A Commentary on
Cicero, De Officiis
A Commentary on
Cicero, De Officiis
ANDREW R. DYCK
Ann Arbor
T H E UNiVERsrrr OF MICHIGAN PRESS
Copyright © by the University of Michigan 1996 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America @ Printed on acid-free paper 1999
1998
4
3 2
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Publication of this volume was supported in part by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dyck, Andrew R. (Andrew Roy), 1947A commentary on Cicero, De Officilis / Andrew R. Dyck. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 0-472-10719-4 (acid-free paper) 1. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De officilis. 2. Ethics, Ancient. 3. Panaetius. 1. Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De officilis. Π. Title. PA6296.D5D93 1996 17Γ.2—dc21 96-45128 CIP
Dis Manibus Friderici Solmsen
Contents Preface ix Works Cited by Author
xiii
Introduction 1 1. Καθήκοντα and Their Place within Stoic Ethics 2 2. Title 3 3. The Composition: Date, Circumstances, Consequences 8 4. The Addressee 10 5. Panaetius, nepi τοΰ καθήκοντος, as Source for Books 1-2 (1) A Note on Source-Criticism 18 (2) Date of Composition 21 (3) Why Panaetius May Have Left irepi του καθήκοντος Unfinished 23 (4) The Intended Audience for Trepi τοΰ καθήκοντος 24 (5) Cicero's Use of His Model 28 (6) The Subsequent Fate of ircpi τοΰ καθήκοντος 28 6. Politics in de Officiis 29 7. Cicero philosophus (?) 36 8. Influence through the Centuries 39 9. Language and Style 49 10. The Text 52 Commentary on Book 1 57 Commentary on Book 2 353 Commentary on Book 3 483 Addenda et Corrigenda
665
INDICES
Index Index Index Index Index Index
of of of of of of
Topics 657 Latin Words 664 Greek Words 671 Grammatical and Stylistic Features Authors 677 Proper Names 708
674
17
Preface
As early as 1932 Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff called for a com mented edition of Cicero, de Officiis,1 a call repeated, so far as the commen tary is concerned, by Olof Gigon in 1969. 2 Indeed the aids in existence when Wilamowitz wrote, consisting mostly of school commentaries from the end of the previous century (C.F.W. Miiller, O. Heine, H.A. Holden), though useful for grammatical or stylistic points and providing some parallels and background information from ancient sources, are inadequate for anyone seeking to follow closely the train of thought or place the argument within the history of philosophy. De Officiis abounds in tricky distinctions, defini tions that appear arbitrary or opaque, and examples that sometimes seem to contradict, rather than illuminate, the argument. Little wonder that a schol arly commentary has remained so long unattempted. It is true that, shortly after Wilamowitz's call for a commented edition, two monographs appeared from the pen of M. Pohlenz: Antikes Fuhrertum: Cicero De officiis und das Lebensideal des Panaitios, which includes a detailed discussion of Books 1-2, and a separate study of Book 3. Pohlenz's work helps to provide philosophical context for the doctrines of de Officiis but is no replacement for a modern commentary. The writer of a monograph has the license, denied to a commentator, to concentrate on points of per sonal interest and to pass over other matters, however important or problem atic, a license that Pohlenz did not hesitate to use. Moreover, Gigon was perhaps not too harsh in saying that, while including many learned details, "Pohlenz largely confines himself to a paraphrase of the content, and this paraphrase rends to be superficial and betrays an occasional tendency toward homemade edification. The result is such as to frighten the reader away from de Officiis, rather than encourage him to study it more closely."3 Finally, Pohlenz underrates, I think, the degree to which Cicero has allowed his own 1. Wilamowitz, 1932, 2, 396, n. 1; sim. Otto Ricth, Grundbegriffe der stoischen Ethik, Problemata 9 (Berlin, 1933), 19. 2. Gigon, 267. 3. Ibid.: " . . . so beschrankt sich Pohlenz doch auf weite Srrccken hin auf eine Paraphrase dcs Inhalts, deren Oberflachlichkeit und gelegentlicher Hang zu hausbackener Erbaulichkeit den Lescr von nahcrcr Bcschaftigung mit De officiis ehcr abschreckt, als dap sie ihn dazu aufmuntcrt."
χ
Preface
iudicium to set the emphasis in Books 1-2 by attributing, for instance, even the attacks on the Gracchi to his Greek source, Panaetius, as well as the degree to which Cicero, rather than Pohlenz's putative Greek source, Athenodorus Calvus, has shaped the direction of the argument of Book 3. 4 The separation of Greek and Roman elements has needed rethinking with greater attention to the personal and political agenda of Cicero at the time of composition. The years since Pohlenz's work have seen publication of school commen taries on Book 1 by S. Prete (1951), on Books 2 and 3 by G. Schiassi (1967, 1954), and on Book 2 alone by P. Cugusi (1994), as well as M. Testard's twovolume Bude edition with translation and notes (1965-70). English readers have reason to be grateful to M.T. Griffin and E.M. Atkins for their recent annotated translation (1991); similar works for the German market have been produced by K. Buchner (2d ed., 1974) and H. Gunermann (rev. ed., 1992). Though all these books have their uses, their format severely limits the scope of the exegesis. Meanwhile K.B. Thomas and W. Heilmann have pro vided observations that help to clarify Cicero's meaning and/or train of thought in particular passages.5 I take it that the edition desiderated by Wilamowitz has now been sup plied by M. Winterbottom (Oxford, 1994), which, in view of its more broadly based recensio, clear presentation of evidence, and judicious han dling of problems, is likely to remain standard for the foreseeable future (see further the introduction, § 10). There remains, however, the need for a modern scholarly commentary to de Offtciis. In trying to supply such, I am well aware that no commentary, except perhaps one that sets no higher goal than to collect the relevant ancient testimonia, can claim to be definitive. Each generation will pose its own questions to the text. I have tried to bear in mind that nowadays commentaries are not (if indeed they ever were) read for their own sake but serve merely as an aid to the understanding of the author. A note of excessive length and prolixity can actually block a reader's approach to the text. I have tried to come quickly to the point by citing the relevant ancient evidence, often verbatim, so that the reader can judge a question independently, and then draw conclusions as appropriate. I have not tried to create a repertory of miscellaneous learning attached to the text; instead I have referred the reader to standard works where such background information can be found. To orient the reader, I 4. See further the introduction to that Book. 5. On Heilmann's work cf., however, Griffin, loc. cit. introduction, n. 142; Dyck, 1984, 216, n. 2.
Preface
xi
have provided introductory notes to each of the three books; I have also included headnotes for cohesive groups of chapters (e.g., 1.1-6) to help the reader grasp the organization of the essay and the direction of the developing argument (in the event of overlapping groups the order is from larger to smaller), as well as notes on individual chapters and lemmata. For grammati cal points I have ordinarily contented myself with citing exempli gratia one or rwo parallels. I am acutely aware that I am standing on my predecessors' shoulders: most of the parallels are drawn without special acknowledgement from the serviceable school commentaries of Heine, Muller, and Holden or the great variorum edition of J.G. Graevius; for points of grammar and style more detailed treatment can be found in Muller's commentary. This work owes a great deal to many benefactors, instititutional and personal, living and dead. I was first introduced to de Officiis as an under graduate in a seminar taught by Friedrich Solmsen at the University of Wisconsin, who encouraged my plan to produce a commentary and read and commented on some specimens of the work in its earliest phase; the dedica tion expresses a debt that can never be repaid. My work began to take real shape during the academic year 1991 - 9 2 thanks to the generous support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the University of California President's Fellowship Program in the Humanities, and the School of Histor ical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. The National Endowment for the Humanities also provided a subvention to help defray printing costs. The Institute for Advanced Study as well as das Philologische Seminar of Bonn University provided me ideal working conditions from the fall of 1991 through the end of the calendar year 1992. The Academic Senate of the University of California, Los Angeles, has over many years generously provided for my research expenses. David Blank, Glen Bowersock, the late Charles Brink, Bruce Frier, Sander Goldberg, Christian Habicht, Michael Haslam, Brad Inwood, Catherine Schlegel, Christine Schmitz, and Michael Winterbottom have laid me under great obligation by reading the manuscript in whole or in part and giving me the benefit of their comments; they have saved me from numerous errors of fact and interpretation. The last-named also very generously allowed me to see a copy of his new critical edition prior to publication. I would like to express special thanks to D.R. Shackleton Bailey, who put me deeply in his debt by reading the manuscript with meticulous care far beyond what anyone has a right to expect from a reader for the Press; he has saved me from many errors and enriched the work with many good suggestions. The work would probably never have been published at all and surely not in this form but for the intervention of Ellen Bauerle of the University of Michigan Press, for whose unflagging encouragement and help at every stage I am profoundly
xii
Preface
grateful, as well as to an anonymous reader for the Press for valuable com ments. Last but by no means least, my wife Janis provided support, under standing, and encouragement throughout the long process of gestation. For remaining defects I bear sole responsibility.
Works Cited by Author
Editions of de Officiis Atzert1 Atzert2 Atzert3 Atzert* Baiter, 1861 Baiter, 1865 Beier Buchncr Cugusi Facciolati
Fedeli Gernhard Graevius
Griffin and Atkins Gruber Gunermann Heine Heusinger
Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1923. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1932. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1949. Atzert, C., ed. Leipzig, 1963. Baiter, I.G., I.C. Orelli, and C. Halm, eds. Opera omnia. 4 vols. (Off. in vol. 4). Zurich, 1861. Baiter, I.G., and C.L. Kayser, eds., Opera omnia. 11 vols. (Off. in vol. 8, 1865). Leipzig, 1860-69. Beier, Carolus, ed. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1820-21. Buchner, Karl, ed. and tr. Vom recbten Handeln. 2d ed. Zurich-Stuttgart, 1964. Cugusi, Paolo, ed. De officiis Libro II con antologia dai libri I e III. Milan, 1994. Facciolati, J., ed. De Officiis libri tres, de Senectute, de Amicitia, de Somnio Scipionis et Paradoxa, accedit Q. Fratris Commentariolum Petitionis. Venice, 1747. Fedeli, P., ed. Milan, 1965. Gernhard, A.G., ed. Leipzig, 1811. Graevius, I.G., ed. De Officiis libri tres, Cato maior, Laelius, Paradoxa, Somnium Scipionis. Leiden, 1710. Griffin, M.T., and E.M. Atkins, trs. Cicero, On Duties. Cambridge, 1991. Gruber, J. von, ed. Leipzig, 1856. Gunermann, Heinz, ed. and tr. De Officiis. Vom pflicbtgemafien Handeln. Rev. ed. Stuttgart, 1992. Heine, Otto, ed. 6th ed. Berlin, 1885 (1st ed. Berlin, 1857). Heusinger, I.F., ed. (post I.M. Heusinger). Braun schweig, 1783.
xiv
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Holden Lambinus Langius Miller Muller Pearce Prete Sabbadini Schiassi Stuerenburg Testard Unger Winterbottom
Holden, Hubert Ashton, ed. New ed. Cambridge, 1899. Lambinus, D., ed. Paris, 1565 {non vidi). Langius, C , ed. Antwerp, 1563 (nott vidi). Mi I lee, Walter, ed. and tr. Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1913. Muller, C.F.W., ed. Leipzig, 1882. Pearce, Zacharias, ed. London, 1745. Prete, Sesto, ed. De Officiis, libro primo. Flo rence, 1951. Sabbadini, Remigio, ed. Turin, 1889 (rp. 1956). Schiassi, G., ed. De Officiis liber tertius, liber secundus. Bologna, 1954, 1967. Stuerenburg, Rudolphus, ed. 2d ed. Leipzig, 1843. Testard, Maurice, ed. and tr. 2 vols., Paris, 1 9 6 5 70. Unger, G.F., ed. Leipzig, 1852. Winterbottom, M., ed. Oxford, 1994. Other Works of Cicero
Att.
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Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. M.T. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum. 2 vols. Stuttgart, 1987 (for Latin text). Or Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. Cicero's Letters to Atticus. 7 vols. Cambridge, 1965-70 (for commentary). Pease, Arthur Stanley, ed. M.T. Ciceronis De Divinatione libri duo. University of Illinois Stud ies in Language and Literature 6 and 8. Urbana, 1920-23; rp. Darmstadt, 1963. Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. M.T. Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares. Stuttgart, 1988 (for Latin text). Or Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. Cicero, Epistulae ad Familiares. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1977 (for commentary). Crawford, Jane W., ed. Cicero, The Fragmentary Speeches. 2d ed. Atlanta, 1994. Gabarino, I., ed. M.T. Cicero, Fragmenta ex libris philosophicis, ex aliis libris deperditis, ex scriptis incertis. Milan, 1984.
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xv
See Crawford under "Modern Authors." Shackleton Bailey, D.R., ed. and tr. Cicero, Philippics. Chapel Hill and London, 1986. Other Ancient Authors and Works
Anon. lamb.
Aristippus Mannebach Bion of Borysthenes
Carneades M.
Carneades W.
Cato Jordan Cirenaici Hecato G.
Metrodorus Muson. Ruf. Panaetius fr. Socr. Solon fr. West
Diels, Hermann, and Walther Kranz, eds. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 11th ed. 3 vols. Zurich-Berlin, 1952, no. 89. Mannebach, Erich, cd. Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum Fragmenta. Leiden-Cologne, 1961. Kindstrand, J.F., ed. Bion of Borysthenes: A Collection of the Fragments with Introduction and Commentary. Uppsala, 1976. Mette, Hans-Joachim. Weitere Akademiker heute: von Lakydes bis zu Kleitomachos. Lustrum 27, 39-148 at 5 3 - 1 4 1 , 1985. Wisniewski, Bohdan, ed. Karneades, Fragmente. With commentary. Wroclaw-Warsaw-Cracow, 1970. Jordan, Henricus, ed. M. Catonis praeter librum de Re Rustica quae extant. Leipzig, 1860. Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. / Cirenaici. Florence, 1958. Gomoll, Heinz. Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton. Seine Begriffswelt und Nachwirkung unter Beigabe seiner Fragmente. Diss. Borsdorf-Leipzig, 1933. Korte, Alfred, ed. Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta. Leipzig, 1890. Hense, O., ed. C. Musonii Rufi Reliquiae. Leipzig, 1905. van Straaten, M., ed. Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta. 3d ed. Leiden, 1962. Giannantoni, Gabriele, ed. Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae. 4 vols. Naples, 1990. West, M.L., ed. Solon is fragmenta. In Iambi et elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati. Vol. 2. 2d ed. Oxford, 1992.
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Solon test. Martina SVF Theophrastus Fortenbaugh, 1984 Theophrastus Fortenbaugh, 1992 Var. Men. Cebe
Martina, Antonius, ed. Solon, Testimonia veterum. Rome, 1968. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Ioannes ab Arnim, ed. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903-24. Fortenbaugh, W.W. Quelle» zur Ethik Theophrasts. Amsterdam, 1984. Fortenbaugh, W.W., et aJ., eds. Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. 2 vols. Leiden, 1992. Cebe, Jean-Pierre, ed. Varron, Satires menippees. Paris, 1972-. Modern Authors
Abel Adams, 1978 Adams, 1982 von Albrecht
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Abel, Karlhans. 100 Jahre Hekaton-Forschung. Wurzburger Jahrbucher N.F. 13, 101-20, 1987. Adams, J.N. Conventions of Naming in Cicero. CQ 72, 145-66, 1978. Adams, J.N. The Latin Sexual Vocabulary. Lon don, 1982. von Albrecht, Michael. Meister romischer Prosa von Cato bis Apuleius. 2d ed. Heidelberg, 1983 = Masters of Roman Prose from Cato to Apuleius, tr. Neil Adkin. Leeds, 1989. Alexander, Michael C. Trials in the Late Roman Republic, 149 BC to 50 BC. Phoenix Suppl. 26. Toronto, 1990. Allen, Walter, jr. Cicero's Provincial Governorship in 63 B.C. TAPhA 83, 2 3 3 - 4 1 , 1952. Altheim, Franz. Romische Religionsgeschichte. 2 vols. 2d ed. Berlin, 1956. Andreau, Jean. La vie financiere dans le monde romain. Les metiers de manieurs d'argent (IVe s. av. J.C. -///' 5. ap. J.C.). Bibliotheque des Ecoles ί^ηςβϊβββ d'Athenes et de Rome, 265. Paris, 1987. Annas, Julia. Cicero on Stoic Moral Philosophy and Private Property. In Philosophic Togata: Es says on Philosophy and Roman Society, ed. M. Griffin and J. Barnes. Oxford, 1989, 151-73.
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Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York-Oxford, 1993. Astin, A.E. Scipio Aemilianus. Oxford, 1967. Atkins, Margaret. 'Domina et regina virtutum': Justice and societas in de Officiis. Phronesis 35, 258-89, 1990. See also Griffin and Atkins under u Editions of de
Officiis.n Austin ad Cael. Barrett ad Hipp. Bauman, 1983
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Austin, R.G., cd. M.T. Ciceronis Pro M. Caelio oratio. 3d ed. Oxford, 1960. Barren, W.S., ed. Euripides, Hippolytos. Corr. rp. Oxford, 1966. Bauman, Richard A. Lawyers in Roman Republi can Politics: A Study of the Roman Jurists in their Political Setting, 3Ί6-82 BC. Munich, 1983. Bauman, Richard A. Lawyers in Roman Transi tional Politics: A Study of the Roman Jurists in their Political Setting in the Late Republic and Triumvirate. Munich, 1985. Beeson, Charles H. The Collectaneum of Hadoard. CPh 40, 201-22, 1945. Bernert, Ernestus. De vi atque usu vocabuli officii. Diss., Breslau, 1930. Beseler, Gerhard von. De iure civili Tullio duce ad naturam revocando. Bullettino dell'lstituto di Diritto Romano 39, 295-348, 1931. Bickel, E. Die Schrift des Martinus von Bracara Formula Vitae Honestae. RhM 60, 505-51, 1905. Blattler, P. Pirmin. Studien zur Regulusgeschichte. Diss., Fribourg, 1945. Bonhoffer, Adolf. Epictet und die Stoa. Ontersuchungen zur stoischen Philosophic Stuttgart, 1890. Bonitz, Hermann. Index Aristotelicus. In Aristotelis Opera ex rec. Immanuelis Bekkeri, ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Ed. alt. quam curavit Olof Gigon. Vol. 5. Berlin, 1961; orig. 1870. Botermann, Helga. Ciceros Gedanken zum "gerechten Krieg" in de officiis 1, 3 4 - 4 0 . Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 69, 1-29, 1987.
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Bringmann, Klaus. Vntersuchungen zum spaten Cicero. Hypomnemata 29. Gottingen, 1971. Brink, C O . Okeiuxjis and OIKCIOTT^: Theophrastus and Zeno on Nature in Moral Theory. Phronesis 1, 123-45, 1955-56. Broggini, Gerardo. ludex arbiterve. Prolegomena zum Officium des romischen Privatrichters. Forschungen zum romischen Recht 10. CologneGraz, 1957. Bruser, Werner Josef. Der Textzustand von Ciceros Biichern de officiis. Diss., Cologne, 1951. Brunt, P.A. Dio Chrysostom and Stoic Social Thought. PCPhS 199, N.S. 19, 9-34, 1973. Brunt, P.A. Stoicism and the Principate. PBSR 43, 7-35, 1975. Brunt, P.A. Laus Imperii. In Imperialism in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1978, 159-91 = Roman Imperial Themes. Oxford, 1990, 288-323. Brunt, P.A. Cicero's officium in the Civil War. JRS 76, 12-32,1986. Brunt, P.A. The Fall of the Roman Republic. Ox ford, 1988. Buchheit, Vinzenz. Ciceros Kritik an Sulla in der Rede fur Roscius aus Ameria. Historia 24, 5 7 0 91, 1975. Buchner, Karl. Studien zur romischen Literatur, 6: Resultate romischen Lebens in romischen Schriftwerken. Wiesbaden, 1967. Buchner, Karl. Zum Platonismus Ciceros. Bemerkungen zum vierten Buch von Ciceros Werk De re publica. In Studia Platonica. Festschrift fur Hermann Gundert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag am 30.4. 1974, ed. K. Doring and W. Kullmann. Amsterdam, 1974, 165-84. Burkert, Walter. Weisheit und Wissenschaft. Studien zu Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon. Niirnberg, 1962 = Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, tr. E.L. Minar, jr. Cambridge, Mass., 1972.
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Burkert, Walter. Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker. Gymnasium 72, 175-200, 1965. Busolt, Georg. Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht hex Chaeroneia. 4 vols, in 3. Gotha, 1893-1904. The Cambridge Ancient History. 2d ed. Cam bridge, 1984-. Carney, Thomas Francis. A Biography of C. Marius. Chicago, 1970. Carter, J.M. Cicero: Politics and Philosophy. In Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, ed. J.R.C. Martyn. Amsterdam, 1972, 1 5 36. Cataudella, Quintino. Sulle fonti del u De officiis" di Cicerone. Atti del I Congresso intemazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 2, 4 7 9 - 9 1 , 1961. Champlin, Edward. Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250. Berkeley, 1991. Chaumartin, Fra^ois-Regis. Le De beneficiis de Seneque, sa signification philosophique, politique etsociale. Lille-Paris, 1985. Clark, Mark E., and James S. Ruebel. Philosophy and Rhetoric in Cicero's Pro Milone. RhM 128, 57-72, 1985. Cole, Andrew Thomas, jr. The Anonymus lamblichi and His Place in Greek Political Theory. HSPh 65, 127-63, 1961. Cole, Andrew Thomas, jr. Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology. American Philo logical Association. Philological Monographs 25. Cleveland, 1967; rp. with appendix Atlanta, 1990. Review of M. Winterbottom's ed. of Off. CJ 91, 78-79, 1995. Crawford, Jane W. M. Tullius Cicero: The Lost and Unpublished Orations. Hypomnemata 80. Gottingen, 1984. Crawford, Michael H. Roman Republican Coinage. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1974.
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Dahlheim, Werner. Struktur und Entwicklung des romischen Volkerrechts im 3. und 2. Jh. v. Chr. Munich, 1968. Daremberg, C , and E. Saglio, eds. Dictionnaire des antiquitis grecques et romaines d'apres les textes et les monuments. 5 vols. Paris, 18771914. D'Arms, John H. Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, Mass., and Lon don, 1981. De Lacy, Phillip. Stoic Views of Poetry. AJPh 69, 241-71, 1948. De Lacy, Phillip. The Four Stoic Personae. ICS 3, 163-72, 1979. D'Elia, Salvatore. Echi del u De officiis" nell' "Ars amatoria" ovidiana. Atti del I Congresso internazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 2, 127-40. Rome, 1961. Denniston, J. D., ed. M.T. Ciceronis In M. Antonium Orationes Philippicae prima et secunda. With introduction, notes (mostly historical) and appendices. Oxford, 1926. Diehl, Hermann. Sulla und seine Zeit im Urteil Ciceros. Beitrage zur Alrertumswissenschaft 7. Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, 1988. Dihle, Albrecht. Die goldene Kegel. Eine Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der antiken und fruhchristlichen Vulgarethik. Gottingen, 1962. Dihle, Albrecht. Posidonius' System of Moral Phi losophy. JHS 93, 50-57, 1973. Dirlmeier, Franz, tr. Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik. With commentary. 7th ed. Berlin, 1979. Dorandi, Tiziano. Contributo epigrafico alia cronologia di Panezio. ZPE 79, 87-92, 1989. Douglas, A.E., ed. M. Tulli Ciceronis Brutus. With commentary. Oxford, 1966. Drerup, Engelbert. Demosthenes im Vrteile des Altertums. Wurzburg, 1923.
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Drexler, Hans. Review of Fedeli's ed. of Off. Gnomon 38, 558-63, 1966. Driefien, J.G. Observations in Ciceronis de officiis librorum locos quosdam difficiliores. Clebe, 1865. During, Ingemar. Aristoteles. Darstellung und In terpretation seines Denkens. Heidelberg, 1966. Dyck, Andrew R. On the Composition and Sources of Cicero, De officiis 1.50-58. CSCA 12, 77-84, 1979. Dyck, Andrew R. The Plan of Panaerius' Tkpi τοϋ καθήκοντος AJPh 100, 408-16, 1979. Dyck, Andrew R. Cicero, De officiis 2.21-22. Philologus 124, 201-11, 1980. Dyck, Andrew R. Panaerius' Conception of μεγα λοψυχία. ΜΗ 3 8 , 1 5 3 - 6 1 , 1981. Dyck, Andrew R. Notes on Composition, Text and Sources of Cicero's "De officiis." Hermes 112,215-28,1984. Edwards, Catharine. The Politics of Immorality in Ancient Rome. Cambridge, 1993. Ernesti, J.C.T. Lexicon technologiae Latinorum rhetoricae. Leipzig, 1797. Ernout, Α., and A. Meillet. Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots. 4th ed. Paris, 1967. Erskine, Andrew. The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action. London, 1990. Fantham, Elaine. Comparative Studies in Republi can Latin Imagery. Phoenix Suppl. 10. Toronto and Buffalo, 1972. Fedeli, Paolo. Sul "De officiis." Ciceroniana 3 - 4 , 33-104, 1961-64. Fedeli, Paolo. Un problema di tradizione indiretta: Nonio e il "De officiis" di Cicerone. Ciceroniana 3 - 4 , 105-154, 1961-64. Fedeli, Paolo. II "De officiis" di Cicerone. Prob lem! e atteggiamenti della critica moderna. ANRW 1.4, 357-427, 1973.
xxii
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Rotondi Rudberg Sailer de Sanctis Sandbach Schmekel Schmidt
Schmitthenner
Schofield, 1991 Schofield, 1995 1 Schofield, 1995 2 Schofield-BurnyeatBarnes Schofield-Striker
Scholz Shackleton Bailey
Rosenstein, Nathan. Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic. Berkeley-Los AngelesOxford, 1990. Rotondi, Giovanni. Leges publicae populi Romani. Milan, 1912. Rudberg, Gunnar. Ein Cicero-Konzept. Zu De officiis I. Symbolae Osloenses 9, 1-27, 1930. Sailer, Richard R Personal Patronage under the Early Empire. Cambridge, 1982. de Sanctis, Gaetano. Storia dei Romani. 4 vols. Turin, 1907-64. Sandbach, F.H. The Stoics. 2d ed. Bristol, 1989; orig. 1975. Schmekel, August. Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa. Berlin, 1892. Schmidt, Peter Lebrecht. Die Abfassungszeit von Ciceros Schrift Uber die Gesetze. Collana di studi Ciceroniani 4. Rome, 1969. Schmitthenner, Walter. Oktavian una das Testament Casars. Eine Untersuchung zu den politischen Anfangen des Augustus. 2d ed. Zetemata 4. Munich, 1977. Schofield, Malcolm. The Stoic Idea of the City. Cambridge, 1991. Schofield, Malcolm. Two Stoic Approaches to Jus tice. In Laks-Schofield, 191-212. Schofield, Malcolm. Cicero's Definition of Res Publica. In Powell, 63-83. Schofield, M., et al., eds. Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. Oxford, 1980. Schofield, Malcolm, and Gisela Striker, cds. The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics. Cambridge/Paris, 1986. Scholz, Udo W. Der Redner M. Antonius. Diss. Erlangen, 1962. See under "Other Works of Cicero" s.vv. Att.t Fam., and Phil. Without other specification = manuscript notes placed at my disposal by D.R. Shackleton Bailey.
Works Cited by Author Shackleton Bailey, 1995 Shatzman Shaw Shewring Shtaerman
Skutsch Skutsch ad Enn. Ann, Smith
Solodow Soltau
Sorabji
Steidle, 1984 Steidle, 1985
Stein ad Hdt. Steinmetz, F.
xxxvii
Review of M. Winterbottom's ed. of Off. BMCR 6,259-60,1995. Shatzman, Israel. Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics. Brussels, 1975. Shaw, Brent. Bandits in the Roman Empire. Past and Present 105, 3 - 5 2 , 1984. Shewring, W.H. Prose Rhythm and the Compara tive Method. Π. CQ 25, 12-22, 1931. Shtaerman, E.M. Die Bliitezeit der Sklavenwirtschaft in der romischen Republik, tr. M. Brauer-Pospelova. Wiesbaden, 1969. Skutsch, Otto. Studia Enniana. London, 1968. Skutsch, Otto, ed. The Annals of Q. Ennius. Oxford, 1985. Smith, Philippa R. " Ά Self-Indulgent Misuse of Leisure and Writing'? How Not to Write Philoso phy: Did Cicero Get It Right?" In Powell, 301 23. Solodow, Joseph B. The Latin Particle Quidem. American Classical Studies 4. Boulder, 1978. Soltau, Wilhelm. Eine annalistische Quelle in Cicero de officiis III. Wochenschrift fur Klassische Philologie 7, 1239-45, 1890. Sorabji, Richard. Animal Minds and Human Mor als: The Origins of the Western Debate. London, 1993. Steidle, Wolf. Beobachtungen zu des Ambrosius Schrift De officiis. VChr 38, 18-66, 1984. Steidle, Wolf. Beobachtungen zum Gedankengang im 2. Buch von Ambrosius, De Officiis. VChr 39, 280-98,1985. Stein, Heinrich, ed. Herodotos. 5th ed. 5 vols. Berlin, 1893-1901. Steinmetz, Fritz. Staatengriindung—aus Schwache oder narurlichem Geselligkeitsdrang? Zur Geschichte einer Theorie. In Politeia und Res publica. Beitrdge zum Verstandnis von Politik, Recht und Staat in der Antike dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet, ed. P. Steinmetz. Palingenesia 4. Wiesbaden, 1969, 181-99.
xxxviii
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Sreinmerz, F.-A.
Stockton Strasburger, 1956
Strasburger, 1965 Strasburger, 1990
StraumeZimmermann Striker Stroh
Stroux, 1927 Stroux, 1933 Stroux, 1949 Sumner
Swoboda
Syme Tatakis
Steinmetz, Fritz-Arthur. Die Freundschaftslebre des Panaitios nach einer Analyse von Ciceros "Laelius De amicitia." Palingenesia 3. Wiesbaden, 1967. Stockton, David. The Gracchi. Oxford, 1979. Strasburger, Hermann. Concordia Ordinum. Eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros. Amsterdam, 1956. Strasburger, Hermann. Poseidonios on Problems of the Roman Empire. JRS 55, 4 0 - 5 3 , 1965. Strasburger, Hermann. Ciceros philosophisches Spatwerk als Aufruf gegen die Herrschaft Caesars, ed. G. Strasburger. Spudasmata 45. Hildesheim, 1990. Straume-Zimmermann, Laila, ed. Ciceros Hortensius. Europaische Hochschulschriften XV, 9. BernFrankfurt am Main, 1976. Striker, Gisela. Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics, OSAP 9, 1-73, 1991. Stroh, Wilfried. Taxis und Taktik. Die advokatische Dispositionskunst in Ciceros Gerichtsreden. Stuttgart, 1975. Stroux, Johannes. Summum ius summa iniuria. Leipzig, 1927. Stroux, Johannes. Die stoische Beurteilung Alex anders des Grofien. Philologus 88, 2 2 2 - 4 0 , 1933. Stroux, Johannes. Romische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik. Potsdam, 1949. Sumner, G.V. The Orators in Ciceros Brutus: Prosopography and Chronology. Phoenix Suppl. 11. Toronto, 1973. Swoboda, Michael. De proverbiis a Cicerone adhibitis. Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu. Pracc Wydzialu Filolog.-Filoz. 14, 3. Torun, 1963. Syme, Ronald. The Roman Revolution. Oxford, 1939. Tatakis, Basile N. Panetius de Rhodes, le fondateur du moyen stoicisme. Sa vie et son oeuvre. Paris, 1931.
Works Cited by Author Taylor Testard, 1974
Thilo
Thomas
TLL Tsekourakis
Unger
Veyne Wacht van Wageningen Wagner
Walbank Walbank ad Plb. Walcot Wallace-Hadrill
xxxix
Taylor, Lily Ross. Party Politics in the Age of Caesar. Berkeley, 1949. Testard, Maurice. Ciceron, bourreau de soimeme? LEC 42, 149-62, 1974. See also under "Editions of de Officiis." Thilo, Ralf Michael. Der Codex accepti et expensi im romischen Recht. Ein Beitrag zu Lehre von der Litteralobligation. Gottinger Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte 13. Gottingen, 1980. Thomas, Klaus Bernd. Textkritische Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De offtciis. Orbis antiquus 26. Miinster, 1971. Thesaurus Linguae Latinae. Leipzig, 1900-. Tsekourakis, Damianos. Studies in the Terminology of Early Stoic Ethics. Hermes Einzelschriften 32. Wiesbaden, 1974. Unger, G.F. Zur Textkritik von Ciceros Schrift De officiis. Philologus, Suppl. 3. Gottingen, 1867, 1 106. See also under "Editions of de Officiis." Veyne, Paul. Le pain et le cirque. Sociologie historique d'un pluralisme politique. Paris, 1976. Wacht, Manfred. Privateigentum bei Cicero und Ambrosius. JbAC 25, 2 8 - 6 4 , 1982. van Wageningen, Iacobus. De Ciceronis libro Consolationis. Groningen, 1916. Wagner, Herbert. Studien zur allgemeinen Rechtslehre des Gaius. Ius gentium und ius naturale in ihrem Verhdltnis zum ius civile. Studia Amstelodamensia ad epigraphicam, ius antiquum et papyrologicam pertinentia 15. Zutphen, 1978. Walbank, F.W. Aratus ofSicyon. Cambridge, 1933. Walbank, F.W. A Historical Commentary on Polybius. 3 vols. Oxford, 1957-79. Walcot, P. Cicero on Private Property: Theory and Practice. G & R 22, 120-28, 1975. Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum. Princeton, 1994.
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Walzer
Wankel ad Dem. 18
Watson, Law Making Watson, Obligations Watson, Persons Watson, Property Wegner
Wehrli ad Aristox., et al. Weidauer Weidner Wendt Westlake White Widmann
Wieacker
Wilamowitz, 1923
Walzer, Richard. Magna moralia und aristotelische Ethik. Neue philologische Untersuchungen 7. Berlin, 1929. Wankel, Hermann. Demosthenes, Rede fiir Ktesiphon tiber den Kranz. 2 vols. Heidelberg, 1976. Watson, Alan. Law Making in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1974. Watson, Alan. The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1965. Watson, Alan. The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1967. Watson, Alan. The Law of Property in the Later Roman Republic. Oxford, 1968. Wegner, Michael. Untersuchungen zu den lateinischen Begriffen socius und societas. Hypomnemata 21. Gottingen, 1969. Wehrli, Fritz, ed. Die Schule des Aristoteles. 10 vols. + 2. 2d ed. Basel-Stuttgart, 1967-78. Weidauer, Frank. Der Prinzipat in Senecas Schrift de dementia. Diss. Marburg, 1950. Weidner, A. Die Interpolationen in Ciceros Officien. Magdeburg, 1872. Wendt, Wilhelm. Ciceros Brief an Paetus IX 22. Diss. Giefien, 1929. Westlake, H.D. Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C. London,1935. White, Nicholas P. Two Notes on Stoic Terminol ogy. AJPh 99, 111-19, 1978. Widmann, Susanne. Untersuchungen zur Ubersetzungstechnik Ciceros in seiner philosophischen Prosa. Diss. Tubingen, 1968. Wieacker, Franz. Romische Rechtsgeschichte. Quellenkunde, Rechtsbildung, Jurisprudenz und Rechtsliteratur. Vol. 1. Munich, 1988. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Stoat und Gesellschaft der Griechen. 2d ed. Berlin-Leipzig, 1923.
Works Cited by Author Wilamowitz, 1926
Wilamowitz, 1932 Wilamowitz ad Eur. Heraci Wilkins on de Orat. Wilkinson, 1963 Wilkinson, 1979 Winterbottom Winterbonom, 1990 Winterbottom, 1993 Winterbottom, 1995 Wirszubski Wiseman Wissowa Wolfflin
Wood Zetzel ad Rep. Zielinski Zucker
xli
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Panaitios. In Reden und Vortrdge. 4th ed. Berlin, 1926, 190-215. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. Der Glaube der Hellenen. 2 vols. Berlin, 1932. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von, ed. Euripides, Herakles. 2d ed. 2 vols. Berlin, 1895. Wilkins, A.S., ed. M.T. Ciceronis de Oratore libri tres. Oxford, 1892. Wilkinson, LP. Golden Latin Artistry. Cam bridge, 1963. Wilkinson, LP. Cbssical Attitudes to Modern Is sues. London, 1979. See under "Editions of de Officiis.1* Winterbottom, M. New Light on the X Tradition of Cicero's De Officiis. MD 2 4 , 1 3 5 - 4 1 , 1990. Winterbottom, M. The Transmission of Cicero's De Officiis. CQ 43, 2 1 5 - 4 2 , 1993. Winterbottom, M. The OCT de Officiis: A Post script. CQ 45, 265-66, 1995. Wirszubski, C. Cicero's cum dignitate otium: A Reconsideration. JRS 44, 1-13, 1954. Wiseman, T.P. New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.-A.D. 14. Oxford, 1971. Wissowa, Georg. Religion und Kultus der Romer. Munich, 1912. Wolfflin, Eduard von. Krieg und Frieden im Sprichworte der Romer. Sitzungsberichte der philosoph.-philol. Classe der konigl. bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften. Munich, 1888, 197-215. Wood, Neil. Cicero s Social and Political Thought. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1988. Zetzel, James E. G., ed. Cicero, De Re Publica: Selections. Cambridge, 1995. Zielinski, Thaddaus. Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte. 4th ed. Leipzig, 1929. Zucker, Fricdrich. Βάθος i\t\tep\ov. Philologus 93, 31-60, 1938.
Introduction
A well-known scholar has confessed having a harder time achieving a per sonal relation to de Offtciis than to any of Cicero's other philosophical works. 2 The fact is not surprising. The work is difficult to categorize. It was not part of the ambitious series of essays by which Cicero proposed to "rouse up" philosophy, long neglected by his countrymen.3 It was an afterthought composed when the planned cycle was complete.4 It was written in uncertain and troubled times, with a tyrant recently killed but his legacy beckoning others to imitate him (2.23 ff.). The previous year Cicero had suffered per sonal misfortune in the death of his beloved daughter Tullia. His remaining offspring, a son also named Marcus, aged rwenry-one, was living away from home and studying philosophy at Athens; he was at a critical stage of life; there were worrisome signs about his development (see § 4 below). Cicero's first impulse was to devote himself to personal matters, to sail to Athens and take young Marcus in hand. After considerable hesitation, however, he aborted the trip and returned to Rome, called back by urgent senatorial business (Att. 16.7). After a bitter exchange of speeches between himself and Antony, Cicero withdrew from Rome in late September, 44, and began writ ing. The Second Philippic, de Amicitia, and de Offtciis were products of the following weeks. Work on de Offtciis is first attested 28 October (ibid., 1. The names of Greek authors and works arc abbreviated as in LSJ (or occasionally in a slightly less abbreviated form), classical Latin authors as in OLD (works of Cicero arc generally cited by title only, Off by book and section only), postclassical Latin authors as in TLL (hence, for instance, the Ciceronian de Officiis is Off., Ambrose's de Officiis Ministrorum, off.; 1 ordinarily cite Var. Men., Sen. Dial., and Plut. Mor. by the title of the individual work. Quota tions are given according to standard editions with no attempt to regularize spelling or punctua tion (Aristotle's Politics is cited from the second edition of Otto Immisch [Leipzig, 1929] with slight modifications). Names of journals are abbreviated as in L'annee philologtque. All dates arc B.C. unless otherwise indicated. 2. Wilhelm Suss, Cicero. Eine Einfiihrung in seine philosopbischen Scbriften {mil Ausschlufi der staatsphilosophischen Werke), Abh. d. Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur, Mainz, Geistcs- und Sozialwisscnschafrlichc Kl., 1965, 5 (Wiesbaden, 1966), 143: "es fallt mir am schwersten, zu ihr (sc. de Officiis] cin lebendiges Vcrhalmis zu gewinncn." 3. Tusc. 1.5: philosophta iacuit usque ad banc aetatem nee ullum babuit lumen litterarum Latinarunt; quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est. . . 4. Cf. Div. 2.1 ff.
2
A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
15.13.6), with completion of the first two books announced 5 November (ibid., 16.11.4). On 9 December he was again in Rome committed to the struggle with Antony (Fam. 11.5.1). What resulted was not and could not be a highly polished work. Nev ertheless it has value of several sorts: it provides a continuous account of an approach to Stoic ethics (based on the καθήκοι/ or "appropriate action," which Cicero has chosen to render as officium) otherwise known to us only from meager excerpts; and it yields insight into Cicero's thinking at a crossroads in his career, as he prepared himself to enter the lists for his final struggle on behalf of the republic. There is some indication that around this time Cicero was growing aware of his mortality and thinking about his legacy and place in history: the composition of de Gloria the previous sum mer, the remark abesse banc aetatem longe a sepulcro negant oportere [Att. 16.7.7), and the renewed work on the άν€κδοτον or "secret history" of his times, containing explosive charges against Caesar and Crassus (cf. ad 2.84). Moreover, the work is at the same time Cicero's last extant communication with his son. It contains observations relevant to the life-choices facing the young man, including an emphasis on the importance of a paternal legacy in providing focus and creating expectations (1.116 ff., 2.44-45), and it re affirms Cicero's own choice of civilian statesmanship above military glory (1.74 ff.) and policy of protection of property interests (2.72 ff.). It also impugns the moral and political record of Pompey (3.82), Crassus (1.25, 3.73-75), and, especially, Julius Caesar (1.26,43,2.23,27-29, 84,3.82 ff.). De Officiis, then, stands at the confluence of several agenda, personal and political, a fact that has made it hard to evaluate. It has proved difficult for modern scholarship to separate the strands and determine where we hear the voice of the Rhodian philosopher Panaetius or other philosophical sources, where the voice of Cicero himself (see $$ 5 and 7 below). The text has raised its own set of problems: it is less polished than the other philosophica, but how much less so, and did Cicero leave things in the manuscript which he would, on subsequent polishing, have banished or destined for other uses (see § 1 0 below)? The following introduces the problems of this peculiar but uniquely precious document. 1. Καθηκοιτα and Their Place within Stoic Ethics For the Stoics appetency (opefts) has as its object καθηκοι/τα, appropriate acts that any person can perform; they have their origin (αρχή) in the "natu ral advantages" (τά κατά φύσιιΟ, more or less equivalent to the "external
Introduction, $$ 1-2
3
goods." 5 For this reason evidently the subject of the καθήκον is said to be subsequent to (ακόλουθο?) the doctrine of the preferred indliferents (SVF 3, 134.18-19); and the emphasis lies on the result of the action, which can be obtained merely by following precepts; correct intent is not implied. A subset of καθήκοντα are the κατορθώματα (also called τ^λαα καθήκοντα; cf. ad 1.8), or correct acts performed by the sage for the right reason; they are directed toward good things (αγαθά), i.e., for the Stoa, the virtues; τα κατά φύσιν provide the material (ϋλη) with which the intelligent moral agent works. 6 Cicero describes his approach to the subject as consisting in praecepta "by which human life can be formed in all directions'* {quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit: 1.7). Elsewhere, too, teachings about καθή κοντα are linked with praecepta; cf. Sen. Ep. 95.45: M. Brutus in eo libro quern περ'ι καθήκοντο? inscripsit dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus.7 Precepts on officia were directed, not toward the sage, who, being able to arrive at the correct action through use of λόγο?, had no need of them, but to the προκύπτων (cf. ad 3.13b-17). However, not all praecepta need have been of the simplistic form hoc uitabis, hoc fades which Seneca says may be needed for "weaker natures" (inbecilliora ingenia: Ep. 94.50). Indeed, Cicero/Panaetius carefully connects the recommended right actions with τα κατά φύσιν (cf. ad 1.11 ff., 97-98, 100-103a, 126-32, 127, etc.); such procedure befits an ethic that defines officium as an action for which a persuasive rationale can be given (1.8; the definition was added by Cicero). 2. Title When Panaetius composed his essay περί του καθήκοντος,8 philosophical writers were already accustomed to providing titles for their own works. 9 5. Cf. Long, 1967,62 and 65-66. When Cicero speaks ο(κα9ήικοντα themselves as if they were classed among the indiffercnts (sc. Fin. 3.58: ex quo mtetlegitur officium medium quiddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis), he appears to be departing from strict Stoic terminology (possibly he is extrapolating from the term medium officium, on which cf. ad 1.8). 6. Cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1069e = SVF 3,134.5: και τίνα λάβω του καβήκοιτο? αρχήν και υλην ττ\ς αρετής άφε'ι? τήν φύσιν και τό κατά φύσιΐ'; Cic. Fin. 3.22: . . . non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; Kidd, 1955, 184-86; Inwood, 1985, 117. 7. On Brutus' essay cf. also Gelzer, RE 10.1 (1917), 1006.57 ff. 8. For the form of the ride cf. Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 34. 9. Cf., e.g., the long list of sober titles arrested for Chrysippus {SVF 2,4.37 ff.); contrast the fact that the book that Heraclitus deposited in the temple of Artemis of Ephesus was only later titled ire pi φύσεω?; cf. E. Wellmann, RE 8.1 (1912), 505.25 ff.; one of Democritus' works, possibly the μικρό? διάκοσμο?, seems likely to have begun in the traditional form: τάδί rrepl τώι/
4
A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
The same title is attested for Zeno (SVF 1,14.31 = D.L. 7.4), Cleanthes (SVF 1, 107.10 [three books] = D.L. 7.174), Sphaerus (SVF 1, 139.31) and Chrysippus (SVF 3, 197.34 ff. [in at least seven books]), as well as for Panaetius* pupil Hecato (frr. 10 ff. Go moll) and Posidonius (frr. 39 and 40 E.-K. = 430 and 429 Th. [the latter gives the title as περί καθηκόντων]; more than one book). Only Chrysippus is known to have written περί κατορθωμά των (ibid., 200.38-39 [in more than one book]). Now the ability to evaluate a translation depends upon one's knowledge of both languages in question. From this perspective Cicero's friend T. Pomponius Atticus, a Roman long resident at Athens and a quasi-native speaker of Greek,10 was a formidable judge. In fact, he expressed reservations about the rendering of καθήκον as officium (Att. 16.11.4 [5 November 44] and 16.14.3 [one week later; quoted below]). To evaluate Cicero's title it will be necessary to analyze the sense of both the Greek and Latin terms; the sketch ing of a certain amount of semantic history on both sides will clarify the range and elasticity of each. The earliest frequently attested sense of καθήκω is geographical: "come down, reach to" (LSJ 1.2), as at Hdt. 7.22.2: ό γαρ "Αθω? έστι όρος μέγα Τ€ και όνομαστόν, ές θάλασσαν κατήκον . . . A common sense of κατά in com position is "back" or "back again" (LSJ s.v., E, citing κάτειμι. καταπορεύομαι, καταπλέω II); hence the use of our verb for regularly recurring events, as with the time of the holy months manipulated by the Argives according to X. HG 4.7.2: . . . χρηστηριαζόμενο? (sc. ό Άγησίπολι?) έπηρώτα τον θεόν εί όσίω? άν εχοι αΰτώ μη δεχομενω τάς σπονδά^ των Άργείων, δτι ούχ οπότε καθήκοι ό χρόνο?, άλλ' οπότε εμβάλλει^ μελλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ί/πεφερον του? μήνας; sim. Arist. HA 568al7 on the spawning of carp εν τη συμτται/τωΐ' λέγω (if so, the title μικρό? διάκοσμο? may have been added later); cf. H. Diels, "Herodot und Hekataios," Hermes 22 (1887), 436, n. 1. When Andronicus of Rhodes edited Aristotle's writings, he found some already supplied with serviceable titles; for the πραγματάαι he invented titles, somerimcs with greater success (e.g., πολιτικά, φυσική άκρόασι?), sometimes with less (μεταφυσικά); cf. During, 591-92. On Greek practices in titulature cf. in general Egidius Schmalzriedt, ilcpl ΦύοΈω?. Zur Fruhgeschichte der Buchtitel (Munich, 1970); on Aristotle, ibid., 96 ff., as well as Paul Moraux, Les listes anciennes des outrages d'Aristote (Louvain, 1951), 7, n. 17; cf. also R. Blum, Kallimachos und die Literaturuerieichnung bei den Griechen, Archiv fur Geschichte des Buchwcscns 18.1-2 (Frankfurt a.M., 1977), 218 = Kalli machos: The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography, tr. H.H, Wcllisch (Madison, 1991), 147. 10. On Atticus' residence at Athens cf. R. Feger, RE Suppl. 8 (1956), 505.17 ff.; on his knowledge of Greek Nep. Att. 4.1: sic enim Craece loquebatur, ut Athenis natus viderelur . . . ; at Att. 1.19.10 Cicero appeals to Atticus to correct any solecisms in die account of his consulate he composed in Greek.
Introduction, $ 2
5
καθηκούση ώρα. With reference to religious festivals the phrase ό καθήκων χρόνος could be understood as denoting the "fit" or "proper" time, a usage that doubtless led to the general sense of καθήκω as "be fitting, proper** (LSJ s.v. II); cf., e.g., Dem. 4.35: . . . ώ άνδρας 'Αθηναίοι, νομί£€Τ€ τήν μέν των Παναθηναίων €ορτήν καΐ την των Διονυσίων άβ του καθήκοντος χρόνου γίγνβσθαι . . . , with OT 75, where Oedipus speaks of Creon being gone to consult the oracle "more than the proper time" (πλβίω τού καθήκοντος χρό νου). Hence the common impersonal construction καθήκα μοι for that which it is fitting or proper for one to do by virtue of office or official charge (Lys. 26.12: . . . I'lkrrc υμΐν καθήκαν π€ρΐ ταύτης της αρχής άκριβ^στβραν την δοκιμασίαν. . .ποΐ€Ϊσθαι;Χ. An. 1.9.7:. . .στρατηγόςδ€ και πάντωνcnreoeiχθη οι ς καθήκα α ς Καστωλού πβδίον άθροίζ€σθαι . . . ; id. Cyr. 1.2.5: είσι δέ και των γ€ραιτ€ρων προστάται ήρημένοι, ο'ί προστατίύουσιν δπως και ούτοι τα καθήκοντα άποτβλώσιν) or in general (Men. fr. 532 K.-Th.: συ μέν παραιν€Ϊς ταύτα foaa σοι πρέπει, / *μέ δέ ποίΕΐν τό καθήκον ούχ ό σος λόγος, /eu ισθ* ακριβώς, ό δ* ίδιος π€ΐθ€ΐ τρόπος). The extant Greek evidence suggests, however, that the felt need to be κόσμιος, rather than to do one's καθήκον, is the norm likely to add moral tension to a Menandrian plot, 11 but this im pression may be deceptive: see the passages of Terence cited below in which officium is used. In any case, the καθήκον was taken over as an ethical term by Zeno; what precise content he gave it is not clear. An etymology was adduced, charac teristically, in support (whether by Zeno or a successor): cf. D.L. 7.108 (= SVF 1, 55.9): κατωνομάσθαι δ' ούτως υπό πρώτου Ζήνωνος τό καθήκον, άπό τού κατά τινας ήκαν τής προσονομασίας €Ϊλημμ€νης12 (might the phrase κατά τινας point to a variation in appropriate action according to social relation, as in Epictetus' σχέσεις [cf. ad 1.149]?). The well-known Stoic definition, τό άκόλουθον ev ζωή, ό πραχθέν βύλογον άπολογίαν έχει {SVF 3, 134.20; cf. 1.8; D.L. 7.108: καθήκοντα μεν ούν elvai Οσα λόγος aipd ποια ν . . .), emphasizes the role of reason, though the term could still apply to animals and plants if the rationale is supplied by an observer (cf. ad 1.8). Like the substantivized participle καθήκον, officium was connected with a verb; and the etymology from facere/efficere long continued to be felt; cf. Don. ad Ter. An. 236 {hoccin officium patrisf): 'officium' dicitur ab efficiendo, ab eo, quod quaeritur in eo, quid efficere unum quemque conveniat pro condicione personae; Aug. c. lul. 4.21: officium est autem quod facien11. Cf. H.-J. Metre, "Moschion ό κόσμιος," Hermes 97 (1969), 432-39, « p . 439. 12. Kilb, 42, should, however, have separated more carefully etymology and usage, since, in spite of the connection commonly assumed by the ancients, the latter can develop quite differently.
6
A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
dum est. By Cicero's day the word had undergone a semantic evolution similar to that of καθήκον prior to its appropriation by Zeno. Thus officium occurs repeatedly in Plautus with reference to an individual's role as a result of belonging to a given social group, e.g., at Cas. 585-86 (Cleustrata to Lysidamas): non matronarum officiumst, sed meretricium, I viris altents, mi vir, subblandtrter, with other passages cited by Bernert, 4 ff.13 In Terence, however, the term broadens beyond social roles to a general moral sense similar to that of καθήκον at Men. fr. 532 quoted above: cf. Ad. 4 6 3 - 6 4 (Hegio to Demea of Aeschinus; cf. also 514, 593, 980): . . . neque boni I neque Itberalts functus officiumst viri; Ph. 138-39: (Geta): quod fors feret feremus aequo animo. (Davos): placet: I em istuc virist officium, where, as Goldberg points out, "the irony of the slaves' posturing depends on a recog nizable moral sentiment appropriate to their superiors."14 With this background in mind let us examine Atticus' objection to Cicero's rendering of καθήκον as officium, which must be inferred from Cicero's rejoinder (Att. 16.14.3):. . . mihi non est dubium quin quod Graeci καθήκον, nos 'officium'. id autem quid dubitas quin etiam in rempublicam caderet? nonne dicimus consulum officium, senatus officium, imperatoris officium? praeclare convenit; aut da melius. If, however, Atticus had objected in general terms that officium was inappropriate for the respublica, he is not likely to have had in mind a problem as easily disposed of as Cicero thought to do by reference to the officio of various officials. Perhaps he had observed that one would scarcely speak of a citizen's officium to the state as such (cf. 1.58), 15 but ordinarily of the officia of individuals in various social relations to each other.16 Another innovation entailed by Cicero's deployment of officium - καθήκον is its use with reference to the enemy in wartime (cf. ad 13. Similarly officium appears as the "proper activity" in a professional role at Inv. 1.6, with reference in particular to physicians and orators: . . . id, quod facere debet, officium esse dicimus . . . ; and Seneca {Ben. 3.18.1) would later distinguish beneficium, officium, ministerium (all three could be called munera; cf. Vat L. 5.179, who speaks of munera given officii causa), nor by the content of the deed, but by the relationship of the agent to the recipient: beneficium esse, quod alienus det. . . ; officium esse fili, uxoris, earum personarum, quas necessitudo suscitat et ferre opem lubet; mmisterium esse servi. . . 14. For the erotic sense of officium and its exploitation in poetry cf. Charles L. Platter, "Officium in Catullus and Propertius: a Foucauldian Reading," CPh 90 (1995), 211-24. 15. Though one might speak of various obligations, such as that of giving testimony, serving as tutor, or the like within the framework of the state and its laws; cf. Oomes, TLL 9, 521.4 ff. 16. Cf. Sen. Ben. 3.18.1 (cited n. 13 supra) and in general on the "caractere subjectif" of officium, which tends to be defined by the person of the individual performing the officium (as opposed to the more objective term munus) Hellegouarc'h, 153.
Introduction, $ 2
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1.34). However, καθήκον in Panaetius' essay doubtless diverged from ordi nary Greek usage in this latter respect as well. Or was Atticus' doubt per haps, as Goldberg moots, less narrow than Cicero's reply suggests and, in fact, an objection to using this familiar Latin moral term in a technical Stoic sense? If so, this fact may explain why Cicero was keen, at the very outset, to insert a definition of terms even though he had to find it in another source (1.8). In selecting officium to render καθήκον Cicero surely chose the nearest Latin equivalent to the Greek term (the discussion of the matter ends in the preserved correspondence with Cicero's challenge da melius, which evidently went unanswered). Whatever his rendering, however, he would have faced the problem of having to fill it with a content derived from Stoic reflection about the nature of the human being and the appropriate action thereby entailed. The problem is not, as formulated by Kilb and O'Regan, 17 a divergence in sense of officium from καθήκον per se, but rather the special Stoic sense of καθήκον, directed toward fulfilling the rational nature of the human being, with officium made equivalent by Ciceronian fiat in this sense; cf. ad 1.142, where, because modestia is equivalent to ευταξία in the sense "orderly behavior," Cicero wants, by fiat, to make the Latin word equivalent to the Greek in another sense, viz., ordinis conservatio. The problem, then, was inherent in any translation project of this kind, in which one had to find a Latin equivalent for a special term already developed in Greek. In our case Cicero's innovation was more successful than his rather arbitrary manipula tion of modestia, the Latin officium being proved by later usage to have been analogously extensible to the Greek καθήκον; cf. Gel. 1.13.1: in officiis capiendis, censendis iudicandisque, quae καθήκοντα philosophi appellant. . . ; Serv. auct. ad Aen. 1.548 (with reference to the nontechnical sense): officium autem est quod Graeci TO καθήκον appellant.1* From the foregoing it is clear that "duty" and its equivalents in modern European languages are rather different from the ancient terms καθήκον/ο/"ficium. "Duty" is used of an a a that is ethically required and the omission of 17. Kilb, 63; Daphne O'Regan, "Officium and kathekon in Cicero's De Officiis," AAPhA 1990, 123. 18. Seneca, too, wrote a treatise de Officiis, though the surviving fragment gives little notion of the approach taken (3, 423 Haase).—Cicero diverges from the title of his Greek source, Panaetius' essay TTCpi του καθήκοντος, in using the noun in the plural; I take it that this is because of the Greek idiom whereby the neuter singular of adjectives and participles is often deployed in a collective sense (cf. Kiihner-Gerth 1,14), whereas in Latin thecolleaive singular for plural is tied to specific semantic categories (cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,67 ff). But Greek could also use the plural in such cases; cf. Posid. fr. 40 E.-K. = 429 Th.
8
A Commentary on Cicero, De Officii*
which is ethically forbidden. This description would, however,fitonly offtcia derived from justice (cf. 1.23b), not offtcia in general. Καθήκον is a much broader term than "duty" and can apply even to plants and animals (D.L. 7.107). Therefore I have used "appropriate action" as equivalent to KdQf\Kovfofficium in the following commentary; 1 hope that this strategy will also help avoid confusion with Kantian and other modern conceptions.19 3. The Composition: Date, Circumstances, Consequences On 17 July 44 Cicero took ship from Pompeii, the goal of the trip being a visit to his son in Athens (Att. 16.3.4 and 6). A week later he had reached Sicca's house at Vibo and was pondering the further route (ibid., 16.6.1). News from Rome that reached him at Leucopetra about the senate meeting called for the first of September, to which all consulars had been summoned by letter and at which Antony was expected to make concessions, caused him to alter his plan and start back to Rome (An. 16.7.1 [19 August]). Though he arrived at Rome just prior to 1 September, putting forward the fatigue of the journey, he kept clear of the meeting in view of death threats. But Antony took this as an insult and threatened to have Cicero's house destroyed {Phil. 1.12 and 5.19). At the senate meeting the following day Cicero rejected Antony's threats and passed scathing judgment on the consuls' conduct of office; he immediately published the speech, the First Philippic. On 19 Sep tember Antony replied in a speech blaming Cicero for the misfortunes of the past twenty years. Meanwhile he began to move closer to Octavius, and his entire policy tended, in Cicero's view, toward avenging Caesar's death (Fam. 12.3.2, quoted ad 3.82b-85). Shortly after writing from Rome the letter to Cassius just cited, Cicero departed for his estate at Puteoli, where inter alia he began writing de Officiis.20 The letters addressed to Atticus at this period attest a breathtaking 19. Cf. Graescr, 175; ad 1.8. Indeed "duty" is unfitting in rendering such a phrase as expositis adulescentium officii* quae valeant adgloriam adipiscendam (Off. 2.52), where what is clearly meant is the actions appropriate to attaining glory. 20. Long, 1995', 220 emphasizes that "there is no necessity to date his first thoughts about Off. by his first mention of it to Atticus." That is true enough. However, it should be borne firmly in mind that Off. has its raison d'etre as an ersatz visit to his son after the voyage to Greece was aborted (cf. Off. 3.121) and that the choice of subject is intimately bound up with the addressee (Att. 15.13a.2; see next section of this introduction). Therefore one doubts mat Cicero "may have been thinking about Off. immediately after he despatched De gloria to AMICUS" (SC. 11 July [Att. 16.2.6J; so Long, 1995», 224). What, if anything, lies behind Cicero's claim to have interrupted writing about maiores res in order to compose the Topica for Trebarius (Top. 1)—Long, loc. at., thinks of Off.—must remain a mystery. Was this perhaps
Introduction, J 3
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speed of composition. Cicero first mentions the project in a letter dated ca. 28 October (Att. 15.13.6 = 15.13a.2 S.B.); already on 5 November he reports completion of the first two books (Att. 16.11.4); the last reference to it is in a letter dated by Shackleton Bailey with a question mark to 13 November (Air. 16.14.3-4). On 9 December Cicero arrived back in Rome (Fam. 11.5.1); flung» in the final year of his life, back into the vortex of politics, 21 he surely could not have found leisure, even if he wanted to, 2 2 for revision of de Officiis.™ Nor was de Officiis the only thing on his mind at this time. The letter of 5 November announcing completion of the first two books also discusses Atticus* reaction to both the reply to Antony's speech of 19 September, the Second Philippic, which must have been composed at around the same time, 24 and de Senectute, and Cicero promises to polish and send off a third book (Att. 16.11.1-3; the άνέκδοτον) cf. ad 2.84); note also the crossreference to the Laelius at Off. 2.31. 2 5 Around this time he was also follow ing closely Octavian's efforts to outbid Antony for the support of Caesar's veterans and was preoccupied with the possibility of another civil war (Att. 16.8.1, dated 2 or 3 November), a concern which spills over on occasion into Off. (see § 6 below). In these troubled times Cicero had to fight free of
merely a literary topos} Cf. Ov. Am. 1.1-2: arma grain numero violentaque bella parabam I edere. . . The aim of Long's argument is to counteract the opinion that in view of die speed of its composition Off. 1-2 of necessity presents merely a translation of Panaetius. I agree with Long in finding inclusion of a fair amount of Ciceronian political reflection in these books (and less of Panaetius' political reflection than has been thought: see $ 5 [2] below). But Cicero was always reflecting on politics. The words exstabit opera peregrinationis huius in the letter announcing the project to Atticus clearly refer to Off. and are most plausibly connected with his sojourn from villa to villa in October and November (Att. 15.13a.2; 28 October). It was the combina tion of his simultaneous rcinvolvcmcnt with politics and wish to communicate with his son in fall, 44, that gave this work its peculiar character. 21. At the senate's meeting of 20 December he already delivered the Third Philippic (Fam. 10.28.2; 11.6a.2). 22. Att. 15.13a.2:. . .τάττ€ρι τοΰκα$(τ\κ)οντος magnifice explicamus... does not encour age the notion that Cicero was dissatisfied with the work. 23. Pace E. Ciaceri, Cicerone e i suoi tempi, 2 (Genoa, Rome, Naples, Citta di Castcllo, 1941), 369, who surmises that Cicero returned to Off. in summer, 43, but offers no supporting textual or other evidence. On the date of composition cf. also Karl Atzert, ed., Markus Tullius Cicero, De officiis (Limburg-Lahn, 1951), 7-8; M. Fievez, " 'Opera peregrinationis huius' ou lesetapesde la composition duDe Officiis," Latomus 12 (1953), 261-74; Testard's edition, 1,7 ff.; Gelzer, 357. 24. See the citations in the Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), Philippicae orationes.^ csp. ad 2.23-29. 25. On the dating of the Laelius to this period see ad 2.31.
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A Commentary on Cicero, De Qfficiis
interruptions in order to work on Off. at all; note the remark in the letter first announcing the project: ego autem in Pompeianum properabam, non quo hoc loco quicquam pulchrius, sed interpellatores illic minus molesti (Att. 15.13a.2, written at Puteoli or Cumae). The transmitted text of Off. needs to be evaluated against the background of the lack of time and the distraaions to which Cicero was exposed during its composition. Hence, the losing of the thread of argument (cf. ad 2.19b-20, 29, 39-42a) the presence of "after thoughts" not integrated into the text where one would have expected (cf. ad 2.19b-20 and 35 and the cause celebre: the divisio of Book 3 added only at $ 96) or the fact that the letters are sometimes the appropriate tertium comparationis for its Latinity.26 There is also the question whether Ciceronian marginalia have en tered the text without proper integration into context (cf. §10 below). 4. The Addressee27 In publishing and dedicating his works Cicero followed policies dictated by an amalgam of personal and political factors. One of his concerns was to strengthen his influence with the younger generation and thus secure his posthumous fame. Hence his claim that the enthusiasm of the youth of Rome spurred him to publish his consular speeches (Att. 2.1.3:. . . nos. . . adulescentulorum studiis excitati. . .). 28 Similarly, the youthful participants Sulpicius and Cotta, though they contribute nothing of substance, constitute an appreciative audience for the conversation of de Oratore and are the catalyst for its continuation [de Orat. 1.96-102), an indication that discourse of this kind, too, was to be thought of as existing for the sake of its educative value for youth. The years of renewed literary activity beginning in 46 saw Cicero still more concerned about the waning of his influence on the younger generation 26. Cf. Thomas, p. 52, n. 157, and 55; Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.w. Colloquialism, sermo cotidianus. 27. L. Doderlein, Reden und Aufsatze, 2 (Erlangen, 1847), 242, already remarked "Cicero hat sie (sc. de Officiis\ seinem Sohne Marcus nicht Ehren halber dediciert, sondern ganz eigenrumlich fur ihn ausgearbeitet. . ."; cf. K. Arzcrt, Die nationalpolitische Bedeutung von Ciceros Werk iiber die Pflichten (Breslau, 1933); R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 (1943-48), 1282.1 ff; M. Testard, "Lc fits dc Ciceron destinatairc du De Officii*," Bulletin de {'Association Guillaume Bude, 1962, 198-213. 28. Cf. other testimonies cited by Stroh, 52, and literature, ibid., n. 93; the motives for the publication of the speeches were, however, no doubt more complex than Cicero's words indi cate; we should probably reckon with unexpressed or unconscious Ciceronian motives in the realm of personal self-advertisement; cf. Crawford, 3 ff.
Introduction, $ 4
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of orators and politicians. Most of his literary projects of these years aimed to secure the allegiance of one of the leading members of the younger genera tion, M. Brutus; hence the dedication to him of Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, and Orator in 46 and de Finibus, Tusculanae Disputationes, and de Natura Deorum in 45; cf. Rathofer. Similarly, in the aftermath of Caesar's assassina tion he dedicated de Fato to Hirrius, consul designate for 43, as part of a strategy to win him over.29 Another member of the younger generation, C. Trebatius Testa, received the dedication of the Topica. Interspersed were dedications of a few works to members of his own generation, the second edition of the Academici libri to Varro, to whom he owed a dedication (Att. 13.12.3, quoted ad 1.48), de Divinatione to his brother Quintus, and de Senectute and de Amicitia to Atricus. Προσφωνώ autem Ciceroni filio; visum est non άι/οίκ€ΐον, so Cicero wrote to Articus with reference to Off. (16.11.4). The Romans made it no secret that ties of the flesh were important to them. Their literature reflects this fact, both thematically30 and in the dedication of works by fathers to their sons (for M. Brutus cf. ad 2.50), including works offering praecepta of various sorts (on Cato's works offering advice on medicine, agriculture, and rhetoric to his son cf. Jordan's ed., pp. XCIX ff. and 77 ff.). After all, a father was responsible for his son's education, a matter that Cicero took seriously, not only by appointing a series of tutors for young Marcus and his nephew Quintus, but also by taking on the role of tutor himself on various occasions (24 October 54: QF 3.4.6; 22 February 49: Att. 8.4.1). 31 Cicero had already written for the benefit of the eleven-year-old Marcus the Partitiones Oratoriae (autumn, 54). But since then he had reached years of discretion. Rote learning being no longer apposite, at some points in Off. Cicero attempts a kind of dialogue, with the possibility of different premises on the other side ostensibly left open (cf. ad 1.2, 3.33). Moreover, there was now, since the death of Tullia in February of the preceding year, more at stake in the rela tionship. Cicero was still concerned, as he had been since 46, with his per sonal and political legacy, of which young Marcus was now the sole custodian. 29. Cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1161.59 ff. 30. For treatment of the theme in literature cf. M. Owen Lee, Fathers and Sons in Virgil's Aeneid: turn genitor naium (Albany, 1979); AJf Onnerfors, Vaterportrats in der riimischen Poesie unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Horaz, Statius und Ausonius (Stockholm, 1974); IxMoine. 31. Cf. M. van den Bruwaenc, "M. Ciceron cducarcur dc scs enfants," Nova et vetera 15 (1933), 53 ff. Note also that in his letters Cicero rook care to correct his son's diction (Quint. Inst. 1.7.34).
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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
Marcus iunior was far from being a model student. Born in the summer of 65 (Att. 1.2.1), he received elementary instruction from Tyrannio as early as March, 56 (QF 2.4.2), later tuition from the rhetor Paeonius (ibid., 3.3.4), from Cicero himself (ibid., 3.4.6), and then from Atticus' freedman M. Pomponius Dionysius (Att. 4.15.10; 4.18.5; 8.4.1). Even at this early stage, however, his son's lack of enthusiasm for his studies did not escape Cicero's notice {Att. 6.1.12: Cicerones pueri amant inter se, dtscunt, exercentur; sed alter, ut Isocrates dixit in Ephoro et Theopompo, frenis eget, alter calcaribus; cf. de Orat. 3.36). After the brief participation of father and son on the Pompeian side in the civil war and Caesar's pardon of both, Cicero pressed young Marcus to pursue studies in Athens, as he himself had done at a similar age. Though tempted instead to rent a house in Rome [Att. 12.32.2), young Marcus finally decided to go to Athens. Here Atticus was to keep an eye on the young man and pay him an allowance derived from rental of maternal property on the Argiietum and the Aventine (ibid.). Before very long, how ever, Cicero received word that his son was not taking his studies seriously enough; he had Atticus write him a warning letter (ibid., 13.1.1). Reports of better progress ensued, but the father remained suspicious (ibid., 16.3.2). To keep Marcus' expenditures under control it proved necessary for Atticus to order Xeno to pay the young man his allowance in very small installments (ibid., 16.1.5). Moreover, Gorgias, who was supposed to be tutoring him in rhetoric, was, in fact, inciting the younger Cicero to pleasures and to drink (Plut. Cic. 24.8: Γοργίαυ . . . αΐτι.ώμ€ΐΌ? πρό$ ήδοΐ/άς προάγβιν και πότους το μ€ΐράκιοι> . . . ; cf. Sen. Suas. 7.13; Plin. Nat. 14.147); his father had Gorgias fired as soon as he found out {Fatn. 16.21.6; Plut. loc. cit.). Hence the planned trip that would take him out of Italy, where he could find no activity worthy of his rank (cf. 3.1 ff.), to visit his son in Athens (cf. Att. 16.3.4: aut proderimus aliquid Ciceroni aut quantum profici possit iudicabimus). The trip was aborted, however, on political grounds (see previous section). As we learn only in the epilogue, the three books de Officiis were intended to replace that planned visit: . . . ut, si ipse venissem Athenas, quod quidem esset factum nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset, aliquando me quoque audires, sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mea, tribues iis temporis quantum poteris . . . (3.121). He had found himself in mid-August faced with a conflict of personal and political officia. Perhaps he thought inter alia that the treatment of such problems in Off. would set his own decision to return to Rome into context for young Marcus and help him better understand his father's reason for so acting. De Officiis was never part of Cicero's earlier philosophical project, and its dedication is not merely an interchangeable literary formality. This work, from the very outset conceived
Introduction, $ 4
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with young Marcus and his needs in mind, is deeply embedded in the fatherson relation. It was meant as a call to order, an emphatic reminder of his responsibilities to himself, his family, and his society. As a father-son communication, Off strikes an intimate tone unique among the extant philosophica. Thus though each of the three proems begins with the more formal mode of address Marce fili, this later melts to mi Cicero (1.1 and 3; 2.1 and 8; 3.1 and 5). The increasingly somber meditation on otium in the last two proems, which betray the elder Cicero's growing impa tience to return to the political arena, could hardly have been addressed to anyone else except Attic us himself. Other personal touches are the inclusion of ager Arpinas and ager Tusculanus, places of personal and familial signifi cance, among the earliest examples in the tract (1.21), such references as de patre nostro (3.77), noster Gratidianus (3.80), occasional attempts to in volve Marcus jr. in the discussion as if it were a dialogue (cf. ad 3.33), and the particularly warm and personal epilogue (3.121). The person of the ad dressee also frees Cicero, so he claims, from certain constraints in speaking of his own achievements, since to him belongs, as he puts it, hereditas huius gloriae et factorum hnitatio (1.78). The intimate tone reappears when Cicero uses his son as an example of the fact that military service is a promising road by which young men can win glory. Like some other examples in the essay, this one misfires, however, since, though young Marcus was put in command of a wing of cavalry at Pharsalia,32 his glory, as Cicero phrases it, collapsed along with the free commonwealth. At this point he perceives a danger that his remarks are becoming too personal, reminds himself and his addressee that he is writing, not de te, but de toto genere» and returns to the subject (2.45;cf. J ^ / O C ) .
Aged twenty-one, young Marcus faced the choice of the career he wished to pursue. The question had exercised Cicero's Greek source for Books 1-2, Panaetius of Rhodes, who had carefully analyzed the moment when such decisions are taken and had offered some relevant precepts, which Cicero fleshed out with Roman examples (cf. ad §$ 115-21). Such a choice is usually made at the beginning of adolescence, a time of maxima imbecillitas consilii (1.117). One can compensate for this weakness, however, by follow ing parentium praecepta, though some manage to find the correct path of life sine parentium disciplina (1.118). The stress thus lies on the positive role parents can play at this critical juncture in their children's lives. In this 32. On Pharsalia, not Pharsalus, as the name of the battlefield cf. J.P. Postgate, ed., M. Annaei Lucani De bello cwili liber VIII (Cambridge, 1917), xcvii-xcviii; cf., however, R.T. Bruere, "Palaepharsalus, Pharsalus, Pharsalia," CPh 45 < 1951), 111.
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instance the illustrations, Roman and Greek,33 precede the rationale (1.116); and they are illustrations, not so much of the process of fathers giving their sons counsel, as of the common practice of following in the father's foot steps, as did Quintus Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) in the civil law and the younger Scipio Africanus in military affairs. Another possibility is for the son to add a further distinction to that inherited from his father, as in the case of the younger Africanus, who added eloquence to military prowess (might Cicero have hoped that his son would, contrariwise, add military prowess to eloquence? See below). Cicero does point out, however, that some— especially those of humble birth—have managed to carve out a successful career without a parental example to imitate (ibid.; was he perhaps thinking of his own case?). Cicero admits, however, that nature may not allow a son to follow his father's career, as in the case of the son of the elder Africanus: though his constitution precluded a military career, he could practice the other virtues (ibid.). It is to Cicero's credit, however, that, much as he would evidently like young Marcus to follow in his footsteps (cf. the argument for the greater importance of civil than military leadership at 1.74-78, culminating in the very personal remarks already mentioned at 1.78), he does (apparently after Panaetius) allow scope for individual interests and tastes. Elsewhere, too, the chosen examples tend to reinforce paternal auctontas. Thus the advice of fathers to sons cited in this essay is always well taken, as when the elder Cato warns his son Marcus, recently discharged from military service, not to engage in combat (1.37), or Philip upbraids Alexander for trying to bind the Macedonians to himself by means of the dole (2.53). Besides the father as good counselor, other models of father/son relations appear, including the contrasting picture of good father/bad son(s). There is, for instance, the case of M. Brutus, one of the founders of the civil law and his son, who likewise pursued a legal career, though, never seeking office, he earned the hated name accusator (2.50). In the case of the Gracchi, too, the sons are unfavorably compared to the father, a tactic Cicero used in his speeches as well (2.43 [cf. ad loc.\ and 80). On the other hand, there is the case of T. Manlius Torquatus, permdulgens in patrem, acerbe severus in filium (3.112), the closest approach in this essay to a bad father (though the incident involving severitas is merely alluded to thus in passing, not narrated). The personal agenda of Off., then, lies close to the surface. In this aspect the essay, as an ersatz visit, responds to Cicero's felt need to take his son in 33. Cf. the (presumably Panaetian) Greek example, the distinguished Athenian generals Conon and Timothcus; for a similar collection of empirical observations cf. 1.108 ff.
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hand and help give him a sense of direction at a critical juncture in life. The son had a taste for military activity, as his service at Pharsalia and desire, in the sequel, to join the Caesarian side show (cf. ad 2.45), a taste that Cicero did not want to discourage altogether (cf. 2.45: prima est. . . adulescenti comtnendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest) but which he wished to temper by showing the limitations of military achieve ment, however superficially glamorous (1.74-78). The emphasis on appro priate action toward parents at 1.58 and 1.160, 34 on sons following in their fathers' footsteps or at least attaining equal distinction in another line, on Cicero's own political views and successes (cf. § 6 below), and the doctrine that paternal achievements constitute a legacy to be imitated, not dishonored (1.121 ), 3 S are clearly orchestrated to galvanize the younger Cicero to achieve something on his own. In the preface to Book 3 Cicero tries strenuously to dissuade young Marcus from breaking off his studies prematurely. In fact, those studies would soon terminate, probably before the end of the year 44; for the youn ger Cicero left Athens to take up a cavalry command in Brutus' army, a decision that evidently met with his father's approval (cf. ad 3.5-6). A letter to Brutus dated April, 43, requests that his son should spend as much time as possible in his company {ad Brut. 2.5.6). Brutus for his parr was pleased with the young man and praised him as a hater of tyrants (μισοτύραιηΌς: Plut. Brut. 24.3, quoted ad 2.45), an attitude Marcus clearly imbibed from his father and not least from Off. (see § 6 below). The remainder of the younger Cicero's biography matches his father's description tua bus pariter cum republica cecidit (2.45). He contemplated launching his political career with a candidacy for the pontifical college {ad Brut. 1.6.1 and 1.14.1); with this in view he was discharged by Brutus and returned to his father in Rome in June, 43 (Cic. writes ad Brut. 1.12.3 in imminent expectation of his arrival). When, however, Antony and Octavian combined forces and he and his father were placed on the proscription list, he returned to Brutus and fought on the losing side at Philippi. Fleeing in the aftermath to the coast of Asia Minor, he joined Cassius of Parma, who still commanded troops loyal to the republic (App. BC 5.7); he later joined Sextus Pompey on Sicily (ibid., 4.220). The conclusion of hostilities by the treaty of Misenum (39) brought him back to Rome, where he enjoyed the favor of 34. At 1.58 patrta ct parentes hold first place; in the non-Panaetian account at 1.160 the gods are added at the top, the patrta takes second place and the parentes rank third; according to the casuistry of 3.90, only in the extremity of a conflict between salus patriae and salus patris should the latter give way. i5. Cf. also 2.76: imttatus patrem Africanus mhilo locuplettor Carthagine eversa.
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Octavian, born in his father's consular year. He was given a priesthood and even rose to suffect consul for the year 30 and—a small consolation for his father's murder—was permitted to read from the rostra the report of An tony's death (ibid., 4.221). Later he served as imperial legate and proconsul in Asia. But these posts were really honors for his dead father;36 for, reverting to the bad habits of his student days at Athens, Cicero jr. became a notorious alcoholic. A characteristic anecdote has it that, while serving in Asia, in his cups, he had the rhetorician Cestius flogged for calling his father an ignoramus.37 In imperial writers he figures primarily as an example of de generacy. Should one regard the role taken by Cicero the father in this work as nurturing or stifling? The relations of fathers and sons as regulated by Ro man law and custom could be fraught with tension, insofar as the son re mained under the father's potestas as long as the latter remained alive; even in Cicero's day this power of life or death over offspring was occasionally still exercised; cf. SaJ. Cat. 39.5. Cicero was surely well within the parame ters of normal parenting in his society, perhaps indeed, in granting a certain leeway in choice of a course of life (while at the same time providing re minders of family traditions), on the more lenient side of the spectrum. Their close cooperation for the rest of his life and the fact that Marcus iunior evidently revered his father's memory after his death tends to confirm this judgment.38 On the other hand, with the suggestion that the one-way com munication of the treatise could be a satisfactory substitute for a conversa tion in Athens, Cicero is a bit more authoritarian than a parent in an indus trial society today would ideally be. While addressed to his son, de Officiis was, however, also clearly meant for public circulation; the self-reminder that he is writing non de te, sed de totogenere (2.45), makes it unmistakably clear that, though the relation with young Marcus provided the causa efficiens for composition (as well as an excuse for dwelling on his own policies and achievements), it was intended, as the consular speeches ostensibly were, for an entire category of young readers in need of similar advice, as they sought, not merely a career, but a set of guiding principles for life. 36. Cf. Sen. Ben. 4.30.2: Oceronem filium quae res consulem fecit nisi paterf 37. Sen. Suas. 7.13; cf. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, "More on Seneca the Elder," Philologus 13711993), 52. Cestius wrote replies to speeches from famous trials of the past, including an In Milonem; cf. Sen. Cow. 3 praef. 15; Quint. 10.5.20. 38. On the Roman family cf. now Richard P. Sailer, Patriarchy, Property and Death tn the Roman Family (Cambridge, 1994); Judith P. Hallert, Fathers and Daughters in Roman Society: Women in the Elite Family (Princeton, 1984), esp. 331 ff., adduces evidence for tensions in the father-son relation.
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5. Panaetius, πβρι του καθήκοντος, as Source for Books 1-2 This is not the place for a full-scale biography of the Stoic philosopher from Rhodes.39 In 1892, on the analogy of the periodization of the Academy in the ancient sources, Schmekel, VI, hypostatized a Middle Stoa and made Pan aetius its founder. However, this division docs less than full justice to Chrysippus, of whose significance the ancients were well aware (cf. the fa mous epigram ei μη γαρ ην Χρύσιππος, ούκ αν ψ Στοά: SVF 2, 3.38), and overstates the importance of Panaetius, whose positions were mostly antici pated by his predecessors. Panaetius did, it is true, take an individual stand in asserting the eternity of the world and denying afinalconflagration (frr. 64 ff.) and in his agnostic attitude toward the mantic arts (frr. 70 ff.). In ethics his originality lay primarily in shifting the focus of argument from the sage to the problem of persons trying to make progress toward virtue (οί προκύπ τοντας; cf. Gill, 1994, 4605; ad 2.35); he may, in the process, have modeled his presentation of καθήκοντα on Chrysippus' handling of κατορθώματα (see introduction to Book 1). His innovations include the redefinition of the second virtue so as to add to the essentially negative virtue of just treatment of others in property questions the positive value that Cicero calls Uberalitas/ beneficentia (cf. ad 1.20-60 and 42-60); the revision of the third virtue to emphasize the mental constituents over physical courage (cf. ad 1.61-92 and 79-81); and the broadening of the fourth part of the honestum to subsume not only the traditional virtue moderation (σωφροσύνη), but appropriate behavior in general (cf. ad 1.93-151). The decision to write at length not only on factors contributing to the καλόν, his term for moral goodness, but also on the συμφέρον, as he did in the portion of his essay serving as a model for most of Cicero's second Book, was likewise pathbreaking for a Stoic and sent him in search of mostly Peripatetic sources (see introduction to Book 2). Cicero never explains his reasons ioi choosing Panaetius as his model for Off.; but they surely had to do with both the person of the author and the approach taken. Q. Mucius Scaevola the Augur, with whom, after assuming the toga virilis, the young Cicero discharged the patrocinium fori (Lael. 1), was an important influence on his young charge, and as a son-in-law of C. Laelius he was an important link between Cicero and the great men of the previous generation, including both Scipio and Panaetius. Scaevola, who, according to Cicero, acknowledged himself a Stoic (de Orat. 1.43: Stoici 39. Cf. most recently M. Pohlenz, RE 18.3 (1949), 418.63 ff., who, however, overempha sizes Panaetius* experiences involving Rome and the Romans (see below); cf. also Modestus van Straaten, Panotitis. Sa vie, ses ecrits et sa doctrine avec une edition des fragments (AmsterdamParis 1946).
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wosfri), is said to have sat at Panaetius' feet (cf. the words quae a Panaetio acceperam [de Orat. 1.75] and Panaeti illius tui addressed by Crassus to Scaevola \de Orat. 1.45]); that such personal connections were important to Cicero in philosophicis as in other matters is clear from the choice of Cratippus as his son's philosophical tutor (cf. ad 1.1), even though Cratippus, a personal friend, was a Peripatetic, rather than an Academic. Apart from the personal tie via Scaevola, Panaetius' method in ethics was evidently con genial to Cicero, since he showed concern with ordinary people, rather than focusing on theoretical problems involving the Stoic sage (cf. ad 1.46), used popularia verba et usitata (2.35), and generally favored a down-to-earth approach (cf. 2.51); in particular the argument that statesmen render greater service than generals will have appealed strongly (1.74-78). While inserting some material of interest to himself (see introduction to Book 1), Cicero probably revised extensively only the first virtue and the place of the vita contemplativa under the third virtue (cf. ad 1.18-19 and 72). The testimonies for Panaetius' essay περί του καθήκοντος are few and owe their preservation mostly to Cicero. The work comprised three books (Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 34); the plan that it should deal not only with the καλόν and συμφέρον but also with their apparent conflict remained unexecuted (ibid.), even though Panaetius lived thirty years after completing the three books used by Cicero (3.8 = fr. 35, citing Posidonius Τ 7 = F 432 Th. = Τ 8 = F 41c E.-K.; cf. introduction to Book 3). In addition, Gellius 13.28 preserves in Latin rendering a fragment of the work (fr. 116) with no precise equivalent in Cicero's text. Following a note on source-criticism in general (1), I will deal with the major problems that have exercised modern scholarship on Pan aetius, περί του καθήκοντος, namely (2) the date of composition, (3) the reason why Panaetius may have left the work unfinished, (4) its intended audience, and (5) the use Cicero made of his model, including the passage from which the fragment quoted by Gellius might derive; to these is added (6) some remarks on the fate of περί του καθήκοντος subsequent to Cicero's adaptation.
(1) A Note on Source-Criticism
There is a recent trend observable in Anglo-American studies of Roman philosophical texts away from an approach based on source-criticism. This is to a degree understandable. Such studies from earlier generations often give the impression of being arbitrary or based on opaque or impressionistic
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criteria;40 and where only internal evidence is at play the method can easily lead to a circular argument, passage y being assigned to author a because passage χ had been, etc. Also, source-criticism seems unsatisfying if it is practiced as an end-result of interpretation, as though the finding of the source were itself the all-sufficient explanation of a passage. In studies of Off. in particular the method may have come into disrepute because of its associa tion with Max Pohlenz, whose work most scholars today probably do not find attractive.41 I want to explain why I have thought it desirable to use a source-critical approach in a commentary of this type. For Off. 1-2 we are in the fortunate position of possessing clear external evidence as to the main source Cicero was using, namely Panaetius, nepi του καθήκοντος [Att. 16.11.4). He also provided clear indications of some mate rial he was adding to Panaetius' treatment (1.7b-8 and 152 ff.; 2.86 ff.; 3). We likewise have evidence about the duration of work on the treatise (intro duction § 3)· From the rapid rate of composition it seems reasonable to infer that Cicero followed his source fairly closely (on the different view of Long, 1995·, 221-22 and 224, cf. pp. 8-9, n. 20 supra). He supplemented it, so far as we can tell, from materials that he had readily to hand, including political commentary such as always flowed freely from his pen (in this essay often showing points of contact with the Philippics, especially the Second, on which he was at work around this same time; see above p. 9 and n. 24), anecdotes or examples he had stored away in his memory (see Index of Authors, s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius [the orator], de Officiis, memory, composi tion from"), or materials he had worked up in preparing other works, espe cially de Republica and de Finibus (cf. ad 1.152-61; 3.116-20). A bit more research went into the third book, for which he had to seek different philo sophical sources and consult historical texts (see introduction to Book 3). Where Cicero's named source is preserved, we find him following it fairly closely (cf. ad 3.113-14). I think that we have a right to insist on the attested source-relations and to press their implications. At the same time, Cicero was not a slave of his exemplar and emphasizes the play of his own tudiaum in the final product (1.6). Within the indicated parameters Cicero does not engage in a great deal of explicit signaling of where he is or is not following a source. On a couple of occasions he indicates that Panaetius quoted or praised the younger Africanus (1.90,2.76) or took a line one might not have expected on the role of 40. Cf. 4 propos assumptions used in the source-criticism of Sen. Ben. Brad Inwood, "Politics and Paradox in Seneca's De beneficHs" in Laks-Schoficld, 245-46. 41. Cf. the characterization by Gigon, 267, cited in the preface; both Atkins and Long, 1995', prefer to leave source-questions to one side in their discussions of problems in Off.
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counsel in litigation (2.51). At 2.60 Panaetius' cited disapproval of certain types of public expenditures is in line with the main argument in the text, of which Cicero adds at this point a slight modification for obvious personal motives {theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprendo propter Pompeium . . . : cf. ad loc). Source-criticism can come to the aid of the text in this regard. By close study both of the philosophical argument and of Cicero's own personal agenda as seen in his other writings of the time, the source-critic can add light and shadow to the seemingly flat and uniform text. A commentary is, I think, the appropriate place for exploring such questions since a decision as to provenance often involves a grasp of the larger architecture of the treatise. Inasmuch as previous commentators have not taken advantage of their sys tematic vantage point but have devoted themselves mostly to elucidating grammatical/stylistic matters and historical background, I have tried to be alert to potentially interesting source-critical problems and have offered, for whatever they may be worth, my opinions and their basis for the reader to consider; in such judgments the risk of subjectivity is, however, always pres ent: caveat lector! I have tried to make the case that passages that fall out of the expressed plan, are illustrated exclusively by Roman examples, or seem at odds with the approach of other passages in a way that would fit Cicero's own agenda at this point in his career are, in fact, Ciceronian additions to his model. To take first an example where several indices point in the same direction: paragraphs 138-40 of Book 1 handle the topic of houses unmentioned in the divisio at 1.126, contain praise of the first consul of the family of the Octavii at a time when Cicero was cultivating the friendship of the young Octavius, and criticism of the incongruity of house and owner (a point directed against Antony in the Second Philippic) and of the excessive scale of Roman villas since Lucullus. In spite of Pohlenz's attempted Greek comextualization, this material can hardly fail to be a Ciceronian addition to Panaetius (cf. ad loc). Similarly the sudden introduction at 1.92 of a third type of μεγαλόψυχο? who qualifies for inclusion in the category, not by virtue of great deeds but by generous use of his estate, is likely to have been invented by Cicero ad hoc, possibly to include such a person as his friend Atticus (see ad loc). Again 1.150-51 have long been assumed to be of Panaetian provenance; if so, we have a Panaetius speaking, as nowhere else, on the basis of commonly held social prejudices, not the criterion of commensurability with nature as else where in the treatment of the virtues. Surely this passage, too, is a Ciceronian addition (see ad loc). Perhaps the most remarkable case of this kind is 1.38, where the whole concept of a war fought for the glory of empire plays havoc
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with the preceding precepts about the conditions and goals of warfare (1.34b-35). If we recognize that there are two distinct trends at work within the text, a Panaetian strand presenting Stoic doctrines and precepts trans parently derived from them, and a Ciceronian, which seeks to take some account of Roman realities (albeit, as Heilmann has argued, to a lesser degree than one might have expected; cf. ad 2.51), the apparent contradictions of this text become at least intelligible. As to Pohlenz's work, it represented progress in its day by drawing Off. more closely into the orbit of studies of Hellenistic philosophy, which within his lifetime began to be pursued with intensity and sophistication. It needs modification, however, as I have argued at $5 5 (2) and (4) below and at various points in the commentary. But it would be a mistake to ignore AFand Off. Ill or to impugn the source-critical approach to Off. generally because of their inadequacies. It will be clear that source-criticism is practiced here not as an end in itself but as one of several ways of shedding light on the background of de Officiis as we have it. The essay operates simultaneously on several levels: as a response to earlier thinking on sociopolitical problems, as a means of ad dressing the mores and political problems of the day, and as a response to the need of Cicero jr. and other young Roman nobles like him for guidance in a world of shifting values. It is worthwhile to take note of where the doctrines of de Officiis came from, since, at least for Books 1-2, we can establish this with greater as surance than in Cicero's other philosophies. Given that earlier Stoic writings survive only in miserable fragments, Books 1-2 of Off., together with Fin. 3, supply what would otherwise be completely missing, viz., some sense of how a Stoic approach to ethics could at this period be constructed to form a coherent whole. But the exploration of this aspect is only one step in the larger task of interpreting de Officiis. (2) Date of Composition The most probable assumption is that πβρί του καθήκοιτος was written by ca. 138/39 or very shortly thereafter.42 The evidence consists in Posidonius* declaration that Panaetius lived for thirty years beyond the composition of Off. (see ad 3.8) together with L. Crassus' statement at de Orat. 1.45 that on his visit to Athens in 109/8 he heard lectures of various philosophers, includ ing the auditor Panaeti . . . Mnesarchus. Presumably Cicero would have wanted to represent him as having heard Panaetius if he were still lecturing. 42. Cf. Tarakis, 33; Garbarino, 1973, 389-90; Dorandi, 92; ad 2.72-85.
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Panaetius' birth is generally placed ca. 185, and there is no evidence requiring him to have lived beyond 109/8. 43 Several scholars have pointed out that Panaetius, though having stopped giving public lectures, could well have lived beyond this date. Thus Pohlenz, AF, 125, adduced the Academics Lacydes and Carneades, both known to have retired from the post of scholarch before their deaths; he moots that Panaetius may have done likewise. Philippson, 1929, 338, points to the fact that Panaetius exercised the duties of scholarch during the lifetime of Antipater and suspects that Mnesarchus may have done the same for Panaetius. These are possibilities, but nothing more. A different approach is based on the tense of some Ciceronian reports of Panaetius* statements. Thus Philippson, 1929,338, argued for a date subse quent to Scipio's death (129) on grounds of the perfect tenses at 1.90 (Pan aetius quidem Africanum. . . solitum ait dicere) and 2.76 {laudat Africanum Panaetius quod fuerit abstinens). Pohlenz, AF, 125, however, countered that the timeless presents ait and laudat allow the perfects to be understood as seen from Cicero's point of view (for another possibility see below). Pohlenz, however, follows the late dating of the essay on other grounds: he argues, after Philippson, loc. cit., that it would have been tactless for Panaetius to praise the abstinentia of Africanus (2.76) during his lifetime; and he believes that the references to the Gracchan reforms at 2.72 and 80 go back to Panaetius (cf. his review of Heinemann, 2, at GGA 192 (1930], 151;Nicolet, 157). Whether tactlessness was involved in the praise of a living man would depend on the occasion and the phrasing. Personal presence could be an inhibiting factor; thus Cicero states that he would praise C. Aquilius timidius if he were present in court (Caec. 77). However, laudes Crassi are inter spersed at a number of points by the speakers of de Oratore with L. Crassus himself present (cf., e.g., 1.76 and 95; 2.227, 233, 364: nihil dicam de ingenio, cut par nemo fuit; cf. also the praise of Antonius, ibid., 1.171-72). In general it should not be assumed that ancient and modern sensibilities, the latter influenced by the Christian ideal of humility, are identical in this mat ter.44 In any case, Panaetius was not praising Africanus to his face, but in 43. Philippson, 1929, 339-40, suggested that the Apollonius whom Cicero recommended to Caesar in 45 (ham. 13.16.1) should be identified with the pupil of Panaetius
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writing. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that we have access, not to the ipsissima verba of Panaetius, but only to his thoughts as passed through a Ciceronian filter. Cicero's use of the perfect, rather than the imperfect tense {quod fuerit abstinens), would be consistent with Panaetius having tied the praise to particular circumstances (cf. a few sentences later: imitatus pattern Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa), whereas Cicero, writing long after Africanus" death, would naturally have eliminated any such re striction. Thus the internal evidence need not indicate that Panaetius wrote his essay after Scipio's death. Underlying Pohlenz's efforts to bring the date of composition of rrepl τοϋ καθήκοντος down to the time of Scipio's death or later is his belief that the commentary on the Gracchi in Off. derives from Panaetius, rather than Cicero. But even if Panaetius did write the work that late, it does not follow that he commented on the Gracchan revolution. It is clear that the recent death of Julius Caesar and related moral questions, such as whether the murder was justified and whether those who had accepted offices and other benefits from Caesar ought to have participated, were much on Cicero's mind as he wrote Off. (cf. esp. ad 2.23-29, 3.19, 82b-85). It is also clear that the case of the Gracchi was in some respects parallel (cf. Amic. 36 ff. on Tiberius Gracchus' abandonment by his friends). The similarity to Cicero's own views on the Gracchi expressed elsewhere and to his views on Caesar ought to have given Pohlenz pause (cf. ad 1.109; ad 2.43 for Cicero's description of the death of Caesar and of the Gracchi in similar terms). The testimony that Panaetius replied to those eager to make him a citizen of Athens, τφ σώφρονι μίαν πόλιν αρκαν (fr. 27), does not encourage the notion that he took a stand on controversial issues of Roman politics; cf. also the precepts at 1.125: peregriniautem atque incohe officium est nihilpraeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena republica curiosum. (3) Why Panaetius May Have Left nepl του καθήκοντος· Unfinished Gartner, 1974, 14-15 and 63, thought to eliminate the problem of the incompleteness of π€ρ'ι του καθήκοντος by assuming that Cicero mistook the Panaetian list of topics about which people tend to deliberate regarding appropriate actions for the divisio of his work. In view of the way he con ceived the καλόν and συμφέρον, Panaetius would, according to Gartner, have regarded any discussion of their conflict, even if only apparent, as super fluous. This interpretation seems unlikely, however, in view of the fact that
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not only Cicero but also Posidonius and P. Rutilius Rufus spoke of π€ρΐ του καθήκοντος as an incomplete work (cf. ad 3.9). One can only speculate as to why Panaetius never returned to the problem of the conflict of the καλόν and apparent συμφέρον. Various possibilities exist. After pursuing other interests for a time, he may have decided, on returning to the problem, that in order to supply the missing part of πβρί του καθήκον τος he would have had to rewrite the first three books. 45 Alternatively, he may never have arrived at a solution to his satisfaction or have discovered that problems of casuistry were simply not to his taste. 46 (4) The Intended Audience for περί τού καθήκοντος Though not the first to argue that Panaetius wrote π€ρΐ του καθήκοντος for a Roman readership (and that Cicero's role in Books 1-2 is correspondingly negligible),47 Pohlenz has done so in most detail (cf. AF, esp. 3 5 , 5 1 , 8 0 , 1 1 1 , 119, and 143). This view is, however, part and parcel of his notion that Panaetius was propagating a "Fuhrerideal,w the most dubious element of his reconstruction and, not coincidentally, the one conditioned most strongly by the time and place in which Pohlenz wrote his work; cf. AFt 143: "Soil ein Fuhrerideal fur eine Vasallenwelt verkundet sein, die keine Fuhrer mehr brauchen konnte?" To subsume Panaetius* ethical system under the rubric "Fuhrertum" is a severe distortion, however. Panaetius' ethic aims to insure a harmonious social order in which people can realize their potential qua human beings. The vita actwa46 is a role that can fulfill one's own potential and at the same time create a framework within which others can do the same. In his treatment of μ€γαλοψυχία Panaetius recommends that those able 45. Note thac Heidegger never supplied the promised second half of Sein und Zeit, an omission he explained as follows: "Die zweite Halfte laGt sich nach eincm Vierteljahrhundert nicht mehr anschlicSen, ohne daS die erste neu dargestellt wiirde. Deren bleibt indessen auch hcutc noch notwendiger, wenn die Frage nach dem Sein unser Dasein bewegen soil" (Martin Heidegger San una Zett. 16th ed. [Tubingen, 1986], "Vorbemcrkung zur 7. Auflagc 1953"); 1 owe this parallel to the kindness of Walter Burkert. 46. Both of these alternatives were formulated by Striker, the former at Striker, 47, the latter suggested orally. 47. Cf. F.G. van Lynden, Disputatio historico-critica de Partaetio Rhodio phihsopho Stoico (Leiden, 1802), 82; Eduard Schwartz, "Vertheilung der romischen Provinzen nach Caesars Tod," Hermes 33 (1898), 237, n. 3. 48. It is presumably this to which Pohlcnz's loaded word "Fuhrertum" refers; but an equivalent to "Fuhrer" such as dux is, except with reference to natura (1.22, 100, 129; 2.73>, notably absent from Off 1-2; nor is there an antidemocratic thrust, Solon being, in fact, one of the statesmen Panaetius most admires (1.75).
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to do so should participate in the political process (1.72); but the vita activa was not the only option he allowed (cf. 1.71). Panaetius clearly admired the μ€γαλόψυχο9, but he was also acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the phenomenon (cf. 1.62-65) and probably valued the vita contemplativa more highly than our text betrays; cf. ad 1.18-19, 72, and Johann, 25 ff. And he was, of course, concerned with appropriate actions in private, no less than public life. Hence it is misguided to describe, as Pohlenz does in his preface, "das Fuhrertum des hochgesinnten Mannes" as the highest element in the Panaetian system. He must have thought Cicero very stupid indeed to have chosen precisely this system of ethics as the vehicle for his criticism of Caesar's ambitions (see § 6 below). Pohlenz was intelligent and knew Off. well but projected onto it (unconsciously) some of the political thinking of his own time and place—or, to be more precise, of the Hohenzollern mon archy under which he grew up: the emphasis on a strong leader or political fighter, the view that such a leader could only be conceived for a large empire, not for small Greek (or German) states, etc. 49 49. At AF, 14.3, he expressly rejects the application to Panaetius of a more recent concep tion of polirical leadership: uSein Fuhrcr ist kein jugendlicher Sturmer, Icein Revolutionar, der einen Wunschstaar grunden oder sein Voile von innen heraus erneuern will." Though a national ist and critic of the Weimar Republic, Pohlenz was never a member of the Nazi Party. Neverthe less polirical opportunism led him to entitle his 1934 book as he did, although this would, almost inevitably, suggest the wrong connotations. (The words Antikes Fuhrertum, in the meantime an embarrassment, were dropped from the title of the Italian translation: L'ideale di vita attiva secondo Panezio net de officiis di Cicerone [Brescia, 1970].) The ritulature of his monograph is in line with his general tendency to read ancient history as a set of positive and negative paradigms for the present, sometimes with strange results; readers will be struck by his reference to "der demagogische Feind der burgerlichen Ordnung" (AF, 118), the "nationale Wehrkraft" of the Romans (ibid., 120), etc.; he was doubtless unaware of the degree to which he was reading the concerns of his own time into the ancient text. However, in view of his lack of Party membership and his fight in behalf of beleaguered colleagues Hermann Frankel and Ulrich Knoche, the Ministry declined to allow him to continue to hold his professorship after he reached the age of 65 in 1937, even though his university (Gottingen) requested an exception; likewise the plan to name Pohlenz in fall 1938 to the Italian Institute for Roman Studies was blocked by the Party. On Pohlenz cf. H. Dorrie, Gnomon 34 (1962), 634 ff.; Otto Skutsch, "Recollections of Scholars I Have Known," ed. A. Bierl and W.M. Calder III, HSPh 94 (1992), 399-400; Cornelia Wcgelcr, Die Selbstbeschrdnkung der Wissenschaft. F.in Beitrag zur Geschichte der Klassischen Phitotogte sett dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, untersucht am Reispieldes lmtitut fur Altertumskunde der Umversitat Gottingen (1921-1962), (diss. Vienna, 1985), 59-65, 164-69, and 183-88; it is misleading, however, for her to speak (164) of a "Lehrvcrbot" for Pohlenz under National Socialism; though forced into retirement for polirical reasons, he was hindered from continuing his teaching as an emeritus not by his politics, but as a result of a charge of betrayal of confidence that was later withdrawn, so that he did resume teaching in winter 1939.
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In other respects, too, Pohlenz's arguments that TTcpi του καθήκοντος was written for a Roman audience appear misguided. In view of the evidence reviewed in (2) above, the attempts of Pohlenz, AF, 119, and others 50 to connect the work with opposition to the Gracchi should be treated with reserve. In attributing 1.138-40 to Panaetius rather than Cicero's own in vention Pohlenz ignores the points adduced above (p. 20). His citation (AF, 35) of the standing commission formed in 149 to investigate complaints of extortion lodged by provincials is not helpful in explaining Panaetius' pre cepts about liberalitas.51 Panaetius' work was written in Greek, strewn with citations of Greek authors and, apart from his friend the younger Scipio (cf. 2.76 and the citation at 1.90), Greek examples (cf. ad 2.16). There was nothing to prevent a Roman philhcllene like Cicero from reading it (and indeed adapting it to his own uses), but there is no reason to suppose that in composing the work Panaetius had primarily Roman conditions or a Roman readership in mind. Pohlenz stresses in general the place of Rome and the people he met there in Panaetius' life and work, a policy that leads to some strained interpreta tions of the sources. Though he admired Scipio (cf. 2.76) and though his acquaintance with Scipio and other statesmen may in a general way have influenced Panaetius to write extensively about the συμφέρον, as well as the καλόι> (cf. introduction to Book 2), it is not clear, pace Pohlenz, that his acquaintance with Scipio was "decisive" ("entscheidend") for Panaetius' life. 52 We know that Panaetius lived for a time at Scipio's house in Rome (frr. 8, 9,11), but it is uncertain for how long. There he will have met the already elderly Polybius (cf. Rep. 1.34 = fr. 119); but Polybius need not have substan tially altered Panaetius' view of Rome, especially if Panaetius' father had already been sent to Rome as part of a pro-Roman embassy.53 He accom-
50. Erskine, 159 ff., follows Pohlenz here. 51. Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, already protested against the "grotcsken lrrtum . . . , dafi er [sc. Panaetius) geschricben hatte, urn die Romcr zu erzichen . . ."; cf. also ad 1.88 (precepts evidently framed with monarchs in mind). 52. Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 422.1: "Enrscheidend fur sein Leben wurde die Bekanntschaft mit Scipio." 53. Ibid., 423.45: MIhm (sc. dem Polybius] danktc cr die Oberzeugung, daft Roms Wcltherrschaft eine geschichtliche Notwendigkeit sei und seine Starke auf der gemischten Verfa&sung bcruhc" (but what is his evidence that Panaetius actually held this view?); on the identification of Panaetius1 father as the Nicagoras on a pro-Roman embassy in 169, ibid., 420.59 ff. For possible connections between Panaetius and Polybius cf. ad % 111, p. 354, n. 5, and Gartner, 1981.
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panied Scipio on an embassy to Egypt and Syria (fir. 2 4 - 2 5 ; cf. fr. 15). 5 4 But surely Tusc. 5.107 = fr. 32 should be taken to mean what it says, viz,, that once he left Rhodes Panaetius never returned, not interpreted out of exis tence so that Scipio can have visited Rhodes in Panaetius1 company.55 Nor need a fragment of the Stoic Index imply that Panaetius divided the decade following the embassy between Rome and Athens. 56 The surviving evidence about his works and their chronology is insufficient to establish that his experience of Rome and Romans fundamentally altered his worldview. What is clear is that his residence at Rome and contacts made there were of impor tance for his posthumous influence.57 These observations suggest that the "Kampfnatur" that Pohlenz, AF, 47, saw behind Off. may not be Panaetius so much as Cicero himself. He was, after all, about to enter the fray for the fight against Antony. In Off. we see him, most clearly in the parts written independently of Panaetius, steeling himself for the task by holding up in the appendix to Book 1 the vita activa as the ideal to be striven for and by promulgating in Book 3 a heroic ethic of self-abnegation in the interest of the state. If Panaetius has appeared to be a 54. On the dating of the embassy to 140/39 cf. Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 422.54 ff., with literature. Exactly when or how long he lived in Rome is impossible to determine in view of the habit evidently described at Stoic. Ind. Hercul. LXIII, ed. Tiziano Dorandi, in Filodemo, Storia dei filosoft. La stoa da Zenone a Panezio (PHerc. J0J8), Philosophia Antiqua 60 (Lcidcn-New York-Cologne, 1994>, 112 a Panaetius fr. 1: Tkrre μέ|ν) ef 'Ρώμ[ηι Tkrre 6C ev 'Αθήναις; the fact that Rutilius Rufus was born ca. 154 need not, pace Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 423.40 ff., show that Panaetius still was active in Rome ca. 135; Rutilius may have been a Panaeti auditor (Brut. 114) at Athens. 55. At Rep. 3.48 Scipio alludes to a visit to Rhodes on which Pohlenz (n. 39 supra), 423.5 ff., wants Panaetius to have accompanied him; for the argument that Tusc. 5.107 is "merit wortlich zu nehmen" cf. Pohlenz loc. cit., 425.16 ff. 56. Quoted n. 54 supra; likewise misleading is Pohlenz's statement (n. 39 supra), 423.60 ff., "die lateinische Sprache beherrschte er (sc. Panaetius] so gut, daft er vor Romern ein Urteil ubcr das Gcdicht des Ap. Claudius abgab, Cic. Tusc. IV 4"; in fact, Panaetius praised the poem (presumably for its content) in a letter to Q. Tubero; clearly he knew some Latin; but probably he, no more than Plutarch (Dent 2.4-3.1), allowed himself an opinion in questions of Latin style. 57. In attributing so much of Off. 1-2 to Panaetius {and so little to Cicero) Pohlenz doubtless reflected the Hellenophile attitudes of German scholarship of his generation. Might he also have been (unconsciously) trying to recreate a figure who could claim equal interest to Posidonius, whose philosophy had recently been reconstructed with such brilliance by Karl Reinhardt (whose studies of that philosopher Pohlenz had critically reviewed \GGA 1922 and 19261)? Such, at any rate, is the suspicion of Gigon, 267, who remarks of Pohlenz's monographs on Off.: ulhr Ziel ist es vor allem, Panaitios . . . gegen Karl Rcinhardts Poseidonios in die Schrankcn rretcn zu lassen; . . ."
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"Kampfnatur," it is perhaps because we see only a Panaetius retouched by Cicero. 58 (5) Cicero's Use of His Model De Officiis, we must assume, presented a considerably shortened version of Panaetius; this would already follow from the fact that he compressed Pan aetius' three books to two of his own. One of the methods was to reduce greatly the amount of illustrative matter, a practice he makes explicit at 2.16 (cf. ad be); I have suspected similar curtailment ad 1.18-19, 51, 73b, 102, 107,122-25,149, and 2.43. The one external control that can be applied to Cicero's handling of his model is the report of Panaetius' comparison of the statesman to the pancratiast, ever ready to face a new challenge (fr. 116 = Gel. 13.28). Alien to the experience of his Roman readers, this passage too fell victim to the Ciceronian ax; its original home will surely have been somewhere within the section on magnitudo animi (Dyck, 1979 2 , 412-15; ad 1.73a and b). In that case, since this fragment is cited from Panaetius' second book, it would seem likely that the first book of his essay comprised the first two virtues, the second the remaining two, and the third the συμφέ ρον. If this is so, it would follow that the first virtue, which occupies a mere two paragraphs in Cicero's treatment (1.18-19), suffered major reduction at his hands, especially in view of Panaetius' known interest in the sciences (cf. Scipio's remark at Rep. 1.15 = fr. 77: 'quam vellem Panaetium nostrum nobiscum haberemus! qui cum cetera turn haec caelestia vel studiosissime solet quaerere'). Cicero's specifically attested addition to the two Panaetian books consists of the two appendices (1.152-61 and 2.86-90), the former dealing with the comparison of honesta, the latter with a critique of Panaetius by Antipater of Tyre and the comparison of utilia. The former is, however, problematical in its ignoring of the connections drawn by Panaetius between the virtues (see ad loc.). For other aspects of this topic see (1) above ("A Note on SourceCriticism"). (6) The Subsequent Fate of π€ρι τού καθήκοντος Panaetius' three books of popularizing ethics π€ρί του καθήκοντος59 might have been expected to have exercised considerable influence in subsequent centuries, but it is not clear that this was the case. It is cited only by Cicero 58. Cf. ad 1.18-19 and 69b-71; Johannt 25 ff. 59. For this characterization cf. ad 2.35.
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and Gellius (fr. 116; see above); and what may underlie the convivial meet ings of Παΐ'αιπασταί alluded to by Athenaeus (5.186a = fr. 29) remains obscure. There are, it is true, traces of similar doctrines, whether known at first or second hand, in such imperial writers as Musonius Rufus, Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Clement of Alexandria, and Isidore of Pelusium, 60 but, generally speaking, it was the problem of the sage as explored by the older Stoa that fascinated later writers.61 6. Politics in de Officii*62 In a sense Cicero conceived de Officii*, not just with young Marcus in view, but for the youth of Rome, for whom he intended his writings in general.63 At Div. 2.4, written earlier the same year, Cicero spoke of his philosophical writing in these terms: quod enim munus reipublicae adferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refrenanda ac coercenda sitf Such a goal explains certain features of our work, such as the repeated emphasis on restraint of the passions (1.101 ff., 132a, 141), the discussion of proper models in choosing a career (1.116 ff.), or the plea for the vita activa (1.72,153 ff.); on the last-named point Cicero proba bly went beyond the precepts of his model (cf. ad 1.18-19 and 72). But in addition to such general advice Cicero surely had a specific political program that he wanted to place before the youth of Rome. In view of the awareness he expressed around this time that his death could not be far off,64 it is not 60. Cf. Index of Authors s.vv. (for Plutarch esp. ad 2.33 and 75); Brunt, 1975, 32 ff. 61. Cf., e.g., Bonhoffcr, 33, who notes, with evident approval, the growth of the view "wonach . . . bei den Jungstoikem, schon bci Seneca, insbesondcre abcr bci Musonius und F.pktet, eine kraftige Reaction gegen die von Panatius und namentlich von Posidonius vorgenommene Vcrmcngung der stoischen Lehre mit akademisch-peripatetischen Elementen zu bemerken ist." 62. Many of the topics broached in this section are dealt with in detail by Long, 1995·; apart from the question of the date of the beginning of composition of Off. (see pp. 8-9, n. 20 supra) and some differences in emphasis, I find myself in substantial agreement with his approach. 63. Cf. $ 4 but also the caveat at p. 10, n. 28 supra. 64. Att. 16.7.7: sed abesse banc aetatem longe a sepulcro negant oportere; cf. Phil. 1.38: miht fere satis est quod vixi vel ad aetatem vel ad gloriam (an echo of Caesar's statement quoted at Marc. 25: satis diu vel naturae vixi vel gloriae). Worth remarking in this context is Cicero's emphasis at certain points in the essay on the deaths of good men (1.112; 2.2 and 20; cf. also Fam. 12.5.3, cued ad 2.65, as well as the similar attitude of Philoctetes in Sophocles1 play, vv. 402 ff.>.
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too bold to call his message on this subject in our essay Cicero's political legacy.65 Once Caesar had established his dictatorship in the aftermath of the vic tory at Pharsalia in 48 (cf. MRR 2, 272), Cicero largely withdrew from politics but did speak several times before the dictator to beg pardon for Caesar's senior surviving opponent, M. Marcellus, for Q. Ligarius, and then for the King Deiotarus. However, the letters from 45 and early 44 in which he calls him a king (rex)66 show just how bitterly he resented Caesar's rule and his own exclusion from any real political role. His philosophical essays from this period, too, contain some veiled criticism of Caesar's tyranny (though not as much as found by Strasburger, 1990; cf. p. 397, n. 32; ad 3.29). The political landscape of Rome was radically altered by Caesar's as sassination. Immediately after the deed, Brutus cried out the name of Cicero, a potent symbol of the free republic he was trying to restore (Phil. 2.28 and 30; cf. Dio 44.20.4 and 46.22.4). Yet the situation remained ambivalent and fluid. The ringleaders Brutus and Cassius did not dare to show themselves in public in Rome; they went to various cities of Italy, where they received moral support but little money. In a meeting on 17 March the senate con firmed all the acts of the slain dictator, whose loyal lieutenant, Marc Antony, remained in office as consul. To complicate matters further, Caesar's nephew and heir, Octavius, emerged, an ambitious young man eager to claim the allegiance of Caesar's followers. On 1 August, while Cicero was on Sicily en route to visit his son in Greece, there was a meeting of the senate at which Antony read a sharp edict against the Liberators and threatened force; with so many of the bravest senators already killed in the civil war, only Caesar's father-in-law L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58) dared to speak against him. Later that month Brutus and Cassius finally agreed to accept the prov inces of Cyrene and Crete, an honorable name for exile. 67 Meanwhile in his writing Cicero could now give free vent to his pent up anger and frustration, first in references to Caesar's assassination which, together with at least the second half of the proem to Book 2, he added to the otherwise complete manuscript de Divirtatione.68 Then when he wrote his essay de Gloria in June and July, the case of Caesar was surely a major concern, though this work survives only in such pathetic scraps that we 65. Cf. Long, 1995', 214. 66. Alt. 13.37.2, Font. 6.19.2, and 11.27.8. 67. For the aftermath of the assassination cf. Syme, 97 ff.; for the departure of the Libera tors from Italy, etc., ibid., 118-19 and 140; Cicero's comments at Att. 16.7.5 and 7; Phil. 1.10 and 14. 68. 1.119; 2.23, 99, 110, 112.
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cannot say exactly how the argument developed.69 The decision to return to Rome for the meeting of the senate called for 1 September and take up the oppositional line marked out by Piso on 1 August (cf. Phil. 1.10 and 14; § 3 above; Gelzer, 346) was a new departure for Cicero, who had since 58 been shut out of any meaningful role in politics. As the confrontation with Marc Antony took shape in the fall (see § 3 above), he was counting on the willingness of young nobles to defend the Republic (cf. Phil. 2.113: babet quident certe respublica adulescentis nobilissimos paratos defensores). This was evidently the intended audience for the political message of de Officiis. The first step in the genesis of Off. was when Cicero read Panaetius' work and decided that his way of writing about politics and ethics was congenial (cf. Leg. 3.14, quoted ad 1.124) and worth applying to Rome (cf. ad 1.14). In writing on this subject at this time Cicero aimed at reforming the political culture at Rome, which he saw veering dangerously from the ideals of tradi tional patriotism toward the kind of egotistical quest for glory and selfaggrandizement that had brought ruin upon Greek city-states and could lead to the permanent establishment of tyranny (cf. the presumably Panaetian examples which Cicero retained because they fined his purpose: the Spartan general Callicratidas |1.84|, Sparta's mistreatment of her allies (2.26a], the reforms of Agis and Lysander at Sparta (2.801). He expounds an essentially four-pronged approach to Rome's political problems: (1) to fill the ideals honestum/honestas/honestus, rarely used and of vague significance in the Roman political vocabulary (Hellegouarc'h, 387-88; cf. 462-63), with a content derived from the Stoic theory of the virtues (Book 1); (2) to rein in the search for glory so that it is strictly subordinate to justice and no threat to social values (1.62, 2.33-34, 38, as well as the references to Caesar); (3) to reaffirm the values of Roman civil society, including oratory and a knowl edge of the civil law and the right to be unmolested in one's person and property (Book 2 and the casuistic cases of Book 3); (4) to inculcate the identity of an individual's interest with the common interest, in particular with the reipublicae utile (especially Book 3). Panaetius' theory of the virtues required a certain amount of tailoring, especially to make his first virtue fit the dimensions appropriate to the life of a Roman gentleman (cf. ad 1.18-19). Even in Book 1, however, Cicero manages to make certain points about Roman politics; here we find his excoriation of Caesar's overweaning ambition (1.26), his condemnation of the violation of property rights by Sulla and Caesar as unjust and illiberal (1.43), or his criticism of the architectural excesses of L. Licinius Lucullus 69. Cf. introduction to Book 2; ad 2.31.
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(1.140); there are also vaguer innuendos, such as the barb directed at Antony, as the Second Philippic makes clear, about homes too grand for their owners (1.139). The pursuit of glory, especially that based on military achievements, was traditionally the motor that drove a Roman political career (cf. Harris, 17 ff.). The Stoa classed glory among the indifferents, albeit the preferred indifferents (cf. ad 2.31). The proper attitude of the μβγαλόψυχος· was therefore to despise glory rather than to seek it. Cicero repeats this doctrine (1.65 70 ), but he admits that, in practice, vix inventur qui laboribus susceptis periculisque ad it is non quasi mercedem return gestarum desideret gloriam (ibid.). On the other hand, Book 2, dealing with the utile, accepts the desirability of glory (albeit as an instrumental rather than a per se value; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 2 2 8 33); indeed the attainment of glory can be seen as the subject of this Book as a whole (see its introduction below). Cicero offers, however, two distinct approaches, never integrated: (1) summa . . . et perfecta gloria predicated upon the opinio iustitiae and aiming at the approval of the many (2.31 b-38) and (2) vera gloria involving the approval of the boni and directly connected with the honestum (2.42b-43). Of these the former is built into the divisio and overall argument of the Book, whereas the latter, with its appeal to the judgment of the boni and use of the examples of the Gracchi, is clearly from the realm of political argument; possibly it suggests a line taken in the re cently completed de Gloria. The case of the Gracchi illustrates what Long, 1995 1 , 216-17, calls the instability of such an ideal as the honestum; for what is praiseworthy may easily be confused with what is actually praised. Cicero addresses this problem both in theory (1.14) and with reference to specific cases: to his attacks on the Gracchi add those on the reputation of Sulla and Caesar, as well as his strictures on the tendency to overrate military glory (1.74 ff.). The conflict of values between the old and new Roman political culture is largely personalized as a conflict between Cicero and Caesar. When Cicero praises the traditional methods of problem solving, the ius civile and oratory, a propos the former he eulogizes Serv. Sulpicius Rufus (2.65), but he can scarcely avoid mentioning himself under the latter (2.66). When he comes to property disputes, Cicero invokes the case of Arams of Sicyon, who, after expelling a long-entrenched tyranny from his native city, managed to solve the ensuing property disputes by peaceful means. Cicero contrasts the sale of confiscated property by Sulla and Caesar. Two other forms of injustice in70. But with a slight twist: qui ex errore impentae multitudmts pendet, hie m magnis viris non est habendus; this leaves room for a role for the boni in allotting vera gloria; see below.
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volving property form the next topic: the remitting of rents to tenants and cancellation of debt. The former was one of Caesar's policies, put in effect probably for the year 48 (cf. ad 2.83). But Cicero goes beyond what most of his contemporaries would have accepted in claiming that Caesar both sup ported Catiline's conspiracy and continued to favor novae tabube (but con trast BC 3.1.2-3, which outlines efforts to avoid cancellation of debt). The scarcely credible portrait of Caesar that emerges is the result of the attempt to present himself and Caesar as representing two fixed and diametrically op posed principles (cf. ad 2.84). But perhaps Cicero's major contribution to Roman political thought is his radical identification of honestum and utile, with the consequences worked out in detail in Off 3. Particularly far-reaching in its implications is the argument at 3.21-28 that the Militates of the individual and of the com munity coincide. This proves to be the controlling principle in deciding the casuistic cases handled in the body of this Book, though in practice, for Cicero, the state interest simply replaces that of the human community as a whole. In Book 3 the Roman examples increasingly take on a life of their own and shape the direction of the argument. In this way he contrives within eleven paragraphs to impugn the morality of the conduct of all three of the so-called triumviri, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus (3.73 ff.). He also attacks Romulus, the founder and first king of Rome, whom Caesar had exploited in his propaganda, for killing his brother Remus (3.41), while approving the elim ination of a colleague by L. Junius Brutus, the founder of the republic and ancestor of Caesar's assassin M. Junius Brutus (3.40). Here we find also, in a crescendo of invective, the most virulent attack on Caesar: ecce tibi qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit, idque perfecerit etc. (3.83). De mortuis nil nisi bene vel sim. was an ancient no less than a modern proverb (cf. ad 3.82b-85). Some have found these attacks on the dead Caesar unseemly. But that is only so if one ignores the immediate political context of a work written when the right or wrong of Caesar's assassination was a heatedly debated political issue, one that would soon lead into yet another civil war. Cicero was trying to warn against the tendency of adven turers like Caesar and now Antony to strive for tyrannical powers and, once they had achieved them, to liquidate their opponents and confiscate their property. Cicero wanted to convince his readers that this is not the route to happiness or glory (cf. Phil. 1.35: quern [sc. Caesarem] qui beatum fuisse putant, miseri ipsi sunt; see further ad 3.83). Of all the examples of de Officiis (or indeed any of Cicero's writings), the
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one that is developed most elaborately appears toward the end of Book 3, it, too, a Roman example, the case of M. Atilius Regulus, a Roman general in the First Punic War. It is clear from Cicero's letter to Atticus of 5 November 44 that at the time he began writing Book 3 the case of Regulus was in his mind as an appropriate example. 71 According to the traditional version followed by Cicero (cf. ad 3.97-115), Regulus was sent to Rome bound by oath that he would return to Carthage unless successful in negotiating an exchange of prisoners. Once arrived, he argued against the offer on grounds that it was not in Rome's interest to return several younger Carthaginian commanders in exchange for himself; when the senate accordingly rejected the proposal, Regulus returned to Carthage to face torture and death. Cicero makes it plain that in Book 3 he is attempting to fill out along the same lines the portion of Panaetius' plan that the Stoic philosopher left incomplete. 72 But the example of Regulus sits oddly here in several respects. First, appropriate actions, for Panaetius, are relative to circumstances; the same act could be correct or incorrect depending on when it was performed. There was no absolute responsibility to keep one's oath; a promise could be ignored if it would harm the person who made the promise more than it would help the person to whom it was made (cf. 1.32); nor need an oath extracted by force be kept (ibid.), and Regulus' oath to return to Carthage surely was extracted by force. Cicero never squarely faces this problem with the example; the reason is that in Rome of the third century the oath was regarded as sacrosanct; Regulus simply could not have done anything but return if the exchange of prisoners did not go forward.73 The argument that the Ciceronian Regulus propounds against the exchange could also be ques tioned in light of Panaetius' teachings: Panaetius had argued that in warfare it is not strength of body but mental powers that are decisive;74 hence Regulus, an experienced general and twice consul, could be seen as the far greater 71. Att. 16.11.4: τα π€ρι του καθήκοιτος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus. illius tres sunt; sed cum initio divisisset ita, tria genera exquirendi offici esse, unum, cum deliberemus honestum an turpe sit, alterum, utile an inutile, tertium, cum haec inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli, redire honestum, manere utile, de duobus primis praeclare dissent, de tertio pollicetur se deinceps scripturum, sed nihil scripsit. 72. 3.33: eiusmodi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus out occupatio eius consilium peremisset. . . . sed quontam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto, tamquam fastigium imponimus, . . . 73. 3.111: sed ex tota hoc laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, illis quidem lemporibus aliter facere nan potuit. 74. 1.80: qua re expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi forti· tudo. . .
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prize. Finally, Cicero represents the case of Regulus as a conflict between bonestum and apparent utile; but it is really, as Cicero presents it, a conflict of two utilia—what was utile for the state (i.e., for the exchange to be rejected and for Regulus to return to Carthage) and what would have been utile for Regulus personally (for the exchange to be carried out and for him to remain at Rome), since, as we have seen, the third possibility of him remaining in Rome without having effected the exchange of prisoners simply did not exist. Thus the case of Regulus, which had seemed to Cicero as he wrote to Atticus so clear-cut an illustration of the problem to be posed in Book 3, proves on closer inspection problematical. Surely, however, in cap ping the main argument of the final book of his treatise75 with this luminous example of a Roman subordinating his apparent personal interest to that of the state, Cicero wanted to put forward a counter-example to the unbridled ambition of a Caesar that he so often excoriates. The political lesson of Off., then, is largely subsumed in the rhetorical question (3.101): potest autem quod inutile reipublicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile essei Cicero's approach has its limitations, however. The career of Cato Uticensis shows that in Cicero's day Stoicism could be a sharp tool for criticizing Roman practices.76 This tool becomes dull, however, in Cicero's hands, its power not exploited as one might have expected. Thus Long, 1995 1 , 239, finds that "human solidarity in Off, for all the rhetoric with which Cicero invests it, proves to consist primarily in respecting strict justice about prop erty rights and business transactions"; the possible egalitarian implications of Stoic teachings are ignored {sunt. . . privata nulla natura: 1.21), and the sanctity of private property is waived only in the case of someone who can do great good for human society and the state (3.30). Similarly Stoic doctrines about war (1.34-35) are diluted so that Roman practice is unaffected (1.38). This character is attributable to Cicero's mood at the time of composition, more inclined to defend institutions in danger of slipping away than to criticize them (cf. ad 3.44), as well as his generally conservative bent (to what degree this last quality was shared by Panaetius we can no longer say with certainty; on Panaetius' political precepts see further ad 1.21 and 2.72-85). At the beginning of Book 3 Cicero reflects on otium in connection with a statement by the elder Scipio Africanus—the same words that Cicero had quoted toward the beginning of the first book of his first philosophical essay, 75. The sequel highlights the contrasting case of the perjury of one or more of the prisoners Hannibal captured after Cannae (3.113-15); then follows another attack on the the qualifica tions of the Epicureans and other schools of similar standpoint to teach about the virtues <3.116-20) and a personal coda to the addressee (3.121). 76. Cf. Taylor, 125 ff.
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de Republics (sc. 1.27). Africanus said that he was never less at leisure than when he was at leisure nor less alone than when he was alone. Cicero goes on to contrast the otium of Africanus with his own to the former's advantage. Unlike other prefaces to Cicero's philosophical books where similar themes are sounded, ours contains no mention of the benefits that Cicero's writing on philosophy in Latin provides to his countrymen.77 Indeed he claims to prefer investigations, like those he attributes to Scipio, which leave no con crete result. This plangent meditation, tinged with self-pity and betraying that for him leisure is, after all, either an adjuna to or a surrogate for political activity, foreshadows Cicero's imminent surrender of his otium and resumption of his political war with Antony by direct, rather than purely literary means (see further ad 3.1-4). 7. Cicero philosophus (?) At the time of the composition of de Officiis, then, Cicero was caught be tween familial and state crises. In both cases he hoped to perpetuate his influence and secure his personal and political legacy. Young Marcus was of an age when he needed to make fundamental decisions about his course of life; Cicero's belief that he required firm parental guidance at this stage is reflected both in the general remarks at 1.117-18 and the planned trip to visit Marcus in Greece, aborted in mid-August (Att. 16.3.4; 16.7). At the same time the future course of the Roman state itself was an open question, Cicero's decision to return being motivated by the hope that he could help restore senatorial rule. At this juncture Cicero evidently saw Panaetius' essay on appropriate actions as a vehicle which, with some modification (cf. 1.6), could be used to convey messages appropriate to the time, both to his son about his choice of career and to his fellow Romans about the proper form of the state and its role, above all vis-a-vis the property of the individual. The precepts offered in our essay are, Cicero claims (2.7-8), compatible with his general stance as an adherent of the Skeptical Academy. He is dealing in this essay at a level of appropriate action (καθηκο») requiring no higher standard than that a ratio probabilis could be offered for the given action (1.8); he argues that the Academy allows him to "follow" probabilia (2.8), a position explained in greater detail at Luc. 99, where it is made clear that the exigencies of daily living impose some such procedure on the Skeptic {quae nisi probet omnis vita tollatur). Nevertheless his project in Off. is different from that in his dialogues in ways that Cicero, in his eagerness to affirm his philosophical consistency, scarcely acknowledges; for here there is no rebut77. Ci.Tusc. 1.5, N.D. 1.7.
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tal of the dogmata espoused. 78 Nor is the philosophical position occupied by Off. adequately described as "an attempt on the pan of an Academic to work out in Stoic terms the solution to the Stoic difficulty that Books I and II have raised" (Annas, 1989, 172; her emphasis). The problem of finding precepts to guide one in daily living (Book 1) or of winning glory and influence (Book 2) are not specifically Stoic. Other approaches could have been chosen. Cicero states sequimur igitur. . . Stoicos (1.6) but never explains why he has chosen to follow a Stoic source in Books 1-2 (the previous discussion had eschewed the claims of the Epicureans, Aristo, Pyrrho, and Herillus to au thority on this subject but had left intact that of the Stoics, Academics, and Peripatetics). More enlightening is the explanation of the adoption of the Stoic position at 3.20: . . . splendidius haec ab Us disserentur quibus quidquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nee utile quicquam quod non honestum . . . , which makes it clear that a rhetorical criterion has governed Cicero's choice of approach. 79 He thus spares himself having to descend to argumentative subtleties. This is, I think, characteristic of Cicero's procedure in this essay, written with speed and with the argument not seldom deline ated in broad strokes. Book 1 is anchored in a Stoicism of an allencompassing and humane variety, which freely quotes Plato and Aristotle and in which the interscholastic debates seldom appear (the polemic at 1.89 against the Peripatetic view of anger being the exception); Book 2, in which one of the external goods (glory) is assumed to be worth striving for (albeit for instrumental reasons specified at 2.31), can virtually be said to be more Peripatetic than Stoic (cf. introduction to that Book). Ironically, it is in Book 3, where Cicero boasts of his independence of sources (§ 34) and where the scale of values can ostensibly be either Stoic or Peripatetic (3.33), that the rigor of the older Stoa reasserts itself (cf. ad 3.62-63, 97-115, 119). In spite, then, of the skeptical pose Cicero adopts at 2.7-8 to save his reputation for philosophical consistency, Off. cannot be adequately ex plained as the exercise of a Skeptic who has allowed himself to explore Stoic problems. A further indication is that in this essay Cicero speaks, not in a persona of philosophical detachment, but as a moralist with a program; note the repeated gerundives: efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant (1.102). . . appetitus omnes contrahendos sedandosque esse (103). . . in omni autem actione susciptenda tria sunt tenenda, primum ut appetitus 78. Cf. P. Steinmetz, "Planting und Plananderung der philosophischcn Schriftcn Ciccros," Beitrage zur hellenistischen /.iterator und ihrer Rezeption in Rom, ed. P. Stcinmcrz, Palingcncsia 28 (Stuttgart,!990), 152. 79. Cf. ad U>c.; in this connection it is perhaps worth remembering that Cicero numbered his rhetorical works along with the philosophical (Div. 2.4).
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rationi pareat (141); the approving comment . . . rectissime praecipitur ut perturbationes fugiamus (136); or again the strong disapprobation con tained in such remarks as Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum (148). Here is no weighing of arguments pro and contra, no sitting on the fence; Off. is, as befits a set of precepts written by a father for his son, a deeply engaged work. It is no less engaged on the political level (see § 6 above). 80 Cicero's probable modifications of his Panaetian source fit with the pro grams that he is advancing both with his son and the Roman people. The fact that the first virtue is much more narrowly circumscribed and given much shorter shrift than Panaetius is likely to have done is in accord with Cicero's conception of the limited scope of the vita contemplativa in the life of the Roman statesman he wants his son to become (cf. ad 1.18-19). One suspects that similarly under the third virtue Cicero has given the vita activa an exclusive claim to be the fulfillment of magnitudo animi, contrary to Pan aetius (cf. ad 1.72). Likewise the list of sordid and liberal professions (1.15051) and all the passages in which dignitas is emphasized under the fourth virtue seem likely to be Cicero's attempts to draw out in more concrete and specifically Roman terms the values latent in Panaetius' account, which was probably argued from phenomena observed in nature to a greater degree than our text suggests (cf. ad 1.127). Finally the critique of Panaetius for omissions from his divisio and supplementation of these topics as appendices to Books 1 and 2 was surely contrived by Cicero in order to provide a ranking whereby the vita activa is placed firmly (and with quite wearying repetition) above the vita contemplativa (1.152 ff.). The subject of Book 3, the conflict of the honestum and apparent utile, had been mooted but never executed by Panaetius (cf. § 5 |3] above). Cicero is familiar with the view of P. Rutilius Rufus that, just as, in view of the beauty of the face, no one had dared to complete Ape lies' Coan Venus, so no one had ventured to complete Panaetius' work on appropriate actions be cause of the excellence of what he had left (3.10). In spite of the initial diffidence with which he had recommended this work merely on stylistic grounds to a son studying with Cratippus (proem to Book 1), Cicero seems to gain confidence as he goes, so that at 3.7 he speaks of having followed Panaetius correctione quadam adhihita and by 3.121 it is hoped that the younger Cicero will benefit from the content, not just the style. In any case, Cicero proceeds undeterred by the praestantia of Panaetius' work (3.10) and in the event produces a dilation on the topic, treated briefly at 1.31 ff., of 80. Cf. the similar conclusion of Long, 1995', 220, n. 16.
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officia ex tempore. For him the solution lies not in a deeper exploration of the concepts honestum and utile, which cannot diverge, but in the applica tion of terms to individual cases; for, since hard and fast rules do not apply, the same action may shift from one category to another depending on cir cumstance. The execution is driven largely by examples dictated by Cicero's current political concerns, as indicated in the previous section. Cicero was a lifelong student of philosophical texts and was genuinely interested in pursuing, in the amateur way he considered suitable to a Roman gentleman and statesman, philosophical questions. After de Republica and de Legibus Cicero resumed writing on philosophy late in life under pressure of personal misfortune and conceived the plan of a systematic introduction to Greek philosophy written in the Latin language. Off. was, however, never part of that plan. Like de Consolatione it had a personal occasion—as a replacement for the aborted visit to his son in Athens (3.121). It was dashed off at a remarkably quick rate; besides reading Panaetius' essay and a tract of Posidonius on circumstantial appropriate action and a work of Hecato and examining some historical texts, he evidently did little specific preparation. His reliance on memory is betrayed on occasion by such a phrase as nihil habeo praeter auditum (1.33). It shows us less of Cicero the philosopher than Cicero the father and politician. 8. Influence through the Centuries If de Officiis was composed in some haste and conceived with reference to a particular set of personal and historical circumstances, it has had neverthe less a remarkable influence and resonance over many centuries. A full study of its Nachleben lies beyond the scope of this introduction. But the student of what has been called the most influential of Cicero's philosophical works 8 1 should at least be acquainted with the main lines of development. 82 Whether or not Cicero intended it to be such, its potential as a school text appears to have been recognized early on; 8 3 that it was viewed as a suitable model of Latinity gave Off., in the Renaissance, additional cachet. 84 As late as the 81. Ziclinski, 66. 82. In default of a needed updating Zielinski's study retains its usefulness (though his interpretation of Off. cannot be relied upon in detail; cf. ad 1.7b); Gunermann, 440 ff., presents a brief sketch; one looks forward to publication of the Cologne Habilitarionsarbeit of Irene Frings, Ciceros de officiis. Studien zur Rezeption von Horaz bis Petrarca, mil einem Anhang ztt Matteo Palmieri, Delia vita civile. 83. See p. 42, n. 98 infra. 84. Sec pp. 45-46 infra.
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eighteenth century the text retained sufficient standing to be taken seriously by major thinkers, such as Montesquieu and Kant, who found in it inspira tion or something to react against, modify, and incorporate in forming their own views on society and ethics, whereas, at a lower level of culture, Off. continued to be recycled more or less unmodified.85 It was only the discredit ing of Cicero's philosophical originality in the nineteenth century that brought a fundamental change, which, followed in our century by an altered attitude toward the traditional classical curriculum in many Western coun tries, has reduced the influence of Off. to perhaps its lowest point since the Dark Ages. The exact circumstances of the publication of this text elude us. Wilamowitz thought, in light of Rudberg's study, "dai? Tiro aus einem unfertigen Konzept, aus verschiedenen Entwurfen und Notizen, die vorliegenden Bucher hergestellt hat";86 some passages of the text as transmitted certainly raise the possibility that it lacks the summa manus and was published posthumously (see § 10 below); 87 but with the evidence at hand it is futile to try to identify the editor or characterize, as Wilamowitz does, the manuscript Cicero left (uversehiedene Entwiirfe und Notizen n ). The terminus ante quern for publication is the Augustan principate if echoes are rightly detected in Horace and Ovid. Carm. 3.5.41 ff. (the Regulus Ode) can be explained as taking Off. 3.100 as its starting point (see ad he. and ad 3.114); and the allusion to unflappable behavior at Carm. 3.3.1 ff. (lustum et tenacem propositi virum . . .) might have been inspired by Off 1.80. 88 Ovid's Ars Amatoria may also depend on our work, though not all of the echoes so far claimed are equally convincing.89 By the reign of Tiberius the indications are more definite: Off. was read and ransacked, along with 85. Cf., e.g., The Letters of Lord Chesterfield to His Son (London-Toronto-New York, 1929), 111 (10 August Old Style 1749): "A certain degree of exterior seriousness in looks and motions, gives dignity, without excluding wit and decent cheerfulness, which arc always serious themselves. A constant smirk upon the face, and a whiffling activity of the body are strong indications of futility. Whoever is in a hurry, shows that the thing he is about is too big for him. Haste and hurry are two different things. . . . Pray read frequently and with the utmost attention—nay, get by heart, if you can—that incomparable chapter in Cicero's Offices upon the τΰ np^now |$ic), or the Decorum. It contains whatever is necessary for the dignity of manners." 86. Wilamowitz, 1932, 2, 390-91, n. 87. On the other hand, Cicero would scarcely have wanted to hold back for very long a work with this kind of political program (cf. $ 6 supra), as Thomas, 6, already noted. 88. Cf. D'Elia, 130. 89. Cf. E.J. Kenney, "Nequiiiae poeta," Ovidiana, ed. N.I. Hcrcscu (Paris, 1958), 201-9 at 207 n. 2; Atzcrf·, VI, and D'Elia; ad 1.129.
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the other Ciceronian philosophica, for the handbook of rhetorical examples that Valerius Maximus dedicated to that emperor.90 The first panegyric of Off comes from the pen of the Elder Pliny, who praises Cicero's candor in naming his source and in his dedication to the Emperor Titus calls our work volumina ediscenda, non modo in manibus cotidie habenda (praef 22 ). 91 The first passage expressly quoted is Cicero's rendering of the Euripidean verses so often cited by Julius Caesar (3.82: Suet. Jul. 30.5). The early fourth-century lexicon de Compendiosa Doctrina of Nonius Marcellus contains a number of quotations from Cicero's works, including de Officiis. Fedeli has emphasized that Nonius does, on occasion, preserve the true reading against the entire medieval tradition;92 elsewhere, however, he is sometimes guilty of banalization typical of excerptors;93 nor, since he himself may sometimes have had to rely on corrupt texts, will it be easy to sort out his own errors from those of his manuscript tradition. In any case, since his readings are not aligned with one or the other of the branches of the medieval tradition,94 it remains unclear whether these do, in fact, go back to antiquity (see § 10 below). 95 Cicero's essay was a force with which Christian authors, too, had to reckon, whether by way of polemical opposition or adaptation. Writing for pagans with the intent of trapping pagan philosophers in self-contradiction, Lactantius alludes to de Officiis, as to other Ciceronian philosophical works, in a number of passages. 96 But it was left to St. Ambrose to provide in his de 90. As was suggested by F. Zschech, De Cicerone et Livio Valerii Maximi fontibus (diss. Berlin, 1865), 6 and 16 if.; cf. also W. Thormcycr, De Valerio Maximo et Cicerone quaestiones criticae (diss. Gottingen, 1902}, 87 ft.; the borrowings are conveniently listed in the apparatus testimoniorum of Fedeli and Winterbottom. 91. Pliny's nephew, too, shows signs of having been influenced by Off. (cf. ad 1.58 and 107-22). 92. Fedeli, 1964 2 and 1973, 386; I am, however, less confident than he that at 1.56 Nonius1 quod Pythagoras ultimum in amicilia putavit (417.26) is preferable to quod Pythagoras vuh in amicitia of the Ciceronian tradition. 93. E.g., at 1.114 bonorum et malorum (Non. 241.3) for bonorum et vitiorum or the insertion of necesse est following the verb and substitution of subjunctive for future in the phrase dissolvetur ontnis bumana consortia (3.26; Non. 196.15). 94. Fedeli 1975, 387.—Fedeli cites (ibid.) some passages to show that Nonius used an already interpolated exemplar; but none of these passages (viz.. 2.22, 3.81, and 3.112) seems likely to be interpolated (cf. ad locos). 95. Some allusions to Off. in the Panegyria Latini are pointed out in D. Lassandro's new edition (Turin, 1992); cf. Michael Winterbottom's comments at Gnomon 67 (1995), 560 and n. I; cf. also citation of Off. 1.10 at RLM 571.22 (Emporius). 96. Forty-two according to L. Cacli Firmiani Lactanti Opera omnia, ed. S. Brandt-G. Laubmann, 2.2 (Prague-Vienna-Leipzig, 1897), 248-49 (index auctorum); cf. Franz Fessler,
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Officiis Ministrorum the most thorough rethinking of Cicero's subject based on a reading of de Officiis preserved from antiquity.97 The best indication we have that Off. was a school text, knowledge of which could be presupposed in an educated reader of late antiquity, consists in Ambrose's allusion to it by praeteritio at 3.66, 70, and 71. 9 8 Perhaps the availability of Ambrose's essay in a new critical edition will stimulate further study of it and its relation to its Ciceronian model." Current scholarship tends to stress Ambrose's indepen dence and the importance of his examples drawn from the Old Testament, which often lend a quite different emphasis from Cicero's.100 There follows a relatively fallow period in the influence of de Officiis. Direct use of our text in the sixth century Formula honestae vitae by Martin of Bracara has been denied by £. Bickel; but to uphold this view one would evidently have to posit a lost work of Seneca as the source for the sententia 'nee dominum esse velis a domo, sed domum a domino' (4, p. 69; cf. Off. 1.139). 101 A fragment written in the first half of the ninth century at Tours (Q) is the earliest extant medieval text of Off.;102 and Tours influence has been suspected in another early witness. 103 Winterbottom conjectures that a borrowed German copy may have been the source used about this time by Hadoard of Corbie for his Florilegium (K) and in related manuscripts.104 The restricted availability of Off. at this period is suggested by the fact that it was evidently inaccessible to Lupus of Ferrieres.105 In general the early ζ Benutzung der philosophischen Schriften Ciceros durch Lactam (Leipzig-Berlin, 1913), csp. 89 and 43 ff.; Nelson, 64 ff. and 155-56. 97. For the effort of Gellius (1.13) in that direction cf. ad 1.32.—On the date of the treatise (subsequent to 386 and prior to 394) cf. Testaxd (n. 99 infra) 1, 44 ff.; see Wintcrbottom's edition (170-72) for a list of dependent passages. 98. Cf. Stcidle, 1984, 58, n. 5, and 1985, 294-95; another indication is the fact that the youthful emperor Severus Alexander (208-35; regn. 222-35) was much occupied in its study (cf. SHA 18.30.2), as the elderly German statesman Otto von Bismarck was to be (Gunermann, 445). 99. Saint Ambroise, Les devoirs, ed. M. Tesiard, 2 vols. (Paris, 1984-92). 100. Cf. most recently Steidle, 1984 and 1985; on the surprisingly small number of citations of Off. in St. Augustine's writings (four) cf. Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Ociron, 1 (Paris, 1958), 214; influence need not, however, take this form; sec Tcstard's index locorum s.v. Ciccron, De officiis, and for the influence of Off. 1.96 ff. on die treatise de Pukhro et Apto cf. J.M. Fontanicr, "Sur le traite d' Augustin De pulchro ct apto. Convenance, beaute et adaptation," RSPh 73 (1989), 413-21 at 417-18. 101. Bickel, 525-30; cf. Nelson, 78. 102. It comprises 2.72 necessaria— 3.11 non potest. 103. Sc. Paris. 6601 (= P), s. IX/X; cf. Beeson, 221. 104. Winterbottom, 1993, 216, n. 8; on Hadoard's excerpts cf. Nelson, 82 ff. 105. Beeson, 219.
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manuscripts show both German and French affiliations, so that the point of origin remains uncertain.106 From the twelfth century onward copies of Off. are much more common, and the tract becomes, for the first time since late antiquity, part of the bloodstream of Western culture. An indicator of the increasing influence of Off. during the twelfth century is the fact that, though omitted from the list of curriculum authors drawn up in the first half of the century by Conrad of Hirsau, it takes its place in the similar list dated to the latter half of the century and attributed to Alexander Neckham. 107 It is to this period, too, that the origin of the vulgate text, presenting a debased form of the ζ tradi tion, has been traced. 108 Moreover, authors begin to plunder our essay for ideas and examples or rethink the problems it raises. Such use is found especially in works that breathe the spirit of the Cathedral school at Chartres, such as the influential Moralium dogma philosophorum ascribed in a thirteenth-century manuscript to William of Conches, an attribution now in doubt, 109 as well as the historical works of Otto of Freising, and, most creatively, the Policraticus of John of Salisbury.110 Though moralists of the earlier thirteenth century show a preference for Seneca and though in the latter part of the century the hegemony of Aristotle sets in, the idealism tempered with realism of de Officiis remains a force, especially on the subjca of justice and liberality. Thus the extensive and fairly representative borrowings from Off. in the Speculum doctrinae of the Dominican reader at the court of Louis IX, Vincent of Beauvais (d. 1264), point to "a larger absorption of pagan ideas than is commonly credited to the thirteenth century" (Nelson, 117); and a full digest of Off. appears in the same author's Speculum historiale (6.7-10). Themes from Off. are likewise prominent in the Summa de regimine vitae humanae sive Communiloquium of the Franciscan theologian active in Paris, Joannes Gallensis (fl. 1260-85). Within his Christian-Aristotelian framework Aquinas, too, especially in the sphere of justice and social thought, shows influence of the views and exam ples he found in our treatise; and Cicero's third Book became via Thomas a 106. Winterbottom, 1993,219.—On the (inaccurate) allusion to Off. 3.8 or 12 by Gcrbcrt of Aurillac (d. 1003; Ep. 44 = PL 139, 214) cf. Nelson, 87-88. 107. Cf. Ernst Robert Curtius, Europdische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter, 3d ed. (Bern-Munich, 1961), 59 = European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. W.R. Trask (Princeton, 1953), 49-50. 108. Winterbottom, 1993, 220; knowledge of the ξ form at any period is unusual; excep tional cases arc noted ibid., 228 ff. 109. Cf. L Rauner, Lexikon des Mittelalters (Munich and Zurich, 1992), 827. 110. Cf. Nelson, 89 ff.
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major influence on the ethics of trade and commerce in the High Middle Ages. 111 Cicero's potent thrusts at tyranny could be an unsettling political force; they were used by ecclesiastics in their attacks on secular power but are absent from the works of such Italian patriots as Giovanni Nanni, Brunetto Latini, and Albertano Bescia—evidently because their knowledge of Off. was filtered through the Moralium dogma, where the attacks on tyrants are diverted to criminals. 112 If the neglect of Cicero prior to Petrarch (1304-74) is sometimes over stated,1 13 it is certainly true that this enthusiast, who called Virgil and Cicero "gli occhi de la lingua nostra,**114 moved the orator to a place at the center of interest that he had not occupied since St. Jerome had dreamed of being reproached at the Last Judgement: Ciceronianus es, non Christianus (epist. 22.30); and Petrarch's personal relation to and emulation of the ancients, in contrast to the medieval reverence for the authority of the "auctores," is a harbinger of the modern approach. 115 The popularity of de Officiis in the early Renaissance is shown by the enormous number of copies made (almost 700 are extant, the overwhelming majority dated to the fourteenth or fifteenth century 116 ); thus it is hardly surprising that, after the invention of movable type, de Officiis, together with the Paradoxa Stoicorum, was the first printed Latin text (Fust and Schoeffer, Mainz, 1465). Its influence can be traced on works as diverse in subject and purpose as Machiavelli's // principe and Castiglione's // cortegiano.117 Among the early editors of de Officiis was no lesser figure than Erasmus of Rotterdam. He announces imminent publication of his annotated edition (Paris, John Philippi, n.d.) in a letter to James Batt dated 5 April 1 5 0 1 . n 8 111. For Joannes Gallensis and Aquinas cf. Nelson, 118 ff. and 157. 112. Ibid., 158. 113. E.g., by Zielinski, 137, and John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, 2 (Cambridge, 1908), 6. 114. Trhnfo della Fama (3.21) in Francesco Petrarca, Le rime sparse e i trionfi, ed. E. Chiorboli (Ban, 1930). 115. Cf. in general P. de Nolhac, Petrarch and the Ancient World (Boston, 1907), csp. 108 ff. 116. Cf. Winterbottom, 1993, 215 and 234 ff. 117. Off. was also the second classical Latin text printed (Cologne, Ulrich Zell, ca. 1466): cf. Sandys (n. Mi supra), 103. On MachiavclliandCasriglionccf. MacKcndhck, 262 ff. Forthe influence of Off. on the architect Leon Battista Albeni (1404-72) cf. Onians. Polirian, too, devoted study to our work; for his uncharacteristic error in attempting to emend the transmitted κατόρθωμα to κατορθωμίΜΗ' (sic) in Off. 1.8 cf. Jill Krayc, "Cicero, Stoicism and Textual Criticism: Poliziano on κατόρθωμα," Rinasamento scr. 2, 23 (1983), 79-110, csp. 89-91. 118. Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, ed. P.S. Allen, 2d ed., 1 (Oxford, 1906), 355.
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During his stay in Paris (1503-7) Beatus Rhenanus acquired one of the two known extant copies. 119 Erasmus likewise alludes to this project in a letter of 28 April 1501 to James Voecht, reproduced in reprints of Erasmus' edition (Froben, Basel; August, 1520, and later) and including a remarkable en comium of our work, of which the following may serve as a specimen: " . . . tres illos M. Tullii de Officiis libellos vere aureos 120 relegimus, incertum maiorene voluptate an fructu. Quos quoniam Plinius Secundus negat unquam de manibus deponi oportere, 121 voluminis magnitudinem quoad licuit contraximus, quo semper in manibus enchiridii vice gestari et, quod scripsit idem, ad verbum edisci possint;. . . Hie fons ille divinus honestatis in quattuor rivulos se dividit, qui potus non solum vocaiem, ut Aonius ille, verum etiam immortalem faciat; cuius undis, si subinde mentis anus tinxeris, velut Achilles alter ad omnia fortunae tela impenetrabilis evades." 122 On the other hand, the spirit not only of humanism but also of the refor mation animates the work of the Wittenberg Greek professor Philipp Schwarzerd (1497-1560), who signed his works with the Greek caique of his surname, Melanchthon. A series of grammars and commentaries on classical authors, including one on de Officiis, as well as his work in organizing or reorganizing several schools, earned him the title "praeceptor Germaniae." 123 In the prefaced explanation "quid conferat lectio librorum de Officiis M. Tulli Ciceronis" he compares Off. with St. Ambrose's reworking in such a way as to leave little scope for a reading of the Milanese bishop: "Civilis vitae consuetudo a Cicerone describitur, cum qua religio nihil pugnat. scripsit de Officiis etiam divinus Ambrosius, credo ut pueris inculcaret religionem, de qua videbat in Ciceronianis nihil praecipi. verum ego religionem ex divinis litteris censeo hauriendam esse, de civilibus moribus malim audire Ciceronem . . ." After fleeing his native France in the face of charges of heresy and immor ality, Marcus Antonius Muretus (1526-85) pursued a teaching career in Italy that culminated in his professorship in Rome (1563-84). If the moral and 119. Ibid. 120. The epithet was taken up in Muretus' lectures on Off. (cf. M. Antonii Mureti Opera omnia ex MSS aucta et emendata, cum brevi annotatione D. Ruhnkemi, 1 [Leiden, 1789), 250) and became traditional; cf. die qualification made by Wilamowitz, 1923, 190: "In Ciceros goldcncm Buchc von den Pflichten stammt das Gold von Panaitios . . ." 121. Cf. p. 41 supra. 122. Opus epist. (n. 118 supra), 356-57; cf. G. Vallese, "Erasmo e Cicerone: Ic Icttercprefazioni crasmianc al De officiis e alle Tuscolane," Le parole e le idee 11 (1969), 265-72. 123. Cf. K. Hartfclder, Philipp Melanchthon als praeceptor Germaniae, Monumenta Germaniac paedagogica 7 (Berlin, 1889), esp. 382 (his views on Cicero).
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political content of the treatise had been at the center of interest of Erasmus and Melanchthon, it is not surprising that, when lecturing on de Officiis, Muretus, who, centuries after his death, was still regarded as a model of neoLatin style, 124 should have listed its style as the first reason for valuing the essay (though he may have exaggerated its degree of polish); next is cited the fact that Off. was written as "prope ultimus illius praestantis ingenii fetus"; and finally that the precepts were carefully collected, since the aim was to counsel his son on his course of life. 125 In the following century the labors of humanist commentators were sub sumed in the great variorum edition of J.G. Graevius (first edition, 1688), an unrivaled collection of ancient parallels. On the other hand, Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), to whom Wilamowitz attributed u das Zeug, Scaliger cbenburtig fortzusetzen,"126 because of the vicissitudes of the vita activa into which he was drawn, appears in these pages, not as a commentator on Off, but as one who made use of it in his own writings. Thus in the de lure Belli ac Pacts he cites Cicero's condemnation of self-aggrandizement [Off. 3.21-22) and his warning against exposing oneself to danger without cause [Off. 1.83). 127 But it was during the eighteenth century that De Officiis achieved what was surely the high-water mark of its influence on modern thought. 128 "Le traite Des Offices de Ciceron m'avait enchante et je le prenais pour mon modele"; so Montesquieu (1689-1755) explained many years later to Mgr. de Fitz-James his decision to embark on his first serious large-scale work. 129 He goes on to give his reasons for abandoning the projected Traite des devoirs: " . . . la division de Ciceron, qui est celle des Stoiciens, etait trop vague; surtout je craignais un rival tel que Ciceron et il me semblait que mon esprit tombait devant le sien." 130 It is not altogether clear what division Montesquieu found wanting (between honestum and utile} of the honestum into four parts?). In any case, the magnum opus De I'Esprit des lots itself breathes the spirit of de Officiis. Thus its analysis of the laws prior and 124. Cf. Pfeiffer, 113. 125. Muretus (n. 120 supra), 251-52. 126. Wilamowitz, Geschichte der Philologte (Leipzig, 1927), 31. 127. Respectively de lure Belli ac Pacts 1.1.3.1 and 2.24.5.4; cf. also ad 3.52 and 61. 128. Besides the French and Prussian examples cited in the text note that the Phanariorc Nicolas Mavrocordatos published in 1719 in Bucharest a book ncpi καθηκόντων, which includes a fairly close backtranslation into the Atricizing Greek of the rime of Off. 1.11-17; at some points one feels he may not be too far from what Panactius might have written; cf. Panagiotis Noutsos, "Nicolas Mavrocordatos et Ciceron," Dodoni 11 (1982), 235-43. 129. Correspondence de Montesquieu, ed. F. Gebelin and A. Morize, 2 (Bordeaux, 1914), 304. 130. Ibid., 305.
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superior to any written code is inspired by Off. 1.11-12, just as "sociabilite" in the sense of the second virtue of Off. becomes the basis for his analysis of the forms of government, the treatment of despotism ringing changes on Cicero's denial that there can be any societas with a tyrant (3.19, 32, and 82).» 3 ' Meanwhile in Prussia Frederick the Great pronounced de Officiis "le meilleur ouvrage de morale, qu'on ait ecrit et qu'on ecrira"*32 and inspired Christian Garve's German translation.133 This version, soon followed by Garve's Philosophische Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen zu Ciceros Buchern von den Pflichten (Breslau, 1783), appeared while Kant was at work on the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. For a time early in 1784 Kant considered publishing his ethical views in the form of a critique of Garve. Though he decided to broaden the scope, the resulting Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten defined its project in opposition to the "populare sittliche Welrweisheit" largely represented by de Officiis as translated and interpreted by Garve. Thus the first section includes a critique of the attempt to ground ethical norms on natural instincts, as at Off. 1.11 ff. (Kant, 395; cf. further ad 1.11); and Kant's rejection of a derivation of "Pflichten" from a "Natureinrichtung" is evidently directed against Cicero's use of naturae ratio at 3.23 (translated by Garve as "Einrichtung unserer Natur"). In spite of the fact that he chose to base ethics on reason ("Vernunft") rather than nature, two of the formulations of the categorical imperative in the second section of the Grundlegung show the influence of Kant's reading of de Officiis. The first formulation of the categorical imperative, "handle nur nach derjenigen Maxime, durch die du zugleich wollen kannst, daft sie 131. Cf. J. Chomarar, "Le 'Dc officiis* ct la pensee de Montesquieu," Presence de Ciciron. Hommages au R.P.M. lestard (Paris, 1984), 195-206, esp. 200 ff. 132. Frederick the Great, De la Utterature allemande. Franzosisch-Deutsch mix der Moserschen Cegenschrift, ed. Chr. Gutknecht and P. Kerner (Hamburg, 1969), p. 64,5 55 (orig. Berlin, 1780). The reaction was not long in arriving; in an address dated 18 January 1811 Johann Friednch Herbart pronounced de Officus "in wissen&chaftlicher Hin&icht . . . das Schlechtcstc . . . . was der grossc Mann uns hintcrlassen hat"; he complains, with some justice, of a composition uohne Sorgfalt" and adds this by no means inapposite characterization: "Der Sohn soil sich uberzeugen, dass der Nutzen nut der Tugend nicht streite; daher verlasst den Vater die Ruhc und Unbcfangcnhcit, womit er in den Buchern vom hochsten Gut cine jcde Sache fur sich selbst hatte reden lassen. Diese Biicher vom hochsten Gut waren schon geschrieben, und der Sohn Icrnt in Athen; daher eilt der Vater fur diesmal iiber die Principien hinweg, er wird ausfiihrlich nur an den Stcllen, wo ihm daran liegt, irgend cine unmittclbar praktischc Wahrheit scinem Sohnc dcutlich zu machen und cinzupragen." (J.F. Herbart, Samtliche Werke. cd. G. Hartenstein, 12 (Leipzig, 1852J, 172). 133. Ciceros Abhandluttg iiber die menschlichen Pflichten in drei Buchern . . . , tr. Christian Garve (Breslau, 1783); cf. Melches Gibert, esp. 55 ff.
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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
ein allgemeines Gesetz werde" (Kant, 421), presupposes a community of all people; this Stoic cosmopolitanism Kant imbibed from de Officiis (3.28). The second formulation of the categorical imperative reads: "handle so, daS du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals blofi als Mirtel brauchst" (Kant, 429). This concept of the humanity in onself and others derives from Off. 3.26:. . . qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam... 5/ nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras qui omnino hominem ex homine tollatt (Garve's translation of the underlined clause: "So verdient er keine Widerlegung, da er im Menschen die Menschlichkeit aufhebt"). 134 The nineteenth century brought a fundamentally altered approach to Cicero both as a philosophical authority and as a politician. 135 The first serious attempt to set de Officiis into context in terms of the history of philosophy was the dissertation that F.G. van Lynden wrote under the guid ance of Daniel Wyttcnbach.136 If as early as 1697T. Graevius' (posthumous) edition of Callimachus had been adorned by 420 fragments collected by Bentley, fragmentarily preserved philosophical texts had to wait longer for such careful philological treatment. Van Lynden, however, made a good start in collecting Panaetian testimonia and fragments and raised such fundamen tal questions as the readership that Panaetius addressed and the reasons Cicero might have been drawn to this source. 137 Such work on the philo sophical sources of Off. was continued notably by R. Hirzel 138 and, in our century, by M. Pohlenz. The Panaetian testimonia and fragments have since been edited on modern principles by M. van Straaten.139 This century, with Cicero's place in school curricula still secure but his influence on high culture waning, 140 also saw a flowering of philological work on Off., including the 134. For chc influence of Off. on Kant's Grundlegung cf. in general Melches Gibert, 77 ff. 135. For the latter point with particular reference to Mommscn cf. Habicht, csp. the "Epilogue." 136. F.G. van Lynden, he. cit., n. 47 supra. 137. For rhc former point cf. he. cit., n. 47 supra, for the latter 86 ff. 138. Hirzel, 2, 721-36. 139. Albeit without a strict division between testimonia and fragments or assignment of fragments to books. 140. Cf. the apparent allusion to Off. 1.15 by Goethe, Kunsttheoretische Schriften una Obersetzungen. Schriften zur btldenden Kunst, 1, Berliner Ausgabc 19 (Berlin-Weimar, 1973), 26, where he calls a remark in J.G. Sulzer's Die scbonen Kiinste in ihrem Ursprung, ihrer wahren Natur una besten Anwendung "so halb und miSvcrstanden und in den Wind geschlagen als der Wunsch Ciceros, die Tugcnd in korperlichcr Schonheit seincm Sohnc zuzufuhrcn" (I owe this reference to the kindness of Christine Schmitz).
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best grammatical and stylistic commentary, written by CF.W. Miiller, and Ernst Popp's work in sorting out the relation of manuscripts, which forms the basis of all subsequent editions. 141 Whereas the nineteenth century called Cicero's philosophical originality into question, it remained for the twentieth, with its ideological Sturm und Drang, to expose and challenge the political assumptions which underlie the work. This goal has been pursued, now with greater, now with lesser sub tlety, ever since Robert von Pohlmann called attention to the classist views latent in Cicero's treatment of honorable and sordid professions {Off. 1.15051; see ad /oc). Certainly Cicero's own background, his class, and political affiliations, as well as his intended readership, were factors in determining his program and procedure in de Officiis to a greater extent than previous scholarship had delineated; hence it was a useful corrective for these elements to be brought out. On the other hand, Cicero's unique achievement can be lost sight of if emphasis is placed too exclusively on his position as a repre sentative of a given social group. 142 Apart from interruptions in the Dark Ages and in our own century, de Officiis has had a long history as a school text. Over the centuries it has had its admirers, those who have paid it the compliment of imitation, emulation, or outright plagiarism, and, especially of late, its critics. If it has provided a civilized model for the relations of human beings within society (1.20-60) and of different states one to another (cf. ad 1.34), quotable protests against absolutist oppression (2.23-24 and 3.82-85), and a vision of a society cmbracing under a common interest the entire human race (3.26-28), it has perhaps exerted as salutary an influence as can be expected of any text of the now much maligned "canon"; its critics should be sure they have something better to put in its place. 9. Language and Style Since philosophical writing generally falls into the aequabile et temperatum genus of the Middle Style (cf. 1.3), shifts of tone of the kind found in the 141. De Ciceronis de offiais librorum codiabus bernensi 104 eique cognatis (diss. Erlangen, 1883); De Ciceronis de officiis librorum codice palatino 1531 (Erlangcn, 1886); De Ciceronis de officiis librorum codicibus vossiano Q 71 et parishto 6601 (Hof, 1893). 142. Cf. Hcilmann, with M. Griffin's review, JRS 75 (1985), 311-13. Extreme examples of this type of approach: Horst Dieter, Ciceros Werk 'De Officiis'—cine ideologische Tendenzschrift (diss. Potsdam, 1960); cf., e.g., 53: "Der vir bonus entpuppt sich als rrcuer und gehorsamer Untertan bzw. als ergebener Anhanger dcr aristokratischen Sklavenhalterrepublikw; Wilfned Lorenz, Virtus und res publico. Untersuchungen turn Verhaltnis von Moralitat und Gesellschaft im philosophischen Werk Ciceros (diss. Leipzig, 1987).
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speeches are not to be expected. De Officiis shows no lack of liveliness, however, but includes exclamations—helpfully marked as such in Winterbottom's text—, epigrams (e.g., nee domo dominus sed dominus domo honestanda est: 1.139; cf. 2.69), quoted remarks by imaginary objectors (cf. ad 3.76), the give-and-take of (imaginary) debate (3.49b-57, 89-92, 100 ff.), occasional attempts to involve young Marcus in the argument as if it were an actual dialogue (cf. ad 3.33), and a mini-philippic directed at the dead Caesar (3.83-85). Nor has Cicero lost the power of vivid narrative that enables him to sketch character in a few deft strokes (3.58-60). As sometimes in Aristotle's πραγματάαι, 143 the proems to the individual books are more carefully worked up; so, too, the conclusion of the main argument of Books 1 and 2 falls into the anaphoric pattern characteristic of hymns, and each is rounded off with a ditrochaic clausula (1.151, 2.85). Elsewhere, however, there are lapses into formulaic writing (see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v.) or occasions when the examples do not quite fit the argument (cf. ad 1.25). The generally loose organization allows Cicero to repeat himself (1.136 and 141 after 1.100-3a; 1.153 ff.; for verbal repetition see Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Repe tition"), to add topics not foreseen by his divisio (cf. ad 1.138-40), or indeed to paste on an improvised divisio three quarters of the way through a book (cf. ad 3.96). Even in the speeches composed after the Civil War the periodic structure is simplified and much less embellished than earlier;144 all the more so in our essay. De Officiis consists of definite opinions emphatically expressed. The praecepta that Cicero promises will play so large a role here (1.7b) often take the form of a gerundive instruction (the officii forma according to 1.103; for examples see % 7 above). Also frequent are the emphatic nominal sentences expressing a value-judgment (e.g., sed Mud maximum: 3.114; for other ex amples see Index of Latin Words s.v. Sum, ellipsis of). Exposition or narra tive relies heavily on simple parataxis (cf. 1.12; at 3.38 the naive narrative of Gyges' ring relies mostly on parataxis with some use of relative connection and cum clauses 145 ). As in other works of Cicero's late period, the parti ciple, including its verbal properties, is exploited extensively, occasionally in parallel with a subordinate clause (cf. 3.2:. . . qui in maxima celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes conspectum sceleratorum . . . ; see Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Par143. The first seven chapters of ££ 1 are, for instance, free of hiatus; cf. Dirlmeier ad EN, p. 265. 144. Cf. Gotoff, xli-xlii. 145. Cf. von Albrecht, RE Suppl. 13 (1973), 1262.33 ff. a propos Fin. 5.42.
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ticiples**). Word-order is, of course, skilfully managed to produce the desired emphasis (e.g., nee veto histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est ut its haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta: 1.129; ita duae res, quae languorem adferunt ceteris, ilium acuebant, otium et solitudo: 3.1; see also ad 3.119). Attention to prose-rhythm was second nature to Cicero and is found even in his infor mal letters. 146 It is not absent from Off. either, though I have called attention to it only in a few places where it serves to underscore a point or plays a role in deciding a textual problem (besides the cases mentioned above cf. ad 1.14 and 15a; 2.48; 3.3). The diction is, of course, not that of the courtroom. Greek words are allowed (καθήκον, κατόρθωμα, πρέπον, ορμή, ευκαιρία, σοφία, φρόνησι?) but are immediately explained. Cicero also takes care to see that the Latin ex pressions used as technical terms (e.g., magnitudo animi, decorum) are, when first introduced, clarified with a congeries of words of related signifi cance. A Greek word used in the letters to Atticus like βαθύτη? is eschewed in favor of the Latin equivalent, altitudo animi, evidently not widely used (note the quae dicitur attached at 1.88; see ad loc). Cicero sometimes allows a Greek-derived technical term like orichalcum (3.92) or scalmus (3.59), but not cothones, for which he prefers portus manu facti at 2.14. Moreover, technical terms can be repeated here within a brief compass; thus, medicamentum recurs four times within 3.92b; see ad loc. A colloquialism such as plecti in the sense ttbe punished," ordinarily excluded from speeches before the bar or the senate, is found here (1.89; see ad loc), as at Amic. 85 (see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.vv. "Colloquialism," "Sermo cotidianusn). Far from following here Caesar's advice to avoid the unusual word tamquam scopulum {apud Gel. 1.10.4), Cicero, a great linguistic inno vator in his philosophical works, 147 uses various words in Off., to our knowledge, for the first time {praegressus: 1.11b; consociatio: 1.100; archi tectural 1.151; derivatio: 2.14), for the first time in prose (consortio: 3.26), or for the first time in the given sense {ratiocinator: 1.59; actio: 2.3; distractio and spiritus: 3.32; converro: 3.78; fugio: 3.91; see ad locos); for the quasipoetic solivaga cf. ad 1.157. Figures are used sparingly in Off. as befits a work in the Middle Style. Perhaps most notable are the personifications of various qualities for vivid ness, e.g., non recipit istam coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur repellit (3.119), which also includes a feature rare in this essay, the piling up of 146. Cf. Eduard Fraenlccl, Useproben aus Reden Ciceros una Catos «Rome, 1968), 164 ff. 147. Cf. N.D. 1.8; but norc the different emphasis of J.G.F. Powell, "Cicero's Translations from Greek," in Powell, 273-300, esp. 296.
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synonyms for emphasis; see Stylistic Index s.v. "Personification** for more examples. Similes play an important role; indeed that of the poets at 1.97-98 really controls the subsequent presentation of the fourth virtue. For minor figures such as anaphora, asyndeton, chiasmus, litotes, oxymoron, and παρονομασία, see the Stylistic Index s.vv. As a version and emulation of the down-to-earth approach of Panaetius (cf. 1.6 and 3.33; 2.35 and 51), de Officiis claims, at least initially, nothing more than to provide young Marcus with a model of the Middle Style (1.3). In spite of some flaws in the execution (cf. ad 2.21-22, 3.96), it aims to be clear and businesslike, providing definitions of terms at critical junctures, marking the ends of sections with clear signposts, 148 and resorting on occa sion to strict syllogistic form or διαίρεσις to lay out the argument (cf. ad 2.10 and 11-16). There was little time or scope for flights of fancy, the imagery used of the passions suggestive of undisciplined soldiers {nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant [1.1021) or frisky animals (tamquam exsultantes |ibid.|) being a rare exception. Nevertheless Cicero's patrocinium has saved Stoic discourse from being thought necessarily exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum {de Orat. 3.66). 10. The Text Though almost 700 manuscripts of de Officiis are preserved,149 only a hand ful are of use for reconstructing the original. They derive from two hyparchetypes, now designated by Winterbottom ζ and ξ (formerly Ζ and Χ)Λ<ο There are three independent witnesses to£: Β = Bamberg, Class. 26, s. Χ; Ρ = Paris, lat. 6601, s. IX med., French; V = Leiden, Voss. lat. Q.71, s. IX^. The preferential treatment accorded to Β by Fedeli seems unwarranted; cf. Win terbottom, 1993, 219-20, and his edition, p. viii and n. 10. Winterbottom*s work alters the basis for reconstructing ξ. Its most impor tant representative remains the lacunose codex L = British Library, Harley 2716, s. X, (West?) German, which is now established as having been the elusive codex Anemoecii (Winterbottom, 1993, 222-23). But in those pas sages where L is now lost (except 2.25-51) two late Munich manuscripts, Μ 148. Cf. ad 1.20 and 92, though more orientation at the beginning of a new topic would sometimes have helped; cf. ad 1.11-17. 149. Seen. 116 supra. 150. A third hyparchetype, Y, reconstructed from four manuscripts of twelfth to fourteenth century date, was posited by Atzert, but has been rejected by Fedeli as a conflation of ζ and C; cf. Fedeli, 1973, 378-79; Winterbottom. 1993, 229 ff.
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= Munich Clm 7020, s. XV ex., and S = Munich Clm 650, s. XV, can now be used to reconstruct it with some reliability, c = Berne 104, s. XIII, remains an essential check on L and is the only witness to ξ in the gap in L in the middle of Book 2. ρ = Palatine 1531, s. XIII is now shown to be too contaminated to be of use; cf. Winterbottom, 1990, and 1993, 224-26. The traditional view of the relation of the two branches was summed up as follows by Testard (1, 88): uTout en se rattachant au meme archetype ω, Ζ et X se seraient separes, le premier representant une transmission fiddle et le second une transmission corrigee." Even before Winterbottom's study of ξ, this distinction was found to be overstated by Fedeli, 1973, 384-85, who concluded: "In futuro . . . bisognera dare un peso maggiore, nello scegliere tra lezioni divergent! delle due famiglie, al iudicium piuttosto che alia ratio codicum." In light of Winterbottom's work one can add that the lower valuation of ξ may also have been related, where L is missing, to its recon struction from unreliable witnesses (see above). In any case, ad 1.40 and 3.53 I have argued for the authenticity of material present in ξ but absent from ζ; and I have used the text presented by ξ, rather than ζ, at 2.23,26, and 3.99; see ad locos and ad 1.128. On the other hand, C's text forms the starting point for Winterbottom's emendation adopted at 3.74, and I have preferred C's in otio over tj's inicio (i.e., initio) at 2.41. The problem most discussed with reference to the text of de Officiis is that of interpolations. Such testimonies as we have suggest that this work was written in haste (see § 3 above). It is not clear whether or not the text ever received the author's summa manus.151 The laxer standard of the letters may sometimes be the apposite yardstick of its Latinity (cf., e.g., Thomas, 55, n. 174). Now Off. is not alone among the philosophica in bearing traces of hasty composition; Div., for instance, betrays an unevenness that has led to doubts that the author completed and published it. 152 On the other hand, even Thomas, who has undertaken to defend a number of passages that 151. How much weight should be attached, for instance, to Cicero's statement τά aepi του καθήκοντος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus . . . [Alt. 16.11.4)? On this testimony see further ad 2.86-87. 152. Cf. C. Sander, Quaestiones de Oceronis libris quos scripsit De divtnatione (diss. Gortingcn. 1908), 5 ff.; he even anticipates solutions offered to some problems in Off. by suggesting (20-21) that at Dw. 2.143 the words dicitur qmdam—effecent constitute a marginal note by Cicero never integrated into context; similar problems of repetition attributed to a conflarion of two versions have been detected in the Tusc. by M. Giusta, "Due edizioni originali delle Tusucutaner ΑΛΤ 103 (1968-69), 437-99; cf. pp. LXII ff. of his edition (Turin, 1984). Cf. also the observation at Att. 12.52.3: απόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfem, quibus abundo, sometimes referred to the philosuphica (howevei; the preceding sentence is corrupt, the reference uncertain); cf., in general, Div.. ed. Pease, pp. 18-19.
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have, in his view, been wrongly suspected, admits that the transmitted text is on occasion marred by interpolation.153 While I have marked some matter, ranging in length from a single word to several sentences, as inter polated, 154 I have also defended a number of other passages previously suspected. In individual cases it is sometimes difficult to draw the line be tween faults that may have resulted from Ciceronian haste on the one side and from the interference of another writer on the other. As a much-studied school text (see $ 8 above), de Officiis is likely to have been exposed to the marginal comments of ancient readers in a higher than average degree. I assume that such interpolations as the medieval tradition contains were undertaken for fairly transparent reasons; there is no need to see behind any of them the machinations of an ancient editor (cf. ad 1.41). The question of author's doublets is raised anew by Winterbottom's re vival of the use of double-square brackets (cf. Atzert2) to distinguish such material {viz., at 1.82, 2.22, 3.29 and 83). In view of the external circum stances that may have prevented him from revisiting the text, if he intended to do so, and Cicero's own testimony about the state of one of his autograph manuscripts,155 it is possible that the archetype of Off. contained such mate rial. However, with the criterion of relevance to context excluded a limine and this work standing on a lower stylistic level than most of the other formal treatises, I have ordinarily felt insufficiently confident of my ability to discriminate between the words of Cicero and those of a learned reader possibly falling in with or imitating his tone to make much use of this category (cf., however, ad 1.109 and 2.21-22). In addition, the attempt to determine what Cicero might have written with a view to working it into the text is linked with the problem of how extensively he was prepared to recast what he had already written. On the whole the student of Off. might be better advised to attempt to reconstruct, with minimal adjustments, an in telligible text rather than to be drawn into an άπειροι' of uncontrollable speculation about an ideal text that Cicero could have constructed out of the transmitted materials; and from the point of view of the text as we have it such notes, whether of Ciceronian or other provenance, are inter polations.
153. Thomas, 105 ff., recognizes five instances (1.31, 36, 59, 147; 3.68). 154. Viz., 1.28,31,32,33,36,59,73,93,101,142[bis), 146,151,2.11,45,48,50,66,86; 3.15, 19,29,39,68,81,82a. 155. . . . dpxcTimov ipsum crebrts loos inculcatum et refectum (Att. 16.3.1).
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The text cited in the lemmata below is my own; for handling of punctua tion, spelling, etc., cf. p. 57, n. 1; the following are my variations from the readings printed in Winterbottom's text: 156 Winterbottom 1.28 31 32 33 fnimis callida sedf 40 [[Secundo autem—cum scelere approbavit.]] 51 sit constitutum 69 nimia 73 76 (partum) 82 [[de evertertdis—crudeliter.]) 92 turn quatn plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat, deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia 101 104 (gravissimo) 109 t Q . Much Mancia] [ne Xenocratetn quidem severissimum philosophorum] 111 121 possint 128 ab omni quod abhorret 132 quoniam 135 \utcumque aderunt\ 142 144 146
Dyck [iustitiae genus) [ea cum tempore—non semper est idem.] [vel ei qui promiserit] [nimis] callida sed
est constitutum animi [maioraque efficiendi] (prolatatum) deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia, turn quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat [ita fit ut—descrtptio officii.] {vel gravissimo) {remissi) Q. Mucio [Mancia] (Q. f.) \\ne Xenocratem quidem severissimum philosophorum]] -[notus possit omne quod abhorret quae [locum autem] [opportunitatis] {verba) [magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis]
156. The list takes account inter alia of readings and interpretations offered, in part by Winterbonom himself, since the appearance of his edition (cf. under 1.76, 104 [the second change], 109 [the first change], 128, and 135 and 3.74).
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1.147 2.11 2.33 [et fidis) 35 subtilitas 37 obiecta totos 41 initio 48 56 (quaeratur) 74 (dicere) 86 3.15 19 28 \etiam ipsius animi\ 29 [[minime veto—gratia]] 32 humanitate corporis 39 74 ο \turpe notam temporum nomen illorum\ 81 [species] 82a [[quid enim—gerat beluaef]] 99 domui
\eligenda [apes]
et t/W«t subtili obiecta est totos{que) (. . .) post rapit in otio [orationis] (capiatur) (. . . dicere) [corporis tuendi—voluptatibus] alt. [idem] [secuta est] etiam ipsius animi (...) [minime vero—gratia] humanitatis corpore [quamquam] ο turpem notam temporum nostroruml [forma] [quid enim—gerat beluaef] domi
Commentary on Book 1 homo homini deus est, si suum officium scial. Caec. com. 2 6 4 . . . singularum virtutum sunt certa quaedam officia ac munera . . . Cic. de Orat. 2.345
Of the three Books of Off., the first is the longest and most varied.! After a personal introduction (S$ 1-3), some comments on the scope of the project and its differentiation from the seemingly similar de Finibus ($$ 3 - 6 ) , Cicero launches into a definition (§$ 7-8) and division of the subject (§§ 9-10). Book 1 is to deal with (a) the honestum and its parts (§§ 11-151) and (b) with a comparison of the parts among themselves (§§ 152-61). The main source for (a), we are told obliquely (§§ 6-7), is the Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes; no source is named for (b); internal evidence suggests that Cicero devoted little specific research to it but pieced it together from mate rials which lay ready to hand (cf. ad §§ 152-61). The major sub-divisions of (a) are as follows:
I. Derivation of the 'parts' of the honestum from drives natural to the human being; their division into theoretical virtues and virtues of action (SS 11-14; 15-17) II. Cognitio (§S 18-19) 1. In spelling and punctuation of Cicero's text I mostly follow Winterbottom, who, on the former point, regularizes after Merguet. Capitalization is used in lemmata for the initial letter of a paragraph. I have indicated deletions by modern scholars (with {)) in quotations from Off. only, not in other ancient texts cited, i.e., I have ordinarily omitted such matter without indica tion; rhc reader should therefore have recourse to the current editions for textual details. MS readings are cited after Winterbottom. Sections of the particular book of Off. under discussion are referred to simply with $ preceding the paragraph number, with book number preceding for the other books. In lemmata (and quotations) I have used "—" for an ellipsis to indicate that the intervening words were also included but". .." when the reference was only to the cited words and not the omitted matter. When there is a paragraph break within a section (or other break in sense which I expressly indicate), for greater precision, I have often referred to section numbers with "a" or "b" attached to indicate matter before or after the break. 57
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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis III. The second virtue, unnamed by Cicero (cf. ad $§ 20-60), consist ing of: A. lustitia[%% 20-41) B. Beneficentia et liberalitas ($S 42-60) IV. Magnitudo animi {%% 61-92) V. Decorum {$$ 93-151).
See under the individual sections for their organization; for the theory that Cicero added §§ 31-41 from Posidonius, see ad loci for problems of over lapping with Book 3 see introduction to that Book. On other theories of Ciceronian divergence from Panaetius in our Book cf. ad §§ 5 0 - 5 8 , 9 2 , 9 3 151. The length of treatment of the several virtues has given rise to specula tion about the apportionment of matter among Panaetius' three books περί τοΰ καθήκοντος, covered in only Off. 1-2; cf. Gartner, 1974. Such attempts are based on the assumption that Cicero's proportions reflect fairly accu rately those of his Panaetian model, an assumption which is by no means safe; and the one piece of external evidence we have on this point evidently contradicts the hypothesis that has been proposed; cf. introduction, $ 5 (5). Gomoll, 33, called attention to the argument about the κατόρθωμα at tested for Chrysippus* essay περί δικαιοσύνης: πάν κατόρθωμα και εύνόμημα και δικαιοπράγημά έστι* το δε ye κατ' εγκράτειαν ή καρτερίαν ή φρόνησιν ή άνδρείαν πραττόμ€νον κατόρθωμα έστιν ώστ€ και δικαιοπράγημά (SVF 3, 73.14 ff. = Plut. St. Repug. 1041a). On this basis he suggested that the disposition of treatises of the Older Stoa π*pi κατορθωμάτων may have served as the model for Panaetius' dividing up of the καθήκον among the four cardinal virtues. However, we are, as Gomoll himself admitted, ignorant of the Older Stoa's division of treatises π*ρ! του καθήκοντος. In addition, the διαίρεσις of Chrysippus' treatise περί κατορθωμάτων (the only one attested; cf. introduction, $ 2) remains obscure, even in light of the cited passage; for although a κατόρθωμα is said to be an act performed in accord with several of the traditional cardinal virtues (φρόνησις, ανδρεία, and, by inference, δικαιοσύνη), it is unclear why εγκράτεια substitutes for σωφροσύνη, to which it is elsewhere subordinated {SVF 3, 64.23), and why καρτ€ρία, elsewhere subordinate to ανδρεία (ibid.), appears on the same level as ανδρεία etc. If this was the diuisio of Chrysippus' treatise περί κατορθωμάτων one wonders how he justified it; or was it perhaps rather merely an ad hoc formulation in the περί δικαιοσύνης? This passage, then, merely proves a general connection of the κατορθώματα with virtuous actions. What little is known of Chrysippus' treatise πεpi τού καθήκοντος suggests a different approach from Panaetius, for he dealt with such matters as the
Commentary on Book 1, Introduction
59
burial of parents (SVF 3, 186.42 ff.), the random acceptance of indifferents (Plut. St. Repug. 1045e-f partially reproduced at SVF 3, 41.34 ff.), and the willingness of the sage to play at dice if he is in prospect of gaining a talent {SVF 3 , 1 7 3 . 8 - 9 , quoted ad% 21); one thinks of the treatise π€pi καθήκοντος of M. Brutus, in which dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus (Sen. Ep. 95.45). When Cicero says of the appropriate actions inculcated by praecepta, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet. . . , this characterization may apply more aptly to praecepta of the Older Stoa; Panaetius, in deriving appropriate actions from natural drives, ties them much more closely to the Stoic τέ\ος formula, "life according to nature." The most one can say is that the connection established with the virtues would be compatible with Panaetius* approach being based on the argumentative structure of a treatise Tf€pt κατορθωμάτων. Besides presenting Panaetius' doctrine of the virtues, Book 1 inaugurates Cicero's practice of supplementing the Greek examples of his source with exempla Romana (cf. ad 2.16), which provide inter alia commentary on currently significant political topics. The recent civil war, Caesar's policies and murder were still reverberating in the political debate, as the Second Philippic, contemporary with Off., shows; hence the transference of prop erty to new owners by Caesar (and Sulla) in the aftermath of civil war (§ 43), the suicide of Cato (§ 112), and in general Caesar's temeritas in the pursuit and use of power (§26) receive mention. Cicero's approval of the assassina tion, which becomes explicit in Book 2 (§§ 23-24; cf. 3.19), is adumbrated in the approval of P. Scipio Nasica's slaying of Ti. Gracchus (§§ 76 and 109; cf. 2.43). In Off. Cicero also takes the opportunity to settle scores with other members of the so-called triumvirate, which effectively excluded him from a political role through most of the 50s; hence the portrayal in an unflattering light of M. Crassus (§ 25 and 3.73). 2 One of the charges Cicero had to answer in the Second Philippic was that he was responsible for Rome's misfortunes over the past twenty years; Antony had also subjected to ridicule the verse he had written describing his consulate cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudt; hence the spirited defense of that verse, not only at Phil. 2.20 but also % 77 (see ad loc). Finally, in a passage that he evidently added suo Marte to the discussion of decorum Cicero was able both to pay a compliment to the first consul of the family of the Octavii (at a time when Antony had been casting aspersions on Octavian's mother [cf. Phil. 3.15-17 and ad §§ 138—40)) and at the same time repeat in generalized form a lamentation over the wrongful occupancy of other people's houses, a charge 2. Cf. also the denunciation of Pompey at 3.82.
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rehearsed at length a propos Antony's occupation of the estates of Pompey and M. Terentius Varro in the latter part of the Second Philippic (cf. ad S5 138-40). 1-6 The proem of Off. falls into two parts: a) personal and literary, including justification of the topic with reference to the addressee's circumstances (§§ l-4a—contempsit alterum)\ b) a justification of the topic by virtue of its scope and importance within philosophical doctrine generally (4b-6: sed cum statuissem—). Cicero thus moves from matters regarding his son and his own place in literature (the personal and literary part of the proem culminates in a differentiation between his own contributions as both orator and philosophical writer and those of Greek predecessors) to more general concerns. l - 4 a —suo studio delectatus contempsit alteram.] In spite of the relatively "official" form of address, Marce fili (see below), the proem is more intimate than that to Cicero's other extant rhetorical or philosophical essays. Only the first sentence of de Oratore with its Quinte frater is comparable. Cicero presents in our proem an elaborate apologia for the choice of topic and addressee. Though it might seem at first redundant to be addressing a philo sophical essay to his son studying philosophy in Athens with Cratippus, Cicero contrives to make his enterprise seem worthwhile without impugning either his son's teacher or his philosophical school (the Peripatos). He does so by stressing the desirability of pursuing Greek and Latin studies in tandem as well as the prospective stylistic benefits young Marcus would enjoy from study of his father's prose. This latter point leads Cicero to lay more stress than in his strictly rhetorical essays on the importance of mastering philo sophical as well as oratorical discourse and to digress on authors who, like himself, have, or could have, excelled in both genres. The proem to Orator likewise shows concern about topic and addressee, but in a different sense: there he is writing on a topic requested by the addressee (Brutus) but to which Cicero professes himself unequal. Here the choice of topic is his own; it is the choice of addressee that requires justification. 1 . . . Marce fili . . .] This is the first of thirty-two passages in which young Marcus is addressed, though not always by name (cf. Gelzer, 357). This more solemn form of address is encountered at the beginning of each book of the essay, though later in this same preface (1.3) Cicero goes over, as in the two later books (2.8, 3.5), to the more familiar mi Cicero (cf. also 2.44, 3.33; Josef Svennung, Anredeformen. Vergleichende Forschungen zur indirekten Anrede in der dritten Person und zum Nominativ fur den Vokativ, Acta Societatis Litterarum Humaniorum Regiae Upsaliensis, 42 [Lund, 1958], 413 ff.; Adams, 1978,148); both forms appear in the concluding paragraph
Commentary on Book 1, Section 1
61
(3.121). We find also the simple second person address without a name (1.151, 2.87, 3. 11, and 81). The more solemn form has the force of em phatically calling attention (1.15: formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tarnquam faciem honesti vides . . .); it is particularly apt when Cicero speaks officially as father to son, reminding young Marcus of his legacy: licet enim mihi, Marce fili, apud te gloriari, ad quern et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet (1.78). . . . te . . . annum iam audicntem Cratippum . . .] The younger Cicero had departed for Athens by 21 May 45 {Att. 12.52.1 and 53; Att. 13.1.1). We first hear of work on de Officiis ca. 28 October 44 (Att. 15.13.6 = 15.13a.2 S.B.); and by 5 November the first two books are already complete {Att. 16.11.4). Taken by itself, our passage would point to late spring or early summer of 44 as the terminus post quern for the beginning of composition (but see further introduction, § 3). On young Marcus' career as a student see the introduction, § 4.—Cratippus' contacts with Cicero went back at least to summer, 5 1 , when he travelled from Mytilene to Ephesus to greet Cicero, who was then en route to take up proconsular duties in Ciiicia; Cicero made the meeting of the two of them together with P. Nigidius Figulus, who was returning from a legatio in an eastern province, the occasion for a dialogue on physics of which only a part of the introduction and a partial translation of Plato's Timaeus survives; here Cicero calls Cratippus Peripateticorum omnium, quos quidem ego audierim, meo iudicio facile princeps [Tim. 2). He was also in touch with other leading Romans of the day. After Pharsalia Pompey visited Cratippus at Mytilene and received consolation from him; and at Brutus 250 (dated 46) Brutus reports that M. Marccllus recently received tuition from Cratippus in that city. Thus Cratippus changed his residence from Mytilene to Athens some time between 46 and the beginning of young Marcus' studies in late spring or summer of 45 (cf. H. v. Arnim, RE 11.2 [1922], 1659, 2 ff.). He received citizenship from Caesar as a result of Cicero's intervention (Plut. Cic. 24.7) and was henceforth known as M. Tullius Cratippus. Cicero jr. valued Cratippus for his kindness and spent time with him outside the classroom as well as in (Fam. 16.21.3). Of Cratippus' philosophical views we know only that he defended prophetic dreams and prophetic utterances by madmen, though he rejected all other methods of divination (cf. Cic. Dm 1.5 and 70-71 (71 preserves our one verbatim quotation|). He had a homonymous son, priest of Rome and of Salus (= Τγί€ΐα), and a daughter Tullia, who married T. Aufidius Spinter, military tribune of the legio IV Macedonica in Spain {CIL 3.399). Both branches of the family are attested at the upper levels of Pergamene sociery into the second century; cf. E. Boehringcr, ed., Altertumer von Pergamon, 8.3: Die
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A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis
Inschriften des Asklepieions, ed. Chr. Habicht (Berlin, 1969), 164-65, with literature. . . . propter summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis, quorum alter te scienria augere potest, altera exemplis . . . ] Cicero memorably conjures up the philosophical genius loci of Athens at Fin. 5.2 ff.: naturane nobis hoc, inquit |sc. PisoJ, datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamusf velut ego nunc moveor. venit enim mibi Platonis in mentent, quern accepimus primum hie disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. hie Speusippus, hie Xenocrates, hie eius auditor Polemo, cuius ilia ipsa sessio fuit, quam videmus. There still more vividly than in our passage Cicero uses the intellectual heroes of the past as a protreptic goad; cf. H. Dorrie, "Summa virorum vestigia. Das Erlebnis der Vergangenheit bei Cicero leg. 2,4 und fin. 5,1 - 8 , " GB 7 (1978), 207-20. For invocation of the auctoritas loci at the beginning of a speech cf. Man. 1 (with reference to the rostra). . . . semper cum Graecis Latina c o n i u n x i . . . ] Together with C. Gracchus (cf. orat.i p. 188), Cicero was one of the first Roman statesmen openly to espouse Greek learning and set it on an equal footing with Latin. This re mains an ideal for the Roman nobility, as seen, for instance, in the separate Greek and Latin libraries in Trimalchio's establishment, which reflects the pretensions of the nouveaux riches of the Neronian age [Sat. 48.4: . . . // bybliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam), or Hadrian's villa at Tivoli. Though satisfied that the place and the instructor will provide a sufficient educational experience for his son, Cicero argues the utility of pursuing Greek and Latin studies in tandem; this policy provides the pretext for composing a philosophical work for young Marcus even though he is already receiving philosophical instruction. . . . neque id in philosophia solum sed etiam in dicendi exercitatione feci. . .J Cf. Brut. 310: commentabar declamitans—sic enim nunc loquuntur—saepe cum M. Pisone et cum Q. Pompeio aut cum aliquo cotidie, idque faciebam multum etiam Latine sed Graece saepius, vel quod Graeca oratio plura orrtamenta suppeditans consuetudinem similiter Latine dicendi adferebat, vel quod a Graecis summis doctoribus, nisi Graece dicerem, neque corrigi possem neque doceri. . . . idem tibi censeo faciendum . . .] He did, in fact, according to Fam. 16.21.5 (Marcus, jr., to Tiro, perhaps August, 44): praeterea declamitare Graece apud Cassium institui, Latine autem apud Bruttium exerceri volo.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 1-2
63
. . . ut par sis in utriusque orationis facilitate.] I.e., Greek and Latin; for oratio in this sense cf. $ 2: . . . orationent autent Latinant efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem; for the expression cf. M. Dubuisson, "Utraque lingua," AC 50 (1981), 2 7 4 - 8 6 . quam quidem ad rem . . .] Probably a reference to the pursuit of philosophy in general, rather than the merging of Greek and Latin studies; cf. the next note for parallels. . . . magnum attulimus adiumentum hominibus nostris . . .] Cicero con ceived his philosophica as filling a gap in Latin literature; he describes his role in more detail at Tusc. 1.5: philosophia iacuit usque ad banc aetatem nee ullunt babuit lumen litterarum ijitinarum-, quae inlustranda et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupati profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi; cf. also Fin. 1.10: . . . debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives met, nee cum istis tantopere pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant ilia ipsa, ne simulent, et its servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. In the proem to Book 3, on the other hand, this educational task no longer appears; Cicero rather sees the use of his leisure to write on philosophy as a sign that he is weaker than the elder Africanus (3.4: nos autem, qui non tantum robons babemus ut cogitatione tacita a solitudine abstrahamur, ad banc scribendi operam omne studium curamque convertimus; cf. ad loc). . . . ut non modo Graecarum litterarum nides sed etiam docti aliquantum se arbitrentur adeptos et ad discendum et ad iudicandum.] Dicendum is a weakly attested variant for discendum here (Monac. 13095, s. XII). A suffi cient defense for discendum is provided by N.D. 1.8 (eoque me minus instituti met paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim), which makes it plain that he would have written scribendum if he had meant the stylistic benefits to be gained from his writing on philosophy; the variant surely arose under the influence of the foregoing dicendi.—In Fin., written in March through June, 45 (cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 119391, 1135.11 ff.), Cicero had thought it necessary to defend his philosophical writing against learned critics who thought it better to read the Greek originals (Fin. 1.4 ff.); the reception of his philosophical books in the interim has evidently changed the position (cf. also ad 2.2). 2 . . . tu quidem . . .\ Correlative with sed tamen, not autem. . . . a principe huius aetatis philosophorum . . .] Cicero attested his high regard for Cratippus by using his influence with Caesar to obtain Roman citizenship for him and at the same time causing the Areopagus to ask him to continue teaching at Athens (Plut. Cic. 24.7). Cf. also Div. 1.5: . . . Cratip-
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pusque, familiaris noster, quern ego parent summis Peripateticis iudico . . . , as well as Tim. 1, cited ad § 1. Such expressions should not, however, be taken to imply that Cratippus, rather than Andronicus, was head of the Peripatos at this time; cf. H.B. Gottschalk, "Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World," ANRW 2.36.2 (1987), 1096-97. . . . disces quam diu voles (tarn diu autem velle debebis quoad te quantum proficias non paenitebit);. . .] This offer of support for his son's studies also mentions lack of progress as a possible motive for breaking them off; he thus discreetly alludes to what was, in fact, the younger Cicero's problem (cf. introduction, § 4; the parental admonition is more pointed at 3.6). As re cently as May, 44, he was planning a trip to Asia Minor, albeit in the com pany of Cratippus, so that his father would not suppose he was on holiday (Fam. 12.16.2). In the event, he did not continue his studies much beyond the completion of de Officiis. After Caesar's assassination, Brutus went in exile to Athens, where he visited Cratippus and listened to his lectures; at this time he made contact with young Cicero, won his sympathy, and recruited him, probably before the end of 44, as a cavalry officer for his army; cf. Plut. Brut. 2 4 . 2 - 3 ; Cic. 45.3; App. BC 4.220; R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 (1948), 1285.19 ff. . . . nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique Socratici et Platonici volumus e s s e , . . . ] One of the bonds between Cicero and Cratippus was the fact that the latter was originally a pupil of the Academic Aristus, brother and successor of Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero's own teacher (Cic. Brut. 315). In our passage Cicero reproduces Antiochus' view that the Stoa and Peripatos merely present refinements in the position of the Academy, not a new doctrine of their own [Acad. 1.43, quoted ad 3.7; cf. also ad § 6). . . . de rebus ipsis utere tuo iudicio (nihil enim impedio),. . .] Cf. ad 3.33. . . . orationem autem Latinam efficies profecto legendis nostris pleniorem.] With reference to our passage Forcellini s.v. plenus II.2.a) explains plena oratio as "copiosa, rebus et ornamentis instructa et referta n (less satisfactory the treatment at OLD s.v., 14, where plenus of orators and of style should not have been lumped together under the definition "covering the whole range" suitable rather to the former). Cf. esp. Ernesti, 289: "Plena oratio, metaphora ducta ab iis rebus vel corporibus, quae vel succo et came, vel alius massae ambitu abundant, dicitur ea, in qua est quaedam ex ubertatc re rum vel copia et ornatu elocutionis grata rotunditas, opponiturque dictioni tenui, exili, iciunae, aridac" etc.—Cicero here makes the very quality for which he had recently undergone attack from the Atticists a point of pride and a thing to be imitated (cf. Quint. Inst. 12.10.12: quern . . . isc. M. Tullium] et suorum homines temporum incessere audebant ut tumidiorem et Asianum et
Commentary on Book 1, Section 2-3
65
redundantem et in repetitionibus nhnium et in salibus aliquando frigidum et in compositione fractum, exultantem, ac paene . . . viro molliorem). "Full ness" is unexpected in philosophical writing, especially on Stoic subjects, and the ability to achieve it the mark of a great stylist; cf. Antonius' eulogy of Crassus at de Orat. 3.51: . . . de horridis rebus η itι da, de ieiunis plena, de pervulgatis nova quaedam est oratio tua, as well as the charaaerization of Stoic writing by Crassus, ibid., 3.66: . . . orationis etiam genus habent [sc. Stoici] fortasse subtile et certe acutum, sed ut in oratore exile, inusitatum, abhorrens ab auribus vulgi, obscurum, inane, ieiunum . . . . . . quod est oratoris proprium apte distincte ornate dicere,.. .] Cf. de Orat. 1.144: audieratn etiam quae de orationis ipsius ornamentis traderentur: in qua praecipitur primum, ut pure et Latine loquamur, deinde ut plane et dilucide, turn ut ornate, post ad return dignitatem apte et quasi decore . . .—Wilkins on de Orat. 3.53 distinguishes distincte from plane in that the former denotes u the clearness which comes from skilful arrangement." . . . quoniam in eo studio actatem consumpsi, si id mini adsumo, videor id meo iure quodam modo vindicare.] Cicero defends himself against possible charges of arrogantia by setting himself up as a stylistic model for his son, not a model philosopher; he can point to a life devoted to oratory, though he was, as he knew, subject to the charge that he had turned suddenly and late in life to philosophical writing (cf. N.D. 1.6-7). Though Plutarch {Comp. Cic. et Dem. 2) and others have found Cicero's self-glorification offensive, his actual claim in our passage is moderate enough (cf., however, ad §$ 77-78).— Cicero's philosophical writings would surely, on stylistic grounds, have com pared favorably with those of his Greek predecessors; Chrysippus, for in stance, who is said to have composed 500 lines per day (Diodes apud D.L. 7.181), is rated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as the worst stylist among famous authors (Comp., p. 21.10-15 Us.-Rad.; cf. also de Orat. 1.50). Cicero is critical of carelessly written Latin philosophical books at Tusc. 1.6; on his tendency to judge philosophical writing according to stylistic criteria cf. Smith. 3 . . . hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam illis fere se aequarunt. . .] This claim is likely to be exaggerated, but perhaps not by as much as one might think at first glance. According to the latest study, in addition to the 58 preserved speeches, Cicero published 17 speeches extant only in fragments and possibly five other fragmentary speeches; hence the possible total of published speeches would stand at a maximum of 80, a minimum of 75: cf. Crawford, 12. The philosophica (including the rhetorica; cf. Div. 2.4) num bered at least 56 books; the following figures are, in default of other indica tion, according to Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1104.1 ff. (I ignore the
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planned but never completed σύλλογος πολιτικός and Ήρακλείδαοι/,3 as well as the volume of proems never intended for publication): Oeconomicus (3), 4 Inv. (2), de Orat. (3), Rep. (6), Leg. (at least 5), 5 Part. (1), Brut. (1), Or. (1), Cons. (1), Hort. (1), Ac. (4), 6 συμβουλβυτικόν for Caesar (1), Fin. (5), Tusc. (5), Prof. (1), Tim. (1), N.D. (3), Div. (2), Far. (l),5e«. (1), Amic. (1), G/or. (2), Top. (l) f O/jf. (3)7 vis. . . dicendi] = δίΐνότη?; cf. Antonius' remarks at de Orat. 2.72-73; on vis as a special characteristic of Demosthenes, ibid., 3.28; cf. in general Ernesti s.v. vis. That the speeches display a greater vis dicendi than the philosophical essays comes as no surprise, since they, unlike philosophical discourse (sec next note), can rise to the High Style, in quo profecto vis maxima est (Orat. 97). . . . sed hoc quoque colendum est aequabile et temperatum orationis genus.] Here, as at Orat. 95, Cicero places philosophical discourse in the genus temperatum of the Middle Style; the Stoics, whom Crassus assigns to the genus subtile at de Orat. 3.65-66 (quoted in part ad $ 2 above), are a special case. M. Winterbottom, "Cicero and the Middle Style," Studies in Latin Literature and Its Tradition in Honour of CO. Brink, PCPhS, Suppl. 15 (Cambridge, 1989), 125 ff., has shown that Cicero presents a fully developed doctrine of the Middle Style, very likely to be his own innovation, only at Orat. 91-96; the forensic use that he found for the Middle Style (Orat. 96: hoc totum e sophistarum fontibus deftuxit in forum . . .) would account for Cicero's injunction in our passage that it must be cultivated, et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum dispu3. On this cf. Hafner, 54 ff.; Long, 1995', 222-23. 4. Macr. Sat. 3.20.4 (. . . Cicero Oeconomicon libra tenia . . . ) ; cf. D.A. Russell, An· tonine Literature (Oxford, 1990), 8 and n. 14. 5. Cf. Macr. Sat. 6.4.8. 6. Second edition. 7. Whether a separate book de Virtutibus should be added is very dubious; St. Jerome asserts that in addition to Off. Cicero wrote a separate book on the subject (in Zacb. 1.2 = PL 25.1429 = test. I Atzert); but Aug. trin. 14.11.14 (= PL 42.1047 ■ test. 2 Atzert) refers not to a treatise on the virtues but a treatment of the virtues and should be referred to Inv. 2.160; and the fragments from the fifteenth century essay La Satade by Antoinc de La Sale cannot be convin cingly assigned to Cicero; cf. G. Garbarino, / presunti frammenti del 'De virtutibus'di Cicerone nelle opere di Antoine de la Sale, Memorie della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di scienze morali, storichc e filologichc, ser. S.S (Turin, 1981). Evidently a commentarius de Virtutibus circulated under Cicero's name in late antiquity from which Charisius (p. 270 Barwick) derived the fragment illud neutiquam probantes; but if he wrote such a treatise, it is surprising that Cicero does not refer to it in Off.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 3-4a
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tandi genus: . . . ] Cicero assumes the desirability of combining philosophy and rhetoric, a lifelong concern of his; cf. Long, 1995 2 , 50, with passages cited ibid., 39, n. 6, to which add de Orat. 3.142-43 (partly cited ad § 156). . . . Demetrius Phalereus . . . disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.J Demetrius had come to Cicero's mind as a representative of the Middle Style at Orat. 92; his characterization in our passage, as elsewhere, 8 is as a master of that Style, which has as its goal delectare (Orat. 91 and 94). Our passage suggests that Cicero saw a certain affinity with Demetrius as one who also essayed both philosophy and oratory (the two were similar also, in Cicero's view, as vic tims of unjust exile; cf. fin. 5.53 = fr. 62 Wehrli);cf. Heldmann, 111 and 114; for another point of similarity between the two (moderation in expenditures to please the public) cf. ad 2.60. Was Cicero also aware that Demetrius was ούκβύγεί'ής (D.L. 5.75 = fr. 2 Wehrli), and, if so, did he find here a parallel to his own novitas? In any case, Cicero makes clear the chasm separating him self from Demetrius the orator {orator parum vehemens).—No verbatim quotations survive among the remains of Demetrius' speeches (frr. 174-86), but the two Latin paraphrases (frr. 185-86) tend to confirm some of Cicero's observations through their concinnitas and the piling up of parallel or anti thetical Gorgianic clauses (cf. Wehrli ad loc).—Theophrastus is similarly characterized to Demetrius at Brut. 121: quis Aristotele nervosior. Theophrasto dulciorf Cf. also Orat. 62: quanquam enim et philosophi quidam ornate locuti sunt—si quidem et Theophrastus divinitate loquendi nomen invenit . . . ; see also ad 4a (et Platonem existimo—). nos autem quantum in utroque profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium . . . ] Cf. Quintilian's famous judgment of Cicero the orator (10.1.112): qua re non inmerito ab hominibus aetatis suae regnare in iudiciis dictus est, apud posteros vero id consecutus ut Cicero iam non hominis nomen sed eloquentiae habeatur. hunc igitur spectemus, hoc propositum nobis sit exemplum, Me se profecisse sciat cut Cicero valde placebit. 4a . . . et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere . . . ] Cf. Orat. 62, where Cicero praises Plato as et gravitate {et suavitate) princeps but then adds (of Plato, Theophrastus, Aristotle, and Xenophon): tamen horum oratio neque nervos neque aculeos oratorios ac forensis habet. . . . et Demosthcnem, si ilia quae a Platone didicerat tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse . . .] In his comparison of the 8. Cf. Brut. 38: suavis, sicut fuit, videri maluit quam gravis; Orat. 94, where Cicero calls Demetrius' rhetorical figures dulcissima; de Orat. 2.95: omnium istorum . . . politissimus.
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two orators (§S 1-2), Plutarch notes that Demosthenes, unlike Cicero, con fined himself to oratory alone, whereas Cicero also left philosophical works. The story of Demosthenes' study with Plato was evidently common coin in the rhetorical schools of Cicero's day; letters of Demosthenes were even adduced in support of it; cf. de Orat. 1.89:. . . sive Me [sc. Demosthenes] hoc ingenio potuisset sive, id quod constaret, Platonis studiosus audiendi fuisset . . . ; Brut. 121 (a passage that takes an opposite view from ours toward the possibility of Plato and Demosthenes exchanging genres): lectitavisse Platonem studiose, audivisse etiam Demosthenes dicitur—idque apparet ex genere et granditate verborum; dicit etiam in quadam epistula hoc ipse de sese—, sed et huius oratio in philosophiam translata pugnacior, ut ita dicam, videtur et illorum [sc. Platonis, Aristotelis, Theophrasti] in iudicia pacatior; Orat. 15: quod idem de Demosthene existimari potest, cuius ex epistulis intellegi licet quam frequens fuerit Platonis auditor . . . ; [Plut.j Wit. X Orat. 844b: Δημοσθένη? . . . ίηλών θουκυδίδην και Πλάτωνα τον φιλό σοφοι, ω n v e s €ΐποι> προηγουμένως αυτόν σχολάσαι; Drcrup, 68. uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alteram.] Compendious for contempsit alterius studium.—In fact, of course, as Cicero well knew, Aristotle did offer rhetorical teaching; cf. Top. 1; F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," CPh 33 (1938), 396 ff. = Kleine Schriften, 2 (Hildesheim, 1968), 222 ff.; where he differed was evidently with Isocrates' method. Idem, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Neue philologische Untersuchungen 4 (Berlin, 1929), 2 0 4 - 5 and 215 ff., has argued that Aristotle criticized Isocrates' approach in the Gryllus and at Rhet. 1354a 1 Iff. Certainly Cicero in our passage, as else where, reflects stories current in the rhetorical schools of a personal rivalry between the two; cf. de Orat. 2.160: [Aristoteles] . . . haec quoque aspexit quae ad dicendi artem, quam ille despiciebat, pertinebant; ibid., 3.141: itaque ipse Aristoteles cum florere Isocraten nobilitate discipulorum videret, quod suas disputationes a causis forensibus et civilibus ad inanem sermonis elegantiam transtulisset, mutavit repente totam formam prope disciplinae suae versumque quendam de Philocteta paulo secus dixit, ille enim turpe sibi ait esse tacere, cum barbaros, hie autem, cum Isocraten pateretur dicere (cf. Eur. fr. 796 Nauck*); Orat. 62; Tusc. 1.7. 4b Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui quod et aetati tuac esset aptissimum et auctoritati meae.] The choice of subject is dictated by what is appropriate to both the writer and the recipient; το πρέπον is the implicit criterion; cf. Att. 15.13a.2: . . . τα TTfpl του καθ(ήκ)οντο5 magnifice explicamus προσφωνούμε vque Ciceroni, qua de re enim potius pater filiof The intention of composing other
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 4a-4b and 5-6
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works for his son (expressed also in the letter after the words just cited: deinde alia) was, of course, forestalled by Cicero's own death the following year.—Here is the first instance in which the division of paragraphs in some recent editions (Fedeli, Atzert) obscures the train of thought. The editor should, like Holden, Testard, and Wintcrbottom, begin a new paragraph with sed cum statuissem . . . , since Cicero now proceeds from a justification of his undertaking in writing to young Marcus on philosophical matters in general to an explanation of the choice of the specific subject of appropriate action. nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt, nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forcnsibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid neque si cum altera contrahas, vacare officio potest. . .] It is taken for granted that the subject must be grave et utile, i.e., trivial subjects or ones of merely theoretical interest are excluded a limine. The broad scope of the concept of officium and its applicability in both the private and public sphere (cf. Att. 16.14.3) evidently attracted Cicero to the subject (and to the term officium as a translation of the Stoic καθήκον); cf. 3.5 and introduction, 5 2. Cicero's examples, especially in Books 2 - 3 , illustrate the full range of the term (cf., for instance, for res contractae 3.49b-67). . . . in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitudo.J Honestas or, more commonly, honestum is Cicero's rendering of the term καλόν evidently (in view of the magnetism he attributes to it; cf. %% 15 and 55) used by Panaetius. Sacrificing the implication of an inherent aes thetic attractiveness, the Latin term, with its connection with honos, derives instead from the sphere of public standing (for a similar transference of terminology from the aesthetic to the social sphere in the process of translat ing from Greek to Latin cf. ad %% 93-99). Both the καλόν and the honestum, however, have as their opposite a term that can mean either "ugly" or "disgraceful" (αίσχρόν, turpe). As the opposite of honestas, turpitudo be comes an important criterion for choosing actions: cf. ad 3.35-37, as well as ad 1.90 and 1.159. 5 - 6 Cicero continues to steer his discussion from the more general to the more specific aspects of the subject. He has mentioned appropriate actions as one of the problems dealt with by philosophers. But which philosophers? He claims that appropriate action is a question dealt with by all philosophers in common. Indeed, he wants to make teaching about appropriate actions a criterion for inclusion in the ranks of philosophers. However, certain philo sophical sects, by uncoupling ευδαιμονία from virtue, undermine appropri-
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ate action. He refers the reader to another passage (sc. Book 2 of ft».), where he has dealt with such views. Indeed our passage reads like a reminiscence, with less doxographical detail, of Fin. 2.35: ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius, tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori, una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate; nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abiecti. Cicero is prepared to recognize the credentials only of the Stoa, the Academy, and the Pcripatos to teach about appropriate actions, since they all recognize, if not the all-sufficiency, at least the importance of virtue for the attainment of euoaipouia. With a frankness later admired by Pliny (Nat. praef. 22), Cicero then declares his plan to follow Stoic sources (i.e., Panaetius), albeit without suspending his own judgment. This passage puts the reader on notice that in Cicero's mind there is an indissoluble link between officium and moral goodness such that the former cannot subsist without the latter. 5 quis est enim qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere?] The phrase nullis officii praeceptis tradendis should be taken as ablative of attendant circumstances (cf. Heine ad he.; Kiihner-Stegmann, 2, 752); the absolute construction of the gerundive occurs only in Late Latin (when the gerundive itself has taken on a future meaning) as a substitute for the future passive participle; cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 139 Zus. a). sed sunt nonnullae disciplinae quae propositis bonorum et malomm finibus officium omne pervertant.] Cf. Fin. 5.22: quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur, ut id vacet honestate, nee officio nee virtutes in ea ratione nee amicitiae constare possunt. coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum, quod amplecti vult, id efficit turpe. Cicero discusses such views of the summum bonum in greater detail at 3.116-19.—The earliest instance of disciplina used for a philosophical school appears to be Ter. Eun. 263-64 (Gnatho loquitur): . . . tamquam philosophorum habent disciplinae ex ipsis / vocabula, parasiti ita ut Gnathonici vocentur; OLD s.v. disciplina 2b. nam qui summum bonum sic instituit ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur,.. .J Cf. the similar characterization of the Epicureans at 3.18 {qui. . . omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis . . .), as well as the still more vivid . . . omnia quae ad beatam vitam pertineant ventre metiri... at N.D. 1.113. . . . hie, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur, neque amicitiam colere possit nee iustitiam nee liberalitatem;...] Cf. Fin. 2.85: vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate mettare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praediorum fructuosorum mercede
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superari; ibid., 3.70 = SVF 3, 85.19 (sim. Fin. 2.78-79): etenim nee iustitia nee amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur; Leg. 1.49: ut enim quisque maxume ad suum commodum refert quaecumque agit, ita minime est vir bonus, ut qui virtutem praemio metiuntur, nuliam virtutem nisi malitiam putent. ubi enim beneficus, si nemo alterius causa benigne facitf . . . ubi ilia sancta amicitia, si non ipse amicus per se amatur toto pectore ut dicitur? For the type of argument cf. also N.D. 1.3: sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt qui omnino nuliam habere censerent rerum humanarum procurationem deos. quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas quae sanctitas quae relight Cf. ad § 56, where amicitia is not used of relationships born of opportunity.—The reference to the bonitas naturae forestalls the doctrine that humans have a natural tendency to form societies and cultivate the social virtues, including justice and liberality (cf. ad $§ 12 and 20 ff.). fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest.] For fortitudo cf. Fin. 2.56; ibid., 3.29: negarine ullo modo possit (numquam) quemquam stabili et firmo et magno animo, quern fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutum sit non esse malum dolorem? Cicero dilates on the point at 3.117.—For participles governing a case cf. ad 3.1. . . . sunt a nobis alio loco disputata.] $c. Fin. 2. 6 . . . neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis qui solam aut ab iis qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum Academicorum Peripateticorum . . .1 A reference respectively to the Stoics {solam: cf. SVF 1, 84.31 lAristo]; 3, 11.38, 12.32, 13.12) and the Peripatetics, whose cases Cicero had stated respectively in Books 3 and 5 of Fin.; cf. ad 3.11. Cicero follows Antiochus' tendency (in the wake of Carneades) to reduce the differences among Academy, Peripatos, and Stoa on €ύδαιμοιήα: cf. ad $ 2; Carneades frr. 135, 137, and esp. 146 W. (this last = Fin. 5.16-23); cf. (a propos the views of Zeno and Antiochus on the summum bonum) Luc. 134: distrahor, turn hoc mihi probabilius turn illud videtur, et tamen nisi alterutrum sit virtutem iacere plane puto; also Gorier, 1974,198 ff.; Glucker, 1988, 64, n. 81. . . . quoniam Aristonis Pyrrhonis Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset.] These three philosophers are often combined by Cicero, or rather his doxographic source(s), as here; cf. loppolo, 1980, 176, n. 13. The phrase iam pridem explosa sententia est will refer to Chrysippus' polemic; ibid., 172, n. 1. Aristo of Chius (fl. ca. 250)
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was a student of Zeno and friend of Cleanthes; cf. remains at SVF 1, nos. 3 3 3 - 4 0 3 (our passage = 363); for new material since SVF cf. loppolo, though the separation of the Chian from his slightly younger homonym from Ceus requires further study (cf. J.G.F. Powell's review of loppolo, CR 32 [1982J, 102). The views of Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 365/60-275/70), spread by his student Timon of Phlius, became the inspiration for the Skeptical school. Our passage, together with de Orat. 3.62, raises the question why Cicero fails to take note of the revival of Pyrrhonianism by Aenesidemus of Cnossus, if the latter was indeed the orator's contemporary and a friend of his friend L. Aelius Tubero. F. Decleva Caizzi, "Aenesidemus and the Academy,n CQ 42 (1992), 176-89, esp. 188-89, while upholding the traditional identification of the dedicatee of the eight books of Πυρρωΐ'ίωι> λόγοι with Cicero's familiaris L. Aelius Tubero (Phot. Bib. 169b31 ff. and Cic. Lig. 21), argues that Aenesidemus met Tubero at Aegae in Asia Minor (cf. Phot. Bib. 170a39-41) during the latter's term as legate of the proconsul Q. Cicero (61-58; Q. fr. 1.1.10; Plane. 100) and that the book then dedicated to Tubero was the starting point for the development of a philosophical sect not yet in ex istence; cf. also Glucker, 1978, 116-17, n. 64. On Pyrrho cf. in general K. von Fritz, RE 24 (1963), 89.18 ff.; on Aenesidemus, the sketch by David Sedley at Schofield-Burnyeat-Barnes, 16-17. For the scanty remains of the third-century Stoic Herillus of Carthage cf. SVF 1, nos. 409-21; loppolo, 1985, argues that Herillus emphasized the ties of the Porch to Socrates and the Cynics and opposed the introduction of Aristotelian elements; cf. in general von Arnim, RE 8.1 (1912), 683.20 ff. Cicero had stated his position more fully at Fin. 5.23: iam explosae eiectaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli quod in bunc orbem, quern circumscripsimus, incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. nam cum omnis haec quaestio de ftmbus et quasi de extremis bonorum et malorum ab eo proficiscatur, quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt, qui in rebus Us, in quibus nihil aut honestum aut turpe sit, negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur, nee inter eas res quicquam omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consilii capiendi causam inventionemque officii sustulit. In both passages Cicero argues that these three philosophers eliminate any basis for choice (negant esse ullam causam, cur aliud alii anteponatur; si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent) and thus should be eliminated from discussion about the summum bonum or appropriate action. C. Levy, ttUn probleme doxographique chez Ciccron: les indifferentistes,,, REL 58 (1980), 247, by ne glecting full context of the two passages, creates a dichotomy between the
Commentary on Book 1, Section 6
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Chrysippcan stance of Off and the Carneadea divisio of Fin.; in fact, the Carneadea divisio is likely to underlie both (I take it that in 1.6 as in 3.116 ff. Cicero is following an Academic doxography). Cicero summarized Aristo's τέ\ος formula as αδιαφορία [Luc. 130 = SVF 1, 83.34), i.e., for him the summum bonum consisted in being indifferent to the things that are neither good nor evil; cf. Ioppolo, 1980,162 ff. Herillus, who made knowledge the summum bonum (cf. D.L. 7.165 = SVF 1, 9 1 . 2 4 25), held a similar doctrine about the terms intermediate between good and evil: τα 6e μεταξύ άρ€τής και κακία? αδιάφορα elvai (D.L. 7.165 = SVF 1, 91.32). Hence, as Cicero sees it, Herillus eliminates any basis for discussing actions (sim. Fin. 2.43 and 4.36). At Fin. 3.31, while still rejecting their views along the same lines as in our passage, Cicero does distinguish between the positions held by Aristo and Herillus. Cicero's source in our passage is probably Chrysippus via Carneades (via Antiochus); when he introduced the doctrine of οίκ6ΐωσΐ£ Chrysippus thought Herillus* teachings were thereby superseded, a view that Cicero reproduces; cf. Ioppolo, 1985, 6 9 - 7 0 . Iop polo, 1980, 179, sees some justification for Cicero's lumping of Pyrrho to gether with Aristo in the influence of Cynicism on both men. For the Greek equivalent of the phrase officii inventio [viz., του καθήκον τος tupeois) cf. ad § 93. sequimur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos, non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videbitur hauriemus.] As an Academic, Cicero carefully hedges his allegiance to the Stoa, which he will follow on this one question; he thus leaves himself free to follow another school on another occasion. Though at this point the reader remains in doubt as to Cicero's reasons for preferring the Stoic position on officiay cf. introduction, § 7, and ad 3.20. On interpresfinterpretari as referring to a close, literal translation cf. J.G.F. Powell, "Cicero's Translations from Greek," in Powell, 278. In empha sizing the use of his own iudicium, Cicero is following a method, described in more detail at Fin. 1.6, that he thinks will insure his philosophical writing a raison d'etre and a readership: quid? si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta suntab its, quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca anteponant its, quae et splendide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecisf Perhaps, as Jonathan Barnes has suggested ("Cicero's de Fato and a Greek Source" in Histoire et structure. A la memoire de Victor Goldschmidt, ed. J. Brunschwig, C. lmbert, and A. Roger (Paris, 1985], 230-32), Cicero's state ments about his own iudicium coming into play in his philosophica need to be taken more seriously than they often have been.
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7a Placet igitur . . . ante definire quid sit officium. quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror; omnis enim quae |a) ratione suscipitur de aliqua re insatutio debet a definitione proficisci. . .] Pohlenz, AF, 17 (cf. Gigon, 270), suggested that Panaetius had good reasons for omitting at this point a gen eral definition of appropriate action and developing it only in the course of the discussion (§ 101, if the definition is genuine; see ad loc). Since for Panaetius certain appropriate actions derive from each of the four άφορμαί of the human being (cf. ad 11-14 and § 15: . . . ex singulis certa officiorum genera nascuntur), it might merely have confused matters for him to offer a definition of appropriate action before explaining the άφορμαί. Alternatively, in view of the previous Stoic literature on the subject, he may have assumed that the term was too familiar to require definition.9 In insisting on a defini tion of the subject at the outset of the inquiry, Cicero is, however, trying to play, as sometimes elsewhere (cf. ad 2.8, 3.18), the part of a good Academic: cf. Rep. 1.38 (Scipio is the speaker): faciam quod vultis ut potero, et ingrediar in disputationem ea lege, qua credo omnibus in rebus disserendis utendum esse si errorem velis tollere, ut eius rei de qua quaeretur si nomen quod sit conveniat, explicetur quid declaretur eo nomine; quod si convenerit, turn demum decebit ingredi in sermonem; numquam enim quale sit illud de quo disputabitur intellegi potent, nisi quod sit fuerit intellectum prius. quare quoniam de republica quaerimus, hoc primum videamus quid sit id ipsum quod quaerimus; de Orat. 1.209 ff., 2.108; Part. 41; Top. 9 and 26 {definitio est oratio, quae id quod definitur explicat quid sit). Perhaps his correspon dence on the subject with Atticus convinced him of the need to define the term carefully, since he will be using officium in a technical Stoic sense unfamiliar to most Roman readers; cf. introduction, § 2.—Though Pliny Nat. praef. 22 praised Cicero's candor in naming his source, it is remarkable—and perhaps a sign of the haste with which Cicero wrote Off.—that, though he elsewhere praises Panaetius highly (cf. 2.51 and 3.7; Mur. 66: eruditissimus homo; Leg. 3.14: . . . a magno homine et in primis erudito Panaetio . . . = respectively frr. 60-61), he first mentions him here as if in passing (in a subordinate clause) and with implicit criticism of a pro cedure less systematic than the one Cicero will follow. Even the more gen erous references to his relationship to Panaetius contain some reservation (Panaetius, quern multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus: 2.60;
9. Cf. also Long, 1967, 59, who notes that "from the time of Panaetius Stoics concen trated attention on practical ethics, and interest in their logical basis and the desire for precise definitions languished."
Commentary on Book 1» Section 7a-7b
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. . . qui sine controversia de officiis accuratissime disputavit quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita . . . secuti sumus: 3.7). 7b The reader is prepared to expect here a definition of appropriate action in view of Cicero's critique of Panaetius for not offering one (7a). Instead Cicero provides a classification into two groups of questions relating to appropriate action; this move proves to be a way of narrowing the subject of this essay, which will deal with one group, but not the other. Cicero's attempt to characterize the difference between the two classes is initially unsatisfactory; he defines the first class as that which pertinet ad finem bonorum but then has to admit that the second class, too, has bearing on the final good, though less obviously so. It is the examples of questions handled under the first category (omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliudalio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem) and the character ization of the second (magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur) that make it clear that he intends a distinction between what we would call theoretical and practical aspects of appropriate action. In light of 7a one assumes that this material had no counterpart in Pan aetius. As he began Off., the similar problems handled the previous year in Fin. were in Cicero's mind (cf. ad § 5-6). Thus 7b is evidently Cicero's own attempt to differentiate his current project from the treatment of officium at Fin. 3.58 ff. (see below). Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio. unum genus est quod pertinet ad fincm bonorum, alterum quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae con form a ri DOSSIL] "The whole of [OLD s.v. omnis la] the in quiry regarding appropriate action is twofold," says Cicero. He distinguishes those parts of the subject that bear upon the question of ευδαιμονία and are therefore relatively remote from everyday life, from the precepts u by which the practice of life [usus vitae] can be molded |on the text see belowl in all directions." This last point takes up the emphasis laid on the scope of the topic at § 4.—For the imagery of molding (conformari) cf. the description Persius gives of his education at the hands of Cornutus: . . . turn fallere sollers /adposita intortos extendit regula mores Ietpremitur ratione animus vincique laborat I artificemque tuo ducit sub pollice voltum (5.37 ff.). unum genus est quod pertinet ad finem bonorum . . .] As perfect appropriate actions, κατορθώματα form a subset of καθήκοντα (cf. introduction, § 1; Long-Sedley, 3 6 6 - 6 7 ) ; l 0 hence one would expect the investigation of them to form a subset of that of καθήκοντα, not for the two to be juxtaposed at the 10. By the time of Epktetus, however, this relation no longer obtained; rather the two terms appear side by side as objects of different kinds of impulse (cf. Inwood, 1985, 117}.
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same level. Though Seneca alludes to a pars praeceptiva of philosophy (Ep. 95.1), it is unclear what other partes were envisioned in his divisio, and there is no reason to associate the construct with Posidonius; cf. Kidd ad Posidon. fr. 176 against Dihle, 1973, 50. The distinction sits particularly oddly here, prefaced to an account of officium that takes its initium a natura (§§ 11 ff.) and thus implicitly connects the subject with the Stoic τέλος formula convenienter naturae vivere (3.13), even though the present project is classed with the other type of inquiry quod positum est in praeceptis . . . In fact, Cicero winds up admitting that the distinction is not hard and fast: quorum . . . officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad ftnem bonorum, tamen minus idapparet. . . Moreover, the question num quod officium aliud alio maius sit is, in fact, raised several times in the sequel (§§ 5 0 - 6 0 , 1 5 3 ff., 2.88), contrary to the expectation created by our passage. This distinction has, then, been grafted on by Cicero without close regard for the sequel and, I think, for a fairly transparent reason, viz., in order further to differentiate his current project from the treatment of officia in de Finibus (esp. 3.58-59). The examples clarify what he has in mind: he sees the account in Fin. as more theoretical in orientation, the current one as more practical. A more cogent distinction could have been drawn between questions pertaining to καθή κοντα άνευ περιστάσεως and καθήκοντα περιστατικά; cf. D.L. 7.109; White, 111. . . . alterum quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit.J The underlying idea is that the precepts provide a standard against which to form one's thoughts and decisions (cf. Fin. 3.60: sed cum ab bis omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes). Similarly, M. Brutus wrote an essay περί καθήκοντος in which dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus (Sen. Ep. 95.45); rules for "weaker natures" take the form hoc vitabis, hoc fades (ibid., 94.50). As Kidd, 1955, 185-86, points out, the attitude of the agent is unaffected. Cf. ad § 60, where Cicero shows awareness of the limita tions of this approach.—Conformari is rightly restored from the twelfth century codex Ambros. H. 140 inf. instead of the otherwise attested confirmari. For the phrasing cf. Fin. 4.5: quarum cum una |sc. philosophiae pars] sit, qua mores conformari putantur . . . superioris generis huiusmodi sunt exempla, omniarie officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem.] The first example (omniane officia perfecta sint) is handled at Fin. 3.59: quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit etiam inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito 'iuste'
Commentary on Book 1, Section 7 b - 8
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fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. For a condition under which a deposit should not be returned cf. 3.95 and the transmitted text at $ 31; in the former passage, however, the term iuste is not used, Cicero merely stating officium non reddere; thus in Off. he appears to reject (or ignore) the distinction between officium and perfectum officium. In spite of what he implies in our passage, Cicero does, in fact, establish a hierarchy of officio (see the next to last note). quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; . . .] This distinction is rather opaque. The aim is evidently again to differentiate this project from the similar de Finibus. Vita communis, though it includes politics, 11 goes beyond it and encom passes the activities of one who enriches the community through works of scholarship (§$ 18-19,71), as well as leisure activities ($$ 103-4), social life (SS 134-35), domestic architecture (§§ 138-40, though this could have political implications!), etc. Panaetius was dealing with issues about which human beings deliberate (§ 9); and, as Aristotle remarked, βουλ€υόμ€θα δ' ού π€ρι τώι> τζλών άλλα π€ρι τώι> -προς τά τβλη (£Ν 1112bl 1-12; cf. 33-34; J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Ethics I London, 1973 J, 27); hence the subject is inevitably one step removed from the finis bonorum. Panaetius' treatment is grounded, however, in the Stoic τκλος- formula ("life according to nature"; cf. fr. 109; § 22 and ad §$ 11-15 and 3.13; Philippson, 1936 2 , 778); hence Cicero's ea . . . pertinent ad finem bonorum. Accepting Cicero's distinction uncritically and in isolation from his practice in Book 1, Zielinski, 65, arrives at the misleading conclusion "seine Pflichtenlehre hat der romische Philosoph mit vollem BcwuGtsein von der Giiterlehre losgelost. . .M (sim. Gred Ibscher, Der Begriff des Sittlichen in der Pflichtenlehre des Panaitios. Ein Beitrag zur Erkenntnis der mittleren Stoa [diss., Munich, 1934], 5). . . . magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur, . . .] Institutio appears here in the sense "method of arrangement, organization, system" {OLD s.v., 1; sim. Kroner-Schmalz, TLL 7.1 s.v., I.l.b; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 233), in contrast to the sense "instruction, education" found at § 7a {pace Atkins). 8 In spite of the difficulties of this paragraph one should not, pace Unger, 1 3 18, cut the Gordian knot by athetizing it. It offers the definition(s) expected
11. Cf. Long, 1995', 233, n. 30, whoremarksof our sentence: "We shall not go far wrong if we take Cicero to be making a distinction between ethics and politics."
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since 7a (cf. Giusta, 1,158). 1 2 This fact is obscured, however, by the way this material is introduced as a "second division of appropriate actions," even though the prior division was rather of "questions concerning appropriate action" (omnis de officio duplex est quaestio); cf. Pohlenz, AF, 17-18. Note also that, in default of subtler connection, the argument is strung together with at que etiam, also used, e.g., to join the problematic material at 2.22. As in the previous division, the material not to be treated in our essay receives a less satisfactory explanation. Here we meet again the perfectum officium, alluded to but not explained in 7b; it is here paraphrased as rectum {officium) in view of the Greek term for it, κατόρθωμα (in Greek, too, however, one could speak of τελειον καθήκον: cf. SVF 3,134.23 [Stob.]; sim. 136.9). But it is only at 3.14 that we are told its differentia specified ( . . . nee praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest; cf. Fin. 4.15 = SVF 3, 5.28). Other Stoic texts make it clear that this distinction as to who can perform either kind of officium corresponds to the kind of λόγο? demanded by each, with the κατορθώματα requiring ορθός λόγο? (cf. Tsekourakis, 21 ff.). The defini tion offered in our passage is a mere shuffling of terms and inelegant to boot (atque ea sic definiunt, ut rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant . . . ). Without some further explanation Cicero's term commune officium also remains obscure; it is possible that, if not Cicero's own invention, the term originally denoted this officium as common to the sage and to others (so Arzert ad loc; cf. Fin 3.59 = SVF 3, 136.6: ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur versari in its, quae media dicamus; Tsekourakis, 10). In our treatise, however, Cicero explains it differently (3.14): haec enim officio, de quibus his libris disputamus, media Stoici appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent, quae et ingenii bonitate multi adsequuntur et progression discendi, i.e., such appropriate actions are "common" in the sense that they are within reach of the ordinary human being (cf. 3.15: haec. . . officia . . . non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia). The commune officium at least is given a palpable content ( . . . quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit). That the commune and medium officium are the same is made clear only if after commune officium one supplies medium (Unger, 1867) or, better, to match the Greek term κατόρθωμα used of the other type, μέσον (Winterbottom). Moreover, Cicero offers no guidance as to the sense in which such 12. The definition takes the form of a partitio; cf. Top. 28: atque etiam definitiones aliae sunt partitionum aliae divisionum; partitionum, cum res ea quae proposita est quasi in membra discerpitur . . .·, cf. B. Riposati, "La genesi e la tccnica definitoria ncllc operc di Cicerone," Studi di filologia classica in onore di Giusto Monaco, 1 (Palermo, 1991), 837-38.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 8
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appropriate actions are called "middle" (he may have been confused about this himself; see above p. 3, n. 5); on the use of μέσα or τα μεταξύ by philosophical schools for terms between good and evil, and the Stoic designa tion of children as μέσοι, cf. Tsekourakis, 12 ff. The term κατόρθωμα has a history predating the Stoa. Κατορθούν was commonly used of succeeding in general, as in the epigram on the fallen at Chaeronea: μηδέν άμαρτεΐν έστι θεών και πάντα κατορθοϋν / έν βιοτή (apud Dem. 18.289); Aristotle seems to have been the first to use κατορθούν/κατόρθωσις in an ethical context, as when he says of such acts as μοιχεία, κλοπή, άνδροφονία,ούκέστινούν ουδέποτε περί αυτά κατορθοϋν,αλλ' αεί άμαρτάνειν (ΕΝ 1107al4); cf. £ £ 1247a4 (the subject is persons who enjoy good luck): άφρονες γάρ όντες κατορθοϋσι πολλά, έν οίς ή τύχη κυρία; hence the MM, close in tendency to Dicaearchus,13 can speak of κατορθώ ματα as follows: τά γάρ άνευ τοϋ λόγου του κρίνοντος γινόμενα κατορθώματα ευτυχήματα έστιν (1199al2). Thus in the Peripatos a κατόρθωμα was the correct outcome of an act; its precondition was that the act itself not be bad. As a technical term in ethics (for earlier usage cf. introduction, § 2), καθήκον was a Stoic coinage. Diogenes Laertius 7.107-8 (= SVF1,55.6-10) attributes the term in the sense in which it occurs in our passage to Zeno: έτι δε καθήκον φασιν είναι δ πραχθεν ευλογον ϊσχει άπολογισμόν, οίον τό άκόλουθον έν τη ζωή. όπερ καΐ επί τά φυτά και ζψα διατείνει. όράσθαι γάρ κάπι τούτων καθήκοντα, κατωνομάσθαι δ' ούτως υπό πρώτου Ζήνωνος τό καθήκον, άπό τοϋ κατά τινας ήκειν της προσονομασίας εΐλημμένης. Arius Didymus formulates similarly: ορίζεται δε τό καθήκον **τό άκόλουθον έν ζωή, δ πραχθεν ευλογον άπολογίαν έ χ ε Γ (Stob. 2.8 [= 2, 85.13 ff. W.-H.| = SVF 1, 55.1314). Chrysippus is the only Stoic known to have written περί κατορθωμάτων (SVF 3, 200.38); probably it was he who gave that term its peculiar Stoic twist: κατορθώματα . . . πάνθ' όσα κατά τον ορθόν λόγον πράττεται (ibid., 3, 136.19-21). However, his contemporary Arcesilas, who changed allegiance from the Peripatos to the Academy, still using κατόρθωμα in its Peripatetic sense, set it in relation to ευδαιμονία and to the ευλογον (S.E. M. 7.158): άλλ* έπει μετά τούτο έδει και περί τής τού βίου διεξαγωγής ζητεΐν, ήτις οΰ χωρίς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν άποδίδοσθαι, άφ'ού και ή ευδαιμονία, τουτέστι τό τού βίου τέλος, ήρτημένην έχει την πίστιν, φησίν ό Άρκεσίλαος ότι ό περί πάντων επέχων κανονιεΐ τάς αιρέσεις και φυγάς και κοινώς τάς πράξεις τφ εύλόγω, κατά τούτο τε προερχόμενος τό κριτήριον κατορθώσει · την μεν γάρεύδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διά τής φρονήσεως, την δε φρόνησιν κεϊσθαι έν τοις κατορθώ13. Cf. Walzcr. 77, 170.190-91, 202-3, 231-32; cf. also n. 20 infra.
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μασιν, το δέ κατόρθωμα €ΐναι όπβρ πραχθέν €υλογον €\€ΐ την άπολογίαν. ό προσεχών ου ν τώ βύλόγω κατορθώσει καΐ βύδαιμονήσο. It seems likely that, as a skeptic, Arcesilas took over the term εύλογον from Zeno's definition of the καθήκον for purely elenctic purposes, i.e., to show that "the Stoics possessed a criterion for action which did not entail certain or absolute knowledge";14 cf. Long-Sedley, 1, 456-57; on the elenctic project of Arcesilas cf. Long, 1986, 446 ff. ,s If Off. 1-2 is a fair representation of Panaetius, πβρί του καθήκοντος·, then the emphasis on καθήκοντα at the expense of κατορθώματα looks as though it might be a response to criticism of the kind that Arcesilas put forward of Stoic epistemology: while not surrendering altogether the operation of ορθός λόγος, Panaetius found it advisable to lay emphasis on the βύλογον as the criterion for most human actions (on the different kinds of knowledge in volved in κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα cf. Tsekourakis, 27). On the importance of πραχθεν in the definition of the καθήκον cf. Tsekourakis, 25 ff.: **in order to decide whether an act is καθήκον or not, we must have its external results present, because they are of primary impor tance in the sphere of appropriateness, where what must count is the material of an act and not the disposition of the agent." On the formula εύλογος απολογία (= "a probable defense": ibid.), see Glucker, 1995,127. Note that the εύλογος απολογία need not be supplied by the agent (otherwise καθήκοντα could not apply to animals and plants); it can be provided by an observer if the relevant criteria are met; cf. Inwood, 1985, 201. Cicero had used probabile as a rendering of εϋλογον at Fin. 3.58 {est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile et quidem ita ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit (on the possible relation of this definition to ours cf. ad $ 101]); but it also does duty for πιθανόν at Luc. 32 and later, including Off. 2.7-8 (see ad loc.)\ cf. Claudio Moreschini, "Osservazioni sul lessico filosofico di Cicerone," ASNP sen 3, 9.1 (1979), 117. In 14. So George E. Ryan, Ratio et oratio: Cicero, Rhetoric and the Sceptical Academy (diss. Princeton, 1982), 81. 15. loppolo, 1980, 145 ff., has argued that Arcesilas went beyond a critique of Zeno's epistemology and put forward the «ύλσγον as a criterion of action in an attempt to defend the suspension of judgment (Ιττοχή) against critics who asserted that it led inevitably to complete inaction. If loppolo is right, the * ύλίχγον was adopted by the Stoa under Arcesilas' influence but unhistorically retrojected to the school's founder, and Arcesilas' own philosophical stance has been assimilated too much to the purely elenctic Cameades. But Long, 1986,446 ff., is probably right to distinguish between Cameades' method in utramque partem disputare and the contra omnia disputare of Arcesilas; cf. also ad 2.8.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 8-9
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our work the ratio would justify a given action as in accord with nature; such rationales are offered from time to time; cf. introduction, § 2, ad $§ 126-32, 127, and 150-51; Heilmann, 2. Within moral theology, probabilism, according to which it is licit in the face of uncertainty about obligation to follow the probable opinion, was formed under the influence of our sentence; cf. Zielinski, 3 0 3 - 4 , and on this doctrine in general, which flourished in the last quarter of the sixteenth century before coming under attack in the seventeenth, cf. S.V. Rovighi, Enciclopedia cattolica 10 (Vatican City, 1953), s.v. probabilismo. 9 Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio.] The igitur is resumptive, bringing us back to Panaetius, from whom we had diverged at 7 b - 8 (cf. Hand, 3, 192 ff.; Skutsch-Rehm, TLL 7.1 s.v. igitur IIB2bl). Panaetius distinguishes three types of question about which people deliberate: 1) is an action καλόν [honestum)} 2) is it συμφέρον (utile)} 3) what should one do in the event of a conflict between the καλόν and an apparent συμφέρον? Note that the καλόν and συμφέρον are two of the three σκοποί. . . της· έφέσ€ω9 των ανθρωπίνων όρέξίων of Arius Didymus (Stob. 2.7 = 2.51.18 ff. W.-H.), the third being TO ηδύ, which, as a Stoic, Panaetius could ignore. Gartner, 1974, 14, argues that Panaetius' questions are an "empirische Bestandsaufnahme" and were misunderstood by Cicero as an editorial divi sion. But although the questions are here presented as ones that arise in the course of deliberation (aut bonestumne factu sit art turpe dubitant etc.), Panaetius surely did not arrive at them by polling opinion. Moreover, Cicero is unlikely to be wrong in his explicit statement in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum [Off. 3.9; cf. also Att. 16.11,4), whether this was to have been in the treatise π€ρί τοΰ καθήκοντος or in a separate essay (if Panaetius indicated his intentions in this regard, Cicero does not report them); even Gartner has to admit that Panaetius changed his mind and decided not to write on this topic (cf. introduction, § 5 [3|; ad 3.710). tertium dubitandi genus est cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id quod vi detur esse utile.] The videtur here is critical; on it Cicero bases his defense of Panaetius at 3.34; indeed, throughout Book 3 Cicero insists that there can be no actual conflict between honestum and utile, since the true utile coincides with the honestum (for the one exception cf. ad 3.39). Heinemann, 2, 45, n. 3, and 328, compares the modification of the traditional definition of μαν τική as praesensio et scientia rerum futurarum (Div. 1.1) to earum rerum, quae fortuitae putantur, praedictio atque praesensio (Div. 1.9; note, how ever, that Heinemann's attribution of the latter definition to Posidonius is followed neither by Edelstein-Kidd nor Theiler).
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cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus adferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi.] For the personification of honestas and utilitas as rival claimants cf. 3.19b; for the image ad se rapere 2.37. 10 Cicero now proceeds to add two topics to Panaetius' list, namely the potential conflict between two honesta and two utilia, and criticizes Pan aetius for omitting these. Pohlenz, AF, 6, assumed that "die Schulpedanten" (i.e., others within the Stoic school) put forward this critique. One piece of evidence points in a different direction, however. At Part. 61 ff. Cicero sets forth, according to the doctrine of στάσι?, the division of types of question (finitum genus, infinitum), the types of propositum (defined as pars causae), viz., cognitio and actio, and under the former the three types sit necne sit et quid sit et quale sit (62). In the discussion of the quale sit Cicero notes a complication: atque in hoc eodem genere, in quo quale sit quaeritur, exoritur aliud quoddam disputandi genus, non enim simpliciter solum quaeritur quid honestum sit, quid utile, quid aequum, sed etiam ex comparatione quid honestius, quid utilius, quid aequius, atque etiam quid honestissimum, quid utilissimum, quid aequissimum . . . (66); sim. de Orat. 2.335: controversia autem inter hominum sententias aut in illo est, utrum sit utilius . . . Else where {viz., Stoa, 2, 128) Pohlenz finds that the passage cited from Part. treats a uber utile und honestum ganz mit Panaitios' Problemstellung . . ."; but, in fact, the example of Part, goes beyond Panaetius1 statement of the problem in precisely the way Cicero does in our passage of Off. This can hardly be an accident. At the end of the work Cicero described the content of Part, this way: expositae tibi omnes sunt oratoriae partitiones, quae quidem e media ilia nostra Academia effloruerunt. . .(139). Surely, then, the critique of Panaetius' divisio was suggested to Cicero by his rhetorical training in the Academy; the pedantry noticed by Pohlenz would also be consistent with that milieu. Moreover, Cicero's execution of the desiderated topics (§§ 1 5 3 61 and 2.88-89) betrays little fresh research into Greek sources of the kind one would have expected had he had a Stoic critique of Panaetius to hand (see ad locos). . . . cum praeterire aliquid maximum vitium in dividendo sit. . .] Cf. de Orat. 2.83:. . . ut genera rerum primum exponerentur, in quo vitium est, si genus ullum praetermittitur; . . . 11-17 It is characteristic of this essay that at this critical juncture the reader is given no pointer as to where the argument is going or what method will be used. The first of Panaetius' issues that arise in decision making was hon est umne factu sit an turpe ($ 9); and Cicero has indicated that his treatment will focus on praecepta, quibus in omnes partes usus vitae conformari possit
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 9-10, 11-17, and 11-14
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(7b). Hence one expects some criteria for distinguishing good and bad ac tions. Instead Cicero/Panaetius provides an analysis of the elements given to the human being by nature. Only toward the end of $ 14 is the relation of these elements to the main subject clarified (quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum); this technique of retrospective clarification is sometimes encountered in the speeches (cf., e.g., Clu. 164). The connected discourse de dolore patiendo of the Stoic Taurus begins sim ilarly with an analysis of τά πρώτα κατά φύσιν (Gel. 12.5.7). 16 It is hardly surprising that after this opening Cicero felt the need to subjoin a systematic account (§ 15: sed omne quod est honestum—) to insure that the main points, which are at the same time the major topics to be treated in Off. 1, have emerged clearly.17 On the other hand, the division into theoretical and practical virtues at §§ 16-17 is probably Panaetian; cf. the abbreviated account at fr. 108 (= D.L. 7.92): Παναίτιο? \ikv ουι> δύο φησιν άρετά^, θεωρητικής και πρακτικήν (cf. Grilli, 45); cf. also ad 2.18. 11-14 Οίκείωσι? is the process whereby one recognizes something as belong ing to oneself. The conception of the newborn animal accepting itself and then the elements that will provide it sustenance and protection while reject ing elements that threaten it is a starting point of several ancient accounts of Stoic ethics (sc. Fin. 3.16-21; D.L. 7.85; Hierocles col. 1.1 ff.). Whether or not Epicurus himself did so, Cicero has the Epicurean speaker Torquatus begin his ethical teaching with a version of οίκείωσις in which the πρώτον οίκεΐον is pleasure {Fin. 1.30). 18 Both schools recognized "life according to nature" as the goal of the human being and an analysis that begins with the first impulses of the newborn as a method of distinguishing what is natural. The Stoic analysis, however, did not stop there but continued to follow moral development through to the time when the human being possesses reason. 19 In its fully developed form as presented by Hierocles (2d century A.D.) the network of human bonding is described as a series of concentric circles corresponding to the different stages of οίκ€ίωσι?, with the individual him self in the innermost circle, which includes his own body and the satisfaction of its needs; in the next circle are parents, siblings, spouse, and children; in 16. Pohlcnz, AF. 18, n. 1, and Cole, 1967,196, regard this material as based on Panaetius; cf. ihe detailed argument at M. Pohlenz, "Das zwcite Buch dcr Tusculanen," Hermes 44 (1909), 36-38. 17. Cf. Gartner, 1974, 24, 53, 60. 18. Cf. Jacques Brunschwig, "The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in Schofield-Striker, 115-16. 19. Cf. ad$ 117; on the conflict in the sources over whether reason was complete in the human being at the end of the first or second hebdomad cf. Schofield, 1991, 33-34, n. 21.
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the third circle uncles, aunts, cousins, etc; in the fourth the more distant relatives; next one's demesmen; then the members of one's φυλή; then one's fellow citizens; the inhabitants of neighboring cities; the members of the same έθνος; and finally the entire human race. One should, Hierocles adds, contract the circles so as ultimately to regard all human beings as brothers and sisters; cf. Stob. 4.84 = 4, 671-72 W.-H. For the Stoa the analysis of οΐκίωοΊ? served to create space for reason within the sphere of nature. The doctrine of οίκείωσις seems unlikely to have been developed within the Peripatos,20 nor is there sufficient evidence definitely to connect it with Zeno. 2 i A definition of οίκ€ίωσΐ£ is attested for Chrysippus {SVF 2, 206.18 ff.), as well as the fact that he criticized the Epicurean version of oiiceiuxns (in his first book π€ρι τ€λώι>: cf. SVF 3,43.9 ff. = D.L. 7.85). The former passage is attested for his first book π€ρί δικαιοσύνης but does not betray how Chrysippus used the fact that one accepts oneself and one's children in the larger context of justice. Our passage perhaps gives a notion of some of the stages by which such an argument might have proceeded, with ingeneratque |sc. natura] praecipuum quendam amorem in eos qui procreati sunt followed by the more general human bonding: impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit ($ 12); cf. Schofield, 1995 1 , 198. Possibly the role of oiKtiuxjig in grounding justice and the other social virtues helps explain why they are here placed ahead of the other virtues (§ 12), contrary to the fact that in the body of the treatise they are the second "part" of the honestum discussed ($§ 20-60). Whether Chrysippus already con nected the other virtues with his argument about natural drives is not alto20. There may have been some tendencies in that direction, however; cf. MM 1206b! 7 ff.: απλώς δ'ούχ.ώσικροϊοιται οι άλλα. της αρετής αρχή και ήγίμώΐ'έστινόλόγος.αλλά μάλλον τα πάθη. δ*ΐ γαρ προς το καλόν όρμήι/ άλογόν τίμα πρώτοι/ ίγγίκσθαι (ο και γίκται). fΐθ* ούτως τον λάγον ucrrtpoi' ^ψηφι^οντα ίίναι και δι α κρίνοντα, unless indeed, as Α.Α. Long, "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics," BICS 15 (1968), 83, notes 10-11, has suggested, MM itself presents a version of Peripatetic ethics designed to make converts from Stoicism and showing some Stoic influence. 21. For the former thesis cf. F. Dirlmeier, Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts. Philologus, Suppl. 30.1 {Leipzig, 1937); contra Pohlenz, Grundfr.; Brink. Pohlenz, loc. cit., saw Zeno as the originator of the doctrine; but the positive evidence consists merely in the information that he wrote, like Polemo before him, wept το& κατά φύσιν βίου (SVF 1,14.28 = D.L. 7.4; SVF 1,48.36 ff., with von Arnim's note, and 198 = fin. 4.45; cf. K. von Fritz, RE 21.2 |1952), 2527.38 ff.). This is not the place for a full discussion of the doctrine of oikeiosis; recent studies include Hcrwig Gorgemanns, uOikeiosis in Arius Didymus," in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus, ed. W.W. Fonenbaugh
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gether clear; SVF 2, 288.10 ff., suggests, however, that he may have framed his argument more broadly:. . . ε πει έν τη φύσει του λόγου ει σι ν άφορμαι του θεώρησα ι το καλόν και τό αισχρό ν, αϊ 9 επόμενοι θεώρησα ντε 9 το καλόν και τό αίσχρόν. αίρούμεθα μεν τό καλόν, έκκλίνομεν δε τό αίσχρόν; cf. Striker, 1983, 163. Among the various other passages that make use of οίκείωσις material, ours stands closest to Fin. 2.45-47, which has the same function of deriving the four "parts" of the honestum from natural drives and presents them in the same order, viz*, 1) the social virtues, 2) the cognitive virtues, 3) the desire to rule, 4) ordo et moderatio. It is tempting to suppose that the two passages derive from the same source (cf. also the citation of [PI.] Ep. 358a at both § 22 and Fin. 2.45), presumably Panaetius22 in view of his characteristic formulations regarding the fourth virtue.23 Panaetius carefully ordered the drives so that the (for him) all-important drive toward social integration appears first, the rational drive before the irrational one, with the aesthetic drive last. Cf. his plan in the treatment of the συμφέρον to give priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt (2.22, evidently altered by Cicero in the execu tion; cf. ad 2.23-29). On the differences between the versions of Off. and Fin. cf. also Cole, 1967, n. 3,199-200; points of contact with other versions of the doctrine are discussed in the following notes. The derivation of morality from natural instincts in our passage was rightly understood at a later date as the basis for Panaetius* ethics and as such set beside the τέλος formulae of his Stoic predecessors: cf. Clem. Al. Strom. 2.129: πάλιν δ' αυ Ζήνων μεν ό Στωικός τέλος ηγείται τό κατ' άρετήν ζην, Κλεάνθης δε τό ομολογουμένως τη φύσει £ήν (Διογένης δε τό τέλος κεΐσθαι ήγεΐτο) εν τω εΰλογιστεΐν. ό έν τη τών κατά φύσιν εκλογή κεΐσθαι διελάμβανεν. ο τε 'Αντίπατρος ό τούτου γνώριμος τό τέλος κεΐσθαι έν τιο διηνεκώς και άπαραβάτως εκλέγεσθαι μεν τα κατά φύσιν, άπεκλέγεσθαι δε τά παρά φύσιν ύπολαμβάνει. . . . προς τούτοις έτι Παναίτιος (fr. 96) τό ζτ\ν κατά τάς δεδομένος ημΐν έκ φύσεως άφορμάς τέλος άπεφήνατο; cf. also ad 3.13. Note that Panaetius employs the term αφορμή contrary to normal Stoic usage (cf. LSJ s.v., 11; Grilli, 31 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 224 ff.) in the sense "starring 22. Via Antiochus in Fin., according to Pohlcnz, Grundfr. 73-76; F.-A. Steinmctz, 19 ff.t supposes that rhc two passages both go back to Chrysippus (who is cited at Fin. 2.44), Fin. through an Antiochcan, Off. through a Panaetian filter; but there is too little evidence ro connect all of these doctrines with Chrysippus (cf. Stetnmetz, 21, n. 85, citing Plut. Stoic. Repug. 10.19c; the καλΰΐ' as έπαιι*τόΐ', however, is by no means confined to Chrysippus; cf. ad S 14). 23. With 5 Η cf. Fin. 2.47: cuius [sc. ordinis et moderations] simtlitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factotum.
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point" (LSJ s.v., 1.2); Philippson, 1930 1 ,364-65, sees this usage as a mark of Panaetius' accommodation of the συνήθεια; cf. ad 2.35. Panaetius' τέλος formula was, however, as Sandbach, 58, pointed out, u a novelry in its word ing rather than its content." Wilamowitz, 1926, 207 note, mooted the following backtranslations for Panaetius' άφορμαί: κοινωνικόν (cf. Stob. 2, 109.17 W.-H.), φιλομαθή (or φιλόσοφοι/), φίλαρχοι/, φιλόκαλον (cf. also Wilamowitz, 1932, 398-99 = 2d ed. 393), sometimes used in the following notes. 11-12 A similar train of thought by which λόγος distinguishes human from animal and results in recognition of the social virtues and establishment of communities is found at Arist. Pol. 1253a9 ff.—Schofield, 1995 1 , 2 0 3 - 4 , contrasts the use of οίκείωσις and stress on reason as a foundation for justice in our passage with the emphasis on the requirement to treat another human being in a certain way on grounds of shared humanity at 3.27. 11 This paragraph moves from the general drives that the human being shares with animals {viz., self-preservation, procreation, care for children) to the specific attribute reason {ratio, λόγος), which sets man apart from beast. Principio—eiusdem.] On the use of natura as an equivalent for φύσις, al ready well established in Cicero's day, as well as its common personification by Cicero, cf. Ernst Zellmer, Die lateinischen Worter auf -ura, new ed. (Frankfurt a.M., 1976), 23 ff.—The drive for self-preservation is common to the various statements of the doctrine of οΐκείωσις; our passage is the most concrete in describing the process involved (ut pastum, ut latibula . . .); cf. Fin. 3.16; Chrysipp. SVF 3, 43.4 ff. = D.L. 7.85. After prefacing a lengthy discussion of conception, birth, and the newborn's self-perception, Hierocles remarks (VI.51 ff.): . . . τό £ώ(οι>), τ(ήν) πρώτη[ν (αϊ)σθησιν εαυτού λαβόν, ευθύς ώ[κ]ειώθ[η πρ(ός) έ]αυτό κ(αι) την εαυτού σύστασιν, . . . ουχί δ(έ) κ(ατά)] την εαυτού δυναμιν εκαστον ποιεί τ[ό ε(πι)β(άλ)λ!ον ύ(πέρ) τ(ής) εαυτού συντηρήσεως, έκκλΐ[νο]ν μ(έν) πάσαν έ(πι)βουλήν πόρρωθεν κ(αί) δ(ια)μ[(εν)ειν] μηχανώμ(εν)ον απαθέςέκ τ(ών) σφάλερω[(ν), 4]ττον δ* (έ)πι τα σωτήρια κ(αι) παντα[χ]όθεν [πορι]£όμ(εν)ον τά πρ(ός) δ(ια)μονήν;24—Kant would distinguish between the natural tendency toward self-preservation and the duty of self-preservation, which he also recognized; but because he grounded his ethics in reason, rather than nature, it is the will, rather than the tendency, to preserve oneself which for him has ethical value; cf. Melches Gibert, 57. 24. Ed. Guido Bastianini and A.A. Long in Unione Accadcmica Nazionalc, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria," Corpus dei papiri filosofia greet e latini, 1.1 (Florence, 1992), 340.
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commune autem animantium omnium est coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa et cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sint.] For the coniunc tionis appetitus procreandi causa cf. Arist. EN 1162a 16 ff.: άνδρί δε και γυναικι φιλία δοκεΐ κατά φύσιν υπάρχει ν άνθρωπο? γάρ τη φύσ€ΐ συνδυαστικόν μάλλον ή πολιτικόν, οσω πρότερον καΐ άναγκαιότερον οικία πόλεως, και τεκνοποιία κοινότερον τοις £ωοι?; Pol. 1252a26-28: ανάγκη δή πρώτον συνδυά£εσθαι του? άνευ αλλήλων μή δυνάμενου? είναι, οίον θήλυ μεν και άρρεν τη? γεννήσεως ένεκεν . . .; PIb. 6.6.2: πάντων γάρ προ? τά? συνουσία? όρμώντων κατά φύσιν . . . ; ad § 54 below.—The desire for intercourse and the concern for children were combined at PI. Smp. 207a7 if. (Diotima as re ported by Socrates): ή ούκ α'ισθάνη ώς δεινώ? διατίθεται πάντα τά θηρία έπειδάν γεννάν έπιθυμήση, και. τά πε£ά καΐ τά πτηνά, νοσοϋντά τε πάντα καΐ ερωτικώς διατιθέμενα, πρώτον μεν περί το συμμιγήναι άλλήλοι?. έπειτα περί την τροφήν του γενομένου, και ετοιμά έστιν υπέρ τούτων και διαμάχεσθαι τά ασθενέστατα τοΐ? ισχυρότατοι? και ύπεραποθνήσκειν . . . ; unlike Plato, Panaetius does not, however, go on to connect this tendency in man with a desire for immortality. The ancients made various observations about the care of animals for their offspring, such as those that Aelian HA 9.9 reports about seals. However, in the οίκείωσι? toward children Chrysippus made an exception for fish; cf. SVF 2, 206.19 ff. (on parents and children in Chrysippus' doctrine of οίκείωσι? generally cf. Pembroke, 123). For the general Stoic doctrine on such matters cf. SVF 3,172.19-20: και γάρ γαμήσειν και παιδοποιήσεσθαι (sc. κατά τον προηγούμενον λόγον), άκολουθεΐν (γάρ) ταύτα τη του λογικού ζώου και κοινωνικού και φιλάλληλου (φύσει); for the special feelings parents have for their children see Hierocles IX.6: καΟάπερ ούν στερκτικώ? μεν κατά τούτο οίκειούμεθα τοΐ? τεκνοι? . . . Sorabji, 124, calls attention to the irony that, although the Stoics observed that animals care for their children—the origin of justice in humans—, they nevertheless excluded them from a share in justice. On care for children as an inborn characteristic that only comes into play later in life cf. Annas, 1993, 265; Schofield, 1995 1 , 194.—Cicero shows awareness of the doctrine as early as Sex. Rose. 63:. . . cum etiam feras inter sese partus atque educatio et natura ipsa conciliet; he glances lightheartedly at οίκείωσι? at Att. 7.2.4 (26 November 50): filiola tua te delectari laetor et probari tibi φυσικήν esse την (στοργήν την) προ? τά τέκνα, etenim si hoc non est, nulla potest homini esse ad hominem naturae adiunctio; qua sublata vitae societas tollitur. sed inter hominem et beluam hoc maxime interest—sentiens praeteritum aut futurum.] For Aristotle perception was the defining characteristic of animals as opposed to plants (cf. PA 666a34 and other passages cited by Bonitz s.v. αϊσθησι? init.). He also distinguished λογιστική and αισθητική φαντασία and
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granted animals a share of the latter, but not the former (cf. de An. 433b29 ff., esp. 434a5 ff.; HA 488b24; Sorabji, 12-16, provides further references). The Stoics generally distinguished eight parts of the soul (SVF 2,226.14 ff.), Panaetius only six (fr. 85; cf. ad % 101); the highest (presumably for both Panaetius and the orthodox Stoa) was the ήγεμονικόν (also called λογισμός; cf. Cicero's ratio), which gives rise to φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέσεις, αισθήσεις, and όρμαί (SVF 2, 227.22 ff.). For the Stoics, as for Hume, the human mind begins as a tabula rasa; perceptions (αισθήσεις) are first written upon it; the result is memory (μνήμη); a collection of many similar memories constitutes experience (εμπειρία; ibid., 28.17-18). Like humans, irrational animals re ceive presentations (φαντασίαι), but they lack λεκτά with which to clarify them; their "appropriate actions" are therefore responses to stimuli accord ing to their interests; cf. lnwood, 1985, 8 4 - 8 5 ; Sorabji, 20 ff. The Stoics deny animals the process of assent, the basis of free will and a moral life among human beings; cf. Sorabji, 4 1 - 4 2 . While not asserting that animals have a share in reason, Cleanthes was moved to ponder the question when he observed ants accept a grub as if in ransom for the corpse of one of their kind {SVF 1,116.6 ff.; cf. Sorabji, 165). Chrysippus discussed the question whether a dog could be said to have performed the fifth indemonstrable syllogism if it followed a trail to a fork in the road on the other side of which was a ditch; then, after finding no scent on either branch of the road, leaped over the ditch in pursuit of its quarry. His conclusion: . . . rationalis habitus necesse est ilia nullam habere participationem. rationalis autem habitus est syllogismus ex apprehensione entium, quae minime adsunt; ut intellectus de deo, de mundo, de lege, de patrio more, de civitate, de politica—quorum nihilpercipiunt bestiae (SVF 2, 206.33 ff., esp. 207.11 ff. [= the quoted passage); cf. also SVF 2,302.4 = Cic. N.D. 2.16; Sorabji, 2 1 , 26, and 89). Panaetius, like Chrysippus, attributes to animals merely reaction to immediate sense-perceptions (quantum sensu movetur)\ like other Stoics, but unlike Aristotle, he denies them memory; cf. Sorabji, 51-52; ad%% 105-6. 11-12 sed inter hominem et beluam—ad rem gerendam facit.] For the con nection of λόγος and the social virtues cf. Arist. Pol. 1253a9 ff.: ούθεν γάρ, ως φάμε ν, μάτην ή φύσις ποιεί- λόγον δε μόνον άνθρωπος έχει των £ψων. ή μεν ούν φωνή του λυπηρού και ήδέος εστί σημείον, διό και τοις άλλοις υπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γάρ τούτου ή Φύσις αυτών έλήλυθε, του έχειν αϊσθησιν του λυπηρού και ήδέος και ταϋτα σημαίνειν άλλήλοις), ό δε λόγος έπι τω δηλούν έστι τό συμφέρον και τό βλαβερόν, ώστε και τό δίκαιον και τό άδικον τοϋτο γάρ προς τά άλλα ζψα τοις άνθρωποις ίδιον, τό μόνον άγαθοϋ και κακού και δικαίου και αδίκου και τών άλλων αϊσθησιν εχειν; ibid., 1332b3 ff.: τά μεν ουν άλλα των
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ζώων μάλιστα μεν τη φύσει £ή. μικρά δ' ένια και τοις έθεσιν, άνθρωπος δε και λόγω· μόνον γάρ έχει λόγον.—The account of the origin of the notions of appropriate action and justice at Plh. 6.6.1 ff. is similar in emphasizing the importance of reason as a factor distinguishing man and beast (6.6.4); but for Polybius society is based purely upon a rational calculus of self-interest, whereas Panaetius adds the natural gregariousness of human beings (eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini. . .). Polybius, then, is closer to the Epicureans in his emphasis on enlightened self-interest. Our passage, on the other hand, combines human weakness and necessity with natural gregariousness as motive forces behind the formation of society (cf. ad 2.73; in the non-Panaetian § 158, however, Cicero emphasizes the latter); cf. von Fritz, 54 ff.; Griffin, 1976, 203, n. 1; David E. Hahm, "Polybius' Applied Political Theory," in Laks-Schofield, 20-21. 11 . . . ad id solum quod adest quodque praesens est se accommodat, paulum admodum sentiens practeritum aut futurum.J Chrysippus had al ready formulated the difference in status between past and future on the one hand and present on the other: μόνον δ* ύπαρχε ι ν φησί τον ενεστώτα, τον δε παρωχημενον και τόν μέλλοντα ύφεστάναι μεν, ύπάρχειν δε ουδαμώς φησιν . . . (SVF 2, 164.26). Cf. ad §$ 105-6.—The substantivized futurum (= the future) is common in Cicero's later works; cf. § 81 and 2.33; Laughton, 123, and next note. homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cerntt, causas rerum videt earumque praegressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit fu tures . . .] For man as the only rational animal cf. Leg. 1.22; Sen. de Ira 1.3.7: nulli nisi homini concessa prudentia est, providentia diligentia cogitatio . . . ; Sorabji, 7-16. For the iunctura rationis particeps cf. H. Frank, 345.—Chrysippus began his περί ειμαρμένης by laying down that TO μηδέν άναιτίως γίγνσεσβαι αλλά κατά προηγούμενα? αιτίας . . . (SVF 2, 264.6; cf. 281.23 and 282.33). Cf. also N.D. 2.147 (on consequentium rerum cum primis coniunctio et conprehensio as an exercise of reason). In the famous refutation of the Stoics on signs, S.E. M. 8.276 distinguishes human from animal on the basis of the human use of transitive and com pound presentation: διύπερ ακολουθίας· έννοιαν έχων [sc. ό άνθρωπος] ευθύς καΐ σημείου νόησιν λαμβάνει διά τήν άκολουθίαν καΐ γάρ αυτό τό σημεΐόν έστι τοιούτον, "ει τόδε, τόδε."—In this passage we have perhaps an illustra tion of what Cicero meant when he boasted . . . tantum profecisse videmur, ut a Graecis ne verborum quidem copia vinceremur (N.D. 1.8; see further ad §142). Antecessio seems to have been a Ciceronian coinage; it appears in the literal sense as a translation of προχώρησις at Tim. 37; at Top. 53, written a
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few months prior to Off., he had applied it metaphorically to time and causality, as in our passage; there, however, the sense had been clarified by the preceding participle:. . .est locus diabeticorum proprius ex consequentibus et antecedentibus et repugnantibus . . . cum tripertito igitur distribuatur locus hie, in consecutionem antecessionem repugnantiam,... In our passage the meaning is clarified by the preceding causas rerum; but the conjoined praegressus is attested here for the first rime in extant literature. Neither praegressus nor antecessio gained currency, however, the latter unattested after Cicero, the former recurring only at Amm. 21.5.13; cf. Bannier, TLL 2, 146.61 ff.; Morano, ibid., 10.2 (1987), 668.42 ff.; Widmann, 133-34.— Cicero uses the future participle, usually of the verb sum and as an attribu tive, frequently in the years after his exile; our passage is the one instance in Off. and is clarified by the corresponding rebus praesentibus; cf. Jacob Wackernagel, Vorlesungen uber Syntax, 1 (Basel, 1950), 34 and 286-87; Laughton, 118 ff., esp. 122. . . . facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias.] This observation will have seemed less overstated to the an cients than it does in an age of rapid technological and sociopolitical change. Panaetius, however, goes still further in arguing that one should not merely see but maintain a consistent course throughout one's entire life; cf. §§ 111 and 119. Cf. also Fin. 2.45:. . . omnemque complectatur vitae consequents statum.—The emphasis on planning in advance is characteristic of Pan aetius; cf. S§ 19, 73, 81, and possibly Plut. Dem. 9.2 (cf. Dyck, 1981, 161).—In discussing hope and fear Seneca sees the gift of human foresight as deeply ambivalent (Ep. 5.8): maxima autem utriusque causa est quod non ad praesentia aptamur sed cogitationes in longinqua praemittimus; itaque providentia, maximum bonum condicionis humanae, in malum versa est. 12-13 The transposition of these two chapters proposed by J. Richter, u Z u Cicero de officiis," Jahrbiicher fur classsische Philologie 19 (1873), 379-80, is not helpful. He should have seen (but did not) that the subject eadem(que) natura refers back to a natura tributum of the first sentence of $ 11; and the order of topics is guaranteed by Fin. 2.45-47 (cf. also ad § § 18-19 below). It is true that his text yields u eine recht markierte Hervorhebung des Unterschiedes zwischen Instinkt und Intellect"; but the doctrine of οίκ€ίωσι? forms the basis of the social instinct; the contrast of instinct and intellect is incidental. 12 eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem . . .] On the natural tendency of human beings to form communities cf. Fin. 3.65 = SVF 3, 83.38 ff., and ad S 54 and 2.73 below. Possibly the double sense of λόγο? ("reason," "speech") may have assisted
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Panaetius' argument at this point. 25 Cicero had emphasized the role of ratio and oratio in the civilizing process at Inv. 1.2-3; cf. Leg. 1.27.—For the personification of natura cf. ad $ 11. . . . ingeneratque in primis praecipuum quendam amorem in eos qui procreati sunt. . .] Though he expressed grave doubts about their authenticity, Facciolati did not {pace Atzert) athetize these words. He found that this material interrupts the train of thought and suggested that they might have been interpolated on the basis of Fin. 2.45 (eademque ratio fecit bominem hominum adpetentem cumque its natura et sermone et usu congruentem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum serpat longius . . .). Certainly in that passage {and in § 54 below) the relationship of love for children to the social impulse in general is worked out in greater detail and with greater clarity than in our passage (cf. also Fin. 3.62 = SVF 3,83.18 ff.). On the other hand, these passages serve as a warning that the idea of the love for children is expected per se in such a context and should not be lightly banished. Another problem with the words in question is that they do not sufficiently distinguish between the human love for children (and the role played in it by reason: cf. vi rationis) and the cura quaedam eorum quae procreata sunt common to humans and animals; does, for instance, the human preparation of quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum for children go further than what animals provide their offspring? Schofield, 1995 1 ,202, supposes that Cicero a has in mind e.g. the sort of provisions in legacies that are produced as evidence of the altruistic character of the concern shown by human parents for their children at Fin. 3.65." This is one of several passages of Off. that leaves the reader feeling that Cicero has included all the elements necessary for his argument (reason, love of parents for children, the social instinct) but has lacked the time and/or power of concentration to delineate their relations clearly. . . . impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit, ob easque causas studeat parare ea quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nee sibi soli, sed coniugi liberis ceterisquc quos caros habeat tuerique debeat; quae cura exsuscitat etiam animos et maiores ad rem gerendam facit.] With the establishment of human society, the development takes an unexpected turn. This is most clearly seen by comparison with Polybius, who gives a similar account of the origin of the concept of justice beginning with the drive for sexual union and the begetting of children (6.6.1 ff.). But whereas Polybius offers a version of the theory that society arises from the weakness of individuals (esp. 6.6.6 ff.; sim. Lucr. 5.1011 ff.), for Panaetius society— 25. For a possible trace of the double sense of πόλι^ (β state and city) cf. ad 2.73.
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and not just that of the family—becomes a value in itself such as to motivate action; cf. Cole, 1967, 196 ff., esp. 199-200; ad 2.73. Presumably it is here that ratio operates (cf. previous note), in seeing that the well-being of the individual and the community are indissolubly bound together. The opera tion of ratio in this instance is, however, not merely a "tenuous and superfi cial link" with the ratio of l i b {pace Cole, 1967, 199, n. 3); it is precisely because human beings can analyze cause and effect that they understand and value the benefits that society confers. Cf. also ad § 20. 13 The mention of animi. . . maiores could have provided a transition to μεγαλοψυχία. If Panaetius included at this point the quotation of the Letter to Archytas attributed to Plato, as at Fin. 2.45 (cf. ad §§ 11-14 and 22), Cicero departs a bit from the wording of his source. In Fin. 2.46 human φιλομαθία is presented as a further quality given by nature [et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi. . .). The transition is thus a bit smoother than in our passage, where, as Richter saw (cf. ad §§ 12-13), the words in primisque hominis est propria would link up more neatly with the end of § 11 than of S 12. In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio.) Cf. the famous opening sentence of Aristotle's Metaphysics: πάΐ'τες άνθρωποι του €ΐδ€ΐ>αι ορέγονται φύσει, with Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles (Berlin, 1923) = Eng. tr., 2d ed. (Oxford, 1948), 68 ff., who argued that the topic was treated at greater length in the Protrepticus (cf. Iamb. Protr. 43.20-27 and 4 4 . 9 27), whence Panaetius may have taken the idea. Cicero only explains why this activity is proper to the human being at § 105 (. . . hominis autem mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit, videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur). itaque cum sumus nccessariis negotiis curisque vacui, turn avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere . . . ] Is the restriction {cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui) perhaps Cicero's own addition? To judge from the setting of his rhetorical and philosophical dialogues during festivals,26 this statement accords with the accepted place of intellectual activity in Roman life; sim. Tusc. 1.44, in the context of a discussion of what the soul might do in the afterlife: . . . quodque nunc facimus, cum laxati curis sumus, ut spectare aliquid velimus et visere, id multo turn faciemus liberius totosque nos in contemplandis rebus perspiciendisque ponemus, propterea quod et natura inest in mentibus nostris insatiabilis quaedam cupiditas veri videndi... An insatiable drive that one has u by nature" would presumably not come into 26. De Orat. during the Ludi Romani (1.24), Rep. and N.D. during the feriae Latinae (Rep. 1.14 and 33; N.D. 1.15 and 2.3).
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play only in moments of leisure; cf. the reference at $ 19 to agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit, as well as Fin, 3.17, where the point is empha sized as nowhere else in Stoic sources: rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. Cicero perhaps narrows and intellectualizes the φιλομαθία of the human being beyond what Panaetius had in mind. . . . cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus.] As an activity of the rational part of the soul which distinguishes the human from the animal, the pursuit of knowledge has value in itself; hence Panaetius had to recognize both theoretical and practical virtues (cf. ad §§ 11-17), even though his emphasis, if Off. 1 is any indication, was on the latter group. Aristotle was prepared to go even far ther; cf. EN 1177al2 ff.: εί δ 1 έστ'ιν ή ευδαιμονία κατ' άρετήν ενέργεια, εΟλογον κατά την κρατίστην αυτή δ* αν εϊη του αρίστου, είτε δη νους τούτο είτε άλλο τι, ό δη κατά Φύσιν δοκεΐ άρχειν καΐ ήγεΐσθαι και εννοιαν έχειν περί καλών και θε ίων, είτε θείον ον καΐ αυτό εϊτε των εν ήμΐν το θειότατον. ή τούτου ενέργεια κατά την οΐκείαν άρετήν εΐη αν ή τελεία ευδαιμονία, δτι δ' έστ'ι θεωρητική, εϊρηται; ad § 153. ex quo intellegitur, quod verum simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum.] This is evidently intended to mark, by ringcomposition (cf. in primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio)y the conclusion of the treatment of φιλομαθία. Hence we have the first instance of a mannerism of Cicero in this essay, to phrase a proposition as a consequence (ex quo intellegitur) without taking care to see that a logical nexus exists (the aptness of truth to human nature by no means following from the human love of hearing novelties); see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lacking." In general, this sentence stands apart from the rest of the argument in that it deals with speaking the truth, rather than the theoretical virtue of discover ing the truth (speaking the truth should rather fall under the second virtue; cf. § 63, where the subject is the nexus binding the second and third virtues: itaque viros fortes (et) magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus; quae sunt ex media laude iustitiae). One suspects that Cicero has added on his own this moralizing interpretation of the virtue, huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus . . .J
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How are the two joined? Merely in being two of the drives basic to the human being, or is some subtler relationship implied? Probably we have to do with a fairly pat transitional formula (cf. the preceding note, on ex quo intelligitur). huic veri videnti—et legitime imperanti;. . .1 Once the virtues were con ceived as behavior in accord with the basic drives of the human being, the traditional ανδρεία which, in the older Stoa, appears to have retained its place as one of the four cardinal virtues (cf. SVF 3, 63.36 ff.), had to be radically redesigned. It was one of Panaetius' major innovations to see that μεγαλοφυχία, which had in the Stoa been a virtue subordinate to ανδρεία, really provides the psychological substrate for ανδρεία (cf. the words bumanarum rerum contemptio) and can be connected with a basic human drive (the appetitio principatus); hence in his system it takes the place of ανδρεία; cf. Dyck, 1981, 153 ff. The underlying psychological observation is implicit at EN 1168bl 5 ff. (οι μεν ούν el? όνειδο? άγοντε? αυτό φίλαυτου? καλουσι του? έαυτοΐ? απονέμοντα? το πλεΐον έν χρήμασι και τιμαΐ? και ήδοναΐ? ταΐ? σωματικαΐ?· τούτων γάροί πολλοί ορέγονται . . .) and MM 1212a34 ff. (αλλ* όρμώσι μεν άπαντε? έπι τάγαθά, και οϊονται αΰτοΐ? δεΐν μάλιστα ΰπάρχειν). Note that, like Panaetius, Posidonius held that magnanimos nos natura produxit, et ut quibusdam animalibus ferum dedit, quibusdam subdolum, quibusdam pavidum, ita nobis gloriosum et excelsum spiritum . . . (T 81 E.K. = Τ 38c Th. = Sen. Ep. 104.23). Galen, de Viae. 437.1 ff., preserves a critique of Chrysippus* doctrine of οικείωσι? based on the observed behavior of children, who are guided not by reason, but, like animals, by irrational impulses; he argues in particular (14 ff.): όρώμεν δε αυτά (sc. τά παιδία) κα! θυμούμενα κάί λακτίζοντα και δάκνοντα και νικάν έθελοντα και κρατεί ν τών τοιούτων, ώσπ€ρ ε νια τών £ι£ων, οΰδενό? άθλου προβαλλομένου παρά το νικάν αυτό. φαίνεται δε έναργώ? το τοιούτον επί όρτύγων καΐ άλεκτρυόνων και περδίκων ίχνεύμονο? Τ6 και άσπίδο? και κροκοδείλου κα! μυρίων έτερων, οϋτω? ούν ΐι!>κ€ΐώσθαι και τά παιδία φαίνεται και προ? ήδονην και προ? νίκην . . . Whether or not this passage derives from Posidonius (= fr. 416 Th.), such considerations (developed at greater length than by Cicero?) doubtless lay behind Panaetius' inclusion of μεγαλοψυχία among the drives basic to hu man nature. Did he also connect it with φιλαυτία (cf. § 30) in the same way as Plut. Tranq. An. 471 d (αίτιον δ' ή φιλαυτία μάλιστα, φιλόπρωτου? ποιούσα και φιλονίκου? εν πάσι και πάντων επιδραττομένου? άπλήστω?)? . . . ut nemini parere animus bene informants a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti;... J The drive itself is irrational, but the animus bene informants a natura acknowledges certain legitimate claims to obedience (cf. § 102); the concept may be com-
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pared to the animus bene constitutes at Amic. 47. The text has caused difficulty because aut is used in two different ways, first in its weak, almost copulative sense, then as a disjunctive; Thomas, 85, saw the former point (though not the latter) 27 and aptly adduced Sen. 17 (non viribus aut velocitate aut celeritate corporum res magnae geruntur) to defend the transmitted text against the athetesis of praecipienti by H. Sauppe, Conjecturae tullianae (Gottingen, 1857), 19. Praecipere and docere are really synonymous terms (cf. Bulhart, TIL 1.7,1750.57; Baumgartner, ibid., 10.2,441.79; Rep. 1.70: . . . quasi praecipientis cuiusdam et docentis . . .), but, both words being so common, it is hard to imagine a time when a reader would have felt tempted to add cither of them as a gloss on the other.—The exercise of authority is justified on two levels, natural and societal, though in this discussion of "natural* drives one might have expected only the former (utilitatis causa). . . . ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio.J The innate human competitiveness gives rise to a positive and a negative quality, which are related as effect and cause; cf. ad §§ 6 6 - 6 7 . 14 The older Stoa retained σωφροσύνη as one of the four cardinal virtues (cf. SVF 1, 49.23; 3, 64.14-16); its replacement by the more inclusive πρέπον was one of Panaetius' major innovations; cf. North, 220 ff. Here he could build upon observations of his teacher Diogenes of Babylon, who, in his books π€ρι μουσική?, remarked that a response to music is universal in human beings and appears before the use of reason (SVF 3,222.14-17). He differentiated, however, between innate perception (αυτοφυής αϊσθησι?), which distinguishes hot and cold, and scientific perception (επιστημονική αϊσθησι?), which distinguishes harmonious and discordant (SVF 3, 222.34 ff.; cf. S H 5 ) . Since he seems to characterize the former as an αυτοφυή? και άλογο? δύναμι? (SVF 3, 223.11), the other would implicitly be a function of λόγο?, as in Panaetius* conception of aesthetic perception in our passage (ratio); cf. Pohlenz, πρέπον, 78-80. Though music was Diogenes* proper subject, he did bring in other arts by way of comparison (SVF 3,222.4 ff.), so that it is unclear whether Diogenes himself or Panaetius was the first to apply what Diogenes says of scientific perception to the perception of beauty in general.—Here ratio, which did not need to be emphasized undeΓφιλoμαθία and was only involved in limiting μεγαλοψυχία [nisi praecipienti aut docenti)y receives explicit mention for the first time since the κοινωνική αφορμή 27. Here he follows Fedcli, 1964', 47; for the two uses of aut cf. Kuhncr-Sregmann, 2,100 ff., « p . 103 (negation preceding); Thomas fails to see that praecipienti and docenti are syn onymous and appeal to reason, whereas imperanti is different and needs the restriction utilitatis causa iuste et legitime (to exclude tyrannical abuse of power of the kind Cicero later excoriates in Caesar and Sulla).
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(beginning of $ 12); like φρόνηση, the fourth αφορμή is said to be peculiar to man {unum hoc animal). nee vero ilia parva vis—qui modus.] For the sense oi vis (= influence) cf. OLD s.v., 12b and 2.19 below.—The human sense of order is conceived as the result of the combination of natura and ratio, which, for the human being, are virtually identical; cf. H. Frank, 352.—The deletion of quid sit quod dec eat, in factis dictisque, proposed by Weidnec, 25, revived by Briiser, 68, and adopted by Atzerr 4 , would reconstruct a train of thought as at Fin. 2A7; however, there is no reason why in our passage Cicero should not begin by stating the general position and then trace the transference from the physical to the mental realm; cf. Ambr. off. 1.99; Thomas, 86 ff.—On in factis dictisque to be taken, by the "law of waxing members," with qui modus, not quod deceaU cf. Thomas, 86, n. 304, and 88, n. 309.—For modus as a Panaetian ideal cf. ad % 93. itaque eorum ipsorum quae aspectu sentiuntur nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium scntit; . . .J The convenientia partium corresponds to one of the kinds of beauty at Arist. Met. 1078a36 ff.: τοΰ δε κάλου μέγιστα είδη τά£ΐ£ και συμμετρία και τό ώρισμένον. Cf. also ad % 130.—Aristotle would not have agreed with Panaetius here; at HA 488b24 he gives the peacock as an example of animals that are φιλόκαλα. Cf. Sorabji, 92 and n. 112. quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem constantiam ordinem in consiliis factisque conscrvandam putat. . . ] Cicero is careful to make the three terms from the physical realm {pulchritudo, venustas, convenientia partium) correspond to three from the mental sphere {pulchritudo, constantia, ordo). This descrip tion of the transference of the notion of the beautiful from the physical to the moral realm was surely inspired by PI. Smp. 21 l b 7 ff. (Diotima, as reported by Socrates): τούτο γάρ δή έστι τό όρθώ? έπι τά ερωτικά Ιέναι ή ΰπ' άλλου αγεσθαι, άρχαμε νον άπό τώνδε τών καλών ε κείνου 'έν^κα του κάλου άει έπα νιε ναι, ώσπερέπαναβασμοίς χρώμενον, άπό ένΟ£ έπι δύο και άπό δυοΐν έπι πάντα τά καλά σώματα, και άπό τών καλών σωμάτων επί τά καλά επιτηδεύματα, και άπό τών επιτηδευμάτων έπι τά καλά μαθήματα . . . Cicero applies to oratory the notion of an ideal image abstracted from the phenomena of the world at Orat. 9 (cf. ad 3.18).—For the a fortiori form of argument (multo etiam magis) cf. ad § 48; the example at § 145 likewise moves from the physical to the moral realm. . . . cavetque ne quid indecore effeminateve f a c i a t . . . ] Though Panaetius takes care to emphasize the positive aspects of this as of the other άφορμαί (cf. Sandbach, 127), the negative corollary is inevitably added. As the πρέπον
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in literary criticism involves the appropriateness of the words or action to the character portrayed (cf. § 97), so in the moral sphere the πρέπον involves suiting one's actions to one's persona. In the context of male society viola tions of decorum would ordinarily take the form of effeminate actions or gestures (at § 129, however, Cicero also opposes such behavior to the other extreme, the durum et rusticum). Hence the emphasis of moralists, beginning with Plato, on "manly" harmonies and rhythms (cf. R. 399a and 399e, after Damon 37 Β 7 ff. D.-K.). Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon referred approvingly to the discussion by Heraclides Ponticus ire pi πρέποντος μέλους και άπρεπους και ά[ρρ)ενων κα[ι] μαλακών ηθών και πρ[άξ]€ων άρμοττουσών κΐα'ι ά]ναρμόστων το[ίς] ύπ[ο]κ€ΐμ€νοις προσώπ[οι]ς (SVF 3, 234.6 = fr. 162 W.). Cf. also ad $$ 1 3 0 - 3 1 ; Edwards, ch. 2. . . . cavetque ne. . . in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet.] Here is our first indication that the fourth virtue does inter alia subsume the older virtue of σωφροσύνη (cf. 3.117: temperantia libidinum inimica)\ cf. North, 222 ff. As presented in Off., it is both a virtue to be cultivated per se (cf. 3.38) and a social virtue, distinguished from iustitia in that its content is non offendere, rather than non violare ($ 99). It is espe cially important in the case of young people (§ 122). That control is to be exercised even over thoughts {ne. . . cogitet) is unusual in pagan, as opposed to Christian (cf. Matt. 5.28), ethics (cf. S 102). quibus ex rebus conflatur—natura esse laudabile.] It is generally assumed that Cicero's honestum corresponds to το καλόν in Panaetius (cf. ad § 4b). Certainly the καλόν was regarded as praiseworthy in itself; cf., e.g.,. . . καλά 6e και επαινετά τάς άρετάς και τάς κατ' αύτάς εν€ργ€ΐας . . . (Arist. fr. 113 Rose = 622 Gigon), where έπαιν€τά appears to be a nearer specification of καλά. The view that the καλόν is^aivtTOv is attested for Chrysippus (SVF 2, 296.1 and 297.17; SVF 3, 9.26-27); similarly that those who perform such actions are praiseworthy (SVF 2, 288.10-13, SVF 3, 20.18-19). The hon estum, too, can be said to be praiseworthy per se (cf. Leg. 1.37; Fin. 2.45; other testimonies cited by Klose, 109-10); hence its appropriateness as a translation, even though it is drawn, not from the aesthetic realm, but from the sphere of public recognition ("worthy of honos"). It is helpful that both the καλόν and the honestum have the disgraceful as their antonyms (turpitudo, το αισχρόν), since at 3.36 ff. the absence of the turpe becomes a test for the honestas of an action; cf. Klose, 104 ff. and 118. . . . etiamsi a nullo laudctur, natura esse laudabile.] Cf. Aristotle's distinction between what is prior or familiar "to us" and what is so by nature (APo. 71b33 (i.);de Ο rat. 2.343: virtus . . . quae est per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudaripotest. . . ; Part. 87:. . . honestate [sc. expetuntur\ ea quae
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proficiscuntur ab his virtutibus de quibus paulo ante est dictum, quae sunt laudabilia ipsa per sese. . . This distinction is, in Cicero's hands, an "attempt to detach 'the honourable* from the traditional honour code and to concep tualize it in terms of what is intrinsically or naturally good** (Long, 1995', 218). In the sequel Cicero cites a few examples of the reverse phenomenon— actions that were thought to be honestum but were not in fact (cf. 3.80-81, including the words et ea rest si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit; cf. also 2.43, where vera gloria rather than the honestum is under discussion; in this latter passage the opinion of the boni weighs in to counter that of the masses). Cicero thus uses his moral standpoint to contradict the communis opinio to a limited degree. This decoupling of the honestum from actual honor proves useful in the third book, where it is argued that the possibility of concealment does not alter the evaluation of an act (3.37-39). Long, loc. cit., finds that in this essay "Cicero*s honestum is very much his own remodeling of a tradi tional Roman concept.** I would add that the remodeling is specifically along lines suggested by Panaetius' καλόν and involves an experiment in the appli cation of a Greek conceptual framework to Roman politics (cf. the brief adumbration of the approach at Att. 7.11.1, cited ad $$ 83-84).—Note the fine clausula (equivalent to a double cretic) with which this introduction of the honestum concludes. 15-17 These chapters comprise a protreptic coda to the preceding account of the derivation of the virtues from the natural drives, then a systematic presentation (Cicero*s own? cf. ad $§ 11-17) of the four "parts" of the honestum in the order in which they will be treated in Off. 1 (i.e., with reversal of the investigation of truth and the social virtues; cf. ad §§ 18-19 below). This list does not merely repeat the material in §5 11-14, however, but in some cases is more specific and gives the first hint of the argument that follows, namely that specific appropriate actions arise from each of the four. Thus, we are told that the first virtue involves not only perspicientia veri but also sollertia (here used, as at § 157 below, in a good sense, though the term can have negative connotations: cf. § 33); and there is the first indication that the preservation of human society involves concretely giving to each his own and observing one's contractual obligations {in . . . tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide: cf. further ad $ 23); similarly, modestia et temperantia are clearly appropriate actions implied by the fourth "part" of the honestum. It is surprising that Cicero here merely alludes in passing to their interrelations {quae quattuor quamquam inter se colligata atque implicata sunt. . .; cf. Fin. 5.67, cited ad § 95 below). We learn more about the connections only under the individual virtues: thus those engaged in research and those who cultivate magnitudo animi—both potentially antisocial
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pursuits—must be careful not to offend against iustitia (cf. $§ 28 and 62 as well as the non-Panaetian § 152); Cicero delimits verecundia (which falls under the fourth virtue) from iustitia at § 99; and a type of decorum is found in each of the other virtues ($$ 94-96). Finally, the first virtue is differenti ated from the other three in that whereas it has truth as its subject matter, the others involve the actio vitae, i.e., there is a distinction between the theoreti cal virtue on the one hand and the practical ones on the other, a distinction which, in simplified form, is attested for Panaetius (cf. ad $$ 11 -17). Though he emphasizes that in ethics το τέλος εστίν ού γνώσις άλλα πραξις (ΕΝ 1095a5), Aristotle similarly distinguishes the ήθικαΐ άρεταί from the διανοητικοί (ibid., 1103a3 ff.). 15a Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides . . .] This is a form for concluding an exposition familiar from Cicero's dialogues, with the direct address added for liveliness; cf. Fin. 2.48: habes undique expletam et perfectam. Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor his virtutibus, quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt, continetur; ibid., 4.19: habes, inquam, Cato, formam eorum, de quibus loquor, philosophorum; and, more remotely, ibid., 5.41: cum igitur ea sit, quam exposui, forma naturae . . . Similarly, at the conclusion of our essay: habes a patre munus, Marce fili,. . . (3.121). Our passage, however, is bolder in its striving for concreteness (tamquam faciem . . . vides). . . . quae si oculis cemeretur» mirabiles amores, at ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae.] An adaptation to the honestum (καλόν) of what PI. Phdr. 250d says of φρόνησις, which, unlike beauty (κάλλος), is not accessible to human sight: όψις γάρ ήμΐν οξυτάτη των διά τοϋ σώματος- έρχεται αισθήσεων, ή φρόνησις ουχ όράται —δεινούς γάρ αν παρείχε ν έρωτας, ει τι τοιούτον εαυτής εναργές εϊδωλον παρείχετο εις όψιν ίόν—και τάλλα όσα έραστά· . . . ; cf. the closer rendering at Fin. 2.52: 'oculorum', inquit Plato, 'est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus. quam ilia ardentis amores excitaret sui!' In speaking of "seeing* (vides) the "form" and "face" of the honestum (before even getting to the hypothesis si oculis cerneretur)y Cicero blunts the contrast between the intellectual and physical realms. 28 —Fedeli, 1 9 6 4 1 , 4 7 49, revived Gernhard's athetesis of sapientiae (already omitted in Vaticanus Reg. lat. 1481, dated to 1418) on grounds that it is a concept alien to this context, in which it is clearly the honestum that is under discussion. The 28. I do not see why one need assume, with Gartner, 1974, 23, that "das Zitat diirftc so schon von Panairios aus Plato umgeformt sein." If used by Panaetius, the citation will have served to show that the καλόν in the moral realm was even more splendid than in the physical. If that is so, then an alteration as in the latin text will not have helped the Panactian argument cirhcr; and there is no reason to suppose that Panaetius was writing in haste.
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mere athetesis of sapientiae cannot be right, however; one expects an object for amores to be expressed, as at Fin. 2.52; and, as in that passage, the object should be the reflexive pronoun sui (already conjectured here by Faernus), presumably ousted by the gloss sapientiae. The process posited (replacement of sui by sapientiae) would assume, however, that the interpolator had Fin. 2.52 in front of him. Or was it Cicero himself who had Fin. 2.52 in mind as he wrote these words and intended sapientiae again to function as a surro gate for the four virtues (cf. Gartner, 1974, 2 0 - 2 1 ; Madvig ad Fin. 2.52; Pohlcnz, AF, 2 1 , n. 1)? But in that passage all four virtues are named in the immediately preceding sentence and are discussed individually in the follow ing paragraphs, so that there is no chance to mistake the meaning. In our passage, on the other hand, where the term honestum already stands for all four virtues, there is some risk of confusion with the first virtue [in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus [§ 15bl), though Ciceronian carelessness can, in this essay, never be ruled out. Also in favor of the emended text is that we expect at this point a good clausula to round out the introduction of the honestum (see the last note on § 14); excitaret sui provides a double cretic, whereas excitaret sapientiae (Isllsslsl) is not a clausula sought by Cicero. However, it would be a mistake to regard our text merely as a surface distortion of Fin. 2.52 (cf. also ad § \4 nee vero ilia parva vis—). It has a different, protreptic purpose, the aim being to win young Marcus over to the study of philosophy. I suspect therefore that neither is sapientia a surrogate for the four virtues nor sui to be substituted for sapientiae; rather sapientia has the sense of "wisdom as the study and goal of philosophers" {OLD s.v., 3a; cf. Homeyer, 306), it being assumed that sapientia in that sense leads to an understanding of the honestum. sed omne quod est honestum, id quanuor pardum oritur ex aliqua.] The sed correlates with the preceding quidem (our passage is cited by Solodow, 55, as an example of "feeble contrast").—In this essay the virtues are commonly referred to by the periphrasis partes honestatis, a usage which, Platonic in inspiration, has the advantage of emphasizing that the virtues form a unified whole and that their separation is merely an analytical convenience; cf. PI. Men. 78d (Socrates is the speaker): δ€ΐ άρα, ώ? eoiKC, τούτω τω πόρω δικαιοσύνης ή σωφροσύνης ή όσιότητα προσβΐναι, ή άλλο τι μόριον αρετής' . . . ; ibid., 79c:. . . okmep €ίρηκώ$ οτι άρίτή €στιν τό όλον και ήδη γνωσομένου εμού, και έάν συ κατακ£ρματί£ης αυτήν κατά μόρια; cf. ad SS 15b, 152-61,2.35. aut cnim in perspicientia veri sollerdaque versatur, aut in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rcrum contractarum fide . . .] This paraphrase of the "parts" of the honestum avoids technical terms (except
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when, in the case of magnitude» animi, they are clarified by modifiers in context (cf. also ad § 61]) and begins by emphasizing the actions associated with the virtues [perspicientia veri. . .in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique . . .).—The defense of the societas of humankind could take various forms; at 3.25 Cicero speaks of undertaking, like Hercules, labors pro omnibus gentibus. . . conservandis aut iuvandis; it might take the form of defending human commoda (cf. § 153), in which case, since the state was founded especially for this purpose (cf. 2.73), it would take place within a specific state (the context assumed by most of the precepts of Off.).—On tribuendo suum cuique cf. ad § 21; on fides ad $ 23a. 15b Quae quattuor quamquam inter se conligata atque implicata s u n t . . . ] Philippson, 1930 1 , 3 6 2 - 6 3 , suspects here a translation of αχώριστους and compares the discussion of the separability of the virtues at Arist. EN 1144b30 ff. and Stob. 2.7.5 b 5 = 2, 63.6 W.-H. (πάσα? δε τάς άρετά?, δσαι έπιστημαί εϊσι και τέχι>αι, κοιι>ά Τ€ θεωρήματα εχειν και τέλο? . . . το αυτό, διό και αχώριστου? εΐΐ'αι). Within the early Stoa the thesis of Aristo, namely that there is a single virtue, identified as the health of the soul, and that the various virtues were merely shapes (σχέσεις: Long-Sedley 61C) assumed by the single virtue, was contradicted by Chrysippus, who nonetheless defended the inseparability of the virtues; cf. Long-Sedley 61B-D with commentary 1, 384. On the interconnectedness of the virtues in Panaetius cf. the important remarks of Gill, 1994, 4605. See ad $$ 62, 93-99, and 152-61. . . . in qua sapientiam et prudentiam ponimus . . .] Did Cicero avoid using sapientia previously of the first virtue to reduce the ambiguity of the Platonic citation (see above)?—For prudentia and its distinction from malitia cf. 3.71. 16 ut enim quisquc maximc pcrspicit quid in re quaque verissimum sit quique acutissime et celerrime potest et videre et explicare ration em, is prudentissimus et sapientissimus rite haberi solet.] Young Marcus' slowness was apparent from an early age; cf. introduction, § 4, esp. Att. 6.1.12 there cited. Cf. 3.81 {explica atque excute intellegentiam tuam, ut videos, quae sit in ea species {formal et notio viri honi), where one senses a certain fatherly eager ness and impatience for young Marcus to display intellectual prowess. 17 reliquis autem tribus virtutibus necessitates propositae sunt ad eas res parandas tuendasque quibus actio vitae continetur . . .] The actio vitae of the gods appears as a topic dealt with by theologians at N.D. 1.2; the Epi curean account is criticized, ibid., 103 (see Pease ad locos). ordo autem et constantia et moderatio. . . versantur in eo genere ad quod est adhibenda actio quaedam, non solum mentis agitatio.] Actio could, of course, refer to purely mental activity; cf. Var. L. 6.42: actionum trium
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primus agitatus mentis, quod primum ea quae sumus acturi cogitare debemus, deinde turn dicere ac facere. However, Varro adds at once: de his tribus minimeputat volgus esse actionem cogitationem; tertium, in quo quid facimus, id maximum. Cicero is using actio in this "vulgar" sense and/or is relying upon the previous actio vitae to clarify what he means; the exclusion of thought from actio rerum becomes critical to his argument in preferring the social to the intellectual virtues (§ 153). In spite of its different subject matter and different relation to the activities comprised under the actio vitae there is no indication here (unlike § 153) that the first virtue is therefore inferior. 18-19 The presentation of the first virtue is curious. In the first place, it is not easy to figure out what the subject is. Elsewhere in this work Cicero does not hesitate to cite the Greek terms he is translating (cf. $§ 8,93,142,153; 2.18), but there is no such indication here, where it would have been unusually helpful. Only at the very end of the discussion does he state that there are actually two types of thought (cogitatio motusque animi), involving (a) deci sion making de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum and (b) pure research {in studiis scientiae cognitionisque). But the prior category is surely too narrow; one does not make decisions only about ethical questions but also about questions in the realm of the utile, as Cicero himself has just pointed out (§§ 9-10). The introductory sentence suggests that (b) alone is to be the topic {qui in veri cognitione consistit); and the strictures against expending excessive effort on obscure and difficult subjects and against being drawn away from public service by such pursuits, as well as the indication that this is the type of activity that one pursues in one's leisure time, provide apparent confirmation that (b) is in question. On the other hand, Cicero has praised this virtue as the one that is especially hominis propria (§ 13), which touches human nature most closely (maxime naturam attingit humanam: $ 18), and which involves an unresting mental aaivity (agitatio mentis^ quae numquam adquiescit: $ 19), as an activity therefore that touches the human being qua human being, not just the scholar, the scientist, or the Roman statesman on his day off. There seems, then, to be a tension between two different conceptions never fully acknowledged, let alone resolved, in the text. Nor is the precept cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduct contra officium est (ibid.) consistently maintained in Off.; cf. the concession at § 71 exempting from state service those qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt. The confusion and inconsistency to which this section gives rise, as well as its much shorter length than the treatment of each of the other three virtues, suggest that this passage is a striking example of the operation of iudicium
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arbitriumque nostrum which Cicero held in prospect ( § 6 ) . Possibly this section contained an exposition of Stoic psychology and epistcmology that Cicero found too theoretical for his present purposes (cf. § 7b); such an exposition would have been helpful prior to the reference to anger and other passions at § 23b (for another possible placement of such material cf. ad § 114). Since he is writing this treatise after a series of other philosophical works» Cicero thought to save time and space in view of his previous treat ment of kindred topics; thus he could omit the type of question concerning appropriate action quod pertinet ad ftnem bonorum in view of Fin. (cf. §§ 5 7) and friendship in view o( Antic. (2.31). Similarly, he had treated epistemology in the way he thought appropriate in the Academica and in our context merely alludes to one typically Academic concern in this area: ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus (§18; cf. ad 2.7-8). He does offer a brief treatment of Stoic psychology at $$ 101-3a. In writing for his son and others like him Cicero was concerned in the first instance with the role of his subject in the life of a Roman statesman; hence the tendency to confine the subject to intellectual pursuits that might fill out one's otium and to warn against becoming involved with these to the point of endangering one's public career; cf. Luc. 6: . . . profecto eius |sc. philosophiae] tractatio optimo atque amplissimo quoque dignissima est, nee quicquam aliud videndum est nobis, quos populus Romanus hoc in gradu conlocavit, nisi ne quid privatis studiis de opera publica detrahamus. The position arrived at is not dissimilar to that put into the mouth of Antonius at de Or at. 2.156: ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint. Panaetius, who was interested in scientific questions (at Rep. 1.15 Scipio expresses the wish that Panaetius were present to discuss with them the alleged appearance of two suns), will have conceived the subject and its possible role in life more broadly (hence the concession of § 71); cf. also Johann, 30. Moreover, at this stage of Stoicism one would have expected φρόι^ησις to be the cardinal virtue in question and to pertain to decision making on moral and other questions (cf. ad § 153). That this was, in fact, the virtue treated by Panaetius is clear from the broader definition of the first virtue presupposed at § 94 (see ad loc.)\ cf. also § 143, where Cicero reproduces Panaetius* cross-reference to his discussion of φρόνηση even though he has altered the virtue so drastically as to make it unrecognizable as such ( . . . prudentiae definitio, de qua principio diximus; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 25). Similar to the narrowed scope of the first virtue in our passage is § 151, where Cicero includes (his own? see ad he.) praise of professions like medicine and architecture, which involve prudentia maior, but adds a saving clause: eae sunt its, quorum ordini conveniunty honestae, so that there can be no question of their being recommended
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for senators' sons. The truncated treatment in our passage is fleshed out by a few more observations on those who pursue the vita contemplativa at $§ 2 8 29, 71, and 92. A further problem is whether the veri cognitio was also the first "part" of the honestum handled by Panaetius, who was very particular about the order in which topics were to be treated (cf. ad 2.22). In favor of its priority is that, as a theoretical virtue, it is set apart from the other three (§§ 16-17); also some attention to psychology would have facilitated the exposition of the following virtues insofar as these involve the curbing or redirecting of appe tencies. On the other hand, it is limited by the second virtue in a way that can be explained only after that virtue has been introduced (cf. § 28); the same is true of the third "part" of the honestum ($§ 69b ff. and 92). In the introduc tion of the four "parts'* of the καλόν (§§ 11-15) Panaetius placed it after the social instinct, which he evidently regarded as fundamental (cf. $ 157, which, though from a non-Panaetian section, is perhaps not at odds with the spirit of Panaetius:. . . homines . . . natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam); the order is changed only in the systematization (§ 15: added by Cicero?). It is thus not impossible that Cicero has altered the order of topics and placed φιλομαθία first in order to get it quickly out of the way before proceeding to the virtues he intends to focus on, in accord with his policy of using his own judgment and emphasizing precepts pertaining to life (SS 6-7). 18 Ex quattuor autem locis in quos honesti naturam vimque divisimus . . .] For the sense of vis (= essence) cf. OLD s.v., 17, and Forcellini s.v., II. 1. omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem . . .] Cf. Arist. Met. quoted ad § 13. . . . in qua excellere pulchnim putamus . . . ] Pulchrum as predicate with an a a i o n as subject is evidently a poetic usage taken over in late works of Cicero; cf. Phil. 2.117 and other passages cited at OLD s.v. pulcher 3b; Forcellini s.v., II. 1.9. . . . in qua excellere—turpe ducimus.] Cf. Luc. 66: sed ut hoc pulcherrimum esse iudico, vera videre, sic pro veris probare falsa turpissimum est. . . . ne incognita pro cognitis habeamus hisque temere adsentiamur . . .] A typically Academic concern; cf. Ac. 1.45: . . . neque hoc quicquam esse turpius quam cognitioni et perceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere and ad 2.8. 19 alterum est vitium, quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias.] Note that C. Sulpicius' pursuit of astronomy resulted in practical benefits (see below). Cicero once contrasted the Greek and Roman attitudes
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toward mathematics as follows: in summo apud illos (sc. Graecos) honore geometria fuit, itaque nihil mathematicis inlustrius; at nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate hums artis terminavimus modum {Tusc. 1.5). It seems doubtful, however, that Sex. Pompeius' study of geometry would have bene fited the agrimensores; was the fact that he pursued it merely as a hobby what saved it, in Cicero's eyes, from the predicates "obscure, difficult, and unnec essary"? The position here is similar to that which M. Antonius adopts toward philosophy at de Orat. 2.156 (ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint), but one wishes Cicero had offered an example of the kind of inquiry he deprecates. Panaetius is likely rather to have expressed the kind of approval for astronomy and geometry found at Isoc. 11.23 and 12.26-27.— For the iunctura cf. de Orat. 2.18, where Crassus declares that there is perhaps no greater ineptia than ut illi [sc. Graeci] solentt quocumque in loco quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necesssariis argutissime disputare. In our passage Cicero is clearly applying what he conceives to be the standards of a Roman gentleman. . . . ut in astrologia C. Sulpicium audimus . . .] C. Sulpicius Gaius accom panied L. Aemilius Paullus on his Macedonian campaign and won celebrity by explaining the causes of the eclipse of the moon in the night of 21 - 2 2 June 168, prior to the battle of Pydna; he later wrote a book on the subject; cf. Plin. Nat. 2.53 and in general Munzer, RE 4A1 (1931), 809.35 ff., and 811.42 ff., partly superseded by Sumner, 37-38; cf. also Elizabeth Rawson in CAH 8 2 ,443; in 166 he became M. Marcellus* colleague in the consulate (cf. MRR, 1, 437). Cf. Rep. 1.21-22 (Philus is the speaker):. . . nam memoria teneo C. Sulpicium Galium, doctissimum ut scitis hominem, cum idem hoc visum diceretur et esset casu apud M. Marcellum, qui cum eo consul fuerat, sphaeram quam M. Marcelli aims captis Syracusis ex urbe locupletissima atque ornatissima sustulisset, cum aliud nihil ex tanta praeda domum suam deportavisset, iussisse proferri; cuius ego sphaerae cum persaepe propter Archimedi gloriam nomen audissem, speciem ipsam non sum tanto opere admiratus; erat enim ilia venustior et nobilior in volgus, quam ah eodem Archimede factam posuerat in templo Virtutis Marcellus idem, sed posteaquam coepit rationem huius operis scientissime Galius exponere, plus in illo Siculo ingenii quam videretur natura humana ferre potuisse iudicabam fuisse.—For astrologia encompassing both astronomy and astrology cf. LSJ and OLD s.v.; Ihm, TLL 2, 965.55 ff.; Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) deserves credit for establishing the modern distinction; cf. Louis MacNeice, Astrology (Garden City, N.Y., 1964), 150-51. . . . in geometria Sex. Pompeium ipsi cognovimus . . .] Cf. Brut. 175: dicebat etiam L. Scipio non imperite Gnaeusque Pompeius Sex. f. aliquem numerum
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obtinebat. nam Sex. frater eius praestantissimum ingenium contulerat ad summam iuris civilis et ad perfectam geometriae rerumque Stoicarum scientiam; F. Milrner, RE 21.2 (1952), 2059.55 ff. cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium e s t ; . . . ] Contrast 5 7 1 , where those qui excellent! ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt are given leave from state service. This statement, according with the view put forward in the non-Panaetian appendix to this Book (§§ 153 ff.), is surely a Ciceronian addition. Cf. Johann, 30. virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit.] Cf. Arist. EE 1219b8: oi έπαινοι τή? αρετή? δια τά έργα and passages cited by Pease ad N.D. 1.110. 20 ac de primo quidem officii fonte diximus.] The explicit marking of the ends of sections in this way is useful in a treatise meant to be reproduced without modern typographical aids. I prefer to see them treated as the end of the previous paragraph rather than the beginning of a new one (the latter Winterbottom's practice here and elsewhere); see ad 2.8 {sed tarn ad instituta pergamus).—On the transitional formula ac . . . quidem cf. KiihnerStegmann, 2, 23. 2 0 - 6 0 Cicero has, at least initially, no name for the second virtue as such (note the paraphrase ea ratio qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur: § 20); ή κοινωνική αρετή would be a possible Panaetian designation (cf. ad §§ 11-14); at $ 100 he designates the virtue as hominum consociatio, at § 149 as communis generis hominum conciliatio et consociatio, at § 153 (non-Panaetian) simply as communitas. This virtue is derived from the social instinct of the human being, which is prior to the other three drives corresponding to virtues (§ 12). Δικαιοσύνη had, of course, for the older Stoa, as for Greek moralists generally, been one of the four cardinal virtues. But here, as in the case of the fourth virtue (cf. ad § 14), Panaetius chooses to emphasize its positive aspect as a drive toward a goal, rather than define it purely negatively as the avoidance of certain actions. Hence he divides the second virtue into two parts by adding to δικαιοσύw\liustitia the Aristotelian virtue έλευθεριότης (respectively 2 0 - 4 1 and 4 2 60). The second virtue is thus not merely the avoidance of acts that under mine the community [iustitita as the avoidance of agression against others and their property) but the performance of acts that help bind the com munity together (t\zv(kp\.o-n)gJbeneficentia/liberalitas); cf. Atkins, 263. From another point of view the two halves of the second virtue correspond to the distinction between the possession of property (made secure by δικαιοσύ νη) and its use (cf. Arist. Pol. 1263bl3: εν τη γάρ χρήσει τών κτημάτων τό τη? έλευθεριότητο? έργον εστίν). 2 0 - 4 1 In accord with the principle εσθλοΐ μεν γάρ απλώς, παντοδαπώς· δέ
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κακοί (adesp. eleg. fr. 3 West apud Arist. EN 1106b35), the treatment of iniustitia extends to greater length than that of iustitia proper, as the follow ing plan of this section indicates: I. iustitiae munera {§§ 20-23a) A. tie cut quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria B. ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis II. iniustitia A. genera 1. eorum qui inferunt; motives ($$ 23b-27): a) metus b) avaritia 2. eorum qui ah Us quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam; motives ($$ 28-29): a) inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt (sim. neglegentia, pigritia) b) suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve impediuntur B. A rule of thumb for avoiding injustice {§ 30) C. Change of appropriate actions κατά -περίστασιν (§§ 31-32) D. Injuries through interpretation of the law (§ 33) Ε. Appropriate actions toward those a quibus iniuriam acceperis (SS 3 4 - 4 0 ) , in particular, enemies in wartime F. Justice toward slaves (5 41). When the various virtues were derived from natural impulses (§§ 11-14), our virtue was presented as a general tendency of the human being to form social groups and direct concern and effort toward others as well as oneself (§ 12). Just behavior was mentioned for the first time in the discussion of magnitudo animi, where it was said that the mind well formed by nature would obey someone giving orders iuste et legitime. That the second virtue involves justice became clearer in § 15 [in hominum societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide). Finally $ 20 states explicitly that iustitia is an important component of the social virtue. Perhaps Panaetius avoided connecting justice with the doctrine of οίκίίωσι? in view of arguments such as those presented in the papyrus commentary to Plato's TbeaetetuSy to the effect that there would then be various kinds of justice depending on one's relation to the agent: κή&ται μέν και Κυρηι>αίωι>, κατά τον αυτόν δ€ λόγον και ώντινωνουν άιΌρώπωΐ'· ψκ€ΐώμ€θα γάρ τοΐ? ύμοειδίσι · μάλλον μ€ΐ>τοι φκ€ΐωται το[ϊ? εαυτού πολίται[?· €πιτ€ίι>ΐ€ται γάρ και dfineTJali] ή οίκβίωσις" ο[σοι TO][VW από τη? οίκ€ΐώσ€ω? είσάγουσι την
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δικαιοσύνης, ει μέν λέγουσιν ΐσην αύτοΟ Τ€ προς αυτόν και προς τ[όν] ε[σ]χατον Μυσών. τεθέντος μέν τούτου σώζεται ή δικαιοσ[ύ]νη, ού συγχωρείται [δ]ε [εΐ]ναι ϊσην παρά γά[ρ την] ένάργειάν εστίν κα[ι] την συναίσθησιν. ή μέν γάρ προς εαυτόν οίκείωσις φυσική εστίν και άλογο?, ή δε προς του? πλησίον φυσική μέν και αυτή, ού μέντοι άνευ λόγου. 29 Hence when οΐκείωσις appears again under the second virtue it is in the section on liberalitas and beneficentia and at precisely the point where a criterion is needed for drawing up a hierarchy of beneficiaries (§§ 53-54). 20 Dc tribus autem reliquis latissime patet ea ratio qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitae quasi communitas continetur.] For ratio as = "system," "Prinzip," or the like cf. OLD s.v., 11 (where our passage is cited); H. Frank, 284. On societas as the abstract to socius and the use of the latter to denote a person who stands in the same relation with another to some third person or thing (and sometimes therefore implies reciprocal relations among the socii) cf. Wegner, 30. On Cicero's paraphrase of the name of the second virtue see ad §§ 2 0 - 6 0 . The scope of officio {latissime patere) was one of the features that attracted Cicero to this subject in the first place (§ 4); within the doctrine of appropriate actions the social virtue has a similar advantage of scope. The implications of the ratio of human society go beyond this virtue to limit what is acceptable behavior under the cognitio return (§19), magnitudo animi (cf. SS 62-65), and the other virtues generally (§§ 153 ff.) and play the major role in deciding the problems of casuistry in Book 3 (see esp. 3.21-32). cuius panes duae—appellari licet.] Not dissimilar is the distinction at §§ 6 6 67 of externarum despicientia and the performance of great deeds as compo nents of magnitudo animi. There splendor omnis (as well as amplitudo and utilitas) is said to reside in the latter. The applicability of splendor in that passage is clear: the performance of great deeds casts an eye-catching glitter; iustitia, on the other hand, would seem an inward quality. Evidently, how ever, what Cicero has in mind is the reputation for justice; his failure to distinguish sharply between the quality and the "image" is less understand able here than at 2 . 3 9 - 4 3 , where glory, not virtue, is the (instrumental, not final) goal; cf. introduction to Book 2. On the division into two parts cf. ad SS 2 0 - 6 0 . . . . ex qua viri boni nominantur . . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1130a8-10: αυτή μέν ούν ή δικαιοσύνη ού μέρα? αρετή? αλλ' δλη αρετή έστιν, ουδ' ή εναντία αδικία μέρος κακίας άλλ' όλη κακία. The epithet bonus is used here, as ordinarily in 29. Ed. D. Seel ley in Unione Accademica Nazionale, Accadcmia Toscana di Scicnzc c Lcttcre "La Colomharia," Corpus dei paptri filosoficigreci e latini, 3 (Florence, 1995), 272 and 274. col. V.14 ff. {ad Tht. 143d).
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this essay (cf. § 3 1 and ad 2.33), as in common parlance and not with reference to the Stoic sage (on Panaetius' general practice in this regard cf. 2.35); cf. 3.17. For vir bonus used in sponsio formulae in Roman litigation cf. 3.70 and 77. Sed iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessirus inju ria . . .J Munus is used here by variatio for officium, with which it is, in one of its senses, identical; cf. Paul. Dig. 50.16.18: 'munus' tribus modis dicitur: uno donum, et inde munera diet dart mittive. altera onus, quod cum remittatur, vacationem militiae munerisque, inde immunitatem appellari; tertio officium, unde munera militaria et quosdam milites munificos vocari. . . ; Lumpe, TLL 8, s.v. munus 1662.76 ff. and 1663.25 ff.; p. 6, n. 13, and ad 3.4 and 121. However, in spite of Atticus' doubts about officium as a translation for καθήκοί' (Att. 16.14.3), de Muneribus would hardly have served as a title for our essay (see introduction, § 2).—On the proviso (sim. 3.76) cf. Dihle, 1962, 13 ff., who traces the lex talionis in ancient legal texts and popular ethics; inevitably it caused difficulty for St. Ambrose in preparing his Christian version: dicunt enim illi earn pnmam esse iustitiae formam ut nemini quis noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria; quod Evangelii auctoritate vac· uatur; vult enim Scriptura (sc. Luke 9.51-56] ut sit in nobis spiritus ftlii hominis, qui venit conferre gratiam, non inferre iniuriam {off. 1.131). But even pagan philosophers provided examples of a higher standard corre sponding to the Christian "turning of the other cheek"; cf. D.L. 6.33 (Diogenes) and 89 (Crates); a similar anecdote is told of Socrates at Basil Ad adulesc. 1. . . . deindc uc communibus pro communibus utatur, privaris ut suis.] An aliquis as subject is, of course, to be extrapolated from the preceding quis.— This formulation ("that one should treat common goods as common, and private ones as one's own" in Atkins' rendering), with its insistence on observing the distinction between public and private property, is a bit odd; it ignores the fact that in practice the major cause of injustice is the violation of private property held by others (as Cicero, of course, knew; cf. § 24: maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam adgrediuntur ut adipiscantur ea quae concupiverunt; § 42: . . . in eadem sunt iniustitia ut si in suam rem aliena convertant)\ and, in fact, apan from $$ 51-52 below, this essay has hardly anything to say about property held in common. No less odd is the paraphrase at § 31 [ut communi uttlitati serviatur), where one would have expected some mention that the communis utilitas includes respect for the private property of others, if that is what was meant. 21 sunt autem privata nulla natura . . . ] When not read closely in context, this statement has given rise to misunderstanding, especially in light of the
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general tendency in this essay naturam . . . ducem sequi (§ 22). Cicero is far from wishing to call existing property relations into question, as a careful study of relevant passages in Off. and the other philosophical works shows (cf. Wacht, 34 ff.). Rather, as he says in our passage, he recognizes two types of property, res communes and respnvatae. But he needs to explain how this situation arose; this he does by describing the original situation {sunt. . . privata nulla natura) and the means by which it was modified [vetere occupa tion . . . victoria . . . lege pactione condicione sorte). At the same time, the picture of early society and its evolution at 2.11-15 does not encourage the idea that Cicero/Panaetius wanted to turn back the clock to primitive condi tions. Cicero explicitly states there is nothing wrong with the just acquisition of property (§ 25: nee vero ret familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est. . .). As a part of the natural human instinct to provide for oneself, one's family, and for the future, it would be in accord with the foundations of Panaetian ethics (§§ 11-12). The possession of property is, however, to some degree limited by the obligation to use it in socially benefi cial ways; cf. Arist. Pol. 1263a37: bavtpov τυίι/υι> οτι βελτιον €Ϊναι μο> ιδία? τάς· κτήσεις, τη δ€ χρήσβι ποΐ€Ϊν κοινός; ad § 92; Wacht, 48.—The doctrine sunt. . . privata nulla natura derives from the early Stoa and had a different significance for Zeno, who advocated the community of women and aboli tion of coinage (cf. D.L. 7.33; Schofield, 1991, 12-13), than for Cicero/ Panaetius. Chrysippus, however, already took a positive view of the acquisi tion of property (cf. SVF 3,172.5 ff., esp. 173.8-9:. . . και κυβιστήσεις τρις |sc. τον σοφόν] επ'ι τούτψ λαβόντα τάλαιτον; Pohlenz, Stoa, l , 140; Schofield, 1991, 18-19), as Seneca was later to do (cf. Griffin, 1976, 298-99).— Ambrose saw clearly the discrepancy between the professed following of nature and the acceptance of private property (off. 1.132). He, too, however, was far from wishing to disturb existing property relations; but whereas for Cicero (and presumably Panaetius) the statement sunt . . . privata nulla natura has lost its power to criticize existing property relations, Ambrose at least uses it as an argument to encourage the wealthy to contribute to the church and its charitable works; cf. Wacht, 50 ff. . . . sed aut vetere occupations ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt, aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti sunt, aut lege pactione condicione sorte;. . .] This is evidently meant to be a fairly complete list of methods by which property could be acquired. An example of the establishment of a community on previously vacant land would be the founding of a city on the site where Aeneas discovered the sow with a litter of thirty piglets (cf. Aen. 3.389 ff., 8.43 ff. and 81 ff.). The Gracchi and other reformers used lex as a method of transferring common land to private ownership. Pactio is a broad term for
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an agreement and could be used both in interstate relations (cf. 3.108) and in those under civil law; it is a virtual synonym of conditio (cf. Frohlke, TLL 10, 24.63 ff.). Sors was used to allot land, not only in saga, as in the allot ment of their conquests among the Heraclidae, but also in historical times to the Athenian κληροϋχοι and Roman veteran-colonists. Cicero glosses over a problem when he speaks of acquisition of land by victory in war; as he himself was aware, there were different types of war, not all just (cf. ad §§ 34 ff.); what about the unjust acquisition of property in war? Cf. Annas, 1993, 311. . . . ex quo fit ut ager Arptnas Arpinatium dicatur, Tusculanus Tusculanorum; . . . 1 Cf. Varro's allusion to the division of land after the Golden Age at Men. 17 (with commentary by Cebe, 1, 77 ff.): terra culturae causa attributa olim particulatim hominibus, ut Etruria Tuscis, Samnium Sabellis. Cicero has chosen examples of personal and familial interest (the former being the orator's birthplace, the latter the site of one of his villas), another indicator that this is the most personal of Cicero's extant philosophi cal works; cf., besides the three proems, §§ 7 7 - 7 8 , 2.45, 3.121 (however, Leg. would be a close second; cf. esp. 2.3). Besides the personal connection, these examples are of places which have taken their names after the occupy ing peoples and therefore, as Wacht, 33, notes, were doubtless intended to make the process seem quite normal. They are evidently cited as examples of vetus occupatio. . . . similisque est pnvatarum possessionum discriptio.) For the spelling and sense of discriptio cf. ad § 124. ex quo, quia suum cuiusque fit eorum quae natura fuerant communia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat;. . .] For the idea of taking possession of originally common property cf. Chrysippus' simile of the theater [SVF 3, 90.30 ff. = Fin. 3.67): . . . quern ad modum, tbeatrum cum commune sitt recte tamen did potest eius esse eum locum, quern quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque cuius que sit. Erskine, 105 ff., tries to deny the Chrysippean provenance of this simile, but see above (on sunt autem privata nulla natura . . .). As Seneca (Ben. 7.12.4-6) pointed out in discussing seating in the theater, in the asser tion me habere in equestribus locum, habere is equivocal and can refer either to possession or occupancy; Chrysippus' use of the theater simile suggests the latter, rather than an unrestricted right to dispose of property as one wishes; cf. Wacht, 4 7 - 4 8 ; Annas, 1989, 167-68. Cicero's text, however, does not encourage one to look for a distinction between occupancy and ownership.—The definition of justice offered by Simonides FMG 642 apud PI. Rp. 331e (το τα όφ€ΐλόμ€να έκάστψ αποδίδομαι δίκαιον έστι) was adopted
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in essentials by the Stoa (e.g., SVF 3, 63.27: δικαιοσύνης 6e έπιστημην άποι^μητικήν ττ\ς άξιας έκάστψ) and was well known to Cicero; cf. Fin. 5.67, where justice is said to consist in suo cuique tribuendo. The formula tion was later taken up and modified by Ulpian {Dig. 1.1.10 pr.: iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi; cf. Wieacker, 1, 510 and n. 44) but, unlike suum cuique (sc. placet or the like), did not achieve proverbial status in ancient, as opposed to modern, times. 30 In our passage the injunction quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat is a variation of that definition with an emphasis characteristic of Off. (cf. esp. 2.73), not on transfer, but retention of property; see next note. . . . fe quo si quisf sibi appetet, violabit ius humanae societatis.] Ε [or ex) quo seems very likely to be a dirtography of the previous ex quo; hence Winterbottom's suggested deletion; following quis we shall surely need quid, as Muller proposed after Lambinus.—Appetitus (= ορμή: cf. 5 101), a drive which the human being shares with animals (cf. 2.11), is, of course, not bad per se (cf. § 11: coniunctionis appetitus procreandi causa). However, the fourth virtue is charged inter alia with keeping wandering appetites under the control of reason (§§ 102-3). For the corresponding adverb used specifi cally regarding designs on another's property cf. l-abeo's warning to the Nolans and Neapolitans: ne cupide quid agerent, ne appetenter . . . (§ 33). The ius humanae societatis is a variatio for iustitia; cf. $ 60. It is no accident that Cicero's first example of wrong-doing involves the violation of property rights, a topic that will receive extensive coverage in this treatise (see esp. 2.72-85 and much of the third book). PereUi, 3 0 2 - 3 , contrasts the formula tion at 3.21: si enim sic erimus adfecti ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est earn quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem, which he sees as more Stoic (certainly it is explicitly tied to the Stoic TeXos formula; cf. ad 3.13). Our sentence presupposes that property rights are to be respected, but that does not necessarily make it a one-sided precept in favor of property owners (it would be so only if the premise were a conflict of rights). Therefore it is not clear, as PereUi argues, that Cicero grossly deforms Panaetius* views; the emphasis may be Cicero's, however. Cf. ad 2.72-85. 22 This material, joined with the weak connector sed (cf. ad § 15 and 2.87), takes us without warning beyond justice proper. We are told that others have claims upon us, that human beings have been created for the sake of others of 30. Cf. Orto, 337-38, esp. 338, n. 1; Georg Biichmann, Geflugelte Worte una Zitatenschatz, new cd. (Konstanz and Stuttgart, 1950), 216, citing Titus Andronicus 1.1.280 and its use as a motto by Frederick the Great.
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their kind, indeed, to benefit each other as much as possible; the paragraph concludes with the statement that we "ought" by various means to bind human society together. One might actually have expected this paragraph, or part of it, as the beginning of the discussion of beneficentia, which begins oddly, not with a definition or explanation of the importance of the subject, but with a list of cautioner (cf. ad § 42). Our paragraph, if oddly placed, is important in that it shows why Panaetius has subsumed tustitia and benefi centia under a single virtue: they are two sides of the same coin; abstaining from injustice to others and their property involves overcoming the desire for self-aggrandizement at all costs; one should develop instead the conviction that the human community has value and deserves to be promoted and maintained. For some of the problems inherent in this disjunctive conception of the second virtue cf., however, Annas, 1989, 168-69. . . . ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici. . .] (PI.] Ep. 9.358a (to Archytas): αλλά κάκάνο oei oe ένθυμ€ΐσθαι, δτι 'έκαστος ημών ούχ αυτώ μόνον yiyovzv, αλλά της yeveoeiog ημών το μέν τι ή πατρίς μ^ρί^ται, το δέ τι οι γεννήσαντε?, το δέ οί λοιποί φίλοι, πολλά δέ και τοις καιροί?δίδοται τοΐς τον βίον ημών καταλαμβάνουσι. Cf. Dem. 18.205: ήγεΐτο γάρ αυτών 'έκαστος ούχι τιΐι πατρ'ι και τη μητρι μόνον γβγενήσθαι, αλλά και τη πατρίδι; cf. the similar attitude Cicero attributes to his client at Clu. 43 (where, in view of the characterization of Sassia, the reference to parents is discreetly dropped):. . . pro eo quod se non suis commodis sed etiam suorum municipum ceterorumque necessariorum natum esse arbitrabatur . . . This quotation may originally have belonged to the introduction of the κοινωνική αφορμή at § 12, as at Fin. 2.45; avoidance of juxtaposition of Platonic citations would not alone, however, be sufficient explanation for its transference to this spot in view of §§ 2 8 , 6 3 - 6 4 , and 85.—Ortus = -γένζσις does indeed appear here u sensu dilatato" (Bohnenkamp, TLL 9.2,1069.66); Miiller (ad loc.) finds latent γίγνεσθαι not merely in the sense of being born but of existence. The connection with -que following a negation where other languages such as English or German would use an adversative is common; Muller counts some twenty instances in Off.—It is odd that Cicero omits parents (unless one assume that partem parentes has fallen out through saut du mime au meme before partem amici)^ especially in view of the emphasis on them in the ranking of claimants to officia at §§ 58 and 160. . . . atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terns gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari . . .] This is, of course, the thesis that Balbus puts forward at N.D. 2.154 ff.; cf. Chrysipp. 5VF2,332.38 = N.D. 2.37 and SVF 3,90.24 ff. = Fin. 3.67.
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. . . homines autem hominum causa esse generates, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent. . .] The point is argued in detail at 2.11-16; cf. also Sen. de Ira 1.5.2: homo in adiutorium mutuum genitus est. . . . . . in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi . . .] Though nature had been the source of the drives giving rise to the "parts" of the honestum at §§ 11-15, this is the first explicit allusion to the Stoic τέλος· formula; cf. $ 100 and ad 3.13; hoc, of course, is defined by the following infinitives. Cf. $ 129, 2.73; Leg. 1.20: . . . repetam stirpem iuris a natura, qua duce nobis omnis est disputatio explicanda. . . . communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, turn artibus, turn opera, turn facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem.) The prescription is, by exchange of officia, to add mutual advantages "to the common stock" (for this sense of in medium cf. OLD s.v. medium 4b) and thus strengthen the social bond (for a different interpretation of in medium cf. Nickel, 66); cf. the similar injunction at § 52: . . . semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem adferendum. That such be havior is "according to nature" has already been established at § 12. This precept has several corollaries: in general the principle hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse (3.25; non-Panaetian); in particular efforts expended in hominum commodis tuendis are approved (§ 153; nonPanaetian), whereas the pursuit of private interests at the expense of the commonality is deprecated (§ 62); cf. §5 11-12 and 3.21 ff. Long, 19951, 239, sees this argument as the basis for Hecato's view of property cited at 3.63. 23a Fides, mentioned already in the periphrasis of the second virtue at § 15, is a term of some importance in the Roman value system, although its coun terpart πίστις has less prominence among the Greeks prior to Epictetus. Heinze, 164 = 79-80, thus describes the role of fides in our treatise: "Wenn Cicero rein aus seinem romischen Bewufitsein de officiis geschrieben hatte, so ware der fides cin ragender Thronsitz zugefallen:31 aber er bindet sich zunachst an das griechische System undfindetso fur die Tugend derfides,die er doch nicht ubergehen kann, einen notdurftigen Unterschlupf im Kapitel uber die iustitia." The expected prominence of fides in a treatise de officiis has to do, of course, with officium in the sense of "favor" being the concrete expression of fides in social relations; cf. Sailer, 15. If, however, iustitia consists in not violating (a) the person or (b) the property of others, then the relevance of fides to both is apparent, so that its treatment under iustitia 31. Fraenkel, TLL 6, 675.74 ff., has collected some passages in which fides appears in enumerations of the virtues.
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seems natural rather than "notdiirftig"; the other references to fides in our Book, apart from its mention in connection with magistrates in § 124, fall within the section on justice (§§ 31,35,40; cf. also 2.26,3.87). On the other hand, πιστις- in the sense of the trust of one's fellow citizens (as opposed to "trustworthiness," as in our passage) was a factor dealt with by Panaetius under the utile (sc. 2.33-34; cf. 2.21); bona fides, on the other hand, a large factor in Roman litigation, receives attention at 3.58 ff. (devoted again to the topic of justice; cf. ad 3.96); cf. Heinze, 147, n. 1, and 164, n. 1. fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictomm conventorumque constanria et Veritas.] Cicero's encomium of fides as the fundamentum iustitiae appears to be an ad hoc invention; in any case, it does not prevent him (after Panaetius?) from calling something else (sc. utpro dignitate cuique tribuatur) the iustitiae fundamentum at § 42.—For the terms of the defini tion cf. Freyburger, 134-35. ex quo, quamquam hoc videbitur fonasse cuipiam durius, tamen audeamus imitari Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt unde verba sint ducta, credamusque, quia fiat quod dictum est, appellatam fidem.] Cicero pretends to offer this etymology of fides reluctantly and merely in imitation of Stoic practice; cf. fr. phil., p. 62, no. 1, where someone quotes an etymology ut . . . imitetur ineptias Stoicorum.31 Cicero has, however, been propounding this particular etymology, in public and private, since the 50s; cf. Rep. 4.7: fides enim nomen ipsum mihi videtur habere, cum fit quod dicitur; Fam. 16.10.2 (to Tiro; 18 April 53): nostra ad diem dicta(m) fient; docui enim te fides €τυμοι> quod haberet; for the later etymological tradition cf. R. Maltby, A Lexicon of Ancient Latin Etymologies (Leeds, 1991), s.v. fides. Moreover, the dissem bling of our passage should not obscure Cicero's own keen interest, often inspired by Varro, in finding etyma for both divine names and Latin words, an interest put on display especially in N.D. 2; cf. the material collected by Carolus Adolphus Benecke, De Cicerone etymologo (diss. Konigsberg, 1835). 23b Sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum qui infemnt, alteram eorum qui ab iis quibus infertur, si possum, non propulsant iniuriam.] Not only is retaliation for wrongdoing allowed (cf. § 20: nisi lacessitus iniuria)t but counteraction against iniuria is required; cf. further ad §§ 27-28. In the speech he attributed to the Corinthians at Sparta Thucydides laid stress on the responsibility of the party who overlooks injustice (1.69.1): ού γαρ ό δουλωσάμενο?, αλλ' ο δυι>άμ€ΐ>05 μέι> παΟσαι. περιορώι/ δέ αληθέστεροι' αυτό 32. On rhc Stoic interest in etymologies cf. A. Dyck, "John Mauropus of Euchaita and the Stoic Etymologikon," JOB 43 (1993), 116-17; Var. fr. 130, p. 238.13 Goctz-Schocll.
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6pg . . . Democr. 68 Β 256 D.-K. formulates more generally: δίκη μέν eoriv ep6eiv τά χρή €Οντα, άδικίη δέ μη Ιρδβιν τά χρή €Οντα, άλλα παρατρ€π€σθαι; sim. 261: άδικουμενοισι τιμωρεΐν κατά δυναμιν χρή και μή παριέναι· το μεν γάρ τοιούτον δίκαιον και αγαθόν, το δέ μή τοιούτον άδικον και κακόν (cf. J.F. Procope, "Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul," CQ 39 [1989J, 317-18); cf. Arist. EN 1113b8-10: ώοτ' ei το πράττίΐν καλόν δν €φ' ήμΐν εστί, και το μή πράττ€ΐν έφ' ήμΐν έσται αίσχρον όν . . . ; Plut. Tranq. An. 466a. Similarly Christian theologians treat "sins of omission" as a separate class; cf. Th. Deman, Dictionnaire de theohgie catholique 12.1 (Paris, 1933), 154 ff. nam qui iniuste impetum in quempiam facit aut ira aut aliqua perturbatione incitatus, is quasi manus adferre videtur s o c i o ; . . . ] The same is presumably the case for premeditated crimes, which are distinguished from crimes of passion only at § 27.—Anger is par excellence the passion that leads to violence; cf. Arist. EN 1130a31; Pol. 131 l a 3 3 - 3 4 ; Sen. de Ira 1.1.1: ceteris (sc. adfectis) enim aliquid quieti placidique inest, hie totus concitatus et in impetu est, doloris armorum, sanguinis suppliciorum minime humana furens cupiditate, dum alteri noceat sui neglegens, in ipsa inruens tela et ultionis secum ultorem tracturae avidus; ibid., 2.3.5: numquam dubium est quin timor fugam habeat, ira impetum. The general Stoic doctrine, which Panaetius probably explained under the first virtue (cf. ad $5 18-19), was that the φαντασίαι that present themselves to the mind give rise to drives (όρμαί) that require, in the human being, assent before they can be acted upon; through a weakness in the soul a ορμή may, however, pass beyond the control of reason and become one of the four passions (on which cf. ad $ 69); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 142; Sandbach, 6 0 - 6 1 ; Inwood, 1993, 164 ff. For the doctrine of the perturbationes animi in general cf. §$ 100-3a, on anger in particular ad §§ 88-89.—Miiller ad he. asserts that aut aliquis is common in the sense "oder uberhaupt" or "oder irgend ein anderer" and cites § 71 as parallel ( . . . aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa . . . [he also cites 3.30 by mistake)), where the parallelism to our passage depends upon graviore not being a true comparative with valetudinis imbecillitate as the point of reference. He is probably right in this interpretation; cf. also, with M. Winterbottom, Tusc. 3.29 [aut mortem acerbam aut exili maestam fugam I aut semper aliquam molem meditabar mali) with Kiihner's note ad he. adducing Tusc. 1.74 ( . . . a magistratu aut ah aliqua potestate legitima . . .).—Elsewhere in Off. Cicero generally refers to passion as perturbatio animi, rather than perturbatio alone as at Tusc. 3.24 et Λ/., perhaps to avoid ambiguity (§§ 27, 66 and 102); cf. § 1 3 6 where perturbationes appears without qualifier but is glossed in the context as motus animi nimios
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rationi non obtemperantes; similarly, in our context the preceding aut ira was surely felt as a sufficient limitation.—The "laying of hands on a sociusn is inferred from the societas hominum inter ipsos (§ 20; cf. ad loc.)y further delineated at $S 50 ff. and 3.21 ff. (non-Panaetian). qui autem non defendit nee obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tarn est in vitio quam si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserac] Parentes and patria are the principal claimaints on one's officia according to § 58 ($ 160 adds the gods at the top of the hierarchy); the amid, though mentioned in context, are not placed in the hierarchy; cf. ad §§ 5 0 - 5 8 . The doctrine is similar to 3.28 (nonPanaetian), where it is argued that there is no point within the chain of humanity at which one can sanction self-aggrandizement at another's ex pense without destroying the humani generis sodetas (see ad he). 24 Atque illae quidem iniuriae—in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia.] The analysis of the causes of iniuria seems truncated; the items named, fear and greed, the latter subdivided into greed for money and for power, correspond to three of Aristotle's seven causes of revolution, though others, such as καταφρόνηση, would also have been apposite (cf. Pol. 1302a34 ff.); cf. also Sen. Ep. 105.1: considera quae sint quae hominem in pernidem hominis instigent: invenies spent, invidiam, odium, metum, contemptum.—Metus reappears as a (rejected) means of propping one's rule over subjects at 2.23 ff.—Greed is also given as a motive for wrongdoing at EN 1130a31 (ει δ' tKfpoavev, έπ' οϋδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν αλλ' ή επ' άδικίαν [sc. γίνεται ή επαναφορά|); in Book 2 Cicero repeatedly warns the would-be statesman against it (§$ 64, 75, 77). 2 5 - 2 6 expetuntur autem divitiae—.] The rather odd organization of this material has caused difficulties. The statement expetuntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, turn ad perfruendas voluptates receives two different sequels: 1) the contrast to those in quibus maior est animus, who see money as a tool with which to achieve power; 2) delectant etiam magnifici apparatus . . . ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset, a further amplification of ad perfruendas voluptates. Furthermore, after the simple declaration that the innocent accumulation of property is unobjectionable, the point follows that imperiorum honorum gloriae cupiditas lures the majority {plerique) to ne glect justice, without any reference to the implications of the Crassus exemplum. Rcinhardt, 1885, 5-6^ wanted to transpose delectant etiam magnifici—ut infinita pecuniae cupiditas esset after ad perfruendas volup tates. But this transposition is difficult to explain as a mechanical defect in transmission and brings, at best, only marginal improvement, since the Crassus exemplum still cannot function as a transition from pursuers of the βίο? απολαυστικό"? to the μεγαλόψυχοι (since nee vero ret familiaris
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amplificatio—iniuria est intervenes), and the oddity of the lack of reference to Crassus in the sentence beginning maxime autem adducuntur plerique is increased if the allusion to him is moved still closer. The athetesis of the Crassus exemplum would also be ill advised, however. Cicero's preoccupation at this period with evaluating Crassus' career is clear from 3.73-75 and Parad. 4 5 - 4 6 ; 3 3 and the anecdote is unlikely to have been invented out of whole cloth by an interpolator in view of the oblique allusion to it at Parad. 4 5 - 4 6 (see ad § IS). Our passage is rather evidence of the mechanical way in which Cicero added examples in this work without mak ing the adjustments one would have expected. Heilmann, 103-4, complains that Cicero fails to provide an example here of how a striving for possessions leads to injustice. Perhaps he thought the point obvious. In any case, a number of such examples, both hypothetical and historical, appear at 3.49b ff. 25 cxpemntur autem divitiae cum ad usus vitae necessarios, turn ad perfniendas voluptates.] Although in Stoicism ηδονή bears a double sense (cf. ad 5 69), here the bodily sensation is clearly meant. in quibus autem maior est animus—cuius fmctibus excrcitum alere non posset.J Opes in this sentence probably refers specifically to political power, a usage that crept into Latin during the Ciceronian age; cf. Kuhlmann, TLL 9, 810.22 ff.; OLD s.v. ops 2.—Cf. Parad. AS: multi ex te audierunt cum diceres neminem esse divitem nisi qui exercitum alere posset suis fructibus, quod populus Romanus tantis vectigalibus iam pridem vix potest, ergo hoc proposito numquam eris dives ante quam tibi ex tuts possessionibus tantum reficietur ut eo tueri sex legiones et magna equitum ac peditum auxilia possis. iam fateris igitur non esse te divitem, cut tantum desit ut expleas id quod exoptas. This passage is part of a longer attack on Crassus a propos the paradox quod solus sapiens dives. RE. Adcock, Marcus Crassus, Millionaire (Cambridge, 1966), 22, connected the six legions of this passage with the legions which Crassus recruited during Spartacus' revolt; in view of Rome's heavy commitment on other fronts [viz., Spain, Asia Minor, and the Bal kans), it would hardly be surprising if he had been largely responsible for equipping and sustaining them as well, perhaps, as Adcock suggests, on the understanding that he would be reimbursed in future; on the whole episode cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 303.15 ff. Thus in setting the maintenance of an army as a prerequisite for a position as princeps in the state, Crassus would have been thinking of his own case (he was elected consul for 70, the year following the suppression of the revolt). D. Whitehead, "The Measure of a 33. Dated before Cato's death in mid-April 46 (2-3).
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Millionaire: What Crassus Really Said," LCM 11 (1986), 71-74, leaves open two possibilities: either (a) Crassus was speaking purely hypothetically or (b) in Parad. Cicero combined statements made by Crassus at different times—the complaint (presumably made at the time of Spartacus' revolt) of the difficulty of maintaining the six legions and a later dictum (cf. nuper in our passage) that has an undertone of boastfulness (presumably Crassus alone would qualify). Probably the two Ciceronian passages refer to a single statement of Crassus. What Crassus said originally was probably something to this effect: nullam satis magnam alicui pecuniam esse, cuius fructibus exercitum alere non possit, with Cicero supplying the person to suit his context in either case. Thus in Parad., where Cicero was concerned to define the term dives, the ability to support an army on the yield of one's property is made a prerequi site for being called dives; in our passage, on the other hand, the concern is with injustice in the use of property, a topic that soon causes Cicero to think of political examples, Crassus here and Caesar in the following paragraph. He is preparing in particular to excoriate the tatter's striving for principatus (§ 26:. . . propter eum quern sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum); hence in our passage Crassus* statement is made to apply to the would-be princeps. Note that the specification of six legions is part of Cicero's reply, not of Crassus' statement; it might simply be given as a figure for an averagesized army; there is no need to assume that Crassus' statement involved reference to the six legions he recruited to face Spartacus (he had charge, in addition, of two legions from the former consular army: App. BC 1.549). It is not prima facie clear on what basis Cicero elicits Crassus' "confes sion" of his inability to support such an army. Nuper is a word notoriously relative in application (cf. also 2.20 and 3.47a; ad 2.58); but if it is to be taken seriously at all, it makes it easier to set Crassus' dictum into the context of the operation against the Parthians than against Spartacus. The efforts of Pompey and Crassus to recruit Italian soldiers for the planned war in the east were met with determined resistance by the tribunes, who hauled the recruit ing officers before a popular tribunal; the consuls responded by putting on mourning clothes and ultimately by threatening the tribunes with force (cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 11927], 320.63 ff.). Crassus surely spoke the words quoted by Cicero during the time when his recruitment of troops was being thwarted; the statement that only a man who can support a private army on his income has enough money gave vent to his exasperation over political roadblocks; but the fact that he continued his recruitment effort in the nor mal way, rather than raising a private army, is evidently what Cicero uses as Crassus' implicit confession that he is not dives.
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Allen Mason Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (Co lumbia and London, 1977), 6 8 - 6 9 , argues that in evaluating Crassus* mo tives scholarship has not taken our passage seriously enough, the implication being that political ambition drove Crassus' accumulation of wealth. Note, however, Cicero's phrase et ad gratificandi facultatem. Also, if the above reconstruction is correct, Cicero has taken Crassus' remark out of context and used it for his own purposes as a sinister foreshadowing of Caesar's striving for principatus. Too much weight should perhaps therefore not be attached to these words, though they can be seen as a symptom of the breakdown, even at the highest levels, of respect for the rule of law (cf. also 3.73-75). Crassus' condemnation by Gelzer, he. cit., 330.42 ff., does nor, in light of Cicero's judgment in Off. and Parad.t seem too harsh, nee vero rci familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est. . .] Cf. A. Pers. 168: €στι γάρ πλούτο? γ ' άμ€μφής· . . .; Plut. de Gen. Soc. 584b (Theanor to Epaminondas): και τίς αν . . . λόγος άπίίργοι την CK καλών και δικαίων κτήσιν (sc. τοΟ πλούτου) . . . ; $ 92 (. . . quaeprimum beneparta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso . . .) and ad §§ 2 1 - 2 2 and 2.73. 26 Maxime autem adducuntur plerique ut eos iustitiae capiat oblivio cum in imperiomm honorum gloriae cupiditatem inaderunt.] This sentence does not contradict the statement made shortly before (§ 24), maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam adgrediuntur ut adipiscantur ea quae concupiverunt, since cupiditas for power and the like is a subset of cupiditas in general; hence we need not excuse the two sentences on grounds of hasty composition (as does Thomas, 21). quod enim est apud Enniura 'nulla sancta societas / nee fides rcgni est', id lathis patet.] Cicero presents remains of two Ennian trochaic septenarii (seen. inc. 404 = trag. 381 = 320 Jocelyn; cf. also Otto, 296; Ribbeck conjecturally assigned them to the Thyestes; cf. ad 3.104 34 ). There were certainly Greek verses of similar purport that Panaetius could have cited, such as Eur. Pho. 5 2 4 - 2 5 (of which Cicero supplied his own version at 3.82). In the following sentence Winterbottom rightly prints sanctam societatem, as an Ennian allusion, in inverted commas. On problems of the same citation (with regni transposed after nulla) as transmitted at Rep. 1.49, cf. Skutsch, 30.—In this passage fides has, of course, the sense "good faith, honesty, honor" {OLD s.v., 6); regni is probably best taken as "genitive of the sphere" (cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 74 ff. ["Genitiv des Sachbetreffs"!; OLD s.v. societas l b , citing our passage; Wegner, 31). Cf. the paraphrase at Luc. 1.92-93: nulla 34. Cf. also Sen. Thy. 424-25 (Thyestes is rhe speaker): rebus irtcerttssimis, I fratrt atque regno, credis . . . f
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fides regni sociis, omnisque potestas I impatiens consortis erit; cf. the similar description of the tyrant's life at Amic. 52: haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benivolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. declaravit id modo temeritas C. Caesaris, qui omnia iura divina et humana perverrJt propter eum quern sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum.] This is the first of the thrusts at Caesar, initially mentioned όνομαστί (here and at § 43); in the later, more emotional attacks the name is omirted (cf. 2.23 ff., 3.36, and ad 3.82-83). Under iura divina Cicero was surely thinking of the decision to honor Caesar with a statue in the temple of Quirinus with the legend "to the unconquered god** (cf. Att. 12.45.2, 17 May 45: eum owvaov Quirino malo quam Saluti), perhaps also of the pulvinar, the flamen, and the adding of a day to the Ludi Romani in his honor, all of which he discusses at Phil. 2.110 (where see Denniston's notes). Cicero himself was among those who proposed honors for Caesar in the aftermath of the civil war, but honors on a human scale, which were soon outbidden by others (cf. Plut. Caes. 57.2); Cicero's references to superhuman honors have been col lected by W. Leschhorn in an appendix to A. Alfoldi, Caesar in 44, 1, Antiquitas 3.16 (Bonn, 1985), 387 ff. Under iura humana Cicero has in mind above all Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in defiance of the senate; cf. Hermann Strasburger, Caesar im Urteil seiner Zeitgenossen, 2d ed. (Darmstadt, 1968), 31 ff., on Caesar's (weak) legal case. On Caesar's ambi tion for principatus under the old form of the Roman state, ibid., 5 2 - 5 3 ; cf. also ad § 124.—Fingere sibi appears in the sense "conjure up in the mind, visualize**: cf. Vollmer, TLL 6.1,775.67; OLD s.v., 8a. The note of condem nation in opinionis errore is striking in light of § 18: labi. . . errare, nescire, decipi et malum et turpe ducimus. Here as elsewhere in this essay Cicero presents his (by no means uncontroversial) political judgment as fact; cf. ad 2.43. est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendidissimisque ingeniis plerumque exsistunt honoris imperii potentiae gloriae cupiditates.] Cf. further ad § 65. 27 Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogjtata fiat iniuria.J PI. Lg. 866e ff. accords lighter penalties to those who kill in anger and without premeditation, though he still regards such acts as voluntary. Similarly, Aristotle observed: οργιζόμεθα . . . και φοβούμ€θα άπροαιρέτω? (ΕΝ 1106a2-3), but he nonetheless regarded action on the basis of the passions as voluntary (ibid., l l l l b l - 3 ) ; for a general sketch of Aristotle's doctrine of the will and passions cf. Anthony Kenny, Aristotle s Theory of the
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Will (London, 1979), esp. 3 5 - 3 7 . In spite of Panaetius' general emphasis on the importance of acting only after proper deliberation (viz., so that the reason will check, rather than assent to, any improper φαι/τασία; cf. §§ 49a, 82, and ad §$ 11 and 23b above), the position taken in our passage does not correspond to any Stoic distinction (in either case one would be yielding to πάθος) but is in line rather with the kind of argumentation that Cicero might have used before the bar (cf. Top. 64: cadunt etiam in ignorationem atque imprudentiam perturbationes attimi; quae quamquam sunt voluntariae— obiurgatione enim et admonitione deiciuntur—tamen habent tantos motust ut ea quae voluntaria sunt aut necessana interdum aut certe ignorata videantur). Only later, however, did it become a principle of Roman jurisprudence; see Marcianus, Dig. 48.8.1.3: divus Hadrianus rescripsit eum, qui hominem occidit, si non occidendi animo hoc admisit, absolvi posse, et qui hominem non occidit, sed vulneravit, ut occidat, pro homicida damnandum; et ex re constituendum hoc: nam si gladium strinxerit et [in] eo percusserit, indubitate occidendi animo id eum admisisse; sed si clavi percusserit aut cuccuma in rixa, quamvis ferro percusserit, tamen non occidendi animo. leniendam poenam eius, qui in rixa casu magis quam voluntate homicidium admisit; similarly Antoninus Pius allowed a mitigated penalty for a man who killed his wife discovered in adultery (ibid., 5). Similar, too, is the scholastic distinc tion between the incontinens, who sins from passion, and the intemperatus, who sins from disposition (Thorn. 5. Th. II.2 q. 156 a. 3).—In characterizing passion (perturbatio animi) as of brief duration Cicero is evidently thinking, as at § 23b, above all of anger, sometimes called a brevis insania (cf. Sen. de ha 1.1.2). 2 8 - 2 9 Cicero lists various factors that might cause one to desert appropriate action and not resist wrongdoing (sc. to a third party). The two groups are respectively those who 1) inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt and who 2a) aut. . . neglegentia pigritia inertia 2b) aut suis studiis quibusdam occupationibusve . . . impediuntur . . . Now 1) and 2a) really amount to the same thing. What interests Cicero is 2b), which he further divides into those who put forward as a hindrance either (i) their studies or (ii) their other occupations; the balance of the discussion of the problem will be devoted to these two types. Cicero's handling of (i) forestalls his com parison of the first and second virtues at §$ 152 ff. 28 nam aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt—desertos esse patiantur.] The excuses are of several types: either one is unwilling to undertake the action because of certain entailed disincentives {aut inimicitias aut laborem aut sumptus suscipere nolunt) or one lacks motivation [ne glegentia pigritia inertia) or one prefers to engage in other activities instead
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(suis studiis quibusdam occuptionibusve. . . impediuntur . . .). As he wrote these lines was Cicero perhaps thinking of those who failed him at the time of his exile? itaque videndum est—propterea iustos esse.] Panaetius was an avid admirer of Plato (ισχυρώς φιλοττλάτων: fr. 57); even considering the dialogues from a philological point of view, he commented on how many times Plato reformu lated the beginning of the Republic (fr. 130) and entertained doubts about the authenticity of the Phaedo (frr. 126-29); cf. in general E. des Places, u Le platonisme de Panetius," Melanges d' archeologie et d'histoire 68 (1956), 8 3 - 9 3 . The passage Panaetius had in mind is evidently the satire of philoso phers at Tht. 173d ff. (note the phrase in philosophos; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 28, n. 4), in particular 1 7 3 e : . . . τω όντι τό σώμα μόνον ev τη πόλ€ΐ κ€ΐται αυτοϋ και έττιδημβΐ, ή δέ διάνοια, ταΰτα πάντα ήγησαμένη σμικρά και ουδέν, άτιμάσασα πανταχή ττετ€ται κατά Πίνδαρον (fr. 292) "τά? τ€ -γάς inrevepOe" και τά βττίπβδα γ€ωμ€τροΰσα. "ουρανού θ' imcp"· άστρονομούσα, καΐ πάσαν πάντη φύσιν έρ€υνωμένη τών όντων έκαστου όλου, εις τών έγγϋς ουδέν αυτήν συγκαθΐ€Ϊσα. The claim to justice {propterea iustos esse) is inferred, rather than explicit. Cicero reverts to the topic at SS 69b ff.—Not attested before Cicero, digladior is a verb he likes to apply, as here, to philosophical con troversies; cf. Ac. 1 fr. (p. 20.10 Plasberg): quid autem stomachatur Mnesarchus, quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibusf or Tusc. 4.47: Peripateticis respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur Hit per me li cet . . . ; Gudeman, TLL 1.7, 1131.50 ff. nam altcrum (iustitiae genus) adsequuntur, in inferenda ne cui noceant inju ria, in alteram incidunt; discendi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent deserunt.] Pearce's athetesis of iustitiae genus, evidently inserted by a careless reader who thought to clarify the meaning (in contradistinction to the genera iniustitiae of § 29), is all that is needed to put this passage right (so Pohlenz, AFt 29; Atzert 3 ; Thomas, 81-84; Fedeli [apart from positing a lacuna before in alterum; see belowj; Testard and Winterbottom retain the transmitted text 3S ), not the extreme solution of bracketing the entire sentence, as Unger, 20, followed by Bruser, 49, and Atzert 4 (in the text, though his apparatus carelessly retains the third edition's approval of Pearce's solution). The nam alterum—deserunt is needed as an explanation of the assertion that what Plato says against the philosophers is insufficient (sc. because it fails to make
35. Winterbottom adds in the critical apparatus that the text can stand if in alterum incidunt can bear the same sense as offendunt; he seems to be reckoning, in other words, with Ciceronian carelessness of expression, a phenomenon that can never be altogether ruled out in this essay.
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clear the injustice of their position). For the form of the thought cf. de Orat. 2.101: ita dum inertiae vituperationem, quae maior est, contemnunt, adsequuntur etiam Mam, quant magis ipsi fugiunt, tarditatis. Note that a prover bial saying (quoted by Panaetius?) underlies this: cf. com. adesp. fr. 424: ποταμόι> δέ φ€υγων αγνοείς / εις τήι> θάλατταν έμπεσών; Cic. fn orat., Pro Cornelio I, no. 4: eiusmodi mihi duos bqueos in causa esse propositos, ut, si me altero expedissem, tenerer altera.—The asyndeton before in alterum incidunt is [pace Fedeli) not such as to demand a lacuna; for the type ("asyn deton adversativum") cf. Hofmann-Szanryr, 830; von Albrecht, 129 = Eng. tr. 104. itaque eos ne ad rempublicam quidem accessuros putat nisi coactos.] The idea of public service under compulsion first occurs at Pi. R. 347c 1: δ€Ϊ δη αύτοΐς ανάγκην προσβΐναι και ίημίαν, ei μβλλουσιν εθέλβιν άρχβιν . . . , where the reference is to the good in general, not just philosophers. It is applied to philosophers and contrasted with the ordinary struggle for power, ibid., 520a6 ff. and c6 ff.: σκβψαι τοίνυν, εΐπον, ώ Γλαυκών, ότι ούδ' άδικήσομ€ν τους παρ' ήμΐν φιλοσόφους γιγνομίνους, άλλα δίκαια προς αυτούς έροϋμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες των άλλων έπιμελεΐσθαί Τ€ και φυλάττ€ΐν. . . . και ούτω ϋπαρ ήμΐν και ύμΐν ή πόλις οίκήσίται αλλ' ουκ όναρ, ως νυν α'ι πολλαΐ ύπό σκιαμαχουντων Tt προς αλλήλους και στασια£όντων π€ρι του άρχαν οικούνται, ώς μεγάλου τινός αγαθού όντος. For the usual Stoic view of public service cf. ad § 71, where Cicero offers the learned a reprieve, albeit grudgingly. Cf. also Fam. 9.6.5 (quoted ad 2.3-5).—In view of the fact that Cicero/Panaetius is reproducing, not a continuous argument, but observa tions culled from several Platonic works, Winterbottom's idemque for itaque is attractive (but for the loose use of inferential particles cf. ad § 13). aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri; nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est quod rccte fit, si est voluntarium.] The goal is still to refute their claim to justice [aequius . . . erat); cf. Arist. EN 1106a2-4: . . . όργιζόμ^θα μέν και φοβούμ€θα άπροαιρίτως, αϊ δ' άθ€τα! προαιρέσεις τινές ή ουκ άνευ προαιρέσεως; cf. ad § 27. For the point that just action is so only when practiced for its own sake cf. ad 2.42. 29 The two types of άπράγμονες discussed in this paragraph have even less excuse to withdraw from public affairs than the philosophers. Those who put forward the need to attend to their own property correspond to the piscinarii whom Cicero excoriates in his letters (cf. ad 3.73). The mis anthrope figures as a butt of satire in Menander's Dyskolos, Plautus' Aulularia, Lucian's Timon, etc.; on Timon cf. also Amic. 87. 3 0 - 4 1 Cicero begins by reviewing the immediately preceding topics, viz., the two types of injustice and their causes (§§ 23b-29), as well as the constitu-
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ents of justice itself (§§ 20-23a). The general factor that might hinder clear judgment is dealt with first, self-love {$ 30), and a rule of thumb is offered to counteract it, viz., to abstain from action in doubtful cases. Other circum stances might, however, tempt one to commit injustice. The focus now shifts to the possibility of a change of appropriate action being entailed by special circumstances (officia κατά π€ρίστασιΐ'); cf. White, 111-15. We are told that there are circumstances in which one need not keep one's word; one must calculate whether fulfilling the promise may do more harm than good to the recipient or may prevent one from discharging a still more important obliga tion (§ 32). Hence to insist on the letter of an agreement in spite of changed circumstances is a form of injustice. Again, promises need not be kept that have been extracted by deceit or force ($$ 33 ff.). This last point raises the question whether promises made to the enemy in wartime are to be regarded as extracted by force or need to be honored; the result is a general discussion of bellica officia (the phrase occurs in 5 41). Finally, being of higher status (i.e., free, rather than a slave) may tempt one to injustice; hence the relations of masters and slaves demand clarification ($ 41a). That this material still falls within the larger discussion of injustice begun in § 23b is shown by the conclusion: the worst kind of injustice is that which clothes itself in the appearance of justice (§ 41b). Characteristic of this section is, apart from Theseus and Hippolytus (§ 32) and Cleomedes (unnamed in § 33), the exclusive use of Roman examples—a sign that Cicero is closely involved in the argument. Johann, 107 and 504, n. 32, has argued that in §§ 3 1 - 4 0 the underlying philosophical doctrine derives from Posidonius, who is known to have writ ten on officia κατά περίστασιν (Att. 16.11.4 = fr. 41a E.-K. = 431a Th.). Though this is not impossible, it is far from certain, and various consider ations tell against it. Thus, Cicero's own announcement τά π€pi τοϋ καθήκον τος, quatcnus Panaetius, absolvi duobus in the same letter in which he reports having sent for Posidonius1 "book" and the κεφάλαια περί του κατά ττ€ρίστασιι> καθήκοντος suggests that at this writing he regarded the first two books as complete (ibid.). Nor is there any need to assume that Cicero revised Book 1 extensively in light of material received later, since Panaetius, too, given his interest in problems and praecepta connected with ordinary life, would probably have dealt with the topic; what can be inferred from internal evidence about Cicero's compositional practice in adding material to this essay does not suggest large-scale insertions to the draft (cf. ad 2.19b20a and 3.96). The overlapping of material, viz., the exemplum of Theseus and Hippolytus, which appears both at $ 32 and 3.94, as well as those of Regulus, Fabricius, and the ten Romans captured after Cannae (cf. §§ 3 9 - 4 0
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and 3.86 and 99-115) should be explained by Cicero's extensive reuse in Book 3 of material from Book 1, with use of Posidonius in Book 3, in any case, unlikely to go beyond thefirstthirty-seven chapters (see introduction to Book 3). Finally, the philosophical doctrines underlying $§ 34 ff. are fully compatible with Panaetius' views (see following notes); hence I have as sumed that Panaetius still continues to be the source, although his doctrines are here interpenetrated with Roman attitudes toward imperialism. 30 . . . facile quod cuiusque temporis officium sit poterirnus, nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus, iudicare.] In fact, however, it is not so simple; for the generally applicable rules may be altered by changed circumstances; hence in S§ 31 ff. an additional set of guidelines is provided. For a similar instance of Cicero's impatience to get to the end being at odds with the subtlety of the argument cf. on the end of § 99.—Tempus is equivalent to ττβρίστασις in the sense "circumstance**; cf. Att. 16.11.4.—On the problem of φιλαυτία cf. ad 3.31. est enim difficilis cura rerum a lien am m. J The implicit assumption is that justice is someone else's good (άλλότριον αγαθοί': Arist. EN 1130a3).—The connection with enim has caused difficulties; though it is omitted by b, it should be retained as connecting with nisi nosmet ipsos valde amabimus; in the following clause one would expect nam before quamquam to clarify the relation of ideas (cf. Muller ad he). . . . Terentianus ille Chremes 'humani nihil a se alienum putat';.. .] It has been debated whether this corresponds to a quotation of Menander in Cicero's source.36 In fact, Hau. 77 (also quoted at Leg. 1.33) is not adduced in favor of a main point in the argument but provides a possible counterindication; therefore neither a Panaetian citation nor a Ciceronian insertion can be excluded. On the meaning of the tag in its original context cf. Jocelyn, 29 ff.—Other poetic citations in the Panaetian part of Off. occur at $$ 48, 51b-52 and 65. If they correspond to Panaetian citations in the original, the Rhodian may have been influenced by Chrysippus, who was not sparing in the citation of poets, especially to exemplify the nature of the soul; cf. SVF 2, nos. 906 and 908; De Lacy, 1948, 264; Christopher Gill, "Did Chrysippus Understand Medea?" Phronesis 28 (1983), 136-49. 36. F.-A. Steinmetz, 149 ff., suggested that each time Cicero quotes Terence in this treatise (cf.
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sed tamen, quia magis ea percipimus atque sentimus quae nobis ipsis aut prospera aut adversa eveniunt quam ilia quae ceteris, quae quasi longo intervallo interiecto videmus . . .] Cf. § 90 and ad 3.30. quocirca bene praccipiunt qui vetant quicquam agere quod dubites acquum sit an iniquum.] This precept derives, not from the Greek philosophical schools, but from Roman street-wisdom; cf. Plin. Ep. 1.18.5: . . . si tutius putas Mud cautissimi cuiusque praeceptum 'Quod dubites, ne feceris'; 3.18 and 37.—Aequum appears as a synonym of iustum as early as Plautus; cf. Am. 16: aequi et iusti hie eritis omnes arbitri; on the other hand, aequitas in the sense of iustitia (as in the next sentence; cf. also § § 3 6 and 62; 2.18, 7 1 , and 78) is unattested before Cicero; cf. Hey, TLL 1, 1034.41 ff.; Ausfeld, ibid., 1014.27 ff.; OLD s.v. aequitas 4. 31 Sed incidunt saepe tempora cum ea quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine eoque quern virum bonum dicimus commutantur fiuntque contraria, ut reddere depositum (etiamne furioso?}, facere promissum, quaeque pertinent ad veritatem et ad fidem . . .] Presumably the author of the transmitted text had in mind, as specified at 3.95, the deposit of a sword or the like with which the madman could do himself mischief, a standard exam ple of the alteration of appropriate actions κατά ττ€ρίστασιν (see ad 3.95). The words etiamne furioso? were evidently already read in this place by St. Ambrose {officium est igitur depositum senate ac reddere. sed interdum commutatio fit aut tempore aut necessitate ut non sit officium reddere quod acceperis:. . . si insanienti gladium depositum non neges quo se Hie interimat, nonne solvisse contra officium est? [off. 1.254J). However, against the authenticity of the phrase is the way it is introduced as a parenthetical rhetorical question 37 and its lack of precision, the text failing to clarify why returning a deposit to a madman is a problem. Hence a consensus has developed for Langius' deletion of the suspect phrase: Atzert, Fedeli, and Winterbottom bracket it; this is one of the few atheteses accepted by 37. The problem is not well formulated by Thomas, 108-9, who adduces Div. 1.12 as a parallel, and notes that in that passage rherc are two corresponding elements, and each has a parenthetical clause inserted after it. He then concludes that in our passage each member of what he calls a tricolon would have to be followed by a parenthetical insertion. In the first place, the material in question (reddere depositum . . . facere promissum quaeque pertinent ad ver itatem et ad fidem) is not a tricolon; what we have are two infinitives, the first with a single, the second with a double object—already an incomplete parallelism. But even if it were a tricolon, Thomas' argument would nor prove what he thinks it docs. Elsewhere Thomas makes effective use of Ciceronian parallels to support suspect constructions; in such cases one cogent parallel can indeed turn the tide. But one dissimilar passage docs not constitute a case for athetosis.
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Thomas, 109. Even Testard thinks the transmitted text untenable, though his own solution, etiamnunc furioso, is unlikely to find followers. Now the following example of Neptune keeping his promise to Theseus illustrates the case of promises and "things which relate to truth and to keeping faith" (Atkins' rendering), but fails to clarify how it can sometimes not be an appropriate action to return a deposit. In view of the abrupt, elliptical character of this text and its Ambrosian attestation, Rudberg, 16, regards it as an old addition and leaves open the question whether it was entered in the margin by Cicero as a note to himself about a topic to be added or as a query by some ancient reader familiar with the school-example. In support of Rudberg's second alternative, I suspect that Cicero thought of the acceptance of a deposit as a species of promise and therefore not necessarily in need of separate illustration. 38 . . . deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur.j On the oddity of this as a para phrase of the second appropriate action under justice cf. ad $ 20; on the other hand, at S 153 the entire actio rerum is said to manifest itself in bominwn commodis tuendis. {ea cum tempore commutantur, commutatur officium et non semper est idem.}] These words were rightly athetized by Bruser, 83, who was followed by Atzert4 and Fedeli. We are told ea quae maxime videntur digna esse iusto homine . . . ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum, but next that the criterion remains the fundamenta iustitiae, primum ut ne cut noceatur etc. Then follows our sentence. Inevitably a reader would take ea of our sentence to refer to the fundamenta iustitiae of the preceding one, which, amid the flux, were to have been the fixed point. This is, of course, nonsense; the fundamenta iustitiae cannot be said to change. Thomas, 6 4 - 6 6 , thought to vindicate the suspect sentence for Cicero with the argument that ea refers back, not to the fundamenta iustitiae, but to the precepts ut ne cut noceatur, deinde ut communi utilitati serviatur. It seems very doubtful that a Roman would have read the sentence this way; but it makes no difference whether the grammatical reference is to the fundamenta iustitiae or to their constitu ents; if cither changes according to circumstance, Cicero and his reader are left within a shifting environment without a fixed standard of reference. Note also the asyndeton of the suspect sentence, as well as the following connec tion with enim: potest enim accidere promissum . . . serves to clarify how keeping a promise can violate the principle ut ne cui noceatur; in that case it would connect, not with the suspect sentence, but the one preceding. Perhaps 38. Atzert's suggestion that both Ambrose and an interpolator independently added the idea nf returning a deposit to a madman multiplies entities beyond necessity.
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our lemma began as a marginal note to clarify ea migrare interdum et non servare fit iustum (in both ea has the same point of reference) or was inserted by a reader who missed the subtle connection of the enim clause with the precept ut ne cut noceatur and was, in later copying, inserted into the text. 32 This passage is, even by standards of Off., poorly constructed. Thus the sentence (a) potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum ut id effici sit inutile vel ei cut promissum sit vel ei qui promiserit (S 32) is partially repeated and partially corrected in the sequel (b): nee promissa igitur ser vanda sunt ea quae sint its quibus promisens inutilia, nee, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint cut promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori . . . Also, both (a) and (b) contain mention of both cases, sc. (1) inexpediency for the person making the promise and (2) for the person to whom the promise is made, although (a) is followed by an illustration of (2) alone and (b) by an illustration of (1) alone. 39 potest enim accidere promissum aliquod et conventum ut id effici sit inutile vel ei cui promissum sit (vel ei qui promiserit).] Keeping a promise is presum ably always inexpedient for the person who made the promise, but that fact does not entail the right to opt out. Hence I have adopted Shackleton Bailey's deletion of vel ei qui promiserit (the remaining vel to be taken as = "even").—The consecutive clause follows upon promissum, not accidere, the relative adjective tale being, as often, suppressed; cf. § 159: . . . non potest accidere [sc. tale] tempus, ut intersit ret publicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem-, Kuhner-Stegmann, 2,248-49.—Gellius (1.13) arrived at a different solution to this problem on the basis of the example of P. Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131), who, during a siege, punished a soldier who used his own judgment in fetching the smaller of two fruit trees, as more suitable for a battering-ram and easier to transport, rather than, as ordered, the larger, nam si, ut in fabulis est, Neptunus quod Theseo promiserat non fecisset, Theseus Hippolyto film non esset orbatus. ex tribus enim optatis, ut scribitur, hoc erat tertium quod de Hippolyti intcritu iratus optavit; quo impetrato in maximos luctus incidit.] According to the extant Euripidean Hippolytus, however, this was the first, not the third, of the wishes: αλλ* ώ πάτερ Πόσα δον. άςέμοί πυτ€ /αράς* ύπεσχου τρεΐς. μις κατεργασαι /τούτων €μόν παΐδ', ήμβραν δε μη φύγοι / τήι>δ\ einep ήμιν ώπασας σαφείς αράς (νν. 887-90). However, scholium NAB ad Hipp. 887, like Cicero, evidently knows a version in which the death of Hippolytus was Theseus* third wish: αλλ' ώ πάτ€ρ, μιςΙ τούτων των κατάρων κατέργασαι τον €μον παΐδα. ποίων oe; άς αράς έμοι ύπεσχοιτ το άνελθεΐν έξ Αϊδου, το ύποστρεψαι από τοΟ λαβυ39. I owe this observation to David L. Blank.
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piνθου, το πεμφθήναι τώ υίώ αΰτοϋ θάνατον; Sen. Ph. 949, too, follows such a version. As Barrett explains ad Hipp. 887-89 (see also pp. 3 9 - 4 0 of his introduction), the version known to Cicero and the scholiast is likely to be original (the possibility of reversal being thereby eliminated). Euripides al tered this point, however, so that Theseus, uncertain of the efficacy of the curse, would behave in the following debate with his son as though exile, which he could enforce, was the one penalty in question.—In writing ut in fabulis est was Cicero/Panaetius thinking of the treatment of the subject in Euripides' Ιππόλυτο? καλυπτόμενος (frr. 428 ff. Nauck 2 ) and extant Hippo lytus, as well as Sophocles' Phaedra (frr. 677 ff. Radt)? In any case, no corresponding Latin play is known prior to Seneca's Phaedra; Juvenal (1.2) alludes to a Theseis, a tragedy by one Cordus (cf. sch. ad /oc), surely a near contemporary of the satirist (whether it dealt with the curse on Hippolytus is unknown). One wonders which Greek version made the curse on his son the last of Theseus' three wishes.—This example treats Neptune implicitly as if he were any other individual who had granted a promise the fulfillment of which is presumed to hurt the person to whom the promise has been made. However, Neptune is not a human being, but a god, and his divine status alters the case; for the question arises whether it is not his office to punish Theseus for his gullibility, irascibility, and rashness in some other way than by the death of the innocent Hippolytus. The example thus raises questions about divine providence 40 that the text does not address. . . . nee, si plus tibi ea noceant quam illi prosint cui promiseris, contra officium est maius anteponi minori:...] Since the fulfillment of a promise is presumably never in the interest of the person who has made the promise, further clarification should have been added. Presumably what Panaetius advocated was a careful prioritization of claimants and of actions; for the former guidelines are offered at §§ 50 ff.; prioritizing actions would also involve calculation of the proper place and time for each action 41 (cf. §§ 142 ff., where ευταξία and ευκαιρία are discussed from the standpoint of το πρέπον, though they have bearing on just actions as well; cf. § 59). In the case of several actions that have deadlines (as in the example given of an appear ance at court), performing one appropriate action may preclude another. . . . ut, si constitueris cuipiam te advocatum in rem praesentem esse venturum atque interim graviter aegrotare filius coeperit, non sit contra officium non facere quod dixeris . . .] This exemplum of a father's solicitude for his 40. Panaetius wrote an essay on the subject, of which, sadly, only the title is known (fr. 33). 41. Cicero/Panaetius wants the reader to become a bonus ratiocmator officiorum |cf. $59).
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son's welfare is, of course, in line with a general tendency of Off. to highlight and solidify father/son relations;42 it is also, however, in line with the hier archy of appropriate actions established at § 58, where, after patria et parentes, liberi totaque domus occupy second place. iam illis proraissis standum non esse quis non videt quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo promiserit? quae quidem pleraque iure praetorio liberantur, nonnulla legibus.] Legal remedy against contracts concluded as a result of the use or threat of force was provided by the formula of Cn. Octavius, praetor in 79; cf. Bruce W. Frier, "Urban Praetors and Rural Violence: The Legal Background of Cicero's pro Caecina," TAPhA 113 (1983), 222, n. 3, and 232; Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,212 ff.; for praetorian remedies against dolus malus cf. ad 3.58-60; for an example of legislation against fraud cf. ad 3.61 {lex Laetoria).—At 3.103 it is objected to Regulus' return to Carthage that this act ratified an agreement extracted by force {quod per vim hostium esset actum). In the sequel, however, Cicero insists that agreements made with a legitimate enemy are not to be violated and adapts the precept of the older Stoa that the sage alone is free {Parad. no. 5) to argue that force cannot be brought to bear on a brave man (3.107-10). 33 For the exempla cf. Everett L. Wheeler, "Sophistic Interpretations and Greek Treaties," GRBS 25 (1984), 269-70. For their order (first Greek, then Roman) cf. ad 2.26. Exsistunt etiam saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et (nimis) callida sed ma litiosa iuris interpretatione.] The words nimis callida sed malitiosa have caused difficulty, since the contrast (cf. sed) is lacking:43 an interpretation of law that is too clever {nimis callida) is already negatively characterized, whereas we expect a positive attribute to contrast with malitiosa. The adjec tive callidus can, however, be positive in itself, as Thomas, 106, n. 4, remarks, citing N.D. 3.25; therefore the required contrast can be restored merely by deleting nimis (a possibility raised by Muller ad /oc), which could have been added with intent of clarification by a reader concerned to make callida . . . interpretatione parallel with calumnia rather than to preserve the contrast between callida and malitiosa.—Cf. S.E. M. 2.38, who attributes a tenden tious interpretation of laws to the pnropes. ex quo illud 'summum ius summa injuria* factum est iam tritum sermone proverbium.] The first reference to this proverb occurs at Ter. Hau.; the words are spoken by Syrus to his master Chremcs as part of an intrigue to 42. Cf. introduction, $ 4. 43. Fcdcli, 1964', 60, argues that sed need not imply a contrast and cites in support Kiihner-Stegmann, 1,76-77; but note that they are speaking of sed at the beginning of a clause, not, as our case, when individual words are divided by sed.
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enable Chremes' son Clitopho to pay 1,000 drachmas to the courtesan Bacchis, whom he loves; the pretext is a loan for which Chremes' recently identified daughter is supposed to have been given in surety. Syrus anticipates possible objections as follows: neque tu scilicet I illuc confugies: 'quid meaf num mihi datumstf I num tussi? num ilia oppignerare filiam I meant me invito potuitf verum illuc, Chreme. I dicunt: 'ius summum saepe summast malitia' (792-96). The phrase verum illuc . . . dicunt shows that Syrus al ludes to an already well-known proverb (cf. Cicero's iam tritum sermone proverbium); the thought is paralleled at Men. fr. 545 K.-Th.: καλοί' οι νόμοι σφόδρ' €Ϊσίν ό δ' όρων τους νόμους / λίαν ακριβώς συκοφάντης φαίνεται; cf. Otto, 179; Swoboda, 110. The Ciceronian testimonies are collected and discussed by H. Komhardt, "Summum ius," Hermes 81 (1953), 7 7 - 8 5 . Surely, however, summum ius summa iniuria has a reciprocal sense, i.e., what for party A is summum ius, viz. A's right pushed to the maximum (cf. OLD s.v. summus 9, esp. 9c), is an iniuria for the other party (B) or indeed, for the sake of symmetry, summa iniuria. The consequence would be that ius in this phrase has the sense "rights over others (conferred by the law)" (cf. OLD s.v. ius1 13), so that the proverb was hardly, as Komhardt, 83, after Stroux, 1927,49, thought, u eine Art von Scheltwort fur das alte ius civile"-,44 hence, too, the original, positive sense that Komhardt posited for the phrase sum mum ius (79) seems implausible. I agree, however, with Komhardt, 8 1 , that iniuria is likely to have been the original formulation, malitia a poetic variatio.—For the ellipsis of esse in such sententiae cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1, 10-11.—For Cicero's position on summum ius vs. aequitas cf. 2.71, ad 3.61, and A. Zamboni, UH aequitas in Cicerone," Archivio Giuridico 157 (1966), 167-203, esp. 183 ff. For the famous causa Curiana see ad 3.67. . . . ut ille qui, cum trigima dierum ess en t cum hoste indutiae factac, noctu populabatur agros, quod dierum essent pactae, non noctium indutiae.] Panaetius will surely have mentioned by name the Spartan king Cleomenes 111, whose tactic resulting in the capture of Argos occurred during the Nemean festival of July, 225: cf. Lenschau, RE 11.1 (1921) 705.12 ff. Cicero presum ably suppressed the name as being without interest for his Roman readers. Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 223a-b: άνοχάς be έφθημβρους προς Άργβίους ποιησάμενος (sc. ύ Κλεομένης), φυλάξας αυτούς, τη τρίτη νυκτι κοιμωμ€νοις διά το ττεποιθεναι ταϊς σπονδαϊς €ΐΤ€θ€το· και τους μέν άπ€ΚΤ€ΐν€, τους δέ 44. Stroux, 1927, argued that the summum ius was essentially the traditional approach of the Roman jurists, aequitas a concept introduced along with Greek rhetoric. Although there were rhetorical influences on legal interpretation, Stroux's scheme is oversimple, as A. Burge, Die juristenkomtk in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena. Ubersetzung una Kommentar (Zurich, 1974), 46-69, has shown.
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αιχμαλώτους IXafcv. όν€ΐδι£όμ€νος be em τη παραβάσα των όρκων, ουκ Ιφη προσομωμοκβναι ταΐς ήμέραις τάς νύκτας" . . . ne noster quidem probandus,—populo Romano adiudicavit.] Cicero has, of course, added this exemplum of Q. Fabius Labeo from his own well-stocked memory, as the phrase nihil enim habeo praeter auditum indicates.45 On Labeo, consul of 183 (cf. MRR, 1, 378), cf. Miinzer, RE 6.2 (1909), 1775.4, who accepts the historicity of the incident on the basis of our passage; cf. also V. Max. 7.3.4.—For the atque of atque ut regredi quam progredi mallent cf. ad § 22 (on -que). quocirca in omni est re fugienda talis sollertia.] Sollertia, a positive quality elsewhere in this treatise (viz., §S 15 and 157), is ironic, the talis adding, in this context, the negative valence. 34-40 For the connection of this material to its context cf. ad $$ 31-41. The stages in the argument are as follows: I. Punishment and vengeance: goals (§ 34) A. Regret on the part of the aggressor (qui lacessierit iniuriae suae paenitere) B. Deterrence of aggression by others II. The iura belli (§ 35) A. Circumstances in which war can be undertaken B. Goal of warfare C. iustitia in hostem 1. The fetial law of the Roman people: fairness in the commencement and goals of warfare (S 36) 2. Cato's letter cautioning his son not to engage in combat once he has been discharged from the army (§37) 3. The early meaning of Latin hostis (= peregrinus) interpreted as a euphemism (lenitate verbi ret tristitiam mitigatam) 4. Distinction of two types of wars (S 38) a) Those fought for survival b) Those fought for glory of empire 5. Promises made to the enemy in wartime ($ 39) a) Example of Regulus b) Example of ten prisoners captured after Cannae ($ 40) 6. Fabricius as the greatest example of iustitia in hostem. 45. For auditum as a substantive meaning "something heard" as early as PI. Merc. 903 (in our passage facilitated by the preceding nihil) cf. Laughton, 71.
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The general principle announced at the onset of discussion (est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus—ad iniuriam tardiores) surely applies throughout; thus, for instance, II.B.-C. represent an application of this gen eral principle to the special circumstances of war. Though § 35 already discusses a Roman military policy, § 36 is specifically marked as Roman. Like other Roman authors,46 Cicero had great respect for the ancient ius fetiale, which apparently fell out of use after 171 but was revived in symbolic form in 32 by Augustus for the war against Cleopatra (Harris, 167); 47 cf. Rep. 2.31 (of Tullus Hostilius):. . . constituitque ius quo bella indicerentur, quod per se iustissime inventum sanxit fetiali religione, ut omne bellum quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque inpium iudicaretur. An early Italic institution for regulating relations between states, the fetials appeared in pairs: the verbenarius, who carried a sack filled with herbs picked on the citadel, which was both a symbol of their office and for protection against wounds, and the pater patratus, who was entrusted with the execution of mandates; for the magical significance of his woollen head gear cf. Ogilvie ad Liv. 1.32.6; on the iron-tipped or cornel-wood spear, ibid., 1.32.12. They would conclude treaties with the fetials of other communities and lodge formal complaint against the violation of existing treaties. In the event of a declaration of war the pater patratus, with at least three adult male witnesses, would proceed to the border of the offending community and hurl across a lance dipped in blood. Cf. Wissowa, 550 ff.; Rich, 104; Harris, 166 ff., esp. 169 and 171, on the technical nature of the justice involved and its function of providing the Romans with "self-reassurance"; C. Saulnier, "Le role des pretres fetiaux et I'application du *ius fetiale' a Rome," Revue historique de droit franqais et etranger 58(1980), 171-93; Alan Watson, International Law in Archaic Rome: War and Religion (Baltimore and London, 1993), esp. 10 ff., is unconvincing in his «interpretation of the position of the gods as testes, which he insists means "judges." It has been argued on the basis of the phrase bella disceptanto at Leg. 2.21 that Cicero adduced the fetiales in our passage as an illustration of negotia tion (Botermann, 16 and n. 61). This seems unlikely, however. Leg. 2.21 reads as follows: foederum pads belli indotiarum ratorum fetiales iudices non(tii) sunto, bella disceptanto. Here disceptanto does not mean "negotiate or debate over" {discepto is not used transitively in this sense), but "judge" (cf. the previous belli . . . iudices . . . sunto; OLD s.v., 3; Hey, TLL 1.7, 46. Cf. Var. L. 5.86, cited n. 48 infra; Harris, 169, compares and discusses Plain. Am. 244-47. 47. Cf. the boast. . . nulli genti bello per iniuriam mlato (Anc. 5.13-14).
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1295.16 ff.). Also, in that case, one would have expected the fetiales to be named in conjunction with the observation nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem at $ 34; and, as Harris, 167-68, points out, the fetials essentially presented Rome's nonnegotiable demands set at a maxi mal level; only rarely, in the event that the other side had to give in, did the demands they presented provide the basis for a peaceful settlement. The fetials will rather have occurred to Cicero in this context as an institution that Romans regarded as preserving belli aequitas,48 even though the aequitas in question was of a formal and ritualized kind. Thus citizens of the foreign power did not need to be present when the spear was launched across the border in formal token of the outbreak of war; and this rite was later performed, not on the border, but outside the temple of Bellona at Rome (cf. Rich, 106). The example of the fetiales leads Cicero (ex quo)t however, to a concep tion of the helium iustum that is more concrete (out rebus repetitis geratur) and formalistic (aut denuntiatum ante sit et indicium) than the Panaetian precepts.49 The remainder of this section consists of several Roman exam ples loosely strung together. Cato's letter to his son 5 0 is, like the ius fetiale, an example of Roman insistence on observing the proper forms, even in dealing with an armed enemy, and thus is relevant to the general topic of appropriate actions toward the enemy in wartime, but is not sufficiently integrated into the developing argument. The same can be said of the (quite unconvincing) analysis of the allegedly benign implications of the early usage hostis = peregrinus (it would more plausibly illustrate the hostility of the early Romans to outsiders). § 38 puts forward a distinction between wars fought for sur vival and those fought for imperii gloria and the thesis that the latter should be less bitterly contested. Cicero states that even the latter presuppose the previously stated iustae causae bellorumy but the Roman notion of imperii gloria fits with difficulty into the Panaetian system (see ad $ 38). Examples given of both types of wars culminate in Pyrrhus* speech from Ennius as an example of the nobility proper to wars fought for empire. $ 39 brings a new (Panaetian?) precept that promises to the enemy are to be kept (evidently an 48. Cf. Var. L. 5.86: fetiales, quod fidei publicae inter populos praeerant: nam per bos fiebat ut iustum conciperetur bellum et finde desitum, ut f{o)edere fides pads constitueretur. One wonders whether this passage in a Book dedicated to him may have inspired Cicero to add the fetiales to Panaetius' account of justice to the enemy; cf. ad $ 37. 49. The connection with ex quo is emphasized in view of Botermann's denial (28) that the ius fetiale "bildet. . . den Ausgangspunkt der Erorterung." 50. On the authenticity of the second, not the first, exemplum of Cato and his son cf. ad S36.
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exception to the principle of § 32), illustrated by the positive exemplum of Regulus and the negative one of the Romans taken captive after Cannae. The section concludes with Fabricius, the crowning example of iustitia in hostem. For a different analysis of the relation of ideas in these chapters cf. Botermann, 1 ff. (on which cf. further ad §§ 36 and 38). Several of the exempla Romarta of this section recur in Book 3: Regulus (S 39 and 3.99 ff.), the ten Romans taken prisoner at Cannae (§ 40 and 3.113-15), Fabricius and the would-be assassin of Pyrrhus (§ 40 and 3.8687), the destruction of Corinth (§ 35 and 3.46). Soltau, 1240, n. 1, thought that Cicero had merely transferred these examples from Book 3 to Book 1; but this is most unlikely, since, in the case of the ten prisoners at Cannae, Cicero has clearly consulted a documentary source for the account in Book 3, but not yet for that of Book 1 (on Cicero's apparently linear Arbeitsweise in this work cf. passages cited in the Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius |the orator], de Officiis, afterthoughts"). Rather Cicero has evidently used Book 1 as a quarry for topics and examples for those portions of Book 3 for which he was without a philosophical source; see the introduction to Book 3. Whether, in light of this practice, he would, in final revision, have altered the examples as given in Book 1 is an interesting, but moot, question. Such a similarity of topics or examples unites parts of Off. 3 with other Ciceronian works as well: cf. N.D. 3.74-76 and Off. 3.61, 7 1 , 73, and 94 (cf. Pease's commentary, 1,21, n. 6, and 52 [contra Pohlenz, AF, 8, n. 2j), as well as Off. 3.61 and Top. 66; use of examples ready to hand is, of course, characteristic of a writer working in haste (cf. introduction, § 3; Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Formulaic writing"). 34 Sunt autera quaedam officia etiam adversus eos servanda a quibus iniuriam acceperis.] Even those who have wronged us belong to the societas hominum coniunctioque adumbrated at §§ 11-12 and described in detail at SS 50 ff.; hence there are certain actions appropriate to them, as to other human beings. But although our passage takes a large step toward recogniz ing the rights of others qua human beings (cf. also 3.21-28), Cicero is not quite consistent, even in Off., in this regard. Thus in trying to refute those who argued that Regulus could have ignored an oath extracted by force he finds that such an oath is binding if sworn to an enemy like the Carthagi nians, but not to pirates (3.107); and the justification of tyrannicide is ex plicit (3.19 ff.; cf. 1.109,2.43).—The use of officium here is not singled out as unusual by Oomes, TLL s.v., by Bernert, or by the commentators I have seen; it is, however, revolutionary. As is shown by Oomes, TLL 9, 518.36 ff. (here cited in parentheses by section), officium is originally used of the tasks of individuals in certain relations: the officia of relatives or friends, patrons
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or clients (ΙΑ1α2); the term is then transferred to interstate relations for behavior imposed by a client-patron relationship {in officio manere and the like: IB1)); it can also be used of the service an individual owes to others within the context of the laws and the state (IB2; cf. introduction» §2). From the standpoint of ordinary Roman usage Cicero might be said finis officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse (Mur. 65, of Cato's Stoic teachers). est enim ulciscendi et puniendi modus; . . .] At § 14 Cicero/Panaetius noted that alone of animals the human can determine . . . in factis dictisque qui modus. Retribution is allowed under the proviso at § 20: ut ne cut quis noceat, nisi bcessitus iniuria; cf. also § 35: ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur. On the puniendi modus cf. further ad §§ 83 and 89 and on Panaetius' general preference for deliberation ad § 11; on modus as a Panaetian ideal generally ad S 93. Atque in republica maxime conservanda sunt iura belli.] For in republica referring to matters of state generally, including interstate relations, not merely matters internal to the Roman state, cf. $ 33 and 3.46.—The iura belli appear in a different (more cynical) sense at Liv. 31.30.2: esse enim quaedam belli iura, quae ut facere ita pati sit fas . . . nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alteram per vim, cumquc illud proprium sit hominis, hoc bcluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius si uti non licet superiore.) It is a commonplace in ancient literature that humans and animals have distinct methods of settling differences; cf. Hes. Op. Ill ff.: ΐχθύσι μέν και θηρσΐ καΐ οιωνοί ς π€Τ€ηνοΐς· / eaOeiv αλλή λους, enet υύ δίκη €στι μ*τ' αυτοΐς· / άνθρώποισι δ' έδωκε δίκην, ή πολλόν άριστη /γίνεται - . . . ; Lys. 2.19:. . . ήγησάμενοι θηρίων μέν έργον είναι υπ' αλλήλων βία κρατεΐσθαι, άνθρωποι^ δε προσήκει νόμω μεν όρίσαι το δίκαιον, λόγω δε πεΐσαι . . . ; cf. Skutsch ad Enn. Ann. Hi (pp. 242-43), a passage which, though sometimes cited in this context (cf. Fuchs, 1955,203), proba bly recommends that a leader possess shrewdness rather than mere physical force. This passage is surely the centerpiece of Panaetius* doctrine of warfare; it incorporates, like his ethical system as a whole, reason as the characteristic distinguishing man and beast (cf. $11) and recognizes disceptatio (based on reason) as the legitimate method of settling disputes between human beings. Though Panaetius' analysis of the sources of the καλόν {honestum) begins with drives shared by human and beast (§ 11), the behavior proper to the human being is based on specifically human traits (§$ 97, 107). It would therefore be surprising if he readily gave humans license to behave like ani mals. Moreover, being φιλοττλάτων (cf. ad §§ 28, 84, 104), Panaetius may
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well have been influenced by the unflattering portrait of the "hater of λόγο?" at PI. R. 411d-e: μισόλογο? δη οΐμαι ό τοιούτο? γίγνεται καλ άμουσο?, καϊ πειθοΐ μέν δια λόγων ουδέν έτι χρήται, βία δέ και άγριότητι ώσπερ θηρίον προ? πάντα διαπράττεται . . . Moreover, the preceding general rule, which allows for the use of violence only in punishing aggression and only to the point of causing the aggressor to repent of his act and deter others, surely still applies. Therefore Panactius presumably meant that if one party denied his rational nature, viz., by attacking, then the other would have to use force in self-defense. This interpretation would likewise accord with the doctrine about the conduct of the μεγαλόψυχο? in wartime at $ 81: temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est; sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda. This latter passage is similar to Aristotle's first reason for military training (ίνα . . . αυτοί μή δουλεύσωσιν έτεροι?: Pol. 1333b40-41). The alternative interpretation is that si uti non licet superiore refers to the failure of negotiations (so, e.g., Finger, 10; Botermann, 17). The question arises, however, whether, under this interpretation, attack would be justified "if negotiations fail." If so, this interpretation accords less well with Panaetius* general view of human nature and what he says about vengeance, punishment, and, in § 8 1 , the circumstances in which one should fight (see above); if not, this interpretation hardly differs from the other, which like wise sees warfare as justified only in self-defense. If, then, our passage and $ 81 taken together provide what can be known of Panaetius' doctrine of when it is appropriate to wage war, it is hard to see how the distinction at § 38 between wars fought for glory and those fought for existence can go back to him (see ad loc); if my reconstruction is correct, he recognized the latter only (loss of libertas or imposition of disgraceful conditions being a far cry from the desire to win glory); cf. Dyck, 1981,21920. 35 quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causara, ut sine injuria in pace vivatur,. . .] Cf. PI. Lg. 628d7 ff.:. . . OUT' άν νομοθέτη? [sc. γένοιτο) ακριβή?, ει μή χάριν ειρήνη? τά πολέμου νομοθετοϊ μάλλον ή τών πολεμικών ένεκα τά τη? είρήνη?; Arist. EN 1177b4-6: δοκεΐ τε ή ευδαιμονία έν τη σχολή είναι· ασχολούμεθα γάρ'ίνα σχολάζωμεν, και πολεμοΰμεν ΐν' είρήνην άγωμεν; Pol. 1 3 3 4 a l 4 - 1 6 : τέλο? γάρ, ώσπερ ειρηται πολλάκι?, ειρήνη μεν πολέμου, σχολή δ' ασχολία?; the words cedantarma togae (§ 77) according to Cicero's exegesis at Pis. 73 {helium ac tumultum pact atque otio concessurum)\ Fuchs, 1955,203, n. 12.—As to the connection with quare, note that peace as the goal of war would follow from the fact that disceptatio is
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the human way of settling disputes; hence peace would be the "normal" condition, war an aberration. . . . ut maiores nostri Tusculanos Aequos Volscos Sabinos Hernicos in civitatem etiam acceperunt. . .] This is a list of unlike entities, with the residents of Tusculum, a municipium, being juxtaposed with a series of peoples (all, however, are of Italian stock). Tusculum is named first both as the earliest recipient of civitas among those mentioned (ca. 381, according to Roman tradition; cf. G. McCracken, RE 7A2 [1943-48], 1467.55 ff.) and for personal interest (cf. ad § 21); also no one would think of accusing the Tusculani, who were suspected of making common cause with the Praenestini but then received without resistance the army despatched under Camillus (D.H. 14.6.1-2; V. Max. 7.3.9 ext.; Plut. Cam. 38; D.S. 7.28), of crudelitas or immanitas in war. The inability of the Aequi to wage warfare cruelly was evidently inferred from their name (cf. the supposed borrowing of the ius fetiale from the Aequicoli or aequi Falisci, doubtless also motivated by etymology, as Wissowa, 5 5 0 - 5 1 , n. 5, suspected); their juxtaposition with the Volsci will have resulted from the fact that they often appeared together in early historical records (e.g., Fast, triumph, under 462 B.C. on the victory of L. Lucretius Tricipitinus de Aequeis et Vobceis . . . : Inscriptiones Italiae, Academiae Italicae consociatae ediderunt, 13.1: Fasti consulates et triumphales, cur. A. Degrassi [Rome, 1947], 537). The Aequi received citizenship shortly after 304, the Volsci ca. 338 (the western branch) or 329 (the eastern branch); cf. Hiibner, RE 1.1 (1893), 597.32 ff., and G. Radke, ibid., 9A1 (1961), 819.43 it The list concludes with the Sabini and Hernici, both of whom made common cause with the related Samnites around the turn of the third century and were duly subjugated (ca. 290 and 306 respec tively); cf. Philipp, ibid., 1A2 (1920), 1578.1 ff. and Weiss, ibid., 8.1 (1912), 909.10 ff. The grants of citizenship were, however, not, as Cicero implies, proferred merely out of Roman kindness but had, in general, strategic signifi cance; thus, for instance, it was in Rome's interest to secure a pro-Roman government in the Volscian city Privernum to serve as a buffer against the Samnites; cf. Liv. 8.20.12; Radke, he. cit., 821.20 ff. . . . at Carthaginem et Numantiam funditus sustulemnt; nollem Corinthum, sed credo aliquid secutos, opportunitatem loci maxime, ne posset aliquando ad bell urn faciendum locus ipse adhortari. mea quidem sententia pad quae nihil habitura sit insidiamm semper est consulendum.] Carthage and Cor inth were of topical interest as recent recipients of Caesarian colonies (earlier in 44: cf. D.S. 32.27.3 |Corinth]; Dio 43.50.3-5). Here Cicero takes an intermediary position, disapproving, but with some understanding for the decision taken by the respected maiores (cf. the unqualified condemnation of
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3.46: sed utilitatis specie in republica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri). At 2.76, where Mummius and the younger Scipio are paired as destroyers of cities who nevertheless maintained their personal integrity, no moral judgment is passed on the destruction itself. However, Cicero does use the destruction of Corinth as a precedent for action against Mithridates at Man. 11-12: . . . Corinthum patres vestri totius Graeciae lumen exstinctum esse voluerunt . . . videte ne, ut Hits pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse; cf. R. Feger, "Cicero und die Zerstorung Korinths," Hermes 80 (1952), 4 5 4 - 5 5 . Cicero dilates on the advantages of the site of Corinth (as of Carthage) at Agr. 2.87: Corinthi vestigium vix relictum est. erat enim posita in angustiis atque in faucibus Graeciae sic ut terra claustra locorum teneret et duo maria maxime navigationi diversa paene coniungeret, cum pertenui discrimine separentur. haec [sc. Carthage and Corinth] quae procul erant a conspectu imperi non solum adflixerunt sed etiam, ne quando recreata exsurgere atque erigere se possent, funditus, ut dixi, sustulerunt. Heilmann, 5 0 - 5 1 , is right to point out that Cicero's apologia for the destruction of Corinth in our passage is weak inasmuch as he has not made the case that the Corinthians waged warfare cruelly, the only justification allowed for not preserving the losers; nor would insidiae of the inhabitants necessarily follow from the strategic advantages of the site. Contrast Cicero's praise of Marcellus' moderate treatment of con quered Syracuse at Ver. 2.4.120 (though here, too, possible future danger is an element in the calculus, as also in the destruction of Numantia and Carthage as described at Amic. 1 1 ) : . . . non putavit ad laudem populi Romani hoc pertinere, banc pulchritudinem, ex qua praesertim periculi nihil ostenderetur, delere et exstinguere . . . On the other hand, Cicero has ac cepted uncritically the optimate doctrine that the destruction of Carthage and Numantia was necessary and does not cite Scipio Nasica's opposition to the destruction of the former; cf. ad § 79; Strasburger, 1965,52; Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1500.50 ff. Possibly Cicero's distinction has to do with the fact that the Corinthians were Greeks, perhaps also with the experience he nar rates at Tusc. 3.53: Karthaginienses multi Romae servierunt, Macedones rege Perse capto; vidi etiam in Peloponneso, cum essem adulescens, quosdam Corinthios. hi poterant omnes eadem ilia de Andromacha deplorare: 'haec omnia vidi. . . \ sed iam decantaverant fortasse. Cf. also § 82 (on authen ticity cf. ad loc): de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. in quo si mihi esset obtemperatum, si non optimam, at aliquam rempublicam, quae nunc nulla est, haberemus.] This sentence may stand as an
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example of the associative method of composition sometimes found in Off. (cf. ad 226y 3.70,77,86-88, but also 112; Thomas, 23). The words pad. . . semper est consulendum deployed in the first place as part of the apologia for the destruction of Corinth evidently triggered in Cicero's mind his own recent efforts to mediate peace between Caesar and Pompey: he, too, had tried to forestall a future war, but without success; the sequel was the present condition of the Roman state, here characterized for the first time in our essay (cf. ad 2.29). As early as mid-December, 50, he observed: pace opus est. ex victoria cum multa mala turn certe tyrannus exsistet [Att. 7.5.4; cf. Att. 8.11.2: uterque regnare vult). This analysis of the situation explains his willingness in the subsequent negotiations (on which cf. Gelzer, 243 ff.) to accept peace at any price [Fam. 6.6.5: . . . cum vel iniquissimam pacem iustissimo bello anteferrem; cf. his appeal reported in a letter to Tiro of 29 January 49: nihil esse bello civili miserius \¥am. 16.12.2]). Similar to our passage in its assessment of the situation but with greater pathos is the nearly contemporary passage at Phil. 2.37: quo quidem tempore si, ut dixi, meum consilium auctontasque valuisset, tu hodie egeres, nos liberi essemus; . . . dolebam, dolebam, patres conscripti, rempublicam vestris quondam meisque consiliis conservatam brevi tempore esse perituram; cf. Heilmann, 51 52. et cum iis quos vi deviccris consulendum est, turn ii qui armis positis ad imperatorum fidem confugient, quamvis murum aries percusserit, recipiendi.] Our passage suggests that what Caesar calls "his custom" was, in fact, the general practice; cf. BG 2.32.1 (reply to the Atuatuci): se magis consuetudine sua quam merito eorum civitatem conservaturum, si priusquam murum aries attigisset, se dedidissent. . . For an example of deditio in fidem cf. Bell. Al. 32.3-4; Dahlheim, 9-10, n. 15.—The policy described corresponds to that of Cato, as depicted at Luc. 9.298-99 (siege of Cyrene): exclusus nulla se vindicat ira, Ipoenaque de victis sola est vicisse Catonem.— For imperatorum fides and similar phrases cf. Fraenkel, TLL 6, 664.52 ff. in quo tantopere apud nostras iustitia culta est ut ii qui civitates aut nationes devictas bello in fidem recepissent, earum patroni essent more maiorum.] The patrocinium, which included the protection of their rights, passed to the general who received the deditio of the group in question and to his heirs; cf. Mommsen, Staatsn, 3.1, 65 and n. 1; Meyer, 212-13; Dahlheim, 5 ff.; Freyburger, 142 ff. The use of in fidem in this sentence and ad imperatorum fidem in the preceding one serves the obvious purpose of emphasizing that those who have surrendered pass into a network of social relations based on trust, rather than mere military force; cf. Botermann, 14; whether the act is called in fidem or in potestatem venire or accipere does not alter the legal
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position; cf. Dahlheim, 25 ff. and 43. Freyburger, 150 ff., collects early testimonies for entrusting oneself to another'sfides;the concept was trans ferred from private intrastate relations to international ones; cf. Heinze, 152 = 69. At 2.27 Cicero emphasizes the benevolent character of the Roman empire in former times by calling it a patrocinium orbis terrae; see ad loc. 36 Ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est, ex quo intellegi potest nullum belium esse iustum nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum.] On belli aequitas as "just or humane laws of war" cf. OLD s.v. aequitas 4b; for the sense of aequitas ad % 30.—On the fetiales in general cf. ad §$ 34-40.—Botermann, 15 (after a suggestion by U. Schindel; sec 1, n. 1), proposes to leave the first aut untranslated and to translate the second one as "und." She cites Hofmann-Szantyr, 499, and Kiihner-Stegmann, 1, 105, for examples of aut used as a copulative particle after a negation. However, she overlooks the fact that in such cases the second element stands to thefirstin the relation of a wTeil oder nahere Besrimmung" (ibid.); this is, however, clearly not the case in our passage, where the declaration of war can hardly be called a part or nearer specification of the fact that war is being waged for the recovery of property. With the aufs therefore taken as disjunctive we shall have to bur den Cicero with a piece of carelessness which, if the extant citation is a safe guide, he managed to avoid at Rep. 3.35: nullum belium iustum habetur nisi denuntiatum, nisi indictum, nisi de repetitis rebus (Isid. etym. 18.1.3); cf., however, Rep. 2.31, where he omits res repetitae:. . . constituitque ius quo bella indicerentur, quod per se iustissime inventum sanxit fetiali religione, ut omne belium quod denuntiatum indictumque non esset, id iniustum esse atque inpium iudicaretur.—The principle of rerum repetitio in interna tional affairs seems likely to have been modeled on the legis actio Sacramento of Roman private law. But in interstate relations there was, of course, no authority to decide which party had the better causa vindicandi. Cf. Herbert Hausmaninger, u'Belium iustum* und 'iusta causa belli* im alteren romischen Recht," osterreichische Zeitschrift fiir offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 11 (1961), 340.—The influential conception of a just war51 that follows from the ius fetiale (ex quo) overlaps with the preceding precept to 51. Cf. Frederick Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (New York, 1975), 62 and 302. The insistence at Thorn. S. Th. II.2.40.1 that the belium iustum be waged on the authority of a prince (auctoritas prinapis) can perhaps be regarded as a remnant of the role of the fetiales in insuring control "from the top"; his further specifications that there should be a causa iusta and intentio bellantium recta have their counterpart in the res repetitae as the goal of military action (as well as, in $ 35, the goal of living in peace sine iniuria) and in Cicero's strictures against cruelty in $ 35.
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the degree that res repetitae represent a specific type of iniuria; the emphasis on the proper form for declaring war is purely Roman. (Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam—adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo.}] The juxtaposition of two accounts (neither of which be trays any awareness of the other) of Cato's insistence that his son retake the military oath if he were going to resume campaigning after he had been dismissed has long roused the suspicion of editors. Plutarch, Quaest. Rom. 273e-f, clearly read the latter: "δια τί τοις μη στρατβυομίνοι? μβν €ΐ> στρατοπ€δω δ' άλλω? άναστρίφομβνοι? ουκ εξήν άνδρα βαλεΐν πολέμιον ουδέ τρώσαι;" και τούτο Κάτων ό πρ^σβύτη? €ν επιστολή τινι δβδήλωκ^, γράφων προ? τον υίόν και κ€λ€ύων, ei παρεθίίη τη? στρατα'α? αποπλήρωσα? τόν χρόνον, υπόστρεφαν ή προσμ^νοντα λαβαν παρά του στρατηγού το έξείναι τρώσαι και άν€λ€Ϊν πολ€μιον. It is true that some of the linguistic oddities of the former version are not as severe as has sometimes been supposed. Thus the asyndeton with which it begins (called by Thomas, 112, "fur die Echtheitsfrage wichtig") is actually a very common method of introducing exempla in this essay; cf. § 133, 2.47, 48, 58, 72, 83 (a hypothetical exam ple), 3.45,48,49, 7 3 , 7 7 , 7 9 , 9 4 , 9 7 , 9 9 , 1 1 2 ; cf. also the notable asyndeta at § 38 and 2.51. Likewise the omission of praenomina for Popilius, Cato, and his son is paralleled in the nearly contemporary Philippics (cf. Adams, 146), as well as 3.114, a passage suspected by no one. Nevertheless the wrong sequence of tenses in obliget is worrisome (B1 alone offers the correct obligaret) as is the fact that the iunctura sacramentum militiae is not otherwise attested until Cypr. epist. 74.8.3 (cited by Thomas, 113, n. 31: si sic honor Deo datur, si sic a cultoribus eius et sacerdotibus timor Dei et disciplina servatur, abiciamus arma, . . . divinae militiae sacramenta solvantur . . .). Further objections are to the poverty of expression betrayed by dimitterel dimisit, remansissetlremanere (cf. Heine ad /oc), the vagueness of Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam (unspecified), the fact that the author of this exemplum, unlike the following one, evidently did not know the praenomen of Cato's son, and the improbability of an entire legion having been discharged. In fact, the military service of Cato's elder son (who died as praetor designate ca. 152) in Macedonia under his future father-in-law the consul L. Aemilius Paullus is independently attested, for he fought with distinction at Pydna (168; cf. V. Max. 3.2.16; lust. 33.2.1), but had to return thereafter, presumably because of wounds. Our passage is the sole evidence for his service under a Popilius, surely in Liguria; the commander in question is assumed to have been M. Popilius Laenas (cf. F. Miltner, RE 22.1 [1953], 167.54 if. [s.v. Porcius no. 14]), who, as consul in 173, defeated the Ligurians near Carystum; cf. Volkmann, ibid., 61.42 if.; but his brother C. Popilius
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Laenas, consul the following year, who also held command against the Ligurians, is not excluded; ibid., 57.36 ff. Whether the theater was Mac edonia or Liguria, the discharge of an entire legion seems most unlikely: hostilities continued after Carystum; and Paullus could hardly have discharged a legion prior to Pydna. If, then, Madvig was probably right in athetizing Popilius—pugnare non poterat,51 should we also delete (as he did) adeo—movendo} Reinhardt, 1885, 6 - 8 , and Thomas, 110 ff., have urged the retention of the suspect sentence; their restored text would read: ac belli quidem aequitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani iure perscripta est, ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum ante sit et indictum. adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo. "Fairness in war has been prescribed by the fetial law of the Roman people; hence it can be understood that no war is just unless it is either fought for redress of grievances or has been declared in advance; so supreme was the vigilance in beginning war.*' Cicero thus uses the ius fetiale as the basis for a statement about the just war (present tense). But adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo is no fit conclusion to this train of thought; and it seems very dubious that Cicero would have deliberately called attention to the ius fetiale having fallen out of use (a possibility mooted with a question mark by Botermann, 19, n. 66). Hence Harder, 1933, 489, suspected that Cicero originally planned to add a historical example before it. However, this sevenword sentence contains several serious problems of Latinity. In the first place adeo thus used is post-Ciceronian; one expects usque eo; cf. K.F. Nagelsbach, Lateinische Stilistik, ed. Iwan Mullet, 9th ed. (Nurnberg, 1905), 759-60. Again, the iunctura adeo summa is nonsensical.53 Finally our text would be the first instance of observatio in the sense "careful observance, punctilious ness"; cf. OLD 3b; Lumpe-Szantyr, TLL 9, 197.55 ff., where Quint. Inst 11.1.38 is adduced as parallel to our passage: negat se magni facere aliquis poetarum Jsc. Catul. 93] utrum Caesar ater an albus homo sit: insania; verte, ut idem Caesar de illo dixerit, adrogantia est. maior in personis observatio est apud tragicos comicosque: multis enim utuntur et variis. The accumu lated linguistic problems make it very doubtful that this text can stand. 37 Marci quidem Catonis senis est epistula ad Marcum filium,. . .] = p. 84, fr. 4 Jordan; Plut. Cat. mat. 20.11 cites a passage from a letter about 52. Apud Lund, 26.—While following Madvig here, Winterbottom (p. xii) raises the pertinent question: "Si Tullius haec non scripsit, cui curae esse poterat ut adderet?" 53. Even Thomas, 114, who otherwise defends the Latinity of the sentence admits that this feature raises suspicions ("Srurzig macht nur eines, die durch adeo summa in das Epiphoncm gehrachte Steigerung").
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military matters to his son (the same letter? = p. 84, fr. 3 Jordan): . . . Κάτωνος αΰτοϋ φέρεται τις επιστολή προ? τον υίόν ύπερφυώς έπαινοΰντος την περί τό ξίφος φιλοτιμίαν αύτου και σπουδήν. No other addressee is known for Cato's letters; cf. F. Miltner, RE 22.1 (1953), 164.41 ff.; one wonders whether they were published during his lifetime. This is one of the few places where, apart from Panaetius, Cicero cites the documentary sources he used in composing Off.; cf. 3.89 and 113-15.—Although this version of the Cato exemplum, unlike the one transmitted immediately be fore, is connected by a particle with what precedes (on "extending quidenT introducing fairly extensive material cf. Solodow, 112 ff.), the nature of the relation is primo aspectu far from evident. What Cicero is doing becomes clear here, as elsewhere (cf. ad §$ 11-17), only ex post facto: he has added to general precepts on the subject a series of exempla iustitiae in hostem a maiorihus nostris constituta (cf. 5 40). Cicero is evidently proceeding here, as elsewhere when not closely following Panaetius, by association, as the loose connectives would suggest ($ 37: equidem etiam Mud animadverto; % 39: atque etiam; § 40: autem . . . autem). Common to the Cato exemplum and the institution of the ius fetiale is the insistence upon punctilious observation of the correct legal forms in contacts with the other side; just as the pater patratus had to aver, under oath, the justice of the Roman claim (cf. Liv. 4.30.14: iurati repeterent res)y so the soldier had to be bound by oath before engaging the enemy. But the military sacramentum had two aspects: it made the soldier's service a sollemnis et sacrata militia in the course of which killing the enemy was allowed; and, like any other Roman oath, the sacra mentum included a curse in the event of its violation, so that it was also a means of reinforcing the soldier's obedience; cf. Klingmuller, RE 1A2 (1920), 1667.56 ff. (s.v. sacramentum). Neither of these functions of the sacramen tum was for the protection of the enemy, however, but then neither was the ius fetiale (cf. ad $§ 34-40). The mention of this anecdote involving the two Catos, father and son, has, however, a certain aptness in Off.; the exemplum is one of a father's solicitude for his son; the son had been carefully educated by his father, evidently with good results (Cic. Sen. 68: in optimo filio; cf. Miltner, loc. cit., 167.31 ff.), and was destined for military glory, which was perhaps important to the younger Cicero as well (cf. 2.45). hostis enim apud maiores nostros is dicebatur quem nunc peregrinum dicimus.] Cf. Var. L. 5.3: . . . multa verba aliud nunc ostendunt, aliud ante significabant (ut hostis: nam turn eo verho dicebant peregrinum qui suis legibus uteretur, nunc dicunt eum quem turn dicebant perduellem). Note that Book 5 was among the six books of L. on the impositio verborum dedicated to Cicero, who is addressed as still alive; it seems likely that at least this Book
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had reached him by the autumn of 44 and that he has drawn this information thence. Cf. also Paul. Fest. p. 102M: hostis apud antiquos peregrinus dtcebatur, etqui nunc hostis, perduellis (scripsi: -to cod.); Serv. auct. in Aen. 4.424; Macr. 1.16.14-15. However, this semantic shift is also susceptible of less benign interpretation: the generalization of the word for foreigner in the sense "enemy" shows that the prevailing attitude toward foreigners in early Rome was anything other than friendly; cf. Walcot, 124. indicant duodecim tabulae: AUT STATUS DIES CUM HOSTE . . . ] = Lex XII 2.2; the phrase is explained at Fest. p. 314M: status dies (cum hoste) vocatur qui iudici causa est constitutus cum peregrino; eius enim generis ab antiquis hostes appelfobantur, quod erant pari iure cum populo Romano, atque hostire ponebatur pro aequare (quotation of PI. Cure. 5-6 follows). As boys Cicero and his brother had learned the Twelve Tables by heart (cf. Leg. 2.9 and 59); he includes an encomium on them at de Orat. 1.195. . . . itemque ADVERSUS HOSTEM AETERNA AUCTORITAS.] = Lex XII 6.4. This provision is an exception to the general rule of the Twelve Tables (6.3; cf. Caec. 54; Top. 23) that usus resulted in ownership over land after two years, over moveable property after one; the foreigner always had to prove that he had legally acquired the property; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1, 136-37. 38 This section distinguishes two types of war, viz., wars fought for glory of empire and those fought for survival, and the behavior appropriate to each. By placing the Carthaginians in the former category Cicero is able to con demn them for inappropriate behavior in contrast to other such adversaries, called iustiores. This procedure is in line with the doctrine at the beginning of S 35 whereby milder treatment is to be accorded to those qui non crudeles in be\\oy non hnmanes fuerunt, a category excluding Carthage, the destruction of which is mentioned without dissent. Finger, 9-10, has shown (against Pohlenz, AF, 31) that the two categories recognized in this passage can hardly go back to Panaetius, whose attitude toward gloriae cupiditas, as indicated in $§ 26, 65, and 68, was far from positive; he clearly despised a man qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet (S 65) and realized that such an attitude can lead one into wrongdoing; and, writing as a Greek for Greeks, S4 he will have been little interested in ea bella quibus imperii proposita gloria est. Moreover, our passage is, I think, the only one in Off. which, contrary to Stoic doctrine, assigns per se value to glory as a goal of action (cf. Long, 1995 1 , 233, who had looked for such a passage; ad 2.42). If not likely to be Panaetian, the distinction in our passage of two types of warfare and of the behavior appropriate to each is plausibly 54. Cf. introduction, $ 5 (4).
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Ciceronian. The topos of the glory of winning an empire appears in his public speeches; cf., e.g., Man. 12: videte ne% ut Hits fsc. maioribus] pulcherrimum fuit tantam vobis imperi gloriam tradere, sic vobis turpissimum sit id quod accepistis tueri et conservare non posse. Moreover, the distinction of our paragraph is already latent in Cicero's judgment on the destruction of Corinth on the one hand and of Numantia and Carthage on the other (§35); and he is steering toward the exempla of Pyrrhus and Fabricius (respectively end of §$ 38 and 40) and needs a rationale for the milder warfare waged then on both sides. In an attempt to clear the way Cicero prefaces the following remark: causas omnino subesse tamen oportet easdem quas dixi paulo ante iustas causas esse bellorum; the cross-reference is evidently to § 35 (quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causam, ut sine iniuria m pace vivatur) and § 36 ( . . . nullum bellum esse iustum nisi quod . . . rebus repetitis geratur . . . ; the attempt of Botermann, 23 ff., to find here a reference, not to § 36, but to the general observations about how one should respond to injustice at the beginning of $ 34 is unconvincing). Some have thought to infer that even wars fought de imperio should be defensive in character;55 Cicero was certainly capable of thinking in such terms (cf. Man. 14: . . . propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt. . . ; Rep. 3.35: noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum mm omnium potitus est). But it is by no means clear that Panaetius would have accepted this attempted harmo nization of his theory with Roman practice. For the very concept of imperium implies conquest of foreign territories; how should an imperium have been established in the first place on Panaetian principles?56 In spite of his
55. M. Gelzer, "Die Anfangc des romischen Wclrrciches," in Vom romischen Staat. Zur Politik una Gesellschaftsgeschichte der romischen Republik, 1 (Leipzig, 1943), 26, thinks of opponents "die Rom das Imperium raubcn und das ihrige aufzwingcn wollten"; cf. Botermann, 23. 56. Anti-Roman feeling found covert expression among Greek intellectuals in criticism of the Romans' treatment of slaves; cf. Shtaciman, 192 ff. Panaetius belonged, of course, to the upper class, which, by the mid-second century, had largely come to terms with Roman rule; cf. J. Dciningcr, Der polttische Widerstandgegen Rom in Griechenland. 217-86 v. Chr. (Berlin-New York, 1971), 267; such an attitude was made easier in his case, as in that of Polybius, by friendships with leading Romans (frr. 8 ff. van Straatcn); whether he would have tried to make room in his ethical system for imperialism in general is, however, another question. Certainly the Greek philosophical tradition had little sympathy with imperialism (at least as applied to Greek communities); cf. PI. R. 348d: TH κα\ φρόιημοί σ<κ. ώ θρπσύμαχ*, δοκοϋσιι> eiwii και αγαθοί οι άδικοι; Cft yt TCXCLJS. ίφη. οίοι τ€ άδικάΐ'. πάλας TC και έθνη δ ί ν ο μ α ι οΜρώπωΐ' ύφ' εαυτούς ποίίϊαθαι·. . . Cf. also Brunt, 1978, 176 = 307: "It was particularly hard for others to concede that Rome were merely fighting in defence of her friends and allies if (as was sometimes the case)
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best efforts Cicero cannot bring Roman practice and Panaetian precept fully into line. Elsewhere in Off., we see some Ciceronian ambivalence where Greek precept and Roman practice collide (cf. ad 2.55b ff., where Cicero faithfully reproduces Panaetius' strictures against short-lived public benefits but then allows himself to be carried away in praising the splendor aedilitatum); and we see the positive view of the Roman imperium implicit in our passage even more clearly in 2.85 (rempublicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus; see ad loc). Although he sometimes shows a keen sense of the injustice suffered by Rome's allies (cf., besides the prosecution of Verres, 2.27-28 and 3.87b-88), Cicero never found for interstate relations an ideal corresponding to vera gloria in internal affairs (cf. ad 2.43). . . . cum cive aliter contendimus si est inimicus, aliter si competitor (cum altero certamen honoris et dignitatis est, cum altero capitis et famae) . . . ] The text printed here is that of L, whereas the other witnesses offer cum civiliter contendimus aliter. . . Now civiliter contendere as opposed to com peting in armed struggle is paralleled in Caelius' letter at Fam. 8.14.3 ( . . . quam diu civiliter sine armis certetur . . . ); also a separate process of altera tion would be needed to account for the insertion of aliter after contendimus; hence Goldbacher, 2, 13-14, wanted to retain the much better attested text and merely insert a second contendimus immediately after the first. How ever, with Goldbacher's text it is a problem to find a referent for inimicus and competitor (is qui cum nobis contendit}); thus recent editors are unanimous in preferring the text of L. . . . cum Celtiberis, cum Cimbris bellum uc cum inimicis gerebatur, utcr esset, non uter imperaret, cum Latinis Sabinis Samnitibus Poems Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur.] The Latini, Sabini, and Samnites are expected follow ing the observations at § 35 on the mild treatment, including grants of citizenship, to such peoples; so, too, is Pyrrhus in light of the sequel. The surprise is that the Celtiberi, who under Viriathus (see ad 2.40) waged a stubborn guerrilla war against Roman armies, but hardly one in which Rome's very existence was in doubt, are placed in the more severe category, the Poeni among those with whom Rome fought for glory of empire but not existence, especially odd in view of the acceptance without criticism of the she admitted states to her friendship and offered them protection at a time when they were already threatened or under attack; it was all too obvious that she was then acting for her own interest, and of course victory would give her control of the conquered iure belli, and justify mass-enslavements, heavy indemnities or annexation, at her own discretion" with examples, including Saguntum, cited, ibid., n. 61 (on Saguntum cf. also Lazenby, 22-29); for an instance of Roman provocation leading to war cf. ad 3.86.
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destruction of Carthage at $ 35 (see ad loc). Fuchs, 1955, 204-5, n.15, suspects that our text presents a crossing of two classifications, a Roman one involving distinction of wars fought de gloria and de salute (cf. Sal. Jug. 114.2; Tac. Agr. 31.3; Curt. 4.14.9; for the distinction transferred to "bat tles" in the lawcourts cf. Cael. 47) and the distinction at Pi. R. 469b ff. according to which wars of Greeks against Greeks should follow different norms from those fought against barbarians; this would account for the inclusion of the Celtiberi in the prior category. On the other hand, the placement of the Carthaginians, along with Pyrrhus, in the second group may be a reminiscence of Antic. 28: cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; there, too, however, the initial jux taposition quickly becomes a study in contrasts (see next note), when Cicero adds: ab altera propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.—OLD s.v. sum A1 cites our passage in the sense "to be (continue) among the living**; here sum borders on the sense of supersum {OLD s.v., 5: u to remain alive, survive**).—Cicero loses sight of the possibility that one side's war fought de imperio might be the other's fight for survival (cf. Sal. Jug. 94.5). 'Poeni foedifragi', crudelis Hannibal, reliqui iustiores.] This sentence pro vides a needed corrective to the previous inclusion of the Carthaginians among those with whom the Romans struggled de imperio (see previous note). Note, too, that, as W.H. Friedrich, uZur altlateinischen Dichtung," Hermes 76 (1941), 116, observed, the first two words are a hexameter quotation, perhaps from Ennius* Annales (this provenance is accepted by Skutsch, pp. 781 -82 of his edition). This fact should also defend the sentence against Weidner's athetesis, since such learned citation is beyond the powers of interpolators as ordinarily conceived;57 on the asyndeton cf. Thomas, n. 28, 112-13, who rightly adds that without this sentence Cicero would con tradict his tacit approval of the destruction of Carthage in § 35; see also the next note.—Punica fides was, of course, a proverbial designation of treach ery among the Romans; cf. Otto, 291; Freyburger, 224. Cicero dilates on the topic in the course of impeaching the testimony of Sardinian witnesses at Scaur. 42.—The charge of cruelty is leveled against Hannibal, not only at Amic. 28 (quoted in the previous note), but also, e.g., at Liv. 21.4.9 (inhu57. See below p. 153, n. 65.—Skucsch, loc. cit.. thinks that there may have been some "critical interchange" between Off. and Rep.; but the only evidence for occurrence of our quotation in Rep. is sch. Hor. Carm. 4.8.17: Cicero in dialogts (an inaccurate reference to our passage?) foedifragos dixit Afros; and the Ennian citation at Off. 1.26 and Rep. 1.49 <see ad the former) would be an instance of a scribe of Rep. being influenced by Off., but not vice-versa.
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mana crudelitas) and other works dependent on Roman sources, such as D.S. 26.14.1-2, App. Harm. 2 7 - 2 8 , 59-60, etc.; but cf. the apologia at Plb. 9.22.7 ff.; Lenschau, RE 7.2 (1912), 2351.1 ff.; Lazenby, 255. Pyrrhi quidem de captivis reddendis ilia praeclara: . . .] Solodow, 125-26, classes our passage among others in which "no other examples do follow, but quidem vaguely suggests that they could be supplied; we might translate quidem 'for one.'" Our sentence, then, is introduced to illustrate the asser tion reliqui iustiores, so that athetesis of the preceding sentence would rob ours of its raison d'etre (besides the fact that, in the absence of the previous transmitted sentence, one would have expected the connection cuius quidem or the like with the immediately preceding cum . . . Pyrrho de imperio dimicabatur; cf. Thomas, 112, n. 28).—For the ellipsis of esse cf. ad $ 63. 'nee mi aurum posco—cum magnis dis\] The reply to an embassy sent by Fabricius to ransom prisoners after the battle of Heraclea (280) = Enn. Ann. 6, fr. **xi, 183-90; see Skutsch ad loc, as well as H. Frankel, "Griechische Bildung in aJtromischen Epen, II,M Hermes 70 (1935), 66 ff. These verses are probably to be restored at PHerc. 2IE; if so, the verse preceding 183 began with nam; cf. K. Kleve, "Ennius in Herculaneum," CrErc 20 (1990), 12-13. Note also that in v. 184 Skutsch prefers p's non to the better attested nee. Ennius' adaptation of the characterization of Parthenopaeus at Septem 5 4 5 46 (ελθών δ' €oucei> ου καττηλεύοΈΐν μάχηΐ', / μακράς κίλ^ύθου δ' ού καται σ χ ύ ν ε ι πόροι>) has often been remarked (likewise the portrayal of Spartan behavior during the Corinthian War, in contrast with that of Philip, at Dem. 9.48 may have been influenced by the Aeschylean passage). regalis sane et digna Aeacidarum genere sentential] On Pyrrhus' lineage, which he traced back to his namesake, the son of Achilles, cf. Dietmar Kienast, RE 24.1 (1963), 112.42 ff., with stemma, 113. Cicero is surely thinking of Achilles' return (albeit for ransom) of Hector's corpse in Iliad 24. Pyrrhus' magnanimity wins an expression of approval rare for a non-Roman in this essay; cf. 2.83 (of Aratus of Sicyon): ο virum magnum dignumque qui in republics nostra natus esset! 39 Atque etiam si quid singuli temporibus adducti hosti promiserunt, est in eo ipso fides conservanda . . . ] Perhaps this is meant as an exception to the doctrine of § 32, since it would never be in one's interest to keep a promise made to the enemy. . . . ut primo Punico bello Regulus—quam fidem hosti datam fallere.] Cf. ad 3.99b-100. 40 Secundo autem Punico bello—cum scelere approbavit.] This account of those captured by Hannibal after Cannae was stricken from a part of the transmission prior to the ninth century. Thus the ζ family omits secundo
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autem Punico bello—cum scelere approbavit.5* However, ζ surely cuts into living flesh by deleting the example of C. Fabricius. Cicero is unlikely to have mentioned the nobility of Pyrrhus ($ 38) without likewise paying fining tribute to his great adversary, as he does in our passage as transmitted in the ξ tradition, calling this the maximum. . . exemplum. . . iustitiae in hostem. A different matter altogether, though lumped together with £'s procedure in most recent discussions of the problem, is the omission from c (cod. Bern. 104, s. XIII) of the words secundo autem Punico—re non erat; this excision leaves the moral of the exemplum of the ten prisoners dangling, since the words semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum est can scarcely refer to the exemplum of Regulus, which, in c, immediately precedes; surely c's omission is a simple case of saut du meme au meme (secundo autem to semper autem).59 Was the omission in C, which cannot be explained as a mechanical fault in copying, based on the interpretation of a marginal sign? This idea was suggested by the presence of "DM" in the margin of L (s. X), which Atzert4, XXIV (sim. Atzert3 app. crit. ad /oc), interpreted as = dolus malus; but the less sinister interpretation, dignum memoria, seems preferable.60 Perhaps as a result of Atzert's interpretation of u D M n G. Jachmann saw the omissions as the result of the activity of an ancient διασκβυαστής who produced an edition of this text equipped with critical signs (and presumably would have marked our passage with an obelus). 61 Now in 1845 Bergk published a brief tract de Notts preserved at cod. Paris. B.N. lat. 7530, foil. 28 r , line l-29 r , line 6, which, together with the chapter de notis sententiarum in Isidore's Origines, comprises our surviv ing ancient evidence about the critical signs used in Latin texts; the statement in the former his solis in adnotationibus fhennii Luciif et bistoricorum usi sunt fvarrus hennius, haelius aequef et postremo Probus, qui illas in Virgilio et Horatio et Lucretio apposuit, ut Homero Aristarchus does not encourage the view that Cicero, or indeed any Latin prose text, received such treat-
58. The agreement of ρ (Palat. lar. 1531, s. XIII) of the ξ family is scarcely worth mention ing; cf. Winterbottom, 1993, 225-26. 59. The possibility is raised by Wimcrbortom, 1993, 228. 60. So Winterbottom, 1993, 223, n. 42, with reference to "Notes and News," The Bodleian Library Record 3 (1951), 121, where the "D.M." found in a group of eleventh· and early twelfth-century manuscripts in the Salisbury Cathedral is so interpreted. 61. Cf. also the occurrence in φ 2 of the letter η beneath semper ($40). For interpretation of η as non and of DM as dolus malus cf. A. Cappelli, Lexicon abbreviaturarum (Milan, 1973), 103 and 229 respectively. Such signs may have motivated the omission of secundo autem Punico—re non erat in c; bur nothing is thereby indicated about the transmission of the passage in antiquity.
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ment. 62 Jachmann's hypothesis should accordingly be treated with reserve, as should, in general, the hunt for interpolations in the text of Off., which, in the sequel, Jachmann's pupil W.J. Bruser pursued with a fervor bordering on fanaticism. The transmitted text evidently contains some interpolations, as is virtually inevitable in the case of a work as much studied in antiquity as was Off.; but there is no evidence to support the notion that the text was sub jected to systematic interpolation of the type posited by Bruser. The omission of this material from the ζ tradition may have resulted from a comparison with the corrected account of 3.113-15, probably by an ancient reader rather than Cicero himself, since, as noted above, the excision alone is rhetor ically unsatisfying.63 Other considerations likewise argue for the authenticity of the material transmitted in ξ. We know from 3.113-15 that Cicero thought of the cases of Regulus and the ten Cannae captives together as positive and negative exempla of the behavior of persons who have sworn oaths to an enemy;64 an interpolator could, of course, have known and made use of the later passage. But the content of the account of the prisoners after Cannae in our passage differs from that given in 3.113-15 (hence it was not simply lifted from that place by an interpolator). In the later passage the versions of Polybius and Acilius are cited and kept scrupulously distinct. Our paragraph, on the other hand, conflates two versions: like Polybius, our passage knows of only one captive, who returned to the camp on the pretext of having forgotten some thing; like Liv. 22.61.7-9, our passage has all ten remain at Rome and receive censorial punishment. This conflation of two accounts is typical of an author relying on memory, as we see Cicero doing elsewhere in this essay (cf. ad SS 33,147). On the other hand, Off. 3.113-15 is clearly based on a recent rereading of the sources there named (see ad he). Finally, Pyrrhus' noble release of the prisoners of Heraclea without ransom in 280 appeared in the historiographical tradition as a foil for Hannibal's greed after Cannae; thus Livy makes the captives' spokesman twice appeal to the example of Pyrrhus (22.59.14 and 18); on echoes of the Ennian passage just quoted by Cicero in the same context cf. Kornhardt, 1954,98-99, n. 1; if Livy has taken over this comparison from an annalistic predecessor, a natural association of ideas 62. On rhc whole question of editions equipped with Probian critical signs cf. CO. Brink, Horace on Poetry. 2 (Cambridge, 1971), 36-38; H.D. Jocclyn, "The Annotations of M. Valerius Probus," CQ 78 (1984), 464-72 and 79 (1985), 149-61 (esp. 158) and 466-74. 63. One could, of course, reply that Cicero may have intended other adjustments, which he never lived to execute.—For another case where ξ preserves apparently genuine matter omitted by ζ cf. ad 3.52. 64. For the censors responsible see on the next lemma.
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65
would have led Cicero from the exemplum of Pyrrhus to the prisoners taken in the aftermath of Cannae. . . . eos omnes censores, quoad quisque eomm vixit, quod peierassent in aerariis reliquerunt. . . ] The battle of Cannae took place in August, 216, the censorial action in 214; Cicero's quoad quisque eorum vixit suggests that one or more of the perjurers may have died in the interval (he is evidently relying on memory rather than written sources). Gel. 6.18.8 6 6 gives the legal basis for this action as follows: turn octo ex his postliminium iustum non esse sibi responderunt, quoniam deiurio vincti forent . . . The censors in question were M. Atilius Regulus, son of the consular who would have been in the same legal position as Hannibal's erstwhile prisoners had he remained in Rome after the failure of his mission (hence perhaps Cicero's linking of the two cases both here and at 3.113), and P. Furius Philus (cf. MRR, 1, 259). For the ex-captives' subsequent fate cf. ad 3.115.—The aerarii were a class of citizens who lacked membership in a tribus and the voting rights thereby entailed (cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 3, 285) but were nonetheless subject to taxation (ibid., 2, 392, n. 2); on the power of the censors civem tribu movere et aerarium facere, ibid., 2, 402, n. 2. Maximum autem exemplum—Pyrrho dedit.J Cf. ad 3.86. 41a Meminerimus autem etiam adversus infimos iustitiam esse servandam. est autem infima condicio et fortuna servorum, quibus non male praecipiunt qui ita iubent uti ut mercennariis, operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.] As at Rep. (3.34-35/36-37), the discussion of slaves follows upon that of the helium iustum. There Philus' argument that conquest of foreign peoples and slavery are unjust was answered by Laelius. Our passage, unlike Rep., does not attempt a justification of slavery as such but merely offers precepts on the humane treatment of slaves. One wonders, however, whether, influenced by the train of thought in Rep. 3, Cicero may have inserted the topic at this point in Off., for our passage is oddly placed between precepts warning against deceit (see ad § 41 b). On the other hand, the inferior position of slaves might tempt one to commit injustice; hence the topic fits generally with the tempta tions to injustice discussed at §S 31 ff. (cf. ad 30-41), though, if this is the connection, an author less pressed for time than Cicero would surely have made it explicit. Like the example of Crassus at § 25, then, our passage should have been integrated more carefully into context. In any case, Testard rightly begins a new paragraph at this point, the subject of hellica officio 65. Less likely an interpolator, interpolators being in general casual readers whose inter ference with the text is motivated by a desire for clarification or amplification but who are not prepared to undertake any very laborious research into sources. 66. It is unclear whether Marshall is right in including this material in Nepos fr. 12.
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begun at § 34 (atque in re publica—) being now concluded.—Our passage presupposes the Old Stoic doctrine άνθρωπο? γάρ έκ φύσβω? δούλο? ouoei? [SVF 3, 86.18-19); cf. Griffin, 1976,459, contra Will Richter, "Seneca und die Sklaven," Gymnasium 65 (1958), 205; and it implicitly approves Chrysippus' doctrine servus . . . perpetuus mercennarius est [SVF 3, 86.1213 = Sen. Ben. 3.22.1; sim. SVF 3, 86.20-21: ο'ι oe δεσπόται τοΐ? αργυρώνη τοι? μη ώ? φύοΈΐ δούλοι? αλλ' ώ? μισθωτοί? προσφ€ρωνται). Chrysippus had also provided a definition for freedom and slavery (ibid., 86.30 ff. = D.L. 7.121: eivai γάρ την €λ€υθ€ρίαν έξουσίαν αύτοπραγία?. την δέ δουλ€ίαν στ€ρησιν αύτοττραγία?). At Rep. 3.36-37 Cicero, while rejecting Aristotle's view that there are "slaves by nature" {Pol. 1254bl9-20), argued that slavery is of common benefit to slave and master; cf. Jean Christian Dumont, "Conquete et esclavage chez Ciceron. De republica HI, 3 6 - 3 7 , " Ktema 8 (1983), 1 1 3 28, esp. 117; Erskine, 196-98. When at 2.24 Cicero (after Panaetius?) speaks of saevitia as the normal method of controlling slaves, he may have meant this merely as an empirical observation, as Griffin, 1976, 460, sug gests; cf. also L. Huchthausen, "Cicero und die Sklaverei. Zur Auswertung indirekter Aussagen," Klio 67 (1985), 4 8 2 - 8 3 . Seneca later provided a more elaborate plea for humane treatment of slaves (£p. 47), as well as a detailed discussion of the question raised by Hecato (fr. 18 G.), whether a slave can confer a benefit on his master [Ben. 3.18 ff.).—On the mercennarii cf. § 150. . . . operam exigendam, iusta praebenda.] These are the two terms of the master-slave relation in accord with the principle of justice ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur (cf. $ 42). This particular precept was easily accepted since it corresponds to the commonsense view long recommended by Greek and Roman writers (with sufficient food understood under the iusta); see Arist. Oec. 1344b2-4: λ€ίπ€ται δη €ργα παρ^χβν και τροφήν Ικανήν αμίσθων γάρ ούχ οίον τ€ άρχ€ΐν, δούλω oe μισθό? τροφή; Cato Agr. 5.2 (under vilici officio): familiae male ne sit, ne algeat, ne esuriat. For a casuistic problem arising from this appropriate action cf. 3.89 [sitne viri boni in maxima cantate annonae familiam non alere). In paying his own slaves for fish that they had caught (cf. Ath. 6.274d), P. Rutilius Rufus was, no doubt on Stoic princi ple, 6 7 unusually generous in his interpretation of the iusta. 41b Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi aut fraude, fiat iniuria, fraus quasi vulpeculae, vis leonis videtur; utrumque homine alienissimum, sed fraus odio digna maiore.] This material connects, not with § 41a, but with §S 3 3 - 4 0 (on deceit); the oddity of the placement of $ 41a (on slavery) may have to do with a reminiscence of the order of topics in Rep. (see the next to 67. On his career in general cf. ad 3.10.
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last note).—The lion and fox as two fixed and contrasting types make an early appearance in Greek gnomic literature; besides the Aesopian fables (nos. 10 and 147 Hausrath-Hunger [with the latter cf. Hor. Ep. 1.1.73 ff.|) cf. Pi. O. 11.19-20: το γαρ έμφυες OUT' αϊθων άλώπηξ / οΰτ' έρίβρομοι λέ οντες διαλλάζαιντο ήθος (for the fox cf. Suet. Vies. 16.3: vulpem pilum mu tate, non mores); the contempt for the latter displayed in our passage (see below) is foreshadowed at Pi. fr. 237: όπισθεν δε κεΐμαι θρασ€ΐάι> αλωπεκών ξανθός λέων; see also Ar. Pax 1189-90: όντες οϊκοι μεν λέοντες, / έν μάχη δ' αλωπεκές (with sch. ad loc: οϊκοι λέοντες: παροιμία παρά τους εν τη Ασία Λάκωνας άτυχήσαντας- "οϊκοι λέοντες, εν Έφέσω δε Λάκωνες"). The appli cation to the Spartans will, however, have been secondary; it presumably reflects the feeling of 394, when the Ephesians drove out their Spartiate harmosts and joined with Rhodes, Samos, Cnidus, and Iasus in a proAthenian alliance; cf. Paus. 6.3.15-16; Burchner, RE 5.2 (1905), 2791.45 ff.; there was a corresponding Latin proverb (Petr. 44.14: nuncpopulus est domi hones, foras vulpes). The use of the diminutive in our passage surely conveys an undertone of contempt. 68 Cicero, no less than Sallust {Cat. 10.5), was, of course, well familiar with the human type to which he allegorical I y alludes; cf. his remarks a propos Hortensius at QF 1.3.8 (quoted ad 3.73). totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior quam eorum qui turn cum maxime fallunt id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur.] The section concludes, like $ 27, with a ranking of phenomena (cf. also $ 58); cf. PI. R. 361a: εσχάτη γαρ αδικία δοκεΐν δίκαιον είναι μή όντα; Pohlenz, AF, 34. 4 2 - 6 0 Liberalitas/beneficetttia appears under the second virtue as the posi tive complement to iustitia. These terms render the Greek έλευθεριότης, properly the behavior appropriate to a free man, but in practice an aristocra tic ideal of liberality in matters of money (the exemplum of Cimon's hospi tality to his fellow Laciads 12.64] gives some notion of the original aristocra tic tincture); so it appears already in its first attestation (προς τήν τών χρημάτων ελευθεριότητα: PI. Tht. 144d). As in the case of μεγαλοψυχία, Aristotle incorporated a virtue drawn from the moral code of the archaic aristocracy in his ethical system, where it appears as a mean between the vices ασωτία and άνελευθερία (£Ν 4 irtit.). At Rome, however, the acceptance of money from another was a mark of the inferior position in a patron-client relationship (cf. 2.69); hence in the republic the ideal was freedom {libertas), and liberalitas tended to be in bad odor as too similar in character to largitio (hence perhaps Cicero's apparent lack of interest in the topic? see below); cf. 68. On rhc form vulpecula as pointing to an original fifth declension -e stem vulpes cf. Leumann, 306 and 344.
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Kloft, 5 ff.; Manning, 73 ff. Under the empire, of course, liberalitas became an ideal, just as €λευθ€ριότη? had been in the Hellenistic monarchies; cf. Kloft, 73 ff. While elsewhere in this essay Cicero's use of definitions sometimes borders on the pedantic (cf. $§ 7-8, 95-96,142), he fails to provide one for liberalitas.69 He would have had to differentiate it (presumably on the basis of intent; cf. $ 44: ab ostentatione magis quant a voluntate; 3.118; Kloft, 41, n. 25) from prodigalitas70 and/or largitio. But in practice the various forms of public generosity were hard for the observer to distinguish, a fact which, as counsel for such defendants on ambitus charges as L. Murena (63) and Cn. Plancius (54), Cicero himself had turned to advantage (cf. de Orat. 2.105:. . . raw illud datur, ut possis liberalitatem ac benignitatem ab ambitu atque brgitione seiungere; Kloft, 42 ff.). So instead of defining the term Cicero begins with cautiones (cf. ad $ 22 and under the third virtue §5 68 ff. [though there a definition of the subject has preceded]). The unusually clear organization of these paragraphs presumably shows that Cicero is, at least in outline, closely following his Panaetian model (or a part of it): I. ne obsit benignitas et Us ipsis quibus benigne videbitur fieri et ceteris (SS 42-43) II. ne benignitas maior sit quant facultates (§ 44) III. dilectus sit dignitatis (§ 45) 7 1 A. mores (§46) B. animus erga nos et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata (§S 4 7 49) C. communitas ac societas vitae 1. General precepts ($§ 50-58). 2. Changes κατά π€ρίστασιι> (§§ 59-60). However, the paucity of illustration (only the political examples of Sulla and Caesar in § 43, the [Panaetian? see ad loc] citation of Hesiod [Op. 349-501 in § 48, and the verses of Ennius in $$ 51-52) suggests that Cicero is according perfunctory treatment to material that did not interest him greatly. Moreover, comparison with Seneca, de Beneficiis, heavily indebted to the 69. There is no definition of beneficium either; it is often used in this section interchangea bly with officium; cf. ad $ 48. 70. Cf. Arist. EN U19b27 ff. and U21al0 ff. (€λ£υθ€ριότης/άσωτία); Sen. Ep. 120.8. 71. The choice is made according to different criteria (the standard being utilitas) in Book 2;d. ad 2.61-62.
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treatise ncpl καθηκοι/το? by Panaetius* pupil Hecato (cf. Griffin, 1976, 300), shows that certain topics that might have been expected in this context have been omitted, viz.» the distinction between the matter of a benefit and the benefit itself {Ben. 1.5.2); a discussion of the receiving of benefits (ibid., 2.18.1 ff.); or a reflex of the Stoic problem of whether one can confer a benefit on oneself (ibid., 5.7.2 ff.); cf. also ad 2.63 (ingratitude). 72 Even allowing for the probability that Hecato elaborated on his teacher's discus sion of benefits, one cannot but wonder whether Cicero has not effeaed considerable economies of space in this section (cf. also ad 2.63). 42 Deinceps, ut erat propositum, de benefkentia ac de liberalitate dicatur: qua quidem nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius, sed habet multas cautioner.] The two operative terms {beneficentia, liberalitate) are closely bound together (ac), since, as Manning, 73, phrased it, uliberalitas . . . is the disposition from which the act of conferring a beneficium is derived**; cf. de Orat. 2.105 {liberalitatem ac benignitatem); cf. also the relation of the two constituents of the third virtue [rerum externarum despicientia and the per formance of great deeds) as described at §§ 66-67.—For the description qua . . . nihil est naturae hominis accommodatius cf. $ 1 3 : quod verum simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum. It is doubtful, however, that Cicero intends some subtle distinction between what is accommodatum and what is aptum; as elsewhere in this essay, he has perhaps not thought through and compared the terms in which he praises the different qualities; cf. ad S§ 55-56.—For the procedure of beginning, not with a definition, but rather cautiones cf. ad §$ 4 2 - 6 0 . . . . turn ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur, id enim est iustitiae fundamentum, ad quam haec referenda sunt omnia.] Cicero's dilectus dignitatis ($$ 45 ff.) turns out not to have the obvious sense of social status, as at Sen. Ben. 2.15.3 (aestimanda est eius persona, cut damus; quaedam enim minora sunt, quam ut exire a magnis viris debeant etc.; cf. also Ben. 2.16.1-2 and ad 2.69 below).—For the formula ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur to be called the iustitiae fundamentum comes as something of a surprise; after all, fides had received this predicate at 5 23a (see ad loc); for the Stoic formula for justice "giving to each his own** cf. § 15 and ad § 2 1 ; Sorabji, 142-43.—For the relation of iustitia and beneficentia cf. SVF 3, 64.24-25 and 4 1 , where χρηστότης, defined as επιστήμη εΰττοιητικη, is subordinated to δικαιοσύιτι; Kloft, 40, n. 20. 72. On the other hand, in view of the way the project has been delimited at $$ 7b-8, it is understandable that Cicero does not discuss the conferring of benefits between sages, mentioned at Sen. Ben. 7.17.1.
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. . . qui gratificantur cuipiam quod obsit illi cui prodesse velle videantur, non benefici neque liberates sed perniciosi adsentatores iudicandi sunt. . .] Plato gives the following description of όψοποιική at Grg. 464e2 ff.: κολακείαν μεν ουν αυτό καλώ, και αΐσχρόν φημι είναι το τοιούτον . . . δτι του ήδεο? στο χάζεται άνευ του βέλτιστου . . . Seneca dilates on this point at Ben. 2.14.1: sunt quaedam nocitura impetrantibus, quae non dare sed negate beneficium est; aestimabimus itaque utilitatem potius quam voluntatem petentium. saepe enim noxia concupiscimus . . . quia iudicium interpellat adfectus; sed cum subsedit cupiditas, cum impetus Hie flagrantis animi, qui consilium fugat, cecidit, detestamur perniciosos malorum munerum auctores. On the figure of the κόλαξ in ancient comedy and philosophy down to Lucian's time cf. H.-G. Nesselrath, Lukians Parasitendialog. Untersuchungen und Kommentar (Berlin-New York, 1985), 92 ff.; Cicero had dealt in detail with the adsentator at Amic. 88-100; cf. also ad § 91 and 2.63. . . . qui aliis nocent ut in alios liberates sint in eadem sunt iniustitia ut si in suam rem aliena convertant.] Cf. Arist. EN 1120a31-33: ουδέ λήψεται δε (sc. ό ελευθέριος] δθεν μη δει- ου γάρ εστί τοϋ μη τιμώντο? τά χρήματα ή τοιαύτη λήψις; ibid., 1121a30 ff.: άλλ' οι πολλοί των άσωτων, καθάπερ ειρηται, και λαμβάνουσιν όθεν μή δει, καΐ είσΐ κατά τούτο ανελεύθεροι. . . . διόπεροΰδ'ελευθέριοι αϊ δόσειςαύτώνεΐσίνούγάρκαλαί,ούδέ τούτου ένεκα, ουδέ ως- δει. Imperial propaganda would later emphasize the pure methods used to obtain the material of benefactions; cf. Kloft, 148, n. 311. 43 sunt autem multi, et quidem cupidi splendoris et gloriae, qui eripiunt aliis quod aliis largiantur,... id autem tantum abest (ab> officio ut nihil magis officio possit esse contrarium.] This is a point on which Cicero insists throughout Off., namely that iustitia is universal and cannot be obtained at the expense of another's rights; cf. § 2 1 , 2.73 ff., 3.21 ff., 42, etc.; de Orat. 2.172 (example of an argument ex pari): est eiusdem et eripere et contra rempublicam largiri pecunias; cf. also the deprecation of political activity in the interest of a single faction only at $ 85; sim. Plin. Ep. 9.30.2: sunt ingenio simili qui quod huic donant auferunt illi, famamque liberalitatis avaritia petunt.—This first mention of personal glory in Off. (as opposed to the gloria belli of 5 38) already emphasizes that its pursuit is fraught with dangers to the community; cf. introduction, p. 32.—Largitio is more com monly used in the republic, as here, in view of its corrupting tendency, with a negative, rather than positive or neutral coloring; cf. Montefusco-Buchwald, TLL 7.2, 971.1 ff.; ad 2.53; under the impact of imperial propaganda, however, the positive sense comes to prevail (cf. Kloft, 159 and n. 355), as reflected in modern derivatives (French largesse or English largess). How-
Commentary on Book 1, Section 42-44
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ever, Pliny, himself a philanthropist, takes a more discriminating view of benefactions (see above and ad 2.69). quare L. Sullae, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet libcralis videri; . . .] Catul. 29.15 already refers to Caesar's sinistra liberalitas. Cicero, however, is surely thinking above all of the disposition of the property of the proscribed, a topic much on his mind at this time as Phil. 2.64 ff. (on Antony as purchaser of Pompey's property) attests; cf. Kloft, 51 ff., and ad 2.29; Sallust's Cato remarks (Cat. 52.11): iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus: quia bona aliena largiri liberalitas . . . vocatur, eo respublica in extremo sita est. Cicero could, however, if so minded (cf. ad § 88: . . . nihil enim laudabilius . . .), have used Caesar as a positive exemplum of liberalitas; cf. Fam. 1.9.18 (to Lcntulus, December, 54): . . . commemoranda quaedam et divina Caesaris in me fratremque meum liberalitas, evidently a reference to Caesar's loan to Cicero of 800,000 sesterces (first expressly attested at Att. 5.5.2 [15 May 51]), a cause of some embarrassment as Cicero drifted toward Pompey's side in the civil war; cf. Shatzman, 416-17. Cf. also Caesar's statement of policy to Oppius (5 March 49, apud Cic. Att. 9.7C.1): . . . quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam, quern imitaturus non sum. haec nova sit ratio vincendi ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus. 44 Alter locus erat cautionis ne benignitas maior esset quam facilitates . . . ] Aristotle's ελευθε piοτης· still betrays its origin in the moral code of the archaic nobility: ελευθερίου δ' εστί σφόδρα και το ύπερβάλλειν εν τη δοσει, ώστε κατάλειπε ι ν έαυτφ ελάττω' το γαρ μη βλεπειν εφ' εαυτόν ελευθερίου (ΕΝ 1120b4-6); he does, however, recognize the corresponding vice of excess, namely ασωτία. Our passage, on the other hand, suggests the transformation of ελευθερωτής· into an ideal within reach of all; cf. 2.59, where moderation in view of one's financial position is clearly what Cicero understands under the mediocritatis regula (cf. Kloft, 141). Seneca takes a similar line (Ben. 2.15.1): dabo egenti, sed ut ipse non egeam; succurram perituro, sed ut ipse non peream . . . ; he does, however, also add a proviso at the other end of the scale (Ben. 2.15.3): respiciendae sunt cuique facultates suae viresque, ne aut plus praestemus, quam possumus, aut minus (cf. SVF 3, 135.10, where τήν κτησιν διαρρίπτειν is given as a κατά περίστασιν καθήκον). Liberalitas so conceived contrasts not only with the earlier Adebethik but also with the Christian morality of the following era (cf. Zielinski, 69); for Lactantius' critique of measured charity cf. inst. 6.11; Nelson, 66. . . . qui benigniores volunt esse quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant,
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quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos;...] Cf. Arist. EN 1120b2-3: ούδ' αμελή σει των ιδίων, βουλωμένος- γε δια τούτων τισίν επαρκεί ν; § 5 2 : . . . Μ/ facultas sit qua in nostros simus liberates; 2.64 {habenda autem ratio est ret familiaris . . .); Hecato's position reported at 3.63. The Twelve Tables prohibited a prodigal from handling his own affairs; he later received a curator on the analogy of the lunatic; cf. FJRA 1, 5.7c = Dig. 27.10.1 (Ulpian), Ulp. 12.2; Watson, Persons, 156-57; Edwards, 180 ff. inest autem in tali liberalitate cupiditas pierumque rapiendi et auferendi per iniuriam, ut ad largiendum suppetant copiae.) Such behavior is only called liberalitas by a corruption of usage according to the Sallustian Cato {Cat. 52.11), quoted ad $ 43; cf. also ad 2.52-64. videre etiam beet plerosque, non tam natura liberales quam quadam gloria duaos, ut benefici videantur facere multa quae proficisci ab ostentarione magis quam a voluntate videantur.] In some sense the desire to put one's generosity on display can be called a voluntas. But Cicero evidently uses the Latin word in the technical sense of the Stoic βούλησις·,73 defined as εύλογοςόρεξις· (SVF 3.41.33; 105.20 and 27) and the opposite of επιθυμία (ibid., 105.20). Cf. Tusc. AM (= SVF 3, 106.45 ff.): quam ob rem simul obiecta species est cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eiusmodi adpetitionem Stoici βούλησι ν appellant, nos appellemus voluntatem. earn illi putant in solo esse sapiente, quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. Cf. also Sen. Ben. 1.6.1: quid est ergo beneficium? benevola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit, prona et sponte sua parata. itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo; Marc. Aurel. 9.42.11-12: προδήλως· γάρ σον το αμάρτημα, . . . είτε την χάριν διδούς* μη καταληκτικώς έ'δωκας μηδέ ώστε έξ αυτής- της* σής- πράξεως· ευθύς· άπειληφεναι πάντα τον καρπόν. τί γάρ πλέον θέλεις- ευ ποιήσας- ανθρωπον; οΰκ άρκεΐ τούτο, δτι κατά φύσιν την σήν τι επραξας·, αλλά τούτου μκτθον ζητείς; (sim., ibid., 1.16.25). On right intent as a prerequisite for virtuous action cf. ad 2A2a. Glory is recognized as an instrumental value in Book 2; cf. the introduction to that Book. In practice, it will be very difficult to distinguish between those whose benefactions are prompted by "nature" and those who desire glory (cf. ad §§ 42-60). talis autem simulatio vanitati est coniunctior quam aut liberalitati aut honestati.] "Such pretence is closer to sham than either to liberality or honorableness" (Atkins). The characterization as simulatio brings this behavior 73. Not to be confused with modern concepts of will; cf. Inwood, 1985, 96 ff.
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into the realm of dolus tnalus; cf. Aquilius* definition of the latter, which turns upon simulation (3.60). Vanitas ("untruthfulness, insincerity": cf. OLD s.v., lb) is a somewhat euphemistic designation; cf. $ 150, where middlemen in commercial transactions are said to be likely to fall into it. 45 Tertium est propositum, ut in beneficentia dilectus esset dignitatis; . . .J Cf. ad SS 42, 4 2 - 6 0 , and 2.61-62. . . . et animus erga nos, et communitas ac societas vitae, et ad nostras utilitates officia ante conlata.] Unger, 28, suggested transposing et ad nostras utilitates officia ante collata after et animus erga nos; certainly these two are treated together prior to communitas ac societas vitae at SS 4 7 - 4 9 , and an omission of et ad nostras . . . through saut du meme au meme {et. . . *f), its insertion in the margin and then in the wrong place in the text is not impossi ble; but in this essay such a transposition may well be a correction of the author; cf. ad $ 125 and Pohlenz, AF, 36, n. 2. quae ut concurrent omnia, optabile est; si minus, plures causae maioresque ponderis plus habebunt.] Besides the factors mentioned here, there are also considerations of special circumstance (S 59); hence one will need to be a bonus ratiocinator officiorum (ibid.) to do justice to one's responsibilities. 46 Quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis . . . ] The realism of Panaetius contrasts markedly with the Older Stoa's concentra tion on the sapiens-, cf. fr. 114 = Sen. Ep. 116.5: eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti an sapiens amaturus esset. 'De sapiente* inquit 'videbimus: mihi et tibi, quiadhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum ut incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancupatam, vilem sibi\ H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge, 1965), 182, comments: a The question of the wise man's conduct can be postponed. It is 'you and Γ who are our immediate concern"; cf. ad 3.13-16.—For the phrasing cf. Fam. 4.14.1 (to Cn. Plancius, January, 45): . . . sin autem in eo dignitas est si quod sentias aut re efficere possis aut denique libera oratione defenderey ne vestigium quidem ullum est reliquum nobis dignitatis agiturque praeclare si nosmet ipsos regere possumus ut ea quae partim iam adsunt, partim impendent, moderate feramus. . . . nemincm omnino esse neglegcndum in quo aliqua significario virtutis appareat. . .] While using character as a criterion, Cicero/Panaetius is pre pared to cast his net widely (see previous note). As at $ 13\,significatio is an "outward sign, expression, intimation" (cf. OLD s.v., 2a). On the sense of apparere (= be noticed, show itself) cf. OLD s.v. appareo lb. . . . colendum autem esse ita quemque maxime ut quisque maxime virtutibus
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his lenioribus erit ornatus, modestia, temperantia, . . . iustitia. nam fortis animus et magnus—bonum virum videntur potius attingere.] A different division of virtues from § § 15-17 or §$ 153 ff.: the danger of the potentially antisocial third virtue is explicitly recognized for the first time (cf. §§ 68 ff.); the first virtue is ignored; cf. also ad 2.33 and 3.24. acque haec in moribus.] For in = u in the matter of," virtually equivalent to de, cf. OLD s.v., 42; Wilkins on de Orat. 2.96. 47 . . . sed benivolentiam non adulescenmlorum more ardore quodam amoris, sed stabilitate potius et constantia iudicemus.] As elsewhere, Cicero/ Panaetius values stable relations; cf. $§ 74 ff.; 2.55b; ad § 49; similarly Seneca a propos amicitia (Ep. 9.11): non dubie habetaliquidsimileamicitiae adfectus amantium; possis dicere ilbm esse insanam amicitiam. nullum enim officium referenda gratia magis necessarium esc] Indeed lack of reciprocity was grounds for dissolving friendship; cf. Sailer, 14. Consider ations of this kind informed Cicero's decision in 49 to follow Pompey rather than Caesar in the civil war; cf. Brunt, 1986, esp. 16; Mitchell, 1991, 253 (cf., however, on Caesar's loan to Cicero ad § 43 above). Cf. also 2.63.—This is an isolated instance of the gerundive as an ablative of comparison; cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, § 203, IV.A). 48 quod si ea quae utenda acceperis maiore mensura, si modo possis, iubet reddere Hesiodus, quidnam beneficio provocati facere debemus?] Cf. Op. 349-50: €υ μει> μετρεΐσθαι παρά yeiTovos, eu δ' άποδοΟναι, / αύτω τψ μ^τρω, και λώϊον αϊ κ€ δύι/ηαι, a passage well known to Cicero, who refers to it on his own several times in 4 6 - 4 5 with reference to literary dedications owed to Atticus and Varro; cf. Brut. 15: quae |sc. the contents of the Liber annalis] cum studiose tractare coepissem, ipsa mihi tractatio litterarum salutaris fuit admonuitque, Pomponi, ut a te ipso sumerem aliquid ad me reddendum teque remunerandum si non parit at grato tamen munere: quamquam illud Hesiodium laudatur a doctis, quod eadem mensura reddere iubet qua ac ceperis aut etiam cumulation, si possis; Att. 13.12.3 (23 June 45): . . . iam Varro mihi denuntiaverat magnam sane et gravem προσφώνησα'. . . . ego autem me parabam ad id quod tile mihi misisset ut "αύτω τφ μετρώ και λιοιοί'," si modo potuissem; nam hoc etiam Hesiodus ascribit, **αΐ κε δύι>ηαι." Cf. ad § 30. etenim si in eos quos speramus nobis profuturos non dubitamus officia conferre, quales in eos esse debemus qui iam profuerunt?] Cicero adds a second argument of the a fortiori type not seldom met with in this treatise; cf. ad$$ 14,103,114,119,131,145,157,2.29,40,3.29-32,74,84,105.This sentence contradicts the distinction whereby beneficium is used for the first gesture establishing a /J
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kindness (cf. also the next sentence: nam cum duo genera liberalitatis sint, unum dandi beneficii, alterum reddendi. . .); in practice the two terms were often used interchangeably; cf. Sailer, 19-20. . . . non reddere viro bono non licet, modo id facere possit sine iniuria.] Aristotle, too, gave high priority to returning benefactions; cf. EN 1164b3132: και τάς μέν eucpyeoi ας άνταποδοτεον ώς em το πολύ μάλλον ή χαριστέον εταίροι?, ώσπβρ και 6άν€ΐον,(ρόφ€ίλ€ΐ αποδοτέου μάλλον ή έταίρωδοτεον. On vir bonus as an equivalent to vir iustus cf. ad 2.33; for its use in Roman sponsiones see 3.77. The saving clause modo id facere possit sine iniuria is in accord with §S 31 ff., as well as §§ 4 2 - 4 4 . 49 . . . nee dubium quin maximo cuique plurimum debeatur.] Sc. beneficio. multi enim faciunt multa temeritate quadam sine iudicio fvel morbo in omnes velf rcpentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi incitati; . . .] Cicero's beneficentia is indeed "more rule-bound and less spontaneous than our 'generosity'" (Atkins, 266). As one should avoid rashness in such mat ters oneself (cf. § 47), so when practiced by others a spontaneous act carries less weight than a carefully considered one; so, too, premeditated wrongdo ing is more serious than a crime of passion (cf. ad § 27). The articulation as well as the text of this sentence is unresolved. T. Stangl in a review of C. Atzert, De Ciceronis librorum de officiis quibusdam codicibus I (Osnabruck, 1914), in Berliner philologische Wochenschrift 35 (1915), 46, defends the transmitted text with the argument that "morbus und furor, wie i w o s und μανία, klassische Vertreter sind fur 'mafiloser Hang, krankhafte Passion, Sucht, Manic*" In support of this assertion he adduces two Ciceronian passages, Ver. 2.4.1 and Fin. 1.59 (I leave aside the post-classical testimonies, which would in any case prove nothing for Cicero nian usage). In the former passage we read: venio nunc ad istius, quern ad modum ipse appellat, studium, ut amici eius, morbum et insaniam, ut Siculi, latrocinium; but here surely the juxtaposition with insaniam and the fact that it is one of three designations for the same state of affairs is what makes Cicero's meaning clear, as morbus alone (as in our passage) would not. Likewise at Fin. 1.59 it is the context and the specification animi morbi that rule out any possible ambiguity: quodsi corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates inmensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. Earlier attempts to defend the transmitted text along similar lines have been sufficiently refuted by A. Tittler, "Restaurationsversuche . . .," Jahrbucher fur Phil. u. Pad. 99 (1864), 500. Two different types of ill-advised giving are contrasted, the former a prodigality that fails to discriminate between objects (sine iudicio), the latter
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a sudden impulse to give; cf. the similar distinction at Sen. Wit. Beat. 24.1: errat si quis existimat faeilem rem esse donare: plurimum ista res habet difficultat is, si modo consilio tribuitur, non casu et impetu spargitur. By its nature this second type of giving must have an individual, not omnes, as its object (hence a comma is needed after omnes). The latter is compared to a (gust of) wind, the former surely to a disease in the sense that the individual loses control over his life (cf. ad § 44 for the handling of the prodigal under Roman law). Since, as we have seen, morbo without a qualifier can hardly denote a "krankhafte Sucht" or the like, surely Beier's velkutl is needed. But the text still needs another verbal idea for the prior type of benefac tion, rather than having to rely on incitati, more appropriate for the sudden impulse (repentino quodam quasi vento impetu animi). Hence Pohlenz, AF, 36, n. 3, comparing for the thought $ 44 and 2.54-55, proposed sine iudicio vel modo keffusil velkutl morbo in omnes {modo appears as a weakly attested variant for morbo); for effusi Pohlenz compares farad. 2 1 : an virum . . . dices . . . temperantem qui se in aliqua libidine continuent, in aliqua effuderitf (his reference to Att. 5.9.3 is in error, however); for the participle effusus used for an adjective in the sense largus, prodigiosus cf. Leumann, TLL 5, 219.71 ff. However, vel modo . . . velkutl morbo seems an unneces sary expansion. Surely either after Pohlenz velkutl morbo in omnes keffusil or after Holford-Strevens {apud Winterbottom) velkutl morbo in omnes kprodigil would restore the probable sense. For the former type of misguided benefaction {sine iudicio) cf. Sen. Ben. 1.14.1: beneficium si qui quibuslibet dat, nulli gratum dat... In the case of the latter the problem (not addressed in our text) might arise of the agent later regretting his action; cf. Plin. Ep. 1.8.8:. . . postremo ut subitae largitionis comitem paenitentiam caveremus; Plut. Tim. 6.2 ff. (after Panaetius?): δβΐ γάρ οΰ μόνον . . . την πράξιν καλήν €ΐναι και δικαίαν, άλλα και την δόξαν, άφ' ης πράττβται, μόνιμο»; και άμίτάπτωτον, 'ίνα πράττωμίν δοκιμάσαιτίς . . . αίσχρόν γάρ ή μ€τάνοια ποΐ€Ϊ και το καλώς π€πραγμ€νον, ή δ' έξ επιστή μης ώρμημξ'νη και λογισμού προαίρεσις ούδ' αν πταίσωσιν αί πράξ€ΐς μ€ταβάλλ€ται. sed in conlocando beneficio—tamen ei potissimum inserviunc] The phrase conlocare beneficium, like conlocare pecuniam, suggests again that this is an act requiring careful deliberation; cf. Sen. Ben. 1.1.1: sequitur enim, ut male conlocata male debeantur. For the contrast of conlocare and effundere cf. ad 2.54; for the phrase conlocare pecuniam and the metaphor of "investing" glory cf. ad 2.42b.—Heilmann, 86, points out that, given the unconditional requirement of returning favors and the restriction si cetera paria sunt, in practice little scope would ordinarily remain for helping the needy; cf. also
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§ 52. However» Cicero/Panaetius inveighs at length at 2.69 ff. against the practice of helping those from whom one expects to gain, rather than those in need.—The hope of benefit appears likewise as a motive both for those who contribute to or augment a person's standing or power at 2.21-22 5 0 - 5 8 This is among the most disputed passages of Off. in respect both of text and source-analysis. Its presence is motivated by the third (according to the transmitted text) of the criteria for the dilectus dignitatis in conferring officia at § 45: the communitas ac societas vitae. Hence our section begins with the general precept: optime . . . societas hominum coniunctioque servabitur si, ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plunmum conferetur. Next we are put on notice that a digression will follow: sed quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius. But there is no indication of why such an explanation is needed at this point; one might well have thought the matter to have been already disposed of at § 12. In any case, we are warned that the following discussion will exceed the modest parameters within which the preceding parallel points have been handled: no. 1 = § 46; nos. 2 and 4 = §§ 4 7 - 4 9 . The sequel in §§ 50b-52 is a description of the society that subsists among all humankind by virtue of their being human: it is based on λόγο?, and the benefits deriving from it are such as to entail no loss to the giver, such as giving free access to flowing water, allowing a person to light fire from one's fire, etc. As one expects in a treatise emphasizing practical precepts (§ 7b), this section con cludes with practical guidelines {vulgaris liberalitas referenda est ad ilium Ennifinem 'nihilo minus ipsilucet*. . . : § 52). § 53 then offers a systematic survey of societies from broad to narrow: 1) the human race; 2) the gens, natio, lingua; 3) fellow citizens; 4) relatives. Anyone expecting that for nos. 2), 3), and 4) guidelines would be issued similar to those for no. 1) will be disappointed, however. For § 54 begins an analysis of the principia com munitatis et societatis humanae from a different perspective: it traces the genesis of the state from the primum coniugium of sexual partners. Here we enter an altogether different realm. The goal of §§ 4 2 - 5 3 has been to deter mine principles by which liberalitas and beneficentia should be directed to ward individuals: hence the precept that benefits be in proportion ut quisque erit coniunctissimus at the beginning of $ 50 and the subsequent delineation of degrees of coniunctio. In §§ 5 4 - 5 8 , however, Cicero uses the digression on quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae as an excuse to introduce successively the family, the state, and friendship as kinds of society. In the process he loses sight, however, of the original goal of the discussion and speaks as if a σύγκρισις oisocietates and their claims on one's officia, not recipients of beneficia, were in question. Note that in § 59, when
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Cicero evidently returns to the Panaetian model that was his starting point, the old premise of individuals as objects returns (although Cicero now speaks of officia, rather than beneficia, as in § 58: quibus plurimum tribuendum sit
officii7*). As is clear from the foregoing, §§ 50-53 fit with the overall plan of the section on liberalitas/beneficentia,75 whereas §§ 5 4 - 5 8 deal with the similar but really distinct question of ranking officia owed to different societies;76 the use of officium in this section with reference to the state may have been the problem perceived by Articus when he objected to officium as a transla tion of καθήκον (cf. introduction, § 2). It seems likely, then, that Cicero, who criticizes Panaetius several times in the course of Off. (at % 7a for the omis sion of a definition of officium; at 2.16 for the multiplication of unnecessary examples) and speaks of following his model iudicio arbitrioque nostro (§ 6) and correctione quadam adhibita (3.7), has parted company from Panaetius in §S 5 4 - 5 8 . Cicero was evidently not content to reproduce a ranking of benefits owed to individuals only; he wanted the state to play some role in the ranking, even though this entailed breaking out of Panaetius' framework; and he doubtless felt that Panaetius had given short shrift to friendship since familiares rank below propinqui in 5 53, contrary to the argument that Cicero had recently developed at Amic. 19-20. Hence Cicero conceived SS 5 4 - 5 8 , dealing not with benefits, but in general with appropriate actions, and involving a ranking not of individuals, but types of society. For executing §§ 5 4 - 5 8 , Cicero used some philosophical materials. The section emphasizes the importance of the state and of friendship. He had dealt with the former in the lost introduction to de Republica, which in cluded a σίτγκρισι? of patria and parens to the advantage of the former (fr. la, quoted ad $ 57); and he is known to have been reading about πολιτέΐαι as recently as April, 46 (cf. ad 3.69); cf. also ad $ 54. For friendship, on the other hand, he had to hand materials recently used in Amic. (see ad $$ 54 and 55-56J. 7 7 But what Cicero evidently lacked was the time and power of 74. On the imerchangeability of the terms cf. ad $ 48. 75. Note also that in $ 53 the stages of human bonding, albeit somewhat simplified and given in the reverse of the normal order, correspond to other Stoic versions of the doctrine of oiiceiwOT·?; cf. ad loc. 76. Thomas, 15 if., contributed important observations leading to this conclusion; how ever, he regarded only the patria in SS 57-58 as a Ciceronian "Einschub" and failed to see that the encomium of amicitia at $$ 55 ff. really docs not fit with the Panaetian scheme at S 53. 77. Johann, 85 ff., argues that in SS 57-59 Cicero has enlarged Panaetius with Posidonian materials; for SS 57-58 this notion rests upon a very slippery argumentum ex silentio, viz., that Cicero has removed mention of the gods from S 58 (but why should he have done so, when he included it at S 160?). For SS 59-60 see ad loc.
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concentration that would have enabled him to combine these entities in a coherent whole without seams showing. Thus, after a warm encomium of the familiaritas of viri boni he appends, apparently for completeness' sake, a note on the importance of friendship based upon exchange of beneficia (§ 56b), which, however, would really have belonged under the utile in Book 2. Then in S 57 we find an encomium of the patria as subsuming all other loved ones; we are told that for the patria one should be prepared even to die. The plethora of superlatives, or rather, negated comparatives, in §$ 55-57 (sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior. . . nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius . . . sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior . . .) might well leave the reader in doubt as to the precise ranking Cicero has in mind. Hence in S 58 he undertakes to systematize the relations among the different claimants ac cording to this hierarchy: 1) patria et parentes, 2) liberi totaque domus, 3) bene convenientes propinqui. Once again, friendship is omitted, and so Cicero adds another encomium of friendship to the end of § 58. Thus we have the juxtaposition, without any explanation, of two analyses of societies in SS 50-53 and § 54, then in SS 55-57 encomia of several types of friend ship and then the patria, in which each seems to be outbidding the last, then finally a systematic scheme that surprisingly omits one of the societies most praised in the preceding paragraphs, which is then added as an afterthought. The resulting text, for all its untidiness, seems likely to be in essentially the state in which Cicero left it. Certainly the bracketing in SS S5-56 of sed omnium societatum—id maxime efficit by Bruser, 122, does not go to the root of the problem; see ad loc. 50 sed quae natura principia sint communitatis et societatis humanae, repetendum videtur altius.] The reader is put on notice that this is not going to be merely a schematic account of the degrees of human coniunctio, though the reason why such a digression is needed at this point is never explained (see preceding note). It will penetrate more deeply into the natural origins {quae natura principia sint78) of human fellowship and society; principium appears here in two senses: at $$ 50-53 the principia constitute the most rudimen tary society, whereas in § 54 principia - άρχαί (cf. principium urbis et quasi seminarium rei publicae); on τά πρώτα κατά φύσιν as a basis for Panaetian ethics cf. ad SS H - H . est enim primum quod cemitur in universi generis humani societate. eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio—naturali quadam societate . . .] Ratio et oratio, of course, = λόγος; cf. ad S 12 above. On the Stoic conception of a 78. c's natura = φύσο is surely to be preferred to the otherwise attested naturae.
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prescriptive reason which instructs its possessors "how to treat each other as social animals" and thereby enables them to constitute a community cf. Schofield, 1991, 67 ff., esp. 72. . . . neque ulla re longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus, iustitiam aequitatem bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.] It was commonly accepted in antiquity that animals could possess courage; thus at PI. Lg. 963e the Athenian stranger distinguishes ανδρεία and φρόνησι? and assigns animals and young children a share in the former, but not the latter (cf. Sorabji, 10-11); sim. Sen. Ep. 76.9: in homine quid est optimumf ratio: hac antecedit animalia, deos sequitur. ratio ergo perfecta propnum bonum est, cetera Mi cum animalibus satisque communia sunt, valet: et leones. However, in Plato's Laches Nicias developed a definition of bravery as knowledge of things that give rise to fear and confidence (196d), a definition that would, he admits, contrary to ordinary usage, exclude animals, women, and children (197b-c).—The idea of justice as a quality distinguishing man and beast is implicit in Protagoras' myth, in which animals prevailed over humans by brute force before the latter developed the πολιτική τβχνη (PI. Prot. 322b); at R. 588e the beast and the human are conceived as elements within each person; he who argues for the profitability of injustice fattens the beast but starves the human. Arist. EN 1161a35 ff. formulated in general terms: ωφελείται μεν γαρ πάντα ταύτα ύπό των χρωμένων, φιλία δ' ουκ έστι προ? τα άψυχα ουδέ δίκαιον. . . . δοκεΐ γαρ εΐναί τι δίκαιον παντι άνθρωπω προς πάντα τον δυνάμενον κοινωνήσαι νόμου και συνθήκης . . . Cf. also Chrysippus' view that there is no justice between humans and other animals because of their dissimilarity (SVF 3, 89.27 ff.). For the general distinction between humans and animals based upon the former's possession of reason, which includes a community-building function, cf. ad §§ 11-12. 51 ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est. in qua omnium rerum quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit est servanda communitas, ut quae discripta sunt legibus et iure civili, haec ita teneantur ut est constitutum legibus ipsis, cetera sic observentur ut in Graecorum proverbio est, amicorum esse communia omnia.] The latter sentence raises various problems of the text and its articulation. Atzert 2 enclosed the words ut quae—observentur in double square brackets as a Ciceronian marginal note that crept into the text; though Atzert abandoned this policy in later editions in view of the critique of Bruser, 7 ff., this material is bracketed as an interpolation by Gunermann. Tempting as this solution may appear at first glance (the subject of the passage as a whole being, not
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private property, but the property held in common by users of reason), it is surely a correction of the author; for Cicero/Panaetius is evidently at pains to contain within the fixed bounds of the ius civile Stoic doctrines about prop erty that nature meant for the common use of humankind (quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit); cf. Erskine, 109. The early Stoa, on the other hand, had allowed greater scope for common property, with Zeno advocating, for instance, like Plato in the Republic, the community of women; cf. ad § 21 and, for Cicero's view of the Cynically colored early Stoa, ad § 128. Cicero has accordingly added after the precept. . . est servanda communitas a consecutive clause (an ita before servanda would have been helpful) to clarify his meaning—actually two consecutive clauses in asyn deton to provide both negative and positive clarification. Discripta (PV), not descripta (BP2[?1£), is clearly needed for the function of setting into system atic order; cf. Leg. 3.44 discriptus {de- codd.) enim populus censu ordinibus aetatibus . . . ; Vertec, TLL 1.7,1354.72 ff.; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89; cf. ad § 1 2 4 . The text ut est constitutum legibus ipsis contains Pearce's est for the universally transmitted sit, a change which, in spite of the possibility of attraction of indicative to subjunctive, seems likely in view of the parallel clause ut in Graecorum proverbio est. . . ; in addition, legibus (before ipsis) is the conjecture of Gulielmius (accepted by Madvig ad Fin. 4.13) for the transmitted e(x) quibus.—For κοινά τα φίλων cf. PI. Pbdr. 279c6 and Lg. 739c2-3; the words are already cited as a proverb at Arist. EN 1159b31 and 1168b7-8 and Pol. 1263a30; they are attributed to Pythagoras by Timaeus {FGrHist 566 F 13b) apud D.L. 8.10; cf. Zenob. 4.79 (cum test.); Diogen. 5.76; Otto, 20; Swoboda, 95. The Stoics applied the proverb to the wise; cf. Stob. 2.7 = 2, 101.21 W.-H.: τά δ' αγαθά πάντα κοινά el ναι τών σπουδαίων . . . 5 1 - 5 2 omnium autem communia hominum—ex quo sunt ilia communia: . . .] Cicero cites verses from an unknown play of Ennius (= seen. 398-400 = trag. 366-68 = 313-15 Jocelyn) 79 to illustrate what is meant by omnium . . . communia hominum. He presents the doctrine that one should grant even to a stranger whatever can be provided without loss as if it were a precept abstracted from Ennius' example (una ex re satis praecipit. . .). It is conceivable that Panaetius offered a similar poetic citation at this point in the argument, e.g., αγνοείς ev ταΐς άραΐς / δ τι εστίν, eli τις μη φράσει' ορθώς 79. Cicero likewise quotes qui errantt comiter monstrat viam in the course of refuting the prosecution's interpretation comiter = communiter in the provision maiestatem populi Ramant comiter conservanto at Balb. 36.
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όδόν / ή πΐιρ έναύσει\ ή διαφθείρει* ύδωρ, / ή δειπνιεΐν μέλλοντα κωλύσαι τινά; (Diphilus fr. 62 Κ.-Α.)· 80 If Panaetius had cited this passage, this fact might help explain the apparent allusion to it by his student Hecato in an argument given to Antipater of Tarsus (cf. ad 3.54).—For quasi lumen de suo lumine accendat cf. Ov. AA 3.93: quis vetet adposito lumen de lumine sumi. . . f 52 non prohibere aqua profluente, pari ab igne ignem capere . . .] Cf. Mer cian. Dig. 1.8.2.1: et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt ilia: aer, aqua profluens et mare et per hoc litora maris; for ab igne ignem capere cf. preceding note. The aquae et ignis interdictio was originally imposed upon persons accused of a capital offense who did not present themselves for the reading of the verdict; later, when the individual quaestiones received juris diction over capital offenses, the aquae et ignis interdictio replaced capital punishment: cf. Hartmann, RE 2.1 (1895), 308, 25 ff. s.v. aquae et ignis interdictio. Cf. also Paul. Fest. p. 2M: Aqua et igni tarn interdict solet damnatis, quam accipiunt nuptae, videlicet quia hae duae res humanam vitam maxime continent. Therefore at PI. Aul. 91-94 the miser Euclio's instruc tions to his servant Staphyla to extinguish the hearth-fire, so that no one will ask for a light, and deny that she has any water are the ultimate antisocial acts: cf. David Konstan, Roman Comedy (Ithaca and London, 1983), 36 and n. 5; cf. also Ov. M. 6.349 (Latona loquitur): quid probibetis aquisf usus communis aquarum est. Since Panaetius was not averse to multiplying examples (cf. 2.16), one wonders whether he offered still more of them (cf. in permultas); cf. Ar. Did. apud Stob. 2.7 = 2, 121.3 ff. W.-H.: τίνα γαρ ουκ αν έξελεΐσθαι θεασάμενον άνθρωπον ύττό θηρίου καταδυναστεύαμε νον, ei δύναιτο; τίνα δ' ούκ αν όδόν πλανωμένω μηνύσειν; τίνα δ' ούκ (άν) έπαρκεσειν υπ' ένδεια? άπολλυμένψ; τίνα δ' ούκ άν έπ' έρημία? άνυδρου νάματι περί τυχόντα γνωρίσμασι διαδηλώ σει ν τοΐ? την αυτήν όδόν βαδίζουσι; Still more extensive is the list of άγραφα εθη και νόμιμα that Eusebius ΡΕ 8.7.6-8 cites after Philo, υποθετικά 7.6 (= 9, 426 Colson), which includes the provisions about fire and water given in § 52; W. Schulze, Kleine Schriften, cd. W. Wissmann, 2d ed. (Gottingen, 1966), 191, n. 3, suggested that Philo depends on Panaetius. Wilamowitz, 1923, 192, regarded Panaetius' view that u der Mensch als solcher nicht mehr fremd oder feind ist, sondern in dem Rechts- und Freundschaftsverhaltnisse steht, das die gemeinsame Menschennatur begriindet" (cf. § 107) as the foundation of the conception of human rights. 80. For the theory that quotations of Terence correspond to ones from Menander in Panaetius cf. ad $ 30; even the quotation of Hesiod at $ 48 need not have been Panaetian, however; see ad loc. but also ad $ 59.
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The points discussed in our passage are, however, appropriate actions and not enforceable rights (cf. ad 3.49b-57); accordingly one cannot yet speak of human rights in any meaningful sense. Sen. Ben. 4.29.2 even denies the name of beneficium to actions of this type: quis beneficium dixit quadram panis aut stipem aeris abiecti aut ignis accendendi factam potestatemf One can, in general, only speak at this period of enforceable rights within the framework of the ius civile (cf. ad §§ 20-21 on the right not to be molested in one's person or property). Indeed there is a marked contrast between the Greek proverb that serves as a model (amicorum esse communia omnia) and the restricted precepts that result (cf. danti non molesta); cf. Heilmann, 77-78; Nickel, 57; Sorabji, 138 ff. Though 3.21 ff. is more visionary than our passage (cf. Sorabji, 144-45; ad 3.28), even there a restricted set of precepts is derived from a sweeping principle; cf. ad 3.26. quare et his utendum est et semper aliquid ad communem utilitatem adferendum.] Cf. ad § 22; Sen. Vit. Beat. 24.3: ubicumque homo est, ibi benefici locus est. scd quoniam copiae parvae singulorum sunt, eorum autem qui his egeant iniinita est multitudo, vulgaris libcralitas referenda est ad ilium Enni finem 'nihilo minus ipsi lucet', ut facultas sit qua in nostras simus liberales.] This particular cautio is unnecessary, since the premise has been all along that the actions in question are ones that bring no loss to the agent; nevertheless Cicero, evidently for fear of being misunderstood, reverts to the point al ready made at $ 44 (see ad loc). On the restricted scope of aid to the needy cf. ad $ 49. 53 On this scheme of degrees of oiiceiuxns from broad to narrow, its relation to other accounts of οίκβίωσι?, and its deficiency in specifying beneficia entailed cf. ad §§ 50-58. A similar ranking of societies from broad to narrow appears at Amic. 19. Both passages read like a somewhat simplified version in reverse order of a standard Stoic presentation of οΐκβίωσις such as that of Hierocles apud Stob. 4, 671.7 ff. W.-H. (= 57G Long-Sedley). Pembroke, 125, complains that in our passage the relations "are simply catalogued, not organised into a scheme of temporal development either individual or histor ical"; but, of course, Cicero was not intending to provide a temporal development in our passage (he had already done so, to the degree required for his purposes, at §§ 11-12). The content of our passage is briefly sum marized at 3.69, albeit with the propinqui omitted. . . . propior est eiusdem gentis nationis linguae, qua maxime homines coniunguntur.] The role of language in the formation of human communities has already been stressed in §§ 12 and 50. interius etiam est eiusdem esse civitatis;. . .] At Rep. 1.41 Scipio defines the
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civitas as the constitutio populi; on the differentiation of civitas from respublica cf. Wood, 126: u In thinking of the state not so much in terms of the common interest and right, as in consisting of laws, courts, and magistrates, he [Cicero] chooses civitas.'" multa enim sunt civibus inter se communia—res rationesque contractae.] E. Remy, ttDu groupement des peuples en etats d' apres le De officiis de Ciceron I, 5 3 , " Melanges Paul Thomas (Bruges, 1930), 587, sees the fourteen items listed here as constituting the goods that the state guarantees its citizens, in particular: I. Use of public space A. Meeting places: forum, farm B. Places for movement: porticus, viae II. Juridical ties among citizens A. Leges, iura B. Their use: iudicia, suffragia III. Private relations A. Relations based upon personal inclination: consuetudines et familiaritates B. Relations based on shared interests: multisque cum multis res rationesque contractae. ab ilia enim immensa societate humani generis in exiguum angustumque concluditur.] Cf. the similar phrasing at Amic. 20: . . . ex infinita societate generis humani quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contractu res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis cantos aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur, where, however, the narrowest society is that based on amicitia, not propinquitas. 54 The point of departure is an explanation of why (cf. nam) the societas propinquorum is closer (artior) than other relations; since it is based upon natural impulses [cum sit hoc natura commune animantium; cf. $$ 11—12), the "first society" is that of sexual partners {prima societas in ipso coniugio est), which in turn is the foundation of the family. This connection with the foregoing should not, however, obscure the fact that $§ 54 ff. really take the subject in a fundamentally different direction. Whereas §§ 5 0 - 5 3 comprised a systematic presentation of human societies from broadest to narrowest, S 54 explores the principia communitatis et societatis humanae (§ 50) from a different, evolutionary perspective (on this evolutionary bent cf. Cole, 1967, 140, n. 29), the aim being to establish how natural drives lead to the founda-
Commentary on Book 1, Section 53-54
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tion first of the household, then, through various degrees of kinship, to the state. The method, with its application of the doctrine of οίκαωσις, is similar to that of § 12 (cf. Fin. 2.45 and 5.6S)y except that, whereas $ 12 contents itself with a vague reference to hominum coetus et celebrationes, our passage is concerned specifically with the establishment of the respublica {quasi seminarium retpublicae, origo est return pub\icarum)\ cf. ad 2.73. So well known was this view that at Rep. 1.38 Scipio prefaces his remarks on the common wealth with: nee vero . . . ita disseram de re tarn inlustri tamque nota, ut ad ilia elementa revolvar quibus uti docti homines his in rebus so lent, ut a prima congressione maris et feminae, deinde a progenie et cognatione ordiar . . . Plato already has the analogy of the founding of new households to the sending out of colonies; cf. Lg. 776a: ων δή χάριν μητρί και πατρι και τοις ττ\ς γυναικός οικείοι? παράτας χρή τάς αυτών οΐκήσ€ΐς, οίον €ίς άποικίαν άφικομ€ΐ>ους . . . The more striking Peripatetic parallels, however, seem to assure some Peripatetic influence on the treatment of this subject. Brink, 138, sees Theophrastus* view of οίκ6ΐότη5 at work, whereas Cole, 1967, 140, n. 29, thinks of Aristotle himself. It is true that Aristotle presents a similar account of the genesis of the state from the household and village.81 How ever, our passage, in common with the later Peripatetics, ignores the village as an intermediary step; and it shares with them the metaphor of the house hold as the seedbed of the state. 82 In arguing that marriage is no impediment to philosophizing Musonius rings changes on the interconnection of marriage, household, and state, not found in this form in earlier Stoics. 83 It thus seems likely that this strand of 81. Pol. 1252a 26-28, b9-10,15-16,27-29: ανάγκη δή πρώτον συνδύαζεσθαι του? άνευ αλλήλων μή δυναμένου? είναι, οίον θήλυ μεν και dppev τής γεννήσεως ένεκεν . . . έκ μεν οΰν τούτων των δύο κοινωνιών οικία πρώτη . . . ή δ' έκ πλειόνων οικιών κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ένεκεν μή εφήμερου κώμη. . . . ή δ' έκ πλειόνων κωμών κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις . . . 82. Dicaearch. fir. 52 W. apud Steph. Byz. s.v. Πάτρα:.. . ώστε πάτρα μεν δνπερ εΐπομεν έκ της συγγενείας τρόπον έγε'νετο μάλιστα τής γονέων συν τέκνοις και τέκνων συν γονεϋσι . . . ; Ar. Did. apud Srob. 2.7 ■ 2,148.5 W.-H.: πολιτεία δε πρώτη σύνοδος ανδρός και γυναικός κατά νόμον επ'ι τέκνων γεννήσει και βίου κοινωνία, τούτο δε προσονομάζεται μέν οίκος, αρχή δε πόλεως έστι· περί ου δή και λεκτέον. μικρά γάρ τις Ιοικεν είναι πόλις ό οίκος, εί γε κατ' εΰχήν αύξομένου τοΰ γάμου και τών παίδων έπιδιδόντων και συνδυαζόμενων άλλήλοις έτερος οίκος υφίσταται και τρίτος ούτω και τέταρτος, έκ δε τούτων κώμη και πόλις. πλειόνων γάρ γενομένων κωμών πόλις άπετελέσθη. διί> και τά σπέρματα καθάπερ τής γενέσεως Tfl πόλει παρέσχεν ό οίκος, ούτω και τής πολιτείας; ci. Moraux I, 420. 83. Muson. 73.10 if.: αρχή δε οίκου περιβολής γάμος, ώστε ό άναιρών έξ ανθρώπων γάμον αναιρεί μεν οικον. αναιρεί δε πάλιν, αναιρεί δε σύμπαν τό άνθρώπειον γένος, ού γαρ άν διαμένοι μή γενέσεως ούσης, ούδ' άν γένεσις εΐη μή γάμου όντος. ή γε δικαία και νόμιμος, ότι μεν γάρ
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Peripatetic political philosophy has been received into the Stoa.84 Cf, ad SS 50-58. . . . prima societas in ipso coniugio est. . .] Cf. D.L. 6.72 (Diogenes of Sinope): €λ*γ€ δέ κα\ κοινά? elvai δβι> τάς γυναίκα?, γάμον μηδέ ονομάτων, αλλά τον πβίσαντα τη πβισθείση85 συνεΐναι; Luce 5.962-65: et Venus in silvis iungebat corpora amantum; I conciliabat enim ve\ mutua quamque cupido I vel violenta viri vis atque impensa libido I velpretium, glandes atque arbuta vel pira lecta; ad % 11. id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae.J Because of the double sense of πόλις (= city and state) Cicero's Greek source may have been more compressed; cf. Arius Didymus' αρχή πόλ€ω£, cited n. 82 supra; ad 2.73.—Seminarium = a nursery of young trees; its metaphorical applica tion was evidently pioneered by Varro (Men. I l l ) and soon taken up by Cicero (Cat. 2.23 ai); cf. OLD s.v. . . . quae propagatio et suboles origo est renim publicanim.] It is surprising to see this point repeated so soon after id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae, a sign perhaps of hasty composition (Facciolati had thought both references to the respublica interpolated); cf. ad $§ 55-56.— Suboles is, according to de Orat. 3.153, an archaic word more readily deployed in poetry, rarely to be used in oratory; cf. Marc. 23 with reference to the prospective rebuilding of the state: constituenda iudicia, revocanda fides, comprimendae libidines, propaganda suboles, omnia quae dilapsa iam diffluxerunt sevens legibus vinciendae sunt, with other instances of suboles cited by Lebck, 29, who comments on our passage: "suboles nach propaga tio erleichtert oder Selbstreminiszenz?" sanguinis autem coniunctio et benivolentia devincit homines (et) caritate.] It can have that effect, but cf. Amic. 19:. . .ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benivolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. 55-56 Sed omnium sociecatum nulla praestantior—id maxime efficit.] This text has, in part or in whole, been disputed among philologists ever since οίκος ή ττόλις οϋτ' €κ γυναικών συνίσταται μόνον ούτ' {ζ ανδρών μόνον, αλλ* ^κ της προς αλλήλους κοινωνίας. δηλον ανδρών 6ί και γυναικών κοινωνίας άλλην ουκ άν ίϋροι τις ούτ* άναγκαιοτ^ραν οΰτ€ προσφιλ^στ^ραν. The earlier Stoa defined the relation of the state to erotic and other kinds of love differently; cf. Schofield, 1991, ch. 2. 84. I leave open, however, the question whether Cicero obtained it from a Stoic or Pe ripatetic source. 85. Or should one, with Schofield, 1991, 12, n. 21, retain the transmitted ποσάση? He attributes Stephanus' πεισθείση. generally accepted by modern editors, to "conventional sexist ideology rejected by Diogenes."
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Goldbacher, 2, 17 ff., wanted to athetize et quamquam omnis—id maxime efficit. Atzert2 placed sed omnium societatum—amicos facit as well as nihil autem est amabilius—ut unus fiat ex pluribus in double square brackets as alternative Ciceronian versions. Then Bruser, 118-25, followed by Atzert4 and Fedeli, athetized our text, whereas Thomas, 115 ff., attempted to refute him, without carrying conviction; cf. P. Fedeli, Gnomon 45 (1973), 654-55; W.-W. Ehlers, Gymnasium 82 (1975), 477. Bruser raised several objections: (1) our passage contradicts sed . . . omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior. . . ($ 57); cf. Reinhardt, 1885,11-12; (2) the use of etiamsi Άηά tamen, which he found disturbing; (3) for illud . . . honestum quod saepe dicimus one expects de quo saepe dicimus. (1) Praestantia, firmitas, gravitas, and caritas are by no means syn onymous terms; but though in strict logic a contradiction is thereby obvi ated, the result is hardly satisfying; why should a societas that is supreme in gravitas and caritas not be so also in praestantia and firmitas}96 Even if such a thing may be (barely) conceivable, argumentation would be re quired to establish that it is the case; but no such argument appears in the text. Even the elimination of the suspect material would, however, not altogether eliminate the problem of the encomia of various societates each seeming to try to outbid the last with a resulting confusion of criteria and results (cf. nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum [§ 56) vs. omnium societatum nulla est gravior, nulla carior quam ea quae cum republica est uni cuique nostrum [§ 57]; why should one societas be carior, another amabilior}). (2) Others, too, have been disturbed by etiamsi and tamen; how indeed could the honestum move us unless seen in another? Hence Unger deleted tamen and Goldbacher, 2, 18, etiam. Yet it is hard to think what motive there could have been for two such interpolations. On the other hand, Muther, 127, suggests, in light of what has just been established for the propinqui, etiamsi in ali(en)o cernimus, tamen nos movet. . . But surely the propinqui are by now too distant for such a connection to be plausible. The implicit point of reference is rather the doctrine of οίκείωσι? and one's tendency to accept oneself first and foremost; hence etiamsi and tamen; the logic, if not impeccable, is at least understandable. (3) For the phrase honestum quod saepe dicimus, cf. Lommatzsch, TIL 5, 979.21 ff. 86. In explaining Cicero's text as the result of hasty composition Thomas, 20-21, im plicitly recognizes this; sim. Reinhardt, 1885, 11-12.
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But beyond a mere refutation of objections there is a positive case to be made that our passage is needed in this context, which deals with friendship based on morum similitudo bonorum; for it explains in terms of the action of the honestum the process by which friendship arises among viri boni moribus similes. This explanation is irreplaceable, since in the sentence beginning nihil autem est amabilius the process is described in its external aspect only and in endoxic terms not specific to the Panaetian system {idem velle, idem nolle: cf. Otto, 19; . . . ut unus fiat ex pluribus: see ad § 56); from the standpoint of content one would rather suspect nihil autem est amabilius— ut unus fiat ex pluribus. In general, the ideas of our passage are unlikely to have been invented by an interpolator as ordinarily conceived (p. 153, n. 65 supra). Thus the superiority of amicitia to propinquitas in terms oipraestantia and firmitas is found at Amic. 19 (sed ea [sc. cum propinquis societas) non satis habet firmitatis. namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benivolentia tolli potest etc.); the operation of the honestum in winning over others is described at 2.32; and the preference for the social virtues iustitia and liberalitas as criteria for entering into social relations with others appears at $ 46; for the thought cf. also Fam. 9.24.3 (perhaps January, 43): et mehercule, mi Paete, extra iocum moneo te, quod pertinere ad beate vivendum arbitror, ut cum viris bonis, iucundis, amantibus tui vivas, nihil est aptius vitae, nihil ad beate vivendum accommodatius. Is an interpolator likely to have hit the mark every time? One suspects that the text owes its current condition to the desire of Cicero, recalling a similar train of thought at Amic. 19 (cf. ad § 5S)y to superimpose that societas on a context from which it had originally been excluded, a project that entailed seemingly conflicting encomia of various societates never brought into sharp focus (for similar seemingly conflicting encomia cf. ad $ 42). At the same time amicitia is a societas of a fundamentally different kind from and incommensurable with the others discussed in this section. Panaetius may well have thought it would be more appropriately dealt with in another context (cf. 2.31). Was it perhaps the recollection of the handling of οίκβίωσι? in relation to friendship at Amic. 19 8 7 that suggested to Cicero the idea of superimposing a discussion of friendship on material probably derived (as argued ad §§ 50-58 and 57) from Rep. 1 and originally involving a comparison only of family and state obligations? In any case, Cicero does not succeed in finding a place for the amici within the hierarchy. 55 Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti.] Antisthenes had held 87. On the date of Amic. see ad 2.31.
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thatoi σπουδαίοι φίλοι (D.L. 6.12), Zeno indeed that the σπουδαίοι "alone" are friends {SVF 1, 54.3 ff. = D.L. 7.33; cf. Amic. 18 and 65). 8 8 The "alone" does not, however, appear in our context and should not be read into it {pace Thomas, 19). Nor is it likely that Cicero is here invoking vir bonus, contrary to his normal usage in this essay (cf. 3.14-17, but also 3.29 and 89-91), of the Stoic sage; see next note and (for the terms praestantior and firmior) ad 55 55-56. illud enim honestum quod saepe dicimus, etiamsi in alio cernimus, tamen nos movet atque illi in quo id inesse videtur amicos facit;. . .] The meaning is likely to be essentially the same as in 3.16 (where the context makes clear that he is talking about secunda honesta): itaque its omnes in quibus est virtutis indoles commoventur; sim. Amic. 48: cum autem contrahat amicitiam ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se shnilis animus adplicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est.— Cf. the papyrus commentary on Plato's Theaetetus he. cit. ad$$ 2 0 - 4 1 and on the formulation ad §§ 55-56. 56 nihil autem est amabilius nee copulatius quam morum similitudo bonorum; in quibus enim eadem studia sunt. . . , in iis fit ut aeque quisque altero delectetur ac se ipso . . . ] Cf. Clu. 46: iam hoc fere scitis omnes quan tum vim habeat ad coniungendas amicitias studiorum ac naturae similitudo; Nep. Att. 5.3. . . . efficiturque id quod Pythagoras vult in amicitia, ut unus fiat ex pluribus.] Cicero evidently alludes to this saying at Leg. 1.33 {unde enim ilia Pythagorea vox de amicitia? flocus ***); the attribution to Pythagoras also appears at sch. Pers. 5.22; cf. other testimonies at Otto, 25-26. magna etiam ilia communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultro et euro datis acccptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt firma devinciuntur societate.] It may not be the highest form of friendship (cf. § 58 and ad § 5; PI. Lys. 219c ff.; SVF 3, 24.22: τριχώς- δέ λίγομ^νης* της* φιλία?, κα& eva μβι> τρόποι της· κοινής- CVCK' ώφίλίίας-, καθ' ην φίλοι εΐναι λέγονται, ταυτηΐ' μέν οΰ φασι των αγαθών είναι . . . ; Cic. Amic. 51: non enim tarn utilitas parta peramicum quam amid amor ipse delectat. . . ; Fin. 2.72), but this, too, is a type of society to which the ancients attached importance—and not just the Romans, as Pohlenz, AF, 39, implies in calling it "die romische amicitia"; cf. Arist. £ N 8.13; for the longevity of such relationships, ibid., 1159bl0 ff.: οι χρήσιμοι be καΐ ήδ€ΐς· em πλάον διαμένουσιν €ως* γαρ άν πορίζωσιν ήδονάς- ή ώφίλβία? άλληλοις. In our passage Cicero does not, 88. One of rhc points Cotta raises against the inactive gods of the Epicureans is the notion of caritas naturalis inter bonos [N.D. 1.122).
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however, call such a relationship amicitia, for good reason; cf. N.D. 1.122: quam [sc. amiatiam) si ad fructum nostrum referemus, non ad illius commoda quern diligemus, non erit ista amicitia sed mercatura quaedam utilitatum suarum; sim. Sen. Ep. 9.10: ista quam tu describis negotiatio est, non amicitia, quae ad commodum accedit, quae quid consecutura sit spectat. He was, however, less precise (but closer to normal, as opposed to philosophical usage) when referring to such relations in the courtroom or in correspon dence; cf. Ciu. 117 (nam mihi cum viris fortibus qui censores proxime fuerunt [sc. for 70; cf. MRR, 2,126] ambobus est amicitia; cum altero vero . . . magnus usus et summa utriusque officiis constituta necessitudo est); Fam. 5.2.3-4 alibi. Cf. Sailer, 13-14, who connects the "instrumental nature of Roman friendship" with "the underdevelopment of rational, impersonal institutions for the provision of services" and concludes (15) that "the Ro mans could hardly conceive of friendship without reciprocal exchange." 57 can sunt parentes, can liberi propinqui familiares; sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est. . .1 This formulation suggests that Cicero may here have adapted material from de Republica, which likewise gave priority to the patria over the parentes (cf. 1, fr. la: sic, quoniam plura beneficia continet patria, et est antiquior parens quam is qui creavit, maior ei profecto quam parenti debetur gratia; ad $5 50-58 and 160). For the thought cf. the verse φιλώ τεκν\ άλλα πατρίδ' εμήν μάλλον φιλώ (tr. adesp. fr. 411 Ν. 2 = Eur. *fr. 51 Austin apud Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. 809d, attributed by Porson to Praxithea in Euripides' Erechtheus); PI. Cri. 51a7 ff.: ή ούτω? ει σοφό? ώστε λεληθεν σε Οτι μητρός τε και πατρός και των άλλων προγόνων απάντων τιμιώτ€ρόν έστιν πατρίς και σεμνότερον και άγιώτερον και εν μεί£ovt μοίρα και παρά θεοΐς και παρ1 άνθρώποις τοις νουν εχουσι, και σεβεσθαι δει και μάλλον ύπείκειν και θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλ€παίνουσαν ή πατέρα, καΐ ή π€ίθ€ΐν ή ποΐ€Ϊν ά αν κελεύη, και πάσχειν έάν τι προστάττη παθ€ΐν ήσυχίαν άγοντα, έάντε τνπτεσθαι έάντε δεΐσθαι, έάντε εις πόλεμο ν άγη τρωθησόμενον ή άποθανούμενον, ποιητεον ταύτα . . . ; § 22 (citation of letter to Archytas). . . . pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere si ei sit profuturns?] Cf. lsoc. Ep. 2.4: χρή δε μη καλάς άπάσας ύπολαμβάνειν τάς εν τοις πολέμοις τελευτάς, άλλα τάς μεν υπέρ της πατρίδος και τών γονέων και των παίδων επαίνων άξιας . . . Cicero attributes such a willingness to Milo (Mil. 104); cf. Balb. 26; Sest. 47: cum esset omnibus definita mors, optandum esse ut vita, quae necessitati deberetur, patriae potius donata quam reservata naturae videreturt Leg. 2.5; Phil. 14.31: ο fortunata mors quae naturae debita pro patria est potissimum reddita! Our passage, with its stress on the personal bond to the homeland, has been used to help explicate the famous verse duke
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et decorum est pro patria mori by S.J. Harrison, "Dulce et Decorum: Horace Odes 3.2.13," RhM N.F. 136 (1993), 91-93. quo est detestabilior istonim immanitas, qui laceranint omni scelere patriam et in ea funditus delenda occupati et sunt et fuenint] The reference to An tony's current and past activities would be unmistakable (the latter including particularly his role as tribune in fleeing to Caesar and providing the pretext for civil war; cf. ad $ 26), even if we did not have Phil. 2.52-53: quid autem agebatur nisi ne deleri et everti rempublicam funditus vellesf . . . tu, tu, inquam, M. Antoni, princeps C. Caesari omnia perturbare cupienti causam belli contra patriam inferendi dedisti. Cf. also Long, 19951, 225. 58 Is the hierarchy established in this chapter likely to be Panaetian? It is different from the hierarchy established in Rep. 1 and § 57. It would be hard to account for the fairly blatant contradiction of $$ 57 and 58 except on the hypothesis that § 57 still reproduces arguments drawn from Rep., whereas $ 58 tries to accommodate Panaetius' views. Thomas, 21-22, has argued that the state did not share the pinnacle in Panaetius* system. He is right in saying that the patria is nofitresponse to the problem as originally posed (sc. to determine who is coniunctissimus); as argued above (ad §§ 50-58), SS 54-58 surely did not form part of the treatment of benefactions in Pan aetius' text; but the hierarchy itself might yet be either drawn from elsewhere in Panaetius' treatise or abstracted from his ideas; and Thomas' arguments against Panaetian provenance based on the general attitudes of Greeks and Stoics are easily contradicted; cf. Dyck, 19791, 82-83, n. 11. While not fully conclusive, certain indices suggest a relation of the hierarchy to Panaetius' thinking: the criteria used, namely obligation (quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus) and dependency (quae spectat in nos solos neque aliud ullum potest habere perfugium), are those that bind together the societas and thus seem to be at least in the spirit of Panaetius.89 In addition, Hecato of Rhodes wrestled with casuistic problems involving a conflict between parents and the state (3.90), as one might have expected if his teacher, Panaetius, had left open the question of which has greater claim.—In listing patria, propinqui, and adfines amid as those to whom liberalitas is owed, Plin. Ep. 9.30.1 was surely influenced by our passage. 89. On returning beneficia cf. $ 48:. . . non reddere viro bono non licet. . . ; on binding society together by exchange of benefits $ 22: quae m terris gignanturad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse pos· sent. . . ; on the "natural" impulse to care for those who depend on one $ 12:. . . ur.. . studeat parare ea quae suppeditent ad cultum et ad victum, nee sibi soli, sed coniugi liberis ceterisque quos earns habeat tuerique debeat;. . .
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Sed si contentio quaedam et comparatio fiat quibus plurimum tribuendum sit officii . . .J Georg Picht, Die Grundlagen der Ethik des Panaitios (diss. Freiburg i.B., 1943), 175-76, points out that the phrase contentio et com paratio recurs at § 152, where Cicero explores the problem of choosing between different types of the honestum, and adds that this type of norma tive approach based on juristic thinking is characteristic of Cicero, rather than Panaetius. Indeed, it seems likely that the following scale has been added by Cicero to dispel possible confusion arising from his previous en comia of several types of society; the content may, however, pace Picht, still reflect Panaetius* views (see above). . . . principes sint patria et parentes, quorum beneficiis maximis obligati sumus, proximi liberi totaque domus . . . ] Cf. Lucil. fr. 1337-38 M. = 135354 K.: commoda praeterea patriot prima put are, I deinde parentum, tertia iam postremaque nostra; Cicero's liberi totaque domus can be seen as the functional equivalent of Lucilius' nostra. Lucilius should perhaps be seen as representing, not Panaetian influence, but an independent (though similar) Roman tradition; cf. Wendy J. Raschke, "The Virtue of Lucilius," Latomus 49 (1990), 352-69, esp. 352-53.—It is bold to speak of beneficia conferred by the state; the term was ordinarily applied in private life or, if used in a public context, referred to an office, a benefit conferred by a law, privileges granted to allies, etc.; this term, then, is being stretched in a fashion similar to officium itself (cf. introduction, $ 2; ad $ 34; Sinko, TLL 2, 1879.15 ff.). Perhaps Cicero has in mind advantages such as those enumerated at § 53. For the hierarchy here established cf. the note on this section as a whole. . . . necessaria praesidia vitae debentur his maxime quos ante dixi . . .] Thomas, 22, suggests that this characteristic would not apply to the patria; but cf. the advantages enumerated in § 53, as well as 2.15 {urbes vero sine hominum coetu non potuissent nee aedificari nee frequentari, ex quo leges moresque constitute. . .) and 73 {banc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenerentur, respublicae civitatesque constitutae sunt). . . . vita autem victusque communis, consilia sermones cohortationes consolaciones, interdum ctiam obiurgationes in amicitiis vigent maxime . . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1172a6 ff.: συζψ γαρ βουλόμ^νοι μ*τά τώι> φίλωι/, ταύτα ποιοΰσι και τούτων κοινωνοΰσιν ois οΐοιται συζτ\ν. γϊΐΈται ούν. . . ή 6e (sc. φιλία] τώι> €ΐτΐ€ΐκώι> έττιβικης, συναυξανομέντ] ταΐς όμιλίαις· δοκοΟσι δέ κα\ βελτίου? γίΐ'εσθαι ei'epyouuTes και διορθοΟι>τ€ς· αλλήλους' . . . ; cf. also Fam. 9.24.3 cited ad §§ 5 5 - 5 6 above.—For consolationes EN 1171a24 ff. (the argument that friendship is more needful in times of misfortune).—For criticism of a friend cf. PI. Trin. 23 ff.: amicum castigare ob meritam noxiam Iinmoene est facinus, verum in aetate utile I et conducibile; § 1 3 6 and ad 3.83.
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. . . estque ea iucundissima amicitia quam similitudo morum coniugavit.] The value-judgment iucundissima betrays that in his successive encomia of friendship Cicero strays ever further from the subject at hand. 59 This chapter relativizes the hierarchy of claimants on our offtcia just established; just as justice itself can change κατά περίστασιν (SS 31-32), so, too, circumstance (καιρό?, tempus) can alter one's priorities in granting beneficia. Johann, 87, would derive this material from Posidonius* treatment of the κατά τκρίστασιν καθήκον; but cf. Λί/ SS 3 1 - 4 1 ; for the connection of this chapter with the previous premise cf. ad §S 50-58. . . . ut vicinum citius adiuveris in fructibus percipiendis quam aut fratrem aut familiarem . . .] Cf. Hes. Op. 342-45 (perhaps cited by Panaetius in the corresponding passage of nepl τοϋ καθήκοντος?): τον φιλέοντ' em δαϊτα καλεΐν, τον δ' έχθρόν έάσαι · / τον δε μάλιστα καλεΐν όστις σεθεν εγγύθι ναίει · / 6ί γαρ τοι καΐ χρήμ' έγκώμιον άλλο γ€νηται, / yeiToves άζωστοι eiaov, £ώσαντο δε πηοί. . . . at, si lis in iudicio sit, propinquum potius et amicum quam vicinum defcnderis.J On representation of a client at court as a beneficium cf. ad 2.66.—Early in his career the young Cicero, in need of all the clients he could find, came to regret taking on a case at the behest of neighbors. In 74 he had yielded to a request from citizens of Aletrium, a community just west of Arpinum, and undertaken the defense of the freedman Scamander on charges of attempting to murder Aulus Cluentius Habitus of Larinum. The defen dant, however, was convicted on eye-witness testimony; and in the sequel his patron C. Fabricius and Cluentius' stepfather Statius Albius Oppianicus were accused and convicted of participation in the plot. Cicero's role in Scamander's case caused him further embarrassment when, as praetor eight years later, he defended Cluentius on charges of having bribed the jury in the trial of Oppianicus; cf. Crawford, 39 ff.; Gelzer, 3 0 - 3 1 . haec igitur et talia circumspicienda sunt in omni officio, (et consuetudo exercitatioque capienda} ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus, et addendo deducendoque videre quae reliqui summa fiat. . .] The bracketed words are unwelcome, since they forestall § 60, which begins with the adver sative sed; but removal or replacement of sed still leaves awkwardness; hence Facciolari's athetesis is generally accepted today (even by Thomas, 105 ff.).— Ratiocinator may have been a Ciceronian coinage (first attested Att. 1.12.2 [1 January 61] as accountant"); here it is used for the first time in a figura tive sense but with an explanation following {addendo deducendoque . . .); cf. OLD s.v. This conception of the moral agent as an accountant keeping an eye on debits and credits in prioritizing the officia owed to each claimant (note the play on several senses of debere—to owe money but also to be
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obliged to do something or owe an officium; cf. Sailer, 15) is unique. It seems more likely to reflect the perspective of the shrewd Roman paterfamilias (which reappears at 2.87 and 89; cf. the anecdote cited ad 3.63: neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus—) than the Rhodian aristocrat; certainly it is quite different from Chrysippus' εκλογή of the first things according to nature {SVF 3, 46.28 ff.) and involves different values from the Epicurean calculus of pleasure and pain. Cicero's words should not be taken too liter ally to imply that one should only provide services for which the recipient could be expected to provide adequate return; indeed a precise measure of value in such cases is rarely possible; cf. Sailer, 16-17; ad § 45. 60 sed ut nee medici nee imperatores nee oratores, quamvis artis praecepta perceperint, quicquam magna laude dignum sine usu ct exercitatione consequi possum . . . ] A similar point is made a propos orators by Antonius at de Orat. 2.28 ff.; cf. Muson., 22.9: δεΐ ούν ώσπερ τον ϊατρόν και τον μούσικόν μη μόνον άνειληφεναι τά θ€ωρήματα της αύτοϋ τέχνης έκάτερον, άλλα και γ€γυμνάσθαι πράττε ι ν κατά τά (δωρήματα, οϋτω και τον έσόμενον αγαθόν άνδρα μη μόνον έκμανθάνειν όσα μαθήματα φέρει προς άρετήν, άλλα και γυμνά£εσθαι κατά ταΟτσ φιλοτίμως και φιλοπόνως. . . . sic officii conservandi praecepta traduntur ilia quidem, ut facimus ipsi, sed ret magnitude usum quoque exercitationemque desiderat.] Cicero here shows himself aware that the approach based on praecepta has its limita tions. Since praecepta cannot be given for every conceivable case, practice is needed in adapting the praecepta to specific circumstances; cf. also 2.87. Sen. Ep. 95 presents a much more detailed critique of praecepta. At 95.12 he notes explicitly their partial character: quid quod facienda quoque nemo rite obibit nisi is cut ratio erit tradita qua in quaque re omnis officiorum numeros exsequi possitf quos non servabit qui in rem praecepta acceperit, non in omne. inbecilla sunt per se et, ut ita dicam, sine radice quae partibus dantur. Moreover, they do not enable one to perform actions with the proper mental attitude, which is essential to virtue (ibid-, 40; cf. ad % 7): deinde praestabunt tibi fortasse praecepta ut quod oportet faciat, non praestabunt ut quemadmodum oportet. . . Finally, it is a mistake to divorce them from the larger question of the finis bonorum (ibid., 45): M. Brutus in eo libro quern περί καθήκοντος inscripsit dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus: haec nemo faciei quemadmodum debet nisi habuerit quo referat. pro· ponamus oportet finem summi boni ad quern nitamur . . . (Cicero perhaps thought that his previous essay de Finibus excused him from dwelling on the connection of practical ethics with the summum bonum; cf. ad § 7b). atque ab iis rebus quae sunt in iure societatis humanae quemadmodum ducatur honestum, ex quo aptum est officium, satis fere diximus.] Cf. $ 15
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(. . . ex singulis certa offtciorum genera nascuntur . . .); on the ius societatis humanae cf. $ 21 and ad § 52 above. 6 1 - 9 2 The treatment of the third pan of the honestum, magnitudo animi, can be outlined as follows: I. The most radiant of the virtues ($ 61) II. Tied to justice (§5 62-65); warnings: A. Perversion of bravery to a vice ($§ 62-63) B. Excessive desire for power (§§ 64-65) III. Two constituents (§§ 66-67): A. The despising of external goods B. The performance of great deeds IV. Magnitudo animi and tranquillitas animi (§§ 68-73) A. Freedom from perturbationes ($ 68-69a) B. Avoidance of public service acceptable only in exceptional cases (SS69b-71) C. Statesmen more exposed to the verbera fortunae ($§ 72-73a) D. On undertaking actions (§ 73b) V. Comparison of military and civilian achievements (§$ 74-78) VI. Precepts for wartime A. Emphasis on the mental constituents of magnitudo animi even in warfare ($$ 79-82a) B. Attitude of the μεγαλόψυχο? toward risk-taking (§$ 82b-84) VII. Precepts for the statesman in peacetime ($$ 85-87) A. Government should be conducted for the benefit of the governed B. Government should aim to benefit the entire citizenry, not a single faction only C. Leaders of government should respect one another, not settle differences under arms VIII. Relation of μεγαλόψυχος to anger (§§ 88-89) A. The proper course is placabilitas and dementia, not anger against inimici B. Punishment is to be carried out without anger IX. Practical advice for the man of action (resumed from § 73b): need for constantia in good and evil fortune ($§ 90-91) X. Precepts for the μεγαλόψυχο? who owns an estate but contributes to the public good through neither research nor state service {§ 92). From this outline it is apparent that Panaetius has subsumed several different concepts under the term μεγαλοψυχία: there is the old virtue άν-
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δρεία, which is used to introduce the subject (SS 61-63), but is played down thereafter (SS 74-82a); there are also the desire for independence and the despising of external goods, which are characteristic of the Aristotelian μεγα λόψυχο?, who in turn is a relic of the ethic of the nobility of the archaic age. Of these two qualities Panaetius emphasizes the latter as the causa efficiens of μεγαλοψυχία (§ 67) and is at pains to confine the desire for independence within bounds that do not endanger the social order (SS 64-65). The vita activa and vita contemplativa, contrasted since Euripides* Antiope,90 appear as alternative channels for the independence of the μεγαλόψυχο? (§§ 6 9 b 73a). There follow practical precepts which, with the exception of the final chapter (§ 92), focus on the man of affairs, since he stands in greater need of them (§ 73b); these are soon divided into separate groups for wartime (SS 79-84) and peacetime (SS 85-91); a comparison of military and civil achievements—to the advantage of the latter—precedes their respective pre cepts. Pohlenz, AF, 48, regarded SS 7 4 - 7 8 as an "Einschub." Note the absence of a transition between SS 73 and 74. Probably this material origi nally belonged to S 79, where the point. . . non minorem uttlitatem adferunt qui togati reipublicae praesunt. . . forms an organic part of the argument, but has been anticipated in accord with a tendency observable elsewhere to give prominence to themes of political interest to Cicero (cf. ad 2.23-29). One wonders whether the "Einschub" is still more extensive, however, since S 73 b on preserving tranquillitas animi in undertaking actions would seem to connect with the further precepts on preserving tranquillitas animi at SS 9 0 91. The last chapter, giving precepts on how one can be a μεγαλόψυχο? by making one's estate available to friends and to the commonwealth, assumes a different definition of μεγαλοψυχία from that of SS 6 6 - 6 7 and therefore seems likely to be a Ciceronian addition (cf. ad S 92). In taking over μεγαλοψυχία from the traditional ethics of the Greek no bility Aristotle pressed it, not without some violence, into his ethical scheme (cf. Dyck, 1981,161). 9 1 Among the consequences of the career of Alexander the Great92 seems to have been a reexamination of μεγαλοψυχία. Although the approach of Demetrius of Phalerum remains unclear, the mere title of a treatise περί μεγαλοψυχία? surviving (fr. 78 W.2), the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades 11 takes aim at the excesses to which μεγαλοψυχία can lead and 90. Though perhaps less sharply than might appear on the surface; cf. S.R. Slings, "The Quiet Life in Euripides1 Antiope," in Fragmenta Drama tica, ed. A. Harder and H. Hofmann (Gottingen, 1991), 137-52. 91. For Cicero magnitude animi remained "erne eigentumliche Tugend der Nobilitat"; cf. Knoche, 1935,68. 92. Cf. ad S 90.
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classes it as the finest of the names for folly (140c, 150c; Kirsche, 34; Dyck, 1981,155). Perhaps in light of such attacks Aristo of Ceus thought it neces sary to differentiate sharply between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (fr. 13 VI, II. 23 ff. W.2, quoted ad $ 90). Meanwhile the older Stoa retained μεγαλοψυ χία as a virtue, albeit one subordinate to ανδρεία (SVF 3, nos. 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 2 6 9 70, and 274-75). Panaetius has restored to μ€γαλοψυχία some, though not all, of its former glory. In his system it appears as one of the four cardinal virtues, replacing ανδρεία (cf. ad § 62); this reform is in line with Panaetius' aim of emphasizing the rational component at the expense of mere animal courage (cf. §$ 79-81), since he wants all four "pans" of the καλόν to be based on drives peculiar to the human as opposed to the beast (cf. § 11 ff., $ 5 0 ) . On the other hand, μεγαλοψυχία has ceased to be, as it was for Aristotle, the κόσμος of all the virtues {EN 1124al); the similar status of ornatus vitae is assumed instead by the fourth virtue (§ 93). This section focuses generally on the attitudes and activities of the states man; perhaps Panaetius had accorded a larger place to the μεγαλοψυχία of the private citizen devoted to research (cf. § 72). In any case, these chapters disclose Panaetius* reading of history, whereby the statebuilding activities of a Solon or a Lycurgus weigh far heavier in the balance than the ephemeral achievements of military leaders, however brilliant (§§ 75-76: a point some what muddled by Cicero's exempla Romana). Precepts on preserving tranquillitas animi form a major concern of this section (cf. §§ 6 8 - 7 3 , 90-91); hence the many points of contact with advice περί ευθυμίας; Panaetius' essay on the subject (fr. 45) was perhaps partly inspired by Democrirus (cf. ad §§ 66 and 68) and was in turn a major source of Plutarch's extant treatise;93 parallels with the latter suggest that Panaetius may have fallen back on some of this material in περί του καθήκοντος (or possibly, since the chronological relation of the two treatises is not fixed, he elaborated in περί ευθυμία? some points adumbrated in περί τοϋ καθήκοντος). Our section likewise shows reception of important elements of Plato's conception of statesmanship (§§ 85-87) and a rejection of the Peripatetic doctrine of the naturalness and usefulness of anger (§§ 88-89). 61 Έπαινος accrues to bravery and ψόγος to its absence, a sign that this quality deserves status as a virtue (cf. ad § 62). Note Cicero's caution in introducing the term magnitudo animi, which, as a virtue, was evidently not well known to Romans of his day. As in the case of the fourth virtue ($93), Ciccro/Panaetius begins with familiar phenomena before going on to philo93. Cf. Zicglcr, RE 21.1 (1951), 787.49 ff. with literature, on Plutarch's use of Panaetius here.
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sophical definitions (cf. § 66). Thus he uses the term animus magnus twice before magnitude» animi itself; and each time animus magnus appears with a nearer specification, first in the phrase animo magno elatoque humanasque res despiciente, then quae gesta sunt magno animo et fortiter excellenterque, as though animus magnus alone would be insufficiently clear.94 Intellegendum autem est, cum proposita sint genera quattuor e quibus honestas officiumque manaret, splendidissimum videri quod animo magno ela toque humanasque res despiciente factum sit.] But at $ 20 it was claimed that in iustitia virtutis splendor est maximus. Possibly a distinction is intended between a splendor which presents itself to the casual observer {splen didissimum videri)—the examples given of the splendor of magnitudo animi being drawn from speeches and public monuments—and true splendor (cf. the distinction at 2.43 between vera gloria and sham glory).—On the jux taposition of magnus animus with clarifying terms see the preceding note. itaque in probns maxime in promptu est. . .1 The expeaed sequence of the two halves of the argument is reversed: one would have expected its promi nence in encomia to be adduced as a consequence [itaque) of the fact that this quality is splendidissimum videri, then, as a negative reinforcement, the fact that its absence provokes reprimand.—The point is illustrated by the declamations of Polemo, in which the fathers of Cynaegirus and Callimachus vie for the right to deliver the funeral oration over the fallen at Marathon, an honor reserved for the father of the most valiant of the victims; the following aspersion cast on Cynaegirus' valor may stand as representative (2.43): Kwaiyeipos μέν ούν ούτ€ θάρρος φίλοι? ούτ€ δ€0? τοΐ? πολ€μίοι? έγένίτο, ος δράσας ουδέν αλλά άποτμηθεις την χείρα eneaev ςίβυς ώσπερ ετέραν ούκ έχων αλλ' έν τη δίζιςί της ψυχής αύτψ κβιμένης· . . . 'vos enim iuvenes animum geritis muliebrem, ilia virgo viri'. . .1 Lachmann ad Lucr. 4.211 identified the trochaic septenarius {trag. inc. inc. 210) and thus put an end to attempts to emend virgo to virago. Ribbeck assigned the verse to the Meleager of Accius; if this is correct, the virgo will be Atalanta (cf. trag. p. 224, vv. 446-47). 'Salmacida spolia sine sudore et sanguine'.] Two interpretations of this verse (Ennius, seen. 36 = trag. 338 = 347 Jocelyn, referred by Ribbeck to the Ajax) compete even in the most recent editions: (1) that Salmacida is vocative and spolia imperative (so Testard, who punctuates after Salmacida and renders: 94. Cf. Knoche, 1935,46: **Aus dem aJrromischen Sprachgcbrauch allein laSt sich nach all dem schwcrlich cine IZntwicklung verstchen, durch welche die magnitudo animi in den Kreis der hochsten Tugenden eintritt"; on Cicero's use of magnitudo ammt in speeches beginning in the year 63, at first, as if in need of such contextual clarification, in company with other virtues, ibid., 13-14.
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"Salmacide, ravis des depouilles sans verser ni sueur ni sang"; cf. Winterbottom, who likewise punctuates after Salmacida but places a query after Salmacides in his index); (2) that Salmacida has adjectival force and spolia is a substantive (so, presumably, those who, like Atzert and Fedeli, omit the comma). The term Salmacis is explained by Festus, p. 329M: SALMACIS nomine nympha, Caeli et Terrae filia, fertur causa fontis Halicamasi aquae appellandae fuisse Salmacidis; quam qui bibisset vitio inpudicitiae mollesceret. ob earn rem ique idi eius adit us, angustatus parietibus, occasionem largitur iuvenibus petulantibus antecedentium puerorum puellarumque violandarum, quia non pate{t re)fugium. Ennius: 'Salmacida spolia sine san guine et sudore'. A morphological problem is prior to the interpretive one. Under interpre tation (1) the form Salmacida cannot, pace Lewis and Short, s.v., II, be vocative to Salmacis in the sense "a weak, effeminate person," since then one would expect Salmaci or, in earlier Latinity, Salmacis (cf. KiihnerHolzweissig 1, 370-71); nor can it be vocative to Salmacides, taken in a similar sense; in that case one would expect Salmacide or Salmacides (ibid., 371); there appears to be no parallel for a Greek patronymic taken over into the first declension (ibid., 981-82). Under interpretation (2), to begin with the Greek form, as an adjective from the quasi-patronymic Σαλμακίδη? one would have expected Σαλμακίδ€ 109, on the analogy of Άσκληπιάδη?, Άσκληπιάδ€ΐο9, and correspondingly in Latin Salmacideus. However, a Greek noun can function in certain set phrases as a quasi-adjective; cf. Kuhner-Gerth, 1, 271 ff.; cf., with CF. Feldhugel, Dissertatio, qua cum aliorum scriptorum Romanorum, turn maxime Ciceronis loci aliquot vel explicantur vel emendantur (Magdeburg, 1871), 11-12, ΣκυθΙ? γυνή or the phrase ττ\ν γήν την Σκυθίδα at Arr. An. 4.15.3 (by variatio where ττ\ς Σκυθική? χώρα? has preceded). Alternatively, the Ennian Salmacida may have been formed ad hoc metri causa for Salmacidea, perhaps on the analogy of adjectives of material, where one finds forms both in -eus and -us; cf. Leumann, 287; or did Ennius actually write Salmacidea, to be read by synizesis as quadrisyllable but then corrupted in the subsequent tradition? One suspects that the longevity of interpretation (1) is connected with the fact that this verse, like the previous one, is quoted as evidence of the promi nence of magnitudo animi in insults (in probris). Under that interpretation the insult presumably resides in the application of Salmacides (granting for the moment that it can mean u a weak, effeminate person" and that Salmacida can be its vocative; see above) to the addressee, and the command, presumably uttered on the field of battle, is quite literally meant. But then what would be the sense of the addition sine sudore et sanguine) If the task
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remaining is that of despoiling the (evidently already defeated) enemy and it can be performed effortlessly, why would the speaker have felt it necessary, in the same breath, to insult the recipient of the command? When a commander insults soldiers on the Held of battle, it is ordinarily rather, as in the previous verse, to shame them into fighting in a crisis (cf., e.g., Verg. A. 11.732 ff.). The one piece of ancient learning that bears on the problem (from Festus, cited above) points rather to interpretation (2) and suggests that Salmacida spolia is a phrase parallel to the Greek proverb Μυσών λβία (invoked in this place by Panaetius?). Festus' gloss would suggest that Salmacida spolia refers to the boys and girls who could be so easily violated at the fountain Salmacis; like Μυσών λ€ΐα it might have been applied generally in the sense "easy pickings," "Siegesbeute der Wollust" (Goldbacher, 2, 20), or the like. Like Μυσών λεία, the Latin phrase will have implied a scathing condemnation of those to whom it was applied (for Μυσών Xcia cf. Arist. Rh. 1372b31 ff.; Dem. 18.72; Harp, μ 46 K. = 130.3 Bk.; Zenob. 5.15 cum test.). Our frag ment is too meager to permit us to see how Salmacida spolia sine sudore et sanguine functioned as an insult in context; one could picture some such context as "(are you going to defend yourselves or become) Salmacid spoils (to be had) without sweat and blood?" concraque in laudibus quae magno animo et foititer excellenterque gesta sunt, ea nescioquo modo quasi pleniore ore laudamus.] On the use of syn onyms for magnus animus see the headnote to this section.—Forcellini s.v. plenus 1.7.f) well explains pleno ore laudare "quantum potest, impense, liberaliter, large." hinc rhetonim campus de Marathone Salamine Plataeis Thermopylis Leuctris . . .J These were, of course, commonplaces of patriotic speeches, Mar athon (September, 490) and Salamis (September, 480) especially at Athens, Thermopylae (summer, 480) at Sparta, and Leuctra (summer, 371) at Thebes; Plataea (fall, 479) could count as a panhellenic victory. Thus, Mar athon, Salamis, and Plataea appear in succession in the επιτάφιο? λόγο? that Aspasia allegedly composed (PI. Mx. 241a-c).—Campus has, of course, its metaphorical sense of "the subject-matter or sphere of an orator or writer" [OLD s.v., 5b); at § 104 it appears in the literal sense.
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with the war against Lars Porsenna, since he mentions it immediately after C. Mucius* plot against the king's life at Parad. 16. Cicero's fullest account is at Leg. 2.10: . . . nee quia nusquam erat scriptum, ut contra omnis hostium copias in ponte unus adsisteret, a tergoque pontem intersemdi iuberet, idcirco minus Coclitem ilium rem gessisse tantam fortitudinis lege atque imperio putabimus . . . Livy (2.10.2-11), in contrast to Polybius, allowed the hero to escape alive. There was an archaic statue, identified as that of Horatius, in the comitium, which was struck by lightning and transferred to the Area Vulcani; cf. Ver. Fl. apud Gel. 4.5.1; it apparently depicted a lame man and gave rise to the legend that he was lamed when he swam the Tiber and hence could hold no public office (cf. D.H. 5.25.3). Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome have insured the hero's modern renown. Cf. Miinzec, RE 8.2 (1913), 2331.62 ff. (Horatius no. 9); Ogilvie ad Liv. 2.10. . . . hinc D e c i i . . .] The Decii Mures (Cicero usually omits the cognomen), father and son, heroes of the wars for hegemony in Italy of the fourth and early third century, were for later ages types of Roman patriotism; cf. Verg. A. 6.824. They appear in Cicero's philosophica inter alia as a counter example to the fear of death (cf. Tusc. 1.89 and 2.59; Sen. 75). Notable, too, is Cicero's comparison of himself to them at Dom. 64: . . . audieram et legeram clarissimos nostrae civitatis viros se in medios hostis ad perspicuam mortem pro salute exercitus iniecisse: ego pro salute universae reipublicae dubitarem hoc meliore condicione esse quam Decii, quod illi ne auditores quidem suae gloriae, ego etiam spectator meae laudis esse potuissem? (cf. Nisbet ad loc). P. Decius Mus Q. f. is said in 343 during the first Samnite War to have saved the army of the consul A. Cornelius Cossus Arvina, caught in a pass by the Samnites. Decius volunteered to lead a small band to occupy a height that commanded the position of the enemy army so that Cossus could withdraw in safety (cf. Liv. 7.34.3-36.13). In 340 he became the first consul of his (plebeian) family. Though he may have died three years later in battle with the Latins, his devotio (cf. Cic. Fin. 2.61; N.D. 3.15; Div. 1.51 and 2.136; Parad. 12) was probably modeled on that of his son; cf. Stein, RE 4 (1901), 2279 ff.; MRR, 1,135. As consul for the fourth time in 295 P. Decius P. f. Q. n. Mus went to Etruria with his colleague to face a coalition of forces of the Samnites, Gauls, and Etruscans at Sentinum; his devotio and death in battle played an important part in the Roman victory; his action became legendary, the subject of triumphal songs sung by Roman soldiers and of Accius' patriotic drama Aeneadae or Decius (trag., pp. 326-28); cf. the narrative at Liv. 10.26-30; Stein, RE 4 (1901), 2283.6 ff.; MRR, 1, 177. . . . hinc Cn. et P. Scipiones . . .] A reference to the two brothers Cn. Cor nelius Scipio Calvus and P. Cornelius Scipio, consuls respectively in 222 and
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218, who died within a month of each other in battle against the Carthagi nians in Spain, probably in 211. As consul Gnaeus and his colleague M. Claudius Marcellus waged successful war against the Insubrians. Less lucky was his brother's consulate, which fell in the year of Hannibal's invasion of Italy; partly because of the treachery of his Gallic auxiliaries Publius suffered defeat against Hannibal at the Ticinus, where he was wounded; and he vainly warned his colleague Ti. Sempronius Longus against a pitched battle prior to Trebia. Meanwhile Gnaeus was sent to Spain; he was able to defeat and capture Hanno at Cissa (218); the following year he defeated Hasdrubal in a naval battle at the mouth of the Ebro. Upon receipt of this news in Rome Publius was despatched as proconsul to Spain to wage war in coordination with his brother. Cf. Henze, RE 4.1 (1900), 1438.66 ff. (Cornelius no. 334: Publius) and 1491.8 ff. (no. 345: Gnaeus); Lazenby, 53 (battle of the Ticinus) and 125 ff. (Spain); Richardson, 35 ff. (with literature). . . . hinc M. Marcellus . . .1 As consul for the first of five times in 222 M. Claudius Marcellus distinguished himself in battle against the Insubrians (killing their leader Virdumarus with his own hand, he won the spolia opima) and celebrated a triumph. After Cannae (216) he was entrusted with the remnants of the Roman army. He was able to arrive in time to prevent Nola from falling away from Rome, an act that, though significant psychologically rather than militarily, later Roman patriotism regarded as the turning-point in the Hannibalic War (Sil. 12.161 ff. and 295 ff.; cf. Cic. Brut. 12: . . . post Cannensem Mam calamitatem primum Marcelli ad Nolam proelio populus se Romanuserexit. . . 'y\erg.A.6.&57-SS:hicremRomanammagnoturbante tumultu I sistet). Cicero had inserted as a foil for Verres' depradations a notable encomium of Marcellus' moderation as victor over Syracuse in 211 at Ver. 2.4.115 ff. In 208 he was killed in ambush by Hannibal; hence his inclusion on this list of commanders who fell in battle. On his career in general cf. Munzer, RE 3.2 (1899), 2738.6 ff.; on the expectation that a general would expose himself to danger in a crisis cf. Rosenstein, 1990,117 ff. . . . maximeque ipse populus Romanus animi magnirudine excellit.] The application of μίγαλόψυχος/μ^γαλοψυχία to the attitude of a people or state, rather than an individual, seems to have been pioneered by the orators of democratic Athens: cf. Dem. 20.142, 23.205; Hyp. Eux. 33; Lycurg. 100; Kirsche, 36 ff. Cicero took up the topos at Man. 7: . . . semper appetentes gloriae praeter ceteras gentis atque avidi laudis fuistis . . .—Cicero has ar ranged his examples carefully from negative to positive and within the latter has built a climax from Greek achievements to those of individual Romans and finally to the populus Romanus itself, an example of whose magnitudo animi he reserves for 3.114.
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6 2 - 6 5 Once the reader has been introduced, by positive and negative exam ples, to the sphere of the virtue, Cicero/Panaetius proceeds at once to hedge it about with restrictions. Aristotle, on the other hand, mentions briefly at the outset that cowardice and injustice are unfitting for a μεγαλόψυχο? {EN 1123b31-32) and that he must possess all the virtues (ibid., 1 1 2 4 a l - 3 and 20 ff.) but offers no such detailed warnings of possible danger to society at large. It is likely that Panaetius, in common with Aristotle and other Stoics, held the doctrine later called the άντακολουθία τών αρετών, whereby the possession of one of the virtues implies the possession of all (cf. ad 55 1 5 2 61). Nevertheless he was evidently at pains to establish, as our section at tests, a nexus between μεγαλοψυχία and the social virtues, including iustitia and a regard for the utilitas communis. Perhaps this increased attention to the risks inherent in μεγαλοψυχία is connected with the figure of Alexander the Great as interpreted by philosophers beginning with Theophrastus, and this emphasis coincided, in view of his recent experience with Caesar and now Antony, with Cicero's own concerns; cf. ad %% 61-92 and 90. But in spite of the emphasis of this essay on down-to-earth precepts (cf. § 7b), Cicero/Panaetius, while describing the problem, offers no practical way of dealing with the negative qualities of pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus; cf. Heilmann, 6. 62 Sed ea animi elatio quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; . . .] Iustitia is thus constitutive of magnitudo animi and cannot be removed from it without destroying the virtue itself. Panaetius has already indicated that the virtues are interconnected (cf. ad % 15); hence the Ciceronian appendix to Book 1, in which he attempts to create a hierarchy of the individual virtues, is problematical; cf. ad 55 152-61.—Under those who fought pro suis com modis perhaps Panaetius had in mind (and mentioned?) Achilles and Alcibiades, who are given as examples of μεγαλοψυχία by Aristotle at APo. 9 7 b l 8 ; if so, this is an early indicator of his plan to challenge conventional rankings of leaders; cf. 55 74 ff. and 90. Cicero surely had Caesar in mind, whom he has already twice criticized by name (55 26 and 43); cf. Sal. Cat. 54.1, where there is said to be magnitudo animi par in Caesar and Cato. . . . non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis.] The use of immanitas strengthens the suspicion that Caesar is the target; cf. 55 26 and 157, 2.23 and 3.32; Heilmann, 4.— Here, as at 2.51, humanitas stands for the interest of the human community; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 140; Ehlers, TLL 6, 3080.8 ff. itaque probe definitur a Stoicis fortitudo cum earn virtutem esse dicunt propugnantcm pro aequitate.J This definition, not attested elsewhere, is likely to
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be Panaetius' own; cf. § 6 {sequimur . . . Stoicos)^ where the reference is likewise to Panaetius; Pohlenz, AF, 43, 2.—For aequitas = iustitia cf. ad § 30.—Hirzel, 2, 507 n., is correct in stating "Cicero ordnet nicht die Tapferkeit dem Hochsinn unter. Vielmehr wechselt er mit beiden Bezeichnungen oder verbindet sie . . ." But Knoche, 1935,52, n. 227, goes too far in trying to transfer this observation to Panaetius (though he does leave open the possibility that Cicero is being imprecise in his terminology). The description of the drive from which this virtue originates (§ 1 3 : . . . appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit. . .) makes it clear that the broader term is in question and that fortitudo, as defined in our passage, can only be a species of magnitudo animi; cf. also the distinction at § 80 between decernendi ratio and decertandi fortitudo and deliberate emphasis on the former. Surely the usage whereby Cicero speaks of fortis animus et magnus (§ 66; sim. 5 65) or magnitudo animi et fortitudo (3.99) or uses fortitudo alone as a designation for the third virtue (3.117-18) results from a desire for variatio as well as the fact that magnitudo animi was a relatively new expression felt to need some elucidation; cf. ad $ 6 1 . quocirca nemo qui fortitudinis gloriam consecutus est insidiis et malitia laudem est adeptus; . . .] Laus (έπαινος) is an attribute of the honestum (though it need not be, in fact, praised; cf. ad § 14) and plays a special role under the fourth virtue ($ 98). Malitia was said to be incompatible with justice at § 33 (malitiosa iuris interpretatio); insidiae are the special subject of 3.49b ff. (the term is used at 3.68). 63 praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: . . .] The ellipsis of esse lends emphasis to such judgments; cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1, 11. Such formulations are par ticularly common in this section of Off.: cf. § 61 (hinc rhetorum campus. . . (hinc no)ster Codes, hinc Decii. . .), $ 84 (atque haec quidem {de Lacedaemoniis) plaga mediocris . . .), § 86 {hinc apud Athenienses magnae discordiae), 90 (itaque alter semper magnus, alter saepe turpissimus). praeclarum igitur illud Platonis: *—quam fortitudinis'.] PL La. 197b: αλλ1 οϊμαι το άφοβοι* και το άνδρεΐον ού ταΰτόν έστιν. εγώ δε ανδρείας* μεν και προμηθίας* πάνυ τισΐν ολίγοις οΐμαι μετεΐναι, θρασύτητος* δέ και τόλμης* και τοϋ άφοβου μετά άπρομηθίας* πάνυ πολλοίς* καΐ ανδρών και γυναικών και παί δων και θηρίων, ταϋτ' ούν ά συ καλείς* ανδρεία και ο'ι πολλοί, εγώ θρασεα καλώ, ανδρεία δε τά φρόνιμα περ'ι ών λέγω. Note that the contrast of motives between sua cupiditas and utilitas communis is absent from Plato; it is also a point emphasized in the non-Panaetian appendix to Book 1 (cf., e.g., § 154: quis enim est tarn cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura ut, si ei tractanti contemplantique res cognitione dignissimas subito sit adhtum penculum discrimenque patriae cui subvenire opitularique possit, non ilb
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omnia relinquat atque abiciat. . .) and was an important concern of Cicero at the time of the composition of Off. (cf. introduction, $ 6). itaque viros fortes (ct) magnanimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritaris amicos minimeque fall aces esse volumus;...] Contrast §§ 108-9 and 113, where, to illustrate the variety of human temperaments, the callidi are con trasted with the simplices et aperti, but without any value judgment.—Cf. Arist. EN 1127a21 ff., where the αύβέκαστος appears as the mean between the άλά£ων and the €Ϊρων, and ad § 13. 64 Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur.] Appetitio quaedam principatus was the natural drive that formed the basis of the third virtue; cf. § 13 (with note); but here, as under iustitia (cf. 5 26), the concern is that this tendency can be taken to extremes {nimia). ut enim apud Platonem est omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi . . .] PI. La. 182e-183a: λβγω oe ταύτα ττερί αυτού [sc. τουόπλιτικού] eis τάδ^ άποβλβψας,οτι οΐμαι €γώ τούτο.ei fsc. μάθημα] TL ην, ούκ αν λελη&'ναι Λακ€δαιμον(ους, οι ς ουδέν άλλο μ€λ€ΐ ev τψ βίω ή τούτο £ητ6ΐν και €πιτηδ€ύειν, οτι αν μαθόντ£ς και 6ττιτηδ€ύσαντ€9 πλ€ον€κτοΪ€ν των άλλων nepi τον πόλ€μον; cf. Sen. Ben. 5.3.1: Lacedaemonii vetant suos pancratio aut caestu decernere, ubi inferiorem ostendit victi confessio. . . . ut quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellet, ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse.] Cf. Soph. Ant. 739 (Haemon to Creon): καλώς έρημης γ ' αν συ γης άρχοι ς· μόνος; ad % 13. difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria.] Stiff competition is licit as long as aequitas is preserved; cf. ad 3.42 (Chrysippus); sim. $ 26 (where the Ennian sancta societas substitutes for aequitas). . . . exsistuntque in republica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam maximas consequantur et sint vi potius superiores quam iustitia pares.] In thus translating the concept into Roman terms, Cicero is evidently thinking above all of Caesar (note: ut. . . sint vi. . . superiores; for the refusal to obey ius cf. § 26). Caesar certainly engaged in the distribution of property to his supporters (§ 43; 2.27-29), but the phrase largitores et factiosi also calls to mind the armed strife of factions that marred the public life of Rome in the 50's; cf. Lintott, 74 ff.; passages in which Cicero criticizes the contiones conductae of P. Clodius are collected by Christian Meier, RE Suppl. 10 (1965), 615.13 ff.—For the negative sense of largitor cf. MontefuscoBuchwald, TLL 7.2, 972.24 ff. (for the corresponding connotations of largitio ad § 43); for opes in the sense of "political power" cf. ad § 25. . . . nullum enim est tempus quod iustitia vacare debeat.] What constitutes a
194 A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis just act may vary according to circumstance (κατά ττερίστασιν; cf. §$ 31-32) but not the obligation to be just. 65 fortes igitur et magnanimi sunt habendi non qui faciunt, sed qui propulsant iniuriam.] This precept, too, establishes ties between iustitia and magni tude* animi, since the failure to ward off wrongdoing is itself unjust; cf. ad SS 23, 28, and 62. vera autem et sapiens—desideret gloriam.] The first two sentences (—non est habendus) comprise a theoretical description of behavior expected of the μίγαλόψυχος. Then follows the empirical observation facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate . . . ; on the importance of glory for a Roman aristocrat in building a political career cf. Harris, 17 ff. The upshot of this confrontation of theory and practice is indeed a locus lubricus; nor is the problem resolved in our passage (cf. p. 32 supra). vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat...] Μεγαλοψυχία, unlike magnitudo animi, was used in common parlance (cf. ad SS 61-92), some times in the debased sense "generosity" (cf. LSJ s.v.), besides being applied to morally dubious characters such as Alcibiades (cf. ad $ 62); hence perhaps Panaetius' need for a stricter sense of the term.—At $ 68 Cicero explains that the lust for glory reduces one's freedom; but a more basic reason for disregarding glory has to do with the Stoic valuation of the external goods; cf. ad 2.31; another reason for despising glory, viz., the transitory nature of what passes for glory in this world, is given at 2.43, where the concept of vera gloria is similar to that of vera. . . animi magnitudo in our passage (see ad he). . . . principemque se esse mavult quam videri.] Cf. Aesch. Sept. 592 (of Amphiaraus, who bears no device on his shield): ου γαρ δοκ€ΐι> άριστος αλλ' eii/αι Θέλα, a verse perhaps cited by Panaetius (cf. Pohlenz, AF, 43, n. 5); on appearance and reality cf. also § 41. Cf. Sallust's comment on Cato (Cat. 54.6): non divitiis cum divite neque factione cum factioso, sed cum strenuo virtute, cum modesto pudore, cum innocente abstinentia certabat; esse quam videri bonus malebat: ita, quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis ilium se~ quebatur. I suspect that in his entire συγκρισι? of Caesar and Cato Sal lust has our passage in mind; note the comment its . . . magnitudo animi par, item gloria, sed alia alii. Caesar beneficiis ac muniftcentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato . . . Cato nihil brgiundo gloriam adeptus est (ibid., 54.1-3). The topics magnitudo animi and gloria and the means of attaining these, whether by virtus or largitio, are common to both passages; that Caesar represents one method is implicit in our passage (and explicit else-
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where in Off.; see ad § 64). It is not impossible, however, in view of his use of bonus, rather than Cicero's princeps, that Sallust may have had some knowl edge, direct or indirect, of the Aeschylean context; cf. R. Renehan, u A Tradi tional Pattern of Imitation in Sallust and His Sources, n CPh 71 (1976), 9 7 99. . . . qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hie in magnis viris non est habendus.) In the Gorgias Callicles is said to be a lover of the δήμος (481d; cf. 513c); but Socrates argues that those who speak before the δήμο? do not so much educate as flatter it (502d-e). Similarly, Arist. EN 1124a4 ff. em phasizes that the μεγαλόψυχο? is independent of public opinion; cf., ibid., 1125a6-8; EE 1232b4-7; ad § 147; supra p. 32 and n. 70. facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate;. . .] Cf. Long, 1995 1 , 227 ff.; § 26; Arch. 26: trahimur omnes studio laudis, et optimus quisque maxitne gloria ducitur. . . . qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenirur qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi merccdem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam.] Cf. Arist. EN 1134bl ff.: εστί δ* ό άρχωι> φύλαξ του δικαίου.€i oe του δικαίου, και τοΰ ίσου. επ€ΐ δ' ούθέν αύτω πλέον είναι δοκεΐ, εϊπερ δίκαιο? . . . ■ μισθό? άρα τι? δοτεο?, τούτο δε τιμή και γέρα?· δτψ δέ μη ικανά τά τοιαύτα, ούτοι γίνονται τύραννοι.—Cicero stated his public position in a letter to Cato dated to late 51 or early 50: si quisquam fuit umquam remotus et natura et magis etiam, ut mihi quidem sentire videor, ratione atque doctrina ab inani laude et sermonibus vulgi, ego profecto is sum. testis est consulatus meus, in quo, sicut in reliqua vita, fateor ea me studiose secutum ex quibus vera gloria nasci posset, ipsam quidem gloriam per se numquam putavi expetendam (Earn. 15.4.13); with his familiars, however, he was more candid about his own fondness for glory; cf. Shackleton Bailey ad loc. (= 110.13.4-5 of his edition) as well as ad 2.31 and 43.—For lubricus in the sense "liable to lead to false steps, hazardous, ticklish," or the like cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Heus, TLL 7.2, 1689.34 ff. 6 6 - 6 7 Cicero/Panaetius distinguishes carefully between the achievements that constitute the glamor and usefulness (sc. to society) of magnitudo animi and its psychological substrate, which is the real concern. 66 . . . una in rerum extemarum despicientia ponirur, cum persuasum est nihil hominem nisi quod honestum decorumque sit aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere, nullique neque homini neque perturbation! animi nee fortunae succumbere.] The Aristotelian μεγαλόψυχο? despises other persons (EN 1124a29 ff.) or their false opinions {EE 1232a38-bl0); hence indeed το όλίγωρον is said to be his πόθο? ϊδιον (ibid., 1232b9-10); hence, too, Aristo of Ceus, who succeeded Lyco as head of the Peripatos, felt the need to draw a
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firm distinction between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (fr. 13 VI, p. 3 5 , 2 3 27 W.; see ad § 90). The despising of external goods is, of course, a specifi cally Stoic attitude (cf. introduction to Book 2). For the ability of the μεγαλό ψυχο? to surmount evil cf. Democ. 68 Β 46 D.-K.: μεγαλοψυχίη το φερειν πραεω? πλημμέλειας Arist. ΑΡο. 97b21-22; ΕΝ 1100b30-33; (Arist.] VV 1 2 5 0 a l 4 - 1 5 and 1250b34 ff.;*« [Plat.] Def. 412e9; SVF 3, nos. 2 6 4 - 6 5 , 269-70,274-75. 67 id autem ipsum cernitur in duobus, si et solum id quod honestum sit bonum iudices et ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis.] Though this sen tence repeats the content of the first sentence of 5 66, Cicero is by no means averse to recapitulations and repetitions in this essay (cf. ad§§ 132 and 141; Thomas, 29); and it does not, pace Atzert, disturb the train of thought; hence his athctesis has not been followed by Fedeli, Testard, or Winterbottom. nam et ea quae eximia—magnaeque constantiae.J Muson. 25.14 ff. recom mends this practice as a training for the soul.—For the first clause {nam et ea—magnique ducendum est) cf. 2.37. . . . et ea quae videntur acerba, quae muha et varia in hominum vita fortunaque versantur, ita ferre ut nihil a statu naturae discedas, nihil a dignitatc sapientis, robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae.] The behavior described here, no less than the martial exploits listed at $ 6 1 , formed the subject of encomia; cf. de Orat. 2.346: magna etiam ilia bus et admirabilis videri solet tulisse casus sap tenter adversos, non fractum esse fortuna, retinuisse in rebus asperis dignitatem. The emphasis, here and elsewhere (cf. § 80: . . . nee tumultuantem de gradu deici. . .), on the dignified appearance appropriate to the μεγαλόψυχο? (cf. Arist. EN 1125a 12 ff.) approaches some of the advice about comportment offered under the fourth virtue (esp. § 131). Cf. in general Arist. EN 1124al2 ff.: μάλιστα μεν ow εστίν, ώσπερ εϊρηται, ό μεγαλόψυχο? περί τιμά?, οΰ μην άλλα και περί πλούτοι/ και δυναστείαν καΐ πάσαν εύτυχίαν και άτυχίαν μετρίω? εξει, όπω? άι> γίνηται, και OUT' ευτυχών περιχαρή? έ'σται οΰτ' άτυχων περίλυπο?.—For the phrase robustus animus cf. SVF 3, 23.28, where μεγαλοψυχία is said to consist in ρώμη και ίσχυ? ψυχή?. Sandbach, 7 6 - 7 8 , gives the background in Stoic physical theory for robustus animus (its firmness saves the sage's soul down to the final con flagration). For the iunctura robusti animi est magnaeque constantiae cf. Sest. 99: . . . magni animi est. . . magnaeque constantiae. 6 8 - 7 3 These paragraphs have as their subject the relation of the μεγαλό ψυχο? to tranquillitas animi. The perturbationes animi form the subject of $§ 68-69a (—turn etiam dignitatem); here it is laid down that cupiditas, 96. On this work cf. I. During, RE Suppl. 11 (1968), 317.58 ff.
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whether the object be pleasure, wealth, or glory, is incompatible with the independence (libertas) for which the μεγαλόψυχο? strives. Then $§ 69b-71 consider one strategy for securing both independence and tranquillitas animi, namely withdrawal from public affairs to one's own estate. But Cicero will grant leave from public service only in special cases (physical weakness is the example given); 97 otherwise those who withdraw from public affairs are only μεγαλόψυχοι, as it were, by halves; their contempt for glory wins ap proval, but they are under grave suspicion of lacking constantia ($ 71). It is admitted, however, that a commitment to public life exposes one in a greater degree to the whims of fortune. The section concludes with some general precepts about undertaking actions. 6 8 . . . nihil honestius magnificentiusque quam pecuniam contemnere, si non habeas, si habeas, ad beneficentiam liberalitatemque conferre.] In the EN Aristotle's formula for the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος· to wealth (and other external goods) is not "despising" but "moderation" (EN 1124al3 ff.: . . . περ'ι πλουτον και δυναστείαν καΐ πάσαν εύτυχίαν και άτυχίαν μετρίως έξει . . . ). The use of wealth for benefactions (cf. Arist. Pol. 1263bl3, cited ad §§ 20-60) was probably a factor in this attitude. Closer to our passage is £ £ 1232bl0 ff.: πάλιν περί τιμή? και του £ήν και πλούτου, περί ων σπουδά ζει ν δοκοϋσιν οι άνθρωποι, οΰθεν φροντίζειν περ'ι των άλλων πλην περί τιμής. In placing wealth among the αδιάφορα, albeit as a προηγμένοι/, the Stoa left the way free for the despising of wealth; cf. SVF 1, 47.24-25; 3, 17.20-21 etc.; ibid., 3, 31.5 (as a προηγμενον); Chrysippus held both a concern and a lack of concern for wealth to be folly (ibid., 33.27 ff.). nee vero imperia expetenda, ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda nonnumquam.] This is for the sake of ευθυμία, Panaetius' essay (fr. 45) on which was inspired in part by Democritus;98 cf. 68 Β 3 D.-K.: τόν ευθυμεΐσθαι μέλλοντα χρή μη πολλά πρήσσειν, μήτε ίδίη μήτε ξυντ\, μηδέ άσσ' αν πράσση, ύπερ τε δύναμιν αίρεΐσβαι την έωυτοϋ και φύσιν . . . ; Arist. EN 1124b25 describes the μεγαλόψυχος as ολίγων μένπρακτικόν, μεγάλων δε και ονομαστών.—Deponenda would, of course, be an implicit thrust at Caesar's refusal, entailing the recent civil war; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 226. In general, the laying down of office was not common in Rome, though Cicero himself had renounced the province of Cisalpine Gaul, a hotbed of conspiracy likely to entail military action, which he had obtained by exchange with his consular 97. For Panaetius' position cf. ad $ 72. 98. Note, however, that the title π*ρϊ ^ύθυμίης may have been inferred from the first sentence of Democritus' treatise; cf. introduction, n. 9, and Schmalzriedt, there cited, 125-26. For a reconstruction of Panaetius1 approach to the subject and relation to Democritus cf. Gill, 1994, 4614 ff.
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colleague C. Antonius, who received instead the more lucrative Macedonia (cf. Cat. 4.23, Pis. 5, and other testimonies discussed by Allen); an arrange ment whereby Cicero shared in the profits seems likely; cf. Shatzman, 4 Π Ι 3; Gelzer, 82-83; T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 363. Some other instances: three praetors of 176 excused themselves from accepting provinces [MRR, 1, 400); Q. Hortensius Hortalus (cos. 69) declined the command against the Cretan pirates (ibid., 2,131), and L. Lucceius (pr. 67) refused the province of Sardinia (ibid., 143). Rather different is the case of Cn. Cornelius Scipio, whose praetorship is usually dated to 109 and whom, in light of his bad character, the senate forbade to go, according to the allotment, to Spain (ibid., 1, 546). Q. Mucius Scaevola, the Pontifex, is said to have laid aside a province to stay clear of debt (Asc. Pis. 13); the incident should perhaps be referred with F. Miinzcr, RE 16.1 (1933), 438.30 ff., to the fact that he governed Asia for only nine months [Att. 5.17.5); for the date cf. ad 3.10. 69a vacandum autem omni est animi perturbatione, cum cupiditate et metu, rum etiam aegritudine et voluptate animi et iracundia, ut tranquillitas animi et securitas adsit, quae adfert cum constantiam rum etiam dignitatem.] The text has caused difficulty: after voluptate the archetype reads animi; but scholars have wondered why voluptas animi should be singled out as op posed to other voluptates. Animi has been suspected of being a dittography from earlier or later in the sentence, and nimia, a reading reported by Pearce, has been adopted by Orelli, Pohlenz, AF, 45, and Winterbottom. To this Thomas, n. 230, 68-69, objected that voluptas is always negatively charac terized in the Stoa. Here one needs to distinguish between two senses of ηδονή, one the bodily sensation, the other the passion; cf. Inwood, 1985, 144-45. The former is acceptable in moderation; cf. § 106: ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia earnque contemni et reici oportere, sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum, as well as the reference to voluptas nimia at § 102; see also ad 3.119, as well as the reference to mala mentis Gaudia at Verg. A. 6.278-79 with Norden's commentary, p. 214. In our passage, however, the passion is in question; animi has been added to clarify this sense (cf. the limitation by corporis in § 106). The words et iracundia (bracketed, along with the immediately preceding animi, by Briiser, 84) have formed another stumbling-block, since the ortho dox Stoa knows the four πάθη επιθυμία, φόβο?, λύπη, and ηδονή, and treats anger as a species of desire (SVF 3, 96.14 ff.); in regarding anger as as an independent expression of the θυμό? Panaetius would, however, be in accord with Plato (and Posidonius): cf. Pohlenz, AF, 45, n. 2; Stoa, 1,199. Note that the same five-fold scheme is found in a discourse of Herodes Atticus against
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the Stoic doctrine of απάθεια apud Gel. 19.12.3: in ea dissertatione, quantulum memini, huiuscemodi sensus est: quod nullus usquam homo, qui se cundum naturam sentiret et saperet, adfectionibus istis animi, quas πάθη appellabat, aegritudinis, cupiditatis, timoris, irae, voluptatis, carere et vacare totis posset . . . Note, too, that anger was singled out from among the perturbationes at $ 23b as an example of a potential cause of injustice and is an emotion that the μεγαλόψυχος in particular must master; hence the homily on the subject at SS 88-89.—The phrase tranquillitas animi et securitas surely renders the Panaetian ευθυμία (cf. ad §§ 61-92, 73a).— Dignitas is a concept of much wider application than αξίωμα; in this regard τιμή would be its Greek counterpart. The adjective dignus, derived from decet," tends, like honestum, to have reference to worthiness in terms of public esteem; hence the common use of dignitas, like honos, of public office; for the connection with honos cf., e.g., Don. ad Ten Hec. 212 (2,229.7 W.): dignum: sic dixit 'dignum', ut honoris sit genus accipere uxorem meruisse; Klose, 45 ff. On Cicero's political ideal cum dignitate otium [Sest. 98 al.) cf. Strasburger, 1956, 73. One cannot but wonder whether Panaetius was not content with ευθυμία as the goal of the process of controlling the πάθη and whether constantia (which has no equivalent in Greek prior to Philo's ευστά θεια; cf. Burger, TLL 4, 504.5 ff.; LSJ s.v.) and dignitas are not Cicero's interpretatio Romana (for the role of dignitas under the fourth virtue cf. ad § 94). However, since bearing good and evil fortune with equanimity was part of Panaetius' conception of μεγαλοψυχία (cf. $ 90), the mention of constantia in this sense is certainly in the spirit of Panaetius.—Constantia, like dignitas, rules out certain types of unbecoming behavior (cf. § 80: fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis . . .); hence its prominence under the fourth virtue; cf. § 98 and ad $ 111. 69b-71 The earlier Stoa had distinguished three προηγούμενοι βίοι, the royal, the political, and the life devoted to knowledge (επιστημονικός; SVF 3, 172.15). Apart from a passing allusion at $ 70 {his idem propositum fuit quod regibus . . .), the life of a monarch has been omitted here, no doubt because Cicero found it unnecessary for his purposes. The essential distinc tion in this section, then, is between two groups, both of which have the same goal, namely independence of external authority (αυτάρκεια), but propose to attain it by different means. The members of the first group pursue otium and are contenti. . . et suo et parvo (% 70); the second group comprises those who engage in the political life of the community. The resulting contrast between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa is a theme traceable as far back as 99. Cf. Ernout-Meillct s.v. decet.
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Euripides» Antiope (frr. 179 ff. N.*); cf. also Arist. Pol. 1324a25 ff. The two groups are said to benefit both society and themselves: the life of the otiosi is minus aliis gravis aut molesta, whereas that of statesmen is fructuosior. . . hominum generi (§ 70); on the other hand, the men of leisure enjoy a life facilior and tutior for themselves, the politicians one that is ad claritatem amplitudinemque aptior (ibid.; cf. Johann, 473, n. 48). The rating of the two alternative βίοι in our passage has caused difficulty. Pohlenz claims that this passage shows that "das Freiheitsstreben des apolitischen Philosophen ebenso unsozial ist wie die Herrschsucht des Tyrannen" (AF, 47). In fact, the contrast in our passage is not between philoso phers and tyrants, as Buchner, 1967, 61, saw. However, the overall contrast here is not between philosophers and kings either (pace Buchner, loc. cit.t and Johann, 37): the kings are cited in the first sentence of $ 70 merely as an example of the type of libertas the otiosi are striving for. The contrast is rather between men of leisure in general and men of affairs in general; and neither is condemned (so, rightly, Johann, 37; in quo neutrorum omnino contemnenda sententia est: % 70). Political life in a free commonwealth is presupposed (. . . qui se ad rempublicam et ad magnas res gerendas accommodaverunt: ibid.). Pohlenz was also mistaken in finding sarcasm in the first sentence of § 70, which states that the otiosi pursue the same goal as kings; the goal in question is tranquillitas animi; and Cicero expressly notes that their approach to obtaining it is not to be despised (see above). In $ 71 Cicero subjects the otiosi to closer scrutiny and is prepared to afford leave from government service to two types: those who have a talent for scholarship or are hindered by ill health or other serious cause 100 (qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt, et Us qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a republica recesserunt). Others are under suspicion of putting forward contempt for glory as a pretext to cover their unwilling ness to take on the hard work or face the possibility of defeat inherent in political life. It is only at this point in the argument, not at the beginning of § 70, that a certain amount of irony is directed at those who for the wrong motives and (presumably) without the proper qualifications seek the life of otium. It seems likely that Panaetius recognized the legitimacy of both the vita activa and the vita contemplativa (sim. Sen. Tranqu. An. 7.2, cited ad % 110 below); the former is, however, said to be the prerequisite for μεγαλοψυχία (cf. ad § 72). In his appendix to this Book (§§ 153 ff.) Cicero argues in detail the superiority of the former over the latter (note, too, that the criticism of 100. For the interpretation cf. ad $ 23.
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philosophers at 5 28 involves the special situation in which they do not intervene to hinder injustice); cf. also introduction, $ 5 (4). 70 his idem proposimm fuit quod regibus, ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur, cuius proprium est sic vivere ut velis.] Cf. SVF 3, 158.34 ff.: οΰ μόνον δε ελευθέρους είναι του? σοφούς, άλλα και βασιλέας, της βασιλείας ούσης αρχής άνυπευθύνου . . .; Farad. 34: quid est enim libertasf potestas vivendi ut velis; Epict. Diss. 4.1.1: ελεύθερος έστιν ό ζών ώς βούλεται, ον οϋτ' άναγκάσαι εστίν ούτε κωλύσαι ούτε βιάσασθαι, ου αί όρμαι ανεμπόδιστοι, αί ορέξεις έπιτευκτικαί, αί έκκλίσεις άπερίπτωτοι.—For Pohlenz's interpretation of this sentence as ironic see the previous note. quare cum hoc commune sit potentiae cupidorum cum his quos dixi otiosis . . .] In fact, this has not been established, but rather that this is a feature shared by the otiosi with kings. Cicero thus none too subtly shifts the basis of comparison to accord with the political circumstances of the Roman republic. For Panaetius, however, it was natural to discuss kings, like Philip and Alexander, or philosophers, such as Socrates, as claimants to μεγα λοψυχία (cf. ad SS 88 and 90). 7 1 . . . et iis forsitan concedendum sit rempublicam non capessentibus.. . et iis qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti a republica recesserunt. . .] The fragments on the subject attested by name for Chrysippus present a contrast that fuller context would doubtless clarify. On the one hand, he maintained a kind of right to live at leisure (Sen. de Otio 8.1: adice nunc quod e lege Chrysippi vivere otioso licet: non dico ut otium patiatur, sed ut eligat). On the other hand, he is said, while not having engaged in public affairs himself, to have sent all others to do so (id. Tranqu. An. 1.10: promptus, compositus sequor Zenona, Cleanthem, Chrysippum, quorum tamen nemo ad rempublicam accesstt, nemo non misit; both frag ments at SVF 3,174.30 ff.). Perhaps the former point was qualified in some such way as in our text. The general Stoic doctrine was that the sage takes part in politics αν μή τι κωλύη (SVF 3, 175.4; cf. 173.17 ff.). In this connec tion Cicero may have thought of his own father (cf. Leg. 2.3: banc vides villam, ut nunc quidem est lautius aedificatam patris nostri studio, qui cum esset infxrma valetudine, hie fere aetatem egit in litteris); a similar case was that of his friend M. Marius (cf. Munzer, RE 14.2 (1930], 1819.32 ff.). Under the empire the parameters for otium ex causa were evidently widened (on the basis of the theory oipersonae; cf. $ 110; Griffin, 1976,341); cf. Sen. de Otio 3.3: alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa; causa autem ilia late patet. si respublica corruptior est quam (ut) adiuvari possit, si occupata est malis, non nitetur sapiens in supervacuum nee se nihil profuturus inpendet; si parum habebit auctoritatis aut virium nee ilium erit admissura
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respublica, si vaktudo ilium inpediet. . .—For the use of the participle after a concessive verb, evidently patterned on Greek usage, cf. Holden ad he, who cites Tusc. 2.19; cf. also Cael. 25.—For the interpretation of aliqua graviore causa cf. ad § 23 b. quibus autem talis nulla sit causa, si despicere se dicant ea quae plerique mirentur, imperia et magistratus, iis non modo non laudi venim etiam vitio dandum puto.] Yet in the following sentence Cicero has to qualify this: quorum iudicium in eo quod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent difficile factu est non probare. . . Perhaps Cicero's text is a surface distortion of a Panaetian thought similar to Arist. EN 1124b5-6: ό μεν γαρ μεγαλό ψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεί (δοξάρι γάρ αληθώς), οί δέ πολλοί τυχόντως. sunt enim qui in rebus contrariis parum sibi constent, voluptatem severissime contemnant, in dolore sint mo Hi ores, gloriam neglegant, frangantur infamia, atque ea quidem non satis constanter.] Aristotle, too, knows pseudo-μ€γαλόψυχoι who fail to qualify for the title because they are unable to bear good fortune {EN 1124a30 ff.). An unflattering portrait of such enervated persons is likewise painted by Herod. Att. apud Gel. 19.12.10 (a passage which elsewhere agrees with Panaetian doctrine; cf. ad § 69 above).—On divergence of precept and practice cf. Servius Sulpicius Rufus' letter on hearing of the death of Tullia {Earn. 4.5.5-6; ca. mid-March, 45). 72 Sed iis qui habent a natura adiumenta renim gerendarum abiecta omni cunctatione adipiscendi magistratus et gerenda respublica est; nee enim aliter aut regi civitas aut declarari animi magnitudo potest.] Our passage is pre sumably the principal foundation for the notion of Pohlenz, AF, 47, that for Panaetius "hohen Sinn tragt. . . nur, wer sich ins Kampfgewiihl begibt und auch d o n als Fiihrer seine Ataraxie und die Sicherheit des Handelns wahrt." Our passage indicates that those fitted by nature for it should take part in public life, but did Panaetius really regard only those who performed great deeds in state service as μεγαλόψυχοι (cf. the words nee enim aliter . . . potest)} If so, why discuss philosophers at all in this context, grant them leave from public service, and compare them with statesmen in terms of their ability to bear changes of fortune (§§ 7 1 , 73, 90)? Why state in § 92 esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam . . . ? Perhaps there are more kinds of "great deeds" than appear in our passage (cf. the reference at § 66 to res arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum). Certainly Aristotle had mentioned So crates along with Lysander, Achilles, and Ajax as a person considered μεγαλόψυχος (ΑΡο. 97b21). One suspects that the formulation of §$ 66 and 72 reflects Cicero's own predilection (common, it must be said, to most Romans) for public service over the vita contemplativa but that Panaetius*
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more evenhanded treatment of the claims of the philosopher and statesman underlies the comparisons of the two spheres and the statement quoted from $ 92.' 0 1 73a quae faciliora sunt philosophis, quo minus multa patent in eorum vita quae fortuna feriat, et quo minus multis rebus e g e n t . . . ] Cf. Plut. Tranqu. An. 475d-e (perhaps after Panaetius, περί ευθυμία?) on the limited vul nerability of the philosopher's life to assault by fortune: όθεν ού δει παντάπασιν έκταπεινοϋν ουδέ καταβάλλειν την φύσιν. ώς μηδέν ίσχυρόν μηδέ μόνιμον μηδ' Οπερ την τύχην εχουσαν, άλλα τουναντίον είδότας δτι μικρόν έστι μέρος τοΰ άνθρωπου τό σαθρον και έπίκηρον, ψ δέχεται την τύχην, της δε βελτίονος μερίδος αύτοι κρατοϋμεν, εν η τά μέγιστα των αγαθών Ίδρυθέντα, δόξαι τε χρησται και μαθήματα και λόγοι τελευτώντες είς άρετήν, άναφαίρετον έ'χουσι την ούσίαν και άδιάφθορον, άνεκπλήκτους προς τό μέλλον εΐναι και θαρραλέους, προς την τύχην λέγοντας, α Σωκράτης δοκών προς τους κατ ηγόρους λέγειν προς τους δικαστάς ελεγεν, ώς άποκτεΐναι μεν "Ανυτος και Μέλητος δύνανται, βλάψαι δ' ού δύνανται.—On the verbs suggestive of sword-play {patent, feriat)—a faint reminder of Panaetius' simile of the pancratiast, which surely occurred in the vicinity (see introduction, $ 5 |5J and ad § 73b)—and similar to metaphors in Caelius* letters (Fam. 8.8.3 and esp. 8.17.2), cf. Fantham, 31, n. 22. . . . maiores motus animorum concitantur (maioraque efficiendi} rempublicam gerentibus quam quietis . . .] For the sense of motus animorum (= πάθη, perturbationes) cf. Tusc. 3.7: num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines iracundiaef haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant;. . . nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec om nia morbos Graeci appelbnt, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem bos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus ...; Wieland, TLL 8.10, 1536.9 ff. The transmitted maioraque efficiendi is retained by Testard and Winterbottom, whereas Atzert4 follows Briiser, 87 ff., in bracketing maioraque efficiendi, and Pohlenz, AF, 46, n. 2, and Fedeli adopt the conjecture pro posed by Unger, 75, maioraque studia efficiendi. Briiser, 88, condemned the transmitted maioraque efficiendi as corrupt or syntactically incomplete. On the other hand, Thomas, 100-1, argued that motus animorum should be supplied from the preceding clause. The sense would then be that those who 101. Albeit the third type of μεγαλόψυχο? introduced there seems likely to be Ciceronian, rather than Panaetian (cf. ad loc); Rist, 193, claimed that Panaetius attributed equal value to the vita activa and vita contemplative and that the preference for the former (presumably at SS 153 ff.) was purely Ciceronian, bur without specific discussion of the obstacles posed by SS 66 and 72.
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engage in public affairs have motus animorum that are greater and try to achieve greater goals (sc. than the otiosi).wl This interpretation entails, however, not merely a very bold transference from the viri magni animi to their motus animorum but the difficulty that, according to $ 66, the great achievements of the μεγαλόψυχοι are the result of the absence of the πάθη (= motus animorum; see above); hence our suspect text can hardly be correct in stating without qualification that the πάθη themselves achieve or try to achieve great deeds. Pohlenz, be. cit., argued that the suspect text should be retained for its reference to the sphere of practice and refers to the following efficiendi facultatem. But, in fact, at this stage in the argument the concern is exclusively with the mental constituents and the possible danger to tranquillitas animi (see the following conclusion: quo magis its el magnitudo est animi adbibenda et vacuitas ab angoribus). The question of efficiendi facultas arises only in the following sentence introduced by the contrasting formula ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit. . . The suspect text was surely interpolated by a reader who failed to appreciate this fact and missed a reference to the second element of magnitudo animi (cf. § 66) without seeing the problems posed by its introduction in this form. 73b Ad rem gerendam—adhibenda est praeparatio diligens.] The general advice to the man of affairs prior to the introduction of the distinction between the general and the statesman ($§ 74-89) is remarkably brief, though it is taken up again in §§ 9 0 - 9 1 . I suspect that Cicero may have considerably shortened his Panaetian model at this point (cf. ad 2.16). The corresponding Panaetian passage has been suspected as the likely home for fr. 116 (= Gel. 13.28), which likewise contains advice for the man of affairs in general; cf. Bringmann, 269-70; ad 73a; introduction, § 5 (5). Ad rem gerendam autem qui accedit, caveat ne id modo considered quam ilia res honesta sit, sed etiam ut habeat efficiendi facultatem; . . .J A characteris tic concern with practical aspects (cf. § 7b); Book 2 offers detailed precepts. . . . in quo ipso considerandum est ne aut temere desperet propter ignaviam aut nimis confidat propter cupiditatem.) Cupiditas and metus are, of course, two of the πάθη (cf. § 69); they must be dealt with even at the planning stage. 7 4 - 7 8 In introducing μίγαλοψυχία, Cicero/Panaetius had used military ex amples to show that this is the splendidissimum of the four types of the honestum (§§ 61-62). Now, however, the plan is to combat the common opinion that attaches such importance to military exploits. This program is 102. Thomas, 101, n. 32, should not have compared Lucr. 4.1011-12 (porro bominum mentes, magnis quae motihus edunt I magna), where motus refers to the atomic movements of the mens (cf. C. Giussani ad 4.1004 in vol. 3 of his edition [Turin, 1897)).—Mullen's conjecture is sufficiently refuted by Bruser, 89.
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in line both with Panaetius' emphasis on the rational constituents of μεγα λοψυχία (cf. ad §S 79-81) and Cicero's own talents and preferences; he may also have thought that, given his military interests, his son needed to be shown this perspective (cf. introduction, $ 4; ad 2.45). Panaetius presents a σύγκριση of two Athenians, Themistocles and Solon, one noted for his military success at Salamis, the other for his contributions to civil government. Solon, we are told, laid out the entire framework for Athenian political life, including the establishment of the Areopagus (but cf. ad § 75), from which Themistocles benefited as well, whereas Themistocles' victory at Salamis, important as it was, was a single event, not a perpetual legacy {Mud enim semel profuit, hoc semper proderit civitati: $ 75). 1 0 3 The same argument is then repeated with the substitution of Spartan examples, the generals Pausanias and Lysander versus the lawgiver Lycurgus. When Cicero sets about adding Roman examples, however, he distorts the clarity of the Panaetian argument, for he compares, not a general with a lawgiver, but generals and politicians of his own time or the previous genera tion or two. Moreover, one of the politicians, P. Scipio Nasica, contributed, not so much through legislation as violence, so that Cicero has to append to this example a rather labored apologia [quamquam haec quidem res non solum ex domestica est ratione—attingit etiam be Hicam, quoniam vi manuque confecta est—sed tamen id ipsum est gestum consilio urbano sine exercitu [§ 76]). Here is an instance where the issues that are really on Cicero's mind obtrude themselves even at the expense of the clarity of the argument (cf. ad 2.21 -22). What lies behind this allusion becomes a bit clearer at 2.43, where he refers again to Tiberius Gracchus' assassination: Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tarn diu laudabitur dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit, at eius filii nee vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum obtinent iure caesorum. The numerus iure caesorum has recently been augmented by one, Julius Caesar, to whom Cicero so often adverts in this treatise, whether by name (1.27,43, and 112), obliquely (2.24,27-29, and 3.82-83), or by surrogate, as in these two passages on the Gracchi; cf. the observation at Amic. 41 [Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses; cf. also 2.80). Our passage culminates, by way of comparison of his achievements with Pompey's, in an allusion to Cicero's own role in crushing the Catilinarian conspiracy. Here by using Pompey's own pronouncement ( . . . frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse nisi meo in rempublicam beneficio ubi triumpharet esset habiturus [§ 78]) and by his refer103. One may query, however, whether Salamis does not receive short shrift here, for if the battle prevented the enslavement of the Greeks, its long-term implications were incalculable.
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ence to the fact that the addressee, his son, shares in the legacy of his father's glory, Cicero mitigates somewhat the odium that ordinarily attaches to selfpraise (cf. Plut. de Laude Ipsius 540b and f; Quint. Inst. 11.1.17 ff.). It is nonetheless clear that Cicero is here constructing the same type of com parison to his own advantage as at Cat. 3.26 ( . . . unoque tempore in hac republica duos civis exstitisse quorum alter finis vestri imperi non terrae sed caeli regionibus terminaret, alter huius imperi domicilium sedisque servaret) and 4.21 (erit profecto inter horum fsc. Africani, Paulli, Marii, Pompeii] laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur). 74 Sed cum plerique arbitrentur res bellicas maiorcs esse quam urbanas, minuenda est haec opinio.] The assumption that warfare is the true test of one's worth was widespread in antiquity; cf., e.g., the person derided at com. adesp. fr. 451: άνηρ άριστος τάλλα πλην iv άσπίδι; Verg. A. 11.338-39 (of Drances): lingua melior, sed frigida bello I dextera. Plutarch devoted an entire essay (de Gloria Atheniensium) to defending the thesis (perverse as it seems to the modern mind) that Athens' military glory surpassed its achieve ments in the cultural sphere. The attack Panaetius evidently launched on such views was, of course, particularly congenial to Cicero; cf. Brut. 255 ff. multj enira bella saepe quaesiverunt propter gloriae cupiditatem, atque id in magnis animis ingeniisque plenimque contingit. . . ] Cicero (Panaetius, too?) speaks empirically and simply assumes that the μεγαλόψυχο? is moti vated by gloriae cupiditas (cf. ad § 65), in spite of $ 66 (his attitude toward the external goods; cf. § 71) and the specific warning of § 68. Soldiers no doubt often spoke in such terms; cf. the words of the centurion M. Perronius quoted at Caes. BG 7.50.4:. . . vestrae quidem certe vitae prospiciam, quos cupiditate gloriae adductus in periculum deduxi. 75 The confusion in this passage of the Council of the Areopagus (which antedated Solon) with the βουλή that he created is also found in Greek sources and may thus have been Panaetian. But is the clause est. . . bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, with its ignoring of the εκκλησία, perhaps a piece of Ciceronian interpretatio Romana? Rawson, 467, suspects that the analogy of the senate's leadership during the Punic Wars may be at the back of Cicero's mind. Cf. test. nos. 298 ff. Martina (our passage = no. 301); for composition and competence of the deliberative body cf. P.J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (corn rp., Oxford, 1985).—On Themistocles' ruse prior to Salamis cf. ad § 108. 76 licet eadem de Pausania Lysandroque dicere, quorum rebus gestis quamquam imperium Lacedaemoniis (prolatatum) putatur, tamen ne minima
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quidem ex parte Lycurgi legibus et disciplinae conferendi s u n t ; . . . ] On Lysander, who was among Aristotle's examples of μβγαλοψυχια (cf. APo. 97b21), cf. ad § 109. As victor at Plataea Pausanias is coupled with Lysander, the great Spartan general of the Peloponnesian War, as the two men "by whose deeds . . . the Spartan empire . . . is thought to have been expanded" (on the text see below); the problematic aspects of his career, including his condemnation for medism and conspiracy with the helots, are thus swept aside; cf. Hans Schaefer, RE 18.4 (1949), 2563.51 ff.; D.M. Lewis in CAH 5 2 , 100-101. For Lysander's role in the development of the Spartan empire cf. H.W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," JHS 50 (1930), 37-79; D. Lotze, Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg, Abh. d. sachs. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu Leipzig 57.1 (Berlin, 1964); for discussion of some problems cf. A. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," Phoenix IS (1971), 206-26.—The transmission is defective; dilatatum has been sup plied before Lacedaemoniis in L [post correcturam) and c and is probably nothing more than a conjecture; Lambinus's partum, which could easily have disappeared by saut du meme au meme before putatur, is adopted by Winterbottom; also palaeographically attractive and perhaps superior in sense is prolatatum, conjectured by Courtney, 79.—Cicero/Panaetius shares the gen eral assumption of ancient sources since Herodotus 1.65 that, in spite of Hellanicus' contrary view (FGrHist 4 F 116), Lycurgus was responsible for the Spartan constitution; cf. Kahrstedt, RE 13.2 (1927), 2442.26 ff. mihi quidem neque pueris nobis M. Scaurus C. Mario neque, cum versaremur in republica, Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio cedere videbatur;. . .] On M. Aemilius Scaurus, whom Cicero admired in his boyhood, cf. ad § 108.— Perhaps Cicero has paired Catulus with Pompey because of their wellknown rivalry. The consuls of 78, Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Aemilius Lepidus, were both despatched to Etruria to put down a rising of the former owners against the new colonists installed by Sulla. A quarrel between the two turned into a military confrontation the following year when the senate issued its consultum ultimwn authorizing Catulus as proconsul together with Pompey to deal with the rebellious Lepidus. The senate's forces were victorious; but the affair contained the seeds of future political quarrels, for Pompey offended Catulus by refusing to disband his army as he had ordered, in the hope of receiving an imperium to fight Sertorius in Spain (Plut. Pomp. 17.3; Gelzer, Pompeius, 4 6 - 4 9 ) . Hence Catulus' opposition to the Gabinian and Manilian laws and subsequent loss of auctoritas (cf. T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 328); thus after losing the election for pontifex maximus to Julius Caesar (63; ibid., 353), in 61 he was asked his opinion in the senate after two men who were his juniors (Att. 1.13.2); cf. Munzer, RE 13.2 (1927), 2082.30
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ff. (Lutatius no. 8); for Cicero's oft-repeated regard for him, ibid., 2086.3 ff.; on his qualities as an orator cf. ad% 109 and 133. Both Scaurus and Catulus were senior optimate leaders not particularly known for military exploits; Cicero perhaps saw them therefore as the leading representatives of the senatorial establishment that provided the basis for the successful warfare waged by Marius and Pompey on foreign soil (cf. the clause est. . . helium gestum consilio senatus of the Areopagus and at $ 76 quin etiam ob has ipsas causas et parentiores habueruttt exercitus et fortiores); the parallel is imper fect, however, since, of course, neither Scaurus nor Catulus was the founder of the Roman constitution and thus both truly parallel to Solon or Lycurgus and of unarguably greater significance than any general, however brilliant. . . . parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.] As Wolfflin, 204, pointed out, this is probably an allusion to a trochaic tetrameter that had as its original form nisi sit consilium domi. Although the thought is paralleled at Euphro fr. 4 K.-A. (ό γάρ τον ίδιον οικονόμων κακώς βίον, / πώς ούτος αν σώσ€ΐ€ των έξω τινά;) and V. Max. 2.9 praef. (quid enim prodest foris esse strenuum, si domi male viviturf expugnentur licet urbes, corripiantur gentes, regnis manus iniciantur, nisi foro et curiae officium ac verecundia sua constiterit, partarum rerum caelo cumulus aequatus sedem stabilem non habebit), it seems not to have attained the fixed form of a proverbial phrase; cf. Otto, 120, n. 2.—Cicero seems to have taken this sentence as the theme to be illustrated and thereby weakened considerably the argument of his Panaetian source; cf. the previous note and ad §§ 74-78. nee plus Africanus—consilio urbano sine exercitu.] On Cicero's oft ex pressed approval of P. Nasica's deed cf. ad § 109 below; for the historical reconstruction of the event itself cf. Stockton, 75 ff. Cicero realizes that this example is not fully apt and quickly adds some qualifiers; cf. Gaillard, 523. Nevertheless he did not wish to renounce it, since it is a station on the way to the comparison of himself with Pompey toward which he is building (Cicero had compared Nasica's murder of Ti. Gracchus with his own actions against Catiline as early as Cat 1.3; cf. Mil. 8).—For Africanus' career cf. ad § 116. 77 Dlud autera optimum est, in quod invadi solere ab improbis et invidis audio: 'cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi'.] This verse from the poem de Consulatu Suo (fr. 16 Traglia = 11 Buchner = 12 Courtney) is never cited by book or set in a larger context. The (correct) reading laudi is transmitted in our passage and appears at Pis. 74; it has been expelled, however, by linguae in a part of the tradition of our text (the recentiores and the contami nated witnesses Υ and p) and in subsequent works beginning with [Sal.] Cic. 6 and [Cic] Sal. 7; as antithesis to the laurels of the military victor the reward
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of the civilian statesman, laus, is surely wanted; cf. Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1246.17 ff. The verse was a target for Cicero's detractors beginning with L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58), who claimed that it alienated Pompey and precipitated Cicero's exile; Cicero replied that the sense of the verse was general and no comparison of himself with Pompey was entailed; or even if Piso's reading of it was correct, the single verse could hardly have carried more weight with Pompey than Cicero's extensive panegyrics of him (Pis. 72-75). Our passage, as well as the comparison of his achievements with Pompey's at Cat. 3.26 and 4.21 (cf. ad §S 74-78), makes one hesitate to take the disclaimer at Pis. 75 at face value, however; cf. Plutarch's condemnation of those who are not merely content with their own honor but seek to rival that of others (de Laude Ipsius 540a-b and 545d). Of greater immediate concern as Cicero composed Off. was Antony's ridicule of the verse in a speech delivered in the senate on 19 September and published immediately thereafter; cf. Cicero's reply (Phil. 2.20): at etiam quodam loco facetus esse voluisti. . . . 'cedant arma togae'. quid? turn nonne cesserunt? at postea tuts armis cessit toga, quaeramus igitur utrum melius fuerit libertati populi Ro man! sceleratorum arma an libertatem nostram armis tuts cedere. Though cited demonstratively at Laus Pis. 36, the verse was an embarrassment to Cicero's later admirers; cf. Quint. Inst. 11.1.24 (in carminibus utinam pepercisset, quae non desierunt carpere maligni, followed by citation of our verse and the even more notorious ο fortunatam natam me consule Romam!); Plut. Comp. Dem. et Cic. 2.—As early as Cat. 2.28 and 3.23 Cicero had emphasized that he had played his part in foiling Catiline and his followers while dressed in the toga (togatus). neque enim periculum in republica fuit gravius umquam nee maius otium: . . .1 Cf. ad 2.S4.—For otium in the sense "peace, freedom from war" cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Baer, TLL 9, 1177.26 ff. and 1179.21 ff. ita consiliis diligentiaque nostra celeriter de manibus audacissimomm civium delapsa arma ipsa ceciderunt.] The image of the dagger or sword slipping or being rested from Catiline's hand appears as early as Cat. 1.16 and 2.2; cf. also Pis. 5: ego tela . . . de coniuratorum nefariis manibus extorsi. Certainly Cicero's vigilance was decisive in forestalling the plans of the conspirators in the city of Rome itself; but he perhaps forgets too readily that an armed conflict had to be fought in Etruria the following year (between Catiline and senatorial troops led by the proconsul Q. Metellus and, nomi nally, by another proconsul, Cicero's former colleague C. Antonius Hybrida, but really by his legate M. Petreius) before the conspiracy could be laid to rest; cf. [Sal.] In Cic. 6: quasi vero togatus et non armatus ea quae gloriaris
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confecsris . . . ;Klebs,R£ 1.2 (1894), 2579.29 ff.; Allen, 240; T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9*, 360.—ipsa = "of their own accord": cf. Tietze, TLL 7.2,335.75 ff. qui triumphus conierendus?] See next paragraph, and on the superiority of civil recognition to military triumph in general cf. the letter that Cato ad dressed to Cicero in the latter part of April, 50 (a propos the awarding of a triumph for Cicero's work as governor of Cilicia): . . . triumpho multo clarius est senatum iudicare potius mansuetudine et innocentia imperatoris provinciam quam vi militum aut benignitate deorwn retentam atque conservatam esse . . . (Fam. 15.5.2; for Cicero's private view of Cato's attitude cf. An. 7.2.7 and 7.3.5). 78 licet enim mihi, Marce fili, apud te gloriari, ad quern et hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet.] Cf. 2.42; ad 1.1; introduction, § 4; Knoche, 1934,109; Long, 1995 1 ,227: "Cicero's boasting at this p o i n t . . . is interesting as an indication of his own deep involvement in the value system he is trying to reform.** mihi quidem certe vir abundans bellicis laudibus, Cn. Pompeius, multis audientibus, hoc tribuit, ut dicerct frustra se triumphum tertium deportaturum fuisse nisi meo in rempublicam beneficio ubi triumphant esset habiturus.] At Cat. 4.21 after a catalogue of the achievements of Roman worthies culminat ing in Pompey, Cicero adds: erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae, nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur. Such is the similarity of the two passages that they can hardly be indepen dent. Probably in preparing the Catilinarians for publication in 60 he in serted an allusion to the comment Pompey had made in the meantime (cf. Att. 2.1.6: quern |sc. Pompeium] de meis rebus, in quas eum multi incitarant, multo scito gloriosius quam de suis praedicare; sibi enim bene gestae, mihi conservatae rei publicae dat testimonium; note that this is the same letter in which Cicero promises to provide drafts of his consular speeches [§ 3]). In view of multis audientibus it seems much less likely that in our passage Cicero has misremembered the statement as having been made by Pompey rather than himself. Phil. 2.12 reports a similarly positive assessment of Cicero's consulate: maxhne vero consulatum meum Cn. Pompeius probavit qui, ut me primum decedens ex Syria vidit, complexus et gratulans meo beneficio patriam se visurum esse dixit. In fact, however, Pompey's reaction to Cicero's quashing of the Catilinarian conspiracy was far more complex than Cicero indicates; cf. Denniston ad Phil. loc. cit. Cicero's attitude toward Pompey was also more complex than appears from our passage; cf. ad 3.82b. 79-81 In this section Cicero/Panaetius takes a stand on the question, accord-
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 77-79 and 79-82
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ing to Sallust (Cat. 1.5) long a topic of debate, whether physical or mental powers are decisive in warfare. The thesis that prudent counsel is of supreme importance is, of course, well adapted to an argument emphasizing the role of old men. In our passage, however, this aspect is not emphasized, 104 whether because Panaetius chose not to do so or Cicero altered the emphasis in view of his youthful addressee and the fact that he had dealt with the subject at Sen. 17; cf. also Plut. An Seni 788c ff. and 789d. 79 The distinction between behavior appropriate to the general and to the common soldier can be traced as far back as Isoc. Ep. 2.3 and 9 (to Philip): οΰδειςγάρέστιν όστιςού κατέγνω προπετέστερόνσε κινδύνευε ι ν ή βασιλικώτερον και μάλλον σοι μέλειν των π€ρι την άνδρ€ίαν επαίνων ή τών όλων πραγμάτων, εστί δ' ομοίως αίσχρόν περιστάντων Τ€ τών πολεμίων μη διαφέ ροντα γενέσθαι τών άλλων, μηδεμιάς τε συμπεσούσης ανάγκης αυτόν έμβαλεΐν εις τοιούτους αγώνας, εν οΐς κατορθώσας μεν ούδεν αν ήσθα μέγα διαπεπραγμένος, τελευτήσας δε τον βίον άπασαν άν την ΰπάρχουσαν εύδαιμονίαν συνανεΐλες. . . . ων ένθυμούμενον χρή μη τιμάν την άνδρείαν την μετ' άνοιας αλόγιστου και φιλοτιμίας άκαίρου γιγνομένην. μηδέ πολλών κιν δύνων ιδίων υπαρχόντων ταΐς μοναρχίαις έτερους άδοξους καΐ στρατιωτικούς αύτψ προσεξευρίσκειν, μηδ' άμιλλάσθαι τοις ή βίου δυστυχούς άπαλλαγήναι βουλομένοις ή μισθοφόρος ένεκα μείζονος εΐκη τους κινδύνους προαιρουμένοις . . . Cf., however, the defense of Philip's practice by E. Meyer, Kleme Schriften, 2 (Halle [Saalel, 1924), 110 ff., and F. Geyer, RE 19.2 (1938), 2297.14 ff; for an overall assessment of Philip's generalship cf. George Cawkwell, Philip ofMacedon (London-Boston, 1978), 157-60. Cf. also ad § 34 above. exercendum tamen corpus et ita adficiendum est ut oboedire consilio rationique possit in exsequendis negotiis et in labore tolerando.] The body, like the appetitus (cf. 1.100-1), is to be trained to obey reason; cf. Muson., 24.14: δει γάρ δη και το σώμα παρεσκευάσβαι καλώς προς τά σώματος έργα τό του φιλοσοφούντος, ότι πολλάκις αϊ άρεταί καταχρωνται τούτω όντι όργάνω άναγκαίω προς τάς τοί) βίου πράξεις. Contrast the Stoic source followed by Seneca Ep. 15, which rejects the training of the body altogether. 7 9 - 8 2 itaque eonim consilio saepe aut non suscepta—recta atque honesta rerinere.] Johann, 4 2 - 4 3 , argues that this passage is an "erratic block" in which Cicero has departed from the train of thought of his Panaetian model. It docs contain one indubitably Ciceronian element, namely the exemplum of M. Cato's influence on the third Punic War; and there is the peculiarity that 104. There may be a hint of the original tenor of the argument in the phrase in quo etiam mortui valuit auctoritas (S 79).
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the point made in the first sentence of § 80 . . . sed cavendum ne id bellandi magis fuga quant utilitatis ratione faciamus is repeated without explanation in the first sentence of § 83 {numquam omnino periculi fuga committendum est ut imbelles timidique videamur . . .). 1 0 5 However, the doctrines it con tains are in general very likely to be Panaetian, viz.» that it is characteristic of the brave and steady mind praecipere cogitatione futura, a translation of the Stoic term προλαμβάνεu' (cf. ad § 81 below), or that physical combat is bestial but may be necessary κατά π6ρίστασιι> (cf. $34). 79 itaque eorum consilio—mortui vaJuit auctoritas.] In the senatorial debate over war-aims (151), Cato had spoken for destruction of Carthage, whereas P. Scipio Nasica had seen its continued existence as a means for maintaining discipline in Rome (Plut. Cat. mat. 27.2 ff.). The war continued after Cato's death in fall, 149, and concluded, as he had recommended, with the destruc tion of Carthage (146; note Cicero's phrase confecta bella sunt); cf. Gelzer, RE 22.1 (1955), 140.58 ff. For an example of mortui auctoritas not to Cicero's liking cf. 2.23. 80 quare expetenda quidem magis est decernendi ratio quam decertandi fortirudo . . .] Here a hierarchy is created involving two of the virtutes imperatoriae quae vulgo existimantur listed at Man. 29. Decernendi. . . decer tandi are a nice example of Ciceronian παροι/ομασία. bellum autem ita suscipiarur ut nihil aliud nisi pax quaesita videatur.] Cf. § 35: quare suscipienda quidem bella sunt ob earn causam, ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur . . . ; Phil. 7.19:. . . sipacefrui volumus, bellum gerendum est. fords vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis . . .] On constantia in both prosperity and adversity cf. $ 90. . . . nee tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur,...] Cf. Arist. EN 1123b31:ουδαμώςτ'άνάρμό^ι μ€γαλοψύχψ φ€ iry€ ι ι>παρασ€ίσαιτι . . .The idea of "losing one's head" is expressed by the image of a soldier or gladiator forced from his place; cf. Cic. Att. 16.15.3 (12 November 44): Leptae litterarum exemplum tibi misi, ex quo mihi videtur Stratyllax ille deiectus de gradu, where Stratyllax is a comic designation for Antony formed from στρατηγός with diminutive and pejorative suffixes (cf. Shackleton Bailey ad 426.3 of his edition); Tert. resurr. 2.10 (cf. adv. Marc. 3.13.4): deiectus enim unusquisque vel motus de gradu eius spei quam susceperat apud Creatorem» facile iam declinatur ad alterius spei auctorem etiam ultro suspicandum. per diversitatem enim promissionum diversitas insinuatur deorum.—The 10.5. The repetition can be explained by the fact that the two subjects, behavior in wartime (SS 79-82a) and the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος to risk-taking, overlap; the absence of indica tion that the point had already been made should surely be set down to hasty composition; cf. the repetitions at $$ 153 ff.
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use of the adverbial present participle agreeing with the subject is character istic of Cicero's late style; cf. Laughton, 147, with other examples there cited. . . . sed praesenti animo uti et consilio nee a ratione discedere.] One should supply aliquem with non perturbari etc.; hence the locution fortis veto animi et constantis est non perturbari. . ♦ sed praesenti animo uti... is tolerable; cf. ad % 101.—For nee a ratione discedere note the characterization of Panaetius' position as "konsequenter Rationalismus" (Wilamowitz, 1926, 201; sim. as early as 10 January 1914 apud W.M. Calder ΠΙ and Sven Rugullis, "Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff on Wilhelm Dilthey: His Letters to Georg Misch [1914-19281," ICS 17 [19921, 341). 81 quamquam hoc animi, illud etiam ingenii magni e s t . . . ] Constantia in adversity (as just described) is characteristic of the vir magni animi; the following description of advance planning for various contingencies belongs rather to magnum ingenium (the latter in the sense of "intellect, mental powers"; cf. OLD s.v., 4a; Hofmann, TLL 7.1, 1527.24 ff.) and thus falls strictly under the first virtue. . . . praecipere cogitatione furura—'non putaram'.J Armed with foreknowl edge, the Stoic sage is able to confront all things, including death: cf. Sen. Ep. 76.33, who quotes Verg. A. 6.103-5 {non ulla laborum I. . . nova mi fades inopinave surgit: I omnia praecepi atque animo mecum ante peregi) and interprets Aeneas' words in a Stoic sense (rightly, according to E. Norden ad loc). Praecipere in our passage and in A. 6.105 appears in the sense of the Stoic term προλαμβάνει ν (Norden, loc. cit.)\ cf. also Tusc. 3.29 and the detailed argument in Sen. Ep. 24. As applied to warfare in particular this doctrine is anticipated by the rational calculus advocated by the Thucydidean Pericles (2.40.2-3):. . . και αυτοί ήτοι κρίνομε γε ή ενθυμούμεθα ορθώς τα πράγματα, οΰ τους λόγους τοις έργοις βλάβην ηγούμενοι, αλλά μή προδιδαχθήναι μάλλον λόγω πρότερον ή επί ά δεΐ έργω έλθεϊν. διαφερόντων γάρ δη και τόδε εχομεν ώστε τολμάν τε οί αυτοί μάλιστα και περί ων έπιχειρήσομεν εκλογί£εσθαι· 6 τοις άλλοι? άμαθία μεν θράσος, λογισμός δε όκνον φέρει, κράτιστοι δ* άν ψυχήν δικαίως κριθεΐεν οί τά τε δεινά και ήδεα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καΐ διά ταϋτα μή άποτρεπόμενοι εκ των κινδύνων. Cf. also Plut. Tranq. An. 474d-e: εξεστι γάρ την Άναξαγόρου διάθεσιν, άφ' ης επί τη τελευτή του παιδος άνεφώνησεν, "ήδειν θνητόν γεννήσας," μή θαυμάζοντας μόνον αλλά και μιμούμενους έπιλεγειν έκάστω των τυχηρών, "οΐδα τόν πλοΰτον εφήμερον έχων και οΰ βέβαιον"· "οΐδα τήν αρχήν άφελέσθαι δυνάμε νους τους δεδωκότας"· "οΐδα τήν γυναίκα χρηστήν γυναίκα δ* ούσαν και τόν φίλον άνθρωπον όντα, £φον φύσει εύμετάβολον, ως ό Πλάτων εΐπεν." αι γάρ τοιαυται παρασκευαί και διαθέσεις, εάν τι συμβη των άβουλήτων μεν ουκ
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απροσδόκητων δε, μή δεχόμενοι τό "ουκ άν φμην" και τό "αλλ' ήλπι£ονΛ και τό **ταϋτ* ού προσεδόκων." οίον πηδήματα καρδία? και σφυγμούς άφαιρούσι και ταχύ πάλιν τό μανιώδες και ταραττόμενον Ίδρύουσιν. (That this material is Panaetian is made likely, both by its similarity to our passage and by Panaetius fr. 115 apud Plut. de Cohib. Ira 463d-e: δει δ*, ως που και Παναίτιος εφη, χρήσθαι τφ Άνα^αγόρου, και καθάπερ εκείνος έπι τη τελευτή τοΰ παιδος εΐπεν, "ήδειν οτι θνητόν έγέννησα," τούτο τοις παροξύνουσιν έκα στοι* έπιφωνεΐν άμαρτήμασιν, "ήδειν ότι σοφόν ούκ έπριάμην δούλον," α ήδειν δτι άναμάρτητον φίλον ούκ έκτησάμην," **ήδειν δτι την γυναίκα γυνάΐκ' εΐχον.") Similarly Tranqu. An. 476c: ό γάρ ειπών, "προκατείλημμαί σ', ώ Τύχη, και πάσαν την σην άφήρημαι παρείσδυσιν,*1 ού μοχλοί ς ούδε κλεισίν ούδε τείχεσιν εθάρρυνεν εαυτόν, αλλά δόγμασι και λόγοις . . .—For *ΛΟ« putararri cf. Sen. de Ira 2.31.4: turpissimam aiebat Fabius imperatori excusationem esse *non putavi\ ego turpissimam homini puto; cf. the view similar to Fabius' attributed to (surely the younger) Scipio Africanus at V. Max. 7.2.2. . . . temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste confligere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est;. . .] Cf. ad §§ 34, 79-82a. . . . sed cum tempus necessitasque postulate decertandum manu est et mors servituti tuφitudinique anteponenda.] Note the personification of tempus necessitasque (which, by εν διά δυοΐν, form a single concept: "the exigencies of circumstance" or the like); similarly $ 84: republics postulante.—Cf. Phil. 2.113: pax est tranquilla libertas, servitus postremum malorum omnium, non modo hello sed morte etiam repellendum. 82a de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. idque est viri magni rebus agitatis punire somes, multitudinem conservare, in omni fortuna recta atque honesta retinere.l Bruser, 53, revived the athetesis of these two sentences by Campe. 1 0 6 The objection is that the topic of the destruction of cities and treatment of the defeated interrupts the discussion of risky actions that precedes. Likewise the ambiguity of rebus agitatis has been adduced against authenticity; the com monly accepted interpretation **in troubled times" or the like (so, e.g., Miiller, Heine) has been called a banality in this context (Thomas, 51). Thomas, 52, accordingly proposes either to assume hasty composition on Cicero's part or to resort to emendation to establish the meaning of agitare, which Cicero does not elsewhere use in the sense of deliberare without further limitation in context (cf. Bruser, 57; OLD s.v., 17); he suggests rebus 106. (J.C.F.) Campe, Zur Kritik des Cicero (Greiffenberg in Pommern, 1865), 15 (not cited by Briiscr).
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agitatis (atque deliberatis) after the model of Ac. 1.4: rem a me saepe deliberatam et multum agitatam.*07 In his second edition Atzert followed the via media of enclosing the sus pect text in double square brackets as an author's addition to his draft never integrated into context; he was converted to Br user's diagnosis in subsequent editions, however. Winterbottom follows Atzert2 for the first sentence but says of the second "pertinet ad hunc contextum." The question of relevance depends on how one defines the subject. I suspect that it is not risky actions per se but the general principle expetenda quidem magis est decemendi ratio quam decertandi fortitudo (§ 80). The following discussion elaborates some of the implications of this point, such as the importance of not giving the impression of being unwarlike, of stead fastness in crisis, and of forethought. Risky actions in the field of battle, though beast-like rather than expressive of the highest human qualities, may be nonetheless needed κατά π€ρίοτασιι\ There may be times when the gen eral must play the part of a common soldier, but these will be the exception. Usually he will engage in decision-making on a higher level. Cicero next turns to problems of such a kind (note the contrasting autem): de evertendis autem diripiendisque urbibus valde considerandum est ne quid temere, ne quid crudeliter. This counsel to follow a humane course is what we have come to expect from Cicero/Panaetius:. . . parta autem victoria conservandi ii qui non crudeles in bello, non immanes fuerunt (§ 35). It does not hurt for it to occur in similar form both under bellica officia and in the context of the proper behavior of the μ€γαλόψυχος (for the ease with which Cicero repeats himself in this essay see the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Repetitions"). Bruser, 55, revived the view of Rudberg, 17, that the mention of Cato and the Third Punic War in § 79 provoked these thoughts de ever tendis . . . diripiendisque urbibus109 and goes on to argue that, in light of Cicero's approval of the destruction of Carthage at 5 $5* the cautionary advice must be non-Ciceronian. However, our words need not imply a con tradiction of the previous judgment about Carthage but merely enunciate a general principle applicable to the case of any city being considered for destruction. The following sentence goes hand in hand with its predecessor, for the description of the recommended behavior punire sontes, multitudinem con107. For the thought see Agapetus, PG 86.1, 1172C: βυυλίύου μΐν τά πρακτέα Ppnoe'w? . . , επ<1 Xiav 4m\ σφαλςρόν τό 4ν τοις πράγμπσιν απερίσκεπτον. 108. For parallels cf. rhe Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Association of ideas {as a principle of composition}."
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servare gives the principle underlying the warning to caution in the destruc tion of cities. Note the connection with -que, appropriate enough if the preceding sentence is there, with its contrasting autem, to restore the normal perspective of a general, less so if immediately preceded by the precept that circumstances may force one onto the line of battle. The problem of Latinity raised by Briiser is, I think, no grave obstacle. Agitare could mean "turn over in the mind, think about, ponder, consider" in Cicero's day; elsewhere he uses the verb in this sense with secum or other limitation in context; but surely he felt that the valde considerandum est of the preceding sentence and indeed the whole tenor of this passage sufficient to eliminate ambiguity. N/7 mutandum. 82b-84 The relation of the μεγαλόψυχο? toward risks and risk-taking had received some, but, it seems, not much attention prior to Panaetius. Arist. EN 1124b6-9 conceived the μεγαλόψυχο? as a runner of great risks (ουκ έστι δε [sc. ό μεγαλόψυχο?) μικροκίνδυνος ουδέ φιλοκίνδυνος' διά τό ολίγα τι μα ν. μεγαλοκίνδυνο? δε, και όταν κινδυνεύη, άφειδή? τοΰ βίου ώ? οΰκ άξιον δν υάιηως £ήν); in this he may perhaps have been influenced by views such as that of the Thucydidean Pericles that great risks can lead to great honors (είδε να ι δε χρή . . . εκ τε των μεγίστων κινδύνων ότι και πόλε ι και ιδιώτη μεγιοται τιμα'ι περιγίγνονται (Thuc. 1.144.3)). Panaetius takes the sensible view that risky actions are not desirable per se (cf. Aristotle's ούδε φιλοκίνδυνος) and that the degree of risk should be proportional to the expected benefit. He likewise points out that it makes a difference who or what is at risk. Panaetius establishes a hierarchy among the external goods, with honor et gloria at the top (cf. ad § 83). However, even the highest external goods must yield to the demands of the public interest, as is illustrated negatively by the cases of Callicratidas (on him see also § 109) and Cleombrorus, positively by the apt exemplum Romanum of Q. Fabius Maximus. 82b Ut enim sunt, quemadmodum supra dixi, qui urbanis rebus bellicas anteponant, sic reperias multos quibus periculosa et calida consilia (et) quietis et cogitatis splendidiora et maiora videantur.] Once again Cicero/ Panaetius steps forth as advocate of the less superficially attractive alterna tive but the one that the reflective person may prefer. The enim denotes this sentence as the reason the preceding cautions were needed: there are those who prefer periculosa et calida consilia. Note that the plundering or destruc tion of a city or mass-executions can be dangerous if they lead to reprisals. For a similar use of nam cf. ad 2.47. 83 . . . consuctudo imitanda medicorum est, qui levitcr aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibcre coguntur.] This procedure of physicians is described in greater detail
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at Sen. de Ira 1.6.2: nempe medicus primo in levibus vitiis temptat non multum ex cotidiana consuetudine inflectere et cibis potionibus exercitationibus ordinem inponere ac valetudinem tantum mutata vitae dispositione firmare. proximum est ut modus proficiat. si modus et ordo non proficit, subducit aliqua et circumcidit; si ne adhuc quidem responded intercidit cibis et abstinentia corpus exonerat; si frustra molliora cesserunt, ferit venam membrisque, si adhaerentia nocent et morbum diffundunt, manus adfert; . . . — For curatio as the mot juste for treatment by physicians (as opposed to cura, used of other types of care) cf. Don. ad Ten An. 30 (1, 50.7 W.). . . . subvenire autem tempestati quavis ratione sapientis . . .] Panaetius was, if not a "Kampfnatur" (cf. introduction, § 5 [4]), certainly close to what nowadays would be called an activist; cf. ad §§ 2 8 - 2 9 . . . . si plus adipiscare re explicata boni quam addubitata mali.] " . . . if you gain greater good when the matter has been brought to a conclusion than evil when it has been hesitated over" (cf. OLD s.vv. explico 9a, addubito 2b). 83-84 Periculosae autem rerum actiones—sine suo dedecore non posse.] Callicratidas' engagement with the Athenians at Arginusae in August, 406, was fatal to himself (he fell overboard and drowned when his ship collided with an enemy vessel: cf. X. HG 1.6.2-34, esp. 33), but merely a plaga mediocris for the Lacedaemonian state, since, although 70 Spartan ships fell into enemy hands, Sparta was, in fact, able to rebuild its fleet and regain the support of Persia (cf. ad § 109); hence Lysander's decisive victory at Aegospotami in autumn, 405, followed by the Athenian capitulation in April of the next year. On Lysander cf. ad § 76 and, in general, Kahrstedt, RE 13.2 (1927), 2503.29 ff.; on Callicratidas Lenschau, RE 10.2 (1919), 1641.10 ff.; A. Andrcwes in CAH 5 2 , 491-92. The criticism of Callicratidas' placing of his own honor ahead of the interests of Sparta would also apply to Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon; cf. Att. 7.11.1 (22 January 49), where, as Narducci, 1989, 138, notes, the critique of Caesar is phrased in strikingly Panaetian terms: utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimurf ο hominem amentem et miserum, qui ne umbram quidem umquam του κάλου viderit! atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa, ubi est autem dignitas nisi ubi honestasf honestum igitur habere exercitum nullo publico consilio, occupare urbis civium quo facilior sit aditus ad patriam, χρ€ώι> αποκοτιάς. Φυγάδων καθόδου?, sescenta alia scelera moliri, "την θβών μ^γίστην ώστ' e'xeiv τυραννίδα"? 83 prompriores igitur debemus esse ad nostra pericula quam ad communia, dimicareque paratius de honore et gloria quam dc ceteris commodis.] The first half of this sentence prioritizes the relations referred to in the next to last sentence [periculosae autem rerum actiones partim its sunt qui eas susci-
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piunt, partim reipublicae). The doctrine that one should endanger oneself more readily than the state 1 0 9 is a bit surprising in view of the importance of the instinct for self-preservation in Panaetius' system (cf. $ 11) but is implicit in 5 57 (. . . patria . . . . pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortem oppetere si ei sit profuturus?) as well as in the exemplum of Regulus (3.99 ff.).—For the older Stoa τιμή was a relative good (5VF 3,26.40, where there is no indication that it was rated above others of its class). Εύδοξία/δόξα was classed among the indiffercnts {SVF 3, 28.7 and 31), albeit the "preferred" ones (προηγμένα; ibid. 31.5); see further p. 357 and ad 2.31. Panaetius* preference for honor and glory above other external goods harks back to Arist. EN 1123bl8-20: μέγιστοι 8c [sc. των έκτος αγαθών] TOUT' αν θβίημεν δ τοις· θεοΐς άπον^μομ^ν. και ου μάλιστ* έφίβνται οι έν άξιώματι, και το em τοις κάλλιστοι? άθλοι/· τοιούτον δ' ή τιμή; for Panaetius as φιλοαριστοτελης see p. 357 below. 84 . . . idem gloriae iacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne re publics quidem postulante,.. .] For the personified subject of postulare cf. $ 8 1 {cum tempus necessitasque postulate for patria et parentes as supreme claimants on our officia § 58. The personification of the patria at 3.121 involves a greater intensity of emotion than that of the respublica here; see ad be. . . . ut Callicratidas, qui, cum Lacedaemoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello multaque fecisset egregie,. . . ] Elected admiral in mid-summer 406 under the banner of the party opposed to Lysandec, Callicratidas departed at once for Ephesus; there, on no good terms with his predecessor, he assumed command of the Spartan army and navy. Once he had secured the necessary financial support (cf. ad $ 109) and had overcome morale problems stirred up by Lysander's supporters, he conquered Delphinium and Teus; proceed ing to Lesbos, he stormed Methymna, where Conon lay at anchor with 70 Athenian ships. After defeating Diomedon and Conon, he trapped the latter in the inner harbor of Mytilene; for literature cf. ad §§ 83-84. . . . vertit ad extrcmum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum qui classem ab Arginusis removendam nee cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant.] Upon learning of Conon's plight the Athenians armed another fleet of 110 ships, which, after reinforcement at Samos, attained a strength of 150 ships. When word reached him of the Athenians' approach, Callicratidas left be hind 50 ships to guard Conon and set forth to meet them with his remaining 120 ships; Lenschau, loc. cit. ad $S 83-84, 1641.38 ff.—Extremus can, of course, in its metaphorical application be an extreme either for good or bad; 109. Cf. OLD s.v. promptus 5 (with ad * ace): "quick (to favor a given course of action).*'
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in practice, however, it is very commonly used "in ma lam partem"; cf. Hiltbrunner, TLL 5.2, 2003.46 ff., including the meanings "periculosissimus, desperatissimus"; cf. also 2.29. quibus ille respondit Lacedaemonios dasse ilia amissa aliam parare posse, se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse.] Cf. X. HG 1.6.32 (a reply to his Megarian steersman Hermo, who advised him that the Athenian fleet was numer ically far superior): Καλλικρατίδας δε εΐπεν δτι ή Σπάρτη οΰδεν κάκιον οικείται αυτού αποθανόντος, φεύγειν δε αίσχρόν είναι. Xenophon's version, focusing on Sparta's general condition in light of Callicratidas' loss, is doubt less closer to the original; the mention of specific military consequences has the air of a vaticinium post eventum. On the Spartan attitude toward victory and defeat cf. ad § 64. atque haec quidem |de Lacedaemoniis} plaga mediocris, ilia pestifera, qua, cum Cleombrotus invidiam timens temere cum Epaminonda conflixisset, Lacedaemoniorum opes corruenint.] Installed as king in 380, Cleombrotus undertook his first expedition to Thebes two years later in response to the massacre of the troops occupying the Cadmea; he contented himself, how ever, with a stay of 16 days on Theban territory and suffered losses of pack animals and weaponry when he encountered a storm on the way home. A second expedition to Thebes in spring 376 was aborted when he found the passes of Cithaeron occupied by Athenians and Thebans. Thus when in 371 he was ordered to proceed against Thebes for the third time, he was under considerable pressure to show results. X. HG 6.4.5 depicts Cleombrotus' friends as warning him ώ Κλεόμβροτε. ει αφήσεις τους Θηβαίους άνευ μάχης, κινδυνεύσεις ύπό της πόλεως τά έσχατα παθεΐν, whereas his enemies said: νυν δή . . . δηλώσει ό άνήρ εί τω όντι κηδεται των Θηβαίων, ώσπερ λέγεται. The result at Leuctra was, of course, fatal, both to himself and to the Spartan hegemony; cf. Lenschau, RE 11.1 (1921), 677.54 ff.; ad 2.26a.—For the haec. . . ilia structure cf. the first sentence of § 81. On our evidence Cicero is the first author to use plaga in the metaphorical sense (evidently modeled on the usage of the Greek source-word: cf. LSJ s.v. πληγή 6); cf. Mur. 48; Forcellini s.v., II; OLD s.v., 1 b; for opes used of political power cf. ad § 25. quanto Q. Maximus melius . . .] The policy of Q. Fabius Maximus (cos. 233, 228, 215, 214, 209) does indeed form a sharp contrast with that of Cleombrotus. In the aftermath of the disaster of the consul Flaminius at Trasimenus (217) Fabius was appointed dictator and entrusted with the war against Hannibal; he pursued the tactic of shadowing the Carthaginians and being always ready to strike whenever an enemy weakness was exposed but never offering a pitched battle. The tactic was controversial, both in the army
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and at Rome; hence M. Minucius Rufus, the master of the horse, was made Fabius' equal in imperium and given the same sphere of responsibility; with the army divided in half, Minucius offered battle, and Fabius had to intervene to save him. Nonetheless pressures for a large-scale victory in battle, stoked by Varro and other demagogues, continued the following year until Cannae (216) left the Romans little choice but to adopt "Fabian tactics" until 205; cf. de Sanctis 3.2,45 ff. and 211 ff.; John Briscoe in CAH 8 2 , 50-51 and 68 ff. Cicero places a warm appreciation of his character (doubtless idealized) in the mouth of Cato at Sen. 10 ff. unus homo—claret.] These verses, which Cicero also quotes at Sen. 10, are from Book 12 of the Annates (so Macrob. 6.1.23); since, however, the death of the Cunctator (203 B.C.) would have been narrated in Book 9, the context of this retrospective encomium remains unclear (cf. Skutsch ad vv. 363-65 of his edition). On the reading non enim, attested both here and at Sen. 10 (as opposed to noenum, restored on metrical grounds by Skutsch), cf. Powell ad loc.—Though Cicero develops the contrast between vera gloria and the transient variety only at 2.43, the point is clear that Fabius renounced the chance for immediate personal glory in favor of what was utile for the state and thereby earned lasting glory. sunt enim qui quod sentiunt, etsi optimum sit, tamen invidiae metu non audent dicere.J As a parallel to the "fear of envy" that was fatal to Cleombrotus and the Spartan hegemony, Cicero may be thinking of the behavior of Roman senators at the time of his own exile (cf. ad §§ 28-29) and especially of the recent inclination of most senators to avoid confronta tion with Antony (see supra p. 30). 8 5 - 8 7 Following the treatment of warfare (§§ 79-82a) and risk-taking (§§ 82b-84) Cicero/Panaetius adds precepts about civil government. 110 These amount to three points, each buttressed by one or more citations from Plato: (1) government should be conducted in the interest not of the gover nors but of the governed; (2) the state should be governed for the benefit of the whole, not a part only, i.e., factional politics should be eschewed; (3) the relations of the leaders of government should be marked by mutual respect; there should be no resort to arms to settle differences. These paragraphs distill the political message of Off., which is developed at greater length in Books 2 and 3, with point (2) reinforced particularly in the discussion of private property toward the end of Book 2 and point (1) by the exemplum of Regulus toward the end of Book 3. Though Cicero could, of course, have 110. Cicero could, had he chosen, have connected this material with the preceding via the point obliti commodorum suorum (5 85).
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offered these observations on his own authority, he chose instead 111 to cite his beloved Plato; cf. in general Burkert, 1965, 177 ff. 85 . . . ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur ut quaecumque agunt ad earn referant obliti commodorum suorum . . . ] This is perhaps abstracted from the following dialectical exchange centered on Thrasymachus' proposition that justice is the advantage of the stronger (Pi. R. 342e; Socrates to Thrasy machus): Ουκ άρα γ€ τοιούτος κυβ€ρνήτης τε και άρχων το τψ κυβερνήτη συμφέρον σκέψεταί τε και προστάξει, άλλα το τψ ναύτη τε και άρχομένω. Συνέφησε μόγις. Οΰκουν, ην δ' εγώ, ώ θρασύμαχ€, ουδέ άλλος ούδεις έν ούδεμιφ αρχή, καθ' 'όσον άρχων εστίν, το αύτφ συμφέρον σκοπεί ούδ' έπιτάττει, άλλα το τφ άρχομένω και ω αν αυτός δημιουργη, και προς έκεΐνο βλέπων και τό έκείνω συμφέρον και πρέπον, και λέγει ά λέγει καΐ ποιεΐ ά ποιεί άπαντα. The precept corresponds to Cicero's own attitude as described at Cat. 4.19: habetis ducem memorem vestri, oblitum sui. . . . . . alteram ut totum corpus reipublicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tucntur, reliquas deserant.] Cf. PI. Lg. 715b: ταύτας δήπου φαμέν ήμεΐς νΰν ουτ' είναι πολιτείας, ουτ' ορθούς νόμους δσοι μη συμπάσης της πόλεως €ν€κα του κοινοϋ ετέθησαν όϊ δ' ένεκα τίνων, στασιώτας άλλ' ού πολίτας τούτους φαμέν . . . ; cf. also R. 420c and 421b-c from Socrates' reply to Adimantus' objection that the Guardians would not be happy (εΰδαίμονες): the aim should be the ευδαιμονία of the whole state.—For the metaphor rofwm corpus reipublicae cf. ad 3.22 (the fable of Menenius Agrippa).—The policy pursued by Sulla and Caesar of rewarding their followers from their oppo nents' property would, of course, be an example of the tendency Cicero deprecates here; cf. § 43; 2.27-29. ut enim tutela, sic procuratio reipublicae ad eorum utilitatem qui commissi sunt, non ad eorum quibus commissa est, gerenda est.] For the provisions under Roman law of the period for the tutela of minors, women, etc., cf. Watson, Persons, 103 ff. This institution provides a good analogue for the kind of administration in the interest of the governed that Cicero demands for the state; cf. § 124; Wood, 134-35; Schofield, 1995 2 ,79 and 81, compar ing Plb. 8.2-3, who uses the verb έπιτρέπειν of the people entrusting their affairs to the nobles after the overthrow of monarchy. For Cicero's com parison of the governing of foreign peoples to a patrocinium cf. ad 2.26b27. qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam 111. After Panacrius, who was also φιλοπλστωΐ· (fr. 57; cf. fir. 55, 56, and 59}?
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in civitatem inducunt, sedirionem atque discordiam;. . . ] On Cicero's slogan concordia ordinum and its political and intellectual roots cf. Strasburger, 1956. . . . ex quo evenit ut alii populares, alii studiosi optimi cuiusque videanmr, pauci universorum.] At Sest. 96 ff. Cicero had provided a sketch of the two parties and their principles; on the origin of largitores et factiosi in the cuptditas principatus cf. § 64; the stand on property rights at 2.78-85 entails a critique of the policies of the Populares. 86 h i n c . . . in nostra republics... pestifera bella dvilia; quae gravis et fords civis et in republica dignus principatu fugiet atque oderit. . .] This corre sponds to Cicero's stand as civil war approached in 49; cf. ad § 35 and the meditation on civil war at 2.27-29. On the other hand, this description stands in marked contrast with Caesar's behavior ($ 26). . . . totamque earn sic tuebitur ut omnibus consulat.] Cf. Carbo's etymology of consul from patriae consulere reported at de Orat. 2.165 (= orat., p. 155); Gaillard, 526, n. 2. nee vero criminibus falsis in odium aut invidiam quemquam vocabit. . .] Cicero certainly felt that such behavior had precipitated his exile; cf. ad §$ 3 and 2 8 - 2 9 . He also considered himself to have been recently the victim of such treatment at Antony's hands; cf. ad § 77; Phil. 2.11 ff. . . . omninoque ita iustitiae honestatique adhaerescet ut, dum ea conserves quamvis graviter offendat, mortemque oppetat potius quam deserat ilia quae dixi.] As at some other points in Off. (cf. ad% 112, pp. 35-36, and ad3A4), Cicero seems here to adumbrate his future political course (note the phrase quamvis graviter offendat, apt for the man at work on the Philippics). When he joined the struggle against Antony he was well aware that his own life might well be entailed in the outcome; cf. Phil. 2.118: quin etiam corpus libenter obtulerim, si repraesentari morte mea lihertas civitatis potest. . . ; ibid., 119: etenim si abhinc annos prope viginti hoc ipso in templo negavi posse mortem immaturam esse consulari [cf. Cat. 4.3, as well as the reflec tions at Sest. 47-48J, quanto verius nunc negabo seni? mihi vero . . . iam etiam optanda mors est, perfuncto rebus eis quas adeptus sum quasque gessi. 87 miserrima omnino est ambitio honorumque contentio . . .] On the despising of office cf. ad %% 28 and 71; Rep. 6.20. . . . similiter facere eos qui inter se contenderent uter potius rempublicam administraret, ut si nautae certarent quis eorum potissimum guberaaret.] Cf. PI. R. 4 8 8 a - b : νόησον γαρ τοιούτον! γ€νόμ€νον eiT€ πολλών νεών περί €ΪΤ€ μια?· ναύκληρον μ^γεθα μέν και ρώμη υπέρ του? ev τη νηι πάντα?, υπόκωφοι* δέ και όρώντα ώσαύτω? βραχύ τι και γιγνώσκοντα περ'ι ναυτικών €T€pa τοιαύτα, του? δέ ναύτα? στασιάζοντα? προ? άλλήλου? π€ρΐ τή? κυβερνήοΈω?,
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έ'καστον οίύμ€νον δίΐν κυβερνάν . . . Plato's contrast of the many sailors striving to control the rudder and the one steersman who has the requisite knowledge for the task is, however, implicitly a plea for an enlightened monarchy, whereas traditional Roman politics involved a competition be tween representatives of the different established political families, as Cicero recognizes, with reference to the aedileship, at 2.57 ff. Hence Cicero elimi nates the implications favorable to monarchy and uses the passage to depre cate political squabbling; cf. Schmekel, 34; Heilmann, 2 7 - 2 8 . idemque praecipit ut eos adversarios existimemus qui arma contra ferant, non eos qui suo iudicio tueri rempublicam velint: . . .] There appears to be no precisely corresponding locus Platonicus; possibly we have a conflation of two passages, namely Lg. 856b: δς άι> άγων «is αρχήν ανθρώπων δουλώται μέ ν τους νόμους, εταιρίας δέ την TTOXLV ύπήκοον ποιή, καΐ βιαίως δη ττάν τοΰτο πράττων και στάσιν έγα'ρων παράνομη, τούτον δή διανοασθαι δ€Ϊ πάντων πολβμιώτατον δλη τη πόλει* . . . and Χ. Mem. 2.6.25, where the question is raised: ei oe τις ev πόλα τιμάσθαι βουλόμ^νος, δπως αυτός TC μή άδικηται και τοΐς φίλοις τά δίκαια βοηθεΐν δύνηται, και αρξας αγαθόν τι ποΐ€Ϊν τήν πατρί δα π€ΐράται, διά τί ό τοιούτος άλλω τοιούτω ούκ αν δύναιτο συναρμόσαι;— The thought is similar to the remarks at Phil. 1.27 made with reference to Antony's tactics of intimidation: sin consuetudinem meam quam in republics semper habui tenuero, id est si libere quae sentiam de republica dixero, primum deprecor ne irascatur; deinde, si hoc non impetro, peto ut sic irascatur, ut civi. armis utatur, si ita necesse est, ut dicit, sui defendendi causa: eis qui pro republica quae ipsis visa erunt dixerint ista arma ne noceant. quaJis fuit inter P. Africanum et Q. Metellum sine acerbitate dissensio.] Q. Caecilius Metellus received the epithet Macedonicus, as well as a triumph, for his victory as praetor in 148 over Andriscus, pretender to the Macedo nian throne; as propraetor in 146 he distinguished himself in battle against the Achaeans prior to the arrival on the scene of the consul L. Mummius; cf. P.S. Derow in CAH 8 2 , 3 2 3 . Despite these services he twice suffered electoral defeat before attaining the consulate for 143. As a champion of the optimate cause, he was a determined opponent of the Gracchi. 112 In spite of his agreement with Scipio on this point, other policy disagreements drove the two men apart {Amic. 77; note the allusion to the invidi Sctptoms at Rep. 1.31, a passage in which inter alios Metellus is mentioned). Thus when in
112. Cf., however, Andrew Linton in CAH 9 2 , 74, who suggests, in view of his speech as censor in 131 urging compulsory marriage to raise the birthrate (orat., pp. 107-8), that Metellus sympathized with the aims of the Gracchan program but not the methods used to advance it.
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138 1 1 3 Scipio prosecuted L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 144) for extortion, Metellus spoke for the defense (in the sequel the bribed jury acquitted the defendant); cf. Cic. Mur. 58 (where the acquittal is ascribed to the jurors' unwillingness to appear to be overly impressed by the authority of the pros ecutor) and Brut 81; App. BC 1.92; Miinzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1456.41 ff.; Alexander, no. 9 with literature. After Scipio's death, however, Metellus gave evidence that he appreciated the greatness of his former adversary;114 cf. Miinzer, RE 3.1 (1897), 1213.60 ff. (Caecilius no. 94). Cicero's picture of these two Optimates as a model of how to handle political differences is doubtless idealized and based upon Metellus* reaction to Scipio's death; 115 he wants to mark a contrast to the pestifera bella civilia just mentioned. At Phil. 2.38 Cicero describes his relation to Pompey in similar terms: quod quidem erat magnum, de summa republica dissentientis in eadem consuetudine amicitiae permanere. 8 8 - 8 9 These sections on the relation of the μεγαλόψυχος to anger form, surely correctly, a separate paragraph in most recent editions. The topic was an obvious one considering that Aristotle's list of μ€γαλόψυχοι (ΑΡο. 97b 18), doubtless reflecting commonly held views, had included Achilles and Ajax. This material complements $ 87 on the proper relations of leaders of state; here, however, the state forms the major, but not the exclusive focus; cf. the reference in the first sentence to anger against inimici, which would not necessarily involve public activity; but with the sentence beginning in liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate exercenda . . . attention centers once again on the state, 116 with particular emphasis on the role of anger in punishment. Another difference from §§ 85-87 is that there Plato was re peatedly cited with implicit approval, whereas Cicero/Panaetius now moves on to a critique of Peripatetic teachings. Here we have one remnant of
113. Daie as in Liv. Per. Oxy. 55; cf. Alexander, no. 9. 114. Cf. V. Max. 4.1.12: acerrhne cum Scipione Africano Metellus Macedonicus dissenserat, eorumque ab aemulatione virtutis profecta concitatio ad graves testatasque mimicitias progressa fuerat: sed tamen, cum mteremptum Sdpionem conclamari audisset, in publicum se proripuit maestoque vultu et voce confusa 'concurrite, concurrite', inquit, 'cives! moenia nostrae urbis eversa sunt: Scipioni entm Africano intra suos penates quiescenti nefaria vis allata est'. . . . idem filios suos monuit ut funebri eius lecto humeros subicerent, atque hmc exequiarum ilium honorem vocis adiecit, non fore ut postea id officntm ab illis matori viro praestari posset; Plut. Rom. Apophth. 202a: . . . TOIS 6e fcots ίφη |sc. Metellus] χάριν €χαν ίτττέρ ττ\ς 'Ρώμη?, οτι παρ' άλλοι? owe cytι*το Σκιττίων. 115. Cf. Astin, 312 ff. 116. Though Panaetius may have meant the preceding encomium of placabilitas atque dementia to refer to monarch*; cf. ad % 88.
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Panaetius' teachings on magistrates (alluded to at fr. 48 = Leg. 3.14; cf. Griffin, 1976, 167; ad$ 124). 88 Nee vero audiendi qui graviter inimicis irascendum putabunt idque magnanimi et fords viri esse censebunt;. . . ] Here begins a polemic against Peripatetic views of the μεγαλόψυχος and of anger. Aristotle had said of the μεγαλόψυχος [EN 1124b26-27): αναγκαίοι/ δε και φανερομιση εΐναι . . . , a trait which would be compatible with free expression of anger, and had called both Achilles and Ajax μ€γαλόφυχοι (see previous note); for the in dulgent Peripatetic view of anger cf. MM 1202b21-22: ή μεν ούν τοιαύτη ορμή προς όργην, ή δοκεΐ άκρασία είναι οργής, ου λίαν ^πιτιμητεα εστίν (cf. also ad § 89). The seeds of a connection between anger and the μεγαλόψυχος, already present in Aristotle, may have been developed in ways we can no longer trace in subsequent Peripatetic writings on the subject, such as the essay περί μεγαλοψυχίας of Demetrius of Phalerum (the title alone is at tested: fr. 78 W.); cf. Sen. de Ira 1.20.1: ne Mud quidem iudicandum est, aliquid iram ad magrtitudinem animi conferre and his following refutation of the notion.—The Ciceronian Crass us had poked a bit of gentle fun at the Stoic view of anger at de Orat. 3.65 [Stoicos autem, quos minime improbo, dimitto tumen nee eos iratos vereor, quoniam omnino irasci nesciunt).—For the Peripatetic and Stoic views of anger cf. now Nussbaum, 391-92. . . . nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et praeclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque dementia.] Here Cicero falls into the anaphoric pattern of encomia; cf. $ 151 sub fin. The abstract placabilitas is attested only here in classical Latin and does not recur until the fourth century (Hilary of Poitiers, Symmachus, Jerome; cf. Weidauer, 8 7 - 8 8 , on the basis of material from the TLL archive); hence its resumption one sentence later by mansuetudo. Scholars have tried to line up each Latin term with a single Greek counterpart; but perhaps Cicero was not so pedantic. Thus Weidauer, 88 and 109, thought that placabilitas and dementia correspond respectively to φιλανθρωπία and επιεί κεια, whereas Griffin, 1976, 166, n. 4, supposed that πραότης would have figured for placabilitas in Panaetius, since it is the opposite of anger, which plays so large a role in our passage. Note also the greater appropriateness of the following mansuetudo as a rendering for πραότης, a quality much praised and encouraged in monarchs; cf., e.g., X. Ages. 1.20:. . . έπεμελετο ού μόνον τοϋ βία χειροϋσθαι τους εναντίους, αλλά και του πραότητι προσάγεσθαι; Isoc. 3.32: προς τε γάρ τους πολίτας μετά τοιαύτης πραότητος προσηνεχθην ώστε . . . ; 5.116 {Philippus): . . . πειρώμαι προτρεπειν επί τε . . . πραότητα και φιλανθρωπίαν; πραότης appears as a quality that Philip V lacked at Plb. 5.11.9 and 10.26.1-2. Clementia, on the other hand, is a peculiarly Roman concept with no one-
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for-one equivalent in Greek; cf. Inv. 2.164: dementia, per quam animi temere in odium alicuius inferioris [Lebreton: iniectionis M: invectionis P3J] concitati comitate retinentur; Sen. CI. 1.11.2: in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia. It corresponds to a congeries of Greek terms: επιείκεια, ήμερότης, ήττιότη?, πραότη?, φιλανθρωπία; cf. Κ. Winkler, RAC 3 (1957), 207 (s.v. dementia). Whether in our passage dementia corresponds to επιεί κεια (so Weidauer, 108, citing EN 1143a21: τον γάρ επιεική μάλιστα φαμεν εΐναι συγγνωμικόν) or φιλανθρωπία (so, with a query, Griffin, 1976, 166, n. 4), the term is naturally applied to one who possesses monarchical or quasimonarchical powers; cf. Scipio's praise of the dementia of Numa Pompilius at Rep. 2.27. During his governorship Cicero describes the reaction to his arrival in Cilician towns: et mehercule etiam adventu nostro reviviscunt, iustitia, abstmentia, dementia tui Ciceronis (cogn)ita, . . . (Att. 5.16.3); cf. the association of επιείκεια with a display of το φιλάνθρωπον at Agap. PG 86.1, 1176C. Hence it seems likely that Panaetius' remarks on πραότης· and anger were framed primarily with monarchs in mind (see also the note on the following sentence); cf. Weidauer, 86. It is a bit surprising that dementia is handled under the third virtue, rather than the fourth; for it elsewhere appears as a part of temperantia (cf. Inv. 2.164: temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi ftrma et moderata dominatio. eius partes continentia, dementia, modestia; cf. also Sen., cited above). On Cicero's "Umdeutung der magnitudo animi in der Richtung der dementia1* during Caesar's dictatorship cf. Knoche, 1935, 66 ff. In line with the general political tendency of Off., Cicero refrains from naming Caesar as an example here (cf. ad § 43,2.23, and 57). For his view of Caesar's dementia during the civil war cf. Att. 8.16.2 (insidiosa dementia)\ cf. also Curio's interpretation reported, ibid., 10.4.8 (. . . ipsum autem non voluntate aut natura non esse crudelem, sed quod (putaret) popularem esse dementiam); Weidauer, 85. The theme of the dementia Caesaris was sounded, however, in the speeches Cicero gave before the dictator; cf., e.g., Lig. 6: ο dementiam admirabilem atque omnium laude, praedicatione, litteris monumentisque decorandaml On dementia in the Caesarian speeches in general cf. Sabine Rochlitz, Das Bild Caesars in Ciceros "Orationes Caesarianae." Untersuchungen zur "dementia" una "sapientia Caesaris" (Frankfurt a.M., 1993), who finds that dementia plays a large role in pro Ligario and pro Rege Deiotarot whereas sapientia is more prominent in the pro Marcello. For a realistic assessment of Caesar's policy of dementia cf. Max Treu, "Zur dementia Caesars," MH 5 (1949), 197-217. in liberis vero populis ct in iuris aequabilitate exercenda etiam est facilitas et
Commentary on Book 1, Section 88
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altitudo animi quae dicitur, ne si irascamur aut intempestive accedentibus aut impudenter rogantibus in morositatem inutilem et odiosam incidamus.] The transitional formula in liberis vero populis et in iuris aequabilitate sug gests that the preceding argument for placabilitas atque dementia was directed (by Panaetius) toward monarchs; see the previous note and ad SS 88-89. Here the subject-matter diminishes in degree of intensity in that the offenses that fall under facilitas et altitudo animi are milder than those requiring placabilitas atque dementia. In view of the nature of the shift it was an unfortunate choice of words when Zucker, 3 9 - 4 0 , called our sentence a "Steigerung" vis-a-vis the preceding. At Man. 41 Cicero praises the faciles aditus that allowed private citizens to voice their grievances to Pompey. Cf. also Cicero's characterization of his attitude during the unfolding of the Catilinarian conspiracy: ego multa tacui, multa pertuli, multa concessit multa meo quodam dolore in vestro timore sanavi (Cat. 4.2); during his governorship of Cilicia, his subjects were im pressed by Cicero's affability (facilitas) and accessibility (cf. Att. 6.2.5). Altitudo animi, like the Greek βαθύτης, which Cicero substitutes in his correspondence with Atticus (Att. 4.6.3, 5.10.3, 6.1.2), is the ability to re press anger or resentment. He had used the term already at Part. 77, where altitudo animi in capiendis incommodis et maxime iniuriis appears (along side liberalitas in usu pecuniae) as a species of magnitudo animi, as well as a letter to Appius Pulcher (cos. 54), toward whom Cicero had exercised βαθύ της according to Att. 6.1.2, dated to the first half of April, 50 (with reference to Pompey's attitude toward himself): . . . haec in eo gravitas, haec animi altitudo fuit . . . ut . . . ne summorum quidem hominum malevolis de me sermonibus crederet (Fam. 3.10.10), where the preceding gravitas helps to clarify, as does facilitas in our passage. The appended phrase quae dicitur suggests that the expression is not yet in general use. This concept is already included under μεγαλοψυχία in the set of Academic-Peripatetic definitions at [Arist.J VV 1250b34 ff. (μεγαλοψυχίας δ' έοτι το . . . έχειι> δε τι βάθος της ψυχής . . .); hence Panaetius certainly is the source here (as one would expect in any case). The concept recurs in the characterization of Sulla at Sal. Jug. 95.3:. . . adsimulanda {ac dissimulanda) negotia altitudo ingeni incredibilis; Liv. 4.6.12: banc modestiam aequitatemque et altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris, quae turn populi universi fuit? Tac. Ann. 3.44.4 (on the al titudo animi of Tiberius); Apring, TLL 1, 1769.34 ff.; Zucker, 36 ff.—Sen. Ben. 1.1.5-6 offers a more concrete picture of the way a person lacking altitudo animi reacts to a request for a favor (quis non, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem adduxit, vultum avertit. . .). et tamen ita probanda est mansuetudo atque dementia, ut adhibeatur re-
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ipublicae causa severitas, sine qua administrari civitas non potest.] Even the sphere of mansuetudo (here substituting for the previous placabilitas117) atque dementia may be restricted by raisons d' etat, as the consecutive clause with limiting force indicates; cf. 2.24, where it is conceded that not merely severitas bur saevitia may be necessary to control subjects vi oppressos.—At Leg. 2.37 Cicero cites as an example of the severitas maiorum in preserving the reputation of women the fact that in 186 the Bacchanals were curbed by use of a consular army and punishments meted out by a special court (several thousand men and women were put to death); cf. Rep. 4.6 (evidently a reference to the severitas of the censors). omnis autem et animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet, neque ad eius qui punitur aliquem aut verbis castigat sed ad reipublicae u til i tat em referri.] Gellius' philosophic teacher, the Middle Platonist L. Calvenus Taurus, developed in his commentary on Gorgias 525b a theory of three types of punishment (Gel. 7.14): 1) κόλασις/νουθεσία {cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia), 2) τιμωρία {ea causa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius, in quern est peccatum, tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et bonorem levet) and 3) παράδειγμα or punishment which, by its example, should serve to deter. Plato recognized only the first and third (Grg. 525b and in general, apart from Lg. 862e, where capital punishment for the incurably wicked is justified not only as a deterrent but also as ridding the state of bad men; cf. Hoi fordStrevens, 70). Plato did, however, provide in certain cases for offenders to be subjected to insult (he presumably would have justified this punishment as an example to deter others); cf. Lg. 855b5 ff.: ζημίας· Se αν τις ττλ€ονο$ d£ios elvai δοκη, eav άρα μη τιν€5 έθίλωσιν αυτόν των φίλων €γγυάσθαί τ€ και συν€κτίνοντ€9 dneXeuGepouv, δβσμοΐς· τε χρόνιοι? και €μφαν€σι καί τισιν προττηλακισμοΐ? κόλαζαν . . . Contumelia was, of course, not among the punishments provided for under Roman law; cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 905-6. In private dealings, too, Cicero/Panaetius recommends ut et severitas adhibeaturet contumelia repellatur (§ 137).—The point has already been made that those who administer the state should do so obliti commodorum suorum (S 85); and the immediately preceding observation that severitas may be brought to bear reipublicae causa helps prepare for the reipublicae utilitas as the standard used here; it assumes a much larger role in Book 3 (cf. the introduction to that Book). 117. Cf. its juxtaposition with dementia in the encomium of his brother's governorship of Asia at QF 1.1.25: toto denique imperio nihil acerbum esse, nihil crudele, atque omnia plena clementiae, mansuetudinis, humamtatis; also Cacs. BG 2.14.5: petere . . . ut sua dementia ac mansuetudine in eos utatur.
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89 cavendum esc etiam ne maior poena quam culpa sit, et ne isdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne appellentur quidem.] The proportionality of the penalty to the crime (or, in Platonic terms, the degree of injustice in the soul) is, of course, the premise of the various grades of punishment set forth in Plato's Laws (cf. 857b, where Clinias balks at the thought that there should be a single penalty for theft, whether the object stolen be of great or little value, sacred or profane, etc.), as well as in historical legislation and jurispru dence; cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 1038 ff.—Plecto "beatM probably spawned the sense "punish," perhaps originally a colloquialism used by slaves (cf. its first attestation at PI. Merc. 826-27; Syra is the speaker:. . .si itidem plectantur viri, /si quis clam uxorem duxerit scortum suam . . .). Cicero used it before the bar only once 118 in citing a definitio iudiciorum aequorum quae nobis a maioribus tradita est, sc. ut in iudiciis et sine invidia culpa plectatur et sine culpa invidia ponatur {Clu. 5); he did, however, use it several times in the philosophica (cf. 2.28; Leg. 3.46; Amic. 85).—For appello in the legal sense ("charge, accuse") cf. OLD s.v., 5b. prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo—utiliter a natura da tarn.] Cicero describes a situation in which the person who administers justice also fixes the penalties; for even though the quaestio system of trial by jury prevailed in his day, the cognitio-type jurisdiction by a magistrate was used for rare and minor offenses as well as by provincial governors for cases involving peregrini and noncapital offenses (and sometimes even capital ones) by Roman citizens; Cicero praised himself as clemens in handling iuris dictio in Cilicia (Att. 6.2.5) and lectured Quintus on the need to avoid orationis acerbitas et iracundia {QF 1.2.7); cf. Griffin, 1976, 167; on the personality of Quintus and the relationship of the brothers cf. in general William C McDermott, "Q. Cicero," Historia 20 (1971), 717; D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero (London, 1971), 179 ff.—For the Peripatetic defense of anger as given "usefully" (sc. as a catalyst for punishment and selfdefense) sec Philodemi Epicurei de Ira liber, ed. T. Gomperz (Leipzig, 1864), p. 107, XXXI.24 ff. (evioi γούν τών Π€ριπατητικώι>, ως που και πρότβρον παρίμνήσθημβν, +διά προσώπων t βκτβμνειν τά νεϋρα ττ\ς ψυχής φασι τους την όργήΐ' και τον θυμοί' αύτη? εξαιρούνται, ών χωρίς ούτ^ κόλασιν ουτ' άμυναν eivai . . .), with other passages cited by Rose under Arist. fr. 80. Cf. the similar formulation with which Cicero introduces the topic at Tusc. 4.43: quid, quod idem Peripatetici perturbationes istas, quas nos extirpandas putamus, non modo naturalis esse dicunt, sed etiam utiliter a natura datasf In the further course of the argument Cicero denies that either P. Scipio 118. He never used it in a deliberative speech.
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Nasica was moved by anger in taking up the sword against Ti. Gracchus or his own public actions (he is doubtless thinking of the execution of the five Catilinarian conspirators) were done in anger (ibid., 4.52: nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fort iter in republica fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus). One wonders whether Cicero has shortened a more detailed Panaetian discussion; cf. Sen. de Ira 1.5 ff., where the propositions that anger is natural to man and that it is useful receive separate refutation. For the Stoic argu ment that anger inevitably goes beyond bounds cf. Nussbaum, 396-98.—In spite of the attack on the Peripatos here, Panaetius found uses for Peripatetic doctrines elsewhere; cf. ad § 93 and the introduction to Book 2. ilia vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est, optandumque ut ii qui praesunt reipublicae legum similes sint, quae ad puniendum non iracundia sed aequitate ducuntur.] Here we have an echo of the Stoic concept of the ruler as νόμος έμψυχος; cf. Sen. Ep. 90.4 = Posidonius F 448.4 Th. (of early peoples): eundem habebant et ducem et legem; Muson., 36.23 ff.: καθόλου be τόν μέν βασιλέα τον αγαθόν ανάγκη πάσα και λόγψ και έργω eivai άναμάρτητον και τελειον, €Ϊπ€ρ δεΐ αυτόν, ώσπ€ρ €δόκ€ΐ τοΐς παλαιοΐς, νόμον έμψυχον eivai . . . This topos was adumbrated by Aristotle, who said that rulers are not bound by law, αύτοι γάρ ασι νόμος (Pol. 1284al4). G.J.D. Aalders, "Νόμος έμψυχος," in Politeia und res publica. Beitrage . . . dem Andenken Rudolf Starks gewidmet, ed. P. Steinmetz, Palingenesia 4 (Wiesbaden, 1969), 315— 29, explores the origin of the concept and its history in antiquity; cf. Lester K. Born, "Animate Law in the Republic and the Laws of Cicero," TAPhA 64 (1933), 128-37; for its later use, H. Hunger, Prooimion. Elemente der byzantiniscben Kaiseridee in den Arengen der Urkunden (Vienna, 1964), 117 ff.—On the inappropriateness of inflicting punishment in anger cf. Sen. de Ira 1.15.3.—On aequitas cf. ad $§ 30 and 32. 9 0 - 9 1 These sections, loosely connected with the preceding (atque etiam), advise moderation in times of prosperity, as of adversity; in the former situa tion one should avoid arrogance and flatterers and bear in mind the muta bility of fortune. The examples, with the probable exception of Laelius, 119 are surely all Panaetian. Stylistic infelicities toward the end suggest that Cicero was hastening to conclude this section; cf. p. 184 (relation to argument). 90 Atque etiam in rebus prosperis et ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiam magnopere, fastidium adrogantiamque fugiamus.] In view of Α Γ Ι 19. Panaetius had evidently departed Rome prior to Scipio's death (he seems to have taken over as scholarch of the Stoa at Athens before 129) and hence would not have been able to observe the equanimity with which Laelius (with whom he was, however, personally ac quainted: fr. 10) bore it; cf. Pohlcnz, RE 18.3 (1949), 424.20 ff.; introduction, $ 5 <4).
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istotle's doctrine that το όλίγωρον is the characteristic πάθος of the μεγαλό ψυχος ( £ £ 1232b9-10), it is not surprising that Aristo of Ceus (fr. 13 VI, p. 35, II. 23 ff. W.) found it necessary to distinguish between μεγαλοψυχία and ύπερηφανία (along lines similar to Arist. EN 1124b2 ff.): καΐ διαιρειν μεγαλοψυχίαν ϋπερηφα[ν]ίας, αλλά μη συμφύρειν ώς εν και ταύτόν διαφ[έ]ρει γαρ όσον και [έ]πΙ τοϋ σώματος οιδήσεως ευεξία, και έστιν τοϋ μεν μεγαλοψ[ύ]χου το καταφρονεί ν των τυχη(ρ)ών υπερέχοντα τφ της ψυχής ογκω, τοϋ δ* υπερήφανου το διά κουφότητα ταύτης έκπνευματούμενον υπό κτήσεως ϋπεροραν έτερους. nam ut adversas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre levitatis est. . .] Cicero himself was far from possessing the equable temperament he holds up as an ideal; cf. J.P.V.D. Balsdon, "Cicero the Man," in Cicero, ed. T.A. Dorey (London, 1964), 195-96. . . . praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni vita et idem semper vultus eademque irons, ut de Socrate idemque de C. Laelio accepimus.] For this trait as characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος cf. Democ. 68 Β 46 D.-K. (cited ad § 66); Arist. APo. 9 7 b l 5 - 1 7 , 2 0 - 2 2 : . . .ει τί εστί μεγαλοψυχίαίητόΐμεν,σκεπτεον επί τίνων μεγαλόψυχων, ους ΐσμεν, τί εχουσιν εν πάντες ή τοιοϋτοι. . . . πάλιν εφ' έτερων, οίον Λυσάνδρου ή Σωκράτους, ει δή το αδιάφοροι εΐναι εΰτυχοϋντες και άτυχοϋντες . . . For Socrates' consistency of mood cf. also Tusc. 3.31: hie est enim Hie voltus semper idem, quern dicitur Xanthippe pmedicare solita in viro suo fuisse Socrate: eodem semper se vidisse exeuntem ilium domo et revertentem, with other testimonies at Socr. fr. IC 65. Seneca, after describing the vicissitudes of Socrates' life, comments (Ep. 104.28): haec usque eo animum Socratis non moverant ut ne vultum quidem moverint. (o) illam mirabilem laudem et singularem! usque ad extremum nee hilariorem quisquam nee tristiorem Socraten vidit; aequalis fuit in tanta inaequalitate fortunae. On the moderation with which Laelius bore Scipio's death cf. Amic. 7 - 9 , a passage that likewise makes him in point oisapientia into a kind of Roman Socrates; cf. ad3A6; Miinzer, RE 12.1 (1924), 407.29 ff.; on his hilaritas ad § 108. As part of his strategy of depicting Milo as a μεγαλόψυχος in contrast to himself, Cicero asks that if the jurors sec his client's visage unchanged they should nonetheless exercise mercy {Mil. 92: nolite, si in nostro omnium fletu nullam lacrimam aspexistis Milonis, si voltum semper eundem . . . videtis, hoc minus ei parcere . . .). The Furstenspiegel sometimes counseled behavior of this sort; cf. Agap. PG 86.1, 1173D: . . . άτρεπτον έχε τον νουν εν πράγμασι τρεπτόίς, μήτε εν ταΐς ευθυμίαις έξυψούμενος, μήτε εν ταΐς άθυμίαις ταπεινούμενος. Philippum quidem Macedonum regem rebus gestis et gloria superatum a filio, facilitate et humanitate video superiorem fuisse. icaque alter semper
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magnus, alter saepe turpissimus . . .] The conjecture tumidissimus for turpissimus proposed by Stroux, 1933,233-36, is attractive at first glance, sed nil mutandum; for turpissimus provides the better antithesis to magnus; cf. also A. Grilli, "Plutarco, Panezio e il giudizio su Alessandro Magno," Acme 5 (1952), 452, n. 5. §$ 90-91 correspond to $$ 7 2 - 7 3 insofar as the earlier advice on preparing oneself to meet evil fortune is here balanced with advice on how to behave in times of good fortune. In spite of his successes, Philip displayed facilitas et humanitas. With this is contrasted the case of Alex ander, who allowed himself to be carried away by good fortune. 120 — Contemporaries often mentioned Philip's affability (φιλανθρωπία); cf., e.g., Aesch. 2.39; Dem. 19.102 and 140 and 18.231 (where it is said to have been feigned). Cf. also the comparison of father and son at Justin 9.8, esp. 9.8.8 ff.: bland us pariter [sc. Philippus] et insidiosus, adloquio qui plura promitteret quam praestaret; in seria et iocos artifex. amicitias utilitate, non fide colebat. . . . huic Alexander filius successit et virtute et vitiis patre maior. . . . tram pater dissimulare, plerumque etiam vincere; hie ubi exarsisset, nee dilatio ultionis nee modus erat. . . . Alexander non in hostem, sed in suos saeviebat. . . . hie [sc. Alexander] amicorum interfector convivio frequenter excessit (the case of Clitus is cited at Sen. de Ira 3.17.1). . . . ut rccte praecipere videantur qui monent ut, quanto superiores simus, tamo nos geramus submissius.] Cf. Arist. EN 1 1 2 4 b l 8 - 2 0 : . . . και προ? μά' τους έν άζιώματι και εύτυχίαις μεγαν elvai, προς δέ τους μβσους μ€τριον . . . ; Sen. Tr. 254 (Agamemnon to Pyrrhus): quo plura possis, plura patienter feras.—Sen. Ben. 1.9.2 describes the opposite behavior and the hatred and envy it entails. . . . ut equos propter crebras contentiones proeliorum ferocitate exsultantes domitoribus tradere soleant, ut iis facilioribus possint uti, sic homines secundis rebus effrenacos sibique praefidentes tamquam in gyrum rationis et doctrinae dud oportere, ut perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem varietatemque forrunae.] = Panaetius fr. 12; cf. § 13: . . . ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti. . .\ad 2.76.—Here in the context of a simile comparing human beings to horses the metaphorical use of effreno is especially apt, but Cicero was generally fond of applying this verb (usually, as here, in the perfect participial form) as a negative characterization for human beings or their emotions; cf. Tusc. 3.11: itaque nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum 120. For this point cf. Sen. Ben. 1.13.1: Alexandra Macedoni, cum victor Orientis animos supra humanos tolleret, .. . ; Plut. ad Princ. Inerud. 782a-b, who quotes Alexander's state ment €ΐ μη ΆΧέξανόρος ήμην, ΔιογίΐΉ^ αν ήμην with the comment ολίγου &ωΐ> f ϊττ£ϊι\ τήΐ/ ncpi αΐιτόΐ' ίΰτυχίαι> και λαμπρότητα και δύναμιι/ ώς κώλυσιι/ άρ€τής και άσχολίαν βαρυνόμεννς . . .
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exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui ecfrenati feruntur aut Ubidine aut iracundia. . . and other passages cited by Bannier, TLL 5.2,201.27 ff.—The Greek γύρο? was taken over into Latin originally as a term for the "circular course on which horses were trained" (cf. OLD s.v. gyrus, Blatt, TLL 6.2,2386.43 ff.). 121 Hence by apt simile (cf. tamquam) the gyrus rationis of our passage is the training ground for the cyclical pattern of human affairs; cf. Hdt. 1.207.2 (Croesus to Cyrus):. . . εκείνο πρώτον μάθε, ως κύκλος των άνθρωπηίων έστι πρηγμάτων, περιφερόμενος δε ούκεφ αίει του? αυτού? εύτυχεειν; Greg. Naz. or. 17.4, PG 35, 969B: κύκλος τίς εστίν, αδελφοί, των ανθρωπίνων πραγμά των, και παιδεύει διά των εναντίων ημάς ό θεός . . . ; Agapet. PG 86.1, 1168C: κύκλος τις των ανθρωπίνων περιτρέχει πραγμάτων, άλλοτε άλλως φέρων αυτά και περιφερών και τούτοις άνισότης εστί <διά) το μηδέν τών παρόντων έν ταυτότητι μένει v. Fantham, 163 n., compares our passage to Propertius 3.3.21 (Apollo to the poet straying from love-poetry: cur tua praescriptos evecta est pagina gyros?) and suggests that in both passages u gyrus symbolizes a desirable limitation or controP (cf. also de Orat. 3.70: . . . ex ingenti quodam oratorem immensoque campo in exiguum sane gyrum compellitis)\ one might add that whereas Scipio's moral gyrus is in tended as a buffer against the vicissitudes of fortune, the gyrus of Propertius' poem presumably represents insurance against poetic disaster. This view of fortune helps explain Scipio's response to the fall of Carthage, when he is said to have wept and quoted the verses εσσεται ήμαρ δτ' άν ποτ' όλώλη Ίλιος ιρή /και Πρίαμος καΐ λαόςέϋμμελίω Πριάμοιο (Horn. //. 4.164-65 = 6.448-49); cf. Walbank ad Plb. 38.21.1-3; Astin, 282 ff. 91 atque etiam in secundissimis rebus maxime est utendum consilio amicorum, iisque maior etiam quam ante tribuenda auctoritas.] Viz., because, unaffected by φιλαυτία (see below), they can see things in perspective; hence the importance of not alienating them by haughtiness (cf. $ 90). Cicero/ Panaetius also recommends consulting the advice of others in questions of το πρέπον; cf. §§ 146-47. . . . cavendum est ne adsentatoribus patefaciamus aures . . .] Aristotle al ready distinguished between the φίλος and the κόλαξ (EN 1108a26 ff.; cf. 1159bl2 ff.); besides offering a memorable sketch of κολακεία (Char. 2), Theophrastus took up the topic in his three books περί φιλίας (frr. 5 3 2 - 4 6 Fortenbaugh, 1992) and the essay περί κολακείας (frr. 547-48 Fortenbaugh, 1992); he in turn served, whether directly or indirectly, as the main source for Plutarch's Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur (cf. K. Ziegler, RE 121. Though Blatt, loc. cit., 2386.21, states "vocabulum exstat inde a Cicerone," our passage suggests its use by Scipio.
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21.1 [1951], 802.53 ff.) and probably also for the advice on the topic at Antic. 89-104 (see further ad 2.31); cf. ad § 42 and 2.31. This is a common topos of the later Fiirstenspiegel; cf., e.g., Agap. PG 86.1, 1168C: αποστρό φου των κολάκων του? απατηλού? λόγους . . . ; sim. 1172Α, 1181 Α. . . . neve adnlari nos sinamus . ..] Since, apart from his own translation from Aeschylus' Προμηθεύς λυόμβίΌ? at Tusc. 2.24 (pinnata cauda nostrum adulat sanguinem), Cicero never uses adulare,122 we should supply eos (sc. assentatores) as subject and take nos as object. tales enim nos esse putamus ut iure laudemur; ex quo nascuntur innumerabilia peccata . . . ] Cf. § 30 for the point that φιλαυτία can cloud one's judgment in questions of iustitia. . . . cum homines inflati opinionibus turpiter inridentur et in maximis versantur erroribus.] The imprecise relation of ideas betrays flagging concentra tion; the fact that these persons become the butt of humor is surely the consequence of their error; and the idea of error is unnecessarily repeated (peccata. . . in. . . erroribus); one would have expected (after Heine) some thing like ex quo homines inflati opinionibus in maximis versantur erroribus; unde fit ut turpiter inrideantur.—Turpiter inridentur = "expose themselves to ignominy and ridicule" (W. Miller). sed hacc quidem hactenus.] This is the first appearance in Off. (cf. §§140 and 160) of a formula for separating subjects that is found both in the philosophica of 45-44 and frequently in Cicero's letters. 92 This section comes as a surprise.123 It begins as a ranking of different types of μεγαλόψυχοι, in accord with Cicero's occasional practice elsewhere in this Book of concluding a section with a ranking of the phenomena discussed (cf. §S 58,141, and, on a smaller scale, § 27). But in the case of the third virtue such a ranking seems superfluous in light of what has been said at §§ 66,69b ff., and especially § 72, where the vita activa is made prerequisite. In our passage, however, the claims of the representatives of the vita contempbtiva to a share in magnitudo animi are also recognized (as in Panaetius? see ad § 72). The process of ranking provides, moreover, the oppor tunity (or excuse) to introduce another class of μεγαλόψυχοι interiecti inter philosophos et eos qui rempublicam administrarent. There is nothing in Aristotle's treatment of μεγαλοψυχία corresponding to this third group, the qualifications for which involve having acquired one's property correctly and making use of it to benefit society (the closest analogue might, however, be 122. Cf. Oertel, TLL 1, 877.58 ff. 123. It should surely form a separate paragraph (beginning with Mudautem sic est tudicandum), as in Tcstard's edition.
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μεγαλοπρέπεια at EN 1122al8 ff.). Does this material really belong here? Is it a Ciceronian appendix that would have been more appropriate under 2.86-87 [curatio pecuniae; cf. Thomas, 62)? In favor of the Ciceronian provenance would be the connections with $$ 138-40, which themselves seem likely to be a Ciceronian addition (see ad loc); note also the similarity of quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso and deinde augeatur rat tone diligentia parsimonia to the (non-Pa naetia η) pre cepts on the acquisition and augmentation of property at 2.87. On the other hand, note that (1) though no Greek examples are cited, the behavior described corresponds to that of Cimon, whom Panaetius admired (cf. 2.64), and (2) the advice to benefit the community is certainly in the spirit of Panaetius. Neither of these arguments is, however, decisive for the prove nance of this material from the corresponding passage of περί τοϋ καθήκον τος. In view of the definition given at § 66 [altera est res, ut, cum ita sis adfectus animo . . . res geras magnas ilbs quidem et maxime utiles, sed vehementer arduas plenasque laborum et periculorum . . .), Panaetius can hardly have seen the behavior of the propertied man here described as that of a μεγαλόψυχο?; nor, according to § 7 1 , would he have granted him exemp tion from state service. 124 Why was Cicero so keen to create room for a μεγαλόψυχο? who was neither a politician nor engaged in philosophical/ scientific inquiry? Was he perhaps thinking of his friend Atticus (cf. Att. 1.17.5, a reference to his friend's magnitudo animi and honestum otium)}125 Similar to our passage is the definition of the man who can be called truly wealthy at Parad. 42 (for the contrasting picture of Crassus cf. ad § 25): quern enim intellegimus divitem aut hoc verbum in quo homine ponimus? opinor in eo, cut tanta possessio est ut ad liberaliter vivendum facile contentus sit, qui nihil quaerat, nihil adpetat, nihil optet amplius; cf. Kloft, 69, n. 142. esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut investigarent aut conarentur magna quaedam seseque suarum rerum fuiibus con124. Rudberg, 14, already saw this paragraph as "cm adespoton, das am Ende der Behandlung dcr bctrcffcndcn Tugend scinen Platz erhielt." 125. On the personality of Titus Pomponius Atticus cf. Shackleton Bailey, Att. 1, 5-58; on the recent study by Olaf Perlwitz, Titus Pomponius Atticus, Hermes Einzclschriften 58 (Stutt gart, 1992), cf Shackleton Bailey, AJPb 115 (1994), 470-71. Atticus had a marked aversion (connected perhaps with the experience of civil war in his youth) to taking risks in either commercial or political matters. On his mostly behind-the-scenes political aaivitics cf. Perlwitz, 125 ff. He was generous in allowing his friend use of his estates, including the splendid one that he acquired in 68 near Buthrotum in Epirus; cf. Perlwitz, 66-78, and R. Feger, RE Suppl. 8 (1956), 506.54 ff., 509.25 ff. and 51-52.
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tinerent. ..] This would follow from the somewhat grudging concession at § 71:. . .etiis forsitan concedendum sit rempublicam non capessentibus qui excellent! ingenio doctrinae sese dediderunt. . . . . . aut interiecti inter philosophos et eos qui rempublicam administrarent delcctarentur re sua familiari . . .] But at § 71 the only other group besides those with talent for intellectual pursuits given leave from state service were those hindered by ill health or some other weighty cause,126 and it is not claimed that such persons are μεγαλόψυχοι; in our passage there is no men tion of ill health or other such hindrance, and the predicate μεγαλόψυχοι seems unwarranted in light of the definition at § 66 (see above). . . . et amicis impertientes et reipublicae, si quando usus esset.] Vitr. 6.5.2 similarly justifies large-scale houses for men of rank on grounds that deliberations on questions of public policy may take place there; cf. Ed wards, 152-53. quae prim urn bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso, deinde augeatur ratione diligentia parsimonia, turn quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat, nee libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati ct bencficentiae pareat.] The guidelines for use of one's estate given in the previous sentence are here amplified; proper acquisition is added (quae prhnum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso)\ under expansion the negative prescription non earn quidem omni ratione exaggerantes is rein forced with a positive precept (deinde augeatur ratione diligentia par simonia). Now the foregoing provision for sharing the estate with others (neque excludentes ab eius usu suos, potiusque et amicis impertientes et reipublicae, si quando usus esset) contains both negative and positive pre cepts specifying the categories of beneficiaries with whom the estate is to be shared (viz., family, friends, and the state). The amplification presented by the transmitted text (turn quam plurimis,*17 modo dignis, se utilem praebeat)) specifies the number who should benefit (viz., as many qualified persons as possible); this is, in fact, an important point and one needed to establish that the estate is in the service of liberalitas and beneficentia rather than libido and luxuria and that its owner lives in a truly philanthropic manner (on vere fhominum amice\ see below); hence the athetesis of turn quam plurimis—se utilem praebeat by Briiser, 73, fails to satisfy.128 How126. Cf.a<*S23. 127. For this idea cf. fin. 3.65: inpellimur autem natura, ui prodesse velimus quam pluri mis . . . 128. The motive that he suggests for the interpolation, viz., that after clauses introduced by primum and deinde a reader felt the need for a /wm-clause, is likewise unconvincing, since the sequence primum . . . deinde without turn is commonly found; cf. Fcdeli, 1964', 79.
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ever, as transmitted between the discussion of acquisition and expansion, these words are evidently out of proper sequence; one expects this topic to be treated, as in the previous sentence, after expansion of the estate; hence Ungers transposition (here adopted) of this clause to a place immediately after parsimonia. Briiser, ibid., argued against the transposition on grounds that the suspect words could not have fallen out through a mechanical defect in transmission, and he won the support of Thomas, 6 1 , n. 102. But surely the initial three letters of parsimonia and praebeat are similar enough that a scribe could have skipped from one word to the other, then noticed his mistake, and inserted the missing words in the margin, whence the next copyist would have reinserted them into the text in the wrong place.—On the relation of liberalitas to magnitudo animi cf. Part. 77: cuius [sc. magni tudes animi] est liberalitas in usu pecuniae . . . quae primum bene parta sit nullo neque turpi quaestu neque odioso . . . ] Plb. 6.56.1 ff. compares attitudes toward gain of the Carthaginians and Romans and finds that among the latter. . . ουδέν αΐσχιον του δωροδοκεΐσθαι καΐ τοΰ πλεονεκτεί άπό τών μη καθηκόντων καθ' δσον γαρ cv καλώ τίθενται τόν άττό τοΰ κρατιστου χρηματισμον, κατά τοσούτο πάλιν βν όνείδει ποιούνται την βκ τών άπβιρημένων πλεονίξίαν. For examples of turpis quaestus cf. § 150. D'Arms, 2 1 - 2 3 , cites other Ciceronian evidence to show that in our passage he would have regarded commerce as a proper method of acquiring wealth. On the home as a means of conferring benefits cf. in general Sen. Virf. Beat. 24.3: quid? domus ipsa divitis viri quantam habet bene faciendi materiam! . . . mm quam plurimis, modo dignis, se utilem praebeat . . .] Cicero speaks of his home being filled with morning callers (Λ/ί. 1.18.1; 20 January 60); cf. Edwards, 151-52 (where the reference should be to Att. 1.13.6). . . . nee libidini potius luxuriaeque quam liberalitati et beneficentiae pareat.] On libido cf. Phil. 2.104 (cited ad $ 139); on luxuria ad S 140; for liberalitas in the use of one's property 2.64. Such use of property appears in a list of topics of encomia at de Orat. 2.342:. . . non fuisse insolentem in pecunia, non se praetulisse aliis propter abundantiam fortunae, ut opes et copiae non superbiae videantur ac lubidini, sed bonitati et moderationi facultatem et materiam dedisse. . . . nee libidini—amicef.] Cf. the similar contrast of approved and disap proved lifestyles at § 106 (. . . quam sit turpe diffluere luxuria et delicate ac molliter vivere, quamque honestum parce continenter severe sobrie). haec praescripta servantem licet magnifice graviter animoseque vivere, atque etiam simpliciter, fideliter, vere fhominum amicef.] Amice is not elsewhere construed with a case (cf. Hey, TLL 1,1914.20 ff.); hence the reading of the archetype, vere hominum amice, is evidently corrupt (c presents vere homi-
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nibus, an obvious correction, the second hand of the Tricassensis 532 vitae hominum). In structure our passage is similar to Phil. 4.6: nee solum id animose et fortiter sed considerate etiam sapienterque fecerunt, where like wise two sets of adverbs are juxtaposed, the former more outwardly impres sive, the latter more inward. In our sentence Cicero evidently aims to show that by following the foregoing precepts two tendencies can be reconciled (note the particularly sharp contrast between the first member of each set, magnifice and simpliciter, pointing to a possible conflict between the desires of the individual or exigencies of one's social position on the one side and the demands of philosophy on the other). Stroux, 1933, 235, suspected that the last three words of our sentence conceal a translation of the Greek φιλα^θρώπως, an echo of the common characterization of the way Philip of Macedon conducted himself (cf. ad % 90). 1 2 9 In Latin terms, the sense will have been similar to humaniter at Fam. 7.1.5 (to M. Marius):. . . te ipsum, qui multos annos nihil aliud commentaris, docebo profecto quid sit humaniter vivere or the underlined words in Lucil. 1335-36 M. = 1351-52 K.: contra defensorem hominum morumque bonorum, Ihos magni facere, his bene velle, his vivere amicum. Lund's vere generi hominum amice would be satisfactory in point of sense; its syntax, however, is unparalleled. Fedeli's vere (erga) hominem amice is better in this latter regard (cf. erga nos amice at Fin. 1.34); but homo seems not to be used as a collective noun for mankind in classical Latin (cf. OLD s.v. homo 1). Another possibility would be erga genus hominum amice (with vere omitted as a corruption of erga)y which would be syntac tically unobjectionable and would also account for the transmitted hominum. 93-151 To πρέπον as one of the four cardinal virtues is found in the ethical system of no other philosophical school and is not found in the Stoa prior to Panaetius (Philippson, 1930 1 ,393); it has been regarded as one of Panaetius' chief innovations in ethics (cf. ad § 14). This section may be outlined as follows (I have placed probable Ciceronian additions in square brackets, material probably moved to its present location by Cicero in double square brackets [see below]): I. quale sit ($$ 93-99) II. Derived officia ($$ 100-51) [JA. Subordination to reason of the motus animi ($§ 100-103a) B. What is appropriate in the matter of ludus et iocus (§§ 103b-4)]] 129. This could be the case whether or not Cicero was following a Greek source in our passage, since, as his letters to Atticus show, when he wished, he was well able to think and write in Greek terms.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 92 and 93-151
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C. The determination of the persona of the agent (SS 105-25; cf. $125) 1. The theory of the four personae a) Natura hominis and its implications (first persona: §§ 105— 6) b) One's individual nature, its variety, and the precepts that flow from it (second persona: §§ 107-14) c) The (third) persona imposed by chance {% 115) d) The (fourth) persowa of one's own choosing (SS 115-17 [— complecti animo et cogitatione debemus])y including choice of profession and its problems (SS 117 [In primis autem constituendum est—]-121) |(2. Appendix on special circumstances a) aetates (1) Youth (S 122) (2) Old age ($ 123) b) tempora (1) Magistrates (S 124a) (2) Private citizens (S 124b) (3) Foreign residents (S 125)]] D. From the point of view of the subject matter of actions 1. The body (SS 126-32a) 2. Speech (SS 132b-37) [3. One's house (SS 138-40)] E. Appendix: placement of actions according to time and circumstance (SS H l - 5 1 ) 1. General precepts (S 141) 2. ζύταξία and ευκαιρία (SS 142-49), including proper behavior in the community (SS 148-49) [3. Liberal and illiberal professions ($S 150-51)]. The structure of this section is not easy to grasp, the parts often lacking clear articulation and the contents sometimes overlapping. The problems of the text reflect not only the difficulty of combining two rather different approaches to the problem of social relations, based respectively on the traditional virtue of σωφροσύνη and on an analysis of social roles subsumed under the heading τό -πρέπον, but also Cicero's own preferences as to inclu sion and order of topics; and in this section more than any other of Off Cicero labors under terminological difficulties (cf. ad SS 9 3 - 9 9 and 142). The excursus on Stoic psychology at SS 100-3 (= II.A. above) would have
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been expected under the first virtue (which Cicero accords very short shrift; cf. ad SS 18-19) or could have been accommodated under the first persona, that of the human being as such, on grounds that human beings, as opposed to animals, subordinate the appetites to reason (cf. SS H a n d 105); the transplantation of this material to SS 101-3a and 105-6 would partially explain why Cicero otherwise has so little to say about the first persona (S 107). The subordination of the appetites to reason receives emphasis not only through this positioning but also through repetition later on (cf. SS 132, 141). Surely Cicero wanted to drive home the point to young Marcus, who had recently been introduced by Gorgias, his teacher in rhetoric, προ? ήδονάς . . . και πότους (Plut. Cic. 24.8; cf. introduction, S 4). One suspects that, similarly, the immediately following discussion of ludus et iocus owes its placement to Cicero jr.'s interests and, presumably, perceived need for advice (the topic of restraining one's speech recurs, in the expected place, under sermo, at S 134; cf. ad SS 103b-4; and S 122 touches on leisure activities for young people). The treatment of the appropriate house (sc. for a leading citizen) at U.D.3., ignored in the list of topics at § 126 and dealing with a problem that became acute in Roman society from the time of Lucullus and with clear parti pris pro Octavio, contra Antonium, is surely a Ciceronian addition (cf. ad SS 138-40); it would not be surprising if the appendix on liberal and illiberal professions, not otherwise integrated into the plan or connected with what precedes, were likewise of Ciceronian rather than Panaetian provenance (see ad loc). After correction for probable Ciceronian additions and rearrangements, the balance discloses a fairly clear and coherent pattern. To πρέπον is a concept without a content of its own; it merely sets up a proportional rela tion between two terms. 130 On one side of the equation is the person who performs the action; the role or roles that the agent has to play, whether of his own choosing or imposed by external circumstance, will determine ap propriate actions. On the other hand, within certain spheres certain actions are appropriate or inappropriate per se. The result is, as in the case of the second virtue, a bipartite division of the subject. Moreover, as under the second virtue, each of the "halves" is followed by an appendix dealing with 130. Cf. SWF 3,214.18 (Diogenes of Babylon: πρέπον &e έστι AcfrsoiKeia τψπράγμα"π),β5 well as the anecdote recounted at Sen. Ben. 2.16.1: urbem cuidam Alexander donabat, vesanus et qui nihil ammo nisi grande conaperet. cum ille, cui donabatur, se ipse mensus tanti muneris invidiam refugisset dicens non conventre fortunae suae, 'non quaero' inquit 'quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare', animosa vox videtur et regia, cum sit stultissima. nihil enim per se quemquam decet; refert, qui det, cui, quando, quare, ubi, et cetera, sine quibus facti ratio non constabit.
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special circumstances { $ § 3 1 - 4 1 and 59-60; I1.C.2. and II.E. in the outline printed above). In several ways Panaetius contrives to give this virtue a content and direc tion based upon the older virtue σωφροσύνη: he includes it in his definition of the nature of the human being under the first persona (. . . nobis autem cum a natura constantiae moderationis temperantiae verecundiae partes datae sint. . . : § 98; cf. §§ 101-3, 105-6); and in the second part he builds verecundia into the precepts about the body (§§ 126 ff.) and speech (esp. § 134). The approval of other persons is cited in justification (cf. $ 126:. . . ut probemur Us quibuscum apud quosque vivamus . . . ; cf. $S 98, 147); presumably Panaetius made it clearer than Cicero does that the virtue is to be practiced for its own sake and not because of the approbatio thereby entailed (cf. 2.42a; Philippson, 1932*, 392). 9 3 - 9 9 This introduction of decorum is perhaps the most difficult section in the entire essay. The subject itself is not an easy one; for here a term from the aesthetic sphere (το πρέπον) is adapted to ethical uses and made to subsume the older virtue σωφροσύνη. At the same time the attempt to distinguish this new virtue from the honestum as a whole proves to be difficult. Moreover, the subject is bedevilled by the lack of a fully adequate Latin translation for το πρέπον and other terminological difficulties. Finally the order of presenta tion is confusing. To begin with the last point, viz., the order of presentation: Cicero first introduces the subject as a congeries of themes related to the traditional virtue σωφροσύνη (§ 93) and invokes the term decorum and its Greek equiv alent πρέπον for this group as if it were merely a generic term for the particu lar phenomena modestia, temperantia, etc.; his introduction of magnitudo animi by using terms from common parlance before philosophical terminol ogy is comparable. However, the emphasis on temperantia, sedatio perturbationum, etc., is in line with Cicero's tendency elsewhere in this section and may be related to his addressee (cf. ad §S 93-151). Next, in view of the doctrine that the decorum is the manifestation of action in accord with each of the virtues, Cicero launches into a discussion of the distinction between the decorum and honestum {§§ 94-95) which is implicitly based, not on what has just been said of decorum, but on a definition that will be given only in § 96 (quod consentaneum sit hominis excellentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat)y which is hardly distinguishable from the definition of the honestum which, though never expressly formulated, was implicit in its derivation from the natural drives of the human being at SS 11-14. The upshot is that in §§ 94-95 the reader is presented with various accidentia of decorum, viz. that it is an €πιγ€νόμ€νον of the ho-
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nestum, that it is something readily perceptible {in promptu) and manifest in the other three virtues, and that it is distinguishable from the honestum theoretically but not in practice, before he comes upon an actual definition of decorum. The Greek πρέπω means la) "be conspicuous" (e.g., Horn. //. 12.104: ό δ* €πρεπ€ και δια πάντων), often with some attributes specified (e.g., Aesch. Ch. 10-12 [Orestes is the speaker]: τίς ττοθ' ήδ' όμήγυρις / στίίχα γυναικών φάρ€σιν μ€λαγχίμοις / πρέπουσα;) and hence lb) "shine forth, show oneself"; 2a) "be conspicuously like" and hence 2b) "be conspicuously fit ting, beseem"; cf. LSJ s.v. Similarly, Latin decorum can be used in the senses 1) "€υ€ΐδής, ώραΐος, pulcher, gratus, speciosus, ornatus, formosus, egregius," in which it refers to external appearance, but also 2) "βύπρεπης, κόσμιος, aptus, conveniens, concinnus, dignus, accommodatus, decens," where, in stead of having a content of its own, it sets up a relationship between two terms as proportional or suitable to each other; cf. Leissner, TLL 5.1, s.v. decorus LA and B. The translation of πρέπον as decorum, however, involves several prob lems. For instance, one gets a much more vivid sense of the meaning of the statement huius [sc. decori] vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari (§ 94) by substituting the Greek terms: αυτή ή δύναμις του πρέποντος, δτι του καλοΰ έστιν αχώριστον. Το καλόν πρέπ€ΐ ("is distinguished, attracts the eye"); on the other hand, the Latin terms decorum and honestum suggest social pro priety and public standing; these, too, may be interconnected, but the thought was first formulated with the Greek terms in mind, and they give it a power and prima facie validity lacking in the Latin equivalent. Similarly, on several other occasions the Latin terms are meant to, but really cannot fully bear the burden of the Greek πρέπ€ΐ in the stronger sense "shine forth," as when Cicero describes decorum as the manifestation of action in accord with the virtues (§ 94-95), offers the analogy that decorum is to virtue as beauty is to health ($ 95), speaks of hoc decorum quod elucet in vita (§ 98), or says that constantia and moderatio will "shine forth" (elucehit) when the ap petites are calm (5 102); cf. Philippson, 1930 1 , 388. Among the presentations of the four "parts" of the honestum this intro duction of decorum is unique in discussing the relationship of the "part" to the whole—not an easy problem. The relation of the πρέπον to the καλόν receives attention in the Platonic Hp. Ma. 293d ff.,131 where it is mooted that the πρέπον is the quality which, inhering in beautiful things, makes them 131. On the problem of the authenticity of this dialogue cf. Paul Friedlander, Platon. 2, 3d ed. {Berlin. 1964), 284, n. 1 = Engl. tr. by H. Meycrhoff (New York, 1964), n. 1, 316-17.
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beautiful; when the problem of the difference between apparent and real arises, however, Socrates concludes that the πρέπον might lend a merely specious beauty (294a-b). In view of the Stoic context it is not surprising that our passage fails to take up the claim that the πρέπον is the "form" of the καλόν. As in the Hp. Ma., however, it is taken for granted that the πρέπον is in the realm of appearance; but, unlike Plato, Panaetius evidently regards the πρέπον as an infallible sign of the presence of the καλόν ($ 94: quidquid est enim quod deceat, id turn apparet cum antegressa est honestas); cf. Arist. Top. 135al3: ταΰτόν γαρ έστι το καλόν και πρέπον. On the different implica tions of the analogy of the relation of beauty to health cf. ad $ 95. Moreover, unseemly behavior would, according to $ 94, appear to be a sure sign of the absence of the καλόν. The basic Stoic conception was that virtue was unitary and was simply given different names in the different spheres of activity; cf. 6 IB Long-Sedley = Plut. de Virt. Mor. 440e ff. = (in part) SVF1,86.8 ff. and 49.30 ff., of which I quote the latter: εοικε δε και Ζήνων εις τοϋτό πως ύποφέρεσθαι ό Κιτιεύς, οριζόμενος την φρόνησιν εν μεν άπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, εν δ' α'ιρετεοις σωφροσύνην, έν δ" ύπομενετέοις άνδρείαν. άπολογούμενοι δ' άξιοΰσιν έν τού τοις την έπιστήμην φρόνησιν Οπό τού Ζήνωνος ώνομάσθαι. The general prac tice of referring to the four cardinal virtues as "parts'* of the honestum suggests that Panaetius similarly viewed his καλόν as an organic unity (cf. also § l i b : quae quattuor. . . inter se conligata atque implicata sunt, with note; fr. 109; ad §§ 152-61). The point of Cicero/Panaetius in % 94 seems to be that the πρέπον is an epiphenomenon of the καλόν in each of its spheres of operation; see below. Another analogue to Panaetius' treatment of the relation of the πρέπον to the καλόν has been sought in Hecato's doctrine of the relation of the nontheoretical to the theoretical virtues. Cf. fr. 6 G. = D.L. 7.90-91: φησί γαρ ό Έκάτων έν τω πρωτω περί αρετών έπιστημονικάς μεν είναι και θεωρηματικάς τάς έχουσας την σύστασιν έκ θεωρημάτων, ως φρόνησιν καΐ δικαιοσύνην αθεώρητους δε τάς κατά παρεκτασιν θεωρούμενος ταΐς έκ των θεωρημάτων συνεστηκυίαις, καθάπερ ύγίειαν και ίσχύν. τη γάρ σωφροσύνη τεθεωρημένη ύπαρχούση συμβαίνει άκολουθεΐν και παρεκτείνεσθαι την ύγίειαν, καθάπερ τη ψαλίδος οΐκοδομία τήν ίσχύν έπιγίνεσθαι. καλούνται δ' αθεώρητοι ότι μή έχουσι συγκαταθέσεις, αλλ' έπιγίνονται και περί φαύλους γίνονται, ως ύγίεια, ανδρεία. (ttFor Hecato says in the first book O n Virtues' that there are scientific and theoretical virtues that consist in thoughts, such as prudence and justice, as well as nontheoretical ones, such as health and strength, which are found alongside the ones made up of thoughts. Thus health happens to follow upon and extend beside the theoretical virtue moderation, just as
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strength follows upon the construction of an arch. They are called nontheoretical because they do not depend upon acts of assent but are superad ded and are possessed by ordinary persons, as are health and bravery.") Philippson, 1930 1 , 365 ff., discussed both this passage and the similar doctrine at Stob. 2.7.5 b4 , where the nontheoretical virtues are called δυνάμα?. Note, however, that his view that the eXeye at Stob. 2.7.5 b5 ( 2 , 6 3 . 2 5 26 W.-H.) = Panaetius fr. 109 points to Hecato as the source (on grounds that the imperfect tense implies a student's report) should, like some of his other attributions to Hecato, be treated with reserve. In fact, H. von Staden, "Jae ger's 'Skandalon der historischen Vernunft': Diodes, Aristotle, and Theophrastus," in Werner Jaeger Reconsidered, ed. W.M. Calder III (Atlanta, 1992), 252, has shown that, in the fourth century (B.C.) and later, the imper fect is often used to cite persons whom the author could not possibly have known. Moreover, it is misleading to claim to find in our passage, as Philippson, he. cit., 385, did, traces ("Spuren") of Hecato's doctrine of the nontheoreti cal virtues. The point of contact is the concept of thee πι yc νόμε vov or the like (the Greek term employed by Panaetius being not altogether clear; see below) of a (particular theoretical) virtue (Hecato) or virtue in general (i.e., the honestum or καλόν: Panaetius). What Philippson failed to note, however, is that Panaetius offered a rather different account of theoretical and practical virtues at §§ 16-17 (on the assumption that Cicero there follows his main source). The analogy to Hecato thus does not lead very far.132 There was, however, in existence in Panaetius1 day a body of Greek lore that attempted to draw conclusions from external phenomena to the state of the human soul, namely the literature on physiognomy. One of the methods followed by physiognomists was to make a classification of superficial characteristics and the character-traits that go along with them (ot bi rives ^κ των ηθών των επιφαινομένων, οία διαθέσβι βπβται εκαστον ήθος, τω όργι£ομ€νψ, τφ φοβουμενω. τφ άφροδισιάζοντι . . . : [Arist.J Phgn. 805a28-30 1 3 3 ). Panaetius1 project in treating το πρέπον as an έπιγ* νόμ€ vov or έπιφαινόμενον of the καλόν is not dissimilar and involves inter alia alert observation of details of physical behavior on the premise that these disclose the state of the 132. Gartner, 1974, 42-43, n. S3, had thought ro solve the problem of the two definitions of decorum in $ 96 on the assumption that Cicero had lifted them from Hecato's doctrine of the nontheoretical virtues; see below. 133. On this treatise, likely to be based on Aristotelian organization and viewpoints, cf. Johanna Schmidt, RE 20.1 (1941), 1070.48 ff., followed by During, ibid., Suppl. 11 (1968), 314.49 ff.
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soul (cf. esp. SS 1 2 8 - 3 2 , 1 4 5 - 4 6 ) . Panaetius, then, shares with the physiog nomists an asumption about the relation of the seen and the unseen; he was also, like them, interested in different character-types (cf. the brief sketch at §§ 108-9). It is therefore tempting to suppose that theories of physiognomy influenced his thinking in some degree. At the same time, physiognomy, with its assumption of fixed character-types, is implicitly anti-ethical. At the core of Panaetius' treatment of the πρέπον is the idealistic notion that the human being is basically good (cf. §§ 97-98) and that what is needed are instruc tions to modify behavior to bring it into line with the beautiful soul within, i.e., to achieve consistency [constantia) of one's behavior (in words and actions) with one's true nature and avoid any divergence (discrepantia) be tween appearance and reality. The discussion of two types of decorum in § 96 has caused difficulty. The text has been thought to be unintelligible through Cicero's interference with his Panaetian model (Miiller ad /oc), in particular his insertion of material from another source. 134 The distinction drawn is between the decorum ge nerate {quod in omni honestate versatur) and the subordinate decorum (aliud huic subiectum). Such a bifurcation is found also in the case of the second virtue, which includes both iustitia and liberalitas/beneficentia; and indeed the two areas are there given separate treatment (corresponding to $$ 20-41 and 4 2 - 6 0 respectively). But a closer analogy than Panaetius' own treatment of the second virtue is provided by Aristotle's discussion in EN of justice and injustice.135 After ascertaining that in common parlance the terms "justice" and "injustice" are used for the whole of virtue and vice, 136 he determines that there is a special sense in which this "justice" can be said to be one among a plurality of virtues and that το πλεονεκτεί ν can serve to distinguish injustice in the narrower sense from other vices (EN 1130al4 ff.): ίητοϋμεν δε γε την εν μέρει άρετη? δικαιοσύνην έστι γάρ TL?, ώ? φαμεν. όμοίω? δε και περί αδικία? τη? κατά μέρο?. σημεΐον δ' δτι εστίν κατά μεν γάρ τά? άλλα? μοχθηρία? ό ενεργών αδικεί μεν, πλεονεκτεί δ' ουδέν, οίον ό ρίψα? την ασπίδα διά δειλίαν ή κακώ? ειπών δια χαλεπότητα ή ού βοήθησα? χρήμασι δι' άνελευθερίαν δταν δε πλεονεκτή, πολλάκι? κατ' ούδεμίαν τών τοιούτων, αλλά μην ούδε κατά πάσα?, κατά πονηρίαν δε γε τινά (φέγομεν γάρ) και κατ' άδικίαν. εστίν άρ' άλλη τι? αδικία ώ? μέρο? τη? δλη?, και άδικόν τι έν μέρει 134. See n. 132 supra. 135. 1 owe this observation to the kindness of Giscla Striker. 136. On the latitude with which &ίκαιο9/άδικο>? were used in ordinary speech in fourthcentury Athens cf. K.J. Dovec, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974), 180 ff. (cf. also 2.38>.
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τού δλου αδίκου του παρά τόι> νόμοι\ Similarly Zeno made φρύνησι? both a virtue in its own right and a quality inhering in the other virtues (cf. ad%\ 53: φρόνησα . . . quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarutnque scientia . . .). In our case there is a sense in which the πρέπον is hardly distinguishable from the καλόι> in general because it is a quality that results from virtuous action; there is another sense, however, in which the πρέπον can be seen as one of the other virtues which form part of the καλόν, i.e., it has a content of its own corresponding in essentials with that of the older virtue σωφροσύνη. The relation of the two types of decorum as described in § 96 (viz., generate and huic subiectum or subiectum generi) is problematical, however. The two are not, as one might have thought, related as genus and species, for the "general" decorum is so by virtue of its manifestation in the honestum in general {quod in omni bonestate versatur)y whereas what is called the subor dinate decorum has its own content and, just like each of the other three virtues, is subordinate to and forms part of, not the decorum generate (in spite of the phrase aliud huic subiectum), but the honestum. Indeed, in a sense, the decorum generate could be said to be subordinate to it, since it is an €ττιγ€ΐ'όμα'υΐ' of action in accord with it, as of action in accord with each of the other virtues. Perhaps this inexactitude should be laid to Cicero's account (for other terminological infelicities in this section cf. ad § 142). The definitions themselves (still in § 96) are not free of difficulties. One supposed difficulty can be readily disposed of, however: the words with which the definitions are introduced {viz., sic fere definiri solet and sic definiunt) should not be used as a basis for arguing that Cicero is here departing from Panaetius {pace Gartner, 1974, 32); for Cicero elsewhere refers to his model vaguely in the plural (5 6: sequimur igitur. . . Stoicos); and the phrase sic definitur a Stoicis at $ 142 surely likewise refers to Panaetius. One prob lem is rather the omission of the idea that decorum is the visible manifesta tion of the quality named (cf. Philippson, 1930 1 , 388-89)—surprising in view of the terms of the preceding differentiation of honestum and decorum. Thus, unless the term apparet or the like can be convincingly supplemented to the text, we shall have to suspect Cicero of careless reproduction of his source. Another problem involves the incommensurability of the descriptio of the first sentence of § 96 with the definitions which then follow. From the descriptio one would assume that the statement honestum decet would fall within the decorum generate, whereas magnitudo animi decet or the like would be an example of the aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. This appears to have been Ambrose's understanding of the passage; cf. off. 1.222: est igitur decorum quod praeeminet, cuius divisio
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gemina est. nam est decorum quasi generale quod per universitatem funditur honestatis et quasi toto spectatur corpore; est etiam speciale quod in parte aliqua enitet. The first of Cicero's following definitions, that of the decorum generate, would not be at odds with this view. However, the subordinate type of decorum is defined only in terms of action in accord with moderatio et temperantia etc., so that Cicero appears to lose sight of the other three virtues. A. Dietrich, "Zu Cicero de officiis," Jahrbiicher fur Philologie und Pddagogik 89 (1864), 527-29, sought to solve this problem by substituting ad singubrem partem for ad singulas partes, so as to read: est autem eius descriptio duplex; nam et generale quoddam decorum intellegimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad sin gubrem partem honestatis. However, the transmitted text receives support at this point from the paraphrase of the subordinate decorum at § 98 (hoc quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis); it strains credulity to suppose that this text, too, has been corrupted independently so as to yield the same sense as our passage (as transmitted), the assumption of those who, with Beier, followed by Dietrich, would read in § 98 in uno quodam (or aliquo) genere virtutis or, more elegantly, with Unger, 34: in uno suoque genere virtutis. An alternative is to assume that both passages owe their form to a misunderstanding on Cicero's pan ("delirat Cicero [similiter 1.98 in uno quoque genere]n Winterbottom ad he). The problem will reside, however, not in the formulation ad singubs partes honestatis, which is confirmed not only by $ 98 but also by the catalogue of decorous actions in § 94, but in the definition of the subordinate type of decorum itself, which ought to have been framed more broadly; as M.W. Haslam (to whom I am generally in debted for clarification of this passage) points out, in Greek an dei attached to the equivalent of quod naturae consentaneum sit would do. Did Cicero perhaps formulate as he did because he felt the subordinate type of decorum as manifested under the other virtues had been sufficiently described at § 94? Finally, even if one otherwise accepts the definition of the subordinate decorum, what is the point of the added prepositional phrase cum specie quadam liberalii Surely the emphasis on moderatio et temperantia is all that is needed to indicate the tendency of this virtue. What Cicero evidently has in mind becomes clearer in § 141, where the phrase recurs, coupled with dignitas (ea quae pertinent ad liberalem speciem et dignitatem). Now dignitas could, like decorum or the πρεπορ itself, be a relative term ("fitness [for a task, etc., stated or implied]": OLD s.v., 1); it could, however, also be an absolute term ("excellence** or, in particular, "standing, esteem": ibid., 2 and 4). I suspect, then, that the stipulation cum specie quadam liberali has been
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added by Cicero to anchor the conduct he is advocating to the social context appropriate to his addressee and other intended readers,137 i.e., to exclude moderatio et temperarttia being taken to extremes of servility. Panaetius may well have been content with nature as his guide and not have felt the need for an external, social prop; cf. ad $ 96. The simile of the poets is introduced ostensibly to clarify the preceding definitions {haec ita intellegi possumus existimare ex eo decoro quod poetae sequuntur . . . : $ 97), but it also serves to adumbrate elements of the personae theory. We are shown by example that to put a wicked sentiment into the mouth of a good character would be a violation of poetic decorum, whereas such a thought spoken by a wicked character would give rise to applause. The poet and the moral agent thus have two points in common: both judge decorum ex persona and both strive for approval.138 But the expected com parison of the poets to "us" as moral agents is implied rather than stated. What ensues instead is a dilation on the role of "nature," which is said to fix the persona of human beings in several ways, viz., a) by making it far better than that of other animals, b) by assigning roles of constantia, moderatio, temperantia, verecundia, and c) by instilling a concern with how we bear ourselves toward others, where b) and c) are, however, essentially two ways of stating the same thing. As a conclusion to this simile one expects "there fore we can act only a good part" or the like. Instead, however, Cicero twists the conclusion so that it forms an illustration of the scope of the two types of decorum defined in § 96. Now the simile of the poets is actually a better illustration of the way a moral agent should choose which persona is appro priate to himself—a use to which it is, in fact, put at 5 114—than of the distinction between the two types of decorum, since both of these perform an essentially similar function in limiting the roles available to the individual (cf. further ad § 97); nor is the scope (quam late fusum sit: $ 98) of the two types of decorum the obvious goal of the argument.139 The theme of approbatio, though touched on in the simile of the poets [Atreo dicente plausus excitantur: § 97), was there in danger of being lost and thus had to be reinforced in a following simile comparing the decorum in its effect on the observer to physical beauty. The section concludes with a comparison of the two social 137. Cf. Cael. 6, where his client is said to have a liberalis species; as Austin remarks ad loc., it often denotes merely a "well-bred appearance." 138. Cf. the comparison of the tragic actor and the moral agent at Epict. 1.29.41-43 to make the point that the mere costume/externals should not be confused with the art of acting/ behaving. 139. Questions of the scope of the subject matter have, however, been of concern to Cicero from the beginning; cf. $ 4.
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virtues, iustitia and verecundia (§ 99). Hasty adaptation of material origi nally put to different use and the attempt to make too many different points at once would account for the state of our text. 1 4 0 At the end of $ 99 Cicero remarks: his igitur expositis quale sit id quod decere dicimus intellectum puto. In fact, however, it is not so. The nature of το πρέπον reveals itself only slowly and indirectly, and important stations are yet to come, including the curbing of the passions (§§ 100-3), the aequabilitas universae vitae (§ 111), and the musical simile (§§ 145-46). 93 Sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua verecun dia et quasi quidam ornarus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cemitur.] Cicero evidently wants at first to emphasize familiar aspects of this topic; only gradually does he intro duce difficult distinctions (cf. ad §§ 93-99). Verecundia, temperantia, and modestia were all qualities well known to Cicero's readers; temperantia and modestia, which already figure in the paraphrase of the fourth virtue at § 15a (cf. also the end of § 96), were treated as synonyms as early as PI. Mer. 54, where intemperans is paraphrased as non modestus; cf. North, 2 6 2 - 6 3 , and, for the equivalence of verecundia and modestia, 267 (a propos PI. Mos. 120 ff., esp. 139). For temperantia and modestia as an omatus vitae cf. Soph. Aj. 293 (as well as PI. R. quoted below): -γυναιξί κόσμον ή σιγή 4>cp€i; for the terms in Roman ethical discourse cf. North, 2 6 2 - 6 3 ; cf. also ad 2.46. Cicero subsumes temperantia and modestia under the term frugalitas, which he applies to his client, at Deiot. 26; the two terms appear as possible equiv alents for σωφροσύνη at Tusc. 3.16: . . . qui sit temperans—quern Graeci σώφρονα appellant eamque virtutem σωφροσύνην vocant% quam soleo equidem turn temperantiam, turn moderationem appellate, non numquam etiam modestiam; . . . For the Stoics generally beginning with Chrysippus one of the major divisions of ethics was that dealing with the passions (cf. SVF 3, 3.3 = D.L. 7.84); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,141 ff. Cicero associated temperantia with control of the passions as early as Inv. 2.164: temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio. eius partes continentia, dementia, modestia; cf. also Fin. 2.60: . . . temperantiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi oboediens. For a Roman rerum modus would be an obvious complement to modestia (Cicero 140. Labowsky, 20, suggests that **. . . wir es hier mit einem vorlaufigen und eiligen Exzerpt aus dcr Panairischen Vorlagc zu tun ha ben . . ."; however, Att. 16.11.4 (τά irepi τοΰ κπθηκυιττο^, quatenus Panaettus, absolvi duobus) tells against the notion that Cicero regarded this pan of the work as provisional ("vorlaufig"). She also made the text more difficult than it had to be by retaining the ut presented in $ 97 by the C tradition but omitted in ζ; Atzert, whose 1932 edition she follows here, bracketed ut in later editions.
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alludes to the latter's etymology at $ 142; cf. also North, 263); although this connection did not exist in the Greek, Panaetius was sufficiently φιλοαριστοτεΛης (fr. 57) to favor moderation in various spheres (cf. ad §S 14, 34, 89, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 141; 2.59). In this series of terms one misses, however, the critical word constantia, the achievement of which was a goal of the sedatto perturbationum animi (cf. $ 137). Moreover, the mere listing of items rather than careful attention to their relations is, of course, characteristic of someone writing in haste. verecundia] Cf. [PI.) Def. 412c: αιδώς τολμήσεως ύποχώρησις εκουσία δικαί ως· και προς το βελτιστον φανεν καταλαβή εκουσία του βέλτιστου* ευλάβεια όρθου ψόγου. The Peripatos subordinated αιδώς to σωφροσύνη; cf. Arist. £ £ 1234a30-32:o μεν ουν φθόνος· είςάδικίαν συμβάλλεται. . . και ή νεμεσιςείς δικαιοσύνην, ή (δ') αιδώς εις σωφροσύνην; [Arist.] VV 1250bll—12: παρεπεται δε τη σωφροσύνη ευταξία, κοσμιότης, αιδώς, ευλάβεια. The older Stoa offered these definitions: SVF 3, 101.34: αιδώς δε φόβος έπι προσδοκία ψό γου; ibid., 105.40: αίδώς μεν ουν εστίν ευλάβεια όρθοϋ ψόγου. In our text verecundia will play a role under the first persona (handled in effect proleptically at §§ 105-6) and in the discussion of the body (§§ 126 ff.). . . . quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia . . .] Cf. PI. R. 430e: κόσμος πού τις . . . ή σωφροσύνη εστίν καΐ ηδονών τίνων και επιθυμιών εγκράτεια, ώς φασι κρείττω δη αυτού άποφαίνοντες- ούκ όΐδ* δντινα τρόπον, και άλλα άττα τοιαύτα ώσπερ ϊχνη αυτής λέγεται. Cf. ad $§ 61-92 on the Aristotelian status of μεγαλοψυχία as the κόσμος of all the virtues. . . . sedatio perturbationum animi. . .] Cf. SVF 3,64.44 ff. = Stob. 2,62.7 ff. W.-H. (a passage claimed for Hecato by Philippson, 1930 1 ,364-65; he notes the use of άφορμαί thought to be characteristic of Panaetius; cf. ad §§ 1 1 14): πασών δε τούτων τών αρετών το τέλος είναι το ακολούθως τη φύσει £ήν έκάστην δε τούτου διά τών ιδίων παρεχεσβαι τυγχάνοντα τόν άνθρωπον. εχειν γαρ άφορμάς παρά της φύσεως και προς την του καθήκοντος ευρεσιν και προς την τών ορμών εύστάθειαν και προς τάς ύπομονάς και προς τάς άπονεμήσεις. The topic, handled in detail at §§ 101-103a, will recur at SS 132 and 141. hoc loco continetur id quod did Latine decorum potest, Graece enim πρέπον dicitur {decorum}.] Γίρεπειν replaced the older Greek idiom κόσμον φερειν (cf. Hdt. 8.60 and 142.2) as a term for appropriate behavior. The Latin decorum, attested in a corresponding sense as early as PI. As. 701 (si verum quidem et decorum erum vehere servum, I inscende), was indeed an obvious equivalent for the Greek πρέπον and appears as such as early as Orat. 70 (from the year 46): ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre: πρέπον appellant hoc Graeci, nos dicamus sane decorum.
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de quo praeclare et tnulta praecipiuntur et res est cognitione dignissima. huius ignoratione non modo in vita sed saepissime in poematis et in oratione peccatur. It is likewise used for πρέπον in the translation of the Timaeus on which Cicero was at work in 45 (viz., %% 17 = 33b and 30 = 38e). 141 —The second decorum is rightly ousted by recentiores beginning with Bibl. Brit. Reg. 15.A.XX (s. XII). 94 huius vis ea est, ut ab honesto non queat separari; nam et quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet.] On Panaetius' general doctrine of the inseparability of the virtues cf. § 1 5 ; for the analogy to Aristotle's treat ment of justice cf. ad §§ 93-99.—Cicero will later rake a similar line for the utile (cf. 2.10 and Book 3 in general), though this fact should not be invoked in favor of Gartner's thesis that the πρέπον occupied the second book of Panaetius' treatise (cf. introduction, § 5 (5] with literature); cf. SVF 3,21.42 (= Stob. 2, 69.11 W.-H.): πάντα δε τάγαθά ωφέλιμα είναι και εύχρηστα και συμφέροντα και λυσιτελή και σπουδαία και πρέποντα και καλά και οίκεΐα; Fin. 3.14:. . . unum tstud, quod honestum appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum . . . (sim. Tusc. 2.30).—For vis = "sense" cf. OLD s.v., 18a. quaJis autem differentia sit honesri et decori, facilius imellegi quam explanari potest.] Cicero himself uses the two as synonyms at Fin. 2.35 (quoted ad SS 5-6) and 2.9 (addecus honestatemque). Both terms apply to actions that enjoy approval in society. On the effect of the honestum see $ 55, as well as Book 2 in general, especially 2.17 and 32 ff. For the approval generated by the decorum cf. § 98b. quidquid est enim quod deceat, id turn apparet cum antegressa est honestas.] Panaetius evidently claims, not merely that decorum always accompanies the honestum, but that it is an external signal to the inner presence of the ho nestum since the hierarchically superior honestum is the condition for its manifestation {antegressa; cf. Graeser, 185); see further ad § 95. Panaetius' doctrine contrasts with the Hippias Maior (294a), where το πρέπον is not an infallible sign of an inner καλόν, but may be delusive. itaque non solum—sic indecorum.] That action in accord with the other virtues is decorous was not mentioned when they were discussed previously, surely because the decorousness of such action is an έπιγενόμενον rather than the essential nature of each virtue. Gartner, 1974, 36, sees this passage as the beginning of an empirical presentation of the subject, presumed to be Panaetian. Panaetian it surely is; but one should not ignore itaque, which indicates that this material follows from the preceding analysis of the relation 141. For rhc dare cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1150.57 ff.
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of the honestum and decorum. Cicero/Panaetius proceeds to work out for each of the three prior parts of the honestum the way in which decorum comes into play. It turns out that in each case action in accord with the virtue decett its neglect dedecet; indeed for the second and third virtues the stronger term turpe is deployed. Similarly, when Cicero/Panaetius comes to derive officia from the fourth virtue at § 100, the first recommendation is for action in accord with the first three virtues. Note in our passage the (surely Panaetian) broader interpretation of the first virtue as that of the use of λόγος generally, as opposed to the narrower version offered at §5 18-19 (see ad he). Furthermore for the first two virtues decet is used without specification of the person so that it seems to apply generally; the third virtue is different, however, since not everyone can (or would wish to) aspire to it; hence the limitation applied (with the unfortunate, tautological formulation quod ertim viriliter . . . fit, id dignum viro . . . videtur). nam et rarione uti—et mente esse c a p t u m ; . . . ] Cf. ad $ 18 above, where Cicero does not hesitate to use the term turpe of the opposite of intelligent and informed action; X. Mem. 3.9.6: μανίαν ye μην εναντίον μέν €*φη €Ϊναι σοφία, οΰ μέντοι ye την άν^πιστημοσύνην μανίαν ένόμιζ*' το δέ άγνοεΐν εαυτόν και ά μη οΐδε δοξά£€ΐν τε και οϊεσθαι γιγνώσκειν ίγγυτάτω μανίας€λογί£6το αναι; Fabio Stok, Omnes stultos insanire. La politica del paradosso in Cicerone, Akroamata 2 (Pisa, 1981), 14 ff. similis est ratio fortitudinis; quod enim viriliter animoque magno fit, id dignum viro et decorum videtur . . . ] Note the use of dignum viro in this context as a paraphrase for decorum; the adjective is critical to the explica tion of decorum in the simile of the poets at § 97: quod quaque persona dignum est; digna persona oratio. Contrast with our passage the deprecation of omnis viro non dignus ornatus at § 130. Erymologically connected with decet (cf. Ernout-Meillet s.v. decet)^ dignusldignitas play in general a promi nent role in Cicero's discussion of decorum (eighteen occurrences); dignitas figures as a designation for masculine comeliness corresponding to the femi nine venustas (§§ 107, 130) but also, as we have seen, as a paraphrase for decorus in the sense "appropriate to" (§§ 97, 104, 106, 144, 151); finally dignitas sometimes has its absolute sense of "public standing" (§§ 138,139, 141; cf. § 124: dignitas civitatis); one suspects that emphasis on this last point may be Cicero's; cf. ad $$ 9 3 - 9 9 , 9 6 {cum specie quadam liberalitatis), and 150-51. 95 est enim quiddam, idque intellegitur in omni virtute, quod deceat;. . .] The shift to virtus here might merely be stylistic variatio (cf. also ad 2.18). However, the ambiguity {in omni virtute could mean "in every virtue" or "in the whole of virtue") might pave the way for the distinction in § 96 between
Commentary on Book 1, Section 94-96
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quod in omni honestate versatur and quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis.142 . . . quod cogitatione magis a virtute potest quam re separari.] Cf. Fin. 5.67: atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur; ad 2.10, as well as the definition of the decorum generale given in 5 96 (sc. id. . . quod consentaneum sit hominis exceUentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat), hardly distinguishable from that of the honestum, based on drives that differentiate the human being from the beast (cf. §5 11-14). ut venustas et pulchritudo corporis secerai non potest a valetudine, sic hoc de quo loquimur decorum totum illud quidem est cum virtute confusum, sed mente et cogitatione distinguitur.] Chrysippus had already constructed an analogy between body and soul, whereby a συμμ€τρία of elements or parts was characteristic of beauty in the one and health in the other; cf. SVF 3, 122.14 ff. (partly quoted ad $ 98); Philippson, 1930», 370-71. Our analogy does not "run on all fours" insofar as health is a condition, but not a suffi cient condition, of beauty, whereas Cicero/Panaerius presumably wants vir tue to be a sufficient condition for the decorum; cf. Graeser, 185. It also suggests that the absence of the πρέπον would not necessarily imply the absence of the καλόν; but this implication is contradicted by the reversability of § 94 init, [quod decet honestum est et quod honestum est decet). 96 On the definition of the two types of decorum cf. ad §§ 93-99. Est autcm eius descriptio d u p l e x ; . . . ] For descriptio as a "description serv ing to identify or define" or the like cf. OLD s.v., 3b and Vetter, TLL 4, 666.53 ff.; sim. $ 101. atque illud superius [sc. decorum generale] sic fere definiri solet, decorum id esse quod consentaneum sit hominis exceUentiae in eo in quo natura cius a reliquis animantibus differat.J This definition, too imprecisely phrased, shows why there was such difficulty over the distinction between the ho nestum and decorum {see ad §S 93-99); Philippson, 1930», 388-89, located the deficiency in the absence of apparet, expected in light of § 94 to make it clear that decorum is the manifestation of the honestum in action. quae autem pars subiecta generi est, earn sic definiunt ut id decorum velint esse quod ita naturae consentaneum sit ut in eo moderatto et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.] The subordinate πρέπον involves the manifestation of σωφροσύνη cum specie quadam liberali. Here the πρέπον receives a distinctive content (cf. § 93); but Cicero never explains how or why this definition pertains to the other three parts of the καλόν. In fact, in 142. I owe this observation to M.W. Haslam.
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$ 94 we were led to believe that the πρ€ποι> of each of the other three virtues was simply the manifestation of action in accordance with that virtue (see ad SS 93-99). . . . cum specie quadam liberali] The phrase was oddly misunderstood by Philippson, 1930 1 , 389 (cf. Philippson, 1936 2 , 777, n. 6) as the eioos eXeuGepias instead of the eloos €\eu6epiou; for the sense of liberalis "worthy of a free man . . . decent" cf. OLD s.v., 2a and Meijer, TLL 7.1, 1290.39 ff.; Gartner, 32 and n. 31; Kloft, 38 and n. 11; the πρβπον, of necessity, is confined to the realm of species ("outward appearance": OLD s.v., 5); the phrase recurs at S 141. Its implications appear more clearly perhaps in the disapprobation of the ilUberale genus iocandi at SS 103b-5 and the list of illiberales etsordidi quaestus at S 150, as well as the remark that there is nihil hotnine libero dignius than agriculture (S 151).—It is tempting to believe that it was Cicero himself who felt the need for an external, social standard as a prop and added this phrase accordingly (cf. the view attributed to C. Lucilius at de Orat. 1.72:. . . neminem esse in oratorum numero habendum, qui non sit omnibus Us artibus quae sunt libero dignae perpolitus; ibid., 137: . . . quod est homine ingenuo liberaliterque educato dignum . . .); but one's view of whether Panaetius was content with nature as a sufficient standard for moderatio and temperantia and would have regarded this qualifier as a threat to the integrity of the virtue may be bound up with one's judgment as to whether a Panaetian original lies behind SS 150-51 (see ad loc). 9 7 - 9 8 Pohlenz, πρεποι>, has investigated the history of the term and its application to literary studies. In itself empty of content, it merely denotes the commensurability of two phenomena; cf., with reference to benefactions, Sen. Ben. 2.16.1, cited n. 130 supra. It was invoked by the Alexandrian scholars as a criterion in textual criticism; e.g., Aristonicus reports the athe tosis (sc. by Aristarchus) of //. 20.180-86 on the grounds that they are vulgar in construction and sense and the words unsuitable (ου πρεποιτέ?) to Achilles' person (προσώττω; the speech, addressed to Aeneas, suggests several materialistic motives for him to want to face Achilles in battle: the prospect of reigning in Troy—dismissed in view of Priam's progeny—or of a choice piece of property); cf. sch. Τ ad 11. 20.180-86a with Dietrich Luhrs, Vntersuchungen zu den Athetesen Aristarchs in der Ilias und zu ihrer Behandlung im Corpus der exegetischen Scholien (Hildesheim-Zurich-New York, 1992), 191, n. 153; other passages cited at Scholia Graeca in Homeri lliadem (scholia Vetera), ed. H. Erbse, 6 (Berlin, 1983), 459 s.v. πρίπβιν. For the term in Zenodotus' textual criticism cf. K. Nickau, Untersuchungen zur textkritischen Methode des Zenodotos von Ephesos (Berlin-New York, 1977), 183 ff.; for Aristarchus D.M. Schenkevcld, "Aristarchus and "Ομηρος φιλό-
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τΈχΐ'ος," Mnemosyne ser. 4,23 (1970), 167-70. 1 4 3 For the Stoics the general criterion for judging a poem was that its various relations be "appropriate" (πρέποντα; cf. De Lacy, 1948, esp. 271). The two similes of poetic decorum ostensibly illustrate the two types of πρέπον (albeit without further clarifying their relation to the other virtues). As the poet's text must be appropriate to the character represented, so must the life-role played by the individual be appropriate to that person's charac ter; but "nature" at once intervenes to place limits on the agent in two ways, each corresponding to a type of decorum: it provides a character greatly excelling that of other animals and one that is σώφρων. Panaetius thus imme diately bars the gate against the use of his theory to promote immoralism; cf. Gill, 1988, 179-80. The similes help to move the discussion ahead by adumbrating the doctrine of the four personae of the moral agent developed at §§ 107 ff. (the rational character given by nature in contradistinction to other animals being the first of the four), as well as by its explicit reference to a concern for quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus (implicit in the notion of σωφροσύνη), which will be developed in § 99. Cf. also ad §§ 93-99 and 97-98 [sed poetae—in uno quoque genere virtutis). 97 Haec ita intelligi possumus existimare ex eo decora quod poetae sequuntur, de quo alio loco plura dici solent.] Perhaps a vague reference to hand books on poetics; see Hon Ars 92 ff., based on a Peripatetic treatise of the type Cicero may have in mind. 144 Cicero had dealt with decorum in oratory zxOrat. 7 1 - 7 4 . sed turn servare iilud poetas quod deceat dicimus cum id quod quaque per sona dignum est et fit et dicitur . . .] The implicit premise is Aristotle's con ception of poetry as imitation [Poet. 1447al3 ff.), so that the characters should conform to what would be expected from such a character in real life; cf. De Lacy, 1948, 2 5 6 - 5 7 . For the πρέπον in characterization see Hor. Ars 119-24 and 309-16. For the πρέπον in style cf. Arist. Rhet. 1 4 0 4 b l - 2 , 3 - 5 , 12-18 and 1408a 1 0 - 1 1 ; it was later one of Theophrastus' four excellences of style; cf. loannes Stroux, De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi (Leipzig, 1912), 16-18; Kroll, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1073.17 ff. . . . ut si Aeacus aut Minos diceret 'oderint dum metuant' aut 'natis sepulcro ipse est parens* indecorum videretur—est enim digna persona orario.] The two verses correspond respectively to Accius, trag. 2 0 3 - 4 and 226 (from the
143. For Panaetius* interest in (Platonic) philology cf. ad $ 28 above; for his admiration of Aristarchus, whom he called a μάι>τι? for his ability to divine the sense of poetry, fr. 93. 144. On Ncoptolcmus of Parium and his relation to the Ars poetica cf. CO. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles (Cambridge, 1963), 43 ff.
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Atreus); Cicero cites Ennius* treatment of the subject at 2.23. Cf. Tusc. 1.98, where Aeacus and Minos appear, together with Rhadamanthys and Triptolemus, 145 among the judges of the dead; a sharper contrast to the wicked Atreus could hardly be imagined. Cf. in general Plut. Aud. Poet. 18d: . . . οικεία δε και πρέποντα τόϊ? αισχροί? τά αισχρά.—For another example of a lapse of poetic decorum cf. Orat. 74: . . . peccat etiam [sc. poeta] cum probam orationem affingit improbo stultove sapientis; . . . Cf. also Att. 13.16.1, where Cicero concedes that the earlier version of his Academica had seemed to depict Lucullus, Catulus, and Hortensius engaged in philosophical controversy παρά το πρέπον and altered accordingly to introduce more learned speakers, namely Varro, Atticus, and himself (cf. Att. 13.18).—For digna cf. ad § 94. 9 7 - 9 8 sed poetae—in uno quoque genere virtutis.] The comparison of "us** as moral agents with poets, carried further, becomes a contrast: the poets "see" (and represent) what befits {quid. . . deceat) all characters, good and bad; Panaetius rules out the possibility that "we" have (and should act in accord with) a bad character; this latter point is made in two steps, each presented as a provision of nature: nature has given (a) a character excelling that of beasts; (b) more particularly it has provided a character marked by consistency and σωφροσύνη (to the latter is appended what is really a defini tion of the attitude of the σώφρων, viz., a concern for quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus, which is presented as a teaching of nature). The expected conclusion ("therefore we can act only a good part") is, however, elided. Instead Cicero presents the broad scope (quam late fusum sit) of the two types of decorum, which correspond to restrictions (a) and (b) on the character of the agent, as the consequence [efficitur ut); cf. ad § 13. The relation of ideas is oddly expressed; thus the fact that under (b) two actions of "nature" are presented in parallel somewhat obscures the fact that (a) corresponds to the decorum generate, which Cicero had, by definition, set in relation to the natura hominis, (b) to the subordinate type of decorum. A further problem is that what were first presented as two types of decorum now appear in a different function as two limitations on the moral agent prior to action; they could thus be more truly said to be predeterminants of decorous action. In general, the Stoics regarded an individual human deci sion (or, in Stoic terms, an assent (συγκατάθεση] to a presentation [φαντασίαΐ) as part of a chain of causes determined by various factors, e.g., heredity, education, past decisions, etc.; cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,106; Sandbach, 103; SVF 2, 291.33 ff. and 293.22 ff.; ad $S 107-21. Chrysippus used the 14.5. Cf. Cicero's encomium of the Eleusinian mysteries ar Leg. 2.36.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 97-98
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analogy of a cylinder that rolls down an incline not only because it has been given a push but also because of its own nature {SVF 2,282.20 ff.). Panaetius has chosen to emphasize that, in the case of human beings, one's nature is determined by the endowment of intelligence and verecundia. Panaetius was evidently at pains to show that the comparison of "us" as moral agents with poets is imperfect; "we" do not have an unlimited number of characters to choose from; rather the parameters for "our" behavior have been set by "nature." However, to identify, as Cicero does, the two proper ties imposed on the human character by nature with two types of decorum is to commingle cause and effect; in terms of the logic of the simile, too, the conclusion, in which the two types of decorum figure {efficitur ut et il~ \ud . . .), gives the impression of having been pasted on. Cf. also ad S§ 9 3 99, 114, and, on the simile of the poets determining the whole presentation of the fourth virtue, ad §§ 126-49. 98 . . . nobis autem cum a natura constantiae moderations temperantiae verecundiae partes datae sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere quemadmodum nos adversus homines geramus . . .] This distinction, intro duced ostensibly as a paraphrase for the two types of decorum, is more apparent than real, since moderatio, temperantia, and verecundia all involve regard for the feelings of one's fellow humans; cf. $ 99. ut enim pulchritudo—dictorum omnium atque factotum.] The simile eluci dates {enim) the point just made, viz., the importance of hoc decorum quod elucet in vita by virtue of its ability to arouse the approval of others. This material also serves as a kind of (implicit) conclusion to the comparison with poets: as the proper observance of poetic decorum gives rise to ovations in the theater [plausus excitantur), so the observance of decorum in life wins approval; cf. also ad § 94. . . . pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum movet oculos . . .] Cf. Arist. Top. 116b21: το δε κάλλος των μελών τις συμμετρία δοκεΐ είναι; SVF 3, 122.19 (sim. 154.34): . . . τό δε κάλλος εν τη |sc. συμμετρία] των μορίων; Clem. ΑΙ. Paed. 272.7-8 and 17 ff., cited ad $ 130 {formae autem dignitas—). . . . hoc decorum quod elucet in vita movet approbationem eorum quibuscum vivitur ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.] For elucere cf. ad % 94; for constantia ad §§ 93, 103, and 111; the ordo of actions corresponds, of course, to the symmetry of the beautiful {apta compositio membrorum; cf. S 14: convenientia partium; cf. further 5 142 a propos ευκαιρία). The doctrine of approbatio of the honestum without reference to decorum appears at $ 55 and Fin. 5.62 {quis est tarn dissimilis homini, qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et com-
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probatione honestatisf). The approbatio of one's fellows is that consequence of virtuous action which gives it weight in the realm of the utile; it thus forms the pivot of Panaetius' doctrine of appropriate actions; cf. Gartner, 1974,55 ff. On the basis primarily of our passage, Gartner, 1981, 98 ff., suggests that the outline of political theory at Plb. 6.3-9 with its emphasis on the multi tude's agreement with the ruler may have been influenced by Panaetius (cf. also 2.23 ff.); on Panaetius and Polybius see further p. 354, n. 5. 99 Adhibenda est igitur quaedam reverentia adversus homines, et optimi cuiusque et reliquomm.] Another elliptical connection (cf. $ 1 3 ) , since the need to have regard for others* feelings does not strictly follow from the fact that decorous action meets with approval (igitur); cf. Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lack ing"; it might rather be said to follow from the next argument (neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat. . . est. . . omnino dissoluti); it is, however, taken for granted that decorous action is to be sought. The genitives optimi cuius que et reliquorum depend, of course, on reverentia; the distinction is likely to have been introduced by Cicero, rather than Panaetius; cf. ad 2.43, where the appeal to the opinion of the boni undercuts the previous analysis of mass psychology. nam neglegere quid de se quisque sentiat non solum adrogantis est sed etiam omnino dissoluti.] This observation provides negative confirmation of the importance of seeking the approval of one's fellows. Contrast § 65: etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hie in magnis viris non est habendus. The μεγαλόψυχο? certainly borders on adrogantia; but if con fronted with the two passages, Cicero/Pa η aeti us would presumably have distinguished between pendere and non neglegere and have emphasized that in the earlier passage the judgment was explicitly false.—Cf. Thphr. Char. 9.1: ή δέ άμαισχυιτία έστ\ μέν, ώς ορφ \afklv. κσταφρόνησι? δόξτ\ς . . . ; the topic comes in for detailed discussion at §§ 126-28 (cf. ad loc). est autem quod differat—in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.] Finally Cicero has found a formula for differentiating decorum from, at any rate, one of the other virtues (. . . non offendere, in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori; cf. his groping efforts in §§ 93-95). In the case of the second virtue it is the person or property of others that is violated, in the case of our virtue, their feelings. For non offendere within the realm of the utile (with reference to the conferring of benefits) cf. the precepts at 2.68. his igitur expositis quale sit id quod decere dicimus intellectual puto.] Per haps Cicero is too optimistic here; for various aspects of the decorum con tinue to emerge as it were guttatim in the following chapters; cf. ad §§ 9 3 99.
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100-3a Officium autem—neglegenterque agamus.] This section on the derivation of appropriate actions from the fourth "part" of the honestum begins by repeating (cf. S 94) that action in accord with the other three virtues is decorous; then the discussion focuses on what is specific to the fourth "part," the testing of the animi motus to see that they accord with nature. The basis is a twofold division of the animus, into appetituslop\ii\ and ratio. For the early Stoa the passions (πάθη) are a rational impulse, but a wrong one; one of the tasks of philosophy was therefore to combat them; hence in addition to the three books nep! παθών Chrysippus wrote a fourth θ€ραπ€υτικο£, evidently directed toward a wider readership (SVF 3,202); cf. Pohlcnz, Stoa, 1, 141 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 127 ff. Our passage alludes to all four passions generally recognized by the Stoa (cf. ad S 69; licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt {$ 102]); the program, however, is not to eradi cate them, as in the earlier Stoa (cf. SVF 3, nos. 444 and 447; Tusc. 4.43, cited ad § 89 above), but merely to subordinate them to reason; on this project as an engagement of the problem of the Stoic προκύπτων cf. Gill, 1994, 4605-6. In Panaetius' treatment the simile of the poets may perhaps have been positioned to lead more directly into the personae theory; if so, SS 101-3a may originally have been subsumed under the first persona but promoted to their present, more prominent position by Cicero (indeed he does not tire of hammering home the need to control the passions; no doubt he thought his son in need of this admonition; cf. SS 132a and 141, ad SS 103b-4, perhaps also promoted by Cicero to their present location, and ad$ 114). 100 Officium autem quod ab eo ducitur . . . ] Cf. S 15 (sed omne quod est honestum, id quattuor partium oritur ex aliqua) and 2.1 (quemadmodum officio ducerentur ab honestate . . . satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore). Our passage provides, however, the clearest distinction of the two aspects of the problem: establishing a) the quid sit of the "part" of the honestum (SS 93-99) and b) the officia derived from it (SS 100 ff.). . . . hanc primum habet viam, quae deducit ad convenientiam conscrvarionemquc naturae; . . .J Again decorum is difficult to distinguish from the honestum as a whole (cf. SS 94-95 and next note).—Labowsky, 21, notes the imprecision of the expression: "nicht die Pflicht als solche 'hat ja einen Weg' (μέθοδος), sondern es gibt einen solchen fur ihre Ableitung und um diescn handelt es sich im folgenden." . . . quam si sequemur ducem . . .] A slight variatio of the Stoic τέλος for mula of "life according to nature" (cf. S 22 and ad 3.13); the sequel amounts to a synopsis of SS 11-14.
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. . . sequemurque et id quod acutum et perspicax natura e s t . . . ] The origi nal (albeit late attested) sense "having keen or penetrating sight" gives rise by easy transference to "attentive to what is going on, observant"; the further shift to "intelligent** is assisted at Ten Hau. 874 (as in our passage) by a preceding synonym: ego me non tarn astutum neque ita perspicacem esse id sciot at trag. inc. 58 by the limited noun: Palamedi perspicax prudentia; our passage is the earliest attestation in prose; cf. OLD and Forcellini s.v. . . . id quod ad hominum consociationem accommodatum . . .] Though the correlative verb consociare occurs already at PI. Rud. 551, consociatio here makes its first appearance in extant Latin literature. In fact, Cicero shows a notable fondness for the word (his coinage?) in this sector of Off. (cf. §§ 149 and 157); cf. Probst, TLL 4, 474.68 ff. . . . neque enim solum corporis qui ad naturam apti sunt, sed multo etiam magis animi motus probandi . . .] For the argument advancing from body to mind, where order is still more important {multo etiam magis), cf. $ 14. Note that in the sequel the motus animi are given prior treatment to the motus corporis (taken up at § 126), just as in Book 2 quae Jsc. res] virtuti propiores sunt (2.22) arc, at least theoretically, given priority to other means of win ning the support of one's fellows; cf. the introduction to Book 2. 101 duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura: . . .] Similar to Panaetius' procedure here is Socrates' argument at Phdr. 271a that the intending rheto rician must study the soul to determine πότεροι» h> και δμοιον π€φυκ€ΐ> ή κατά σώματος μορφή»' πολυ€ΐδ€ς· τούτο γαρ φαμ€ΐ> φύσιΐ' αι>αι δεικνύναι. duplex est enim—fugiendumque sit.] The basic Stoic view of the soul as material and consisting of fire and breath (π^υμα) continues to be the prem ise (cf. SVF 1, 38.3 ff.; Sandbach, 60, n. 1, and 82 ff.). The later Stoa attempted some refinements within this scheme, however; thus Tertullian (anim. 14) reports that Chrysippus distinguished eight parts of the soul (SVF 1,90.16-17; 2,234.31 ff.; cf. Inwood, 1985,29), Panaetius six (fr. 85). Both men accepted the ηγεμονικοί*, located in the heart (cf. SVF 2, 228.1 ff.), as one of these parts and as comprising the powers 1 4 6 ορμή and λόγος (cf. SVF 2, 227.23-25: οί Στωικοί φασιΐ' eivai της ψυχής άι>ώτατον μ^ρος το ήγ€μοι>ικόι>, το ποιούν τάς φαντασίας καΐ συγκαταθίσας και αίσθήσ€ΐς καΐ ορμάς· και τοΰτο λογισμοί* καλούσιν). Panaetius differed from the older Stoa in recognizing the ορμή as an irrational element (quae hominem hue et illuc
146. Cicero would have been more accurate to speak of vires (= δυκΐμίΐς) of the soul, as Panaetius doubtless did after Chrysippus; cf. SVF 2,230.23:. . . ούτω και η ψυχή ολη δι' όλου δύο ί χ α τάςάιτιπαρηκούσαςάλλήλαις δυναμό. ώι> ή μέι>€στι λογικη,ήδέ άλογος . . . ;Philippson, 1930', 382; Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 100 (ad p. 198, last paragraph).
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rapit) independent of λόγος; cf. Philippson, 1929, 358-59; Grilli, 72 ff.; Inwood, 1985, 2 9 2 - 9 3 , η. 19. 1 4 7 Cf. the famous simile of the soul as a charioteer controlling two horses: και πρώτον μέν ημών ό άρχων συνωρίδος ήνιοχίΐ, €Ϊτα τώνϊτπτων ύ μέν αΰτφ καλός Τ€ και αγαθός και έκ τοιούτων, ό δ' έξ εναντίων Τ€ και ενάντιος (PI. Phdr. 246b); cf. also $ 132a and, in general, Inwood, 1985, ch. 2. (ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetims obtemperet. omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et neglegentia, nee vero agere quicquam cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere descriptio officii.}] Facciolati sug gested that these sentences were stitched together from Fin. 3.58 and that their removal from our passage would restore a proper connection of thought (however, though Fin. 3.58 does include the definition est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit, the author of these words could have found a similar formulation nearer to hand at § 8: medium autem officium id esse dicunt quod cur factum sit ratio probabilis reddi possit (though Cicero may have taken this definition in rum from ft». 3.58 or its source]). Indeed our passage, as transmitted, does present a strange juxtaposition of dogmatic and hortatory elements (ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet . . . efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant. . . ) connected very loosely (Winterbottom ad he. notes that one might rather expect igitur for the underlined autem). Facciolari's athetesis was revived by Jachmann, 215, n. 1, and justified in detail by his student Briiser, 126 ff. Not all of the arguments that have been adduced in its favor are equally cogent, however. Thus, for instance, no one who pays close attention to the connections of thought throughout Off. and Cicero's other philosophical works will be greatly troubled by the loose connective ita fit ut (cf. below p. 349, n. 212), which, like ex quo efficitur (cf. 3.25), is a common Ciceronian formula: cf. $ 142 (sicfitut), § 160, Amic. 97, Fin. 5.68, Tusc. 2.16, 3.1, N.D. 1.37, 88, 121, Leg. 1.58, etc.; cf. also ad S 13.»4* More problematic, however, is that actio should, according to the trans mitted text, be the subject of agere. Thomas, 48, attempts to defend the transmitted text on this point by appeal to similar inadvertances at §§ 80, 134, and 3.37 in order to show that "Cicero kann das eigentliche Subjekt aus den Augen verlieren." He can indeed, but only where a substantial body of 147. Appetitus and appetitio alternate as Cicero's rendering of ορμή; cf. 2.18 and other passages cited by Gtuckcr, 1995, 118, n. 18. 148. In his defense of the transmitted text Thomas, 45-46, fails to distinguish clearly between the cause (γαρ) and the result, so that the "parallels" he adduces lack relevance.
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text intervenes, as in Thomas' first two examples: (1) fortis vero animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis nee tumultuantem de gradu deici, ut dicitur, sed praesenti animo uti. . . (§ 80), where one would have expected fortis vero viri. . . ; (2) sit ergo hie sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos. nee vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios. . .(SI 34), where the sermo itself substitutes for the person engaged in such conversation. In both of these cases, however, the shift to a personal subject is at a greater distance from the original subject than in our passage. On the other hand, Thomas' third example, 3.37, is not truly relevant: quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant utrum id sequantur quod honestum esse videant; here there is no analogous problem since qui deliberant refers back to hoc deliberantium genus by a common type of constructio ad sententiam: cf. Kuhner-Sregmann, 1, 30. In spite of Thomas' attempted defense, then, the problem of mala Latinitas (characterization of Atzert4 ad loc.) remains. Other arguments both for and against authenticity are less than decisive. It is true, as Briiser notes, that several points made in the suspect passage are taken up in the sequel; in particular ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet presents in dogmatic form the precept efficiendum . . . est ut appetitus rationioboediant. . . (S 102) and omnis. . . actio vacaredebet temeritateet neglegentia is similar t o . . . excitandamque animadversionem et diligentiam, ut ne quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus (S 103). Here the problem is not the repetition per se, for in this essay devoted to moral praecepta Cicero is by no means averse to repeating himself (cf. exam ples offered in another connection by Thomas, 29 1 4 9 ), but rather the jum bling together of dogma and exhortation (see above). Another argument in favor of authenticity has been drawn from the description of qui appetitus longius evagantur at S 102: relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nee rationi parent, cut sunt subiecti lege naturae, the argument being that the subjection of the appetites to reason lege naturae presupposes the point ita fit ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet, since, if the suspect matter is removed, the subordination of the appetites is presented merely as something to be striven for (efficiendum . . . est ut appetitus rationi oboediant. . .), not a fixed state; cf. Thomas, 4 3 - 4 4 . But the primacy of reason in decisionmaking is sufficiently indicated in the characterization of ratio as quae docet et explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque sit {% 101). 149. He should not, however, have termed 3.27 {atque etiam—esse communem) a recapitulation.
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On the whole, in view of problems of style and integration into context, the suspect matter seems likely to be an interpolation, albeit an early one (attested already at Ambr. off. 1.229). 102 efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant, eamque neque praecurram nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant. . . ] Cf. Pi. R. 44 le (Socrates to Glaucon): ούκοΰν τω μεν λογιστικώ άρχει ν προσήκει, σοφψ όντι και εχοιτι τήν υπέρ άπάσης τής ψυχής προμήθειαν, τω δε θυμοειδεΐ ύπηκόω είναι και συμμαχώ τούτου; Socrates goes on to describe how the irrational part of the soul will otherwise attempt to achieve dominance (442b).—The verb oboedire used of the appetitus is developed by images suggestive of undisciplined soldiers [praecurrere, ignavia, deserere), perhaps designed by Cicero to appeal to the imagination of a son with known military interests (cf. 2.45).—On the problem of the connection with autem see the previous note. qui appetitus . . . sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur . . . ] Cf. SVF 3, 92.4: ορμή μεν ούν φορά διανοίας επί τι ή άπό του· . . . . . . ex quo elucebit omnis constantia omnisque moderatio.] Cf. ad $ 94. nam qui appetitus longius evagantur et tamquam exsultantes sive cupiendo sive fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunt.] Zeno defined πάθος as ή άλογος και παρά φύσιν ψυχής κίνησις, ή ορμή πλεονάζουσα (SVF 1, 50.23); cf. SVF 3, 92.5: πάθος δε πλεονάζουσα ορμή ή ΰπερτείνουσατά κατά τον λόγον μέτρα* . . . ;sim. 95.14,113.14-15; ibid., 130.12: υπερβαίνουσα γάρ τον λόγον ή ορμή και παρά τούτον αθρόως φερομένη οικείως τ' αν πλεονάζειν ρηθ^ίη . . . \ cf. ad §§ 100-103a.— Kostermann, TLL 5,1948.16 ff., cites evidence for exsultare used of hooved animals; cf. § 90 above (horses); was Cicero perhaps thinking of the famous horse-simile at Phdr. 246 (cf. tamquam and ad § 101)? relinquunt enim et abiciunt oboedientiam nee rationi parent, cui sunt subiecti lege naturae; . . .] The military metaphors continue. Cf. Seneca's meta phor of the passions as disobedient soldiers at de Ira 1.9.4, on which see In wood, 1993, 171. On the basis for subiecti lege naturae cf. ad § 101. For lex naturae cf. ad 3.27. licet ora ipsa cernere iratorum aut eorum qui aut libidine aliqua aut metu commoti sunt aut voluptate nimia gestiunt; quorum omnium vultus voces moms statusque mutantur.] Plut. de Cohib. Ir. 456a-b makes the same point: έμοι δ' ει τις εμμελής και κομψός ακόλουθος ην, ούκ αν ήχθόμην αύτοϋ προσφεροντος ε πι ταΐς όργαΐς εσοπτρον, ώσπερ ^νίοις προσφερουσι λούσαμενοις έπ' οϋδενι χρησίμω. το γάρ αυτόν ίδεΐν παρά φύσιν έ'χοντα και συντεταραγμενον ου μικρόν εστίν εις διαβολήν του πάθους. He follows this with the citation from a satyr play of Marsyas' rebuke to Athena for her distorted
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features while playing the flute: ούτοι πρεπα το σχήμα· του? αυλούς μ€&ς Ι και θωπλα λά£*υ και γνάθους€υθημόν€ι (TrGF, adesp. 381 Kn.-Sn. = sat. inc. F 35 Steffen). One wonders whether this was among the Panaetian examples curtailed by Cicero (cf. 2.16); for the distortion of the features of a person in anger cf. Sen. de Ira 1.1.7; 2.35.3 and 36.1; 3.4.1-2.—On voluptas nimia cf. ad 3.119.—In the sequel Cicero offers some precepts for motus statusque (sc. §S 126-32b) and speech (§S 132b-37); he warns against distortion of the facial expression as a result of over-exertion at $ 131 and alludes to the importance of decorum in facial expression in general at S 146 (see ad loc). 103a ex quibus illud intellegitur, ut ad officii formam revertamur, appetitus omnes contrahendos . . .] The phrase officii forma refers to the gerundive form of expression that has preceded (efficiendum autem est...: $ \02) and now ensues (appetitus omnes contrahendos etc.), not to the definition of officium at S 101 {pace Thomas, 44, n. 116, with predecessors whom he cites). 103b-4 Neque enim ita generati a natura sumus—.] The new topic 1 5 0 (ludus et iocus) is not introduced or connected to the preceding argument as one would have expected. A similar train of thought occurs at Arist. Pol. 1333a 16 ff., which begins with a division of the soul into two parts, one rational, the other capable of obeying reason. Then (after a further analysis of the rational soul) follows a division of βίος into ασχολία and σχολή (ibid., 30 ff.). But whereas Aristotle states that ασχολία is chosen for the sake of σχολή (ibid., 35-36), Cicero/Panaetius wants to emphasize the greater im portance of ασχολία in human life. Moreover, apart from the observation that the human being is not born for levity but that there is room for it when the serious business of life has been handled, the distinction of these two phases of life plays no role in the sequel. Note, too, that the topic of jokes would rather be expected under $134 (where this point is made: ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem. in primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus; quod maxime turn solet evenire cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa aut per ridiculum aut severe maledice contumelioseque dicitur). Now Cicero jr. was evidently fond of jokes (cf. Fam. 16.21.4 [to Tiro; August, 44], in which he praises the iuncundissima convictio of Bruttius and adds: non est enim seiunctus iocus a philologia et cottidiana συζητή σει; ibid., 3, he tells of Cratippus' changed demeanor over dinner:. . . sublataque severitate philosophiae humanissime nobiscum iocatur). One 150. Surely a new paragraph should begin at this point (so, among recent editors. Testard and Winterbottom, but not Atzcrt4 or Fcdcli).
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wonders whether this fact, as well as an association of ideas after mentioning the need for diligence ut tie quid temere ac fortuito, inconsiderate neglegenterque agamus (jokes being notoriously an outlet for just such thoughtless behavior 151 ), may have led Cicero to promote the subject for emphasis to this place. Wit was in any case a topic congenial to the orator, as the discus sion of the subject in his rhetorical writings, as well as his own practice (cf. ad 103b, 104), shows. For other suspected Ciceronian changes in the order of topics (to lend emphasis to Roman political concerns) cf. Index of Authors s.v. "Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), de Offtciis, Topics, order of." 103b ludo autem et ioco uti illo quidem licet—sed ingenuum et facetum esse debet.] Cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 17.4: nee in eadem intentione aequaliter retinenda mens est, sed ad tocos devocanda. cum puerulis Socrates ludere non erubescebat etc.; Phil. 2.39-40, where Cicero defends himself against An tony's criticism of his witticisms in Pompey's camp (on which see Plut. Cic. 38.2 ff.) on grounds that, even in such times, there were moments of relaxa tion when jokes were in order, and that the fact that he was criticized both for gloom and jokes is proof of his moderation in both. 104 duplex omnino est iocandi genus, unum inliberale petulans flagidosum obscenum, alterum elegans urbanum ingeniosum facetum . . .] S. Halliwell, "The Uses of Laughter in Greek Culture," CQ 85 (1991), 2 7 9 - 9 6 , distin guishes between playful and consequential laughter (corresponding respec tively to Cicero's elegans, urbanum, etc. and inliberale, petulans, flagitiosum, etc.) and cites (284) evidence for the humor especially of the young assuming "irreverent or uncontrolled forms" (cf. Cic. Sen. 36: ut petulantia, ut libido magis est adulescentium quam senum . . .); hence the warnings of moralists such as Cicero/Panaetius.—Cicero had, of course, dealt in detail with the use of humor in oratory, at de Orat. 2.216-90 (a section sometimes singled out for separate treatment, as in Cicerone, Uexcursus de ridiculis, ed. G. Mon aco, 2d ed. [Palermo, 1968]) and Orat. 87-89. Ethical aspects of the ques tion are not ignored in de Orat. either; cf. 2.236-39 with Leeman-PinksterNelson-Rabbie, 2, 206 ff.; cf. in general Kroll, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1077.29 ff.—For petulantia cf. further ad § 127. . . . quo genere non modo Plautus noster et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti s u n t . . . ] Panaetius evi dently shared the positive judgment of Old Comedy which prevailed in the Hellenistic age (cf. F. Quadlbauer, "Die Dichtcr der griechischen Komodie im literarischen Urteil der Anrike," WS 73 [1960], 45-51), as did Cicero (cf. Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy [New York, 1922], 9 1 151. Sec ad S 104 below.
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92); cf. also Hor. 5. 1.4.1 ff. Cicero has added Plautus; cf. Crassus' commen dation of the Latinity of Plautus and Naevius at de Orat. 3.45 (perhaps under the influence of Aelius Stilo's judgment [as reported by Varro apud Quint. Inst. 10.1.99 = gramm., p. 70, fr. 50 = p. 329, fr. 3211 that if the Muses should wish to speak Latin they would use the language of Plautus). In the archaizing second century, appreciation of Plautus reached its highwater mark; cf. Holford-Srrevens, 157-58. A work περί Σωκράτους is attested for Panaetius (fr. 50), as are judgments on the authenticity of various Socratic writings (ibid., frr. 123, 126 ff.); he also discussed Arisrippus' doctrines in a work titled περί αιρέσεων (ibid., fr. 49). Schmekel, 9 and 231 ff., posits a work περί Σωκράτους καΐ των Σωκρα τικών, of which the περί Σωκράτους would have formed a part, separate from the περί αιρέσεων. But our evidence is insufficient to support SchmekePs firm distinction between a historical study on the one hand (sc. περί Σωκράτους και των Σωκρατικών) and a doxographical study (περί αιρέσεων) on the other (Panaetius would, for instance, on SchmekePs theory, have had to treat Aristippus twice, once for his doctrine and once for the critical study of his writings [cf. frr. 49 and 123 respectively]). It is perhaps safer—and certainly more economical—to assume that the large work περί αιρέσεων included all the Socratic material. In any case, Panaetius had, in the course of his re search, to familiarize himself with the various Socratici libri, a task that our passage (= Socr. fr. IH 21) shows him to have enjoyed; cf. also 5 134. . . . multaque multorum facete dicta, ut ea quae a sene Catone conlecta sunt, quae vocant αποφθέγματα.] It has been supposed that Cato's compilation consisted of the bons mots of others and the collection of Cato's own witti cisms known to Plutarch (Diet. 97 ff. J.) was a later product; cf. Plut. Cat. 2.6; Cato, CVI-VII J.; F.Miltner, RE 22.1 (1953), 164.46 ff. Possibly Cicero was mistaken in thinking that Cato had collected them himself,152 but surely the anecdote cited at 2.89 is the kind of thing he had in mind. On Cicero's fondness for witticisms cf. ad § 108. alter est, si tempore fit, ut si remisso animo, (vel gravissimo) homine dignus, alter ne libero quidem, si rerum turpirudo adhibetur aut verbonim obscenitas.] Contrasted with liber should be, not merely homo, since a liber, too, is a homo, but a specific type of homo; hence such conjectures as gravissimo (Miiller) or vel severissimo (Atzert).—Cf. de Orat. 2.252 (in a listing of types of the risible): quartum, obscenitas, non modo non foro digna, sed vix convivio liberorum. 1 52. Note, however, that Cato did publish speeches of his own in the Origines (and not of others); cf. Leo, 283.
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ludendi etiam est quidam modus retinendus, ut ne nimis (remissi) omnia profundamus elatique voluptate in aliquam turpitudinem delabamur.] Un ger, 4 0 - 4 1 , is probably right to suppose that in ne omnia profundamus Cicero has in mind the possibility of losing control over one's substance and person; for profundere used of money cf. $ 84 and 2.55 (in classing our passage under the sense "to express without restraint, give free play to [a feeling, desire, etc.]," OLD s.v. profundo 6a perhaps takes too little account of the change of subject from jokes to games). Under Unger's interpretation the various dangers of games would be brought out, the danger to person and property as well as the moral danger; cf. Arist. EN 1176bl0: βλάπτονται γαρ άπ' αυτών [sc. των παιδιών] μάλλον ή ώφίλούνται, άμ^λοΟντ^ς τών σωμά των και τη? κτήσ€ω?. Finally the transmitted nimis can hardly be right, nor, pace Atzert 4 ad / o c , does Quint. Inst. 1.3.11 153 suggest otherwise. Unger, he. cit., put forward the conjecture ne in istis (presumably = in ludis, though the antecedent would have to be supplied out of ludendi). Courtney, 79, would insert remissi, which yields good sense in itself and could easily have dropped out through homoeoteleuton; our sentence would then make the point that the remissus animus of the preceding sentence can go too far. suppeditant autem et Campus noster et studia venandi honesta exempla ludendi.] What Cicero has in mind under Campus noster can be inferred from Ovid's discussion of pastimes enjoyed by men but denied to women (Ars 3.383 ff.): sunt Mis celeresque pilae iaculumque trochique / armaque et in gyros ire coactus equus; I nee vos Campus habet. . .—Here Cicero offers no examples of the recreational activities of which he disapproves, though such are plentiful enough in the Second Philippic (e.g., §§ 63, 67); cf. also passages from other Roman moralists cited by Edwards, 190 ff., as well as X. Mem. 3.9.9 (with Friedrich Solmsen, "Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State," RhM 107 (19641,203 = Kleine Schriften, 2 IHildesheim, 1968], 11). 105-6 These paragraphs reaffirm a fundamental principle of Panaetius' doctrine of καθήκον, the great gulf separating man and beast. A similar point had been made in § 11 about the beast being attracted to the immediately perceptible object (cf. ad loc.)\ here that object is specified as pleasure (voluptas). The analysis of human mental activity is similar to that at $$ 13 and 19 (see ad locos). The excellentia of the human being compared to the beast had been a part of the definition of the decorum generate (§ 96) and of the first persona given by nature in the comparison with poets ($ 97); here Cicero/Panaetius begins to work out the consequences: voluptas, common to 153. modus tamen sit remissionibus, ne aut odium studiorum faciant negatac out otti consuetudinem nimtae.
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man and beast, should be enjoyed in moderation; any excessive propensity toward it should be concealed. 105 . . . modo ne sit ex pecudum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re sed nomine) . . .] To call a human being a pecus was to deliver an insult; Cicero hurled the term at various political enemies, including Antony (Phil. 2.30; cf. other examples collected by Hillen, TLL 10.1, 956.17 ff.). Cf. the application of the term to the human being at Fin. 2.40: . . . ut tardam aliquam et languidam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal Jsc. hominem] ortum esse voluerunt [sc. Cyrenaici] . . . . . . sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamvis voluptate capiatur, occultat et dissimulat apperitum voluptatis propter verecundiam.] In the phrase 5/ quis est paulo erectior (opposed to si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior) erectior refers to the upright posture which distinguishes human beings from beasts and gives access to higher realms; cf. N.D. 2.140: qui [sc. di] primum eos [sc. homines] humo excitatos celsos et erectos constituerunt, ut deorum cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent. sunt enim ex terra homines non ut incolae atque habitatores sed quasi spectatores superarum rerum atque caelestium, quarum spectaculum ad nullum aliud genus animantium pertinet; Ov. Met. 1.84-86 (the creation): pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, I os homini sublime dedit caelumque videre I iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus; Sen. Ep. 65.20-21: vetas me caelo interesse, id est tubes me vivere capite demissof maior sum et ad maiora genitus quam ut mancipium sim met corporis . . . ; ibid., 90.13; Gorier, 1974, 99, n. 9. For the general thought cf. Muson. 64.12 ff.: το γαρ μη νόμιμον μηδ* βύπρεπές των συνουσιών τούτων αίσχος" τ€ και oveioos1 μ€γα τοΐ? θηρωμ^νοις· αντάς· ofkv ούδξ πράττειν φαν^ρώ? ουδέν άνεχβται των τοιούτων ουδείς, καν €π' ολίγον έρυθριάν οΐός- τε ή. έπικρυπτόμ€νοι δέ και λάθρα οι γ€ μη τβλβως άπ€ρρωγότ€9 ταύτα τολμώσιν. καίτοι τό γ€ παράσθαι λάνθαναν *φ' οίς· πράτΤ6ΐ τι? όμολογοϋντο? άμαρτάναν εστί. 106 ex quo intellegitur corporis voluptatem non satis esse dignam hominis praestantia eamque contemni et reici oportere . . . ] Hence, for instance, Panaerius' concern (frr. 132 and 133) with defending Socrates against charges of bigamy and his praise of Africanus for being abstinens (fr. 13 = Off. 2.76).— On dignus as a paraphrase for decorus cf. ad § 94. . . . sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendae modum.] Cf. ad 3.119. itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem—severe sobrie.] Cf. 5 92 (sub /?«.), 2.88 (ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur)t and Muson., 104.12 ff.: καίτοι καν έττ' ίσον ή TC πολιπΈλή? και ή €ΰτ€λή? τροφή ρωννύη τό σώμα, όμω$ αΐρ€Τ€ον βστί την
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ευτελή, ότι αϋτη σωφρονικωτερα και πρέπει άνδρι άγαθψ μάλλον, ή και τό εύπόριστον τουδυσπορίστου, και τό άπραγμάτευτον του μετά πραγμάτων, και τό ετοιμον τού ανέτοιμου προ? τροφή ν πρεπωδεΌτερον τοΐς επιεικεσιν.ϊνα δε συνελων εϊπω περί τροφής τό πάν, φημί δεϊν σκοπόν μεν αύτη? ποιεΐσθαι ύγίειάν τε και ίσχύν, ώ? τούτων μόνον ένεκα βρωτεον, α δή δεΐται πολυτέλεια? ουδεμιάς· . . . 107-21 The simile of the playwright ($$ 97-98) suggested that the moral agent should suit actions to his/her persona. To his credit Panaetius realized, however, that no simple formula for the persona would do justice to the complexity of the human character.154 He distinguishes, in fact, four perso nam 1) the persona common to all human beings as users of reason; 2) the individual nature of each; 3) the persona imposed by chance or circumstance; 4) the persona we choose for ourselves. 155 The doctrine is structured so that it begins with the characteristic shared by all human beings and narrows by gradual stages; similar in development is Panaetius* analysis of who is coniunctissimus (as reconstructed ad §$ 50-58). Thus thefirstpersona is defined by the differentia specifica of the human being and involves the basic division of living things into rational and nonrational (with the gods left out of the picture; cf. 2.11). The second persona is based upon a broad typology of human characters, the cited examples being of severitas vs. hilaritas and calliditas vs. simplicitas; on the Stoic view heredity played some part in this formation (SVF 1, 116.32 ff.; Panaetius fr. 83 = Tusc. 1.79). The circum stances into which one is born and other factors not predictable by the human being will, however, further limit the individual's options (the third persona). Within the successive limitations of one's status as possessor of reason and of a certain type of character and of the circumstances of one's birth and other such accidents, the final stage is the individual's own decision as to career; this, like other "assents" (συγκαταθέσεις) to φαντασίαι, is vol untary (cf. SVF 1,19.1 ff.; 2,35.15,282.23,283.27,291.1;cf. $ 115: iudicio nostro; ipsi autem quam gerere personam velimus, a nostra voluntate pro-
ISA. De Lacy, 1979,170, raises the problem whether this pluralization of roles destroys the "individuality" (but surely he means "unity") of the moral agent. On the other hand, moral decisions are complex, and one might question whether even the Panaerian quadripartite divi sion is not an oversimplification. A further problem is that, in spite of his sensitivity to the possibility of conflicting precepts elsewhere in this treatise (cf. SS 9-10 and the consequent augmentation of Panaetius at SS 152 ff., 2.88-89, and the whole of Book 3), Cicero only once (in a single sentence of $ 120) discusses the possibility of a conflict of personae (and only between two of them at that). 155. I here assume that all four personae are of Panaetian origin; for a different view cf. ad 5 115.
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ficiscitur). However, Panaetius* system of progressively limiting personae makes it clear that, as in the case of other assents, there are factors that tend to predetermine this choice. 156 The personae theory, then, can be regarded as an analysis of the different aspects of the human character and how they fit together to yield the final result. As an antecedent to the doctrine of the fourth persona, Gill, 1994,4608, points to the analysis in Plato's Republic (Book 4, esp. 433a-434c) of the various roles in the state appropriate to the exercise of the particular virtues of individuals. A more comprehensive analogue has been found in the analysis of the origins of action at MM 1.11-15; cf. 1187^4-16:άρχήδ'έστΙ πράξεως και σπουδαίας και φαύλης προαίρεσις και βούλησις και το κατά λόγον πάν; De Lacy, 1979, 169-70. The factors limiting these άρχαί may be viewed as analogous to the personae; thus φύσις, in spite of προαίρεσις, may limit one's chances of achieving preeminence (1187b25 ff.; cf. the second persona); then, after a discussion of voluntary action and the problem of άκρα σία (1.12-13), the passage concludes with a discussion of βία and ανάγκη (1188a38 ff.; cf. the third persona). In spite of these points of contact the differences are, however, as De Lacy, 1979,170, notes, "so great that a direct connection seems most unlikely." Since the whole theory of personae presupposes an analogy between the moral agent and a stage-actor, there seems greater likelihood that the Cyn ically colored analogies of the moral agent to an actor put forward by Bion of Borysthenes and Aristo of Chios provide a link to Panaetius* conception. Thus Bion compared τύχη to a ποιήτρια imposing upon one now this πρόσ ωπον, now that (fr. 16; cf. ad § 115)—a striking anticipation of Panaetius* third persona. Aristo's comparison of the sage to an actor makes a similar point: . . . όμοιον τον σοφόν τφ άγαθφ υποκριτή, ός αν τ€ θερσίτου αν Τ€ 'Αγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον άναλάβη, έκάτερον υποκρίνεται προσηκόντως (SVF 1, 79.9 ff. = D.L. 7.160); this report of Aristo's view fails to specify how it comes about that one "takes up" this persona or that; possibly τύχη again lurks in the background. In any case, such observations may have constituted one of the starting points for Panaetius* personae theory, though, in the context of the πρέπον, he limited the number of personae suitable to a pos sessor of reason (unlike Aristo, he would surely not have found the role of Thersites acceptable for a possessor of reason, let alone a sage; cf. §S 9 7 - 9 8 , ad % 135), and he broadened the analysis beyond τύχη to include other
156. For factors conditioning assents in general, cf. ad SS 97-98.
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factors involved in the formation of the human persona. Panaetius' theory may also have been developed in part under the influence of the older Stoic praecepta for persons in various social relations; but he will have transferred these teachings from justice to the fourth virtue and added a concern for the individual's aptitudes (cf. ad §§ 122-25). Influences of the personae theory have been traced in various authors. Thus Seneca's definition of a happy life, with its addition of "one's own" to the standard Stoic τέλος formula [beata est ergo vita conveniens naturae suae: Vit Beat. 3.3), may have been influenced by Panaetius' second persona with its recognition of individual differences; cf. Elizabeth Asmis, "Seneca's On the Happy Life and Stoic Individualism," Apeiron 23 (1990), 2 1 9 - 5 6 , esp. 224 ff. For other reflexes of the doctrine in Seneca cf. ad §§ 71 and 110. Epictetus' doctrine of the σχέσης or relations in which human beings stand to one another and to the deity also bears comparison with the theory of personae; cf. De Lacy, 1979,171; Brunt, 1975, 33. Several of the relevant passages mention the σχέσεις in the context of καθήκοντα, e.g., Diss. 3.2.4 (similar in this regard 4.4.16; 4.12.16; Ench. 30): δεύτερος έστιν [sc. τόπος περί όν άσκηθήναι δεΐ τον έσόμενον καλόν και αγαθόν] ό περί το καθήκον ού δει γαρ μ€ είναι απαθή ως ανδριάντα, αλλά τάς σχέσεις τηροΰντα τάς φυσικάς και έπιθέτους ώς ευσεβή, ως υ'ιόν. ώς άδελφόν, ώς πάτερα, ως πολίτην. The doctrine of the σχέσεις was evidently known to Epictetus from a work or works περί καθηκόντων and surely originated with Panaetius or a student of his (note in the cited passage the specific rejection of the Older Stoa's ideal of απάθεια). Epictetus' description of the σχέσεις as either φυσικαί οΓέπίθετοι, i.e., cither imposed by nature or added (sc. by individual choice: cf., besides the passage quoted, Diss. 2.14.8), would correspond to Panaetius' distinc tion between the first three personae and the fourth. One suspects that Epictetus' σχέσεις may be an elaboration (whether by Epictetus himself or an intermediary) of Panaetius 1 personae theory together with an (older Stoic?) analysis of aetates and tempora similar to that at §§ 122-25 (cf. ad be. and ad $ 149). Some elements of the theory of personae as well as the advice about magistrates ($ 124) recur in Pliny's letters; cf. 1.23.5 {sed tu . . . plurimum interest quid esse tribunatum putes, quam personam tibi imponas; quae sapienti viro ita aptanda est ut perferatur) and other passages cited by H.-P. Butler, Die geistige Welt des jiingeren Plinius (Heidelberg, 1970), 21, n. 3. 107 . . . una (sc. persona] communis est ex co quod omnes parcicipes sumus rationis—et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exqutritur . . .] On the human possession of ratio as the foundation of Panaetius' doctrine of officia cf. ad §S 11 ff. Its parallel role within the fourth part of the honestum was adum-
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brated in the simile comparing the moral agent to a poet ($ 97: . . . nobis autem personam imposuit ipsa natura magna cum excellentia praestantiaque animantium reliquarum) and has just been sketched (§S 105-6). Cicero therefore mentions it here only to turn to the second persona, which, appear ing now for the first time, calls for detailed discussion.—For the phrase ratio inveniendi officii cf. ή του καθήκοντος εϋρεσις at Stob. eel. 2.7.5 b 3 = 2, 62.9 ff. W.-H., cited ad $ 93 above, a passage that Philippson, 1930 1 , 365, at tributes to Panaetius. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt—sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates.] The body is deployed as an analogue in discussing the soul and its properties by the Platonic Socrates (cf. ad § 101) and else where by Panaetius (§ 95; cf. § 14). At Phdr. 271 c-d Socrates recommends that the intending rhetorician study the types of souls: επειδή λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία ούσα, τόν μέλλοντα ρητορικοί* εσεσθαι ανάγκη είδεναι ψυχή δσα εϊδη έχει. εστίν ούν τόσα και τόσα, και τοΐα και τοΐα . . . , a pro gram carried out in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The sequel offers similar observations detached from rhetorical application. The individuals endowment of qualities by nature is simply a given; no precepts are possible here; cf. Arist. EN 1179b21 - 2 3 : τό μεν ουν της φύσεως δήλοι* ως ουκ έφ* ήμΐν υπάρχει, άλλα διά τινας θείας αιτίας τοΐς ώς αληθώς εύτυχεσιν υπάρχει. The Epicureans, too, recognized a variety of temperaments, which they explained by reference to the character of the constituent soul-atoms (cf. Lucr. 3.288 ff.). The present project, however, is simply to illustrate the diversity of the human personality. The point is made, as usual, by reference to well-known individuals; it is not that the qualities discussed in themselves necessarily served to make their bearers distinguished (pace Gill, 1988, 180-81; cf. Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate |S 1081, where the absence of a socially desirable quality was no hin drance to advancement). If there is a pattern to the presentation it is in the pairing of opposite qualities and of examples, whether by way of similarity or contrast. In spite of Cicero's emphasis on the greater variety of types in the mental than the physical realm (sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam vari etates) and the relatively large number of examples (28, of which 16 are Roman), the analysis in §§ 108-9 and 112-3 really turns upon only two sets of contrasting qualities: (1) leposthilaritas : severitaslgravitaslambitio and (2) calliditas: simplicitas. These are, it emerges later, offered merely exempli gratia with no effort made at exhaustive coverage (end of § 109: innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque . . .). Might Cicero perhaps here, as elsewhere (cf. ad 2.16), have curtailed a more extensive set
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of examples in his model? As a reader of Theophrastus (cf. 2.56 and 64), Panaetius could, of course, have found ample material in the Characteres. . . . itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem . . .] On the distinction cf. further § 130. 108 Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos . . . ] Cicero begins the series of examples by contrasting the light-hearted and severe temperaments, as evidently Panaetius, too, had done (cf. Socrates contrasted with Pythagoras and Pericles). The topic of wit was of special interest to Cicero, who was celebrated for it himself (Caesar is said to have been able to distinguish genuine and spurious Ciceronian borts mots [Fam. 9.16.4] 157 ) and who once confessed to his friend Paetus: ego autem . . . mirifice captor facetiis, maxime nostratibus . . . [Fam. 9.15.2).—On Crass us in general see ad 2.47. Cf. the description at Brut. 143: erat summa gravitas, erat cum gravitate iunctus facetiarum et urbanitatis oratorius, non scurrilis lepos . . . ; cf. also the discussion (with examples) of Crassus' wit at de Orat. 2.220 ff., including Antonius* handsome admission of having given the palm to Caesar in this field (see below) because of jealousy of Crassus (2.228).— After stressing that L. Marcius Philippus (cos. 91) was a distant third to Crassus and Antonius among orators active around the turn of the century, Cicero offers this characterization {Brut. 173): sed tamen erant ea in Philippo quae, qui sine comparatione illorum |sc. Crassi et Antoni] spectaret, satis magna diceret: summa libertas in oratione, multae facetiae; satis creber in reperiendis, solutus in explicandis sententiis; erat etiam in primis, ut temporibus tllis, Graecis doctrinis institutes, in altercando cum aliquo aculeo et maledicto facetus. Cf. also the specimens of Philippus' wit cited at de Orat. 2.245 and 249. On his political career cf. ad 2.59 and 73. . . . maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. f . ; . . . ] On C. Julius Caesar L. filius Strabo (cur. aed. 90) cf. Antonius* judgment: in quibus |sc. in ioco et facet its] tu longe aliis mea sententia, Caesar, excellis . . . (de Orat. 2.216); hence in the sequel Caesar becomes the main speaker on the subject of humor; cf. Brut. 177: festivitate igitur et facetiis, inquam, C. Iulius L. f. et superioribus et aequalibus suis omnibus praestitit oratorque fuit minime ille quidem vehemens, sed nemo umquam urbanitate, nemo lepore, nemo suavitate conditior. Cicero preserves a specimen of his humor at Brut. 216: motus [sc. Curionis] erat is, quern et C. Iulius in perpetuum notavit, cum ex eo in utramque partem toto corpore vacillante quaesivit, quis loqueretur e 157. On collections of Ciceronian bans mots cf. K.Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1272.63 ff.; cf. the short collection at Plut. Rom. Apophtb. 204c ff.; a collection is appended to fr. phil.
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luntre . . . ; cf. also ad § 133; on his prosecution of T. Albucius ad 2.50; Diehl, RE 10.1 (1918), 428.53 ff., esp. 430.31 ff. at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas . . .] M. Aemilius M. f. L. n. Scaurus (cos. 115), father of Cicero's client, of noble but impoverished family, was a self-made man (cf. Asc. Sc. 2 0 : . . . Scauro aeque ac novo homini laborandum fuit)\ hence, perhaps, his severitas. Cf. the characterization at Brut. I l l s m Scauri oratione, sapientis hominis et recti, gravitas summa et naturalis quaedam inerat auctoritas, non ut causam, sed ut testimonium dicere putares cum pro reo diceret. As princeps senatus he was long a bulwark of the optimate cause; hence Cicero's uniformly encomiastic public references to him. In private he tempered his stature somewhat in allowing that Q. Caecilius Metellus L. f. Numidicus (cos. 109) excelled him in constantia and gravitas (Fam. 1.9.16, though this may have been an ad hoc judgment connected with Cicero's selfidentification with Metellus in this letter; cf. ad 3.79); cf. Rawson, 22 ff., with literature, and § 76.—M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112) died in 109 as Scaurus' colleague in the censorship, with Scaurus forced out of office in the sequel; hence perhaps the juxtaposition of the two here. The characterization at Brut. 109 is similar: M. Drusus C. f., qui in tribunatu C. Gracchum conlegam iterum tribunum fregitt vir et oratione gravis et auctoritate . . . This severitas found expression in his criticism of the extravagance of C. Gracchus; cf. Plut. Ti. Gracch. 2.4:. . . oi περί Δρουσον ήλεγχον Οτι δέλφινας· αργύρους επρίατο τιμής εις έκάστην λίτραν δραχμών χιλίων και διακοσίων πεντήκοντα. Cf. Munzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 856.31 ff. . . . in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior.] According to Cicero (Rep. 1.18; Amic. 15), C. Laelius (cos. 140) was older than his friend the younger Scipio, born in 184. His public career appears to have gotten off to a slow start, however, his first attested office being that of legate to the consul Scipio during the Third Punic War (147). In the following year he and the troops under his command were the first over the wall defending the military harbor of Carthage (App. Pun. 606); he received the reward for his bravery in the praetorship for 145 (on his service in Spain, 145-44, cf. ad 2.40). Hence the ambition of Scipio, who was elected consul in 148 at roughly age 36, might well be called maior; cf. Astin, 2 1 - 2 2 . The phrase vita tristior refers to his sudden death, the cause of which was never clarified, in 129; cf. Astin, 2 3 8 - 4 1 . On his military and oratorical achievements cf. ad § 116; on his abstinentia ad 2.75. Cf. Munzer, RE 12.1 (1924), 404.41 ff. and 4.1 (1900), 1439.4 ff. For an example of the diver sions of Laelius (and Scipio) at leisure cf. the famous description of them gathering shells on the beach at de Orat. 2.22.
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de Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festiviquc sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quern εΐρωνα Graeci nominarunt, Socratem acccpimus . . .] Precious little has survived of Panaetius' essay περί Σωκράτους (cf. ad SS 104 and 106); it is thus good to have at least this brief appreciation of his personality; cf. also Luc. 15:. . . Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat is quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter utisolitus est ea dissimuhtione quam Graecielpiuveiav vacant, which, together with our passage, constitutes Socr. fr. IC 439. A Roman example would have been possible here as well; for C. Fannius' characterization of the younger Africanus as an εΐρων cf. hist., p. 140, fr. 7. Was it perhaps this connection that caused Cicero to insert Socrates at pre cisely this point in the series of examples? Note that Panaetius in general regarded the civilized repartee of the Socratic dialogues as a model of sermo, a matter in which he took a particular interest (surely as one of the bonds connecting the societas generis humani; cf. ad $$ 132b-37); similarly Cicero uses the capacity in sermonibus. . . quamvis praepotens sit, efficere ut unus de muitis esse videatur as a characteristic feature of P. Scipio Nasica as well as another Roman (perhaps Q. Mucius Scaevola, "the Augur"; see ad loc.) mentioned in the corrupt portion of 5 109.—Occasionally characters in the Platonic dialogues impute ειρωνεία to Socrates: cf. R. 337a (Thrasymachus), Crg. 489e (where Callicles and Socrates exchange charges of ειρωνεία), Symp. 216e4 (Alcibiades' description of Socrates), as well as Apol. 38al (the supposed view of an imaginary objector); Arist. EN 1127b22 ff. likewise cites Socrates as an εΐρων: οι δ' είρωνες επί το ελαττον λέγοντες χαριεστεροι μεν τά ήθη φαίνονται' ού γαρ κέρδους ένεκα δοκούσι λέγειν, άλλα φεύγοντες το όγκηρόν μάλιστα δε και ούτοι τά ένδοξα απαρνούνται, οίον και Σωκράτης έποίει. On Socratic irony cf. in general the first chapter of Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca-New York, 1991), esp. 33 ff. (on the Symposium). . . . contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate.] For the former's character cf. D.L. 8.56:. . . τον δε Άναξαγόρου διακοϋσαι και Πυθαγόρου· και τοϋ μεν την σεμνότητα ζηλώσαι τοϋ τε βίου και τοϋ σχήματος, τοϋ δε τήν φυσιολογίαν; for his authority, cf. the proverbial αυτός έφα with which his school cited him (cf. Otto, 292, n. 2). For the lat ter cf. Plut. Per. 5.1: . . . ό Περικλής . . . ού μόνον . . . το φρόνημα σοβαρον και τον λόγον ΰψηλόν εΐχε και καθαρόν όχλικής και πανούργου βωμο λοχίας, αλλά και προσώπου σύστασις άθρυπτος εις γέλωτα . . . ; Fritz Schachermeyr, Perikles (Stuttgart, 1969), 91-92. callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum . . . ducibus . . . accepimus . . .] Han nibal might well be cited to illustrate calliditas, not necessarily a bad quality
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(cf. ad 5 33); however, the juxtaposition with Q. Fabius Maximus does less than full justice to the great Carthaginian, whose generalship was on a far higher level; cf. ad $ 38. . . . ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus—praeripere hostium consilia.] Cf. ad S 84. in quo genere Graeci Themiscoclem et Pheraeum lasonem ceteris anteponunt. . .] Themistocles' notable stratagems include sending to Xerxes on the eve of Salamis a message urging that the opportunity was favorable for attack since the Greek fleet was about to withdraw (cf. Aesch. Pers. 355-60; Hdt. 8.75; Plut. Them. 12.2) and the embassy to Sparta during which he stalled negotiations long enough for the fortification of Athens to be com pleted and left instructions that the Spartan ambassadors were not to be allowed to return until he and his fellow ambassadors had safely departed Sparta (cf. Thuc. 1.90.3 ff.; Plut. Them. 19); cf. U. Kahrstedt, RE 5A2 (1934), 691.12 ff. and 1692.27 ff.—By threats and promises made to Polydamas, commander of the citadel and administrator of its public money, Jason of Pherae (f370) was able to win the bloodless submission of Pharsalus and hence the title of ταγό? of all Thessaly; cf. Polydamas' detailed descrip tion to the Spartans of Jason's talent and resources at X. HG 6.1.4-16; one wonders whether Panaetius might have been influenced by this passage, especially the words: €υ γάρ ϊστβ, ότι προς τ€ μ€γάληι> έσται ρώμηι> ό πόλ€μος\ και προ? άι>δρα ος φρόνιμος· μέι> ούτω στρατηγό? €στιι> ως οσα τ€ λανθάι^ιΐ' και οσα φθάνειν και οσα βιάζ€σθαι έπιχ€ΐρ€ΐ ού μάλα άφαμαρτάΐΌ (6.1.15); cf. Labowsky, 40 and n. 77. He was also shrewd enough to broker peace between the Thebans and Spartans after Leuctra (summer, 371), rather than join with the Thebans in storming the Spartan camp, as he was invited to do; he thus maintained a balance of power favorable to his own plans for expansion; cf. X. HG 6.4.22 ff.; Stahelin, RE 9.1 (1914), 775.32 ff.; Westlake, 119 ff.; Robin Seager in CAH 6\ 175, 184-85. . . . in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto reipublicae prodesset, furcrc sc simulavit.J A reference to a famous incident: when it had been forbidden on pain of death to advocate the recovery of Salamis, Solon feigned madness, rushed into the marketplace, and recited a poem urging just that course of action; cf. Plut. 5o/. 8.1-3; Solon, test., nos. 237-55 Martina (our passage = no. 242); Solon frr. 1 - 3 West. The motive quo . . . plus . . . reipublicae prodesset evidently made this action acceptable; on the utilitas reipublicae as a criterion cf. the introduction to Book 3. 109 Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti, qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque
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alii qui quidvis perpetiantur . . . ] Cf. the characterization of the just man at PI. R. 361b6-7 (άνδρα άπλοϋν και γενναΐον). Did Panaetius perhaps insert the exempla of Odysseus and Ajax ($ 113; see ad he.) at this point, then reinforce them with the historical examples Lysander and Callicratidas? Cicero's qui quidvis perpetiantur surely renders πανούργοι in his model.— For the colloquial comparison of an adjective by addition of multum cf. KieSling-Heinze ad Hor. Carm. 1.25.3-4.—For the iunctura simplices et apertid. N.D. 1.27. . . . cuivis deserviant, dum quod velint consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus.J For the unscrupulousness of Crassus cf. ad 3.73-75, as well as the extended attack on him tacito nomine at Parad. no. 6; for Sulla cf. ad 2.27. quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit.l The difference in temperament is illustrated by their respec tive dealings with Cyrus: Lysander won his financial support for the Spartan cause (X. HG 1.5.2-7), whereas, when Callicratidas called upon him and was asked to wait for two days, he lost patience and elected to support his fleet instead with money collected from Sparta's subjects (ibid., 1.6.6 ff.); cf. A. Andrewes in CAH 5 2 , 4 8 9 ff. Lysander as characterized by Theopompus [FGrHist. 115 F 20) was bound to appeal to Panaetius (cf. 2.76 a propos Scipio Africanus): φιλόπονος τε ην καΐ θεραπεύειν δυνάμενος και ίδιώτας και βασιλείς, σώφρων ων και των ηδονών άπασών κρείττων. γενόμενος γουν της 'Ελλάδος σχεδόν άπάσης κύριος εν ούδεμιςΙ φανήσεται των πόλεων ούτε προς τάς αφροδισίους ήδονάς όρμήσας ούτε μέθαις και πότοις άκαίροις χρήσα με νος. From the point of view of a Callicratidas, however, he would appear quite different, as Plutarch (based perhaps on Cicero's Panaetian model?) saw (Lys. 7.5; cf. 2.4): τοις δε τον άπλουν και γενναΐον άγαπώσι των ηγεμό νων τρόπον ό Λύσανδρος τω Καλλικρατίδα παραβαλλόμενος έδόκει πανούργος είναι και σοφιστής, άπάταις τά πολλά διαποικίλλων του πολέμου και το δί καιον έπι τφ λυσιτελουντι μεγαλΰνων, ει δε μη, τω συμφεροντι χρώμενος ώς καλώ, και το αληθές ού φύσει τοΰ ψεύδους κρε'ιττον ηγούμενος, άλλ' έκατερου Τ ΓΙ Χί*ι'
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never explained.—For the phrase unus de multis cf. Otto, 358. To appear to be unus de multis was necessary, of course, in canvassing for office; to some it came more naturally than to others; perhaps the more typical reaction is the feeling of being ineptus, which Cicero attributes to Crassus at de Orat. 1.112. . . . quod in Catulo, et patre et filio,. . . vidimus.] The affability of the elder Q. Lutatius Catulus did not spare him three defeats in consular elections (for 106,105,104) before he finally was elected as Marius* colleague in his fourth consulate (102); for a specimen of his wit cf. de Orat. 2.278; cf. also § 133, where the Catuli, pere et fits, are likewise mentioned together. The career of the younger Catulus culminated in the consulate of 78; cf. ad § 76; Munzer, RE 13.2 (1927), 2072.24 ff. and 2082.30 ff. . . . idemque in Q. Mucio {Mancia} (Q. f.) vidimus.] As Winterbottom re marks ad he, a Mancia could hardly be regarded as a vir praepotens. Surely, as Shackleton Bailey, 1995, 259, suggests, this name, lacking a praenomen, should be thrown out altogether as a rewriting of Much. He points out that the description would fit Q. Mucius Scaevola ("the Augur"),158 called hculator senex at Att. 4.16.3, and adds, probably rightly, (Q. f.) to distinguish the Augur from the Pontifex of the same name (cf. $ 116). audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, ilium qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis . . . ] The salient characteristic of P. Scipio Nasica Serapio (cos. 138) was inflexibility, a quality that his apparent ad herence to Stoic principles (cf. Tusc. 4.51) hardly diminished. V. Max. 7.5.2 retails the anecdote, generally referred to our man, that a P. Scipio Nasica, in the course of campaigning for curule aedile, clasped the gnarled hand of a farmer and inquired whether he was in the habit of walking on his hands (the upshot is said to have been electoral defeat). Similarly, in a contio the tribune C. Curiatius demanded measures against inflation of the price of grain; when Nasica as consul responded negatively, he managed to quiet the unruly mob with the proud assertion that he knew the state interest better than they (V. Max. 3.7.3; A.E. Astin in CAH 82,193); hence the characterization at Brut. 107:. . . ilium Scipionem, quo duce privato Ti. Gracchus occisus esset, cum omnibus in rebus vehementem turn acrem aiebat (sc. L. Accius] in dicendo fuisse; cf. orat., pp. 157-59. Cicero likewise expresses approval of Nasica's murder of his cousin Ti. Gracchus (their mothers were sisters) at Dom. 91, Plane. 88, and Brut. 212, as well as $ 76 above (sec ad he. and ad $ 116 and 2.43); cf. also Cat. 1.3; Gaillard, 523 ff.; Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1501.47 ff. 158. Sec also Winterbottom's index nominum.
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(Cornelius no. 354).—When his son died as consul in 111, he left insufficient money to pay for his funeral; but such was his popularity that the people gave pennies to defray the expense and strewed the city with flowers (Plin. Nat. 21.10 refers the story, as has long been recognized, by mistake to the elder Serapio); no doubt his wit helped endear him to the public (cf. Brut. 128:. . . omnis sale facetiisque superabat)\ cf. Miinzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1504.37 ff. (Cornelius no. 355). . . . [[ne Xenocratem quidem severissimum philosophorum]] . . .] The fol lowing characterization (. . . magnum et clarum fuisse) refers to Nasica. Yet the veracity of the content of this lemma is confirmed by D.L. 4.6 (sim. Plut. COM/. Praec. 141 f, Amat. 769d): σεμνός δε τά τ' άλλα Ξενοκράτης και σκυθρωπός αεί, ώστε αύτώ λέγειν συνεχές τον Πλάτωνα, "Ξενόκρατες, θύε ταΐς Χάρισι"; cf. Η. Dorrie, RE 9A2 (1967), 1514.54 ff. Hence Pohlenz, AF, 69 n., viewed these words as a Ciceronian addition never integrated into context; cf. introduction, § 10, and ad 2.21-22. Or must we posit a learned interpolator (cf., however, p. 153, n. 65 supra)} 110-11 These sections draw the practical consequence from the diversity of character types just sketched, viz., that one must use one's own nature as a yardstick in making choices. In claiming that the interest of the ruling class in pressing young nobles into a sufficient number of conventional roles pro vides the key to understanding the Panaetian/Ciceronian personae theory, Fuhrmann, 101-2, perhaps gives this passage too little weight; see also ad § 115. 110 Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique, non vitiosa, sed tamen pro pria, quo facilius decorum illud quod quaerimus retineatur.] The formula tenenda sunt sua cuique has, of course, been transferred from the treatment of justice (cf. ad%2\). The phrase non vitiosa is added to prevent an immoralist application of the theory, as likewise the following reference to the universa natural cf. ad §§ 97-98 and 120. . . . ut etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur;. . . ] The image of the rule {κανών) had been applied to the good man (σπουδαίος) by Aristotle {EN 1113a29 ff.; cf. 1176a 17); Karl-Hermann Rolke, Die bildbaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios, Spudasmata, 32 (HildesheimNew York, 1975), 4 7 2 - 7 3 , suggests that Panaetius may have used the term (= regub) under Aristotle's influence. If so, it is notable that nostra natura has replaced the good man (σπουδαίος) as the standard (cf. ad § 46). The treat ment of the utile is likewise Aristotelian in spirit in making mediocritas the regula (2.59); cf. also the use of the term at 3.81 (non-Panaetian); Herbert Oppel, ΚΑΝΩΝ. Zur Bedeutungsgescbicbte des Wortes und seiner la-
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teinischen Entsprechungen (regula-norma), Philologus, Suppl. 30.4 (Leipzig, 1937), 8 8 - 9 0 . For Panaetius' willingness to allow a great variety of ways of achieving ευδαιμονία cf. his simile comparing the moral agent to an archer who may hit any of several differently colored areas of his target (fr. 109).— The idea expressed here is, of course, assumed in the priamel form used in poetry from early times; cf. Ulrich Schmid, Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen von Homer bis Paulas (Wiesbaden, 1964); William H. Race, The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius, Mnemosyne Suppl. 74 (Leiden, 1982). neque enim artinet naturae repugnare nee quicquam sequi quod adsequi non queas.] Seneca offers similar advice (Tranqu. An. 6.3): aestimanda sunt deinde ipsa quae adgredimur, et vires nostrae cum rebus quas temptaturi sumus comparandae. debet enim semper plus esse virium in actore quam in opere: necesse est opprimant onera quae ferente maiora sunt, as well as in the misplaced passage, ibid., 7.2: considerandum est utrum natura tua agendis rebus an otioso studio contemplationique aptior sit, et eo inclinandum quo te vis ingenii feret: Isocrates Ephorum iniecta manu a foro subduxit, utiliorem componendis monumentis historiarum ratus. male enim respondent coacta ingenia; reluctante natura inritus bbor est; cf. also de Otio 3.3 (cited ad § 71 above); sim. Plut. Tranqu. An. 471 d. ex quo magis emergit quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugnante natura.] The nature of decorum must needs continue to emerge given the muddled way in which the topic was introduced (cf. ad § 99).—Invita Minerva was, according to [Aero] on Hor. Ars 385, a proverbium artificum; see further Otto, 225; Swoboda, 8 2 - 8 3 . I l l omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, turn singularom actionum, quam conservare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam.] At $ 11 Cicero/Panaetius made the point that the possession of reason makes one capable of surveying and making material provision for the whole course of one's life: homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, . . . similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adiungit atque adnectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. Here, however, he turns to the "much more important" (cf. ad $ 14) provision for the whole of life in the mental realm. Aristotle had used Solon's famous admonition to "look to the end" in making judgments about happiness (Hdt. 1.32-33) as the starting point for reflections on appropriate use of the term ευδαιμονία; he objected that such a conception yielded an unstable ευδαιμονία too much subject to changes of fortune; he substitutes a stable ευδαιμονία by emphasizing that
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activities in accord with the virtues are its source (EN HOOalO ff.); cf. Gill, 1994,4608 and n. 34. Panaetius, on the other hand, like Solon, is interested in judging a human life, 159 and has taken over an emphasis in the Solonic manner on the whole human life, but he has used it as part of his concept of the πρέπον, not ευδαιμονία. Moreover, because of his acceptance of the Stoic valuation of the external goods and those of the body, his emphasis is not on changes of fortune but on consistent behavior. Now the Stoics held that all the sage's individual actions were correct (cf. SVF1,53.13-14: πάντα . . . εύ ποιήσει ό σοφός . . . ; sim., ibid., 3, 148.37-38, 149.4, 163.12, etc.) and hence self-consistent; cf. SVF 1, 52.27-29: καΐ τό μεν των σπουδαίων διά παντός του βίου χρησθαι ταΐς άρεταΐς, τό δε των φαύλων ταΐς κακίαις. Hence the self-consistency that Panaetius seeks under the πρέπον is evidently mod eled upon that of the sage. The aesthetic emphasis is, however, all his own, the shaping of one's life being implicitly compared to the shaping of a work of art (cf. S§ 97-98, 1 1 4 , 1 4 5 - 4 6 , 1 4 7 ; Gill, 1994,4606-7). — Cf. Polybius' observation that in spite of the growing corruption of Roman society Scipio was at pains to lead a self-consistent life (. . . ο γε Σκιπίων όρμήσας επί την εναντίον άγωγήν του βίου και πάσαις ταΐς έπιθυμίαις άντιταξάμενος και κατά πάντα τρόπον ομολογούμενον και συμφωνον εαυτόν κατασκευάσας κατά τον βίον . . . [31.25.81); cf. $$ 119 and 125; Labowsky, 45, n. 92. at enim sermone eo debemus uti qui fnotusf est nobis, ne ut quidam Graeca verba inculcantes iure Optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus.] When he wrote these words Cicero may have been thinking of the case of T. Albucius (praetor ca. 105), whom Q. Mucius Scaevola ("the Augur"; cos. 117), praetor in 120, greeted in Athens as follows: ''Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, I municipem Ponti, Tritani, centunonum, I praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, I maluisti diet. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, I id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: I "chaere," inquam, "Tite." lictores, turma omnis chorusque: I "chaere, Tite." hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus' (Lucil. vv. 89-95 K. = 88-94 M.f quoted at Fin. 1.9; cf. w . 74-76). On the incident cf. Miriam Griffin in CAH 9 2 , 698. The parading of foreign words is an apt illustration (perhaps introduced by Cicero himself, since Panaetius would have been hard pressed to find an analogue to Graeca verba inculcantes) of how one can make oneself absurd by imitating something alien. This is after §§ 97-98 a second passage with a simile illustrating what is meant by decorum (cf. also $ 114); if in the previous case it was the content 159. Cf. S 114: bonorum el vitiorum suorum iudicem; $ 146: si acres ac diligentes (tudices) esse volumus animadversuresque vitiorum.
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of the words that was inappropriate to the speaker, here it is their form or language. The transmitted notus is problematic; a T. Albucius presumably in some sense "knows" Greek (cf. Pohlenz, AF, 69, n. 2). Natus, attributed by Heusinger to the Leipzig edition (1516), even as emended to innatus (Baiter), is no improvement, since the latter is post-Ciceronian in the sense of nativus and Tusc. 4.80, cited by Atzert, is hardly a convincing parallel for the former; cf. Fedeli, 1964 1 , 86. W.S. Wan's vemaculus is perhaps the best solution so far offered ("Tulliana," CJ 83 11987], 37); it could have been glossed notus and then ousted by its gloss. The theme of the need to avoid any discrepantia, however small, is taken up and illustrated further at SS 145-46. 112 Cicero/Panaetius has spoken of the change of officia with a change in external circumstances (SS 31-32). Here external circumstances are the same {num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri... f) but a different decision is justified by a difference in the nature of the individuals. It would have been inconsistent with the rest of his life for Cato to have reconciled himself with a tyrant (the word appears here for the first time in this essay; it is used implicitly of Caesar also at 2.23 and 3.19; cf. also 3.83; ad 2.43), whereas others' suicide might have been an imitation of what was πρέπον for Cato but not for themselves. 160 Cf. Fin. 3.61: nam neque virtute retinetur (ille) [sc. sapiens] in vita, nee its, qui sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et saepe offtcium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatisshnus . . . , as well as the case of Socrates cited ad% 114. Though Cicero limits the comparison to ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt, he, too, was in essentially the same position after Pharsalia (and at the time of his exile some had put to him the proposition that he ought to commit suicide [cf. Sest. 47]). This indis putably Ciceronian example, though superficially in agreement with the Panaetian argument and examples that surround it, implicitly holds up the con sistency and moral rigor of Cato's life for admiration, just as Cicero does Regulus in the non-Panaetian Book 3; thus Gill, 1988, 186-87, rightly sees here a harbinger of a Ciceronian style of moral discourse fundamentally different from the Panaetian and more fully delineated in Book 3 with its excoriation of deceit in business dealings and political activity directed to ward selfish ends. In addition, our passage, together with Tusc. 1.74, perhaps gives some notion of the tone of the lost encomium of Cato which, at Brutus' urging, Cicero composed shortly after Thapsus; cf. Gelzer, 276; Gelzer, Caesar, 279-80 = Engl. rr. 301-2; Griffin, 1986, 202, n. 18; K. Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1272.2 ff. 160. Cato may have made this distinction himself; cf. Griffin, 1986, 201, n. 14, as well as the advice Cato gave to Cicero upon his arrival in Pompey's camp (Plut. Cic. 38.1).
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113 This paragraph, which lacks a connection with the foregoing, offers further examples of affabilitas and severitas such as those encountered in SS 108-9, this time from literature, rather than history. Note that the begin ning of ξ 114 (suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium . . .) would connect equally well with the end of $ 112. One wonders whether Cicero has here found a home for several Panaetian examples he had previously omitted. However, the contrasting characters of Ulysses and Ajax were well known to Romans from the treatments of the Armorum iudicium by Accius and Pacuvius (see ad § 114); in view of Ovid's handling of the theme in Met. 13, it would not be surprising if it had become a staple of the rhetorical schools; cf. ad 3.97-99a. quam multa passus est Ulixes . . . cum . . . in omni sennone omnibus adfabilem et iucundum esse se vellet.. .] On the possibility that the words et iucundum, omitted from the ζ MSS, constitute a gloss cf. Thomas, 108, n. 13.
. . . domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancillammque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando quod cupiebat veniret!] References to the insults of Melantheus (Od. 17.212 ff.) and Melantho (18.321 ff., 19.65 ff.). 114 Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat . . .] A variation of the command γνώθι σ€αυτόν variously ascribed to Solon, Chilo, or the Delphic oracle and in scribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi; cf. Otto, 245. Seneca offers similar advice to those undertaking a task at Tranqu. An. 6.2. For the iunctura iudex vitiorum cf. § 146 (as emended). . . . ne scaenici plus quam nos—non videbit sapiens vir in vita?] At §§ 97-98 Cicero had compared the moral agent to a playwright who must produce a text to fit the nature of characters known from saga. Here the comparison is with aaors who must judge themselves in order to know what roles they are bestfittedto play; cf. Socrates' refusal of the speech written in his defense by Lysias on grounds that, though good per se, it was inappropriate for him (cf. de Orat. 1.231; Quint. Inst. 11.1.11; D.L. 2.40: καλός μέν λόγο?, ώ Λυσία, ου μην άρμόττων γ' €μοί). This second version is more apt in several ways: it includes the point that the judgment needed is, at least in part, self-reflexive and that the judge is to be at the same time the performer of the chosen role. On the other hand, both comparisons assume that the roles cannot be freely created but are conditioned either, for the playwright, by the expectations of an audience familiar with preexisting saga or, for the aaors, by the plays existing in the repertory; this limitation corresponds to the fact that what Cicero actually discusses in the sequel are roles conventional in society. Im plicit, too, in both comparisons is the importance of a successful outcome—
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the applause of the public corresponding to the approbatio eorum quibuscum vivitur ($ 98). As Gill, 1988, remarks (192), **a sensible man takes the good actor as his model, because the latter knows how to deploy and exhibit his own special qualities." The similes at SS 97-98 had prepared the way for the persona theory (albeit Cicero perhaps retarded the develop ment of thought by inserting the digression on games and jokes [103b-4]; and one wonders whether, in Panaetius' treatment, SS 101-3a were not placed either under the first virtue [cf. ad SS 18-19] or the first persona; cf. ad SS 93-151); so, too, our simile, with its emphasis on the actors' choice of role, leads to the next major topic, the persona that the individual chooses. Note finally the a fortiori form of argument often met in this essay (cf. ad S 48).—The plays in question are the Epigoni of Accius (trag., pp. 200 ff.), Pacuvius' Medus (118 ff.), Ennius' Mehnippa (57-58), Accius* Clutemestra (161 ff.), Pacuvius' Antiopa (86 ff.), and any of the several plays in which Ajax appeared: Ennius' Aiax (19-20) or the Armorum iudicium of Pacuvius (90 ff.) or Accius (178 ff.). 161 Rupilius, evidently a tragic actor famed during Cicero's youth, is known only from our passage; cf. Miinzer, RE 1A1 (1914), 1229.23 ff. Cicero was personally acquainted with Aesopus, a favorite actor of his invalid relative M. Marius, to whom Cicero reports on a disastrous performance {Fam. 7.1.2 and 4; September, 55); Cicero alludes [Att. 11.15.3; 14 May 47) to some anguish caused him by the actor's son (possibly his affair with Caecilia Metella: cf. Shackleton Bailey ad Att. 226.3).—Sapiens vir is used, of course, in the vulgar, not the strict Stoic, sense; cf. S 46 and 3.16. ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in us potissimum elaborabimus.] Cf. Hor. Ep. 1.14.43-44: optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus: I quant scit uterque libens, censebo, exerceat artent. sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura meditatio diligenria ut ea, si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus . . .] Before engaging in any activity Cicero/Panaetius has recommended praeparatio diligens ($73); but the point receives special emphasis here. Seneca Tranqu. An. 10.6 offers more specific counsel for those whom an unkind fortune has placed in a difficult position but then emphasizes (11.1) that such advice is for ordinary persons, not for the sage, who need nor tread gingerly. Ibid., 4.2 ff. Seneca treats from a different point of view from our passage the problem of what to do \ifortuna limits one's options: one can always find some role in which one can be utilis civitati.—Necessitas is not the €*ιμαρμ€νη or fatum of the Stoics, which 161. 1 assume that Livius* Aiax mastigophorus (trag., pp. 2-3) was no longer in the repertory.
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Cicero/Panaetius never directly mentions, but evidently rather a condition imposed by external circumstances as described in the next paragraph under the third persona (quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit); sec ad $ 115. That one should yield to such pressures was already recommended by Democritus (68 Β 289 D.-K.: άλογιστίη μη ξυγχωρέβν ταΐσι κατά TOf βίον άνά-γκαις).— This passage suggests that one's role in life, including one's profession, can be at least partly predetermined and, once fixed, in turn determines one's ac tions (cf. ad §S 107-21). . . . nee tarn est enitendum, ut bona quae nobis data non sint sequamur quam ut vitia fugiamus.] This point is likewise emphasized by Bion of Borysthenes fr. 16A (cited ad $ 115); cf. Panaetius' reaction to the thought of becoming an Athenian citizen (introduction, § 5 [2]). 115-21 The third and fourth personae come as something of a surprise, since they were not mentioned when the first two were introduced at $ 107; also, the influence of necessitas on one's actions, corresponding to the third persona, had already been discussed in § 114; see ad loc. Moreover, the third and fourth personae differ from the first two in not being moral determi nants. The choice of career involved in the fourth persona could have been described equally well as the result of the action of the second persona within limits imposed by universal human nature (the first persona) and external circumstances (necessitas or the third persona); cf. the beginnings of such a treatment at § 110; Schmekel, 40. Hence Schmekel, 3 9 - 4 1 , argued that the third and fourth personae were added by Cicero. However, the echoes of the third and fourth personae in later Greek moralizing (see next notes; Gill, 1988, 175 and n. 27) suggest that Panaetius was the common source of that tradition and Cicero, and the fourth persona is buttressed by Greek examples (Timotheus and Conon), a feature typical of material borrowed from Pan aetius (cf. ad 2Λ6). Belief in fortune and in an all-encompassing determinism of the Stoic variety are mutually exclusive (cf. SVF 2,281.45 = Serv. ad Aen. 8.334: nihil tarn contrarium est fato quam casus). Panaetius* use of casus as the basis of the third persona in conjunction with the emphasis on the individual's own choice under the fourth persona might suggest that he is breaking with Stoic determinism in general (cf. Puhle, 101; for Panaetius* skepticism of the mantic arts cf. frr. 70 ff.). However, Panaetius does hold that through reason and its apprehension of causal connections the course of an entire human life is calculable ( § 1 1 : homo autem, quod rationis est particeps, per quam conse quent ia cernit, causas rerum videt. . . facile totius vitae cursum videt. . .); would he have gone so far as to assert, with Chrysippus, that even the tiniest details of human behavior, such as the turning of the neck, stretching of a
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finger, etc., are predetermined (SVF 2, 268.33 ff.)? Again, through his doctrine of assent (συγκατάθεση) Chrysippus had, at least to his own satis faction, reconciled Stoic determinism with the instinctive feeling that the human being enjoys free will in decision making; cf. ad §S 97-98; Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 104-6, and 2, 60; hence in positing a persona quant nobismet ipsi iudicio nostro accommodamus (§ 115) Panaetius would not necessarily be at odds with orthodox Stoicism (cf. also ad §§ 107-21). Finally, the Stoa ex plained fortune as a construct that covered human ignorance of causal rela tions {SVF 2, nos. 965 ff.); hence in invoking τύχη Panaetius may merely be using, as elsewhere, popularia . . . verba . . . et usitata (2.35). The third persona is despatched in a single sentence, for it provides a framework, rather than involving a decision, whereas various precepts and examples are offered under the fourth, the persona of one's own choosing, which rapidly boils down to choice of profession (se alii ad philosophiam, alii ad ius civile, alii ad eloquentiam applicant: S 115). S 116 propounds three models of behavior in making this choice: 1) to cultivate the same field in which one's father or ancestor excelled; 2) to do not only that but also add distinction in another profession; 3) to excel in a wholly different field. Each of the first two options is illustrated with two exempla, the third with no specific case; it is simply said to be characteristic of ii qui magna sibi proponunt obscuris orti maioribus. These appear to be empirical observations, as also at § 118: plerumque autem parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur. In Cicero's mind, however, if not in the written text, what was being offered was the praeceptum imitandos esse maiores (§ 121). After beginning with concrete cases Cicero 162 turns to the situation of the adolescent making his life's choice, characterized as deliberatio . . . omnium difficillima (S 117). We are told that the difficulty resides in the time of life, namely adolescence, the state of the maxima inbecillitas consilii, and the lack of time in which to reflect. The exemplum of Hercules is invoked as an ideal, for he had both the solitude and the leisure [exisse in solitudinem atque ibi sedentem diu secum multumque dubitasse . . .) as well as clear alternatives. The empirical mode sets in again at the end of § 118, where he describes what ordinary mortals wind up doing. Again three possibilities appear, though there could have been more: the first combines following parental precepts and following in the parent's footsteps; the second, based upon the 162. Panaetius, too? Or has Cicero perhaps altered the order of presentation to give empha sis to his (mostly Roman) examples? If inserted within the argument, the content of $ 116 would have been expected at $ 118 in connection with the observation plerumque . . . parentium praeceptis imbuti ad eorum consuetudinem moremque deducimur.
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judgment of the many, implicitly leads to the wrong choice; the third involves finding, whether by luck or natural endowment, the right path without pa rental guidance. The criteria for selection finally appear at §§ 119-20a (— pugnare videatur)^ namely fortuna (= the third persona) and natura (i.e., one's own individual nature = the second persona)^ with far greater impor tance assigned to the latter. The discussion concludes with two appendices, the first comprising praecepta on change of career (§ 120b), the second some caveats on the imitation of ancestors (§ 121). If the asymmetry of the personae categories has caused difficulty, so, too, has the speed with which the entire machinery is made to focus on the choice of a career; hence Fuhrmann's critique (101) that a die Identitat, um die es hier geht, ist, wie ersichtlich, keine subjektive Kategorie, kein aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehenes Ich, keine Einheit des Erlebens und Bewufitseins—sie ist eine vom 'Stellenplan' der Gesellschaft aus betrachtete Grofse, eine konventionelle Gegebenheit, ein 'pattern*, kurz: die perpetuierte soziale Rolle." But Panaetius' subject is not "das aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehene Ich," but rather the πρέπον, a quality that one displays (or not) in society. Moreover, the choice of profession is perhaps a human being's major act of social self-definition (cf. § 1 1 7 : quos nos et quales esse velimus); hence Cicero/Panaetius is right to lay as much stress upon it as he does in this context. 1 * 3 However, the process of choice is presented in excessively narrow and schematic terms, as can be seen from comparison with de Orat. 2.88 ff., a description of the orator's selection of a stylistic model, where the possibility is raised that among the characteristics of one's model orator one may have to discriminate between those worthy of imitation and those that ought rather to be avoided; no procedure of comparable subtlety is envisioned in our passage, where the subject is the still more complex problem of finding a model for one's life. 115 . . . tertia adiungitur, quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit. . . ] Cf. Bion of Borysthenes fr. 16A: 6el ώσπ€ρ τόν ayaQov ύποκριτήν δ τι αν ό ποιητής πβριθή πρόσωπον τούτο άγωνί^σθαι καλώ?, ούτω και τόν αγαθόν άνδρα ο τι αν π6ριθή ή τύχη. και γάρ αϋτη, φησιν ό Βίων. ώσπερ ποιήτρια, ότέ μέν πρωτολόγου, ότέ δέ δβυτβρολόγου πβριτίθησι πρόσωπον, και OTC μέν 163. In addition, if it is true that the specialization of professions was characteristic of Hellenistic society (cf. Carl Schneider, Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus, 2 (Munich, 1969], 70 ff.), the resulting complexity of the problem may have moved Panaetius to devote to it as much attention as he docs (though if Cicero's version is a reliable reflection of the original, Panaetius failed to do full justice to this complexity); Panaetius was writing, in any case, probably for a Greek, rather than, as Fuhrmann, 98, supposes, a Roman readership; cf. introduction, $ 5 (4).
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βασιλέω?, ότβ be άλήτου. μη ουν βούλου δειττερολόγος" ών τό πρωτολόγου πρόσωπο^· ei be μη, ανάρμοστοι' τι ποιήσεις. nam regna iraperia nobilitas honores divitiae opes eaque quae sunt his contraria in casu sita temporibus gubernantur;. . .] Interesting, as Brunt, 1975, 34, n. 6, notes, that Panaetius assigns such variations to chance, not the deity; this is in line with the rather perfunctory remarks on appeasing the gods at 2.11; cf. also the following report of Panaetius' views: . . . τό πβρί Ββών λβγόμενα άνήρει. eXeye γαρ φλήι>αφον €Ϊναι τον TTCOI 6eou λόγοι> (fr. 68). The divine element plays a somewhat larger role in the non-Panaetian por tions of this Book (cf. § § 1 5 3 and 160). . . . ipsi autem quam gerere personam velimus, a nostra voluntate proficiscitur.] This, rather than predetermination by fate, is clearly what Pan aetius wants to stress (cf. ad § 114). This emphasis did not, however, neces sarily place him at odds with the general Stoic view that events are predetermined by fate, since Chrysippus had attempted to find a via media between fate and free will in order to assure that one would bear responsibil ity for one's own actions (cf. ad §$ 97-98; 115-21). It would be interesting to know what line Panaetius took on πρόνοια (cf. p. 130, n. 40 above). 116 quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plemmque eodem in genere laudis excellere, ut Q. Mucius P. f. in iure civili, Pauli filius Africanus in re militari—cloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam . . .] What is here presented as the ordinary goal (student plerumque) appears at Rab. Post. 2 as virtually an endowment of nature: . . . praesertint, iudices, cum sit hoc generi hominum prope natura datum ut, si qua in familia laus aliqua forte floruerit, banc fere qui sint eius stirpis, quod sermone bominum ac memoria patrum virtutes celebrantur, cupidissime persequantur. . . (he goes on to instance Scipio's imitation of the military glory of Paullus and of his grandfather).—As in § 108, the Roman examples precede the Greek. P. Mucius Scaevola's career fell largely within the u storm and stress" period of the 130s and 120s. He was elected consul for 133 on the same winds of change that carried Tiberius Gracchus into his tribunate of the plebs; the crisis came to a head while his colleague L. Calpurnius Piso was putting down a slave revolt in Spain; when Scaevola refused to take action, P. Scipio Nasica uttered the famous words reported by Cicero [Tusc. 4.51) qui rempublicam salvam esse vellent, se sequi iussit and proceeded to the fatal deed (cf. ad $ 109; Andrew Lintott in CAH 9\ 69 and 72). In 130 he succeeded his brother P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus (cos. 131) as pontifex maximus; though in the modern literature he is often credited with the eighty-book edition of the priestly chronicles (Annates Maximi), this is more plausibly dated to the Augustan age; cf. B.W. Frier, Libri Annales Pontificum
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Maximorum: The Origins of the Annalistic Tradition, PMAAR, 27 (Rome, 1979), 179-200. Only party spirit kept the Optimates from acknowledging him as the leading jurist of the day (cf. Rep. 1.20). Cf. F. Munzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 425.47 ff. (Mucius no. 17); Bauman, 1983, 230 ff. His son Q. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 95) was the author of the libri XVIII iuris civilis, the first attempt to reduce the subject to an organized system. He advocated the correctness of the summum ius in the celebrated causa Curiana (cf. ad 3.67), in which he appeared, according to the Ciceronian Antonius, as paterni iuris defensor et quasi patrimonii propugnator sui [de Orat. 1.244; sim. Brut. 197). Upon his father's death he succeeded him in the pontifical college; cf. ad 2.57 and 3.62-63; F. Munzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 437.1 ff., and, on his work as a jurist, B. Kubler, ibid., 442.7 ff.; Bauman, 1983, 340 ff.; Wieacker, 596 ff.; ad 3.70-71—L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 182, 168) was decreed a supplicatio for his victory over the Lusitanians (after an initial defeat) at the end of 190 or beginning of 189 and a triumph for his defeat of the Ligurians in 181; the defeat of Perseus at Pydna on 22 June 168 brought him a second triumph; on his moderation following this victory cf. 2.76; cf. Klebs, RE 1.1 (1893), 576.44 ff., as well the darker portrait of the conqueror painted by Reitcr. P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus was his son by his first marriage with Papiria and as a boy was given to P. Cornelius Scipio, eldest son of Africanus, for adoption. He participated in the battle of Pydna and distinguished himself in the fighting as military tribune in Spain in 151 and in Carthage in 149; elected consul by special dispensation though underage in 147, he took command of the war against Carthage and presided over its destruction in 146; elected consul for the second time in 134, he brought the Numantine War to successful conclusion the following year; for a com prehensive study cf. Astin. . . . ut hie idem Africanus eloquentia cumulavit bellicam gloriam . . . ] For Africanus' military glory' see the previous note; Cicero assigns him the predi cate eloquens at de Orat. 1.215 and Brut. 82; ibid., 83-84, he compares him to Laelius and finds the latter the more distinguished in oratory, as Africanus was in war; cf. also Brut. 258 and 295; orat., pp. 122 ff. . . . quod idem fecit Timotheus Cononis filius, qui cum belli laude non inferior fuisset quam pater, ad earn laudem doctrinae et ingenii gloriam adiecit.] At Aegospotami Conon observed Lysander's approach, signaled it to his colleagues, and was able to escape to Cyprus with eight ships. In the years following the war he pursued with considerable success Lysander's game of ingratiating himself at the Persian court. In 399 with the aid of Evagoras and Pharnabazus he was able to win approval for the building on Cyprus of a Persian fleet of 100 vessels, of which he was to be admiral. His
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subsequent devastating defeat of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus (August, 394) broke the Spartan naval hegemony established at Aegospotami. Then on a voyage with Phamabazus along the coast of Asia Minor he was able to move a number of islands and coastal cities to expel their Spartan harmosts and garrisons; in early 393 they paid a visit to Corinth to strengthen the coalition at war with Sparta. Then Conon brought the Persian fleet to anchor off Athens, where he drove forward the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the walls of the Piraeus. When on a visit in 392 Antalcidas won Tiribazus over to the Spartan cause, Conon, who was on a mission in Sardis at the time, was imprisoned; though he escaped, he died shortly thereafter. He received lavish honors at Athens, including statues before the temple of Zeus Eleutherios, in the marketplace, and on the Acropolis. Cf. Swoboda, RE 11.2 (1922), 1319.19 ff.—Especially the brilliant victory won over the Spartan fleet at Alyzia at the end of June, 375, demonstrated Timotheus' comparable skill in naval warfare. In his efforts to strengthen the Second Athenian Naval Con federacy he was, however, hampered by lack of funds, which, for instance, prevented him from sailing in summer 374 to help the democrats on Corcyra, as the Athenian assembly had directed, with the result that he was removed from office and, when put on trial, narrowly acquitted. On his subsequent career cf. Karl Klee, RE 6A2 (1937), 1324.42 ff. The fact that he was the pupil of Isocrates, who drew a sympathetic portrait of his late friend at 15.101-39, accounts for Cicero placing him in parallel with the younger Scipio as a representative oidoctrina et ingenium as well as military prowess; cf. de Orat. 3.139; Isocrates is even said to have accompanied him on his travels and to have composed the letters Timotheus sent back to Athens ([Plut.J Wit. X Orat. 837c). 117-21 In primis autem constiruendum est—] A new paragraph probably should begin with In primis, since it is here that the topic of how one should go about making the choice of profession, and what factors need to be considered and in what proportion, really begins (the preceding being rather a series of examples and empirical observations of what people in practice do); of recent editors Arzert and Fedeli continue the paragraph begun at § 1 1 5 , whereas Testard and Winterbottom introduce a new paragraph with the preceding summary haec igitur omnia, cum quaerimus quid deceat. . .— The passage highlights a structural problem in the way most people go about choosing their profession, namely that the decision is taken ineunte . . . adulescentia, cum est maxima inbecillitas consilii. . . The upshot is that each chooses quod maxime adamavit and is already entangled in that choice before reaching years of mature judgment. Contrasted with this practice is the picture of Hercules at the crossroads, who, albeit also quite young (cum
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primum pubesceret), nevertheless makes a choice based upon considerable deliberation [diu secum multumque dubitasse; cf. in § 119 the mention of the fortunate circumstance of having spatium . . . deliberandi). 117 ineuntc cnim adulescemta, cum est maxima imbecillitas consilii.. .] An exaggeration, since the formulation maxima imbecillitas consilii would strictly apply to infancy according to Stoic doctrine. The Stoics held that the child gradually gathers προλήψεις ("preconceptions"), of which enough are assembled by about the seventh year that one can speak of λόγος; then by around the fourteenth year λόγος reaches its maturity (τελειότης) in the human being; cf. SVF 2,215.6 ff., with other passages discussed by Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 33; cf. also p. 83, n. 19 above. . . . turn id sibi quisque genus aetatis degendae constituit quod maxime adamavit;. . . ] The prefix ad- intensifies the simplex amare, as, for instance, at Sen. Ep. 71.5: hoc si persuaseris tibi et virtutem adamaveris (amare enim parum est). . . The compound, nor attested before Cicero and seldom found in other than the perfect tense, can denote an enthusiastic or excessive love characteristic of adolescents, as in our passage and Quint. Inst. 2.5.22 (on dangers to be avoided in education): alterum . . . ne recentis hums lasciviae flosculis capti voluptate prava deleniantur, ut praedulce illud genus et puerilibus ingeniis hoc gratius quo propius est adament.164 118 nam quod Herculem Prodicus dicit—utram ingredi melius esset. . .] Virtually a literal translation of X. Mem. 2.1.21: φησ'ι γαρ [sc. ό Πρόδικοςΐ Ήρακλεα, επεί εκ παίδων €Ϊς ήβτμ> ώρμάτο, έν ή οι νέοι ήδη αυτοκράτορες γιγνόμε νοι δηλουσινεϊτε τήι>δι'αρετήςόδόν τρέφονται επί τον βίονείτε την δια κακίας, εξελθόντα εις ήσυχίαν καθήσθαι άποροϋντα ποτεραν των οδών τράπηται· . . . Possibly the passage conveys some notion of what Cicero's youthful version of the Oeconomicus might have been like (cf. 2.87). . . . hoc Herculi, 'Iovis satu edito',—rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.] This passage contrasts the deliberate method of Hercules just described and that of "us," qui imitamur quos cuique visum est atqueadeorum studia institutaque impellimur. Two examples are given of this: (1) the imitation of par ents, 1 6 5 (2) the reliance upon multitudinis iudicium. Now this passage is implicitly a plea for following the parentium praecepta in view of the im becillitas consilii of youth, since ordinary mortals cannot, like Hercules, 164. Cf. OLD s.w. ad-, adamo; Vollmer, TLL 1, 567.4 ff. 165. Initially it is vaguely said to be an imitation of "those whom each thought best" (sc. to imitate: quos cuique visum est), then that "for the most part" (plerumque) we arc drawn to the "habits and character" {consuetudinem moremque) of parents; parentes figures (twice) in this section, where moral influence is in question, whereas $ 116 focuses on patres aut maiores as models for career and achievement.
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deliberate at length and in isolation. 166 On the other hand, Cicero/Panaetius is, in general, no friend of the multitudinis judicium, reliance upon which can easily lead one into error; cf. 1.65 and 2.37 (§ 147 and 3.19 pose special problems; cf. ad locos), as well as the Stoic argument that the pravitas opinionum can lead one away from nature at Tusc. 3.2-3. Hence the follow ing clause [nonnulli tamen—) connects adversatively only with the latter of the two common methods of choosing a profession:167 in spite of youth's susceptibility to influence in the wrong direction (viz., through the multi tudinis judicium), some do actually manage to hit upon the right career. Cicero does not seem at this point to envision the possibility that, in view of the precept in qua deliberatione (i.e., choice of profession) ad suam cuius que naturam consilium est omne revocandum (§ 119), imitation of a parent or ancestor might actually lead one astray. Only in § 121 does he backtrack and clarify (in view of 5 116) that one should not imitate an ancestor's vices or follow his example si natura non feret.—In view of the diction, Winterbottom ad he. is surely right in suspecting that *Iovis satu edito' derives from a tragedy.168 nonnulli tamen sive felicitate quadam sive bonitate naturae sine parentium disciplina rectam vitae secuti sunt viam.] Cf. de Orat. 2.98: atque esse tamen multos videmus, qui neminem imitentur et suapte natura, quod velint, sine cuiusquam similitudine consequantur.—Sine is Stuerenburg's (necessary) correction for yet a third sive. 119 . . . turn in tota vita constituenda multo est cius rei cura maior adhibenda, ut constare in perpetuitate vitae possimus nobismet ipsis . . . ] Cf. ad S i l l and for the a fortiori form ad § 48. 120 ad hanc autem rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habec, fortuna proximam—cum immortali natura pugnare videatur.] This is among the passages that exemplify Panaetius' role as the "Wiederentdecker der Ethik Demokrits" (Philippson, 1929,337; cf. ad $$ 23b, 66y 68,90,114; introduc tion to Book 2; 2.11-16). For the characterization of natura as multo . . . et firmior . . . et constantior cf. Democr. 68 Β 176 D.-K.: τύχη μεγαλόδωρο^, αλλ'αβέβαιος·.φύσιςoc αυτάρκης- διόπ€ρ WKQ τφ ήσσοιη και β€βαίω τό μ€Ϊ£οΐ' της ελπίδος. Not dissimilar to Panaetius' picture of fortuna engaged in an unequal struggle with the stronger natura is the struggle of τύχη and φρόι>ησις at Democr. 68 Β 119 D.-K.: άνθρωποι τύχης εΐδωλον επλάσαντο πρό166. Labowsky, 50, is surely mistaken in chinking chat in our passage "von dcr Nachahmung dcr Elrem chcr abgcratcn wird." 167. This connection, howevet; caused (unnecessary) difficulty for Rcinhardt, 1893, 16 ff. (hence his Draconian athetesis of nonnulli tamen—viam). 168. For satus cf. Ace. trag. 618: profecto hauquaquam est ortus mediocri satu.
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φασιν ίδίης άβουλίη?. βαιά γάρ φροι>ήσ€ΐ τύχη μάχίται, τα oe πλ€Ϊστα έν βίφ ξύξύνςτος όξυδβρκείη κατιθύνβι; Puhle, 106-7. The doctrine of our passage is, of course, in line with Panaetius' general tendency to give preference to the more permanent over the more transitory (cf. ad §§ 74 ff. and 2.55 b ff.); cf. ad § 115.—One wonders whether Panaetius might have made the simile (ut fortuna. . . tamquam ipsa mortalis cum immortali natura pugnare videatur) more vivid by comparing the struggle of Apollo and Hercules over the Delphic tripod.—This is the only passage in which Cicero/Panaetius raises the possibility of a conflict of the different personae, a problem explored by Seneca and Epictetus; cf. Gill, 1994, 4633. . . . sensim erit pcdetemptimque facienda, ut amicitJas quae minus delcctent ct minus probentur magis decere censent sapientes sensim diluere quam repente praecidere.] Antic. (78), recently completed, offered a corresponding precept: quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. cavendum vero ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se ami citiae . . . Cf. F.-A. Steinmetz, 134 ff.—Here an example might have helped to clarify how a change of profession could be achieved with elegance (one is, in fact, given at § 151; see ad loc.)\ cf. Heilmann, 57; for further cases where an example would have been helpful cf. ad $§ 18-19,159, juxtaposed with 3.93. 121 Sed quoniam paulo ante dictum est imitandos esse maiores . . .J In fact, that is not what was said in $ 116, but rather that this is what people tend to do if they have distinguished forebears (. . . it student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere . . .). Presumably the reason for this counsel is that one is likely to have inherited some of the same ingenium (on relevant Stoic doctrine cf. ad §§ 107-21). Cf. the personal application of this precept to the addressee at 3.6: s us tines enim non parvam exspectationem imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, nonnullam fortasse nominis. . . . primum illud exceptum sit, ne vitia sint imitanda . . . ] One would have expected ne vitia imitemur; the construction is assimilated to that of verbs of striving and the like; cf. 2.74: danda . . . opera est ne . . . tributum sit conferendum. . . . deinde si natura non feret ut quaedam imitari p o s s i t . . .] Imitare ap pears as early as Livius Andronicus but occurs in Cicero only in the par ticipial form at Tim. 8 (cum autem ingressa est imitata et efficta simulacra)^ cf. O. Prinz, TIL 7.1, 432.63 ff. Hence possit of Londinensis Add. 11937 (anno 1416), adopted here after Pearce et al., for the transmitted possint, an easy mistake for a scribe writing after deponent forms had fallen out of the spoken language (surely during the fifth century; cf. B. Lofstedt, Kratylos 20
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[1975], 120, in a review of P. Flobert, Les verbes deponents latins des origines a Charlemagne [Paris, 1975]); one must supply, somewhat awkwardly, "the individual" or the like as the subject, but the following words poterit . . . debebit require that anyway. Atzert's athetesis of ut quaedam imitari possint is a cure too radical for the ailment. . . . (ut supcrioris Alius Africani—quo minus ab eo id quod desit requiratur.] Frail health kept Africanus' son out of the cursus honorum, though he was augur in 180. Cf. Sen. 35: quam fuit imbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulb potius valetudinel quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud exstitisset lumen civitatis; ad paternam enim magnitudinem animi doctrina uberior accesserat; cf. the similar comment on his health and favor able judgment of his literary style in oratiunculae and a history written in Greek at Brut. 77; the epitaph at CIL 1 2 .10 is sometimes assigned to him; cf. K. M. Moir, CQ 36 (1986), 264-66. Cf. Munzer, RE 4.1 (1900), 1437.23 ff. . . . ilia tamen praestare debebit quae erunt in ipsius potestate . . .] Good Stoic doctrine; cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 4.2 ff. optima autem hereditas a patribus traditur liberis omnique patrimonio praestantior gloria virtutis rcrumque gestarum, cui dedecori esse nefas et vitium iudicandum est.] The Romans liked to boast in such terms as in the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (pr. peregr. 139): virtutes generis mieis monbus accumulavi, I progeniem genui, facta patris petiei. I maiorum optenui laudem, ut sibei me esse creatum I laetentur: stirpem nobilitavit honor (CIL 1 2 .15). For the conception of glory as a legacy cf. § 78, as well as the letter congratulating Dolabella on his destruction of an altar to Julius Caesar and a pillar set up to him as pater patriae, as well as the punishment of the worshippers; in the course of the letter Cicero mentions that many had assumed (wrongly) that Dolabella was acting on his own advice and adds jokingly: a te autem peto ut me banc quasi falsam hereditatem alienae gloriae sinas cernere. . . (Fam. 9.14.4; 3 May 44); cf. V. Max. 4.4.10: idem senatus Fabricii Luscini Scipionisque filias ab indotatis nuptiis liberalitate sua vindicavit, quoniam paternae hereditati praeter opimam gloriam nihil erat quod acceptum referrent; on the gloria nominis of the gens as an important factor in Roman thinking (and a burden for the individual) cf. Knoche, 1 9 3 4 , 1 0 9 10. With the optima hereditas of our sentence contrast Caesar's legacy as described in 2.28.—The shame attached to wasting ancestral property and repute emerges vividly in the exchange of the spendthrift youth Lesbonicus and his friend Lysiteles at PI. Τήη. 641 ff.: LY. . . . itan tandem banc maiiores famam tradiderunt tibi tut, I ut virtute eorum anteperta per flagitium perderesf . . . LE. omnia ego istaec quae tu dixti scio, vel exsignavero, I ut rem patriam et gloriam maiorum foedarim meum: I scibam ut esse me deceret,
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 121 and 122-25
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facere non quibam miser . . . (642-43, 655-57).—Though recent editors (Atzert4, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom) agree in retaining the transmitted text, it is dubious whether the anticlimactic nefas et vitium is Ciceronian; the choice lies between a) Baiter's deletion of et vitium and b) flagitium (for vitium), conjectured by Driefien, 11. The latter seems more probable, it being otherwise hard to explain how et vitium could have arisen; for the iunctura Goldbacher, 2, 37, adduces nefarie flagitioseque (Ver. 37). 122-25 These sections deal with social roles imposed by external circum stances (tempora; see below); on the relation of this material to teachings of the Older Stoa cf. Brunt, 1975, 33. The first topic is age, under which separate sets of precepts are given for young and old (§§ 122-23; cf. the virtues associated with different ages and social roles at PI. Men. 71 e); the middle years as such are not discussed, presumably since here one's civic status comes into play, treated in the following section on tempora (§§ 1 2 4 25), including precepts for those holding public office, private citizens, and resident aliens. Surely a new paragraph should be marked at § 122: Et quoniam officio . . . , as is done, among recent editors, by Fedeli, Testard, and Winterbottom, but not Atzert4. Griffin, 1976, 342 n., finds this transition "cu rious." What is odd is not the formulation169 but the lack at this point, as elsewhere in the essay (cf. ad%% 11-17,150-51), of a clear indication of the relation of this material to what has preceded; the reader is thus left without orientation until a dispositio is finally inserted at $ 125 (for a similar case cf. ad 3.96). This material was omitted by Cicero where one would have ex pected it, under the third persona (cf. $ 115: tertia. . . quam casus aliqui aut tempus imponit, where tempus has the broad sense of "external circum stances" [cf. OLD s.v., 10-111 and ad % 125).l7<> Griffin, loc. cit., sets this material into the context of an older Stoic set of precepts, criticized already by Aristo of Chios (cf. Sen. Ep. 94.2 and 18), which offered advice for those acting in various public or social roles, e.g., husband, father, brother, friend, citizen, etc., which would have found their place under "justice" (ibid., 94.11: 'Sic amico utere, sic civet sic socio'. 'Quaref 'Quia iustum est'.). She supposes that Panactius has taken over these older Stoic precepts and inte grated them imperfectly into his own personae theory, which, unlike its predecessor, took account of the individual's own aptitudes and was sub sumed under the fourth, rather than the second, virtue. This hypothesis is 169. Labowsky, 50, n. 103, cites the similar formulations ar $S 126 and 132b as well as Arist. EN 1148b 15 and U51b23. 170. Not just SS 124-25a, as Labowsky, 51, supposed, since aetas, too, belongs under tempus in the broad sense.
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possible but still leaves unexplained why this material was postponed to this point and not dealt with under the third persona. Another possibility worth considering is that Cicero himself is responsible for the imperfect juncture, a state of affairs observed elsewhere in Off.wl Pointing out that Panaetius is known to have dealt with magistrates (cf. ad $ 124), Labowsky, 51, supposes that Cicero had originally meant to eliminate the entire treatment of the third persona but then changed his mind and added the discussion of civil officia in SS 124-25, a topic of special interest to him, as an appendix. This, too, is possible. A third possibility would be that Cicero did not care for the treat ment of the third persona that he found in ntpl τοΟ καθήκοντος and therefore omitted it in sequence but added an appendix on the subject from another source, whether Panaetian172 or non-Panaetian. Besides the problematical relation to its larger context, the want of examples in this section is also striking; one wonders whether here, as elsewhere (cf. 2.16), Cicero has cur tailed those of his model. The precept est igitur adulescentis matures natu vereri, exque its deligere optimos et probatissimos quorum consilio atque auctoritate nitatur is, however, illustrated at 2.47; and perhaps Cicero touched so briefly here on old age in view of Sen. and on magistrates in view of his treatment of the topic at Leg. 3; if so, however, one would have expected an explicit indication, as at 2.31. 122 Hippias is said to have produced a discourse on the noble pursuits of youth (PI. Hp. Ma. 286a-b). Cf. ad 2.46, where similar topics are treated. . . . ineuntis enim aetatis insciria senum constituenda et regenda pmdentia est.] Ci. ad § 123. maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est...] Cf. Polybius' charac terization of Scipio's youth cited ad $ 111. 123 senibus autem labores corporis minuendi. . .] Cf. Plut. An Sent 793b-c. . . . danda vero opera ut et amicos et iuventutem et maxime rempublicam consilio et pmdentia quam plurimum adiuvent.] For the old advising the young cf. the example of Sparta at Plut. An Sent 795f-796a. For Aristotle what is old and complete is "more worthy of rule" (ήγ€μοι>ικώτΈροι>) than what is young and incomplete (Pol. 1259bl ff.). For the role of the elderly as teachers cf. the advice of Sen. de Otto 2.2. That the old should continue to help the state is, of course, the thesis of Plutarch's An Sent Respublica Gerenda Sit as a whole; the examples shared with Sen. have led scholars to posit the essay π€ρι γήρως of Aristo of Ceus as common source (cf. Sen. 1.3 = 171. Cf. ad S$ 24-26, 74-78, and 2.19b-20a, to name only a few flagrant examples. 172. In the event that Panaetius1 own discussion of magistrates occurred in a work other than ntp'i tw καθήκοντος.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 122-25 and 122-24
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Aristofr. 12 [see Wehrli *d/o<;.];Ziegler, RE21.1 [1951], 821.51 ff.; Powell, pp. 26 and 28 of his ed. of Sen., is skeptical). nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti quam ne languori se desidiaeque dedat; . . .] Contrast the description of Appius Claudius at Sen. 37: . . . tantas clientelas Appius regebat et caecus et senex; intentum enim animum tamquam arcum habebat, nee languescens succumbebat senectuti. Cicero evidently took to heart such reflections, which he found in the philosophical tradition (cf. Plut. An Sent 784a: πολλών δέ κακιών ούδεμιά? ήττον άπραζία και δ€ΐλία και μαλακία καταισχυνουσιν άνδρα πρ^σβύτην . . .); for in the very personal preface to Book 3 he notes that otium and solitudo can induce languor but denies that he is allowing his solitude to languish (3.1 and 3); such thoughts doubtless helped propel him back into politics. . . . luxuria vero cum omni aetati turpis, turn senectuti foedissima est.] Cf. Plut. An Sent 785e-f, including Pompey's reply to Lucullus' criticism of his fondness for holding office: άωρότερον civai γεροντι το τρυφάν ή τό άρχε ι ν. 124-25 The applicability of the term officium to both public and private activities commended it to Cicero as a translation for καθήκον: cf. ad § 4 and introduction, § 2. 124 est igitur proprium munus magistratus intellegere se gerere personam civitatis . . .] The Roman public official was supposed to lay aside personal inclinations and interests when acting officially; cf. Cic. Mur. 6 (in answer to the charge that his leniency in handling the case of Murena is inconsistent with the severitas with which he forced Catiline out of Rome): ego autem has partis lenitatis et misericordiae quas me natura ipsa docuit semper egi libenter, Mam vero gravitatis severitatisque personam non appetivi, sed ah republica mihi impositam sustinui. . . ; Tac. Agr. 9.3: iam vero tempora curarum remissionumque divisa: ubi conventus ac iudicia poscerent, gravis intentus, severus et saepius misericors: ubi officio satis factum, nulla ultra potestatis persona; tristitiam et adrogantiam et avaritiam exuerat. Cf. also 3.43: ponit enim personam amici cum induit iudicis; Wood, 135. est igitur proprium munus—ea fidei suae commissa meminisse.] Cicero al ludes to Panaetius' treatment of magistrates (possibly corresponding to our passage) at Leg. 3.13-14 (= Panaetius fr. 48): MARCUS:. . . sed huius loci de magistratibus sunt propria quaedam, a Theophrasto primum, deinde a Dio(ge)ne Stoico quaesita subtilius. ATTICUS: Ain tandem? etiam a Stoicis ista tractata sunt? MARCUS: Non sane, nisi ab eo quern modo nominavi et postea a magno homine et in primis erudito, Panaetio. nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem, de republica disserebant. Cf. the advice to magistrates regarding the punish ment of offenders at §§ 88-89, especially $ 89 fin.:. . . ut it qui praesunt
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reipublicae legum similes sintf quae ad puniendum non iracundia sed aequitate dueuntur. Interesting that the magistrate's charge is conceived in terms of fides; cf. Freyburger, 209. Viewing these matters as the magistrate's trust, Cicero was inevitably offended at the behavior of Caesar, who, in his view, omnia iura divina et humana pervertit. . . (§ 26). . . . iura discribere . . .] MSS generally show much fluctuation between describere/descriptio and discribere/discriptio; their authority is correspon dingly slight. Indeed the two groups are not easy to distinguish semantically, especially as applied to iura or the like; a symptom of the difficulty is the fact that Vetter, TLL 5.663.13 ff. and 1354.80-81, lists our passage under both describo and discribo1. In general the basic distinction seems to be between the writing out or initial prescribing of laws by a lawgiver or the like (describere; cf. OLD s.v. describo 5) and the setting of laws and rights into a proper order, i.e., with a view toward their application to specific cases, by a magistrate [discribere). To give a few instances, at de Orat. 1.33, which refers to the first act of establishing laws, surely describere is wanted, as also de Orat. 3.76 [vis . . . eloquentiae tanta est, ut . . . mores leges iura describat), whereas the function of setting in order for application prevails at Quinct. AS {quis tandem nobis ista iura tarn aequa discribit? quis hoc statuit, quod aequum sit in Quinctium, id iniquum esse in Naeviumf), where discribit is Biicheler's conjecture. If that is so, then in our passage Baiter's discribere is surely the form wanted; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89. Similarly, the form discriptio is evidently correct for "systematic distribution" of property at § 2 1 ; cf. also ΛΛ S 51 and 2.15. privatum autem oportet aequo et pari cum civibus iure vivere neque submissum et abiectum neque se efferentem . . .] The mean is the implicit ideal here, as so often under the fourth virtue, of which modus was a defining characteristic as early as S 14; cf. SS 102,130-31,140,andd
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 124-25 and 126-49
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peccatorum suorum conscii, novos motus conversionesque reipublicae quaerant, aut qui propter insitum quendam animi furorem discordiis civium ac seditione pascantur, aut qui propter implicationem rei familiaris communi incendio malint quam suo deflagrare. On the term bonus/boni cf. p. 425, n. 50. 125 peregrini autem atque incolae officium est nihil praeter suum negotium agere, nihil de alio anquirere minimeque esse in aliena republica curiosum.] Those engaged in politics were held to be πολυπράγμονες (Arist. EN 1142a2); even an Athenian citizen was well advised to keep clear of that predicate (cf. Lys. 24.24; Isoc. 15.99 and 230 wards off the charge that his students and fellow sophists are πολυπράγμονες). Foreign residents, who could by definition play no political role, are here advised to avoid πολυπραγ μοσύνη and keep a low profile, presumably since they are easy targets in troubled times (cf. Lys. 12.6; ad 3.47). PI. Lg. 952dl stipulates the death penalty for a foreign visitor εάν γ ' εν δικαστήρια) άλφ πολυπραγμόνων τι περί την παιδί ίαν και τους νόμους. ha fere officia reperientur cum quacretur quid deceat et quid aptum sit personis temporibus aetatibus.] This summary comprises the dispositio of the preceding section; cf. ad $$ 122-25. Personae is a reference to §§ 1 0 7 21; tempora to civic status, office, and the like, discussed at §§ 124-25a (cf. $ 115: nam regna imperia nobilitas honores divitiae opes eaque quae sunt his contraria in casu sita temporibus gubernantur)\ aetates to the discussion of youth and old age at §§ 122-23. The fact that this summary fails to list the topics in the order of treatment has no particular significance; cf. the dispositio at $ 126 as discussed ad $S 126-49; ad § 45. Cf. Labowsky, 5 1 ; for a different view Griffin, 1976, 342 n., modified in her note ad he. nihil esc autem quod tarn deceat quam in omni re gerenda consilioque ca piendo servare constantiam.] Cf. ad § 111. 126-49 § 126 provides a dispositio for the rest of the Panaetian portion of this Book. These chapters deal with some aspects of the πρέπον considered by the older Stoa (in the sequel they are handled in reverse order of their presentation here): (1) corporis motus et status ($§ 126-32a); (2) dicta (§§ 132b-37); (3) facta (§$ 141-49). Topic (1) corresponds to κοσμιότης, defined as επιστήμη περί το πρέπον εν κινήσει καΐ σχεσει (SVF 3, 66.43). Dicta (2) are expected, since the πρέπον originally had reference to diction (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1404bl ff.; ad $ 97; it was still recognized by Diogenes of Babylon as one of the five άρεται λόγου: SVF 3,214.11-12 and 18). The one passage that does not fit into this scheme, that dealing with the house of a great man {hominis honorati et principis: $§ 138-40), is inserted without reference to the original plan (cf. the general rationale given at the beginning
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of $ 138: quoniam omnia persequimur) and illustrated exclusively with Roman examples; it is thus very likely to have been added (with transparent political subtext) by Cicero himself (cf. ad loc. and Schmekel, 41). Note that all the items of this divisio are points that apply both to human beings in daily life and to actors upon a stage, so that the simile of the playwright (S§ 97-98) really controls the whole presentation of decorum, the first half comprising the determination of the persona of the individual (SS 105-25), the second half the actions, words, or movements that are to be matched to that persona. 126-32a These sections deal with corporis motus et status under three head ings: 1) formositas, 2) ordo, 3) ornatus ad actionem aptus; these three topics receive, however, rather perfunctory treatment at SS 130-3 la (—non adesse constantiam). Cicero prefaces, however, surely after Panaetius (cf. SS 9 8 99), some remarks about showing concern for the feelings of one's fellow humans, i.e., about the avoidance of obscenity. Panaetius' defense of αιδώ? takes as its primary target Diogenes of Sinope, the founder of the cult of άναί&ισ (cf. D.L. 6.69: eitoGei δέ πάντα ποΐ€Ϊι> iv τφ μίσψ, και τα Δήμητρο? και τα 'Αφροδίτη?; for a sexual act performed in public see also D.L. 6.46). Panaetius' argument takes, as so often, an initium a natura. It was Diogenes who first made "life according to nature" the means for attaining ευδαιμονία (cf. D.L. 6.71). Panaetius, however, contrives to turn the tables on Diogenes by invoking "nature" on the side of convention. He does so by pointing to the tendency of civilized peoples to conceal certain parts of the body. Αιδώ? therefore can be said to "imitate" nature in this respect; or, put another way, αιδώ? is commensurate with (πρέπουσα) nature. Panaetius also cites the ap probate of others when obscenity is avoided ($ 128: nos autem naturam sequamur et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus173). Zeno seems to have followed Diogenes in his willingness to call a spade a spade: ό σοφό? ^υθυρρημονήσβι (SVF 1, 22.28); hence Cicero's si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici (S 128). In a witty reply to a letter in which his friend L. Papirius Paetus had evidently used the term mentula17* (Fam. 9.22, dated by Shackleton Bailey between 46 and 44), Cicero deals more fully with the topic of verecundia in language. From this it appears that Zeno held, like Heraclitus, that objects and their names are related φύσει, rather than Oeoei, and that things should therefore be called by their proper names, not cuphe173. On the text, with omne restored for ab omni after Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 cf. Winrerbottom, 1995, 265-66. 174. Cf. S 4: quam multa ex uno verbo tuo! with Adams, 1982, 9-10, and Wendt, 24.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 126-32a and 126
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misms. Zeno also posed the dilemma that obscenity must reside either in the name or the thing and proceeded to argue against both possibilities; this is a variant of the debate as to whether truth or falsity resides in the thing signified, the sound, or the movement of the mind (cf. S.E. M. 8.11). At both the beginning and end of the letter Cicero makes it clear that, while reporting Zeno's views, he is far from accepting them: $ 1: . . . Zenoni. . . homini mebercule acuto, etsi Academiae nostrae cum eo magna rixa est; $ 4: te adversus me omnia audere gratum est; ego servo et servabo (sic enim adsuevi) Platonis verecundiam. Zeno also held that no part of the body should be concealed (sc. in doing athletics: D.L. 7.33; cf. Schofield, 1991, 13). On the Roman rejection of Cynicism in general cf. Griffin, 1976, 297, n. 6. 126 . . . decorum illud in omnibus factis dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cemitur . . .] Cf. Muson., 34.18 ff.: τίς μεντοι επιστήμη προς σωφροσύνης άγ€ΐ πλην φιλοσοφίας, ούκ εστίν ειπείν αυτή γαρ δίδασκα μεν επάνω ηδονής είναι, διδάσκει δ' επάνω πλεονεξίας, διδάσκει δε αγαπάν εύτελειαν, διδάσκει δε φεύγειν πολυτελειαν, εθίζει δ* αιδώ εχειν. εθίζει δε γλώττης κρατεΐν, τάξιν δε και κόσμον και εύσχημοσύνην περιποιεΐ και δλως το εν κινήσει και σχεσει πρέπον. . . . in his autem tribus continetur cura etiam ilia, ut probemur iis quibuscum apud quosque vivamus . . .] The approbatio of one's fellow humans was a point first made in the simile of the playwrights (§$ 97-98a) and then immediately amplified (§§ 98b-99); it is now revived, since in the following discussion of the body it will play an important role both in its own right (S 128: . . . omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus) and in terms of the attitude/behavior that gives rise to it {verecundia: § 127) and the opposite attitude (petulantia: ibid.). . . . quae partes autem corporis ad naturae necessitatem datae aspectum essent deformem habiturae atque turpem, eas contexit atque abdidit.] The organs of reproduction and of elimination are placed in the same aesthetic category here (Heinemann, 2, 211, notes that in the construction of the human body Panaetius attributes to Nature the same kind of aesthetic sense that he found in the human being [§ 14]). The teleological/aesthetic interpre tation of the placement of the excretory organs is found already at X. Mem. 1.4.6: προς δε τούτοις ού δοκεΐ σοι και τάδε προνοίας εργοις έοικε ναι. . . έπει δε τά αποχωρούντα δυσχερή, άποστρεψαι τους τούτων οχετούς ή δυνατόν προσιυτάτω από των αισθήσεων . . . ; cf. Arist. ΡΑ 681b26: επί δε της μύτιδος το έντερον έξωθεν, κα'ι ό θολός προς τφ έντερω, όπως οτι πλείστον άπέχη τής εισόδου και το δυσχερές άποθεν ή τοϋ βελτίονος και τής αρχής. Perhaps Panaetius had in front of him a Stoic teleology of the kind repro duced at N.D. 2; cf. N.D. 2.141: atque ut in aedificiis architecti avertunt ab
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oculis naribusque dominorum ea quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid habitura, sic natura res similis procul amandavit a sensibus with further parallels cited by Pease ad loc. A negative valuation of the sexual organs was not inevitable, however, nor are they, in the male, "concealed" by nature as are the excretory organs; cf. PI. Smp. 191b5 ff.: έλεήσας δε ό Ζευς άλληι> μηχανήν πορίζεται, και μετατίθησιν αυτών τά αίδοΐα εις το πρόσθεν, together with PI. Tim. 45a3: τοϋ δ' όπισθεν τό πρόσθεν τιμιώτερον και άρχικώτερον νομί£οντες . . . 127 hanc naturae cam diligentem fabricam imitata est hominum verecundia.] By making verecundia an imitation of nature Cicero/Panaetius contrives to enlist "nature" on the side of codes of dress conventional in society; cf. Fantham, 165. For the phrase naturae fabrica with reference to the human body cf. N.D. 2.138 [incredibilis fabrica naturae); cf. also Luc. 86: iam ilia praeclara, quanto artificio esset sensus nostros mentemque et totam constructionem hominis fabricata natura . . .—Did Panaetius perhaps connect the following precepts more closely with the imitation of nature than Cicero's text indicates? Nature might have provided a rationale for the recta et simplicia in movements or the mediocritas in clothing, just as, after Zeno, Muson. 115.4 ff. based his recommendation of shorter rather than longer hair on nature: ευ γάρ εΐρηται, εφη, τό τοϋ Ζήνωνος, δτι τούτου ένεκα καρτεον ού και κομητεον, τού κατά φύσιν, 'ίνα μη βαρούμενός τις υπό της κόμης μηδ' ενοχλούμενος ή προς μηδεμίαν ένεργειαν. ή γάρ δη φύσις τό μεν ενδεές μάλλον φαίνεται φυλαξαμενη, τό δε περιττόν ήττον, επί τε φυτών και επ'ι {ώ ων, ότι της πρόσθεσε ως του ενδεούς ή άφαίρεσις τού περιττού πολύ ρ
Commentary on Book 1, Section 126-29
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ruborem suum verborum turpitudine et rerum obscenitate vitanda. Cicero had offered at Rep. 4.6 {apud Non. p. 23M) the etymology a petendo petulantia later taken up by Festus p. 206M: petulantes etpetulci etiam appellantur qui protervo impetu et crebro petunt laedendi alterius gratia, where the emphasis on injury to another is in accord with the trend of our passage (cf. § 126); for petulantia as one step removed from insanity (see the preceding qui sana mente sunt) cf. de Orat. 2.305:. . . Mud adsequor, ut si quis mihi male dicat, petulans aut plane insanus esse videatur; cf. ad §§ 104-5. For orationis obscenitas cf. ad 3.32. 128 Nee vero audiendi sunt Cynici, aut si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici.. .] = Socr. VB 515. Zeno's Republic, a σκάνδαλον to some later Stoics (cf. Schofield, 1991, 8 ff.), was said to have been written "on the dog's tail" (em της τοϋ κυνος ουράς: D.L. 7.4); on frankness in speaking of sexual matters as characteristic of mainstream Stoicism through the time of Chrysippus cf. Erskine, 14. latrocinari fraudare adukerare re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis dare operam re honestum est, nomine obscenum;. . .] Cicero elaborates this paradox in the letter cited above, where he adduces scenes from a comedy and three tragedies in which the matter, if expressed in other terms, would be obscene. There he includes the similar observation: 'liberis dare operam' quam honeste dicitur; etiam patres rogant filios. eius operae nomen non audent dicere (Fam. 9.22.3).175 Quintilian demands a higher standard of the orator: obscenitas vero non a verbis tantum abesse debet, sed etiam a significatione (6.3.29). Cf. also Hieron. in Is. 47.3.: disputant Stoici multa re turpia prava hominum consuetudine verbis honesta esse, ut parricidium, adulterium, homicidium, incestum et cetera his shnilia. rursumque re hon esta nominibus videri turpia, ut liberos procreare, inflationem ventris crepitu digerere, alvum relevare stercore, vesicant urinae effusione laxare. denique non posse nos, ut dicimus a ruta rutulam, sic ύποκορ<στικόι> mentae facere.— Against adoption of the chiastic order honestum est re, nomine obscenum attested at Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 (cf. Winterbottom, 1995,265) is the fact that the ditrochaic rhythm of re honestum est (with elision assumed) would have to give way. nos autem naturam sequamur et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus;...] Aug. c. lul. op. imperf. 4.43 now joins with ξ in support of omne for ab omni (£), better anyway before abhorret; cf. Winterbottom, 1995, 265-66. 129 This section presents a nicely coherent argument beginning with a pre175. On liberis dare operam cf. Adams, 1982, 157; Wendt, 29.
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cept {quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda . . .)»followed by its exten sion to actors and orators, for whom no double standard is to be counte nanced (nee vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est. . .). Two arguments in favor of this position are then introduced, each based on mos and connected with quidem (of the type called "begriindend oder erganzend" at Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,803). A final sentence draws the conclu sion (retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia, praesertim natura ipsa magistra et duce [this latter an allusion to § 127 into.]). quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit.] Here decorum appears again as a mean between extremes (cf. ad § 93). Ov. Ars 3.305-6 was perhaps influenced by our passage (cf. D'Elia, 136): sedsit, ut in multis, modus hie quo que: rusticus alter I motus, concesso mollior alter erit; cf. Ep. 20.61 Dorrie (from Acontius' description of Cydippe): et decor et vultus sine rusticitate pudentes; Quint. Inst. 1.11.16 (directions for gestus motusque): . . . ne indoctae rusticae manus, ne status indecorus, ne qua in proferendis pedibus inscitia . . . The former violation of decorum appears already at $ 14 (see ad loc.).—For an example of rusticitas of the type Cicero evidently has in mind cf. Thphr. Char. Α Α (αγροικία?): και άναβ€βλημ€νος· άνω του γόνατο? καθιζάνω 11>, wore τά γυμνά αΰτοϋ φαίν€σθαι. nee vero histrionibus oratoribusque concedendum est ut iis haec apta sint, nobis dissoluta.] Perhaps this stricture is aimed inter alia at the mimeactresses* practice of stripping naked at the Floralia (cf. Lact. inst. 1.20.10); it is said that in 55 Cato had the tact to withdraw from the theater so as not to inhibit the proceedings (V. Max. 2.10.8; Mart. 1 proem); cf. also Procop. Arc. 9.14; Edwards, 128-29.—For emphasis histrionibus oratoribusque is anticipated from the subordinate clause in a manner more characteristic of Greek than Latin style (cf. Kuhner-Gerth, 2, 598); their placeholder iis thus also forms a more effective contrast to nobis. Haec are presumably violations of decorum in either direction. scaenicorum quidem mos tantam habet vetere disciplina verecundiam ut in scaenam sine subligaculo prodeat nemo; verentur enim ne, si quo casu evenerit ut corporis partes quaedam aperiantur, aspidamur non decore.] The subligaculum was a loincloth corresponding to the π€ρίζωμα or διάζωμα, which athletes are sometimes depicted wearing on Greek vases. The Romans wore it under the toga and, if not nude, in bathing. Cf. Schuppe, RE 4A1 (1931), 481.65 ff.; E. Saglio in Daremberg-Saglio, 4.2, 1550 (with illustra tions); Wilkinson, 1979, 98; Norma Goldman, "Reconstructing Roman Clothing," in Judith Lynn Sebesta and Larissa Bonfante, eds., The World of Roman Costume (Madison, 1994), 233-34.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 129-30
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nostra quidem more cum parentibus puberes ftlii, cum soceris generi non lavanmr.] Cf. Plut. Cat. mat. 20.8: και τοΟτο κοινόν εοικε 'Ρωμαίων εθο? είναι· και γαρ πενθεροι γαμβροί? έφυλάττοντο συλλουεσθαι, δυσωπουμενοι την άποκάλυψιν και γύμνωσιν; de Orat. 2.224 (a joke of Crassus at the expense of M. Brutus [see ad 2.50] that turns upon this custom); Wilkinson, 1979, 100, compares the story of Moses and his sons at Ge. 9.20 ff. retinenda igitur est huius generis verecundia . . . ] The sense of good old customs or institutions having slipped or being in danger of slipping away is met with elsewhere in Off.; cf. 3.44: itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT; 2.27 and 29; 3.110. 130-3 la—non adesse constantiam.] On the plan of this section cf. ad SS 126-32. 130 Similar but much expanded precepts on many of these topics (inter spersed with Biblical citations) appear at Clem. Al. Paed. 3.11 (see the fol lowing notes). If, as seems likely, Clement used Panaetius as one of his sources, Cicero may have considerably compressed his model in this sector. Cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera siM, quorum in altera venustas sit, in altera dignitas, venustatem muliebrem ducere deberaus, dignitatem virilem.] For this sense of dignitas cf. Cael. 8 with Austin's note. For possible influence of this doctrine on L.B. Alberti's concepts gravitas and festivitas cf. Onians, 99-100. ergo et a forma removeatur omnis viro non dignus ornatus . . . ] In his essay u O n Shaving," after invoking nature as a model Musonius deprecates effeminacy in a way similar to our passage: όθεν και καρτεον μόνη? 'ένεκα τή? άφαιρεσεω? του περιττού και ουχί κόσμου χάριν, όπερ οΐονται δεΐν ενιοι τα μεν γενεια λεαινόμενοι και μιμούμ€νοι του? άγενείου? ή νή Δία του? άρτι γενειάσκοντα?, την δε κεφαλήν ούχ όμοίω? κειρόμενοι διαφόρω? δε τά πρόσω των οπίσω, και γαρ τοι δοκών είναι κόσμο? ουτο? πολλήν άκοσμίαν έχει και διαφέρει ουδέν του καλλωπισμού του τών γυναικών (115.15 ff.). In the follow ing detailed discussion of ornaments by Clement (Paed., 266.26 ff. and 267.8 ff. Stahlin-Treu) note the recommendation of moderation and of re straint of the irrational part of the soul, the citation of poetic authority, and the assumption that σωφροσύνη is the ideal, all characteristic of Panaetius: δια τοϋτο και τό χρυσοφορεΐν και το εσθήτι μαλακωτερα χρήσθαι ού τελεον περικοπτέον. χαλινωτεον δε τά? άλογου? τών ορμών, μη ει? τό αβροδίαιτον ήμά? ενσείσωσιν φερουσαι υπό πολλή? τη? άνεσεω? έξαρπάσασαι- δεινή γάρ ή τρυφή ci? κόρον εξοκείλασα σκιρτήσαι και αναχαιτίσαι και τον ήνίοχον, τον παιδαγωγόν. άποσείσασθαι, ό? πόρρωθεν ανακόπτων τά? ηνία? άγει και φέρει προ? σωτηρίαν τόνϊππον τον άνθρώπειον, τό άλογον μερο? τη? ψυχή? τό περί
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ήδονά? και όρεζει? έπιψόγου? και λίθου? και χρυσίον και έσθήτα ποικίλην και τήν άλλην χλιδήν έκθηριούμενον . . . άβροδίαιτον όνειδίζων νεανίαν ό Σοφοκλή? λέγει (fr. 769 R.)· "γυναικομίμοι? έμπρεπει? έσθήμασιν." ώ? γαρ στρατιώτου και ναύτου και άρχοντο?, ούτω? δε και σώφρονο? έστιν οικεία στολή ή άπερίεργο? και ευσχήμων και καθάριο?. nam et palaestrici moms sunt saepe odiosiores . . .] I.e., before they have been trained; hence Horace's invocation of Mercury {Carm. 1.10.2-4) qui feros cultus hominum recentutn I voce formasti catus et decorae I more palaestrae. Cf. Quintilian's description (1.11.16) of palaestrici:. . . a quibus gestus motusque formantur, ut recta sint bracchia, ne indoctae rusticae manus, ne status indecorus, ne qua in proferendis pedibus inscitia, ne caput oculique ab alia corporis inclinatione dissideant. Hence in Cicero the pa laestra is ordinarily a metaphor for polish, as in the description of Coelius Antipater at Leg. 1.6 (. . . paulo inflavit vehementius habuitque vires agrestis ille quidem atque horridas, sine nitore ac palaestra . . .). . . . et histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non vacant, et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et simplicia laudantur.] Our passage has been thought to betray "the suspicion and reserve with which in ordinary life the Romans viewed the athletic and performing arts" (Fantham, 165), on which cf. in general Edwards, ch. 3. Cicero's goals here are modest, however; he is merely concerned with the degree to which such very public gestures can serve as a model for the ordinary citizen; elsewhere he makes it clear that he respects the taste of certain actors (§ 114). The Ciceronian Crassus recommended that the intending orator study actors to learn to avoid deformitas pravitasque {de Orat. 1.156); cf. Quint. Inst. 1.11.3 (in a passage discussing the comic actor as a model for the intending orator): ne gestus quidem omnis ac motus a comoedis petendus est. quamquam enim utrumque eorum ad quendam modum praestare debet orator, plurimum tamen aberit a scaenico. nee vultu nee manu nee excursionibus nimius. nam si qua in his ars est dicentium, ea prima est, ne ars esse videatur; Clem. Al. Paed. 273.30 ff. Stahlin-Trcu: έπανορθωτέον δέ δτι μάλιστα και τά σχήματα και τα βλέμματα και τά βαδί σματα και τά? φωνά?. ού γαρ ώ? τινε? την ύπόκρισιν ζηλοϋσαι τη? κωμωδία? και τά? κατεαγυία? τών όρχηστών κινήσει? παραφυλάττουσαι παρά τά? ομιλία? σκηνοβατοϋσιν, αύτοϊ? τοΐ? κινήμασιν τοΐ? άβροΐ? καΐ τοΊ? υγροί? βαδίσμασιν και φωναΐ? ταΐ? πεπλασμέναι?, κλαδαρον περιβλεττουσαι, δέλεαρ ηδονή? έξησκημέναι. formac autem dignitas colons bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis.] Ibid., 272.7-8 and 17 ff. Stahlin-Treu: έπειτα και το σωματικόν κάλλο? ήσκήσθω, "συμμετρία μελών και μερών μετ* εύχροία?.*' . . . άνθο? δε τή? υγιεία?ελευθεριον το κάλλο?· ή μεν γάρ ένδον του σώματο? εργάζεται, τό
Commentary on Book 1, Section 130-31
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δε εις το εκτός του σώματος έξανθησαν φανεράν ενδείκνυται την εϋχροιαν. αϊ γούν κάλλιστοι και υγιεινότατοι άγωγαι διαπονούσαι τά σώματα το κάλλος τό γνήσιον και παράμονον εργάζονται . . . adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa neque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam neglegentiam.] Here, too, a mean is recommended between mollitia and rusticitas (cf. 5 129); the malodorous Rufus of Catullus' acquaintance would, for instance, have fallen under the ban against agrestis et inhumana neglegentia (Carm. 69); cf. E.S. Ramage, Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement (Norman, Okla., 1973), 176, n. 45. Cf. Clem. Al. Paed. 268.6 ff. Stahlin-Treu: καθάριος δε και αφελής ή σωφροσύνη, επει ή μεν καθαριότης έξις έστιν παρασκευαστική διαίτης καθαρός και αμιγούς αίσχροΐς, ή δε αφέλεια εζις αφαιρετική των περιττών. eadem ratio est habenda vestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est.] On the πρέπον in clothing cf. Arist. Rhet. 1405a 13: άλλα δεΐ σκοπεΐν, ώς νεω φοινικίς, οϋτω γεροντι τί · ού γαρ ή αυτή πρέπει έσθής. Cf. the detailed instructions about (mostly women's) clothing at Clem. Al. Paed. 268.9 ff. Stahlin-Treu. 131 cavendum autem est ne aut tarditatibus utamur—aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates . . .] Catiline, as depicted by Sallust [Cat. 15.5), exceeded the mean on both sides: . . . citus modo, modo tardus incessus; cf. also Hor. S. 1.3.9-11: saepe velut qui I currebat fugiens hostem, persaepe velut qui I lunonis sacra ferret (perhaps an allusion to the Greek proverbial expression βαδί£ειν <είς> Ήραΐον έμπεπλεγμενον attested at Ath. 12.525e); passages cited by Maud W. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 1995), 61 and n. 26.—At Fin. 5.35 Cicero gives a more vivid description of the movements he deprecates on grounds of "unnaturalness":. . . etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi fractique motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt. . . ; on the Roman construction of mollitia cf. in general Edwards, ch. 2 (on Cicero, pp. 63 and 90), and Gleason, loc. cit., 62 ff.; cf. SS 14 and 146. . . . ut pomparum ferculis similes esse videamur . . . ] The phrase pomparum fercula, referring to the frames used to convey sacred objects in procession, betrays Cicero's satirical streak, ordinarily kept in check in Off. but given free vent around this time in the Second Philippic; it was picked up by Ambr. off. 1.73: sunt etiam qui sensim ambulando hnitantur histrionicos gestus et quasi quaedam fercula pomparum . . . and Hieron. epist. 125.16 (a passage satirizing those whose monastic vows involve a change of habit but little else): pomparum ferculis similes procedunt ad publicum, ut caninam exerceant facundiam; cf. David Wiesen, 5/. Jerome as a Satirist (Ithaca, 1964),
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88. Cf. also Hon 5. 2.8.13: ut Attica virgo I cum sacris Cereris procedit, an allusion to the κατήφορο? at the Eleusinia; cf. L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin, 1932), 91. . . . ne . . . in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias edentates, quae cum fiunt anhelitus moventur, vultus mutantur, ora torquentur. . . ] Cf. ad §§ 102 (effects of anger on one's features) and 145; Ter. Hau. 3 5 - 4 0 : adeste aequo animo, date potestatem mihi I statariam agere ut Uceat per silent ium, I ne semper servo' currens, iratus senex, I edax parasitu\ sycophanta autem inpudens, Iavaru' leno adsidue agendi sint sent I clamore sum mo, cum labore maxumo. Here L. Ambivius, the prologus, pleads with his audience to allow him to perform without interruption the stataria of Terence so that he may not always have to perform roles unsuited to an old man. Even though Terence and Panaetius were both acquainted with Scipio Aemilianus, it is necessary to assume only that both were influenced by similar rhetorical doctrines of the πρέπον, rather than that Panaetius influenced Terence.— Gill, 1988, 197, n. 101, compares our passage to Aristotle's "notorious" description of physical traits (slow gait, low voice, steady speech) of the μβγαλόψυχος at EN 1125a 12 ff. and adds that Aristotle, however, "does not claim that such characteristics are in themselves natural'." But 1 take it that what has made that passage notorious is that Aristotle has otherwise described the virtues in terms of mental constituents and that, in spite of some attempt to link these physical traits to mental ones (ούγάρσπβυστικός ό π€ρΙ ολίγα σπουδάζων κτλ.), given the general lack of correlation between physical and mental traits, it seems arbitrary to fasten on particular physical attributes. 176 On the other hand, the πρβπον of Cicero/Panaetius is man ifested in the physical events of life (cf. § 9 8 : . . . hoc decorum quodelucet in vita . . .), and our passage is not the first or the only place where specific behaviors are recommended; hence it does not stand out in the same way as a μ£τάβασΐ5€ί?άλλογ€ΐΌ£. Also, "nature" in Panaetius'claim that the πρέπον and the other virtues are "according to nature" has the sense of "the higher nature of the human being" as opposed to animals, not the sense in which "nature" and "natural" are commonly used today. Typically, the behavior advocated by Panaetius represents, as here, a mean between extremes (both tarditationes and festinationes being deprecated); cf. ad $$ 93 and 126-32. . . . ex quibus magna significatio fit non adesse constantiam. sed multo etiam magis elaborandum est ne animi moms a narura recedant. . .] The relation of ideas is somewhat oddly expressed, since surely the point of avoiding a change of vultus was that an inconsistency in the soul would be thereby 176. Why, for instance, should a μεγαλόψυχο? nor have a high voice?
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 131-32a and 132b-37
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revealed; cf. § 145; de Oral. 3.221: animi est enim omnis actio et imago animi voltus, indices oculi. nam haec est una pars corporis, quae, quot animi motus sunt, tot significationes et commutationes possit efficere. A connec tion between external and internal characteristics is assumed in the Iliad, and its absence is a cause for blame or embarrassment; cf. H. Bernsdorff, Untersuchungen zur Rolle des Aussehens im homerischen Menschenbild (Gottingen, 1992), esp. 115 ff.; for Plato's cautionary note at Hp. Ma. 294a cf. ad $ 94. Dionysius Thrax, περί εμφάσεω? (fr. 52 Linke), had perhaps explored the relation between outward appearance (this is surely the sense of εμφασι? in question; cf. LSJ s.v., 1.2.) and meaning. Such inferences from the external to the internal continue in the following section ($ 134: ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet); cf. ad SS 93-99; on constantia cf. ad § S 93,98, and 111; for the a fortiori form ad § 48. 132a Maler, 2 0 - 2 1 , athetized motus autem animorum—praebeamus on grounds that they are not needed to conclude the section on corporis motus et status and may have been interpolated from $$ 101-2. But the joint between the different announced subjects is particularly vulnerable to receiv ing Ciceronian insertions (see ad §§ 126-49 a propos $§ 138-40); and in this book of moral precepts Cicero elsewhere is by no means averse to repeating himself (for this point as well as for the content see ad $ 101). Hence the general practice of editors in tolerating these words is probably right. 132b-37 Sermo among friends was for Cicero an important component of a happy life; cf. Fam. 9.24.3: nee id |sc. the company of good men bound to one by ties of affection; cf. the immediately preceding matter quoted ad §§ 55-56J ad voluptatem refero sed ad communitatem vitae atque victus remissionemque animorum, quae maxhne sermone efficitur familiari... It is therefore tempting to suppose, with Reinhardt, 1885, 9, that Cicero himself added this section. On the other hand, Schmekel, 233-34, suggested that we have, apart from the Roman examples of § 133, a Panaetian comparison, which also left traces at 2.48, of conversation with public speeches. Panaetius may have wanted to develop the thesis that the Socratic dialogues should be regarded as a model in the former genre. Panaetius' interest in offering precepts for sermo rather than contentio in our passage may have been rooted not merely in the fact that he found the latter, but not the former, already covered in rhetorical handbooks (see the following notes) but, as David Blank suggests, in the distinction between άγωι>ίζ€σθαι and διαλεγεσθαι developed at PI. Tht. 167e ff., whereby the latter leads to the pursuit of philosophy, the former away from it; the remark at 2.48 difficile dictu est quantopere conciliet animos comitas adfabilitasque sermonis is in much the
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same vein; cf. also § 12. This section may therefore, like §§ 7 4 - 7 8 , be an instance in which Panaetius" views corresponded closely to those held by Cicero (cf. also 2.51). It is, however, pace Schmekel, not clear that, if he is the source here, Panaetius argued the general superiority of sernto over contentio (in view of 2.48:. . . non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio (oration is} maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam), merely that he thought it better adapted to certain pur poses {viz., persuasion). To what degree Cicero's exempla Komana have displaced or distorted the Panaetian argument can no longer be made out with certainty (see ad § 133). Thus though it is said that C. Julius Caesar Strabo could use sermo successfully even in the forensic sphere against the contentiones of others ($ 133), 1 7 7 this example, as Schmekel himself pointed out (234), contradicts the context (. . . contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum contionum senatus, sermo in circuits, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivia: § 132b). On the possibility of the remarks on jokes having been transferred from this section, which may have contained several sets of special precepts of which only obiurgatio ($$ 136-37) remains, cf. ad §§ 103b-4. In general the emphasis in this passage is on the smooth functioning of relaxed sermo in small circles of friends; one should make a winning impression and avoid disclosing flaws of character; unpleasantness can be forestalled by seeing to it that conversa tion is not monopolized by one party, sticks to certain licit topics, but allows for some variety, etc.; in the event of conflict anger is, on Stoic principle, to be eschewed, though it may be feigned (the feigning has, of course, not a Stoic, but a rhetorical purpose; cf. Tusc. 4.55: oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet). One cannot, of course, expect every conversational situation to be pro vided for in a set of precepts such as this. Thus Heilmann, 119 ff., shows that this approach fails to deal with emotionally charged conversations, such as the consultation over strategy among Brutus, Cassius, Cicero, and others that took place in early June 44 at Antium (Att. 15.11), which would fall outside both the precepts for placid conversations among friends at §$ 1 3 2 36a and obiurgatio at §§ 136b-37. Such a situation might be said to resem ble the give-and-take of senatorial discussion or between witness and at torney in a court of law and to that degree would, though not involving a setspeech, be closer to contentio. 177. On him cf. ad $$ 108 and 133.—Cf. the similar testimony about Cicero, who in pro Flacco is said toct opportunitate to have freed his client de mamfestissimu criminibus (Macr. 2.1.13), though the passage, unfortunately, does not survive.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 132b-37 and 132b-33
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132b contention is praecepta rhetorum sunt, nulla sermonis, quamquam haud scio an possint haec quoque esse.] There is no obstacle to Panaetius having known the πραγματεΐαι of Aristotle (cf. ad 2.52-64); he might there fore have been expected to mention the advice on social intercourse at EN 1126bll ff. . . . quae verborum sententiarumque praecepta sunt, eadem ad sermonem pertinebunt.] In the sequel, after introductory remarks on vox ($ 133), the precepts all have to do with sententiae, not verba; no doubt Cicero thought the treatment of diction in de Orat. 3 sufficient. 133 Sed cum orationis indicem vocem habeamus, in voce autem duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis . . .] One would have expected cogitationis, rather than orationis here. Cf. Sextus* famous discussion of the Stoic theory of signs: και δη τη? μεν πρώτη? δόξης (i.e., that truth resides in the thing signified) προεστήκασιν ο'ι από τη? Στοά?, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεΐν άλλήλοι?. τό τε σημαινόμενον και το σημαίνον και το τυγχάνον, ών σημαίνον μεν είναι την φωνήν. οΐον την Δίων. σημαινόμενον δε αυτό τό πράγμα τό υπ' αύτη? δηλούμενον και ου ήμεΐ? μεν αντιλαμβανόμεθα τη ημέτερα παρυφισταμενου διάνοια, οι δε βάρβαροι ουκ έπαΐουσι καίπερ τη? φωνή? άκούοντε?, τυγχάνον δε τό εκτό? ύποκείμενον, ώσπερ αυτό? ό Δίων (Μ. 8.11-12). On the Stoic definitions of φωνή/fox cf. in general Wolfram Ax, Laut, Stimme una Sprache. Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie (Gottingen, 1986), 151 ff. Similarly to our passage Cicero had discussed the importance of vox for expressing ideas clearly at de Orat. 3.41 (under Latinitas, the first requisite of elocutio) and had differentiated this concern from problems of delivery: nam de voce nondum ea dico, quae sunt actionis, sed hoc, quod mihi cum sermone quasi coniunctum videtur. Clara is one of the predicates for the voice that falls under vocis qualitas at Quint. Inst. 11.3.15. For suavis or dulcis sonus see the next note. nihil fuit in Catulis—sine contentione vox nee languens nee canora.] In giving a series of examples of the vocal production characteristic of great Roman orators of the previous generation, is Cicero not, perhaps contrary to his model, carrying what seemed to begin as a Stoic discussion of dialectic (see previous note) into the sphere of applied rhetoric? If so, this process was perhaps triggered by a reminiscence of de Oratore 3.41-42. Thus Crassus' discussion of Latinitas includes a similar appreciation addressed to the elder Catulus (3.42): me autem tuus sonus et subtilitas ista delectat, omitto ver borum, quamquam est caput; verum id adfert ratio, docent litterae, confirmat consuetudo et legendi et loquendi; sed banc dico suavitatem, quae exit ex ore; quae quidem ut apud Graecos Atticorum, sic in Latino sermone huius est urbis maxime propria. Similar to our passage is also Crassus* list of
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deprecated qualities (ibid., 41): nolo exprimi litteras putidius, nolo obscurari neglegentius; nolo verba exiliter exanimata exire, nolo inflata et quasi anbelata gravius. The suavitas of Catulus and the similarity of father and son in this regard receive emphasis likewise at Brut. 133: fuit igitur in Catulo semto Latinus; quae laus dicendi non mediocris ab oratoribus plerisque neglecta est. nam de sono vocis et suavitate appellandarum litterarum, quoniam filium cognovisti, noli exspectare quiddicam; similarly, ibid., 259: Catulus erat ille quidem minime indoctus, ut a te paulo est ante dictum, sed tamen suavitas vocis et lenis appellatio litterarum bene loquendi famam confecerat. On the Catuli in general cf. ad § 109. uberior oratio L. Crassi nee minus faceta . . .] On Crassus' wit cf. ad § 108; for his ubertas cf. Antonius' characterization at de Orat. 3.51, cited ad § 2. sale vcro et facetiis Caesar, Catuli patris frater, vicit omnes, ut in illo ipso forensi genere dicendi contentiones aliorum sermone vinceret.j Caesar was not the germanus but only the half-brother of the elder Catulus, both sons of a Popilia, Catulus by her first marriage, to a Q. Lutatius Catulus, Caesar by her second, to L. Julius Caesar (RE s.v. Iulius no. 141); cf. Volkmann, ibid., 22.1 (1953), 64.49 ff.—Cf. ad § 108, as well as Crassus' remarks at de Orat. 3.30: quid, noster hie Caesar nonne novam quandam rationem attulit orationis et dicendi genus induxit prope singulare? quis umquam res, praeter hunc, tragicas paene cornice, tristis remisse, severas hilare, forenses scaenica prope venustate tractavit atque ita, ut neque iocus magnitudine rerum excluderetur nee gravitas facetiis minueretur? In our passage Cicero identifies this special "light touch," which Caesar could apply successfully to the most varied themes, with the sermo (perhaps = το διαλ^γίσθαι.? [cf. ad S§ 132b37]) of Panaetius; but it is not clear that these can be brought under a common denominator in view of the following precept for sermo (§ 134): ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem; cf. also ad §§ 132b-37. 134 Sit ergo hie sermo, in quo Socratici maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax, insit in eo lepos.J A clarification of what is meant by sermo. On Panaetius' interest in the Socratics cf. ad $ 104; for Socrates excelling in a certain type of sermo § 108. nee vero, tamquam in possessionem suam venerit, excludat alios, sed cum reliquis in rebus turn in scrmonc communi vicissitudinem non iniquam putet.] The person engaged in conversation is easily supplied as subject, though the previous subject had been sermo itself; cf. ad % 101 (§ 151, a personification of mercatura, is a bit different).—Thphr. Char. 7 (\α\ίας) confirms that the person who monopolizes conversation was as resented in ancient as in modern times; cf. also TrGF adesp. lb, (c) 4 - 5 Kn.-Sn.: άι/ήρ
Commentary on Book 1, Section 133-35
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γάρ 'όστις ηδεται λίγωΐ'ά€ΐ, /λ€ληθ€ΐ> αυτόν τοΐ?£υνοϋσιι>ών βαρύ?; Clem. ΑΙ. Paed. 192.19-20 Stahlin-Treu: ούτε γάρ μακρολογητ€ον ποτέ ούτε πολυλογητ€οι> οϋτ« άδολ€σχητ€θΐ' . . . ac videat in primis quibus de rebus loquatur: si seriis, severitatem adhibeac, si iocosis, leporem.] This description makes the matter seem simple, but con trast Orat. 70 ff., where Cicero expatiates on the difficulties: ut enim in vita sic in oratione nihil est difficilius quam quid deceat videre. . . . non enim omnis fortuna non omnis honos non omnis auctoritas non omnis aetas nee vero locus aut tempus aut auditor omnis eodem aut verborum genere tractandus est aut sententiarum . . . Cf. Hon S. 1.10.11: et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso . . . in primisque provideat ne sermo vitium aliquod indicet inesse in moribus; quod maxime turn solet evenire cum studiose de absentibus detrahendi causa . . . dicitur.J On the inference from behavior to character in general cf. ad §S 9 3 - 9 9 , 131. Seneca develops the topic talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita at Ep. 114. For the deprecation of backbiting cf. Hor. 5. 1.4.81-85: absentem qui rodit, amicum I qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos I qui capiat risus hominum famamque dicacis, I fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere I qui nequit: hie niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto. 135 danda igitur opera est ut, etiamsi aberrare ad alia coeperit, ad haec revocetur oratio, sed utcumque aderunt;...] The clause utcumque aderunt has caused much difficulty. Recentiores and some early editors added res as subject; when it became clear that this was not the transmitted text, Lambinus wanted to delete the entire clause. Facciolati, on the other hand, printed a full stop after oratio, joined sed utcumque with the sequel and explained "qualescumquc res sint, de quibus loquimur . . . ," surely wrongly. Heine 6 still explains the clause "je nach der Eigentumlichkeit der Anwesenden," an interpretation that had been rightly exploded by Miiller, who suggested utcumque {adfecti erunt, qui) aderunt, whereas Winterbottom obelizes utcumque aderunt. But perhaps the transmitted text can stand; cf. Shackleton Bailey, 1995,260: "Conversation has certain staple topics. It may diverge to others, but must come back to these, 'but in whatever way they crop up.* They will not always present themselves {aderunt) in the same form." neque enim isdem de rebus nee omni tempore nee similiter delectamur.] Literature, however, is an exception according to the famous panegyric at Arch. 16: nam ceterae neque temporum sunt neque aetatum omnium neque locorum; at haec studia adulescentiam acuunt, senectutem oblectant, secundas res ornant, adversis perfugium ac solacium praebent, delectant domi, non impediunt forts, pernoctant nobiscum, peregrinantur, rusticantur.
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animadvertendum est etiam quatenus sermo delectationem habeat, et ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit dcsinendi modus.] After pronouncing the stric tures already cited ad S 134 against speaking at excessive length, Clem. Al. Paed. 192.25 Stahlin-Trcu goes on to adduce the characterization of Thersites from Horn. //. 2.212-14 (also cited by PanaetiusPJ^eTpoeTrriseKoXuia, / ος p' errta φρ^σ'ιν vpw άκοσμα TC πολλά τ€ ήδη, / μάψ, άτάρ ου κατά κόσμον. 136 Sed quomodo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur ut perturbationcs fugiamus . . . sic eiusmodi motibus sermo debet vacare . . .] Cf. ad%% 1 0 0 3a; § 132. . . . maximeque curandum est ut eos quibuscum sermonem conferemus et vereri et diligere videamur.] The theme of regard for others, first broached at SS 98-99 and then revived beginning at § 126 (see ad /oc), reappears, obiurgationes etiam nonnumquam incidunt necessariae—videamur irati.) For the sense of obiurgatio in relation to its parasynonyms cf. ad 3.83.— What is described here is a type of role-playing for a temporary and limited purpose as opposed to the choosing and playing of a role for life as described in the personae theory ($§ 105-21). On the orator's imitation of anger cf. de Orat. 3.217: nullum est enim horum generum, quod non arte ac moderatione tractetur. hi sunt actori, ut pictori, expositi ad variandum colores. aliud enim vocis genus iracundia sibi sumat, acutum, incitatum, crebro incidens . . . aliud miseratio ac maeror . . . sed ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus, nee umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina;. . .] A similar gradation according to medical model is recommended for actions at § 83 (, . . in adeundis periculis consuetudo imitanda medicorum est, qui leviter aegrotantes leniter curant, gravioribus autem morbis periculosas curationes et ancipites adhibere coguntur). For the medical procedure urere et secare = u to cauterize (a diseased part, wound, etc.)" cf. OLD s.v. uro 2b, citing inter alia Phil. 8.15: in corpore si quid eius modi est quod reliquo corpori noceat, id uri secarique patimur ut membrum aliquod potius quam totum corpus intereat. As he wrote these words Cicero surely thought of his break with Antony in the Second Philippic, on which he was at work more or less simultaneously (cf. introduction, § 3). . . . sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest.] Cf. ad SS 88-89. 137 magna(m) autem parte<m) dementi castigatione licet uti, gravitate tamen adiuncta, ut et seventas adhibeatur et contumelia repellatur . . .] See ad S 88, where the recommendation of dementia and the discountenancing of contumelia are forestalled and severitas is to be used reipublicae causa. rectum est autem etiam in illis contentionibus quae cum inimicissimis fiunt,
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 135-37 and 138-40
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etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere, iracundiam pcllere;. . . ] Though not personally present in the senate when Antony at tacked him in his speech of 19 September (cf. Gelzer, 350), Cicero must have felt the need for restraint in its aftermath. quae enim cum aliqua perturbatione hunt, ea nee constanter fieri possunt neque iis qui adsunt probari.] Cicero has described appetitus per se {hominem hue et illuc rapit . . . : $ 101), depicted appetitus under the sway of the passions {perturbationes animi)^ and made clear that freedom from passion gives rise to constantia (efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi ohoediant . . . sintque tranquilli atque omni animi perturbatione careant; ex quo elucebit omnis constantia . . . : $ 102). At Tusc. 4.52 (quoted ad J 89) Cicero denies that his services to the state were performed in anger. The approval of one's fellows was introduced as an ideal early in this section (§S 98-99) and has received special emphasis since $ 126 (see ad loc). deforme etiam est de se ipsum praedicare, falsa praesertim, et cum inrisione audientium imitari militem gloriosum.] On the entire topic see Plutarch's essay de Laude Ipsius; on its likely origin in his work on the biographies of Demosthenes and Cicero and its contacts with rhetorical doctrine cf. K. Ziegler, RE 21.1 (1951), 784.29 ff., with literature.—As he wrote these words Cicero, who attested his fondness for Plautus at § 104, surely had in mind the Plautine Miles Gloriosus after a Greek original (Άλά£ωι>) by an unknown playwright, so that Panaetius might have offered a corresponding example; on the character-type cf. O. Ribbeck, Alazon. Ein Beitrag zur antiken Ethologie und zur Kenntnis der griechisch-romischen Komodie (Leipzig, 1882). 1 3 8 - 4 0 The building of a house being an action, this section might have been expected under that rubric (§§ 141-49). Instead, introduced with the hyper bolic et quoniam omnia persequimur, not mentioned in the plan given in § 126, illustrated with exclusively Roman examples, and driven by a fairly transparent political agenda (see below), it is likely to have been added by Cicero himself (cf. ad §§ 126-51). Note, too, that the subject, the type of house appropriate to a leading statesman, represents a change of premise, since the previous types of decorum were ones to which anyone could aspire; concomitant with this change is the fact that dignitas now appears as a standard [dignitatis diligentta, plenam dignitatis domum, ornanda enim est dignitas domo); here the dignum is not merely a paraphrase for the decorum (cf. ad §§ 93-99) but an external, social measure, whereas natura is the implicit or explicit standard elsewhere in this section (except for §§ 150-51, probably of Ciceronian provenance; see ad loc). In the course of the argu ment Cicero cites the case of two Romans, Cn. Octavius and M. Aemilius
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Scaurus. The splendid house built by Octavius on the Palatine was thought to have contributed to his election, the first in his family, to the consulate of 165. On the other hand, when Scaurus removed that building to make room for an addition to his own house, he suffered both electoral reverse and ealamitas. The moral Cicero draws is this: ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nee domo dominus sed domino domus honestanda est. Shackleton Bailey observes: "Cicero's meaning (badly expressed) I take to be that in spite of the magnificence of Scaurus' house he came to grief. A fine house may help (as in Cn. Octavius* case), but only if the owner's dignitas has other props, nee. . . honestanda est takes this a step further: the owner should make the house respected rather than vice versa. Cicero cannot mean to deny outright what he has just implicitly admitted (that domo dominus honestatur), but the important thing (he means to say) is the other way round. For the sake of his epigram he overstates." On our passage as a guide to Roman attitudes toward domestic architecture cf. Wallace-Hadrill, 4 if. Finally, a political agenda probably underlies the passage; with Octavius and Antony competing for the support of veterans (cf. ad 3.84) Cicero takes the opportunity to praise the first Octavius to attain the consulate (note that ignobilitas was among the charges Antony leveled against Octavius [and against which Cicero defends him; Phil. 3.15] 178 ) and to criticize the appro priation in "these times" (i.e., in the aftermath of the civil war with its attendant confiscations and sales) of houses by unworthy persons, a charge that Cicero brings against Antony with reference to the property of Pompey {Phil. 2.64-75) and Varro (ibid., 103-5). 138 . . . dicendum est etiam qualem hominis honorati et principis domum placeat esse;. . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1123a6-10: μεγαλόπρεπου? δε και οίκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντω? τω πλούτω (κόσμο? γάρ τι? και ούτος), κα! περί ταϋτα μάλλον δαπανά ν οσα πολυχρόνια των έργων (κάλλιστα γάρ ταύτα), και εν έκαστοι? τό πρέπον ού γάρ ταύτα αρμόζει θεοί? και άνθρωποι?, ούδ' εν ί€θφ και τάφω. 178. At pains to establish the emperor's noble pedigree» Suet. Aug. 2 asserts that the family was enrolled in the senate by Tarquinius Priscus, transferred to the patricians by Servius Tullius, but then reverted to the plebs, from which they were raised once again to patrician status by Julius Caesar. He goes on to distinguish two branches, each descended from the quaestorian C. Rufus. Whether Octavian was related to the noble Octavii, who favored the praenomma Cn. and M., is, however, very dubious in light of Augustus* own testimony (apud Suet., loc. cit.) that his family was merely equestrian until his father entered the senate. Nevertheless Cicero's attention at this period to the noble Octavii (cf. Phil. 9.4) was surely intended as a compliment to Octavian; cf. Shackleton Bailey, PhtL, 239, n. 3.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 138-40 and 138-39
317
Cn. Octavio, qui primus ex ilia familia consul factus est—putabatur.] The day after Paullus* renowned triumph for Pydna (cf. ad 2.74), Cn. Octavius celebrated his naval triumph (also over Perseus). The building of the house, probably on the northeastern slope of the Palatine,179 was surely financed with the spoils of war; for the contrast to Paullus cf. ad 2.76. In the sequel he was elected consul for 165 with T. Manlius Torquatus. Following the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, he was despatched in 163 on an embassy to elimi nate the Syrian military potential; the destruction of the warships and mutila tion of the war-elephants provoked a popular outcry, which led to his murder early the next year in Laodicea by one Leptines. His memory was honored at Rome with a statue on the rostra (cf. Phil. 9.4). Near the Circus Flaminius he built (doubtless also from spoils of war) a porticus Octavia, which Augustus restored. Cf. F. Munzer, RE 17.2 (1937), 1810.68 ff.; Shatzman, 256. banc Scaurus demolitus accessionem adiunxit aedibus.] The reference is to M. Aemilius Scaurus (pr. S6)y son of the princeps senatus whom Cicero admired in his boyhood (§ 76). Cicero successfully defended him on charges of extortion {repetundarum) after his term as propraetor of Sardinia. When, however, he was prosecuted for corrupt practices in his consular campaign for 53, in view of Pompey's enmity he was forced into exile; hence the reference to his ignominia. Scaurus demolished the house built by Cn. Oc tavius in order to build an addition to his own mansion; the atrium con tained, for instance, colossal marble columns that had stood in the temporary theater built for his aedileship (Plin. Nat. 36.6 and 114); Clodius later pur chased it for 14.8 million sesterces (ibid., 36.103). Cf. also ad 2.57. 139. . . nee domo dominus sed domino domus honestanda est. . .] Note the handsome chiastic arrangement of nouns, as well as alliteration and polyptoton. . . . ut in ceteris habenda ratio—cura est laxitatis.] The laxitas ("spacious ness") of the great man's house is justified on grounds that it will benefit others as well; cf. ad § 92. odiosum est enim, cum a praetereuntibus dicitur: Ό domus antiqua fetf quam dispari / dominare domino'; quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere.] Both author and play are unknown (trag. inc. inc. 184-85 |p. 3031). The situation would fit the Erigona (either the same as or confused in the later tradition with the Agamemnonidae) of Accius, with Clytemnestra and Aegisthus installed in the palace of the murdered Agamemnon (ibid., 53, p. 164). Cicero cited part of the prior verse in the nearly contemporaneous 179. Cf. H. Jordan, Topographic der Stadt Rom im Alterthum, 1,2d ed. rev. by Ch. Hud sen (Berlin, 1907), 56 and n. 49.
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Second Philippic (104) a propos Antony's occupancy (and attempt to claim ownership) of Varro's farm at Casinum: at quam multos dies in ea vilk turpissime es perbacchatus! ab bora tertia bibebatur, ludebatur, vomebatur. ο tecta ipsa misera, 'quam dispan domino*—quamquam quo modo iste dominus—sed tamen quam ab dispart tenebantur! studiorum enim suorum M. Varro voluit Mud, non libidinum deversorium. The confiscations follow ing Caesar's civil war victory account for the many instances of incongruous possession. Cf. also ad §§ 138-40. 140 cavendum autcm est—villamm magnificentiam imitati!] Under the virtus of L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74), who was, prior to Pompey's eastern command, Rome's richest citizen after M. Crassus and a loyal servant of Sulla and his order, Cicero surely understood his qualities as a personally brave and tactically circumspect general during his eight-year imperium over several eastern provinces (74-66), which decisively weakened Mithridatcs prior to Pompey's victory. Another merit was his mild treatment of his Asia tic subjects, which resulted in him often being remembered in their wills (cf. Fbc. 85). The enmity of the popular party hindered, however, his celebration of a triumph until Cicero's consulate (summer 63). At Leg. 3.30 Cicero reports that, when reproached for the magnificence of his Tusculan villa, Lucullus replied that the villas of his neighbors, one a Roman knight, the other a freedman, were also grand, so that he could surely have a fine villa, if even members of the lower orders could. Similar to the point in our passage that multum mali in exemplo est is Cicero's comment (ibid.): non vides, Luculle, a te id ipsum natum ut Mi cuperentt quibus, id si tu non faceres, non liceret? Veil. 2.33.4 likewise emphasizes that Lucullus' villas marked a depar ture: . . . et Lucullus, summus alioqui vir, profusae hums in aedificiis convictibusque et apparatibus luxuriae primus auctor fuit, quern ob iniectas moles mart et receptum suffossis montibus in terras mare baud infacete Magnus Pompeius Xerxen togatum vocare adsueverat (the sea water channeled in land refers to his celebrated fishponds; cf. ad 3.73). Horace repeatedly assails extravagant building projects such as those pioneered by Lucullus: cf. Carm. 2.15.1 ff.; 2.18.17 ff.; 3.1.33 ff.; 3.24.1 ff.; cf. also Sen. Ep. 114.9. On invective against luxurious buildings in general cf. Edwards, ch. 4. On his career in general cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 (1927), 376.50 ff., and Keaveney (cf. also ad 2.50 and 57b); on his villas Gelzer, 411.10 ff., Keaveney, 144 ff.t and Shatzman, 380; on the spread by example of the mores and luxuries culti vated by the upper class cf. Wallace-Hadrill, 143 ff. Elsewhere, however, Cicero speaks approvingly of the senator as a role-model; cf. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "The Social Structure of the Roman House," PBSR 56
Commentary on Book 1, Section 139-41
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(1988), 45.—Cicero had similarly stressed the role of adults in forming the character of adolescents at SS 122-23. quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque revocandus. eademque mediocritas ad omnem usum culmmque viue transferenda est.] For the quasi-Peripatetic emphasis on the mean in this sector (cf. extra modum just above) cf. ad $ 93. 141-49 The section on actions can be outlined as follows: I. Undertaking actions (§ 141) A. Appetites to be subordinated to reason B. Effort to be in proportion to the goal C. Account to be taken of dignitas and liberalis species II. The proper deployment of actions A. Definition of terms (SS 142-43) B. Unseasonable actions (S 144) C. Need for alertness to small discrepancies (SS 145-46a) D. Correction of one's own faults through observation of others (S 146b) E. Consultation of others' opinions (S 147) F. Civil institutions to be respected (S 148) G. Proper behavior toward various social groups (S 149). One might well query whether G., to which F. forms a kind of prologue, belongs here or should form a separate category. In fact, this subject, too, belongs with the others, all being actions that pertain ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem quibuscum vivimus and are controlled by the corre sponding type oiprudentia (S 143). 141 This chapter, actually an introduction to the topic of facta or actio (see ad SS 93-151 and 126-49), begins by emphasizing a point Cicero is not averse to repeating, viz., utappetitus rationi pareat (cf. SS 101-3a and 136), not only in the subordinate clause quo nihil est ad officia conservanda accomodatius, but also by the final statement horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi; it is nevertheless not to be athetized {pace Stuerenburg); cf. Thomas, 29. . . . deinde ut animadvertatur quanta ilia res sit quam efficere velimus, ut neve maior neve minor cura et opera suscipiatur quam causa postulet.] Cf. Sen. Tranqu. An. 6.3 {aestimanda sunt deinde ipsa quae adgredimur . . .), where the comparison is with "our powers** rather than a calculation of whether the effort is in proportion to the causa; cf. SS 73b, 110.
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modus autem est optimus decus ipsum tenere, de quo ante diximus, nee progredi longius.) Decus is a transparent variatio for decorum; cf. the imagery of transgression at § 102. horum tamen trium praestantissimum est appetitum obtemperare rationi.] For Cicero's tendency to provide a ranking at the ends of sections see ad SS 92 and 151. 142 An action that is good in itself can be bad if done in the wrong time or place, just as it is not an appropriate action to fulfill a promise at the wrong time (cf. S§ 31-32; 3.95). Here we find Cicero laboring under the kind of terminological difficulty Lucretius had complained of (1.832 and 3.260: patrii sermonis egestas; cf. also Caec. 5 1 : . . . in nostra lingua, quae dicitur esse inops . . .; Cicero claims to have overcome the problem at N.D. 1.8). Since ευταξία has no precise Latin equivalent, Cicero falls back on modestia, even though, as he admits, the basic idea underlying the Latin word is modus (cf. ad § 93 and the following notes). haec autem scientia continentur ea quam Graeci ενταξίαν nominant, non hanc quam interpretamur modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest, sed ilia est ευταξία in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio.J Two different senses of εύταjiqa are in question, the first equivalent to modestia (cf. LSJ s.v. ευταξία 2: "orderly behavior"; for modestia in its normal Latin sense cf. § 93 and 2.46); this is the sense in which it was ordinarily associated with σωφροσύνη; cf. SVF 3,27.7-8: άλυπίανδέ και εύταξίαντά? αυτά? είναι τη σωφροσύνη . . . ;ibid., 3, 64.22: τη δε σωφροσύνη εύταξίαν, κοσμιότητα . . . |sc. ύποτάττεσθαι); ibid., 3, 73.5-6: τη δε σωφροσύνη |sc. έπονται] ευταξία και κοσμιότη?. For the other, more literal sense of "good arrangement w cf. LSJ. s.v., 1. . . . modestiam, quo in verbo modus inest. . .] Cf. Paul. Fest. p. 127M: (a) modo fit. . . modestia . . .; Non. p. 30M (with reference to our passage). itaque, ut eandem nos modestiam appellemus, sic definitur a Stoicis, ut modestia sit scientia rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlocandarum.] Cf. SVF 3, 64.31: εύταξίαν δε έπιστήμην τοΰ πότε πρακτέον και τί μετά τι και καθόλου τη? τάξεως των πράξεων . . . ; cf. also SVF 3, 67.1: ευταξία δε εμπειρία καταχωρισμοϋ πράξεων ή περί τάς π ρ ά ξ ε ι έχουσα το βέβαιον ή του? καταχωρισμοϋ? των πράξεων; SVF 3, 68.12: ευταξία εστί . . . δύναμι? τεταγμένη βεβαία των έξη? άλλήλοι? κείμενων εν έργω καλώ? απο δοτική, κατ' άρετήν ανυπέρβλητο?. Our definition evidently conflates the first two quoted (Jungblut, 1, 7 1 , had thought that Cicero's model corresponded to the second only, but note scientia = επιστήμη, and see next note). Perhaps Cicero was not well advised to impose, by fiat, upon modestia the more literal definition of ευταξία simply because the two correspond in the other sense ("orderly behavior"); fortunately, however, this piece of terminological
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legerdemain plays, apart from the next sentence and the first sentence of § 143, no role in the sequel. ita videtur eadem vis ordinis et conlocationis fore; nam et ordinem sic definiunt, compositionem rerum aptis et accommodatis locis.] This sentence has caused considerable difficulty. It is bracketed by Atzert4 and Fedeli (though not Testard or Winterbottom); Reinhardt, 1885,12-14, supposed that conlocationis had displaced modestiae so that the point would be the identity of the preceding and following definitions.180 The argument makes sense, how ever, if one considers closely what Cicero has just said. He has just given a description of ευταξία which acknowledges the inherent difference of this term from the word modest us, viz., in qua intellegitur ordinis conservatio, i.e., not \itTpov/modus but τάξις/ordo, and a definition of ευταξία/Latinemodestia, viz., scientia rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlocandarum. Therefore he is now at pains to harmonize the description and definition: the ordo of the former and the conlocatio implicit in the latter are really the same; he could have clarified this point had he mentioned that the Greek τάξις both figures in the definition of ευταξία (see previous note) and is used as the technical term for the arrangement of arguments in rhetoric (see next note). The identity of the terms is also clear from de Orat. 2.307 (Antonius is the speaker): itaque nunc illuc redeo, Catule, in quo tu me paulo ante laudabas, ad ordinem conlocationemque rerum ac locorum.181 . . . nam et ordinem sic definiunt, compositionem rerum aptis et accom modatis locis.] The subject of this sentence is still the Stoics, i.e., Panaetius (cf. 1.6: sequimur . . . Stoicos), who, as in his formulation of το πρέπον generally (cf. ad § 97), has here drawn upon Hellenistic rhetorical manuals, no Stoic definition of τάξίς/ordo being otherwise a nested. Τάξι? (ordinarily rendered in this technical sense as dispositio, not ordo Ibut cf. de Orat. 2.307, quoted in the preceding note]) was, of course, among the five έργα του ρήτορο
180. Respectively ut modestia sit rerum earum quae agentur aut dicentur loco suo conlo candarum and nam et ordinem sic definiunt. . . 181. I am grateful to Michael Haslam for help in formulating this note and in interpreting this chapter generally.
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app. crit. ad loc. Atzerr 4 reports Reinhardt, 1885, 12-14, as expelling this text along with the following tempus—occasio; in fact, however, Reinhardt excised only the latter. Our sentence, as transmitted, can scarcely be right, however. That the topic is the temporal arrangement of events is announced in the sentence with which our section is introduced {de ordine rerum et de opportunitate temporum) and is made clear beyond any doubt by SVF 3, 64.31, cited in full ad itaque, ut eandem—above (πότε και τί μετά τί). Indeed, one would naturally refer any discussion of the order of actions to temporal, not spatial order. The point in § 144 about the appropriateness of an act being occasion-dependent involves a slight shift, but even there the essential point is about timing or ευκαιρία. Surely Shackleton Bailey is there fore right to delete locum autem and interpret "they say that the opportune ness of an action depends upon the timing." The transmitted text, with its confusion of the categories of time and place, may have resulted from the intervention of an ancient reader who thought that the second genitive needed to limit a second noun and supplied locum in view of the immediately preceding aptis et accommodatis locis. tempus autem actionis opportunum Graece ευκαιρία, Latine appellatur oc casio.] Occasio = ευκαιρία is also a virtue derived from rhetoric; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1408a36: το δ' εύκαίρως ή μή εύκαίρως χρήσθαι κοινον απάντων των ειδών εστίν. Cf. Ιην. 1.40: occasio autem est pars temporis habens in se alicuius ret idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem. At Fin. 3.45 Cicero renders ευκαιρία instead as opportunitas. sic fit ut modestia haec, quam ita interpretamur ut dixi, scientia sit | ο poorrun itatis) idoneomm ad agendum temporum.] Oportunitatis and idoneorum ad agendum temporum surely should not stand side by side; one or the other would be enough (cf. $ 144: inscitia temporis). I suspect that oportunitatis has been introduced either on the basis of the first sentence of this section [de opportunitate temporum) or as a gloss. 143 sed potest eadem esse prudentiae definitio, de qua principio diximus . . .] It could indeed be the same as the definition of φρόνησι?; cf. ad S 153. However, at SS 18-19 (cf. S 17) Cicero had treated the first virtue as purely theoretical (cf. ad locos); φρόνησι? in the sense of practical intelligence is illustrated rather under the third virtue (cf. ad SS 73b and 81), where, however, the term prudentia is not used. . . . quae autem harum virtutum, de quibus iam diu loquimur, quae pertinent ad verecundiam et ad eorum approbationem quibuscum vivimus, nunc dicenda sunt.] Cicero offers, as at § 93, a paraphrase of the fourth virtue without use of technical terms; once more verecundia and the approbatio of one's fellows are juxtaposed, even though these two concepts are so similar (cf. ad S 98), but constantia is omitted.
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144 Talis est igitur ordo actionum adhibendus ut, quemadmodum in oratione constant!, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se et convenientia;. ..] The actions of one's life should form a coherent whole, like a well-crafted speech; cf. § H I and Horace's demand for consistency in characterization (sibi convenientiafinge:Ars 119). . . . turpe enim valdeque vitiosum in re severa (verba) convivio digna aut delicatum aliquem inferre sermonem.] Though accepted by none of the most recent editors (Atzert4, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom), verba of the recentiores is needed for balance {verba convivio digna: delicatum. . . sermonem; cf. Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2) and can easily have fallen out after severa.— Delicatus here clearly has the sense "luxuriosus, libidinosus, lascivus, mollis," as indicated by the following example; cf. Simbeck, TLL 5, 444.65 ff. bene Pericles, cum haberet conlegam in praetura Sophoclem poetam . . .] For Panaetius' interest in the offtcia of magistrates cf. ad $ 124 above. For the modern reader there is some irony in the choice of Sophocles, whose art of plot-construction was so admired in antiquity182 (and modern times), to illustrate want of βύταξία. Panaetius may have found this anecdote in the Έπιδήμιαι of Ion of Chios, who met Sophocles on Chios (FGrHist 392 F 6) at the time of the campaign to put down the Samian revolt during Sophocles' first στρατηγία (441/0), to which our anecdote (= Τ 74c R.) evidently refers; on the character of the Έπιδήμιαι, evidently organized by the personalities Ion had met, cf. M.L. West, "Ion of Chios," BICS 32 (1985), 71-78, esp. 75. V. Max. 4.3. ext. 1 depends on our passage. at enim] Pericles calls his colleague sharply to order; for this collocation of particles (= άλλα γαρ) cf. ad 3.79. atqui hoc idem Sophocles si in athletarum probatione dixisset, iusta reprehensione caruisset: . . .] Atqui (Val. Pal. lat. 1527, anno 1467; Victorius) for the transmitted atque is accepted by Atzert4, Fedeli, and Winterbottom, not by Testard; the two are often confused. Other passages in which atque joins a contrasted idea have been cited in support of our text as transmitted, viz. 3.13 and 48. In the first of these, however, the conjunction follows a negative sentence, where such usage (with et and -que, as well as aclatque) is common in Latin, unlike most modern languages; cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 28; ad § 22. At 3.48, on the other hand, Victorius' atqui deserves serious consideration, the test uter in utrumf telling both there and here in favor of atqui. Cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 22-23, who want to retain atque in our passage. 182. Cf. Scholia in Sophoclis Oedipum Coloneum. rec. V. dc Marco (Rome, 1952), ad v. 28 (with note).
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ut si qui, cum causam sit acturus, in itinere aut in ambulatione secum ipse meditetur, aut si quid aliud attentius cogitet, non reprehendatur, at hoc idem si in convivio facial, inhumanus videatur inscitia temporis.) Indeed such a person could be called ineptus; cf. Cic. de Orat. 2.17: qui aut tempus quid postulet non videt. . . is ineptus esse dicitur; Don. Ten An. 257: ineptum est, quod a quovis reprehendi potest. . . Contrariwise it was the humanitas of the host Crassus at de Orat. 1.27 that freed the evening's dinner from the cloud of political troubles discussed that afternoon. On the use of inhumanus = insociabilis cf. Pfligersdorffer, TLL 7.1, 1607.68 ff. 145 . . . ut si qui in foro cantet aut si qua est alia magna perversitas . . .] For dancing in the forum as a disgraceful act cf. 3.75 and 93; for the equally disreputable dicing in the forum cf. Phil. 2.56. . . . facile apparet nee magnopere admonitionem et praecepta desiderat;. . .] Did Panaetius nevertheless provide such (cf. ad 2.16)? 1 4 5 - 4 6 ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamvis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadvert! solet, sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepct, vel multo ctiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est. itaque ut in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt, sic nos, si acres ac diligentes (iudices) esse volumus animadversoresque vitiorum, (magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis} ex oculorum optutu, superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione, ex maestitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu, ex locutione, ex reticentia, ex contentione vocis, ex submissione, ex ceteris similibus facile iudicabimus, quid eorum apte fiat, quid ab officio naturaque discrcpet.J The juxtaposition of these two similes has caused difficulty;183 for complaints of want of a clear train of thought cf. Muller ad loc. and Pohlenz, 82, η. 2 . 1 8 4 Atzert thought it necessary to athetize the first [ut in fidibus—concentus est) on grounds that it merely duplicates the content of the second. However, the two similes are not identical in content, as Thomas, 23 ff., showed. More over, the first simile is for several reasons likely to be genuine: the a fortiori argument from the realm of physical perception to that of actions (or thoughts) that have moral significance is used elsewhere in the essay (see $ § 1 4 , 100, and 131); and the need for attentiveness to small details rein forced by the first simile likewise appears in the preceding sentence, sus-
183. For the subject matter see the simile comparing a symphonic performance with con cord in the state at Rep. 2.69, where the idea of the expert's sensitivity to discord is also met {. . . concentus est qutdam tenendus ex dtstmctts sonis, quern inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre non possunt . . .). 184. "In 145.146 ist die Gcdankcncntwicklung unscharf und nicht endgiltig geformt. Das zeigen die zwei gleichen Satzanfange Ut in fidibus."
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pected by no one (quae autem parva videntur esse delicto—ab its est diligentius declinandum)y as well as § 111 (omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae, turn singularum ac tionum . . .). It seems doubtful, in fact, that anyone would ever have thought of bracketing the first simile if it were not followed by the similarly intro duced {ut in ftdibus) second simile; but note the comparison of the moral agent to a poet twice formulated at $§ 97-98, where likewise the second formulation is introduced with an inferential particle (sed poetae quid quernque deceat ex persona iudicabunt, . . . quocirca poetae in magna varietate personarum etiam vitiosis quid conveniat et quid deceat videbunt. . .). Whether Cicero would in revising the work have eliminated this repetition (e.g., by deleting sic videndum est in vita—musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt) is an interesting, but moot, question. What really ails this passage is something else. Thomas, 24, already pointed out some of the problems of the clause magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis as a conclusion to the second simile. Especially in light of the preced ing emphasis on parva in the first simile and the prior sentence (for further examples of such parva cf. § 131) it is odd for the parva to be thrust into the background and the stakes suddenly raised to magna, especially when the term is not clearly defined here (or susceptible of ready inference from con text; contrast N.D. 2.145, quoted below); what are the magna that "we" are supposed to learn? Again how is the learning of magna, of whatever sort, a fitting conclusion to the fact that the ears of musicians pick up even the subtlest nuances (vel minima sentiunt)} Is it a matter of learning at all or rather one of perception? In view of these problems it is hard to avoid the conclusion that magna saepe intellegemus ex parvis has been interpolated on the basis of the preceding simile (vel multo etiam magis, quo maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est) by a reader who misunderstood the structure of the long period and thought something missing. The premise of both similes is that the ear of the musical specialist (sciens, musici) can make subtle discriminations (presumably of tone: quamvis paulum discrepent is explicit in the former). This accords with the distinction of αυτοφυής αΐσθησις and επιστημονική αϊσθησις by Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon, according to whom in the course of musical training one strives for subtler perception; cf. Philodemus* riposte (SVF 3,223.31 ff.): και δια τούτο £ητών (ό) μουσικό·? την τοιαύτης συνεσιν, ή δυνήσ€ται διαγινώσκ€ΐν, αί ποΐαι των αΐσθησ€ων πώς διατβθήσονται, των ανύπαρκτων έττιστήμην Cnjei . . . ; cf. ad § Η . For the notion that details of behavior disclose the state of the soul cf., besides §§ 102 and 131, N.D. 2.145:. . . venustatem atque ordinem et ut ita
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dicam decentiam oculi iudicant atque etiam alia maiora: nam et virtutes et vitia cognoscunt, iratum propitium, laetantem dolentem, fortem ignavum, audacem tumidumque cognoscunt, with Heinemann, 2 , 2 1 1 ; Sen. £p. 52.12: omnia rerum omnium, si observentur, indicia sunt, et argumentum morum ex minimis quoque licet capere: inpudicum et in cess us ostendit et manus mota et unum interdum responsum et relatus ad caput digitus et flex us oculorum; inprobum risus, insanum vultus habitusque demonstrat; Ed wards, 89-90. 145 . . . sic videndum est in vita ne forte quid discrepet. . .] The discrepancy would presumably be, as in the case of Sophocles just cited, between the given action and the social role one was assuming; on the need to avoid any discrepantia cf. § 111. . . . maior et melior actionum quam sonorum concentus est.j Cf. D.L. 6.27 (sim. 6.65): και μην κα\ του? μουσικού? [sc. έθαύμα£ε ό Διογένη?] τα? μεν εν τη λύρα χορδά? άρμόττεσθαι, ανάρμοστα δ' εχειν τη? ψυχή? τά ήθη; Sen. Ep. 88.9 (the famous letter de liberalibus studiis): ad musicum transeo. doces me quomodo inter se acutae ac graves consonant, quomodo nervorum disparem reddentium sonum fiat concordia: fac potius quomodo animus secum mens consonet nee consilia mea discrepent. 1 4 6 . . . sic nos, si acres ac diligentes (iudices) esse volumus animadversoresque vitiorum . . .] Cf. $ 114 (where, however, it is "our" behavior that is to be judged): suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat. . .—Animadversor is a άπαξ, presum ably coined by Cicero for this place, the coinage facilitated by the fact that he had used the corresponding verb several times recently (§ 135: animadvertendum est etiam quatenus sermo delectationem habeat; $ 141: ut animadvertatur quanta ilia res sit quam efficere velimus)\ cf. Klotz, TLL 2, 74.26. . . . ex . . . superciliorum aut remissione aut contractionc . . . ] Cf. Quint. Inst. 11.3.79: ira . . . contractis [sc. superciliis], tristitia deduetts, hilaritas remissis ostenditur. . . . ex . . . superciliorum aut remissione aut contractione—quid ab officio naruraque discrepet.] Cf. Sex. Rose. 37:. . . id quod praeclare a sapientibus dicitur, voltu saepe laeditur pietas. . . Reminiscent of our passage (and based on the corresponding place in Panaetius?) in assuming the importance of even tiny details of comportment is the letter Isidore of Pelusium directed to a soldier named Isaiah who had, by his αλαζονεία, aroused the saint's wrath: . . . ρύθμιζε σαυτόν προ? τό πρέπον άνδρΐ ε πιει κει σχήμα, καΐ μήτε δι' οφθαλμών μήτε δι* οφρύων μήτε δια γλώττη? μήτε δια βαδίσματο? ϊχνο? τι τη? τοιαύτη? έμφαινεσθω νόσου {PG 78, 721C). quo in genere non est incommodum quale quidque eorum sit ex aliis
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iudicare, ut si quid (de)deceat illos, vitemus ipsi.] Deceat is transmitted in the 9th-10th century MSS (PVL) and was surely the reading of the archetype; it is also impossible. We have our choice between two conjectures, non deceat of Β or dedeceat of P 2 ; Atzerr 4 , Fedeli, and Testard have chosen the former, presumably because Β is the older witness; but given that both are conjec tures, that hardly matters. Dedeceat, adopted by Winterbottom, is surely the original and was corrupted through haplography (so already Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2); cf. also de Orat. 1.132. fit enim nescioquo modo ut magis in aliis cernamus quam in nobismet ipsis si quid delinquitur.] On φιλαυτία, which creates a gulf separating one from others, cf. ad $ 30; for this piece of popular wisdom cf. Ten Hau. 503-5 (sim. 210): ita conparatam esse hominum naturam omnium I aliena ut meliu' videant et diiudicent I quam sua; Cic. Tusc. 3.73: est enim proprium stultitiae aliorum vitia cernere, oblivisci suorum; Sen. de Ira 2.28.8: aliena vitia in oculis habemus, a tergo nostra sunt; Matt. 7.4 (sim. Luke 6.42): ή πώς €ρ€Ϊς τω ά&λφψ σου· άφ€ς €κβάλω το κόρφος *κ του οφθαλμοί» σου, και ιδού ή δοκός έν τω όφθαλμφ σου; Otto, 209 (s.v. mantica). Similarly Plutarch (de Laude Ipsius 547d) recommends the observation of others' self-praise as a cure for one's own. itaque facillime corriguntur in discendo quorum vitia imitantur emcndandi causa magistri.] Cicero perhaps has in mind his own master of rhetoric, Molo of Rhodes; cf. Brut. 316: quibus \sc. rbetoribus Asiae] non contentus Rhodum vent meque ad eundem quern Romae audiveram Molonem adplicavi cum actorem in veris causis scriptoremque praestantem turn in notandis animadvertendisque vitiis et instituendo docendoque prudentissimum. 147 Nee vero alienum est ad ea feligenda quae dubitationem adfemnt, adhibere doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos, et quid iis de quoque officii genere placeat exquirere (maior enim pars eo fere deferri solet quo a natura ipsa deducitur).] As Pohlenz, AF, 82, n. 2, pointed out, (d)eligenda hardly fits quae dubitationem adferunt; it is not a question of choosing matters that cause doubt but rather of discriminating among them the good and bad actions. In point of sense one might expect diiudicanda (cf. 3.19: itaque, ut sine errore diiudicare posshnus, si quando cum illo quod bonestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur quod appellamus utile . . . ; sim. 3.56). 185 On the basis of Lp's reading dirigenda Pohlenz suggested dirimenda. Cf. OLD s.v. dirimo 4b: "impose a decision, settle"; but in this sense dirimo would 185. For its transitive use cf. Ciceronian and other examples at Gudcman, TLL 5,1156.33 ff.
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require controversiam, litem, or the like as object; cf. Tafel, TLL 5, 1259.10 ff. The other sense that might come into question would be "separate" (OLD s.v., 3); but in this sense Cicero uses the word not of a systematic division but of a separation of a societas (cf. 3.23, where it is used of the avium coniunctio, and other examples at TLL, loc. cit., 1258.45 ff.). Hence, appar ently, Pohlenz's conjecture has not found favor with Fedeli, Testard, or Winterbottom, all of whom print eligenda (without a crux), or Atzert4 (who brackets deligenda). Another possibility worth considering would be digerenda, which, unlike dirimenda, can be used of a systematic division or classification; cf. OLD s.v. digero 4b: "arrange, organize, classify,** where inter alia de Orat. 2.79 is cited (on the classification of the parts of eloquence: . . . aliter ab aliis digeruntur).—The words here set in parentheses, maior enim pars—deducitur, form a problem of their own. If the majority is guided by nature, it does well according to Panaetius* system, since he recognizes the Stoic TeXog formula "life in accord with nature" (cf. ad 3.12-13). But this sentence has clearly been written in the intent, not of praising, but of deprecating the behavior of the maior pars; it is given as the reason {enim) for consulting the learned or experienced, an unnecessary procedure if the maior pars could trust their instincts; for Panaetius' general distrust of the majority cf. ad % 118.1 suspect that we have here an instance of Cicero lapsing into nontechnical language without considering the possible philosophical im plications (cf. ad § 114 a propos sapiens). Pohlenz's supposition (AF, 83, n. 2) that Cicero added this sentence to the margin in light of the following simile (ut enim pictores—corrigenda sunt) is both uncontrollable and unnec essary. It is true, as Atzert4, XXX-XXXI, states, that the following in quibus videndum— connect with what precedes maior enim pars—deducitur; but this by no means rules out the possibility of a parenthetical insertion by Cicero himself.186 in quibus videndum esc non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid quisque senoat atque etiam qua de causa quisque sentiat.] For the distinction between what one says and what one feels cf. $ 40 [semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum est; cf. ad 3.108) and § 124 (talem enim solemus et sentire bonum civem et dicere), as well as Luc. 15, quoted ad § 108 (de Graecis autem—); cf. also Mil. 105: vos oro obtestorque, iudices, ut in sententiis ferendis, quod sentietis, id audeatis.—Attention to the rea186. The reference of the relative connector in quibus over the parenthetical matter is no great problem; cf. S. Lundstrom, Vermeintliche Glossemc m den Tuscuhnen (Uppsala, 1964), 47 ff. (on Tusc. 1.3: qui fuit maior natu quant Plautus et Naevius, which refers, not to the immediately preceding Ennhtm, but to the previously mentioned Livius).
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 147 and 148-49
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sons as well as the judgments will presumably enable one both to evaluate the judgments and have a basis for forming judgments in future, ut enim pictores—corrigenda sunt.] As Reinhardr» 1893, 12 ff.» saw, the process described in the prior part of the simile really applies only to Apelles, not to painters in general, let alone sculptors and poets. In question is the famous anecdote recounted at Plin. Nat. 35.84-85 (cf. V. Max. 8.12 ext. 3): Apelli fuit alioqui perpetua consuetudo numquam tarn occupation diem agendi, ut non lineam ducendo exerceret artem, quod ab eo in proverbium venit. idem perfecta opera proponebat in pergula transeuntibus atque, ipse post tabulam latens, vitia quae notarentur auscultabat, vulgum diligentiorem iudicem quam se praeferens; feruntque reprehensum a sutore, quod in crepidis una pauciores intus fecisset ansas, eodem postero die superbo emendatione pristinae admonitionis cavillante circa crus, indignatum prospexisse denuntiantem, ne supra crepidam sutor iudicaret, quod et ipsum in proverbium abiit. If there are problems with the terms in which the example is presented, its adaptation to context generally leaves much to be desired, as Thomas, 115, saw. Cicero has recommended consulting doctos homines vel etiam usu peritos, but not the opinion of the vulgus, which indeed is depre cated both in the sentence maior enim pars—deducitur and elsewhere in Off. However, lest anyone be tempted to delete this passage, it can be said that it does not actually recommend consulting the opinion of the vulgus but merely uses a case of this to make the point that one needs aliorum iudicium, which is in line with the larger argument. Cicero was unlucky in his choice of the example of consulting the vulgus (on Panaetius' opinion of which see the first note on this section); and, evidently relying on memory here, as sometimes elsewhere in Book 1 (cf. ad SS 33 and 40), he made the phenomenon more widespread than it actually was and omitted Apelles' name. Our passage is in part a reminiscence of the theme that appears at de Orat. 3.195 (a propos prose rhythm): omnes enim tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava, diiudicant; idque cum faciunt in picturis et in signis et in aliis operibus, ad quorum intellegentiam a natura minus habent instrumenti, turn multo ostendunt magis in verborum, numerorum vocumque iudicio . . . (on which passage see D.M. Schenkevcld, u ludicia vulgi. Cicero, De oratore 3.195 ff. and Brutus 183 ff.," Rhetorica 6 [1988], 291-305). Perhaps Cicero would have mended these defects in sub sequent revision. For other problems of adaptation of exemplum to argu ment cf. ad SS 25, 7 4 - 7 8 , and the introduction, S 6 (Regulus). 148-49 Cicero fails to take the opportunity to use nature as a yardstick for measuring and criticizing conventional society. Social critics are either ex traordinary persons such as Socrates and Aristippus who can exercise such
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license (but what are the criteria for admission to this category?) or arc Cynics, whose hostility to verecundia disqualifies them from discussing the honestum; cf. ad § 128. 148 Quae vero more agentur institutisque civilibus, de his nihil est praecipiendum; ilia enim ipsa praecepta sunt.] Sc. by parents or the like. nee quemquam hoc errore duci oportet, ut, si quid Socrates aut Aristippus contra morem consuetudinemque civilem fecerint locutive sine, idem sibi arbitretur licere; magnis illi et divinis bonis hanc licentiam adsequebantur.] An example of Socrates* behavior being at odds with societal convention would be his standing rapt in thought for a considerable time in a neighbor's portico rather than coming immediately to Agathon's dinner (PI. Smp. 174e175a); when he alludes to Socrates' speaking contra morem consuetudinem que civilem Cicero may be thinking of the attack on Athenian democracy and the arts that minister to it at Grg. 502dl0 ff. The contrast between the respectful treatment of Aristippus in this Panaetian section of Off. (our passage = fr. 115 Mannebach = Cirenaici it. IA 65 = Socr. IVA 83; one would have expected it also under the testimonies for Socrates [IC]) and the dismis sive tone of 3.116 (evidently based on an Academic doxography; see ad loc.) is striking. On Panaetius' studies of Aristippus cf. ad § 104. Pohlenz, AF, 83, n. 4, suspected that it was Aristippus' motto € χω, ούκέχομαι that appealed to Panaetius (cf. $S 6Sy 70). In any case, the implicit distinction in our passage is between behavior appropriate to the sapiens and to the ordinary person, with the former relegated to the past. As at $ 21 {sunt autem privata nulla natura . . .) an opportunity for criticizing the existing order of things is ignored.187 Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.] Our passage = Socr. VB 515; cf. ad%% 126-32. 149 Having cleared the way in the previous section, with its acceptance of the mores and institutions of conventional society, Cicero/Panaetius can now lay down customary precepts for behavior toward those who play various roles within the community (as opposed to behavior in those roles, discussed at $S 124-25). Cf. Epict. Ench. 30: ούτως oui> άπό του yeiTovos, άπό του πολίτου, άπό του στρατηγού το καθήκον εΰρήσας, έάν τάς σχέσεις έθί£η θ€ωρ€ΐι>. On the place of this material within the section on actions cf. ad SS 141-49. 187. Cf. Heilmann, 87: "Hatte man hier nicht folgcm Iconncn, daS mos und institura civilia in sich fragwiirdig scin konnen?"
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 148-49 and 150-51
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ad summam, ne agam de singulis, communem totius generis hominum conciliationem ec consociationem colere tueri servare debemus.] Here it becomes clear that the two social virtues (the second and fourth) do indeed overlap (cf. SS 50 ff. on the communitas et societas humana); cf. hominum consociatio as a paraphrase of the second virtue at § 100 (cf. ad he). Does the phrase ne agam de singulis hint that Cicero has curtailed a longer treatment of the theme in Panaetius (cf. l.\6\ad%% 102,107,122-25)? The summary nature of this concluding sentence following upon the more detailed prescriptions of behavior toward various ranks and social groups within the polity has suggested to Heilmann, 87, that in this version of Stoic ethics "das historisch Gewordene gewinnt . . . ein Ubergewicht gegenuber dem von der Natur hergeleiteten MaSstab." The similarity to the earlier phrase observare et colere debemus suggests that Cicero is hastening to bring this topic to a close. 150-51 This list of acceptable and unacceptable professions 188 stands in a long aristocratic tradition; and Greek and Roman views on such questions often coincided (see below). Hence the disagreements as to the audience addressed, the realities reflected, and, ultimately, the provenance. Though Pohlenz and Wilamowitz both regarded this material as Panaetian, the for mer thought it written for a Roman, the latter for a Greek readership. 189 In his extensive commentary on this passage Finley, 5 0 - 5 8 , assumes it to be an accurate reflection of Roman attitudes, but allows (187, n. 42) for some "Greek influence." 190 The previously assumed Panaetian origin is defended by Brunt, 1973, 27 ff. The section on actions has just included advice about proper behavior toward officials, citizens, and foreigners (5 149). Our sec tion deals not with choice of profession (if so, we should have expected it to fall under Il.C.l.d. in the outline ad %% 9 3 - 1 5 1 , i.e., the fourth persona) but the amount of respect that representatives of various professions can claim in society. It is introduced rather abruptly without a connection to what has preceded and follows rather oddly upon the point. . . totius generis hominum conciliationem et consociationem colere tueri servare debemus (such distinctions as are here drawn being potentially invidious and not tending to promote the totius generis hominum conciliatio; see ad § 150). 1 suspect that it has been appended as an explication of the first sentence of $ 149 or rather 188. Surely the formulations improbantur, inliberales et sordidi, sordidi, in sordida arte versantur. and minime probandae arc an example of variatio; no graded scale of values is being drawn up in $ 150. 189. Cf. Pohlenz, AF, 83-84; on his view that Panaetius wrote for a Roman audience esp. 51 and 118 ff. (sec introduction, $ 5 [4\); Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, n. 1. 190. On Finley's method in general cf. D'Arms, 13 ff.
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that that sentence has been formulated with a view to this material following {eos . . . quorum vita perspecta in rebus honestis atque magrtis est, . . ♦ observare et colere debemus); note that the honestum has been used as a criterion throughout Book 1, but the scale of activity (in rebus . . . magrtis) becomes such, apart from the treatment of magrtitudo animi (§§ 61-92), where the element of greatness inheres in the subject ex vi termini, only in § 151 (apart from §§ 138-40, surely of Ciceronian provenance). Moreover, such a formula as haec fere accepimus is not used elsewhere in this treatise to introduce an argument (as opposed to an example, as at § 108); it seems likely to lead into a rehearsal of traditional views; cf. sic a patribus accepimus at Amic. 39, where a Roman tradition is in question. Brunt, 1973, 27, supposes that Cicero has merely reproduced haec fere accepimus from Panaetius; but it is not in Panaetius' manner simply to report commonly ex pressed views for their own sake; he would attack them (cf. §S 74-78), question their sincerity (2.69), or the like; he admires the man who rises above and despises popular values (§§ 65y 147, 2.37). Now the lack of an explicit connection to what precedes or of Greek examples is not an infallible index of non-Panaetian provenance (cf. ad SS 11-17,122-25); but the lack of a connection to the overall argument and a method different from that of the indubitably Panaetian portions of this treatise is. The fourth virtue involves establishing a fitting relation between two terms, one's persona and one's actions; apart from Ciceronian distur bances in the topics and their order (cf. ad $$ 93-151), the first half of this section explored the determination of one's persona (§§ 105-25), the second half the character of actions (§§ 126-49), including those involving the body (§§ 126-32a), and speech (132b-37), and how they are affected by time and circumstance (§§ 141-49); throughout the section the implicit or explicit criterion is nature. On the other hand, $$ 150-51 are not about actions but attitudes; and there is no process of reasoning from nature to the particular recommendation; rather the appeal is to tradition (haec fere accepimus) and to appropriateness to one's social rank (eae sunt its quorum ordini conveniunt honestae; nihil homine libero dignius); this latter concern is, I think, specifically Ciceronian; cf. ad §§ 93-99 and 94 (with reference to dignitas) and 96 (cum specie quadam liberali). It may well be, as Brunt, loc. cit., has suggested, that Panaetius, a Rhodian aristocrat who probably refused pay ment for teaching, 191 thought no differently on this subject than Cicero (cf. 191. There is no evidence that Panaetius accepted money for his teaching (cf. Brunt, 1973, 11)\ and his pupil Posidonius mocked Athcnion, who did accept such payment (F 253.45 if. E.K. = F 247 Th. = FGrHist 87 F 36 = Ath. 5.212c-d); see also ad $ 150.
Commentary on Book 1, Sections 150-51 and 150
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also on § 150 inliberales autent—); but would he have seen fit to introduce his views on the subject in this place and on the basis of reasoning here presented! The similar Greek tradition of approved and disapproved professions is reflected in the list at Pollux 6.128 of βίοι εφ' οΐς αν τις όνειδισθείη. When discussing the occupations worthy of a free man [EN 1121 b31 ff.), Aristotle had placed such conceptions within the framework of his ethical system: di δ' αυ κατά την λήφιν υπερβάλλουσι τφ πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν και πάν, οίον οι τάς ανελεύθερους εργασίας έργα£όμενοι. πορνοβοσκοί και πάντες οί τοιούτοι, και τοκισταί κατά μικρά και ε πι πολλψ. πάντες γάρ ούτοι όθεν ού δει λαμβάνουσι, και όπόσον ου δει, κοινόν δ' επ' αυτοί ς ή αισχροκέρδεια φαίνεται. Our ac count, on the other hand, is moralizing in tendency (note the use of vanitas as a criterion for judging merchants) but can hardly be called philosophical (see next note). Finally note that the end of a Panaetian argument or the interstices be tween such arguments are points at which matter is regularly inserted (whether from elsewhere in Panaetius' treatise, another source, or suo Marte) by Cicero (cf. ad §§ 4 1 , 5 4 - 5 8 , 1 0 0 - 3 a , 1 0 3 b - 4 , 1 2 2 - 2 5 , 138-40, 2.23-29). 150 lam de artificiis et quaestibus, qui liberates habendi, qui sordidi sint, haec fere accepimus.] The following doctrine is more endoxic than philo sophical in character; thus the first item, those occupations that incur peo ple's hatred, makes no attempt to distinguish justified from unjustified odium (cf. Cato [2.89] for the same attitude toward usury; on the other hand, Aristotle [EN 1121b34] specifies τοκισταί κατά μικρά και επί πολλώ), nor is there a philosophical distinction, only a social one, between those who en gage in commerce on a small or large scale (§ 151); and there was certainly no moral stigma attached to the portitor (corresponding to the τελώνης in the list at Pollux 6.128); he was merely unpopular because of his habit of poking his nose ex officio into the property of others (see the next note). primum improbantur ii quaestus qui in odia hominum incurrunt, ut portitorum, ut faeneratomm.] The customs officer owed his unpopularity, of course, to his having to scrutinize closely the cargo of all vessels entering or leaving port; cf. Plut. de Cur. 518c: . . . τους τελώνας βαρυνόμεθα και δυσχεραίνομεν, ούχ όταν τα εμφανή τών εισαγομένων έκλεγωσιν, αλλ' δταν τα κεκρυμμενα £ητοϋντες iv άλλοτρίοις σκεύεσι και φορτίοις άναστρεφωνται· . . . , as well as the metaphorical use of portitor at PI. Men. 114 ff. (Menaechmus I to the parasite Peniculus): nam quotiens foras ire volo, me retines, revocas, rogitasjquo ego earn, quam rem agam, quid negoti geram, I quid petam, quid feram, quid forts egerim. I portitorem domum duxi, ita
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omnem mihi I rem necesse eloqui est, quidquid egi atque ago.—For the Roman attitude toward moneylenders see Cato Agr. 1.1: maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt, furem dupli condemnari, faeneratorem quadrupli. quanta peiorem civem existimannt faeneratorem quant furem, hinc licet existimare; cf. also the caricature at Sen. de Ira 3.33.3: quid si propter usuram vel milesimam valetudinarius faenerator distortis pedibus et manibus ad computandum non relictis clamat ac per vadimonia asses suos in ipsis morbi accessionibus vindicatf192 inliberales autem et sordidi quaestus mercennarionim omnium, quorum operae, non quorum artes emuntur; est enim in illis ipsa merces auctoramentum servirutis.] For the general thought cf. PI. R. 371 e: di δή πωλούι>τ€9 την ττ\ς ισχύος· xpeiav, την π μην ταύτην μισθόν καλοΟντ€?, κ€κληνται, ως €γψμαι, μισθωτοί.—Auctoramentum = recompense, reward {OLD s.v., 3); on payment as a criterion for judging an activity cf. O. Diliberto, Ricerche sull' "auctoramentum" e sulla condizione degli "auctorati," Universita di Cagliari. Pubblicazioni della Facolta di Giurisprudenza I 24 (Milan, 1981), with literature at 32, n. 89; Sen. Ep. 88.1: de liberalibus studiis quid sentiam scire desideras: nullum suspicio, nullum in bonis numero quod ad aes exit. The breakdown in the distinction between slave and free operated to the advantage of slaves (cf. ad § 41a on Chrysippus* formula servus . . . per petuus mercennarius est) but the disadvantage of free laborers, who are now conceptually (though perhaps not yet in reality; cf. Brunt, 1973, 29, n. 3) degraded to little better than slaves.—According to Panaetius, a beneficium that consists in opera is more valuable than one involving pecunia (cf. 2.5264). Thus on his scale of values the moneylender should rank at the bottom, next the mercenarii, then those who practice the liberal arts. Agriculture and commerce fall outside this scheme since they involve the production or sale of commodities. A moral criterion is applied to them, viz., vanitas (perhaps = άλα£ον£ία), which is also deprecated elsewhere (cf. the next note); it was evidently seen as a special temptation for merchants (S 150 of retailers: nihil 192. Brunt, 1973, 30, wrongly supposes that Cicero would not have introduced such views into his essay because of his personal acquaintance with Brutus, who engaged in usury (cf. Gelzer, RE 10.1 [19171,979.12 if.); nor is herightin saying (ibid.) that "the relative position of the merchant and the publican in our text's scale of values is un-Roman" (his emphasis) if by publican he means faenerator. Finley, 54-55, juxtaposing our passage with Cicero's efforts, as governor of Cilicia, to collect loans, with interest, owed to M. Brutus asks "Did not Cicero the practical man make a mockery of Cicero the moralist?" He defends our text, however, by pointing out that Cicero does not call the faeneratores unnecessary and would hardly have called such statesmen as Brutus, Crassus, and Caesar faeneratores, even though they did lend money at interest.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 150
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enim proficiant nisi admodum mentiantur; nee vero est quicquam turpius vanitate; and at § 151 the merchant wins approval if he deals on a large scale and sine vanitate).—At Rome the mercennarii, like the opifices, were ex cluded from the senate; cf. O'Brien Moore, RE Suppl. 6 (1935), 691.56 ff.— Latent in ipsa merces auctoramentum est servitutis is the Marxist analysis of the worker's alienation; for Cicero, however, this observation leads to no desire to reform the existing system. 193 Robert von Pohlmann, Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt, 2, 3d ed. (Munich, 1925), 3 5 9 - 6 1 , subjects our passage to a Marxist critique. With some justice he faults Cicero for failing to accord respect to every honest form of work. On the other hand, in claiming that these chapters aim to sharpen tensions already present in the workplace, he seems to assume a modern industrial society in which books are mass-produced and relatively cheap, and literacy and the study of literature spread through various levels of society; cf. William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Mass.London, 1989), who emphasizes that in antiquity literacy was largely cir cumscribed by location and class, though his thesis is controversial; cf., e.g., the critical review by James G. Keenan, AHB 5 (1991), 101-6. Cicero is writing in a pre-industrial society for an aristocratic readership; and in this passage he shows that he accepts a great many of the assumptions, indeed prejudices, of that constituency. Though here he may be operating largely within its parameters, his project of reforming aristocratic behavior shows through clearly above all in his treatment of the second and third virtues and in the attempt to channel the competitive impulse on a more humane course there and in Book 2; and 3.21-28 is truly visionary, sordidi etiam putandi qui mercantur a mercatoribus quod statim vendant;— nee vero est quicquam turpius vanitate.] Cicero's lack of sympathy with profit-making in commercial transactions is likewise evident in his remarks on some of the casuistic cases in Book 3 (cf. ad 3.49b-57).—For vanitas as a cause of inaccuracy cf. Rhet. Her. 2.35: vitiosa ratio est quae ad expositionem non est adcommodata vel propter infirmitatem vel propter vanitatem; cf. also $$ 137, 151, and 3.58. opificesque omnes in sordida arte versantun nee enim quicquam ingenuum habere potest officina.J The same point is made in detail at X. Oec. 4.2: και γάρ αϊ ye βαι>αυσικα'ι καλούμα ναι και emppnjoi €ΐσι, και €Ϊκότω9 μβντοι πάι/υ άδοξοϋνται προ? των πόλεων, καταλυμαίνονται γάρ τά σώματα τώι> τε εργαζο μένων και των έπιμελομενων, άναγκά£ουσαι καθήσθαι και σκιατραφείσθαι, eviai δέ και προ? πΰρ ημερεύει μ. τών δέ σωμάτων θηλυνομενων και α'ι ψυχαι 193. I owe this observation to Rebecca Rezinski.
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πολύ άρρωστότ€ραι γίγι>οι>ται. Hence the sting in Cicero's portrayal of the shop that Verres established in the palace at Syracuse for making golden vessels: ipse tamen praetor, qui sua vigilantia pacem in Sicilia dicit fuisse, in hac officina maiorem partem diet cum tunica pulla sedere solebat et pallio {Ver. 2.4.54) or his contemptuous reference at Flac. 18 to opifices et tabernarios atque Mam omnem faecem civitatum . . . minimeque artes eae probandae quae ministrae sunt voluptatum, 4cetarii lanii coqui fartores pi sea tores', ut ait Terentius. adde hue, si placet, unguentarios, saltatores, totumque ludum talarium.] The reference is to Eun. 257 (the parasite Gnatho describes a scene at the market); Seneca dismisses such providers of unnecessary pleasures with contempt at Ep. 88.18. Cicero fails to mention the leno, even though the πορι>οβοσκό$ appears in this connection in both Aristotle and Pollux. At Grg. 464b ff. Plato had examined the arts that minister to pleasure and found them to be a species of flattery and αισχροί;; cf. ad § 42. As at Att. 1.16.3 the ludus talarius is the gaming house, which one might have expected to see mentioned at § 104. 151 quibus autem artibus aut prudentia maior inest aut non mediocris utilitas quaeritur, ut medicina, ut architectura, ut doctrina rerum honest arum, eae sunt iis quorum ordini conveniunt honestac.] The liberal arts in general were more highly esteemed among the Greeks than the Romans (cf. Tusc. 1.3 ff.), an imbalance which, at least in philosophy, Cicero was keen to redress (ibid., 5). On the other hand, one Stoic tradition, traceable to Zeno and the Cynics, regarded a liberal education as useless; cf. D.L. 7.32; Schofield, 1991, 10-11; Seneca, too, sometimes emphasized its limitations {Ep. 88; but con trast Vit. Beat. 20.1).—Note the restriction iis quorum ordini conveniunt; such professions would not, of course, come into question for a senator's son. Hence there is no question of our text recommending that noble Ro mans become physicians, architects, or teachers, pace Wilamowitz, 1932, 396, n. I.194—The term architectura as equivalent of ή άρχίτοττοΐΊκή (sc. -ΐΈ'χΐ'η) isfirstattested here; cf. Ausfeld, TLL 1.2, 464.73 ff. The ninth book of Varro's Disciplinae, apparently composed after Off., was entitled de Ar chitectura; cf. H. Dahlmann, RE Suppl. 6 (1935), 1255.42 ff.; hence, writing under Augustus, Vitruvius did not hesitate over what to call his discipline (title, 1.3 et saepe). mercatura autem, si tenuis est, sordida putanda est; . . .] Euripides was mocked in comedy because his mother was a greengrocer (cf. Aristophanes, Frogs, ed. Kenneth Dover [Oxford, 1993] ad 840; γένος· Εύριπίδου, ed. 194. On the social respectability of architecture as a profession at Rome cf. Brunt, 1973, 30 and n. 2; on physicians' fees, ibid., 32.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 150-51
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Schwartz, sch. Eur. 1, 3.15; he is defended against the charge at Su. ε 3695). Plato Lg. 918d gives greed as the reason shopkeepers and tradesmen were held in contempt: τά δε τών ανθρώπων πλήθη . . . δεόμενά τε άμε τρως δείται και εξόν κερδαίνειν τά μέτρια, άπλήστως α'ιρεΐται κερδαίνειν, διό πάντα τά περί την καπηλείαν και έμπορίαν και πανδοκείαν γένη διαβεβληταί τε και εν αισχροί? γε>ονεν όνείδεσι ν; hence the law that only foreigners should engage in such commerce (ibid., 920a; cf. 849b). The inclusion in Pollux's list of such items as κάπηλος, όπωρώνης, and άλλαντοπώλης attests to the per sistence of this particular prejudice. . . . sin magna et copiosa—non est admodum vituperanda;. . .] The stigma is reduced, but not eliminated altogether, if the named conditions are fulfilled. Senators, too, were tempted to engage in commerce; hence the law passed (ca. 218) by plebiscite, despite senatorial opposition, on the initiative of the tribune of the people Q. Claudius, which prohibited senators or their sons from owning a ship with capacity to store more than 300 amphorae (Liv. 21.63.3; Rotondi, 249-50; MRR, 1, 238; C. Nicolet, CAH 9*, 643), a provision often circumvented in practice (E. Gabba, ibid., 8 2 , 204); cf. D'Arms, 31-34.—Mercatura is personified for vividness; cf. the Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Personification." . . . atque etiam, si sariata quaestu vel contenta potius, ut saepe ex alto in portum, sic ex ipso se portu in agros possessionesque contulit, videtur iure Optimo posse laudari.] As D'Arms, 23, pointed out, the implication is that only when transferred to the land is commercial gain regarded as fully legiti mate. Cf. the discussion of change of profession at § 120; on the standing of agriculture cf. the next note. omnium autem rerum ex quibus aliquid adquiritur nihil est agri cultura melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine {nihil} libera dignius.] This is the traditional Roman attitude, reflected in Cato's response recorded at 2.89 (cf. ad loc.)y as well as at Colum. 1 praef. 10 (after considering the claims of warfare, overseas commerce, moneylending, etc.: quae si et ipsa et eorum similia bonis fugiettda sunt, superest, ut dixi, unum genus liberate et ingenuum rei familiaris augendae, quod ex agricolatione contingit). But some Greek authors held similar views; cf. X. Oec. 5.17: καλώς δε κάκεΐνος είπε ν δς εφη τήν γεωργίαν των άλλων τεχνών μητέρα και τροφόν είναι; Muson. 57.6: εστί και έτερος πόρο? ούδεν τούτου κακίων, τάχα δε και άμείνων νομισθείς αν οΐικ άλόγως άνδρί γ ' εύρώστω το σώμα, ό άπό γης . . . This attitude led inter alia to the creation of the latifundia (on which cf. Shatzman, 36-37). Contrast Seneca's condemnation of excessive land-purchases at Ep. 89.20; cf. Griffin, 1976, 298. In calling agriculture and hunting servilia officia {Cat. 4.1) Sallusr no doubt meant to be provocative; cf. Stockton, 7, n.
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6; A. Cossarini, "II prestigio dell' agricoltura in Sallustio e Cicerone," Atti deW Istitutο Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Artit Classe di scienze morali, lettere ed arti, 138 (1979-80), 355-64.—At the end of such a survey of various possibilities Cicero shows a tendency to systematize or at least con clude with a clear indication of which deserves primacy (cf. $$ 58 and 141); so here.—Cicero makes sparing use of figures in this essay; evidently, how ever, he thought that the anaphora characteristic of liturgical language was warranted here to set the dignity of agriculture apart from other occupations (cf. also 2.5); the solemnity is further enhanced by the double cretic clausula. Cf. also ad 2.85. de qua quoniam in Catone Maiore satis multa diximus, illim adsumes quae ad hunc locum pertinebunt.] Cf. Sen. 51 ff. 152-61 Here Cicero fulfills his promise ($ 10) to make good what he re garded as a defea in Panaetius' treatment of the καλόν. Since Panaetius had distinguished four "parts" of the καλόν, the possibility suggested itself to Cicero 195 of having to choose one "part" over another 196 or rather an action dictated by one over an action dictated by another. Panaetius, however, surely did not see this as a problem; like Socrates (?), 197 Plato, 198 Aristotle (EN 1144b30 ff.), and the Stoa in general he held the doctrine later called the άντακολουθία των αρετών (SVF 3, nos. 295-304, with Pohlenz, Stoa, 1,127; Off. 2.35: qui unam haberet omnes habere virtutes, as well as Seneca's phrase comitatus virtutum consertarum et inter se cohaerentium [Ep. 90.31); in part he defined the virtues in such a way that they implied one another (cf. ad § 62; for other Panaetian hints about the interconnection of the virtues cf. $ 1 5 with note). Cicero's observation a propos magnitudo animi (§ 157; see ad be.) might have led him to confront this problem, but he did not. This passage is disappointing in several other respects. 199 We were led to expect a comprehensive comparison, if not of the individual appropriate actions derived from each of the virtues, at least of the individual virtues one with another. What we are given instead is essentially a comparison of the claims 195. Pohlenz, AF, 85, supposes that Cicero here follows a critique of Panaetius that origi nated within the Stoic school; but see below on the άντακολουθία τών αρετών, as well as a
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of the second virtue, which is here called simply communitas, with those of the first;200 the upshot is a defense of activity directed toward the common good as more valuable than purely intellectual pursuits, a theme developed (along the same lines?) in the lost introduction to Rep. I. 2 0 1 The third virtue, magnitude* animi, is dismissed in one clause of $ 157; the fourth virtue, too, is raised as a problem only to be dismissed (§ 159). Besides the less than comprehensive scope, another defect in this section lies in the inconsistency between the treatment of certain subjects here and in the Panaetian portion of the Book. Thus in § 157 bees are cited as an example of things that are sociable by nature; but at $$ 11-12 the social instinct had been presented as something that reason develops in the human being. Furthermore the gods play a larger role here than they do in the Panaetian portions of Off. Thus at § 153 Cicero speaks of the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos, whereas Panaetius was con cerned merely with the societas hominum coniunctioque (§ 50). Moreover, the gods have taken their place at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of appropriate actions at § 160, whereas they were omitted altogether at § 58 (note also how parents in the later passage have been demoted to a place below the patria). In addition one wonders whether the treatment of the first virtue in our section does full justice to its description in $ 18 as a desire for knowledge to which all are drawn (see ad § 153). Other oddities include the fact that in §155 Cicero invokes himself among other examples, but in such a way as to obscure the point of the argument (see ad loc.) and that, according to the transmitted text, Cicero announces that the second virtue is preferable to the first no fewer than five times (end of § 153,157 [see ad loc], 158, and in the first and second sentences of $ 160). Cicero might have been warned, if not by the Greek forerunner of Horace's Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam /iungere si velit. . . , at least by the remark of P. Rutilius Rufus (cited at 3.10) against trying to fill out what Panaetius had left untouched. Pohlenz, AF, 89-90, suspected Posidonius to be Cicero's source for this section. However, as Theiler [ad Posidon. fr. 433) noted, the point for which Posidonius is cited (5 159) runs counter to the general trend of the argument to grant primacy to the communitas;202 and one would hesitate to burden 200. Here he presents variations on the theme of PI. Mx. 246e7: πάσα τε επιστήμη χωριζομοΐΉ, δικαιοσύνη? και ττ\ς άλλη? άρ€τή? πανουργία, ού σοφία φαίνεται. 201. Cf. Philippson, RE 7Α1 (1939), 1110.54 ff. 202. Pohlenz, AF, 89, perhaps reads too much into optimus quisque at $ 154 in seeing a reference to "die άριστοι . . . . in denen die Stimme der Natur am reinsten spricht"; from the context it seems clear that optimus quisque refers rather to those engaged in the vtta con templative, from whom Cicero wants to elicit evidence of the superiority of the social virtues.
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Posidonius with the kinds of arguments that appear in $ 153 (see ad loc). On the other hand, the critique of the theory that humans formed societies because of weakness (§ 158) could derive from Posidonius (see ad loc). I suspect that, apart from consulting Posidonius for $ 159 and possibly § 158,203 Cicero did little specific preparation for the writing of this section. The basic argument appears already at § 153, perhaps taken over in essen tials from the proem to Rep. I; 204 he then dilates on it, partly on the basis of materials from de Orat. (see ad $5 155-56), not, unfortunately, without repetitions (cf. ad $§ 157, 158, and 160).2<>s 152 . . . potest incidere saepe contentio et comparatio, de duobus honestis utrum honestius: . . .] The agonistic approach adumbrated here is somewhat disappointing in the execution (cf. ad $ 159); it inevitably poses the questions num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem, which, we were told at § 7, belonged to the first type of enquiry into appropriate action not to be handled in Off. (cf. ad loc). 153 Cicero advances several arguments in favor of the superiority of communitas to cognitio: (1) the life of total contemplation cut off from all human society is unbearable; (2) σοφία, distinguished from φρόι>ησι.9, is identified with the first virtue and defined as the rerum . . . divinarum et humanarum scientia, in qua continetur deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos; this last, however, is said to be the greatest (sc. type of knowledge) there is and therefore the appropriate action derived from it will be the greatest appropriate action; (3) the first virtue is said to be incomplete if divorced from the actio rerum, which consists in the guarding of human goods; therefore the societas generis humani is superior to pure contem plation. The solution at which Cicero arrives—that social officia take precedence over theoretical ones—is certainly defensible; indeed one of the main prob lems which has of late exercised students of Aristotle EN 10.6-8 is that the championing of the life of contemplation there seems to entail an amoralist political and social ethic.206 It is the way Cicero goes about arguing this position that causes difficulties. No doubt the pressure of time and other 203. Also for the hierarchy of appropriate actions at $ 160, as Pohlenz, AF, 90, assumes? See ad loc. 204. This may have depended in turn on Dicaearchus: cf. An. 2.16.3; Walzcr, 190. 205. For further instances of Cicero's use of materials from other works in Off. cf. p. 364, n. 16. 206. For a recent approach that acquits Aristotle of maximizing egoism cf. Richard Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton, 1989), « p . ch. 2; cf. also Gavin Lawrence, "Aristotle and the Ideal Life," The Philosophical Review 102 (1993), 1-34.
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concerns (see introduction, $ 3) explains why Cicero is so "eager to move from the statement of the issue to its resolution" (as Gill, 1988, 171, n. 13, remarked a propos another Ciceronian supplement to Panaetius, Book 3; cf. also ad § 159). In any case the arguments presented are less than fully satisfying. Cicero's first argument is based, reasonably enough in view of the preced ing Stoic system, on determining which officia are aptiora naturae. Aristotle had, of course, already made the famous observation ότι των φύσο ή πόλι? 6στί. και οτι ό άνθρωπο? φύσει πολιτικόν ζφον, και ό άπολι? δια φύσιν και ού δια τύχην ήτοι φαύλο? €στιι> ή κροττων ή άνθρωπο? [Pol. 1253a2 ff.), a view essentially shared by Panaetius ($ 12). In positing the natural sociability of the human being, then, Cicero is on safe ground. But on the other hand, as Cicero himself pointed out, there is also a natural human craving for knowl edge: omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem . . . ($ 18; the natural attraction to intellectual activity appears as early as § 13 within the presentation of the doctrine of οΐκ€ίωσι?). Cicero argues that if one could devote oneself exclusively to theoretical pursuits but be cut off from contact with one's fellows, one would not choose to go on living. In spite of his profession at $ 7 to be offering practical precepts in this essay, Cicero here allows himself to follow an all-or-nothing approach that involves the positing of a highly artificial situation, since in order to engage exclusively in studies one would have to have one's other needs for food, shelter, etc., provided for—presumably by other human beings. Even if one would not choose a life in Cicero's sense exclusively devoted to contempla tion (if that were a human option), one might still prefer a life mostly devoted to contemplation over the other available alternatives. Hence for some a life devoted primarily to intellectual pursuits might well be "more suited to nature" in the sense of their individual nature, the claims of which Cicero/ Panaetius explicitly recognized ($$ 107 ff.: the second persona). Moreover, we have a right to ask whether the other equally artificial situation of being constantly in contact with other human beings but never able to learn or satisfy one's curiosity for knowledge would be any more satisfying. But this first argument put forward by Cicero surely mistakes the problem; it is not a question of choosing one's ideally circumstanced life, with the theoretical life and the social life as the alternatives; rather the problem is that of choosing within a life, however circumstanced, between appropriate actions recom mended by the human drive toward knowledge and the other drive toward joining in activities that benefit society. Cicero's second argument for the stronger claim of social over theoretical officia is no better. Miller ad § 153 states the problem this way: "Cicero is
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guilty of a curious fallacy. If it follows from his premises, (1) some one virtue is the highest virtue, and (2) the officia derived from the highest virtue are the highest officia, and if (3) wisdom is the highest virtue, then it can only follow that the officia derived from wisdom are the highest officia. But Cicero throws in a fourth premise that the "bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man' are derived from wisdom, and therewith side-tracks wisdom and gives the appropriate actions derived from the social instinct the place from which wisdom has been shunted." 207 Evidently Cicero is adapting—albeit not very subtly or cogently—an argument which originally served rather different ends. Note, too, that Cicero has not shown that the deorum et hominwn communitas et societas inter ipsos is the only item contained within the rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia. But even if this were shown, it could still be argued that the appropriate actions derived from rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia itself, as standing higher in the hierarchy, take precedence over those derived from the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos. Cicero's third argument is that pure contemplation is defective unless followed by actio rerum. This latter term is then said to be seen especially in hominum commodis tuendis (why not also inveniendi$})\ the conclusions that this too pertains to the human community and that the latter is therefore superior to pure contemplation are then quickly stated. But why is pure contemplation defective if not followed by actio rerum} If indeed omnes. . . trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et scientiae cupiditatem (§ 18), the satis faction of that desire would appear to be an end in itself; uses for the results of research may not, even in the long run, be found, but the research may be a valuable activity in itself. Contrast with Cicero's view Aristotle's description of the life of the mind (EN 1177al2 ff.): ει δ' έστιν ή ευδαιμονία κατ* άρετήν ενέργεια, εύλογον κατά τήι> κρατίστην αϋτη δ* αν €Ϊη του αρίστου. είτε δη νους τοΟτο εϊτε άλλο τι, ό δη κατά φύσιν δοκεΐ άρχειν καΐ ήγεΐσθαι και ε ννοιαν εχειν περί καλών και θείων, είτε θεΐον δν και αυτό είτε τών εν ήμΐν το θειότατον. ή τούτου ενέργεια κατά τήνοίκείαν άρετήν εϊη αν ή τελεία ευδαιμονία, δτι δ* έστι θεωρητική, εΐρηται. Indeed he goes on to show that each of the other virtues is deficient since they depend on persons toward whom justice, moderation, etc., can be exercised (ibid., 1177a27 ff.). 207. R.R. Wellman, "An Argument in de Officiis," CJ 60 (1965), 271-72, attempts to defend Cicero against this critique, unconvincingly; for he mistakes the basis of the second argument and thinks to introduce commensurability with Nature as a criterion; thus he argues (271) "to claim that duties derived from the social instinct are more in accordance with Nature, however, is not to affirm that they are necessarily the 'highest'"; but cf. Cicero's words ea si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 153
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Cicero had spoken at $ 19 of. . . vert investigatione . . . cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduct contra officium est. It is, as I have said, a defensible position; but only at § 154 does he adduce a convincing argument that this is so (quis enim est tarn cupidus . . . f). If paragraphs are to correspond to divisions of the argument, then a new paragraph should begin at $ 153, not at $ 154, which continues the argument pro communitate contra cognitionem (of recent editors Testard and Winterbottom, but not Atzert4 or Fedeli, begin a paragraph at $ 153; all four begin one at § 154). Placet igirur aptiora esse naturae ea officia quae ex communitate quam ea quae ex cognitione ducantur;. . .] In the material that Cicero appends to Panaetius' treatment the criterion remains the Stoic one of what is "in accord with" or "fits with" nature (cf. ad 3.13 and, on the criteria secundum or contra naturam, ad 3.19b-32); cf. also § 159: apta naturae. . . . si solitudo tanta sit ut hominem videre non possit, excedat e vita.] Cf. Arist. EN 1169b 16 ff.: άτοπον δ' ίσως και το μονώτην ποιεί ν τον μακάρι ο ν ουδείς γαρ ελοιτ* αν καθ' αυτόν τά πάντ' έχειν αγαθά- πολιτικόν γαρ ό άνθρωπο? και συζήν πε φυκός, as well as the view that Cicero gives as his own opinion at 2.39; Fin. 3.65; Amic. 55. princepsque omnium virtutum ilia sapientia quam σοφίαν Graeci voc a n t . . .] Cicero never explains in what sense wisdom is "first" of the vir tues; but he clearly means something more than that it was the first in the order of presentation at §§ 18 ff.; Aristotle regarded its exercise as the most pleasurable (EN 1177a23 ff.: . . . ήδίστη δε των κατ* άρετήν ενεργειών ή κατά την σοφίαν ομολογουμένως εστίν . . .). . . . φρόνησιν . . . quae est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque sdentia . . .] Cf. MM 1197al ff.:... ή δε φρόνησις περί τά πρακτά, έν οι ς αϊρεσις και φυγή και εφ' ήμΐν εστίν πράξαι και μή πράζαι (at 1198a32 ff. the author goes on to argue that φρόνησις, as the αρχιτέκτων of the other (practical) virtues, is itself πρακτική); on the general Aristotelian conception of φρόνησις as the ability to evaluate human action, as opposed to επιστήμη, which pertains to the unchangeable, cf. During, 4 5 0 - 5 1 , n. 118. Zeno made φρόνησις not only a virtue in itself but a quality inherent in the other virtues, in which sense later Stoics used επιστήμη: . . . Ζήνων . . . οριζόμενος την φρό νησιν έν μεν άπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην, έν δ' α'ιρετέοις σωφροσύνην, έν δ' υπομένετε οι? άνδρείαν. άπολογούμενοι δ* άξιοΰσιν έν τούτοις την έπιστήμην φρόνησιν υπό τοϋ Ζήνωνος ώνομάσθαι {SVF 1,49.30 ίί.); cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 72. Our text is evidently at the stage of SVF 3, 23.27-28, where φρόνησις, along with the other virtues σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, and ανδρεία, are called έπιστήμαι and τέχναι; cf. SVF 3, 7 3 . 3 - 4 : . . . τήν φρόνησιν περί τά ποιητέα
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και μη καΐ ουδέτερα . . . ; sim., ibid., 63.39,69.8,70.6; closest to our passage is perhaps 156.1-2:oi δε Στωικοί και άντικρύςφασι τήνφρόνησιν,έτΓίστήμην ούσαν αγαθών και κακών και ουδέτερων . . . ; Cicero omits (as too pedantic?) the category of things neither to be sought nor avoided (i.e., the αδιάφορα). . . . ilia autem sapientia . . . rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia . . .] Cf. Homeyer, 307 (less accurate, 306); ad 2.5. etenim cognitio contemplatioque naturae manca quodam modo atque in choate sit si nulla actio rerum consequatur. ea autem actio in hominum commodis tuendis maxime cernitur;. . .] A similar point about action as a complement of thought is made in the suspect sentence of § 160 {etenim cognitionem—cogitare prudenter)\ see ad he. Even though ενέργεια is given as one of the definitions oi actio by Klotz, TLL 1, 438.16, Cicero evidently understands under actio rerum something different from Aristotle's ενέρ γεια, since Aristotle regards contemplative activity as an ενέργεια; cf. EN 1177a 12 ff., cited in the headnote to this section; nor is our passage alone in this usage: cf. other parallels from Cicero's philosophica cited by Klotz, loc. cit.t including $ 17, which distinguishes between actio quaedam and mentis agitatio. At §§ 16-17 Panaetius had distinguished the first virtue as a the oretical virtue from the other virtues involving actio vitae without any hint that the first virtue was thereby inferior.—For use of etenim to introduce a new argument, as here in the connection between (2) and (3) (cf. the headnote to this section), cf. Hand, 2,542; Madvig ad Fin. 1.3; Friedrich, TLL 5, 920.61 ff.—In this sentence the bracketing of naturae by Unger, 47, has been followed by Atzert 4 and Fedeli, surely wrongly, since natura is evidently thought of as the object of investigation; cf. § 154: . . . in perspicienda cognoscendaque rerum natura . . . ; nor is rerum a necessary complement (it was conjecturally supplemented to our passage [following naturae) by Carolus Scheibe, "Coniecturae Tullianae," Jahns Jahrbiicher fur Philologie und Pddagogik 81 [1860], 374); cf. cognitio naturae at Fin. 4.8 and other passages cited at Merguet 2, 643.—Cicero could never have anticipated the much more problematical relationship between cognitio rerum and action consisting in hominum commodis tuendis that has arisen in modern times; cf. Nickel, 6 0 - 6 1 : "Als Glieder einer Informationsgesellschaft verfugen wir iiber eine permanent expandierende cognitio rerum. Aber je mehr wir wissen, desto spurbarer wird unsere Unfahigkeit zur actio in hominum com modis tuendis . . . " 154 quis enim est tarn cupidus in perspicienda cognoscendaque—non ilia omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsi dinumerare se Stellas aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur?] Might Cicero have been thinking of the renowned Syracusan scientist Archimedes, whom he so greatly admired (cf.
Commentary on Book 1, Section 153—55b
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Tusc. 1.63, 5.64)? On his calculation of the diameter of the sun, the moon, and the fixed stars, as well as of the distances of the planets from the earth cf. Hultsch, RE 2.1 (1895), 537.27 ff.; on his war-engines, deployed during Marcellus' siege of Syracuse in 212, cf. Plb. 8.5-7; Liv. 24.34; Plut. Marc. 14-17.3; E.J. Dijksterhuis, Archimedes, tr. C. Dikshoorn (Princeton, 1987), 26 ff.; A.G. Drachmann, The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Copenhagen, 1963), 202.—Note the alliterative sonority of the phrase metiri mundi magnitudinem, which seems to imitate the grandeur of the project itself. 155a . . . utilitatem, qua nihil homini esse debet antiquius.] ξ offers caritatem for utilitatem, a reading surely of Christian provenance;208 a pa gan writer would presumably acknowledge the attractions of the utile; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1366b3-5: ανάγκη δε μέγιστα? είναι άρετάς τάς τοις· άλλοις χρησιμιοτάτας, είπε ρ εστίν ή αρετή δύναμι? ευεργετική; 3.35: cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis ohiecta est, commoveri necesse est; 3.101: omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur, nee facere aliter ullo modo possumus.—As Fronto, p. 160.1-2 van den Hout, phrased it, volgo dicitur, quod potius sit, antiquius esse; the usage is first attested at Cato, orat., no. 8, fr. 178, the (implicitly) negativized form first at Inv. 1.69 (quid . . . anti quius . . . ?); cf. Bannier, TLL 2, 180.9 ff. 155b-58 Atque illi ipsi—] Here Cicero begins to ramble; thus he inserts at the end of § 156 a quite irrelevant encomium of eloquentia; and § 158 essentially repeats the argument from § 153 that the purely contemplative life in isolation from human contact would be intolerable. Note that this material is loosely strung together, with new points introduced by atque in the second sentence of § 155 and the first sentence of § 157 and nee at the beginning of § 158. The main stations of the argument are as follows: (1) even a scientist would instinctively help his country, a parent, or friend in trouble; (2) the learned have often helped to educate statesmen either person ally or, through their writings, posthumously; (3) in the human being the social impulse is primary, the impulse to thought secondary; (4) even one who did not have to procure the necessities of life would not be content to live in pure contemplation without human contact. 155b The argument is designed to show that even those devoted to the contemplative life value the social virtues as well. nam ec erudierunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresquc rebus suis publicis essent, ut Thebanum Epaminondam Lysis Pythagorcus, Syracosium Dionem 208. Cf. E. Popp, De Ciceroms de officiis librorum codicibus bernensi 104 eique cognatis. diss. (Eriangen, 188.3), 39, and ad 3.29.
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Plato multique multos . . .] At some point not before 450 the Pythagorean leaders were killed when the followers of their opponent Cylon set fire to the house of Milo, in which they were meeting; the only survivors were Lysis and Archippus, who, because of their youth, were not present. After this disaster Lysis went first to Achaea in the Peloponnese, then to Thebes, where he taught Epaminondas. Such was the Theban's reverence for his teacher that he called him "father" and supported him in his old age; Lysis died not long before 379. Cf. Aristox. fr. 18 with Wehrli's note; Plut. de Gen. Soc. 579e and 583c; Burkert, 1962, 181-82 = Eng. tr. 115-16.—During his stay in Syr acuse in 388/87 Plato met Dio, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I, and won him over to his political ideas. Twenty years later the philosopher revisited Syracuse on Dio's invitation as part of a joint effort to influence Dionysius II, son and successor of Dionysius I. In the sequel Dio liberated Sicily but allowed the assassination of his coadjutant Hcraclides and died himself by the sword soon thereafter; cf. Kurt von Fritz, Pbton in Sizilien und das Problem der Philosophenherrschaft (Berlin, 1968); H.D. Westlake in CAH 6 2 , 695 ff.; Kai Trampedach, Platon, die Akademie und die zeitgenossische Politik, Hermes Einzelschriften 66 (Stuttgart, 1994), 102 ff.—Plato's teaching of Dio and Lysis* of Epaminondas are among the exam ples cited at de Orat. 3.139 (see ad $ 156). . . . nosque ipsi, quidquid ad rempublicam attulimus, si modo aliquid actulimus, a doctoribus atque doctrina instructi ad earn et ornati accessimus.] When Cicero adds a Roman example—himself—the emphasis shifts insofar as he names no specific teacher. Rather Cicero places his own person in the foreground and allows the doctores to stand merely in a hazy background, presumably as being of lesser importance than himself (cf. his similar practice in the speech pro Archia poeta209), even though his source was developing an argument in which the role of the teachers was stressed. Cf., however, N.D. 1.6-7: . . . et principes Mi Diodotus Philo Antiochus Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus. et si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestitisse quae ratio et doctrina praescripserit. In addition, Cicero evidently mentioned P. Nigidius Figulus (pr. 58) as a source for the policies of his consulate; cf. Plut. An Sent 797d, who gives Laelius' advice to Scipio as a parallel example, and Kroll, RE 17.1 (1936), 201.1-5; on Nigidius in general cf., ibid., 200.53 ff.; Eliz abeth Rawson, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic (Baltimore, 1985), 291-92; Miriam Griffin in CAH 9\ 708-10. Might he also have had 209. Cf. Arch. 12: art tu existimas aut suppetere nobis posse quod cotidie dscamus in tanta vartetate rerum, nisi animos nostros doctrina excolamus . . . ?
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L. Lucceius in mind? Cf. Fam. 5.13.4. On Cicero's relation to his political mentors at Rome cf. in general Mitchell, 1 9 7 9 , 1 0 - 5 1 , as well as Rawson, 16 ff. 156 neque solum vivi atque praesentes studiosos discendi erudiunt ac docent, sed hoc idem etiam post mortem monumentis litterarum adsequuntur.] Cf. the posthumous influence attributed to the elder Cato at $ 79. ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam intellegentiam prudentiamque potissimum conferunt; . . .] The description fits Crassus as presented in de Orat. and, still better, Cicero himself. Sapientia here has a broader sense than in § 153, hardly differing from doctrina; cf. examples of this usage cited by Homeyer, 156, who, however, defines the term in our passage too narrowly ("Beschaftigung mit philosophischen Gedankengangen"), I think. . . . eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acuussime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos, quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus.] Eloquentia is adduced as a special case of actio vitae, the result being a reminiscence of Crassus* train of thought at de Orat. 3.139 ff. (see ad § 155), especially 142: nunc sive qui volet eum philosophum, qui copiam nobis rerum orationisque tradat, per me appellet oratorem licet; sive hunc oratorem, quern ego dico sapientiam iunctam habere eloquentlae, philosophum appellare malet% non impediam; dummodo hoc constet neque infantiam ems, qui rem norit, sed earn explicare dicendo non queat, neque inscientiam illius, cut res non suppetat, verba non desint, esse laudandam;... Cf. also ad § 3 and 3.4. 157 Atque ut apium examina non fingendorum favorum causa congregantur,—natura congregati adhibent agendi cogitandique sollertiam.] The social instinct is prior to the exercise of skill or intelligence and therefore presumably in a higher degree "according to nature." Aristotle, too, had recognized the gregariousness of bees {Pol. 1 2 5 3 a l - 3 , 7-9): εκ τούτων ουν φανεροί' οτι των φύσει ή πόλι? εστί, κα\ οτι ό άνθρωπο? φύσει πολιτικόν ζωον . . . διότι δε πολιτικόν ό άνθρωπο? ζψον πάση? μελίττη? και παντό? άγελαίου ζώου μάλλον, δήλον; cf. Plut. An Sent 783f: άλλα και τό τοϋ θουκυδίδου (2.44.4) παράγειν έπι τό βέλτιον, μη τό φιλότιμον άγήρων μόνον ηγουμένου?, άλλα μάλλον τό κοινωνικόν και πολιτικόν, 6 και μύρμηζιν άχρι τελου? παραμε ίνει και μελίτται?· . . .—For atque as a transition to a comparison cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 23 (where our passage is cited).—Sollertia appears here, as at § 15, in a positive sense (contrast § 33).—For the form of argu ment cf. ad § 48. . . . solivaga cognitio . . .] Solivagus looks as though it belongs among the poetic -vagus compounds like nemorivagus (Carul. 63.72) or noctivagus
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(Lucr. 5.1191); cf. other examples cited by Otto Gradenwitz, Laterculi vocum iMinarum (Leipzig, 1904), 485; cf. also Leumann, 268, and, on the type of which our word is a variant, 394. But it first appears in Ciceronian prose, and no poetic attestations are cited in the OLD or Forcellini s.v. At Tusc. 5.38 Cicero calls the beasts that walk the earth partim solivagas, partint congregatas . . . ; but he denies that the human race can be called solivagum {Rep. 1.39). As in our passage, Cicero deploys the epithet meta phorically in the sense "solitary" at Tim. 20, where solivagus translates μόνος έρημος; cf. Widmann, 177, as well as Mart. Cap. 1.40: ac tunc septem radiorum coronam solivaga virginitas renudavit, ne feturarum causis et copulis interesset. . . . itemque magnitudo animi remota communitate coniunctioneque humana feritas sit quaedam et immanitas. ita (it ut vincat cognitionis studium consociatio hominum acque communitas.] Stuerenburg's athetesis of these words 2 1 0 was revived by Jachmann, 215, n. 1. (1) itemque—immanitas: From the introductory remarks to this sec tion (§ 152) one would have expected a much more comprehensive com parison of the four virtues among themselves, rather than each of them merely with communitas hominum (see above). Once this limitation is accepted, one expects some comparison of magnitudo animi with com munitas; but if the suspect sentence be expelled, the third virtue alone would go unmentioned. Cf. with our sentence the similar thought at § 62: sed ea animi elatio quae cernitur in periculis et laboribus, si iustitia vacat pugnatque non pro salute communi sed pro suis commodis, in vitio est; non modo enim id virtutis non est, sed est potius immanitatis omnem humanitatem repellentis. The problem of the separability of the virtues presents itself unmistakably. Panaetius has defined magnitudo animi so as to be bound to the community (cf. §$ 62-65); that element cannot be removed without destroying the virtue itself (albeit at § 46 Cicero/ Panaetius speaks as though a person can possess fortis animus et magnus without the other virtues); hence the problem of comparing the com munity and magnitudo animi cannot arise for Panaetius; they are indissolubly intertwined. The suspect sentence makes this point, just as it had been made at § 62. This observation ought to have thrown into relief for Cicero the problematic nature of his project at §§ 152 ff. In § 159 he confronts a similar problem with regard to the fourth virtue and decides 210. Pearce had already suspecred itemque—immanitas.
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that it is not a problem at all . . . quod non potest accidere tempus ut intersit reipublicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem, i.e., the second and fourth virtues likewise are bound together in such a way that they could not pose conflicting demands (cf. also $149 fin.). It is only the first, purely theoretical, virtue that lacks any necessary social dimension. The athetesis of our sentence would therefore not do very much to save Cicero's philosophical reputation; he would really need to have thought through the whole problem much more carefully than he evidently had been able to do within the brief period in which he composed this essay (cf. introduction, $ 3). A further problem is the placement of itemque— immanitas within the discussion of the first virtue, cognitio. It is true, as Thomas, 3 4 - 3 5 , points out, that one type of μ€γαλόψυχο? is devoted to learned pursuits ($$ 69b ff. and 92) and that this type would be essentially independent of the community; hence this type may have suggested itself to Cicero within this context. Had it not been for the haste that reveals itself elsewhere in this passage, some further elaboration or clarification would surely have been offered. Sabbadini suggested that our sentence is a marginal note added by Cicero with a view toward later elaboration (cf. Rudberg, 19; Atzert2); this is one possible explanation but by no means the only one. In the circumstances athetesis would run a grave risk of correcting the author. (2) ita fit ut—atque communitas: These words, bracketed by Atzert4, form, in the text as transmitted, a premature conclusion to the com parison of cognitio and communitas. But surely Cicero wrote these words; why indeed would an interpolator have added them? What we have are evidently alternative endings for the comparison of cognitio and com munitas: a shorter version ending in 5 157 and a longer one continuing to the end of § 158. Whoever edited de Officiis for publication (Tiro? 211 )— the essay may have been published posthumously from Cicero's papers— allowed both to stand side by side. There are thus two possibilities: either Cicero wanted to continue the argument as in § 158 and neglected to strike ita fit ut—communitas (but would presumably have done so in revision), 212 or he intended to delete § 158, which merely duplicates an argument of § 153, and indicated this fact by entering ita fit ut— communitas (in the margin?) at this point. 211. Cf. Wilamowitz, 1932, 390-91, n. 1. 212. Jachmann's argument, lot. at., that ita fit ut . . . is an "Interpolatorcnflosker is, however, wide of the mark; cf. Thomas, 33, and ad $ 101.
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158 This paragraph repeats in essence the first argument of 5 153, prefaced by a critique of the theory advanced notably at Plb. 6.5.4 ii. that humans formed social units out of weakness. Posidonius evidently criticized this view (F 448.4 Th. = Sen. Ep. 90.4; cf. F. Steinmetz, 188-89); hence Cicero may have drawn upon him even before § 159. Panaetius, in contrast to the author followed by Cicero here, allowed that both the natural social instinct of the human being and a calculation of self-interest lay behind the founding of societies; cf. ad §§ 11-12 and 2.73. Note the speed with which, for Cicero, haec communitas, presumably the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos (§ 153), is equated with the respublica (non suscipiet reipublicae causa, ne respublica quidem pro se suscipi volet). Cicero's un willingness or inability to distinguish these two is also a problem in Book 3; cf. introduction to that Book. . . . quodsi omnia nobis quae ad victum cultumque pertinent quasi virgula divina, ut aiunt, suppeditarentur, mm Optimo quisque ingenio negotiis om nibus omissis torum se in cognirione et scientia conlocaret.] The u magic wand" characteristic of Northern European witches entered Greek folklore with Circe (ράβδο? at Od. 10.238, 319, 389); cf. A. Heubeck in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homers Odyssey, 2 (Oxford, 1989), ad 10.234-43; it exercised a no less potent influence on the Roman folk imag ination; cf. Verg. A. 4.242 ff.; Otto, 373.—In Book 3 the hypothesis of magical powers comes into play several times—Gyges' ring (§§ 38-39) or a magical snap of the fingers (§ 75). 159 This section deals with the second and fourth virtues. It is curious that Cicero, both here and in Book 3, raises the possibility of competition of principles (cf. also § 152: contentio) only to deny that it can, in fact, arise (. . . ne respublica quidem pro se suscipi volet). Cicero's denial is in this case particularly surprising, since he knows that the question was taken seriously and investigated by Posidonius, and in 3.93 he cites the case of an action conventionally regarded as turpe that might nevertheless be undertaken in behalf of the state. Cicero reveals in our passage, then, not so much an interest in exploring casuistic problems as in solving them speedily by asser tion and bringing this Book to a quick conclusion. non placet; sunt enim quaedam partim ita foeda, partim ita flagitiosa, ut ea ne conservcndae quidem patriae causa sapiens factums sit. ea Posidonius conlegit permulta, sed ita taetra quaedam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia.] At 3.93 Cicero declares that even dancing in the forum, if it be done to collect money for the patria, is no disgrace; cf. § 145, where he describes singing in the forum as a magna perversitas. His prudishness in refusing to cite examples in our passage thus leaves one in doubt as to exactly
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where he would draw the line. He follows a similar policy both in private correspondence (cf. the passage in the letter to Paetus [9.22.4] cited ad SS 126-32a) and in public speeches and essays (cf. flac. 34: . . . exstant Acmonensium litterae, qua$ ego . . . propter turpissimam obscenitatem verborwn praetereundas puto; Phil. 2.47 (of Antony's misdeeds): sunt quaedam quae honeste non possum dicere; . . .; N.D. 1.111: non arbitror te veile similem esse Epicureorum reliquorum, quos pudeat quarundam Epicuri vocum, quibus Hie testatur se ne intellegere quidem ullum bonum quod sit seiunctum a delicatis et obscenis voluptatibus; quas quidem non erubescens persequitur omnis nominatim). In general for turpitudo attaching to speech cf. § 128.—Posidonius was evidently interested in testing the boundaries of the kinds of praecepta offered by Panaetius; hence his exploration of the change of appropriate actions κατά τκρίστασιι> [Att. 16.11.4 = F 41a E.-K. = F 431a Th.) and interest in our passage (= F 177 E.-K. = F 433 Th.) in showing that even officio to the community have their limits. Note, however, that with Cicero's change of source the premise for the discussion is also (implicitly) changed; Panaetius had not been concerned with the sapiens (cf. ad S§ 7b and 46), who, however, in Posidonius becomes once again the center of interest (as sometimes in Book 3: cf. 3.29 and 50, but also 45); cf. Pohlenz, AF, 89, n. 1. . . . non potest accidere tempus ut intersit reipublicae quicquam illorum facere sapientem.| For the syntax cf. ad § 32. 160 quare hoc quidem effectual sit. . .] For effectum sit and the like used of the desired outcome cf. Gorier, 1974, 127, n. 87. etenim cognitionem pnidentiamque sequetur considerata actio; ita fit ut agere considerate pluris sit quam cogitare prudenter.] These words, offering an argument for the primacy of the social virtues just when, in light of the previous sentence, one had thought the topic concluded, have roused the suspicion of editors since Facciolati and are bracketed by Atzert4 and Fedeli; note, too, that the argument they present hardly differs from (3) under 5 153 (see ad loc). On the other hand, though the formulation has been faulted for failing to specify that the actio in question has been undertaken for the sake of the community, surely this is to be assumed from context (cf. Thomas, 56). This matter could be omitted without loss (and might well have been in subsequent revision), but, given the general tenor of the passage, any exci sion would be likely to correct the text as the author left it. in ipsa autem communitate sunt gradus officiorum,—ut prima dis immortalibus, secunda patriae, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debeantur.J One would have expected some reference to, if not explanation of, the difference of this scheme from that at % 58 (cf. ad §§ 152-61). The
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explanation may lie in the use of a different source (Posidonius, according to Pohlenz, AF, 90) or of traditional Roman views (cf. Lucil. 1337-38 M. = 1353-54 K., cited ad $ 58); the resulting inconsistency apparently escaped Cicero as he hastened to complete this Book; cf. also ad $ 159.—For the gradus officiorum within the community cf. the Hierocles passaged cited ad $53.
161 sed iam ad reliqua pergamus.] Cf. ad 2.8.
Commentary on Book 2 Cuius opes tantae esse possunt aut umquam fuerunt quae sine multorum amicorum officiis stare possintf —Cic. Plane. 81 nee vero neglegenda est fama nee mediocre telutn ad res gerendas existimare oportet benivolentiam civium . . . —Amic. 61 You must be sensible that you cannot rise in the world without forming connections and engaging different characters to conspire in your point. You must make them your dependents without their knowing it, and dictate to them while you seem to be directed by them. Those necessary connections can never be formed or preserved but by an uninterrupted series of complaisance, attentions, politeness, and some constraint. —Lord Chesterfield to his son, 14 November O.S. 1749
Prior to Panaetius the σύμφοροι' or ώφελιμον (= utile) played only a very minor role in Stoic philosophy. No treatises περί τοΟ συμφεροιτο? or the like are attested. The burden of Stoic teaching on the subject was the paradoxical assertion of the identity of the good (or virtue) with the expedient, evil with the inexpedient (cf. ad 3.11); in such contexts τά συμφεροιτα as a predicate for τάγαθά sometimes appears in the company of other terms popularly approved or regarded as desirable (cf. 5VF 3,21.42 ff., quoted ad 1.94). This position was buttressed with an etymology (ibid., 50.4: συμφέρον, φέρειν γαρ τοιαύτα α συντείνει προς το εύ ζτ\ν). A curious testimony indicates that the sage will lie "without assent" (άνευ συγκατάθεσε ως) κατά την του συμφέρον τος προόρασιΐ' (ibid., 148.7-10). The Stoics' policy on the expedient, then, was to accept it as desirable but to annex it to the good; 1 we do not know whether prior to Panaetius the implications were ever worked out in detail. But it seems clear that Panaetius found precedent within his school for the general tack he chose to take on the συμφέρον.2 1. Cole, 1961, 136, has suggested that Panaetius distrusted the utile; but this point de pends upon rhe utile bearing a non-Stoic sense. 2. The term was used by Panaetius' teacher Diogenes of Babylon, though the interpretation of the context remains in doubt; cf. the discussion at Obbink-Vander Waerdt, 374.
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Panaetius' bold departure was to treat the συμφέρον, as in Off. 2, as a criterion for judging actions. The view is attested for Chrysippus' first book On perfect appropriate actions τοΐ? φαύλοι? ουδέν είναι χρήσιμον (SVF 3, 168.27-28). Tackling the subject in the way he did for the benefit of ττροκότττοντες involved Panaetius in an exercise in the use of terms in their popular senses (cf. ad § 35). For members of the political class generally, as for the actors in Thucydides* History,3 the criterion of action was the συμφεpov/utile.* Now Panaetius had contacts with statesmen such as Scipio and Laelius, had observed political careers, and had developed views about the foundations on which such a career should rest. He recognized the need to speak to would-be statesmen in a language they understood; and in general he wrote on political topics in a down-to-earth way that Cicero found useful (Leg. 3.14 = Panaetius fr. 48, quoted ad 1.124). Moreover, he believed, like a good Stoic, that even the path to the συμφέρον would lead to virtue. In recognizing this possibility latent in the συμφέρον he may have been influ enced by Socrates* description of the method by which Themistocles won the affection of his fellow-citizens, in contrast with that of Pericles:. . . ήκουσα μεν ότι Περικλής πολλάς [sc. επψδά^Ι έπίσταιτο, ας επωδών τή πόλει έποίει αύττ\ν φιλεΐν αυτόν. Θεμιστοκλή? δε πώς έττοίησε τήν πόλιν φιλεΐν αυτόν; Μά Δί' ουκ επωδών, άλλα περιάψας τι αγαθόν αυτή (Χ. Mem. 2.6.13, cited by Pohlenz, AF, 113). The entire second book of Off. is in effect an extended commentary on this passage (for Panaetius' use of Xenophon cf. also § § 1 6 and 43, 1.84, 108,118, and possibly $ 33). Panaetius' goal, then, is to win over members of the ruling class to the honestum, if not for its own sake, then on grounds of utilitas, or, as Cicero puts it a propos iustitia, omni igitur ratione colenda et retinenda iustitia est, cum ipsa per sese [i.e., as argued in Book 1 ] (nam aliter iustitia non esset) turn propter ampliftcationem honoris et gloriae [as argued in Book 2) ($ 42; cf. ad loc.).5 In order to advance this case Cicero/Panaetius follows a careful strategy: 3. Cf. the rich testimonies assembled by E.-A. Bctant, Lexicon Thucydideum (Geneva, Ι847)δ.ν.ξυμφ^ρ€ΐν. 4. To be sure, Cicero claims that among the maiores the utile prevailed over consuetudo only in wartime {Man. 60); bur consuetudo itself, of course, laid down principles that were in general utile for the political class. 5. Cf. the empirical observation of Polybius (6.6.9): έξ ov πάλιν €ϋλογον ύττογϊι^σθαϊ τίνα θίωρίαν παρά τοΐς· ττολλοΐ? αίσχροΰ και καλού και τής τούτων ιτρός άλληλα διαφορά?, και τό μ«ν ίήλου και μιμήσΐω? τύγχαναν διά τό συμφέρον, τό 6c φυγ%; in general for possible Panactian influence on the political theory at Plb. 6.3-9 cf. ad 1.98. For Polybius1 use of the Stoic terms καλόν and συμφέρον at 21.32c cf. von Fritz, 57-58; for the agreement of Panaetius and Polybius in their judgment of Aratus of Sicyon ci.ad$ 81; on the relation of Polybius and Panaetius see further introduction $ 5 (4), ad 1.111.
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first, the discussion focuses on the man engaged in a political career; second, it is argued that such a man obtains the utile by means of glory but glory by means of virtuous action. Hence glory, though its pursuit was disapproved under the honestum (cf. 1.26,65,68,74), is the link whereby the officio that fall under the utile correspond to those of the honestum; cf. Garbarino, 1980, 201-2. Thus, although Book 2 begins with a general classification and analy sis of the utilia at the disposal of the human being and what it is that renders them utile ($§ 11-15), Cicero/Panaetius soon orients the term toward a specific goal, namely glory.6 Not that Cicero/Panaetius recommends in this Book that glory should be pursued for its own sake; virtue remains the human goal; the topic is rather handled as if, like Socrates' response quoted at $ 43, in answer to a young person's question, "How can I obtain glory?"7 The central position of glory in this Book is somewhat obscured, however, in Cicero's execution. Cicero states that he will skirt the topic of friendship since he has recently dealt with it in de Amicitia but that he will deal with glory even though he has written two books on that subject (5 31). Cicero never explains this difference in approach. In fact, the attainment of glory is the real subject of our Book, as the following outline makes clear: I. Proem A. The plan (S 1) B. Reply to the boni (SS 2-6) C. Reply to learned critics (SS 7-8) II. The honorable and expedient distinguished by a deplorable trend of usage (SS 9-10) III. Classification of elements beneficial and harmful to the human being (SS H - 1 7 ) A. Inanimate B. Animate 1. Nonintelligent 2. Intelligent a) Gods b) Humankind IV. Other factors A. Virtue (SS 18-19a) B. Fortune (SS 19b-20) 6. Cf. Leeman, 180; Long, 1995», 228. 7. Cf. Tatakis, 233; one apparent exception is the evidently non-Panactian use made of the concepr of martial glory at 1.38; cf. ad loc.
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V. Division of the subject ($$ 21-22) VI. Whether to be loved or feared is a better means of proteaing one's interests ($$ 23-29a) VII. Number of friends needed is relative to one's type of life ($$ 2 9 b 30) Vffl. Glory (S 31) A. Love of the many ($ 32) B. Trustworthiness ($$ 33-34) C. Digression on the use of terms in their popular sense ( $ 3 5 ) D. Admiration ($$ 36-38) E. Reputation for justice (§5 39-42) F. officia that enable the young to attain glory ($$ 43-51) G. Liberality and the conferring of benefits 1. Comparison of money vs. services as a means of bestowing benefits ($$ 52-54a) 2. Largesse a) A limit should be observed ($$ 54b-55a) b) Prodigality ($$ 55b-60) c) Liberality ($$61-64) 3. Benefits that consist of services, not largesse a) Benefits conferred on individuals (1) The civil law ($ 65) (2) Ability in speaking ($$ 66-68) (3) Character, not wealth, to be the criterion in choosing recipients ($$69-71) b) Benefits that pertain to the state ($72) (1) Each to possess his own property ($$ 73-74) (2) Suspicion of avarice to be avoided ($$ 75-77) (3) Excessively liberal grain laws not in the public inter est ($$ 78-83a) (4) Contra remission of rents ($ 83b) (5) Against accumulation of debt ($ 84) (6) Final precepts for governing ($85) IX. Care for one's health (non-Panaetian; $ 86) X. Care for one's money (non-Panaetian; $ 87) XI. Comparison of expedient things (non-Panaetian; $$ 88-89). In the divisio ($ 21), however, Cicero paraphrases the idea of glory [quaecumque . . . homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum), perhaps deliberately, in order not to detraa from his own de
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Gloria, completed the preceding summer (see below). As elsewhere in this essay the goal is more clearly stated at the end than the beginning of the exposition (cf. § 85: . . . haec genera officiorum qui persequuntur cum summa utilitate reipublicae magnam ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam; ad 1.11-17, § 11,3.89-95). The decision, then, to write about the utile/συμφέρον and to do so in this way inevitably entailed treating in detail a subject [gloriaJei&otia) that was one of the external goods of the Peripatos but that the earlier Stoa had classed among the αδιάφορα (cf. ad $ 31). Fin. 3.57 = SVF 3, 37.33 ff., attributes a Stoic transvaluation of ευδοξία following Chrysippus and Diogenes of Babylon to Carneades' critique. The question also arises whether the treat ment of ευδοξία might be related to the higher valuation of the external goods generally which is attributed to Panaetius and Posidonius (but cf. ad 3.12). In general, to the degree that achieving one's aims in the sphere of the utile involves use of external goods, the subject would be taken seriously by the Peripatos (see below), much less so by the earlier Stoa (cf. SVF 1, 47.19 ff. and 3,28.4 ff.; Off. 3.35). Panaetius is thus unlikely to have found much that he would have wanted to use in earlier Stoic writings on the subject of property, which Zeno may have banned altogether from his republic (cf. ad 1.21-22; however, Diogenes of Babylon apparently took a more positive view; cf. ad 3.49 ff.). On the other hand, Aristotle had, of course, justified private property as an institution that allowed scope for the exercise of €\eu8epiOTris among friends {Pol. 1263b5 ff.) and had offered advice on c\eu0epiOTn£, μ^γαλοπρ^πβια, and ασωτία (EN 1119b22 ff., I122al8 ff., and 1121a8 ff. respectively), a tradition followed by later Peripatetics. In fact, the Peripatetic citations in this Book tend to cluster in the section on largitio, including both prodigalitas and liberalitas (§$ 5 4 - 6 4 ; see outline printed above): Aristotle ($$ 56-57), Theophrastus, πβρι πλούτου (§§ 56,64 [bis]), and Demetrius of Phalerum (§ 60). 8 This fairly extensive use of Per ipatetics in our Book 9 accords with Panaetius1 attitudes as known from other sources (cf. fr. 55 = Dicaearch. fr. 3 Wehrli2 = Fin. 4.79: . . . semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant; and the characterization as φιλοαριστοτ€λη
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largely on Peripatetic material; Cicero could thus, while following a single source for most of Off. 1-2, recreate some of the effect of philosophical works such as de Finibus and de Natura Deorum, which devote different books to arguing (or refuting) the positions of various schools. The Peripa tetic emphasis of Book 2 would likewise make it a more apposite gift to his son, who was studying philosophy at Athens under the Peripatetic Cratippus (see introduction, § 4; ad 1.1 and § 8 ) . But the decision to give the treatment of the utile a particular focus on glory also accords well with Panaetius' other known predilections, including whatWilamowitz, 1926,201, called his "konsequenterRarionalismus.wThe exploitation of beast by man exhibits the superior intelligence of human beings as such; but what really interests Panaetius is the exploitation of man by man as the ultimate exercise of intelligence in the sphere of the συμφίροί' (cf. § 46: ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur gratiores sunt quam Mae quas viribus). In this regard the treatment of the utile in Book 2 parallels the handling of magnitudo animi in time of war in Book 1 (§§ 79 ff.). 10 So too the emphasis on glory as a goal and criterion of action is adumbrated in the treatment of approbatio as a criterion of the decorum (1.99). Hence there is truth in the thesis of Gartner, 1974, that the decorum serves as a link and transition between the "halves" of Panaetius' ethical system, focused respec tively on the honestum and utile (though one need not accept the redactional consequences he would draw; cf. ad 1.73b, 94, 3.9). If the Peripatetic material behind the teachings of Off. 2 is readily identifi able through explicit citations, the question remains whether some other source may also have influenced Panaetius' view of the συμφεροι>. Q. Cataudella and AT. Cole have pointed to parallels between the Anonymus Iamblichi and Off. 2, with Cole, 1961, 131, suggesting that "the whole concept and structure of Book 2 derive either from the Anonymus or from a work closely resembling his." He goes on to propose Democritus' nepl avδραγαθίης11 as the common source of Panaetius and Anon. lamb. (156). However, although influence of Democritus on Panaetius is likely elsewhere (cf. ad 1. 23b, 6 1 - 9 2 , 66, and 68), caution seems advisable on several grounds: nothing is known of this work apart from the title (in full: nepl άνδραγαθίη? ή περί αρετή? [fr. 68 Β 2a D.-K.]); and though Cicero/Panaetius is by no means averse to citing Greek sources, Democritus is nowhere cited 10. Cf. the remark of Cole, 1961,136, that "the useful, in so far as it is a principle worthy of being admitted into his (Panaetius') philosophy alongside the honorable, must be the useful as conceived by a superior intelligence." 11. The title will surely have been in Ionic, in spite of Diogenes Laertius' Atticization.
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by name in Off. (though it might be urged that, as sometimes happens, the name of the main source is suppressed but subsidiary sources named). Then, too, we will need, on occasion, to draw finer distinctions; thus, fr. 68 Β 146, which Cole compares to Anon. Iamb. 5.2 and 2.7, seems more likely to derive from the treatise Trepi βύθυμίης (by abstinence one shows α τόν λόγον" ϊντας ήδη τρεφόμβνον και ρι£ούμ€νον ev €αυτω και κατά Δημόκριτου "αυτόν έξ έαυτοϋ τάς Τ€ρψια$ €θι£όμίνον λάμβαναν") than τκρί άνδραγαθίη?. Now the detailed examination of the proposed parallels between the Anon. Iamb, and our Book in the following commentary yields no firm support and at best a non liquet on the question of a genetic relationship between the source of Anon. Iamb, and Panaetius (cf. below ad $ $ 1 1 - 1 6 , 3 6 - 3 8 , 4 4 - 4 5 , 5 2 - 6 4 , 72-85). The absence of truly striking parallels to Anon. Iamb., together with positive indications of the influence of other, mostly Peripatetic, authors on Panaetius' thinking on the συμφέρον, makes it unlikely that Panaetius, how ever unoriginal here, took his approach over wholesale from Democritus, though 2.11-16 may have been directly or indirectly inspired by him; see ad loc. In Off. 2 we have, however, not Panaetius pure and uncompounded, but Panaetius as seen through a Ciceronian lens (cf. $ 60:. . . Panaetius, quern multum in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus . . , 1 2 ). Cicero's own contribution thus requires careful consideration. He has added at the begin ning a proem ($$ 1-8) much less personal in tone than those to Books 1 and 3; probably indeed $$ 2 - 6 , an answer to critics of his philosophical writing similar to the proems to Tusc. 1 and N.D. 1, derive from the collection of ready-made prooemia to which Cicero elsewhere refers {Att. 16.6.4); see further ad SS 2 - 8 . In spite of his critique of Panaetius at 1.9-10, Cicero seems not to have fully appreciated the importance, in philosophical writing, of providing at the outset of each Book and sticking to a clear divisio (see also introduction to Book 3 and ad 3.96). Thus the divisio of Off. 2 is obscured by having appended to it a second, similar list of topics without explanation of the differences or consequences (cf. ad $$ 2 2 - 2 3 , 29, 31, and 55b-60). In addition, the announced plan to give prior treatment to quae virtuti propiores sunt ($ 22) is twice violated: 1) $$ 2 3 - 2 9 , which discuss metus as an inferior means of securing obedience as compared with caritas; 2) $$ 55b-60 on largitio precede liberalitas ($$ 61-64). Certainly a comparison of metus and benevolentia as means of promoting one's interests would be expected in this Book, but rather just prior to the discussion of beneficentia and libe12. Cf. ad 1.6 and 3.113-15.
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ralitas at §$ 52 ff.; one suspects that here the political topics uppermost in Cicero's mind have obtruded themselves at the expense of logical sequence (cf. ad S§ 23-29). Similarly, in §S 55b-6O the expected order is altered to give priority to examples from Roman public life, whereas, to preserve a certain balance, the Greek examples tend to illustrate private relations (cf. ad S$ 61-64). Since in this Book of advice for would-be statesmen Panaetius himself was inspired, not only by the Peripatetic writings noted above, but also by the literature of advice to kings or on the ideal kingship (cf. ad $§ 17, 33, and 55b), Cicero found here still better opportunity than in Book 1 for pursuing his political ends by other (viz.y literary) means. Thus he deprecates the methods of tyrants, including intimidation and tampering with the property of citizens ($5 2 3 - 2 9 and 73-84), and praises instead the arts of peace, including knowledge of the ius civile, eloquence (§5 65-68), and negotiated settlement of civil differences (see ad §§ 81-82). Carter, 20 ff., noting that the other extant philosophica written after the Ides of March, viz., Div. 2, Amic, and Fat., do not approach the rancorous tone of our work, 13 sus pected that this fact had to do with the current political situation in Rome, in particular the law providing for veterans' benefits (commoda veteranorwn)^ carried, in spite of a thunderstorm and ill omens, in early June by Antony and Dolabella (cf. Fam. 11.2.3). Cicero, according to Carter, feared that this law signaled another round of expropriation of property and awarding it to clients, and he hoped by speaking out strongly to put an end to such measures. Such circumstances may have played a pan in determining the direction of some of the political commentary in Off. But the protection of private property is not Cicero's sole concern; the hindrance of future civil wars was certainly a part of his agenda (esp. at SS 27-29), and the redistribu tion of private property was only one of the evil consequences of civil war;14 the same may be said for the hindrance of future tyranny at Rome (§§ 2 3 24). De Gloria, too, composed between 27 June and 11 July, contained a sharp attack on Caesar and his followers (cf. Bringmann, 198-99). Hence our work should be seen in the broader context of a coming to terms with Caesar and his legacy,15 but also as an attempt to justify Cicero's own pol13. Cf. Strasburger, 1990, 87-89. 14. Cf. Att. 10.8.2: nam caedem video si vicent et impetum in privatorum pecunias et exsulum reditum et tahulas novas et turpissimorum honores et regnum non modo Romano homini sed ne Persae quidem cuiquam tolerabile. 15. The exempla Romano, with the exception of that of Scipio Africanus, specifically attributed to Panaetius ($ 76), but including the references to the Gracchi ($$ 43 and 80), should surely be taken as Ciceronian, rather than Panaetian; cf. introduction $ 5 (2) and (4).
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icies, even though he may in the process have placed greater emphasis than he found in his source on the importance of maintaining property holdings (cf. ad SS 72-85). Finally Cicero has appended a reply to the critique of Panaetius' handling of the συμφέρον by the recently deceased Stoic Antipater of Tyre ($§ 86-87) and a quite perfunctory comparison of utilia ($ 88). 1 This paragraph combines a summary of the contents of the previous book with a general plan for Book 2, which will be similar to its predecessor in comprising first a determination of what falls under the subject (quid utile, quid inutile) and then a comparison of relevant items (turn ex utiiibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile). The latter topic is given only summary treat ment, however (§ 88). Quemadmodum officia ducerentur ab honestate, Marcc fili, atque ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore.] As in Book 1, Cicero begins with the more formal mode of address (Marce fili), and later (1.3; § 8) switches to the familiar mi Cicero (see ad 1.1). This summary of the content of Book 1 is curious in that it ignores the second topic, which he himself had insisted upon so firmly, namely duobus propositis honestis utrum honestius (1.10; cf. 1.161), treated at 1.152-60, and thereby leaves the parallel to the organization of Book 2 incompletely stated. The procedure is understandable, however, on the assumption that a shorthand for the main content rather than a precise catalogue was wanted.—On the use of atque "connecting a more particular or emphatic term or sentence" cf. OLD s.v., 1. On the apparent identification of virtus and the honestum cf. on § 18 below. sequitur ut haec officiorum genera persequar quae pertinent ad vitae culrum et ad earum rerum quibus utuntur homines facultatem, ad opes, ad copias; in quo turn quaeri dixi quid utile, quid inutile, turn ex utiiibus quid utilius aut quid maxime utile.] At 1.7 Cicero announced that he planned to deal in this treatise with appropriate actions that magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; hence the specification of types quae pertinent ad vitae cultum is unsurprising here. Beginning in his third edition (1949) Atzert inserted, after homines, the words commoditates ad, thinking thereby to restore the divisio of Book 2 (he finds a progression from commoditas at 14b to opes at 23, copiae at 57b, and facultas at 75); he thereby betrays a serious misunderstanding of the broad divisions of the Book (see its introduaion). Note that in § 9, which he likewise cites in support, the wording (. . . quarum duae ad decus honestatemque pertinerent, duae ad commoda vitae, copias opes facultates . . .) suggests that terms have been chosen, not systematically, but ex empli gratia (otherwise it is inexplicable why the other three "parts" of the
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honestum are unmentioned); cf. also 3.22, where the terms of our passage recur, albeit in a different order (facultates copias opes). Our sentence rather gives a broad definition of the "useful" by connecting it with the idea of "use" (quibus utuntur homines) and presenting it as a means to an end {fa cultas opes copiae) but as yet leaving that end undefined (in the course of SS 11-17 it will emerge as specifically political). For the introduction of a concept with a congeries of synonyms cf. 1.61 and 93. The clause beginning in quo turn quaeri dixi has been suspected since Langius' edition (1563), cited by Fedeli; in his second edition Arzert placed it in double square brackets as a Ciceronian marginal note falsely inserted here instead of after libro superiore of the previous sentence. Fedeli also brackets it; but Testard and Winterbottom are surely right to allow the text to stand. The dixi refers back to 1.10, but the clause need not, on that account, be placed after our Book's first sentence.—The superlative quid maxime utile was a possibility not raised in 1.10. 2 - 8 These paragraphs comprise an answer to two charges (de institute ac de iudicio meo: § 1), leveled by two distinct groups of critics. (SS 2-6) The first group, evidently comprising members of the senatorial class with no particular interest in—possibly even a positive hostility to— philosophy (vereor ne quibusdam bonis viris philosophiae nomen sit invisum: $ 2), express surprise that Cicero spends so much time in writing on this subject. Cicero explains with reference first to the condition of the state: as long as the institutions of the respublica operated freely, he engaged fully in the life of the state and had for philosophy only so much time as was left over after the claims of state business and friendship had been satisfied; and this time was only enough to read, not to write on the subject. Once the respublica had ceased to function and Cicero was excluded from a real political role, however, he found writing on philosophy far preferable to the alternatives, namely to give himself over to angores or voluptates (inactivity was not an option, since the mind always craves activity (§ 4; cf. 1.191). The argument of §§ 2 - 4 (ego autem, quam diu—si me ad philosophiam ret· tulissem) is structured in a clear pattern of a-b-a-b, where (a) has reference to Cicero's previous practice of giving priority to the work of the courts and the state, (b) to possible means of filling in the void created by the withdrawal of these activities. At Tusc. 1.1 Cicero had depicted his outsider status as a liberation (cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus). At Div. 2.6-7, however, Cicero had made it clear that philosophy served for him at this juncture as a surrogate for politics (cf. Habicht, 3): id enim tpsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut
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eae turn a principibus tenerentur, turn a populis, aliquando a singulis, quod cum accidisset nostrae reipublicae, turn pristinis orbati muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris, qua re cumque possemus. in libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro reipublicae procuration substitutam putabamus. In the aftermath of the Ides of March, however, in our proem and, with greater pathos in the proem to Book 3, Cicero was free to state his true attitude toward his enforced otium. (SS 4b-6) Upon this personal defense follows a description of Cicero's previous involvement with philosophy and then a brief encomium of phi losophy based upon protrepric topics from the Hortensius, to which he soon refers the reader. (SS "7-8a) In contrast to these critics, the second group comprises learned men who, upon hearing that Cicero was writing on appropriate actions, complained that such a project was inconsistent with his general philosophi cal stance of Academic skepticism. Cicero replies that the Academy distinguishes certa and incerta, probabilia and improbabilia; and he adds that surely there is no reason why he should not follow what he regards as probabilia as long as he avoids the arrogance of positive assertion; he thus proposes to have a vivendi ratio while avoiding the dogmatists' adfirmandi adrogantia. (S 8b; Tibi autem—) Cicero turns back briefly to Marcus jr. and the relation of the present project to his current studies. For the proem as a vehicle for answering critics cf. the still more elaborate apologia at Fin. 1.1 ff., with answers to four sets of critics, three of which are similar to the critics of our passage: nam quibusdam, et Us quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet, philosophari. quidam autem non tarn id reprehendunt, si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrabantur. . . . postremo aliquos futuros suspicor, qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent {Fin. 1.1; in our passage this last point may be lurking behind the phrase mirenturque in ea tantum me operae et temporis ponere [§ 2]). However, the third group of Fin. 1.1, who prefer to read philosophy in Greek, not Latin, are not represented here. Private motives, such as the death of Tullia, are touched on obliquely (cf. ad §4); rather, the turn to philosophy is presented mainly as a response to the condition of the state and the desire to turn his enforced otium to account (maximis igitur in malts hoc tamen boni adsecuti videmur, ut ea litteris mandaremus quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima [S 5J). Graff, 58, has spoken of Cicero's "need" to explain and defend his
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philosophical writing; it may have been both an inner need, insofar as here, as in other aspects of his career, Cicero was motivated by a desire for public recognition, and a need imposed from outside, in that the Roman senatorial class in general had to be persuaded that expenditure of time on such pursuits was, in fact, worthwhile. At Att. 16.6.4 Cicero mentions a slip by which he had affixed to de Gloria one of the specimens from his book of ready-made proems that he had already used for the third book of the Academici posteriores; cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1127.67 ff. Heine (ad%\) brings our proem as well as others from the works of this period into connection with that testimony. Certainly the topics dealt with in §§ 2 - 6 have a stereotypical ring; there is on occasion a more direct and personal cast than elsewhere (see on § 4), though less so than one might have expected given that the addressee is his son. This im pression is reinforced by the numerous verbal echoes of N.D. 1.1 and 1.612, presumably also from the book of proems, listed by Pease ad N.D. 1.1. On the other hand, the problem dealt with in §§ 7-8 is specific to de Officiis as a treatise based on a model from dogmatic philosophy; the echoes here of N.D. 1.12 may therefore have a different explanation; Cicero may simply have borrowed a part of the critique [nee habeat umquam quid sequatur: § 7; cf. N.D. loc. cit.: nee tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur) and the reply (§ 8: quid est igitur quod me impediat ea quae probabilia mihi videantur sequi. . .) from N.D. loc. cit. (. . . multa esse probabilia, quae quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam haberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur)y just as he has elsewhere drawn upon phrases and arguments from de Orat., Fin., N.D., Rep., and Top. in our essay.16 2 . . . libri nostri complures non modo ad legendi sed etiam ad scribendi studium excitaverunt. . . ] In Div., completed ca. March, 44 (cf. Gelzer, 335), Cicero had asserted only the former point: nee vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentes se ad haec studia convertant. pauci utinam! quorum tamen in republica late patere potent industria. equidem ex Us etiam fructum capio bboris mei, qui iam aetate provecti in nostris libris adquiescunt; quorum studio legendi meum scribendi studium vehementius in dies incitatur; quos quidem plures, quam rebar, esse cognovi (2.5). Straume-Zimmermann, 33, suspects a reference inter alios to Brutus, who composed a book, dedicated to Cicero, on the 16. For Fm. ad 1.5-6, 3.116-20; for N.D. cf. ad $$ 7-8, I2K-15; for de Orat. ad 1.133, 147, and 156; for Rep. ad 1.41b and 152-61; for Top. ad 3.61b and 75-76.
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sufficiency of virtue to guarantee happiness (Tusc. 5.1); cf. Gelzer, RE 10 (1919), 987.50 ff. 2 - 5 ego autem, quam diu respublica per eos gerebatur . . . nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cf. the more compressed and more circumspect—Caesar was still alive!—expression of this thought at N.D. 1.7-8: nam cum otto langueremus et is esset reipublicae status ut earn unius consilio atque cura gubemari necesse esset, prhnum ipsius reipublicae causa philosophiam nostris hominibus explicandam putavi, magni existimans interesse ad decus et ad laudem civitatis res tarn gravis tamque praeclaras Latinis etiam litteris contineri. eoque me minus instituti met paenitet, quod facile sentio quam multorum non modo discendi sed etiam scribendi studia commoverim. 2 cum . . . socios denique tuendae reipublicae summos viros amisissem . . .] He was perhaps thinking of Pompey (called summus vir at $ 45), Cato Uticensis (cf. 1.112), and M. Marcellus (cos. 51; cf. Marc. 2), as well as the list of deceased statesmen who had approved his consular policies at Phil. 2.12; cf. above p. 29, n. 64. 3 atque utinam respublica stctisset quo coeperat statu, nee in homines non tarn commutandarum quam evertendarom rerum cupidos incidisset!] Cicero had himself employed the expression commutatio reipublicae for Caesar's rule in a letter of the year 46 to Brutus: deinde versatus [sc. M. Terentius Varro | in utrisque subselliis optima et fide et fama iam ante banc commutations reipublicae petitioni sese dedit. . . (Fam. 13.10.2). primum enim, ut stante republica facere solebamus, in agendo plus quam in scribendo operae poncremus, deinde ipsis scriptis non ea quae nunc sed actiones nostras mandaremus . . . ] Although Klotz, TLL 1, 440.73 ff., does not recognize actio in the sense "speech" as Ciceronian, a majority of recent translators so interpret the word in this passage (Miller, Gunermann, Atkins; Testard, however, renders "mes propres aaions"); this may be the first extant passage in which the word is so used (as is suggested by OLD s.v., 5), but the usage is assisted by the preceding in agendo. 3 - 5 cum autem respublica, in qua omnis mea cura cogitatio opera poni solebat, nulla esset omnino, illae scilicet litterae conticuerunt forenses et senatorial nihil agere autem cum animus non posset—quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cf. the similar thought at Fam. 9.6.5 (to Varro, latter part of June, 46): quod [sc. Varro's use of his time for his studies] nos quoque imitamur, ut possumus, et in nostris studiis libentissime conquiescimus. quis enim hoc non dederit nobis, ut, cum opera nostra patria sive non possit uti sive nolit, ad earn vitam revertamur quam
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multi docti homines, fortasse non recte sed tamen multi, etiam reipublicae praeponendam putaverunt? quae igitur studia magnorum hominum sententia vacatiortem habent quondam publici muneris, Us concedente republica cur non abutamur? as well as Fam. 4.4.4 (to Servius Sulpicius; October, 46): nam etsi a prima aetate me omnis ars et doctrina liberalis et maxime philosophia delectavit, tamen hoc studium cottidie ingravescit, credo, et aetatis maturitate ad prudentiam et Us temporum vitiis ut nulla res alia levare animum molestiis possit.—He pronounces a similar judgment on the state of the senate and courts at 3.2.—On the loss of the respublica cf. ad § 29a. 4 nihil agere autem cum animus non posset. . . ] Cf. 1.19 (agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit) and ad 1.13. . . . existimavi honestissime molestias posse deponi. . .] Contrast the pre ceding charaacrization of voluptates as indignae homine docto.—For the oblique allusion to Tullia's death cf. Pease ad N.D. 1.9. cui [sc. philosophiae] cum multum adulescens discendi causa temporis tribuissem, posteaquam honoribus inservire coepi meque totum reipublicae tradidi,—scribcndi otium non erat.J Cf. the presentation of the return to philosophy in briefer, more literary, and less personal terms at Tusc. 1.1, quoted ad $§ 2 - 8 . 5 maximis igitur in malis hoc tamen boni adsecuti videmur, ut ea linens mandaremus quae nee erant satis nota nostris et erant cognitione dignissima.] Cicero took a dim view of his Latin predecessors; cf. Tusc. 1.6,2.7; he had, for instance, no high opinion of the style of the Epicurean C. Amafinius (Ac. 1.5), in spite of his popularity and influence (Tusc. 4.6-7); cf. J. Kwapiszewski, "Roman Philosophers in the Philosophical Works of Cicero," Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium 1 (1973), 65-75; Miriam Griffin in CAH 9\ 718. 5 - 6 quid cnim est, per deos,—sed hacc cum ad philosophiam cohortamur accuratius disputari solent, quod alio quodam libro fecimus.] = Hort. fr. 5 Grilli. Straume-Zimmermann's suggestion (34) that the following reply to the charge of philosophical inconsistency in combining dogmatism and skep ticism may likewise derive from the Hortensius should be treated with re serve, however; the problem has no obvious connection with the protreptic theme of that work and arises rather out of the specific situation of Cicero writing first as a skeptic and now propounding doctrines on appropriate actions; cf. 2.7: . , . hoc ipso tempore praecepta officii persequamur. The eulogy of philosophy here is a bit less intense than in the famous passage analyzed by Hildebrecht Hommel, Ciceros Gebetshymnus an die Philosophic, Tusculanen V 5, SHAW, philos.-hist. Kl. (Heidelberg, 1968), no. 3, and less developed than that at Leg. 1.58-62, on which see P. Boyancc,
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"Ueloge de la Philosophic dans le De Legibus I,w Ciceroniana n.s. 2 (1975), 21-42.—For the use of anaphora cf. ad 1.151.—This eulogy of sapientia is conventional (see above ad §S 2-8) and need not, pace Marianne Kretschmar, Otium, studia litterarutn. Philosophic und βίος θεωρητικός im Leben und Denken Ciceros (diss. Leipzig, 1938), 138-39, be the result of Cicero's political disappointment between the composition of Div. and Off. 5 sapientia autem est — rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque quibus eae res continentur scientia.j In attributing this view to veteres philosophi Cicero perhaps has Socrates and Plato in mind; for the former cf. X. Mem. 4.6.7: επιστήμη άρα σοφία εστίν; for the latter, D.L. 3.63: ίδιαίτατα μεν σοφίαν ηγείται [sc. Plato] είναι την τών νοητών και όντως όντων επιστήμην . . . ιδία δε σοφίαν και την φιλοσοφίαν καλεί, όρεξιν ούσαν της θείας σοφίας, κοινώς δε λέγεται παρ* αύτω σοφία και ή πάσα εμπειρία, οίον όταν σοφον λεγη τονδημιουργόν;cf. also Arist. ΕΝ 1141 b 2 - 3 (sim. 114la 18-19): . . . δήλον ότι ή σοφία εστί και επιστήμη καΐ νους τών τιμιωτάτων τη φύσει. The doctrine was taken up by the Stoa (Aet. de Viae. Phil. 1 proem 2 = S VF 2, 15.3-5; sim. ibid. 11-13 and 304.25): οι μεν ούν Στωικοί εφασαν την μεν σοφίαν εΐναι θείων τε και ανθρωπίνων έπιστήμην, την δε φιλοσοφίαν άσκησιν επιτηδείου τέχνης. The inclusion of knowledge of causes is not attested before Cicero (and not included, e.g., at 1.153; see ad be.) but surely had its origin in the Greek philosophical schools; cf. Arist. Met. 1025b5-7 (et alibi): . . . και όλως δε πάσα επιστήμη διανοητική ή μετέχουσα τι διανοίας περί αιτίας και αρχάς έστιν ή ακριβεστέρας ή απλουστέρας; Phil, de Congr. 79 (3, 87.19 Cohn-Wendland): και μην ώσπερ τα έγκύκλια συμβάλλεται προς φι λοσοφίας άνάληψιν, οϋτω και φιλοσοφία προς σοφίας κτήσιν. εστί γαρ φι λοσοφία επιτήδευσις σοφίας, σοφία δε επιστήμη θείων και ανθρωπίνων και τών τούτων αιτίων, on which see A.-M. Malingrey, "Philosophia." Etude d'un groupe de mots dans h litterature grecque, des Presocratiques au IVe siecle apres J.-C. (Paris, 1961), 7 9 - 8 1 . Seneca, however, thought the causes no necessary part of the definition (because they are implied by the other terms; cf. £p. 89.5: sapientiam quidam ita finierunt ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam; quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas. supervacua mihi haec videtur adiectio, quia causae divinorum humanorumque pars divinorum sunt). Cf. also Tusc. 4.57: . . . sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; Off. 1.153: . . . ilia autem sapientia . . . rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia . . . ; S.E. M. 9.13, partially reproduced at SVF 2, 15.11-13: ό περί θεών λόγος πάνυ αναγκαιότατος είναι δοκεί τοις δογματικώς φιλοσοφουσιν. εντεύθεν την φιλοσοφίαν φασίν έπιτήδευσιν είναι σοφίας, την δε σοφίαν έπιστήμην θείων τε και ανθρωπίνων πραγμάτων; Aug.
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c. acad. 1.6.16: itaque a me nihil aliud habebis quam definitionem sapientiae, quae nee mea nee nova est, sed et priseorum hominum et quam vos miror non recordari. non enim nunc primum auditis sapientiam esse return humanarum divinarumque scientiam; Anon, in Rhet. Gr., ed. Walz, 7, 696.8: . . . σοφία δε επιστήμη των πρώτων αιτίων . . .—For a different definition of sapientia cf. Leg. 1.22. 6 nam sive oblectatio quaeritur animi requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest qui semper aliquid anquirunt quod spectet et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum?] The theme that studies in general provide delight and relaxation appears as early as Arch. 16 (62), cited ad 1.135; cf. QF 3.7.2 (December, 54). In October, 46, even before Tullia's death, Cicero finds the hold of philosophy upon him growing (cf. Fam. 4.4.4, quoted ad SS 3-5). But perhaps closest in spirit to our passage are the words put into Atticus' mouth at Ac. 1.7: totum igitur illud philosophiae studium mihi quidem ipse sumo et ad vitae constantiam quantum possum et ad delectationem animi, nee ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est |sc. Tim. 47b), maius aut melius a diis datum munus homini. . . sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est aut nulla omnino— cum ab hoc discendi genere discesseris?] The question whether virtue can be taught, i.e., is a τενη or ars, arises in several Platonic dialogues and forms the subject of the Meno, which begins with the question (70a) έχεις μοι είπεΐν, ώ Σώκρατες, αρα διδακτοί/ ή αρετή; and leads to the conclusion: ει δε νυν ημείς εν παντι τφ λόγω τούτω καλώς εζητήσαμεν τε και έλέγομε ν, αρετή αν εϊη ούτε φύσει ούτε διδακτόν, άλλα θεία μοίρα παραγιγνομενη άνευ νοΰ οι ς άι> παραγίγνηται . . . (99e; cf. Arist. ΕΝ 1099b9). Cf. also Prt. 319a ff., with its com parison of virtue to other arts that can be taught, and the equation of philoso phy with the cultivation of virtue (αρετής επιμέλεια) at Euthd. 275a.—It is a bit surprising to see constantia and virtus placed on the same level here; but perhaps constantia is thought of as the outward manifestation of virtus, as is implicit in the discussion of the fourth virtue (cf. ad 1.93,103,111); cf. also Tusc. 5.13, quoted ad 3.116, and Farad. 16. 7 Occurritur autem nobis, et quidem a doctis et eruditis, quaerentibus satisne constanter facere videamur qui, cum percipi nihil posse dicamus . . .] Cf. Luc. 66 (Cicero is the speaker): visa enim ista cum acriter mentem sensumve pepulerunt accipio Usque interdum etiam adsentior. nee percipio tamen: nihil enim arbitror posse percipi. non enim sumus ii quorum vagetur animus errore nee habeat umquam quid sequatur.] Cf. the similar denial at N.D. 1.12: nee tamen fieri potest ut qui hac ratione philosophentur hi nihil habeant quod sequantur. Who are the unnamed persons here criticized? The description fits no one so well as
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Pyrrho, who, as depicted (after Antigonus of Carystus [p. 36 Wil.]) at D.L. 9.62, required the help of friends to stay clear of dogs, carts, precipices, etc., so little reliance did he place on the evidence of his senses; on this portrait cf. M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, 1987), 181-82. In spite of his own adherence to the Skeptical Academy, Cicero fails to evince any sympathy for Pyrrho (cf. ad 1.6). In a different mood Cicero confesses at Luc. 66 (where he is himself the speaker): ego vero ipse et magnus quidam sum opinator (non enim sum sapiens) et meas cogitationes sic dirigo, non ad illam parvulam Cynosuram,. . . sed Helicen et clarissimos Septentrtones, id est rationes has latiore specie non ad tenue limatas; eo fit ut errem et vager latiuSy on which passage cf. Gorier, 1992, 168. 7 - 8 quae enim esset ista mens vel quae vita potius, non modo disputandi sed etiam vivendi ratione sublata?—sed haec explanata sunt in Academicis nostris satis, ut arbitror, diligenter.] Cicero's combination of skepticism in some questions and dogmatism in others has, since the eighteenth century, damaged his philosophical reputation. Therefore his own attempt to justify his position deserves close attention. The skeptic, no less than the dogmatist, needs to arrive at a vivendi ratio. The skeptic differs from the dogmatist, however, in seeing not certa, but, in Ciceronian terminology (cf. ad § 8), probahilia and accordingly engaging in suspension of judgment (€ποχή; cf. Luc. 59). The chief argument against ancient skeptics was the charge of απραξία, i.e., that their suspension of judgment rendered them incapable of carrying on the business of everyday life (cf. Luc. 62: sublata enim adsensione omnem et motum animorum et actionem rerum sustulerunt). In our passage Cicero adopts a strategy of Carneades reported (via Clitomachus) in greater detail at Luc. 99 (= Carneades F 5, p. 86, 98 M.): duo placet esse Carneadi genera visorum; in uno hanc divisionem, alia visa esse quae percipi possint (alia quae non possint), in altero autem, alia visa esse probahilia, alia non probahilia. itaque quae contra sensus contraque perspicuitatem dicantur ea pertinere ad superiorem divisionem, contra posteriorem nihil diet oportere. quare ita placere, tale visum nullum esse ut perceptio consequeretur, ut autem probatio multa. etenim contra naturam esset, (si) probabile nihil esset; sequitur omnis vitae ea quam tu Luculle commemorabas eversio. itaque et sensibus probanda multa sunt, teneatur modo Mud, non inesse in is quicquam tale quale non etiam falsum nihil ab eo differens esse possit—sic quidquid accident specie probabile, si nihil se offeret quod sit probabilitati illi contrarium, utetur eo sapiens, ac sic omnis ratio vitae gubernabitur. etenim is quoque qui a vobis Isc. Stoicis] sapiens inducitur multa sequitur probahilia non conprehensa neque percepta neque adsensa sed similia vert, quae nisi probet omnis vita tollatur. Similar to the brief reply of
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our passage is N.D. 1.12:. . . multa esse probabilia quae, quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia visum quendam baberent insignem et inlustrem, his sapientis vita regeretur. Cicero proposes to follow {sequi) the probabilia, i.e., to use them as a basis for daily living, the way a dogmatist uses his certa, and to disapprove of non-probabilia so used; the substitution of probabilia for certa and of sequi17 for adsentiri enables the skeptic to take a position at one level while reserving judgment at another. Cicero's critics might, how ever, while conceding the skeptic's right to an everyday life like other per sons, still query the appropriateness of the skeptic offering advice to others on important matters, an aspect of the problem that he does not address. Cf. R. Bett, "Carneades' Pithanon: a Reappraisal of its Role and Status,'' OSAP 7 (1989), 5 9 - 9 4 , and "Carneades' Distinction between Assent and Ap proval," Monist 73 (1990), 3 - 2 0 , esp. 3 - 6 , with literature cited at 17, n. 1; Neuhausen, 104-5. 8 . . . atque adfirmandi adrogantiam vitantem fugere temeritatem, quae a sapienria dissidet plurimum?] Cicero similarly expresses the appeal of skep ticism at Div. 2.1: . . . quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus. contra autem omnia disputatur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non posset nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio.] This pas sage, like Luc. 7 (neque nostrae disputationes quicquam aliudagunt nisi ut in utramque partem dicendo et audiendo eliciant et tamquam exprimant aliquid quod aut verum sit aut ad id quam proxime accedat) and Quint. Inst. 12.1.35 and 12.2.25, involves a confusion of Arcesilas' method of contra omnia disputari (de Orat. 1.43, N.D. 1.11) with no positive doctrine ex pected to emerge18 and the Peripatetic method of ex utraque parte disputari so that the probabilia may become apparent (cf. Arist. Top. 163a36-bl2; de Orat. 1.158); cf. Douglas ad Brut. 119; M. Ruch, "La 'disputatio in utram que partem' dans le Lucullus' et ses fondements philosophiques," REL 47 (1969), 310-35, esp. 329. The confusion may have been abetted by Cicero's choice of probabile, with its connotations of positive acceptance (note rela tion to probus, probare), to render the more neutral πιθανόν, a move that has sown confusion to quite recent times; cf. M. Bumyeat, "Can the Skeptic Live his Skepticism?" in Schofield-Burnyeat-Barnes, 28-29; Gorier, 1992, esp. 165 ff. 17. For the use of κατακολο\&1νίέ·πζο0αι fsequi in skeptical arguments cf. passages cited by Gorier, 1992, 164. 18. The result of the iooofitveia of arguments is rather the suspension of belief (εποχή); cf. Long, 1986, 446 ff.
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Tibi autem, mi Cicero, quamquam in antiquissima nobilissimaque philosophia Cratippo auctore versaris, iis simillimo qui ista praedara pepererunt, tamen haec nostra, finitima vestris, ignota esse nolui.] A brief resumption of themes from the proem to the first book—an apologia for writing on phi losophy when his son is already studying philosophy with a teacher and for writing in a Stoic vein though Cratippus is a Peripatetic; cf. ad 1.1-2. On Cicero's tendency to reduce the distance between the Academy/Peripatos and the Stoa cf. Gorier, 1974,198 ff. On change in the form of address from the more formal Marce fili cf. ad 1.1.—Glucker, 1988, 39-57, argues against what he sees as the misuse of this passage, in particular the phrase haec nostra, in combination with Inv. 2.10, to construe a lifelong affiliation of Cicero with the Skeptical Academy (he does not dispute the reference of haec nostra to Academic teachings, merely the continuity); but note that with autem Cicero has now turned from his response to critics back to Marcus jr.; the words haec nostra, finitima vestris, ignota esse nolui should therefore be read in parallel with 1.2 {tamen nostra legens non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia) as justifying his present project as something akin to Peripatetic teachings. Against Glucker's thesis cf. also Miriam T. Griffin, "Philosophi cal Badinage in Cicero's Letters to His Friends," in Powell, 3 3 4 - 3 5 , and Woldemar Gorier, "Silencing the Troublemaker: De Legibus 1.39 and the Continuity of Cicero's Skepticism," ibid. 85 ff. sed iam ad instituta pergamus.) Such markers of the ends of sections play an important role in articulating the structure of Off.; cf. 1.161 fin.: sed iam ad reliqua pergamus. In such cases I would treat the marker as the end of the previous argument, not as a paragraph in itself or the beginning of a new paragraph, as does Winterbottom (a false emphasis, I think); cf. also ad 1.20. 9 - 1 0 These sections comprise some preliminary observations on the terms honestum and utile and on their relation to each other and to the iustum. One can err either, as pointed out in our passage, by differentiating honestum and utile (and using the utile as a criterion of action instead of the honestum) or, a possibility mooted several times in Book 3, by allowing conceptions of the utile to define the honestum, rather than the reverse (cf. 3.81, 103 [. . . quidquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum], and 110). 9 igitur] Resumptive of § 1 after the "digression" of §§ 2 - 8 has intervened. This ultimately goes back, of course, to the quinquepartite scheme of 1.10. u t i l e . . . in quo verbo lapsa consuetudo deflexit de via, sensimque eo deducta est ut honestatern ab militate secernens constitueret esse honestum aliquid quod utile non essct et utile quod non honestum, qua nulla pernides maior hominum vitae potuit adferri.) Underlying this is the common ancient con ception of usage {consuetudo = συνή&ια) as deviating from an original norm,
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whether that original state is assumed to have existed φύσει (as commonly by the Stoics; cf. De Lacy, 1948, 256) or θέσει (cf. the νομοθέτης of Plato's Cratylus [388eJ); cf., in general, J. Wackernagel, De pathologiae veterum initiis (diss. Basel, 1876), esp. 25 = Kleine Schriften, 3 (Gottingen 1979), 1451; D.L. Blank, "The Etymology of Salvation in Gregory of Nyssa's De virginitate," JTS N.S. 37 (1986), 8 7 - 8 8 . Like όνομα and ρήμα themselves (cf. R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford 1968], 59-60), συνήθεια was.evidently on its way to becoming a technical term in Plato's time; note that at Tht. 168b-c the genitival limitation is still felt as necessary: και εκ τούτων επίσκεψη είτε ταύτόν είτε και άλλο επιστήμη και αΐσθησις, αλλ' ούχ ώσπ€ρ άρτι εκ συνή θειας ρημάτων τε και ονομάτων, α οι πολλοί οπη αν τυχωσιν ελκοντες απορίας άλλήλοις παντοδαπάς παρεχουσι. For Varro (L. 5.6) observation of the effects of consuetudo abets the study of etymology. One would expect in the original state of affairs to find a one-to-one correspondence of word and thing. For a single reality to have two different names, honestum and utile, points to a deviation by consuetudo (here personified; cf. 3.71 \malitia\). Cicero sup poses that this confusion of terminology has sown moral confusion. He has the cart before the horse, however, since usage follows mores rather than vice-versa. What he found in his source was probably a statement about Socrates cursing the first person to introduce the distinction, as at 3.11; cf. also SVF 1, 127.20 ff. = Clem. Al. Strom. 2.131: διό και Κλεάνθη? εν τω δευτέρω περί ηδονή? τον Σωκράτην φησί παρ' έκαστα διδασκειν. ώς ό αυτό? δίκαιο? τε και ευδαίμων άνήρ, και τω πρωτω διελόντι το δίκαιον άπό του συμφέροντος καταρασθαι, ώς άσεβες τι πράγμα δεδρακότι- ασεβείς γάρ τφ δντι οι το συμφέρον άπό του δικαίου του κατά νόμον χωρί£οιτες; Leg. 1.33: ius igitur datum est omnibus, recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat qui primus utilitatem a iure seiunxisset; id enim querebatur caput esse exitiorum omnium. 10 summa quidem auctoritate philosophi severe sane atque honeste haec ttria generaf confusa cogitatione disringuunt: quidquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent, itemque quod honestum, idem iustum, ex quo efficitur ut quicquid honestum sit, idem sit utile.] A much disputed text. In particular, scholars have found difficulty with tria, since the preceding discus sion contrasted two terms, honestum and utile. Furthermore in a treatise where honestum and utile are on the same level but the iustum subordinate to the honestum, it seems odd for the three terms to be treated as on a par in the following clauses quidquid enim iustum sit—idem sit utile. Hence Beier suspected tria to be a gloss; cf. J. von Gruber (1874 ed.); Charles Knapp, "Cicero De officiis 2.10," AJPh 31 (1910), 6 6 - 7 3 . In addition, Unger's
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bracketing of quidquid enim iustum sit—idem sit utile won the support of Miiller, von Gruber, Heine, and others. Finally Hottinger (as reported by Beier) proposed simply emending tria to duo (i.e., Ill to II). (1) Goldbacher, 2, 49, pointed out that the version of our passage St. Ambrose read certainly included the material bracketed by Unger and his followers: liquet igitur quod honestum est utile esse, et quod utile honestum; et quod utile iustum, et quod iustum utile (off. 2.25); but this fact would, of course, not rule out an early interpolation. (2) Heine attempted to extract the following three categories from § 9: (1) honestum without the utile; (2) utile without the honestum; (3) honestum and utile together. In fact, however, $ 9 deals with usage, whereby the utile came to be seen as something different from the honestum (see above), not with three objective categories. In default of a referent for haec tria in % 9, if tria is authentic, it evidently refers, not to what pre cedes, hut to what follows (either deixis is possible per se: cf. HofmannSzantyr, 180-81). (3) Though iustitia/iustus stood in common parlance for the whole of virtue (cf. ad § 38), it is odd and contrary to the usage of Book 1 for iustitia to be so deployed when the honestum itself is mentioned in the same context, with the result that the iustum stands on the same level as the honestum and utile, nor in the following syllogism is the iustum placed on the same level as the other terms (see [4b] below). (4a) Tria, then, seems indefensible; either it may have been corrupted from duo, or some ancient reader may have inserted it, with intent of clarification, on the basis of the following syllogism. But there remains the problem of the sequel. The best attested reading is genera (C), printed by Testard and, together with tria within cruces, by Winterbottom; genere is read by c and adopted by Atzert4, Fedeli, and Cugusi, whereas L offers genera e(con-)\ hence Lambinus's genera {re) confusa (adopted among recent editors by Schiassi) would account for the phenomena of the wit nesses. The sense will surely be not dissimilar to 3.11, where reference is made to eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxissent. If that is so, then the reading genere cannot be right; they are not jumbled together "in respect of kind"; rather it is the classification in distinct genera that is referred to with the words cogitatione distinguunt. Genera is surely correct: honestum and utile are distinct types that are jumbled together. One feels, however, the need for some further qualification along the lines of, but less cumbersome than, Pohlenz's (etsi re eadem esse dicunt). Surely Lambinus's re, besides its palaeographical attractiveness
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(see above), fills the bill admirably by showing in what sense the two classes are confusa and creating a contrast of res and opinio used by Cicero elsewhere; cf. 1.95: quod lsc. quod deceat] cogitatione magis a virtute potest quant re separari.19 (4b) The fact that young Marcus is studying philosophy with Cratippus may have to do with Cicero's (exceptional) willingness to use the un disguised syllogistic form of argument; cf. Luc. 67 and ad $ 48 and 3.27. The syllogism should therefore probably not be deleted. However, the argument does not proceed the way one would have expected, for the equivalence of the iustum and the utile should be the final outcome, not the first premise, as at SVF 3, 76.16-18: πάν δίκαιον καλόν, πάν καλόν αγαθόν πάν άρα δίκαιον αγαθόν αλλά μην και το αγαθόν τφ συμφίροντι ταύτόν πάν άρα δίκαιον συμφέρον, lustitia will play a dominating part in Books 2 (SS 52-84) and 3 (really the whole down as far as $ 116), since those who push the utile too far will offend above all against iustitia, rather than against prudentia, magnitudo ammi, or decorum; cf. Cicero's later description:. . . iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur . . . (S 38) and haec [sc. iustitia] enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum (3.28), as well as the transmitted text at $ 33: iustis autem etfidis hominibus, id est bonis viris . . . (see ad loc.).zo The key point, then, is to establish the identity of the iustum and the utile. The syllogism just quoted from SVF 3, 76.16-18, or something very similar, is surely what Cicero found in his Panaetian source at this place; for it involves reasoning from the Stoic premise of the identity of the αγαθόν and συμφέρον (cf. introduc tion to this Book), not the emergence of this identity as the final out come. 21 The disturbance in the Latin text could possibly result either from Ciceronian or scribal error; Ambr. off. 2.25, cited under no. (1) above, would argue for the latter; 3.19, where the logic of the passage has fallen victim to the inattentiveness of scribes (see ad loc.)y could be adduced as parallel. However, since the identity of honestum and utile here estab lished will form the basis for the treatment of their apparent conflict in Book 3, one wonders whether it may not have been Cicero himself who rearranged the terms to effect this outcome (cf. the similar formulation at 3.35).
19. Cf. the similar error at 1.128, where re has fallen out in ζ.—Similar in sense and worth considering (though more remote palaeographically) is Winterbonom's natura for genera, for which he compares both 3.11 and Leg. fr. 2 Ziegler. 20. On the importance of iustitia in Off. generally cf. Atkins. 21. For the minor premise quod honestum, idem iustum cf. Fin. 2.71.
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Note that at PI. Prt. 333d ff. Protagoras demurs at the identification of goods (αγαθά) with things useful to humans (ωφέλιμα τοΐ? άνθρωποι?) on grounds that "useful" is a relative term, so that, for instance, oil may be useful when applied to the surface of the body but harmful when taken internally. Similarly, the simple Ciceronian/Ambrosian 22 identification of honestum and utile seemed to Thorn. Aqu. 5. Th. I1.2.cxlv.3.3 fin. to require clarification:. . . intentio Tullii et Ambrosii dicere est quod nihil potest esse simpUciter et vere utile quod repugnat honestati, quia oportet quod repugnet ultimo fini hominis, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quamvis forte possit esse utile secundum quid respectu alicuius finis particularis. non autem intendunt dicere quod omne utile in se consideratum pertingat ad rationem honesti; cf. Nelson, 126. . . . severe sane atque honeste . . .] This characterization of the philosophers* procedure would have been redundant but for what follows; they must not be implicated in the distinction drawn between honestum and utile by those who admire versutos homines et callidos. quidquid enim iustum sit, id etiam utile esse censent. . .] Phil. Mut. Nom. 197 (3, 190.15 Cohn-Wendland) lists among the common hypocrisies the sentiment συμφέρον ή δικαιοσύνη, άσυμφ€ρον ή αδικία. quod qui parum perspiciunt, ii saepe versutos homines et callidos admirantcs, malitiam sapientiam iudicanL] Quod surely refers to the identity of honestum and utile, not the fact that the philosophers divide in theory what belongs together by nature (as Pohlenz, AF, 9 1 , n. 1, and Goldbacher, 2 , 4 8 49, still influenced too much by Unger, assume). For manifestations of malitia cf. 1.33. quorum error cripiendus est opinioque omnis ad earn spem traducenda, ut honestis consiliis iustisque factis, non fraude et malitia se intellegant ea quae velint consequi posse.] This sentence is, in a sense, the keynote of Off. 2. Cicero/Panaetius speaks unabashedly as a moralist aiming to reform be havior by convincing readers that it is possible to attain their ends without resorting to deceit or other unethical practices; cf. Heilmann, 3. 11-16 F. Wchrli {ad Dicaearch. fr. 24) has suggested that Dicaearchus was the source, not only of Panaetius' discussion of the causes of human death in § 16, but in general of the argument at §§ 11-16; similarly, Cole, 1961,131, while finding that this "uncompromising glorification of technology" should ultimately derive from a fifth-century source, is prepared to entertain Dicaearchus as an intermediary. Though the title of the work Cicero cites [de Interitu Hominum |§ 16] = π€ρι ανθρώπων φθοράς) does not encourage this 22. Sc. off 2.28.
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theory, Cicero might, as Pohlenz mooted {AF, 97, n. 1), be thus referring to a section of the βίο? Ελλάδος; and the emphasis on human cooperation (absent from the Peripatetic parallels cited by Wehrli23) could have been added by Panaetius for his own purposes. Also, the method of oiatpeois in 5 11 would be compatible with a Peripatetic source behind Panaetius (cf. Cole, loc.cit.). Nevertheless this theory must face the fact that Dicaearchus, like Hesiod, placed the golden age in the remote past (cf. esp. frr. 4 8 - 4 9 Wehrli2), a view difficult to square with this optimistic account of human progress; one would then have to assume that Panaetius had completely altered the tendency of Dicaearchus* account (Cole, 1961, 158, n. 19, tries to obviate this difficulty by emphasizing that Dicaearchus and Panaetius both see successive stages in human exploitation of the natural environment). If, then, we leave to one side the problematical role of Dicaearchus, Cole's notion that Panaetius derived this material (whether directly or indirectly) from a fifth-century source is attractive per se. Panaetius would then have added the emphasis on cooperation, and the orthodox Stoa have turned the Democritean (?) argument on its head in seeing divine πρόνοια behind every milestone of human progress {N.D. 2.150 ff.). However, the parallel in this sector to Anon. Iamb, cited by Cataudella, 481-82 and 483, and Cole, 1961, 132, viz., 6.1-5 = Iamb. 100.5 ff., presents too generalized a similarity to establish a case for a genetic relation of it or its source to Panaetius. In any case, while using a traditional method (διαίρεσι?) and topos (the stages of human development), Panaetius is adapting them to his own ends (the emphasis on human cooperation and reason; cf. 1.12: eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini. . , impellitque ut hominum coetus et celebrationes et esse et a se obiri velit etc.). 11 This classification of things beneficial to the human being corresponds to the Stoic scala naturae or hierarchy of entities: I. Inanimate II. Animate [A. Plants] B. Animals C. Intelligent beings 1. Human beings 2. Gods. Each entity at a higher level has the properties of the lower one(s) as well as one additional quality. Similar to our passage is N.D. 2.33-36, where Balbus 23. Viz.. Arist. Pol I253a31ff. and MM 1203a22ffM boih cited ad $ 16.
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 11-16 and 11
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uses the scab naturae to argue that the existence of the lower entities implies the existence of a highest, namely the deity; there the inanimate objects were omitted, whereas in our passage plants receive no mention (hence the square brackets in the outline printed above). The influence of the Academic/ Peripatetic method of διαίρεση is apparent here; cf. in general Inwood, 1985, 18 ff., esp. 25. The presentation in our passage is, as Inwood notes, systematic, rather than argumentative. The scab naturae yields a com prehensive framework for analyzing utilia; and the division between inanima (άψυχα) and animalia (έμψυχα), the latter category further subdivided into nonintelligent (άλογα) and intelligent (λογικά), 24 provides the skeleton filled in with examples in $§ 12-15 (see ad he). But, in fact, the gods are men tioned here only to be dismissed in a sentence (deos placatos pietas efftciet et sanctitas [§ 11]); as a factor contributing to human utilitas they are, from Panaetius' perspective, trivial compared to other human beings. Thus the last two terms of the conventional hierarchy really need to be reversed in a hierarchy of utilia for the human being; and Cicero does, in fact, present them in the reverse of the expected order:. . . deorum unum, alterum homi num. Cf. also J.A. Akinpelu, "The Stoic Scab Naturae (with Special Refer ence to the Exposition of It in Cicero's De Natura Deorum)," PACA 10 (1967), 2 9 - 3 5 , who points out that in that passage, too, the focus is, to a greater degree than one might have expected, on the human being. Pohlenz thought that Panaetius would, at this point, analogously to the treatment of the καλόν in Book 1, have derived the ώφβλιμον from human nature {AF, 91). But this was already done at 1.11: principio generi animantium omni est a natura tributum ut se vitam corpusque tueatur, declinet ea quae nocitura videantur, omniaque quae sint ad vivendum necessaria anquirat et paret, ut pastum, ut latibub, ut alia generis eiusdem. Quae ergo ad vitam hominum tuendam pertinent, partim sunt inanima . . . partim animalia . . .] Pohlenz, AF, 93, finds that the connection with ergo "verschleiert nur diinn den abrupten Charakter des Eingangs," whereas Gartner, 1974, 24, n. 11, with reference to our passage, points out that ergo u wird u.a. gebraucht, wenn die Rede nach einer langeren Vorbereitung zum crsten Hauptteil ubergeht." I suspect, however, that most readers would have welcomed at this stage some more explicit pointer as to the direction the argument is taking (cf. ad 1.11 - 1 7 , 3.89-95). It will, of course, turn out that what one needs in order to attain one's ends is the conspiratio hominum atque consensus (§ 16). Cole, 1961, 135, suspects that in this passage "the honestum is being imposed on a context not originally designed for it." At 24. The Greek equivalents are given by Pohlenz, AF. 93.
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the very least, Cicero/Panaetius has omitted a step in the argument by failing to show that the conspiratio hominum atque consensus tends to be in line with the honestum (Panaetius was, of course, well aware that there are societies, like those of thieves, that do not follow general norms, though they have rules of their own; cf. § 40). . . . partim animalia, quae habent suos impetus et rerum appetitus.] Cicero omits plants and passes directly to animals, an evident inadvertence since he does mention agriculture in the following sketch of the progress of human civilization (§ 12). Impetus and rerum appetitus render ορμή in Cicero's source; cf. Robert Fischer, De usu vocabulorum apud Ciceronem et Senecam Graecae philosophiae interpretes (diss. Freiburg i.B., 1914), 75 ff., esp. 77; Inwood, 1985, 25 and 263, n. 30. According to Aristotle, as living things, plants have a nutritive soul that holds them together, but not a conscious soul; the Stoics explained the plants' maintenance of structural integrity differently and denied them soul altogether, a point implicit in our passage (for ορμή as one of the powers of the soul cf. ad 1.101); cf. Sorabji, 98-99, with Stoic sources cited at 98, n. 14. On impetus as common to human and beast cf. also Sen. de Ira 1.3.4: sed dicendum est feras ira carere. . . impetus habent ferae, rabiem feritatem incursum, iram quidem non magis quam luxuriam . . . ; in general, O. Prinz, TLL 7, 608.62 ff., esp. 67 ff. (s.v. impetus). expertes rationis equi boves, reliquae pecudes (apes), quarom opere efficirur aliquid ad usum hominum atque vitam.] Facciolati's athetosis of apes, on grounds that u etiam volatile genus est inter pecudes,** has been revived by Bruser, 99, and followed by several recent editors (Atzerr4, Fedeli). Facciolati may have been thinking of the following entry in Nonius (p. 460M): pecudes non solas quadrupedes, sed et alia animalia dicere Vergilio auctore possumus in Georg. lib. IV [327]: 'quern mihi vix frugum et pecudum custodia sollers' et: 'ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent' [ibid., 168]. Perhaps, how ever, this is a poetic usage, the term pecudes being ordinarily applied to large land animals; hence the distinction of apes and pecudes at Col. 9.4.1 {interim per has notas quas iam diximus probatis apibus destinari debent pabulattones, eaeque sint secretissimae et, ut noster praecipit Maro, viduae pecudibus . . .). Nevertheless equi boves, reliquae pecudes looks very much like a Ciceronian triplet in which the final member subsumes all other possibilities (cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 1,154), and apes following it seems, at the very least, anticlimactic. Nor is it convincing to assume loss of apes by homoeoteleuton after boves, its reinsertion in the margin, and, ultimately, in the wrong place in the text, since the summarizing reliquae pecudes would not apply, in prose, to apes (see above). Bees are, of course, a preeminent example of a
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 1 l-12a and 12b—15
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creature "by whose work something of use to humans and (their) life is effected"; perhaps for that very reason a reader of Off. was moved (at a prearchetypal stage) to insert apes into the text. ratione autem utentium duo genera ponunt, deorum unum, alteram hominum.] It did not suit Cicero's purpose to dilate upon the community of reason of men and gods as he had at Leg. 1.23. deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas;. . .J Pietas and sanctitas corre spond, as Wilamowitz, 1926, 201, n. 1, notes, respectively to ewefkia and ayveia. However, Panaetius, reserved about the popular cult of the gods (frr. 70 ff.), will have phrased the matter more cautiously, in terms of what people believe, as in the previous sentence and in the following quia deos nocere non putant. . . ; cf. also 1.9: triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant. . .; cf. Heinemann, 2, 13. N.D. 1.116 defines sanctitas as scientia colendorum deorum. 12a sed quia deos nocere non putant, iis exceptis homines hominibus obesse plurimum arbitrantur.J Cf., e.g., PI. R. 379b; N.D. 1.117: nam superstitione, quod gloriari soletis |sc. Epicurei], facile est liberare, cum sustuleris omnem vim deorum; Sen. Ep. 95.49: quae causa est dis bene faciendif natura. errat si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt; SVF 2, 325.8 (= Lact. ira 5): existimantur Stoici et alii nonnulli aliquanto melius de divinitate sensisse, qui aiunt, gratiam in Deo esse, tram non esse; Sen. de Ira 2.27.1: quaedam sunt quae nocere non possunt nullamque vim nisi beneficam et salutarem habent, ut di inmortales, qui nee volunt obesse nee possunt; natura enim Hits mitis et placida est, tarn longe remota ab aliena iniuria quam a sua; 3.102 and 104. 12b-15 These sections (from Ea enim ipsa quae inanima diximus), while following (with omission of the gods) the order of categories of § 11, trace, in effect, the progress of human civilization in three stages: I. Exploitation of inanimate matter (§§ 12-14a—capere potuisse) A. Trade B. Mining C. Construction 1. Houses 2. Other large-scale projects II. Exploitation of animals (14b) III. Artes(\S) A. Medicine B. Entertainment C. The city and its institutions.
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Such an analysis derives ultimately from sophistic thought of the fifth century as reflected in the myth of human development at PI. Prt. 320c ff. or in the eulogy of man in the first stasimon of Sophocles* Antigone. There are, to be sure, surface variations, with Protagoras omitting animal husbandry (indeed humans find themselves in a losing struggle with beasts until they develop social skills: 322b), while emphasizing the role of divine assistance. In all three versions, however, the civilized life of the city represents the crowning achievement. Pohlenz, AF, 95-97, P.-M. Schuhl, "Panaitios et la philosophic active," RPhilos 150 (1960), 232-33, and Bronislaw Bilinski, "Elogio della mano e la concezione ciceroniana della societa," Atti del I congresso internazionale di studi Ciceroniani, 1 (1959), 197 ff., have compared our text with the praise of the manus in the context of Balbus' expositon of the Stoic doctrine of πρόνοια (N.D. 2.150 ff.), which illustrates the ever-widening spheres of human dominatus culminating in mastery over all the earth's bounty (cf. also the much abbreviated version at Off. 1.22: . . . ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa essegeneratos . . .). Like our passage, these paragraphs proceed from the inanimate sphere to the animate. Our passage, too, places some emphasis on the manus as the human tool par excellence (. . . nisi manus et ars ac~ cessisset. . . sine hominum labore et manu . . . portus manu factos . . . sine hominum manu atque opera . . .), though this theme is not elaborated in the detail of N.D. In Off., where there are verbal echoes of the earlier passage (mostly in the same order; see following notes), the argument has the func tion of narrowing the focus to the human being as the proper subject, since the other utilia are easily manipulated if one has the cooperation of other humans (cf. ξ 17: cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dub it attorns, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint. . . , where the gods are lost sight of entirely). This topos, then, appears in two versions: (1) the stages of human pro gress will originally have formed a eulogy of man, as in the first stasimon of the Antigone; (2) some reinterpreted even these human achievements as grounded in divine πρόνοια (cf. Protagoras). Panaetius followed a tradition closer to (1) (cf. the agnostic or skeptical stand of Zeno's pupil Persaeus at SVF 1, 99.3 ff.). By inserting this material here Panaetius could deal rapidly with those aspects of the συμφέρον that were of little interest to him. 25 25. In view of Panaetius1 skepticism of the mantic arts (frr. 70 ff.) and the argument from divination at N.D. 2.7-12a, it seems doubtful that the Stoic theology of N.D. 2, including
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 12b-15 and 13
381
13 iam vero et earum rerum quibus abundaremus exportatio et earum quibus egeremus invectio . . .] Cf. ad $ 15 below. . . . nee ferrum aes aumm argentum effoderetur penitus abditum sine hominum labore et manu.] The same verse from an old poet is cited at N.D. 2.151: nos e terrae cavemis ferrum elicimus, rem ad colendos agros necessariam; nos aeris argenti auri venas penitus abditas invenimus et ad usum aptas et ad ornatum decoras. Langius conjectured that it belongs to Accius* Prometheus in view of Aesch. PV 5 0 0 - 3 : evepOe δέ χθονο? / Κζκρυμμέν' άνθρώποισιν ωφελήματα, / χαλκόν, σίδηρον, άργυρον χρυοόν Τ€, τίς Ι φήσαεν άν πάροιθ€ΐ> έξευρύν έ\ιοΰ; Cf. trag. inc. LXXXV, p. 298, where Ribbeck restores ferrum aes argentum aurum penitus abditum. tecta vero, quibus et frigoram vis pellcretur et calorom molestiae sedarentur . . .] Cf. N.D. 2.151: arborum autem confectione omnique materia et culta et silvestri partim ad calficiendum corpus igni adhibito et ad mitigandum cibum utimurt partim ad aediftcandum, ut tectis saepti frigora caloresque pellamus . . . tecta vero . . . unde aut initio generi humano dari potuisscnt, aut postea subvenire si aut vi tempestatis aut terrae moru aut vetustate cecidissent, nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset?] The difficulty lies in the second infinitive, transmitted either as subvenire (C) or subveniri {ξ). Recent editors (Atzert, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom) have adopted C's reading, Fedeli appealing specifically to Goldbacher, 2, 5 0 - 5 1 . Muller had followed ξ and understood its potuisset. Goldbacher objected that one expects the same subject in both clauses introduced by aut and that, once a house has collapsed, it is a question rather of replacing than repairing it. He therefore favors subvenire, which he interprets to mean "als Ersatz nachkommen" or the like, a sense which he admits does not occur elsewhere in Cicero and for which OLD and Forcellini provide no encouragement (though Goldbacher does cite Plin. Nat. 31.73: aliud etiam in eo (sc. sale qui in lacibus gignitur] mirabile, quod tantundem noctu subvenit, quantum die auferas). . . . nisi communis vita ab hominibus harum rerum auxilia petere didicisset?] Here begins the process of transforming what has so far been a straightfor ward argument for man's ability to rearrange his environment to suit his own convenience into a eulogy of human cooperation, which is taken up in
2.147-54, derives from him, pace?oh\enz,GGA 184(1922), 168-69,188 (1926), 286 ff., and 192(1930), 144;AF,95, 1.
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SS 15-16 and is the point of departure for the following argument ( § 1 7 : . . . conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere). 14 adde ductus aquarum, derivationcs fluminum, agrorum inrigationes, moles oppositas fluctibus, portus manu factos, quae unde sine hominum opere habere possemus?] Cf. N.D. 2.152: nos aquarum inductionibus terris fecunditatem damus, nos flumina arcemus derigimus avertimus;. . .— Derivatio is first attested here, its only occurrence in the extant corpus Ciceronianum (a Ciceronian coinage?); cf. Bogel, TLL 5, 634.64 ff., esp. 74.—Cicero prefers portus manu facti to the technical term κώθωνες, which had entered Latin by this time (B. Afr. 62.5); for the equivalence cf. Paul. Fest. p. 37M. nam et qui principes inveniendi ruerum quern ex quaque belua usum habere possemus, homines certe fuerunt, nee hoc tempore sine hominum opera aut pascere eas aut domare . . . possemus.] An implicit polemic, as Heinemann, 2 , 1 2 , saw, against the popular conception of the θεοί εύεργεται, such as the saga that Athena taught Erichthonius to hitch a wagon or Bellerophon to yoke Pegasus (hence her epithets Χαλανΐτις and Δαμάσιππος); Poseidon "Ιππιος, of course, disputed the honor of teaching horse-taming at both Athens and Corinth; cf. Roscher, Ausfuhrliches Lexikon der griechischen una romischen Mythologie, 1 (Leipzig, 1884-86), 680.35 ff.; Ernst Wust, RE 22.1 (1953), 483.55 ff.; cf. in general Christopher A. Faraone, Talismans and Trojan Horses (New York/Oxford, 1992), 28. If so, Panaetius is in agree ment with his teacher Diogenes of Babylon; cf. SVF 3, 234.35 ff. (humans invented music). Isoc. 2.12 already made a similar claim for human indepen dence: . . . περί μεν τά θηρία τεχνας ευρήκαμεν αίς αυτών τάς ψυχάς ήμερουμεν και πλείονος αξίας ποιοΰμεν . . .—On the exploitation of animals cf. also Leg. 1.25. 15 Quid enumerem artium multitudinem, sine quibus vita omnino nulla esse potuisset?] Cf. Catulus' characterization of the interlocutors at de Orat. 2.20:. . . qui omnes it sumus, ut sine Us studiis vitam nullam esse ducamus, an obvious allusion to Socrates' famous saying ό δε ανεξέταστος βίος ου βιωτός άνθρώπιυ (PI. Ap. 38a). qui enim aegris subveniret(ur),—mm iuris aequa discriptio . . . ] These topoi probably belonged originally to a eulogy of λόγος and have been transferred by Panaetius (or his source) to human cooperation; cf., besides Inv. 1.2-3, Isoc. 3.6: έγγενομενου δ' ήμΐν τού πείθειν αλλήλους και δηλοΰν προς ημάς αύτοΰς περί ών αν βουληθώμεν, ού μόνον τοϋ θηριωδώς ζτ\ν άπηλλάγημεν, άλλα και συνελθόντ€ς πόλεις ωκίσαμεν και νόμους εθεμεθα και τέχνας εϋρομεν, και σχεδόν άπαντα τά δι* ημών μεμηχανημενα λόγος ήμΐν έστιν ό συγκατασκευάσας. On walled cities (and commerce) as characteristic of humankind cf.
Commenrary on Book 2, Section 13-16
383
Cole, 1967,44, n. 40. In de Gloria Cicero had risked an etymology of oppida from opem dare (fr. phil., pp. 6 1 - 6 2 , no. 1).—The contrast qui. . . aegris subveniret{ur), quae esset oblectatio valentium is reminiscent of the distinc tion at N.D. 2.150: atque haec oblectationis, ilia necessitatis . . .—On the spelling of discriptio cf. ad 1.124 with Quinct. 45 there cited; aliter Lahmeyer, 288-89. 16 Longiores hoc loco sumus quam necesse est. . . . utitur in re non dubia testibus non necessariis.] This is an obvious instance of shortening in this Book (cf. also § 31), which is, as Pohlenz, AF, 90, observes, apart from prefatory material, little more than half the length of the previous Book. Hcinemann, 2, 12, observes that though Panaetius' thoroughness on this point seemed to Cicero needless, it is understandable, u denn auf dem Gedanken der Interessengemeinschaft der Menschen beruht die Ethik des Panaitios." Although the doctrine is not explicitly formulated until the nonPanaetian portion of the treatise (3.26), Heinemann is correct, for otherwise the identity of the honestum and utile could not be upheld. The restriction is needed, however, that it is the part of Panaetius' ethics bearing on the συμφέ ρον that is so based, whereas most of the "parts" of the καλόν rest upon the human Gemeinschaft in a broader sense. commemoratur ab eo Themistocles Pericles Cyrus Agesilaus Alexander . . .] These examples complement those of § 15 by showing that, even when an orderly society has been achieved, further progress is still dependent on human cooperation.—Apart from two allusions to his friend Scipio Aemilianus (1.90, 2.76), this is the one explicit testimony that we have for the examples adduced by Panaetius. Except for Cyrus and Scipio they are all Greek. In view of the evidently chronological order, it is surely the younger Cyrus who is in question; he and Agesilaus will both have derived from a Greek author, Xenophon. Probably we must reckon in general with a divi sion between Panaetian Greek examples and Roman examples added by Cicero; cf. also ad $ 40. Cf. the juxtaposition of Greek and Roman examples in § 80 with introduction, $ 5 (4). atque ut magnas utilitates adipiscimur conspiratione hominum atque consensu—quam omni reliqua calamitate.] Dicaearchus evidently collected material to confirm such statements as Arist. Pol. 1253a31: ώσπερ γάρ και τελεωθεν βελτιστον των ζώων άνθρωπο? έστιν, ούτω και χωρισθεν νόμου καΐ δίκη? χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη γάρ αδικία έχουσα δπλα; and MM 1203a22: έπεί πότερο? αν πλείω κακά ποιήσ€ΐ€ν λέων ή Διονύσιος ή Φάλαρις ή Κλέαρχος ή τις τούτων των μοχθηρών; ή δήλον δτι ούτοι; ή γάρ αρχή ένούσα φαύλη μεγάλα συμβάλλεται, εν δε θηρίω δλως ούκ εστίν αρχή; cf. Sen. Ep. 103.1: rari sunt casus, etiamsi graves, naufragium facere, vehiculo everti: ab
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homine homini cotidianum periculum; Plin. Nat. 7.5; Wehrli ad Dicaearch. fr. 24; Martini, RE 5.1 (1903), 557.40 ff.—Gartner, 1981, 111, suggested that conspiratio hominum atque consensus translates such Greek terms as έπαινος and εύνοια. But surely ομόνοια is a more likely candidate; Cicero might also be rendering σύμπνοια of Panaetius, evidently used with a different point of reference by Chrysippus {SVF 2,172.19); both words are given as glosses for conspiratio (cf. Lommatzsch, TLL 4, 499.54-55). Per haps Cicero added consensus to clarify that the pejorative sense of con spiratio is not in question; the iunctura recurs several months later in a letter to Plancus: quam ob rem, mi Plance, incumbe toto pectore ad laudem, subveni patriae, opitulare collegae, omnium gentium consensum et incredibilem conspirationem adiuva (Fam. 10.10.2; 30 March 43).—Eluvio is first attested at Rep. 6.23 and seems likely to be a Ciceronian coinage; ours is the earliest passage in which it appears without a limiting genitive either of the realm affected (ibid.: eluviones exustionesque terrarum) or of material {Div. 1.111: aquarum eluviones); cf. Krohn, TLL 5, 437.6 ff. 17 In this critical paragraph Cicero summarizes what has preceded and goes on to deduce the subject of this Book, namely winning the studia of others for the amplificatio nostrarum rerum. . . . proprium hoc statuo esse virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.] The winning over of the minds of men is far removed from the αυτάρκεια advocated by the Old Stoa; cf. Leeman, 42. Here, as in the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία and το πρέπον, Panaetius draws inspiration from older traditions, including perhaps the literature of advice to kings; cf. the penultimate sentence of the fourth Platonic letter (321b; to Dio): μη ουν λανθαι*ετω σε οτι δια του άρεσκαν τοις άνθρώττοις και το πράττειν εστίν, ή δ' αύθάδεια έρημία συνοικος; but this is also a good Peripatetic, specifically Dicaearchean, project (cf. Dicaearchus fr. 46 Wehrli:. . . ωετοχρήναι Δικαίαρχος εύνους μεν αύτω παρασκεύαζαν απαντάς, φίλους δε ποιεΐσθαι τους αγαθούς, with Wchrli's note ad he). . . . hominum autcm studia, ad amplifkationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata, virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur.] Madvig, 2, 2 4 1 , 1 , inquired: "Quid enim ad nostrarum rerum amplificandarum studium valet (aliorum) virorum praestantium virtus? et quis in hac re sapientiae locus est?" Since the two oldest MSS then known offered virorum praestantia. he conjectured morum praestantia and deleted sapientia. However, it is now clear that virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute is the transmitted text and virorum praestantia . . . and virorum sapientium et virtutum prae stantium peculiar errors respectively of Ρ and p. It may seem at first sight strange that the task of winning people over to
Commentary on Book 2, Section 16-18
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promote "our interests" belongs to someone other than "us." The difficulty can be obviated, as M. Winterbottom points out {per litt.), by taking nostrarwn as = "ours as men" or virtually "men's"; then the sentence would contrast the sordid artes operosae by which inanimate objects and beasts are rendered serviceable to humans with the more important contribution to human well-being of top people in society (cf. $ 83, where the phrase vir praestans is applied to Aratus of Sicyon: id quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit), a parallel that also suggests that sapientia in our passage has rather the sense "good judgment" than the intellectual sense commonly found in Off. (cf. ad 1.153 and § 5; OLD s.v.). It is true that in the sequel (§$ 22 ff.) the emphasis shifts specifically to advancing a politi cal career; but at this point Panaetius may have offered a more general and less selfish observation.—The same phenomenon is discussed from the standpoint of the praise that the vir praestans derives at de Orat. 2.346: ea enim denique virtus esse videtur praestantis viri, quae est fructuosa aliis, ipsi aut laboriosa aut periculosa aut certe gratuita. 18-20 Though one might have expected the divisio to follow immediately upon the statement of subject, two additional topics are inserted at this point, virtus and fortuna. The former is important, for it was just explained that hominum . . . studia, ad amplificationem nostrarum rerum prompta ac parata, virorum praestantium sapientia et virtute excitantur; and in the follow ing divisio priority is given to quae virtuti propiores sunt. Possibly the thumb-nail sketch of vinue in $§ 18-19a was included for the benefit of those readers inclined to skip the καλόν altogether and begin their study with the συμφέρον; for §§ 19b-20a and their placement see ad he. 18 Given that Cicero has so often identified the "parts" of the honestum with the virtues (e.g., § 1: Quemadmodum officia ducerentur ab honestate . . . atque ab omni genere virtutis . . . ; cf. ad 1.95), the somewhat different analysis of the virtues here comes as a surprise, albeit it was adumbrated at 1.46. 26 The first virtue here, however, does correspond to the first "part" of the aomstam (previously called a virtue: cf. 1.15:. . . ex ea parte quae prima descripta est, in qua sap tent tarn et prudentiam ponimus, inest indagatio atque inventio veri, eiusque virtutis hoc munus est proprium). The second and third parts of virtue enumerated here, restraint of the passions and moderate use of one's fellow-men, are social virtues, the one falling under the fourth "part" of the honestum (cf. esp. 1.102: efficiendum autem est ut 26. Yet another analysis of the σρεταί is attested for Panaetius at D.L. 7.92 » fr. 108 (Παναίηος μένουν δύο Φησ'ιν άρ€τά£.θεωρητικής και πρακτικήι/); but perhaps this is a simplified version of the doctrine of 1.16-17 (cf. ad 1.11-17).
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appetitus rationi oboediant etc.), the other under iustitia. This passage also makes it clear that the third virtue flows from the second; it is likewise closely connected with the first (note the term scienter in the phrase Us quibuscum congregemur uti moderate et scienter). Under the third virtue the emphasis on the usefulness of one's fellow human beings in attaining what one needs and repelling and avenging aggression is in keeping with the theme of this Book. One's use of one's fellows for such purposes is hedged about, like the activity of the μεγαλόψυχος (cf. 1.64 ff.), with qualifiers, however: selfaggrandizement is limited to quae natura desiderat; likewise punishment of those who have wronged one must remain within bounds {tantaque poena . . . quantam aequitas humanitasque patiatur), in accord with the doctrine of 1.88-89. Cf. also ad § 33. On attempts to assimilate our passage to the διαίρ€σι? of ethics at Ar. Did. 42.11 ff. and Sen. Ep. 89.14 cf. Giusta, 1,152. 19b-20 Magnam vim esse in fortuna—tamen sine hominum opibus et studiis neutram in partem effici possunt] This material is evidently an after thought; hence its odd placement. One would have expected it to follow the end of § 16, since it raises and dismisses the possibility that fortuna should be considered alongside the items already discussed (inanimate objects, beasts, other humans, the gods) as a force affecting human life. This reaffirmation of the primacy of the human factor would have been apposite just prior to § 17 (cum igitur hie locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint); placement there would also have enabled Cicero to go right on to the subject announced at the beginning of § 19 (quibus autem rationibus banc facultatem adsequi possimus, ut hominum studia complectamur eaque teneamus) and spared him having to reannounce it toward the end of § 20 (. . . dicendum est quonam modo hominum studia ad utilitates nostras adiicere atque excitare possimus). We should probably class the placement of this passage as a symptom of what Rudberg called "rough-draft style** ("KonzeptstiP). Cf. also ad 3.96.—On the place, or rather lack of a place, of fortuna in Stoicism cf. ad 1.115-21. 19b Magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel adversas, quis ignorat? nam et cum prospero flatu eius utimur ad exitus pervehimur optatos, et cum reflavit adfligimur.] Cicero was fond of the nautical metaphor for favorable circumstances or the reverse, as in Antonius' description of his forensic practice at de Orat. 2.187: si se dant Jsc. iudices] et, ut ante dixi, sua sponte, quo impellimus, inclinant atque propendent, accipio quod datur et ad id, unde altquis flatus ostenditur, vela do . . . The intransitive reflo in the sense "to blow in a contrary direction" in both literal and metaphorical applications is first attested in Cicero; cf. OLD s.v., 1.
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 18-20 and 21-22
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20 . . . interims exercituum, ut proxime t r i u m , . . . clades imperatorum, ut nupcr summi et singularis viri . . . ] Cicero is still writing much under the impact of the civil war, as in Phil. 2.37: quo quidem tempore si, ut dixi, meum consilium auctoritasque valuisset, tu hodie egeres, nos liberi essemus; respublica non tot duces et exercitus amisisset; ibid., 75: ter depugnavit Caesar cum civibus, in Thessalia, Africa, Hispania. The three armies (all defeated by Caesar) were those of Pompey the Great, lost at Pharsalia (9 August 48), Scipio, lost at Thapsus (6 April 46) and Gnaeus and Sextus Pompey, lost at Munda (17 March 45). . . . summi et singularis viri . . .] Pompey is referred to with great respect in this Book (cf. § 45: . . . magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare . . . ; cf. also § § 5 7 and 60), in stark contrast to the following one (cf. ad 3.82). . . . invidiae praeterea multitudinis atque ob eas bene meritorum saepe civium expulsiones . . . ] Cicero is surely thinking of his own case, contrasted with Pompey's military activity also at 1.78.—Though the preceding interitus exercituum and clades imperatorum are ambiguous as to the number of the limited noun and thus could fall under the type de vita Caesarum, invid iae must be plural; one might be tempted to read invidia and adopt in the following ob eas res of the ξ family except for Cicero's evident fondness for invidia in the plural; cf. Stiewe, TLL 7.2, 199.26 ff. 2 1 - 2 2 The juxtaposition in these paragraphs of two lists under different headings but with very similar (though not identical) contents raises ques tions about authenticity and composition. The prior list comprises approved and disapproved motives for advancing a public career. Though disapprobation is stated only under the final item (. . . quae sordidissima est ilia quidem ratio et inquinatissima . . .), this list corresponds to the content of the rest of the Book, where the deprecation of the last three methods is made explicit: first list I. benivolentiae gratia . . . cum aliqua de causa quempiam diligunt II. honoris {gratia) A. si cuius virtutem suspiciunt quemque dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant
plan of Off. 2 (see p. 356 above) VI. Whether to be loved or feared is a better means of protecting one's interests VIII. Glory D. Admiration
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B. aut cut fidern habent et bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur C. aut cuius opes metuunt D. aut contra a quibus aliquid exspectant, ut cum reges popularesve homines largitiones aliquas proponunt E. aut postremo pretio ac mercede ducuntur
B. Trustworthiness
(see VI. above) G. Liberality and the conferring of benefits (esp. G.2., Largesse) 1. Comparison of money vs. services.
The first item is benivolentia in the broadest sense without nearer specifi cation of motive; activity in behalf of that individual or his interests [beneftcentia) is its natural expression; at N.D. 1.121 the Skeptic Cotta argues that without beneftcentia love cannot subsist. On the other hand, one can respect without loving; and a candidate may be elevated to office on this basis (5/ cuius virtutem suspiciunt). Finally, regarding the exercise of office as a public trust (cf. 1.124), one may hold a candidate worthy on the basis of fides. On the other hand, fear appears as a foil for love at SS 23-29, and largitio, including pecunia, is clearly condemned as a means of advancing one's popu larity at § 53. The plan to treat quae virtuti propiores sunt is followed insofar as benivolentia and the factors contributing to gloria, including, under admiratio, magnitudo animi and opinio iustitiae, precede such topics as utrum genus benignitatis potius sit, pecunia an opera, and largitio (cf., however, ad SS 2 9 , 4 4 - 4 5 and 55b-60). Clearly, then, this list has an inner logic and is a guide to the Panaetian plan underlying Book 2, i.e., it comprises the divisio of the Book. 27 The second list, on the other hand, loosely attached and not well thought through, contains several stylistic oddities. The connection with what pre cedes by atque etiam lacks subtlety. The rubric is different now, not advance ment in dignity or office (cf. OLD s.v. augeo 5a), a process proper to a respublica, but subordination to the imperium and potestas of another, a description of the position of subjects of an absolute ruler or Rome's foreign clients, a topic taken up in SS 23-29. One misses here, as sometimes else where in this essay, a clear delineation of the relation of sequel to antecedent (cf. Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Connection of thought, 27. The major difference between thefirstlist and the content of Off. 2 is that, in the list, in order to contrast the antithetical concepts spes and metus, the topic cuius opes metuunt is displaced from benevolentia {under I.) for juxtaposition with a quibus aliquid exspectant under honor (II.C.-D.); cf. Dyck, 1980, 207.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 21-22
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careless, loose, or lacking"). Furthermore the items and their arrangement lack the perspicuousness of the former list. As Winterbottom's punctuation indicates, the words benivolentia aut beneficiorum magnitudine really con stitute a single item; but in that case we have aut in the weaker sense (= vel), whereas the other autys are disjunctive (cf. ad 1.13: . . . aut docenti aut utilitatis causa . . . imperanti. . .). Then, too, how does the more generally formulated spe sibi id utile futurum in practice differ from spe largitionis promissisque captit Surely one or the other is redundant. On the other hand, fides, which appears in the first list, should on no account have been omitted here, since it also applies to the situation of those who subject themselves imperio alterius etpotestati; cf. Li v. 22.13.11, cited ad § 26; on the concept in fidem venire or accipere see ad 1.35. Finally there are the stylistic oddities: the words metu ne vi parere cogantur appear to misstate the relationship of ideas, since compulsion and intimidation are surely two alternative descrip tions of the same process, not subordinate one to the other (Dyck, 1980,210; perhaps the author meant to speak of the fear of force, as at Caec. 44: quid igitur fugiebant? propter metum. quid metuebantf vim videlicet); and there is the evident inadvertence ducuntur . . . mercede conducti. It is thus not surprising that a number of scholars (viz., Briiser; Atzert4; Fedeli; Dyck, 1980; Cugusi) have been inclined to bracket the second list as an interpola tion (it was already omitted at Senensis H. V1.22, assigned by Winterbottom with a query to the fifteenth century). There are nevertheless some formidable arguments for retention, namely: (1) Thomas, 30, truly says of the phrase ut saepe in nostra republica videmus: "Schon sein Inhalt entspricht zu sehr Ciceros Intentionen, als dal? man ihn der Feder eines Interpolators zurechnen mochte." 28 (2) As T. Maslowski has pointed out to me, this comment corresponds to Cicero's characterization of the Clodiani as having been hired for pay; he compares Red. Sen. 26, Red. Pop. 12, Dom. 23, 45, 89; Sest. 104-6; cf. also Phil. 2.51:. . .turn iste [sc. M. Antonius] venditum atque emancipatum tribunatum consiliis vestris opposuit... (3) The following sentence omnium autem return nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri can hardly connect directly with the sentences immediately following the first list [male enim se res habet cum quod virtute effici debet, id temptatur pecunia. sed quoniam nonnumquam hoc subsidium necessarium est, quemadmodum sit utendum eo dicemus, si prius its de rebus quae virtuti propiores sunt dixerimus), as it would have to do if the second list were deleted. Cicero would then have to explain the relation of this subject to the 28. They were also quoted by Nonius p. 274M.
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plan to discuss quae virtuti propiores sunt. Also, omnium autem rerum or the like is a formula used when a number of factors has preceded and a clear hierarchy needs to be established; cf. 1.57: sed cum omnia ratione animoque lustraris, omnium societatum nulla estgravior, nulla carior, etc. But it is only the second list that provides a series of factors pertaining specifically to the question of political power (subiciunt se homines imperio alterius et potestati); if the second list is deleted, this new subject would have to be an nounced in some way, presumably with a long list of factors. Perhaps the phenomena can be best accounted for by assuming, with Atzert 2 and Winterbottom, that the second list, modeled on the first, whether or not, as Sabbadini (ad loc.) thought, added "posteriormente," comprises Ciceronian matter, perhaps intended to effect a transition to the topics of absolute rule and imperium prominent in §§ 2 3 - 2 9 , 2 9 but never fully pol ished or integrated into context. Both lists bear a certain resemblance to rhetoricians' lists of emotions, such as those found at de Orat. 2.185 and 206; cf. in the former passage . . . ratio orationis, quae . . . mentis iudicum permovet impellitque ut aut oderint aut diligant, aut invideant aut salvum velint, aut metuant aut sperent, aut cupiant aut abhorreant, aut laetentur aut maereant, aut misereantur aut poenire velint. . . Although hatred does not figure in either of our lists, it is, in fact, contrasted at length with love in the sequel (5$ 23-29), so that a broader heading for the list and a first item corresponding to ut aut oderint aut diligant of de Orat. would have been apt. The phrase aut salvum velint leaves the motive undefined; but if one can infer from its counterpart {aut invideant) that the opposite quality, admiration, is involved, then this would match aut honoris [sc. causa), si cuius virtutem suspiciunt... of the first list and dignitatis praestantia of the second. The antithetical concepts of hope and fear appear in both of our lists as well as in the lists of emotions. The two missing elements refer not to emotional states, but to property relations, namely fides (first list only) and payment. 21 Quaecumque igitur homines homini tiibuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum . . .] For the meaning of these words as well as the distribution of the topics here mooted within the argument of this Book cf. ad § 3 1 . 2 3 - 2 9 After the promise to give priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt {§ 22) one expects a discussion of the three means of attaining glory (§ 31), the first being caritas. Cicero/Panaetius may on occasion begin discussion of one point by comparison with its opposite, as when he compares opera and
29. Cf. Goldbachcr, 1, 27; Pohlenz, AF, 97-98.
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 21-22 and 23-29
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pecunia as alternative types of beneficia at $§ 5 2 - 5 3 . But the handling of caritas/metus gives the latter so much more attention that one doubts that this can be the execution of the plan to treat virtuous methods first. Cicero's procedure at $$ 2 3 - 2 6 becomes clearer, however, in light of the recurrence of this theme in the contemporary Second Philippic, where he lays emphasis on Antony's tactic of intimidating the senate through armed force: cf. $ 8 (qui . . . stent cum gladiis in conspectu senatus . . . ) , $ 15 (. . . tu homines perditissimos cum gladiis conlocavistit), § 19 (. . . cum inter subsellia nostra versentur armati. . . cum gladiis homines conlocati stent?), § 46 (. . . nisi Hits quos videmus gladiis confideres . . .), § 104 (remove gladios parumper illos quos videmus), § 1 0 8 (memineramus Cinnam nimis potentem, Sullam postea dominantem, modo Caesarem regnantem videramus. erant fortasse gladii, sed absconditi nee ita multi. ista vero quae et quanta barbaria est! agmine quadrato cum gladiis sequuntur; scutorum lecticas portari videmus), § 112 (cur armatorum corona senatus saeptus est, cur me tui satellites cum gladiis audiunt . . . cur homines omnium gentium maxime barbaros, Ituraeos, cum sagittis deducts in forum?).30 When Cicero reports Antony's answer to the question raised in the last passage quoted (praesidi sui causa se facere dicit), the topic culminates in this impassioned response: non igitur miliens perire est melius quam in sua civitate sine armatorum praesidio non posse vivere? sed nullum est istuc, mihi crede, praesidium: caritate te et benevolentia civium saeptum oportet esse, non armis. eripiet et extorquebit tibi ista populus Romanus, utinam salvis nobis! sed quoquo modo nobiscum egeris, dum istis consiliis uteris, non potes, mihi crede esse diuturnus (Phil. 2.112-13). §S 23-26 of our passage treat the same topic—the futility of trying to achieve long-term political gains through intimidation—with il lustrative material drawn from poetry and, apart from Caesar's case, Greek history; § 25 reads as if written to illustrate Phil. 2.116 (quae est autem vita dies et nodes timere a suis?). The convergence of topics is so striking that it seems justified to speak of an invasion of concerns from the speech; this would explain the fact that at § 32 he goes on to give the precepts on benevolentia (which one had expected to follow, if not in § 22b (in place of the second list], then surely in § 23) as if no discussion of the topic had intervened. The Greek examples of exitus tyrannorum aim to prove malus . . . est custos diuturnitatis metus (§ 23). They suggest that Cicero is using some Greek source or sources. Might that have been Panaetius' discussion of cuius opes metuunt, or might these be materials Cicero had once intended for 30. Sim. Phil. 1.27 {cum tanta praesertim gladiorum sit impunitas) and 7.13 (armorum offidnas in urbe videtis; milites cum gbdiis sequuntur consulem).
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the Ήρακλβίδιοι/, a projected but abandoned dialogue on Caesar's assassina tion? Cf. ad 3.19b-32. Tracing the (sometimes elusive) train of thought in these paragraphs discloses a good deal about Cicero's "Arbeitsweise" and general state of mind at the time of composition. The thesis is clearly stated both at the outset and toward the conclusion: omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri (§ 23); atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum) dum metui quam cart esse et diligi malumus (§ 29); but the development is any thing but straightforward. Taking the Ennian verse quern metuunt oderunt, quern quisque odit peri(i)sse expetit as his starting point, Cicero seems to want to focus first on the fact that the personal safety of tyrants is by no means insured by intimidation. He appears, however, to condone the use of saevitia to maintain an imperium (§ 24: sed its qui vi oppressos imperio coercent, sit sane adhibenda saevitia, ut eris in famulos, si aliter teneri non possunt)\ in the sequel, however, he emphatically rejects crudelitas as a method for holding together the Roman Empire (§§ 26-29; cf. also 3.46). The sentence just quoted from § 24 is included for the sake of contrast with a free commonwealth, where such a policy is madness [qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt ut metuantur, Us nihil potest esse dementius). He then seems to want to broaden from the topic of personal safety to the general question of power and from affairs of state to affairs in general (§ 24: quod igitur latissime patet—et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur). But then we pass to the topic "uneasy lies the head that wears a crown," which is essentially a reprise, this time armed with Greek examples, of the argument of SS 2 3 - 2 4 that methods of terror are no proof against assassination. Cicero's procedure here is similar to that in 1.153 ff., SS 17-20, and, to some degree, §S 2 2 - 2 3 , in that he leaves the impression in § 24 that he has rounded out his treatment of this topic {ita facillime quae volemus et privatis in rebus et in re publica consequemur) only to launch in again with new material. Clearly it was the thought that Caesar's recent death was a prime example of the exitus tyrannorum that motivated Cicero's departure from Panaetius, including presumably the contrast between what is appropriate for an imperium and within the context of a libera civitas. Note that etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est. . . (end of S 24 and following) would form an equally good sequel to the first sentence of % 23 (omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri). The discussion of Roman conditions beginning in the middle of % 26 is presented as parallel to the exemplum of the Spartans, who are said to have
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 23-29 and 23
393
been abandoned by their allies at Leuctra because of the mistreatment they had meted out to them (see ad $ 26a). To construe a parallel, Cicero must argue that the Romans, too, have been guilty of mistreating their allies; as his prize example Cicero cites the case of Massilia, a loyal ally of Rome that nevertheless suffered the indignity of having its image carried in Caesar's triumph. But the case of the Massiliotes, whose treachery Caesar emphasizes (BC 2.14), can hardly stand as typical of Caesar's treatment of provincials; and no threat to the imperium resulted (cf. Heilmann, 113-14). A further problem is that these matters were indissolubly connected for Cicero with the topic of civil war (Caesar's engagement with Massilia having been pan of the recent one). Thus, though Sulla's reign is introduced ostensibly as a turning point in Rome's relations with its allies, in fact, it serves to make two points about civil war: 1) the civil war unleashed by Caesar was worse than Sulla's in that both the cause and the sequel were dishonorable, not the sequel alone; 2) greed for the property of others is the semen et causa of civil war. Both points, of course, reinforce the campaign against the dead Caesar begun in §S 2 3 - 2 4 , but divert attention from the main argument, as Cicero was aware (redeundum est enim ad propositum: § 29). Moreover, Cicero's at tempt to force Caesar and Sulla into the same mold does justice to neither man nor to the historical circumstances, as Diehl, 161, points out. 31 Paragraphs 26b-29, then, comprise Cicero's most extensive use of Roman examples to advance his political agenda in Off. 1-2 (including a hit at Antony and his followers, when he says that Caesar's cupiditatum ad multos improbos venit hereditas [§ 28; see ad he.]); but they stray from the main argument, in spite of Cicero's violent attempt to bring his Roman material back into line: atque in has clades incidimus (redeundum est enim ad propositum) dum metui quam cart esse et diligi malumus; cf., in the following sentence, quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere potuerunt. . . , parallel to Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes of § 26. 23 Omnium autem rerum nee aptius est quicquam ad opes ruendas ac tenendas quam diligi nee alienius quam timeri. praeclare enim Ennius: 'quern metuunt oderunt, quern quisque odit peri(i)sse expetit'.] The verse of Ennius (whose editors restore periisse, which Winterbottom, after Bibl. Brit. Add. 11935 [fourteenth century], rightly prints in Cicero's text) provides a neat transition to the topic of the deaths of tyrants; it may well, as Ribbeck {trag., 31. "Mit dieser Reduziemng der historischen Realitat zwangt Cicero beide Diktatorcn in ein Erklarungsschcma, das beiden nicht gcrcchr wird, weder Sulla, dem Urhcbcr der Proskriptionen, aber restitutor reipublicae, noch Caesar, dem versohnlichen Sieger, aber sclbstherrlichen Regenten, noch den Biirgerkriegen und dem Untergang der republikanischcn Staatsordnung, fur die der skru pel lose Bcreichcrungswillc als cinzigc Ursache nichr ausreichr."
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p. 80 ad v. 379 = seen. 402 = 348 Jocelyn) suggested, have been spoken by a warner of Atreus in the Thyestes. Cicero was also well acquainted with Accius' treatment of the subject, as 1.97 and 3.102 show. Cf. Clu. 169: homines inimicos suos morte adfici volunt aut quod eos metuunt aut quod oderunt.—The opes of this sentence are, as in older Roman usage (cf. Kuhlmann, TLL 9, 810.22 ff.), one's resources in general; but the protection of them falls squarely in the political sphere, as the following paragraphs make clear; cf. § 24 (ad opes et potentiam), 5 4 1 , and ad 1.25.—Cf. the advice given Antony at Phil. 2.112, quoted ad §§ 2 3 - 2 9 , or, ibid., 2.90, where fear is said not to be a lasting teacher of appropriate action [non diuturnus magister offici); Sen. Ep. 47.18: non potest amor cum timore misceri. nee vero huius tyranni solum, quern armis oppressa pertulit civitas paretque cum maxime mortuo, interims declarat quantum odium hominum valeat ad pestem, sed reliquorum similes exitus tyrannorum, quorum haud fere quisquam talem in ten turn effugit.] I have hesitatingly adopted, with Pohlenz, AF, 99, n. 1, and Winterbottom, paretque cum maxime mortuo, the reading of the generally less sincere ξ tradition, rather than the corrupt reading of £, apparet cuius maxime portui. If the sentence has a recoverable point, it is probably a reprise of Cicero's oft-repeated lamentation that the senate con firmed Caesar's acta on 17 March. Cf. Fam. 12.1.1 - 2 (to Cassius; 3 May 44: . . . non regno sed rege liberati videmur. interfecto enim rege regios omnis nutus tuemur . . . adhuc ulta suas iniurias est per vos interitu tyranni [sc. respublica], nihil amplius. ornamenta vero sua quae reciperavitt an quod ei mortuo paret quern vivum ferre non poteratf), as well as similar statements at Att. 14.14.2, ad Brut. 1.16.5 (Brutus to Cicero), Phil. 1.24, and 2.96; cf. also Amic. 4 1 , where Cicero emphasizes that Tiberius Gracchus' partisans persisted in their stance even after his death [hunc etiam post mortem secuti amid . . .). His preoccupation with current politics sometimes causes Cicero to lose the thread (see ad §§ 23-29). Hence the objection of Arzert 4 , XXXIII, that a complaint about the loss of liberty hardly fits the argument about the deaths of tyrants, though true in itself, is not necessarily decisive against £'s reading, nor is the fact that this reading to some degree undercuts the doctrine malus . . . est custos diuturnitatis metus ($ 23). The reading of ξ is odd, however; for the point is introduced elliptically without, as in the paral lel passages, full context being given (has material been lost? would Cicero have clarified in revision?).—Cicero had already made the essential point at Phil. 1.35: 5i enim exitus C. Caesaris efficere non potest ut malis cams esse quam metui, nihil cuiusquam proficiet nee valehit oratio.—Lactantius (un der Ciceronian influence?) likewise follows the method of impugning his
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adversaries by reference to their violent deaths in his de Mortibus Perseeutorum. . . . huius tyranni. . . quern armis oppressa pertulit civitas . . .] On Cicero's characterization of Caesar as a tyrant throughout the period following his assassination (while at the same time he complains privately that the condi tion of the state is still worse than during Caesar's dictatorship), cf. Justinus Klass, Cicero und Caesar. Ein Beitrag zur Aufhellung ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehungen, Historische Studien 354 (Berlin, 1939), 213 ff., esp. 218; ad 3.83-85.—Cf. the similar point at Phil. 2.116: attulerat iam [sc. Caesar] liberae civitati partim metu partim patientia consuetudinem serviendi; ibid., 117 (a warning to Antony): haec non eogitas neque intellegis satis esse viris fortibus didicisse quant sit re pulehrum . . . tyrannum occideref Cicero at this period was in no mood to acknowledge Caesar's dementia (ibid., 116 he grants Caesar only clementiae species); cf. ad 1.88. Contrast various pas sages of the Caesarian orations, especially Deiot. 33-34, where Cicero ex plicitly repudiates the term tyrannus as applied to Caesar; cf. Heilmann, 107. On the other hand, Caesar did accept the title dictator for life (cf. MRR, 2, 305), hardly compatible with the free commonwealth.—For the iunctura armis oppressa cf. Fam. 10.1.1 (to Plancus, September, 44): quae potest enim spes esse in ea republiea in qua hominis impotentissimi atque intemperantissimi armis oppressa sunt omnia et in qua nee senatus nee populus vim habet ullatn nee leges ullae sunt nee iudieia nee omnino simulacrum aliquod ac vestigium civitatisf Sim. Mil. 38: . . . ne P. Clodius . . . vi oppressam civitatem teneret. 24 sed iis qui vi oppressos imperio coercent—qui vero in libera civitate ita se instruunt ut metuantur, iis nihil potest esse dementius.] Rep. 3.37 describes the differential treatment for citizens and children on the one hand and slaves on the other: nam ut animus eorpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidmi, sed eorpori ut rex civibus suis aut parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod earn coercet et frangit. . . domini autem servos ita fatigant ut optima pars animi, id est sapientia, eiusdem animi vitiosas imbecillasque partes, ut libidines, ut iracundias, ut perturbationes ceteras; cf. ad 1.41a, 3.89. At Ter. Ad. 6 5 - 6 7 Micio denies that force is a good way to maintain an imperium (et err at longe mea quidem sententia I qui imperium credat gravius esse aut stabilius I vi quod fit quam illud quod amicitia adiungitur); and in the sequel (26b ff.) Cicero himself seems to prefer kindness to cruelty for this purpose. quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta libertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando aut iudiciis tacitis aut occultis de honore suffragiis.] In our passage Cicero formulates the matter in general,
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not specifically Roman terms. The occulta de honore suffragia correspond, of course, to the Roman comitiat mentioned at Sest. 106 as one of the three outlets for expression of public opinion. Cicero states his point in stronger and more personal language at 3.83: ecce tibi qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit, idque perfecerit etc.—The confidence that Cicero here expresses in the resilience of the ancestral system stands in marked contrast with the pessimism of $ 29 [rem vero publicum penitus amisimus) or the fairly recent letter to Plancus quoted ad § 23; cf. also Hcilmann, 132. Elsewhere, too, Cicero's opinions on the subject changed with his mood (cf. passages collected by Meier, 2, n. 4), but never quite so rapidly as here.—Thomas, 107, n. 10, cites our main clause as an example of how a metaphor (demersae) can, even after an interruption (quamvis timefacta libertas), reassert itself (emergunt).—For the demersae leges note that, in the aftermath of the Sullan proscriptions, Cicero had similarly spoken of the possibility of the ius civile being oppressum (Caec. 73); cf. also, a propos Cassius' seizure of Syria, Phil. 11.28 (immediately following the sentence quoted ad 3.23): huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriam profectus, alienam provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, eis vero oppressis suam lege naturae. acriores autem morsus sunt intermissae libertatis quam retentae.] The meta phorical use of morsus was pioneered by Cicero the previous year, first in private correspondence (dum recordationes fugio quae quasi morsu quodam dolorem efficiunt. . . : Att. 12.18.1 [15 March 45]), then at Tusc. 2.53, 3.61, and 4.15, perhaps modeled on the similar use of δηγμοί by the Stoics with reference to the effects of pain and fear (SVF 3, 107.26). Among the instances of the metaphorical usage cited by Reichmann-Buchwald, TLL 8, 1509.27 ff., our passage is unique in referring, nor to a mental state, but to physical action, i.e., Caesar's assassination. For the general idea cf. Phil. 2.113: . . . respublica, quae se adhuc tantum modo ulta est, nondum recuperavit. The text suggests that within the context of a free polity the exercise of saevitia, though apt in a relation of master and subject (in Cicero nian terms, for those qui vi oppressos imperio coercent), calls forth beastlike retaliation; possibly the bold metaphor suggested itself in light of the descrip tion of the action of beasts at $ 16 (. . . beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta . . .). The formulation is illogical, however, since one would not expect retenta libertas to involve morsus at all. Etenim qui se metui volent, a quibus metuentur, eosdem metuant ipsi necesse est.] This is the doctrine of Plato's Republic; cf. Socrates' question at 578a: τί oe; φόβου -γέμειν αρ' ουκ ανάγκη την re τοιαύτην πόλιν τον TC TOLOOTOV άνδρα;
Commentary on Book 2, Section 24-25
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He then goes on to establish that the fear of his city is mirrored in the tyrant's soul (cf. 579e, quoted ad 3.85). The idea had also been put forward in Rome not long before. The mimographer Decimus Laberius, forced to perform in his own composition during Caesar's triumph over Munda (celebrated Octo ber, 46), whereby he necessarily lost his equestrian status, got his own back inter alia with the verse: necesse est multos timeat quern multi timent (= com. p. 361 = 297 R.*; cf. Cic. Earn. 12.18.2; Sen.delra2.11.3;Macr.Sjf. 2.7.25); cf. also Sal. Rep. 1.3.2: equidem ego cuncta imperia crudelia magis acerba quam diutuma arbitror, neque quemquam multis metuendum esse quin ad eum ex multis formido reccidat. . . Nevertheless Caesar evidently did not fear assassination, as Cic. Div. 2.23 implicitly admits: quid vero Caesarem putamusy si divinasset fore ut . . . trucidatus ita iaceret . . . quo cruciatu animi vitam acturum fuissef 25 quid enim censemus superiorem ilium Dionysium quo cruciatu timoris angi solitum, qui cultros metuens tonsorios candente carbone sibi adurebat capillum?j This anecdote, reported in greater detail at Tusc. 5.57 ff. (whence V. Max. 9.13. ext. 4), 3 2 was later provided with the motive of a barber's boasting that he regularly held a razor to the tyrant's neck (the indiscreet barber suffered crucifixion in the sequel; cf. Plut. de Garrul. 508f); it is part of an early and widespread tradition of hostile anecdote surrounding Dionysius I (432-367). T.B.L. Webster, Studies in Late Greek Comedy (Manchester, 1953), 29, and K.F. Stroheker, Dionysios I. Gestalt und Geschichte des Tyrannen von Syrakus (Wiesbaden, 1958), 21, attempted to connect this anecdote with contemporary Attic comedy. But note that the evidence they relied upon, Strattis fr. 6 Kock, is now (in part) rightly Cratin. fr. 223.3 K.-A.; hence it is unlikely on chronological grounds that the refer ence there to |Διονυσοκουρώνων (whatever the correct reading) should be connected with our Dionysius, since Cratinus, a γ€ρωι> in 424 (Ar. Eq. 533 = Τ 9 K.-A.), is last mentioned in 421 (Ar. Pax 700 ff. = Τ 10 K.-A., a joke about his death); even if the joke in this latter passage is not to be taken literally, he will have died shortly thereafter (otherwise he would presumably have continued to be an Aristophanic target); cf. A. Korte, RE 11.2 (1922), 32. Ncpos, too, drew this lesson (de Viris lllustribus, fr. 45 Marshall, based on the example of Dionysius?): hie autem, sicut ante saepe dictum est, quam mvisa sit singularis potentta et mtseranda vita, qui se metui quam amart malunt, cuwis facile mtellectu fuit; but this was a common topos, so that it remains unclear whether there is any relation between Cicero's use of it and that of Nepos.—Strasburger, 1990, 89-90, finds that our passage, in which Caesar is referred to along with Dionysius and other tyrants, makes explicit an implicit allegorical refer ence to Caesar at Tusc. 5.57 ff.; but the exemplum of Dionysius was traditional, and Caesar was not afraid of assassination (cf. ad $ 24).
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1648.11-13. The same seems likely mutatis mutandis for Callias fr. *3 K.-A. (also = Strattis fr. 6 Kock); and Strattis fr. 9 K.-A. (αλλ* ει μέλλει? ανδρείως / φώι£ειν ώσπερ μύστακα σαυτόν) has no clear bearing on Dionysius either (it is quoted at Et. Gen. [A] s.v. φώι£ειν; hence the speaker and the addressee are alike unknown; and the reference to shaving is merely by way of comparison Ιωσπερ μύστακα]). Stroheker, 21 ff., goes on to argue that such anecdotes were formed in Athens, perhaps under the influence of the Academy in the aftermath of Plato's encounter with Dionysius in 388, and disseminated to Cicero via Timaeus, to whom one anecdote hostile to Dionysius can be traced. But Panaetius can have drawn on either a philosophical or a historical source; cf. Brian Caven, Dionysius /, War-Lord of Sicily (New Haven and London, 1990), 2 3 1 - 3 2 . For the general problem of assessing Dionysius' character cf. D.M. Lewis in CAH 6 2 , 153-55. quid? Alexandrum Pheraeum—propter pelicatus suspicionem interfectus.J In the ancient sources Alexander of Pherae [regnavit 369-59) appears as the type of the suspicious tyrant; cf. Kaerst, RE 1.1 (1894), 1409.56 ff. Alex ander was actually killed, not by his wife (V. Max. 9.13. ext. 3 agrees with his source, our passage, in this error), but by her brothers Lycophron and Tisiphonus at her instigation (cf. X. HG 6.4.35 ff.; D.S. 16.14.1; Plut. Pel. 35.6 adds a third brother, Peitholaus). Nor was the motive, according to our earliest source, unambiguously attested or as simple as Cicero makes out: ή δε έχθρα λέγεται αύτη προ? τον άνδρα γενέσθαι υπό μεν τίνων ώ? έπεί έδησε τά εαυτού παιδικά ό 'Αλέξανδρο?, νεανίσκον όντα καλόν, δεηθείση? αυτή? λϋσαι έξαγαγών αυτόν άπέσφαξεν oi δε τινε? to?, έπει παϊδε? αΰτώ οΰκ εγίγνοντο εκ ταύτη?, ότι πέμπων ει? Θήβα? έ μ νήστευε την Ίάσονο? γυναίκα λαβείν (Χ. HG 6.4.37); in the latter version it was hardly an ordinary case of pelicatus, but a question of replacement of his niece (Thebe) by his aunt on grounds of the former's infertility; cf. Westlake, 155-56. . . . ad earn ex epulis in cubiculum veniens barbarum et eum quidem, ut scriptum est, compunctum notis Thraeciis destricto gladio iubebat anteire . . .] The reference is to tattooing, rather than branding. Runaway slaves and prisoners of war were often tattooed among the Greeks and Romans, a practice introduced from Persia, whereas there is little unambiguous evi dence for the actual branding of human beings in the classical world. The Greek attitude is exemplified by Herodotus' comment on the tattooing of the Thebans who medized at Thermopylae with the στίγματα βασιλήια: ού μεντοι τά γε πάντα ευτύχησαν . . . (7.233.2). On the other hand, in Thracian society the tattoo was a mark of nobility; ibid., 5.6.2: τό μεν έστίχθαι εύγενε? κεκριται. το δε άστικτον άγεννε?; cf. Artem. 1 . 8 : . . . στίζονται παρά θραξιν οι εύγενεΐ? παΐδε? . . . If the tattooing of Thracian women is more
Commentary on Book 2, Section 25-26a
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prominent in our evidence, which includes Attic vase-paintings as well as such literary sources as Plut. de Sera Num. Vind. 557d and Ath. 12.524d, this is presumably because they were more likely to attract notice (through taking up residence in Greek cities as a result of capture in war, marriage, etc.). An Athenian resident who bore such marks was likely to receive an unflattering sobriquet (cf. the man mentioned as the father of Theocritus and by the nickname Έλαφόστικτο? at Lys. 13.19). The notae Thraeciae, then, would have implied to Roman ears that their bearer was an incorrigible slave; he may, however, rather have been a Thracian noble in the employ of Alex ander of Pherae. On the whole subject cf. CP. Jones, "Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity," JRS 77 (1987), 139-55. ο miserum, qui fideliorem et barbarum et stigmatiam putaret quam con· iugem!] Apart from the title of a Naevian comedy (p. 19 R. 2 ), stigmatias is attested for the first time in our passage, its use facilitated by the preceding explanation {compunctum notis Thraeciis); see previous note. Beginning with Vitruvius stigma becomes, in fact, the technical term in Latin for a tattoo (perhaps because nota would have suggested the nota censoria); cf. OLD s.v. 26a testis est Phalaris, cuius est praeter ceteros nobilitata crudelitas, qui non ex insidiis interiit. . . non a paucis. . . sed in quern universa Agrigentinorum multitudo impetum fecit.] Phalaris' cruelty is attested as early as the allusion to the brazen bull at Pi. P. 1.95 (from the year 476, in the third generation after the tyrant). The conspiracy against him is said to have been led by Telemachus, the great-grandfather of the later tyrant Theron (sch. Pi. O. 2.82d and especially 3.68d). Cicero himself did not a little to spread the tyrant's notoriety in the Latin-speaking world; cf. T. Lenschau, RE 19.2 (1938), 1649.1 ff., esp. 1650.1-3, 18 ff., 1651.26 ff. Macedones nonne Demetrium reliquerunt, universique se ad Pyrrhum contulerunt?] The reference is to the revolt, in the year 287, of Macedonian troops near Beroea, which Pyrrhus had just captured; in the sequel Demetrius Poliorcetes lost the Macedonian throne. As Heilmann, 108, points out, one would have expected Cicero to mention the cause. Contributing factors included a distaste with the forms of Oriental monarchy introduced by Alex ander and his successors, war-weariness (on the heels of an unsuccessful campaign against Pyrrhus in Aetolia, massive preparations were underway for war in the East), and Demetrius' own arrogance; cf. Kaerst, RE 4.2 (1901), 2788.33 ff.; CF. Edson, HSPh 45 (1934), 236 ff.; Walbank in N.G.L. Hammond and F.W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia 3 (Oxford, 1988), 224 ff.; Edouard Will in CAH 7.1 2 , 101-9. Lacedaemonios iniuste imperantes nonne repente omnes fere socii deserue-
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runt, spectatoresque se otiosos praebuerunt Leuctricae calamitatis?] It would not be surprising if, as at 1.84, Panaetius offered the Spartans as an example. Isocrates' catalogue of Spartan misdeeds culminates in a similar assessment of the cause of Sparta's downfall: . . . ουδέν δ' έπαύσαντο του? μέν άλλου? κακώ? ποιούντε?, αύτόϊ? δέ τήν ήτταν τήν ev Αίύκτροι? παρασκ€υά£οντ€?; ην φασί τιν£? αΐτίαν γ€γ€νήσθαι τη Σπάρτη των κακών, ούκ αληθή λ^γοντ^?* ού γάρ δια ταύτην υπό των συμμάχων έμισήθησαν, αλλά δια τα? ϋβρ€ΐ? τα? έν τόί? έμπροσθεν χρόνοι? και ταύτην ήττήθησαν και π€ρί τη? αυτών βκινδύνβυσαν (8.100; for further detail cf. $$ 97-100 with the com mentary of M.L.W. Laistner, ed., Isocrates, De pace and Philippus [New York and London, 1927] ad loc). Though the sources for the Spartan disas ter at Leuctra (July, 371) tend to emphasize Epaminondas' superior tactics, even Xenophon admits that low morale on the allied side was a factor (HG 6.4.15: οι δέ πολέμαρχοι . . . αίσθανόμενοι δε του? συμμάχου? πάντα? μέν άθύμω? έχοντα? προ? το μάχ€σθαι. έστι δέ οϋ? αυτών ουδέ άχθομένου? τω γβγενημένω . . .), as well it might be in view of continued Spartan domina tion when the percentage of Spartiate fighters was substantially reduced: cf. P. Cartledge, Sparta and Laconia: A Regional History (London, 1979), 294; J.F. Lazenby, The Spartan Army (Warminster, 1985), 58; on Leuctra in gen eral, ibid., 151 ff., esp. 160-61; Robin Seager in CAH 6 2 , 183-84. 26b-29a The observations Cicero here offers are the most thoughtful reflec tions on imperialism that have come down to us from a Roman pen; though written hastily rather than systematically, they challenge comparison with Thucydides' analysis of Athenian imperialism, on which cf. Jacqueline de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, tr. Philip Tody (Oxford, 1963), 311 ff. 26b Externa libentius in tali re quam domestica recordor.] Here Cicero makes explicit his general practice of adding "domestic" (Roman) examples to the Greek ones 33 supplied by Panaetius (cf. ad $ 16 above). Such a division between foreign and domestic examples was in use in other works of the time. Thus Nepos* biographical collection de Viris lllustubus was organized on this principle (cf. fr. 47), with (presumably after a first, introductory book) the foreigners occupying the even-numbered books, the Romans the odd-numbered (fr. 56: Aulus Albinus treated in Book XIII); this arrangement (also followed in his Exempla}) may have influenced Valerius Maximus' arrangement of material in the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia (the order being reversed for the sake of local interest and/or patriotism). Cicero was person ally acquainted with Nepos; whether he knew the de Viris lllustribus or 33. On his altered practice in the final Book cf. ad 3.48.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 26a-26b
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Exempla and could thus have been influenced by Nepos' arrangement is, however, unclear (cf. p. 397, n. 32 supra). Varro's Hebdomades vel de Imaginibus, composed ca. 39, probably adopted a similar division of Greek and Roman material; cf. Wissowa, RE 4.1 (1900), 1409.32 ff. (Nepos* personal acquaintance with Cicero); ibid., 1411.5 ff. and 1412.43 ff. (respectively on the organization of de Viris Illustribus and the influence on Valerius Maximus); H. Dahlmann, ibid., Suppl. 6 (1935), 1227.31-32 and 1228.22 ff. (on the date and probable disposition of the Hebdomades). Cf. also Sen. de Ira 3.18.1: utinam ista saevitia intra peregrina exempla mansisset nee in Romanos mores cum alt is adventiciis vitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset!—The Spartan experience appears as a warning for Rome at § 77 as well. Some authors traced the Sabines back to wandering Lac edaemonians and regarded many Roman customs as Sabine/Spartan in ori gin; cf. Elizabeth Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in European Thought (Oxford, 1969), 99 ff. 2 6 b - 2 7 verum tamen quam diu imperium populi Romani—patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.] Chapter 6 of Meyer ("Patrocinium und praedia populi Romani bei Cicero") amounts to an ex tended commentary on this passage. He shows that Cicero's preference for the term patrocinium, which implies responsibility of the patronus to protect the legal rights of the cliens, over the term imperium, with its implication of unlimited power based upon superior force, did not result in any thor oughgoing attempt on Cicero's part to reform the imperial system because of the essentially passive role of the patronus in intervening only in emergencies (ibid., 221-23). Moreover, in spite of the fact that Cicero took on, for instance, the prosecution of Verres in part out of real sympathy for the plight of the Sicilians (and, of course, in part for opportunistic political reasons 34 ), he did not always adhere to the high ideals of de Officiis (cf., besides our passage, 3.36, 49, and 87-88), as Meyer, 226 ff., shows in detail; on his financial gains as governor of Cilicia cf. Shatzman, 413; on his probable share in the profits from Antonius' governorship of Macedonia cf. ad 1.68. 26b . . . quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebarur, non iniuriis . . .] Several writers assert the mildness of early Rome in dealing with subject peoples, sometimes in contrast with Greek states: Sallust remarks in pace . . . beneficiis quam metu imperium agitabant {Cat. 9.5); Li v. 22.13.11 explains the failure of Hannibal's scorched-earth policy to incite rebellion among Rome's Campanian allies in 217 as follows: nee tamen is terror, cum 34. Cf. RA. Brunt, "Patronage and Politics in the 'Vernnes,'" Chiron 10 (1980), 288-89, for an analysis of Cicero's motives for accepting the case; ad $ 50.
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omnia bello flagrarent, fide socios dimovit, videlicet quia iusto et moderato regebantur imperio nee abnuebant, quod unum vinculum fidei est, melioribus parere; and in a speech reported at Tac. Ann. 11.24.4, in a similar vein to our passage, Claudius contrasts early Rome's kindly treatment of conquered peoples with the harsher practices that led to the ruin of Greek states: quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebantf at conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia valuit, ut plerosque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit. A realistic account would have included some sort of qualification; cf. Heilmann, 109; ad $ 75. For attitudes of Romans of the time toward their empire in general cf. Brunt, 1976, 161 ff. = 291 ff.—For the ethical Golden Age situated in the past cf. also ad 2.76, 3.1-4,13b—17, 109, and 111 (on observance of oaths); Edwards, 178, n. 8.—Sal lust, too, associated Rome's moral decay with the mistreatment of its allies; cf. Cat. 10.6; Gabba, 133. Cf., in general, J. de Romilly, The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors (Ann Arbor, 1977), 75. . . . exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii. . . ] Cicero is building a crescendo; the next stage will be the non honesta victoria of Sulla, the climax Caesar's victory, foedior even than his causa impia. . . . regum populorum nationum portus erat et perfugium senatus . . .] Cf. (on the burning of the senate house) Mil. 90: quo quid miserius. . . vidimusf templum sanctitatis,. . . caput urbis, aram sociorum, portum omnium gentium . . . inflammari, exscindi, funestari. . .—Perfugium (c), though a favor ite word of Cicero (it also occurs, e.g., at § 63), all but died out after him; Winterbottom was surely right to insert it in the text here in place of refugium (£), for which our passage would be the earliest attestation; for the iunctura cf. Clu. 7:. . . magna me spes tenet. . . hunc locum consessumque vestrum . . . tandem ems [sc. A. Cluenti] fortunae miserae multumque iactatae portum ac perfugium futurum; cf. Forccllini s.vv. perfugium, refugium. 27 sensim hanc consuetudinem et disciplinam iam antea minuebamus, post vero Sullae victoriam penitus amisimus;. . . ] Authors differed as to the date of the onset of moral decay at Rome; cf. Edwards, 177-78. Cicero was, in any case, not alone in seeing Sulla's victory as a major turning point; cf. Sal. Cat. MAS; Gabba, 132-33; Heilmann, 110. Laelius at Rep. 3.41 rraces to Ti. Gracchus the first sign of a change in relations with the socii: [incipit quaternio] * Asia Ti. Gracchus, perseveravit in civibus, sociorum nominisque Latini iura neglexit ac foedera. quae si consuetudo ac licentia manare coeperit latius, imperiumque nostrum ad vim a iure traduxerit, ut qui adhuc voluntate nobis oboediunt, terrore teneantur, etsi nobis qui id aetatis sumus evigilatum fere est, tamen de posteris nostris et de ilia immortalitate re-
Commentary on Book 2, Section 26b-27
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ipublicae soUicitor, quae poterat esse perpetua, si patriis viveretur institutis et moribus. desitum est enim videri quicquam in socios iniquum, cum exstitisset in cives tanta cmdelitas.] Our passage comprises a short account, with focus on effects on relations with the socii, of the process of desensitization described in detail at the conclusion of Sex. Rose, which, though delivered thirty-six years previously, remained a favorite of Cicero (cf. ad $ 51): vestrum nemo est quin intellegat popuium Romanum qui quondam in hostis lenissimus existimabatur hoc tempore domestica crudelitate laborare. banc tollite ex civitate, iudices, . . . ; quae non modo id habet in se mali quod tot civis atrocissime sustulit verum etiam hominibus lenissimis ademit misericordiam consuetudine incommodorum. nam cum omnibus horis aliquid atrociter fieri videmus aut audimus, etiam qui natura mitissimi sumus adsiduitate molestiarum sensum omnem humanitatis ex anhnis amittimus; cf. Diehl, 161. See the comprehensive study by Frar^ois Hinard, Les proscriptions de la Rome republicaine, Collection de l'Ecole Frar^aise de Rome 83 (Rome, 1985). For the mistreatment of allies cf., e.g., Man. 38: utrum pluris arbitramini per hosce annos militum vestrorum armis hostium urbis an hibernis sociorum civitates esse deletasf ergo in illo secuta est honestam causam non honesta victoria.] The honesta causa was, of course, the restitution of the respublica, marred, however, by the ensuing proscriptions. The distinction is made to highlight that Caesar was worse in both respects, causa and the use of his victoria. In fact, Sulla's change after his victory became common coin in ancient historiography beginning with Sal. Cat. 11.4: sedpostquam L. Sulla armis recepta republica bonis initiis malos eventus habuit, rapere omnes, trahere,. . . foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere; cf. Meier, 248 and n. 261. est enim ausus dicere hasta posita, cum bona in foro venderet et bonorum virorum et locupletium et certe avium, praedam se suam vendere.] Later in this Book (§§ 73-83) Cicero will argue in detail that private property should not be tampered with; and that argument will culminate in another reference to the hasta of Sulla and Caesar (§ 83). Cicero had retailed the anecdote, in virtually the same words, at Ver. 2.3.81: unus adhuc fuit post Romam conditam—di immortales faxint, ne sit alter!—, cut respublica totam se traderet temporibus et malis coacta domesticis, L. Sulla, hie tantum potuit ut nemo illo invito nee bona nee patriam nee vitam retinere posset; tantum animi habuit ad audaciam ut dicere in contione non dubitaret, bona avium Romanorum cum venderet, se praedam suam vendere; cf. Agr. 2.56: L. Sulla cum bona indemnatorum civium funesta ilia auctione sua venderet et se praedam suam diceret vendere . . . ; Shatzman, 272. Cf. Farad. 46 on the
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proscriptiones locupletium and ilia Sullani temporis messis; Atticus' policy as described at Nep. Att. 6.3: ad hastam publicam numquam accesstt. Sulla's policy is typical of a tyrant; and though Cicero does not apply the term to him here, he does so elsewhere (Agr. 3.5); cf. also the reference to Sulla's regalis potestas at Har. 54; Heilmann, 110; S. Lanciotti, "Silla e la tipologia del tiranno nella letteratura latina repubblicana (!)," Quaderni di Storia 3 (1977), 129-53 (on our passage 137-38); Diehl, 149-50 and 160-61. secutus est qui in causa impia, victoria etiam foediore, non singulonim civiurn bona publicaret, sed universas provincias regionesque uno calamitatis iure comprenderet.J For Cicero's view of Caesar's legal basis for the civil war (implicit in the phrase in causa impia) cf. ad 1.26 and 3.82b-85; on the outcome cf. Phil. 8.7: de proximo bello civili non libet dicere: ignoro causam, detestor exitum.—For the antithesis cf. Tusc. 5.15: quid, si idem, quod plerumque fit, paupertatem ignominiam infamiam timet, . . . 5/ denique, quod non singulis hominibus, sed potentibus populis saepe contingit, servitutemf—lus appears here in the broad sense "condition, status"; hence Holden paraphrases calamitatis iure as calamitoso statu; cf. Primmer, TLL 7, 688.32 ff., esp. 4 0 - 4 1 . 28 itaque vexatis ac perditis cxteris nationibus ad exemplum amissi imperii portari in triumpho Massiliam vidimus, et ex ea urbe triumphari sine qua numquam nostri imperatores ex Transalpinis bellis triumpharont.] Else where, too, Cicero cited the fate of Massilia, which in the year 49 refused Caesar entry on his way to Spain but capitulated after a siege (cf. Caes. BC 1.34-36, 5 6 - 5 8 ; 2.1-16,22), in order to stir sympathy for Caesar's victims (cf. Elizabeth Rawson in CAH 9*, 430); cf. Phil. 8.18: ego te, cum in Massiliensis tarn es acerbus, Q. Fufi. non animo aequo audio, quo usque enim Massiliam oppugnabisf ne triumphus quidem finem facit belli, per quern lata est urbs ea sine qua numquam ex Transalpinis gentibus maiores nostri triumpharunt. quo quidem tempore populus Romanus ingemuit: quamquam proprios dolores suarum rerum omnes habebant, tamen huius civitatis fidelissimae miserias nemo erat civis qui a se alienas arbitraretur. Cf. also the brief allusion to Caesar's hostility to the city at Phil. 2.94 and the dispute with Antony over restoring rights of citizenship to Massilia at Phil. 13.32 (cf. Att. 14.14.6).—On the history of Massilia's close relations with Rome cf. Michel Clerc, Massilia. Histoire de Marseille dans /' antiquite a la fin de Vempire Romain d' Occident, 2 vols. (Marseille, 1927-29), esp. 1.178 ff. and 2.1 ff.; H.G. Wackernagel, RE 14.2 (1930), 2132.34 ff.; the importance that Cicero here as elsewhere (cf. Font. 45) attributes to the town is, of course, overstated for rhetorical effect; cf. Wackernagel, loc. cit., 2134.18 ff.—The images of captured cities, rivers, mountains, etc., constructed of various
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materials, formed a regular part of the triumphal procession; cf. Cic. Pis. 60: disseres de triumpho: 'quid tandem habet iste currus, quid vincti ante currum duces, quid simulacra oppidorum,. . . quid tota ilia pompaf. . . ' and other testimonies cited by W. Ehlers, RE 7A1 (1939), 503.1 ff.—On the four triumphs that Caesar celebrated in 46, including the Gallic triumph, cf. in general Gelzer, Caesar, 263-64. = Eng. tr. 2 8 4 - 8 5 . multa praeterea commemorarem nefaria in socios, si hoc uno quicquam sol vidisset indignius.] The negativized comparative with a form of unus is a common means of lending rhetorical emphasis; cf. Fam. 7.16.3 (to Trebatius; November, 54): sed tamen est quod gaudeas; constat enim inter omnis neminem te uno Samarobrivae iuris peritiorem esse. iure igitur plectimur.] For plecto cf. ad 1.89. nisi enim multorum impunita scelera tulissemus, numquam ad unum tanta pervenisset bcentia . . .| The antithesis of the many and the few or the one is found elsewhere in this passage (cf. the penultimate lemma, § 27 \secutus est qui . . . universas provincias regionesque uno cabmitatis iure comprenderet], and the next lemma). Cicero does not spell out the connection; pre sumably Caesar's monarchy is interpreted as divine punishment for the mis treatment of Rome's allies; not dissimilar perhaps is Tacitus' explanatory principle deum ira in rem Romanam (Ann. 4.1.2). . . . a quo quidem rei familiaris ad paucos, cupiditarum ad multos improbos venit hereditas.] Caesar's last of several wills is described in greatest detail at Suet. Jul. 83.2: sed novissimo testamento tres instituit heredes sororum nepotes, Gaium Octavium ex dodrante, et Lucium Pinarium et Quintum Pedium ex quadrante reliquo; cf. further Schmitthenner, 13 ff.; Gelzer, Caesar, 284 = Eng. tr. 315. In a similar vein Phil. 8.9: hasta Caesaris . . . multis improbis et spem adfert et audaciam. viderunt enim ex mendicis fieri repente divites: itaque semper hastam videre cupiunt ei qui nostris bonis imminent, quibus omnia pollicetur Antonius. 29a nee vero umquam belloram civilium semen et causa deerit—alter autem, qui in ilia dictatura scriba fuerat, in hac fuit quaestor urbanus.] Cicero had already expressed concern about incitements to fresh booty at Phil. 1.6: veterani qui appellabantur, quibus hie ordo diligentissime caverat, non ad conservationem earum return quas habebant, sed ad spem novarum praedarum incitabantur^ a theme on which he continued to play variations; cf. Phil. 8.8: . . . M. Antonius . . . praedam retpublicae causam belli putet. . . However, if in our passage Cicero has not confused cause and effect, he has at least emphasized a subsidiary cause at the expense of a major one, namely the ambitions of Roman grandees of the period; cf. Heilmann, 112 and 114; Dichl, 161.—Causa is juxtaposed to semen for clarification; in
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fact, semen = causa is first attested in the Ciceronian age, as at Fin. 4.17:. . . reperiebant inesse in its [sc. in animi bonis] iustitiae semina . . . ; cf. OLD s.v., 7. Similarly to our passage Luc. 1.158-59 and 3.150 refers to wealth as the "seeds of war." Comparisons of the behavior of Caesar and Sulla in the aftermath of civil war appear at several points in Cicero's correspondence. With civil war brewing on 19 (?) December 50, he shared with Atticus his foreboding that si boni victi sint, nee in caede principum clementiorem hunc fore quam Cinna fuerit nee moderatiorem quam Sulla in pecuniis locupletum {Att. 7.7.7); those forebodings were realized, according to Cicero, by 25 August 47: Sullana confers; in quibus omnia genere ipso praeclarissima fuerunt, moder ation paulo minus temperata. haec autem eius modi sunt ut obliviscar (met) multoque malim quod omnibus sit melius {quam quod its ad) quorum utilitatem meam iunxi (ibid., 11.21.3), where Carter, 17, interprets haec autem . . . to refer to confiscation of private estates for settlement of veterans. Cf. also 1.43: quare L. Sulbe, C. Caesaris pecuniarum translatio a iustis dominis ad alienos non debet liberalis videri. . . If the allusion to Massilia was meant to arouse pity for Caesar's victims, mention of the Cornelii would stir hatred and envy for his beneficiaries. The former was the P. Cornelius Sulla (cos. des. 65) defended by Cicero in 62 on charges of involvement in the Catilinarian conspiracy. He was, according to Dio 36.44.3, a nephew of Sulla Felix; in defending him Cicero claimed that his client had used his influence with the dictator for the good (§ 72). In the civil war he took Caesar's side and commanded the right wing at Pharsalia (Caes. BC 3.89.3 and 99.4). He died shortly after enriching himself in Caesar's auction of the property of civil war victims; Cicero leaves open the question whether the cause was indigestion or attack by thieves (Fam. 15.17.2). Cicero provided ironic commentary on his death in letters of early 45: te tamen hoc scire volo, vehementer populum sollicitum fuisse de P. Sullae morte ante quam certum scierit. nunc quaerere desierunt quo modo perierit; satis putant se scire quod sciunt. ego ceteroqui animo aequo fero. unum vereor, ne hasta Caesaris refrixerit (Fam. 9.10.3 |to Dolabellaj; sim. Fam. 15.17.2 [to Cassius], where he calls Sulla the πρόσωπον πόλΕω?). Cf. Munzer, RE 4 (1901), 1518.65 ff. (Cornelius no. 386), esp. 1519.5 ff., 1521.7 ff.; Shatzman, 336-37; ad SS 6 9 - 7 1 . Apart from our passage and Sal. Hist. 1.55.17 (oratio Lepidi: scilicet quia non aliter salvi satisque tuti in imperio eritis, nisi Vettius Picens et scriba Cornelius aliena bene parta prodegerint. . . ), the scribe Cornelius is un known. Cicero cites the rise from scriba to praetor urbanus as a symptom of the disordered social conditions of which he complains (a criticism of
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Caesar's personnel policies is also implicit). But a scriba might be of eques trian standing, and such an advancement, though unusual, was not unprece dented; cf. Ronald Syme, Roman Papers, 1 (Oxford, 1979), 101. One would, however, be excluded from the senate as a mercennarius as long as one exercised the profession of scribe; cf. ad 1.150. Turpissimorum honores (as well as tabulae novae) were among the evil consequences of civil war that Cicero foresaw in May, 49 [Att. 10.8.2, quoted at p. 360, n. 14 above). Cf. Munzer, RE 4 (1901), 1250.50 (Cornelius no. 5); MRR, 2, 475; on the economic and social changes wrought by Sulla's victory cf. Shatzman, 38 ff.; on those wrought by Caesar's, Syme, 7 6 - 7 7 and 78 ff.; on Caesar's new senators, Wiseman, 8-9, 100, 146-47, 176-77, and appendix 1; on the decline of the nobles generally in the following period, Syme, 490 ff. itaque parietes modo urbis stant et manent, iique ipsi iam extrema scelera metuentes, rem vero publicam penitus amisimus.] In contrast to the foreign peoples who were vexati ac perditi ($ 28), the house walls of Rome are still standing; but in spite of the intact shell, the substance of the Roman state, i.e., its liberty, 35 has been lost; cf. the similar thought at Thuc. 7.77.7 (con clusion of Nicias' speech to his troops): άνδρες γάρ πόλις. και ου τείχη ουδέ ι>ή€£ ανδρών κ€ναί; Sal. Cat. 52.23 (Cato's speech): ubi vos separatim sibi quisque consilium capitis, ubi domi voluptatibus, hie pecuniae aut gratiae servitis, eo fit ut impetus fiat in vacuam rempublicam. Notable the person ification of the parietes,36 to which the fear felt by a tyrant's subjects (§23) has now been transferred.—The loss of the republic on moral grounds had been warned against by C. Gracchus (eae nationes cum aliis rebus per avaritiam atque stultitiam respublicas suas amiserunt: orat., p. 180, from the speech de Lege Penni et Peregrinis, on which see ad 3.47) and proclaimed by Cicero as early as the year 60; cf. passages collected by Meiei; 2, n. 4; cf. also Rep. 5.2: nostris enim vitiis, non casu aliquo, rempublicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem amisimus (cf. Scipio's general observation, ibid., 3.43: ergo ubi tyrannus est, ibi. . . nullam esse rempublicam); at de Orat. 1.38, set in 9 1 , Scaevola is made to speak of. . . rempublicam, quam nunc vix tenemus . . . ; if the gods had not set Clodius on Milo rempublicam nullam haberetis (Mil. 89); cf. also the letter to Plancus quoted ad § 23; Phil. 2.37: if those killed in the civil war were still alive, rempublicam hodie teneremus. On the place of the respublica in Cicero's thought cf. in general Diehl, 2 5 - 2 6 . For Cicero, Caesar's assassination did not entail any funda35. For this implication of the term respublica in Cicero cf. Schofield, 19952, 76. 36. Cf. CIu. 15, where the house walls should be feared by the wicked Sassia, as well as Marc. 10 and Phil. 2.69, which refer respectively to the walls of the curia and of Pompcy's house, occupied by Antony.
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mental change in the state (cf. ad % 23).—On -que used to add "a word or phrase qualifying one in the preceding part of the sentence, so as to form an emphatic parenthesis . . . especially with demonstratives'* cf. OLD s.v., lib.—For the sense of extrema {- "crudelissima" or the like) cf. Hiltbrunner, TLL 5.2,2003.63; ad 1.84.—For vero with relatively strong adversative force cf. OLD s.v., 7b. atque in has clades incidimus . . . dum metui quam cari esse et diligi malumus.J According to § 23, hatred is the corollary of fear; hence its juxtaposi tion with love here; Cicero describes the position candidly at Man. 65: difficile est dictu, Quirites, quanto in odio simus apud exteras nationes propter eorum quos ad eas per hos annos cum imperio misimus libidines et imurias. Cicero had spoken more vaguely of the civil war as a divine punish ment for some sin (ob aliquod delictum) at Marc. 18. Similar to our passage is the diagnosis of the civil war at Luc. 7.644-45: alieni poena timoris I in nostra cervice sedet. quae si populo Romano iniuste imperanti accidere poruemnt, quid debent putare singuli?] Another argument of the a fortiori type beloved in this essay; cf. ad 1.48; for the phrasing cf. ad $$ 2 3 - 2 9 . 29b-30 This section is essentially an appendix to the preceding designed to meet the objection that different individuals require caritas to a different degree (non pariter). The point that all persons require contact with others had been forestalled at 1.153; cf. also the encomia of friendship at 1.55 and 58. 29b Quod cum perspicuum sit—cum honore et fide caritatem.] The discus sion of caritas might have been expected to follow immediately after this sentence but begins, in fact, only in § 32 (cf. Schmekel, 22); cf. also ad$$ 2 3 29. 30 sed ea non pariter omnes egemus; nam ad cuiusque vitam institutam accommodandum est a multisne opus sit an satis sit a paucis diligi.] Having many friends, like the pursuit of public office, inevitably involves one in labores et molestiae (cf. 1.71, as well as Arist. EN 1170b24 ff. and Amic. 45). Hence the assumption that, ceteris paribus, one would prefer a paucis diligi (cf. Mil. 21: consuetudines victus non possunt esse cum multis; it is misleading, however, to say, with F.-A. Steinmetz, 190, that Panaetius here gives priority ["Vorrang"| to private relations over public popularity). Like Aristotle {EN 1171al7), Cicero/Panaetius assumes that πολυφιλία is one of the exigencies of political life; cf. F.-A. Steinmetz, 24, n. 95. The fact that no absolute advice is given but the matter is made relative to one's vita instituta (though at § 39 Cicero gives it as his opinion that omnis ratio atque institutio vitae requires the help of others; cf. also 1.153) accords with the tolerant
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approach of Off. in general, which allows room for a considerable variety of human character and choice; cf. 1.107 ff. and 115 ff. certum igitur—propemodum comparanda.] Cicero/Panaetius takes note that here the interests of the public and the private man overlap (both need friendship), but then focuses immediately on the situation of the public man, who enjoys honor, gloria, and benivolentia civium, which, in turn, aid in forming friendship. 3 1 - 3 4 These sections set out the problem initially as if it consisted of three subjects on the same level: honor, gloria, benivolentia. In fact, in the sequel the focus is on glona, with benivolentia (S 32) and honor (under $§ 3 6 - 3 8 : si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat [S 31]) both treated as means to that general end (see outline in the introduction to this Book). These sections narrow the topic by eliminating amicitia and identifying three con stituents of gloria, as well as alluding to another means of influencing the multitude (alius . . . aditus ad multitudinem [$ 31], presumably largitio, to be discussed at SS 54b-60). Cicero proceeds in a businesslike way to despatch two of the constituents of gloria, beginning with the causes of love ($ 32), followed by an analysis and comparison of the two contributors to fides (prudentia, iustitia: §§ 33-34). 31 Honore et gloria et benivolentia civium fortasse non aeque omncs egent. . .] Editors tend to introduce a new paragraph with the following sentence (so Atzert 4 , Fedeli, Testard, Gunermann, Winterbottom) but should perhaps rather do so here. For our sentence really marks the point of depar ture for the sequel by listing the topics that will now be taken up, viz., honos, gloria, benivolentia civium (cf. § 32 init.: ac primum de Hits tribus quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta videamus; but this threefold division is mis leading; see the preceding note). On the other hand, the sentence beginning sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est takes its starting point from the mention of amicitiae in the preceding sentence and explains why that topic is here omitted, whereas gloria will be treated, in spite of Cicero's likewise having dealt with it in a recent work. sed de amicitia alio libro dictum est, qui inscribitur Laelius; . . .] This refer ence provides the terminus ante quern for the composition of Amic, whereas the absence of reference to it at Div. 2.1 ff. creates the presumption that it was composed after the Ides of March. The correspondence with Marius (Fam. 11.27-28, mid-October, 44) raised the topic of friendship with a tyrant pursued at Amic. 36 ff.; the situation of civil war presupposed in the work likewise fits with the situation Cicero saw developing in fall, 44; cf. the convincing contextualization by Bringmann, 215, and Combes, pp. V1I-XI of his edition (Paris, 1971), followed by Neuhausen, 21-22; Powell ad
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Antic, pp. 5 - 6 , takes an agnostic position on a closer dating than the termini just mentioned. 37 F.-A. Steinmetz, especially 190 ff., argued that at this point in Panaetius" treatise stood a long discussion of friendship that Cicero could omit here with a cross-reference to his own Laelius because he had used this material as his (single) source for that work; the consequence would then be that of Panaetius1 three books περί τοϋ καθήκοντος, one would have been devoted to the καλόν, two to the συμφέρον. This theory is unlikely to be correct. In the first place, Cicero/Panaetius is focusing in this Book on the situation of the summi viri (see ad § 30: cerium igitur—propemodum comparanda). Though they need friendship no less than ordinary men, as we have just been told, would Panaetius in this case uniquely have discussed at length a subjea that relates to them qua viri, but not qua summi viri} Note the justification given for covering again the topic of gloria: quandoquidem ea [sc. gloria) in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum. Panaetius evidently of fered more on the subject than Cicero gives in § 32 (Pohlenz, AF, 100, suspects the equivalent of Amic. 26-32), but it seems doubtful that it amounted to the whole content of the Laelius. For, given that even within this discussion of the συμφβρον Panaetius insisted on giving emphasis to the elements quae virtuti propiores sunt ($ 22), it is most unlikely that in the overall plan of his treatise he devoted two books to the συμφέρον and only one to the καλόν;38 and in that case the divisio at SS 2 1 - 2 2 would have had to look rather different (unless one assumes Ciceronian alteration). Moreover, Steinmetz's theory is contradicted by the one explicit testimony we have about the source for the Laelius, namely Gellius 1.3.11: eum librum (i.e., Theophrastus, περί φιλίας·] Μ. Cicero videtur legisse, cum ipse quoque librum de Amicitia componeret. et cetera quidem, quae sumenda a Theophrasto existimavit, ut ingenium facundiaque eius fuit, sumpsit et transposuit commodissime aptissimeque; hunc autem locum [i.e., Amic. 61] . . . strictim atque cursim transgressus est, neque ea, quae a Theophrasto pensiculate atque enucleate scripta sunt, exsecutus est. . . Steinmetz, 112 ff., argues that Gellius may have relied solely on excerpts on the subject €i 6el βυηθεΐν τψ φίλω παρά το δίκαιον και μβχρι πόσου και ποία and may not have undertaken a systematic source analysis. But Gellius does cite Theophrastus* book by title (fr. 436.23b = 534 Fortenbaugh, 1992 = S 22 = L 95 Forten37. For an earlier dating cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1164.59 ff., who thought that, since it is unmentioned in the letters to Atticus, it was written during Atticus' stay in Rome between March 15 and May 7. 38. His theory also requires Steinmetz to place fr. 116, cited from Book 2 of τκρί τοϋ καθήκυιτο?. within the treatment of the utile, but this is unlikely; cf. introduction $ 5 (5).
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baugh, 1984) and allows himself to pass favorable judgment on Cicero's handling of the materials he chose to use from Theophrastus {quae swnenda a Theophrasto existimavit) apart from the passage corresponding to Amic. 61. Hence, if Gellius really proceeded in the manner Steinmetz suggests, he appears to have deliberately misled the reader. Steinmetz, 201, attempts to save his theory without assuming misrepresentation on Gellius' part by the hypothesis that Panaetius in turn used Theophrastus, so that Gellius could have been honestly deceived as to Cicero's immediate source. But it seems doubtful that Panaetius would have followed Theophrastus so closely as to make such a misunderstanding possible; consider the plethora of Greek au thors cited in Off. 1-2! Finally, the agreements between the Laelius and Panaetius pointed out by Steinmetz are susceptible of other explanation. In his review of Steinmetz, F. Wehrli, MH 24 (1967), 245, suggests that we ought to distinguish between dependence in terms of the history of the problem and literary dependence ("zwischen problemgeschichtlicher und literarischer Abhangigkeit") and bear in mind that much of Panaetius doubtless passed into the eclecticism of the Hellenistic period from which Cicero derived his philosophical educa tion. Thus while some Panaetian material may underlie the Laelius,39 the matter cannot be proven along the lines attempted by Steinmetz.40 nunc dicamus de gloria, quamquam ea quoque de re duo sunt nostri libri; sed attingamus, quandoquidem ea in rebus maioribus administrandis adiuvat plurimum.] The divisio (§21) might not have led one to expect a discussion of gloria; but see the introduction to this Book and the next note. For the older Stoa ευδοξία was among the αδιάφορα (cf. SVF 3, 28.7 and 261.8 (Apollod. Stoic.]); according to Cicero, it was the influence of Carneades that brought a change {Fin. 3.57 = SVF 3, 37.33, 219.3, and 252.22): de bona autem fama—quam enim appellant €ύδοξίαι>, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam—Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, banc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixeruntt esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque prop ter rem ipsamy non propter usum, dicuntque, ut liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae 39. Note, however, the different ranking of friendship and blood-ties at Amic. 19-20 and Off. 1.50-53 (sec ad 1.50-58). 40. Steinmetz's conclusion is likewise rejected by Powell ad Amic, p. 18.
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tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum. At 1.65 Cicero/ Panaetius had remarked. . . qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hie in magnis viris non est habendus and had gone on to warn against gloriae cupiditas, with, however, the realistic addition . . . vix invenitur qui labonbus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam. This last point really lies at the heart of Book 2, where it is assumed that, as in Cicero's own case (cf. Graff, 2 2 - 2 3 ; Heilmann, 25), glory is the motor that drives a public career.—For the definition of gloria cf. Marc. 26 (. . . inlustris et pervagata magnorum vel in suos civis vel in pa· triam vel in omne genus hominum fama meritorum). On the lost treatise de Gloria (our passage = fr. phil., p. 6 1 , test. 5) cf. Philippson, RE 7A1 (1939), 1167.8 ff.; Leeman, 153 ff.; Bringmann, 196 ff.; Long, 1995', 223-24. Luigi Alfonsi, "Studi sulle Tusculanae,' w WS 80 (1967), 147 ff., thinks that de Gloria can be reconstructed in part from §§ 3 1 - 3 8 ; but these paragraphs form a cohesive argument within the divisio set forth at §§ 2 1 - 2 2 ; surely the intrusive matter from de Gloria is to be found rather at § 43 (see ad loc). summa igitur et pcrfecta gloria constat ex tribus his: si diligit multitudo, si fidem habet, si cum admiratione quadam honore dignos putat.J Here we find three of the topics mooted in the divisio of § 2 1 : . . . aut benivolentiae gratia . . . , cum aliqua de causa quempiam diligunt, aut honoris, si cuius virtutem suspiciunt quemque dignum fortuna quam amplissima putant, aut cui fidem habent et bene rebus suis consulere arbitrantur . . . It is thus clear that what Cicero paraphrased in $ 21 as quaecumque igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eum augendum atque honestandum really amounts to quaecumque homines ad gloriam hominis tribuunt and that gloria is, in fact, the real subject of this Book; hence the topic could not be avoided, in spite of the fact that Cicero had written two Books on it not very long ago (cf. Leeman, 180, who already mooted that the "ethics of glory" are the central subject of this Book). The omitted topics are metus (cf. the phrase cuius opes metuunt IS 211), which has already been dealt with extra ordinem (cf. ad §§ 2 3 - 2 9 above), largitio, which will be handled later (§§ 54-64), and pretium, which is discussed only insofar as the question arises whether pecunia or opera constitutes a preferable benefaction (§§ 52-53). Cf. Philippson, 1936 1 , 749. haec autem, si est simpliciter breviterque dicendum, quibus rebus pariuntur a singulis, isdem fere a multitudine.] Cf. Amic. 50:. . . bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benivolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. sed est alius quoque quidam aditus ad multitudinem, ut in universonim animos tamquam influere possimus.] The unnamed alius. . . aditus ad multitudinem is evidently largitio, which is discussed at $§ 5 4 - 6 4 , after the be-
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nivolentiae praecepta ($$ 32-42), as well as the praecepta on how young men may obtain glory ($§ 43-51); this is in accord with the plan to give priority to quae virtutipropiores sunt ($ 22); Philippson, 1936 1 , 749, n. 14, thinks rather of §§ 73 ff.; but these deal not so much with largitiones publicae as with public policy matters, especially the preservation of private property (see ad $$ 21-22 above). 32 Ac primum de illis tribus quae ante dixi, benivolentiae praecepta videamus;—commovecur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis . . . ] The first factor contributing to a reputation is benivolentia. Deeds are the obvious means of displaying this quality; if, however, the material basis (res) for benefactions is lacking (as it was for the young Cicero: cf. $ 58), good will {voluntas benefica) may substitute. The law court was in the ancient world an arena where goodwill played a large role (cf. ad $ 6G\ Linger, 67-68); indeed, the goodwill gained in court was the foundation of Cicero's career (cf. ad § 31 [nunc dicamus—]). In the following sentence (vehementer autem—) Cicero proceeds to discuss the multitudo, who are moved by fama et opinio. etenim illud ipsum, quod honestum decorumque dicimus,—illos in quibus eas virtutes esse remur a natura ipsa diligere cogimur.] For the attractive power of the virtues as the basis for friendship cf. 1.55-56 and Amic. 50, partly quoted ad § 3 1 . 33 Fides autem ut habeatur duabus rebus effici potest,—hanc enim utilem homines existimam veramque prudentiam.] The traditional emphasis was evidently on prudentia/^povr\ais; cf. X. Cyr. 1.6.21: και em μεν γε το ανάγκη επεσθαι αϋτη, ώ παΐ, ή οδός ε σ τ ί ν έπ'ι δέ το κρεΐττον τούτου πολύ, το έκόντας πείθεσθαι, άλλη εστί συντομωτέρα. δν γάρ αν ήγήσωνται περί του συμφέρον τος έαυτοΐ? φρονιμώτερον εαυτών εΐναι, τούτω οι άνθρωποι ύπερηδέως πεί θονται. The inclusion of justice is perhaps Panaetius' own improvement; cf. Plut. Cat. min. 44.12-13, a passage that Leeman, 4 1 , n. 30, refers to a Middle Stoic source: ουδεμιάς γάρ αρετής δόξα και πίστις έπιφθόνους ποιεί μάλλον ή της δικαιοσύνης, δτι και δύναμις αύτη και πίστις έπεται μάλιστα •παρά τών πολλών, οΰ γάρ τιμώσι μόνον, ώς τους ανδρείους, οΰδε θαυμά£ουσιν. ως τους φρόνιμους, άλλα και φιλοΰσι τους δικαίους, και θαρροΰσιν αύτοΐς και πιστεύουσιν.—For Panaetius* admiration for coolheadedness under pressure (cum res agatur in discrimenque ventum sit. . .) cf. 1.80 {fortis veto animi et constantis est non perturbari in rebus asperis . . . sed praesenti animo uti et consilio . . .).—The phrase cum res agatur is ignored by commentators and taken by translators mostly as synonymous with the following in discrimen que ventum sit ("when an emergency arises" [Miller]; "devant Pevenement" |Testard|; "wenn es hart auf hart geht" IGunermann]; "when the issue
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arises" (Atkins]). Cf. OLD s.v. ago 20 u((intn] to adopt an active policy, take action, do something, act lalso pass., of res\)" with examples. The critical point is surely the progressive aspect of the verb; perhaps "while the issue is still open" or the like (cf. Testard's rendering). iustis autem et ffidisf hominibus, id est bonis viris, ita fides habetur ut nulla sit in iis fraudis iniuriacque suspicio.] Facciolati's athetesis of et fidis has been widely accepted. Atzen justly remarks: "quomodo fidis fides ita habeatur, ut nulla sit in eis fraudis suspicio, vix intellegas." However, if the simple dele tion of et fidis is the solution, the interpolator has created nonsense, and for no apparent reason. I suspect that the diagnosis may be more complex, viz., that fidis may have ousted prudentibus. In light of the preceding specification fides autem ut habeatur duabus rebus effici potest, si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam, a reader who found iustis et prudentibus in his text might have added fidis as a paraphrase above the line or in the margin; this note could have been later misinterpreted as a variant reading and mechanically substituted for prudentibus without regard to the sense (or lack thereof) of the sentence as a whole. This solution has several other advantages: 1) it enables §$ 33-34 to deal, from beginning to end, with coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam; note the comparison of the two factors in S 34 concluding quam ob rem intellegentiae iustitia coniuncta quantum volet habebit ad faciendam fidem virium. iustitia sine prudentia multum potent, sine iustitia nihil valebit prudentia; 2) in $ 38 Cicero refers to . . . iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur; if he had paraphrased iusti as boni viri just a few paragraphs above, would he not have alluded to that fact? Note also that in the account of the virtues given at § 18 the first lies definitely in the sphere of prudentia (. . . una est in perspiciendo quid in quaque re verum sincerumque sit, quid consentaneum cuique, quid consequens, ex quo quaeque gignantur, quae cuiusque rei causa sit), the other two social virtues broadly in the realm of iustitia. 34 quo enim quis versutior et callidior, hoc invisior et suspectior detracta opinione probitatis.] Callidus need not have negative connotations per se, as our passage as well as 1.33 illustrates; cf. ad loc. 35 The preceding statement that prudentia, unless combined with iustitia, is useless for securing fides is an apparent contradiction of the Stoic doctrine of the inseparability of the virtues (cf. ad 1.152-61); hence the insertion of this digression (acknowledged as such by the words sed ad propositum revertamur with which it concludes) on deploying terminology in the popularly accepted sense. One might have expected it to precede, rather than follow, SS 33-34; but such afterthoughts are typical of this essay; cf. ad §§ 19b-20.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 33-35
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As in §5 7 - 8 , Cicero is defending himself against an implicit charge of philosophical inconsistency. In our passage, however, he can cite Panaetian precedent for use of terms in a popular rather than an orthodox Stoic sense. Panaetius, in turn, could have appealed to the example of Chrysippus, who was prepared to allow the προηγμένα to be called ayaQa as a closer approx imation to ordinary usage provided there was no confusion over what this did or did not imply (cf. SVF 3, 33.19 ff.; Kidd, 1955, 188-89; Kudlien, 449). For Cicero's differentiation of this project from strict Stoic doctrine of the κατόρθωμα cf. 1.7b-8 and 3.14 ff. He used a similar procedure in writing de Legibus (1.19: sed quoniam in populari ratione omnis nostra versatur oratio, populariter interdum loqui necesse erit, et appellare earn legem, quae scripta sancit quod vult aut iubendo {aut vetando), ut vulgus appellat). Cf. also Gorier, 1974, 75. Sed ne quis sit admiratus cur, cum inter omnes philosophos constet a meque ipso saepe disputamm sit, qui unam haberet, omnes habere virtutes, nunc ita seiungam . . .] Inter omnes philosophos and saepe may be a bit overstated, but the doctrine was held by Plato and Aristotle, as well as the Stoa (cf. ad 1.153-62). Cicero argues the case at Tuse. 3.14-18 and alludes to the doctrine at Fin. 5.66 and Ac. 1.38 (cumque illi [sc. superiores] ea genera virtutum quae supra dixi seiungi posse arbitrarentur, hie (sc. Zeno) nee id ullo modo fieri posse disserebat. . .). . . . alia est ilia cum Veritas ipsa limatur in disputatione subtili, alia cum ad opinionem communem omnis accommodatur ο ratio.] I adopt subtili from c and Ambrose [off. 2.49:. . . ab ilia subtili disputatione philosophiae . . .) for subtilitas of the rest of the tradition, since the prior alia must refer to oratio, not subtilitas, which could easily have been substituted for the adjective by an inattentive scribe expecting a noun.—Balzert, ILL 7,1422.71 ff. (s.v. 1. limo) well brings out the sense by classing our passage among those in which the notion of exploring, investigating, or testing prevails; OLD s.v. limo 2 tries to connect our instance with the basic meaning of the verb by rendering "remove the blemishes of, polish, perfect**; but this, as applied to Veritas ipsa, is less convincing; the literal sense had evidently paled considerably by Cicero's day. popularibus enim verbis est agendum et usitatis, cum loquimur de opinione populari, idque eodem modo fecit Panaetius.] In this respect Panaetius fol lows the example of Chrysippus (see above). At Fin. 4.78-79 (= Pan. fr. 55) Cicero likewise describes Panaetius' departure from the usual norms of Stoic discourse: quam illorum [sc. Stoicorum] tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nee acerbitatem sententiarum nee disserendi spinas probavit. . .
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On Panaetius' evident intention to reach a reading public beyond profes sional philosophers cf. also the introduction to this Book and § 51. Cf. also Leg. 1.19: . . . populariter interdum loqui necesse erit. . . 3 6 - 3 8 The third factor contributing to glory is the power to excite the admiration of the many. In the course of this excursion into mass psychology Cicero/Panaetius distinguishes the following types: those whom ordinary persons (1) despise, (2) disapprove of, (3) admire. The first group consists of the helpless, the second of villains. What separates those who admire from those who are admired is their valuation of the external goods. Thus, if iustitia and pmdentia were central to winning fides, magnitudo animi—the attitude of despising the external goods (see 1.66)—is what distinguishes the outstanding from the ordinary man and wins the latter's admiration; the problems to which magnitudo animi can give rise (cf. ad 1.68) receive no mention here; cf. Heilmann, 30. Cole, 1961, 140, compares Anon. Iamb. 4.1-6 = Iamb. Protr. 98.17 ff., which recommends that the seeker after άρ^τή keep a certain distance from the popular attitudes toward life, limb, and property; but in that passage Panaetius* point that such a perspective rouses the admiration of the ordinary man is missing. Moreover, since this valuation of the external goods was readily available to Panaetius (it was, of course, Stoic orthodoxy), we need not posit a genetic relation here between Anon. Iamb, (or his source) and Panaetius. 36 . . . despiciunt autem eos et contemnunt in quibus nihil virtutis, nihil animi, nihil nervorum putant.] Cf. 1.61. quam ob rem, ut ante dixi, contemnuntur ii qui 'nee sibi nee alteri', ut dicitur, in quibus nullus labor, nulla industria, nulla cura est.] Nee sibi nee alteri was the proverbial expression for helplessness; its positive counterpart is found at Plaut. Mil. 684: tu homo et alteri sapienter potis es consulere et tibi; cf. Otto, 16. 37 . . . voluptates, blandtssimae dominae, maioris partis animos a virtute detorquent . . . ] Cf., with reference to Epicureanism, 3.117: quam miser virtutis famulatus servientis voluptati! Cf. also Cicero's description of the trend of the times away from virtue at Cael. 4 0 - 4 2 . . . . dolorum cum admoventur faces, practer modum plerique exterrentur; . . .] For the "torches of pain" see Tusc. 2.61 (Pompey's report of his visit to the ailing Posidonius): . . . narrabat eum graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum nisi quod esset honestum, cubantem disputavisse, cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur, saepe dixisse: 'nihil agis, dolor! quamvis sis molestus, numquam te esse confitebor malum'; ibid., 5.76: dolor esse videtur acerrumus virtutis adversarius; is ardentis faces intentat. . . For torches inciting terror cf. Sex. Rose. 67: nolite enim putare, quern ad modum
Commentary on Book 2, Section 35-38
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in fabulis saepenumero videtis, eos qui aliquid impie scelerateque commiserint agitari et perterreri Furiarum taedis ardentibus. . . . vita mors divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. quae qui in utramque partem excelso animo magnoquc despiciunt, (. . .), cumque aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est totos(que) ad se convertit et rapit, (. . .) turn quis non admiretur splendorem pulchritudinemque vir tu tis?] The sentence beginning quae qui in utramque partem . . . is badly corrupt. There is surely a lacuna following despiciunt, where something like Goldbacher's eos omnes suspiciunt or Winterbottom's it merito laudantur needs to be supplied. In addition, totos ad se convertit et rapit would be expected to be in parallel with cum. . . aliqua iis ampla et honesta res obiecta est; I have accordingly adopted the -que (attached to totos) of Monac. 13095 (twelfth century); Goldbacher's et following est would also be possible. But the sense is evidently still incomplete. The larger argument has to do with the means for winning the admiratio hominum. One sure method is to display an attitude of despising the things that most people value, i.e., the external goods, a phenomenon Cicero discussed at length in Book 1 under magnitudo animi (= μεγαλοψυχία of Panaetius: §§ 66-92; cf. 1.66: rerum extemarum despicientia). Our sentence evidently describes two parallel situations in both of which the admiration of the many follows upon the action of the μεγαλό ψυχοι; in the first half, as restored by Goldbacher or Winterbonom, the admiration ensues when the μεγαλόψυχοι despise various named conditions (vita, mors, divitiae, paupertas).4* In the second half, surely the great and honorable prize placed in the path of the μεγαλόψυχοι that exercises its magnetism upon "all" is something they likewise reject, since the pursuit of glory, no less than other external goods, inhibits one's freedom (cf. 1.68 and 71, the text of the lemma after next, and the last sentence of $ 38). Therefore to complete the thought after rapit add // autem parvi ducunt or the like. Cf. also the end of § 38:. . . etob eandem causam fidem, et admirationem, quod eas res spernit et neglegit ad quas plerique inflammati aviditate rapiuntur.— When writing these words did Cicero perhaps think of Cato Uticensis, on whom he had recently composed a eulogy (cf. ad 1.112)? Cf. the characteriz ation at Sal. Cat. 54.6: ita, quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis ilium sequebatur. 38 . . . iustitia, ex qua una virtute viri boni appellantur, . . .] For the Greek background cf. ad 1.20 and 9 3 - 9 9 . maximeque admirantur eum qui pecunia non movetur; quod in quo viro 41. In utramque partem surely means that the subject is indifferent to whether or not he has them or, in the case of death, it befalls him.
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perspectum sit, hunc igni spectatum arbitrantur.] For the common Hebrew, Greek, and Roman proverbial expression about being "tested by fire" (often used of a friend, good faith, or the like) cf. Red. Sen. 23; Catul. 100.6; Fantham, 125; Otto, 170. Itaque ilia tria quae proposita sunt ad gloriam, omnia iustitia conficit.. .] Is it, however, iustitia itself or only the opinio iustitiae?42 Only the latter has been shown; cf. § 33: si existimabimur adepti coniunctam cum iustitia prudentiam; § 37: admiratione autem adficiuntur ii qui anteire ceteris virtute putantur etc., as well as in the sequel § 39 {ergo etiam solitario homini atque in agro vitam agenti opinio iustititae necessaria est. . .) and § 42 {ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis).42 Many of the casuistic cases discussed at 3.38 ff. attempt to fill this gap between the apparent and the actual. 3 9 - 4 2 a Oddly connected (by JC), this section on the opinio iustitiae might have been expected earlier. The first two sentences, which argue that a repu tation for just dealings is a prerequisite for social relations of any kind, could have followed immediately upon the last sentence of § 29 (. . . sequitur ut disseramus quibus rebus facillime possimus earn quam volumus adipisci cum honore et fide caritatem); for one would have expected Cicero/Panaetius to establish the fundamental point that all human beings require some measure of regard from their fellows before going on to say sed ea [sc. caritate] non pariter omnes egemus . . . (§ 30). Furthermore the continuation, which em phasizes that the most varied social groups regard such a reputation as the quality of a good leader, would have been relevant to the discussion of fides at SS 3 3 - 3 4 , where stress is laid upon the opinio probitatis as a component. For similar displacements cf. above ad §§ 19b-20a and 29b. 39 Ac mea quidem sementia omnis ratio atque institutio vitae adiumenta hominum desiderat. . . ] One might have expected this fundamental point to precede the first sentence of § 30; see previous note. Cf. also 1.153 and 158. . . . in primisque ut habeat quibuscum possit familiares conferre sermones; . . .] On the importance of sermo for Panaetius see ad 1.132b-37. 40 cuius tanta vis est ut ne illi quidem qui maleficio et scelere pascuntur possint sine ulla particula iustitiae vivere.] An a fortiori argument (cf. ad 1.48). Being φιλοπλάτων (fr. 57; cf. fr. 56), Panaetius may have been inspired by R. 351c, where Socrates asks Thrasymachus: δοκ€Ϊς αν ή πόλιι* ή στρατό42. Contrast Antic. 98, where Cicero draws a careful distinction between virtus and virtutis opinio. 43. Cf. also Long, 1995', 230: "The best that Cicero can offer is the piety that 'true glory' cannot be acquired by simulation of justice" (sc. $ 43).
Commentary on Book 2, Section 38-40
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ireoov ή ληστάς ή κλ€πτας ή άλλο τι έθνος, όσα κοινή έπί τι 6ρχ€ται αδίκως, πραξαι αν τι δύνασθαι, €Ϊ αδικούν αλλήλους; itaque propter aequabilem praedae partitionem et Bardulis Illyrius latro, de quo est apud Theopompum, magnas opes habuit. . .] The former charcoalmaker (άνθρακ6ύς) Bardylis (ca. 448-358) carved out for himself and his descendants a kingdom among the Dardani (one of the three strongest IIIyrian tribes, according to Stn 7 C 315 fin.) and even captured Macedonian territory (he was perhaps responsible for the defeat and death of Perdiccas HI in 359) before being defeated by Philip II the following year; cf. Kaerst, RE 3.1 (1899), 12.9 ff.; N.G.L. Hammond, "The Kingdoms in Illyria ca. 4 0 0 167 Β.*:.," ABSA 61 (1966), 2 3 9 - 5 3 , esp. 252 (on the localization of Bar dylis' kingdom); N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Mac edonia, 2: SSO-336 B.C. (Oxford, 1979), ind. s.v. Bardylis I, esp. 213-14 (defeat by Philip); N.G.L. Hammond in CAH 6*, 428-29 and 436; our passage = FGrHist 115 F 286 (see Jacoby's commentary ad he).—On the sense of opes cf. ad 1.25. . . . et multo maiores Viriatus Lusitanus, cui quidem etiam exercitus nostri imperatoresque cesserunt, quern C. Laelius, is qui Sapiens usurpatur, praetor fregit et comminuit, ferocitatemque eius ita repressit ut facile bellum reliquis traderet.] Cicero, both here and at Brut. 84, is our sole source for the success ful campaign that Laelius waged against Viriathus in 145 [MRR, 1,469) or 144 (Hans Gundel, RE 9A1 [1961], 214.36 ff.; Richardson, 184); certainly he exaggerates its significance, for Rome's problems with Viriathus persisted (interrupted briefly by the treaty of 140) until his murder, incited by the Roman proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio, in 139; cf. Gundel, he. cit., 214.67 ff.; Richardson, 147 ff.; W.V. Harris in CAH 8*, 133-34. Brut. 84 shows that Cicero knew of this episode independently of Panaetius (cf. also ad § 16); his knowledge may have derived either from a chronicle (though Soltau, 1240, is skeptical), another historical account (Posidonius?), or, more probably, a family tradition via Laelius' son-in-law Q. Mucius Scaevola, "the Augur"; D.S. 33.1.5 (a fragment preserved in the Constantinian excerpts de virtutibus et vitiis44 and from a sector dependent on Posidonius; cf. E. Schwartz, RE 5.1 [1903], 690.31 ff.) contains a similar account of Viriathus' character: δτι Ύρίατθος ό λήσταρχος ό Λυσιτανος και δίκαιος ην ev ταΐς διανομαΐς τών λαφύρων και κατ' άξίαν τιμών τους άνδραγαθήσαντας έξαιρετοις δώροις, e n δέ ουδέν απλώς έκ τών κοινών νοσφιζόμβνος. διό και συνέβαινβ τους 44. Excerpta Htstorica tussu imp. Constantini Porphyrogeniti, 2.1: Excerpta de virtutibus et vitiis, ed. Th. Butner-Wobst (Berlin, 1906), 294.14 ff.
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Λυσιτανούς προθυμότατα συγκινδυι^ύξΐν αύτώ, τιμώντας· olowei τιι>α κοινόι> €ύ€ρ·γέττ\ν και σωτήρα. Cum igitur tanta vis iustitiae sit, ut ea etiam latronum opes firmet atque augeat, quantam eius vim inter leges et iudicia et in constitute rcpublica fore putamus?] On Cicero's fondness in this essay for the form of argument a minore ad maius cf. ad 1.48; on the sense of opes ad 1.25. 41 mini quidem non apud Medos solum, ut ait Herodotus, sed etiam apud maiores nostros iustitiae fruendae causa videntur olim bene morati reges constituti.) Herodotus (1.96 ff.) gives the following account of the founding of the royal house after a period in which the Medes had lived in villages, i.e., without central authority. As a judge Deioces cultivated a reputation for δικαιοσύνη, but when he stepped down, still greater lawlessness ensued, so that he was then asked to ascend the throne, which he occupied for fifty-three years. 45 As presented here the example is an appropriate illustration of the precept eos ad imperandum deligi solitos quorum de iustitia magna esset opinio multitudinis ($42). Herodotus, however, regarded Deioces* rise as a carefully contrived fulfillment of ambition (έρασθΰς* τυραννίδος· ciroiee τοιάoe: 1.96.2); but if Deioces did harbor such ambitions, events beyond his control played perfectly into his hands. Hence perhaps Panaetius' decision to interpret his career differently. The words mihi quidem . . . videntur signal an expansion of his model by Cicero, who occasionally in this essay tries to "broaden" Panaetius' Greek examples to make them apply more generally (§77: quod Apollo Pythius oraculum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse perituram, id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis praedixisse) or give them greater weight in the eyes of Roman readers (§ 60: Periclem, principem Graeciae). Pohlenz, AF, 103, supposed that Panaetius used the case of Deioces as license for retro jeering the activity of a διαλλακτής such as Solon into the earliest stages of history. But his attempt to reconcile this passage with Scipio's view of the state at Rep. 1.39, which Pohlenz also attributed to Panaetius, leads him to claim that our passage "sich . . . um den Ursprung der speziellen Staatsform der Monarchic handelt" (ibid.) and neglect its bearing on the origin of laws (eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa quae regum); cf. Perelli, 2 9 8 99, and the next note. nam cum premeretur in otio multitudo ab iis qui maiores opes habebant, ad unum aliquem confugiebant virtute praestantem, qui cum prohiberet iniuria tenuiores, aequitate constituta summos cum infimis pari iure retinebat.] This 45. On the problems of connecting Deioces with the Daiukku of Assyrian records and of the Herodotean chronology in general cf. T.C. Young, jr., in CAH A2, 19-20.
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is perhaps a case of the "bending" of one example to fit with another. What we are here given is, in any case, rather different from the traditional account of the origins of the Roman kingship at Rep. 2.4 ff. Cicero does not explain what factors hindered the Medes from obtaining justice prior to Deioces; Herodotus speaks of a general condition of "lawlessness" (άΐ'ομίη). In the case of Rome, Cicero evidently projects the class strife of the republic back into prehistoric times; in the process he assumes, like Polybius 6.6.8-11, that in the earliest times political control was exercised on the basis of power alone {qui maiores opes habebant; cf. ad 1.25; Heinemann, 1, 31).—c, the sole witness to ξ here, 46 has inicio (i.e., initio). But surely the chronological indication initio is redundant when Cicero has already explained that he is discussing the establishment of the Roman kingship. 47 On the other hand, in otiot printed by Atzert, Fedeli, and Testard, is the reading of the ζ tradition. Atzert's defense (" . . . in eo ipso vis est quaestionis, quod inter leges et iudicia, i.e., in pace et otio, premuntur") is, however, mistaken to the degree that, according to Cicero (§ 42), laws were invented only after the monarchy failed to satisfy the need for justice. Possibly, however, there is an implicit distinction between peacetime and time of war, 48 some privation in wartime being expected. Goldbacher's inopia (2, 54) thus seems unnecessary. 4 1 - 4 2 eademque constituendarum legum fuit causa quae regum.—una atque eadem voce loquerentur.] Posidonius, too, regarded laws as a pis alter to which people had recourse when kingship was debased (F 284.6 Ed.-K. = 448.6 Th. = Sen. Ep. 90.6: sed postquam subrepentibus vitiis in tyrannidem regna conversa sunt, opus esse legibus coepit. . . ; Cole, 1967, 75, n. 11). Cf. also the description at Rep. 5.3 of an early Greek custom by which the settling of disputes, interpretation of law, etc., were in the hands of a king and which Numa is said to have maintained (et mihi quidem videtur Numa noster maxime tenuisse hunc morem veterem Graeciae regum).—Evidently Cicero's conception of the juridical activity of the Roman kings rests upon the view, widespread in antiquity, that the king is the source of law and has the prerogative to determine how it should be used; cf. Franz Leifer, Die Einheit des Gewaltgedankens im romischen Staatsrecht (Munich-Leipzig, 1914), 164. 42a omni igitur ratione colcnda ct retinenda iustitia est, cum ipsa per sese (nam aliter iustitia non esset), turn propter amplificarionem honoris et gloriae.] For the two-pronged strategy to promote the honestum both per se 46. Cf. Wintcrbottom, 1993, 226. 47. Nor do wc have here a relative use of initio, as in $ 13, compared by Winrerhottom ad lot., where initio and postea are contrasted. 48. For atium referring to the absence of foreign wars cf. ad 1.77.
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and on grounds of utilitas cf. Socrates' exchange with Glauco (PI. R. 357d58a): Έν ποίω. €φη, τούτων την δικαιοσύνην τιθε'ις;—Έγώ μέν οΐμαι. ην δ' €7ω, έν τώ καλλίστω. ο και δι' αυτό κα\ δ*ά τά γιγνόμΕνα απ' αύτοϋ άγαπητέον τάϊ μ€λλοντι μακαρίω βσβσθαι, as well as the introduction to this Book. That virtue is such only when practiced for its own sake and not for the sake of something else was a doctrine well established among ancient ethicists; cf. Arist. EN 1105al7 ff. and I120a23 ff. (similar in implication EN 1099al8: ούτε γαρ δίκαιον ού&ί? άν €Ϊττοι τον μη χαίροντα το} δικαιοπραγβν); Cic. Fin. 3.70: etenim nee iustitia nee amicitia esse omnino poterunt, nisi ipsae per se expetuntur; Off. 1.44:. . . ab ostentatione magis quam a voluntate . . . and 3.118, last sentence; D.L. 7.89. 49 The thought recurs in less philosophical terms (applied to good deeds in general) at Phil. 2.114: etsi enim satis in ipsa conscientia pulcherrimi facti fructus erat, tamen mortali immortalitatem non arbitror contemnendam. As Long, 1995 l , 231, points out, "nothing could be further from Stoicism than the thought that a virtue has instrumental value for the sake of securing something non-virtuous. What he should have said, if he were thinking as a strict Stoic or Platonist, is that the just use of glory is something to be cultivated.M But, as Long goes on to argue, Cicero/Panaetius is not here attributing per se value to glory (cf. ad 1.38). However, a passage such as this, if it accurately reflects the Panaetian original, taken out of context, might have contributed to the (surely mistaken) view that Panaetius did attribute such value to the "natural advantages'* (cf. ad 3.12). 4 2 b - 4 3 Some Ciceronian indication of the bearing of this material would have been helpful, as is shown by the variety of approaches to it by recent editors: (1) Atzert, Testard, and Winterbottom begin a new paragraph with Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae . . . ; (2) Fedeli and Cugusi allow the para graph begun with § 39 to continue to the end of 5 43; (3) Griffin and Atkins introduce paragraph break at the beginning of § 43 {Quamquam praeclare Socrates . . .). But quamquam praeclare Socrates . . . should not be sepa rated by paragraph break from the preceding sentence, which it contradicts (see below). Fedeli's procedure of breaking only at $ 44 has the unfortunate effect of dividing $$ 4 4 - 4 5 from $§ 4 2 b - 4 3 , which go closely together (the idea of "investing" glory and the distinction between "true glory" and other types lead into the precepts for young men; see below); it also results in an exceedingly long paragraph (§§ 39-43). To solution (1) might be objected that the last two sentences of § 43 connect closely with the preceding discus sion of justice (S§ 40-42a) and that §$ 42b-43 should not be divided from 49. The suspicion of Reinhardt, 1893,13, that nam aliter iustitia non esset is an interpola tion based on the preceding neque enim aliter esset ius is therefore wide of the mark.
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§§ 4 4 - 4 5 (see above). Perhaps the relation of ideas would be most clearly articulated by a fourth possibility: to begin at $ 42b {Sed ut pecuniae . . .) a paragraph that would continue through the end of § 45. This would make it clear that the case of the iuvenes really begins at § 42b (see ad he.) and that the reference to iustitia at the end of § 43 is really an aside, not an indication that we are still in the midst of the discussion of opinio iustitiae begun in §39. 42b Sed ut pecuniae non quaerendae solum ratio est verum etiam conlocandae, quae perperuos sumptus suppeditet, nee solum necessarios sed etiam liberales, sic gloria et quaerenda et conlocanda ratione est.] The metaphor of "investing" glory is not further developed. What Cicero has in mind becomes clearer in the discussion of what young people can do by way of accumulat ing a reputation that will lead to glory later on (cf. ad §§ 4 4 - 4 5 ) . The opposite behavior is described at Cael. 39, where Cicero has an imaginary objector speak, perhaps more logically, of investing time or rather a part of one's life: ob banc causam tibi hunc puerum |sc. Caelium] parens commendavit et tradidit, ut in amore atque in voluptatibus adulescentiam suam conlocaret. . . ? Note, too, that glory, like a benefaction (cf. § 63), was, on the Roman view, bequeathed from generation to generation; cf. ad 1.78. 43 quamquam praeclare Socrates banc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi corapendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut qualis haberi vellet, talis esset.] Our passage = Socr. fr. IC 483. The problem of the possible divergence of appearance and reality is dealt with only here and by assertion rather than argument; hence the need for a full discussion in Book 3 (cf. ad § 38 above). The reference is to X. Mem. 2.6.39: αλλά συντομωτάτη Τ€ και ασφαλέστατη και καλλίστη οδός, ώ Κριτόβουλ*, ο τι αν βούλη δοκ€Ϊν αγαθό? eivai, τούτο και γενέσθαι αγαθόν π€ΐράσθαι . . . In that passage the subject is the way to win friends (the words quoted form the climax of a discussion that begins with Critobulus' request:. . . θαρρών δίδασκε τών φίλων τά θηρατικά [2.6.33]) and in the course of which Socrates discards flattery as a method; cf. PI. Grg., esp. 527b-c and X. Cyr. 1.6.22.—Quamquam here is surely of the type defined at OLD s.v., 3b: "(correcting or elaborating what precedes) although, as a matter of fact, however, yet* (cf. § 57; 3.4). Given the respect for Socrates expressed at 1.148, it was to be expected that some attempt would be made to accommodate his point of view, as is done both here and in the first sentence of § 44. However, Socrates' position is fundamentally at odds with the tack taken since § 31, for he implicitly contradicts the idea that ratio and praecepta can help in the pursuit of glory; and the attempt to integrate Socrates* viewpoint via the concept of vera gloria takes the concept of glory in an altogether different direction.
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quod si qui simulatione et inani ostentatione et ficto non modo sennone sed etiam vultu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant, vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nee simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum.] This passage provides a rationale for despising glory, apart from the general Stoic valuation of the external goods (cf. with reference to the μεγαλόψυχο? ad 1.65, 68, and 84); for the vanity of mere appearance cf. 1.111 (prior sentence). Since $ 31 the implicit assumption has been the adequacy of the judgment of the many, but vera gloria introduces a new concept antithetical to popularity with the masses. It is no accident that such a view of glory appears in his work after his exile, when his youthful intoxication with political success (cf. passages cited by Long, 1995 1 ,216, n. 9) has given way to a more sober evaluation of public renown: cf. the allusion at Sest. 139 to qui . . . bonam famam bonorum, quae sola vere gloria nominari potest, expetunt. Similarly in the Somnium Scipionis the true glory (verum decus) is said to be connected with virtue, whereas the false is despised in light of a Peripatetic/Stoic diatribe on the insignificance of earthly things {Rep. 6.25: suis te oportet inlecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus, with Harder, 1960, 373 ff.). However, in a letter in which he canvasses Cato's support for a triumph Cicero is a bit less than fully candid in attributing to himself the Stoic attitude toward glory {Fam. 15.4.13; end of 51/beginning of 50, cited ad 1.65). The contrast between the two types of glory, the spurious one identified with fama Popularis and the one that involves the approval of the boni, is drawn sharply and in detail at Tusc. 3.3-4: ad quam (sc. popularem gloriam] fertur optumus quisque veramque ilbm honestatem expetens, quam unam natura maxime anquirit, in summa inanitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta vox bene iudicantium de excellent! virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est bonis viris repudianda. ilia autem, quae se eius imitatricem esse volt, temeraria atque inconsiderata et plerumque peccatorum vitiorumque laudatrix, fama Popularis, simulatione honestatis formam eius pulchritudinemque corrumpit; cf. Heilmann, 33, ad 1.84, and the note on the next sentence. Surely in our passage the argument has taken this new direction in order to draw a contrast with Caesar and Antony; cf. the discussion of the verum iter gloriae at Phil. 1.33 ff., where other themes from Off. also make an appearance (oderint dum metuant: 1.97; fear vs. love as a method of winning glory, illustrated by the death of Caesar: $$ 2 3 - 2 9 ; cf. Long, 1995», 2 3 0 -
Commentary on Book 2, Section 43
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31), as well as Phil. 2.115, where Antony is implicitly classed with the libidinosi, avari, facinerosi, who verae laudis gustatum non babent. For the phrasing cf. the deprecation of hypocrisy at N.D. 1.3 (in specie autem ftctae simulations sicut reliquae virtutes item pietas inesse non potest).—Sallust (Jug. 41.10) appropriates the philosophical term vera gloria (from our pas sage?) and applies it to the reformers: nam ubiprimum ex nobilitate reperti sunt qui veram gloriam iniustae potentiae anteponerent, moveri civitas et dissensio civilis quasi permixtio terrae oriri coepit; cf. Nicolet, 156-57. Cf. also Liv. 22.39.20 (the speaker is Q. Fabius Maximus): glonam quispreverit, veram habebit; PI in. Pan. 55.8: ac mihi intuenti sapientiam tuam minus mirum videtur, quod mortales istos caducosque titulos aut depreceris aut temperes; sets enim ubi vera principis, ubi sempiterna sit gloria.—"False glory" could have been connected with the earlier topic of intimidation (5S 23 ff.), as is done, for instance, at Agapetus, PG 86.1,1169D: ή γαρ διά φόβον γινομένη θεραπεία, κατεσχηματισμενη εστί θωπεία, πεπλασμενης τιμής ονόματι φενακί£ουσα τους αύτη προσανεχοντας.—For the Roman conception of glory as an organism cf. the passages collected by Knoche, 1934, 118, n. 87. The botanical metaphor has proved potent; cf. Milton, Lycidas (78-82): "Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil, / Nor in the glistering foil / Set off to the world, nor in broad rumor lies, / But lives and spreads aloft by those pure eyes / And perfect witness of all-judging Jove; testes sunt permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia content! erimus una.—iure caesorum.] Whether or not Cicero has here eliminated other examples at his disposal (cf. ad § 16 above), the ones he has chosen derive from the political realm and are presented rather elliptically. He does not attempt to show that the elder Gracchus was such as he appeared to be and that his sons were merely feigning. Instead he appeals to the judgment of the boni, who, on Cicero's view, were presumably able to see beneath the reformers' glittering f^ade. In Cicero's lexicon boni is, of course, a political term, 5 0 and the upshot is a political judgment no longer founded on the reaction of the public at large. 51 Heilmann, 33, is right in seeing that this 50. Cf. G. Achard, "L'cmploi dc boni, boni viri, bom ewes et leurs formes superlatives dans Paction politique de Ciceron," LECA (1973), 207-21; Hellegouarc'h, 484 ff.; however, at Tusc. 3.3 (quoted in the previous note) the consentient bus bonorum has in context a moral, rather than a political, tincture. 51. Thus the example of the Gracchi is imperfectly matched to a context that requires a case of quickly faded reputation. This point is emphasized by LA. Thompson, "Cicero the Politi cian," Collana di studi Ciceroniani 1 (1962), 44: Cicero "does not say that the fame of the Gracchi brothers was short-lived like fragile flowers. He was only too well aware that their
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argument, based on vera gloria, tends to undercut the preceding analysis of mass psychology. Might Cicero here be falling back on material he had used the previous summer in composing the essay de Gloria, in which the topic of vera gloria, anomalous in our context (see preceding note), surely played a large role? 52 The Roman examples also lead back to the previous point about justice and its relation to gloria (cf. end of % 42a): qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam volet, iustitiae fungatur officiis, since the sin of the brothers Grac chus, as Cicero presents it in this work (SS 72 and 80), was the violation of the sanctiry of private property, which he will argue for at SS 78-83.—This, together with § 80, belongs to a series of passages going back as far as Cat. 1.4 in which Cicero contrasts one or both of his sons unfavorably with Gracchus pere; cf. Har. 41; Prov. 18; de Orat. 1.38; Fin. 4.65; Miinzer, RE 2A2 (1923), 1409.25 ff.; Gaillard, 513 ff.—On Tiberius Gracchus' "justi fied" murder cf. ad 1.109. The phrase iure caesorum goes back ultimately to the provision si nox furtum faxsit, si im occisit, iure caesus esto {Lex XII 8.12 = FJRA, p. 57), echoed in the famous judgment of Scipio Aemilianus on the death of Tiberius Gracchus (cited at Cic. Mil. 8): nisi vero existimatis dementem P. Africanum fuisse qui, cum a C. Carbone tribuno plebis seditiose in contione interrogaretur quid de Ti. Gracchi morte sentiret, respondent iure caesum videri;53 for a full discussion of this and other testimonia cf. Hermann Rieger, Das Nachleben des Tiberius Gracchus in der lateinischen Literatur (Bonn, 1991), 176 ff; cf. also the use of the phrase with reference to Caesar's assassination at Att. 15.3.2 (22 May 44; on Articus' suggestion that he should write a speech as if by Brutus, although Brutus had published such a speech): qui tandem convenitf an sic ut in tyrannum iure optimo caesum f Cf. also ad 3.19a. ea quae essent, dictum est in libra superiore.] I.e., 1.20b-41. 4 4 - 4 5 Cole, 1961,130, rightly notes that Cicero should have distinguished clearly between how to be as one would like to appear {ut simus ii qui haberi names lived on and would continue to do so. What he does hint at, is that, in the 'best1 circles, the memory of the Gracchi was under a cloud . . ."; but did Cicero acknowledge that the fame of the Gracchi would continue to live on, or did he rather think that their fame would, in the long run, perish, when the opinion of the boni prevailed? Thompson, 43, suggests that "the distinction he [Cicero] makes between vera and ficta gloria is not so much the contrast between immortality and transitory glory, bur between the renown of the bonus avis and die notoriety of the improbus"', but surely both distinctions are involved, albeit the precept is in the former realm, the example in the latter.—For another political judgment as a basis of argument cf. ad 3.19. 52. Cf. Bringmann, 198 ff. 53. Clark and Rucbel, 57 ff., esp. 59, argue that it was the case of Milo (in 52) that caused Cicero for the first time to work out a philosophically grounded position on homicide.
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velimus; cf. § 43: ut quails haberi vellet, talis esset) and how to appear as one is {ut quales simus, tales esse videamur). In fact, however» the following precepts do not have to do with bringing appearance and reality into line with one another but with the means by which young men can acquire glory (that all these precepts bear specifically on the young is made clear by Cicero only retrospectively, in the first sentence of § 52). In other words, the Socratic precept was a red herring with no real influence on the argument. Cataudella, 480, and Cole, 1961, 129-30, have called attention to a similar train of thought at Anon. Iamb. 2.1-5 = Iamb. Protr. 96.1 ff.: . . . εξ ου αν τις βούληται δόξαν παρά τοίς άνθρωποι? λαβείν και τοιούτος φαίνεσθαι, οι ο? άν ή, αύτίκα δεΐ νέον τε άρξασθαι και έπιχρήσθαι αύτω όμαλώς άεΊ καΐ μή άλλοτε άλλως, συγχρονισθώ μεν γαρ έκαστοι τούτων και αύτίκα τε άρζάμενον και συναυξηθεν εις τέλος λαμβάνει βέβαιον την 6όξαν και το κλέος δίά τάδε, δτι πιστεύεται τε ήδη άνενδοιάστως, και ό φθόνος τών ανθρώπων ού προσγίγνεται . . . άμα δε και ούκ άμφιβάλλουσιν, ει άρα τοιούτος άνθρωπος έστιν, οίος φαίνεται . . . There are several interesting similarities to our passage: (1) the connection with the idea of appearing as one is; (2) the importance of begin ning early (this is obscured in Cicero's treatment by his failure to develop his metaphor of "investing" glory [see ad 42b] as well as his dogmatic presenta tion in the form of praecepta for young men; he never makes it clear why an early start is so important); (3) the emphasis on tttruew (Cicero) or "secure" (Anon. Iamb.) glory (did Panaetius connect this with an early start in a way that Cicero obscures?); (4) the fact that youth is less exposed to envy (this last is, of course, an observation that several authors could have made indepen dently). Note that appearing as one is (the first similarity between passages), which Cicero once alludes to in passing (see above), does not play any role in his subsequent discussion (though one might have expected a point such as άμα δε και ούκ άμφιβάλλουσιν, ει άρα τοιούτος άνθρωπος εστίν, οίος φαί νεται . . . [Anon. Iamb.] to appear in the discussion of fides at §$ 33-34). The similarities of the two treatments raise interesting possibilites but are, in the end, inconclusive; to decide the question of dependence we would need both the source of Anon. Iamb, and Panaetius' own treatise. I suspect that, as in the case of §$ 2 3 - 2 9 (see ad loc), Cicero has pro moted to first place in his treatment material of personal interest in view of his addressee but of less consequence on Panaetius' scale of values; this would seem to follow from $ 46 ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quant corporis, sic eae res quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur gratiores sunt quam illae quas viribus. prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia etc., as well as from Panaetius* preference to give priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt (§ 22). In fact, so personal does Cicero
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become in this sector that he has to remind himself: mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto (§45). 44 nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis—ita nullum obscurum potest nee dictum eius esse nee factum.] Cf. ad 1.78. Cicero jr. seems to have taken these words to heart, at least initially; cf. ad Brut. 2.3.6, quoted ad § 45; introduction, § 4. 45 prima est igitur adulescenti commendatio ad gloriam, si qua ex bellicis rebus comparari potest.] See above on the fact that Cicero here prematurely introduces a topic that Panaetius will surely have postponed. For military glory as the basis for a public career at Rome cf. Harris, 17 ff. tua autem aetas incidit in id bellum cuius altera pars sceleris nimium habuit, altera felicitatis parum.] For this judgment on the civil war cf. § 27 (. . . in causa impia, victoria etiam foediore . . .); Phil. 2.39: sed omittatur bellum illud in quo tu [sc. Antonius] nimium felix fuisti. quo tamen in bello cum te Pompeius alae (alteri) praefecisset, magnam laudem et a summo viro et ab exercitu consequebare equitando iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando. atque ea quidem tua laus pariter cum re publics cecidit.] Even while his father hesitated, the younger Cicero was a convinced Pompeian; our passage is the sole testimony for his role in the civil war; cf. R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 (1948), 1283.4 ff. On the other hand, after he and his father had been pardoned, in autumn, 46, he had mooted the possi bility of joining the Caesarian forces in Spain (but was evidently dissuaded by his father); cf. Att. 12.7.1 and 12.8.—Cicero jr. was hardly commander of half the allied forces in Pompey*s army; and alae alteri is otherwise nonsensi cal unless the name of the legion is also mentioned (could it have dropped out?); therefore recent editors apart from Testard follow Graevius' bracket ing of alteri; perhaps it was added under the influence of the two occurrences of altera just above (M. Winterbottom per litt.).—On the characterization of Pompey here {summo viro) and elsewhere in Off. see ad § 20 above.—The younger Cicero later won similar praise from Brutus after joining his army; cf. ad Brut. 2.3.6 (Brutus to Cicero, April 43): Cicero, films tuus, sic mihi se probat industria, patientia, labore, animi magnitudine, omni denique officio ut prorsus numquam dimittere videatur cogitationem cuius sit filius; Plut. Brut. 2 4 . 3 : . . . Kitcepun/os υιός, bv έπαιι^ΐ διαφερόντων, και φησιν, α τ ' €γρήyopev ειτ' €νυπι>ιά£€ται, Οσυμάζ^ιν οϋτω yein>cuoi> οντά και μισοτύρανα>οι>. mihi autem haec oratio suscepta non de te est, sed de genere toto.] Cf. Luc. 66 (immediately after the passage cited ad § 7): sed non de me, ut dixi, sed de sapiente quaeritur; at § 67 Cicero states that he would lament the death of eloquence ni vererer ne de me ipso aliquid viderer queri.
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quam ob rem pergamus ad ea quae restant.] Cf. 1.161 fin. 4 6 - 4 7 For the direction of the argument cf. ad §$ 4 8 - 5 1 . 46 Ut igitur in reliquis rebus multo maiora opera sunt animi quam corporis, sic eae res quas ingenio ac ratione persequimur gratiores sunt quam illae quas viribus.] An example of the intellectualism of Panaetius, particularly striking in his treatment of μβγαλοψυχία; cf. ad 1.80. prima igitur commendatio proficiscitur a modestia . . .] Modestia appears here in its ordinary sense, not in the forced Stoic sense that Cicero assigns to it at 1.142; it is equivalent to σωφροσύνη and is subsumed under the fourth "part" of the honestum (cf. 1.15 and 93). Scipio stresses the importance of verecundia for the young and criticizes the Greek παλαίστρα at Rep. 4.4. The young were commonly viewed 35€ττιθυμητικοι (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1389a3), and their general disinclination to σωφροσύνη was well known (cf. Arist. EN 1179B33-34; Off. 1.122: maxime autem haec aetas a libidinibus arcenda est. . .); on Cicero's handling of related topoi with special reference to the Pro Caelio cf. Narducci, 1989,189-225 ("Cicerone e la gioventu romana"), esp. 202-211 ("11 disagio della gioventu"). facillime autem et in optimam partem—fore se similes quos sibi ipsi delegerint ad imitandum.] Cicero had dealt in detail with the question of imitation of oratorical models at de Orat. 2.87-97; cf. Elaine Fantham, "Imitation and Evolution: the Discussion of Rhetorical Imitation in Cicero de Oratore 2.87-97 and Some Related Problems in Ciceronian Theory," CPh 73 (1978), 1-16; Leeman-Pinkster-Nelson-Rabbe ad loc. 47 P. Rutili adulescentiam ad opinionem et innocentiae et iuris scientiae P. Muci commendavit domus.] The opinio innocentiae failed to save P. Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105) from exile, however; for this episode and his whole career cf. ad 3.10. Although Rutilius was a student of Panaetius, this example, like the following one, and the whole topic of the patrocinium fori, is surely Ciceronian (though Panaetius may have cited the case of the precocious Demosthenes; cf. also 1.122). Cf. Pompon. Dig. 1.2.2.39-40, overstating his office in Asia: post hos fuerunt Publius Mucius et Brutus et Manilius, qui fundaverunt ius civile. . . . ab his profecti sunt Publius Rutilius Rufus, qui Romae consul et Asiae proconsul fuit etc. For P. Mucius Scaevola ("the Pontifex") cf. α<Π.116. nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodum adulescens, non aliunde mutuatus est, sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex ilia accusatione nobili et gloriosa . . .) Born in 140 {Brut. 161), L. Licinius Crassus (cos. 105) estab lished his reputation in 119 by the successful prosecution [de repetundis? cf. Andrew Lintott in CAH 9 2 , 86) of C. Papirius Carbo, who, as consul the preceding year, had defended L. Opimius (cos. 121), charged with the murder
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of C. Gracchus; cf. orat, pp. 2 4 0 - 4 1 ; Alexander, no. 27; in the sequel Carbo committed suicide, and Crassus regretted beginning his career this way; cf. Alexander, no. 30; Miinzer, RE 13.1 (1926) s.v. Licinius no. 55, 254.42 ff., and 18.3 (1949) s.v. Papirius no. 33, 1020.14 ff. Cicero set a monument to Crassus by making him the mouthpiece for his views in de Oratore; his admiration speaks in this passage as well through the favorable contrast of the orator with both P. Rutilius {non aliunde mutuatus est) and Demosthenes (qua aetate qui exercentur laude adfici solent, ut de Demostbene accepimus, ea aetate L. Crassus ostendit id se in foro optime iam facere quod etiam turn poterat domi cum laude meditari). The aristocratic preference for native ability over learning is a common topos in ancient literature going back as far as Pindar (O. 2.86 ff.: σοφός· ό ττολλά eiowg φυςτ / μαΟόιηςς 6e λάβροι / παγγλωσσία κορακ€? ώς άκραντα γαρικτων / Διός προς όρνιχα (teiov). That Cicero can unselfconsciously adopt such a tone shows how completely he has absorbed the point of view of his mentors. On the ancient tradition that Demosthenes was επιμελής μάλλον ή €ύφυης cf. Drerup, 66 ff. On Crassus' influence on Cicero in general cf. Rawson, 25 ff.; Mitchell, 1979,4 ff. and 42 ff.—Nam in this passage is an instance of its use in an occupation i.e., in explaining to an imaginary objector why Crassus* case should not be cited in parallel with that of Rutilius; so iViuller ad loc; cf. Hand, 4, 16-17; the sentence introduced with nam is often, as here, negated; cf. Einar Lofstedt, Coniectanea (Stockholm, 1950), 56-57 and n. 3. 4 8 - 5 1 From the topics of proper behavior in childhood and getting started in a profession (§§ 46-47) Cicero turns (partly under the influence of the exemplum of Crassus?) specifically to the role of discourse in shaping a career. Cicero reverts to the distinction between sermo and contentio (cf. 1.132b ff.) and cites both Greek examples that probably derive from his Stoic model (§ 48) and Panaetius himself ($ 51 = fr. 95). One wonders, however, whether Cicero's Roman examples (§$ 49-50) may have expanded this section beyond its Panaetian proportions. 48 Sed cum duplex ratio sit orationis, quarum in altera sermo sic, in altera contentio, non est id quidem dubium, quin contentio {orationis} maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam: . . .] Fleckeisen (apud Baiter, 1865) was surely right to delete orationis following contentio, which is here a technical term for a formal speech admitting no further limitation (cf. 1.132; Fam. 11.14.1). Contentio is, however, more commonly used of exercise of a particular fac ulty or activity specified in the genitive (cf. OLD s.v. contentio 2; Gudeman, TLL 4, 671.64 ff.), a usage some ancient reader evidently thought to restore here; cf. Brut. 202 (of Corta):. . . illudque maximum quod, cum contentione orationis flectere animos iudicum vix posset nee omnino eo genere diceretf
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tractando tamen impellebat. . . , where the underlined words refer to the orator's exertion in the process of speaking; sim. de Orat. 3.230:. . . ab hac contentione disputationis animos nostros curamque laxemus. exstant epistulae et Philippi ad Alexandrum et Antipatri ad Cassandrum et Antigoni ad Philippum filium . . . ] These were surely the product of the rhetorical schools, rather than authentic documents; cf. Heine ad loc; Pohlenz, AF, 106, n. 1; ad § 53 below.—On Philip's famous affability cf. ad 1.90. . . . quibus praedpiunt ut oratione benigna multitudinis animos ad benivolentiam adliciant militesque blande appcllando sermone deleniant] Some editors prior to Manutius already deleted sermone; Briiser, 102-3, revived the athetesis on grounds that sermone is a pedantic specification, and he has won the backing of Atzerr 4 , Fedeli, and Cugusi. He ought, however, also to have considered the implications for the clausula: the deletion would substitute molossus plus cretic for double cretic, both clausulae sought by Cicero, the latter somewhat more so (by 8.3% : 7.7%). Moreover, molossus plus cretic is commoner than double cretic in metrical Latin prose generally by 5.4% : 2.9%, so that the odds would be heavily against an interpolator effecting the double cretic clausula. 54 Surely sermone was included to make clear that the two superficially similar situations—address to the troops, address to the populace—in fact illustrate different types of oratio, the one sermone, the other cum contentione. If this seems pedantic, the formalism of argument in this essay sometimes borders on pedantry; cf. Cicero's insistence on inserting, prior to the argument of Book 1, a definition of officium and (implicit) criticism of Panaetius for omitting it (1.7), the presentation of the Stoic scab naturae at § 11, the syllogistic form of argument at § 10, or quasisyllogism at 3.27; perhaps Cicero thus reproduces a feature of schoolphilosophy because he is writing for his student son. quae autem in multitudine cum contentione habetur oratio, ea saepe universam excitat gloriam.] Similar considerations to the above tell against Langius' athetesis of gloriam (omitted already by Roman. Bibl. Angel. 1391 of 1405; followed by Atzerr 4 ); again the double cretic much favored by Cicero but uncommon in metrical prose generally would fall victim; the new clausula would be the less favored choriamb plus cretic (2.3% frequency in Cicero). 55 The objection of Ungcr, 7 1 , is also noteworthy and has never been properly answered by the proponents of athetesis: if gloriam is deleted and multitudinem supplied as object, as Atzerr proposes, we must also supply a 54. Dc Groot's figures at ShcwrinR, 15.
55. Ibid.
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complement such as ad virtutem or ad res gerendas, and the sentence is then no illustration of the thesis that contentio maiorem vim habeat ad gloriam. Nevertheless the transmitted text remains suspect insofar as gloria as pre sented here is hardly such as to be acquired on a single occasion but is like a plant in its gradual growth (cf. § 43: vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur . . .); hence the attractiveness of Winterbottom's laudem (for gloriam), which also restores an even more favored Ciceronian clausula (cretic plus trochee: 16.2% frequency); note also the convincing parallel he adduces, Sest. 5:. . . prius quam docuero quibus initiis . . . haec tantae . . . laudes excitatae sint. si vero inest in oratione mixta modestia gravitas, nihil admirabilius fieri potest, eoque magis si ea sunt in adulescente.] Cf. ad § 46 above. 49 . . . quarum etsi laudabilior est defensio, tamen etiam accusatio probata persaepe est. dixi paulo ante de Crasso. idem fecit adulescens M. Antonius.] The two were naturally paired in Cicero's mind as the leading orators of the previous generation and the main speakers in de Oratore. On Crassus' pre cocious prosecution of Carbo see ad $ 47. This testimony is rightly referred to Antonius' prosecution in 112 of Cn. Papirius Carbo, the brother of the man prosecuted by Crassus (orat., pp. 225-26). However, Klebs, RE 1 (1894), 2591.66 ff., connects our passage with otherwise unknown early speeches, since Antonius was three years older than Crassus (Brut. 161; cf.de Orat. 2.364 [quadriennio minor)), who was born in 140 (see ad § 47), so that it would seem inapposite to call him adulescens in 112. But note that Cicero refers to nos . . . adulescentes at the time of his defense of Sex. Roscius in 80 (§ 51); and C. Iulius L. f. Caesar Strabo was ca. 27 when he undertook the prosecution of T. Albucius and Cicero himself 36 when he prosecuted Verres, both cases mentioned in this context, which pertains specifically to adulescentium officia (§ 52). The traditional interpretation of Cicero's comment on the outcome at Fam. 9.21.3 (. . . accusatus a M. Antonio sutorio atramento absolutus putatur) as referring to suicide has been challenged of late. Shackleton Bailey ad Fam. 188.3 of his edition finds it "barely credible that so extraordinary a coincidence between the deaths of the two consular brothers should go without special remark, or that it should be known from no other source" and prefers the old view that the phrase sutorio atramento absolutus is proverbial for a corrupt verdict. However, given the lacunose tradition for the immediate sequel to the death of C. Gracchus, the argumentum ex silentio does not, in this case, carry great weight; and the alleged proverb would require a parallel or at least a convinc ing rationale. Moreover, the poisonous effects of ingested copper vitriol (atramentum sutorium) were well known in antiquity; cf. Nies, RE 2.2
Commentary on Book 2, Section 48-50
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(1896), 2136.32 ff.; and in this light-hearted letter to Paetus the phrase sutorio atramento absolutus should not be taken too literally (as by Alex ander, no. 47, n. 2). On the accusation of Carbo cf. Scholz, 17-19 (on our passage, 19), and W. Kroll, RE 18.3 (1949) s.v. Papirius no. 37,1023.53 ff., who sees Antonius' accusation (the grounds for which are nor given in the sources) as connected with Carbo's disaster the preceding year at the hands of the Cimbri.—In general, aggressive prosecution was a well established method of winning a reputation at Rome by the time of the youth of Scipio Aemilianus; cf. Harris, 19 and n. 2. etiam P. Sulpicii eloquentiam accusatio inlustravit, cum seditiosum et inutilem civem, C. Norbanum, in iudicium vocavit.] A young associate of Crassus, P. Sulpicius Rufus (tr. pi. 88) prosecuted C. Norbanus (cos. 83) in 94 de maiestate in connection with his role as tribune nine years before in presiding over a popular court that condemned Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) for the defeat at Arausio; the proceedings had been marred by the forced removal of the tribunes L. Cotta and T. Didius, and the princeps senatus, M. Aemilius Scaurus, had been wounded by a rock thrown by a member of the unruly mob (cf. orat., pp. 280 ff.; Lintott, 7, 69, and 210). Norbanus was acquitted through the efforts of his defense counsel, M. An tonius; cf. orat., pp. 229 ff.; Lintott, 118, n. 2; Gruen, 1966,43-44 and 4 6 47; Scholz, 59 ff.; Alexander, no. 86. On the irony of prosecution of a Popularis under Saturninus' law de maiestaU cf. Lintott and Cloud in CAH 9 2 , 95-96 and 518 respectively. De Oratore, set in 92, is replete with rever berations of the cause celebre. Cf. in general F. Munzer, RE 17.1 (1936), 928.14 ff. and 4A1 (1931), 844.39 ff. 50 sed hoc quidem non est saepe faciendum, nee uraquam nisi aut reipublicae causa,. . . aut ulciscendi gratia, ut duo Luculli . . .] That prosecution was to be avoided was a conviction Cicero formed early (cf. Quinct. 5 1 : iugulare civem tie iure quidem quisquam bonus vult. . .). Was he perhaps influenced in this by the example of Q. Hortensius (ibid., 4 4 : . . . Q. Hortensius contra caput non didicit dicere)} After the Verrines his only known prosecution was that of T. Munatius Plancus Bursa (cf. Crawford, 230 ff.). Cf. in general testimonies gathered by Fuchs, 1959, 15.—Cicero refers to another sensational case of the first decade of the century. Born respectively ca. 117 and 116, L. Licinius Lucullus (cos. 74) and his brother (to use his adoptive name) M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (cos. 73) successfully pros ecuted ca. 91 (?) the augur C. Servilius (pr. 102) for dereliction of official duty (cf. orat., pp. 308 ff.; Alexander, no. 71; Keaveney, 6-7), a trial that was marred by violence (cf. Lintott, 186 and 211). As praetor in 104 the elder L. Licinius Lucullus had put down a slave revolt in Lucania and had been sent
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the following year as propraetor to face a still more menacing uprising of slaves in Sicily; though he defeated his foe at Scinhaea, he allowed the survivors to escape, took no further countermeasures, and is said to have left the troops and materiel to his successor, C. Servilius, in deplorable condition. Upon his return from Sicily in 101, Servilius, seeking to blame his pre decessor for his ill success, filed a suit for peculation that drove him into exile (Alexander, no. 69). On the joint aedileship of the brothers Lucullus in the year 79 cf. ad $ 57b; on the younger L. Lucullus cf. ad 1.140. Cf. Munzer, RE 13.1 (1926) s.v. Licinius no. 103 (the father), 375.46 ff.; Miltner, ibid., s.v. Licinius no. 109 (M. Licinius Lucullus = M. Terentius M. f. Varro Lucullus), 415.38 ff.; Munzer, ibid., 2A2 (1923) s.v. Servilius no. 12, 1762.39 ff. The action of the Luculli supports, of course, the theme of pietas in parentes (§ 46); cf. also Cicero's characterization of L. Lucullus at Luc. 1: ut enim admodum adulescens cum fratre pari pietate et industria praedito paternas inimicitias magna cum gloria est persecutus . . . , with F. Hinard, "Paternus inimicus. Sur une expression de Ciceron," Mehnges de litterature et d' epigraph ie latines, d' histoire ancienne et d* archeologie. Hommages a la memoire de Pierre Wuilleumier, preface by H. Le Bonniec and G. Vattet, Collection d' etudes lat., ser. scientif. 35 (Paris, 1980), 197-210, who ex plores the three Ciceronian passages where the expression occurs and the implications for the social structure of the late republic (cf. also the expres sion paternus amicus at Flac. 14). . . . aut patrocinii, ut nos pro Siculis, pro Sardis {pro M. Albucio) Iulius.] On Cicero's patrocinium of Sicily cf. Meyer, 213 ff.; on his acceptance of the prosecution of Verres, ibid., 228-29; Gelzer, 36 ff., and p. 401, n. 34 above.—Lambinus' deletion restores the (surely original) chiastic arrange ment of patroni and clientes.—Cicero cited the prosecution of T. Albucius, the former propraetor of Sardinia, for extortion by C. Julius L. f. Caesar Strabo (aedile 90) in 103 as parallel to his own case against Verres as early as Div. Caec. 63; cf. Alexander, no. 67; Diehl, RE 20.1 (1919) s.v. Iulius no. 135,429.43 ff.; orat., p. 273; on the orator's famous wit cf. 1.108 and 133. in accusando etiam M \ Aquilio L. Fufi cognita industria est.] After sharing the consulate with Marius in 101, M'. Aquilius was delegated, as proconsul the following year, to deal with the rebellious slaves of Sicily. While sustain ing severe wounds himself, he killed the rebel leader Athenion in single combat and thus brought the war to a successful conclusion. On his return to Rome in 100 Fufius prosecuted him for extortion. In spite of Aquilius' patent guilt M. Antonius managed to win acquittal by a brilliant defense speech that included the coup de theatre of tearing the tunic from his client's chest to display his wounds; cf. Klebs, RE 2.1 (1896), 325.3 ff.; Munzer, ibid., 7
Commentary on Book 2, Section 50-51
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(1912), 203.43 ff.; orat., pp. 227 ff. and 278; Scholz, 7 9 - 8 3 ; Alexander, no. 84. A similar judgment of Fufius' oratory appears at Brut. 222: multum ab his |sc. C. Carbo, Q. Varius, Cn. Pomponius] aberat L. Fufius, tamen ex accusatione ΛΓ. Aquili diligentiae fructum ceperat. duri enim hominis, vel potius vix hominis, videtur periculum capitis inferre multis.—quod contigit M. Bruto, summo genere nato, illius filio qui iuris civilis in primis peritus fuit.] Besides the moral stigma highlighted by Cicero, one who brings capital charges against many may suffer loss of his civil rights and be tattooed on the forehead with a k as a kalumniator (cf. Sex. Rose. 57; Mommsen, Strafr., 490 ff., esp. 494 ff.; Rotondi, 363-64); he also risks countersuit either by the accused or his friends or relatives (as in the case just cited of the Luculli vs. Servilius); on the accusatores in general cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 189, n. 6.—The Bruti named are a case of a son following in his father's footsteps (i.e., in this case, pursuing a career in the law; cf. 1.116), but this time to bad effect. The elder Brutus (pr. 142) was, according to Pomponius, one of the three men who laid the foundations of civil law (he. cit. ad $ 47 above), on which he published three books in the form of a dialogue between himself and his son (Cic. Clu. 141; de Orat. 2.224). Cf. in the same vein Brut. 130: isdent temporibus M. Brutus, in quo magnum fuit, Brute, dedecus generi vestro, qui, cum tanto nomine esset patremque op timum virum habuisset et iuris peritissimum, accusationem factitaverit, ut Athenis Lycurgus. is magistratus non petivit sed fuit accusator vehemens et molestus, ut facile cerneres naturale quoddam stirpis bonum degeneravisse vitio depravatae voluntatis. Cf. Miinzer, RE 10.1 (1919), 971.1 ff. (the elder Brutus) and 44 ff. (the younger Brutus); orat., p. 207. 51 . . . eloquentiam a natura ad salutem hominum et ad conservationem datam . . .] Cf. Inv. 1.2-3. vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas.] The tricolon exhibits, thanks to etiam, the "law of increasing members" (respectively six, seven, and eight syllables). For the sense of humanitas cf. ad 1.62. iudicis est semper in causis verum sequi, patroni nonnumquam veri simile, etiam si minus sit verum, defendere . . .1 Cf. Clu. 139: sed errat vehementer, si quis in orationibus nostris quas in iudiciis habuimus auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. omnes enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt, non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum. . . . adhibemur ut ea dicamus, non quae auctoritate nostra constituantur sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur. Evidently the assumption is that, as stated at § 8, the truth will emerge from the clash of opposing views; cf. Frier, 132 and notes 113 and 117; for analogous modern theory cf. Smith, 318. . . . quod scribere, praesertim cum de philosophia scribe rem, non auderem
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nisi idem placeret gravissimo Stoicorum Panaetio.] = fr. 95. Here Cicero betrays that in his philosophical writings he is especially striving to be u on good behavior." To some extent this posture explains Heilmann's disap pointment that Roman realities in this work so often become absorbed in the ideal, philosophical realm ("gehen ganz in die Idealitat der philosophischen Darstellung auf ": p. 25 a propos 1.69b-73, but similar to his findings else where). The engagement with Roman realities is to be found on another level, as Long, 1995 1 , has shown. maxime autem et gloria paritur et gratia defensionibus,—quae, ut scis, exstat oratio.] Cicero took pride in his defense, in the year 80, of Sex. Roscius of Ameria, who stood accused of parricide; he was circumspect enough to assert that Sulla knew nothing about the affair but unmistakably pointed an accusing figure at the main beneficiary of the elder Roscius* murder, Sulla's favorite, L. Cornelius Chrysogonus; hence the phrase contra L. Sullae dominantis opes; cf. Gelzer, 18 ff., and the detailed analysis by Buchheit, 570 ff. Even if one chooses to place emphasis as does T.E. Kinsey, "The Political Insignificance of Cicero's Pro Roscio," LCM 7 (1982), 3 9 - 4 0 , the courage displayed by the young Cicero in taking on the case should not be underesti mated; cf. also R. Seager, ibid., 10-12; on Cicero's fondness for citing this speech in later years cf. Gelzer, 22, n. 35. The reference to the fact that the speech is extant is an obvious invitation to read it; for indications that Cicero published his speeches generally with youthful readers in mind cf. above p. 10, n. 28. On the gratia felt toward the patronus who represents one's case before the bar cf. Sailer, 29. 5 2 - 6 4 This treatment of liberalitas (= iXcuOepiOTris) supplements that of fered at 1.42-60, with the subject handled this time from the standpoint of its relation, not to iustitia, but the utile. In this sector Panaetius probably followed primarily Theophrastus, περί πλούτου (cf. citations at §§ 56 and 64), doubtless similiar in doctrine to passages of the extant Peripatetic πραγματεΐαι (£N 1119b22 ff.; EE 1231b27 ff.; MM 1191b39 fi.)t which, how ever, Panaetius could also have used (a propos the report of the rediscovery of Aristotle's library in the first century B.C. at Str. 13 C 608-9 cf. Moraux, 1, 18 ff.). For Aristotle, however, the problem of pecunia vs. opera does not arise, because he defines the ελευθέριος as having to do with the giving and receiving of money {EN 1119b25; EE 1231b28-29; cf. MM 1192al). Cicero/Panaetius has to admit that both cases involve a βουλησι? {liberalis voluntas), which is essential for a virtuous action (cf. ad 1.44 above; regard ing benefactions in particular cf. SVF 1,131.5 ff.); nevertheless he claims that there is a moral difference between the two actions {altera ex area, altera ex virtute depromitur . . . qui opera, id est virtute et industria, benefici et libe-
Commentary on Book 2, Section 51-53
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rales erunt. . . [$§ 52-53]). But it is one-sided to paraphrase the giving of services as virtus; if the liberalis voluntas is present, surely the giving of money is likewise virtuous. It may be that largitio . . . , quae fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhauut (§52); but brgitio need not derive from capital, rather than income (cf. § 42b: . . pecuniae . . . ratio est. . . conlocandae, quae perpetuos sumptus suppeditet, nee solum necessarios sed etiant liberales . . . ). Liberalitas is a matter of prudently matching income to expenditures (cf. EN 1120b7: ού γαρ €v τω πλήθει των διδομ€νων το €λ€υθ6ριον, άλλ' ev τη του δίδοντος e£ei, αυτή δέ κατά την ούσίαν. ούθέν δη κωλυ€ΐ €λ€υθ€ριώτ€ρον είναι τον τα έλάττω δίδοντα, έάν άπ' βλαττόνων δίδω; §$ 5 4 55). A more penetrating critique of financial subsidies is the comment a propos Philip's purported letter to Alexander: fit enim deterior qui accipit atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior ($ 53; cf. $ 2 1 : . . . pretio ac mercede ducuntur, quae sordidissima est ilk quidem ratio et inquinatissima et Us qui ea tenentur et illis qui ad earn confugere conantur); see also ad 1.150-51. One might have expected the recipient's actual need to figure in the discussion more than it does; in some circumstances, for instance, the donor might be unable to provide precisely the service needed, in which case money would be more apposite. Cataudella, 481, and Cole, 1961, 128-29, cite Anon. Iamb. 3.3-6 = Iamb. Protr. 97.25 ff. as parallel to our passage. The following argument of Anon. Iamb, bears an evident similarity to the point sequuntur largitionem rapinae at § 54: ei μβν τις χρήματα διδούς €υ€ργ€τήσ€ΐ του? πλησίον, άναγκασθήσ€ται κακός clvai πάλιν αύ συλλόγων τά χρήματα (ibid., 3.4 = 97.2729). But Aristotle makes a similar point a propos the άσωτοι: άλλ' οι πολλοί των ασώτων, καθάπερ €Ϊρηται, και λαμβάνουσιν oGcv μη δ«ΐ, και €ΐσί κατά τούτο άν6λ€ύθ€ροι. ληπτικοι δί γίνονται διά το βούλ€σθαι μέν άναλίσκβιν, ίΰχ^ρώς δέ τούτο ποιεΐν μη δύνασθαι. ταχύ γάρ έπιλβίπβι αυτούς τά υπάρ χοντα (ΕΝ 1121a30 ff.). Nor does Cicero describe various stages ending in the erstwhile donor's poverty, as Anon. Iamb, does; and Cicero/Panaetius need not depend on a source for the idea that legal advice could be an alternative to financial subsidy. Again there is no need to assume that Pan· aetius used the source of Anon. lamb.—On the postponed announcement of the subject of §$ 43-51 cf. ad §S 4 4 - 4 5 above; on the strategy of beginning discussion of one point by comparison with its opposite cf. ad §§ 2 3 - 2 9 . 52 Sed expositis adulescentium officiis quae valeant ad gloriam adipiscendam . . . ] Here finally Cicero gives explicit indication of what he has been doing; on the sense of officia here cf. above p. 8, n. 19. 53 praeclare epistula quadam Alexandmm filium Philippus accusat. . . ] In this fabricated letter, which corresponds to no known historical circum-
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stances and is wholly wrong in tone (note, however, that V. Max. 7.2 ext. 10, who has copied from our passage, reads fili, rather than the abusive malum)y we see the two rulers in the sharp characterological contrast beloved by later moralists; cf. ad 1.90. bene 'ministram et praebitorem', quia sordidum regi, melius etiam quod largitionem cormptelam dixit esse, fit enim deterior qui accipit atque ad idem semper exspectandum paratior.] Cf. §§ 21-22 above, where Cicero notes the degradation largitio involves for both giver and recipient. The largitor, on Cicero's view, provides the object of his attentions not what is best but what is most pleasant and hence corrupts; in this sense largitio is comparable to the art of fine cookery {όφοποακή), which Socrates classes, like rhetoric, as a species of flattery (κολακεία) at Grg. 462d ff. 54 Nonnumquam tamen est largiendum—sed diligenter atque moderate.] Only in § 58 does Cicero explain that such activity is a political necessity at Rome. Largitio might be described as a sociological necessity as well, since the exchange of beneficia would otherwise be confined to the wealthy; cf. Veyne, 439. . . . et saepe idoneis hominibus indigentibus de re familiari impertiendum . . .1 On Lactantius' misunderstanding of idoneis (as equivalent to utilibus, rather than dignis) in our passage (at inst. 6.11.12) and consequent polemic cf. Kloft, 175, n. 430. multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte largiendo.] As at 1.42 ff. cautiones receive priority and emphasis (cf. ad 1.42-60). Cf. the evaluation of Octavian's work in gathering an army at Phil. 3.3, composed virtually at the same time as Off.: C. Caesar adulescens, paene potius puer, incredibili ac divina quadam mente atque virtute, . . . firmissimum exercitum ex invicto genere veteranorum militum comparavit patnmoniumque suum effudit: quamquam non sum usus eo verbo quo debui; non enim effudit: in salute reipublicae conlocavit, with Kloft, 74, n. 4. atque etiam sequuntur largitionem rapinae. cum enim dando egere coeperunt, alienis bonis manus adferre coguntur.) Cf. 1.42-43. 55 . . . modus adhibeatur, isque referatur ad facultates.] Cf. Arist. EN 1120b7 (quoted ad §S 52-64 above). omnino meminisse debemus id quod a nostris hominibus saepissime usurpatum iam in proverbii consuetudinem venit, largitionem fundum non habere.] Cicero has found a Roman equivalent for the proverb eis τ€τρημ€νον πίθον (sc. άντλ€Ϊΐ') perhaps cited by Panaetius (as by Arist. Pol. 1320a 3 1 - 3 2 ; cf. Macar. 3.57; Apostol. 6.79; Su. ei 321; Proverb. Bodl. no. 449; Zenob. 2.6). In spite of Cicero's assurance of the popularity and proverbial
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 5 3 - 5 4 and 5 5 b - 6 0
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character of the phrase, it is not extant elsewhere in Latin; cf. Otto, 149; Swoboda, 102. 55b-60 The placement of these chapters on brgitio publico prior to the treatment of liberalitas (SS 61-64) is another (cf. ad SS 23-29) violation of the principle of giving priority to quae virtuti propiores sunt ($22); again the announced order is flouted in favor of a topic that offers greater scope for comment on Roman politics. In general, Jungblut, 2, 25, is right in finding that in SS 55b-56 Cicero is following mutatis mutandis56 his Greek source (see below), whereas in 55 5 7 - 5 9 he deploys Roman examples. The problem is that the Roman examples are actually at odds with the argument of SS 55b-56, which de mands disapproval of gladiatorum munera and things that will leave, if any, merely a brief impact. Cicero was himself by no means an uncritical admirer of the games, as is attested, for instance, by his letter of ca. September, 55, to M. Marius on games recently offered by Pompey (Fam. 7.1.2-3). 5 7 More over, he was aware of this contradiction between (Panaetian) theory and (Roman) practice (cf. S 60; he shows less awareness at 1.34-40; see ad loc). His approach is related to his apparent desire to make this treatise a hand book for his son on social and political behavior. What would prevent a Roman politician from acting according to the principles set out in SS 5 5 b 56 is that this could be construed as avaritta, and the suspicio avaritiae can be a grave danger to one's career, as Cicero documents with the example of Mamercus ($ 58). 5 8 Cicero's solution, then, is to recognize the games as a fact of political life at Rome (see ad $ 58), but urge moderation, after his own example. There are several problems with this approach, however. As a
56. The gladiatorum munera are the obvious exception. 57. omnino, si quaeris, ludi apparatisshni, sed non tui stomachi; coniecturam enim facia de meo. . . . apparatus enim spectatio tollebat omnem hilaritatem; quo quidem apparatu non dubita quin animo aequissimo carueris. quid enim delectationis habent sesctnti muli in 'Clytaemestra' aut in 'Equo Troiano' creterrarum tria mtlia aut armatura varia peditatus et equitatus in aliqua pugnaf quae popularem admirationem habuerunt, delectationem tibi nullam attulissent. . . . reliquae sunt venationes binae per dies quinque, magnificae, nemo negat; sed quae potest homini esse polito delectatto cum aut homo imbeciilus a valentissima bestia bniatur aut praeclara bestia venabulo transverberaturi . . . extremus elephantorum dies fuit. in quo admiratio magna vulgi atque turbae, delectatto nulla exstitit; quin etiam misericordta quaedam consecuta est atque opinio eius modi, esse quondam tlli beluae cum genere humano soctetatem. 58. Cicero has left a vivid description of the dilemma of the politician at Rome, dependent on the favor of the populace and yet aware of the fallibility of public opinion, at Plane. 7 and 9; cf. Heilmann, 94.
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novus homo whose career was driven more by oratory than by wealth, Cicero was hardly a typical case; and his aedileship of 69 had been followed by a crescendo of ostentation (5 57: . . . inveterasse torn bonis temporibus . . . P. Lentulus me consule vicit superiores; hunc est Scaurus imitatus; magnificentissima veto nostri Pompei munera secundo consulate). It was hardly realistic to expect wealthy nobles to exercise restraint in an escalating bid ding war for popularity in the eyes of an increasingly jaded public; cf. Heilmann, 96. Here, as elsewhere, Cicero's account does not penetrate beneath the per sonalities (magnificentissima vero nostri Pompei munera . . . nos ipsi ut fecimus . . . nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo gloriari. . . theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprendo propter Pompeium . . .) to the underlying problems of the system. Personal ties, too, doubtless explain his failure to be more critical of the senseless extravagance of some of the politi cians cited in $ 57 (cf. Plin. Nat 36.113: . . . M. Scauri, cuius nescio an aedilitas maxime prostraverit mores . . .), though he finally expresses his disapproval clearly at $ 6 3 : . . . banc ego consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe antepono; haec est gravium hominum atque magnorumt ilia quasi adsentatorum populi multitudinis levitatem voluptate quasi titillantium. 55b Most of the expenditures in which the liberales engage according to our text would be equally at home in a Greek or Roman context (for the case of ransoming from pirates cf. Arist. EN U64b34 (but cf. the note after nextl; for the exception cf. p. 439, n. 56 supra). The distinction between worthy and unworthy benefactions on the basis of the duration of their effect is analogous to that between statesmen and generals argued at 1.74 ff. It formed a topic in the traditional literature of advice to princes ("FurstenspiegeD: X. Hier. 11.2; Isoc. 2.19; cf. also Plut. Caes. 5.9. Aristotle seems to have something similar in mind when he recommends eschewing a vain liturgies" (Pol. 1320a35 ff.): τεχναστεον ουν όπως αν εύπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος (επειδή συμφέρει, τοϋτο και τοις εύπόροις)· τά μέν από τών προσόδων γινόμενα συναθροίζοντας αθρόα χρή διάνεμαν τοΐς άττόροις . . . άφιεμενους των ματαίων λειτουργιοΗ>), though for him not all liturgies are vain (ibid., 1309a 17 ff.; Dem. Phal. fr. 136 justifies the elimination of the χορηγία and its replacement with the άγωνοθεσία |cf. Wehrli ad /oc.|); however, in discussing μεγαλοπρέπεια Aristotle takes a view very similar to that attributed in § 56 to Theophrastus (EN 1122bl9 ff.). Omnino duo sunt genera largorum, quorum alteri prodigi, alteri libe rales: . . .] For the distinction cf. Meijer, TLL 7.1, 1292.51 ff. . . . qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt.. .] Cf. 3.107,
Commentary on Book 2, Section 55b-56
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where Cicero holds that an oath to pay ransom to a praedo can be violated, but not an oath to a hostis. 56 itaque miror quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro quern de Divitiis scripsit, in quo multa praeclare, illud absurde: est enim multus in laudanda magnificentia et apparitione popularium munerum, taliumque sumptuum facultatem fructum divitiamm putat.] Theophrastus' treatise = 436.19b Fortenbaugh, 1992 = S 19 Fortenbaugh, 1984; cf. Regenbogen, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1487.1 ff.; our passage = fr. 514 Fortenbaugh, 1992 = L 76 Fortenbaugh, 1984 (see commentary ad he). In view of our passage the theory that Cicero's negative characterization of Theophrastus' ethics gener ally derives from Antiochus needs to be modified; Panaetius, too, could be critical of the Peripatetic philosopher; cf. D.T. Runia, "Aristotle and The ophrastus Conjoined in the Writings of Cicero," Cicero s Knowledge of the Peripatos, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and Peter Steinmetz (New Brunswick and London, 1989), 32-33.—The tradition is split between apparitione (ζ) and apparatione (P2£)· The MSS are divided as well at Fam. 13.54 [apparitione DH : apparat- MV); cf. also Vitr. 2.8.20; but apparationis is the transmitted text at Inv. 1.25 (cf. Klotz, TLL s.v. apparatio)yapparationibus at QF 1.1.12. With so much variation among the witnesses (cf. OLD s.v. apparitio) one falls back on the better attested reading in the Off. MSS; the meaning is unaffected. mihi autcm ille fructus libcralitatis, cuius pauca exempla posui, multo et maior videtur et certior.] Cicero refers to the deeds described in the preceding paragraph: qui suis facultatibus aut captos a praedonibus redimunt aut aes alienum suscipiunt amicorum aut in filiarum conhcatione adiuvant etc. Using terms similar to our passage, he presents a more vulgar conception of wealth in his diatribe against the dead Crassus at Farad. 47: etenim dwitiarum est fructus in copia, copiam autem declarat satietas rerum atque abundantia; quant tu numquam adsequere . . . quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit. . .] Aristoteles (= fr. 89 Rose = 839 Gigon) is the reading of all preserved manuscripts; Manutius claimed to have read Aro in one codex, and on this basis Muret conjectured Aristo (sc. of Chius, the Stoic); Beier [ad loc.) thought rather of Aristo Ceus (the Peripatetic), a hypothesis revived by Georgius Schnaydec, "Ad Ciceronem, De Officiis II 16, 56," Eos 31 (1928), 289-96. However, Philippson, 1930 2 , 4 4 3 - 4 4 , has shown that the argument quoted is in line with the position taken in the EN (see ad $ 55b) and could therefore have stood in one of Aristotle's lost dialogues.—For Aristotle's views on pecuniarum effusiones and their effect cf. Them. Or. 2.27a (a distinction between μ6γαλοφυχία and χαυί'ότπς) = fr. 88 Rose = 981 Gigon (whose text I follow):
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τον μεν δη tiri δήμου θόρυβοι ? καΐ κρότοι? έξογκούμενόν τ€ και έγείροντα την όφρϊιν δτι σφίσιν ει? θέατρα ή ιπποδρόμου? πολλά χρήματα έξεχεε, χαυνόν τε εΐναι και ζυνεχεσθαι τη κακία, ή τούνομα τοϋτο έπιτίθηον τον δέ τούτων μεν των θορύβων καταφρονοΟντα και σμικρόν οίόμενον διαφερειν ροθίου κυμάτων αιγιαλοί? προσηχούντων, ψήφον δέ ανδρών αγαθών άκολάκ€υτον επ' αρετή π€ρί πλείστου πάντων ποιούμε νον, τούτον είναι τφ όντι μεγαλόψυχο ν τε και μεγαλογνώμονα. fatf ii qui ab hoste obsidentur si emere aquae sextarium cogerentur mina, hoc primo incredibile nobis videri omnesque mirari, sed cum attendcrint, veniam necessitati dare, in his immanibus iacturis inftnitisque sumptibus nihil nos magnopere m i r a r i . . . ] The defense of the transmitted text by Goldbacher, 2, 5 6 - 5 7 , appealed to by Atzert, is wide of the mark; he sees at as introducing an objection u gegen unsere eigentumliche Haltung gegenuber den maSlosen Verschwendungen zur Koderung der Volksmenge"; but at in this context would imply a contradiction of the previous sentence (quanto Aristoteles gravius et verius nos reprehendit qui has pecuniarutn effusiones non admiremur quae ftunt ad multitudinem deleniendam!), which is clearly not intended, our sentence continuing and illustrating Aristotle's strictures. Hence C.F.W. Muller, u Z u Cicero," Philologus 19 (1863), 630, proposed ait enim for the transmitted at ii (after Pearce, who had suggested ait or ait enim in place of at). This is perhaps the best solution so far offered (it is adopted among recent editors by Fedeli and Cugusi, Testard retaining the transmitted text), though the corruption of such common words is strange and the re ported speech would not need to be explicitly signaled. Winterbottom ad loc. proposes reading ut for at and adopting £'s ita in his immanibus iacturis (for C*s in his immanibus . . . ) in the sequel. But in the text of ζ two actions are contrasted through asyndeton: the wonderment over payment of a mina for a pint of water by persons under siege and the lack of surprise over much larger expenditures for the public amusement. By substituting an ut. . . ita structure the antithesis is destroyed and replaced with an odd parallelism; for the two pans marked by ut and ita fail to correlate as one would expect, there being no second stage in the ita portion to correspond to the twofold primo . . . sed cum attenderint of the clauses introduced by ut (perhaps this is why Winterbottom prefaces his suggestion with "in (e.g.) Quintiliano scriberes w ). . . . cum praesertim neque necessitati subveniatur nee dignitas augeatur ipsaque ilia delectatio multitudinis ad breve exiguumque tempus (capiatur). . .] In the clause beginning ipsaque ilia, where the verb has fallen out, there is still no consensus among editors as to what is lacking. Fedeli and Cugusi simply mark a lacuna after tempus. Pohlenz, AF, 109, inserted excitetur after breve and won the support of Atzert; but surely with the rather violent excitari one
Commentary on Book 2, Section 56-57b
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would expect a subject akin to libidines, as in Ver. 2.4.39 or Clu. 36; even Sest. 5, quoted ad $ 48, where laus is the subject of excitariy is no indicator that delectatio could be. Quaeratur was inserted after exiguumque by Goldbacher, 2, 57, after tempus by Winterbottom, petatur proposed with a query by Winterbottom. Duret read in this place by the twelfth-century Ambros. 140 inf. is ruled out (as Winterbottom points out ad be.) because of the following a levissimo quoque. Perhaps a more elegant solution is Sauppe's capiatur, which could easily have fallen out by homoearcton before eaque. 57b In this list of brilliant aedileships the spectacles mounted by Caesar in 65 (on which cf. Suet. Jul. 10) are conspicuous by their absence (on Cicero's similar refusal to acknowledge Caesar's dementia at this period cf. ad 1.88 and S 23); cf. Kloft, 62, n. 113. Quamquam intellego—postuletur.] Cf. ad §§ 55b-60 and $ 60. itaque et P. Crassus, cum cognomine Dives turn copiis, functus est aedilicio maximo munere, et paulo post L. Crassus cum omnium hominum moderatissimo Q. Mucio magnificentissima aedilitate functus est,. . .] Cicero has probably confused two Crassi, P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97; RE s.v. Licinius no. 61), called Dives elsewhere only at Macr. Sat. 3.17.7, and P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus {RE s.v. Licinius no. 72), who lived ca. 180-131 and was the son of P. Mucius Scaevola (cos. 175) before being adopted by the other wise unknown son of the first P. Licinius Crassus Dives (RE s.v. Licinius no. 69). The temporal relation paulopost would,pace Munzer, RE 13.1 (1926), 335.6 ff., better fit the former, perhaps aedile ca. 102 (so, with a query, MRRt 1, 568), with L. Licinius Crassus following in the aedileship for 100 (again with a query MRR, 1, 575), whereas the latter (i.e., Mucianus) would have been aedile ca. 142 (cf. MRR, 1, 475 and 476, n. 2). However, if Plutarch's description of the modest household of P. Licinius Crassus (no. 61) is accu rate {Crass. 1.1-2), he seems unlikely to have financed splendid games; cf. Munzer, RE 13.1 (1926), 289.62 ff.—The curule aedileship of the orator L. Licinius Crassus will have fallen between 105 and 103. To decorate the stage he procured six columns of Hymettian marble which he later placed in the atrium of his mansion (Plin. Nat. 17.6 and 36.7); cf. N. Hapke, RE 13.1 (1926), 258.37 ff. The games given by Q. Mucius Scaevola ("the Pontifex"; cos. 95) brought a battle of several lions for the first time to the Roman arena (Plin. Nat. 8.53), possibly booty from Marius' campaign against Jugurtha (the triumph was celebrated 1 January 104); cf. F. Munzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 437.51 ff.; on Scaevola see further ad 3.62-63.—For details on the games and their costs cf. in general Shatzman, 84 ff.; Veyne, 387 ff. . . . deinde C. Claudius Ap. f., multi post, Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus.] C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 92; RE s.v. Claudius no. 302), son of Appius {RE s.v.
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Claudius no. 295), made his curule aedileship (99) memorable by including works of art as stage decorations and introducing elephants to the Roman arena; cf. Munzer, RE 3 (1899), 2856.22 ff.; MRR, 2, 1.—L. Licinius Lu cullus postponed his campaign for the office of aedile until his brother M. Terentius Varro Lucullus was eligible to run (presumably to enhance his brother's chances of election). Their joint aedileship of 79 was remembered for use of a rotating stage and for pitting bulls against elephants in the arena; cf. Gelzer, RE 13.1 (1926), 381.16 ff.; Milmer, ibid., 416.36 ff.; MRR, 2, 83; Keaveney, 3 4 - 3 6 ; on the financial position of L. Licinius Lucullus cf. Shatzman, 378; cf. further^ 1.140 and $ 50.—Q. Hortensius Hortalus (114-50; cos. 69), whom Cicero by his prosecution of Verres eclipsed as Rome's leading orator, made his aedileship memorable by producing splendid games and by distributing grain to the people; cf. Munzer, RE 8 (1913), 2470.41 ff.; MRR, 2,97; cf. further ad 3.73.—As consul designate, D. Junius Silanus was the first to give his opinion in the senate deliberations of 5 December 63; his famous response was that Catiline's imprisoned confederates deserved the ultimate penalty, which was generally understood to mean death; but after Caesar's speech he claimed that he had merely meant imprisonment. He must have been aedile before 69; cf. Munzer, RE 10 (1919), 1090.17 ff. omnes autem P. Lentulus me consule vicit superiores;...] In his consulate Cicero could rely, if not on Silanus (see above), then on the support of the curule aedile P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, to whose custody one of the captured conspirators, P. Lentulus Sura, was entrusted (Sal. Cat. 47.4); and as consul in 57 his role in promoting Cicero's recall from exile endeared him still more to the orator. Not only his aedileship of 63 but also his praetorship (60) was marked by great splendor; cf. Munzer, RE 4 (1901), 1394.43 ff.; MRR, 2, 167 and 183; on his finances Shatzman, 334-35. . . . hunc est Scaurus imitatus;. . .] A laconic comment. Indeed the extrava gance of his curule aedileship (58), in which he squandered his patrimony, was the beginning of the sad decline of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cf. also 1.138). Hence he used his propraetorship on Sardinia as an opportunity to enrich himself. Hence, in turn, his prosecution in 54 on charges of peculation, in which Cicero and others managed to procure acquittal. But his bribery in the failed consular campaign of that same year resulted in a prosecution for ambitus, from which, in view of Pompey's opposition, even Cicero's art of advocacy could not save him, and he was forced into exile. Cf. Plin. Nat. 36.113, quoted ad $$ 55b-60 above; Klcbs, RE 1 (1894), 588.23 ff., esp. 40 ff.; on his finances Shatzman, 290 ff. magnificentissima vero nostri Pompei munera secundo consulatu.] The dedication of Pompey's theater (see ad § 60 below) in October, 55, was
Commentary on Book 2, Section 57b-58
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marked by games involving 600 lions, 410 panthers, a safari with 18 ele phants, etc.; cf. Gelzer, Pompeius, 172; on Pompey'sfinancescf. Shatzman, 389 ff. 58 Mamerco, homini divitissimo, praetcrmissio aedilitatis consulatus repulsam attulit.] Though, as Veyne, 419 ff., has argued, it would be too simple to assert that the games constitute the single explanation for electoral suc cess, Mommsen, Staatsr., 1,532, is likely to berightinfindingthat as early as the final years of the Hannibalic War the munera aedilicia exercised a disproportionate influence on the elections; cf. also Millar, 1984, 12. A skewed relationship between the two certainly existed in Cicero's day, as our passage documents all too clearly, and structurally little had changed in the interim; cf. Veyne, 387 ff.; Pohl, 177-78. A senatusconsultum of 182 limit ing expenditures of aediles for the games points to a feeling that they were then already getting out of hand (Liv. 40.44.11-12); Friedrich Miinzer, Romiscbe Adelsparteien una Adehfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920), 197-98, would explain this and other legislation of 182-80 regulating the cursus honorum by reference to an unusual constellation of plebeian officials. The underlying factional model of Roman politics of the period is now seen to rest upon an acceptance of popular slogans at face value and too little posi tive evidence, however; cf. Astin in CAH 8 2 ,163 ff. In view of the consider able rate of success of plebeian aediles between 196 and 175 in seeking higher office (cf. M.G. Morgan, "Politics, Religion and the Games in Rome, 200-150 B.C.," Philologus 134 (19901,28), it is unclear that the legislation of 182 was needed to serve plebeian interests. In any case, the defeat of Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus in consular elections sometime prior to 78 is an indicator that the link between expenditures on the games and political success remained potent. Cf. Sal. Hist. 1.86: Curionem quaesit uti adulescentior et a populi suffragiis integer aetati concederet Mamerci, where the sub ject is evidently one of the optimate leaders, e.g., Philippus or Catulus, and the appeal to Curio evidently had the effect of clearing the way for Mamercus to attain the consulate for 77 (cf. MRR, 2, 88); cf. Sallust, The Histories, tr. with introduction and comm. by Patrick McGushin, 1 (Oxford, 1992), 153; Klebs, RE 1.1 (1894), 564.8 ff. Similar is the case of Sulla, who had to campaign twice for the praetorship because he had omitted to serve as aedile; cf. M. Gelzer, Die Nobilitat der romischen Republik (Leipzig, 1912), 92 = Eng. tr. by R. Seager (Oxford, 1969), 111. Cicero shows himself well aware of the political implications of the games given by Murena and of his own rival C. Antonius in their respective candidacies for the consulate (Mur. 37 ff.; Heilmann, 94).—Beyond his difficulty in attaining the consulate and his handling as consul of the testamentary claim of one Genucius, a eunuch in
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the service of the Magna Mater (V. Max. 7.7.6), little is known about Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus. The form of the name points to his birth as a Livius and adoption into the patrician family of the Aemilii Lepidi. Both here and at Brut. 175 Cicero refers to him by praenomen only, in this case hardly a mark of intimacy. Mamercus was one of those praenomina used in a single aristocratic family (cf. Ernst Fraenkel, RE 16.2 [1935], 1660.59 ff.); proba bly, like Appius Claudius Pulcher (cf. Adams, 1978, 153), he employed his patrician praenomen as others did their cognomina. . . . faciendum est, modo pro facultatibus, nos ipsi ut fecimus . . .] During his aedileship in the year 69, Cicero offered three sets of ludi (cf. Ver. 2.5.36; Mur. 40; Gelzer, 51; MRR, 2, 132), for which he received help from the grateful Sicilians; cf. Shatzman, 416 and n. 885. . . . et si quando aliqua res maior atque utilior populari largitione adquiritur, ut Oresti nuper prandia in semitis decimae nomine magno honori fuerunt.] An Aurelius by birth, Cn. Aufidius Orestes (pr. urb. 77, cos. 71) had been adopted by the praetorius Cn. Aufidius summa senectute (Dom. 35); cf. Klebs, RE 2.2 (1896), 2295.64 ff. This benefaction is unattested elsewhere; hence its precise date remains uncertain (cf. nuper, also used below of Milo's purchase of gladiators in 57; cf. also ad 1.25). The res maior atque utilior (i.e., than political office) that he attained was presumably the magnus honor he received (from the standpoint of the honestum, however, glory is con demned as a motive for benefactions [1.44]).—A decima (sc. pars) was a tithe of booty or other property dedicated to a god. An analogue to our case (though on a larger scale) would be Sulla's dedication of a tenth of his private property to Hercules Victor and feasting of the people in compensation for the sufferings of the civil war (cf. Plut. 5M//. 35.1); similarly Crassus, so as not to be outdone by Pompey's triumphal games, dedicated a tithe of his prop erty to Hercules, feasted the people, and distributed a three-month supply of grain (Plut. Crass. 2.3); cf. Liebenam, RE 4.2 (1901), 2306.51 ff.; Robin Seager in CAH 9 2 , 225. On such feasts and their financing cf. in general Shatzman, 88. nc M. quidem Seio vitio datum est quod in caritate asse modium populo dedit; magna enim se et inveterata invidia nee turpi iactura, quando erat aedilis, nee maxima liberavit.] As a result of a conviction {calamitas indict; Alexander, no. 377), M. Scius lost his knight's status but nonetheless de feated M. Pupius Piso in the race for aedile for the year 74 {Plane. 12). He rehabilitated himself in a time of severe inflation by selling grain and oil at the ridiculously cheap price quoted; cf. Munzer, RE 2A1 (1921), 1121.30 ff.; Stein, ibid., 23.2 (1959), 1988.13 ff.; MRR, 2, 102. The expenditure is said to be "not dishonorable" because largesse of one kind or another was ex-
Commentary on Book 2, Section 58-59
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pected of an aedile. In fact, Seius' benefaction was one of a series of such relief measures during the acute shortage of grain that prevailed prior to Pompey's action against the pirates; cf. Man. 44 and ad 3.49; Gruen, 1974, 35-36. sed honori summo nuper nostra Miloni fuit, qui gladiatoribus emptis reipublicae causa, quae salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodi conatus furoresquc compressit.] The reference is to gladiators whom Milo obtained prior to Cicero's recall from exile in September, 57; cf. Klebs, RE 1.2 (1894), 2271.47 ff.; A.W. Lintott, "Cicero and Milo," JRS 64 (1974), 6 2 - 6 3 ; T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 389 and n. 74. Cicero similarly speaks of Milo as acting in the state interest in effecting his own recall from exile at Sest. 87 [adiit igitur T. Annius ad causam reipublicae sic ut civem patriae reciperare vellet ereptum). In our context Cicero might also have mentioned the games Milo financed as a private citizen in 54 (in preparation no doubt for his consular candidacy the following year); cf. Klebs, loc. cit., 2272.59 ff. On Milo's murder of Clodius on 18 January 52 and Cicero's unsuccessful defense of his friend cf. Gelzcr, 206 ff.—Here as elsewhere Cicero conceives his own safety as bound up with that of the free commonwealth; cf. ad3A2\; Strasburger, 1956, 65.—For Cicero's use of furor in a political sense of revolutionaries, including both Catiline and Clodius, cf. the testimonies cited by Rubenbauer, TLL 6, 1630.80 ff. 59 in his autem ipsis mediocritatis regula optima est·! Cf. ad 1.140, where the same rule is applied to houses. L. quidem Philippus Q. f., magno vir ingenio in primisque clams, gloriari solebat se sine ullo munere adeptum esse omnia quae haberentur amplissima.J Philippus' evident refusal to run for aedile may well have been a factor in his defeat by M. Herennius in the consular elections for 93. He was, of course, later elected consul for 9 1 , a consulate marked by his bitter oppo sition to the reform plans of the tribune M. Livius Drusus, who had a sen ate majority behind him but died suddenly in circumstances never fully clarified. Philippus later joined Sulla's side in the civil war and, following Sulla's death, became the leading spokesman of the senatorial party. Cf. Miinzer, RE 14.2 (1930), 1562.27 ff., esp. 1563.1 ff.; MRR, 2, 20; ad $ 73 and 3.87. dicebat idem Cotta, Curio.] C. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 75), together with P. Sulpicius, appears in de Oratore as representative of the next generation of orators younger than Antonius and Crassus. He was Cicero's fictive source for the reported dialogue, and he also appears as the spokesman for the Skeptical Academy in de Natura Deorum. His early career was blighted, shortly after Crassus' death (September, 91), by condemnation under the lex
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Varia de maiestate (Alexander, no. 105). However, he returned from exile in the wake of Sulla's victory in the civil war and resumed his political career, though without ever seeking the office of aedile; cf. Klebs, RE 2.2 (1896), 2482.68 ff., esp. 2484.33-34; on his consulate see Robin Seager in CAH 9\ 211.—This passage is rightly referred by commentators to the elder C. Scribonius Curio (cos. 76; RE s.v. Scribonius no. 10), the contemporary of Cotta and Philippus; cf. Munzer, RE 2A2.1 (1921), 862.56 ff. The context seems to exclude the younger Curio (tr. pi. 50; ibid., s.v. Scribonius no. 11), who became a partisan of Caesar in 50 and fell in the Caesarian cause in North Africa in August, 49, as narrated in BC 2, though he, too, omitted the aedileship; cf. Munzer, ibid., 869.30 ff. nobis quoque licet in hoc quodam modo gloriari;. . .] Another sign that this is the most personal of Cicero's philosophical essays; cf. 1.78, where Cicero inserts the apology: licet enim mihi, Marce fill, apud te gloriari, ad quern hereditas huius gloriae et factorum imitatio pertinet; on Cicero's aedileship cf. ad § 58 above. 60 Atque etiam illae impensae meliores, muri navalia portus aquarum ductus omniaque quae ad usum reipublicae pertinent, quamquam quod praesens tamquam in manum datur, iucundius est, tamen haec in posterum gratiora.] Goldbachec, 2, 5 8 - 6 0 , thought, based on the position of etiam, that an anacoluthon must be assumed, since no u better" expenditures have pre ceded; he would supply sunt grata et after pertinent. However, illae can refer not only to what precedes but also to what follows (cf. $ 56: illud absurde; and, in general, Hofmann-Szantyr, 184-85); hence there is no obstacle to taking meliores as predicate and illae impensae as referring to the following [muri, navalia, etc.). For the loose connective atque etiam cf. ad 1.8 and 37; on the summarizing haec cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 180.—The contrast of the iucundum and gratum appears elsewhere in Cicero's writings, as in the letter in which he reports to Servius Sulpicius his son's officia in the aftermath of TuIlia's death: cuius officia iucundiora scilicet saepe mihi fuerunt, numquam tamen gratiora {Fam. 4.6.1; mid-April, 45).—Here, as elsewhere (cf. 1.74 ff. and § 55b), Cicero/Panaetius gives preference to lasting results over the superficially more glamorous; cf. Edwards, 157. theatra, porticus, nova templa verecundius reprendo propter Pompeium, sed doctissimi non probant, ut et hie ipse Panaetius . . .] Here we have another case of the conflict between Roman sentiment and Greek precept; cf. ad 5S 55b-60. On the magnificent stone theater, with the cavea surmounted by a temple of Venus Victrix, with Pompey's famous portico behind the scenebuilding and the curia Pompei adjacent, all richly decorated with works of art, cf. Gelzer, Pompeius, 171-72.—On the financing of public buildings at
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Rome cf. in general Shatzman, 90-91.—In spite of the doubts raised in Atzert's app. crit., propter Pompeium is retained by subsequent editors; how should an interpolator have read Cicero's mind so precisely? This is in keep ing, of course, with the marked respect shown to Pompey in this Book (in contrast to the following one); cf. ad $ 20 above.—Cicero was, of course, himself involved with building projects (including the restoration of the temple of Tellus in 54: hence perhaps the specification of nova templa here); cf. R. Morlino, "Cicerone e Pedilizia pubblica: De officiis, II, 60, w Athe naeum 62 (1964), 623. . . . Phalereus Demetrius, qui Peri clem, principem Graeciae, viruperat quod tantam pecuniam in praeclara ilia propylaea conieceriL] Though one might have expected Panaetius to approve of such buildings, since they can hardly be said to have memoriam aut brevem aut nullam (cf. § 55 above), he seems to have quoted with approval the strictures of Demetrius of Phalemm (fr. 137 Wehrli2). Like Cicero, Demetrius evidently considered his own expenditures in this line justified since they were modest and came out of his own pocket (cf. Wehrli ad he, as well as his fr. 132). For other Ciceronian views on Demetrius' style and career cf. ad 1.3 above; on his policies in general cf. Hans-Joachim Gehrke, "Das Verhaltnis von Politik und Philosophic im Wirken des Demetrios von Phaleron,*' Chiron 8 (1978), 149-93.—For the description of Pericles as princeps Graeciae cf. ad $ 41. sed de hoc genere toto in iis libris quos de Republica scripsi diligenter est disputatum.] Cf. the all too fragmentary remains at Rep. 4.7. Tota igitur ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, temporibus necessaria, et turn ipsum et ad facilitates accommodanda et mediocritate moderanda est.] Finally Cicero offers a theoretical basis for allowing Roman practice so much scope in spite of Greek precept. He thinks to save himself by appealing to the doctrine that appropriate actions sometimes change in light of changed circumstances (κατά π€ρίστασιν; cf. ad 1.30-41). Certainly the circumstances of Cicero's Rome were different from those of the Rhodes, Athens, or even Rome Panaetius knew; it seems doubtful, however, that Panaetius would have gone nearly so far as Cicero in accommodating Roman practice. 6 1 - 6 4 This treatment of liberalitas4*9 is, apart from the citations of Ennius and Crassus (both from memory?), either kept in general terms or buttressed by Greek example (Cimon) and citation (Theophrastus, bis), in contrast with the preceding paragraphs, heavily dominated by Roman examples. It is cu rious that Cicero did not offer Roman examples here, though he certainly .59. On its postponement cf. ad $$ 55b-60 above.
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could have cited, e.g., the generosity of Scipio Aemilianus in inviting his clients to dinner (cf. Fat. fr. 5 Giomini). Perhaps this fact springs from a desire to maintain in this work a balance between Greek and Roman, with the latter dominating the public sphere and the former, by default, the private. 6 1 - 6 2 The question of the dilectus dignitatis for conferring benefits was already raised (and decided by different criteria) at 1.45 ff. Our passage evidently has the greatest utilitas in view in recommending giving priority to victims of disaster, since they, presumably, will have the greatest gratitude. 62 propensior benignitas esse debebit in calamitosos, nisi forte erunt digni calamitate.] Cf. Sen. Ben. 1.11.1: incipiendum est autem a necessariis; aliter enim ad animum pervenit, quod vitam continet, aliter quod exornat aut instruit. Presumably the arrogant are seen as digni calamitate in accord with the old Greek scheme of ϋβρις followed by άτη. bene facta male locata male facta arbitror.] The trochaic septenarius {seen. 409 = trag. 389 = 349 Jocelyn) is quoted only here; hence play and immediate context remain unclear; Vahlen compared Liv. 7.20.5: . . . ut sua Vetera beneficia, locata praesertim apud tarn gratos, novis corrumperent maleficiis . . . 6 3 - 6 4 The discussion of liberalitas concludes with an encomium on its nature and its public and private benefits (§ 63), as well as an appendix on various other forms that benefactions can take ($ 64). 63 temeritate enim remota gratissima est liberalitas . . .] Cf. ad 1.43. . . . summi cuiusque bonitas commune perfughim est omnium.] For perfugium cf. ad § 26b; for the iunctura cf. Cat. 4.2: ego sum ille consul. . . cut . . . non domus, commune perfugium . . . umquam vacua mortis periculo atque insidiis fuit. danda igitur opera est ut iis beneficiis quam plurimos adficiamus quorum memoria liberis posterisque prodatur, ut iis ingratis esse non liceat.] Here Cicero brings out more clearly the implications of the metaphor of "invest ing" benefactions used in the previous paragraph [bene facta male lo cata . . .); cf. also ad § 42b. In recommending that one confer benefits that will leave an impression on the recipient ut iis ingratis esse non liceat, Cicero may seem to be giving self-serving advice. But, in fact, the aim is to keep the cycle of services performed within society for the mutual benefit of members in motion (cf. 1.22:. . . communes utilitates in medium adferre, mutatione officiorumt dando accipiendo, turn artibus, turn opera, turn facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem; Veyne, 438-39).—This is the sole mention of ingratitude in Off., an important topic, since the avoidance of it is one reason why a careful choice of recipients is important, as Seneca
Commentary on Book 2, Section 61-63
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makes clear at Ben. 1.1.1-2 (note the emphatic statement: nee mirum est inter plurima maximaque vitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi; cf., e.g., Catul. 76.7-9: nam quaecumque homines bene cuiquam aut dicere possunt I aut facere, haec a te dictaque factaque sunt. I omnia quae ingratae perierunt credita menti). Now one of the issues between Cicero and Antony in autumn, 44, was Antony's charge that Cicero had been ungrateful for a beneficium bestowed on him when he had spared the orator's life at Brun ei isi urn in October, 48 (Phil. 2.5). 60 Though he had ample answer to Antony's charges, Cicero evidently decided to reserve such matters for the Second Philippic and reduce to a minimum the topic of ingratitude, with its politi cally sensitive aspects, in Off. omnes enim immemorem beneficii o d e r u n t . . . ] Cf. Soph. Aj. 523-24 (Tecmessa): δτου δ' άπορρεΐ μνήστις· €υ π€ττονθότο5, / ουκ αν γενοιτ' €θ' ούτος €iryeW|? άνήρ; Sen. Ben. 3.1.1: non referre beneficiis gratiam et est turpe et apud omnes habetur, Aebuti Liberalis; ideo de ingratis etiam ingrati queruntur . . . (there follows an analysis of the causes of ingratitude and how it should be dealt with). . . . eamque iniuriam in deterrenda liberalitate sibi etiam fieri, eumque qui faciat communem hostem tenuiorum putant.] The point is echoed by Sen eca's imaginary proponent of legal penalties for ingratitude (Ben. 3.13.1): 'tardiores\ inquit, 'ad beneficia danda facimus non vindicando data nee infitiatores eorum adficiendo poena'. Atque haec benignitas etiam reipublicae est utilis, redimi e servitute captos, locupletari tenuiores . . .] The ideal is for the actions that promote one's personal glory also to benefit the state; cf. ad § 85. In fact, in the latter part of the treatise the utilitas reipublicae becomes an independent criterion for judging actions; cf. § 60 (quae ad usum reipublicae sunt) and introduction to Book 3. A more specific case of the ransoming of captives (i.e., their ransom ing from latrones) was mentioned at § 55b. . . . quod quidem vulgo solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus.] According to Clu. 140, in the course of prosecut ing Cn. Plancus, M. Brutus had contradictory excerpts from previous speeches of the defense counsel, L. Licinius Crassus, read out in court, in cluding a speech from the year 118 in favor of founding the colony Narbo Martius in Gaul, in which quantum potest de auctoritate senatus detrahit, as 60. Similarly, Seneca mentions the existence of a debate as to whether Brutus ought to have accepted the gift of life from Caesar even though he thought it appropriate to kill him {Ben. 2.20.1); surely this was a topic of discussion in the immediate aftermath of the assassination, as Cicero's oblique reference at Phil. 2.116 suggests {nisi veto aut matoribus babes beneficiis obligatos quam Hie quosdam habuit ex eis a quibus est interfectus . . .).
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well as the speech of 106 in behalf of the Servilian law to divide the jurors equally between the equites and senators (cf. Rotondi, 325); in this latter speech sumntis ornat senatum laudibus (this speech, delivered in the year of his birth, had a special significance for Cicero; cf. Brut. 164: mihi quid em a pueritia quasi magistra fuit. . . ilia in legem Caepionis oratio). In view of the tenor of the argument M. Kruger, M. Antonii et L. Licinii Crassi oratorum Romanorum fragmenta (diss. Breslau, 1909), 37, n. 2, refers our passage to the Serviliana ("Sed quo modo tandem in oratione in qua quantum poruit de senatus auctoritate dctraxit, merita eiusdem senatus ad caelum efferre potuit!M). On the other hand, Hapke, RE 13.1 (1926), 255.62 ff., followed by Malcovati, orat., 241, evidently because of the example locupletari tenuiores, found in our passage an allusion to the earlier speech and urged (256.20) u es kann der Hinweis gefolgt sein, dafi diesmal der Senat die ihm eigene benignitas vermissen lasse (vgl. imlgo)." Evidently Crassus offered a lengthy recital of the benefits conferred upon the state by the senatorial order {quod. . . solitum fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiose videmus), of which Cicero has merely cited two examples; if that is right, then surely the passage comes from the praise of the senate in the course of argument in the Serviliana for some senatorial representation on the juries, not from the speech on the founding of Narbo Martius, an action carried by Crassus as a young Popularis (cf. ad § 47) in the teeth of bitter senatorial opposition (cf. Andrew Lintott in CAH 8 2 , 86). banc ego consuetudinem benignitatis largitioni munerum longe antepono; haec est gravium hominum acque magnomm, ilia quasi adsentatorum populi multirudinis levitatem voluptate quasi tirillantium.] This sharp condemna tion of largitio would have been expected either at the beginning of the discussion of benefits in § 53 or at the transition from largitio to liberalitas (§ 61); and, in spite of $5 53-54a, it does come as a surprise after 5 57; the emphasis on a permanent habit {consuetudo) and on the truly constructive as opposed to ephemeral pleasures is, of course, typically Panaetian (cf. §§ 55, 57a, 60).—Titilbre appears at Lucr. 2.429 in the sense "titillate," rather than the literal sense "tickle," but for Cicero this is still a poetic usage requiring the apologetic quasi, as also at Fin. 1.39 (cf. also quasi titillatio at N.D. 1.113 [with Pease's note]; OLD s.vv.). 64 Conveniet autem cum in dando munificum esse, turn in exigendo non acerbum,—multa multis de suo iure cedentem, a litibus vero, quantum liceat et nescio an paulo plus eriam quam liceat, abhorrentem.] Cf. Arist. EN 1121a4: και εύκοινώνητος δ τ εστίν ό ελευθέριο? εις χρήματα· δύναται γαρ άδικε! σθαι, μή τιμών γε τα χρήματα.—De suo iure cedere is virtually a definition of dementia; cf. Sen. CI. 2.3.2:. . . maxime ad verum accedat [sc.
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 63-64 and 65-68
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the definition of dementia], si dixerimus clementiam esse moderationem aliquid ex merita ac debita poena remittentem . . . ; see further ad 1.88; it is also the attitude espoused by Micio at Ten Ad. 51-52 (cf. also 217): do, praetermitto, non necesse habeo omnia I pro meo iure agere . . . The Caesarian speeches, with their frequent references to Caesar's liberalitas (Lig. 6, 23, 3 1 ; Marc. 16, 19), can be seen as an appeal to the dictator "to stand back from his rights" in the sense of our passage (cf. Kloft, 61). Cf. Nep. Att. 6.3: in ius de sua re numquam iit. habenda autem ratio est rei familiaris . . . sed ita ut inliberalitatis avaritiaeque absit suspicio.] At § 58 the avaritiae suspicio likewise had the function of promoting spending. The degree to which it is legitimate to take account of one's own property interests becomes an issue in Book 3, where Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus ($S 49b-57, 89-92) as well as Hecato of Rhodes and Q. Scaevola (§ 63) are presented on opposite sides. posse enim liberalitate uti non spoliantem se patrimonio nimirum est pecu niae fructus maximus.] This alternative formulation to Theophrastus' on the fructus divitiarum (cf. ad § 56) is followed immediately by another citation of Theophrastus. est enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, valde decorum paterc domus hominum inlustrium hospitibus inlustribus, idque etiam reipublicae est oraamento homines externos hoc liberalitatis genere in urbe nostra non egere.] Cf. ad 1.92 on the willingness of the μεγαλόψυχο? to share his property with friends and the state, as well as the precept under decorum at 1.139:. . . in domo ciari hominis, in quam et hospites multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo, adhibenda cura est laxitatis. Theophrastus quidem scribit Cimonem Athenis etiam in suos curiales Laciadas hospitalem fuissc; . . .] Both citations of Theophrastus in this section surely derive (via Panaetius) from the περί πλούτου (= 515 Fortenbaugh, 1992 = L 77 Fortenbaugh, 1984; cf. Fortenbaugh's commentary ad he. and ad § 56 above). Cf. Arist. Ath. 27.3: ό γαρ Κίμων, άτε τυραννικην έχων ουσία ν . . . των δημοτών έτρεφε πολλούς* έξήν γάρ τφ βουλομενω Λακιαδών καθ* εκά στης τήι> ήμέραν ελθόντι παρ' αυτόν εχειν τά μέτρια . . . (whence Plut. Cim. 10.2 = fr. 402 Rose). Aristotle goes on to report that Cimon set no guard over his estates so that any Athenian could pick the fruit, a story which also occurs in Theopompus [FGrHist 115F89), whence it entered the biographical tradi tion; cf. Nep. Cim. 4.1; Plut. Per. 9.2 has both anecdotes, but with the free dinners extended to all Athenians; cf. Jacoby ad Theopomp., loc. cit. 6 5 - 6 8 Cicero now moves from private donations to services, the preferable form of benefaction, according to §S 5 2 - 5 3 ; these, like the other beneficia discussed in this Book, are not undertaken disinterestedly, but with a view to
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increasing the fame and influence and thus enhancing the political career of the benefactor; cf. Kunlcel, 38. These chapters begin with the two obvious services of this type, legal advice (S 65) and oratory (§§ 66-67a), proceed to services that require no special skills (§ 67b), and conclude with advice on avoiding giving offense in the process of helping others (§ 68). 65 This paragraph comprises a "concise summary of the jurists functions" (Bauman, 1983, 3). Kunlcel, 38 ff., supplies an extended commentary on this paragraph by comparing Cicero's account of the social decline of the legal profession at Rome with what is known of the backgrounds and careers of the Roman jurists. He concludes that Cicero's statement that the principes maintained a monopoly of knowledge and interpretation of the law is essen tially correct for the second century, whereas in the first century the aristoc racy virtually disappears from the jurists' ranks, which are now taken over by the equites. Later he modified his view in laying greater stress on the incur sion of dubious elements into the legal profession; cf. Wolfgang Kunkel, "Das Wesen des ius respondendi," ZSS 66 (1948), 452, n. 36. This would be in line with Cicero's emphasis on the social confusion of his own times (ante banc confusionem temporum)\ cf. ad § 29 above. nam in iure cavere, consilio iuvare atque hoc scientiae genere prodesse quam plurimis vehementer et ad opes augendas pertinet et ad gratiam.] Giving legal responses was an activity expected of a man of distinction at Rome; cf. de Orat. 1.198. Some legal knowledge could advance one's career, as, for in stance, the post of iudex quaestionis shows; cf. Wiseman, 179. The consider able wealth of Aquilius Callus (see further ad 3.60) has been adduced by Bauman, 1985, 24, as confirmation of what Cicero here asserts about opes. But the jurists' activities [respondere, cavere, agere) also give rise to gratia; cf. Bauman, 1983, 424-25; Sailer, 21; Brunt, 1988, 389.—Norr, 84, contrasts this encomium of the benefits of legal knowledge with Cicero's mockery of Servius Sulpicius at Mur. 19-30, though the forensic speech need not, of course, correspond to Cicero's actual views (see $ 51 and below). . . . optime constituti iuris civilis summo semper in honore fuit cognitio atque interpretatio.] Expressions of satisfaction with the status quo are not uncommon in Cicero (further examples at Norr, 144, n. 3); contrast, how ever, the less sanguine view of the ius civile at 3.69. . . . idque eo indignius, quod eo tempore hoc contigit cum is esset qui omnes superiores, quibus honore par esset, scientia facile vicisset.] The jurist whose superior knowledge is praised here is, of course, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, consul for 51 {MRR, 2,240) and therefore honore par with his predecessors (the office had not been held by a jurist since Q. Mucius Scaevola, "the Pontifex," cos. 95; cf. Kunkel, 39; MRR, 2, 11). At Brut. 155, however,
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Cicero makes it clear that legal skill absent rhetorical ability would not have carried him to the consulate; cf. Frier, 155; on the circumstances of his election cf. T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 4 1 3 . Cf. the similar praise of his skills as a jurist at Brut. 150-57 and Phil. 9.10, where he goes so far as to claim omttes ex omni aetate qui in hac civitate intellegentiam iuris habuerunt si unum in locum conferantur, cum Ser. Sulpicio non sint comparandi; also the comment on his death at Fam. 12.5.3 (3 February 43, to Cassius: Serv. Sulpici morte magnum praesidium amisimus. reliqui partim inertes, partim improbi); on his career and activities as a jurist cf. Miinzer and Kiibler, RE 4A1 (1931), 851.53 ff.; Wieacker, 602 ff.; in general the detailed discussion at Bauman, 1985, chapter 1. 66 Atque huic arti finitima est dicendi gravior facultas et gratior et ornatior.] For similar addition of a new item favorably compared with the preceding cf. 1.55 ff. On the claim of gravitas for the orator cf. de Orat. 1.214. For a comparison of legal knowledge with oratory to the advantage of the latter cf. Mur. 29: ut aiunt in Graecis artificibus eos auloedos esse qui citharoedi fieri non potuerint, sic nos videmus, qui oratores evadere non potuerint, eos ad iuris studium devenire. magnus dicendi labor, magna res, magna dignitas, summa autem gratia. quid enim eloquentia praestabilius vel admiratione audientium vel spe indigentium vel eorum qui defensi sunt gratia?] The praise of oratory is, of course, a favorite Ciceronian topos; cf., e.g., besides § 48, de Orat. 1.14 ff. and 3.136; Heldmann, 95.—On substitution of the clause qui defensi sunt for the participle defensorum to avoid ambiguity with the genitive plural of the noun defensor cf. Laughton, 81. huic {quoquc} ergo a maioribus nostris est in toga dignitatis principatus datus.J Quoque was omitted in the twelfth-century cod. Ambros. H. 140 inf. and athetized by Facciolati, followed by Bruser, 103 ff., Atzert4, Fedeli, and Winterbottom; it would have to be taken with huic, rather than the sentence as a whole (cf. Muller ad he). In spite of Cicero's evident keenness to establish a parallel between the arts of legal interpretation and oratory, both of which have fallen on hard times, he has not made the point that the dignitatis principatus was given to the former.—For in toga as the equivalent of u in time of peace" cf. OLD s.v. toga 4; Cic. Pis. 73 (a propos 'cedant arma togae'):. . . pads est insigne et oti toga . . . discrti igitur hominis et facile laborantis, quodque in patriis est moribus, multorum causas et non gravate et gratuito defendentis beneficia et patrocinia late patent.] Payment for legal defense was prohibited by the lex Cincia of 204 (Rotondi, 261 ff.; Mommsen, Strafr., 705-6), abandoned in the reign of Claudius (Tac. Ann. 11.5 ff.); on the whole subject cf. Franco
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Casavola, Lex Cincia. Contribute alia storia delle origini della donazione romana (Naples, 1960).—For representation of a client at court as a beneficium (also assumed at 1.59) cf. Austin ad Cael. 7. 67 admonebat me res ut hoc quoque loco intennissionem eloquenriae, ne dicam internum deplorarem, ni vererer ne de me ipso aliquid viderer queri.— quam in mulris sit audacia.] These remarks reflect Cicero's disapproval in general of the younger generation of orators, explored in more detail in the rhetorical writings of 46, where he criticizes their concept of Atticism as too narrow; cf. esp. Brut. 21,157, 330 ff., with Douglas, xii ff.; Orat. 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 8 ff., 89-90, 234 ff.; Opt. Gen. 8 and 12 (the authenticity of this tract is dubious, however: cf. most recently Bringmann, 256 ff.; G.L. Hendrickson, "Cicero De Optimo genere oratorum," AJPh 47 [1926], 111 ff., tried to explain the stylistic problems as the result of hasty composition). For another case in which the discussion threatens to become too personal cf. § 45 (at 1.78 he justifies his boasting on grounds that his son is the addressee). Cicero displays fewer scruples about lamenting his own fate in the proem to Book 3.—For ne dicam cf. Gotoff, 203. 68 It was characteristic of Panaetius to include, not only positive, but also negative advice (i.e., warnings); cf. 1.42 and 68-69; nevertheless this advice on not giving offense, and what to do if one does, might rather have been expected under the fourth "part" of the honestum (cf. 1.99: iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere, in quo maxhne vis perspicitur decori). 6 9 - 7 1 These sections explore the divergence of theory and practice in the conferring of benefits: everyone claims to confer benefits on the basis of character, rather than fortuna (external circumstance), but the reality is far different, because the assumption is, as Veyne, 439, expressed it, uSe livrer a des bienfaits sans contrepartie, c'est jeter des marchandises a la mer." Cicero/ Panaetius undertakes to show that following mores, rather than fortuna, is, in fact, not only more honorable, but even more useful. It is very dubious, however, whether Cicero himself followed this precept. Walcot, 125, points, for instance, to his defense of P. Sulla, whom Cicero, on the evidence of § 29 and the letters cited ad he, cannot have supposed to be of high character but who, according to Gel. 12.12.2, provided Cicero with a loan of two million sesterces to enable him to buy a house on the Palatine. 69 Sed cum in hominibus iuvandis aut mores spectari aut fortuna soleat, dictu quidem est proclive, itaque volgo loquuntur se in beneficiis conlocandis mores hominum, non fortunam sequi.] Cf. Arist. EN 1162b34 ff.: τούτο Se συμβαίι>€ΐ δια τό βούλ*σθαι μέν πάιτας ή τους πλ€ΐστου? τά καλά, προ-
Commentary on Book 2, Section 66-69
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αιράσθαι δέ τα ωφέλιμα· καλόν δέ τό eu ποΐ€Ϊι> μήϊνα αντιπαθή, ώφέλιμον δέ τό €ΐχργ€Τ€Ϊσθαι.—The metaphor of "investing" benefits, which appears here and in $ 71, seems to continue that of the "investing" of glory (§ 42) and the "placing" of good deeds (§ 62). Cf. also Sen. Vit. Beat. 24.2: beneficium conlocetur quemadmodum thesaurus alte obrutus, quern non eruas nisi fuerit necesse.—Character is a criterion for conferring benefits at 1.45-46. For the metaphorical use of proclivis (mostly in comedy and other informal writing) cf. OLD s.v., 2b, with Fantham, 65, who compares Fam. 6.106.3 (to Trebianus; capping a series of images of sliding, sloping, etc.). a quo enim expeditior et celerior remuneratio fore videtur, in eum fere est voluntas nostra propensior.] The situation remained so in Pliny's day; hence his plea that one should help one's amid pauperes, not those best able to pay; cf. Ep. 9.30 with Kloft, 165-66.—This state of affairs, described but by no means defended by Cicero, provoked in the thirteenth century the bitter protest of Vincent of Beauvais: corruptique sunt mores et depravati admiratione divitiorum, an echo of $ 71: Speculum Doctrinale 4.50 (Douai, 1624), p. 329; cf. Nelson, 115.—Cicero's own practice in accepting cases probably did not differ much from this deprecated but widespread principle, though he did defend some poor and/or obscure clients early in his career (he described his early client D. Matrinius, for instance, as homo tenuis: Clu. 126 = orat. deperd. test. 11A Crawford). nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiam si referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest, commode autem, quicumque dixit pecuniam qui habeat, non reddidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem et qui rettulerit habere et qui habeat rettulisse.] As part of the larger argument that potential beneficiaries be judged by character, not wealth, Cicero observes that the poor but good man, even if he cannot return the favor (for the sense cf. OLD s.v. gratia 4e; Sailer, 21), can still feel gratitude (OLD s.w. gratia 4d, habeo 19d). The epigram that he then cites with approval contrasts the properties of pecunia and gratia; the former as a material and finite entity cannot be both held and returned by the beneficiary, whereas the expression of grati tude by no means prevents one from continuing to feel grateful. The poor beneficiary will thus at least both express and feel gratitude, whereas (he goes on the suggest) the wealthy beneficiary will think that he has done a favor merely by accepting. Cicero seems to have been fond of this enthymeme; it is trotted out with slighly different wording at Red. Pop. 23 and Plane. 68. However, it is built into the argument only in the latter passage, where Cicero follows it immediately with the point neque ego nunc Plancio desinam debere, si hoc solvero, nee minus ei redderem voluntate ipsa, si hoc molest iae
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[i.e., the prosecution de sodalicio] non accidisset. At Red. Pop. 23 the enthymemc is omitted, perhaps rightly, 61 in some inferior manuscripts; and both there and in our passage the relevance is dubious. In our passage the needed point is contained in the words etiam si referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest and is not strengthened by the enthymeme. Ε silentio support for the interpolation of the enthymeme in Red. Pop. and Off. might be sought from the fact that the second-century rhetorician Antonius Julianus, whose captious criticism of the epigram is preserved by Gellius (1.4.2 ff.), cites it only from Plane.62 In any case, the epigram is, of course, oversimplified in ignoring the factor of gratitude in the lending of money. at qui se locupletes honoratos beatos putant, ii ne obligari quidem beneficio volunt; quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur cum ipsi quamvis mag num aliquod acceperint, atque etiam a se aut postulari aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se usos aut dientes appellari mortis instar pu tant.] On those who have accepted benefits but are reluctant to acknowledge the fact cf. Sen. Ben. 2.23.3: rariores in eorum officiis sunt quibus vitam aut dignitatem debent, et, dum opinionem clientium timent, graviorem subeunt ingratorum; on those who accept superciliously, ibid., 2.24.3; cf. in general Brunt, 1988, 395.—Note that Cicero has carefully contrived to present the feelings of the wealthy in a crescendo of suspicion and indignation: ne obli gari quidem . . . quin etiam beneficium se dedisse arbitrantur . . . atque etiam a se aut postubri aut exspectari aliquid suspicantur, patrocinio vero se usos aut dientes appellari mortis instar putant.—The last clause about re garding a dependent position as equivalent to death corresponds, as J.F. Gronovius saw, to the reaction of Pompey when approached during the civil war by familiars with Caesar's terms of peace: quid mihi aut vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? (Caes. ΒC 3.18.4). In general Romans showed consideration by using the term amicus rather than cliens even of a social inferior; cf. Sailer, 11.—This is the one explicit allusion in Off. to the relation of patron and client, once assumed to have been fundamental to the workings of society and politics of the republic. That view is now controversial, however; cf., e.g., Millar, 1984 and 1986, and, contra, L. Burckhardt, "The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Com ments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts nobilitas and homo novus" Historia 39 (1990), 77-99. Brunt, 1988,389, called attention to the lack of a
61. T. Maslowski brackets this matter in his edition (Leipzig, 1981); cf. also Cicero, Back from Exile: Six Speeches upon his Return, tr. D.R. Shackleton Bailey (Chicago, 1991), iS, n. 29. 62. Omission of gratiam autem et qui rettulerit habere by the £ tradition in our passage is, however, a simple case of saut du mime au meme.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 69-71
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reference to such matters at 1.150-51; use of Greek sources and a preoc cupation with amicitia will account for the omission at 1.50 ff.; see ad 1.5058. 70 at vero ille tenuis, cum quidquid factum sit se spectatum, non fortunam p u t a t . . .] The premise implicit here was formulated by Seneca: non est beneficium, quod ad fortunam spectat {Ben. 4.3.1). 71 . . . niminim Themistocles est auctor adhibendus, qui, cum consuleretur utrum bono viro pauperi an minus probato diviti filiam conlocaret, 'ego vero' inquit 'malo virum qui pecunia egeat quam pecuniam quae viro*.] Cf. Rep. 5.2: nam de viris quid dicam? mores enim ipsi interierunt virorum penuria . . . Panaetius evidently admired Themistocles' cleverness (1.108; cf. 2.16; was he perhaps influenced by the encomium at Aesch. Socr. fr. 9?), though, because he was a wartime leader, rather than a legislator, he ranked him lower than Solon (1.75). Besides V. Max. 7.2 ext. 9, which derives, with pathetic embellishment (Themistocles' interlocutor is now unicae filiae pa ter), from our passage, the anecdote recurs at D.S. 10.32: οτι Θεμιστοκλής ό τοϋ Νεοκλέους, προσελθόντος τινός αύτώ πλουσίου και ζητοϋντος κηδεστήν εύρεΐν πλούσιον, παρεκελεύσατο αύτφ ζητεΐν μη χρήματα άνδρος δεομενα, πολύ δε μάλλον άνδρα χρημάτων ένδεά. άποδεξαμένου δε τάνθρώπου το ρηθέν συνεβούλευσεν αύτιμ συνοικίσαι την θυγατέρα τφ Κίμωνι. διόπ€ρ εκ ταύτης της αιτίας ό Κίμων εύπορήσας χρημάτων απελύθη της φυλακής κτλ.; Plut. Them. 18.9 makes Themistocles himself the father (cf. Plut. Reg. Apophth. 185e and Stob. v. 5, p. 679.2 W.-H.): των δε μνωμένων αυτού την θυγατέρα τον επιεική τοϋ πλουσίου προκρίνας, εφη ζιχτ€ϊν άνδρα χρημάτων δεόμενον μάλλον ή χρήματα ανδρός. The ancient tradition in general emphasizes, how ever, Themistocles' greed, which was sometimes excused on grounds that he needed money to satisfy his generous impulses; cf. Plut. Them. 5.1; U. Kahrstedt, RE 5A2 (1934), 1697.16 ff. Heilmann, 100, believes that, though this example adopts the general standpoint of Cicero/Panaetius, viz.y a preference for mores over fortuna, it does not really fit the argument that this policy is more expedient. This problem might, however, be the result of Ciceronian redaction, if Panaetius presented the example in the form given by Diodorus (quoted above), who probably depends on Ephorus, in which the successful suitor was Cimon. The historicity of the anecdote is, however, highly suspect in view of Cimon's enormous wealth (cf. ad § 64), which he must have inherited from his father; cf. Swoboda, RE 11.1 (1921), 439.30 ff. sed corrupti mores depravatique sunt admiratione divitiarum.] It was pre sumably this conviction that led Cicero to his denunciation of Crassus (tacito
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nomine) at Farad, no. 6 [quod solus sapiens dives); for the use of these words by Vincent of Beauvais cf. ad $ 69. quarum magnitudo quid ad unum quemque nostrum pertinet? ilium fortassc adiuvat qui habet. ne id quidem semper, sed fac iuvare. utentior sane sit, honestior vero quomodo?] The άπαξ utentior has been controverted for centuries. Among recent editors Atzert, Testard, and Winterbottom print the word, whereas Fedeli marks it as corrupt. Atzert does, however, voice reser vations on grounds of the phrase ultra usum at Ambr. off. 2.132. But ultra usum in that passage is hardly a paraphrase of utentior in ours. As often, Ambrose is handling his Ciceronian source material quite freely: feralis igitur avaritia, illecebrosa pecunia quae habentes contaminate non habentes non iuvat. esto tamen ut aliquando adiuvet pecunia inferiorem, tamen et ipsum desiderantem. quid ad eum qui non desiderat, qui non requirit, qui auxilio eius non indiget, studio non flectitur? quid ad alios, si sit Hie copiosior qui habet? numquid idcirco honestior, quia habet quo honestas plerumque amittitur, quia habet quod custodiat magis quam quod possideatf illud enim possidemus quo utimur; quodautem ultra usum est non utique habet posses sions fructum, sed custodiae periculum. Ambrose's equivalent of utentior (or whatever he read in this place) is rather copiosior.61 Moreover, in view of Cicero's use of the concessive particle sane, utentior (or whatever is the correct reading) will be good per se (albeit its goodness will be limited). The uniqueness of the form utentior is not a problem, for a present par ticipial form of utor, though rare, is attested (Iren. 2.280 6 4 ), and the use of the comparative of the present participle is not uncommon (cf. parentiores {1.76]). The stumbling block has been rather the sense of utor used abso lutely. But cf. (with Heine) Demea's speech at Ter. Ad. 9 7 9 - 8 1 : siquidem porro, Micio, I tu tuom officium fades atque huic aliquid paullum prae manu I dederis, unde utatur, reddet tibi cito, where Donatus glosses unde utatur as de quo fructum usumque capiat; cf. P. McGlynn, Lexicon Terentianum, 2 (London and Glasgow, 1967), s.v. utor IV.65 63. For which Tcstard now conjectures, and sets in the text, cupidiur, surely wrongly.— Atzert's further observation about Cicero having in mind something like κτήμα τψ xptiav ΰττ{ρβ€βηκ09 is likewise wide of the mark; note that, though Atzert attributes the phrase to Musonius Rufus, it is really found at Clem. Al. Paed. 2.35 (p. 188 Potter [= p. 178.2 StahlinTrcuj), as a careful reading of P. Wend land, Quaestiones Musonianae (diss. Berlin, 1886), 4, n. 1, cited by Atzert, shows. 64. I owe this reference to the TLL archive. 65. Amic. 22 (. . . oportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, dimtiae ut utare, opes ut colare, honores ut laudere, uoluptates ut gaudeas. valttudo ut dotore careas et muneribus fungare corporis. . . ), also cited by Heine, is a less convincing parallel, however, since iis can be supplied as object ("wealth for its uses" tr. Powell).
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 71 and 72-85
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Opulentior, read in Vaticanus Reg. lat. 1481 [anno 1418) and by Lambinus, is superficially attractive but besides being unnecessary is unsatisfying because, instead of explaining how wealth affects the possessor in a limited way for the better, it is merely a paraphrase of the original proposition, the possessor of riches being by definition opulentior. Those not satisfied with the explanation of utentior given above may want to consider Cugusi's v{ir po)tentior; for the idea one could compare 1.25. However, one might rather expect the more difficult utentior to be corrupted to vir potentior than the reverse; and Ambrose's copiosior is intelligible as a paraphrase of utentior, but not of vir potentior. Extremum autem praeceptum in beneficiis operaque danda, ne quid contra aequitatem contendas, ne quid pro injuria;. . .] The point is discussed fur ther with reference to the limits oiamicitia at 3.43. For the sense oiaequitas cf. ad 1.30. fundamentum enim est perpetuae commendationis et famae iustitia, sine qua nihil potest esse laudabile.] Cf. ad § 33 above. 72-85 The focus now shifts from benefactions for private individuals to benefactions for the entire citizenry or the state. What Cicero has in mind, however, is not largitio, games, or the like, which have already been treated (§§ 52 ff.), but public policies of benefit to the entire citizenry. Pohlenz, AF, 114 ff., while admitting that Panaetius' handling of this theme prompted Cicero to dilate on related matters, nonetheless claims for Panaetius such points as the doctrine that states originated above all ut sua tenerentur or the citation of the deaths of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus in parallel with the fate of the Spartans Lysander and Agis. On both points he is unlikely to be right. The observation on the origins of the state is embedded in a context in which initial Panaetian precepts (the first two sentences of § 72) have given way to a series of Roman examples (approved and disapproved leges frumentariae, Philippus' remark in a contio on the small number of propertied citizens, and the desirability of avoiding reimposition of tributum). The emphasis on guarding property as the motive for creating the state contrasts with the indubitably Panaetian account of the social instinct natural to the human being at 1.12, where protection of property is unmentioned, or the descrip tion of the benefits obtained through the building of cities and founding of laws (S 15). Cicero's words . . . etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant (§73) look like an attempt to harmonize his version with that of Panaetius.66 One 66. Contrast F. Steinmetz, 181, who interprets our passage as a sign that Panaetius was a "Mann des Ausglcichs." Cf. also the emphasis on guarding the status quo in the non-Panaetian
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suspects that 1.85 gives a clear statement of Panaetius' precepts for states men (unum ut utHi tatem avium sic tueantur ut quaecumque agunt ad earn referant obliti commodorum suorum, alterum ut totum corpus reipublicae curent. . .) and that he gave Africanus and the Spartans as examples respec tively of abstinence and avarice (his first point) and the Spartans Agis and Lysander as statesmen who cared for only a pan of the body politic con trasted with Aratus of Sicyon, who cared for the whole (his second point). This was surely the skeleton of Panaetius' argument,filledin by Cicero with the other cases and examples cited, including that of the Gracchi (see ad § 80). Cicero's emphasis on the protection of private property fits with a desire to incorporate in this work a defense of his own policies (see introduc tion, § 7; ad 1.21). Panaetius may well have been more evenhanded, as 1.85 suggests (cf. Perelli, 299-300, but also ad § 73); the modern historian would certainly be so.67 In any case, the summary of recommended policies at § 85 could stand as an epitome of the concordia ordinum itself. Cataudella, 481-82, and Cole, 1961,138,findsimilarities in this section to Anon. Iamb.; but though one could, at a pinch, regard Cicero/Panaetius as a modification of Anon. Iamb, on the nature of and differences between €ύνομία and ανομία (6.1-5 = Protr. 100.9 ff.), since both believe the state should protect private property, any genetic relationship remains dubious in view of differences of tone and purpose. 72 Sed quoniam de eo genere beneficiorum dictum est quae ad singulos spectant, deinceps de iis quae ad universos quaeque ad rempublicam perti nent disputandum est.] A reference back to the divisio in thefirstsentence of § 65; the prior part, that dealing with individuals (singuli), having been despatched, the latter remains [quae ad universos quaeque ad rempublicam pertinent is a variatio for [ea beneficia quae) in universam rempublicam. . . conferuntur of § 65). eorum autem ipsorum partim eius modi sunt ut ad universos cives pertineant, partim singulos ut attingant, quae sunt etiam gratiora.] For instance, legislation in behalf of a particular group is more appreciated (by members of that group) than that which benefits the universal citizenry. C. Gracchi frumentaria magna largitio, exhauriebat igitur aerarium;.. .] As tribune for 123 and 122 {MRR, 1, 513-14 and 517-18), C. Gracchus pro posed various pieces of reform legislation, including, probably in the former appendix to Book 1: ea . . . actio in hominum commodis tuendts maxime cernitur (1.153). 67. Cf. Hcilmann, 76-77: "Wcnn man aber an die Kampfe um Ackergesetze seit den Gracchen und die dabei of fen bar werdende cgoisrischc Uncinsichrigkeit in der senatorischen Schicht denkt, dann ist deutlich, daS ein Denken, welches wirklich das Wohl des Ganzcn im Auge hat, sich nicht so uncingeschrankt hutte auficrn diirfen."
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 72-85 and 72 463 year, a law providing a state subvention to supply grain to the citizens each month at a low price; cf. Munzer, RE 2A2 (1923), 1387.14 ff. and, on the dating, 1381.61 ff.; Rotondi, 307-8; Stockton, 126 ff.—In his attempt to provide a balanced account of Roman factional strife at Sest. 103 Cicero presents the case of C. Gracchus in similar terms: frumentariam legem C. Gracchus ferebat: iucunda res plebei, victus enim suppeditabatur large sine labore; repugnabant boni, quod et ab industria plebem ad desidiam avocari putabant et aerarium exhauriri videbant; ci. Tusc. 3.48 a propos Epicurus' praise of virtue: et quidem C. Gracchus, cum largitiones maximas fecisset et effudisset aerarium, verbis tamen defendebat aerarium. quid verba audiam, cum facta videamf—Under the Gracchan law a modius of grain sold for 61/3 asses; since the market price of good grain in the province, before the addition of shipping costs, was already 3-4 sesterces,68 Cicero's description of the losses to the treasury (exhauriebat) seems warranted; cf. Marquardt, 2, 114-15. 69 modica M. Octavi et reipublicae tolerabilis et plebi necessaria, ergo et civibus et reipublicae salutaris.] The date for the law that M. Octavius carried, presumably during his tribunate, has been much discussed, with estimates varying between 123 and 78. RA. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 B.C.-A.D. 14 (Oxford, 1971), 377, thinks that it was passed in the immediate after math of C. Gracchus' death and that the law opposed by Marius in 119 was a liberal reaction against it;70 but this seems unlikely in view of the faa that at Brut. 222 Octavius is mentioned among a group of men who achieved politi cal prominence in the early decades of thefirstcentury;71 cf. Douglas ad loc; A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome (Ithaca, 1968), 102 and 166, n. 120; Sumner, 114-16. The three leges frumentariae of our passage need not be in chronological order; C. Gracchus and M. Octavius may be grouped together for contrast; Rickman, 161-62, is probably right in placing Octavius' tribunate at the earliest in the 90s, possibly the 80s. Our passage shows, however, that M. Octavius did not abolish frumentationes altogether (the point was already made by Sumner, 115; aliter Andrew Lintott in CAH 92, 83, dating Octavius' measure to the last decade of the 68. Three sesterces = 12 asses. 69. There were, however, ways of filling the treasury again; cf., e.g., ad% 74 a propos the tnbutum. 70. Cf. Pease ad N.D. 1.106, who assumes the identity of the M. Octavius there mentioned as an opponent of Τι. Gracchus during the letter's tribunate (133; RE no. 31) with our man (RE no. 32). 71. . . . Μ. Octavium Cn. f„ qui tantum auctoritate dicendoque valutt ut legem Semproniam frumentariam populi frequentis suffragiis abrogaverit.. .
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century). Cf. also F. Miinzer, RE 17.2 (1937), 1822.24 ff. (in part superseded by Sumner, loc. eit.)\ Rotondi, 317.—Here, as elsewhere in this essay, Cicero approves moderation {mediocritas: cf. 1.89 and 140; 2.59-60).—The predi cate plebi necessaria, assigned to M. Octavius' grain law, but not to C. Gracchus', is, of course, a political judgment; one could query whether the same did not apply to Gracchus' law inasmuch as no such legislation existed prior to its enactment. 73 In primis autem videndum erit ei qui rempublicam administrabit ut suum quisque teneat. . .] Cf. ad 1.20-21. perniciose enim Philippus in tribunatu, cum legem agrariam ferret, quam tamen antiquari facile passus est—capitalis oratio, ad aequationem bonorum pertinens!] Philippus' tribunate is generally placed in 104 {MRR, 1, 560 [with a question mark]; Miinzer, RE 14.2 (19301, 1562.57 ff.); he will have let fall the deprecated remark in a contio supporting his bill (cf. orat., 266-67); on his later career cf. ad % 59.—Philippus, a fiery extemporaneous speaker in contiones,72 doubtless intended to stir envy of the rich; the remark could thus, pace Heilmann, 116, be seen as implicitly "pointing to an equal ization of property," though the immediate goal was to promote his rogatio frumentaria; cf. Millar, 1986, 7.—Festus (p. 26M) offers the following definition with implicit etymology: antiquare est in morem pristinum reducere, i.e., annul, cancel. Philippus' behavior was similar to but less extreme than Piso's in the aftermath of the Bona Dea scandal: in hac causa Piso amicitia P. Clodi ductus operant dat ut ea rogatio quam ipse fertt et fert ex senatus consulto et de religione, antiquetur (Att. 1.13.3; 25 January 61). Gruen, 1968, 164, n. 38, and 210, surmises that the agricultural bill, put forward with no great conviction, was a ploy by which Philippus hoped to win a popular following.—For the phrase populariter agere cf. Ver. 2.1.151, where Hortensius, piqued that Cicero had produced in court the ward P. Junius, dressed in the rags to which he had been reduced by Verres' scam in the letting of a contract for temple repairs, is reported to have complained that Cicero was resorting to such tactics. hanc enim ob causam maxime, ut sua tenercntur, respublicae civitatesque constitutae sunt, nam, etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen spe custodiae rerum suarum urbium praesidia quaerebant.J There were two
72. Cf. a propos a later contio de Orat. 1.24 (= orat., 267): cum igitur vehementius invebcretur in causam principum consul Philippus. . . , as well as the reaction of Crassus described at de Orat. 3.2 (= oral., 267):. . . vehementer commotus oratione ea, quae ferebatur habita esse in contione a Philippo . . . ; de Orat. 2.316 suggests that he tended to speak extemporaneously: ... Philippum,quiitasoletsurgereaddicendum,utquodprimumverbumhabiturussitnesciat.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 72-74
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basic ancient theories of the origin of society, one based on human weakness, the other based on the social instinct; cf. F. Steinmetz (though not all of his attributions to Panaetius are convincing); von Fritz, 54 ff.; Griffin, 1976, 203, n. 1. The basic Panaetian doctrine on the subject is surely the foundational passage 1.11-12, which presents a combination of motives—the natural drive toward sociability with an implicit calculation of self-interest, since presumably the children will one day protect and provide for the parents. Our passage, while paying lip service in a subordinate clause to the natural sociability of the human being [etsi duce natura congregabantur homines), chooses to emphasize the guarding of property as a motive for the establish ment of cities. Possibly Panaetius distinguished sharply between natural so cial groupings such as the family and a formal state, such as that of the Medes, founded iustitiae fruendae causa ( § 4 1 ; iustitia is, of course, bound up to a considerable degree with property relations; cf. 1.20-21; Heinemann, 2, 212). 7 3 At the same time, as Perelli, 300, suggested, Cicero's emphasis on property in our text should be seen against the background of Roman traditions such as the Law of the XII Tables, which so fiercely defend property rights (cf. also ad $$ 72-85). 7 A Wood, 132, concludes on the basis of our passage that Cicero u is the first important social and political thinker to affirm unequivocally that the basic purpose of the state is the protection of private property." 74 danda etiam opera est ne, quod apud maiores nostros saepe ficbat propter aerarii tenuitatem adsiduitatemque bellorum, tributum sit conferendum . . .] The tributum refers to a property tax levied on each citizen accord ing to the censors' rating. The citizens* tributum had been dispensed with since Aemilius Paullus' Macedonian triumph in 167 (cf. § 76), since the income from the provinces and the continuing tributum from Macedonia and Illyria sufficed. The implicit premise is, as Long, 1995 1 ,235-36 pointed out, that "any intervention by government in the sphere of private owner ship, whether by taxation or appropriation, is as flagrantly wrong as an individual's theft of another individual's property." Cicero's foreboding that
73. This hypothesis would accord with a theory of the non-Panaetian provenance of 1.54: . . . prima societas in ipso coniugto est, proxima in hberis, detnde una domus, communia omnia; cf. ad h>c. 74. Cf. also Heinemann, 1, 31, n. 3, who argues that our passage presupposes ττόλις as both "city" and "state" and therefore seems likely to be based on a Greek source (i.e., Panaetius); but the letters to Atticus show that Cicero himself was quite capable of thinking in Greek terms. On the advantages of the urban environment cf. $ 15.
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the tributum might again be needed 75 proved all too accurate; it was revived the following summer on his own motion (App. BC 3.387; cf. Gelzer, 400); cf. Walter Schwann, RE 7A1 (1939), 8.15 ff.; Claude Nicolet, Tributum. Recherches sur la fiscalite directe sous la republique romaine, Antiquitas 1.24 (Bonn, 1976), esp. (on the reimposition of the tributum) 88. sin quae necessitas huius muneris alicui reipublicae obvenerit (malo enim < . . . dicere) quam nostrae ominari, neque tamen de nostra, sed de omni republics disputo),. . .1 After enim c reads alien(a)e, Q 1 extranea,76 modi fied by Fedeli, Gnomon 37 (1965), 263, to extraneae; but these readings fail to satisfy since Cicero has phrased the matter not in terms of a foreign state but in general terms. The best solution so far proposed is Winterbottom's ita dicere (after Sydow's dicere); Heine had already cited Att. 13.42.1 but had denied any need to supplement our passage; there we read the report of a conversation with his nephew Quintus: 'sed me maxime angit avunculus'. 'quidnamV inquam. 'quod mibV inquit 'iratus est', 'cur pateris?' in quam, 'malo enim ita dicere quam cur committisV One might also contemplate dicere generatim (for generatim cf. Luc. 47), which can easily have fallen out by saut du meme au meme after enim.—Once again it becomes clear that, though he uses a general formulation, a specific agenda tied to the current situation underlies Cicero's remarks; cf. § 45. atque etiam omnes qui rempublicam gubernabunt consulere debebunt ut earum rerum copia sit quae sunt ad victum necessariae.] Cicero is prepared to concede this much to the proponents of leges frumentariae (see ad § 72 above a propos M. Octavius). The point is already implicit at Sest. 1 0 4 - 6 (March, 56), where Cicero argues that factional warfare is a thing of the past and the commons have, apart from some hired troublemakers, embraced otium; on the political agenda of this speech cf. Strasburger, 1956, 68. 75 Caput autem est in omni procuratione negotii et muneris publici ut avaritiae pellatur etiam minima suspicio.] The point is repeated from $ 5 8 . The avaritia of the aristocracy was, of course, a rallying-cry of the Populares; cf. Sallust/ug. 41.9: ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo modestiaque invadere, polluere et vastare omnia . . . Cicero parts company with the Populares in seeing the solution in the moral regeneration of the aristocrats, not the reform of the system.—Cf. Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip. 822a (under Panaetian influence?): ού μήι> διά τούτο μικρολογητεον tv τοΐ? νζνομισμένοις φιλοτιμή75. Cf. the similar hint at Phil. 2.93: ubi est septiens miltens quod est in tabulis quae sunt ad Opts? funestae illius quidem pecuniae, sed tamen quae nos, si eis quorum erat non redderetur, a tnbutis pnsstt vindicate. 76. Cf. Wintcrbottom, 1993, 218, n. 21.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 74-75
467
μασι, των πραγμάτων εύπορίαν παρεχόντων ώς μάλλον οι πολλοί μη μετα δίδοντα των ιδίων πλούσιον ή πένητα των δημοσίων κλεπτοντα δι' εχθου^ έχουσιν. ύπεροψίαν τοϋτο και περιφρόνησιν αυτών εκείνο δ' ανάγκην ηγούμενοι. 'utinam' inquit C. Pontius Samnis *ad ilia tempora me fortuna reservavisset et mm essem natus, quando Romani dona accipere coepissent. non essem passus diutius eos impcrare'.] Cf. Sen. 4 1 : quocirca nihil esse tarn detestabile tamque pestiferum quam voluptatem, siquidem ea cum maior esset atque longinquior, omne animi lumen exstingueret. haec cum Cato Pontio Samnite, patre eius a quo Caudino proelio Sp. Postumius T. Veturius consules superati sunt, locutum Archytam, Nearchus Tarentinus hospes noster, qui in amicitia populi Romani permanserat, se a maioribus natu accepisse dice bat; cum quidem ei sermoni interfuisset Plato Atheniensis, quern Tarentum venisse L. Camillo Ap. Cbudio consulibus reperio. Students of de Officiis are divided as to whether the C. Pontius named in our passage is the victor of the Caudine Forks (321; so Testard ad loc. and the older commentators gener ally) or his father of the same name, a kind of Samnite Anacharsis, referred to at Sen. 41 (so Powell ad loc. and F. Miinzer, RE 22.1 [1953], 31.63). A reference to the victor of 321 seems very likely, however; surely if Cicero had meant the father of the more famous man, he would have had to indicate the fact expressly, as in Sen. 4 1 . The remark is likely to have been the Samnite general's commentary on the famous anecdote of the incorruptibility of Curius Dentatus (on which cf. Harris, 65 and n. 5 and 66 and n. 3); thus, as Soltau, 1240, suspected, an annalist (probably of Sudan date) will have provided Cicero with this curious vaticinium ex eventu. ne illi multa saecula exspectanda fuerant;...] Liv. per. 11 has Q. Fabius Maximus Gurges put the Samnite leader to death after leading him in tri umphal procession (in 292; 290 according to the Acta triumph.; cf. Miinzer, RE 6 [1909], 1799.19 ff.).—Ne is, of course, the affirmative particle ("truly"), not the adverb/conjunction; cf. OLD s.v. ne2; Douglas ad Brut. 249. nondum centum et decern anni sunt cum de pecuniis reperundis a L. Pisone lata lex est, nulla antea cum fuisset.] The first law de repetundis was carried during his tribunate (149; MRR 1, 459) by L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi (cos. 133), a special favorite of Cicero (cf. Ver. 2.4.56-57; Font. 39; his greatgrandson was Tullia's first husband; cf. Miinzer, RE 3.1 [1897], 1391.10 ff.); it created the first quaestio perpetua (Brut. 106); cf. Rotondi, 292; Miinzer, RE 3 (1899), 1392.11 ff.; Duncan Cloud in CAH 9\ 505 ff.; John Richardson, ibid., 578. The absence of previous legislation on the subject was not, as Cicero implies, simply due to the probity of earlier Roman
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officials; cf. Kleinfeller, RE 2A1 (1920), 603.63 ff.; Walter Eder, Das vorsullanische Repetundenverfabren (diss. Munich, 1969), 6 ff.; G. Forsythe, T h e Political Background of the lex Calpurnia of 149 B.C.," The Ancient World 17 (1988), 109-19. As praetor of 66 Cicero had himself been charged with the presidency of the quaestio de repetundis; cf. MRR, 2, 152. at vero postea tot leges et proximae quaeque duriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantum {Italicum} bellum propter iudiciomm metum excitatum, tanta sublatis legibus et iudiciis cxpilatio direptioque sociorum, ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute valeamus.) The following comprise major republi can legislation de repetundis after the lex Calpurnia (renewed apparently by the lex lunia, which Rotondi, 306-7, dates to 149-23): the lex Acilia of 123-22 (Rotondi, 312-13); the lex Servilia of 111 (Rotondi, 322); the lex Cornelia of 81 (with a query, Rotondi, 360); and the lex lulia of 59 (Rotondi, 389 ff.). The lex Acilia stipulated an indemnity double the amount embez zled; by the lex lulia the penalty was fourfold. Loss of civil rights, which could be entailed as early as the Servilian Law, was probably eliminated by Sulla, 77 but restored by Caesar (cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 729). On the crimen repetundarum cf. in general Mommsen, Strafr., 705 ff. and Kleinfeller (loc. cit. in previous note). Despite all these measures the exploitation of provin cials continued to be a problem; cf. Brunt, 1976, 188-89 = 320-21.—M. Livius Drusus' law of 91, which removed from the equites the right to sit on juries, was, as Cicero observes, among the causes of the Social War (in which he himself served; cf. Gelzer, 5-6); cf. Rotondi, 313-14 and 337; on Drusus' political program cf. in general E. Gabba in CAH 9 2 , 111 ff.; on Cicero's varied depictions of the Social War cf. Meyer, 68 and n. 2.—In general, the leges and the iudicia were for Cicero the two foundations of the respublica, the loss of which, together with the mistreatment of allies, he laments at §§ 2 7 - 2 9 ; cf. Diehl, 2 5 - 2 6 . The ominous words ut imbecillitate aliorum, non nostra virtute valeamus are foreshadowed in the earlier passage by the words parietes modo urbis stant et manent (§ 29). 76 laudat African urn Panactius quod fuerit abstinens.. . . laus abstinentiae non hominis est solum, scd etiam temporum illorum.j All evidence points to a special closeness of Scipio Aemilianus and Panaetius, who lived for a time at Scipio's house and accompanied him on an embassy to the East; cf. frr. 8 if. (our passage is fr. 13); Pohlenz, RE 18.3 (1949), 422.1 ff.; Astin, 297. It is debatable whether, as Malirz, citing 1.3.4-7, thought, 78 the abstinentia of Africanus was connected with his admiration of Xenophon's Cyropaedia 77. If so, Cicero's description proximae quaeque duriores is nor strictly accurate. 78. Jiirgen Malitz, Die Historten des Poseidomos, Zetcmata 79 (Munich, 1983), 251, n. 83.
Commentary on Book 2, Section 75-76
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(attested by Cic. QF 1.1.23 and Tusc. 2.62); cf. Astin, 16, who emphasizes the work's pragmatic outlook. Moreover, Malitz's notion (133-34) that our passage refers to Scipio's role in bringing the Numantine War to an end is doubtful on chronological grounds (see introduction, $ 5 [2]); the sequel suggests that Panaetius had the defeat of Carthage in mind.—On the "ethical golden age n of Rome to which Cicero alludes several times in this work cf. ad SS 2 6 - 2 7 and 3.111; Font. 39; Cael. 40: verum haec genera virtutum non solum in moribus nostris sed vix iam in libris reperiuntur. It is very difficult to evaluate such claims, but Polybius for one was convinced that the Romans of his day set a higher standard than Greeks in the handling of public monies (6.56.13-15). omni Macedonum gaza, quae fuit maxima, potitus est Paulus; tantum in aerarium pecuniae invexit ut unius imperatoris praeda finem attulerit tributorum. at hie nihil domum suam intulit praeter memoriam nominis sempiternam.] Veil. 1.9.6 gives the figure as 200 million sesterces. This account of the probity of L. Aemilius Paullus after his defeat of Perseus in 168 is repeated by V. Max. (4.3.8, based on our passage) and Plutarch {Paul. 4.4: . . . €is 'Ρώμηι> ίπανήλθο', ουδέ δραχμή μιςί yt-γονώς 6υπορωτ€ρο? από της στρατέίας). On the other hand, he did retain Perseus' library, give presents to friends and kinsmen as well as 100 denarii to each soldier in his triumph, and embellish Rome and other Italian cities with the spoils; cf. Shatzman, 2 4 3 44. Paullus' probity needs to be seen, however, against the background of other commanders of the period, such as M'. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191), hero of Thermopylae, or the brothers L. (cos. 190) and P. Scipio (Africanus), victors over Antiochus III at Magnesia ad Sipylum, who returned home to face controversies over their use of the booty; cf. Erich S. Gruen, The Helle nistic World and the Coming of Rome, 1 (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1984), 228-29. On the end of the tribute cf. Reiter, 138-39, and ad $ 74 above. imitatus patrem Africanus nihilo locupletior Carthagine eversa.] The defeat of Carthage in 146 may not have personally enriched Africanus (cf. Plb. 18.35.9-10), but he used some of the proceeds for distribution to provincial towns and for the celebration of games; cf. Shatzman, 249. On imitatio patris and its limits cf. 1.116 and 121.—On the ablative phrase Carthagine eversa modifying locupletior cf. Laughton, 113. qui eius conlega fuit in censura, L. Mummius, numquid copiosior, cum copiosissimam urbem funditus sustulisset?) Though after the destruction of Corinth in 146 (cf. 1.35), L. Mummius built a temple to Hercules, feasted the people, and embellished public buildings in Rome, Italy, and the provinces, he took nothing for himself; Plin. Nat. 34.36 reports that he could not even
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provide his daughter with a dowry. Possibly Cicero's words Italia ornata domus ipsa mihi videtur ornatior hint that her dowry was, in fact, paid by the senate (attested at Fron. Str. 4.3.15). Cf. Shatzman, 255. For the joint censorship of Africanus and Mummius (142) cf. MRR, 1, 4 7 4 - 7 5 . 77 Nullum igitur vitium taetrius est, ut eo unde egressa est referat se oratio, quam avaritia, praesertim in principibus et rempublicam gubernantibus. habere enim quaestui rempublicam non modo turpe est sed sceleratum etiam et nefarium.) Reference back to the beginning of $ 75. The "detour" con sisted of a series of examples of the Roman "ethical golden age" prior to the onset of avaritia; did Panaetius supply corresponding Greek examples, which, apart from the following case of Sparta, Cicero omitted? Cf. SS 2 6 29, where it was likewise the accumulation of Roman examples that formed the content of the (openly acknowledged) digression. On the severity of the offense cf. Arist. EN 1122a3: τους γάρ τά μ€γάλα μη oOev 6k δ α λαμβάνον τας, μηδέ α δ ά , ού λέγομ€ν άν€λ€υθέρους, οίον τους τυράννους πόλας πορθοΟντας και iepa συλώντας, άλλα πονηρούς μάλλον και άσ^ρΥϊς και αδίκους. Cicero has in mind the self-aggrandizement of Antony and other Caesarians in light of their victory in the civil war; cf. ad 1.138-40 and SS 27-29.—If habere. . . quaestui etc. has a familiar ring, the phrase sometimes figures as a parade-example of the predicative dative; cf. James Mountford, "Bradley's Arnold" Latin Prose Composition (London, 1938), $ 260 and Exercise 32. A.9. Cicero contrasts profit with glory as a motive for political activity at Phil. 1.29 and 2.115. . . . quod Apollo Pythius oraculum edidit, Spartam nulla re alia nisi avaritia esse perituram,. . .] The oracle ά φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν όλεΐ is supposed to have been given to the eighth-century Spartan kings Alcamenes and Theopompus (Plut. Inst. Lac. 239f); it attained proverbial status (cf. Zenob. 2.24 cum adn.). . . . id videtur non solum Lacedaemoniis sed etiam omnibus opulentis populis praedixisse.] Sparta appeared as a warning example for Rome at § 26 (mistreatment of allies) and will again at S 80 (agrarian reform); on Cicero's "broadening" of Greek examples cf. ad % 41. nulla autem re conciliare facilius benivolentiam multitudinis possum ii qui reipublicae praesunt quam abstinentia et continentia.] Cicero here connects the topic of abstinenta/avoidance of avaritia with the general subject of this Book {conciliare benivolentiam multitudinis). The reason why abstinentia has this effect has already been suggested at SS 3 7 - 3 8 . Cf. also Arist. EN 1121bl5: οι γάρ πολλοί φιλοχρήματοι μάλλον ή δοτικοί. 78-85 These chapters comprise "the fullest and most famous discussion of the law and economics of debt" from the ancient world (Frederiksen, 138).
Commentary on Book 2, Section 76-78
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Cicero stands firmly within the traditional Roman view of debt and its repayment explicitly formulated at Gel. 20.1.39 ff.: omnibus quidem virtutum generibus exercendis colendisque populus Romanus e parva origine ad tantae amplitudinis instar emicuit, sed omnium maxime atque praecipue fidem coluit sanctamque habuit tarn privatim quam publice. . . . banc autem fidem maiores nostri non modo in officiorum vicibus, sed in negotiorum quoque contractibus sanxerunt maximeque in pecuniae mutuaticae usu atque commercio: adimi enim putaverunt subsidium hoc inopiae temporariae, quo communis omnium vita indiget, si perfidia debitorum sine gravi poena eluderet. Cicero's debt-relief policies remained constant throughout the course of his career. A man of fairly considerable means by 64 when he ran for consul, he owed his victory not least to his stalwart opposition to the debt relief advocated by his rival candidate, Catiline (cf. ad $ 84 below). In connection with his opposition to the rogatio agraria of L. Flavius he tells Atticus quite explicitly: is enim est noster exercitus, hominum, ut tute sets, locupletium {Att. 1.19.4; 15 March 60). During his exile he suffered some financial setbacks, including damage inflicted by Clodius and his followers to the villas at Tusculum and Formiae, inadequately compensated by the senate according to Att. 4.2.5 (cf. Shatzman, 407). Still worse, he lost large sums lent to the Pompeian side in the civil war (cf. Shatzman, 421-22). Neverthe less at the time of composition of Off. he was a man of greater means than he had been in the 60s; cf. Andre Lichtenberger, De Ciceronis re privata (these Paris, 1895); Shatzman, 403-25, including at 408 a list of his estates by date of purchase, and 416-20 (Cicero's creditors and debtors). Hence it is un surprising that his views on debt relief remained unchanged. The target of Cicero's attack is first described in general terms ($ 78: qui . . . se Populares volunt). Next Greek examples are narrated, the policies of Agis IV of Sparta, invoked as a counterpart to the Gracchi, and Aratus of Sicyon as an example of how property disputes can be resolved without resort to force. The treatment of the topic culminates in a diatribe against the debt-relief measures of Caesar (not mentioned by name) and a reaffirmation of the policies of his own consulate. The lesson is underlined with an empha tic coda in hymnic style [haec magnorum hominum—et graham et gloriam: §85). 78 Qui vero se populares volunt—ii labefactant fundamenta reipublicae, concordiam primum, quae esse non potest cum aliis adimuntur, aliis condonantur pecuniae,.. .] The leges agrariae (133) of Tiberius Gracchus were, of course, the first and most famous attempts to redistribute the public lands of Italy; cf. Rotondi, 298 ff.; Stockton, 40-60; Flach, 38 ff. In the course of his
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successful opposition during his consulate to the rogatio agraria of Servilius Rullus, Cicero maintained that he was not opposed in principle to such legislation (cf. Gelzer, 73; Walcot, 124; ad $§ 72 and 74 above; on the whole episode cf. T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9 2 , 349-51). When in 60 he supported, in Pompey's interest, the agrarian bill of L. Flavius, he represented himself to Atticus as seeing to it that no existing property relations were disturbed (Att. 1.19.4: ego autem . . . confirmabam omnium privatorum possessiones; cf. 2.1.6; Cicero's claims on the subject are, however, put into perspective by Flach, 76 ff.; cf. also T.P. Wiseman in CAH 9\ 365). On Cicero's political program of concordia in relation to property holdings in general cf. Strasburger, 1956, 62. By 56 Cicero concluded (too hastily) that factional strife over such issues was a thing of the past (Sest. 104-6). Cf. also ad § 84 below; Chr. Meier, RE Suppl. 10 (1965), 609.1 ff. . . . aequitatem, quae tollitur omnis si habere suum cuique non licet.] Cf. 1.20-21 and, for the sense of aequitas, ad § 30. id enim est proprium, ut supra dixi, civitatis atque urbis, ut sit libera et non sollicita suae rei cuiusque custodia.] Cf. $ 73. 79 atque in hac pernicie reipublicae ne illam quidem consequuntur quam putant gratiam.] Contrast § 85 below (haec genera officiorum qui persequuntur . . . ipsi adipiscentur et gratiam et gloriam). Note that gratia has repeatedly served as a criterion for benefactions in the preceding chapters (SS 60, 64, 69 [bis]). The connection between the insecurity of private prop erty (because of the civil wars and proscriptions) and the pernicies reipublicae has already been drawn at SS 2 6 - 2 9 . nam cui res erepta est, est inimicus, cui data est, etiam dissimulat se accipere voluisse, et maxime in pecuniis creditis occultat suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse solvendo.] Cicero has put his finger on a real problem for those proposing debt relief: saving face for the debtors. In view of a crisis involving a shortage of cash and the collapse of land values, as an alternative to tabulae novae, Caesar carried a law in 49 allowing repayment of debt in property rather than specie and based upon an aestimatio of the prewar value of the property. Caesar states that he was motivated inter alia by a wish to preserve the reputation of debtors (ad debitorum tuendam existimationem [BC 3.1.31); cf. Frederiksen, 135, who suggests that the Lex lulia de bonis cedend is (which he dates to 46/45; but cf. Rotondi, 415, who gives it to Augustus) was devised to solve this very problem of the disgrace attached to insolvency, since it allowed the debtor to "cede" his land in settlement of debt, retain enough to secure his livelihood, and not suffer infamia as a result.—On solvendo esse, a fixed formula from the language of public officials, cf. Pentti Aalto, Untersuchungen iiber das lateiniscbe Gerundium
Commentary on Book 2, Section 78-80
473
und Gerundivum (Helsinki, 1949), 64, who cites among other testimonies Att. 13.10.3 (18 (?) June 45), a discussion of Magius* motive for murdering Marcellus: quamquam nihil habeo quod dubitem nisi ipsi Magio quae fuerit causa amentiae; pro quo quidetn etiam sponsor sum factus, et nimirum id fuit. solvendo enim non erat. credo eum petisse a Marcello aliquid et ilium, ut erat, constantius respondisse (where Shackleton Bailey translates the under lined words "he was ruined"). at vero ille qui accepit iniuriam et meminit et prae se fert dolorem suum, nee, si plures sunt ii quibus improbe datum est quam illi quibus iniuste ademptum est, idcirco plus etiam valent. non enim numero haec iudicantur sed pondere.J This last statement will come as no surprise to those familiar with the way, even in modern democracies, special interest groups exercise an influ ence on policy far out of proportion to their numbers. Lily Ross Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic, PMAAR 20 (Rome, 1960), 297 ff., describes the control noble families exercised over the apportionment of new citizens among existing tribes or the creation of new ones. quam autem habet aequitatem ut agrum multis annis aut etiam saeculis ante possessum qui nullum habuit habeat, qui autem habuit amittat?] Nicolet, 156, sees in these words an echo of the arguments used by opponents of the Gracchan agrarian reforms and compares Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9.3, App. BC 1.44, and Flor. 2.1, the last a passage that N. Hapke, C. Sempronii Gracchi oratoris fragmenta collecta et illustrata (diss. Munich, 1915), 73 (with dou ble question mark), connected with C. Gracchus (cf. Stockton, 224-25); it does not follow, however, that Panactius already took account of the Grac chan reforms (see ad § 80 below). 80 ac propter hoc iniuriae genus Lacedaemonii Lysandrum ephonim expulerunt, Agim regem, quod numquam antea apud eos acciderat, necaverunt, exque eo tempore tantae discordiae secutae sunt ut et tyranni exsisterent et Optimates exterminarentur et praeclarissime constituta respublica dilaberetur.] Agis IV used his influence to help Lysander become ephor in 243. In view of the reduction in the number of citizens to 700, of whom only 100 possessed property, reform was urgently needed. The plan was to abolish debts, divide the land of the Spartiates into 4,500 equal plots, increase the citizenry to this number by addition of foreigners and περίοικοι, and assign a plot to each citizen. When the bill failed by one vote in the γ€ρουσία, Lysander prosecuted King Leonidas for violation of the laws and caused him to be replaced by his son Cleomenes. When the new ephors, who took office in autumn, 242, opposed the reforms, the reform party had recourse to violence, drove the ephors and Leonidas from the land, and elected new ephors. The reforms had gone as far as the cancellation of debt
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when, at the request of Aratus, Agis agreed to lead a Spartan contingent to help the Achaean league against the Aetolians. When he returned, he found that his support had dwindled and the reforms had come to a standstill. The opponents of reform rose up, gained control of the city, and restored Leonidas to the throne. Agis took refuge in a temple hut was seized while returning from the baths by the ephor Amphares; after a brief hearing before the hostile γ€ρουσία, he was put to death (autumn, 241); cf. Plut. Agis; F.W. Walbank in CAH 7.1*, 252 ff.; P. Cartledge in Paul Cartledge and A. Spawforth, Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities (London and New York, 1989), 38 ff. The Spartan constitution, though praised by Plato (cf. Lg. 69Id ff. and 712d-e, but note also the criticism at 666e), could hardly be said to be praeclarissime constituta in Agis' day; on social condi tions in mid-third century Sparta cf. in general Pavel Oliva, Sparta and Her Social Problems (Amsterdam and Prague, 1971), 208 ff. A. Fuks, "NonPhylarchean Tradition of the Program of Agis IV," CQ 12 (1962), 118-21, esp. 120-21, finds in our passage a tradition about Agis' reforms indepen dent of Phylarchus, the source of Plutarch's Life. Though Fuks is right in seeing, after Pohlenz, AF, 116, that hoc iniuriae genus refers back to the first sentence of § 78 (ut possessores pellantur suis sedtbus, aut pecunias creditas debitoribus condonandas put ant, corresponding to γης αναδασμός and χρ€ώι> αποκοπή, two of the features of Agis' program according to Plutarch), it does not follow, just because Lysander's fate in the sequel is mentioned by Cicero/Pa naeti us but not by Plutarch, that Phylarchus cannot have narrated it. For exque eo tempore— Fuks compares the similar description of the decline of Sparta at Plb. 4.81.13: ΐΈλος πλείστων μέν πόνων και στάσεων εμφυλίων πεΐραν ίΐχον, πλείστοις δ' έπάλαισαν αναδασμοί? και φυγαΐς, πικροτάτης δέ δουλείας πεΐραν ελαβον έως της Νάβιδος τυραννίδος . . . His conclusion that "Cicero may be using Polybius" seems unlikely, however, even if one substitutes "Panaetius" for "Cicero"; for Agis was surely named in Panaetius* source, whereas Polybius fails to mention him by name. nee vero solum ipsa cecidit, sed etiam reliquam Graeciam evertit contagionibus malorum, quae a Lacedaemoniis profecta emanarunt latius.] No doubt Cicero added this comment to give these events a larger significance and greater weight in the eyes of his Roman readers (cf. ad § 41).—Contagio is used by Cicero of contact with malign influences of various kinds; cf. Lommatzsch, TLL 4, 625.57 ff., 626.22 ff. (though Livy still thought the usage bold enough to warrant a velut at 5.6.11: an est quicquam quod Veientibus optatum aeque contingere possit quam ut seditionibus primum urbs Romana, deinde velut ex contagione castra impleantur?); the use of manare (which appeared previously of the individual virtues "flowing" from
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 80 and 81-83a
475
the honestum: 1.61 and 152) with reference to wickedness is paralleled at Phil. 13.36, where, however, the use of fons assists the metaphor: nonne cemitis ex uno fonte omnia scelera manaref Contrast Mur. 78: latius patet illius sceleris contagio quam quisquam putat. . . quid? nostros Gracchos, Ti. Gracchi summi viri filios, Africani nepotes, nonne agrariae contentiones perdidenint?] The Gracchi suggest themselves as a Roman counterpart to Agis to illustrate the "ingratitude" that reformers can expect and that non . . . numero haec iudicantur, sea pondere ($ 79).79 Cf. ad % 43, where Ti. Gracchus pere is likewise mentioned and praised as a foil for his disapproved sons.—Nicolet, 157, queries whether Panaetius al ready contrasted the Gracchi with Aratus; cf. introduction, $ 5 (2). 81 -83a These sections recount in detail the story of Aratus of Sicyon and culminate in Cicero's supreme encomium on a foreigner (o virum magnum dignumque qui in republica nostra natus essett). He is invoked as an alterna tive to the statesmanship of those qui se Populares volunt ($ 78), an example of how concordia, rather than strife, can be brought about. At the head of a band of exiles he liberated Sicyon from the tyranny of Nicocles, then sailed to Egypt and persuaded Ptolemy Philadelphus to donate 150 talents, of which forty were paid immediately, the balance in installments (cf. Plut. Arat. 13.6; and on the voyage in general, ibid., 12-13; Walbank, 38 ff.). Thus equipped, he was made αυτοκράτωρ διαλλακτής and appointed a board of fifteen to help sort out property claims (Plut. Arat. 14.2).80 Ptolemy's support involved a special constellation of circumstances, including not only Aratus* diplomatic skill (he was able to deploy Sicyonian art to advantage), but also Ptolemy's wealth and wish to contain Macedonian expansion into the Peloponnese; cf. Niese, RE 2 (1896), 384.33 ff.; F.W. Walbank in CAH 7.1*, 246-47. Thus Aratus could hardly serve as a precise model for others; but surely the point is that solutions should be sought by peaceful, rather than violent means (cf. § 83: sic par est agere cum civibus. . .at Hie Graecus, id quod fuit sapientis et praestantis viri, omnibus consulendum putavit. . ,). 81 79. Cf. Plutarch's decision to set the Lives of the Gracchi in parallel with those of Agis (and Cleomencs) and his following essay comparing the two pairs of reformers. 80. Nicolet, 155, has confused the benefaction of Ptolemy, which enabled Aratus to provide compensation to some landowners, with the gift of 25 talents which, according to Plut. Arat. 11.2, Aratus received soon after the coup from a king, presumably Antigonus: cf. M. Holleaux, "Sur un passage de la vie d'Aratos par Plurarque," Hermes 41 (1906), 475-78, followed by Walbank, 35. 81. Heilmann, 128, remarks a propos the example of Aratus: "Dieses ohnc irgcndwelchc Einschrankungen als vorbildlich hingestellte Verhalten zeigt, daS hier nicht die Rucksichtnahme auf das Ganze bestimmend ist, sondern rum Nutzcn der Bcsitzcnden gedacht und gehandelt
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8 1 . . . Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur,.. .] Aratus was a controversial figure in antiquity; thus Phylarchus criticized him severely for giving Macedonia a foothold in the Peloponnese (cf. FGrHist 81 F 52, with Jacoby's note), whereas Polybius (2.47-48 and 56-57) defended him on the grounds that the alliance with Antigonus Doson was unavoidable; cf. F.W. Walbank in CAH 7 . 1 M 6 1 - 6 2 . . . . qui, cum eius civitas quinquaginta annos a tyrannis teneretur, profectus Argis Sicyonem clandestino introiru urbe est potitus—remque publicam adventu suo liberavit.] Plutarch (Arat. 7 ff.) provides a gripping narrative of the bold coup de main; cf. Walbank, 33 ff. and in CAH 7.1*, 2 4 3 - 4 4 . Although the twenty-year-old 82 Aratus had surprise on his side, Nicocles was able to escape (Plut. 9.2). In speaking of 600 exiles, Cicero/Panaetius is using a round figure; cf. Plut. 9.4: κατήγαγε δε φυγάδα? του? μεν υπό Νικοκλεου? έκπεπτωκότα? όγδοήκοντα, του? δ' επί των έμπροσθεν τυράννων ούκ έλάττου? πεντακοσίων, οι? μακρά μεν ή πλάνη και όμοΰ τι πεντηκονταετη? εγεγόνει. . . . et quinquaginta annorum possessiones movere non nimis aequum putabat, propterea quod tarn longo spatio multa . . . tenebantur sine injuria . . . .J For non nimis aequum = "none too fair* cf. OLD s.v. nimis 2. 82 cui cum exposuisset patriam se liberare velle causamque docuisset, a rege opulento vir summus facile impetravit ut grandi pecunia adiuvaretur.] On the use, common since Plautus, of grandis with pecunia and other terms for money cf. Blatt, TLL 6, 2182.59 ff. 83a ο vinim magnum dignumque qui in republica nostra nams esset!] The highest praise a Roman can give to a foreigner; cf. B. Alex. 15.1: Rhodiis navibus praeerat Euphranor, animi magnitudine ac virtute magis cum nostris hominibus quam cum Graecis comparandus. sic par est agere cum civibus, non, ut bis iam vidimus, hastam in foro ponere et bona avium voci subicere praeconis.] Cicero stresses the contrast to the hasta of Sulla and Caesar, already painted in such dark colors at §§ 27-29; thus the exemplum of Aratus bears both on fairness in distribution of lands and on property rights in general; cf. Gaillard, 521, n. 2. Besides the sale as wircL" But the story of Aratus presents the resolution of conflicting claims of two sets of property-owners with the aim of providing a solution satisfactory to both groups. In that sense it is an example of action in behalf of the whole. Moreover, Cicero need nor have intended it as a "model" in a narrow sense, rather than in the broad sense suggested above. Conceived as an exact model for Rome it would be absurd; perhaps a city-state could be rescued by the interven tion of a Ptolemy, but hardly an empire. There was only one Attalus. 82. Cf. Polyb. 2.43.3; Walbank, 175. Note that he was roughly the same age as young Marcus (cf. ad $ 87).
Commentary on Book 2, Section 81-84
477
booty of property confiscated in civil war, Cicero goes on to discuss two other forms of injustice regarding property, the remitting of rents to tenants and the cancellation of debts. 83b 'Habitent gratis in alieno'. 'quid ita? ut, cum ego emerim aedificarim tuear impendam, tu me invito fruare meo? quid est aliud aliis sua eripere, aJiis dare alien a? . . . ') Madvig, Opuscula academica, 2 (Copenhagen, 1887), 718-19 = Philologus 1 (1847), 143-44, led the way to the correct interpretation of this passage, with the first sentence as a statement (as if spoken by a tyrant such as Caesar), followed by the owner's quizzical quid ita? Since the dispossessed party is represented not only as having bought the property and built the house, but also as guarding and spending money on it (present tense: tuear, impendam), the situation is that of a tenant given remission of rent, a policy proposed by M. Caelius Rufus as praetor in 48 (Caes. BC 3.21.1-2; Dio 42.22.3) and again the following year by Dolabella (ibid., 42.32.2) and put into effect in the same year by Caesar (ibid., 42.51.1), though the remission was for one year only and eligibility was limited to those paying 2,000 sesterces or less; cf. Frederiksen, 133-34, who suggests that, by Dio's method of grouping, Caesar's measure really belongs to 48, not 47.—For the ablative of price (gratis) cf. OLD s.v. gratia 8; Austin ad Cael. 17. 84 quam ob rem ne sit aes alienum quod reipublicae noceat providendum est, quod multis rationibus caveri potest, non, si fuerit, ut locupletes suum perdant, debitores lucrentur alienum.] It is difficult to say what, if anything, Cicero had in mind in speaking of the "many methods" for preventing debt from arising to the detriment of the state. Frederiksen, 139-40, attempts to extrapolate from context: "It is not easy to see what form Cicero's own proposals would have taken, to which he refers—multis rationibus caveri potest (84). Did he believe that his own measures of 63 B.C. could be applied again? It seems rather that his solution might have been like that of Aratus— the creation of a fund by the state from which, perhaps, low-interest loans could be made, or even direct subsidies could be paid. . . . But if this was Cicero's suggestion, it might be thought to lack something in immediate efficacy, for it turned on the ultimate availability of money; Caesar knew no doubt better than he that it was not to be had." nee enim ulla res vehementius rempublicam continet quam fides . . .] Within the state fides occupies a position analogous to its role in ethical theory, where it was the fundamentum iustitiae (cf. ad 1.23; Schofield, 1995 2 , 81). numquam vehementius actum est quam mc consule ne solveretur. armis ct castris temptata res est ab omni genere hominum et ordine; quibus ita restiti
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ut hoc totum malum de republics tolleretur.] Here Cicero sketches the back ground to the "grave danger" during his consulate alluded to at 1.77. The main beneficiaries of cancellation of debts would have been indebted land owners, who were in jeopardy of losing their estates. For Catiline's followers tabulae novae were a major, perhaps the major issue; cf. Dio 37.30.2, as well as the Ciceronian evidence collected by Arthur Kaplan, Catiline: The Man and His Role in the Roman Revolution (New York, 1968), 76-77. Cicero appropriates for his own purposes the rhetoric of tabulae novae at Cat. 2.18. 8 3 After borrowing for the purchase of a house Cicero jokes about being ripe to join a conspiracy (Fam. 5.6.2; December, 62). at vero hie nunc victor mm quidem victus, quae cogitarat cum ipsius intererat, cum ea pcrfecit cum eius iam nihil interesset. tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit ut hoc ipsum eum delectaret peccare, etiam si causa non esset.] One might conclude from Cicero's words that Caesar had instituted tabulae novae, but this is not, in fact, the case (cf. ad §§ 79 and 83 above). In spite of fears of tabulae novae in December, 50, Caesar soon succeeded in calming the financial interests. His reforms were generally accepted as moderate even by those who, like Cicero's friend Paetus, lost money because of the aestimatio {Fam. 9.16.7; T. Frank 1,310 ff.).—The phrase turn quidem victus hints at Caesar's support for the Catilinarian conspiracy, a point Cicero made (also with respect to Crassus) in the Expositio or "secret memoirs,** which are attested in the correspondence with Articus and cited by Asconius and Dio 39.10.2-3; cf. Marshall ad Asc. 83.22; Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1267.16 ff.; fr. phil., pp. 2 4 - 2 7 and 89-92. According to Plut. Crass. 13.3, Cicero impli cated Crassus and Caesar in the conspiracy ev τινι λόγω published after the death of both (sc. Crassus and Caesar). This probably does not refer to an oration (the translation given, e.g., by B. Perrin, Plutarch's Livest 3 [Cam bridge, Mass., and London, 1916]), since we otherwise know of no oration that was held back and published after Caesar's death; this description would, however, fit the "secret memoirs**; cf. Garbarino, fr. phil., p. 25 and n. 59 and p. 90, fr. 1. If Att. 16.11.3 of 5 November [librum quern rogas perpoliam et mittam) refers to the avetcOoTov (Buchner, loc. cit., 1268.2, accepted by Shackleton Bailey ad 420.3 of his edition), then one might expect some overlapping of themes in these two works on which Cicero was working in tandem; might 3.73-85 give further hints of the tone and ten dency of this work? In any case, we have no knowledge of the evidence 83. In general on Cicero's "Kunst, die politischen Schlagworte der Zeit an sich zu reifien" cf. Strasburgcr, 1956,67.
Commentary on Book 2, Sections 84-85 and 86-87
479
behind Cicero's implication of Caesar in the conspiracy;84 cf. Gelzer, Caesar, 35, n. 39 (= Eng. tr. 39, n. 4) and 44 (= Eng. tr. 49). Even those who did not expect fair treatment of Caesar in a work written by this author at this time (cf. ad § 23 above) may find this a surprisingly implausible portrait of a skilled politician (. . . etiamsi causa non esset). The strain comes from trying to portray the sharpest possible contrast between the policies of Cicero's own consulate and those of Caesar. Hence Cicero asserts that Caesar was involved in Catiline's conspiracy and that, in spite of changed circumstances, he was semper idem. For the no less implausible lumping together of Caesar and Sulla cf. p. 393, n. 31 supra. 85 This summary of precepts on the utile—it might be called a peroration— comprises two stately periods, the first beginning as a descriptio [aberunt. . . dabunt; cf. ad 3.38) but then turning into an exhortation (augeant), the second falling into the anaphoric form (haec. . . haec. . . haec) characteris tic of hymns and rounded off by a clausula equivalent to a double cretic. This concluding sentence thus forms a pair, in structure and final rhythm, with the sentence omnium autem rerum—dignius, which caps the presentation of the honestum at 1.151. It shows how the utile of the individual and of the state are interwoven, since the individual who pursues the traditional path of Roman statesmanship wins glory for himself while contributing to the utilitas of the state; cf. Long, 1995», 231. . . . rempublicam augeant imperio agris vectigalibus.] This advice is not atypical of an unreflective acceptance of their imperium often found in Ro man writers of the time; cf. Brunt, 1976, 161 ff. = 291 ff. This precept had been carried out most notably in recent years in the Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar, whom Cicero in this essay is so keen to denounce (ibid., 163 = 293). 8 6 - 8 7 These sections present a critique by Antipater of Tyre of Panaetius' handling of the συμφέρον, which is, indeed, at least in Cicero's version, more narrowly defined than might have been anticipated; one might have expected a treatment, not merely of glory, but of the other elements of what Aristotle called ή ίκτός χορηγία (EN 1178a24; his division of goods: ibid., 1098bl2 ff.), namely care for one's health and money; cf. Gigon, 275-76. Panaetius did, however, have something to say on these matters, as Philippson, 1936 1 , 84. Possibly Crassus' visit ίο Cicero by night with a letter pertaining to the conspiracy, an incident Cicero narrated in his speech de Consulate Suo of 61 (cf. Plut. Crass. 13 J = oral, deperd. 28C; also included as fr. 1 of the Greek commentary de Consulate Suo at fr. phil., p. 88), was the basis for his belief in Crassus' participation.
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750, pointed out: on health cf. 1.106; on property, 1.12, 2 0 - 2 1 , 2.52 ff. (1.92 and 2.73, if Panaetian, would also belong here; cf. ad locos). Antipater, a pupil of Panaetius' student Stratocles of Rhodes and of Antidotus, is known to have written a treatise περί κόσμου in at least eight books (it remains unclear whether the several other titles "of Antipater" which Diogenes Laertius cites belong to our Stoic or to Antipater of Tarsus, cited in the following Book); a treatise περί τοϋ καθήκοντος has been posited on the basis of our passage (but might he have dealt with such matters within the π*ρΙ κόσμου?). He is also known to have introduced the younger Cato to Stoicism (Plut. Cat. mitt. 4.2). Our passage is the sole testimony for the date of his death. Cf. von Arnim, RE 1 (1894), 2516.5 ff. Did Cicero use Antipater's work himself, as Gigon, loc. cit., thought, or know it via an intermediary (Philippson, loc. cit., thinks of Athenodorus)? Despite the attractions of economy of hypothesis, there are problems with Philippson's view. Cicero describes the state of composition at the end of Book 2 this way: τα περί του καθήκοντος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus (Att. 16.11.4), and he goes on to say that he is seeking to obtain τά κεφάλαια of Posidonius' treatise on circumstantial appropriate action from Athenodorus Calvus. The quoted words claim, strictly speaking, that the Panaetian handling of the topic (τά περί του καθήκοντος, quatenus Pan aetius) is complete; but surely by juxtaposing the three Panaetian books with two of his own, Cicero suggests that he now has two finished books. Such evidence as we have for the addition of material to Off. suggests an inartistic grafting at a point determined less by attention to the argument than the time when the need occurred to the author (cf. Index of Authors s.v. u Cicero, M. Tullius [the orator], de Officiis, afterthoughts"), though addition of matter is admittedly easier at the end of a Book. But would Cicero have added some thing to a Book he considered complete? And even if he changed his mind and decided to do so, would he have been likely to find relevant citation of Antipater in a summary of Posidonius' treatise on circumstantial appropriate action? It is not obvious that he would (on material supplied by Athenodorus cf. also introduction to Book 3). All in all, it seems easier to assume that Cicero obtained his knowledge of Antipater from a reading of the man's own writings, especially since he has some interest in or at least knowledge of his activities. 86 sed valetudo sustentatur notitia sui corporis, et observatione quae res aut prodesse soleant aut obesse, et continentia in victu omni atque cultu {cor poris tucndi causa praetermittendis voluptatibus), postremo arte eorum quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent.] Heine had already branded praetermit tendis voluptatibus as an interpolation on grounds of the asyndetic connec-
Commentary on Book 2, Section 86-87 481 tion and the fact that this idea is already implicit in the words continentia in victu omni atque cultu corporis; Bruser, 107, added the athetesis of tuendi causa, since the protection of the body is implied in valetudo sustentatur, Winterbottom (in his apparatus ad /oc), the likewise unnecessary corporis. 87 has res commodissime Xenophon Socraticus persecutus est in eo libro qui Oeconomicus inscribitur, quern nos, ista fere aetate cum essemus qua es tu nunc, e Graeco in Latinum convertimus.] Xenophon's treatment of the topic may perhaps, as Philippson, he. cit. ad §$ 86-87, thought likely, have been cited by Antipater. Cicero will not necessarily have needed this prompting, however, and, in any case, he gives the citation a twist related to one of his own purposes in writing: the example of his own youthful precocity may give young Marcus the spur he needs (cf. Att. 6.1.12, cited in the introduction, § 4). Born in summer 65 (Att. 1.2.1), the addressee was twenty-one at the date of writing. On the influence of Xenophon's Oeconomicus cf. in general H.R. Breitenbach, RE 10A2 (1967), 1871.37 ff.; for the Ciceronian version cf. testimonia and fragments at fr. phil., pp. 65 ff. sed toto hoc de genere—de qua hoc libro disputatum est.] Unger's transposi tion of these two sentences (transmitted just prior to reliqua deinceps persequemur in § 90) is accepted by all recent editors except K. Biichner.85 The material in question is clearly meant to terminate Antipater's points about valetudinis curatio et pecuniae. The error is a simple case of saut du mime au meme (sed. . . sed); when the scribe noticed his error, he reinserted the lost matter at a point where space allowed, namely where space was left free for the title of the following Book; cf. Havet, 396.—Ad lanum medium desig nated the banker's district at Rome; cf. Cic. Phil. 6.15: sed ilia statua pal mares de qua, si meliora tempora essent, non possem sine risu dicere: 'L. ANTONIO Α ΙΑΝΟ MEDIO PATRONO'. itanef iam lanus medius in L. Antoni clientela est? quis umquam in illo lano inventus est qui L. Antonio mille nummum ferret expensumf and Phil. 7.16; Hor. 5. 2.3.18-19 and Ep.
85. Instead Biichner brackets sed toto hoc de genere . . . disputatum est. Besides the mis placement of the material in the manuscripts, which he finds implausible, he poses the following objections to the transposed text: 1) the connection with sed (but surely this relatively mild adversative, which appears elsewhere as a kind of transitional formula |cf. 3.5|, is inoffensive; cf. Thomas, 22, n. 35); 2) the comparative commodius following so soon after the superlative commodissime (this is a problem, but Cicero could be much less sensitive to repetitions than one might expect; cf. Thomas, 70-71; and commodius is relative to the terms of its comparison; since Xenophon could hardly be called a school philosopher, no contradiction is entailed); 3) the application of disputari to bankers (but surely the verb has been chosen on account of the nearer referent, the school philosophers).
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1.1.54 (with Kieftling-Heinzea^ locos); Ov. Kern. 561; on the moneylenders' status and influence cf. C. Nicolet in CAH 9 2 , 642. 88 With this rather perfunctory comparison of utilia Cicero executes another point promised in 1.10.1 suspect that, as in SS 153-61 (see ad loc.)y he did little specific preparation for this section. The advice given is obvious and not supported by philosophical argument or Greek examples; thus the various hypotheses about a possible Greek source 86 seem otiose. ipsa inter se corporis sic, ut bona valetudo voluptati anteponatur . . .] Cf. 1.106 [itaque victus cultusque corporis ad valetudinem referatur et ad vires, non ad voluptatem). . . . anteponatur . . . gloria divitiis . . .] Similarly Arist. EN 1123b20 re garded τιμή as the greatest of the external goods; cf. also 1.83. 89 This anecdote, quoted also by Col. 6 praef. 4 - 5 and Plin. Nat. 18.29-30, probably derives from a collection of Cato's αποφθέγματα; cf. ad 1.104. Pliny gives only the first two responses, Columella the first three (he adds the third with some embarrassment, since he knows that male pascere can be ruinous). Pliny explains the underlying principle this way: summa omnium in hoc spectando fuit, ut fructus is maxime probaretur, qui quam minimo inpendio constaturus esset. The fourth reply, whether historical or not, is certainly in line with Cato's known views; cf. Agr. 1.1, cited ad 1.150. This ending forms a pair with that of the main argument of Book 1, which likewise concludes with a favorable comparison of agriculture with other quaestus (1.150-51) and an allusion to the Elder Cato (albeit in the earlier passage it was actually to Cicero's essay).
86. Philippson, 1936', 750, and Gigon, 274, suspecied Posidonius; Pohlenz, Off Ill, 2, n. 1, Athenodorus Calvus.
Commentary on Book 3 . . . antiquum offici rationem dilexit, cuius splendor omnis his moribus obsolevit. —Cic. Quinct. 59 h'mc denique aequitas, temperantia, fortitudo, prudentia, virtutes omnes certant cum iniquitate, luxuria, ignavia, temeritate, cum vitiis omnibus . . . —Cat. 2.25 quae [sc. honestum et utile] quia pugnare saepe inter se videntur, qui utilitatem defendit, enumerabit commoda pads, opum, potentiae, vectigalium, praesidi militum, ceterarum rerum, quarum fructum Militate metimur, itemque incommoda contrariorum. qui ad dignitatem impellit, maiorum exempla, quae erant vel cum periculo gloriosa, colliget, posteritatis immortalem memoriam augebit, utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet semperque earn cum dignitate esse coniunctam. -de Orat. 2.335 sciat nee malum esse ullum nisi turpe nee bonum nisi honestum. —Sen. Ben. 7.2.2
Having dealt in Books 1-2 respectively with the honestum and the utile (and with the priority of items within each category), Cicero proposes to discuss in this Book what to do in cases of apparent conflict between honestum and utile. Cicero proudly proclaims that he is striking out on his own and will proceed nullis adminiculis, sed. . . Marte nostro (§ 34). The major problem posed by Book 3 is the evaluation of this unique claim. Whatever the reasons for Panaetius' omission,1 Cicero's first act of originality in Book 3 was to take up the topic that Panaetius had mooted but not dealt with. The handling of this topic is by no means superfluous, especially since the treatment of the utile in Book 2 was so one-sided, focused exclusively on the advancement of a political career. Politics are by no means absent from Off. 3 (see below), but commercial and property transaaions receive fairly extensive treatment as well (SS 49b-78). Furthermore in Book 2 the utile, defined as it there was, I. For a discussion of some possibilities cf. introduction, $ 5 (3). 483
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required good repute, and hence could not be at odds with the honestum (= possessed of honos "public standing"). But what if concealment of one's actions were possible and public reputation were not at stake? The question, in other words, raised by Glauco at the beginning of Republic 2 (357b) needed to be addressed: αρά σοι δοκά τοιόνδε τι α ναι αγαθόν, ο δ^ίαίμεθ' αν εχ€ΐι> ού των άποβαινόντων εφι^μίνοι, αλλ' αυτό αύτοϋ evcKa ασπασ μένοι . . . In deploying, like Glauco, the tale of Gyges (§§ 37b-39), Cicero shows awareness of this problem, but he is not prepared to argue at length with immoralists; his premise remains throughout what a vir bonus would do (cf. $ 18:. . . ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo quod utile putant comparare, boni viri non solent; § 73). Now Cicero may not have found a continuous and detailed Greek source to follow in Book 3 as he did in the first two books of de Officiis,2 but he surely did have some kind of Greek source, as both internal and external evidence suggests. Thus the text itself provides various examples from Greek history, mythology, and literature: under history we find Aristides and the Seven Wise Men (§ 16), the archetypical friends Damon and Phintias ($ 45), the Athenians' departure from their city during the Persian war ($ 48), their decree providing for mutilation of the Aeginetans (§ 46), Themistocles' plan, utile but not honestum, discountenanced by Aristides (§ 49); from the myth ological sphere there are Sol and Phaethon ($ 94), Theseus and Hippolytus (ibid.), Agamemnon and Iphigenia (§ 95), and the feigned madness of Ulys ses (§ 97, chough this was available through Roman sources: cf. ad loc.)\ and there are citations of the Greek philosophers Socrates (S 11), Plato (§ 38), Chrysippus (S 42), Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater of Tarsus ($$ 51-55, 91), and Hecato of Rhodes (§§ 63 and 89), as well as references to Aristippus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and the Cyrenaici and Annicerii (§§ 11617). Though it would be a mistake to underestimate the breadth of Cicero's reading and the depth of his acquaintance with Greek culture, the general opinion of scholars that some kind of Greek philosophical source or sources has provided many of these references, especially the philosophical ones, is unlikely to be wrong. We are fortunate in possessing, in a letter to Atticus dated 5 November 44, explicit testimony about the reading Cicero undertook in connection with Off. 3 (Att. 16.11.4): τά περ'ι του καθήκοντος, quatenus Panaetius, absolvi duobus. illius tres sunt; sed cum initio divisisset ita, tria genera exquirendi offici esse, unum, cum deliberemus honestum an turpe sit, alterum, utile an 2. Cf. his remark at $ 34: neque entm quicquam est de hac parte post Panaettum explicaturn, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de Us quae in manus mea$ venerint.
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inutile, tertium cum baec inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli, redire honestum, manere utile, de duobus primis praecbre disserit, de tertio pollicetur se deinceps scripturum sed nihil scripsit, eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi ut ad me τα κεφάλαια mitteret; quae exspecto. . .in eo esr περί τοΟ κατά περίστασι ν καθήκοντος. Ca. 12 November3 Cicero writes again to Atticus telling him Athenodorum nihil est quod hortere; misit enim satis helium υπόμνημα (Att. 16.14.4). In the proem to our Book Cicero states that the topic of Off. 3 had been briefly touched on by Posidonius in quibusdam commentariis ($8). The problem thus arises of the relation among 1) the liber of Posidonius, 2) the κεφάλαια requested from Athenodorus, 3) the υπόμνημα that Cicero received from Athenodoms, and 4) the Posidonian commentarii. Att. 16.11.4 has been variously interpreted, its implications for the source of Off. 3 variously assessed. Gigon, 271 ff., and Pohlenz, AF, 7-8 and Off. Ill, 1-2, are at one in regarding what Athcnodorus provided as the main philosophical source of Off. 3 but differ on the interpretation of some details and on their view of the nature of that source. They disagree as to (1) whether Cicero had before him Posidonius* work when he wrote Att. 16.11.4 (Pohlenz supposed he did, Gigon thought not); (2) the identity of the Athenodorus in question (see [2] below); (3) what it was that Athenodorus provided (Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 2 and n. 1, thought it not an excerpt from Posidonius but an outline of material relevant to a literary treatment of the subject, whereas Gigon believed that Athenodorus had merely provided an outline of Posidonius' book and that for important points Cicero would have gone back to the Posidonian text itself). Underlying these controversies is a disagreement as to the nature of the Stoicism of Off. 3 itself, with Gigon viewing it as essentially Posidonian, Pohlenz as a composite created by Athe nodorus from various Stoic sources. (1) Pace Pohlenz, while writing Att. 16.11.4 Cicero seems unlikely to have had Posidonius περί του καθήκοντος in front of him (for this, as all students of the problem are agreed, is surely the Posidonian work in question, even though Cicero refers to it loosely as eius librum, when, in fact, it comprised more than one liber; see below). Gigon rightly empha sizes the parallelism of the two actions joined by et. . . et, both evidently aimed at obtaining knowledge of Posidonius1 work {et eius librum ar cessivi et_ ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi. . . ). He already knew some3. Shackleton Bailey marks the dare with a query.
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thing of its content [eum locum Posidontus persecutes . . . in eo est πβρί του κατά π^ρίστασιν καθήκοντος) but seems to have been under the false impression that the work comprised only one book, rather than several (cf. D.L. 7.124 and 129 = frr. 40 and 39 E.-K. = 429 and 430 Th., both citations from the first book). This is surely the natural interpretation of the passage, rather than to take arcessivi as = "I have had fetched" or the like, as Pohlenz suggested; cf. also Shackleton Bailey ad Att. 420.4.10 of his edition. (2) Two Stoic Athenodori of this period are known; Shackleton Bailey, following T.W. Allen, uPisistratus and Homer," CQ 7 (1913), 35 n., thought to identify our man with Athenodorus Cordylion in view of the fact that the epithet derived from κορδύλη (= a bump or swelling) points to a feature likely to attract attention on a bald pate. However, Strabo 14 C 674 states that Cordylion συν€βίωσ€ Μάρκω Κάτωνι και έτίλίύτα παρ' eκ€ί ΙΊ·* (sc. at Utica in 46; cf. Kidd ad Posidon. Τ 44). That would leave as a possible candidate Athenodorus of Tarsus, the son of Sandon, the later philosophical tutor of Augustus; cf. Philippson, RE Suppl. 5 (1931), 47.1 ff. The hypothesis of Gigon, 272, whereby Calvus is not a nickname, but a cognomen resulting from his having obtained Roman citizenship through the efforts of a Licinius Calvus, seems less likely; one hesitates to posit, unless absolutely necessary, yet a third Athenodorus with Posidonian in terests (so Theiler ad Posidon. fr. 431a, b; sim. Kidd, he. cit.). (3) Τά Κ€φάλαια of Att. 16.11.4 are surely, as Gigon suggested, the "chapter headings** or "main points" of Posidonius' treatise. The ques tion arises, however: was the satis helium υπόμνημα referred to at Att. 16.14.4 the same as the requested κεφάλαια or something different? Gigon assumes the former, Pohlenz and Philippson, loc. cit.t 53.19 ff., implicitly the latter. Philippson assumed that Athenodorus produced a commentary on Pan aetius* περί του καθήκοντος*. Certainly a υπόμνημα can be, among other things, a commentary. But if Panaetius failed to cover the subject matter of Off. 3, how could a commentary on Panaetius have filled the gap? Pohlenz, on the other hand, took υπόμνημα as the equivalent of commentarius in the sense of raw material for the production of a literary work and assumed that Athenodorus must have gone beyond Posidonius to provide material from various Stoic sources. According to this hypoth esis, Cicero used a single philosophical source for Book 3. In view of the speed with which he evidently composed this Book (work is attested between 5 and 12 November; see introduction, $ 3), one doubts that a great deal of new research went into it; but it need not follow that he used only one philosophical source.
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If Philippson and Pohlenz have opted for different interpretations of υπόμνημα, they have not yet exhausted the possibilities of this semantically varied word; cf. F. Bomer, "Der Commentarius,w Hermes 81 (1953), 210-50, esp. 225. Used of notes and sketches of various kinds, it could surely cover τά κεφάλαια, i.e., the chief points or summary of Posidonius' treatise, which Cicero requested from Athenodorus according to Att. 16.11.4 and Cicero's need for which was satisfied by the sending of the υπόμνημα. There is no need to assume that Athenodorus provided anything more. One question to which the letters provide no answer is whether Cicero ever did receive the liber of Posidonius that he had sent for according to Att. 16.11.4. He had evidently requested that it be brought to Puteoli from the library at another villa (the et. . . et structure shows that the liber itself was not being sought from Athenodorus4). However, the reference at $ 8 of our proem suggests that the liber did arrive; for Cicero can hardly have written quern locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis if he had not received the liber and ascertained its contents. Probably commentarii here is equivalent to libri; cf. Bannier, TLL 3, 1858.54. The indications of the letters thus provide some knowledge of Cicero's reading at the time of composition of Off. 3. But they need to be supple mented by the internal evidence of the Book itself, which suggests use of materials derived at least from Posidonius and from Hecato, the latter cited more precisely than ever Panaetius had been by both title and book number ($ 89). Pohlenz's assumption that both these works were known to Cicero via Athenodorus is not inevitable, and it seems clear that Cicero did in any case have direct access to Posidonius" essay as well (see above). It is argued below that Posidonius may have served as Cicero's source for a fair amount of the first third of the Book (ad $$ 1 3 b - 1 7 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 9 - 3 2 , 3 5 37), in particular on the need for ethical praecepta ($§ 13b—17), for the formula (§ 21) and its application to specific cases ($$ 29-32), and for turpitudo as a criterion for actions which do not conform to the honestum (SS 35-37). He supplemented Posidonius with Hecato ($5 49b-57 and 8 9 92; cf. esp. ad § 63) and (probably) an Academic doxographical work for his critique of the Epicurean view of pleasure (§§ 116-19). In addition, he has evidently drawn upon an annalistic source or sources for the early history of the republic and to provide background for Regulus and related examples. Soltau argued that this source was specifically Claudius Quadrigarius; for the aftermath of the Caudine Forks and the anecdotes of T. Manlius this seems 4. I owe this observation to David Blank.
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likely (cf. ad SS 109 and 112); in other cases, the annalist could be Quadrigarius but need not be (cf. ad 2.75 and SS 4 0 - 4 2 ; cf. § 86); for use of Tuditanus cf. ad S 100; on the perjurer(s) after the battle of Cannae Cicero evidently consulted his named sources, Polybius and Acilius (cf. ad SS 1 1 3 15). Cicero's earlier letter to Atticus discloses another important fact about Off. 3: he had in mind, even before beginning to write, the case of Regulus, the Roman general in the First Punic War, as illustrating the conflict of bonestum and apparent utile. Thus from early on Cicero planned to include this Roman exemplum as part of his bold effort, as he puts it, to add a roof to Panaetius' unfinished house (§ 33). One of the most puzzling features of Off. 3 is that the dwisio, which one expects to find toward the beginning, as in Books 1 and 2, is postponed to the 96th of the 121 paragraphs of text. Moreover, that dwisio does justice, at best, to what follows it, not what precedes. Though the dwisio makes it appear that, as in Book 1, each of the four parts of the bonestum is to be given separate treatment, this is not in fact the case, as the following outline of contents makes clear: I. Meditation on the use of otium by himself and the elder Africanus (SS1-4) II. Exhortation to Marcus jr. to see his studies through to completion (SS 5-6) III. The question of the conflict of bonestum and apparent utile, mooted but never treated by Panaetius (SS 7-10) IV. The question whether Panaetius rightly posited this third topic about which people deliberate (SS Μ-13a) V. The need for precepts A. The sage alone can perform perfect officia (S 13b) B. Most people, distant from perfection, confuse an accumula tion of middle officia with perfect officium (SS 14-16) C. Nevertheless even the bonestum in the vulgar sense is not to be compared with the utile (S 17) D. What gives rise to doubts is not whether the bonestum or utile is to be preferred but rather the categorization of a given ac tion (SS 18-19a) VI. The formula for deciding such cases A. It accords with Stoic teachings (SS 19b-20) B. Depriving others of something for one's own benefit is con trary to nature ($21)
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XI. XII. XIII.
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C. Such action dissolves the fellowship (societas) of the human race 1. Comparison of the human community to the body: selfaggrandizement of one member at another's expense ruins the whole (5 22) 2. The laws, too, forbid such behavior (§ 23a) 3. So, too, does the natural order (naturae ratio; § 23b) 4. The virtues are more in accord with nature than the exter nal or bodily goods, including one's life ($ 24) 5. To benefit others is more in accord with nature than to live privately amid pleasures {$25) 6. Those who behave otherwise do so on the basis of a false valuation of the bodily and external goods (§ 26) 7. All persons are grouped together under a single law of na ture (S 27) 8. Those who would draw the line at relatives or fellow citizens likewise destroy the fellowship of the human race (S 28) D. The formula can be applied as follows: 1. One may not ordinarily deprive another of necessities for one's own benefit (§§ 29-30a) 2. An exception is allowed if one is of great benefit to the community and takes from a person useless to it (§§ 3 0 b 31a) 3. Self-love must not be allowed to interfere with this judg ment (S 31b) 4. A tyrant may be so deprived or indeed killed (§ 32) Postulate that the honestum alone or above all is to be sought (§33) The conflict envisioned by Panaetius between the honestum and only the apparent, not the real, utile (§ 34a) Claim to independence in treating this topic (§ 34b) turpitudo as a test of apparent expediency (§§ 35-42) A. Any thought of concealment is to be eschewed (§§ 37b-39) B. Can the deed be done non turpitert ($$ 40-42) officia and friendship (§$ 43-46a) utilitatis species and the state (§§ 46a-49) Deception to be eschewed A. Antipater vs. Diogenes ($$ 49b-57) B. C. Canius(S§ 58-61)
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(2) Saleofslaves($71)
XIV. XV. XVI. XVII.
XVIII.
(3) Conclusion from nature as source of law (§ 72) E. Behavior of men who are held to be good (§ 72) 1. Case of L. Minucius Basilus Satrianus (§§ 73-74a) 2. Identity of honestum and utile even in such cases (§S 7 4 b 75) 3. Possibility of concealment irrelevant (§$ 76-78) F. When the rewards are very great . . . 1. C Marius (S 79) 2. M. Marius Gratidianus ($$ 80-81) 3. Denunciation of Pompey and, especially, Caesar {§§ 8 2 85) 4. Fabricius (S$ 86-87a) 5. L. Philippus' annulment of tax-relief ($ 87b) 6. Cato and Curio on treatment of provincials (§ 88) G. Antipater vs. Diogenes again ($$ 89-92a) Changed circumstances (§S 92b-95) divisio ($ 96) Conflict of magnitudo anhni and the utile: exemplum of M. Atilius Regulus ($$ 97-115) Conflict of the fourth "part" of the honestum (decorum) with the utile (really an attack on Epicurus' authority to teach about the virtues: § 5 116-20) Coda: personal message to his son ($$ 121).
Though the paragraphs preceding the divisio ($96) contain a good deal of material bearing upon iustitia, the first two parts of the honestum, prudentia and iustitia, are not cleanly separated or articulated, as one would have expected {pace Abel, 107). Cicero's procedure in Off. 3 is different from that in 1 and 2 in that the overall plan is not dictated by a Greek source. Hence the
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lack of a dwisio at the beginning. Cicero began by using topics adumbrated, if not fully worked out, in a υπόμνημα either by Posidonius or summarizing his views. He then went on to casuistic cases from the sixth book of Hecato's work περί καθήκοντος, to which he added Roman examples of the same type and parallels from Roman law.5 Then he changed plan in order to accommo date the Regulus example, which had provided some of the original impulse for the project; this, like the debate of Antipater vs. Diogenes taken over from or inspired by Hecato (cf. ad $S 49b-57), was developed by the tech nique of in utramque partem disputari. However, in order to separate Reg ulus' case from the preceding examples of sharp business practice and politi cal misdeeds and thus throw it into relief, Cicero added an improvised divisio. In fact, however, the case of Regulus is an instance, not of the conflict of magnitudo animi with an apparent utile {pace Cicero §S 96 and 99), but again of justice with an apparent utile (magnitudo animi in the sense of the despising of death was a prerequisite and product, but not a motive force here; cf. ad $ 99). Off. 3, then, shows us Cicero at his most philosophically independent (if not quite as independent as he portrays himself). How does the result stand up both as a continuation of Panaetius and as a philosophical argument in its own right? Cicero clearly wants the third book to follow the general line of Panaetius (cf. § 33); but he begins his attack on the problem of the conflict of honestum and apparent utile by articulating a formula, a blanket rule of conduct, a procedure that is at odds with the approach of Books 1-2, in which appropriate actions were either derived from the individual virtues (Book 1) or recommended according to specific categories designed to lead to glory/political success (Book 2). Also, the formula would be difficult to sustain in the face of determined opposition by someone committed, like Thrasymachus of Republic 1 or L. Furius Philus in de Republica 3, to the right of the stronger; cf. Gorier, 1978,10; hence Cicero limits his concern to what viri boni would do (cf. ad$ 18). But though Cicero shows awareness of a problem when he admits qui sint boni et quid sit bene agi magna quaestio est (S 70), no detailed answer is offered; cf. Heilmann, 4 2 - 4 3 . The effect of the formula is to subsume the utile of the individual under that of the group. This would at least rule out selfish acts of injustice prompted by the interests of individuals. But need the honestum and the group interest always coincide? Cicero fails to consider the possibility of a 5. This approach was foreshadowed by Crassus' remark at de Orat. 1.193:. . . sive quern ista praepotens et gloriosa philosophia delectat—dicam audacius—hosce habet fontis omnium disputationum suarum qui iure dvili et legibus continentur.
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group being swayed by corrupt interests. In spite of the Stoic cosmopolitan ism for which he makes a strong case at § 28, it soon becomes clear that the respublica is, for Cicero, the relevant societal unit. Thus, the utilitas reipubltcae tends to become, especially in the final portion of the Book, a criterion of conduct almost, if not quite, equal to the honestum itself (cf. ad SS 4 0 - 4 2 , 88, 99b, 101, 112). The concept is, of course, familiar from Cicero's speeches;6 it does not play a role of comparable importance in Off. 1 - 2 , 7 where, respectively, the honestum and the utile for the rising statesman are the criteria for action. However, the placement of the patria, together with parentes, at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of those to whom appropriate actions are owed, if Panaetian, suggests that this emphasis is not at odds with the spirit of Panaetius (cf. ad 1.58). The modern reader may not be satisfied with this approach in view, e.g., of Reinhold Niebuhr's differentiation of the morality of individuals from group-morality and conclusion that the latter is inevitably on a lower level.8 In general, the utile is a relative term, the utilitas of an act residing in the accomplishment of a certain goal. The term utile thus refers to the relation of an act to a result and implies nothing about the ethical status of the act. At bottom lies the assumption that the utile is to be sought [cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est: § 35; omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur, nee facere aliter ullo modo possumus: § 101; cf. also 1.155). Cicero's approach is not to combat this notion but rather to reform the content of the utile. An ethical problem could arise from either (a) the pursuit of an immoral goal or (b) the use of immoral means to achieve a goal, whatever the moral character of the goal itself.9 Cicero claims 6. Cf. Gaudemet, 467, nn. 5-6. 7. Note, however, its use as a standard against which to measure punishment at 1.88 (cf. 1.84 ff.) and the reference to communis utilitas at 1.31; cf. also 1.108 {quo . . . plus . . . reipublicae prodesset) and 155 (non-Panaetian): . . . erudierunt multos, quo meliores cives utilioresque rebus suis publicis essent. . . 8. Cf., e.g., Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York and London, 1935), 128-29: "Only a forgiving love, grounded in repentance, is adequate to heal the animosities between nations. But that degree of love is an impossibility for nations. It is a very rare achievement among individuals; and the mind and heart of collective man is notoriously less imaginative than that of the individual." There is some evidence, however, for an ancient view that the morality of states is generally on a higher level than that of individuals: cf. Sen. de Ira 3.2.2: denique cetera [sc. vitia] singulos corripiunt, hie unus adfectus est |sc. ira\, qui interdum publice concipitur. 9. Cicero docs not, it is true, expressly formulate this distinction, but it is implicit in some of his examples; thus Brutus acted correctly in abrogating the hnperium of his colleague Collatinus because the goal was a wonhy one {patriae consulere: $ 40), whereas the Athenian
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that in the event of either (a) or (b) the enabling act should not be described as utile because that term should be reserved for the pursuit of morally sanc tioned goals by morally sanctioned means. Cicero's analysis thus involves two utilia, an apparent utile, which turns out on closer inspection not to be utile, and a true utile, which coincides with the honestum (cf. his distinction of vera gloria at 2.43; Gorier, 1978,9). The problem for the individual agent lies in judging the character {quale sit: $18) of a given (proposed or contem plated) action. Here Cicero operates with Stoic terminology and values fa miliar from Books 1-2 [secundum naturam, contra naturam; societas gen eris humani etc.; cf. ad §§ 19b-32). Perhaps under the influence of Posidonius, he suggests the presence of turpitudo as the test of the moral character of an act (cf. 1.159; 5S 35-39) but is later prepared to allow that an act that is turpe per se may be warranted in order to attain a certain worthy goal (§ 9 3 : . . . ut vel saltare, cum patriae consulturus sit, turpe non sit), so that the end would appear, within certain constraints,10 to justify the means. In spite of the presentation with a flourish at the outset of a formula intended to enable one to decide sine ullo errore the conflict of honestum and apparent utile (§ 19; 21), the approach turns out to be a piecemeal, un systematic one (cf. ad §§ 19b-32), as one might expect in a Book dealing with casuistic problems in a world of shifting interests (cf. § 95: commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta), though certain tendencies emerge, including a vehement condemnation of tyranny (§§ 26, 36, 83-85) and a firm stand against deceit in politics and commercial dealings. Here Cicero saw the relevance of his legal experience, and he bolsters his argument against sharp practice with a series of legal texts and precedents. But though he admits the inadequacy of the ius civile to cover all immoral acts (cf. ad $$ 67 and 69) and remarks aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias (§ 68), the differences are never worked out in detail.11 The problem with Cicero's approach is that he tends to define the conflict out of existence by fiat; in spite of Panaetius' refreshing tendency to use popularia verba et usitata (2.35), in this continuation of Panaetius, ostensibly carried out on Panaetian principles (§33: eiusmodi. . . credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse . . . ; § 20: erit decree to mutilate Aeginetan captives is condemned because, although the goal was evidently also a patriotic one, the means was cruel (S 46). 10. The closest approach to a formulation of the absolute limit is perhaps the following: est . . . hominum naturae, quant sequi debemus, maxime mimica crudelitas (S 46). 11. On the other hand, Gigon, 274, is wrong to suspect, on the basis of Att. 16.11.4, that Cicero confused the case of Regulus with κατά π€ρίστασιν officia; this results from his mistake in taking eum locum there to refer to the case of Regulus, rather than the conflict of honestum and apparent utile.
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autem baec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea . . .), Cicero gives the utile a sense that it evidently did not bear in common parlance (. . . dixitque [sc. Aristides] perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles adferret, sed minime konestum: § 49); it is hard to see the utile that emerges from Cicero's account as that same force which draws us ineluctably to itself (§ 101). At his best in this Book Cicero argues for a kind of enlightened self-interest which sees itself as part of a larger network of the interests of the human race ($§ 21 ff.); the point was reinforced with one example (Hercules, § 25) of how the pursuit of a more narrowly defined selfinterest might prove less fruitful than a broader view of one's interests; but one wishes Cicero had also used historical examples to drive home the point. Difficulties also arise from Cicero's reproduction of contrary doctrines from his several sources or his deployment of Roman examples. At §$ 30-31 we are told, presumably after Posidonius, that one who can contribute much to the state and the human community by remaining alive is justified in removing necessities from someone not so qualified; but in § 89 the view of Hecato (which Cicero evidently approves) is quoted that in a shipwreck a wise man is not justified in extorting a plank from a fool. Moreover, the Regulus exemplum itself is not unproblematic, since Cicero notes that an oath extracted by violence, as Regulus' oath to return to Carthage if his negotiation proved unsuccessful surely was, need not be honored (1.32). One other problem posed by Book 3 is the overlapping of examples with Book 1. The cases in question are (1) the return of a deposit to an insane person (1.31 [if the transmitted text is genuine; cf. ad loc.]y S 95), (2) Nep tune's adherence to his promise to fulfill Theseus' wish (1.32, § 94), (3) Regulus' return, in accordance with his oath, to Carthage to face torture and death (1.39, §§ 99b—111), (4) the contrasting case of Roman soldiers cap tured in the aftermath of Cannae who did not return to Hannibal (1.40, $5 113-15), and (5) C. Fabricius' return to Pyrrhus of a fugitive who had offered to assassinate the Epirote king (1.40, §$ 86-87); there are no crossreferences from one discussion to the other. Editors have not been pleased by these repetitions; thus Atzert and Fedeli athetize the occurrence in Book 1 of (1), (4), and (5) (but without cogent grounds; cf. ad locos) but let (2) and (3) stand. That Regulus, though mentioned in the already completed Book 1, would play a role in 3 was clear to Cicero on 5 November (Att. 16.11.4). The cases both of Regulus and the soldiers captured after Cannae are developed in considerably more detail in Book 3 (the latter with citations of specific historical sources); the case of the deposit owed to the madman, merely alluded to in the transmitted text of 1, is described more fully in 3; so, too, the case of Fabricius is given with more circumstantial detail in 3; only
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Neptune's pledge to Theseus is narrated more fully in 1 (though 3 has more examples of this kind from Greek saga). Except for (1) and (2), all are Roman examples; (1) was a fairly standard illustration of the alteration of appropri ate actions κατά ττ*ρίστασιι> (cf. ad § 95). The repetition of examples is related to (a) the fact that, though the divisio at § 96 is pasted on superficially, some of the same topics are dealt with in 3 as in 1 and from a casuistic point of view, so that Cicero could not avoid citing examples; and (b) Cicero, writing in haste, rather than find or invent new examples, had recourse to those ready to hand from Book 1; cf. ad 1.34-40. One wonders whether, had he revisited the manuscript, Cicero would have altered Book 1 so as to avoid duplication of examples or at least a conflict of different versions of the same example, as in the case of Fabricius and the Romans captured after Cannae (it has been suggested that the state of manuscript attestation of 1.40 reflects Cicero's desire to cancel duplicated matter; but see ad he). De Offtciis is the most political of Cicero's philosophical essays, and of its three books, Book 3—where, with Cicero for the most part untrammeled by a Greek source, the Roman exempla tend to drive the argument—contains the most sustained political commentary. Hence he contrives, within eleven paragraphs ($§ 73-83), to criticize the conduct of all three of the so-called triumviri, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus. Especially virulent are the attacks on the dead Caesar and his policies; these need to be read as a part of the political debate, ongoing at the time of the composition of Off., over the justice of Caesar's assassination (cf. ad §§ 82b-85). The prefaces of the three books de Officiis show Cicero increasingly chafing under his absence from politics; and, with the completion of this essay, he would, of course, plunge into political life once again in a final attempt to save the republic. The examples are carefully chosen to make a political point: Fabricius, just even toward the (foreign) enemy in wartime, contrasts with Caesar's injustice to fellow citizens. In spite of its problems in this particular context (see intro duction, § 6 ) , the Regulus exemplum is a brilliant tour-de-force; an impor tant motive for the composition of Book 3 was surely the inclusion of this luminous portrait of all that was good and noble in the Roman character in sharp contrast with the greed and venality of his own times, which he drew in such dark colors both in Book 2 and in §§ 7 3 - 8 5 . 1 2 Perhaps, too, he hoped that this shining example of the old virtus Romana would draw together the threads of Off. in somewhat the same way that the Somnium Scipionis evidently did in Rep. Moreover, in times of crisis Cicero tended to identify 12. Liv. praef. 5 would later speak of the contemplation of the past as a means of diverting one's attention from the evils of one's own lime.
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himself with figures of Roman history in parallel situations; cf., e.g., Cat. 1.3 (P. Scipio, C. Servilius Ahala), Dom. 86-87 (Quinctius Kaeso, Camillus, Ahala, P. Popilius, Q. Metellus [on the last named cf. ad 1.108 and § 79]). In the current crisis he identifies himself with a figure prepared to sacrifice everything in the state interest. 1-4 Book 3 opens with a meditation on otium and negotium, topics already touched on in the proem to Off. 2, where such reflections ($$ 1-4) led to an encomium of philosophy ($§ 5-6). Here, however, the stress is on the nega tive aspects of Cicero's enforced otium. He introduces the topic with refer ence to a statement of Scipio Africanus (the elder) which he had already quoted in de Republics (see below). Cicero more typically identified himself with the learned younger Scipio, who figures so importantly in de Republics (cf. Kretschmar, 139). But it is fitting for this book to begin with an allusion to the hero of the Second Punic War. That epoch will provide Cicero's final Roman example, viz., the soldiers who, captured by Hannibal after Cannae, were sent to Rome bound by oath that they would return unless they effected an exchange of prisoners. When one or more of them tried to evade the oath, they were punished either by being returned to Hannibal or by being reduced in civil status by the censors (§$ 113-15). That epoch, situated well before the institution of a court to handle accusations de pecuniis repetundis (cf. 2.75), could stand as a symbol of the "ethical golden age" of Rome to which Cicero several times alludes in this essay (esp. 2.26 ff., § 111; cf. § 47: plena exemplorum est nostra respublica cum saepe, turn maxime bello Punico secundo . . .). Cicero sets up Scipio's use of his otium as a model for himself (note that he speaks of his effort as imitatio): . . . numquam se minus otiosum esse quam cum otiosus, nee minus solum quam cum solus esset (5 1). He interprets this to mean that Scipio et in otio de negotiis cogitare et in solitudine secum loqui solitum (ibid.). Thus, far from bringing him languor, as it does others, otium and solitudo sharpened him {acuebant); Scipio found in his otium a haven. Far different Cicero's otium, resulting from his forced exclusion from public affairs. His present situation contrasts sharply with his former posi tion: ita qui in maxima celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos quantum licet et saepe soli sumus (§3). This contrasts also with the picture painted of his position at Div. 2.6:. . . cum esset in unius potestate respublica, neque ego me abdidi neque deserui neque adflixi neque ita gessi, quasi homini aut temporibus iratus, neque porro ita aut adulatus aut admiratus fortunam sum alterius, ut me meae paeniteret. Yet this is exactly what we find him doing in our proem. Nor do we find in Off. the philosophi-
Commentary on Book 3, Introduction and Section 1
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cal acceptance of the status rei publicae as a part of the life-cycle of states that we see in the subsequent sentences of Div.: id enim ipsum a Platone philosophiaque didiceram, naturales esse quasdam conversiones rerum publicarum, ut eae turn a principibus tenerentur, turn a populis, aliquando a singulis, quod cum accidisset nostrae reipublicae, turn pristinis orbati muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris, qua re cumque pos~ semus. In our passage, on the other hand, the benefits of Cicero's engagement with philosophy—both for himself and for other Romans—receive no men tion (contrast Div. 2.3 (personal benefit]; Tusc. 1.5; N.D. 1.7-8); it is merely a oeUTepos πλους to which he resorts when political activity is excluded. He even interprets his philosophical writing as a sign that he is weaker than Africanus (non tantum roboris habemus: $ 4), who, on Cicero's view, was content to fill his solitude with thought alone (Cicero interpreting Africanus* statement to mean that ilium mentis agitatione investigationeque earum rerum quas cogitando consequebatur nee otiosum nee solum umquam fuisse: ibid.). But, even if this is so, it is strange to prefer investigations that leave no concrete result (munus) to those that do. Possibly the example of Socrates led him to this view; but more probably he is simply carrying the comparison of himself with Scipio to the latter's advantage to its (absurd) conclusion. Surely the important thing was to see that solitudo and otium did not breed languor (cf. § 1); and Cicero, no less than Scipio (and, presumably, Cato; see next note), could claim to have avoided this. In any case, this meditation, in which it emerges that otium is either an adjunct or a pis aller to the βίο? πολιτικός, foreshadows Cicero's imminent surrender of otium and return to the political arena. Perhaps Cicero's real model was not after all the elder Scipio but his fellow homo novus, M. Cato, who, as described at Rep. 1.1, preferred the vita activa to otium deep into old age. 1 P. Scipioncm . . . eum, qui primus Africanus appellatus est, dicere solitum scripsit Cato . . . numquam se minus otiosum esse quam cum otiosus, nee minus solum quam cum solus esset.] Scipio's paradox is cited, likewise with reference to Cato as source, at Rep. 1.26-27: quid porro aut praeclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui haec deorum regna perspexerit, aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit quid sit aeternum, aut gloriosum, qui viderit quam parva sit terra . . . qui denique, ut Africanum avum meum scribit Cato solitum esse dicere, possit idem de se praedicare, numquam se plus agere quam nihil cum ageret, numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus esset. According to the attractive conjecture of Leo, 269, Cato's citation {hist. fr. 127) stood in the preface to his history. If so, it is likely to have served as a point of comparison and contrast with Cato's use of his otium to write history (did Cato, like
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Cicero, express preference for studies that leave no concrete product [munus]}). The citation of these words in the first book of his first philosoph ical essay and in the last book of his final one gives the reader a sense of the rounding off his oeuvre in this genre. However, Cicero, though showing at this period some foreboding of impending death (cf. p. 29, n. 64; ad 1.86), did plan to address further writings (including philosophical ones?) to his son; cf. 1.4: sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac . . . ; hence it is doubtful that this effect was intended. Cicero was fond of such paradoxes; cf. N.D. 1.6:. . . cum minime videbamur turn maxime philosophabamur.—Cf. Plut. Apophth. Rom. 196b: Σκιπίων δε ό πρεσ βύτερος την από των στρατειών και της πολιτείας σχολήι> eV γράμμασι διατριβήν ποιούμενος ελεγεν, οπότε σχολάζοι, πλείονα πράττει v. G. Pfligersdorffer, Politik und Mw/fe. Zum Proomium und Einleitungsgesprach von Ciceros De re publica (Munich, 1969), 72, n. 117, supposed that Plu tarch has here conflated Rep. 1.27 with Off. 1.90, pertaining to the younger Scipio, but surely he could have used Rep. alone.—Karl Gross, "Numquam minus otiosus quam cum otiosus. Das Weiterleben eines antiken Sprichwortes im Abendland,n A & A 26 (1980), 123, connects Scipio's statement with his habit of spending time in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (Liv. 26.19.5:. . . ex quo togam virilem sumpsit, nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit quam in Capitolium iret ingressusque aedem con siders et plerumque solus in secreto ibi tempus tereret);13 this would fit with the description in § 2 {die enim requiescens a reipublicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando, et e coetu hominum frequentiaque interdum tamquam in portum se in solitudinem recipiebat. . .), but less so with 5 4 (. . . ex quo inteilegi debet ilium mentis agitatione investigationeque earum rerum quas cogitando consequebatur nee otiosum nee solum umquam fuisse). If Cicero is right here, Scipio's visits to the temple of Jupiter were merely one of the ways he spent his otium.—For the later influence of Scipio's double paradox cf. Gross, loc. cit., 127 ff. . . . Marce fili . . .] Here, as in Books 1 and 2, the more formal form of address precedes and then gives way (§ 5) to the less formal mi Cicero; cf. ad 1.1. magnifka vero vox et magno viro ac sapiente digna!] For the ellipsis of esse cf. ad 1.63. . . . ut neque cessaret umquam et interdum conloquio alterius non egeret.] 1.3. Frank W. Walbank, "The Scipionic Legend," PCPhS n.s. 13 (1967), 54-69 at 64 = Selected Papers (Cambridge, 1985), 130-31, offers some reflections on the date and historicity of this behavior.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 1-2
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On the Peripatetic doctrine of the need of every animal, especially humans, for mental activity cf. Fin. 5.55; the qualification interdum is needed in view of 2.39 (. . . omnis ratio atque institutio vitae adiumenta hominum desiderat, in primisque ut habeat quibuscum possit familiares conferre sermones . . .); cf. also 1.18 and 153. . . . duae res, quae languorem adferunt ceteris . . . otium et solitude] Here otium appears plainly as the cause of languor, the weakening of the will (cf. Pecere, TLL 7, 927.59 ff.), which can in its turn lead to luxuria = τρυφή (cf. the last stanza of Catul. 51): cf. E. Fraenkel, Horace (Oxford, 1967), 212, n. 3; ad S 3. nam et a republica forensibusque negotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur et ob earn causam urbe relicta rura peragrantes saepe soli sumus.l Cicero lays stress thoughout the quasi-contemporaneous Second Philippic on Antony's use of armed force to intimidate the senate; cf. ad 2.23-29.—This proem and §§ 112-14 are the two places in Off. where a remarkable concentration of participles occurs. Laughton, 145, explains the phenomenon in our passage as an effort to avoid a diffuseness inappropriate to the personal proem. An increasing exploitation of the present participle and of its verbal properties (as in the phrase rura peragrantes) is also charac teristic of Cicero's late style; ibid., 45.—His solitary condition {soli sumus)y as he travels from villa to villa to keep clear of the weaponry with which Antony dominates the capital, aligns Cicero with Scipio [cum solus esset of the opening sentence); note that both phrases receive emphasis from sentence-final position. 2 ille enim requiescens a reipublicae pulcherrimis muneribus otium sibi sumebat aliquando . . .] For the deployment of the participle requiescens see previous note. . . . nostrum autem otium negotii inopia, non requiescendi studio constitutum est.] The iunctura otium negotii inopia is striking in its assonance and in standing the etymological relation on its head (negotium, quod non sit otium: Paul. Fest. p. 176M).—For the conception of the relation of otium and negotium here cf. ad 1.103b-4. exstincto enim senatu deletisquc iudiciis, quid est quod dignum nobis aut in curia aut in foro agere possimus?] The senate and the courts had been, of course, the two main theaters of Cicero's public activity.—On the extinction of the senate cf. 2.2-3; Phil. 2.51: in te, M. Antoni, id decrevit senatus et quidem incolumis, nondum tot luminibus exstinctis, quod in hostem togatum decerni est solitum more maiorum; ibid., 37: illos ego praestantissimos viros, lumina reipublicae, vivere volebam, tot consularis, tot praetorios, tot honestissimos senatores . . . On Caesar's new senators, whom
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Cicero pointedly ignores, cf. Syme, 78 ff.; Gelzer, Caesar, 269-70 = Eng. tr. 290-91.—Concern over the state of the courts is a topos of Cicero*s corre spondence as early as February, 55, when he begins to smart under the checks to his freedom in the aftermath of the conference at Luca (April, 56) (cf. Fam. 1.8.4 [to Lentulus]: commutata tota ratio est senatus, iudiciorum, ret totius publicae); by December of the following year he is prepared to identify Caesar as the enemy inter alia of the courts (ibid., 1.9.10); such worries intensified with the arrival of civil war in spring, 49 {Att. 9.7.5; Fam. 4.1.2 |to Serv. Sulpicius]). Caesar's victory merely confirmed Cicero's exclusion (Fam. 9.18.1 to Paetus, 26 July 46); the theme had been sounded most recently in the letter to Plancus quoted ad 2.23; see the next note. 3 ita qui in maxima celebritate atque in oculis civium quondam vixerimus, nunc fugientes conspectum sceleratorum, quibus omnia redundant, abdimus nos quantum licet et saepe soli sumus.] The sentence is so disposed as to effect maximum contrast between the former condition and the current procedure counterpoised at beginning and end; notable, too, the plangent repetition from the last sentence of § 1 of the sentence-ending saepe soli sumus. For the panicipiai phrase fugientes conspectum sceleratorum see ad $ 1.—The mood of our passage is very similar to that expressed under Caesar's dictatorship (Att. 12.21.5: 17 March 45): quod me in forum vocas, eo vocas unde etiam bonis meis rebus fugiebam. quid enim mihi foro sine iudiciis, sine curia, in oculos incurrentibus Us quos animo aequo videre non possum f Sed quia sic ab hominibus doctis accepimus, non solum ex malis eligere minima oportere, sed etiam excerpere ex his ipsis si quid inesset boni, propterea et otio fruor, non illo quidem quo debebat is qui quondam peperisset otium civitati, ncc earn solitudinem languere parior quam mihi adfert necessitas, non voluntas.] It is the enforced nature of his otium that sticks in Cicero's craw (a point underlined by the clausula non voluntas with its handsome ditrochee); cf. § 1: nam et a republica forensibusque negotiis armis impiis vique prohibiti otium persequimur . . . A pride in his achieve ment not unalloyed with self-pity speaks through the words . . . non illo quidem quo debebat is qui quondam peperisset otium civitati. . . The irony of Cicero's situation as here described depends upon two different senses of otium, "freedom from business or work** (OLD s.v., 2a) and "a state of public peace or tranquility" (ibid., 4a); cf. ad 1.77, 2.41. . . . ex malis eligere minima oportere . . .] Cf. Arist. EN 1109a33: των γαρ άκρων το μίν €στιν άμαρτωλότίρον το δ' ήττον €π€ΐ οίιν του μέσου τυχβΐν άκρως· χαλ€ττόι\ κατά τον oeirrepov, φασί, πλουν τα ελάχιστα λητττέον τών κακών . . . The phrase minima de malis had become proverbial in Latin (cf.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 2-4
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Otto, 207). Later in the Book this piece of folk wisdom is invoked by critics of Regulus' behavior (see ad § 102) and is itself subjected to critique (§ 105); here, however, Cicero represents himself as acting in accord with the saying. . . . ncc earn solitudinem languere patior . . .] This point had formed part of his reply to critics of his philosophical writing at Luc. 6 : . . . quis reprendet otium nostrum, qui in eo non modo nosmet ipsos hebescere et languere nolumus sed etiam ut plurimis prosimus enitimur? Cf. 1.123: nihil autem magis cavendum est senectuti quant ne bnguori se desidiaeque dedat. . . , as well as the contrasting picture of Africanus at § 1 (. . . duae res, quae languorem adferunt ceteris, ilium acuebant, otium et solitudo). 4 quamquam Africanus maiorem laudem meo iudicio adsequebatur. nulla enim eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii, nullum solitudinis munus exstat; . . .] This statement is both strange in itself (see ad §S 1-4) and at odds with the claim at 1.156: . . . causam eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus; cf. also Arch. 12: ceteros pudeat, si qui ita se litteris abdiderunt ut nihil possint ex eis neque ad communem adferre fructum neque in aspectum lucemque proferre. Cf. LeMoine, 355: u Hidden in that explicit comparison is the tacit admission that Cicero can only sustain his isolation and affirm his self-worth by fulfilling services which will win him the respect and gratitude of his son and of others for whom his writings are destined."—For munus cf. ad §5 1 and 121; for quamquam cf. ad 2.43. . . . ex quo intellegi debet ilium mentis agitatione investigationeque earum rerum quas cogitando consequebatur nee otiosum nee solum umquam fuisse.] This is Cicero's explanation for Scipio's statement numquam se minus otiosum esse quam cum otiosus, nee minus solum quam cum solus esset (§ 1) and goes back to his conception. . . cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, turn avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere etc. (1.13; cf. 1.19: . . . agitatio mentis, quae numquam adquiescit. . .), That the elder Scipio filled up his otium this way is far from clear, however; cf. ad% \. itaque plura brevi tempore eversa quam multis annis stante republica scripsimus.] Even more overstated than the assertion at 1.3 (. . . hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui iam tilts [sc. orationibus] fere se aequarunt. . .; cf. ad loc), but a clear indicator that he regarded the republic and the period beginning with Caesar's dictatorship as two distinct phases of his literary activity. For the description of the current political situation {eversa . . . re publica) cf. ad 2.29 [rem vero publicam penitus amisimus). 5-6 The meditation on otium and negotium is followed, somewhat abruptly, by a personal word for the addressee, Cicero's son Marcus. Here emerge,
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even more clearly than in 1.1-2, the less than enthusiastic attitudes of the younger Cicero toward his studies: suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi.... 52 discendi labor est potius quant voluptas . . . ($ 6). Indeed, writing explicitly cohortandigratia (ibid.), Cicero tries to discourage Marcus jr. from breaking off his studies prematurely: ad quos fsc. Athenas et Cratippum] cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est, dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem et magistri. In fact, the younger Cicero had in May mooted to Trebonius the possi bility of a trip to Asia; cf. Fam. 12.16.2 (25 May 44), where Trebonius tries to disarm Cicero's objeaions with the prospea that the party should include Cratippus as well; perhaps it was the revival of that or a similar plan which caused Cicero to write in this vein. In fact, his son's studies would soon terminate—probably before the end of the year—but for a different reason: the younger Cicero left Athens to take up a cavalry command in Brutus' army (Plut. Cic. 45.3; Brut. 24; App. BC 4.220),14 a decision that evidently met with his father's approval (at Phil. 10.13 |ca. mid-February; cf. Gelzer, 381 ] he mentions that a legion commanded by Antony's legate L. Piso has surren dered to his son). 5 Sed cum tota philosophia, mi Cicero,—nullus feracior in ea locus est nee uberior quam de officiis . . .] Cf. ad 1.4 b. quare quamquam a Cratippo nostro, principe huius memoriae philosophorum,—conducere arbitror talibus aures mas vocibus undique circumsonare, nee eas, sifieripossit, quicquam aliud audire.] On Cratippus and his relations with Cicero cf. ad 1.1; for the thought cf. PI. Crit. 54ά: ταύτα, ώ φίλ€ έταΐρ€ Κρίτων, ευ ΐσθι δτι €γώ δοκώ άκουε ι ν, ώστκρ ο'ι κορυβαντιώντ€£ των αυλών δοκοΰσιν άκουε ι ν, και έν εμοι αϋτη ή ήχή τούτων των λόγων βομβεΐ καΐ ποιεί μη δύνασθαι τών άλλων άκουαν . . .—For haec memoria in the sense "living memory" cf. OLD s.v. memoria 6a; O. Prinz, TLL 8,680.57 ff. 6 quod cum omnibus est faciendum qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant, turn haud scio an nemini potius quam tibi.] Cicero here explicitly connects his son with the situation discussed in detail at 1.117 ff., viz. the entry upon a certain path of life. sustines enim non parvam exspectationem imitandae industriae nostrae, magnam honorum, nonnullam fortasse nominis.) The explanation of why Cicero jr. in particular should occupy himself with questions of appropriate 14. R. Hanslik, RE 7A2 < 1948), 1285.11 ff., confuses the warnings in the preface to Book 3 with Book 2; and the dismissal of Gorgias, which probably belongs to August (Fam. 16.21.6; Shackleton Bailey's dating), would not explain the difference in tone between the prefaces to Books 1 and 3.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 4-7
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action; the triplet (with litotes in the first and third members) follows the ascent of Cicero's career in a crescendo with a concluding rhythm of the cretic plus iamb form (4.9% frequency in Cicero vs. 4.4% generally; cf. Wilkinson, 1963, 156); cf. ad 1.78 and 121, 2.44. suscepisti onus praeterea grave et Athenarum et Cratippi; ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profecrus, inanem redire tur pissimum est, dedecorantem et urbis auctoritatem ct magistri.] This begins as an additional argument [praeterea) as to why the topic of appropriate actions is relevant to the addressee but turns into a case against terminating studies prematurely: the reputation of Athens (the "school of Hellas" according to the Thucydidean Pericles |2.41.1]) and of Cratippus are made to rest upon successful completion by Cicero jr.; cf. ad 1.1, where Cicero likewise invokes summam et doctoris auctoritatem et urbis. The commercial simile (tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium) is continued by the thought of returning inanis in the sense "empty-handed," "sine onere, praeda," or the like (cf. O. Prinz, TLL 7, 821.57 ff.; OLD s.v., 6). The situation per se could, however, have been interpreted as a victory for the party who refuses to purchase, as at Dem. 18.247: ώσπερ γαρ ό ώνούμενος νενίκηκε τον λαβόντα, εάν πρίηται, οίττως ό μη λαβών νενικηκε τον ώνούμενον. The judgment turpissimum est assumes added significance when prefaced to a Book in which the avoidance of the turpe is a major theme; cf. ad §§ 35-37. For the concluding participial phrase cf. ad $ 1. quare quantum coniti animo potes, quantum labore contendere, si discendi labor est potius quam voluptas, tantum fac ut efficias, neve committas ut, cum omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi defuissc vidcare.J Cicero ex horts to hard work and acquits himself of responsibility for any eventual failure [cum omnia suppeditata sint a nobis). Young Marcus' effort to reduce the amount of labor entailed in his studies is documented in his letter to Tiro (Fam. 16.21.8) of ca. August, 44: sed peto a te ut quam celerrime mihi librarius mittatur, maxime quidem Graecus. multum enim mihi eripitur operae in exscribendis hypomnematis; cf. introduction, § 4. 7-10 These sections deal with Panaetius' omission of the expected third topic, the (apparent) conflict of honestum and utile. Only later (§ 33) does Cicero try to explain Panaetius' failure to treat this theme even though he had promised to do so and though, according to Posidonius (T 7 = F 432 Th.= Τ 9 = F 41c E.-K.), he lived on for thirty years after writing περί του καθήκοντος. 7 Panaetius igitur, qui sine controversy a de officii s accuracissime disputavit quemque nos correctione quadam adhibita potissimum secuti sumus . . .] Here we find at last the encomium of Panaetius' treatment of the subject one would have expected at first mention of his name (1.7; cf. ad loc). The
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correctio refers above all to the expansion of topics at 1.10 and the material added accordingly at 1.152 ff. and 2.88; cf. also the rejoinder to the criticism of Panaetius' handling of the συμφέρον by Antipater of Tyre (2.86-87). Cf. the use oicorrectio at Ac. 1.43: horum |sc. Stoicorum] esseautem arbitror, ut Antiocho . . . placebat, correctionem veteris Academiae potius quam aliquam novam disciplinam putandam. . . . tertio, si id quod speciem haberet honesti pugnaret cum eo quod utile videretur . . .] If this reflects Panaetius' formulation, he allowed for the pos sibility of error on both sides, i.e., in judgment as to what constitutes both honestum and utile. This is consistent with the doctrine that the many, because of their own distance from it, generally fail to understand or recog nize perfect offtcium or wisdom (§§ 15-16). In fact, however, Cicero focuses in this Book almost exclusively on the apparent utile to the exclusion of the apparent honestum, the two exceptions being § 4 1 , where he regards Romulus' reason for killing Remus, namely that he had violated the wall of his new city, as a mere species honestatis, and § 103, where an imaginary objector argues that for Regulus to keep his oath was to follow an apparent honestum; cf. also ad § 17. . . . de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum nee exsolvit id quod promiserat.] Cf. § 9 below and Att. 16.11.4:. . . de duobus primis praeclare disserit, de tertio pollicetur se deinceps scripturum sed nihil scripsit. 8 quod eo magis tniror, quia scriptum a discipulo eius Posidonio est triginta annis vixisse Panaetium posteaquam illos libros edidisset.] On the ablative (annis) with ante or post (here posteaquam) as an extension of the ablative of comparison cf. Kuhner-Stegmann 2, 403 ff.—On the chronology cf. intro duction, § 5 (2). quern locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentariis . . .J Contrast Att. 16.11.4 = F 431a Th.: eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius librum arcessivi et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi ut ad me τα κ€φάλαια mitteret; quae exspecto . . . in eo est ncpi τοΰ κατά πβρίστασιν καθήκοντος. Striker, 48 ff., thinks that Cicero ought to have looked at Posidonius' criticism of Chrysippus' psychology. See also the intro duction to this Book. 9 minime vero adsentior iis qui negant eum locum a Panaetio praetermissum, sed consulto relictum, nee omnino scribendum fuisse, quia numquam posset utilitas cum honestate pugnare.] Taking up the view here quoted, Gartner, 1974, 1 4 - 1 5 , believes that Panaetius never intended to include a treatment of the conflict of the καλόν and apparent συμφέρον and that Cicero has confused a report of maners in quibus deliberare homines et consultare de officio solerent (§ 7) with the divisio of Panaetius' treatise. But note Cicero's
Commentary on Book 3, Section 7-10
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explicit statements de tertio autem genere deinceps se scripsit dicturum . . . (S 7) and . . . in extremo libro tertio de hac parte pollicetur se deinceps esse dicturum (§ 9), as well as the fact that P. Rutilius Rufus spoke of π€ρ\ του καθήκοντος as an unfinished work (§ 10) and that Posidonius both quoted Rutilius to that effect and commented on Panaetius' living for thirty years after publishing the books π*pi τοϋ καθήκοντος (S 8). The obvious inference would be that he, too, regarded the work as unfinished; cf. introduction, § 5 (3). de quo alteram potest habere dubitationem, adhibendumne fuerit hoc genus, quod in divisione Panaeti tertium est, an plane omittendum . . .) For plane "utterly, absolutely, quite" cf. OLD s.v., 3 (sim. § 50: repugnetne plane). 10 accedit eodem testis locuples Posidonius . . . ] Locuples used of a person who, by virtue of wealth, can serve as a guarantor gave rise to locuples as an epithet of a witness whose word carries weight; cf. Kempe, TLL 7,1571.1 ff. and 1572.67 ff.; OLD s.v. locuples 4. P. Rutilium Rufum] The career of P. Rutilius Rufus (born ca. 154, died after 75; cos. 105) tested the degree to which a committed Stoic could succeed in Roman politics. Scion of a plebeian family (his father, also named Publius, is presumably identical with the tribune of 169), Rutilius studied, as our pas sage indicates, under Panaetius, whose other Roman students included Scipio's nephew Q. Aelius Tubero (cf. ad § 63) and Laelius' sons-in-law, Q. Scaevola, "the Augur," and C. Fannius. Our passage may rest on an oral communication to Posidonius. 15 After service as thbunus militum under Scipio in the Numantine War (cf. Cic. Rep. 1.17), when he fell into an ambush and had to be rescued by his commander (cf. App. lb. 382-83), Rutilius pursued a career at the bar. His marriage to a Livia aligned him (probably as brother-in-law) with M. Livius Drusus (cos. 112), who, as his colleague in the tribunate of 122, opposed the reforms of C. Gracchus. In the aftermath of Gracchus* death Rutilius won election to the praetorship (prob ably for 119); but, defeated in the consular elections for 115, he filed pros ecution for ambitus against his successful opponent M. Aemilius Scaurus, who replied with a counter-suit on the same charge (both suits were unsuc cessful; cf. Cic. de Orat. 2.280; Brut. 113; Tac. Ann. 3.66.1; Alexander nos. 34-35). Like C. Marius, Rutilius was among the legates who accompanied Q. Metellus when in 109 he undertook the war against Jugurtha; he re mained loyal to his commander, however (cf. ad § 79), and was delegated to turn over the army to the newly elected Marius in 107 (Sal. Jug. 8 6 . 4 - 5 ; Plut. 15. = F41cE.-K. η Τ 13 E.-K. = fr. 432 Th.; cf. hist. l.CCLXVII; Munzer, RE 1A1 (1914) s.v. Rutilius no. 34, 1278.30 ff.
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Mar. 10.1). As consul in 105 Rutilius recruited and trained new troops in the aftermath of the disaster that his colleague Cn. Mallius Maximus suffered at the hands of the Cimbri at Arausio; so well did Rutilius do his work that Marius preferred to lead this army, not his own larger African army, to Gaul as consul the following year (Fron. Str. 4.2.2). Apart from his taking up arms against Saturninus and Glaucia in 100 (Cic. Rab. Perd. 21), little is known of Rutilius' further political activities down to the time when as legate he accompanied Q. Scaevola ("the Pontifex") to Asia and defended the interests of the provincials against the tax farmers, who exacted revenge by prosecuting Rutilius repetundarum upon his return (Al exander, no. 94). Refusing, on Stoic principle and in imitation of Socrates, to appeal to the jurors' emotions (de Orat. 1.227-31; cf. Brut. 115; V. Max. 6.4.4; Dio 28, fn 97.2), he was condemned by the equestrian jury. Although he liquidated all assets, he was unable to pay the assessed penalty (a sure sign of innocence in view of his austere lifestyle; see below and Dio 28, fr. 97.2), and he went into exile to Asia, the province he had allegedly abused. His condemnation, a miscarriage of justice diaated by class interests,16 was surely a factor in the attack on the equestrian courts in 91 by his nephew M. Livius Drusus (tr. pi. of that year).17 He lived first at Mytilene (where he avoided Mithridates' bloodbath against Romans in 88 by putting on Greek clothing: Cic. Rab. Post. 27) and later in Smyrna, where he was awarded citizenship. In exile he wrote memoirs in Greek and Latin (cf. hist. 1,189 ff., as well as Tac. Agr. 1.3; Posid. F 78 E.-K. = fr. 243 Th. = Ath. 4.168d-e). Cicero visited him in Smyrna in 78; hence the literary fiction that he provided the material underlying Rep. (cf. 1.13 and 17). Besides his refusal to appeal to the pity of the jurors at his trial, his Stoicism appeared in his excoriation of the notorious voluptuary Sittius (hist. 1,188, test. 6 = Ath. 12.543a) and in his austere literary style (Cic. Brut. 113-14: multaque opera multaque industria Rutilius fuit, quae erat propterea gratiort quod idem magnum munus de iure respondendi sustinebat. sunt eius orationes ieiunae; multa praeclara de iure; doctus vir et Graecis litter is eruditus, Panaeti auditor, prope perfectus in Stoicis;. . .). Posidonius called him one of the three Romans who followed the simple Stoic way of life (the other two being the aforementioned students 16. Cicero repeatedly protests Rutilius' innocence; cf. Font. 38, Pis. 95, Scaur, fr. d, N.D. 3.80, Off 2.47. 17. On the chronology cf. R.M. Kallet-Marx, "The Trial of Rutilius Rufus," Phoenix 44 (1990), 122-39, who argues, convincingly I think, that Scaevola more probably went to Asia as praetor in 98-97, than, as commonly supposed, in 94; he now dates the trial to ca. 94; nonetheless a causal connection between the trial and Drusus1 reform bill seems, in view of their family connection, more likely than he allows.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 10 and 11-19a
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of Panaetius, Q. Mucius Scaevola, "the Augur" |cos. 117], and Q. Aelius Tubero: fr. 81 Th. = Ath. 6.274a ff.); he is treated as a kind of Stoic saint at Sen. Prov. 3.7. Cf. hist. 1, CCLIV ff.; Miinzer, RE 1A1 (1914) s.v. Rutilius no. 34, esp. 1269.46 ff.; cf. also ad 1.41a, 2.47, $$ 58 and 62-63. . . . nemo pictor esset inventus qui in Coa Venere earn partem quam Apelles inchoatam reliquisset, absolveret (oris enim pulchritudo reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat) . . . ] Our passage = test. 1866 in Johannes Overbeck, Die antiken Schriftquellen zur Geschichte der bildenden Kiinste bei den Griechen (Leipzig, 1868). Cf. Plin. Nat. 35.92: Apelles inchoaverat et aliam Venerem Cot, superaturus etiam illam suam priorem [sc. anadyomenen; cf. Nat. 35.86-87]; invidit mors peracta parte, nee qui succederet operi ad praescripta liniamenta inventus est. Cicero was fond of citing Apelles' Aph rodite of Cos to illustrate the difficulty of creating great art (Div. 1.23; Or. 5) or the notion of incompleteness (cf. Fam. 1.9.15: . . . ut Apelles Veneris caput et summa pectoris politissima arte perfecit, reliquam partem corporis incohatam reliquit. . . ) or the difference between art and reality (N.D. 1.75). Strasburger, 1965, 53, suggested that Posidonius had alluded to Rutilius* comparison of the unfinished treatise of Panaetius to the unfinished Coan Aphrodite of Apelles in the letter in which he declined to elaborate Cicero's υπόμνημα on his consulate into a history. But there is difficulty in the tense of the verb; one would have expected scripsit (sc. ad me) if the reference were to an (unpublished) letter to Cicero, rather than a published letter. Furthermore the analogy is in this case far from apt, since working up a υπόμνημα into a history is a different sort of task from completing a work left unfinished; cf. Johann, 517, n. 92. l l - 1 9 a In these paragraphs Cicero sets out to discuss the question rectene . . . banc tertiam partem ad exquirendum offtcium adiunxerit [sc. Panaetius] an secus (§ 11). In fact, this discussion, no less than § 34, where Cicero announces explicitly. . . in hoc Panaetius defendendus est... , proves to be a defense of Panaetius* procedure against the critique oiquidam (§ 13), who regard the introduction of a comparison of honestum and apparent utile as incompatible with Stoic doctrine (cf. Heinemann, 2, 45). The discussion begins by going over again the basic concepts of honestum and utile and their relation to the summum bonum (cf. 1.5-10) and clarifying that Panaetius, too, adopts the strong Stoic position that identifies the honestum as the sole good (§ 12). At S§ 13b-17 (Atque illud quidem honestum . . .) Cicero sub joins a distinction between perfectum and medium officium (respectively = κατόρθωμα and καθήκον) more detailed than that offered at 1.8, but irrelevant to the argument being developed here. When at § 18 Cicero returns to the problem at hand, he begins by summarizing § 12 (qui autem omnia
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metiuntur—boni viri non solent). Then follows the actual defense of Panaetius: itaque existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse quod dixerit, solere modo, non etiam oportere, i.e., Panaetius' words were descriptive, rather than prescriptive. Cicero proceeds to introduce his own approach, along lines adumbrated in Att. 16.11.4 (the reference to Posidonius πβρι τοΰ κατά πβρίστασιν καθήκον τος): quid ergo est quod nonnumquam dubitationem adferre soleat considerandumque videatur? credo, si quando duhitatio accidit, quale sit id de quo consideretur. saepe enim tempore fit ut quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat inveniatur non esse turpe ($ 18). He then cites Caesar's murder as an act, turpe per se, which was, in the circumstances, honestum (§ 19). Cf. Heinemann 2, 4 5 - 4 6 . 11 nam, sivc honestum solum bonum est, ut Stoicis placet, sive quod ho nestum est, id ita summum bonum est, quemadmodum Pcripateticis vestris vidctur, ut omnia ex altera parte conlocata vix minimi momenti instar hab e a n t . . .] This was, of course, the first of Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum; cf. SVF 3, 165.21: . . . ή μέν άρ^τή τ€ καΊ ή κακία μόναι κατ' αύτοϋς ή μβν αγαθόν, ή δ€ κακόν, . . . ; sim. 1, 83.31 (Aristo) and 3, 218.14 (Diog. Bab.); for the Peripatos cf. EN 1098bl2 ff. and the "balance" of Critolaus (fr. 21 W. = Tusc. 5 . 5 1 : . . . libra ilia Critolai, qui cum in alteram lancem animi bona imponat, in alteram corporis et externa, tantum propendere illam bonorum animi lancem putet, ut terram et maria deprimat; sim. fr. 22 = Fin. 5.91; cf. Wehrli ad Critol. frr. 19-24). On Cicero's tendency to minimize differences among the Academy, Peripatos, and Stoa cf. ad 1.6. Vestris includes Crarippus, too, in the discussion; cf. § 33: sin hoc non licet per Cratippum . . . itaque accepimus Socratem exsecrari solitum eos qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxissent.] Our passage = Socr. fr. IC 481. Cf. above ad 2.9, as well as $§ 72, 75, 101. Panaetius took a similar stand (§ 34 = fr. 102 van Straaren): nihil vero utile quod non idem honestum, nihil honestum quod non idem utile sit saepe testatum negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem qui ista distraxerint. Cf. Heinemann, 2, 45. cui quidem ita sunt Stoici adsensi ut et quidquid honestum esset, id utile esse censerent, nee utile quicquam quod non honestum.] = SVF 1, 127.28; cf. 1.127.6 (Cleanthes), as well as the syllogism at SVF 3, 76.16-18, cited ad 2.10; ibid., nos. 82, 86, and 87. 12 quod si is esset Panaetius qui virtutem propterea colendam diceret quod ca efficiens utilitatis esset, ut ii qui res expetendas vel voluptate vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere utilitatem aliquando cum honestate pugnarc] Another hit at the Epicureans, who had been disallowed as moral teachers at
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 11-19a and 11-12
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1.5 (. . . qui summum bonum sic instituit ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur. . .); cf. also $S 18 and 116-18 below and Leg. 1.49: atque etiam si emolumentis, non suapte (vi) virtus expetitur, una erit virtus quae malitia rectissime dicetur. ut enim quisque maxume ad suum commodum refert quaecumque agit, ita minime est vir bonus, ut qui virtutem praemio metiuntur, nullam virtutem nisi malitiam putent. The indolentia takes aim specifically at the catastematic plea sures of the Epicureans; cf. Epicurea, 281.13 ff.—Even in Book 2 Cicero/ Panaetius did not claim that virtue should be cultivated merely for its instru mental value in attaining glory; cf. the introduction to that Book and ad 2.42. sed cum sit is qui id solum bonum iudicet quod honestum sit, quae autem huic repugnent specie quadam urilitatis, coram neque accessione meliorem vitam fieri nee decessione peiorem . . . ] Cicero attributes to Panaetius the standard Stoic view. Contrast the different position assigned to him at D.L. 7.128 = Pan. fr. 110: ό μεντοι Παναίτιος και Ποσειδώνιο? ουκ αυτάρκη λ€γουσι την άρ^τήν, αλλά xpeiav οναί φασι και υ γ ε ί α ς και χορηγία? και ισχύ ος. Though this testimony had been commonly interpreted to mean that Panaetius effected a revolution in the Stoic concept of the τ€λος by denying that virtue alone was sufficient to guarantee €υδαιμονία, Kidd, 1955, argued that this view failed to consider the implications of the fact that Panaetius had written rrep! τοΰ καθήκοντος, rather than περί του κατορθώματος, so that the subject itself stands at one remove from the virtues. He argued that Diogenes Laertius (or his source) had misunderstood Panaetius speaking, as Chrysippus sometimes did (cf. ad 2.35), in nontechnical language; 18 he added that the physical system of the Stoics was incompatible with any view of the summum bonum other than the self-sufficiency of the virtues, and he pointed to Cicero's opinion that such a position was characteristic of the Stoics (Fin. 3.24, 34, 3 6 , 4 0 , 4 4 ; 4.45, cited by Kidd, 188, n. 2). Kudlien, on the other hand, has argued that there were, in fact, controversies over the summum bonum within the Stoa itself. While accepting Panaetius fr. 110 at face value, he denies that it had the character of a revolution. Kudlien ad duces some evidence neglected by Kidd, such as the case of Dionysius ό Meταθέμένος, whose suffering led him to reject the classification of illness as an άδιάφορυν (Tusc. 2.60; Fin. 5.94; D.L. 7.167); but whether this incident gave rise to a significant debate on the subject is unclear. A small breach in the 18. Similarly Long, 1967,90 n.: "In the case of Panaetius wc have to remember that Cicero's De Offiais does not report his views on goodness but on καθήκοντα, and hence a passage such as I 103 (he surely means 1.122-23] in which wealth and age are used to determine what actions arc considered 'decorum' may have been mistakenly taken to represent an upgrading of these by Panaetius to the status of 'good'"; cf. also ad 2.42.
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Stoic wall against the external goods prior to Panaetius is, however, sug gested by the position of his teacher Antipater of Tarsus, who held that τα κατά φύσιι>, if rightly chosen, yield the ουσία τάγαθοϋ, even if their contribu tion is tiny (SVF 3, 253.8 ff. and 252.4 ff.). Also worth considering in this context is a testimony not mentioned by Kudlien or Kidd, namely Panaetius fr. 46 = 113 (= Fin. 4.23), which states that in writing to Q. Tubero de dolore patiendo Panaetius failed to make the point that pain is not an evil, even though, according to Cicero, this ought to have been the chief point, if it could be proven (quod esse caput debebat, si probari posset, nusquam posuit, non esse malum dolorem). But perhaps this is an example of rhetori cal tact rather than a change of philosophical premise. It seems, on balance, more likely that the explicit statement of our passage is correct and that Diogenes Laertius' characterization is based on a false inference.—The things that neither by being added make life better nor by being removed make it worse are, of course, in Stoic terminology the αδιάφορα (cf. SVF 3, 28.30); however, κακία, too, is at odds, in a different sense, with the καλόν; hence Cicero might have been more precise in his phrasing (quae . . . huic repugnent). 13a etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, convenienter naturae vivere, id habet hanc, uc opinor, sententiam, cum virtute congruere semper, cetera autem, quae secundum naruram essent, ita legere si ea virtuti non repugnarent.] The original τέ\ος formula of the Stoa seems to have been τό ομολογούμε νω? ζψ, perhaps to be understood in the etymological sense of "to live in accord with reason** (όμο-Λόγο-j), later explained as τό κατά φύσιν ζψ (SVF 1,45.20 ff. and 3,6.9-10); cf. Long, 1967,61. The corresponding formula of Chrysippus (κατ' έμπ€ΐρίαν των φύσει συμβαινόντων ζψ: D.L. 7.87) appears at Fin. 3.31 expanded by addition of the element of selection and rejection of the "natural advantages" (cf. introduction, § 1 )*· relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere (sim. Fin. 2.34). On the assumption that the expanded version faithfully represents Chrysippus, Diogenes* formulation (εύλογιστβΐν ev τη τών κατά φύσιν εκλογή και άπΈκλογή [SVF 3,219.11-121) would involve a relatively modest change, namely the substitution of εύλογιστεΐν, evidently coined on the basis of (ύλογος απολογία in the definition of καθήκον (cf. ad 1.8; Gisela Striker, "Antipater, or the Art of Living,** in Schofield-Striker, 185-204, at 188, n. 4), for κατ' €μπ€ΐρίαν . . . ζψ; cf. Long, 1967, 68-69. Cicero*s formulation in our passage reflects Stoic thinking at the stage of Diogenes; for he treats "the natural advantages** (quae secundum natura essent = τα κατά φύσιν) as the
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 12-13a and 13b-17
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class within which the process of selection is to occur, whereas for Chrysippus the "natural advantages" were to be chosen en bloc [seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem). On Antipater's version, which emphasizes that one does everything in one*s power to obtain the natural advantages, a formulation evidently designed to meet objections raised by Carneades to the circularity of Diogenes' definition, there has been considerable recent discussion; cf. SVF 3, 252.35-253.23; Long, 1967, who cites the older literature; Striker, loc. cit, as well as other recent bibliography listed at Long-Sedley, 2, 508-9. 13b-17 Quod cum ita sit, putant quidam hanc comparationem non recte introductam nee omnino dc co genere quicquam praecipiendum fuisse.—] This sentence leads into the following argument, really a digression which Cicero brings to an end with the words sed haec quidetn de its qui conserva tion officiorum existimantur boni (end of § 17). Moreover, the conclusion (§17, introduced with quocirca; see ad loc.) is a denial that the distinction between κατορθώματα and καθήκοντα just introduced makes any substantial difference to his argument and leads, in the first sentence of § 18, to a repetition of the point made in § 12 about the kinds of people who allow other factors to outweigh the bonestum. Cicero's failure to clarify the reason for this distinction suggests that he has introduced material from a different source. The inserted matter is not necessarily irrelevant but should have been clearly integrated into the larger argument; the faa that ordinary individuals, in Stoic terminology the προκόπτοντ€£, have difficulty distinguishing κατ ορθώματα from καθήκοντα might, for instance, have been connected with the argument that they (though not the sapientes) can, in general, be in doubt about quale sit id de quo consideretur (§18), i.e., whether it is, in fact—even in the vulgar sense—bonestum or not, and therefore may well require praecepta; cf. Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 5. Two attempts have been made to identify the author from whom Cicero has drawn this inserted material. Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 7-8, thinks our para graphs derive from "the theoretical part** that he posits as the first book of Panaetius' π€ρϊ τοΰ καθήκοντος (see also Pohlenz, Stoa, 2, 101); he admits that the tone in which the sapiens is discussed in our paragraphs differs from what we elsewhere find in Panaetius, but he invokes the difference in subject matter as the cause. But if Panaetius had dealt, as at $§ 13b-16, with the distinction between media and perfecta officia, why did Cicero express disappointment at notfindingsuch definitions at the beginning of Panaetius' essay (1.7)? Moreover, the emphasis on the difficulty of the vulgus in distinguishing the two ($§ 15—16) points not so much to a general theoretical discussion as a focus on the need for offering guidelines {praecepta).
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Heinemann, 2, 49, on the other hand, compared these paragraphs with the argument at Sen. Ep. 95 that precepts can be useful for the moral training of the ίύφι*ΐ9 and concluded that both Cicero and Seneca are following Posidonius. Heinemann finds that both authors distinguish three groups: 1) the wise, who perform κατορθώματα and therefore require no precepts ($14; Sen. 95.5); 2) the eityueis, who can benefit from praecepta (§ 14 ingenii bonitate; this group includes the "wise" of popular parlance [§ 16]; Sen. 95.36); 3) the bad (§ 18; Sen. 95.64). Item 3) is not a true parallel, however; for Sen. 95.64 includes no reference to the morally hopeless, nor is it clear that the reference to what boni viri do not do at $ 18 is pan of the inserted material (its position would suggest otherwise). As for item 1), it is true that Seneca's language is not dissimilar to $ 14 (Sen. 95.5: omnes exsequi nu· meros); yet Seneca never clarifies the implications, including the distinction between κατορθώματα and καθήκοιτα that is crucial to our passage; rather his focus is on the contrast between the "ethical golden age" (when praecepta sufficed) and the corrupt present, when various other means are needed as well (cf. S§ 13-34,65), though Seneca may thereby have obscured what was clear in his source. Moreover, the amount of Posidonian material in Seneca Ep. 95 is controverted between Theiler, who assigns to Posidonius $§ 4 5 - 6 7 (F 452 of his edition), and Edelstein-Kidd, who limit Posidonius to the ex press citation at §§ 6 5 - 6 7 (ft 176 of their edition); but neither gives to Posidonius the material relevant to this question, i.e., the first two passages cited as parallel by Heinemann. Even those inclined to draw the Posidonian lines in this letter more generously19 may doubt, however, that Heinemann's parallels by themselves are substantial enough to make a case for Posidonius as the source. The following considerations may, however, lend some sup port to the theory of Posidonian provenance: (1) Posidonius is known to have dealt with the value of praecepta (see above); (2) Cicero is known to have consulted Posidonian materials in connection with the composition of Off. 3; (3) in the sequel (§§ 21 ff.; seeadloc.) there are striking parallels with Sen. Ep. 95. But with so much unknown about the writings of Posidonius, Panaetius, and other Stoics on these matters, a non liquet seems, on present evidence, the appropriate verdict. 19. Note the parallel between the Posidonian view cited in $ 65 {Posidonius non tantum praecepttonem . . . sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem neeessariam iudtcat. . .) and $ 34 (his [sc. decretis) siadiunxerimuspraecepta, consolattones, adhortationes, poterunt valere . . .), which surely secures the preceding argument for Posidonius; however, against Dihle, 1973, esp. 53, who assigns to Posidonius "the systematic division of the pars praeceptiva in letter 9.5," cf. Kidd, 1978, 251, who sees praecepta as a general Stoic, not specifically Posidonian, problem, and his commentary on fr. 176.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 13b-17 and 13b-14
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13b atque illud quidem honestum quod proprie vereque dicitur, id in sapien tibus est sous neque a virtute divelli umquam potest.] This is surely an instance of atque followed by an adversative idea (cf. ad 1.144), since Cicero now launches into the proof that, in spite of the opinion of "certain persons" (quidam) just quoted, precepts are needed in view of the fact that so few attain to virtue.—Cf. SVF 3, 152.35: €v έαυτω γαρ έχει ν [sc. τον σοφόι/] το αγαθόν και τήν fkiav άρετήν . . . ; ibid., 1, 129.20 and 29 (Cleanthes). in iis autem in quibus sapientia perfecta non est, ipsum illud quidem perfectum honestum nullo modo, similitudines honesti esse possum.] Cicero uses such language elsewhere (cf. 1.46: quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum iis in quibus praeclare agitur si sunt simulacra virtutis; cf. § 69, where the contrast is between verum ius and its umbra et imagines, and Div. 2.71, a contrast between auspicia and simulacra auspiciorum), but I have not found parallels in other Stoic treatments of the προκύπτων; it thus seems likely to be Cicero's own formulation. However, to describe the relation of the καθήκον to the κατόρθωμα as a similitudo is hardly apt, for the latter is not the cause of the former; both may, in fact, materially coincide and differ only in respect of the mental attitude of the agent, the κατόρθωμα being performed by the sage for the right reason (cf. ad 1.8);20 on Cicero's use of platonizing language in Off cf. ad $ 18. 14 haec enim officia . . . media Stoici appellant; ea communia sunt et late patent, quae et ingenii bonitate multi adsequuntur et progressione discendi.] For the term medium officium cf. ad 1.8 above. Cf. SVF 3, 137.43 (Chrysippus): ό err' άκρον, φησί, προκύπτων άπαντα πάντως άποδίδωσι τά καθήκοντα και ουδέν παραλείπει. Ingenii bonitas = ευφυΐα, thus defined by the Stoics:. . . ευφυίαν μεν είναι κοινώς ϋξιν εκ φύσεως ή εκ κατασκευής οίκείαν προς άρετήν, ή έζιν κα& ην εΰανάληπτοι αρετής είσί τίνες . . . {SVF 3, 89.21); they classed it among the προηγμένα (ibid., 3,32.42). As our passage suggests and Kidd, 1955, 191 ff., shows in detail, the Stoa's moral training through praecepta (cf. 1.7b) directed toward the προκόπτων was in the realm of καθήκοντα, not κατορθώματα. For a suggested model for the Stoic doctrine of ethical progress and an explanation of how προκοπή and ευφυία can coexist with the doctrine nil medium inter virtutem et vitium cf. Otto Luschnat, "Das Problem des ethischen Fortschritts in der alten Stoa," Philologus 102 (1958), 178-214, esp. 205 ff. illud autem officium quod rectum idem appellant perfectum atque absolutum est et, ut idem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nee praeter sapientem cadere in quemquam potest.] The Stoic description of "perfect duty" as 20. I owe this observation to David Blank.
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comprising "all the numbers" may go back to Chrysippus; cf. SVF 3,136.14: κατόρθωμα δ' εΐναι λέγουσι καθήκον πάντας επέχον τους αριθμούς, ή . . . τελειον καθήκον . . . ; ibid., 20.20: καλόν δε λεγουσι το τελειον αγαθόν παρά τό πάντας απέχει ν τους επι ζητούμε νους αριθμούς υπό της φύσεως ή το τελείως σύμμετρον; Fin. 3.24 = SVF 3, 4.40: . . . quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, Mi autem appellant κατορθώματα, omnes numeros virtutis continent; Sen. Ep. 95.5: non potest enim quisquam nisi ab initio formatus et tota ratione compositus omnis exsequi numeros . . . ; sim ilarly Marcus Aurelius speaks of mastering the "numbers of appropriate action" (τους του καθήκοντος αριθμούς άκριβούν: 3.1.2); see ad 1.8 above. "Number" (αριθμός) here would evidently have the sense "constituent, ele ment"; cf. Isoc. 11.16 (of Busiris): απαντάς δε τους αριθμούς περιλαβωνέξ ων άριστ' αν τις τά κοινά διοικήσεων . . . Possibly the conception is modeled on the Pythagorean interpretation of ten as the perfect number (τέλειος αριθμός; so already Speus. περί Γίυθαγορικών αριθμών apud Iamb. Theol. Arithm. 83.6-7), related to the fact that it contains within itself the λόγοι of all realities (Iamb, in Nic. 118.11 ff.) or simply all the numbers (Did. Caec. in Ps. 2 9 - 3 4 , cod. p. 186.16 alibi; Burkert, 1962, 63-64 = Eng. tr. 71-72). A different approach is taken by A.A. Long, "The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue," OSAP suppl. (Oxford, 1991), 97-116, esp. 105 if., who tries to contextualize the expression within musical theory.—For the restriction to the sage cf. Cicero, Fin. 4.15 (= SVF 3, 5.28): Mud enim rectum est (quod κατόρθωμα dicebas) contingitque sapienti soli, hoc autem inchoati cuiusdam officii est, non perfecti, quod cadere in nonnullos insipientes potest. 15 cum autem aliquid actum est in quo media officia compareant, id cumu late videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod vulgus quid absit a perfecto non fere intellegit. . .] On the epistemological problem for the ordinary individ ual in distinguishing κατορθώματα from καθήκοντα cf. ad § 16 below; for distance as an impediment to correct judgment cf. 1.30.—For the iunctura cumulate . . . esse perfectum cf. Div. 2.3: quae (sc. quaestio de natura deorum] ut plane esset cumulateque perfecta, de divinatione ingressi sumus his libris scribere; for the sense "amply" cf. Lommatzsch, TLL 4,1384.66 ff. . . . quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum. quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut deleaentur imperiti—ignaros, qui (idem} quid in una quaque re vitii sit nequeant iudicare;. . .] This deprecation of the reactions of the imperiti/ignari is remi niscent of the position of Panaetius' teacher, Diogenes of Babylon, who emphasized the "trained perception" (επιστημονική αϊσθησις) in music (also in the other arts?); cf. ad 1.14; Luc. 86: pictor videt quae nos non videmus . . . Contrast 1.147, where the exemplum commends the judgment of the
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vulgus in evaluating paintings.—Idem (after quod) is generally restored from Nonius for autem of ζ; item of ξ is, as Miiller observed ad loc.t less likely in view of quod idem at 1.116 and § 109. On the other hand, the idem follow ing qui was deleted by Madvig apud Lund, 39 (quidem is a weakly attested variant); indeed it seems very likely to be a marginal correction for the transmitted autemJitem just discussed, which crept into the text at the wrong point; cf. Havet, § 1415. haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia.] For Cicero's term secunda honesta cf. the δεύτερα αγαθά at SVF 3, 27.33 (Philo): αρέσκει γαρ αύτφ |sc. Moysi] τά μεν προηγούμενα αγαθά αυτοπροσώπως· αυτόν τόν Όντα διδόναι. τά δεύτερα δε τους αγγέλους και λόγους αύτοϋ* δεύτερα δ' εστίν, δσα περιέχει κακών άπαλλαγήν; but it is unclear whether this corresponds to a Stoic technical term. Cf. ad 1.7b. 16 itaque iis omnes in quibus est virtutis indoles commoventur.] The virtus in question is evidently in the category of secunda honesta or simulacra virtutis, which the average individual can recognize, as opposed to true virtue, which, according to § 15, is so hard for the ordinary person to distinguish (cf. the concept vera gloria at 2.43). For the effect of virtus on the observer cf. 1.5556 and 2.36-38. nee vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur— similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium.] According to Plut. Ti. Gracch 8.5, C. Laelius received the cognomen Sapiens as a result of his prudent withdrawal of a land bill in the face of determined senatorial opposition. If this was the causa efficiens, the fact is ignored by Cicero, however; cf. Fin. 2.24-25, 2 1 where he construes a contrast with the literal meaning of the word, and Amic. 6-7, where Fannius, while denying sapientia to the "Seven Wise Men n tries to vindicate Laelius' traditional epithet, albeit not in the same sense in which it was applied to M. Cato and L. Acilius. The Ciceronian Laelius comments on sapientia in the traditional Roman and the Stoic sense, ibid., 18-19 (quoted ad § 17 below). A similar point is made with reference to the sages of the Golden Age at Sen. £p. 90.44: sed quamvis egregia illis vita fuerit et carens fraude, non fuere sapientes, quando hoc iam in opere maximo nomen est. non tamen negaverhn fuisse alti spiritus viros et, ut ita dicam, a dis recentes; neque enim dubium est quin meliora mundus nondum effetus ediderit. quemadmodum autem omnibus indoles fortior fuit et ad labores paratior, ita non erant ingenia omnibus consummata, a passage 21. Here Cicero cites Lucil. fr. 1235 M. = 1130 K.; Homeyei; 303, suggests that Lucilius' application of the Greek σοφός raises the concept "auf cine hoherc gcistigc Ebene."
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Heinemann, 2, 46, referred to Posidonius (cf. F 448 Th.; consulto praetermiserunt E.-K.; cf. in the same letter $ 16: illi sapientes fuerunt aut certe sapientibus similes quibus expedita erat tutela corporis). Cicero has added the Decii and the Scipiones (see ad 1.61), Fabricius (cf. ad 1.40 and §S 8 6 87), M. Cato, and C. Laelius, the last two sapientes in popular parlance, to Aristides and the "Seven Wise Men" doubtless mentioned in his Greek source. For the notion that there have been only one or two σοφοί cf. SVF 3, 167.34. Plut. Quomodo Quis Suos in Virt. Sentiat Profectus 76a-b criticizes the Stoics for thus lumping together in a single category persons as diverse as Aristides and Phalaris. nemo enim honim sic sapiens ut sapientem volumus imellegi, nee ii qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt. . .] Baiter conjectured sunt before habiti, perhaps too fastidiously (note that Lact. inst. 6.6.27 agrees with the Off. MSS at this point); ellipsis oiesse with the perfect passive participle or in a subordinate clause can be paralleled in Cicero (cf. A. Klotz, "Sprachliche Bemerkungen zu einigen Stellen in Ciceros Reden," Glotta 6 [1914], 2 1 2 - 2 3 , at 221); for the conjunction of both phenomena cf. 3.112 (a passage wrongly suspected; see ad loc): cuius tertio consulatu Latini ad Veserim fusi et fugati. Such instances may be another index of the nearness of Off. to the sermo cotidianus (cf. Ten Phorm. 4 5 - 4 6 : baud existumans I quanto labore partum and other passages cited by Klotz, loc. cit.). 17 The connection with quocirca is strange, a mark of the haste with which Cicero pasted this argument drawn from elsewhere onto this context. As Cicero presents it, the point to the argument at §§ 13b-17 is to deny that it makes any substantial difference whether one speaks of κατόρθωμα or καθήκον or the real or apparent honestum; a comparison of honestum and utile is in any case—here the disapproval escalates—impious (nefas). He seems unaware of the possibility of connecting the preceding paragraphs with the problem of determining the quale sit of a given act (end of $ 18; cf. ad S§ 13b-17). Cicero's procedure here is similar to that advocated at 2.8: just as there he proposed to substitute probabilia for the dogmatists' certa and to "follow" these (i.e., use them as a basis for daily living), so here he wants the popular conception of honestum to have the same place-value vis a-vis the utile as the Stoics' true honestum. This strategy is very similar to that followed in the quasi-contemporaneous Laelius (18-19): sed earn sapientiam interpretantur [sc. phihsophi Stoici] quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur% spectare debemus. numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M\ Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores
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iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, concedant ut viri boni fuerint. ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi. agamus igitur pingui ut aiunt Minerva, qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt ut eorum probeturfidesintegritas aequalitas liberalitas, nee sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna constantia ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos ut habiti sunt sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur quantum homines possunt, naturam opthnam bene vivendi ducem. In this way Cicero can hold up as a model the behavior of Q. Scaevola ($ 63) or Regulus ($$ 99 ff.) in spite of the contrary approaches of Stoic philosophers (in Scaevola's case, Hecato; in Regulus' Panaetius himself; cf. ad $ 64 and 1.32); cf. Milanese, 136-38. This move on Cicero's part apparently settles largely to his satisfac tion the problem that might otherwise have arisen of a difference between an apparent and a true honestum; cf. ad § 7. . . . si quae ad virtutem est facta progression Cf. ad § 14 above. 18 qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo quod utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent.] A restatement, in stronger form {boni viri non solent), of the critique of the Epicureans at § 12; see ad loc; having disallowed their authority as moral teachers a limine (1.5), Cicero is not about to open up a dialogue with them now. Here is the first hint of the line Cicero will take in this Book. He has recourse, not to the concept of the Stoic wise man {sapiens), which he evidently found too techni cal and remote from reality for his purposes (see ad $ 17), but to the platonizing vir bonus. "Platonizing" because, although Cicero evidently identifies this with a Platonic idea (cf. § 77: viro bono, quern Fimbria etiam, non modo Socrates noverat; § 81: species et notio viri boni), the concept carries none of the metaphysical connotations of the Platonic idea, but is rather an ideal or standard for which the human being should strive. This on the positive side and the turpe on the negative side are, apart from the utilitas reipublicae (cf. ad § 88), the criteria deployed to decide the casuistic cases of Off. 3. The procedure is similar to the concept of the perfect orator (and there still more directly placed into a Platonic frame of reference) in Orat., esp. 9-10: ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur ea quae sub oculos ipsa non cadunt, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus. has rerum formas appellat ιδέας ille . . . Plato . . . ; cf. Klaus Reich, "Die Tugend in der Idee. Zur Genese von Kants Ideenlehre," Argumentationen. Festschrift fur Josef Konig (Gottingen, 1964), 209-10; Long,
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1995 2 , 47 ff.—For the phrase omnia metiuntur emoluments et commodis
d.ad 1.5. itaque existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse quod dixerit, solere modo, non etiam oportere.] Here finally is Cicero's first line of defense for Panaetius (cf. § 34), viz. that his statement was merely an empirical observation, not a recommendation; he is therefore not guilty of recommending an action which, as the next sentence indicates, is turpissimum. etenim non modo pluris putare quod utile videatur quam quod honestum sit, sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare turpissimum est.] Cf. 1.30 and § 37; Prot. 345d-e, where Socrates says that none of the "wise men* ήγβΤται ούδένα ανθρώπων έκόντα έξαμαρτάνζιν ουδέ αισχρά Τ€ και κακά έκοπτα έργά£*σθαι, αλλ' eu ισασιν δτι πάντες οι τά αισχρά και τά κακά TToiouvTes άκοι>τ€5 ποιουσι. 18-19a Quid ergo est quod nonnumquam dubitationem adferre soleat considerandumque videatur? credo, si quando dubitatio accidit quale sit id de quo consideretur. saepe enim tempore fit ut quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat inveniatur non esse turpe.] This approach to the problem is already adumbrated at Att. 16.11.4:. . . tertium cum haec [sc. honestum and utile\ inter se pugnare videantur, quo modo iudicandum sit, qualis causa Reguli . . . de tertio pollicetur [sc. Panaetius] se deinceps scripturum sed nihil scripsit. eum locum Posidonius persecutus. ego autem et eius lihrum arcessivi et ad Athenodorum Calvum scripsi ut ad me τά «φάλαια mitteret;. . .in eo est περί τοϋ κατά περίστασιι> καθήκοιτο? (cf. the introduction to this Book). That appropriate actions change according to circumstance (κατά περίστασιΐ'; cf. ad 1.30-41) means that praecepta that generally hold good may sometimes be invalidated, and the judgment of what is honestum in particu lar circumstances becomes corrrespondingly difficult. Hence legitimate doubt can arise, not about the relative value of honestum and utile per se [sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare turpissimum est: §18), but about the categorization of particular acts.—The quale sit suggested itself to Cicero as the basic question to be resolved under the status qualitatis (ποιοTTJS) of the method of analyzing the status of a legal case; cf. de Orat. 1.139 and 2.137; Kroll, RE Suppl. 7 (1940), 1091.58 ff.; George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), 308 ff. 19a exempli causa ponatur—illud pulcherrimum existimat.] The example, chosen, of course, with reference to Caesar, enables Cicero to comment on Roman politics; on the characterization of Caesar as a tyrant cf. ad 2.23; on Cicero's view of "justified" homicide cf. ad 2.43; on tyrants in general Rep.
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1.65, 68,2.47,48, 3.23 and 43; on the argument from public opinion rather than philosophical premises cf. introduction, § 7. Cf. also ad § 83; Phil. 2.27: quo etiatn maiorem ei [sc. C. Trebonio) respublica gratiam debet qui libertatem populi Romani unius amicitiae praeposuit depulsorque dominatus quam particeps esse maluit; ibid., 86: quid indignius quam vivere eum qui imposuerit diadema, cum otnnes fateantur iure interfectum esse qui abieceritt—Cicero offers a similar assessment of Roman opinion at Phil. 10.7 (ca. middle February, 43; cf. Gelzer, 381): Brutus could have enjoyed the protection of the whole of Italy. In fact, the situation was much more ambiva lent: Brutus and Cassius did not dare to show themselves to the Roman people, had difficulty raising funds for their cause, and in August accepted the provinces of Crete and Cyrene added to an extraordinary commission to supervise collection of grain in Sicily and Asia—an honorable form of exile; cf. Symc, 101-3, 119, 124. vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? immo vero honestas utilitatem (secuta est).] Among recent editors only Winterbottom retains the transmitted text, with the comment "ut postulat άντίθβσις." But for honestas to "follow* utilitas is the functional equivalent of it being "conquered" by utilitas, so that it is precisely on grounds of the lack of the expected antithesis after immo vero that the transmitted text is suspect. The honestum in the situation was, on Cicero's view, the restoration of the human (or at least Roman; Cicero does not sharply distinguish; cf. p. 492) societas, unfettered by the rule of a tyrant; the utile was the smooth advancement of a political career that Brutus and his fellow conspirators could presumably have anticipated under Caesar's dictatorship. Surely here as elsewhere Cicero wants utilitas to be an imyivι>ημα of honestas, not vice versa; cf. § 40: itaque utilitas valuit propter bonestatem, sine qua ne utilitas quidem esse potuisset; $ 83: honestate igitur derigenda utilitas est. . . ; Amic. 51: non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed uti litas amicitiam secuta est; Ambr. off. 3.60: itaque . . . utilitas secuta ho· nestatem est; cf., however, ad $ 95. On the other hand, the reading honestatem utilitas of Ambros. H. 140 inf. (s. XII), adopted by Atzert and Fedeli, is frigid, as Winterbottom points out. The solution surely lies in the simple deletion of secuta est, perhaps added after Amic. 51 by an ancient reader who failed to grasp the logic of the passage and thought something missing. 19b-32 The true subject and direction of the argument become clear only retrospectively (as sometimes occurs in Off.: cf. ad 1.11-17, 2.42b-43 and 44-45). 2 2 In fact, these paragraphs present a justification of tyranni22. Perhaps this fact explains the neglect of our passage, e.g., by Erskinc.
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cide, 23 hinted at, it is true, by the provocative Roman example of $ 19a, though the specific case of murdering a tyrant who was one's familiaris is not pursued (perhaps because it had already been handled at Amic. 36 ff.). Cicero surely drew this material from the section on καθήκοντα κατά nepiστασιι> of Posidonius' treatise nepi καθηκόντων.24 Cicero's way of presenting the argument is, however, disjointed and misleading. For he begins by offer ing a blanket formula as if this would cover every case which could arise (§ 19: . . . quam (sc. formulam] si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus), when, in fact, the point of the discussion of καθήκοντα κατά πβρίστασιν is to show that in certain circumstances an or dinarily valid general rule may not apply. The order of arguments is odd as well. He might rather have begun with the content of §§ 2 7 - 2 8 , since he really needed to establish at the very outset the value of the homo as such, apart from other bonds, in order for the humani generis societas to have the value assigned to it at §§ 21 ff. If one understands that the focus is on tyrannicide, §§ 2 4 - 2 5 fall into place; for they discuss the proper vs. im proper outlets for magnitudo animi, with the tyrant appearing at $ 26a as an extreme case; the direction taken by the casuistic problems at §§ 29-32 is also clear in light of the overall subject. One suspects that Cicero has here found room for some material he had gathered with a view toward writing a dialogue on Caesar's death in the manner of Heraclides Ponticus; on this abandoned project cf. p. 66, n. 3. As Cicero has indicated, the formula is consistent with Stoic doctrine (Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea: § 20). The formula operates with the definition of ίύδαιμονία as a life κατά φύσιν (cf. ad $ 13) expressed through the binary opposition secundum naturam—contra naturam, whereby what is secundum naturam is to be sought, what is contra naturam to be avoided; cf. Nickel, 61. Note the phrases maxime est secun dum naturam ($ 21), magis est secundum naturam ($ 25), contra naturam (S 21; twice, § 26; twice, § 30; $ 32), natura praescribit (§ 27), secundum eandem naturam and lege naturae (ibid.), contra naturae legem (§ 30). In general, instead of establishing a simple "thou shalt not," the formula sets up a hierarchy of things "contrary to nature" (= to be avoided), according to which no event affecting the body or one's external goods is as bad as to procure one's own advantage at another's expense. Events adversely affecting 23. Cf. Clark and Ruebel, 60 ff.; for Cicero's views on tyrannicide in general cf. Lintott, 54 ff. 24. Schofield, 1995', 199-201, argues on the basis of the reference to the common interest of all (S 26, paralleled at S 52) that Antipatcr lies behind our passage "directly or indirectly" (201); but for another possibility cf. ad %% 49b-57.
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the body or external goods were for the Stoa άποπροηγμε να (cf. SVF 3,29.37: . . . ε ν δε τοις άποπροηγμε νοις νόσον και πενίανκαί άλγηδόνα καΑ τά ανάλογα, as well as 3,31.5, where death appears in a similar list) and therefore less bad than κακά, viz., the vices (cf. S VF 1,47.22 alibi). Thus in view of the role of natura as criterion and the value-judgment given, the formula is really an application of the orthodox Stoic view. Natura provides ties and protections among all human beings as such, but a tyrant is one qui omnmo hominem ex homine tollat ($26) and thus forfeits the guarantees of the societas generis humam. Thus the general formula does not apply to him {neque est contra naturam spoliare eumt si possis, quern est honestum necare: § 32). Socrates' position that injustice is the greatest evil is similar but differently grounded, since his notion was that to commit injustice makes one's soul worse (cf. Grg. 469b: μέγιστοι; τών κακών τυγχάνει δν το άδικεΐν; ibid., 473a ff.). Cicero is, however, not quite consistent in holding to the Stoic, rather than the Socratic, view in this matter; cf. ad § 36. The focus of the formula on this particular type of injustice, viz,, the removal for one's own benefit of another's commoda, is anticipated, and doubtless influenced, by Chrysippus {SVF 3, 173.11 = § 42): qui stadium . . . currit, eniti et contendere debet quam maxime possit ut vincat, supplantare eum quicum certet aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere quod pertineat ad usum non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est; cf. also Fin. 3.70:. . . alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat; Dihle, 1962, 69. Gigon, 274, thought that Posidonius had treated both the καθήκοντα κατά περίστασιν and the problem of the conflict of the καλόν and apparent συμφέ ρον. But surely he dealt only with the former. It was the treatment of this theme that Cicero had in mind when he wrote eum locum Posidonius persecutus {Att. 16.11.4) and questions of this type that he first presents as the ones Panaetius would have handled had he completed his work (§§ 32-33); and why would Posidonius quote, with evident approval, Rutilius' com parison of the uncompleted περί τοΰ καθήκοντος of Panaetius with Apelles' unfinished Coan Venus (§ 10) if he had himself tackled the problem of honestum vs. apparent utile and thus implicitly attempted to finish Pan aetius' essay? 19b Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo quod honestum intellegimus pugnare id videbitur quod appellamus utile, formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus.] Note that the legal metaphor {diiudicare) is continued with formula (with quaedam apologizing for the metaphorical application of the legal term). Cicero is evidently modeling his guideline for
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action in doubtful cases on the formula drawn up by the plaintiff, defendant, and magistrate that formed the basis for Roman litigation (the praetor's album comprised a collection of model formulae; cf. OLD s.v. formula 6b, 7a; Wenger, RE 6.2 [1909] s.v. formula).15 The honestum and (apparent) utile are conceived as rival litigants whose case is to be regulated by the formula. Perhaps Cicero has chosen the term as a more expressive equivalent for κανών, used by Chrysipp. SVF 3,77.37, since neither of the Greek glosses attested for formula (sc. τύπο?, υπόδειγμα; cf. I. Kapp, TLL 6, 1113.36) is known to have been used as a Stoic technical term; the usual Latin equivalent for κανών, viz. regula, appears at 3.81; cf. Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 8; K. Reinhardt, RE 22.1 (1953), 772.7. 20 This constitutes, as the concluding words sed redeo ad formulam indicate, a digression on the philosophical affiliations of the formula Cicero is about to propose. erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea—et utile non honestum.] Cicero signals that, as in Books 1-2, he is remaining within the Stoic orbit; but, unlike his similar announcement at 1.6, here he indicates his reason (. . . splendidius haec ab iis disserentur quibus quidquid honestum est, idem utile videtur . . .). Splendor is, of course, a rhetorical, not a philosophical category; he means to give his patrocinium to the case that best lends itself to presentation in the way recom mended at de Orat. 2.68, where Antonius observes that the orator should know about omnia quae pertinent ad usum avium, morem hominum, quae versantur in consuetudine vitae, in ratione reipublicae, in hac societate civili, etc. and recommends hisce. . . ipsis de rebus ut ita loquatur, uti ei qui iura, qui leges, qui civitates constituerunt locuti sunt, simpliciter et splendide, sine ulla serie disputationum et sine ieiuna concertatione verborum. Cf. also 3.125 (. . . si est honestas in rebus ipsis, de quibus dicitur, existit ex re naturalis quidam splendor in verbis) and ad § 97; Ernesti s.v. splendor, splendidus. The Stoic argument is characterized a bit differently at § 106 (nervosius), as opposed to that of the Academics/Peripatetics [remissius). Cicero drew in general no sharp distinction between philosophy and rheto ric, as the inclusion of his rhetorical writings in the list of philosophica at DIM, 2.1 ff. shows; cf. also J. Mar^al, Zum Begriffder Philosophie bet M. 25. This nuance is missed by I. Kapp, TLL s.v. formula I.B.9; no doubt the metaphor was made easier by Cicero's use of the term two years previously in Orat. 36 and 75, in which passages our word is accompanied respectively by praescriptum and nota to clarify the meaning (the TLL article should have placed the use of the term at Var. R. 1.18.1 and 1.22.4 after the Ciceronian passages, since that work dates to 37; cf. Hellfried Dahlmann, RE Suppl. 6 [1935], 1185.8-9).
Commentary on Book 3, Section 19b—21 523 Tullius Cicero (Munich, 1982), 194. The importance of the rhetorical ele ment in Cicero's philosophica is beginning to be better appreciated; cf., for instance, Inwood, 1990, whofindsthat Cicero makes very effective use of the strategy of arguing rhetorice (2.17) in Fin. 2 so as to be likely to convince a Roman reader that the Epicurean doctrine of the virtues was at odds with generally accepted Roman values.—On the differences among the philo sophical schools on these issues cf. ad 1.6 and 3.11; on the Stoic character of the formula ad §§ 19b-32. nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat ut quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostra iure liceat defendere.] Actually the agenda of the Skeptical Academy, to which Cicero owed allegiance, was to tear down, rather than defend, arguments or set them up in order to demolish them. Cicero's idiosyncratic interpretation of the skeptical program26 may be related to his translation of πιθανοί/ with the more positive probabile; cf. Gorier, 1992; ad 2.8. This generous conception reconciled, in Cicero's view, his speaking as a dogmatist here with his usual skepticism (see next note; introduction, § 7; ad 2.7-8). 21-27 Cicero begins by stating his formula, which disallows depriving oth ers for one's own advantage, and then advances the following arguments in its favor: 1) from the point of view of human society in general: otherwise the human convictus and societas are destroyed; 2) from the viewpoint of or ganized states: the formula agrees with the leges populorum, which provide sanctions against such behavior; 3) from the individual's standpoint: the virtues, especially magnitudo animi and iustitia, are in accord with nature, not so the pursuit of pleasure and the external goods; the same may be said of the heroic life; cf. also Fin. 3.64. Possible motives for ignoring the dictates of nature are given as 1) ignorance; 2) a different valuation of the virtues vis a-vis the goods of the body and/or the external goods. Striker, 47-48, points out the problems in this approach; thus, one may well ask, in a life or death situation, whether benevolence is, in fact, a stronger impulse than self-love; and the analogy to the parts of the body fails because "by contrast with the members of a body, a member of a group can survive the group, not to mention a single member of the group" (48). 21 Detrahcre igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera quae possum aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis.] The utile involves, inevitably, the amplificatio nostrarum rerum (cf. 2.17); the formula here proposed would therefore set a limit to that process: 26. Cf. also Gluckcr. 1978. 62.
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it is not to be achieved incommodo hominis. The result is a formulation» made explicit in $ 27 (. . . ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob earn ipsam causam quod is homo sit, consultum velit. . .), of the rights of the human being as such. A similar rule of conduct appears at Sen. Ep. 95.52 (ex illius [sc. naturae] constitution miserius est nocere quam laedi), where the term formula is likewise used; and leading up to the Senecan rule is a process of reasoning similar to that in our $S 21-22: quare omnia quae praestanda ac vitanda sunt dicamf cum possim breviter banc Mi formulam humani offici tradere: omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est; membra sumus corporis magni. natura nos cognatos edidit, cum ex isdem et in eadem gigneret; haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit, ilia aequum iustumque composuit;. . . {Ep. 95.51-52). Heinemann, 2 , 4 7 - 4 8 , suggested that the same source underlies the two passages and that Seneca presents this material in a form closer to the original context. If that is right, the case was first made for the use of decreta, praecepta, etc. in moral teaching (Seneca §§ 34 ff.), and the importance of keeping clearly in view the finis summi boni received emphasis (§ 45); then the author launched into praecepta governing relations with the gods (§§ 47 ff.) and human beings (§§ 51 ff.). The gods play only a minor role in this essay: there is an allusion to the deorum et hominum communitas et societas inter ipsos at 1.153 (in the non-Panaetian supplement), a perfunctory reference to piety at 2.11, an allusion to the gods sanctioning the humani generis societas (§ 28), a refer ence in passing to the possibility of deceiving gods and men ($ 39), and a discussion of oaths sworn by the gods (§§ 44 and 104, the former including a rationalizing interpretation of the divine witness). The secular emphasis may be connected both with Panaetius' own skepticism of the mantic arts, which made any interpretation of divine will problematic (cf. frr. 70 ff.), and with the fact that, in light of the recently completed N.D. and Div., Cicero doubt less felt no need to pursue the matter. Similarly, in Seneca the negative precept corresponding to our passage is complemented by a positive one (ex illius (sc. naturae] constitution miserius est nocere quam laedi: Ep. 95.53), which Cicero doubtless judged irrelevant to his concern here. On Posidonius as the probable author in question cf., besides Heinemann, K. Reinhardt, RE 22.1 (1953), 772.6 ff.; Theiler ad Posid. fr. 452 of his collection; further literature at Johann, 506, n. 48. Though Cicero may have tailored the treatment of appropriate actions here to Panaetian scale by eliminating the divine element (but see § 28), the formula itself, as a universally valid norm, has been thought alien to the piecemeal approach of Panaetius (Johann, 115-20). The argument is not free
Commentary on Book 3, Section 21
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of circularity, however, since the piecemeal approach of Panaetius is inferred from Off. and is not controllable by other evidence. 27 On the other hand, Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 10, finds the formula at odds with Panaetius on other grounds: whereas it is purely negative, Panaetius sharply condemned the mere avoidance of injustice (1.28-29). But that was in the Book on the virtues, where the inadequacy of the mere avoidance of injustice needed to be emphasized; our context demands a criterion that will rule out a given op tion; if it results in injustice, then it is indeed to be avoided; but the avoidance of injustice is not held to be virtuous here any more than in Book 1; hence no contradiction is involved. In fact, in spite of the way it is introduced here as if it were the full solution to Panaetius* problem, the formula plays a very restricted role in Off. 3; it underlies the discussion at $$ 2 1 - 3 2 but then, in spite of occasional echoes (cf. ad SS 4 0 - 4 2 , 6 8 - 6 9 , 7 2 , 7 5 , 81), its place is essentially taken by another rule: aut illud quod utile videtur turpe ne sit, aut si turpe est ne videatur esse utile (S 81), i.e., the absence of the turpe becomes the test of whether an act that seems to be utile is so in fact. Insofar as it is merely an application of Stoic doctrine to particular choices, the formula is redundant per se (so Gorier, 1978,9); but to condemn it on such grounds is to condemn the entire approach based on praecepta that underlies Off. as a whole (cf. introduction to Book 1 and ad 1.7b). si enim sic erimus adfecti ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alteram, disrumpi necesse est earn quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem.] Cicero first puts forth and illustrates (§ 22) this thesis; the reason for it emerges only in the sequel, when it is explained that the humani generis societas is a community of interests (§§ 2 6 - 2 7 ; cf. ad 1.21); hence the characterization of the humani generis societas as maxime secundum naturam is not necessarily at odds with the statement nihilque tarn secundum naturam quam utilitas (§ 35); hence, too, the violation of any individual's interest amounts to the destruction of the whole; cf. Nickel, 66.—On the origin of human society, directed by nature, cf. 1.12; on the appropriate actions derived from the different gradations of societies cf. 1.50-58; on the impossibility of a solitary human existence cf. 1.153 and 2.39; on the humani generis societas being "most" according to nature see ad § 28 below.—Against the athetesis of this sentence by Fedeli, 1964 1 , 9 9 100, cf. Hcilmann, 36, n. 2 1 . 27. Other problems with Johann's analysis include the invention of «φάλαιον as a term for the result of the application of an ethical rule (115) and application of it as if it were a technical term of ancient ethics (117).
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22 ut, si unum quodque membrum—evertatur necesse est.] Nestle, 350-60, compared the fable of Menenius Agrippa narrated at Liv. 2.32.8-12 (de secessione plebis agitur): placuit igitur oratorem adplebem mini Menenium Agrippam, facundum virum et quod inde oriundus erat plebi carum. is irttromissus in castra prisco Mo dicendi et horrido modo nihil aliud quam hoc narrasse fertur: tempore quo in homine non ut nunc omnia in unum consentiant, sed singulis membris suum cuique consilium, suus sermo fuerit, indignatas reliquas partes sua cura, suo labore ac ministerio ventri omnia quaeri, ventrem in medio quietum nihil aliud quam datis voluptatibus frui; conspirasse inde ne manus ad os cibum ferrent, nee os acciperet datum, nee denies quae acciperent conficerent. hac ira, dum ventrem fame domare vellent, ipsa una membra totumque corpus ad extremam tabem venisse. inde apparuisse ventris quoque baud segne ministerium esse, nee magis ali quam alere eum, reddentem in omnes corporis partes hunc quo vivimus vigemusque, divisum pariter in verms maturum confecto cibo sanguinem. comparando hinc quam intestina corporis seditio similis esset irae plebis in patres, flexisse mentes hominum. There are also versions at D.H. 6.86 and Zon. 7.14. Nestle, 353, thought the fable the product of sophistic thought at the end of the fifth century and cited testimonies pertaining to the Athenian constitu tion of 411 (viz., Thuc. 8.75, Antiphon 87 A 2 and Β 44a-71,and [possibly] Thrasym. 85 Β 1; cf. K. Oppenheimer, RE 6A1 [1936], 587.46 ff.), as well as Gorgias' Olympic speech (82 Β 8a) and Democritus (68 Β 250 and 255); these passages provide a general background for the underlying idea of ομόνοια, but no analogy to the parts of the body. More to the point is X. Mem. 2.3.18-19, where the analogy of the warring limbs is used to argue for harmony between two brothers. The Aesopic fable κοιλία και πόδες περί δυνάμεως ήρι£ον (no. 132 Hausrath-Hunger) applied the lesson to an army's dependence on its commander {viz., οϋτω και έπι τών στρατευμάτων μηδέν έστι το πολύ πλήθος, εάν μή οι στρατιώται άριστα φρονώσι), as did the fourthcentury Athenian general Iphicrates (apud Polyaen. 3.9.22): Ιφικράτης την σύνταζιν τών στρατοπέδων είκαζε τώ σώματι, θώρακα έκάλει την φάλαγγα, χείρας τους ψιλούς, πόδας την ϊππον, κεφαλήν τόν στρατηγόν κτλ. Established as a method of arguing for the mutual interdependence of members, the fable was then applied to argue for coalitions of Hellenistic city-states on grounds of their greater strength, as in Aratus' conception of the Achaean league (described at Plut. Arat. 24.6): ήγ€"ιτο γαρ ασθενείς ιδία τάς πόλεις υπάρχουσας σώζεσθαι δι' αλλήλων ώσπ€ρ ένδεδεμενας τω κοινω συμφεροντι, και καθάπερ τά μέρη του σώματος £ώντα και συμπν^οντα διά την προς άλληλα συμφυΐαν, όταν άποσπασθη και γένηται χωρίς, ατροφεί και σή-
Commentary on Book 3, Section 22-23
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π€Ται. παραπλήσιων τάς πόλεις άπόλλυσθαι μβι/ υπό των διασπώντων το κοινόν. αύξεσθαι 6' υπ' αλλήλων, όταν όλου τινός μεγάλου μ€ρη γενόμβναι κυινης προνοίας τυγχάνωσιν. Note that in these passages and the fable of Menenius Agrippa harmony is recommended for the members' benefit. A. Momigliano, u Camillus and Concord," CQ 36 (1942), 117-18, argued that the fable entered into Roman tradition in the fourth century because of its aptness to the historical situation then (viz., the construction of a temple of Concord in 367 by Camillus) and since the Menenii fall out of the fasti after 366. However, the fable has no inherent connection with Menenius or the secessio plebis of 494; cf. E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften 1* (Halle [Saale], 1924), 359 ff. Ogilvie ad Livy he. cit. suggests that the fable entered Roman histo riography around the time of Fabius Pictor. It was perhaps Posidonius who transferred the fable from the political sphere to that of human society in general and placed the emphasis on the preservation of the individual being in the interest of the whole; 28 in this form the analogy is, of course, an apt illustration of his concept of the συμπάθεια of the elements of the cosmos with each other; cf. K. Reinhardt, RE 22.1 (1953), 653.49. For subsequent influence of the fable cf. Sen. de Ira 2.31.7: quid si nocere velint manus pedibus, manibus oculif ut omnia inter se membra consentiunt, quia singula servari totius interest, ita homines singulis parcent quia ad coetum geniti sunt, salva autem esse societas nisi custodia et amore partium non potest; Hierocles, πώς πατρίδι χρηστέον apud Stob. 3, 732.1 ff. W.-H.; M. Aurel. 8.34 (sim. 7.13); cf. also St. Paul (esp. 1 Cor. 12.12 ff.). The simile proves fruitful again at § 32, where the tyrant appears as an example of the withering away of a member (hypertrophy would have been per se a more apt image, but ill adapted to the argument for tyrannicide). nam sibi ut quisque malit—opes augeamus.] The emphasis in our passage on the active role of natura (. . . non repugnante natura; illud natura non patitur . . .) is similar to that in Sen. Ep. 95.52 (natura nos cognatos edidit. . . haec nobis amorem indidit mutuum et sociabiles fecit, ilia aequum iustumque composuit; ex illius constitutione . . . ex illius imperio . . .). 23 neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populonim, quibus in singulis civitatibus respublica continetur, codem modo constitutum e s t . . .] Though the ius gentium may not have been a technical legal term in his day (cf. Michel, 336, on the basis of Rab. Post. 42), 28. That the transference was pre-Posidonian is not established by the parallels from Dio of Prusa, Philo, and Seneca cited by Nestle, 356; nor need Hecato be brought into the picture as Cicero's source here (ibid., 357); cf. Ncucnschwander, 44.
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Cicero evidently thought it familiar enough to elucidate his meaning. Cf. the equation of the lex naturae and ius gentium at Har. 32: quamquam hoc si minus civili iure perscriptum est, lege tamen naturae, communi iure gentium sanctum est ut nihil mortales a dis immortalibus usu capere possint. On the relation of the ius gentium to the ius civile and to iustitia cf. ad § 69. atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui velit. . . numquam committet ut alienum appetat et id quod alteri detraxcrit sibi adsumat.] Naturae ratio is surely the "system of nature," i.e., nature as accessible to the human understanding; cf. H. Frank, 3 5 2 - 5 3 ; OLD s.v. ratio 11; Pease ad N.D. 1.20. For the equation of ratio with lex cf. Leg. 1.23 (inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: quae cum sit lex . . .); Phil. 11.28: est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria. For the thought as a whole cf. M. Aurel. 9.1.1: ό αδικών aaefkr της γάρ των όλων φύοΈως· κατεσκ€υακυία5 τά λογικά £φα CVCKCV αλλήλων, ώστε ώφ€λ€ΐι> μέν άλληλα κατ' άξίαν, βλάτττ€ΐν 6e μηδαμώ?, ό το βούλημα ταύτη? παραβαίνων άσεβα δηλονότι €ig την ττρεσβυτάτην των θεών; Neuensch wander, 45, points out that reminiscences of Posidonius are to be found elsewhere in this passage. 24 etenim multo magis est secundum naturam excelsicas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas iustitia liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; . . .] A restatement of the Stoic valuation of the virtues vis-a-vis the bodily and external goods; cf. ad § § 13 and 21. These virtues are perhaps not merely named exempli gratia or the result of a mistake (pace Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 10, n. 2); rather these are the virtues of the human being in society for contrast with the potentially antisocial voluptas and divitiae (cf. 1.46). Both here and at 5 118, but not elsewhere in Off. (cf. 2.48), comitas appears as a complement to iustitia and liberalitas; it evidently stands for the fourth virtue, in which the approbatio of others plays a significant role; cf. K.H. Heuer, Comitas, facilitas, liberalitas. Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Kultur der ciceronischen Zeit (diss. Miinster, 1941), 45. . . . quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere comparantem cum mili tate communi magni animi et excelsi est;. . .] The humani generis societas has been subtly replaced by the utilitas communis (the case is made for it only at § 27). It thus becomes explicit that the utilitas of the individual cannot be driven to extremes because it is subordinated to the common utilitas, the lesson of the simile of the pans of the body. detrahere autem de altera sui commodi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem.] Gruter's athetesis of this material was revived by Hafner, 14, Briiser, 134, and in the editions of
Commentary on Book 3, Section 2 3 - 2 6
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Atzert4 and Fedeli (Rudberg, 22, on the other hand, sees the sentence as a Ciceronian doublet). The oddity lies in the repetition, within the proof, of the thesis itself (albeit in slightly shortened form) without an indication that it has preceded. A defense of the passage is offered by Thomas, 58-61; though not all his arguments carry equal weight, 29 it seems, as he suggests (59), likely that, in view of its introduction by itemque, the following sentence should offer a close parallel to what precedes; and since the following sentence includes both a positive and negative side (respectively magis est secundum—in concilio caelestium conlocavit and quam vivere—ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus), so, too, should what precedes, a condition fulfilled only if our sentence is retained. In applying the final polish Cicero would doubtless have added a reference to the fact that this point stands just above. 25 itemque magis est secundum naturam—ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus.] The example of Hercules, a pan-Hellenic hero, breaks down the boundaries of individual states and emphasizes the common needs and inter ests of all humankind (pro omnibus gentibus. . . conservandis aut tuvandis), a point that becomes explicit in the sequel (. . . ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum: § 26, as well as $ 28). Prodicus' allegory of his fateful choice between Virtue and Vice at the crossroads as recounted at X. Mem. 2.1.21 ff. (partly reproduced at 1.118) shines through our passage. Cf. similar use of Hercules at Tusc. 1.28:. . . et apud Graecos indeque perlapsus ad nos et usque ad Oceanum Hercules tantus et tarn praesens habetur deus; Fin. 3.65-66: inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. . . . atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic it, qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libera accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur.— The beneficia that will be remembered by the beneficiary are the kind recom mended at 2.63; for the phrase beneficiorum memor cf. Norden ad Aen. 6, p. 36, n. 2. 26 si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat?] For Kant's use of the con cept of "humanity in oneself and others" derived from this passage cf. p. 48 above. Ergo unum debet esse—dissolverur omnis humana consortio.] Restatement 29. E.g., he quotes such older commentators as Mclanchthon and H. Wolf on the usefulness of repetition in moral instruction; but this commonplace is, of course, inadequate to meet the special problems of our passage.
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in a positive and more generalized form of the formula and the consequence of violating it. The point ut eadem sit utilitas unius cumsque et universorum is breathtaking in its implications; the rest of this Book can be regarded as an attempt to work out what some of these might be, 30 though they turn out, in Cicero's hands, to be narrower than one might have expected; cf. Long, 1995 1 , 237: "Why did Cicero apply the principle of communal utility so restrictively ?. . . Cicero either did not see, or did not wish to see, the possible democratic and egalitarian applications of communal utility."—Consortio appears here for the first time in Latin prose, the previous occurrence being at Lucil. 857-58 Krenkel ( = 8 1 8 - 1 9 Marx): deierat se non \se non Baehrens : enim codd.] scripsisse et post non scripturum: redi I in consortionem, where a woman is evidently seeking a love-charm from a witch; it was later largely displaced by the younger form consortium, beloved by Christian authors; cf. Spelthahn, TLL s.vv. 27 Atque etiam—omnium utilitatem esse communem.] Cf. ad$$2\ and 24; Fin. 3.63: ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri.—For the iunctura natura praescribit cf. Ac. 1.23; N.D. 1.77; for the personification of natura ad 1.11. quod si ita est—naturae lege prohibemur.] After Cicero has sought to define what nature does not allow (§22) and has spoken of naturae ratio as a lex divina et humana and of natura as equivalent to the ius gentium (§ 23), the reference to a lex naturae comes as little surprise; cf. also ad § 23. verum autem primum, verum igitur extremum.J Cf. Schofield, 1995 1 , 200: "We must each be bound by this law of nature: i.e. / must care for any person's interests because 1 recognize him as related to me by a common humanity. And from this in turn it follows that I must refrain from injustice—from harming another person's interests: which would be to treat them as those of someone to whom 1 am not related. The logic of the argu ment is emphasized by the self-conscious syllogistic structure: if p, then q; if q, then r. But the first (p). So the last (r).M Cf. ad 2.48. 28 As in 1.53, Cicero goes through the various human societies, this time from the narrowest to the broadest; he determines that there is no point at which one can violate the formula and still maintain the humani generis societas. As Sorabji, 145, points out, this passage (and ft». 3.63) is closer to the modern conception of human rights than most Stoic texts because the emphasis is on the recipient's characteristic of membership in a divinely 30. The point is taken up by Antipater in the debate with Diogenes at $ 52. Cf. Schofield, 1995', 200-1.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 26-28 and 29-32
531
sanctioned societas, rather than merely on the recipient as material for the agent's exercise of virtue. The view that Cicero qualifies as absurdum is, of course, the traditional one, combated by the Stoa; cf. Walcot, 123, and ad 5 25. What is new in this paragraph is the emphasis on the gods as those who have constituted the humani generis societas (cf. ad $ 21). nam illud quidem absurdum est—ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem . . .] Cf. Sen. de Ira 2.31.7: nefas est nocere patriae; ergo civi quoque, nam hie pars patriae est—sanctae partes sunt, si universum venerabile est; ergo et homini, nam hie in maiore tibi urbe civis est. . . . cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naruram hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subirc vel externa vel corporis vel etiam ipsius animi {.. .) quae vacent iustitia. haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum.] Among recent editors Fedeli posits a lacuna at this point, 31 Testard merely prints the transmitted text, and Atzert 4 deletes quae vacent. . . haec on the theory that they represent the marginal note quae(re) vac(ant) hie of a reader who suspected a lacuna; but if that reader found before him the text that Atzert restores, the posited reader's suspicion of a lacuna is quite gratuitous. Sydow's conjecture affectiones is superficially attractive but seems an un likely object of subire (cf. Merguet s.v. adfectio)\ hence the case is more complex, the lacuna likely to be more extensive.—On the Stoic scale of values cf. ad §§ 13 and 21 above.—For the human societas as the artissimum vinculum and the characterization of iustitia cf. 1.153 (the non-Panaetian appendix): . . . ea [sc. communitas et societas] si maxima est, ut est certe, necesse est quod a communitate ducatur officium, id esse maximum. On the importance of iustitia cf. ad 2.10. For the iunctura cf. Tusc. 2.47: domina omnium et regina ratio together with A.E. Douglas, "Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations," in Powell, 207. 2 9 - 3 2 These paragraphs test the limits of the formula, which is held not to apply in all situations. The humani generis societas has been determined to be maxime secundum naturam ($ 21); hence its interest (utilitas) can allow one, κατά πβρίστασιΐ', to opt out of the formula. Thus χ can steal y's food only if χ is more valuable to the community than y (cf. ad § 30). This applies a fortiori if y is a tyrant like Phalaris whom one could not only despoil but even kill since, like a wild beast, he is outside of and at odds with the hominum communitas. In practice, however, the matter will seldom be as simple as Cicero's hypothetical case ( . . . « / ah homine inerti atque inutili ad 31. Similarly Winterbottom daggers etiam ipsius animi with a now mooting loss of material after ammi.
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sapientem bonum fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si occiderit multurn de communi utilitate detraxerit. . . ; $ 31). Cicero and his source are aware of the danger:. . . hoc ita faciat ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens banc causam habeat ad iniuriam (S 31). But in view of the imperfect moral judgment of the ordinary individual, who cannot distinguish a genuine sapiens (§$ 15-16), such a discrimination can surely be safely entrusted only to a sapiens (that this was Cicero's intent is, however, pace Nickel, 65, not altogether clear, since he speaks in § 30 of the person whose continued existence can contribute much to the state and to human society as qualified to remove means of subsistence from a less qualified person, and such benefits could, as $ 16 indicates, be offered by those who are not sapientes in the strict Stoic sense; cf. also ad § 90). The casuistic cases at 3.49b ff. give some notion of the kinds of abuse that could otherwise ensue. In view of its subject this material seems likely to derive from Posidonius π*ρι του κατά πζρίσΊαοιν καθήκοντος, which Cicero was interested in reading in connection with Off 3 (Att. 16.11.4; see the intro duction to this Book). Note that Posidonius (1.159 = fr. 177 E.-K. = 433 Th.) raised the similar question whether there is a limit to what one should do in the interest of the communitas. 29 Forsitan quispiam dixeriu 'nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? (minime vero: non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis adfectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia.) . . .'] Unger, 83-84, argued that the sentence minime vero—gratia does not belong in this place because of the following haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. which introduces the answer to the first question and then (beginning in § 32) to the second without any indication that an answer has already been given. Unger originally proposed a simple athetesis but later preferred to transpose the sentence in question to § 26 (after vitiis animi gravius existimat), where, however, it belongs even less (since it cannot even function as the answer to a question). If, then, Unger's positive sugges tion has fallen into well-deserved oblivion, his critique of the sentence has continued to exercise scholars. Suspecting that a Ciceronian marginal note had crept into the text, Atzert 2 enclosed the suspect matter in double square brackets (so, too, Winterbottom). Pohlenz, Off III, 10, n. 1, tried to explain it as a remark of Cicero's own which he would have deleted in a final redac tion; but, if it is so objectionable that Cicero would have deleted it, how can we be certain that Cicero, and not an interpolator, wrote it in the first place? Thus it is hardly surprising that Bruser, 64, revived Unger's original position and branded minime vero—commodi mei gratia as an interpolation. In this he has been followed by Atzert 4 and Fedeli, with the former adding to
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 29-32 and 29
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previous arguments an objection to utilior: what the author really meant, he suggests (app. crit. ad loc.)y is potior. But note Cicero's tendency to expand the use of utilis in works of this period, as at $ 85 {cuius autem vita ipsi potest utilis esse . . . » a very similar usage to our passage [cf. also $ 84, where the adjective is applied to angores etc.J) or Phil. 2.37:. . . mihi enim omnis pax cum civibus bello civili utilior videbatur . . . Nevertheless Atzert has here, perhaps more than he realized, put his finger on a real problem, for the criterion for such judgments, according to Cicero, is not utilitas, but rather what is secundum naturam: cf. ad $$ 19b-32. On the other hand, Thomas, 102 ff., followed by Johann, 526, n. 138, defends the suspect matter. He cites 5 89, which he interprets as a case in which Cicero first answers a question unequivocally "no" but then modifies the answer. This is a misreading of $ 89, however. There Cicero, in reporting specific cases from a casuistic discussion in the sixth book of Hecato's trea tise on appropriate actions states: 'si tabulam de naufragio stultus adripuerit, extorquebitne earn sapiens, si potueritV negat, quia sit iniurium. In fact, there is no modification of this judgment in what follows and hence no parallel to the transmitted text of 3.29 (Thomas' difficulty stems from a misunderstanding of Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 25, who is concerned to establish what Hecato may actually have said on the subject, as opposed to what Cicero reports; cf. also ad loc). Furthermore Thomas' attempt to establish hasty composition in §§ 2 9 - 3 2 and thus excuse the suspect material of § 29 is unsuccessful. Certain expressions in §$ 30-31 (e.g., si in vita remaneas) could refer either to the case of the starving sapiens stealing food or the freezing vir bonus stealing Phalaris' clothes, but this ambiguity is the result, not of hasty composition, but of the similarities of the cases themselves. The subject of §S 3 0 - 3 1 , namely the claims of the homo ad nullam partem utilis, is clearly stated at the beginning of $ 30; there is no mention of the tyrant again until the beginning of § 32, where the new subject is clearly introduced {nam quod ad Phalarim attinet. . .) and no real basis for misunderstanding the train of thought. The sentence minhne vero—commodi met gratia is surely an interpola tion. Cicero can hardly have been guilty of so muddling his central point that utilitas becomes the criterion for judging such cases or offering an answer and then blithely continuing haecad iudicandum sunt facillima. Might it be a (Christian?32) reader's shocked response, entered in the margin and thence inserted in the text in subsequent copyings?
32. For a probably Christian reading in the ξ MSS cf. ad 1.155a.
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. . . quid? si Phalarim, cmdelem tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nonne faciat?'] For the Peripatos, Phalaris already served as a stock example of cruelty: cf. EN 1148b24 and 1149al4, MM 1203a22 (quoted ad 2.16 above); cf. also ad 2.26. Strasburger, 1990, 90, thinks that here and in § 32 "Caesar gemeint ist, obwohl 'Phalaris' gesagt wird"; whether or not Cicero used such allegorical references to Caesar in the philosophica published under his dictatorship, there was no need to do so in Off., where the dead Caesar is expressly mentioned a number of times. In our context Cicero made his point with unmistakable reference to Caesar at $ 19; our passage states the argument in the broader terms in which it might be handled by philosophers, including the stock example of a tyrant. 30 . . . sin autem is tu sis qui multam utilitatem reipublicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, adferre possis, si quid ob earn causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum.] This major modification of the formula opens up the possibility of abuse (cf. Heilmann, 92, and following note) and is at odds with Hecato's teaching (cf. § 89: 'si tabulam de naufragio stultus adripuerit, extorquebitne earn sapiens, si potuerit?' negat, quia sit iniurium). This contradiction is the clearest evidence that Cicero is following more than one philosophical source in Off. 3.—The societas generis humani includes not only the living but also posterity; Cicero justifies action in behalf of the respublica on these grounds at Fin. 3.64 (certe verum est etiam Us, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum)\ cf. Nickel, 66. 31 . . . modo hoc ita faciat ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam.] Aristotle makes it clear that φιλαυτία can affect one's moral judgment when he writes of the aged: και προς το συμφέρον ζώσιν, άλλ' ού προς τό καλόν, μάλλον ή 6 d , δια τό φίλαυτοι elvar . . . {Rhet. 1389b36). He also remarks on its universality:. . . ανάγκη πάντα? φίλαυτους ei ναι ή μάλλον ή ήττον . . .(ibid., 1371 bl 9-20; cf. Cicero's application of the epithet communis to φιλαυτία at Att. 13.13.1). A propos the question πότβρον δ€Ϊ φιλ€Ϊν εαυτόν μάλιστα ή άλλον τινά; {ΕΝ 1168a28) Aristotle proposes to reform terminology and speak of φιλαυτία in a good sense (ibid., 1168b 13 ff.), but MM 1212a31 acquiesces in the ordinary usage (ό μένουν φαύλος φίλαυτος εστί . . . άλλ' ούχ ό σπουδαίος); cf. also 1.30.—The unsolved problem of our passage is how this judgment of one's usefulness to society can be made without self-love entering in (cf. the problem of who the good are and what it is to deal well, left open at § 70); cf. Heilmann, 92. 32 nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis et potius summa distractio e s t . . .1 This would be the first occurrence of distractio in this sense (needed here by Cicero as an antonym for societas) if Varro's four books de Vita
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 29-32 and 33-34
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Populi Romani date to the year 43 (cf. Dahlmann, RE Suppl. 6 11935J, 1243.1 ff.); cf. Non. p. 287M: Varro de Vita Populi Romani lib. II: 'distractione civium elanguescit bonum proprium civitatis atque aegrotare incipit et consenescit'. This usage was prepared by the use of distrahere of the sunder ing of ties at Deiot. 15 {quonam ille modo cum regno, cum domo, cum coniuge, cum carissimo filio distractus esset. . . ?); cf. Bauer, TLL 5, 1540.40 and 1542.15. etcnim, ut membra quaedam amputantur si et ipsa sanguine et tamquam spiritu carcre coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquam humanitatis corporc segreganda est.] Cf. ad § 22 above and § 82a below, as well as Rep. 2.48: simul atque enim se inflexit hie rex in dominatum iniustiorem, fit continuo tyrannus, quo neque taetrius neque foedius nee dis hominibusque invisius animal ullum cogitari potest; qui quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen inmanitate vastissimas vincit beluas. quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi cum suis civibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem velitf—Spiritus has here, by metonymy, the sense "life, vital force"; cf. OLD s.v., 3b, where our passage, rather than Phil. 11.24 (bellum gent, in acie stat, de sanguine et de spiritu decertat) should have been cited as the first occurrence; the tam quam signals the metaphorical application to the membra.—I adopt (with Muretus) the correction humanitatis corpore offered by some recentiores for humanitate corporis; if taken literally, this latter reading results in absurdity, as H. Volkmann, "Griechische Rhetorik oder romische Politik?" Hermes 82 (1954), 4 7 0 - 7 1 , showed with reference to K. Biichner's translation; cf. also Ehlers, TLL 6,3079.47-48. Atzerr4 attempted to defend it as an instance of εναλλαγή; but he is able to adduce only pseudo-parallels: there is nothing remotely comparable at 3.109 {hie ea quae videbatur utilitas plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores utilitatis species falsa ah honestatis auctoritate superata est) or 1.127 [itaque nee actio rerum alarum aperta petulantia vacat nee orationis obscenitas), where orationis obscenitas is surely equiv alent to verborum obscenitas (so Miiller ad loc). 3 3 - 3 4 Themes of current political interest tend to receive priority in Off. (cf. ad 2.23-29 and 55b-60); hence the insertion of the preceding matter on tyrannicide. These sections bring the reader back to the subject of this Book by going over ground previously covered, including (1) the plan of Panaerius' book and its incomplete state (cf. §§ 7-10); (2) the premise of the argument based upon valuation of the external goods (cf. §§ 11-13); (3) the defense of Panaetius for including the third question, the conflict between the honestum and the apparent utile (along the same lines as §§ 12 and 18). Having used
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the material supplied by Posidonius (cf. ad $$ 13b-17, 21, 22, 29-32), Cicero now wanted to emphasize his originality for the balance of the Book; to do so, he evidently felt he had to go back over the plan of Panaetius' work and its incomplete state. Here would have been the apposite place for the divisio (cf. ad § 96). 33 ad quas ipsas consultationes ex superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, quibus perspici possit quid sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum . . .] In fact, turpitudo has not played a large role in Off. 1-2; we were told of Posidonius' collection of materials ita taetra quae dam, ita obscena, ut dictu quoque videantur turpia (1.159); and verecundia, a subordinate virtue under το πρέπον, had entailed strictures against obscenitas in speech and action (1.127-29); and likewise under the fourth virtue Cicero had included a list of professions that are sordidi and therefore to be avoided (1.150-51). But he is evidently assuming that acts of injustice are generally disgraceful (cf. Polus' admission at Grg. 475b that to commit injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer it; cf. also 482d). . . . ut geometrae solent non omnia docere—nee praeterea quicquam probabile.] It is surprising that Cicero asks for this concession only here, when it was really needed before § 21; moreover, the argument has so far been based specifically on the Stoic valuation of the bodily and external goods (as he explicitly acknowledged at § 20; cf. ad 1.6, §§ 11, 13, and 21); but this changes at § 35, where Cicero places the Stoic and Peripatetic views on an equal footing (cf. Leg. 1.37).—In spite of this work's status as a surrogate for Cicero's aborted visit to his son in Athens (cf. § 121), this is one of very few attempts to involve Cicero jr. in the argument as if it were an actual dialogue (cf. 2.44-45, S§ 81, 85, 97, 99b; cf. also the postulate requested by Marcus and granted by Atticus at Leg. 1.21). For the form of the request and the analogy to geometricians cf. PI. Men. 86e: ei μη τι ούν αλλά σμικρόν -γέ μοι της αρχής χάλασον, και συγχιύρησον έξ υποθέσεως αυτό σκοπ€~ισθαι, €ΐτε διδακτόν έστιν €ΪΤ€ όπωσοΰν. λέγω δέ το έξ ύποβέσζως ώδ€, ώσπ^ρ οί γ6ωμέτραι πολλάκις σκοποϋνται, έπβιδάν τις ερηταί αυτούς, οίον π€ρι χωρίου, ei οΐόν TC ές τόνδί τον κύκλον τό& το χωρίον τρίγωνον ένταθηναι . . .—Cicero ostensibly grants his son intellectual freedom (cf. 1.2; Testard, 1974, 157) but, in fact, sees Cratippus' Aristotelianism as the potential obstacle. 34 . . . negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem qui ista distraxerint.] Cf. ad § 11 above. banc igitur partem rclictam cxplebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicirur, Marte nostra.] Pohlenz, Off. ///, 25, finds Cicero operating essentially suo Marte only in §$ 58-88; but see the introduction to this Book. Bringmann,
Commentary on Book 3, Section 33-35
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230, refers more vaguely to "ein bedeutender Anteil eigener gedanklicher Leistungen" in Off. 3 and has promised a study of the subject. Abel, 108-9, tries to justify Cicero's claim; but surely Cicero has at least used Hecato (§§ 4 9 b - 5 7 , 89-92a) plus another philosophical source at variance with Hecato (cf. ad § 30); nor has Abel discussed the parallels with doctrines attested for or attributed to Posidonius noted ad §§ 2 1 , 22, and 29-32; see also the next note. neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaerium explicatum, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de lis, quae in manus meas venerint.] Cf. the praise of Panaetius* way of handling the subject at § 7 (accuratissime). The judg ment expressed here certainly accords with the cool verdict on Hecato passed at § 63 (huic nee laus magna tribuenda nee gratia «r), but not with the enthusiastic reception of the satis bellum υπόμνημα sent by Athenodorus (Att. 16.14.4), unless perhaps the υπόμνημα comprised only the work of Posidonius used by Cicero in the preceding paragraphs and therefore not a full treatment (and the defect was therefore one of scope; cf. § 8: quern locum miror a Posidonio breviter esse tactum in quibusdam commentaries . . .). Perhaps what Cicero really means is that he found no satisfactory connected treatment of this subject. But even if he did not have a main source to follow for the balance of Off. 3, it does not follow that he made all the arguments up out of whole cloth; the citations of Hecato alone would show otherwise (see previous note). 3 5 - 3 7 Section 35 begins by attacking the problem of the conflict of the honestum and apparent utile at the point where Cicero had left it at the end of § 18—before he launched into the formula and its application κατά τκρίστασιΐ'—, namely determining for a given act quale sit. He proposes turpitudo as a test, a fairly obvious move, since it is the opposite of virtuous action (cf. 1.4b; Arist. EN 1128b25: φαύλου 6έ και το €ΐναι τοιούτον οίον πράττ€ΐι> τι τών αισχρών; SVF 3, 6.18, 37.15; Cic. Leg. 1.44 = SVF 3, 76.28; for turpe = malum vel sim. cf. SVF 1, 83.35 and 84.37 [Aristo] and 130.27 ICleanth.J; SVF 2, 296.1 and 297.17; Fin. 3.29 = SVF 3, 10.40; Fin. 3.36 = SVF 3,12.6; SVF 3,44.8-9; § 105: an est ullum maius malum turpitudinef), and disgraceful actions arise from vice (Fin. 3.36 = SVF 3,12.8); turpitudo is also the factor that can limit even action in behalf of the communitas (1.159 = Posidon. fr. 177 E.-K. = 433 Th.). Cicero then establishes to his own satisfaction that turpitudo and utilitas cannot coexist in the same action and reaffirms the identity of honestum and utile (this time giving equal weight to the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the summum bonum: cf. ad $ 33). 35 Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commovcri necesse esc]
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Cf. 2.37: vita mors divitiae paupertas omnes homines vehementissime permovent. quod si nihil est tarn contra naturam quam turpitudo . . .J Cf. Leg. 1.45 = SVF 3, 77.16:. . . honesta quoque et turpia . . .ad naturam referenda sunt. . . . (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat, aspernaturque contraria) . . .] Cf. ad 1.111 and 144. . . . nihilque tarn secundum naturam quam utilitas . . .] Cf. ad § 21. . . . si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut Zenoni visum est, aut—quod Aristoteli p l a c e t . . . ] SVF omits this testimony to Zeno's "uncompromising moral idealism" (Long, 1967,62); cf. ad 1.6,3.11. . . . ita quidquid honestum, id utile.] Cf. the similar formulation at 2.10 (. . . ut quidquid honestum sit, idem sit utile; cf. ad he); but what Cicero really needs to establish for his argument in this Book is rather . . . nee utile quicquam quod non honestum (§ 11). 36 Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid quod utile visum est adripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto.] This is the view so strongly con demned by Socrates (cf. ad § 11 above); the masses admire those who can resist such temptation (2.37). . . . hinc falsa testamenta nascunmr,—nee foedius excogitari potest.] Most of these points had either been taken up in the previous Book (pecubtus at 2.75, direptiones sociorum et avium at 2.27-29 and 72-85, the lust for kingly power in a free commonwealth at 2.23-24) or are about to be treated here {falsa testamenta: $§ 73-75); Cicero's denunciation of the final abuse in this list rises to a crescendo at § 83. emolumenta enim rerum fallacious iudiciis vident, poenam, non dico legum, quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est, non vident] For the iunctura fallacibus iudiciis (= "false judgments") cf. Lucr. 4.513 ff.: denique ut in fabrica, si pravast regula prima, I normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, I. . . I omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est I . . . I iam mere ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque I prodita iudiciis fal lacibus omnia primis . . . —Similar to our metaphor of legal penalty as a restraint, such as a rope or chain, which a determined criminal can break through, is the description of Verres' attempts to evade justice (Ver. 2.1.13): confringat iste sane vi sua consilia senatoria, quaestiones omnium perrumpat, evolet ex vestra severitate: mihi credite, artioribus apud populum Romanum laqueis tenebitur.—The poena turpitudinis presumably refers to the harm done to the soul; cf. ad § § 21 and 85. — Cicero has discussed at § S 1 5 16 the moral myopia that causes men to be considered sapientes who are rather less than that; but this is a more extreme case, akin rather to the φιλαυτία which can lead one into injustice (cf. ad § 31).
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 35-37a and 37b-39
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37a . . . in ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint.] Cf. $ 18. 37b-39 The Latin turpitudo, like the Greek αίσχρόν. implies public disgrace. Therefore it is apposite to consider whether the possibility of concealment alters the case. In § 33 the postulate was already granted that nihil praeter id quod honestum sit propter $e esse expetendum; now Cicero wants to estab lish that the reverse applies to the turpe, viz., omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse (3.39). To establish this point, however, he must face the vulgar opinion that the turpe might be better apart from its consequences. Cf. the problem broached at Glauco's instance by Socrates at R. 358b, namely whether justice is worth cultivating apart from its rewards. In fact, Cicero follows Socrates* example in deploying the Gyges story as a test-case. These chapters comprise the thesis later defended by Peregrinus: virum quidem sapientem non peccaturum esse dicebat, etiamsi peccasse eum dii atque homines ignoraturi forent (Gel. 12.11.2). In focusing on the Gyges tale, however, which he recounts at length, Cicero misses the opportunity to explore the meaning of turpitudo or, like Peregrinus, the fact that human crimes hardly ever, in the long run, go undetected (see ad $ 38). The ring of Gyges was proverbial in antiquity em των πολυμήχανων και πανούργων (Diogen. 3.99 with von Leutsch's note). Hence its appropriate ness for illustrating teachings about the relation of morality to the fear of detection; Plato had already used it for such purposes (R. 359d ff.), and it was from Plato that Cicero or his source, while aware of the fact that the tale had been dramatized, derived it {Hie Gyges inducitur a Platone: § 38). It has long been recognized that Plato's folktale version, in which Gyges is a simple shepherd who wins his way to the throne with the aid of a magic ring, is original and Herodotus' version a secondary rationalization, in which, not a magic ring, but King Candaules' indiscreet boasting together with the queen's decisive action elevate Gyges to the throne (Stein ad Hdt. 1.12 al ready recognized that the folktale had influenced Herodotus' account; E. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, 3 2 (Stuttgart, 19371,133, n. 1, was the first to see that Herodotus merely presents a rationalization of the folktale). Justin 1.7.14 ff. alters Herodotus' version in the direction of the folktale to the degree that he inserts a love affair involving Gyges and the queen between his act of voyeurism and his murder of Candaules. The testimonies then avail able were collected by K.F. Smith, "The Tale of Gyges and the King of Lydia," AJPh 23 (1902), 261-82 and 361-87, who, however, is too uncriti cal, especially in his use of Justin and Ptolemy Chennus.—According to the older manuscripts at R. 359d (and Proclus in R. 2,111.4 Kroll), the experi ence occurred, not to Gyges himself, but to his ancestor (τω Γύγου του Λυδου
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πρυγόνω). In view of R. 612b (. . . εάντ' έχη τον Γύγου δακτύλων . . . , without a variant) as well as our passage, Wiegand, Zeitschr. f. d. Alterth., 1834, 863, suggested that Γύγου in 359d should be bracketed as a gloss, the reference being to Gyges (unnamed), the ancestor of the Lydian (sc. Croesus); but this is a rather oblique identifier. Probably the reading of the recentiores (Γύγη τω for τω Γύγου) is right (it is, for instance, adopted by Chambry, whereas Burnet accepts Wicgand's athetesis), with the error due to confusion of compendia in minuscule script and the Proclan tradition Corrected" from the Platonic. The more economical hypothesis would be that Cicero is citing the story at second hand via a source that also mentioned that it had been criticized on grounds of impossibility; however, citation from memory can not be ruled out (cf., in favor of direct dependence on Plato, Abel, 111). 37b . . . satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum.] The example of Gyges aptly illustrates the various types of shameful behavior listed here. The words si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus raise the possibility that the following material derives from a discussion such as Chrysippus' book περί του διαλεληθότο? προ? Άθηνάδην (SVF 2, 8.12); this or a book of similar content was the source of Plut. Quomodo Quis Suos in Virtute Sentiat Profectus, where cf. 82b, a discussion of the concealment of the faults of the soul: άχρι δ' ου τι? έπιδεικνύμενο? ρύπον ή κηλίδα χιτώνο? ή διερρωγό? υπόδημα καλλωπίζεται προ? του? έκτος άτυφία κενή και διασκώπτων αυτό? εαυτόν ώ? μικρόν ή ώ? κυρτον οϊεται νεανιεύεσθαι, τα δ" ε ντο? αίσχη τή? ψυχή? και τα περί τον βίον εγχρεμματα και μικρολογία? και φιλ ηδονία? και κακοήθεια? και φθόνου? ώσπερ έλκη περιστελλων και αποκρυπτων ούδενα θιγείν ούδε προσιδεϊν έ
Commentary on Book 3, Section 3 7 b - 3 9
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quality of this corpse (cf. Plato's description μ€ΐ'£ω ή κατ' άνθρωποι') is per haps better captured by magnitudine invisitata, as recent editors (Atzert 4 , Fedeli, Testard, Wintcrbottom) agree, in spite of the contrary opinion of Stiewe, TLL 7,2.2,273.6 ff., who prefers (with Β 2 , Ρ, and ξ) inusitata; Clark is probably also right in printing, with a single codex, invisitatum (inusitatum cett.) at Phil. 11.2 (with reference to Antony and Dolabella: ecce tibi geminum in scelere par, invisitatum, inauditum, ferum, barbarum). . . . (erat autem regius pastor) . . . ] Cicero inserts this piece of information only at the point when it becomes vital to the story (to explain Gyges' connection with the court), whereas both Herodotus and Plato had more artfully explained Gyges' position upon first mention of his name (respec tively 1.8.1, where he is rather said to be τών αίχμοφόρων, and R. 359d). hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo plus sibi licere putet peccare quam si non haberet;. . .] The sapiens substitutes for ό δίκαιο? in Plato; the tale may have passed to Cicero via a Stoic intermediary, or he may himself have adjusted it to Stoic terminology. Rather than what he elsewhere calls the forma officii(1.103 with note) Cicero here uses a description of the behavior of the sage, which amounts to the same thing; cf. Sen. Ep. 95.66: haec res eandem vim habet quam praecipere; nam qui praecipit dicit ΊΐΙα fades si voles temperans esse', qui describit ait 'temperans est qui ilia facit, qui Hits abstinet'. quaeris quid intersitt alter praecepta virtutis dat, alter exemplar. 39 Atque hoc loco philosophi quidam minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone . . .] Who are the "not very bright" philosophers with whom Cicero loses patience in this passage, and why did they so stubbornly refuse to accept the premise and commit to a course of action? Was their point that no unobserved act can be called αισχροί'? Possibly, as Goldbacher, 2, 69, suggested, in spite of their apparent dismissal at § 18, the Epicureans are meant; cf. Tusc. 2.44: venit Epicurus, homo minime malus vel potius vir optumus. Alternatively, this debate may reflect Stoic-Academic discussions of the second century, with the Academy objecting to positing an αδύνατον (cf. Phld. Acad. Hist. XIV.2 ff.: l€|ftixi<x>cpaive δ* |sc. Polemol κα|\1 τοις a s [άδύ]νατ' άνάγουσι τάς ερωτήσεις, άξιων εν τοις πράγμασιν γυμνάζεσθαι) and the Stoics replying by citing the Academics1 own Plato. 33 negant id fieri posse, {quamquam} potest id quidem, sed quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent.J Manutius changed quamquam to 33. Ed. Tiziano Dorandi, Storia dei Filosofi. Platone e V Academia, La Scuola di Epicuro 12 (Naples, 1991), 145.—I owe this suggestion and parallel to the kindness of Stephen A. White.
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nequaquam on the assumption that if Cicero had wanted to affirm the possi bility of concealment, he would have omitted the gods. Cicero's own views on the subject remain obscure, however, since our evidence comes from judicial speeches, which need not be a true indicator (cf. ad 2.51): thus, at Sex. Rose. 131 he speaks of Jupiter Optimus Maximus as not the cause of, and, implicitly, not taking cognizance of, harmful events in the world, but observes at Deiot. 18: si (sc. te interemisset] veneno, lovis iliius hospitalis numen numquam celare potuisset, homines fortasse celasset. In point of sense, then, a case could be made either way. But anyone who carefully studies the Ciceronian attestations of nequaquam, which limits such terms as satis, similis, par, tantus, omnis, seldom a verb, never posse, will doubt that he used it here. The problem with our text is rather the doubling of conces sive words (cf. OLD s.v. quidem 4); more idiomatic to omit the quamquam (inserted by a reader who did not see the force of quidem})\ for potest id quidem, sed cf. Fin. 3.26. . . . ut si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant.] Either these opponents must concede Cicero's point (omnia iwrpia per se ipsa fugienda esse), in which case they cease to be opponents, or convict themselves of villainy. Such an argument directed at the opponent's character is proper to political debate but sometimes transferred by Cicero to the judicial sphere; cf. Christopher P. Craig, Form as Argument in Cicero's Speeches: A Study of Dilemma (Atlanta, 1993), 175. In thus applying it to philosophical opponents Cicero seems to forget that, if they do not agree that omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse, they do not "admit" that the behavior described is bad; it would only be so on Cicero's premise.—omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda was, of course, orthodox Stoic doctrine; cf. Fin. 3.36 = SVF 3, 12.3, where it appears as the counterpart of the proposition quod honestum sit, id esse propter se expetendum.—Note the exceptional phrasing quod expediat, rather than quod expedire videatur; but Cicero is, of course, quoting imaginary opponents, not speaking in his own person; cf. § 49 (perutile attributed to Aristides). 4 0 - 4 2 Among recent editors Testard, Fedeli, and Winterbottom, unlike Atzert, rightly begin a new paragraph at § 40, since the topic now changes from concealment to cases in which one may be in doubt possitne id quod utile videatur fieri non turpiter. This is, in effect, the topic of the entire Book. In default of a clear divisio or stated method of proceeding (cf. ad §§ 33-34), Cicero now passes from topic to topic apparently as it occurs to him. Thus there arc two separate sets of political examples at $$ 4 0 - 4 1 and 4 6 b - 4 9 ; the former, pertaining to Rome and involving possible excesses of personal ambi-
Commentary on Book 3, Section 39-40
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tion, derive from Cicero's own reflections on his historical reading (perhaps an annalist, though this is denied by Soltau, 1240); note that the priority given to them is in line with Cicero's procedure elsewhere (cf. ad 2.29 and 55b-60). The latter set involves decisions taken in the name of the state and is thus com parable to the cases discussed at 1.34-41 and, in view of the Greek examples, might well derive from a Greek source (see ad loc). Cicero's text does not distinguish the two sets of cases, though he could have (see also ad 46b-49a). In our passage Cicero presents two cases, both from early Roman history, of getting rid of an unwelcome colleague; Brutus is exculpated on grounds that the exile of Collatinus was not motivated by personal ambition; rather the principes determined that cognationem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse totlendam (§ 40), so that what was politically utile for Brutus coincided with concern for the interests of the state. On the other hand, Romulus is condemned for killing his brother without substantial cause merely for the sake of political selfaggrandizement. Thus two superficially similar deeds are differently judged in light of their different motives. Political implications were surely in Cicero's mind here,34 as elsewhere in this essay: he manages to expose the moral failing of Rome's first king, whom Caesar's propaganda had glorified (cf. ad § 41), and praise the action of the founder of the republic, the ancestor of Caesar's assassin M. Junius Brutus (pr. 44; cf. Phil. 2.26). In the one case the goal was to establish regnum, in the other to avoid its reestablishment; Cicero assumes that Brutus' action was in Rome's interest, though he had written in Book 2, following Panaetius, that a concern for iustitia led to the establishment of bene morati reges ($ 41); he would no doubt have replied that the Tarquins were hardly bene morati. In any case, the exile of Col latinus, who was not himself a tyrant and not accused of any crime (cf. Rep. 2.53: . . . nostri maiores et Conlatinum innocentem suspicione cognationis expulerunt; Liv. 2.2.3: . . . cum nihil aliud offenderet, nomen invisum civitati /Μ/Γ), shows how readily in this essay the communis utilitas becomes the reipublicae utilitas. Cicero concludes this section by noting that he is not counseling neglect of one's own utilitas, merely the pursuit of it in such a way as not to injure others (a restatement of the essence of the formula of § 21). 40 L. Tarquinius Collatinus was the son (or, according to D.H. 4.64.3, the grandson) of Egerius, who was, in turn, the son of Aruns, the brother of L. Tarquinius Priscus. He was known to Roman saga both as a consul of the first year of the republic and as the husband of Lucretia, whose rape by Sextus Tarquin brought down the royal house; cf. F. Schachermeyr, RE 4A2 34. Heilmann, 60, notes that Mder Gegenwambezug deutlich erkennbar ist."
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(1932), 2387.53 ff. and 2389.23 ff.; Miinzer, ibid., 5.2 (1905), 1982.57 ff. Both Lucretia's father and husband are, as if in recompense, given consulates in the republic's first year, but both are quickly removed from the scene (a propos Sp. Lucretius cf. Liv. 2.8.4: creatus Sp. Lucretius consul, qui magno natu, non sufficientibus iam viribus ad consularia munera obeunda, intra paucos dies moritur); surely neither one served, since our earliest source (Plb. 3.22.1) gives Brutus and M. Horatius as consuls for that year (cf. Ogilvie ad Liv. 1.60.4; material collected at MRR, 1,1-2). Livy differs from Cicero (cf. also Rep. 2.53; Brut. 53 [de Bruto agitur]: . . . qui collegae suo imperium abrogaverit, ut e civitate regalis nominis memoriam tolleret) in making Collatinus lay down his imperium (albeit under some public pressure and yield ing to the advice of his father-in-law) voluntarily; since Dionysius agrees with Livy in this, Ogilvie {ad Liv. 2.2-11) plausibly suspects the innovation of a Sullan annalist who wanted to deny that imperium, once granted by the people, could be legally abrogated (as the senate abrogated Cinna's consulate in 87). Relieving Brutus of any personal onus, Cicero attributes the plan to the principes; Livy (2.2.3-4) represents Brutus as responding to public opin ion; a third tradition makes Collatinus' intervention on behalf of the Aquilii, his nephews, accused of plotting to restore the Tarquins, responsible for his withdrawal or removal (D.H. 5.9; Plut. Popl. 7; Zon. 7.12). Might the Roman tradition have been formed in part under the influence of the first use of ostracism at Athens against Hipparchus son of Charmus, a relative of the Pisistratidae (cf. Arist. Ath. 22.4)? . . . cognationem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam . . .] Cf. Liv. 2.2.3: nescire Tarquinios privatos vivere; non placere nomen, periculosum libertati esse. 41 The tale of Romulus and Remus took root in the republic, when to have two leaders seemed the natural order of things and for a single individual to gather all the power seemed criminal; the unvarnished republican version appeared not only in Cicero but also, in spite of Romulus' later apotheosis, in Ennius (cf. Ann. l.xlviii-1 with Skutsch's notes) and still, after republican sources, in Livy (1.7.2, after the tale of the twins coming to blows over the ambivalent augury): volgatior fama est ludibrio fratris Remum novos transiluisse muros; inde ab irato Romulo, cum verbis quoque increpitans adiecisset, 'sic deinde, quicumque alius transiliet moenia mea\ interfectum. In interposing Celer as the murderer and making Romulus a grieved recipient of the news, Ovid (Fast. 4.837 ff.) doubtless reflects Augustus' rehabilitation of Romulus (cf. also Aen. 1.292-3: cana Fides et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus Iiura dabunt;. . .);cf. Rosenberg, RE 1A1 (1914), 1082.47 ff. and 1091.44 ff.; R. Schilling, "Romulus l'elu et Remus le reprouve," REL 38
Commentary on Book 3, Section 4 0 - 4 2
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(1960), 182-99; T.R Wiseman, Remus: A Roman Myth (Cambridge, 1995), including an appendix of versions. Cicero himself had propagated an ide alized portrait of Romulus in de Republica (esp. 1.64 and 2.10 ff.); it was doubtless Caesar's emphasis on Romulus (cf. Gelzer, Caesar, 295 = Eng. tr. 318; W. Burkert, "Caesar und Romulus-Quirinus," Historia 11 [1962], 356-76) at a time when he was striving for the kingship (cf. A. Alfoldi, Studien iiber Caesars Monarchic ILund, 1953], 18 ff.) that caused Cicero to take a quite different line in our passage; cf. Richard Klein, Konigtum und Konigszeit bei Cicero (diss. Erlangen, 1962), 73. at in eo rege qui urbem condidit non item.] Reserving the name to the end of his account for greater impact, Cicero criticizes at first tacito nomine.—For in - deci. ad 1.46. omisit hie et pietatem et humanitatem . . . et tamen muri causam opposuit, speciem honestatis nee probabilem nee sane idoneam.] Whether one agrees or disagrees with R. Reitzenstein, Werden und Wesen der Humanitat im Altertum (Strassburg, 1907), 7, that humanitas was coined in the "Scipionic circle," 35 it was evidently during the lifetime of the younger Scipio that the terms humanus/inhumanus (the former attested already at PI. Mos. 814) gained currency at Rome (cf. testimonies cited by Reitzenstein, loc. cit., 2 2 23, n. 2); cf., however, the note of caution on the fragmentary nature of our evidence sounded by Astin, 302 ff. Hence Cicero seems to be passing anach ronistic judgment on Romulus. Perhaps, too, he underrates the strength of the early Roman conviction of the sanctity of the city wall, illustrated by this incident (cf. Ogilvie ad Liv. 1.6.3-7.3). For another instance of the different moral criteria of early Rome cf. § 111; for our passage as an example of an apparent honestum cf. ad § 7. peccavit igitur, pace vcl Quirini vel Romuli dixerim.] Cicero narrates the origin of the "divine name" Quirinus at Rep. 2.20. In fact, Quirinus was originally the local divinity of the population of the Quirinal; he was identi fied with Romulus only in the first century B.C.; cf. Wissowa, 111; Altheim, 2, 14; however, Latte, 113 and n. 5, places the identification before 293 B.C.—The topic is rounded off with a double cretic. 42 scite Chrysippus, ut multa . . . ] = SVF 3, 173.10. Did Cicero find this quotation in Posidonius' discussion of the κανών (cf. ad §§ 19b and 21), for 35. Cf. Hermann Strasburger, "Der Scipionenkreis," Hermes 94 (1966), 60-72, who raised the possibility that the Scipionic circle was a Ciceronian literary construct; sim. J.E.G. Zetzel, "Cicero and the Scipionic Circle," HSPh 76 (1972), 173-80; on the interpretation of the phrase grex Scipionis at Amic. 69, often cited as evidence for the existence of such a circle, cf. now Joseph P. Wilson, "Grex Scipionis in De amicitia: A Reply to Gary Forsythe," AJPh 115 {1994), 269-71, with literature.
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which it provides a vivid formulation? Annas, 1989, 167, 18, remarks that Cicero should not approve of Chrysippus' view on grounds that u it is effec tively the same view as Hecato's, which he abuses"; on this inconsistency cf. ad SS 6 2 - 6 3 . 4 3 - 4 6 a At the beginning of § 40 Cicero speaks in general of multae . . . causae quae conturbent artimos utilitatis specie. Here he begins to break them down into groups; two of the obvious areas of life where such problems arise being friendship (§§ 43-46a) and the state (§$ 46b-49a, though, as is noted above, the state has already been dealt with in the examples of §§ 4 0 42). What should or should not limit amicitiaf The topic was raised at Amic. 3 6 - 6 0 , and Cicero had cited the example of Damon and Phintias at Tusc. 5.63, so that he could fall back upon material previously used, as well as his experience at the bar for the judge's responsibilities. 43 Here Cicero establishes two categories, one of things that rank below friendship and therefore can and should be sacrificed to it (one will thus avoid the Scylla of non tribuere quod recte possis)y namely honores, divitiae, voluptates, etc., i.e., the external and bodily goods, the other of things that rank above friendship and should not be sacrificed to it {at neque contra rempublicam neque contra iusiurandum ac ftdem amici causa vir bonus faciei . . .). These are evidently regarded as elements essential to the humani generis societas, which was, according to § 21, maxime. . . secundum naturam; this latter rule is meant to keep one clear of the Charybdis of tribuere quod non sit aequum. It is odd, however, that Cicero, though aware that appropriate actions may change κατά π€ρίστασιν (cf. 1.31-41), makes no mention of that fact here. The traditional Stoa seems to have ranked friend ship higher, among the virtues of the soul (cf. SVF 3,24.27: την δέ περί αυτόν φιλίαν, καθ* ήν φίλος έστι των πέλας, τών περί ψυχήν άποφαίνονσιν αγαθών). quae enim videntur utilia, honores divitiae voluptates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam ameponenda sunt.] Cf. Arist. EN 1169a26: και χρήματα προοΐντ' αν εφ* ω πλείονα λήψονται οι φίλοι· γίνεται γάρ τω μεν φίλω χρήματα, αΰτφ δέ το καλόν τό δη μείζον αγαθόν έαυτφ απονέμει, και περί τιμάς δέ καΐ αρχάς ό αυτός τρόπος* πάντα γάρ τφ φίλψ ταύτα προήσεται· καλόν γάρ αύτφ τούτο και έπαινετόν. at neque contra rempublicam neque contra iusiurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet. . . ] The state is elevated above the friend, a ranking implicit at 1.58 and already at Rab. Perd. 23: . . . induxerit eum (sc. Q. Labienum] L. Saturnini familiaritas ut amicitiam patriae praeponeret. Cicero doubtless felt that he had illustrated the point sufficiently at Amic. 36 ff.; the same triplet appears ibid., 39: igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum [sc. Papi Aemilii, Luscini, M\ Curii, Ti. Coruncanii] ab
Commentary on Book 3, Section 4 2 - 4 4
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amico quippiam contendisse quod contrafidem,contra iusiurandum, contra rempublicam esset; cf. Arist. EN 1169al8: αληθές δέ πβρί τού σπουδαίου καΐ το των φίλων €ΐ*κα πολλά πράττε ι ν καΐ τη? πατρίδος, καν δέτ\ ύπεραποθντ\σκ€ΐν.—The competition of a friend and the state as claimants on our officia was discussed in the virtually contemporaneous correspondence of Cicero and Matius (mid-October, 44), with Marius remarking: aiunt . . . patriam amicitiae praeponendam esse, proinde ac si iam vicerint obitum eius reipublicae fuisse utilem [Fam. 11.28.2). Cf. also Phil. 2.26-27, where, in trying to refute the charge Caesarem meo consilio interfectum (25), Cicero represents various conspirators as acting, not under his influence, but for the good of the state.—The fact that the vir bonus now substitutes for the sapiens (who still appeared at § 38) is a sign that Cicero is now free of any Stoic source or is no longer thinking in specifically Stoic terms; cf. § 18; for the form (a descriptio) cf. ad § 38. . . . ponit enim personam amid cum induit iudicis.] Cf. Quinct. 45: possumus petitoris personam capere, accusatoris deponere? . . . ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet.] Perhaps Cicero has in mind his own role in the case of C. Manilius, whom radical oligarchs accused repetundarum upon expiration of his tribunate in Decem ber, 66, while Cicero was still praetor in charge of such cases. While advocat ing Manilius* bill giving special powers to Pompey, Cicero had pledged his utmost support to Manilius (Man. 69 and 71), but, evidently fearing political repercussions with the Optimates, he sought to avoid having to defend Ma nilius by setting his trial for 29 December, the last day of his praetorship. When Manilius and his followers protested the deadline of only one day for preparing the defense, Cicero made reply in a contio that he was protecting Manilius' interests by insuring that the case came before a well-disposed presiding officer, viz., himself. In the sequel Cicero had to postpone the case and promise to defend Manilius, but the matter never came to trial. Cf. Gelzer, 60; Mitchell, 1979,157-59; Crawford, 64 ff.—For the phrase oran dae litis cf. in lite oranda, correctly restored against L and M, partly on the basis of our passage, at de Orat. 2.43. 44 cum vero iurato sententia dicenda est, meminerit deum se adhibere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius.J There are several senses in which the ancients treat "mind" and "god" as equivalent terms; god as the mind that shapes the world appears in Anaxagoras (59 A 48 D.-K.36) and PI. Lg. 897b: . . . ψυχή . . . wuv μϊν προσλαβοϋσα del Qebv ορθώς θεοΐς, ορθά και εύδαίμονα παιδαγωγεΐ πάντα . . . 36. Cf. the Epicurean critique of Anaxagoras and Xenophanes at N.D. 1.26-28.
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(cf. F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology [Ithaca, 1942], 112-13). In the Pythagorean system the world-soul is sometimes identified as νους or mens (cf. 58 Β 15 D.-K.; Wehrli ad Heracl. Pont. fr. I l l = N.D. 1.34).3? Our passage evidently falls into a third, popular tradition, according to which ό νους γάρ ημών έστιν έν έκάστψ 9e6? (Eur. fr. 1018); sim. Rep. 6.26:. . . nee enim tu is es quern forma ista declarat, sed mens cuiusque is est quisque, non ea figura quae digito demonstrari potest, deum te igitur scito esse, siquidem est deus qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tarn regit et moderatur et movet id corpus cut praepositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus . . . ; for the background cf. Harder, 1960, 368 ff. Cicero expounded the thought more fully at ConsoL fr. 10 Miiller = Tusc. 1.66 (cf. van Wageningen, 45-46): anhnorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut igneum. his enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriae mentis cogitationis habeat, quod et praeterita teneat et futura provideat et complecti possit praesentia. quae sola divina sunt, nee invenietur umquam, unde ad hominem venire possint nisi a deo. singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi seiuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. ita, quicquid est illud, quod sentit quod sapit quod vivit quod viget, caeleste et divinum ob eamque rem aeternum sit necesse est. Cf. also Leg. 2.28. On divina mens and its relation to law cf. Leg. 2.8-10. The skeptic Cotta reduces the deification of such entities as Honos Fides Mens Concordia adabsurdum by adding Spes Moneta at N.D. 3.47. itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudids, si eum teneremus, QUAE SALVA FIDE FACERE POSSIT.] The oath of the iudex in criminal proceedings (as well as of the judge in private cases) is attested from early times; cf. Steinwcnter, RE 10.1 (1918), 1257.57 ff. (s.v. iusiurandum); Mommsen, Strafr., 219 and 395, 2; Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht, 273; cf. also lust. Cod. 3.1.14 init.: rem non novam neque insolitam adgredimur, sed antiquis quidem legislatoribus placitam . . . cut enim non est cognitum antiquos iudices non aliter iudicialem calculum accipere, nisiprius sacramentum praestitissent omnimodo sese cum veritate et legum observatione iudicium esse disposituros? In both Athens and Rome the defense regularly appealed to the jurors to remember their oath; cf. A. Eu. 679-80 (Apollo is the speaker): έν 5έ καρδία: / ψήφον «bepoires δρκον αΐο€Ϊσθ€. ξένοι; Landgraf ad 37. Cf. also Sen. 78: audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque, ittcolas paene nostros, qui essent Italia philosophi quondam nominati, numquam dubitasse quin ex universe mente divina delibatos antmos haberemus.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 44-45 and 45-46a
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Sex. Rose. 8. The words quae salva fide facere possit are from the praetor's formula, the document governing the case agreed upon by the parties to the dispute (cf. ad § 19b above).—Cicero expressed concern about the Romans* ability to maintain the institution of the jury-courts on various occasions; cf. Roloff, 63, n. 4, 91 and, with particular reference to our passage, 103, n. 7 ("ein fur diese Schrift charakteristisches Abgleiten in die Verfallsvorstellung"). For si eum teneremus (sc. morem) cf. the similar thought at Flac. 15: ο morem praedarum disciplinamque quam a maioribus accepimus, £/ quidem teneremus! sed nescio quo pacto iam de manibus elabitur, where the mos in question is the orderly Roman contio (in the course of defending his client on extortion charges supported by Asiatic Greeks, Cicero attributes the growing disorder of the Roman contiones to the influx of persons of Asiatic origin); cf. also Clu. 5:. . . ilia definitio iudiciorum aequorum quae nobis a maioribus tradita est retineatur . . . The topos is likewise echoed at Sal. Cat. 51.42 (Caesar's speech): profecto virtus atque sapientia maior Hits fuity qui ex parvis opibus tantum imperium fecere, quam in nobis, qui ea bene parta vix retinemus. Cf. also the passages collected ad § 2 {deleta iudicia). 4 4 - 4 5 nam si omnia facienda sint quae amid velint, non amicitiae tales sed coniurationes putandae sint. loquor autera de communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest esse tale.] That is, because the sapiens would ask a friend to do nothing improper; cf. Amic. 38: quodsi rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis quidquid velinty vel inpetrare ab its quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de Us amicis qui ante oculos sunt. . .—Though it is true, as Jerome implied [in Os. 5.13), that coniuratio is neutral and need not involve any improper activity (e.g., the soldiers' sacramentum could be so desig nated), in practice the term usually had, as here, negative connotations; cf. Gudeman, TLL 4, 338.18 ff.; Hellegouarc'h, 95-97. 4 5 - 4 6 a In antiquity there were two main versions of this anecdote, one circulated by Aristoxenus (fr. 31 Wehrli = Iamb. VP 233) attributed to Dionysius the Younger living in Corinthian exile (this appears in shorter form at Porph. VP 59 ff.), the other given by Diodorus (10.4.3 ff.). 38 Cicero's version, not only here but also at Tusc. 5.63 (cf. also the reference at Fin. 2.79), agrees in essentials with Diodorus. Aristoxenus differs from Diodorus in making the story spring from a ruse of Dionysius to test the vaunted strength of Pythagorean friendship; thus Phintias is falsely accused of plot38. E. Schwartz, RE 5.1 (1903), 678.63 ff. and 679.12 ff., sees Diodorus' source here as a rhetorical account of the "Seven Wise Men."
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ting against the tyrant. There is, however, a logical flaw in this version: how could Dionysius know that Phintias would want to settle his domestic affairs and ask a friend to substitute for him?39 Nevertheless Aristoxenus' version is no doubt original, since the denouement {viz., Dionysius* request to become the third in their league of friendship) presupposes that there is no bitter enmity involved; cf., after Cobet and Nauck, Burkert, 1962,93, n. 36 = Eng. tr., 104, n. 36. However, in view of theflawedlogic noted above, caused by a desire to avoid representing the Pythagoreans as actually plotting against the life even of a tyrant,40 the anecdote can hardly be other than a literary fiction of Aristoxenus; cf. Wehrli ad Aristox. fr. 31. The bearing of this anecdote in our context is made clear only through the following comment:41 cum igitur id quod utile videtur in amicitia cum eo quod honestum est comparator, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas. It is, in other words, the case described at § 40, namely the conflict of the honestum and the apparent utile, and illustrates the choice of loyalty to one's friend over life itself (at 5 43 Cicero had given examples only of external, not bodily goods; but the two are always treated as one class in our essay). . . . cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset.. .] The failure to specify which was under sentence of death suggests that Cicero is relying on memory (though in Tusc. and Fin. he does not even mention their names!). 46b-49a These sections present examples of wrong and right decisions in republica, i.e., involving raisons d'etat. Unlike §§ 40-41, where the suspi cion of an unjust striving for power within the (Roman) state was at issue, these are decisions taken by or (in the case of the destruction of Corinth) in the name of entire states. The argument begins with Roman and Greek examples of cruel or inhuman treatment (the destruction of Corinth, an Athenian decree mandating the mutilation of captured Aeginetans, and the laws of Pennus and Papius excluding foreigners from Rome) and then pro ceeds to positive Roman and Greek examples in which honestas prevails over the utilitatis species: the refusal to make peace during the second Punic and Persian wars and the Athenians' refusal to listen to Themistocles' dishonor able plan. 46b Sed utilitatis specie in republica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri.] Cf. ad 1.35 above. 39. So Kurt von Fritz, Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy: An Analysis of the Sources (New York, 1940>, 24. 40. Ibid. 41. In view of § 16 even Damon and Phintias can hardly be qualified as sapientes viri perfectique.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 45-46a, 46b-49, and 46b
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durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderenmr.] Durius etiam Athenienses surely means u the Athe nians also acted too harshly" (for the type of comparative cf. KuhnerStegmann, 2 , 4 7 5 - 7 6 ) , not, as the phrase is commonly rendered, "the Athe nians were even harsher" (Atkins; sim. Testard, Gunermann);42 for it was hardly harsher to cut off the thumbs of male captives than to slay the entire male population, sell the women and children into slavery, and apply the torch to the city, as was done to Corinth (cf. Strab. 8 C 381; Paus. 7.16.7; Lenschau, RE Suppl. 4 [1924], 1033.36 ff.); this interpretation of etiam also receives support from the similarly structured sentence male etiam qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent. . . (§ 47). For criticism of Roman imperial ism cf. 2.27 ff. and $$ 49a and 87 (contrast 1.35 and 38 and 2.85). This Athenian decree is also attested at Ael. VH 2.9 (V. Max. 9.2 ext. 8 depends on our passage): οΐα έψηφίσαντο 'Αθηναίοι, και ταύτα έν δημοκρατία. Αιγινητών μέν έκαστου τον μέγαν άποκόψαι της χ^ιρο? δάκ τυλοι' της δεξιάς, ϊνα δόρυ μέν βαστά£€ΐν μη δύνωνται, κώπην δέ έλαύναν δύνωνται ·. . . (but surely the loss of a thumb would also make rowing more difficult); neither source states that the decree was actually put into effect. A similar decree is said to have been passed, on the urging of Philocles, shortly before Aegospotami (405); cf. Plut. Lys. 9.7: eστρατηγούν δέ των 'Αθηναίων άλλοι τζ πλ€ίου£ και Φιλοκλής ό πβίσας ποτέ ψηφίσασθαι τον δήμον άττοκόπτ€ΐν τον δίζιόν άντίχ€ΐρα των άλισκομβ'νων κατά πόλεμον, οπω? δόρυ μέν φέρβιν μη δύνωνται, κώπην δβ έλαίινωσι. In view of the similar phrasing of the justification (note the words underlined in the two cited passages), both testimonies seem likely to refer to the same decree; cf. Busolt, 3.2,748-49, n. 3: uIn der Fassung Plutarchs, jedoch mit Beschrankung auf die Aigineten und ohnc Nennung des Antragstellers, ist der Beschlufi (i.e., of Philocles| bei Cic. d. off. Ill, 11,46 und Ail. V.H. II, 9 erwahnt." T.J. Figueira, "Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries," RhM 133 (1990), 22, n. 16, and 4 3 - 4 4 , and "Four Notes on the Aiginetans in Exile," Athe naeum n.s. 66 (1988), 535, n. 33, respectively = Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays (Lanham, 1993), 331, n. 16, 349, and 304, ob serving that the degree of cruelty is inappropriate to the mid-fifth century conflict of Athens and Aegina, suggests that Cicero and Aelian refer to an incident of the early fourth century, when the Aeginetans were once again something of a sea-power; he suspects that Aegina's own fourth-century law providing for the execution of any Athenian discovered on the island may have been a response to the Athenian decree. But Cicero's phrase qui classe 42. Either reference of etiam is possible per se; cf. Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 462.
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valebant would seem quite misleading if it was meant to refer to the early fourth century. In any case, as Figueira points out, if historical and actually carried out, the measure would have had a devastating effect on the island's economy, so utterly dependent on sea-faring; idem, Aegina: Society and Politics (New York, 1981), 166-70. Cf. also Treves, RE 19.2 (1938), 2486.58 ff. (s.v. Philokles, 3). hoc visum est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo.J Cf. Pericles' remark that, as the λήμη του Γί€ΐραιώ? ("eyesore of the Piraeus"), Aegina must be removed (Plut. Vend. 8.7; Reg. et Imp. Apoph. 186c and Praecept. Reip. Ger. 803a; Arist. Rhet. 1411al5-16). 47a male etiam qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibem eosque exterminant, ut Pcnnus apud patres nostras, Papius nuper.] Foreigners had the right to reside at Rome contingent on approval of the magistrates (cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 3, 635). Cicero here groups together two pieces of legislation each of which provided for the ejection of foreigners from Rome and a quaestio to regulate disputed cases. He deplores the fate of those affected by such laws at Sest. 30 {nihil acerbius socii et Latini ferre soliti sunt quam se, id quod perraro accidit, ex urbe exire a consulibus iuberi. . .).—The motives behind the law of M. Junius Pennus, tribunus plebis of 126, remain obscure. It is tempting to see it as not merely an expression of fear at the influx of foreigners but a response to a proposal that M. Fulvius Flaccus put forward as consul the following year (and perhaps already mooted during his campaign) to extend citizen rights more widely in Italy; the aim of Pennus' law would then have been to keep Flaccus' supporters from the polls; cf. T. Mommsen, Rbmische Geschichte, 2 (Berlin, 1903), 102; E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford, 1958), 177-78; Brunt, 1988, 96; Andrew Lintott in CAH 9 2 , 76. C. Grac chus, who was then serving as quaestor in Sardinia, delivered, upon his return, a speech de Lege Penni et Peregrinis {orat., pp. 179-80), on which see E. Badian, "Roman Politics and the Italians (133-91 B.C.)," Dialoghi di archeologiaA-S (1970-71), 388; cf. also Miinzer, RE 10.1 (1918), 1076.20 if.; Rotondi, 304; Stockton, 94-95.—Cicero's information on the law of C. Papius (tr. pi. 65) is confirmed by Dio 37.9.5: κάν τούτψ πάντες οι έν τη 'Ρώμη διατρίβοι^τ€ς πλήΐ' τώι> την νυν Ίταλίαν οικοΰντων €ξ€π€σοι> Γαίου τινός Παπίου δημάρχου γι>ώμη . . . Gruen, 1974, 186, sees this measure as directed primarily against the Transpadani (and thus designed to forestall Crassus' drive to obtain them citizenship) but then has to read vvv in Dio's text as carried over from the original wording of the law (since the Trans padani were part of Italy in Dio's time), hardly the natural way of taking the Greek. Among others Cicero's clients Archias (in 62) and Balbus (in 56) were
Commentary on Book 3, Section 46b-48
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prosecuted under the lex Papia (cf. Arch 10; Balb. 38 and 52); cf. Miinzer, RE 18.3 (1949), 1076, 47 ff.; Mommsen, Strafr., 858-59 and Staatsr., 3, 200, 1; Rotondi, 376; Nicholas Purcell in CAH 9\ 6 5 2 - 5 3 . nam esse pro cive qui civis non sit rectum est non licerc, quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola; usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum esc] Traditionally, a Latin who changed residence and paid taxes could obtain Roman citizenship. The lex Licinia Mucia of 95 altered this; it limited eligibility for citizenship so as to exclude the Latins and instituted a special quaestio; cf. MRR, 2 , 1 1 ; Mommsen, Staatsr., 2,639 and n. 2; Rotondi, 335; on Crassus cf. ad 2.47; on Scaevola ad §§ 6 2 - 6 3 . The approval expressed here for the lex Licinia Mucia contrasts sharply with Cicero's view in the speeches Pro Cornelio of the year 65 (cf. Gelzer, 62 ff.): legem Liciniam et Muciam de civibus redigendis video constare inter omnis, quam{quam) duo consules omnium quos nos vidimus sapientissimi tulissent, non modo inutilem sed perniciosam reipublicae fuisse (fr. orat. Pro Corn. I fr. 22 apud Asc. Corn. 59). Asconius offers inter alia this (perhaps overstated; cf. Crawford ad loc.) assessment (ibid., 60): verum ea lege ita alienati animi sunt principum Italicorum populorum ut ea vel maxima causa belli Italici quod post triennium exortum est fuerit.—The nam here is perhaps related to the narrative use of the particle discussed at Hand, 4, 5, wherein the demonstration may be preceded by a prologue; in any case, the explanation really follows in the words usu vero urbis . . . 47b Ilia praeclara in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate contemnitur.] Gaudemet, 467 ff., has argued that this passage betrays a pejorative nuance in the conception of publica utilitas unparalleled until the absolutism of the Severines; but he has failed to see that the pejorative tone is entailed by species, not publica utilitas; cf. Jossa, 286; Johann, 516, n. 84.—For the ellipsis of esse in the main clause cf. ad 1.63. plena exemplorum est nostra respublica cum saepe, turn maxime bello Punico secundo, quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis: . . .] Cf. ad § 114. nulla timoris significatio, nulla mentio pads.] The ellipsis of esse lends em phasis; see next to last note. 48 Athenienses cum Persarum impetum—lapidibus obruerunt.] Here, by reversal of the procedure in the previous two Books, the Roman examples precede and inspire their Greek counterparts. This story was familiar to Cicero from Demosthenes, de Corona (§ 204), a work which, if de Optimo Genere Oratorum is genuine (cf. ad 2.67), he planned to translate (less probable is the notion of Hafner, 9-10, that the translation of the speeches
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for and against Ctesiphon was actually made but lost in transmission); he thus follows Demosthenes (against Herodotus 9.4-5) in giving the traitor's name as Cyrsilus, not Lycides, and in placing the event before the battle of Salamis; cf. Wankel ad Dem. loc. cit. atque ille utilitatem sequi videbatur . . . ] On the conjunction (and the possi bility of adopting Victonus' atqui) cf. ad 1.144. 49a Themistocles, post victoriam—auctore Aristide repudiaverunt.] A simi lar incident involving a secret proposal of Themistocles appears at D.S. 11.42; there, however, the plan is for the fortification of Piraeus and wins the support of Aristides and Xanthippus. Closer to our version is an anecdote told twice by Plutarch, according to which the target was the Greek dockyard at Pagasae; cf. Plut. Them. 20.1-2 (sim. Arist. 22.2-4): Θεμιστοκλή? δε και μζϊζόν τι περί τή? ναυτικής διενοήθη δυνάμεως, επει γαρ ό τών Ελλήνων στόλο? άπηλλαγμενου Ξερξου κατήρεν εί? Παγασά? καΐ διεχείμαζε, δημηγορών εν τοις 'Αθηναίοι? εφη τίνα πραξιν έχειν ώφελιμον μεν αύτοϊ? και σωτήριον. απόρρητον δε προ? του? πολλού?, τών δ' 'Αθηναίων 'Αριστείδη φράσαι μόνω κελευόντων. καν εκείνο? δοκιμάση πέραινε ι ν, ό μεν Θεμιστοκλή? εφρασε τω 'Αριστείδη το νεώριον έμπρήσαι διανοεΐσθαι τών Ελλήνων ό δ' 'Αριστείδη? ει? τόν δήμον προελθών εφη τή? πράξεω? ην διανοείται πράττει ν ό Θεμιστοκλή? μηδεμίαν είναι μήτε λυσιτελεστεραν μήτ' άδικωτέραν. οι μεν ουν 'Αθηναίοι δια ταύτα παύσασθαι τω θεμιστοκλεΐ προσετα^αν. This will refer to the Spartan action against the Aleuadae in Thessaly in spring, 476, supported by a mostly Corinthian fleet anchored at Pagasae. Busolt, 3.1, 85, n. 2, would trace the incident to Theopompus; he regards it as unhistorical; sim. U. Kahrstedt, RE 5A2 (1934), 1692.63 ff. Cicero's version, substituting the Spartan fleet at Gythaeum, is evidently modeled on or based on confusion with the destruction of that Spartan naval base by Tolmides in 455 (Thuc. 1.108.5); so Busolt, loc. cit., followed by A.J. Podlecki, The Life of Themistocles (Montreal and London, 1975), 117. V. Max. 6.5 ext. 2 de pends on our passage. On the rivalry of Themistocles and Aristides cf. in general Martin Ostwald in CAH 4 2 , 343-44. itaque Athenienses quod honestum non esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt. . .] Cicero thus brings the anecdote into line with what Gorier, 1978, 9, calls the "central thesis" of this book, in spite of the fact that Aristides' own characterization of the proposal (sc. perutile esse) is rather different (cf. the introduction to this Book; ad % 39). melius hi quam nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus.] Rome was slow to take up the policing of the Mediterranean in the wake of the disappearance or marginalization of the powers previously responsible, viz., the extirpation of Carthage, the impoverishment of Rhodes following the
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 48-49a and 49b-67
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proclamation of Delos as a tax-free port (167), 43 and the decline of the oriental monarchies. The problem reached crisis proportions with the threat to Rome's grain supply from pirates in league with Mithridates; cf. Man. 31 ff.; Rickman, 5 0 - 5 1 and 167-69; Pohl, 169 ff. Armed with an extraordinary imperium under the Gabinian law (67), Pompey took only three months to clear out the pirates and destroy their ships. Our passage refers to the favor able terms on which Pompey resettled the more than 20,000 captured pirates on land in Cilicia; cf. Gelzer, Pompeius, 74 ff.; for other critics of Pompey's generosity ibid., 272, n. 64.—For Cicero's criticism of the mistreatment of Rome's allies cf. $ 87 and 2.27. 49b-67 These sections comprise six cases, two hypothetical and four histor ical, of the transfer of property involving problems of concealment {reticentia) and fraud {dolus malus). The ostensible purpose is to illustrate the kinds of cases in which viri boni may, in faa, deliberate whether the given a a should be classified as honestum or utile (cf. § 18), though this motive recedes into the background after (1) and (2). The cases are as follows: (1) should a grain-seller at Rhodes disclose to prospeaive buyers that other grain-vessels are en route? (2) should the seller of a house disclose severe defeas? (3) Pythius' defrauding of Canius in the sale of a house; (4) Scaevola's payment of 100,000 sesterces above the seller's price for purchase of a farm; (5) Centumalus' sale to Lanarius of a house part of which had been condemned; (6) a servitude undisclosed in the sale of a house by Gratidianus to Orata (but about which the buyer had reason to know). Cases ( 1 ), (2), and (5) all involve concealment; the verdia actually rendered under (5) in favor of the plaintiff Lanarius settles to Cicero's satisfaction that concealment was wrong also in cases (1) and (2) (though the applicability to [2] is clearer than to [1]; see below and ad § 67). Number (3) is a simple but amusing case of fraud and illustrates how important the proverbial injunction caveat emptor was in the days before there were legal remedies against dolus malus. The final case is a classic confrontation of the summum ius and aequitas; Orata surely decided against the purchase of the house on other grounds (cf. ad $ 67) and tried to use Gratidianus' failure to disclose the servitude as a legal pretext to void the contraa of sale; but since he had owned the house himself previously and therefore must have known of the servitude, the contract was allowed to stand. The most interesting case is (4), which involves full disclosure on the pan of the purchaser, rather than the seller, Scaevola evi dently knowing better than the seller what the market value of the property 43. For the background cf. E.S. Gruen, "Rome and Rhodes in the Second Century B.C.: A Historiographies Inquiry," CQ 25 (1975), 58-81.
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was. Roman jurisprudence is the implicit standard throughout,44 though Cicero admits that the meshes of the law are too large to catch all moral delinquencies (§§ 67-68). In approving Scaevola's action, Cicero goes be yond any provision in Roman law of his time, though the so-called laesio enormis later provided remedies for the seller under certain conditions; cf. ad SS 6 2 - 6 3 . Cicero's approach in this section as elsewhere is to categorize specific acts as honestum or utile. The problem of secrets and secret-keeping could, how ever, have been framed much more broadly and with a different emphasis and result. Frier notes that Cicero's text, especially cases (1) and (4), opens onto the problem whether "it is desirable to encourage the acquisition of information by parties to a sale, so that we should reward a parry who expends resources to obtain it. How should such encouragement be balanced against the overall desirability of fairness in trade? In short, just where do we draw the line and say that one party has 'immorally' taken advantage of another?" These problems are discussed with reference to Anglo-American legal culture by Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (Chicago and London, 1988). Cicero's case (1) involves the future value of purchased goods. A modern analogue would be, as Frier suggests, the person who knows that a company is about to renounce a dividend. If no "insider" information is involved, the modern observer would not condemn the person who used this knowledge to his advantage. Similarly, while admiring Scaevola's principled action in paying what he thought was the correct price for a farm, one may yet sympathize, as Frier points out, with the person who spots a Picasso offered for $25.00 at a garage sale and buys it without alerting the seller (cf. also at § 92 the hypo thetical case of a person selling real gold in the belief that it is fool's gold). See also ad § 64. 49b-57 Cicero reaffirms that a disgraceful act is never expedient (cf. §§ 3 5 37) and that it is disastrous to think otherwise. There are, however, cases in which honestum and utile are not patently at odds (on the text see below) and which therefore require closer study (cf. §§ 18-19, § 40 init.). Cicero proceeds to give two such cases. One involves a merchant who, selling grain on Rhodes in a time of famine, knows that other grain-ships are en route: should he share this knowledge with his potential customers? The other is the case of the seller of a home that has grave defects known only to himself: 44. At $ 72 Cicero belatedly brings Roman practice into line with the Stoic standard, "nature":. . . quoniam iuris natura fotts sit, hoc secundum naturam esse, nemmem id agere ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 49b-67 and 49b-57
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again, should he share this knowledge with potential buyers? Both cases are presented in the form in utramque partem disputari and in both Antipater and Diogenes of Babylon are the spokesmen respectively for full disclosure and for following the letter of the law. At § 89 Cicero explains Plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum . . . ; he adds the method used: in utramque partem disputat. He then goes on to list a series of such cases, to one of which he subjoins, without explanation, Diogenes ait, Antipater negat, whereby Diogenes and Antipater take stands corresponding to those attributed to them at §S 4 9 b 57. Hirzel, 2, 726 and 733-34, inferred that Diogenes and Antipater are the (Active) speakers in Hecato's presentation of the arguments pro and con; indeed it is very hard to explain the references to Antipater and Diogenes at § 91 on any other assumption. If Hirzel is right, the presentation of opposed views on the earlier set of casuistic problems, in which Diogenes and Antipa ter appear as the spokesmen for analogous positions (§§ 49b-57), is likely to be either drawn from or inspired by Hecato. In view of the rambling organi zation of this Book (cf. ad §§ 4 0 - 4 2 , 96), it is no particular problem for Cicero to have drawn upon Hecato's repertory of casuistic cases at two different points in the argument {viz., 5 0 - 5 7 and 89-92a). The use of fortasse (§ 52) or inquiet Hie (§53; but note inquit Antipater in § 54) may have been retained from Cicero's source (Hecato), as an indication that this is a made-up dialogue, or inserted by Cicero himself.45 In either case the implica tion is that this is at best an extrapolation, not a precise representation of the doctrines of the historical Diogenes and Antipater (cf. the use of Hecato at § 63); fragments of the two derived from 3.50 ff. are, however, printed at 5VF 3,219.35 ff. and 253.27 ff. One oddity is that the first case, that of the grain merchant, is, unlike the others, situated in a particular place (Rhodes); possi bly the others, too, were fined out with particulars of time and place that were shorn off by Cicero as irrelevant; or perhaps Hecato, a native of Rhodes, invoked, in addition to cases of general type, an example from his own experience. Annas, 1989,154-55, points to Fin. 1.6 (legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios, in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium)y with no mention made of Hecato, as a basis for repudiating the standard view that Hecato is Cicero's source here. But this is, of course, an argument ex silentio and not a very cogent one at that; it by no 45. This latter is the suggesrion of Annas, 1989, 155; if this has occurred, 1 suspect that Cicero is less likely to have filled out these arguments based on a fresh study of the works of Antipater and Diogenes, Annas' preferred explanation, than, in view of time constraints (cf. introduction, ξ 3), based on hints in Hecato; see also the next footnote.
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means follows that, since Cicero did not mention Hecato by name in the list at Fin. 1.6, he cannot have consulted Hecato in connection with Off. 3 or that because he mentions Diogenes and Antipater there they must have been used directly in Off. 3; Fin. 1.6 does not, after all, purport to be an exhaus tive list of authors still read [multos alios). Note the reference at § 89 specifi cally to Hecato's sixth book On Appropriate Actions, whereas there is no such citation by title or book number for Diogenes or Antipater. Nor is the fact that Cicero differs from the approach of Hecato (and Diogenes) an argument against Hecato being Cicero's immediate source (so Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 11, followed by Dyck, 1984,225). Cicero himself states that he found no source whose handling of these matters he approved (§ 34: neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de lis quae in manus meas venerint)\ this would be in accord with Hecato being the direct source here,46 in view of Cicero's statement of Hecato's position at § 63 and appended comment: huic nee laus magna tribuenda nee gratia est. These observations leave open the possibility that the embedded dialogue of Antipater and Diogenes was either taken over in essentials by Cicero from Hecato or filled out by Cicero, probably on the basis of hints in Hecato. However, Antipater's position as sketched at % 52 {quid aisf tu, cum hominibus consulere debeas . . .etea habeas pnncipia naturae... Mi utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit. . .) so closely approximates Cicero's formulation at $ 26 {ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et uniuersorum) that one wonders whether there might be some genetic connection, viz., either Cicero's discussion in the earlier passage derived from the full exposition of Antipater's view in Hecato or, perhaps more probably, Cicero has framed Antipater's arguments in our passage to accord with the preceding exposi tion, which he took over from Posidonius (cf. also p. 520, n. 24 supra). Also relevant to the problem of provenance is the puzzling conclusion of the dialogue with an affirmation by Antipater that it is necessary (sc. for Diogenes to tell him what it is in his [Antipater's] interest to know) 'si quidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem\ to which Diogenes replies: lmemini. . . sed num ista societas talis est ut nihil suum cuiusque sitf quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed donandum' (§ 53). This conclusion is, of course, unacceptable to Cicero, who, 46. And would evidently not apply if a book by Antipater, expounding the position Cicero attributes to him here, was among the books that "came into [his] hands" (i.e., because Cicero would have been in agreement with it).
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while supporting Antipater's position (cf. § 91: . . . Antipater negat, cui potius adsentior), does not want existing property relations disturbed (cf. esp. 1.20-22,2.72-85); nevertheless he allows Diogenes' characterization of Antipater's position to stand as the final word in the debate, whether through inadvertence or, possibly, because it so functioned in his source, Hecato, who tended toward a utilitarian approach not dissimilar to that here attributed to Diogenes. 47 In any case, Cicero, composing hastily, did not frame a reply to this specific point 48 but made clear in the sequel his general rejection of Diogenes' position ($$ 57, 67). Annas, 1989, 158 ff., attempts to save Diogenes' reputation as a magnus et gravis Stoicus (§ 51), 4 9 by arguing that this "debate" is actually con structed from very unlike materials supplied by Antipater and Diogenes, in particular that Antipater was interested in the moral duties of a vir bonus, Diogenes in (enforceable) legal obligations and corresponding legal rights. She seeks to explain away through textual corruption the one passage where the two appear to meet on the same ground (but see ad $ 53). But surely, as they appear here, Antipater and Diogenes are essentially conveniences used by Cicero for his own purposes. Whether a systematic, recoverable philo sophical position corresponding to that of the historical persons lurks be neath the Ciceronian overlay seems doubtful. Thus Diogenes' position as stated at § 51 is this: venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere . . . But at §§ 5 4 - 5 5 Diogenes is made to defend an unscrupulous tactic that was, in fact, as Cicero sees it, both insidiosum (§68) and contrary to the ius civile of his day ($$ 66-67; cf. Watson, Law Making, 177); cf. also ad $ 53 and above on Antipater's argu ment in § 52. Finally, to explain Cicero's mistake in supposedly misinterpreting Diogenes and adopting a position at variance with his elsewhere expressed support for private property, Annas, 1989, argues (172) that Off. 3 u does not straightforwardly express a position of his [Cicero'sl own" and "is an attempt on the part of an Academic to work out in Stoic terms the solution to the Stoic difficulty that Books I and II have raised" (her emphasis). In fact, Cicero adopts a two-level approach: while reserving judgment about ulti47. As is clear from $ 89: in utramque partem disputat [sc. Hecato|, sed tatnen ad extremum unlitate, ut putat, offiaunt derigtt magis quant humanttate; I owe this point to Thomas Frazel. But for their disagreement over the reason for valuing riches cf. ad $ 51. 48. He could, of course, have pointed to the parameters of obligations to other human beings (1.50-52) or to the limits set to liberality (1.42-43). 49. Cf. the round condemnation of Diogenes' stand in this passage by E. Elorduy, Die Sozialphifasophie der Stoa. Philologus, Suppl. 28.3 (Leipzig, 1936), 143.
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mate questions of truth, he was sensitive to the problem posed to ancient skeptics of having a basis for decisions in everyday life (cf. 2.7: non enim sumus ii quorum vagetur animus errore nee habeat umquam quid sequatur) and proposed to "follow" probabilia (2.8), the subject of Off. being the medium officium . . . quod cur factum sit ratio probabilis reddipossit{\.&). In writing to his son at a stage when life-decisions needed to be made, he was hardly writing about matters about which he "has no substantial position" [pace Annas, ibid.; cf. also introduaion, § 7; on Cicero's apparent lack of sympathy for profit-making in commercial transactions ad 1.150). 50 . . . si idem sciat—silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus?] A simple application of the law of supply and demand. The case raises the question whether knowledge of special circumstances should be exploited in the mar ketplace (cf. ad SS 49b-67). sapientem et virum bonum fingimus;. . .] Both the Stoic and Platonic terms are used, though sapiens presumably not in the strict Stoic sense; cf. $§ 1 5 16. 51 In huiusmodi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo; . . .] Diogenes of Babylon was a pupil of Chrysippus; as head of the Stoa he (together with Carneades for the Academy and Critolaus for the Peripatos) participated in the famous embassy to Rome in 156/5 to plead for remission of the fine of 500 talents imposed upon Athens for the plundering of Oropus (the evidence is collected at Carneades Τ 7 Μ.); among his pupils was Panaetius of Rhodes; for his ethical fragments cf. SVF 3, 218-21 (our passage = fr. 49). He evi dently valued riches for a different reason than Hecato (cf. § 63): divitias autem Diogenes censet earn modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam . . . [Fin. 3,49 = SVF 3, 218.26); cf. M. Wellmann, RE 5.1 (1903), 773.37 ff. Antipater of Tarsus was Diogenes' student; his fragmenta moralia are printed at SVF 3, 251-58 (our passage = fr. 61); cf. von Arnim, RE 1.2 (1894), 2515.7 ff. On the "debate" between the two cf. above ad §§ 49b-57. . . . Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constiturum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, vclle quam optime vendere.] Diogenes admits that he is obliged dicere vitia but evidently would deny that the imminent arrival of more grain-ships can be regarded as a vitium of his product. He also seems to define insidiae as a positive act of misrepresentation, rather than merely omitting to tell; cf. Goretti, 79-80. A more comprehensive statement of principles would have been welcome at this point: did Diogenes regard the demands of morality as coterminous with
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 49b-57 and 50-52
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those of the law? What qualifications would the questioner or the question have to have in order to elicit information from Diogenes (see § 52)? Cf. Goretti, 88. 'advexi, exposui; vendo meum non pluris quam ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia; cui fit iniuria?'] The two adversaries are allowed, both here and in the following example, to present their views in direct speech (unlike §§ 88-92); the oddity is that here (though not in § 54) the defendant speaks first. The question cui fit iniuria? is evidently predicated on the Stoic formula for justice suum cuique tribuere (cf. ad 1.21). 52 . . . ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas . . . ] Cf. ad §$ 26 and 49b-57; Diogenes implicitly disagrees; see the next note. 'aliud est celare, aliud tacere, neque ego nunc te celo si tibi non dico quae natura deorum sit—sed non, quidquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est'.] Diogenes makes the point that tacere is not the same as celare and gives examples to illustrate the distinction. His argument is evidently based on the nature of a contract and the rights thereby entailed. Grotius, de lure Belli ac Pacts 2.12.9.1, unpacks Diogenes* argument this way: "Nam inter contrahentes propior quaedam est societas quam quae communis est hominum. Atque hoc modo solvitur quod dicebat Diogenes Babylonius hoc tractans argumentum, non celari omnia quae tacentur: nee quidquid tibi audire utile est idem mihi dicere necesse esse, ut de rebus caelestibus, nam contractus natura utilitatis causa reperta propius quiddam exigit"; sim. Annas, 1 9 8 9 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 : "52 makes it clear that for Diogenes concealing is not telling what someone has a right to know, whereas not telling is merely not telling someone something which the person has no right to know, even if it is in their interests to know it." But tacere and celare can coincide. At % 57 Cicero draws the distinction from the standpoint of the motive of the seller rather than the rights of the buyer: neque enim id est celare, quidquid rcticeas, sed cum quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tut causa velis eos quorum intersit id scire; cf. also ad § 61.—Diogenes implicitly contradicts Antipater's point ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, when he declares non, quidquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. His position seems to be that there is a conflict between utilitas tua and utilitas mea such that " Γ should serve "your" utilitas only when bound by law to do so. At §§ 68-72 Cicero presents his definitive answer to Diogenes' position, including a critique of the ius civile as a guide to morality; note the conclusion ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia ($ 72).—Diogenes' interest in language is well attested; cf.
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SVF 3, 212-15. If our passage is in contact with his concerns and if these included distinguishing parasynonyms, then Cicero's celare and tacere might correspond respectively to σιωπάι> and σιγάι> in Diogenes (cf. T. Krischer, "Σιγάν und σιωπάν," Glotta 59 [1981], 93-107), rather than κρύπταν and σιιοπάΐ', as Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 17, suggested. 53 'immo vero' inquiet ille 'necesse est. . .'] This is the one point where Antipater and Diogenes are made to meet on the same ground. Annas, 1989, 158, therefore suggests that the words immo vero—necesse est, absent from the ζ MSS, may be u a gloss. n But what were they glossing? One would, in any case, have to conjecture some replacement of roughly the same sense in order to complete Antipater's reply (since the si-clause is otherwise left dangling). 'sed num ista societas talis est ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? quod si ita est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed donandum'.] Here Diogenes puts his finger on a real problem, drawing the line between obligations entailed by private property and the generis hwnani societas, both of which were evi dently of some importance in Panaetius* system (cf. 1.20-21 and 50-58; 2.72 ff.). For shifting attitudes toward private property within the Stoa cf. ad 1.21. . . . sed ita expedire ut turpe non sit. . . ] This characterization is similar to the argument at % 103 {quidquid valde utile sit, id fieri honestum) but would not do justice to Diogenes' position, if it was based on my legal obligations and, accordingly, the rights that others may enforce against me in a given case; cf. Annas, 1989, 160. 5 4 - 5 5 Another case of reticentia by the seller. This time, however, it is clearly a matter of vitia inhering in the object offered for sale, so that that particular evasion of Diogenes (§ 51) no longer applies. The example of a pestilential house had already been used by Carneades to pose a dilemma to the propo nents of morality (as reported by Lact. inst. 5.16.5 = Cic. Rep. 3.29): bonus vir, inquit [sc. Carneades fr. l i b 1 , p. 101, 36 M.], si babeat . . . domum insalubrem ac pestilentem, quae vitia solus sciat, et ideo proscribat ut vendat, utrumne profitebitur. . . se. . . pestilentem domum vendere, an celabit emptoremt si profitebitur, bonus quidem, quia non fallet, sed tamen stultus iudicabitur, quia vel parvo vendet vel omnino non vendet-, si celabit, erit quidem sapiens, quia rei consulet, sed idem mains, quia fallet. The similarity to our passage is not just the use of the same example, as Annas, 1 9 8 9 , 1 5 6 58, suggests; the same arguments relating to morality and stultitia are in voked; they are merely divided between the two speakers. If we should see the historical Diogenes behind the stand attributed to him here, possibly, as Pohlenz, Off. Ill, 17-18, suggests, he formulated his position to answer this
Commentary on Book 3, Section 5 2 - 5 5
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point of Carneades. 50 —Cod. lust. 4.58.4.1 (Diocletianic) does, in fact, pro vide a legal remedy for the ignorant purchaser of a pestibilis fundus, but this was evidently a later innovation; cf. Norr, 43, n. 201. 54 'quid est enim aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum e s t . . .'] Cf. ad 1.51 above. Buzyges, sometimes given as inventor of the plow, is said to have established this practice; cf. CPG 1,388 (= App. prov. 1.61): Βουζύγης:. . . άλλα τε πολλά άράται και τοις μή κοίνωνοϋσι κατά τον βίοι> ύδατος ή πυρός ή μή ΰποφαίνουσιν όδόν πλανωμ^νοις; cf. Dem. 23.97: αλλ' €Ϊ τις €ίδώς 6και>ους προδ€δωκ€ΐ' ή έξαπατφ, ουτός έστ' ένοχος τή άρα; Dem. 18.282 with Wankel's note. plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere.] Both are unjust (cf. 1.23b and 51) but the latter more so because the agent is actively deceiving rather than merely failing to help. Antipater thus rejects in advance Diogenes' argument that his reticentia is not an act and therefore cannot be qualified as deceit {quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas?)\ cf. Goretti, 86. 55 sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas?] Apparently the conditional clause is a resumption of the preceding quod si qui proscribunt villam bonam beneque aedificatam and refers to the fact that the seller is not liable for claims that are in the nature of puffery; cf. Dig. 18.1.43 (Florentinus): ea quae commendandi causa in venditionibus dicuntur, si palam appareant, venditorem non obligant, veluti si dicat servum speciosum, domum bene aedificatam: at si dixerit hominem litteratum vel artiftcem, praestare debet: nam hoc ipso pluris vendit; sim. Ulpian, Dig. 21.1.19 pr. and Paul. 19.2.22.3 (on lease with cross-reference to the law of sale). However, a point of civil law seems an unlikely basis for argument by a Greek philosopher like Diogenes unless this argument has been framed for him by Cicero. Indeed at this point Diogenes' position begins to look like that of a proponent ofsummum ius (cf. ad 1.33); for he could invoke the provision of the Twelve Tables satis ea praestari quae essent lingua nuncupata [Lex XII 6.2 = FJRA, p. 43), a statute which, Cicero hastens to add (§ 65), the iurisconsulti had in the meantime supplemented with a penalty for reticentia; cf. Goretti, 87.—For the sense of praestare (cf. also §§ 65 [bis], 66, and 71) cf. OLD s.v. praesto 15: "to be responsible for making good (loss, damage, etc.), answer for . . ."; sim. Axel Hagerstrom,
50. Annas, loc. cit., argues that since it is unclear that Carneades' point was directed against the Stoics, there is no reason to see in the material quoted by Cicero a Stoic response to it; hut the contrast Carneades works out between justice and expediency would, as Pohlcnz, loc. cit., points out, certainly affect the Stoic position (cf. the introduction to Book 2).
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Recht, Pflicht una bindende Kraft des Vertrages nach romischer und naturrechtlicher Anschauung, ed. K. Olivecrona (Stockholm, 1965), 37. 56 . . . ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur ut id quod utile videatur non modo facere honestum sit sed etiam non facere turpe.] Presumably the reason why not doing what is in one's financial interest can be regarded as turpe is that it reduces the material for benefactions, as argued by Hecato (§ 63). 57 non igitur videtur nee frumentarius ille Rhodios nee hie aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse.] What has been called "a very curious instance in which the medieval saint is weighed and found wanting by the austere pa gan" (Nelson, 127) is the less stringent treatment of the disclosure of future market conditions by the seller of grain at Thorn. Aqu. S.Tb. II.2.lxxvii.3: . . . non videtur contra iustitiam facere, si quod futurum est non exponat. si tamen exponeret> vel de pretio subtraheret, abundantioris esset virtutis, quamvis ad hoc non videatur teneri ex iustitiae debito. neque enim id est celare, quidquid reticeas, sed cum quod tu scias, id ignorare emolument! tui causa velis eos quorum intersit id scire.] On the interpreta tion of Annas, 1989, 161-62, Cicero gets this distinction wrong, or rather, he substitutes his own distinction for Diogenes' distinction, which has to do with "your" rights (cf. ad § 52); "my" profit does not enter into it. But this is not the only place where the Ciceronian Diogenes shows interest in maximiz ing profit; cf. § 51: velle quam optime vendere. hoc . . . celandi genus . . . certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri astuti fallacis malitiosi callidi veteratoris vafri.] Cf. ad 1.108 ff., where the same characterological contrast appears without any value judgment attached. On callidus cf. ad 1.33; on vafer Pease ad N.D. 1.39; on the piling up of synonyms ad § 115. 58-71 As Frier points out, the cases Cicero discusses in these paragraphs constitute, whether by design or accident, a kind of short history of contrac tual rights at Rome, illustrating (except for no. [3]) the increasing protection of the buyer. Cicero begins with (1) C. Canius, left prey to the unscrupulous Pythius before C. Aquilius had promulgated his de dolo malo formulae (§§ 58-60); next follows (2) the case of Lanarius, whom Cato's verdict protected against Centumalus' concealment of a property defect ($§ 6 6 67a); then (3) a decision based on equity upholding Gratidianus' sale of a property, in spite of his failure to disclose a defect about which the buyer must have known (§ 67b); finally (4) the sale of slaves, where even the seller's ignorance of undisclosed defects is unable to save the transaction, so com pletely is the buyer protected (though a criminal penalty does not come into play either; cf. ad § 71). 5 8 - 6 0 Cicero has just condemned withholding knowledge of defects in sell ing one's house; still worse is the positive commission of fraud, as when the
Commentary on Book 3, Section 55-58
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banker Pythius sold his house at Syracuse to C. Canius, a wealthy but gullible eques. Here Cicero clearly turns to his own Roman material, with which, apart from §§ 63 (citation of Hecato), 89-92a, (further) cases from Hecato, 9 4 - 9 5 (from Posidonius on officia κατά π€ρίστασιν?), and 97-99a [exemplum of Ulysses* evasion of military service—though he could have known of this from Roman sources as well; see ad /oc.), he will remain for the rest of the Book. 58 . . . quid de iis existimandum est qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt?] On vanitas in commercial transactions cf. 1.150 with note. C. Canius, eques Romanus . . .] Apart from the fact that the exceptio doli of C. Aquilius Gallus is a terminus ante quern (see below), Canius is dated by his support for the defense of P. Rutilius in a trial of 116 (see next note; on the date see also von Rohden, RE 1.1 [1893J, 588.12 ff.; Alexander, no. 35); hence Andreau, 440, dates our incident to the last decades of the second century. Cicero will surely have heard the anecdote, as Frier suggests, during his Sicilian quaestorship. Cf. Munzcr, RE Suppl. 1 (1903), 274.9; C. Nicolet, L'ordre equestre a Vepoque republicaine (312-43 av. J.-C), 2 (Paris, 1974), 825. . . . nee infacetus . . . ] Cic. de Orat. 2.280 gives a specimen of his wit:. . . ut cum Scaurus accusaret Rutilium ambitus, cum ipse consul esset fact us, tile repulsam tulisset, et in eius tabulis ostenderet litteras A.F.P.R. idque diceret esse: 'actum fide P. Rutili', Rutilius autem: 'ante factum post relatum', C. Canius eques Romanus, cum Rufo adesset, exclamat neutrum illis litteris declarari. 'quid ergof inquit Scaurus;—'Aemilius fecit, plectitur Rutilius'. . . . ut ipse dicere solebat. . . ] Canius was evidently not only witty but also a raconteur not averse to telling a story at his own expense (though it might also serve to elicit sympathy for him). . . . Pythius. . . quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis . . . ] The descrip tion suggests that Pythius was not a Syracusan citizen; cf. Andreau, 420, who compares Ver. 2.5.165 (of Q. Lucceius):. . . qui argentariam Regimaximam fecit... He is known only from our passage; cf. H. Gundel, RE 24 (1963), 568.36 ff. . . . Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus . . .1 Pythius* rapport with various social groups results from his status as a deposit banker who can offer credit; cf. Andreau, 67. . . . opipare a Pythio—abiciebantur.] The short clauses of this narratto sug gest the efficient execution of the plan stage-managed by Pythius; for the ellipsis of esse {opipare—multitudo) cf. ad 1.63. opipare] Note that this colloquial word is used by Plautus (Bac. 373) and Apuleius (Soc. 22) but by Cicero elsewhere only in a letter {Att. 7.2.3). . . . cumbarum ante oculos multitudo . . . ] After Afran. 138 {turn con-
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scendo cumbam interibi luci piscatoriam) our passage is the second attesta tion of cumba; cf. Mertel, TLL 4, 1587; the word is likewise used of small fishing boats at Li v. 26.45.7 and Plin. Nat. 9.33 and 145; cf. L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (Princeton, 1971), 330, n. 4. . . . ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur.] The alliteration seems to mimic the plopping of fishes at Pythius* feet. 59 et ille 'quid minim?' inquit. 'hoc loco est Syracusis quidquid est piscium, hie aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt'.] As Frier notes, with this statement Pythi us plainly aims to induce buyer's reliance; it constitutes his overt misrepresentation. He adds: "What if Pythius had said nothing and simply let Canius draw his own conclusions from the artfully placed fishers? A harder case which lies somewhere on the borderline between fraud and concealment."—Syracusis, if not corrupted from Syracosiis (Reid), may have its origin in a gloss on hoc loco (see Winter bottom's apparatus). aquatio] Best explained as nomen actionis to aquari and hence = "the fetch ing of water"; so Vollmer, TLL 2, s.v., 1, and OLD s.v., 1, both with refer ence to our passage; cf. H. Gundel, RE 24 (1963), 568.49. Canius* cupidity was evidently aroused by the prospect of enjoying fish dinners in return for permitting the fishermen to draw water from his property, even if he had to sacrifice, to some degree, his goal of spending his otium sine interpellatoribus (cf. § 58). Though at PI. Rud. 131 ff. Daemones supplies water and other amenities to visitors to the neighboring shrine of Venus without recompense, the imagined speech assigned to Clodia's brother suggests that she could exploit the favorable position of her property (Cael. 36: habes hortos ad Tiberim ac diligenter eo loco paratos quo omnis iuventus natandi causa venit; hinc licet condiciones cotidie legas . . .). The interpretation of W.H. Alexander, uHic aquatio: Cicero, de Officiis III, 14,59," C/ 36 (1941), 2 9 0 93, whereby aquatio = aqua and Canius aims to charge fishermen for fishing in his waters, has been sufficiently refuted, with reference to the legal texts bearing upon the ius piscandi, by J.P. Turlcy, in an article with the same title, ibid., 37 (1942), 485 ff. nomina facit, negotium conficit.] Nomina facere originally denoted the entry of actual profit or loss under the name of the person in question; by this association nomen came to be used of the debt itself. As the bearer of a Greek name, Pythius was very probably a peregrinus. Von Lubtow, 188 ff., thinks the transaction was made, not by literal contract, 51 from which peregrines were excluded at this period, but by a stipulatio (though Cicero does not mention this). On this view Pythius receives a formal promise to pay {sti51. Nomina facere need not imply that it was; cf. Thilo, 251.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 5 8 - 6 0
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pulatio) the purchase price; a document {cautio) is drawn up by buyer and seller including the question of Pythius as creditor and the answer of Canius as debtor; in this way the transaction is completed. As a banker Pythius has at home his codex accepti et expensi and can have the entry made at once.52 Any prosecution would then have to be based upon the stipulatio. To enforce his rights Pythius could obtain an actio stricti iuris against Canius (whereby the bonae fidei element of emptio venditio would be excluded); litigation based on the formula %si paret C. Canium, equitem Romanum, Pythio, qui Syracusis argentariam facit, (ex stipulatu) sestertium decies centena milia dare oportere\ could, in default of Aquilius' exceptio doli (see below), only result in a victory for Pythius. For the alternative (but less likely; see above) interpretation of the transaction as a literal contracted Watson, Obligations, 30 ff. Adolf Holm, Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum, 3 (Leipzig, 1898), 193, wants to set the incident into the context of Roman imperialism: "die Geschichte beweist ubrigens, dai? nicht immer die Eingeborenen der Insel von den Romern ausgesogen wurden; jene rachten sich bisweilen, indem sie ihre Herren und Gebieter betrogen." But note that Pythius was probably not a native of Syracuse (see above); the ruse by which he took advantage of Canius need only have been motivated by his own interest. . . . scalmum nullum videt.J The Greek word σκαλμό? was sufficiently Lati nized by Cicero's day for him to use it, not only here but also at de Orat. 1.174 and Brut. 197. Scalmus properly = "the peg to which an oar is fastened in rowing, thole-pin" (OLD s.v.); in our passage the meaning clearly is that Canius sees "no trace of a boatn (ibid.). 60 nondum enim C. Aquilius, conlega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas;.. .1 An exceptio is a clause added to the praetor's formula that limits the circumstances under which the defendant can be condemned; it was ordinarily petitioned by the defendant and granted by the praetor, who could threaten to deny an actio if the plaintiff refused to accept it. It had the form si in ea re nihil dolo malo A. Agerii factum sit neque fiat (Gai. 4.119; Lenel, 512); here factum sit refers to deceit practiced by the creditor prior to the bringing of charges, e.g., in the signing of a contract, whereas fiat refers to a dolus committed by the act of bringing suit; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1, 246 and 488-89, and Zivilprozessrecht, 194-95; Watson, Obligations, 259. Cicero's use of formulae (plural) is evidently nontechnical and refers not only to the exceptio doli but also to the actio doli, which would have enabled Canius to take the offensive and sue for discharge from debt (acceptilatio) for 52. On evidence for the codex accepti et expensi at rhis period cf. Thilo, 276 ff., who notes (279) that the business documents of bankers were deemed a powerful proof in court.
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the sum in question; if so, Aquilius was the originator of both the actio and exceptio doli; cf. von Liibtow, 191-92. "The last of the great cautelary jurists" (Frier, 148), C. Aquilius was a pupil of Q. Scaevola, "the Pontifex" (Pompon. Dig. 1.2.2.42), and was Cicero's colleague in the praetorship of 66 (hence the conlega of our passage; cf. MRR 2,152; he never sought the consulate [cf. Att. 1.1.1; Bauman, 1985, 5, n. 8, and 76]). The date of Aquilius* work on dolus is problematical; in view of the phrase protulerat de dolo malo formulas in our passage, it is usually associated with his praetorship; but this connection can be valid only if (a) in addition to presiding over the quaestio ambitus (Cic. Clu. 147), he was also responsible for the duties of praetor peregrinus and (b) if the refer ence at N.D. 3.74 (see next note) is anachronistic, for the fictive date of N.D. is 77-76; 5 3 cf. Frier, 148 and n. 39. By the date of Off. Aquilius was no longer alive, since Cicero speaks of him in the past tense at Top. 51 ('nihil hoc ad ius; ad Ciceronem', inquiehat Gallus noster, si quis ad eum quid tale rettulerat, ut de facto quaereretur). On Aquilius* achievements cf. Brut. 154 and especially Caec. 78 (a case in which Cicero had sought his legal advice): quapropter hoc dicam, numquam eius auctoritatem nimium valere cuius prudentiam populus Romanus in cavendo, non in decipiendo perspexerit, qui iuris civilis rationem numquam ab aequitate seiunxerit. . . Cf., besides Kaser, loc. cit., Klebs, RE 2.1 (1895), 327.56 ff., and Jors, ibid., 329.10 ff.; Wieacker, 6 0 0 - 1 . . . . in quibus ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur quid esset dolus malus, re spondeat cum csset aliud simulatum, aliud actum, hoc quidem sane luculente, ut ab homine perito definiendi.J Cf. Cic. N.D. 3.74:. . . inde everriculum malitiarum omnium iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquilius familiaris noster protulit, quern dolum idem Aquilius turn teneri putat cum aliud sit simulatum aliud actum. Cicero gives another specimen of his skill in definition at Top. 32: solebat igitur Aquilius conlega et familiaris meus, cum de litoribus ageretur, quae omnia publica esse vultis, quaerentibus eis quos ad id pertinebat, quid esset I it us, ita definire, qua fluctus eluderet;. . . Though repeated by Servius (viz., Sulpicius Rufus; cf. Ulpian, Dig. 4.3.1.2: dolum malum Servius quidem ita definiit machinationem quandam alterius decipiendi causa, cum aliud simulatur et aliud agitur; Bauman, 1985, 12), Aquilius' definition was insufficiently precise in that it focused too narrowly 53. Pease, 1,25-26, gives the parameters as 77-75; but if the dialogue was meant to be set in Cotta's consular year (w't., 75; see MRR 2,96) or even when he was consul-designate, the fact surely would have been mentioned (cf. the reference to the approaching praetorship of T. Manlius Torquatus at tin. 2.74).
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 60-6la and 61b-64
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on pretense and failed to link the pretense with an intent to defraud. A critique of Aquilius (contained in the underlined words) and a new and henceforth standard 54 definition of dolus malus were offered in the next generation by Labeo: Labeo autem posse et sine simulatione id agi, ut guts circumveniatur: posse et sine dolo malo aliud agi, aliud simulari, sicuti faciunt, qui per eiusmodi dissimutationem deserviant et tuentur vel sua vel aliena: itaque ipse sic definiit dolum malum esse omnem calliditatem fallaciam machinationem ad circumveniendum fallendum decipiendum alterum adhibitam {Dig. 4.3.1.2); cf. Wieacker, 6 4 4 - 4 5 . 61a . . . ex omni vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est.] These words are cited by Grotius, de lure Belli ac Pads 3.1.7 as too broad a formulation: "Nam cum nee quae scias, nee quae velis omnia aperire aliis tenearis, sequitur ut dissimulare quacdam apud quosdam, id est tegere et occultare fas sit." He thus takes up a position similar to that of Diogenes of Babylon at § 52 (cf. ad loc). Cf. Cicero's own advice at 1.105. 61b-64 The general subject is still that stated at § 49 {quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne turn quidem cum id quod utile esse putes adipiscare). There are now legal remedies available; what Cicero calls Aquilius' de dolo malo formulae (in the nontechnical sense; see above) are not an isolated phenomenon but part of a larger tendency of jurisprudence to protect against fraud and deception. Beginning with the sentence tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrabendis omne mendacium, Cicero makes it clear that the be havior he advocates goes beyond a mere observance of the law. Possibly it was the quotation of the phrase from the fiduciary formula UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER, as well as the general topic of fairness in buying and selling, which caused Cicero to introduce the example of Q. Scaevola, certainly a vir bonus in Cicero's view (cf. ad §§ 6 2 - 6 3 ; on Cicero's associa tion of him with this formula cf. ad % 70), and who, far from using unfair means to gain advantage in purchasing property, actually paid a substantial amount above the seller's price. Scaevola's case raises a conflict of two princi ples: the buyer's obligation to truthfulness (not yet recognized in Roman law of Cicero's day; cf. ad $ 62) and the buyer's obligation to save money to benefit children, relatives, and friends. Cicero poses the problem with refer ence to the particular case of Scaevola and alleges that Hecato, who is cited as an advocate of the latter principle, would have disapproved Scaevola's action because he had gone beyond legal requirements (see, however,
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with a resulting elevation of the standard of morality into the heroic sphere (Cicero essentially admits this with respect to Scaevola's case at § 64). 61b Atque iste dolus malus—BENE AGIER.] Here Cicero can draw upon material ready to hand, since he had just used these examples at Top. 66, a work sent to Trebatius on 28 July (Fam. 7.19): in omnibus igitur eis iudiciis, in quibus EX FIDE BONA est additum, ubi etiam UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET in primisque in arbitrio ret uxoriae, in quo est QUOD EIUS AEQUIUS MELIUS, parati eis [sc. iuris consultis) esse debent. Atque iste dolus malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela duodecim tabulis, circumscriptio adulescentium lege Laetoria et sine lege iudiciis, in quibus additur EX FIDE BONA.] The tutor testimentarius was, as Cicero states, provided for in the Twelve Tables; cf. Lex XII 5.3 {=FJRA, 1, 37-38): uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita ius esto; E. Sachers, RE 7A2 (1948), 1499.48 ff. (s.v. tutela); Watson, Persons, 114.—The Laetorii and Plaetorii are often confused in transmission. Laetoria is the transmitted read ing both here (letoria ζ and, corrupted to latoria, ξ) and at N.D. 3.74. Even prior to Langius' edition some read Plaetoria, the form attested in the lex lulia municipalis of 45 B.C. (CIL I 2 593.112); but early confusion is indi cated by the reading Laetoria in the papyrus of Claudius* judicial reform (BGU 611.6) as well as in Greek papyri. A Ciceronian error is by no means excluded.—Apart from his role in sponsoring our law, nothing is known of the Laetorius in question. In view of the reference at Pseudolus 303 (cf. Rud. 1382) and the fact that the didascaliae set the Pseudolus in 191, our law is usually dated to 192. It provided an actio Popularis for a fine against anyone who cheated a person less than twenty-five years old, with conviction result ing in infamia; the statute also provided for an exceptio; cf. F. Miinzer, RE 20.2 (1950), 1947.14 ff.; E.Weiss, ibid., Suppl. 5 (1931), 578.21 ff.; Watson, Persons, 157; Rotondi, 271-72.—The bonae fidei indicia were, as our pas sage shows, without a legislative basis; they were created by the praetors after the model of the extralegal concept of fides, on which a series of legal demands was based; the new set of indicia was thus more flexible than the older system of iudicia stricti iuris (cf. ad § 59); cf. Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht. 110; Lcnel, 188 ff. As § 70 makes clear, the bonae fidei iudicia of Cicero's time comprised emptio, venditio, locatio, conductio, mandatum, societas, fiducia, tutela, and negotium gestum; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,486. Note that it was in particular the exceptio of Scaevola's edict extra quam si ita nego tium gestum est ut eo stari non oporteat ex fide bona that Cicero proposed to follow as proconsul in Cilicia (cf. Att. 6.1.15 and ad §$ 62-63). rcliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba maxime excellunt: . . . ] The
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 61b and 62-63
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phrases Cicero selects illustrate that, besides the bonae fidei iudicia, other iudicia also recognized the claims of aequitas and did not allow a mechanical applicaton of the law to support fraud. Cicero had, of course, fought against the summum ius and for aequitas above all in his defense of A. Caecina; cf. Gelzer, 5 2 - 5 3 ; in general, Frier; ad 1.33. in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER.] For the former formula the reconstruction by Lenel, 303 ff., has in the meantime been confirmed by Tab. Here. 87: lSi paret Num. Num. Aae. Aae. dotem partemve eius reddere oportere, quod eius55 melius aequius erit, eius iudex Nm. Nm. Aae. Aae. c.s.n.p.a.' In view of the wide scope thus allowed the judge, Gaius 4.62, unlike Cicero or the great classical jurists, counted the actio rei uxoriae among the bonae fidei iudicia; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,288.—Lenel, 292, reconstructs the latter formula as follows: *S. p. Am. Am. No. No. fundum q.d.a. ob pecuniam debitam fiduciae causa mancipio dedisse eamque pecuniam solutam eove nomine satisfactum esse aut per Nm. Nm. stetisse quo minus solveretur eumque fundum redditum non esse negotiumve ita actum non esse, ut inter bonos bene agier oportet et sine fraudatione, quanti ea res erit tantam pecuniam* et rel. This formula is perhaps considerably older than the formula for fiducia with ex fide bona; cf. Watson, Obligations, 176 ff., and Persons, 142. Cf. also $ 70. non inlicitatorem venditor, non qui contra se liccatur emptor apponet.J In a letter dated by Shaclcleton Bailey to January, 5 1 , to his friend M. Marius Cicero agrees to act as his correspondent's agent in the purchase of an (unspecified) object at auction, even though Cicero himself is among the heirs to the estate being offered for sale; he jokes about the conflict of interest thereby entailed: nunc, quoniam tuum pretium novi, illicitatorem potius ponam quam illud minoris veneat [Fam. 7.2.1).—Legal remedies against collusion or other fraud are attested for public auctions of the imperial period; cf. Cod. lust. 10.3.1-2 and 2.36.3; M. Talamanca, Contributi alio studio delle vendite all' asta nel mondo classico. Am del la accademia nazionale dei lincei, Memorie, sen 8, 6 (Rome, 1954), 236-38. 6 2 - 6 3 The eminent jurist Q. Mucius Scaevola ( u the Pontifex"; cos. 95) was Cicero's own teacher in the law (cf. Leg. 2.49); Cicero praised him at 2.57 as omnium hominum moderatissimus; cf. N.D. 3.80: temperantiae prudentiaeque specimen; Amic. 1: unus nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimus; Sex. Rose. 33: vir sanctissimus atque ornatissimus nostrae civitatis . . . quern pro dignitate ne laudare quidem quisquam satis commode posset. In judging cases as proconsul in Cilicia Cicero largely used Scaevola as his 55. Eius is the reading in the better mss. at Cic. Top. 66 (quoted above).
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model (Att. 6.1.15). Characteristic of Scaevola's generosity is that as procon sul in Asia he paid out of his own pocket not only his personal expenses but those of his suite (D.S. 37.5.1) and that he gave financial help to Rutilius Rufus after his conviction (Dio fr. 97.4 = 1, 339.18 ff. Boiss.; cf. ad § 10). A certain tendency to unworldliness appears, not only in our passage, but also in the fact that, when he built a villa (whether on this or another piece of property), the buildings were insufficient to contain the harvest (Col. 1.4.6; Plin. Nat. 18.32), this, too, as Columella remarks, an action contra rem familiarem. Cf. F. Miinzer, RE 16.1 (1933), 437.1 ff., esp. 441.13 ff.; Shatzman, 282-83; on Scaevola the jurist Wieacker, 596 ff. and ad §§ 7 0 - 7 1 . The price to be paid for an object offered for sale was, in the Ciceronian age, a function of the market economy. It is, however, conceivable that in certain circumstances the seller might think himself disadvantaged if paid the asking price, e.g., if, in times of rapid inflation, he were paid in devalued specie. Hence as a remedy Justinian provided the so-called laesio enormis, whereby the seller could rescind the sale and demand back the object against the purchase price if the latter could be shown to be less than half its true value, though the buyer could save the sale by paying the difference; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,550, and 2 , 2 8 3 - 8 4 ; cf. also cod. lust. 4.44.2 and 8. Scaevola, then, put his finger on a potential legal problem, though one not recognized as such in his day. The citation of Scaevola's action here foreshadows the critique of the defects of positive law at §§ 68-69. Cicero goes on to criticize Hecato's (supposed) disagreement with Scaevola on this point. Hecato, however, in pointing to the obligation to accumulate wealth in the interest of family, relatives, friends, and the state, is fully in accord with the doctrines espoused in Book 1; cf. 1.44: . . . qui benigniores volunt esse quam res patitur, primum in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias Us et suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos; 1.92: esse autem magni animi et fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui. . . interiecti inter phihsophos et eos qui rempublicam administrarent delectarentur re sua familiari, non earn quidem omni ratione exaggerantes neque excludentes ab eius usu suos, potiusque et amicis impertientes et reipublicae, si quando usus esset.56 In light of these passages and of his own staunch defense of private property at 2.72-85, it was misconceived for Cicero to attack Hecato along such lines. 57 If he wanted to justify Scaevola's action in Panaetian terms, he could have argued 56. On the provenance sec ad he. 57. Annas, 171, suggests that Hecato may have posited a moral duty over and above the legal obligation to pay the stipulated sum and may have |ustified Scaevola's action on such grounds; if that were so, Cicero's attack on him in our passage would be doubly surprising.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 62-63
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that Scaevola was acting in accord with the principle of justice suum cuique tribuere (cf. 1.15). Both here and in the Regulus exemplum (§§ 99 ff.) we find Cicero, while ostensibly filling out along Panactian lines the part of the project the Stoic philosopher had omitted (cf. § 33: . . . tamquam fastigium imponimus), actually adopting a morally rigorist standpoint at odds with that of Panaetius. 62 ex quo Ennius nequiquam sapere sapientem qui ipse sibi prodesse non quiret.] An allusion to the verse that Cicero quotes from the Medea at Fam. 7.6.2 (May, 54; to Trebatius in Gaul 58 ): qui ipse sibi sapiens prodesse non quit nequiquam sapit (= seen. 273 = trag. 240 = 221 Jocelyn); cf. Eur. fr. 905 (play unknown): μισώ σοφιστήν. όστις ούχ αύτψ σοφός (quoted in Greek to Caesar at Fam. 13.15.2 [May, 45]). Ennius perhaps chose to substitute this commonplace for the meditation on the ill-will that the clever arouse in their duller neighbors at Eur. Med. 2 9 4 - 3 0 1 ; so Jocelyn ad loc; cf. Otto, 307. 63 Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in us libris quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni dicere sapientis esse nihil contra leges mores instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris.] Like Posidonius, Hecato of Rhodes was a pupil of Panaetius and a fairly prolific author; he is credited with at least nine books περί αγαθών (fr. 5 G.), three nepi αρετών (fr. 7 G.), two π€ρ*ι παθών (fr. 9 G.), three nepi παραδόξων (fr. 20 G.), and six π€ρί καθήκοντος (§ 89 = fr. 11 G.), as well as two books of χρεΐαι (fr. 24 G.). But it is very dubious that, as Gomoil, 73 ff., argued, he also wrote a work π^ρι χαρίτων; the fragments of Sen. Ben. that he assigns to it (frr. 15-19) should probably be referred to π€ρϊ καθήκοντος. It is not surprising that, in attempt ing to handle the conflict of honestum and apparent utile in the Panaetian manner, Cicero should have wanted to consult, not only Posidonius, but also Hecato (the description discipulus Panaeti in our passage makes plain the reason for Cicero's interest in him). Cicero's knowledge of the dedicatee in our passage and citation by title and book number in $ 89 surely make direct use of Hecato likely (cf. also ad §§ 49b-57). The contrary assumption of Pohlenz, GGA 1935,106, is based on Att. 16.11.4 and 14.4, passages which show that Cicero was interested in seeing Posidonius π€ρι του κατά περίστασιν καθήκοντος in connection with Off. 3 and that he obtained a υπό μνημα from Athenodorus Calvus (presumably summarizing that work), but not that this was the sole reading that Cicero undertook in this regard. In view of the fact that he found Posidonius' treatment sketchy (§ 8: quern 58. After reusing materia] from Top. at $ 61, Cicero evidently still has Trebatius on his mind.
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locum. . . breviter esse factum in quibusdam commentariis)y it would not be surprising if Cicero sought out other sources (see the introduction to this Book). In spite of his considerable output, Hecato's named fragments are few; and attempts to assign other material to him have not been notably successful. For instance, the argument of Bickel, 505 ff., that the Formula Vitae Honestae of the sixth-century bishop Martin of Bracara contains mate rial from Seneca, de Officiis, who, in turn, drew upon Hecato, TIC pi του καθήκοντος, though developed by his pupil, H. Gomoll, does not survive a critical comparison of Martin's doctrines with the secured fragments of Hecato; cf. Abel, 105, and, for other theories that would enlarge our knowl edge of Hecato's doctrines, ibid., 101 ff. (he finds no use of Hecato in Off. beyond the express citations); on his general assessment of Cicero's origi nality see ad § 34. Q. Aelius Tubero was on his mother's side the grandson of L. Aemilius Paullus. Cic. Mur. 75-76 records how his austere decoration of a triclinium on a public occasion cost him the praetorian elections (Pomponius' claim {Dig. 1.2.2.40] that he rose to consul can scarcely be right in view of Brut. 117: bonoribus maiorum respondere non potuit). Besides Hecato's περί του καθήκοντος he received the dedication of a work of Panaetius de Dolore Patiendo {Fin. 4.23 = fr. 46); probably Panaetius' reference to Crantor de Luctu at Luc. 135 = fr. 137 comes from the same work; cf. also the allusion to a letter of Panaetius to him at Tusc. 4.4 = fr. 47. The advice about regard for property was presumably not uncongenial to Tubero, who abandoned his friendship with Τι. Gracchus in view of the latter's agitation for reform (cf. Cic. Amic. 37: Ti. quidem Graccbum rempublicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus). While praising his diligence in pbilosopbicis (de Orat. 3.87), Cicero found his style distasteful (Brut. 11718); 59 no doubt he was well advised to deliver a panegyric of his uncle Scipio written by C. Laelius (de Orat. 2.341). Cf. Klebs, RE 1.1 (1893), 535.56 ff. neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis propinquis amicis maximeque reipublicae.] I.e., personal wealth provides the material for bene factions and thus binds the community together; cf. ad 1.22 and 92. Else where Cicero shows himself well aware of the force of this commonsense view, which his unqualified support for Scaevola's action forces him to downplay. Cf. the anecdote retailed by Gellius (12.12) that, during the trial of P. Sulla (62), Cicero secretly borrowed two million sesterces from the 59. In ihe lost de lure Civiii m Artem Redigendo (fr. phiL, p. 94, no. 1 = Gel. 1.22.7) Cicero praised our Tubero's learning and legal knowledge if the argument of M. Brctone, "Quale Tuberone?" lura 27 (1976), 72-74, is correct.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 63-65
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defendent with a view to purchasing a house on the Palatine; when the matter was divulged, and Cicero was reproached with this, he denied the transac tion and added: adeo verum sit accepisse me pecuniam, si domum emero. When he did, in fact, buy the house and was confronted in the senate with his lie, he joked: άκοιι>οι>όητοι homines estis, cum ignoratis prudentis et cauti patrisfamilias esset quod emere velit, empturum sese negare propter com petitors emptionis. etenim omnino tantum se negat factumm compendii sui causa quod non liceat.] Here as elsewhere in Off. Cicero is not satisfied with the minimalist position of merely avoiding the commission of wrongful acts; he wants to extend to property the precept that failing to protect another against harm is itself a form of injustice (cf. ad 1.23). 64 Sed sive et simulatio et dissimulado dolus malus est, perpaucae res sunt in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur . . .] An important admission that things are not really as simple as they have so far been represented as being. "All sales involve," as Frier observes, "some measure of taking advantage. I value an auto more than I value $10,000; you value the money more than the car. When wc exchange, there is always some element of taking advantage. For instance, I might have been willing to pay $12,000 for the car because I think it is worth that much.* numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile.] Heine 1 suggested that this conclusion (note connection with igitur) follows, not from the immediately preceding sentence, but from the entire foregoing chapter; even that would be difficult to show, however (hence perhaps he suppressed the remark in later editions). The doctrine of this sentence is not so much a result deduced from prior examples and reasoning (where turpitudo plays no explicit role) as the conviction which informs Cicero's entire treatment of the apparent conflict of honestum and utile (cf. $§ 12 and 35); on the loose use of connec tives in this essay cf. ad 1.13 [ex quo intellegitur . . .). 6 5 - 8 8 provide Roman examples, first from the law of contractual sale (cases of reticentia related to the examples previously quoted, probably from Hecato), then involving misbehavior of Roman public figures, beginning with the acceptance of a fraudulent legacy by Crassus and Hortensius ($S 73-78), next the political sins of C. and M. Marius ($$ 79-82), and then, in a crescendo of invective, of Pompey and Caesar ($$ 82b-85). The "Roman** section concludes with the contrasted pictures of the just Fabricius returning a would-be assassin to Rome's enemy, Pyrrhus, and the opposition to the interests of Rome's allies by L. Philippus, Cato Uticensis, and Curio. 65 An actio ex empto was available if a property were found to have legal
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defects known to the seller but not disclosed to the buyer in the process of emancipation; that only legal defects are in question follows from the fact that the ius praediorum is a technical term for the legal condition of the property (thus all the examples of §$ 6 6 - 6 7 involve legal defects); cf. Wat son, Obligations, 88. nam cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari quae essent lingua nuncupata . . .] Cf. Lex XII 6.1 (FJRA, 1, 43): cum nexum faciei mancipiumque, uti lingua nuncupassit, ita ius esto.—For the sense of praestari cf. ad § 55. . . . quae qui inlhiatus esset dupli poenam subiret. . . ] On the principle lis crescit contra infitiantem cf. Paul. Sent. 1.19.1 {FJRA, 2, 334): quaedam actiones si a reo infitientur, duplantur, velut iudicati, depensi, legati per damnationem relicti, damni iniuriarum legis Aquiliae, item de modo agri cum a venditore emptor deceptus est and 2.17.4 (FJRA, 2, 343): distracto fundo si quis de modo mentiatur, in duplo eius quod mentitus est officio iudicis aestimatione facta convenitur; Watson, Obligations, 81 ff.; Wieacker, 247-48. quidquid enim esset in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere.] This point may not have been quite settled in the jurisprudence of Cicero's day; cf. Pompon. Dig. 19.1.6.4, where, as Frier notes, Labeo is surely arguing against a late republican jurist: si vas aliquod mihi vendideris et dixeris certam mensuram capere vel cerium pondus habere, ex empto tecum agam, si minus praestes. sed si vas mihi vendideris ita, ut adfirmares integrum, si id integrum non sit, etiam id, quod eo nomine perdiderim, praestabis mihi: si vero non id actum sit, ut integrum praestes, dolum malum dumtaxat praestare te debere. Labeo contra putat et illud solum observandum, ut, nisi in contrarium id actum sit, omnimodo integrum praestari debeat: et est verum. 66 Our passage (on which V. Max. 8.2.1 depends) is the sole source for this case. P. Calpurnius Lanarius must have brought his suit against T. Claudius Centumalus 60 before 9 1 , the year of the death of M. Livius Drusus (tr. pi. 91), since, after the death of the arbiter, M. Porcius Cato (tr. pi. 99), his son (born 95), the later (Jticensis, was raised by Drusus, his maternal grand father. Cato pere served as tribune of the plebs and died while campaigning for the praetorship (Gel. 13.20.14); cf. F. Miltner, RE 22.1 (1953), 166.5 ff. Later, in 81, Calpurnius killed Julius Salinator, whom Sertorius had delegated 60. This is the transmitted form of the name; however, Langius' conjecture Ti., the likelier pracnomen for a member of the gens Claudia, may be right (Ti. being easily corrupted to T, as by the codices at N.D. 1.106).
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to hold the passes of the Pyrenees, and put his troops to flight (Plut. Sert. 7.3; cf. Sal. Htsf. 1.95-96);cf.Miinzer,RE3.1 (1897), 1374.4ff. Of Centumalus nothing is known beyond his part in this case; cf. Miinzer, ibid., 3.2 (1899), 2695.21 ff. Of the historical examples Cicero cites, Centumalus' is the only one of concealment by a knowing seller. Though he draws a broad inference from it (§ 67), this is a special case in several respects. Since property including land is the object of sale, the transaction is an important one and disclosure of defects correspondingly more critical than in the sale of, e.g., a piece of furniture. The importance of the defect is also a factor, the augurs already having ordered demolition of a part of the structure; 61 what had presumably been a prime site for a house was thus rendered less valuable, though not necessarily wholly uninhabitable. The case would have been different and more complex if the augurs were still deliberating over the matter at the time of the sale or if they had ordered merely the removal of, e.g., a chimney (this last case would involve a complex weighing of the ttmaterialityn of the defect relative to the object of sale). 62 ut, cum in arce augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque T. Claudium Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea quorum altitudo officeret auspiciis . . .] The augurs had a special place on the Capitoline for the taking of the auspices sometimes called the auguraculum (though Cicero does not use this technical term, evidently no longer current in his day; cf. Paul. Fest. p. 18M); cf. Wissowa, 524. This templum alone, not other places from which auspices were taken, was kept free of structures that might block the view; cf. Wissowa, RE 2.2 (1896), 2338.64 ff.; J. Linderski, "The Augural Law," ANRW 2.16.3 (1986), 2158.—For the iunctura augurium agere cf. Van L. 6.42:. . . augures augurium agere dicuntur, cum in eo plura dicant quam faciant; Cic. Div. 1.32: Me augurio acto posse respondit. . . . arbitrum ilium a d e g i t . . . .] "Er zwang ihn zur Einsetzung des Cato als arbiter mit folgendem Streitprogramm" (Broggini, 227). For arbitrium empti see Celsus, Dig. 19.1.38.1: si per emptorem steterit, quo minus ei mancipium traderetur, pro cibariis per arbitrium indemnitatem posse servari Sextus Aelius, Drusus dixerunt, quorum et mihi iustissima videtur esse sententia; Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht, 139, n. 5. Cf. with reference to the procedure described in our passage Heinze, 162 = 78: "Durchaus begreiflich: wahrend 61. Cicero probably knew of the case as a result of his own membership of the board of augurs, to which he was elected in S3; cf. MRR, 2, 233. 62. This paragraph comprises legal analysis kindly provided by Bruce W. Frier.
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dabei uber den Inhale der fides kein Zweifel bestehen kann, liegt es in der Natur der Sache, da£ bei Geschaften wie Kauf und Miere die Parteien verschiedener Meinung daruber sein konnen, was die bona fides im gegebenen Falle erfordere, auch wenn beide prinzipiell durchaus gewillt sind, die Forderung zu erfiillen. Das Nachstliegende ist dann, dafi sie im Einverstandnis einen privaten Schiedsrichter, arbiter, wahlen, der nach seiner Auffassung der bona fides entscheidet; sparer ist das Verfahren staatlich geregelt, der beiderseitigen Freiwilligkeit entzogen worden . . . " QU1DQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX FIDE BONA.] The intentio from the praetor's formula for an actio ex empto; cf. Lenel, 299. Broggini, 227, explains the significance of the example for the history of the law of sale: "Der Jurisprudenz hatte naturlich auch die Abfassung von Stipulationen, die die verschiedenen Aspekte des Kaufgeschaftes betreffen, zur Verfiigung gestanden. Aber es zeigt sich, dais nicht dieser Weg die Weitercntwicklung des Kaufrechtes bestimmt hat, sondern die viel freiere und allgemeinere Gewahrung einer actio mit bonae fidei intentio." . . . (ut enim ceteri ex patribus, sic hie, qui illud lumen progenuit, ex filio est nominandus): . . . ] The observation that a son may overshadow his father's glory is in line with Cicero's purpose of using this essay infer alia to spur his son on; cf. 1.78,115-17, and 2.44 and introduction, § 4.—Cicero is the first to use lumen metaphorically of persons {Cat. 3.24); at this period he applies the term above all to Caesar's victims in the civil war; cf. Phil. 2.51: in te, M. Antoni, id decrevit senatus et quidem incolumis, nondum tot luminibus exstinctis . . . ; ibid., 54: . . . Cn. Pompeium quod hnperi populi Romani decus ac lumen fuit. . . ; Ehlers, TLL 7, 1821.13 ff. For Cicero's general attitude toward and literary use of Cato at this period cf. ad 1.112. is igitur judex ita pronuntiavit, cum in vendendo rem earn scisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere.] This is the only case known in which a iudex gave a reason for his verdict; had this example been followed by other iudices, the result would have been judge-made law; cf. Frier, 230 and n. 119. 67 ergo ad fidem bonam staruit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium quod nosset venditor, quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius ille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit.] From the case of Claudius and Calpurnius Cicero abstracts the general principle that fides bona requires the buyer to know what the seller knows and goes on to apply this result to the quaestiones which he had presented in the form of a debate between Diogenes and Antipater, viz., the grain-dealer who withholds knowledge of further shipments on the way (§§ 50 ff.) and the seller of a house with material defects (§$ 54 ff.). However, as Cicero goes on to admit, huiusmodi
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reticentiae iure civili comprebendi non possunt; nor would the classical ju rists have found these to be cases of dolus; cf. Broggini, 226, n. 23. On the absence of the critique of the ius civile that might have been expected here cf. Norr, 43. M. Marius Gratidianus—non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos.] The year 91,the Active date of de Oratore, as well as the year of Crassus' death, is the terminus ante quern for this case. The context, including the case cited in 5 66 with the comment ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium quod nosset venditor (§ 67), suggests that an actio ex empto is in question; cf. Watson, Obligations, 80. A combination of our passage with V. Max. 9.1.1 and Plin. Nat. 9.168-69 (the latter two assumed to derive from Cic. Hort.) yields the following reconstruction: the entrepreneur C. Sergius Orata bought a property on the Lucrine Lake and built on it; but then the lucrative fishing rights on the lake were farmed out for the benefit of the fisc (perhaps by Antonius as censor for 97); considering its value diminished, Sergius sold the property to Marius at a relatively low price. Then Sergius developed oyster ponds (ostrearum vivaria) at Baiae (cf. Plin. Nat. 9.168). Convinced that this innovation would enable him, once again, to turn a handsome profit at the Lucrine Lake property, he bought it back from Marius at a higher price. But the attempt to introduce the oyster ponds there encountered opposition from the fish-farmers; hence Sergius attempted to rescind the sale; cf. Munzer, RE 2A2 (1923), 1713.22 ff. Cicero's comment quorsus haecf ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos63 shows clearly that Antonius won his case, in spite of the fact that Crassus cites it at de Orat. 1.178, pace N. Hapke, RE 13.1 (1926), 264.65 ff.; Crassus claims merely that his case turned upon ius [nonne omnis nostra in iure versata defensio est?); cf. Alexander no. 362.—For Cicero's relative M. Marius Gratidianus cf. ad § 80; for the entrepreneur C. Sergius Orata, Munzer, loc. cit.; on the origin of his cognomen cf. Fest. p. 182M:. . . Sergium quoque quendam praedivitem, quod et duobus anulis aureis et grandibus uteretur, Oratam dicunt esse appellatum (for the pronunciation of au as o, rustic in origin, cf. W.S. Allen, Vox Latina, 2d ed. {Cambridge, 1978], 60-61); Miinzei; loc. cit., 1714.29 ff., ventures that Festus' point about the ostentatious rings may derive from a malicious remark of opposing counsel in the suit.
6.1. Cicero thus stretches a bit the lower limit of the concept of the maiores (usually people older by two generations or more); this is a part of his strategy of deploying authoritative Romans (cf. Scaevola at $$ 62-63) to counter what he sees as the sharp practice countenanced by his Greek source, Hccato; cf. Roloff, 131 and n. 3.
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eae (Sergio) serviebant, sed hoc in mancipio Marius non dixerat.] "Servi tudes were rights in rem vested in a person as owner of a praedium over a neighboring praedium": Watson, Property, 176, who goes on to list the servitudes known from texts of our period as: itert actus, via, aquae ductus, aquae haustus. lumen, prospectus, cloaca, aquam immittere, servitus proiciendi protegendive, stillicidium, flumen, pecoris ad aquam appellandi, and onus ferendi; it is unclear which of these is in question in our case.—The mancipium or mancipatio was a formal act of transfer of property transacted before five witnesses and a man charged with holding the scale (libripens), all of whom had to be Roman citizens; the seller would lay hands on the prop erty (e.g., a slave) and pronounce the words hunc ego hominem ex iure Quiritium meum esse aio isque mihi emptus est(o) hoc aere aeneaque libra; at the same time he would deposit the coin on the scale held by the libripens and give the property to the buyer; cf. Kunkel, RE 14.1 (1928), 999.5 ff. (s.v. mancipatio). In our passage in mancipio evidently has the sense in instrument venditionis; cf. Vittinghoff-Rubenbauer, TLL 8, 254.49 and 52 s.v. mancipium; the expression is actually short for in lege mancipii; cf. de Orat. 1.178 (quoted below); A. Hagerstrom, Der romische Obligationsbegriff, 1 (Uppsala-Leipzig, 1927), 377. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum defendebat Antonius, ius Crassus urgebat. . . aequitatem Antonius . . .J Cf. de Orat. 1.178 (Crassus is the speaker): nuper, cum ego C. Sergi Oratae contra hunc nostrum Antonium iudicio privato causam defenderem, nonne omnis nostra in iure versata defensio estt cum enim M. Marius Gratidianus aedis Oratae vendidisset neque servire quandam earum aedium partem in mancipi lege dixisset, defendehamus, quicquid fuisset incommodi in mancipio, id si venditor scisset neque declarasset, praestare debere. Crassus, of course, took the opposite position, for equity and against the summum ius, in the famous causa Curiana; cf. orat., pp. 245 ff., and bibliography cited by J.A. Crook in CAH 9 2 ,554; for the principle of summum ius cf. ad 1.33; for our case cf. orat., pp. 234 and 253; Scholz, 74 ff. quod vitii venditor non dixisset sciens—quoniam id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset . . .] For the legal principle involved cf. Ulp. Dig. 19.1.1.1: venditor si, cum sciret deberi, servitutem celavit, non evadet ex empto actionem, si modo earn rem emptor ignoravit. . . 68 ttThis last case in which equity was really on the side of the defendant, whose silence, not intended to deceive, was legally exploited by the plaintiff, leads into Cicero's argument that civil law is an imperfect instrument for enforcing morality" (Griffin ad he). The point also bears, of course, upon the position taken by Diogenes in the foregoing debate (cf. ad §§ 51-52). Sed alitcr leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias: leges quatenus manu tenere
Commentary on Book 3, Section 67-69
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possunt, philosophi quatenus ratione et intellegentia.] Frier nores chat Cicero has here put his finger on an ineptitude of the law, but adds: how certain can one be of proof on minor issues? On the relation of law and morals cf. Arist. EN 1180a24-26: ev μόνη 6e τη Λακεδαιμονίων ττόλβ (ή) μετ' ολίγων ό νομοθέτης βπιμβλβιαν δοκβΐ ττεποιήσθαι τροφή? τ€ και επιτηδευμάτων; Kaser, Privatrecht, 1, 194 ff.and250-51;cf. alsoad% 67(ergoadfidembonam—). For the contrast of manu and ratione cf. N.D. 1.115: . . . non eum qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem nee manibus ut Xerxes sed rationibus deorum inmortalium templa et aras everterit. ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid simulate, ne quid fallaciter.] This can be viewed as a corollary of § 23: atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cut parere qui velit (omnes autent parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere) numquam committet ut alienum appetat et id quod alteri detraxerit sibi adsumat. suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas, etiam si excitaturus non sis nee agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo insequente saepe incidunt. sic ru aedes pro scribes, tabulam tamquam plagam ponas, (domum propter vitia vendas) in earn aliquis incurrat imprudens?] This is evidently a response to Diogenes* defense of the seller on grounds that his role was purely passive: num te emere coegit qui ne hortatus quidem est? ille quod non placebat proscripsit, tu quod placebat emisti {§ 55).—Fantham, 40, offers parallels for the hunt ing imagery.—Unger's bracketing of domum propter vitia vendas, an evident gloss, perhaps inspired by § 54, is accepted by recent editors apart from Testard. 69 hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi nequc aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est.) Cicero cannot appeal to mos or lex for this point but must have recourse to the lex naturae (cf. ad § 23); the depravity of morals of his time is a recurring topos of (particularly the latter part of) this work; cf. ad 2.26-27; cf. also Leg. 1.29, where the depravatio consuetudinum is among the causes of the dissimilarity of human beings. societas est enim (quod etsi sacpe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius) latissime quidem quae pateat omnium inter omnes, interior eorum qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum qui eiusdem civitads.] The same series of societies from larger to smaller as at 1.53, but this time without the propinqui as the final term; at § 28 he had argued against the possibility of drawing a line so as to exclude any human being from the societas. itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem condnuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet.] Scholars have had difficulty with the words of the lemma from several angles.
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(1) They have been thought to be an interpolation (Beseler, 334-36) or a marginal note added by Cicero and inserted in the text "par une inadvertence des editeurs" (Michel, 341); indeed the following words emphasize the insuf ficiency of the ius civile in comparison with verum ius germanaque iustitia, presumably equivalent to the ius gentium (cf. ad § 23), and represent the division between the two as something which ought to be changed (eas ipsas utinam sequeremur!)\6A hence they are hard to reconcile with the notion that the ordinarily authoritative maiores were responsible for the division be tween the two. (2) The problem has been raised of the debet evidently con tradicting the institution of the ancestors; they were responsible for the division between ius gentium and ius civile, yet we are told that quod autem (sc. ius) gentium, idem civile esse debet; hence Roloff, 102, n. 6, proposed to emend debet to debere and punctuate with colon after this word so that the wish of the ancestors would be contrasted in the sequel to what "we" (sc. Cicero's generation) possess. Roloff's suggestion (2) is unnecessary, since, in any case, the words quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet define what the difference between ius gentium and ius civile in the sense of the ancestors, should be: "daft nicht jede Bestimmung des ius gen tium notwendig im ius civile enthalten sein miisse, wohl aber sich das ius civile nach dem richten solle, was das ius gentium an allgemeingiiltigen Rechtssatzen birgt" (Roloff, 102; sim. Schmidt, 206). 6 5 For the underlying conception cf. SVF 3, 80.8 ff.: e o n δ* ή πλεονίξία και ή προς αλλήλους απιστία, δι' ας, οΰκ άρκεσθεντβς τοΐς της φύσεως θεσμοΐς, τά δόξαντα συμφερειν κοινή τοις όμογνώμοσιν όμιλοι ς ταύτα νόμους έπεφήμισαν. ώστε εΐκότως προσθήκαι μάλλον α'ι κατά μέρος πολιτεΐαι μιας της κατά φύσιν. προσθήκαι μεν γάρ οί κατά πόλεις νόμοι τοϋ της φύσεως όρθοϋ λόγου. On the other hand, to adopt proposal (1)—I treat the two suggestions as one since they have the same result, the removal of the words of the lemma from Cicero's text; the origin of the interpolation in a Ciceronian marginal note is a hypothesis which can be neither demonstrated nor refuted—is to cut into living flesh. If the lemma is deleted, the point of contrast of the following sea nos . . . disappears; a preceding reference to the maiores is definitely needed. Cicero's aim here is evidently to link the broadest types of human society from 1.53 with the types of ius, whereby the ius gentium covers the omnium inter omnes societas and the eiusdem gentis societas (cf. 64. Cf. 3.11 on the differentiation of honestum and utile. 65. However, the translation of T. Frank, "Cicero," PBA 1932,121, is both imprecise and taken out of context in such a way as to mislead the reader: "So our forefathers felt. . . that the law of nations should also become the civil law of Rome."
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Roloff, 102), the ius civile the civitas. Cicero's point in the sequel is not that there should be a total identity of ius civile and ius gentium but that in his day both ius civile and ius gentium have diverged too far from verum ius germanaque iustitia (cf. Wagner, 96 and 173); hence the transmitted text implies no criticism of the maiores. Schmidt, 206, compares our passage with Leg. 2.11 ff., where, presuppos ing an identity of natural and positive law, Cicero denies the title lex to any law which falls short of this standard; his discussion of our passage takes too little account of its context, however. On the preference of Cicero and Gaius for the ius gentium over the ius civile cf. Norr, 92 ff., esp. 97. sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iusritiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur.] Cicero has recourse to language proper to the Platonic ideas; cf. Orat. 9-10, cited ad § 18. In view of the fact that he was reading about πολιΤ€Ϊαι as recently as 23 April 46 {Fam. 9.2.5), R.G. Tanner, "Cicero on Conscience and Morality," in Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt, ed. John R.C. Martyn (Amsterdam, 1962), 111, has suggested that Cicero has in mind the simile of the cave at PI. R. 514a ff., with the umbra corresponding to the prevailing darkness only partly lighted by the fire, the imagines the figurines displayed above the wall separating the prisoners from the fire, and the effigies the form visible only in the upper world. Similar to our passage in its complaint over the inadequacy of the imago is Tusc. 3.3, cited ad 2.43. Cicero was well aware that Roman jurisprudence had since the previous century moved toward aequitas and away from the summum ius (cf. the case of Canius narrated at §§ 58-60), so that a more positive view of the develop ment would have been possible. With Cicero's distinction between iustitita and ius contrast Arist. EN 1 1 2 9 b l l : €πβ δ' ό παράΐΌμος άδικος ήι> ό δέ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δηλον Οτι πάιτα τα ι^ίμιμά εστί πως δίκαια. On the ius gentium cf. also Mommsen, Staatsr., 3.1, 603; Wieacker, 642 ff.; ad § 72. The imperfection of the ius civile is analogous to that of people themselves; cf. 1.46:. . . vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus, sed cum Us in quibus praecbre agitur si sunt simubcra virtutis . . . , - $ § 1 3 - 1 6 . Just as, in the passage just cited, there is an imperfect human perception of sapientby so, too, of justice, according to Rep. 3.11, as quoted in the epitome of Lactantius: atqutn nullus est hominum ne infimorum quidem ac mendicorum, in quern iustitb cadere non possit. sed quia ignorabant quid esset, unde proflueret, quid operis baberet, summam illam virtutem, id est com mune omnium bonum, paucis tribuerunt, eamque nullas utilitates proprias aucupari, sed alienis tantum commodis studere dixerunt. For exprimo in the sense of "producing" an image or the like cf. OLD s.v.,
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6c; Oellacher, TLL 5, 1795.28 ff.; for the juxtaposition with solidus cf. (besides Tusc. 3.3, quoted ad 2.43) ND 1.75 (Cotta to Velleius): Mud video pugnare te, species ut quaedam sit deorum, quae nihil concreti habeat nihil solidi nihil expressi nihil eminentis, sitque pura levis perlucida. For solidus as a desirable attribute cf. OLD s.v., 7 ("having substance, solid, real, lasting, etc."); to the examples there cited add Sen. Vit. Beat. 3A:quaeramus aliquod non in speciem bonum, sed solidum et aequale et a secretiore parte formosius; hoc eruamus. 70 In spite of the imperfections of the ius civile highlighted in § 69 (cf. also § 6 7 : sed huiusmodi reticentiae iure civili comprehendi non possunt; and § 68: sedaliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias)^ Cicero certainly does not deprecate it altogether, as this section shows. ΙΓΠ NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM!| In view of the personal form, Max Kaser, Das altromische Ius (Gottingen, 1949), 2 9 2 - 9 3 , sees this as an archaic sponsio ("Spruchformel") used by one of the litigants in an actio fiduciae; it was perhaps modeled on legis actiones and a stage preliminary to the written formulae. He recon structs it as follows: uaio te mihi. . . dare oportere, uti ne propter te fidemve tuam captus fraudatusve sim.n He adds: "Halt man eine solche Spruchformel fur glaubhaft, dann beweist sie, dafi es auch ein nicht gesetzliches Spruchformelverfahren gab, dessen Entscheidungslage materiell die fides, prozessual die Amtsgewalt des Gerichtsmagistrats war" (293); cf. Zivilprozessrecht, 114, n. 56; Privatrecht, 1,461, n. 19. Here fides has, of course, the concrete sense of "promise"; cf. Beseler, 337-38; Fraenkel, TLL 6, 1, 674.77-79, who compares Ten Ad. 621: sat adhuc tua nos frustratast fides. UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE!]Cf.**S61. 70-71 Q. quidem Scaevola—quid quemque cuique praestare oporteret.] For the eminent jurist Q. Mucius Scaevola, Cicero's own teacher, whose legal opinions carried great weight, cf. ad § 62. As in that passage, the allusion to Scaevola follows upon the citation of the formula ut inter bonos bene agier, the two evidently associated in Cicero's mind; cf. also ad § 61; for his cosponsorship of the lex Licinia Mucia cf. ad § 47. The summa vis possessed by bonae fidei actions in Scaevola's view (surely communicated orally to Cicero; d. Wieacker, 643, n. 20) evidently had to do with the fact that they were generally associated with a iudicium contrarium, i.e., the accused in the first case could turn the tables and bring suit against his erstwhile accuser; cf. B. Kiibler, RE 16.1 (1933), 444.64 ff.; Frier, 161-62; further literature at Wieacker, loc. cit. Hence in trying such a case the judge should be aware of
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this implication and consider the broad question of the possible liability of either party to the suit.—In general bona fides, which began as a foundation for contracts and regarding which, as our passage shows, the judge originally had considerable discretion, had by the late republic been increasingly cir cumscribed in positive law; cf. Top. 66 and, with particular reference to the law of urban leasehold, Bruce W. Frier, Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton, 1980), 57.—This list of bonae fidei actions places the infaming actions before the non-infaming; from the order here and in other Ciceronian passages (viz., N.D. 3.74; Caec. 7; Q. Rose. 16; Top. 42 and 66), it has been inferred that tutela was the oldest such action; cf. Watson, Per sons, 140 ff. 71 quocirca astutiac tollcndae sunt eaque malitia quae vult ilia quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum;...] Malitia is defined at N.D. 3.75 as versuta et fallax ratio nocendi; cf. ad 2.10. The personification lends vividness; cf. 1.134 (sermo) and 151 (mercatura); 2.9 (consuetudo); § 99 {magnitudo animi et fortitudo); $ 119 (honestas). In a similar vein, Jerome (epist. 57.3.1) criticizes those qui malitiam prudentiam vocant. prudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum . . .] If prudentia at 1.15 is a more theoretical virtue (corresponding to the wider sense of φρόνηση in Aristotle) and at 1.143 corresponds roughly to the common Stoic sense (cf., e.g., SVF 2, 297.13: επιστήμη ποιητέων Τ€ και ου ποίητεων), the emphasis on choice in our passage is in accord with Fin. 3.31 (= SVF 3, 46.2: quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab Us rebus, quae contra naturam sint, earum rerum, quae sint secundum naturam, {fore ut) tollatur omnis ea, quae quaeratur laudeturque, prudential) and 5.67 (. . . ut . . . cernatur . . . prudentia in dilectu bonorum et malorum); possibly our pas sage is under the influence of the TC'XO? formula at 3.13 (see ad loc). For the alleged Epicurean perversion of prudentia cf. $ 117. . . . malitia, si omnia quae turpia sunt mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante.] On anteponit (ξ) as a normalization of ponit ante (£) cf. Lebek, 222 and n. 43. nee vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiomm venditione venditoris fraus omnis excluditur. qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de funis, is praestat edicto aedilium . . .] The derivation of the whole ius civile from nature contrasts with the view of Aristotle, for whom only a part of το πολιτικοί' δίκαιον was by nature: του δέ πολιτικού δικαίου το μέν φυσικόν ^στι το δέ νομικόν. φυσικοί» μέν τό πανταχού την αυτήν έχον δυναμιν, και οΰ τω δοκεΐν ή μή, νομικόν δ€ ο έξ αρχή? μέν ουδέν διαφέρει ουτω$ ή άλλω?, όταν δέ θώνται. δ ι α φ ^ ι ...(ΕΝ 1134bl8 ff.); cf. Wagner, 130 and notes 5 - 6 .
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The ius praediorum had formed the basis for discussion at SS 6 5 - 6 7 (for the term cf. ad S 65); the point can, Cicero now adds, be illustrated in the sale of slaves as well. Since at the slave market buyers and sellers were usually unknown to each other, a legal remedy already existed in Cicero's day whereby the sale could be rescinded (the technical term for the process is redhibitio) in the event of an undisclosed defect. Cf. Gel. 4.2.1, who confirms Cicero's point about the praetor's edict on the sale of slaves: in edicto aedilium curulium, qua parte de mancipiis vendundis cautum est, scriptum sic fuit: 'titulus servorum singulorum scriptus sit curato ita, ut intellegi recte possit, quid morbi vitiive cuique sit, quis fugitivus errove sit noxave solutus non sit'; sim. Dig. 21.1.1.1: aiunt aediles: 'qui mancipia vendunt certiores faciant emptores, quid morbi vitiive cuique sit, quis fugitivus errove sit noxave solutus non sit. eademque omnia, cum ea mancipia venibunt, palam recte pronuntianto . . . '. As Frier observes, "At this point we start to reach toward outright buyer's protection." Cicero's handling of the matter is defective in several respects. The phrase qui. . . scire debuit, often used of carelessness, shows that the law applied whether the seller actually knew or not; 66 thus by the very act of selling the seller takes responsibility that the slave is free of defects. But if the seller does not know of the defect, the transaction, though liable to redhibition, can hardly be called fraus (cf. $ 60 on the inadequate definition of dolus malus in use in Cicero's day). Again he fails to indicate that the remedy involves only the voiding of the sale (redhibition) but no damages, so that, although the buyer's case is easier, he gets less. Finally, as Frier notes, Cicero's scire debuit attempts, wrongly, to assimilate the praetor's edict to the law of sale (cf. ad S 65); cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,560 and n. 52. Cf. also ad SS 5 4 - 5 5 and, for the general question of slavery, ad 1.41a. 72 . . . quoniam iuris natura fons s i t . . .] Cf. Leg. 1.16-17: . . . nullo in genere disputando magis patefieri, quid sit homini a natura tributum, quantum vim rerum optimarum mens humana contineat, cuius muneris colendi efficiendique causa nati et in lucem editi simus, quae sit coniunctio hominum, quae naturalis societas inter ipsos. his enim explicatis fons legum et iuris inveniri potest. . . . natura enim iuris explicanda nobis est, eaque ab hominis repetenda natura, considerandae leges quibus civitates regi debeant . . . ; cf. Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford, 1965), 39 ff.; ad § 7 1 . . . . hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia.] Another corollary of the formula of SS 21 ff. (cf. ad SS 68-69). 66. Ulp. Dig. 21.1.1.2 states explicitly that here ignorance is no defense.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 71-72, 73-85» and 73-74
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nee ulla pemicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio intellegentiae, ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum honestis pug· nare videantur.) Cf. ad%\\ above. quotus enim quisque reperietur qui impunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit injuria!] At §S 37-38 Cicero said that boni viri and those who have made some progress in philosophy are convinced that they must not engage in wrongful acts even if there is no possibility of detection; but now we discover just how few such persons are. Cf. Fhc. 104: quotus enim quisque est qui banc in republica sectam sequatur. . . ; CaeL 38: quotus quisque istam [sc. malam famam] effugere potest, praesertim in tarn maledica civitatef 73-85 On possible connections of this politically explosive material with the άι^κδοτα on which Cicero may have been simultaneously at work cf. ad 2.84. 7 3 - 7 4 The death, in Greece, of L. Minucius Basilus should be placed fairly soon after the successive consulates of Crassus and Hortensius in the years 70 and 69 respectively (homines eiusdem aetatis potentissimos).67 However, pace Miinzer, RE 15.2 (1932), 1947.20 ff., the case is not identical with the fraudulent will of a Minucius (no other name given) handled by Verres as praetor urbanus in 74 and alluded to at Cic. Ver. 2.1.115 ff.; for that Mi nucius died intestate (eius testamentum erat nullum), so that possession of the estate should have fallen to the gens Minucia {Verr. 2.1.115), whereas L. Minucius Basilus adopted and left his estate to his sister's son, M. Satrius (. . . cum Basilus M. Satrium sororis filium nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem). There has been much confusion about the later career of the younger L. Minucius Basilus because a contemporary evidently bore the same gentile name and cognomen. I take it that the Caesarian officer who was rewarded with the praetorship of 45 (MRR 2, 307) but was given money instead of a province (Dio 43.47.5) is the same man who in the summer of 44 was elected patron by the Piceni and Sabini, just as Antony, Brutus, and Cassius were by other regions of Italy at this time. He will also have been the target of attack at Phil. 2.107, where he is classed with Antony as one of those who have obtained the patron's status vi et armis, as opposed to Brutus and Cassius, who have earned it magno . . . studio, iudicio, benevolentia, caritate (on the status of patronus of a provincial town cf. Denniston ad he). If the hypoth esis of Miinzer, be. cit., 1950.6 ff. (sim. Elizabeth Rawson in CAH 9 2 ,441), is correct that Caesar's decision in the matter of a province was motivated by 67. The account at V. Max. 9.4.1 depends on our passage.
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reports of Minucius' cruelty {cf. App. BC 3.409), then this is very likely to be the man who died at the hands of his own slaves in summer, 43. Note that another Satrius (praenomen unknown) is attested in 43 as legate of one of Caesar's assassins, C. Trebonius, in the east {ad Brut. 1.6.3). To be separated from the above is the Minucius who participated, albeit incompetently, in Caesar's assassination {he accidently wounded another of the assassins in the scuffle:. . . MUOUKIOS δέ και αυτός τύτττωι; Καίσαρα παία 'Ρουβριον d s τον μηρόι> . . . : Nic. Damasc. Wit Caes. 24 = FGrHist 90 F 130: 2A, 409.8-9) and with whom Cicero was personally acquainted (the curi ously laconic note that Cicero addressed to him has been thought to be a congratulation following the assassination: Fam. 6.15: tibi gratulor, mihi gaudeo. te amo, tua tueor. a te amari et quid agas quidque agatur certior fieri volo). It seems very doubtful that these passages can refer to a single bearer of this name. How could the same man have participated in the assassination and then "made a lightning change of political associates" (E.T. Merrill, "On Cicero to Basilus [Fam. VI. 15)," CPh 8 [1913], 50-51) so as to be classed with Antony? Cf. (for distinction of two Minucii) D.R. Shackleton Bailey, Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature, 2d ed. (Atlanta, 1991), 34, and Onomasticon to Cicero s Speeches (Norman and London, 1988), 69; aliter, besides Merrill and Miinzer, 68 G.V. Sumner, review of 1976 ed. of Shackleton Bailey, Nomenclature, in CPh 73 (1978), 161. Satrius' current political prominence and connection with a false testa ment account for his presence here; he was both a victim and, in his turn, a practitioner of the politics of unscrupulous self-aggrandizement. 73 neque enim de sicariis—quae faciunt ii qui habentur boni.) The behavior of the boni has been the basis for discussion all along; cf. § 18 (. . . boni viri non solent), $ 38 (honesta enim bonis viris non occulta quaeruntur)t § 50 (sapientem et virum bonum fingimus), § 61 (ut inter bonos bene agier)y § 64 (cf. also §S 7 5 - 7 6 , 81-82). The new element added in our sentence is the possible divergence of appearance and reality [qui habentur boni); thus Cicero can go on to criticize respected Romans like M. Crassus and Q. Hortensius.—This delimitation of the subject in question presumably ex cludes Marc Antony, whose appropriation of property bequeathed to others under wills of L. Rubrius, L. Turselius, and Julius Caesar is among the targets of Phil. 2 (sc. SS 4 0 - 4 1 and 103; $ 109 [with reference to Caesar]: testamentum inritum fecit, quod etiam infimis civibus semper obtentum est); however, 68. Miinzer, 1950.11, however, admits, contrary to his earlier opinion {RE 2A1 |1921], 190.22), that the Satrius of ad Brut. 1.6.3 must be different.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 73-74 and 73 589 recent abuses by Antony doubtless suggested to Cicero the topic of wills.— Cf. the similar list at N.D. 3.74: turn baec cotidiana: sicae venena peculatus testamentorum etiam lege nova quaestiones. . . . alieni facinoris munusculum non repudiaverunt.] Crassus and Horten sius could easily have afforded to forego this "tip"; on their finances cf. Shatzman, 375-78 and 344-46 respectively. On Crassus1 shady financial dealings cf. Plut. Crass. 2.4 and 6.8 (property of the proscribed) and 2.5 (purchase of buildings at or near the scene of afire).On Hortensius* relation to the extortions of his client C. Verres ("probably an accessory after the fact") cf. Robin Seager in CAM 92, 226-27. satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur? mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alteram vivum amavi, alteram non odi mortuum.] Cicero's answer is not unexpected in view of §§ 38-39 (exemplum of Gyges).—An aesthete who introduced the peacock as a new delicacy at Rome, collected wine on a lavish scale (at his death he left 10,000 jars of it), owned several grand villas, including one at Bauli with famous fish-ponds, and reportedly wept over a dead murena, Q. Hortensius Hortalus was a gifted orator but a mediocre politician. After Cicero attained the consulate, Hortensius began to collabo rate with his erstwhile rival in the courts; but he persisted in resenting the upstart (or so Cicero thought) and failed to provide the kind of leadership Cicero had expected after the death of his brother-in-law Catulus in 60. He followed Hortensius' advice to go into exile and await a swift and trium phant recall but soon lost confidence; hence his bitter comment from Salonica (13 June 58; QF 1.3.8): quantum Hortensio credendum sit nescio. me summa simulatione amoris summaque adsiduitate cottidiana sceleratissime insidiosissimeque tractavit adiuncto Q. Arrio. quorum ego consiliis, promissis, praeceptis destitutus in banc calamitatem incidi; sim. (on the same day) to Atticus [Att. 3.9.2): 'nunc Hortensium adlice et eius modi viros\ obsecro, mi Pomponi, nondum perspicis quorum opera, quorum insidiis, quorum scelere perierimusf Cf. T.P. Wiseman in CAH 92, 381 and n. 50. Though he avoided criticizing him by name, he (together with the brothers M. and L. Lucullus) was certainly one of the targets of Cicero's attack on the piscinarii {Att. 1.18.6; 1.19.6; 1.20.3; 2.1.7; 2.9.1; Parad. 38; cf. also Att. A.Sa.2 [viri boni nusquam]). Nevertheless Cicero set a monument to Horten sius, not only in the lost dialogue which bore his name, but also in de Orat., which concludes with an encomium of the young Hortensius (3.228-30), just as Plato's Phaedrus concludes with the praise of the young Isocrares (278e ff.), and at Brut. 317 ff. (where, however, Cicero's presentation of his own career contains a latent critique of the older orator; cf. Rathofer, 104 ff.). Our passage, at least with regard to Hortensius, is reminiscent of Aris-
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totle's comment on friendship vs. truth:. . . καίπερ προσάντου? της τοιαύτη? ζητήσεως γινομένη? διά το φίλου? άνδρα? εΐσαγαγεΐν τά είδη. δόξειε δ' άν ϊσω? βελτιον ει ναι και δει ν επί σωτηρία γε τη? άληθεία? και τά οικεία άναιρεΐν, άλλω? τε και φιλοσόφου? όντα?· άμφοΐν γάρ όντοιν φίλοιν όσιον προτιμάν την άλήθειαν (ΕΝ 1096a 12 ff.). Hortensius died in June, 50, just in time, with his usual good luck (cf. Fam. 8.2.1 [Cael.]), to miss the civil war (Brut. 4 and 329); cf. Miinzer, RE 8.2 (1913), 2475.13 ff.—On Cicero's attitude toward Crassus cf. ad 1.25; note the reference to testamenta subiecta in the catalogue of Crassus 1 misdeeds at Parad. 46. 74 sed cum Basilus M. Satrium sororis filium nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni et Sabini; ο turpem notam temporum nostrorum!), non erat aequum principcs rives rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen pervenire.] Schmitthenner, 45, assumes that there were two wills, a genuine one which adopted M. Satrius and installed him as heir, and a spurious one, also adopting him but giving the property to M. Crassus, Q. Hortensius, and the unnamed forgers. Although Cicero is not quite explicit, the obvious assumption would be that the two parallel acts for which the same tense is used (nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem) both found expression in the writing of the will, possibly with the legacy given, as was sometimes the case, on the condicio nominis ferendi (on which cf. Schmitthenner, 42). Whether or not the spurious will actually included a clause adopting M. Satrius (a strange procedure if he was to receive no legacy), Satrius took the name L. Minucius Basilus (Satrianus) in fulfillment of a clause of the genuine will and retained it demonstratively even after the spurious will was legally sanctioned. On the forgery of wills in general cf. Champlin, 82-87.—The ζ family offers after Sabini the words ο turpe notam temporum nomen illorum; the ξ manuscripts ο turpe nomen illorum temporum (for minor variants cf. Winterbottom's apparatus). This locus conclamatus has provoked a host of conjectures but little agreement. There is not even consensus as to whether the words in question refer to the preceding or the following matter. 69 Scholars are likewise divided into camps as retaining one or the other of the nouns nomen and nota or retaining or eliminating both. 7 0 Unger, 92, proposed that nota here should bear the gen69. Biichner, Testard, Gunermann, and Wintcrbottom connect it with the preceding clause, Atzert and Fcdeli with the following. 70. Solutions involving retention of both nouns: ο turpem notam temporum nomen hominum ilhrum (DrieiSen, 13-15); ο turpe, notam temporum, nomen illorum (Ungcr, 91-93); ο turpem notam temporum nomen illorum (Goldbacher, 2» 72); cf. also ο turpe notum temporum nomen illorum (translated u o nom thstement eelcbre dc cettc epoquc": Testard; did he also
Commentary on Book 3, Section 73-74
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eral meaning "sign"; he explains: "Eine signatur der zeit, in der Rom eine monarchic wurde, war der name Basilus . . . n ; but there is nothing in this context to fix the reference of illorum temporum to Rome's monarchical period; the words are more naturally taken to refer to the time of the spu rious testament. Nota is most often interpreted as the nota censoria, con strued with the genitive illorum temporum and rendered tta black mark against those times" or the like; for the construction cf. with Winterbottom, 1995, 266, Phil. 11.36: Antonios . . . non modo suarum familiarum sed Romani nominis probra atque dedecora. However, in a work containing so much criticism of the contemporary or near-contemporary scene, to empha size the remoteness of the incident {illorum temporum), especially when Satrius was still alive, seems false. Hence Winterbortom's nostrorum for nomen illorum,71 with the restored text to read ο turpem notam temporum nostrorum (for the word-order he compares Tac. Dial. 27.1). The restored text would thus correspond to the sense suggested by M. Giebel, M.T. Cicero, Philippische Redengegen M. Antonius. Erste una zweite Rede (Stutt gart, 1983), 178, n. 117 (ad 2.107, where there is likewise a disapproving reference to Basilus* status as patronus [see abovel: "der Patron des Picenerund des Sabinerlandes—welch ein Schandfleck fur unsere Zeit!") and would be in keeping with the sardonic political commentary elsewhere found in this essay. etenim si is qui non defendit iniuriam neque propulsat a suis cum potest iniuste facit, ut in primo libro disserui, qualis habendus est is qui non modo non repellit sed etiam adiuvat iniuriam?] An a fortiori argument based on 1.23: sed iniustitiae genera duo sunt, unum eorum qui inferunt, alterum eorum qui ab its, quibus infertur, si possunt, non propulsant iniuriam. . . . qui autem non defendit nee obsistit, si potest, iniuriae, tarn est in vitio, quam si parentes aut amicos aut patriam deserat. mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae videntur, si sunt maJitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate sed simulatione quaesitae.] Captatio be comes a prime target for satirists and moralists of the following century; on the phenomenon cf. most recently Champlin, 87 ff. Here, as in the case of Scaevola (§ 62) and reticentia ($ 67), Cicero advocates norms of behavior mean ιο emend turpe to turpiteri'); solutions involving retention of nota only: ο turpem notam temporum [nomen illorum] (Victorius), ο turpem notam horum temporum (Winterbottom in his critical apparatus; but see below); both nouns are eliminated by Biichner (o turpe temporum) and Gunermann (o turpe illorum temporum). 71. Winterbottom, 1995, 266; nomen, which otherwise occurs twice in this sentence, had been deleted by Victorius, whom Atzert, Fedcli, Biichner, and Gunermann follow.
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that go beyond what is demanded by law; cf. Heilmann, 46. Legacies were on Cicero's mind at this time as a topic in his quarrel with Antony; cf. ad § 73. 75 sic enim cogitans: 'est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc expedit',—qui fons est fraudium maleficiorum scelerum omnium.] Cf. ad § 11 above. itaquc si vir bonus habeat hanc vim,—hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum.] An application of the doctrine expounded at §§ 38-39 on the basis of the exeniplum of Gyges; cf. also the ignoratio omnium of § 72. . . . si digitis concrepuerit. . .] As in summoning a servant; cf. Cic. Agr. 2.82: . . . qui, simulac xviri concrepuerint, armati in civis et expediti ad eaedem esse possint; Otto, 89. at dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saharct.] I.e., he would stick at no act, however turpe. Cicero presupposes a disapproval of public dancing similar to that implied by the scornful question Demea poses to Micio tu inter eas |sc. meretricem et matremfamilias) restim ductans saltabisf [Ad. 752) or voiced by Crato at the beginning of Lucian, Salt.; cf. Mur. 13 (nemo . . . fere saltat sobrius, nisi forte insanit. . .), as well as 1.145, where singing in the forum is given as an example of magna perversitas. However, at § 93 a scenario is outlined in which a sapiens might, in fact, dance in the forum. homo autem iustus, isque quern sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam quod in se transferat detrahet.] Essentially a restatement of the formula of § 2 1 . 7 5 - 7 6 hoc qui admiratur, is se quid sit vir bonus nescire fateatur. at vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam notionem evolvere . . .] Notio occurs in this treatise only toward the end of Book 3, twice (in our passage and at § 81) in a technical sense, and once (§ 111) with reference to the activities of the Roman censors. In the former two passages notio renders €W>oia, a term from the Stoic/Academic doctrine of the ψυχή (cf. SVF 2, 228.32), the result of the contact of sensation and reason; cf. Luc. 2 1 : lsi homo est, animal est mortale rationis particeps'. quo e genere nobis notitiae rerum inprimuntur, sine quibus nee intellegi quicquam nee quaeri (nee) disputari potest (in the next sentence he states explicitly that notitiae renders ewoiai). From epistemology the term was transferred to rhetorical theory. As in § 6 1 , Cicero, striking out on his own philosophically, touches points dealt with in the recently completed Topica; cf. Top. 31: notionem appello quod Graeci turn cwoiai' turn πρόληφιι>. ea est insita et animo praecepta cuiusque cognitio enodationis indigens (there is no differentiation here between ewoia and πρόληψι? since in the sense "concept" both are formally identical [cf. Hartung, 93], though in strict Stoic epistemology they are distinct [cf. Reid ad
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Luc. 30, p. 2131). In ° " r passage, as in Tusc. 4.53, 7 2 the point is to show that each person has the potential to arrive at the correct view through the posses sion of the κοιι>αί ei>i>oiai, which merely need to be "unfolded" or "opened." On Stoic epistemology in general cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 54 ff., esp. 56; on Cicero's various translations of ewoia and the route by which he arrived at the term worio, which has proved indispensable for Western thought, cf. Hartung, 84 ff. 76 . . . «am se ipse doceat eum virum bonum esse qui prosit quibus possit, noceat nemini nisi laccssitus iniuria.] A paraphrase of the second virtue; cf. ad 1.20 and 2 0 - 6 0 . quid ergo?—'non igitur faciat' dixerit quis 'quod utile sit, quod expediat?' immo intellegat nihil nee expedire nee utile esse quod sit iniustum. hoc qui non didiccrit, bonus vir esse non poterit.] Cicero now applies the principles just enunciated to the case of Minucius' will. The direct speech of an imagi nary objector, a feature of the diatribe, 7 ' adds liveliness, as in the presenta tion of the opposed views of Antipatcr and Diogenes at $5 49b-57; Cicero will use the same technique at §§ 79, 100, and 102 ff. Hecato functioned as an objector, though without direct speech, to the exemplum of Scaevola (§ 63). 77
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same name, probably his son, who, during the capture of Rome by Marius' troops, killed P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97; see ad 2.57b) and all but one of his sons; only M. Crassus, the later so-called triumvir, escaped with his life (did this association of ideas lead to the mention of the elder Fimbria following Crassus?). See Miinzer, RE 6.2 (1909), 2598.58 ff.; Kunkel, 16-17; Wise man, 119; A.W. Lintort, "The Offices of C. Flavius Fimbria in 86-85 BC," Historia 20 (1971), 696-701. On the otherwise unknown M. Lutatius Pinthia, cf. Miinzer, RE 13.2 (1927), 2096.23 ff.—The incident evidently involved a sponsio, a kind of judicial wager preliminary to the case being decided; each of the parties undertook to pay a fixed sum in the event of a finding against him (though in practice the avowed sum was not collected); cf. Kaser, Zivilprozessrecht, 76-77; and on the designation of the judge as a iudex Broggini, 177; however, Frier, 200, n. 10, regards our case as a non judicial arbitration.—On the implications of a reputation for being a vir bonus cf. PI. R. 361b-c: €i γαρ δόξ€ΐ δίκαιο? eii/αι. έσοιται αύτφ τιμαι και δωρβαι δοκουντι τοιούτψ eivai; for the case of Deioces cf. ad 2.41. huic igitur vtro bono, quern Fimbria eriam, non modo Socrates noverat, nullo modo videri potest quicquam esse utile quod non honestum sit.] As in $ 63, a remarkable confrontation of Greek and Roman traditions, here with the intent of harmonization. In our passage, as elsewhere (cf. ad 2.43), Cicero seems to reflect the dogmatic Socrates of Xenophon rather than the agnostic Socrates of Plato (cf., however, 1.148). For the use of the concept vir bonus in this Book cf. ad § 18.—The igitur draws a conclusion from the foregoing in the sense that, since Fimbria said that being a vir bonus involved "countless . . . praises" [innumerabilibus . . . laudibus), such a man could hardly recognize the utile as a value distinct from the honestum, a term which, for Romans of Cicero's day, was bound up with the laudabile (cf. ad 1.14). itaque talis vir non modo facere sed ne cogitare quidem quicquam audebit quod non audeat praedicare.] Non modo non is unnecessary, the negation being carried over from non modo to the verb [facere); cf. Hofmann-Szantyr, 519; less convincingly explained at Kuhner-Stegmann, 2, 62-63. Haec non turpe est dubitare philosophos, quae ne rustici quidem dubitent?] Though this is phrased as a thrust at philosophers generally (cf. 1.28, ad 2.87), the target is clearly Diogenes' position as presented at §5 49b-57. Cf. Leg. 1.41: ο rem dignam in qua non modo docti sed etiam agrestes erubescantl a quibus natum est id quod iam contritum est vetustate provcrbium; cum enim fidem alicuius bonitatemque laudant, dignum esse dicunt quicum in tcncbris mices.] The game designated by the verb micare involved two
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 77-78 and 79-82a
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players, who, at a given signal extended one or more fingers, the goal being to match the number opened by one's opponent; it could also be used as a lottery procedure in business transactions (cf. Van Parmen. 396: micandum erit cum Graeco, utrum ego illius numerum an Me meutn sequatur); cf. J. Marquardt, Das Privatleben der Romer, 2, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1886), 836. Though said to be ttworn out by (its) antiquity" this proverb is not attested in literature until Fin. 2.52: cur iustitia laudator? out unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: 'quicum in tenebris'? Cf. Petron. 44.7: . . . cum quo audacter posses in tenebris micare; Fronto 1.5.5 (= p. 9, 9-10 van den Hout 2 ): aliud scurrarum proverbium: 'en cum quo in tenebris micesy; Otto, 221-22; Lambertz, TLL 8, 929.60 ff. 77-78 hoc quam habet vim nisi illam—videsne hoc proverbio neque Gygi illi posse veniam dari neque huic quern paulo ante fingebam digitorum percussione hereditates omnium posse converrere?] Cicero's use of an etymological argument was consciously based on a philosophical model (cf. ad 1.23), perhaps too this use of a Roman proverb as a basis for deciding casuistic cases. For Aristotle, seeing in them remains of primordial human wisdom (fr. 13 Rose = 463 Gigon), collected a book of proverbs (D.L. 5.26; cf. Cephisodorus' [earlier?] complaint apud Ath. epit. 60d-e that he had not done so); and Theophrastus did so as well (D.L. 5.45 = 727.14 Fortenbaugh, 1992); another pupil of Aristotle, Clearchus of Soli, offered proverbs in two books as literature of entertainment (frr. 63-83; see Wehrli ad he); Chrysippus wrote several books on the interpretation of proverbs {SVF 3, 202).—Jacobsohn, TLL s.v. converro, lists our passage as the earliest meta phorical use under the first meaning ("verrendo colligere"); was this perhaps a colloquialism? 78 . . . quod honestum non est, id utile ut sit effici non potest adversante et rcpugnante natura.] Cf. 1.110 (the idea of a resistant nature expressed with the proverbial phrase invita Minerva); a similar thought is expressed in posi tive terms at Fin. 1.63 (. . . morati melius erimus cum didicerimus quid natura desideret). 79-82a These sections present the cases of two Marii, both distant relatives of Cicero, who were induced by permagna praemia (i.e., the prospect of the consulship) to violate iustitia (cf. § 40, where Cicero acquitted Brums of eliminating a consular colleague by unjust means, and the condemnation of Romulus' fratricide at $ 41); he adds in the case of M. Marius that. . . id in quo violator aequitas non ita magnum . . . videtur ($ 81). Since the latter never attained the consulate, the stronger moral condemnation is reserved for C. Marius, who did (seven times). If iustitia involves respecting the inter ests of another, how is it in my interest to be just, especially when the stakes
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are high? Cicero's answer, implicit in the rhetorical questions of § 82, turns upon the fact that he has confined his discussion to the man who wants to be considered a vir bonus (cf. ad §§ 18 and 73). However, Heilmann, 64, objects that the Marii did not lose the viri boni et splendor et nomen; their downfall had military/political, not moral causes. It may well be that Cicero has in mind the fame of the Marii in the "best** circles and believes that this valuation will, in the end, prevail; cf. ad 2.43 with reference to the fame of the Gracchi. 79 Marius* political prospects did indeed seem slight when he was appointed legate by Q. Caecilius Metellus, charged as consul in 109 with handling the war in Numidia. Such political successes as he had enjoyed seemed tied to the support of the Caecilii Metelli, beginning with a tribunate in 119 when L. Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus was consul and with whom he came into conflict (cf. MRR 1, 525-26). Following defeat in the running for both curule and plebeian aedileship on the same day (Plut. Mar. 5.1-3), he had been elected praetor for 115 (cf. MRR 1,532) in last place and under a cloud (he barely escaped conviction on charges of ambitus: cf. Plut. Mar. 5.3 ff.; V. Max. 6.9.14), when Delmaticus1 cousin M. Caecilius Metellus (RE no. 77) was elected consul. The aforementioned Q. Caecilius Metellus (Delmaticus' brother) and Marius succeeded in restoring discipline to the army in Numidia, but a decisive victory over Jugurtha eluded them; meanwhile an intense personal rivalry developed between the aristocratic proconsul and his socially inferior legate. The leave that Cicero emphasizes Metellus granted Marius {cum ab eo% imperatore suo, Romam missus esset. . . cuius legatus et a quo missus esset) was not for official business (otherwise the et a quo missus would be redundant), but for the specific purpose of standing in the consular elections for 107 (cf. Sal. Jug. 6 4 . 1 : . . . ab Metello petundi gratia missionem rogat; contrast C. Gracchus, whose return in 124 from his post as quaestor in Sardinia to run for tribune resulted in a censorial inquiry; cf. MRR 1,512 7 5 ). Marius' leave was, however, granted only grudgingly and at the last moment: twelve days before the election, when two days and a night were required to reach Utica from camp and another four days with favoring wind for sailing to Rome (Plut. Mar. 8.7-9). Cf. Weynand, RE Suppl. 6 (1935), 1371.55 ff., 1372.5 ff., 1373.8 ff.; Andrew Lintott in CAH 9*, 90 ff.;
75. However, in spite of de Vir. III. 65.1 {Gaius Gracchus pesttlentem Sardinian quaestor sortitus nan veniente successors sua sponte discessit), it seems unlikely char he departed without permission of his commander, in which case he would have had difficulty providing the censors with satisfactory answers; probably he had his superior's leave but broke with custom by departing before him.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 79-82a and 79
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Carney, 2 7 - 2 8 , n. 142, who remarks a propos our passage: "Cicero seems to be carefully choosing his words so as to heighten the treachery in this inci dent, suppressing, but not explicitly contradicting its background facts . . ."; this is, of course, a technique to which later rhetoric applied the term color; cf. Lausberg §§ 329 and 1061. SaJlust, too, while critical of Metellus' superbia {Jug. 64.1), finds Marius' reaction incorrect, influenced by cupido and ira (ibid., 64.5; cf. D.C. Earl, The Political Thought ofSallust [Cambridge, 1961 ], 73-74). Elsewhere Cicero often speaks favorably of Marius; cf. mate rial collected by T.F. Carney, "Cicero's Picture of Marius," WS 73 (1960), 83-122 (though the audience Cicero is addressing on each occasion needs to be borne firmly in mind); for Cicero's poem on Marius cf. K. Buchner, RE 7A1 (1939), 1253.3 ff.; Courtney, pp. 174 ff. 'At enim cum permagna praemia sunt, est causa peccandi'.] For the deploy ment of an imaginary objector cf. ad $ 76. Hand, 1,445, explains the force of at enim thus: "Per at reiicitur aliqua sententia . . . : per enim infertur alia sententia in vicem comprobationis, qua aliter sc rem habere confirmamus: quasi plena oratio haec sit: at contra, nam hoc quoque respici debet, nam hoc verum est"; on the analogous Greek expression άλλα γάρ cf. J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1954), 98 ff. Cf. also 1.144. . . . Q. Mctcllum . . . summum virum cc civem . . .] Following his own exile Cicero was fond of comparing himself with Q. Metellus, the optimate leader who went into exile (in 100) and was later (99) recalled; cf. Fam. 1.9.16, where he denies that after his recall Metellus was fracto animo et demisso, as well as Red. Sen. 37 and Red. Pop. 6; on his restoration cf. Andrew Lintott in CAH 9 2 , 101. Such was Metellus' reputation for personal integrity that when he was prosecuted repetundarum the (equestrian) judges did not even want to examine his accounts (Cic. Balb. 11; Att. 1.16.4). In spite of the fact that Marius took over the command against Jugurtha and brought the war to its conclusion, the Optimates continued to regard Metellus as the victor; he received the sobriquet "Numidicus" and celebrated a triumph in 106. As censor for 102 he wanted to exclude Saturninus from the senate but was hindered by his colleague; cf. MRR 1, 567, and, in general, Miinzer, RE 3 (1899), 1218.43 ff. . . . bellum ilium ducere; si se consulem fedssent, brevi tempore aut vivum aut mortuum Iugurtham se in potestatem populi Romani redacturum.] Cf. Plut. Mar. 8.9 (Marius at Rome):. . . και προαχθβ? Οπό TIVOS τών δημάρχων €ΐς τό πλήθος. €πι πολλαΐς κατά του Μ€Τ6λλου δι.αβολάΪ9 ήτ€~ιτο την αρχήν, υπισχνούμενος ή KTCVCLV ή ζώντα λήψβσθαι τον ΊοιτΥούρθαν; cf. Marius' boast to the Roman merchants at Utica (Sal. Jug. 64.5): dimidia pars exercitus si sibi permitteretur, paucis diebus Iugurtham in catenis habiturum; ab impe-
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ratore consulto trahi, quod homo inanis et regiae superbiae imperio nimis gauderet. . . . cuius legatus et a quo missus esset, in invidiam falso crimine adduxerit.] Cicero assumes, rather than argues, that the charge was false; as at 2.43, he offers an essentially political judgment and would, if pressed, doubtless ap peal, as he did there, to the verdict of the boni (see above). 80-81 M. Marius Gratidianus of Arpinum was the son of M. Gratidius and Maria, the sister of C. Marius, and was later adopted by another of his mother's brothers, M. Marius; the sister of our Marius' biological father, a Graridia, married M. Tullius Cicero, the orator's grandfather; see stemma at Carney, 77. The two brothers-in-law Cicero and Gratidius found themselves at odds over a voting law which, according to the orator, adumbrated, on a smaller scale, the later reforms of Gratidianus (Leg. 3.36). The quarrels between the two Arpinate families continued in the next generation with a suit between Gratidianus and C. Visellius76 Aculeo, the husband of the orator's aunt (de Orat. 2.262; Alexander no. 366). On Gratidianus' suit with C. Sergius Orata cf. ad $ 67. Gratidianus entered politics after the Social War, first as tribune of the plebs and partisan of L. Cinna during his consulate (87); he was among the six tribunes who were banished from Rome along with Cinna (Liv. per. 79; App. BC 1.295, where he, not C. Marius, is surely the man in question). But when before the end of the year Cinna had returned together with C. Marius, Gratidianus was put in charge of prosecuting Q. Catulus (sch. Luc. 2.174: placatos Catuli r.: Q. Lutatium Catulum tangit, cui cum Marius Gratidianus diem dicerett qui^a)77 sciebat se non evasurum, fumo se calcis occidit et sic fugit inimicum; cf. Alexander no. 115). He held the praetorship twice, doubtless in 85-84, when Cinna and Carbo iterated the consulship. Cf. Miinzer, RE 14.2 (1930), 1825.20 ff. On Cicero's attitude toward this rela tive cf. Rawson, 20-21. Our passage is the main source for the meteoric rise of Gratidianus' political fortunes. The cause for the confusion of coinage described by Cicero (iactabatur . . . temporibus illis nummus sic ut nemo posset scire quid haberet) is obscure; it has been associated with M. Livius Drusus' mixing of 1/8 part bronze in silver coins (Plin. Nat. 33.46);78 but Crawford, RRC, 2, 616,findsno evidence of such adulteration and assumes Drusus' coinage law 76. 354.18 77. 78.
On the basis for the reconstruction of rhc gcnrilicium cf. Hans Gundcl, RE 9A1 (1961), ff. Com ShackIcton Bailey. Cf. Miinzer, loc. cit., 1826, 58 ff.; T. Frank, 1, 266 ff.
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 79 and 80-81
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to have been annulled along with the rest of his legislation. In any case, the innovation of Gratidianus and his colleagues was to alter the rate of asses per denarius from 10 : 1 to 16 : 1 and to establish an office to test for debased coin and remove it from circulation; cf., ibid., 2, 614, and, on the factors contributing to the devaluation of the as, 625; cf. also Crawford, "The Edict of M. Marius Gratidianus," PCPhS n.s. 14 (1968), 1-4. Cicero clearly con demns Gratidianus' preempting of his colleagues and claiming of sole credit as a violation of aequitas. It is stressed that this course seemed to him mightily expedient [valde utile videbatur: § 81); his readers well knew (and hence he did not need to add) that Gratidianus' hopes of the consulate were dashed. After Sulla's victory he was driven through the city while being beaten with staves; he was put to death on the other side of the Tiber, his head carried as a trophy by Catiline; on this incident as an illustration of the culture of violence that prevailed in the Roman populace at large cf. Nicholas Purcell in CAH 9 2 , 678 and n. 143; Lintott, 40, n. 2. Marshall ad Asc., pp. 291-92, and, with more detail and nuance, "Catilina and the Execution of M. Marius Gratidianus," CQ 35 (1985), 124-33, has reexamined the incident and differentiated two traditions, a Ciceronian, in which Catiline beheaded Gratidianus (to which belongs inter al. Sen. de Ira 3.18.1-2), and a Sallustian (Hist. 1.44), in which he was murdered on the grave of Q. Catulus (agent unspecified). Note that the two versions are not mutually exclusive (as Marshall himself, in the latter place, 124, points out), since the Sallustian fragment makes no mention of the beheading (which could have been posthumous, in spite of Cicero's rhetori cal exaggeration at fr. orat. Tog. (Zand. no. 15: quod caput etiam turn plenum animae et spiritus ad Sullam usque ab laniculo ad aedem Apollinis manibus ipse suis detulit). Politics, proverbially, makes strange bedfellows; and one need not agree with Mommsen's characterization of him as "notoriously a political trimmer" (ttnotorisch ein politischer Achseltrager")79 to concede that Cicero's own political alliances shifted with changes of circumstance no less than those of most other politicians. In view of his disapproval of Grati dianus' politics and opportunism, it is not inconceivable that Cicero might have contemplated an electoral alliance with a man who took an active role in, or at least capitalized on, his murder [viz., Catiline); it seems less likely that the incident reported in the Tog. Cand., albeit rhetorically exaggerated, was made up out of whole cloth; nor should too much be read into Cicero's later silence on the matter. Marshall, Comm., 292, is surely right, however, in 79. Thcodor Mommsen, The History of Rome, rr. W.P. Dickson, 4 (New York, 1894), 208 Rfimische Geschichte, 3, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1875), 180; cf. the reply of Mitchell, 1979, 106.
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arguing that Catiline was not related to Gratidianus; but this fact makes it easier to assume that he played a role in the murder. 80 iactabatur enim temporibus illis nummus sic ut nemo posset scire quid haberet.] This metaphorical use of iactari of fluctuations in the value of currency seems not to occur elsewhere, but the transference from the agita tion of the sea is so transparent that Cicero felt no need to add an apologetic quasi or ut ita dicam; cf. J.B. Hofmann, TLL 7, 55.67-70. et ea res, si quaeris, ei magno honori fuit: omnibus vicis statuae, ad cas tus, cerei.] Mary Beard in CAH 9 2 ,752, comments: "Divine status, it seems, went hand in hand with political dominance, or claims to such dominance"; cf. Sen. de Ira 3.18.1: M. Mario, cut vicatim populus statuas posuerat, cut ture ac vino supplicabat. . . ; Plin. Nat. 33.132.—For the ellipsis of esse in lively narrative cf. ad 1.63. 81 sed omnium una regula est, quam tibi cupio esse notissimam: aut illud quod utile videtur turpe ne sit, aut si turpe est ne videatur esse utile.] On turpitudo as the litmus test for utilitas cf. ad §§ 35-37; for the term regula cf.
ad\A\0. quid igitur? possumusne aut ilium Marium virum bonum iudicare aut hunc? explica atque excute intelligentiam tuam, ut videas quae sit in ea species (forma) et notio viri boni.J Here, as in 2 . 4 4 - 4 5 , Cicero seeks, for the sake of liveliness, to involve his son more closely in the discussion; one thinks of the Partitiones oratoriae, composed in question-and-answer format, where, however, the questions are posed by the younger Cicero, the answers given by his father; cf. also ad 1.16.—Here intelligentia surely has the same sense as elsewhere in Off., "faculty of understanding, intelligence" (cf. OLD s.v., 1; 1.156; §§ 17, 68, 72), not the technical sense in which it is equivalent to ewoia (OLD s.v., 3), and notio the same sense as at 5 "76 (see ad $§ 75-76). However, species in this passage was bound to give difficulty in view of the fact that Cicero so often uses the word in this Book with reference to the species bonesti, utilitatis, and the like (cf. §§ 16, 3 5 , 4 1 , 86, 99,109); hence the insertion of forma as a gloss, whether interlinearly or, as Bruser, 82, 2, supposed, in the margin, cannot be made out; in either case, it found its way into the archetype. 80 Here species is clearly u a mental picture or impression" (cf. OLD s.v., 9b; Oral. 9 [cited ad % 18 above]).
80. N.B. Krarup, Observations crtticae et grammattcae in hbros Ciceronis de Republica (Copenhagen, 1827), 6 n., already saw that either species or forma must be deleted. The latter was athetized in G.F.V. Lund's edition (1869); he has been followed by Mcrguct s.v. species and, more recently, by Pohlenz, Grundfr., 97, Atzerr4, and Fedcli. Heine, Mullcr, Holdcn, Sabbadini, and Winterbottom bracket species instead.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 80-82a
601
cadit ergo in viram bonum mentiri emolumenti sui causa, criminal! praeripere fall ere? nihil profecto minus.] For cadere in the sense "pertinere, locum habere, quadrare," a common Ciceronian usage, especially in the philosophica, cf. Hoppe, TLL s.v., HE.—In specifying "for the sake of his own profit" Cicero reverts to the formula and its justification (§ 21-22: . . . suumcommodumaugere. . .sienimsicerimusadfectiutproptersuum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum . . . si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque quod cuique possit emolumenti sui gratia . . . ); Cicero has clearly rejected the position of those qui. . . omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis . . . ( § 1 8 ) ; and he had invoked action emolumenti tui causa as a basis for rejecting Diogenes' defense of withholding information from a potential buyer (§ 57). 82a {quid enim interest utrum ex homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis figura immanitatem gerat beluae?}] This sentence can hardly stand in the place where it is transmitted (to be a belua is, of course, no necessary consequence of losing the boni viri nomen; hence the inappropriateness of the connection with enim), and no satisfactory home has been found for it elsewhere; nor is the syntax free of suspicion. After Baiter had deleted the sentence in his 1865 edition, 81 Ungcr, 93 ff., discussed its oddities in detail, viz., that it is inapposite as a conclusion to the cases of Cicero's relatives, the Marii, since, though he has stated that they violated justice, he has not accused them of being tyrants (and the person who bears the immanitas beluae, albeit in human form, is a tyrant [cf. § 32]); he added doubts about the syntax of hominis figura. Heine attempted to defend the phrase as an ablative of quality in view of Rep. 2.48 {qui quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen inmanitate vastissimas vincit beluas)y in spite of in hominis figura at § 32; but then one would expect, as at Rep. 2.48, the verb esse; cf. Kiihner-Stegmann, 1, 454 ff. Unger's solution, however, was not a simple athetesis, but rather the trans position of this sentence to follow exceperit (end of § 82); at the same time he wanted to substitute Caesar for Euripides at the beginning of the same sentence, so as to read: capitalis Eteocles, vel potius Caesar, qui id unum quod omnium sceleratissimum fuerit exceperit. (quid enim interest, utrum ex homine se convertat quis in beluam an hominis in figura immanitatem gerat beluae?) The suspect sentence, thus positioned and emended, is meant to justify the view that Caesar deserved the death penalty. But surely the sub stitution of Caesar for Euripides is mistaken: it was, after all, Euripides who
81. Maler, 29-31, leaves rhis possibility open (sec below).
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made the exception, with Caesar merely quoting the verse;82 and in his most vehement denunciations of Caesar Cicero tends, effectively, to omit his name, as at 2.23 and in our passage as transmitted; and once the substitution of Caesar for Euripides is rejected, the transposition becomes untenable, Euripides never having been a tyrant. On the other hand, Maler, 31, is right in thinking that our sentence could serve as a justification for excluding the tyrant from human society. How ever, his suggested transposition of our sentence after segreganda est at $ 32 is implausible, since the phrases in figura hominisJfigura hominis and immanitasl-atem beluae would then occur in two successive sentences. Others regard the material as of Ciceronian origin, never integrated into context (Goldbacher, 1, 10-11; Atzert2, Winterbottom). It is indeed similar to the antityrannical tone of the work and reminiscent of § 32 and to a still greater degree Rep. 4.1 (etenim si nemo est quin emori malit quam converti in aliquam ftguram bestiae, quamvis hominis mentem sit habiturus, quanto est miserius in hominis figura animo esse efferatoi [cf. also Rep. 2.48, quoted above]). In view of the syntactical problem and false connection (see above), it seems likelier, however, to be a thought added by an ancient reader, perhaps after the model of Rep. 2.48 or a passage from Rep. now lost. 82b-85 The criticism of unjust action in the service of political ambition began moderately with the case of the Marii ($$ 79-82). The polemic inten sifies, however, when the examples move into the time of Cicero's own political activity and culminates in a bitter excoriation of Caesar's tyranny. This passage has attracted criticism from several angles. Gelzer, 363, re marks: "Ciceros Beschimpfung des toten Caesar ist wohi das Unedelste, was sein unermudlicher Griffel hinterlassen hat." He might have added that an cient feelings, no less than modern, could be offended by such abuse; on the proverb τόι> τίθΐ'ηκότα μη κακολογ€Ϊΐ' (D.L. 1.70, attributed to Chilon) and its Latin equivalents cf. Otto, 230. 8 3 The passage needs to be evaluated, however, against its immediate political context, a rime when the right or wrong of Caesar's assassination was a large political issue (cf. Fam. 12.3.2 [a little after 2 October 44]: consilium omne autem hoc est illorum ut mortem Caesaris persequantur), which would lead into yet another civil war. Cicero
82. The same objection applies, of course, to Baiter's deletion of Eteocles vcl potius Euripides. 83. Cf. also Soph. A/. 1344-45 {Odysseus is the speaker): άνδρα δ' ού δίκαιοι\ ei θσι\κ. / βλάίΓΓίΐΐ' τύι· €σθλύι\ ούδ'^άι* μισώι· κυρής·; Dem. 18.315: τις γάρούκοΐδ* τώΐ'πάι/τωι>. ότι . . . του? τ€θ»<ώτας δ' <>ύδί π'αν «'χθρώι> ούδ*Ίς ίτι μισ(ΐ; Verg. Α. 11.104: nullum cum victis certamen et aethere cassis.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 82a-82b
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is warning against the tendency of ambitious Romans, like Caesar and now Antony, to strive for tyrannical powers; he wants to convince his readers that this is not the route to happiness or glory. Strasburger, 1990,90-91, remarks on the political riskiness of this passage, which, once published, would re move any chance of compromise with the Caesarian party. He supposes that it is Cicero's response to the provocative statue of Caesar that Antony erected on the rostra with the inscription parenti optime merito [Fam. 12.3.1), a clear step, as Cicero recognized, toward branding the assassins as parricides (see further ad § 83). One ought also to take account of the generally polar ized political atmosphere of the time, in which there appeared to be only two alternatives, the regnal and senatorial models (cf. Chr. Meier, Caesar [Berlin, 19821, 422 ff.). Our passage comes from a period of escalating rhetoric on both sides (Antony's attacks on Cicero on 1 and 19 September were presum ably no more moderate in tone than Cicero's rebuttals). Heilmann, 127, offers a different critique of the passage, viz., that Cicero has substituted the opinion of senatorial circles for that of the populus Romanus. In fact, this is a tendency found in a number of passages of our essay (see Index of Proper Names s.v. Tullius, judgments, political, presented as fact) and has to do with the culture of traditional optimate politics, dismis sive of reformers. The modern historian may well choose not to adopt Cicero's view of Roman politics. But the words of Syme, 146, are worth remembering: "It is presumptuous to hold judgment over the dead at all, improper to adduce any standards other than those of a man's time, class and station." 82b Quid? qui omnia recta et honesta neglegunt dummodo potentiam consequantur, nonne idem faciunt quod is qui etiam socerum habere voluit eum cuius ipse audacia potens esset? utile ei videbatur plurimum posse alterius invidia; id quam iniustum in patriam et quam turpe esset, non videbat.] Readers who recall the previous allusions to Pompey in this essay may well be surprised at the vehemence of the censure he receives in this passage. At 1.78 Cicero was pleased to quote Pompey's praise of himself;84 at 2.20 he was lamenting the death of Pompey and the loss of three armies fighting in his name; at 2.45 he mentioned with evident satisfaction the praises that his son earned as cavalry commander in Pompey's army. Though Cicero shows no awareness of the coalition of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus until 56 (cf. H.A. Sanders, T h e so-called First Triumvirate," Memoirs of the American Acad84. Cf. also rhc judgment passed during Caesar's lifetime, perhaps to encourage Caesar to strive for similar thanks:. . . Pompeius, cut recte faaenti gratia est habenda; esse enim quam vellet iniustus poterat inpune {Hn. 2.57; text of Manutius, approved by Madvig).
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emy in Rome 10 [1932], 5 5 - 6 8 , esp. 59 ff.; James S. Ruebel, "When Did Cicero Learn about the Conference at Luca? n Historia 24 [1975], 622-24), similarly severe criticism of Pompey recurs in the letters to Atticus from December, 50, through May, 49: cf. Att. 7.3.4; 8.3.3; 8.8.1; 9.5.2; Brunt, 1986, 19; this is also the period when he refers to the triumvirate as a factio {Att. 7.9.4 [29 December 50]; Taylor, 10 and 189, n. 36). On the marriage of Julia, who had been betrothed to one Servilius Caepio 85 (who was promised but never received Pompey's daughter in exchange) to Pompey, who was thirty years her senior, cf. Gelzer, Caesar, 72 = Eng. tr. 80, and Pompeius, 148. ipse autem socer in ore semper Graecos versus de Phoenissis habebat, quos dicam ut potero, incondite fortasse, sed tamen ut res possit intellegi: 'nam si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia / violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas'.] Cf. Eur. Ph. 5 2 4 - 2 5 : είπε ρ γάρ άδικεΐν χρή, τυραννίδο? περί / κάλ λιστοι' άδικεΐν, τάλλα δ' εύσεβείν χρεών; Suet. Jul. 30.5: quidam putant captum imperii consuetudine pensitatisque suis et inimicorum viribus usum occasione rapiendae dominationis, quam aetate prima concupisset. quod existimasse videbatur et Cicero scribens de officiis tertio libro semper Caesarem in ore habuisse Euripidis versus, quos sic ipse convertit: 'nam si— colas'. capitalis Etcoclcs vel potius Euripides, qui id unum quod omnium sceleratissimum fuerit exceperit!] Cicero does not draw nice distinctions between the views of the characters and those of the playwright; nor does he take into account that, in context, Eteocles is immediately rebuked by the coryphaeus: ούκ ευ λέγειν χρή μη 'm τοΐ$ έργοις καλοί?' / ού γάρ καλόν TOUT', άλλα τη δίκη πικρον [Ph. 526-27). 83 ecce tibi qui rex populi Romani dominusque omnium gentium esse concupiverit. . .] The "ethical" dative tibi adds liveliness, as at de Orat. 2.94: ecce tibi est exortus Isocrates . . .; cf. also Phil. 11.2, cited ad § 38. Pace Heilmann, 118, our lemma comprises no "Auseinandersctzung mit einem angenommenen Gegner," though Cicero returns to this procedure at § 87 ('at aucta vectigalia, utile igitur*); cf. ad §§ 79, 85. banc cupiditatem si honestam quis esse dicit, amens est; probat enim legum et libertatis interitum, earumque oppressionem taetram et detestabilcm gloriosam putat.] A reprise of the anti-tyrannical rhetoric of 2.24 (quit/ero in libera civitate ita se instruunt ut metuantur, iis nihil potest esse dementius. quamvis enim sint demersae leges alicuius opibus, quamvis timefacta /;85. On this man, sometimes identified with a Pompeian legate during the war with the pirates (67), cf. Munzcr, RE 2Λ2 (1923), 1776.45 ff.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 82b-83
605
bertas, emergunt tamen haec aliquando . . .); the injection of personal revul sion (taetram et detestabilem) is new. qui autem fatetur honestum non esse in ea civitate quae libera fuerit quaeque esse debeat regnare, sed ei qui id facere possit esse utile, qua hunc obiurgatione aut quo potius convicio a tanto errore coner avellere?] Such views were, of course, widespread, and not only at Rome; cf. note on the next paragraph.—A more detailed and nuanced Lateiniscke Synonymik than we now possess will use this passage as an index of the relative force of obiurgatio and convicium; still lower on the scale is the lenior obiurgatio, admonitio (cf. de Orat. 2.339, where the point is made that obiurgatio presupposes auctoritas). Obiurgatio can and indeed, in the case of friends, should be free of contumelia (cf. Amic. 89). Cicero seems convinced that the holders of such a view can only be reached by convicium (cf., e.g., Non. p. 64M: CONVIC1VM dictum est quasi e vicis logi, in quis secundum ignobilitatem loci maledictis et dictis turpibus cavilletur); cf. also the distinction of convicium and accusatio at CaeL 30 ('adulter, impudicus, sequester' convicium est, non accusatio). potest enim, di immortales, cuiquam esse utile foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium patriae, quamvis is qui se eo obstrinxerit ab oppressis civibus parens nominctur?] On the title pater patriae given among many other hon ors to Caesar cf. Suet. Jul. 76.1; Gelzer, Caesar, 292 = Eng. tr. 315.—In a letter to Cassius dated a little after 2 October 44, Cicero mentions the statue that Antony set up on the rostra with the inscription 'parenti Optimo merito', ut non modo sicarii sed iam etiam parricidae iudicemini. quid dico 'iudicemini't iudicentur potius (Fam. 12.3.1); sim. Phil. 2.31: confiteor eos, nisi liberatores populi Romani conservatoresque rei publicae sint, plus quam stcarios, plus quam homicidas, plus etiam quam parricidas esse, si quidem est atrocius patriae parentem quam suum occidere. Hence in the propaganda warfare of the time the reversal of the term to apply to Caesar. Parricidal-ium patriae had formed a part of Cicero's lexicon of abuse as early as Sull. 6 (cf. Vat. 35, Plane. 70) and was later applied to Antony {Phil. 4.5) and Dolabella {Phil. 11.14 and 29) and taken up by L. Munatius Plancus in a letter of 6 June 43 {Fam. 10.23.5); cf. E. Heck, a Das Romuluselogium des Ennius bei Lactanz—ein Testimonium zu Ciceros Schrift De gloria?" in Oberlieferungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen, ed. F. Paschke (Berlin, 1981), 310.—For the "oppression" of Rome under Caesar cf. 2.23 {quern armis oppressa pertulit civitas). honestate igitur derigenda utilitas est, et quidem sic ut haec duo verbo inter se discrepare, re unum sonare videantur.] Cf. OLD s.v. dingo 6c: "to regu late (an action in accordance with a standard)" or, more precisely, "fere i.q.
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exigere, definire, limitihus circumscribere": Dittmann, TLL 5, 1239.57 ff. {de- was restored by Muller; on the form di-, attested with certainty only from the fourth century onward, cf. Dittmann, he. cit., 1232.62 ff.); cf. also § 89. For the thought honestate. . . derigenda utilitas est cf. ad § 19. On the discrepancy of the two concepts as purely verbal see ad § 11. 84 non habeo ad vulgi opinionem quae maior utilitas quam regnandi esse possit. . .] Plato knew and sought to combat the attitude of the naive ob server who καθάπερ παις έξωθεν όρων εκπλήττεται υπό της των τυραννικών προστασεως ην προς του? έξω σχηματίζονται . . . (Κ. 577a); cf. Arist. EN 1095bl9 ff.: οί μεν ouv πολλοί παντελώς άνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δε λόγου δια το πολλούς των εν ταΐς εξουσίαις όμοιοπαθεΐν Σαρδαναπάλλω; Ε£ 1216al6 ff. possunt enim cuiquam esse utiles angores sollicitudines, diurni et nocturni metus, vita insidianun periculorumque plenissima?] Cicero offers several examples illustrating this topos at 2.25-26. 4 multi iniqui atque infideles regno, pauci benivoli {sunt)', inquit Accius.) The trochaic septenarius (= Accius trag. 651) is from an unknown play, possibly, as Ribbeck suggests, in view of the context, the Atreus, the Pelopidae, or the Clutemestra; he compares Clytemnestra's words at Ag. 807 ff.: γνώση δε χρόνω διαπευθόμενος / τόν τε δικαίως και τόν άκαίρως / πόλιν οΐκουροΰντα πολιτών. at cut regno? quod a Tantalo et Pelope proditum hire obtinebamr. nam quanto plures ei regi putas qui exercitu populi Romani populum ipsum Romanian oppressisset, civitatemque non modo liberam sed etiam gentibus imperantem servire sibi coegisset?] On the use of nam in questions cf. Hand, 4, 18 (cf. also 12-14): "Loquimur ita, ubi cogitamus ea, quae dicta sunt, iam sufficere, nee reliquis opus esse, aut quae addi possint, per se intelligi. Id vero particula significat vi sua affirmative, qua idem est quod mmirum"— quanto plures (sc. angores). Cicero is combining two a fortiori arguments: (1) if even the Pelopidae, who had obtained their royal power iure, were afraid, how much more Caesar . . .? (2) for a libera civitas to be oppressed is bad enough (cf. 2.24), but the oppression is even worse if the victim is gentibus imperans (presumably since it is on a larger scale). The reference to Caesar's use of the army of the Roman people needs to be seen against the background of the current situation, which involved a bidding war between Octavian and Antony for Caesar's troops; cf. esp. Att. 16.8.1 (2 or 3 Novem ber 44 [of Octavianl): veteranos qui Casilini et Calatiae {sunt) perduxit ad suam sententiam. nee mirum, quingenos denarios dat; for Antony's efforts in the same line Fam. 12.23.2; for details of Octavian's financing of this recruit-
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 83-85 and 86-88
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ment see Schmitthenner, 85 ff.; cf. also Syme, 120 and 125; Eleanor G. Huzar, Mark Antony: A Biography (Minneapolis, 1978), 100. 85 hunc tu quas conscientiae labes in animo censes habuisse, quae vulnera?) Although at §S 3 8 - 3 9 and elsewhere Cicero has strongly asserted that one must not commit wrongful acts even if there is no danger of detection, he never explained why this was so, what the results would be for the individ ual. Here we have the one indication of his views on this subject. This picture of the tyrant (including the previous part about his state of fear) is surely inspired by PI. R. 577e (και ή τυραννουμενη άρα ψυχή ήκιστα ποιήσει α αν βουληθή, ως περί όλης εΐπεΐ ν ψυχής· υπό δε οίστρου αεί έλκομενη βία ταραχής καΐ μεταμέλειας μεστή εσται) and 579e (. . . εάν τις ολην ψυχήι> έπίστηται θεάσασθαι, και φόβου γέμων δια παντός του βίου, σφαδασμών Τ€ και οδυνών πλήρης, εϊπερ τη τής πόλεως διαθέσει ης άρχει εοικεν). To what degree Cicero is falling back on material already used, e.g., at Rep. 4.1 can no longer be made out. Cf. also the allusion to the Platonic passage at Tac. Ann. 6.6.2 (with reference to Tiberius).—The tu . . . censes draws young Marcus into the discussion again, as at § 81 (see ad he). cuius autem vita ipsi potest utilis esse cum eius vitae ea condicio sit ut qui illam eripuerit in maxima et gratia futurus sit et gloria?] Cf. ad 2.43. 8 6 - 8 8 These sections ostensibly provide exempla to illustrate the precept nihil esse utile, quod non honestum sit. The case of Fabricius does just that. Cicero then goes on to the corollary sin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum infamia (§ 87) with an illustrative example (L. Philippus' law subjecting once again to tribute places exempted by Sulla without returning the money they had paid to secure immunity) which curi ously contradicts the preceding characterization of the senate: qui numquam utilitatem a dignitate seiunxit (§ 87a). The exemplum of Cato, however, causes even greater difficulty. Heine ad he. suggested that it does not really belong here, since, as presented, it does not involve a conflict between ho nestum and utile. Evidently, however, it is associated in Cicero's mind with Philippus" law inasmuch as both involve a conflict between income for the Roman state [utile) and proper treatment of subject peoples (honestum). Yet Cicero does not make this explicit and fails to integrate the exemplum prop erly into context (cf. ad 1.25 [exemplum of Crassus]). As presented here, it seems rather a conflict between his own political goal (ordhtum coniunctio) and the state treasury. Likewise the final example (Curio on enfranchisement of the Transpadani) is not put to the use one would have expected in this context (see below). We have, in other words, Cicero once again losing the thread of the philosophical argument and, where Roman political examples
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appear, proceeding by association of ideas (see Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. "Association of ideas (as a principle of compositionΓ). 86 C. Fabricius Luscinus, together with M\ Curius Dentatus, referred to obliquely at 2.75, was among the plebeian politicians who distinguished themselves during Rome's struggle for supremacy in Italy during thefirsthalf of the third century; his career culminated in a second consulate (274), when he is said to have triumphed over the Lucanians, Bruttians, Tarentines, and Samnites {MRR 1, 194). In Off. and elsewhere Cicero deploys him as a favorite representative of the old Roman virtues, including justice (§ 16), wisdom {de Orat. 3.56), and continentia (Parad. 12); cf. also the reference to him at Sen. 15 as one of those who defended the state consilio et auctorttate or at Plane. 60 in a list of older statesmen whom Cicero's contemporaries could not claim to equal in gloria. Gel. 3.8 contrasts versions of our anecdote by Valerius Antias {hist. 21) and Claudius Quadrigarius {hist. 40-41). The former gives the would-be assassin as Timochares, a friend of the king, and states that Fabricius disclosed the matter to the senate, which, in turn, sent ambassadors who were to warn Pyrrhus but not mention Timochares by name. Quadrigarius, on the other hand, identifies the plotter as Nicias and says that the consuls, rather than the senate, sent the ambassadors with the warning. Cicero retails the anecdote thrice, each time in slightly different form: at Fin. 5.64 it is, as in Quadrigarius, the consuls who issue the warning (. . . nostri consules regent inimicissimum moenibus iam adpropinquantem monuerunt, a veneno ut caveret. . .); at 1.40, evidently relying on memory, Cicero has the fugitive make his promise to the senate and has the senate and Fabricius {senatus . . . et C. Fabricius) return the traitor to Pyrrhus; in our passage it is Fabricius alone who is sought out by the fugitive and who returns him to Pyrrhus (though with the senate giving approval after the fact); both passages of Off. thus posit a nobler Roman action than the historians attest. It seems likely that Cicero knows—and at 1.40 contaminates—both versions; cf. Munzer, RE 6.2 (1909), 1936.10 ff., who gives a full account of the later tradition; it is possible that in writing our passage Cicero reread Quadrigarius* treatment of the episode in order to add more specific detail; cf. Soltau, 1242. On internal contradictions in Qua drigarius' branch of the tradition regarding the series of events of which this incident forms a part cf. Dietmar Kienast, RE 24.1 (1963), 140.33 ff. Cicero deliberately places Fabricius in the foreground at the expense of his consular colleague (Q. Aemilius Papus), contrary to the practice of the early annals. cum enim rex Pyrrhus populo Romano bellum ultro intulisset. . .) Pyrrhus entered the conflict on the invitation of Tarentum, whose war with Rome had been caused by the arrival of a squadron of ten Roman ships from Thurii
Commentary on Book 3, Section 86-87
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(probably) in the hope of provoking an oligarchic rising against the δήμο?; cf. Kienast, be. cit., 128.47 ff. . . . cumque de imperio certamen esset cum rcge generoso ac potente . . .] For the characterization of Pyrrhus as generosus and of the war with him as de imperio cf. ad 1.38; see also next note. . . . sed magnum dedecus et flagitium quicum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non virtute sed scelere superatum.] This assumes the doctrine laid down at 1.38: sed ea bella quibus imperii proposita gloria est minus acerbe gerenda sunt. 87 . . . Fabricio, qui talis in hac urbe qualis Aristides Athenis fuit. . .] Here, by reversal of the practice in Books 1 - 2 , Cicero seeks Greek analogues for his Roman examples (cf. ad § 48). The pairing of Aristides and Fabricius as examples of iustitia appears already at § 16; however, in his Vitae Parallelae Plutarch (for lack of material?) replaced Fabricius as Aristides' counterpart with Cato Uticensis. si gloriae causa im peri urn expetendum est, scelus absit, in quo non potest esse gloria; sin ipsae opes expetuntur quoquo modo, non poterunt utiles esse cum infamia.) At 1.38 a distinction was drawn between wars fought de imperio and those over the question uter esset; our passage, however, appar ently recognizes a third category, in which ipsae opes expetuntur. In fact, the question of opes (wealth) leads into the next two examples, which involve a conflict between the interests of Rome's socii (and, in the second one, the publicani as well) and those of the treasury. Non igitur utilis ilia L. Philippi Q. f. sentcntia, quas civitates L. Sulla pecunia accepta ex senatus consulto liberavisset, ut eae rursus vectigales essent, neque iis pecuniam quam pro libertate dederant redderemus. ei senatus est adsensus.] On the background to Sulla's grants of immunity to cities of Asia Minor and the change in the legal view of such status cf. David Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the End of the Third Century after Christ, 1 (Princeton, 1950), 233-36. Our episode probably dates from the time of Sertorius' revolt, when Pompey was despatched to Spain with an extraordi nary proconsular imperium and there was presumably an urgent need to increase revenues; cf. Miinzer, RE 14.2 (1930), 1566,62 ff. A similar calcula tion of state interest doubtless lay behind Philippus* stand for the validity of the alleged will of Ptolemy XI (f80) ceding Egypt to Rome and against the fitness of his son to rule {Agr. 2.41-42). piratarum enim melior fides quam senatus.] On fides among latrones cf. 2.40; cf. also ad § 49 (melius hi quam nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus). On the fides publica of Rome cf. in general Freyburger, 126 ff.
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quo usque audebunt dicere quicquam utile quod non honestum?] For quo usque expressive of impatient indignation (most famously at Cat. 1.1) cf. Pease ad N.D. 1.113. 88 potest autem ulli imperio, quod gloria debet fultum esse et benivolentia sociorum, utile esse odium et infamia?] Cf. 2.27-28. ego eriam cum Catone meo saepe dissensi; nimis mini praefracte videbatur aerarium vectigaJiaque defendere, omnia publicanis negare, multa sociis, cum in hos benefici esse deberemus, cum illis sic agere, ut cum colonis nostris solercmus . . .] Cicero evidently has in mind Cato's response to the request of the tax farmers of Asia for a reduction of the amount due to the fisc under their contract for 61 after they discovered they had bid too high. He describes his own mixed feelings about the request at Att. 1.17.9 (5 Decem ber 61; cf. 1.18.7 and 2.1.8): Asiam qui de censoribus conduxerunt questi sunt in senatu se cupiditate prolapsos nimium magno conduxisse; ut induceretur locatio postulaverunt. ego princeps in adiutoribus atque adeo se~ cundus; nam ut illi auderent hoc postubre, Crassus eos impulit. invidiosa res, turpis postulatio et confessio temeritatis. summum erat periculum ne, si nihil impetrassent, plane alienarentur a senatu. Cicero's fears were, of course, realized; Cato procured the defeat of the bill, and the equites joined the cause of Caesar, who as consul in 59 reduced the amount due to the government by one-third; cf. Taylor, 130-31; Strasburger, 1956, 52. On occasion Cicero himself defended the vectigalia and opposed those who wanted to reduce them; cf. testimonies at Meyer, 230 ff.; presumably he saw the situation of 61 as a special case.—The adverb praefracte occurs only here in Cicero; it perfectly summarizes, from Cicero's point of view, Cato's way of proceeding in this matter; cf. Att. 1.18.7: unus est qui curet, constantia magis et integritate quam, ut mihi videtur, consilio aut ingenio, Cato. Similar the caricature of him at Mur. 60 ff. on grounds of inflexibility and lack of lenitas. Cf. the application of the corresponding adjective to an orthodox Stoic at Hort. fr. 45 Grilli, where a clarifying synonym is added: his contrarius Aristo Chius, praefractus, ferreus: nihil bonum nisi quod rectum atque honestum est. The adverb was taken up, with a synonym added, by V. Max. 9.7. Mil. Rom. 3: ille quoque exercitus nefarie violentus, qui C. Carbonem . . . propter bella civilia dissolutam disciplinam militarem praefractius et rigidius astringere conatum privavit vita . . . ; cf. Zoppi, TLL 10,655.22 ff., esp. 48 ff. male etiam Curio, cum causam Transpadanorum aequam esse dicebat, sem per autem addebat 'vincat utilicas'.] E. Meyer, Caesars Monarchic und das Principat des Pompejus3 (Stuttgart-Berlin, 1922), 12 and n. 2, connects Cu rio's pronouncement with the attempt by Crassus as censor in 65 to add the
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 87-88 and 89-95
611
Transpadani to the citizen rolls; cf. also Miinzer, RE 2A2.1 (1921), 862.52 ff.; Gruen, 1974,411. The Transpadani would later be among Caesar's most loyal supporters in the civil war, so that a far-sighted policy of accommodat ing their wishes, at the expense of a certain amount of tax-revenue, might, pace Curio, have proved to be utile; cf. Meyer, 63-64.—With the disap proval of our passage contrast the realistic assessment Cicero places in the mouth of Antonius at de Orat. 2.334: . . . vincit utilitas plerumque, cum subest ille timor, ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri potius doceret non esse aequam quia non esset utilis reipublicae, quam, cum utilcm diceret non esse, esse aequam fateretur.] Cicero's response to Curio's position on the enfranchisement of the Transpadani comes as a surprise in view of the precept it ostensibly illustrates (see above on $§ 86-88) as well as the overall argument of this Book (see on § 19a above). However, utilitas reipublicae has served as a criterion for judging problems in casuistry at 3.30 and will so again in the case of Regulus (§ 101: potest autem quod inutile reipublicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse?); cf. Jossa, 232. Yet just above as well as in other passages of this work Cicero shows awareness that what is utile reipublicae is not necessarily aequum (cf. 2.26 ff.). In § 30 Cicero speaks of greater value attaching to a man who can contribute multam utilitatem reipublicae atque hominum societati than one who cannot; and he concludes this paragraph: . . . communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. In our passage Cicero does not face the possibility that the utilitas reipublicae and the communis utilitas—let alone aequitas—may be in conflict; nor does one find such a conflict discussed where one might have expected, namely 2.88-89 (non-Panaetian appendix on the conflict of utilitates). If he had thought through the implications of his argument more carefully, Cicero might rather have written: potius doceret esse utilem reipublicae, quia esset aequa; and, given the manuscripts' confusion in other cases where the apparent philosophical sense is violated {viz.*, §§19 and 110; note also in the latter passage following the disputed text the words . . . nee quia utile honestum, sed quia honestum utile), it is not impossible that the archetype represents a scribal rewriting. If the manuscript reading stands, we find Cicero here, as in some other passages of Books 3, guided by politics rather than philosophy (cf. ad §§ 19a and 79-82a). 89-95 This series of casuistic cases is added in asyndeton (plenus est sextus liber de officiis Hecatonis talium quaestionum:. . . ) and with only a retro spective indication of their bearing ($ 95 fin.: quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae). Having allowed himself to be drawn ever deeper into issues of Roman politics ($$ 79-88), Cicero now draws back and tries to restore some semblance of philosophical plan. He
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improvises a divisio on the model of the first book (§ 96); this will enable him to steer toward the Regulus cxemplum via a similar route to that of Book 1, viz.» problems of officia κατά π€ρίστασιι\ which can once again fall under the general heading of iustitia; but Regulus himself will this time be set off by being placed under magnitude* animi—a mistake; cf. ad %% 96 and 99. Another problem was that Cicero, evidently writing in great haste, could not take time to think of or find new examples and hence had recourse in the section leading up to Regulus to many of the same examples used in the corresponding section of Book 1 (see introduction to this Book). 89-92a After the series of Roman examples (cf. ad §§ 65-88), Cicero now turns back briefly to one of his philosophical sources for further casuistic cases (cf. ad §§ 49b-57). The problems, twelve in number, are cited specifi cally from the sixth book Tiepi του καθήκοντος of Hecato of Rhodes (= fr. 11 Gomoll); if Pohlenz, GGA 1935, 107, is correct, this portion of Hecato's treatise comprised χτήματα following upon the systematic presentation of the subject. Two of these cases {viz., 3 and 11), like one of Hecato's previous problems (cf. ad §§ 54-55), are similar to Carneades' paradox that the just man is stupid (F l i b 1 , p. 101, 35 ff. M. = Rep. 3.29-30 = Lact. inst. 5.16.5 ff.). Only (4) and (7)-(8) really break new ground. The first two require the vir bonus to decide in conflicts between res familiaris and humanitas where the lives of slaves are involved. Cicero gives Hecato's answer only for the prior case of feeding slaves at a time of shortage of grain; Hecato evidently found it possible to defend allowing the slaves to starve: ad extremum utilitate, ut putat, officium derigit magis quant humanitate; in seeing it as an issue involving humanitas and expressing reservations about Hecato's view (ut putat), Cicero implies that he prefers a different approach (cf. 1.41). If (1) is vague about the alternatives available to starving the slaves, (2) is quite explicit: either some cheap slaves or some expensive horses must be cast overboard (viz., to keep the vessel from sinking). Though Cicero docs not quote Hecato's solution, in the light of his position on (1) and his view of the obligations entailed in property ownership (cf. § 63), he probably decided against humanitas in the second case as well. The example of shipwreck "was considered a sharp weapon for prising self-love from altruism" (M.R. Wright, "Self-Love and Love of Humanity in De Finibus 3," in Powell, 185). Hence its use in Hecato's cases (3)-(6), in quibus nemo posset sine periculo vitae iustus esse (Rep. 3.30 ILactantius' paraphrase]): (3) a sapiens will not snatch a plank away from a stultus, since this would be a wrongful act (cf. ad%%2\ and 42; in Carneades' version the opponent is designated as "weaker" rather than "stupid" [F l i b 1 p. 101,50 M. = Rep. 3.30 = Lact. inst. 5.16.101); tne assumption seems to be, in accord
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with Chrysippus' theater simile (cf. ad 1.21), that prior occupancy justifies continued possession; cf. Erskine, 108; (4) nor does the shipowner himself have a right to do so, with the same value ascribed to occupancy as in the previous case; (5) if two sapientes are near the same plank, the other will yield to the one with more to contribute either per se or to the state; (6) if the two sapientes are of equal value, the lot will decide. Apart from the substitu tion of the respublica for the bumani generis societas, these decisions mostly follow from the precepts previously given; the exception is (4) with its argu ment that the situation overrides ordinary property rights {quoad enim perventum est eo quo sumpta navis est, non domini est navis sed navigantium). All of these are presumably the positions of Hecato as well as Cicero, since there is no indication of disagreement. The next two cases involve conflicts between appropriate actions toward a parent and toward the state: if the father loots a temple or the treasury, his son should not merely refrain from informing on him, but defend him if accused (7); only if the father plans to install himself as a tyrant or betray his country should the son intervene against him (8; cf. the similar finding re garding a friend at § 19). In this conflict between appropriate actions at the highest level (cf. 1.58), only at the point where the existence of one or the other is at stake does appropriate action toward one's country override that toward one's father. The last four problems involve business situations and essentially restate the positions drawn at $§ 49b-57. In the first three cases, the passing of adulterated coin (9), the sale of bad wine (10), and the disclosure of a slave's defects of character beyond what the law requires (11), the property-oriented approach is this time attributed to Diogenes, but he was no doubt followed by Hecato as well; the final problem is whether to tell a benighted seller that he is offering, not brass, but gold (12; cf. Cameades' similar case [F l i b 1 p. 101, 42 M. = Rep. 3.29 = Lact. inst. 5.16.7]). In saying perspicuum est iam . . . quid mihi videatur (§ 92) Cicero makes it clear that his agreement with Antipater holds in general. 89 derigit] Cf. ad $ 83. quaerit, si in mari iactura facienda sit, equine pretiosi potius iacturam faciat an scrvuli vilis.] Apart from the preference for humanitas implied in $ 91 (cf. Antipater. . . cui potius assentior . . . ;cf. $ 92: perspicuum est iam. . . quid mihi videatur . . .), Cicero does not elsewhere deal with this question, though he does show that masters should be concerned for the well-being of their slaves and not take their lives without good cause. Thus in the letter addressed to Quintus on the occasion of the extension of his governorship of Asia to a third year (end of 60/beginning of 59) Cicero made the general
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observation: est autem non modo eius qui sociis et civibus sed etiam eius qui servis, qui mutis pecudibus praesit eorum quibus praesit commodis utilitatique servire (QF 1.1.24). At Parad. 24, under the heading ότι ίσα τά αμαρτή ματα και τά κατορθώματα, Cicero considers the question nihilne igitur inter est . . . patrem quis necet anne servumf and arrives at a paradoxical conclusion: patrem vita privare si per se scelus est, Saguntini, qui parentes suos liberos emori quam servos vivere maluerunt, parricidae fuerunt. ergo et parenti non numquam adimi vita sine scelere potest et servo saepe sine iniuria non potest, causa igitur haec non natura distinguit. . . ; cf. other testimonies at Shtaerman, 195; ad 1.41.—For the repetition of iacturam facere cf. ad § 92b; our passage is the earliest attestation of iactura in the proper sense: cf. J.B. Hofmann, TIL 7, 63.35 ff.; OLD s.v., 1. hie alio res familiaris, alio ducit humanitas.) This is still, though couched in more specific terms, a version of the conflict between (apparent) utile and honestum. On humanitas {here = φιλανθρωπία, kind feelings for a human being as such, etc.) cf. Ehlers, TIL 6, 3079.1 ff. *si tabulam de naufragio stultus adripuerit, extorquebitne earn sapiens, si potuerit?'] Cf. Rep. 3.30 (reported by Lact. inst. 5.16.5 ff.): nempe iustitia est hominem non occidere, alienum prorsus non attingere. quid ergo iustus faciet, si forte naufragium fecerit, et aliquis inbecillior viribus tabubm ceperitf nonne ilium tabula deturbabit, ut ipse conscendat, eaque nixus evadat, maxime cum sit nullus medio man testis? si sapiens est, faciet: ipsi enhn pereundum est nisi fecerit; si autem mori maluerit quam manus inferre alteri, iam iustus Hie, sed stultus est, qui vitae suae non parcat, dum parcit alienae. 90 'si una tabula sit, duo naufragi, iique sapientes, sibine uterque rapiat an alter cedat alteri?' 'cedat vero, sed ei cuius magis intersit vel sua vel reipublicae causa vivere'.] Only a sage, his reason in harmony with the whole of nature, could make such a judgment; since both sages would arrive at the same conclusion, no conflict would ensue; cf. Mary Whitlock Blundell, "Pa rental Nature and Stoic Οΐκ€ίωσις," Ancient Philosophy 10 (1990), 231. This situation differs from the one described at $ 30 [sin autem is tu sis qui multam utilitatem reipublicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, adferre possis, si quid ob earn causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum)y where the moral agent is not so qualified. In our passage, however, further clarification is needed, since the two criteria themselves (vel sua vel reipublicae causa) could lead to conflicting results; cf. Inwood, 1984,182, n. 37. micando] Cf. ad $ 77.
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'quid? si pater . . . cuniculos agat ad aerarium, indicetne id raagistratibus filius?') Our passage is, besides QF 3.1.3 (September, 54), the earliest nonmilitary attestation for cuniculus in the sense "tunnel, subterranean passage" (cf. OLD s.v., 2; Hoppe, TLL 4, 1407.46-47); probably the word in this sense was pioneered in the military sphere (cf. Caes. Gal. 3.21.3) and belongs to the series of military terms based on animal names {aries, musculi, onager, scorpio). 'quid? si ty ran η idem occupare—patriae salutem anteponet saluti patris'.] For the opposite case of a father testifying against a son who plotted to set himself up as king cf. Rep. 2.60 (. . . Sp. Cassium de occupando regno molientem . . . quaestor accusavit, eumque . . . cum pater in ea culpa esse conperisse se dixisset, cedente populo morte mactavit); cf. also the case of Torquatus' execution of his son for disobedience alluded to at § 112; for similar problems involving an amicus cf. Amic. 36 ff.; cf. also the general principle formulated at Phil. 2.53: . . . omnino nulla causa iusta cuiquam esse possit contra patriam arma capiendi. 91 qui vinum fugiens vendat sciens, debeatne dicere.] Fugio is attested in our passage for the first time of perishable things in the sense "to begin to decay, 'go off*"; cf. OLD s.v., 8b; Rubenbauer, TLL 6,1483.74 ff. Lacking modern methods of bottling, the ancients had considerable difficulty getting wine to consumers before acetic fermentation {acor) had eliminated its alcoholic content and oxidized it into acetic acid and ethyl acetate; wine was ruined in this way well before the smell and taste of vinegar were apparent to the senses. The wine trade being as important as it was, the jurists devoted considerable attention to the problem; cf. Bruce W. Frier, "Roman Law and the Wine Trade: The Problem of 'Vinegar Sold as Wine,'" ZSS 113 (1983), 2 5 7 - 9 5 , esp. 259. in mancipio vendendo dicendane vitia, non ea quae nisi dixeris, redhibeatur mancipium iure civili, sed haec, mendacem esse, aleatorem furacem ebriosum.] A technical term in the law, redhibere had previously appeared in literature only at Pi. Mos. 800 and Mer. 419, its use another sign of the modest stylistic pretensions of our essay.—For the law on sale of slaves cf. ad $71. 92a si quis aurum vendens orichalcum se putet vendere, indicetne ei vir bonus aurum illud esse, an emat denario quod sit mille denarium?] Ori chalcum was the ancient "fool's gold," apparently brass or a similar alloy (cf. OLD s.v.). The original form was orichalcum (from ορείχαλκο?; cf. Paul. Fest., p. 9M: orichalcum sane dicitur, quia in montuosis locis invenitur) and was used by Cicero here, as our manuscripts indicate; the spelling au-
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richalcum, based on folk etymology from aurum, is attested early, however; cf. the word-play at PI. Cure. 201-2: Phaedromus: auro contra cedo modestum amatorem: a me aurum accipe. I Palinurus: cedo mibi contra aurichalco quoi ego sano serviam; Diehl, TLL 1, 1493.20 ff.—This example, like that of the pestilential house at § 54, had been used by Cameades (fr. 1 lb M. = Cic. Rep. 3.29): rursus si reperiat aliquem qui oricbalcum se putet vendere, cum sit illud aurum, aut plumbum, cum sit argentum, tacebitne ut id parvo emat, an indicabit ut magno? stultum plane videtur malle magno. unde intellegi volebat et eum qui sit iustus ac bonus stultum esse, et eum qui sapiens malum, et tamen sine pernicie fieri posse, ut sint homines paupertate contenti. For a modern analogue cf. ad §§ 49b-67. Similar but with poten tially dire consequences is another case Cicero cites from Carneades {Fin. 2.59): should one warn a person from whose death one would profit that he is about to sit on a viper?—For the opposite case of oricbalcum sold as gold there was a legal remedy available at least by the age of the Antonines; cf. Pompon, apud Marcian. Dig. 18.1.45: . . . quemadmodum si aurichalcum pro auro vendidisset ignorans, tenetur, ut aurum quod vendidit praestet; ad SS 5 4 - 5 5 . 92b-95 These sections raise the question whether there are circumstances in which promises that have not been extracted by trickery or force need not be honored. The matter is considered first with reference to two examples from everyday life (92b-93), then on the basis of mythological examples (§§ 9 4 95), and finally with another case from everyday life, the return of a deposit (§ 95). Two of these cases, the deposit and the example of Theseus' curse on Hippolytus, are repeated from the discussion of this question at SS 31-32 (if the transmitted text is sound; but see ad 1.31). 92b Pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLO MALO, ut praetores solent, FACTA SINT.] Evidently an earlier version of Dig. 2.14,7.7: ait praetor: 'pacta conventa, quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges plebis scita senatus consulta decreta edicta principum, neque quo fraus cut eorum fiat, facta erunt, servabo'. si quis medicamentura cuipiam dederit ad aquam intercutem pepigeritque, si eo medicamento sanus factus esset, nc illo medicamento timquam postea uterctur, si eo medicamento sanus factus sit et annis aliquot post incident in eundem morfoum . . .) The deployment of medicamentuml-o four times in this sentence is explained by Heine as reflecting the language of laws and contracts in which technical terms are repeated to avoid any ambiguity. The phenomenon also perhaps points to the lack of a good synonym: medicamen was used by Cicero only at Pis. 13 (the word's earliest attestation), as op posed to the fifteen occurrences oimedicamentum (attested as early as PI. Ps.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 92a-95
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870) in his corpus; cf. Beutler, TLL 8,529.40 ff.86 But the repetition involves not just this one word but the entire protasis si eo medicamento sanus factus esset/sit, so that in this hastily composed treatise (cf. introduction, $ 3) we must reckon with generally lowered stylistic standards; cf. also ad § 89 (on repetition of iacturatn facere). 93 Singing in the forum was given as an instance of quae multum ab humanitate discrepant at 1.145; and dancing in the forum appears as an example of a disgraceful act at 5 75 (cf. ad he); cf. the apparent approval of Solon's feigning of madness to benefit the state (1.108). But Cicero viewed other acts as still worse; cf. the allusion to Posidonius' collection of acts which one should not perform even for the sake of one's country (1.159). 94 Cicero had used the examples of Sol and Phaethon and Theseus and Hippolytus at N.D. 3.76; cf. ad 1.30-41. Sol Phacthonti—non esse servatum!] Phaethon is called the son of Cephalus and Dawn at Hes. Th. 9 8 4 - 8 7 but usually, as here, the son of Sol; the tale appears at Lucr. 5.396 ff. and later at Ov. Met. 2.1 ff. . . . atque is antequam constitit ictu fulminis deflagravit.] The intransitive use of deflagrate is first attested in Cicero (SesL 99); cf. Lommatzsch, TLL 5, 357.14 ff. quid quod Theseus exegit—in maximis fuit luctibus.] Cf. ad 1.32. 95 quid (quod) Agamemnon—quam tarn taetrum facinus admittendum fuit.) Iphigenia's sacrifice appeared in literature as early as the Cypria (p. 41.42 ff. Bernabe); cf. also Aesch. Ag. 184 ff.; Eur. IA 87 ff., 358 ff., 1541 ff.; Lucr. 1.84 ff. and, later, Ov. Met. 12.24 ff. si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere.] A stock example of the change of appro priate action with altered circumstances. Cf. PI. R. 331c: πάς αν που εϊποι, ει τις λάβοι παρά φίλου ανδρός σωφρονοϋντος όπλα, ει μανεις άπαιτόΐ. οτι ούτε χρή τα τοιαύτα άποδιδοναι, ούτε δίκαιος άν εϊη ό άποδιδούς, ούδ' αύ προς τον ούτως έχοντα πάντα έθελων τάληθή λέγειν; Ph. 1,173.12 Cohn-Wendland (= de Cherubim 14-15): το δέον πολλάκις δεόντως ούκ ενεργείται καΐ το μή καθήκον εστίν οτε δράται καθηκόντως· οΐον ή μεν της παρακαταθήκης άπόδοσις όταν μή άπό γνώμης υγιούς γίγνηται άλλ' ή επί βλάβη τοϋ λαμβάνοντος ή έπ' έΐ'εδρα της περί μείζονα πίστιν αρνήσεως, καθήκον έργον ου δεόντως επιτελείται· το δε τω κάμνοντι μή άληθεϋσαι τόν ίατρον κενοϋν ή τεμνειν ή 86. Cf. also Jean Perrot, Les derives latins en -men et -mentum (Paris, 1961), 274, who notes that the forms in -men arc verbal substantives, those in -mentum derived from verbal substan tives; the creation, as in the case of the Ciceronian medicamen, of secondary doublets in -men to earlier forms in -mentum shows the breakdown in the original distinction in the wake of the disappearance of root formations from the living language.
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καίεινδιεγνωκότα έπ' ωφελεία τού νοσουντος.ϊνα μη προλαβών τα δεινά φύγη την θεραπείαν ή έξασθενήσας άπείπη προς αυτήν, ή προς τους πολεμίους τον σοφονψευσασθαι επι τη της πατρίδος σωτηρία, δείσαντα μήέκτοϋάληθεΟσαι ρωσθή τά τών αντιπάλων, ου καθήκον έργον δεόντως ενεργείται; Sen. Ben. 4.10.1: depositum reddere per se res expetenda est; non tamen semper reddam nee quolibet loco nee quolibet tempore, aliquando nihil interest, utrum infitier an palam reddam. intuebor utilitatem eius, cut redditurus sum, et nociturum Hit depositum negabo.—On the provisions for dealing with luna tics under Roman law cf. Watson, Persons, 155-56. si is qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum? non credo, fades enim contra rempublicam, quae debet esse carissima.] An unsurprising conclusion in view of 1.58 and $ 90. . . . commutata utilitate flunt non honesta.) It is clear that Cicero means that when these cease to be in the interest of the party to whom the promise was made fulfillment is no longer honestum (cf. Sen. Ben. 4.10.1, quoted above). But the wording is odd; for this text, together with the last sentence of § 88, alone in Off. suggests that the honestum is defined by the utile instead of the reverse (cf. ad loc. and ad $ 19). ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum.] This is evidently said with a view to the claim about to be made (§ 96) that the first two parts of the honestum, prudentia and iustitia, have been handled. For the simubtio prudentiae cf. the discussion of sharp business practice at $§ 4 9 b - 7 8 , esp. 71-72; the behavior of the Marii at §§ 79-82 could also be classed as simulatio pruden tiae. On the other hand, the cases at §§ 92b-95 could be called opportunities for the exercise of genuine prudentia. 96 This dispositio is not merely postponed, but added ad hoc. It imitates the divisio of Book 1 in being based on the four parts of the honestum. In fact, however, the contents of this Book cannot be forced onto this Procrustean bed. Prudentia, in the sense in which it appeared in Book 1 (cf. 1.18-19), has not been dealt with, at most the simulated prudentia of those who pursue the apparent utilitates (see previous note); nor does the case of Regulus truly illustrate the conflict of magnitude animi and the species utilitatis (see be low); and the treatment of the fourth part of the honestum, decorum, is perfunctory and ill-adapted to the purpose (cf. ad $$ 116-20). Surely this divisio owes its existence to the need to provide a transition to the Regulus exemplum, which seems to have been, from the outset, pan of Cicero's conception of this Book (cf. Att. 16.11.4). However, though Regulus, insofar as he advised against accepting the Carthaginian offer, displayed magnitudo animi, this quality is not the real subject; Regulus returned to Carthage
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 95-96 and 97-115
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because, in Cicero's view, this was the just course (cf. $ 104: ad iustitiam etad fidem pertinet); so, too, he condemns the ten Roman captives sent back by Hannibal to negotiate an exchange of prisoners for not returning, as their oath obliged them to do (§ 113). Thus, though Cicero brings in magnitudo animi at SS 97-98 and 114 (here with reference to the Roman attitude in the Second Punic War), it cannot really function as a counterweight to the appar ent utile the way iustitia does; as Aristotle remarks, εοικε . . . ή μεγαλοψυχία οίον κόσμο? τις είναι τών αρετών (ΕΝ 1124al), and as such it is a byproduct, but not a criterion, of virtuous action. The same is true mutatis mutandis of decorum (cf. ad 1.94); only its opposite turpitudo can serve to distinguish virtuous action (cf. ad §§ 35-37).—The implication of the placement of the divisio here, as well as of the location of 2.19b-20a would be that Cicero added material when he thought of it and did not rearrange the order (per haps any rearrangement might have been reserved for a later stage of com position, which was never to be; see introduction, § 3, and ad 1.30-41). . . . altera in conformatione ct moderatione continentiae et temperantiae.] The use of continentia with reference to the fourth virtue is new in this Book (it reappears at §§ 116 and 117), an indicator (if such were needed) of the use of a different source; cf. 2.77 (abstinentia et continentia) and 86 (continentia in victu). 9 7 - 1 1 5 The consensus among historians is that M. Atilius Regulus died in Carthaginian captivity and never engaged in an embassy to Rome; certainly that is the version known to Polybius. The legend of his embassy, return to Carthage, and torture at the hands of his captors will have arisen to counter the fact that his widow tortured two Carthaginian prisoners in custody of the Atilii with the result that one of them died (cf. ad § 100); cf. Walbank ad Plb. 1.35 and chapters I and II of Blattler. Our subject, however, will be the narrative as it existed for Cicero. Cicero invoked the figure of Regulus for various purposes in sundry pas sages of his speeches, letters, etc., with the focus always on his return to Carthage for torture and death; but nowhere else does he explore the case— or indeed any other exemplum—in such detail as in our text. Regulus ap pears as early as 56 (Sest. 127), where Cicero parries the thrust of the pros ecutor P. Albinovanus, who evidently compared Cicero's homecoming with Regulus' heroic departure for Carthage. At Pis. 43 he serves as an example of being unaffected by punishment. By comparing Trebonius, tortured by Dolabella, with Regulus tortured by the Carthaginians, Cicero elevates the victim to heroic stature and emphasizes the more than Punic cruelty of one who would torture his own fellow-citizen (Phil. 11.9). At Sen. 75 Regulus appears in a list of those who died bravely, at N.D. 3.80 as an example of the
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gods' neglect of human affairs. But Cicero's favorite deployment of Regulus was to illustrate the Stoic doctrine that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness {Tusc. 5.14; Fin. 2.65, 5.82, and 88; Parad. 16). Cicero's conversion of this figure from Roman patriotic lore to Stoic uses exerted in turn a powerful influence on Seneca and Augustine; cf. Blattler, 61 and 63 ff. The presentation of Regulus' case is similar, if not to the more elaborate six-fold dispositio at Rhet. Her. 1.4 (= Inv. 1.19), then to the quadripartite scheme for the judicial speech at Part. 4; cf. Richard Volkmann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1885), 126. The principium (SS 97-99a) and peroratio (§§ 113-15) enlist our sympathy for Regulus by contrasting his action with the unheroic decisions respectively of Ulysses and Hannibal's ten noble captives, who perjured themselves by not returning when they had discharged their mandate; and after the narratio of the facts of the case (§§ 99b-100), follows the confirmatio, including the confutatio of those who would convict Regulus, like Scaevola (cf. ad SS 62-63), of stultitia(§§ 101-12). Cicero lavishes extraordinary praise upon the exemplum of Regulus: . . . ex multis mirabilibus exemplis baud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius (S 110). The perceived opportunity to dilate on his heroism may well have been a chief motive behind the composition of Off. 3 (see introduction to this Book). What does Cicero achieve thereby? He is able to argue that oaths should be kept even to an enemy in wartime; but that this is a demand of justice had already been shown (with reference to the case of Regulus!) at 1.34 ff. Nor was it extraordinary that Regulus returned to Carthage in obedience to his oath; in that period he could scarcely have done otherwise (S 111). We should look rather to what Cicero declares to be maximum in eo: he did not presume to substitute his own judgment but submitted to the senate's decision (non . . . suo iudicio stetit, sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus: § 110). A sharper contrast to the recent case of Julius Caesar in crossing the Rubicon in defiance of the senate could hardly be imagined. Regulus is regarded as a model because he subordinated his personal (apparent) interest to the larger interest of the state. The point had been anticipated to some degree at SS 26b-28, where Cicero speaks of the identity of the individual and universal interest, but there no examples had been offered. It becomes clear in the course of the subsequent discussion that for Cicero in practice this principle means the superiority of the reipublicae utile over the individual's (apparent) utile (cf. introduction to this Book); and this is precisely the point that Cicero opposes to the claim that Regulus acted stupidly: quomodo stulte? etiamne si reipublicae conducebatt potest autem quod inutile reipublicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esset (S 101).
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 97-115, 97-99a, and 97
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In spite of the pretext that he merely wanted to add a roof to Panaetius' unfinished structure (5 33) Cicero uses Book 3 as a means of propagating a rigorist ethic based upon the example of Romans he admired (Scaevola, Fabricius, Regulus, Manlius) and set in relief by the examples of other Ro mans whose behavior he deprecated or indeed, in some cases, abominated [viz.» Crassus, Hortensius, M. and C. Marius, Pompey the Great, Caesar, Q. Pompcius). The result is more akin to the rigorism of the Paradox a Stoicorum (note the paradoxical formulation at $ 100: itaque turn, inquam, cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa quam si domi senex captivus» periurus consularis remansisset) than with the Panaetian doctrines of Off. 1 2.87
97-99a As elsewhere in this Book the Greek examples are chosen as ana logues to the Roman (cf. ad §§ 48 and 87), so here Ulysses' attempt to evade military service is introduced to point a contrast to Regulus' behavior; sim ilarly, Cicero began the discussion of magnitudo animi at 1.61 with rhetoric directed against those who fell far short of the ideal; cf. § 97 [utile, ut aliquis fortasse dixerit, regnare et Ithacae vivere otiose cum parentibus, cum uxoret cum filio) and the unheroic alternative rejected by Regulus: manere in patriat esse domi suae cum uxoret cum liberis ($ 99). Cicero presupposes the wellknown tale whereby the hero's feigned madness was exposed when, while plowing the beach, he swerved to avoid young Telemachus, whom Palamedes placed in the way (cf. [Apollod.) Epit. 3.7; Philostr. Her. 33.4; sch. Lye. 815). The verses cited [trag. ex incertis incertorum fabulis 55-60) surely derive from the Armorum Judicium of Pacuvius or Accius, since they are spoken by Ajax before the Achaean host {quod omnes satis); the subject had been handled in Aeschylus' "Οπλων Κρίσιν (frr. 174 ff. Radt) and Sophocles' Oourjotvs Μαινόμ€ΐ>ο5 (frr. 462 ff. Radt); cf. also the treatment at Ov. Met. 13.1 ff. 97 ullum tu decus in cotidianis laboribus et periculis cum hac tranquillitate conferendum putas? ego vero istam contemnendam et abiciendam, quoniam quae honesta non sit ne utilem quidem esse arbitror.] Cicero again uses the address to young Marcus to enliven his presentation (cf. § § 8 1 , 85, and 2.44-45); he places the case of Regulus in parallel by using the same question-and-answer form: quis haec negat esse utiliaf quern censes? magni tudo animi et fortitudo negat (§ 99). One thinks of Achilles' heroic choice to have a brief, glorious life by joining the Achaean assault on Troy rather than 87. On Farad. as "philosophy done in a form as close to oratory as |Ciccro| could make it," cf. Walter Englert, "Bringing Philosophy to the Light: Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum," Apeiron 21 (1990), 117-42 (the phrase quoted from p. 141».
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a long, undistinguished life in his native Phthia {//. 9.410 ff.); cf. also Pelops' words at Pi. O. 1.81 ff. Here adopting the Stoic view enables Cicero to capture some of the early Greek (and Roman) heroic ethic; one understands what Cicero meant when he spoke of following the Stoics because splendidius haec ab its disserentur (§ 20); at 1.61 he characterized magnitude* animi as the type of honestas that is splendidissimum. 99a . . . dimicarc melius fuit quam deserere consentientem Graeciam ad bellum barbaris inferendum.] Cicero is the first author known to substitute ad with consentire for the earlier construction with the dative or cum; for use with gerundive following cf. Cat. 4.18: omnes ordines ad conservandam rempublicam . . . consentiunt; sim. Phil. 4.10; N.D. 2.60; Burger, TLL 4, 397.61 ff. 99b Sed omittamus et fabulas et externa;.. . ] A new paragraph should begin here (so Testard, Winterbottom), not at the beginning of § 99 (as Atzert 4 , Fedeli). On the principle of organization cf. ad 2.26b. M. Atilius Regulus, cum consul iterum in Africa ex insidiis captus esset duce Xanthippo Lacedaemonio, imperatore autem patre Hannibalis Hamilcare . . .] In de Senectute Cicero had alluded to Marcum Atilium qui ad supplicium est profectus ut fidem hosti datam conservaret... (S 75). In our passage Cicero is evidently using consul in the loose sense (cf. OLD s.v., 1 b), for Regulus was consul in 267 and 256 but was captured while procon sul in 255; cf. MR R 1,200,209-10. Also it is unclear whether his captor was Hannibal's father; the identification is favored by Lenschau, RE 7.2 (1912), 2303.12 ff. s.v. Hamilkar no. 6, though Hamilcar Barca is no. 7. Regulus had defeated the Carthaginians on sea and land and captured Tunis; but his harsh conditions for peace were refused. At this point the Spartan mercenary gen eral Xanthippus arrived and restored morale and discipline to the Carthagin ian troops; since the previous Carthaginian reverses had been, as Polybius remarks, ού διά την των πολλών άνανδρίαν, άλλα δια τήν των ηγουμένων άβουλίαν (1.31.1), his presence proved decisive. The other sources have Reg ulus captured in flight following a pitched battle (along with 500 soldiers, according to Plb. 1.34.8); it seems very doubtful that Cicero can have con sidered the stratagem described at Fron. Str. 2.3.10 as insidiae {Xanthippus Lacedaemonius in Africa adversus M. Atilium Regulum levem armaturam in prima acie conlocavit, in subsidio autem robur exercitus praecepitque auxiliaribus, ut emissis telis cederent hosti et, cum se intra suorum ordines recepissent, confestim in latera discurrerent et a cornibus rursus erumperent; exceptumque iam hostem a robustioribus et ipsi circumierunt); in any case, the capture ex insidiis is a detail that increases the reader's sympathy for
Commentary on Book 3, Section 97-100
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Regulus whether invented or misremembered by Cicero. 88 —For exempla asyndetically introduced in this essay cf. ad 1.36. . . . iuratus missus est ad senatura, ut nisi redditi essent Poenis captivi nobiles quidam, rediret ipse Carthaginem.] Another tradition, first attested at Liv. per. 18, gives a negotiated peace as the primary object of the mission, the exchange of prisoners as a pis aller [Regulus missus a Carthaginiensibus ad senatum, ut de pace et, si earn non posset impetrare, de commutandis captivis ageret. . .); cf. Blattler, 36-37, 63. . . . manerc in patria, esse domi suae cum uxore, cum liberts, quam calamitatem accepisset in bello communem fortunae bellicae iudicantem tenere consularis dignitatis gradum.] But this was not really an option for Regulus, as Cicero himself later admits (§ 111: nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, Mis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit); had he tried to stay at Rome in violation of his oath, he would have been subject to deditio or at least reduction in status (cf. ad % 100). Cicero initially portrays Regulus, like Ulysses (cf. ad $§ 97-99a) or Hercules (1.118), as having a choice between the pleasant and the virtuous; only in the course of the argument do the different conditions of ilia tempora become clear to him.— For domi of ξ preferred over £'s domui cf. Jacob Wackernagel apud Pohlenz ad Tusc. 1.51.—The phrase communem fortunae bellicae paraphrases the proverbial Mars communis {Mil. 56; cf. passages cited by Otto, 214, n. 2). quis haec negat esse utilia? quern censes? magnitudo animi et fortitudo negat.] A remarkable personification of the virtue (cf. $ 119: non recipit istam coniunctionem |sc. cum voluptate] honestas, aspernatur repellit)\ it is really, however, as presented here, a conflict of two utilitates, the utilitas reipublicae and personal expediency, with magnitudo animi—or rather that part of it that involves the despising of the bodily and external goods (cf. 1.66)—the attitude that enables one to give way to the larger utilitas. For the practice of drawing young Marcus into the discussion and use of the question-and-answer form to draw a parallel to the case of Ulysses cf. ad §97. num locupleriores quaeris auctores?] For the use of locuples cf. ad % 10. 100 in senatum venit, mandata exposuit, sententiam ne diceret, recusavit; quam diu iureiurando hostium teneretur, non esse se senatorem.] As one captured by the enemy, he had lost his citizenship and thus his right to speak in the senate; cf. Mommsen, Stoatsr., 3.2, 882. It is unclear whether 88. Cf. Blattler, 62: "Es soil da offenbar nicht der Eindruck crwcckt werden, als ob Regulus wegen mangelnder Knegstiichtigkeit besiegt worden ware."
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postliminium existed in Regulus' day or whether a statute would have been needed to restore his rights of citizenship, as in the case of C. Hostilius Mancinus, who, after being surrendered to the Numantines and not accepted by them, tried to reoccupy his seat in the senate but was removed; postliminium did not apply to him; only after a statute was carried restoring his citizenship and he had again been elected praetor, could he return to the senate; cf. Munzei; RE 8.2 {1913), 2511.27 ff.; Watson, Persons, 243-46; ad § 109. Pomponius reports the view of Q. Mucius Scaevola that postliminium did not apply to Regulus, since he returned without intending to stay (Dig. 49.15.5.3: non esse eum postliminio reversum, quia iuraverat Carthaginem reversurum et non habuerat animum Romae remanendi). While attributing the formulation to Pomponius, Kornhardt, 1953, 30, argues on this basis that postliminium did exist in Regulus* day.—It is surprising that an opinion in the matter (expressed privately?89) is nevertheless attributed to Regulus {atque illud etiam . . . : reddi captivos negavit esse utile). . . . (*o stultum hominem' dixerit quispiam 'et repugnantem utilitati suae!') . . .] The imaginary objector returns (cf. ad §§ 76, 79); the point is essentially the same as that of the Ennian quotation invoked against Q. Scaevola at § 62. reddi captivos negavit esse utile; illos enim adulescentes esse et bonos duces, se iam confectum senectute.] But to this Cicero could, if so inclined, have opposed arguments such as those he used at Off. 1.79 ff. or in Sen. (cf. Sen. 17, cited ad 1.13; cf. also ad § 110).—Kornhardt, 1954, 103-4, believes that, in fact, Regulus wanted the exchange of prisoners to take place but that it was rejected by the senate as a bad bargain to trade one general for several. The argument for Regulus" attitude is based on his refusal to wear the toga that his Carthaginian captors offered him for his mission (Sil. 6.392-94). Kornhardt forgets, however, that the toga was reserved for Roman citizens: non-Romans, exiles, and soldiers were forbidden to wear it; Regulus, as one in the power of and under oath sworn to the enemy, would have fallen under this ban. 90 Hence there can be no question of Regulus striving uauf diesem indirekten Weg, Mitleid und Nachsicht fur sich zu erwecken" (Kornhardt, 1954,103). Indeed Regulus can hardly have been so naive, especially in light of the fate of those who surrendered at the Caudine Forks (cf. ad § 109); if 89. Bui cf. 1.39: captwos reddendos m senatu non censutt. 90. Cf. F.W. Gocthert, RE. 6Λ2 (1937), 1653.12 ff. (s.v. toga); cf. Horace's phrase ut capitis minor (see on the following lemma) as Regulus rejects other privileges of Roman citizenship. Also too psychological is the explanation of Watson, Persons, 243, that Regulus* behavior in Rome was "based on a desire to punish himself for what he regarded as his disgrace"; in fact, under Roman law there was no other way for him to behave.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 100
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not subject to deditio, he could at least have anticipated being reduced in status; cf. the fate of the prisoners returned by Pyrrhus as described at Fron. Str. 4.1.18: Appii Claudii sententia senatus eos, qui a Pyrrho rege Epirotarum capti et postea remissi erant, equites ad peditem redegit, pedites ad levem armaturam, omnibus extra vallum iussis tendere, donee bina hostium spolia singuli referrent (sim. V. Max. 2.7.15); perhaps, as Marquardt, 2,572, n. 1, suspects, the pedites were, in fact, reduced to velites; for the fate of those taken prisoner after Cannae cf. ad § 115; Eutr. 2.25.3 gives a realistic picture of Regulus' prospects at Rome: . . . offerentibusque Komanis, ut eum Ro~ mae tenerent, negavit se in ea urbe mansurum, in qua, postquam Afris servierat, dignitatem honesti civis habere non posset. The incident in this form is unhistorical in any event (cf. ad %% 97-115); the transmitted version is at least consistent with Roman attitudes of the time.—D.S. 24.12 gives the names of the Carthaginian captives as Bodostor and Hamilcar and narrates the revenge that Regulus* wife Marcia wreaked upon them, fatal for the former and nearly so for the latter. . . . ipse Carthaginem rediit, neque eum caritas patriae rctinuit nee suorum. neque vero mm ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem et ad exquisita sup· plicia proficisci . . .J The scene is visualized with pathetic detail at Hon Carm. 3.5.41 ff.: fertur pudicae coniugis osculum I parvosque natos ut capitis minor I ab se removisse et virilem I torvus humi posuisse vultum, I donee labantis consilio patres I firmaret auctor numquam alias dato, I interque maerentis amicos I egregius properaret exsui I atqui sciebat quae sibi barbarus I tortor pararet; non aliter tamen I dimovit obstantis propinquos I et populum reditus morantem I quam si clientum longa negotia I diiudicata lite relinqueret, I tendens Venafranos in agros I aut Lacedaemonium Tarentum. itaque turn, inquam, cum vigilando necabatur, erat in meliore causa quam si domt senex captivus, periurus consularis remansisset.] This is based, of course, on a premise corresponding to the first of Cicero's Stoic paradoxes: quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse. The turpitudo of Regulus' position if he had remained in Rome is reinforced by the oxymoronic formulations senex captivus and periurus consularis (cf. Horace's no less oxymoronic characterization of the returning Regulus as egregius . . . exsul [previous note|).—The two earliest sources for the manner of Regulus' death are at variance, with C. Sempronius Tuditanus being followed by Cicero here {hist. 5 = Gel. 7.4.4: Tuditanus autem somno diu prohibitum atque ita vita privatum refert. . . ; cf. also Fin. 2.65 and 5.82, in both of which starvation is added to sleep-deprivation as the cause), whereas Q. Aelius Tubero hist. 9 = Gel. 7.4.2-3 has him confined in darkness and then, with his eyelids sewn
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open, thrust into bright sunlight; cf. Cic. Pis. 43: nee mihi Me M. Regulus, quern Carthaginienses resectis palpebrts inligatum in machina vigilando necaverunt, supplicio videtur adfectus . . . ; for the tradition on Regulus' death cf. in general Klebs, RE 2.2 (1896), 2088.1 ff. 101 potest autem, quod inutile reipublicae sit, id cuiquam civi utile esse?] Cf. Cat. 4.9: sed tamen meorum periculorum rationes utilitas reipublicae vincat. pervertunt homines ea quae sunt fundamenta naturae cum utilitatem ab honestate seiungunt.] Recent editors (Atzert4, Fedeli, Testard, Winterbottom) begin a new paragraph with this sentence; but our lemma continues the reflection on the utile begun in the preceding rhetorical questions, albeit no longer specifically in relation to the respublica. One could begin a new paragraph with at stulte . . . (but this is a continuation of the previous objection [*o stultum hominem' dixerit quispiam . . .]) or, better, only at $ 102 {'Quid est igitur* dixerit quis . . .), where Cicero lists the four further objections to Regulus* action (haec fere contra Regulum: § 103; see ad SS 102-3), which he will refute at $S 104-10.—Cf. ad $ U above, omnes enim expetimus utilitatem ad eamque rapimur, nee facere aliter ullo modo possumus.] For the formulation cf. 2.37:. . . cumque aliqua Us ampla et honesta res obiecta est totos{que) ad se convertit et rapit . . . For the thought cf. ad 1.155. 102-3 These sections present four major objections to Regulus* decision: I. He need not have feared divine wrath for breaking his oath (and Jupiter could hardly have inflicted a harsher penalty upon him anyway). II. Arguments about turpitudo: A. Turpitudo is not always the summum malum. B. One need not keep faith with the faithless. III. The honestas involved in the action is apparent, not real, because the oath was extracted by enemy violence. IV. Whatever is mightily expedient thereby becomes honestum. The objections combine philosophical (I., H.A., ΠΙ.) with pragmatic (H.B., IV.) considerations; cf. Heilmann, 67. 102 'Quid est igitur' dixerit quis 'in iureiurando? num iratum timemus Iovem? . . .'] It was, of course, the popular belief that the gods punish oathbreakers; cf. the old law cited at Leg. 2.22: periurii poena divina exitium, bumana dedecus; this was the special function of Jupiter, as of Zeus {Dins fidius = Ζ*νς πίστιος); cf. Steinwenter, RE 10 (1919), 1253.48 ff. (s.v. iusiurandum) and Latte, ibid., 15.1 (1931), 354.8 ff. (s.v. Meineid).—For
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Cicero's own rationalizing interpretation of the divinity by whom the judicial oath is sworn cf. $ 44. 4 . . . at hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo qui deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, nihil exhibere alteri, sed eorum etiam, qui deum semper agere aliquid et moliri v o l u n t . . . ' ] The two schools are, respectively, the Epicurean (cf. N.D. 1.42-45) and the Stoic (N.D. 2.75-77). Our passage includes verbal echoes of the previous treat ment; cf. N.D. 1.45: . . . vere exposita ilia sententia est ah Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit id nee habere ipsum negotii quicquam nee exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri. . . ; ibid., 2.76:. . . is \sc. those who concede the existence of the gods] fatendum est eos (sc. deos] aliquid agere idque praeclarum;. . . For the Epicurean view cf. also Epicur. Sent. 1 (p. 71 Usener = p. 121 Arrighetti): τό μακάριοι/ και άφθαρτου ούτε αυτό πράγματα 6χ€ΐ ουτ€ άλλψ παρε\€ΐ, ώστε οΰτ€ όργαΐ? οΰτ€ χάρισι συνέ χεται . . . ; for the Stoic doctrine cf. Fin. 3.64 (= SVF 3, 81.38): mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum . . . '. . . numquam nee irasci deum nee nocere. . . .'] It was, of course, a project of philosophers to purify the traditional Greco-Roman gods of human emo tions; for Plato's work in this regard cf., for instance, E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1951), 219 ff. Our text reflects the predominant influence of the Stoa on Roman religious thinking of the late Republic; cf. Altheim, 2 , 6 9 - 7 0 ; for the Stoic reinterpretation of the popular gods in general cf. Pohlenz, Stoa, 1, 9 6 - 9 8 ; for Cicero's own re ligiosity cf. Latte, 285-86. For nocere cf. ad 2.12a '. . . primum minima de malis. num igitur tantum mali rurpirudo ista habebat quantum ille cruciarus? . . .'] On the proverbial phrase minima de malis cf. ad$ 3 above; on the use of proverbs in philosophical argument cf. ad SS 7 7 - 7 8 . 1 . . . deinde illud etiam apud Accium: "fregistin fidem?" / a neque dedi ne que do infideli cuiquam," . . .'] The Accian text = trag. 227-28, where Ribbeck rightly divides between Thyestes (first speaker) and Atreus (clinched by § 106 below: . . . cum tractaretur Atreus . . . ; cf. also the following reference to an impius rex). For Thyestes' incredulous question cf. Sen. Thy. 1024: hoc foedus? haec est gratia, haec fratris fides? Fregistin is now rightly accepted, after I.F. Heusinger {fregistin'), for fregistine [ζ) or fregisti [ξ). 104 4non fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque irasci solet nee nocere'.] Cf. on the previous paragraph. est enim iusiurandum adfirmatio religiosa; quod autem adfirmate et quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est.] These words in combination with
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§ 111 have been cited as evidence for the oath as a source of obligation at the time of the Twelve Tables (cf. Maurice Guibal apud Testard ad loc.)\ the importance of the oath in that age was, however, grounded in the belief that perjury would incur divine punishment (cf. Leg. 2.22, cited ad § 102); our text reflects the attenuated religiosity of Cicero's time; cf. also ad § 107. Ό Fides alma apta pinnis et iusiurandum lovis'.] This verse (= seen. 403 = trag. 380 = 350 Jocelyn) is conjecturally attributed along with trag. 381-82 (= 1.26) to the Thyestes. They will come from Thyestes* reaction to the revelation of Atreus' treachery.—The oath by Fides, said to have been intro duced by Numa, was the most solemn used by the Romans (cf. Plut. Num. 16.1); Δίκη is conceived as winged at Arat. 133-34 {και τότ€ μισήσασα Δίκη Κ€ίνων yevo? άν&ρων Ι€πταθ' υπουρανίη, ταύτης δ' άρα ι^άσσατο χώρηι> . . .), as is the goddess 'Οσία, invented ad hoc at Eur. Bacch. 370 ff.; cf. Wilamowitz ad Eur. Heraci 649; for a collection of occurrences of fides together with iusiurandum cf. Fraenkel, TLL 6.1, 671.1 ff.; ad § 111. qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio vicinam lovis Optimi Maximi, ut in Catonis oratione est, maiores nostri esse voluerunt.] Testard and Winterbottom, unlike Arzert4 and Fedeli, rightly capitalize Fidem. Our passage appears as orat. fr. 238; it would, however, consort well with the extant remains of the two speeches In Q. Minucium Thermum (cf. fr. 58: ubi fides maiorumf and fr. 61 [albeit heavily restored]: {neque fidem, neque iusiurandum,) neque pud(icitiam multifacit). . .).— Fides is the feminine counterpart of Dius Fidius; the early oath pro tuam fidem is independent of the goddess, however; cf. Stefan Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971), 168-69. A sacrarium of Fides is said to have been established by Numa between the temple of Jupiter and the Tarpeian rock (Liv. 1.21.4; cf. D.H. 2.75.3; Plut. Num. 16). A temple was built on the site by A. Atilius Caiatinus (cos. 258) and restored by the consul M. Aemilius Scaurus in 115; it was an occasional meeting-place of the senate; tablets inscribed with international agreements were affixed to its walls; cf. testi monies collected by Samuel B. Platner, A Topographical Dictionary of An cient Rome (Oxford, 1929), s.v. Fides, aedes, and L. Richardson, jr., A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome (Baltimore and London, 1992), s.v.; for related archaeological finds cf. Giuseppe Lugli, Roma antica (Rome, 1946), 30. 105 'at enim ne iratus quidem Iuppitcr plus Regulo nocuisset, quam sibi nocuit ipse Regulus'.] For the force of at enim cf. ad § 79. certe, si nihil malum essct nisi dolcrc. id autem non modo non summum malum sed ne malum quidem esse maxima auctoritatc philosophi adfirmant.] Tusc. 2 is, of course, devoted to attacking the Epicurean proposition
Commentary on Book 3, Section 104-6
629
that pain is an evil (though Regulus does not appear as an example in that Book). Cf. Varad. 16: nee vera ego M. Regulum aerumnosum nee infelicem nee miserum umquam putavi. non enim magnitudo animi cruciabatur eius a Poenis* non gravitas, non fides, non constant ta, non ulia virtus, non denique animus ipse, qui tot virtutum praesidio tantoque comitatu, cum corpus eius caperetur, capi certe ipse non potuit. quorum quidem tcstem non mediocrem sed haud scio an gravissimum Re gulum nolite quaeso vituperare. quern enim locupletiorem quaerimus . . . ?] The metaphorical sense of locuples as applied to a witness (= gravis) would be clear from this context, if it were not otherwise; cf. ad $ 10. Nam quod aiunt minima de malis, id est, ut turpiter potius quam calamitose: an est ullum maius malum turpitudine?] Cf. ad § 102 and on turpitudo ad §§ 3 5 - 3 7 . quae si in deformitate corporis habet aliquid offensionis, quanta ilia depravatio et foeditas turpificati animi debet videri?] An a fortiori argument based upon the double application of turpitudo in the mental, as well as physical realm; Cicero has already discussed verecundia, its function of avoiding offense (1.99), and the concealment of deformitas corporis thus entailed (1.126-27); cf. also $ 85. 106 itaque ncrvosius qui ista disserunt, solum audent malum dicere id quod turpe sit, qui autem remissius, ii tamen non dubitant summum malum dicere.] A distinction of the Stoics (qui. . . solum audent malum dicere id quod turpe sit) from the Peripatetics and Academics [qui autem remissius . . .);cf. Orat. 127: dicetur autem non Peripateticorum more. . .sed aliquanto nervosius . . . (but contrast Brut. 121, where the discussion turns on style per se: quis Aristotele nervosior . . . ?). The basis for discussion remains as at §§ 11 and 33, with the Epicureans, as at 1.5 and § 18, still excluded (cf. also ad §§ 116-20). Gorier, 1974, 25, n. 9, contrasts this passage with the sharp critique of Theophrastus at Tusc. 5.25. The Stoic argument is differentiated in other terms at § 20. nam illud quidem 'neque dedi neque do infideli cuiquam' idcirco recte a poeta, quia, cum tractaretur Atreus, personae serviendum fuit. sed si hoc sibi sument. . .] As at 1.97, to place wicked sentiments in the mouth of a wicked character accords with poetic decorum; but the moral agent, in fashioning his own character, must be wary of imitating such sentiments, sed si hoc sibi sument, nullam esse fidem quae infideli data sit, videant ne quaeratur latebra periurio.] This response is a petitio principii, since the question is whether breaking faith with a faithless person constitutes periurium (cf. ad § 39, where the theoretical discussion is similarly preempted). In fact, this objection would probably have satisfied ordinary Roman feeling
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(cf. ad 1.38: Poeni foedifragi). Cicero offers a more substantive reply at § 1 0 8 [cum iusto . . . et legitimo hoste res gerebatur . . .). 107 Est autem ius etiam bellicum, fidesque iurisiurandi saepe cum hoste servanda.] This was, of course, the argument at 1.34-40 (why no Ciceronian cross-reference?). quod enim ita iuratum est ut mens conciperet fieri oportere, id servandum est; quod aliter, id si non fecerit, nullum est periurium: . . .] I.e., the oath is sworn with full understanding, as opposed to the case of Hippolytus (see below); this is a significant modification of the blanket defense of oaths at § 104. Another modification would have been apposite in view of 1.30b-32 and SS 92b-95. ut, si praedonibus pactum—cum hoc nee fides debet nee iusiurandum esse commune.] Ulpian would later formulate with reference to the communi dividundo iudicium as follows: inter praedones autem hoc iudicium locum non habet, nee si precario possideant locum habebit nee si clam, quia iniusta est possessio ista, precaria vero iusta quidem, sed quae non per gat ad iudicii vigorem {Dig. 10.3.7.4). For the distinction of hostis and praedo cf. Ulpian, ibid., 49.15.24: hostes sunt quibus bellum publice populus Romanus decrevit vel ipsi populo Romano: ceteri latrunculi vel praedones appellantur; sim., ibid., 50.16.118 (Pompon.); cf. Pohl, 36-37. 108 non enim falsum iurare periurare est, sed quod EX ANIMI TUI SENTENTIA iuraris . . . ] The distinction between false oath and perjury is an important one, rooted in the precautions of Roman law against dolus malus; in this Roman feeling differed markedly from Greek (cf. the following note on the shocked reaction to Euripides' verse, which Cicero accepts without hesitation). The words ex animi tui sententia are a formula from a solemn oath; cf. the oath taken by Scipio and others after the Roman defeat at Cannae: ex met animi sentenia . . . ut ego rempublicam populi Romani non deseram neque alium civem Romanum deserere patiar; si sciens fallo, turn me, luppiter op time maxime, domum, familiam remque meam pessimo let ο adficias (Liv. 22.53.10-11) or the oath of allegiance sworn by the Aritienses to the emperor Gaius at his accession in 37 and recorded on a gold leaf (CIL 2.172): ex met animi sententia ut ego its inimicus ero quos C. Caesari Germanico inimicos esse cognovero et si quis periculum ei salutique eius infert intuleritve armis bello internecivo terra marique persequi non desinam quoad poenas ei persolverit. . . si sciens fallo fefellerove turn me liberosque meos luppiter optimus maximus ac Divus Augustus ceterique omnes di immortales expertem patria incolumitate fortunisque omnibus faxint (cf. Hiibner, RE 2.1 [1895], 1116.63 ff.; Peter Herrmann, Der romische Kai-
Commentary on Book 3, Section 106-9
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sereid, Hypomnemata 20 [Gottingen, 1968], esp. 50 ff.); cf. Latte, RE 15.1 (1931), 354.22 ff. (s.v. Meineid). iuravi lingua, mcntem iniuratam gero.] Eur. Hipp. 612: ή γλώσσ' όμώμοχ', ή δε φρήι> άνώμοτος. The verse is pivotal to the plot, since Phaedra must believe that Hippolytus is likely to ignore his oath and tell Theseus of her advances in order to precipi tate the catastrophe (see Barrett ad he); but taken out of context, it soon became notorious, as Aristophanes' repeated parodies attest: Th. 275-76: Μι>. μβμι/ησο τοίνυν ταΰΟ', δτι ή φρήι> ώμοσεν, ή γλώττα δ' ούκ όμώμοκ'· ούδ* ώρκωσ' εγώ. Ran. 96 ff.: Δι. γόι>ιμοι> δέ ποιητής αν ούχ eupoig βτι . . . Up. πά>9 γόνιμον; Δι. ώδΐ γόιημοι>, όστις φθβγξβται . . . ή "φρό'α μέν ούκ ίθέλουσαν όμόσαι κα& ΐ6ρώι>, γλώτταν δ' έπιορκήσασαν ίδίςι τη? φρίνό?." ibid., 1471: Δι. "ή γλώττ* όμώμοκ'," Αίσχύλον δ' αίρήσομαι. Aristotle (Rhet. 1416a28 ff.) reports that the verse even figured in a prosecu tion brought against the poet by a certain Hygiaenon, one of whose tactics was to brand the poet as άσίβή?. cum iusto enim et legitimo hoste res gerebatur, adversus quern et totum ius fetialc ct multa sunt iura communia.J On the ius fetiale cf. ad 1.34-40. quod ni ita essct, numquam daros viros senatus vinctos hostibus dedidisset.] This point is illustrated by the cases discussed below, % 109. 109 This section adduces historical exempla to confirm that Regulus behaved properly in advocating his own return to Carthage; Sp. Postumius and C. Mancinus are said to have uged their own deditio after making treaties respectively with the Samnites and Numantines; contrasted with Mancinus is the negative example of Q. Pompeius, who deprecated his own deditio. at vero T. Veturius et Sp. Postumius,—suasor et auctor fuit.] T. Veturius Calvinus and Sp. Postumius Albinus were consuls together in 334 and again in 321 (MRR 1, 140 and 150-51). In the latter year while marching from Campania to Apulia they were lured by the Samnite leader C. Pontius into an ambush at the Caudine Forks; they negotiated a treaty or at least a sponsio of peace (cf. Liv. 9.5.1-6; the former is the view of CI. Quadrigarius hist. fr. 18,
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the latter that of Livy), abdicated their offices and were replaced at once. When the senate took counsel on the events, Postumius rose to advocate continuation of the war and deditio of himself and other returned prisoners to the Samnites (Liv. 9.8.1-10, esp. 6). Livy (9.8.13 ff.) gives the tribunes as L. Livius (not Ti. Minucius/Numicius; see below) and Q. Maelius and says that they at first opposed the plan, which, since they, too, were among sponsores of the peace (cf. Liv. 9.5.4 and 9.8.15, as well as Cicero*s quod eorum auctoritate pax erat facta), would have entailed their own surrender to the Samnites; however, when confronted with Postumius* proposal that they be beaten with rods now and delivered to the Samnites only after the expiration of their term, the tribunes laid down their office at once (Liv. 9.9.1 and 10.1-2). The Samnites, however, refused to accept the returned captives (Liv. 9.11). Winterbottom prints the name of Q. Maelius* fellow-tribune as Ti. Minucius, the reading of BV and, with the orthographic variant Minutius, of Pc, whereas the traditional reading Numitius is weakly attested (a manu script of 1416); note, too that the praenomen Ti. was one of those favored by the Minucii (Munzer, RE 15.2 [1935], 1939.2-3) but is not otherwise at tested for the Numicii.9i Cf. in general Munzer, RE 14.1 (1928), 239.17 ff. (Maelius) and 17.2 (1937), 1342.21 ff. (Numicius); Hans Gundel, ibid., 8A2 (1958), 1886.23 ff., esp. 1887.46 ff. (Veturius). Not since the first edition of the RE has there been an article on our Sp. Postumius Albinus. Soltau, 1241-42, suspects, perhaps rightly, that Cicero is here following Quadrigarius, who held that a foedus had been made and the officials respon sible turned over to the Samnites, whereas Livy's source considered the agreement a sponsio and the deditio that of the sponsores (Soltau identifies Valerius Antius as the source in question, since he [hist. fr. 57] regarded the analogous case of Mancinus' treaty as a sponsio). In general, the situation is so closely parallel to the defeat of Mancinus, repudiation of his treaty, and his deditio to Numantia that the earlier incident is likely to have been mod eled on the later one; cf. M.H. Crawford, "Foedus and Sponsio," PBSR 41 (1973), 1-7. On the practice of surrendering to the enemy leaders who conclude peace iniussu populi ac senatus cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 3, 125556, n. 2; for parallel cases ibid., 1,255,2. It remains uncertain whether this is an early instance of the despatching of tribunes outside the city by the senate, since it is unclear whether Ti. Minucius and Q. Maelius were already tribunes when they were with the army; cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 2, 292.4. 91. Assuming the traditional reading, Munzer, RE 13.1 (1926), 814.52 ff., esp. 815.2 ff., suspected that Cicero's source substituted a member of the defunct Numicii to save the honor of the still surviving Livii.
Commentary on Book 3, Section 109-10
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quod idem multis annis post C. Mancinus—deprecante accepta lex non est.] After pursuing the war in Hither Spain with mixed success, first as consul (141), then as proconsul, in 139 Q. Pompeius concluded a treaty with the Numantines but managed to escape deditio; cf. Cic. Fin. 2.54; App. Hisp. 340 ff.; MRR 1,477 and 480; F. Miltner, RE 21.2 (1952), 2056.4 ff.; Gruen, 1968,35; and esp. Rosenstein, 1986,248 ff. It fell to C. Hostilius Mancinus, assigned as consul to Hither Spain in 137, to repair the situation. When he tried to withdraw his undisciplined army from the walls of Numantia by night, he was encircled by the enemy and forced to capitulate; twenty of his highest officers (including the quaestor Ti. Sempronius Gracchus) had to provide a sponsio (in addition to the consul's oath). When he returned to Rome and was replaced as consul, he was subjected to deditio (on the debate cf. Rosenstein, 1986, 236 ff.), whereas Ti. Gracchus successfully opposed that of himself and the other officers (Cicero's criticism of the deprecatio of Q. Pompeius implies disapproval of Gracchus as well); on the reason for the distinction, viz., that Mancinus alone had imperium and that therefore his word alone could engage the fides publica, cf. Rosenstein, 1986, 2 4 7 - 4 8 . The consuls who carried his deditio were L. Furius Philus and Sex. Atilius Serranus; the latter surely invoked the example of his famous ancestor and thus helped to keep the fame of Regulus alive; cf. Kornhardt, 1954, 105-6; for a reconstruction of the political background of the trial cf. Gruen, 1968, 4 0 - 4 2 . At Rep. 3.28 Cicero has Philus describe his role as follows: consul ego quaesivi, cum vos mihi essetis in consilio, de Numantino foedere. quis ignorabat Q. Pompeium fecisse foedus, eadem in causa esse Mancinum? alter vir optimus etiam suasit rogationem me ex senatus consulto ferente, alter acerrime se defendit. si pudor quaeritur, si probitas, si fides, Mancinus haec attulit, si ratio, consilium, prudentia, Pompeius antistat. utrum (a la cuna follows). Philus thus first obtained a senatus consultum and then went to the comitia; on the procedure cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 3, 339, n. 1. The Numantines refused to accept the extradited Mancinus, who returned to Rome, regained his citizenship, and resumed his political career; cf. ad § 100; MRR 1, 482 and 486; Miinzer, RE 8.2 (1913), 2508.31 ff.; J.-H. Michel, "L'extradition du general en droit romain," Latomus 39 (1980), 675-93 at 6 9 0 - 9 1 ; Rosenstein, 1990, 148-50. hie ea quae videbarur utilitas plus valuit quam honestas, apud superiores utilitatis species falsa ab honestatis auctoritate superata est.] Cicero again rings changes on the theme of early Rome as an "ethical golden age"; see ad S 111. 110 This section handles objections III. and IV. to Regulus' action (see ad $S 102-3). According to III., the oath was invalid because extorted by force
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(cf. § 103). Cicero himself recognized the principle at 1.32 {iam Mis promissis standum non esse quis non videt quae coactus quis metu, quae deceptus dolo promiserit?); cf. also the exclusion at § 92: pacta et promissa semperne servanda sint, QUAE NEC VI NEC DOLO MALO . . . FACTA SINT. At Fin. 2.65, in arguing the paradox that Regulus' fate was preferable to that of the voluptuary L. Thorius Balbus (cf. the similar argument at Farad. 16), Cicero stated that Regulus had returned to Carthage nulla vi coactus praeter fidem, quam dederat hosti. . . Here Cicero's argument is (a) that force cannot be brought to bear on a brave man and (b) that Regulus actually wanted to return to Rome to intervene with the senate, which would otherwise have agreed to the exchange. In view of the senate's record in extraditing officials who made treaties with the enemy iniussu populi senatusque just narrated (§ 109), it seems very dubious that the senate would have agreed to such an exchange. In any case, the point of the oath was not his trip to Rome so much as his return if his mission were unsuccessful, something he surely did not want to do (cf. Dyck, 1984, 226, n. 32). How ever, it would not have been possible for Regulus to regard his oath, taken under duress, as invalid and remain at Rome; he would surely have been extradited, like Mancinus. Even at a later period his fate would have been none too pleasant: he would have faced censorial action of the kind later meted out to the man or men guilty of perjury in the aftermath of Cannae (cf. ad § 115). 92 Objection IV. gives Cicero the opportunity to reaffirm the thesis of the Book about the relation of honestum and utile; cf. ad § 11. non enim suo iudicio stetit, sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium senatus; cui nisi ipse auctor fuisset, captivi profecto Poenis redditi essent, ita incolumis in patria Regulus restitisset.] Kornhardt, 1954, 104, surmised that the senate's decision seemed to the later tradition incomprehensible; hence the various attempts to explain it either by increasing the captive Carthagi nians to thousands (Eutr. 2.25.2: tot milia captivorum) or by reducing Reg ulus' value (cf. § 100: se iam confectum senectute); hence, too, C. Sempronius Tuditanus' story that the Carthaginians had administered a slow poison before sending Regulus to Rome (hist. fr. 5 = Gel. 7.4.1); Cicero has taken the third path of increasing Regulus' own influence on the decision.— On the importance for Cicero of the fact that Regulus subordinated his own judgment in the matter to that of the senate cf. Heilmann, 70, and ad §$ 9 7 115. 111-12 These sections comprise a digression (as Thomas, 39, well observes, 92. In arguing for the possible usefulness of Regulus* presence in Rome, Heilmann, 69, takes Cicero's guess about the senate's attitude too seriously (see next note).
Commentary on Book 3, Section 110-11
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§ 1 1 3 [Sed, ut laudandus Regulus . . .] connects with the end of § 110 [. . . baud facile quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius aut praestantius] as if nothing had intervened). The point is to place the exemplum of Regulus in its historical context and thus determine what was truly admirable about his action. The power of the oath in early Rome is clarified by the example of the tribune of the plebs M. Pomponius, who dropped his prosecution of L. Manlius Imperiosus, even though his oath agreeing to do so was clearly extracted vi (see ad § 110, where Cicero could perhaps have deployed this material to greater effect in countering argument III.). 111 Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli unum illud est admiratione dignum, quod captivos retinendos censuit. nam quod rediit, nobis nunc mirabile videtur, illis quidem temporibus aliter facere non potuit. itaque ista laus non est hominis sed tempo rum.] The decline of Roman values is one of the themes underlying this work; see Index of Topics s.v. "Golden age, ethical.** Cicero might have added that it is this action, too, that makes him an example of magnitudo animi (cf. § 115). nullum enim vinculum ad astringendam fidem iureiurando maiores artius esse voluerunt. indicant leges in duodecim tabulis, indicant sacratae, indicant foedera, quibus etiam cum hoste devincitur 6des . . .] On the basis inter alia of this passage, the earliest business transactions by sponsio or stipulatio have been regarded as one kind of early oath-taking ceremony; cf. Kaser, Privatrecht, 1,168-69 and n. 24. On the connection of fides and oaths cf. ad § 104. As our sentence itself implies, however, fides could take other forms than merely adherence to sworn oaths; cf. Freyburger, 232 ff.—For the phrase fidem astringere (= "to pledge one's word, give a solemn promise") cf. OLD s.v. astringo 8c; Miinscher, TLL 2,963.25 ff.—Our passage = FJRA, 1, 74.6, referred by Dirksen to Lex XII 8.23 = Gel. 20.1.53: . . . si non ilia etiam ex duodecim tabulis de testimoniis falsis poena abolevisset et si nunc quoque, ut antea, qui falsum testimonium dixisse convictus essett e saxo Tarpeio deiceretur . . . ; cf. Mommsen, Strafr., 668,1.—The leges sacratae, an institution common to the ancient Italian peoples, are those reinforced by oath, as that sworn by the plebs to avenge any harm done to the tribunes; cf. Liv. 2.33.3; Mommsen, Staatsr., 2, 286-87, n. 2; Altheim, 2, 37; Ernst Meyer, Romischer Staat und Staatsgedanke, 3d ed. (Zurich and Stuttgart, 1964), 45.—For foedera cf. material collected by Hatto H. Schmitt, Die Staatsvertrage der griechisch-romischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr. (Munich, 1969). . . . indicant notiones animadversionesque censorum, qui nulla de re diligentius quam de iureiurando iudicabant.] This assertion is supported by the censors' treatment of the ten captives who, in spite of their oath, did not
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return to Hannibal after failure of their mission: cf. 1.40 and $ 115, with evidence adduced from Acilius (hist. fr. 3). 112 The example of T. Manlius extracting by force an oath from the tribune M. Pomponius that he will drop his suit against the elder Manlius is ostensi bly included in order to illustrate how seriously oaths were taken in early Rome (tantum temporibus Hits iusiurandum valebat). By the associative method of composition sometimes observed in Off., the exemplum causes Cicero to add a brief digression on the same Manlius' greatest exploit, the slaying of a Gaul in single combat. L. Manlio A. f., cum dictator fuisset, M. Pomponius tribunus plebis diem dixit, quod is paucos sibi dies ad dictaturam gerendam addidisset;. . .] Dur ing a plague of the year 363, it was remembered that a pestilence had once been dispelled when a dictator had performed the ceremony of driving a nail into the wall of the sanctuary of Jupiter Capitolinus; the practice was now revived and L. Manlius appointed dictator clavifigendi causa (Liv. 7.3.3-4); cf. MRR 1, 117-18; Munzer, RE 14.1 (1928), 1177.15 ff. (on the name— un-Roman because of the absence of the expected assimilation of consonants—ibid., 1149.10 ff); A. von Premerstein, ibid., 4 (1901), 2.19 ff. s.v. clavis; Liebenam, ibid., 5 (1905), 383.45 ff. s.v. dictator. The ceremony was to be performed on the ides of September (Liv. 7.3.5). Mommsen, Staatsr., 2, 161 and n. 2, argues that the early dictators were appointed for military campaign, assumed to be confined to the summer months; hence the earliest formula for appointment contained the words in sex menses. This stipulation was presumably omitted for dictators appointed, like Manlius, for a specific purpose, it being assumed that the dictatorship lapsed upon completion of the task; however, ambiguity might have been entailed. Livy states that Manlius wanted to wage war with the Hernici but desisted from the attempt (7.3.9: qua de causa creatus L. Manlius, perinde ac reigerendae ac non solvendae religionis gratia creatus esset, helium Hernicum adfectans dilectu acerbo iuventutem agitavit; tandemque omnibus in eum tribunis plebis coortis seu vi seu verecundia victus dictatura abiit). Marianne Eliz abeth Hartfield, The Roman Dictatorship: Its Character and Its Evolution (Ph.D. diss., Berkeley, 1982), offers an analysis of the historical development of the uses of the office but seems to be of two minds about the historicity of Manlius' harsh levy (contrast 272-73 and 369-70). . . . criminabatur etiam quod Titum filium, qui postea est Torquatus ap pellants, ab hominibus relegasset et run habitare iussisset.] A curious charge, hardly actionable. Yet it also appears, with pathetic embellishment, at Liv. 7.4.4 ff.: criminique ei tribunus inter cetera dabat quod filium iuvenem nullius probri compertum, extorrem urbe, domo, penatibus, foro, luce, con-
Commentary on Book 3, Section 111-12
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gressu aequalium prohibitum, in opus servile, prope in careerem atque in ergastulum dederit, ubi summo loco natus dictatorius iuvenis cotidiana miseria disceret vere imperioso patre se natum esse, at quam oh noxam? quia infacundior sit et lingua impromptus. The unexpected inclusion of these domestic circumstances in political debate was surely, in light of the denoue ment, to point the lesson that the Roman son remained loyal even to an unfair father (Liv. 7.5.7: eoque id laudabilius erat quod animum eius tanta acerbitas patria nihil a pietate avertisset); cf. Munzer, RE 14.1 (1928), 1180.24 ff.; it also provides the reason why Pomponius was prepared to speak with Titus remotis arbitris. Munzer, ibid., 14 ff., compares the case of L. Junius Brutus but thinks that the anecdote, including this justification, might yet be "ein Stuck alter Familientradition." However, the energy and effectiveness of the younger Torquatus in foiling Pomponius' prosecution are incompatible with dullness; note, too, that Brutus put his sons to death for plotting to restore the monarchy (cf. D.H. 8.79.2, who compares Manlius and Brutus in this respect). However much of the saga of the Manlii may be historical, such details as his slowness of speech and his relegation to the countryside have been added on the model of Brutus and of Roman comedy, where being sent to work on the farm is an unwelcome fate for sons: cf. PI. Ba. 899 (Mnesilochus); Cist. 225-26 (Alcesimarchus' father has kept him on the farm; hence he could not see his arnica for six successive days); Merc. 61 68 (Charinus' father was kept on the farm by his father); True. 645 (where, however, Strabax's trip to the farm results in an unexpected windfall); cf. also the play of Caecilius (probably the Hypobolimaeus; cf. com., pp. 4 7 - 4 8 n.) that Cicero cites at Sex. Rose. 46 in refuting the charge that the elder Sextus Roscius' delegation of his son to farm duty proved odium.—Livy adds a more substantial charge not mentioned by Cicero: acerbitas in dilectu, non damno modo civium sed etiam laceratione corporum lata, partim virgis caesis qui ad nomina non respondissent, partim in vincula duetts, invisa erat . . . (7.4.2). quod cum audivisset adulescens filius—tantum temporibus illis iusiurandum valebat.J Cf. the somewhat more circumstantial version at Livy 7.5.3 ff.: inscientibus cunctis cultro succinctus mane in urbem atque a porta domum confestim ad M. Pomponium triburtum pergit; ianitori opus esse sibi domino eius convento extemplo ait; nuntiaret T. Manlium L. ftlium esse, mox introductus—etenim percitum ira in patrem spes erat aut criminis aliquid novi aut consilii ad rem agendam deferre—salute accepta redditaque esse ait quae cum eo agere arbitris remotis velit. procul inde omnibus abire iussis cultrum stringit et super lectum starts ferro intento, nisi in quae ipse concepisset verba iuraret se patris eius accusandi causa concilium plebis nun-
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quam habiturum, se eum extemplo transftxurum minatur. pavidus tribunus, quippe qui ferrum ante ocuios micare, se solum inermem, ilium praevalidum iuvenem et, quod baud minus timendum erat, stolide ferocem viribus suis cemeret, adiurat in quae adactus est verba . . . Soltau, 1242, argues plausi bly that Livy and Cicero both follow CI. Quadrigarius. atque hie T. Manlius is est—et qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in filium.] This sentence was athetized by J. A. Ernesti with the com ment "haec si abessenr, nemo desideraret"; he was followed by Baiter. But Unger, 101, pointed out, quite properly, that, even so, inauthenticity is not the inevitable consequence. Ernesti's position was revived, however, with detailed argumentation by Briiser, 3 7 - 4 2 , and has won the support of Atzert 4 and Fedeli, though not of Testard or Winterbottom. Apart from a passing allusion in the treatment of anger at Tusc. 4.49 (ego ne Torquatum quidem ilium, qui hoc cognomen invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse . . .), Cicero's other references to the early Manlii are in connection with L. Manlius Torquatus, who represents the Epicurean doctrine at Fin. 1-2. As an adulescentulus (Cic. Fin. 2.62) Torquatus col laborated in the successful prosecution of P. Sulla de ambitu, which cleared the way for his father's victory in the new election for consul of 65. Both under his father's consulate and that of Cicero he was involved in planning countermeasures against Catiline. In 62 he prosecuted the same Sulla de vi for his part in the Catilinarian conspiracy; when Cicero undertook the defense he was subjected to a barrage of aristocratic criticism for the regnum that he, a municipals, was establishing at Rome {Sull. 2 1 - 2 3 , 48). As a cultivated member of Rome's jeunesse doree in the 50s, Manlius received an epithalamium from the pen of Catullus {c. 6 1 ; cf. vv. 16, 209, 215). During his praetorship (49), he took the Pompeian side; after Thapsus he tried to sail to Metellus Scipio in Spain but, surrounded by enemy ships, committed suicide; cf. Munzer, RE 14.1 (1928), 1203.3 ff. In spite of the contretemps of 62, Cicero remembered the recently deceased Manlius fondly in his writings of 4 6 - 4 5 ; note, besides Fin. 1-2, the praise of his gifts as an orator at Brut. 265. Fin. 1-2 are set in the year 50, when Torquatus was praetor designatus (2.74). When asked what it is about Epicurus' doctine that he disapproves (1.17), Cicero, to make his reply relevant to his interlocutor, says inter alia: ac fieri potest, ut errem, sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum, qui hoc primus cognomen invenerit, aut torquem ilium hosti detraxisse, ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem, aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu conflixisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem; quod veto securi percussit filium, privavisse se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amort praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperii (ibid., 1.23). Tor-
Commentary on Book 3, Section 112
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quatus, however, counters that in acting as he did in both cases his ancestor thought, if not de voluptatibus, at least de commodis suis (1.34; cf. 2.60-61) since the defeat of the Gaul earned him laudem et carita tern, quae sunt vitae sine metu degendae praesidia firmissima, and in executing his son saluti prospexit avium, qua intellegebat contineri suam (1.35). In his reply Cicero first imagines the older Torquatus' disapproval of his descendant's attribu tion of motives: utrum tandem censes, Torquate, Imperiosum ilium, si nostra verba audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum fuisse an meam, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse sua causa omniaque reipublicae, tu contra nihil nisi sua? (2.60; cf. the similar tactic of her ancestor's imagined disap proval of Clodia at Cael. 33-34). He returns to the subject in a similar vein in arguing against the Epicureans' right to teach about virtue (cf. ad Off. 1.5 and §§ 116-20): si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto {Fin. 2.73). Our sentence is a digression within a digression; it is, however, not to be tampered with. The passages just cited from Tusc. and Fin. make it clear that T. Manlius was admired by Cicero; he, like Regulus, was a man who could be said nihil. . . fecisse sua causa omniaque reipublicae (Fin. 2.60). The case previously cited by Cicero, his intervention to compel Pomponius' with drawal of the suit, could only be approved with some qualification (cf. Livy's comment: . . . non civilis exempli, tamen pietate laudabile: 7.5.2). Hence Cicero evidently felt the need to redress the balance by narrating his glorious victory over the Gaul and alluding to his severity in punishing his son, both acts which were, in Livy's terminology, civilis exempli. The narration is thus not merely an association triggered by the phrase qui postea est Torquatus appellatus, as Bruser, 40, suggested (attributing our sentence to expansion by an ancient editor) and Thomas, 39, still too much influenced by Bruser, agreed (though seeing it as a Ciceronian association); rather it probably arises from the felt need to do justice to a family that had lost a distinguished scion in the recently ended civil war.93 Furthermore, as Thomas, 3 9 - 4 0 , pointed out, this text also bears upon the father/son relation, an important theme in this work (see introduction, $ 4); Cicero formulates Manlius' posi tion pointedly (. . . qui perindulgens in patrem, idem acerbe severus in fi93. Soltau, 1240-41, had argued against the hypothesis that our passage is an interpolation on grounds that this saga and the preceding narrative of Torquatus* action against the tribune correspond to Livy's account (6.42.5 and 7.5 respectively), and he suggested that our text reflects "Lcscfruchtc Ciccros"; this may be the effect, but not the cause. The anecdote of the Gaul corresponds to Quadngarius hist. fr. 10h.
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Hum); as in the case of Regulus the utilitas reipublicae must take precedence over personal feelings (cf. 5M//. 32: an vero clarissimum virum generis vestri ac nominis nemo reprehendit, qui ftlium suum vita privavit ut in ceteros firmaret imperium . . . f Cicero does not consider whether this can still be said to be secundum naturam; Fin. 1.23, quoted above, would suggest other wise). For other examples of material added afterward rather than integrated into context cf. ad 2.19b-20a. The stylistic objections raised by Briiser, 4 1 , have been adequately met by Thomas, 40 (for the connection with atque cf. ad § 13b above). atque hie T. Manlius is est qui ad Anienem Galli, quern ab eo provocatus occiderat, torque detracto cognomen invenit. . .J Livy narrates the encoun ter at 7.9.6 ff. (cf. also 6.42.5 = CI. Quadrigarius hist. fr. 10a); Manlius' insistence on obtaining his commander's approval before undertaking single combat (Liv. 7.10.2: 'iniussu tuo'inquit, 'imperator, extra ordinem nunquam pugnaverim . . .') is, of course, for the sake of contrast with his son; cf. Miinzer, RE 14.1 (1928), 1181.9 ff. . . . idem acerbe severus in filium.] Torquatus went on to hold the consulate thrice (347, 344, 340); in his last year in office he defeated the Latins at the Veseris River. Prior to the battle it was decided that strictest discipline must be observed since the enemy were kindred in language, customs, weaponry, etc.; it was therefore strictly forbidden to fight outside the ranks (Liv. 8.6.1516). On a scouting expedition the consul's son encountered Tusculan cavalry under Geminus Maecius, who challenged him to single combat. Like his father before the Gaul, young Torquatus accepted the challenge and defeated his opponent. When he returned to camp with his gear, his father ordered him executed by the lictor for disobedience (Liv. 8.7.1 ff.; after decorating him for bravery, according to D.H. 8.79.2); cf. Miinzer, loc. cit., 1186.8 ff.; MRR 1,135-36. Besides the passages cited above cf. Sal. Cat. 52.30 (Cato's speech) and Verg. Aen. 6.824-25. 113-15 As at 1.40, the story of the ten noble Romans whom, in the after math of Cannae, Hannibal despatched under oath to convey an offer of prisoners for ransom serves as a counterpoint to Regulus' action. In the earlier passage Cicero (relying on memory?) states that all ten perjured them selves by refusing to return to Hannibal. In the meantime he has consulted several historical narratives to provide greater detail, although they differ in some respects {de quibus non omnes uno modo: § 113). He gives a circum stantial account (with some moralizing added) after Polybius, who states that nine captives returned, whereas the one who had returned to camp briefly on the pretext of having forgotten something remained at Rome. A comparison with PIb. 6.58 shows Cicero, albeit not translating verbatim, following his
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 112-13
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source fairly closely (see below), 94 a fact that ought to be borne firmly in mind in studies of Cicero's use of his Panaetian model in Books 1-2; he adds that Acilius states that there were several captives who returned briefly to camp and on this basis remained at Rome. In the course of criticizing the perjurer(s), however, Cicero gives the exemplum a new direction by inter preting, again after Polybius, the way the Roman people as a whole re sponded to Hannibal's offer as an example of magnitude* animi; he thus provides an additional point of contrast to the perjurer(s) and adroitly con nects the episode with the theme of the entire section (after the digression of §S 111-12) in such a way that the perjury is seen as an aberration from the (earlier) Roman norm. 113 . . . ex decern nobilissimis qui turn erant missi novem revertisse dicit re a senatu non impctrata; unum ex decern, qui paulo post quam erat egressus e castris redisset quasi aliquid esset oblitus, Romae remansisse. reditu enim in castra libcratum scesse iureiurando interpretabatur . . . ] Cf. Plb. 6.58.3: των δέ προχειρισαμένων δέκα τους επιφανέστατους, όρκίσας ή μην επανή^ειν προς αυτόν, εξέπεμψε τούτους. εΤς δε τώνπροχειρισθεντωνεκπορευόμενοςεκ τοϋ χάρακος ήδη, καί τι φήσας έπιλελήσθαι, πάλιν άνέκαμφε, και λαβών τό καταλειφθέ ν αύθις άπελύετο, νομίμων διά της αναχωρήσεως τετηρηκεναι την πίστιν και λελυκεναι τον ορκον; Liv. 22.58.8: cum egressi castris essent, unus ex Us, minime Romani ingenii homo, velut aliquid oblitus, iuris iurandi solvendi causa cum in castra redisset, ante noctem comites adsequitur. Soltau, 1243, would infer from the fact that both Cicero and Gel. 6.18.3 include the condition under which the captives need not return that both are follow ing Quadrigarius; but the sequel makes it clear that this is what was meant, so that the detail could have been filled in separately by the two authors (and Gellius could, of course, depend on Cicero). . . . non recte: fraus enim astringit, non dissolvit periurium.] Vetter, TLL 5, 1550.49-50, rightly calls distringit (ζ for astringit) dubious or corrupt. Though Fedeli still appeals to the defense of distringit by Goldbacher, 2, 7 5 77, who thought that the "naive beliefn of the agent helped to reduce the guilt of perjury, this interpretation is, of course, as Bruser, 16, saw, at odds with Cicero's text, which speaks of stulta calliditas, perverse imitata prudentiam but gives no hint that the agent's culpability is thereby reduced. Surely, as Shackleton Bailey suggests, astringit was chosen for contrast with dissolvit. Cicero doubtless regarded our case in the same light as the one 94. Though Cicero used Quadrigarius in this sector (cf. ad J 112 n.}, Soltau, 1242-46, was quite mistaken to claim that that annalist is the common source of Cicero and Livy and that Cicero consulted neither Polybius nor Acilius directly.
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described at Fin. 2.54: non igitur de improbo, sed {de) callido improbo quaerimus, qualis Q. Potnpeius . . . (cf. § 109). Translate: "deceit does not mitigate perjury but makes it worse. w itaque decrevit senatus ut ille veterator et callidus vinctus ad Hannibalem duceretur.] Cf. Plb. 6.58.12: διό και ταύτα [sc. οι 'Ρωμαίοι] προθεμ€νοι του? μεν εννέα τών πρεσβευτών εθελοντήν κατά τόν δρκον άναχωρουντα? εξέπεμ ψαν, τόν δε σοφισάμενον προ? τό λυσαι τόν δρκον δήσαντε? αποκατάστησαν προ? του? πόλε μίου? . . . ; Li ν. 22.61.4: unus ex its domum abut, quod fallaci reditu in castra iure iurando se exsoluisset. quod ubi innotuit relatumque ad senatum est, omnes censuerunt comprehendendum et custodibus publice datis deducendum ad Hannibalem esse. Note that the detail of returning the perjurer bound {vinctus, δήσαντε?) links the Ciceronian and Polybian acounts. Cicero likes to sec the senate get credit in such cases; cf. ad § 86. The senate's involvement could have been added independently by Cicero and Livy; or perhaps both followed Quadrigarius in this respect; but Ciceronian use of Polybius is not thereby placed in doubt; contrast Soltau, 1243-44, who tries to use this point to support his thesis. 114 octo hominum milia tenebat Hannibal, non quos in acie cepisset, aut qui periculo mortis defugissent, sed qui relicti in castris fuissent a Paulo et a Varrone consulibus.J Cf. Plb. 6.58.2: 'Αννίβα? γάρ επειδή τη περί Κάνναν μάχη περί γενόμενο? 'Ρωμαίων εγκρατή? εγενετο τών τόν χάρακα φυλαττόντωνόκτακισχιλίων.ζωγρήσα? άπαντα?συνεχώρησε διαπεμπεσθαι σφίσι προ? του? εν οϊκω περί λύτρων και σωτηρία?; cf. 58.6. According to Livy, on the other hand, most of them took part in the battle and withdrew to camp in the evening (22.59.3 and 9; 60.25); T. Manlius Torquatus (cos. I 235) in his successful plea against the ransoming argues that they should have fled the camp that night (60.8 ff.). eos senatus non censuit redimendos, cum id parva pecunia fieri posset, ut esset insitum militibus nostris aut vincere aut emori.] On the amount of money cf. Li v. 22.58.4: pretium fore in capita equiti quingenos quadrigatos nummos, trecenos pediti, servo centenos (cf. 22.57.12: pretio minore). Cf. Plb. 6.58.5: ων παραγ€νομ€νων ei? τήν 'Ρώμην, και δ€ομ€νων και παρακαλουντων τήν σύγκλητον μη φθονήσαι τοϊ? έαλωκόσι τη? σωτηρία?, αλλ* έάσαι τρει? μνά? έ'καστον καταβαλόντα σωθήναι προ? του? αναγκαίου?; ibid., 11: . . . τοΐ? δέ παρ* αυτών ενομοθετησαν ή νικάν μαχόμενου? ή θνήσκειν, ώ? άλλη? οΰδεμιά? ελπίδο? ύπαρχούση? ει? σωτηρίαν αύτοΐ? ήττωμενοι?.—The spectre of Roman captives growing old in the land of their new masters, as in the case of Crassus 1 troops defeated at Carrhae in 55, was what, according to Horace (Carm. 3.5.5 ff.), Regulus had acted to prevent: milesne Crassi coniuge barbara I turpis maritus vixit et hostium I (pro Curia inversique mores!)
Commentary on Book 3, Section 113-15
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/ consenuit socerorum in arvis95 I sub rege Medo Marsus et Apulus, I anciliorum et nominis et togae I oblitus aeternaeque Vestae, I incolumi love et urbe Roma? I hoc caverat mens provida Reguli . . . In making Regulus* mission involve negotiating not only his own exchange but that of the captiva pubes as well (ibid., 18), Horace seems to conflate the cases of Regulus and those captured in the aftermath of Cannae. 9 6 In this way he was able to construe a stark contrast between Regulus and Crassus* men.—According to Livy (22.61.1-2), an additional consideration was that the money would give Hannibal further advantage in the war. Heilmann, 7 2 - 7 3 , emphasizes that the decision was inhumane and that Cicero passes over this fact in silence. In calling the senate's decision a triste responsum (22.61.3) and characterizing its champion, T. Manlius Torquatus, as priscae ac nimis durae, ut plerisque videbatur, severitatis (22.60.5), Livy presents a more balanced picture. But balance is, of course, not what Cicero was aiming at; he wanted rather to inculcate a heroic moral code such as he found in Rome of the Second Punic War and earlier (cf. § 47).—In fact, the captives were sold in Greece; some were freed in 194 by Flamininus (cf. Liv. 34.50.3 ff.). qua quidem re audita fractum animum Hannibalis scribit idem, quod senatus populusque Romanus rebus adflictis tam excelso animo fuisset.] Cf. Plb. 6.58.13: . . . ιϋστβ τον Άννίβαν μη τοσούτον χαρήναι νικήσαντα τη μάχη 'Ρωμαίους ώς συντριβήναι καταπλαγ^ντα τό στάσιμον και το μβγαλόψυχον τών ανδρών ev τοις διαβουλίοι?. On the magnitudo animi of the Roman people cf. § 47 and ad 1.61; on the unflappability of the μβγαλόψυχος cf. ad 1.71-73 and 80.—The chiastic arrangement of nouns and attributes heightens the contrast (rebus afflictis . . . excelso animo); cf. $ 2, where Cicero had eschewed chiasmus in two sentences where it could have been deployed. 115 C. Acilius autem—a censoribus omnibus ignominiis notatos.] Bruser, 4 2 - 4 8 , argued for the athetesis of this sentence and convinced Atzerr 4 and Fedeli, though not Testard or Winterbottom. Not only the hypothesis itself but also the amount of support it has garnered is very surprising in view of Cicero's announcement non omnes uno modo ($ 113) with its implication that several versions will follow. Bruser's theory requires him to assume that though Cicero wrote non omnes uno modo (he does nor propose to bracket these words) he nevertheless forgot to include a variant to Polybius' account; an ancient editor noticed this omission, looked up Acilius* version, and 95. arvis Fabcr : armis IU. 96. For other parallels that point in the same direction cf, KieKling-Heinzc ad Hon Carm. 3.5.25 and 31.
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added it to Cicero's text. But there is no reason to suspect that such learned activity was carried on by an ancient editor of Off (cf. ad 1.40); Bruser himself (45) speaks of the "durchgangige(n) Minderwertigkeit der Interpolationen in de officiis." Surely it is far more likely that Cicero himself carried out the research which underlies non ontnes uno modo and recorded the result, as in the transmitted text. Bruser's violation of Occam's razor was motivated by the notion that it was "ganz unglaublich . . . , da£ Cicero drei verschiedene Versionen (1.40, 3.113, 3.115) ein und desselben Ereignisses angefuhrt haben s o i r (46; even when he has announced (5 113] that there are various versions to report? and when all three versions are independently attested (see below]?) and that our sentence destroys the structure of the passage (42), i.e., it seems anticlimactic after the words sic honestatis comparatione ea quae videntur utilia vincuntur, which form an apparent conclu sion to the exemplum. But, as we have seen {ad 2.19b-20a), it is a composi tional method in Off. to add new material at the end of a section, in this case, the material from Acilius (= hist. 3) following upon that of Polybius. The words sit iam huius loci finis attempt to restore order; they would be super fluous if sic honestatis comparatione ea quae videntur utilia vincuntur had immediately preceded (as they do if one adopts Briiser's athetesis). Would Cicero have altered this arrangement had he come back to the manuscript to add the summa manusf Thomas, 38,—still perhaps too much influenced by Bruser—thinks so; cf., in general, Thomas, 35-38.—Cf. the account (after Acilius?) at Gel. 6.18.9-10: duo reliqui Romae manseruntsolutosque esse se ac liheratos religione dicebant, quoniam, cum egressi castra hostium fuissent, commenticio consilio regressi eodemt tamquam si ob aliquant fortuitam causam, issent atque ita iureiurando satisfacto rursum iniurati abissent. haec eorum fraudulent^ calliditas tarn esse turpis existimata est, ut contempti vulgo discerptique sint censoresque eos postea omnium notarum et damnis et ignominiis adfecerint, quoniam, quod facturos deieraverant, non fecissent. On the other hand, Off. 1.40 agrees with an alternate version given by Livy (22.61.7-9); cf. ad loc.—On ignominia imposed by the cen sors cf. Mommsen, Staatsr., 2, 382-83, with 383, n. 1; on their miserable subsequent fate see Nepos (fr. 12) apud Gel. 6.18.11 (. . . usque adeo intestabiles invisosque fuisse, ut taedium vitae ceperint necemque sibi consciverint)\ sim. Liv. 22.61.9. perspicuum est enim ea quae rimido animo, humili demisso fractoque fiant . . . non esse utilia quia sint flagitiosa foeda turpia.] The piling up of syn onymous terms for emphasis is a well-known feature of Cicero's speeches (cf. Quint. Inst. 8.4.26 and 9.3.45-46, in the latter place citing the famous abiit excessit eruptt evasit of Cat. 2.1) but not alien to the aequabile et tern-
Commentary on Book 3, Sections 115 and 116-20
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peratum orationis genus of the philosophica (1.3), especially when, as here, a point needs to be restated emphatically at the conclusion of an argument. 116-20 These sections ought, according to the divisio of § 96, to comprise a discussion of the conflict of the apparent utile with the fourth virtue, decorum. In fact, Cicero, evidently finding no pertinent model, on the pretext that pleasure is contrary to the fourth virtue, inserts in this place a general discussion of pleasure and its relation to the finis bonorum similar to that in the essay de Finibus. The premise implicit here was stated at Luc. 138: testatur saepe Chrysippus tris solas esse sententias quae defendi possint de finibus bonorum: . . . aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrum{que). Within our section $$ 116-18, a virtual precis of Fin. 2.45 ff., pursue the attack adumbrated at 1.5-6 on the Epicureans' right to teach about the virtues (i.e., on voluptas as the finis bonorum). In this passage temperantia represents the fourth virtue, but is not, as one would have expected, specially emphasized. Cicero had completed Div. the previous spring; at 1.62 of that work he had written of Epicurus: sentit autem nihil umquam elegans, nihil decorum. That feeling might have been reason enough for Cicero to use this as an opportunity to launch yet another assault against Epicureanism; but more probably the deployment of this argument results from an association with Regulus, whom he had deployed in the attack on the Epicurean conception of the virtues at Fin. 2.65. Packer com plains of the inadequacy of Cicero's handling of Epicurean ethics (explained as a failure to grasp the system as a whole); certainly Cicero's account of the subject is unsympathetic and does not allow the Epicureans to state their best case; but it fulfills his own purposes admirably; cf. Ι π wood, 1990, as well as Michael C. Stokes, "Cicero on Epicurean Pleasures," in Powell, 145-70, who finds the presentation of the subject in Fin. more reliable than had been thought. Cicero likewise rejects (§ 119) the halfway position of Callipho and Dinomachus, who defined the summum bonum so as to include both virtue and pleasure. In contrast to his procedure elsewhere in this Book, no casuis tic cases, real or hypothetical, are cited. This conclusion to the argument is unexpected; it amounts to a reaffirma tion of what had, in view of 1.5-6, been the premise all along. Perhaps the inclusion of this material was conditioned by the fact that Cicero is speaking not only as a philosopher but also as a father to a son already prey to the temptations of the flesh (cf. introduction, § 4) 9 7 and that he is eager to bring this Book to term. 97. Cf. the general observation of Gigon, 268, that "in De officiis eben nicht argumentiert, sondern doziert wird . . .**
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116 Restat quarta pars, quae decore moderatione modestia continentia temperantia continetur.] On the factors that caused Cicero to deploy various synonyms for the fourth virtue cf. ad 1.93; on the use of continentia cf. ad §96. potest igitur quicquam utile esse quod sit huic talium virtutum choro contrarium?] For the iunctura virtutum chorus cf. Tusc. 5.13 (following a refer ence to constantia gravitas fortitudo sapientia reliquaeque virtutes):. . . iste chorus virtutum in eculeum impositus . . . 116-17 atqui ab Aristippo—ut a Metrodoro scriptum e s t . . .] This passage derives from a doxographical source similar to that used at Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21 (184.18 ff. Stahlin-Friichtel-Treu):. . . οι δε Άννικερειοι καλούμενοι έκ της Κυρηναϊκής διαδοχής του μεν δλου βίου τέλος ουδέν ώρισμένον έταξαν, έκαστης δε πράξεως ίδιον ύπάρχειν τέλος την εκ της πράξεως περιγινομενην ήδονήν. ούτοι οι Κυρηναικοί τον δρον της ηδονής Επικούρου, τουτεστι τήν του άλγούντος ύπεξαίρεσιν, άθετοϋσιν, νεκρού κατάστασιν άποκαλοΰντες· χαί ρει ν γαρ ημάς μη μόνον επί ήδοναις, αλλά και έπι όμιλίαις και έπι φιλοτιμίσις. ό δε Επίκουρος πάσαν χαράν της ψυχής οϊεται επί πρωτοπαθούση τη σαρκί γενέσθαι, ο τε Μητρόδωρος έν τω περί του μείωνα είναι την παρ' ημάς αίτίαν προς εύδαιμονίαν τής εκ των πραγμάτων "αγαθόν" φησι "ψυχής τί άλλο ή το σαρκός ευσταθές κατάστημα και το περί ταύτης πιστόν ελπισμα;" 116 atqui ab Aristippo Cyrenaici atque Annicerii philosophi nominati — ] "The philosophers who are called, after Aristippus, Cyrenaics, and those who are called Annicerians" (Laughton, 68, while admitting that it is unusual for the noun philosophi to separate the participle from its predicate). I sus pect that here (and possibly also at Sen. 78, cited p. 548, n. 37, which would pose the same problem of word-order if nominati = "called") we have nomi nati = "famous" (cf. OLD s.v. nomino 10, Forcellini s.v. sub fin.); for ab applied to philosophers = "from the school of" cf. OLD s.v. 17.c. 98 Our passage = Aristipp. fr 221A Mannebach = Cirenaici fr. IB 43 = Socr. IVA 189. Our documentation on the hedonists is incomplete and mostly late. Giannantoni, Cirenaici, esp. 70 ff., as well as Socr., 4,169 ff., has questioned whether, in fact, the Cyrenaic doctrines derive from Aristippus (ca. 4 2 5 355), whom he sees rather as a "Lebenskiinstler" than a philosopher; in this argument Eusebius* denial that Aristippus spoke about the τέλος {ΡΕ
98. Rcid's minuti for nominati (proposed ad Luc. 75) has been revived by Gorier, 1974,7778, n. 33; Cicero uses the epithet of the Epicurean school at Div. 1.62 and (probably) Sen. 85 {sin mortuus ut quidam minuti philosophi censent nihil sentiam . . .), so that it is tempting per se to restore it here for those whom he regards as the forerunners of the Epicureans. Cf. Winterbottom's apparatus, where nominati is qualified as vix sanum.
Commentary on Book 3» Section 116-17
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14.18.31) plays an important role (on this passage cf., however, F. Wehrli, Gnomon 31 |1959|, 413). Did D.L. systematize on the analogy of the other schools that had a founder who laid out basic doctrine? The question is also complicated by the fact that Aristippus had a grandson of the same name who was also a Cyrenaic philosopher. D.L. 2.93 ff. gives the major sects of the Cyrenaics as the Ήγησιακοί, the Άννικέρειοι, and the θεοδώρειοι. Anniceris of Cyrene was, according to Su. α 2466, a friend of Aristippus* pupil Paraebatus. The hedonism of the Annicerii was less thoroughgoing than that of the Hegesiaci and left room for friendship, gratitude, regard for parents, and action in behalf of one's country (D.L. 2.96); the sparse testimonies for Anniceris are collected at Cirenaici, pp. 4 5 1 - 5 3 , and Socr. IVG. . . . omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt. . .] Cf. D.L. 2.87: δοκεΐ δ' αύτοϊς και τέλος ευδαιμονία? διαφέρει ν. τέλος μεν γαρ είναι την κατά μέρος ήδονήν, εΰδαιμονίαν δε το έκ τών μερικών ηδονών σύστημα, αΐς συναριθμοϋνται καΐ αί παρωχηκυΐαι και αί μέλλουσαι. . . . virtutemque censuerunt ob earn rem esse laudandam, quod efficiens esset voluptatis; . . .] Cf. D.L. 2.91: την φρόνησιν αγαθόν μεν είναι λέγουσιν, οίι δι* έαυτήν δε α'ιρετήν, αλλά διά τά εξ αυτής περί γινόμενα. . . . quibus obsoletis floret Epicurus, eiusdem fere adiutor auctorque sententiae.l Here, as at Fin. 1.23 (cf. 26), Cicero brings in Aristippus in order to discredit Epicurus' originality. Similarly the Ciceronian Cotta condemns Epi curean physics as derivative from Democrirus; cf. N.D. 1.73 with Pease's note. cum his viris equisque, ut dicitur, . . . decertandum est.] This proverbial phrase (of military provenance) for deployment of all available resources recurs at Fam. 9.7.1 (to Varro; May, 46): dubitandum non est quirt equis viris; cf. Otto, 126; Wolfflin, 212. 117 nam si non modo utilitas sed vita omnis beata corporis firma constitutione eiusque constitutionis spe explorata, ut a Metrodoro scriptum est, continetur . . .] Metrodorus of Lampsacus (ca. 331/30-278/7) was a pupil and friend of Epicurus and one of the four καθηγεμόνες of the Epicurean school (cf. Epicures LIV); cf. Kroll, RE 15.2 (1932), 1477.6 ff.; ad %% 1 Ι ο ί 7; our passage = fr. 5 Korte and is, as Korte notes, virtually a translation of Epicurea, 121.34: το γάρ ευσταθές σαρκός κατάστημα και τό περί ταύτης πιστόν ελπισμα την άκροτάτην χαράν και βεβαιοτάτην έχει τοις έπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις; cf. also Tusc. 2.17 (sim. 5.27): Metrodorus quidem perfecte eum beatum putat, cui corpus bene constitutum sit et exploratum ita semper fore; Fin. 2.92: ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum esse describit his fere verbis: 'cum corpus bene constitutum sit et sit explora tum ita futurum'; cf. also the characterization at N.D. 1.113: accusat enim
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Timocratem fratrem suum Metrodorus, quod dubitet omnia quae ad beatant vitam pertineant ventre metiri. . . . . . certe haec utilitas et quidcm summa (sic enim censenc) cum honestate pugnabit.] Cf. Epicurea, 315.29 = Plut. contra Epic. Beat. 1095f: ούχ ομολογουσι be τω καλώ πολίμβΐν τον άσπονδον και άκήρυκτον πόλίμον; ei 6e μη ηδονή πρόσεστι, τί σεμνόν και καθάριοι/ άσπά£ονται και άγαπώσιν; nam ubi primum prudentiae locus dabitur? an ut conquirat undique suavitates?] Cf. Epicurea, 316.30 = Plut. Stoic. Rep. 1046e: €i μέν ούν την φρόνησιν ήγ€ΐτο [sc. Chrysippusl ποιητικοί/ el ναι της €ύδαιμονίας τι ayaQov, ώσπ€ρ ό Επίκουρος—; Epicurea, 317.1 = Alex. Aphr. de An. 2.22: περί την έκλογήν έστι των ηδέων κατ* Έπίκουρον [sc. ή άρβτή]. quam miser virtutis famulatus servientis voluptati!) In his reply to Torquatus, Cicero (after Cleanthes) conjures up this picture in vivid detail (Fin. 2.69):. . . pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae, quam Cleanthes sane commode verbis depingere solebat. iubebat eos, qui audiebant, secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula Voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem, praesto esse Virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium ducerent, nisi ut Voluptati ministrarent et earn tantum ad aurem admonerent, si modo id pictura intellegi posset, ut caveret ne quid faceret inprudens, quod offenderet animos hominum, aut quicquam, e quo oriretur aliquis dolor, 'nos quidem Virtutes sic natae sumus, ut tibi serviremus, aliud negotii nihil habemus'. Cf. Sen. Vit. Beat. 11.2: egregium autem habet virtus apud vos officium, voluptates praegustare! Ibid., 13.5: virtutem quidem, excelsissimam dominam, voluptati tradere ancillam nihil magnum animo capientis est. quod autem munus prudentiae? an legere intellegenter voluptates?] The rep etition of essentially the same set of rhetorical questions about the role of prudentia in relation to pleasure is a sign of Cicero's haste to bring this essay to a close.—Cf. Fin. 2.52, where after quoting PI. Phdr. 250d (cf. ad\.\5) Cicero adds: cur tandemf an quod ita callida [sc. sapientia] est, ut optime possit architectari voluptates^ quamvis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti dicit, satis fortiter de dolore . . .] Cf. Epicurea, 292A: oi μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως έξάγουσιν, oi δ€ χρόνιοι μέγ€θος ούκ έχουσιν; ibid., 291.15 ff. (including both our passage and Tusc. 2.44). ut si ilium audiam de continentia et temperanaa: dicit ille quidem multa multis locis, sed aqua haeret, ut aiunt.J If Epicurus did in fact speak about continentia and temperantia u in many passages," none of them survives (our passage = Epicurea, p. 316, fr. 514). Phillip Mitsis, Epicurus' Ethical Theory
Commentary on Book 3, Section 117
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(Ithaca and London, 1988), 61, n. 7, presumes that they might have been dealt with under καλώς ίψ. The expression aqua haeret occurs both in our passage and at QF 2.7.2 (a little after 15 May 56): (ab)eram autem quod Idibus et prostridie fuerat dictum de agro Campano actum iri, ut est actum, in hac causa mihi aqua haeret. sed plura quam constitueram. coram enim. For our passage the con text provides help: Cicero clearly mistrusts what Epicurus says about the virtues; the case of continentia and temperantia is compared (ut) with Epi curus' teaching about pain: quamvis enim multis locis dicat Epicurus, sicuti dicit, satis fortiter de dolore, tamen non id spectandum est, quid dicat, sed quid consentaneum sit ei dicere, qui bona voluptate terminaverit, mala dolore-, note also the remark on this subject in % 118: etiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo modo possunt. In other words, Epicurus is trying mightily to argue a difficult case. One could paraphrase: "there are grave impediments or obstacles," sc. illi (referring to Epicurus; cf. W.S. Wart, "Cicero, QF 2.7 (olim 6).2," LCM 5 [1980], 157), in trying to make his case. The origins of proverbial phrases are often difficult or impossible to re cover. Nor is any of the recent reinterprctations of our phrase altogether convincing; cf. LCM 5 (1980), 1 0 7 , 1 3 3 - 3 5 , 1 5 7 , 1 8 5 , and 187-88, as well as Crawford, 155, n. 12. Water is hardly likely to stick in a water-clock; and a reference to stagnant water standing in a farmer's fields would require a great deal that is unexpressed to be understood. The most recent suggestion, that of S. Treggiari, "mihi aqua haeret (Cicero, QF 2.6.2)," LCM 5 (1980), 188, that aqua - urina, would be more convincing if there were an indisputable instance of that usage in Latin; she cites, after Prinz, TLL 2,363.43-44, Petr. 52.6 (aquam foras, vinum intro); but that passage is susceptible of other interpretation (as Treggiari acknowledges); and even if it should be so inter preted, it is evidently, as Prinz indicates, per iocum and hardly a testimony for normal usage, whereas proverbial expressions are ordinarily based upon obvious and indisputable facts and usages. A body of water may be sluggish or stuck within banks (cf. Sen. Thy. 66S67; Luc. 2.214-18), but sticking water is an anomaly, indeed, in normal circumstances, an αδύνατον (it would be expected to soak through or roll off, depending on the texture of the material with which it is in contact). If this is right, Cicero's point would be that, in spite of all the words he spent on the subject, Epicurus' attempt to deal adequately with continentia et temperantia within the framework of his system was doomed to failure. Similarly at QF 2.7.2: in spite of his mighty efforts for the Campanian land bill, by which
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he hoped to lure Pompey away from Caesar, he saw that his effort was doomed (cf. Shackleton Bailey ad loc: "Something like Ί am up against a brick wall'"). The fact that the conferendum for aqua haeret is a passage from a letter suggests that Cicero is again in the realm of the sermo cotidianus; cf. ad S§ 7 7 - 7 8 . est enim temperantia libidinum inimica, libidines autem consectatrices voluptatis.] The chiastic arrangement of attributes with their limiting genitives {libidinum inimica . . . consectatrices voluptatis) helps to clarify a bold ex pression: consectatrix is a άπαξ λεγόμβ vov; and consectator itself is not other wise attested until the fifth century (Vincent Lerinensis; cf. Remme, TLL 4, 385.32 ff.). 118 Cf. the argument that Epicureanism is incompatible with courage and temperance at ft». 2.60 ff. But, contrary to the impression left by Cicero here, Epicureanism, with its ideal of tranquil happiness, offers no incentive to injustice or intemperance; cf. Packer, 91 ff. and 118. atque in his tamen tribus generibus, quoquo modo possunt, non incallide tergiversantur.] The verb tergiversor, used of reluctant or dissimulated be havior, is first attested at Sis. Mil. 6 {quid nunc ostium scalpis? quid tergiversaris nee bene naviter isf)\ Cicero found it a useful description of uncoopera tive witnesses; cf. OLD s.v. He had applied the term to Epicurus at Tusc. 3.41: quid tergiversamur, Epicure, nee fatemur earn nos dicere voluptatem, quam tu idem, cum os perfricuisti, soles dicere? prudentiam introducunt sciential» suppeditantem voluptates, depellentem dolores.] Cf. ad previous paragraph. fortitudinem quoque aliquo modo expediunt, cum tradunt rationem neglegendae mortis, perpetiendi doloris.] Cf. Epicureat 317.3 = Orig. contra (Zeis. 5.47: οϋτω oe καΐ άλλη μέν ή Επικούρου ανδρεία υπομένοντος πόνους δια φυγήν πόνων πλειόνων, άλλη δ* ή του άπό της στοάς δι' αυτήν αίρουμενου πάσανάρ€τήν . . . ;Epicurea, 317.7 = D.L. 10.120: τήν δε άνδρείαν φύσει μή γίνεσθαι, λογισμώ δε τοΰ συμφέροντος. etiam temperantiam inducunt non facillime illi quidem, sed tamen quoquo modo possunt. dicunt enim voluptatis magnitudinem doloris detractione finiri.] Cf. Epicurea, 289.11-12: συμφέρει τώνδε τίνων άπέχεσθαι τών ηδονών, ϊνα μή άλγώμεν άλγηδόνας χαλεπωτέρας; ibid., 13 ff.—Though, as argued here, Epicureanism as well as Stoicism may lead to a reduction of pleasure, the phenomenon is differently grounded in either case; cf. Sen. Wit. Beat. 10.3: temperantia autemt cum voluptates minuat, summi boni iniuria est. tu voluptatem complecteris, ego compesco; tu voluptate frueris, ego
Commentary on Book 3, Section 117-19
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utor; tu Mam summum bonum putas, ego nee bonum; tu omnia voluptatis causa facts, ego nihil. iustitia vacillat vel iacet potius, omnesque eae virtutes quae in communicate ccrnuntur et in societate generis humani. neque enim bonitas nee liberalitas nee comitas esse potest, non plus quam amicitia, si haec non per se expetantur, scd ad voluptatem utilitatemve referantur.J The asyndeton sets off justice from the tria genera of the first sentence of this paragraph.—The inability of justice to subsist with pleasure as the summum bonum is argued at length at Fin. 2.51 - 5 9 ; cf. the critique of Packer, 91.—On the need to cultivate justice per se cf. ad 2.42a; on the doctrine that liberalitas should be awarded on the basis of character and not influenced by the prospect of future reward cf. 2.69-71.—On the appearance of comitas here cf. ad § 24.—At Fin. 1.65-70 Torquatus argues that the view that pleasure is the summum bonum is not deleterious to friendship; cf. the refutation ibid., 2.78 ff.; Sen. Vit. Beat. 15.4: sed ne patriae quidem bonus tutor aut vindex est nee amicorum propugnator, si ad voluptates vergit. Cicero likewise rejects friendships that are entered into for expediency at Fin. 2.72 and Amic. 79 (cf., however, ad 1.56). 119 nam ut utilitatem nullam esse docuimus quae honestati csset contraria, sic omnem voluptatem dicimus honcstati esse contrariam.] The first half of this statement reflects Cicero's position all through this book {utilitatem nullam esse . . . quae honestati esset contraria). The second half is mislead ing, however, since though the passion ήδοι/η can be said to be contrary to honestas, the bodily sensation was allowed in moderation (for the distinction cf. ad 1.69); cf. 1.102 and 106; Philippson, 1930 1 , 357. quo magis reprehendendos Calliphontem et Dinomachum iudico, qui se dirempturos controversiam putaverunt si cum honestate voluptatem tamquam cum homine pecudem copulavissent.] As a "philosophical orator" Cicero introduces the topic shorn of learned detail at Cael. 4 1 : alii cum voluptate dignitatem coniungendam putaverunt, ut res maxime inter se repugnantis dicendi facultate coniungerent;. . .—The school affiliation of Callipho and Dinomachus is unknown. Carneades is the terminus ante quern for the former, since he cited Callipho in his lectures περί τελών (F 5, p. 88, 181 M. = Luc. 139); he is named after Aristo of Chius and Hieronymus of Rhodes in the chronologically ordered doxography on τέλη at Fin. 5.73 and thus doubtless belonged to the second century. Cf. Luc. 131: alii voluptatem finem esse voluerunt, quorum princeps Aristippus, qui Socraten audierat, unde Cyrenaici, post Epicurus, cuius est disciplina nunc notior, nee tamen cum Cyrenaicis de ipsa voluptate consentiens fexspectaveris a Cyrenaicis. . . dissentiens]. voluptatem autem et honestatem finem esse Callipho censuiv.
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Fin. 2.19:. . . Callipho adiunxit ad honestatem voluptatem . . . ;sim. ibid., 2.34-35, 5.21 (where Dinomachus, too, appears) and 73; Tusc. 5.85 (again conjoined with Dinomachus). Callipho did, however, posit that what lacks honestas is far inferior [Tusc. 5.87); but he evidently did not, in Cicero's eyes, qualify for the exceptional status accorded to the Peripatos at 5 11. The two appear to be much closer to the hedonists, however, at Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21 (p. 182.9 Stahlin-Fruchtel-Treu): Δ6ΐι>όμαχο$ δέ και Καλλίφων τέλος elvai «φασαν πάν το καθ' αυτόν ποΐ€Ϊν €ν€κα τοΰ € πι τυγχάνει ν ήδοι/η? και τυγχάι>€ΐν . . . Cf. von Arnim, RE 4 (1901), 2394.3 ff. (Dinomachus) and 10 (1919), 1656.3 ff.—For the characterization of pleasure as bestial cf. 1.105-6. non recipit istam coniunctionem honestas, aspernatur repellit.] The sharp refusal of honestas to enter into any such alliance is underlined by the asyn deton, the emphatically placed negation, the accumulation of quasisynonymous verbal expressions (cf. ad § 115), and the personification (cf. ad S 99b). nee vero finis bonorum et malorum, qui simplex esse debet, ex dissimillimis rebus misceri et tempcrari potest, sed de hoc (magna enim res est) alio loco pluribus;. . . ] Perhaps, unless Cicero's plan to write multa posthac to Marcus jr. (1.4) included a more detailed treatment, a reference to Tusc. 5.84 ff., where four simple views de finibus are distinguished, as well as the view of Dinomachus and Callipho, similarly described to our passage (voluptatem cum honestate Dinomachus et Callipho copulavit. . .); cf. also Fin. 2.35. The preference for a solution that involves no compound of disparate ele ments is, of course, in line with the general Stoic tendency of this work (. . . tres, in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione . . . . una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate: ibid.); he had claimed, however, that his argument would accord equally well with the Peripatetic view (§ 33).—Muretus' deletion of et malorum (see Winterbottom's appa ratus) may be an improvement on the author himself; this would not be the first time Cicero fell into formulaic writing in this essay (cf. ad 1.13). 120 nam, ut tribuamus aliquid voluptati, condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit.] The phrasing is a bit odd, since even a condimen tum must have some utilitas, or it would presumably not be used at all. But Cicero uses utilitas, of course, in the technical sense it has borne throughout this essay, i.e., as a principle determining conduct and identical with the honestum.—The metaphorical use of condimentum is attested as early as Plautus; cf. Cos. 221: nam ubi amor condimentum intent, quoivis placituram (escam) credo and other passages cited by Spelthahn, TLL 4, 142.35 ff. 121 Habes a patre munus, Marce fili, . . .] For the concluding formula cf. ad
Commentary on Book 3, Section 119-21
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1.15a; for the use of munus here (and comparison with its use in the final sentence of the other work dedicated to his son, Part,) cf. LeMoinc, 353-54; ad § 1.—For the variation in the form of address in this chapter from the formal Marce fill to the informal mi Cicero cf. ad\.\. . . . mea quidem sententia magnum, sed perinde erit ut acceperis.] Testard, 1974, 151, sees in these words an allusion to the verse in which Chremes characterizes the advantages enjoyed by Clinia, the son of Menedemus (Han. 195): atque haec perinde sunt ut illius animu qui ea possidet. He cites as parallel ¥am. 7.10.4 (to Trebatius), where Cicero alludes to Hau. 84 (fac. . . ut sciam) and then makes the allusion explicit by citing Hau. 86. But if our passage were meant to contain an identifiable allusion, would Cicero not have had to be similarly explicit about the fact? In any case, our sentence is too insubstantial a peg to support Testard's further theory that Cicero identi fied himself with Menedemus and young Marcus with Clinia in that play. Even if Cicero did entertain such a self-identification (and there is, apart from our passage, no reason to suppose that he did), he would hardly have given indication of the fact here, the identification with a comic figure being out of keeping with the dignitas of a philosophical writer and in particular with the persona of a moralist and Stoic (and father) he has been wearing in this essay (cf. his description of the subject as aptissimum . . . auctoritati meae: 1.4b). Testard points to similarities in the situation of Cicero and of Menedemus in the play (age, difficulties in father/son communication, etc.), but the differences are more striking: Cicero did not push his son to the extreme of entering military service in order to get away from home (to the contrary, young Marcus once wanted to undertake a military project that his father discouraged (cf. ad 2.451); nor does Cicero give evidence of regretting his treatment of young Marcus, let alone punishing himself as a result; quite the contrary, he remarks at § 6:. . . fac ut efficias, neve committas ut, cum omnia suppeditata sint a nobis, tute tibi defuisse videare. quamquam hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi conunentarios tamquam hospites erunt recipiendi; . . .] Cf. Fam. 16.21.8, quoted ad § 6 above. The metaphor of Cicero's three books being received as guests from abroad [hospites) among Cratippus' lecture-notes plays again, as in 1.1-2, on the difference between Roman and Athenian (perhaps also between Stoic and Peripatetic). The tone here is less diffident than in the earlier passage, where Cicero had claimed merely the stylistic benefits of his project for Marcus. . . . sed ut, si ipse venissem Athenas, quod quidem esset factum nisi me e medio cursu clara voce patria revocasset. . .] Cicero had represented the patria as speaking to him (after the model of the personified laws at Pi. Cri. 50c ff.?) most famously at Cat. 1.27 ff. He described the recent volte-face in
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similar terms to Plancus in September: et afui proftciscens in Graeciam et, postea quam de me{di)o cursu rei publicae sum voce revocatus, numquam per M. Antonium quietus fui;. . . (Fam. 10.1.1) but more matter of factly to Brutus: sed animus idem qui semper infixus in patriae cantate discessum ab eius perictdis ferre non potuit. itaque in medio Achaico cursu cum etesiarum diebus Auster me in Italiam quasi dissuasor met consili rettulisset. . . (ad Brut. 1.15.5; July, 43). Our passage is reminiscent of the description of his return from exile at Sest. 5 2 : . . . videtis me tamen in meam pristinam dignitatem brevi tempore doloris interiecto reipublicae voce esse revocatum; sim. Red. Sen. 34 and Red. Pop. 10 (in the former passage the Republic herself goes into exile, Cicero follows, and she brings him back with her). At Red. Sen. 39 Cicero pictures Italy carrying him back from exile on her shoulders (. . . Italia cuncta paene suis umeris reportarit. . .); this passage, rather than the poem de Temporibus Suis (Morel, FPL, Cicero 212, p. 73 = fr. 14 Courtney), is likely to be the source of the mocking allusion at [Sal.] In Cic. 7, as S.J. Harrison, "Cicero's 'De temporibus suis': The Evidence Recon sidered," Hermes 118 (1990), 4 5 5 - 6 3 , at 460, has argued; cf. John Glucker, "As Has Been Rightly Said . . . by Me," LCM 13 (1988), 6-9, and ad 2.5S. . . . sic, quoniam his voluminibus ad te profecta vox est mca, tribues iis temporis quantum poteris, poteris autem quantum voles.] Cf. the similar phrase applied to young Marcus' studies with Cratippus at 1.2, another indication of Cicero's increased self-confidence as he draws this work to a close.—Note the chiastic order, a sign that this final paragraph has been carefully worked up. vale igitur, mi Cicero, tibique persuade esse te quidem mihi carissimum, sed multo fore cariorem si talibus monitis praeceptisque laetabere.] We have not many direct communications from Cicero to his son. There are the four letters written to the entire family when he was either embarking upon or in exile {Fam. 14.1-4, from the year 58) and the rather impersonal Partitiones Oratoriae (from 54). But Off. is the only extant communication addressed to young Marcus as an adult; cf. introduction, § 4.
Addenda et Corrigenda
P. 16, n. 37, II. 1-2: after "Philologus 137 (1993), 52" add u ; Kaster, 328-29". P. 29, n. 62: add sub fin.: "Cf., however, the reservations of Miriam Griffin, 'When Is Thought Political?' Apeiron 29 (1996), 278-80." P. 42, n. 100, 1st line: after "Stcidlc, 1984 and 1985;" add "cf. also Klaus Zelzer, 'Zur Beurteilung der Cicero-Imitatio bci Ambrosius, De officiis,* WS 11 (1977), 168-91, and 'Randbemerkungen zu Absicht und Arbcitsweise dcs Ambrosius in De officiis,' ibid. 29 (1995), 481-93." P. 47,1. 20: after "(translated by Garve as 'Einrichtung unsercr Natur')" add "; cf. Kant, 425; Mekhes Gibert, 82-83". P. 60, last line (1.1): after "Adams, 1978, 148" add "; Zctzel ad Rep. 6.15.4". P. 62, L 23 (1-1): after "Greek and Latin libraries" add "on the Palatine (on which see Raster, 210-11, with literature),". P. 65,1. 14 (1.2): after " . . . " add "; ibid. 3.37; cf. I. Frings, 'Struktur und Quellcn dcs Prooemiums zum 1. Buch Ckeros De Officiis,' Prometheus 19 (1993), 175 and n. 20." P. 68,1. 16 (1.4a): after "Drerup, 68" add "; Riginos, 134-35 and notes 56-57". P. 75,1. 30 (1.7b): after tt$ 4." add "—For the iunctura usus vitae cf. Rep. 1.30.5." P. 81,1. 9 (1.8): add sub fin.: "On probabilism as used in scientific discourse today and Gcero's possible relation to it cf. Carlos Levy, Cicero academicus. Recherches sur les Academiques et sur la philosophic ciceWonienne (Rome, 1992), 276-90." P. 92,1.8 (1.12): after "Cf. also ad % 20." add "—For the founding of coetus et celebrationes cf. Rep. 2.27.2:.. . omnesque conveniundi causas et celebrationes invenit [sc. Numa]." P. 109,1. 35 (1.21): after "about property held in common" add "; possibly the formulation is meant to adumbrate the criticism of the Gracchi, slain, in Cicero's view, 'justly' as a result of agrariae contentions (2.43 and 80; see also next note)". P. 112,1. 5 (ibid.): after "Wieacker, 1, 510 and n. 44" add "; Wolfgang Waldstein, 'Zu Ulpians Definition der Gerechrigkeit (D 1,1, 10 pr.)' in Festschrift fiir Werner Flume zum 70. Geburtstag. ed. H.H. Jakobs et al., 1 (Cologne, 1978), 213-32". P. 115,1. 3 (1.23a): after "3.87)" add "; for the association of iustitia and fides cf. also Rep. 2.26.1". P. 123,1. 7 (1.28): after "fr. 130" add "; cf. Riginos, 185-86". P. 124,1.23 (ibid.): after "Cf. also Font. 9.6.5 (quoted ad 2.3-5)" delete period and add "; Rep. 1.10: ilia autem exceptio cut probari tandem potest, quod negant sapientem suscepturum ullam reipublicae partem, extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegeriti'" P. 129,1.27 (1.32): after "the larger" add ";cf. Rudolf Till, 4Der Befehl. Zu Scmpronius Ascllio Fragment 8,' Chiron 3 (1973), 109-18". P. 132, n. 44 (1.33): add sub fin. "Cf. also Michael Hillgrubcr, 'Scriptum und voluntas in der Rechrswissenschaft der romischen Republik,' MH 52 (1995), 170-80, who arrives at conclu sions similar to Biirge's." P. 135, n. 49 (1.34-40): add sub fin. "On the other hand, Shaw, 6, n. 10, seems to overlook our passage in declaring 'there is no indication that this rite [sc. the tus fetiale] had any explicit connection with the concept of the "just war".1" P. 144, n. 52 (1.36): add sub fin. "Cf. J.G.F. Powell, CR 46 (1996), 46." 655
656
Addenda ct Corrigenda
P. 147, n. 55 (1.38): after "cf. Botcnnann, 23" delete period and add "; sim. R. Werner, 'Imperialismus und romische Ostpolitik im 2. Jh. v. Chr.,* ANRW 1.1 (1972), 528 ff." P. 151, next to last line (1.40): after "«* Homero Aristarchus" add "(on the text of the Anecdotum Parisinum cf. Kastcc, 57-58)". P. 156, last line-157,1. 1 (1.42-60): " . . . Seneca, de Beneficiis, heavily indebted to die treatise περί καθήκυντυ? by Panactius' pupil Hecato (cf. Griffin, 1976, 300)": I am less certain of the truth of this statement now in light of Chaumartin, 31 ff., and Brad Inwood, "Politics and Paradox in Seneca's De benefiais," in Laks-Schofield, 245-46; but the point about omissions of possibly relevant topics from Cicero's treatment of liberalitas/beneficentia is unaffected. P. 158,1.14 (1.42): after "$91 and 2.63." add"—For gratificari with dative and accusative cf. Rep. 1.68.6 with Zetzel's note." P. 163,1. 3 (1.48): after "Sailer, 19-20" add "; Chaumartin, 36-37, n. 35". P. 169,1.19 (1.51): after uut in Graecorum proverbio « / . . . ; " add "on confusion of sit and est cf. Zetzel ad Rep. 2.42.3;". P. 187,1. 8 (1.61): after "t<7«* "*t" add "(lege quod\n. P. 193,1. 32 (1.64): after "cf. $ 26)" add "and Antony (cf. ad 2.23-29)". P. 199,1. 17 (1.69a): after "Strasburger, 1956, 73" add "; Wirszubski". P. 208,1. 31 (1.76): after "cf. ad $ 116." add "—Exscindere is also used of Africanus' action against Numanria at Rep. 6.11.4." P. 213,1. 24 (1.81): after "cf. also" add "Rep. 1.45.2 and". P. 221, next to last line (1.85): after "2.26b-27." add "For the terminology cf. Rep. 2.51.1: sit huic |sc. tyranno\ oppositus alter, bonus et sapiens et peritus ulilitatis dignitatisque civilis, quasi tutor et procurator rei publicae . . . " P. 222,1. 3 (ibid.): after "1956" add "; Wirszubski". P. 226,1. 13 (1.88): after "Att. 5.16.3" add "and 6.2.5". P. 227,1. 6 (ibid.): after "$$ 88-89" add "; for the phrase iuris aequabilitas cf. Rep. 1.53 with Elaine Fantham, 'Aequabilitas in Cicero's Political Theory, and the Greek Tradition of Pro portional Justice,' CQ 67 (1973), 285-90". P. 230,1. 14 (1.89): after "cf." add "Rep. 1.52:. . .nee \x. is qui imperat] leges imponit populo quibus ipse nun pareat, sed suam vitam ut legem praefert suis avibus;". P. 248, II. 20-21 (1.93-99): after "As a conclusion to this simile one expects 'therefore we can act only a good part1 or the like" add "; cf. Socrates' point with reference to the Guardians' education at PI. R. 395c: iav δέ μιμώνται. μιμεΐσθαι τά τούτοι? προσήκοντα . . . ανδρείους. σώφρονα?, οσίου?. ελευθέρους, καΐ τά τοιαύτα πάντα, τά 6( ανελεύθερα μήτε ποιεΐν μήτε δεινούς είναι μιμησασθαι, μηδέ άλλο μηδέν τών αισχρών . . . " . Ρ. 266,1. 29 (1.104): after "he had in mind." add "On collections of jokes cf. in general Raster, 220-21." P. 272, II. 24-25 (1.107): after "The point is made, as usual, by reference to well-known individuals" add "(cf. Rep. 2.55.3: . . . sed illustribus in personis temporibusque exempla hominum rerumque definio . . . ) " . P. 277, last line (1.109): for "; in addition, the motive—is never explained." substitute ". Perhaps read itemque in sermonibus alius comitate, quamvis praepotens sit, kpotestl efficere . . . . with potest lost by saut du meme au mime, alius changed to accusative after loss of potest, and comitate corrupted to quemque. Then one must assume an anacoluthon (cf. Winter bottom's apparatus)." P. 280, I. 9 (1.110): after "(Leiden, 1982)" add "; cf. also the homo-mensura formula of Anaxagoras (80 Β 1 D.-K.)". P. 299, 1. 14 (1.125): after "Lys. 12.6;" add "Hommel, RE 15.2 |1932], 1442.63 ff. s.v. Metoikoi [Rechstverhaltnisse];". P. 317,1. 20 (1.138): after "ignominia" add "; on Scaurus' consular campaign cf. E.S. Gruen, 'The Consular Elections for 53 B.C..' in Jacqueline Bibauw, ed., Hommages a Marcel Renard 2 (Brussels, 1969), 311-21".
Addenda et Corrigenda
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P. 325,1.22 (1.145-56): after "supposed to leam?" add "On the need for a definition of magna in the transmitted text cf. also Rep. 1.30-31:'... istae quidem artes, si modo aliquid Yvalent, id\ valent, ut paulum acuant et tamquam irritent ingenia puerorum, quo facilius possint maiora discere.' Turn Tubero: 'non dissentio a te, Laeli, sed quaero quae tu esse maiora intellegas.'" P. 333,1.14 (1.150-51): after "(see next note)." add "Cf. PI. Lg. 743d: λ€γομ€ΐ'δή μήτ€ χρυσόν buv μήτζ άργυρον έν τη ττόλ£ΐ, μήτ€ αύ χρηματισμόν πολΰν δια βαναυσία? και τόκων μηδέ βοσκημάτωΐ' αισχρών, αλλ' όσα γεωργία δϊδωσι και 4>epci.. .1 suspect that Cicero began with some such general framework and filled it out with his own emphases and examples." P. 334, n. 192 (1.150): after "they did lend money at interest" add "; Cicero himself lent money at interest on occasion; cf. Shatzman, 419, no. 14". P. 350,1.5 {1.158): after "before $ 159" add "; for the dieory of me origin of society cf. also Rep. 1.39.2 with Zetzel's note". P. 365, I. 23 (2.3): after "(Fern. 13.1C2)" delete period and add "; cf. Rep. 2.63.1 (with reference to the Decemviri): ergo horum ex iniustitia subito exorta est maxima perturbatio et totius commutatio reipublicae; P. 382,1. 21 (2.14): after "483.55 ff.;" add "cf. also Prometheus* role as divine benefactor as described at ΡV 442 ff.;". P. 389,1. 20 (2.21-22): after "Cugusi" add "; cf. Powell, CR 46 (1996), 46". P. 396,1. 3 (2.24): after "public opinion." add "Cicero's view of the secret ballot was not al ways so positive; cf. Leg. 3.33-34 with C. Wiraubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate (Cambridge, 1950), 50; in general, Alexander Yakobson, 'Secret Ballot and Irs Effects in the Late Roman Republic,* Hermes 123 (1995), 426-42." P. 400,1.29 (2.26b): after "(cf. ad $ 16 above)" add "; cf. also Brut. 52: sedde Grace is hactenus; . . . veniamus ad nostras P. 401, I. 31 (2.26b-27): after "cf. ad 1.68." add "Cf. also Dieter Timpe, 'Caesars gallischer Kricg und das Problem des romischen Imperialismus,' Historia 14 (1965), 210, who sets Caesar's policies into the context of the new-style bnperium of which Cicero disapproves." P. 406,1.22 (ad 2.29a): after "a nephew of Sulla Felix" add "(cf. Cicero, Pro P. Sulla Oratio, cd. D.H. Berry [Cambridge, 1996], 320-21, who reviews the relevant literature and finds no good reason to repudiate Dio's testimony)". Ibid., I. 35 (ibid.): after "ad $$ 69-71" add "; cf. Berry, loc. cit. previous note, 1 ff." P. 407,1. 5 (ibid.): after "cf. ad 1.150" add "; on the position of senba cf. in general Wiseman, 72-74". P. 421, II. 18-19 (2.41): after "some privation in wartime being expected" add "; cf. Rep. 1.63.1-2". P. 427,1. 2 (2.44-45): after "wf quales simus, tales esse videamurm add "; cf. Cael. 8 : . . . ut qualis es talem te omnes esse existtment P. 433,1. 9 (2.49): after "cf." add uCael. 73;". Ibid., II. 26-33, and 435, II. 7-13 (2.50): cf. also Jean-Michel David, Le patronat judiciaire au dernier Steele de la republique romaine, Bibliotfieque des Ecolcs franchises d'Athenes et de Rome 277 (Rome, 1992), chs. 11 ("Les ambiguites de Taccusation") and 12 ("La gloirc de la defense"). P. 435,1. 10 (2.50): after "Rotondi, 363-64" add "; however, J.I.. Stachan-Davidson, Problems of Roman Criminal Law, 2 (Oxford, 1912|, 139-42, argues for a metaphorical interpretation of ad caput affigere so that the reference would be to the k being 'attached to the name in the praetor's list of persons who were warned away as infames from his court* [p. 140|; sim. Ernst Levy, 'Von den romischen Aklagervergehen,' ZSS 53 11933), 153-58; I owe these references to Andrew J. Riggsby". Ibid., next to last line (2.51): after "cf. Smith, 318." add "On the rules laid down for the defense of guilty persons cf. now D.H. Berry ad Sul. 2.6.8 {addend, ad p. 406,1. 22)."
658
Addenda et Corrigenda
P. 436, II. 13-14 (ibid.): after "die main beneficiary of the elder Roscius' murder; Sulla's favorite, L. Cornelius Chrysogonus" add u(butcf. Landgraf, 174)". P. 437,1. 16 (2.52-64): after "1.150-51." add "The two types of benefacrions are also con trasted in the narrative of the Roman kings at Rep. 2: Numa religionibus colendis operant addidit, sumptum removit. . . (2.27.2), whereas one of Servius Tullius' strategies for becom ing king was to use his own money to free people from debt, a policy clearly disapproved by Cicero (2.38.1)." P. 441,1.17 (2.56): after "Vitr. 2.8.20" add ", where apparitione is the text of GH, apparahone that of the editio prmceps". P. 446,1. 8 (2.58): after "cognomina" add u ; on Mamercus cf. also Olli Salomies, Die romischen Vomamen. Studien zur romischen Namengebung (Helsinki, 1987), 34-35". P. 447,1.21 (ibid.): after "TLL 6,1630.80 ff." add "; cf. also Pis. 47: quid est aliudfurerei non cognoscere homines, non cognoscere leges, non senatum, non civitatem." Ibid., 1. 23 (2.59): after "applied to houses." add "Observance of moderation is a common theme of paraenetic literature; cf. Hes. Op. 694 (μ^τρα φυλάσσ^σθαι) with parallels cited by M.L West, Hesiod, Worts and Days (Oxford, 1978) ad /oc" P. 449,1. 21 (2.60): after uad $ 41." add "Cf. the more nuanced description of Pericles at Rep. 1.25: . . . Pericles tile et auctoritate et eloquentia et consilio prmceps civitatis suae..." Ibid., 1.23 (2.60): after "at Rep. 4.7" add "; but cf. Kbcrhard Heck, Die Bezeugung von Ciceros Schrift De republica, Spudasmata 4 (Hildesheim, 1966), 41, who would refer this passage to Book 5, wrongly, I think". P. 451,1. 11 (2.63): after "in Off.' add "—For posteris prodi cf. Zetzel ad Rep. 6.23.1." P. 453,4th line from bottom (2.64): after "Jacoby ad Theopomp., loc. c/'f." add "; cf. also J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford, 1971), 311." P. 454, after I. 18 (2.65) add: "Quae autem opera, non largitione beneficia dantur, haec mm in univcrsam rcmpublicam turn in singulos rives conferunmr.] For sense and rhythm cf., with G.O. Hutchinson, 'Rhythm, Style, and Meaning in Cicero's Prose,' CQ 45 (1995), 498, DIP. 1.117: esse deos, et eorum providentia mundum administrari eosdemque consulere rebus humanis, nee solum universis, verwn etiam singulis." P. 459,3rd line from bottom (2.71): after "Swoboda, R£ 11.1 (1921), 439.30 ff." add "; Davies, loc. cit. addend, ad p. 453,310-11. Cicero apparently took the same line as in our passage in discussing a husband for the child Caerilia Attkia; cf. An. 13.21a.4 with Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage: lusti Coniuges from the Time of Ocero to the Time of Ulpian (Oxford, 1991), 105 and n. 117." P. 466,1.18 (2.74): before "Once again it becomes clear . . ." add "For the general idea cf. Rep. 1.64.6: 'Video vero' mquit 'et studeo cursus istos mutationum non magis in nostra quam in omni republica noscere.'" P. 468, last line (2.76): after "rhe abstinentia of Africanus" add "(on which cf. also ad 1.111)". P. 470,1. 13 (2.77): after "the (openly acknowledged) digression." add "For condemnation of profit making in public office cf. PI. R. 347b." P. 473, 1. 13 (2.79): after "out of proportion to their numbers." add "Cf. Servius Tullius' organization of die centuriae ne plurimum valeant plurimi (Rep. 2.39.1) with Fanrham, loc. cit. supra addend, p. 227,1. 6." Ibid., I. 15 (ibid.): before "control" add "continuing". P. 481,1.16 (2.87): after "fr. phil., pp. 65 ff." add "; D.M. Jones, 'Cicero as a Translator,' B/CS 6 (1959), 23; Helmut Miiller, Ciceros Prosaiibersetzungen. Beitrage zur Kenntnis der ciceronischen Sprache (diss. Marburg, 1964), 89-91." P. 486, II. 17-18 (Book 3, introduction): after "Philippson, RE Suppl. 5 (1931), 47.1 ff." add "; G.W. Bowersock, Augustus and the Creek World (Oxford, 1965), 32, 39, and 138." P. 496,1. 32 (3.1-4): after "public affairs" add "; cf. Wirsiubski, 13". P. 499, I. 24 (3.1): after "sentence-final position." add "—With this description of Cicero's current position (urbe relicta rura peragrantes) cf. the assurance exstabit opera peregrina-
Addenda et Corrigenda
659
tionis huius in the letter first announcing work on Off. (Att. 15.13a.2); cf. above pp. 8-9, n. 20." P. 506,1. 23 (3.10): after "Posid. F 78 E.-K. - fr. 243 Th." add "» FGrHist 87 F 27". P. 507,1. 2 (ibid.): after "fr. 81 Th." add "« FGrHist 87 F 59". P. 514,1. 13 (3.14): after "διακήοτuv ..." add "; cf. also Petr. 63.3 with Petronii Arbitri Cena Trimalchionis, cd. Martin S. Smith (Oxford, 1975) ad locn Ibid., II. 17-18 (ibid.): more indicative than Did. Caec. m Ps. 29-34, cod. p. 186.16, a context in which the idea of perfection is associated with one hundred, is Orig. m Lev. horn. 13.4: decern numerus ubique perfectus invenitur. tonus enim numeri ex ipso ratio et origo consurgit. P. 515, n. 21 (3.16): after "'auf eine hohere geistige Ebene'" add "; I doubt, however, that riiat was Lucilius' intent (the fragment deals with Laelius' excoriation of gluttons, and sapiens would not fit the position in the hexameter verse)". P. 520, n. 24 (3.19b-32): add subfin.:"Cf. also Miriam Griffin, loc. cit. addend, ad p. 29, n. 62, 276-77." P. 527, J. 12 (3.22): after "around the rime of Fabius Pictor" add "; one might query, however, whether this is not still too early; the hypothesis that Livy himselffirstplaced this argument in the mouth of Menenius Agrippa would be difficult to refute, since Cicero would otherwise have been expected to make some reference to its use in Roman history". Ibid., II. 17-18 (ibid.): after ucf. K. Reinhardt, RE 22.1 (1953), 653.49" add "; Willy Thcilcr, Die Vorbereitung des Neuptatonismus, Problemara 1 (Berlin, 1930), 120 ff." P. 542, I. 2: (3.39): after "he would have omitted the gods" add "(the possibility of such deception is discussed at PI. R. 365d)". Ibid., II. 12-15 (3.39): I now think the transmitted text can be defended; cf. Fin. 5.6 with Solodow, 38-39. P. 548,1. 10 (3.44): after "Harder, 1960, 368 ff." add "; Zetzel ad loc.n P. 550,1. 23 (3.46b-49a): after "involving raisons d'itat" add "(cf. ad 1.34)". P. 551,1.18 (3.46b): after "neither source states that the decree was actually put into effect" add "(though V. Max. makes this claim)". P. 553,4th line from bottom (3.48): after "precede and inspire their Greek counterparts" add "(for arrangement of Roman and Greek examples cf. also Zetzel ad Rep. 1.25.3)". P. 555,1. 8 (3.49a): after "Gelzer, Pompeius. 74 ff.;" add "Robin Seagcr, Pompey: A Political Biography (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1979), 37-38;". P. 573, II. 24-25 (3.63): "should probably be referred to^pi καθήκοντος": sec addend, ad pp. 156-57. P. 576, II. 16-17 (3.65): after "Wieacker, 247-48" delete period and add "; J.M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966), 153 ff." P. 583,1.22 (3.69): after "Tusc. 3.3, cited ad 2.43." add "For the iunctura umbra et imaginibus cf. Rep. 2.52.1." P. 587, third line from bottom-588,1.2 (3.73-74): after "If the hypothesis of Miuuet, loc. cit. 1950.6 ff. . . . is correct that Caesar's decision in the matter of a province was motivated by reports of Minucius' cruelty . . . , then this is very likely to be the man who died at the hands of his slaves in summer, 43" add "; in that case, however, Appian would be mistaken in identifying the man killed by his slaves as Caesar's assassin". P. 591, II. 2-3 (3.74): after "in this context" add ", unlike Rep. 2.33.6,". P. 594, 6th line from bottom (3.77): after "Cf." add "Rep. 2.24;". P. 598, II. 26-27 (3.80-81): after "He held the praetorship twice, doubtless in 85-84, when Cinna and Carbo iterated the consulship" add "; however, Sumner, 118-19, argues that the second praetorship was held in 82, given as a consolation prize when his hopes of the consulate were forestalled by the illegal election of the younger Marius". P. 609,1. 30 (3.87): after "233-36." add "On the date of this change ('presumably soon after Sulla's death in 78') and the circumstances see now Robert M. Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to
660
Addenda et Corrigenda
Empire: The Development of the Roman imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C. (BerkclcyLos Angeles-Oxford, 1995), 272." P. 623, II. 19-20 (3.99b): after "apud Pohlenz ad Tusc. 1.51" add "; cf $ 100". P. 624,1.5 (3.100): after "postliminium did not apply to him" add "(but cf. the argument at Top. 37)". P. 627, before 1.4 from bottom: add " 1 0 3 . . . quidquid valde utile est, id fieri honestum . . . ] Cf. PI. R. 457b (in a discussion of Guardian women stripping to do athletics):... το μέν ώφέ· λιμον καλόν, το δέ βλαβίρόν αΐσχρόν.*' Ρ. 630,1.20 (3.107): after "cf. Pohl, 36-37." add "On the distinction of btrocmium and helium cf. also Shaw, 6-7." P. 641, n. 94 (3.113-15): add sub fin. "For the use of Polybius as a source of Rep. cf. Zetzel, pp. 18-19 and ad 1.65.3, 2.1, 2.17, 18.2-3, 21.2, 27.4, 28.5, and 30."
Indices
References below are to the section or sections of Cicero's text on which the relevant comment appears or, following **ρ.Μ or "pp.," to the page number(s) of the introduction to this volume or to the individual Books. A repetition of section number may occur if there is a reference both in a comment on a group of sections and on an individual section within that group. The Index of Authors includes references to pre-twentieth century authors and to passages in their works actually quoted verbatim or discussed, whether by way of interpretation or paraphrase, not to passages simply cited. The authors' names appear in the form most familiar to English readers, e.g., "Lucan,n not "Annaeus Lucanus, M." Works are listed alpha betically with fragments unassigned to works at the end of the series, fol lowed by spuria. Under de Officiis I do not include a list of the numerous quoted passages but rather something presumably more useful, viz., a list of topics relevant to its content, composition, etc. The Index of Proper Names is, for Romans, arranged alphabetically by gentes, next familiae, then praenomina, and then chronologically within this framework. Identification in parentheses is by year of first consulate or dic tatorship or, in default of these, the highest office held; otherwise by article number in the RE (if there is more than one known bearer of the gentilicium) or for well-known persons some more obvious identifier, e.g., "Tullius Cicero, M. (the orator)." In the case of Cicero, data bearing on his biography (i.e., other than his opinions and literary methods) are included in the Index of Proper Names, philosophical/literary data in the Index of Authors. To avoid a confusion of Dichtung und Wahrheit, names of characters in Cicero's dialogues are excluded. No set of indices, however thorough, can hope to capture every item in just the form every reader would want to access it. Publication of the com mentary in electronic format is planned, however.
661
Index of Topics
Abstinence [abstinentia), 2.72-85, 76, 77 Aedileship. See Games, aedilkian. Allies, Roman mistreatment of, 2 2 7 - 2 9 , 3.49, 87. See s.v. Imperialism, Roman; Index of Latin Words s.v. impertum. Alternatives, limited choice of in Roman politics, 3.82b-85 Ancestors, imitation of, 1.115-21, 121 Anger, 1.18-19, 23b, 27, 61-92, 69, 88-89, 88, 89, 102, 131, l32b-37, 136, 137, 3.112 Animals, 1.8, 11-14, 11-12,11. See s.w. Humans, Plants, care of offspring by, 1.11 distinguished from plants, 1.11 excluded from a share of justice by the Stoics, 1.11,50 exploitation of, p. 358, 2.l2b-15, 14 place of in the scab naturae, 2.11 sense of aesthetics and proportion lacking in, 1.14, 34 traits shared with humans by, 1.14, 21, 50, 61-92, 3.1 Annalists, Sullan. See Index of Authors s.v. Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator}, de Officiis, annalist sources, use of. Appearance and reality, divergence of, 2.38, 43, 44-45 Approval, 1.93-151, 93-99, 94, 98, 99, 137. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Approbatto. Arts athletic and performing, Roman atti tude toward, 1.130 Atticism, 2.67 Auctions, collusion or fraud at public, 3.61 of property of the proscribed, 2.27-29a, 83a Augurs, augural practices, 3.66 Avarice, 2.55b-60, 64, 72-85, 75, 77 Bathing customs, 1.129 Beauty, 1.14, 98
Bees, 1.157,2.11 Behavior, public dancing, 3.75, 93 singing, 1.145, 3.93 Body (as analogue to the soul), 1.95, 98, 107 members as metaphor of part and whole, 3.22 organs, reproductive and excretory, place ment of, 1.126 training of to obey reason, 1.79 Branding, 2.25, 50 Casuistry, pp. 15 n. 34, 24,31, 491, 493, and 495, 3.30, 49b-57, 77-78, 88, 8 9 92a Censors, 1.40, 88, 3.1-4, 79, 88, 110, 111, 113-15,115 Chance. See s.v. Fortune, Index of Latin Words s.v. Fortune, Index of Greek Words s.v. τύχη. Character, disclosed by details of behavior, 1.93-99,131, 134,145-46 Children designated by the Stoics as μέσοι, 1.8 gradual development of reason in, 1.1114 n. 19,13,50, 117 oiwiuais with one's, 1.11-14,11, 12, 2.73 Christian ethics compared, 1.14, 21, 23b, 146, 155a, 3.57. See Index of Authors s.w. Ambrose, St., and Thomas Aqui nas, St. Christian readings, suspected, 1.155, 3.29 Cities, advantages of life in, 2.15 City wall, early belief in the sanctity of, 3.41 Civil war. See s.v. War, civil. Client-patron relations, 1.34, 42-60, 2.26b27, 69. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Patrocinium. Clothing, 1.130, 3.10, 100 Coinage, fluctuation in value of, 3.80-81 663
664
Index of Topics
Comedy, Attic Old, 1.104 Commerce, ban on senators engaging in, 1.151 Commercial transactions, concealment of defects in, 3.49b-67, 71 Conflict of honestum and apparent utile, pp. 491-94, 3.7-10, 9, 17, 19b-32, 3 3 34, 35-37, 45-46a, 49, 63, 64, 86-88, 88, 89-92a, 89, 96, 99b, 116-20 property transactions as examples of, 3.49b-67 Conversation. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Sermo. Court, representation of clients at, 2.49-51 Crimes, premeditated vs. of passion, 1.23b, 27 Criteria for moral judgment, diachronic changes in, 3.41, 111. See s.v. Golden age, ethical. Critique of society, potential for, ignored or downplayed, 1.20,148 Cruelty, 1.38, 2.24, 3.29, 46b-49a, 46b Custom {mos) as a basis for argument, 1.129 Customs endangered, 1.129, 227, 29, 3.44, 69,110-11 Customs officials, unpopularity of, 1.150 Dancing in public, attitudes toward, 3.75, 93 Debt, relief of, 2.79, 84 Caesar's policies on, 2.79, 83, 84 Roman view of, 2.78-85 Deceit. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Dolus mains. Definition of terms, 1.7a Depravity of morals {topos), 2.26-27, 3.69 Determinism and free will, 1.107-21, 114, 115-21, 115. See Index of Greek Words s,v. βούληση. Dictator clavi figendi causa, 3.112 Disgrace, forms of public, 1.145, 3.75, 93 Editions of Latin texts, ancient, use of crit ical signs in, 1.40 Effeminacy, 1.14, 130 Encomia, 1.61, 67, 92. See Index of Latin Words s.vv. Approbatio, Laus. Envy, 1.84, 86, 2.44-45, 58, 3.79, 82b. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Invidia. Epistemology, 1.18-19, 2.7-8, 3.75-76
Etymologies (ancient), p. 5, 1.23a, 86,127, 142, p. 353, 2.9, 15, 73, 3.2, 77-78 folk, 3.92a External goods, valuation of, 1.61-92, 6 6 67, 82b-84, 83, 2.36-38, 37, 43, 3.19b-32. See Index of Greek Words s.v. τ€λο?, Index of Proper Names s.v. Stoic{s), scale of values. Extortion/embezzlement by officials, legisla tion against (de repetundis), 2.75 prosecutions for, 1.138, 2.47, 3.10, 43, 77,79 Factions, strife of in Roman politics 2.69, 74,78 Farm-duty as an unwelcome fate for sons {literary topos), 3.112 Father/son relations, pp. 11-16, 1.32, 37, 112, 116, 121, 2.50, 2.76, 3.66, 8992a, 89,90,112 Fetials, 1.34-40, 36. See Index of Latin Words s.v. lus fetiale. Flatterers, 1.42, 91 Force, status of a promise extracted by, 1.32,3.111-12 use of to settle differences, 1.34 Foreign words, parading of, 1.111 Fortune, 1.66, 68-73, 69, 71, 72, 73a, 9 0 91, 90, 115-21, 115, 120, 2.19b-20 Fraud. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Dolus malus. Friendship, 1.18-19, 47, 50-58, 55-56, 55, 56, 58, 132b-37, p. 355, 2.29b-30, 30, 31-34, 31, 32, p. 489, 3.43-46a, 43, 44-45,45-46a, 62-63, 73, 83,116, 118 Games, aedilician, 2.55b-60, 57-58 Glory, pp. 2, 13, 20, 31-33, and 37, 1.20, 34-40, 34, 37, 38, 43, 44, 49, 61, 65, 68-73, 69b-71, 74-78, 74, 83, 84, 116,121, pp. 355-56, 358,2.21-22, 23-29, 31-34, 31, 36-38, 37, 42a, 42b-43,42b, 43, 45, 58, 63, 69, 77, 85, 86-87, p. 491, 3.12, 66, 82b-85 true, p. 32, 1.38, 65, 84, 2.43 Gnomic literature, 1.41b God(s), treatment of, 3.21, 28, 44, 102. See also Index of Authors s.v. Panaetius, deity, treatment of.
Index of Topics Golden age, ethical, 2.9, 26-27, 75, 76, 77; 3.1-4, 13b-17, 109, 111 Goodwill, 2.32. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Benevolentia. Grain, distribution of regulated by law (leges frumentariae), 2.72, 74 Greed, 1.24, 40, 151, 2.23-29, 71, p. 495. See s.v. Avarice. Greeks, anti-Roman feeling among, 1.38 n. 56 Haplography, 1.146. See s.v. Saut du mime au meme. Hedonism, 3.116 Heredity, 1.97-98, 107-21, 121 Homoearcton, 2.56. See s.v. Saut du meme au meme. Homoeotelcuton, 1.104, 2.11. See s.v. Saut du meme au meme. Human development, stages of (topos), 2.11-16, 12b-15 Humans, distinguished from animals, 1.11, 13, 14, 34, 50, 93-151, 93-99, 97-98, 105-6, 131 Images carried in triumphal procession, 2.28 Imperialism, Roman, 1.38, 2.26b-29a, 26b, 3.46b, 49, 59, 87. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Imperium. Ingratitude, 1.42-60, 2.63 Injustice, 1.20-41, 20, 22, 23b, 25-26, 25, 30-41, 38, 41a, 50, 62-65, 69a, 69b71, 89, 93-99, 2.83a, pp. 491 and 495, 3.10, 19b-32, 21, 27, 33, 36, 63,118 Interest. See Index of Latin Words s.w. Utititas, Utilis. of a group, pp. 491-92 of the state (utilitas reipublicae), p. 31, 1.88, 108, 157, 158, 2.63, 85, p. 492 and n. 7, 3.18,40-42, 46b-49a, 88, 97-115, 99b, 112 Interpolator, hypothesis of, pp. 53-54, 1.15a, 25-26, 38, 40 and n. 6S, 55-56, 109, 157, 2.21-22, 33, 48, 60, 3.29 Jokes, 1.103b-4, 103b, 104, 108,109, 132b-37, 133, 2.50 Juridical forms (quaestio, cognition 1.89 Jurists, social position of, 2.65 Justice, 1.5, 11-14, 11,11-12, 20-41, 20, 23a, 28, 30-41, 30, 31, 34-40, 37,
665
41a, 42, 50, 59, 61-92, 62, 64, 85, 9 3 99, 107-21, 110, 122-25, p. 356, 2.33, 38,41, 43, p. 491, 3.37b-39, 51, 62-63, 69, 82a, 86, 97-115, 118 as a component of the second virtue, 1.20-60 and 20-41,42 reputation for, 1.20, p. 356, 2.39-42a, 41. See Index of Latin Words s.v. lustitia. Kings (as an example or subject), 1.69b-71, 70, 79, 88, 89, 2.41, 3.41 Land, redistribution of (leges agrariae), 2.78 Language, 1.53, IW.See Index of Latin Words s.v. Oratio. relation of words and things, 1.126-32, 2.9 Law of contractual sale, protection of the buyer under, 3.58-71, 65 rule of, threatened, 2.24. See s.v. Legisla tion, Roman; Monarch as Living Law; Transfer of Property, Law of; also Index of Latin Words s.v. Lex. Law of the ΧΠ Tables, 1.37, 44, 2.73, 3.61b, 65,104, 111. See Index of Au thors s.v. Leges XII Tabularum. Legal profession/advice at Rome, 2.65, 66 Legislation, Roman lex Cmcia, 2.66 lex Claudia, 1.151 lex Cabinia, 3.49 lex lulia de bonis cedendis, 1.19 lex lulia municipalis, 3.61b lexLaetoria. 1.32,3.61b lex Licmia Mucia, 2.57b, 3.47a, 70-71 lex Papia, 3.47 lex Plaetoria. See s.v. lex Laetoria. lex Servilia, 2.63 lex Varia. 2.59. See s.w. Law of the XII Tables; Extortion . . . ; Grain, distribution of; Land, redistribution of. Liberal arts, attitudes toward, 1.151 Lives, rating of different types of, 1.69b-71 Lunatics, 3.95 Luxury, 1.92, 123, 140 Magic wand or other powers, hypothesis of, 1.158,3.38-39,75
666
Index of Topics
Magistrate, ideology of the Roman, 1.124 Majority, attitude toward, 1.147, 2.79 Many, judgment of the, 1.118, 147. See In dex of Latin Words s.v. Valgus. Mathematics, Greek and Roman attitudes toward, 1.19 Maturity of reason, age of, 1.11-14 n. 19, 117 Misanthrope, 1.29 Modern society, comparison with, 1.153, 2.79 Monarch as living law {topos), 1.89 Moneylenders, 2.87 attitudes toward, 1.150 Morality criteria for judging (changing over time), 3.41,111 heroic code demanded, 3.62, 67, 74, 97115,97, 114 relation to law, 3.68 Mysteries, Eleusinian, 1.97 n. 145 Nature, 1.8, 11-17,12, 13,18-19, 21, 22, 93-99, 96, 97-98, 100-103a, 105-6, 107-21, 107, 118, 126-32, 127,131, 147,148-49,153, 2,73, 3.19b-32, 21-27, 49b-67, 78. See Index of Greek Words s.vv. φύσι?, τέ\ος. Oaths, swearing/keeping of, p. 34, 1.34, p. 494, 3.44, 97-115,102,107, 108,110, 111,112 Obscenity, 1.126-32,159, 3.33 Office, despising of, 1.28, 71, 87 laying down of, 1.68 Old age, 1.79-81, 123 Omission, sins of (in Christian theology), 1.23b Oratory, 2.66, 67 Paragraphs, division of, 1.4b, 20, 41a, 8889, 92 n. 123, 117-21, 121, 153, 2.8, 42a, 3.99b, 101 Parents, imitation of, 1.118 and n. 165 Parricide, 3.83 Passions, 1.69, 73b, 93, 100-103a, 102 Patron. See s.v. diem-patron relations; In dex of Latin Words s.v. Patrocinium. Pedantry, 1.10,42-60,2.48 Performing arts, attitudes toward, 1.130 Perjury, 3.108, 113-15
Physiognomy, ancient theories of, 1.93-99 Piracy/pirates, 1.34, 2.58, 3.49, 87, 107 Plants, distinguished from animals, 1.11 place of in the scala naturae, 2.11 Pleasure, 1.11-14,25, S% 68-73, 105-6, 150, 3.21-27, 116-20, 117, 118, 119. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Voluptas, Index of Greek Words s.v. ηδονή. opposed to honestum, 3.119 Priamel form, 1.110 Prioritization of actions, 1.32, 58 ff., 152 if. Probabilism, 1.8 Prodigals, 1.44, 49 Profession(s) change of, 1.120,151 choice of, 1.115-21,117-21 respect accorded to various, 1.150-51 Profit as a criterion of action, 3.57. See Index of Authors s.v. Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), commercial transactions, lack of sympathy for profirmaking in. Progress of human civilization, 2.11-16, 12b-15 Promises, keeping of, 1.31, 32, 3.92b-95 Property held in common, 1.20, 51 private, p. 35, 1.21, 92, pp. 357 and 360, 2.27, 31, 43, 64, 3.53 accumulation of, through commercial transactions, 1.150-51, 3.49b-57, 63 defense of the institution, 2.73 equalization of, 2.73 insecurity of and the danger to die respubtica, 2.79 protection of, pp. 2 and 360, 2.72-85, 73 resolution of disputes regarding, 2.7285, 81-83a transfer of, concealment and fraud in, 3.49b-67 uneven distribution of in Hellenistic Sparta, 2.80 Proscriptions, 224, 27 Proverbs and proverbial expressions, 1.21, 28, 33, 38,41b, 50, 51, 61, 76,109, 110,114, 131,147, 2.36, 38, 55, 77, 3.3, 37b-39, 49b-67, 54, 77, 77-78, 82b-85, 102, 116,117
Index of Topics Providence, divine, 1.32 and n. 40. See In dex of Greek Words s.v. πρόΐΌΐα. Psychology, mass, 2.36-38 Punishment, theory of, 1.34, 88, 89, 2.18 Realities, influence of on the argument, 2J1 Reciprocity, 1.47 Regard for others, 1.98-99, 126, 136. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Approbatio. Rent, remission of, 2.83b Resident aliens, 1.125 Respublica, 2.2-8, 29a amissa [topos), 2.3-5, 29a, 3.4 constituent elements of, 2.75, 3.2 Retribution, 1.20, 34, 83, 89, 2.24, 62. See s.v. Punishment. Rights, human, 1.34, 52, 3.28 Risk-taking, 1.82b-84 Sage. Stoic, pp. 3, 17, 18, 29, and 59, 1.7b, 8, 20, 32, 55, 81, 107-21, 111, 114, 148, pp. 353 and 488, 3.14,16, 18, 29-32, 38, 43, 50 Saut du mime au mime, 1.22, 40, 45, 76, 92, 2.69 n. 62, 74, 87. See s.vv. Homoearcton, Homoeoteleuton. Scale of activity (as a criterion for judg ment), 1.150-51 Self-aggrandizement, 2.18, 3.21 ff. See s.w. Avarice, Greed. Self-love, 1.30-41. See Index of Greek Words s.v. φιλαυτία. Semantic change, 1.37, 2.9 Servitude (in law of property), 3.67 Severity, examples of, 1.88, 108 Sexual drive, 1.11, 54 Slavery, slaves, 1.30-41, 41a, 150, 2.24, 3.19b-32, 43, 67, 71, 73-74, 89-92a, 89 Society, origin of, 1.11-12, 12, 152-61, 158,2.73,3.21 Soul, harm inflicted upon by criminal ac tivity, 3 2 1 , 36, 85 parts of, 1.11, 101 Stare, 1.88-89 benefits guaranteed to citizens by, 1.53 conflict in duties toward, involving a) friend, 3.19 b) parent, 3.89-92a origin of, 1.54, 2.72-85, 73, 85. See s.v. Society, origin of.
667
Statesman, motives of, 1.63, 85-87. See s.v. Glory. Status, rhetorical theory of, 3.18-19a Style, High, 1.3 Middle, pp. 49-52, 1.3 Tattooing, 2.25, 50 Tax, property. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Tributum. Tragedy, possible fragment of a Roman, 1.118 Transfer of property, law of, 1.21 Transpositions (in the text of de Offiais), proposed, 1.12-13, 25-26, 92, 2.87, 3.82a Tribes, apportionment of citizens among as a means of control by the nobiles, 2.79 Truth, emergence of from clash of opposing views, 2.8, 51 Tyrannicide/tyrant, pp. 1, 15, 30, 31, and 47, 1.34, p. 360, 2.23, 24, 27,29a, pp. 489 and 493, 3.19a, 19b-32, 22, 2932, 29, 32, 45, 82a, 85 "Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown" itopos), 2.23-29. 3.84 Verdict, rationale given for judge's, 3.66 Veterans, Caesar's, as a political factor, pp. 9 and 360, 3.84 Violence. See s.v. Force; Index of Latin Words s.v. Vis. Virtues), 2.42a, 3.24. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Virtus. division of, 1.11-17, 13, 15-17,46 first, narrower and broader interpretations of, 1.18-19,94 relation to other virtues, 1.153 interrelations of, p. 28, 1.15-17, 18-19, 28, 62-65, 62, 65, 88, 92, 93-99, 94,99, 152,2.18 is virtue an art? 2.6 second, concept of, 1.20-60,20-41, 22 designations for, 1.20-60, 152-61, 3.76 separability of, 1.15, 94, 157, 2.35 Voting system by tribes, political manipula tion of, 2.79 Wall of the city, belief in the sanctity of, 3.41
668
Index of Topics
War acquisition of property in, 1.21 civil, confiscation of property in, 2.27, 28, 29a, 83a. See Index of Authors s.v. Cicero, M. (die orator), civil war, at titude toward/concern about. division into types, 1.38, 3.86, 87 status of promises made to an enemy in time of, 1.30-41, 3.97-115, 102-3, 110 Wealthly), 1.21, 25, 68-73, 68, 92, p. 356,
2.29a, 55b-60, 56, 65, 69, 71, 81-83, 3.62-63, 63, 87, 97-115, 102-3, 110. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Locuples. Will, free, 1.11. See s.v. Determinism and free will. Wills, forgery of, 3.73-74, 73, 74 Wine, problem of "going off," 3.91 Wit. See s.v. Jokes. Women, senatorial action aiming to protect the reputation of, 1.88 Work/workers, attitudes toward, 1.150
Index of Latin Words
Ab, 3.116 Abstmentia, 1.T7 Ac, 1.42, 2.39-42a. See s.v. Atque. Ac . . . quidem, 1.20 Acceptdatio, 3.60 Accusatio, 3.83 Accusator, 2.50 Λ<ΓθΓ, 3.91 Ac/ισ, 1.10, 17, 101, 141, 153, 160,2.3. See s.vv. Bonus, Dolus malus; Index of Topics s.v. Legislation, lex Laetoria. dolt, 3.60 ex empto, 3.65, 66y 67 fiduciae, 3.61b, 70 ret uxoriae, 3.61b rerom, 1.31, 153 jfricfi wro, 3.59. See s.v. Indicium. vitae, 1.15-17, 17, 153, 156 Adamo, 1.117 Addubito, 1.83 A
Antecessio, 1.11 Antiquius, 1.155 Antiquo, 2.73 Apparatiolapparitio, 2.56 Appareo, 1.46 Appello. 1.89 Appetitio, 1.101 n. 147 Appetitus, 1.21, 101 n. 147, 102,137, 141, 2.11 AppTobatio, 1.93-151, 98, 114, 126-32, 126 (cf. 137), 143, p. 358 A<JIM,
3.117
Aquae et ignis interdictio, 1.52 Aquatio, 3.59 Architectura, 1.151 Are. 2.6 Astringo, 3.111 Astrologia, 1.19 A/, 2.56 A/«iim, 1.144,3.79, 105 A/<JM*, 1.33, 144, 155b-58, 157,2.1, 3.13b, 48,112 Α / φ * tfijm, 1.8, 90-91, 2 2 1 - 2 2 Atqui, 1.144, 3.48 Atramentum sutorium, 2.49 Auctoramentum, 1.150 Auditum, 1.33 n. 45 Auguraculum, 3.66 Augurium, 3.66 Aurichalcum, 3.92a A«f. 1.13,36,2.21-22 Autaliquis, 1.23b Aufem. 1.82a, 101,2.8 Avaritia. Sec Index of Topics s.v. Avarice.
Beneficentia. pp. 17 and 58, 1.49, p. 359, 2.21-22 Beneficium, 1.42-60 n. 69, 42, 48, 5 0 58 n. 74, 58, 59, 150, 2.65-68, 66, 3.25
669
670
Index of Latin Words
Benevolentia, p. 359. 2.21-22, 32 Bonus, 1.20, 48,55, 93-99, 124, 2.33, 38, 43, 3.18, 31, 61b-64, 70, 73, 77, 7982a, 79, 89-92a bonae fidei actiones/iudicia, 3.61b, 70-71, 111 Cado, 3.81 Catlidus, 1.33, 63, 2.34, 3.57 Campus, 1.61 Captatio, 3.74 Cautio, 1.42-60, 2.54, 3.59 Civitas, 1.53 Clemens/clementia, 1.88, 89,137,2.23, 57b, 64 Cliens, 2.69 Codes, 1.61 n. 95 Cognitio, 1.89, 153 Comitas, 3.24, 118 Comitia, 2.23 Commentarius, p. 486 Communis, 1.8 Communitas, 1.152-61, 158 Commutatio/commuto, 2.3 Compositio, 1.142 Condicio, 1.21 Condhnentum, 3.120 Coniuratio, 3.44-45 Con/oco, 1.49,142,2.42b Consectator/trix, 3.117 Consensus, 2.16 Consentio + ad, 3.99a Consociatio, 1.100 Consocio, 1.100 Consortiof-um, 3.26 Conspiratio, 2.16 Constantsa, 1.69, 80, 81, 90, 93, 103, 111, 131,137,143,2.6 Consuetudo, 2.9 Con»/, 3.99b Contagio, 2.80 Contentio, 1.132b-37,2.48-51, 48 Continentia, 3.96, 116 Contumelia, 1.88 Converro, 3.77-78 Convicium, 3.83 Correctio, 3.7 Cothones, p. 51, 2.14 Cumfca. 3.58 Cumulate, 3.15 Cuniculus, 3.90
Curatio, 1.83 Cursus honorum, 2.58 DtJwo, 1.59 D«*r, 1.94 Deama, 2.58 Decorum, p. 51, 1.93-99, 93, 94, 100, 110, p. 358, 3.96, 106, 116-20 Dora, 1.141 Dotoio, 3.99b, 100, 109 Definitio, 1.8 n. 12 Deflagro, 3.94 Delicatus, 1.144 Derigo, 3.83 Denvatio, 2.14 Descriptio. 1.93-99, 96, 124. See s.vv. Discribo, Discriptio. Index of Gram matical and Stylistic Features s.v. D«cnpfio. Devotio, 1.61 Digero, 1.147 Digladior, 1.28 Dignitas/dignus, p. 38, 1.69, 93-99, 94, 106,130, 138-40, 150-51 Diiudico, 3.19b Dirigo. See s.v. Derigo. Dirimo, 1.147 Discepto, 1.34-40 Disdplma, 1.5 Discrepantia, 1.111 Discribo, discriptio. 1.21, 51, 124 Dispositio. See Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. Dispositio/divisio. Distmctus, 1.2 Distractio, 3.32 Distraho, 3.32 D/i/«. 1.25 Divisio. See Index of Grammatical and Sty listic Features s.v. Dispositio/divisio. DM., 1.40 Doceo, 1.13 Do/iu mj/Ms, 1.32, 44, 3.60, 67, 71, 108 E/fcro. 1.124 E/jfreno, 1.90 E/jfcmfo, 1.49 Eiigo, 1.147 £toeo, 1.94,98 EWio. 2.16 fjfim, 1.30,31,82a, 98, 147 Erectus, 1.105
Index of Latin Words Ergo. 2.U Etenim, 1.153 Etiam, 3.46b and n. 42 Exceptio, 3.60, 61b Excito, 2.56 Explico, 1.83 Exprimo, 3.69 Exsulto, 1.102 Extremus, 1.84,2.29a Factio, 3.82b Faenerator, 1.150 and n. 192 Fatum, 1.114 Fereula pomparum, 1.131 Fetiales. See s.v. /us; Index of Topics s.v. Ferials. Fides. 1.23a, 26, 35, 124, 2.21-22, 31-34, 33, 38, 39-42a, 44-45, 3.67, 70, 87, 104, 111. See Index of Proper Names s.v. Fides. bona fidei indicia. See s.v. Bonus, deditio in fidem, 1.35 publico. 3.87, 109 Fingo mihi. 1.26 Foedus, 3.111 Forma (officii), 1.103a Formula, pp. 487-89, 491, 493-94, 3.19, 19b-32,19b, 20, 21-27,21, 26, 28, 29-32, 29, 44, 60, 61, 66, 70, 72, 75, 81 Fortitudo. 1.62. See Index of Greek Words s.v. ανδρεία. Fortuna. 1.115-21,120, 2.18-20, 19b-20. See Index of Greek Words s.v. τύχη. Frugalitas. 1.93 Fugio. 3.91 Furor. 2.58 Futurum, 1.11 Gloria, 2.31 Grandis, 2.82 Gratia, 2.50, 65, 69, 79 Gratus. 2.60 Gyrus. 1.90 Habeo, 2.69 Haereo, 3.117 Hie, 2.10, 60, 3.5 Homo. 1.92 Honestas/bonestum, pp. 31-33 and 35, 1.4b, 14. S5-56, 62, 93-99, 94, 100,
671
2.9-10, 10, 16, pp. 484 and 491, 3.7, 11-I9a, 17, 18-I9a, 19a, 35, 41, 46b49a, 49b-67,49b-57, 77, 86-88, 95, 96,97,102-3, 119 secundum honestum, 3.15 Hospes, 1.121 Hostis, 1.34-40,37 Humanitas/humanus, 1.62,144, 2.51, 3.41, 89-92a, 89
lacto, 3.80 Igttur. 1.9,99,2.9,3.64,77 Ignominia, 3.115 llle. 2.60 Imago, 3.69 Imito(r), 1.121 Immanitas, 1.62 Imperium. 1.38, 2.26b-27, 85, 3.40, 49, 109 Impetus, 2.11 In, 1.46, 3.41 lnanis, 3.6 /«rifo, 1.49 Ineptus, 1.144 ittffffiM, 2.79, 3.61b, 70-71 lngenium, 1.81 Inhumanus, 1.144 Inimicus, paternus, 2.50 Institutio, 1.7b Intellegentia, 3.81 Interdicno. See s.v. Aquae et ignis mterdictio. Inusitatus, 3.38 Invidiai-ae, 2.20 Invisitatus. 3.38 Jp*r, 1.77 hacundia, 1.69 //α?»*, 1.94 lucundus, 2.60 ludichtm stricti tuns, 3.61b. See s.vv. Actio, Bonus, lus. 1.21,33,2.27,3.69 CTw/e, 2.65, p. 493, 3.23, 67, 69, 70, 71 /rtia/*, 1.34-40, 35, 36, 37, 3.108 gentium, 3.23, 69 praediorum, 3.65, 71 lusiurandum, 3.104. 5 M Index of Topics s.v. Oaths. lusntialiustum, 1.20-60,41a, 42, 43, 62, 93-99,2.10, 33, 38, 73, 3.16, 21-27,
672
Index of Latin Words
lustitiaJiustum, (continued) 28, 69, 79-82a, 87, 89-95, 95,118. See Index of Topics s.v. Justice, universality of, 1.43 Laesio enormis, 3.49b-67, 62-63 Languor, 1.123,3.1 Largitio/largitor, 1.42-60, 43, 64, pp. 357 and 359, 2.31, 53, 52-64, 53, 54, 63 Latifundia, 1.151 Laus, 1.62, 77 Laxitas, 1.139 Lex, 3.23. See Index of Topics s.vv. Law, Legislation. naturae, 3.23,27, 68, 69 sacrata, 3.111 talionis, 1.20 Liberalis. 1.96, 150-51 Liberalitas, pp. 17, 26, and 58, 1.42-60, 42, 92, p. 357, 2.52-64, 64, 3.118 Libertas, 1.68-73,70 Limo, 2.35 Locuptes, 3.10, 99b, 105 Lubricus, 1.65 Ludus talarius, 1.150 Lumen, 3.66 Luxuria, 3.1 Magnitudo anhni, pp. 28, 38, 51, and 58, 1.61, 62, 88, 152-61, 157, p. 358, 2.36-38, 37, pp. 490-91, 3.l9b-32, 21-27, 89-95, 96t 97-99a, 97, 99b, 105,111,113-15,114 Maiores. 1.35, 3.69 Malitia, 1.33,62,2.10,3.71 Manctpatio/Mancipium, 3.67 Mano, 2.80 Mansuetudo, 1.88 ΜΛ«Ι«. 2.12b-15
Medicamen/medicamentum, p. 51, 3.92b Mediocritas, 1.110,2.59,72 Meatus. 1.8,22 Memoria, 3.5 Mens. See Index of Greek Words s.v. νους. Mentula, 1.126-32 Mercemtarius, 1.41a, 150, 2.29a Metus, 124, 73b, p. 359, 2.21-22, 23-28, 31 Mico, 3.77, 90 Militiae sacramentum, 1.36 Mmutus, 3.116n. 98
Modestia, 1.93, 142, 2.46 Modestus, 1.142,2.46 Modus, 1.14,34, 124, 142 Mollitia. 1.131 Morbus, 1.49 Morsus, 12A Motusanimi, 1.73a, 100 Moms corporis, 1.100, 102, 126-49, 12632a Multum + adjective, 1.109 Munus, p. 6 n. 13,1.20, 3.1-4, 1, 4, 121 Nam, 1.54,2.47, 3.47a, 84 Natura, 1.11, 110,115-21, 126, 153,2.27. See Index of Topics s.v. Nature; Index of Greek Words s.v. φύσι?. Ne, 2.75 Nee, 1.153b-58 Necessitas, 1.114, 115-21 Nequaquam, 3.39 Nimis, 1.31, 2.81 Noceo, 3.102 Nomen, 3,59 Nomino, 3.116 Non modo, 3.77 Nota. 3.74 Notae Thraeciae, LIS Notio, 3.75-76, 81 Nuper, 1.25,2,58 Obiurgatio, 1.132b-37, 136, 3.83 Observatio, 1.36 Occasio, 1.142 Offidum, pp. 4-8, 1.4b, 5-6, 7b, 34,48, 58, 124-25, 2.52 commune, 1.8 κατά πβρίστασιν, 1.30-41, 31, 59, 79-82* 2.60, 3.29-32,43, 3.89-95 medium, 1.8,3.14 perfectum, 1.8 Omnis. 1.7b, 95 Opes, 1.25, 64, 84, 2.23,40, 3.87 Opiftces, 1.150 Opipare, 3.58 Oratio, 1.1, 12, 50 Ordo, 1.98, 142 Orichalcum, 3.92a Ortus, 1.22 Otium, 1.77, 2.2-8, 41 n. 48, 74, 3.1-4, 1, 3 cum dignitate, 1.69
Index of Latin Words Ρactio, 1.21 Pabestra/palaestricus, 1.130 Panicida/-ium patriae, 3.83 Parstpartes, 1.93-99, 101 pars honestatis, 1.15, 93-99 Partitio, 1.8 n. 12 Pater patratus, 1.34-40,37 Pater patriae, 3.83 Patria. 1.50-58,84, 159,3.121 Patwanium, 1.35, 85, 2.26b-27, 50. See Index of Topics s.v. Client-patron relations. fori, 2.47 Peats, 1.105,2.11 Perfugium, 2.26b, 63 Periurium, 3.106, 107 Perspicax, 1.100 Perturbatio animi, 1.23b, 27, 68-71 Petubntia, 1.104,126, 127 Pietas.2.\l Piscinarius, 1.29,3.73 Placabilitas, 1.88 Plaga, 1.84 Plane, 3.9 Plecto,p. 51, 1.89,2.28 Pkm«, 1.2,61 Populares. 2.75. Se* Index of Topics s.v. Grain, distribution of . . . . Portitor, 1.150 Postliminium, 3.100 Praecepta. pp. 3, 11, 13, 50, and 59, 1.7b, p. 487, 3.14. See Index of Proper Names s.v. Stoic(s), ethics, pars praeceptwa of. Praecipto, 1.13,79-82,81 Praefracte/-us, 3.88 Praegressus, 1.11 Praesto, 3.55 PrincepslPrmcipatus. 1.25, 26, 86 Principtum, 1.50 Probabilis, 1.8, 2.2-8, 7-8, 8, 3.20 Proctitis, 2.69 Prodigalitas, p. 357 Profunda, 1.104 Promptus, 1.83 and n. 109 Prudentia, 1.15b, 143, 2.33, 3.71, 95, 117. 5w Index of Greek Words s.v. φρόνησι?. Pulchrum. 1.18 Quaestio, 1.52, 89, 3.47a, 60
673
Quean». 1.92 Quamquam, 2.43 Qiwre, 1.35 -<7M*. 1.22, 82a, 2.29a Q««fem. 1.15a, 37, 38, 129, 3.39 Quidem. ,.scd, 1.15,3.39 Quodrca, 3.17 Quoque, 2.66 Ratio, 1.12,14,20, 50,107, 3.23. See Index of Greek Words s.v. λόγο?. Ratiocinator, 1.59 Redhibeol-itio, 3.71, 91 Reflo. 2.19 R^MAJ. 1.110, 2.59, 3.19b, 81. See Index of Greek Words s.v. κανών. Repetitio rerum, 1.36 Respublica. pp. 6, 31,1.53, 2.26-29, 58, 67, p. 492 Reticentia, 3.49b-67, 54-55, 54, SSt 6 5 88,67 Rusticitas, 1.129 Sacramentum, 1.37, 3.44-45 Saevitia, 2.24
Salmacida, 1.61 Sanctitas, 2.11 Sopww. 1.46,114,159, 3.13b-17, 16, 18, 29-32, 29, 36, 38, 43, 44-45,45-46a n. 41, 50, 75, 89-92a Sapientia, 1.15a, 156, 2.5-6, 5, 17, 3.16, 69 Satus, 1.118 Scab naturae, 2.U, 49 Scalmus, 3.59 Scriba, 2.29a Sed, 1.22, 33 and n. 43, 2.87 n. 85. See s.v. Quidem . . . sed. Semen, 229a Semmarium, 1.54 Senatus consultum ultimum, 1.76 Sequor. 2.7-8 n. 17 Sermo, 1.108, 111,132b-37, 133,134, 135, 2.43, 48-51 Severitas, 1.88 Significatio, 1.46 Simplex, 1.63 Shnulatio, Simulatum, 1.44, 3.60. See Index of Greek Words s.v. eipto»', ciptofeia. Societas/socius, 1.20, 23b, 26 generis bumani, 1.15a, 20-60, 20, 23b, 34, 50-58, 51, 108, 149, 152-61,
674
Index of Latin Words
SocietasJsocius, {continued) 153, 158, 3.19b-32, 21, 24, 28, 2 9 32, 30, 43, 53, 69, 89-92a Solidus, 3.69 Solivagus, 1.157 Sollertia, 1.15-17,33,157 Species, 1.96,3.47b, 81 Spiritus, 3.32 Splendor/splendide. 1.61, 3.20, 97 Sponsio, 3.70, 77,109, 111 Stigma, 2.25 Stigmatias, 2.25 Stipulatio, 3.59, 111 Stratyllax, 1.80 Suavitas, 1.133 Subligaculum, 1.129 Suboles, 1.54 Subvenio, 2.13 Sum, 1.38 ellipsis of, p. 50,1.33, 38, 63, 3.1, 16, 47b, 58, 80 Summus, 1.33 Summum bonurn. See Index of Greek Words s.v. τέλος. Summum ius, 1.33, 116, 3.49b-67, 55, 61b, 67, 69 Tabulae novae. See Index of Topics s.v. Debt, relief of. Talis, suppression of, 1.32 Tamen, 1.118 Temperantia, 1.88, 93, 3.116-20 Tempus, 1.30, 59 Tergiversor, 3.118 Tttillo, 2.63 Toga/Togatus, 1.77, 2.66, 3.100 Tranquillitas animi, 1.61-92, 68-73, 69 Tributum, 2.72-85, 74, 76 Turpis/turpimdo, 1.4b, 14, 90, 94, 159, pp. 487, 489, and 493, 3.6, l l - 1 9 a , 18, 21, 33, 35-37, 37b-39, 39, 56, 64, 75, 81,92,94,96, 100, 102-3,105 Tutela, 1.85,3.70-71
Tyramtus, 1.112, 2.23. See Index of Topics s.v. Tyrannicide/Tyrant. Ubertas, 1.133 Onus, 2.27 Uroet seco, 1.136 Usus, 1.37 Utentior, 2.71 («/«, pp. 33 and 35,1.84, pp. 353-55, 2.1, 9-10,10,16, pp. 483-84, 491, and 492-94, 3.18-19a, 19a, 21, 29, 35, 49b-67, 49b-57, 77, 80-81, 86-88, 88,95,96,97-115 Utilitas, 1.88, 2.61-62, 63, pp. 491-94, 3.7, 35-37, 40-42, 43-46a, 46b-49a, 99b, 120. See Index of Topics s.v. Interest. communis, 3.24, 40-42 publica, 3.47b Vafer, 3.57 Vanitas. 1.44, 137,150-51, 150, 3.58 Venustas, 1.94, 107, 130 Verbenarius, 1.34-40 Verecundia, 1.15-17, 93-151, 93-99, 93, 97-98, 98,126-32, 126, 127, 129, 143,148-49, 2.46, 3.33, 105 Vero, 2.29a Vir bonus. See s.v. Bonus. Virtus, 2.1, 6, 18-20,18, 52-64, 3.16. See Index of Topics s.v. Virtue. VK, 1.3, 14,18, 94. See Index of Topics s.v. Force. Vita activa, vita contemplativa, pp. 18, 2 4 25, 27, 29, and 38, 1.61-92, 69b-71, 72,92 Voluntas, 1.44, 2.42a, 52-64. See Index of Greek Words s.v. βούλησις. Voluptas, 1.69, 105-6, 3.119. See Index of Topics s.v. Pleasure. Vox, 1.133 Vulgus, 1.147, 3.15, 25
Index of Greek Words
αδιάφορα, ρ. 32, 1.6, 68, 83, p. 357,2.31, 3.12 άδικο?. 1.93-99 αδύνατον, 3.39 αιδώς, 1.93, 126-32 αϊσβησι?. 1.11, 14,3.15 αίσχρόν. 1.4b, 14, 84, 150, 3.35-37, 37b39, 39. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Turpis/turpitudo. άλλα γάρ. 3.79 ανδρεία, p. 58,1.13, 61-92, 63, 79 άντακολουθία τών αρετών, 1.62-65, 152-61, 2.35. See Index of Topics s.v. Viitue(s), interrelations of. αξίωμα, 1.69 απάθεια, 1.107-21 άποπροηγμενα, 3.19b-32 άπράγμων, 1.29 απραξία. 2.7-8 αριθμό?. 3.14 ασχολία. 1.103b-4 αύθεκαστο?. ρ. 22 η. 44, 1.63 αυτάρκεια, 1.69b-71, 2.17 αφορμή. 1.11-14,93 βαθύτη?.1.88 βίοι. See Index of Topics s.v. Lives. βουλή, 1.75 βούλησι?. 1.44, 107-21, 2.52-64 γϋρο?. 1.90 δηγμό?. 2.24 διαί ρε σι?, 2.11-16, 11. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Partitio. διαλέγομαι, 1.132b-37 διασκευαστή?, 1.40 δίκαιο?, 1.93-99 δικαιοσύνη. 0 0 - 6 0 , 2.41. See Index of Topics s.v. Justice; Index of Latin Words s.v. lustitia. ειμαρμένη. 1.114
ει ρω v. ειρωνεία, 1.108 εκκλησία. 1.75 ελευθεριότη?. 1.20-60,42-60, p. 357, 2.52-64 εμπειρία, 1.11 έμφασι?. 1.131 ενέργεια, 1.153 έννοια, 3.75-76, 81 έπιγέννημα/έπιγΐγνομαι, 1.93-99, 3.19a επιείκεια, 1.88 επιστήμη. 1.153 Ιπομαι, 2.7-8 n. 17 εποχή. 2.7-8, 8 n. 18 ευδαιμονία, 1.126-32, 3.12, 21. See s.v. τέλος, ευδοξία, 1.83, p. 357,2.31 ευθυμία. 1.69 ευκαιρία. 1.142 εύλογο?. 1.8 ευστάθεια, 1.69 ευταξία, 1.142 ευφυή?. 3.13b-17 ευφυΐα, 3.14 ηγεμονικοί'. 1.101 ηδονή. 1.69, 3.119. See Index of Topics s.v. Pleasure; Index of Latin Words s.v. Voiuptas. ήμερότη?, 1.88 ήιπότη?, 1.88 καθήκοιΆίαθήκω, pp. 2-3 and 58-59,1.7b, 8, 3.12, 13b-17,13b, 14,15,17 κακία. 3.12 καλόν. ρ. 17,1.4b, 14, 93-99, 3.12 κανών. 1.110, 3.19b, 21, 42. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Reguh. κατακολουθεω, 2.7-8 n. 17 κατορθόω, 1.8 κατόρθωμα, pp. 3 and 58-59,1.8, 2.35, 3.12, 13b-17, 13b, 14, 15, 17 κεφάλαιον. pp. 486-87, 3.21 n. 27 675
676
Index of Greek Words
κόλαξ. κολακεία. 1.42,91 κορδύλη, ρ. 486 κύβων. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Cothottes. λεκτόν, 1.11 λόγος, 1.12, 14, 50-58, 50, 94, 107, 117, 2.15 μεγαλοπρέπεια, 1.92, 2.55b μεγαλοψυχία7μεγαλόψυχος, pp. 20, 24-25, and 32, 1.13, 61-92, 61, 65, 67, 90, 92, 99, 157, 2.17, 18, 37, 43, 46, 56, 64,3.96,114 μέσος, 1.8 μεταξύ. 1.8 μνήμη, 1.11 νόμος έμψυχος. 1.89 νους, 3.44 νύν, 3.47a οίκειότης, 1.54 οΐκείωσις. 1.11-14,11-12,11, 20-41, 5 0 58 η. 75, 53, 54, 55-56 ομόνοια, 2.16, 3.22 όρεξις. p. 2, 1.44 ορμή. 1.21, 23b, 101 and n. 147, 2.11 πάθος. 1.27. See Index of Topics s.v. Passions. πανούργος. 1.109 πιθανός. 1.8,2.8,3.20 πίστις, 1.23a πόλις, 1.54,2.73 πολυπράγμων, 1.125 πολιφλία. 2.30 πραότης, 1.88 πρίπω. τό πρέπον, 1.14, 93-151, 93-99, 93, 94, 96, 97-98,131. See Index of Latin Words s.w. Decorum, Decus. προαίρεσις. 1.28,49,107-21. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Voluntas. προηγμένα. 1.68, 83, 2.35, 3.14 προκύπτων, pp. 3 and 17, 1.100-103a, p. 354, 3.13b-17, 14 προλαμβάνω, 1.79-82, 81 πρόληφις, 1.117,3.75-76
πρόνοια, 2.11-16, I2b-15. See Index of Topics s.v. Providence. σιγάω. 3.52 σιωπάω, 3.52 σοφία, 1.153. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Sapientia. σοφός, 3.16 n. 21. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Sapiens. συγκατάθεσις. 1.97-98, 107-21, 115-21 συμπάθεια, 3.22 σύμπνοια. 2.16 συμφέρον, pp. 17, 26, and 28, 1.9, pp. 35358, 2.9,16, 18-20, 31, 86-87, 3.7, 9, l9b-32. See Index of Latin Words s.w. Uttlis, Utilitas. συνήθεια, 2.9 σύνθεσις, 1.142 σχεσις. ρ. 5,1.107-21, 149 σχολή, 1.103b-4 σωφροσύνη, 1.14, 93-151, 93-99, 93, 96, 97-98, 142, 2.46 τάξις, 1.142 τέλος, ρ. 59,1.7b, 11-14, 21, 22, 100, 107-21,126-32, 147, 153, 3.12, 13a, 19b-32, 33, 35-37, 71, 116, 118,119 τέχνη. 2.6 τρυφή, 3.1 τύχη. 1.107-21. See Index of Topics s.v. Chance; Index of Latin Words s.v. Fortuna. ΰπερηφανϊα, 1.90 υπόμνημα, pp. 486-87, 3.10 φαντασία. 1.11, 23b, 27, 97-98 φιλανθρωπία, 1.88,90 φιλαυτία, 1.13, 30, 91, 146, 3.31, 36 φιλομαθία, 1.13, 18-19 φρόνησις. 1.18-19, 143, 153, 2.33, 3.71. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Prudentia. φύσις. 1.50 n. 78,107-21, 3.13, 21. See In dex of Topics s.v. Nature; Index of Latin Words s.v. Natura. Φωνή. 1.133 ωφέλιμον, ρ. 353
Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features
Ablative case, 1.5, 47, 2.76, 83b, 3.8, 82a Address direct, for liveliness, 1.15a, 3.76, 81, 85, 97, 99b. See s.v. Dialogue/debate, form of, l.l-4a, 1,2.1, 8, 3.1, 121 Alliteration, 1.139,154,3.58 Anacoluthon, suspected, 2.60, addend, p. 277 Analogy, 1.54, 85, 93-99, 95,107-21,107, 3.10, 21-27, 22, 33. See s.v. simile. Anaphora, 1.88, 151,2.5-6,85 Anticlimax, 3.115 Antithesis, 2.28, 56, 59, 3.2 άπαξ \€·γομ(.νον, 1.146, 3.117 Argument a fortiori, 1.14,48, 100,103, 111, 114, 119, 131, 145, 157, 2.29a, 40, 3.2932, 74, 84, 100, 105 dilemma, as a form of, 3.39 direction of, clarified retrospectively, 1.11-17,37, 122-25, 125, p. 357, 2.11, 23-29, 42b-43, 44-45, 5 2 64, 52, 3.19b-32, 21,45, 89-95 ίνδοξα as a basis for, 1.55-56, 150 petitio principii, 3.106 syllogistic form, 2.10, 48, 3.27 Aspect, verbal, 2.33 Association of ideas (as a principle of com position), 1.35, 37, 40, 82a, 108, 2.2329, 3.40-42, 62 n. 58, 68, 70-71, 77, 86-88,87,112 Asyndeton, 1.28, 31, 36, 38, 51, 2.56, 86, 3.89-95, 99b, 118, 119 Attacks on opponents tacito nomine, 1.26, 109, 3.41, 73, 82a Carelessness. See s.v. Formulaic writing . . . Chiasmus, 1.128,139, 144, 2.50, 3.114, 117,121 Clarity, lack of, 1.81, 3.29. See s.v. For mulaic Writing . . . Clauses, short, 3.58
Clausulae, pp. 50-51,1.14, 15,128,151, 2.48,85,3.3,6,41 Climax, 1.61, 2.26b, 69, 3.6, 36, 82b-85 Coinages of new words, possible Cicero nian, p. 51,1.11, 59, 88, 100, 14*, 151, 2,14,16. See s.v. άπαξ Xiyouevoi>. Collectives as expressed in Greek and Latin, p . 7 n . 18 Colloquialism, p. 51, 1.89,109, 3.58, 7 7 78. See s.v. Sermo cotidianus. Color, 3.79 Composition, hasty. See s.v. Formulaic writing . . . Conanmtas, 1.3 Conclusion of a topic, apparent, undermined in the sequel, 1.152-61,157, 2.23-29 Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lacking, 1.11-17, 13,28, 37, 41 a-b, 61, 90-91, 91, 99, 101, 103b-4,113, 150-51, 2.21-22, 3.17, 64. See s.v. Asyndeton. Consecutive clauses, 1.32, 51, 88, 97-98 Constructio ad sententiam, 1.80, 101,121 Contrast. See s.v. Antithesis. Crescendo. See s.v. Climax.
Dative, ethical, added for liveliness, 3.83 predicative, 2.77 Deponent verbs, disappearance of from the spoken language, 1.121 Descriptio (as opposed to praesenptio), 2.85, 3.38, 43 Dialogue/debate (as a means of adding liveli ness), 3.33,49b-57, 76, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 97-98, 99b, 100. See s.v. Address, direct, for liveliness. Digression, 1.50-58, 114, p. 356, 2.9, 2 3 29, 35, 77, 3.13b-17, 20, 111-12, 112 Diminutive, 1.41b, 80 Dispositio/divisio, p. 50, 1.45, 122-23, 125, 126-49,142, pp. 359-60, 2.18-20, 677
678
Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features
Dispositio/divisio (continued) 21-22, 31, 72, pp. 488-91, 3.33-34, 40-42,88,88-95,96,97-115 Doublet, possible Ciceronian, 1.157 ϊν δια δυοϋν, 1.81 εναλλαγή. 3.32 Enthymemc, 2.69 Epigrams, p. 50 Examples. See Index of Authors s.v. Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), de Officiis, examples, "bending" of (viz., to match other exam ples), 2.26, 41 distorting effect of Ciceronian, 1.74-78, 132b-37, 133, 155b lack of, 1.18-19, 120, 122-25, 159 order of, 1.33, 61, 116, 2.26, 3.99b relation of to argument, pp. 34-35 and 50, 1.21,25-26, 34-40, 41a, 61-92, 147,3.86-88,88,112 relation of Greek and Roman, pp. 59 and 360, 2.16, 26, 55b-60, 61-64, 77, 3.48, 87, 97-99a repetition in Book 3 of examples from Book 1,1.34-40, pp. 494-95, 3.8995, 92b-95 Exclamations, p. 50 Formulaic writing, hasty composition, im perfect integration of parts, inclcgancy, imprecision, Konzeptstil, poor construc tion, etc., 1.8, 12, 15, 26, 31-41, 32, 54, 79-82 n. 105, 82a, 90-91, 91, 93, 97-98, 100, 101 and n. 146, 149, 157, 2.19b-20, 21-22, 3.12,13b-17,17, 29,49b-57, 86-88, 91, 92b, 117, 119 Genitive "of the sphere," 1.26 Gerundive, p. 50, 1.5, 47, 103, 2.79, 3.99a Gorgianic clauses, 1.3 Grccism, 1.71
Greek words, p. 51, 2.14, 3.59 Hyperbole, 1.138-40 Imagery animal, p. 52, 1.102,2.24 hunting, 3.68 legal, 3.19 military, p. 52, 1.80, 102
molding, 1.7b nautical, 2.19 rule (regula, tcaiuu), 1.110 sword-play, 1.73a torch, 2.37 transgression, 1.102, 141 Irony, 1.69b-71, 70 Latinity, bad, real, or suspected, 1.36, 82a, 92,101,3.82 Litotes, 3.6
Metaphor, 1.85, 2.19, 24, 42b, 43,63, 69, 3.19b n. 25, 32, 36, 66, 77-78, 80, 121 Negation, emphatically placed, 3.119 Objector, imaginary, as a means of enliven ing the argument, 3.76, 79,100. See s.v. Dialogue/debate. Oratio recta. 3.76. See s.v. Dialogue/debate. Overlapping of material between 1 and 3, 1.31-41, 34-40. See s.v. Examples. Oxymoron, 3.100
Pairs (as a principle of organization), 1.76, 107, 108, 2.49 Parataxis, p. 50 παρονομασία, 1.59, 80 Participles, p. 50, 1.5,11, 33 n. 45, 71, 80, 2.66,76,3.1,2,3,6,116 Personification, pp. 51-52, 1.9, 11, 12, 81, 84,102, 134, 151,2.9, 29a, 3.27, 71, 99b, 119 Poly proton, 1.139 Praenomen omission of, 1.36 use of in lieu of cognomen, 2.58 Proems more carefully elaborated, p. 50 Ranking of phenomena (to conclude a sec tion), 1.27,41b, 50-58, 92, 141, 151 Recapitulation, 1.67, 101 n. 149 Relative pronouns as connectors, p. 50 Relevance, points of dubious, 1.155b—58 Repetitions, pp. 50 and 51,1.67, 79-82 and n. 105, 82a, 91, 94, 100-103a, 101, 132a, 141, 145-46, 149, 152-61, 158, 2.87 n. 85, 3.24 n. 29, 89, 92b, 117 Revisions to Cicero's draft, possibly to be undertaken, 1.34-40, 40 and n. 63,
Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features 145-46, 147, 157, 160, 2.23, p. 495, 3.96 Ring-composition, 1.13 Sarcasm. See s.v. Irony. Section-ends, phrases marking, 1.20, 92, 2.8 Sentence-final position, 3.1 Sermo cotidianus, 3.16, 117. See s.v. Colloquialism. Short clauses, 3.58 Simile, p. 52, 1.111, 120 of horses, 1.102 of musicians, 1.145-46 of physical beauty, 1.98 of physicians, 1.83, 136 of poets, 1.93-99,97-98, 107-21, 12649 Synonyms, deployed in introducing a con cept, 1.61, 93, 2.1, 3.116 piled up for emphasis, pp. 51-52, 3.57, 115, 119 Technical terms, p. 51, 3,92b military, based on animal names, 3.90
679
Tenses imperfect, 1.93-99 perfect, pp. 22-23 sequence of, 1.36 Tmesis, 3.71 Transitions, 1.13, 19, 22, 61-92, 122-25, 150-51. See s.v. Asyndeton; Index of Latin Words under the various connec tive particles. Tricolon, 1.31 n. 37, 2.51 Triplet, 2.11, 3.6, 119 Unus {+ negativized comparative), 2.28 Variatio, 1.20, 21, 33, 61, 62, 95, 100, 141, 150-51 n. 188,2.72 Vocabulary, poverty of, 1.36, 142, 3.92b Vocative, forms of, 1.61 Waxing members, law of, 1.14, 2.51 Word-order, 3.1,2, 116. See s.v. Sentencefinal position, normal, altered for emphasis, p. 51, 1.129,3.119
Index of Authors
Accius, L. Aeneadae vel Decius, 1.61 Agamemnonidae, 1.138 Armorum iudicium, 1.113, 114, 3.97-99a Atreus, 2.23 trag. 203-4: 1.97 226: 1.97 227-28: 3.102 Clutemestra, 1.114 Epigoni, 1.114 Erigona, 1.138 Meleager, 1.61 Prometheus {?), 2.13 trag. 618: 1.118 n. 168 651: 3.84 Acilius, C , p. 488, 3.113-15 hist. 5:3.115 Aelian Historia Animalium 9.9: 1.11 Varia Historia 2.9: 3.46b Aelius Srilo Pracconinus, L gramm. p. 70, fr. 50: 1.104 Aelius Tubcro, Q. hist. 9: 3.100 Acschincs Socraticus fr. 9: 2.71 Aeschylus Agamemnon 807 ff.: 3.84 Armorum Iudicium (frr. 174 ff.): 3.9799a Choephoroe 10-12: 1.93-99 Eumenides 679-80: 3.44 Persae 168: 1.25 Prometheus Vinctus 500-503: 2.13 Septem 545-46: 1.38 Septem 592: 1.65 Aesop Fahulae 10: 1.41b 132: 3.22 147: 1.41b Afranius, L.
com. 138:3.58 Agapetus Patrologia Graeca 86.1 1168C: 1.90,91 1169D:2.43 1172C: 1.82a n. 107 1173D: 1.90 1176C: 1.88 Albcrti, L.B., p. 44 n. 117, 1.124, 130 Ambrose, St., pp. 41-42 (and notes 9 8 100) and 45, 1.14 de Officii! Ministrorum 1.73: 1.131 1.131: 1.20 1.132: 1.21 1.222: 1.93-99 1.229: 1.101 1.254: 1.31 2.25: 2.10 2.49: 2.35 2.132:2.71 3.60: 3.19a Anaxagoras 59 A 48: 3.44 A males Maximi, 1.116 Anonymous Author de Notts cod. Paris, B.N. lat. 7530, 28'-29*: 1.40 Anonymous Commentator on Plato, Theaeutus V.14 ff.: 1.20-41, 55 Anonymus Iamblichi, pp. 358-59 2.1-5: 2.44-45 2.7: p. 359 3.3-6: 2.52-64 4.1-6: 2.36-38 5.2: p. 359 6.1-5:2.11-16,72-85 Antipater of Tarsus, p. 22, 2.64, 86-87, pp. 484,489, and 490-91, 3.12, 13a, 19b32 n. 24, 26 n. 30, 49b-57, 51, 8992a SVF 3, 252.4 ff.: 3.12 680
Index of Authors SVF 3, 253.8 ff.: 3.12 Aniipaier of Tyre, pp. 28 and 361, 2.86-87, 87, 3.7 Antiphon 87A2andB44a-71:3.22 Aratus Pbaenomena 133-34: 3.104 Aristo of Ceiis, 1.6, 107-21, 2.56 Tiepl γήρω?: 1.123 fr. 13V1.23ff.: 1.61-92,66,90 Aristo of Chius, p. 37, 1.6, 15b, 107-21, 122-25,2.56,3.119 SVF 1.79.9 ff.: 1.107-21 Aristophanes Equites 533: 2.25 Pax 700 ff.: 2.25 1189-90: 1.41b Ranae 96 ff.: 3.108 1471:3.108 Thesmophoriazusae 275-76: 3.108 Aristotle, pp. 37, 43, and 50, 1.4a, 42-60, 61-92, 62-65, 65, 83, 2.11, 55b. See Index of Proper Names s.v. Peripatetic/ Peripatos. Analytica Posteriora 71b33ff.: 1.14 97M5-17: 1.90 97b 18: 1.62 97b20-22:1.90 97b21: 1.72,76 Athenaton Politeia 27.3: 2.64 de Partibus Anhnalium 681b26: 1.126 Ethica Eudemia 12l9b8: 1.19 1232a38-bl0: 1.66 1232b9-10: 1.90 I232bl0ff.:1.68 l234a30-32: 1.93 1247a4: 1.8 Ethica Nicomachea 1095a5: 1.15-17 1095bl9ff.:3.84 I096al2ff.:3.73 1098bl2 ff.: 2.86-87 1099a 18: 2.42a 1100a 10 if.: 1.111 1103a3ff.: 1.15-17 1106a2-3:1.27 U06a2-4: 1.28 1107a 14: 1.8 1109a33:3.3
1112bll-12: 1.7b 1113a29ff.: 1.110 1113b8-10: 1.23b 1120a31-33: 1.42 1120b2-3:1.44 1120b4-6:1.44 1120b7: 2.52-64 1121a4:2.64 U21a30ff.: 1.42,2.52-64 1121bl5:2.77 1121b31 ff.: 1.150-51.150 1121b34: 1.150 1122a3:2.77 1122al8ff.:1.92 1122bl9ff.: 2.55b U23a6-10: 1.138 1123bl8-20:1.82b-84 1123b20:2.88 1123B31 ff.: 1.61, 80 1124al: 1.61-92,96 H24a4ff.: 1.65 1124al2ff.: 1.67 1124al3ff.:1.68 1124a29ff.: 1.66 1124a30ff.: 1.71 U24b6-9: 1.82b-84 1124bl 8-20: 1.90 1124b25:1.68,71 U24b26-27: 1.88 1125al2ff.: 1.67, 131 1126bll ff.: 1.132 1127a21 ff.: 1.63 1l27b22ff.: 1.108 U28b25: 3.35-37 1129bl 1:3.69 I130a3: 1.30 1130a8-10: 1.20 H30al4ff.: 1.93-99 H30a31: 1.24 1134bl ff.: 1.65 I134bl8ff.:3.71 1141b2-3:2.5 1142a2: 1.125 1143a21: 1.88 1159blOff.: 1.56 1161a35ff.: 1.50 1162al6ff.: 1.11 I162b34ff.:2.69 H64b31-32: 1.48 1164b34: 2.55b 1168a28:3.31
681
682
Index of Authors
Aristotle (continued) 1168bl5ff.:1.13 1169a 18: 3.43 1169a26:3.43 1171al7:2J0 1172a6: 1.58 1176a30ff.<= 10.6-8): 1.153 1176M0: 1.104 U77al2ff.:1.13, 153 1177a23ff.: 1.153 1177M-6: 1.35 U78a24: 2.86-87 1179b21-23: 1.107 1179b33-34:2.46 U80a24-26:3.68 Historia Animalium 488b24: 1.14 568al7: pp. 4-5 Metaphysial 980al: 1.13 1025b5-7: 2.5 1078a36ff.: 1.14 Oeconomicus 1344b2-4: 1.41a Poetica 1447al3 ff.: 1.97 Politica 1252a26ff.:l.ll,54n. 81 1253al ff.: 1.157 1253a2 ff.: 1.153 1253a9ff.: 1.11-12 I253a31 ff.: 2.16 1254bl9-20: 1.41a 1259bl ff.: 1.123 1263a37: 1.21 1263b5 ff.: p. 357 1263bl3: 1.20-60 1284al4: 1.89 1302a34 ff.: 1.24 1309al7ff. : 2.55b 1320a35 ff.: 2,55b 1333a 16 ff.: 1.103b-4 1333b40-41: 1.34 1334al4-16: 1.35 1336b3-8: 1.127 Rhetorical: 1.107 1366b3-5: 1.155 1371 bl9-20: 3.31 1389a3: 2.46 1389b36: 3.31 1404bl ff.: 1.97,126-49 1405al3: 1.130
1408a36:1.142 1416a28ff.: 3.108 Topica 135a 13: 1.93-99 116b21: 1.98 ft 13 Rose: 3.77-78 88 Rose: 2.56 89 Rose: 2.56 113 Rose: 1.14 [Aristotle] de Virtutibus et Vitiis 1250bl 1-12: 1.93 1254b34:1.88 Magna Moralia H87b4ff (= 1.11-15): 1.107-21 H87bl4-16: 1.107-21 1197alff.: 1.153 1199al2:1.8 1202b21-22: 1.88 1203a22: 2.16 1206bl7ff.: 1.11-14 n. 20 12l2a31: 3.31 Physiognomica 805a28-30: 1.93-99 Aristoxenus ft 31 Wehrli: 3.45-46a Artemidorus Daldianus Onirocritus 1.8: 2^25 Asconius Pedianus, Q. Pro Cornelio 60: 3.47a Pro Scauro 20: 1.108 Athenaeus Dipnosophistae I2.525e: 1.131 Augustine, St., p. 42 n. 100, 3.97-115 contra Academicos 1.6.16: 2.5 contra lulianum 4.21: pp. 5-6 contra lulianum opus imperfectum 4.43: 1.128 de trinitate 14.11.14: p. 66 n. 7 Augustus Monumentum Ancyranum 5.13-14: 1.34-40 n. 47 Aurelius Antoninus, M. ad Se Ipsum 3.1.2: 3.14 9.1.1: 3.23 9.42.11-12: 1.44 Bion of Borysthenes ft 16A: 1.107-21,114, 115 Brutus, M. Junius Trtpi καθήκοντος, p. 3 and n. 7, p. 59,1,7b
Index of Authors Caecilius Statius Hypobolimaeus (?) apud Cic. Sec. Rose. 46:3.112 com. 264: p. 57 Caelius Rufus, M. ad Familiares 8.14.3: 1.38 Caesar; C. Julius de hello Civili 2: 2.59 3.1.3: 2.78 de Bello Gallico 2.14: 2.23-29 2.14.5: 1.88 n. 117 2.32.1: 1.35 3.18.4:2.69 7.50.4: 1.74 Carneades fr. 5 M.: 3.119 fr. l i b ' M . : 3.54-55, 89-92, 92a Castiglione, Baldassare, p. 44 and n. 117 Cato (Censorius), 3.1-4. See Index of Proper Names s.v. Porcius Cato, M. αποφθέγματα, 1.104, 2.89 de Agricultura 1.1: 1.150,2.89 5.2: 1.41a Epistulue, 1.37 hist. fr. 127: 3.1 orat. no. 8 fr. 58: 3.104 fr. 61:3.104 fr. 178: 1.155 fr. 238: 3.104 Catullus, C. Valerius Carmina 29.15: 1.43 61:3.112 69: 1.130 76.7-9: 2.63 Charisius, p. 270 Barw.: 1.3 n. 7 Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of, p. 40 n. 85, p. 353 Chilon apud D.L. 1.70: 3.82b-85 Chrysippus, p. 3 n. 9 and p. 17, 1.2, 6, 8, 11-14 and n. 22, 11, 13, 14, 15b, 21, 22, 30, 41a, 50, S9t 68, 71, 93, 95, 9798, 101 and n. 146, 115-21, 128, 2.31, 35, 58, p. 484, 3.8, 12, 13a, 14, 19b32, 19b, 21, 42, 51, 77-78, 89-92a,
683
117. See s.v. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 2-3. π«ρί δικαιοσύνη?, ρ. 58 •rep* κατορθωμάτων, ρ. 58,1.8, p. 354 Trepi τοΰ διαλέληθότο? προ? Άθηνάδην (SVF 2, 8.12), 3.37b ικpi του καθήκοντος, pp. 58-59 Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator). See Index of Proper Names s.v. Tullius Cicero, Marcus (the orator), agriculture vs. commerce, views on, 1.151, 3.49b-57 civil war, view of/concern about, pp. 9 and 33, 1.35, 86, p. 360, 2.20, 2 3 29, 27, 29a, 45 commercial transactions, lack of sympa thy for profitmaking in, 1.150, 151, 3.49b-57 consulate, characterization of his, 1.77, 2.84 courts/legal system/legal advice, concern over state of, 2.65, 3.2,44 criticism of earlier Latin philosophical books, 1.2, 2.5 death, attitude toward, p. 29 and n. 64, 1.57, 86 debt-relief, views on, p. 33, 2,78-85 divergence of precept and practice, probable case of, 2.69-71, 69 exile, feelings about his, 1.28, 84, 86, 2.20, 3.79, 121 festivals, setting of dialogues during, by, 1.13 games, attitude toward, 2.55b-60 glory, relation to, 2.31, 43. See Index of Topics s.v. Glory, judgments, political, presented as fact, 1.26, 2.43, 72, 3.79-82a, 79, 82b85 justification of his own policies, pp. 360-61, 2.72-85 kings, Roman, view of, 2.41-42, 41, 3.40-42, 41 mean, his approval of, 2.72 mood, rapid change of, 2.24 otittm, attitude toward, pp. 13, 35-36, 1.1, 69b-71, 92, 2.2-8,3.1-4,1 party politics, view of, 1.85, 2.72, 74 paterfamilias, in the role of, 1.59, 3.63.
684
Index of Authors
Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator) [continued) See s.v. de Officiis, father, speaking as. pessimism, 1 .29, 75 phases of his literary activit)' (as seen by himself), 3.4 philosophy and rhetoric not sharply distinguished by. See s.v. rhetoric, philosophy, writing on/relation to, 1.1, 3,2.2-8,3.1-4,3.1,3 prudishness, 1.159 public opinion, questionable assessment/use of, 3.19a, 82b-85 rambling, tendency toward, 1.155b—58 rhetoric and philosophy not sharply distinguished by, p. 37 and n. 79, 1.2,3.20 self-contradiction through change of sources, 1.148, 152-61, 152, 158, 159, 160, p. 494, 3.30 self-glorification, 1.2, 74-78, 2.59 self-pity, 3.3 self-presentation as a covert critique of another, 3.73 senate, role of stressed by, 1.75, 3.86, 97-115, 110, 113 vectigalia, attitudes toward, 3.88 wit, 1.103b-4 witticisms, fondness for, 1.104, 108 Academica, 2.7-8. See s.v. Lucullus. 1.4: 1.82a 1.7: 2.6 1.38:2.35 1.43: 3.7 1.45: 1.18 l,fr. 1:1.28 3 proem: 2.2-8 ad Atticum 1.12.2: 1.59 1.13.3:2.73 1.16.3: 1.150 1.17.9:3.88 1.18.1: 1.92 1.18.7:3.88 1.19.4:2.78-85,78 2.1.6: 1.78 4.2.5: 2.78-85 4.16.3: 1.109 5.16.3: 1.88 6.1.2: 1.88 6.1.12: p. 12 6.2.5: 1.88, 89
7.2.4: 1.11 7.5.4: 1.35 7.7.7: 2.29a 7.11.1:1.14,83-84 8.11.2:1.35 8.16.2: 1.88 9.7C.1: 1.43 10.4.8: 1.88 10.8.2: p. 360 n. 14, 2.29a 11.15.3: 1.114 11.21.3:2.29a 12.7.1: 2.45 12.8: 2.45 12.21.5: 3.3 12.45.2: 1.26 13.10.3: 2.79 13.12.3: 1.48 13.13.1:3.31 13.16.1: 1.97 13.42.1:2.74 15.3.2:2.43 15.11: l.l32b-37 15.13a.2:p.9n.22, 1.4b 16.6.4: 2.2-8 16.8.1: 3.84 16.11.3:2.84 16.11.4: p. 11, 1.8, 93-99 n. 140, 2.86-87, pp. 484-87,493 n. 11, 494, 3.7, 8, l l - 1 9 a , 18-19a, 19b32,63 16.14.3: p. 6 16.14.4: p. 485, 3.63 16.15.3: 1.80 ad Familiares 1.8.4:3.2 1.9.15: 3.10 1.9.16: 3.79 1.9.18: 1.43 3.10.10: 1.88 4.4.4: 2.3-5, 6 4.5.5-6: 1.71 4.6.1:2.60 4.14.1: 2.46 5.6.2: 2.84 6.6.5: 1.35 6.106.3: 2.69 6.15:3.73-74 7.1.2: 1.114 7.1.2-3: 2.55b-60 7.1.5: 1.92 7.10.4: 3.121
Index of Authors 7.16.3: 2.28 9.6.5: 2.3-5 9.7.1:3.116 9.10.3:2.29a 9.14.4: 1.121 9.15.2:1.108 9.16.7: 2.84 9.21.3:2.49 9.22: 1.126-32 9.22.2-4a: 1.127 9.22.3: 1.128 9.24.3: 1.55-56, 132b-37 10.1.1:2.23,3.121 10.10.2:2.16 11.2.3: p. 360 11.27-28:2.31 12.1.1-2:2.23 12.3.1: 3.82b-85, 83 12.3.2: 3.82b-85 12.5.3:2.65 12.16.2: 3.5-6 13.10.2:2.3 15.4.13: 1.65,2.43 15.5.2: 1.77 15.17.2: 2.29a 16.10.2: 1.23a 16.12.2: 1.35 16.21.5: 1.1 16.21.6: 3.5-6 n. 14 16.21.8:3.6,121 ad Marcum Brutum 1.6.1: p. 15 1.6.3:3.73-74 1.12.3: p. 15 1.14.1: p. 15 1.15.5:3.121 2.3.6: 2.45 2.5.6: p. 15 ad Qumtum Fratrem 1.1.24:3.89 1.1.25: 1.88 n. 117 1-2.7: 1.89 1.3.8: 3.73 2.7.2:3.118 Brutus 12: 1.61 15: 1.48 53: 3.40 77: 1.121 82 ff.: 1.116 84: 2.40
685
106: 2.75 107: 1.109 109: 1.108 111:1.108 113-14:3.10 117: 3.63 121: 1.4a, 106 128: 1.109 130: 2.50 133: 1.133 143: 1.108 155: 2.65 164: 2.63 173: 1.108 175: 1.19,2.58 177: 1.108 202: 2.48 216: 1.108 222: 2.50, 72 and n. 71 255 ff.: 1.74 259: 1.133 265: 3.112 310: 1.1 316: 1.146 317 ff.: 3.73 Cato, 1.112,2.37 de Amicitia, pp. 1 and 11,1.50-58, 54 and n. 87, 55-56y 2.31 6-7:3.16 7-9: 1.90 11: 1.35 16: 1.30, 3.16 18-19:3.17 19: 1.54,55-56 19-20:1.50-58,2.31 n. 39 20: 1.53 28: 1.38 36ff.:1.31,3.19b-32 37: 3.63 38: 3.44-45 39: 1.150-51, 3.43 41: 1.74-78,2.23 47: 1.13 48: 1.55 50:2.31 51:1.56,3.19a 52: 1.26 61: p. 353 78: 1.120 88-100: 1.42 89-94: 1.91
686
Index of Authors
Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator) {continued) 98: 2.38 n. 42 de Consolatione, p. 39 fr. 10 Muller: 3.44 de Consulatu Suo fr. 12 Courtney: 1.77 de Dh/inatione, pp. 11, 30, and 53 1.1 and 9: 1.9 1.12: 1.31 n.37 1.23:3.10 1.32: 3.66 1.62:3.116-20, 116 n. 98 1.111:2.16 2.1: 2.8 2.3: 3.15 2.4: p. 29 2.5: 2.2 2.6:3.1-4 2.6-7: 2.2-8 2.23: 2.24 2.71:3.13b-17 de Domo Sua 64: 1.61 86-87: p. 496 de Finibus. pp. 11, 19, 47 n. 132, 57, 1.5-6,11-12,12,14,101, p. 358, 3.116-20 1-2:3.112 1.1 ff.: 2.2-8 1.4 ff.: 1.1 1.6: 1.6, 3.49B-57 1.10: 1.1 123 ff.: 3.112, 116 1.34: 1.92 1.59: 1.49 1.63: 3.78 1.65-70:3.118 2: 1.5, 320 2.17: 3.20 2.19:3.119 2.35: 1.5-6,3.119 2.40: 1.105 2.45: 1.12, 22 2.45 ff.: 1.11-14, 11, 12-13, 3.116-20 2.47: 1.14 2.48: 1.15a 2J1-59: 3.118 2J2: 1.15a, 117 2.54:3.113 2.57: 3.82b n. 84 2.60: 1.93 2.60 ff.: 3.118
2.63:3.117 2.65:3.110,116-20 2.69:3.117 2.71: 2.10 n. 21 2.73:3.112 2.85: 1.5 3.14: 1.94 3.26: 3.39 3.29: \J 3.31: 3.13a, 71 3.36: 3 J 9 3.45: 1.142 3.57: p. 357, 2.31 3.58: 1.101 3.59: 1.7b 3.61: 1.112 3.63: 327 3.64: 3.30, 102 3.65: 1.92 n. 127 3.70: 1.5, 2.42a, 3.19b-32 4.5: 1.7b 4.15: 3.14 4.17:2.29a 4.79: 2.35 5.2: 1.1 S22: 1.5 S23: 1.6 5.35: 1.131 5.55:3.1 5.62: 1.98 5.64: 3.86 5.67: 1.21, 95, 3.71 de Glona, pp. 2, 8 n. 20, 30, 31 n. 69, 32, 356-57, 2 2 - 8 , 31, 43 fr. phil. pp. 61-62, no. 1: 2.15 de Haruspichtm Responso 32: 3.22 de Inventtone 1.2-3:1.12,2.15 1.6: p. 6 n. 13 1.9: 1.142 1.40: 1.142 1.69: 1.155 2.10: 2.8 2.164:1.88,93 de lure Civili m Artem Redigendo ft phil., p. 94, no. 1: 3.63 n. 59 de Lege Agraria 2.56: 2.27 2.82: 3.75 2.87: 1.35 de Lege hAanilia
Index of Authors 1: 1.1 7: 1.61 11-12:1.35 12: 1.38 14: 1.38 29: 1.80 38: 2.27 41: 1.88 65: 2.29a de Legibus 1.6: 1.130 1.16-17: 3.72 1.19:2.35 1.20: 1.22 1.21:3.33 1.22:1.11,2.5 1.23:2.11,3.23 1.25:2.14 1.29: 3.69 1.33:1.30,56,2.9 1.41:3.77 1.45:3.35 1.49: 1.5,3.12 1.58-62: 2.5-6 2.3: 1.21,71 2.10: 1.61 2.10-11:3.44 2.11 ff.: 3.69 2.21: 1.34-40 2.22: 3.102 2.36: 1.97 n. 145 2.37: 1.88 3: 1.122-25 3.13-14: 1.124 3.14: 1.7a, 88-89, p. 354 3.30: 1.140 3.36: 3.80-81 3.44: 1.51 fr. 2 Zieglcr: 2.10 n. 19 de Natura Deorum, p. 358, 2.59, 3.60 n. 53 1 proem: p. 359 1.1:2.2-8 1.3: 1.5,2.43 1.6: 3.1 1.6-7: 1.155b 1.6-12:2.2-8 1.7-8:2.2-5 1.8: 1.1 1.12: 1.7,7-8 1.45:3.102
687
1.73:3.116 1.75:3.10,69 1.76: 3.92b 1.111: 1.159 1.113:1.5,2.63,3.117 1.115:3.68 1.116:2.11 1.117:2.12a 1.121:2.21-22 1.122:1.56 2:1.23a, 126, 2.12b-15 n. 25 2.7-12a:2.12b-15n.25 2.33-36:2.11 2.138:1.127 2.140: 1.105 2.141: 1.126 2.145: 1.145-46 2.147:1.11 2.150:2.15 2.150 ff.: 2.11-16, 12b-15 2.151:2.13 2.152:2.14 2.154:1.22 3.47: 3.44 3.74: 3.60, 73 3.74-76: 1.34-40 3.75: 3.71 3.80:3.62-63,97-115 de Officiis afterthoughts, 2.19b-20, 35, 86-87, 3.96,112,115 alterations to his Panaetian model, sus pected, pp. 20-21, 28,1.13, 19, 38,42-60, 45, 50-58, 54, 58, 6 1 92,69, 70, 71, 72, 73b, 75. 76, 89,92,93-151,93-99,94,99, 100-103a, 102, 103b-4, 107, 109, 111,113,115-21 (and n. 162), 122-25, 126-49, 127,130, 132a, 132b-37,133,149,150-51, pp. 359-60, 2.10, 11, 21-22,23-29, 26a, 29-42a, 43,44-45, 45, 47, 48-51, 49, 52-53, 55b-60, 71, 73 n. 73, See Panacrius of Rhodes, delimitation of property vis-a-vis Cicero. annalist sources, use of, 2.40, 75, pp. 487-88, 3.40-42. See s.w. Quadrigarius, Q. Claudius; Tuditanus, C. Sempronius. borrowings from other Ciceronian
688
Index of Authors
Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator) {continued) works in, 2 2 - 8 n. 16, 3.85, 102. See s.v. self-reminiscence in. composition, pp. 8-10, 1.1 probable motives for, pp. 8-9 n. 20, 11-15,31-35 cross-references, 1.18-19, 38, 70, 121, 2.31 omined where expected, 1.160, p. 494, 3.107 deletions from his manuscript, sus pected, 1.40 difference from Panaetius, 3.62-63 dogmatism, inclination toward, pp. 3738,3.19b-32,20,49b-57 errors of fact, real or possible, 1.75, 3.86, 99b examples. See s.vv. Panaerian examples; Index of Grammatical and Stylistic Features s.v. Examples, -bending" of, 2.41 careless addition of, 1.25-26, 3.8688 chosen for personal interest, 1.21, 35, 2.59 political commentary contained in, pp. 31-35, 59-60, 360-61, 2.43, pp. 495-96, 3.74, 88 Roman, 1.30-41, 34-40, 138-40, 226b, 48-51, p. 494, 3.62-63 unlucky choice of, 1.147, 152-61 father, speaking as, pp. 11-16 and 47 n. 132,1.16, 74-78, 7 8 , 9 3 151, 100-103a, 102,2.8,48,87, 3.5-6, 33, 49b-57, 66, 85, 11620, 121 formalism of argument characteristic of, 2.48 heroic moral code adopted in. See s.v. rigorist position, impatience to get to end of an argu ment, 1.30, 93-99, 99, 149,153, 159,3.116-20 insertions of material of interest to him self (within Panaerian pan), pp. 20-21, 1.138-40,1.150-51. See s.v. examples, chosen for personal interest, marginalia, suspected, 1.31, 109, 147, 157, 2.21-22, 3.29, 82
memory, composition from, p. 39, 1.33, 40, 147, 3.37b-39,45-46a, 86, 99b, 113-15, 3.45-46a misstatements of previous argument, 1.8,70,115-21, 121 model in controllable cases followed fairly closely in, 1.118, 3.113-15, 117 model of Latiniry in die Renaissance, p. 46 moralizing tendency in, pp. 37-38, 1.112, 132a, 2.10 nontechnical language, problematical use of, 1.114,147,2.35 omission/reduction of source material in, p. 28, 1.19, 22, 42-60, 93-99, 93, 96, 97-98, 107, 120, 122-25, 149,153,2.16 organization of, 1.11-15,42-60, 9 3 151, 93-99, 94, 100, pp. 359-60, 2.31, 39-42a, 44-45, 45, 52-53, 55b-60, pp. 493-95, 3.96 originality, attempts at, 3.75-76 claim to, pp. 483-94, 3.33-34 Panaerian examples "broadening" of, 2.41, 60, 77, 80 curtailment of, p. 28, 2.16 Panaetius criticized in, 1.7a, 50-58, 2.16 Panaetius defended in, 2.86-87, 3.1119a, 18,34 platonizing tendencies in, 3.13b, 18, 21, 36, 69, 77, 81 political commentary/examples at expense of philosophical argument, pp. 32-35, 1.74-78,3.19,88 priority given to, pp. 359-60, 2.29, 55b-60, 3.33-34, 40-42 precepts, practical, emphasized or of fered in, 1.7b, 73b publication of, p. 40, 1.157 reform of aristocratic behavior as goal of, 1.150-51,2.10 revisions to, possible further, 1.82, 145, 147, 157, 160, 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 23, 3.24, 96,115 rigorist position adopted in, 1.112, 3.62-63,97-115,114,119 Roman gentleman/statesman as in tended reader of, 1.18-19,150-
Index of Authors 51. See Index of Latin Words s.v. Dignitas/dignus. school text in antiquity, p. 42 and n. 98 self-reminiscence in, 1.5-6, 38, 41b, 54, 133, 147, 156, 2.2-8 terminology, problems of, pp. 4-7, 1.8, 20-60, 44, 61, 93-99, 96, 114, 142, 147, 3.12, 120 topics, order of, 1.11-17, 18-19, 22, 41a, 45, 93-151, 103b-4, 115-21 n. 162, 125, 126-49, pp. 359-60, 2.19b-20, 21-22, 39-42a, 44-45, 45, 55b-60, 3.19b-32 de Optimo Genere Oratorum, 2.67, 3.48 de Oratore, 1.156. 2.49, 59, 3.67 1.1: 1.1-4a 1.24: 2.73 n. 72 1.27:1.144 1.33: 1.124 1.38: 2.29a 1.45: p. 18 1.72:1.96 1.75: p. 18 1.89:1.4a 1.112:1.109 1.137: 1.96 1.144: 1.2 1.156: 1.130 1.178:3.67 1.193: p. 491 n. 5 1.195: 1.37 1.198:2.65 1.214:2.66 1.215: 1.116 1.244:1.116 2.17: 1.144 2.20:2.15 2.22: 1.108 2.43: 3.43 2.68: 3.20 2.79: 1.147 2.83: 1.10 2.87-89: 2.46 2.88 ff.: 1.115-21 2.98:1.118 2.101:1.28 2.105: 1.42-60, 42 2.156: 1.18-19, 19 2.159:3.116 2.160: 1.4a
2.172: 1.43 2.185: 2.21 - 2 2 2.187: 2.19 2.216: 1.108 2.216-90: 1.103b 2.220 ff.: 1.108 2.224: 1.129 2.228: 1.108 2.236-39: 1.103b 2.242: 1.127 2.252: 1.104 2.280: 3.58 2.305: 1.127 2.307: 1.142 2.316: 2.73 n. 72 2.334:3.88 2.335: 1.10, p. 483 2.339:3.83 2.342: 1.92, 124 2.343: 1.14 2.345: p. 57 2.346:1.67,2.17 3:1.132 3.2: 2.73 n. 72 3.30:1.133 3.41: 1.133 3.42: 1.133 3.45: 1.104 3.51:1.2 3.65:1.88 3.66: 1.2 3.70:1.90 3.139:1.116,155b 3.139 ff.: 1.152-61, 156 3.141:1.4a 3.153: 1.54 3.195:1.147 3.217: 1.136 3.221: 1.131 3.228-30: 3.73 3.230: 2.48 de Republica, p. 19, 3.10 1: 1.58 1 proem: 1.152-61 1, fr. la: 1.57 1.1:3.1-4 1.15: 1.18-19 1.21-22: 1.19 1.26-27:3.1 1.31: 1.87
689
690
Index of Authors
Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator) {continu 1.38: 1.7a, 54 1.39: 1.157,2.41 1.41: 1.53 1.49: 1.26 1.70: 1.13 2.4 ff.: 2.41 2.27: 1.88 2.31: 1.34-40,36 2.48: 3.32, 82a 2.53: 3.40-42 2.60: 3.90 2.69: 1.145-46 n. 183 3.11:3.69 3.28: 3.109 3.29: 3.54-55 3.30: 3.89-92a, 89 3.34-37: 1,41a 3.35: 1.36,38 3.36-37: 1.41a 3.37: 2.24 3.41: 2.27 3.43: 2.29a 3.48: p. 27 n. 55 4.1: 3.82a 4.4: 2.46 4.5: 2.73 4.6: 1.127 4.7: 1.23a, 2.60 5.2: 2.29a, 71 5.3:2.41-42 6.23: 2.16 6.25: 2.43 6.26: 3.44 de Senectute. pp. 9 and 11,1.122-25, 123,151,2.89 10 ff.: 1.84 15: 3.86 17: 1.13,79-81 35: 1.121 36: 1.104 37: 1.123 41:2.75 51 ff.: 1.151 75:3.97-115, 99b 78: 3.44 n. 37, 116 85: 3.116n. 98 de Temporibus Suis, 3.121 \de Virtutibus\,\.ln.7 Expositio m Secret Memoirs, 2.73-85, 84
Heracleidion, 1,3 and n. 3,2.23-29, 3.19b-32 Hortensius, 2.2-8, 3.67, 73 fr. 5 Grilli: 2.5-6 ft 45 Grilli: 3.88 in Cattlmam 1.3: p. 496 1.27 ff.: 3.121 2.1:3.115 2.25: p. 483 3.26: 1.74-78 4.2: 1.88,2.63 4.9: 3.101 4.18: 3.99a 4.19: 1.85 4.21:1.74-78,78 in Pisonem 5: 1.77 43:3.97-115,100 60: 2.28 73: 1,35 in Verrem 37: 1.121 2.1.13:3.36 2.1.115:3.73-74 2.1.151:2.73 2.3.81:2.27 2.4.1: 1.49 2.4.54: 1.150 2.4.115 ff.: 1.61 2.4.120: 1.35 2.5.165: 3.58 liber prooemiorum, p. 359, 2.2-8 Lucullus 1:2.50 6: 1.18-19,3.3 7:2.8 15: 1.108 21:3.75-76 47: 2.74 62: 2.7-8 66:1.18,2.7,45 67: 2.10 86: 1.127, 3.15 99: 2.7-8 131:3.119 134: 1.6 138:3.116-20 Marius, 3.79 Oeconomicus, 1.118, 2.87
Index of Authors Oratio in Toga Candida fr. orat. no. 15: 3.80-81 orationes Caesarianae, p. 50, 1.88, 2.64 Orator 1-2: 1.1-4a 5: 3.10 9-10:3.18,69 15: 1.4a 62: 1.4a 70: 1.93 70 ff.: 1.134 71-74: 1.97 74: 1.97 87-89:1.104 97: 1.3 127: 3.106 Paradoxa Stoicorum, pp. 11,44, 2.56, 3.97-115 n. 87,105 no. 1:3.11,100 no. 5:1.32 no. 6: 1.109,2.71 16:1.61,3.105 21: 1.49 24: 3.89 25: 1.92 34: 1.70 45: 1.25 45-46: 1.25-26 46:2.27,3.73 47:2.56 Partitiones Oratoriae, 3.81, 121 4:3.97-115 61 ff.: 1.10 77:1.88,92 87: 1.14 140: 3.121 Philippicae orationes, 1.86, 136 1.6:2.29a 1.27: 1.87, 2.23-29 n. 30 1.33:1.43 1.35:2.23 2: pp. 1, 9 and n. 24, 2.23-29, 3.1, 19 2.8: 2.23-29 2.12:1.78,2.2 2.15: 2.23-29 2.20:1.77 2.26-27:3.43 2.27:3.19a 2.30:1.105 2.31:3.83
2.37: 1.35, 2.20, 29a, 3.29 2.38: 1.87 2.39: 2.45 2.39-40: 1.103b 2.46:2.23-29 2.47: 1.159 2.51:221-22,3.2,66 2.52-53: 1.57 2.53: 3.90 2.54: 3.66 2.56:1.145 2.63: 1.104 2.64 ff.: 1.43, 138-40 2.67: 1.104 2.69: 2.29a n. 36 2.75: 2.20 2.86: 3.19a 2.90:2.23 2.93: 2.74 n. 75 2.94:2.28 2.103-5: 1.138-40 2.104:1.138 2.107: 3.73-74 2.108: 2.23-29 2.109: 3.73 2.110: 1.26 2.112-13: 2.23-29, 23 2.113: p. 31,1.81, 2.24 2.114:2.42a 2.115:2.43 2.116: 2.23-29, 23, 63 n. 60 2.117:223 2.118-19: 1.86 3.3:2.54 3.15: 1.138-40 4.6: 1.92 6.15: 2.87 7.19:1.80 8.7: 2.27 8.9:2.28,29a 8.18:2.28 9.4: 1.138-40, 138 9.10: 2.65 9.15:1.136 10.7: 3.19a 11.2:3.38 11.19:3.97-115 11.24:3.32 11.28:2.24,323 11.36:3.74
691
692
Index of Authors
Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator) (continued) 13.32: 2.28 13.36: 2.80 14.31: 1.57 post Reditum ad Populum 23: 2.69 post Reditum ad Senatum 34 and 39: 3.121 proArchia, 1.155b 16:1.134 26: 1.65 proBalbo26: 1.57 pro Caecina, 3.61b 3:224 44:2.21-22 51:1.142 78: 3.60 pro Caelio 6: 1.93-99 n. 137 30: 3.83 33-34:3.112 36: 3.59 38: 3.72 40: 2.76 41:3.119 47: 1.38 pro Cluentio, 1.59 15: 2.29a n. 36 43: 1.22 46: 1.56 117: 1.56 139:2.51 140: 2.63 pro Cornelio I fr. orat. no. 4: 1.28 22: 3.47a pro Fhcco 14: 2.50 15: 3.44 34: 1.159 104: 3.72 pro Ligarto 6: 1.88 pro Marcetlo 10: 2.29a n. 36 18:2.29a 23: 1.54 26: 2.31 pro Milone diatribe in: 3.76 n. 73 21:2.30 38: 2.23 89: 2.29a 90: 2.26b
92: 1.90 104: 1.57 105: 1.147 pro Murena 6: 1.124 8: 2.43 13: 3.75 19-30: 2.65 29: 2.66 58: 1.87 60ft.:3.88 65: 1.34 pro Plancio 7 and 9: 2.55b-60 n. 58 60: 3.86 68: 2.69 81: p. 353 pro Quinctio 45:1.124,3.43 51: 2.50 59: p. 483 pro Rabhio Perduetlionis Reo 23: 3.43 pro Rabirio Postumo 2: 1.116 pro Rege Deiotaro 15: 3.32 18: 3.39 26: 1.93 33-34: 2.23 pro Sestio 30: 3.47a 47:1.57,112 52: 3.121 87: 2,58 96 ft.: 1.85 97 ft.: 1.124 99: 1.67 103: 2.72 104-6: 2.74, 78 106:223 127:3.97-115 pro Sexto Roscio, 2.27,49, 51 33: 3.62-63 37: 1.146 46:3.112 57: 2.50 63:1.11 67: 2.37 131:3.39 139: 2.43 154: 2 2 7 pro Sulla
Index of Authors 21-23:3.112 32:3.112 48:3.112 Timaeus, 1.1, 93 and n. 141 17: 1.93 20: 1.157 30: 1.93 Topica 1: pp. 8-9 n. 20 28: 1.8 n. 12 31: 3.75-76 32: 3.60 51: 3.60 Si: 1.11 64: 1.27 66: 1.34-40, 3.61b, 70-71 Tusculanae Disputations, p. 1 1 proem: p. 359 1.1:2.2-8,4 1.3: 1.147 n. 186, 151 1.5: 1.1, 151 1.6: 2.5 1.28: 3.25 1.44: 1.13 1.74: 1.23b 2: 3.105 2.7: 2.5 2.17:3.117 2.24: 1.91 2.44: 3.39 2.61: 2.37 3.2-3:1.118 3.3-4: 2.43 3.7: 1.73a 3.11: 1.90 3.14-18:2.35 3.16: 1.93 3.29: 1.23b 3.31: 1.90 3.41:3.118 3.48: 2.72 3.53: 1.35 3.73: 1.146 4.12: 1.44 4.39: 1.124 4.43: 1.89 4.47: 1.28 4.49:3.112 4.51: 1.116 4.52: 1.89, 137 4.53: 3.75-76
693
4.55:1.132b-37 4.57: 2.5 S.5: 2.5-6 5.13:3.116 5.15:2.27 S25: 3.106 5.38: 1.157 5.57 if.: 2.25 and n. 32 5.76: 2.37 5.84 ff.: 3.119 5.85:3.119 5.107: p. 27 and n. 55 Cicero, M. Tullius (son of die orator) ad Familiares 16.21.3: 1.1 16.21.4: 1.103b-4 16.21.5: 1.1 16.21.6: p. 12 16.21.8: 3.6, 121 Cleanthes, p. 4, 1.6,11, 2.9, 3.11, 13, 117 SVF 1,127.20. 2.9 Clement of Alexandria Paedagogus 178.2: 2.71 n. 63 192.19-20: 1.134 192.25: 1.134 266.26 ff.(= 3.11) and 267.8 ff.: 1.130 268.6 ff.: 1.130 268.9 ff.: 1.130 272.7-8: 1.130 273.30 ff.: 1.130 Stromateis 2.21:3.116-17,119 2.129: 1.11-14 Clitomachus, 2.7-8 Columella de Re Rustica 1 praef. 10: 1.151 1.4.6: 3.62-63 6 praef. 4-5: 2.89 9.4.1:2.11 Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta adespota 424: 1.28 451: 1.74 Conrad of Hirsau, p. 43 Cordus Theseis. 1.32 Corpus inscriptionum luttinarum R10 and 15: 1.121 11.172: 3.108
694
Index of Authors
Corpus luris Civilis Codex lustinianus 3.1.14: 3.44 4.58.4.1:3.54-55 Digesta 1.1.10 pr.: 1.21 1.2.2.39-40:2.47 1.2.2.40: 3.63 1.8.2.1: 1.52 2.14.7.7:3.92b 4.3.1.2: 3.60 4.3.1.3: 3.60 n. 54 10.3.7.4: 3.107 18.1.43: 3.55 18.1.45:3.92a 19.1.1.1:3.67 19.1.38.1: 3.66 21.1.1.1:3.71 21.1.1.2:3.71 n. 66 29.2.6.4: 3.65 48.8.1.3 and 5: 1.27 49.15.5.3:3.100 49.15.24: 3.107 50.16.18:1.20 Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum 1,388:3.54 Crantor de Luctu, 3.63 Cratinus fr. 223.3 K.-A.: 2.25 Critolaus fr. 21: 3.11 Cyprian, St. Epistulae 74.8.3: 1.36 Damon of Athens (musical theorist), 1.14 de Bello Africa 62.5:2.14 de Bello Alexandrino 15.1:2.81 Demetrius of Phalerum, 1.3, p. 357 fr. 78: 1.61-92,88 fr. 136: 2.55b fr. 137: 2.60 Dcmocritus, pp. 3-4 n. 9, 1.61-92, 120, pp. 358-59, 2.11-16, 3.116 68 Β 2a (TTcpi άν^ραγαθίη?): ρ. 358 68 Β 3: 1.68 68 Β 46: 1.66, 90 68 Β 119: 1.120 68 Β 146: p. 359
68 Β 176:1.120 68 Β 250: 3.22 68 Β 255: 3.22 68 Β 256: 1.23b 68 Β 261: 1.23b 68 Β 289: 1.114 Demosthenes, 1.4a, 2.47 Orationes 9.48: 1.38 18.204:3.48 18.205: 1.22 18.247: 3.6 18.315: 3.82b-85 n. 83 de Viris lllustribus 65.1: 3.79 n. 75 Dicacarchus, 1.8, p. 357 n. 8, 2.16, 17 Bios Έλλάδοϊ: 2.11-16 de Interim Hominum: 2.11-16 fr. 46: 2.17 fr. 52: 1.54 n. 82 Didymus Caecus in Psalmos 29-34, cod. p. 186.16: 3.14 Dio Cassius 37,95: 3.47a Diodorus Skulus 10.4.3: 3.45-46a 10.32:2.71 11.42:3.49 24.12:3.100 33.1.5: 2.40 37.9.5: 3.47 Diogenes Laertius, 3.12. See s.v. Zeno of Citium. 2.40: 1.114 2.87:3.116 2.91:3.116 3.63: 2.5 3.86: 1.127 4.6:1.109 6.12: 1.55 6.27: 1.145 6.46 and 69: 1.126-32 6.71: 1.126-32 6.72: 1.54 7.4: 1.128 7.87: 3.13a 8.56: 1.108 Diogenes of Babylon, 1.14,145-46, pp. 353 n. 2, 357, 2.14, 31, 64, p. 484, 3.13a, 15, 26 n. 30, 37a, 49b-57, 51, 55, 77, 89-92a
Index of Authors SVF 3, 214.11-12:1.126-49 SVF 3, 214.18: 1.126-49,93-151 n. 130 SVF 3, 218.26: 3.51 SVF 3, 219.11-12: 3.13a SVF 3, 234.6: 1.14 SVF 3, 234.35 ff.: 2.14 Dionysius Thrax fr. 52: 1.131 Diphilus fr.62K.-A.: 1.51-52 Donarus ad Tcrcnci Adelphous 981: 2.71 ad Terenti Andriam 30: 1.83 257: 1.144 ad Tercnti Hecyram 212: 1.69 Ennius, Q., 1.34-40, 34, 40, 50-58, 97, 2.62, 3.100 Aiax. 1.114 Annates, 1.38 183-90 Slcutsch: 1.38 363-65 Skutsch: 1.84 Medea, trag. 240: 3.62 Melantppa, 1.114 trag. 338: 1.61 366-68: 1.51b-52 379: 2.23-29, 23 380: 3.104 381: 1.26 Epicteius, p. 5, 1.7b n. 10 Dissertationes 1.29.42-44: 1.93-99 n. 138 3.2.4:1.107-21 4.1.1: 1.70 Enchmdium 30: 1.149 Epicurea 121.34:3.117 289.11-12:3.118 292.4:3.117 315.29:3.117 316.10 ff. (= fr. 514): 3.117 316.30:3.117 317.1:3.117 317.3:3.118 317.7:3.118 Epicurus. See s.v. Epicurea; Index of Proper Names s.v. Epicurus/Epicureanism. Sententiae 1:3.102 Erasmus, Desiderius, pp. 44-45 Euphro fr. 4 K.-A.: 1.76
695
Euripides, 1.151, 3.82a-b Antiope, 1.61-92, 69b-71 Hippolytus 612: 3.108 887-90: 1.32 'Ιππόλυτο? καλυπτόμενος, 1.32 Phoenissae 524-27: 3.82b ft 905: 3.62 fr. 1018: 3.44 Eusebius of Caesarea Praeparatio Evangelica 8.7.6-8: 1.52 14.18.31:3.116 Eucropius Breviarium ab Urbe Condita 2.25.2:3.110 2.25.3: 3.100 Fannius, C. hist. 7: 1.108 Festus de Verborum Signifkatu p. 26M: 2.73 p. 182M:3.67 p. 206M: 1.127 p. 329M: 1.61 Frederick U "the Great," pp. 47, 112 n. 30 Fronrinus Strategemata 2.3.10: 3.99b 4.1.18:3.100 4.3.15: 2.76 Fronto, M. Cornelius p. 9.9-10 van den Hout: 3.77 p. 160.1-2 van den Hout: 1.155 Gaius Institutiones 4.119:3.60 Galen dePlacitisWA ff.: 1.13 Garve, Christian, p. 47 Gellius, A. Nodes Atticae 1.3.11:2.31 1.4.2 ff.: 2.69 1.13: 1.32 4.2.1:3.71 6.18.3:3.113 6.18.8: 1.40 6.18.9-10:3.115
696
Index of Authors
Gellius, Λ. {continued) 7.14: 1.88 12.11.2: 3.37b-39 12.12: 3.63 12.12.2: 2.69-71 13.28: pp. 18 and 28, 1.73b 19.12.3: 1.69 19.12.10: 1.71 20.1.39:2.77 Gocche, Johann Wolfgang von, p. 48 n. 140 Gorgias 82 Β 8a: 3.22 Gracchus, C. Scmpronius oral. no. 48 frr. 21-22 (de Lege Pennis et Peregrinis; pp. 179-80): 3.47a fr. 22 (p. 180): 2.29a Graevius, J.G., pp. ix, 46, 2.45 Gregorius Nazianzenus, Orationes 17.4: 1.90 Grorius, Hugo, p. 46 de lure Belli ac Pads 2.12.9.1:3.52 3.1.7:3.61a Hadoard of Corbie, p. 42 Hecato of Rhodes, pp. 4 and 39, 1.22, 41a, 42-60, 44, 51-52, 58, 93, 2.64, pp. 484, 487, 491, and 494, 3.17, 22 n. 28, 30, 34, 49b-57, 54-55, 56, 58-60, 61b-64, 62-63, 63, 65-88, 76, 8992a ncpi καθήκοντος 1.42-60, 3.49B-57, 63 nepl χαρίτων, 3.63 fr. 6: 1.93-99 fr. ll:3.89-92a fr. 18: 1.41a Hellanicus of Lesbos FGrH«MF116: 1.76 Hcraclidcs Ponticus fr. 162: 1.14 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, p. 47 n. 132 Her ill us of Carthage, p. 37, 1.6 Herodotus Historiae 1.12:3.37b-39 1.32-33:1.111 1.65: 1.76 1.96 ff.: 2.41 1.207.2: 1.90 5.6.2: 2.25
7.22.2: p. 4 7.233.2: 2.25 9.4-5: 3.48 Hesiod, 2.11-16 Opera et Dies 277 ff.: 1.34 342-45: 1.59 349-50: 1.48 Theogonia 984-87: 3.94 Hierocles 1.1 ff.: 1.1-14 VI.51 ff.: 1.11 IX.6: 1.11 dpK
Index of Authors Origmes 1.21 (de notis sententiarum): 1.40 Isocrates, 1.4a Epistulae 2.3: 1.79 2.4: 1.57 2.9: 1.79 Orationes 2.12:2.14 3.6:2.15 3.32: 1.88 5.116:1.88 8.100: 2.26a 11.16:3.14 15.99: 1.125 15.101-39:1.116 15.230: 1.125 Jerome, St. Epistulae 22.30: p. 44 57.3.1:3.71 125.16: 1.131 in Isaiam 47.3: 1.128 m Oseam 5.13: 3.44-45 m Zachariam 1.2: p. 66 n. 7 Joannes Gallensis, p. 43 Joannes Sarcsbcriensis, p. 43 Justin Epitoma Historiarum Philtppicarum Pompei Trogi 9.8.8 ff.: 1.90 Kani, Immanuel, pp. 47-48, 1.11, 3.27 Laberius com. 361 = 297 R.*: 2.24 Lactanrius, p. 41 and n. 96 Divinae Institutions 120.10: 1.129 5.16.5: 3.54-55 6.11:1.44 6.11.12:2.54 Lous Pisonis 36: 1.77 Leges XII Tabularum 6.1: 3.65 6.2: 3.55 6.4: 1.37 8.12:2.43 Livy ab Urbe Condita. 3.115 pracf. 5: p. 495 n. 12 1.7.2: 3.41
2.2.3: 3.40-42, 40 2.8.4: 3.40 2.10.2-11: 1.61 2.32.8-12: 3.22 4.6.12: 1.88 4.30.14: 1.37 5.6.11:2.80 7.3.9:3.112 7.4.2 ff.: 3.112 7.9.6 ff.: 3.112 7.20.5: 2.62 7.34.3-36.13: 1.61 9.5 ff.: 3.109 10.26-30: 1.61 pec 11: 2.75 per. 18: 3.99b 22.13.11:2.26b 22.39.20: 2.43 22.53.10-11:3.108 22.58.4:3.114 22.58.8:3.113 22.60.5:3.114 22.61.1-3:3.114 22.61.4:3.113 26.19.5: 3.1 31.302: 1.34 Lucan de Bello Civili 1.92-93: 1.26 1.158-59: 2.29a 3.150:2.29a 7.644-45: 2.29a 9.298-99: 1.35 Lucian de Saltatione, 3.75 Timon, 1.29 Lucilius, C , 1.96 88-94 M.: 1.111 818-19 M.: 3.26 1235 M.: 3.16 n. 21 1335-36 M.: 1.92 1337-38 M.: 1.58, 160 Lucretius Carus, T. de Rerum Natura 1.832:1.142 2.429: 2.63 3.260: 1.142 3.288 ff.: 1.107 4.513 ff.: 3.36 4.1011-12: 1.73a n. 102 5.962-65: 1.54
697
698
Index of Authors
Lupus of Ferrieres, p. 42 van Lynden, F.G., p. 24 n. 47; p. 48 and n. 136 Lysias, 1.114 Orationes 2.19: 1.34 13.9: 2.25 24.24: 1.125 26.12: p. 5 Macchiavelli, Nkcolo, p. 44 and n. 117 Macrobius Saturnalia 2Λ Λ 3: 1.132b-37n. 177 Mania η us Capella de Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae 1.40: 1.157 Martin of Bracara, p. 42, 3.63 Marius, C. ad Familiares 11.28.2: 3.43 Mavrocordatos, Nicolas, p. 46 n. 128 Mclanchrhon, Philipp, p. 45 Menander comicus, 1.30 Dyskotos, 1.29 fr. 475 K.-Th.: 1.30 n. 36 532 K.-Th.: p. 5 545 K.-Th.: 1.33 Metrodorus of Lampsacus, p. 484 fr. 5Kortc:3.117 Milton, John Lycidas 78-82: 2.43 Montesquieu, C. de Secondat, Baron, pp. 46-47 Moralium dogma philosophorum, p. 43 Muretus, Marcus Antonius, pp. 45-46 Musonius Rufus, C. Dissertationes, 1.106, 126 22.9: 1.59 24.14: 1.79 25.14 ff.: 1.67 34.18 ff.: 1.126 36.23 ff.: 1.89 56.7: 1.151 64.12 ff.: 1.105 73.10 ff.: 1.54 and n. 83 104.12 ff.: 1.106 115.4ff.: 1.127 115.15 ff.: 1.130 Naevius, Cn. p. 19 R.2: 2.25 Neclcham, Alexander, p. 43
Ncoptolcmus of Parium, 1.97 n. 144 Ncpos, Cornelius de Viris lllustribus fr. 45: 2.25 n. 32 frt 47 and 56: 2.26b Exempla, 2.26b fr. 12: 1.40 n. 66, 3.115 Nicolaus Damascenus FGrHist 90 F 130 (2A, 409.8-9): 3.7374 Nonius Marcellus de Compendiosa Doctrina, p. 41 p. 287M: 3.32 p.460M:2.11 Otto of Freising, p. 43 Ovid, 3.94, 95 Ars Amatoria, p. 40 3.83 ff.: 1.104 3.93: 1.51-52 3.305-6: 1.129 3.383 ff.: 1.104 Epistulae 20.61: 1.129 Fasti'4.837 ff: 3.41 Metamorphoses 1.84-86: 1.105 2.1 ff.: 3.94 6.349: 1.52 12.24 ff.: 3.95 13:1.113, 3.97-99a Pacuvius, M., 1.113 Antiopa, 1.114 Armorum iudicium, 1.113, 114, 3.9799a Medus, 1.114 Panaetius of Rhodes, pp. 17-18, 21-28, 58-59, 1.7a, 21, 61-92, 62-65, 62, 69b-71, 82b-84, 82b, 93-151. 101, pp. 353-60, 2.10, 14, 23-29, 47, 4 8 51, 71, 77, pp. 491-92, 3.7-10, 7, 10, 1 l-19a, 13b-17, 17, 18, 33-34, 34, 51,62-63,97-115, 113-15 activist, as, 1.83 afterlife of his teachings, pp. 28-29 Aristotelian treatises, possible use of, 1.132b, 2.52-64 Aristotle, admiration of, 1.93, p. 357 coolhcadedncss under pressure, admira tion for, 1.80, 2.33
Index of Authors deity, treatment of, 1.115, 152-61, 2.11, I2b-15 deliberation and planning, emphasized by, 1.11,27,34, 73,81 delimitation of property vis-a-vis Cicero, 1.11-17,50-58,58,69, 72, 79-82, 88, 90-91, 92, 9 3 151,93-99,99,113, 115-21, 122-25, 2.21-22, 72-85, 73. See Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), de Officiis, alterations to his Panaetian model, suspected, external goods, valuation of/advice about, p. 37, 1.58, 83, 111, pp. 357-58, 2.42a, 86-87, 3.12 idealistic view of human nature, 1.9399 immoralism eschewed by, 1.97-98, 110 innovations philosophical, p. 17, 1.13, 14,3.12 intellcctualism. See s.v. rationalism. "Kampfnaturw
699
tolerance of a variety of human types and life-choices, 1.107-21, 110, 2.29b warfare, doctrine of, 1.34, 38, 79-82 ntpl τοΰ καθήκοντος, date of composition, pp. 21-23, 2.80 division into books, p. 28, 1.94, 2.31 n. 38 examples used, p. 26, 2.16 Gracchan reforms, relation to, p. 23, 2.79, 80 incompleteness of, pp. 23-24 and 483, 3.7-10, 7, 9, 10 influence of outside Off., possible, pp. 28-29,1.52,73a, 81,109 kingship, literature on, as a source of, p. 360,2.17,33,55b plan of, p. 28 plan to write about the conflict of moral goodness and interest, pp. 23-24,1.9,3.7-10,7,9,10 poets cited in, 1.28, 30 and n. 36, 48, 51b-52,65, 130 putative source of de Amicitia. 2.31 sources of, putative or possible, pp. 5 8 59,128,85,108, pp. 357-59, 2.11-16,25,52-53,56,60,80. See s.w. Anonymus Iamblichi; Democrims; Dicaearchus; kingship, litera ture on, as a source of; Theophras· rus; Xenophon as a source of. warnings, inclusion of, 1.42-60, 2.68 Xenophon as a source of, 1.84,108, 118, p. 354, 2.16, 43 fr. 13: 1.106 fr. 33 (TTtpi πρόνοια?): 1.32 n. 40 fr. 45 (titpi (χΑυμίαζ): 1.61-92 fr. 46: 3.12, 63 fr. 48: 1.88-89, 124, p. 354 ft 49: 1.104 fr. 50
700
Index of Authors
Panaetius of Rhodes {continued) fr. 109: 1.93-99,110 fr. 110:3.12 fr. 113:3.12 fr. 114:1.46 fr. 115: 1.81 fr. 116: p. 28, 1.73b, 2.31 n. 38 fr. 126-29: 1.28 fr. 130: 1.28 frr. 132-33:1.106 fr. 137:3.63 Paulus Sententiae 1.19.1:3.65 2.17.4:3.65 Paulus Diaconus Epitoma Festi p.2M: 1.52 9M: 3.92a 102M.: 1.37 127M: 1.142 176M:3.2 Persaeus SVF 1,99.3 ff.:2.12b-15 Persius Flaccus, A. Saturae 5.37 ff.: 1.7b Petrarch, Francesco, p. 44 Petronius Arbiter Satyricon 44.14: 1.41b 48.4: 1.1 Philo Judaeus. See s.v. Stoicorum Veterum Fragments 3, 27.33. de Cherubim 14-15: 3.94 de Congressu Eruditionis Gratia 79: 2.5 de Mutatione Nominum 197: 2.10 ύττοθίτικίί 7.6: 1.52 Philodemus Academiae Historia XIV.2 ff.: 3.39 de Ira XXXI.24 ff.: 1.89 SVF 3, 223.31 ff.: 1.145-46 Phylarchus, 2.80 FCrHistS] F 52: 2.81 Pindar Carmina Olympica 1.81 ff.: 3.97 2.86ff.: 2.47 11.19-20: 1.41b Carmina Pythia 1.95: 2.26a fr.237: 1.41b
Plato, 1.4a, 51, 69, 85-87, 88-89, 151, 155b, 2.5, 25, 73 Apologia tt* 1.108,2.15 Crito 51a7ff.: 1.57 54d: 3.5 Gorgias 462d ff.: 2.53 464b ff.: 1.150 464e2ff.: 1.42 473a ff.: 3.19b-32 475b: 3.33 48 Id: 1.65 489e: 1.108 502d-e: 1.65, 148 Hippias Motor. 1.93-99 n. 131 286a-b: 1.122 293d ff.: 1.93-99 294a: 1.94 Laches 182c-183a: 1.64 196dff.:1.50 197b: 1.63 Leges 628d7 ff.: 1.35 715b: 1.85 776a: 1.54 855b5: 1.88 856b: 1.87 857b: 1.89 862e: 1.88 866e: 1.27 897b: 3.44 918d: 1.150 952dl: 1.125 963e: 1.50 Mertexenus 246e7: 1.152-61 n. 200 Meno 70a: 2.6 71c: 1.122-25 78d: 1.15a 79c: 1.15a 86e: 3.33 99e: 2.6 Phaedrus 246b: 1.101 250d: 1.15 271a: 1.101 271c-d: 1.107 278e ff.: 3.73 Protagoras
Index of Authors 319a ff.: 2.6 320c ff.: 2.12b-15 322b: 1.50 333d ff.: 2.10 345d-c:3.18 Respubtica 331c: 3.95 337a: 1.108 342e: 1.85 347c 1: 1.28 348d: 1.38 n. 56 351c: 2.40 357b: p. 484 357d-358a: 2.42a 358b, 359d ff.: 3.37b-39 361a: 1.41b 361b6-7: 1.109 361b-e 3.77 371e: 1.150 411d-e: 1.34 420c and 421 b-c: 1.85 430c: 1.93 434a-434c: 1.107-21 441c ff.: 1.102 469b ff: 1.38 488a-b: 1.87 514a ff.: 3.69 520a6 ff. and c 6 ff.: 1.28 577a: 3.84 577e: 3.85 578a ff.: 2.24 579e: 3.85 588e: 1.50 612b: 3.37b-39 Symposium 174c-175a: 1.148 191b5ff.: 1.126 207a7ff.:l.ll 211b7ff.:1.14 216e: 1.108 Theaetetus 144d: 1.42-60 167eff.: 1.132b-37 168b-c: 2.9 173d ff.: 1.28 Timaeus 45a3: 1.126 [Plato] Alcibiades II 140c, 150c: 1.61-92 Defimtiones 412c: 1.93 Epistulae 4.321b: 2.17
701
9.358a: 1.11-14, 22 Plaurus, p. 6, 1.104 Asinaria 701-2: 1.93 Aulubria, 1.29 91-94:1.52 Bacchides 899: 3.112 Casina 221:3.120 585-86: p. 6 Gstetlaria 225-26: 3.112 Curculio 201-2: 3.92a Menaecbmi \\A ff.t 1.150 Mercator 54: 1.93 61-68:3.112 826-27: 1.89 Miles Gloriosus, 1.137 684: 2.36 Rudens 131 ff.: 3.59 Trmummus 23 ff.: 1.58 641 ff.: 1.121 Truculentus 645: 3.112 Plinius Caecilius Sccundus, C. (minor), p. 41 n.91 Epistulae 1.8.8: 1.49 1.18.5: 1.30 1.23.5: 1.107-21 9.30: 2.69 9.30.1: 1.58 9.30.2: 1.43 Panegyricus 55.8: 2.43 Plinius Secundum, C. (major) Naturalis Historia praef. 22: p. 41,1.5-6, 6, 7a, 3.113-15 9.168: 3.67 18.29-30:2.89 21.10: 1.109 31.73:2.13 34.36: 2.76 35.84-85: 1.147 35.92:3.10 36.113: 2.55b-60 Plutarch, 3.87 ad Principem tneruditum 782a-b: 1.90 n. 120 Agis, 2.80 An Sent Respublica Gerenda Sit, 1.123 783f: 1.157 784a: 1.123
702
Index of Authors
Plutarch [continued) 785e-f: 1.123 797d: 1.155b Apophthegmata Lacontca 223a-b: 1.33 Apophthegmata Romanorum 196b: 3.1 Aratus 7 ff.: 2.81 9.4: 2.81 11.2: 2.81-83a n. 80 24.5: 3.22 Aristides, 3.87 22.3-4: 3.49 Brutus 24.3: 2.45 Cato maior 20.8: 1.129 20.11:1.37 Cato minor, 3.87 4.2: 2.86-87 44.12-13: 2.33 Cicero 24.7: 1.1,2 24.8: p. 12,1.93-151 38.1: 1.112 n. 160 38.2 if.: 1.103b 45.3: 2.5-6 Comparatio Ciceronis et Demosthenis 1-2: 1.4a 2: 1.2, 77 Crassus 1.1-2: 2.57b 13.3: 2.84 and n. 84 de Audiendis Poetis 18d: 1.97 de Cohibenda Ira 456a-b: 1.102 de Curiositate 518c: 1.150 de Garrulitate 508 f: 2.25 de Cento Socratis 584b: 1.25 de Gloria Atheniensium, 1.74 de Laude Ipsius. 1.137 540a-b and 545d: 1.77 de Stoicorum Repugnantiis 1042c ff.: 3.37b 1045c-f: p. 59 de Tranquillitate Animi 471d: 1.13 474d-e: 1.81 475d-e: 1.73a Instituta Lacomca 239f: 2.77 Lysander 7.3: 1.109 9.7: 3.46b Marius 8.9: 3.79
Paullus 4.4: 2.76 Pericles 5.1: 1.108 Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae 822a: 2.75 Quaestiones Romanae 273c-f: 1.36 Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur, 1.91 Quomodo Quis Suos in Virtute Sentiat Profectus 76a-b:3.16 82b: 3.37b Romanorum Apophthegmata 202a: 1.87 n. 114 Themistocles 5.1: 2.71 18.9: 2.71 20.1-2: 3.49 77. Gracchus 2.4: 1.108 8.4: 3.16 Timoleon 6.2 ff.: 1.49 lPlurarch] Vita X Orat, 837c: 1.116 844b: 1.4a Polcmo Sophista Declamations 2.43: 1.61 Politian, Α., 1.8 Pollux, Julius Onomaticon 6.128: 1.150-51, 150, 151 Polyacnus Strategemata 3.9.22: 3.22 Polybius Historiae, p. 354 and n. 5, 2.61-64, 3.40, 113-15, 115 1.31.1:3.99b 2.47-48 and 56-57: 2.81 4.81.13:2.80 6.3.6-9: 1.98 6.5.4 ff.: 1.158 6.6.1 ff.: 1.11-12, 12 6.6.2:1.11 6.6.8-11:2.41 6.6.9: p. 354 n. 5 6.54.6 ff.: 1.61 6.56.1 ff.: 1.92 6.56.13-15: 2.76 6.58.2:3.113 6.58.3:3.113 6J8.5 and 11: 3.114 6.58.12:3.113
Index of Authors 6.58.13:3.114 8.2-3:1.85 31.25.8: 1.111 Popp, Ernst, p. 49 Posidonius, pp. 4, 18, 21, 24, 39, and 58, 1.7b, 8, 9, 21, 59, 69, 152-61, 158, 159, 160, p. 357, 2.40, 88 n. 86, pp. 485-87 and 494, 3.7-10, 8, 9, 10, 16, 19b-32, 21, 22, 23, 33-34, 33, 34, 35-37, 42, 49b-57, 58-60, 63 F41aE.-K.: 1.30-41 F176E.-K.:3.13b-17 F 177 E.-K.: 3.29-32 F 253.45 ff. E.K.: 1.150 n. 191 F 284.6 E-K.: 2.41-42 Τ 81 E.K.: 1.13 Propcrtius, Scxtus £4**10*3.3.21:1.90 Pythagoras 58 Β 15: 3.44 Quadrigarius, Q. Claudius, pp. 487-88 hist. 10h: 3.112 n. 93 18: 3.109 40-41:3.86 Quintilian Institutions Oratoriae 1.3.11: 1.104 1.11.3: 1.130 1.11.16: 1.129,130 2.5.22:1.117 6.3.29: 1.128 10.1.112:1.3 11.1.24: 1.77 11.1.38: 1.36 11.3.15:1.133 11.3.79: 1.146 12.10.12: 1.2 Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.3: 1.142 1,4:3.97-115 3.116: 1.142 Sallust Bellum Catilinae 1.5: 1.79-81 4.1: 1.151 9.5: 2.26b 10.6: 2.26b 11.4: 227
703
11.4-8:2.27 15.5: 1.131 51.42: 3.44 52.11: 1.43,44 52.23: 2.29a 54.1: 1.62 54.1-3: 1.65 54.6: 1.65,2.37 Bellum lugurthae 41.9: 2.75 41.10:2.43 64.1: 3.79 64.5: 3.79 95.3: 1.88 Epistulae ad Caesarem Senem de Republica 1.3.2: 2.24 Historiae 1.55.17:2.29a 1.86: 2.58 (Sallust) in Ciceronem 7: 3.121 Scholia in Euripidis Hippotytum 887: 1.32 in Horatii Carmina 4.8.17: 1.38 n. 57 in Lucanum 2.74: 3.80-81 in Pcrsi Saturas 5.22: 1.56 in Pindari Carmina Olympica 2.82d and 3.68d: 2.26a Scripture, Sacred 1 Cot 12.12 ff.: 3.22 Genesis 9.20 ff.: 1.129 Matthew 7.4: 1.146 Seneca the Younger, pp. 3, 42-43, 1.21, 41a, 42-60, 56, 71, 79, 88, 97-98, 107-21, 110, 111, 114, 123, 150, 151, 152-61,2.5, 12a, 23, 62, 63t 64, 69, 70, 3.13b-17, 15, 28, 38, 63, 69t 95, 97-115,102,117,118 de Beneficiis 1.1.1:1.49 1.1.1-2:2.63 1.1.5-6: 1.88 1.6.1: 1.44 1.9.2: 1.90 1.11.1:2.62 1.13.1: 1.90 n. 120 1.14.1: 1.49 1.20.1: 1.88 2.14.1: 1.42 2.15.1: 1.44 2.15.3: 1.42,44
704
Index of Authors
Seneca the Younger (continued) 2.16.1: 1.93-151 n. 130 2.20.1: 2.63 n. 60 2.23.3: 2.69 2.24.3: 2.69 2.31.4: 1.81 3.1.1:2.63 3.13.1:2.63 3.18 ff.: 1.41a 3.18.1: p. 6 n. 13 4.3.1:2.70 4.10.1: 3.95 4.29.2: 1.52 5.3.1: 1.64 7.2.2: p. 483 7.12.4-6: 1.21 de dementia 1.11.2:1.88 2.3.2: 2.64 de Ira 1.1.1: 1.23b 1.1.2: 1.27 1.3.4:2.11 1.3.7: 1.11 1.5 ff.: 1.89 1.5.2: 1.22 1.6.2: 1.83 1.9.4: 1.102 2.3.5: 1.23b 2.27.1: 2.12a 2.28.8: 1.146 2.31.7:3.22,28 3.2.2: p. 492 n. 8 3.17.1: 1.90 3.18.1: 2.26b, 3.80 3.33.3: 1.150 de Otto 2.2: 1.123 3.3: 1.71 8.1:1.71 de Tranquillitate Animi 1.10: 1.71 4.2 ff.: 1.114 6.3: 1.110,141 7.2: 1.110 10.6 ff.: 1.114 11.2:3.117 13.5:3.117 17.4: 1.103b de Vita Beata 3.1:3.69
3.3: 1.107-21 10.3:3.118 15.4:3.118 24.1: 1.49 24.2: 2.69 24.3:1.52,92 Epistulae 5.8: 1.11 9.10: 1.56 9.11: 1.47 15: 1.79 24: 1.81 47.18:2.23 52.12: 1.145-46 65.20-21:1.105 71.5:1.117 76.9: 1.50 76.33: 1.81 88.9: 1.145 88.18: 1.150 89.5: 2.5 8920: 1.151 90.3: 1.152-61 90.4: 1.89 90.44: 3.16 94.11: 1.122-25 95: 1.60, 3.13b-17 95.1: 1.7b 95.5: 3.13b-17, 14 95.12: 1.60 95.36: 3.13b-17 95.40: 1.60 95.45: 1.60 95.49: 2.12a 95.51-52: 3.21 95.52: 3.22 95.53: 3.21 95.64: 3.13b-17 95.66: 3.38 103.1:2.16 104.28: 1.90 105.1: 1.24 114:1.134 Phaedra, 1.32 Thyestes 1024: 3.102 Troades 254: 1.90 Servius adAen. 1.548: p. 7 adAen. 8.334: 1.115-21 Sexcus Empiricus adversus Matbematicos
Index of Authors 2.38: 1.33 2.276: 1.11 7.158: 1.8 8.11: 1.126-32 8.11-12: 1.133 9.13: 2.5 Shakespeare, William Titus Andronicus 1.1.280: p. 112 n. 30 Silius Iralicus Punica 6.392-94: 3.100 Simonides Poetae Metici Graeci 642: 1.21 Siscnna, L Cornelius Milesiae 6: 3.U8 Sophocles, 1.145 Ajax 293: 1.93 523-24: 2.63 1344-45: 3.82b-85 Antigone 332 ff.: 2.12b-15 739: 1.64 Oedipus Tyrannus 75: p. 5 Phaedra, 1.32 F 462 ff.: 3.97-99a F769: 1.130 Τ 74c: 1.144 Speusippus περί Πυβαγορκώΐ' αριθμών. See s.v. Iamblichus, Theologoumena Arithmeticae. Stobaeus Eclogae 2.7: 1.51, 52, 54 n. 82 2.7.5·"·: 1.93-99 2.7.5M : 1.15b, 93-99 2.8: 1.8 4.23 (=4, 671.7 ff.W.-H.): 1.53 4.84: 1.11-14 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta. See s.w. Aristo of Chius, Cleanthes, Diogenes of Babylon, Philodcmus, Zeno. 1,22.28: 1.126-32 1,45.21 ff.: 3.13a 1,47.22: 3.19b-32 1,49.30: 1.93-99,153 1, 50.23: 1.102 1,52.27-29:1.111 1,53.13-14: 1.111 1,54.3: 1.55 1.55.6-10: 1.8
2, 15.3-5: 2.5 2,164.26: 1.11 2,206.33 ff.: 1.11 2,227.23-25:1.101 2,230.23: 1.101 n. 146 2,264.6:1.11 2, 268.33 ff.: 1.115-21 2, 288.10 ff.: 1.11-14 2,297.13:3.71 2, 325.8: 2.12a 3, 4.40: 3.14 3, 6.9-10: 3.13a 3, 20.20: 3.14 3, 21.42: 1.94 3,23.27-28:1.153 3,23.28:1.67 3,24.22: 1.56 3, 24.27: 3.43 3, 27.7-8: 1.142 3, 27.33: 3.15 3, 29.37: 3.19b-32 3, 33.19 ff.: 2.35 3, 37.33 ff.: p. 357 3, 50.4: p. 353 3, 63.27: 1.21 3,64.22:1.142 3,64.24-25:1.42 3,64.31:1.142 3,64.41:1.42 3, 64.44 ff.: 1.93 3,66.43: 1.126-49 3, 67.1: 1.142 3,68.12:1.142 3,73.3-4: 1.153 3, 73.5-6: 1.142 3,76.16-18:2.10 3, 77.37: 3.19b 3, 80.8 ff.: 3.69 3,86.12-13: 1.41a 3,86.18-19: 1.41a 3,86.20-21: 1.41a 3,89.21:3.14 3, 90.24 ff.: 1.21 3,92.5: 1.102 3, 101.34: 1.93 3, 122.19: 1,98 3, 130.12: 1.102 3, 134 JO: p. 5 3, 135.10: 1.44 3, 136.14:3.14 3, 136.19-21: 1.8
705
706
Index of Authors
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (continued) 3, 137.43: 3.14 3, 152.35: 3.13b 3, 156.1-2: 1.153 3, 158.34 ff.: 1.70 3, 16521:3.11 3, 167.34: 3.16 3, 16827-28: p. 354 3,172.19-20: 1.11 3, 173.9-10: 1.21 3,173.17 ff.: 1.71 3, 174.30 ff.: 1.71 3, 175.4: 1.71 Strabo 14 C 674: p. 486 Strattis it. 9 K.-A.: 2.25 Suetonius Tranquillus, C. Divus Augustus 2: 1.138-40 n. 178 Divus Julius 30.5: p. 41, 3.82b 83.2: 2.28 Divus Vespasianus 16.3: 1.41b Tacitus Agricob9.il 1.124 Annates 3.44.4: 1.88 4.1.2:2.28 11.24.4:2.26b Terence, p. 6 Adelphoe 51-52:2.64 65-67: 2.24 621:3.70 752: 3.75 979-81:2.71 Eunuchus 257: 1.150 263-64: 1.5 Heauton Ttmoroumenos 35-40: 1.131 77: 1.30 84, 86: 3.121 195: 3.121 503-5: 1.146 792-96: 1.33 874: 1.100 Phormio 45-46: 3.16 Terrullian deAnhna 14: 1.101 de Resurrectione 2.10: 1.80
Theophrastus, 1.3, 54, 97. p. 357, 2.31, 5 2 53,56,61-64,3.106 Characteres. 1.107 2: 1.91 4.4: 1.129 7: 1.134 9.1: 1,99 Tiep! -πλούτου, ρ. 357, 2.52-64, 56 fr. 515 Fortcnbaugh, 1992: 2.64 532-46 Fortcnbaugh 1992: 1.91 727.14 Fortenbaugh, 1992: 3.77-78 Theopompus, 3.49 FGrHist. 115F20: 1.109 FGrHist. 115F89: 2.64 FGrHist. 115F286:2.40 Thomas Aquinas, St., pp. 43-44 Quaestiones Disputatae 2, 767 ff.: 1.15261 n. 196 Summa Theologica 11.2.40.1: 1.36 n. 51 II.2.77.3: 3.57 11.2.145.3: 2.10 Il.2.156a.3:1.27 Thucydides, p. 354 Historiae 1.44.3: 1.82b-84 1.69.1: 123a 1.144.3: 1.82b-84 2.402-3: 1.81 2.41.11:3.6 7.77.7: 229a Timacus of Tauromcnium, 2.25 FCrH«r566F13b: 1.51 Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta adespota lb (c) 4-5: 1.134 381: 1.102 411: 1.57 Tragicorum Romanorum fragmenta, inc. inc. 55-60: 3.97-99a 58: 1.100 85: 2.13 184-85:1.139 210: 1.61 389: 2.62 Tuditanus, C. Scmpronius hist. 5: p. 488, 3.100, 110 Ulpian Digesta 1.1.10 pt: 121
Index of Authors 4.3.1.2:3.60 10.3.7.4:3.107 19.1.1.1:3.67 21.1.19 pr.: 3.55 27.10.1: 1.44 49.15.24:3.107 Valerius Antias hist. 40-41: 3.86 57: 3.109 Valerius Maximus Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, pp. 40-41, 1.33,34,36, 109, 121,129, 144, 147, 2.26b, 76, 3.10, 46b, 49, 66, 67, 79, 100 2.9praef.: 1.76 4.1.12: 1.87 n. 114 7.2.2: 1.81 7.2 ext. 9: 2.71 7.2 ext. 10: 2.53 7.7.6: 2.58 9.7 Mil Rom. 3: 3.88 9.13. ext. 3: 2.25 Varro, M. Tcrenrius, pp. 11 and 60, 1.9798, 138-40,151, 2.3, 3-5, 26, 3.32, 116 de Lingua La Una, 1.37 5.3: 1.37 5.6: 2.9 5.86: 1.34-40 n. 48 5.179: p. 6 n. 13 6.42: 1.17, 3.66 de Vita Populi Romani, 3.32 Disciplinae, 1.151 Hebdomades, 2.26b Menippeae 17: 1.21 Parmeno 396: 3.77 Velleius Paterculus, C. Historia Romana 1,5.6: 2.76 2.33.4: 1.140 Vergil Aeneid 1.292-93:3.41 6.103-5: 1.81 6.278-79: 1.69
707
6.857-58: 1.61 11.338-39:1.74 Georgia 4.168 and 327: 2.11 Vincent of Bcauvais, p. 43 Speculum Doctrinale 4.50: 2.69 Vitruvius Pollio de Architectura, 2.25 1.3:1.151 6.5.2: 1.92 William of Conches, p. 43 Xenophon,p. 354,2.16, 3.77 Agesilaus 1.20: 1.88 Anabasis 1.9.7: p. 5 Cyropaedia, 2.76 1.2.5: p. 5 1.6.21:2.33 Historia Graeca 1.6.32: 1.84 4.7.2: p. 4 6.1.4-16: 1.108 6.1.15: 1.108 6.4.5: 1.84 6.4.15: 2.26a 6.4.37: 2.25 Memorabilia 1.4.6: 1.126 2.1.21: 1.118,3.25 2.3.18-19:3.22 2.6.13: p. 354 2.6.25: 1.87 2.6.39: 2.43 3.9.4: 1.152-61 n. 197 3.9.6: 1.94 3.9.9: 1.104 4.6.7: 2.5 Oeconomicus, 1.118,2.87 4.2: 1.150 5.17: 1.151 Zeno of Citium, 1.6, 8, 11-14, 21, 51, 55, 126-32, 127, 151,153, p. 357,2.35, 3.13, 119. See s.v. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 1. apud D.L. 7.108: p. 5 Respublica, 1.128
Index of Proper Names
Academy/Academic, pp. 36-37, 1.2, 6, 7a, 10, 18-19, 88, 2.2-8, 5-6, 7, 7-8, 8, 11, 25, 59, p. 487, 3.20, 39, 49b-57, 51,75, 106 Achilles, 1.38, 62, 72, 88-89, 88, 97-98, 3.97 Acilius, L (7), 3.16 Acilius Glabrio, M\ (cos. 191), 2.76 Aeacidae, 1.38 Aeacus, 1.97 Acgina, Aeginetans, pp. 484 and 492-93 n. 9, 3.46b-49a, 46b Aegosporami, battle at, 1.83-84, 116, 3.46b Aelius Tubero, L. (150), 1.6 Aelius Tubero, Q. (tr. pi. 130?), 3.10, 12, 63 and n. 59,100 Aemilius Lcpidus, M. (cos. 78), 1.76 Aemilius Lepidus Livianus, Mam. (cos. 77), 2.55b-60. 58 Aemilius Papus, Q. (cos. I 472), 3.86 Aemilius Paullus, L (cos. I 182), 1.19, 36, 116, 138,2.74,76,3.63 Aemilius Scaurus, M. (cos. 115), 1.76, 108, 138,2.49,3.10,104 Aemilius Scaurus, M. (pr. 56), 1.138-40, 138,2.55b-60, 57b Aeneas, 1.21,81,97-98 Aenesidemus of Cnossus, 1.6 Aequi, 1.35 Aequicoli, 1.35 Aesopus (actor), 1.114 Agamemnon, p. 484, 3.95 Agesilaus, 2.16 Agis IV of Sparta, 2.72-85, 80 Ajax, 1.72, 88-89, 88, 109, 113, 3.97-99a Albinovanus, P. (1), 3.97-115 Albius Oppianicus, Statius (10), 1.59 Albucius, T. (pr. ca. 105), 1.108, 111, 2.49, 50 Alc.b.adcs 1-62,65 Alctrium, 1.59
Alexander of Macedon, p. 14,1.61-92, 6 2 65, 70, 90, 2.26a, 52-64, 53 Alexander of Pherae, 2.25 Alyzia, battle of, 1.116 Amafinius, C , 2.5 Amphares (Spartan ephor), 2.80 Andriscus, 1.87 Andronicus of Rhodes, p. 4 n. 9, 1.2 Annicerii, p. 484, 3.116 Anniceris of Cyrenc, 3.116 Annius Milo, T. (pr. 55), 2.58 Antidotus (Stoic philosopher), 2.86-87 Antigonus III Doson, 2.81 Antigonus of Carystus, 2.7 Antiochus III ("the Great">, 2.76 Antiochus Epiphanes, 1.138 Antiochus of Ascalon, 1.3, 6, 11-14 n. 22 Antisthenes, 1.55 Annstius Labeo, M. (34), 3.60, 65 Antonius, M. (cos. 99), 1.108, 2.49, 3.67 Antonius, M. (cos. 44), pp. 1-2, 8-9, 1516, 20,27, 30-31, 32, 33, 36, 59-60, 1.43, 57, 62-65, 77, 80, 84, 86, 87, 93-151, 103b, 105, 136,137, 138-40, 139, 159, p. 360, 2.23-29, 23, 28,43, 63, 77, 3.1, 5-6, 38, 73-74, 73, 74, 82b-85, 83, 84 Antonius Hybrida, C. (cos. 63), 1.68, 77, 2.58 Antonius Julianus, 2.69 Apelles, p. 38, 1.147, 3.10, 19b-32 Apollo, 1.120 Apollonius (freedman of P. Crassus), p. 22 n.43 Appuleius Saturninus, L. (tr. pi. I 103), 2.49, 3.10, 79 Aquilius M\ (cos. 101), 2.50 Aquilius Callus, C. (pr. 66), p. 22, 2.65, 3.58-71, 58, 60 Arams of Sicyon, p. 32, 1.38, 2.17, 72-85, 78-85, 80, 81-83a, 81, 83, 3.22
708
Index of Proper Names Arausio, battle at, 2.49, 3.10 Arcesilas of Pitane, 1.8 and n. 15, 2.8 Archias. See s.v. Licinius. Archimedes, 1.154 Areopagus, 1.74-78, 75 Argjnusae, battle at, 1.83-84 Argos, 1.33 Aristarchus of Sa moth race, 1.97-98 Aristides, p. 484, 3.16, 49, 87 Aristippus of Cyrene, 1.104,148-49, 148, p. 484, 3.116 Aristippus of Cyrene (grandson of the pre ceding), 3.116 Arisronicus (Alexandrian philologist), 1.9798 Ariricnses, 3.107
Aruns, 3.42 Athena, 1.102,2.14 Athenion (leader of a slave revolt), 2.50 Athenion (Peripatetic philosopher), 1.15051 n. 191 Athenodorus CaJvus, 2.86-87, 2.88 n. 86, pp. 485-87, 3.34 Athenodorus Cordylion, p. 486 Athenodorus of Tarsus, p. 486 Athens, Athenians, pp. 1,4, 8,12, 15, 16, 21, 23, 27, 39, 1.1-4a, 1, 75, pp. 358 and 484, 3.6, 46b-49a, 46b, 48, 51 Atilius Caiatinus, A. (cos. 258), 3.104 Atilius Regulus, M. (cos. I 267), pp. 34-35, 40, 1.34-40, 40, 110, 112, pp. 487, 488, 491, 494-95, 3.3, 17, 61-64, 6 2 63, 88, 89-95, 96, 97-115, 97-99a, 99b, 100, 109, 110, 111-12, 116-20 Atilius Regulus, M. (cos. I 227), 1.40 Atilius Serranus, Sex. (cos. 136), 3.109 Atreus, 1.97, 3.102, 104 Aufidius, Cn. (6), 2.58 A ufidι us Orestes, Cn. (cos. 71), 2.58 Aurelius Cotta, C. (cos. 75), 2.59, 3.60 n. 53 Aurelius Co π a, L. (cos. 144), 1.87 Aurelius Cotta, U (tr. pi. 103), 2.49 Bacchanals, 1.88 Bardylis, 2.40 Bellcrophon, 2.14 Bellona, temple of, 1.34-40 Bodostar, 3.100 Bruttius(l), 1.103b-4 Buzyges, 3.54
709
Caecilius Metellus, M. (cos. 115), 3.79 Caecilius Metellus Celer, Q. (cos. 60), 1.77 Caecilius Metellus Delmaticus, L. (cos. 119), 3.79 Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q. (cos. 143), 1.87 Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q. (cos. 109), 1.108, p. 496, 3.10, 79 Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, Q. (cos. 52), 2.20,3.112 Caecina, A. (6), 3.61 Caelius Rufus, M. (pr. peregt 48), 1.38, 2.83b. See Index of Authors s.v. Callicratidas, 1.82b-84, 83-84, 84,109 Callipho, 3.116-20, 119 Calpurnius Lanarius, P. (49), 3.49b-67, 5 8 71, 66, 67 Calpurnius Piso, L. (legate of Antony), 3.56 Calpurnius Piso Cacsoninus, L. (cos. 58), pp. 30-31,1.73, 77 Calpurnius Piso Frugi, C. (qu. 58), 2.75 Calpurnius Piso Frugi, L. (cos. 133), 1.116, 2.75 Calvenus Taurus, L See s.v. Taurus. Candaules, 3.37b-39 Canius, C. (Suppl. 1, a), 3.49b-67, 58-71, 58-60, 58, 59, 60, 69 Cannae, battle of, 1.34-40, 40, 61, 84, pp. 488 and 494-95, 3.1-4, 100, 107, 110,113-15,114 Cameades, p. 22, 1.6, p. 357,2.7-8, 31, 3.13a, 51, 54-55, 89-92a, 119 Carrhae, battle of, 3.114 Carthage/Carthaginians, pp. 34-35, 1.34, 35, 38, 61, 79, 82a, 116, 2.76, p. 494, 3.49, 97-115, 99b, 100 Cassius Longinus, C. (pr. peregc 44), pp. 8 and 30, 1.132b-37, 2.23, 24, 29a, 3.19a, 73-74 Cassius of Parma (80), p. 15 Caudine Forks, battle at, 2.75, p. 487, 3.100, 109 Celtiberi, 1.38,2.40 Cephisodorus, 3.77-78 Cicero. See s.v. Tullius Cicero, M. (the orator). Cilicia, 3.49. See s.v. Tullius Cicero, M. (the orator), Cilicia, governorship of. Cimbri, 2.49, 3.10 Cimon, 1.42-60, 92, 2.61-64, 64, 71
710
Index of Proper Names
Cissa, battle of, 1.61 Claudius, Q. (tr.pl. 218), 1.151 Gaudius Caecus, Appius (cos. I 307), 1.123 Gaudius Cenrumalus, T. (107), 3.49b-67, 58-71, 66, 67 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. I 222), 1.35, 61 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. I 166), 1.19 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. 51), p. 30, 2.2, 79 Claudius Nero Germanicus, Ti. {princeps A.D. 41-54), 2.26b Claudius Pulchcr, Ap. (cos. 54), 1.88,2.58 Claudius Pulcher, C (cos. 92), 2.57b Clcarchus of Soli, 3.77-78 Cleombrotus, 1.82b-84, 84 Cleomenes III of Sparta, 1.33, 2.80 Cleopatra, 1.34-40 Clitus, 1.90 Clodiani, 2.21-22 Clodius Pulcher, P. (tr. pi. 58), 1.64, 138, 2.58, 78-85 Cluentius Habitus, A. (4), 1.59 Cnidus, 1.41b, 116 Collatinus. See s.v. Tarquinius. Concord, temple of, 3.22 Conon, 1.84, 115-21, 116 Corinth, Corinthian(s), 1.23b, 116,2.14, 3.45-46a, 49a destruction of, 1.34-40, 35, 38, 2.76, 3.46b-49a, 46b Cornelius Balbus, L. (69), 3.47a Cornelius Chrysogonus, L. (101), 2.51 Cornelius Cinna, L. (cos. 87), 3.40, 80-81 Cornelius Cossus Arvina, A. (cos. 343), 1.61 Cornelius Dolabella, P. (cos. 44), 1.121, p. 360, 2.29a, 78-85, 83b, 3.97115 Cornelius Lcnrulus Spinthcr, P. (cos. 57), 2.57b Cornelius Scipio, Cn. (321; pr. 109?), 1.68 Cornelius Scipio, P. (cos. 218), 1.61, 3.16 Cornelius Scipio, P. (331; son of Africanus maior), p. 14, 1.116, 121 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (minor; cos. 1 147), P., pp. 14, 17, 19, 22-23, 26-27, 28,1.35, 76, 81, 87, 90-91 n. 121, 90, 106, 108, 116, 131, 155b, p. 354, 2.16, 43, 61-64, 72-85, 75,76,3.1-4,10,16
"Scipionic circle," 3.41 and n. 35 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. (maior; cos. I 205), pp. 35-36, 2.76, 3.1-4, 1, 3,4, 108 Cornelius Scipio Asiagcnus, L. (cos. 190), 2.76 Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Cn. (cos. 222), 1.61,3.16 Cornelius Scipio Hispanus, Cn. (pr. peregr. 139), 1.121 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, P. (cos. I 162), p. 59, 1.35, 74-78, 76, 79, 89, 108, 116, 2.57b, p. 496 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, P. (cos. 138), 1.109 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, P. (cos. I l l ) , 1.109 Cornelius scuba (5), 2.29a Cornelius Sulla, P. (cos. des. 65), 2.29a, 6971,3.63,112 Cornelius Sulla Felix, P. (diet. 82-81), pp. 31, 32, 59, 1.85, 88,109, 140, 2.2329, 26b, 27, 29a, 51, 58, 59, 75, 8081, 83a, 86-88, 87 Crates the Cynic, 1.20 Cratippus, pp. 18 and 38, 1.1-4a, 1.1-2, 103b-4, p. 358, 2.8, 3.5-6, 5, 6, 11, 33, 121 Critolaus, 3.11, 51 Curiatius, C. (u. pi. 138), 1.109 Curius, M\ (5), 1.33,116,3.67 Curius Dcntatus, M\ (cos. I 290), 2.75, 3.86 Cynicism/Cynics, 1.6, 107-21,126-32, 128, 148-49, 148, 151 Cyrenaici,p. 484, 3.116 Cyrsilus, 3.48 Cyrus (the Younger), 1.109, 2.16 Damon of Syracus and Phinrias, p. 484, 3.43-46a, 45-46a Decius Mus, P. P. f. (cos. I 312), 1.61, 3.16 Decius Mus, P. Q. f. (cos. 340), 1.61, 3.16 Deioces (Median king), 2.41, 3.77 Deiotarus, p. 30 Delos, 3.49 Delphi, temple of Apollo at, 1.114 Demetrius Poliorcctes, 2.26a Didius,T. (tr.pl. 103), 2.49 Dinomachus, 3.116-20, 119 Dio of Syracuse, 1.155b
Index of Proper Names Diodorus (Mcgarian philosopher), 3.116 Diogenes of Sinope, 1.20, 126-32, 145 Dionysius I of Syracuse, 1.155b, 2.25, 3.4546a Dionysius U of Syracuse, 1.155b, 3.4J-46a Dionysius ό Μ€τσθ€μ6ΐΑϊ9, 3.12 Drances, 1.74 Egerius, 3.40 Epaminondas, 1.155b, 2.26a Epicurus/Epicureanism, p. 37, 1.5, 11-14, 59, 2.36, pp. 484 and 487, 3.12, 18, 39, 102, 106, 116-20, 116, 117, 118 Erichthonius, 2.14 Etruscans, 1.61 Fabius Labeo, Q. (cos. 183), 1.33 Fabius Maximus Gurges, Q. (cos. I 292), 2.75 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (Cuncrator), Q. (cos. I 233), 1.82b-84, 84,108, 2.43 Fabricius, C. (2), 1.59 Fabricius Luscinus, C (cos. I 282), 1.30-41, 34-40, 38,40, pp. 494-95, 3.16, 6588, 86, 87 Falisci, 1.35 Fannius, C. (cos. 122), 3.10 Fides, 3.104 Flaminius, C. (cos. I 223), 1.84 Flavius, L (pr. 58), 2.78-85, 78 Flavius Fimbria, C. (cos. 104), 3.77 Flavius Fimbria, C. (qu. 86; son of the pre ceding), 3.77 Floralia, 1.129 Formiae (site of a Ciceronian villa), 1.77 Fufius, L. (5), 2.50 Fulvius Flaccus, M. (cos. 125), 3.47a Furius Camillus, M. (diet. I 396), 1.35, p. 496, 3.22 Furius Philus, L. (cos. 136), p. 491, 3.109 Gaul(s), 1.61,2.63,85,3.62, 112 Geminus Maecius, 3.112
Genucius, 2.58 Glaucia. See s.v. Servilius. Gorgias (tutor of Cicero jr.), p. 12, 1.93151, p. 502 n. 14 Gracchus. See s.v. Sempronius. Gratidia (sister of the following), 3.80-81 Gratidius, M. (2), 3.77, 80-81
711
Gyges, pp. 50 and 484, 3.37b-39, 37b, 38, 73,75 Hamilcar (captor of M. Arilius Regulus), 3.99b Hamilcar (Carthaginian captive at Rome), 3.100 Hannibal, 1.38,40, 61, 84, 108, 3.1-4, 96, 113-15 Hanno, 1.61 Hasdrubal, 1.61 Hector, 1.38 Hedonists, 3.116, 119 Helvius Mancia (15), 1.109 (?) Heraclea, banlc of, 1.38 Heradidae, 1.21 Heraclides of Syracuse, 1.155b Hercules, 1.115-21, 117-21, 118, 120, 2.58, 76, p. 494, 3.25, 99b Herennius, M. (cos. 93), 2.59 Hernici, 1.35 Herodcs Atticus, 1.69, 71 Hieronymus of Rhodes, 3.119 Hippolytus, 1.32, p. 484, 3.92b-95, 94, 107, 108 Hirtius, A. (cos. 43), p. 11 Horatius, M. (cos. 509), 3.40 Horatius Codes, 1.61 Hortensius Hortalus, Q. (cos. 69), 1.41b, 68, 97, 2.50, 57b, 3.65-88, 73-74, 73, 74,97-115 Hostilius Mancinus, C. (cos. 137), 3.100, 109,110 Hume, David, 1.11 Hygiaenon, 3.108 lasus, 1.41b Insubrians, 1.61 Iphicrates, 3.22 Iphigenia, p. 484, 3.95 Jason of Pherae, 1.108 Jugurtha, 2.57b, 3.10, 79 Julia (daughter of the dictator), 3.82b Julius Caesar, C. (the dictator), pp. 2, 8, 12, 23, 25, 30-33, 35, 41, 50-51, 59, 1.26, 35, 43, 62, 64, 65, 68, 74-78, 76, 83-84, 85, 86, 88, 108, 112,124, p. 360, 2.2-5, 23-29, 23, 26b, 27, 28, 29a, 43, 57b, 59, 64, 69, 75, 78-85, 83a-b, 84, 85, p. 495, 3.2, 1 l-19a,
712
Index of Proper Names
Julius Caesar, C. (che dictator) (continued) 19a, 29,40-42, 41, 43, 65-88, 73-74, 73. 82a, 82b-85, 82b, 83, 84, 88, 9 7 115 Julius Caesar, L. (141), 1.133 Julius Caesar Augustus, C. ("Octavian"). See s.v. Octavius. Julius Caesar Augustus, Ti. (prmceps A.D. 14-37), p. 40, 1.88,2.54,3.85 Julius Caesar Germanicus, C. ("Caligula"; prmceps A.D. 37-41), 3.107 Julius Caesar Srrabo Vopiscus, C. (aed. 90), 1.108, 109,132b-37,133, 2.49, 50 Julius Salinator, L. (453), 3.66 Junius, P. (2), 2.73 Junius Brutus, L (cos. 509), pp. 33, 492 n. 9, 3.40-42, 40, 79-82a, 112 Junius Brutus, M. (pr. 142), pp. 11, 14, 2 J 0 Junius Brutus, Μ. Μ. f. (50), p. 14, 1.129, 2.50, 63 Junius Brutus, M. (pr. urb. 44), pp. 11, 15, 30, 33, 1.2, 1.7b, 112, 122-25, 132b37, 150, 2.2, 3, 43, 45, 3.5-6,19a, 4 0 42, 73-74, 121 Junius Pcnnus, M. (tr. pi. 126), 3.46b-49a, 47a Junius Silanus, D. (cos. 62), 2.57b Jupiter, 3.39, 102 temple of, 3.1, 104 Labeo. See s.v. Antistius. Laberius, Decimus, 2.24 Labienus, Q. (4), 3.43 Lacydes, p. 22 Laclius Sapiens, C. (cos. 140), p. 17,1.9091 andn. 119,90, 108,116, 155b, p. 354,2.40,3.16, 17,63 Latini, 1.38,3.47a Leonidas II of Sparta, 2.80 Leptines (assassin of Cn. Octavius), 1.138 Leucrra, battle of, 1.61, 84,108, 2.26a Licinius Archias, A. (20), 3.47a Licinius Crassus, L. (cos. 95), 1.108, 109, 133, 156, 2.47, 49, 57b, 59, 63, 3.47, 67 Licinius Crassus, P. (cos. 97), 2.57b, 3.77 Licinius Crassus Dives, M. (the triumvir), pp. 2, 33, 59, 1.25-26, 25, 86,109, 140, 2.58, 71, 84, 3.47, 65-88, 73-74, 73, 74, 75, 77, 82b, 88, 97-115, 114 Licinius Crassus Dives Ρ (69), 2.57b
Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, P. (cos. 131), 1.32, 116,2.57b Licinius Lucullus, L (pr. 104), 2.50, 57b, 3.73 Licinius Lucullus, L. (son of the preceding; cos. 74), 1.93-151, 97, 140, 2.50, 57b Licinius Lucullus, M. See s.v. Terentius. Licinius Murena, L (cos. 62), 1.42-60, 124, 2.58 Ligarius, Q. (4), p. 30 Ligurians, 1.36, 116 Livius,L. (tr.pl. 321?), 3.109 Livius Drusus, M. (cos. 112), 1.108, 3.10 Livius Drusus, M. (tr. pi. 91), 2.59, 75, 3.10, €Sy 80-81 Lucceius, L. (pr. 67), 1.68,155b Lucceius, Q. (9), 3.58 Lucretia (38), 3.40 Lucretius Tricipitinus, L. (cos. 462), 1.35 Lucretius Tricipitinus, Sp. (cos. 509?), 3.40 Lusitanians, 1.116, 2.40 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (father of the cos. of 102), 1.133 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (cos. 102), 1.109, 133, 3.80-81 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (son of the preceding; cos. 78), 1.76, 97, 109, 133, 2.58, 3.73 Lutatius Pinthia, M. (21), 3.77 Lycides, 3.48 Lycurgus, 1.61-92, 74-78, 76, 109 Lysander (Spartan admiral), 1.72, 74-78, 76, 83-84, 84,109, 116 Lysander (Spartan cphor), 2.72-85, 80 Lysis, 1.155b Macedon, 2.26, 40, 74, 76, 81-82, 81 Maelius,Q. (tr.pl. 321), 3.109 MagiusCilo, P. (15), 2.79 Magnesia ad Sipylum, battle at, 2.76 Mallius Maximus, Cn. (cos. 105), 3.10 Mamcrcus. See s.v. Aemilius Lcpidus Livianus. Mam. Manilius, C. (tr. pi. 67), 3.43 Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosius, L. (diet. 363), 3.111-12, 112 Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, T. (cos. I 347), p. 14, 3.90,97-115, 112 Manlius Torquatus, L. (pr. 49), 3.112 Manlius Torquatus, T. (cos. I 235), 3.114 Manlius Torquatus, T. (cos. 165), 1.138 Marathon, battle of, 1.61
Index of Proper Names Marcia (wife of M. Atilius Rcgulus), 3.100 Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91), 1.108, 2.58, 59, 72-85, 73, 3.65-88, 86-88, 87 Maria (sister of C. Marius), 3.80-81 Marius, C. (cos. I 107), 1.76, 109, 2.50, 57b, 72, 3.10, 65-88, 77, 79-82a, 79, 82b-85,97-115 Marius, M. (25), 1.71, 114, 2.55b-60, 3.61b Marius Gratidianus, M. (pr. I 85?), 3.49b67, 58-71, 65-88, 67, 77, 79-82a, 80-81, 82b-85, 97-115 Marsyas, 1.102 Massilia, 2.23-29, 28 Matrinius, D. (2), 2.69 Medes, 2.41, 73 Melanrheus, 1.113 Melanrho, 1.113 Mcnenius Agrippa (cos. 503), 1.85, 3.22 Minos, 1.97 Minucius, Ti. (tr. pi. 321?», 3.109 Minucius Basilus (Caesar's assassin), 3.7374 Minucius Basilus, L. (37), 3.73-74, 76 Minucius Basilus Satrianus, L. (pr. 45), 3.73-74, 73, 74 Minucius Rufus, M. (cos. 221), 1.84 Miscnum, treaty of, p. 15 Mithridates VI Euparor, 1.140, 3.10, 49 Mncsarchus, pp. 21-22 Molo of Rhodes, 1.146 Mucius Cordus Scaevola, C. (10), 1.61 Mucius Scaevola, P. (cos. 175), 2.57b Mucius Scaevola, P. (cos. 133), 1.116, 2.47 Mucius Scaevola, Q. ("the Augur"; cos. 117), pp. 17-18, 1.108, 109, 111,2.40, 3.10 Mucius Scaevola, Q. ("the Pontifcx"; cos. 95), p. 14, 1.68, 116, 2.47, 57b, 64, 65, 3.17, 49b-67, 60, 61b-64, 61b, 6 2 63,70-71,74,97-115,100 Mummius Achaicus, L. (cos. 146), 1.35, 87, 2.76 Munatius Plancus, Cn. (27), 2.63 Munatius Plancus, L. (cos. 42), 2.23, 24, 29a, 3.83, 121 Munatius Plancus Bursa, T. (tr. pi. 52), 2.50 Munda, bartlc at, 2.20, 24 Narbo Martius (Roman colony), 2.63 Neptune, 1.31, 32, p. 494. See s.v. Poseidon.
713
Nicias (would-be assassin of Pyrrhus), 3.86 Nicocles (tyrant of Sicyon), 2.81-83a, 81 Nigidius Figulus, P. (pr. 58), 1.1, 155b Nola, 1.61 Norbanus, C. (cos. 83), 2.49 Numa Pompilius, 3.104 Numanria, destruction of, 1.35, 38 war with, 1.116,2.76,3.10, 109 Numanrines, 3.100, 109 Numicius, Ti. (tr. pi. 321?), 3.109 Octavius, C. = C. Julius Caesar Octavianus Augustus (princeps 27 B.C.-A.D. 14), pp. 8, 9, 15-16, 20, 30, 40, 59, 1.93-151, 138-40, 138, 2.54, 79, p. 486, 3.84 Octavius, Cn. (cos. 165), p. 20, 1.138-40, 138 Octavius, Cn. (pr. 79), 132 Octavius, M. (31; tr. pi. 133), 2.72 and n. 70 Octavius, M. (32), 2.72 and n. 70 Opimius, L. (cos. 121), 2.47 Oropus, 3.51 Paconius, p. 12 Palamcdes, 3.97-99a Papirius Carbo, C. (cos. 120), 1.86, 2.47,49 Papirius Carbo, Cn. (cos. 113), 2.49 Papirius Pactus, L. (69), 1.126-32, 2.49, 84 Papius, C. (tr. pi. 6S)t 3.46b-49a, 47 Parthians, war against, 1.25. See s.v. Carrhae, battle of. Pausanias (Spartan general), 1.74-78, 76 Pegasus, 2.14 Pelops, 3.97 Perdiccas III of Macedon, 2.40 Peregrinus Proteus, 3.37b-39 Pericles, 1.108, 144, p. 354, 2.60, 3.46b Pcripatetic/Peripatos, pp. 17, 18, 37, 1.2, 6, 8, 11-14, 54, 61-92, 88-89, 88, 89, 97, 140, pp. 357-58, 359, 360, 2.8, 11-16, 11, 17, 43, 52-64, 3.1, 11, 29, 33,35-37,51,106, 119, 121. See Indcx of Authors s.v. Aristotle. Persaeus,2.12b-15 Perseus (king of Macedon), 1.116, 138, 2.76 Persia, 1.83-84, 116, 3.46b-49a Pctrcius, M. (3), 1.77 Petronius, M. (90), 1.74 Phaedra, 3.108
714
Index of Proper Names
Phaethon, p. 484, 3.94 Phalaris, 2.26a, 3.29 Pharsalia, battle at, pp. 13 and n. 32, 15, 30, 2.20, 29a Pharsalus, 1.108 Philip II of Maccdon, p. 14, 1.70, 79, 90, 92, 2.40, 48, 52-64, 53 Philip V of Maccdon, 1.88 Philocles, 3.46b Phintias and Damon. See s.v. Damon. Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, conte, 1.19 Plancius, Cn. (aed. 54), 1.42-60 Plataea, battle of, 1.61, 76 Poeni. See s.vv. Carthage/Carthaginians, Punic Wars. Polydamas of Pharsalus, 1.108 Pompeia (daughter of the triumvir), 3.82b Pompcius, Q. (cos. 141), 3.97-115, 109 Pompeius, Sex. (18), 1.19 Pompcius Magnus, Cn. (the triumvir), pp. 2, 33, 60, 1.1, 1.35, 47, 74-78, 76, 77, 78, 87, 103b, 138-40, 140, 2.2, 20, 45, 55b-60, 57b, 58, 60, 69, 78, p. 495, 3.49, 65-88, 82b, 87, 97-115 Pompcius Magnus, Cn. (32; older son of the triumvir), 2.20 Pompcius Magnus Pius, Sex. (33; younger son of the triumvir), p. 15, 220 Pomponius, M. (tr. pi. 362), 3.111-12, 112 Pomponius Articus, T., pp. 4, 6-9, 11-13, 20, 34-35, 51, 1.92 and n. 125, 97, 2.27, 64, pp. 484-85, 488 Pomponius Dionysius, M., p. 12 Pontius, C. (father of the following), 2.75 Pontius, C. (Samnite leader), 2.75, 3.109 Popilia (32), 1.133 Popilius Laenas, C. (cos. 172), 1.36 Popilius Laenas, M. (cos. 173), 1.36 Popilius Laenas, P. (cos. 132), p. 496 Porcius Cato, M. (Censorius), pp. 11,14, 1.34-40, 36-37, 65, 79-82, 79, 82a, 156, 2.43, 3.16. See Index of Authors s.v. Cato. Porcius Cato, M. (tr. pi. 99), 3.58-71, 66 Porcius Cato, M. (Uticensis), pp. 3S and 59, 1.62, 65, 77, 112, 129, 2.2, 37, 86-87, 3.65-88, 66, 88 Porcius Cato Licinianus, M. (pr. dcs. 151), p. 14, 1.36-37 Porscnna, Lars 1-61 Poseidon, 2.14. See s.v. Neptune.
Posrumius Albinus, Sp. (cos. I 334), 3.109 Praenestini, 1.35 Privernum, 1.35 Prodicus of Ceus, 1.118,3.25 Ptolemy II Philadelphia 2.81-83a Ptolemy XI Alexander II, 3.87 Punic War(s), 1.75 Second, 3.1-4, 46b-49a, 47, 96, 114 Third, 1.79-82,79, 82a, 108 Pupius Piso Frugi, M. (cos. 61), 2.58, 73 Puteoii, pp. 8, 10, 487 Pydna, battle at, 1.19, 36, 116, 138 Pyrrho of Elis, p. 37, 1.6,2.7 Pyrrhus of Epirus, 1.34-40, 38, 40, 2.26a, p. 494, 3.65-88, 86, 100 Pyrrhus son of Achilles, 1.38 Pythagoras, 1.56, 108 Pythagorean(s), 1.155b, 3.14, 45-46a Pythius, 3.49b-67, 58-71, 58-60, 58, 59 Quincrius Kaeso (8), p. 496 Quirinus, 3.41 Remus, p. 33, 3.7, 41 Rhadamanthys, 1.97 Rhodes, p. 27 and n. 55, 1.41b, 3.49b-57 Romulus, p. 33, 3.7, 40-42, 41, 79-82a Roscius, Sex. (7), 2,49, 51 Rubrius, L(12), 3.73 Rupilius(l), 1.114 Rutilius Rufus, P. (tr. pi. 169; father of the following), 3.10 Rurilius Rufus, P. (cos. 105), pp. 24 and 38; 1.41a, 152-61, 2.47, 3.9, 10, 19b-32, 58, 62-63 Sabines, 1.35, 38, 2.26b, 3.73-74 Saguntum, 1.38 n. 56 Salamis, battle of, 1.61, 74-78 and n. 103, 75, 108, 3.48 Samnitcs, 1.35, 38, 61, 2.75, 3.86, 109 Samos, 1.41b Satrius (leg. 43), 3.73-74 and n. 68 Satrius, M. See s.v. Minucius Basilus Satrianus, L. Sarurninus. See s.v. Appuleius. Scamandcr (freedmen), 1.59 Scirthaea, battle of, 2.50 Scribonius Curio, C. (cos. 76), 2.58, 59, 3.65-88, 86-88, 88 Scribonius Curio, C. (tr. pi. 50), 2.59
Index of Proper Names Seius, M. (aed. 74), 2.58 Sempronius Gracchus, C. (tr. pi. 1 123), pp. 14, 23, 26, 32, 1.21, 87, 2.29a, 43, 47, 72-85, 72, 78-85,79, 80, 3.10, 7 9 82a, 79 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (father of the tri bunes; cos. I 177), p. 14, 2.43, 80 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (tr. pi. 133), pp. 14, 23, 26, 32, 59, 1.21, 74-78, 76, 87, 89, 109, 2.27, 43, 57b, 72-85, 78-85, 78, 79, 80, 3.63, 79-82a, 109 Sempronius Longus, Ti. (cos. 218), 1.61 Scntinum, battle of, 1.61 Sergius Catilina, L. {the revolutionary), 1.76, 77, 124, 131, 2.57b, 56, 78-85, 84, 3.80-81,112 Scrgius Orata, C. (33), 3.49b-67, 67, 80-81 Scrtorius, Q. (pr. 83?), 1.76, 3.66, 87 Scrvilius, C. (pr. 102), 2.50 Servilius Ahala, C. (32), p. 496 Servilius Caepio, 3.82b and n. 85 Servilius Caepio, Q. (cos. 140), 2.40 Servilius Caepio, Q. (cos. 106), 2.49 Servilius Glaucia, C. (pr. 100), 3.10 Servilius Rullus, P. (tr. pi. 63), 2.78 Sicilians/Sicily, 2.26b-27, 50, 58, 3.58 Sicyon, 2.81-83a Sittius, 3.10 Skepticism, Skeptics, 1.6, 2.7, 7-8, 3.49b57. See s.v. Academy. Social War, 2.75, 3.80-81 Socrates, 1.6, 20, 70, 72, 90,106,108, 114, 133, 148-49, 148, pp. 354-55, 2.5, 9, 15, 43, 53, p. 484, 3.1-4, 10, 11, 19b32, 21, 36, 37b-39, 77 Sol, p. 484, 3.94 Solon, 1.61-92, 74-78, 75, 108, 111, 2.41, 71, 3.93 Sparta/Spartans, 1.41b, 64, 76, 83-84, 84, 108, 116, 2.26b, 72-85, 77, 80, 2.26a, 3.49, 99b constitution of, 1.76, 2.80 Sparracus, 1.25 Sphacrus, p. 4 Srilpo, 3.116 Stoa, Stoicism, pp. 17, 29, 32, 35, 58-59, 1.2, 15b, 21, 22, 46, 51,61-92, 66t 68, 69b-7l, 71, 79, 79-82, 83, 93-151, 100-103a, 109, 126, 152-61, 153, p. 357, 2.5, 9, 12a, 17, 19b-20, 35, p.
715
485, 3.11, 12, 21, 24, 49b-67, 53,105, 116,121 Stoic(s), pp. 2-3, 5, 7, 17-18, 21, 27, 31, 35, 37, 46, 48, 52, 59, 1.3, 6, 7a, 10, 23b, 41a, 42-60, 42, 50, 62, 81, 9 3 99, 93, 97-98,101, 107-21, 111, 115-21, 117, 121, 132b-37, 133,142, 152-61 n. 195, pp. 353-54, 357, 361, 2.8,11, 36-38, 42a, 43, pp. 485-86, 492-93, 3.10, 15, 19b-32, 20, 28, 38, 39, 43, 51, 75, 97,102, 105,118,119, 121 ethics, pars praeceptiva of, 1.7b, 60, 10721,3.13b-17n. 19 scale of values, 1.83, 3.12, 13, 21, 24, 33, 35-37. See Index of Topics s.v. Exter nal goods, valuation of; Index of Greek Words s.v. τέλος. Strategies of Rhodes, 2.86-87 Sulpicius Gaius, C. (cos. 166), 1.19 Sulpicius Rufus, P. (tr. pi. 88), 2.49, 59 Sulpicius Rufus, Scrv. (cos. 51), p. 32, 1.71, 2.3-5, 65, 3.60 Tarentum, 3.86 Tarquinius, Sex. (14), 3.40 Tarquinius Collatinus, L. (cos. 509?), 3.4042,40 Tarquinius Priscus, L. (6), 3.40 Taurus, 1.11-17, 88 Tclcmachus, 3.97-99a Tel I us, temple of, 2.60 Tcrentius Varro, C. (cos. 216), 1.84 Tcrentius Varro Lucullus, M. (cos. 73), 2.50, 57b, 3.73 Thapsus, battle of, 2.20, 3.112 Thebes, 1.84,108 Themistocles, 1.74-78, 75,108, p. 354, 2.71, pp. 484,494, 3.46b-49a, 49a Thermopylae, battle of, 1.61 Thersites, 1.107-21, 135 Theseus, 1.31, 32, pp. 484, 494-95, 3.92b95, 94, 108 Thessaly, 3.49a Thorius Balbus, L. (4), 3.110 Thrasymachus, 1.85, 108, 2.40, p. 491 Thyestes, 3.102,104 Ticinus, battle of the, 1.61 Timochares (would-be assassin of Pyrrhus), 3.86 Timon, 129
716
Index of Proper Names
Timon of Phlius, 1.6 Timotheus, 1.115-21, 116 Tolmides, 3.49 Tours, p. 42 Transpadani, 3.47, 86-88, 88 Trasimenus, battle of Lake, 1.84 Trebatius Testa, C. (7), p. 8 n. 20, p. 11, 3.61,62 Trebia, battle of, 1.61 Trebianus, 2.69 Trebonius, C. (cos. suff. 45), 3.5-6, 74-75, 97-115 Triptolemus, 1.97 Tullia (daughter of the orator), pp. 1 and 11,1.71,2.2-8,4,75 Tullius Cicero, M. (grandfather of the ora tor), 3.80-81 Tullius Cicero, M. (father of the orator), 1.71,3.77,80-81 Tullius Cicero, M. (the orator). See Index of Authors s.v. Cicero, M. Tullius (the orator), aedile, moderate expenditures as, 2.55b60,58 appropriation of others' political slogans, 2.84 and n. 83 augurs, membership of the board of, 3.66 n. 61 aversion to prosecution, 2.50 Cilicia, governorship of, 1.77, 88, 89, 226b-27, 3.61b, 62-63 concordia ordinum (vel sim.) as political ideal, 1.85, 2.72-85, 78, 3.86-88 defense, principle of speaking only in. See s.v. aversion to prosecution, financial position/dealings, 2.69-71, 7 8 85 Gaul, Cisalpine, renunciation of governor ship of, 1.68 loan from Caesar accepted by, 1.43, 47 political alliances, shifting, 3.80-81 quaestio de repetundis, presidency of the, 2.75
speeches, motive for publication of, p. 10 andn. 28, p. 16,2.51 Tellus, temple of, restored by, 2.60 Verres, C , acceptance of prosecution of, 2.26b-27 and n. 34, 50. See s.v. Verres, C. Tullius Cicero, M. (son of the orator), pp. 1, 8, 11-16, 29, 38, 46, l.t-4a, 1-2, 16, 37, 93-151, 103b-4, 2.2-8, 8, 10, 44, 45; 3.5-6, 6, 81, 82b, 116-20, 121 Tullius Cicero, Q. (brother of the orator), p. 11, 1.89,3.89 Tullius Cicero, Q. (son of the preceding), p. 11,2.74 Tullius Tiro, M., p. 40, 1.157 Turselius, L, 3.73 Tusculum/Tusculani, 1.35, 2.77 Tyrannio, p. 12 Ulysses, 1.109, 113, p. 484, 3.58-60, 9 7 99a, 99b Valerius Probus, M. (315), 1.40 Venus of Cos, 3.10, 19b-32 Victrix, temple of, 2.60 Verres, C. (pr. urb. 74), 1.150, 2.26b-27, 49, 50, 57b, 73, 3.73-74, 73 Veseris River, battle of the, 3.112 Veturius Calvinus, T. (cos. I 334), 3.109 Virdumarus (leader of the Insubrians), 1.61 Viriathus (leader of Lusitanian rebels), 1.38, 2.40 Visellius Aculeo, C. (1), 3.80-81 Volsci, 1.35 Xanthippus (Athenian statesman), 3.49 Xanthippus (Spartan general), 3.99b Xenocrates, 1.109 Xerxes, 1.108 Zenodotus of Ephesus, 1.97-98 Zeus (as sanctioner of oaths), 3.102
