A Commentary on Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo
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A Commentary on Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo
© 2007 Leuven University Press / Universitaire Pers Leuven / Presses Universitaires de Louvain Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 90 5867 603 0 D/2007/1869/23 NUR: 635 Cover design: Joke Klaassen
A Commentary on Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo Geert Roskam
Leuven University Press 2007
To my children
εἰ μή τι κακὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ἀπεκρύπτετο. (Plutarch, De cur. 516E)
gloria umbra virtutis est: etiam invitam comitabitur. (Seneca, epist. 79,13)
“Thème boehmien de la vie cachée, obscure, mouvement perpétuel sans frein et sans but, vie qui se poursuit elle-même, se ronge, se dévore et se fuit; vie inquiète, vie de désespoir sans fin et sans lumière” (R. Barthes, le neutre, ed. Th. Clerc, p. 130)
Contents Acknowledgements
7
Abbreviations
8
Introduction
15
1. Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition
17
1.1. Λάθε βιώσας: a psychagogic remedy
17
1.2. A two-step cure: ἔλεγχος and νουθέτησις
19
1.2.1. ἔλεγχος
19
1.2.2. νουθέτησις
28
1.3. Three further characteristics of Epicurus’ psychagogical approach
32
1.4. Qualifications and restrictions: φρόνησις at work
36
1.5. Conclusion
40
2. The anti-Epicurean tradition before Plutarch
43
2.1. Timocrates
43
2.2. Cicero
49
2.3. The Stoa
69
2.3.1. Early Stoicism
69
2.3.2. Seneca
71
2.3.3. Epictetus
80
3. Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo
85
3.1. Introduction: the work and its author
85
3.2. Inconsistency between Epicurus’ words and deeds
90
6
G. Roskam 3.3. The ethical arguments
99
3.4. Epicurus’ egoistic hedonism versus Plutarch’s social commitment
118
3.5. Man as a social being
132
3.6. The ontological foundations: the connection between being and being known
138
3.7. An eschatological perspective
159
3.8. Conclusion
174
3.8.1. Plutarch as a polemicist: eristic strategies and anti-Epicurean polemic in De latenter vivendo
174
3.8.2. Plutarch’s own position as presented in De latenter vivendo
175
3.8.3. Plutarch’s philosophical position in De latenter vivendo: a schematic survey
179
3.9. Schematic structure of De latenter vivendo
180
Commentary
183
Bibliography
223
Indices
247
Index nominum
249
Index locorum
253
Acknowledgements Gratitude to friends was of paramount importance in the Garden. Although I disagree with Epicurus’ basically self-centred motivation, I have no difficulty in admitting that I derived many Epicurean pleasures from the following paragraphs. First and foremost, my thanks are due to L. Van der Stockt, the supervisor of my PhD dissertation on Plutarch. I have benefited greatly, and continue to benefit, from his valuable and stimulating advice. In his respect for my own alterity, he far surpasses Plutarch’s high moral demands, in savoir vivre he is Epicurus’ equal. A significant part of this book has been written during a stay at Utrecht University. I am indebted to many members of the staff, especially to K. Algra and J. Mansfeld, with whom I could discuss the Epicurean position in detail. I am also much indebted to W. Evenepoel, H.G. Ingenkamp, J. Opsomer, and C. Steel, all of whom read parts of an earlier draft and made many useful and pertinent suggestions. Special thanks are also due to Michael and Julianne Funk Deckard for having corrected my English. Needless to say, all shortcomings remain my own. It is a pleasure to extend thanks to my colleagues at the Department of Classical Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven and to the members of the De Wulf - Mansion Centre at the Leuven Institute of Philosophy. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (Belgium). Finally, I am glad to express my thanks to my parents, who offered me ζῆν and contributed a great deal to εὖ ζῆν as well, to my children, whose cheerful simplicity forms the perfect antidote to the complex vexations of the scholarly life, and to my wife Kristin, who had to share me with both Epicurus and Plutarch. It is clear that without her unconditional and generous readiness to do so, this book would never have been written.
Abbreviations 1. Plutarch’s works 1.1. Moralia De liberis educandis
De lib. educ.
De audiendis poetis (Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat)
De aud. poet.
De audiendo (De recta ratione audiendi)
De aud.
De adulatore et amico (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur)
De ad. et am.
De profectibus in virtute (Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus)
De prof. in virt.
De capienda ex inimicis utilitate
De cap. ex inim.
De amicorum multitudine
De am. mult.
De fortuna
De fortuna
De virtute et vitio
De virt. et vit.
Consolatio ad Apollonium
Cons. ad Apoll.
De tuenda sanitate praecepta
De tuenda
Coniugalia praecepta
Con. praec.
Septem sapientium convivium
Sept. sap. conv.
De superstitione
De sup.
Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata
Reg. et imp. apophth.
Apophthegmata Laconica – Instituta Laconica – Lacaenarum apophthegmata
Apophth. Lac.
Mulierum virtutes
Mul. virt.
Quaestiones Romanae
Quaest. Rom.
Quaestiones Graecae
Quaest. Graec.
Parallela Graeca et Romana
Parall. Graec. et Rom.
De fortuna Romanorum
De fort. Rom.
De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute
De Al. Magn. fort.
Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses (De gloria Atheniensium)
Bellone an pace
De Iside et Osiride
De Is. et Os.
De E Delphico (De E apud Delphos)
De E
Abbreviations
9
De Pythiae oraculis
De Pyth. or.
De defectu oraculorum
De def. or.
An virtus doceri possit
An virt. doc.
De virtute morali
De virt. mor.
De cohibenda ira
De coh. ira
De tranquillitate animi
De tranq. an.
De fraterno amore
De frat. am.
De amore prolis
De am. prol.
An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat
An vitiositas
Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores
Animine an corp.
De garrulitate
De gar.
De curiositate
De cur.
De cupiditate divitiarum
De cup. div.
De vitioso pudore
De vit. pud.
De invidia et odio
De inv. et od.
De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando (De laude ipsius)
De se ipsum laud.
De sera numinis vindicta
De sera num.
De fato
De fato
De genio Socratis (De Socratis daemonio)
De genio Socr.
De exilio
De exilio
Consolatio ad uxorem
Cons. ad ux.
Quaestionum Convivalium l. IX
Quaest. conv.
Amatorius
Amatorius
Amatoriae narrationes
Am. narr.
Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum (Maxime cum principibus philosophandum esse)
Maxime cum principibus
Ad principem ineruditum
Ad princ. iner.
An seni respublica gerenda sit
An seni
Praecepta gerendae reipublicae
Praec. ger. reip.
De unius in republica dominatione, populari statu, et paucorum imperio
De unius
De vitando aere alieno
De vit. aer.
Decem oratorum vitae
Dec. or. vit.
Comparationis Aristophanis et Menandri epitome
Comp. Ar. et Men.
De Herodoti malignitate
De Her. mal.
Placita philosophorum
Plac. philos.
Quaestiones naturales
Quaest. nat.
10
Abbreviations
De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet
De facie
De primo frigido
De prim. frig.
Aqua an ignis utilior sit
Aqua an ignis
De sollertia animalium (Terrestriane an aquatilia animalia sint callidiora)
De soll. an.
Gryllus (Bruta animalia ratione uti)
Gryllus
De esu carnium
De esu
Quaestiones Platonicae
Quaest. Plat.
De animae procreatione in Timaeo
De an. procr.
De Stoicorum repugnantiis
De Stoic. rep.
Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere
Stoic. absurd. poet.
De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos
De comm. not.
Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum
Non posse
Adversus Colotem
Adv. Col.
De latenter vivendo (An recte dicendum sit latenter esse vivendum)
De lat. viv.
De musica
De mus.
Fragmenta
fr.
1.2. Vitae Theseus
Thes.
Romulus
Rom.
Comparatio Thesei et Romuli
Comp. Thes. et Rom.
Lycurgus
Lyc.
Numa
Num.
Comparatio Lycurgi et Numae
Comp. Lyc. et Num.
Solon
Sol.
Publicola
Publ.
Comparatio Solonis et Publicolae
Comp. Sol. et Publ.
Themistocles
Them.
Camillus
Cam.
Aristides
Arist.
Cato Maior
Ca. Ma.
Comparatio Aristidis et Catonis
Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma.
Cimon
Cim.
Lucullus
Luc.
Comparatio Cimonis et Luculli
Comp. Cim. et Luc.
Abbreviations
11
Pericles
Per.
Fabius Maximus
Fab.
Comparatio Periclis et Fabii Maximi
Comp. Per. et Fab.
Nicias
Nic.
Crassus
Crass.
Comparatio Niciae et Crassi
Comp. Nic. et Crass.
Alcibiades
Alc.
Marcius Coriolanus
Cor.
Comparatio Alcibiadis et Marcii Coriolani
Comp. Alc. et Cor.
Lysander
Lys.
Sulla
Sull.
Comparatio Lysandri et Sullae
Comp. Lys. et Sull.
Agesilaus
Ages.
Pompeius
Pomp.
Comparatio Agesilai et Pompeii
Comp. Ages. et Pomp.
Pelopidas
Pel.
Marcellus
Marc.
Comparatio Pelopidae et Marcelli
Comp. Pel. et Marc.
Dion
Dion
Brutus
Brut.
Comparatio Dionis et Bruti
Comp. Dion. et Brut.
Timoleon
Tim.
Aemilius Paulus
Aem.
Comparatio Timoleontis et Aemilii Pauli
Comp. Tim. et Aem.
Demosthenes
Dem.
Cicero
Cic.
Comparatio Demosthenis et Ciceronis
Comp. Dem. et Cic.
Alexander
Alex.
Caesar
Caes.
Sertorius
Sert.
Eumenes
Eum.
Comparatio Sertorii et Eumenis
Comp. Sert. et Eum.
Phocion
Phoc.
Cato Minor
Ca. Mi.
Demetrius
Demetr.
Antonius
Ant.
Comparatio Demetrii et Antonii
Comp. Demetr. et Ant.
12
Abbreviations
Pyrrhus
Pyrrh.
Caius Marius
Mar.
Agis
Agis
Cleomenes
Cleom.
Tiberius Gracchus
TG
Caius Gracchus
CG
Comparatio Agidis et Cleomenis cum Tiberio et Caio Graccho
Comp. Ag., Cleom. et Gracch.
Philopoemen
Phil.
Titus Flamininus
Flam.
Comparatio Philopoemenis et Titi Flaminini
Comp. Phil. et Flam.
Aratus
Arat.
Artaxerxes
Art.
Galba
Galba
Otho
Oth.
2. Other abbreviations References to Latin authors follow the forms established by the TLL. Abbreviations of Greek authors and works are usually as listed in LSJ. Where they differ, they are more complete. Abbreviations of journals are as listed in L’Année Philologique. AB
I. Bekker (ed.), Anecdota Graeca, Graz, 1965 [= Berlin, 1814-1821].
ANRW
Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin – New York, 1972-.
BT
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana
CPF
Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini. Testi e lessico nei papiri di cultura greca e latina, Firenze, 1989-.
CPG
E.L. a Leutsch – F.G. Schneidewin (eds.), Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum, Göttingen, 1839-1851.
CUF
Collection des Universités de France
DK
H. Diels – W. Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Dublin – Zurich, 19661967.
IG
Inscriptiones Graecae, [various editors], Berolini, 1890-.
LCL
Loeb Classical Library
LSJ
H.G. Liddell – R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 9th edn., rev. H. Stuart Jones, with a revised supplement, Oxford, 1996.
Abbreviations
13
PG
Patrologia graeca
PHerc.
Herculaneum Papyri; cf. M. Gigante, Catalogo dei Papiri Ercolanesi, Napoli, 1979.
PL
Patrologia latina
PMG
D.L. Page (ed.), Poetae melici graeci. Alcmanis Stesichori Ibyci Anacreontis Simonidis Corinnae Poetarum minorum reliquias, carmina popularia et convivialia quaeque adespota feruntur, Oxford, 1962.
POxy.
B.P. Grenfell – A.S. Hunt (and others) (eds.), The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, London, 1898-.
PTS
Patristische Texte und Studien
RE
G. Wissowa (and others) (ed.), Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, München – Stuttgart, 1893-1980.
RS
Ratae Sententiae (= Κύριαι δόξαι)
SEG
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, [various editors], Lugduni Batavorum – Amsterdam, 1923-.
SH
H. Lloyd-Jones – P. Parsons (eds.), Supplementum Hellenisticum [Indices by H.-G. Nesselrath], Berolini – Novi Eboraci, 1983 (Texte und Kommentare 11).
SIG
G. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, Hildesheim, 19604 [= Leipzig, 1915-19243].
SV
Sententiae Vaticanae
SVF
J. von Arnim (ed.), Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta [indices by M. Adler], Leipzig, 1903-1924.
TAM
E. Kalinka (and others) (ed.), Tituli Asiae Minoris, Vindobonae, 1901-1989.
TLL
Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Index: Leipzig, 1990).
TrGF
B. Snell – R. Kannicht – S. Radt (eds.), Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta, Göttingen, 1977-2004.
introduction
1. Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition 1.1. Λάθε βιώσας: a psychagogic remedy The story of this book begins at the end of the fourth, or the beginning of the third, century B.C. At about that moment, Epicurus formulated his famous advice to ‘live unnoticed’ (λάθε βιώσας; fr. 551 Us.). This advice was based on his sincere conviction that happiness could best be reached by avoiding a brilliant career1. It is neither the famous politicians nor the celebrated orators who should be regarded as paradigms worthy of imitation, but the man who quietly enjoys the uncomplicated pleasures of a simple and sequestered life. As a rule, this preference for an ‘unnoticed life’ should be consistently maintained until one’s last hour: λάθε βιώσας culminates in λάθε ἀποβιώσας. Epicurus was not the first one to reject participation in politics. Euripides already paid a great deal of attention to this issue in several of his tragedies. Ion, for instance, elaborated different rational arguments against political engagement in Athens (Ion 595-647), just as Amphion did in his famous debate with his brother Zethos (TrGF 5.1, fr. 193 and 194; cf. also fr. 227)2 or Odysseus at the outset of the lost Philoctetes (TrGF 5.2, fr. 787). In none of these tragedies, however, has the motif seemed to influence the thread of the story. It usually occurs at the beginning of the play, where it contributes to the characterisation of the dramatis personae and raises questions that undermine the heroic perspective of the traditional myth. Moreover, such questions may well have reflected the convictions of several members of the audience. We know that around 430 B.C., a group of young and talented aristocrats deliberately presented themselves as ἀπράγμονες because they preferred the rest of a sequestered life to the risks entailed by a political career3. In philosophical circles, finally, the motif of the ‘unnoticed life’ occasionally occurs in the Democritean tradition4. Democritus’ famous statement “I came to Athens and nobody knew me” (fr. 68 B 116 DK) is often quoted by later authors, but its precise meaning, background, and scope are far from clear. It may reflect Democritus’ decision to pursue an ‘unnoticed life’ out 1 For the following presentation of Epicurus’ argument, I rely heavily on G. Roskam (2007), where further details can be found. 2 Allusions to this debate can be found in the last part of Plato’s Gorgias, where Socrates sides with Amphion; see, e.g., S.R. Slings (1991); A.W. Nightingale (1992). 3 See esp. L.B. Carter (1986); cf. also S. Gastaldi (2003), 48-56. 4 See J. Warren (2002) for a useful introduction.
18
Epicurus and the epicurean tradition
of contempt for fame (cf. Diog. Laert. 9,36 and Cicero, Tusc. 5,104), but may be equally rooted in a completely different context. Democritus’ political philosophy in general seems to have been rather ambivalent, and perhaps he never expressed himself clearly about the desirability of political engagement. Later Pyrrho likewise preferred to withdraw, but his decision was based on his concern for pedagogical credibility rather than on the doctrine or example of Democritus (Diog. Laert. 9,63). He may have influenced Epicurus, though. We know in any case that the latter greatly admired Pyrrho’s conduct and often asked his teacher Nausiphanes for information about him (Diog. Laert. 9,64). As far as we know, however, Epicurus was the first one to motivate and defend the ideal of an ‘unnoticed life’ by a coherent and systematic argumentation. Although the maxim λάθε βιώσας has come down to us without its direct context, we can easily connect it to the broader perspective of Epicurus’ philosophy5. This philosophical perspective is at the same time a psychagogical perspective. For Epicurus, philosophy is basically Seelenheilung. He addresses his readers as patients who suffer from diseases such as irrational fears and empty desires (SV 64; Porphyry, Marc. 27 = fr. 471 Us.) and offers his philosophy as a therapy (SV 54; Porphyry, Marc. 31 = fr. 221 Us.) which rests, essentially, on a fourfold cure (τετραφάρμακος)6. This cure should directly restore the patient to health, that is, pleasure (Diog. Laert. 10,138 = fr. 504 Us.) and happiness (Epist. ad Men. 122). This psychotherapeutic understanding of philosophy remained important throughout the whole tradition of Epicureanism. Different psychagogical techniques can be found in Lucretius’ De rerum natura7 and in Philodemus. The latter’s treatise On frankness provides an interesting picture of Epicurean Seelenheilung. We can read how the Epicurean teachers act as doctors who try to cure the moral diseases of their pupils with healing παρρησία. Philodemus’ works also throw light on the more concrete Epicurean therapy of passions and vices. He wrote a work On vices in at least 10 books, including discussions of flattery (De adulatione), arrogance (De superbia), and avarice (De avaritia), and added other treatises on, for instance, anger (De ira), madness (De insania), and envy (De invidia). This seems to point to a fairly systematic and comprehensive psychotherapeutic method, which could Epicurus’ lost work Περὶ βίων may have been of paramount importance in this context, since it not merely contained a rejection of political engagement (Diog. Laert. 10,119 = fr. 8 Us.) but perhaps also a positive defence of the Epicurean alternative of a sequestered life. This, in any case, is suggested by M. Schofield (2000), 436-437; cf. Id. (1999), 741; M. Erler - M. Schofield (1999), 669. 6 That is, the first four maxims of the Κύριαι δόξαι, epitomised in Philodemus, Πρὸς τοὺς ––, col. v, 8-13 A. 7 See, e.g., A. Grilli (1957) on the proem of book 2, and in general P.H. Schrijvers (1969) and (1970), passim; D. Clay (1983a), 169-266. 5
Epicurus and the epicurean tradition
19
procure the adequate moral support to cure all kinds of passions8. Diogenes of Oenoanda, finally, still continues to adopt the same perspective. He places the whole of his Epicurean inscription into a psychagogical framework by arguing that most of his contemporaries suffer from a common disease (fr. 3, IV, 3-8) and offering his inscription as a medicine that can cure them all (fr. 3, V, 8 – VI, 4). 1.2. A two-step cure: ἔλεγχος and νουθέτησις The importance of this psychagogical aspect of Epicurus’ thinking can hardly be overemphasised. At the same time it illustrates the high demands which Epicurean philosophy makes on its adherents, requiring as it does a radical cure that has implications for the whole of one’s life. The patient has to go through a difficult therapeutic process comprised of two basic components. On the one hand, his erroneous convictions entailing all kinds of irrational fears and vain desires should be refuted. This is the phase of ἔλεγχος (cf. SV 21; ἐπανόρθωσις in fr. [34],25,31 2Arr.), in which the soul of the patient is freed from wrong assumptions and made receptive to more correct ideas. On the other hand, the patient is strongly invited to adopt the better alternative. This is the phase of νουθέτησις (fr. [34],25,22-23 2Arr.), which ultimately leads to health. Epicurus’ maxim λάθε βιώσας obviously belongs to the second phase, since it offers positive advice that directly contributes to happiness. However, it will only convince the patient if the ἔλεγχος has already done its work. In practice both phases are intertwined and mutually complement each other, to be sure, but structurally, it is the ἔλεγχος that should come first. 1.2.1. ἔλεγχος Epicurus’ philosophy contained a strongly provocative component and often proved diametrically opposed to widespread convictions. Laughter was used as an important means to disregard these common views9, but reason was no less efficient. A sober analysis of real life, combined with a careful calculus of pleasure and pain, frequently unmasks traditional beliefs as irrational and unjustified, and the elenctic phase in general is characterised by eye-opening criticism based on thorough realism and a down-to-earth approach. This also appears in Epicurus’ evaluation of politics and politicians. 1.2.1.1. The domain of politics was highly esteemed in traditional philosophical thinking. Most of the Presocratics were aristocrats who somehow or other engaged in public life and the political orientation of Plato and 8
On Philodemus’ moral therapy, see V. Tsouna (2001a) and (2001b). See J. Salem (1989), 167-174.
9
20
Epicurus and the epicurean tradition
ristotle appears on many pages of their works. Epicurus took a completely A different path, stripping politics of its appeal and attractiveness. a) First of all, politics is traditionally regarded as the domain of honourable achievements. Its field is that of τὸ καλόν (cf., e.g., Aristotle, EE 1, 1216a23-27). Epicurus vehemently attacks this view, which also returns in Plutarch10. In his opinion, τὸ καλόν is no more than an empty term (fr. 511 Us. = Cicero, Tusc. 5,73; 5,119; etc.)11. The political scene is not dominated by what is honourable but by empty desires that oppose true pleasure. This evaluation, which is based on Epicurus’ classic distinction between three kinds of desires (RS 29; SV 20; cf. Epist. ad Men. 127), provides one of the most important arguments against participation in political life. Politics is unmasked as a disordered and uninterrupted pursuit of unnatural and unnecessary desires by which real pleasure is continuously postponed12. Moreover, such empty desires are usually harmful for the community as a whole. Torquatus argues that they ruin both families and the state (Cicero, fin. 1,43-44) and Lucretius attacks the passions of avarice and ambition as social evils in 3,59-86. R.C. Monti has connected this kind of argument with a typically Roman point of view13. This may well be an unjustified generalisation – a Greek Platonist or Stoic would defend the same position – but Monti is right that the argument reflects a basically un-Epicurean perspective. Philodemus’ tenet that it is better to care for oneself than for the ordinary multitude (Rhet. II, 157, fr. xvii, 3-8 S.) illustrates the Epicurean point of view much better. Yet this need not imply that Torquatus or Lucretius in this respect fully abandon the orthodox Epicurean view. Their argument should rather be understood in the light of an eristic strategy. They actually try to demonstrate that the widespread un-Epicurean position directly entails conclusions that run counter to what is, in that position itself, regarded as an ideal. In this sense, their argument has an important elenctic function and in the end clears the way for the orthodox Epicurean point of view. b) Secondly, the debate on the status of political rhetoric may have helped to temper the traditional enthusiasm for politics. Important in this respect is Metrodorus’ attack against Epicurus’ teacher Nausiphanes14. According to 10 In Non posse 1092E, φιλοκαλία is regarded as the exemplary virtue of the vita activa, just as φιλομαθία serves as paradigmatic quality of the vita contemplativa; cf. also An seni 783C and 786D; Praec. ger. reip. 799A and 822C; De lat. viv. 1129B. 11 A concept such as τὸ καλόν can only be meaningful if it is reoriented towards an Epicurean perspective; cf. Seneca, epist. 2,6 (= fr. 475 Us.); Epist. ad Men. 132; RS 5 = SV 5; A. Long (1986), 302-304. 12 Cf. also Lucretius, 2,16-19; Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 29, ii, 4 – iii, 3 and NF 131, 1-6. 13 (1981), 58-66. 14 In his work Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας λέγοντας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ῥήτορας; fr. 25 K. = Phi-
Epicurus and the epicurean tradition
21
Philodemus15, Metrodorus argued that political rhetoric should not be considered as an art. Moreover, political success in Metrodorus’ view presupposes insight into the public interest (Rhet. II [PHerc. 1672], col. xxii, 18-19 L.A. and Rhet. III, col. xli, 8-9 Ham.) and especially practical experience (Rhet. II [PHerc. 1672], col. xxii, 7-25 L.A.; cf. [PHerc. 1674], col. liv, 2227 L.A.), neither of which can be gained by theoretical study of nature. Philodemus himself adds that such political success is far from certain, since the politician can never be sure about the reactions of the capricious multitude16. Politics, then, turns out to be a risky business. c) Thirdly, politics was probably regarded as the direct way to all kinds of interesting advantages. One should merely recall Stratocles’ and Dromocleides’ characterisation of the speaker’s platform as “the golden harvest” (Plutarch, Praec. ger. reip. 799F-800A). Along such lines, political engagement could be understood as a way of self-realisation and thus ultimately as a means that directly contributes to personal pleasure. For Epicurus, such a view of politics is unconvincing and naive. A careful calculus of pleasure and pain quickly shows that the disadvantages of political engagement far outbalance its advantages. Cicero refers to the wellknown argument from the labores required by a political career at the beginning of his Republic (1,4) and Lucretius makes the same point in the famous proem of book 2, where he regards politics as one arduous and uninterrupted struggle for pre-eminence (2,11-13; cf. also 3,996-997; 5,1124 and 1132). Moreover, politics is dominated by vain passions such as envy (cf. Lucretius, 5,1125-1128), ambition, and discord, and as such proves to be the worst enemy of friendship (Philodemus, Rhet. II, 158, fr. xix, 6 – 159, fr. xix, 22 S.). This argument of Philodemus’ was no doubt crucial for any Epicurean philosopher, given the paramount importance of friendship in Epicureanism, and at the same time was diametrically opposed to the current opinions about politics17. One may add that politics is not merely destructive for friendship but also for personal independence. Political engagement indeed implies being subject to the will of the people and trying to satisfy another’s desires rather than one’s own. This argument, which occurs lodemus, Rhet. II [PHerc. 1674], col. xxvii, 16-19 L.A.; discussion in F. Longo Auricchio – A. Tepedino Guerra (1980). 15 Who, it should be noted, is not necessarily a reliable source; cf. D. Sedley (1989), 108-109 and 117. 16 Cf. Rhet. VIII, II, 17, col. xxiii, 18-19 S.; cf. also Rhet. IV [PHerc. 1007/1673], I, 209, col. xxviiia, 13 - 210, col. xxviiia, 17 S. 17 In Roman politics, the term amicus was used in a fairly broad sense (Q. Cicero, Pet. 16; cf. Cicero, Att. 1,18,1 and Seneca, epist. 3,1). For Plutarch, too, friends have an important part to play in political life. The politician should use them as living and thinking tools in the service of his own political project; Praec. ger. reip. 807D; cf. 806F-809B and 814C-E.
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throughout the whole Epicurean tradition18, indirectly illustrates the great importance which is attached to self-sufficiency (Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 6,2,31 = fr. 476 Us.: πλουσιώτατον αὐτάρκεια πάντων; cf. also Porphyry, Marc. 28). Finally, the Epicureans time and again underlined the great dangers politicians had to undergo (see, e.g., Cicero, rep. 1,4; Lucretius, 5,1124; 2,6; 2,15; Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 2, II, 3-4). Political life turns out to be nothing more than an uninterrupted series of murder (Lucretius 3,70-71), cruel passions (72-73), and treason (83-86). This negative characterisation of political life should correct unjustified idealisations and unreasonable expectations based on them, by providing a sober analysis of daily political praxis and doing away with many of its deceptive façades. d) Yet objections could be raised against Epicurus’ negative judgement of politics. What about political power, for instance? This may even from an Epicurean perspective be regarded as an important advantage, as it can directly contribute to personal security and thus indirectly to pleasure as well. In that sense, political engagement could even be defended on an Epicurean basis. Epicurus’ answer to this possible objection is typical of his nuanced down-to-earth approach: Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦτο οἷός τ’ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι. (RS 6) “In order to get confidence from other men, there was the natural good of public office and kingship, from which one is sometimes able to reach that end.” Epicurus thus agrees that the pursuit of political power can be approved if it contributes to personal security. The same argument is developed more in detail by Torquatus in Cicero’s De finibus (1,34-36; cf. infra 2.2.4b). Nevertheless this is definitely not the best way to reach happiness. Epicurus’ argument should not be understood as protreptic advice but primarily as an interpretative key to the past. This interpretative key also nuances the attractiveness of the brilliant achievements of powerful political predecessors by reorienting them towards an Epicurean perspective. In that sense, the scope of RS 6 is mainly elenctic. Traditional ideals can only be praised to the extent that they can be understood as resulting from a careful calculus of pleasure and pain and thus support the Epicurean view; if not, they should be rejected if not despised. It is clear, then, that the objection will neither force the Epicurean to abandon his position nor to question the general rule 18 See, e.g., SV 67; Lucretius, 5,1133-1134; Philodemus, Rhet. I, 226, fr. ii, 8-12 S. and i, 238, col. viii, 14-17 S.; Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 112.
Epicurus and the epicurean tradition
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of non-participation (cf. also Philodemus, Rhet. I, 254, col. xxi, 3 - 255, col. xxi, 10 S.). Broadly the same is true for the pursuit of honour, which can likewise be regarded as a means to reach security19 and thus pleasure (cf. Plutarch, Non posse 1099F-1100A = fr. 549 Us.). In this case too, Epicurus agrees that security can be acquired through honour, but once again, the emphasis is on the interpretation of the past rather than on paraenetic advice for the future. Moreover, honour sometimes entails more pain than pleasure (Cicero, Tusc. 5,103 = fr. 586 Us.) and in any case is unable to cure disturbance of the soul (SV 81). Lucretius tries to nuance the importance of honour even more by connecting, in the much-discussed proem of book 3, avarice and ambition with fear of death20. This original argument is basically in line with RS 7, although it puts the tenet in a somewhat different light by showing that the pursuit of honour has, in the end, nothing to do with a rational calculus but rather rests upon an irrational and unjustified fear. Additional arguments can finally be found in Philodemus. In his view, ambition has both pragmatic and philosophical disadvantages. It often makes people envious (Rhet. II, 154, fr. xii, 5-15 S.), thus damaging one’s security rather than contributing to it, and no less often interferes with one’s personal moral improvement (De lib. dic. col. xviiib, 1-3; xxiib, 10-13; cf. also col. xviib, 6-13; xxiia, 10-11; xxiiib, 12 – xxivb, 12). It is clear, then, that the Epicureans basically approached honour with the same scepticism as political power: as a rule, neither contributes anything at all to true happiness. e) Yet it should be added that there may occasionally be found a more positive evaluation of politics in the Epicurean tradition. Philodemus notably strikes a somewhat different note by granting to politics its own autonomy. Political life has its own domain with its own characteristic activities, and also requires its own qualifications, that is, training (Rhet. III, col. viia, 23-30 Ham.) and experience in political affairs21. In order to be politically successful, then, one should not have read Plato’s Timaeus or Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but be thoroughly familiar with the different phases of political decision-making, similar precedents, and relevant jurisprudence. 19 See esp. RS 7; cf. Cicero, fin. 1,34-35 and 52-53; Philodemus, De adul. [PHerc. 222], col. iv, 4-7 Garg. According to M. Erler (1992a), 195-198, and (1992b), 315-317, the last passage is influenced by the Roman ideal of gloria, but in my view, the passage is basically in line with RS 7. 20 J. Perret (1940) argues that Lucretius’ position is rooted in contemporary political circumstances; see, however, A. Desmouliez (1958) and W. Schmid (1978), 140-151. P. H. Schrijvers (1970), 288-290 connects the argument to the importance of imagination in Epicurus’ thinking. 21 Rhet. II [PHerc. 1674], col. xxxvi, 7-23 L.A. and II [PHerc. 1672], col. xxi, 36 col. xxii, 5 L.A.; cf. also II [PHerc. 1674], col. xx, 20 - col. xxi, 11 L.A.; VIII, I, 284, col. iii, 2-13 S.
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Although this might seem an evident position to us, one should not underestimate its philosophical importance. First of all, one should note that ancient philosophers usually did not think along these lines. Both Plato and the Stoics, for instance, were convinced that politics most of all required philosophical understanding. Secondly, Philodemus’ view enables him to discuss politics in a sober and unbiased way. He can evaluate politics on its own standards, without having to start from philosophical aprioris. That this position entails many advantages appears from Philodemus’ polemic against the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. The latter defends the typically Stoic tenets that the only successful politician is the philosopher (Rhet. II, 226, col. xxi, 15-19 S. = SVF 3, Diog. 125), that only the Stoa produces good citizens (II, 227, col. xxi, 28-30 S.), and that all other politicians are radically bad22. It is clear that Diogenes’ view is strongly conditioned by several basic presuppositions of Stoic philosophy23. In his reply, Philodemus strongly underlines the autonomy of politics. This enables him to approach political history in a more positive and far less prejudiced way. He even claims that history will bear him out (II, 209, col. vi, 28-30 S.). This more positive view of politics does not imply, however, that Philodemus was inclined to recommend political engagement to the Epicurean philosopher. From a philosophical point of view, he fully endorsed the advice of λάθε βιώσας24. Yet he refrained from easy generalisations or apodictic aprioris, and one may presume that his nuanced and unbiased analysis of political life added to his credibility among politicians and fellow Epicureans alike. 1.2.1.2. Epicurus was no less critical of politicians than of politics and, once again, his elenctic criticism was presumably at odds with standard convictions. It is likely indeed that most of Epicurus’ contemporaries regarded the career of famous statesmen or legislators as the classic example of a successful and happy life25. a) Such a view is unconvincing in an Epicurean perspective. Epicurus himself vehemently criticised Epameinondas (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1127AB 22 Philodemus, Rhet. II, 208, col. vi, 9-16 S. (= SVF 3, Diog. 115); II, 224, col. xviii, 29-32 S. (= SVF 3, Diog. 124); II, 225, col. xix, 30-31 S.; II, 225, col. xx, 15-18 S. 23 That is, the radical dichotomy between good and bad, which implies that anyone who is not yet perfect is utterly bad; cf. O. Luschnat (1958) and G. Roskam (2005a). See on Diogenes’ position also D. Obbink – P.A. Vander Waerdt (1991). 24 See, e.g., Rhet. VIII, II, 35, col. xxxviii, 8-12 S.; De Epic. [PHerc. 1232], col. xxviii, 12-15 T.G.; cf. Rhet. I, 234, col. iv, 17-19 S; II, 298, fr. iii S.; De lib. dic. col. ib, 5-6; Rhet., PHerc. 463, fr. 13 (published by F. Longo Auricchio (1982), 73; see also Ead. (2004), 37-39). 25 Cf. K.J. Dover (1974), 226-234 and L.B. Carter (1986), 1-25, on political offices and public honours as components of the popular traditional morality.
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= fr. 560 Us.) and probably also Miltiades and Themistocles (Cicero, rep. 1,5 and Plutarch, Non posse 1097C = fr. 559 Us.), whereas Diogenes of Oenoanda attacked Alexander the Great (fr. 51, i, 5-12 and NF 131, 9-11). According to the Epicurean view, none of these famous politicians knew how to apply the rational calculus of pleasure and pain. They lost their independence, spared no pains in trying to satisfy their unnecessary desires, and continuously postponed pleasure in their attempt to gain time26. In a famous digression in book 3, Lucretius compares the politician to Sisyphus. In assuming the efforts of a political career, he has to roll his own rock up the hill and cannot but observe how it almost inevitably rolls down again (3,995-1002)27. This allegory obviously excludes the possibility that the politician attains his political goal. Even if he for a moment reaches the top (1001: summo vertice), the fruit of all his efforts (999: durum laborem) immediately comes to nothing. Lucretius’ position can be explained partly by the demands of the myth, partly by the contemporary political situation in Rome28, and to a certain extent proves more radical than that of Epicurus, who did not exclude in principle that the politician can be successful (cf. RS 6 and 7). Yet Epicurus in general likewise remained fairly sceptical about the politician’s chances of success. Political engagement in any case remains a risky business, and history shows that politicians all too frequently met an unhappy end (cf. Cicero, rep. 1,4-6). Philodemus underlines that they were tortured and executed, often for strange and insignificant reasons29. They were slaughtered, as it were, like cattle (Rhet. I, 234, col. v, 6 - 235, col. v, 15 S.). This rhetorical comparison is particularly efficient, in that it radically unmasks unrealistic political ideals. A beginning politician may often launch ambitious projects and dream of public honour, but the actual fruits of his ambition are often much more prosaic: he is merely slaughtered like a beast – an eye-opening conclusion, to say the least. b) Such arguments should reduce the attractiveness of the traditional ideals. Famous statesmen of the past and the present should not be regarded as examples worthy of emulation. The same holds true for the philosophers who try to imitate them. Metrodorus, for instance, attacked in his work On J. Salem (1989), 67-70. There has been a great deal of discussion about the sources of this passage; see F. Cumont (1920) (a Neopythagorean source); P. Boyancé (1963), 179-181 (the Stoicising Academy in the tradition of Antiochus of Ascalon); B.P. Wallach (1976), 90 (a combination of a technique used by the diatribe with Epicurean themes). However that may be, Lucretius’ allegory in any case does not run counter to the orthodox Epicurean position. 28 Cf. D. West (1969), 102. 29 Rhet. I, 234, col. iv, 8-15 S.; II, 147, fr. iv, 4-17 S. and II, 151, fr. viii, 16-23 S.; cf. De morte col. xxxv, 1-5. 26 27
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philosophy certain sages (τῶν σοφῶν τινες)30 who tried to imitate Lycurgus and Solon in their discourses on lives and on virtue (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1127B = fr. 31 K.). In Metrodorus’ view, these philosophers gave evidence of great vanity (δαψίλεια τύφου). Their authority, then, is not undermined on intellectual but on moral grounds. Even a philosopher like Socrates, who never actively engaged in politics but nonetheless participated in his own way in public life (cf. Xenophon, Mem. 1,1,10: ἀεὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ; cf. also Dio of Prusa, 54,3), should not be imitated. He, too, experienced the disadvantages of a political career and was in the end executed (Philodemus, De piet. col. 59,2-18). Neither politicians nor public-spirited philosophers qualify as examples worthy of imitation. If one needs such examples, one can primarily find them in the Epicurean tradition: Epicurus himself, the other scholarchs, and different members of the community. c) It is important to add, though, that Epicurus avoided rash generalisations in his criticism of politicians as well. Once again his position proves to be more nuanced. Ancient legislators are highly esteemed in Epicurean philosophy, since they have greatly benefited their community31, and politicians can also be praised if their actions were motivated by a rational calculus of pleasure and pain (cf. Cicero, fin. 1,34-36). On this point too, Epicurus’ view rests on a careful evaluation of separate cases rather than on abstract aprioris. An even more positive tone is to be found in Philodemus’ Rhetoric. By granting to politics its own autonomy (cf. supra, 1.2.1.1e), he can judge the politician on the latter’s own standards. Consequently, whereas Diogenes of Babylon tries to demonstrate that nearly all politicians are bad, Philodemus argues that there are many examples of politicians who gave excellent advice and were of great benefit to their cities (Rhet. II, 209, col. vi, 19-28 S. and II, 224, col. xix, 9-20 S.). Philodemus finds no difficulty in appreciating the politicians’ contributions to the public interest. His apolitical philosophy does not force him to brush aside all of the positive aspects of the politician’s achievements. On the other hand, Philodemus’ acknowledgement of these 30 E. Bignone (1973), II, 56-58 and R. Westman (1955), 214 identify Metrodorus’ opponents as Plato and his followers; B. Einarson – P.H. De Lacy (1967), 310, note e as Diogenes the Cynic, and A. Angeli (1993), 23 and M. Erler (1994b), 219-220 as Diogenes and Zeno of Citium. One might also think of the Peripatetics (cf. Philodemus, Rhet. ii, 276, fr. x, 25-29 S.), although it is equally possible that Metrodorus did not direct his attack at one specific (school of) philosopher(s). 31 Cf. Colotes’ position in Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1124D, and Hermarchus’ conviction in Porphyry, Abst. 1,8,2 and 1,10,2 (= Hermarchus, fr. 34 L.A.); see also Lucretius, 5,1106-1107 and 1143-1160, and R. Westman (1955), 214 on the above mentioned passage from Metrodorus’ On philosophy.
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positive aspects need not imply that he regards the politician as an example worthy of imitation. In his view, too, the paragon for the philosopher remains Epicurus rather than Pericles. 1.2.1.3. The complement of the traditional ideal of a great reputation during life is that of an honourable death and posthumous fame. A brilliant political career should culminate in a conspicuous death. When Hector is staring death in the face, he expresses the wish not to die ingloriously (ἀκλειῶς) but, rather, after having accomplished some great deed that will remain famous among future generations (Homer, Il. 22,304-305). This ideal of a heroic death remained attractive for centuries and Plutarch still claims that it would, in principle, be pursued by everyone (Non posse 1099AB). Epicurus came to a radically different conclusion, however. His elenctic arguments against political engagement remain true for the last hours of one’s life and then even become especially important. At this moment, there can be no room for ambitious projects that entail arduous efforts without leading to personal pleasure. The fact that there will be no afterlife once one has dissolved into atoms (RS 2 = SV 2) makes it indeed more urgently necessary to enjoy the pleasures of life during one’s last hours. A similar conclusion can be found in the extant part of the fourth book of Philodemus’ De morte. The elenctic function of Philodemus’ argument appears throughout the whole book, where erroneous opinions regarding death and dying are introduced and rejected one after the other. As regards the traditional ideal of a heroic, conspicuous death, Philodemus provides different arguments in order to cast doubt on its attractiveness. First of all, he refers to the Epicurean doctrine of ἀναισθησία, one of the Leitmotive throughout the whole book: after death, we are no longer able to notice our posthumous fame (col. xxviii, 5-14 and 32-36). Secondly, this insight directly implies a new criterion to judge the way of dying. This criterion should not be the heroic or ordinary character of the cause of death, but the degree of pain it entails before death (col. xxviii, 14-32). Furthermore, few people actually meet a heroic death (col. xxviii, 36 – col. xxix, 2) nor is such a heroic death a necessary condition for posthumous fame: Themistocles and Pericles both died in bed (as did Epicurus and Metrodorus) but became famous nevertheless, whereas countless soldiers who bravely died in battle remained unknown (col. xxix, 2-15). Philodemus’ argument thus provides a cure for the irrational fear of death and the empty desires for posthumous fame that this fear entails. At the same time, it clears the way for a more sober and rational view, which enables one to really enjoy the pleasures of life. 1.2.1.4. In conclusion, Epicurus and his followers try to show that the traditional ideals make people seriously ill. Their disease prevents them from being happy and urges them on to seek happiness where it cannot be found.
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A great number of elenctic arguments have to convince people of their bad condition and of the truth of Epicurus’ diagnosis. When this ἔλεγχος has laid bare the need for a cure, the process of recovery can really start32. At the same time, Epicurus’ elenctic arguments already contain the seeds of his own positive alternative. This alternative is developed more in detail in the pole of νουθέτησις. 1.2.2. νουθέτησις Epicurus’ philosophy of Seelenheilung was not merely negative but also provided much positive advice about the way to reach happiness. The maxim λάθε βιώσας, and its complement λάθε ἀποβιώσας, belong to this positive pole of νουθέτησις, clarifying as they do an important aspect of Epicurus’ own ideal which has to do away with the misery caused by widespread and traditional convictions. a) First of all, one has to abandon empty ideals such as τὸ καλόν, in order to focus on oneself and one’s real needs. This implies a self-imposed limitation of one’s desires33. Attention should primarily be given to desires that are both natural and necessary, and since such desires are also easy to satisfy, most of one’s troubles will immediately belong to the past. Ambitious political projects are no longer necessary to fulfil vain desires: the Epicurean can quietly enjoy his pleasures in the undisturbed peace of his private life. b) Moreover, an ‘unnoticed life’ will contribute much to one’s personal security. It is true that such security can occasionally also be gained through political power (RS 6) or honour (RS 7), but Epicurus makes it perfectly clear that he regards the choice for a sequestered life as a far better alternative: Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια. (RS 14) “Even though security from other people comes to a certain extent by means of the power to repel [attacks] and by means of prosperity, the purest security is that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many.” (transl. B. Inwood – L.P. Gerson, strongly modified) The Epicurean ideal of ἡσυχία and ἐκχώρησις τῶν πολλῶν is thus presented as Cf. Seneca, epist. 28,9 = fr. 522 Us.: initium est salutis notitia peccati. For the importance of limitation in Epicurean philosophy, see Ph. De Lacy (1969) and J. Salem (1989), 83-99. 32 33
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the adequate road to the purest security. This idea is often repeated throughout the Epicurean tradition. Philodemus, for instance, argues that a philosopher avoids the hatred of other people by living in rest, justice, and tried friendship (Rhet. II, 162, fr. xxvii, 7-14 S.). A sequestered life helps both in avoiding a trial, as is illustrated by Epicurus’ own life (De piet. col. 53,4 – col. 54,27), and in defending oneself in court (Rhet. II, 140, fr. xi, 12-15 S.). Moreover, by living an ‘unnoticed life’ one is able to avoid βλάβαι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων. Such harm is usually caused by envy, hatred, or contempt34, and is often suffered by politicians and by all who enter into public life. The best way to avoid such βλάβαι consists in taking care not to offend. This is a constant refrain in Epicurean authors. Epicurus himself already argued that the sage should work towards a good reputation, though only insofar as not to be contemned (Diog. Laert. 10,120 = fr. 573 Us.). He recommended Idomeneus to take into account the customs and opinions of other people if opposing them would entail harm35, and advised to make akin to oneself the things that one can, while in any case avoiding making the rest alien to oneself (RS 39). Metrodorus advocates a similar message in more metaphorical language: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεῖται, τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται. (Stobaeus, 4,4,26 = fr. 60 K.) “Do not behave in the city as a lion, nor as a gnat. For men avoid the one, and lie in wait for an opportunity against the other.” The lion and the gnat both in their own way offend, the former by his arrogance, the latter by uninterruptedly bothering everybody. Neither will succeed in adding to their security by winning over other people. On the contrary, the one is avoided, the other destroyed. Accordingly, they cannot serve as examples worthy of imitation. This argument most interestingly shows that Epicurus’ well-known provocative tenets36 are counterbalanced by a certain caution and a leaning toward conformism. The same tendency can be found in Philodemus. In his De oeconomia, he underlines more than once that the way one acquires money should be with respect for social decorum. A landowner can earn his income while having 34 Cf. Diog. Laert. 10,117 = fr. 536 Us.; cf. also Cicero, fin. 1,67; Seneca, epist. 14,10 and 105,1-4. 35 Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1127D, with the interpretation of R. Westman (1955), 189192. 36 Such as ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή (Athenaeus, 7, 280a and 12, 546f = fr. 409 Us.; see T. Gargiulo (1982) for a good discussion) or προσπτύω τῷ καλῷ καὶ τοῖς κενῶς αὐτὸ θαυμάζουσιν, ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἡδονὴν ποιῇ (Athenaeus, 12, 547a = fr. 512 Us.).
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the work done by others. This alternative does not merely enable one to enjoy all the pleasures of a sequestered life among friends but also implies an income that is highly respectable among temperate people (παρὰ τοῖς σώφροσιν εὐσχημονεστάτην πρόσοδον; col. xxiii, 9-18). Another respectable (οὐκ ἄσχημον) way to earn one’s income is to acquire it through a tenement or through slaves or persons exercising reputable arts (τέχνας [...] μηδαμῶς ἀπρεπεῖς; col. xxiii, 18-22). This illustrates the same concern to avoid unseemly behaviour. One may add, moreover, that Philodemus’ nuanced view of politics and politicians may at least partly be explained by his concern to avoid offending the aristocratic circles he frequented. Diogenes of Oenoanda, finally, may have been motivated by the same concern to erect his Epicurean inscription. Without a doubt, he belonged to the rich upper-class of his society. Therefore, a refusal to engage in politics and spend his money for the public interest, albeit motivated by rational Epicurean arguments, could have made him quite unpopular in his relatively small hometown. It cannot be excluded that such considerations may have influenced his decision to benefit his city in a way that was both in line with his own philosophical convictions and satisfied his fellow citizens. c) There are still other advantages which an ‘unnoticed life’ yields to the Epicurean. It contributes to his independence and self-sufficiency and enables him to enjoy the pleasures of his quiet life among friends and neighbours37. In such a context, all conditions for tranquillity of mind are fulfilled. One may recall Lucretius’ famous image of the sage who looks down from his edita templa, which are bene munita, on the multitude of unhappy fools (2,7-10). Such images give the Epicurean message a strongly protreptic component, depicting the pleasures of the Epicurean way of life in all their attractiveness. No less protreptic is the example of Epicurus himself. In one of his letters, he claimed that Metrodorus and he himself were so happy that they were not harmed by remaining unknown in Greece (Seneca, epist. 79,15 = fr. 188 Us. and Metrodorus, test. 23 K.). Epicurus thus introduces himself, together with Metrodorus, as a concrete example that can be imitated by everyone38. They have consistently lived according to their own philosophy and demonstrated that their ideal can indeed be realised and leads to happiness. Centuries later, Diogenes of Oenoanda makes essentially the same claim by underlining that the medicines which he offers have been put to the test (fr. 3, VI, 2-4).
The orientation towards neighbours (RS 40: ὁμορούντων, and SV 67: τοῦ πλησίον) illustrates the typically Epicurean preference for a confined circle of acquaintances. 38 On the importance of imitation and emulation in the Garden, see D. Clay (1983b), 264-270. 37
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d) One of Epicurus’ elenctic strategies consists in demonstrating that the widespread traditional ideals were often at odds with what they themselves regarded as important, that is, the public interest (cf. supra, 1.2.1.1a). This strategy also has its complement in Epicurus’ νουθέτησις, namely, the argument that Epicurus’ philosophy in its own way leads to the realisation of traditional ideals. Different Epicureans indeed argued explicitly or indirectly that their philosophy could contribute to the public interest. They are neither subversive nor anarchistic, but rather teach the young to always obey the laws (Philodemus, Rhet. II, 155, fr. xiii, 9-19 S.). Lucretius explicitly promotes parere quietum as his ideal (5,1129-1130). Colotes even argued that conformity to the doctrines of other philosophers actually makes life impossible and at the end of his work applied this thesis also to the domain of politics (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1124D). The implication of his work, dedicated most likely to Ptolemy II 39, is that only the Epicurean philosopher respects and guarantees social and political order. According to Philodemus, the Epicurean philosopher also has a part to play as adviser to the politician. For it will be advantageous to the city that its politicians are virtuous (Rhet. III, col. xiva, 30 – col. xva, 16 Ham.), and in order to reach virtue, these politicians should turn to the philosopher (col. xva, 16-21 Ham.), who should give them general and more specific moral advice suitable for political administration (col. xva, 22-31 Ham.). Philodemus’ treatise De bono rege in this respect perfectly illustrates the kind of advice Philodemus has in mind. One should note that this argument need not run counter to the autonomy of politics. The philosopher in principle has to respect the politician’s autonomy, but may give inspiring advice that can contribute both to the politician’s project and to the social stability needed by the philosopher to reach tranquillity of mind. All of these arguments show that the Epicurean position can also be useful for the state. Such a conclusion is only of secondary importance in an Epicurean perspective, to be sure. The orthodox Epicurean is primarily concerned with his own happiness, rather than with the well-being of the state. It may win these persons over, however, who attach great importance to the social perspective (and, one may add, it also provides a reply to the polemical attacks on the parasitic character of Epicurus’ philosophy). e) Moreover, Epicurus did not refrain from offering more specific and practical instruction. He, for instance, advised Idomeneus regarding how to leave public life (cf. Seneca, epist. 22,5-6 = fr. 133 Us.). His advice gives evidence of his sober sense of realism, which once again avoids rash conclusions. Philosophical aprioris about the need to abandon the political scene as quickly as possible (ut quantum potest fugiat et properet) are adapted in a meaningful way to the concrete circumstances: Idomeneus should only take W. Crönert (1906), 13 and R. Westman (1955), 41.
39
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action at the καιρός, when his attempt is likely to be successful (cum apte poterit tempestiveque temptari). A similar concern for the feasibility of the Epicurean ideal in concrete practice can be found in Philodemus’ De oeconomia. In this work, the theoretical arguments in support of a sequestered life are completed by more concrete advice regarding the financial implications of such an ideal. This more practically-oriented component of the Epicurean νουθέτησις not only adds to the credibility and feasibility of the Epicurean way of life, but also illustrates that the concrete needs and questions of members and prospective members of the Garden were taken seriously by their leading figures. f) Finally, the theme of an unnoticed death as the consistent consequence of an unnoticed life probably also received attention in Epicurean νουθέτησις. About this positive advice of λάθε ἀποβιώσας we have only little information, however, since the extant part of Philodemus’ De morte, as has been said, mainly deals with the negative, elenctic aspect. Only occasionally does Philodemus refer to the ideal of a quiet death among friends (col. xxviii, 28-29; cf. also col. xxvii, 1-8). But the correct attitude towards death and dying was probably also illustrated by more concrete examples. Metrodorus showed the right way to die (Diog. Laert. 10,23 = test. 1 K.), Philistas the correct way to watch over a friend’s deathbed (Carneiscus, col. xxi, 7-9 C.). Above all, the right way to die can be inferred from Epicurus’ famous last letter, which shows that the master was until the very last moment, and even while suffering excruciating pain, focusing on his pleasure and on the means to reach that end. Few would doubt that this example had even more persuasive force than the pithy rhetoric of the maxim λάθε ἀποβιώσας. 1.3. Three further characteristics of Epicurus’ psychagogical approach Epicurus’ ideal of an ‘unnoticed life’ is thus based on a whole series of interrelated theoretical arguments. These arguments both reveal the need to be cured and to contribute to the actual cure itself. They are not the only means to reach the psychotherapeutic goal, however. Their efficiency is enhanced by several other elements. 1.3.1. The powers of rhetoric. In spite of the orthodox Epicurean tenet that the sage will not make beautiful speeches (οὐ ῥητορεύσειν καλῶς; Diog. Laert. 10,118 = fr. 565 Us.), Epicurus was not blind to the powers of rhetoric. The formulation of the maxim λάθε βιώσας already forms a striking illustration of the importance of the rhetorical component in Epicurean Seelenheilung. Its extreme conciseness strikes the mind40 and not only makes it far easier to memorise but also focuses all attention on what is really essential. All super Cf. Seneca, epist. 94,27-28 and 43; I. Hadot (1969), 16-17.
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fluous information is omitted and the two remaining terms accurately denote the precise meaning and scope of the advice. The emphasis is on λάθε, but hardly less on βιώσας: it is not just a specific behaviour or action but a whole life that is concerned. One may note in passing that probably as a result of this rhetorical effect the motif later became part of a literary tradition. In Horace, the motif of the ‘unnoticed life’ twice occurs in a context that can still be connected with Epicurean philosophy (epist. 1,17,10 and 1,18,103). In Ovid (trist. 3,4a,25) and Philostratus (VA 8,28), the link with Epicureanism has already disappeared, and in Neoplatonism, the ideal is ascribed to a Pythagorean or gnomic tradition41. It should be noted that Epicurus’ attention to the advantages of a rhetorical phrasing is no less obvious in his ἔλεγχος than in his νουθέτησις. A case in point is SV 58: ’Εκλυτέον ἑαυτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια καὶ πολιτικὰ δεσμωτηρίου. “They must free themselves from the prison of daily duties and politics.” The imagery of the term δεσμωτήριον summarises in a beautiful and adequate way a whole series of elenctic arguments about political engagement, recalling as it does the politician’s lack of self-sufficiency and independence with all the pains and efforts it entails, and his dependence on the future42. It thus expresses in a concise way the core of Epicurus’ argument. It is not unlikely that for this reason it was inserted into the collection of Sententiae Vaticanae. Similarly, the above-mentioned image of the lion and the gnat in Metrodorus’ work provides a beautiful concretisation of Epicurus’ more abstract RS 39, and as such has important pedagogical advantages. One may add that striking passages from traditional literature were often quoted and re-interpreted in the light of the Epicurean ideal43. Lucretius even used poetry as a therapeutic means, comparing the elegance of his verses to honey on the rim of a cup full of bitter wormwood (1,935-950). 1.3.2. Radicalising frankness. The importance of frankness in the process of Seelenheilung primarily appears from Philodemus’ Περὶ παρρησίας, but is not absent from Epicurus either (SV 29). This is again illustrated by the maxim λάθε βιώσας, which runs counter to widespread convictions and even turns See Marinus, Procl. 15.29-32; Suda III, 228.4-7 and IV, 324.3-6 Adler; Macarius 5,47 (CPG II,183). 42 Cf. also D. Puliga (1983), 257, on the maxim λάθε βιώσας as an attempt to avoid the tyranny of time. 43 See M. Erler (1997) and (2006) on Epicurean interpretatio medicans. 41
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them upside down. It is not the criminal who should hide himself but the sage, and this hiding does not concern one specific action but one’s whole life. A similar radicalisation can be found in Metrodorus’ notorious statement that we should not save the Greeks but merely eat and drink, and gratify the belly without harming it (Plutarch, Non posse 1098CD and 1100D; Adv. Colot. 1125D = fr. 41 K.). Sedley suggests that these radical words are merely the product of a polemical misrepresentation by Timocrates44, but in my view they should rather be regarded as a verbatim quotation and understood in a pedagogical and psychagogical context. They are an adequate, albeit radical, expression of the essence of Epicurus’ message and form a remarkable illustration of Metrodorus’ famous frankness in a psychotherapeutic context (cf. Philodemus, De lib. dic. fr. 15,6-10 and col. vb, 1-6). The same tendency towards radicalisation occurs in Lucretius as well. We already saw that he compared the politician to Sisyphus and came to the conclusion that he could never reach his goal (3,998 and 1001-1002). In book 5, he emphasises even more strongly that ambitious political projects are of no more avail in the present than in the future or in the past (5,1135: nec magis id nunc est neque erit mox quam fuit ante). One should note that Lucretius shows himself in this more radical than Epicurus45, who as a rule avoided such absolute and apodictic statements. 1.3.3. Personal approach. In the context of Seelenheilung, Epicurus preferred face-to-face conversation to a more numerous audience (cf. Seneca, epist. 7,11 = fr. 208 Us.)46, and his followers adopted the same view. Diogenes of Oenoanda, for instance, addresses all passers-by, even all Greeks and barbarians (fr. 32, II, 11-12) and future generations (fr. 3, IV, 13 – v, 4), but he makes it clear that this is only a δεύτερος πλοῦς, caused by the general illness of the great majority of people. If only a limited number of persons suffered from that disease, he would have addressed them individually and cured them one by one (fr. 3, III, 5 – IV, 3). That the maxim λάθε βιώσας was also directed to one person, perhaps in the broader context of Seelenheilung, clearly appears from the aorist imperative λάθε47. This does not imply of course that other people could not (1976), 132. Cf. D.N. Sedley (1998), esp. 62-93, on Lucretius as a ‘fundamentalist’; contra C. Lévy (1999). 46 Cf. also M. Nussbaum (1986), 41-43. 47 Pace C.J. Ruijgh (2000), who tries to explain the aorist imperative by means of the view of the ancient grammarians: “D’après l’analyse des grammairiens grecs, l’expression λάθε βιώσας vise au moment futur où l’on pourrait constater qu’un homme ἔλαθε βιώσας ‘a vécu en cachette’” (p. 327). It is much easier, however, to suppose that the maxim should be traced back to one of Epicurus’ letters (and was thus directed to only one person, that 44 45
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follow the same advice. Epicurus’ letters address both individual persons and the broader public of fellow Epicureans (καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ; fr. [59] 2Arr.; cf. Epist. ad Her. 37 and Epist. ad Pyth. 85). Yet the original context of the maxim may well have been one of personal, private advice. Such a personal approach has two important consequences. First, Epicurus’ moral advice can never be generalised in an absolute way. It can in all likelihood be applied to the great majority of people, but there may always be exceptions to the general rule (cf. infra, 1.4). Second, Epicurus often takes into account the personal convictions of his addressee and the concrete situation in which the latter finds himself48. If possible, he even tries to adopt these convictions after reorienting them towards his own Epicurean perspective. This appears from another interesting fragment from a letter to Idomeneus: Si gloria tangeris, notiorem te epistulae meae facient quam omnia ista, quae colis et propter quae coleris. (Seneca, epist. 21,3 = fr. 132 Us.) “If you are attracted by fame, my letters will make you more renowned than all the things which you cherish and which make you cherished.” (transl. R.M. Gummere) From the Epicurean point of view, the pursuit of fame should be regarded as an unnatural and unnecessary desire, which usually entails much more pain than pleasure. On the other hand, Epicurus may have realised that fame was not unimportant to Idomeneus and that his addressee was not yet free from his empty desire. For that reason, he does not abruptly reject all striving for fame but rather prefers to neutralise its possible disadvantages by introducing it into his own perspective. A somewhat similar argument can be found in Metrodorus, who guarantees that all future Epicureans can be sure of a magnum paratumque nomen (Seneca, epist. 79,16 = fr. 43 K.). Again, traditional – and erroneous – ideals are thus used as a protreptic argument in support of the Epicurean perspective. An echo of the same approach can finally be found in Plutarch’s characterisation of Epicurus and his followers as those who say that the crown of an untroubled condition is incomparable to great leadership (τὸν τῆς ἀταραξίας στέφανον ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις; Adv. Colot. 1125C = fr. 556 Us.). As a general rule, the pursuit of crowns should once again be regarded as an unnecessary desire. It may be approved, however, if is, the addressee); cf. H. Usener (1881), lxiii-lxiv and 326; cf. also H. Steckel (1968), 592. 48 One may recall his above-mentioned advice to Idomeneus on the question of how to abandon political life, which takes into account the latter’s situation as a politician (supra, 1.2.2e).
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it concerns a special crown, that is, the one of Epicurean tranquillity of mind49. In this case too, Epicurus takes as his point of departure widespread ideals which have a great attraction for his addressee, in order to neutralise them and reorient them towards his own philosophical perspective. It is clear that such an approach may yield interesting pedagogical advantages and moreover gives evidence of a certain respect for the patient under therapy. 1.4. Qualifications and restrictions: φρόνησις at work 1.4.1. There can be little doubt about the paramount importance of philosophy in Epicurean Seelenheilung. It offers the systematic and efficient cure that is necessary for tranquillity of mind and as such is the necessary condition par excellence for happiness. It is quite remarkable, then, that Epicurus nevertheless argues that there is yet something more precious than philosophy, that is, φρόνησις (Epist. ad Men. 132). In the end, decisions about one’s concrete course of life should not be based on philosophical theoretical arguments but on sober analysis of reality and sound judgement of the present situation. This position is the consequence of Epicurus’ fundamental choice of pleasure as the final goal. Maximisation of pleasure should then be pursued by means of a rational calculus, which precisely is the task of φρόνησις. This results in what I would call a philosophy of qualifying. Epicurus usually avoids absolute and apodictic generalisations and takes care to qualify his arguments. General rules are completed by provisos50 or contain in themselves qualifying terms51. The great number of similar qualifications in Epicurus’ works illustrates the paramount importance of φρόνησις. Philosophy offers broader advice which can provide general orientation, but it will in the end be φρόνησις which has to determine whether or not the general rule is valid for the concrete circumstances of the moment. The decisive factor thus always remains the rational judgement of the specific situation at hand. 1.4.2. As a direct result, Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy never loses sight of the contemporary political circumstances and the advice of λάθε βιώσας itself Or that of poetry; cf. Lucretius, 6,95 (and 1,117-119 on Ennius). For instance SV 21 (we should satisfy our necessary and natural desires if they bring no harm: ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι) or SV 51 (one may indulge in sexual intercourse if one does not break the laws or good customs nor cause pain to one’s neighbour nor wear out one’s body nor waste what is necessary for livelihood). 51 For instance Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1125C = fr. 554 Us. (λέγειν δεῖ πῶς ἄριστα τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος συντηρήσει καὶ πῶς τις ἑκὼν εἶναι μὴ πρόσεισιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πληθῶν ἀρχάς); Diog. Laert. 10,120 = fr. 564 Us. (ἀναγνώσεσθαι ἐν πλήθει, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑκόντα); ibid. = fr. 590 Us. (ὑπὲρ φίλου ποτὲ τεθνήξεσθαι); ibid. = fr. 577 Us. (μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν). 49
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is closely connected with a specific historical context. It is neither a timeless truth which transcends history nor the gate to an irrational dream world52 or an idyllic Arcadia, but is based on a sober analysis and evaluation of the contemporary political situation. Epicurus usually kept track of political events53, just as Philodemus was presumably doing, and Lucretius often refers in fairly unambiguous terms to the political troubles at the end of the Roman Republic54. Later Diogenes of Oenoanda proves to be thoroughly familiar with the contemporary political system of euergetism, which he cleverly reorients towards his own Epicurean perspective. The Epicureans were no otherworldly thinkers, but tried to acquire an accurate and realistic view of the day-to-day reality in order to derive as much pleasure from it as possible. This close connection with the historical situation implies that it cannot be excluded a priori that there are moments in history when the advice to ‘live unnoticed’ is no longer valid. In the primitive age, for instance, living unnoticed would have harmed one’s security, since one would have been exposed to the threat of beasts and hostile people (Porphyry, Abst. 1,10,3 = Hermarchus, fr. 34 L.A.). It is only at a later stage, when this threat had been eliminated and vain desires had arisen, that living an ‘unnoticed life’ became a meaningful ideal (cf. Lucretius, 5,1113-1135). This further implies that there can in principle also be periods in the future when the general rule should be questioned. Again, this will be the task of φρόνησις. The importance of this point will appear in due course (cf. infra, 2.2.5; cf. also 2.3.3b). 1.4.3. Attention should finally be given to the famous passage in Seneca’s De otio, where he points to Epicurus’ doctrine that in exceptional cases the Epicurean sage should engage in politics: Epicurus ait: “Non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit”. (dial. 8,3,2-3 = fr. 9 Us.; cf. also Cicero, rep. 1,10 and 1,11) “Epicurus says: ‘The wise man will not engage in public affairs unless something occurs’ ”. (transl. J.W. Basore, modified) Pace G. Castelli (1969), 20. To give but one example, he was informed about the presence of the Stoics Persaeus and Philonides at Antigonus’ court (Diog. Laert. 7,9 = fr. 119 Us.); cf. further H. Steckel (1968), 591-592 and M.L. Silvestre (1995). 54 See, e.g., 2,11-13; 3,70; 3,996-1002; D.P. Fowler (1989), 134-135 and 137-140; on the vague phrase patriai tempore iniquo, see esp. M. Erler (1994c), 400 (“In diesem Zusammenhang wird bisweilen auf das Proömium des ersten Buches (bes. I 41: patriai tempore iniquo) hingewiesen und diese Aussage mit den innenpolitischen Zuständen in Verbindung gebracht, doch ist das nur eine Hypothese”), and G.O. Hutchinson (2001), with further bibliography. 52 53
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The precise meaning of the vague phrase si quid intervenerit is far from clear. It has usually been interpreted as a reference to an extreme political emergency. The Epicurean philosopher will enter political life when the state risks to be ruined and social stability destroyed55. Sedley adds that the Epicurean can in such emergency situations also be motivated by “an overriding sense of obligation” to his non-philosophical fellow-citizens56. There are many objections that can be raised against the commonly accepted interpretation, however. A simple calculus of pleasure and pain quickly shows that it entails much less trouble to live unnoticed, even under such extreme circumstances, than to be in the eye of the political storm57. Philodemus underlines against Aristotle that one can even be happy under a bad government (Rhet. VIII, II, 51, fr. 37, 3-6 S. and II, 63, col. lvii, 11-16 S.), and argues that one should observe even laws that are arbitrarily made, or else if one is convinced that one is unable to live well under these laws, one has to leave that place (ἢ μεταβαίνειν ἐκ τῶν τόπων, ἐὰν μὴ καλῶς ζῆν οἴωνται; Rhet. I, 259, col. xxiv, 33-39 S.). Similarly, L. Piso declared that he would depart from Italy if Antony destroyed the republic (Cicero, Phil. 12,14). It is clear that this position is much more in line with the spirit of orthodox Epicureanism, and makes the traditional interpretation extremely unlikely. In order to acquire a better understanding of Epicurus’ position, one may have a quick look at the history of the Garden, and try to find out when the Epicureans indeed engaged in politics and for what reason, and when and why they rather preferred to stick to their sequestered life. One may presume of course that when they stayed in their Garden, they merely adopted the orthodox arguments. A case in point is Statilius, who refused to get into trouble for the sake of fools (Plutarch, Brut. 12,3). Occasionally, however, their decision to stay away from politics is problematic, even from an Epicurean perspective. The most interesting example is their absence from the famous embassy of philosophers that the Athenians sent to Rome in 155 B.C. This absence can of course be explained as a consistent application of the general Epicurean doctrine of μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι, but in such circumstances, φρόνησις should also play its part. By refraining from delegating a member of their school to the embassy, the Epicureans made it perfectly clear that they were the only important philosophical school that did not benefit its country on this particular matter. In that way, they could risk incurring the people’s hatred or bringing themselves into contempt, which would directly harm their personal security and even that of the Garden. Accordingly, it is far from unlikely that Epicurus would have regarded this opportunity as one of the specific καιροί on which he would enter into politics. Yet his followers even then apparently preferred to maintain Cf., e.g., K. Bringmann in A. Long (1986), 321-322; D.P. Fowler (1989), 127-128; M. Griffin (1989), 30 and 33; B. Besnier (2001), 148; E. Asmis (2001), 118. 56 (1997), 46-47. 57 Cf. W.J. Earle (1988), 101. 55
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their usual attitude of withdrawal. Unfortunately, the precise background of their decision is unknown. They may have concluded on the basis of a careful calculus that the matter was not worth the trouble, although it is equally possible that they were indeed prepared to participate in the embassy but were excluded by a decision of the state. More decisive information can be gathered from the particular cases in which the Epicureans did engage in politics. I know of four cases: 1. Epicurus approached the king by means of some followers (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1126C) cause of his decision: Timocrates had slandered him at the court. 2. Metrodorus went to the Piraeus in order to help Mithres, a minister of Lysimachus who was kept in prison by Craterus (Plutarch, Non posse 1097B; Adv. Colot. 1126EF = fr. 194 Us.; Philodemus, Πραγματεῖαι, col. xxv, 1 – col. xxxiii, 19 M.). cause of his decision: willingness to help an influential politician who entertained friendly relations with the Garden 3. Patro, the successor of Phaedrus as scholarch at Athens, repeatedly asked Cicero to interfere with Memmius. The latter intended to pull down the ruins of Epicurus’ house in order to build a villa for himself there (Cicero, fam. 13,1,2-4; Att. 5,11,6). Patro’s request was supported by Atticus (fam. 13,1,5). cause of his decision: the traditional view of the Garden in danger and Memmius’ building plans risk to cut the Epicureans off from an important way to remain in touch with their own revered past. One may add that Cicero himself mentions more in detail the different components of Patro’s argumentation (fam. 13,1,4: honorem, officium, testamentorum ius, Epicuri auctoritatem, Phaedri obtestationem, sedem, domicilium, vestigia summorum hominum sibi tuenda esse dicit). 4. Popillius Theotimus, scholarch of the Garden at Athens, turned to Pompeia Plotina with the request to be able to make his will in Greek and choose as his successor a non-Roman citizen. Plotina pleaded Theotimus’ case with Hadrian, who granted the request (IG II2 1099.1-38; the Greek part of the inscription also in SIG 834; cf. also SEG 3,226 which apparently also concerns the question of succession in the Garden). cause of his decision: Theotimus faced a situation in which only Roman citizens could be elected as scholarch. Either he had difficulties in finding
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a candidate who qualified for the position (cf. in angustum redigitur eligendi [facultas]) or the candidate he had in mind was not a Roman citizen. Several conclusions can be drawn from these four cases. First of all, in all of them, the Epicureans’ political engagement was in a sense involuntary. It was a direct consequence of particular contingencies, which could best be settled by temporary participation in politics. A sober calculus presumably showed that such participation would entail far less troubles than refusing to face the facts. Secondly, in none of these four cases do the particular contingencies driving Epicureans to political life have anything to do with the state. The emergency rather concerns the Epicurean community as a whole or one of his members. It is interesting to add in passing that in the case of the Athenian embassy of 155 B.C. the emergency did concern the state, but as has been said, the background of the Epicureans’ decision not to participate unfortunately remains unclear. When they did enter public life, however, they always did so for their own sake, not because they wished to serve the public interest. Thirdly, their way of proceeding is basically in line with their philosophy. In three cases, they enter into political life only indirectly, that is, through their pupils (case 1) or through politicians who are better qualified to solve the problem successfully (case 3 and 4)58. Only Metrodorus decided to settle the matter himself, perhaps out of gratitude for Mithres’ previous financial support59. Finally, we can presume that in all of the four cases, the Epicureans managed to deal with the situation successfully and in a way that contributed to their pleasure. Either they succeeded in realising their particular political project or they were at least able to solve the problem in a sufficiently satisfactory way. When they engaged in politics, they did not merely try to secure their pleasures, but actually succeeded in doing so. 1.5. Conclusion A good doctor knows his patients, their diseases no less than their ardent wishes for recovery. He perfectly knows how to make his diagnosis and to administer the appropriate medicines. Epicurus was a good doctor. He presented his philosophy as a systematic, coherent, and efficient Seelenheilung, which leads through ἔλεγχος and νουθέτησις to the happiness of a pleasant life. Perhaps politicians such as Idomeneus and Mithres could have helped the Epicureans in similar cases as well, but evidence is lacking. 59 See Philodemus, Πραγματεῖαι, col. xxx, 13-16 M. (= fr. 151 Us.); xxxi, 11-16 M. (= fr. 177 Us.); and xxxv inf. M. (= fr. [74] 2Arr.). 58
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His advice of λάθε βιώσας was one medicine of many. Although it no doubt contributed a great deal to recovery by clearly showing how pleasure can best be reached, it should in the end be placed back into the broader framework of a more comprehensive cure (cf. SV 81). Epicurus’ diagnosis and therapy in general, and his medicine of λάθε βιώσας in particular, were enthusiastically adopted and defended throughout the history of the Epicurean school. At the same time, however, they encountered much criticism from members of other philosophical schools. Time and again, different aspects and (supposed) implications of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy were vehemently attacked. Plutarch’s short work De latenter vivendo is of paramount importance in this respect, since it is the only extant work from antiquity that is completely devoted to a rejection of Epicurus’ maxim λάθε βιώσας. But Plutarch’s polemical attack did not come into being ex nihilo. Several of his predecessors had already discussed the topic in various contexts and proposed different arguments against Epicurus’ apolitical position. It is their polemical views that are discussed in chapter 2.
2. The anti-Epicurean tradition before Plutarch 2.1. Timocrates 2.1.1. If Timocrates undoubtedly occupies a special place in the rich history of anti-Epicurean polemical literature, this is not because he brought forward the best arguments against the philosophy of his previous master, nor even because he was his first opponent (Eudoxus of Cnidus and his followers at Cyzicus were probably earlier). No, he holds his prominent place mainly due to two reasons. First of all, as D. Sedley has convincingly argued1, Timocrates’ criticism has exerted a strong and lasting influence on later generations. Elements that can probably be traced back to his campaign of slander indeed prove to return again and again in later anti-Epicurean polemics. There is, however, also a second reason why Timocrates occupies such an important place among the opponents of Epicurus. His criticism was particularly purposeful and aimed at the very heart of the Epicurean way of life. As will appear from the rest of this chapter, there was perhaps nobody who caused as much trouble to Epicurus as Timocrates. If this claim indeed holds true, it is worthwhile to reopen the debate on the course and content of the whole polemic. It is well-known of course that Timocrates first endorsed Epicurus’ view, and only later came into conflict with his younger brother Metrodorus, whereupon he left the school. According to Cicero (nat. deor. 1,113), the conflict focused on the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure. R. Philippson2 has tried to reach a more detailed reconstruction and discerned three main points of disagreement: [1] Timocrates denied that the good should entirely be measured by sensual pleasure, [2] he was convinced that a philosopher should practise rhetoric and engage in politics, and [3] he also adopted a heterodox position in the domain of physics. From this general philosophical position could be inferred that Timocrates was influenced by Epicurus’ own teacher Nausiphanes. However, Philippson’s hypothesis is not without problems. His detailed reconstruction almost entirely rests on the notorious fragment from a letter of Metrodorus to his brother (fr. 41 K.) concerning the need to gratify the belly rather than saving the Greeks. But this fragment in all probability dates from the period before the rift3, and should be understood against the psychotherapeutic background of Epicurean Seelenheilung. Accordingly, the passage should not be regarded as Metrodorus’ polemic against the opposite view of Timoc (1976), esp. 127-132. (1936), 1268-1269. 3 Cf. A. Angeli (1993), 14. 1 2
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rates, but as a radical confirmation of the truly Epicurean perspective. Its original context was most likely protreptic, rather than polemic. The direct consequence of this interpretation is of course that the fragment as such contains no direct information about Timocrates’ own view, nor about the influence of Nausiphanes4. Epicurus’ political view is also under discussion in another fragment from a letter to Timocrates. Unfortunately, the fragment just breaks off when the topic of a withdrawal from the multitude (ὑποστολὴν λαοῦ) comes up (Philodemus, Πραγματεῖαι col. xii, 12 Sp.5). According to L. Spina6 and A. Angeli7, the fragment should be dated in the period when the relations between Timocrates and his community are gradually deteriorating, but still before the final rift. This is not impossible, although it is perhaps more likely that it goes back even earlier. Just before, indeed, Timocrates is urged to support others (col. xii, 1-9 M.), for then he would present himself as useful and benevolent (col. xii, 10-11 M.). Now it would have been quite undiplomatic to bother Timocrates with such a direct question at a moment when mutual communication began to become difficult. Both fragments, then, contain no information regarding Timocrates’ philosophical position at the moment of the conflict, nor about his motivations or about the influence of another philosophical school. The only conclusion to which they can lead is that Timocrates was acquainted with Epicurus’ main doctrines. This result is hardly impressive, to be sure: of course he did, since he was for several years a full member of the Epicurean community. Yet, this evident knowledge is extremely important for a correct understanding of Timocrates’ polemical approach. Indeed, the fact that Timocrates knew Epicurus’ doctrine first hand, even more, that he himself lived for years as an Epicurean and was thus familiar with the concrete praxis of Epicurean philosophy from the inside, thoroughly conditioned his polemic and enabled him to become such a formidable opponent of Epicurus. 2.1.2. First of all, Timocrates seems to have perverted Epicurus’ philosophical convictions in a fairly systematic way. The doctrine of λάθε βιώσας may well have played a part in this approach. Indeed, Timocrates proclaimed It is possible, of course, that Timocrates after the rift used the passage from his brother’s letter in order to suggest that he had very good philosophical reasons to disagree with the base view of the Epicureans. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Timocrates’ motivation for leaving the community at Lampsacus was indeed a strictly philosophical one. His decision might equally have had a purely emotional basis, which he later rationalised for the sake of his polemical goal. In any case, Philippson’s reconstruction then follows Timocrates’ biased presentation of what happened; at best, it could be regarded as a rationalisation of one party of the conflict. 5 One should note that the term λαοῦ, which is present in the Neapolitan apograph, is omitted in the most recent edition by C. Militello (1997), 125. 6 (1977), 71. 7 (1993), 14. 4
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that “he could only with difficulty escape from these notorious nocturnal sessions of philosophy and that notorious mystic kind of reunion” (μόγις ἐκφυγεῖν ἰσχῦσαι τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐκείνας φιλοσοφίας καὶ τὴν μυστικὴν ἐκείνην συνδιαγωγήν; Diog. Laert. 10,6). This is quite a subtle combination of captatio benevolentiae and downright slander. For, on the one hand, Timocrates presents himself as a reliable eyewitness of even the most esoteric secrets of the Garden8. On the other hand, it is an intelligent, if malicious, appeal to common sense reflexes: “What indeed happens behind the walls of that Garden, among philosophers who claim that pleasure should be regarded as the final end of life? Would anybody conceal himself in the darkness of the night if there is nothing for which he can be blamed?” (cf. Plutarch, De cur. 516E and 518C; De lat. viv. 1129B; infra, 3.4.1). Such common sense reflexes are further stimulated by suggestive defamation concerning Epicurus’ supposed preoccupation with gastronomic (Diog. Laert. 10,6 and 7) and sexual (10,7) pleasures. In Timocrates’ presentation, then, the Epicurean sequestered life appears not as a means to counter unlimited desires but as its exact opposite. This result he easily obtains by omitting all nuances and qualifications with which he was no doubt familiar, and by replacing them with wellchosen slanderous attacks. The general ignorance of the great majority of his contemporaries and popular imagination will do the rest. Such an attack may have been worthless from a philosophical point of view, to be sure, but Timocrates probably did not bother about that, since he could be confident that his words would guarantee him much more success than he could have reached through technical and theoretical polemics. For indeed, if Timocrates perverted Epicurus’ doctrines, he did so not in order to refute him with theoretical arguments, but merely in order to prevent him from reaching happiness on the basis of his own principles. His main polemical goal probably consisted in forcing Epicurus to live against his own philosophical convictions. Accordingly, whereas Epicurus advised to lead an ‘unnoticed life’, Timocrates brought him to the notice of the multitude. In Alciphron’s words, he satirised him in the assemblies, theatres, and among other sophists (4,17,10). He even made him appear in an unfavourable light at the Royal Court (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1126C). In short, he took care that Epicurus received (negative) attention in precisely those places which the latter wished to avoid as much as possible, thus forcing his opponent to face all the troubles which a public life entails, and this not even of his own free will (μὴ ἑκών) but merely through Timocrates’ doing. As a direct consequence of Timocrates’ attack, Epicurus’ own security was put at risk. His pursuit of the most preferred alternative, viz. ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἡσυχίας, was considerably hindered, both because his ideal of ἡσυχία itself had become suspected and because he had caught the attention of the multitude. His convictions, and even more his person and way of life had become 8 See also D. Sedley (1976), 154, n. 47, who reads the passage as Timocrates’ “attempt to prove his credentials as an authoritative source”.
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the centre of interest, which, of course, made an unnoticed life and the security it offered difficult to pursue. The security that comes from other people (ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) was no less menaced, and even risked being replaced by harm (βλάβαι). In Epicurus’ view, such harm results from either hatred, envy, or contempt (Diog. Laert. 10,117 = fr. 536 Us.). Now the harm which he suffered through Timocrates may be traced back to hatred. This, in any case, may be inferred from the latter’s own evaluation of his attitude towards his brother, whom he both loved and hated as no one else did (Philodemus, De lib. dic. col. xxb, 3-6). Later Epicurean sources also point to envy for his brother (De Epic. [PHerc. 1289β], col. xxvii, 2-4 T.G.). Both parties were equally biased of course, although nothing precludes that in this case both were right. Besides the βλάβαι which came directly from Timocrates, Epicurus also had to face those that came from the multitude, which perhaps resulted from contempt. In any case, due to his opponent’s slanderous attack, he received a bad reputation, which he precisely wanted to avoid so as not to be contemned (Diog. Laert. 10,120 = fr. 573 Us.). No doubt Timocrates realised very well that in undermining Epicurus’ security and bringing him into disrepute, he could cast a dark shadow over his opponent’s happiness. Finally, even the security that came from his friends had been badly damaged and this is perhaps what troubled Epicurus most of all. For one of the reasons why he attached so much importance to friendship was precisely that he considered it a strong guarantee of help in circumstances of adversity (RS 28; SV 34 and 39). Precisely this basis of confidence and security was also questioned in the conflict with Timocrates. For it is likely that before the rift, Timocrates himself belonged to the inner circle of Epicurean friends. If that is true, his decision to leave the community directly entailed a serious crisis of confidence, since the certainty that rested on the foundation of friendship turned out to be much less unfaltering in concrete praxis than in theory. This conclusion may well have sufficed to undermine the ἀταραξία of more than one Epicurean. 2.1.3. It is clear, then, that the principal goal of Timocrates’ polemical attack against Epicurus and his community was to trouble their happiness as much as possible. In that way, Epicurus had to face surely one of the greatest challenges in the entire history of the school. How did he deal with it? One can presume that he did his utmost to prevent the definitive rift. Philodemus in any case underlines the irenic attitude which Epicurus usually adopted in such conflict situations (De Epic. [PHerc. 1289β], col. xxvi, 1-12 T.G.), and it is hard to see why the case of Timocrates would have been different. Probably other members of the community at Lampsacus also tried to prevent escalation of the conflict through diplomatic interventions. Leonteus, for instance, may have acted as a mediator, remaining impartial to both sides (Scriptor Epic. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. x, 1-8 A.). When the rift finally proved unavoidable and Timocrates had launched
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his attack, Epicurus could not but react. Besides polemical works (Diog. Laert. 10,23 and 28; cf. Cicero, nat. deor. 1,93), he wrote public and private letters (Scriptor Epic. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. xv, 2-4 A.), and also sent some followers to the Royal Court in order to repair the damage which Timocrates’ slander had caused (Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1126C). For this was no doubt one of the particular circumstances in which it was right to pay court to a king (cf. Diog. Laert. 10,120 = fr. 577 Us.). Nonetheless, it is quite significant that Epicurus sent some of his followers to the king rather than going himself, contrary to Metrodorus, who himself went to the Piraeus in order to help Mithres. Security reasons may have played their part, to be sure, similarly to the fact that others were in a better position to complete the matter successfully9. But by sending others, Epicurus also showed his opponent that his slanderous attack failed to reach its destructive end. For Epicurus remained after all inaccessible and well protected by the walls of his Garden, enjoying the pleasures of his otium in the company of Metrodorus, whereas Timocrates himself risked being entangled more and more in the troubles of the Royal Court. Nonetheless, Epicurus presumably did suffer some harm from Timocrates’ polemic, even if he tried to reduce it to a minimum. According to his own doctrine, the sage will overcome βλάβαι ἐξ ἀνθρώπων through reasoning (λογισμῷ; Diog. Laert. 10,117) and this is probably what Epicurus also tried to do in this case. One could presume that, contrary to his opponent, he refrained from personal attacks and rather used rational arguments in order to correct Timocrates’ slander10. These arguments may well have been insufficient to clear himself of all suspicions, but they probably guaranteed him at least the security he needed in order to continue his pleasant life in the Garden. Finally, it is likely that Timocrates’ polemical attack also had one positive consequence for the Epicurean community: it forced the other members to close the ranks and reaffirm their devotion to their master. One could presume that the Epicureans of the community of Lampsacus after the rift underlined their loyalty to Epicurus and Metrodorus11. They licked their wounds together and tried to recover their harmony. In that sense, by throwing his enemies back upon their own circle, Timocrates also contributed, somewhat paradoxically, to the sequestered life of the Epicurean community.
9 Plutarch’s vague τοὺς Τιμοκράτει λοιδορησομένους (Adv. Colot. 1126C) may in the first place refer to Idomeneus, who maintained good relations with the Royal Court; cf. Scriptor Epic. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. xv, 4-5 and 9-12 A. 10 See Philodemus, De Epic. [PHerc. 1289β], col. xxiv, 2-9 and col. xxvi, 1-12 T.G.; cf. also Scriptor Epic. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. xv, 5-9 A. 11 Cf. Script. Epic. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. xi, 6 - xii, 13 A., with the interpretation of A. Angeli (1988), 37-38.
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2.1.4. To conclude, it is far from surprising that so much attention was given to the conflict with Timocrates, both in the first generation of the Garden and in later Epicurean literature. For Timocrates’ decision to leave the Garden and his subsequent polemical attack harmed Epicurus and his community probably more than all of the other philosophical polemics. The reason was that Timocrates was not interested in reaching the truth through philosophical or theoretical arguments, but merely wanted to be a source of trouble for Epicurus and mar the latter’s life. He played the man, not the ball. This conclusion can throw new light upon the controversial question to which philosophical school Timocrates deserted. Philippson’s hypothesis that Timocrates was influenced by Nausiphanes already proved to rest on insufficient evidence (cf. supra, 2.1.1). According to E. Bignone12, Timocrates crossed over to the Platonic-Peripatetic tradition, whereas A. Tepedino Guerra13 rather thinks of the Cyzicenes. The crucial passage is Philodemus, De Epic. [PHerc. 1289β], col. xxvii, 6-12 T.G., where it is said that Timocrates in his youth had already associated with certain sophists (τινας σοφιστῶν) outside the school. This allusion, however, is too vague to base apodictic conclusions on it. Moreover, the passage deals with the period before the conflict and it is far from certain that Timocrates again joined these sophists after the rift. My own suggestion is that Timocrates abandoned philosophy all together. There is no evidence that he was looking for other philosophical schools the doctrines of which were more in line with his own views. In that respect, it is highly relevant that in later periods, he was never defended by philosophers of any other philosophical school, and that no such school counted him among its members. Probably, Timocrates along with Epicureanism also renounced philosophy as such. In later generations, one often underlined that the value of Epicureanism is based on its practice, rather than on its theoretical arguments (see, e.g., Cicero, fin. 2,81; Seneca, dial. 7,13,2-3). This for the last time illustrates the importance of Timocrates’ polemic and the potential harm it could cause to Epicurus. For it was precisely the practice of the Epicurean way of life that Timocrates questioned and even tried to render impossible. This also puts the later biographies of Epicurus and his συμφιλοσοφοῦντες into a new perspective. For it now becomes clear that the importance of these texts did not merely lie in giving examples that are worthy of imitation and in adding to the pleasure of later members of the school by recalling the happy life of their predecessors (ἡδὺ ἡ φίλου μνήμη τεθνηκότος; Plutarch, Non posse 1105E = fr. 213 Us.). They can also be regarded as an answer to slanderous attacks such as that of Timocrates. Just as theoretical polemics against Epicurus’ philosophy had to be answered in theoretical replies, the attacks on the actual praxis of the Epicurean way of life should be countered by eulogies on the important members of the school. (1973), I, 473-474; cf. D. Sedley (1976), 153, n. 33. (1992), 173-175.
12 13
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Timocrates’ attack seems to have been fairly systematic and was far from unintelligent. It was an assault on the heart of Epicurus’ philosophy. But, as far as we can still judge from the scanty material at our disposal, it was unfair and malicious too. Unlike Aristotle, Timocrates did not like the truth and hated his previous master even more. Since his sole intention seems to have been a negative one, one could presume that a certain rancour was not foreign to him. In any case, his negative intentions were diametrically opposed to those of Epicurus, who wished to lead everybody to happiness. If this radical opposition indeed holds true, it would not be very surprising that, whereas Epicurus continued to enjoy life in the company of many friends, Timocrates in the end, embittered and isolated, died an unnoticed death. 2.2. Cicero 2.2.1. Although Cicero was as fervent an opponent of Epicurus as Timocrates, the polemical approach of both radically differs. Cicero had no personal conflicts with the Epicureans – his best friend Atticus adhered to Epicurean philosophy – and more than once points to the positive aspects of Epicurus’ doctrines, although his kindness is usually condescending and nearly always contributes indirectly to his polemical goal14. Moreover, such occasional instances of fair kindness do not alter the fact that Cicero often omits the stronger points of Epicurus’ philosophy15 and prefers to dwell at length on the difficulties which it entails16. This overall aversion to Epicureanism, and more specifically to the Epicurean apolitical doctrine with which we are concerned here, shows that Epicurus’ arguments did not leave Cicero indifferent. It is probably true that Cicero’s polemical reaction was not rooted in feelings of rancour or personal enmity, but there was much more at stake for him than just a purely theoretical issue. Epicurus’ general tendency to avoid politics and public speaking17 was no doubt particularly offensive to Cicero, who lived for politics and loved to excel as an orator, and whose philosophical convictions were thoroughly impregnated with such a perspective18. Again and again, Cicero underlines that the good man should pursue honour and fame as a Cf. C. Lévy (2001). Cf. P. MacKendrick (1989), 146 and J. Leonhardt (1999), 104-105. 16 There is no doubt that Epicurus is always situated at the lowest level of probability in Cicero’s works; see esp. W. Görler (1974), 63-83 and passim; G. Gawlick – W. Görler (1994), 1100-1116 and 1122-1123, on Cicero’s ‘Stufenschema’. 17 The two are connected in Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1127A = fr. 8 Us.: γράφουσι περὶ πολιτείας ἵνα μὴ πολιτευώμεθα, καὶ περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἵνα μὴ ῥητορεύωμεν, κτλ. 18 A.A. Long (1995), 38-39 is right in claiming that Cicero remains consistent about his interest as a writer in integrating philosophy with politics and rhetoric, and that this is “the key to understanding his philosophical œuvre as a whole, his philosophical sympathies, and much of his mind-set”. 14 15
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reward for his virtue19, and his uninterrupted self-praise more than anything else illustrates his own aspirations to a great reputation20. In that sense, Epicurus’ advice to ‘live unnoticed’ must have run counter to Cicero’s deepest convictions21. Yet, one should note that Cicero’s position towards otium was much more ambivalent than might be suggested by his enthusiasm for politics. Plutarch informs us that Cicero considered to retire to Athens in order to lead a contemplative life devoted to philosophy (Cic. 4,2; cf. also 3,2)22, and the attractivity of such leisure was a problem with which Cicero struggled for his whole life23. He never endorsed the Epicurean interpretation of a vita otiosa, but advocated the more honourable ideal of an otium cum dignitate (Sest. 98; fam. 1,9,21; de orat. 1,1), exemplified by Scipio (off. 3,1-4; cf. also rep. 1,14), an otium entirely oriented towards a political ideal (cf. rep. 1,8) and even acquires a political meaning24. That Cicero was himself forced to political inactivity was one of the greatest tragedies of his life. The renewal of the first Triumvirate at the Conference of Luca (56 B.C.) compelled him to bid farewell to his political ambitions. At that moment, he faced a difficult dilemma: a political understanding of his otium became problematic, but the Epicurean alternative was even under such circumstances no option to him25. In order to escape from this dilemma and lend at least a certain degree of dignitas to his involuntary otium, he undertook to compose his philosophical treatises as a service to his 19 See, e.g., Sest. 139; rep. 3,6; 3,40 (vult plane virtus honorem, nec est virtutis ulla alia merces); 5,6; 5,9; 6,25; leg. 3,18; Lael. 34 and 84; Pis. 57 and 82; etc. Cicero also wrote a work De gloria, which unfortunately has been lost; short discussions can be found in K. Bringmann (1971), 198-205 and J. Boes (1990), 36-43. 20 In one of his letters, he himself admits that he is even too fond of glory (fam. 9,14,2 = Att. 14,17a,2), a telling example of an understatement of course. 21 W. Süss (1966), 9 even regards Epicurus’ apolitical doctrine as the most important reason for Cicero’s rejection of Epicureanism. But in his philosophical works, the em phasis is rather on the rejection of voluptas as the final end; cf. Süss’ own apt remark: “wie Luther einmal bekennt, nicht beten zu können, ohne dem Papst zu fluchen, wie Schopenhauer nicht philosophieren kann, ohne auf die Philosophieprofessoren zu schimpfen, so kann Cicero nicht den Namen Epikur aussprechen, ohne wieder einmal mit sichtlichem Behagen weit über die unmittelbare Veranlassung hinaus die Gelegenheit wahrzunehmen, ihn und sein Lustprinzip so recht von Grund aus abzufertigen.” (p. 81). 22 Cf. also J.L. Moles (1988), 151, on the ‘two lives’ theme in Plutarch’s Life of Cicero. 23 Cf. J.-M. André (1966), 279-334. 24 On the precise significance of the difficult phrase otium cum dignitate, see, e.g., P. Boyancé (1941); A. Grilli (1951); C. Wirszubski (1954); J.-M. André (1966), 295-306. 25 About ten years later, Cicero claims in a letter to Papirius Paetus to have abandoned all concerns for politics and to have thrown himself into the camp of his old enemy Epicurus (fam. 9,20,1), but the tone of the passage is one of sad irony, which does not imply real conversion to Epicureanism on Cicero’s part.
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country26. This implies that his polemical attacks against Epicurus can themselves be interpreted as a service to the state, and thus as a political act. One should be cautious, though, not to overemphasise the importance of this observation, as Cicero’s own view regarding the political significance of his works primarily rests on an intelligent rationalisation of his own political downfall. His short return to the political scene after the murder of Caesar sufficiently reveals that the political project of the philosophical treatises is at best a δεύτερος πλοῦς. Cicero was, and remained, a statesman through and through, up until his last day. This brief portrait may suffice to show why Cicero is a much more interesting opponent of Epicurus than Timocrates. Epicurus had strong arguments to promote a sequestered life and even recall those who had already engaged in politics (cf. rep. 1,3: ut eos etiam revocent qui iam processerint). In Cicero’s works, we can find the reply of an experienced politician to these arguments. As far as I know, Cicero is the only true politician in antiquity who thematised and tried to refute Epicurus’ arguments at length in his works27. Moreover, his familiarity with philosophy largely sufficed both to understand Epicurus’ argumentation28 and to give his own political position and motivations a philosophical foundation. Finally, his own position towards and interpretation of otium was for him what we might call an ‘existential’ problem, so that we can be sure that his own arguments were the fruit of careful and long thinking. All this makes Cicero a particularly interesting source in the context of this study. Before turning to Cicero’s different arguments, a brief methodological remark is in place. There are some good arguments to deal with the relevant works in a chronological order. Such a chronological approach indeed will not only show very well how Cicero’s anti-Epicurean criticism through a gradual crescendo culminates in his late philosophical treatises29, but will See, e.g., nat. deor. 1,7; fin. 1,10; ac. 1,6 and 2,11; div. 2,1; cf. also rep. 1,12 and fam. 9,2,5 (Cicero serves the state in the library rather than in the senate). 27 Seneca and Plutarch were both politically active, to be sure, but few, I think, would consider them to be true politicians in the same sense as Cicero. The emperor Julian ex officio was a true politician, but his discussion of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy is extremely brief (ad Them. 255b-d). 28 Cicero heard leading Epicureans such as Phaedrus and Zeno (fin. 1,16), and if necessary, he could always turn to Atticus for further clarifications. 29 Attacks against Epicurus remain almost entirely absent from his early works. According to H.M. Howe (1951), 61-62, Cicero’s anti-Epicurean polemic only starts after Pharsalus (48 B.C.), that is, in the last years of his life. T. Maslowski (1974), esp. 73-78 is convinced that Cicero’s anti-Epicureanism can be traced back to his reading of Lucretius’ De rerum natura (at about 55/54 B.C.). Much more plausible, however, is the view of G. D’Anna (1965), that Cicero has always been opposed to Epicurus; cf. also T. Gargiulo (1980), 307-310 and J.-L. Ferrary (2001), 102-105. That the theme only comes to the fore in his philosophical writings is not really surprising, since a full discussion of 26
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also take into account the fact that Cicero himself appears to regard his philosophical works as one whole (cf. div. 2,1-4), which may imply that the reader of a later treatise is expected to be familiar with the arguments elaborated in previous works30. Nonetheless, I am convinced that a thematical approach in the end proves more fruitful, not merely because it enables one to avoid many awkward repetitions (as we will see, several arguments return in different works) but primarily because it throws more light on what Cicero’s basic arguments are and on the direct and indirect connections between several passages from different works. To compensate for the loss of the advantages yielded by the chronological approach, I begin with a discussion of Cicero’s Republic, one of the earlier works in which Cicero attacks Epicurus’ apolitical view and which provides a good general image of Cicero’s own position. 2.2.2. Cicero wrote his Republic when he could already look back on a whole political career. The views defended in the work are those of an ex-consul thoroughly familiar with all the details of political life up to the highest level. In that sense, Cicero’s attempt to refute, at the very outset of his work, those thinkers who dissuaded him from engaging in politics can be regarded as an apologia pro vita sua. Yet the first aim of the proem is to be sought elsewhere. Cicero himself explicitly informs us that he wishes to remove all grounds for hesitation about participation in politics in order to take care that the following discussion on the state is not useless in advance (1,12). This is an intelligent and well-considered approach, which enables Cicero to thematise some of the fundamental presuppositions on which the rest of his work is based, and which thus lends additional importance to the incompletely preserved proem. And yet, Cicero does not offer a detailed and exhaustive status quaestionis. He merely points to some general objections without specifying the context in which they were raised and without – at least in the section which is still extant – identifying his opponents by name. One should note that the Epicureans are not the only philosophers whom Cicero attacks in this passage. Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics all had their own reasons to temper their enthusiasm for politics, and thus are also among the targets of Cicero’s polemical attacks31. This is important because it implies that Cicero can no longer fall back on cheap common places such as an attack on uncultivated egoism or the pursuit of vulgar pleasures, if he really wishes to refute his opponents. Epicurus’ philosophy is much more relevant in these works than in political speeches, which are rooted in specific political or juridicial contexts that have nothing to do with philosophy. 30 Cf. also O. Gigon (1973), 243. 31 See E. Asmis (2001), 117-118, who correctly shows that the Epicureans were the only ones who endorsed all of Cicero’s objections to the very end.
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The text that has been preserved actually begins with two positive arguments in favour of political engagement. First, Cicero argues that great politicians had a natural wish to serve the public interest. The fact that they entered public life even when they did not need it at all (cum cogeret [...] necessitas nulla) shows that their commitment is rooted in nature (1,1). Man is a ζῷον πολιτικόν, born to take part in political life (cf. leg. 1,62)32. Second, the politician far better succeeds in realising virtue than the philosopher, because he proves to be much more useful to his fellow citizens (1,2-3). These two arguments are extremely important for a correct understanding of Cicero’s polemical position, since they clarify the basic presuppositions on which his following arguments rest. From the very outset, Cicero proves to adopt a point of view diametrically opposed to Epicurus’ philosophical convictions. Epicurus indeed argued that human beings are not social by nature (frs. 523, 540, 551, 580 and 581 Us.) and he would strongly doubt that a politician would benefit his fellow citizens better through his political actions than he himself by freeing them from their irrational fears and empty desires. It is clear, then, that Cicero in these paragraphs immediately raises fundamental philosophical questions, which thoroughly condition the rest of the whole debate. It is only after having introduced this fundamental perspective that Cicero turns to the different arguments against political engagement. As I said before, the objections are not only gathered from Epicurus’ writings. In what follows, however, I shall confine myself to the (anti-)Epicurean aspect of the discussion. a) The first objection is derived from the labours implied by a political career (1,4). This is brushed aside by Cicero as a particularly trivial argument. Of course Cicero knew from personal experience that his opponents were basically right in claiming that political life entailed many efforts33, and his dismissal of this objection is based in this case on rhetorical plausibility rather than on philosophical reflection. What seems so trivial to Cicero is essential in an Epicurean perspective characterised by a careful calculus of pleasure and pain. Moreover, the objection is formulated in a biased way, See E. Asmis (2001), 120 for Cicero’s transformation of Aristotle’s argument. Cf. W. Süss (1966), 9: “Wir besitzen die Briefe des Atticus an seinen Freund leider nicht; doch man vermag sich neben anderem gerade auch folgenden Inhalt vorzustellen: daß Atticus selbst ebenso wie die übrigen epikureischen Freunde Ciceros – deren er nach Zeugnis seiner erhaltenen Korrespondenz recht viele hatte – Cicero immer wieder, schriftlich und auch mündlich, dringend ermahnt haben, er möge doch den ganzen Bettel hinwerfen; daß sie ihm oft darlegten, es gebe gar keine bessere Bestätigung für die Lehre des Meisters als – eine Art Musterbeispiel – das politische Leben Ciceros, überreich an furchtbaren Enttäuschungen, mit qualvoller Mühe den eigenen Ehrgeiz an ewigen Anfeindungen teilweise unwürdiger Gegner zerreibend, schließlich im Kampf mit mächtigeren Gegnern zerbrechend.” 32 33
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since it omits the nuances of the Epicurean position – Epicurus, too, was prepared to assume great efforts, though only if necessary, that is, if they contributed to even greater pleasures – and, more importantly, since it presupposes a fairly positive evaluation of the politician’s motivations (re publica defendenda), whereas Epicurus would argue that one usually enters political life for the sake of empty and unnatural desires which are difficult to satisfy. From an orthodox Epicurean point of view, then, Cicero’s reply is entirely unconvincing. b) Closely connected to the argument from the labores is that of the pericula vitae. This is somewhat maliciously interpreted by Cicero as an appeal to a man’s fear of death (1,4). Such an interpretation would be particularly offensive to Epicurus, who precisely wished to cure everyone from this fear (cf. RS 2 = SV 2). Cicero then goes on to argue that a brave man would prefer an honourable death for his country to dying from old age (1,4). A quick look at Philodemus’ De morte shows that the Epicureans knew how to unmask such rhetorical argument. Most people who strive for such an honourable death are merely slaughtered like cattle (col. xxviii, 36 – col. xxix, 2; cf. col. xxxiii, 15-23 and Rhet. I, 234, col. v, 6 – 235, col. v, 15 S.) and a good death on one’s sickbed, surrounded by one’s friends, may well be preferred to death in battle34. Even apart from that, it is silly to risk one’s life for an empty ideal. In an Epicurean perspective, the argument from the pericula vitae is based on a careful calculus of pleasure and pain rather than on fear of death. Cicero elaborates the argument from the pericula vitae through a whole series of examples (1,4-6). The misfortunes of famous Greek and Roman politicians time and again illustrate the same point. History turns out to be a storehouse of concrete examples which can be used as a confirmation of the Epicurean point of view. Cicero then makes the whole series culminate in ... himself: nec vero iam meo nomine abstinent et, credo, quia nostro consilio ac periculo sese in illa vita atque otio conservatos putant, gravius etiam de nobis queruntur et amantius. (1,6) “They even include my own name; I suppose that because they think that they were preserved in a life of peace by my counsel and dangers they make even stronger and more affectionate complaints about what happened to me” (transl. J.E.G. Zetzel). This, again, is malicious rhetoric rather than fair discussion. Cicero does not merely characterise his opponents as parasites (I shall deal with this ar Cf. supra, 1.2.1.3 and 1.2.2f; G. Roskam (2007), 125-128.
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gument later on; cf. infra, 2.2.5), but also suggests that, as a result of this parasitic character, they even complaint of his own misfortune. That the Epicureans would rather burst into laughter at this conceited braggart than complain of his misery is obvious of course (cf. Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1127C = Metrodorus, fr. 32 K.). Yet, for all its boastful self-glorification, this passage may well introduce the most interesting argument of the whole proem. For when Epicurus points to the unhappy fate of many politicians, and Plutarch counters with a different interpretation of the same examples (cf. infra, 3.3.3.2a), they both speak about others. Cicero speaks about himself. For once, we have the testimony of an ancient politician himself. This precious passage may show which attitude such a politician adopts towards Epicurus’ argument from pericula vitae. It is the dark irony of history that precisely at this place, a part of the text has been lost, but at least a part of the crucial information can still be recovered. In Cicero’s view, all his misery has been amply compensated for: his sufferings brought him more honour than labour, and more joy because of the longing felt for him by the good than grief at the joy of the wicked (1,7). This in the end turns the Epicurean calculus upside down. I see no reason to doubt Cicero’s sincerity here. It indeed seems likely to me that Cicero does not make this point merely pour le besoin de la cause, but that he expresses his sincere convictions. Of course Epicurus would regard Cicero’s answer as highly irrational, but that does not alter the fact that Cicero established his own priorities and created his own value scale. In what follows, Cicero adds that he could have acted otherwise, as he had all the talents to derive even greater pleasure from a quiet life than other men (1,7). Again, in spite of all self-praise, his argument is important, since it underlines that Cicero’s decision not to follow Epicurus’ advice of μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι was not the result of necessity or lack of competence, but of a conscious choice to serve his country (1,7-8). Once again, Cicero’s testimony thus shows that not all politicians were blindly following irrational and empty desires without being able to give their political actions a rational motivation. Epicurus could have regarded such motivations as mere rationalisations, to be sure, and would have stuck to his conviction that the costs of a political career far outweigh the benefits, but once more, this does not alter the fact that ancient politicians could have seen things differently and acted on their own value scale. c) The last argument save one against participation in politics is derived from the character of the politicians themselves. They are usually base men and the association with them is not merely degrading for the sage, but also useless and even dangerous (1,9)35. Cicero confirms this negative evalu According to G. Pfligersdorffer (1969), 27 (and cf. K. Büchner (1984), 70-71 and 89), this objection should not be traced back to the Epicureans but to the Stoics. He points to a parallel passage in off. 1,69, which in my view is not decisive. The passage may show that the Epicureans were not the only ones to raise this objection, but it does not show that they did not endorse it. 35
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ation36, probably speaking from personal experience, but reinterprets it as an argument for his own position: the sage engages in politics because he refuses to be ruled by such wicked men (1,9). It is clear that this argument will fail to convince Epicurus. As long as those base politicians do not throw the whole legislation and political constitution into confusion, they can pursue their own empty desires and contribute to their own unhappiness. Their political scheming will hardly damage Epicurus’ private life in his Garden. d) But what if those wicked politicians indeed ruin the state? This problem is discussed in the final objection. Cicero introduces the Epicurean doctrine that the sage does not engage in politics unless he is forced by circumstances and necessity (extra quam si eum tempus et necessitas coegerit; 1,10). Cicero once again points to his own example. He had to face such a great necessitas (that is, the Catilinarian conspiracy) and could only solve the problem because he was consul at that moment, which, of course, was only the result of a long political career. The conclusion is obvious: the opportunity of serving the state does not come all of a sudden, or when you wish it, but only when you are in the position which enables you to do so (1,10). In this case, however, Cicero’s reference to his own example is particularly misleading, because it entails a highly biased, even simply erroneous interpretation of the Epicurean doctrine. As has been said earlier (cf. supra, 1.4.3), Seneca more generally states that the Epicurean sage will enter political life si quid intervenerit (dial. 8,3,2 = fr. 9 Us.). Cicero more concretely interprets this exceptional case as helping the state (1,10: opitulandi rei publicae; 1,11: polliceri operam suam rei publicae) in emergency situations, but it is much more likely that Epicurus was rather thinking of circumstances where the situation of (one or more members of) a particular Epicurean community required political action. In other terms, Cicero’s tempus et necessitas concerns the Epicureans themselves, rather than the state. They will enter political life not as a service to the state but in order to contribute to the wellbeing of their own community and its members. However, Cicero puts forward a second argument which further problematises Epicurus’ position. He recalls that his opponents themselves openly proclaim that they have never cared to learn or teach the art of politics (1,11). Exactly the same point is to be found in leg. 1,39 (rei publicae, cuius partem nec norunt ullam neque umquam nosse voluerunt), but whereas this negative characterisation there merely serves as an easy rhetorical strategy to remove possible nuisance, in the Republic it has important argumentative It is worth noting that Philodemus has completely different accents. He recognises that some politicians are bad, to be sure, but underlines, against Diogenes of Babylon, that many have shown evidence of personal virtue; Rhet. II, 209, col. vi, 19-28 S.; cf. G. Roskam (2007), 105-107. 36
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value. How can the occasional political engagement of the Epicurean be successful if he is unfamiliar with the domain of politics? Philodemus himself agrees that politics has its own autonomy37 and that the philosopher as philosopher can hardly contribute anything to political life (Rhet. I, 383, col. cx, 2-7 S.). Is the political project of an Epicurean philosopher, unexperienced with the daily struggles and manœuvres of political life, not doomed to failure in advance? Cicero’s argument is not without value, and yet the problem is far less severe than Cicero thinks. First of all, Epicurus was not completely ignorant of politics. He was well informed about the course of political events38 and it is not impossible that he understood as an intelligent outsider several mechanisms of political life even better than insiders who were completely involved in them. Secondly, as has been mentioned above, it is extremely doubtful that Epicurus would ever have to deal with an emergency such as the Catilinarian conspiracy or would “take the helm of the state when the waves dash highest” (1,11: iidem ad gubernacula se accessuros profiteantur excitatis maximis fluctibus). He would not feel the need to save the state, but would in extreme emergencies rather prefer to leave the country39. His political projects, then, will have a much more limited scope, closely connected with the interest of his own community, and will often be less difficult to realise. Moreover, he can turn to more influential friends in order to reach his end. One should note that Cicero himself once lent assistance to such an Epicurean political project, when he wrote on behalf of his friend Atticus to G. Memmius in order to prevent him from destroying the ruins of Epicurus’ house (fam. 13,1; cf. supra, 1.4.3). These are the kinds of emergencies which force the Epicureans to turn to politics, and in this case, as in others, they were apparently successful. It is true of course that they owe their success to the intervention of more powerful politicians, but even this, in a way, is just part of the political game40. e) To conclude, the proem of the first book of Cicero’s Republic provides an interesting picture of several arguments which Cicero opposes to the Epicureans and of the fundamental philosophical presuppositions upon which they ultimately rest. None, I think, would convince Epicurus. Yet they are interesting because they show why Epicurus himself failed to convince the politicians. An intelligent statesman such as Cicero was able both to agree G. Roskam (2007), 104-108, and supra, 1.2.1.1e. H. Steckel (1968), 591-592 and M.L. Silvestre (1995). 39 Cf. Philodemus, Rhet. i, 259, col. xxiv, 33-39 S.; cf. also Cicero, Phil. 12,14 and supra, 1.4.3. 40 Cf. Plutarch’s political advice to his young friend Menemachus of Sardes to use more powerful friends in the service of his honourable political goal; Praec. ger. reip. 806F-807D; 814C-E; 819B-D. 37 38
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(partly) with Epicurus’ evaluation of the negative aspects of political life and to nuance the importance of this evaluation by giving it a meaningful place in a broader philosophical perspective which provides political engagement with a rational foundation. 2.2.3. In the rest of Cicero’s works, we can find three other anti-Epicurean arguments41. All three of them have a strongly rhetorical aspect42, yet they are all philosophically interesting as well. The first argument consists of a direct attack ad hominem, based on the importance of consistency between words and deeds. The most interesting examples of this argument are to be found in Cicero’s letters. In a letter to Trebatius (February 53 B.C.), Cicero expresses his surprise that his addressee has become Epicurean and goes on to argue that Epicurus’ philosophy is incompatible with Trebatius’ activities as a lawyer. Not all of his objections are equally convincing – it is perfectly possible to defend ius civile in an orthodox Epicurean perspective, to give but one example – but his last argument is an interesting one: Quid fiet porro populo Ulubrano si tu statueris πολιτεύεσθαι non oportere? (fam. 7,12,2) “And what is to become of the good folk of Ulubrae, if you decide that it is wrong to take part in public affairs?” (transl. D.R. Shackleton Bailey) Commentators note that Trebatius was probably patronus of the small town Ulubrae43. In Cicero’s view, such political engagement is opposed to Epicurean philosophy. And indeed, in order to defend himself, Trebatius could A fourth argument, sui generis, is to be found in Att. 14,20,5: Epicuri mentionem facis et audes dicere μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι? non te Bruti nostri vulticulus ab ista oratione deterret? According to J. Boes (1990), 383, n. 418, “le diminutif ‘vulticulus’ pourrait bien désigner tout simplement le visage trop peu expressif de Brutus dans ses interventions publiques, un visage incapable de provoquer l’effroi chez les citoyens manquant de civisme, ce qui permet alors à un épicurien comme Atticus d’avouer son ‘mê politeuesthai’”. I find the traditional interpretation more convincing: the seriousness which is written all over Brutus’ face (cf. Att. 15,12,1 and ad Brut. 2,5,2) is used as an argument against the Epicurean doctrine of μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι. Of course this is not a philosophical argument, nor is it intended as such. We here witness the warm exchange between friends. Cicero did not feel the need to attack the sincere convictions of his best friend by means of vehement polemical arguments, and thus turns to witticism. One may add that we do not even know how serious Atticus’ own advice was. It is not impossible that Cicero merely countered one joke with another. 42 On the importance of rhetoric in Cicero’s philosophical works, see, e.g., A. Michel (1973); P.R. Smith (1995); E.G. Schmidt (1995); J. Leonhardt (1999). 43 R.Y. Tyrrell – L.C. Purser (1906), 244-245; D.R. Shackleton Bailey (1977), 339. 41
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only point to RS 6 and 7, even though these doctrines primarily offer an interpretative key to the past rather than protreptic advice to enter political life44. Cicero may well be right in detecting a possible inconsistency on this point. It is not immediately evident in any case how Trebatius’ political engagement is in line with Epicurus’ tenet of μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι. One may note in passing that Trebatius was probably not the only one who had to face this theoretical difficulty. In his day, many politicians endorsed Epicurean philosophy45, although it is far from clear to what extent their political activities were influenced by their philosophical views46, how they themselves understood their own ‘Epicureanism’, and how seriously they took it. Particularly illustrative in this respect is Rambaud’s evaluation of Caesar’s Epicureanism: “Il convient de le définir comme un épicurisme de l’utilitas plutôt que de la voluptas, car il donne à l’action une primauté de fait sur le repos”47. This evaluation may well be right, but one wonders of course what kind of Epicureanism this is. Epicurus himself made it perfectly clear that pleasure is the absolute standard to which any action should be referred (RS 25). If Caesar was an Epicurean, he had learned this tenet by heart. It is clear that Cicero’s ad hominem argument derives its persuasive force primarily from its rhetorical power. Yet it also has a certain philosophical value, not because it refutes Epicurus’ philosophy but because it rightly questions the precise relation between Trebatius’ political commitment and his Epicureanism. Unfortunately, we do not have Trebatius’ answer48 and thus are unable to judge to what extent he indeed took seriously all the implications of his Epicurean philosophy. A somewhat similar argument can be found in the famous letter to Cassius (January 45 B.C.). Cicero once again expresses his astonishment that his addressee converted to Epicureanism: Quamquam quicum loquor? cum uno fortissimo viro, qui, postea quam forum attigisti, nihil fecisti nisi plenissimum amplissimae dignitatis. in ista ipsa αἱρέσει metuo ne plus nervorum sit quam ego putaram si modo eam tu probas. (fam. 15,16,3) “But to whom am I talking? Why, to the most gallant gentleman alive, whose every action since entering public life has been in the fullest accord On Plutarch, De tranq. an. 465F-466A = fr. 555 Us., see G. Roskam (2007), 52-
44
54. See esp. A. Momigliano (1941) and C.J. Castner (1988). M. Griffin (1989), 28-32. 47 (1969), 433. 48 A possible reconstruction of what Trebatius could have said is to be found in M. Erler (1992b), 310-321. 45 46
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with his exalted standing. I am afraid that even this system of yours must have more spunk in it than I had supposed, that is if you are really an adherent.” (transl. D.R. Shackleton Bailey) In this case too, Cicero’s ad hominem argument rests on his conviction that the political career of his addressee is incompatible with his Epicurean views. His final proviso si modo eam tu probas is crucial, revealing as it does Cicero’s doubts about the seriousness of Cassius’ Epicureanism and thus forming an interesting challenge to Cassius himself. What is the power of Epicureanism that it succeeds in convincing a politician such as Cassius and how does he manage to reconcile his political action with his theoretical views? In this case, we are fortunate to have Cassius’ reply, and it is particularly illustrative in that it completely ignores Cicero’s challenge. He answers other questions, raised in previous letters, but keeps silent regarding Cicero’s last point. This is even more important because he is able to counter convincingly the other objections of Cicero49. On this particular issue, however, Cicero seems to carry the day. His argument does not show that Epicurus was wrong, to be sure, but it does show that Cassius is wrong if he thinks that his political engagement is in line with his Epicureanism. 2.2.4. The second argument is derived from the mos maiorum and the authoritative examples of the past. Cicero uses this argument in different contexts. a) It plays an important part in his speech Against Piso, delivered after his return from exile. Cicero’s vitriolic attack against Piso is not free from feelings of frustration and rancour, and it is likely that he misrepresents the events of the recent past. In order to discredit his opponent, he also refers to the latter’s ‘Epicurean’ convictions. It is clear that the anti-Epicurean polemic in this speech is merely one of the means to destroy Piso’s reputation and undermine his credibility as a politician. It is true of course that Cicero more than once uses imagery and ideas which also occur in other, more philosophically oriented polemics (for instance in Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo)50, but his intention is not so much to question the truth of Epicurus’ philosophy as to attack its application by Piso. Piso’s refusal of a triumph is important for us here. We do not know the motivations of his refusal, although it is not unlikely that Piso’s decision was at least partly based on his Epicureanism51. Cicero, for his part, tries to dis See M. Griffin (1995), 343-346. See Ph. De Lacy (1941). 51 M. Griffin (2001), 92 thinks that Piso in his own speech also dealt with the Epicurean qualification of RS 7: “Did Piso, as a good Epicurean, accept this qualification and 49 50
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credit his opponent’s decision by opposing it to a great number of counterexamples from both the present and the past. The list is quite impressive: Pompey, Crassus, P. Servilius, Q. Metellus, C. Curio, L. Afranius, C. Pomptinus, Camillus, Curius, Fabricius, Calatinus, Scipio, Marcellus, Maximus, Paulus, Marius, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, and P. Licinius Crassus (all in one paragraph: 58), Caesar (Piso’s own son-in-law; 59), T. Flamininus, L. Paulus, Q. Metellus, T. Didius (61), L. Crassus, C. Cotta, M. Piso (62) and innumerabiles alii (61). All of these examples are piled up in a few paragraphs, which creates the impression that Cicero could easily continue ad infinitum. Their great number even forms part and parcel of Cicero’s argument, as it illustrates that Piso stands alone in his convictions and is actually at odds with the traditional morality of the mos maiorum that made Rome great. Moreover, Cicero subtly suggests that Piso despises all these great predecessors and colleagues52, which, of course, makes him even more unsympathetic. It is clear, then, that the counterexamples neither aim at a better philosophical insight into the foundations of honourable behaviour nor aim at a discussion and refutation of the Epicurean point of view, but that they primarily have a destructive purpose, that is, the character assassination of the opponent. b) A completely different use of such counterexamples can be found in De finibus, where they have a certain philosophical significance. It is important to note from the very beginning that Epicurus’ political doctrine is nowhere discussed for its own sake in the first two books of De finibus. The greatest part of the discussion focuses on the opposition, inspired by the Carneadea divisio53, between voluptas and honestas or virtus. This is the background against which the function of the counterexamples should be understood. They are intended to show that one should prefer honestum (with its political connotation) to pleasure. At the same time, however, they throw light on the motivations of famous politicians and thus indirectly on the question of whether or not to engage in politics. The discussion of concrete examples permeates the first two books of De finibus. At the beginning of the discussion, Cicero already recalls the famous indeed confront it in his speech? The fact that Cicero does not use this argument against him and accuse him, as he does elsewhere, of ignorance of his own philosophy, might suggest he did.” I do not think that this argumentum e silentio is compelling, and it can in fact be reversed: if Piso indeed discussed Epicurus’ more qualified position and Cicero keeps silent about this discussion, his apparent failure to refute his opponent on this point may well add to the plausibility of Piso’s argument. 52 E.g. Pis. 58: homo stultus; 59: valebis apud hominem volitantem gloriae cupiditate vir moderatus et constans, apud indoctum eruditus, etc.; 62: tu eruditior quam Piso, prudentior quam Cotta, abundantior consilio, ingenio, sapientia quam Crassus, ea contemnis quae illi ‘idiotae’, ut tu appellas, praeclara duxerunt. 53 C. Lévy (1984) and J. Leonhardt (1999), 135-212 (esp. 191sqq.).
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achievements of Torquatus’ own ancestors, and argues that they were not motivated by personal pleasure at all (1,23-24). This is a shrewd balance of subtle flattery54, argumentum ex auctoritate, and ad hominem argument. As such, Cicero’s words are particularly apt to provoke Torquatus’ reaction55. They are a direct challenge, not merely to his Epicurean convictions but even to his own person. Torquatus confidently accepts the challenge and in his reply neutralises the three components of Cicero’s argument. He appreciates Cicero’s kindness but is not prepared to be bribed by it (1,34; cf. also 2,72). He then interprets the history of his ancestors in a typically Epicurean way, arguing that their accomplishments were not based on love for virtue but on a careful calculus of their personal advantage. The behaviour of his ancestors can be regarded as an authoritative example worthy of imitation, but only if it rested on an Epicurean motivation. If not, it should be rejected as irrational conduct. Torquatus fully accepts the consequence of this conclusion for his own person: if his ancestor really acted from no motive, he would not wish to be his descendant (1,35: si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum). If he takes pride in his noble birth, it is obviously because he is convinced that his ancestors already acted in a rational, well-considered, ‘Epicurean’ way. For those reasons, Cicero’s counterexamples entirely fail to refute Torquatus’ Epicurean point of view. In the second book, Cicero nonetheless persists in calling to mind new examples of brilliant politicians of the past. His series of counterexamples recalls the long catalogue in his speech Against Piso, although this time, they are more elaborated and spread over the whole book. Greek examples are few; Leonidas, Epameinondas, some three or four (2,62; cf. also 2,116) – Plutarch would have difficulties to restrain his anger if he read this passage –, but the history of Rome provides a multitude of examples: Scipio (2,56), T. Manlius Torquatus (2,60), Publius Decius, and his son and grandson (2,61), Torquatus’ own father (2,62), Lucretia and L. Verginius (2,66), Aulus Torquatus (2,72-73), and Calatinus (2,117). This continuous reference to new concrete examples does not merely lend rhetorical power to Cicero’s argument, but also gradually isolates the Epicurean point of view. Moreover, by going back to the very beginning of the republic, while paying attention to the achievements of the Torquati in different periods, Cicero suggests that Torquatus’ Epicureanism is opposed to the whole glorious history of his own family and of Rome itself56. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are unable to produce a similar list of traditional authorities in support of their own view. Cf. B. Inwood (1990), 151. Which, according to Cicero, is actually their main goal (1,26: ut illum provocarem). At the same time, the initial attack already undermines Torquatus’ argument in advance; cf. C.J. Classen (1987). 56 Cf. C. Lévy (1992), 426. 54 55
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Not one famous statesman is mentioned in the Epicurean school: in vestris disputationibus historia muta est (2,67). It is clear that Cicero’s impressive list of counterexamples need not greatly trouble Torquatus’ tranquillity of mind. He merely has to analyse all of these examples one by one and examine to what extent they can be reconciled with his Epicurean point of view. Torquatus’ and Cicero’s standards of evaluation prove to be diametrically opposed: the former will praise the traditional heroes if they pursue their personal advantage (1,35), the latter if they refuse to do so (2,73). Furthermore, Cicero is simply wrong in claiming that history receives no place in the Epicurean discourses. The Epicureans were no less familiar with history than Cicero, but merely interpreted it in a different way. Torquatus is perfectly able to evaluate the accuracy of Cicero’s information (1,34: memoriter) and Philodemus even claims that history shows the truth of his own position (Rhet. II, 209, col. vi, 28-30 S.). One may add that the Epicureans could probably come up with an equally long list of examples which illustrate the correct Epicurean behaviour, gathered both from history and from biographical writings about members of their own school. Yet, Cicero’s argument from examples is much more interesting and relevant than the above evaluation might suggest. This appears from a radicalisation of the discussion, which was already prepared by Torquatus (1,40-41) and is fully elaborated by Cicero (2,63-65). The choice between the ideals of voluptas and honestas is represented as a choice between two concrete lives, embodied by two extreme examples. L. Thorius of Lanuvium is introduced as the representative par excellence of the life of pleasure. He uninterruptedly pursued exquisite pleasures in the most rational and well-considered way, had no irrational fears at all, and was greatly successful in satisfying his desires. In short, his whole life was full of pleasure of every variety (2,63-64; cf. also 2,70). His opposite is M. Regulus, who for the sake of honour returned to Carthage, where he was tortured to death (2,65). This is the challenge which Torquatus has to face and to which Cicero returns at the end of the discussion (2,118): which of the two embodied the preferable ideal? In an interesting contribution, A. Brinton has pointed to the rhetorical power of this argument57. Almost instinctively, many would opt for the alternative of M. Regulus. One feels that his ideal is more noble, more praiseworthy than that of Thorius. Cicero himself argues that a man like Thorius may be called callidus, but not bonus (leg. 1,41 and Att. 7,2,4). Again, many would probably agree. One should note, however, that there is much at stake here. Cicero in the end builds his whole case on the basic dilemma which is concretised in these two extreme examples, so that the instinctive preference for M. Regulus may well imply a radical refutation of Epicurus’ moral philosophy (2,44). (1988).
57
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But Cicero was a brilliant advocate who perfectly knew how to manipulate his audience. It is wise to suspend our judgement for a moment and first turn to Epicurus. Which alternative would he choose? Neither. He would like to insist indeed that Thorius does not personify the Epicurean ideal. Cicero brings the whole matter to a head (as he himself admits), but it cannot be excluded a priori that it is precisely these un-Epicurean characteristics (2,64: cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat sed sua satietate) which make Thorius less sympathetic. A figure such as Thorius may indeed be called callidus rather than bonus, but is this also true for the Epicurean sage? There can be little doubt that the Epicureans would prefer their own ideal to that of M. Regulus. Metrodorus explicitly argues that there is no need to save Greece but to gratify the belly without harming it (Plutarch, Non posse 1098CD and 1100D; Adv. Colot. 1125D = fr. 41 K.; cf. also SV 76). It is true that such a value scale is quite offensive in this radical form – something which Timocrates realised very well – but it leaves little room for doubt concerning the preference of the Epicureans. One cannot but recognise that the choice of the Epicurean sage is far from irrational and that he himself is probably much more sympathetic than a radical hedonist such as Thorius. Yet one may be left with feelings of dissatisfaction. Should we indeed consider the Epicurean ideal to be higher than that of M. Regulus? Again, we feel that Regulus in the end accomplished greater things. I do not think that Epicurus himself would deny this. He could recognise that Regulus’ conduct provided evidence of his impressive devotion to duty, but he would add that his virtuous action was unnecessary, being the direct consequence of his political career and his pursuit of an empty ideal. Cicero himself makes a somewhat similar point when he argues that T. Albucius bore his exile with perfect tranquillity, but that he could have avoided his banishment if he had followed Epicurus’ advice not to engage in politics (Tusc. 5,108). The unhappy fate of people like M. Regulus precisely shows the strength of the Epicurean alternative, which as a rule does not ask such self-sacrifice from its adherents. Cicero claims that M. Regulus’ conduct was not merely more glorious, but that he himself was happier too. Epicurus would never agree with this and his position is stronger than we may be inclined to admit. Few would contest Cicero’s claim that one can be happy if one accomplishes glorious deeds such as those of Regulus, but the question is whether one needs to accomplish such deeds in order to be happy, and whether one is happier if one accomplishes them than if one does not accomplish them. When the problem is formulated in such terms, the answer becomes far less evident. Everything in the end depends on one’s personal value scale, which is itself rooted in a more fundamental perspective. There the discussion ends, before it really started.
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2.2.5. Cicero’s final argument concerns the problem of the ‘universalisability’ of Epicurus’ philosophy (to use a Kantian concept). In the second book of his De finibus, Cicero strongly emphasises that Torquatus can never profess his philosophy before the people, nor in the senate, nor in a lawcourt (2,74). He will be forced to adopt the vocabulary of the Peripatetics and the Stoics in his public life, while relegating his true opinions to his private life (2,76). He will, in Cicero’s words, “change his opinions like his clothes, one set to use at home, another one for public use” (2,77). Exactly the same argument occurs in Tusc. 3,51. The importance of Cicero’s objection has been pointed out by B. Inwood. In his view, “the argument rests on the assumption, widely held by philosophers in the ancient world and in the modern world too, and probably true, that moral values are the public, shared beliefs of a community, that a moral belief not widely shared is mere idiosyncracy. [...] If an ethical doctrine is true, it ought to be public and shared. If it is new, it must win authority by being argued for in public. Epicurus, oddly enough, did not see fit to present his views to the community and argue for them in this way: λαθὲ [sic] βιώσας, the injunction to avoid the public gaze, was also a license to evade the obligation to seek public and general acceptance of hedonism. The point Cicero is pressing rhetorically is a valid one, one that the Epicureans never answered. Epicurean hedonism and withdrawal could never be a universal ethical code. For an Epicurean life in a small group of reliable friends depends for its very existence on a non-Epicurean society.”58 It is clear that Inwood here introduces a particularly interesting problem, although his analysis in my view does not do justice to Epicurus’ intentions, nor does it do justice to the precise purpose and meaning of Cicero’s argument. We can be fairly certain that Epicurus’ advice to ‘live unnoticed’ was not intended as “a license to evade the obligation to seek public and general acceptance of hedonism” and that it had no direct connection at all with the problem of universalisability. Nor does Cicero deal with this problem. He rather advances an ad hominem argument which can be compared to those against Trebatius and Cassius discussed above (cf. supra, 2.2.3). Torquatus indeed engaged in politics59. He will have to express his political views and defend them in the senate, so he may well be forced to such dissimulatio. In that sense, Cicero’s point indeed is a valid one. However, if Torquatus gets into trouble by means of Cicero’s argument, Epicurus certainly does not. For Epicurus did not wish to defend his opinions (1990), 154-155. The discussion of the first two books of De finibus takes place when he was about to assume his praetorship; cf. 2,74. 58 59
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in the senate. In that sense, one could say that Cicero saddles Epicurus with a presupposition which the latter is not prepared to accept. Of course a gremium such like the senate will be rather unfavourably predisposed towards Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy, but this need not be a philosophically compelling argument. One may note that Cicero uses precisely the same argument against the Stoics as well (fin. 4,21-22), even if he had earlier (2,76) introduced them as good counterexamples, and I would add that an intelligent orator would probably be able to make the same point against all philosophical schools. Epicurus could easily reply that the values accepted in the senate cannot be universalised either, so that Cicero’s argument is in any case unconvincing, because it presupposes a biased standard of evaluation. Yet Inwood raised an interesting question. To what extent is Epicurus’ philosophy in principle universalisable (abstracting from its reception by particular, prejudiced audiences and/or readers)? I think there can be little doubt that Epicurus would have claimed it was60. He underlined that both young and old should seek wisdom (Epist. ad Men. 122) and that, given the importance of limitation, natural and necessary desires are easy to satisfy61. Yet as far as his apolitical philosophy is concerned, he may have to face a problem of universalisability. This appears from a last Ciceronian passage: Verum ego non quaero nunc, quae sit philosophia verissima, sed quae oratori coniuncta maxime. Quare istos sine ulla contumelia dimittamus; – sunt enim et boni viri et, quoniam sibi ita videntur, beati; – tantumque eos admoneamus, ut illud, etiam si est verissimum, tacitum tamen tamquam mysterium teneant, quod negant versari in re publica esse sapientis. nam si hoc nobis atque optimo cuique persuaserint, non poterunt ipsi esse, id quod maxime cupiunt, otiosi. (de orat. 3,64). “But the question I am asking now is not which philosophy is the truest, but which has the most affinity with the orator. So let us dismiss these people, but without insulting them, for they are good folk and, since they think so themselves, they are blissful as well. Let us merely remind them to keep their opinion to themselves, and guard it as a holy secret, even if it should be quite true – I mean their claim that it is not the part of a wise man to be involved in politics. If they convince us as well as all the best people of the truth of this, then they themselves will not be able to do what they desire most – that is, to live in undisturbed peace.” (transl. J.M. May – J. Wisse)
One may note in passing that Cicero himself often admits that Epicurus had a great many followers; cf. fin. 1,25; 2,49; 2,81; Tusc. 4,7; cf. also 3,50, but contrast 2,8. 61 See, e.g., Cicero, Tusc. 5,89 (= fr. 472 Us.) and 5,93 (= fr. 456 Us.); Seneca, epist. 18,9 (= fr. 158 Us.); Diog. Laert. 10,11. 60
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This passage is part of a broader survey of philosophical schools and their relation to the ideal orator. Epicurean philosophy proves to be quite remote from Cicero’s ideal and is brushed aside as irrelevant. This is an example of the same polemical technique as in leg. 1,39 and Tusc. 3,51. The passage is also a telling illustration of Cicero’s condescending attitude towards the Epicureans. His ‘kind’ recognition sunt boni viri of course suggests his own infinite intellectual and even moral superiority62. At the same time, his advice to the Epicureans to keep their apolitical philosophy to themselves tamquam mysterium is a far echo of Timocrates’ reference to the nocturnal ‘mystic’ reunions in the Garden (Diog. Laert. 10,6) and may again sow the seeds of suspicion about all the Epicureans’ secrets that cannot bear the light of day. Finally, one should note that Cicero’s argument in this passage is much more radical than his similar objections in fin. 2,74-77 and Tusc. 3,51, since he now does not focus on one particular gremium (the senate, the court, etc.) but on optimus quisque. What would happen if all the best men converted to Epicureanism? Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy appears to presuppose that there are always boni who secure otium for others (cf. Sest. 139; rep. 1,6 and 1,7). When such boni can no longer be found, the state will soon slide into a political chaos which also ruins the Epicureans’ ἀταραξία. In that sense, the universalisability of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy can indeed be called into question. It is clear that Cicero here speaks as a pragmatic politician with a sober sense of reality. Again, one may well be inclined to agree, but again, it is wise not to be carried away by Cicero’s rhetorical appeal to plausibility. What would Epicurus’ reply to Cicero’s argument be? I think that from an Epicurean point of view, three points can be made against Cicero’s objection. First of all, Epicurus would be correct in underlining that there is no fundamental problem with the universalisability of his apolitical doctrine, since his philosophy allows everyone (including the profanum vulgus) to become Epicurean. It is clear of course that Epicurus neither expects nor pursues such a universal conversion – he never sought the favour of the multitude (fr. 187 Us.; cf. also frs. 208, 209 and 489 Us.) and argued that the sage can found a school, but not in order to draw a crowd (fr. 564 Us.) – but there is hardly anything in his philosophy which directly precludes it either. His system does not presuppose any παιδεία (cf. esp. fr. 163 Us. = Diog. Laert. 10,6 etc.) and appears to be open for every Greek63. Diogenes of Oenoanda went even further and depicted a Golden Age when everyone has become Epicurean (fr. 56, i, 1-12). Of course this ideal has not yet been realised and See also C. Lévy (2001), 68-69. Cf. Plutarch, De lat. viv. 1129A: μηδὲ διάπεμπε βίβλους πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ἐπιδεικνύμενος τὴν σοφίαν; Seneca, epist. 14,18; but contrast epist. 7,11 (= fr. 208 Us.): haec ego non multis, sed tibi; satis enim magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus. 62 63
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may well always remain a utopian dream, but the fragment in any case shows that the Epicureans themselves had no doubts about the theoretical universalisability of their philosophy64. What if one, however, leaves such utopian dreams and turns to real life? What if all boni suddenly converted to Epicureanism in Cicero’s day? Such a general conversion would not be problematic at all if the profanum vulgus followed their example (then, the Golden Age would indeed begin). It is only when the great multitude does not imitate the example of the boni that a problem may arise. It is true of course that this is no longer a problem of universalisability in the true sense of the word (concerning everyone), but in a more pregnant sense (concerning optimus quisque). I think Epicurus would answer that such a general conversion of all the boni is as imaginary as the presupposition that a criminal can be sure of remaining undetected during the rest of his life. Cicero confronts Epicurus with a presupposition which the latter would regard as unreal and thus irrelevant. There will always be boni who remain unconvinced by Epicurus’ arguments and de facto take care of the preservation of social order. Epicurus could reply that everyone is free to follow his advice but that, rebus sic stantibus, he does not face any practical problem. Still one might insist with Cicero that there remains at least a theoretical problem. What if one, for the sake of argument, accepts Cicero’s imaginary presupposition? What if all boni (and they alone) do become Epicureans? In such unreal circumstances, one would presumably fall back into a more primitive phase of culture and society. Then, the Epicurean boni would have to look for new solutions. One should recall that the Epicurean advice to ‘live unnoticed’ did not hold in primitive times, when human beings collaborated with one another in order to avoid the threat of the beasts (Porphyry, Abst. 1,10,2-4 = Hermarchus, fr. 34 L.A.) and legislators secured the common interest through their laws65. If the sudden conversion of all boni would entail a relapse into a more primitive stage, Epicurus’ political doctrine may have to change for a short period. For the time being, however, the presupposition of Cicero’s objection is too unreal to trouble the Epicureans’ tranquillity of mind. 2.2.6. To conclude, when Hunt claimed that Cicero “did not advance any original point of view on Epicureanism”66, he expressed the communis opinio of that moment. Even a communis opinio can be subject to change, however. Meanwhile, Cicero’s personal approach has gradually received a more pos Cf. also Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 3, i, 10-13: ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀταραξία, καὶ ἑνὶ καὶ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν. 65 Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1124D; Prophyry, Abst. 1,8,2; 1,10,2; 1,10,4-11,1 = Hermarchus, fr. 34 L.A.; Lucretius, 5,1143-1144. 66 (1954), 210. 64
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itive evaluation, and in general, his anti-Epicurean polemics have been rehabilitated to a certain degree67. The above analyses may contribute to this process of partial rehabilitation. One of Cicero’s greatest merits in this context is no doubt his intellectual fairness. At his best moments, he was not blind to the strong points of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy. In de orat. 3,63, he admits that Epicurus’ advice to abandon political life may be wise in the contemporary political circumstances (fortasse sapienter, hac praesertim republica) and in one of his letters, he regards tacere and latere as means to avoid conflicts with Caesar (Att. 13,31,3). In the first book of his De finibus, he gives attention to the Epicurean analysis of the empty and unlimited desires of the politician (1,59 and 60). Torquatus even argues that such vain passions ruined the state (1,4344). Cicero does not return to this particular argument in his polemical reply of book 2, presumably because he knew that it was true. It is fair to add, though, that Cicero’s intellectual fairness often has to yield to all kinds of unjustified insults and belittling attacks. In spite of his own repeated assertion (fin. 1,13 and 2,8), his goal is often refutation rather than truth. For Cicero, Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy is not merely a theoretical problem. His anti-Epicurean arguments are often influenced by his personal experience and are strongly conditioned by his own fundamental presuppositions. This no doubt made his objections unconvincing for orthodox Epicureans. They are in the end rooted in a completely different ideal of life, and convince only the already convinced. Yet, his arguments are more than mere self-assurance and confirmation of his own view. From his own perspective, he is able to point to difficulties and blind spots in his opponent’s philosophy, and can confront him with intelligent and interesting questions which force him to make his position more explicit and/or nuanced. Above all, Cicero’s anti-Epicurean polemic is interesting because it allows us a glance into Cicero’s own soul and enables us to get to know him in all his vanity and selflove, but also with his sincerest convictions, purest intentions, and highest ideals. 2.3. The Stoa 2.3.1. Early Stoicism The Stoics are widely known as the most fervent opponents of Epicurean philosophy. Their anti-Epicurean polemics can be traced back to a fairly early stage of the school. Regarding the earliest period, however, we hardly have any information. There remains only the much discussed testimony See, e.g., B. Inwood (1990) and M.C. Stokes (1995); cf. G. Patzig (1979), 317-
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318.
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concerning Polyaenus that he could count on the benevolence of members of other philosophical schools, including the Stoics68. From this fragment it has often been inferred that the two schools at the outset maintained excellent relations with one another and refrained from attacking each other’s convictions69. For such a conclusion, however, compelling evidence is lacking70. We simply have no sources that provide adequate information concerning the whole question and an argumentum e silentio (we know of no early Stoic attack on Epicurus) is unconvincing because of the complete loss of so many treatises. One may add that the lack of any context in the testimony concerning Polyaenus does not even allow us to attain a clear picture of Polyaenus’ own relations with the Stoics. Regarding Zeno’s position towards Epicurus, we can only conclude, then, that we know nothing for certain. Cleanthes was already critical of hedonistic philosophy71 and it is far from unlikely that Epicurus was one of his main targets. But we do not know how systematic Cleanthes’ polemical attacks actually were, nor do we have any information about his position towards Epicurus’ ideal of an ‘unnoticed life’. On the other hand, we may presume that Chrysippus’ anti-Epicurean polemic was fairly systematic. He wrote no less than four books in order to prove that pleasure should not be regarded as the final end, and another four to show that it is not a good (Diog. Laert. 7,202). In addition, he more than once referred to the founder of the Garden in negative terms72, and we even have some evidence that he also attacked Epicurus’ ideal of a sequestered life. Joly has pointed to several interesting opposite parallels between Epicurus’ Περὶ βίων and Chrysippus’ work with the same title, and concluded that the Stoic there refuted the Epicurean ideal in a systematic way73. This theory, ingenious though it may be74, needs some qualification in that Epicurus was probably not Chrysippus’ only target. In a precious passage, Plutarch informs us that Chrysippus refused to regard the scholastic life as the central aim for the philosopher, on the ground that such a life in the end does not differ at all from a life devoted to pleasure (De Stoic. rep. 1033CD = SVF 3,702). It is clear that Chrysippus’ polemic rests on a rejection of pleasure as an ideal. But Plutarch gathers this fragment not from book 1 (where it would 68 Scriptor Epicur. incert., PHerc. 176, fr. 5, col. xxiv, 4-13 = fr. 156 Us. or Polyaenus, fr. 15 T.G. 69 See, e.g., P.H. De Lacy (1948), 13-14; R. Westman (1955), 82-84; A. Grilli (1963), 301; E. Bignone (1973), I, 51, n. 119 and II, 181-187. 70 Cf. A. Angeli (1993), 17-18. 71 See, e.g., Cicero, fin. 2,69 and Augustine, civ. 5,20 = SVF 1,553. 72 See, e.g., Athenaeus, 3, 104b and 7, 278ef (= SVF 3,709); Stobaeus, 4,20a,31 (= SVF 3,720); Eusebius, PE 6,7,41 (= SVF 2,978); cf. also E. Bignone (1973), I, 591-594. 73 (1956), 144. 74 It has been accepted by H. Cherniss (1976), 416-417 (note c); cf. also M. Schofield (1999), 741.
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have been found if Chrysippus’ Περὶ βίων was systematically and exclusively directed against Epicurus) but from book 4, and the passage itself shows that Chrysippus attacks Aristotle no less than Epicurus75. Elsewhere in the same book, Chrysippus also argued that the prudent man is both ἀπράγμων and ὀλιγοπράγμων (De Stoic. rep. 1043B = SVF 3,703). This is a strange fragment, in spite of Plutarch’s claim to offer a verbatim quotation (ἔστι δὲ ἡ λέξις αὕτη). Plutarch himself connects this tenet with another one, viz. that the quiet life contains something safe and secure (ibid. = SVF 3,704), and opposes these doctrines to Chrysippus’ conviction that the sage will assume kingship himself or dwell with a king (1043BC = SVF 3,691). Unfortunately the three quotations are given without any context. The third one is by far the least problematic. It is perfectly in line with the general Stoic doctrine that the sage participates in political life (e.g. Diog. Laert. 7,121 = SVF 3,697; Seneca, dial. 8,3,2 = SVF 1,271) and that political engagement is κατὰ φύσιν (Dio of Prusa, 47,2 = SVF 1,28). The second quotation can be understood as a mere concession that a sequestered life entails less dangers, but need not imply that such a κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος should be regarded as an absolute ideal. There need not be a real inconsistency here. The first quotation, however, is more difficult. The combination of φρόνιμον and ἀπράγμονα recalls popular opinions such as those expressed in Euripides (TrGF 5.2, fr. 787) and discussed in Aristotle (EN 6, 1142a1-11); the term ὀλιγοπράγμονα rather calls to mind Democritus’ famous advice of μὴ πολλὰ πρήσσειν (68 B 3 DK). In light of Chrysippus’ extensive use of quotations (Diog. Laert. 7,180-181 and 10,27), it cannot be excluded that this fragment was closely connected to some such quotation. It is also possible that Chrysippus’ words were qualified further on, or that his argument only holds for special circumstances. However that may be, it in any case remains extremely unlikely that Chrysippus advocated an ideal similar to that of Epicurus. 2.3.2. Seneca 2.3.2.1. The first more extensive Stoic evaluation of the Epicurean ideal of a sequestered life that has come down to us is to be found in the works of Seneca. His view on this subject is no less interesting than that of Cicero’s. It is well-known that he is often fairly positive about Epicurus. He endorses many of his doctrines and indeed frequently quotes him with approval76, thus showing that he is not led by aprioris dominated by philosophical schools, but rather independently judges each doctrine on its own value and degree of Cf. also E. Brown (1997), 236, n. 6 and 259, n. 54. It is striking that no philosopher is more frequently quoted nominatim than precisely Epicurus (who is cited by name even more than Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus together); cf. A.L. Motto – J.R. Clark (1968), 39. 75 76
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truth77. As such, he appears to fulfil all of the conditions for an open-minded and fair evaluation of Epicurus’ doctrine. One should add that Seneca himself usually endorses the ideal of otium, which he explicitly recommends to Paulinus (dial. 10,18,1-19,2)78 and to Lucilius79. In his youth, he did not seem to be particularly enthusiastic to engage in politics80. Later he twice asked Nero to be allowed to withdraw, and although his request was twice refused81, he more and more abandoned public life. The question remains, to be sure, as to what extent Seneca regarded the attractive82 ideal of otium, which he himself pursued, as a typically Epicurean ideal. 2.3.2.2. The answer should be nuanced. We of course know that otium was not the privileged ideal of the Epicureans alone. Seneca himself no doubt knew this too. Yet he more than once explicitly associates his ideal of a quiet, leisured life with that of Epicurus’ (dial. 8,1,4; epist. 68,10; cf. also 8,1 and 22,5-6). Particularly interesting in this respect is dial. 10,14,1-2, where Seneca argues that we have the considerable advantage to be able to learn from our predecessors. We can argue with Socrates, doubt with Carneades, live a peaceful life with Epicurus, overcome human nature with the Stoics, and exceed it with the Cynics (disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere). This is a well-considered selection of some central doctrines of different great philosophers. In Epicurus’ case, Seneca strikingly does not opt for voluptatibus frui or something similar – he vehemently disagreed with Epicurus’ doctrine of voluptas83 – but for quiescere. The quiet life thus appears as a typically Epicurean ideal which, moreover, is worth pursuing. One could object that Seneca merely selected this doctrine pour le besoin de la cause, since it is perfectly in line with the general subject matter H. Freise (1989); E. Hachmann (1996), 394-397. According to M.T. Griffin (1976), 320, “it seems likely that at least a secondary purpose of the work was to save public appearances for Seneca and his father-in-law when the latter had to surrender his post for reasons of court politics”. If that is true, his arguments are not directly relevant for his own philosophical position. 79 See, e.g., epist. 19,1; 22,1 and 3; 68,1 (absconde te in otio); nat. 4A, praef. 3 and 20. 80 M.T. Griffin (1976), 46-47. 81 Tacitus, ann. 14,53-56 and 15,45; cf. Octavia 377-390 and Suetonius, Nero 35,5. 82 The attractiveness of this ideal also appears from Thy. 393-403 (adopted by Usener among the testimonies of the Epicurean ideal of an ‘unnoticed life’; fr. 551), which has been regarded as “una contingente ‘confessione’ politico-morale dell’autore”; C. Monteleone (1991), 339-342; cf. also O. Herzog (1928), 73-74 and E. Lefèvre (1985), 1281: “Ohne Frage aber kann man in der Distanzierung des Chors von der Macht in den Versen 391-403 eine Überzeugung Senecas erblicken.” 83 See H. Freise (1989), 543-545 and E. Hachmann (1996), 398-402. 77 78
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of the treatise and with the final advice to retire. Such an objection, however, is invalidated by the references to the other key doctrines (disputare, dubitare, etc.), which do not have the same close connection with the subject matter and final advice. We can only conclude, then, that in this passage at least, Seneca acknowledges that Epicurus’ ideal of a quiet life can for him be a source of inspiration. In De otio, he deals with the subject in a more theoretical vein. Here too, he underlines that otium is an Epicurean ideal (1,4), but adds that it is no less a Stoic one (2,1). He shows that it can perfectly be reconciled with some basic Stoic doctrines84 and recalls that the Stoics accept exceptional circumstances under which the sage better abstains from politics (3,2-4)85. He even argues that such a withdrawal is for a Stoic the necessary option, given the bad political situation of the moment (8,1-4)86. Thus, Epicureans and Stoics, in spite of their great differences, in the end both lead us to basically the same ideal: Duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae, Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diversa via mittit. Epicurus ait: “Non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens, nisi si quid intervenerit”; Zenon ait: “Accedet ad rem publicam, nisi si quid impedierit”. Alter otium ex proposito petit, alter ex causa; causa autem illa late patet. (dial. 8,3,2-3 = fr. 9 Us. and ~ SVF 1,271) “The two sects, the Epicureans and the Stoics, are at variance, as in most things, in this matter also; they both direct us to leisure, but by different roads. Epicurus says: “The wise man will not engage in public affairs unless something occurs”. Zeno says: “He will engage in public affairs unless something prevents him”. The one seeks leisure by fixed purpose, the other for a special cause; but the term “cause” has here a broad application.” (transl. J.W. Basore, modified) This passage shows how Seneca actually tries to reconcile the antithetical claims of the two schools. The ways they propose prove to be different, to be 84 He distinguishes, for instance, between two res publicae, a more general one, which embraces both gods and men, and the more particular one in which we live (cf. also epist. 68,2 and 120,12). A man who withdraws from the latter can still serve the former – even better (dial. 8,4,1-2). Seneca further argues that even a life in otio involves action (6,3-5). More material in M.T. Griffin (1976), 329-331. 85 The same doctrine can be found in Diog. Laert. 7,121 = SVF 3,697; cf. also Seneca, epist. 68,2. 86 According to M.T. Griffin (1976), 332-333 and 344, Seneca does not like this particular causa, but neither the term fastidiose in 8,1, nor the final sentence of De otio shows explicit disagreement with Chrysippus; cf. also I. Dionigi (1983), 273-274; E. Brown (1997), 288, n. 108; G.D. Williams (2003), 113.
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sure, but ultimately they arrive at the same destination. The passage thus provides a clear illustration of a typical aspect of Seneca’s position towards Epicurus, that is, his irenic, reconciliatory attitude87. Of course Seneca was no Epicurean88. Adopting Seneca’s own rhetorical style, one could say that Seneca would rather be prepared to regard Epicurus as a Stoic (at least on some points) than to regard himself as an Epicurean. Perhaps more accurately, one could argue that he often considered the Epicurean position to be basically correct, and thus worth appropriating: quod verum est, meum est (epist. 12,11; cf. 16,7). It is exactly this attitude which he wishes to instil in Lucilius and his other readers. For indeed, Seneca’s open-minded position has an important pedagogical aspect as well, showing as it does how to look for the truth in a frank and unprejudiced way, without being conditioned in advance by the boundaries of the different philosophical schools. 2.3.2.3. The above discussed passages might create the impression that Seneca’s position towards Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy was fairly positive. Such a conclusion, however, would be one-sided, for Seneca’s judgement is much more nuanced and in fact contains both positive and negative elements. This appears both from his more concrete interpretation of the ideal of otium and from his view on how to assume it. Both topics deserve a more detailed examination. a) Seneca’s concrete interpretation of otium. First of all, one’s otium should be devoted to two main tasks, that is, moral progress and contemplation. The former is an important component of a sequestered life. Quid in otio facio?, Seneca asks himself, and he answers: ulcus meum curo (epist. 68,8). Withdrawal from the multitude and from political occupations amounts to withdrawal into oneself. In that sense, otium is the direct road towards interiorised ethics (cf. 7,12 and 56,11-12). It entails a conversation with oneself (68,6) and makes room for true friendship (19,10-12). On this point, there is hardly any difference between Seneca and Epicurus, who also emphasised the importance of curing oneself (SV 64). Moral progress was of paramount importance in the Garden, as Seneca no doubt knew very well. He himself refers to Epicurus’ well-known advice to appoint a guardian for oneself89 and to his classification of proficientes (epist. 52,3-4). It is clear, then, that Seneca’s understanding of otium as a means for moral progress can perfectly be reconciled with the Epicurean position. On the other hand, one’s otium should also be devoted to theoretical 87 Cf., e.g., dial. 2,16,1-3; 7,13,1-2; 8,7,1-3; epist. 21,9; 29,11; 33,2; 66,47; 81,11; 92,25. 88 H. Mutschmann (1915), 323 and R. Schottlaender (1955), 140 obviously exaggerate Epicurus’ influence on Seneca; see H. Freise (1989), 543-546; E. Hachmann (1995), 15 and 235-237; Id. (1996), 397-402. 89 See epist. 25,5 = fr. 211 Us.: sic fac [...] omnia, tamquam spectet Epicurus; cf. 11,8 (= fr. 210 Us.). Seneca gives the same advice also in 32,1 and 83,1.
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study, to the contemplation of nature90. Such study is even the necessary condition for being otiosus (dial. 10,14,1: soli omnium otiosi sunt qui sapientiae vacant). This redefinition is important in that it inextricably connects otium with contemplation and thus presupposes a fundamental opposition between actio and contemplatio as the only two possible alternatives (cf. dial. 9,7,2). In this, Seneca’s position differs from that of Epicurus, who opted for the βίος ἀπολαυστικός as the tertium quid. Yet, this fundamental difference is to a certain extent explained away by Seneca himself in his De otio. He there argues that the three traditional kinds of life all come to the same thing, since they all contain in their own way pleasure, contemplation, and action (7,1-3)91. In actual practice, the three ideals are much closer to one another than in theory. This is again a telling example of Seneca’s irenic attitude. In Seneca’s own view, then, even his interpretation of otium as otiosa contemplatio can perfectly be reconciled with that of Epicurus. There is, however, still a further condition which has to be fulfilled, that is, one’s otium has to be useful92. As a direct result, otium and a political life approach one another even more closely. In a certain sense, everyone who benefits others during his otium enters public life93. This redefinition of engaging in public life also enables Seneca to defend Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus against an attack on their inconsistency. It is true that, in spite of their advice to participate in politics, they never entered political life themselves94, but they actually accomplished greater things. Their usefulness for the whole of mankind fully legitimises their decision (dial. 8,6,4-5). Instead of opting for such lifelong otium, one can also turn to the peace of a quiet life after a rich political career95. It is this alternative which is chosen by Paulinus (10,18,1) and by Lucilius and Seneca himself (epist. 19,1-2). For them, the problem of personal usefulness is less urgent of course, and they can in the evening of their lives sail into the harbour of a richly deserved otium (ibid.: in freto viximus, moriamur in portu). It is with this great emphasis on one’s personal usefulness for the state that a clear indication of a basically un-Epicurean position can be found. This is not to say that all Epicureans were completely disinterested in the way in which their philosophy could contribute to the public interest. Philo90 See, e.g., dial. 8,2,1; 9,7,2 (otioso studio contemplationique); 10,19,1-2; epist. 8,1 and 82,3-4. 91 Thus he is even more radical than Chrysippus, who connected the pleasant and the contemplative life; cf. Plutarch, De Stoic. rep. 1033CD = SVF 3,702; supra, 2.3.1. 92 See, e.g., dial. 8,3,5; 8,6,2-4; 9,4,7-8; epist. 8,1-6; 14,14; 68,10; benef. 4,13,1-2; cf. also Athenodorus’ position in dial. 9,3,3-6. 93 Dial. 8,3,5: nam cum se utilem ceteris efficit, commune agit negotium; cf. again Athenodorus’ position in 9,3,3: in privato publicum negotium agit. 94 Seneca alludes to this problem in dial. 8,1,5 and 9,1,10; epist. 68,1; cf. also Plutarch, De Stoic. rep. 1033B-E. 95 The two alternatives are opposed in dial. 8,2,1-2.
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demus, for instance, more than once shows how the Epicureans succeed in benefiting their fellow citizens96. Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that such arguments were at least partly developed in reply to the polemical attacks of other philosophical schools97. Seneca’s preoccupation with personal usefulness is much more in line with his own Stoic perspective than with that of Epicurus’. Whereas the latter would regard such usefulness at best as a sideeffect of his philosophical way of life that is not directly intended, the former considers it to be a conditio sine qua non of meaningful otium. It is clear, then, that Seneca’s ‘Epicurean’ ideal of otium is thoroughly reoriented towards a Stoic perspective. At the same time, the typically Epicurean interpretation of otium fades into the background. Seneca strongly rejects any otium which is merely pursued for the sake of pleasure without contributing anything at all to the public interest (dial. 8,6,1; epist. 55,5 and 73,6). The occasional outburst against Epicurus’ philosophy quae civem extra patriam posuit (epist. 90,35) should be understood in this perspective as well. This, to a certain extent, is no more than a polemical exaggeration, for Epicurus was no more extra patriam than the thousands of anonymous citizens in Athens. Still Seneca might reply that in a certain sense he was, since his abstention from politics was not involuntary, but the result of a conscious and deliberate decision. Along this line of interpretation, the polemical paraphrase should not be understood as an attack against Epicurus’ lack of patriotism – according to Diog. Laert. 10,10, Epicurus was a real patriot – nor against the subversive character of his philosophy. Rather, it should be seen only as a somewhat maliciously phrased reference to his apolitical doctrine, which is not further discussed, but is clearly regarded as inferior to the Stoic position. The egoistic focus on personal pleasure also entails, in Seneca’s view, a life of inertia98. Here too, Seneca’s interpretation of otium proves diametrically opposed to (what he regards as) the Epicurean position (dial. 10,18,2 and epist. 36,2). A case in point is benef. 4,13,1: Vobis voluptas est inertis otii facere corpusculum et securitatem sopitis simillimam appetere et sub densa umbra latitare tenerrimisque cogitationibus, quas tranquillitatem vocatis, animi marcentis oblectare torporem et cibis potionibusque intra hortorum latebram corpora ignavia pallentia saginare. “You count it pleasure to surrender your miserable body to sluggish ease, to court a repose that differs not much from sleep, to lurk in a covert of 96 See G. Roskam (2007), 121-125. For possible influence of Philodemus on Seneca, see M. Gigante (2000). 97 Although they may also have served a psychagogical purpose; cf. supra, 1.2.2d. 98 See, e.g., benef. 4,4,1; dial. 2,14,4; the link is most clearly established by Athenodorus in dial. 9,3,7.
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thick shade and beguile the lethargy of a languid mind with the most delicate thoughts, which you call tranquillity, and in the secret retreats of your gardens to stuff with food and drink your bodies that are pallid from inaction.” (trans. J.W. Basore) This passage contains the gist of Seneca’s objections to the Epicurean ideal. The overall impression it creates is one of utter langour and passivity. The Garden’s otium is entirely inactive and apathetic (inertis otii; sopitis simillimam; marcentis; torporem; ignavia). The only thing that really matters is eating and drinking. This is no place for virtue, brilliant achievements, or honour. The Epicureans actually hide themselves (latitare; latebram), a clear reference to their ideal of ‘living unnoticed’. The thick shade of the trees99 or the wall of their garden has to conceal their general lethargy. The difference with the Stoic alternative, which combines dynamic vitality with usefulness (13,2), can hardly be greater. A somewhat similar polemic is to be found in epist. 55 about the villa of Vatia. This praetorian millionaire there led a sequestered life, avoiding all the troubles inherent in politics (55,3). For Seneca, however, Vatia did not give evidence of savoir vivre: latere sciebat, non vivere; his life was not otiosa, but ignava100, and actually was closer to death than to life (4). It is clear that Vatia’s interpretation of otium strongly resembles the Epicurean one attacked in benef. 4,13,1101, and is diametrically opposed to Seneca’s own. We may conclude, then, that two different interpretations of the ideal of otium can be found in Seneca’s works. They are schematically presented as follows: otium
correct understanding Seneca’s own position
moral progress
contemplatio (which, however, also includes actio)
wrong understanding the ‘Epicurean’ position
voluptas
inertia
99 For the connection between otium and umbra, see also epist. 33,8 and 36,1 (umbram et otium); benef. 4,2,1 (the Epicureans as umbratica turba) and 4,30,4; further background is found in P.L. Smith (1965). 100 But cf. 55,7: otium suum pigrum iam et senile. 101 It is interesting to note that both J.M. André (1969), 478 and R. Degl’Innocenti Pierini (1992), 165 interpret Seneca’s discussion of Vatia’s way of living as an attack against Epicurus’ ideal of λάθε βιώσας.
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Although this scheme has the advantage of illustrating the opposition between both interpretations of otium fairly well, it calls for an important caveat. As has been shown by the above discussion, Seneca is far less clear about the place taken by Epicurus than the scheme suggests. He more than once subsumes Epicurus under the positive pole and acknowledges that several aspects of the Epicurean position are perfectly in line with his own ideal. In such cases, he is even prepared to learn from Epicurus. It is only to the extent that there are negative elements such as voluptas and inertia, which can be ascribed to the Epicurean interpretation of otium, that the Epicurean position might be rejected by Seneca. b) how should one assume otium? In reply to Athenodorus, Seneca underlines that one should avoid rash decisions and prefer a gradual approach. The former argued that, due to the bad (moral) condition of the state one should completely withdraw from politics in order to benefit other people as a private person (dial. 9,3,2-6). For Seneca, this solution is too radical. Athenodorus throws in the towel too quickly. One will do better by looking for other solutions in order to be useful for one’s fellow citizens in public life (4,1-8). The ideal is not complete otium but a combination of withdrawal and public engagement: miscere otium rebus (4,8). Although the positions of Seneca and Athenodorus are very close to each other, to my mind Seneca is more in line with the spirit of the orthodox Stoic point of view in that he regards complete withdrawal as a real exception rather than as an exception turned into a rule. The same gradual withdrawal is recommended to Lucilius (epist. 22,3 and 8; cf. also 19,1). In this case, Seneca explicitly and with approval refers to Epicurus’ advice. The latter advised Idomeneus to flee from politics as fast as he could, yet added that he should not make a premature and hasty decision, but rather wait for the καιρός (22,5-6 = fr. 133 Us.). Once again, Seneca is prepared to learn from Epicurus. By approving Epicurus’ advice, however, he at the same time departs from the orthodox Stoic position which he defends against Athenodorus in De tranquillitate animi. He twice recommends a gradual approach, to be sure, but the underlying motivation is radically different in the two cases. In De tranquillitate animi, the emphasis is entirely on one’s personal usefulness for the state. In this context, otium appears as a δεύτερος πλοῦς which should be postponed as long as possible. In epist. 22, on the other hand, it is an ideal that should be reached as quickly as possible, and any delay is only inspired by a concern for safety rather than by the demand for usefulness. It is true of course that the problem discussed in the above-mentioned section of De tranquillitate animi (whether or not to engage in public affairs) is no longer urgent in epist. 22, since Lucilius has apparently made up his mind and expressed his preference for otium (cf. 22,1), but the fact remains that Seneca in the letter adopts a position that is in the end Epicurean rather than Stoic.
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One may add in passing that this concern for securitas does not merely condition the way in which one has to withdraw, but that it also motivates the ideal of otium itself (epist. 14,10). In this respect as well, Seneca’s position is in line with that of Epicurus. Yet even concerning the demand for safety, differences remain. In the case of Lucilius and Seneca, a completely unnoticed life as a means to reach ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἡσυχίας (RS 14) is not the appropriate alternative. For Lucilius is already famous, so that the ideal of living unnoticed is no real option for him any longer (epist. 19,3-4; cf. also clem. 1,8,1 and 4 on Nero). This provides an important difference. The marked withdrawal of a famous person is a statement in itself and can even be understood as an indication of political disapproval and opposition102. Lucilius will have to avoid that his otium is misunderstood. In order to do so, he will have to conceal his otium (epist. 68,1-3)103. He should not boast of it (for that would be nimis latere; 68,5), but should pursue a subtle balance: id age, ut otium tuum non emineat, sed appareat (19,2). It is clear that Seneca’s advice derives its relevance and meaning from his own social position and from that of his correspondent. Their situation no longer enables them to pursue a quiet life just like that. I would like to add that it cannot be excluded that Epicurus would have agreed on this point. It is striking in any case that he did not advise Idomeneus to burn his ships and simply take refuge in the Garden. He may well have taken into account his friend’s position and the possible consequences of such a rash decision. 2.3.2.4. Epicurus himself of course did not face such problems. He did not have to bother about the political implications of withdrawing from politics, but could enjoy the pleasures of his quiet life in the company of his friends. Seneca explicitly refers to Epicurus’ own ‘unnoticed life’ in epist. 79,15 (= fr. 188 Us.), recalling Epicurus’ statement that he had suffered no harm from having remained unknown in Greece. No trace of criticism or disagreement can be found in this passage. Yet Seneca here too follows his own path. Epicurus’ example is used in order to show that ... nulla virtus latet (79,17; cf. Athenodorus’ position in dial. 9,3,6). In such a perspective, latere is no longer understood in an Epicurean way. In spite of Seneca’s own statement (79,17: et latuisse non ipsius est damnum), the context of the whole passage shows that the term latere has for Seneca a fairly negative connotation. It refers to the absence of well-deserved fame and often has to yield to the justified and rewarding praise which comes from later generations. Living unnoticed is not regarded as a means to reach security and tranquillity of mind, even less as an ideal in itself, but as an unfavourable condition that need not harm one’s happiness (an ἀποπροηγμένον, to use the technical term). Cf. M.T. Griffin (1976), 362-366, on Thrasea Paetus’ withdrawal. For instance, by pointing to ill health as an excuse, as Seneca did himself; cf. Tacitus, ann. 14,56 and 15,45. 102 103
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Here too, Epicurean motifs are introduced in a different, that is Stoic, perspective. 2.3.2.5. To conclude, Seneca presents himself as a confirmed advocate of the ideal of otium, and both his interpretation of otium and his view on how to assume it are at least partly inspired by Epicurus’ philosophy. Yet Seneca was no absolute adherent of the Epicurean ideal of λάθε βιώσας. His conceptual framework, ultimate goals, and general outlook on life are often diametrically opposed to Epicureanism, but he feels free to adopt whatever seems useful to him. In order to illustrate his way of dealing with Epicurus’ philosophy, Seneca himself makes a comparison with regards to his conduct in the senate. If someone has made a motion which he partly approves, he asks the man to make the motion in two parts and then votes for the part he approves (epist. 21,9). This famous comparison can also be applied to Epicurus’ apolitical doctrine. In general, Seneca is rather positive about the Epicurean ‘motion’ of otium, but before ‘voting’ for it, he first gets rid of several important elements and adopts and reorients others towards his own Stoic perspective. We may take Seneca’s comparison a little further. Seneca has appropriated several elements of the Epicurean motion and voted for them. The question remains as to what extent he has done justice to the original motion. Would the Epicurean who introduced the motion be satisfied with the outcome of the debate? I doubt it. It is much more likely that he in turn would be inclined to approve one part of the new motion and reject another part. Moreover, the unsuccessful part of the original motion will end up in the archives, where it becomes at best food for historians. An experienced statesman such as Seneca knew that such a division of the motion is often more efficient than a vehement attack on it. What he could not foresee, however, is that precisely such an approach would entail, several centuries later in the period of Neoplatonism, not only the loss of so many Epicurean doctrines, but of the central part of Stoic philosophy as well. 2.3.3. Epictetus Epictetus, who was an almost perfect contemporary of Plutarch104, deals with Epicurus’ philosophy in a completely different way. In the extant Discourses, he always refers to Epicurus in the most negative terms105. He strongly rejects the Epicurean doctrine of pleasure, emphasising that the good should not be sought in the flesh but in one’s volition or προαίρεσις
104 On a possible reference to Plutarch in Epictetus, 2,20,27 see M. Cuvigny (1969) and J. Opsomer (1997b), 24-28. 105 See R. Laurenti (1960) for a general survey; cf. also J.-M. André (1987), 40.
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(2,23,20-22; 3,7,2-9; cf. 1,20,17-19)106. He also attacks Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy on the basis of two arguments which complete and clarify one another. a) The first argument is proposed in a difficult passage which deserves to be quoted in full: διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν πολιτευόμενον· ἐπείτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυίαις μέλλεις ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει; (1,23,6) “For this reason he says that a man of sense will not engage in politics either, for he knows what things a politician should do. Well, it is true, if you are going to behave as if you were among flies, there’s nothing to prevent you.” (translation R.F. Dobbin) Epictetus’ line of reasoning in this passage is extremely concise and rather obscure. The words διὰ τοῦτο at the beginning probably refer back to Epicurus’ most fundamental choice for pleasure as the final goal of his philosophy (cf. 1-2). If that is true, Epicurus’ apolitical view is correctly107 regarded as the direct implication of his doctrine of pleasure. The following general phrase οἶδεν γὰρ κτλ. can then be understood as a vague allusion to the many efforts and dangers which a politician has to endure. Epictetus thus presents the argument of his opponent fairly well. Epicurus indeed rejects political engagement because it usually does not contribute to pleasure. Epictetus’ basic problem with this apolitical position is that it is at odds with the social nature of man. In his Stoic view, this social nature is beyond dispute108. He even suggests that Epicurus himself understood perfectly well that we are social beings by nature, but that he had to give up this insight as a direct result of his philosophical starting point (1-2). Both the notorious Epicurean tenet that parental love for offspring is not natural (3-5 and 7-10) and his apolitical doctrine are understood in this light as ad hoc arguments, developed in order to save the consistency of his philosophical system. It is clear, then, that Epictetus’ argument in the end rests upon fundamental anthropological premises which are no longer argued for, but regarded as self-evident. In the Epicurean view, however, these premises were anything but evident. In spite of Epictetus’ suggestion, Epicurus was fully convinced that we are not social by nature (Themistius, Or. 26, 324a = fr. 551 Us.) and that everyone only takes care of himself (Lactantius, inst. 3,17,42 = fr. 523 Us.; Cicero, fam. 7,12,2). This view also makes its in See A.A. Long (2002), 218-220 for the translation of the term προαίρεσις, and C. Cassanmagnago (1977) and R.F. Dobbin (1991) for its significance in Epictetus. 107 R.F. Dobbin (1998), 199. 108 Cf. A. Bonhöffer (1894), 94-95. 106
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fluence felt in his theory of friendship as well as his philosophy of law and justice and is perfectly in line with his doctrine of pleasure without being a rationalised concession to it. There still remains the obscure comparison with flies. As far as I can see, we may ascribe three functions to it. First of all, it suggests that Epicurean philosophy implies a devaluation of human beings. The Epicurean philosopher merely attains the level of a fly. Such a denigratory conclusion is not without parallel in Epictetus. In 2,20,10, for instance, the conduct of the Epicurean is equated with that of a worm. Secondly, the comparison with the flies illustrates the antisocial character of Epicurus’ philosophy. Dobbin argues that “flies do not bestow any care on their young, and show no sign of co-operating among themselves, although they are not solitary animals but are often seen together”109. One may add that flies are not inclined to make any contact with human beings, although they live under the same roof110. Finally, the comparison can be interpreted as an allusion to the parasitic nature of Epicurus’ philosophy. Lucian points to the fact that the fly does not work herself, but reaps the harvest of another man’s toils (Musc. enc. 8). Similarly, Epicurus does not contribute to the public interest, but nonetheless shares in all its advantages. In that sense, the comparison with the flies contains the core of the second argument. b) The second argument indeed concerns the parasitic character of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy. We met this argument before in the works of Cicero, who questioned the universalisability of Epicurus’ philosophy, arguing that a problem would arise if optimus quisque converted to Epicureanism (cf. supra 2.2.5). In Epictetus, a similar argument occurs in two places. In 2,20,6-20, Epictetus emphasises more than once that Epicurus would profit from the fact that other people regard themselves as social beings and act accordingly. It would definitely add to his own security (8), so that he would have done better by confining his views to his own circle and persuading everyone else from the truth of the Stoic doctrine (12-13). This advice recalls that of Cicero in de orat. 3,64, although important differences between both passages remain. In Epictetus the whole argument is neither used for its own sake nor does it directly thematise the question of universalisability. From the general context it appears that Epictetus once again attacks the Epicurean tenet that man is not a social being by nature. He tries to refute this tenet by means of an argument from inconsistency: Epicurus de facto shows himself to be a social being by writing all his books (8-11; cf. (1998), 198. In this context, one may recall Plutarch’s argument that the fly and the swallow are the only creatures that share man’s dwelling without allowing any companionship (Quaest. conv. 728A, with the pertinent observations of S.-T. Teodorsson (1996), 236). 109 110
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1,20,19). Epictetus’ emphasis on the parasitic implications of Epicurus’ philosophy should then prove that Epicurus’ decision to write his voluminous œuvre is not based on rational arguments, but on nature itself (15-20). It is clear, then, that Epictetus’ attack on Epicurus’ parasitism in this passage is merely one premise of a more general argument. This argument would presumably fail to persuade Epicurus. He would not connect his decision to write his works with his supposed social nature but argue that it contributed to his personal pleasure. The more people who actually advocate Epicureanism, the more he will profit from that (in terms of personal security, gratitude, friendship, etc.), and moreover, a careful calculus may well show that the pleasures derived from writing outweigh the efforts required by it (cf. Lucretius, 2,730 and 3,419). Epictetus also uses the argument from parasitism in 3,7, against an Epicurean corrector. Having attacked Epicurus’ doctrine of pleasure and his philosophy of law (3,7,2-18), Epictetus turns to social and political philosophy and briefly recalls some of Epicurus’ basic doctrines: the sage does not marry, has no children, and does not engage in politics (19). Suggestive rhetorical questions then illustrate the direct consequences of these tenets: where are the citizens to come from, and who will educate them? In this case, Epictetus’ argument does raise the problem of universalisability. An Epicurean πόλις is simply inconceivable for him. If everyone converts to Epicureanism, the human race will die out in one generation. It is interesting to dwell for a moment on the general and theoretical character of Epictetus’ argument. Epictetus could have confronted the corrector with his own inconsistency, since his political engagement was obviously at odds with the doctrine of his master. Yet he nowhere does this explicitly111, but merely exhorts him to give up his view (21) in order to live like a Stoic. The fairly general and impersonal character of this approach may be an indication that we are reading Arrian rather than Epictetus. This is the thesis of Wirth, who argues that Arrian in all likelihood was not present during the private encounter between Epictetus and the corrector, and later himself composed a short treatise on the basis of traditional arguments112. Wirth’s theory has recently been defended by B. Wehner, who nonetheless adds that Epictetus could have told Arrian afterwards what he had said to the corrector113. Certain conclusions regarding the authorship cannot be safely made in this case. The general character of Epictetus’ argument may indicate that it is Arrian who holds the pen, but may equally well illustrate Epictetus’ strategic caution to attack the corrector all too directly. However that may be, it is safe to conclude that there is nothing in the argument which seems to be at odds with the thought of Epictetus himself.
Although he underlined the importance of consistency just before; 3,7,17-18. Th. Wirth (1967). 113 B. Wehner (2000), 41-42. 111 112
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The question remains, however, whether the attack on Epicurus’ parasitism is justified. Epicurus himself would no doubt disagree. If everyone advocates Epicurean philosophy, there will be no need for any offices, for everybody will abide by the law and support one another in mutual friendship. The children can be educated in the Epicurean communities114. But where are the children to come from? Epicurus argued that the sage will marry only in special circumstances (Diog. Laert. 10,119 = fr. 19 Us.). It is typical of his qualifying philosophy that he leaves room for such exceptions. There is nothing which really excludes that the ideal situation, when everybody has become Epicurean, should be regarded as such an exceptional circumstance, especially since many efforts required by the education of children will be considerably mitigated under such circumstances (though not necessarily all of them). If Epicurean philosophy is universalised, Epictetus’ problems would not arise at all, or in any case far less acutely. If, on the other hand, it is not universalised, the whole problem of course becomes merely theoretical. It is true that this is not the merit of Epicurus’ philosophy, but he may have a point in arguing that it is unfair to blame him for the problem of other men’s pains if they do not accept the solutions he himself offers in order to solve it. In a certain sense, he could claim to be forced into the role of parasite. In other words, his parasitism was not the theoretical implication of his philosophy, but the direct consequence of the decision of others to prefer pain to pleasure. In conclusion, Epictetus’ rejection of Epicurus’ apolitical philosophy was more straightforward and less wordy than that of Cicero, far more radical and apodictic than that of Seneca, and no doubt based on much more honourable intentions than that of Timocrates. Epictetus had more important things on his mind than anti-Epicurean polemic. His attacks are usually short, focus on fundamental questions, and after all contain more self-assurance of his own Stoic perspective than compelling arguments against Epicurus. In the end, Epictetus was far less interested in such theoretical issues than in moral virtue. As an ex-slave and a Stoic, he knew better than anyone else that this is the only thing that is truly ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.
114 Pace B. Frischer (1982), 64, who argued that the Epicureans preferred to send their children to normal Hellenistic schools; see G. Roskam (2007), 59-60.
3. Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo
3.1. Introduction: the work and its author 3.1.1. Plutarch hardly needs an introduction. The scarce biographical data which we can recover from his own works and from other sources have been intensively studied and enable us to catch at least a glimpse of the author1. We can follow his traces on his journeys to Rome and Italy, Alexandria, and Asia Minor; we again find him back in the company of the Platonist Ammonius and may visit him most of the time at his home in Chaeronea. We finally witness how he later in his life divided his time between his little hometown, an unimportant hole (albeit with a rich history), and Delphi, the centre of the world, where he served the god Apollo as one of the two priests there. And of course, there remains his voluminous and various œuvre, through which he acquired a prominent place in the intellectual life of his day. Plutarch never wished to ‘live unnoticed’ and it is likely that he did not ‘die unnoticed’ either. One may well imagine that the news of his death caused hardly less agitation in Platonic circles than that of Great Pan which he mentions in De def. or. 419B-D. This is not the place to give an extensive discussion of Plutarch’s life, works, and philosophical convictions, nor do I wish to give a short overview of the ‘most important’ topics at the cost of gross oversimplification and arbitrary selection. I merely wish to briefly call attention to two further aspects which are of paramount importance for a good understanding of De latenter vivendo. First of all, Plutarch was proud to be a convinced follower of the ‘divine’ Plato (De cap. ex inim. 90C; Per. 8,2) and as such showed himself an implacable opponent of both Stoics and Epicureans. Anti-Epicurean polemic occupies an important place in Plutarch’s philosophical writings. No less than five works have been preserved which are entirely dedicated to antiEpicurean polemic: Adversus Colotem (Lamprias catalogue n° 81; a refutation of Colotes’ polemical work entitled Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν)
1 Good introductions include K. Ziegler (1951); R.H. Barrow (1967); C.J. Gianakaris (1970); D.A. Russell (1973); J. Sirinelli (2000) and R. Lamberton (2001).
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Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum (Lamprias catalogue n° 82; presented as a sequel to the former treatise) De sera numinis vindicta (Lamprias catalogue n° 91; against the Epicurean denial of divine providence) De amore prolis (not in the Lamprias catalogue; against Epicurus’ notorious conviction that parental love for offspring is not natural) De latenter vivendo (Lamprias catalogue n° 178). Apart from these five works, the Lamprias catalogue contains the titles of at least six more works that appear to have been directed against Epicurus’ philosophy2: Πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ’Επικούρου ἀκρόασιν περὶ θεῶν (n° 80) Περὶ τῶν ’Επικουρείων ἐναντιωμάτων (n° 129) Περὶ τοῦ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν πρὸς ’Επίκουρον (n° 133) Ὅτι παραδοξότερα οἱ ’Επικούρειοι τῶν ποιητῶν λέγουσι (n° 143) Στωικῶν καὶ ’Επικουρείων ἐκλογαὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι (n° 148) Περὶ βίων πρὸς ’Επίκουρον (n° 159). One may add that Epicurus’ tenets are also attacked in many other passages from several of Plutarch’s works3. Anti-Epicurean polemic, then, remains a constant in the Corpus Plutarcheum4. Even passages which at first sight On n° 155 (Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας πρὸς ’Επίκουρον), see K. Ziegler (1951), 700. According to M.A. Joyal (1993), 100-101, n° 69a and n° 70 should be taken together to form the title Πρὸς ’Αλκιδάμαντα ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους (cf. already R. Volkmann (1869), I, 111). In this work, Plutarch would have attacked “an Epicurean adherent who took exception not merely to reports and discussions about Socrates’ divine sign, but in particular to the apparently extravagant (and possibly superstitious) claims made for the efficacy of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Thg.” (p. 101). See also J. Opsomer (1997a), who discusses this work of Plutarch in an epistemological context. 3 See, e.g., De sup. 164F; De Is. et Os. 369A; De Pyth. or. 398A-C and 398E-399E; De def. or. 420BC and 434C-F; De Stoic. rep. 1052B; cf. also Quaest. conv. 673C-674C, with the discussions of R. Westman (1987) and L. Van der Stockt (1990a), 27-31. 4 R. Flacelière (1959) argued that there can be found an evolution in Plutarch’s attitude towards Epicurus, from a less negative to a much more polemical position, but the evidence which he offers is far from compelling; cf. also J.P. Hershbell (1992), 33733374 and J. Boulogne (2003), 18-19. 2
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seem to imply a more positive evaluation of the Epicurean point of view may in the end show evidence of a certain distance5. It is true that Plutarch counted several Epicureans among his friends6, but even if he no doubt showed respect to them as philosophers, I strongly doubt whether he respected them as Epicurean philosophers7. Second, Plutarch’s Platonic philosophy contains a strongly political component. He still adopts the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king8 and also defends the less radical alternative of a collaboration between publicspirited philosopher and philosophically oriented politician9. In his Political precepts, he offers concrete advice to his young friend Menemachus of Sardes, which is characterised by well-balanced prudence and a sound combination of philosophical principles and pragmatic realism, and which illustrates his intelligent insight in the demands of the political circumstances of his day. This insight is probably the fruit of a long experience in politics. In his youth already, Plutarch went as an envoy to the proconsul (Praec. ger. reip. 816D) and later he held important political offices (Quaest. conv. 642F and 693F), without despising the more trivial ones (Praec. ger. reip. 811B). This political orientation is diametrically opposed to the spirit of Epicurus’ quietistic philosophy. No wonder, then, that Plutarch often attacks Epicurus on this point. Both Non posse and Adv. Colot. contain important sections that deal with Epicurus’ apolitical position. These will be discussed in due course, as they throw an interesting light on several arguments that are adduced in De latenter vivendo. In other works from the Moralia, such as De tranq. an. (465F-466A) and De tuenda (135B-D), Plutarch’s discussion of Epicurus’ political philosophy is much shorter, but no less polemical, and even in the Lives, he occasionally introduces short anti-Epicurean comments (Comp. Cim. et Luc. 1,3 and Pyrrh. 20,3-4)10. The mere recurrence of this polemical refrain already shows its importance for Plutarch. In the end, it is not just a theoretical position which is at stake, but a whole way of life, and Plutarch’s polemic is not merely a rejection of a different opinion but also a matter of self-justification11.
See G. Roskam (2006/7), 80-81 on De aud. poet. 37a. See esp. J.P. Hershbell (1992), 3355-3356. 7 See G. Roskam (2004a), esp. 271-272. 8 G.J.D. Aalders (1982), 41; G.J.D. Aalders – L. de Blois (1992), 3391; J.P. Hershbell (1995), 213. 9 The latter is addressed in Ad principem ineruditum, the former in Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum. 10 See G. Roskam (2005b), 362-368 for a discussion of all of these passages. 11 This need not imply, however, that Plutarch’s political engagement was the most important motivation of his anti-Epicurean polemical attacks. J. Boulogne (2003), 26-32 has actually shown that it was not. 5
6
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3.1.2. This also holds true for De latenter vivendo. The analysis of Plutarch’s different arguments and of his polemical techniques and eristic strategies will show in a moment that his short but vehement attack on Epicurus’ advice to ‘live unnoticed’ also illustrates his own Platonic convictions. But first I wish to turn briefly to some other general characteristics of the little work. First of all, the wealth of quotations which is so typical of Plutarch’s works also occurs in De latenter vivendo. References can be found to poets (Euripides in 1128B, Sophocles in 1129CD; unknown poets in 1129E and 1130A; Pindar in 1130C and D; Homer in 1130D) and philosophers (Democritus in 1129E, and, of course, Epicurus himself in 1129B; cf. also 1128F1129A). The quotations are often used for the sake of ornatus, although they never aim at literary embellishment alone. They may function as argumentum ex auctoritate against Epicurus (cf. infra 3.5.1e) or contribute to Plutarch’s polemical argument by illustrating it or making it more explicit. Furthermore, they all give cumulative evidence of Plutarch’s impressive παιδεία, and as such add to his general credibility. Plutarch’s παιδεία is not merely illustrated by such quotations, however. He refers to the most various elements of the previous tradition, including the parasitical methods of Philoxenus and Gnathon (1128B) and customs and opinions from ancient times (1128E and 1130AB), alludes to technical philosophical doctrines (such as the theory of antiperistasis in 1128C and the traditional definition of γένεσις in 1129F), and mentions specific theories which presuppose a more than superficial familiarity with the philosophical tradition (e.g. the theory of some philosophers that the soul is in its substance light; 1130B, or several detailed aspects of Epicurus’ conduct; 1128F1129A). All these different elements are introduced in one and the same perspective and are used for the same purpose of refuting Epicurus’ advice. The reader may be overwhelmed by the wealth of allusions and references and may get the impression that the whole of the Greek intellectual tradition rises in protest against Epicurus’ infamous maxim. In that sense, Plutarch’s use of the previous tradition also has a strong rhetorical aspect. It is important to deal with the rhetorical character of Plutarch’s argument in De latenter vivendo somewhat more in detail, since it illustrates the peculiar character of the work fairly well. In fact, rhetorical approaches and techniques make their influence felt on every page of De latenter vivendo. Brief outbursts (1128A and C) alternate with lengthy periods (1129DE and 1130B), elaborate comparisons (1128BC and 1129CD) with brief examples (1128F and 1129BC), and rhetorical questions (1128C; 1129A; 1129B; 1129D) with explicit affirmations (1128CD and 1129E) or suggestive insinuations (1129B). Clear-cut oppositions (1128D-F; 1129DE; 1130A; 1130C-E) permeate the whole discussion, whereas the phrasing of the different arguments is time and again dominated by tricolon (1128D and E; 1129A; 1129B; 1129BC; 1130B; 1130E) and even tetracolon (1129A and B; 1130E). Whatever the value of Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean arguments may be, the brilliant style
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which he uses in this little work makes it a delight to read. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that an ancient reader (or audience) appreciated these literary qualities even more than we are able to do. If that is true, the rhetorical character may even have added, at least in Plutarch’s own day, to the force of his argument (on the basis of the well-known saying rem tene, verba sequuntur). 3.1.3. The last topic to be discussed in this brief introduction concerns the date of De latenter vivendo. This is a difficult problem, however, given the lack of evidence regarding absolute chronology12. It has been regarded as a late work13, but has also been placed in a middle period14 and has even been characterised as a school exercise that stems from Plutarch’s youth15. This great diversity of opinions illustrates the huge amount of speculation and the fact that we have little compelling evidence about the question. The strongly rhetorical character of De latenter vivendo may offer the proverbial protruding branch to take hold of, since it enables us to connect the work with a specific genre (viz. the thesis or discussion of a quaestio infinita16), which seems to point to a relatively early period. But this branch soon breaks off when it has to bear the full weight of the argumentation. For I. Gallo is right in remarking that Plutarch only gradually leaves behind the phase of school rhetoric17 and one may add that rhetorical strategies play an important part in his other polemical works too. Moreover, we have seen the rich παιδεία of which the little work provides evidence and which far surpasses the level of introductory works such as Alcinous’ Didaskalikos or Apuleius’ De Platone et eius dogmate. These observations might again point to a somewhat later date. A simple non liquet proves to be the only possible conclusion. This uncertainty about the date of the work may be highly deplorable, to be sure, but I do not think it has far-reaching consequences for its interpretation. In any case, it never precludes a full understanding of Plutarch’s argument. This will appear from the following systematic analysis of the subsequent chapters of the work. De latenter vivendo remains absent from the chronological list of C.P. Jones (1966), 70-73. 13 G.M. Lattanzi (1932), 332-336; cf. also R. Flacelière (1959), 205 (who bases himself on the conviction of the young D. Babut) and F. Fuhrmann (1964), 23. 14 A. Strobach (1997), 29 (though with a certain reserve: “eventuell auch später”); cf. also K. Ziegler (1951), 766, who rejects a late date, and ventures only the quite general remark “daß die antiepikureischen Schriften nicht in eine so frühe Zeit fallen wie die gegen die Stoiker gerichteten”. 15 A. Barigazzi (1990), 46-47; cf. also B. Heininger – R. Feldmeier (2000), 40. 16 Thus rightly B. Heininger – R. Feldmeier (2000), 39; for the thesis as one of the praeexercitamenta, see H. Lausberg (1990), 544-546; see also S.F. Bonner (1969), 2-11. 17 (1996a), 931; cf. also Id. (1996b), 216 and 218-219; Id. (2000), 9. 12
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3.2. Inconsistency between Epicurus’ words and deeds 3.2.1. Plutarch usually pays much attention to the opening of his writings. P.A. Stadter even made the claim, significant in itself, that “no writer [...] excels Plutarch in the variety, charm, and technical skill of his proems”18. This claim, which is based on a thorough analysis of the proems of the Lives, proves generally valid for the Moralia too, and even for the more specific domain of Plutarch’s extant philosophical polemics. Both Non posse and De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos have well-constructed introductions, presented in the form of a short dialogue and containing a concise depiction of interlocutors and circumstances. Other polemics open with a systematic programmatic introduction (De virtute morali) or with a motivation of the standards of evaluation that will be used (De Stoicorum repugnantiis; cf. also Adv. Colot. 1108B and D). But all of these introductions are alike in offering essential information that is very helpful for a correct understanding of the general perspective, scope, and purposes of the respective works. a) In that respect, the opening of Plutarch’s De latenter vivendo may seem disappointing at first sight. Plutarch in fact does not offer any such introduction at all, but immediately launches a violent ad hominem attack against Epicurus’ inconsistency, arguing that “not even the man who formulated this advice wished to remain unnoticed” (1128A). This quite abrupt beginning has been regarded more than once as evidence for the unfinished character of the work19. Such a conclusion remains unconvincing, however, because it does not take into account the polemical perspective of the little work. It is much more likely in my view that Plutarch deliberately chooses to omit a more formal introduction because it would have harmed rather than contributed to his auctorial purposes. The abrupt opening should indeed be interpreted as a rhetorical eristic strategy. By raising the question of Epicurus’ inconsistency in the opening sentence, without any introduction, Plutarch immediately attracts his readers’ attention, in order to make Epicurus appear in an unfavourable light. At the same time, Plutarch may arouse a certain good-will regarding his own position (captatio benevolentiae). The combination of the adversative ἀλλά at the very beginning and the ex abrupto-character of the opening suggests an indignant rejection of the confirmation of the maxim λάθε βιώσας in the title of the work20 and constitutes a stylistic means in order to emphasise even more the directness of his attack. (1988), 274. K. Ziegler (1951), 766: “Das Schriftchen macht durchaus, schon mit seinem abrupten Anfang und auch durch die unverhältnismaßig große Zahl unerlaubter Hiate, den Eindruck des Skizzenhaften und Unfertigen, und wird [...] mit Recht zu den Schriften gezählt, die nicht von P. selbst, sondern aus seinem Nachlaß herausgegeben worden sind”; cf. also M. Pohlenz (1952), 216: “declamatio excepto prooemio elaborata”; G. Verbeke (1962), 21, n. 1. 20 A. Barigazzi (1990), 51 is right in understanding the adversative ἀλλά in connection with the question of the title (cf. also I. Gallo (1996a), 932-933; Id. (2000), 11 and 12-13). 18 19
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b) There is something more to be said about this opening sentence, though. It is quite remarkable that Plutarch does not immediately identify his opponent21 but rather refers to him through a vague paraphrase. This is even more remarkable because Plutarch severely condemns a similar approach in Colotes’ work. Now there is an important difference to be sure. Colotes apparently only concealed the names of his contemporaries, but not those of his predecessors (which is already something of a contradiction). This makes Plutarch conclude that his opponent is guided by cowardice rather than respect (Adv. Colot. 1120C: ἀποδειλιάσας πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας, οὐ μετριάσας ὑπ’ αἰδοῦς). This is an important passage, in that it throws an interesting light on Plutarch’s own custom to use paraphrases instead of proper names in his philosophical polemics when he considers the origin of the discussed theory to be sufficiently clear, at least for the public of the philosophical schools22. Such a method of working may thus usually be interpreted as a token of respect for the opponent. The question remains, however, whether this also holds for our passage. To my mind, the most important reason why Plutarch has given preference to the vague ὁ τοῦτο εἰπών should be sought elsewhere. It is not primarily motivated by a feeling of respect towards his philosophical predecessor23, nor by the opposed feeling of “una forma di disprezzo nei confronti dell’odiato filosofo”24, but, once again, by polemical aims. The inconsistency between words and deeds is expressed far more sharply by the use of the formula ὁ τοῦτο εἰπών than by the name of Epicurus: “exactly the man who said it, failed to do it”. At the same time, Plutarch can ironically claim to do justice to his opponent, since his refusal to introduce Epicurus nominatim is directly in line with the latter’s preference to remain unnoticed. It is clear, then, that both the abrupt beginning and the vague paraphrase ὁ τοῦτο εἰπών are rooted in, and greatly contribute to, the polemical purpose of the work. 3.2.2. The argument of inconsistency advanced in the first sentence of De latenter vivendo is by no means self-evident. It was widely known indeed that Epicurus led a retired life in his famous Garden, far away from all the His name appears for the first time in chapter 3 (1128F), where he is directly addressed. 22 Cf. τοῖς φιλοσόφοις (De aud. poet. 37A: the Epicureans); τοὺς ταῦτά γε λέγοντας (De prof. in virt. 75D) and οὗτοι (76A: the Stoics); τις (De sup. 164F: Epicurus); τινες (165A: the Stoics); ἔνιοι (De virt. mor. 446F: Chrysippus and his successors; see D. Babut (1969a), 21-22 and 158; F. Becchi (1990), 196); ὁ εἰπών (De tranq. an. 465C: Democritus); οἱ ... λέγοντες (Cons. ad ux. 611D: the Epicureans); οἱ ... κελεύοντες (De esu 997E: the Stoics; cf. SVF 3,749); etc. 23 Even if it is true that Plutarch more than once expresses his feelings of respect, both to Epicurus himself and to Metrodorus; it is only Colotes who never receives any favorable evaluation; see J.P. Hershbell (1992), 3364-3365. 24 I. Gallo (1996a), 933; cf. also Id. (2000), 13. 21
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troubles inherent in public life. In what follows, Plutarch further argues (cf. γάρ) his initial claim: “It was precisely this statement (αὐτὸ τοῦτο) which Epicurus made in order to escape from being unnoticed” (1128B). Even though the vocabulary hardly changes, Plutarch here makes an important move. By concentrating on the maxim itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο), he in fact excludes many possibilities and at the same time considerably enlarges the challenge. For as a result of this focus, he can no longer argue that Epicurus was de facto well-known, in spite of his advice to strive for an ‘unnoticed life’, nor that Epicurus exhorted to remain unnoticed in public life, while on the other hand striving for fame, e.g., in the domain of physics. In what follows, Plutarch will have to prove that Epicurus aimed at fame specifically with his statement λάθε βιώσας. This claim is made more explicit in the following participle construction: Epicurus procures himself fame by inciting others to ἀδοξία (1128B). Apparently considering his maxim λάθε βιώσας an important thought (ὥς τι φρονῶν περιττότερον), through it he pursues an unjust fame. Here, the opposition between Epicurus’ words (ἐκ τῆς εἰς ἀδοξίαν προτροπῆς) and deeds (δόξαν ἄδικον ποριζόμενος) is given its sharpest possible formulation: it is precisely by exhorting to ἀδοξία that Epicurus aims at δόξα. By means of a quotation from Euripides, Plutarch returns to the inconsistency itself by explicitly disapproving it. The clear aba-pattern which thus appears at the outset of De latenter vivendo is one of the most typical compositional schemes in Plutarch’s works, often used “when die Rede eindringlich sein soll”25. At this point, Plutarch prefers to interrupt his argumentation for a while, in order to make Epicurus’ outrageous behaviour itself sink in more thoroughly to his readers. To that purpose, he first introduces two illustrating comparisons (1128BC). He first points to renowned gourmands such like Philoxenus, son of Eryxis, and Gnathon of Sicily, who make the food unattractive for the other banqueters by blowing their noses on it and so succeed in keeping everything to themselves. Analogously, those with an immoderate appetite for fame – again a paraphrase instead of the proper name – make fame unattractive to others in order to keep it entirely for themselves. The unfair, selfish character of Epicurus’ behaviour emerges clearly from this comparison. Fame is the ὄψον, as it were, which Epicurus dishonestly pursues by removing its attraction for others. Plutarch’s choice of examples may well be motivated here by a subtle irony, for the Epicureans also embraced as a principle the notorious tenet that the pleasure of the belly forms the beginning and root of every good (ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή; Athenaeus, 7, 280a and 12, 546f = fr. 409 Us.)26. The second com H.G. Ingenkamp (1971), 71, who also offers many examples of this aba-pattern; cf. also Id. (1992), 4301-4303. 26 The fragment is discussed in detail by T. Gargiulo (1982). It should be noted that Epicurus himself is characterised as ὀψοφάγος in Aelian, fr. 42a), and that the Epicureans 25
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parison is taken from the field of seamanship: just as rowers make the ship advance, even while facing its stern, Epicurus aims at fame “with his back turned to it” (ὥσπερ ἀπεστραμμένοι) (1128BC). The unfair selfishness of Epicurus’ behaviour here again fades into the background; the comparison rather focuses on the mere fact of his inconsistency. It is only after these two comparisons that Plutarch further demonstrates his claim that Epicurus indeed pursued fame through his maxim λάθε βιώσας. His argument, formulated as a rhetorical question, is short and clear: if Epicurus would have followed his own advice to remain unnoticed, he would certainly not have written down and published his tenet. But he did not wish to remain unnoticed to posterity, and thus, one may add, a fortiori not to his contemporaries (1128C). Any further comment is left behind. Plutarch prefers to focus merely on the apparent inconsistency between Epicurus’ thoughts and deeds. That the latter could perhaps put forward another motivation for his γράφειν and ἐκδιδόναι than the striving for fame (e.g. a concern for future generations of Epicurean pupils) is passed over completely. Of course, the seeming obviousness suggested by the rhetorical question can easily be explained by the genre of De latenter vivendo – this not being a technical, theoretical treatise but a polemical thesis directed against Epicurus – but in the end, it nevertheless ruins (the persuasiveness of) Plutarch’s argument. As a whole, the first chapter seems generally coherent and well-structured. The different moves in the argumentation are clear, the range of thoughts is developed in a logical pattern, the internal coherence of the different parts is made clear by connecting particles (3 times γάρ, once ἐπεί)27, and the ABA-structure at the beginning even reinforces the impression of logical coherence28. Plutarch obviously wants to suggest a strictly rational argumentation. suffered from all kinds of digestive disorders (cf. Adv. Colot. 1103A and esp. Non posse 1089EF, with the commentary of K.-D. Zacher (1982), 155-158). In the anti-Epicurean polemical tradition, those various diseases were explicitly linked with the alleged intemperance and gluttony of the Epicureans; see e.g. Cicero, fam. 7,26,1 and Diog. Laert. 10,6; cf. also Plutarch, De tuenda 135C. 27 One should note, however, that the two comparisons are somewhat loosely connected with the rest of the argumentation. For the association ὁ εἰπών – οἱ ἀκράτως φιλόδοξοι is nowhere made explicit and the γάρ at the outset of the comparison (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ...) does not have its strictly logical meaning (cf. J.D. Denniston (1954), 61). Perhaps, Plutarch inserted material here from one of his sources as illustrative examples. 28 In that sense, the first chapter already shows that one should nuance the conviction of M. Pohlenz (1952), 123: “magis[que] movere quam docere vult”; cf. also J.J. Hartman (1916), 612: “(...) delectandi quam docendi cupidum magis”, D.A. Russell (1993), 120: “It is, however, more a rhetorical exercise than a serious argument”; and B. Heininger – R. Feldmeier (2000), 37-38. It is clear that De latenter vivendo has a rhetorical flavour, to be sure, but this does not necessarily exclude all logical argumentation. The work aims at more than mere ‘movere’ or ‘delectare’.
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3.2.3. This argumentation is based on two fundamental pillars, viz. Epicurus’ striving for fame and his inconsistency. Both themes occur elsewhere in Plutarch’s œuvre as well and can apparently be traced back to a previous antiEpicurean polemical tradition. a) Epicurus’ excessive φιλοτιμία is also attacked in Non posse, where the philosopher is depicted as someone “who swelled with furious, excited desire for fame” (1100A = fr. 233 Us.): he does not recognise any teacher29; he struggled with Democritus about syllables and serifs, although he took away all his doctrines verbatim30; he considers only himself and his pupils to be wise31; he himself mentions both Colotes’ famous act of adoration (προσκύνησις)32 and the far-reaching admiration of his own brother Neocles33; and he even declared that his mother had such atoms in herself as to produce a sage by their conjunction34. By means of this self-praise, Epicurus attempted to both seduce and force fame, giving himself the honours which he failed to get from others35. It is clear that this section from Non posse offers an interesting parallel to Plutarch’s argument in the first chapter of De latenter vivendo. In both passages, Epicurus’ supposed ambition is the target of a vigorous ad hominem attack. Moreover, the many parallels to Plutarch’s argument in Non posse which are mentioned in the notes above suggest that he there falls back on a traditional attack. Even though this observation also Non posse 1100A. Epicurus’ denunciation of all his previous teachers and his claim to be an autodidact did not remain without comment; cf. Diog. Laert. 10,8 and 13; Cicero, nat. deor. 1,72-73 and 93; Sextus Empiricus, M. 1,3-4. See K. Freeman (1938), 158-160 for a defense of Epicurus. 30 Non posse 1100A; cf. also Cicero, nat. deor. 1,72 and 93; fin. 1,21. For the important influence of Democritus on Epicurus, see also Cicero, nat. deor. 1,120 and fin. 4,13; Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 735A; Diog. Laert. 10,4; cf. Cicero, ac. 1,6; fin. 1,17 and 18; 2,102; Lactantius, inst. 3,17,23. That this influence of Democritus on Epicurus was recognised also in Epicurean circles appears from Plutarch, Adv. Colot. 1108EF; see also P.M. Huby (1978). 31 Non posse 1100A = fr. 146 Us.; cf. also Cicero, fin. 2,7 and Cato 43. In nat. deor. 1,113, Metrodorus is called Epicuri collega sapientiae. 32 Non posse 1100A = fr. 141 and 178 Us. The whole scene is more fully described in Adv. Colot. 1117B; cf. also Non posse 1100C. The precise meaning of Colotes’ behaviour and of Epicurus’ reaction to it remains unclear; cf., e.g., A.-J. Festugière (1946), 66-68; R. Westman (1955), 27-31; F. Albini (1993), 213-214; M. Erler (1994b), 235236. 33 Non posse 1100A = fr. 178 Us.; cf. also Non posse 1100C, and especially De frat. am. 487D. 34 Non posse 1100AB = fr. 178 Us.; cf. Eusebius, PE 14,26,2. One may wonder whether this is one of the ways in which Epicurus showed his great gratitude towards his parents (Diog. Laert. 10,10; Philodemus, De piet. col. 51,25-26), whose memory he also secured in his last will (cf. Diog. Laert. 10,18). 35 Non posse 1100B; see also De se ipsum laud. 540AB. 29
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throws light on the first chapter of De latenter vivendo, the precise importance of the traditional material there can only be evaluated when the differences between both passages are also taken into account. One may first of all point to the difference with regard to their general context. In Non posse, Plutarch tries to demonstrate that a life according to Epicurus’ doctrine can never be pleasant. To that purpose, he shows in this particular section36 that the pleasures of a vita activa considerably surpass those promised by the trivial occupations in the Garden. For the recollection of great achievements and of the fame which results from them provides pleasures which totally overshadow the corporeal pleasures of eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse37. Even Epicurus was well aware that honours can bring some pleasures and his striving for fame is understood in this light. Since neither the theme of inconsistency nor that of λάθε βιώσας is directly relevant in this context, they both disappear or at least fade into the background38. Secondly, in both De latenter vivendo and Non posse, Plutarch emphasises that Epicurus aims at an unjust fame, but the way in which this is gained greatly differs in both works. Indeed, the unfair and egoistic character of his behaviour, which was emphasised in the former work, totally disappears in the latter, where Plutarch focuses on the theme of Epicurus’ unjustified selfpraise. It is this self-praise which seems to have been important in the antiEpicurean polemical tradition. If that is true, Plutarch gives this tradition an interesting turn in the first chapter of De latenter vivendo, by connecting the traditional idea of an Epicurus gloriosus not with the latter’s unjustified selfpraise but with his advice to ‘live unnoticed’. In other words, he changed not the end that was polemically ascribed to Epicurus (that is, fame), but the means to that end. b) The argument of inconsistency between words and deeds, which constitutes the second pillar of Plutarch’s argumentation, frequently occurs in the Corpus Plutarcheum and forms one of the important argumentative strategies in the philosophical polemics against both Stoics and Epicureans39. Its The chapters 15-19 (1096F-1100D); cf. H. Adam (1974), 46-47; K.-D. Zacher (1982), 21; F. Albini (1993), 23. 37 Non posse 1099D; cf. also Comp. Cim. et Luc. 1,7 and Lys. 2,1. 38 Plutarch alludes to the theme of λάθε βιώσας in chapter 19 (1100BC), where he ascribes to Epicurus a lack of political talent. On the slight value of this argument, which is characterised by the typical ancient interest in the author’s ἦθος, see G. Roskam (2007), 64. 39 The strategy occurs, e.g., in De prof. in virt. 76AB (directed against the Stoics) and 84B-85B (consistency as a general ἐπιλογισμός of moral progress; see G. Roskam (2005a), 239-244 and 320-335) and in Non posse 1095C-F. The anti-Stoic polemic De Stoic. rep. is even entirely based on the demand of consistency (both between words and deeds and between several tenets; cf. M. Baldassarri (1976), 53-54 and G. Boys-Stones (1997), 4748 on the ambivalent formula τὴν τῶν δογμάτων ὁμολογίαν ἐν τοῖς βίοις in 1033A). 36
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central importance is stressed and argued in a very explicit way at the beginning of De Stoicorum repugnantiis (1033AB). Plutarch was not the only one who considered such consistency between words and deeds to be a matter of major concern. In fact, all of the philosophical schools made much of this argument40, the importance of which is directly connected to their great interest in the domain of ethics. Indeed, the argument of inconsistency between words and deeds became one of the basic eristic strategies which could be used to refute the ethical position of a philosophical opponent41. Such formal eristic strategies formed a kind of matrix which the philosopherpolemicist had at his disposal, and which could be used in various polemical contexts42. c) The pillars on which the argument of the first chapter of De latenter vivendo is based, can thus be traced back to a long tradition of philosophical (anti-Epicurean) polemics. However, they only form the raw material which Plutarch had at his disposal and which he further elaborated in his own, personal way. It should be noted that this material – at least as far as we can verify – was never used in the discussions concerning the Epicurean maxim λάθε βιώσας. The above analysis of Cicero’s anti-Epicurean criticism and of the Stoic attacks by Seneca and Epictetus already showed that the philosophical polemics against Epicurus’ socio-political thinking usually dealt with other questions. This is further illustrated by the concluding section of Adversus Colotem (1124D-1127E), which is entirely dedicated to a refutation of Colotes’ apolitical doctrines43. The Epicurean philosophers are there blamed for dissolving all political institutions and for abrogating the existing legislation (1125C). By destroying religion, they take away the necessary foundation of each society (1125D-F), they attack distinguished philosophers who have given proof of their excellence and usefulness (1126AE), whereas they themselves remain totally useless (1126EF) and hence parasitic (1127A). They deter everyone from any social commitment (1127A) and deride all great political leaders (1127A-C). In short, by abolishing laws and governments, they abolish human living itself (1127DE). Such argumentation is very different from Plutarch’s anti-Epicurean attack in the first chapter of De latenter vivendo. Indeed, neither the argument of inconsistency See the evidence in J. Mansfeld (1994), 177-191. In order to refute an ethical theory from the inside, one could try to demonstrate that a correct application of its basic precepts did not lead to happiness (cf. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, which was Plutarch’s answer to Colotes, who used the same method in his polemical work Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι κατὰ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων δόγματα οὐδὲ ζῆν ἐστιν, Adv. Colot. 1107E), or one could show that its authors themselves did not live in accordance with their tenets (inconsistency). 42 This appears e.g. from Cicero, fin. 2,81 and Epictetus 3,7,17-18, where the argument is used in an original way; cf. also Cleanthes’ evaluation of Arcesilaus in Diog. Laert. 7,171 (= SVF 1,605). 43 See J. Boulogne (2003), 183-197 for a detailed and systematic analysis. 40 41
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nor the theme of Epicurus’ striving for fame appears in the last part of Adversus Colotem, where the Epicurean attitude is blamed – erroneously, to be sure, but no doubt in accordance with the foregoing tradition – as useless and even subversive. In the first chapter of De latenter vivendo, Plutarch thus develops a new criticism, by introducing the (traditional) anti-Epicurean argument of Epicurus’ excessive φιλοτιμία into the context of the (traditional and formal) argument of inconsistency. To that purpose, however, he cannot but isolate Epicurus’ original advice from its general context. Indeed, Plutarch does not place the maxim back into the general outlines of Epicurus’ socio-political philosophy44, but interprets it as an exhortation to seek obscurity (εἰς ἀδοξίαν προτροπή). That this is a highly biased interpretation hardly needs further explanation. Not only does Plutarch confine himself to the strictly literal meaning of the maxim45 as well as omit all of Epicurus’ arguments in favour of it, but the term ἀδοξία which he uses also has a negative connotation (“ill repute”; LSJ) and is far less neutral than, e.g., λανθάνειν or even ἄγνοια. Even if one interprets ἀδοξία here in a more neutral way (“obscurity”, or even “the condition of being unnoticed”), it remains true that Plutarch’s choice of words reflects his polemical intentions. Finally, Plutarch understands the maxim λάθε βιώσας in a far more absolute way than Epicurus intended it to be (since Plutarch nowhere seems to suggest in this chapter that several exceptions to this rule were possible in the Epicurean doctrine46). Of course, it is only this biased interpretation of the maxim that makes Plutarch’s argument of inconsistency possible. For as long as the maxim λάθε βιώσας is understood in an orthodox Epicurean way, as an advice to avoid participation in public life and ambitious striving for fame, Epicurus proves to be consistent indeed, since he has always sought his ἀταραξία in his Garden, limiting his social contacts for the greater part to the intimate circle of likeminded friends. Plutarch can only establish indications of inconsistency by leaving the Epicurean point of view, by isolating the maxim λάθε βιώσας from its direct context47 and criticising it within the framework of a different phi44 In that light, one should amend M. Isnardi Parente’s casual characterisation of De latenter vivendo as dealing with the theme “dell’astensione dalla vita politica” [(1988), 72; cf. also F. Portalupi (1961), 6]. In fact, this characterisation is as such more applicable to orthodox Epicurean thinking than to the broader subject of De latenter vivendo. Such generalisations are characteristic of the way in which Plutarch’s little work is mostly treated; compare the concise approaches of