Britain's Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain's World Role, 1964-1967

Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community Harold Wilson’s apparent volte-face on European Community membership in the autumn of 1966 has long puzzled commentators and Wilson’s colleagues alike. Based on interviews, private papers and recently released evidence from the National Archives, this book provides a fresh interpretation of Wilson’s policy towards the European Community. Britain’s policy is analysed between 1964 when Harold Wilson took office, and 1967 when the French President General de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s membership application for a second time. Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community examines the rationale behind Britain’s approach, explaining why Wilson launched an initiative for membership when the French seemed certain to obstruct. Helen Parr considers Wilson’s handling of the Cabinet, and elucidates Britain’s diplomacy towards the Six, placing British policy towards Europe within the context of Britain’s foreign policy transition from a global to a regional role. This book will prove to be essential reading for students of postwar British history and those interested in Britain’s historical relationship with Europe. Helen Parr is a Lecturer in the School of Politics, Philosophy and International Relations at Keele University. She is also an editor of The Labour Governments 1964– 1970 Reconsidered (Routledge forthcoming).

British foreign and colonial policy

Series Editor: Peter Catterall ISSN: 1467–5013

This series provides insights into both the background influences on and the course of policy making towards Britain’s extensive overseas interests during the past 200 years. Whitehall and the Suez Crisis Edited by Saul Kelly and Anthony Gorst Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement The Liberal Party, 1919–1939 Richard S.Gray son British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963 Scrutinising the official mind Frank Heinlein Harold Wilson and European Integration Britain’s second application to join the EEC Edited by Oliver Daddow Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955–1958 Beyond Suez Orna Almog The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union, 1937–1939 Louise Grace Shaw Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967 From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six Day War Robert McNamara British Foreign Secretaries since 1974 Edited by Kevin Theakston

The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939–1951 R.M.Douglas India’s Partition The story of imperialism in retreat D.N.Panigrahi Empire as the Triumph of Theory Imperialism, information and the colonial society of 1868 Edward Beasley The British Intervention in Jordan, 1958 Stephen Blackwell The Office of the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, 1854–1945 Thomas Otte Mid-Victorian Imperialists British gentlemen and the empire of the mind Edward Beasley Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community Harold Wilson and Britain’s world role, 1964–1967 Helen Parr British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955–67 Last outpost of a Middle East empire Spencer Mawby

Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community Harold Wilson and Britain’s world role, 1964–1967

Helen Parr

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2006 Helen Parr All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-31029-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-714-65614-3 (Print Edition)

To my parents

Contents

Foreword, by Sir Michael Palliser Preface

xii

Acknowledgements

xiv

Introduction 1 Harold Wilson, Britain’s world role and the European Community, October 1964 to January 1965 2 Bridge-building and the empty chair: British policy towards the European Community, February 1965 to February 1966 3 The politics of decision, March to October 1966

x

1 13 36 61

4 Free-wheeling with the General: the formation and conduct of the probe of the 89 Six, November 1966 to March 1967 5 Finding a role? Cabinet’s acceptance of the European application, March to 114 April 1967 6 The long haul to membership? May to December 1967 134 Conclusions

163

Bibliography

182

Index

195

Foreword

By Sir Michael Palliser

Helen Parr has chosen to write about a particularly intricate and interesting segment of the complicated jigsaw of Britain’s post-World War Two relationship with the other countries of Western Europe. As with any jigsaw, the segment has to fit in comfortably with those that precede and those that follow it, if the picture as a whole is in due course to be revealed. That final revelation, of course, is still a long way off. There remain many other pieces of the puzzle to be fitted in first, over the coming years. The period from 1964 to 1967 is only a short but highly significant moment in the long story. The author, thanks to meticulous research and real scholarship, achieves the linkage with the past and the future and also gives a detailed, and I believe, accurate account of the formidable political and economic problems with which, in its search for EEC membership, the government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson had to contend, both on the domestic front and abroad. I was fortunate enough to be for two of the years in question—1966–7—the Foreign Office Private Secretary to Wilson in 10 Downing Street, having succeeded my friend and colleague Oliver Wright after Wilson’s victory in the March 1966 general election. That was traditionally at the time the number two post in the team of private secretaries at Number Ten. I had to ensure that the Prime Minister was fully informed about every aspect of foreign relations, to convey his reflections or comments to the Foreign Secretary and to ensure in turn that the latter’s views and advice were drawn fully to the Prime Minister’s attention. This remit was not, of course, confined to any particular aspect of foreign policy or any particular region of the world. I had, so far as possible, to cover the globe. But by the time I joined Number Ten, Europe had become a particularly important item on the Prime Minister’s agenda. This was satisfying to me. As a young army officer in a tank battalion in the North West European campaign in 1944–5, and subsequently for 18 months in the postwar Army of Occupation in Germany, I had seen with dismay the appalling destruction and human misery resulting from the second war within 20 years started by the nations of Europe. As many others, I had resolved that this must somehow be prevented from ever happening again, so I welcomed the efforts of the six nations of Western Europe to form a real community and I regretted the reluctance of successive British governments, until that of Harold Macmillan, to become involved in the process. Naturally, as a junior in the Foreign Office in the early years of my service there, my personal views were of no account, no doubt rightly so. But by 1964, when I was Head of the Foreign Office

Planning Staff, the attitude of the then Conservative government coincided with my own, even after the blow of General de Gaulle’s 1963 veto. The arrival of the Labour government after the 1964 general election appeared to change the European picture, as the book brings out. So, when I was interviewed by Harold Wilson to see if he would accept me as his private secretary in 1966, after a friendly and positive conversation I thought it only right to tell him that I was very concerned to see active British participation in Europe and that I would not wish him to take me on under a misapprehension. He laughed. ‘We won’t have any difficulty over Europe: you’ll see’ he replied. And nor did we. Why that was so this book demonstrates with clarity and accuracy, based on a mass of written and oral evidence, much of it only recently available. Amid all the information about both policy and people, which in any case makes fascinating reading, two broad conclusions emerge about Harold Wilson himself, the main character in a remarkable cast taking part in the political drama that the book unfolds. I believe them both to be correct, despite a certain amount of evidence to the contrary. Harold Wilson was an extraordinarily complex human being, combining intellectual brilliance with political cunning, but with an inveterate tendency to suspect others, friends as well as opponents, of motives and ambitions designed to thwart his own or even to displace him. Many of those closest to him found it difficult to divine his purposes and often misunderstood them. This explains, I think, the disagreements among his political associates which are described in the book, in particular about his real intentions towards Europe. Was he sincere in his expressed desire to see Britain join the EEC? Did he see this as essentially a political, not solely an economic matter? Or was his apparent approval of the EEC simply designed to appease his pro-European colleagues and demonstrate the impossibility of British membership? Helen Parr concludes, rightly in my view, that he was indeed sincere and the evidence in the book supports that. But her further conclusion, which I also support, is for those who knew Wilson perhaps equally contentious. She brings out at various points in the book that contrary to a widespread belief that Wilson was a great tactician but a poor strategist; the converse is almost certainly the case. He had strategic vision, but his attempts to pursue that vision were sometimes hampered by indifferent or misconceived tactics. These resulted all too often from his instinctive distrust of the motives of others, including even those colleagues who shared his vision and whose advice and support he most needed. Who can tell which of us is right? My advice is to read this book and see what conclusion you in turn may reach.

Preface

In the postwar years Whitehall tentatively began to explore the idea of long-range planning. Preventative planning had long been imbued into Civil Service culture, particularly through the Edwardian device of the War Book. Forecasting future domestic needs and then planning to meet them, however, had not. Observing trends in, for instance, fuel policy or car usage and then making choices in response became increasingly one of the tasks of government. In an era when international options on whether or not to retain expensive and not particularly desirable commitments like the British forces on the Rhine were boxed in by the exigencies of the cold war, a mixture of cost and scarcity factors pushed governments to think more strategically in other spheres. One of these spheres, perhaps contrary to popular belief, was the European. There seems little doubt that, had the various European Communities that came into being in the 1950s not existed, few British politicians of any party would have regarded their creation in that form as a desirable object of policy. Even those politicians who at the time talked of themselves as ‘Europeans’, among whom Harold Wilson does not feature, tended to have a different and looser vision of ‘Europe’ than that which came about. Nevertheless, come about it did, and by the early 1960s the existence of the Six boxed British policy options in as surely did the cold war in wider international policy. This, however, does not mean that British policy was entirely reactive. Harold Macmillan, when he unveiled his scheme for European entry to President Kennedy in April 1961, christened it his ‘Great Design’, subtly conceived as it was for addressing future political and strategic issues in Europe, as well as domestic and Commonwealth concerns. Wilson was more down-to-earth, arguably less given both to strategic thinking and such flights of (over) subtlety. His comments at the time of the first bid for entry into Europe of 1961–3, both publicly and privately, suggest a more tactical appraisal. Even when persuaded to launch his own bid for membership, as detailed in this book, he could still use the negative language of lack of alternatives to which, now as then, British proEuropeans too readily turn. And yet there was a broader vision as well which, as for Macmillan, tied in with wider policy objectives. Wilson’s call for a European Technological Community was more than tokenistic, reflected domestic policies which were being pursued energetically, albeit with mixed success, and launched an idea which was only to be achieved in a more attentuated form by the successive European Research and Technological Development Framework Programmes first introduced in 1984. And, as Helen Parr here argues, there was a political vision as well. Europe was not just a prop to shore up Britain’s by then visibly crumbling international position. Wilson also aspired to an Anglo-French led Europe. Both of these developments—the political and the

technological—if successful, might have also had the beneficial effect of increasing British leverage with their powerful American ally. However, as it turned out, Wilson’s bid for entry was doomed almost before it was made. Britain’s economic travails may have given the French a perfect excuse for their hostility. In reality, however, despite his best efforts, there was little Wilson could offer that they wanted out of such a bid. France, for instance, did not need the unknown consequences of a technological community to make joint projects like Concorde happen. Much of Wilson’s strategy in connection with the bid was therefore concerned with preparing for failure. Macmillan four years earlier had been faced with a similar dilemma and had used the opportunity to demonise de Gaulle in American eyes while cementing his own relations with the Kennedy administration. His European policy, however, was left in tatters. Wilson almost had the reverse experience. By the end of 1967 many of the policy goals with which he had entered office had collapsed. Sterling had been devalued, the East of Suez role was about to end and the National Plan was an ignominious failure. On Europe, however, as Parr shows, Wilson had gone from a position of mild scepticism to firm commitment, regardless of de Gaulle’s present hostility. His bid was left on the table to be picked up again after the 1970 general election by, contrary to Wilson’s own expectations, his Conservative successor Edward Heath. Europe, then, was one of the few policy areas in which the Wilson governments of 1964–70 did not get blown off course by circumstances. Indeed, instead, policy was to harden remarkably across these years. How far Wilson, like Macmillan, was the progenitor of these developments is, however, another matter. Unlike his Tory predecessor, Wilson did not have form as a Europhile. And his thinking about Europe at the time of the first bid, at least in Shadow Cabinet discussions, seems to have been largely in economic terms. The shift in his position subsequent to his arrival in Downing Street, as Parr shows, seems to owe much to the persuasive powers of the Foreign Office. Once in Opposition again in 1972 Wilson was to divide his own party in leading them against the entry terms Heath had eventually negotiated. But then, he had been always been at his most cautious—witness the various negotiating probes he launched—and deeply pragmatic in his European policy. He did not share Heath’s instinctive Europeanism. He could and did object to the specific terms of a policy, unavailingly as it proved during the rather bogus ‘renegotiation’ exercise upon his return to office in 1974, whilst not disputing the overall goal. The Wilson who thus emerges from this account differs markedly from the ‘Yorkshire Walter Mitty’ of legend, twisting and turning in every wind. European entry was, Wilson was persuaded during the 1960s, in Britain’s strategic interest. Quite how he was persuaded, what that strategic vision was, and how, in the difficult circumstances of the mid-1960s, he went about pursuing it, is the story of this book. Peter Catterall General Editor 27 July 2004

Acknowledgements

This book has been a long time in its making and it would not have been possible without the support of a number of institutions and people. First, I wish to thank my two doctoral supervisors, Dr James Ellison and Professor Peter Hennessy. Peter’s enthusiasm for post1945 British history has been a source of inspiration since I began my Masters at Queen Mary and continues to be so. Particular thanks are due to James, who commented in detail on innumerable drafts of my thesis and offered invaluable support. James has continued to provide telling observations on subsequent drafts of this book and I owe him many thanks. I wish also to thank the staff at the former Institute of Contemporary British History, in particular Dr Harriet Jones, for friendship and encouragement. The examiners of my PhD, Professor John Young and Dr Piers Ludlow, made important comments on the text and I would especially like to thank Piers for his remarks on later drafts of the manuscript. I wish also to thank the series editor, Dr Peter Catterall, for his comments on this manuscript and to the editorial team at Routledge for the assistance they have provided. Conversations with other former research students and friends, including Philip Alexander, Kay Arthur, Gavin Bailey, Andrew Blick, Paul BouHabib, Michael Brennan, Oliver Buston, Grace Chapman, Richard Coggins, Jamie Coulthard, Jon Davis, Chris Fagg, Sue Fisher, Andrew Flynn, Andrew Holden, Rebecca Gillieron, Mark Leonard, Chas Loft, Glen O’Hara, Hugh Pemberton, Melissa Pine, Liz Piper, Amanda Singh and Keir Thorpe have also been useful at various times and for differing reasons. I have also been lucky enough to work in very supportive institutions. The history department at Queen Mary College was a dynamic environment in which to study for my Masters and subsequently my PhD. I benefited tremendously from employment as a temporary lecturer at Queen Mary and also at King’s College, London. After completing my thesis, the International History Department at LSE provided a stimulating workplace. In the final stages of completing this manuscript, I have also been fortunate to take up employment in the School of Politics, Philosophy and International Relations (SPIRE) at Keele University; and I would like to acknowledge the support of colleagues in all these institutions. Thanks are due to the British Federation of Women Graduates Charitable Foundation for funding much of my fourth year and to Queen Mary History Department Stretton Fund for a research grant. I would also like to thank the staff of various libraries and archives, mainly the National Archives in Kew, the Modern Records Reading Room of the Bodleian Library, the British Library, Queen Mary Library and the British Library of Political Science, but also the Bank of England Archive, the Labour Party Archive, the LSE Archive and the Churchill College Archive Centre. Particular thanks to Jane Reilly

and also to the Bodleian Library for granting me permission to quote from the papers of Sir Patrick Reilly and to the trustees of the private papers of Lord George Brown, Anthony Crosland, Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Alastair Hetherington and Lord Wilson of Rievaulx for providing permission to cite from these papers. Several participants have also been kind enough to allow me to interview them: thanks to the late Sir Patrick Reilly, Lord Eric Roll, Lord Peter Shore and Sir Norman Statham, and also to Sir Derek Mitchell, Lord George Thomson and most particularly to Sir Michael Palliser. I would also like to thank all my friends, especially Liz and Mandie, for bearing with me and providing me with much-appreciated support. My partner’s family, particularly Pat and Gayna, have been extremely understanding and helpful. My thanks also go to my family, especially to Marian, and to Chris, Don, Hilda and Joy for much encouragement and laughter. My deepest thanks go to Gavin, who has patiently listened to many versions of papers I have presented and has been a willing partner in many discussions, subjectrelated and otherwise. Without his support and constant good humour I doubt I would have completed this book. Finally, my thanks to my parents, Harmer and Vivien, who have supported me in all aspects of my life and without whom this project would never have been possible. This manuscript is dedicated to them.

Introduction

The 1960s were a crucial decade in the history of Britain’s relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC). Since the end of the Second World War, the British had taken an approach towards European integration at odds with many of their continental neighbours. The 1950s witnessed the more serious divergence between Britain and the Six founding states of the European Communities; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. In 1950, the British decided against participation in the Schuman Plan establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.1 Three years later, the British withdrew from the Spaak Committee negotiations instigated at Messina, a process that culminated in the signature in March 1957 of the Treaties of Rome, setting up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Authority (EURATOM).2 Although historians have reached a comprehensive understanding of the rationale driving British policy, most still agree that Britain’s retreat from the Spaak Committee was a mistake.3 Thereafter, the British struggled to reconcile their interests with the burgeoning EEC. First, the Conservative government under Anthony Eden attempted to coax the negotiators of the Six into a broader free trade area.4 After this had failed, the new Macmillan government returned to Plan G, and sought to use the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to build a free trade area around the fringes of the Community’s proposed common external tariff.5 The Free Trade Area talks became embroiled in technical difficulties and having encountered overt opposition from Fifth Republic France, the OEEC confirmed their collapse in December 1958.6 The British contented themselves with a European Free Trade Association (EFTA), comprising Austria, Denmark, Portugal, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Finally, as the 1960s began, Macmillan embarked on a review of British policy leading to Britain’s first application for membership of the European Communities in 1961.7 Although Macmillan’s initiative failed, by 1973 Britain was a full member of the EEC. Thus, the substantial shift in British policy that brought Britain to terms with the European Community occurred during the 1960s and the first two years of the 1970s. To date, and understandably given the availability of primary evidence, the main advances in historical debate regarding Britain’s approach for membership of the EEC have concerned Macmillan’s 1961–3 bid for accession. Historians have discussed both why and how Harold Macmillan decided to apply for membership of the Community. On the subject of why, some historians emphasise the compelling economic factors pressing the Conservative governments towards a membership bid. The British needed to secure their position within a competitive global marketplace. The proportion of both Britain’s

Britain's policy towards the European Community

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imports and exports were shifting away from the Commonwealth and towards the Community countries, moreover, the ‘cold douche’ of enhanced competition would provide stimulus to force change in Britain’s sluggish industrial structure. Exclusion from the increasingly dynamic European Community would curtail Britain’s international influence.8 Others have centralised political factors to account for Macmillan’s turn towards the EEC. Macmillan appreciated the demise in Britain’s international power position. The failure of the Paris Summit in 1960 showed clearly Britain’s inability to influence superpower decision making.9 The successes of the nascent Community exposed Britain’s position further. As the Community became more powerful, so the Americans would turn increasingly to the EEC, and, worryingly, to the West Germans, as their primary partner across the Atlantic.10 Historians have differed as to the emphasis they place on the importance of the Anglo-American partnership in determining Macmillan’s shift. For Wolfram Kaiser, Macmillan’s initiative was a tactical manoeuvre to secure American support for the continuation of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, as well as to divide the Labour Party and to face down pro-European opposition within the Conservative Party.11 For others, such as Nigel Ashton or James Ellison, Macmillan intended a ‘hedge against the unreliability’ of the Atlantic relationship.12 As Britain’s influence in Washington weakened, so Macmillan sought an alternative position of leadership in the European Community, both to foster a new role for Britain and to shore up Britain’s international posture. The debate as to how Macmillan attempted to enter the Community has been sharpened by the failure of Britain’s initiative in January 1963. Essentially, Macmillan applied, not directly for membership of the EEC, but to conduct negotiations to ascertain whether the conditions existed for accession. Most commentators have comprehended Macmillan’s conditional approach in terms of the Prime Minister’s need to head off serious domestic dissent. John Ramsden’s sympathetic history of the Conservative Party recounts that Macmillan realised that Britain must head out of Empire, signalled by his pronouncement that the ‘wind of change’ was sweeping across the African continent, and into the EEC. In order to bring the party to accept this transformation, both ends of the transition had to be disguised. As many as 80 Conservative MPs opposed the notion of Britain’s membership of the European Community, including heavyweight members of the Cabinet.13 For one commentator, Macmillan manipulated the reluctant members of the Cabinet, employing clever, obfuscatory language to bring ministers to support an application.14 Another claims that Conservative opposition to the initiative has been overstated. Macmillan in fact moved towards the EEC in order to placate the proEuropean Conservative MPs, as well as to outflank the Liberals and to deepen the split in the Labour Party.15 Alan Milward’s comprehensive study adopts a different argument. Milward shows that Britain’s national strategy was consistently global in outlook, geared to maximise the benefits of the tactical advantages the British still possessed, such as an independent nuclear deterrent and the preferential system of trade with the Commonwealth. Macmillan turned to the EEC because exclusion from the Community would condemn Britain to weakening economic influence and thus would erode Britain’s authority in Washington and with the Commonwealth. Macmillan did not, however, make a distinct political choice in favour of Community accession in 1961. With the Cabinet insistent on special terms for Britain, Macmillan opted to advance towards the

Introduction

3

EEC while not breaking the ministerial consensus that Britain’s stance should remain global. Britain would turn to the Community, but only on terms that permitted a continuation of Britain’s trade with the Commonwealth and preserved Britain’s agricultural system.16 This strategy failed, Milward argues, in the summer of 1962. Subsequently, membership of the European Community on the Community’s terms was the primary objective of Britain’s overseas policy: there was no convincing alternative.17 The impact of Macmillan’s conditional approach on the outcome of Britain’s initiative has also engendered lively debate. Some commentators have focused on Macmillan’s grand strategy. In this interpretation, Macmillan’s acceptance of the Polaris missile deal with the Americans in December 1962 has been seen as the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. The Nassau agreement illustrated to the French President, General de Gaulle, Britain’s continued ties to the USA and contingent unsuitability for membership of the EEC.18 Closer attention to the 15 months of negotiations in Brussels has posed further questions. One interpretation suggests that the conditional application undermined Britain’s chances in Brussels. Macmillan, keen to quash domestic doubts about accession, asked for too much, and despite requests from the negotiators in Brussels, failed to encourage adequate, timely compromises.19 A more recent view suggests that the negotiators in the Six, sympathetic to the demands of domestic audiences, understood Britain’s requests for safeguards. Conversely, the expectation of negotiating success at home left the British in an uncomfortable position, unable to convince domestic opinion of the need to make concessions.20 This was evident during British Cabinet discussions of the vue d’ensemble under negotiation in late July and early August 1962. Negotiations between the Six terminated without a binding agreement on Commonwealth trade. Ludlow shows that the British must bear some responsibility for their failure, as in late July, the Cabinet had opted to reject the terms on offer. Partially for presentational reasons, ministers preferred to hold out for better arrangements in the autumn.21 Ludlow’s argument encourages observations as to the importance of Britain’s tactics in explaining the collapse of the negotiations in 1963. All commentators agree that de Gaulle was hostile to British accession, with some preferring to emphasise the French President’s political opposition and others pointing to the centrality of agriculture and French economic dependence on the existing EEC.22 Moreover, other writers have shared the view that Britain’s ability to enter did not begin and end in Paris. Studies have attested the importance of Britain’s tactical approach to the West Germans. The British, as Martin Schaad explains, failed to employ political arguments to convince the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to support British accession on its merits, jeopardising the potential for Germany to bring pressure to bear on the French.23 Furthermore, few would deny that de Gaulle was in a stronger domestic position in early 1963 than he had been in 1961, once he had dealt with the Algerian question and secured his domestic mandate.24 What Ludlow adds is attention to the importance of the constraints placed on de Gaulle by the Community system. Britain’s inability to make more rapid concessions allowed de Gaulle to ground his rebuttal in the evidence of the fractious months of negotiations. Speaking to the press in January 1963, de Gaulle talked about Britain’s ties to the USA, but concentrated mainly on Britain’s difficulties in accepting the Community’s terms for agriculture and for Commonwealth trade.25 In this way, de Gaulle could equate French interests with the interests of the Community. While France wished to protect the burgeoning Community, Britain’s entry would disturb and transform it. Thus, if

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Macmillan missed an opportunity, it was less because of Nassau, than because of unrealistic expectations, hardened by the conditional application, as to what Britain could achieve in Brussels. In contrast to the 1961–3 application, Britain’s second attempt to enter the European Community under Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1966–7 has received little attention. Undoubtedly, this is the consequence of the availability of primary material. With British archives now fully open for the period, new works have begun to emerge. Oliver Daddow’s edited collection of essays was the first of these books directly to address the issue of Wilson’s EEC initiative, complemented recently by the publication of John Young’s work on the international policies of the Labour governments, 1964– 70.26 However, this book is the first monograph focusing exclusively on Harold Wilson’s policy towards the European Community, having full access to the available primary material. It is based mainly on government sources in the National Archives, but it has also made use of numerous collections of private papers. Alastair Hetherington, the editor of the Guardian, with whom Wilson spoke regularly; Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office; and Sir Patrick Reilly, Britain’s Ambassador in Paris, all possess private collections of papers which have contributed valuable additions to our comprehension of the development of Britain’s approach. Not least, Wilson’s own papers are now partially available, and access to these has facilitated a fuller understanding of the attitude of this most ambiguous of prime ministers. Moreover, this book has made use of the Labour Party archives, the Bank of England archives, elements of the press, published documents from the United States and interviews with key participants. The availability of these sources permits new complexities and nuances of opinion. Yet this work deliberately aims to establish the distinct methodological approach of reconstructing the opinion of policy makers as they appeared at the time. A full understanding of what British policy was and why it was constructed in that way enables the historian to elude the burden of hindsight and illuminates comprehension of Britain’s policy towards the EEC in this important decade in three main ways. It is to these aspects that this introduction now turns. The first justification for a primary source based study of British policy 1964–7 concerns the issue of continuity between Britain’s two attempts to enter the EEC. Harold Wilson’s policy has been overlooked not only because of the hitherto dearth of sources, but also as a consequence of a general sense of inevitability about Britain’s turn to the EEC. Struggling to explain the reasons why Wilson apparently shifted from hostility towards Community membership to enthusiastic support, commentators have settled on the idea, to use Lieber’s phrase, of ‘collapsing alternatives’.27 In this interpretation, Labour came to office after 13 years in opposition unversed in the ‘realities’ of Britain’s global power position.28 The experience of office was a sharp shock to ministers bred on assumptions of Britain’s great power role. Rapidly recognising the relative demise in Britain’s international status, Wilson had no choice but to turn to the EEC. Such an interpretation shares assumptions with the survey literature on the transformation in Britain’s overseas role from ‘Empire’ to ‘Europe’. Writers in the 1970s such as F.S.Northedge argued that the contraction of Britain’s economic power created an external reality to which ministers had to adjust. Successive governments failed to cut the British coat according to its cloth, embarking on globalist policies that overstretched Britain’s diminishing resources.29 In this view, ministers perceived the European

Introduction

5

Community as the disfavoured third of Winston Churchill’s famous ‘three circles’ and turned to the EEC only after better options had been ruled out.30 It was only a matter of time before Wilson was forced to face up to Britain’s scaled-down capabilities, which pressed Britain inexorably towards the EEC. Alan Milward has added a different perspective on the same debate. He maintains that after the July 1962 summit between Britain and the Six, at which it was evident that Britain could not get the terms desired for Commonwealth trade, British national strategy changed. At this juncture, membership of the European Community became the central objective of British overseas policy.31 Thus, although Milward’s case shares none of the assumptions of ‘collapsing alternatives’, he also intimates that Britain’s first application was an irrevocable turning point in Britain’s trajectory. However, Wilson did not exhibit continuity with previous Conservative governments’ stance when he took office in 1964. The question of what Wilson’s policy was—and why it changed—is consequently of acute importance in explaining Britain’s accommodation towards the Community. There have been two main approaches to this issue. On the one hand, some have maintained that Wilson lacked strategic vision and was obsessed only with domestic politics. For Jeffrey Pickering, Wilson opted for a global foreign policy, deluded about Britain’s power. His retreat from East of Suez and turn to the EEC was the result of the configuration of domestic politics, as Wilson, a weak leader, reacted to pressures from his Cabinet team.32 Some of Wilson’s closest colleagues agree that the Prime Minister’s policy towards the Community was driven by domestic political considerations. Paymaster General and Wilson’s security adviser George Wigg explained that after the damaging July 1966 crisis, Wilson needed an initiative that ‘looked and sounded like business’.33 Peter Shore, Wilson’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, concurred, arguing that Wilson never seriously intended to take Britain into the EEC, but did it to show the pro-European then Foreign Secretary George Brown that it was not possible.34 President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, thought Wilson was reacting to a hostile press in the form of the Mirror Group ‘and the belief that this could be skilfully averted by at least the appearance of an approach to Europe’.35 The chairman of the Mirror Group, Cecil King, was equally unconvinced of Wilson’s personal support for EEC membership, commenting in March 1966 that ‘none of these terms is available and it is hard to see what Wilson is playing at’.36 More recently, Wolfram Kaiser has added to Labour Party considerations that Wilson sought to outflank the new Conservative leader Edward Heath and to isolate de Gaulle in Europe.37 If, as we know, Douglas Jay took cornflakes with him on continental trips, then Wilson’s enduring image, to borrow a phrase from Peter Hennessy, is that he looked at Europe through the provincial lens of ‘HP spattered’ spectacles.38 On the other hand, commentators ascribing to Wilson a greater sense of strategy have argued that he probably did decide to turn towards the Community ‘at some point between 1964 and 1966’, but that he obscured his intentions for domestic political reasons.39 With a Parliamentary majority lessened to three, a party containing sceptics about EEC membership and a Cabinet consisting of some heavyweight opponents of British entry, there was little scope for an earlier initiative. Miriam Camps explained in 1965 that Wilson’s own uncertainty about membership was tempered with a grudging understanding that the UK ‘cannot afford not to become a member of a European Community’.40 Helen Wallace saw support emerging from ambiguity: ‘after the 1966

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election, a vague sympathy for a new approach was transmuted into a firm resolve’.41 Philip Ziegler’s authorised biography suggested that by the autumn of 1966, Wilson was a ‘decided, if sometimes covert, supporter of British entry’.42 Ben Pimlott maintained that it was during the probe of the countries of the Six in early 1967 that Wilson became a whole-hearted convert to the European cause.43 Cynthia Frey argued that Wilson’s concentration on the political issues confirmed his sincerity in taking Britain into the EEC.44 Uwe Kitzinger agreed, reasoning that only the 1970 election defeat prevented Wilson from collecting ‘the prizes for European statesmanship that several foundations lavished on Edward Heath at the end of 1971’.45 In this more sympathetic interpretation, Wilson turned to the Community because he had no choice. John Young argues convincingly that the government had little alternative, as the Commonwealth was a wasting asset, a North Atlantic Free Trade Area was impossible and the option of ‘Going It Alone’ was no longer viable.46 This book builds on these historiographical foundations to present a new view of what Wilson’s policy was and why he elected in October 1966 to embark upon an initiative for membership. Access to primary material highlights the strategic considerations underlying Wilson’s approach. Wilson never ruled out membership of the European Community, yet, like Macmillan’s government, he aspired to the attainment of membership only on the right terms. The revelation of the terms of entry in August 1962, added to the failure of the Conservative bid in January 1963, led Wilson to prioritise the Commonwealth in Britain’s overseas affairs. Focus on the Commonwealth and on Britain’s defence role in the Far East did relegate the importance of the EEC in Britain’s outlook. Nevertheless, from 1964 Wilson engaged in a policy towards the Community based upon technological partnership with the French, and from early 1965 the notion of ultimate accession to the Community was a growing feature of policy. January 1966 witnessed a turning point of sorts, in response to the Community’s empty chair crisis and to the threat of France’s withdrawal from NATO. It was after the July 1966 sterling crisis that Wilson was pushed towards an initiative to attain membership while de Gaulle was still in power.47 Following the deflation imposed after the crisis, the Prime Minister faced the unravelling of Labour’s domestic programme, as the National Plan targets could not be met. Moreover, accelerated withdrawal from the Far East subsequent to the crisis led Wilson to grasp at the notion of British leadership of the EEC to forge a new overseas role. The second reason for this book’s closer attention to Labour’s application is that 1967 emerges as the moment at which the domestic political consensus in Britain shifted decisively in favour of a British future in Europe. This may seem a surprising observation, given that in the early 1970s Wilson eased the party against accession on the terms of entry negotiated by Edward Heath’s government. Wilson’s policy of renegotiation of the terms of entry and referendum on Britain’s continued membership of the Community once Labour regained office in 1974, shows the continuing domestic political difficulties with British membership of the Community.48 Labour’s left-ward drift in the early 1980s and the 1983 manifesto pledge to withdraw from the EEC further indicates that the party was ill at ease with Britain’s role in Europe.49 However, when Britain’s initiative in 1967 is contrasted with that of 1961, the extent to which the British political establishment had moved towards the European Community becomes apparent. In 1961, Macmillan’s application for membership was conditional upon the attainment of

Introduction

7

certain terms. By contrast, in 1967 Wilson delivered a one-line application for membership of the EEC. In a statement to the Commons, he outlined certain areas where safeguards would be necessary, but Wilson gave no guarantee of changes in advance of accession. The Commons vote of 488 to 62 was overwhelmingly in favour. Within the Labour Party, there was still considerable ambivalence, as despite a three-line whip, 36 voted against and 50 abstained. Amongst the Conservatives, 26 voted against.50 Nevertheless, the second application established, as Hugo Young wrote, a ‘critical mass’ of support in favour of a British future in the EEC, a critical mass that has not since been broken by either major party in power.51 With this in mind, the way in which Wilson handled the EEC question domestically assumes additional importance. Although this book does not seek to address attitudes towards the EEC within the Labour Party, the wider political environment or the public, the question as to why a Cabinet supposedly antipathetic to British membership of the Community agreed to endorse Wilson’s unconditional initiative merits close inspection. Commentators have tended to focus on Wilson’s domestic political manipulation, presenting Wilson as a master tactician.52 Douglas Jay provided an outspoken account, arguing that Wilson deliberately obscured the principle of membership behind discussion of the conditions. Jay contended that the Cabinet never would have agreed to the tour of the countries of the Six in November 1966 had Wilson asked for a deliberate decision on the principle of membership. Once begun, it became more difficult to halt the course of the application. Jay only failed to resign because Wilson continued to stress the importance that membership would only occur on the right terms.53 Douglas Evans extended this interpretation. Evans stressed that the political class foisted on an unsuspecting public and parliament, a decision that created a ‘radical realignment of power and accountability’ without discussion. The reasons why Wilson and later Heath supported British membership of the Community were never made clear and the implications of membership were insufficiently explained.54 The consequence, to borrow words the then Minister of Technology Tony Benn used later, was a ‘democratic coup d’état’, an unprecedented transfer of constitutional powers.55 Scholarly analyses such as those by Wallace and Tratt support to some extent Evans’ judgement. Wallace showed that in order to gain acceptance of European membership from the Cabinet and public, Wilson muddied the issues surrounding membership. The need to appeal to opinion in Brussels meant that ministers could never reveal decisions until after their confirmation in the European arena. This clouding of the issues was possible because decision making was concentrated in the hands of a small number of ‘pro’ European ministers and officials, reflecting the growth of central control over policy.56 Tratt adopts a similar approach. In her work on the Macmillan initiative, she argued that ministers and officials exploited the ‘formal and informal’ power structures of the state to push their decision through.57 This book agrees that policy making towards the European Community became increasingly elite-centred. However, it adopts a different emphasis in seeking to explain why this centralisation occurred. Rather than to see domestic politics as Wilson’s priority, this research suggests that Wilson gave precedence to the strategic objective of attaining membership of the EEC, despite the likelihood that Britain’s initiative would fail in the short term. Thus, Jay’s argument that Wilson evaded discussion on the principle of membership is inadequate. On the contrary, after the probe of the countries of the Six,

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Wilson deliberately presented the Cabinet with a political choice. Even if de Gaulle prevented British accession, Britain would have to enter over the longer term. This approach backed Cabinet into a corner, leaving them with little alternative but to accept the application. Nevertheless, when presented with the option of accepting a European future or irrevocably turning away, ministers, albeit reluctantly, chose Europe. The error of Wilson’s approach was that he failed to garner a consensus as to the conditions under which Britain would enter the EEC; indeed, he did not attempt to do so. In this way, Wilson’s initiative was less a temporary lid on underlying hostility, but a contributory factor to later distaste towards the terms of Community membership.58 The third reason for further study of Wilson’s policy is that the period 1964–7 was a crucial time in the Community’s development. After the shock of the 1963 veto, which threatened to paralyse Community progress, the Six were faced with the three principal challenges of settling their agricultural financial arrangements, of creating a political organisation and of determining their attitude to enlargement.59 French dominance of the Community, a key characteristic of the early flourish, could no longer be taken for granted. The empty chair crisis breaking in July 1965, during which the French refused to participate in Community institutions, illustrated the heightened willingness of the West Germans, supported by the Italians and the Dutch, to stand up to the French, calling de Gaulle’s bluff on his repeated threats to withdraw from the EEC.60 Moreover, although the French had successfully prevented Britain’s entry in 1963, the unilateral nature of de Gaulle’s veto ensured that the question of enlargement was not dead. De Gaulle’s ability to justify his exclusion of Britain depended upon the continued willingness of the Five— and of opinion within France—tacitly to accept such justification.61 De Gaulle’s retraction of France from the command structures of NATO in March 1966 further emphasised the differences between France and their principal partners within the Six.62 Britain’s policy towards the Community could therefore influence proceedings within the EEC. If Britain did not wish ever to join the Community, there was little point for the Five to press for enlargement, and fewer reasons for them to resist a Gaullist conception for European political and defence organisation. Wilson’s policy towards the Community came to reflect this heightened sensitivity towards the internal dynamics of the Community. Between 1964 and 1966, Wilson stated, as the Conservatives had done, that Britain wanted to be involved in any moves towards political union in the Six.63 France’s retreat from NATO’s command connected more intimately Britain’s stance towards the EEC and Britain’s interests within the Atlantic Alliance. The notion of an enlarged Community under British leadership served as a counterweight to a Gaullist vision of a ‘European Europe’, helping to stiffen the Five against acquiescence to de Gaulle’s terms in politics and defence. Once Wilson did decide to embark on an initiative for membership of the Community, Britain’s diplomacy reflected these broader considerations. Thus far, Wilson’s diplomatic approach to the Six has been regarded with some perplexity, as the apparently established fact of a second veto appeared to condemn Wilson’s efforts before they had begun. Richard Crossman, a left-wing ally of Wilson, summed up many critics when he argued that Wilson’s belief in his ability to get into the EEC was founded on his deluded sense of his own diplomatic ability: ‘he already regards himself as an expert on foreign affairs and a statesman able to achieve what no professional diplomat can achieve’.64 As already suggested, this book adopts the

Introduction

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argument that Wilson’s strategic priority in 1967 was to ensure British accession to the European Community whether or not the initiative failed in the short term. In part, Wilson did hope to negotiate a deal with the General, but he also deployed an alternative strategy. Determined to deliver a bid that was convincing to European opinion, Wilson aimed to ‘make life difficult for the General’, by showing Britain’s readiness to enter the Community and exposing de Gaulle’s political opposition to enlargement.65 The British sought to undercut the pretexts for de Gaulle’s veto, making it hard for him to justify his rebuttal in terms acceptable to European and to French opinion. In this way, Harold Wilson helped to establish the foundations of Britain’s third, successful application for Community membership. The fact that Wilson did issue an application the Five could readily support meant that enlargement remained a live issue on the Community’s agenda. After de Gaulle’s prevention of the opening of negotiations in November 1967, Wilson left the application on the table. This policy helped to pressure the French until de Gaulle’s successor, Georges Pompidou, lifted the veto to enlargement at the Hague Summit in 1969.66 Without Wilson’s bid, there would have been little chance that Edward Heath could have instigated Britain’s final initiative only days after the 1970 election. This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 begins with an assessment of the development of Wilson’s policy from 1962 until taking office in 1964. It examines the Prime Minister’s desire to enter the ‘right sort’ of Europe, places Wilson’s policy towards the EEC within the context of Britain’s overseas role and assesses attitudes within Whitehall to Community membership. It concludes with an exploration of Wilson’s first talks with de Gaulle and the West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard in January 1965. Chapter 2 investigates the development of Wilson’s policy of bridge-building between EFTA and the EEC in May 1965 and Britain’s reaction to the Six’s empty chair crisis between July 1965 and February 1966. It shows that bridge-building was a reactive policy. While Wilson did indicate that Britain would have to join some kind of European Community one day, he had not changed in his view that Britain should join only the ‘right sort’ of Europe. This chapter then appraises the impact of the Community’s empty chair crisis on British policy. It illustrates the interrelation between the agricultural breakdown and the issue of the Community’s political and defence organisation and exposes the different reactions in Whitehall to the perceived opportunity to achieve membership. January 1966 marked the moment at which Wilson agreed to begin studies of eventual membership, but whether or not Britain would attempt to accede in the short term remained uncertain. Chapter 3 begins with an examination of the development of policy from the March 1966 election until early July 1966 when the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Georges Pompidou and Maurice Couve de Murville, visited London. This period did mark an attempt by the British to embark on some kind of approach to the Community, but the road into the EEC appeared to be blocked. The chapter then considers the considerable impact of the July sterling crisis on Britain’s policy towards the EEC. It scrutinises the important Chequers meeting of 22 October, at which Wilson announced his intention to conduct a probe of the countries of the Six to see if the conditions existed for membership. Chapter 4 elucidates the formation and conduct of the probe of the countries of the Six. It shows that Wilson had a twin strategy for dealing with the General and assesses

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the impact of Wilson’s approach on the continent. Although Wilson and Brown did make some political advances, the Common Agricultural Policy and sterling were likely to cause difficulties. Chapter 5 shows that Wilson forced the pace towards an application following the tour and it investigates the question of why the Cabinet accepted this application. Not only did Cabinet agree to seek membership for a second time, but they also agreed that Britain’s bid should attach formally no prior conditions. Ministers accepted the political case that there was no alternative but membership, but resented the way in which their options had been foreclosed. Chapter 6 tracks the progress of the application. It starts with an analysis of de Gaulle’s press conference on 16 May, showing that de Gaulle’s early indication he would not permit the opening of negotiations made it much less likely that the Five would strongly press the French to a breach. Wilson still hoped to negotiate a deal with the General in June 1967, arguing to de Gaulle that British membership would bring technological and political strength to the Community, enabling the Community to stand up to the USA. After the Trianon talks, Wilson accepted that de Gaulle would not admit Britain to the Community, and turned his attention to courting the favour of the Five. Meanwhile, George Brown delivered Britain’s negotiating position to the Western European Union (WEU). Trimmed of commitment to satisfaction of the terms of entry in advance, Brown’s speech was very well received by the Europeans. Nevertheless, although the European Commission’s document on enlargement in September urged negotiations to open, de Gaulle continued to cause prevarication and delay. In the wake of devaluation, the French President advanced his public rebuttal of the British bid. Subsequently, the British insisted that the Five demand the opening of negotiations, and in the Council of Ministers on 19 December, the differences between the positions of the French and the Five were established. The British left the application on the table in anticipation of success once the political circumstances were right.

Notes 1 See in particular Dell (1995, esp. pp. 90–170); Bullen (1988, pp. 199–210); Lord (1996); Gillingham (1991, pp. 174, 238–9); Young (1993, pp. 28–35); Greenwood (1992, pp. 30– 41); Milward (2002, pp. 48–77). 2 Burgess and Edwards (1998, pp. 393–413); Young (1989, pp. 197–224); Camps (1964, pp. 45–53); Ellison (2000a, pp. 13–36); Kaiser (1996, pp. 28–60); Bullen (1989, pp. 315–38); Milward (2002, pp. 177–216); Young (1993, pp. 46–8); Moravcsik (1998, pp. 122–35). 3 On the need to understand the motives behind British policy, Ellison (2000a, pp. 1–10); on Britain’s retreat from the Spaak Committee as a mistake, ibid, (pp. 32–6); Deighton (1990, pp. 16–17); Charlton (1981, pp. 9–22); Burgess and Edwards (1998, p. 393); Camps (1964, p. 51); Milward (2002, pp. 177–82, 204–26); Kaiser (1996, pp. 54–60). 4 Ellison (2000a, pp. 25–32); Ellison (1996, pp. 1–18); Milward (2002, pp. 230–3); Camps (1964, pp. 49–50); Young (1993, pp. 43–9). 5 Ellison (2000a, pp. 95–150); Ellison (1996, pp. 17–27); Camps (1964, pp. 93–129); Milward (2002, pp. 240–64); Young (1993, pp. 49–52); Schaad (1998, pp. 39–60); Bromund (2001, pp. 76–97); Kane (1997, pp. 83–98); Kaiser (1996, pp. 61–87); Griffiths (1997, pp. 35–50). 6 Ellison (2000a, pp. 153–220); Camps (1964, pp. 153–72); Milward (2002, pp. 265–309); Lynch (2000, pp. 111–35).

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7 Milward (2002, pp. 310–51); Tratt (1996); Kaiser (1996, pp. 88–173); Camps (1964, pp. 274– 366); Young (1993, pp. 57–85); Greenwood (1992, pp. 79–90); Ellison (2000b, pp. 178–86); Home (1989, pp. 256–62); Macmillan (1972, pp. 44–60) on the failure of FTA and creation of EFTA, ibid. (pp. 316–28) on turning to the Community. 8 For an account that emphasises the economic motivation behind Britain’s policy, Milward (2002, pp. 4–5, 326); Moravcsik (1998, pp. 164–76). 9 Home (1989; p. 256). 10 Steinnes (1998, pp. 61–80). 11 Kaiser (1996, pp. 151–73); Kaiser (1993, pp. 144–54). 12 Ashton (2002, p. 132); Ellison (2000b, pp. 178–86). 13 Ramsden (1996, pp. 146–54). 14 Tratt (1996, pp. 55–127). 15 Kaiser (1996, pp. 143–51). 16 Milward (2002, pp. 310–51). 17 Ibid. (pp. 386–91, 415–17). 18 Toschi (1995, p. 109); for other studies that emphasise the importance of high politics, Bange (2000); Kaiser (1995, pp. 65–85); Deighton and Ludlow (1995, pp. 114–20); Schmidt (1997, pp. 70–90); Vaisse (1997, pp. 51–69); Bange (1997, pp. 191–212). 19 Deighton and Ludlow (1995, pp. 107–11). 20 Ludlow (1999b, pp. 281–5). 21 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 153–4). 22 On the economic aspects, Moravcsik (2000: Part 1, pp. 3–43 and Part 2, pp. 4–68, esp. pp. 4– 34); Milward (2002, pp. 468–83); on the political considerations, Vaisse (1998, pp. 191– 224). 23 Schaad (2000, pp. 167–71); on the importance of Germany, also Bange (2000, pp. 165–233); on Britain’s tactics and Germany, Lee (1999, pp. 211–24); Schulte (1999, pp. 167–84). 24 See also Milward (2002, pp. 466, 481). 25 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 211–12). 26 Daddow (2003); Young (2003a, pp. 142–65). 27 Lieber (1970, p. 261). 28 de La Serre (1968, pp. 886–98). 29 Northedge (1994); Darby (1973). 30 Sanders (1990, p. 166); Roll (1995, pp. 36–7); Northedge (1974, p. 328). 31 Milward (2002, pp. 386–91, 415–17). 32 Pickering (1998, pp. 153–8). 33 Wigg (1972, p. 339). 34 Shore (2000, p. 69). 35 Jay (1980, p. 368). 36 King (1972, p. 62). 37 Kaiser (2001a, pp. 70–2). 38 Comment made by Professor Peter Hennessy, Institute of Contemporary British History Seminar, 14 January 2001. 39 Young (1993, p. 88); Young (2003a, pp. 142–8). 40 Camps (1967, p. 192). 41 Wallace (1975, p. 160). 42 Ziegler (1993, p. 332). 43 Pimlott (1992, pp. 439–40). 44 Frey (1967–68, pp. 197–230). 45 Kitzinger (1973, p. 293). 46 Young (1993, pp. 86–93); Kaiser (2001a, pp. 63–5); Bossuat (2001, pp. 513–15). 47 George Wigg also argued that Wilson turned to the European Community in response to the July crisis (Wigg 1972, p. 339).

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48 See for example, Broad (2001, pp. 72–119); Robins (1979, pp. 77–129); Kitzinger (1973, pp. 293–330); Kitzinger and Butler (1999, esp. pp. 68–115); Smith (1999, pp. 41–56). 49 Geddes (1994, pp. 370–80); Tindale (1992, pp. 278–99); George and Rosamond (1992, pp. 171–83). 50 Deighton (2001, p. 396); Deighton (2003, p. 46). 51 Young (1998, pp. 195–6). 52 For example, Deighton (2003, pp. 41–8). 53 Jay (1980, pp. 360–70). 54 Evans (1975, pp. 11, 59–71). 55 Tony Benn, quote taken from the Poisoned Chalice, BBC TV Documentary, 1996, episode 2. 56 Wallace (1975, pp. 345–8). 57 Tratt (1996, pp. 188–201). 58 For the argument that Wilson held together an ideologically divided Cabinet, Wallace (1975, pp. 345–8); Deighton (2003, pp. 43–8); Broad (2001, pp. 66–7). 59 Ludlow (forthcoming). 60 Ludlow (1999a, pp. 231–48). 61 Ludlow (forthcoming): Ludlow (2002); on French policy towards enlargement, Badel (2001, pp. 236–41). 62 On de Gaulle’s policy towards NATO, Vaisse (1998, pp. 381–96); Bozo (1996, pp. 331–57); Guellon (1996, pp. 359–79); Brunet (1996, pp. 379–401); on the connections between de Gaulle’s policy to NATO and Britain’s policy towards the European Community, Ellison (2003, pp. 172–87); Ellison (2001). 63 On Britain’s policies towards political union, Ludlow (1997b, pp. 259–72). 64 Grossman (1976, p. 87, 22 October 1966); Gore-Booth (1974, p. 352). 65 The National Archives [henceforward TNA] PREM13/897, Palliser to Wright, 21 October 1966. 66 Pine (2003, esp. pp. 278–89); Ludlow (2002); on the Hague Summit and French policy, Bitsch (2003, pp. 83–99).

1 Harold Wilson, Britain’s world role and the European Community, October 1964 to January 1965

Commentators, wrought with a sense of disappointment that the radical promise of opposition was jettisoned once in office, have been quick to criticise the foreign policy of the Labour governments 1964–70. Some authors have argued that Harold Wilson lacked strategy. He lurched from one crisis to another, with little sense of where the country must head, interested only in domestic political tactics.1 Others have intimated that the new government’s policy was obsessed with grandeur and deluded notions of Britain’s power and influence.2 These debates are relevant in discussion of Wilson’s policy towards the EEC. In one perspective, writers suspect that Wilson recognised the need for EEC membership as early as 1964, yet obscured his intent for domestic political reasons.3 Another interpretation regards Labour’s journey towards EEC membership as a question of ‘collapsing alternatives’, an unwelcome change in direction as the government acknowledged the unreality of their global stance.4 New evidence from Wilson’s private papers and from the government archives reveals that Wilson’s policy towards the EEC had greater consistency than many of his detractors would suggest. Wilson was driven not exclusively by domestic political considerations, but by strategic concerns. The government’s initial policy was internationalist in outlook and did relegate the priority afforded to membership of the European Community. Yet, Wilson’s approach was founded upon understandable assumptions and articulated the constant objective of accession to the ‘right sort’ of Europe. This chapter assesses the development of Labour’s policy in opposition, and provides an analysis of the government’s stance from October 1964 to January 1965, after which point Labour’s focus on a possible membership initiative to the EEC was refreshed.

Labour and the ‘right sort’ of Europe, 1962–4 In October 1962, Labour’s leader Hugh Gaitskell made a rousing speech to the Labour Party Conference in Brighton. British entry into a federal Europe, Gaitskell told delegates, would mean ‘the end of Britain as an independent state… It means the end of a thousand years of history’.5 The speech had astonishing force. The anti-EEC and right-

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wing Labour Party member, Douglas Jay, recalled that ‘it was unique among all political speeches I ever heard; not merely the finest, but a class apart…it can only be described as an intellectual massacre’.6 The applause from the conference hall was ‘unparalleled’: as a political performance, this was Gaitskell’s ‘finest hour’.7 Yet, to the dismay of Gaitskell’s closest colleagues, Labour revisionists on the right such as Roy Jenkins, George Brown and William (Bill) Rodgers, the speech tipped Gaitskell towards association with the antiEEC elements of the party. Gaitskell’s wife noted, ‘all the wrong people are cheering’.8 George Brown, Jenkins and the Durham miner’s leader, Sam Watson, dutifully climbed to their feet; Bill Rodgers could not bring himself to stand.9 The deep disappointment of the Gaitskellite, pro-European right has led to an interpretation of Gaitskell’s 1962 speech as a turning point for Labour, ‘closing the door’ to the principle of membership of the EEC. Roger Broad wrote: ‘Gaitskell may have believed in reason, but where his faith lay was becoming very clear’.10 However, Philip Williams’ biography argues that Gaitskell’s position in 1962 was a genuine representation of his view that the terms for British membership of the Community negotiated between Britain and the Six in August 1962 were indeed inadequate. In a letter to the American President John F.Kennedy, Gaitskell revealed: right up until mid-summer 1962 we were reasonably hopeful. I myself expected that the terms would be such as to prove acceptable to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and that my task would be to persuade my Party to accept them… I was prepared to do it as being the only course consistent with the line we had followed… We were, therefore, bitterly disappointed and indeed astonished at the provisional agreements reached at the beginning of August… Had such terms been announced at the beginning of the negotiations, they would have been rejected out of hand by the British people.11 Moreover, after the Conference speech, Gaitskell assumed a much more balanced stance in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), prompting one pro-marketeer to note that Labour’s position had not changed at all.12 The terms Gaitskell so reviled concerned arrangements for Britain’s trade with the Commonwealth, as well as the position of the neutrals in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). While no definitive agreement was reached in early August between Britain and the Six, the provisional arrangements intimated that Britain’s preferential trade with the Commonwealth could continue until 1970, but it would gradually become less favourable during the transitional period and cease thereafter. Britain and the Six had agreed that the developing Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean could, in theory, associate with the Community. Moreover, arrangements had been made for the exports of tea and textiles from India, Pakistan and Ceylon. The major sticking points were sugar exports from the Commonwealth sugar producers, and temperate zone agricultural products from the Old Dominions. The Six had suggested that worldwide agreements, covering all cereals, could provide a solution; and the proposal had been made (although not agreed) that New Zealand could be treated as a special case.13 Labour was also concerned as to the status of the countries of EFTA. Some of the EFTA countries would be expected to apply for membership of the Community alongside

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Britain. Yet, the Six were unclear as to whether the neutral states, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, would be eligible to associate with the Community.14 Partly, this was because the association of states could dilute the common external tariff into a broader free trade zone. Mainly, Labour’s fear was that the ambivalence of the Six suggested the hidden political component of the Community. If there was no intention to develop into a federation, why could not the neutral countries seek an arrangement with the EEC? Comments made by Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and one of the founders of the EEC, at the Socialist International in July 1962, fuelled Gaitskell’s concern that there was a federalist ambition on the part of the Six. It may have been Spaak’s comments that prompted Gaitskell to add ‘freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy’ to the terms of entry initially established by Labour’s National Executive Committee in 1961.15 Gaitskell was not alone in his concern about the terms of entry. As Ludlow shows, the Conservative Cabinet debated and rejected as binding the provisional arrangements in 1962. Pressured also by Gaitskell’s position, the Conservatives wanted to hold out for better terms, a decision that slowed the pace of the subsequent negotiations.16 Undoubtedly, Gaitskell sought to unify his party, and to avoid the repeat of bitter disputes over Clause IV and unilateralism.17 Yet Gaitskell’s position was sincerely that Britain should join the EEC on the right terms.18 The terms of entry—safeguards for Commonwealth, for agriculture and for EFTA, as well as the freedom to plan the economy and the freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy—represented a genuine aspiration. Harold Wilson, like Gaitskell, emphasised that Britain could join the Community only on the right terms. Wilson’s political allies tended to be from the left of the party, thus, it was natural for him to assume a slightly more sceptical posture than the leader, and easier to place pressure on Gaitskell from a hostile position. Nevertheless, Wilson’s position in 1960 was balanced, as he cited concerns about the Commonwealth but stated that ‘the case for going in is formidable’.19 One of Wilson’s key allies, the Hungarian-born Oxford economist Thomas Balogh, who was to become Wilson’s economic adviser when he became Prime Minister, was also cautiously in favour at this stage. Balogh was later renowned for his hostile position, but in 1961 he was part of a Labour Party Finance and Economic Policy Sub-Committee study group on Common Market membership. He noted: Adherence to the Common Market might be the sole measure by which British industry and finance can be jolted into a new dynamic mould… The special relationship is dead…it would be silly to expect the Americans will pay more attention to us mainly because of sentimental reasons, Dunkirk or something… It is fatuous to think that we can forego entry into the Common Market if that is economically required for strengthening ourselves on the plea that Commonwealth relations will survive our economic weakness.20 Macmillan’s announcement of Britain’s application for membership in July 1961 trumped any potential Labour move, and began to crystallise Wilson’s opinion. In the House of Commons debate on the application in August, Wilson spoke quite firmly in leftist terms against the Common Market: ‘we are not entitled to sell our friends and

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kinsmen down the river for a problematical and marginal advantage in selling washing machines in Dusseldorf’.21 In addition to the left-leaning language that the EEC was inimical to a planned economy, Wilson’s consistent objections were the impact of Community membership on Commonwealth trade and the potential of Europe to develop in a federal direction. He emphasised the need to protect imports of temperate zone agricultural produce from Australia and New Zealand and to sustain arrangements under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.22 He characterised the Common Market as an entity likely to move towards a federation. This, he believed, posed a danger for Britain. The British public would never accept a federal union; thus, once in, Britain would have to retract, inviting charges of ‘perfidious Albion’.23 In this way, membership would weaken Britain’s relationship with the continent. He also emphasised that the EEC was a ‘bloc with military motivation’ in the cold war, a bulwark against the Soviet Union, that only served to strengthen Germany, anger the Soviet Union and so militate against détente.24 In private, Wilson’s views were more flexible. On 15–16 July 1962, Wilson and Gaitskell attended the Socialist International in Brussels. At this meeting, the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak declared the British as demandeurs, arguing they would have to accept the terms they could get from the Six. It was this speech that so irritated Gaitskell, pushing him towards insistence on safeguards for British foreign policy. Wilson made very detailed personal notes on the speeches made by Spaak, and also by the progenitor of the Common Agricultural Policy Sicco Mansholt, the VicePresident of the European Commission Robert Marjolin and Gaitskell. He then began to make his own personal jottings. He mused that there were two trading systems—the EEC and the Commonwealth—and could they be brought together? The Six had made sacrifices, Wilson conceded, but ‘so have HMG, even to point where Labour Party’s agreement—we are prepared to scrap our preferential system and come in alone, provided only that as HG [Hugh Gaitskell] said this does not mean disrupting the Commonwealth’.25 This was the rub. On the one hand, both Gaitskell and Wilson seemed to be willing to make the ‘sacrifice’ of Commonwealth trade for the sake of Community membership; but on the other, this should not ‘disrupt the Commonwealth’. Could Wilson reconcile these two apparently unreconcilable goals? It would appear as if Wilson had difficulty with this question, as he deviated in his notes, talking about his anxiety as to the impact of membership on planning and the consequences of accepting free movement of capital. He admitted that the agricultural questions were not insoluble. He then returned to the Commonwealth. ‘Commonwealth. Most important. Not transitional relief. Not a solution. Spaak said no desire to disrupt the Commonwealth. Welcome that. But how, how do you see it?’26 As was his penchant, Wilson then lapsed into metaphor in an attempt to conclude the impossible Commonwealth question: Marriage—young, vigorous, go ahead young man, very good prospects. We—well, too modest to desire our charms; faded beauty? Still some assets, certainly not love at first sight—and must confess, we have been married before—have many children, Commonwealth, orphanage?27

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Thus, Wilson appeared on one level to acknowledge the political importance of Community membership. However, his preference was for membership of the right sort of Europe, only possible if Commonwealth trade continued and if the Commonwealth itself was not disturbed. De Gaulle vetoed British membership of the EEC on 23 January 1963, days after Hugh Gaitskell’s sudden death. When Wilson was elected leader, he did not have to reconsider Labour’s stance towards the Common Market. In fact, de Gaulle’s veto reinforced the rationale behind Labour’s position. The Labour Party could use the EEC as a useful stick with which to beat the Conservatives. Macmillan had played the EEC as his most powerful political card, as the panacea for renewed economic growth and the retreat for post-imperial Britain.28 Collapse of the entry talks allowed Labour to argue that the Conservative government had relied too much on the EEC for economic regeneration: ‘For the Conservative government, it must be awful, as they had repeatedly stressed that Britain had no alternative but to join the Common Market’.29 Labour could make political capital from the sense they offered an alternative course for Britain.30 Wilson harnessed the party’s energy into the modernisation of Britain on a policy platform centred on economic planning, scientific and technological endeavour and the regeneration of the Commonwealth.

Whitehall and EEC membership In contrast to incoming Labour ministers, Whitehall had reinvestigated British policy towards the European Community since the failure of the Brussels negotiations and had reached some radical new conclusions. In 1964, Third Secretary in the Treasury, David Pitblado, chaired an inter-departmental report on Community membership.31 Pitblado’s study revealed the dominance of the Foreign Office in formulating policy towards the European Community, reflecting the strength of the political case in favour of British membership of the EEC. The political argument was that unless Britain developed a satisfactory relationship with the increasingly powerful European Community, she would cease to be a world power. As the EEC developed, so the USA would come to look to Europe and to Germany as its primary partner. EFTA members and the developing Commonwealth nations could also be tempted into the Community’s sphere. A position of dwindling influence, officials argued, could be acceptable was Britain willing to accept a shrivelled international role. Con O’Neill, Britain’s Ambassador to the Community in Brussels, expressed the case thus: we can decline again to what was for so long our proper place: but if we choose this course I feel we must be prepared for the decline to be rather rapid. In particular, I fear that unless we succeed in creating a satisfactory relationship with Europe we may have declined in a relatively short time into neutrality…a greater Sweden.32 Entry into the European Community was the only means by which Britain could preserve a global presence. Thus, behind the Foreign Office’s support for a British future in

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Europe was an assumption of mastery: it was only via a political relationship with Europe that Britain could sustain an international role. The wider foreign and defence policy-making community shared many of O’Neill’s conclusions. Under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary and Chair of the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (OPD), Sir Burke Trend, officials had conducted a review of Britain’s defence posture prior to the 1964 election. Entitling their work the Long Term Policy Study, they had grappled with the difficulty of allocating Britain’s everdecreasing resources and concluded that: we believe that politically, Europe must, if largely for geographical reasons, remain our first priority… If Britain allows herself to be excluded from Europe, she will be increasingly isolated from what is becoming one of the main political and economic power centres of the industrialised northern world.33 The consequences of isolation would be grave. Britain’s influence with the United States would weaken and Britain’s ability to assist in the resolution of world problems would diminish. Britain’s trade would also suffer, impeded from trading with the EEC and facing increased competition from its dynamic neighbour. At the heart of officials’ concerns rested Britain’s partnership with the United States. The so-called ‘special relationship’ was, officials suggested, ‘more vital to us than our relations with Europe’. Britain depended on American power to protect Western interests outside Europe. As the US came to ascribe greater importance to the increasingly dynamic EEC, so Britain’s ability to pass muster with the Americans would ‘depend substantially on the political role we are prepared to play in Europe’.34 It was less that the Long Term Policy group favoured a relationship with the EEC as an ideological preference to a global defence role or a connection with the Commonwealth, rather, the EEC offered the key to continued British influence on the world stage. As well as regarding European membership as the only possible course for Britain, Foreign Office officials had also re-evaluated the methods by which Britain would seek that entry. The Foreign Office felt that General de Gaulle’s veto was a bar to accession: Britain would be unable to join while he was in power.35 Not only this, but none of the Six would want to reconsider enlargement before the end of their transitional period in 1970, the date at which the internal customs union and common external tariff would come fully into force.36 Yet, Britain should not just sit back and wait. Stung by the Brussels failure, officials formulated a different diplomatic approach, abandoning both Macmillan’s effort to seek safeguards prior to entry and Labour’s emphasis on the satisfaction of the conditions of membership. Officials did not advocate that Britain would ‘roll over and die’, acquiescing wholesale to the Community’s demands. Rather, the British would seek to agree to the principle of membership and then work to safeguard Britain’s essential interests from the inside.37 The new method, termed the ‘crash operation’, would obviate the need for a detailed and uncertain negotiation. O’Neill was the principal advocate of the new approach, demonstrating a refined comprehension of how best to wield Britain’s influence within Community confines. He accepted the loss of sovereignty implied by membership, but understood also that the future exercise of power depended on that acceptance:

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We in Britain still, in general, underestimate the extent to which the European Communities are and always have been concerned with politics and power…they aim, through union, to revive their influence and power, not merely the prosperity of their countries and their peoples… Mao Tse Tung declared that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Professor Hallstein operates in a more sophisticated environment; but he has always declared he is in politics not business, and he may well believe that power grows out of the regulation price of Tilsit cheese or the price of a grain a hen needs to lay one egg. I think it does.38 Thus, the Foreign Office recommended that despite de Gaulle’s block, Britain should continue to state its desire for eventual entry. Evidence of Britain’s desire to join the European Community would act as a corrective to French influence in Europe, reminding the Five that there were alternatives to a political settlement on French terms.39 Elsewhere in Whitehall, de Gaulle’s veto had encouraged a re-emergence of anxieties as to the economic impact of Community membership. In 1961, the Treasury had favoured accession, believing that membership of the Six would enable Britain’s financial and insurance markets to dominate the EEC and hoping that membership would increase Britain’s ability to borrow from the Six.40 Treasury doubts about the wisdom of a short-term step into the Common Market arose because of the danger officials perceived to the balance of payments. The Community’s 1963 Action Programme ordered the liberalisation of capital movements within the Six and, the Treasury felt, ruled out devaluation as a tool of policy. With the fixing of agricultural prices based on units of gold, devaluation could lead to food price inflation. Thus, if the British economy was weak, or in balance of payments difficulties at the point of accession, the knowledge that Britain would be unable to alter the parity once a member could cause Britain to devalue in advance. Once inside the dynamic Community zone, capital could be attracted to flee Britain for stronger areas.41 Within the EEC, Britain’s freedom of economic action could be seriously curtailed, the inadmissibility of devaluation compelling the UK instead to adopt deflationary policies to rectify payments deficits. The question of the pound was complicated further by the links between the domestic balance of payments weakness and the reserve currency role of sterling. Growing monetary solidarity between the Six, Treasury officials believed, meant that Britain could be pushed to adopt a common line with the EEC in global forums such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Group of Ten (G10). As the French currently favoured an end to reserve currencies and their replacement by an alternative reserve asset, the British could find themselves faced with a choice. Entry into the EEC could force Britain, particularly if the economy was weak, to abandon the reserve role of sterling in the name of European co-operation.42 This was a choice the Treasury was reluctant to make: unwilling to be pushed towards a hasty end to sterling’s reserve role, particularly at the insistence of the French. The Board of Trade continued to press for eventual membership. Its Permanent Under Secretary, Sir Richard Powell, cautioned of the dangers to Britain politically of continued exclusion from the European Community. Dealing with the Kennedy Round, Powell lamented Britain’s lack of clout between the giants of the EEC and the USA. Tendencies in global trade were to form trading units—between the US and Canada in motor cars—

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or in the EEC and between the EEC and her associates. Outside the EEC, Britain’s ability to get her own way in trade talks would be seriously reduced.43 In the Commercial Relations and Export Division, Eric Phillips added that the EEC offered opportunities the Commonwealth could not provide. This was less because of the direction of Britain’s trade. Trade was shifting from the Commonwealth to the EEC and would continue regardless of Britain’s accession.44 But, the Commonwealth market was neither sophisticated nor diverse in comparison to the Community.45 Participation in the larger market would encourage specialisation of production and enable industry to rationalise, facilitating domestic trends necessary for modernisation. The Permanent Under Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture, Sir John Winnifrith, was strongly opposed to membership.46 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) remained unpopular: it would raise food prices in the UK and distort production into more lucrative and larger cereal farms in the south and east to the detriment of hill and dairy farmers in the north and west. It would force the abandonment of the use of deficiency payments paid directly by the Exchequer, to subsidise farmers. If the method of financing the fund based on levies came to fruition, Britain would also bear an unreasonable proportion of payments.47 Winnifrith represented the dominant view in the Ministry of Agriculture, but some officials saw that EEC entry would help to attain some of Labour’s economic objectives. Mainly, imports of low-cost produce weighed on the British balance of payments and the cost to the Exchequer of direct farming subsidies was high. Labour’s objectives in the National Plan were to increase exports and reduce imports. EEC entry would help by raising the tariff against Commonwealth goods, cutting cereal imports by up to one half, and by provision of a larger domestic market.48

Harold Wilson and Britain’s world role Wilson’s private stance at the Socialist International in July 1962 suggested his acknowledgement of the political importance of accession to the EEC. Yet, the Anglo-Six verbal agreement the following month pushed Gaitskell, as well as the Conservative Cabinet, to conclude that the terms were inadequate. The failure of the application in January 1963 consolidated the logic of Labour’s shift against membership on the available terms. Wilson worked to present an alternative, centred on the Commonwealth, science and technology and economic planning. Wilson’s alternative course was clearly in part opportunistic. With EEC membership apparently ruled out by the General, Wilson did not have to trouble himself with the issue. A policy platform centred on entry into the EEC could have appeared incredible. However, Wilson’s policy choice was not without consequences and his strengthened focus on the Commonwealth served to shift the government away from concentration on the Community.49 Both Conservative and Labour election manifestos suggested only that Britain sought ‘closer relations’ with Europe.50 The difference between them was that the defeated Conservative Party retained an explicit commitment to the principle of eventual membership. Although membership was temporarily ruled out, the Conservatives would continue to work towards an ultimate goal.51 For Labour, ‘closer relations’ with Europe enabled the party to avoid discussion on a renewed membership initiative, content instead

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with the idea that Labour would join the ‘right sort’ of Europe at some future, unspecified date. Support for the Commonwealth had a heritage in the Labour movement and it therefore represented a policy with which the party was comfortable. The Labour left favoured the proposition that trade with the world’s poorer nations should take priority over trade with the wealthy Community countries.52 For the Labour right, Commonwealth imports provided cheap food, so benefiting the workers in Britain and enabling a socially progressive form of agricultural subsidisation financed by the taxpayer, not the consumer.53 The Commonwealth offered Britain leadership and influence and the moral dignity of assisting a diverse, underdeveloped and multiracial grouping.54 Moreover, Commonwealth regeneration, unlike membership of the EEC, appeared a plausible objective, strengthened by a sense of ideological difference from the outgoing Conservative government. For the Conservatives, Labour argued, lack of focus on Commonwealth trade and preference for Europe had been a party political choice.55 Labour conceived of Britain’s role with the Commonwealth as providing the British a global position based on responsibility, rather than an untrammelled exercise in imperial power. In a similar vein, the new government prioritised a global defence role East of Suez, perceiving this role as a means of bringing stability to the poorest areas of the world.56 Thus, Wilson’s emphasis on Britain’s global defence when the government took office was based on a strategic rationale. The onset of détente between the superpowers meant there was a decreased risk of war in Europe. By contrast, in South East Asia, Chinese influence, Sino-Soviet friction and wars in Malaysia and Vietnam indicated serious threats to burgeoning prosperity and to social and political equilibrium.57 Britain’s resources, the new Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker argued, could best be spent reinforcing Britain’s troop capability in the Indian Ocean, moving away from costly nuclear projects and from defending Europe and the Mediterranean.58 However, should a British presence suggest a rise in local nationalism, the government should consider gradual withdrawal, striking a ‘delicate balance between the dangers of staying too long and the opposite dangers of withdrawing too fast’.59 Emphasis on Britain’s international posture was also a means to strengthen Britain’s relationship with the United States. The United States had criticised British colonialism, but American involvement in Vietnam led the administration to fear the onus of bearing the ‘white man’s burden’ of global defence alone. When Wilson visited Washington in December 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk told him that the US welcomed Britain’s world commitments: ‘the UK fulfilled a strategic function in the world the US could not attempt…enabling greater power of the US to be deployed in areas which might otherwise be largely inaccessible to it’.60 Britain’s defence commitments East of Suez provided Wilson a means to demonstrate to the Americans Britain’s continued ability to pursue a role of global worth. Such a stance afforded Britain a degree of independence. Britain’s involvement in Confrontation in Malaysia helped Wilson to resist pressure for direct assistance to the Americans in Vietnam.61 Influence in America could also provide tangible benefits. Wilson may have hoped that his personal bargaining skills could provide a way out of the financial dilemma of Britain’s defence. He could use the fact America wanted Britain in the Far East to bargain for greater assistance.62 The pursuit of ‘power-by-proxy’, garnering influence in America to help to ensure that American

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protection of the West’s global interests reflected Britain’s concerns, would also strengthen Britain’s voice in international forums, particularly in NATO and the UN.63 The priority afforded to Britain’s global stance and to Britain’s relations with the USA also helps to explain Labour’s position in international economic affairs. Wilson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan and the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs George Brown, opted against devaluation immediately after taking power, a decision much criticised for condemning Labour’s domestic economic policies to failure for the sake of international status.64 At the time the decision was straightforward.65 Only one of the team of Treasury officials and government economic advisers, Donald MacDougall at the Department of Economic Affairs, advocated to Wilson an immediate devaluation.66 Wilson was mindful of the party political implications of a change in parity. Devaluation was a risk and to do it when Labour had not pledged to do so was an early admission of failure and a clear means to be labelled the ‘party of devaluation’.67 Such decisive action before the government’s National Plan had even been launched seemed premature. Labour’s optimism that they could run the economy more effectively than their Conservative predecessors meant there was little reason to ‘chop off your head’ before a long-term headache had even been proven.68 Moreover, Wilson did not wish to break faith with the Commonwealth who held their reserves in sterling, so undermining his objective of renovating UK-Commonwealth links.69 Strategically, sterling acted as the front line for the dollar. One-third of the world’s trade was conducted in sterling and devaluation could spark a series of competitive devaluations, causing world trade to seize up. Depression-like conditions would create instant bad faith with the Americans and could encourage communist or nationalist insurgency in the areas of the world the British hoped to defend.70 Wilson’s position was that the main threats to Britain’s global interests were in South East Asia. It therefore made sense to concentrate Britain’s efforts in this region for the time being. Britain’s international military commitments provided Britain a role of world responsibility, helping to bolster Britain’s influence in the United States. Wilson’s internationalist outlook did thus have a coherent grounding. Combined with Labour’s focus on the Commonwealth, the internationalist foreign policy relegated the priority of Europe in the new government’s thinking.

Wider European unity: EFTA and the EEC Labour was preoccupied with questions other than Europe, yet the government’s policy remained that Britain could seek membership of a Europe of the ‘right sort’. Gordon Walker emphasised that Britain wanted to move towards wider European unity, bringing the EFTA and the EEC together in some kind of unspecified arrangement: ‘Europe was bigger than the EEC and we must not lose sight of the possibility of Europe in a true and larger form’.71 For Labour, the ‘right sort’ of Europe would be outward-looking in defence and in trade, non-supranational in organisation and would open the possibilities for connections between British and European technological industries. In this way, Wilson’s stance towards the EEC was more consistent than has generally been thought.

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The notion that a ‘right sort’ of Europe was a plausible objective was strengthened by indications of the possible collapse of the EEC. Gordon Walker explained: I do not regard joining the EEC as a problem. We cannot do so. In certain circumstances, the EEC might break up. This would not be bad for us: but we must not bring it about or appear to want it. But we should not adapt our policies in order to save the EEC.72 The Foreign Secretary recognised that it would be detrimental to Britain’s diplomatic interests to be seen to champion the dissolution of the Community. He did not, however, advocate that Britain should work to keep the Community together. On the contrary, if the Community did collapse through its own internal disarray, Britain could capitalise, taking the opportunity to build a new Europe in Britain’s image. Such a possibility had been investigated in Whitehall. In the winter of 1963, as the Six prepared to take crucial decisions over the CAP, British officials wondered whether the Community would survive. If it collapsed, the Treasury saw the opportunity to create an industrial free trade area in Europe, bringing what was left of the EEC into a wider grouping based on EFTA. This would satisfy Britain’s global economic interests, allowing Britain to persist with Commonwealth trading, exclude agriculture from any Community arrangement and to avoid political institutions.73 In November 1964, the prospect that the Six would have to reach agreement on cereal prices led to a repeat of the fears that the Community could unravel. The German agricultural lobby demanded prices much higher than those the French wanted; yet French threats of withdrawal from the Community created the risk that the German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard would be forced to settle on French terms.74 Wilson took these threats seri-ously. Sir Charles Johnston, head of the European Economic Organisations Department (EEOD) at the Foreign Office, wrote to the Permanent Under Secretary Sir Harold Caccia early in November to warn that de Gaulle was preparing some initiative to the EEC ‘which might take the form of withdrawing France from it, or of an empty chair policy’. Johnston conceded that de Gaulle was unlikely to leave, but suggested that the French President was unpredictable and thus it was not possible to be certain.75 Three days later, Wilson met with the Guardian editor Alastair Hetherington. Wilson told Hetherington that he did not think de Gaulle’s threats to leave NATO or the EEC were purely brinkmanship. Pressed by the editor that surely Erhard would not discard European integration for the sake of cereal prices, Wilson replied that the German Chancellor was in an impossible electoral position and could have little choice. He continued: if de Gaulle did leave the Common Market, then there would be a magnificent opportunity for Britain. What would it be? A free trade area, taking in the Five, as well as the EFTA countries, and perhaps going beyond. He looked forward to this with relish. He thought that we could negotiate a free trade area on these lines and that the others in Europe would be glad of it.76

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Wilson claimed privately that the Conservative negotiations for a Free Trade Area in 1956–8 had failed because the Conservatives had declined to understand the political impetus behind the European Community.77 In this thinking, therefore, a diplomatic approach that appeared to appreciate the Community’s objectives could yield better results for Britain. The prospect of a Community break-up enabled Wilson to elude consideration of what the ‘right sort’ of Europe could actually mean, yet the government did actively pursue a wider Europe in two distinct ways. The first was to emphasise the importance of the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations currently underway in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Trade Expansion Act, which provided the American executive with the authority to negotiate in the Kennedy Round rejected product-byproduct negotiating methods in favour of across the board cuts of 50 per cent.78 Substantial tariff reductions could be one way of diluting the impact of membership of the European Community: ‘Clearly all the advantages that are claimed as a consequence of our entry into the Common Market—a mass market, specialisation of production, greater competition, etc—would be still greater in a large free trade area’.79 The advantages of a successful trade round rested with the hope of securing arrangements for third countries—countries outside the EEC—that could facilitate access of Commonwealth exports to Community markets. Labour expressed the intention of pressing for the reduction of tariffs and quotas that would be imposed on the exports of developing countries and the reduction of duties on tropical produce, as well as sustaining Britain’s cheap imports of temperate agricultural foodstuffs.80 In this way, Labour saw the Kennedy Round as a precursor to British membership of the Community. Gordon Walker told the German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder in 1963: I said the Kennedy Round was vital for us. Not only did we want a liberalisation of trade, but only in this atmosphere could we set about getting the right relations with the EEC. If the Kennedy Round failed, it would, I thought, prove impossible for us to join the EEC. It would have grown and developed too far.81 The second, more important, feature of Britain’s policy was EFTA. The existence of EFTA was the proof of British will to create a ‘wider Europe’ and a platform from which to approach the EEC. Gordon Walker emphasised that ‘we attach the greatest importance to EFTA’.82 However, Britain’s economic difficulties led Wilson inadvertently to damage Britain’s standing within EFTA only days into office. Having rejected devaluation, Wilson, Brown and Callaghan settled instead on a Treasury suggestion for a rise in the Bank Rate and the imposition of an import surcharge. The three ministers debated whether to impose the surcharge or to use quantitative restrictions on imports. Quantitative restrictions were legal under the regulations of the GATT and the Stockholm Treaty establishing EFTA. However, the ministers felt that restrictions would hit hardest at the exports of Britain’s main creditors in the EEC and the US.83 By contrast, the import surcharge was forbidden under the Stockholm Treaty, yet because it represented a control that could later be removed, ministers felt it could better be presented as a temporary measure. The core of Labour’s economic appeal—dynamism and modernisation—would remain unaffected by the restriction.84

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The Board of Trade issued a caution to Wilson, Brown and Callaghan’s decision. Interventionist controls on imports would jeopardise the Board of Trade’s more liberal approach to trade. Committed to a policy of multilateralisation of tariffs within the framework of the GATT, and of the promotion of wider free trade in Europe through EFTA, the Board of Trade saw that a unilateral restriction would weaken Britain’s hand in international negotiations. The President of the Board, Douglas Jay, warned that the surcharge would have a detrimental effect on EFTA. Failure to consult EFTA in advance, he counselled, would have a damaging impact on the Association and would encourage the other EFTA countries in their belief that Britain did not take EFTA seriously.85 Jay was right to warn of an adverse EFTA reaction. That Brown, Callaghan and Wilson all ignored him indicates their preoccupation with Britain’s domestic economic difficulty, as well as overestimation of Britain’s capacity for independent action in the international economy. As Callaghan put it: ‘this failure to consult was our undoing’.86 EFTA reacted to news of the surcharge by threatening tariff retaliation under Article 31 of the Stockholm Convention. The British were pressed to an immediate promise that they would soon reduce the level of the charge.87 Furthermore, to make amends, Jay suggested the expedient of a unilateral reduction of Britain’s tariffs within EFTA.88 The French responded with the argument that Britain could not discriminate in favour of EFTA, as this would also contravene GATT. If Britain did so, the French would refuse to endorse Britain’s borrowing in the International Monetary Fund.89 The surcharge weakened Britain’s hand in the international economic arena, did nothing to suggest that Britain was serious in the pursuit of the ‘right sort’ of Europe and jeopardised British ability to influence in EFTA.

Political union As well as to promote ‘wider European unity’, Labour also sought to forestall the creation of a political union among the Six from which Britain was excluded. Prevention of a Six-wide political union was consistent with the stance of the former Conservative government. Despite Britain’s non-membership of the Community, Macmillan had stated Britain’s desire for inclusion with the 1962 Fouchet Plan proposals for foreign policy cooperation with the EEC.90 Knowledge that the British wished to participate contributed to the failure of the Fouchet Plan, as the Dutch and Belgians refused to proceed without the UK.91 Nevertheless, political union remained a popular goal with the governments of the Six and possible proposals were discussed among Western European leaders throughout 1964.92 A successful political union posed a threefold danger to Britain. First, the British feared the emergence of a powerful, cohesive European unit. Conjuring images of a ‘greater Sweden’ kind, the Foreign Office worried that Britain’s exclusion from a dynamic political bloc would rapidly subdue British international influence, as America could not ignore such a potent partner.93 Second, the Foreign Office regarded de Gaulle’s activities with suspicion. Having failed to secure a French say in the direct running of NATO via the tripartite suggestions in 1958, de Gaulle’s attitude towards NATO and the Alliance had, from the British and American perspective, become more hostile. During 1964, his opposition to proposals for some kind of European nuclear force within the

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Alliance led to speculation that he intended to disrupt or withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance.94 As the Foreign Office saw it, the danger was that de Gaulle could tempt other members of the Five to team up with the French in a political and defence union. A union on French terms could encourage the Community to diverge from the Atlantic Alliance.95 Third, a political union unhinged from the Atlantic would, the Foreign Office felt, eventually be dominated by Germany: ‘A Europe in which France and Germany are in agreement but also in balance and in which our own influence is strong must remain our long-term objective’.96 The British were also keen to check any continental tendencies towards federalism. Wilson, as Macmillan had, saw de Gaulle as the champion of a Europe of nation states.97 Wilson viewed tendencies in the Six to move towards supranational organisation with extreme misgiving. If the Six did intend a federation, Wilson had argued in the Commons, this would pose a stark political choice for Britain: Europe or Commonwealth? Britain would be forced to retreat from such a union, leading to charges of perfidy. Echoing his speech in the Commons, Wilson wrote to himself at the Socialist International: ‘This is my fear… PERFIDIOUS ALBION’ (his capitalisation).98 In any moves towards political union, Wilson preferred to team up with the French in order to prevent supranationalism. The prospect of political union also raised the issue of the organisation of European defence. Wilson felt that Britain and France shared an objective in denying German access to nuclear hardware. The failure of the British application in January 1963 led the United States to crystallise proposals with the purpose of solving the dilemma of Germany’s status and of Europe’s place within NATO. The American idea was for a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF). The MLF would provide the West Germans with access to nuclear hardware and so keep Germany tied into the Western system, a counterweight to Gaullist efforts to use the French force de frappe as a European nuclear force.99 With the MLF proposal, the Americans envisaged building a mixed-manned multilateral deterrent force in Europe, in which Germany, France and Britain would equally participate. To anticipate the problem of German control of nuclear weaponry, the Americans suggested that ultimately, should Europe develop into a full federation, the European powers would have exclusive right of veto over the use of the force.100 Both Britain and France opposed the MLF. The British did not support the American idea that Europe could eventually have its own veto. A European right of veto would provide the Germans with a ‘finger on the nuclear trigger’, albeit a negative one. This, the government felt, could only encourage German desires for access to nuclear hardware.101 Furthermore, the notion of a coherent, perhaps eventually federal European grouping, ate away at the fundaments of Britain’s security position within the Atlantic Alliance. British participation in a strong European body within the Alliance could encourage the Alliance to separate: ‘there would be a risk that US and Europe, although neither may desire it, will begin to drift apart’.102 A European force with Britain in it could also encourage the US to slide into isolationism. Britain needed a national nuclear deterrent to tie the US to the defence of Britain and Europe: ‘we should have enough nuclear power to prevent some foolish decisions being made to our detriment on the other side of the Atlantic’.103 Moreover, the creation of a new force would encourage global tendencies towards nuclear proliferation. By indirectly arming Germany and establishing a new force, the MLF would, the British argued, thwart détente.104

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To foil discussion on the MLF, Wilson proposed the alternative of the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). In part, Wilson’s motivation was domestic; to wriggle out of his commitment in opposition to get rid of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent.105 Aware, like all British prime ministers, of the influence afforded by Britain’s nuclear status, Wilson probably never envisaged the termination of Britain’s force.106 Instead, Wilson promised to ‘renegotiate Nassau’, the agreement made between Macmillan and Kennedy for the British purchase of Polaris nuclear weapons. The ANF, which promised to commit Britain’s V-bombers to a multilateral force, was one way to ‘renegotiate Nassau’. The ANF also reflected Britain’s strategic concerns. It would maintain Britain’s independent deterrent and would insist that the Americans declared the permanence of their veto on the use of the force. These steps would help to deny German access to nuclear hardware and to preserve Britain’s influence within the Alliance between the US and the EEC. Britain’s objectives were to ensure that the US remained committed to the defence of Europe, and Europe continued to look towards the US. The ANF also reflected a way of thinking about European defence centred upon Anglo-French partnership. Oliver Wright, Wilson’s Private Secretary explained that: Real stability can only be achieved in the future when Germany is reunited but non-nuclear. As we move towards détente with USSR, France will increasingly see the need for Britain to be closely associated with France in order to control the reunified Germany… The situation would be a Europe des Patries, led by Britain and France, with Germany reunified and détente with east.107 Wright’s note was an intriguing glimpse into Wilson’s thinking, as the Private Secretary attempted to anticipate and thus to articulate what he perceived Wilson’s wishes to be. Partly, Wright’s thoughts reflected a left-wing formulation of British European policy. A substantial proportion of the Party had opposed West German rearmament in 1955.108 The left feared the possibility of resurgent German nationalism, and believed that a strengthened Germany would reduce the likelihood of East-West détente. As Catterall has shown, in 1957 Labour proposed the neutralisation of West and East Germany, of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in order to provide a solution to the problem of German reunification and détente.109 Wright also assessed that de Gaulle’s stance towards détente and towards Germany would facilitate an opening for the British to team up with the French. French foreign policy sought to promote détente with the Soviet Union but to deny the re-emergence of Germany as a full power. Britain could join de Gaulle in his pursuit of closer relations with the Soviet Union and in so doing could assist the French in their containment of Germany. Within the framework of a Europe of nation states, Britain and France together would be able to manage German strength. Thus, Wilson wanted to prevent the creation of a political union in Europe and to forestall German access to nuclear hardware. He remained firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance and to Britain’s position within it, yet regarded any British initiative in Europe as centred around Anglo-French links. Crucially, if Britain remained aloof from a supranational European grouping through partnership with the French, Britain could continue to ensure that the ‘twin pillars’ of the Alliance did not cleave apart.

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A technological community? A major part of Wilson’s thinking about the ‘right sort’ of Europe lay in the field of technological co-operation. Recent research has stressed the radical nature of Wilson’s intentions in establishing the Ministry of Technology (MinTech) and the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA).110 The aim of MinTech was to promote the expansion of civil technological projects, shifting resources from military to civil expenditure. Wilson’s objective was to create a powerful industrial economy, turning Britain into the ‘tool-room of the world’.111 His goal fitted well with the notion of entry into an expanded European Community. Britain could team up with the European countries, particularly the French, in European projects. Access to an enlarged market would provide better export opportunities for Britain’s firms. The purpose of the DEA was to wrest control of the economy’s productive potential from the Treasury, providing a dedicated department to focus on planning and economic growth. The DEA also had a self-consciously proEuropean agenda. Headed by George Brown, Wilson’s second in command and vociferous supporter of British entry into the EEC, the DEA gave departmental force to some of the more positive economic arguments in favour of membership of the Community. Brown envisaged that membership of the EEC would help promote the economic expansion intended through indicative planning.112 The Permanent Under Secretary at the DEA, Sir Eric Roll, had been a lead negotiator during the Brussels talks and was also a strong advocate of accession. The DEA viewed Community membership in terms of the modernisation of Britain’s economy. As Macmillan had argued, membership of a wider, more sophisticated market would act as the ‘cold douche’ of competition, forcing industry to be more competitive.113 But the case of the ‘cold douche’ was subordinate in importance to the argument about the ‘economies of scale’. Industry would have the opportunity to merge into gigantic European conglomerates capable of competing on equal terms with industries in the US and the USSR and British firms would have the benefit of access to Europe’s markets in order to boost exports. The economies of scale, the notion that bigger was better, was particularly important in technology. Britain and Europe were lagging behind America in the most developed industries of computers, aircraft, energy, space, telecommunications and electronics. There was the risk of a brain drain to the US and the prospect that if Britain failed to develop her own alternatives, the US could refuse access to the latest discoveries. Economists felt it was not lack of technological knowledge alone that kept Britain in second rank to the US, but the fact that the US had a much larger domestic market, which provided a larger base for investment in research. A population of 55m, 75m by the end of the century, [would] afford neither a sufficient base for the research and development effort necessary for the technologically advanced industries which offer the best prospects for future growth, nor a sufficiently large home market for the goods those and other industries produce.114 Expansion of the domestic market through membership of the EEC would supply better returns and would open the possibility of cost sharing with the European countries, of

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pooling ideas and of avoiding the duplication of research.115 The DEA proposed that collaboration with European countries either bilaterally or multilaterally would enable Europe to build bigger industries and so to stand strong between the two superpowers.116 As had occurred regarding Britain’s policies towards EFTA, in the early days of the government, Wilson’s ideas about European technological expansion played second fiddle to the balance of payments deficit. The Wilson Cabinet felt that Concorde, the Anglo-French project to provide the world’s first supersonic passenger airliner, was too expensive.117 Unwilling to spend resources on a ‘prestige’ project, the Cabinet preferred to concentrate on areas which would prove more lucrative for British exports.118 Some ministers, particularly the Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins, argued that the cancellation of Concorde would harm British relations with France and would undermine British approaches to Europe. Yet the promise of easy savings was too great: it was only the potential cost of withdrawal that persuaded the Cabinet, early in 1965, to stay in the project.119 Similarly, the British sought to reduce expenditure on the European space race—the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO)—a collaborative project involving all the Six (except Luxembourg) and Australia. In this instance, the possibility that the EEC would be upset by British withdrawal led the British to proceed with caution.120

Wilson, de Gaulle and Erhard Wilson met with de Gaulle and Erhard for the first time on 29 and 30 January at the occasion of Sir Winston Churchill’s funeral in London. With the settlement of cereal price levels in December 1964, the immediate prospect of a Community crisis had passed. Erhard had visited de Gaulle at Rambouillet on 19 January, where the two leaders discussed proposals for political union. For Erhard, it was extremely important in domestic political terms to continue to demonstrate stimulus for further European integration and political union was a popular cause. De Gaulle had suggested at Rambouillet that the French might be interested in reconsideration of a possible political union. De Gaulle and Erhard clearly differed greatly in their approaches towards German defence, as the French, although accepting that Germany wanted a say in NATO strategy, wished to deny German equality in nuclear access and prevent a ‘German finger on the nuclear trigger’. De Gaulle also favoured an approach to the Eastern European countries in order to promote European détente. Reunification was a cardinal goal for the German government and the Germans preferred a four-power approach, engaging Britain and America as well in any talks with the Soviet Union.121 Britain’s concern was that playing on Erhard’s desire for progress on political union, de Gaulle could insist that the Germans turned their back on the Atlantic Alliance.122 Indications from the Rambouillet meeting were that this had not occurred. Although de Gaulle had declared his willingness to talk about political union, Erhard had insisted on Germany’s commitment to Atlantic defence. The ANF, the Germans felt, provided an adequate basis for discussion, although Erhard would postpone talks until after the German elections in September.123 De Gaulle had reluctantly accepted that talks with the Soviet Union should proceed on a four-power basis.

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British objectives, as Erhard and de Gaulle travelled to London for the state occasion, were twofold. First, the British wished to emphasise to the Germans their desire to participate in political union and to stress the importance of Atlantic defence and a fourpower approach to détente. Such a stance would perpetuate the ties between Europe and America and would prevent the dangers of an all-European coherent grouping.124 Second, the British had to avoid snapping the stretched ties between de Gaulle and the Atlantic world, presenting to de Gaulle a pretext by which he could justify his presumed intentions to withdraw from NATO. Thus, the Foreign Office advised that Britain should ‘maintain contact with France and co-operate with them where practicable’.125 The place of British policy towards the EEC in these objectives was not stated, although ultimate British accession to the EEC, as an expression of Britain’s interest in Europe, was a logical part of Britain’s position towards political union. When Erhard asked Britain’s Ambassador in Bonn, Sir Frank Roberts, where Britain stood on the Common Market, the German Chancellor seemed satisfied with the response that at the current moment the question was irrelevant because the door to the Community was closed.126 Wilson seemed to exceed his brief for limited co-operation with the French, as he sought to use his interpretation of Britain’s relations with the EEC in order to draw de Gaulle to greater support for Britain’s position. De Gaulle told Wilson that Britain had offended the French, by attempting to divert the Common Market into a free trade area. When Reginald Maudling, the Conservative negotiator of the Free Trade Area talks, failed, Britain had tried to join the EEC, but had not been able to because of Commonwealth links: ‘France had gained the impression that the UK tended to bear a grudge against France for stating what was obvious’. Wilson claimed that he had long held that the failure of the free trade area was due to Maudling’s short-sightedness and he argued that Labour wanted the EEC to succeed in its political objectives: He [Wilson] had criticised the Maudling initiative at the time on the grounds that it was based on a total misunderstanding of what the European Powers were trying to achieve, it had failed to appreciate that Europe was uniting economically for non-economic motives.127 Wilson then went further in his explanation of his complicity of view with the French. De Gaulle had been right to exclude Britain from the Community. Commonwealth trade was an impediment to membership and Britain could not accept supranationality: he did not see how links with the Commonwealth could be reconciled with the spirit of the Common Market. Britain was dependent for 40% of her trade in foodstuffs with Commonwealth countries. It was an illusion to imagine the irreconcilable could be glossed over…the Labour Party had also strongly opposed the supranational element in the Treaty of Rome and were certainly not prepared to abandon to a supranational authority control over foreign policy and defence. The Labour Party’s view was much closer to the President’s own view of l’Europe des Patries.128 Frankness with the General, Wilson hoped, could bring the French to support British propositions. Wilson suggested that France and Britain could establish the ‘closest

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possible collaboration…in the development of future types of aircraft, especially in the military field’, mentioning the variable-geometry light-strike aircraft or vertical take-off fighter aircraft as examples. Wilson also suggested that Britain and France could join together to provide aid to Africa. De Gaulle appeared keen for practical technological cooperation: ‘there was a danger that if the British aircraft industry and the French aircraft industry went their separate ways they would both separately end up being submerged by the Americans’.129 Wilson thus succeeded in bringing de Gaulle to indicate support for technological links. Wilson’s talks with Erhard had a different tone. He did not repeat Britain’s inability to join the EEC, but argued that it was ‘not in the realm of practical polities’. Rather, ‘the question was how to develop closer relations between Britain and the EEC’. Economically, the Kennedy Round could provide a way to reduce barriers in Europe; politically, Wilson stressed Britain’s desire to participate in political union.130 Returning to the idea of technological connections, Wilson asked Erhard whether he would be interested in joint development and purchase of the military aircraft the BAC-111 and the P-1127. Erhard commented that collaboration would have to be on a tripartite AngloFrench-German basis. Both men emphasised their interest in sustaining Europe’s connections with NATO and the Western Alliance. Erhard argued that de Gaulle had been sensitive towards German needs at Rambouillet and thus the prospect of a European political union remained. Moreover, there were points of conflict between Erhard and Wilson. Wilson wanted Erhard to provide more support for the heavy cost of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). British forces abroad were a drain on the balance of payments as they converted their wages into Deutschmarks and the British had to pay out wages for German civil employees and payments for services by German agencies; yet, it was domestically difficult for Erhard to offer more.131 Threats to withdraw British forces from Germany appeared to demonstrate Britain’s intent to appease the Soviet Union rather than to uphold the interests of West Berlin and to work for German reunification. Although Erhard acknowledged that de Gaulle’s vision of a ‘European Europe’ including the Eastern states did not provide an answer to German reunification, it was important for the West to avoid a lethargic stance towards this vital issue.132 If Britain and America appeared disinterested in the future reconciliation of the continent and of the two Germanies, then de Gaulle’s idea of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals would garner additional currency. Thus, it is clear that Wilson’s policy towards the EEC, although of low priority from October 1964 to January 1965, reflected more consistent objectives than generally recognised. First, Wilson’s internationalism was not exclusively based on delusion, but on serious strategic considerations. Second, Wilson held the idea of the ‘right sort’ of Europe, a Europe that would be outward-looking in trade and in defence policies, would veer away from supranationality and would facilitate technological connections. Wilson did have some success in engendering French interest in co-operative projects in computers and aircraft. Nevertheless, the general approach to seek a Europe of the right sort was difficult. For a start, Labour’s preoccupation with the balance of payments undermined Britain’s relations with the EFTA countries and led Labour to attempt to cancel the flagship Anglo-French aircraft, Concorde. Moreover, Wilson’s efforts to curry favour with the French created problems within the context of the General’s policies towards the Atlantic Alliance. If Wilson’s comments about Commonwealth trade were

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true, the French maintained that Britain under Labour could never successfully negotiate Britain’s entry into the Common Market.133 After Churchill’s funeral, de Gaulle broadcast to the Five and the British press that Britain’s difficulties prohibited British entry to the Community. Such a stance provided de Gaulle easy justification for his policies towards the EEC and thus served to weaken Britain’s wishes to uphold European support for the Atlantic Alliance. If Britain could never enter the European Community, then French influence over the course of Community development loomed that much larger.134 It was these considerations that led the Foreign Office in early February 1965 to press for redefinition of Britain’s stance towards ultimate accession to the European Community.

Notes 1 Wrigley (1993, pp. 123–35). 2 Northedge (1974, pp. 238–52); Reynolds (2000, pp. 190, 207–18); Sanders (1990, pp. 135– 68). 3 Young (1993, pp. 88–9); Dickie (1992, p. 98); Greenwood (1996, p. 30). 4 Lieber (1970, p. 261); de La Serre (1968, pp. 886–98). 5’Britain and the Common Market’, text of speeches by Hugh Gaitskell and George Brown at the Labour Party Conference, Labour Party: London, 1962, p. 12. 6 Jay (1980, p. 286); Brivati (1996, p. 415). 7 Brivati (1996, pp. 414–15); Williams (1992, p. 409). 8 Ibid. (p. 409); Brivati (1996, pp. 414–15). 9 Ibid. (p. 414); Broad (2001, p. 52). 10 Ibid. (pp. 51–2). 11 Memorandum to Kennedy, 11 December 1962, cited in Williams (1992, pp. 396, 402, 404). 12 Robins (1979, p. 29). 13 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 140–51). 14 Ibid. (pp. 104–6). 15 Williams (1992, pp. 402–3). 16 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 151–4). 17 Robins (1979, pp. 30–1); Broad (2001, p. 50). 18 See also Catterall (2000, pp. 97–8). 19 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, vol. 627, 25 July 1960, col. 1117; Robins (1979, p. 30). 20 Labour Party Archive [henceforward LPA], EEC Memoranda, 1961, comments by Balogh, June 1961. 21 Hansard, vol. 645, 3 August 1961, col. 1665. 22 Ibid., cols. 1484–5; Hansard, vol. 661, 7 June 1962, cols. 676, 686, 688–9; Hansard, vol. 664, 1 August 1962, cols. 706–8. 23 Hansard, vol. 661, 7 June 1962, cols. 693–4. 24 Ibid. col. 695. 25 Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Wilson notes on Europe, 15–16 July 1962, p. 1. 26 Ibid. (p. 3). 27 Ibid. (p. 3). 28 Ramsden (1996, pp. 146–54). 29 LPA, EEC Memoranda, Home Policy Sub-Committee, Common Market: The Way Ahead, 1 February 1963.

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30 LPA, Research Department Paper, RD377, December 1962; LPA Common Market Alternatives Group, The Alternative to the Common Market, Balogh, 5 November 1962; LPA EEC Memoranda, 1961, comments by Balogh and Kaldor, June 1961. 31 TNA T312/1011, Pitblado Report, 11 September 1964. 32 TNA T312/1011, Despatch no. 6, O’Neill to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1964. 33 TNA CAB 148/10, DO(O)(S)(64)42, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Report of the Long Term Study Group, 23 October 1964; Dockrill (2002, pp. 50–5). 34 Ibid. 35 TNA FO371/177370/M1093/25, SC(64)24, The UK and Europe, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 6 April 1964. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 TNA T312/1011, Despatch no. 6, O’Neill to Foreign Secretary, 23 July 1964. 39 TNA FO371/177374/M1093/115, Keeble Memorandum, 14 October 1964. 40 Schenk (1999, pp. 124–7, 133–4). 41 TNA T312/1011, Pitblado Report, 11 September 1964. 42 TNA CAB134/1772, EEP(65)24, Financial and Monetary Implications of Membership of the EEC, Treasury, 6 April 1965. 43 TNA CAB134/1472, CCP(65)8, Report of the Kennedy Round, November 1964-February 1965, Richard Powell, 23 February 1965; TNA CAB134/1783, EER(64)75, Relations with Developing Countries, Board of Trade, 5 November 1964; TNA BT241/1319, Phillips to Nicoll, 13 May 1965. 44 TNA BT241/1319, Phillips memorandum, 3 May 1965. 45 TNA CAB134/1472, CCP(65)11, Commonwealth Conference: Trade with the Commonwealth, Board of Trade, 1 March 1965. 46 LPA, Box 328/5101, Sir John Winnifrith, Food Costs more in the Common Market, 1975, confirms his views at a later date; Lamb (1995, p. 185). 47 TNA T312/1011, Pitblado Report, 11 September 1964. 48 TNA CAB 134/1773, Implications for British Agriculture and Agricultural Trade, MAFF, 7 April 1965. 49 Tomlinson (2003, pp. 210–16); Ziegler (1993, p. 291); Pimlott (1992, pp. 433–4). 50 Butler and King (1965, p. 131). 51 Camps (1967, pp. 125–36); Lynch (2003, p. 57); TNA FO371/173316/WP19, SC(63)20, Policy towards France, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 3 July 1963; TNA FO371/171475/M10920/89, Office meeting, 14 January 1963. 52 Robins (1979, p. 21). 53 Jay (1980, pp. 337–407). 54 Russell (2001, pp. 9–11). 55 Tomlinson (2003, p. 210). 56 TNA CAB128/39, CC(64)11th, 26 November 1964; Dockrill (2002, pp. 55–8). 57 TNA PREM13/103, Wright to Wilson, 2 December 1964. 58 Pearce (1991, pp. 298–9, August 1964, Thoughts on Foreign Policy). 59 TNA CAB148/17, OPD(64)10, Policy in South East Asia, Foreign Secretary, 11 November 1964. 60 TNA PREM13/104, Wilson—Johnson, 7 December 1964. 61 Dockrill (2002, pp. 107–8); Young (2002, p. 66). 62 On Wilson’s belief in his diplomatic abilities, Dockrill (2002, p. 64); TNA PREM13/104, Wilson, Gordon Walker, Healey—Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, 7 December 1964. 63 On ‘power-by-proxy’, Ellison and Ruane (2003); ‘The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Pursuit of Power-by-Proxy, 1952–1958’, Paper presented to the Institute of Contemporary British History, Conference on the Foreign Office, 20 June 2003; TNA

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CAB148/10, DO(O)(S)(64)42, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee: Report of the Long Term Study Group, 23 October 1964. 64 MacDougall (1987, pp. 152–3); Brittan (1969, pp. 187–9); Ponting (1989, pp. 41, 45–6). 65 Woodward (1993, p. 79); Symposium on 1967 Devaluation, Contemporary Record, vol. 1, no. 4, winter 1988, pp. 44–5, 52. 66 MacDougall (1987, p. 152). 67 Pimlott (1992, p. 351). 68 Brittan (1969, p. 188); Trend likened devaluation to ‘chopping off your head to cure a headache’ TNA PREM13/854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966. 69 Callaghan (1987, p. 160); Wilson (1971, pp. 27–8). 70 TNA PREM13/109, Wilson to Johnson, 23 October 1964; TNA CAB130/202, MISC1/1st, 17 October 1964; Bartlett (1992, pp. 109–10); Bale (1999, pp. 192–203); Roy (2001, pp. 62– 5). 71 TNA FO371/177374/M1093/130, FO to Missions, Guidance tel. 577, 23 October 1964. 72 Pearce (1991, p. 301, August 1964, Thoughts on Foreign Policy). 73 TNA T312/1008, Keeble to Marjoribanks, 13 December 1963. 74 TNA FO371/177374/M1093/143, Johnston to Caccia, 2 November 1964; Camps (1967, p. 19); Vanke (2001, p. 99). 75 TNA FO371/177374/M1093/143, Johnston to Caccia, 2 November 1964. 76 British Library of Political and Economic Science [henceforward BLPES], Alastair Hetherington Papers, 7/19, meeting with Wilson, 5 November 1964. 77 Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Wilson notes on Europe, 15–16 July 1962, p. 3; for an account of the Free Trade Area talks, Ellison (2000a, pp. 153–220). 78 Lee (1999, p. 58); Boccia (1996, pp. 164–8); Winand (1996, pp. 171–3). 79 LPA, Alternatives to the Common Market: Outline Report, LPRD. 377/December 1962. 80 Ibid. 81 Pearce (1991, p. 285, 6 April 1963). 82 TNA FO371/177374/M1093/130, FO to Missions, Guidance tel. 577, 23 October 1964. 83 TNA CAB130/202, MISC1, 17 October 1964. 84 TNA CAB 128/39, C(64)2nd, 22 October 1964. 85 TNA PREM13/1240, Jay to Wilson, 22 October 1964; see also Jay (1980, pp. 297–304). 86 Callaghan (1987, p. 171). 87 TNA CAB128/39, CC(64)10th, 24 November 1964. 88 TNA PREM13/1240, Jay to Wilson, 22 October 1964; Mitchell to Carey, 23 October 1964. 89 TNA CAB 128/39, CC(64)8th, 12 November 1964; CC(64)9th, 19 November 1964; PREM13/1240, Washington to FO, 7 November 1964. 90 Ludlow (1997b, pp. 259–72). 91 Asbeek Brusse (1996, pp. 125–8); Gerbert (1997, pp. 135–42). 92 In particular, Germond (2001, pp. 109–30). 93 TNA FO371/173316/WP19, SC(63)20, Policy towards political union, 3 July 1963. 94 On de Gaulle, Bozo (2001, pp. 121–35); TNA FO371/179016/ WUN10711/8, Barnes to Hood, 11 May 1964. 95 TNA FO371/173316/WP19, SC(63)20, Policy towards political union, 3 July 1963. 96 Ibid. 97 On Macmillan, Ludlow (1997b, pp. 265–72). 98 Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Wilson notes on Europe, 15–16 July 1962, p. 3. 99 Winand (1999, pp. 17–30); Buchan (1964, pp. 622–32); Camps (1967 p. 19); Schmidt (1997, pp. 75–6); Costigliola (1994, pp. 174–210); on French policies, Bozo (2001, pp. 91–4, 103– 4); Vanke (2001, pp. 96–9); Koopman (2001, pp. 56–60); Soutou (2001, pp. 34–6); TNA PREM13/27, Dixon to FO, tel. 893, 3 December 1964. 100 TNA CAB128/37, CC(63)16th, 14 March 1963. 101 TNA CAB148/40, OPD(O)(64)2, Multi-Lateral Force, Chairman, 23 October 1964.

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102 TNA T312/1011, Greenhill to Keeble, 28 August 1964; see also TNA PREM13/26, discussions between Gordon Walker and Rusk, 26 October 1964. 103 Philip de Zulueta, Macmillan’s Private Secretary, cited in Hennessy (2002, p. 62). 104 TNA PREM13/104, Wilson—Johnson, 7 December 1964. 105 Craig (1990, p. 217). 106 Hennessy (2000, p. 290). 107 TNA PREM13/316, Wright to Wilson, 12 February 1965. 108 Robins (1979, p. 19). 109 Catterall (2000, pp. 98–9). 110 On MinTech, Edgerton (1996, pp. 56–82); Coopey (1991, pp. 115–27); Young (2003b, pp. 95–114); on the DEA, Brown (1971, pp. 113–21); Callaghan (1987, pp. 149–54, 163–6); Dell (1997, pp. 330–46); Clifford (1997, pp. 94–116); Pollitt (1984, pp. 51–62); O’Hara (2002, pp. 89–160) and most recently, Davis (forthcoming). I am grateful to Jon Davis, Cabinet Office Burke Trend Research Scholar, Queen Mary College, University of London, for providing me with his chapter on the DEA, entitled ‘Hardware’. 111 Coopey (1991, p. 116). 112 TNA CAB134/1771, EEP(65)3rd, 29 January 1965; Brown (1971, pp. 211–12). 113 Kaiser (1996, pp. 110–14). 114 TNA CAB134/1773, EEP(65)28, Future Relations with Europe, DEA, 14 May 1965. 115 TNA EW24/53, Nield brief for visits to France, 24 March 1965. 116 Badel (2002, esp. pp. 237–43). 117 For background to Concorde, Johnman and Lynch (2002, pp. 229–52). 118 TNA CAB128/39, CC(64)1st, 19 October 1964. 119 Young (2003b, pp. 97–8); Jenkins (1991, pp. 155–74, esp. p. 161); TNA CAB130/202, MISC16(65)2nd, 4 January 1965. 120 Young (2003b, pp. 98–9). 121 TNA PREM13/899, Roberts to FO, tel. 25, 23 January 1965. 122 Ibid; TNA PREM13/329, Roberts to FO, despatch 29, 12 January 1965; on political union see Germond (2001, pp. 119–21, 124–5). 123 TNA PREM13/899, Roberts to FO, tel. 25, 23 January 1965. 124 TNA PREM13/317, Caccia to Trend, 22 January 1965, brief on talks with Erhard, 22 January 1965. 125 TNA PREM13/317, Caccia to Trend, 22 January 1965; brief on talks with de Gaulle, 22 January 1965. 126 TNA PREM13/899, Roberts to FO, tel. 25, 23 January 1965. 127 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—de Gaulle, 29 January 1965. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—Erhard, 30 January 1965. 131 On this problem, Zimmermann (2002, pp. 179–89); Zimmermann (2000, pp. 225–36). 132 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—Erhard, 30 January 1965. 133 See also Newhouse (1970, p. 297). 134 TNA FO182952/RF1052/15, Steering Brief for visit of de Gaulle, 2 April 1965.

2 Bridge-building and the empty chair

British policy towards the European Community, February 1965 to February 1966 From early February 1965, the Foreign Office began to pressure Wilson more directly to declare his hand in favour of eventual accession to the European Community. A longdistance commitment to membership of the ‘right sort’ of Europe did not, Foreign Office officials felt, suffice to demonstrate to the continental countries the sincerity of Britain’s intentions. Wilson was slow to respond to Foreign Office blandishments. His approach to the Commonwealth had gained momentum and with this policy active, it would have been difficult to turn to a bid for Community membership. Thus, the policy of bridgebuilding between EFTA and the EEC did not amount to a re-evaluation of the bases of British policy towards the European Community. Bridge-building was a response primarily to EFTA’s anger at the imposition of the import surcharge the previous November and reflected Wilson’s continuing will for technological collaboration and tariff reductions in Europe. Foreign Office concerns did lead Wilson to raise the principle of eventual membership with the Cabinet, but he did not address the terms under which Britain would take this step. By contrast, January 1966 was a genuine reconsideration of Britain’s position. Partly, Wilson’s shift was a reaction to the EEC’s empty chair crisis. With the Atlantic Alliance in potential jeopardy, the British wished to preserve the impulse to European integration within an Atlantic shell. But, persistent indications of the implausibility of the Commonwealth trading alternative, added to the shock of the Rhodesia crisis, provided evidence that Britain’s political options were limited. This chapter assesses the development in Britain’s policy between February 1965 and February 1966, when Wilson’s tentative suggestions for a European initiative were stalled after the settlement on 30 January of the Six’s crisis in Luxembourg.

An Anglo-French connection? From February 1965, the Foreign Office intensified pressure on Wilson to take a ‘closer look’ at his policies towards the EEC. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, acting on the advice of the head of the Planning Staff, Michael Palliser, sent two memoranda to Wilson

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in February and March to urge the Prime Minister to develop a more coherent policy towards the European Community.1 Stewart took over from Gordon Walker as the latter failed to win a Commons seat in the Leyton by-election in January. Like Gordon Walker and Wilson, Stewart was a supporter of Commonwealth ties, but Foreign Office officials rapidly persuaded him that as a ‘major power of the second rank’ Britain risked isolation if excluded from the power unit of the EEC.2 Mild-mannered and conscientious, Stewart’s ability to influence Wilson was considerable. Pimlott testifies that Stewart was ‘a politician of great competence and dependability, who seemed curiously to shun the limelight; {his} views on many matters accorded with the Prime Minister’s own [and he] became a greatly valued adviser’.3 The architect of Stewart’s memoranda was Michael Palliser. The Planning Staff, designed to think long term but not based in any particular section of the Foreign Office, needed a strong, determined individual at its helm and Palliser was exactly that. Palliser’s views converged with those of the new head of the Western Organisations and Cooperation Department, John Barnes. Barnes was a leading advocate of Britain’s European role within the Atlantic complex and the two represented a formidable pairing: ‘our aim is to develop progressively closer and wider European co-operation in all fields, within the Atlantic Alliance’.4 Prompted by Palliser, Stewart pressed on Wilson Britain’s ‘increasing and dangerous isolation from Europe’ as the EEC became a more ‘cohesive, dominating and assertive entity’.5 The fear of isolation reflected the general case that unless Britain evolved a more satisfactory relationship with the European Community, Britain would decline to the status of a ‘greater Sweden’. Stewart warned that Britain’s exclusion would lead to a loss of British influence from the centres of power on both sides of the Atlantic. As the EEC developed, America would turn increasingly to the Community, as its primary partner in the Alliance and its principal interlocutor in the resolution of global trading questions. Moreover, Britain’s traditional partners in EFTA and the Commonwealth would be drawn into the Community’s orbit.6 Exactly how the British could effect a ‘closer look’ at the EEC was more difficult. De Gaulle’s veto rendered any sudden effort to accede to the Community implausible and unpopular. Stewart indicated: ‘there can be no question of renewing our application to join the Common Market as things stand’.7 Within Whitehall, there were two very different methods of approaching the Community. One, championed by Labour’s leading proEuropean, George Brown and his department, the Department of Economic Affairs, was to seek partnership with the French. The other, forcibly presented by the Foreign Office, was that the French were the ‘consistent opponent of most of our main objectives’ and thus Britain should aim to court favour over the longer term with the so-called ‘Friendly Five’.8 The DEA acknowledged that de Gaulle’s attitude was currently a block to accession. In the interim, the British should work to promote economic links with the Europeans. These links, known as ‘functional collaboration’, should start with the creation of bilateral ties between Britain and France. The French were deemed suitable partners partly for practical reasons. France had a similarly sized economy, shared Britain’s concern with American domination and had a highly evolved research and development base. Bilateral co-operation was also simpler and more likely to bear fruit. Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins posited: ‘this is one of the reasons why if co-operation with

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Western Europe is our primary objective, France is important as the most natural point of entry’.9 Although Wilson had wanted to cancel Concorde, joint Anglo-French collaboration on the world’s first supersonic passenger airliner did establish a precedent. The desire to team up with the French also went beyond practicality, suggesting shared assumptions as to how Europe should be organised and how the economy should be run. Politically, Britain and France harboured mutual hostility to supranationalism and a wish to forestall German control of nuclear weaponry.10 Economically, Britain’s ideas for planning were partly based on French dirigisme after the war and officials had visited France in the early 1960s to gain experience of French methods.11 Stuart Holland, economist at Number Ten, later went as far as to recommend the complete merger of the planned sections of the British and French economies.12 William Nield, Assistant Under Secretary at the External Relations Department of the DEA, suggested that the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC), established to provide money for research and development, could merge with similar institutions in Europe. The French had already held discussions with the British NRDC to see if they could set up an equivalent institution.13 Nield had strong personal connections with the French Commercial Counsellor in London, Jean Wahl. Stuart Holland had links with Pierre Joxe, son of the Deputy Prime Minister Louis Joxe and supporter of plans for the Europeanisation of the sterling balances.14 When Derek Mitchell, in 1965 Wilson’s Personal Private Secretary at Number Ten, transferred to the DEA in 1966, he remembered he was sent to create a ‘miniature Foreign Office, concentrating on Europe’.15 However, the Foreign Office disagreed with the DEA’s prognosis. Barnes was opposed to focusing Britain’s economic and technological efforts exclusively with the French. The French were working against Britain’s aims in the EEC, in NATO and also in global commercial policies. It would be contradictory to place France as the pivot in Britain’s industrial policies in Europe: ‘We cannot have two foreign policies’.16 A major point of difference between France and Britain concerned the Atlantic Alliance. Palliser saw the Americans under President Johnson as ‘bored and irritated with foreigners of all kinds’ and tempted towards introspection. Lack of American authority encouraged de Gaulle to exploit the ‘crisis of leadership in the Alliance’. Not only did the French President offer an alternative means for the organisation of European defence, he also seemed to be the only Western statesman with a vision for the ultimate reunification of the continent.17 Repeated French threats that France would withdraw from the Community meant the Five had tended to acquiesce to French wishes. ‘Bending his partners to his will’ with increasing ease, the Foreign Office argued that de Gaulle was turning the EEC into an inward-looking ‘closed shop’.18 Despite Britain’s exclusion from the Community, the Foreign Office maintained, Britain could play an important role in the organisation of the continent. Ultimate British involvement in the Community was an aspiration for members of the Five. British engagement offered the prospect to the Five of increased trading possibilities and confirmed Europe’s ties to the Atlantic. Britain would provide an important counterweight to French dominance or to German revival. In the absence of Britain’s interest in the Community, Erhard could be pushed towards the French in order to secure the domestic prize of political union. The French appeared to propose nuclear defence to the Germans through access to the French force de frappe, at a time when Western proposals for the MLF/ANF were not making progress. Moreover, the notion of a

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European Europe, uniting Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, suggested a method by which Germany could be reunified. Although Erhard was committed to Atlantic defence, he could find himself propelled towards de Gaulle: General de Gaulle will surely do his utmost to enmesh the six in talks about centring the European nuclear defence on the force de frappe and experience shows that his capacity for bamboozling the Five into going some way in his own direction is considerable.19 A French-led ‘closed shop’ was not only a danger to the European Community and Atlantic Alliance, but also posed an assault on Britain’s global economic interests. De Gaulle’s press conference in February called for a hike in the gold price as a way of curbing the American balance of payments deficit. The British and Americans felt there was insufficient liquidity; world trade was growing too quickly for liquidity to keep up.20 Guardians of French orthodoxy such as Foreign Secretary Maurice Couve de Murville and the economic adviser Jacques Rueff believed there was too much liquidity in the world. The US could run her economy at low interest rates and low inflation, sustaining buoyant consumer demand despite the deficit: absorbing the fruits of European labours without having to pay for it. Such an approach forced the European countries to dampen domestic demand, sustaining high interest rates and encouraging inflationary trends.21 French policies in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an alternative reserve asset, the Currency Reserve Unit (CRU), proposed that currencies would switch into the new asset when the pound and dollar were under pressure. Contrary to British preferences, French proposals envisaged the termination of the existing reserve currency system, replacing the dollar and sterling with a different asset or with gold.22 With the British balance of payments fragile, France’s suggestion that countries should buy up gold added an unwelcome pressure to sterling. French policies also affected British interests in Africa and the Commonwealth. The Yaoundé Convention, finalised in 1963 to replace Part IV Association under the Treaty of Rome, effectively offered to the developing countries a reciprocal free trade area between the EEC and its associates (AOTs). The Convention did not insist that the AOTs must grant preferences in favour of EEC countries, but it stipulated that AOTs grant the same tariff advantages to all the EEC countries. Guaranteed prices formerly granted by France were abolished. Instead, the AOTs would market their produce at world prices and receive assistance from the European Development Fund in order to do so. Institutional arrangements, including a Parliamentary Assembly, were established to supervise the agreement.23 The problem for the UK was the attraction of the EEC’s system to the African Commonwealth countries, competitors to the African AOTs. Nigeria, a country wary of institutional ties and without a history of granting trading preferences, had begun association negotiations in April 1963. Britain felt that the French would insist on Nigeria’s full acceptance of the Yaoundé Convention terms.24 O’Neill, leaving his ambassadorial post in Brussels to take over the European Economic Organisations Department in the Foreign Office, used his valedictory despatch to explain to Stewart the deleterious effects of French protectionism:

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In Africa, it is France alone who stand between Nigeria and an agreement with the Community in line with the GATT New Chapter and Nigeria’s tradition of non-discrimination. France insists on terms which the East Africans will at least be reluctant to grant and which will damage their relations with other countries if they grant them.25 Nigeria would be compelled to grant access to EEC produce, effectively erecting preferences against British produce; moreover, Nigeria would probably be forced to yield its preference in Britain’s market. The political danger was that Nigeria would choose to accept association on France’s terms. Attracted by the lure of access to the lucrative Community markets, the other African countries could follow Prime Minister Abubakar’s example.26 Stewart warned Wilson: The Commonwealth will fix up their own arrangements with the Six, as Nigeria is now trying to do and as, if she succeeds, the East African territories will also try to do, in which case the EEC will inherit our place in a large part of Africa. This is a process which could spread to other areas.27 Moreover, the French and the EEC posed a challenge to Britain’s interests in the GATT Kennedy Round. The Kennedy Round had been deadlocked between the French and American positions over grain tariffs. The French insisted on a montant de soutien formula, which worked by measuring the level of domestic support against the international price. Montant de soutien would fix the principle that the cheaper the product, the greater the domestic support, echoing the philosophy of the agricultural levy system and entrenching the protectionism of the CAP.28 At the March 1965 meeting of the Contracting Parties, the US and the EEC agreed a compromise to proceed along the lines of a watered-down montant de soutien formula.29 An arrangement that consolidated the CAP was detrimental to Britain’s interests. Protectionism in Europe meant an increase in cheap imports from elsewhere in the world to Britain, weakening the balance of payments. In 1963, the Conservative government had been forced to apply a ceiling to the quantity of agricultural imports they could accept.30 Shut out of the EEC market, members of EFTA, such as the Danes, agitated for greater access to the British consumer.31 The National Plan aimed to increase domestic agricultural production, a goal made more difficult by the British inability to match EEC export subsidies to their producers for exports to third countries.32 The British, caught between the two giants of the EEC and the USA, could do little to enforce their strong interest in the successful conclusion of the talks. Stewart shared the preoccupation of Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Under Secretary of the Board of Trade and Britain’s main negotiator at the GATT Kennedy Round, that the talks, so crucial to Britain’s future prosperity, would be settled without regard to Britain’s interests. Stewart cautioned: ‘the US will be forced to make deals with the Six, bypassing Britain, as they now look like doing over the Kennedy Round’.33

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The development of bridge-building, March to May 1965 Stewart recommended to Wilson that although there was ‘no chance of renewing our application to join the Common Market as things stand… one day we may wish to’. In the interim, Britain should ‘encourage the powerful elements in the Six which, for all emotional attachment to the Common Market, mistrust de Gaulle’s political and defence aims and want us in as a counterweight and guarantee’. To attain this goal, Britain’s approach towards Europe required greater coherence. Britain’s current policies, with emphasis on fulfilment of the terms of entry, were too negative. Rather, Britain should show that ‘provided our essential (but unspecified) interests were safeguarded we should ultimately want to join a wider European market with any other members of EFTA who also wanted to go in’.34 Wilson’s response, in his customary tiny handwriting, reverted to an instinctive hostility towards the existing Community. Wilson wrote: but what is the right sort of Europe? Unless it was genuinely outward looking and not autarkic it must be inimical to Atlantic and Commonwealth links. The real test is agricultural policy, which in its present form is autarkic and would deal a death-blow to Commonwealth trade.35 The force of Wilson’s riposte reflects that fact that at this stage in the government, Wilson’s priority was the reinvigoration of Commonwealth trade. In preparation for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in June, Wilson and Jay sought methods of extending Britain’s preference with the Commonwealth. Shortly before Wilson wrote these comments, he had held a meeting with Jay to discuss the promotion of interCommonwealth trading connections. Wilson suggested forging a preference for British suppliers in the Commonwealth market along the lines of the Buy America Act; or establishing quotas for Britain to buy more Commonwealth agricultural produce.36 He set up an ad hoc Committee, MISC56, to investigate possibilities, recommending the creation of bilateral free trade areas between Britain and the developed Commonwealth. Joint planning initiatives were another of Wilson’s favoured policies: ‘we might seek joint planning with other Commonwealth countries …by which our own industrial capacity might be developed to produce competitively their main imports’.37 In this way, the proposed National Plan could be linked to an expansion of Commonwealth ties.38 The fact that Wilson’s Commonwealth policies had gained momentum meant that Wilson’s thinking was diverted further from an ultimate approach to the EEC. Bridgebuilding, developed alongside the Commonwealth initiative between March and May 1965, reflected the ongoing concerns to broaden trading links within Europe, to forestall a Six-wide political union and to cast for technological connections. Wilson was also inspired by Foreign Office anxieties of Britain’s diminishing political influence in Europe, particularly because the damage to EFTA wrought by Britain’s imposition of the import surcharge in November 1964 created the very real danger that EFTA could break up. Without EFTA, Britain would have no base of influence in Europe. At Foreign Office

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prompting, Wilson did raise the possibility of eventual membership of some kind of European Community with the Cabinet in May. Wilson’s first objective, as he prepared to visit Erhard in early March, was to continue to guard against German acquiescence to a French-led political union. The Six were discussing the possibility of a summit in Rome in May at which they would deliberate on political union. Erhard had tabled his own proposals for political union the previous November. In economic terms, he favoured a wider, more outward-looking Europe of the kind supported by the British and he had also emphasised the importance of retaining links to the Atlantic Alliance.39 In order to appeal to industrial opinion, his proposals for a union included ties between the EEC and EFTA and measures to ensure tariff reductions between the two groups.40 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office remained concerned that the absence of alternatives could force Erhard along the route to an exclusively Six-wide political union.41 Thus, by continuing to stress Britain’s commitment to participate in a European political union, Wilson could help to legitimise Erhard’s proposals and to stiffen the German Chancellor against concurrence with the French.42 Wilson also hoped to ease the economic disadvantages of exclusion from the EEC by encouraging Erhard’s ideas for tariff reductions between the EEC and EFTA, within the context of the Kennedy Round. The Prime Minister was aware of the potent political symbol of Western Europe divided by a tariff wall. The completion of the EEC’s customs union and the finalisation of EFTA’s tariff reductions would cement the division in Western Europe. By drawing attention to this division, Wilson aimed to generate pressure for tariff arrangements between the two blocs. As Kaiser shows, the liberal rhetoric of EFTA was a way of placing strain on the protectionist bloc of the EEC, despite the fact that the Community’s common external tariff was on average lower than Britain’s own tariffs.43 Tariff reductions between EFTA and the EEC would bring economic benefits, providing better access for British industry into the Community market. More importantly, the prospect of access to the EEC market would encourage industry to continue to invest in the UK. If Britain’s economy appeared permanently isolated from the EEC’s dynamism, investors would favour the Community over opportunities in the UK and EFTA.44 Furthermore, if Britain and Germany appeared to be taking action to overcome the tariff divide, France would shoulder the blame for Europe’s barriers. European opinion would subsequently pressure the French to complete the Kennedy Round. The main achievement arising from Wilson’s visit to Bonn in early March was Erhard’s agreement to seek methods of facilitating trade between the EEC and EFTA and of ensuring Europe benefited from the promised 50 per cent cut in GATT. The scope for potential intra-European tariff reductions was, however, limited. Tariff cuts in adjunct to the Kennedy Round could jeopardise the GATT talks. France could use additional intraEuropean agreements to stall progress, or America could also perceive such settlements as lack of interest in the Kennedy Round. Wilson suggested a variety of methods. His proposals included a treaty between the Six and the seven EFTA states leading to the progressive reduction of tariffs or a special approach to certain, important commodities. He also forwarded the catch-all solution of the Munchmeyer Plan. Named after a German industrialist who had first suggested the idea, the Munchmeyer Plan envisaged that the

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EEC would join EFTA as one unit.45 Although Wilson was keen on the Munchmeyer Plan, as it would enable Britain to join with the Community without making changes to Commonwealth trade and without raising the spectre of supranationalism, Erhard was unenthusiastic. His proposals were limited to an exchange of ambassadors between the EEC and EFTA in order to generate closer co-operation and a quest for methods of tariff reduction after the Kennedy Round was completed.46 On the question of Britain’s relations with the EEC, Wilson maintained his opposition to membership on terms likely to be available from the Six. The Prime Minister told Erhard that Britain could not agree to supranationality in defence or in political union. Erhard quipped that surely Britain could accept as much supranationality as de Gaulle could; in response, Wilson argued that Britain had abandoned more sovereignty in NATO. Erhard replied that Britain was unwilling to cede sovereignty in economic relations and Wilson admitted that entry into the EEC would kill Commonwealth trade.47 In talks with de Gaulle early in April, Wilson did not discuss the possibility of links between EEC and EFTA, but concentrated on the possibility of industrial collaboration, particularly in military aircraft. He intended to use Britain’s lack of current interest in the EEC as a bargaining stick with the General. Stewart told Hetherington that ‘the improved position with France came about because of a recognition on both sides that Britain was not now trying to get into the Common Market’.48 This approach reaped dividends. Wilson’s meetings with the General were extremely frank and elicited considerable agreement. Wilson floated the possibility of the production of a European aircraft. Cabinet had just decided, in two long and acrimonious meetings, to cancel the British built TSR-2.49 TSR-2, Wilson explained to de Gaulle, had taught the British a simple lesson. As Britain reduced its defence role in the world, there was not an adequately sized market in the UK to justify the research and development costs of new, sophisticated aircraft: ‘there was no future, for a country of Britain’s size, in this kind of unilateral production’. Purchases from America were costly and would underline Britain’s dependence on the US. AngloFrench production was the only way to pursue new ‘revolutionary’ technologies such as the variable-geometry aircraft. Other European countries could participate in these collaborative projects, but Wilson agreed with de Gaulle that they did not have much to contribute.50 Wilson made clear to the General that Cabinet had insisted on the retention of an option on the American TFX as an alternative to the TSR-2. He stressed that this option would only be for a few planes and did not upset Wilson’s intention to reorient Britain’s aircraft production towards joint European ventures. In ten years’ time, the Anglo-French plane would be the major part of Britain’s armoury.51 Extending his offer, Wilson suggested that the British and French could co-operate in other industrial projects, particularly in the production of computers. De Gaulle seemed very keen to implement collaboration in both areas. Regarding aircraft, he said that ‘if Britain was ready to go ahead then agreement should be reached at once’.52 He appeared even more compelled by the case for joint work on computers, commenting that the computer industry was one area in which the French had been unable to avoid American domination. He was ‘very ready to see whether progress might be made in this field’.53 Wilson eluded in-depth discussion of the Common Market. When de Gaulle did raise it, Wilson refused to elaborate. He stated that the issue was ‘whether and on what terms

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the UK could join the Common Market’. Britain required safeguards for Commonwealth imports of primary produce; it was unlikely that such safeguards could be obtained.54 By emphasising Britain’s reluctance, Wilson hoped to bring de Gaulle to support functional collaboration and any British initiative on tariff reductions in Europe. He told the General that the division in Europe was harmful and affected French access to EFTA markets: ‘With high tariff walls in prospect between France and Britain and between the Six and the Seven it became all the more important to build tunnels under these walls’.55 The most vital objective in the pursuit of bridge-building, however, was to quell the forces that threatened to break EFTA apart. In November 1964, Wilson had imposed a 15 per cent import surcharge in order to stave off pressures on the pound. The surcharge contravened the Stockholm Convention and despite warnings that EFTA should be consulted first, the Cabinet had elected to impose it.56 Anger at the import surcharge encouraged calls, led by the Norwegians and Danes, for greater solidarity in EFTA. Denmark, an agricultural exporter, felt the squeeze of the CAP as Community protectionism, consolidated by the 1964 cereal price agreement, obstructed penetration of the Six’s markets. As compensation, the Danes sought access to the vast consumption power of Britain’s market: they wanted agriculture enshrined in EFTA’s Convention. Threatened with similar pressure, the Norwegians backed the Danes, calling also for the inclusion of fish. Less enamoured by the idea of membership of the Community, however, the Norwegians argued for the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and for a common external tariff in EFTA.57 The Austrians were so concerned by the tariff discrimination of the EEC that they had already begun negotiations for EEC association. As double membership was improbable, Austria could choose to leave EFTA for the wider market of the Community.58 Unable to join the EEC because of Salazar’s dictatorship, the Portuguese also felt that EFTA should move to more autonomous attempts at internal commercial harmonisation. Neutral Switzerland, also excluded from Community membership, wanted to strengthen the trade benefits of EFTA. An initiative to make links between EFTA and the EEC would have multiple benefits for EFTA. Not only would an initiative help to encourage investment in EFTA, but bridge-building would contribute to ‘sublimating’ the ‘surcharge obsession’ of certain EFTA members.59 Giving EFTA something to do would dilute the Swiss intent to force Britain to remove the charge before Britain’s economy could bear it. With EFTA’s energies diverted into the bridge-building proposal and Britain’s commitment to EFTA thus proven, calls for the elimination of the charge would carry less weight. Bridgebuilding would strengthen EFTA ‘by default’. Discussion of the initiative would provide EFTA with a focus, uniting all members around a single goal.60 Although not all EFTA members supported the idea of bridge-building, and the Swiss and Austrians in particular thought it could not work, a British-backed proposal had gravity that the Scandinavian suggestions could not attain. Nordic proposals would naturally become embroiled in delay, as the Austrians did not support the agricultural propositions and the Swedes would not benefit from tariff harmonisation.61 A meeting of the Socialist International at Chequers on 24–25 April provided Wilson with the opportunity to sound out his tariff ideas with some of the EFTA leaders. Encouraging to Wilson was the strong support given to Munchmeyer—the EEC joining EFTA as one unit—by the German Social Democrat leader and Mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt. Brandt had obvious domestic reasons for stressing such a possibility, with

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West German industry critical of Erhard’s European policy and keen for access to EFTA’s markets. In a speech the previous December, Brandt had said that he believed ‘that for the EEC to join EFTA, which would procedurally be simple, would be the most reasonable solution’.62 Alongside Brandt, the Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander and the Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag both gave strong support to Wilson’s ideas to seek tariff reductions and EEC—EFTA links.63 Wilson was fortified with the evidence that not only did Erhard encourage institutional ties and tariff reductions and de Gaulle support functional collaboration, but also that Brandt would pressure the German Chancellor to adhere to his word. Thus, at the Socialist International, Wilson decided that the forthcoming May meeting of the EFTA Ministers should be held at Prime Ministerial level.64 This would provide the platform for the launch of the bridge-building proposal. The press release of the Socialist International emphasised that ‘the question of Britain or other European states joining the EEC will not arise for several years’.65 But, at the prompting of the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, Wilson did raise the question of eventual European membership with his Cabinet colleagues. His reasons for doing so were primarily political. Wilson recognised the strength of the Foreign Office argument that without an indication of Britain’s ultimate desire for Community membership, Britain’s influence in the immediate term would weaken. Trend, whose impression on Wilson was all the greater as he was not a natural supporter of British membership of the Community, urged Wilson that failure to mention whether or not Britain intended to join the EEC in the future would cast doubt on the sincerity of a short-term initiative.66 If there were no indication of Britain’s reconsideration of eventual membership of the EEC, the risk of the development of a Gaullist ‘closed shop’ would be enhanced. Trend warned: ‘those who want us in will become uncertain and conclude we will not join and the price of joining will increase’.67 Wilson also had domestic political considerations in mind. With a parliamentary majority of only three, there was no prospect of a serious reconsideration of Britain’s membership of the European Community, particularly while de Gaulle’s veto still stood. Yet, Brown had instigated a study of the implications of Community membership, linking membership to the National Plan.68 At a restricted ministerial meeting, MISC48, convened to discuss EEC-EFTA relations, Wilson suggested that although ministers supported limited solutions such as functional collaboration: doubts had been raised about the advisability of remaining outside the major developments that had been taking place within the EEC. Therefore, further consideration should be given to the balance of advantage of UK membership of the EEC in quantitative and qualitative terms.69 In this way, Wilson could control ministerial dealings with the Community. He proposed to Brown that the First Secretary work on a paper on the political and economic implications of membership. To sustain balance, he asked the President of the Board of Trade, Douglas Jay, who was extremely sceptical about membership, to write a paper on the trading implications of accession.70 Wilson did proceed to raise the possibility of membership of the right sort of Europe with the Cabinet in May. Wilson told MISC48 that Britain would have little choice but

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entry into a Community ‘based on the Treaty of Rome, but developing and adapting policies acceptable to us’.71 To the full Cabinet, Stewart suggested that Britain would have to approach the European Community ‘provided our essential but unspecified interests could be safeguarded’.72 Wilson did not go this far, telling ministers: ‘we must… maintain our efforts to promote closer political and economic unity in Europe in a form in which we could play an integral part. It was difficult to envisage the ultimate solution to this problem’.73 Cabinet did not discuss this proposition, but agreed to pose suggestions for EEC-EFTA connections at the EFTA summit at Prime Ministerial level in May. Thus, it is worth considering the place of the bridge-building initiative in the development of Harold Wilson’s policy towards the EEC. Was this a turning point? Wilson’s policy remained consistent with his stance in opposition, when he had demonstrated a kernel of comprehension that the EEC would, at some point, come to be the central political question of Britain’s foreign policy orientation. His agreement to raise the issue of eventual membership with the Cabinet indicated his continuing political awareness of the importance of the issue of the EEC. However, Wilson’s focus on the Commonwealth, which had gained momentum in the early months of 1965, reinforced his preference to enter only the right sort of Europe. The Prime Minister’s comments as to the autarky of the EEC indicated a less ambiguous posture than his scribbled efforts to reconcile the EEC with the Commonwealth at the Socialist International in 1962. The Foreign Office felt that as time passed, so the adequacy of a policy centred on membership of a Europe of the right sort diminished. In order to sustain the same degree of influence in the Six, to stave off the likelihood of a Gaullist ‘closed shop’, Britain had to demonstrate a more specific commitment to ultimate accession. In this way, Wilson’s policy was proved inadequate and Britain’s policy developed in a reaction to events on the continent. Bridge-building emerged in response to short-term pressures, with its primary purpose to help prevent the self-made problem of the fragmentation of EFTA and thus of Britain’s influence in Europe. Wilson was only persuaded to mention eventual British membership at all with the full Cabinet at Trend’s urging. Furthermore, Wilson’s diplomacy towards the Community countries remained discordant and does not support the idea that Wilson was playing a longer game. He continued to emphasise to de Gaulle and to Erhard that Britain could not join the EEC if it meant a change in Commonwealth trading policies and an acceptance of supranationality. While this approach may have had the benefit of attracting the French towards technological co-operation, Wilson’s intentions remained mystifying for his European counterparts and served to cast him as a Community-sceptic, a reputation it would be difficult to shed. Bridge-building, even with a hint of ministerial reconsideration of eventual membership, could only ever be a very limited policy in terms of reconciling Britain’s interests with those of the European Community. Wilson’s grander propositions, such as the Munchmeyer Plan for the EEC to join EFTA as one unit, had no prospect of success. Indeed, Wilson’s paper to the Cabinet, drafted by a Foreign Office disconcerted by Wilson’s approach, acknowledged this, but Wilson still expounded on the possibility of Munchmeyer during the Vienna Prime Ministers’ meeting.74 The mention of eventual accession in Cabinet was just enough to satisfy Foreign Office concerns, but membership of the ‘right sort’ of Europe appeared an increasingly improbable goal.

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The Vienna Prime Ministers’ meeting, 24 to 25 May 1965 Two weeks after the Cabinet meeting, Wilson attended the EFTA Prime Ministers’ meeting at Vienna, alongside Jay. Armed with a large folder of briefs, Wilson told Hetherington that he had not read any of them. How could he be expected to fly by the seat of his pants ‘when his pants were stuffed full of great big books?’ Wilson ‘sewed up the European business the evening before in conversation with the Scandinavians and Austrians and later the Swiss’, securing agreement between them to investigate a proposal for a progressive removal of all tariffs between EFTA and the EEC between 1967 and 1972.75 Wilson acknowledged to Hetherington the improbability of success: ‘He indicated that 50–50 was probably about right’.76 The Vienna meeting issued no specific invitation to the Six, merely posited ideas for future joint work and established a trawling committee within EFTA to investigate areas for possible collaboration between the Community and the Association. The trawling committee was to report to the EFTA meeting at Copenhagen in October. The most promising and weightiest aspect of bridge-building was a search for methods of commercial harmonisation. In a remarkable cultural shift, Wilson had agreed to begin to transform from an imperial to a metric system in weights and measures in order to facilitate trade with the Europeans. Cabinet had discussed decimalisation of the currency, but had dismissed it as too difficult in the immediate term, as many of Britain’s trading partners still used pounds, shillings and pence. ‘Going metric’ would, it was thought, prepare the ground for later decimalisation.77 The European Community’s reception of bridge-building was cautious, but sceptical. The Luxembourgers, Belgians and Italians all expressed doubt that bridge-building could reap valuable rewards; the Netherlands also queried the lack of a specific proposition. The Germans said that a rehash of the free trade area proposal would prove inadequate and the Italians were careful to reiterate their commitment to supranationality. The French reaction was that there was little prospect for success.78 Other component parts of bridge-building were also challenged. EFTA’s trawling committee established that many areas for joint Six-Seven discussion were unsuitable. Topics such as non-tariff barriers to trade were already dealt with in the Kennedy Round, others such as credit and investment guarantees or cyclical policy, in the OECD. Crucial areas like the harmonisation of taxation would be unlikely to be greeted enthusiastically, as the Six were still undecided amongst themselves. Issues of distinct national interest could not be openly discussed: the Norwegians stated they could not contemplate the allimportant question of access to fishing grounds.79 The trawling committee identified standardisation, patents and inland transport as areas where progress could be made.80 Functional collaboration in industry also became embroiled in practical difficulties. Wilson’s proposal for Anglo-French co-operation in computers ran aground over scepticism that the project could ever work. There was no reason to suppose that simply through collaboration with another European power that Britain’s industrial deficiencies—manpower, lack of research revenue—could be overcome. A technological community would widen the market and would offer opportunities for sharing of ideas, but no country was likely to give away national commercial secrets unless some kind of return was promised. With this uncertainty, the Treasury was reluctant to provide finance.81 Britain’s industries were averse to sharing their own information. Where

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British industries were more advanced, such as electronics, firms were concerned that handing over information would enable France to beat Britain in competition for third markets.82 The Common Market’s company laws could also prevent fruitful collaboration. Britain’s links with the US, for instance the licences granted by the US to the NRDC in the development of fuel cells, could inhibit closer links.83 Progress on technological co-operation was likely to be slow. Studies of European membership within Whitehall were also quietly shelved. Jay’s paper on the trading implications of membership, ordered by Wilson at MISC48 in March, argued that entry into the EEC would place a threefold burden onto Britain’s balance of payments. The cost of Britain’s food imports would rise, as Britain tended to import more from the EEC than from the Commonwealth. An increased import bill would raise the costs of living and labour, making Britain’s exports less competitive. Commonwealth exports would encounter reverse preferences in Britain’s market, losing the Commonwealth preference and facing the common external tariff.84 Within Whitehall, Jay’s paper was regarded as ‘partisan and emotionally directed’.85 Treasury officials noted that the paper was inaccurate, overestimating the impact of membership on the cost of living and retail prices and underestimating the likely rise in world food prices.86 It also took ‘the current position as static’, assuming that the Commonwealth and EFTA would continue to gravitate around the UK.87 Assessing a draft of the paper, an interdepartmental official meeting under the chair of Sir Eric Roll, Permanent Under Secretary at the DEA, concluded that ‘this paper was not considered an objective statement of the considerations involved’. The officials recommended suppressing circulation, fearful that such views could lead ministers to harden against membership.88 Wilson agreed, indicating primarily his desire to sustain balance; he suggested that if Brown’s paper had been circulated, then Jay’s could be. If not, ‘I should keep this in cold storage’.89 Yet, his support for the officials’ line also revealed that Wilson had a different view from that of Jay. While Wilson prioritised the Commonwealth above the EEC, he did not do so to the extent whereby he would rule out ever seeking membership of the Community, as Jay’s paper appeared to do. The greatest challenge to bridge-building came from the Six. On 1 July 1965, following two weeks of discussions as to the methods of financing the CAP, the French delegation pulled out of the Community’s Council of Ministers. Appearing initially to be no more than a temporary breakdown, the deadlock escalated into a six-month paralysis as the French refused to participate in Community institutions.90 The crisis dimmed the already shaky prospects for bridge-building. Any EFTA proposal for formal links was unlikely to meet a positive response. Uncertainty strengthened the sceptics’ hand, giving weight to Swiss calls to drop the initiative.91 More importantly, the Foreign Office was worried that the British could appear as saboteurs of the Community, exploiting the crisis in order to push through a settlement more amenable to Britain’s interests.92 A British gesture could become embroiled in the Six’s dispute, as the French could use an EFTA proposal to initiate a European conference without the Commission, strengthening their stance against supranationality.93 Thus, at the Copenhagen EFTA meeting in October, EFTA elected not to launch a specific set of proposals for links between the two units. Instead, EFTA handed to the Ambassadors of the Six and to the Commission a statement outlining the intention to look for co-operation in areas affecting trade between the two units, including patents and

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industrial standards.94 The Munchmeyer Plan was never formally entered onto an EFTAEEC agenda. Ideas for progressive reduction of tariffs foundered on the greater concern that the Six’s crisis could derail the Kennedy Round.

The empty chair crisis and the Atlantic Alliance, July 1965 to February 1966 Historical attention to the empty chair crisis has focused on the origins of the rift, emphasising the importance of this first major row between the French and the Germans since the inception of the Community. Contemporary writers interpreted the deadlock in terms of de Gaulle’s deliberate challenge to the Community’s supranational provisions. In this analysis, the French intended to provoke a split because of de Gaulle’s adherence to ideals of French national independence. The French deliberately picked on the Commission’s proposal that the proceeds of agricultural levies and industrial customs duties should belong to the Commission. That the Commission should have its ‘own resources’—a budget that would also augment the role of the European Parliament—was seen by the French as an unacceptable acceleration of the centralising, bureaucratic forces in the Community. Subsequently, the Luxembourg Compromise, settling the dispute at the end of January 1966, established the principle that no state would be over-ridden on a matter of national interest. The compromise has been interpreted as a victory for the French and thus the principle of unanimity, allowing each member state the privilege of a veto.95 An alternative view using archives of Italy, Germany and the Netherlands challenges the notion that the French intended to instigate the rupture. Rather, French actions were forced by the deliberate hardening of German, Italian and Dutch positions against French leadership. French threats to pull out of the Community from the winter of 1964–5 and the refusal of the French to deliver on political union angered the Germans and the Italians. Piqued by de Gaulle’s repeated failure to deliver on political union and parallel development on commercial policy each of the three independently resolved to stand up to de Gaulle.96 After the end of the Community’s transitional period in 1970, member states’ contributions to the agricultural fund were to be calculated based on the net agricultural imports from third countries. The Commission’s proposals, supported by the Germans and the Italians, aimed to break the link between agricultural imports and finance, hoping to water down the eventual introduction of a funding system based on the quantity of imports. The Commission retained the principle of a formula using levy proceeds and tariff revenue from goods included in the industrial customs union, but aimed to agree a fixed contribution in advance.97 For the Germans and Italians, both net importers, breaking the link would enable a reduction of their contributions to the agricultural fund. Faced with this challenge, the French had very little option but to withdraw.98 In this interpretation, the Luxembourg Compromise did not find exclusively in favour of France, but formalised current Community practice.99 Once the French bluff had been called, de Gaulle opted to use the crisis to challenge the Commission’s proposals and the supranational aspects of the Community. The original interpretation regards de Gaulle’s attack on supranationality as revelation of the true nature of the crisis.100 The revisionist perspective, by portraying de Gaulle as

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reacting to circumstances as well as defining the agenda, points to the possibility that there was also a defensive element to the General’s thinking. The empty chair crisis was unpopular in France. The French press, the Conseil National du Patronat Francais and French industry joined forces to highlight the substantial economic advantages of membership. The French farmers’ unions publicly blamed de Gaulle for the outbreak of the crisis and suggested that farmers should not support de Gaulle in the forthcoming Presidential election.101 All four of de Gaulle’s opponents in the election campaign, beginning in November, argued that they would immediately resume talks with the Five.102 Thus, de Gaulle’s challenge to supranationality and assertion of national sovereignty had one eye on the domestic political arena. Furthermore, the Five were initially resolute in resisting de Gaulle, firmly declaring that they would not revise the Treaty of Rome.103 Faced with their refusal to yield, de Gaulle began to escalate the crisis into the wider sphere of politics and defence. His press conference on 9 September attacked the basis of supranationality and defended the supremacy of the nation state.104 From this date, indications began to appear that he intended to take the French out of NATO. The Times reported on 10 September that de Gaulle had threatened to leave NATO in 1969, demanding revision of the Treaty of Rome as his price for continuing with the Common Market.105 These tactics raised the stakes, drawing the crisis out of the initial focus on agriculture and back into the realm of political union. Consistent with his tactics throughout 1965, use of arguments in the political and defence sphere gave de Gaulle a wider field over which to play and posed problems of the first magnitude for the Europeans. Barnes noted that ‘by threatening his partners, he softens up their resistance to his next threat to NATO and viceversa. If he continues with these tactics, I doubt if we can rely on the Five standing up to him on both fronts’.106 De Gaulle could, by threatening to pull out of NATO, hope that the Five would agree to agricultural arrangements in order to stop him from doing so: limiting the damage by giving him what he wanted in the EEC. Alternatively, the disruption in NATO could pull apart the Five’s will to preserve the EEC intact, encouraging the channels of opinion attracted to de Gaulle’s brand of nationalism. The connection between de Gaulle’s policies towards the EEC and NATO demands a reassessment of the importance of the breach to the development of British policy. In keeping with the original view of the empty chair crisis, supranationality has been seen as the key element in determining Britain’s response. Helen Wallace, for instance, emphasised that the Luxembourg Compromise, by reducing the Community’s formal commitment to supranationality, made it easier for the British to accept membership.107 In contrast, Miriam Camps suggested that the British should have taken the opportunity to team up with the Five. Indecision meant Britain missed a genuine opportunity to advance her outlook towards accession.108 In fact, for much of the Foreign Office, the most important aspect of the crisis was not supranationality but the putative challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance. As it became clear that the Six would not swiftly resolve their differences, Britain’s reaction was one of ‘sympathetic inactivity’.109 In Cabinet, Stewart declared that Britain should stand aside. Echoing concerns already discussed in relation to bridge-building, the British did not want to be seen as gloating over the Six’s difficulties and as encouraging their split.110 Yet Stewart warned that if the crisis did persist, Britain would have to consider an approach towards the EEC. Germany’s strong stance upset the balance of the

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Community, creating doubts both of the Germans’ reliability and of their potential strength. On the one hand, the American State Department feared that the Germans would be unable alone to resist de Gaulle’s offers of political union and would be forced to acquiesce to French terms on defence.111 On the other hand, the Five were alarmed at the implications of Germany’s growing influence. The Belgian Foreign Minister PaulHenri Spaak reiterated his doubts about guaranteeing Belgian Atlanticism if, once France had withdrawn, Belgium had to accept German dominance in the Community.112 Some felt that a British indication of interest would strengthen the morale of the Five, showing that there was an alternative to a French or a German dominated EEC. Spaak’s views were put to the British Counsellor in Brussels that Britain should make a gesture of interest in joining the EEC.113 Members of the State Department were reported to believe that if Britain declared a readiness to accept the Treaty of Rome, ‘the French would be defeated and the Community would be saved’.114 De Gaulle, presumably aware of the forces operating on public opinion and keen to limit the perception that France was the only state keeping Britain out of the Community, responded by inviting Britain to join the EEC. De Gaulle declared that ‘Britain was evolving in the direction of Europe and if this took a more precise form it would be considered sympathetically by France’.115 Indications that the French wanted Britain in were particularly difficult for Wilson, as Edward Heath had just become leader of the Conservative Party. At a lunch in Paris on 22 November, Heath said that Conservative policy would facilitate Britain’s entry into the EEC. The Conservatives would accept the Treaty of Rome and would begin to make adjustments in Britain, such as moving to a levy system for agriculture.116 Thus, de Gaulle put the ball back in Wilson’s court: if Britain wanted to intervene in the EEC’s crisis, British policy would have to be much more clearly defined. The fact that supranationality was a major concern in the crisis did bring into the open, at least within Whitehall, the splits in the British establishment as to what kind of Europe Britain wanted to join. The DEA saw opportunities. Sir Eric Roll wrote to the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under Secretary Paul Gore-Booth in October to argue that the French would ‘win’ the crisis. Britain’s position should be to wait until the problems were settled and then to offer to team up with the French in a new Community based on the erosion of the supranationality. It was less that the DEA hated supranationality than that Roll saw that its demise would remove one of the major objections among Britain’s political elite to membership. After France had won, it would be easier to take Britain into Europe.117 Roll’s minute bore the hallmark of Brown’s enthusiasm for Community membership and reflected the DEA’s favour for an Anglo-French economic and political condominium leading the Community, forging links in planning and technological research. This view chimed with Wilson’s anti-federalism. Wilson told Geoffrey de Frietas, the head of Britain’s delegation to the Council of Europe: ‘we ought to avoid appearing to take sides in the EEC dispute. Nor should we say anything about supranationality, which in any case, we oppose’.118 The DEA could therefore expect their interpretation to meet the Prime Minister’s dispensation. The Foreign Office disagreed with the DEA’s analysis and was careful to bypass interdepartmental discussion when Stewart wrote to Wilson in December to urge a more proactive policy towards the crisis.119 The main difference was the Foreign Office assessment of the risk de Gaulle and the French posed to Britain’s interests in the

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Kennedy Round, but more importantly in the Atlantic Alliance. It was unlikely that France would ‘win’ the crisis and eradicate supranationality. If this happened the Community would have collapsed and the European balance would lie in ruins. Even if France did ‘win’ and the Community remained intact, the objectionable features of the Community now favoured by the French, such as the CAP, would still exist and would still form obstacles to the acceptance of membership by Britain’s political elite. The destruction of supranationality would leave Europe a more ‘dangerous continent’: ‘Having bowed to her will, France’s partners could be tempted to adopt her methods’. French nationalism could prove contagious in Germany and the Germans could team up with France, a partnership the Germans would eventually dominate. Moreover, the Foreign Office wished to ensure the Community did not break up: ‘Germany has a lot invested in the Community and if it collapsed it could lead her to dangerous temptations’.120 Stewart recommended that to demonstrate Britain’s intent to enter, Britain should make a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome. A declaration would show Britain’s support for the Five and thus for the ‘Europe de la Commission’ they favoured. It would also illustrate that Britain no longer attached importance to the conditions of membership, but would be willing to accede to the Community via the ‘crash operation’, sorting out any difficulties from the inside.121 The intention of Stewart’s policy was not that Britain could join the Community in the immediate term as, unless France had left, which the British did not want, the Five could not admit Britain without French agreement.122 The fact that Stewart did not intend to enter pours cold water on Camps’ assertion that the British missed an opportunity here. O’Neill, who had been in touch with Camps, viewed the prospect of the British taking the French place in the Community with equanimity.123 O’Neill, now head of the European Economic Organisations Department, welcomed the opportunity to precipitate France’s departure. He commented: for my part if I were able to push France out of the Community it is a responsibility I would willingly accept. If by making a European declaration of intent we stiffen the Five and help them to resist French terms to the point where France might fail to get her way and so encourage the Five to turn to us, we could hardly be said to have been responsible for pushing her out. If as is unlikely, France finds herself a year hence outside the Community it will surely be not we or the Five who have driven her out, but her own policy.124 But O’Neill’s judgement was not accepted throughout the Foreign Office. Barnes was wary of using the crisis to further Britain’s objectives towards membership in case this should serve to jeopardise Britain’s policy in NATO. Tactically, Britain’s policy towards de Gaulle’s obstructionism in NATO was to continue as if nothing was happening in order to minimise the impact of de Gaulle’s policies.125 Barnes argued: I wonder if it would be a good thing for us to be responsible for pushing France out of the Community, even if we were thereby helped to enter it. Not only would this be inconsistent with our declared support for the Community and desire not to make capital out of its troubles, it would

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also be inconsistent with our policy towards NATO where we are trying to avoid precipitating a crisis with France and even more to avoid driving France out of NATO.126 However, Wilson’s disagreement with the Foreign Office’s support for supranational integration did delay a British response to the crisis. In December, when first approached by Stewart, Wilson resisted any change in Britain’s policy towards the European Community: there is a lot here I find hard to swallow. Why should we find the acceptance of French conditions ‘dangerous’ since they reject supranationality, play down the Commission and oppose majority voting? These ought to help us and also minimise the dangers of an exclusively European foreign policy and ultimately European deterrent. On agriculture and the Commonwealth there seems to be no analysis to the cost to our balance of payments. All the figures I have seen would seem to be ruinous to our already vulnerable balance of payments. It is still a recipe for high prices therefore high wages and high industrial costs. On planning I am sure that had we been in the EEC last year we would have had to accept full deflation—as Italy were forced by the EEC to do.127 Wilson’s objections were primarily against acceptance of the supranational organisation of the Community, a refusal to countenance a ‘Europe de la Commission’. His comment that British membership would precipitate Britain along the path towards an ‘exclusively European foreign policy and ultimately European deterrent’ was revealing. His perception was that once embroiled in a supranational Community, the British would be unable to resist the slide towards federalism. British involvement would tip the balance of the Atlantic Alliance away from the Atlantic and towards Europe. As with the MLF/ANF, once Britain embarked on the path to a European deterrent, there would be no need for America to come to Europe’s defence: the twin pillars of the Alliance would gradually cleave apart. For Wilson, acceptance of federalism would challenge Britain’s commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. These ideas were linked to a conception of Germany and also to Britain’s policy towards détente. Wilson’s Private Secretary Oliver Wright argued: ‘it seems to me utterly lunatic to base a European policy on sucking up to the Germans and doing down the French’.128 ‘Sucking up to the Germans’ would annoy the Soviet Union and so would jeopardise Britain’s traditional attempts at securing détente, in turn relegating Britain’s power position further. The Labour left feared the resurgence of Germany, maintaining that German power should be curbed, a sentiment Wilson shared. The Minister of Housing Richard Grossman, on the left of the Labour Party, equated France’s interests with Britain’s as de Gaulle was working towards détente and in the short term wanted to keep Germany divided and away from nuclear hardware. As well as concerns for détente, Grossman’s objection to ‘sucking up to the Germans’ was also more visceral. Giving the Germans what they wanted had never worked:

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two souls live in every German breast…every time in the past when we have been felt by the Germans to be appeasing their worst instincts out of a desire to get their help, they have responded not with gratitude but with contempt. This was the lesson of Munich.129 Wilson’s comments also suggested that the Prime Minister’s appreciation of the economic impediments to membership had shifted. Britain’s failure to rectify the balance of payments led to crisis in July 1965, which the government dealt with by imposing a deflation on the economy and restricting the flow of sterling to non-sterling area countries.130 Wilson feared that the lowering of tariffs with the Community, if Britain entered, would lead to an influx of imports. Added to the higher cost of food from the Community, the balance of payments could seriously suffer. Moreover, the Prime Minister remarked that Britain’s freedom of action to remedy the ailing economy would be restrained inside the Community. Tellingly, he noted that the British could be forced into deeper deflationary cuts, because economic controls such as the barriers to the flow of sterling or even devaluation would be difficult inside the EEC.131

Turning point? January 1966 Wilson’s reluctance meant that no action was taken in December. As the crisis continued throughout January, Stewart spoke to the Prime Minister again directly to demand a response. Further indications of the likely approach by the Five meant that Britain should prepare a reaction: ‘in no case would a negative response be appropriate’.132 The Cabinet Office agreed that Britain should do something to show her hand in favour of the Five. Acknowledging that a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty would be too much of a leap in policy, Burke Trend and Philip Rogers recommended that Britain let it be known on the continent that she was reconsidering the question of membership.133 As the Six advanced towards reconciliation at Council Meetings late in January, the realisation that the crisis could pass without any indication of Britain’s position led Stewart to meet Wilson on 19 January to attempt to convince him to take action. Wilson agreed, but insisted that a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome was impossible because of the ‘political repercussions that would ensue’.134 A declaration of intent would suggest Britain’s readiness to adopt all of the economic provisions of the EEC, including the CAP. This was a position Wilson had resisted. Here also were the grounds for contention to which Wilson’s ministers would be certain to object. Instead, Wilson suggested a tour by a ‘prominent person’, without specifying who, of the countries of the Six to show Britain’s continued interest in the prospect of membership and to take soundings on the kind of conditions Britain would be able to negotiate.135 Wilson also suggested that officials embark on studies of the economic implications of membership. Under Sir Eric Roll, a group of interested officials had already agreed to investigate possible accession. This was an independent official initiative, as they promised to keep the studies entirely secret from ministers: ‘officials would neither report to ministers that they were working on questions connected with our future relations with Europe, nor inform them how that work was progressing’.136 For the Foreign Office, Wilson’s decision was just enough. Stewart was dubious about the benefits of a tour by a

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prominent person, unless the person had ‘something new’ to say. There would be no point in touring Europe to reiterate Britain’s objections to membership.137 But, it would be possible to let it be known in the European Community that the Prime Minister had endorsed studies of membership. This could be enough to encourage the Five in their resistance to the French, as well as to ensure Britain was not forgotten in the EEC. What occasioned Wilson’s change of mind? Stewart’s depiction of the crucial role Wilson could play in the salvation of the crisis was no doubt attractive. Anxious that the British made some kind of move towards the EEC, Stewart emphasised that only Britain could keep the Alliance together: ‘it is a turning point. We must do what we can to make a French victory less probable’.138 Thus, Wilson acted to shore up the integrity of the Alliance and to bolster Britain’s influence on the continent, accelerating the pace of policy to attain consistent objectives. Failure of bridge-building, which had at least signalled Britain’s interest in the relationship between the EEC and EFT A, was important in this regard. Without any means to demonstrate Britain’s interest in the Community, British influence waned further. The weakening of Britain’s authority as the Six’s circumstances changed meant the British were compelled to run faster and faster to stand still, ratcheting up Britain’s commitment to sustain the same degree of command. The difference since 1964 and early 1965 was that Wilson implicitly accepted Stewart’s advice and did not use the crisis to make an approach to the French President. In fact, Wallace’s original interpretation that the reduction of supranationality made acceptance of Community membership easier appears inadequate. Although this had been the view of the DEA, Wilson endorsed the studies of membership before the Luxembourg Compromise. The trigger of Wilson’s change in heart was not the sense of opportunity created by the crisis, but the fear of the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. To put it crudely, it was Atlanticism, not Europeanism that spurred the Prime Minister to act. Domestic political concerns remained important. Wilson may have wanted to formulate policy in order to head off pressure from the proEuropean George Brown.139 He certainly wanted a strategy with which to outflank Heath. Interestingly, he continued to present the policy as one thought of by himself. Just after the meeting with Stewart on 19 January, he told Hetherington that ‘he was thinking of stirring things up a bit’. Wilson explained that during a long bath’ several days ago, he had decided to ‘make an offer to the Common Market’. His motive was to ‘corner Heath’: to outflank the Conservative Prime Minister who had so openly approached the French and declared Conservative support for the Treaty of Rome.140 Wilson’s corroboration with the studies also coincided with the Commonwealth Special Conference in Lagos on 12 January. Failure on the part of the British to reverse Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia on 11 November led to unrest in the Commonwealth. A meeting of the Organisation of African Unity threatened to sever diplomatic ties with Britain if the rebellion had not been crushed before 15 December. The Nigerian Prime Minister Abubakar called the Special Conference in an attempt to stave off the worst of the criticism, but even this action illustrated the extent to which Britain’s position had been undermined. It was the first time a Commonwealth conference had been held outside London.141 The Conference was the focus of Wilson’s personal activity over the Christmas of 1965 and it in fact helped to keep the Commonwealth together, as Wilson promised that sanctions would begin to take effect in

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‘weeks not months’.142 Yet Britain’s political leadership of the Commonwealth had been seriously challenged. Moreover, Wilson’s support for the regeneration of the Commonwealth in economic terms was waning. The previous March, Wilson had written that membership of the EEC would deal ‘a death-blow to Commonwealth trade’.143 In December, he commented not that entry into the EEC would affect Commonwealth trade, but that membership would weigh heavily on the balance of payments.144 The alteration in the Prime Minister’s position reflected the persistent difficulties with the balance, but was also an acknowledgement of the failure of his efforts to revive inter-Commonwealth trade. Despite the many proposals Wilson had forwarded, the Commonwealth countries displayed little interest in refocusing their trade with Britain. The Board of Trade had repeatedly argued that exclusive attention to the Commonwealth jeopardised Britain’s own policies of multilateralisation of tariff reductions in GATT.145 Thus, as Wilson accepted evidence that his Commonwealth policies could not work, so the impediments to European membership were lessened. Britain’s reaction to the empty chair crisis was therefore diplomatically sensible. It may not have been quite what the EEOD wanted, but as Camps notes, the British had moved towards the Five without doing Anything mischievous’.146 The expectation of Britain’s eventual membership had again been raised.147 But, as the Six settled their differences at Luxembourg on 31 January 1966, Britain’s ability to influence in the European Community diminished. Consequently, Stewart moved to stall Wilson’s wish for a tour by a ‘prominent person’. The Six, he noted, were now ‘mending their fences’ and would regard as unwelcome any advance from the British: ‘a move now would look as if we had missed the bus and were looking to see where it had gone’.148 With the settlement of the next stage in the CAP and of the EEC’s offers in the Kennedy Round still to decide, the Six would be busy with their own affairs.149 For the first time, Wilson, in January 1966, was willing to begin to address the implications of membership of the ‘right sort’ of Europe. The Prime Minister seemed to realise a weakening of Britain’s political position. He accepted that efforts to regenerate Commonwealth trade could not recreate a flourishing Commonwealth institution and he was confronted, following the outbreak of the Rhodesia crisis, with the limitations to Britain’s political leadership there. Wilson reacted not to the DEA’s suggestions of a union with France against supranationality, but to the Foreign Office’s calls for an initiative to strengthen the hand of the Five against France. Preoccupation with the Atlantic Alliance took precedence over Wilson’s regard for an Anglo-French partnership against supranationality. Yet, as Britain mobilised, expectations raised, the Six retreated to the time-consuming business of Brussels. Exactly how Wilson intended to advance towards membership was undecided. Thus, although January 1966 was a turning point of sorts, it was not a straight path from here to October 1966, when the European initiative began.

Notes 1 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/26, 12 February 1965; PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 2 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/26, 12 February 1965; Stewart (1980, p. 142). 3 Pimlott (1992, p. 334).

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4 Sir Michael Palliser, interview with author, 5 November 2001; on Barnes, TNA FO371/184289/W6/38, Barnes to Hood, 14 July 1965. 5 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/26, 12 February 1965. 6 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 7 Ibid. 8 TNA FO371/184288/W6/12, Barnes to Nicholls, 11 February 1965. 9 TNA CAB134/2134, JRD(65)2, Work of the Committee, Minister for Aviation, 28 May 1965. 10 TNA PREM13/905, Holland to Balogh, 5 April 1966; TNA PREM13/306, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 3 March 1965. 11 Middlemas (1990, p. 107); Roll (1985, p. 30). 12 TNA PREM13/905, Holland to Balogh, 5 April 1966. 13 TNA EW24/53, Nield to Burgh, 24 March 1965; The Times, 3 April 1965, p. 8 and 5 April 1965, p. 10. 14 Badel (2002, pp. 237–43); Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Holland to Wilson, 4 May 1967. 15 Sir Derek Mitchell, interview with author, 26 August 1997. 16 TNA FO371/184288/W6/8, Barnes to Nicholls, 4 February 1965. 17 TNA FO371/184288/W6/12, Palliser to Nicholls, 9 February 1965; Brands (1995, pp. 99– 105); Bozo (1998, pp. 344–8). 18 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 19 TNA FO371/184288/W6/8, Barnes to Hood, 4 February 1965; also TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/26, 12 February 1965. 20 For example, Wilson (1971, pp. 127–32). 21 Bank of England Archive [henceforward BOE], OV53/31, Hubback Brief on Press Conference, 5 February 1965. 22 O’Hara (2003, p. 269); Schenk (2002, p. 363); see also Kunz (1997, pp. 112–13). 23 TNA CAB134/1783, EER(64)56, Association of the Commonwealth with the EEC, Treasury, 3 November 1964. 24 Ibid. 25 TNA PREM13/306, O’Neill to Stewart, 3 May 1965; see also Alexander (2003, pp. 195–7). 26 TNA CAB134/1783, EER(64)56, Association of the Commonwealth with the EEC, Treasury, 3 November 1964. 27 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 28 Lee (1999, p. 76); Evans (1971, pp. 210–12); TNA CAB134/1472, CCP(65)8, report on the Kennedy Round, November 1964—February 1965, Powell, 23 February 1965. 29 TNA CAB134/1473, Report on the 22nd Session of the Contracting Parties at the GATT, 2– 26 March, Powell, 10 May 1965. 30 TNA CAB128/37, CC(63)26th, 25 April 1963 and CC(63)28th, 2 May 1963; MAF276/145, Intel. No. 32, 10 March 1964; Evans (1971, p. 242); Strange (1971, p. 312). 31 TNA CAB134/1783, EER(64)79, European Integration: Austria, Foreign Office, 10 November 1964. 32 TNA CAB134/1774, EEP(65)71, The National Plan: Appendix on Agricultural Aspects, DEA and MAFF, 14 October 1965; TNA FO371/ 182377/M10810/28, Statham note, 4 April 1965. 33 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 34 Ibid. 35 TNA PREM13/306, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 3 March 1965. 36 TNA PREM13/182, Reid to Nicoll reporting meeting between Wilson and Jay, 2 March 1965. 37 TNA CAB130/229, MISC56/1st, 13 May 1965. 38 TNA PREM13/182, Balogh to Wilson, 12 May 1965. 39 Germond (2001, pp. 119–20).

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40 On German industry, Rhenisch and Zimmermann (1996, pp. 85–8). 41 TNA PREM13/329, Roberts to Stewart, RG1013/12, 1 March 1965. 42 TNA PREM13/329, Draft Steering Brief for Visit to Bonn, 5 March 1965. 43 TNA PREM13/306, Trend to Wilson, 24 March 1965; Kaiser (1997, pp. 20–1). 44 Ibid. (p. 20). 45 TNA PREM13/329, Wilson—Erhard, 7 March 1965. 46 Ibid., 8 March 1965. 47 Ibid., 7 March 1965. 48 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 8/3, meeting with Stewart, 18 February 1965. 49 TNA CAB128/39, CC(65)20th and 21st, 1 April 1965. 50 TNA PREM13/324, Wilson—De Gaulle, 2 April 1965, 11 am. 51 Ibid., 3 April 1965, 10 am. 52 Ibid., 2 April 1965, 11 am. 53 Ibid., 3 April 1965, 10 am. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 TNA CAB130/202, MISC1/1st, 17 October 1964; TNA CAB128/39, CC(64)2nd, 22 October 1964. 57 TNA PREM13/307, Text of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Proposals for a new Mandate for the EFTA Council, 15 May 1965. 58 TNA CAB134/1773, EEP(65)26, Austrian Negotiations with the EEC, Board of Trade and Foreign Office, 23 April 1965. 59 TNA PREM13/306, Wilson to Stewart, tel. 245, 24 April 1965. 60 TNA PREM13/sh307, meeting of officials under Trend, 19 May 1965. 61 Ibid. 62 TNA FO371/182345/M10723/26, Newington to Statham, 23 March 1965. 63 TNA PREM13/306, Wilson to Stewart, tel. 245, 24 April 1965; Wilson (1971, p. 105). 64 Ibid. 65 TNA T312/1361, press release, 28 April 1965. 66 On Trend’s views towards the EEC, Hennessy (1990, p. 215). 67 TNA PREM13/306, Trend to Wilson, 24 March 1965. 68 TNA CAB134/1771, EEP(65)3rd, 29 January 1965. 69 TNA CAB130/227, MISC48/1st, 25 March 1965. 70 Ibid. 71 TNA CAB130/227, MISC48/2, Linking EFTA and the EEC, Prime Minister, 7 May 1965; MISC48/2nd, 10 May 1965. 72 TNA CAB128/39, CC(65)30th, 13 May 1965. 73 Ibid. 74 On the difficulties with these proposals, TNA FO371/82345/M10723/37, Drafts for EECEFTA Links, Comment by Hancock, 3 May 1965; TNA CAB134/1773, EEP(65)52, PostKennedy Round tariff negotiations between EFTA and the EEC, Board of Trade, 9 June 1965; TNA BT241/1360, Brown memorandum, 6 May 1965; BT303/445, Geneva to FO, tel. 131, 11 June 1965; for the Vienna meeting, TNA PREM13/308, Eighteenth Meeting at Vienna, 24–25 May 1965. 75 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 9/2, meeting with Wilson, 2 June 1965. 76 Ibid. 77 TNA PREM13/308, Eighteenth Meeting at Vienna, 24–25 May 1965; TNA CAB130/227, MISC48/2nd, 10 May 1965. 78 TNA CAB134/1773, EEP(65)58, EEC reactions to EFTA Ministerial Meeting, Foreign Office, 11 June 1965; FO371/182346/M10728/79, Statham Memo, 3 June 1965; T312/1361, Roberts to FO, tel. 117, 28 May 1965; Aldington to FO, tel. 4, 1 June 1965; Barclay to FO, tel. 116, 28 May 1965.

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79 TNA T312/1363, Baker to Wakefield, 7 July 1965. 80 Ibid.; TNA FO371/182347/M10723/128, Baker to FO, tel. 184, 29 July 1965. 81 TNA CAB134/2545, T(O)(65)2nd, 15 June 1965. 82 TNA CAB 134/2545, TO(65)2, Collaboration with France, Ministry of Technology, 11 June 1965. 83 Ibid. 84 TNA PREM13/904, EEC membership, President of the Board of Trade, 15 June 1965. 85 TNA FO371/182377/M10810/55, R.J. O’Neill Memo, 28 May 1965. 86 TNA T312/1014, Carr to Owen, 1 June 1965; Owen to Pitblado, 1 June 1965. 87 TNA FO371/182377/M10810/55, RJ O’Neill Memo, 28 May 1965. 88 TNA T312/1014, Roll meeting, 2 June 1965. 89 TNA PREM13/904, Wilson comments on Jay paper, 15 June 1965. 90 Camps (1967, pp. 58–80). 91 TNA T312/1015, Geneva to FO, tel. 214, 16 September 1965; CAB134/1774, EEP(65)83R, Steering Brief, DEA, 22 October 1965. 92 TNA T312/1363, FO to Vienna, tel. 413, 15 July 1965; BT241/1363, Jay meeting with officials, 16 July 1965; TNA FO371/182348/M10723/163, Marjoribanks to O’Neill, 20 September 1965. 93 TNA T312/1363, FO to Vienna, tel. 413, 15 July 1965; T312/1365, Brussels to FO, tel. 144, 13 September 1965. 94 EFTA Bulletin, vol. vi, no. 7, November 1965. 95 Camps (1967 pp. 81–91, 58–70); Lambert (1996, p. 207). 96 Ludlow (1999a, pp. 236–43). 97 Ibid. (pp. 243–5). 98 Ibid. (p. 248). 99 Ludlow (2001, pp. 247–65). 100 Lambert (1996, p. 214); Camps (1967, pp. 81–4). 101 Lambert (1996, p. 217); Camps (1967, pp. 95–6). 102 Lambert (1996, p. 220); Camps (1967, p. 98). 103 On the resolution of the Five, particularly the Germans, TNA FO371/182375/M1088/172, Robinson to Statham, 22 July 1965; M1088/225, Robinson to O’Neill, 29 October 1965; TNA FO371/184200/M10836/60, Marjoribanks to FO, tel. 160, 27 October 1965; M10836/55, Statham Memorandum, 18 October 1965. 104 Lambert (1996, pp. 214–16). 105 The Times, ‘General de Gaulle Threatens to Leave NATO’, 10 September 1965; Foreign Relations of the United States, [henceforward FRUS] Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, doc. 100, Leddy to Read, 19 August 1965, p. 239; TNA T312/1015, Reilly to Stewart, 23 November 1965. 106 TNA FO371/182378/M10810/102, Barnes to O’Neill, 14 October 1965. 107 Wallace (1975, pp. 141–2). 108 Camps (1967, pp. 176–85). 109 TNA CAB128/39, C(65)36th, 8 July 1965. 110 Ibid.; TNA T312/1014, The Present Deadlock in Agricultural Financing in the Community and its Implications for Britain’s policy, EEOD, 13 July 1965. 111 FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, doc. 112, Ball to Mission in the European Communities, 24 November 1965; TNA T312/1015, O’Neill to Dean, Record of Conversation with Hinton in the State Department, 30 November 1965. 112 FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, doc. 107, Spaak-Rusk, 21 October 1965; doc. 110, Cleveland to Rusk, 16 November 1965. 113 TNA FO371/182378/10810/107, Barclay to FO, tel. 36, 29 October 1965. 114 TNA T312/1015, O’Neill to Dean, Record of Conversation with Hinton in the State Department, 30 November 1965.

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115 TNA T312/1015, Paris to FO, tel. 792, 24 November 1965. 116 Ibid. 117 TNA T312/1015, Roll to Gore-Booth, 20 October 1965; Wallace (1975, pp. 142–3). 118 TNA PREM13/309, Wilson—De Frietas, 16 September 1965. 119 TNA PREM13/904, Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 120 Ibid.; FO371/182400/M10836/37G, SC(65)27, Britain’s Policy Towards Developments in the Community, 20 September 1965; Ellison (2001). 121 TNA PREM13/904, Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 122 TNA T312/1016, Possible Approach from the Five, Gore-Booth, 25 January 1966. 123 TNA T312/1015, Camps to O’Neill, 10 October 1965; Camps (1967, pp. 176–85). 124 TNA FO371/182378/M10810/102, O’Neill to Barnes, 14 October 1965. 125 Ellison (2003, pp. 175–7). 126 TNA FO371/182378/M10810/102, Barnes to O’Neill, 14 October 1965. 127 TNA PREM 13/904, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 128 TNA PREM13/905, Wright to Wilson, 1 February 1966. 129 TNA T312/1016, Grossman to Wilson, 1 February 1966. 130 On the economic measures, TNA PREM13/254, Trend to Wilson, 8 July 1965; Cairncross (1992, pp. 156–8); O’Hara (2002, pp. 93–4). 131 The Treasury was aware of the European views about Britain’s restrictions, Cairncross (1997, pp. 120–2, 15 March 1966); TNA PREM13/258, Bancroft note, 6 September 1965; Strange (1971, p. 73). 132 TNA T312/1016, Possible Approach from the Five, Gore-Booth, 25 January 1966. 133 TNA CAB164/10, Rogers to Trend, 5 January 1966. 134 TNA PREM13/905, Stewart to Wilson, PM/66/3, 21 January 1966, reporting meeting of Wilson on 19 January 1966. 135 Ibid. 136 TNA FO371/188328/M10810/37, meeting in Roll’s room, 26 January 1966; FO371/188328/M10810/39, Wilson to Stewart, 2 February 1966; Young (1998, p. 186). 137 TNA PREM13/905, Stewart to Wilson, 26 January 1966. 138 TNA PREM13/904, Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965; Parr (2003, pp. 78–80). 139 On the forthcoming election, Pimlott (1992, p. 396); TNA PREM13/904, Brown to Wilson, 18 January 1966. 140 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 11/4, meeting with Wilson, 20 January 1966. 141 TNA PREM13/776, Lagos to CRO, tel. 1781, 10 December 1965. 142 TNA PREM13/777, Communiqué of Lagos Conference, 12 January 1966. 143 TNA PREM13/306, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 3 March 1965. 144 TNA PREM13/904, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 145 CAB134/1746, ED(ER)(65)32, Meeting Commonwealth Trade Officials, President of the Board of Trade, 29 November 1965; Tomlinson (2003, pp. 216–17). 146 Camps (1967, p. 182). 147 Ibid. (p. 185). 148 TNA PREM13/905, Stewart to Wilson, 3 February 1966. 149 Ludlow (2001 pp. 252–63).

3 The politics of decision, March to October 1966

As the March 1966 election approached, Wilson publicly altered Labour’s position towards the European Community, stating that Britain would be ready to enter Europe ‘if safeguards for our interests can be negotiated’.1 Wilson did not in fact reiterate the conditions Labour would seek, but argued that ‘Tory terms’ would lead to an unacceptable increase in the import bill and disruption of Commonwealth trade, adding that Britain should never accept supranational control over foreign and defence policies.2 In addition, he was able to play on recent French suggestions that Britain might be able to join the Community to make Heath look weak, whilst dismissing France’s claims, a goal consistent with the Foreign Office’s desire to uphold the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance.3 Behind the scenes, Wilson shifted the personnel around him to facilitate any potential initiative towards the Community. The most significant move was that of the Planning Staffs Michael Palliser to replace Wright as the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary. Not only was Palliser a firm supporter of Britain’s membership of the Community, he was also married to the daughter of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak. As Palliser remembered: [I told Wilson that] ‘I am a tremendous believer of entry into Europe and I would not want you to take me on under a misapprehension’… He laughed and said, ‘you’ll see, we won’t have any problems on that front’. And of course, nor did we.4 At ministerial level, George Thomson was moved to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, working inside the Foreign Office but outside the Cabinet, with special remit for European affairs.5 However, in the face of de Gaulle’s veto, exactly how Britain could get into the Common Market was still unclear. From March to early July, the government explored different approaches to EEC membership. In July, Wilson’s response to the sterling crisis radically changed the government’s outlook. The imposition of a deflation ended the government’s growth targets under the National Plan and led to further defence cuts that presaged the complete withdrawal of military commitments in the Far East. After the deflation, there was

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nowhere else for the government to go but Europe. Wilson’s endorsement of a short-term initiative was the only way to forge an international role for the UK that would sustain Britain’s influence across the Atlantic and the only way to create a framework for the future pursuit of realistic economic policies. At Chequers in October, Wilson announced his intention to embark on a tour of the countries of the Six to determine whether the conditions existed for membership. This chapter assesses the development of Britain’s policy from the March 1966 election until the Chequers meeting in October.

How to get into the Common Market, March to July 1966 Hope of making an early move towards the EEC was stifled in the spring of 1966. Sir Eric Roll’s report, begun in the January secret studies, ruled out a membership initiative in the short term. Roll’s report was submitted to the Ministerial Committee on Europe, constituted to ‘keep under comprehensive review Britain’s political, economic and military relations with Europe’, and meeting twice before the Chequers meeting. Roll’s circumspection was not through lack of support for the principle of EEC membership. On the contrary, the report, which was organised through the DEA but involved all the departments, maintained that the UK had no choice but to accept EEC membership in the long term. The reasons for joining the Community can equally well be expressed as the disadvantages of exclusion… There would be a level at which the British economy would be viable, provided that our external commitments and internal consumption were related to our economic capacity. But the adoption of such a course by a country which, unlike Sweden or Switzerland, has not opted for a role of international neutrality would clearly relegate the UK to a position of secondary influence in world affairs…[this] would constitute a radical change in thinking of and circumstances to which the British people have become accustomed and to be a break with the role that the country has tried to perform hitherto.6 Whitehall’s unwillingness to endorse a short-term move resulted principally from the Treasury. The Chancellor’s adviser Robert Neild, the Head of Overseas Finance (Western European) John Owen, and Ambassador to EFTA Frank Figgures all recommended that Britain do nothing until at least the end of 1967, and possibly for up to five years.7 Their concern was the cost to the balance of payments of membership. The Six, better apprised of Britain’s financial difficulties because of the frequent calls for assistance to support sterling, could insist on a sterling devaluation before Britain was permitted to enter. The £900 m of debt accumulated since 1964 added to the problem, as the government would have to be able to demonstrate exactly how it intended to generate enough growth to pay back its arrears.8 Although the Foreign Office wanted to push for acceptance of EEC membership in principle, tactically they agreed that the government should not attempt a second European initiative at least until the end of 1967. After the empty chair crisis, the Community wanted time to resolve its internal difficulties. The Six had to settle the next

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stage of the CAP, over which the empty chair crisis had broken. They were all anxious to conclude agreement on the divisive issue of agricultural financing in order that the Community’s transitional period could be completed.9 The Italians in particular, who sought to add ‘southern’ European agricultural produce to the CAP, thought de Gaulle could use a British membership bid as an excuse for delay.10 The British did not want to jeopardise the Community’s progress; nor did they want to issue a bid that would only be ill-received. Moreover, the Foreign Office did not want a membership proposition to divert attention and time away from the more serious crisis in NATO.11 On 9 March, de Gaulle told the American President Lyndon Johnson of his intention to extricate France from the Allied Command Structure of NATO and to expel American troops from French soil.12 Although de Gaulle’s actions strengthened the case for Britain’s ultimate accession to the Community, the Foreign Office was wary that an initiative could involve Britain in dangerous bargaining with the General, providing de Gaulle ample opportunity for extracting concessions from the UK or from the Five. Michael Stewart made clear that France’s policy towards NATO enhanced the imperative that Britain must eventually join Europe. He told the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee that France’s withdrawal ‘creates a gap which other countries and public opinion in France would like to see filled by stronger UK influence in Europe’.13 There were two principal ways in which British influence would help. First, the wellrehearsed problems of German dominance, as the simple fact of French withdrawal meant German influence correspondingly increased.14 Second, de Gaulle’s withdrawal had serious implications for sustaining the legitimacy of the Atlantic Alliance as the best means of working towards East-West détente. By offering the first new vision of détente following the relaxation of tension after the Cuban missile crisis, de Gaulle could encourage questioning in public and political opinion as to the purpose of the Atlantic world.15 His alternative was rapprochement between France and Russia, apparently allowing German reunification through a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’.16 French actions could encourage latent doubts as to the value of the American security guarantee, which could in turn limit the options of Europe’s politicians.17 In particular, opinion in Belgium thought that the General genuinely could offer a path towards détente, with Spaak telling Palliser that the Belgians did not want to be left alone with the Germans in Europe.18 In this environment, American pressure for Britain to play a role in the advancement of European unity increased. Only Britain could help to keep alive the European impulse within the wider Atlantic system, by encouraging the Five to believe that there was a viable alternative to de Gaulle. Johnson urged Wilson: Our best hope of peace and stability lies in the inclusion of Germany in a larger European unity, in which any latent nationalistic drives can be submerged. I am sure that you and your country hold the key to this possibility and that you can play a role of great leadership in Europe.19 At the same time, the Foreign Office feared that a British initiative could drive a wedge in NATO and could provide de Gaulle with valuable ammunition in the pursuit of his policies.20 The priority for the British Foreign Office and for the US was to ensure the continued functioning of NATO. Thus, President Johnson rejected calls from the State

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Department for the pursuit of directly anti-Gaullist policies.21 Rather, the US response should be ‘calm and bland’; aiming to show de Gaulle that NATO could carry on without the French and attempting also to bring home to French public and political opinion the implications of de Gaulle’s policies.22 By sustaining the legitimacy of the Atlantic security system and showing that de Gaulle was the main obstruction to European peace, the British and Americans could hope to undermine support for de Gaulle within France and so speed his departure from office.23 Britain’s ultimate accession to the EEC was a crucial part of this strategy. But an immediate initiative could give de Gaulle grounds to argue that Britain and America wanted to push France out of NATO and the EEC, so providing justification for his policies. As Stewart put it: in general, we must make it clear that we are not drumming France out of NATO. If France breaks with NATO, it is her own choice and not ours. The damage to French interests is being done by General de Gaulle. We must be careful not to use threats which could rally French opinion behind the General… Our line should be sorrow rather than anger, confidence rather than panic.24 It was also possible that de Gaulle could link NATO and the EEC in order to attempt to extract political concessions from the British.25 This was a particular risk as Brown and Wilson had both shown signs of wanting to negotiate with de Gaulle, Wilson later suggesting a summit meeting between himself and the General to discuss Europe under the guise of discussing NATO.26 DEA officials cautioned Brown: ‘be on guard against any suggestion that General de Gaulle should be assumed to be the key to the whole problem and that he should be dealt with in direct and personal confrontation’.27 The Foreign Office warned: It is not inconceivable that General de Gaulle might be disposed to show greater understanding for our need for special safeguards, in joining the EEC, if he thought that we could be persuaded to acquiesce in his policies towards NATO; but we could not have it both ways… for us to take sides with him against the Five about the economic and political future of Europe would certainly be to put at risk not only our relations with the USA and our other NATO allies, but also our longer term relationship with Europe as a whole.28 The NATO crisis led the British to advance their public position towards the Community. On 6 May, Brown, at a speech to the Socialist International in Stockholm, claimed that the ‘political will’ for accession existed in Britain.29 Thomson was despatched on a factfinding mission to the countries of the Six to ascertain the terms Britain would be likely to be able to negotiate in any membership settlement.30 For Thomson the mission was a clear first step in Labour’s attempt to get into the EEC: it was definitely a very strong signal that the lessons of our first 18 months in office were such that instead of believing that we could coast

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along with EFTA, that we wanted to reopen the whole business of Britain becoming a full member…that was the remit that I had.31 Yet, there remained substantial problems as to how the British hoped to get into the Community in the face of the Gaullist obstacle. Brown recommended a declaration of intent to accept the Treaty of Rome, interpreting this as a quick means to launch an initiative. Wilson, as in January 1966, warned of the political difficulties of such a strategy. He did not want to accept the terms of entry without question; moreover, such an approach would prove intolerable to ministers who still expected Britain’s policy to be based on the protection of Britain’s ‘essential interests’.32 Trend counselled against weakening Britain’s bargaining power prior to any negotiation. While it was still uncertain whether Britain could attain the terms Wilson wanted, there was no point in declaring surrender to the Six: ‘how could it pay us to nail this flag to the mast before knowing in practice whether the ship will ever be put out to sea?’33 Ministers at the Europe Committee did reject Brown and Thomson’s recommendation for a declaration.34 The government was also unsure whether or not to adopt the Foreign Office’s tactics of trying to find a way into Europe through the support of the Five, or whether it could be possible to negotiate a deal with the French. Clearly, the advantage of the Foreign Office’s tactic was that the Five did support Britain’s membership for political reasons and this support was strengthened following France’s actions against NATO.35 When Erhard visited London in May, he and Wilson found a commonality of interests in meeting the Gaullist threat to the legitimacy of the Atlantic path to détente and German reunification. As the British saw it, de Gaulle’s vision of European détente posed a threat if he could persuade the Europeans, particularly the Germans, that he did offer a viable alternative course towards the reconciliation of the two Germanies and of the continent. Erhard, however, remained firmly opposed to a ‘European Europe’. He commented that the French could never deliver German reunification unless Germany remained under French and Russian hegemony.36 Anglo-German rapprochement within an enlarged, strengthened EEC could offer a plausible image of a Europe able to take the lead in the pursuit of détente and able to provide a framework for German reunification. Erhard commented ‘when de Gaulle developed his visionary notion of European unity, Erhard always replied it was best to begin by bringing the EEC and EFTA closer together’.37 Wilson responded that Britain was moving towards the EEC and intended to probe the possibilities of membership.38 Contrasted with Erhard and Wilson’s meetings in 1965, Wilson’s shift towards the idea of Community membership facilitated a marked improvement in Anglo-German relations. Erhard said that he would start to examine the British case for membership with the Five and to ensure ‘friendly responses’ to Britain’s overtures to eventual entry.39 Later in July, the Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder suggested on German radio that there should be a ‘systematic study’ of the problems involved in getting Britain into Europe, in order to create a plan for British accession before negotiations began.40 There was, therefore, the will in Germany to investigate methods of helping expedite British accession. With German enthusiasm in mind, Brown suggested the creation of a European defence force, based on partnership with the Germans and Americans. The force could go some way to solve the problem of Germany’s access to nuclear weaponry and could thus, Brown suggested, prove so popular to European opinion that de Gaulle, through pressure

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by the Germans, would be compelled to give way.41 Brown outlined the policy further in another memo the next day: The US would like an initiative for us to enter Europe and to restructure the Alliance on the basis of partnership between the US and a united Europe. This could be an opportunity for seeking their financial support for the resources we are providing East of Suez.42 Wilson dismissed this plan. Brown’s idea would raise questions about Britain’s approach to Germany’s access to nuclear hardware. Whereas the British preferred to prevent access; if Britain approached the US, the Americans would insist on a hardware solution. Wilson also felt that President Johnson would not ‘lift a finger’ to assist a British plan. Johnson was not particularly interested in Europe and had been put off by the European reactions to the MLF. Wilson had recently disassociated Britain from the American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. The Americans were so aggravated by this stance that Wilson felt they would not provide help with Britain’s resources for a continued role East of Suez. A defence community excluding France would also antagonise the French, cutting against the Anglo-American ‘calm and bland’ NATO strategy.43 The root of the problem in getting into the Community via the Five was that it would probably not work. There was no real prospect that the Germans would stand up to the French and force a breach in Franco-German relations for the sake of getting Britain into the Community.44 The economic interest vested in the Community was much too high for Germany to break the Community up. The interim agreement on the financing arrangements of the CAP between the Six on 12 May meant that Britain would be unlikely to be able to negotiate substantial changes to the agricultural conditions. Indeed, Erhard had made quite clear to Wilson during his May visit the impossibility of reopening disputes already settled.45 Nor would Britain seek a second Community crisis, with all the risks for European security and economic prosperity already emphasised during the empty chair crisis. Siding with the Five was a tactic for the long term; building support for British entry that would ultimately overwhelm Gaullist opposition. If Britain wanted to get in now, as First Secretary George Brown realised, the only way was to hope to ‘outflank’ the French President, General de Gaulle.46 In response to Wilson’s negative attitude towards the ‘political’ route to outflanking the General via a defence initiative, Brown suggested using the forthcoming visit of the French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou and Foreign Secretary Maurice Couve de Murville to sound out French views. He argued in a further memo to Wilson that once Britain could get round the table with the Six, an enlightened British attitude to the terms of entry would force France’s hand. The problem, then, was how to get to ‘first base’. Brown posited that there had been indications recently in the press that the French might like British accession and that a negative reaction from the French could not be assumed. Britain should seek bilateral discussions with members of the Six, starting with the French. The tenor of Brown’s suggestion was that the deal on British membership would come through these Anglo-French talks; but Brown insisted that it should not be a ‘hole in the corner affair’. He recognised the need to talk also to the rest of the Five: Britain could not team up with the French against them. Brown suggested that if Pompidou or Couve suggested talks, Britain should jump at the chance. Wilson agreed and commented

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that his previous negative response was the result of a feeling that Britain could not get the co-operation required. Optimistically, he suggested ‘a lot may change, and possibly for the better, in the course of this month’.47 Brown’s scheme revealed much of the attitude of the First Secretary towards British membership of the EEC. Increasingly frustrated at the lack of growth achieved under the National Plan, Brown saw European membership as an essential part of Britain’s economic policies. He argued that Britain would achieve only very slow growth at 2 per cent per year. This was worse than the previous administrations and unacceptable to public opinion. Part of the reason was the external constraints to economic policy of overseas defence expenditure and the parity of sterling. He argued that: we have known for a long time that we can get a satisfactory rate of growth only if we can find ways of increasing our exports and restraining our imports much more rapidly. We have not yet found sufficiently powerful means to this end.48 Contrary to the accusations of his critics, he did realise the need for deflation to accompany devaluation in order to reign in imports and dampen demand, but he did recommend devaluation as a way of easing policy. ‘I am aware of difficulties of altering the parity, but we are paying a price for ruling out what was once regarded as the natural means of correcting a major imbalance of payments’. Deflation by itself would not work, as it would not effect any structural changes. He advocated: A vigorous and speeded up policy towards Europe could provide the means by which we might work our way out of this box…any such arrangements would be very likely to involve a change in parity but by agreement and as part of much longer positive policies designed to provide a major move forwards in our broad economic and foreign relations… It would open a route which would not only enable us to play our part in Europe and the world and turn what must otherwise look like a series of negative policies into a positive strategy.49 Brown linked European membership and devaluation to a strategy for economic regeneration and a reorientation of Britain’s global outlook. Wilson had already refused the idea of a defence arrangement in agreement with the US and Germany, an arrangement that Brown believed could have bought American assistance for Britain’s world defence commitments. Brown suggested an alternative: a possible agreement with the Six for funding Britain’s IMF debt and for finding a means to pay off the sterling balances, leading to arrangement that removed the constraint these place on our economy’.50 A ‘European solution’ to the question of sterling was a radical proposal. Brown appeared to hope that British willingness to divest of the global commitments of sterling, to organise a dignified retreat in cahoots with the EEC, could encourage the French to support Britain’s initiative. Of course, such a proposal would involve devaluation and thus from the standpoint of the Treasury, appeared to play into France’s hands.

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Britain’s diplomacy, when Couve and Pompidou visited on 8 July, was to attempt to draw the French delegation to admit that there would be no ‘political veto’ should Britain attempt for a second time to accede to the EEC. It would be difficult for the French to admit that de Gaulle’s rebuff was the consequence of Britain’s ties with the US, as this would invite hostile opinion both from members of the Five and within France. A French denial of a ‘political veto’ could provide Brown and Wilson the justification for embarking on the bid. Wilson asked whether the Nassau agreement had caused the French to veto Britain’s first application. Couve replied that Nassau had coincided with deadlock in agriculture; but Nassau had also illustrated Britain’s intention to purchase an American missile, which seemed out of step with the spirit of the Common Market application. Wilson pressed harder: if we entered a negotiation to join the EEC, the French would still at some point adduce as an argument against our entry that Britain was too outward looking—outward looking towards the Commonwealth and towards the US… The basic issue was whether we should at the end of a further negotiation be told that because of our foreign policy, we were back in a Rambouillet/Nassau situation. Pompidou and Couve replied that this would not be the case.51 Thus, Brown believed some success had resulted from the meeting. Pompidou and Couve had denied that there would be a ‘political veto’ on British accession. The Foreign Office commented ‘this seems doubtful’, but Brown maintained: ‘Why don’t we make use of it? Why doubt what can help us?’52 From the French perspective, it mattered little if they had suggested the circumstances of ‘Nassau-Rambouillet’ would not re-emerge. Britain’s emphasis on the settlement of the terms of entry, particularly of safeguards for British agriculture, led the French to believe Labour would not be able to negotiate a satisfactory settlement for British accession. Britain would have difficulty accepting the form of financial regulation and did not want to adopt provisions that would compel Britain to trade with the Six in preference to Britain’s Commonwealth partners. Hence, Couve proposed three alternatives for Britain. Britain could accept the CAP, could come to an agreement with the Six or could join the EEC without accepting the agricultural provisions. Although the latter alternative would technically be less difficult, the British leadership had long since rejected a partial accommodation with the Community. Association rather than membership would cause Britain to accept the economic drawbacks of membership with none of the political benefits.53 Yet, the British could not shift their position on the CAP. Wilson, Brown and Stewart clearly sought to make continued provision for the Commonwealth suppliers, asking whether the preference system could persist after the end of transitional periods. Couve admitted that New Zealand’s dairy was a special case, but argued that the problem of cereals was no longer so acute. Consumption in Russia and China meant that global demand now far outstripped supply. Canada and Australia could easily find alternative markets. He also maintained that the rising world prices would bring international prices into line with those of the EEC. Pompidou emphasised that the real problem was whether Britain could accept the principle that the EEC should be self-sufficient.54

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The question of sterling created a further area of disagreement between Britain and France. In Britain, the seamen’s strike, breaking on 24 June, led to a flight of sterling. Devaluation lurked under the surface of ministerial and official disquiet as to the persistence of balance of payments crises. The French felt that Britain would be unable to enter the Community with the pound at its current level, remarking that Britain’s position now was as France’s in 1958. The franc had been devalued after French signature of the Treaty of Rome.55 France was also concerned as to the level of indebtedness in Britain, anxious that the British, once in the Community, could call on the Six for assistance. The French also wished to run down the reserve role of sterling. They believed the fact of sterling’s reserve position created instability in the domestic balance of payments. Coupled with France’s policy of buying up gold to place pressure on the dollar and on sterling, the French supported a radical transformation in international monetary organisation.56 Within Britain, there was some support for a possible ‘French’ or ‘European’ solution to Britain’s difficulties with the currency. One suggestion had been for a long-term European loan to pay off the holders of sterling, running down the sterling balances and devaluing the pound. As Brown’s earlier note showed, the First Secretary found favour with such an idea. In the heat of the July sterling crisis, Brown told Castle, Grossman and Benn: ‘We’ve got to go somewhere. We can’t manage alone. That is what Pompidou said to us: “Devalue as we did and you’re in”’.57 It seems as if Callaghan also briefly toyed with the possibility of French assistance, indicating his private support in September for a further proposal for a French loan.58 However, Wilson sought to avoid devaluation and Whitehall officials did not want to place Britain in a position of supplication to the French over sterling. In his press briefing, Pompidou commented on sterling’s weakness, speculating as to the prospect of devaluation.59 These comments led officials to regard the visit of Couve and Pompidou to indicate major failure. Roll remembered that while the British team had ‘a voluminous folder of briefs, not one of the French had a single sheet of paper in front of him’.60 Cairncross suggested in passing: There was a general agreement that Europe was now out, since Pompidou’s visit’.61 Alan Campbell in the Foreign Office’s Western Department agreed that ‘there is very little we can do with the French while de Gaulle remains in power and while our own economic difficulties persist’.62 Patrick Reilly recalled that the meeting ‘went very badly on both sides’ and that the British offended the French and misunderstood Pompidou’s comments about the pound: ‘the subject of sterling was extremely sensitive and Pompidou when questioned may not have chosen his words with sufficient care’.63 Thus, Wilson’s investigations into a possible membership initiative appeared to arrive in an impasse. Erhard supported enlargement, but lacked the political will for a breach with the French. Couve and Pompidou suggested there was no ‘political veto’ but saw British difficulties over the CAP and sterling as impediments to British accession. These very problems were topics of enormous sensitivity within Britain. Wedded to satisfaction of the ‘terms’ of entry, Wilson’s next move was far from assured.

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The politics of economic crisis, July 1966 The disastrous loss of reserves in early July 1966 precipitated the government into a crisis debate as to how to manage the country’s economy. Brown’s already-declared favour for devaluation led the government’s leading ministers—Wilson, Brown and Callaghan— into a deadlocked battle as to whether or not to devalue. Should Callaghan join forces with Brown—and for a brief time on 10 and 11 July it seemed possible that he mightWilson could be bounced into acceptance of devaluation.64 Such a defeat would likely bring the Prime Minister’s career to an ignominious end. There were multiple reasons for Wilson’s protection of the parity. Party political considerations and fear that Labour would be labelled the ‘party of devaluation’ were of course paramount.65 Yet, what has been insufficiently appreciated in the political literature is the extent to which Wilson’s decision was a strategic one, as a minute from Trend to Wilson on the eve of the deflation showed. Britain’s political influence depended in no small measure on Britain’s standing with the Commonwealth and with the United States. Devaluation would shatter the value of the Commonwealth’s savings and so jeopardise Britain’s relations with them: most important, it would amount to breaking faith with all sorts of people who are content to hold sterling, particularly in the Commonwealth. Nobody would trust us again, and from this point of view, devaluation would be a strange remedy for a situation which, basically, is a question of confidence.66 Cutting the value of the Commonwealth’s financial assets would lead to economic instability in vulnerable areas and it could lead to a seize up of international trade. The pressure on the world’s system of international liquidity meant that the sterling and the dollar were now much more closely linked ‘because the viability of the sterling system is now of more pressing importance to the stability of the entire international monetary structure than before, devaluation would touch off crisis in the USA dollar and payments system’.67 Thus, devaluation would cede Britain’s influence dramatically in both the Commonwealth and the USA. These strategic concerns were linked to France’s position towards international liquidity and towards the two reserve currencies. As Trend put it, devaluation would ‘provoke competitive devaluations of other currencies, or retaliation. Those hostile to us, especially France, would retaliate by political as well as economic means’.68 Exposure of Britain’s economic weakness internationally would place the British in a position of political vulnerability. Because of the French challenge to NATO, such weakness would place the Alliance and Britain’s European strategy in a perilous position. Moreover, Britain could hand France a victory in the G10 talks on international liquidity. The French wanted to insist on a veto for the EEC within the G10 in order to reduce the influence of the IMF and were obstructing a move to the second stage of contingency plans for an alternative reserve unit.69 France’s policies of buying up gold were placing additional pressures on both sterling and the dollar: US Treasury Secretary Joe Fowler

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told Callaghan ‘we would be taking in gold this year if it weren’t for the French’.70 A British move towards devaluation could herald the end of the reserve role of sterling against Britain’s will. Deflation, on the other hand, would preserve the goodwill of American and Commonwealth opinion, showing Britain ready to put her own house in order first. In this way, the government could maintain control over the direction of Britain’s international policy. Wilson was convinced against devaluation. This conviction, and his fear that Brown and Callaghan could ally against him, led the Prime Minister to a rash decision that set in train the process that would unravel Britain’s defence commitment East of Suez. Wilson first promised Callaghan an alliance against Brown, then Brown an alliance against Callaghan. On 13 July, the three men agreed to defer a decision on devaluation until after Wilson got back from Washington at the end of July. To placate Brown’s and Callaghan’s fears and so to stave off pressure for devaluation, Wilson agreed to announce a rise in the bank rate and an immediate cut of £100m from overseas defence expenditure, £50m from East of Suez and £50m from Germany.71 Some light is shed on the high political drama by notes made by Sir Paul Gore-Booth, who was consulted by Trend later that evening: BT [Trend] told us that within the last hour a proposal had come from ‘certain ministers’ that the next day the PM should announce that he proposed to make economies of £100m in the next year on the government’s expenditure abroad. Many questions. Was it really necessary to decide this today and announce it tomorrow? M.Halls [Wilson’s Private Secretary] politically it was, yes, but was it financially? WA [Armstrong] (less certainly) ‘yes’. I urged that it was no good doing this unless at least comparable economies were announced in internal matters.72 The Foreign Office’s case against was obvious. Gore-Booth felt it would be impossible to make the reductions without withdrawal either from East of Suez or from Germany, suddenly and drastically making a major change in foreign policy orientation.73 The Foreign Secretary had not been present when the decision was made. Grossman made clear in his diaries Stewart’s anger during the 14 July Cabinet meeting.74 Evidence from Gore-Booth’s papers reveals just how close Stewart came to announcing his resignation at the height of the government’s crisis: The Foreign Secretary invited me to stay behind and asked whether he should consider resignation. He had tried to contact the Prime Minister who had declined to see him the previous night; drastic proposals had been made gravely affecting foreign relations without his being consulted before they came to full Cabinet.73 Gore-Booth persuaded Stewart that he was doing a good job as Foreign Secretary. Stewart resisted the cuts in Cabinet; as a consequence, announcement of the defence savings was left until late in Wilson’s speech to the Commons. Nevertheless the pledge

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was still there to make a ‘substantial reduction’ in overseas expenditure.76 Britain’s defence commitments would again face review. Five days later, with sterling still under pressure, the Cabinet accepted a stringent deflation that put an end to the notion that the National Plan’s growth targets could be met. Minister of Technology Tony Benn, Transport Secretary Barbara Castle, Secretary of State for Education Tony Crosland, Minister of Housing Richard Grossman and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins all favoured devaluation along with Brown, yet none wanted Brown to take over as leader. Benn, Castle and Grossman, from the left of the party, were natural allies of Wilson and neither Jenkins nor Crosland would support Brown in a leadership challenge.77 The rest of the Cabinet upheld Wilson’s desire to retain the parity, agreeing with Wilson’s judgement, inspired by Trend, that devaluation might not work.78 What was needed instead was a domestic deflation, to prove to international confidence that Britain was ready to make internal sacrifices.79 In response, Brown tendered his resignation. His resignation letter showed the divergent opinion in central government as to how to manage the future exercise of Britain’s world role: It is my firm conviction that what the Cabinet has now accepted [deflation]—if it works—can only lead Britain back to industrial stagnation and therefore to economic disaster. In addition, it means that all the aims which we have so proudly put to the Nation must be disowned. And I do not believe it will just be a postponement. We cannot build a new Britain, getting rid of our inherited social evils and create a modern, industrial society by engaging in such a massive deflation of our economy. Nor, or course, could we play anything approaching an honourable part in the biggest struggle of all in the world today, that against poverty and hunger over such a large part of it… We should have started with a firm purpose: cut free from our limiting inhibitions: and then done whatever was necessary in that context. Put to our people in that way it would have been defensible, justifiable and responded to.80

Wilson’s tilt to Europe: pressures for decision George Wigg, Paymaster General and Wilson’s security adviser, saw the July sterling crisis as a turning point in Wilson’s policy towards the EEC. After the crisis, Wigg maintained, Wilson needed an initiative to deflect attention from domestic problems.81 Wigg’s interpretation underplays the extent to which Wilson’s decision was a genuine engagement with the issues of Britain’s relations with the Community. Nevertheless, the political and economic consequences of the sterling crisis and the difficulties of implementing the July deflation did have a role to play in compelling Wilson to show his hand in favour of an initiative towards the Community. The Prime Minister did, in the fallout from the crisis, face domestic political pressure that may have tempted him to seek a diversionary manoeuvre to placate the supporters of Community membership. Discontent at the deflation came from all sides. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) was furious, as unions had already accepted voluntary wage and price restraint.82 Its anger was compounded after the Cabinet decided to enforce statutory

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control over the pay freeze.83 Industry and business were also dissatisfied. Leaders of the CBI pressed on Wilson their distress at the way they felt they had been treated, arguing that the sudden nature of the statutory clause confirmed their worst fears. The Labour government had no respect for private industry and they did not see why they should support the government’s efforts.84 The prices and incomes legislation also led to discontent among the party. After the deflation, Brown attempted to resign, but was persuaded to stay in the government late in the evening on 20 July.85 His near-defection illustrated the potential of a parliamentary revolt, as Brown fuelled the discontent of the right. Benn estimated that if Brown went, the government would not be able to command a majority in the House.86 The left were similarly disturbed, with 47 MPs tabling a motion, ‘Never Again’, to demand withdrawal from Britain’s world role and running down of sterling’s position as a reserve currency.87 Left-winger Eric Heffer, at this stage in favour of Britain’s membership of the EEC, argued that the government could not sanction deflationary unemployment if there were no defence cuts overseas.88 The Conservatives led a resolution of no confidence in the government’s ability to manage the economy, drawing attention to the failure of the National Plan.89 This motion was defeated with a majority of 79, but the capacity for dissent was evident. The government attempted to table the statutory section of the prices and incomes bill, Part IV, as an amendment to the existing Bill, currently in the Standing Committee stage of its passage through the House. Heath demanded that the Bill be brought back for discussion in the whole House. This motion was thrown out with a slimmer majority of 52.90 Imposition of the deflation and the consequent failure of the National Plan led Wilson to move Brown from the DEA to the Foreign Office, switching Michael Stewart to manage the DEA. Brown needed an outlet for his energies and the Foreign Office, a post Brown coveted, would suit Brown’s interests well. The Cabinet’s unrest over whether or not to devalue and Wilson’s paranoia that there had been an attempt to unseat him was one factor causing him to make the reshuffle. It was not that Wilson offered Brown the post of Foreign Secretary in order to keep him in the government on the evening of 20 July. The most comprehensive account suggests that Brown agreed to stay in government after he realised that Wilson would not resist his resignation further.91 Rather, once the DEA’s authority had crumbled, Wilson needed an alternative means to curb the influence of Callaghan, whom Wilson saw as his most determined and likely adversary.92 He told some of the Cabinet that the August reshuffle was to ‘isolate Callaghan’.93 Placing Brown at the Foreign Office would certainly augment the pressure in the administration for a European initiative. Brown was the only minister who had argued hitherto that Britain should try to ‘outflank’ General de Gaulle and seek to get into Europe in the short term.94 Wilson’s decision must therefore have indicated his willingness to endorse a shift in European policy. From the Foreign Office, Brown pressured relentlessly for an immediate move. The weakening of Labour’s position at home, as it was apparent that the sustained economic growth proposed in the National Plan would not occur, also compelled the Prime Minister towards the EEC. The problem essentially was how to hold fast to the deflation without jeopardising Labour’s wider political objectives, sustaining employment and encouraging growth.95 The tension between making the deflation work and demonstrating to economic interest groups and public and political opinion exactly

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how the economy was going to grow in the longer term created acute problems. Wilson’s concern was evident, as whereas the Treasury urged for cuts, as soon as it became apparent early in October that unemployment would rise above 2 per cent, Wilson began to cast around for reflationary measures.96 The problem of a downturn in the economy was particularly serious in the realm of private and industrial investment. There were three related problems: the practical impact on the economy of the loss of investment, the centrality of the future confidence in the economy and the relationship between government and private industry. In September, both the Chancellor and the First Secretary argued that the effect of the deflation on the psychology of business confidence, as well as the practical impact on investment in industry, had been underestimated.97 ICI, for example, the chemical firm with the largest investment programme, had promised severe cutbacks for the oncoming year as the freezing of prices had led to a slump in profits.98 Investment predictions showed a dramatic decline. Fixed investment in manufactured industry had reduced by 4 per cent between 1965 and 1966 and was predicted to fall by a further 9 per cent in 1967. Investment in the distributive and service trades, including shipping, was to lower by 15 per cent in 1966–7. These concerns were widespread: the risk of a downturn was the headline in The Times as ministers prepared to go to Chequers for discussions on the EEC.99 The Board of Trade and the DEA put a large part of the decline down to the confidence in the future prospects for the economy, which could therefore be rapidly rectified: ‘in part this [the reduction in investment] may reflect not only intentions in regard to investment but a loss of confidence in the ability of the economy to regain its resilience and prospects further ahead’.100 The Confederation of British Industries (CBI) published a report urging that some action be taken to mitigate the degeneration of private investment. John Davies, the Director General of the CBI, mentioned the absence of any move towards Europe as part of the reason why business confidence had been so undermined.101 The government was acutely conscious of the relationship with private industry, with Wilson particularly fearful that ICI’s investment decisions were based on ‘political’ considerations.102 Wilson was also highly anxious as to the state of the economy overall, frantically writing to his Chancellor to suggest schemes to tighten control of capital flows out of Hong Kong and Kuwait.103 Without investment, there could be no future growth. Without a framework for growth, all of the government’s economic policies would lie in ruins. It is distinctly possible then that European membership, known to be favoured by the CBI, was seen as a possible remedy, offering a framework for future business confidence in the economy that had originally been intended by the National Plan. Trend recognised that to counteract the slump in business confidence the government needed ‘appropriate propaganda of the psychological warfare type’.104 Wilson told Hetherington afterwards that ‘the prospect of entry at an early date could stimulate investment soon in expectation of the expanded market’.105 The deflation, which aimed to hold down demand and growth, rendered impossible the National Plan’s promise of annual 4 per cent growth. The Plan had been the binding goal of the government, wedding together the aspirations of the left and the right of the Party and providing Labour’s answer to the persistent crises of stop-go. The death of the Plan left the government with literally no direction. The new

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Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Michael Stewart, wrote to Wilson late in October to warn that: To put it crudely, there is no progress to report in terms of the original National Plan targets…a document published now which would be concerned with exposing the extent to which the growth assumption has had to be reduced could be embarrassing, one which dodged this issue would not be credible and would lead to ridicule. Moreover, the object of publishing something this year would, as I see it, be to maintain continuing public acceptance of the concept of planning. This would, however, depend on our ability to show when and how we hope to resume growth. I think it would be giving too much of a hostage to fortune to attempt this until we have completed our discussions of the problems involved and have taken the strategic policy decisions required.106 Stewart’s paper was more than just a restatement that the targets of the National Plan could not now be reached. Rather, Stewart questioned the whole concept of planning as a credible framework for the government’s economic policy. The deflation had killed not only the Plan, but also the public’s willingness to believe in a Plan. There was little alternative but European membership to fill the aspirational hole left by the failure of the Plan, restoring confidence in the economy and providing the framework for future economic growth. The National Plan had been one part of Wilson’s appeal to the party and nation in 1964. Another was his stress on science and technology, and the Prime Minister was now tempted to reinvigorate these ideas through an approach to the EEC. Evidence was that the Europeans were keen on technological collaboration. Italian proposals for European political development presented to NATO in June suggested a ten-year plan to bring Europe to the levels of technological development experienced in the US.107 Technology could provide Britain with a bargaining stick in attempting to seek membership of the EEC. As the most technologically developed nation in Europe, Britain could have much to offer the Europeans. An article in The Economist, which Wilson claimed had influenced him in favour of membership, seemed to suggest that the Europeans would welcome British participation. It argued that the European Parliament agreed that the creation of a technological community was one ‘sound and solid’ reason for British membership. British expertise in science and technology would add a welcome angle to Europe’s own projects, and the European Parliament had recommended that Britain should be invited to take part in a small number of important technological projects, such as space and data-processing. These tactics could even appeal to the French, who wanted to prevent the ‘brain drain’ to the USA, fearing that Europe would become an ‘industrial province’.108 Palliser certainly encouraged the Prime Minister to think positively about the potential opportunity created by Britain’s technological strength. In very undiplomatic language, he commented on this article: what none of our people seem to want to do is use our technological superiority as a lever to get what we want, they’re always too afraid the

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wily Europeans are going to pinch our know-how and leave us naked. Surely we can do better than that.109 Through Palliser’s encouragement, Wilson saw the potential for technology to smooth Britain’s path into the Community. Via the expectation of membership, confidence and expectation in the economy would be revived. Compulsion for Wilson to show his hand in favour of Europe also derived from external sources, as the Americans reiterated a wish to see Britain join the EEC. In July 1966, the American Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Solomon and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Stoessel, wrote to the Secretary of State for European Affairs, George Ball, to advocate ‘a Presidential push on Wilson toward UK membership of the Common Market’. The benefits of a membership initiative were: ‘in the short run, an unequivocal British willingness to join the EEC would significantly strengthen the Five in dealing with Gaullist France and indirectly help the Fourteen hold NATO together, whatever the French do’. Britain’s interest in the EEC would be the best way of exposing French intransigence in Europe.110 As Wilson prepared to visit Washington at the end of July, Britain’s delegation in Washington reported that: ‘All administration leaders cherished the vision of a Europe with British leadership. No special course would be urged on the Prime Minister, but the President would like to hear that we were quietly positioning ourselves for eventual entry’.111 Research in the US confirms that Johnson did intend to encourage Wilson to show his hand in favour of ultimate membership of the EEC.112 The impact of American ordinance was not immediate, nor direct. Wilson intended to use his knowledge that America wanted Britain in the EEC to bargain for assistance. ‘Clearly the White House is hoping that the Prime Minister’s conclusion will be that we can, in fact, stand with them both in Europe and East of Suez. This hope is our best political card’.113 In a high-level strategy meeting prior to Wilson’s visit, the Prime Minister argued that he would use France’s block to British accession to seek American agreement to a deal in international liquidity talks. He hoped to prevent the French from barring proposals for a new reserve currency. Wilson thought he should begin with a description of the choice facing Britain between withdrawing from the world role into a fortress Europe, or seeking to get into Europe on the right terms, which implied continuing British involvement in the world outside and a continuation of the close partnership with the US. As long as de Gaulle was in power it seemed inevitable that France would insist, before admitting us to the Common Market, that Britain should choose between the French concept of Europe and partnership with America. This was a choice we could not accept. If France forced us to choose we would choose the Atlantic—and indeed the Pacific—partnership.114 Wilson’s bargaining strategy brought relatively less success than hitherto.115 The July visit indicated a transgression in Washington’s willingness to shore up Britain’s global interests. Johnson showed publicly his warmth for Wilson, comparing Wilson’s fortitude in the face of crisis to the spirit of Churchill and arguing that ‘the dollar and sterling

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should link arms’.116 But in so far as the records of the talks reveal, there was no agreement for an Anglo-American bilateral front in the IMF. Fowler argued that a deal could discourage a settlement, as the G10 had finally agreed to talk in the wider forum of the IMF.117 Nor would the US provide assistance for Britain’s military role in Malaysia.118 Powerful members of the US administration argued that if the UK could not rectify her economic problems, letting the pound go and allowing Britain to cut back her overseas role would not be the catastrophe often predicted.119 The 14 July promise to make ‘substantial savings’ from defence expenditure led to two further pressures that threatened Britain’s international position. To ensure that the deflation worked, the Treasury was anxious to implement a maximum of deductions from defence expenditure. Callaghan argued forcefully that Britain should demand compensation for the cost of maintaining forces in Germany. He insisted that if the Germans would not contribute more to the expense of these forces—offset savings— Britain should make early troop withdrawals.120 This threat worried the Americans. If Britain was likely to pull troops out of Germany, then Johnson would find it difficult to convince Congress and public opinion to keep American troops in Europe. With the threat of French withdrawal of troops from Germany following the NATO crisis, Americans feared that the defence of central Europe could disintegrate.121 Johnson warned Wilson: ‘I have become increasingly concerned during the past few weeks about the dangers of an unravelling in NATO which could easily get out of hand’.122 A British political commitment to the EEC would be one way of forestalling a crisis in European and Atlantic defence, counterbalancing Britain’s military and economic weakness and consolidating British influence in both Europe and the USA. Second, the pressure for military expenditure cuts reopened the question of whether Britain would make a complete withdrawal of military commitments in the Far East. Callaghan urged Healey in the strongest terms for cuts well beyond the February defence review projections of a ceiling to expenditure of £2000m. By 1969–70, the Chancellor now wanted savings of an additional £150m.123 With cuts in Europe politically difficult, the government’s attention turned to the question of Britain’s global defence role. The case for retrenchment was strengthened by the possibility of a further Callaghan—Brown axis. The new Foreign Secretary now supported the termination of Britain’s defence role. Brown told officials and Healey that complete withdrawal was the only possibility.124 Healey did not favour retrenchment, but he recognised that the pressure for savings would necessitate a further, extensive review. He replied to Callaghan: what you are asking me to consider is a reduction of up to £200m a year on the figure approved earlier this year by ministers. There is no hope whatever of tackling this by for example, closing the odd dockyard. What is involved is a complete new defence review with major implications for our foreign and defence policy, also maybe for the aircraft industry.125 Significantly, Wilson and Trend intervened to stifle further discussion as to how to implement the savings, deferring further discussion until after the scheduled Chequers meeting on Europe.126 At this meeting, and after a day-long discussion on Europe, ministers met in a highly restricted session to discuss Britain’s global defence assurances. The end of Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia enabled some military savings

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to be made; but ministers decided against total withdrawal—retrenchment—from Britain’s political and military role East of Suez. The shock to Britain’s standing in the world was too great to contemplate.127 However, the prospect of the closure of Britain’s global presence was becoming a question increasingly difficult to avoid. Within two months, Wilson endorsed studies for the first time of the implications of a complete departure from the Far East.128 As Wilson took his decision to advance towards the EEC at the Chequers meeting, the possibility of an accelerated retreat from East of Suez was very real. It cannot have been lost on the Prime Minister that abandonment of Britain’s global role would leave Britain in a perilously weak international position. The paucity of the British international stance was further in evidence at the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference. Unable to contain anger at the UDI in Rhodesia, the black African nations had come close to precipitating the collapse of the Commonwealth, the Zambian Prime Minister Kaunda calling Wilson a ‘racialist’.129 Cessation of Britain’s international alternatives left Wilson with little choice but to turn to the Community. The accelerated retreat from Britain’s world commitments, forcing the government to address precipitately the thorny issue of retrenchment, left Wilson with nowhere else to go. Thus, Wilson’s turn to the Community, made under duress in the wake of the sterling crisis, was still a genuine effort to tackle the difficulties of Britain’s international position. Interpretations that stress Wilson sought an initiative that ‘looked and sounded like business’ miss the essential point of Britain’s contracting options on the international stage. The Commonwealth alternative had proved inadequate, and Britain’s position East of Suez was under threat. A turn towards the EEC could provide an alternative for Labour’s domestic programme, replacing the National Plan as an indication of the government’s ability to encourage future investment and growth. A move towards Europe would also help to forge an independent power base for Britain and to bolster British influence in the United States, thus to sustain a platform for the continued exercise of Britain’s international power.

The Chequers meeting, 22 October 1966 Preoccupation with economic failure dominated the Chequers meeting on Saturday 22 October. Inviting a committee of nearly the full Cabinet to the country residence, Wilson intended to allow a full discussion of the implications of Community membership, without any compulsion to take a decision. Wilson’s purpose was to encourage discussion, not on membership in principle, but on the advantages and disadvantages of possible entry. At the end of the meeting, Wilson introduced his suggestion that he and Brown conduct a ‘probe’ of the countries of the Six to establish whether the conditions existed under which Britain could seek to join. These tactics were certainly designed to take heat out of the political questions; however, Wilson’s approach also reflected his own preference to avoid acquiescence to Community terms. Wilson produced no paper outlining his view of the European question. This task he left to Brown and Stewart, whose paper expressed the argument that Britain had no alternative but membership of the EEC in order to avoid relegation to secondary influence in world affairs. EFTA and the Commonwealth were bound to seek closer

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relations with the stronger Community market. Business and industry would suffer serious psychological setback at the prospect of permanent exclusion from Europe’s most dynamic markets. In the long term, Britain would be left ‘swimming increasingly alone against contrary economic tides’.130 In the short term, Brown and Stewart argued that Britain had to keep demonstrating interest in European membership in order to sustain existing European policy. To repeat the same policy without showing Britain’s intent to enter would undermine the confidence of Britain’s supporters among the Six and would make it look as if Britain was not serious. Again, Britain had to keep running faster and faster to stand still.131 These political arguments remained on the fringes of the Chequers meeting. Not all ministers agreed with Brown and Stewart’s point that Britain would have to enter the EEC to continue to count in the counsels of the world. Grossman argued, supported by Benn, Marsh and Castle, that ‘we should not go into Europe in order to remain great’.132 The Labour left supported a ‘little England’ role for Britain, ridding Britain of global military commitments and devaluing the pound. Creation of ‘little England’ should be Britain’s priority, establishing a successfully run ‘socialist planning experiment’. ‘Little England’ also expressed an assumption of British sovereignty and thus a refusal to accept the loss of British influence that Brown and Stewart depicted.133 Moreover, the left felt that ‘the Anglo-American relationship [was] worth a great deal more than entry into Europe’. Britain’s ties across the Atlantic were expansive, whereas Europe was inwardlooking and protectionist.134 Nevertheless, the Cabinet accepted that Balogh’s alternative of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was unworkable because the Americans did not want it.135 To cool tempers on the political questions, Wilson was careful to stress that no decision had to be taken. He suggested further studies on the political options of NAFTA and Going It Alone (GITA). His proposal for a probe, announced at the end of the day-long meeting, would not commit Britain on the principle of membership until these options had been thoroughly assessed. Ministers did discuss the question of the Community’s impact on Britain’s constitution. The Sub-Committee on Legal and Constitutional Implications, chaired by Sir George Coldstream of the Lord Chancellor’s Department, presented a lengthy paper on the subject, which took care to minimise its portrayal of the changes that would ensue.136 Coldstream admitted that Community law would be binding upon member states and so would limit national sovereignty. Membership would thus circumscribe Britain’s freedom of action in an unprecedented manner, as Britain would be committing to a range of existing obligations and would be subject to future Community law, agreed on by majority voting.137 But, Coldstream argued that the application of the Treaties would be consistent with the constitutional doctrine of the sovereignty of parliament, as parliament would have to pass the act applying the Treaties in the first place. It would be on parliament’s authority that future Community law would be implemented.138 Bolstered by a Foreign Office paper on a similar topic, Coldstream pointed to the flexibility of the Community. In practice, neither the Council of Ministers nor the Commission had ever sought to overrule a member country on an important issue. The Luxembourg Compromise further enshrined this tacit principle. In an expanded Community with EFTA states entering alongside Britain, Britain would be unlikely to find herself in an excluded minority. The Foreign Office pointed out that power in the Community was vested not in the Commission, but in the Council of Ministers, which

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approved or rejected Commission proposals and in which Britain would have a voice. In fact, the Commission, the supposed supranational body, acted as a check on the abuse of majority voting. Nation states could not take advantage of the Community system to push through a particular proposal against others’ national interests, as only the Commission could table the proposal in the first place.139 The Foreign Office also enunciated that there would be tactical disadvantages to too rigid an opposition to supranationality in advance of British accession. Suggesting amendments to the Treaty of Rome to bring the Treaty into line with the pragmatic dayto-day workings of the Community would only instil hostility, doubt about Britain’s intentions and ultimately impede membership. Once inside the Community, Britain would be in a better position to secure her objectives.140 Thus, the question of sovereignty was presented as a pragmatic and a tactical issue, with legalistic interpretations subordinated to the overall political point. This minimal approach may have had the effect of pushing discussion in a certain direction. However, there is no evidence that the constitutional issue unduly worried ministers. On the contrary, ministers were influenced by the constriction of Britain’s influence outside the Community. Some ministers expressed doubts about the wisdom of submitting to an institution in which national legislation could be overridden. But the main point was that: it was, however, strongly argued that current practice in the Communities, and political realities, made it unreasonable to think that we should be overruled in the Communities in any matter affecting our major interests, as in respect of economic controls, the major constraints upon our position arose from the extent to which we were politically, militarily and financially interdependent with major western powers.141 In this way, it is evident that ministers were ready to address the issues of the limits to their power in a way that had not been apparent during the first term in office. The collapse of the government’s economic objectives under the National Plan was central to this shift in thinking. The government’s absorption in economic questions was evident in the frank discussion at Chequers on the topic of devaluation. The Treasury’s Permanent Under Secretary, Sir William Armstrong, argued that an approach to Europe could precipitate devaluation of the pound. Britain’s balance of payments, Armstrong argued, was heavily dependent on exchange controls of capital movements, of a kind contrary to the Treaty of Rome. If the economy was weak at the time of entry, the expectation that Britain would lift exchange controls—or the end of the transitional period at which Britain would have to lift the controls—capital would ‘tend to anticipate’ the outflow of funds. Speculators, envisaging an outflow of capital, would sell sterling in anticipation.142 Britain’s prospects for membership rested on the recovery of the economy. The Treasury’s view coincided with that expressed by the politically appointed economic advisers Thomas Balogh and Nicholas Kaldor. In the interdepartmental official Committee set up to deal with the implications of membership, Balogh and Kaldor had maintained that the economy was so weak that an attempt to enter the Community was not possible for at least five years. Capital and labour would be drawn out of Britain into

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more prosperous areas in Europe, leaving Britain an ‘industrial slum’.143 Part of Balogh’s and Kaldor’s motivation was to use the Europe question as a stick to beat the government’s economic policies, illuminating the need, as they saw it, for devaluation. The advisers’ submission to the Chequers meeting argued that Britain’s economy could cope only if ‘we could find ways of improving the balance of payments prospects in a dramatic manner’.144 Armstrong’s main interest, in contrast, was to ensure in the light of the pressures for reflation, that the stringent deflationary package worked. The DEA’s Derek Mitchell, chair of the Economic Official Sub-Committee, declared himself ‘fed up to the back teeth of the whole sodding lot of them’.145 Mitchell submitted his own minority report to the Official Committee, arguing that economic hiccups did not prevent Britain from embarking on membership negotiations. Economic recovery could proceed in tandem with negotiations, boosted by the promise of investment opportunities enlargement created.146 The economic concerns translated into debate about the timing of any initiative. Brown wanted membership by 1969. The Treasury felt that Britain should desist for up to five years.147 The impact of the sterling crisis was certainly apparent in Wilson’s treatment of the terms of entry. In contrast to his attitude during 1965 and early 1966, Wilson was now willing to address the economic changes membership would bring. Each of the five ‘conditions’ of membership was shown to be of a lesser importance than hitherto. Wilson showed that preservation of economic sovereignty was no longer a stumbling block. Britain’s freedom of economic action was circumscribed anyway by activities beyond Britain’s control. ‘Experience and enquiry now suggested that our external financial and economic obligations already limited our freedom to plan the economy as much as, or more than, membership of the Community seemed likely to do in practice’.148 Freedom to fulfil Britain’s foreign policy was technically less of a problem. De Gaulle, Wilson argued, did not find himself much constrained by the EEC.149 Protecting EFTA’s interests was not as important, as some EFTA members wanted to join the EEC and would seek to do so if Britain did not take the lead. Austria’s negotiations showed that the 1961–3 problem, when neutrality stood in the way of EFTA’s accession to the EEC, was no longer an issue.150 The transformation of trade with the Commonwealth raised greater dissent, as some ministers were wary of the balance of payments cost of a loss of the Commonwealth preference. But the developing countries were seeking association with the EEC, and Australia, New Zealand and Canada were strong nations in their own right, whose trading interests were diversifying. Canada was becoming increasingly associated with the USA and Australia with Japan, although New Zealand was still dependent on Britain’s market. Wilson hedged the question of the Commonwealth, arguing that the settlement for the Commonwealth depended on the extent to which Britain would accept the CAP.151 On the CAP, Wilson insisted that changes would be sought. Britain would require transitional periods in order to adjust to the different prices and would also need ‘accommodation’ for the distortion to production.152 Agricultural considerations were, however, subordinate to concerns about economic health. The official report reiterated the Ministry of Agriculture’s worries that membership would dislocate agricultural production, favouring cereals to the detriment of dairy, livestock and horticulture. High prices and higher import costs would raise the cost of living by 10–14 per cent. In

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addition, the Six’s ratification of the May settlements as to the next stage of the CAP confirmed that Britain would have to hand over to the agricultural fund 90 per cent of the proceeds from agricultural levies. The net cost to the balance of payments would be between £175m and £250m per year.153 The DEA in the Economic Sub-Committee had led the charge that agriculture constituted only 4 per cent of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The effect on industry was therefore by far the most important consideration. If industry stood to benefit from membership, then the economy as a whole would be able to carry the balance of payments effects of entry.154 Grossman indicated that he had been swayed by this argument. Most of us, I think—and here Tommy [Balogh] is absolutely right—felt that agriculture is really an ancillary argument. If we try to go in when the economy is weak and we have to suffer deflation and unemployment then the increased agricultural prices will be a heavy burden on top of that. But if we go in when our economy is booming and our industry growing then the agricultural prices will be something we can sustain.155 The question was still pertinent as to how Britain could hope to get into the Common Market. It was acknowledged at the Chequers meeting that a Gaullist veto was still likely, yet there was a strong sentiment that de Gaulle’s possible attitude should not dictate what Britain did or did not do. Brown and Stewart recommended making an immediate declaration that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome, continuing with bilateral discussions in order to establish the main areas of difficulty and possible solutions. Evidence of Britain’s sincere intent to enter and the support of the Five could this way facilitate Britain’s accession before the Six’s agricultural review in 1969.156 Wilson’s opposition to a declaration was well rehearsed. As he had indicated, he still wished to investigate the possibility, contrary to Foreign Office advice, that Britain could negotiate safeguards for agriculture, transitional periods for the movement of capital and provisions for New Zealand’s trade. To announce in advance that Britain accepted the Treaty would instantly wipe out the possibility of doing so and would weaken Britain’s bargaining power. As Trend had put it earlier, why declare Britain’s firm intent when Britain’s ultimate commitment to membership on those terms was not yet decided?157 In addition, Wilson indicated that early acceptance of the Treaty could prove disastrous for the economy. Announcement of a firm intent to enter now would have a deleterious impact on speculation against the pound: ‘if made prematurely, [an announcement] would have more immediate serious consequences for our economic position by suggesting that we intended at an early stage to abandon the economic controls which were at present necessary to maintain it’.158 Thus, the tour was an appropriate choice as it was widely regarded that immediate negotiations for membership were impossible. Not only was de Gaulle’s attitude likely to prove obstructive, but as Trend had pointed out, negotiations could prove ‘embarrassing’ by revealing the strength of the economic arguments, both at home and abroad, against immediate accession. As a result Trend suggested taking up Gerhard Schroeder’s proposal for a detailed study of the problems of accession between Britain and ‘likeminded’ members of the EEC.159 The proposal of a probe of the countries of the Six, to be conducted by Brown and Wilson, was Wilson’s own. It had been his preference when

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European policy was raised in January 1966. According to Palliser, Wilson suggested the idea to Brown during the day at Chequers. Brown was disappointed, as it fell short of his proposal for a declaration, but was forced to accept because the probe suggestion at least committed the Prime Minister to a European initiative.160 The probe would, as Wilson put it, enable ‘informal consultations with the Six individually’, to ‘state what our major difficulties were, and seek to ascertain how far they would be met, and whether there would be any conditions in regard to, for example, our relations with the USA’. On the central issue of the Treaty of Rome, Wilson conceded that ‘if asked whether we could accept the Treaty, the reply might be that provided that we received satisfaction on the points on which we still saw difficulty, adherence to the Treaty would not in itself be a sticking point’.161 While the probe was ongoing, officials would study possible alternatives to membership, namely ‘going it alone’ and staying out of any grouping, or teaming up in a North Atlantic association. Wilson’s tactical choice of a tour was largely for party political reasons, but it also reflected his disposition against acquiescence to Community terms. The tour of the Six implied no prior commitment to the principle of membership; it was simply a fact-finding mission to see if the conditions existed for Britain to enter the EEC.162 The tour bought time, advancing Britain’s commitment by associating the Prime Minister with the initiative, but postponing the moment of decision as to whether or not Britain could accept the conditions on offer. In this way, Wilson could keep his options open, facilitating retreat should the terms of entry prove too onerous. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister harnessed himself firmly to Britain’s European policy and backsliding from some kind of approach to the EEC was extremely unlikely. Wilson’s tour differed from Trend’s suggestion in one crucial aspect. The Prime Minister intended to take on de Gaulle.

Notes 1 Young (1993, pp. 90–1); Camps (1967, pp. 185–91); Young (1999, p. 186); Wilson (1971, p. 283); Castle (1990, p. 61). 2 TNA PREM13/905, text of speech delivered to Central Hall, Bristol, 18 March 1966. 3 See Young (1993, p. 90); Young (1999, p. 186); on France’s offer, TNA PREM13/905, Reilly to FO, tel. 152, 21 February 1966; TNA FO371/188331/M10810/106, FO to Missions, Guidance tel. 101, 17 March 1966; on making Heath look like a Gaullist, TNA PREM13/1043, Wilson to Stewart, 15 March 1966; on Foreign Office attitude towards the French offer, FO371/188330/M10810/79, Possible Approach by France, Con O’Neill, undated, March 1966. 4 Sir Michael Palliser, interview with author, 24 August 1999. 5 TNA PREM5/467, List of Cabinet Ministers, 1 April 1966. 6 TNA EW24/53, Future Relations with Europe, Roll Report, 30 March 1966; this was forwarded to ministers in May as TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)2, Future Relations with Europe, 5 May 1966, along with the covering note. 7 TNA T312/1018, Owen to Figgures, 30 March 1966; Neild comments, 4 April 1966; TNA EW24/53, Figgures to O’Neill, 17 March 1966. 8 TNA EW24/53, Figgures to O’Neill, 17 March 1966. 9 TNA T312/1018, cover note, 24 March 1966; TNA FO371/188334/ M10810/154, UK Membership of the EEC, Roberts to FO, 29 April 1966. 10 TNA PREM13/905, Ward to FO, tel. 391, 22 April 1966.

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11 TNA T312/1018, cover note, 24 March 1966. 12 Bozo (2001, pp. 164–6). 13 TNA CAB148/25, OPD(66)18th, 5 April 1966. 14 TNA FO371/190534/W6/3, Barnes comment on Thomson to Barnes, 18 April 1966; Ellison (2003, p. 177). 15 Bozo (1998, pp. 345–8). 16 Ibid., (p. 345). 17 TNA CAB148/25, OPD(66)15th, 9 March 1966 and 16th, 17 March 1966. 18 TNA PREM13/933, Stewart—Schroeder, 4pm, 23 May 1966; TNA PREM13/906, Palliser to Wilson, 31 May 1966. 19 TNA PREM13/906, Johnson to Wilson, tel. 5288, 23 May 1966. 20 That the French did employ these arguments is clear in Bossuat (2001, pp. 515–7). 21 Ellison (2003, pp. 175–7); FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, doc. 138, Bator to Johnson, 7 March 1966. 22 TNA CAB164/28, Paris to FO, tel. 181, 4 March 1966. 23 TNA CAB 148/69, OPD(66)9, The International Consequences of General de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25 March 1966. 24 TNA CAB 148/27, OPD(66)39, France and NATO, Foreign Secretary, 8 March 1966. 25 TNA CAB148/25, OPD(66)15th, 9 March 1966 and 16th, 17 March 1966; TNA CAB 148/69, OPD(66)9, The International Consequences of General de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25 March 1966. 26 TNA BT241/1323, Stewart to Wilson, 4 May 1966. 27 TNA EW5/7, Mitchell to Brown, 6 May 1966. 28 TNA CAB 148/69, OPD(66)9, The International Consequences of General de Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Office, 25 March 1966. 29 TNA FO371/188335, draft of Brown speech to Socialist International at Stockholm, 6 May 1966. 30 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)3, Relations with Europe: The Next Step, First Secretary and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 6 May 1966. 31 Lord Thomson of Monifieth, interview with author, 26 November 2001. 32 TNA CAB164/11, Brown to Wilson, 15 May 1966; TNA PREM13/906, Palliser comments, 16 May 1966. 33 TNA PREM13/905, Trend to Wilson, 6 May 1966. 34 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)1st, 9 May 1966. 35 TNA FO371/190534/W6/3, Thomson to Barnes, 13 April 1966. 36 TNA PREM13/933, Erhard—Wilson, 23 May 1966. 37 Ibid.; TNA FO371/190534/W6/3, Thomson to Barnes, 13 April 1966. 38 TNA PREM13/933, Plenary session, 4pm, 23 May 1966. 39 Ibid. 40 TNA BT241/1324, Roberts to FO, tel. 960, 3 July 1966. 41 TNA PREM13/906, Brown to Wilson, 23 June 1966. 42 TNA PREM13/853, Brown to Wilson, 24 June 1966. 43 TNA PREM13/906, Wilson comments on Brown to Wilson, 23 June 1966; on Hanoi and Haiphong, TNA PREM13/933, Wilson to Johnson, 25 May 1966; Ellis 2001, pp. 189, 196. 44 TNA PREM13/906, Palliser to Wilson, 31 May 1966. 45 TNA PREM13/933, Plenary session, 4pm, 23 May 1966. 46 TNA PREM13/906, Brown to Wilson, 23 June 1966. 47 TNA PREM13/907, Brown to Wilson and Wilson’s response, 29 June 1966. 48 TNA PREM13/853, Brown to Wilson, 24 June 1966. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 TNA FO371/189127/RF1053/38, Wilson, Brown, Stewart—Pompidou, Couve, 8 July 1966.

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52 TNA FO371/188347/M10810/458, How to Get into the Common Market, EEOD, Brown comments, 18 August 1966. 53 For example, Tratt (1996, pp. 112–13); Milward (2002, pp. 325–40). 54 TNA FO371/189127, RF1053/38, Couve—Pompidou—Wilson—Brown—Stewart, 8 July 1966. 55 TNA FO371/188341/M10810/343, Wilson—Pompidou, 7 July 1966. 56 O’Hara (2003, p. 269); Schenk (2002, p. 363). 57 Castle (1990, p. 75, 18 July 1966). 58 TNA EW5/18, FO to UK Director IMF, 25 September 1966. 59 Wilson (1971, pp. 323–4). 60 Roll (1985, p. 173). 61 Cairncross (1997, p. 146, 11 July 1966). 62 TNA FO371/189127/RF1053/36, Campbell comments on Reilly despatch, 13 July 1966. 63 Bodleian Library, Sir Patrick Reilly Papers, MSS.Eng.c.6925.folio Paris 1966. 64 Cairncross (1997, p. 146, 12 July 1966); TNA CAB 128/41, CC(66)35th, 12 July 1966; Grossman (1975, p. 568, 12 July 1966). 65 Pimlott (1992, pp. 133–53); TNA PREM13/853, Wilson—Callaghan—O’Brien, 15 July 1966. 66 TNA PREM13/854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966. 67 BOE, OV44/151, Sir Leslie Cromer to Armstrong, 19 October 1965. 68 TNA PREM13/854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966. 69 BOE OV53/47, Report of the G10, 8 February 1966, 21 March 1966; 25–26 July 1966. 70 TNA PREM13/853, Callaghan—Fowler, 15 July 1966. 71 TNA CAB 128/41, CC(66)36th, 14 July 1966; Grossman (1975, p. 569, 14 July 1966), Pimlott (1992, pp. 417–18), Cairncross (1997, p. 149); Ziegler (1993, p. 254). 72 Bodleian Library, Sir Paul Gore-Booth Papers, MS Gore-Booth 92, ff. 101–17, envelope 6, note by Gore-Booth, 13 July 1966. 73 Ibid. 74 Grossman (1975, p. 569, 14 July 1966). 75 Bodleian Library, Sir Paul Gore-Booth Papers, MS Gore-Booth 92, ff. 101–17, envelope 6, note by Gore-Booth, 14 July 1966. 76 Hansard, vol. 731, col. 1734, 14 July 1966; The Times, ‘Stern Action to Cut Spending: Interim Budget Coming after Bank Rate rise’, p. 1, 15 July 1966. 77 Castle (1990, p. 75, 18 July 1966); Grossman (1975, p. 574, 18 July 1966); Benn (1987, p. 160, 18 July). 78 TNA PREM13/854, Trend to Wilson, 19 July 1966; Bale (1999, pp. 203–7). 79 TNA CAB128/46, CC(66)37th, 19 July 1966; Castle (1990, p. 76); Grossman (1975, p. 576, 19 July 1966). 80 TNA PREM5/483, Brown to Wilson, 20 July 1966. 81 Wigg (1972, p. 339). 82 TNA PREM13/859, Wilson—TUC Economic Committee, 25 July 1966. 83 TNA CAB128/41, CC(66)40th, 28 July 1966; Castle (1990, p. 80, 28 July 1966); Cairncross (1997, pp. 156–7, 30 July 1966); TNA PREM13/859, Wilson to Economic Committee, 26 July 1966. 84 TNA PREM13/859, CBI—Wilson, 2 August 1966. 85 TNA PREM5/483, Note for the Record, 20 July 1966. 86 Benn (1987, p. 454, 16 July 1966). 87 Wilson (1971, pp. 338–9); a copy of the motion is in Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge, Michael Stewart Papers, STWT9/6/8, ‘Never Again, 25 July 1966. 88 The Times, ‘Cabinet meeting again today: last minute talks on economic measures’, p. 1, 20 July 1966; on Heffer, Broad (2001, pp. 65–6). 89 Hansard, vol. 732, 26 July 1966, cols. 1449–62.

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90 Hansard, vol. 733, 3 August 1966, cols. 605–20; Grossman (1975, p. 602, 3 August 1966). 91 Pimlott (1992, pp. 426–7). 92 Morgan (1997, p. 250); Pimlott (1992, pp. 422–4); Grossman (1975, pp. 581–3, 24 July 1966: p. 591, 28 July 1966: pp. 593–6, 31 July 1966: p. 599, 2 August 1966). 93 Pimlott (1992, p. 437). 94 On Brown’s support for ‘outflanking’ the General, TNA PREM13/906, Brown to Wilson, 24 June 1966. 95 See Trend’s analysis of this problem, TNA PREM13/855, Economic Strategy, Trend to Wilson, 10 August 1966; also TNA CAB134/3195, SEP(66)1st, 11 August 1966. 96 TNA PREM13/857, Economic Strategy, Halls to Trend, 11 October 1966; on the holding line taken by the SEP Committee in September, TNA CAB134/3195, SEP(66)2nd, 16 September 1966; Grossman (1976, pp. 39–40, 16 September 1966); The Times, ‘Unemployment near danger point: Ministers discuss when to pull out of deflation’, Political Correspondent, p. 1, 20 October 1966. 97 TNA CAB 134/3195, SEP(66)7, Economic Situation and Prospect, Chancellor, 14 September 1966; SEP(66)8, Economic Situation, First Secretary, 14 September 1966; see also TNA CAB130/299, MISC(66)127, 17 October 1966. 98 TNA PREM13/824, Reid to Nicoll, 9 November 1966. 99 The Times, ‘Aim to limit fall in investment: industry’s anxiety at sharp decline’, City editor, p. 1,21 October 1966. 100 TNA CAB134/3195, SEP(66)l4, The Investment Outlook, Board of Trade and DEA, 20 October 1966. 101 TNA PREM13/1429, CBI Report on Stimulation of Industrial Investment, 25 October 1966. 102 TNA PREM13/824, Reid to Nicoll, 9 November 1966. 103 TNA PREM13/823, Wilson to Callaghan, 17 October 1966. 104 TNA PREM13/856, Trend to Wilson, 21 October 1966. 105 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 12/5, meeting with Wilson, 28 October 1966. 106 TNA PREM13/827, Stewart to Wilson, 17 October 1966. 107 TNA PREM13/1850, FO to Rome, tel. 998, 22 September 1966. 108 The Economist, Europe, 22 October 1966; on Wilson’s interest in this article, Grossman (1976, p. 83, 22 October 1966). 109 TNA PREM13/1850, Palliser comments on The Economist article, 22 October 1966. 110 FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii., doc. 188, Solomon and Stoessel to Ball, 19 July 1966; Ellison (2003, pp. 177–9). 111 TNA PREM13/1262, Washington to FO, tel. 2173, 27 July 1966. 112 Ellison (2001). 113 TNA PREM13/1262, Washington to FO, tel. 2173, 27 July 1966. 114 TNA PREM13/1262, Wilson—Stewart—Trend—Gore-Booth—Dean—Greenhill— Palliser, 26 July 1966. 115 See also, O’Hara (2003, pp. 257–63); Roy (2001, pp. 243–7, 252–3). 116 Wilson (1971, pp. 342–3). 117 TNA PREM13/855, Wilson—Johnson—Fowler, 29 July 1966. 118 TNA PREM13/1083, Wilson—Johnson, 29 July 1966. 119 FRUS, International Monetary and Trade Policy 1964–1968, vol. viii., doc. 100, Bator to Johnson, 6 July 1966; Ziegler (1993, p. 254); Bartlett (1992, pp. 116–17). 120 TNA CABl48/25, OPD(66) 35th, 10 August 1966. 121 TNA PREM13/1262, Dean to FO, tel. 2138, 21 July 1966; TNA PREM13/1044, Healey— McNamara, 25 July 1966; PREM13/1262, Killick to Palliser, 27 July 1966; TNA PREM13/802, Palliser to Maclehose, 21 July 1966. 122 TNA PREM13/935, Johnson to Wilson, 26 August 1966. 123 TNA FO371/190820, Callaghan to Healey, 11 August 1966.

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124 FO371/190820/ZD13/23G, Fenn to Burrows, 20 August 1966; Maclehose to Arthur, 19 September 1966. 125 TNA FO371/190820, Healey to Callaghan, 16 August 1966; on Healey’s views on retrenchment, Healey (1989, pp. 299–300); FO371/190821/ ZD13/53G, Arthur to GoreBooth, 6 October 1966. 126 TNA FO371/190821/ZD13/54G, Burrows to Gore-Booth, 30 September 1966. 127 TNA CAB 130/301, MISC129(66)1st, 22 October 1966; Crossman (1976, pp. 85–7); Healey (1989, pp. 299–300); Wilson (1971, p. 381); Dockrill (2002, pp. 173–7). 128 TNA CAB148/25, OPD(66)48th, 9 December 1966; Dockrill (2002, p. 177). 129 Ziegler (1993, p. 240); Wilson (1971, pp. 357–70). 130 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)11, Britain and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 18 October 1966. 131 Ibid. 132 Crossman (1976, p. 84, 22 October 1966). 133 Ibid. (p. 83). 134 Ibid. (p. 84). 135 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)12, Longer Term Economic Strategy and our Relations with Europe, Balogh, 20 October 1966. 136 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)7, Legal and Constitutional Implications of UK Membership of the EEC, Sub-Committee, 23 August 1966. 137 Ibid.; TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)8, The Future of Europe: Nation States or Supranationality, Foreign Office, 23 August 1966. 138 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)7, Legal and Constitutional Implications of UK Membership of the EEC, Sub-Committee, 23 August 1966. 139 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)8, The Future of Europe: Nation States or Supranationality, Foreign Office, 23 August 1966. 140 Ibid. 141 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)3rd, 22 October 1966. 142 TNA CAB130/298, MISC126(66)1st, 22 October 1966. 143 TNA PREM13/908, Balogh to Wilson, 20 October 1966; TNA CAB134/2756, E(O)(E)(66)6th, 14 July 1966; TNA CAB134/2757, E(O)(E)(66)3, Economic Considerations, Report by MacDougall, Balogh, Cairncross, Neild and Kaldor, 2 June 1966. 144 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)9, Economic Implications of UK Membership, Officials, 22 October 1966. 145 Sir Derek Mitchell, interview with author, 26 August 1997. 146 TNA CAB134/2757, E(O)(E)(66)6, Interim Report on the Economic Implications, Minority Report, 26 July 1966. 147 Crossman (1976, p. 82, 22 October 1966); TNA CAB130/298, MISC126(66)1st, 22 October 1966. 148 Ibid. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)9, Economic Implications of UK Membership, Official Report, 22 October 1966. 154 TNA CAB134/2757, E(O)(E)(66)22, Draft Interim Report, DEA, 19 July 1966. 155 Crossman (1976, p. 83, 22 October 1966). 156 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)11, Britain and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 18 October 1966. 157 TNA PREM13/905, Trend to Wilson, 6 May 1966. 158 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)3rd, 22 October 1966.

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159 TNA PREM13/908, Trend to Wilson, 21 October 1966. 160 Sir Michael Palliser, interview with author, 24 August 1999; Wilson (1971, p. 380). 161 TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)3rd, 22 October 1966. 162 Crossman (1976, pp. 84–5, 22 October 1966).

4 Free-wheeling with the General1

The formation and conduct of the probe of the Six, November 1966 to March 1967 The prospect that de Gaulle would prevent Britain’s accession to the European Community was widely debated in 1966–7.2 Thus, there was considerable doubt as to how Wilson could hope to attain membership. Richard Grossman maintained that the rationale for success lay in Wilson’s diplomatic vanity: Wilson ‘already regards himself as an expert on foreign affairs and a statesman able to achieve what no professional diplomat can achieve’.3 An alternative interpretation suggests that Wilson was certain the initiative would fail, but proceeded for domestic political reasons. He never intended to take Britain into the EEC, but sought to isolate the French in Europe and to appease the desires of the pro-European right.4 Both these interpretations require modification. A deal with de Gaulle was a part of Wilson’s diplomacy, but it was only a part. Wilson endorsed a longer-term strategy designed to make it difficult for de Gaulle to veto by showing Britain’s sincerity and willingness to enter the Community. As the tour progressed, so Wilson began to lessen his commitment to the terms of entry. The paradox of Wilson’s approach was that a clean, uncluttered demand for accession, free from conditions, was the only way to avert a rapid and humiliating veto. Yet, an uncluttered demand would run counter to Wilson’s hope and his promise to ministers that Britain would only enter the Community with adequate safeguards: would only, in effect, enter the ‘right sort’ of Europe. Bilateral discussions with the Six and with the European Commission helped to convince continental opinion of Britain’s determination to enter, but they also exposed the difficulties in Britain’s approach. Whereas worries about EFTA, regional planning and some Commonwealth sticking points proved to be less difficult than Wilson had thought, agricultural financing would pose one major problem, the weakness of sterling another. De Gaulle moved to suggest that Britain was ‘mooring alongside’ the continent, yet the new German administration under Kurt Kiesinger and Willy Brandt recommended Wilson delay a further application. This chapter traces the development of Britain’s policy before and during the tour of the Six, examining Wilson’s tactical approach to the Community.

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Dealing with the Cabinet, November 1966 Cabinet endorsed the proposals of the Chequers meeting in three discussions early in November. Ministers agreed to the probe in large part because of the conditional nature of the approach. There would be no application unless satisfaction on certain terms would prove attainable. Wilson and Brown undertook to emphasise on the tour that the CAP would distort British agricultural production and lead to a rise in prices and living costs. Acceptance of the agricultural financing arrangements would pose an intolerable burden on Britain’s balance of payments and would need review. Liberalisation of capital movements would also require safeguards, and Britain’s ability to carry out regional policies that prioritised the development areas would have to be ensured. Certain Commonwealth countries would have to seek association and arrangements would be required in particular for New Zealand trade.5 Agreement for the Commonwealth should be no worse than that reached during the Brussels negotiations in 1961–3.6 Wilson expressly stated that only after exploratory discussions would the Cabinet have to choose whether terms that might reasonably be obtained in negotiations were adequate to justify joining the Community.7 The probe was a shift towards the EEC without forcing a ministerial decision on the principle, as Wilson emphasised that no verdict was necessary until after the tour was complete.8 Wilson was undoubtedly playing a longer game with ministers, as Castle put it: ‘edging his way step by step towards his goal’.9 Yet, there was also a note of urgency in ministers’ acquiescence to the probe. Crucial in bringing ministers to endorse the move was a change of heart on behalf of the Chancellor, Callaghan. Influenced by high-ranking Treasury officials, Callaghan wrote to Wilson after the Chequers meeting to record his uncertainty about a move towards the EEC. He was unsure, he wrote, whether he could guarantee the parity of the pound if Britain chose to shift towards membership.10 By the time of the November Cabinet meetings, Callaghan had undergone a revolution in attitude. Trapped by the need to demonstrate confidence in the economy, Callaghan embraced the optimists’ assessment of a move to Europe. The prospect of access to a dynamic market would, he argued to ministers, encourage faith in future recovery and would attract investment, helping to keep the UK economy afloat. In fact, Callaghan told the Cabinet, with the economic strain of sanctions against Rhodesia, he was unsure if Britain could hold the sterling rate unless Britain moved towards Europe.11 As Castle’s diary entry demonstrates, the connection Callaghan made between a move towards the Community and the success of sanctions in Rhodesia was vital in convincing the left to support the move.

Wilson, Brown, the French and the Five: the formation of the probe Was Wilson’s turn to the European Community a question mainly of domestic politics? The evidence in fact suggests to the contrary. Echoing the zeal with which he had approached the question of Commonwealth regeneration in the first term, Wilson became absorbed, at least between January and June 1967, with the need to attain membership of

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the Community. The high profile probe entwined Wilson personally with the fate of the initiative. Had he predicted certain failure, he could have contracted the initiative to his eager Foreign Secretary, Brown, who would have been a willing fall-guy for a fated bid. Instead, Wilson established firm control over the conduct of the tour. He created the Official Committee on the Approach to Europe (EURO), chaired from the Cabinet Office by William Nield. Within the Cabinet Office, the powerful duo of Burke Trend and Michael Palliser guided Wilson’s policy, assisted by the work of Nield’s EURO group. As already noted, Trend shared Wilson’s natural scepticism towards the Community and thus his advice carried additional weight. Palliser, by contrast, was an enthusiastic supporter of Community membership. An able official who later headed the Diplomatic Service, Palliser played an essential role in shaping Wilson’s tactics. Well-connected to the Foreign Office, where he had formerly led the Planning Staff, Palliser was able to nourish Wilson’s desire for the initiative to succeed. As Palliser explained: I think I always made it clear to Wilson that I was very sceptical of his being able to get General de Gaulle to change his mind. But I do not think that I would ever have told him that there was no hope of success. He was…an inveterate optimist, with great confidence in his own ability to influence others, even as obstinate as he knew the General to be. To have told him categorically that he was completely wrong in his judgement would not have led him to change it; but it would have affected the closeness of our own relationship, which would not have been helpful either to him or to me.12 Wilson’s instincts towards the European Community did little to challenge his hope that a settlement could prove possible. His assumption, as he elucidated to the Guardian editor Alastair Hetherington, was that Britain could lead in Europe: ‘he repeated his old argument that we can lead politically’.13 Later he told Hetherington: ‘he still thought that our political influence in Europe if we joined would be great. If we couldn’t dominate that lot, there wasn’t much to be said for us’.14 His presumption of superiority helped to ossify a sense that he could negotiate a deal with the General: ‘He would ignore everything [else], he would deal direct with de Gaulle. It would be the crucial part of the European negotiation’.15 Initially, Wilson thought he would attempt to make links with de Gaulle based on Franco-British suspicion of supranationality.16 After taking advice, Wilson’s position shifted, as he accepted that a deal on supranationality would jettison potential support of the Five. In place, Wilson accepted Palliser’s verdict as to how to deal with the General: you may find it of value to appeal to de Gaulle’s sense of history and his monumental vanity. He has no doubt that he is the greatest Frenchman since Napoleon… To be fair, he is probably right, and wants to go down in history accordingly. Palliser’s idea was to convince de Gaulle that he would undermine French and European power by keeping Britain out. In the long term, Europe could not prosper without Britain:

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You should speak to him about the account he will render to history—he risks going astray: by vetoing the attempt not only to bring France and Britain together more intimately but also to create a really dynamic economic, industrial and no doubt eventually political—European power complex, he irrevocably split the old continent and condemned the countries in it to a permanently declining world status, as compared to current (US and USSR) and future (China and Japan) giants of the world… The alternative to agreement between you—an essential element in which must be acceptance of Britain within the Community—is a growing division and thereby inevitably the permanence of second class status for the countries of Europe—including France.17 That Palliser envisaged the appeal of these arguments to more than de Gaulle’s ‘monumental vanity’ is plausible. Wilson was evidently pleased with these suggestions, writing: France and Britain are politically stable. If we give a pledge, we can deliver. Unlike Germany (also Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy). In a sense, more stable than the US, who are more subject to Congressional pressures. The General and I can sign a Treaty and carry it. LBJ couldn’t be certain, (he couldn’t pull out of Vietnam if he wanted to). Another bond—can help to unite and develop Africa. Technology widening from aircraft. Though using US for late 60s generally for our main aircraft (forced there by the improvidence of our predecessors), we shall be indissolubly tied to joint French aircraft interdependence in the 1970s. Nuclear—Nassau we opposed as he did. Killed the MLF on coming into office. Opposed to any collective pooling involving hardware solution.18 In this way, Wilson’s preconceptions about the Community and belief that it could be possible to find a way around de Gaulle persisted. His ideas centred on a notion of British leadership, alongside the French, in a partnership that aimed to control and contain Germany. Technological collaboration, particularly in aircraft, would underpin this partnership. For his part, Palliser selected the arguments and language he judged would appeal to Wilson, enabling Palliser to sustain a high degree of influence on the Prime Minister. The idea of a technological community was a significant feature of Wilson’s bargaining hand. The Italian proposal, fleshed out in October, for a technological initiative in NATO recommended that the US would supply the technical knowledge free of charge and the Europeans would finance joint development projects in specific sectors. The proposal was not popular in Britain. Officials felt that the difficulty faced by the Europeans was not lack of technological know-how itself, but the fact that the US had access to a vast domestic market and the EEC countries did not. Nevertheless, the Italian proposal provided the impetus for the launch of a British counter-proposal.19 Since 1964, Wilson had sought access to the Community market as a means of improving the export opportunities of Britain’s technological industries. He had

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supported collaborative projects in order to augment the returns of investment in research and development. He also saw that technology could be a useful lever with which to attain Britain’s entry into the EEC. Wilson regarded Britain’s technological industries as much more developed than those in the Six and he was aware of the political appeal of a technological solution that avoided (and possibly thwarted) further American expansion. Thus, shifting from his previous quest for collaborative projects, he wanted to make further joint work contingent upon Britain’s entry into Europe. He suggested that Britain should ‘hint that if they [the Six] want anything they’ll get nowt through NATO and must support our entry into the EEC when we’ll really talk business’.20 In particular, he thought that an alternative to American penetration would prove popular in France. Commenting on the dominance of the American computer industries in France, he remarked: ‘the French computer industry had not only been raped but was now aborted. He was going to see whether we could make a new arrangement’.21 Wilson proposed a ‘fourth community on technology’, enabling Europe to take advantage of the much enlarged, integrated market. To this enlarged market, Britain could offer considerable expertise.22 Within 12 days, Wilson was ready to present Britain’s proposal for the ‘technological fourth community’ to the annual Guildhall City dinner. The speech had been prepared within the Cabinet Office without interdepartmental discussion and glided over the rather dismal prospects for joint European ventures. The appeal of the idea was evident. Technology showed the Prime Minister, still emerging from the sterling crisis, as unearthing dynamic and fresh proposals for economic regeneration, able to appeal to industrial and financial opinion. He argued: I would like to see, as was recently suggested in one of the more far seeing articles I read in a City journal, a drive to create a fourth community, a technological community to pool with the Europeans the enormous technological inventiveness of Britain and other European countries…if this is acceptable in this field of technological collaboration, nobody has more to contribute than Britain.23 Wilson also used technology to justify Britain’s move into the EEC in discussions with the TUC. Membership would improve management and increase employment opportunities in the developed industries.24 However, the proposal outlined at the Guildhall speech was over-optimistic. Minister of Technology, Tony Benn, felt that British know-how would not prove sufficiently alluring to the Six. Benn argued: we must avoid overstating our great technological advantage over the European countries…nor could we assume that Europe will look to us rather than to the US as the main source of technological innovation. Although we have much to offer, there is already considerable interchange of scientific and technological knowledge.25 Thus, although Wilson had been serious about seeking industrial projects with the EEC countries, the need to use technology as a method of getting into the Community altered the complexion of the policy. Technological collaboration assumed greater prominence in

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Wilson’s rhetoric, both to portray Wilson’s vigour and to underline the case for getting into the EEC. As technology took centre stage, so the policy became more politically expedient, leading to a muddying of the details. Wilson’s desire to negotiate a deal with the General therefore did contain measures both of delusion and of optimism. Yet, it overlooks the depth of his position to dismiss his diplomacy as either too cunning or too vain. After all, it would have been implausible for Wilson to master a convincing approach for EEC membership without a personal negotiation with the man deemed to hold the key to Britain’s entry. The important point is that Wilson did not rely exclusively on his own dealings with de Gaulle. Indeed, he admitted to Hetherington that the success of a bargain with de Gaulle was unlikely: ‘he would do all he could to win de Gaulle round, but the prospects were not too bright’.26 Instead, the premise of the initiative was that while it was abundantly clear that de Gaulle did not want to let Britain into the Community, nor did he want to deliver a second veto. Enlargement was popular in France and among the Five. De Gaulle’s veto in 1963 had threatened to paralyse the Community, had damaged France’s standing within the EEC and jeopardised the development of the Community itself. It could prove a risk too great for France’s position in the Community for de Gaulle to attempt a further unilateral rebuttal of an applicant state. The approach of parliamentary elections in April 1967 could also place domestic constraints on de Gaulle’s public opposition to British candidature.27 The Gaullist majority in the Assembly depended on the support of the Independent Republicans led by Giscard d’Estaing. Giscard supported enlargement and although the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Patrick Reilly thought it unlikely, he could use the issue to break from the Gaullist Party, thus harming de Gaulle’s domestic support. Furthermore, de Gaulle’s approach towards NATO added to the forces of public opinion acting against the French President. Withdrawal from the command structures of the Alliance potentially jeopardised France’s security and was therefore a policy difficult to justify to the French public, who feared the threat from a resurgent Germany. Hostility towards enlargement of the EEC could weaken de Gaulle’s position further, as enlargement offered a possible solution to the German question. British entry was one way to balance German power. Palliser argued that ‘most thinking Frenchmen, including Gaullists whether of the Pompidou or Debré variety, want us in as a counterpoise to Germany’.28 Moreover, the British felt that de Gaulle prioritised his policies towards NATO above the EEC. Reilly argued that de Gaulle had settled the EEC’s empty chair crisis in order to withdraw from NATO. Public opinion, de Gaulle realised, could prove unable to cope with simultaneous crises in the EEC and the Alliance. Faced with a repeat of this choice, de Gaulle could favour admission of Britain into the EEC in order to free his hands to concentrate on further distancing from NATO.29 In this way, the British could hope for eventual accession. De Gaulle was likely to delay any decisive rebuff. If negotiations began, the impetus of the talks and de Gaulle’s reluctance to confront the weight of support for Britain could compel the negotiations to success. In addition, de Gaulle was ageing and the application could outlive him. If the application added to currents of opinion that worked against de Gaulle’s presidency, the day of his departure would hasten. Palliser argued that Britain should ‘prepare for a post de Gaulle situation where our entry—together with that of Denmark, Norway etc—can become possible within the reasonably near future, and perhaps even before the next general election’.30 As one journalist sarcastically remarked: ‘The baked meats of de

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Gaulle’s funeral will coldly furnish forth Britain’s European marriage tables, and we shall all dance on an obstinate old man’s grave’.31 The potential success of a British initiative hinged on Britain’s ability to make negotiations work despite de Gaulle’s position. In 1963, de Gaulle had argued that his exclusion of Britain was the result not of a fundamental disagreement about the future of the Atlantic Alliance and the shape of Atlantic and European integration, but from a disagreement about agriculture. The 18 months of difficult negotiations in Brussels had displayed Britain’s desire for safeguards and alterations, providing evidence in which de Gaulle could ground his veto. Thus, Foreign Office rationale was that Britain should undercut the pretexts of that rebuttal. If Britain could show acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and willingness to endorse the terms of entry, then it would be harder for de Gaulle to find an acceptable basis for Britain’s exclusion.32 It was this longer term strategy that gave Wilson optimism that he could accede to the Community during his term of office. For a Prime Minister characterised as ‘a fighter who never lacked courage when his back was to the wall’, a man with renowned stamina when faced with adverse circumstances, the opposition of the French President could be overcome if, and only if, Wilson persisted.33 This was the key. When, for example, in late October the prospects for the success of the application appeared gloomy, Palliser recommended ‘returning the ball firmly but politely into the General’s twenty-five’.34 A month later, Wilson repeated Palliser’s words to Hetherington, who remembered: ‘as he had said to me before, we must keep kicking the ball into his twenty-five’.35 As Palliser had outlined, if Wilson was sincere and determined enough, accession could come within Wilson’s term of office. These considerations explain Wilson’s adoption of the policy of ‘not taking no for an answer’ in January 1967. ‘Not taking no for an answer’ was the way to circumvent de Gaulle over the longer term.36 Foreign Secretary George Brown had a different approach to diplomacy within the Community, preferring to get into the EEC by courting favour with the Five. Although Brown has been viewed as the architect of Britain’s European policy, Brown’s diplomatic approach was less subtle than Wilson’s and consequently less likely to reap dividends. Furthermore, Brown’s influence in the political direction of policy towards the EEC was subsidiary. Partly, this was because Brown’s relations with some Foreign Office officials were characterised by mutual distrust: the bombastic Foreign Secretary did not always see eye to eye with the urbane diplomatic elite. Of Brown’s arrival at the Foreign Office, Gore-Booth recalled: ‘I…warmly welcom[ed] Mr. Brown personally and I [said] that everybody would be greatly heartened by his assurance that the Foreign Office under his leadership would effectively control foreign policy’.37 The essential difference between officials and Brown was the Foreign Secretary’s desire, grounded in the way in which he viewed politics, to challenge de Gaulle directly. It was a political duty to act; failure to do so meant nothing would change. In the EEOD, O’Neill had countered Brown’s enthusiasm for an initiative with a laconic paper on ‘How to Get into the Common Market’. O’Neill advised that de Gaulle’s attitude constituted an ‘absolute bar’ to accession. There was little choice but to wait ‘for time and circumstance to play its inevitable role’. In the meantime Britain should declare acceptance of the Treaty of Rome and show commitment to the terms of entry. Brown responded: ‘what nonsense, what are we here for?’38 Brown found the Foreign Office officials excessively defeatist about the prospects of success, telling the French Ambassador, Geoffrey de

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Courcel, that the Foreign Office despised de Gaulle.39 He also disagreed with the Foreign Office’s assessments that Britain would not be able to make adjustments to the Rome Treaty: ‘he found this disturbingly negative…about the French attitude…he thinks we could get better terms’.40 However, Brown was also an exasperating character, possessed with a furious temper, exacerbated by drink, and fuelled by a sense of inferiority wrought by his background. This explosive blend led to a serious dispute between Brown and the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Patrick Reilly, during Brown’s visit to Paris in late 1966. Brown was incensed when he perceived that Reilly had not ordered him a car at the correct time. Reilly remembered: I heard padding steps and Brown came in… For what seemed an age he abused me. When he was transformed by his devil, the force of his personality and his natural sensitivity combined to give him an extraordinary ability to say the things most likely to hurt his victim, and with devastating effect. Thus he was able to hit me where it hurt most. For I had always prided myself on not being in any way puffed up by my status as Ambassador, on knowing that my enjoyment of my honours and privileges must be brief and transient. I remember that he said to me with scathing contempt ‘you call yourself Her Majesty’s Ambassador. Your job is simply to see that my car is available when I want it. I do everything that is important here’… I kept my temper and said nothing… I was overcome by the horror of the situation… [of the Foreign Secretary] treating me, his loyal servant and host, in this loathsome way. Over nineteen years later the horror is still with me. Except for Rachel’s [Reilly’s wife] death, this was the worst thing that ever happened to me.41 Reilly’s vivid recollection points to the deeper difficulty between Brown and his Foreign Office staff. His assertion that ‘I do everything that is important here’ indicated his belief in the conspiracy of the diplomatic world against the Foreign Secretary with little formal education, perpetuating his conception of the ‘defeatism’ of officials about de Gaulle.42 The effect of the collapse in relations between Brown and the Embassy was to isolate Brown from any advice that the European initiative could not work. He refused to receive reports arguing that de Gaulle would veto.43 The lack of communication between Foreign Office officials and Foreign Secretary enabled Brown to persist in his belief that pressure would force de Gaulle to yield and correspondingly elevated the significance of Palliser’s confidence with Wilson. Palliser’s good relations with Brown’s Private Secretary Murray Maclehose meant that the Foreign Office, when denied the audience of Brown, could exert influence through Palliser directly to the Prime Minister. Brown’s wish was to accede to the Community before 1969, the year in which the Six were due to renegotiate their arrangements for the financing of agriculture. Membership before 1969 would enable Britain to participate in the review, providing the chance to alleviate the burdensome levy payment system. Brown maintained that direct and forceful influence from the Five on the French would compel de Gaulle to give way. He told the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns that:

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de Gaulle’s position was different to 1963, as now more French opinion was in favour of British entry and de Gaulle could not take France out of the Community. The Germans, faced with a choice of France and the US would have to choose the US and if against this background the Five showed a completely solid front the French government would have to give way.44 The shortcomings of this approach were evident in his talks with the Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani. Brown argued that: He believed that the contribution that Europe could make to the world would be enormously greater if we were in and Fanfani must understand that it was in the mutual interest of the UK and Italy that we should be in. He would pay a great deal to arrange this… The Italians must bring the other members of the five to set up the jumps on the course, he would get his people over them.45 Fanfani was alarmed at the suggestions that Brown might wish to play the French against the Five. O’Neill intervened in this meeting to stress that Britain would go as far as possible to accept the provisions of the Treaty and that the British would not manipulate between the two sides. Fanfani also intimated that if it came to the crunch, the Six would prefer to keep the Community together. Afterwards, the Italians suggested that Brown was setting too hot a pace.46 Moreover, Brown placed great weight in his relationship with the new German Foreign Secretary, the Social Democrat Willy Brandt. The German elections in November had led to the coming to power of the Grand Coalition headed by Brandt and the Christian Democrat Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. Brandt noted Brown’s perception of affinity in his memoirs, as he claimed Brown urged him: ‘Willy, you have to get us in so that we can take the lead in Europe’.47 Brown’s faith in his relations with Brandt seemed to develop from his sense of the two leaders’ left-wing heritage and their shared will to move to détente. During the probe, Brown wrote to Brandt, arguing that de Gaulle’s opposition was unravelling following his and Wilson’s visit: ‘I remain convinced, as I have often told you that, provided we all show a solid front, he will acquiesce in the end’.48 Palliser, receiving the letter through his contacts in the Foreign Office, suggested to Wilson that Brown should not speak to Brandt in such candid terms: It is difficult for me—and I dare say not my business anyway—to judge how safe it is to write as frankly as this to Brandt, who, whatever, his qualities, is a German concerned with German interests and not necessarily, as firmly on our side as this might imply.49 Brown was right that Brandt was more likely to pressure for British accession than the Chancellor Kiesinger, who was known to favour Franco-German links.50 Yet, the will of the Germans to push France for a rapid accession was extremely doubtful, as Kiesinger had already assured de Gaulle he would not pressurise him to admit Britain. The Foreign Office was well aware of this fact. John Robinson, First Secretary at Britain’s delegation

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to the Community, reported that ‘Kiesinger had made plain to de Gaulle that he needed French support and the price would be German acquiescence to France’s policy on Britain’s entry’.51 Thus, it is clear that Brown’s approach was fraught with difficulties. Not only had the Germans already assured the French of their support; but too heavy a hand on the Five made the Five wary of Britain’s intentions. Wilson’s optimism may have been excessive, but he had little choice but to negotiate with the General, and his strategy of ‘not taking no for an answer’ offered the most sustained hopes for success.

The conduct of the probe, January to March 1967 Wilson left London for Rome with a reputation marked as sceptical about European membership.52 The tour did much to restore and to create the impression that Britain was eager to enter the Community: It’s my impression that whereas George is unchanged, Harold comes back from Paris for the first time determined to enter the Market’.53 Wilson employed twin tactics during the tour. First, he emphasised the political case in favour of British accession and enlargement, challenging the French view of the Community. Second, the flexible formula of the tour, deliberately isolating Wilson from pressures of domestic opinion, provided him considerable leeway to play the conditions as he saw fit. Evidence of the Five’s position on the question of agriculture and sterling led Wilson to the unwelcome acknowledgement that safeguards would be difficult to negotiate. The probe began in Rome, deemed a less controversial starting point than Paris, and proceeded via Strasbourg, Paris, Brussels, where Wilson spoke also to the European Commission, Bonn, The Hague and Luxembourg. First, Wilson aimed to establish Britain’s sincerity in approaching the European Community. He argued that Britain ‘meant business’ and was determined to enter with Britain’s safeguards assured. He drew on the crossparty endorsement in the House of Commons to show the breadth of support for European membership in the country: The House of Commons debate on 16 and 17 November was principally remarkable for the wide agreement, from all political parties, that membership of the Communities was a desirable objective and that the decision the government had taken was the right one… The government had a wide measure of support in Parliament and the country at large…and all the EFTA countries welcomed Britain’s move as an important step in determining the solution to the question of economic integration.54 To demonstrate Britain’s conviction, he employed the political argument that British entry would invest the Community with ‘strength, unity and independence’. The injection of technological knowledge and the expansion of the market underpinned Wilson’s sense that British membership would empower the Community. A fortified Community could stand up to the superpowers, acting independently in both economic development and in political outlook. Moreover, Wilson argued that an enlarged Community would not entrench the divide between West and East. Rather, by diluting the tightly knit unit of the

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Europe Six, the enlarged Community could act as inspiration for the Eastern European countries, ultimately ensuring the unity of a wider Europe.55 Emphasis on the unity of Europe was partly a means by which to dodge the British position on supranationality. The Italians, Dutch, Belgians and Luxembourgers had pressured for an increase in the Community’s supranational provisions in order to balance Franco-German dominance. Guiseppe Saragat, the Italian President, in response to recent indications of a Gaullist revival of interest in political union, had forwarded proposals to institutionalise political discussion in the Community that would confirm commitment to supranationality.56 For tactical reasons, Wilson was unwilling to come down on either side of the supranationality debate. Eschewing ‘political union’ for the more neutral ‘political unity’, Wilson aimed to toe a middle ground on supranational commitment. In forward-thinking language, he emphasised the importance of an ‘outward looking’ Europe that would not absorb the national identity of each nation. Of course, the idea of an ‘outward looking’ Europe could also stand as a counter to the Gaullist favour of a closely bound Community of Six: The twentieth century would go down in history as an age in which man had the vision to create a new unity, greater for building on diversity of nation states, so that national characteristics would be enriched by their association in a wider outward-looking unity.57 Wilson consistently engaged these arguments on each visit. Yet, the effect he sought in the vital meetings with the French and the Germans differed. Wilson intended his exposition of an enlarged Europe’s ‘strength and independence’ to appeal to de Gaulle. To illustrate independence from the Americans, Wilson showed that the Labour government had resisted the takeover of Britain’s computer industry by the US. Britain and France could expand their co-operation in new technologies, particularly aircraft. In this way, the two countries could build up European strength in order to work for peace in Europe: The task of the great European powers, of France and of Britain, was not to be mere messenger boys between the two great powers. They had a bigger role to play—and other nations wished them to play it—than merely waiting in the ante-rooms while the two great powers settled everything direct between themselves.58 Wilson argued that this could be the last chance for Britain to enter the Community.59 Here, he aimed to point out the consequences of a Gaullist veto by showing de Gaulle the legacy he would leave to history, as Palliser had suggested. Not only would de Gaulle shoulder the blame for a decisive break in Britain’s orientation away from Community membership, but he would also condemn Europe and France to withering influence in the world. Wilson’s diplomacy, however, faced two ways at once, as the French were no doubt aware. While hoping to lure de Gaulle with the promise of a Europe strong enough to resist American influences, ‘strength, unity and independence’ was also a way directly to combat de Gaulle’s preference for a little Europe of Six. Only an enlarged Community

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would have the strength to stand up to the superpowers and to house a reunified Germany. Furthermore, the Foreign Office realised that the image of an enlarged Europe provided a means by which to counteract de Gaulle’s vision for European détente. De Gaulle had been able to make political capital from the idea that only the French offered a solution to the difficulties of European and German reconciliation. A ‘European Europe’ could negotiate the problems of Europe, reaching out to the Soviet Union. An enlarged Europe, the British argued, would act not as a bulwark against communism, but as a bridge to the East. The new, strengthened Europe would attract the democratising tendencies of the Eastern European satellites, leading to eventual reconciliation of the continent.60 Ultimately, the British hoped to stiffen the currents of opinion in Western Europe who believed that ‘economically, politically and geographically, the Six no longer form a natural unit.61 Brown also maintained that a strengthened Europe would assuage the fears in Germany that the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would enshrine Germany’s non-nuclear status. Revealing his view that Germany should not have access to nuclear hardware, but would find security through the embrace of a stronger Europe, Brown argued: Britain could best encourage those who were worried on this count by entering the EEC. If Britain did so, people’s belief in the ability of Europe to stand up for itself would be strengthened. That was why our present initiative was so important and could not be allowed to fail or to suffer long delay.62 As in his meetings with de Gaulle, Wilson suggested to the Germans that if Britain faced rebuff, public opinion in the UK would turn against Europe and the great opportunity for the extension of East-West détente would be lost.63 This was the last chance to bring Britain into the EEC. The second aspect of Wilson’s approach was his treatment of the terms of entry; wherein lay the tangible evidence of Britain’s commitment. The advance in Britain’s position since 1961 was in the statement, albeit diluted, that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome. At each meeting, Wilson argued that Britain was ‘prepared to accept the Treaty of Rome subject to the necessary adjustments consequent upon the accession of a new member, and provided that we received satisfaction on the points of difficulty we saw’.64 Some of the terms of entry were far less problematical than Wilson had initially maintained. The EFTA countries, for example, were willing to join or to associate with the EEC: ‘all EFTA countries welcomed Britain’s move as an important step in determining a solution to the question of economic integration’.65 Protection of Britain’s regional policies was also a potential problem, as the Treaty of Rome could rule out negative controls on development in wealthy areas. The Italians and Germans assured Wilson and Brown that the Community was anxious to assist underdeveloped areas. Member states had been able to pursue regional policies unhindered.66 Consequently, meeting with the Netherlands delegation in The Hague, Wilson emphasised that he was not overly concerned with the regional policy question.67

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Discussing the issue of capital movements, Wilson argued that portfolio investment, currently restricted outside the UK, would be able to flow through the Community into third countries. His concern about portfolio investment was a reflection of the economic advisers’ and Treasury’s fears that capital would flood from the weaker to the stronger areas of the EEC. Wilson disguised his concern as an argument about inadvertent strengthening of the USA, who would benefit from British investors operating via the EEC. The Dutch showed that they had faced similar difficulties. Article 70(2) of the Treaty of Rome made some provision for these problems, preventing individual investors from using Community rules to override legislation in their home country.68 The Luxembourg Prime Minister Werner later agreed, suggesting that Britain could use Article 70(2) to circumvent difficulties in accepting the provisions for portfolio investment.69 Wilson and Brown were anxious not to concede too much, nor to give too hasty an indication of their possible negotiating position, when it came to questions of the Commonwealth. The British had not consulted with the Commonwealth countries and had to avoid diplomatic embarrassment by promising too many concessions too soon. Some Commonwealth difficulties were far less acute than they had been during the first negotiations. In a radical shift, Wilson and Brown did not attempt to seek access for temperate zone agricultural produce from Australia and Canada. Although there could be some difficulties for their trade, Wilson and Brown stressed that these difficulties would be soluble. Both these Old Dominions were wealthy countries, who were in any case diversifying their external trade.70 The developing Commonwealth would also pose fewer problems. During the Brussels negotiations, provisional arrangements had been made for association of African and Caribbean countries.71 Commonwealth sugar exporters, protected in Britain by the terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement would, Brown emphasised, require some arrangement. Neither he nor Wilson elucidated exactly what the British sought.72 The main difficulty was New Zealand’s exports. Brown insisted on permanent arrangements for New Zealand, as New Zealand was curiously dependent on the British market.73 In response to the Belgian Minister for Agriculture, who retorted that ‘any mention of permanency was a frightening concept’, Brown did offer that ‘there were a number of ways in which New Zealand could be satisfied’.74 In Bonn, Wilson returned to the demand that New Zealand would require an indelible arrangement.75 Brown outlined three possible solutions. Association of New Zealand to the Community was one, a ‘protocol’ of special association arrangements along the lines of Morocco’s agreement another. Failing these solutions, Brown would be content with simple but everlasting derogation from the common external tariff.76 The Dutch Foreign Secretary Joseph Luns maintained that New Zealand would prove the most difficult issue and suggested that New Zealand would have to be content with transitional periods.77 In Luxembourg, Brown contended that a 20-year-long transitional period might be satisfactory.78 Yet, because of Wilson and Brown’s efforts to appear conciliatory, the Commonwealth did not dominate the tour and it hardly featured in de Gaulle’s comments as to Britain’s suitability for membership. By far the most contentious question was agriculture. In each country, Brown outlined that acceptance of the CAP would increase the cost of living in Britain by some 10–14 per cent because of higher food prices. The CAP would distort British agricultural production, providing incentives to wealthier

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agrarian farmers in the south and east, to the detriment of dairy and hill farmers in the north and west. Reasonable transitional periods would make these adjustments bearable.79 The most serious problem was agricultural levy payments. Brown established that the current system of agricultural finance, reconfirmed during 1966, would pose an unfair burden. Member states’ contributions to the Common Agricultural Fund depended on the quantity of imports each member took from third countries.80 Britain imported £970m of leviable produce compared to Germany, the next biggest importer, who brought in £640m. Despite Britain’s lower GDP in contrast to Germany, the British would be liable for a high proportion of the payments. Moreover, the Exchequer would pay the money across the exchanges, affecting directly the balance of payments through a net outflow of pounds. The higher food prices, thus higher import prices resulting from membership, as trade switched from the Commonwealth to the EEC, would add to the detriment on the balance. In Rome, Brown and Wilson made clear that they did not consider an openended renegotiation to be a sufficient safeguard. With sterling at potential risk, the advance indication of the blow to the balance of payments could induce devaluation.81 To the French, Wilson established a change of tone with the tentative ‘perhaps the CAP was not as problematical as first thought’. He was cautiously optimistic at the rise in general world prices, which could narrow the gap between the Community and the wider environment.82 Wilson attempted to show de Gaulle that Britain and France would both benefit from a reduction in the Community’s price level. Germany’s protected farming sector and the need to give Erhard a settlement he could justify to the public in December 1964 had led the French to settle at a level higher than they ideally sought. Wilson threatened de Gaulle with the commercial consequences of Britain’s adoption of the Community price. Production in Britain would boom, increasing from 13 million to 20 million tons per year. Britain would prove a devastating competitor to France in export markets.83 On levy payments, Wilson suggested that the current system was only suitable for a Community of Six. Enlargement would increase the receipts and so would justify a change in the method of collecting the funds.84 As the tour progressed, Wilson’s treatment of the CAP did alter. The flexible formula of the tour allowed Wilson to develop Britain’s position without consulting the Cabinet. Away from home, he had significant leeway to adopt alternative postures. The Dutch advised that Wilson would have to be more forthcoming in acceptance of the CAP. Subsequently, Wilson engaged in his trusted technique of verbal play, experimenting to see if he could get around the problem of levies without making real concessions. In Luxembourg, Wilson put forward his ‘personal opinion’ that Britain would be able to accept the philosophy that the Commission should ‘own’ the receipts of the agricultural levies. Britain sought not a fundamental change, but ‘special safeguards’, in the way that the Council granted Germany a ceiling for its contribution to the fund. Thus, Wilson implied, but did not state directly, that Britain would not require safeguards in advance of membership: We were after all talking in terms of a marriage between the Community and Britain. You might prefer the girl you were marrying to have blue rather than grey eyes but you could not insist on her changing the colour of her eyes before you married her.85

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On this basis, the Luxembourg Prime Minister Werner indicated that a solution should be possible.86

The impact of the probe The tour was successful in impressing on the Six Britain’s determination to enter the Community and gravity of purpose in asking to advance towards the Community. Both Amintore Fanfani, the Italian Foreign Minister, and Aldo Moro, the Prime Minister, greeted favourably the sincerity of Britain’s approach.87 De Gaulle also indicated that Wilson had convinced him of Britain’s ardent determination to enter.88 One of de Gaulle’s delegation, who had spoken to a Dutch source just after the first meeting, reported that de Gaulle had declared himself ‘impressed’.89 Wilson’s political outlook, de Gaulle told Wilson, stood in real contrast to the attitude of the previous government, who had spoken about economic warfare and hoped the Common Market would fail. He appreciated also Wilson’s remarks about independence, commenting that since the war, the British had wanted to retain special ties with the US to the exclusion of all else: ‘Churchill had made it clear that unity was alright for the Europeans but not for the British’.90 Couve de Murville, who had formerly maintained that Britain’s position on agriculture prevented her accession, said that ‘political questions overshadowed economic areas’.91 De Gaulle then stated that he: had the impression that England now wished to moor itself alongside the continent and was prepared in principle to pledge itself to rule which would involve it in definite links with the Community. His impression was that England was ready to detach a bit from the US, enabling it to become a European country.92 In 1963, de Gaulle had maintained that Britain had taken ‘the first steps down the path which one day, perhaps, will lead it to make fast to the continent’.93 That 1967 could be the day of Britain’s arrival was met with real delight in the Foreign Office. O’Neill reported that he was ‘to some extent elated’ and that he regarded de Gaulle’s comment as the most significant result of the Paris visit, a sentiment with which Wilson indicated agreement.94 Yet, Wilson had far from convinced de Gaulle of Britain’s genuine independence from the USA. Palliser paraphrased Wilson to explain that ‘de Gaulle is scratching his head and trying to figure out how far he can trust you’, but Palliser added that de Gaulle did not accept a change in British attitude. The French leader could not fully believe Wilson’s claims of independence from the USA.95 Nor did Palliser presume that Wilson had forced de Gaulle to retreat or to change tactics. Palliser wrote: ‘The General has not, in his own view, moved to a second line of defence—he is indulging in a diversionary manoeuvre on our flanks’.96 Reasonably enough, de Gaulle suspected that Wilson’s explanation of independence from the USA differed radically from France’s. Economic unity in Europe, de Gaulle stressed, would count for nothing unless Europe achieved ‘total independence that he sought from the United States’.97 In addition, de Gaulle appeared unconvinced by Wilson’s technological arguments, appreciating the need for

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Anglo-French co-operation, but arguing that co-operation could take place whether or not Britain was a member of the EEC. Wilson’s counter-argument that it was necessary to be part of the same market in order to reap the full benefits of technological co-operation did not invoke any comment.98 The response of the Germans was also less forthcoming than Wilson might have hoped. German reluctance to stand up to de Gaulle was partially because there was little economic stimulus for them to do so. Despite the support of industry for access to wider markets, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) would not force the government to break with the French. Its President, Fritz Berg, argued that the continued development of the Common Market was more important than enlargement in the short term. In particular, industry wanted to see the fusion of the executives of the three Communities (the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom) in order to move towards a common energy policy.99 The Ministry of Finance was also concerned that Britain could be too weak to cope with membership without heavily drawing on Article 108.100 Germany’s attitude towards British concerns about agriculture was also relevant. The influential Rolf Lahr, Minister of State in the Auswärtiges Amt, disputed the British figures. He pointed out that Britain’s calculations of a balance of payments cost of £175–250m from levy payments was in fact the total cost of the burden including the rise in import prices.101 The British considered that the German Ministry of Agriculture had not fully appreciated that the British saw the problem as the cost to the balance of payments rather than balancing the budget in Britain.102 In political terms, there were disagreements between Britain and Germany. Wider opinion in Germany worried that the British were willing to ignore German interests in pursuit of an agreement with the Soviet Union.103 Wilson and the Soviet Premier Kosygin had just discussed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Brown had made some comments implying, to a German ear, Britain’s acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line and thus of the permanent division of Germany.104 To add to the malcontent atmosphere as Wilson and Brown arrived in Bonn, tripartite talks on offset payments were proceeding badly. The German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Strauss, had indicated that he would recommend to the German Cabinet for no further offset payments after the termination of the current agreement in 1967. Any offset payments in 1968 should be very small.105 The British had subsequently decided to continue to plan for the withdrawal of two brigades and four RAF squadrons after 1 July, although they recognised the need to gain assurance from NATO and the WEU.106 The Western Department of the Foreign Office recommended that Britain should avoid talk of offset during the probe.107 Furthermore, Kiesinger, his heritage in the Adenauer wing of the party, was personally in favour of Franco-German rapprochement.108 Kiesinger maintained that the best tactical approach to the General was to side with him, bringing him gently to accept a different point of view. Kiesinger argued: Revived Franco-German friendship was a tender plant which had to be treated with great care, not only because of the importance of their relationship to the two countries themselves, but also because these relations were of importance to the whole of Europe… How could the Germans exert an influence in Paris?… The more Germany could fulfil

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the hopes which the French placed in improved co-operation with her, the better would be the chance of her arguments succeeding.109 Brandt was a more instinctual supporter of enlargement, but as Wilson put it, he had conducted a ‘squalid deal’ with Kiesinger. Brandt would endorse Kiesinger’s pro-French policies in return for Kiesinger’s acceptance of Brandt’s approach to the NonProliferation Treaty.110 Yet, despite the points of dispute, the Foreign Office felt that in the longer term, Germany’s position towards Eastern Europe was shifting in a favourable direction. Britain’s tactical stance towards Germany was complicated because the British did not wish to jeopardise the potentially larger prize of an Anglo-German concert over reunification and détente. The British welcomed Brandt’s support for Ostpolitik, which sought to improve relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union without necessarily insisting on simultaneous steps for German reunification.111 Moreover, the Germans were worried as to the implications of the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty for Germany’s nuclear status. Kiesinger was able to play Britain’s desire for German collaboration off his wish for concessions over nuclear non-proliferation. He tried to exert from Britain an assurance that it ‘understood the anxieties of the non-nuclear powers’ in the creation of a Non-Proliferation Treaty, likening it to Wilson’s desire for him to ‘do all in their power to bring about Britain’s entry to the EEC’.112 Thus, Wilson had to tread carefully. Britain needed German support, but not at the cost of breaking up the EEC, jeopardising NATO or the potential treaty on nonproliferation.113 Aware of the Chancellor’s reluctance to stand up to de Gaulle, Wilson was wary of pressing him too hard. Urging German action with too much force could also jeopardise any support; as after all, why should the Germans court bad faith with the French if the British stood to one side and tried to woo the General?114 There was little hope other than to argue that this was the last chance for Britain: a second failure would revolve Britain irrevocably away from the continent. The Germans did agree to continue to state that Germany would work for British entry, which Kiesinger maintained would ‘be a useful contribution to the existing Community’. He pledged to ‘exercise some influence over the French’.115 Brandt did appear to have been swayed by the prospect that Britain would turn away from Europe. According to the British records, when Kiesinger and Brandt reported to the German Cabinet, Kiesinger said that they would now seek to ‘dissipate French reservations’. Brandt, however, said that the Germans must give active support, as ‘failure would cause great dismay to the European-minded young generation in Britain’.116 However, both Kiesinger and Brandt actively warned against an immediate application. Brandt argued that it would prove impossible to make headway with de Gaulle and advised Britain to wait until the Germans had talked to the French: ‘he doubted whether it was wise to have multilateral discussions on British entry at this stage before some further progress had been made in various bilateral talks’.117

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The terms of entry The tour also demonstrated the potential difficulties in dealing with the terms of entry. The European Commission was the most sympathetic regarding the CAP. Agricultural Commissioner and Vice-President Sicco Mansholt in particular showed will to begin to tackle the problems of British accession. His support for enlargement was primarily political, but was also because, with the principles of the CAP more settled, enlargement was less likely to derail the whole project.118 Mansholt’s vast knowledge of the CAP did mean that he was anxious to preserve it, but he argued that the existing arrangements for levy payments were suitable only for the Community of Six. Provided Britain was disposed to accept the principles of the system, Mansholt indicated that Britain should participate in the 1969 renegotiation, whether or not Britain was a member.119 Yet, others in the Commission, in particular the soon-to-be President Jean Rey, stressed that it would be difficult to begin negotiations for British accession straight away.120 The Italians maintained that Britain would have to put up with the negative effects of the CAP in order to reap the political benefits of Community membership, as Italy had done.121 Fanfani stressed that it was necessary to think in terms of ‘a new equilibrium in the economy as a whole’ and the ‘overall balance of advantage in terms of resources’. Their attitude indicated the cross-sectoral nature of the Community’s bargain, that losses in one sector would be compensated by gains in another. With this in mind, the Italian delegation stated quite bluntly that it would not be possible to make special arrangements for Britain: ‘it would be wrong to upset the present balance of interest of the six (which had been achieved only after considerable negotiation) in order to accommodate the UK’s entry’.122 The Belgians echoed these concerns during Britain’s visit on 1 February. What Britain failed to appreciate, Harmel indicated, was the temper of the Community’s appeal. Advantages in other industrial sectors would offset the disadvantage to British agriculture.123 In addition, the work done on the CAP over the years meant that the CAP embodied a Community philosophy involving Community preferences, free movement of goods and Community responsibility for marketing surplus agricultural produce: ‘He thought it would be hard to fit new ideas into a framework which had already been so fully elaborated’.124 Wilson’s rendering of the agricultural case also enabled de Gaulle to argue that Britain would be unable to accept the Community regulations. Couve could tell the Dutch, for instance, that Britain wanted to change the agricultural system.125 De Gaulle suggested instead that Britain and the Community created ‘something new’, arguing that Britain could not enter the Community without a fundamental change in her character.126 ‘Something new’ was de Gaulle’s attempt to show the Five that Britain would reopen the hard-fought agreements.127 In this way, de Gaulle could appeal to the reticence of the Five to challenge arrangements made only with difficulty. ‘Something new’ went right to the heart of the Anglo-French battle over the future shape of Western Europe and thus Europe as a whole. De Gaulle argued that enlargement would ‘profoundly change the practical application of the Treaty’ as the Community grew from six to up to 13.128 Thus, de Gaulle could attempt to use Britain’s posture towards agriculture to question whether enlargement in principle was acceptable for the Community. Belittling the issues

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somewhat, Wilson told Hetherington: ‘Harold said that from de Gaulle’s point of view this [enlargement] would bring in people who would have runny noses and wet pants and would have to be trained. It would upset what had already been built’.129 As well as posing the problem of the agricultural levies, the tour also showed that sterling would form a major part in an immediate initiative. Britain’s balance of payments weakness provided an easy target for France’s broader political attack on the reserve role of both sterling and the dollar. De Gaulle was able to use Britain’s problems with sterling to tap into German fears about Britain’s potential use of Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 108 made provision to assist a member of the Community in balance of payments difficulties. The problem was less that the British would demand assistance for the domestic balance, than that they would theoretically be able to call upon the Community to finance the holdings of sterling. Article 108 had not been devised with a ‘reserve currency in mind’. Should the British decide, for example, to run down the sterling balances (assets of British securities held by foreign governments) by paying off the holders of sterling, they could ask the Six to contribute. Alternatively, should large withdrawals from the sterling balances occur, Britain could call upon the Six for assistance. In practice, the British could force the Germans, as the Community’s wealthiest member, to bankroll Britain’s world commitments.130 Thus, it was essential for the British to demonstrate that the sterling balances were not a drain on the balance of payments, an argument about which the Six remained sceptical. In the Netherlands, the Dutch delegation advised Wilson to pledge not to draw on Article 108 for the purpose of underwriting sterling in the event of British entry.131 France’s arguments about sterling were extremely difficult for the British to refute. It was important to avoid reopening the serious Cabinet splits over devaluation. Wilson had regard to the potential effects in the markets and wanted to avoid any impression that the French thought Britain should devalue. He told the Cabinet that Pompidou had said it was the right decision to avoid devaluation the previous summer.132 Desperate to repel any indication that the British economy was weak, Wilson’s main argument in Paris was to emphasise that Britain would only enter with the strong balance of payments that would result from the deflationary measures.133 He also emphasised that the assets of sterling holdings exceeded the liabilities.134 The arguments about sterling’s position as a reserve currency were complicated further by the current discussions in the IMF and the G10 as to the future of world liquidity. The Treasury was looking for a way to alleviate the difficulties of managing the sterling balances and recognised that support for a’European solution’ could encourage the EEC’s willingness to admit Britain.135 Thus, Wilson did go much further than the Cabinet’s 9 November agreement in order to show Britain’s commitment to a ‘European solution’ for the sterling balances. A ‘European solution’ remained a wild-card option, as it repudiated the need for American support and also because it was not at all clear that the EEC would be interested.136 However, Chancellor Callaghan, who had also previously indicated interest in a long-term loan from the French, had instigated a report into a single currency with the European Community countries. Callaghan’s economic adviser Nicholas Kaldor, author of the paper, argued that if the problems of the sterling balances were to acquire solution in a European context, creating a single currency was the only method that would work. Entry into a single currency with the Six would enable

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the Six to take over some of the role of running the sterling balances, facilitating the gradual end of Britain’s global position.137 Wilson stated to the Belgians: A single currency would not be ruled out by the British government. Indeed it could be more acceptable to Britain than to certain present members of the Community. It was possible that a way could be found of combining a single European currency with funding the sterling balances. This could put an end to their future for the rest of the twentieth century.138 The Belgian Prime Minister Van Den Boeynants’ reaction was lukewarm, commenting that the Six would have to call in the experts.139

A question of procedure As the probe ended, Wilson faced the decision as to how to proceed. He opted, early in March, to make an application for membership, attaching no formal conditions in advance, but dealing with the terms in a statement to the House of Commons. Why did he select this course? Procedural alternatives to the unconditional application did exist. In February, Wilson told Hetherington he was thinking of holding multilateral discussions between Britain and the Six when the probe was over. These discussions would deal with four or five major issues, preparing further the terms Britain would be likely to attain, and would allow time for opinion in Britain to evolve towards acceptance of membership.140 He did not seem to be thinking in terms of an immediate application, suggesting that there was no need to hurry and that Britain’s balance of payments would be stronger later in the year.141 Moreover, Brown, Con O’Neill and William Nield all counselled delay; Brown in particular influenced by German advice that Britain should wait.142 Instead, Brown suggested a declaration that Britain accepted the Treaty in principle, combined with multilateral discussions on the terms to build on the bilateral talks just held. In this way, the Six and Britain could pour over potential solutions to Britain’s difficulties in advance of a membership bid.143 Wilson came to reject the idea of multilateral talks. In the Netherlands, Luns and the caretaker President of the Dutch Council of Ministers, Professor Jelle Zijlastra, argued against multilateral discussions. Further talks would only emphasise Britain’s difficulties in accession and thus would give fuel to Britain’s detractors. Another round of probing and pre-negotiation would simply add complications and delay. Rather, Britain should deliver an unconditional application.144 This straightforward manoeuvre would capitalise on the momentum and support engendered by the probe and would undercut de Gaulle’s suggestion that Britain should not seek membership, but should negotiate ‘something new’ with the Community. Wilson thus found himself with a dilemma. On the one hand, he recognised the force of the Dutch argument that only an unconditional application could press de Gaulle to embark on negotiations. On the other hand, the domestic basis of his approach was to emphasise that Britain would not enter unless Britain could obtain satisfactory terms. In a rare reflection on his options, Wilson wrote to Trend to explain the evolution of his

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thinking, a letter the Foreign Office managed to obtain. He recognised, Wilson explained, that Britain needed to sustain momentum, making an initiative with maximum impact that de Gaulle would find difficult to rebut. Thus, he favoured an unconditional application. Aware that this would prove impossible for domestic opinion, he intended to accompany the application with a statement in the House of Commons outlining the major areas of difficulty. These problems would form the hub of negotiations: the French could not deny, after all, that Britain needed to negotiate about something. Wilson commented that while de Gaulle was likely to obstruct: I think our general view has been that a total rebuff would be very difficult for them and delay would certainly be no greater, and would be less easy for them, than if we moved into an amorphous type of intensified probing.143 Wilson’s procedural choice—made well in advance of Cabinet discussions—illustrates two vital points. First, that the Prime Minister made a political choice in favour of an advance towards the EEC. He did not choose to prevaricate, to play pro-European games, with little intention to join the Community later. If he wanted the approach to fail, further probes, multilateral discussions or pre-negotiation could have served his purpose well. Wilson opted to demonstrate Britain’s political acceptance of the principle of membership by making a bid that simply applied for membership of the Community under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Second, that the choice of the application itself was a tactical manoeuvre. Wilson’s priority was to get de Gaulle to the negotiating table, to bring the General to first base. To do this, Wilson needed to show that Britain could accept the conditions of membership, would be able to negotiate a settlement with the Six. Only such an approach could hope to bring the necessary weight of opinion to work on the French President. A diplomatic rationale circumscribed Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC. The likelihood that de Gaulle would veto pushed Wilson to a revolutionary reappraisal in the method by which Britain would seek membership of Europe. Abandoning his former tactic of balancing the interests of his ministers with the diplomatic requirements of a turn to the EEC, Wilson reluctantly recognised that Britain would have to state willingness to enter the EEC almost at any price.

Notes 1 Young (1993, p. 96). 2 In the wider environment, The Times, ‘British Move Welcomed by EEC Leaders’, p. 6, 11 November 1966 shows Paris’ lukewarm reception of the bid. 3 Crossman (1976, p. 87, 22 October 1966). 4 Kaiser (2001a, pp. 67–72); Shore (2000, p. 69). 5 TNA CAB129/127, CC(66)149, Europe, Foreign Secretary, 7 November 1966. 6 TNA CAB 129/127, CC(66)150, Commonwealth Consultations, Commonwealth Secretary, 7 November 1966. 7 TNA CAB128/41, CC(66)55th, 9 November 1966. 8 The Times, ‘New Year Steps to Get into Europe: Wilson and Brown missions direct to heads of the Six’, p. 1, 11 November 1966.

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9 Castle (1990, p. 92, 3 November 1966). 10 TNA PREM13/909, Callaghan to Wilson, 31 October 1966. 11 TNA CAB128/41, CC(66)55th, 9 November 1966; Grossman (1976, p. 117, 9 November 1966); Castle (1990, p. 93, 9 November 1966). 12 Sir Michael Palliser, letter to author, 18 September 1999. 13 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/22, meeting with Wilson, 19 February 1967. 14 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/18, meeting with Wilson, 24 April 1967. 15 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/25, meeting with Wilson, 12 January 1967. 16 Ibid.; TNA PREM13/910, Wilson comment on Paris to FO, tel. 873, 18 November 1966. 17 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson, 6 January 1967. 18 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson’s comments, 6 January 1967. 19 TNA CAB134/3312, ST(O)(66)2nd, 26 October 1966; TNA CAB134/3308, ST(66)1st, 28 September 1966; ST(66)2nd, 2 November 1966. 20 TNA PREM13/1850, Wilson comments on Brown to Wilson, 24 November 1966. 21 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/25, meeting with Wilson, 12 January 1967. 22 TNA CAB134/3308, ST(66)2nd, 2 November 1966; see also TNA PREM13/1850, Trend to Wilson, 1 November 1966. 23 TNA CAB164/97, Guildhall speech, 14 November 1966. 24 TNA EW5/17, briefing meeting for TUC Economic Committee, 15 November 1966. 25 TNA PREM13/1850, Benn to Wilson, 24 November 1966. 26 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/25, Meeting with Wilson, 12 January 1967. 27 TNA PREM13/910, Reilly to FO, 1 December 1966; Reilly to FO, tel. 856, 14 November 1966. 28 TNA PREM13/897, Palliser to Wright, 21 October 1966. 29 TNA PREM13/910, Reilly to FO, 1 December 1966; Reilly to FO, tel. 856, 14 November 1966. 30 TNA PREM13/897, Palliser to Wright, 21 October 1966. 31 New Statesman, Francis Hope, ‘Could De Gaulle be Right?’, p. 34, 13 January 1967. 32 TNA CAB134/2813, EUR(O)(67)12, Steering Brief for Paris, Foreign Office, 16 January 1967; TNA PREM13/910, Reilly to FO, 1 December 1966; Reilly to FO, tel. 856, 14 November 1966; Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6925. folio Paris 1966. 33 On Wilson’s courage, see Callaghan (1987, p. 200); Pimlott (1992, p. 411); on politicians believing they could get round de Gaulle, Gore-Booth (1974, p. 352). 34 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson, 6 October 1967. 35 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/2, meeting with Wilson, 6 November 1967. 36 See TNA FCO30/186, Hancock to O’Neill, 11 January 1967. 37 Gore-Booth (1974, p. 347). 38 TNA FO371/188347/M10810/458, How to get into the Common Market, and Brown comments, 18 August 1966. 39 Bossuat (2001, p. 513). 40 TNA FO371/188346/M10810/458, Fenn to Gore-Booth, 18 August 1966. 41 Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6925. folio George Brown. 42 TNA FO371/188346/M10810/458, Brown comments on How to get into the Common Market and O’Neill to Maclehose, 18 August 1966; Brown (1971, pp. 127–35, esp. pp. 132, 134); for the wider belief that the Foreign Office was defeatist, Shore (2000, p. 36). 43 Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6925. folio Paris 1966. 44 TNA PREM13/909, Brown—Luns, 2 November 1966. 45 TNA PREM13/1475, Brown—Fanfani, 3 January 1967. 46 TNA FCO30/62, Shuckburgh to O’Neill, 9 January 1967. 47 Brandt (1993, p. 420). 48 TNA PREM13/1476, Brown to Brandt, tel. 297, 26 January 1967. 49 TNA PREM13/1476, Palliser comments on Brown to Brandt, 26 January 1967.

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50 Bömer (2003, pp. 219–20). 51 TNA FCO30/186, Brussels to FO, tel. 14, 19 January 1967; see also Young (1993, p. 98). 52 Couve had commented that he did not know what the Prime Minister’s views were, see TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)11, Britain and Europe, First Secretary and Foreign Secretary, 21 October 1966. 53 Crossman (1976, p. 212, 26 January 1967); Castle (1990, p. 109, 26 January 1967). 54 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967, 10 am. 55 For example, TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967 10 am. 56 Ibid.; TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)42, Political Implications, Foreign Office, 21 January 1967. 57 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967, 10 am; see TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)27, Majority Voting and the Powers of the Commission, Foreign Office, 13 December 1966; TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)42, Political Implications, Foreign Office, 21 January 1967. 58 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle, 24 January 1967, 10 am. 59 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle and delegations, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm. 60 TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)42, Political Implications, Foreign Office, 21 January 1967; The Times, ‘Another Knock on the door’, p. 11, 16 January 1967; The Times ‘Unity Pledge by Mr. Wilson’, p. 1, 24 January 1967; TNA FCO33/44, Lush to Simpson-Orlebar and Simpson-Orlebar comments, 24 April 1967. 61 The Times, ‘Another Knock on the Door’, p. 11, 16 January 1967. 62 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson, Brown—Kiesinger, Brandt, 16 February 1967, 10 am. 63 Ibid. 64 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967 10 am. 65 Ibid. 66 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 17 January 1967, 10 am; TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 15 February 1967, 3.30pm. 67 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Zijlastra and delegations, 26 February 1967, after dinner. 68 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Zijlastra and delegations, 27 February 1967, 4 pm. 69 TNA PREM13/1478, Wilson—Werner and delegations, 8 March 1967, 10 am. 70 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 15 February 1967, 3.30pm. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967, 4.30 pm. 74 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 1 February 1967, 9.30 am. 75 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 15 February 1967, 10 am. 76 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 15 February 3.30pm. 77 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Zijlastra and delegations, 27 February 1967, 10 am. 78 TNA PREM13/1478, Wilson—Werner and delegations, 7 March 1967. 79 For example, TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967, 10 am. 80 For details of the agreements see TNA FO371/188379/M10840/53, Marjoribanks despatch 9, 17 May 1966; FO371/188381/M10840/120, Marjoribanks despatch 13, 4 August 1966. 81 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro, 16 January 1967, 4 pm. 82 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle and delegations, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm. 83 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson, Brown—Pompidou, de Murville, 25 January 3 pm. 84 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle and delegations, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm; Wilson, Brown—Pompidou, Couve de Murville, 25 January 3 pm; Wilson—de Gaulle, 25 January 1967, 4.15 pm. 85 TNA PREM13/1478, Wilson—Werner and delegations, 8 March 1967, 10 am. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.; TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967, 10 am.

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88 Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6926. folio Paris 1967. 89 TNA FCO30/168, Robinson to Statham, 27 January 1967. 90 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle, 24 January 1967, 10 am; Wilson (1971, p. 336). 91 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle and delegations, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm; on Couve’s former view, see TNA FO371/189127/RF1053/38, Couve—Wilson, 8 July 1966; TNA PREM13/906, Reilly to FO, tel. 481, 11 June 1966. 92 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle and delegations, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm. 93 Camps (1967, p. 476). 94 TNA PREM13/1477, O’Neill to Pilcher, 3 February 1967; TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson comments on Vienna tel. 29, 1 February 1967. 95 TNA PREM13/1476, Palliser to Wilson, 26 January 1967; Palliser paraphrased Wilson’s comments to him. 96 Ibid. 97 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle, 24 January 1967, 10 am. 98 Ibid. 99 TNA FCO30/187, Berg to Kiesinger, 4 February 1967. 100 TNA FCO30/187, German Ministry of Finance Note on Monetary Implications, 31 January 1967. 101 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 15 February 1967, 3.30pm. 102 TNA FCO30/187, Galsworthy to Statham, 8 February 1967; Statham to Galsworthy, 9 February 1967; Kelsey (MAFF) to Statham, 10 February 1967. 103 The Times, ‘Germans upset by Mr. Brown’, p. 1, 15 February 1967; TNA FCO30/73, Roberts to Brown, 24 February 1967; TNA PREM13/1477, Roberts to FO, tel. 319, 17 February 1967. 104 The Times, ‘Germans upset by Mr. Brown’, p. 1, 15 February 1967. 105 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)3rd, 26 January 1967. 106 TNA CAB148/30, OPD(67)7th, 10 February 1967. 107 TNA FCO30/72, Campbell memorandum, 7 February 1967. 108 Wilson (1971, p. 368). 109 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson, Brown—Kiesinger, Brandt, 15 February 1967, 10 am. 110 BLPES, Hetherington papers, 13/25, 12 January 1967. 111 TNA FCO30/72, Campbell memorandum, 7 February 1967. 112 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson, Brown—Kiesinger, Brandt, 16 February 1967, 10 am; on non-proliferation, TNA FCO30/72, Campbell memorandum, 7 February 1967. 113 TNA FCO30/72, Campbell memorandum, 7 February 1967. 114 TNA PREM13/1477, Roberts to FO, tel. 328, 18 February 1967; Roberts to FO, tel. 348, 23 February 1967. 115 TNA PREM13/1477, Bonn to FO, tel. 315, 16 February 1967. 116 TNA FCO30/73, Roberts to FO, tel. 322, 17 February 1967. 117 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson, Brown—Kiesinger, Brandt, 16 February 1967, 10 am. 118 On Mansholt’s views, TNA PREM13/1475, Marjoribanks to O’Neill, 5 December 1966; TNA FCO30/69, Personality notes, O’Neill, 31 January 1967. 119 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—Rey, Mansholt, Marjolin, Van Der Grooter, Herbst, Chatenet, 1 February 1967, 2.30 pm. 120 Ibid. 121 TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 17 January 1967, 10 am. 122 Ibid. 123 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 1 February 1967. 124 Ibid. 125 TNA FCO30/67, Robinson to Statham, 3 February 1967. 126 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle, 25 January 1967, 4.25 pm. 127 TNA FCO30/187, Galsworthy to Statham, 26 January 1967.

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128 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—De Gaulle, 24 January 1967, 10 am. 129 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/22, meeting with Wilson, 19 February 1967. 130 TNA FCO30/187, German Ministry of Finance Note on Monetary Implications, 31 January 1967; TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)37, Sterling, Treasury, 5 January 1967. 131 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Zijlastra and delegations, 27 February 1967. 132 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)3rd, 26 January 1967. 133 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson, Brown—Pompidou, de Murville, 25 January 1967, 3.30pm. 134 Ibid.; TNA CAB 134/2814, EUR(O)(66)37, International Role of Sterling, Treasury, 5 January 1967. 135 TNA CAB134/2814, EUR(O)(66)37, International Role of Sterling, Treasury, 5 January 1967. 136 Cairncross (1996, p. 169); TNA T312/1890, LP Thompson-McCausland to Rickett, 18 January 1967; Balogh to Wilson, 13 January 1967. 137 TNA T312/1890, Kaldor to Baldwin, 12 January 1967. 138 TNA PREM13/1476, Wilson—Van Den Boeynants and delegations, 1 February 1967, 4 pm. 139 Ibid. 140 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/22, meeting with Wilson, 19 February 1967. 141 Ibid. 142 TNA FCO30/188, O’Neill to Gore-Booth, 28 February 1967; Roberts to O’Neill, 9 March 1967; TNA FCO30/189, Galsworthy to Statham, 14 March 1967. 143 TNA FCO30/82, Brown—Mulley, 24 February 1967. 144 TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson—Zijlastra and delegations, 27 February 1967, 10 am. 145 TNA FCO30/82, Wilson to Trend, undated, early March 1967 (probably before the Luxembourg visit on 8 March).

5 Finding a role? Cabinet’s acceptance of the European application, March to April 1967

Between March and April 1967, Wilson managed to convince his Cabinet to accept not only the European application, but that this application should be virtually unconditional. The reasons for Cabinet’s acquiescence have been the subject of some controversy. One view argues that the Cabinet was steam-rollered into acceptance, denied a rightful channel to express their views and never fully informed of the true extent of Britain’s transition. Both the President of the Board of Trade Douglas Jay and the Minister of Transport Barbara Castle agreed that the Cabinet was ‘ruthlessly stage managed’ in order to secure a ‘yes’ vote to a second European application.1 This argument reflects a deeper malaise with the place of European membership in British political life. Never told what European membership would ‘mean’, ministers and public alike were duped into dumb acceptance of membership by a political class determined to protect its own interests.2 Yet, a reading of the Cabinet meetings reveals that this is, at best, a partial explanation. Wilson’s tactics were indeed slow. He intended to give the Cabinet members time, to draw them gradually to acquiescence. He did allow discussion of the changes membership would bring and it was abundantly clear that some of those changes— acceptance of agricultural levies and the detriment to the balance of payments in particular—would be most unwelcome. However, the Prime Minister did not want to concede the argument over the finer details of the terms of entry. His principal case was political. He maintained that Britain had no choice but membership, both in the short and in the longer term. Barred from entry, the British would have to persist with the membership bid until it proved successful. It would be impossible to team up with the USA without conceding political independence and the value of the Commonwealth was diminishing. To sustain international reach, there was simply nowhere else to go. Faced with this barrage, the Cabinet members were compelled to accept the application. Wilson cornered them, but underlying their acceptance was the knowledge that there was no alternative. Thus, the conventional wisdom that Wilson ground Cabinet into acceptance by droning on and on about the terms of entry—‘boring our way in’—needs to be revised.3 He did not obscure the principle of membership behind discussion of the terms. Rather, he made the issue into a political choice. Cabinet members accepted they had no option but to turn to the EEC. Yet, ministers did not reach a decision, and nor did Wilson force one, as to what terms of entry they could accept during any negotiations. The contentious

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aspects—the CAP, New Zealand’s trade and Commonwealth sugar—were shepherded into an open-ended statement of intent to the House of Commons. This chapter analyses the Cabinet discussions held throughout March and April.

Capital movements and regional policy, 21 March and 6 April 1967 The experience Wilson had gained of the European Community on the probe gave him the credibility to take the lead in the Cabinet. Beginning with a faithful description of the issues dealt with during the tour, Wilson illustrated that the four main problems were the CAP levy system, capital movements, New Zealand and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Other difficulties, he argued, had been shown as less important than originally thought. Britain’s ability to pursue regional policies would not be impeded. There was nothing in the Treaty of Rome to rule out economic planning. Sterling and Article 108 could constitute a stumbling block, although the Dutch had made the useful suggestion that Britain could pledge not to call on the article. He admitted de Gaulle did not want Britain in and that the Five would be unwilling to push for a breach with the French for the sake of British accession.4 The Cabinet turned to discuss the conditions of membership, beginning with capital movements and regional policy. The problem for the UK in accepting the Community’s provisions for capital movements resulted mainly from the current weakness of sterling. The Community’s third directive on capital movements in 1966 sought liberalisation of capital between member states. Since 1964, however, the government had adopted stringent controls on capital movements in order to protect the parity of the pound, including the recent voluntary programme to restrain the export of capital to the sterling area.5 It would be impossible to sustain this upon entry to the Community, as it would be politically difficult to discriminate against the sterling-area countries in favour of the Community. Outside the sterling area, neither direct nor portfolio investment were allowed in official exchange. Direct investment had to be financed by borrowing abroad and portfolio investment was only permitted in investment currency.6 Direct investment outflows would be offset by inflows, but portfolio investment could lead to a massive outflow to the USA, as British investors would be able to hold foreign currency securities outside the Community. Capital could rapidly flow out of the UK calling into question the exchange value of the pound.7 Callaghan acknowledged that Community provisions could be adopted to safeguard the potential outflow of portfolio funds. The Dutch had had a similar problem regarding portfolio investment and had recommended that Article 70(2) of the Treaty could provide safeguards against the outflow. If the provisions were phased in over a transitional period, Britain could avoid the shock of sudden change. Importantly, Callaghan told the Cabinet that membership would help to preserve the parity of sterling by providing a stimulus to industrial competitiveness and would make the UK more attractive to US investment. The economies of scale provided by a larger market could also provide a spur to industrial efficiency.8 This argument had an essential impact on ministerial opinions. Callaghan demonstrated confidence in the economy and confidence that the prospect of European membership would assist the recovery of the economy.

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Callaghan’s support for the initiative was vital. Wilson argued that discussion in Europe had shown that it would not be difficult to safeguard the government’s practice of regional policies as all members of the Six discriminated in favour of underdeveloped regions in some form. Jay countered that the removal of exchange controls would weaken the government’s capacity to enforce regional provision, as the government would not be able to control where investment took place. This would mean effectively handing over to the markets the government’s control of the distribution of employment and prosperity. Wilson responded that without membership, Britain would not be able to have regional policies: our investment in development areas depended on our growth of the economy and there was reason to think that entry would lead to an incentive for industry to increase investment and thus increase the growth of the economy.9 The argument that membership would encourage investment and growth and facilitate regional policies and by implication, welfare policies, was crucial. Ministers such as Grossman, disappointed by the failure of the National Plan, voiced support for this case: Once it’s known we are going into the Common Market the industrialists who are holding back now will put in an extra 20 or 30% of investment. That will get the growth rate up. It’s the lift we require to restore growth that will help the development areas more than any artificial scheme a British government could think up.10 Even Barbara Castle, more fervently opposed to membership, admitted that the collapse of the ‘socialist’ economic plan left the government with no real alternative. She indicated her appreciation of the need to adopt credible policies in order to stay in office, showing the force of Stewart’s argument in October that the public had lost faith in planning as a framework for growth. She consoled herself that she could work for smaller aims within the European framework: Yet the more disappointed I am over our policies in other fields, the more satisfaction I get from fighting for the right policies in my own. And the more painful becomes the thought of giving up my job to return to the sterilities of the back benches.11

The CAP, 18 April 1967 During the Brussels negotiations, the British had initially hoped to avoid the main ramifications of the CAP. When agriculture was discussed in February 1962, Heath asked for a transitional period of 12 to 15 years and suggested that the Treasury could continue to supplement grants to farmers.12 Combined with Britain’s demands for exceptions to the common external tariff for Commonwealth trade, Britain’s commitment to the nascent CAP seemed minimal.

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Within the Foreign Office, the collapse of the Brussels negotiations led officials to devise a new negotiating strategy. John Robinson, First Secretary at Britain’s embassy to the Community and identified by Hugo Young as the driving force behind Foreign Office policy, developed these ideas to a novel and coherent strategy.13 The innovation in Robinson’s thinking was to set out the case for accession to the Community via one single transitional period covering all sectors. Robinson’s paper, ‘Negotiating Objectives’, was an enormously detailed study of what Britain could hope to attain and how best to go about it. Its existence explains Con O’Neill’s judgement that Robinson’s extraordinary commitment to Britain’s relations with the EEC was at its most important ‘in the years between the first and last negotiations’.14 A single transitional period was designed primarily to smooth the process of adapting to the Community’s agricultural provisions, phasing in the agricultural changes at the same time as the industrial ones in a total period of five years.15 Robinson’s idea of a single transitional period had many advantages. The British would benefit from a rapid introduction of the provisions for an industrial customs union, but would prefer a longer period of adjustment for the agricultural arrangements. Robinson felt that an offer to embrace all provisions simultaneously would strengthen Britain’s negotiating hand with the Six, indicating Britain’s willingness to take on unwelcome agricultural tariffs in return for the Six’s acceptance of British competition in industrial goods. It would also strengthen Britain’s case for attaining full voting rights at an earlier date. Moreover, the states joining alongside Britain, such as Denmark, could employ the same system. It would help to ease the Six’s receipt of Denmark’s agricultural exports if Britain’s market was opened to help absorb them at the same time. Furthermore, a single transitional period would overcome the fundamental problem of ‘trade deflection’, a vital issue between the Six and the British during the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1957.16 If Britain adopted the internal customs tariff at a quicker rate than the common external tariff, Britain would benefit from free trade in manufacture with the Community while retaining free imports of food and other raw materials from the Commonwealth. Britain would then benefit from lower costs for producing manufactured goods that could be sold in the Community. Importantly, the idea of a single transitional period reiterated the political principle that Britain could and would accept all the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The Ministry of Agriculture had accepted there was little choice but to endorse the CAP, subject to particular safeguards. Yet, the safeguards requested undermined Robinson’s proposals and so raised questions about Whitehall’s commitment to the EEC system. The Ministry of Agriculture’s main concern was that adoption of the CAP would cause distortion in British farming. In December 1964, the Six had agreed prices for cereals considerably higher than Britain’s own levels. Projections for 1966–7 revealed that Britain’s wheat price would face a hike of just over £10 per ton and barley at just under £6 per ton. The rise in cereal prices, the Ministry predicted, would lead to an unmanageable distortion in domestic production. Higher cereal prices would encourage farmers to concentrate production in larger units in more lucrative agrarian pursuits in the south and east of the country, increasing cereal production from its projected 18m tons in 1973 to 20m tons. Dairy and hill farmers alongside pig and poultry farmers made up a much higher proportion of total farm sales: 50 per cent compared to cereals’ 12 per cent. Based principally in the north and west, Scotland and Wales, these farmers would suffer a

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comparative loss of profits, face unemployment and the practice of such farming would fall into decline.17 Britain’s domestic beef price was set to rise, although price levels for milk, potatoes, sheepmeat and some fruit and vegetables would drop slightly.18 The National Farmers’ Union (NFU) also wanted to preserve the existing system of the annual review procedure, a procedure that gave the NFU a say in pricing and production quotas. In the wider political environment, it was the question of prices that posed the most sensitive problems.19 Because of the higher Community prices, the British predicted that the cost of food was set to rise by between 10 to 14 per cent and the cost of living by 3 per cent.20 Presented in terms of the cost to the ‘pocket of the ordinary housewife’, price rises were a weapon employed by both left and right wing opponents of membership. The Ministry of Agriculture wanted to seek from the Community assurances for four specific problems involved in Britain’s adoption of the CAP: the winter production of liquid milk, arrangements for pigs and eggs, continuation of hill farm subsidies and an annual review procedure similar to the existing scheme in Britain.21 Milk was a problem because of the CAP agreement for dairy produce, which set the price for butter and cheese at the same level as that of liquid milk. In the UK, liquid milk received a guaranteed price, whereas butter and cheese were sold at world prices. This encouraged the production of liquid milk throughout the year, ensuring supply in the winter when it was more expensive to produce. The Ministry of Agriculture’s anxiety was that the levelling of prices and the undermining of the collective marketing system of the Milk Marketing Boards would encourage local dairies to sell cheese and butter rather than liquid milk. This could leave households short of milk in the winter and would create ‘social and political problems’. The Ministry of Agriculture accordingly suggested retention of the role of Milk Marketing Boards and arrangements to ensure the continuation of higher prices for milk than butter and cheese.22 For pigmeat and eggs, the Ministry of Agriculture wanted to introduce support buying in order to boost their prices and thus their profitability. The problem was the general distortion of agricultural production favouring cereal farmers over hill farmers. Pig and poultry farmers would stand to lose also because of the increased cost of cereal feed due to the cereal price rises. Intervention arrangements, for which talks were underway in the Community, could, however, meet Britain’s needs.23 The Minister of Agriculture, Fred Peart, established that it was not in Britain’s interests to join the CAP because of the distortion to agriculture and the reduction in farmers’ security. Higher prices would add to the cost of living and the cost to the balance of payments would be serious. Peart demanded at least a seven year transitional period, thus breaking with Robinson’s strategy, and argued that Britain must seek commodity arrangements for milk and also for sugar, in order to protect the imports of the Commonwealth sugar producers. It would also be necessary to find ways of relieving the balance of payments and to sustain the current system of an annual review.24 Wilson stemmed much discussion on the specific provisions. He argued that Britain would have to insist on more than transitional periods to alleviate the inequitable burden of levy payments and the balance of payments cost of membership.25 Wilson’s intervention pointed to the most serious problem: agricultural levy payments. The settlement in July 1966 of the exact quantities confirmed just how much Britain would have to contribute. Calculations indicated that Britain would be charged £180m in

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levy payments and a further £30m on the fixed percentage contribution, while net receipts would only be £45m, leading to a net contribution of £192.5m.26 Britain’s contribution would be 35 per cent of the total contributions, higher than Germany, the next largest contributor, whose payment would be 20 per cent, despite Germany’s higher GDP. Payment across the exchanges into the Fund, a net outflow of sterling, would be detrimental to the balance. The total balance of payments cost of the levies was calculated at between £175m and £250m annually.27 Admission that Britain would shoulder this burden could encourage an anticipatory outflow of capital and so reopen the fundamental question as to whether or not Britain was economically strong enough to seek entry. Privately, the Foreign Office felt that Britain would have no choice but to accept the levy payments, hoping to modify them once inside the Community. Robinson’s paper envisaged that Britain would adapt to the levy payment system, along with the other provisions of the CAP, under the transitional periods. Wilson, on reading Robinson’s paper, commented that ‘I’m still worried about the ease with which we are moving to the view that transitional arrangements are enough for agricultural levies. I have never accepted this’.28 Robinson’s draft reply did not appear to reach Wilson, but Brown certainly had read it. Robinson suggested that the Six’s agricultural review in 1969 could provide the solution to Britain’s difficulties: ‘We assumed that it would be our objective to be in the Community in time to take part in negotiating the new financial arrangements to apply after 1969’.29 Robinson used the promise of the 1969 review to dodge the all-important issue of whether or not Britain could alter the agricultural levy system in advance. The Cabinet Office continued to resist Robinson’s interpretation. Trend’s paper on agriculture specifically stated what the Foreign Office knew: that the French would not permit British entry prior to the 1969 renegotiation. The agricultural review was too important to the French to run the risk it would be upset by premature enlargement.30 It was stated in Cabinet that entry before 1969 was not a reliable way to deal with the question of agricultural levies.31 Brown, however, was determined that Britain should accede before 1969 and the idea that Britain could nullify the drawbacks of the agricultural funding system by participation in 1969 entered Cabinet consciousness. In his private notes on the Cabinet meetings, Education Secretary Tony Crosland recorded: ‘Miss crucial 1969: higher and higher price to pay’.32 Entry by 1969, not explicitly endorsed by Wilson but not emphatically denied by him either, became the way by which ministers could fudge their acceptance or otherwise of the CAP.

There is no alternative, 20 April 1967 Aware that continual discussions on the conditions of membership focused ministers’ minds on the negative implications of membership, Wilson, in a radical transformation in Britain’s tactics, turned to the political case for entry. Wilson was heavily influenced by the advice of Burke Trend. Trend discerned that Wilson would have to separate those ministers who were opposed in principle from those who were opposed at the moment:

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expose the duality…between those who would prefer not to enter in any circumstances we can foresee (the ‘nevers’) and those who think we should eventually become members but that it would be premature for us to seek membership in the next year to two, or even perhaps so long as General de Gaulle remains in power (the ‘not yets’).33 Specifically, Trend’s argument was designed to meet the case put by Denis Healey that there was no point applying because of the certainty that de Gaulle would veto; no point in ‘playing for a rebuff’.34 At least half the Cabinet was still opposed to an immediate initiative or wavering. Healey’s argument that the application was bound to fail could therefore provide an easy way to oppose the decision without abjuring the principle and so could swing the balance against. To fend off this challenge, Wilson aimed to show that it was irrelevant whether the application failed. The Cabinet had no alternative, if they were to stay in power, than to state that they accepted European membership on the reduced terms they would be likely to get.35 Trend established the economic case for membership, attaching a cover note to Thomas Balogh’s paper ‘Alternatives to Common Market membership’. Wilson’s economic adviser opposed European membership on the grounds that it would precipitate a devaluation of sterling. He believed that the likelihood of devaluation if Britain joined the EEC would provide political support from the United States for an Atlantic Free Trade Area. This, Trend argued, was not the case. Unless there was a complete breakdown in relations between the USA and the EEC over the Kennedy Round, there was no reason for the USA to sign a free trade agreement with Britain. Mainly for political reasons, US policy was to support Britain’s membership of the EEC. Trend also ruled out the possibility of ‘Going it Alone’, reconfigured as ‘Abstention’. Technically it would be possible to sustain Britain’s economy alone, but it would entail a massive specialisation and limitation of production. Without the benefits of access to the EEC market, having to rationalise the economy in this way would be less appealing than doing so within the framework of membership of the EEC. In an expression of the bottom line economic case for British entry, Trend showed that ‘in form we might be more free [outside], but it would be a freedom to submit to disagreeable necessities’.36 In addition to the implications for Britain’s economy, Trend argued that in world trade, Britain needed to be a member of a larger grouping. Other countries were forming trading agreements, such as the American-Canadian agreement for cars or the AustralianNew Zealand free trade arrangement. Outside these developments, Britain would command little bargaining power and be able to find only limited export markets. Deciding irrevocably against membership would cast Britain adrift from the main developments in politics and trade. Finally, Trend argued that if the French did veto, the UK should continue with current economic and trading policies, but should continue to hope, with US support, that ‘at a later stage a more favourable opportunity might occur’.37 Wilson adopted Trend’s arguments, but added a more overtly political case for going into the EEC. Staying out would confine the role the UK could play in the world, handing over Britain’s relationship with the USA to the Germans and watching as the Germans dominated in Europe. Inside Europe, it would be possible to influence the development of the Community. Both the US and the USSR wanted Britain inside Europe in order to act

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as a counterweight to a resurgent Germany, enabling Britain to play a role in détente. In this sense, Wilson tentatively outlined a role of leadership for Britain in Europe: ‘regard must also be had to the important and perhaps decisive role which we might play as a member of the EEC’.38 The Cabinet furiously rejected Trend’s suggestion that in the event of a veto Britain should ‘stand on the threshold in a stance of eager expectation’.39 But Wilson did not let this pass, making clear that if Britain was kept out, there would be little choice but to seek membership in the longer term: ‘if rebuffed, we should not rule out the possibility of joining Europe later’.40 Wilson’s arguments did have immediate effect. Healey, the key target of the tactics, was annoyed. His case that he supported the bid because ‘the General will save us from our folly’ reflected his irritation but masked the deeper realisation that the Cabinet was backed into a corner. He argued that Wilson had brought them to the point where they had no choice but to accept the application.41 Or as Wilson saw it, Healey had given himself the option of supporting the application, but also would be able to say ‘I told you so’ if it failed.42 Wilson’s new tactics worked. By expressing the political argument that the British had no alternative but to apply for the EEC, Wilson did divide the ‘nevers’ from the ‘not yets’. As Crossman suggested: ‘Jay wants postponement. But my impression is that most of the Cabinet now realise that whether we like it or not we must make a serious effort to get in as soon as possible’.43 Very few ministers—Jay, Castle, Marsh, Peart and possibly Ross—believed that Britain should never join the Community. Others—Brown, Stewart, Jenkins, Gardiner, Longford, Gunter—were enthusiastic about the principle of entry. The wavering middle ground accepted that at some point Britain would have to join the ‘right sort’ of Europe, but felt that the timing of the initiative was wrong. Presented with the choice of Europe now or never, ministers reluctantly endorsed the principle of a political future in the Community. Wilson’s argument, essentially a negative case that Britain had no choice, induced a resigned acceptance of the application.

The Commonwealth, 24 and 27 April 1967 Commonwealth trade had dominated the negotiations during the first attempt to accede in 1961–3.44 The Commonwealth had significant political importance for the British public and political class: membership of the EEC thus raised difficult questions about Britain’s future political role.45 During the first negotiations, Britain and the Community had established that African and Caribbean Commonwealth countries were eligible for association. India, Pakistan and Ceylon could seek arrangements for the specific commodities of tea and textiles. The greatest difficulties concerned exports of temperate zone agricultural produce from the developed Old Dominions, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.46 In 1962, the Community acknowledged the principle of New Zealand’s special status. They insisted that all other temperate zone produce would face the common external tariff, subject to global agreements on access for all cereals. The advantages enjoyed by the Commonwealth in Britain’s market would be gradually phased out over the transitional period.47 Robinson now accepted the common external tariff, making specific amendments for key products. In a fundamental shift, the British were not asking for

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arrangements for temperate zone agricultural produce from the developed Commonwealth, except special arrangements for New Zealand. In procedural terms, Robinson also advocated a different stance from 1961. Britain should not consult with the Commonwealth before and during talks with the Community, as they had in the Brussels negotiations. Rather, the UK should inform and discuss a position with Commonwealth countries, but refuse to enter any formal consultation and avoid giving any commitments. There was no question of Commonwealth involvement in any negotiation.48 Politically, the Commonwealth was still important to British identity as was quite clear in Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden’s submission to the Cabinet: We speak the same language and we understand each other—all the more so because we have largely common systems in administration, the law, the armed forces, education, British merchanting and banking traditions and interests. Oxbridge, Sandhurst, Shakespeare, the authorised version of the Bible are all genuine links.49 With the Europeans, Britain shared none of these links and none of the ‘ties of history’ that had forged the Commonwealth and encouraged its growth as Britain disbanded from Empire. The multiracial principle was a matter of some pride.50 Yet, the Commonwealth was becoming less important to both British politics and Britain’s economy. Britain’s recent decision to withdraw troops from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975–6 had engendered strong opposition in Australia, who considered Britain was reneging on historical commitments.51 Economic ties with the Old Commonwealth were also eroding. Australia had annoyed Britain during the Kennedy Round talks by bargaining away Britain’s preference in Australia’s market, a policy also followed less ruthlessly by Canada.52 Both were diversifying their markets. Australia now exported more to Japan than to Britain—after sugar, only 5 per cent of Australia’s trade would be affected—and the USA supplied far more to the two than Britain did. Australia’s reorientation both commercially and politically towards the Pacific lessened the sympathy of both Britain and the EEC to her needs.53 Wheat exporters, such as Australia and Canada, could also expect to secure a rise in their export earnings in the Kennedy Round, which was likely to increase the price of wheat.54 Britain’s relationship with the developing Commonwealth had also been changing. As Bowden put it: ‘in a special sense, Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings in recent years have contained examples of Britain clutching vipers to her bosom—and paying for it’.55 Pressure had been brought to bear most harshly over the Rhodesia problem, but also over trade and aid policies, a phenomenon also demonstrated in the wider arena in the United Nations Council for Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Although the Commonwealth still counted for a quarter of Britain’s exports and a quarter of imports, the Commonwealth was distancing from Britain. Multilateralisation in trade steadily eroded the value of the Commonwealth preference in Britain’s market.56 In addition, specific agreements for certain commodities eased the burden of reverse preferences the Commonwealth countries would face. The two difficult products for the countries ineligible to associate were tea and textiles. Tea represented 87 per cent of Ceylon’s exports to Britain and 41 per cent of India’s and the government did not want to

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face the prospect of rising prices for a nationally popular product.57 In 1962, the Six had agreed to reduce the common external tariff on tea to zero, an agreement extended in 1964.58 It had proved more contentious to find agreement for textiles in 1962 as the Six did not want to subject their own textile industries to low duty, high quality competition. Agreement had been reached that Britain would gradually adopt the external tariff subject to remedial action if either the exporters suffered or the Community became swamped in cheap cotton.59 On cotton textiles, the British were keen to share the burden of imports and acknowledged in any case that the British tariffs were higher than Community ones.60 For other tropical products important to the Asian Commonwealth, including manufactured sports products like cricket bats and polo sticks, Britain would seek to revive the nil tariff 1962 arrangement. Processed goods important to other Commonwealth countries not essential to Community markets—kangaroo meat being the most frequently used example—should also receive a nil tariff.61 The British felt that it would also be easier to make arrangements for Britain’s dependent territories and for the African and Caribbean Commonwealth than it had been during 1961–3. It was established during the Brussels negotiations that the African and Caribbean Commonwealth, as well as the dependent territories, except Hong Kong, Gibraltar and the three former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa, would be qualified to associate with the Community under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.62 Yet, former colonies had resisted association, with Ghana leading the charge that Part IV was an extension of neo-colonial ties.63 The Yaoundé Convention replaced Part IV in 1963 and offered a different kind of arrangement. Yaoundé offered reciprocal tariff arrangements between the Community and its associates, forcing associates to market produce at world prices but offering assistance, institutional ties and preferential access to the EEC’s market.64 Article 238 of the Treaty also offered the alternative of individual arrangements and Nigeria was in the process of negotiations on this basis. Association therefore appeared less of a dependent . arrangement and the African states were more willing to accept it. Indeed, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had already begun association talks, and Ghana and Sierra Leone were looking into the possibility. Greece and Turkey were associated under Article 238 and the UK wanted Malta and Cyprus to seek similar arrangements. For Southern Rhodesia, whose Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 led to the severance of trading links with the UK, there was no short-term hope of agreement, but arrangement would be required when the regime returned to legality.65 The Commonwealth in fact posed far less of a problem for the Cabinet than agriculture or the balance of payments. Bowden argued that the Commonwealth could not be sustained ‘whatever the cost to us might be’. The economic diversification of the Commonwealth was a major factor in its lessening importance in the Cabinet’s considerations. Although some ministers highlighted the value of cheap food imports and of the Commonwealth preferences for Britain’s exports, most accepted that the developing Commonwealth would continue to seek new markets if Britain did not turn to Europe. In fact, Britain’s membership of the EEC could strengthen the assistance Britain could provide to the Commonwealth by bolstering Britain politically and economically. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth question would still pose problems. The Cabinet did insist that there would have to be arrangements for New Zealand’s dairy and meat products. The Six had accepted the principle that New Zealand should be treated as a

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special case, but the probe had shown that the Six were unlikely to accept permanent derogations. Cabinet insisted that for New Zealand, ‘transitional provisions should not suffice’.66 Ministers also sought arrangements for Commonwealth sugar producers in the Caribbean.67 With Wilson virtually assured of the political support of the Cabinet, precise details of the safeguards the British required were not debated.

East of Suez and America: Wilson meets President Johnson, 25 April 1967 In December 1966 Wilson had ordered studies of complete retrenchment from the Far East for the first time. These studies led to a further decision in April 1967 to withdraw all forces from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975–6.68 Currently, the government aimed to stem spending by £100–125m by 1970–1, but low economic growth meant the Treasury demanded savings of up to £200–300m. Denis Healey also argued in favour of complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975–6. The Ministry of Defence felt it could no longer operate with constantly shifting targets. Officials wanted to plan for an orderly retreat, arguing also that the government could make greater savings after 1971 if the Ministry had an ultimate date for retrenchment in mind.69 Healey’s desire to plan coincided with Brown’s pressure for a real change in foreign policy, wanting a withdrawal from the mainland of Asia as soon as possible. He did not agree with Healey’s idea to set 1975–6 as a firm deadline, partly because it would be politically difficult and also in case the opportunity arose to withdraw more quickly.70 Both men wanted to retain a force in Australia in order to cushion the blow for Britain’s allies, but the OPD Committee pushed for complete withdrawal, deciding to review the retention of an Australian presence during the summer.71 In view of international opposition, the Cabinet reserved full decision until July and agreed to withhold any public announcement.72 Cabinet’s decision to accelerate withdrawal from Britain’s defence role in the Far East was taken alongside its decision to advance towards the European Community. Within the Cabinet, there was no discussion of any link between the twin policies of retreat from Singapore and Malaysia and membership of the EEC. The only way in which linkage was mentioned was to stress that it would heighten the irritation of the Australians to have to cope with the blow of the reduction in Britain’s defence role and the reverse preferences of EEC membership. In addition, if the EEC application failed, Britain would be left with nothing.73 In terms of day-to-day policy making, the government made no effort to present the issues as a grand change in Britain’s foreign trajectory. To deal with both questions at once would maximise the opposition Wilson faced. It would certainly heighten the Commonwealth’s criticism of Britain’s move towards the EEC, perhaps augmenting the influence the Commonwealth could hope to wield over Britain’s approach. Domestically, binding the two elements would make Wilson’s task harder if leftist opponents of Britain’s move to the EEC could link abandonment of the Commonwealth to an ideological preference for the Community.74 Nevertheless, it was not lost on Wilson that a move towards the European Community did provide Britain with a new international role once it was evident that British defence commitments in the East of Suez would terminate. Wilson made clear to ministers that a

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turn to the EEC was the only way to secure Britain’s political independence with East of Suez gone. The Commonwealth was too diverse to offer a sound basis for the exercise of Britain’s strength. A union with the United States, because of the US’s superior power, could only subordinate Britain. The EEC, a relatively homogenous organisation of powers of a similar size to the UK, was the only bloc with which Britain could satisfactorily unite. Membership would afford Britain a role of leadership, guiding the continent towards détente, and would bolster Britain’s faltering position on the international stage.75 Wilson’s turn to the Community was a solution to a British problem, but Wilson saw that he could use membership of the EEC as a bargaining counter to boost Britain’s diminishing influence in the United States. Successive sterling crises, the war in Vietnam and Britain’s posture in the Far East meant that British and American interests were growing apart.76 In 1964, Wilson had been able to highlight Britain’s defence contribution in East Asia to articulate Britain’s shared objectives with the US.77 Although the American administration was aware of the pressures operating on British foreign policy, when Wilson met Johnson in April 1967, the American President indicated his fear that Britain’s withdrawal would expose America to greater criticism: He said that he wondered whether the British government was ‘going crazy’ in apparently wanting to pull out of its position in South East Asia at a time when its principal allies in the area were fighting communism in Vietnam.78 Johnson suggested that the Americans would review Britain’s decision on 2 June, adding that: perhaps by 2 June the British might have agreed to send two brigades of troops to Vietnam, and if they did this he could assure the Prime Minister that all his and Britain’s financial worries would be at an end. Wilson resisted: even to suggest such a possibility was a libel on his own declared policy and attitude, and any case, if he attempted it, he would have no financial worries himself, since he would be out of office and no doubt doing quite nicely on his memoirs.79 Wilson evoked Britain’s leadership of the European Community to help to stave off American pressure for a commitment to Vietnam, and to mitigate the expression of American ire at Britain’s posture in the Far East. He argued that Britain was carving a new role in international affairs, a role the Americans had requested that Britain take: Since the war, one of the main thrusts of Western policy had been to ensure that Germany was able to develop a democratic form of government within the kind of western framework that would prevent any reversion to earlier and more dangerous tendencies there. At present, as

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the whole pattern of relationships in Europe, between Europe and America and between east and west was changing, it was becoming harder to contain Germany within this kind of system, as current trends in German policy tended to demonstrate… If Britain were not by then linked with the other European countries within the tight association provided by the Community, the latter would be dominated by a very powerful Germany, about whose political dispositions confident prediction was impossible but anxiety seemed only too justified. The consequences of this would be extremely dangerous not only for France but for the whole of Europe and thus for the US.80 Thus, membership of the European Community could come to replace East of Suez as the explanation of Britain’s mutual aims with the United States, a shift from fighting communism in the Far East to resisting nationalism in Europe. In this way, Wilson continued to play Britain’s weakening hand in the US with some skill, demonstrating that Britain was taking on a new stance of responsibility in the world. At the same time, Wilson’s recourse to British leadership in Europe indicated the way in which Britain’s overseas role was changing. With the ties between Britain and America stretched, a British role in Europe did come to assume increasing prominence in Britain’s foreign orientation.

The Kennedy Round and the balance of payments, 30 April 1967 With the decision in principle essentially taken following the 20 April discussions, the meeting at Chequers on 30 April that Wilson ordered after his visit to Washington was something of an anticlimax.81 There was, however, considerable doubt in the economic departments as to the wisdom of embarking on an application straight away. The first consideration related to the interplay between an application and the Kennedy Round. On 30 June the American Trade Expansion Act, agreed in 1962 to provide the American government with the powers to make sweeping reductions in the GATT talks, would expire. Inability to complete by this time would doom the negotiations to failure. The British and Americans feared that the French could use the British application to delay the talks.82 The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, urged the British to go ahead on political grounds as the Kennedy Round was nearly complete in any case, but there was doubt in the US administration as to the wisdom of jeopardising the final stages of the talks.83 Second, the Treasury and the economic advisers were still opposed to an immediate application for economic reasons. John Owen and G.R.Ashford in the Overseas Division wondered why ministers were determined to move so quickly when it seemed apparent that the initiative would fail.84 More seriously, the prospect of an application raised again the risk of precipitating a sterling devaluation as speculators reacted to the quite widespread expectation that Britain would be unable to enter the Community with the parity intact. This fear was current in the US, with both the US Treasury and Federal Reserve questioning whether Britain could hold the rate in the event of an application.85 In Britain, the government’s economic advisers, Balogh and Kaldor, argued that the

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predicted impact on prices and costs would lead to a devaluation in advance of entry.86 In the Treasury, a committee privately called the ‘Forever Unmentionable’ Committee had been established in 1965 for officials to make secret contingency plans about devaluation. The prospect of an advance towards an application led officials to accelerate their planning. As the former DEA economist and Financial Times economic editor Samuel Brittan explained: ‘once devaluation was thinkable in one context, it was thinkable in another’.87 A paper produced for the Forever Unmentionable Committee in June revealed that the overwhelming official expectation was that Britain would be unable to enter the EEC without a change in the parity. The paper stated official optimistic assessments were wrong: ‘unfortunately these medium term projections have no compelling evidence to justify them’.88 The balance of payments cost of membership, taking into consideration payments into the agricultural fund and changes to investment patterns, was likely to be between £250m and £600m. Adding the import cost of food would increase this bill by a further £150–350m. Avoiding devaluation would be impossible, as speculators would sell sterling in advance. It could even be to Britain’s interests to devalue beforehand, as devaluation would be difficult from the inside and because the agricultural prices were defined in units of gold, any devaluation would increase the domestic price of food and cause inflation. Thus, the Committee considered how devaluation could be timed in relation to EEC membership.89 Forever Unmentionable was chaired by the Joint Permanent Under Secretary of the Treasury, William Armstrong, who stressed that while officials did not necessarily support devaluation, many now regarded it as inevitable.90 The Committee was kept secret and its conclusions were not taken to ministers. With ministers, Armstrong took an utterly different position. In the strategic committee MISC143 Wilson established to co-ordinate papers to Cabinet, chaired by Trend and peopled by Permanent Under Secretaries, Armstrong argued that the government had to assume that the policies it had established would work. The new economic strategy, announced in the 11 April Budget, was based on low growth and expenditure cuts abroad and was expected to bring the balance of payments surplus necessary to meet the requirements of membership. By the time Britain faced the balance of payments cost of entry, Britain would have paid off the IMF debt of £200m per year and could then use this extra to absorb the price of entry.91 In fact, the prospect of EEC membership would serve to stiffen the British economy against its potential effects. The support of the CBI, the promise of increased investment in the UK and the opportunities for the UK capital market to expand in Europe would help to bolster Britain’s economic fortunes in event of entry.92 Not all the economic advice counselled that EEC membership would precipitate devaluation. The DEA’s Derek Mitchell continued to argue as he had in 1966, that reports of devaluation ignored the potentially worse effects of staying out of the Community.93 The government was caught in a confidence trick. Expectation of devaluation at the point of entry was a comment on the state of the economy and thus on the government’s current economic policies. If those policies could be expected to work, it had to be assumed that Britain would not be forced to devalue upon entry into the EEC. It was unthinkable that Britain would enter on terms so ruinous as to force the end of sterling as a reserve currency or to precipitate a large devaluation. Trend emphasised that the economic measures had been taken to ensure growth and it was essential to assume their

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success.94 Armstrong added that a change of the parity ‘was neither necessary nor appropriate’.95 Presenting confidence in the current health of the economy and efficacy of economic policy would lessen the risks of speculation against sterling. A turn to the EEC could be part of this confidence illusion. Yet, there was no denying that devaluation was on the immediate agenda in a way it had not been throughout 1966. Nobody dared speak it publicly, but should devaluation prove irresistible, Forever Unmentionable’s contingency planning showed that an application to the EEC could provide both a framework and a justification. The looming prospect of devaluation was evident as a restricted session of ministers debated sterling at Chequers, while the Cabinet prepared to complete its talks on EEC membership. Trend indicated that Britain would need a stronger economy if Britain was to enter Europe. Membership would impose a greater pressure on the balance of payments that could not be handled by further deflation. Thus, membership would either require deeper cuts in defence expenditure or in exchange rate policy.96 Wilson argued that if devaluation did transpire, it would have to be discussed in a very small group of ministers in order to maintain secrecy.97 The purpose of the meeting was for Wilson and Callaghan to demonstrate that devaluation would not ensue and it was not relevant within the context of EEC membership. Wilson argued that despite Pompidou’s comments last July, in fact the French did not want Britain to devalue and would be unlikely to let Britain in if they did. Devaluation should not be considered as the catch-all remedy to Britain’s economic ills. It would encourage competitive devaluations, would inspire drawings from the OSA’s sterling holdings, could lead to a hike in the gold price and the seizure of international trade and would not obviate the need for stringent domestic deflation. Callaghan in effect staked his career on the future of the parity: Whilst a theoretical case could be constructed in favour of devaluation at the point when we entered the EEC, it would unleash such powerful adverse forces beyond our control and would involve a breach of so many pledges which he had given to holders of sterling that he could not remain Chancellor of the Exchequer if this course were adopted.98 Callaghan’s comments were sufficient to stop ministers from discussing devaluation within the framework of Community membership, as they did not want to force the Chancellor to resign.99 The meeting illustrated, however, the precarious position in which the government found itself. Despite Wilson’s apparent acknowledgement of the possibility of devaluation, ministers were compelled to deny the weakness of the balance of payments in the hope that the prospect of future strength would become a selffulfilling prophecy. At the Sunday meeting, the last lengthy discussion before the full Cabinet formally accepted the statement to the Commons at Downing Street the next Tuesday, both economic and political arguments were expounded in now familiar terms.100 Without membership, Britain would not be able to command any political influence in the world and only British membership would offer a counterweight to German influence after de Gaulle’s departure. Wilson added, in view of his discussions with Johnson, that declining to join would condemn Britain to following American policies in South East Asia.

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Directly stressing the importance of EEC entry to Britain’s independence, Wilson argued that failure to move towards Europe would oblige Britain to join the USA in Vietnam.101 Partnership with the United States in a North Atlantic Free Trade Area would place Britain in a position of subordination to America’s might. Economically, Britain needed to encourage investment and to take advantage of a larger market and a larger economy.102

The application, 2 May 1967 By the time the Cabinet took a formal decision on the application on Tuesday 2 May, Wilson knew he had won the tactical battle. Brown set out a range of options between not applying, having more discussions and making an application. Outright opposition to the application was minimal. Gordon Walker remembered that only Fred Peart and Minister of Power Richard Marsh held out against an application in principle. Barbara Castle, Douglas Jay and Scottish Secretary Willie Ross would have cast themselves alongside the ‘nevers’, yet all three agreed to support Wilson’s application.103 Only Jay seriously considered resignation. He decided against on the basis that the Cabinet had not taken any decisions on the terms under which Britain would go in: on the CAP and on New Zealand’s trade, Wilson had suggested that permanent safeguards would be necessary.104 Of the ‘not yets’, at least Healey, Bowden and Greenwood favoured postponement, although agreed to support the application.105 These ministers did not necessarily oppose entry into the ‘right sort’ of EEC on principle, but felt that the timing of Wilson’s initiative was extremely misjudged. The case was thus expressed: ‘this [not applying] was now politically impractical—although they would have preferred not to apply— because the government’s freedom of action was so circumscribed by momentum which had built up and stimulated in favour of entry’.106 The left-leaning waverers, namely Crossman and Benn, both accepted that the government had little choice, but felt that this lack of choice was the consequence of poor decision making earlier in the government. Crossman made clear the role of the July sterling crisis in ministers’ acceptance of the decision: The other shift in opinion relates to our own economy. Those who are in charge…all now felt that the attempt to have a socialist national plan for the British Isles keeps us balanced on such a terribly tight rope that it really has got to be abandoned and that of course is the main reason why they favour entry into the Market… Up to the July freeze it was still possible to believe that we in the Wilson government would strip ourselves of the sterling area, withdraw from East of Suez and take the Swedish line of socialism. We could have done that a year ago but now it is felt by almost everyone that it is too late.107 Tony Benn added that the sense of failure, resulting from the collapse of the National Plan, was the underlying reason for the Cabinet’s acceptance, leading them also to accept the minimal conditions attached to Britain’s membership:

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Those of us who favoured the application were not too worried about the conditions because we were a defeated Cabinet. Going back to the war, we had tried as a Labour Government to solve the country’s economic problems and we had left in a balance of payments crisis in 1951. The Tories had tried and had left in the balance of payments crisis in 1964. We had tried and had had to put the brakes on in 1966, and we were now looking for solutions to our problems from the outside and somehow we were persuaded that the Common Market was the way of making progress.108 Thus, in a final count, 13 ministers supported Wilson’s application, adding Gordon Walker, Callaghan, Cledwyn Hughes and Grossman himself to Crossman’s list of Stewart, Brown, Jenkins, Crosland, Gardiner, Benn, Gunter, Elwyn Jones and Longford.109 Not only did they accept that Britain would make an application for membership, they also agreed that this should be free from mention of prior safeguards.110 The ‘conditions’ to defend Britain’s interests would be discussed in a statement to the House at the same time as the application.111 In a mixture of resigned acceptance, economic failure, bored awareness of Wilson’s tactics and the unreality created by the probability of de Gaulle’s veto was the second application for membership of the EEC accepted. At the root of it all the Cabinet was aware that they had no alternative. Particularly with the risks facing sterling and the planned withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, the British literally had nowhere else to go. Although ministers had turned to the EEC when faced with this stark choice, such a view was not a powerful endorsement of Britain’s future in Europe and the kind of Europe Britain could enter remained undefined.

Notes 1 Castle (1990, p. 92, 3 November. 1966); Jay (1980, pp. 366–89). 2 Evans (1975, pp. 11–12, 68). 3 Cited in Kaiser (2001a, p. 72). 4 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)14th, 21 March 1967. 5 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)17th, 6 April 1967. 6 TNA CAB134/2812, EUR(O)(66)38, Capital Movements, Treasury, 5 January 1967. 7 Ibid. 8 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)17th, 6 April 1967. 9 Ibid. 10 Grossman (1976, p. 303, 6 April 1967). 11 Castle (1990, pp. 120–1, 21 March 1967). 12 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 99–104). 13 Young (1998, pp. 172–81). 14 Ibid. (p. 175). 15 TNA PREM13/1479, Negotiating Objectives, Robinson, 20 March 1967. 16 Ellison (2000a, pp. 187–97, esp. p. 188). 17 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)21st, 18 April 1967; TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 18 TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967.

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19 Pfalzgraff (1969, p. 189). 20 TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 21 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)21st, 18 April 1967. 22 TNA CAB 129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 23 Ibid. 24 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)21st, 18 April 1967. 25 Ibid., Grossman (1976, p. 308, 18 April 1967). 26 TNA CAB 134/2817, EUR(O)(67)65, Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, 23 May 1967. 27 TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 28 TNA PREM13/1479, Wilson comments on Negotiating Objectives, 7 April 1967. 29 TNA FCO30/100, Robinson to O’Neill, draft response to Wilson, 11 April 1967. 30 TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 31 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)21st, 18 April 1967. 32 BLPES, Anthony Crosland Papers, Crosland 4/9, Personal notes on Europe, 1967. 33 TNA PREM13/1479, Trend to Wilson, 19 April 1967. 34 Castle (1990, pp. 123–4, 20 April 1967). 35 TNA PREM13/1479, Trend to Wilson, 19 April 1967. 36 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary, 14 April 1967. 37 Ibid. 38 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)22nd, 20 April 1967. 39 Grossman (1976, pp. 320–1, 20 April 1967). 40 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)22nd, 20 April 1967. 41 Castle (1990, pp. 123–4, 20 April 1967). 42 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/18, meeting with Wilson, 24 April 1967. 43 Grossman (1976, pp. 320–1, 20 April 1967). 44 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 79–99); Ward (1997, pp. 93–105); Robertson and Singleton (1999 pp. 107–22). 45 Ward (1997, p. 105); Tratt (1996, pp. 119–23); Ellison (2000a, pp. 37–63). 46 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 80–94). 47 Ibid. (pp. 144–51). 48 TNA CAB134/2817, EUR(O)(67)52, Negotiating Objectives, Foreign Office, 9 May 1967; TNA CAB 134/2813, EUR(O)(67)20th, 31 May 1967. 49 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)59, The Value of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Secretary, 24 April 1967. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid.; on Anglo-Australian relations and the Singapore and Malaysia withdrawal, TNA CAB148/30, OPD(67)17th, 21 April 1967. 52 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)55, Sector Report on Kennedy Round Negotiations, President of the Board of Trade, 14 April 1967. 53 TNA CAB134/2804, EUR(M)(67)18, Commonwealth Negotiating Brief, Secretaries, 30 June 1967; Ward (2001, pp. 156–80). 54 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)55, Sector Report on Kennedy Round Negotiations, President of the Board of Trade, 14 April 1967; Evans (1971, p. 271). 55 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)59, The Value of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Secretary, 24 April 1967. 56 Ibid.

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57 TNA CAB134/2813, EUR(M)(67)19, Negotiating Objectives on Protective Tariffs, Secretaries, 30 June 1967. 58 Ludlow (1997a, p. 140); TNA CAB134/2813, EUR(M)(67)19, Negotiating Objectives on protective Tariffs, Secretaries, 30 June 1967. 59 Ludlow (1997a, p. 141). 60 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)55, Sector Report on Kennedy Round Negotiations, President of the Board of Trade, 14 April 1967. 61 TNA CAB134/2813, EUR(M)(67)19, Negotiating Objectives on protective Tariffs, Secretaries, 30 June 1967. 62 Ludlow (1997a, p. 142). 63 Ibid. 64 TNA CAB134/2804, EUR(M)(67)18, Commonwealth Negotiating Brief, Secretaries, 30 June 1967. 65 Ibid.; Alexander (2003, pp. 195–8). 66 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)23rd, 27 April 1967. 67 Ibid. 68 Dockrill (2002, pp. 178–93); Carver (1992, p. 80). 69 TNA CAB148/30, OPD(67)14th, 22 March 1967; TNA CAB148/80, OPD(67)2, Defence Expenditure Studies, Report by the Official Committee, 20 March 1967. 70 TNA CAB148/30, OPD(67)14th, 22 March 1967; TNA CAB148/80, OPD(67)2, Defence Expenditure Studies, Report by the Official Committee, 20 March 1967. 71 TNA CAB148/30, OPD(67)14th, 22 March 1967; TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)19th, 11 April 1967. 72 TNA CAB128/42, OPD(67)17th, 21 April 1967; TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)23rd, 27 April 1967. 73 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)19th, 11 April 1967. 74 For example, Robins (1979, p. 21). 75 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary, 30 April 1967; TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)22nd, 20 April 1967. 76 Bartlett (1992, pp. 112–18); Ellis (2001, pp. 196–200); Kunz (1999, p. 225); Dumbrell (1996, pp. 219, 229–31); O’Hara (2003, pp. 273–8). 77 TNA PREM13/104, Wilson—Johnson, 7 December 1964. 78 TNA PREM13/1480, Palliser reports on Wilson’s meeting with Johnson, 25 April 1967. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Wilson (1971, p. 498). 82 TNA FCO30/189, Brief no. 4, Britain and the EEC, 11 April 1967; TNA CAB130/316, MISC(67)3rd, 7 April 1967; CAB134/2813, EUR(O)(67)12th, 4 April 1967. 83 TNA PREM13/1479, Washington to FO, tel. 1246, 18 April 1967; FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, doc. 247, conversation Rusk and Brown, 18 April 1967. 84 TNA T312/1019, Owen to Figgures, 14 April 1967; Ashford to Owen, 13 April 1967. 85 TNA FCO30/166, Washington to FO, tel. 1376, 26 April 1967. 86 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)6l, The Balance of Payments, Cabinet Secretary, 27 April 1967; see also Cairncross (1997, p. 209, 13 April 1967). 87 Brittan (1969, p. 226). 88 BOE, OV44/136, FU(67)1, Contingency Planning: Entry into Europe, June 1967. 89 Ibid. 90 BOE OV44/136, FU(67)2nd, 16 June 1967. 91 TNA CAB130/316, MISC143(67)5th, 21 April 1967; Cairncross (1997, p. 209, 13 May 1967); Cairncross (1996, pp. 159–60). 92 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)6l, The Balance of Payments, Cabinet Secretary, 27 April 1967. 93 TNA CAB130/316, Dissenting note by D.J.Mitchell, 21 April 1967.

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94 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)6l, Balance of Payments, Cover Note, Cabinet Secretary, 27 April 1967. 95 TNA CAB130/316, MISC143(67)5th, 21 April 1967. 96 TNA CAB128/46, CC(67)25th, 30 April 1967 10.30 am; Hennessy (2000, p. 314). 97 Ibid. 98 TNA CAB128/46, CC(67)25th, 30 April 1967 10.30 am. 99 Grossman (1976, pp. 335–6, 30 April 1967); Pearce (1991, p. 313, 30 April 1967). 100 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)27th, 2 May 1967. 101 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)26th, 30 April 1967 2.45 pm. 102 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary, 30 April 1967. 103 Pearce (1991, p. 312, 30 April 1967); Castle (1990, p. 126, 30 April 1967); Grossman (1976, p. 336, 1 May 1967). 104 Jay (1980, p. 389). 105 Pearce (1991 p. 312, 30 April 1967); Grossman (1976, p. 336, 1 May 1967). 106 Grossman (1976, p. 335, 30 April 1967). 107 Ibid. 108 Benn (1987, p. 496). 109 Grossman (1976, p. 336, 1 May 1967); Gordon Walker includes also himself, which seems therefore to be likely, Callaghan, who did favour the bid, and Hughes, who Castle says ‘toed the Wilson line predictably’, Castle (1990, p. 126, 30 April 1967); Pearce (1991, p. 312, 30 April 1967). Elwyn Jones was Attorney General, not in Cabinet but called to advise the Cabinet on the EEC. 110 Pearce (1991). 111 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)26th, 30 April 1967 2.45 pm.

6 The long haul to membership? May to December 1967

There is little doubt that Britain’s application failed because of General de Gaulle’s political and commercial opposition to British membership. The British could not convince him to admit Britain because he sought a Europe free from Atlantic influence and led by the French.1 British attempts to elicit a change in de Gaulle’s bar to accession were twofold. First, Wilson did want to negotiate a deal with the General, an objective never likely to succeed. It derived from his political conception of the Community and was composed around the creation of technological and possibly defence links between Britain and the EEC. At the same time, Wilson aimed to persist in showing Britain’s sincerity, making it difficult for de Gaulle to issue a decisive rebuttal. Second, Brown wanted to show that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome, delivering Britain’s negotiating position to the WEU on 4 July. Such an approach, he mistakenly believed, would encourage the Five to stand up to de Gaulle and so force the General to yield. Brown’s policy failed because the Five were reluctant to evoke a breach in the Community. Each had too much vested in the continuation of the EEC and in the completion of the 1969 agricultural review to risk antagonising de Gaulle to the point of his withdrawal. The Germans in particular were politically unwilling to pressure de Gaulle and Britain’s economic weakness provided a further justification for delay. Yet, although German hesitancy facilitated de Gaulle’s diplomatic task, after July 1967 heavier German pressure would simply have brought de Gaulle’s veto forward. Similarly, while devaluation of sterling in November 1967 provided the façade for de Gaulle’s verdict, indications were that de Gaulle was already planning his rejection. The story of Britain’s second application was not just a straight tale of misperception and failure. Wilson and Brown did hope to accede in the short term, yet the application also established a long-term case for entry. In 1963, de Gaulle had been able to legitimise his veto by pointing out the ways in which the British contributed to their own exclusion. Although the crisis of January 1963 had threatened to paralyse the Community, de Gaulle had eluded longer-term repercussions of his unilateral actions and by late 1963 the Community appeared to be back on track.2 In 1967, the British won the long-term war. The Five, the British, the US and opinion in France stressed that Britain would accede to the European Community eventually.3 At the Council of Ministers on 19 December, the Five confirmed their support for enlargement, isolating de Gaulle in his view that negotiations should not start. De Gaulle could thus no longer claim that French interests

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were commensurate with the interests of the developing Community: the limits to the French experiment were apparent.

The application and the press conference, May 1967 The Labour Government’s application was exactly as the Foreign Office had advised: simple and uncluttered. In a one-line statement, the government despatched a letter to the institutions and governments in the Community declaring that the UK applies ‘for membership under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome and Article 98 of the Treaty of Paris’.4 Wilson dealt with the conditions of membership in a statement to the House of Commons on 2 May, outlining the problems Britain would face upon accession, but not promising changes in advance of membership. He stated that it would not be problematical for Britain to accept the Treaty of Rome. Negotiations ‘ought not to be unnecessarily complicated with lesser issues, many of which can be best dealt with after entry’.5 Nevertheless, there were difficulties, mainly the CAP’s impact on the cost of living and structure of agriculture. The only specific safeguards Britain requested in advance were for New Zealand’s agricultural exports and for sugar exports from the countries protected by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. Wilson did not state exactly what provision would be sought. He emphasised that agricultural levies would ‘involve an inequitable sharing of the financial cost and impose on our balance of payments an additional burden which we should not, in fairness be asked to carry’.6 Yet, he did not expressly remark that Britain would require prior safeguards. For capital movements and regional policies, he suggested that adequate provisions would be obtainable.7 On sterling, Wilson hedged. He suggested that there could prove to be unwelcome short-term economic effects, but asked MPs to ‘make up your own mind’. In the long term, the creation of a large single market would provide enormous incentive for British industry.8 In The Economist, the bid was presented as ‘unconditional’.9 The Commons vote recorded a massive 488 in favour with 62 against. The Labour Party’s endorsement was not emphatic, as despite the three-line whip, 36 MPs voted against the motion and 50 abstained.10 Nevertheless, the decision established a cross-party consensus in favour of a European future and this was important in adding weight to Britain’s initiative in the Community.11 The Five immediately praised the simplicity of Britain’s approach. Pescatore, the Secretary-General of the Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, echoed widespread opinion in applauding the clarity of the application and arguing this would make it difficult to refuse.12 Press coverage throughout the Six commented favourably on the impressive Commons majority supporting the application.13 Britain’s ambassador in Paris, Sir Patrick Reilly, considered that Britain’s ‘speed and assurance’ had left de Gaulle uneasy.14 The Dutch and German press reported admiration for Wilson’s courage, with the usually hostile Christian Social Union (CSU) paper Münchner Merkür suggesting that Wilson had staked his future on the bid and so it had to be taken seriously.15 The problems of British accession did not, however, go unnoticed. Il Globo, the Italian conservative financial paper was alarmed at Britain’s uncertainty about agricultural levies and did not want old difficulties in the Six over agriculture to be

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reopened.16 France’s La Croix commented that Wilson was insisting on an unreasonably short interval to decide on negotiations. Influential officials in the Auswärtiges Amt, such as Dr Harkort, did not hide their feelings that the most optimistic assessment was a meeting before the summer break at which the British could state their case.17 Nevertheless, the British considered that they had done enough in issuing a straightforward request. Brown wanted no follow up action with Couve de Murville. The facts of the application—that Britain attached no conditions to accession—could speak for themselves.18 On 16 May, de Gaulle in a press conference immediately rebutted the British request. He began by stressing that there was no question of a French veto. He then argued that even if Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome, the Six had added countless regulations to the Treaty, ‘involving a minutely determined equilibrium between the various interests of the member states’. Accession of four new applicants would upset this equilibrium: to introduce new and massive factors now in the midst of those which have been reconciled with such difficulty would obviously mean bringing both the structure as a whole and the details back into question and setting the problem of an entirely different venture.19 The strength of his case lay in showing that Britain’s balance of payments weakness would render Britain incapable of accepting Community obligations. Acceptance of the agricultural arrangements for the UK would be impossible as it would ‘crush’ Britain’s balance of payments, because of the levy payments, and force up the price of food and thus industrial costs in Britain. Lifting of exchange controls would lead capital to flow from Britain into the EEC. Moreover, the balance of payments served to emphasise Britain’s extra-European role. He argued that the reserve role of sterling weakened the balance of payments and showed that Britain was a power with different concerns from those of the Six. Britain was an island, with ties of the Commonwealth and to the US, unable to participate in Six-wide interests such as monetary solidarity.20 He thereby attached Britain’s ability to enter to the demise of sterling’s reserve role. Furthermore, he suggested that if Britain did enter without acceptance of the agricultural regulations, this would ‘upset completely the balance of the whole Common Market and rob France of one of her chief reasons for being a member’.21 The implication was clear: British entry before 1969, when Britain could participate in the agricultural review, could lead to French withdrawal. Returning to a well-worn theme, de Gaulle suggested that the Six and the applicants could renegotiate a whole new Treaty; Britain could associate with the Treaty of Rome or the world could wait until Britain’s evolution to the continent was complete: If, one day, Britain reached this stage, how wholeheartedly France would welcome such a historic conversion’.22 Thus, while denying that he was issuing a veto on British accession, de Gaulle was able to show, as he had in 1963, that Britain remained insufficiently ‘European’ to take on the obligations of membership.23 The press conference effectively meant that there would not be early negotiations for British entry. Hervé Alphand, Secretary General at the Quai d’Orsay, spread the word that de Gaulle did intend to prevent the opening of negotiations, rather than procrastinate during Anglo-Six talks. Immediate prevention of negotiations had not been widely

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anticipated. De Gaulle appeared to take opinion by surprise with his swift and unequivocal response. Reilly indicated that the press conference was ‘more negative than I expected’.24 Brown responded that the strength of the French response was Very disagreeable’.25 Evidence that de Gaulle would not permit the opening of negotiations shifted the tone of the Five’s reaction. The German Economics Minister, Schiller, stated that the Germans wanted to play a role of mediation between the British and the French.26 Conrad Ahlers, deputy spokesman for the Federal Government, gave a briefing, reported in the front pages of the Guardian and the Express, to the effect that the Germans would not promote British entry.27 In Brussels, Harmel continued to insist on the opening of negotiations, but stressed that the Belgians did not want to indulge in ‘public polemics’ with the General.28 The Belgian Ambassador hoped the British would not attempt to drive a wedge between the French and the Five.29 The Italian press took the view that Italian ministers would be unwilling to defy de Gaulle’s pressure for delay.30 The British had not expected de Gaulle’s tactics, yet the essential difference between 1963 and 1967 was Britain’s determination to continue in the face of his obstruction. In 1963, the British had been ultimately unable to sustain the impulse towards membership, largely because the public shattering of the prospects for entry removed a coherent framework for steps towards the Community.31 In 1967, public opinion accepted it as reasonable for the British to press on towards membership regardless of de Gaulle’s stance.32 The Foreign Office issued guidance to the Community members, stating that Britain accepted the Treaty of Rome and the principles of the CAP and urging the Six to respond. No state had said during the tour that British accession would prove impossible.33 Informed opinion supported the government in its bid to get into the Community. The Times commented: there can no longer be any faint hope that the walls will fall at the sound of the trumpet. Indeed, it may well be argued that there is no hope of moving the General and that the best plan, therefore, is to prepare the ground for the day when he is no longer at the head of affairs in France.34 The Economist added: Curious things have been happening in Europe which suggest that the tide is running the right way. It certainly will not carry Mr. Wilson to harbour as long as the general [sic] has his way. But there is a lot that can be done in the next couple of years while everyone is waiting for the general to quit the scene.35 De Gaulle ensured further delays at a summit of the Six held at Rome shortly afterwards. Explicitly linking the Italian and German will for political union with the question of enlargement, de Gaulle declared that the Community had to ‘think thoroughly and profoundly about where it is going before accepting approaches from the outside’.36 He suggested that the Six investigate enlargement in principle. They should study the effect on the existing Community of entry of four new members and should research the particular problems in agriculture and monetary questions raised by British accession.37

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Politically unwilling to see the Rome Summit dissolve into acrimony, the Six agreed to discuss British membership at the Council of Ministers the following week.38 At this meeting, in the absence of Couve, Brandt and Fanfani, representatives agreed again to postpone discussion of British accession until 26 June.39 On 26 June, in a highly restricted session, the French continued to insist on the discussion of enlargement in principle, but the Six did make agreements as to how to deal with the British approach. First, under strong pressure from the Belgian Foreign Secretary Pierre Harmel, the Council agreed that the Commission was to produce an Opinion on the problems of British accession. This, Harmel argued, was procedure as established in Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. Crucially, the Commission could focus exclusively on the British case and not on the accession of the other applicants, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland (Norway applied two months after the British).40 Second, Harmel and Brandt insisted that the British present their application at the WEU on 4 July.41 The French did not explicitly agree, but nevertheless George Brown took this as the opportunity for Britain’s case to be heard.

Wilson meets General de Gaulle, 19 June 1967 The priority for Wilson was his visit to General de Gaulle, scheduled for 19 June. Wilson’s aim was to convince de Gaulle that Britain genuinely was a European power. He wanted to outline Britain’s proposals for complete withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975–6, despite the USA’s opposition.42 His central case was that British membership was the only way of ensuring that Europe would have the industrial, technological and ultimately political strength to stand up to the superpowers. Wilson explained in his memoirs: ‘I was presenting him not with a new Nassau but a Nassau in reverse. Trianon was the opposite of a Rambouillet’.43 A Nassau in reverse implied repudiation of Britain’s links with the US and raised complex issues surrounding the possibility of European arrangements in defence. Wilson wished to go further than he eventually did in proposing European collaboration to de Gaulle. In an ad hoc preparatory meeting, Wilson informed selected ministers of his intention to hint strongly to de Gaulle that a European partnership could provide Britain’s future requirements in nuclear weapons. The thrust of Britain’s nuclear policy, Wilson would tell the French President, was away from connections with the United States. Britain had elected not to continue with Polaris and not to acquire a future generation of American equipment for nuclear weapons, Poseidon. Britain would be independent and free to choose and Britain’s choice could be for European projects, collaborating with France to create a successor missile system to Polaris. Wilson indicated that Britain’s future decisions as to nuclear policy ‘would be influenced largely by the possibilities presented to us of fuller European development in the economic, political and defence fields’.44 Although Wilson acknowledged that there would be considerable difficulties with this approach, a joint effort to further both countries’ nuclear arsenals could provide the base for a defence community within the EEC. Wilson said to Hetherington:

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He thought that de Gaulle might offer a defence community if we would go in on a nuclear programme with them. He said, however, that the French were a long way behind and had not got a thermonuclear weapon yet. He was not prepared to go in with de Gaulle (although he was a little ambiguous about the way he put it).45 Brown, however, was unsure that Wilson should move so far towards de Gaulle. Britain’s agreements with the US placed certain restrictions on Britain’s co-operation with other countries. Collaboration on missile development would undoubtedly raise questions as to the derivation of the information the British would propose to share. Britain would be dependent on American technical information for the continuation of her Polaris force until any successor system was ready and could not afford to jeopardise this connection. Suggestions of a defence community, a solution Brown had actually favoured in June 1966, were also replete with difficulties. An Anglo-French led force would raise the unresolved issues of Germany’s nuclear status. America would not support a force that did not offer a solution to German access to nuclear hardware; moreover, a force would foster questions of Europe’s place within the Atlantic Alliance. Preoccupied with de Gaulle’s challenge to NATO and engaged in efforts to minimise the potential damage to NATO, a joint Anglo-French approach would contradict Britain’s existing NATO policies. Brown emphasised that Britain could not afford to appear even to want a European nuclear force.46 Hetherington’s notes suggested a further dimension of Wilson’s thinking. In an April letter to Fred Mulley, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Reilly indicated that the French did not yet know how to make a thermonuclear bomb. Reilly wrote: ‘if this is correct, the General faces the humiliating prospect of having a completely useless nuclear submarine force on his hands in a few years’ time, unless the French have made the breakthrough by then’. Thus, Reilly suggested that an offer of thermonuclear knowledge could sway the General.47 Reilly’s suggestion derived from comments made by Pierre Maillard, Minister in the French Foreign Service, to the British Embassy’s Crispin Tickell, a few days earlier. The Embassy felt that Maillard had confirmed indirectly that the French lacked the knowledge to create thermonuclear warheads for their submarine force. The Foreign Office speculated, but had not yet confirmed, that the Elysée Palace had commissioned a report on the extent of Britain’s links with the US in nuclear questions. If this were the case, it would suggest that the President was potentially interested in collaboration with the British.48 It is possible, therefore, that the Prime Minister made a veiled offer of thermonuclear co-operation. Palliser remembered an inkling of a thermonuclear offer, a vague suggestion to see if de Gaulle would bite. There were, however, multiple problems with the possibility, not least that it would require agreement from the Americans. American endorsement would of course turn de Gaulle away from the idea and in any case, any such offer would extend Wilson’s Cabinet brief. Palliser conceded that Wilson might have mentioned the possibility to de Gaulle—‘I think there were hints dropped’—but certainly did not follow it to a conclusion.49 The minutes of the Trianon talks record that Wilson was a little less definite than he would have liked, reigned in perhaps by Brown’s caution. He argued that Britain’s decision not to purchase American Poseidon missiles meant that after Polaris, Britain

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would not be dependent on America for the nuclear capability. Yet, he made neither mention of thermonuclear collaboration, nor a serious offer of co-operation in missile development. Rather, he reiterated his old proposal for joint efforts in military aircraft, and concentrated on civil aspects of co-operation: ‘We should work out our military and political destiny; and an important part of that would be in partnership with France, for example in connection with the production of military aircraft’.50 In civil and military aircraft, French firms had strong links to the US, for example in the production of aero-engines. Collaboration with Britain would enable greater independence as Britain had the best aero-engines in the world. The Airbus project could enable French and British industry to compete more equally with the American company Boeing. Britain could also offer expertise in civil nuclear technology. British gas-cooled reactors, for example, could be an alternative to the American water-cooled reactors the Belgians had just purchased. The computer industry was another example where Europe was failing to stand up to the USA: ‘Europe could only make progress if France and Britain acted together’.51 Britain and France, Wilson told de Gaulle, could also collaborate in the production of enriched uranium-235.52 Currently Britain and France had independent plants at Capenhurst and Pierrelatte respectively, but the United States had a monopoly of supply. Wilson emphasised the importance of U-235 for civil purposes, in attempt to break American dominance. Yet, as Wilson’s Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Solly Zuckerman had noted, U-235 was also essential for the use in the propulsion engines for submarines. Submarine missiles were one element in the French force de frappe. America had initially supplied France with U-235 after an agreement in 1959 and France had used this supply, but their own engine design, when they completed their first propulsion plant in 1964.53 The emergence of a new method of enriching uranium, the centrifuge technique, on which the British and Americans collaborated between 1960 and 1965, troubled the British. The existence of the centrifuge technique meant the British could not afford to be left behind, and thus were in the process of reassessing plans to extend the diffusion plant at Capenhurst.54 Ultimately, the British entered into a joint project with West Germany and the Netherlands to develop the centrifuge. The meeting failed to elicit a change in de Gaulle’s attitude. De Gaulle argued that regardless of Wilson’s statements, Britain was still dependent on the USA. De Gaulle agreed that Britain and France could participate in civil nuclear technology, particularly in the supply of enriched uranium and possibly in aviation. He also mentioned missile cooperation as one possibility for joint action. Britain’s political links with the USA in the larger questions of global security meant, however, that Britain’s orientation was not certain. Wilson argued that Europe was at a turning point. Kept out of Europe, Britain would have to turn to the USA and to create an Atlantic and eventually Pacific Community that would ultimately overwhelm the European Community. This was not what Britain wanted, but the French could give them little choice: ‘The greatest risk of all was that we should delay while the rest of the world drifted towards a disaster which could possibly be averted by a strong Europe acting independently and without fear or favour as regards anyone’.55 De Gaulle agreed that this was an unfavourable prospect, but argued that British accession would not safeguard against an Atlantic grouping. Britain’s introduction of

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Atlantic influence inside the Community would slowly kill French and ‘European’ dominance. Britain would take a different stance in agricultural and commercial policies. If Britain joined the Communities, in two to three years’ time what would her attitude be in discussions within Europe in regard to the US, and in such matters as agriculture, food production, currency questions, capital movements—all fundamental to the EEC—what would Britain’s attitude be?56 Yet, de Gaulle also displayed a curious sense of fatalism, an acknowledgement that ultimately he and the French would be unable to prevent the submergence of a ‘European Europe’ into a wider unity. He told Wilson: he knew that the Prime Minister was aware of the general French approach. It was possible that this approach would be unsuccessful, it was conceivable that one day the Atlantic concept would submerge them. But in that case there would be no Europe, or at least no European Europe and no specifically European character or personality. They did not wish this to happen. But they recognised that they might be unable to prevent it.57 The meeting evoked a mixed response in the UK. De Gaulle’s pessimism that one day British and Atlantic influence could indeed overwhelm Europe led to Reilly’s assessment that he was ‘paradoxically encouraged’ by the visit.58 Wilson wrote to Johnson that de Gaulle was ‘obsessed in his fatalistic way by a sense of real impotence (a word he used twice with me)’.59 De Gaulle’s apparent acknowledgement of the ultimate failure of the ‘European Europe’ could indicate the French President’s lack of will or strength to deny British accession. As Palliser had put it earlier, he could prefer to avoid the historical black mark of the man lacking vision, responsible for temporarily ‘splitting the old continent’. De Gaulle’s prevarication could lead to his failure decisively to dispel the initiative and thus to the commencement of negotiations after his departure. Yet, for the first time, Wilson admitted it would not be possible to secure a short-term route into the Community by negotiating with the General. He noted on a letter from the Minister for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, that: ‘we are past the point of forecasting his actions on the basis of rational judgement’.60 As Wilson saw it, his arguments had offered the General the chance to secure enduring technological and political strength for France and for Europe. Such arguments held a logical appeal, and Wilson justified their failure with his sense that de Gaulle was not ‘rational’. An irrational leader could veto Britain’s bid through his own, unfathomable, volition. With the failure of the June meeting, Wilson’s thinking shifted away from the notion of a deal with the French and towards a more overt seduction of the Five. Britain’s strategy now rested on the long-term hope that the application could outlast de Gaulle.

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Courting the Five: George Brown at the WEU, 4 July 1967 Wilson and Brown were not working together closely on Britain’s European initiative. While the Prime Minister had concentrated on his journey to Trianon, Brown focused on the delivery of Britain’s negotiating position to the WEU on 4 July. On reading about Brown’s plans in the press, Wilson noted to Palliser: ‘could you please check…whether the Press story about WEU meeting and George’s statement thereto is true?’61 The Prime Minister’s intention, again urged by Palliser, was to allow Brown to take charge of the ‘day-to-day’ handling of negotiations. Wilson’s role would be to intervene at Various points in the negotiations, to force concentration on the major issues and keep up the vital momentum’.62 This was significant. Brown would deal with the issues Wilson preferred to avoid, such as agricultural levies, while Wilson could exercise political charge. Brown developed Britain’s negotiating position in the new Ministerial Committee On the Approach to Europe, EUR(M), of which he was chair and which had been established to oversee negotiations.63 Set up at the same time was the Official Steering Committee on the Approach to Europe, EUR(S), chaired by Trend, a formalisation of Trend’s ad hoc steering group during the Cabinet’s deliberations. EUR(S) would supervise EUR(O), the official committee guiding Britain’s position towards the ‘conditions’ of membership since November 1966.64 In this way, the Cabinet Office could continue to monitor Brown’s activities. Brown’s statement to the WEU established vital advances in Britain’s negotiating stance. The premise of the 1967 push for entry was that Britain could accept the Treaty of Rome, the CAP and the common external tariff (CET), subject to agreements on specific commodities or problems. This statement remained the basis of Britain’s demands when the final bid began in 1970.65 The EUR(M) Committee comprised a mix of the ardent and the uncommitted. Brown, Stewart and Jenkins were strongly in favour; Jay, Peart and Scottish Secretary Willy Ross against. Commonwealth Secretary Herbert Bowden did not support European membership, but did not oppose the initiative and Callaghan, although ambivalent in attitude, had moved to support the bid. Despite their differences, ministers reached agreement on the negotiating position for two main reasons. First, Douglas Jay overplayed the opposition hand. He insisted on retention of duty free imports for all cereals, meat and dairy produce. His stance would render obsolete Britain’s claim to accept the Treaty of Rome, rejecting the common external tariff. By taking such a strident position, Jay isolated himself from other potential opponents. Bowden, who wanted to seek some safeguards for some commodities, told Jay that there was no point in asking for more than even the New Zealanders requested.66 Jay’s position, divergent with what Cabinet had agreed, also made it easy for Wilson to disregard him. Wilson wrote to him to argue that his requests were out of line with Cabinet’s decision to apply in accordance with the principles of the Rome Treaty, in which he had acquiesced.67 Jay’s inflexible attitude towards the Community certainly contributed to his dismissal from the Cabinet in August.68 Second, Brown, backed by Foreign Office officials, consistently reminded ministers that their purpose was to get the Six to the negotiating table. They were not taking decisions on the final details Britain would accept. In order to convince the Five to

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pressure the French into a decision, it was necessary to deliver a position as free from conditions as possible. Brown told the Cabinet: ‘the immediate purpose must be to assure that negotiation actually began’.69 Disagreement focused on the two main areas of agriculture and the Commonwealth. Jay and Peart both now pressed hard for a transitional period for acceptance of the CAP of a maximum of ten years and a minimum of seven.70 EUR(M) could not decide, feeling that the burden of reconstruction and the balance of payments merited a transitional period of at least seven years. Faced with the Foreign Office’s case that asking for too much would jeopardise Britain’s approach as a whole, ministers deferred a final decision until the length for other products was established.71 In the full Cabinet, the government hedged the question of agriculture. Significantly, Brown dodged a decision on agricultural levies by assuring ministers that the 1969 review offered a solution. The basis of the Cabinet’s agreement was that ‘it was incompatible to leave out discussion of the levy payments for the CAP, but once in, we would have more influence at the agricultural review in 1969’.72 Cabinet thus developed a collective analgesia regarding their agricultural difficulties. This central tenet of the government’s negotiating position remained undecided, salved by the unworkable position that Britain would join in the Six’s review in 1969. Brown’s statement to the WEU was extremely favourable to European opinion in both tone and substance. The only safeguards he mentioned were for Commonwealth sugar exporters after 1974 and New Zealand’s butter exports. Agricultural modifications, such as the winter supply of liquid milk, would find solution under Community regulations. Britain could renegotiate agricultural levy payments as a member in 1969: ‘we shall look forward to taking part as a full member of the Community in the negotiation of the agricultural finance arrangements for the period after 1969’.73 The reception of the statement in the Five was consequently very positive. At the WEU meeting, Luns reiterated that the ‘completeness of detail was of the highest value’.74 Brandt said he was impressed by the British statement, which was ‘unequivocal and unusually important. A milestone on the road to a united Europe had been reached’.75 Harmel’s praise was the most fulsome, commenting that he was impressed by Britain’s ‘desire not to disturb the treaties or the decisions taken under them by the Six’.76 Fanfani added that the chance of political and economic unity in Europe was to be welcomed. Luxembourg’s Grégoire stressed that Britain could accept the Treaty and Luns argued that it would be possible to solve Britain’s difficulties during transitional periods.77 Only the French representative, Bettencourt, mentioned any negative points, suggesting that Britain needed to reconcile its entry with its essential national and Commonwealth interests and therefore that the French government could not yet give a view.78 Thus, by early July 1967, Wilson knew that de Gaulle would not admit Britain in the short term, but Britain’s approach had brought a kind of success. The Five stated their strong support for British accession. In a Council meeting on 10 July, for example, the Five endorsed the opening of negotiations and insisted that the Commission begin to study Britain’s candidature.79 Davignon, Harmel’s Private Secretary, had gone as far as to suggest that de Gaulle could not let negotiations begin as he knew they would work. The Belgians were thinking along the lines that there would be a crisis in the autumn with the Five insisting on the opening of negotiations and the French refusing. This crunch point could result in arrangements between the Five and the British, perhaps in the technological field, to pave the way for British entry. Palliser pointed out that de Gaulle’s

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bargaining power was weakened because he could no longer threaten to pull France out of the EEC: his ability to cow his partners was thus reduced.80 Exactly how de Gaulle intended to deal with the application remained unclear. Meeting with Reilly, de Gaulle concentrated on the political aspects of British accession, arguing that British entry would entrench the divide in Europe, as the Russians feared Atlantic incursion. On the terms, he maintained only that the British would not be able to do what they had promised.81 Further indications of de Gaulle’s domestic weakness suggested that the application could survive the General. The French government faced Parliamentary difficulty with the budget in deficit and the economy in trouble. De Gaulle’s condemnation of the Israelis had been unpopular and recent social legislation led to the possibility of workers’ strikes. Reilly mentioned for the first time that there was widespread questioning of de Gaulle’s judgement, brought about by the General’s Middle East policies and also by indications that he intended building French intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Reilly added that there was a ‘general, though unexplained feeling here that he is not likely to last very long’.82 Wilson’s attention turned to methods of tightening pressure on the General. To encourage the Five to resist de Gaulle, Wilson suggested ‘blatant technological cooperation with individual members of the Five or bilateral co-operation’.83 The idea of such co-operation would be to give the Five an incentive to back British membership: ‘whet European appetites while making it clear they could not be satisfied pending our eventual entry’.84 Joint ventures, if established, could also create an impulse towards membership after any French obstruction. Moreover, the Ministry of Technology was worried that the French would benefit more than Britain did from collaborative projects between Britain and France. It would be worth showing the French that they could not gain so much unless they were prepared to admit Britain to the Community, a sentiment with which Trend agreed. Withholding the benefits of British technological know-how could be the stick with which to beat France’s wider policies towards the Atlantic world.85 The dispute within Britain as to whether Britain’s European policy should focus on the French or on the Five swung decisively towards the Five. France’s persistent blocking of British policies towards the EEC led Wilson to shift from a policy centred on AngloFrench links to one aimed expressly at constraining France’s position in the Community as well as in NATO. Indications were that de Gaulle intended to withdraw completely from the Atlantic Alliance by 1969.86 Since June, the NATO powers had been discussing Pierre Harmel’s proposals to increase the role of NATO in pursuing détente, proposals that were supported but regarded suspiciously by the French.87 ‘Blatant technological cooperation’ with the Five, or suggestions of it, would heighten the pressure on de Gaulle. Wilson’s tactical shift was an acceleration of Britain’s policy since 1963 to insist on British participation in the Six’s political union. By providing specific evidence of Britain’s will to participate in projects with members of the Community, ‘blatant technological collaboration’ was an effective means to pressure de Gaulle’s policies.88

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The problem of sterling: the Commission’s Opinion, September 1967 The European Commission under the new President Jean Rey was keen to support Britain’s bid for accession. Indecision by the Council of Ministers as to how to proceed provided the opportunity to do so.89 The Commission’s Opinion, the study of British membership ordered by the Council of Ministers on 26 June and produced on 29 September 1967, was enthusiastic about the principle of enlargement and recommended that negotiations should begin.90 The Commission thought Britain’s case to be negotiable, with Britain’s difficulties soluble during transitional periods.91 The African and Caribbean Commonwealth could associate with the Community and negotiators could seek solution for Commonwealth sugar and for New Zealand’s butter exports.92 As for agricultural levies, enlargement could provide the opportunity to rethink the balance between payments and receipts for the agricultural fund.93 However, the Opinion raised doubts about the strength of sterling. The Commission recorded that the fundamental problems of disequilibrium in the British economy remained and that reflation therefore had dangerous consequences for the balance.94 Consequently: ‘the British authorities, in their efforts to prepare the economy for integration, might unilaterally adopt certain measures which could have major repercussions for the Community’.95 Devaluation upon entry to the Community could encourage price inflation and jeopardise agricultural pricing arrangements. It could also encourage other countries to follow suit, engendering economic instability in the Community. Accession of a weak economy could hamper trade and economic growth and prompted queries as to whether Britain would be able to cope with the consequences of membership. The British hoped and Brown maintained in Cabinet that the Commission’s conclusions on the fundamental fragility of sterling resulted from French opposition.96 The French contribution was to make explicit links between the balance of payments and the reserve role of sterling, so drawing a clear political picture of a country whose extraEuropean obligations would render a European role difficult.97 In particular, Commissioners rejected the Treasury view that the sterling balances did not affect the domestic balance of payments. During Britain’s secret contacts with the Commission before the production of the Opinion, the Treasury’s Fred Atkinson had attempted to show that the holders of sterling were unlikely to make sudden withdrawals and even if they did, Britain could cover the loss through her drawing capabilities in the IMF.98 Assets of the sterling area outweighed the liabilities and the sterling holdings were fundamentally stable.99 However, the Opinion argued that although the sterling balances were relatively stable, should withdrawals occur, the UK’s official liquid assets were less than the total liabilities.100 Moreover, the Opinion pointed out that Britain’s extra-European interests would make it difficult for the UK to side with the Six in IMF talks, a claim evinced by the process of recent negotiations, where Britain’s existing interests meant the British had tended to align with the United States.101 In September, the IMF formalised acceptance of a Special Drawing Right (SDR) to ease pressure on the reserve currencies. The Six had tentatively pushed for a veto on its use, seeking to strengthen the European voice in international

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monetary affairs.102 The British and French were still divided as to exactly what the SDR would mean. Britain and America wished to use it to shore up the existing system, whereas the French preferred the SDR to take the place of sterling and the dollar as the framework for the managed termination of sterling and the dollar’s roles as reserve currencies.103 Furthermore, the Opinion argued that Britain’s undertaking not to use Article 108 was meaningless and Britain had not been willing to take the lead in discussing a possible ‘European solution’.104 Britain’s treatment of a possible ‘European solution’ for the problem of the sterling balances was contentious. Some in the Treasury genuinely did favour the exploration of a deal with the Europeans, perhaps a long-term loan to pay off the holders of sterling. In an article in Le Monde in late September, Callaghan countered that Britain was willing to discuss with the Europeans any proposals for the sterling question they cared to implement. In keeping with Wilson’s comments to the Belgian delegation during the probe, he argued that the enlarged Community would eventually lead to the creation of a European currency.105 However, as Callaghan’s Mansion House speech on 26 October made apparent, without the prospect of British accession or of closer European monetary union, the British could not prove their commitment. It was difficult for Britain to stress support for an option it was uncertain whether the French or the Germans would ultimately endorse. Many also felt that it was unrealistic to expect that Britain could simply ‘end’ the reserve role of sterling, not least because of the many holders of sterling and its continuing global trading role.106 The Commission’s Opinion led Wilson and Palliser to discuss the possibility that de Gaulle would deliver a quick veto, killing the application on the back of the poor prospects for sterling. Wilson recommended that if he did, Britain should ‘keep the ball’ by issuing another application.107 Others suggested different methods to circumvent de Gaulle’s apparent refusal to open negotiations. Rey proposed that Britain should enter ‘pre-negotiation’ with the Commission to hammer out the problems of sterling and the adoption of the common external tariff.108 Yet, the British remained unwilling to contemplate alternative routes. Talks with the Commission would let de Gaulle off the hook and by instigating detailed discussions, would emphasise the difficulties Britain faced. The application had succeeded in gathering support for Britain’s accession: anything less than a decisive verdict would squander the progress made. With these considerations in mind, the British embarked on contingency planning in preparation for a rebuff.109 De Gaulle was still unwilling, however, to deliver an unequivocal judgement. Instead, the French established economic ‘preconditions’ to British membership. Before negotiations could begin, Britain’s economy would have to pass certain unspecified tests over which the Community would have the ultimate say.110 The Five continued to resist the French idea of preconditions. The Dutch and the Germans felt that although sterling probably would be a problem if it were still weak when the British were about to join, sterling should not impinge on the Community’s judgement now. Negotiations could take place alongside the recovery of economic strength and could in fact serve to stimulate the economy.111 Thus, although there was a widespread sentiment that the reserve role of sterling could cause difficulties, it was not certain that the French had won the diplomatic argument that the weakness of sterling should deter the opening of negotiations.

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‘Something more subtle than flattery’:112 dealing with Germany, October 1967 De Gaulle was still unwilling to risk the odium of international opinion ensuing from a veto. Early in October, in a highly unusual move, the General summoned Patrick Reilly to a private meeting. Reilly recorded de Gaulle’s view that Britain was not ready to enter. Economic problems and the agricultural levies meant that British accession would change the nature of the Community. Politically, he noted that Britain was moving away a little from the United States, but economically, there were grave problems. He commented: ‘no doubt the British believed they could accept the essential principles of the Community, but the truth was they could not’.113 The General urged Reilly to convince the British to drop the whole venture, arguing that negotiations could not work and so there was no point in embarking upon them.114 If Britain would abandon the initiative, de Gaulle could escape the unwelcome consequences of a veto. Thus, the British felt it essential to persist in the objective of making life difficult for the General. If he did veto, it should be politically odious for him, ensuring that the political nature of his opposition was exposed and his isolation from the main currents of European and French political opinion made clear. Yet, the objective of Britain’s strategy was not to force de Gaulle to veto. This option was discussed, but was dismissed in the Cabinet Office as excessively dangerous. There was no point in apprehending Gaullist action, which could result in Britain’s own isolation in Europe, particularly when members of the Five wanted to give the General more time.115 Furthermore, Palliser felt that if provoked, de Gaulle would not hesitate to issue a veto, which the British still preferred to avoid.116 Britain therefore aimed to strike a balance, persisting in demanding that negotiations start in case de Gaulle proved reluctant to veto; but ensuring that it was unfavourable for him if he did. Central to the strategy of making life difficult for the General was the attitude of the Germans. Kiesinger disagreed with the French concept of Europe and France’s attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance, but he felt that Franco-German rapprochement was essential to European unity. Kiesinger told Britain’s Ambassador in Bonn, Sir Frank Roberts, that Britain’s membership was bound to happen; even de Gaulle accepted that ‘history and the force of events’ was on the British side.117 With membership ultimately inevitable, there was no reason for the Germans to stand up to the French now. Kiesinger’s position was part self-justification, as it was in German interests to ensure the survival of the existing Community and to begin steps towards fusion of the three Communities. It was also a tactical consideration. Kiesinger believed he knew the General. Treating the General too roughly, as the Dutch did, would cause him to break free from the EEC and from NATO. But ‘if handled with the right mixture of firmness and understanding, he could be brought round’.118 Brandt as well as Kiesinger was unwilling to risk Franco-German relations by provoking de Gaulle.119 Brandt in fact told Couve that the Germans were worried about the British economy and that the Germans felt there should be further discussions between the Six before involving the British.120 Germany’s attitude was significant. The French based their tactical decision for the 23 October Community Council meeting on the knowledge that the Germans would not force a breach. In light of Germany’s desire to avoid a crisis, it would not be necessary to issue a direct veto on the starting of

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negotiations. Rather, Couve would continue to prevaricate and delay.121 Thus, Germany’s attitude enabled the French to slip between the twin objectives of Britain’s tactics: neither forced into saying ‘yes’ nor exposed by saying ‘no’. The British were also unsure as to how best to deal with the Germans as Kiesinger prepared to visit London. Some in the Foreign Office, as well as the Minister for Disarmament Lord Chalfont, were tempted to take a strong stance to ‘put some backbone into Dr. Kiesinger’. Britain could withdraw troops from Germany, take no interest in future reunification, and argue that the opportunity to strengthen Europe’s technological base would be lost.122 Palliser, however, recommended that Britain persist in beating on the door to entry, as Kiesinger would not change his tactics, a view shared by the British Embassy in Bonn.123 Palliser’s advice was reminiscent of his guidance during the probe that Wilson should aim to play the European statesman, creating genuine ties of interest with the German leader. Kiesinger, he judged, had been disappointed by Britain’s turn away from Europe after the Second World War. Wilson should aim to play on this aspect of Kiesinger’s complex character, affected also by his unhappy childhood. Palliser suggested that: it is over-simplified to say that this means flattering him: it means something more subtle than flattery. You will continue the process begun so skilfully on your last two visits to Bonn and strengthen both his conviction and his sense of purpose in a way that a crude approach would certainly not achieve.124 The strategy adopted by Wilson did engage in some threat tactics, particularly following indications from the Council of Ministers on 23 October that the French intended to use Britain’s economic weakness to prevent the opening of negotiations. In the Council of Ministers, Couve, apparently to Kiesinger’s surprise, took a much more decisive stance against the opening of negotiations than the Germans had expected.125 The French Foreign Minister argued that the Six could not begin to discuss British entry until Britain could fulfil certain preconditions. Not only was it necessary for Britain’s economy to have recovered, but also sterling should be divested of its role as a reserve currency.126 Kiesinger admitted to Wilson that Couve’s stance looked like a veto.127 The British delegation in Brussels considered that France’s position was extremely negative, but pointed out that the Five had stood up well, forcing France out on a limb.128 Seeing the French as isolated, the British team intensified the pressure on the Germans. Wilson stressed that Britain would ‘not take no for an answer’, would continue to insist that negotiations began. He threatened that the government would have to reconsider various aspects of policy, ‘particularly those which were expensive in terms of our balance of payments’.129 The key issue upon which Britain could exercise some influence was that of the foreign exchange cost of Britain’s troops in Germany. As Callaghan emphasised: If we made the kind of agreement Sir Frank Roberts had been discussing, the net cost of our forces in Germany would still be about 700m DM a year. We should be much better placed to deal with Couve’s arguments

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about the British balance of payments if we did not have a burden of this order.130 Yet, Wilson did take a measured approach to threatening the Germans. In the ten years since Macmillan had evoked an isolationist Britain if the Free Trade Area negotiations collapsed, the efficacy of British blackmail had waned further.131 Paradoxically, the withdrawal of forces from the Far East meant that Britain was much more reliant on its European role. Britain’s tilt towards Europe in defence rendered diplomatic arguments that Britain would pull out of Europe ineffective. As Healey indicated: ‘the government had just taken a decision to base their whole defence policy on the defence of the European theatre and to reduce forces outside Europe’.132 Moreover, Kiesinger was able to challenge Britain’s aims in moving towards a NonProliferation Treaty. Britain could not afford to jeopardise German support for the NPT. The NPT was potentially damaging to Germany’s interests and they sought a guarantee against the Soviet use of political blackmail in dealing with the non-nuclear powers, as well as the use of Euratom safeguards. Kiesinger emphasised that he could do no more to bring the Germans to accept the NPT.133 Trading threats was ineffective not only because of the lack of muscle behind Britain’s approach; it was also dangerous as German support was essential to Britain’s other foreign policy objectives. Kiesinger’s visit to London and Couve’s hard stance did in any case seem to have put new rhetorical life into the German Chancellor’s support for the application. In the Bundestag both Kiesinger and Brandt emphasised the importance of British entry and the dangers to Europe in its denial. Brandt declared that the Six could not expect Britain to fulfil more stringent conditions than the Six had themselves (and particularly the French) in 1958.134 Thus, Wilson’s line was quite different from that chosen by the Minister for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, some days later. In what Chalfont took to be an off-therecord conversation with journalists following an EFTA meeting in Lausanne, he resorted to a ‘fortress Britain’ approach.135 He told journalists that if de Gaulle should veto, Britain would reappraise her European policy. The UK would withdraw completely the BAOR, cut loose from the Four Power Agreement in Berlin, abandon support for the reunification of Germany and reduce Britain’s political and defence commitment to Western Europe.136 Chalfont decided unilaterally to make this statement, but it did reflect his previously declared belief that de Gaulle would be unable to veto and that British pressure could force him to give way.137 He presumably thought the statement would have some impact. It did not: reaction from the continent was muted.138 The Foreign Office disowned Chalfont’s comments with a sideswipe at the Minister for Disarmament: ‘The Permanent Under Secretary said the Foreign Office were the true gospel’.139 Five minutes to midnight:140 the technological community and devaluation, November 1967 On 13 November, Wilson launched his proposals for a European Technological Community at his annual speech in Guildhall. He declared: ‘what I propose now is not a substitute for British membership of the EEC which we stand ready to negotiate now, but a catalyst to a deeper and closer economic integration’.141 Wilson’s technological

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proposals did reflect a genuine fear that European national economies, condemned to smaller domestic markets, could never match the might of the USA.142 However, technological collaboration was no longer simply a policy in its own right, as in 1965, but a lure to get Britain into the EEC and a stick with which to castigate French exclusionary policies. Despite this, Wilson did intend both collaboration and commercial harmonisation to outlive the short-term fate of the bid. Regardless of de Gaulle’s veto, Britain’s industry and business would continue to shift towards the EEC. Wilson was adamant that there should be no technological collaboration without membership: ‘it should be made clear that the whole concept was predicated on British membership of the Communities’.143 He proposed technological collaboration either bilaterally or multilaterally with those members of the Six who wished it. Of the European countries, only Britain had industries with a hope of competing with the USA, in particular in aero-engines (Rolls-Royce), computers and nuclear fast reactors. The prospect of an injection of British wisdom to the economies of the Six could provide an incentive to get Britain into the EEC. It would be a clear indication of what the Six were missing without Britain and an implicit criticism of French policies, which by repelling Britain, subordinated Europe to American superior power. American industry was already making inroads into Europe: IBM in computers, Ford, General Motors and Chrysler in motor vehicles, Honeywell in electronics and Kodak in photography. The danger was that ‘many of the most advanced and rapidly growing sectors of the European economy were in effect controlled from the United States’.144 Beneath the immediate tactics, Wilson attempted to maximise the advantage for the UK economy once Britain did accede to the Community and also provided schemes that could foster Anglo-EEC collaboration regardless of de Gaulle’s verdict. The Guildhall speech fleshed out Britain’s suggestions for a fourth community in technology. As well as bilateral or multilateral collaboration, the Prime Minister suggested the establishment of a European Institute of Technology to examine with governments and industry areas for fruitful technological collaboration.145 Wilson was interested in examining any projects, although thus far, such efforts had not been successful. The more propitious aspect of Wilson’s speech was to foster the economic conditions for increased commercial collaboration in a wider European market. Wilson suggested that the British should move towards economic union, seeking to bring Britain’s economy into line with the Six. His main idea was for a smoothing of the legal ground in order to establish European companies, an area where the Six’s indecision provided opportunity for a British initiative.146 The Six had not determined whether European companies should exist alongside national ones, with privileged legislation, or whether all companies should be obliged to adapt to new regulations.147 Wilson also propounded bringing Britain’s domestic arrangements in patents, monopolies and restrictive practices into line with EEC requirements.148 Apart from Community regulations on capital movements and harmonisation of VAT, where Britain would require transitional periods to adapt to new arrangements, Britain could prepare her economy for Community accession.149 Priming of Britain’s economy for accession, and of Europe’s economy for receiving Britain, could continue even if Britain’s bid failed. Such measures would also help to bolster immediate-term industrial investment and interest in the UK economy. A well-presented idea, Wilson’s launch of the technological community was undermined by Britain’s weak economy. The European press could not help but comment

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on the problems of the British economy, questioning Britain’s ability to deliver technological expertise. The Belgian independent paper, Le Soir, for example, commented that while there was ‘widespread recognition of the boldness of Wilson’s plan’, there were significant economic problems: ‘although Britain has a very real technological contribution to offer, her economy is in a state of stagnation and there is no visible hope of a solution’.150 In Britain, The Economist noted that technological links would be excessively expensive. Britain could ill-afford ‘co-operation on an industrial level to sell products to an as yet non-existent buyer’.151 Five days after the Guildhall speech, the British devalued the pound. It was plausible to suggest that French comments that Britain would have to devalue had gone some way to encourage it, hastening a meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers early in November that encouraged adverse speculation.152 France’s attitude towards the pound was one feature leaning against retention of the parity in the ensuing negotiations. When G10 met in Basle on 13 November, the USA, the Germans and the Italians wanted Britain to hold the rate, but the French and Belgians thought that Britain would be unable to avoid devaluation.153 France’s attitude also contributed to the bedevilling of a possible standby package from the IMF: ‘The Chancellor commented that if the French were going to make the IMF so difficult to work, then it cast a grave doubt on the value of the IMF itself’.154 Yet, acceptance of devaluation was a British decision, reached primarily because Wilson no longer had a choice. By 4 November, Wilson indicated to the Chancellor that, although he remained unconvinced that the critical point at which to jump had been reached, there would be no ‘political veto’ on a change in parity.155 Persistent disequilibrium strengthened the case for devaluation: the longer Britain’s economy was weak, the harder it was to show that other economic policies would work. Britain now required a support package from the IMF of $3bn, or a mixed package of IMF borrowing and accumulation of guaranteed sterling from the US and European central banks.156 Wilson and Callaghan felt that the conditions attached to such a package would prove too onerous, leaving Britain too heavily dependent not only on the USA, but on the Europeans: This must lead to the most searching intrusions not only into our privacy, but even into our economic independence, not least from the French’.157 Thus, in the final instance the British acted to preserve their influence. As Trend put it: ‘we must make sure, so far as we can, that it is an orderly affair rather than a headlong rout’.158 With both Callaghan and Wilson convinced that the alternatives to devaluation would be worse, on 16 November, Cabinet agreed to devalue from $2.80 to a new fixed rate of $2.40.159 Wilson announced the change on Saturday 18 November. Ostensibly, devaluation made little difference to Britain’s persistent approach to the Community. Turning away from the steady drive towards membership would simply confirm the truth behind France’s position, allowing the French to argue that Britain had again excluded herself. Wilson sent an urgent message to each of the heads of government of the Six that the decision to devalue in no way affected ‘our resolve to pursue our declared European policy’.160 He commented to Brown: ‘I expect you will be working out how sterling devaluation could be turned to account in relation to our application to join the Common Market. Clearly it ought to help certainly it undermines part of Couve’s stated position’.161 Couve reiterated French preconditions to British entry in the Council of Ministers on 20 November. Before membership, Britain’s economy

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must recover and the reserve role of sterling must end. The Five resisted; arguing that devaluation made no difference. As a compromise, the Six agreed that the Commission should revise their Opinion to consider devaluation and should make an oral report in mid-December.162

De Gaulle’s press conference, 27 November 1967 It was de Gaulle’s decision to present a negative judgement at a press conference on 27 November that broke the diplomatic deadlock. Devaluation did not cause his decision to proffer a definite block to the opening of negotiations. Patrick Reilly had reported in late October that de Gaulle was planning to veto. Reilly felt that de Gaulle would wait until early in 1968, when the French Assembly would be in recess and France would have the chair of the EEC Council of Ministers. The General would consequently be able to ride out any unpleasant reaction from public opinion before he made further moves against the Atlantic Alliance, now intended for 1969.163 Rather, devaluation supplied unequivocal evidence of Britain’s political and economic weakness, encouraging de Gaulle to advance his public rebuttal. De Gaulle’s press conference presented three main arguments, centred on the question of sterling. First, he claimed that Britain’s economy could not sustain the burdens of membership. Britain’s application for membership was made too early ‘with really extraordinary insistence and haste’, the consequence of Britain’s realisation of her political feebleness and economic failure.164 In particular, fragility meant that Britain could not accept the obligations of the CAP. Payment of the levies would be a ‘crushing burden’ on the British.165 Second, he contended that Britain’s economic weakness illustrated Britain’s continued world power interests. The reserve role of sterling was proof of Britain’s unreadiness to undertake the solidarity accompanying Community membership. For Britain to enter, they would need to undergo a’radical transformation’.166 Sterling’s weakness, illustrated by devaluation, Britain’s debts to the international community and the international character of the pound meant that British entry would disturb the growing financial unity of the Six. Britain’s entry would inevitably ‘break up a Community that was built and operates according to rules which do not tolerate such a monumental exception’.167 He did concede that Britain was moving in a European direction. The British were aware of their loss of power, signalled by the growth of influence of the US, the Soviet Union, China and the EEC and the movement away from Britain of the Commonwealth. They needed to seek membership of the Community because ‘the structure and norms of Britain’s activities and even her national personality are now at stake’.168 But Britain had not come far enough along this path. Britain, ‘owing precisely to its currency, its economy and its politics, is not at present part of the Europe we have begun to build’.169 Third, Britain’s membership would transform the nature of the Community of the Six. This was the nub of the issue: the conflict between the ‘little Europe’ of the Six favoured by de Gaulle and the ‘wider Europe’ represented by enlargement. De Gaulle argued that it would be impossible to enlarge Europe without destruction of the existing Community: ‘The question is whether this could be done today without tearing apart, without breaking up what already exists’.170 Negotiations, de Gaulle argued, would lead to the destruction

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of the efforts the Community had already made: ‘the Six [would have to give] their consent in advance to all the artifices, delays and make-believe liable to conceal the destruction of a structure built up at the cost of so much toil and amidst so many hopes’.171 Moreover, de Gaulle challenged directly Britain’s argument that only an enlarged Europe would have the political strength to stand up to the USA. He maintained that enlargement would lend the Community to the infiltration of American influence not only in politics, but also in trade, economics and finance. Europe’s task was to consolidate itself against such penetration: ‘in order that Europe may counterbalance the immense power of the United States, it must not weaken, but on the contrary, tighten the bonds and rules of the Community’.172 British accession would transform the Community into a completely different entity: one can imagine a free trade area stretching over the whole western part of our continent: one can also imagine some kind of multilateral treaty comparable to the one that will emerge from the Kennedy Round… but in either case, one would first have to abolish the Community and disperse its institutions.173 Thus, de Gaulle claimed as he had in 1963, that whereas French policy would preserve the existing Community, British entry would overwhelm and ultimately condemn it. To a certain extent, the immediate consequences of the press conference were less brutal than in 1963. Then, France’s unilateral action had shocked European and international opinion; in 1967, de Gaulle’s negative judgement was widely expected.174 However, although there was a muted sense of immediate crisis, in 1963, de Gaulle had been able to deliver his verdict because of the strengthening of his domestic and international position. The 1967 veto, by contrast, was a signal of de Gaulle’s weakening power. De Gaulle’s first rebuttal had removed enlargement from the Community’s agenda. The Five, after their initial indignant hostility, had appreciated the need to concentrate on development within the Six.175 After the 1967 veto, the Five were not willing to force a change in French policy, but their endorsement of the principle of enlargement left enlargement at the heart of the Community’s future agenda. Ultimately, France’s vision of a Europe stopped at six could not prevail, as continental opinion accepted that the British bid should persist despite de Gaulle.

A successful failure? The veto, 28 November to 20 December 1967 Britain’s immediate response to the veto was to reiterate that Britain’s application still stood. Britain had applied to the whole Six, not to the French and thus could not withdraw the request.176 As the Guardian put it: ‘Mr. Wilson told Parliament yesterday: we have slammed our application on the table and there it is and there it remains’.177 Thereafter, Cabinet decided to encourage the Five to tighten their pressure on the French in the Council of Ministers. Cabinet accompanied their tactical shift with acknowledgement that they had no alternative other than European membership in the long term: yet, the precise connotations of British accession remained unexplored.

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The Cabinet agreed to coerce the French by encouraging the Five to insist on a date for the opening of negotiations.178 Primarily, ministers wanted to avoid the uncertainty generated by continuation of current policy. De Gaulle’s press conference, by showing that negotiations could not start, meant the British could no longer credibly claim their advent. Consequently, failure to take decisive action would nourish the elements of opinion in the Five that tended to agree with the French verdict and plans for association alternatives could gain currency. The British could not allow opinion to assume that London was contented with the French veto.179 Furthermore, Britain’s actions would have repercussions in NATO and in international liquidity talks. France’s withdrawal from the gold pool and purchases of gold created the risk of crisis as the dollar was under pressure.180 The NATO countries were preparing to take decisions on the Harmel Report on 13–14 December, which outlined a role for NATO in pursuing détente.181 Brown believed that if de Gaulle vetoed in the EEC, it could make him more likely to veto Harmel. Alternatively, as in 1966, strong pressure in the EEC to force the breach could make him reluctant to risk twin crises in the EEC and NATO. Brown argued: ‘by facing these various issues in isolation, we allow de Gaulle to choose his time for piecemeal attacks and so to defeat us in detail’.182 Cabinet’s agreement to increase pressure on the Five was relatively straightforward, although ministerial reasons for giving support differed. Brown argued that the General could be persuaded to yield: ‘it is possible that de Gaulle can be forced to give way’.183 This was unlikely. Whether or not Brown genuinely believed it is unclear. He certainly told the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk of his intentions and was met by disbelief; Con O’Neill intervened to assure Rusk the British knew they could not accede.184 Brown also hoped that the odium created by the obvious breakdown would encourage the Five to paralyse Community development until Britain could join: If we are unable to join the Community now, we shall have ensured that bitterness against France will hold up its progress for what may be a long time’.185 Such a view reflected Brown’s earlier outlook that the Five’s enthusiasm would confound de Gaulle. Others did not share Brown’s optimism. Healey wanted to step up pressure on the Five precisely because he wished to deliver a veto, in order to concentrate on other policies. He commented: ‘do not only push for early negotiations, but that negotiations be concluded quickly, as we do not want the humiliation of a long negotiation and a veto’.186 Tony Crosland, President of the Board of Trade since Jay’s dismissal in late August 1967, disagreed that the Five would thwart Community development for Britain’s sake and argued that Community paralysis was not in Britain’s interests in any case. He also felt that delay would give Britain’s economy time to recover.187 A further view was forwarded at Cabinet that Britain should simply accept the veto. This aside, there was no opposition to the decision to compel a definite verdict on the starting of negotiations.188 Cabinet’s endorsement given, the Five were largely willing to heighten their pressure on the French. The Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns argued in favour of stiffening opinion in the Five to discourage support for association alternatives.189 With de Gaulle’s position so clear, there was less risk of offending the French, a consideration thought to be important for the Germans.190 There was, however, also the sense that some in the Five welcomed the prospect of removing Britain’s bid from the immediate agenda in order to facilitate the next stage of their own development. For instance, Harmel suggested phased accession for the British over a transitional period. In the first phase,

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Britain would discuss the technical problems of integrating Britain’s economy to that of the Six and in the second would engage in more detailed talks on the institutional arrangements required. Crucially, Britain would not receive voting rights in the Community at the beginning of the technical discussions.191 This meant that during the 1969 agricultural review, Britain would be committed to Community membership at the end of the transitional period, but unable to influence the shape of the settlement. While Harmel’s proposal constituted a realistic attempt to seek a solution, it also reflected the fact that it would benefit the Five to be able to settle in 1969 without having to take account of Britain’s considerable interests. The influential German official Rolf Lahr also argued in favour of phased accession.192 The Council of Ministers’ meeting on 19 December resulted in a distinct cleavage of opinion between the Five and the French. First, led by Brandt, the Five showed their disagreement with Couve’s assessments on Britain’s economic recovery, arguing that negotiations should start regardless of Britain’s economic state. Negotiations would provide a stimulus to Britain’s economic recovery. Brandt also agreed with the Treasury prognosis on the value of the sterling balances. The balances were not, he maintained a source of volatility and the UK had indicated willingness to discuss solutions and had agreed not to draw on Article 108. Luns, Rey and Harmel affirmed that opening negotiations would help sterling. Fanfani urged that no one state had the right to prevent negotiations and the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Pierre Grégoire argued that the UK’s economy was fundamentally the same as the Six’s except for the losses incurred during the war. For these losses, the Luxembourgers were extremely grateful. Couve asked whether it could be possible to reach a compromise, as everyone agreed that Britain’s economy should first recover and Schiller, the Chair of the Council, supported him. The Five continued to resist and Couve finally admitted there was no agreement on the question of the UK’s economic recovery and the start of negotiations.193 On the conditions of membership, it was apparent that the Five thought that if negotiations started, they would succeed. Brandt maintained that Britain would have to accept the CAP and could have a transitional period, although it would help if this were short. Fanfani reiterated that the UK had accepted the CAP in principle and with regard to demands for New Zealand butter and Commonwealth sugar, the UK was not asking for as much as the French had for their African associates. Luns and Harmel both indicated their view that Britain’s position constituted a satisfactory basis for negotiations and Grégoire professed that the UK should have the same period to adapt to the agricultural prices as the Six had required themselves. It was not in the Community’s interest to place too heavy a burden on the UK. Precise solutions to the difficulties would, it was plain, prove difficult to reach. Brandt indicated the German view that in the enlarged Community, it would be necessary for states to hand over 90 per cent of their levy payments to the FEOGA (Guidance and Guarantee Fund). This would, he admitted, place a heavy onus on the UK, but felt that the requirement to admit New Zealand butter and Commonwealth sugar would burden the Community.194 Despite the attempts at compromise between the Six, the communiqué issued by the Council left no doubt that only France opposed the extension of the Communities. It stated first that although no member state raised objection in principle to enlargement, one member state believed that enlargement would modify the Community in a ‘profound fashion’. Second, all members thought that Britain’s economy needed to recover first, but

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‘several’ (thought to mean all Five) did not regard complete recovery as a precondition of membership. Five member states believed that negotiations could occur alongside economic recovery. One member state thought that recovery of the British economy should be concluded so that the UK’s economic requirements could be reconsidered.195 To the Cabinet, Brown presented the Council’s decision as a victory for Britain’s policy: ‘the December meeting of the EEC ministers had done as we wished and forced the issue. We had succeeded in eliciting a clear veto by the French on the opening of negotiations’.196 Success in eliciting a clear veto was an uncertain triumph. The French stood apart from the dominant current of opinion in the Community: that the existing Community could accept enlargement. The Foreign Office’s guidance telegram stressed that given the support of the Five and public opinion, Western Europe would inevitably one day find unity.197 Harmel stated that enlargement was the way to unify Europe, illustrating lack of support among the Five for France’s preference for a tightly knit Community of Six. Luns agreed that France’s obstructionism blocked the development of the Community and the Commission reiterated that negotiations should open.198 De Gaulle and the French were isolated. French signature to the Harmel Report indicated the contraction of de Gaulle’s options in the wider arena of NATO.199 These developments suggested the weakening of French influence in Europe and a British victory for the kind of Europe that should emerge in the future: a victory for wider European unity. It was more doubtful that the Five would embrace Community deadlock for the sake of British accession. In the immediate term, the Dutch had withdrawn from agricultural talks and the Six had cancelled a Finance Ministers’ meeting. Wilson hoped that the Germans would withhold funding for the CAP unless Britain joined.200 The press argued that the Five were willing and capable of forestalling Community development: ‘An open crisis in the Common Market is now inevitable’.201 Although the Five wanted to sustain discussion of enlargement, their desire for further ossification of the Community after the empty chair crisis was questionable. The emotional tone of the 19 December Council was less an expression of intent, than the result of an over-pitched intervention by Rey that led the Italians, Dutch and Belgians to state clearly their frustration with France’s policies.202 Taking a longer perspective, peaceful resolution of the 1969 agricultural review, confirming the end of the Community’s transitional period, was likely to be the priority of all the Six.203 Domestically, the close of the application also delivered an ambiguous victory. Brown outlined in Cabinet Britain’s objective of attaining full membership in the future: ‘maintain the longer-term objective of full membership as a valid and credible policy in the eyes of public opinion here and in Europe’.204 The reasons for this decision had not changed. An official paper reiterated the arguments of April 1967 that in the long run, there existed no satisfactory alternative economic grouping with which Britain could join. To sustain political strength and influence, Britain needed access to the EEC’s large and sophisticated market.205 Cabinet ministers endorsed without question the continuation of Britain’s approach to the Community. That they did so reflected the enduring success of Wilson’s handling of the Cabinet, but the veto added to the unreality ministers felt about British entry into the EEC. Grossman wrote that although he found ‘unattractive’ the policy of trying to get into the Community at all costs, there was little option with Wilson, Brown and the new Chancellor Roy Jenkins all in favour of membership.206 For the tactical waverers of the previous April, the closure of the application was a relief.

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Denis Healey wanted to discharge the government from consideration of a wasted policy in order to concentrate on areas more imminently likely to bear fruit. In particular, he wished to devote attention to the creation of a European Defence Caucus that would strengthen Europe’s place in the Atlantic Alliance and would enable Britain to play a leading role in European defence.207 Moreover, devaluation further tightened Britain’s options. To enforce the devaluation, Jenkins intended to press hard for an acceleration of Britain’s defence cuts in the Far East. Consequently, Jenkins reinforced the sense that there was nowhere else to go but Europe.208 Cabinet’s decision in April to apply for membership was born from economic defeat. Confirmation of this choice in December stemmed from the deeper defeats inflicted by devaluation and de Gaulle’s veto.

Notes 1 Young (1993, pp. 100–1); Greenwood (1992, p. 92); Reynolds (2000, p. 218). 2 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 206–12, 239–40). 3 Ibid. (pp. 139–48). 4 TNA FCO30/91, FO to Brussels, tel. 439, 6 May 1967. 5 Hansard, vol. 746, col. 311, 2 May 1967. 6 Ibid., col. 312 7 Ibid., cols. 312–13 8 Ibid., col. 313 9 The Economist, ‘It’s a Blank Cheque’, 6 May 1967. 10 Deighton (2001, p. 396). 11 See also Young (1998, pp. 195–6); Kitzinger, (1973, p. 288). 12 TNA FCO30/91, Malcolm to Statham, 11 May 1967; Simpson-Orlebar to Cambridge, 11 May 1967; Rome to FO, tel. 415, 12 May 1967. 13 TNA FCO30/91, Rome to FO, tel. 413, 12 May 1967; Paris to FO, tel. 426, 12 May 1967; The Hague to FO, tel. 181, 12 May 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 767, 12 May 1967. 14 TNA FCO30/169, Paris to FO, tel. 418, 11 May 1967. 15 TNA FCO30/91, The Hague to FO, tel. 181, 12 May 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 767, 12 May 1967. 16 TNA FCO30/91, Rome to FO, tel. 415, 12 May 1967. 17 TNA FCO30/91, Paris to FO, tel. 426, 12 May 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 765, 12 May 1967. 18 TNA PREM13/1482, FO to Paris, tel. 1206, 12 May 1967. 19 De Gaulle’s Press Conference, 16 May 1967, Kitzinger (1968, p. 180); TNA FCO30/170, Paris to FO, tel. 440, 16 May 1967 and tel. 443, 17 May 1967; de Gaulle’s press conference is also reproduced in Keesings Contemporary Archive [henceforward KCA], vol. xvi, part 1, 22246–7, September 9–16, 1967. 20 De Gaulle’s press conference, 16 May 1967; Kitzinger (1968, p. 184). 21 Ibid. (p. 183). 22 Ibid. (p. 188). 23 The Times, ‘Gen [sic] de Gaulle says it again: British association conceivable, fusion of policies impossible’, p. 1, 17 May 1967. 24 TNA FCO30/170, Reilly to FO, tel. 439, 16 May 1967; The Times, ibid. 25 TNA PREM13/1482, O’Neill to Gore-Booth, 18 May 1967; TNA FCO30/170, Brown comments on O’Neill to Maclehose, 18 May 1967. 26 TNA FCO30/179, Bonn to FO, tel. 783, 17 May 1967. 27 TNA FCO30/190, Bonn to FO, tel. 797, 20 May 1967. 28 TNA FCO30/170, Brussels to FO, tel. 257, 18 May 1967. 29 TNA FCO30/170, Paris to FO, tel. 464, 19 May 1967.

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30 TNA FCO30/170, Rome to FO, tel. 432, 18 May 1967. 31 See Ludlow (1997a, pp. 226–8). 32 Ludlow (2003a, pp. 138–9). 33 TNA FCO30/170, FO guidance tel. 102, 16 May 1967. 34 The Times, Leader Comment, ‘Not Taking Non for an Answer’, p. 9, 17 May 1967. 35 The Economist, ‘Not Absolutely Like 1963’, p. 884, 27 May 1967. 36 TNA FCO30/170, Paris to FO, tel. 83, 31 May 1967. 37 TNA PREM13/1482, Paris to FO, tel. 552, 5 June 1967. 38 TNA FCO30/190, Bonn to FO, tel. 840, 31 May 1967. 39 TNA FCO30/92, Statham to O’Neill, 7 June 1967. 40 TNA PREM13/1483, Brussels to FO, tel. 165, 27 June 1967; KCA, vol. xvi, part 1, 22247, 9–16 September 1967. 41 Ibid. 42 TNA FCO41/38, Defence Policy in the Far East, Briefing for Visit to de Gaulle, 14 June 1967; TNA PREM13/1906, Wilson—Johnson, 2 June 1967, 3 pm. 43 Wilson (1971, p. 522). 44 TNA CAB130/325, MISC153(67)1st, Nuclear Aspects of Technological Co-operation, 15 June 1967. 45 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/9, meeting with Wilson, 12 June 1967. 46 TNA CAB130/325, MISC153(67)1st, Nuclear Aspects of Technological Co-operation, 15 June 1967. 47 TNA PREM13/1479, Reilly to Mulley, 20 April 1967. 48 TNA PREM13/1482, Ramsbotham to Campbell, 14 April 1967. 49 Sir Michael Palliser, interview with author, 5 November 2001. 50 TNA PREM13/1731, Wilson—De Gaulle, 19 June 1967, 4 pm. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 TNA PREM13/1521, ‘Review of French efforts in the nuclear weapons field as they might be seen through General de Gaulle’s eyes’, Zuckerman, 13 June 1967. 54 Schrafstetter and Twigge (2002, pp. 256–8). 55 TNA PREM13/1731, Wilson—De Gaulle, 19 June 1967, 4 pm. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 TNA PREM13/1483, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 28 June 1967; Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6926. folio Paris 1967. 59 TNA PREM13/1521, Wilson to Johnson, 22 June 1967. 60 TNA PREM13/1484, Wilson comments on Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967. 61 TNA PREM13/1483, Wilson to Palliser, 27 June 1967. 62 TNA PREM13/1482, Palliser to Wilson, 11 May 1967. 63 TNA CAB134/2803, EUR(M)(67)1, 24 May 1967. 64 TNA CAB134/2833, EUR(S)(67)1st, 9 June 1966. 65 Hannay (2000, p. 10). 66 TNA CAB134/2803, EUR(M)(67)1st, 5 June 1967. 67 TNA PREM13/1483, Wilson to Jay, 27 June 1967. 68 Wilson (1971, p. 545); Jay (1980, p. 408); Pimlott (1992, p. 467). 69 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)44, 3 July 1967. 70 TNA CAB134/2803, EUR(M)(67)2nd, 20 June 1967. 71 Ibid. 72 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)44, 3 July 1967. 73 Brown Statement to the WEU 4 July 1967, Kitzinger (1968, p. 195); also KCA, vol. xvi, part 1, 22248, September 9–16 1967. 74 TNA PREM13/1483, The Hague to FO, tel. 290, 4 July 1967.

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75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 TNA PREM13/1483, The Hague to FO, tel. 290, 4 July 1967. 79 TNA CAB 128/42, CC(67)46th; Hannay (2000, p. 10). 80 TNA PREM13/1484, Palliser to Wilson, 15 July 1967. 81 TNA PREM13/1483, Paris to FO, tel. 738, 12 July 1967. 82 TNA FCO30/170, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 July 1967; on ICBMs also see TNA PREM13/1515, Palliser to Wilson, 4 August 1967. 83 TNA PREM13/1484, Wilson’s comments on Palliser to Wilson, 15 July 1967; Young (1993, p. 100). 84 TNA PREM13/1851, Wilson—Zuckerman—Trend, 1 August 1967. 85 TNA PREM13/1851, Trend to Wilson, 24 July 1967. 86 TNA FCO30/170, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 14 July 1967; TNA PREM13/1484, Palliser to Barnes, 14 July 1967. 87 Bozo (2001, pp. 193–6); Ellison (2001); Haftendorn (2001, pp. 285–322). 88 Schrafstetter and Twigge (2002, pp. 253–72) shows how these policies endured after the veto. 89 TNA PREM13/1482, Palliser comments on Marjoribanks to FO, tel. 132, 2 June 1967; also TNA PREM13/1485, conversation between the President of the Board of Trade and Danish Ambassador Herr Gundelach, 30 September 1967. 90 TNA PREM13/1469, The EEC Commission’s Opinion [henceforward Opinion], 29 September 1967; for a published reproduction of this text, Kitzinger (1968, para. 8, p. 210 and para. 194, p. 299) and KCA, vol. xvii, part 1, 23166–70, 1–8 February 1969; see also Ludlow (2003a, p. 143). 91 Opinion, paras 54–77; Kitzinger (1968, pp. 232–44); see also TNA PREM13/1484, Brussels to FO, tel. 251, 30 September 1967. 92 Opinion, paras 65–6; Kitzinger (1968, pp. 237–8), Opinion, para. 165; Kitzinger (1968, pp. 286–7). 93 ibid., para. 77, p. 244. 94 ibid., paras 81–2, 89, pp. 248–50. 95 ibid., para. 95, p. 253. 96 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)58th, 11 October 1967. 97 Strange (1967, pp. 8–10). 98 See also TNA PREM13/1485, Treasury Response to the Commission’s Opinion, 2 October 1967; TNA CAB134/2822, EUR(O)(67)123, Analysis of the Commission’s Opinion, 8 December 1967. 99 For example, TNA CAB134/2803, EUR(M)(67)12, International Role of Sterling, Treasury, 27 June 1967; TNA CAB134/2804, EUR(M)(67)23, Contacts with the Commission, 11 September 1967. 100 Opinion, paras 86–8; Kitzinger (1968, pp. 249–50). 101 Opinion, para. 100, p. 255; TNA FCO30/96, Hildyard to Statham, 2 June 1967. 102 BOE OV53/52, Hubback Report on Munich Meeting of the Six, 19 April 1967. 103 Schenk (2002, p. 363); James (1996, pp. 168–71); O’Hara (2003, pp. 269–71). 104 Opinion, para. 99; Kitzinger (1968, p. 254). 105 BOE OV53/36, draft article by Chancellor for Le Monde, 24–25 September 1967. 106 TNA FCO30/112, draft by Roger Lavelle for Mansion House speech, 26 October 1967; TNA PREM13/1485, Treasury Response to the Commission’s Opinion, 2 October 1967. 107 TNA PREM13/1484, Palliser to Wilson, 22 September 1967. 108 TNA PREM13/1484, Marjoribanks to FO, 27 September 1967; TNA PREM13/1485, Crosland—Rey, 2 October 1967. 109 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)58th, 11 October 1967.

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110 Hannay (2000, p. 83). 111 TNA FCO30/191, Bonn to FO, tel. 1284, 23 September 1967. 112 TNA PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967. 113 TNA PREM13/1485, Reilly to FO, tel. 975, 5 October 1967; Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6926. folio Paris 1967. 114 TNA PREM13/1485, Reilly to FO, tel. 975, 5 October 1967; Palliser to Wilson, 6 October 1967; Paris to FO, tel. 983, 6 October 1967. 115 TNA PREM13/1485, Situations we might face and what our attitudes to them might be, Cabinet Office, 16 October 1967. 116 TNA PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967. 117 TNA PREM13/1485, Bonn to FO, tel. 1397, 19 October 1967. 118 Ibid. 119 TNA FCO30/191, Bonn to FO, tel. 1404, 19 October 1967. 120 TNA FCO30/171, Roberts to FO, tel. 1392; Paris to FO, tel. 1028, 18 October 1967. 121 TNA FCO30/171, Brussels to FO, tel. 307, 19 October 1967. 122 TNA CAB134/2822, EUR(O)(67)122, Visit of Kiesinger to London, Foreign Office, 20 October 1967; on Chalfont’s attitude, TNA PREM13/1486, Chalfont to Brown, 20 October 1967. 123 TNA PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967; TNA PREM13/1485, Bonn to FO, tel. 1397, 19 October 1967. 124 TNA PREM13/1527, Palliser to Wilson, 21 October 1967. 125 The suggestion that Kiesinger genuinely believed that the French could be brought to negotiate eventually was made in TNA PREM13/1527, Mitchell to Wilson, 8 November 1967. 126 TNA PREM13/1486, Marjoribanks to FO, tel. 9, 23 October 1967; Maitland to Brown, 24 October 1967. 127 TNA PREM13/1527, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 24 October 1967. 128 TNA PREM13/1486, Marjoribanks to FO, tel. 9, 23 October 1967; Maitland to Brown, 24 October 1967. 129 TNA PREM13/1527, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 24 October 1967. 130 Ibid. 131 On Macmillan’s suggestion of these tactics, Ellison (2000a, pp. 200–1). 132 TNA PREM13/1527, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 24 October 1967. 133 Ibid. 134 TNA PREM13/1489, Bonn to FO, tel. 1449, 27 October 1967; FCO30/192, Bonn to FO, tel. 1450, 27 October 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 1444, 26 October 1967; Dean to Gore-Booth, 1 November 1967. 135 Chalfont (2000, pp. 122–3); Wilson, (1971, p. 567). 136 Daily Mirror, ‘The Rumour that Shook Europe Last Night’, 28 October 1967; Kitzinger (1968, p. 301). 137 TNA PREM13/1484, Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967. 138 TNA FCO30/192, Bonn to FO, tel. 1455, 29 October 1967. 139 TNA FCO30/192, FO to Bonn, tel. 2754, 29 October 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 1455, 29 October 1967. 140 Comment made by Callaghan, cited in Wilson (1971, p. 572). 141 Guildhall speech, in Kitzinger (1968, p. 307). 142 TNA CAB134/2822, EURO(67)126, The Industrial and Technological Advantages of an Enlarged Common Market, Secretaries, 17 October 1967. 143 TNA PREM13/1851, Wilson—Trend—Zuckerman, 2 November 1967. 144 TNA CAB134/2822, EURO(67)126, The Industrial and Technological Advantages of an Enlarged Common Market, Secretaries, 17 October 1967. 145 Guildhall speech, Kitzinger (1968, p. 308).

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146 Ibid. (p. 309). 147 TNA CAB134/2822, EURO(67)131, Steps following the Guildhall Speech, Secretaries, 4 December 1967. 148 Guildhall speech, Kitzinger (1968, p. 309). 149 TNA CAB134/2822, EURO(67)131, Steps following the Guildhall Speech, Secretaries, 4 December 1967. 150 TNA PREM13/1728, Brussels to FO, tel. 645, 15 November 1967. 151 The Economist, ‘Technology: Europe and Wilson’, p. 770, 18 November 1967. 152 Wilson (1971, pp. 570–4). 153 BOE, OV44/143, Baldwin Note for the Record, Report of Central Banks Meeting in Basle, 13 November 1967. 154 BOE, OV44/140, Baldwin note recording meeting with Chancellor, Governor of the Bank, Armstrong, Trend, Morse, Posner, 15 November 1967; The Economist, ‘Devaluation’, p. 825, 25 November 1967. 155 Wilson (1971, p. 570); TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson to Callaghan, 5 November 1967. 156 BOE, OV44/140, Baldwin note recording meeting with Chancellor, Governor of the Bank, Armstrong, Trend, Morse, Posner, 15 November 1967. 157 Wilson (1971, p. 577). 158 TNA PREM13/1477, Trend to Wilson, 14 November 1967. 159 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)66th, 16 November 1967. 160 TNA PREM13/1487, FO to Vienna, tel. 472, 19 November 1967. 161 TNA PREM13/1487, Wilson to Brown, 24 November 1967. 162 TNA FCO30/95, Brussels to FO, tel. 370, 20 November 1967. 163 TNA PREM13/1486, Reilly to Gore-Booth, 26 October 1967. 164 De Gaulle’s Press Conference, Kitzinger (1968, p. 312); the press conference is also reproduced in KCA, vol. xvi, part 2, 22521, 10–17 February 1968. 165 Kitzinger (1968, p. 315). 166 Ibid. (p. 312). 167 Ibid. (p. 315). 168 Ibid. (p. 314). 169 Ibid. (p. 315). 170 Ibid. (p. 312). 171 Ibid. (pp. 315–16). 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. (p. 316). 174 The Times, ‘De Gaulle rules out early negotiations with Britain’, Charles Hargrove, p. 1, 28 November 1967. 175 Ludlow (1997a, pp. 216–30). 176 Hansard, vol. 755, col. 234, 28 November 1967. 177 Guardian, ‘Britain’s right to be heard’, p. 1, 29 November 1967. 178 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)69th, 30 November 1967. 179 TNA CAB129/134, C(67)187, The Approach to Europe, Foreign Secretary, 28 November 1967; TNA PREM13/1487, Palliser comments on Grossman to Wilson, 29 November 1967. 180 BOE, OV53/37, Ryrie to Rickett, 28 November 1967. 181 Bozo (2001, pp. 196–7); Ellison (2001); Haftendorn (2001, pp. 315–18). 182 TNA CAB129/134, C(67)187, The Approach to Europe, Foreign Secretary, 28 November 1967. 183 Ibid. 184 FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, no. 280, Rusk to State Department, 13 December 1967; also TNA FCO33/44, FO to Washington, tel. 13004, 6 December 1967; Washington to FO, tel. 1244, 8 December 1967.

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185 TNA CAB129/134, C(67)187, The Approach to Europe, Foreign Secretary, 28 November 1967. 186 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)69th, 30 November 1967. 187 TNA PREM13/1487, Crosland to Wilson, 29 November 1967. 188 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)69th, 30 November 1967. 189 TNA PREM13/1487, Luns—Wilson, 5 December 1967. 190 Ibid. 191 TNA PREM13/1487, FO to Brussels, tel. 2365, 2 December 1967; FO to Brussels, tel. 2367, 2 December 1967; Brussels to FO, tel. 698, 1 December 1967. 192 TNA FCO30/193, O’Neill—Lahr, 6 December 1967. 193 TNA PREM13/1488, Brussels to FO, tel. 89, 19 December 1967. 194 Ibid. 195 TNA PREM13/1488, Brussels to FO, tel. 421, 19 December 1967. 196 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)73rd, 20 December 1967. 197 TNA PREM13/1488, FO statement, 19 December 1967; The Times, ‘France votes to bar Britain’s entry into the Common Market’, p. 1, 20 December 1967. 198 TNA PREM13/1488, The Hague to FO, tel. 573, 21 December 1967; Brussels to FO, tel. 429, 21 December 1967. 199 Ellison (2001); Bozo (2001, pp. 187–213); Haftendorn (2001, pp. 318–21). 200 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)69th, 30 November 1967. 201 The Times, ‘Moment of Truth for the Common Market’, David Spanier, p. 1, 28 November 1967. 202 Ludlow (forthcoming). 203 Ibid.; FRUS, Western European Region 1964–1968, vol. xiii, no. 283, Intelligence Note 1020, pp. 654–8. 204 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)73rd, 20 December 1967. 205 TNA CAB134/2822, EUR(O)(67)132, The Consequences of UK Exclusion from the EEC, Secretaries, 21 December 1967. 206 Grossman (1976, p. 614, 20 December 1967). 207 TNA CAB134/2822, EUR(O)(67)132, The Consequences of UK Exclusion from the EEC, Secretaries, 21 December 1967. 208 Dockrill (2002, pp. 202–8); Carver (1992, p. 84); Pickering (1998, pp. 152–71).

Conclusions

What disturbed me about your speech on Saturday was that it had no warmth of feeling for Europe, no sense of regret that you could not approve the terms. If that was really your heart and mind about the matter, was it right to apply?1

The transition in Britain’s foreign policy between 1964 and 1967 has widely been regarded as inevitable. Writers in the 1970s interpreted the shift from Empire to Europe in terms of the time lag between economic realities and political perceptions.2 Northedge, for instance, described the ‘inescapable logic of Britain’s movement to Europe’.3 The hard facts about Britain’s external position would translate into policy choices. In this analysis, Wilson’s turn to the EEC was the result of the experiences of office, catching up with the Conservatives’ reappraisal of 1961.4 Stewart’s note to Wilson as the Labour Party began to turn away from membership in the early 1970s, quoted above, further illustrates a widely held assumption. Once the decision to apply was taken, it was a foregone conclusion that Labour would accept the terms.5 This book has rejected the interpretation that Britain’s turn to the EEC was inevitable and continuous. Rather, it has attempted to reconstruct the way in which policy makers viewed events at the time. By emphasising the gradual development of policy, this book set out to address three main issues concerning Harold Wilson’s approach to the EEC: first, continuity with Harold Macmillan’s application; second, ministerial support for the EEC bid; and third, the way in which Britain’s initiative interacted with the development of the Community itself. Consequently, this book presents three new conclusions. It shows that Wilson’s policy towards the European Community in the first term of office did have a more coherent rationale than some authors would suppose. Wilson was pragmatic, and his policy developed in response to external events. Nevertheless, it was never inevitable that Wilson would apply for membership of the EEC while de Gaulle was still in power, thus, it was still the shock of the July 1966 sterling crisis that precipitated the Prime Minister towards an initiative. Second, that 1967 was a turning point in the reconciliation of Britain’s political class to a European future. Wilson did address the political importance of Community membership with the Cabinet to secure ministerial support for the unconditional application, but he did not gain agreement on the terms under which Britain would accede to the Community. Third, that despite de Gaulle’s veto, Britain’s second application was a watershed in British relations with the Community. The British initiative brought further evidence of the eclipse of Gaullist

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dominance within the EEC. France’s vision of a Europe of Six, a vision hitherto illustrated as commensurate with the Community’s own interests, would not survive the Five’s preference for an enlarged EEC. British membership of the Community in the future was virtually assured. These three conclusions will now be discussed in more detail. The first point this book seeks to elucidate is the question of continuity with Harold Macmillan’s 1961–3 initiative for membership. Essentially, the issue of continuity concerns how the British managed the relative contraction of their economic power. As many survey writers have assumed, did all roads lead inexorably to Rome?6 Wilson’s policy towards the European Community certainly did not appear continuous with previous British policy when Labour took office in 1964. Yet by the close of 1967, Wilson had applied and failed to attain membership of the European Community; Three differing interpretations have attempted to explain Wilson’s policy. One suggests that Wilson was initially ‘deluded by grandeur’, yet was pushed towards the EEC once the government realised the economic contraction of its power.7 Another posits that Wilson’s initiative was purely a tactical device to unite the party and to divert attention from economic disaster following the July 1966 sterling crisis.8 A third argues that Wilson had greater strategic vision, but obscured his intentions for domestic political reasons during the first term in office.9 This book has moved away from these interpretations, instead stressing that Wilson was a pragmatist. Wilson was not pushed reluctantly and inexorably towards the EEC, but rather his policy developed in response to changing circumstances. Thus, it is consistent to suggest that although Wilson clearly did appreciate the political importance of EEC membership in 1962, he might not have applied for membership in 1966–7 had circumstances evolved differently. This argument grounds Wilson’s policy in strategic considerations; however, this attempt to reconstruct policy as it appeared at the time also facilitates criticism of that policy. While Wilson came to power with ideas for the modernisation of Britain, these ideas were founded upon unrealistic assumptions about the European Community and how best to reach an accommodation with it. Consequently, Wilson’s policy developed between 1964 and 1966 in a reactive fashion, as Britain’s existing stance was proved inadequate to meet the challenge posed by the Six. Nevertheless, once the pressure for change became irresistible in the summer of 1966, Wilson turned to the EEC in a serious attempt to provide a framework for future British policy. Entry into the Community would shore up Britain’s weakening position, but it was also an answer to the question of Britain’s orientation in the modern world. This explanation highlights the importance of the summer of 1962 in defining the Labour Party’s stance towards European Community membership. Wilson did appreciate the political significance of membership of the European Community while in opposition. Thomas Balogh, Wilson’s close colleague and a later sceptic about Community membership, indicated in 1961 his appreciation that without membership of the EEC, ‘the special relationship is dead’ and Britain’s ties with the Commonwealth could not last.10 Wilson himself noted the dynamism of the EEC, depicting the Community as a ‘go-ahead young man’, contrasted to Britain’s ‘faded beauty’.11 Wilson thus implied that Britain would have to come to terms with the EEC for political reasons, but continued to demonstrate deepseated ambivalence about the relationship between the EEC and the Commonwealth. Were Britain forced to make a political choice between the

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Commonwealth and the Community, Wilson could not decide in which direction he would turn. Gaitskell’s decision, revealed at the October 1962 Labour Party conference, to emphasise the importance of the Commonwealth in Britain’s reconciliation with the Community, had considerable significance for the Party’s stance. The traditional interpretation is that Gaitskell’s choice ‘closed the door’ to EEC membership in principle.12 In fact, Gaitskell confirmed Labour’s political support for an ultimate future in Europe, but contested Conservative policy seriously on the terms under which Britain should accede. Clearly, Gaitskell could see tactical advantage in adopting this posture. As the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting loomed, criticism of the terms provisionally agreed for British accession would place pressure on the Conservative negotiators. Support for the Commonwealth was a party unifier, unequivocal support for the EEC potentially a party divider, and in this way, Gaitskell could elude serious discussion about Labour’s stance towards the terms. However, Gaitskell’s position was also sincere.13 With no direct experience of the Community as negotiators and no real understanding of the importance of the CAP to the Six, the Labour leadership genuinely thought the terms on offer to be inadequate, both because of Commonwealth trade and because of the position of the EFTA neutrals. The Conservatives would accept the terms because Macmillan wanted to get into the Community in order to benefit from the invigorating ‘cold douche’ of competition. Ludlow’s conclusion that Macmillan erred in underselling the negotiations to a domestic audience, raising expectations as to what could be attained in Brussels, thus acquires additional significance.14 Far from splitting the Labour Party, Macmillan’s conditional application allowed Gaitskell credibly to take such a position and did nothing to challenge the widespread assumption that better terms were a plausible goal.15 Once Wilson became leader, his policy towards the EEC developed in a pragmatic fashion. Gaitskell had established the main lines of party policy— that Labour accepted the principle and not the terms—and the failure of the Conservative application meant there was no reason to open any internal dispute about the Community while the door to the Community was closed. Wilson’s task was to formulate a coherent programme for the modernisation of Britain. De Gaulle’s veto on British entry meant that Wilson could extract political points from the Conservatives, emphasising that whereas the Tory vision for British regeneration had centred on getting into the EEC, Labour offered a coherent and plausible alternative.16 With the EEC ruled out, Wilson developed Britain’s overseas policy in an internationalist direction. He stressed the renewal of the Commonwealth, without doubt a policy with which he had more natural affinity and with which the Party had less contention, but also outlining a progressive notion that Britain’s role was to assist the more underdeveloped parts of the world. British defence East of Suez was part of this vision of Britain as a post-imperial power, bringing prosperity and stability to the more vulnerable areas of the globe.17 On the domestic front, Wilson argued that whereas Conservative economic modernisation had depended upon entry into the Community, Labour’s conception was for indicative economic planning and for the restructuring of the industrial economy, partly through a heightened focus on scientific and technological endeavour.18 As part of these policies, Wilson continued to maintain that Britain could join the ‘right sort’ of Europe. Exactly what the ‘right sort’ of Europe would be was not

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articulated openly, but to his European counterparts, Wilson emphasised that Britain would not make changes to British trade with the Commonwealth and could not participate in any kind of federal grouping.19 Britain’s policies in 1964 reflected these broad considerations. Wilson aimed to use the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations to penetrate more easily the Community’s market, to emphasise the importance of EFTA as a symbol of Britain’s ‘outward looking’ preference in trade and to prevent the creation of a quasi-federal European political grouping from which Britain was excluded. Importantly, the ‘right sort’ of Europe also had an economic dimension distinctive to the Labour Party. The Department of Economic Affairs sought joint initiatives in economic planning, particularly with the French. Wilson aimed to engender connections in technological and industrial policy, focused again on relations with France. Tied with Wilson’s desire to create a flourishing industrial base in the UK, Wilson’s technological policy sought to expand the export potential for Britain’s industrial produce by gaining access to the Community market. Technological ties would also create joint European ventures that would, because of the better returns for research and development investment, be capable of standing up to the two superpowers. In particular, Wilson wanted to develop military aircraft in partnership with the French, although he also suggested the joint development of large computers as a possible option.20 Thus, Wilson’s policy towards the European Community developed with regard to external circumstances and was founded upon more coherent reasoning than many of his critics would suggest. However, this interpretation does not go as far as some commentary on earlier British policy towards the Community, as it does not suggest that Wilson’s approach was ‘farsighted, efficient and well-informed—close to the ideal rational actor’.21 On the contrary, Wilson’s policy towards the Community was based on several flawed assumptions about the European Community and Britain’s position towards it. To begin with, Wilson’s approach was grounded upon an absence of reconsideration of Britain’s ultimate posture towards Community membership. The failure of the Conservative bid had enabled Wilson to evade serious thought about future membership. He did not have to attempt to reconcile his ambivalence about the relationship between the Commonwealth and the Community, nor did he have to express precisely what the ‘right sort’ of Europe could entail. Moreover, in 1964 Wilson displayed an indifference towards the possible break-up of the Community, commenting that if it did collapse, Britain could reconfigure the remaining EEC into an entity more representative of Britain’s interests.22 Wilson’s attitude, admittedly revealed in response to official advice, deviated from the benevolence the British had generally shown towards the continuation of supranational integration since the creation of the ECSC.23 The Prime Minister underestimated the capacity of the Community to heal its difficulties for the sake of its future development and overestimated the Community’s will for alternative British solutions. In addition, Wilson’s conception of diplomacy with the Community was based upon bilateralism. The negotiators in Brussels had developed experience of the EEC system that incoming Labour ministers lacked. Wilson’s thinking centred upon the kind of political deals one leader could effect with another, whereas the Foreign Office suggested that Britain should deal with the Community as a whole. The Foreign Office argued that Britain could not hope to convince the Six to grant major abrogation from the Community’s acquis communautaire before Britain joined. Instead, Britain would have

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to accept a limited loss of sovereignty in return for greater influence once inside the EEC.24 Wilson’s notion of sovereignty and of supranationality was much more rigid. Outside the Community, Britain was sovereign, once inside the British would be precipitated ineluctably towards a loss of independence.25 As a consequence, Wilson exaggerated the influence Britain could wield from the Community’s fringes. Moreover, in thinking about British diplomacy with the Community, the Prime Minister prioritised Britain’s relations with France. A policy of ‘France first’ reflected left-wing views that Germany could not fully be trusted, but Wilson also demonstrated a belief that de Gaulle, as a statesman who emphasised the importance of national sovereignty, shared a fundamental outlook with Britain.26 Britain and France were sovereign nations. Between them, they could lead the Community, containing German potential.27 Finally, Wilson displayed a lack of comprehension concerning Britain’s ability to negotiate safeguards for the terms of entry in advance of accession. When he met de Gaulle and Erhard in late 1964 and early 1965, he stressed that Britain could not accept the terms for Commonwealth trade, nor merge into a supranational body.28 Unequivocal expression of Britain’s position weakened Britain’s ability to influence on the continent, an eventuality Wilson had not anticipated. The Six interpreted the Prime Minister’s stance as indication that he would never be able to lead Britain into the EEC: if Britain’s accession was permanently ruled out, the Six would continue to develop without regard to Britain’s interests.29 The point of emphasising Wilson’s conception of Britain’s relations with the Community is to illustrate that British policy, although founded upon strategic considerations, was not a rational, far-sighted approach to Britain’s excluded status. Thus, this work is aligned more closely with a historical strand of thinking that emphasises the importance of political or geopolitical motivation in explaining Britain’s shift towards Community membership. The alternative school, characterised by focus on the economic rationale underpinning British actions and illustrated by Moravcsik’s argument, quoted above, that British policy at an earlier point could be considered ‘farsighted’, interprets policy choices as proactive, reasoned responses to British interests.30 Writers prioritising political motivation, on the other hand, have stressed that British policy towards the EEC was reactive, evolving as previous, more preferred policies failed.31 This book shows that Wilson’s policy did develop in a reactive manner. The bridge-building initiative, between March and May 1965, demonstrates this. The main motor behind the policy was the threat that EFTA could disintegrate following Labour’s imposition of the illegal import surcharge in November 1964. Wilson was also persuaded by the Foreign Office’s political argument that existing British policy did not demonstrate sufficient British interest in eventual membership of the EEC to sustain a minimum of influence.32 However, this explanation of policy development does not go as far as interpretations centred upon ‘collapsing alternatives’.33 ‘Collapsing alternatives’ is predicated on the notion that politicians harboured a fundamental misperception about Britain’s economic power in the world which had to be disabused, an assumption this work does not share. Consequently, bridge-building should be seen not as the first step in any inevitable shift towards membership, but as an indicator of the Prime Minister’s pragmatism. Wilson’s policy continued to develop in reaction to external events. January 1966 emerges as a more sustained reconsideration of Britain’s ultimate posture towards

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Community membership, as Wilson endorsed secret official studies of the economic implications of accession.34 The prospect of a second general election, expected to increase Labour’s majority, was one element in Wilson’s shift, but the main motor of change was a twin response to the French challenge to the Atlantic Alliance and to the overshadowing of the ideal of British leadership of the Commonwealth. The Community’s empty chair crisis has previously been identified as important in diluting Labour’s opposition to entry to the Community. Miriam Camps suggested that the government missed an opportunity to team up with the Five in answer to the French challenge to the EEC.35 Helen Wallace argued that the French attempt to weaken the Community’s supranational provision facilitated the British political elite’s acceptance of Community membership.36 Neither author appreciated the importance of the empty chair crisis to Britain’s policies towards NATO. From the perspective of the Foreign Office, the economic community the Six had created was unlikely to break up. Combined with de Gaulle’s threats to withdraw from NATO, however, the potential for crisis deepened. To keep de Gaulle in NATO, the Five could be tempted to concur with de Gaulle’s demands in the EEC. If de Gaulle did withdraw from NATO with the Community’s future in jeopardy, the stimulus to European integration that kept Germany tied into the Atlantic system could unravel.37 Thus, the Foreign Office and the American administration urged on Wilson the idea of British leadership of the European Community. This would stiffen the Five against acquiescence to French terms and help to cement, against the Gaullist alternative, the idea of European integration within an Atlantic shell.38 Rather than to team up with the French in a union against supranationality, or to side with the Five in the hope of taking France’s place, Wilson’s endorsement of studies indicated Britain’s support for the continuation of the supranational Community within the Atlantic security framework. Wilson’s agreement to the studies was also a reaction to the progress of Britain’s policies for Commonwealth regeneration. The timing of Wilson’s shift was telling. The Commonwealth trade ministers’ meeting in November 1965 had already poured doubt on the likelihood of success of Wilson’s policies to revive trade between Britain and the Commonwealth. Yet in December, Wilson was still wary of Stewart’s desire to move towards the European Community.39 It was after meeting with Stewart on 19 January, as Stewart pressed on Wilson the vital role of leadership Britain could play in the empty chair crisis, that Wilson’s attitude changed.40 Between the two dates, Wilson had been dealing with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia. The Commonwealth Special Conference in Lagos on 12 January delivered a serious blow to the notion of a revived Commonwealth with Britain at its political helm.41 With the idea of British leadership of the Commonwealth publicly exposed, the alternative of British leadership of the European Community proved increasingly attractive. Although January 1966 was undoubtedly a turning point, the studies Wilson affirmed did not render Britain’s turn to the EEC inevitable. In fact, officials argued that Britain should desist from making a second initiative for membership in the short term, partly because of the prospect of a Gaullist veto, but also because of Treasury fears about sterling.42 Between the March election and the outbreak of the sterling crisis in July, central government debated methods of approaching the Community, but the visit of the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on 8 July appeared to indicate that the door to the Community remained closed.43 Thus, the central argument of this book is that

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Wilson’s decision to embark on an initiative in October 1966, geared to attain membership while de Gaulle was still in power, was a reaction to the effects of the July 1966 sterling crisis. This argument requires closer inspection. Domestic political considerations form part of the explanation for Wilson’s turn, but only a part. The July crisis did encourage Wilson to move Brown to the Foreign Office and did shake political faith in the government’s economic and overseas programmes. However, the reasons for Wilson’s move lie much more deeply than a superficial gesture in reaction to domestic pressure or to divert attention from trouble at home.44 Rather, the July crisis called into question Labour’s policies of economic planning and also set in motion the train of events that was to lead to Britain’s retrenchment from a global defence role in the Far East. Wilson invoked the idea of a British future in Europe—of British leadership of the European Community—to provide a framework for the continued modernisation of Britain. The deflation Labour imposed in response to the crisis led in September and October to dramatic doubts about Britain’s future economic growth. The downturn caused a greater-than-expected slump in investment predictions, particularly from private industry.45 The fact that Labour had imposed an economic standstill created a serious gap in the credibility of the National Plan. It was less that the public thought the Plan’s growth targets could not be met, but that they had lost faith in the concept of planning.46 A renewed turn to the EEC could stimulate confidence among private industry about the future recovery of the economy and could create a framework to explain how Labour intended to resume economic growth. With a turn to the EEC, Wilson could also reignite Labour’s policies of scientific and technological endeavour, posing the idea of a ‘technological community’ between Britain and the EEC countries.47 At the same time, the need for further savings on British defence expenditure led to calls for a British pullback from the Far East. The end of Confrontation in Indonesia facilitated savings, and although ministers resisted the idea of complete withdrawal from East of Suez in October, by December Wilson ordered studies of retrenchment for the first time.48 With the Commonwealth already shown to be an implausible arena for British leadership and with Britain’s international defence role unlikely to endure, Wilson had nowhere else to go but Europe. This is not the first time that Wilson’s initiative has been put down to absence of alternatives.49 However, the fact that it was the July crisis that brought into sharp focus this contraction of options allows further observations about British policy making. A central debate in the historical literature has been whether Britain’s turn to the EEC was a radical change in Britain’s foreign policy orientation, or a shift in tactics to attain the perpetual objective of British international influence. Followers of the ‘collapsing alternatives’ school have seen British membership of the EEC as a revolutionary, albeit reluctant, change in Britain’s direction.50 Other writers, most notably Wolfram Kaiser, have argued that Britain’s move to the EEC was a tactical diversion, geared to sustain Britain’s privileged partnership with the USA.51 Authors favouring a political explanation for the motivation behind British policy have argued that while Britain’s move towards Europe aimed to maximise Britain’s power in the world, it was also a genuine shift, presaging a serious alteration in Britain’s global posture.52 To point to the July crisis and its aftermath as a determinant in Wilson’s turn towards the EEC is to suggest that there was nothing inevitable about Wilson’s course of action. It was not just that Wilson’s alternatives collapsed as the Prime Minister was forced to

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recognise the diminishment of Britain’s economic power. Rather, Wilson was pushed towards an initiative for Community membership because of external events, but his choice of the EEC was a way to improve the government’s prospects in the wake of domestic disaster. The Prime Minister could have chosen to pursue the route of a ‘Greater Sweden’—‘Going it Alone’ (GITA)—the topic of one of the studies ordered at the Chequers meeting in October.53 Trend’s consequent paper on GITA revealed that whereas Britain could afford to support its population alone, to stand as a ‘socialist offshore island’ would extract a high price.54 Britain would be relegated to the status of a political neutral, unable to carry a decisive voice in international forums such as GATT, the UN and NATO. Economically, Britain would be compelled into greater specialisation of production and British influence in Western Europe and subsequently in America would wither.55 For a power with international trading connections and international interests, the loss of sway in the United States would cut particularly deeply, as the United States would no longer act in Britain’s interests by proxy. Thus, once the British found themselves in an impasse, Wilson selected the course that would shore up British authority on the international stage. However, like Macmillan, Wilson was serious about getting into the EEC. His primary intention was not to curry favour in the United States—although he did evoke the idea of British leadership of the Community in conversation with the American President— aiming to shore up Britain’s weakening influence following the July deflation and the prospect of retrenchment.56 Rather, Wilson argued that a move towards the European Community was the only way to secure British political independence. Too close a partnership with the United States would condemn Britain’s influence: as Wilson put it, Britain would have to follow the Americans into Vietnam.57 Joining with America in a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) would overwhelm Britain. By contrast, the European Community was relatively homogenous, comprising countries of a similar size. The British could hope to exercise a role of leadership inside the Community and could use the base of power the Community offered for the continued exercise of favoured policies. In this way, the July 1966 crisis brought home to Wilson the constriction of British sovereignty outside the EEC.58 There was no choice but Europe: consequently, Europe would come to assume much greater importance in Britain’s international outlook. Once Wilson had taken the decision to embark on an initiative for EEC membership, he became absolutely determined that the bid should succeed. This observation is central to the second set of conclusions of this book: how Wilson convinced the apparently recalcitrant Cabinet to endorse the move to the EEC. Wilson’s tactical approach to the Community countries developed in two stages. First, Wilson conducted a tour of the countries of the Six to see if the conditions existed for membership. Subsequently, the Prime Minister delivered on 2 May 1967 a one-line application for membership under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, suggesting in a statement to the House of Commons that Britain would require safeguards for New Zealand’s agricultural exports, for the Commonwealth sugar producers and stressing that the current system of levies was inequitable.59 Wilson’s application, attaching no formal conditions in advance, was a break with former British tactics in attempting to get into the Community. Whereas Macmillan had stated that Britain would enter the Community if and only if British essential interests could be safeguarded, Wilson’s application demanded no substantive

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prerequisites. Wilson stated that Britain would accept the Treaty of Rome and enter the Community, provided minor adjustments could be made. To return to the question of continuity with Macmillan’s initiative, 1967 emerges as a turning point in British policy. It was Wilson’s application that committed Britain’s political elite to the principle of a British future in the EEC. After 1967, borrowing a phrase from Alan Milward, membership of the EEC was a ‘cardinal goal’ for both main political parties.60 However, Labour’s subsequent treatment of the terms of entry shows that Wilson’s initiative did not lie to rest a controversy about the kind of Community Britain could enter. Some of Wilson’s critics have argued that Wilson muddied discussion of the principle of EEC membership, talking instead about the ‘conditions’ of accession.61 In fact, the Prime Minister attained agreement from the Cabinet that there was no political alternative but Europe. He did not, however, gain consensus as to the terms under which Britain would join. This observation helps to make sense of Labour’s stance in the 1970s; and points to the conclusion that Wilson’s priority was not domestic politics, but overseas tactics: he did what he could to ensure ministerial acceptance of an initiative pleasing to continental opinion.62 In order fully to understand Wilson’s breach with Macmillan’s methods in 1967, it is necessary to explain why Wilson agreed to launch the unconditional application. The Prime Minister remained pragmatic in outlook, but after the failures of July 1966, he well understood that Britain had no long-term choice but to enter the EEC. As this was so, and with de Gaulle’s probable veto an unavoidable obstacle, Wilson’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre was slim. Even if Britain’s initiative did fail, Wilson had to demonstrate with conviction that it was a bid that could have succeeded had it not been for de Gaulle: otherwise, what would be the point in making an application? But, Wilson did not think the initiative would fail in the short term and certainly did not predicate the initiative on this foundation. On one level, Wilson maintained he could negotiate a deal with the General. A hangover from the assumptions he had made in 1964, Wilson believed that Britain and France were the powerful countries within the Community: ‘France and Britain are politically stable. If we give a pledge, we can deliver’.63 The Prime Minister did not try to conduct a deal on the basis of mutual hostility to supranationalism, indicating his greater appreciation of Britain’s influence and of the way in which the Community worked since his instinctive approach in 1964. Instead, he wanted to appeal to de Gaulle’s anti-Atlanticism, arguing that between them, Britain and France could create a Europe capable of standing up to the superpowers. Britain would bring technological know-how, enabling Europe to create a gigantic industrial economy and consequent political strength to wield an independent voice in international affairs.64 Anglo-French co-operation could expand to incorporate defence, possibly even nuclear matters: as the ‘special relationship’ weakened, so Britain would come to rely increasingly on France and the EEC.65 This approach made sense to Wilson. After his visit to de Gaulle in June 1967, the Prime Minister commented that it was impossible to judge de Gaulle’s actions ‘on the basis of rational judgement’.66 Nevertheless, Wilson acknowledged that the probability of bringing de Gaulle to admit Britain was slender.67 The key to the British initiative was to demonstrate to willing European domestic and political opinion Britain’s determination to enter. In order to attain this goal, the British had to show that they no longer insisted on the satisfaction of Britain’s ‘essential interests’ prior to entry.68 A conditional application, such as

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Macmillan had made, would be an easy hostage for de Gaulle’s 1963 argument that the British were unready to accept the rules of the EEC. Britain’s approach in 1967 owed much to the dominance of the Foreign Office over the formulation of Britain’s tactics. Since the close of the Brussels negotiations, committed Foreign Office officials had devised a new approach towards attaining membership, predicated on the idea that Britain would have more influence from inside the Community. Con O’Neill and John Robinson were the leading advocates of the notion that Britain should accept the terms in advance of accession. Once inside, they maintained that Britain would be better placed to realise her goals.69 The existence of such a strategy by the time Labour took office meant that Foreign Office officials were well-prepared to put forward their ideas; and Robinson’s paper on ‘Negotiating Objectives’ became the benchmark for discussion in the interdepartmental committees in 1967. Moreover, the centralisation of decision making, through Wilson’s establishment of a ‘European Unit’ in Number Ten to oversee treatment of the ‘conditions’ of membership facilitated a minimal application.70 Thus, the terms of entry, satisfaction of which Wilson insisted in 1964–6 and during the probe of the countries of the Six, became a sacrifice for the tactical requirement of launching an initiative difficult for de Gaulle to reject out of hand.71 Should negotiations start, and Wilson assumed they would, Britain’s willingness to make concessions would disarm the pretexts for the General’s rebuttal, forcing him to admit Britain to the EEC. Wilson was therefore willing to yield on the conditions in order to bring de Gaulle to negotiate and to expedite British entry into the Community. Had negotiations started, these actions suggest that he would have continued to make concessions, to do what he must in order to facilitate accession. Nevertheless, Wilson remained privately ambivalent about acquiescence to the terms, or at least, unwilling to acknowledge the full implications of his stance. He noted his opposition to Robinson’s idea that Britain should adopt the agricultural levies under transitional periods.72 Still more, Wilson told Hetherington that commitment now did not necessarily mean commitment at a later date: if Britain did accept the Treaty today, it would be possible to ‘pull back’ tomorrow should the terms prove too onerous.73 If negotiations did start, Wilson could reckon that Britain’s political standing would be stronger, thus, it was plausible to aim for a more satisfactory settlement. Wilson’s stance was in part a consequence of the tactically narrow position the British were in during 1967. The unconditional application was not an optimum strategy, but sought to make the best from a weak position. It was less that Wilson was ‘predisposed to accept almost any condition’ as Lieber argued, and more that he elected to do so to fulfil his desire to make life difficult for the General.74 In this way, Wilson’s questioning of the terms in the 1970s had greater uniformity with his position throughout the 1960s. He accepted the principle of Britain’s future in Europe, and he was prepared to do what he needed to attain and later preserve it. But he was fundamentally unwilling to conclude that Britain could not negotiate better terms. These tactical realities of Britain’s approach towards the Community had bearing on Wilson’s handling of the Cabinet. While he resolved to do what it took to get Britain into the Community, he undersold Britain’s initiative at home. The Cabinet was divided as to the wisdom of accepting a European initiative in 1967. According to the diaries of Castle, Crossman and Gordon Walker, by the end of the Cabinet discussions on the application, there were six ministers in favour of the principle of British membership of the EEC: Brown, Gardiner, Gunter, Jenkins, Longford and Stewart. Five ministers were opposed

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the principle of entry to varying degrees: Castle, Jay, Marsh, Peart and Ross. In between the two positions were the ‘waverers’: Benn, Bowden, Callaghan, Crosland, Crossman, Gordon Walker, Greenwood, Healey and Hughes.75 However, of the ministers classed in the ‘undecided’ bracket, most were cautiously in favour. Benn was enthusiastic about access to the economies of scale, Crossman was willing to support Wilson, Crosland recorded the political case as decisive and Callaghan endorsed the view that anticipation of membership would strengthen the economy.76 Gordon Walker also counted himself as a supporter of the initiative.77 When this is taken into consideration, it is clear that although Wilson had to tread carefully, the Cabinet balance hung in favour of a British future in Europe. Moreover, the opposition of Healey and Bowden has been misrepresented.78 Neither minister was antipathetic to the notion that Britain should join some kind of Europe. Indeed, Bowden, as Commonwealth Secretary, explained that EEC entry would bolster British influence in the Commonwealth.79 But both felt that the timing of the application was wrong, as de Gaulle was likely to veto.80 Douglas Jay and Douglas Evans have claimed that Wilson droned on and on about the conditions of entry, obscuring the principle of membership behind the terms.81 In fact, what Wilson did was to make the initiative into a question of political choice, but did not attempt to force decision about the terms. From Wilson’s perspective, the main challenge to acceptance of the initiative came from Healey. Healey’s stance—that there was no point applying because it was bound to fail—enabled ministers to oppose the bid without challenging Wilson directly.82 Following Trend’s advice, Wilson sought to separate the ‘not yets’ in the Cabinet from the minority of ‘nevers’. To do so, he adopted the emphatically political case, discussed above, that Britain had no choice but membership. Even if Britain’s initiative failed in the short term, the British had no alternative but to accede at a later date.83 In this way, Wilson presented ministers with a stark choice: accept a British future in Europe, or have nothing. Ministers had little option but to endorse the view that there was no alternative but entry into the EEC, regardless of their feelings as to the wisdom of the immediate attempt. When it came to the crunch, ministers signalled their recognition of the need to accept Community membership, but the Prime Minister gathered only a superficial agreement as to the terms of entry that Britain might accept. Like Wilson, ministers appreciated that if they were going to bother to make the initiative, they might as well do it properly.84 There was no point playing into Gaullist hands. As a result, ministers issued little resistance to Brown, as he galvanised Cabinet into delivery of a minimalist negotiating stance at the WEU in July. Wilson allowed Brown to take charge of Britain’s negotiating position. Brown’s determination to bring de Gaulle to the table led him to obscure, in part deliberately, Britain’s position towards the agricultural levies. He employed the improbable argument that Britain would participate in the Six’s 1969 review, despite the Cabinet Office’s earlier acknowledgement that this was unrealistic.85 Thus, Wilson silenced his critics, but the way in which he did so helped to contribute towards later hostility towards the Community. First, the left, not unreasonably, came to connect Wilson’s turn to the EEC with the economic failure of 1966. As Benn put it, ministers were a ‘defeated’ Cabinet, convinced that Europe rather than economic reform was the answer to Britain’s problems.86 Second, ministers were vexed by the tactical way in which Wilson backed them into a corner in 1967. Wilson did not make a sustained ‘sell’ of the idea of a British future in Europe on its merits, presenting the idea of British

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entry into the EEC in the negative framework that Britain had no other option. Ministers were pressed to accept even if they felt it tactically unwise. Many continued to doubt Wilson’s intentions. As Shore’s account shows, even those closest to Wilson could persist in the view that Wilson applied only to invite a Gaullist rebuff.87 Third, Stewart’s quote at the beginning of these conclusions illustrates that the pro-European members of the Cabinet believed that Wilson had not gone far enough. As Wilson began to express doubt about the terms of entry in the 1970s, the pro-Europeans became disillusioned with his stance.88 For those in favour of the principle of membership, the 1967 decision did suggest that the British were ‘predisposed’ to accept the terms. Thus, Wilson’s main achievement was to force through the decision he needed to make a convincing application. By bringing both the Conservative and Labour parties to endorse this decision in the Commons, the 1967 application marked a watershed in the acceptance of the British political elite of a British future in Europe. Yet, the Prime Minister failed to convince at home, creating long-term doubt about his intentions and about the reasons why Britain should enter. Rushed by the imperatives of the July crisis, and pressed by the probability of a Gaullist veto, Wilson’s treatment of the terms of entry had an air of improbability. Consequently, by focusing on the need to bring de Gaulle to negotiate, the second try did little to challenge the idea that ultimately, the British could still hold out for better terms. Britain’s 1967 application for membership was a turning point domestically, but it also marked a transitional moment in the European Community. The British failed to attain membership in the short term, but succeeded in challenging de Gaulle’s argument that the preservation of a ‘little Europe’ of Six, the aim of French foreign policy, was in the interests of the Community as a whole.89 Wilson’s initiative, therefore, established the groundwork for Britain’s final, successful application, leading to British membership of the Community in 1973. Although de Gaulle’s opposition to British accession terminated the second application, the British were well aware of his likely stance and thus, the question remains whether more astute British diplomacy could have brought a different outcome. The foundation of Britain’s diplomacy, that de Gaulle would prove hesitant to veto and the British should make it difficult for him to do so, was soundly judged. Nevertheless, both Wilson and Brown held flawed assumptions about Britain’s relations with the EEC countries. First, Wilson attached too great a weight to political factors in assessing the General’s thinking. He did not comprehend the extent to which de Gaulle’s stance reflected a coherent set of policies centred upon the existing EEC. Wilson did not anticipate, for example, de Gaulle’s objections to the influx of Atlantic influence British entry would bring to Community trade, agriculture and currency questions.90 Moreover, the French were unconvinced by Wilson’s explanation of the way in which Britain was moving away from the Atlantic world. Wilson had, to some extent, recognised that the British would find it difficult to demonstrate distance from the United States, but attached too much weight to his own capacity to make a difference. It surprised Wilson that de Gaulle would not prefer to reap the benefits of British collaboration in technology than to continue to invite American investment in Europe.91 Wilson’s understanding of de Gaulle’s ‘anti-Atlanticism’ was quite crude. He underplayed the importance to de Gaulle of the Community and its economic basis, believing instead that the prospect of a politically strong Europe, independent between the superpowers, would woo de Gaulle to

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Britain’s way of thinking. What impressed the French was less the depiction of Britain’s political orientation, than the unequivocal Commons majority in favour of the application. Second, the British did not accurately judge the extent to which the Five were ready to stand up to France and to force a breach in the Six for the sake of British entry. In particular, Brown misunderstood West German support. Brown believed that Brandt’s favour for enlargement and détente would translate into a strong political endorsement; and it was partly this view that encouraged Brown to force the minimalist negotiating stance through Cabinet.92 Wilson’s view of Brandt was slightly different. Wilson concluded that Brandt had agreed to support Kiesinger’s pro-French policies in return for Kiesinger’s blessing on non-proliferation.93 However, the Foreign Office records depict Brandt as reluctant as the German Chancellor to pressure the French to a showdown.94 Thus, the British failed to comprehend completely the importance to the Germans of the economic bindings of the Community. The Germans did not want to disrupt the Community prior to the agricultural review in 1969, had serious concerns about the reserve role of sterling and wished to embark on the fusion of the three Communities before the British joined.95 Britain’s tactics before the beginning of Brown and Wilson’s tour of the Six, shortly after the Grand Coalition came to power, were important. At this stage, the new German government was loath to test the boundaries of the ‘tender plant’ of their relationship with the French.96 But it was just preceding the probe that Britain’s diplomacy was at its most boisterous, as Brown insisted to Fanfani and to Luns that they must bring the French to negotiate.97 In January, the Germans let the French know they would not pressure France to a breach.98 Germany’s stance meant de Gaulle was aware he could get away with a policy of prevarication, deflating the sense of momentum from the British bid. Later in the initiative, the British displayed a much greater sense of subtlety, resisting the temptation to ‘bully’ Bonn.99 Comprehending their precarious position, the British recognised they were too weak to seriously threaten the Germans. Moreover, they did not wish to jeopardise crucial German support over important questions such as nonproliferation, Ostpolitik and offset.100 In October, when Kiesinger visited London, the British blended the tacit threat that if Britain did not join now, there would be no opportunity later, with the encouragement that enlargement would bring political strength to the Community. These tactics were better received.101 Combined with German recognition of France’s intransigence, the Germans, towards the end of the application, displayed heightened willingness to resist the French position, although never to force the French to decide. Wilson also did not anticipate that de Gaulle would prevent negotiations from opening. In this way, the dynamics between the Foreign Office and their political masters were important. Brown expressly forbid any indication that Britain’s application would not work and Wilson was an ‘inveterate optimist’, unwilling to accept that the door to entry was closed.102 Foreign Office officials, keen that Wilson and Brown should make a convincing initiative, emphasised the positive aspects of British diplomacy. The point of Britain’s bid was to persist, continually knocking on the door to the Community until the day at which Britain’s vision prevailed.103 The General’s May press conference, accompanied by Secretary General at the Quai d’Orsay Hervé Alphand’s briefing that de Gaulle intended to prevent the opening of talks, took the British by surprise and had an important effect in the Five.104 It would be virtually impossible for the Five to force de

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Gaulle to open negotiations; thus, there were fewer reasons staunchly to resist him. Had negotiations begun, the Five’s support for enlargement, armed with judicious British concessions, would have made it much harder for de Gaulle to act unilaterally against British accession. By maintaining that Britain was not even a suitable candidate, de Gaulle could shield himself from overt pressure. Conversely, the British managed their defence of the weakness of sterling relatively well, and the French did not succeed in making the pound’s fragility the breaking point for the application. In fact, as the application dragged on without British surrender, the initiative did succeed in causing the French considerable anxiety. From October, de Gaulle wished to veto outright the start of negotiations, but was uncertain as to the best tactics to employ.105 At the Council of Ministers on 23 October, Couve argued that Britain’s economic weakness meant negotiations should not start.106 France’s harder stance led the Five to rally in support of Britain, resisting Couve’s interpretation and accepting Britain’s counter-case that the economy would recover alongside negotiations.107 Economic weakness was more problematical in connection with Wilson’s arguments for a technological community, as members of Five wondered seriously whether Britain could make good her promises.108 The French made headway not because of the prospect of devaluation, but by linking sterling’s frailty to its international role. In his November press conference, de Gaulle concentrated partly on the fundamental challenge to the Six posed by enlargement but also on the way in which the international reach of sterling made Britain unsuitable for membership.109 He argued that the global status of Britain’s currency contributed to uncertainty as to its fate, a view the British had not successfully combated; and that the British, through their world priorities, would exclude themselves from the monetary solidarity of the Six. Although the government could be criticised for failure to anticipate the economic tone of de Gaulle’s opposition, it would have been difficult for the British convincingly to dispel de Gaulle’s case. A ‘European solution’ had been studied in the Treasury, and Wilson and Callaghan insisted that it was one possibility in the longer term. Nevertheless, it was not in Britain’s interests to pursue a ‘European solution’ with too much vigour. The government wished to avert doubt about sterling’s capacity, not, as the Treasury saw it, to play into France’s hands.110 The 1967 veto was, however, different to the 1963 veto and indicated just how much the balance of power inside the EEC had shifted. 1967 was a turning point, marking the eclipse of French dominance in the Community and the end of France’s ability to marry their interests with the interests of the Community as a whole.111 In 1963, de Gaulle argued that France would protect the Community whereas Britain would disrupt it. He used this argument again in 1967, stating that France would preserve the existing format of the EEC, whereas British entry would transform it into a different entity.112 He maintained that if Europe was to stand up to the superpowers, Europe had to tighten the bonds that existed between the Six, not to dilute the Community into a wider body. The British met this argument head-on, making the political case that enlargement was necessary for the development of the Community. British membership would provide the Community with ‘strength, unity and independence’.113 An enlarged Europe would stand independently between the superpowers and could forge a distinct route towards détente. In 1967, the Five clearly disagreed with de Gaulle’s judgement that the British were unsuitable candidates for membership. At the Council of Ministers in December, the

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opinion was recorded that the Community could aptly look to enlargement, and that Britain’s economic weakness should not preclude the opening of negotiations.114 In this way, the Five rejected the French interpretation of the Community’s future shape, embracing instead the British view of an enlarged, strengthened Europe. French policy was overshadowed in the EEC, a development that was replicated in the wider environment. Shortly before the Council of Ministers meeting, the NATO countries, including France, had signed up to the Harmel Report outlining a role for NATO in pursuit of détente. The Harmel Report was a response to de Gaulle’s challenge to NATO and to de Gaulle’s desire to create a ‘European Europe’ to offer a route to German reunification and détente.115 The Gaullist era was coming to an end. After the Council of Ministers meeting, Wilson left Britain’s application on the table. In 1963, it had proved impossible for the British to sustain the impulse towards British entry; but in 1967, it was widely anticipated that Britain would enter the Community when the political circumstances were ripe. Enlargement was an accepted part of the Community’s political development. Moreover, in practical terms, enlargement remained on the agenda of the Council of Ministers and the failure to resolve the issue became a bar to development of the Community in other ways. Pressure for enlargement convinced the new French President Georges Pompidou to lift France’s veto at The Hague Summit in December 1969.116 Although Wilson lost the 1970 election, it was undoubtedly the work undertaken during his administration that allowed the Heath government to embark on Britain’s third application 12 days into office.117 In the early 1970s Michael Stewart asked of Wilson whether he had been right to champion Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC. The judgement offered by this book is that Wilson was right to apply in 1967, regardless of his later position about the terms. Wilson had a much greater sense of strategy than many of his critics would suggest. From 1962, Wilson understood the political importance of the EEC, but de Gaulle’s veto and the temptation to make political capital from the Conservative position led him to formulate policies for British modernisation centred on the Commonwealth, global defence, economic planning, science and technology. The failure of parts of this programme in the summer of 1966 caused Wilson to turn towards the Community. EEC membership would serve as the framework for renewed policies of economic growth, and would provide an alternative arena for the exercise of British power. Europe was the only place to go to provide the base of Britain’s future political independence and to enable the British to remain a power with global reach. His decision taken, Wilson determinedly sought to take Britain into the EEC. The 1967 application was a major break with past British tactics, as Wilson jettisoned guarantees about safeguards for British entry in order to deliver a convincing initiative that would find support amongst European opinion. The uncluttered application failed to attain membership in the short term, but succeeded in placing enlargement at the centre of the Community’s agenda. France’s opposition to enlargement was challenged to its core, leading ultimately to the lifting of the French veto in 1969-Wilson’s mistake was to continue to undersell the initiative at home. He undersold it partly because the unwelcome position Britain was in during 1966–7 gave him little diplomatic room for manoeuvre, partly because of his own ambivalence about the terms of entry, but also because he needed to draw ministers into line. He rightly judged that anything less than an unequivocal vote in favour of entry would serve up an easy feast to his critics. The

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unequivocal endorsement of the bid in the House of Commons, regardless of the shortterm outcome for the initiative, meant that the British could advance towards the EEC despite de Gaulle’s attitude. Wilson’s achievement was to garner a political consensus in favour of the principle of British membership of the EEC, a political consensus that has thus far proved impossible to break. However, Wilson did not gain agreement as to the terms that Britain would accept. Labour’s position in 1967 did not challenge the longheld belief, wishfully shared by Wilson himself, that better terms were a realistic and credible objective. What kind of Europe Britain could accept was unresolved, and has remained central to a British national debate.

Notes 1 Churchill College Archive Centre, Michael Stewart Papers, STWT7/1/2; PLP, vote for entry into Common Market, Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, undated circa 1971. 2 Frankel (1973); Northedge (1974). 3 Northedge (1974, p. 347). 4 Reynolds (2000, p. 190); Lieber (1970, p. 261); de La Serre (1968, p. 890); Wrigley (1993, pp. 124–5). 5 Lieber (1970, p. 272). 6 Examples of survey authors include Northedge (1974, pp. 328–52); Lieber (1970, pp. 260– 74); Sanders (1990, pp. 135–68). 7 In particular, Lieber (1970, p. 261); de La Serre (1968, p. 890); Northedge (1974, pp. 346–52). 8 Wigg (1972, p. 339); Shore (2000, p. 69); Kaiser (2001a, pp. 70–2). 9 Young (1993, pp. 88–9); Young (2003a, pp. 142–8). 10 LPA, EEC Memoranda, 1961, comments by Balogh, June 1961. 11 Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Wilson notes on Europe, 15–16 July 1962, p. 3. 12 Broad (2001, p. 51–2). 13 Memorandum to Kennedy, 11 December 1962, cited in Williams (1992, pp. 396, 402, 404); Robins (1979, p. 29). 14 Ludlow (1999b, pp. 281–5). 15 For the view that Macmillan’s initiative split the Labour Party, Kaiser (1996, p. 200). 16 LPA, EEC Memoranda, Home Policy Sub-Committee, Common Market: The Way Ahead, 1 February 1963; LPA, Research Department Paper, RD377, December 1962; LPA Common Market Alternatives Group, The Alternative to the Common Market, Balogh, 5 November 1962; LPA EEC Memoranda, 1961, comments by Balogh and Kaldor, June 1961. 17 Also Pearce (1991, pp. 298–9, August 1964). 18 On the domestic features of Wilson’s policy, Favretto (2000, pp. 54–80); Edgerton (1996, pp. 56–82). 19 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—de Gaulle, 29 January 1965; TNA PREM13/317, Wilson— Erhard, 30 January 1965. 20 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—de Gaulle, 29 January 1965; TNA EW24/53, Nield to Burgh, 24 March 1965. 21 Moravcsik argues this about British policy towards the Free Trade Area, Moravcsik (1998, p. 131) and towards Macmillan’s application (ibid. p. 165). 22 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 7/19, meeting with Wilson, 5 November 1964. 23 On British benevolence, Young (1993, p. 39); the inception of the Free Trade Area idea was also a deviation from benevolence, (ibid. pp. 47–8); on Wilson’s approach, TNA FO371/177374/M1093/143, Johnston to Caccia, 2 November 1964. 24 TNA FO371/177370/M1093/25, SC(64)24, The UK and Europe, Foreign Office Steering Committee, 6 April 1964.

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25 Bodleian Library, MS Wilson c.873, Wilson notes on Europe, 15–16 July 1962, p. 3. 26 On the left’s attitude towards Germany, Robins, (1979, p. 19); Catterall (2000, pp. 98–9); TNA T312/1016, Crossman to Wilson, 1 February 1966. 27 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson’s comments, 6 January 1967. 28 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson—de Gaulle, 29 January 1965 TNA PREM13/317, Wilson— Erhard, 30 January 1965; TNA PREM13/329, Wilson—Erhard, 7 March 1965; TNA PREM13/324, Wilson—De Gaulle, 2 April 1965, 11 am. 29 The loss of British influence on the continent is described in TNA FO371/184288/W6/12, Palliser to Nicholls, 9 February 1965. 30 Leading advocates of ‘economic motivation’ are Moravcsik (1998, pp. 159–76); also about European integration more generally, Milward (1992, pp. 1–19). Another leading advocate of the idea that British policy was a clear-sighted response to British interests, Kaiser (1996, pp. 194–203). 31 In particular, Ellison (2000b, pp. 178–86); Ellison (2000a, pp. 1–10); another writer prioritising political motivation, Ludlow (1997a, pp. 26–42). 32 TNA PREM13/306, Stewart to Wilson, PM/65/38, 3 March 1965. 33 For the phrase, Lieber (1970, p. 261). 34 TNA FO371/188328/M10810/37, meeting in Roll’s Room, 26 January 1966; FO371/188328/M10810/39, Wilson to Stewart, 2 February 1966; Young (1998, p. 186); Young (2003a, p. 146). 35 Camps (1967, pp. 176–85). 36 Wallace (1975, pp. 141–2). 37 TNA PREM13/904, Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 38 Ibid.; TNA T312/1015, O’Neill to Dean, Record of Conversation with Hinton in the State Department, 30 November 1965. 39 TNA PREM13/904, Wilson comments on Stewart to Wilson, 10 December 1965. 40 TNA PREM13/905, Stewart to Wilson, PM/66/3, 21 January 1966, reporting meeting of Wilson on 19 January 1966. 41 TNA PREM13/777, Communiqué of Lagos Conference, 12 January 1966. 42 TNA EW24/53, Future Relations with Europe, Roll Report, 30 March 1966; this was forwarded to ministers in May as TNA CAB 134/2705, E(66)2, Future Relations with Europe, 5 May 1966. 43 TNA FO371/189127/RF1053/38, Couve—Pompidou—Wilson—Brown—Stewart, 8 July 1966. 44 The earliest proponent of the idea that Wilson’s initiative was a gimmick to divert attention from crisis, Wigg (1972, p. 339); also Shore (2000, p. 69); Robins (1979, pp. 60–2); Kaiser (2001a, pp. 70–2). 45 TNA CAB 134/3195, SEP(66)7, Economic Situation and prospect, Chancellor, 14 September 1966; SEP(66)8, Economic Situation, First Secretary, 14 September 1966; see also TNA CAB130/299, MISC(66)127, 17 October 1966. 46 TNA PREM13/827, Stewart to Wilson, 17 October 1966. 47 TNA PREM13/1850, Palliser comments on The Economist article, 22 October 1966. 48 Dockrill (2002, pp. 173–7); Jones (2002, pp. 569–95); TNA CAB130/301, MISC129(66)1st, 22 October 1966; Crossman (1976, pp. 85–7); Healey (1989, pp. 299–300); Wilson (1971, p. 381). 49 Young (1993, pp. 86–93); Bossuat (2001, pp. 513–5). 50 Northedge (1974, pp. 328, 360); Roll (1995, pp. 36–7); Lieber (1970, p. 261). 51 Kaiser (1996, pp. 151–73); Kaiser (1993, pp. 144–54); George (1990, pp. 37–40). 52 Ashton (2002, p. 132); Ellison (2000b, pp. 178–86). 53 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)3rd, 22 October 1966. 54 The phrase ‘socialist offshore island’ was used by Crossman (1976, p. 335, 30 April 1967).

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55 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)52, Alternatives to Membership of the EEC, Cabinet Secretary, 14 April 1967. 56 TNA PREM13/1480, Palliser reports on Wilson’s meeting with Johnson, 25 April 1967. 57 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)26th, 30 April 1967, 2.45 pm. 58 TNA CAB134/2705, E(66)3rd, 22 October 1966. 59 Hansard, vol. 746, col. 311–13 (2 May 1967). 60 Milward (2002, pp. 386–91, 415–17). 61 Jay (1980, p. 373); Evans (1975, p. 68). 62 Accounts that emphasise that Wilson was interested primarily in domestic politics include, Wigg (1972, p. 339); Shore (2000, p. 69); Robins (1979, pp. 60–2); Pickering (1998, pp. 153–4). 63 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson and Wilson’s comments, 6 January 1967. 64 TNA PREM13/1731, Wilson—De Gaulle, 19 June 1967, 4 pm. 65 TNA CAB130/325, MISC153(67)1st, Nuclear Aspects of Technological Co-operation, 15 June 1967. 66 TNA PREM13/1484, Wilson comments on Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967. 67 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/25, meeting with Wilson, 12 January 1967. 68 TNA CAB134/2813, EUR(O)(67)12, Steering Brief for Paris, Foreign Office, 16 January 1967; TNA PREM13/910, Reilly to FO, 1 December 1966; Reilly to FO, tel. 856, 14 November 1966; Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6925. folio Paris 1966. 69 Hannay (2000, p. 356); TNA T312/1011, O’Neill Despatch no. 6, 23 July 1964. 70 Wallace (1975, pp. 161–4). 71 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)44, 3 July 1967; also Lieber (1970, p. 274). 72 TNA PREM13/1479, Wilson comments on Negotiating Objectives, 7 April 1967. 73 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/21, meeting with Wilson, 1 March 1967; see also Milward (2003, pp. 120–1). 74 Lieber (1970, p. 272). 75 Taken from Grossman (1976, p. 336, 1 May 1967); Pearce (1991, p. 312, 30 April 1967); Castle (1990, p. 126, 30 April 1967). 76 BLPES, Crosland Papers, 4/9, Personal notes on Europe, 1 May 1967; TNA CAB128/41, CC(66)55th, 9 November 1966; Grossman (1976, p. 117, 9 November 1966); TNA CAB128/46, CC(67)25th, 30 April 1967, 10.30 am. 77 Pearce (1991, p. 312, 30 April 1967 (from footnote)). 78 On Healey, Pimlott (1992, p. 438); on Bowden, Evans (1975, p. 68). 79 TNA CAB129/129, C(67)59, The Value of the Commonwealth, Commonwealth Secretary, 24 April 1967. 80 Pearce (1991, p. 312, 30 April 1967); on Bowden, Grossman (1976, p. 336, 1 May 1967). 81 Jay (1980, p. 373); Evans (1975, p. 68). 82 TNA PREM13/1479, Trend to Wilson, 19 April 1967. 83 Ibid. 84 Grossman (1976, pp. 320–1, 20 April 1967). 85 TNA CAB128/42, CC(67)44, 3 July 1967; the Cabinet Office’s stance is in TNA CAB129/128, CC(67)44, Agriculture and the Common Market, Secretaries, 30 April 1967. 86 Grossman (1976, p. 335, 30 April 1967); Benn (1987, p. 496). 87 Shore (2000, p. 69). 88 Churchill College Archive Centre, Michael Stewart Papers, STWT7/1/2; PLP, vote for entry into Common Market, Michael Stewart to Harold Wilson, undated circa 1971. 89 On French foreign policy, Badel (2001, pp. 246–55). 90 TNA PREM13/1731, Wilson—De Gaulle, 19 June 1967, 4 pm. 91 TNA PREM13/1484, Wilson comments on Chalfont to Wilson, 19 July 1967. 92 TNA PREM13/1476, Brown to Brandt, tel. 297, 26 January 1967. 93 BLPES, Hetherington Papers, 13/25, 12 January 1967.

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94 TNA FCO30/171, Roberts to FO, tel. 1392; Paris to FO, tel. 1028, 18 October 1967. 95 TNA FCO30/187, Berg to Kiesinger, 4 February 1967; TNA FCO30/187, German Ministry of Finance Note on Monetary Implications, 31 January 1967; TNA PREM13/1485, Bonn to FO, tel. 1397, 19 October 1967. 96 Kiesinger’s description of Franco-German relations as a ‘tender plant’, TNA PREM13/1477, Wilson, Brown—Kiesinger, Brandt, 15 February 1967, 10 am. 97 TNA PREM13/909, Brown—Luns, 2 November 1966; TNA PREM13/1475, Brown— Fanfani, 3 January 1967. 98 TNA FCO30/186, Brussels to FO, tel. 14, 19 January 1967; see also Young (1993, p. 98). 99 Schaad (2000, pp. 162–73). 100 TNA PREM13/1489, Bonn to FO, tel. 1449, 27 October 1967; FCO30/192, Bonn to FO, tel. 1450, 27 October 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 1444, 26 October 1967; Dean to Gore-Booth, 1 November 1967. 101 TNA PREM13/1527, Wilson—Kiesinger and delegations, 24 October 1967. 102 Sir Patrick Reilly, interview with author, 5 July 1999; Sir Michael Palliser, interview with author, 24 August 1999 103 TNA PREM13/1475, Palliser to Wilson, 6 October 1967. 104 TNA FCO30/170, Reilly to FO, tel. 439, 16 May 1967; TNA PREM13/1482, O’Neill to Gore-Booth, 18 May 1967; TNA FCO30/170, Brown comments on O’Neill to Maclehose, 18 May 1967; TNA FCO30/179, Bonn to FO, tel. 783, 17 May 1967; TNA FCO30/179, Bonn to FO, tel. 783, 17 May 1967; TNA FCO30/170, Brussels to FO, tel. 257, 18 May 1967. 105 TNA PREM13/1485, Reilly to FO, tel. 975, 5 October 1967; Bodleian Library, Reilly Papers, MSS. Eng. c. 6926. folio Paris 1967. 106 TNA PREM13/1486, Marjoribanks to FO, tel. 9, 23 October 1967; Maitland to Brown, 24 October 1967. 107 TNA PREM13/1489, Bonn to FO, tel. 1449, 27 October 1967; FCO30/192, Bonn to FO, tel. 1450, 27 October 1967; Bonn to FO, tel. 1444, 26 October 1967; Dean to Gore-Booth, 1 November 1967. 108 TNA PREM13/1728, Brussels to FO, tel. 645, 15 November 1967. 109 De Gaulle’s Press Conference, Kitzinger (1968, pp. 312–17); KCA, vol. xvi, part 1, 246–7. 110 TNA FCO30/96, Marjoribanks to O’Neill, 22 May 1967; also BOE, OV53/52, Reilly to O’Neill, 27 April 1967; FCO30/96, Hildyard to Statham, 2 June 1967. 111 Ludlow (2003a, pp. 136–9, 147–8). 112 De Gaulle’s Press Conference, Kitzinger (1968, p. 316); KCA, vol. xvi, part 2, 22521, 10– 17 February 1968. 113 For example, TNA PREM13/1475, Wilson—Moro and delegations, 16 January 1967 10 am. 114 TNA PREM13/1488, Brussels to FO, tel. 421, 19 December 1967. 115 Bozo (2001, pp. 187–213); Ellison (2001); Haftendorn (2001, pp. 285–322). 116 Pine (2003, pp. 206–49, esp. pp. 240–6); Ludlow (2002). 117 Pine (2003, pp. 278–89); Kitzinger (1973, p. 276).

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Newspapers The Economist Guardian New Statesman The Times

Index

Abubakar, President 45, 63 Adenauer, Konrad 4, 118 Ahlers, Conrad 155 aircraft: Airbus 159; co-operation with France 35, 49, 104–5, 112, 158–9; co-operation with Germany 35 Alphand, Hervé 155, 200 America see United States Armstrong, Sir William 81, 92, 144, 145 Ashford, G.R. 143 Ashton, Nigel 2 Atkinson, Fred 165 Atlantic Alliance: Britain and France 43–4, 59, 107, 190; Britain’s policy towards 61, 62, 63, 64, 70; crisis in 72–4; and EEC 29, 41, 158, 178; French threats to withdraw from 164, 172; Germany 167; see also NATO Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) 30–1, 34, 44, 61 Australia 78, 93, 114, 136, 137, 138, 141 Austria 50, 53, 93 balance of payments: crisis in July 1965 61; French views towards 78–9, 121, 154; membership of EEC 23, 54–5, 60–1, 71, 102, 115–16, 129, 134, 140, 144, 153, 162; technology 33; see also sterling Ball, George 86 Balogh, Thomas 17–18, 90, 92, 93, 136, 143, 187 Bank of England 5 Barnes, John 42, 43, 57, 60 Belgium 29, 54, 58, 72, 104, 155, 159, 163, 171, 178; probe 112, 115, 120, 122

Index

196

Benn, Tony 8, 79, 82, 83, 90, 146–7, 196, 197; technology 106 Board of Trade: attitude towards Commonwealth regeneration 64; attitude towards EEC membership 22–3; economic policies after sterling crisis 84; import surcharge 28 Bowden, Herbert 138–40, 146, 161, 196, 197 Brandt, Willy 101; attitude towards Britain’s membership bid 120, 156, 162, 167, 169, 176, 177; Brown, George 110–11, 199; EFTA 51; Ostpolitik 119; see also Germany bridge-building 11, 41; development of policy 46–53, 190; outcome of policy 53–5, 63 Britain: application for membership of EEC 122–4, 152–3; application ‘on the table’ 174–8; association with the EEC 78, 175; commercial harmonisation with the EEC 171; devaluation and the EEC 143–6, 165–6; defence collaboration with France 157–60; development of policy towards the EEC 47, 51–3, 71–2, 73–7, 77–9, 82–9, 122–4, 152, 186; Germany 166–9; probe 104, 107, 111–16, 117–20; technology 105–6, 170–1; terms of entry 120–2, 129–32, 132–5, 189; world role 2, 7, 20, 24–5, 71, 82, 89, 90, 136–7, 140–3, 188, 192, 193; see also Wilson, Harold British Army on the Rhine 36, 169 Brittan, Samuel 144 Broad, Roger 16 Brown, George 6, 16; Cabinet and EEC application 137, 146, 147, 161–2, 196, 197; defence role East of Suez 88, 140–1; Department of Economic Affairs 32, 42–3, 59; devaluation, 1967 172; devaluation decision against, 1964 25; devaluation and EEC membership 76–7, 79; foreign secretary 83–4, 108–9, 192; import surcharge 28; probe 89, 94, 103, 111, 113, 114–16; Reilly, Sir Patrick 109; resignation attempt 82, 83; sterling crisis 80–2; strategy for attaining membership 73–4, 75–6, 84, 92, 108–11, 118, 123, 152–3, 154, 155, 157, 165, 175, 177–8, 198–200; studies of membership of the EEC 51–2, 55, 63, 90; talks with Couve and Pompidou, July 1966 77–9; terms of entry 135, 197;

Index

197

Treaty of Rome 94; Western European Union speech 12, 152, 156, 161–3, 197 Brussels negotiations 3; failure of first application 4; vue d’ensemble, 1962 3, 5, 16–17, 23 Cabinet: acceptance of probe and application 8–9, 11, 102, 122, 124, 129–30, 130–2, 136, 140, 145–6, 146–7, 162, 185, 194, 196–8; application on the table 174–5, 177–8; August 1966 reshuffle 84; Chequers meeting, October 1966 89–95; devaluation 172; EEC and East of Suez 141; nuclear weapons 158; sovereignty 91–2; sterling crisis 82, 83 Cabinet Office 62, 103, 105, 135, 161, 167, 197 Caccia, Sir Harold 27 Cairncross, Sir Alec 79 Callaghan, James: August 1966 reshuffle 84; Cabinet’s acceptance of probe and application 102, 130–1, 147, 196; defence expenditure cuts 88; devaluation 171–2; devaluation, decision against 1964 25; devaluation and EEC membership 145–6; economic policies after sterling crisis 84, 85; European solution 122, 165–6, 201; French loan 79; Germany 168; import surcharge 28; sterling crisis 80–2 Campbell, Sir Alan 79 Camps, Miriam 6, 57–8, 59, 64, 191 Canada 78, 93, 114, 136, 137, 138 capital movements: liberalisation of 22; membership of the EEC 102, 114, 130, 153, 171 Castle, Barbara 79, 82, 90, 102, 129, 131–2, 137, 146, 196 Catterall, Peter 31 Ceylon 139 Chalfont, Lord 160; Germany 168–9 Chequers, meeting, 30 April 1967 143, 145–6; meeting, 22 October 1966 11, 71, 84, 88, 89–95, 102; meeting, 22 October 1966 on defence expenditure 88–9 China 104 Churchill, Winston 87, 117; funeral 33; three circles 5

Index

198

Coldstream, Sir George 90–1 commercial harmonisation, EFTA and EEC 53–4 Committees; Europe Committee (E) 71, 74; ‘Forever Unmentionable’ (FU) 143–5; Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe (EUR(M)) 161–2; MISC56 47; MISC143 144; Official Committee on the Approach to Europe (EUR(O)) 103, 161; Official Economic Sub-Committee on Europe (E(O)(E)) 92, 93; Official Europe Committee (E(O)) 92; Official Steering Committee on the Approach to Europe (EUR(S)) 161; Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (OPD) 20–1, 72, 141 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 64; agricultural financial regulation 9, 56, 72, 76, 78, 101, 102; agricultural levy payments 93, 109–10, 115–16, 120, 121, 129, 134–5, 153, 161, 164, 166, 176, 194, 196; agricultural review in 1969 94, 109, 120, 135, 152, 178, 197, 199; Britain and difficulties with CAP 11, 59, 60, 62, 93, 101, 102, 115–16, 130, 132–5, 146, 153, 161–2, 187; Britain and 1969 agricultural review 162; European Community and development of CAP 26, 26–7, 33, 55, 116; France and 154–5, 173; Kennedy Round 46; Ministry of Agriculture and 23, 133–4; Six and 120–1, 176–7 Common Market 78, 94, 117, 118; see also Six; European Economic Community Commonwealth: Board of Trade and 23; Brussels negotiations 132; commission’s opinion and 164; Conference, September 1966 89; declining importance of 7, 89, 129, 139, 141, 173, 190, 191, 192; developing Commonwealth 93, 115, 137, 138–40; EEC membership and 35, 41, 50, 54, 60–1, 70, 78, 90, 93, 101, 102, 114–15, 116, 137–40; Kennedy Round 27; regeneration of 19, 23–4, 47, 63–4, 103, 187, 188; Rhodesia crisis 63, 89, 191; Special Conference, Lagos, January 1966 63, 191; sterling 80–1; sugar exporters 115, 130, 134, 140, 153, 162, 176–7, 194; temperate zone agricultural produce 17, 114–15, 137–8; vue d’ensemble, 1962 5, 16–17; Wilson and 17–19 Concorde 33, 43 conditions of entry see terms of entry Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 83, 85, 144 Confrontation 25, 88–9, 192 Conseil National du Patronat Français 57 Conservative Party, Commons vote on second application 8;

Index

199

first application 2–3, 188; Heath, Edward 58; prices and incomes legislation 83; terms of entry 1962 17, 187 cost of living 93, 115, 133, 134, 153 Council of Ministers 91, 116; meetings, June 1967 156, 164; meeting 10 July 1967 163; meeting 23 October 1967 167, 168; meeting 20 November 1967 172; meeting 19 December 1967 12, 152, 174, 176–8, 201 Courcel, Geoffrey de 108 Couve de Murville, Maurice 117, 121, 154, 156; economic preconditions to British membership 167–9, 172, 176, 200; gold 44; visit to London (July 1966) 11, 76–9, 191–2 Crosland, Anthony 82, 135, 147, 175, 196 Crossman, Richard 10, 61, 79, 81, 82, 90, 93, 101, 131, 137, 146–7, 178, 196 Crash operation 21, 59 Cyprus 140 Daddow, Oliver 4 Davies, John 85 Davignon, Etienne 163 Debré, Michel 107 decimalisation of the currency 53–4 deficiency payments, Ministry of Agriculture and 23 Denmark 46, 50–1, 107, 132, 156 Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) 32–3, 83–4, 188; policy towards France 42–3, 59, 63, 64, 73; studies of British membership 71, 93 détente 110; Britain 18, 24, 30, 31, 61; Britain, enlargement and 74–5, 112, 113, 114, 119, 137, 141, 199, 201; East of Suez 24; France 31, 34, 44; Germany 34, 61, 74–5, 110, 119, 199, 201; Harmel Report 164, 175, 201; Labour Party 31, 61; MLF 30; NATO crisis 72–3 devaluation see balance of payments; sterling economic planning 19, 23; budget, 11 April 1967 144; France 43; membership of EEC 60–1; see also National Plan East of Suez, Commitments 24–5, 188; United States 75, 142–3;

Index

200

withdrawal of defence role 6, 7, 70–1, 81–2, 89, 138, 140–3, 147, 169, 178, 192 Eden, Anthony 1 election March 1966 11, 70 Ellison, James 2 empty chair crisis 7, 11, 41, 72, 76, 190–1; British policy 57–61; outbreak 56–7 enlargement; attitude of EEC towards 9–10, 156, 177, 186; Britain and 106, 113, 121; CAP and 177; de Gaulle and 173–4; Five and 120, 200; see also détente Erhard, Ludwig; attitude to de Gaulle and political union 33–4, 44, 47; attitude to European Europe 36; cereal prices 26–7, 33, 116; talks with Wilson, January 1965 33–6, 190; March 1965 47–9; May 1966 74–5, 76, 79; see also Germany Erlander, Tage 51 European Commission 91, 101, 111; document on enlargement (Opinion) 12, 156, 163, 172; empty chair crisis 56; opinion and sterling 164–6; probe 120 European Economic Community (EEC), Associated Overseas Territories 45; bridge-building 54; Britain’s world role 141–3; common external tariff 48, 115, 132, 138, 139, 161; empty chair crisis 56–64; European or Atlantic orientation 159–60; fusion of executives 118, 199; internal development 9, 22, 72, 178, 185, 198; market 90; technology 86, 105–6, 118; Wilson and 103; see also Common Market and Six European Free Trade Association (EFTA), bridge-building 47, 50–1, 53–5, 63; Copenhagen meeting 53, 55; EEC 75, 90, 91, 101, 112, 114; establishment 1; import surcharge 28, 41, 50–1, 190; status of neutrals during Brussels negotiations 17, 187; Vienna Prime Ministers’ meeting 53–5; wider European unity 28, 188 European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) 33 European Parliament 56, 86 Evans, Douglas 8, 197

Index

201

Fanfani, Amintore 110, 117, 156, 162, 176, 199 federalism see supranationality Figgures, Sir Frank 71 Five, attitude to Britain’s application 153–6, 163; approach to Britain 62; Britain’s policy towards 12, 42–3, 64, 74–6, 104, 106, 108, 110–11, 152–3, 160, 162–4, 175, 199; Council of Ministers 19 December 1967 12, 176–8; empty chair crisis 57, 59, 60, 191; France 10, 130, 174–5, 201–2; NATO crisis 72, 87; political union 29; sterling 165, 17 Foreign Office 83–4, 103, 111, 117, 118, 177; Atlantic Alliance 70, 191; attitude towards the EEC 21–2, 189; attitude towards Wilson’s policy 53; briefings 34; Brown, George 108–9; DEA 42–6; Development of policy towards the EEC 36, 41–6, 47; empty chair crisis 55, 58, 59–60, 62, 64; European Economic Organisation (later Integration) Department 27, 60, 64, 108; Five 74; Germany 168–70, 199; NATO crisis 72–4; political union 29; probe 117, 118, 119, 123; role 20–2, 70, 195, 200; strategy towards attaining membership of the EEC 107–8, 132–3, 134–5, 153, 155, 162; supranationality 91, 189; talks with Couve and Pompidou, July 1966 78, 79; terms of entry 94 Fouchet Plan 29 Fowler, Joe 81, 87 France 101; agriculture 135; bridge-building 54; Commonwealth 45; détente 31, 44; economic preconditions to Britain’s membership 168; EEC 198; empty chair crisis 56–7, 59–60; Five 130, 162–3, 174–8, 201; force de frappe 44, 159; Germany 119; gold 44–5, 79, 81; Kennedy Round 45–6, 48, 59; NATO 26–7, 57–9, 72–4, 108, 175, 190; opinion towards British membership 153;

Index

202

Political union 29–30, 33–4, 44, 56–7, 58, 112; possible partnership with Britain 31–2, 42–3, 74–6, 157–9; probe 104, 106, 111, 112–13, 116, 117; sterling 44–5, 78–9, 80–1, 121–2, 152, 154, 165–6, 168, 171–3, 200–1; technological collaboration with Britain 35–6, 48, 54, 118, 158–9; see also Gaulle, General Charles de Free Trade Area 1, 27, 34–5, 86, 132–3, 169 Freitas, Geoffrey de 59 Frey, Cynthia 7 Gaitskell, Hugh, death 19; Labour Party Conference, October 1962 15–16, 187; Socialist International, July 1962 18; terms of entry 16–17, 187–8 Gardiner, Lord 137, 147, 196 Gaulle, General Charles de 6, 93, 103; Britain’s application 163, 166–7, 195, 199; British policy towards de Gaulle’s veto 42–3, 70, 94, 101, 104–5, 106–8, 110, 123–4, 130, 135– 7, 185, 188, 194, 197; CAP 72, 121; détente 31, 44, 72; empty chair crisis 56–7; European Community 26–7, 146, 170–1, 175; European Europe 10, 44, 72, 113, 160; Germany 111, 119–20; invitation for Britain to join EEC 58, 70; Nassau agreement 3; NATO 26–7, 29, 57, 72–4, 108, 191; negotiations 200; political union 29, 33–6, 156; post-veto 175, 177; presidential election, 1965 57; press conferences, May 1967 11, 154–5; November 1967 172–4, 200–1; probe 117–8, 121–2; Rome Summit, 1967 156; sterling 121, 200; talks with Erhard, January 1965 33–4; talks with Wilson, January 1965 33–5, 190; talks with Wilson, April 1965 49–50; talks with Wilson, January 1967 112–13, 116; talks with Wilson, June 1967 11, 156–60; vetoes, 1963 4, 19, 107, 152–3; 1967, 152–3, 166; see also France General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 27 Germany 104; attitude to British membership bid 118–20, 152, 154, 155, 156, 176, 177, 199–200; bridge-building 54; Britain’s fears of German domination in the EEC 29–30, 59, 61, 72, 136–7, 142, 146; Britain’s tactics towards 75–6, 167–9;

Index

203

empty chair crisis 56–7, 191; nuclear hardware 30–1, 43, 75, 104, 13, 157–9; offset payments 88, 119, 199; Ostpolitik 119, 199; probe 105, 107, 110–11, 112, 113–14, 116; reunification 74–5, 113, 201; sterling 121, 166, 171, 199; uranium enrichment 159; see also Brandt, Willy; Erhard, Ludwig; Kiesinger, Kurt Georg Ghana 139 Gibraltar 139, 140 Giscard d’Estaing 107 Going It Alone (GITA) 7, 90, 95, 136, 193 Gordon Walker, Patrick, application for membership EEC 146, 147, 196; East of Suez 24; EFTA and EEC 26–8; Leyton by-election 42 Gore-Booth, Sir Paul: Brown, George 108; defence expenditure cuts 81–2; empty chair crisis 58; Papers 4 Grand Coalition 110, 199 Greece 140 Greenwood, Anthony 146, 196 Gregoire, Pierre 162, 176, Group of 10(G10)22, 80, 87, 122, 171 Gunter, Ray 137, 147, 196 Hague Summit 202 Halls, Michael 81 Hallstein, Professor Walter 21 Harmel, Pierre 120, 155, 156, 162, 176, 177; Harmel Report 164, 175, 177, 201 Healey, Denis, application for membership EEC 135–7, 146, 169, 175, 196–7; East of Suez 88, 140–1; European Defence Caucus 178 Heath, Edward 6, 7, 70; Britain’s membership EEC 58, 63; final application 10, 202; prices and incomes legislation 83; terms of entry 7, 132 Heffer, Eric 83 Hennessy, Peter 6 Hetherington, Alastair, conversations with Wilson 27, 53, 63, 85, 103, 106, 108, 121, 123, 158, 196; Papers 4 Holland, Stuart 43 Hong Kong 139

Index

204

Hughes, Cledwyn 147, 196 India 139 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 22, 29, 44, 77, 81, 87, 122, 144, 165, 171–2 investment, need for 4, 102, 131–2, 144; slump in 84–58, 192; see also capital movements Italy 54, 56, 72, 86, 104, 195, 154, 155, 156, 171; probe 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 120 Japan 93, 104, 138 Jay, Douglas 6, 175; Cabinet discussions of probe and application 7, 9, 129, 131, 137, 146, 161–2, 196, 197; Commonwealth 47; EFTA 53; import surcharge 28–9; Labour Party Conference, October 1962 16; studies of membership of the EEC 52, 54–5 Jenkins, Roy 16, 33, 43, 82, 137, 147, 161, 178, 196 Johnson, Lyndon B. 43, 104, 160; Britain’s policy towards the EEC 87; memoranda to Wilson 73, 88; NATO crisis 72–3; talks with Wilson, April 1967 142; troops in Europe 88; Vietnam 75; see also United States of America Johnston, Sir Charles 27 Jones, Elwyn 147 Joxe, Louis 43 Joxe, Pierre 43 Kaiser, Wolfram 2, 48, 193 Kaldor, Nicholas 92, 122, 143 Kaunda, Kenneth 89 Kennedy, John F. 16 Kennedy Round 27–8, 136, 138, 174, 188; bridge-building 54; EEC 64; France’s attitude 45–6, 48, 59; tariff reductions in Europe 48, 55; timing of Britain’s application 143; Wilson, Erhard and 35, 48 Kenya 139 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 101, 110; attitude towards Britain’s membership bid 120; Franco-German links 111, 118–19, 199–200; meeting with Wilson, October 1967 166–9, 199; see also Germany King, Cecil 6 Kitzinger, Uwe 7

Index

205

Kosygin, Alexei 118 Krag, Jens Otto 51 Labour Party, Archives 5; attitudes towards British membership of EEC 90, 187; Commons vote on the second application 8, 153; Commonwealth 24; Germany 61; Labour Party Conference, October 1962 15–16; National Executive Committee 17; National Plan 85; policy in 1970s and 1980s 7, 185 prices and incomes legislation 83; technology 188 Lahr, Rolf 118, 176 Lieber, Robert 5, 196 Longford, Lord 137, 147, 196 Long Term Policy Study 20–1 Ludlow, Piers 3–4, 17, 187 Luns, Joseph 110, 115, 123, 162, 175, 176, 177, 199 Luxembourg 54, 104, 153, 176; probe 112, 114, 115, 116 Luxembourg compromise 41, 56, 57, 63, 64, 91 MacDougall, Sir Donald 25 Maclehose, Murray 109 Macmillan, Harold, application for membership 1–2, 3, 8, 18, 19, 169, 185, 186, 193, 194, 195; Brussels negotiations 3; cold douche of competition 32; Fouchet Plan 29 Maillard, Pierre 158 Malaysia 137, 140, 141, 147, 157 Malta 140 Mansholt, Sicco 18, 120 Marjolin, Robert 18 Marsh, Richard 90, 137, 146, 196 Maudling, Reginald 34–5 metrication of weights and measures 53–4 Milward, Alan 3, 5, 194 Ministry of Agriculture 23, 93, 133–4 Ministry of Defence 140 Ministry of Technology 32, 163 Mitchell, Sir Derek 43, 92, 144 Moravcsik, Andrew 190 Moro, Aldo 117 Mulley, Fred 158 Multilateral Force (MLF) 30, 44, 61, 75, 104 Munchmeyer Plan 48–9, 53, 55 Nassau agreement 3, 31, 77–8, 104, 157 National Archives 4

Index

206

National Farmers’ Union (NFU) 133 National Plan, Agriculture 23, 46; Commonwealth regeneration 47; failure of 7, 70–1, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 131, 147, 192; membership of EEC 51, 76; sterling 25 National Research Development Corporation (NRDC) 43, 54 Neild, Robert 71 Netherlands 29, 54, 56, 104, 130, 154, 159, 166, 167, 175, 177, 178; probe 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 121, 123 New Zealand 78, 93, 94, 136, 161, 176–7, 194; membership for the EEC 102, 115, 130, 137–8, 140, 146, 162 Nigeria 45, 63, 139 Nield, William 43, 103, 123 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 113, 118, 119, 169, 199 North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 7, 90, 95, 136, 146, 193 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 87; Britain’s policy 60, 191; Britain’s policy towards the EEC 175, 177; French threat to withdraw 7, 9–10, 34, 57; French withdrawal 72–4, 80, 107, 158; Germany 35; Harmel Report 164, 174, 177, 201; technology 86, 105 Norway 50–1, 54, 107, 156 Northedge, Frederick 5, 185 nuclear weapons: America and France 157–60; France and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 163; thermonuclear collaboration with France 157–8; Wilson and 31 O’Neill, Sir Con 20, 21, 45, 59–60, 108, 110, 117, 123, 132, 175, 195 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 54 Organisation of African Unity 63 Ostpolitik 119, 199 Owen, John 71, 143 own resources 56 Palliser, Michael 72, 86, 94; memoranda to Wilson, 1965 41–2; Private Secretary 70; role in Wilson’s tactics during the probe 103–5, 107, 108, 109, 110–11, 113, 117; role in Wilson’s tactics during application 158, 160, 161, 163, 166, 167, 168 Parliamentary Labour Party 16 patents 54, 55, 171 Peart, Fred 134, 137, 146, 161–2, 196 Phillips, Eric 22 Pickering, Jeffrey 6 Pimlott, Ben 6, 42 Polaris 157, 158

Index

207

political union of the Six 9, 112, 164; Britain’s policy towards 10, 29–32, 47; empty chair crisis 57; France and Germany 33–6; Rome Summit, 1967 156; technology 164 Pompidou, Georges 107; lifting of the French veto 10, 202; sterling 79, 122, 145; visit to London, July 1966 11, 76–9, 191–2 Portugal 50 Poseidon 157, 158 Powell, Sir Richard 22, 46 probe, of countries of Six 11, 62, 64, 71, 89, 90, 94, 95; Cabinet 102; conduct of 111–16; formation of 103–11; impact of 117–20, 120–2 Ramsden, John 2 regional planning policies 101, 102, 114, 130–2, 153 Republic of Ireland 156 Reilly, Sir Patrick 79, 107, 154, 155, 158, 160, 172; Brown, George 109; De Gaulle, General Charles 163, 166–7; Papers 4 Rey, Jean 120, 164, 166, 176, 178 Rhodesia, EEC and 102, 140; Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 41, 63, 89, 191 Roberts, Sir Frank 34, 167, 169 Robinson, John 111, 132, 134, 135, 138, 195, 196 Rodgers, William 16 Rogers, Philip 62 Roll, Sir Eric 32, 55, 58, 62, 71, 79 Ross, Willy 137, 146, 161, 196 Rueff, Jacques 44 Rusk, Dean 24, 143, 175 Schaad, Martin 4 Schiller, Karl 155, 176 Schroeder, Gerhard 75, 94 Schuman Plan 1 Shore, Peter 6, 198 Sierra Leone 140 Six 101, 132; Britain’s application 154–6, 176–8, 190; De Gaulle’s attitude 113, 173–4; European companies 171; European solution for sterling 77; probe 117, 120, 121, 123; sterling 71, 77, 164–6, 172, 176;

Index

208

see also Common Market and European Economic Community (EEC) Singapore 137, 140, 141, 147, 157 Socialist International, April 1965 51; May 1966 74; July 1962 17–18, 23, 30 Sovereignty 21, 90, 91, 189 Soviet Union 104, 113; Britain and 61, 118, 136; France and Germany and 34, 119, 163; Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 169 Spaak Committee 1 Spaak, Paul-Henri 17–18, 58, 70, 72 sterling: Article 108 118, 121, 130, 165, 176; British membership of the EEC 11, 22, 71, 77, 101, 102, 116, 130–1, 136, 143–6, 153, 176, 200–1; Commission’s opinion 164–6; Crisis, July 1965 61; Crisis, July 1966 6, 7, 70–1, 80–2, 82–9, 92, 105, 185, 186, 192, 193; Currency Reserve Unit 44; devaluation, decision against 1964 25; devaluation, debates in British government 77, 78–9, 80–2, 92; devaluation 12, 171–2; devaluation and de Gaulle’s veto 172–3, 178; ’Forever Unmentionable’ committee 143–5; French views 78–9, 153, 165; European solution 77, 122, 165–6, 201; international liquidity talks 22, 44, 81, 87, 122, 165, 175; reserve currency role 22, 79, 81, 145, 165, 173, 200; single European currency 122; Special Drawing Rights 165; sterling balances 79, 121, 122; see also balance of payments Stewart, Michael 41–2, 161, 202; Cabinet discussions on EEC membership 137, 147, 196, 198; Commonwealth 42; declaration of intent to accept the Rome Treaty 94; empty chair crisis 58, 59, 60, 62–4, 191; memoranda about EEC membership 42–6; National Plan 85–6, 131; NATO crisis 72–4; policy towards membership of the EEC 52, 78, 185; resignation attempt 81–2; Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 83, 84; studies of British membership of the EEC 90 Strauss, Franz Joseph 118 supranationality; British attitude 57, 58–61, 112; DEA attitude 43, 59; empty chair crisis 56–7, 191; European Community attitude 54; Foreign Office and Lord Chancellor’s Department attitude 91;

Index

209

Wilson’s attitude 30, 35, 49, 70, 104, 188, 189, 195 Switzerland 50, 53 Tanzania 140 tariff reductions, Between EFTA and EEC 41, 48, 53, 55 Taxation, harmonisation of 54, 171 technology: collaboration with EEC 41, 47, 86, 192; collaboration with Five 163–4; collaboration with France 7, 32, 35, 53, 54, 104, 105, 112, 118, 188; economies of scale 32–3; enlargement 112; Fourth Community in technology 105–6, 170–1; sterling 200; ‘white heat’ 19, 23, 26 terms of entry; British attitude 41, 70, 74, 76, 79, 90, 92–4, 101, 111, 114–16, 122–4, 153, 185, 186; Cabinet 11, 102, 130–2, 135; first application 2, 132; Six’s attitude 120–2, 176; vue d’ensemble, 1962 3, 5, 7, 16–17, 23 TFX, option on 49 Thomson, George 70, 74 Tickell, Sir Crispin 158 tour of the countries of the six see Probe Trade Expansion Act 27, 143 Trades Union Congress 83, 106 transitional period 164, 171; Brussels negotiations 132; CAP 162; Commonwealth 138; Foreign Office 132–5 Tratt, Jacqueline 8 Treasury: Britain’s membership of the EEC 22, 71, 92, 102, 114, 143; Economic policies after deflation 84; Defence expenditure 88, 140; import surcharge 28; possible break-up of EEC 26; sterling 77, 122, 143–4, 165, 176, 201; studies of membership of the EEC 55; technological collaboration 54 Treaty of Rome 121; Article 108 118, 121, 130, 165, 176; Article 237 124, 153, 156, 194; Article 238 139–40; Britain’s acceptance 91, 95, 110, 133, 153, 161; British declaration to accept 58, 59, 62, 74, 94, 107–8, 108–9, 114, 123, 194; capital movements 92, 114; Conservative Party 63; empty chair crisis 57;

Index

210

establishment 1; France 79, 154–5; part IV 139 Trend, Sir Burke 85, 88, 94, 95, 103, 163; application for membership 123, 135–7, 193, 197; Chair of the OPD 20; devaluation 172; devaluation and EEC membership 144–5; Long Term Policy Study 20; membership of the EEC 51, 62, 74; sterling crisis, July 1966 80–2 TSR-2: cancellation of 49 Uganda 140 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) see Soviet Union United States of America (USA) 104, 114, 130; Anglo-American relationship 21, 24–5, 75, 89, 90, 117, 136, 141–3, 193, 199; Anglo-American relationship and Britain’s suitability for EEC membership 77–8, 95, 118, 157– 60, 166; British partnership with 129, 136; Canada 93, 136; East of Suez 75, 87, 142; Johnson memorandum to Wilson 73, 88; NATO crisis 72–3; France 43, 58, 72–4, 143, 154, 159, 160, 173; pressure for Britain to apply to EEC 86–7, 191; State Department 58; sterling 80–1, 87, 122, 143, 165, 171–2; technology 170–1; troops in Europe 88; Wilson talks with Johnson, April 1967 141–3; Wilson visit to Washington, December 1964 24; Wilson visit to Washington, July 1966 81, 87; see also Johnson, Lyndon B. Uranium, U-235 159 Vanden Boeynants, Paul 122 Vietnam War 24, 25, 141, 142, 146, 193; bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong 75 Wahl, Jean 43 Wallace, Helen 6, 8, 57, 63, 191 Watson, Sam 16 Western European Union: George Brown’s speech to 12, 152, 156, 161–3, 197 Whitehall: attitudes to Community membership 10, 11, 19–23, 71–4, 133; attitudes towards possible break up of the Community 26–7 Wigg, George 6, 82–3 Williams, Philip 16

Index

211

Wilson, Harold 4; Application 153–6, 177–8; Atlantic Alliance 61, 63, 64, 88; attitude towards Commonwealth 7; attitude towards European Community 7, 18–19, 46–51, 52–3, 62–4, 70–1, 79, 89, 187, 189–90, 198–200; attitude towards free trade area 27; bridge-building 53; Britain’s world role 141–3, 192–4; Cabinet and application 102, 129–30, 131, 135–7, 146–7, 186, 194, 196–8; Cabinet reshuffle, August 1966 83–4; Chequers meeting, October 1966 89–95; Commonwealth 47, 52, 63–4, 89, 188, 191; decision to turn towards European Community membership 82–9, 122–4, 185–6, 190–3; defence role in the Far East 7, 81, 87, 88–9, 188, 192; domestic political tactician 8–9; economic policies after deflation 84; Heath, Edward 63; historiography of foreign policy 6, 186; hopes of negotiating a deal with de Gaulle 10, 11, 95, 101, 103–8, 152, 195, 198–9, 200; import surcharge 28; National Plan 85–6; NATO crisis 72–3; organisation of Britain’s application 161; papers 5; probe 94–5, 111–16, 117–20; ‘Right sort’ of Europe 10, 11, 15, 26–33, 36, 41, 46, 64, 101, 188; sterling 25, 80–2, 144–6, 171–2, 192, 200; strategy for attaining membership 10, 11, 75–6, 106–8, 152–3, 163–4, 166, 194–6; supranationality 30, 49, 53, 59, 60–1, 70, 112, 189; Talks with Couve and Pompidou, July 1966 77–9, 191–2; talks with de Gaulle, January 1965 10, 33–5, 190; April 1965 49–50, 53; June 1967 11, 156–60; talks with Erhard, January 1965 10, 33–6, 190; March 1965 47–9, 53; May 1966 74–5; talks with Hetherington 53, 63, 85, 103, 106, 108, 121, 123, 158, 196; talks with Johnson, April 1967 142; talks with Kiesinger, October 1967 167–9; technological community 86, 105–6, 170–1; terms of entry 74, 78, 92–4, 114–16, 121–2, 190, 196–7; Treaty of Rome 74, 94–5; Visit to Washington, December 1964 24; July 1966 86–7; see also Britain Werner, Pierre 114, 116 Winnifrith, Sir John 23 Wright, Sir Oliver 31, 61, 70 Yaoundé Convention 45, 139

Index Young, Hugo 8, 132 Young, John W. 4, 7 Zambia 89 Ziegler, Philip 6 Zijlastra, Jelle 123 Zuckerman, Sir Solly 159

212