honestum and utile here estab­ lished will form the basis for the treatment of their apparent conflict in Book 3, one wonders whether it may not have been Cicero himself who rearranged the terms to effect this outcome (cf. the similar formulation at 3.35).

19. Cf. the similar error at 1.128, where re has fallen out in ζ.—Similar in sense and worth considering (though more remote palaeographically) is Winterbonom's natura for genera, for which he compares both 3.11 and Leg. fr. 2 Ziegler. 20. On the importance of iustitia in Off. generally cf. Atkins. 21. For the minor premise quod honestum, idem iustum cf. Fin. 2.71.

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Note that at PI. Prt. 333d ff. Protagoras demurs at the identification of goods (αγαθά) with things useful to humans (ωφέλιμα τοΐ? άνθρωποι?) on grounds that "useful" is a relative term, so that, for instance, oil may be useful when applied to the surface of the body but harmful when taken internally. Similarly, the simple Ciceronian/Ambrosian 22 identification of honestum and utile seemed to Thorn. Aqu. 5. Th. I1.2.cxlv.3.3 fin. to require clarification:. . . intentio Tullii et Ambrosii dicere est quod nihil potest esse simpUciter et vere utile quod repugnat honestati, quia oportet quod repugnet ultimo fini hominis, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quamvis forte possit esse utile secundum quid respectu alicuius finis particularis. non autem intendunt dicere quod omne utile in se consideratum pertingat ad rationem honesti; cf. Nelson, 126. . . . severe sane atque honeste . . .] This characterization of the philosophers* procedure would have been redundant but for what follows; they must not be implicated in the distinction drawn between honestum and utile by those who admire versutos homines et callidos. quidquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent. . .] Phil. Mut. Nom. 197 (3, 190.15 Cohn-Wendland) lists among the common hypocrisies the sentiment συμφέρον ή δικαιοσύνη, άσυμφ€ρον ή αδικία. quod qui parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantcs, malitiam sapientiam iudicanL] Quod surely refers to the identity of honestum and utile, not the fact that the philosophers divide in theory what belongs together by nature (as Pohlenz, AF, 9 1 , n. 1, and Goldbacher, 2 , 4 8 49, still influenced too much by Unger, assume). For manifestations of malitia cf. 1.33. quorum error cripiendus est opinioque omnis ad earn spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis, non fraude et malitia se intellegant ea quae velint consequi posse.] This sentence is, in a sense, the keynote of Off. 2. Cicero/Panaetius speaks unabashedly as a moralist aiming to reform be­ havior by convincing readers that it is possible to attain their ends without resorting to deceit or other unethical practices; cf. Heilmann, 3. 11-16 F. Wchrli {ad Dicaearch. fr. 24) has suggested that Dicaearchus was the source, not only of Panaetius' discussion of the causes of human death in § 16, but in general of the argument at §§ 11-16; similarly, Cole, 1961,131, while finding that this "uncompromising glorification of technology" should ultimately derive from a fifth-century source, is prepared to entertain Dicaearchus as an intermediary. Though the title of the work Cicero cites [de Interitu Hominum |§ 16] = π€ρι ανθρώπων φθοράς) does not encourage this 22. Sc. off 2.28.

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theory, Cicero might, as Pohlenz mooted {AF, 97, n. 1), be thus referring to a section of the βίο? Ελλάδος; and the emphasis on human cooperation (absent from the Peripatetic parallels cited by Wehrli23) could have been added by Panaetius for his own purposes. Also, the method of oiatpeois in 5 11 would be compatible with a Peripatetic source behind Panaetius (cf. Cole, loc.cit.). Nevertheless this theory must face the fact that Dicaearchus, like Hesiod, placed the golden age in the remote past (cf. esp. frr. 4 8 - 4 9 Wehrli2), a view difficult to square with this optimistic account of human progress; one would then have to assume that Panaetius had completely altered the tendency of Dicaearchus* account (Cole, 1961, 158, n. 19, tries to obviate this difficulty by emphasizing that Dicaearchus and Panaetius both see successive stages in human exploitation of the natural environment). If, then, we leave to one side the problematical role of Dicaearchus, Cole's notion that Panaetius derived this material (whether directly or indirectly) from a fifth-century source is attractive per se. Panaetius would then have added the emphasis on cooperation, and the orthodox Stoa have turned the Democritean (?) argument on its head in seeing divine πρόνοια behind every milestone of human progress {N.D. 2.150 ff.). However, the parallel in this sector to Anon. Iamb, cited by Cataudella, 481-82 and 483, and Cole, 1961, 132, viz., 6.1-5 = Iamb. 100.5 ff., presents too generalized a similarity to establish a case for a genetic relation of it or its source to Panaetius. In any case, while using a traditional method (διαίρεσι?) and topos (the stages of human development), Panaetius is adapting them to his own ends (the emphasis on human cooperation and reason; cf. 1.12: eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini. . , impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit etc.). 11 This classification of things beneficial to the human being corresponds to the Stoic scala naturae or hierarchy of entities: I. Inanimate II. Animate [A. Plants] B. Animals C. Intelligent beings 1. Human beings 2. Gods. Each entity at a higher level has the properties of the lower one(s) as well as one additional quality. Similar to our passage is N.D. 2.33-36, where Balbus 23. Viz.. Arist. Pol I253a31ff. and MM 1203a22ffM boih cited ad $ 16.

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 11-16 and 11

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uses the scab naturae to argue that the existence of the lower entities implies the existence of a highest, namely the deity; there the inanimate objects were omitted, whereas in our passage plants receive no mention (hence the square brackets in the outline printed above). The influence of the Academic/ Peripatetic method of διαίρεση is apparent here; cf. in general Inwood, 1985, 18 ff., esp. 25. The presentation in our passage is, as Inwood notes, systematic, rather than argumentative. The scab naturae yields a com­ prehensive framework for analyzing utilia; and the division between inanima (άψυχα) and animalia (έμψυχα), the latter category further subdivided into nonintelligent (άλογα) and intelligent (λογικά), 24 provides the skeleton filled in with examples in $§ 12-15 (see ad he). But, in fact, the gods are men­ tioned here only to be dismissed in a sentence (deos placatos pietas efftciet et sanctitas [§ 11]); as a factor contributing to human utilitas they are, from Panaetius' perspective, trivial compared to other human beings. Thus the last two terms of the conventional hierarchy really need to be reversed in a hierarchy of utilia for the human being; and Cicero does, in fact, present them in the reverse of the expected order:. . . deorum unum, alterum homi­ num. Cf. also J.A. Akinpelu, "The Stoic Scab Naturae (with Special Refer­ ence to the Exposition of It in Cicero's De Natura Deorum)," PACA 10 (1967), 2 9 - 3 5 , who points out that in that passage, too, the focus is, to a greater degree than one might have expected, on the human being. Pohlenz thought that Panaetius would, at this point, analogously to the treatment of the καλόν in Book 1, have derived the ώφβλιμον from human nature {AF, 91). But this was already done at 1.11: principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum ut se vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea quae nocitura videantur, omniaque quae sint ad vivendum necessaria anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibub, ut alia generis eiusdem. Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt inanima . . . partim animalia . . .] Pohlenz, AF, 93, finds that the connection with ergo "verschleiert nur diinn den abrupten Charakter des Eingangs," whereas Gartner, 1974, 24, n. 11, with reference to our passage, points out that ergo u wird u.a. gebraucht, wenn die Rede nach einer langeren Vorbereitung zum crsten Hauptteil ubergeht." I suspect, however, that most readers would have welcomed at this stage some more explicit pointer as to the direction the argument is taking (cf. ad 1.11 - 1 7 , 3.89-95). It will, of course, turn out that what one needs in order to attain one's ends is the conspiratio hominum atque consensus (§ 16). Cole, 1961, 135, suspects that in this passage "the honestum is being imposed on a context not originally designed for it." At 24. The Greek equivalents are given by Pohlenz, AF. 93.

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the very least, Cicero/Panaetius has omitted a step in the argument by failing to show that the conspiratio hominum atque consensus tends to be in line with the honestum (Panaetius was, of course, well aware that there are societies, like those of thieves, that do not follow general norms, though they have rules of their own; cf. § 40). . . . partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus.] Cicero omits plants and passes directly to animals, an evident inadvertence since he does mention agriculture in the following sketch of the progress of human civilization (§ 12). Impetus and rerum appetitus render ορμή in Cicero's source; cf. Robert Fischer, De usu vocabulorum apud Ciceronem et Senecam Graecae philosophiae interpretes (diss. Freiburg i.B., 1914), 75 ff., esp. 77; Inwood, 1985, 25 and 263, n. 30. According to Aristotle, as living things, plants have a nutritive soul that holds them together, but not a conscious soul; the Stoics explained the plants' maintenance of structural integrity differently and denied them soul altogether, a point implicit in our passage (for ορμή as one of the powers of the soul cf. ad 1.101); cf. Sorabji, 98-99, with Stoic sources cited at 98, n. 14. On impetus as common to human and beast cf. also Sen. de Ira 1.3.4: sed dicendum est feras ira carere. . . impetus habent ferae, rabiem feritatem incursum, iram quidem non magis quam luxuriam . . . ; in general, O. Prinz, TLL 7, 608.62 ff., esp. 67 ff. (s.v. impetus). expertes rationis equi boves, reliquae pecudes (apes), quarom opere efficirur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam.] Facciolati's athetosis of apes, on grounds that u etiam volatile genus est inter pecudes,** has been revived by Bruser, 99, and followed by several recent editors (Atzerr4, Fedeli). Facciolati may have been thinking of the following entry in Nonius (p. 460M): pecudes non solas quadrupedes, sed et alia animalia dicere Vergilio auctore possumus in Georg. lib. IV [327]: 'quern mihi vix frugum et pecudum custodia sollers' et: 'ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent' [ibid., 168]. Perhaps, how­ ever, this is a poetic usage, the term pecudes being ordinarily applied to large land animals; hence the distinction of apes and pecudes at Col. 9.4.1 {interim per has notas quas iam diximus probatis apibus destinari debent pabulattones, eaeque sint secretissimae et, ut noster praecipit Maro, viduae pecudibus . . .). Nevertheless equi boves, reliquae pecudes looks very much like a Ciceronian triplet in which the final member subsumes all other possibilities (cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,154), and apes following it seems, at the very least, anticlimactic. Nor is it convincing to assume loss of apes by homoeoteleuton after boves, its reinsertion in the margin, and, ultimately, in the wrong place in the text, since the summarizing reliquae pecudes would not apply, in prose, to apes (see above). Bees are, of course, a preeminent example of a

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 1 l-12a and 12b—15

379

creature "by whose work something of use to humans and (their) life is effected"; perhaps for that very reason a reader of Off. was moved (at a prearchetypal stage) to insert apes into the text. ratione autem utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alteram hominum.] It did not suit Cicero's purpose to dilate upon the community of reason of men and gods as he had at Leg. 1.23. deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas;. . .J Pietas and sanctitas corre­ spond, as Wilamowitz, 1926, 201, n. 1, notes, respectively to ewefkia and ayveia. However, Panaetius, reserved about the popular cult of the gods (frr. 70 ff.), will have phrased the matter more cautiously, in terms of what people believe, as in the previous sentence and in the following quia deos nocere non putant. . . ; cf. also 1.9: triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant. . .; cf. Heinemann, 2, 13. N.D. 1.116 defines sanctitas as scientia colendorum deorum. 12a sed quia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse plurimum arbitrantur.J Cf., e.g., PI. R. 379b; N.D. 1.117: nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis |sc. Epicurei], facile est liberare, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; Sen. Ep. 95.49: quae causa est dis bene faciendif natura. errat si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt; SVF 2, 325.8 (= Lact. ira 5): existimantur Stoici et alii nonnulli aliquanto melius de divinitate sensisse, qui aiunt, gratiam in Deo esse, tram non esse; Sen. de Ira 2.27.1: quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt nullamque vim nisi beneficam et salutarem habent, ut di inmortales, qui nee volunt obesse nee possunt; natura enim Hits mitis et placida est, tarn longe remota ab aliena iniuria quam a sua; 3.102 and 104. 12b-15 These sections (from Ea enim ipsa quae inanima diximus), while following (with omission of the gods) the order of categories of § 11, trace, in effect, the progress of human civilization in three stages: I. Exploitation of inanimate matter (§§ 12-14a—capere potuisse) A. Trade B. Mining C. Construction 1. Houses 2. Other large-scale projects II. Exploitation of animals (14b) III. Artes(\S) A. Medicine B. Entertainment C. The city and its institutions.

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Such an analysis derives ultimately from sophistic thought of the fifth century as reflected in the myth of human development at PI. Prt. 320c ff. or in the eulogy of man in the first stasimon of Sophocles* Antigone. There are, to be sure, surface variations, with Protagoras omitting animal husbandry (indeed humans find themselves in a losing struggle with beasts until they develop social skills: 322b), while emphasizing the role of divine assistance. In all three versions, however, the civilized life of the city represents the crowning achievement. Pohlenz, AF, 95-97, P.-M. Schuhl, "Panaitios et la philosophic active," RPhilos 150 (1960), 232-33, and Bronislaw Bilinski, "Elogio della mano e la concezione ciceroniana della societa," Atti del I congresso internazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 1 (1959), 197 ff., have compared our text with the praise of the manus in the context of Balbus' expositon of the Stoic doctrine of πρόνοια (N.D. 2.150 ff.), which illustrates the ever-widening spheres of human dominatus culminating in mastery over all the earth's bounty (cf. also the much abbreviated version at Off. 1.22: . . . ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa essegeneratos . . .). Like our passage, these paragraphs proceed from the inanimate sphere to the animate. Our passage, too, places some emphasis on the manus as the human tool par excellence (. . . nisi manus et ars ac~ cessisset. . . sine hominum labore et manu . . . portus manu factos . . . sine hominum manu atque opera . . .), though this theme is not elaborated in the detail of N.D. In Off., where there are verbal echoes of the earlier passage (mostly in the same order; see following notes), the argument has the func­ tion of narrowing the focus to the human being as the proper subject, since the other utilia are easily manipulated if one has the cooperation of other humans (cf. ξ 17: cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dub it attorns, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint. . . , where the gods are lost sight of entirely). This topos, then, appears in two versions: (1) the stages of human pro­ gress will originally have formed a eulogy of man, as in the first stasimon of the Antigone; (2) some reinterpreted even these human achievements as grounded in divine πρόνοια (cf. Protagoras). Panaetius followed a tradition closer to (1) (cf. the agnostic or skeptical stand of Zeno's pupil Persaeus at SVF 1, 99.3 ff.). By inserting this material here Panaetius could deal rapidly with those aspects of the συμφέρον that were of little interest to him. 25 25. In view of Panaetius1 skepticism of the mantic arts (frr. 70 ff.) and the argument from divination at N.D. 2.7-12a, it seems doubtful that the Stoic theology of N.D. 2, including

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 12b-15 and 13

381

13 iam vero et earum rerum quibus abundaremus exportatio et earum quibus egeremus invectio . . .] Cf. ad $ 15 below. . . . nee ferrum aes aumm argentum effoderetur penitus abditum sine hominum labore et manu.] The same verse from an old poet is cited at N.D. 2.151: nos e terrae cavemis ferrum elicimus, rem ad colendos agros necessariam; nos aeris argenti auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras. Langius conjectured that it belongs to Accius* Prometheus in view of Aesch. PV 5 0 0 - 3 : evepOe δέ χθονο? / Κζκρυμμέν' άνθρώποισιν ωφελήματα, / χαλκόν, σίδηρον, άργυρον χρυοόν Τ€, τίς Ι φήσαεν άν πάροιθ€ΐ> έξευρύν έ\ιοΰ; Cf. trag. inc. LXXXV, p. 298, where Ribbeck restores ferrum aes argentum aurum penitus abditum. tecta vero, quibus et frigoram vis pellcretur et calorom molestiae sedarentur . . .] Cf. N.D. 2.151: arborum autem confectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calficiendum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimurt partim ad aediftcandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pellamus . . . tecta vero . . . unde aut initio generi humano dari potuisscnt, aut postea subvenire si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae moru aut vetustate cecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset?] The difficulty lies in the second infinitive, transmitted either as subvenire (C) or subveniri {ξ). Recent editors (Atzert, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom) have adopted C's reading, Fedeli appealing specifically to Goldbacher, 2, 5 0 - 5 1 . Muller had followed ξ and understood its potuisset. Goldbacher objected that one expects the same subject in both clauses introduced by aut and that, once a house has collapsed, it is a question rather of replacing than repairing it. He therefore favors subvenire, which he interprets to mean "als Ersatz nachkommen" or the like, a sense which he admits does not occur elsewhere in Cicero and for which OLD and Forcellini provide no encouragement (though Goldbacher does cite Plin. Nat. 31.73: aliud etiam in eo (sc. sale qui in lacibus gignitur] mirabile, quod tantundem noctu subvenit, quantum die auferas). . . . nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset?] Here begins the process of transforming what has so far been a straightfor­ ward argument for man's ability to rearrange his environment to suit his own convenience into a eulogy of human cooperation, which is taken up in

2.147-54, derives from him, pace?oh\enz,GGA 184(1922), 168-69,188 (1926), 286 ff., and 192(1930), 144;AF,95, 1.

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SS 15-16 and is the point of departure for the following argument ( § 1 7 : . . . conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere). 14 adde ductus aquarum, derivationcs fluminum, agrorum inrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde sine hominum opere habere possemus?] Cf. N.D. 2.152: nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus derigimus avertimus;. . .— Derivatio is first attested here, its only occurrence in the extant corpus Ciceronianum (a Ciceronian coinage?); cf. Bogel, TLL 5, 634.64 ff., esp. 74.—Cicero prefers portus manu facti to the technical term κώθωνες, which had entered Latin by this time (B. Afr. 62.5); for the equivalence cf. Paul. Fest. p. 37M. nam et qui principes inveniendi ruerum quern ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nee hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare . . . possemus.] An implicit polemic, as Heinemann, 2 , 1 2 , saw, against the popular conception of the θεοί εύεργεται, such as the saga that Athena taught Erichthonius to hitch a wagon or Bellerophon to yoke Pegasus (hence her epithets Χαλανΐτις and Δαμάσιππος); Poseidon "Ιππιος, of course, disputed the honor of teaching horse-taming at both Athens and Corinth; cf. Roscher, Ausfuhrliches Lexikon der griechischen una romischen Mythologie, 1 (Leipzig, 1884-86), 680.35 ff.; Ernst Wust, RE 22.1 (1953), 483.55 ff.; cf. in general Christopher A. Faraone, Talismans and Trojan Horses (New York/Oxford, 1992), 28. If so, Panaetius is in agree­ ment with his teacher Diogenes of Babylon; cf. SVF 3, 234.35 ff. (humans invented music). Isoc. 2.12 already made a similar claim for human indepen­ dence: . . . περί μεν τά θηρία τεχνας ευρήκαμεν αίς αυτών τάς ψυχάς ήμερουμεν και πλείονος αξίας ποιοΰμεν . . .—On the exploitation of animals cf. also Leg. 1.25. 15 Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset?] Cf. Catulus' characterization of the interlocutors at de Orat. 2.20:. . . qui omnes it sumus, ut sine Us studiis vitam nullam esse ducamus, an obvious allusion to Socrates' famous saying ό δε ανεξέταστος βίος ου βιωτός άνθρώπιυ (PI. Ap. 38a). qui enim aegris subveniret(ur),—mm iuris aequa discriptio . . . ] These topoi probably belonged originally to a eulogy of λόγος and have been transferred by Panaetius (or his source) to human cooperation; cf., besides Inv. 1.2-3, Isoc. 3.6: έγγενομενου δ' ήμΐν τού πείθειν αλλήλους και δηλοΰν προς ημάς αύτοΰς περί ών αν βουληθώμεν, ού μόνον τοϋ θηριωδώς ζτ\ν άπηλλάγημεν, άλλα και συνελθόντ€ς πόλεις ωκίσαμεν και νόμους εθεμεθα και τέχνας εϋρομεν, και σχεδόν άπαντα τά δι* ημών μεμηχανημενα λόγος ήμΐν έστιν ό συγκατασκευάσας. On walled cities (and commerce) as characteristic of humankind cf.

Commenrary on Book 2, Section 13-16

383

Cole, 1967,44, n. 40. In de Gloria Cicero had risked an etymology of oppida from opem dare (fr. phil., pp. 6 1 - 6 2 , no. 1).—The contrast qui. . . aegris subveniret{ur), quae esset oblectatio valentium is reminiscent of the distinc­ tion at N.D. 2.150: atque haec oblectationis, ilia necessitatis . . .—On the spelling of discriptio cf. ad 1.124 with Quinct. 45 there cited; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89. 16 Longiores hoc loco sumus quam necesse est. . . . utitur in re non dubia testibus non necessariis.] This is an obvious instance of shortening in this Book (cf. also § 31), which is, as Pohlenz, AF, 90, observes, apart from prefatory material, little more than half the length of the previous Book. Hcinemann, 2, 12, observes that though Panaetius' thoroughness on this point seemed to Cicero needless, it is understandable, u denn auf dem Gedanken der Interessengemeinschaft der Menschen beruht die Ethik des Panaitios." Although the doctrine is not explicitly formulated until the nonPanaetian portion of the treatise (3.26), Heinemann is correct, for otherwise the identity of the honestum and utile could not be upheld. The restriction is needed, however, that it is the part of Panaetius' ethics bearing on the συμφέ­ ρον that is so based, whereas most of the "parts" of the καλόν rest upon the human Gemeinschaft in a broader sense. commemoratur ab eo Themistocles Pericles Cyrus Agesilaus Alexander . . .] These examples complement those of § 15 by showing that, even when an orderly society has been achieved, further progress is still dependent on human cooperation.—Apart from two allusions to his friend Scipio Aemilianus (1.90, 2.76), this is the one explicit testimony that we have for the examples adduced by Panaetius. Except for Cyrus and Scipio they are all Greek. In view of the evidently chronological order, it is surely the younger Cyrus who is in question; he and Agesilaus will both have derived from a Greek author, Xenophon. Probably we must reckon in general with a divi­ sion between Panaetian Greek examples and Roman examples added by Cicero; cf. also ad $ 40. Cf. the juxtaposition of Greek and Roman examples in § 80 with introduction, $ 5 (4). atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque consensu—quam omni reliqua calamitate.] Dicaearchus evidently collected material to confirm such statements as Arist. Pol. 1253a31: ώσπερ γάρ και τελεωθεν βελτιστον των ζώων άνθρωπο? έστιν, ούτω και χωρισθεν νόμου καΐ δίκη? χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη γάρ αδικία έχουσα δπλα; and MM 1203a22: έπεί πότερο? αν πλείω κακά ποιήσ€ΐ€ν λέων ή Διονύσιος ή Φάλαρις ή Κλέαρχος ή τις τούτων των μοχθηρών; ή δήλον δτι ούτοι; ή γάρ αρχή ένούσα φαύλη μεγάλα συμβάλλεται, εν δε θηρίω δλως ούκ εστίν αρχή; cf. Sen. Ep. 103.1: rari sunt casus, etiamsi graves, naufragium facere, vehiculo everti: ab

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homine homini cotidianum periculum; Plin. Nat. 7.5; Wehrli ad Dicaearch. fr. 24; Martini, RE 5.1 (1903), 557.40 ff.—Gartner, 1981, 111, suggested that conspiratio hominum atque consensus translates such Greek terms as έπαινος and εύνοια. But surely ομόνοια is a more likely candidate; Cicero might also be rendering σύμπνοια of Panaetius, evidently used with a different point of reference by Chrysippus {SVF 2,172.19); both words are given as glosses for conspiratio (cf. Lommatzsch, TLL 4, 499.54-55). Per­ haps Cicero added consensus to clarify that the pejorative sense of con­ spiratio is not in question; the iunctura recurs several months later in a letter to Plancus: quam ob rem, mi Plance, incumbe toto pectore ad laudem, subveni patriae, opitulare collegae, omnium gentium consensum et incredibilem conspirationem adiuva (Fam. 10.10.2; 30 March 43).—Eluvio is first attested at Rep. 6.23 and seems likely to be a Ciceronian coinage; ours is the earliest passage in which it appears without a limiting genitive either of the realm affected (ibid.: eluviones exustionesque terrarum) or of material {Div. 1.111: aquarum eluviones); cf. Krohn, TLL 5, 437.6 ff. 17 In this critical paragraph Cicero summarizes what has preceded and goes on to deduce the subject of this Book, namely winning the studia of others for the amplificatio nostrarum rerum. . . . proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.] The winning over of the minds of men is far removed from the αυτάρκεια advocated by the Old Stoa; cf. Leeman, 42. Here, as in the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία and το πρέπον, Panaetius draws inspiration from older traditions, including perhaps the literature of advice to kings; cf. the penultimate sentence of the fourth Platonic letter (321b; to Dio): μη ουν λανθαι*ετω σε οτι δια του άρεσκαν τοις άνθρώττοις και το πράττειν εστίν, ή δ' αύθάδεια έρημία συνοικος; but this is also a good Peripatetic, specifically Dicaearchean, project (cf. Dicaearchus fr. 46 Wehrli:. . . ωετοχρήναι Δικαίαρχος εύνους μεν αύτω παρασκεύαζαν απαντάς, φίλους δε ποιεΐσθαι τους αγαθούς, with Wchrli's note ad he). . . . hominum autcm studia, ad amplifkationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata, virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur.] Madvig, 2, 2 4 1 , 1 , inquired: "Quid enim ad nostrarum rerum amplificandarum studium valet (aliorum) virorum praestantium virtus? et quis in hac re sapientiae locus est?" Since the two oldest MSS then known offered virorum praestantia. he conjectured morum praestantia and deleted sapientia. However, it is now clear that virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute is the transmitted text and virorum praestantia . . . and virorum sapientium et virtutum prae­ stantium peculiar errors respectively of Ρ and p. It may seem at first sight strange that the task of winning people over to

Commentary on Book 2, Section 16-18

385

promote "our interests" belongs to someone other than "us." The difficulty can be obviated, as M. Winterbottom points out {per litt.), by taking nostrarwn as = "ours as men" or virtually "men's"; then the sentence would contrast the sordid artes operosae by which inanimate objects and beasts are rendered serviceable to humans with the more important contribution to human well-being of top people in society (cf. $ 83, where the phrase vir praestans is applied to Aratus of Sicyon: id quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit), a parallel that also suggests that sapientia in our passage has rather the sense "good judgment" than the intellectual sense commonly found in Off. (cf. ad 1.153 and § 5; OLD s.v.). It is true that in the sequel (§$ 22 ff.) the emphasis shifts specifically to advancing a politi­ cal career; but at this point Panaetius may have offered a more general and less selfish observation.—The same phenomenon is discussed from the standpoint of the praise that the vir praestans derives at de Orat. 2.346: ea enim denique virtus esse videtur praestantis viri, quae est fructuosa aliis, ipsi aut laboriosa aut periculosa aut certe gratuita. 18-20 Though one might have expected the divisio to follow immediately upon the statement of subject, two additional topics are inserted at this point, virtus and fortuna. The former is important, for it was just explained that hominum . . . studia, ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata, virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur; and in the follow­ ing divisio priority is given to quae virtuti propiores sunt. Possibly the thumb-nail sketch of vinue in $§ 18-19a was included for the benefit of those readers inclined to skip the καλόν altogether and begin their study with the συμφέρον; for §§ 19b-20a and their placement see ad he. 18 Given that Cicero has so often identified the "parts" of the honestum with the virtues (e.g., § 1: Quemadmodum officia ducerentur ab honestate . . . atque ab omni genere virtutis . . . ; cf. ad 1.95), the somewhat different analysis of the virtues here comes as a surprise, albeit it was adumbrated at 1.46. 26 The first virtue here, however, does correspond to the first "part" of the aomstam (previously called a virtue: cf. 1.15:. . . ex ea parte quae prima descripta est, in qua sap tent tarn et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium). The second and third parts of virtue enumerated here, restraint of the passions and moderate use of one's fellow-men, are social virtues, the one falling under the fourth "part" of the honestum (cf. esp. 1.102: efficiendum autem est ut 26. Yet another analysis of the σρεταί is attested for Panaetius at D.L. 7.92 » fr. 108 (Παναίηος μένουν δύο Φησ'ιν άρ€τά£.θεωρητικής και πρακτικήι/); but perhaps this is a simplified version of the doctrine of 1.16-17 (cf. ad 1.11-17).

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appetitus rationi oboediant etc.), the other under iustitia. This passage also makes it clear that the third virtue flows from the second; it is likewise closely connected with the first (note the term scienter in the phrase Us quibuscum congregemur uti moderate et scienter). Under the third virtue the emphasis on the usefulness of one's fellow human beings in attaining what one needs and repelling and avenging aggression is in keeping with the theme of this Book. One's use of one's fellows for such purposes is hedged about, like the activity of the μεγαλόψυχος (cf. 1.64 ff.), with qualifiers, however: selfaggrandizement is limited to quae natura desiderat; likewise punishment of those who have wronged one must remain within bounds {tantaque poena . . . quantam aequitas humanitasque patiatur), in accord with the doctrine of 1.88-89. Cf. also ad § 33. On attempts to assimilate our passage to the διαίρ€σι? of ethics at Ar. Did. 42.11 ff. and Sen. Ep. 89.14 cf. Giusta, 1,152. 19b-20 Magnam vim esse in fortuna—tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici possunt] This material is evidently an after­ thought; hence its odd placement. One would have expected it to follow the end of § 16, since it raises and dismisses the possibility that fortuna should be considered alongside the items already discussed (inanimate objects, beasts, other humans, the gods) as a force affecting human life. This reaffirmation of the primacy of the human factor would have been apposite just prior to § 17 (cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint); placement there would also have enabled Cicero to go right on to the subject announced at the beginning of § 19 (quibus autem rationibus banc facultatem adsequi possimus, ut hominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus) and spared him having to reannounce it toward the end of § 20 (. . . dicendum est quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras adiicere atque excitare possimus). We should probably class the placement of this passage as a symptom of what Rudberg called "rough-draft style** ("KonzeptstiP). Cf. also ad 3.96.—On the place, or rather lack of a place, of fortuna in Stoicism cf. ad 1.115-21. 19b Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel adversas, quis ignorat? nam et cum prospero flatu eius utimur ad exitus pervehimur optatos, et cum reflavit adfligimur.] Cicero was fond of the nautical metaphor for favorable circumstances or the reverse, as in Antonius' description of his forensic practice at de Orat. 2.187: si se dant Jsc. iudices] et, ut ante dixi, sua sponte, quo impellimus, inclinant atque propendent, accipio quod datur et ad id, unde altquis flatus ostenditur, vela do . . . The intransitive reflo in the sense "to blow in a contrary direction" in both literal and metaphorical applications is first attested in Cicero; cf. OLD s.v., 1.

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 18-20 and 21-22

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20 . . . interims exercituum, ut proxime t r i u m , . . . clades imperatorum, ut nupcr summi et singularis viri . . . ] Cicero is still writing much under the impact of the civil war, as in Phil. 2.37: quo quidem tempore si, ut dixi, meum consilium auctoritasque valuisset, tu hodie egeres, nos liberi essemus; respublica non tot duces et exercitus amisisset; ibid., 75: ter depugnavit Caesar cum civibus, in Thessalia, Africa, Hispania. The three armies (all defeated by Caesar) were those of Pompey the Great, lost at Pharsalia (9 August 48), Scipio, lost at Thapsus (6 April 46) and Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey, lost at Munda (17 March 45). . . . summi et singularis viri . . .] Pompey is referred to with great respect in this Book (cf. § 45: . . . magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare . . . ; cf. also § § 5 7 and 60), in stark contrast to the following one (cf. ad 3.82). . . . invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones . . . ] Cicero is surely thinking of his own case, contrasted with Pompey's military activity also at 1.78.—Though the preceding interitus exercituum and clades imperatorum are ambiguous as to the number of the limited noun and thus could fall under the type de vita Caesarum, invid­ iae must be plural; one might be tempted to read invidia and adopt in the following ob eas res of the ξ family except for Cicero's evident fondness for invidia in the plural; cf. Stiewe, TLL 7.2, 199.26 ff. 2 1 - 2 2 The juxtaposition in these paragraphs of two lists under different headings but with very similar (though not identical) contents raises ques­ tions about authenticity and composition. The prior list comprises approved and disapproved motives for advancing a public career. Though disapprobation is stated only under the final item (. . . quae sordidissima est ilia quidem ratio et inquinatissima . . .), this list corresponds to the content of the rest of the Book, where the deprecation of the last three methods is made explicit: first list I. benivolentiae gratia . . . cum aliqua de causa quempiam diligunt II. honoris {gratia) A. si cuius virtutem suspiciunt quemque dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant

plan of Off. 2 (see p. 356 above) VI. Whether to be loved or feared is a better means of protecting one's interests VIII. Glory D. Admiration

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B. aut cut fidern habent et bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur C. aut cuius opes metuunt D. aut contra a quibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones aliquas proponunt E. aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur

B. Trustworthiness

(see VI. above) G. Liberality and the conferring of benefits (esp. G.2., Largesse) 1. Comparison of money vs. services.

The first item is benivolentia in the broadest sense without nearer specifi­ cation of motive; activity in behalf of that individual or his interests [beneftcentia) is its natural expression; at N.D. 1.121 the Skeptic Cotta argues that without beneftcentia love cannot subsist. On the other hand, one can respect without loving; and a candidate may be elevated to office on this basis (5/ cuius virtutem suspiciunt). Finally, regarding the exercise of office as a public trust (cf. 1.124), one may hold a candidate worthy on the basis of fides. On the other hand, fear appears as a foil for love at SS 23-29, and largitio, including pecunia, is clearly condemned as a means of advancing one's popu­ larity at § 53. The plan to treat quae virtuti propiores sunt is followed insofar as benivolentia and the factors contributing to gloria, including, under admiratio, magnitudo animi and opinio iustitiae, precede such topics as utrum genus benignitatis potius sit, pecunia an opera, and largitio (cf., however, ad SS 2 9 , 4 4 - 4 5 and 55b-60). Clearly, then, this list has an inner logic and is a guide to the Panaetian plan underlying Book 2, i.e., it comprises the divisio of the Book. 27 The second list, on the other hand, loosely attached and not well thought through, contains several stylistic oddities. The connection with what pre­ cedes by atque etiam lacks subtlety. The rubric is different now, not advance­ ment in dignity or office (cf. OLD s.v. augeo 5a), a process proper to a respublica, but subordination to the imperium and potestas of another, a description of the position of subjects of an absolute ruler or Rome's foreign clients, a topic taken up in SS 23-29. One misses here, as sometimes else­ where in this essay, a clear delineation of the relation of sequel to antecedent (cf. Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, 27. The major difference between thefirstlist and the content of Off. 2 is that, in the list, in order to contrast the antithetical concepts spes and metus, the topic cuius opes metuunt is displaced from benevolentia {under I.) for juxtaposition with a quibus aliquid exspectant under honor (II.C.-D.); cf. Dyck, 1980, 207.

Commentary on Book 2, Section 21-22

389

careless, loose, or lacking"). Furthermore the items and their arrangement lack the perspicuousness of the former list. As Winterbottom's punctuation indicates, the words benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine really con­ stitute a single item; but in that case we have aut in the weaker sense (= vel), whereas the other autys are disjunctive (cf. ad 1.13: . . . aut docenti aut utilitatis causa . . . imperanti. . .). Then, too, how does the more generally formulated spe sibi id utile futurum in practice differ from spe largitionis promissisque captit Surely one or the other is redundant. On the other hand, fides, which appears in the first list, should on no account have been omitted here, since it also applies to the situation of those who subject themselves imperio alterius etpotestati; cf. Li v. 22.13.11, cited ad § 26; on the concept in fidem venire or accipere see ad 1.35. Finally there are the stylistic oddities: the words metu ne vi parere cogantur appear to misstate the relationship of ideas, since compulsion and intimidation are surely two alternative descrip­ tions of the same process, not subordinate one to the other (Dyck, 1980,210; perhaps the author meant to speak of the fear of force, as at Caec. 44: quid igitur fugiebant? propter metum. quid metuebantf vim videlicet); and there is the evident inadvertence ducuntur . . . mercede conducti. It is thus not surprising that a number of scholars (viz., Briiser; Atzert4; Fedeli; Dyck, 1980; Cugusi) have been inclined to bracket the second list as an interpola­ tion (it was already omitted at Senensis H. V1.22, assigned by Winterbottom with a query to the fifteenth century). There are nevertheless some formidable arguments for retention, namely: (1) Thomas, 30, truly says of the phrase ut saepe in nostra republica videmus: "Schon sein Inhalt entspricht zu sehr Ciceros Intentionen, als dal? man ihn der Feder eines Interpolators zurechnen mochte." 28 (2) As T. Maslowski has pointed out to me, this comment corresponds to Cicero's characterization of the Clodiani as having been hired for pay; he compares Red. Sen. 26, Red. Pop. 12, Dom. 23, 45, 89; Sest. 104-6; cf. also Phil. 2.51:. . .turn iste [sc. M. Antonius] venditum atque emancipatum tribunatum consiliis vestris opposuit... (3) The following sentence omnium autem return nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri can hardly connect directly with the sentences immediately following the first list [male enim se res habet cum quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. sed quoniam nonnumquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quemadmodum sit utendum eo dicemus, si prius its de rebus quae virtuti propiores sunt dixerimus), as it would have to do if the second list were deleted. Cicero would then have to explain the relation of this subject to the 28. They were also quoted by Nonius p. 274M.

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plan to discuss quae virtuti propiores sunt. Also, omnium autem rerum or the like is a formula used when a number of factors has preceded and a clear hierarchy needs to be established; cf. 1.57: sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla estgravior, nulla carior, etc. But it is only the second list that provides a series of factors pertaining specifically to the question of political power (subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati); if the second list is deleted, this new subject would have to be an­ nounced in some way, presumably with a long list of factors. Perhaps the phenomena can be best accounted for by assuming, with Atzert 2 and Winterbottom, that the second list, modeled on the first, whether or not, as Sabbadini (ad loc.) thought, added "posteriormente," comprises Ciceronian matter, perhaps intended to effect a transition to the topics of absolute rule and imperium prominent in §§ 2 3 - 2 9 , 2 9 but never fully pol­ ished or integrated into context. Both lists bear a certain resemblance to rhetoricians' lists of emotions, such as those found at de Orat. 2.185 and 206; cf. in the former passage . . . ratio orationis, quae . . . mentis iudicum permovet impellitque ut aut oderint aut diligant, aut invideant aut salvum velint, aut metuant aut sperent, aut cupiant aut abhorreant, aut laetentur aut maereant, aut misereantur aut poenire velint. . . Although hatred does not figure in either of our lists, it is, in fact, contrasted at length with love in the sequel (5$ 23-29), so that a broader heading for the list and a first item corresponding to ut aut oderint aut diligant of de Orat. would have been apt. The phrase aut salvum velint leaves the motive undefined; but if one can infer from its counterpart {aut invideant) that the opposite quality, admiration, is involved, then this would match aut honoris [sc. causa), si cuius virtutem suspiciunt... of the first list and dignitatis praestantia of the second. The antithetical concepts of hope and fear appear in both of our lists as well as in the lists of emotions. The two missing elements refer not to emotional states, but to property relations, namely fides (first list only) and payment. 21 Quaecumque igitur homines homini tiibuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum . . .] For the meaning of these words as well as the distribution of the topics here mooted within the argument of this Book cf. ad § 3 1 . 2 3 - 2 9 After the promise to give priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt {§ 22) one expects a discussion of the three means of attaining glory (§ 31), the first being caritas. Cicero/Panaetius may on occasion begin discussion of one point by comparison with its opposite, as when he compares opera and

29. Cf. Goldbachcr, 1, 27; Pohlenz, AF, 97-98.

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 21-22 and 23-29

391

pecunia as alternative types of beneficia at $§ 5 2 - 5 3 . But the handling of caritas/metus gives the latter so much more attention that one doubts that this can be the execution of the plan to treat virtuous methods first. Cicero's procedure at $$ 2 3 - 2 6 becomes clearer, however, in light of the recurrence of this theme in the contemporary Second Philippic, where he lays emphasis on Antony's tactic of intimidating the senate through armed force: cf. $ 8 (qui . . . stent cum gladiis in conspectu senatus . . . ) , $ 15 (. . . tu homines perditissimos cum gladiis conlocavistit), § 19 (. . . cum inter subsellia nostra versentur armati. . . cum gladiis homines conlocati stent?), § 46 (. . . nisi Hits quos videmus gladiis confideres . . .), § 104 (remove gladios parumper illos quos videmus), § 1 0 8 (memineramus Cinnam nimis potentem, Sullam postea dominantem, modo Caesarem regnantem videramus. erant fortasse gladii, sed absconditi nee ita multi. ista vero quae et quanta barbaria est! agmine quadrato cum gladiis sequuntur; scutorum lecticas portari videmus), § 112 (cur armatorum corona senatus saeptus est, cur me tui satellites cum gladiis audiunt . . . cur homines omnium gentium maxime barbaros, Ituraeos, cum sagittis deducts in forum?).30 When Cicero reports Antony's answer to the question raised in the last passage quoted (praesidi sui causa se facere dicit), the topic culminates in this impassioned response: non igitur miliens perire est melius quam in sua civitate sine armatorum praesidio non posse vivere? sed nullum est istuc, mihi crede, praesidium: caritate te et benevolentia civium saeptum oportet esse, non armis. eripiet et extorquebit tibi ista populus Romanus, utinam salvis nobis! sed quoquo modo nobiscum egeris, dum istis consiliis uteris, non potes, mihi crede esse diuturnus (Phil. 2.112-13). §S 23-26 of our passage treat the same topic—the futility of trying to achieve long-term political gains through intimidation—with il­ lustrative material drawn from poetry and, apart from Caesar's case, Greek history; § 25 reads as if written to illustrate Phil. 2.116 (quae est autem vita dies et nodes timere a suis?). The convergence of topics is so striking that it seems justified to speak of an invasion of concerns from the speech; this would explain the fact that at § 32 he goes on to give the precepts on benevolentia (which one had expected to follow, if not in § 22b (in place of the second list], then surely in § 23) as if no discussion of the topic had intervened. The Greek examples of exitus tyrannorum aim to prove malus . . . est custos diuturnitatis metus (§ 23). They suggest that Cicero is using some Greek source or sources. Might that have been Panaetius' discussion of cuius opes metuunt, or might these be materials Cicero had once intended for 30. Sim. Phil. 1.27 {cum tanta praesertim gladiorum sit impunitas) and 7.13 (armorum offidnas in urbe videtis; milites cum gbdiis sequuntur consulem).

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the Ήρακλβίδιοι/, a projected but abandoned dialogue on Caesar's assassina­ tion? Cf. ad 3.19b-32. Tracing the (sometimes elusive) train of thought in these paragraphs discloses a good deal about Cicero's "Arbeitsweise" and general state of mind at the time of composition. The thesis is clearly stated both at the outset and toward the conclusion: omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri (§ 23); atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum) dum metui quam cart esse et diligi malumus (§ 29); but the development is any­ thing but straightforward. Taking the Ennian verse quern metuunt oderunt, quern quisque odit peri(i)sse expetit as his starting point, Cicero seems to want to focus first on the fact that the personal safety of tyrants is by no means insured by intimidation. He appears, however, to condone the use of saevitia to maintain an imperium (§ 24: sed its qui vi oppressos imperio coercent, sit sane adhibenda saevitia, ut eris in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt)\ in the sequel, however, he emphatically rejects crudelitas as a method for holding together the Roman Empire (§§ 26-29; cf. also 3.46). The sentence just quoted from § 24 is included for the sake of contrast with a free commonwealth, where such a policy is madness [qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt ut metuantur, Us nihil potest esse dementius). He then seems to want to broaden from the topic of personal safety to the general question of power and from affairs of state to affairs in general (§ 24: quod igitur latissime patet—et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur). But then we pass to the topic "uneasy lies the head that wears a crown," which is essentially a reprise, this time armed with Greek examples, of the argument of SS 2 3 - 2 4 that methods of terror are no proof against assassination. Cicero's procedure here is similar to that in 1.153 ff., SS 17-20, and, to some degree, §S 2 2 - 2 3 , in that he leaves the impression in § 24 that he has rounded out his treatment of this topic {ita facillime quae volemus et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur) only to launch in again with new material. Clearly it was the thought that Caesar's recent death was a prime example of the exitus tyrannorum that motivated Cicero's departure from Panaetius, including presumably the contrast between what is appropriate for an imperium and within the context of a libera civitas. Note that etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. . . (end of S 24 and following) would form an equally good sequel to the first sentence of % 23 (omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri). The discussion of Roman conditions beginning in the middle of % 26 is presented as parallel to the exemplum of the Spartans, who are said to have

Commentary on Book 2, Sections 23-29 and 23

393

been abandoned by their allies at Leuctra because of the mistreatment they had meted out to them (see ad $ 26a). To construe a parallel, Cicero must argue that the Romans, too, have been guilty of mistreating their allies; as his prize example Cicero cites the case of Massilia, a loyal ally of Rome that nevertheless suffered the indignity of having its image carried in Caesar's triumph. But the case of the Massiliotes, whose treachery Caesar emphasizes (BC 2.14), can hardly stand as typical of Caesar's treatment of provincials; and no threat to the imperium resulted (cf. Heilmann, 113-14). A further problem is that these matters were indissolubly connected for Cicero with the topic of civil war (Caesar's engagement with Massilia having been pan of the recent one). Thus, though Sulla's reign is introduced ostensibly as a turning point in Rome's relations with its allies, in fact, it serves to make two points about civil war: 1) the civil war unleashed by Caesar was worse than Sulla's in that both the cause and the sequel were dishonorable, not the sequel alone; 2) greed for the property of others is the semen et causa of civil war. Both points, of course, reinforce the campaign against the dead Caesar begun in §S 2 3 - 2 4 , but divert attention from the main argument, as Cicero was aware (redeundum est enim ad propositum: § 29). Moreover, Cicero's at­ tempt to force Caesar and Sulla into the same mold does justice to neither man nor to the historical circumstances, as Diehl, 161, points out. 31 Paragraphs 26b-29, then, comprise Cicero's most extensive use of Roman examples to advance his political agenda in Off. 1-2 (including a hit at Antony and his followers, when he says that Caesar's cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit hereditas [§ 28; see ad he.]); but they stray from the main argument, in spite of Cicero's violent attempt to bring his Roman material back into line: atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum) dum metui quam cart esse et diligi malumus; cf., in the following sentence, quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt. . . , parallel to Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes of § 26. 23 Omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes ruendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri. praeclare enim Ennius: 'quern metuunt oderunt, quern quisque odit peri(i)sse expetit'.] The verse of Ennius (whose editors restore periisse, which Winterbottom, after Bibl. Brit. Add. 11935 [fourteenth century], rightly prints in Cicero's text) provides a neat transition to the topic of the deaths of tyrants; it may well, as Ribbeck {trag., 31. "Mit dieser Reduziemng der historischen Realitat zwangt Cicero beide Diktatorcn in ein Erklarungsschcma, das beiden nicht gcrcchr wird, weder Sulla, dem Urhcbcr der Proskriptionen, aber restitutor reipublicae, noch Caesar, dem versohnlichen Sieger, aber sclbstherrlichen Regenten, noch den Biirgerkriegen und dem Untergang der republikanischcn Staatsordnung, fur die der skru pel lose Bcreichcrungswillc als cinzigc Ursache nichr ausreichr."

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p. 80 ad v. 379 = seen. 402 = 348 Jocelyn) suggested, have been spoken by a warner of Atreus in the Thyestes. Cicero was also well acquainted with Accius' treatment of the subject, as 1.97 and 3.102 show. Cf. Clu. 169: homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt aut quod eos metuunt aut quod oderunt.—The opes of this sentence are, as in older Roman usage (cf. Kuhlmann, TLL 9, 810.22 ff.), one's resources in general; but the protection of them falls squarely in the political sphere, as the following paragraphs make clear; cf. § 24 (ad opes et potentiam), 5 4 1 , and ad 1.25.—Cf. the advice given Antony at Phil. 2.112, quoted ad §§ 2 3 - 2 9 , or, ibid., 2.90, where fear is said not to be a lasting teacher of appropriate action [non diuturnus magister offici); Sen. Ep. 47.18: non potest amor cum timore misceri. nee vero huius tyranni solum, quern armis oppressa pertulit civitas paretque cum maxime mortuo, interims declarat quantum odium hominum valeat ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem in ten turn effugit.] I have hesitatingly adopted, with Pohlenz, AF, 99, n. 1, and Winterbottom, paretque cum maxime mortuo, the reading of the generally less sincere ξ tradition, rather than the corrupt reading of £, apparet cuius maxime portui. If the sentence has a recoverable point, it is probably a reprise of Cicero's oft-repeated lamentation that the senate con­ firmed Caesar's acta on 17 March. Cf. Fam. 12.1.1 - 2 (to Cassius; 3 May 44: . . . non regno sed rege liberati videmur. interfecto enim rege regios omnis nutus tuemur . . . adhuc ulta suas iniurias est per vos interitu tyranni [sc. respublica], nihil amplius. ornamenta vero sua quae reciperavitt an quod ei mortuo paret quern vivum ferre non poteratf), as well as similar statements at Att. 14.14.2, ad Brut. 1.16.5 (Brutus to Cicero), Phil. 1.24, and 2.96; cf. also Amic. 4 1 , where Cicero emphasizes that Tiberius Gracchus' partisans persisted in their stance even after his death [hunc etiam post mortem secuti amid . . .). His preoccupation with current politics sometimes causes Cicero to lose the thread (see ad §§ 23-29). Hence the objection of Arzert 4 , XXXIII, that a complaint about the loss of liberty hardly fits the argument about the deaths of tyrants, though true in itself, is not necessarily decisive against £'s reading, nor is the fact that this reading to some degree undercuts the doctrine malus . . . est custos diuturnitatis metus ($ 23). The reading of ξ is odd, however; for the point is introduced elliptically without, as in the paral­ lel passages, full context being given (has material been lost? would Cicero have clarified in revision?).—Cicero had already made the essential point at Phil. 1.35: 5i enim exitus C. Caesaris efficere non potest ut malis cams esse quam metui, nihil cuiusquam proficiet nee valehit oratio.—Lactantius (un­ der Ciceronian influence?) likewise follows the method of impugning his

Commentary on Book 2, Section 23-24

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adversaries by reference to their violent deaths in his de Mortibus Perseeutorum. . . . huius tyranni. . . quern armis oppressa pertulit civitas . . .] On Cicero's characterization of Caesar as a tyrant throughout the period following his assassination (while at the same time he complains privately that the condi­ tion of the state is still worse than during Caesar's dictatorship), cf. Justinus Klass, Cicero und Caesar. Ein Beitrag zur Aufhellung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen, Historische Studien 354 (Berlin, 1939), 213 ff., esp. 218; ad 3.83-85.—Cf. the similar point at Phil. 2.116: attulerat iam [sc. Caesar] liberae civitati partim metu partim patientia consuetudinem serviendi; ibid., 117 (a warning to Antony): haec non eogitas neque intellegis satis esse viris fortibus didicisse quant sit re pulehrum . . . tyrannum occideref Cicero at this period was in no mood to acknowledge Caesar's dementia (ibid., 116 he grants Caesar only clementiae species); cf. ad 1.88. Contrast various pas­ sages of the Caesarian orations, especially Deiot. 33-34, where Cicero ex­ plicitly repudiates the term tyrannus as applied to Caesar; cf. Heilmann, 107. On the other hand, Caesar did accept the title dictator for life (cf. MRR, 2, 305), hardly compatible with the free commonwealth.—For the iunctura armis oppressa cf. Fam. 10.1.1 (to Plancus, September, 44): quae potest enim spes esse in ea republiea in qua hominis impotentissimi atque intemperantissimi armis oppressa sunt omnia et in qua nee senatus nee populus vim habet ullatn nee leges ullae sunt nee iudieia nee omnino simulacrum aliquod ac vestigium civitatisf Sim. Mil. 38: . . . ne P. Clodius . . . vi oppressam civitatem teneret. 24 sed iis qui vi oppressos imperio coercent—qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt ut metuantur, iis nihil potest esse dementius.] Rep. 3.37 describes the differential treatment for citizens and children on the one hand and slaves on the other: nam ut animus eorpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidmi, sed eorpori ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod earn coercet et frangit. . . domini autem servos ita fatigant ut optima pars animi, id est sapientia, eiusdem animi vitiosas imbecillasque partes, ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes ceteras; cf. ad 1.41a, 3.89. At Ter. Ad. 6 5 - 6 7 Micio denies that force is a good way to maintain an imperium (et err at longe mea quidem sententia I qui imperium credat gravius esse aut stabilius I vi quod fit quam illud quod amicitia adiungitur); and in the sequel (26b ff.) Cicero himself seems to prefer kindness to cruelty for this purpose. quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis.] In our passage Cicero formulates the matter in general,

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not specifically Roman terms. The occulta de honore suffragia correspond, of course, to the Roman comitiat mentioned at Sest. 106 as one of the three outlets for expression of public opinion. Cicero states his point in stronger and more personal language at 3.83: ecce tibi qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit, idque perfecerit etc.—The confidence that Cicero here expresses in the resilience of the ancestral system stands in marked contrast with the pessimism of $ 29 [rem vero publicum penitus amisimus) or the fairly recent letter to Plancus quoted ad § 23; cf. also Hcilmann, 132. Elsewhere, too, Cicero's opinions on the subject changed with his mood (cf. passages collected by Meier, 2, n. 4), but never quite so rapidly as here.—Thomas, 107, n. 10, cites our main clause as an example of how a metaphor (demersae) can, even after an interruption (quamvis timefacta libertas), reassert itself (emergunt).—For the demersae leges note that, in the aftermath of the Sullan proscriptions, Cicero had similarly spoken of the possibility of the ius civile being oppressum (Caec. 73); cf. also, a propos Cassius' seizure of Syria, Phil. 11.28 (immediately following the sentence quoted ad 3.23): huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriam profectus, alienam provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, eis vero oppressis suam lege naturae. acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae.] The meta­ phorical use of morsus was pioneered by Cicero the previous year, first in private correspondence (dum recordationes fugio quae quasi morsu quodam dolorem efficiunt. . . : Att. 12.18.1 [15 March 45]), then at Tusc. 2.53, 3.61, and 4.15, perhaps modeled on the similar use of δηγμοί by the Stoics with reference to the effects of pain and fear (SVF 3, 107.26). Among the instances of the metaphorical usage cited by Reichmann-Buchwald, TLL 8, 1509.27 ff., our passage is unique in referring, nor to a mental state, but to physical action, i.e., Caesar's assassination. For the general idea cf. Phil. 2.113: . . . respublica, quae se adhuc tantum modo ulta est, nondum recuperavit. The text suggests that within the context of a free polity the exercise of saevitia, though apt in a relation of master and subject (in Cicero­ nian terms, for those qui vi oppressos imperio coercent), calls forth beastlike retaliation; possibly the bold metaphor suggested itself in light of the descrip­ tion of the action of beasts at $ 16 (. . . beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta . . .). The formulation is illogical, however, since one would not expect retenta libertas to involve morsus at all. Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est.] This is the doctrine of Plato's Republic; cf. Socrates' question at 578a: τί oe; φόβου -γέμειν αρ' ουκ ανάγκη την re τοιαύτην πόλιν τον TC TOLOOTOV άνδρα;

Commentary on Book 2, Section 24-25

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He then goes on to establish that the fear of his city is mirrored in the tyrant's soul (cf. 579e, quoted ad 3.85). The idea had also been put forward in Rome not long before. The mimographer Decimus Laberius, forced to perform in his own composition during Caesar's triumph over Munda (celebrated Octo­ ber, 46), whereby he necessarily lost his equestrian status, got his own back inter alia with the verse: necesse est multos timeat quern multi timent (= com. p. 361 = 297 R.*; cf. Cic. Earn. 12.18.2; Sen.delra2.11.3;Macr.Sjf. 2.7.25); cf. also Sal. Rep. 1.3.2: equidem ego cuncta imperia crudelia magis acerba quam diutuma arbitror, neque quemquam multis metuendum esse quin ad eum ex multis formido reccidat. . . Nevertheless Caesar evidently did not fear assassination, as Cic. Div. 2.23 implicitly admits: quid vero Caesarem putamusy si divinasset fore ut . . . trucidatus ita iaceret . . . quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuissef 25 quid enim censemus superiorem ilium Dionysium quo cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente carbone sibi adurebat capillum?j This anecdote, reported in greater detail at Tusc. 5.57 ff. (whence V. Max. 9.13. ext. 4), 3 2 was later provided with the motive of a barber's boasting that he regularly held a razor to the tyrant's neck (the indiscreet barber suffered crucifixion in the sequel; cf. Plut. de Garrul. 508f); it is part of an early and widespread tradition of hostile anecdote surrounding Dionysius I (432-367). T.B.L. Webster, Studies in Late Greek Comedy (Manchester, 1953), 29, and K.F. Stroheker, Dionysios I. Gestalt und Geschichte des Tyrannen von Syrakus (Wiesbaden, 1958), 21, attempted to connect this anecdote with contemporary Attic comedy. But note that the evidence they relied upon, Strattis fr. 6 Kock, is now (in part) rightly Cratin. fr. 223.3 K.-A.; hence it is unlikely on chronological grounds that the refer­ ence there to |Διονυσοκουρώνων (whatever the correct reading) should be connected with our Dionysius, since Cratinus, a γ€ρωι> in 424 (Ar. Eq. 533 = Τ 9 K.-A.), is last mentioned in 421 (Ar. Pax 700 ff. = Τ 10 K.-A., a joke about his death); even if the joke in this latter passage is not to be taken literally, he will have died shortly thereafter (otherwise he would presumably have continued to be an Aristophanic target); cf. A. Korte, RE 11.2 (1922), 32. Ncpos, too, drew this lesson (de Viris lllustribus, fr. 45 Marshall, based on the example of Dionysius?): hie autem, sicut ante saepe dictum est, quam mvisa sit singularis potentta et mtseranda vita, qui se metui quam amart malunt, cuwis facile mtellectu fuit; but this was a common topos, so that it remains unclear whether there is any relation between Cicero's use of it and that of Nepos.—Strasburger, 1990, 89-90, finds that our passage, in which Caesar is referred to along with Dionysius and other tyrants, makes explicit an implicit allegorical refer­ ence to Caesar at Tusc. 5.57 ff.; but the exemplum of Dionysius was traditional, and Caesar was not afraid of assassination (cf. ad $ 24).

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1648.11-13. The same seems likely mutatis mutandis for Callias fr. *3 K.-A. (also = Strattis fr. 6 Kock); and Strattis fr. 9 K.-A. (αλλ* ει μέλλει? ανδρείως / φώι£ειν ώσπερ μύστακα σαυτόν) has no clear bearing on Dionysius either (it is quoted at Et. Gen. [A] s.v. φώι£ειν; hence the speaker and the addressee are alike unknown; and the reference to shaving is merely by way of comparison Ιωσπερ μύστακα]). Stroheker, 21 ff., goes on to argue that such anecdotes were formed in Athens, perhaps under the influence of the Academy in the aftermath of Plato's encounter with Dionysius in 388, and disseminated to Cicero via Timaeus, to whom one anecdote hostile to Dionysius can be traced. But Panaetius can have drawn on either a philosophical or a historical source; cf. Brian Caven, Dionysius /, War-Lord of Sicily (New Haven and London, 1990), 2 3 1 - 3 2 . For the general problem of assessing Dionysius' character cf. D.M. Lewis in CAH 6 2 , 153-55. quid? Alexandrum Pheraeum—propter pelicatus suspicionem interfectus.J In the ancient sources Alexander of Pherae [regnavit 369-59) appears as the type of the suspicious tyrant; cf. Kaerst, RE 1.1 (1894), 1409.56 ff. Alex­ ander was actually killed, not by his wife (V. Max. 9.13. ext. 3 agrees with his source, our passage, in this error), but by her brothers Lycophron and Tisiphonus at her instigation (cf. X. HG 6.4.35 ff.; D.S. 16.14.1; Plut. Pel. 35.6 adds a third brother, Peitholaus). Nor was the motive, according to our earliest source, unambiguously attested or as simple as Cicero makes out: ή δε έχθρα λέγεται αύτη προ? τον άνδρα γενέσθαι υπό μεν τίνων ώ? έπεί έδησε τά εαυτού παιδικά ό 'Αλέξανδρο?, νεανίσκον όντα καλόν, δεηθείση? αυτή? λϋσαι έξαγαγών αυτόν άπέσφαξεν oi δε τινε? to?, έπει παϊδε? αΰτώ οΰκ εγίγνοντο εκ ταύτη?, ότι πέμπων ει? Θήβα? έ μ νήστευε την Ίάσονο? γυναίκα λαβείν (Χ. HG 6.4.37); in the latter version it was hardly an ordinary case of pelicatus, but a question of replacement of his niece (Thebe) by his aunt on grounds of the former's infertility; cf. Westlake, 155-56. . . . ad earn ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum et eum quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis destricto gladio iubebat anteire . . .] The reference is to tattooing, rather than branding. Runaway slaves and prisoners of war were often tattooed among the Greeks and Romans, a practice introduced from Persia, whereas there is little unambiguous evi­ dence for the actual branding of human beings in the classical world. The Greek attitude is exemplified by Herodotus' comment on the tattooing of the Thebans who medized at Thermopylae with the στίγματα βασιλήια: ού μεντοι τά γε πάντα ευτύχησαν . . . (7.233.2). On the other hand, in Thracian society the tattoo was a mark of nobility; ibid., 5.6.2: τό μεν έστίχθαι εύγενε? κεκριται. το δε άστικτον άγεννε?; cf. Artem. 1 . 8 : . . . στίζονται παρά θραξιν οι εύγενεΐ? παΐδε? . . . If the tattooing of Thracian women is more

Commentary on Book 2, Section 25-26a

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prominent in our evidence, which includes Attic vase-paintings as well as such literary sources as Plut. de Sera Num. Vind. 557d and Ath. 12.524d, this is presumably because they were more likely to attract notice (through taking up residence in Greek cities as a result of capture in war, marriage, etc.). An Athenian resident who bore such marks was likely to receive an unflattering sobriquet (cf. the man mentioned as the father of Theocritus and by the nickname Έλαφόστικτο? at Lys. 13.19). The notae Thraeciae, then, would have implied to Roman ears that their bearer was an incorrigible slave; he may, however, rather have been a Thracian noble in the employ of Alex­ ander of Pherae. On the whole subject cf. CP. Jones, "Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity," JRS 77 (1987), 139-55. ο miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret quam con· iugem!] Apart from the title of a Naevian comedy (p. 19 R. 2 ), stigmatias is attested for the first time in our passage, its use facilitated by the preceding explanation {compunctum notis Thraeciis); see previous note. Beginning with Vitruvius stigma becomes, in fact, the technical term in Latin for a tattoo (perhaps because nota would have suggested the nota censoria); cf. OLD s.v. 26a testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit. . . non a paucis. . . sed in quern universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.] Phalaris' cruelty is attested as early as the allusion to the brazen bull at Pi. P. 1.95 (from the year 476, in the third generation after the tyrant). The conspiracy against him is said to have been led by Telemachus, the great-grandfather of the later tyrant Theron (sch. Pi. O. 2.82d and especially 3.68d). Cicero himself did not a little to spread the tyrant's notoriety in the Latin-speaking world; cf. T. Lenschau, RE 19.2 (1938), 1649.1 ff., esp. 1650.1-3, 18 ff., 1651.26 ff. Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt, universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt?] The reference is to the revolt, in the year 287, of Macedonian troops near Beroea, which Pyrrhus had just captured; in the sequel Demetrius Poliorcetes lost the Macedonian throne. As Heilmann, 108, points out, one would have expected Cicero to mention the cause. Contributing factors included a distaste with the forms of Oriental monarchy introduced by Alex­ ander and his successors, war-weariness (on the heels of an unsuccessful campaign against Pyrrhus in Aetolia, massive preparations were underway for war in the East), and Demetrius' own arrogance; cf. Kaerst, RE 4.2 (1901), 2788.33 ff.; CF. Edson, HSPh 45 (1934), 236 ff.; Walbank in N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia 3 (Oxford, 1988), 224 ff.; Edouard Will in CAH 7.1 2 , 101-9. Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes fere socii deserue-

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runt, spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae calamitatis?] It would not be surprising if, as at 1.84, Panaetius offered the Spartans as an example. Isocrates' catalogue of Spartan misdeeds culminates in a similar assessment of the cause of Sparta's downfall: . . . ουδέν δ' έπαύσαντο του? μέν άλλου? κακώ? ποιούντε?, αύτόϊ? δέ τήν ήτταν τήν ev Αίύκτροι? παρασκ€υά£οντ€?; ην φασί τιν£? αΐτίαν γ€γ€νήσθαι τη Σπάρτη των κακών, ούκ αληθή λ^γοντ^?* ού γάρ δια ταύτην υπό των συμμάχων έμισήθησαν, αλλά δια τα? ϋβρ€ΐ? τα? έν τόί? έμπροσθεν χρόνοι? και ταύτην ήττήθησαν και π€ρί τη? αυτών βκινδύνβυσαν (8.100; for further detail cf. $$ 97-100 with the com­ mentary of M.L.W. Laistner, ed., Isocrates, De pace and Philippus [New York and London, 1927] ad loc). Though the sources for the Spartan disas­ ter at Leuctra (July, 371) tend to emphasize Epaminondas' superior tactics, even Xenophon admits that low morale on the allied side was a factor (HG 6.4.15: οι δέ πολέμαρχοι . . . αίσθανόμενοι δε του? συμμάχου? πάντα? μέν άθύμω? έχοντα? προ? το μάχ€σθαι. έστι δέ οϋ? αυτών ουδέ άχθομένου? τω γβγενημένω . . .), as well it might be in view of continued Spartan domina­ tion when the percentage of Spartiate fighters was substantially reduced: cf. P. Cartledge, Sparta and Laconia: A Regional History (London, 1979), 294; J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster, 1985), 58; on Leuctra in gen­ eral, ibid., 151 ff., esp. 160-61; Robin Seager in CAH 6 2 , 183-84. 26b-29a The observations Cicero here offers are the most thoughtful reflec­ tions on imperialism that have come down to us from a Roman pen; though written hastily rather than systematically, they challenge comparison with Thucydides' analysis of Athenian imperialism, on which cf. Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, tr. Philip Tody (Oxford, 1963), 311 ff. 26b Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor.] Here Cicero makes explicit his general practice of adding "domestic" (Roman) examples to the Greek ones 33 supplied by Panaetius (cf. ad $ 16 above). Such a division between foreign and domestic examples was in use in other works of the time. Thus Nepos* biographical collection de Viris lllustubus was organized on this principle (cf. fr. 47), with (presumably after a first, introductory book) the foreigners occupying the even-numbered books, the Romans the odd-numbered (fr. 56: Aulus Albinus treated in Book XIII); this arrangement (also followed in his Exempla}) may have influenced Valerius Maximus' arrangement of material in the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia (the order being reversed for the sake of local interest and/or patriotism). Cicero was person­ ally acquainted with Nepos; whether he knew the de Viris lllustribus or 33. On his altered practice in the final Book cf. ad 3.48.

Commentary on Book 2, Section 26a-26b

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Exempla and could thus have been influenced by Nepos' arrangement is, however, unclear (cf. p. 397, n. 32 supra). Varro's Hebdomades vel de Imaginibus, composed ca. 39, probably adopted a similar division of Greek and Roman material; cf. Wissowa, RE 4.1 (1900), 1409.32 ff. (Nepos* personal acquaintance with Cicero); ibid., 1411.5 ff. and 1412.43 ff. (respectively on the organization of de Viris Illustribus and the influence on Valerius Maximus); H. Dahlmann, ibid., Suppl. 6 (1935), 1227.31-32 and 1228.22 ff. (on the date and probable disposition of the Hebdomades). Cf. also Sen. de Ira 3.18.1: utinam ista saevitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nee in Romanos mores cum alt is adventiciis vitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset!—The Spartan experience appears as a warning for Rome at § 77 as well. Some authors traced the Sabines back to wandering Lac­ edaemonians and regarded many Roman customs as Sabine/Spartan in ori­ gin; cf. Elizabeth Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in European Thought (Oxford, 1969), 99 ff. 2 6 b - 2 7 verum tamen quam diu imperium populi Romani—patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.] Chapter 6 of Meyer ("Patrocinium und praedia populi Romani bei Cicero") amounts to an ex­ tended commentary on this passage. He shows that Cicero's preference for the term patrocinium, which implies responsibility of the patronus to protect the legal rights of the cliens, over the term imperium, with its implication of unlimited power based upon superior force, did not result in any thor­ oughgoing attempt on Cicero's part to reform the imperial system because of the essentially passive role of the patronus in intervening only in emergencies (ibid., 221-23). Moreover, in spite of the fact that Cicero took on, for instance, the prosecution of Verres in part out of real sympathy for the plight of the Sicilians (and, of course, in part for opportunistic political reasons 34 ), he did not always adhere to the high ideals of de Officiis (cf., besides our passage, 3.36, 49, and 87-88), as Meyer, 226 ff., shows in detail; on his financial gains as governor of Cilicia cf. Shatzman, 413; on his probable share in the profits from Antonius' governorship of Macedonia cf. ad 1.68. 26b . . . quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebarur, non iniuriis . . .] Several writers assert the mildness of early Rome in dealing with subject peoples, sometimes in contrast with Greek states: Sallust remarks in pace . . . beneficiis quam metu imperium agitabant {Cat. 9.5); Li v. 22.13.11 explains the failure of Hannibal's scorched-earth policy to incite rebellion among Rome's Campanian allies in 217 as follows: nee tamen is terror, cum 34. Cf. RA. Brunt, "Patronage and Politics in the 'Vernnes,'" Chiron 10 (1980), 288-89, for an analysis of Cicero's motives for accepting the case; ad $ 50.

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omnia bello flagrarent, fide socios dimovit, videlicet quia iusto et moderato regebantur imperio nee abnuebant, quod unum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere; and in a speech reported at Tac. Ann. 11.24.4, in a similar vein to our passage, Claudius contrasts early Rome's kindly treatment of conquered peoples with the harsher practices that led to the ruin of Greek states: quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebantf at conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit. A realistic account would have included some sort of qualification; cf. Heilmann, 109; ad $ 75. For attitudes of Romans of the time toward their empire in general cf. Brunt, 1976, 161 ff. = 291 ff.—For the ethical Golden Age situated in the past cf. also ad 2.76, 3.1-4,13b—17, 109, and 111 (on observance of oaths); Edwards, 178, n. 8.—Sal lust, too, associated Rome's moral decay with the mistreatment of its allies; cf. Cat. 10.6; Gabba, 133. Cf., in general, J. de Romilly, The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors (Ann Arbor, 1977), 75. . . . exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii. . . ] Cicero is building a crescendo; the next stage will be the non honesta victoria of Sulla, the climax Caesar's victory, foedior even than his causa impia. . . . regum populorum nationum portus erat et perfugium senatus . . .] Cf. (on the burning of the senate house) Mil. 90: quo quid miserius. . . vidimusf templum sanctitatis,. . . caput urbis, aram sociorum, portum omnium gentium . . . inflammari, exscindi, funestari. . .—Perfugium (c), though a favor­ ite word of Cicero (it also occurs, e.g., at § 63), all but died out after him; Winterbottom was surely right to insert it in the text here in place of refugium (£), for which our passage would be the earliest attestation; for the iunctura cf. Clu. 7:. . . magna me spes tenet. . . hunc locum consessumque vestrum . . . tandem ems [sc. A. Cluenti] fortunae miserae multumque iactatae portum ac perfugium futurum; cf. Forccllini s.vv. perfugium, refugium. 27 sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus;. . . ] Authors differed as to the date of the onset of moral decay at Rome; cf. Edwards, 177-78. Cicero was, in any case, not alone in seeing Sulla's victory as a major turning point; cf. Sal. Cat. MAS; Gabba, 132-33; Heilmann, 110. Laelius at Rep. 3.41 rraces to Ti. Gracchus the first sign of a change in relations with the socii: [incipit quaternio] * Asia Ti. Gracchus, perseveravit in civibus, sociorum nominisque Latini iura neglexit ac foedera. quae si consuetudo ac licentia manare coeperit latius, imperiumque nostrum ad vim a iure traduxerit, ut qui adhuc voluntate nobis oboediunt, terrore teneantur, etsi nobis qui id aetatis sumus evigilatum fere est, tamen de posteris nostris et de ilia immortalitate re-

Commentary on Book 2, Section 26b-27

403

ipublicae soUicitor, quae poterat esse perpetua, si patriis viveretur institutis et moribus. desitum est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta cmdelitas.] Our passage comprises a short account, with focus on effects on relations with the socii, of the process of desensitization described in detail at the conclusion of Sex. Rose, which, though delivered thirty-six years previously, remained a favorite of Cicero (cf. ad $ 51): vestrum nemo est quin intellegat popuium Romanum qui quondam in hostis lenissimus existimabatur hoc tempore domestica crudelitate laborare. banc tollite ex civitate, iudices, . . . ; quae non modo id habet in se mali quod tot civis atrocissime sustulit verum etiam hominibus lenissimis ademit misericordiam consuetudine incommodorum. nam cum omnibus horis aliquid atrociter fieri videmus aut audimus, etiam qui natura mitissimi sumus adsiduitate molestiarum sensum omnem humanitatis ex anhnis amittimus; cf. Diehl, 161. See the comprehensive study by Frar^ois Hinard, Les proscriptions de la Rome republicaine, Collection de l'Ecole Frar^aise de Rome 83 (Rome, 1985). For the mistreatment of allies cf., e.g., Man. 38: utrum pluris arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestrorum armis hostium urbis an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletasf ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria.] The honesta causa was, of course, the restitution of the respublica, marred, however, by the ensuing proscriptions. The distinction is made to highlight that Caesar was worse in both respects, causa and the use of his victoria. In fact, Sulla's change after his victory became common coin in ancient historiography beginning with Sal. Cat. 11.4: sedpostquam L. Sulla armis recepta republica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit, rapere omnes, trahere,. . . foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere; cf. Meier, 248 and n. 261. est enim ausus dicere hasta posita, cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium et certe avium, praedam se suam vendere.] Later in this Book (§§ 73-83) Cicero will argue in detail that private property should not be tampered with; and that argument will culminate in another reference to the hasta of Sulla and Caesar (§ 83). Cicero had retailed the anecdote, in virtually the same words, at Ver. 2.3.81: unus adhuc fuit post Romam conditam—di immortales faxint, ne sit alter!—, cut respublica totam se traderet temporibus et malis coacta domesticis, L. Sulla, hie tantum potuit ut nemo illo invito nee bona nee patriam nee vitam retinere posset; tantum animi habuit ad audaciam ut dicere in contione non dubitaret, bona avium Romanorum cum venderet, se praedam suam vendere; cf. Agr. 2.56: L. Sulla cum bona indemnatorum civium funesta ilia auctione sua venderet et se praedam suam diceret vendere . . . ; Shatzman, 272. Cf. Farad. 46 on the

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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officii*

proscriptiones locupletium and ilia Sullani temporis messis; Atticus' policy as described at Nep. Att. 6.3: ad hastam publicam numquam accesstt. Sulla's policy is typical of a tyrant; and though Cicero does not apply the term to him here, he does so elsewhere (Agr. 3.5); cf. also the reference to Sulla's regalis potestas at Har. 54; Heilmann, 110; S. Lanciotti, "Silla e la tipologia del tiranno nella letteratura latina repubblicana (!)," Quaderni di Storia 3 (1977), 129-53 (on our passage 137-38); Diehl, 149-50 and 160-61. secutus est qui in causa impia, victoria etiam foediore, non singulonim civiurn bona publicaret, sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure comprenderet.J For Cicero's view of Caesar's legal basis for the civil war (implicit in the phrase in causa impia) cf. ad 1.26 and 3.82b-85; on the outcome cf. Phil. 8.7: de proximo bello civili non libet dicere: ignoro causam, detestor exitum.—For the antithesis cf. Tusc. 5.15: quid, si idem, quod plerumque fit, paupertatem ignominiam infamiam timet, . . . 5/ denique, quod non singulis hominibus, sed potentibus populis saepe contingit, servitutemf—lus appears here in the broad sense "condition, status"; hence Holden paraphrases calamitatis iure as calamitoso statu; cf. Primmer, TLL 7, 688.32 ff., esp. 4 0 - 4 1 . 28 itaque vexatis ac perditis cxteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi imperii portari in triumpho Massili