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sagt er () wir wissen nichts, > 10 11Erik: hajaja 12 die krieget.h [die krieget () en vollstandig neue lebenslauf, [< des hat er net emol aguckt>. 5Erik: des isch doch dere katz ihr erschtes weihnachte 6 die weifi gar net dafi mer do [was kriegt== 7?Marie: [was los isch 8Erik: etz niichsch jahr () da muj3 me re vielleicht was gebe; 'lMarie: 2 3Fritz: 4 5Erik: 6 deins isch kleiner.> 2Kai: gar net 3 [fwe: noi nemm du i will blo) e schtii[ck; == 4Kai: [nein (2 Silben) esse. 5Uwe: i will doch net solche brocken. 'IErik: 2Kai: 3Uwe: 4Kai: 5Uwe: des hat er net emol aguckt>. 5Erik: des isch doch dere katz ihr erschtes weihnachte 6 die weifJ gar net daft mer do [was kriegt== 7?Marie: [was los isch; 8Erik: etz niichsch jahr () da muj3 me re vielleicht was gebe; 'lMarie: 2 3Fritz: 4 5Erik: 6 7?Marie: 8Erik: mhm, vor[her () ko]nnen wir nicht die geSAMTfinanzierung, [(h) ] wie mit KDpenick. ja und () fund er da]nn NUR aufder STRAsse ist; [(h)] (-) dann SAGT er das LOHNT sichfiir mich nicht. (-) dann bleib ich LIEber () in nordrhein westFAlen. nich allEin sein miissn. > un dem==mer (-) sich RANzieht, ja? (-) (-) wenns HARTwird; (3.0) an dem=mer sich FESCHThiilt, (2.0) wem==mer EINsam isch, (1.0) nd der ii: berall MIT muss. 'TM: eating is like a teddy bear. TW: yeah TM: who who you carry around with you. h:m,] B: und eh (-) WEGste//en. (-) .hja? () eh==s da stunden/ang streiteREIen gibt, wiird ich sagen, a/[so: ] jetzt is:II: [hm,} (0.5) II: da hiitt==ich iirger [mit IHnen. B: [sch/uss aus ENde? II: [wenn SIE mir dann auch noch den KAFfee (wegschlieften.)] B: [he he he he he he 'B: II: B:
96
Christine Gohl
16
(1.5)
17
na diirfe se 10s lege.
, 1Fritz: 2
3 4 5 6 7 8
« »
he used to work as a policeman. ie gJ, ludwigsburg. «name of policestation and town»
(1.5) and then he went underground.
(1.5)
only recently his parents came in, (---) and then I asked them well: eh:, 9 how is your son these days e::, 10 «p> he said (.) we don't know anything,> 11Erik: ohyeah 12 they get .h [they get (.) a completely new personal record, 13Fritz: [<
The accounts offered after dispreferred seconds in examples (6), (7), and (8)-whether they follow requests for information (excerpt (7) and (8» or suggestions (excerpt (6»-all refer to some kind of inability to "carry out the proposed or required conversational action" (Heritage 1988: 136). In (6), the speaker accounts for why he is not able to use the scissors for cutting the meat as Anne has suggested; in (7) the patient accounts for her inability to completely comply with the doctor's request for information, and in (8) a third speaker accounts for the inability of two other-distant-speakers to carl)' out the action that has been called for by the question asked, namely to provide an answer.
Causal relations in spoken discourse
4.3.
97
Accounts after assessments
Accounts are not only offered after dispreferred seconds; they also · emerge regularly after assessments. 15 These assessments 0 f en t contaIn lexical markers or phrases that make them 'strong assessments' in the sense of what Ford has described as 'strong evaluation' (Ford 1994: 548). In German, some of these lexical markers are: besonders 'especially', wirklich 'really', sehr 'very', ganz 'totally', as well as particular adjectives like abscheulich 'dreadful', wunderbar 'wonderful', genial 'brilliant' or adjectives in their superlative form, e.g. am schlimmsten 'worst' and nominal expressions like da war die holle los 'all hell broke loose' . Accounts after strong evaluative assessments are more frequent in my data than accounts after assessments that do not express a strong evaluative stance. This observation leads to the conclusion that it is not particular lexical items that are responsible for the production of an explanatory unit, but the action carried out by the evaluative statement, the assessment. Let us look at transcript (9). The participants are talking about the family's cat. The starting point for this discussion is Marie's utterance. She thinks that the cat is sad because it did not get anything for Christmas. (9) CAT I (Schwab 3; 0:07:45) lMarie: i mochtja nix (sage aber) die katz isch ganz traurig2 die hat nix kriegt. 3Fritz: <
I don't want to (say) anything (but) the cat is really sad she didn't get anything. «f> just now I gave her something>, (.) «p> she didn't even look at it>. it's the cat's first Christmas, you see she doesn't know that [you get something at Christmas= -
98
Christine Gohl
7?Marie: 8Erik:
[what's going on next year you'll probably have to give her something;'
With her utterance die hat nix kriegt 'she didn't get anything' Marie gives an account for her assessment die katz isch ganz traurig- 'the cat is really sad-' . The following excerpt illustrates the interactive production of an assessment-account sequence. The participants, mother and son, are talking about the car the son has used to drive to his parents' home. This car is obviously not his own, but belongs to the company he works for. (10) AUTO (Schwab 3; 0:27:29) lMarie: <
«cresc> were you allowed to drive> that beautiful car today; yeah:: I have to keep up appearances, haven't I?'
With her utterance, Marie is doing two things that call for a second action by the recipient. She is asking a question and is also making an assessment of the car the son has used to visit his parents: mit dem schone auto 'that beautiful car'. The content of this question is marked on the prosodic level as something extraordinary: first, during its production the utterance increases in volume; second, there is remarkable pitch movement on auto Jahre, with the pitch falling from a very high level. Marie's question - which constitutes the first part of an adjacency pair - calls for an answer. This is produced by Erik immediately after Marie has finished her tum (ja:: 'yeah::'). The assessment, however, requires a separate acknowledgment. This is provided when Erik gives a reason for what Marie has said (line 2). Note that Erik not only reacts to the content of Marie's utterance, but also to its prosodic design, which conveys a somewhat surprised and approving attitude towards the fact that Erik was allowed to drive this beautiful car. This attitude, however, has a slight ironic undertone, which is taken up by Erik in his utterance: both Marie's question and Erik's answer are thus produced in a teasing, slightly ironic style-judging from content and, especially in Marie's utterance, from the prosody.
Causal relations in spoken discourse
4.4.
99
Accounts after requests
Asking a question is a particular form of requesting something from the recipient, namely the provision of information (cf example (7) FINDINGS, in which the doctor asks for detailed information about the patient's medical history). Consider now example (11). The participants are discussing the appropriate time for smoking and the quality of the cigars a family member has brought along. Erik was offered one of these cigars on an earlier occasion. He now reports on the bad effects it had on him. (11) CIGARS (Schwab 3; 0:0:37) lMarie: do hocksch na un rauchsch st[att daj3 de unsre esse/ 2Erik: [ja sind die zigarre scho was, 3 also mir isch ganz ubel denoch gwase. 4Marie: er==hot==doch==gsagt die beschtn wo==s gibt5 (1.5) was 6Fritz: 7Erik: die zigarre, 'IMarie: 2Erik: 3 4Marie: 5 6Fritz: ?Erik:
then you will sit down and smoke in[stead of our eating our foodl [are these cigars okay, I felt absolutely sick after smoking one. he said the best ones you can get. (1.5.) what the cigars,'
In line 3, Erik gives a reason for asking the question ja sind die zigarre scho was? 'are these cigars okay?'. He asks if the cigars are okay, because he felt sick after smoking one of them, implying with his question that the cigars might not be okay. By offering an account, Erik is giving the recipients some insight into the motive he has for asking the question. In the speaker makes a request in the form of an imperative. The participants are talking about the food, the meat they are having for dinner in particular.
100 Christine Gohl
(12) MEAT (Schwab 8; 15:18) 1Erik: tausche mer <
let's swap «p> yours is smaller.> not true no you take it Ijust want a pie[ce;= [no (2 syl.) eat. 1 don't want such big pieces. '
Erik asks Uwe if he wants to swap pieces of meat. Immediately after this request, he offers a reason for requesting: deins isch kleiner 'yours is smaller'. In his next tum (line 3), Uwe refuses to accept Erik's request (noi nemm du 'no you take it') and accounts for the production of this dispreferred second action in lines 3 and 5: i will blo) e schtiick; 'I just want a piece', and i will doch net solche brocken 'I don't want such big pieces' . Excerpts (11) and (12) show that requests-in these cases formulated as a question and as an imperative-are followed by accounts. Requests are face-threatening activities because they put some obligation on the recipient he or she has to do something for the speaker, either in the form of a verbal action (provide the information requested) or in the form of a non-verbal action (do the thing requested). This format makes requests conversationally sensitive actions-and these are likely to be followed by accounts.
4.5.
Accounts after complaints and reproaches
A common feature of activities like complaining and reproaching is their moral bias. "In these activities interlocutors focus on an infringement of expectations concerning situatively appropriate behaviour and in doing so, demonstrate their own orientation to moral rules and values" (Giinthner 1994: 2). Reproaches make second actions by the person the reproach is directed at relevant, i.e. they call for justifications or apologies (Giinthner 1993: 3-6). In the data analyzed here, however, reproaches are not only followed by such second actions (compare (13) below, where Fritz denies the action he has been reproached for). First speakers, too,
Causal relations in spoken discourse
101
i. e. the persons who are doing the reproaching, offer accounts for reproaching someone or complaining about something. In (13) the topic is once again the family cat. Anna is blaming Fritz for having given his cold to the cat. (13) COLD (Schwab 3; 1:49:38) JAnna: mensch jetz hasch die katz scho angschteckt mit deiner erkiiltung-== der nie:st scho de ganze d[a:g; 2 3Fritz: [des hat er heut morge scho gmacht.
'lAnna: good heavens you've given the cat your cold= 2 he's been sneezing all d[ay 3Fritz: [he did it this morning already.' From the external, visible fact der nie:st scho de ganze dag 'he's been sneezing all day', Anna draws the conclusion that Fritz, who has a cold, must have given it to the cat. She formulates this conclusion as a reproach: both the content of this utterance and the way it is expressed (e.g. the term mensch, which is very often used at the beginning or at the end of an accusatory utterance) give it its reproachful character. Right after this unit, Anna offers an explanation and a justification for the conclusion and the reproach: the cat's been sneezing all day. 16 Reproaches are face-threatening activities, i.e. activities which are likely to threaten both the face of the person the reproach is directed at and the social relationship between the parties. Offering an account after such an action makes a reproach more understandable because it reveals the reasons behind it and gives the person blamed the chance to react to the reproach in a way which is more customized than a mere refusal would be: he or she can exculpate him- or herself by referring to the reason for the reproach. This happens in line 3 in (13): Fritz makes it clear that he refuses to take responsibility for the cat's cold because the cat has been sneezing all morning. He implies that it must have caught the cold elsewhere. It will not come as a surprise that accounts after reproaches emerge not only after a speaker has blamed some other participant for something, but also after complaints about a third party. Consider the following transcript. The content is the same as in CAT I: three family members are talking about the meal they have just had and are considering the 'poor cat', who seems to be sad because it did not get anything.
102 Christine Gohl
(14) CAT II (Schwab 3; 0:07:45) lMarie: i mochtja nix (sage aber) die katz isch ganz traurig2 die hat nix kriegt. 3Fritz: <
I don't want to (say) anything (but) the cat is really sadshe didn't get anything. «f> just now I gave her something>, (.) «p> she didn't even look at it>. it's the cat's first christmas you see she doesn't know that [you get something at christmas= [what's going on; next year you'll probably have to give her something;'
With his utterance des hat er net emol aguckt 'she didn't even look at it', Fritz complains about the cat's behavior with respect to his action: he has given the cat some food, but the cat did not appreciate it. Erik and Marie account for this behavior with the utterances that follow. Thus, once again, the causal relation is constructed interactively. Fritz produces an utterance which is treated by a second speaker, Erik, as a consequence: the cat does not appreciate the food because it is her first Christmas. Therefore, you cannot expect her to react in a particular way. The second part of Erik's utterance (die weifJ gar net dajJ mer do was kriegt- 'she doesn't know that you get something at christmas-') provides another potential reason for the cat's behavior. At the same time, another speaker (probably Marie) comes in and completes another explanatory unit (die weifJ gar net was los isch; 'she doesn't know what's going on;') for what Fritz has said earlier (des hat er net emol aguckt 'she didn't even look at it' ). Both explanatory units, Erik's and Marie's, contain reasons for the cat's behavior, as well as consequences with respect to the first part of Erik's utterance (des isch doch dere katz ihr erschtes weihnachte- 'it's the cat's first christmas-'): hence, because it is the cat's first Christmas, she does not know that you receive something on this occasion and she does not know what is going on. The interactive nature of this production of accounts shows that both speakers, as recipients, consider the action of
Causal relations in spoken discourse
103
blaming the cat for not appreciating the food as an action that calls for accounting.
4.6.
Activity types as constraints on the interpretation of asyndetic causa/constructions
In my data, asyndetically linked accounts follow dispreferred second actions and various other types of action which are organized as adjacency pairs in that they make a second-verbal or non-verbal-action sequentially necessary: first assessments, for example, call for second assessments (Pomerantz 1984), requests call for responses in the form of an acceptance or refusal, reproaches for denial or admission (Heritage 1984: 269; Levinson 1983: 308,336). The causal units in the latter cases account for the production of the first actions. However, not all first parts of actions that are organized as adjacency pairs require accounts. Rather, accounting occurs, in particular, after activities which are sensitive to the social relationship between the parties. Requests and reproaches, are, like dispreferred seconds, face-threatening actions-requests, because they impose some obligation on others, reproaches, because they imply criticism of others. Although assessments are not face-threatening in the same way, they are still sensitive to possible disagreement-especially as 'strong assessments'-in that they express a speaker's highly subjective evaluative stance towards a particular fact or event. Accounting after first assessments makes a subjective position more understandable and thus more likely to lead to a preferred second assessment. The analysis of the data shows that participants are sensitive to the production of accounts in these particular environments. Therefore, I would argue that these activity types constrain the interpretations that arise when a causal unit is not explicitly marked as such. An utterance is much more likely to be interpreted as an account, i. e. as an utterance explaining and/or justifying a previous conversational move, if the preceding utterance, by virtue of its sequential and social implications, calls for accounting. Concerning accounts after dispreferred seconds, Heritage (1988: 136) argues that they help to avoid threatening the social relationship between the participants. Accounting for the inability to produce an answer, for example, leaves the responsibility for the dispreferred second with the speaker. Not accounting for a dispreferred second or denying the right of the first speaker to carry out the first action would constitute a threatening act, endangering the participants' relationship. The same holds for the
104 Christine Gohl
production of accounts after reproaches: reproaches are, by their very nature, disaffiliative acts threatening the recipient's face. Giving a reason for such a disaffiliative move makes the act of reproaching more understandable because it reveals the motives behind the reproach. With respect to requests, which, of course, are much less facethreatening than reproaches, it can be argued that a request always puts some obligation on the recipient(s): he or she is asked to do something for the speaker, for example, provide him/her with the information requested. Again, providing a reason for requesting makes the act more understandable because it gives the recipient some insight into the speaker's motives. In sum, the interpretation of an asyndetic construction depends on the features described in sections 2 and 3 and on the sequential environment of the construction in question, i. e. on the activity it can be construed as relating to.
5.
Concluding remarks
This study shows that speakers may give reasons without usmg a conventionalized causal connective element. Different sequential environments were investigated in which speakers produce such asyndetically linked causal relations in order to give accounts. These environments are constituted by different actions which, for various reasons, call for accounting. One group of these activitiesdispreferred seconds, requests, and reproaches-is particularly sensitive to the social relation between participants, either because these activities are face-threatening or because they put some obligation on the recipient. The second group, including first (strong) assessments, is also socially risky. Accounts following strong assessments make the production of a preferred second more likely because they support what is often a highly subjective attitude on the part of the speaker and thus make it easier for recipients and possible next speakers to understand the speaker's stance and react to it in a preferred format. Ford has shown in her studies (1994 and this volume) that accounts or explanations and justifications often emerge in contexts involving some form of contrast, which mayor may not be marked, for example, by contrastive markers or negation particles. The analysis of the asyndetic causal constructions in my data, however, shows that only about half of the accounts occur in contexts involving contrasts. This means that accounts have a much broader context of occurrence. In fact, much
Causal relations in spoken discourse
105
suggests that the production of accounts should be seen as motivated by making reference to the kinds of actions which call for them. This is not to deny that there may be a correlation between linguistic structure and the kind of action that is carried out by an utterance-dispreferred seconds, for example, often contain negation markers-but the correlation is by no means obligatory. Consequently, analysis must go beyond the linguistic realization of an utterance and ask what a speaker is doing with a particular utterance. Related to the issue of structure and action is the question of linguistic practices. Which ones do speakers have at their disposal for the production of reasons? What circumstances influence the choice of linguistic means, especially the choice between explicit conjunctional linkage and asyndetic linkage, when speakers produce accounts for previous actions? First tentative analyses show that one of many possible factors is whether speakers are giving reasons for their own actions or for actions produced by other speakers: asyndetic linkage seems to be preferred to conjunctional linkage in cases of interactively produced constructions. Moreover, particular environments apparently allow only asyndetic linkage. For example, when an account refers to a non-verbal action, there is no previous utterance or implication to which a conjunctional clause could be linked (cf example (6) SCISSORS). These questions, which still need investigation, touch upon the general issue of the linkage between (linguistic) practices and actions, discussed, for example, in ScheglofI (1996, 1997). Further studies along the lines suggested here could bring about a fuller understanding of the relation between various linguistic practices and the action of 'giving reasons' in spoken interaction.
Appendix: Transcription conventions [] overlap [] (.) micro-pause (-), (--), (---) short, middle or long pauses of approx. 0.25-0.75 seconds, up to ca. 1 second (2.0) estimated pause of more than 1 second slurring within units and=uh lengthening, according to its duration hesitation signals, so-called "filled pauses" uh,ah, etc. intonation phrase-final: high rise ? intonation phrase-final: mid-rise intonation phrase-final: level pitch
106 Christine Gohl
/
«
(
»
)
(such)
~ » j,
«t» «p» «all» «cresc»
intonation phrase-final: mid-fall intonation phrase-final: low fall break-off interpretive comments over a stretch of speech unintelligible passage uncertain transcription onllssion of text pitch step up pitch step down forte, loud piano, soft allegro, fast crescendo, becoming louder
Notes * 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
I am grateful to Dagmar Barth and Susanne Gtinthner as well as to the editors of this volume for their valuable comments on earlier versions. For the connection between the term 'account' and the more generic phenomenon of interactional accountability discussed in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, see Heritage (1988: 128, 138-141). I view speaking as a form of social action (Heritage 1984: 135) and therefore linguistic utterances as a means for carrying out particular actions. From this premise it follows that coherence relations, e.g. causal relations, that hold between utterances also hold between actions, i.e. an utterance referring to some other utterance does so because of the action(s) carried out by that particular utterance. This applies to utterances to the extent that they consist of one or more turn-constructional units. For the notion of turnconstructional unit (TCD), see Sacks, Schegloffand Jefferson (1974). A first analysis of explicitly linked causal structures compared with asyndetic causal structures shows that explicit linkage allows for more conversational space inbetween accountable action and account. Exceptions are, moreover, deviant cases (Heritage 1988: 133-135), in which an account is produced with a delay, usually when a first speaker does not offer the account immediately but only after a second speaker has elicited its production (see excerpt (5) DECISION in section 4.1.). The translations are meant to convey more the content of the utterances than the stylistic subtleties of the Swabian dialect. Chafe (1988: 1) defines the prototypical intonation unit as "single coherent intonation contour characterized by one or more intonation peaks and a cadence that is recognizable as either clause-final or sentence-final." For this connective function see also Franck (1980: 253) and Lindner (1991: 174). Besides emphasizing their connective function, Ickier (1994: 377) also stresses the interactive role of modal particles: they "anchor particular utterances in larger contexts, which are usually characterized by their
Causal relations in spoken discourse
7. 8.
9. 10. 11. 12.
13.
14. 15.
16.
107
dialogic nature." For the interactive function of the particles doch, eben, and ja in spoken discourse see also Liitten (1979). Occasional remarks on the possible causal meaning of modal particles can be found for doch (Feyrer 1998: 187-192), auch (Paul 1966), halt (Abraham 1983, Hinrichs 1983) eben andja (Abraham 1983). This investigation is based on the analysis of approximately 7 hours of spoken German comprising about 4 1/2 hours of informal conversational data, i.e. family conversations, 1 1/2 hours of interactions in a medical setting, and 3/4 of an hour of radio phone-ins. Most of the data was recorded in the Swabian area of Southern Germany. I wish to thank Ute LacherLaukenikat and project C4 of the SFB 471 for making their data available to me. For the interpretation of asyndetic conditional structures, i.e. paratactic conditionals, see Thumm (1999). For the notion of 'dispreferred second' and a more detailed discussion of accounts after dispreferred second actions, see section 4.2. In fact, in excerpt (3), the utterance'.h .h Ooh I've no idea:.' also constitutes an account: M accounts for her failure to provide J with the information requested (Heritage 1984: 250). Compare also excerpt (6) in section 4.2. For more details, including the marked-unmarked distinction, and a survey of the most important issues concerning preference organization, see Levinson (1983: 332-345). On the use of causal markers in English and Japanese conversations in dispreferred environments, see Ford and Mori (1994). For another example illustrating the production of a dispreferred secondaccount-sequence after a suggestion, see excerpt (1) SMOKING. While in excerpt (6) SCISSORS the declining component is not verbalized, in excerpt (1) SMOKING the speaker formulates the declining of another speaker's suggestion in a very explicit and highly marked way. 'Pock-pock' is presumably the name for a kind of a fowl. For a discussion of assessments and their sequential implications in spoken German interaction, see Auer and Uhmann (1982). Some of their transcripts show that second speakers may explicitly ask for the reason of an assessment given by a first speaker if the latter does not account for the assessment him/herself (Auer and Uhmann 1982: 8-9). The formulation der nie:st scho de ganze da:g ('he's been sneezing all day') falls into the category of Extreme Case Formulations (Pomerantz 1986). Such formulations are used by speakers when they justify complaining about something or somebody to "legitimize a complaint and portray the complainable situation as worthy of the complaint" (Pomerantz 1986: 228).
References Abraham, Werner 1983 Starke Satzverkniipfer-Sinnsog und Partikelenquete. In: Harald Weydt (ed.), Partikeln und lnteraktion, 25-39. Tiibingen: Niemeyer.
108 Christine Gohl Atkinson, J. Maxwell and Paul Drew 1979 Order in Court. London: Macmillan Auer, Peter and Susanne Uhmann 1982 Aspekte der konversationellen Organisation von Bewertungen. Deutsche Sprache 10: 1-32. Bergmann, Jorg R. 1991 Konversationsanalyse. In: U. Flick, E. von Kardoff, H. Keupp, L. von Rosenstiel and S. Wolff (eds.), Handbuch Qualitative Sozialforschung, 213-218. Mfinchen: Psychologie Verlags Union. Blakemore, Diane 1987 Semantic Constraints on Relevance. Oxford: Blackwell. Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth 1996 Intonation and clause combining in discourse: The case of because. Pragmatics 6/3: 389-426. Chafe, Wallace 1988 Linking intonation units in spoken English. In: John Haiman and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.), Clause Combining in Grammar and Discourse, 1-27. AmsterdamIPhiladelphia: Benjamins. Feyrer, Cornelia 1998 Modalitiit im Kontrast: Ein Beitrag zur ubersetzungsorientierten Modalpartikelforschung anhand des Deutschen und des Franzosischen. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Ford, Cecilia E. 1994 Dialogic aspects of talk and writing: because on the interactive edited continuum. Text 14/4: 531-554. Ford, Cecilia E. and Junko Mori 1994 Causal markers in Japanese and English conversations: A crosslinguistic study of interactional grammar. Pragmatics 4/1: 31-61. Franck, Dorothea 1980 Grammatik und Konversation. Monographien Linguistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft 46. Konigstein, Ts.: Scriptor. Gfinthner, Susanne 1993 "Kannst du auch fiber ANDERE Leute LAsTERN." Vorwiirfe als Formen moralischer Kommunikation. Arbeitspapier Nr. 9. MORAL-Projekt. Universitat Konstanz. 1994 Moral voices: Prosodic features of reproaches in "why"-formats. Arbeitspapier Nr 11. MORAL-Projekt. Universitat Konstanz. 1996 From subordination to coordination? Verb-second position in German causal and concessive constructions. Pragmatics 6/3: 323370. Heritage, John 1984 Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hartmann, Dietrich 1986 Semantik von Modalpartikeln im Deutschen. Deutsche Sprache 14: 140-155.
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Hinrichs, U. 1983 Konnen Abtonungspartikel metakommunikativ funktionieren? In: Harald Weydt (ed.), Partikeln und lnteraktion, 274-290. Tubingen: Niemeyer. IckIer, Theodor 1994 Zur Bedeutung der sogenannten 'Modalpartikeln'. Sprachwissenscho:ft 19: 374-404. Levinson, Stephen 1983 Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lindner, Katrin 1991 'Wir sindja doch alte Bekannte' The use of Germanja und doch as modal particles. In: Werner Abraham (ed.), Discourse Particles, 163-201. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Lutten, Jutta 1979 Die Rolle der Partikeln doch, eben, und ja als KonsensusKonstitutiva in gesprochener Sprache. In: Harald Weydt (ed.), Die Partikeln der deutschen Sprache. 30-38. Berlin: de Gruyter. Pasch, Renate 1997 WElL mit Hauptsatz-Kuckucksei im DENN-Nest. Deutsche Sprache 3: 252-271. Paul, Hermann [1966] Deutsches Worterbuch, 6.A. Tubingen: Niemeyer. Pomerantz, Anita 1984 Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some features of preferredldispreferred turn shapes. In: 1. Maxwell Atkinson and John Heritage (eds.), Structures of Social Action, 57-101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pomerantz, Anita 1986 Extreme Case Formulations: A way of legitimizing claims. Human Studies 9: 219-229. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., and Jefferson, Gail 1974 A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language 50/4: 696-735 Scheutz, Hannes 1998 Weil in spoken German. Presentation given at the conference on 'Cognitive and Discourse Perspectives on Cause, Condition, Concession and Contrast'. Oktober 1998. UniversiUit Konstanz. Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1996 Confirming allusions. American Journal of Sociology 102/1: 161216. 1997 Practices and actions: Boundary cases of other-initiated repair. Discourse Processes 23: 499-549. Schleppegrell, Mary J. 1991 Paratactic BECAUSE. Journal ofPragmatics 16: 323-337.
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Thumm, Markus 1999 How to do some things without 'if. Eine empirische Untersuchung zu parataktischen Konditionalkonstruktionen im gesprochenen Englisch. MA-thesis, Department of Linguistics, University of Konstanz. Uhmann, Susanne 1998 Verbstellungsvariation in Weil-Satzen: Lexikalische DifIerenzierung mit grammatischen Folgen. Zeitschrift .fur Sprachwissenschaft 17/1: 92-139.
Constructions with if, since, and because: Causality, epistemic stance, and clause order* Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
English causal and conditional conjunctions show significant overlap both in functions and in the ranges of grammatical constructions in which they occur. These phenomena are related: one reason why different conjunctions can express similar meanings is that the lexical semantics of one conjunction may explicitly involve meaning which is not present in the other conjunction's semantics but can be expressed by accompanying grammatical constructions. Using Mental Spaces theory (Fauconnier 1985/1994, 1997), we analyze the semantics of English if, since, and because, examining the interaction between their lexical semantics and the semantics of their grammatical surroundings. Among the factors involved are predictive function and causal relations (Dancygier 1993, 1998; Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, 1997), epistemic stance (Fillmore 1990a,b), and the relation of the mental space to the speech setting (Sweetser 1990, Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, Dancygier 1998).
1. Introduction In this paper we will analyze the uses of causal and conditional constructions using the conjunctions if, since, and because. These conjunctions specialize in distinct areas of meaning, but their areas of use overlap significantly: a comprehensive analysis, therefore, should explain the overlap as well as the distinctions between them. It has been noted, for instance, that since could substitute for if in (1) without significant change in interpretation, and that a causal relation underlies the contingency described in (2):
(1)
If (as you say) he is in town now, maybe we should phone him?
(2)
If I take my pills regularly,
the symptoms go away.
In (1), imagine that the hearer has said earlier in the conversation that the relevant person is in town now. In the speaker's reference to this previous statement, she could use since instead of if, with quite similar
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effect. (2) can naturally be interpreted to mean that taking pills regularly makes the symptoms disappear-a causal interpretation related to readings of because and since. There is thus a significant degree of overlap among the uses of the conjunctions involved. But the potential for such interpretations will often depend on factors other than the conjunction itself; notice that when is a plausible substitute for if in (2) but not in (1), suggesting that the lexical and constructional contexts are important in determinining possible construals of the relations between conjoined clauses. In positing functional overlap between these conjunctions, we are by no means suggesting that they are synonymous--or even that they have specific senses which are synonymous. On the contrary, we will try to specify the source of the similarities as well as to clearly delineate the differences. Both similarities and differences are best accounted for not by focusing only on the conjunctions themselves, but by describing the range of constructions they participate in. The main goal of our analysis is thus to distinguish aspects of constructional meaning which are involved in various uses of each of the conjunctions, and to show how particular formal parts of constructions combine with each other to contribute to varying interpretations of the whole. 1 We will bring up three relevant parameters in trying to compare and contrast the four kinds of constructions. First, we will consider the role of causal models in interpretation. Causality is involved in the constructions in a variety of ways and on various levels of interpretation. Constructional aspects of meaning, and the cognitive domains in which these constructions are interpreted, can be as important as the choice of conjunction, in bringing causality into the interpretation. The conjunctions will also be compared in terms of the type of mental space set-up they engage in; this is often also specifically signalled by the use of verb forms marking negative epistemic stance. Finally, we will review the constructions with respect to their roles in backgrounding or foregrounding elements of interpretation in different clause order configurations. Our analysis of meaning will be framed in terms of Mental Spaces theol)' (Fauconnier 1985, 1997), an extremely general formal theory which provides mechanisms for talking about the ways in which we connect cognitive structures with each other. To some extent, traditional treatments of conditional semantics in terms of Possible Worlds have aimed at capturing similar insights. Somewhat in the way that an ifclause can be said to set up a Possible World within which a then-clause
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is construed, we would argue that an ~clause sets up a Mental Space which is the background for the construal of the then-clause. For example, in If his computer gets repaired, then he'll finish the paper by Friday, the ~clause sets up a space wherein the computer gets repaired, and within that space, the speaker predicts that the paper will get finished by Friday. However, mental spaces are a more general mechanism than possible worlds, referring not only to very partial cognitive "world" or "situation" constructions as well as to more complete ones, but also to a variety of non-world-like structures which can be connected and mapped onto other cognitive structures. For example, the two mental spaces consisting of our mental list of restaurant customers and our mental list of their orders are mapped onto each other to allow utterances such as The ham sandwich wants his check now, wherein the name of the food item ordered can be used to refer to the customer who placed that order (Fauconnier 1985[1994]). World-like structures are not the only consistent, complex mental models which humans develop, and which humans can interconnect with each other. We have exemplified the use of if as a mental space builder. Numerous linguistic devices can play such a role: in 1984, in the picture, possibly, etc. All such expressions require that the content of the clause or sentence be considered in a mental space other than the base space-the reality space of the hearer and the speaker. In what follows we will show how the conjunctions if, since, and because participate in the construction of mental spaces and how the kind of space being set up affects the way the conjunctions are used.
2. Mental spaces, causality, and levels of interpretation We will start this section by outlining types of mental spaces which are particularly relevant to our interpretation of the use of conjunctions. We will then show how these types of mental space set-ups correspond to levels of interpretation of constructions and how causal relations are established at each of these levels.
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2.1.
Mental spaces and cognitive domains
Causal and conditional constructions, and particularly if-conditionals, are known to vary widely in function. It would be economical and possibly even elegant to be able to attribute some of this functional diversity to a few specific parameters of interpretation. In fact, mental spaces theory opens up the possibility for such an elegant treatment, by allowing us to talk about different kinds or classes of mental spaces. For example, in a more or less "standard" conditional such as (3),the speaker sets up a space of mental content (cf Sweetser 1990,1996; Dancygier and Sweetser 1996)-a space which is about a possible state of affairs in the world, namely the computer getting repaired. (3)
Ifhis computer gets repaired, he 'llfinish the paper by Friday.
Within this content-domain space (further filled out by the speaker's and hearer's general knowledge about the individuals referred to), the speaker predicts an added aspect of the content of this mental spacethe paper getting finished by Friday. As argued in Dancygier (1993, 1998), prediction in the content domain represents the central use of conditional constructions. "now (not Friday yet)"
Future Space = P (neutral stance) "his computer gets repaired"
Counter-Future Space = ",p "his computer doesn't get repaired"
Figure 1. If his computer gets repaired, he'll finish the paper by Friday.
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As seen in Figure 1, a predictive conditional such as (4) automatically also sets up an alternative space, where P does not hold (no computer repair) and Q also does not hold (no finished paper by Friday). Although this is not a logical property of conditionals, it is a necessary property of the predictive use of conditionals, as we have argued elsewhere (Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, 1997); (3) would not be relevant as a prediction if the paper were just as likely to be finished regardless of the computer repair. By contrast, in an example like (4), the speaker does not predict something about a good Thanksgiving on the basis of information about seeing the addressee before Thursday.
(4)
If! don't see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving!2
Rather, the speaker sets up a discourse context, a speech-act space wherein Thursday has arrived without her seeing the hearer, and then utters a speech act which is to be taken as effective within that space. This can't quite literally be true, since of course the well-wishing is uttered in the current context and can't exactly be retracted; but the conditional certainly modifies the context of interpretation from the previously accepted one. In particular, the hearer cannot now reply with but isn't it a bit early for that? As we might expect from the nonpredictive nature of (4), no alternative space is set up; that is, although the speaker knows she may see the addressee before Thursday, she is not providing for that separate contingency. Her good wishes are offered regardless.
P: S doesn't see H between Monday and Thursday Figure 2. If I don't see you before Thursday, have a good Thanksgiving.
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A conditional can thus set up, imagine, and negotiate possibilities in either the world of linguistically described content, or in the world of current speech-act context and performance, where the events and participants are the Speaker, the Hearer, and the speech act with its interpretive context. Speech act conditionals have been noticed as a special and interesting case for some time (Vander Auwera 1986, Sweetser 1990). Mental spaces theory provides a simple mechanism for the description and analysis of the difference between them and content conditionals: conditional constructions may build speech-act spaces as well as content spaces. What other sorts of spaces might speakers construct with conditionals? Sweetser (1990) has argued for a distinction between content conditionals and epistemic conditionals, which follow the speaker's reasoning process in a conditional manner, as in (5):
(5)
If he finished the paper by Friday,
his computer must have gotten
repaired. In the described world of content, the paper's being fInished is not a condition for the computer's being repaired, rather the reverse. But in the epistemic world, where knowledge of effects limits possible conclusions about causes, knowing when the paper was finished is a condition which may be sufficient to warrant an inference about computer repairs. In (5), an epistemic space is set up, wherein the speaker believes or knows that the paper was finished, and it is in that space that she draws the conclusion about the repairs. (Possible paraphrase: 'If I know (or we know) that the paper was finished, then I (we) must conclude that the computer was repaired. ') A further point here is that the speaker of (5) is very possibly not doing initial setup of a space wherein the paper is known to be finished. We might say that she is evoking, rather than actively setting up, that space, if she is borrowing structure set up by an interlocutor who has just informed her that the paper was fInished by Friday. Dancygier (1993, 1998) has set out a further variety of conditional uses, as in (6), wherein metalinguistic negotiation is the subject of the conditional relationship:
(6)
Chris wants you to meet her fiance, him.
if that's
the right word for
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the speaker perhaps thinks that Chris is using fiance as a euphemism for 'live-in partner.' Crucially, the speaker is not here construed as negotiating either the facts of the case (the content), or conclusions to be drawn from them in the epistemic domain; nor is she conditionally performing the speech act of stating that Chris wants the hearer to meet a particular individual. She is apparently metalinguistically commenting on, or presenting as merely conditional, her use of the label fiance to refer to that individual. In this case, we need a somewhat more complex mental space structure, which we have referred to (Dancygier and Sweetser 1996,1997) as a metalinguistic space. A metalinguistic space (generically diagrammed in Figure 3 below) consists of a speechcontext space, within which there is a space of content being discussed and a space of linguistic forms available for referring to that content. Metalinguistic conditionality concerns mappings between the content space and the form space within a particular context. Here, the speaker constructs a particular form-content mapping (uses fiance to refer to Chris' partner), and then sets that in the context of a particular metalinguistic space by calling the mapping into question explicitly (if that's the right word). By implication, such a conditional usage at least suggests that other metalinguistic spaces could be imagined, with different form-content mappings; however, in (6) there is no explicit attempt to evoke other specific mappings (e.g., partner).
Figure 3. Metalinguistic space
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Every speech act, of course, involves interlocutors and a context and the interlocutors' ideas of each other's understandings of the content and of the forms used to express it. So all of this mental space structure is present and accessible in any speech situation. However, not all of this structure is necessarily actively at stake in a given conditional use. (6) demands that we bring all of these elements into our diagram overtly, because in a metalinguistic conditional the content-label mappings themselves are what are being conditionally represented and compared. In (4), we needed to overtly represent speech-act context spaces involving S and H to analyze a speech-act conditional, but the contentlabel mappings were not part of the conditional relationship. Rather, they were taken for granted as background to it. A diagram of (5) would need to represent possible epistemic spaces of S, but would take the S/H context and label spaces for granted as background. Our claim, then, is that in all these cases, a conditional construction involves setting up a mental space (in the case of if conditionals, this is the job of the ~clause), and requesting construal of something (in if conditionals, the then-clause or main clause) within that space. Much of the diversity of interpretation can be attributed to the fact that the spaces themselves can be quite diverse sorts of objects, related to the linguistic form in a variety of ways. Crucial to this analysis is the idea that domains related to the current speech interaction are generally privileged with respect to mental space construction (cf Sweetser 1990): they are automatically "accessible" for interpretation, even without explicit mention, in ways that other spaces are not. 3 This fact has wide-ranging effects on interpretation, far beyond conditional constructions. As noted in Sweetser (1990), broad classes of linguistic forms show the same kind of possibility for multiple interpretations depending on the level or domain accessed. Parallel to conditionals are causal and adversative conjunctions (as well as many coordinate conjunction usages, which are beyond the scope of the present paper): (7)
.Joe turned down the stereo because Sam was studying. (Causal relation is between state of affairs described in P and event described in Q, i.e. between contents of the clauses.)
(8)
Sam is (must be) studying, because Joe turned down the stereo. (Causal relation is between speaker's knowledge about content ofP and speaker's conclusion about content ofQ.)
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(9)
Could you turn down the stereo, because I'm trying to study. (Causal relation is between the contextual state expressed in P and the speech-act performance of the request in Q.)
(10)
OK, Chris introduced me to her partner, since we're being politically correct. (Causal relation is between contextual situation P and a particular form-content mapping used in Q.)
(11) Since you're a linguist, what's the Russian wordfor "blender"?
(Speech-act level: the addressee's professional status causes or enables the current speech act of questioning. ) Examples such as these can be multiplied with ease in the domain of conjunction. Some conjunctions seem to prefer certain domains: since in English has preferentially a temporal sense in the content domain4 (Chris has been studying since he came home), but has readily accessible causaVenablement senses in the other three domains (a speech-act domain example is [11]). Ranging farther afield, Hom (1985) has laid out in detail the differences between content and metalinguistic uses of negation. And the well-known contrast between deontic and epistemic modal uses is interpretable in terms of the content/epistemic contrast here invoked. Thus Joe must be home by ten, because I say so imposes a modality of compulsion in the content domain of Joe's getting home. But Joe must be home by ten, because I always see his light go on then involves instead a metaphoric 'compulsion' of the speaker's reasoning processes: 'I am forced to conclude that he gets home by ten, because 1 know that 1 always see his light go on then' (cf Sweetser 1982, 1990, Talmy 1988). What all these examples share is an implicit contribution of the speech setting to the interpretation: some part of the linguistic form (for example, because) need not be interpreted directly with respect to the content expressed by surrounding forms, but can be interpreted as meaning something about the speaker's mental processes or the speech interaction, even though those mental processes or that speech interaction have not been explicitly mentioned. So conditionals are not alone in allowing speakers to implicitly access speech-act, epistemic and metalinguistic structure as well as content, in building an interpretation. As we shall see, however, each of the conjunctions participates in mental space set-up in a somewhat different way.
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2.2.
Conjunctions versus constructions: sources of causality in the content domain
As we claimed above, causal relations in content mental spaces are understood in terms of standard causal models, including an active causation model wherein one event or state of affairs actively brings about another. Content-level causality also includes enablement (cf Sweetser [1990]). Causal because occurs in examples like He is tired because he's been up all night, where staying up late is presented as the cause of ensuing tiredness, and also in sentences such as He will come and spend Christmas with us because I'm paying for his flight, where a free ticket enables the person to spend Christmas with his family, rather than causing him to do so. Such content-level causal models constitute a major part of the actual interpretation of constructions containing because and if. 2.2.1. Two ways of depicting causality: because and if Causal conjunctions like because introduce causality or enablement into the interpretation as part of their lexical semantics, although other constructional features and the context help the hearer locate the causal link in the appropriate cognitive domain. (As we will try to show in section 4, intonation patterns and clause order in constructions with because signal content and non-content interpretation of causality in a fairly regular way.) In the cases of non-causal conjunctions, causal interpretations may arise from other aspects of the context and surrounding grammatical constructions: She insulted me and I got angry is easily interpreted as meaning that the insult caused the anger, on the basis of iconic interpretation of clause order, plus real-world knowledge about likely results. Although because lexically expresses causality, the direction of the causal chain is marked by the conjunction's placement in a larger construction: the because-clause presents the cause, the main clause presents the result. Consequently, even though the conjunction seems to be solely responsible for the causal meaning, the way in which causality participates in the interpretation of the sentence is also dependent on the subordination construction. It may initially seem trivial to focus on the obvious fact that the because-clause is marked as representing the cause, as opposed to the caused event, in the causal relation. But as Lightbown
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and Spada (1993) observe, children learning their first language may in fact hypothesize that principles of iconicity override meanings introduced at the lexical level and produce sentences like You took the towels away because I can't dry my hands. In such cases, the strategy used is to present events in their sequential iconic order (the towels disappeared from the bathroom first, and consequently the child had nothing to dl)' her hands with later on). The child needs to learn not only the causal meaning of because, but also the way to use it constructionally to mark causal connections correctly. 5 In many content-domain causal conjunction examples, only the causal relation itself is asserted, while the two events or situations between which the causal relation holds are presupposed background. In the classic I'll do it because I want to, and not because you told me to, the speaker does not assert either that she will do as she is told, or that she wants to do so, or that she was told to do so: but she is necessarily asserting that her actions are caused by her wishes and not by the addressee's commands. .[fclauses generally set up a new mental space distinct from the Base space of the speaker's assumed construal of "reality", but because-clauses do not set up such a space. Main clauses of content-domain because constructions decribe situations which may already be known to hold in the interlocutors' current base space. 6 The because-clause then offers a causal explanation of how that situation came about, also not necessarily on the basis of brand-new information. The causal relationship is at the core of the message. Since is similar to because in being semantically causal, and in that both are often said to presuppose the truth of their complements. These differences interact with other parameters, such as information structure and typical clause order. Since will be discussed in more detail in sections 3 and 4, where we focus on epistemic stance and information structure. The conjunction if presents an interesting case. Unlike because, it is not lexically causal. In the content domain, however, if-sentences typically express causal or enablement relations among events. (12), for example, would typically convey the message that the conditioner will cause the hair to get softer. (12)
Ifyou use this conditioner, your hairwillfeel much softer.
Similarly, in example (3) above, it-is likely to be assumed that the repair will enable the owner to start using the computer again.
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Dancygier (1993, 1998) has argued that causal meanings enter the interpretation of content conditionals via conditionals' primary function, prediction. 7 Prediction in conditionals is a type of reasoning which consists in setting up a hypothetical (typically future) mental space and attempting to predict its consequences based on knowledge of typical cause-effect chains and general world-knowledge. In (12) above, the speaker sets up a space in which the hearer applies the recommended conditioner, and predicts in that space that the hearer's hair will become softer as a result. Such causal interpretations tend to arise in conditionals which set up content mental spaces, where causation-based predictions can be made on the basis of assumptions of sequential correlations among events or states of affairs and general knowledge. But the interpretation of speech-act or epistemic conditionals also involves setting up causal relations: the speaker of Since you're a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky? constructs relationships of causality and enablement as part of the background to the act of asking a question. The most notable formal feature distinguishing English predictive conditionals is the combination of verb forms: for future-reference conditionals, a present-tense verb form is used in the If-clause, and the modal will in the main clause (cf Fillmore 1990a,b). This verb form pattern characterizes the whole sentence (not the two clauses in isolation from each other) as representing a certain kind of reasoning. Predictiveness (and, consequently, causality) is part of the interpretation of certain If-constructions as wholes, rather than of the conjunction if or any other lexical element of the sentence. Let us also note that such constructions do not assert any of the clauses. The If-clause cannot express an assertion because the conjunction sets up a hypothetical mental space, different from the base space where assertions could be made. The main clause describes the predicted result in that same hypothetical space, so it is not asserted either. What a predictive conditional asserts is the causal dependency and correlation between the events or states of affairs described by its clauses. To sum up, content-domain conditionals are interpreted causally as a result of predictive uses which are explicitly marked by formal markers such as verb forms. This is one of the basic differences between sentences with because, and those with if. In the former, the conjunction itself introduces causality; in the latter, constructional meaning is the source of the causal interpretation. Though the constructions with because and if are different in a number of respects (verb forms, clause order, mental space set-up, to mention just a few), they can both convey
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information about the causal relations between the content of the subordinate clause and that of the main clause. These differences and similarities are related to other aspects of the constructions, such as their epistemic stance and clause order, which we will consider in the sections to follow.
2.3.
Causality in other domains
As seen above, clauses marked by causal and conditional conjunctions are often used to set up or evoke epistemic, speech act, or metalinguistic mental spaces, in which relations are established among beliefs or speech acts, not events or states of affairs. Does causality play any role in such spaces? Causal models are certainly present in the interpretation of noncontent domain constructions, but we will have to distinguish more than one level of causal links to show how they contribute to the overall interpretation. In the content spaces, causal links can be established between events or states of affairs described. In the other domains, similar links can be established between beliefs or between beliefs and speech acts. In example (8) above (Sam is (must be) studying, because Joe turned down the stereo), the causal relation is between the speaker's knowledge about the content of P and the speaker's conclusion about the content of Q. Similarly, in (11) (Since you're a linguist, what's the Russian word for "blender"?, the belief expressed in the since clause causes or enables the act of asking about Russian. We can interpret metalinguistic uses similarly. For instance, in example (6) above (Chris wants you to meet her fiance, if that's the right word for him) the speaker uses the word fiance while also pointing out that the (possibly mistaken) belief in fiance being the right word is all that enables her to do so. It is known that causal/enablement relations in non-content domains often go in a direction opposite to the causal links in the content domain (Sweetser 1990, Dancygier 1993, 1998). This is especially common in the epistemic domain, where the speaker is often reasoning from effect to probable cause. In (8), for example, we assume that Sam's need to study normally causes Joe to tum his music down, so the fact of the music being turned down enables one to infer that Sam is studying. In fact, it is possible for epistemic sentences to be ambiguous, depending on the underlying assumption about a content causal chain. For
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example, a sentence like If Tim went to the embassy, he has his visa documents can have two epistemic interpretations. If the speaker believes that Tim was going to obtain his visa documents at the embassy, she may use the information about Tim's visit there to infer that he now has his documents. If, on the other hand, the speaker believes that acquiring the documents enabled Tim to go to the embassy, she concludes that he had them prior to the visit. In either case, knowledge of cause-effect links in the content domain is used in a reasoning process carried out in the epistemic domain. Causal models can thus participate in the construction of meaning on various levels. This is due not only to our understanding of causality, which allows us to locate it in various types of mental spaces, but to our understanding of the relations among those spaces, and, more generally, to our understanding of speech interaction. This understanding is dependent on what we may see as a nested complex of mental spaces. At the center of this complex is some representation of the content of what is said: events or states of affairs which are referred to by the speaker. The content space need not make any reference to the speaker's reasoning processes or to the speech exchange itself (although these may also be addressed as explicit COlltent: I am asking you why you need an extension on your paper). However, reasoning processes relevant to the speech interaction almost inevitably make reference to the content space: the speaker may, for example, be reasoning specifically about the structure of the content space. In He must be home; I see his coat, the speaker's use of must refers to her understanding that her reasoning processes are under compulsion, not that the described subject's actions are compelled; but the reasoning processes about the act of returning are necessarily based on the speaker's understanding of the content world, where both the return and the coat's presence reside. The structure of the speech exchange will necessarily involve both the idea that some content is expressed, and the understanding that the speaker has reasoning processes related to that content, plus the added understanding that there are a speaker and a hearer interacting in the current speech setting, with all the social interactional issues attendant upon conversational exchange. As we have seen, each of these levels of mental space structure may involve causal models appropriate to the level. But the nesting effect explains how different causal models can enter the interpretation at the same time. This includes the possibility of exploiting a cause-effect chain wherein P causes Q, as the necessary
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background for an inferential chain wherein a belief that Q leads to a conclusion that P.
3. Epistemic stance As noted above, predictive conditionals with future reference typically display a characteristic verb form pattern in English, with a present tense verb in the protasis and the predictive modal verb will in the apodosis. In fact, the same pattern is found in constructions with temporal conjunctions like when: If/when we find the paper, we'll xerox it right away. If and when have similar functions in this example, in that both mark backgrounds to main-clause predictions. The central difference between if and when is that when commits the speaker to the reality of the space described in the when clause, even if that reality will only take place in the future. If, on the other hand, makes no such commitment. This contrast exemplifies the broader phenomenon of epistemic stance (Fillmore 1990a,b), a parameter which is by no means restricted to temporal and conditional clauses. When identifies the speaker's beliefs with P as a description of the real state of affairs (expresses positive epistemic stance); if, on the other hand, expresses the speaker's lack of full positive stance with respect to the content. The non-positive stance of if need not commit the speaker to a negative or skeptical stance, but does indicate that she thereby distances herself from full commitment to the contents of the ~clause. Other aspects of a conditional construction may go further, and explicitly mark the speaker's leaning towards non-belief in the reality of the described situation. Sentences such as If we found the paper, we would xerox it right away, If we had found the paper, then we would have xeroxed it right away, and Even if we found/had found the paper, we wouldn't xerox/wouldn't have xeroxed it right away express negative epistemic stance towards the content of the conditional clause-and hence also towards the content of the main clause, since that is situated in the mental space defined by the conditional clause. The expression of negative epistemic stance is formally marked by the use of verb forms which in earlier work we have dubbed distanced, which pick up the Present + will predictive pattern and backshift it, that is, contribute added layers of past morphology. 8 We have seen examples of positive epistemic stance (with when) as well as neutral and negative epistemic stance (with ij). We noted that
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these constructions use a special predictive pattern of verb forms, in both non-distanced and distanced format, and that the distanced forms correlate with negative epistemic stance. Since and because, our two remaining conjunctions, express positive epistemic stance~ the clauses in their scope are seen as representing "factual" or presupposed information. This aspect of their use seems to result from the mental space set-up they engage in; in contrast with conditionals, they do not build new hypothetical spaces, but instead evoke aspects of whatever space is currently the base space. They also do not require any special pattern of verb forms. As one might expect, they do not allow the use of distanced verb forms, which are appropriate only in the cases of hypothetical mental spaces marked with negative epistemic stance. However, not all conditionals are predictive. We have shown above that causality-asserting predictive reasoning (and, consequently, the use of predictive and distanced verb forms) is necessarily characteristic only of conditionals setting up their mental spaces in the content domain. It has been noted (cf Dancygier 1993, 1998; Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, Sweetser 1996) that the use of if in other domains need not involve any restrictions on the use of verb forms, and that such conditionals need not necessarily bring up another alternative space9 . Recall our earlier discussion of speech-act uses of since such as Since you're a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky? A parallel speech-act conditional could serve a similar function: imagine a context where the interlocutor has stated that he is a linguist, and the speaker says If you're a linguist, what do you think of Chomsky? Here the speaker does not intend to compare the space where the addressee is a linguist with other possible spaces, nor to predict the speech act, but only to situate the actually performed speech act in a well-defined space. In such nonpredictive cases, ~clauses may rely on context in ways which are reminiscent of the more positive epistemic stance of since-clauses. Are we now calling into question our previous argument that ifhas a non-positive (neutral) epistemic stance, while since has an overtly positive stance? One might initially feel that (13) expresses a positive stance regardless of whether since or if is used.
(13) If/Since he's (so) hungry (as you say he is), he'll want a second helping.
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Sentences like (13) certainly suggest that the truth of the proposition ('he's hungry') has been asserted in earlier discourse. Rather than setting up a novel space, they evoke a space already contextually accessible. However, referring to a space available in previous discourse does not necessarily mean that the speaker always aligns herself with its content to the same degree. As argued by Dancygier (1998), ~f indicates non-commitment to the clause it marks: but non-commitment covers a wide range of possible attitudes, from strong disbelief to nearcommitment. Even in an example such as (13), where ~fand since seem interchangeable, since sounds more completely positively aligned than if, although in the presence of other strong indications of positive attitude, the degree of non-commitment conveyed by if may be negligible. So there are important differences between if and since. If maintains a neutral stance, while since takes a positive one. Also, since, unlike ~f, has explicitly temporal senses. However, in appropriate contexts, there is predictable functional overlap between the two conjunctionspredictable, in the sense that it falls out naturally from a mental space analysis of the constructions and contexts in question. But in defining the possible contexts of overlap, we need a clear understanding of the factors which make some particular assertion or claim accessible to, or assertable by, some particular participant in the speech interaction. What licenses a speaker to treat a particular content as already accessible to the hearer, or as not being subject to questioning by the hearer? We shall make use of the standard constructs of speech act theory to define contexts where if and since are naturally isofunctional. As will become evident, the relevant factors have a general application to the analysis of the relationship between space-builders and informational structure: space-building background information has to be brought up in a way appropriate to its status in the speech context. When fills a genuinely temporal space-building function, as does since when used to mean 'from some past time to the present.' Nontemporal since, however, builds up causal relations; it states a causal relationship between the space which it evokes (rather than constructs) and the main clause. An ~clause may, as in (13), merely re-enact the building of an already accessible space--or it may build a truly novel space, as in many predictive constructions. A causal since-clause, however, always evokes a space which is presupposed by the speaker, as accessible already to the audience.
128 Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
Discourse accessibility of a mental space can arise in a variety of ways. One of these ways is the speaker's right to access her interlocutor's prior conversational record, quoting or summarizing or making inferences from it. (14)
Since he's so inefficient, maybe you should make a formal complaint. (The speaker accesses her interlocutor's prior claims about inefficiency, as background to her suggestion.)
Since, with its positive epistemic stance, marks (14) as explicitly accepting the claim about the inefficiency-although of course this acceptance may be insincere or ironic. We could expect the speaker to have used if here, if she were not fully convinced or simply wanted to avoid taking sides. Another source of evocation is the immediate physical context of the exchange. In (15), since is appropriate in two situations: one where the speaker is expressing her own knowledge about the rain, and one in which the hearer has reported the rain to the speaker who has not observed it firsthand: (15)
Since it's raining, we can't go outside after all.
As (15) shows, contextually evident information should normally be marked with since rather than if, unless for some reason doubt is being thrown on its validity. For example, a speaker who is physically examining the hearer's clothing to decide whether it is warm enough or weatherproof enough could say: (16)
Since you're wearing those shoes, we'd better not go to the beach.
But for a speaker considering the possibility of the hearer's changing into sneakers before departure, ifwould be a valid choice. Typically, then, the context and the speaker's evaluation of the situation (and in particular, her epistemic stance towards it) dictate the choice between if and since. Certain categories of information are by their nature presupposed to be known to the speaker, or to the hearer, while others are not. In particular, speaker-based preconditions for a speech act are presumed to be accessible to the speaker, while hearerbased ones are not. Hearer-based preconditions, on the other hand, are
Constructions with if, since and because
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presumed to be uniquely accessible to the hearer; the speaker cannot treat them as presupposed unless the hearer has already put them on the conversational record. Predictably, the non-presuppositional nature of if contrasts with the presuppositional semantics of since in marking clauses expressing speech-act preconditions. A speaker may hypothesize, but not presuppose, the hearer's willingness to answer a question or comply with a request or tolerate a potentially inappropriate remark:
(17) If/#Since it's not rude to ask, what made you get interested in linguistics? (since would be acceptable only if the hearer had already made it plain that the question was acceptable.) (18) If/#Since you don't mind, could you hold this stack ofbooks for a moment? (since is acceptable only if the hearer has indicated he doesn't mind.) (# is here used to indicate that the sentence so marked is grammatical, but would be unacceptable without special context; one would have to imagine that the addressees of (17)-(18) had just said things like, No, it's not rude to ask about my personal intellectual development, or qr course I don't mind holding somethingfor you.) On the other hand, speaker-based preconditions demand a positive epistemic stance; it is normal for a speaker to presuppose her authority on these subjects. She does not need to hypothesize, normally, about whether or not she is speaking technically:
(19)
Since/#IfI'm speaking technically, I'll call it a misdemeanor and not a crime. (The if form would be acceptable as a general condition, meaning 'Whenever I'm speaking technically, ... ' It cannot, unlike the since form, refer to the current speech act.)
And if the speaker is making a request on the preconditional basis of her own desires, she is presumed to know (and not hypothesize) her stated reasons for those wishes:
130 Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
(20)
Since/#If I'm stranded without a car, could you drop me at the BART station?
If for some reason the speaker were not the most knowledgeable person about her own access to a car, then if would seem more acceptable in (20). (Imagine a situation where H, a service station employee, has just told her that her husband picked up the car an hour ago, while she was expecting to pick it up and drive home in it.) Speaker and hearer are each presumed to be authorities on their own states of mind and body, and not on each other's. Hence the speaker should normally use since when evoking her own mental and physical states, and ifwhen referring to the hearer's:
(21) If/#Since you're really tired, maybe we should stop work now. (since is acceptable if the hearer has himself indicated his tiredness. ) (22)
Since/#IfI'm totally exhausted, maybe we should stop work now.
By this analysis, since should only be employed when the hearer must concede the speaker's right to take a positive epistemic stance to the content of the space-evoking clause. There remain a variety of reasons to use if rather than since. First, of course, the material may really be one towards which the speaker genuinely does not take a positive stance (truly neutral or negative-stance hypothesizing), or about which the speaker must defer to the hearer (as in hypothesizing about the hearer's tiredness). But inheritance from the conversational record is especially complex with regard to epistemic stance. On the one hand, if the hearer has just said that it is raining, and there is no reason to doubt his word, the simplest scenario may be to adopt it as given and mark it with since. On the other hand, if (cf Akatsuka 1986; Schwenter 1997, 1998) marks a non-positive stance, which may mark genuinely reserved judgement (If she was at· the party, I didn't see her), or may just acknowledge that this claim is not the speaker's own. Quotative if can thus be more polite than since, or less so, depending on whether the issue is acceptance of the contents or taking credit for the claim. How does since interact with the various parameters of interest to us? Obviously, being positive in epistemic stance like when, it does not cooccur with verb forms marking negative stance. Like if, it allows interpretation of the relationship between the two clauses as existing in
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131
different domains. There are content, epistemic, and speech-act uses of since; and it is easy to find metalinguistic ones as well (cf Sweetser [1990; chap. 4]): (23)
Since my plane was delayed, I'm phoningfrom London. (Content the plane's delay-a situation treated as already familiar to the hearer-is what necessitates the phone call.)
(24)
Since he's phoning from London, his plane must have been delayed. (Epistemic: the presupposed knowledge of the phoning causes the conclusion about the plane's delay.)
(25)
Since you're so smart, when was George Washington born? (Speech act the on-the-floor claim that the hearer is smart is what provokes the query.)
(26)
Since you're so picky, I'll just put another "trout" on the grill. (Metalinguistic: The addressee has just corrected the speaker's use of the term salmon to refer to the wrong species of fish. )
Sweetser comments that since may be preferentially used in the noncontent domains, precisely because of its presuppositional status; there is a relationship between presupposed or given background-clause material and non-content usage (cf. Dancygier 1998), as Nikiforidou (1990) has also pointed out for Greek conditional forms. It is in the noncontent domains that it is often most useful to contextualize a main clause, to make clear on what grounds or against what background assumptions the speaker is performing the present speech act, drawing the present conclusion, or using the present linguistic label. Unlike when, which at the content level can refer to cotemporality at any time relative to the speaker's present, since demands present or past (realis) tenses in its content-level uses. It is not used to make contentlevel predictions, and does not participate in the predictive use of tense; backshifting does not occur in since-clauses, and in general predictive uses of will in since-constructions can be interpreted as expressing prediction at some other level than that of content. This may follow from the fact that a conditional's business is to set up a (possibly entirely unreal) space, as background to some further inferences, while
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that of a causal conjunction is to link situations, claims, and conclusions causally to a given background.
4. Clause order, space set-up, and causal/conditional relations Given the flexibility of clause order in conditional and causal constructions, how do different orderings of the main and subordinate clause interact with space building? This is a very general issue indeed: not only if=-conditionals, but most of the broader class of conditionally used constructions, involve conventional use of the order of the expressions of antecedent and consequent. It seems intuitively natural that the space-builder clause should precede the clause which elaborates the space; and this is of course consistent with the observed tendency for if=-clauses to precede their main clauses. 10 However, the other order is certainly also possible, although (as we shall see) it is not possible for all conditionals-the clause containing the apparently space-building (or more neutrally, space-delimiting) material can follow the main clause. Doesn't this violate some basic understanding of how space-structuring proceeds? The answer is that perhaps it might, if the cognitive processing of mental spaces were done in a vacuum; but in fact, context may already have done a great deal of a speaker's building for her, in which case an explicit space-building clause may only be needed to confirm or clarify an already-constructed mental space. Looking first at if=-conditionals, we may note that all three of the following organizations ofP and Q are possible:
If
(27)
ifP, Q
(28)
Q, ifP I'll work at my office, down.
(29)
Q ifP
the home computer breaks down, I'll work at my office.
if
the home computer breaks
I'll work at my office if the home computer breaks down.
(27), diagrammed in figure 4, follows our intuitively basic strategy of first building a space defined by P, then adding the assertion of Q to the structure of that space. Note that the relevant space could still be in
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133
some sense pre-built by the discourse; (27) could respond to What 'II you do ifyour home computer breaks down?
Set up conditional space defined by P, then assert Q within that space. Space setup first, then contents. There may be a background assumption that P is already a cognitively accessible possibility, but Q is not accessible in this way. (Implicitly set up """'P, ~ space as well.)
Figure 4. If the home computer breaks down, I'll work at my office.
(28) instead asserts Q, without first specifying in what space Q applies. Here it seems almost necessary that some background space be already established, to make sure that the hearer will be adding Q to the relevant space. The speaker can make sure that has been achieved by adding a disambiguating if P of her own, following Q, but this would be an odd way to introduce a genuinely new space. Note that in both (27) and (28) we have standard predictive conditional structure, with the implicit setup of a """'P, ......,Q space alongside the P, Q space; the difference lies not in the relations expressed but in the order of their construction and its relation to the informational context of the discourse. The contrast between (28) and (29) exemplifies a more general contrast between conjuncts juxtaposed with and without comma intonation. (29) would be an answer to Would you ever work at your office? or When will you work at your office?, rather than to What will
134 Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
if the home computer breaks down? Its major assertion is the identity of the conditional relation under which the working in the office would happen; the main clause content is already "on the floor." In mental space terms, (29) begins by expressing a prediction Q, but in an intonation pattern which makes it clear that Q is not being independently asserted, and is therefore unlikely to belong to the base space. The focal stress (marking new information), and the final intonation fall (marking the end of an assertion), happen only once we are identifying the space P within which Q is to be placed. Q is "old information," while its space-setting is not. So (27)-(29) correspond to different sequences of instructions for building what are rather similar final mental space constructs. (27) is the "canonical" sequence of setting up a space and then making a prediction within it. (28) might be said to involve at least a potential pre-built Pspace, to which the utterance adds Q, subsequently confirming with an ~clause that yes, P was the intended space for elaboration by Q. (29) could be seen as involving a presupposed Q, and asserting the alternative space structure which links that Q with P rather than with ,-..;P. These differing sequences of instructions are useful in different contexts, just the way physical instructions to construct the same object might usefully differ depending on which components of the object were already pre-assembled or ready to the addressee's hand. The three space set-up options presented in (27)-(29) differ in foregrounding or backgrounding causal relations. (27), being a typical predictive conditional, asserts the causal relation (rather than any of the clauses) in the way discussed above. (28) is different in that it initially asserts Q, and thus pushes the nature of the relation between P and Q into the background. In fact, as Dancygier (1998) claims, this clause order in conditionals is perhaps most common among speech act and metalinguistic conditionals, which often perform a speech act in the current space, and use the ~clause to negotiate the background structure of that space. In (29), the stress on identifying the space in which the "old" prediction is valid gives additional focus to the causal relation on which the prediction is based. Dancygier (1998) argues that this clause order and intonation pattern is available only to predictive, causalityasserting conditionals, while all the other types of space-settings are excluded. (29) thus represents a clause pattern which constructionally requires causality to be asserted. 11 Similar clause order options are available for because-constructions, but the preferences are distinctly different. While ~clauses typically
you do
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precede their main clauses, clauses with because typically follow theirs. This regularity (observed by Ford 1993) is influenced by the fact that because-constructions do not set up new spaces, but establish causal relations in the base space. It is thus common for these constructions to first mention the fact requiring explanation, and then establish the cause of the state of affairs in question. Consequently, the main contrast among because-sentences is between two intonation contours available in the Q because P pattern. Sweetser (1990, 82ff) discusses parallel examples involving causal conjunction, as examples of Chafe's (1984) generalization about "bound" (commaless) and "unbound" (comma) intonation: comma intonation demands an interpretation involving assertion of both the main clause and the causal connection between the clauses, while commaless intonation is readily given an interpretation which presupposes the assertion (in this case, prediction) embodied in the main clause, and newly asserts only the causal connection between the clauses. Thus (30) is likely to be understood as asserting that the reason for Anna's love is Victor's resemblance to her first love, but presupposing that Anna loves Victor; (31), on the other hand, asserts that Anna loves Victor, as well as the reason why. (30)
Anna loves Victor because he reminds her o..f herfirst love.
(31)
Anna loves Victor, because he reminds her ofherfirst love.
Sweetser comments that the bound interpretation is unlikely to occur in conjunction with a speech-act or epistemic reading of the causal relationship between the clauses. Thus, (31) but not (30) is readily susceptible to non-content causal readings-for example, to conveying the message that the inference about Anna's love for Victor is caused by knowledge about a resemblance to her earlier sweetheart, rather than the content-level message that the love is caused by the resemblance. Sweetser's explanation for this contrast is that it would be exceptional to presuppose the main clause of a speech-act or epistemic conditional, since this would involve presupposing the very speech act being performed, or the new conclusion being drawn. The mental-space structures of (30) and (31) above are similar to the conditional examples (28) and (29). The main difference between the causals and conditionals is the preference for PQ clause order in conditionals and QP clause order in causals, which appears to be a
136 Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
consequence of the differing space-building functions of the two conjunctions. Space-building background has a natural reason to precede the content of a newly-built space, while a base-space state of affairs in need of explanation may well reasonably be described first, before giving the explanation for why or how it came to be that way. In contrast with because and when, since seems awkward in the commaless Q conjunction P construction: #1'1/ marry you since you're so sweet, or #He invited me since I live next door are strange, though it seems normal to say Since I live next door, he invited me or I'll marry you, since you're so sweet. Since does not seem to allow foregrounding or focus on the assertion of the causal relation, perhaps does not even assert it 12 . In this, since contrasts with a wide range of temporal conjunctions (before and after behave like when) as well as with because and if. Compare the following examples of conjunctions in constructions which employ stress or syntactic focalizing structures to mark the focus of contrast:
(32) I love you because you're sweet, not because you're rich. (33)
We'll eat when Sue arrives, not now.
(34)
They had coffee after lunch, not before dinner.
(35)
#He invited me since I live next door, not since I'm his boss.
(36) It's because you're sweet that I love you, not because you're rich. (37) It's when Sue arrives that we'll eat, not now (/not when Joe arrives). (38) It's after lunch that they had coffee, not before dinner.
(39)
#It's since I live next door that he invited me, not since I'm his boss.
Various causal and adversative conjunctions fall on one side or the other of this contrast: though and while behave like since, and phrases like in spite of the fact that or despite the fact that behave more like because. Interestingly, since in its temporal sense does allow assertion and focus of the temporal relation:
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137
(40) It's since the pollen came out that I've been sniffling, not since I moved to the new apartment. (41) I've been sniffling since the pollen came out, not since I moved to the new apartment. Of the two causal conjunctions we have looked at only one, because, readily allows focus on the causal relationship itself Interestingly, another conjunction which can foreground the causal link in this way is if, in its predictive use. A look at clause order and intonation options thus reveals further similarities and distinctions between the constructions under scrutiny. Both if and because constructions allow the use of sentence-final adverbial clause placement and commaless intonation to unambiguously assert the causal relation between the contents of the clauses, while the "comma" intonation usually renders the sentences ambiguous between domains. On the other hand, since does not seem to allow foregrounding or focus on the assertion of the causal relation. These facts are added evidence of the varying degrees to which asserted, presupposed, and construed causality are integral parts of building these constructional meanmgs.
5. Conclusion The functions of causal and conditional constructions can be compared along a variety of parameters. We considered both the contribution of conjunctions as lexical items, and the constructions in which these conjunctions appear. Particular conjunctions participate in mental space configurations in differing ways: some conjunctions set up their own spaces, some evoke spaces set up in preceding discourse, some merely elaborate the base space of the ongoing interaction. Further, important differences arise with respect to the cognitive domains in which the spaces are set up, but significant aspects of the overall interpretation result from the spaces being nested one within each other. Such parameters of interpretation correlate significantly with formal features of constructions, such as the choice of verb forms, clause order, or intonation. Some of these formal features may be claimed to invite certain types of mental space set-up or contextual use, regardless of the choice of conjunction. One good example of such a feature is clause
138 Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser
order and accompanying intonation, since we observe recurring patterns of interpretation in constructions which use the same clause order and intonation patterns. It is often difficult to isolate the study of a small group of linguistic forms. Temporal and adversative conjunctions, which were not originally meant to appear in our data, had to be mentioned along with if or since; otherwise, important facts about the behavior of our primarily chosen conjunctions would have to be missed. As we have also claimed elsewhere (Sweetser 1990; Dancygier 1993, 1998) coordinate conjunctions and even conjunctionless and paratactic constructions 13 also share some constructional characteristics and aspects of interpretation with if, because, and since. What is needed is an analysis which uses parameters of constructional meaning (verb forms, clause order, intonation, use of mental space builders) to outline the range of constructions which participate in the construal of related meanings (causality, sequentiality, conditionality), and explores the similarities and differences between the constructions with respect to these parameters. We hope to have shown that such an analysis can reveal generalizations and aspects of constructional meaning which accounts of individual conjunctions can describe only partially.
Notes * 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
For Ekkehard Konig, on his sixtieth birthday. It is impossible to cite all the works which have helped us to develop an understanding of the semantics of grammatical constructions. Among salient ones are Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor (1988), Fillmore and Kay (1999), Langacker (1987, 1991a, 1991b), and Goldberg (1995). Sweetser (1999) deals generally with the relation between lexical meaning and constructional composition. We are grateful to the late Suzanne Fleischman for this example as well as for characteristically insightful comments on it. By "automatically accessible," we mean that speakers do not need any special shared experience, knowledge or context besides the fact of the speech exchange, in order to have implicit access to these spaces. Though see section 3 for a full discussion of uses of since in different domains. Traugott (1982) gives an illuminating discussion of the differences between earlier stages of English, wherein both clauses in a causal relation were marked, and the modern English situation.
Constructions with if, since and because
6. 7. 8.
9.
10.
11. 12.
13.
139
Or, of course, in whatever space is currently being added to; the crucial fact is that no new space need be set up when because is used. For discussion of the relationship of then to predictive function, see Dancygier and Sweetser (1997), Schiffrin (1992), and Iatridou (1991, 1994). Conditionals with distanced form have been discussed extensively as "counterfactual" or "unreal". The discussion of this issue exceeds the limits of the present paper. The reader is referred to Sweetser 1990, Dancygier 1993, 1998, Dancygier and Sweetser (1996, 1997). For reasons why distanced conditionals should not be treated as counterfactual, see Comrie (1986); for discussion of the crosslinguistic connection between past tense forms and distanced forms, see James (1982) and Fleischman (1989). Cf. Dancygier and Sweetser (1996, 1997), for discussion of predictive and non-predictive epistemic and metalinguistic conditionals, and for analysis of reasons why content conditionals are necessarily predictive and speech-act conditionals necessarily non-predictive (see also Sweetser (1990), Dancygier (1998). Cf Haiman 1980, 1986; also Ford 1993 on because vs. if. All the patterns just discussed are also found among even if constructions, with the same priorities and restrictions involved. As Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen has pointed out to us, this incompatibility with non-comma intonation brings us back to Sweetser's (1990) original concern about the preference of since for non-content uses, and raises doubts as to whether examples like (23) should really be treated alongside other content examples. For discussion of parallels with paratactic conjunction, see Lakoff (1971), Grice (1978), and Sweetser (1990).
References Akatsuka, Noriko 1986 Conditionals are context-bound. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 333-52. Chafe, Wallace L. 1984 How people use adverbial clauses. BLS 10: 437-449. Comrie, Bernard 1986 Conditionals: a typology. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 77-99. Dancygier, Barbara 1998 Conditionals and prediction: time, knowledge, and causation in conditional constructions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992 Two metatextual operators: negation and conditionality in English and Polish. BLS 18: 61-75. 1993 Interpreting conditionals: time, knowledge and causation. Journal of Pragmatics 19: 403-434. Dancygier, Barbara and Eve Sweetser 1996 Conditionals, distancing and alternative spaces. In: Adele Goldberg (ed.). Conceptual structure, discourse and language, 83-98. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications. 1997 Then in conditionals. Cognitive Linguistics 8/2: 1-28.
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Weak and strong conditionals. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 57-71. Fauconnier, Gilles 1985 Mental spaces. Cambridge MA: MIT Press [Reprinted 1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press]. 1996 Analogical counterfactuals. In: Fauconnier and Sweetser (eds.), 5790. 1997 Cognitive mappings for language and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fauconnier, Gilles and Eve Sweetser (eds.) 1996 Spaces, worlds and grammars. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Fillmore, Charles J. 1990a The contribution of linguistics to language understanding. In: Aura Bocaz (ed.). Proceedings of the first symposium on cognition, language, and culture, 109-128. Universidad de Chile. 1990b Epistemic stance and grammatical form in English conditional sentences. CLS 26: 137-162. Fillmore, Charles J., Paul Kay, and Mary Catherine O'Connor 1988 Regularity and idiomaticity in grammatical constructions: the case of let alone. Language 63/3: 501-538. Fillmore, Charles and Paul Kay 1999 Grammatical constructions and linguistic generalizations: the what's X doing Y? construction. Language 75/1: 1-33. Fleischman, Suzanne 1989 Temporal distance: a basic linguistic metaphor. Studies in Language 13/1: 1-50. Ford, Cecilia E.
1993
Grammar in interaction: Adverbial clauses in American English conversations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goldberg, Adele 1995 Constructions. A Construction Grammar approach to argument structure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Grice, H. P. 1978 Further notes on logic and conversation. In: Peter Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics, 113-127. NY: Academic Press. Haiman, John 1980 The iconicity of grammar: isomorphism and motivation. Language 56: 515-40. 1986 Constraints on form and meaning of the protasis. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 215-227. Hom, Larry 1984 Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and Rbased implicature. In: Deborah SchifIrin (ed.), Meaning, form and use in context: linguistic applications (GURT 1984), 11-42. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
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Metalinguistic negation and pragmatic ambiguity. Language 61: 121-74. Iatridou, Sabine 1991 If then, then what? NELS 22: 211-225. 1994 On the contribution of conditional then. Natural Language Semantics 2: 171-199. James, Deborah 1982 Past tense and the hypothetical: a crosslinguistic study. Studies in Language 6: 375-403. Konig, Ekkehard 1986 Conditionals, concessive conditionals, and concessives: Areas of contrast, overlap and neutralization. In: Traugott et ale (eds.), 22946. Lakoff, Robin 1971 Its, and's, and but's about conjunction. In: Charles 1. Fillmore and D. Terence Langendoen (eds.), Studies in Linguistic Semantics, 114149. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Langacker, Ronald W. 1987 Foundations ofcognitive grammar, vol. 1: Theoretical prerequisites. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 1991a Foundations ofcognitive grammar, vol. 2: Descriptive applications. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 1991b Concept, image, symbol: the cognitive basis of grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Lightbown, P.M. and N. Spada 1993 How languages are learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nikiforidou, Kiki 1990 Conditional and concessive clauses in Modern Greek: A syntactic and semantic description. Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley. Schiffrin, Deborah 1992 Anaphoric then: aspectual, textual, and epistemic meaning. Linguistics 30: 753-792. Schwenter, Scott 1997 The pragmatics of conditional marking: Implicature, scalarity, and exclusivity. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University. 1998 From hypothetical to factual and beyond: refutational si- clauses in Spanish conversation. In: Jean-Pierre Koenig (ed.), Discourse and cognition: Bridging the gap, 423-436. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications. Sweetser, Eve 1982 Root and epistemic modals: causality in two worlds. BLS 8: 484-507. 1990 From etymology to pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996 Conditionals and mental spaces. In: Fauconnier and Sweetser (eds.), 318-333. 1985
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Compositionality and blending: semantic composition in a cognitively realistic framework. In: Theo Janssen and Gisela Redeker (eds.), Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, scope and methodology, 129-162. Berlin: Mouton de Gmyter. Talmy, Leonard 1988 Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 2: 49100. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1982 From propositional to textual and expressive meanings. In: Winfred Lehmann and Yakov Malkiel (eds.), Perspectives on Historical Linguistics, 245-271. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, Alice ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer Reilly and Charles A. Ferguson (eds) 1986 On conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van der Auwera, Johan 1986 Conditionals and speech acts. In: Traugott et al. (eds.), 197-214.
On affirmative and negative complex conditional connectives* Estrella Montolio
This paper describes the characteristic features of clauses introduced by complex conditional connectives (CCCs). Specifically, I analyze the grammatical (§2), semantic (§3, §5, and §6) and pragmatic (§7) properties of these clauses which distinguish them from ij=-conditionals. CCCs are organized into two subsets that stand in complementary distribution: (i) affirmative CCCs and (ii) negative CCCs. These subsets show essentially the same grammatical behavior but differ in terms of their semantics (§ 1 and §4) and their pragmatics (§7). The data are drawn principally from Spanish, but the results of the analysis are, in general, equally applicable to English and French.
1. Preliminaries Though it is true that the literature on conditionals is quite extensive, conditional structures other than !fclauses have traditionally attracted little attention from linguists. This is most definitely the case with what might be called complex conditional connectives (Dostie 1987; Leard 1987; Montolio 1991b, 1999; Visconti 1994), which have received anything but extensive treatment. Perhaps this has to do with the general impression that complex conditional connectives (henceforth, CCCs) are not only equivalent to one another but are also completely parallel to !fclauses. 1 The goal of this paper is to refute such an idea and demonstrate how mistaken it actually is. Contrary to the view of equivalence, I shall show that CCCs cannot appear in the majority of the contexts in which it is possible to use !fclauses. As we shall see, this is because CCCs express a much more specific and restricted relationship between the protasis and the apodosis than does if. I concentrate mostly on Spanish data, but I believe that, for the most part, my observations are equally valid for both Romance and Germanic Languages. 2 The connectives that we shall include in the category of CCCs correspond to two complementary subsets (cf Montolio 1990, 1991b,
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1999). The first group, which we shall call the affirmative group (or ACCCs), is made up of constructions such as:
(1)
a. a condici6n de que (= French: acondition que) 'provided that', 'on the condition that', 'so long as' b. con tal de que (= French: pourvu que) 'provided that', 'so long as' c. siempre que 3 (= French: pourvu que) 'provided that', 'so long as'
Expressions such as the following are included in the second, negative group (or NCCCs). (2)
a. a menos que
'unless' b. a no ser que
'unless' salvo que 'except if d. excepto que 'except if
c.
amoins que) (= French: amoins que)
(= French:
(= French: saufsi)
(= French: saufsi)
Spanish conditional connectives excepto si ('except if) and salvo si ('except if) are semantically analogous to the other connectives included in this group (2), but, as if-compounds, they can combine with either the subjunctive or the indicative. Given the fact that the rest of the complex connectives to be analyzed here all trigger the subjunctive mood, 1 have preferred not to pursue their description any further here. Because these two subsets stand in complementary distribution, any member from the ACCC group can appear in the same contexts as all the others of this group but in none of the contexts required by NCCCs. The complementary distribution of these subsets is due to a difference in semantic content, which explains the pragmatic inadequacy of these connectives when an ACCC is replaced by an NCCC (or vice versa) within the same context. This can be seen in examples (3b) and (4b) below. (I use the #sign to indicate that the utterance under consideration is grammatically correct but pragmatically inadequate).
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(3)
a. Ire con vosotros al cine a condici6n de que/con tal de que/siempre que me acompaneis luego a casa en coche. 'I'll go with you guys to the movies provided that/so long as you take me home afterwards by car. ' b. # Ire con vosotros al cine a no ser que/a menos que me acompaneis luego a casa. '# I'll go with you guys to the movies unless you take me home afterwards by car. '
(4)
a. No ire con vosotros al cine a no ser que/a menos que me acompaneis luego a casa en coche. 'I won't go with you guys to the movies unless you take me home afterwards by car. ' b. # No ire con vosotros al cine a condici6n de que/con tal de que/siempre que me acompaneis luego a casa en coche. '# I won't go with you guys to the movies provided that/so long as you take me home afterwards by car. '
The utterances in question become acceptable again if their polarity is changed (see example (4a». Hence, we can say that the complementary distribution of these two subsets (ACCCs and NCCCs) stems from their complementary polarities. Notice that it is not a matter of whether utterances with NCCCs should necessarily be negative (as shown by a simple example such as Manana ire a hacer jogging a no ser que llueva 'Tomorrow I'll go jogging unless it rains'). Rather, the point is that its potential commutation by an ACCC always entails a change in polarity (Manana ire a hacer jogging a condicion de que no llueva 'Tomorrow I'll go jogging provided that it doesn't rain'). As we shall see below, the reason for the strangeness of the (b) sentences is not, strictly speaking, a matter of ungrammaticality, i.e., a problem in the syntax of the constructions. Instead, it probably has more to do with a pragmatic inadequacy between the informational content of the two clauses and the processing instructions conveyed by the connectives in question. Despite these distributional constraints, it is easily shown that si ('if) and its corresponding negative counterpart si no ('if ... not') can appear in the ACCC and NCCC contexts, respectively.
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(5)
a. Ire con vosotros al cine si me acompafiais luego a casa en coche. 'I'll go with you to the movies if you take me home afterwards by car.' b. No ire con vosotros al cine si no me acompafiais luego a casa en coche. 'I won't go with you to the movies if you won't take me home afterwards by car.'
The distribution of the data leads me to believe that si 'if is the prototypical and superordinate member of the category of conditional structures. The connective si is semantically unmarked as compared to CCCs (as well as other possible conditional constructions), which express a more specific and restrictive type of condition. The import of this observation is that CCCs are less abstract and more specific in meaning than if and its negative counterpart if ... not. That is to say, if and if ... not constitute the superordinate terms of the relationship, in which CCCs are the subordinate terms.
2. The order and the value of p in CCCs Although research on clause order in conditional structures has not specifically examined CCC constructions, the data they provide seem to show that clauses introduced by CCCs, unlike if-clauses, usually occupy the second position in conditional constructions (for English, see Traugott, 1997: 160 and Dancygier, 1998: 173; for French, cfr. Dostie, 1987: 177-178; see Montolio 1991b: 134-135, for Spanish data). Therefore, in a high percentage of the cases, CCCs invert the normal or unmarked order of conditional expressions, which of course tends prototypically to be [if p, q]. CCC-ciause order, then, has to be related to the schema [q ifp].4 Ramsey (1985: 405) observes that while preposed protases tend to have discourse functions, postposed protases "look more like a parenthetical comment for the main clause". The corpus-based studies by Ford and Thompson (Ford and Thompson 1986, Ford 1993, 1997) have corroborated this observation, namely that when the protasis is preposed it either conveys information that is in some sense already known or creates the framework for the following discourse. However,
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when !fclauses are postposed, they function more like afterthoughts, evaluations, justifications. Prosodic features also play a role. When the postposed clause is preceded by a pause [q, ifp], on occasion at least, the !fclause seems to convey the sense of less probability. The expectation that the contents in p will not be fulfilled is often taken advantage of in advertising slogans: (6)
a. Si puede mirela. 0 cambie, si puede. (Catchphrase for the Spanish TV series Serie Rosa 'Pink Series') (EI Peri6dico de Catalunya, March 21, 1991). 'If you can, watch it. Or change [the channel], if you can.' b. Resistete, si puedes. (Advertising slogan for the Renault 19) (EI Pais, September 15, 1992). 'Resist [the temptation], if you can.'
In each case the effect of postposition in conjunction with the preceding pause clearly conveys an inferential interpretation that the fulfillment of the modal puede(s) 'can' is improbable. In fact, in the television commercial corresponding to the same Renault advertising campaign as that in (6b) even a priest succumbs to the temptation. The interpretation that 'p will not be easily fulfilled' is used as sort of a challenge, a strategy to incite the consumer's interest. I would like to suggest that the CCC-schema conveys an analogous sense of improbability or exceptionality. The characteristic semantics of postposed protases headed by CCCs represents an a-posteriori specification that rectifies 5 the content of the main clause, by stipulating the conditions under which q will or will not be carried out. In these constructions the hearer is instructed that p entails a certain type of correction of what is affirmed in q. As pointed out by Dancygier (1985, 1998) for unless constructions, we can propose that the relation between q and p in CCC structures is not one of cause (as is prototypically the case of conditionals), but rather one of circumstance. That is, p constitutes a specification of the circumstances under which q can be maintained. This can be seen in the following examples: (7)
a. A mi me parece que las especulaciones son muy poco
pertinentes, a no ser que seamos capaces de imaginarnos a nosotros mismos convertidos en un anciano de setenta y siete afios [ ..}. (El Europeo, October 1988, pp. 59-60).
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'It seems to me that the speculations are rather inappropriate, unless we are able to imagine ourselves turned into a 77-yearold elderly person [... ]. b. La respuesta a tan dificil pregunta es sf, es posible broncearse, siempre que la exposicion solar se realice de manera inteligente. (Marie-Claire, February, 1993). 'The answer to such a difficult question is yes, it is possible to get a tan, provided that exposure to the sun is done in an intelligent manner.' The specification implied by p is so strong that, orally, it is often introduced by a long pause or, graphically, ~y a comma or even a period. In many cases, CCC-ciauses constitute phonologically and graphically independent utterances. The schema [ q. CCC p] is quite frequent in Spanish. It can be observed in the following example:
(8)
Sf, sf, vamos. Estoy convencido de que en mi vida futura la filosofia sera mi hobby. Ahora, no mi profesion, desde luego. A no ser que cambie mucho, 0 me vea en una situacion... economica muy ahogada y me tenga que dedicar a dar clases. (Esgueva and Cantarero (1981: 24). 'Yes, yes, well.... I'm convinced that in my life to come philosophy will be my hobby. But not my job, that's for sure. Unless my life changes a lot, or I find myself in a very tight financial. .. situation and I have to earn a living teaching. ' As opposed to prototypical If-clauses, which are preposed, the order
[q, CCC p] is not iconic with the sequence of events in the 'real world'.
Instead, the order appears to be iconic with the mental processing of the instructions to be given to the hearer. That is, CCC-ciauses tend not be iconic with event structure, but rather with argumentational patterns, in that their cognitive processing seems to mirror the sequence used in assertion-restriction or the specification thereof
3. The biconditional value of CCCs The hypothesis put forth here is the following: whereas the construction if p designates a very broad and generalized condition, roughly paraphrasable as 'in the event that p,' CCCs express highly specific
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conditions. As noted above, CCCs establish a much more precise and restricted relationship between p and q than if does. It is true that, as it has been seen, !fclauses can convey a similar "restricted" relation betwen p and q in certain grammatical circumstances (for instance, in cases in which the subordinate clause is postposed and preceded by a pause). The difference lies in the fact that if only suggests such a strong contingency in the appropiate context, whereas CCCs make the "restricted" relation explicit, which is consistent with the greater transparency of CCCs. The relationship between p and q in a CCC-structure is so strong that, as we shall see, it cannot be canceled. In fact, the exceptionality of the condition expressed by CCCs is such that it cannot be later neutralized without leading to a semantically and pragmatically unacceptable utterance (cf. Dostie 1987: 190). Ducrot (1973: 267) and Fauconnier (1984: 147) have both pointed out that there exist mechanisms that nullify the biconditional reading of !fclauses, which is the normal interpretation in ordinary language (known as conditional perfection). Fauconnier proposes that de toute far;on ('anyway') can be employed to nullify the 'invited' inference of a conditional reading (ifp, q , if not p, not q) (Geis and Zwicky 1971). The neutralizing character of de toute far;on is confirmed by "l'apparition simultanee possible de mais ou cependant" (Fauconnier 1984: 147). (9)
a. Si tu viens,} 'irai, mais si tu ne viens pas,} 'irai de toute fa~on. b. Si til vas, ire, pero si no vas, yo ire de todos modos. 6 c. Ifyou go, I'll go, but if you don't, I'll go anyway.
However, as can be seen in (10), such expressions cannot be used with CCC-ciauses. (10) a. *J'irai a condition que tu viennes, mais si tu ne viennes pas, } 'irai de toute fa~on. b. *Ire a condici6n de que vayas, pero si til no vas, ire de todos modos. c. *1'11 go provided that you go, but if you don't, I'll go anyway. These examples corroborate the hypothesis that the condition established by CCC-ciauses is in no way defeasible. This behavior is similar to that of the connective if and only if. A condicion de que
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'provided that' and a menos que/a no ser que 'unless' convey unique or exceptional circumstances that will allow (or block) the event expressed in the main clause to occur. This explains why such CCC-constructions cannot be iterated in coordinate structures: (11) a. *,Sa/dre contigo a cenar a condicion de que no hab/emos de trabajo y a condici6n de que me invites. 'I'll go out to dinner with you so long as we don't speak about work and so long as you pick up the tab. ' b. *Me ire de esta empresa a no ser que me asciendan y a no ser que me aumenten e/ sue/do. 'I'll leave this company unless they promote me and unless they give me a raise. ' Notice that both constructions are perfectly viable with si: (12) a. Sa/dre contigo a cenar si no hablamos de trabajo y si me invitas. 'I'll go out to dinner with you if we don't speak about work and if you pick up the tab. ' b. Me ire de esta empresa si no me ascienden y si no me aumentan e/ sue/do. 'I'll leave this company if they don't promote me and if they don't give me a raise. ' The reason for the unacceptability of the iterated CCCs lies in the fact that it is simply not possible to present the only circumstance under which something will or will not happen and then add another exceptional condition. In short, CCCs disallow the presence of other exceptional conditions.
4. ACCCs and NCCCs Both groups (ACCC and NCCC) express exceptional conditions. The meaning of a condici6n de que 'provided that' and other ACCCs in general is restrictive: they establish the only condition under which q can be realized. That is, ACCCs have approximately the same value as [q only ifp]. ACCCs are therefore formulations of a favorable exception for something to happen. NCCCs, on the other hand, indicate the only
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situation by which q will not be realized. 7 That is, NCCCs convey the instruction [q only if not pl. Hence, NCCCs convey something to the effect of "in any situation other than p." In other words, NCCCs express the exceptional circumstance by which the proposition expressed by the main clause will not be fulfilled. Both types of CCCs express tff relations. Both types of CCCs present a modal and argumentative value, since they instruct the hearer whether a given circumstance is favorable or disfavorable to the proposition in the main clause. The perspective that the speaker adopts in the face of the possibility of q 's realization is therefore quite different: while ACCCs signal that q can only be realized if p, NCCCs express that q will not be realized only in the case of p. This is what determines the affirmative character of the first group and the negative character of the second. ACCCs convey the necessary basis for something to occur; NCCCs express the circumstance under which something will not be realized. Dancygier (1985: 68) proposes quite insightfully that what unless really denies is q, not p. Her proposal seems to be clearer than the one advanced by Geis (1973): except if p, q. To observe a case in which the main clause displays negative polarity (for instance, example (4)), we can extrapolate from Dancygier's observation as follows in (13b): (13) a. q (b. not q
unlessp unlessp
q; notq;
[(not q) ifp] [ (q) ifp])
(1985: 65)
The negative character of NCCCs is the reason why a no ser que 'unless' and like connectives appear to be generally the equivalent of si no 'if ... not' -clauses. In fact, however, there are quite a few differences between the· two types of constructions (cf Geis 1973; Dancygier 1985; von Fintel 1991; Dancygier 1998: 169-171). Consider, for instance, the odd combination of NCCCs such as unless with negative-polarity clauses which are perfectly acceptable with if (Cf *Unless .John cares a bit for Mary, he shouldn't marry her vs. If John doesn't care a bit for Mary, he shouldn't marry her (Geis 1973:283)). In my opinion, regardless of whether they are equivalent to if or if ... not clauses, the fundamental value of NCCCs is to specify in p the circumstances under which q will not be fulfilled. The point is that the circumstances present in p are construed as improbable or contrary to what one might expect. The contrast between the two following examples adds credibility to the hypothesis advanced here (cf Smith 1983: 21 for similar examples):
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(14) a. Los cocodrilos no podrian sobrevivir si no tuvieran dientes afiladisimos. 'Crocodiles couldn't survive if they didn't have extremely sharp teeth. ' b. # Los cocodrilos no podrian sobrevivir a menos que tuvieran dientes afiladisimos. 'Crocodiles couldn't survive unless they had extremely sharp teeth. ' (14a) sounds perfectly normal but (14b) is surprising from a pragmatic point of view. In (14a), the negation of the counterfactual structure presupposes that crocodiles actually do have extremely sharp teeth. On the other hand, (14b) is decidedly odd because the clause introduced by the NCCC presupposes that the condition in p is exceptional. That is, the condition is contrary to what would normally be expected. Since NCCCs convey an exceptional obstacle for q, in an eternal-truth context such as (14b) they are obviously inappropriate: the clause suggests that crocodiles do not have extremely sharp teeth, and this conflicts whith our encyclopedic knowledge. This nuance of less expectation conveyed by unless-constructions explains why they are often inappropriate for counterfactuals. As is well known, counterfactual clauses are presupposed to be false: (15) Yo Ie habria dado ese medicamento a la nina, si no 10 hubiera desaconsejado el medico explicitamente. 'I would have given the medicine to the girl, if the doctor hadn't advised against it explicitly. ' The utterance in (15) conveys a factual interpretation in which the content of p is negated. The doctor is understood as indeed having advised against giving the girl the medicine. Clauses headed by a menos que 'unless' and a no ser que 'unless' convey information which is necessarily understood as hypothetical, precisely because they carry a sense of high improbability-and improbability is necessarily hypothetical. Thus, a version of (15) with a menos que or a no ser que indicates that the hypotheticality (i.e., nonfactuality) of p is real, since in reality we do not know if the doctor did or did not authorize the medicine:
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(16) Yo Ie habria dado ese medicamento a la nina, a menos que/a no ser que 10 hubiera desaconsejado el medico explicitamente. 'I would have given the medicine to the girl, unless the doctor had advised against it explicitly. '
Precisely because they can only receive a hypothetical interpretation and are primarily future-oriented (see Traugott 1997: 158 for the case of unless), a menos que/a no ser que-clauses are incompatible with counterfactuals that presuppose the creation of an 'impossible world.' This is also shown by the behavior of the following examples. (17) a. Si Colon no hubiera descubierto America, los indios habrian sido mas felices. 'If Columbus hadn't discovered America, the Indians would have been happier. ' b. *A no ser que Colon hubiera descubierto America, los indios habrian sido mas felices. *' Unless Columbus had discovered America, the Indians would have been happier. ' As we have seen, a no ser que presents q as well as the possibility of not q. Nevertheless, counterfactuals only allow for one interpretation: q, if the clause is in negative form, or not q, if there are no overt markers of negation. Hence, (17b) is odd because we know that Columbus did actually discover America.
5. CCCs and contextually given conditions As we have just seen, the greater specificity of CCCs-in contrast to the neutral, unmarked character of si 'if-makes them inappropriate with counterfactual structures. This same reason, I contend, stands behind their inability to appear in constructions in which the content of p is contextually asserted. Take for example sentence (18): (18)
A: Ya he acabado el trabajo. 'I've just finished the job.'
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a. B: Pues si ya has aeabado e/ trabajo, sa/gamos a eenar por ahi. 'Well, if you've just finished the job, let's go out for dinner. ' b. 'B: *Pues a condici6n de que ya hayas aeabado e/ trabajo, sa/gamos a eenar por ahi. *'Provided that/so long as you've finished the job, let's go out to dinner. '
In other cases, the assertion hidden in the protasis is less explicit, but it is information that is present in the context of the speech event (the term context should be understood in the broad sense of Sperber and Wilson 19962) . The thematic or given nature of such rrotases is demonstrated by the fact that the protasis cannot be postposed: (19) a. Si hay una pasion franeesa que no //eva camino de desapareeer, esa es /a pasion por /a po/itiea. [E/ Pais, June 21, 1992] 'If there is one French passion that is not on its way to disappearing, it is their passion for politics. ' b. *Es /a pasion por /a po/itiea, si hay una pasion franeesa que no //eva camino de desapareeer. 'It's is a passion for politics, if there is one French passion that is not on its way to disappearing. ' c. *A condici6n de que haya una pasion franeesa que no //eva camino de desapareeer, esa es /a pasion por /a po/itiea. 'Provided that there is one French passion that is not on its way to disappearing, it is their passion for politics. ' (20) a. Si no te /0 ha dicho es porque te quiere. 'Ifhe hasn't told you it's because he loves you.' b. *Es porque te quiere, si no te /0 ha dicho. 'It's because he loves you, ifhe hasn't told you.' c. *A no ser que te /0 haya dicho es porque te quiere. *' Unless he's told you, it's because he loves you.' Elsewhere (Montolio 1999) I have called such conditional structures identificatives (19) and exp/ieatives (20), respectively. Unlike prototypical (i.e., hypothetical) conditionals, the If-clauses here are far from left-open (in the sense of Lehman 1974: 234; that is, the
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proposition in the antecedent of a conditional sentence is not asserted). On the contrary, these uses of si-clauses seem to be what I propose to call left-given. This is shown by the fact that these clauses cannot be postposed, as is demonstrated by the (b) examples, nor can they be used with CCC-structures, as in the (c) examples. In Spanish, as well as in French and English, the apodoses of ifconstructions can be-indeed frequently are-yes/no-questions «21a)) as well as wh-questions «22a) and (23a)). (21) a. Sifuese obispo, ~condenaria el aborto? 'If you were a bishop, would you condemn abortion?' b. *A condici6n de quefuese obispo, ~condenaria el aborto? *'Provided that you were a bishop, would you condemn abortion?' (22) a. Si a Gonzalez Ie gusta tanto participar en la campana de un referendum, ,",por que no organiza uno en su pais? dice Philippe Seguin. [El Pais, June 21, 1992] 'If Gonzalez likes participating in the campaign for a referendum so much, why doesn't he organize one in his country? says Philippe Seguin. ' b. *A condici6n de que a Gonzalez Ie guste tanto participar en la campana de un referendum, ,",por que no organiza uno en su pais? dice Philippe Seguin. *' Provided that Gonzalez likes participating in the campaign for a referendum so much, why doesn't he organize one in his country? says Philippe Seguin. ' (23) a. Si no estas preparada para tener un hijo, ,",por que demonios has querido quedarte embarazada. 'If you're not ready to have a child, why the hell did you want to get pregnant?' b. *A menos que estes preparada para tener un hijo, ,",por que demonios has querido quedarte embarazada. *' Unless you're ready to have a child, why the hell did you want to get pregnant?' In view of examples such as these, it seems feasible to state that ACCCs are difficult to combine with yes/no-questions, as is the case with example (21b). Such a combination gives rise to utterances that are
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clearly very strange. Furthermore, CCCs are, in general, difficult to interpret with wh-interrogatives (e.g., (22b) and (23b». Actually, this difference in behavior with regard to the two different basic types of interrogatives does not come as much of a surprise. This is so because in wh-interrogatives the tt:protasis functions as a framework for a latent assertion (e.g.,(22a) and (23», whose superficial hypothetical form lays the groundwork for and justifies the question that follows it. That is, the use of a hypothetical form for contextually asserted information constitutes a mechanism that attempts to safeguard the relevance of the subsequent question (cf Haegeman 1984). CCCs are also incompatible with so-called indicative counterfactuals, since they also presuppose some kind of previous assertion: (24) a. Mira, si esa chica es guapa, yo soy Claudia Schiffer. 'Look, if that girl is pretty, I'm Claudia Schiffer.' b. *A condici6n de que esa chica sea guapa, yo soy Claudia Schiffer. *'Provided that that girl is pretty, I'm Claudia Schiffer.' (25) a. Si tit no eres rico, yo entonces soy un mendigo. 'Ifyou're not rich, then I'm a beggar. ' b. *A no ser que tit seas rico, yo soy un mendigo. *' Unless you're rich, I'm a beggar.' All of these kinds of conditionals fall under the heading of nonpredictive conditionals (according to Sweetser 1990; Dancygier 1993, 1999). Note that, to a greater or lesser extent, they all constitute "echoes" from some previous discourse. Furthermore, they can be characterized by their lack of strict iconicity. The sequence of clauses is not iconic with the sequence of events, though in fact there does seem to be an iconic correspondence between the linear order of the clauses and the sequence of steps taken in argumentation: Given X allows me to assert ... (cft. Sweetser 1990: 128). That is, speakers use p to show the hearer how they arrive at the assumptions in q. As we can see, CCCstructures cannot appear in any context of epistemic conditionals, where the tt:clause introduces some type of assumption present in the context of the speech situation (Sweetser 1990: 128). That is, CCC-ciauses cannot appear in any context whose content is given, assumed, or clearly presupposed. The information that CCC-ciauses convey is
x:
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therefore necessarily rhematic. This is consistent with post-main-clause order, because focus tends cross-linguistically to occur in sentence-final position (Comrie 1986: 86). The insertion of a CCC, especially NCCC, seems slightly more acceptable--especially when they appear preposed-with speech-act and metalinguistic conditionals than with any of the former types. Nevertheless, such uses do not, by any means, constitute prototypical contexts for CCCs. Let us consider Austin's celebrated example: (26) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard ifyou want them. b. #There are biscuits on the sideboard provided that/so long as you want them. Clearly there is something peculiar about (26b). Consider the examples in (27): (27) a. En espanol americano a eso Ie llaman 'durazno', SI no confundo la palabra. 'In Latin-American Spanish that's what they call a 'durazno' (peach), if I'm not confusing the word.' b. ?En espanol americana a eso Ie Ilaman 'durazno', a no ser que confunda la palabra. 9 'In Latin-American Spanish that's what they call a 'durazno' (peach), unless I'm confusing the word.' The ability of NNNC clauses to be inserted in these nonpredictive, nonprototypical schemas can be explained by the parenthetical nature that both !fclauses and CCC-ciauses acquire in these types of conditionals: the independence of the propositional content of CCCclauses with regard to the main clause also corresponds to ·the nonembedded character of the subordinate clauses in speech-act and metalinguistic conditionals.
6. CCCs and the discourse deictic then Another feature that characterizes CCC-constructions as noncentral members of the family of conditional structures is their inability to combine with the phoric then: 10
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(28) a. Si hace sol, entonces iremos a la playa. '/fit's sunny, then we'll go to the beach.' b. *A condici6n de que/con tal de que/ siempre que haga sol, entonces iremos a la playa. 'Provided that/so long as it's sunny, then we'll go to the beach.' (29) a. Si no llueve, entonces iremos a la playa. '/fit doesn't rain, then we'll go to the beach.' *A no ser que/ a menos que/ salvo que/ excepto que llueva, entonces iremos a la playa. *' Unless/except ifit rains, then we'll go to the beach.' The presence of entonces ('then') in conditional schemas is a matter that remains to be thoroughly studied in Spanish. Nonetheless, as pointed out by Haiman (1978: 576), in contradistinction to the traditionally studied schema if p, then q, the phoric then does not constitute by any means an obligatory element in ordinary-language conditionals. In fact, certain types, such as speech-act conditionals or metalinguistic conditionals, reject it. (30) a. ?? Si no me equivoco, entonces ese es tu primo. ??'/fI' m not mistaken, then that guy is your cousin. ' b. ?? Si se Ie puede llamar asi, entonces es una estructura condicional. ??' /f you can call it that, then it's a conditional structure. ' Of course, speech-act and metalinguistic conditionals, by their very nature, do not express a grammatical relationship where p entails q. By contrast, entonces 'then' explicitly expresses that q follows from p. Therefore, the semantics of these constructions clashes with that of then and thus produces an unacceptable utterance. In those constructions that do accept its presence, the insertion of then is neither pragmatically, nor semantically identical to its omission: it is one thing to imply that q follows from p, as in prototypical conditionals using the schema [if p, q], and it is another to mark this explicitly, as in [ifp, then q]. In any event, it should be noted that those if-constructions that do allow the presence of then do not allow it when the normal order of the clauses is altered, which happens to be the schema normally used by CCCs:
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(31) *Entonces ire a la playa, si llueve. 'Then I'll go to the beach, ifit rains.' Nevertheless, the examples in (28) and (29) show that CCCs are incompatible with entonces 'then' even when they appear in a preposed position. Such a fact invites the question of just what the function of then in a conditional is. There seems to be agreement that one of its main functions is to act as an anaphoric emphatic correlate to the protasis, i.e., something like a resumptive pronoun (Dancygier 1998; Dancygier and Sweetser 1997; latridou 1992; Montolio 1991b, 1999). One might say that the use of then constitutes an attempt on the part of the speaker to insure that the interlocutor retains the hypothetical framework on which the following clause or utterance is based. This is clearly the case of conditionals in which various protases are linked to one apodosis: (32) Todos creemos tener el mismo derecho: si uno se puede hacer millonario en dos dias, si no es el resultado de una vida de esfuerzo, si se consigue con solo jugar a la Bolsa, con disponer de informacion privilegiada, entonces todo el mundo cree que tiene derecho a ganar mas de 10 que gana. [EI Pais, May 17, 1998] 'We all believe that we have the same right: if one can become a millionaire in two days, if it's not the result of a life of hard work, if it can be obtained by playing the stock market, by having privileged information, then everybody believes that they have the right to earn more than they do.'
As opposed to prototypical ~clauses, CCC-ciauses do not function as a hypothetical framework for the assertion of q. Rather, as we have seen, they restrict or specify what is expressed in q. They are not, however, the basis for asserting the content of the main clause. These facts account for why CCCs cannot collocate with then, since the cohesive function of this element is to serve as an elliptical framework for the apodosis. However, when the CCC-structure is included in a larger framework, entonces 'then' is indeed acceptable. (33) A: Papa, iftle Ilevaras al cine? 'Dad, will you take me to the movies?'
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B:
J.~i,
a condici6n de que acabes los deberes. Entonces te llevare al cine. 'Provided that/so long as you finish your homework. Then I'll take you to the movies. '
As can be seen, in (33) the insertion of entonces 'then' sounds perfectly normal because its presence is not linked solely to the information in the CCC-ciause. If this were the case, it would have given rise to an unacceptable utterance: (34)
*A condici6n de que acabes los deberes, entonces te llevare al cine. *'Provided that/so long as you fmish your homework, then I'll take you to the movies. '
Instead, in (33) B's answer, entonces ('then') is linked to a larger discourse context, to the whole previous sentence ("yes, I will take you to the movies, provided that you fmish your homework. Then --'if this is the case' --, I'll take you").
7. The pragmatics of CCCs In various papers, Fillenbaum has analyzed the relationship that exists between a series of conditional constructions and certain speech acts (see, specially, Fillenbaum 1986). He points out that the semantic content of unless makes it appropriate to appear in deterrents, while at the same time making it unnatural-sounding in inducements. This semantico-pragmatic relationship between unless-constructions and the illocutionary value of threats!! and prohibitions has been documented diachronically for English (Traugott 1997) as well as for Spanish. Bartol Hernandez (1992: 89) briefly comments that, historically, in the majority of the cases, they are prohibitions (or negative orders, expressed with can, should, or the subjunctive) whose compliance carries an exception, a restriction, presented as a necessary condition. (35) is an example given by this author:
(35) E si por aventura el Rey fuere de tan gran piedat que 10 quiere dexar vivir, non 10 pueda facer a menos que no Ie saque los ojos. (Fuero Real, 350)
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'And if by chance the King were so kindhearted as to want to let him live, he cannot do so unless his eyes are tom out. (Regional Code, 350)' Fillenbaum has shown that in a high percentage of cases provided that appears in promises or inducements (e.g., Fillenbaum 1976: 148). The fact is that it is very difficult to invert these roles; that is to say, the formulation of a promise with unless or that of a threat with provided that is highly infrequent (being generally inadequate). This is true even if we change the polarity of the clauses, in accordance with the complementary distribution of the CCCs that we have analyzed. As can be seen, (36b) is no longer a deterrent (as (36a» but a promise not to do something undesirable. In contrast, (36d) seems a threat more than an inducement (in contradistinction to (36c»: (36) a. Te dejare todo el verano sin vacaciones, a no ser que mejores estas notas. 'I'll take away your vacation, unless you improve these grades. ' b. # No te dejare todo el verano sin vacaciones, a condici6n de que mejores estas notas. #'1 won't take away your vacation, provided that you improve these grades. ' c. Iremos de viaje a Disneylandia, a condici6n de que mejores estas notas. 'We'll go to Disneyland, provided that you improve these grades.' d. # No iremos de viaje a Disneylandia, a no ser que mejores estas notas. #'We won't go to Disneyland, unless you improve these grades.' The favoring character of positive stimuli presented by provided that is corroborated by the fact that it can paraphrase-with the right modifications in the clauses-any paratactic conditional construction with the conjunction and, but only in the event that it expresses an inducement stimulus, such as: (37) a. Dame un besito y te dare un caramelo. 'Give me a little kiss and I'll give you a piece of candy.'
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b. Te dare un earamelo, a condici6n de que me des un besito. 'I'll give you a piece of candy, provided that you give me a kiss. ' However, when these coordinate structures are the equivalent of a threat the paraphrase is impossible. Compare the following sentences: (38) a. Toea a mi hermano y te parto la eara. 'Touch my brother and I'll bash your face in. ' b. #Te parto la eara, a condici6n de que toques a mi hermano. #'1'11 bash in your face, provided that you touch my brother. ' The illocutionary specialization of these connectives is derived from their semantics. The lessening of expectation or high improbability conveyed by a menos que ('unless') conveniently explains its inadequacy as a stimulus: it does not seem pragmatically profitable to try to act upon one's interlocutor under the pretext that something probably WILL NOT happen. This same reason explains the adequacy of unless for prohibitions and threats. The coercive power of a threat lies in the fact that the negative event for the hearer is presented as a general assertion, which only has a distant possibility of being revised: X, unless Y. The hearer must therefore either comply with the proposition in the unless-clause or suffer the consequences. 12 To exemplify this, we can recreate a cliche-ridden dialogue from the film-noir genre between a gangster type and "the other guy's girl." In the improbable event that the gangster were to use a CCC-construction instead of the more predictable paratactic structure, he could choose between formulating his threat with provided that or unless. Nevertheless, one of them would seem much more persuasive than the other: (39) a. No matare a tu novio, a condici6n de que te fugues eonmigo. 'I won't kill your boyfriend, provided that you run away with me.' b. Matare a tu novio, a no ser que te fugues eonmigo. 'I'll kill your boyfriend, unless you run away with me.' The greater force of (39b) lies precisely in that the threatening action (i.e., kill the boyfriend) is expressed in an affirmative factual manner.
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This seems to be more effective than posing the matter in the converse terms, as in (39a), where the threatening action is negated and the restriction on this negated threat appears later. The same pragmatic explanation can be applied to resolve the greater or lesser inadequacy of utterances (36b) and (36d). As can be seen, exchanging connectives causes the speech acts to be exchanged too. Thus, (3 6b) seems to be a much weaker version of a threat than that formulated in (36a), though it also could be interpreted as an unconvincing stimulus. Insofar as the clear stimulating promise in (36c) is concerned, it is converted directly into a threat as soon as its connective is changed (36d). Besides the illocutionary value generally equated with CCCstructures, we can also pose the question of what their pragmatic behavior is as compared to that of if-clauses. Also worth considering is the question of whether there exist differences between the two subsets of CCCs from such a point of view. An if-clause can appear in any context that a CCC can, and in fact, speakers prefer to use the unmarked connector if even when the insertion of a CCC is possible. The very subtle differences that these constructions convey with regard to if (and if ... not) are so faint that most speakers probably do not consider them to be very operative. Furthermore, in the Romance languages, CCCclauses trigger the subjunctive mood, which according to the literature on the matter is in the decline. This seems to be why CCC-ciauses are more characteristic of formal, written registers than of spontaneous, oral ones. CCC-structures are, in effect, noticeably less frequent than if-clauses in oral and spontaneous registers. In this sense, we can see the correspondence between ontogenesis and linguistic universals, because such constructions are acquired much later than if-structures. Although most authorities on the matter of the acquisition of conditionals only deal with if-clauses, Wing and Kofsky (1981) point out that just as common sense would lead us to believe, CCC-structures are among the latest to be acquired. Given their formal complexity and the specificity of the condition they introduce, CCC-structures surface in child language at a later stage than if-clauses and other types of synthetic conditional structures, such as paratactic structures (McCabe et al. 1983, Wing and Kofsky 1981). In the case of NCCCs, this late appearance seems to be even more justified. NCCCs imply a greater cognitiveprocessing complexity in that to the uncertainty of the truth value they add a negative relationship between the two clauses.
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My claim is that no matter what the speech act may be, ACCCs and NCCCs are pragmatically very different from one another. When speakers choose to use an unless-clause, they are often trying to avoid committing themselves completely: q is said first, and afterwards, as a kind of afterthought, the only situation in which their utterance will not be true is signalled (P). This claim is consistent with the historical corpus-based analysis of Traugott (1997), who concludes that in general unless-clauses express 'possible events that will block promises, threats, expectations, and even probable recurrence. '
(40) Creo que [el condicionamiento social y economico] impiden que en la practica se pueda decir: yo me caso cuando quiera. A no ser que la ... no se, tambien la situacion economica familiar del novio y de la novia, su plan, claro (Esgueva and Cantarero 1981: 34). 'I think that [social and economic conditioning factors] keep one from saying in practice: I'm going to get married whenever I want. Unless the ... I don't know, also the boy's and the girl's family financial situation, their plans, of course. ' Thus, in most cases, the use of unless can be interpreted as aface-saving repair (cf Goffman 1967). In such cases the speaker tries to take precautions against an interpretation of his utterance in terms of overall truth, which could jeopardize the speakers "face" in the future. In this sense, the use of unless is much like metadiscursive if=-clauses of the type if I'm not mistaken, if that's the right word, if I remember correctly, etc., and has to do with the strategy of guarding oneself from possible criticisms from one's interlocutor. On the other hand, ACCCs are more problematic from an interactive perspective: once established, provided that cannot be mitigated. Such a specific meaning explains-at least in part-its low frequency: speakers prefer to propose a condition with an if=-clause, rather than impose a condition with provided that. In fact, according to the data I have worked with, speakers often use an ACCC-ciause when they are talking about a third party. In effect, ACCCs can be too imposing, and therefore are used typically when there exists a certain asymmetry ("power") in the social status of the interlocutors. Thus, a tenured professor can easily indicate to his graduate student:
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(41) De acuerdo, Ie dirigire la tesis, a condici6n de que trabaje sobre el subjuntivo. 'Agreed, I'll supervise your thesis, provided that you work on the subjunctive. ' On the other hand, this utterance would not be very likely the other way around; that is, it would be precarious if the graduate student declared something like the following to his superior: (42) Muy bien, dare sus clases a condici6n de que usted me ayude a preparar la bibliografia. 'Okay, I'll teach your classes provided that you help me with the bibliography. ' Such an utterance, without a doubt, would seem less risky formulated as an ~clause: (43) Muy bien, dare sus clases si usted me ayuda a preparar la bibliografia. 'Okay, I'll teach your classes if you help me with the bibliography. ' The rule of linguistic politeness which indicates that indirectness is more courteous than direct expressions also explains why the ACCCstructures can seem not very polite: with these structures, there is no interpretation other than the imposition of a necessary condition. Such constructions are learned; furthermore, they can also seem impolite if they are used in direct address.
10.
Summary
To summarize, I shall try to list the principal traits of CCC-structures and place them in relation to other structures belonging to the family of conditional structures: (i)
Non-predictive conditionals are non-prototypical. a. CCCs cannot appear in non-predictive contexts (i.e., where, in most cases, [ifp] equals [givenp]); b. CCCs are related to predictive and future-oriented contexts.
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(ii)
Hypotheticals and counterfactuals are non-prototypical (Dancygier 1993: 428). a. CCCs rarely appear in counterfactual contexts; b. CCCs are basically related to central, predictive conditionals (i. e., prototypical conditionals).
(iii)
In prototypical, predictive conditionals, CCCs are non-central because: a. whereas, in prototypical If-conditionals, clauses are related through causal relationships, in CCC structures, clauses are related through circumstantial relationships; b. whereas the prototypical order of central If-conditionals if p, q makes them iconic with the sequence of events, the prototypical order of CCC-conditionals q, CCC P makes them iconic with the order involved in processing assertionrestrictions; c. whereas the function of If-clauses is, prototypically, to establish a state of affairs to be taken as the basis for considering the consequent, the function of CCC-ciauses is to restrict or specify the contents of the apodosis (hence, their incompatibility with then).
Notes *
1.
2.
I would like to thank Maria Rosa Vila and Joseph Hilferty for the many hours that they spent with me discussing many of the points expanded upon here, as well as the editors of this volume, Bernd Kortmann and Elizabeth CouperKuhlen, for their exhaustive observations on this chapter. I would also like to thank lbon Sarasola for providing me with the Basque example in endnote 4. I would further like to mention the help received from Joseph Hilferty in making an intelligible English version. It goes without saying, however, that all errors are of my own responsibility. The lack of quality grammatical descriptions regarding CCCs is reflected in the fact that most Spanish textbooks and reference grammars for foreign learners give a rather jumbled treatment of these constructions. Furthermore, they tend to present them as if they were mutually commutable with one another as well as with ij=-clauses in general. This has the unfortunate side effect, as I have seen in my own classes, of prompting foreign students to produce unacceptable utterances. It may be possible that the conclusions reached here are also largely applicable to languages such as Italian and German. Given my unfamiliarity with these languages, however, I leave it to others to confirm or disprove this
Complex conditional connectives
3.
4.
5.
6.
possibility. It should also be noted, however, that in Spanish--as in other Romance languages--clauses containing CCCs are generally constructed with the subjunctive mood. The inflectional contrast between the present and the imperfect subjunctives allows speakers of the Spanish language to differentiate the values that conditional constructions with if express through the indicative/subjunctive opposition. The Spanish ACCC siempre que (literally: 'always that') maintains a temporal meaning in many of the utterances in which it appears. An interesting question is which formal elements must be involved so as to obtain a conditional reading; in this sense, it seems that the presence or absence of a pause between the relevant clauses is decisive. Conditional readings tend to be marked by a pause, whereas a lack of a pause seems to signal a temporal interpretation. Compare the following examples: (i) a. Nos traera un regalo siempre que vue/va de viaje. (temporal) 'She'll bring us a present every time she returns from a trip.' b. Nos traera un regalo, siempre que vuelva de viaje. (conditional). 'She'll bring us a present, provided that she returns from a trip.' The relation between CCC-ciauses and postposed ~clauses appears to be corroborated by the fact that languages such as Basque, which do not possess specific unitary connectives to convey such conditional nuances, often express them by postposing the ~clause (as in the Basque ba): (i) Hondartzarajoango ara eguzkia egiten Beach ABL go FUT AUX(lPL/PRES/ITR) sun-ART badu bederen make-IMP COND-AUX(CONJ/TR/3SG) at least 'We'll go to the beach if it's at least sunny out.' Something similar is suggested by Leard (1987: 164) upon isolating a particular group of conditional expressions which he calls restrictives. Dostie (1987: 191-192) also associates this rectifying mechanism with CCCs, though she only considers those structures that I have included in the ACCC group. Of course, such utterances would sound more natural if an optative concessive conditional were used: (i) Vayas 0 no vayas, go-PRES-SUBJUNCT-you or NEG go-PRES-SUBJUNCT-you yo ire. I
7.
8.
167
gO-FUT
'I'm going whether you go or not.' NCCCs are, in a manner of speaking, related to concessive-conditional connectives. This applies, specifically, to incluso si ('even if), since concessive-conditionals express the idea of 'contrary to expectation'. On the other hand, a no ser que ('unless') and incluso si ('even if) have, in a certain sense, complementary meanings: a no ser que conveys the only circumstance that will be an impediment for the fulfillment of q; in contrast, incluso si entails that p will never be an obstacle for q to be realized. In Spanish there is another type of conditional structure labeled a contrastive conditional, which is characterized by the thematic nature of the protasis. It does not appear to have a clear counterpart in English:
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(i)
Si Chatwin eligi6 vlaJar caminando, Paul Theroux redescubri6 las glorias y zozobras del ferrocarril (El Europeo, May 1993). *lfChatwin chose to travel by foot, Paul Theroux rediscovered the glory and angst of the train. However, just as in the case of other conditionals whose protasis expresses a contextually given condition, this conditional cannot appear with a CCC, as is demonstrated by the grammatical behavior of the sentences in (ii). (ii) *A condici6n de que Chatwin eligiera viajar caminando, Paul Theroux redescubrio las glorias y zozobras del ferro carri I. *Provided that Chatwin chose to travel by foot, Paul Theroux rediscovered the glory and angst of the train. For more information on Spanish contrastive conditionals, see Montolio (1999). 9. In fact, speech-act conditionals are a habitual context for a natural unlessclause anteposition.Thus, for instance, the example at hand would seem more plausible with a preposed CCC: A no ser que confunda la palabra, en espanol americana a eso Ie llaman udurazno" 'Unless I'm confusing the word, LatinAmerican Spanish they call this [i.e., a peach] "durazno'" 10. In Spanish there exist two particles that correspond to this value of then: entonces (which, like then, coincidentally also has a temporal meaning) and pues (which historically meant 'after'). In fact, the connective pues 'thus'seems actually to be much more frequent than entonces 'then' in spoken Spanish conditionals and seems to correspond to a marker of sequentiality (Dancygier, 1998: 178 et passim), that is, a particle that introduces conclusions. This matter still needs to be examined further, but a first approximation can be found in Montolio (1991a, 1999). 11. It is worthwhile pointing out that in a conversational context, especially where direct reference is being made to the interlocutor, conditional threats in Spanish frequently take the form of a special construction: como + VPRESSUBJUNCT. This construction seems to be quite similar to the Japanese -tewa (Akatsuka, 1997) and the disjunctive paratactic conditional, as in: Cena 0 no veras la television ('Eat your dinner or you can't watch TV'). For more on such threatening conditionals in Spanish, see Montolio (1999). 12. To this effect, Brown and Levinson distinguish concrete types of acts that threaten negative face and that are formulated in the following way: Threats, warnings, dares (S[peaker] indicates that he (or someone or something) will instigate sanctions against H[earer] unless he does A) (Brown and Levinson 1987: 65-66; the italics are mine).
References Akatsuka, Noriko 1997 Negative conditionality, subjectification, and conditional reasoning. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou and Rene Dirven (eds.), On Conditionals Again, 323-354. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
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Austin, John L. 1956 1ft and cans. Proceedings ofthe British Academy: 109-132. Bartol Hernandez, Jose Antonio 1992 Algunas conjunciones y locuciones condicionales en la Edad Media. In: Jose Antonio Bartol Hernandez, Juan Felipe Garcia and Javier de Santiago (eds.), Estudios jilol6gicos en homenaje a Bustos Tovar, vol. 1,85-110. Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca. Brown, Penelope and Stephen C. Levinson 1987 Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Comrie, Bernard 1986 Conditionals: A typology. In: Elizabeth Traugott, Alice Ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer and Charles Ferguson (eds.), On conditionals, 77-99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Contreras, Lidia 1963 Las oraciones condicionales. Boletin de Filologia de la Universidad de Chile XII: 273-290. Dancygier, Barbara 1985 If, unless, and their Polish equivalents. Papers in Contrastive Linguistics XX: 65-72. 1990 Conditionals: Sequence of events and sequence of clauses. In: Jaeck Fisiak (ed.), Further insights into contrastive analysis, 357-373. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1993 Interpreting conditionals: Time, knowledge, and causation. Journal ofPragmatics 19: 403-434. 1998 Conditionals and prediction. Time, knowledge and causation in conditionals structures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dancygier, Barbara and Eve Sweetser 1997 Then in conditional constructions. Cognitive Linguistics 8(2): 1-28. Dostie, Gaetane Etude semantique de quatre connecteurs conditionnels: a condition 1987 que, pourvu que, en autant que et d'abord que. Le jran9ais moderne LV/3-4: 174-203. Ducrot, Oswald 1973 La preuve et Ie dire. Paris: Marne. Esgueva, Manuel and Margarita Cantarero (eds.) 1981 El habla culta de la ciudad de Madrid. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas. Fauconnier, Gilles 1984 Espaces mentaux. Paris: Minuit. Fillenbaum, Samuel 1986 The use of conditionals in inducements and deterrents. In: Elizabeth Traugott, Alice Ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer and Charles Ferguson (eds.), On conditionals, 179-195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. von Fintel, Kai 1991 Exceptive conditionals: the meaning of unless. North Eastern Linguistics Society 22: 135-148.
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Ford, Cecilia E. and Sandra A. Thompson 1986 Conditionals in discourse: A text-based study from English. In: Elizabeth Traugott, Alice Ter Meulen, Judy Snitzer and Charles Ferguson (eds.), On conditionals, 353- 372. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ford, Cecilia E 1993 Grammar in interaction. Adverbial clauses in American English conversations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geis, Michael and Arnold M. Zwicky 1971 On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry 2: 61-66. Geis, Michael 1973 If and unless. In: Braj B. Kachru, Robert B. Lees, Yakov Malkiel, Angelina Pientrangeli and Sol Saporta (eds.), Issues in Linguistics. Papers in honor of Henry and Renee Kahane, 231-253. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Goffman, Erving 1967 Interaction ritual: Essays on face to face behavior. New York: Garden City. Haegeman, Liliane 1984 Pragmatic conditionals in English. Folia Linguistica XVIII/3-4: 485502. Iatridou, Sabine 1991 If Then, then what? North Eastern Linguistics Society 22: 211-225. Leard, Jean-Marcel 1987 La syntaxe et la classification des conditionnelles et des concessives. Le Fran~ais Moderne LV (3/4): 158-173. Lehmann, Christian 1974 Prinzipien flir "Universal 14". In: Hansjakob Seiler (ed.), Linguistic Workshop 11, 69-97. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. McCabe, Anne E., Susan Evely, Rona Abmmovitch, Carl M. Corter and Debra 1. Pepier 1983 Conditional statements in young children's spontaneous speech. Joumal ofChild Language 10: 253- 258. Montolio, Estrella 1990 Expresi6n de la condicionalidad en espano!. Ph.D. dissertation. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona. 1991a Asi, pues entonces, 10 mejor sera que pienses bien 10 de casarte. Acerca de los procondicionantes en espana!. Foro Hispanico 2: 4353. 1991b On conditional structures with complex connectors. In: Johan van der Auwera (ed.), Eurotyp working papers: Adverbialia, volume 1: 33-52. 1999 Capitulo 57: Las construcciones condicionales. In: Ignacio Bosque and Violeta Demonte (eds.), Gramatica descriptiva de la lengua espanola, Volume III: 3643-3737. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.
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Ramsey, Violeta 1987 The functional distribution of preposed and postposed if- and whenclauses in written discourse. In: Russell S. Tomlin (ed.), Coherence and Grounding in Discourse, 383-408. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Smith, Neil V. 1983 On interpreting conditionals. Australian Journal ofLinguistics 3: 124. Sperber, Dan and Deidre Wilson 19962 Relevance. Communication and cognition. Oxford: Blackwell. Sweetser, Eve E. 1990 From etymology to pragmatics: Metaphorical and cultural aspects ofsemantic structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs 1997 Unless and but conditionals: a historical perspective. In: Rene Dirven and Angeliki Athanasiadou (eds.), On conditionals again, 145-167. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Visconti, Jacqueline 1994 Entre hypotheses et conditions. Sur la semantique des connecteurs conditionnels complexes. Cahiers de linguistique fran~aise 15: 77108. Wing, C.S. and Ellin Kofsky 1981 Children's comprehension of pragmatic concepts expressed in because, although, if, and unless. Journal ofChild Language 8: 347365.
Pre- and post-positioning of wenn-clauses in spoken and written German * Peter Auer
This paper is concerned with the distinction between pre- and postpositioned (initial and final) wenn-clauses in German, and with the distinction between written and spoken language. A simple cross-tabulation of the two features [spoken/written] and [pre-/postpositioned] shows that initial wennclauses are preferred in spoken German, but final wenn-clauses are preferred in written German. An attempt will be made to explain these findings.
1.
Introduction
The fmdings and discussions in this paper are corpus-based. They are partly quantitative, partly qualitative. With respect to both dimensions, the claim is that a full understanding of the syntax of (particularly) spoken language eludes the possibilities of a purely introspective methodology. Of course, no (quantitative or qualitative) corpus-based investigation can do without a strong reliance on the analyst's knowledge ('intuition') about the language being researched; in fact, fmding valid generalizations always involves Gedankenexperimente, playing with structural changes in and recontextualizations of the 'examples' found to be used by the informants. On the other hand, not even the empirical starting point of the present investigation (i.e., the (differing) preferences of spoken and written language for post- and prepositioning) is available to a purely introspective approach, since it is of a quantitative kind. In order to reach an explanation of these findings, this quantitative analysis has to be complemented by an in-depth analysis of individual cases of usage. Such an analysis will pay attention (a) to the in-time emergence of syntactic patterns, including the details of their delivery such as hesitations, reformulations, break-offs, etc., and (b) to the interactional aspects of this emergence, including hearer feedback (or lack of it) and sequential placement. In this respect, spoken language research can profit in important ways from conversation analysis.
174 Peter Auer
2.
German wenn-clauses and English tactic and semantic overview
~clauses:
a brief syn-
This, of course, is not the place for a full contrastive analysis of the two constructions. In order to facilitate the reader's access to the examples to be discussed below, and in order to link up the present investigation with previous ones on tf-clauses in spoken (and written) Engiish, a short sketch of some important similarities and differences may, however, be in order here.
2.1. Syntax
The syntax of English suggests a (misleading) parallel between pre- and postpositioned adverbial clauses (including conditionals) since they can usually be exchanged without structural changes in either the main or the dependent clause. German syntax, on the other hand, treats the two positions quite differently. While post-positioned adverbial clauses always occupy the so-called post-field (Nachfeld), which is not obligatory, and are thus tagged on to an already complete syntactic pattern, pre-positioned subordinated clauses may be (and in written, normative language usually are) more tightly integrated into the syntactic structure of the following main clause: they occupy the so-called front field (Vorfeld) of the sentence, i.e., the uniquely available and obligatory position before the finite verb. Moving adverbial clauses from one to the other position therefore involves structural changes in the main clause: (1) a. wenn sie==n JOB haben wollen, () mUssen sie==n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen. (original utterance) 1 'if you want to have ajob, you need to get down to the point' b. sie miissen n bisschen auf==n PUNKT kommen wenn sie==n jOb haben wollen. (fabricated) 'you need to get down to the point if you want to have a job' Positioning the wenn-clause in the post-field (lb) instead of the frontfield (la) implies that another constituent will fill this position (in the present case, it is the subject pronoun Sie). The dominant syntactic pattern in which pre-positioned adverbial clauses occur in written German may therefore be called "integrative", while the English treatment is "non-integrative" (cf Konig and van der Auwera 1988: 103-109 for this
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
175
terminology and some further remarks). In spoken German, however, the fully integrated placement of the pre-positioned adverbial clause in the front-field is only one possibility. Alternatively, pre-positioned wenn-clauses may be followed by a resumptive particle (a localtemporal adverbial such as dann or one of its regional equivalents, e.g. na, denn, no, etc.; cf (2b»;2 or they may even be used in a nonintegrative way, rather like in English (cf (2c»: (2) a. wenn sie==n JOB haben wollen, () mUssen sie==n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen. (original utterance) 'if you want to have ajob, you need to get down to the point' b. wenn sie==n JOB haben wollen, () dann mOssen sie==n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen (fabricated) (same meaning) c. wenn sie==n WIRKlich n JOB hiitten haben wollen; () sie hiitten dann SCHON n==bisschen aufn PUNKT kommen miissen (fabricated) 'if you had really wanted a job, (then) you would have needed to get down to the point' For (2c), special conditions of use hold, and it may therefore be considered to be "marked" (cf Konig and van der Auwera 1988, Kopcke and Panther 1985, Giinthner 1999, and below).
2.2. Semantics
The semantics of German wenn-clauses3 is not strictly equivalent to English conditional tf-clauses either. The cognate of English if, German ob (> Germanic *eba), has lost its original (OHG/MHG) function of introducing conditional clauses, although remnants of this usage may still be found in (etymologically) composite concessive conjunctions such as Modem German ob+wohl and ob+gleich and in concessive conditionals of the type ob X oder nicht...('whether X or not'). Filling the gap, the temporal conjunction wenn (or rather, its predecessors, MHG swenne/swanne), a cognate of English when, has taken over most of its functions. As a consequence, the semantics of wenn-introduced clauses oscillates between a temporal and conditional reading in the indicative mood. (For this reason, German wenn-clauses, other than English tfclauses, cannot be called conditional clauses. 4 ) Other conjunctions are
176 Peter Auer
available for a nonambiguous encoding of a conditional or a temporal relationship. Disambiguation of wenn is possible on the basis of contextual information (i.e., the semantics of the remainder of the clause and/or its conversational context) in some, but certainly not all cases. Even in the following examples (which are among the clearest in my data) the paraphrases are not entirely beyond dispute. However, they do represent the prevalent readings ofwenn-clauses: (3) (temporal: consecutive) dann MELD ich mich morgen bei ihnen? (-) wenn «=SOBALD, SOWIE)) ich bei AUror angerufen hab, 'so I'll be in touch with you tomorrow as soon as I have given "Auror" a ring' (4) (temporal: simultaneous) TRIFFST du den () wenn «=WAHREND, sOLANGE)) du in PEking bist? 'will you see him while you are in Peking?' (5) (temporal: iterative) ich sprEch UNdeutlich, (1) LISpel auch n=b' etwas, (-) und (-) ich sprEch dann after zu SCHNELL. (-) wenn «=JEDESMAL WENN)) ich beGEIStert bin, oder (-) eh im element bin; (-) dann sprech ich zu SCHNELL, 'I speak inarticulately, I also lisp a little, and then I often talk too fast. whenever I am enthusiastic about something, or ehm get carried away; (-) then I talk too fast,' (6) (conditional: hypothetical) er will sie jetzt wieder HElraten, und die haben so ne FRIST ehm in den islamischen liindern dass innerhalb von nem halben JAHR oder so, muss die frau dann wieder zum MANN zuriick wenn «=FDRDEN FALL DASS, FALLS)) er sie DOCHwiederwil1 h. 'he now wants to marry her again and they have kind of a deadline ehm in the Islamic countries that within half a year or so the wife has to return to her husband in case he wants her back again'
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
177
(7) (conditional: factual) «radio phone-in, psychotherapeutic consulting; the caller has complained about having no-one to tum to with his marriage problems; the therapist recapitulates and formulates her advice» denn LETZTlich .h wenn ((=DA)) sie in ihrer verwAndtsch~ft niemand HAbn mit dems REden kOnnen, .h iih is=danns BESte, (-) sie wiirden zu am Eheberater gehn? 'for in the end, since you have nobody among your relatives who you could talk to, ehm it's best then to tum to a marriage counselor' Clearly, the temporal readings of wenn are not covered by English if, but by when instead. Some verbal and prosodic features of wenn-clauses may facilitate or even enforce one or the other reading: (a) the temporal, non-iterative reading is not available in sentences referring to past events; here, the temporal conjunction als takes over (while English allows when); (b) focussing adverbials such as stressed nur ('only') in the main clause strongly suggest a conditional reading of the (following) wenn-clause; (c) the particle schon (no English equivalent) in the wenn-clause suggests a factual-conditional reading; (d) immer wenn ('always when') instead of a simple wenn as a conjunction enforces a habitual-temporal/ contingent reading; (e) selbst wenn (' even if) and wenn ... iiberhaupt ('if ... at all') instead of a simple wenn enforce a conditional reading; (f) subjunctive (Konjunktiv II) in the wenn-clause enforces a hypotheticalconditional reading; (g) stressed wenn-conjunctions suggest a conditional instead of a temporal reading. Two special uses of wenn-clauses need to be mentioned. The first is the expression of concessivity through the combination of wenn and auch (wenn + auch or auch + wenn), roughly similar to Engl. even if/even though: 5 (8) a. auch wenn sie KEInen job haben wollen, () miissen sie=n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen. (fabricated) 'even if you don't want ajob, you need to get down to the point' b. wenn sie auch keinen JOB haben wollen, () sie miissen n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen. (fabricated) 'even though you don't want a job, you need to get down to the point' c. obWOIa sie KEInen job haben wollen, () miissen sie=n bisschen da aufn PUNKT kommen. (fabricated)
178 Peter Auer
'although you don't want to have ajob, you need to get down to the point' The auch wenn-construction (8a) differs from obwohl-concessives (Eng!. although, (8c» in that the truth of the proposition it expresses can but need not be taken for granted ("neutral epistemic stance"; cf Fillmore 1990, Couper-Kuhlen, 1999): whereas the proposition 'you don't want a job' is not asserted in (8a)/auch wenn, it is in (8c )/obwohl. Auchwenn-clauses therefore differ from if=-conditionals and resemble true (obwohl-) concessives in that the presupposed generic statement is negative (for the above example: 'someone who does not want a job does not have to get down to the point'). At the same time, they differ from true concessives and are similar to true conditionals in that the truth of the antecendent may but need not be asserted. Note that, differently from auch wenn pre-positioned wenn auch-clauses (8b) co-occur with nonintegrative word order in the consequent, and always receive a factual interpretation. Finally, it should be noted that German wenn-clauses occur sometimes as obligatory constituents of the verb. 6 (English often uses nonfinite forms such as participle or infinitive clauses for this purpose, although if=-clauses are also possible.)
(9) das EINfachste, da ham sie RECHT, das war fiir uns, wenn sie mal==n MOnat (-) im teleFONmarketing ARbeiten wiirden. 'the simplest solution for us, and here you are right, would be if you could work in our direct marketing sector for a month' Syntactically speaking, wenn-clauses of this kind can be replaced by dass-(complement) clauses (das Einfachste ware, dass sie mal im Telefonmarketing arbeiten). Semantically speaking, various differences result from the choice between dass- and wenn-complements; most of them pertain to the presumed status of the information in the complement clause (cf Eisenberg 31994: 365f for some further discussion).
3.
German wenn-clauses from a quantitative perspective
The observations in this section are based on a collection of 500 wenn7 clauses taken from a corpus of spontaneous, direct conversations. All instances of wenn were considered for analysis, apart from obvious syn-
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
179
tactic break-offs in the wenn-clause, some non-reconstructable utterances, and the comparative uses of als/wie wenn (see note 5). In Figure 1, the total of n=500 tokens is broken down according to the position of the adverbial clause relative to the main clause: pre-positioning, postpositioning, parenthetical positioning within the clause, 8 independent use of the wenn-clause as a turn-constructional unit of its own, and a residual category of ambiguous cases (e.g. apo-koinu constructions, see below). There can be no doubt that the front position is preferred in spoken German. 60,00 50,00 40,00 30,00 20,00 10,00 0,00
IJ percentage
prepositioned
parenthetical
postpositioned
single
others
56,00
4,00
32,60
5,40
2,00
Figure 1. Position of German wenn-clauses relative to the main clause~ n=500.
The results agree with Ford and Thompson's fmdings on If-clauses in English conversations, according to which initials outnumber finals by a ratio of 4:1 (n=316, initial=81%, fmal=19%; Ford and Thompson 1986: 362), with Ford's findings based on a smaller collection (n=52, 50% of which where preposed, 35% postpositioned, and 15% single; cf Ford 1993: 24), and with more general claims about a universal preference for pre-positioning of antecedents in conditional constructions (Greenberg 1963). Note, however, that the preference found in the English data for pre-positioning of conditional clauses does not extend to temporal (e.g., when-) clauses; rather, Ford (1993: 24) found these to follow their main clauses by a ratio of 2:1. Given the ambiguity of German wennclauses (in the indicative mood) between a conditional and a temporal reading, it may be asked if the preference for initial placement of wennclauses holds for both. To answer this question, those instances ofwennclauses have been singled out (n=203) which have either a clear tempo-
180 Peter Auer
ral or a clear conditional reading (based on the substitution tests and criteria discussed in section 2.3).9 Of the n=203 disambiguated wenn-clauses, 24% have temporal, the remainder conditional meaning. Exactly half of the wenn-clauses with temporal meaning are prepositioned and postpositioned respectively. (Of the 76% unambiguously conditional examples, about two thirds are pre-positioned (55% of the total), one third is postpositioned (21 %).) There is, then, a clear difference between conditional and temporal uses: only for the former does the preference for pre-positioning hold. Since the majority of German wenn-clauses are semantically ambiguous between a temporal and a conditional reading, this fmding also suggests that, taken as a whole, they behave syntactically like (English) conditional rather than temporal clauses. Figure 2 shows the percentage of integrative, resumptive and nonintegrative constructions among the pre-positioned wenn-clauses in the sample (n=280).
60,00 50,00 40,00 30,00 20,00 10,00 0,00 integrative
resumptive
nonintegrative
others
25,72
47,83
18,48
9,42
Figure 2. Integration (%) of pre-positioned wenn-clauses into the subsequent main clause (n=280)
The relatively large residual category ("others") covers wenn-clauses plus subsequent main clauses within larger hypotactical constructions (see below example (26)-(28)). Again, the results are very clear: resumptive constructions are preferred to fully integrated and totally nonintegrated constructions. The canonical, integrative construction of standard written German only plays a secondary role in spoken German.
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
181
Some comments on non-integrative wenn-clauses in German are necessary at this point. Pre-positioned wenn-clauses occurring in the pre-front field of a sentence are basically of two types (cf Auer 1996). We find instances which cannot be positioned in the front field (i.e., integrated into the main clause); in other words, the only available pattern for them is non-integrative syntax. This is sometimes for syntactic reasons; in particular, yes/no-questions and imperatives, which are verbinitial syntagms in German, do not have a front field, and in wquestions, the w-question word is usually said to occupy the frontfield. 10 In these contexts, adverbial clauses either need to be postpositioned (despite the general preference for pre-positioning), or to be non-integrative. Of the 45 questions/imperatives in the sample, 16 have pre-positioned wenn-clauses, i.e., non-integrative word order (cf (10», while 29 have post-positioning; this means that the normal preference is reversed in this syntactic environment. (10) ich mein ich muss ihnen (-) ganz SCHNELL und GANZ: vehement sagen wenns IRgendwie gEht (-) fahrns InN 'I mean I have to tell you without hesitating and very vehemently: if you can make it at all, go there!'
However, there are also semantic reasons why certain wenn-clauses have to occur in the pre-front instead of the front field. This is the case for "speech-act related" 11 wenn-clauses which do not conjoin two propositions on the content level; often, they are used in order to mitigate subsequent face-threatening acts (such as, in the following example, an interruption). The apodosis is asserted independently of the protasis, and this semantic independence corresponds with obligatory syntactic non-integration: (11) (Gob interview» wenn ich (-) grad WElter ausfiihren darf; (0.5) Sie wissenja in de: in der A Utoinduschdrie .h herrschen SEHR grofJe k' konkurRENZ, markt 'if I may continue elaborating on that; (0.5) you know that in the car industry there is a lot of competition «etc.»' In such cases, the marked position of the wenn-clause in the pre-front
field helps to contextualize a marked (non-referential) semantic interpretation.
182 Peter Auer
But there are also contexts in which non-integrative syntax is frequent although not obligatory. For instance, there is a tendency for nonintegrative clause-combining to occur in concessive wenn nichtconstructions: (12) wenn auch die theoRIE; (-) eh (-) so IRgendwo mal gehOrt wurde im KOPF? (-) eh das UMsetzen das ist ja das entSCHEldende, 'even though the theory (-) ehm (-) may have been heard somewhere in one's head (-) the decisive thing is putting it into practice' Another frequent function of non-integrated wenn-clauses is topicalization; in this case, the wenn-clause is typically followed by an anaphoric pronoun back-referencing the proposition expressed in the wenn-clause as a whole, or an element contained in it. In the following example, the wenn-clause introduces a new discourse referent or topic; it is in many ways equivalent to other topicalization constructions (such as a cleft construction: was Ihre Fragen angeht, die konnen Sie jetzt stellen), with the additional implication that the speaker is not certain about the relevance of the new discourse referent for the co-participant.
(13) also wenn sie FRAgen ham zwischendufch, eh DIE konnen Sie ruhig STELlen? 'well if you have any questions in between, ehm you can ask THEM of course. ' A similar topicalization (not of a single referent, but of a whole proposition) is involved in the following example:
(14) un wenn ich mein Eltem anrufh wUrde, ==DS wiirde AUCH nix bringn. 'and if I called my parents, that wouldn't be any use either. ' Here, the wenn-clause could even be entirely replaced by an infinitival construction (meine Eltern anzurujen), since potentiality is already expressed by the conditional verb form wiirde... bringen and redundantly coded by wenn. Finally, non-integrated wenn-clauses often express emphasis and lend an emotional meaning to the utterance: 12
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
183
(15) wenn WIRKlich==n ganzen tag das telefon klingelt, und acht STUN' (-) man IS hinterher' <
4.
Some reasons for pre- and post-positioning
What are the advantages of pre-positioning wenn-clauses? This question seems less difficult to answer than the opposite one of why a certain number of these clauses - roughly a third in our data - are postpositioned. We will deal with each question in turn.
4.1. The advantages ofpre-positioning To start with, it should be noted that the preference for pre-positioned wenn-clauses is not just a quantitative fmding but is reflected in speakers' changes in the design of an emerging syntactic pattern 'in midstream'. Particularly striking are cases such as Ex. (5), in which a postpositioned wenn-clause is retrospectively turned into a pre-positioned one via what might be called an apo-koinu construction: The K01VOV here, of course, is wenn ich beGEIStert bin, oder (-) eh im element bin. It seems that the speaker, having completed the threepart list of his verbal handicaps, wants to qualify the last item retrospectively. He could have done this by simply adding the wenn-clause in the post-field but recycles this last component instead, with the wenn-clause inserted before it. The wenn-clause here is both final and initial. instances in which a clause is broken off and a wenn-clause is inserted before it is re-started (as in (16)) are also evidence for the interactional relevance of pre- vs. postpositioning.
(16) ichfahr (-) wenn (-) wenns iiberHAUPT geht dennfahr ich NA:CH(er) erscht in Urlaub,
184 Peter Auer
'I'll have if if it works out at all then I'll only have my holidays afterwards' So why this additional effort? There seems to be some kind of cognitive 'naturalness' in the way in which conditionals create the ground - or, in more recent but equally metaphorical parlance, set up a "mental space" (Fauconnier 1985) - in which some hypothetical or factual proposition is located. 13 For cognitive reasons, it is the grounding which (iconically) precedes the focal proposition, and not the other way round. Ford, for instance, suggests that "the prevalence of initially placed if-clauses may reflect the general tendency to signal «... » that the interpretation of the coming clause will be, in some general way, limited by the contents of the if-clause" (1993: 15). Further evidence for the 'naturalness' of this position can be derived from the affinity of conditional clauses and topic-introducing devices (topics precede comments), for which some evidence has been given in the preceding section (see Haiman 1978, Ford and Thompson 1986 for an in-depth treatment of this line of argumentation), and from the affinity of conditional and causal clauses (where causes iconically precede their effects). The advantages of this discourse function seem to outweigh the cognitive costs linked to the deployment of a syntactic pattern which projects considerably into time. It may not have been sufficiently taken into account in previous research on clause positioning, however, that this projection in time has an interactional side as well: 14 speakers who open up far-reaching syntactic gestalts claim the tum for at least the time which is necessary to bring them to a well-formed conclusion. In other words, producing a wennclause gives the speaker the right and obligation to go on talking; it functions as a tum-holding device until the formulation of the consequent is completed. There are numerous cases in the data in which highly complex turns emerge in this way, since the speaker uses the space between a gestalt-opening wenn-clause and a terminating main clause for detailing the "mental space" opened up by the first component. Two elaborate examples (as they seem to be typical for institutional talk) are (17) and (18): (17) (Gob interview; applicant B is talking about his previous employment in a West German consultant company which, however, withdrew from East Germany, despite the fact that it had highly experienced consultants»
Positioning ofwenn-c/auses in German
B:
I: B:
185
zum beispiel einen herren, () KELler? (-) eh der () is: () FONFundzwanzig jahre unterNEHmensberater? () der hat=n STAM!vfklientel in uh es ah KAnada? mhm, und DER war naturlich, (-) ein FACHmann. (-) aber er KOMMT,
()
I: B:
I: B:
I: B:
I: B:
in die neuen BUNdesliinder? () «acc>er war ja nu> (-) eh hatte es ja gar nicht mehr NDtig gehabt; =da () so [VIEL] (-) zu REIsen, [mhm,] aber (-) er IS in die neuen BUNDdesliinder gekommen, (-) um auch etwas zu be WEgen. (-) aber wenn er dann nur auf der STRASse () sitzt, (-) und DANN (-) den () kliENten () mit nach schweRIN nehmen muss um=n FDRderantrag zu stellen; (-) dann wieder zur BANK, (-) und die BANK sagt () wir brauchen erst=ne ZUstimmung von dem FDRderinstitut, =
'B:
for instance a Mr Keller ehm who has been a consultant for 25 years he has his regular clients in the U.S. and Canada
I:
mhm,
B:
and he was a specialist of course. (-) but he is coming to the New States (.) he certainly had (-) ehm he had no need to do that any more; to travel so [much there
I: B:
[mhm, but (-) he did come to the New States, (-) in order to get something moving. (-) but if he is on the road all the time (-) and then (-) he has to take his client with him to Schwerin in order to hand in the proposal for the subsidies; (-) and then back to the bank, (-) and the bank says (.) first we need the subsidizing body's consent
186 Peter Auer
I: B: I: B:
mhm, before [that we cannot (do) the total financing [(h) like with Kopenick 15 and (.) and he is just on the road then he says this isn't worth it for me. then I'd rather stay in North Rhine-Westphalia «a West German state»'
This passage is embedded into a larger report the applicant gives of his participation in a West German consultant agency in the New States, which however closed down its East German office, making him redundant. The interviewer does not seem to know the company and questions its importance on the market. The applicant counters by stating that although small, the company had very professional consultants. At the same time, he has to deal with the interviewer's innuendo that the company withdrew from the East German market because it was not working successfully. In this context, the case of "Mr. Keller" is mentioned, an experienced consultant who was disappointed by the kafkaesque way in which state and bank authorities made it hard for new enterprises to get subsidies, and returned to the Old States. After he has been portrayed as a successful consultant who came to East Germany mainly for idealistic reasons, "Mr. Keller's" dissatisfaction with the situation is described in a complex tum construction which starts out with a wenn-clause (wenn er nun aufder Straj3e sitzt... ). In the given context, the interpretation is not hypothetical but refers to a (factual) state of affairs ('since he was always on the road... '), which is established as the ground from which some conclusion can be drawn. Before this conclusion is reached, however, the speaker elaborates at considerable length on the unfortunate situation in which "Mr. Keller" and his clients found themselves; in four clauses each introduced by (und) dann, the various fruitless journeys between the financing bank and the state authorities in Schwerin are described. Towards the end of this elaboration (securely produced by the speaker within the realm of his own tum, since a syntactic projection - that of the when-clause - still remains to be taken care of), the interviewer produces some recipiency tokens which, although not claiming the tum (cf their reduced loudness, indicating non-competitiveness), nevertheless acknowledge the speaker's point: two laughter particles and one comment (wie mit Kopenick) display understanding. Only after this feedback does the
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
187
speaker close the syntactic gestalt with two resumptive dann-clauses. Their content is higWy predictable, given the fact that it has been mentioned before that the company closed down its East German branch. It seems, then, that what the speaker wanted to convey by this complex turn is not so much this consequent but rather the details of the situation which led to it. The relevant information of this complex construction is what is produced BETWEEN the initial wenn-clause and the final dannclauses. The speaker employs the projecting force of the first in order to claim conversational space for himself: and makes use of this space as long as he needs it to 'convince' the recipient of his point (as evidenced by the recipient's responses). The 'orderly' conclusion of the turn is produced as soon as this purpose is reached. The following extract similarly shows how pre-positioned wennclauses can be used to claim conversational space: (18) (bulimia therapy) M: aso ich hab ma mit einer zuSA!vfMgewohnt, == ==und .h die hab ich EH nich so leidn kOnn un sie mich AUCH nich, und dann hab ich IMmer so.h (0.5) und (-) DIE: is schon wesentlich DICker als ich; == ==und dann hab ich ECHT immer gedacht (0.5) ich hab so alles des (-) AUF se projeziert und wenn se viel geGESsn hat, == ==die hat sich .h SAHne n ganzn becher SAHne mit Apfelschnittchen drin gegessn. == ==und das warfiir mich ECHT der ABscheu. == <
you see I once lived with a girl and I couldn't really stand her and neither could she me and then I always and she really was a lot bigger than I was and believe me I always thought I projected everything on her and when/if she ate a lot, she put cream a whole cup of cream she ate with slices of apple in it
188 Peter Auer
and to me that was really disgusting. then I thought .h isn't that (1.0) that is really appalling how can you eat anything like that and without even feeling guilty. ' Once more, a speaker is involved in telling a story which in this case is supposed to show how she projected her own feelings of guilt for eating too much onto her flatmate. And once more, a wenn-clause is the first component of a syntactically cohesive turn construction which spans six intonation units. The speaker does not go into gestalt closure (apodosis) after the wenn-clause, but rather parenthetically includes information detailing the claim that the roommate 'ate a lot', and how she herself reacted to that emotionally. Only then does a (dan)n-clause follow which ties back to the initial part of the turn, where a story concerning 'projection' (ich hab so alles des aufse projeziert) was announced. There is only one legitimate way for a recipient to share (or rather, intrude into) the conversational space which a wenn-projection creates for the current speaker: by becoming a co-speaker herself, i.e, by collaboratively producing the gestalt-closing apodosis matching the already produced protasis (cf. Lerner 1991). Both inserted material between protasis and apodosis and collaborative constructions pivoting around this transition suggest that there is some interactional work going on, and that, at least in a substantial subgroup of examples, the construction is not planned and executed as one whole, but rather develops in (at least) two steps.
4.2. Why post-positioning at all?
If pre-positioned wenn-clauses are both cognitively more 'natural' and interactionally more advantageous than post-positioned ones, why do the latter occur at all? Two reasons have already been mentioned in section 3: wenn-clauses may be used for expressing the temporal circumstances of an event, and since temporal adverbial clauses do not follow the preference for pre-positioning, wenn-c1auses of this semantic type need not do so either. I Secondly, it was shown that the absence of a front-field in questions and other verb-initial syntagms makes their postpositioning more likely. 17 There are, however, other important reasons. First of all, it may be asked if there are any further syntactic environments in which post-positioning is preferred or even necessary.
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
189
There is indeed another construction in which the front-field is not available: that in which the wenn-clause plus subsequent clause are themselves embedded into a larger construction. The various types of embedding show different patterns with respect to the possibility of prepositioning. As in Ford and Thompson's English data (1986: 359), final positioning is preferred "when a conditional clause occurs within a nominalization, an infinitive, or a relative clause". Take, for instance, the following case of a relative clause: (19) (therapy session) TM: s==ESsn isch wie? ein Teddybiir. == TW: ==ja, TM: den' den sie: (-) .h mit sich RUMtragn. (2.0) damit SIE <
so that you don't have to be alone. and whom one holds close, right? (-) (-) when life becomes hard; whom one clings to, (2.0) when one is lonely, and who has to come along all the time. ' Both wenn-clauses in this extract are part of a relative clause introduced by an oblique relative pronoun, i.e., their matrix clause is itself subordinated, and therefore has verb-final syntax (cf the placement of the finite verbs ranzieht and festhiilt). Here, the wenn-clause cannot be placed in front of the relative clause (*und wenn's hart wird den man sich ranzieht); pre-positioning would require a superordinate main clause instead of the relative clause (und wenn's hart wird, zieht man sich den ran).18 The same applies to dependent clauses introduced by wie 'as', obwohl 'although', weil 'because', etc. which likewise do not allow initial wenn-clauses. However, subordination by the most frequent complementizer dass ('that') shows a different pattern. Here, we frequently encounter initial placement of the pre-positioned wenn-clause be..fore the complementizer dass:
190 Peter Auer
(20) MEIN interesse is natiirlich WENN ich da: .h schon als POSTdoc auf==m ZEITvertrag bin; dass ich wahrend de dieser ZEIT dann; (-) auch==n paar ergebnisse MITnehme 'my interest of course is if I am there as a post-doc on a temporary contract that I can take at least some results with me during this time' (21) und DESwegen war es natiirlich; (-) fir uns WUNschenswert; () <<scanning>WENN wir uns einigen KONNten, > dass sie so friih wie MOGlich
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
191
the hearer. As outlined in section 1, final subordinated clauses in German are added onto an already complete syntactic structure. They are therefore a straightforward means for expanding a syntactic gestalt, and thereby the tum-at-talk. This is particularly obvious in cases where syntactically complete syntagms preceding the wenn-clause are marked as terminal by intonation, e.g. by a pitch fall to the speaker's base line (full stop in the transcription); the wenn-clause then appears as an afterthought, or epexegesis (cf Auer 1991):
(22) «hypothetical talk about a situation in which two people are in conflict over where to put the cup for the coffee; B is asked to mediate» ich wiird [einfach] die () die tasse kaffee NEHmen, B: II: [
II:
II: B: II: B:
I would [simply take the (.) the cup of coffee
[mhm and ehm (-) put it away. (-) you see? before they start quarreling for hours, I would say right [now it is [hm,] (0.5) then I would have trouble [with you. [over and out [if you (shut away) my coffee [he he he he he he'
At a point where B has already suggested to simply 'taking away' the disputed coffee cup, but is in the middle of a syntactic construction elaborating on this proposal (eh's da stundenlang Streiterei gibt wiirde ich also sagen: Schluss, aus, Ende) II intervenes during an intra-tum
192 Peter Auer
hesitation pause to refute this solution: 'if you did that, there would be trouble between the two of us' (i.e. between the mediator, B, and one of the two people quarreling, i.e. himself). The utterance is linked to B's proposal by the initial anaphoric da; it is semantically and syntactically complete, and being marked by a final fall, it certainly is a candidate for a complete tum. However, B does not pick up this refutation, but continues with the production of the unfinished syntagm in another piece of simultaneous talk. Sequential structure and temporal development are now out of phase: a response has been produced to an utterance which is still in need of being completed, and is only completed after the response. In this context, II's following wenn-clause, syntactically expanding an already complete turn/syntagm, can be seen as a skillful way of re-aligning sequentiality and timing: it re-instantiates II's refutation of B' s proposal without repeating it, by retrospectively transforming a simple construction into a hypotactical one with a post-positioned adverbial clause. Semantically, this expansion adds nothing new: it just restates what B herself has said before. The possibility of such an expansion is not only available to the speaker but also to the recipient, of course, who may become a cospeaker and co-producer of the emerging syntactic pattern by adding a wenn-clause himself/herself: (23)
L: S: L: S: L:
S:
.h dann: eh () wir' der Hundwird auchjetz zunehmend ruhiger; mHM (-) des GUT so; (-) JAja des==also wird langsam (a)==richtiger HUND; aHA hm, (-) wenn==er (nicht mehr) abhaut, (-) hat (name) des ANgebot jetz fiir den zaun? ==
'L: S: L: S:
then ehm beco the dog is becoming more and more calm now; this is how it should be; yeah slowly he's tuming into a real dog. I see
L:
hm, if he doesn't escape (any more),
S:
did NN get the offer for the fence in the meantime?'
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
193
So it is not only the transition between a wenn-clause and its subsequent main clause which is sensitive to turn-taking, but also the inverse transition between a (main) clause and its subsequent wenn-clause. But obviously, there is an important difference: while in the first case an open syntactic projection is in play, in the second case the first speaker has already come to an orderly completion of the sentence/turn. Post-positioned wenn-clauses thus offer the possibility not only of expanding a turn, but also of expanding a sentence by adding a postfield constituent. At least example (22)22 also points to an important pragmatic feature of such expansions: its low information value. Indeed, this applies to a very large number of post-positioned wenn-clauses. Often it is the whole previous text which functions to build up the 'mental space' that is necessary to come to the conclusion expressed in the main clause, while the post-positioned wenn-clause only summarizes this preceding text, sometimes slightly changing the focus. In (24), the introductory adverbial insofern explicitly establishes this resultative link between pre-text and conclusion, while the post-positioned wenn-clause just repeats what is known from the previous conversation anyway (the wenn-clause is factual here): (24)
«after a long discussion of the applicant's career aspirations in the bank, and an equally long description of the branch of the bank in Stralsund and its sophisticated private customer service, which seems to match these wishes» (( ..)) das HAM wir alles in stralsUnd, also inSOfern, (-) eh ware das==ne ideAle (-) STELle, (-) wenn sie (-) praktiZIEren wollen im verTRlEBSbereich. im KUNDdennahen bereich. 'we've got all that in Stralsund, so in that regard, this would be an ideal position if you want to be a trainee in the sales department. in client-oriented business.'
As in other, similar cases of low-relevance wenn-clauses in final position, the front-field is used here for a connecting (anaphorical) adverbial, which is preferentially placed in sentence-initial position, where its indexical meaning is most easily processed. Since only one constituent may be placed in the front-field, this position is not available for the wenn-clause any longer. Since post-positioned wenn-clauses are often of low pragmatic relevance, upgrading their informational value requires special means; a standard technique for doing so is the use of focussing particles such as
194 Peter Auer
(stressed) auch, nur or dann, or a combination of these. In this case, it is the focussing particle which projects syntactically: it requires a constituent to follow which is in its scope. Therefore, wenn-clauses such as the following cannot be treated in the same way as post-field wenn-clauses in general: they do not expand an already complete syntactic pattern but rather close a gestalt projected by the particle. (25) «about wearing glasses)) ich zieh==se nur DENN ouf wEnn==i==se wIrklich (-) Effektiv brOuch 'I only put them on then when I really and positively need them' Ex negativo, the necessity of using such focussing particles in order to upgrade the following wenn-clause to rhematic status is evidence for the (sub)thematic status which wenn-clauses usually have in the post-field.
5.
Pre- and post-positioning of wenn-clauses in written German
In the last sections, it has been shown that wenn-clauses are preferentially pre-positioned with respect to their main clauses in spoken German, and that this serialisation has a number of cognitive and interactional advantages. It has also been shown that the more marked structure, i.e. post-positioned wenn-clauses, which does occur in about a third of all instances, has its own specific contexts of usage. These are partly due to (a) syntactic constraints on pre-positioning in superordinate clauses without a pre-field or in which two complementizers occur in adjacent position; partly to (b) tum-taking (afterthought position); partly to (c) semantic-syntactic reasons (wenn-clauses in complement function are postpositioned); and partly to (d) pragmatic reasons (postpositioned dependent clauses are thematic or subthematic, unless focussing particles indicate the contrary). In written German, wenn-clauses are generally less frequent than in spoken discourse, a finding which contradicts the frequent claim that spoken language avoids syntactically complex constructions: the frequencies of wenn-clauses per 100 words in the corpus of spoken language used above is 0.54, but in a corpus of written language, taken from the newspapers DIE ZEIT (politics section) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (culture section), it is 0.33. 23 To put it differently,
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
195
every 186th word is wenn in our spoken corpus on an average, but only every 300th word in our written texts. Once more, this fmding is in line with comparative work on written and spoken English (Ford and Thompson 1986, 354: 0.72 vs. 0.46; similarly: Beaman 1984 and Biber 1986), but also with previous work on German (Leska 1965: 450). There are of course also qualitative differences between the wennclauses used in the two corpora; in particular, certain rather idiomatic patterns (constructions) seem to be more or less exclusively used either in spoken or written language. For instance, the reduced wenn-(dann)constructions of spoken German (cf section 2.2. above) do not occur in the newspaper corpus, while, on the other hand, the topicalizing causative construction wenn p dann (deswegen), weil q ('if p, then that is because of q'), as in (26), seems to be used exclusively in writing. (26) (DIE ZEIT Nr. 8 17.02.1995) Wenn wir das Leugnen von Auschwitz, anders als das Leugnen der kopernikanischen Wende, unter Strafe stellen, dann deswegen, weil es uns nicht nur hypothetisch angst macht. 'If we punish the denial of Auschwitz, and not the denial of the Copernican revolution, then that is because it does not make us feel afraid only hypothetically. ' Also, and contradicting received wisdom according to which written language is more logical and more explicit, we fmd instances of wenn as a conjunction in the newspaper texts with semantics which are exceedingly vague, as for instance in (27): (27) (F.A.Z 19.06.1993, S. 27 / Nr. 139) Aber wenn zum stets und instiindig angestrebten "Weltniveau" der DDR die Stellvertreterschaft des iiberragenden, fortschrittlichen, darin sagar selbst "biirgerlichen" Kulturerbes gehorte, dann iiufJert sich nun das AufschliefJen zur Weltoffenheit seltsam kleinmiitig. 'But if the representation of an outstanding and progressive cultural heritage, one which includes even the "bourgeois", belonged to the ever and urgently sought after "international standard" of the GDR, then growing into cosmopolitan openmindedness expresses itself rather timidly nowadays. '
196 Peter Auer
Here, the wenn-dann construction seems to vaguely express something between adversativity and concessivity. However, these differences only affect a relatively small number of examples and are not directly linked to the positioning of the wennclause. The important question for the present discussion is rather whether the preference for pre-positioning of wenn-clauses is also to be found in written German (as it is in written English, cf Ford and Thompson 198624). Fig. (3) shows that this is not the case: 60,00 50,00 40,00 30,00 20,00 10,00 0,00
a percentage
Figure 3.
51,60
1,60
1,00
Percentage of post- and pre-positioned wenn-clauses in written German (n=626)
In the written materials, post-positioned wenn-clauses are almost one and a half times more frequent than pre-positioned ones, while the opposite ratio is found in the spoken material. 25 As would be expected, the number of integrative pre-positioned wenn-clauses is higher than in conversational language (65.56%), and both the number of nonintegrative (9.28%) and resumptive (26.16%)26 structures is markedly reduced. The preference for post-positioning is only slightly less pronounced in unambiguously conditional wenn-clauses than in unambiguously temporal ones (65 % vs. 71%) (n=301). What could be the reason for this reversal of preferences for postand pre-positioning in written German compared to spoken language? Three factors seem to be primarily responsible for it. First, the number of (almost exclusively final) wenn-clauses with a preceding focus particle in the main clause is about eight times as high in the written as in the spoken material (40 vs. 5 occurrences). An example is:
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
197
(28) (DIE ZEIT Nr. 7 10.02.1995) Danach durfen Frauen ungewollte Schwangerschaften in den ersten drei Monaten nur beenden, wenn sie sich vorher haben beraten lassen: in einer Beratungsstelle und vom abtreibenden Arzt. 'Accordingly, women may only terminate an unwanted pregnancy during the first three months if they have undergone counselling: in an advice centre and also by the physician who does the abortion. ' Secondly, although embedded wenn-clause plus main clause constructions are not more frequent in the written than in the spoken material, all 52 wenn-clauses of this type are post-positioned, while a majority of them (34 of 54, all of which are embedded into dass-constructions) are pre-positioned in the spoken materials. In other words, fronting of wenn-clauses before the embedded matrix clause such as in (20) or (21) does not occur in the newspaper texts. Finally, one of the important reasons outlined above for frequent prepositioning in interactional language use is simply not applicable to writing: this is the need for the speaker to claim conversational space for the production of a larger tum, through projecting syntactically beyond the current clause. Instead, another factor becomes relevant: in writing, the wenn-clause may become so complex that processing it would become difficult even in reading if it was pre-positioned with respect to its main clause; cf for instance: (29) (DIE ZEIT Nr. 03 13.01.1995) Und man denkt an Talleyrands Feststellung: "Hochverrat ist eine Frage des Datums", wenn man sich daran erinnert, daft Hans Modrow in einer Phase als Reformer und Hoffnungstriiger galt, aber in der niichsten fiir schuldig erachtet wurde, weil er mitverantwortlich warfiir das DDR-System. 'And one thinks of Talleyrand's statement: "High treason is a question of the date" when one recalls that Hans Modrow was regarded as a reformer and as a source of hope in one phase, but that he was found guilty in another, because he shared responsibility in the GDR political system. '
198 Peter Auer
Neither of these reasons for post-positioning in written German can explain the difference between the English and the German results, of course. Why should these same reasons not lead to a preference for post-positioning in written English as well? If one was looking for a structural explanation, one would probably try to find an answer based on the most prominent difference between English if- and German wenn-clauses, i.e. the semantic ambiguity of the latter. For instance, it might be argued that since wenn can often be interpreted either conditionally or temporally, German newspaper journalists try to disambiguate their sentences by using other, strictly conditional conjunctions instead, such as falls, im FaIle dass, fiir den Fall dass, sofern or soweit. However, this hypothesis receives little empirical support in my data: not only are these conjunctions very rare in the newspaper texts (a total of 31 tokens!), they also fail to show a positional distribution different from that of wenn (6 initial vs. 17 fmal tokens, with 8 parentheticals).27 Another possibility to express conditionality in German which is not available in present-day English (apart from peripheral cases) is inversion (as in: kommst du zu spat, bestraft dich das Leben := wenn du zu spat kommst, dann bestraft dich das Leben 'if you are late, you will be punished by life'). This possibility is almost never used in spoken German because of its bookish and high-register connotations but its occurrence cannot be excluded in rather conservative newspapers such as DIE ZEIT and F.A.Z.; and since the distribution of pre- and post-positioned conditional clauses with inversion is unknown we cannot exclude a balancing effect, for instance due to a preference for pre-positioning in this case. Since this syntactic pattern can only be quantified in syntactically labelled corpora, there is no possibility to test this hypothesis in a straightforward way in our materials. However, preliminary analyses of some texts suggests that inversion hardly occurs in newspapers. Alternatively, one might look for a non-structural explanation which would locate the reason for diverging English and German patterns on the textual level, possibly in the stylistic preferences of English and German text composition. The matter clearly awaits further investigation.
6.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have looked at the placement of German wenn-clauses in spoken and written texts. Various explanations for the general quantitative results - i. e., that spoken German prefers pre-positioning, written
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
199
German post-positioning - have been presented and discussed on the basis of individual conversational contexts in which wenn-clauses occur. The general conclusion of this study is that the supposed parallel between 'left' and 'right' in syntax (suggested by parlances such as 'left extraposition' vs. 'right extraposition', or 'left-adjoined' vs. 'rightadjoined') is fundamentally mistaken when applied to spoken syntax; in speaking, to be sure, there is no 'left' and 'right', but only 'earlier' and 'later'. At least for an approach to syntax which takes the in-time ('online') emergence of (particularly) oral language units seriously, what is dealt with first and what is taken care of later cannot be seen as a decision between two logical equivalents (as between 'right' and 'left'). Rather, it involves one of the most basic and far-reaching decisions a speaker can make, with all kinds of cognitive, interactional and structural repercussions. 28 Appendix: Regularisation ofTranscriptions ofWord-Count(example) original transcription:
regularised transcription:
M .hh ich will UMgehend den (-) nachsten (-) ANrufer wieder einen Horer begrii.6en guten Abend? A guten Abend, B guten Abend? (0.5) A .hhh ja; ALso hh das proBLEM ah ALler steht ah auch ah so fib vor MIR jetzt irgendwo-wie wie und wo ANfangen am besten? B rnhm, A = ahrn: (--) es is eine etwas AUSsergewohnliche Proble ProbleMAtik, die vielleicht nicht nicht so ganz ah: : HAUfig in ihrer sendung erscheint, .hh obgleich des eigentlich ah::: ne total MENSCHliche angelegenheit isich lebe: seit =um gleich mal auf FAKten mal zu KOMM: ich lebe seit hh fib circa FONFzehn JAHRN mit einern MANM zusArnrnen? [.hh ] B [ja] A und fib auch ah recht GU:T eigentlich =natiirlich mit den iiblichen ALLtagsschwierigkeiten die iiberall existieren
Ich will umgehend den nachsten Anrufer, wieder einen Horer, begrii.6en: Guten Abend. Guten Abend. Guten Abend. Ja, also das Problem aller steht auch so vor mir jetzt irgendwo. Wie und wo anfangen am besten? Es ist eine etwas auBergewohnliche Problematik, die vielleicht nicht so ganz haufig in ihrer Sendung erscheint, obgleich das eigentlich eine total menschliche Angelegenheit ist. Ich lebe seit, urn gleich mal auf Fakten zu kornrnen, ich lebe seit circa fiinfzehn Jahren mit einern Mann zusarnrnen.
Ja? Und auch recht gut, eigentlich. Natiirlich mit den iiblichen Alltagsschwierigkeiten, die iiberall existie-
200 Peter Auer original transcription:
B A
regularised transcription:
auch in HEterobeziehungen, ja, u:nd fih das=(dies) ist nicht unsere probleMAtik eigentlich, wir kommen mit diesem mit unserer verANlagung sehr gut zuRECHT? also=[das]= ist alles o.k. soweit,
B
[ja:]
ren, auch in Heterobeziehungen. la. Und das ist nicht unsere Problematik, eigentlich. Wir kommen mit unserer Veranlagung sehr gut zurecht, also das ist alles o.k. soweit. Ja.
Notes
* 1.
2. 3.
4.
5. 6.
7.
The corpus research on which this paper is based was supported in many and substantial ways by Benjamin Stoltenburg. Thanks to Jessica Wallace for correcting the worst blunders in my English, and to Susanne Giinthner as well as to the editors of this volume for their comments on a previous version. Transcription of the spoken extracts follows GAT-conventions (cf. Selting et al. 1998); capital letters indicate stress positions. English translations are simplified, particularly with respect to prosody and hesitation phenomena. In case of conflict, less idiomatic versions have been chosen in order to give a better impression of German syntactic structure. The wenn-clause itself should be seen as adjoined to the resumptive particle, i.e., as a co-constituent of the front-field; cf. Eisenberg (31994: 364f). For a detailed discussion, see Metschkowa-Atanassowa 1983 and Zifonun et al. 1997: 2280-2293. A certain kind of ambiguity between a temporal and a conditional reading can also be observed in the German question word wann (usually asking for temporal information, 'at which time') which, when followed by a verb in the subjunctive mood, often takes on a conditional meaning (wann wiirdest du kommen = 'under which conditions would you come' or 'at which time would you come'). Thanks to Bernd Kortmann for drawing my attention to this parallel. For an analysis of these "concessive conditionals", cf. Konig 1985. Among these wenn-clauses in the role of obligatory constituents, we may also count comparisons using wie wenn and als wenn, as in: du kOmmsch dir vielleicht vor wie wenn dir deine wErte verLORN gangn sin. ('maybe it seems to you as ifyour values had been lost '). This usage of wenn will not be taken into account in the following discussion, nor has it been included in the quantitative analysis. A note in passing: some grammarians believe that wenn-clauses in complement function are obligatorily marked by a resumptive es (e.g. Eisenberg 31994: 365); this is not supported by my data, however. Some 400/0 of the corpus are job interviews, mainly collected among north and east German speakers, some 30% are therapeutic conversations, both in faceto-face and in radio phone-in contexts, and the remaining 30% represent pri-
Positioning ofwenn-clauses in German
8. 9.
10.
11.
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
19.
20.
201
vate everyday conversations, partly on the telephone. In the latter two types of data, southern German speakers prevail. Embeddings of wenn-clauses into complex hypotactic constructions were not counted as parenthetical. The count excludes, in addition to all polyvalent cases, all factual conditionals (Le. those expressing a positive epistemic stance), which are always nontemporal, and all concessives, as well as wenn-clauses used as complements, but includes counterfactual conditionals and reduced wenn-dann routines. *Warum [wenn Du Kirschen magst] pfliickst Du Dir keine vom Baum? 'Why [if you like cherries] don't you pick any from the tree?' therefore has to be understood as parenthetical. Resumption by dann is also excluded here, Le., non-integration is the only option. The term is used in a broader sense here than in Sweetser 1990. Details on this construction may be found in Gfinthner 1999. Note that Sweetser's "epistemic conditionals", although not "content conditionals", do not allow pre-front field placement in German (* Wenn er sich jeden Tag voillaufen lasst, sie hat ihn verlassen. 'If he gets drunk everyday, she has left him. '). Cf. Konig and van der Auwera 1988: 128 ("assertive emphasis on a consequent of a concessive allows non-integration"), Kopcke and Panther 1989: 700 ("high degree of ego involvement") and Gfinthner 1999 for details. Cf., among others, Ford and Thompson 1986: 370; Ford 1993; Dancygier and Sweetser 1996. But see Ford 1993: 56. Speaker I is most likely alluding to Zuckmayer's play (and a famous German movie) Der Hauptmann von Kopenick, in which the Prussian state and army authorities are caricatured. This of course, leaves the question open why temporal adverbial clauses should behave differently from conditional ones-a question which requires an investigation of its own. For a similar remark on English, cf. Ford and Thompson 1986: 369. In some cases, however-though not in (26) with its oblique relative pronoun-the wenn-clause can follow the relative pronoun (das Essen ist wie ein Teddybtir, der, wenn es hart ist, immer bei Ihnen ist, und der, wenn man einsam ist, zum Festhalten da ist). But here we are dealing with parenthetical placement in the middle field of the sentence; this is exceedingly rare in spoken German. Of course, wenn is not always stressed in fronted wenn-clauses. Cf. the following example: ich (.) hab (-) FUNF jahre lang an der schule franzOsisch geHABTh, mir jEhlts eigentlich an (.) PRAxis, .h aber: (-) ich bin aberZEUGT davon, =wenn ich: eh eh OFters mal die geLEgenheit hatte zum beispiel in FRANKreich, eh mich aufzuhaltn, .hh dass des: (-) eh SICherlich Ausbauftihig is. 'I had French at school for five years, actually I'm lacking practice, but I'm convinced if I on occasion had the chance to spend some time for instance in France, that I could work on it. ' The tendency to place the wenn-clause early in dependent constructions is also evidenced by the fact that parenthetical placement immediately after dass is
202 Peter Auer
21. 22.
23.
24.
25. 26.
27. 28.
frequent (cf. Note 18). Often, a second, resumptive dass is added at the beginning of the consequent: kAnnst du ihm vielleicht (-) A USrichten dass ich ANgerufn habe? und dass wenn er mit dem trelitz geSPROChen hat uber meine priifungk, dass er sich dann irgenwie=mal=GANZ kurz bei mir mElden soli? 'could you perhaps tell him that I called? and that if he has talked to Trelitz about my exams, that he should give me a quick ring some time?' The same was found in English conversations by Ford and Thompson 1986: 368. In other-speaker produced post-positioned wenn-clauses this does not always hold, since second speakers may choose this way of intimately linking their speech to a preceding syntactic pattern but nonetheless produce unexpected and even contradictory information under this 'disguise'. More exactly, the corpus included the F.A.Z. Feuilleton-Glossen from Jan 8, 1993 (Ausgabe Nr. 6) to Dec 31, 1993 (Nr. 304) and DIE ZEIT politics section of Dec 30, 1994 (No.1) to Feb 17, 1995 (Nr. 8). Transcriptions of conversational speech were regularized in order to make a comparative computerbased word-count possible; see the appendix for an example. The written corpus used by Ford and Thompson consisted of philosophical essays, a professional text for automobile mechanics, and a personal narrative account (1986: 355). The preference for pre-positioning held for all these sources. A separate count for the two newspapers shows that the quantitative results are identical. The resumptive particle is dann in 46 cases and so in 16 cases. Dann and so are not freely interchangeable; in particular, so can be used with concessives (introduced by auch/selbst wenn), while dann cannot. Cf.: Auch wenn das Abgeordnetenhaus erst im Herbst, voraussichtlich am 22. Oktober, gewtihlt wird, so hat mit der Urabstimmung schon der Wahlkampf begonnen. ('Even though parliament will not be elected until autumn, probably on October 22, SO the electorial campaign has already begun with the strike ballot. ') Of the 15 tokens in the spoken material, the three positions were about equally distributed. For a similar argument, cf. Thompson 1985.
References Auer, Peter 1991 1996
Das Ende deutscher Satze-Rechtsexpansionen im deutschen Einfachsatz. Zeitschriftfur germanistische Linguistik 1991: 139-157. The pre-front field in spoken German and its relevance as a grammaticalization position. Pragmatics (Special issue, eds. Johannes Wagner and Cecilia Ford), Vol. 6, No.3: 295-322.
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Biber, Douglas 1986 Spoken and written textual dimensions in English: Resolving the contradictory findings. Language 62: 384-416. Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth 1999 Varieties of conditionals and their emergence in discourse. In: Aditi Lahiri, Alexander Patschosvky and Christoph Schwarze (eds.), Issues in interdisciplinary research on the lexicon = Working Paper No. 99, University of Konstanz, Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft, 89130. Dancygier, Barbara and Eve Sweetser 1996 Conditionals, distancing, and alternative spaces. In: Ann E. Goldberg (ed.), Conceptual structure - Discourse and language, 83-98. Stanford: CSLI Publications Eisenberg, Peter 1994 GrundrifJ der deutschen Grammatik. Stuttgart: Metzler. Fauconnier, Gilles 1985 Mental spaces. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fillmore, Charles J. 1990 Episternic stance and grammatical form in English conditional sentences. In: Chicago Linguistic Society 26, University of Chicago, 137-162. Ford, Cecilia E. 1993 Grammar in interaction. Adverbial clauses in American English conversations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997 Speaking conditionally: Some contexts for if-clauses in conversation. In: Angeliki Athanasiadou (ed.), On conditionals again, 387-413. Amsterdam: Benjamins, Ford, Cecilia E. and Sandra A.Thompson 1986 Conditions in discourse: a text-based study from English. In: Elizabeth Traugott et al. (eds.), On conditionals, 353-372. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Greenberg, Joseph H. 1963 Some universals of grammar with particular reference to the order of meaningful elements. In: Joseph H. Greenberg (ed.), Universals of language, 73 -113. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT-Press. Gtinthner, Susanne 1999 Wenn-Satze im Vor-Vorfeld: ihre Formen und Funktionen in der gesprochenen Sprache. Deutsche Sprache 27(3): 209-235. Haiman, John 1978 Conditionals are topics. Language 54: 564-89. Konig, Ekkehard 1985 Where do concessives come from? On the development of concessive connectives. In: Jacek Fisiak (ed.), Historical semantics, 263282. Berlin: de Gruyter.
204 Peter Auer Konig, Ekkehard and Johan van der Auwera 1988 Clause integration in German and Dutch conditionals, concessive conditionals, and concessives. In: John Haiman and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.), Clause combining in grammar and discourse, 101133. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Kopcke, Klaus-Michael and Klaus-Uwe Panther 1989 On correlations between word order and pragmatic function of conditional sentences in German. Journal ofPragmatics 13(5): 685-711. Lerner, Gene 1991 On the syntax of sentences-in-progress. Language in Society 20(3): 441-458. Leska, Christel 1965 Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur Syntax gesprochener und geschriebener deutscher Gegenwartssprache. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache und Literatur 87: 427-464. Metschkowa-Atanassowa, Sdrawa 1983 Temporale and konditionale "wenn "-Satze. Dusseldorf: Schwann. Selting, Margret, Peter Auer, Birgit Barden, Jorg Bergmann, Elizabeth CouperKuhlen, Susanne Gunthner, Christoph Meier, Uta Quasthoff, Peter Schlobinski, Susanne Uhmann 1998 Gesprachsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem. Linguistische Berichte 34(173): 91-122. Sweetser, Eve E. 1990 From etymology to pragmatics. Metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, Sandra 1985 Grammar and written discourse: initial vs. final purpose clauses in English. Text 5: 55-84. Zifonun, Gisela, Ludger Hoffmann and Bruno Strecker 1997 Grammatik der deutschen Sprache. Vol. III. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Counterfactual reasoning and desirability* Noriko McCawley Akatsuka and Susan Strauss
This paper calls into question the popular view of counterfactual thinking under the influence of formal logic, which considers the utterance of a counterfactual sentence as an instance of complex and intricate reasoning skills. Using naturally occurring data from English, Japanese, and Korean, we will demonstrate that there exists a pattern of prototypical counterfactual reasoning which appears to be natural and spontaneous to every human being. Speakers/writers express a particular stance of desirability versus undesirability toward a particular event, based on their subjective evaluation of reality. Counterfactual conditionals are invoked as a necessary step in this line of thinking.
1. Introduction l This chapter represents a continuation of our inquiry into the most typical usage of counterfactual conditionals in everyday life across language and culture (Akatsuka 1997, 1999). We use the word "typical" here in the sense of "natural and spontaneous," and thus underscore our claim that human beings appeal to counterfactual reasoning in dealing with the many aspects of everyday life that we find ourselves facing. In the tradition of mathematics, philosophy and formal linguistics, the conditional sentence has been regarded as the epitome of Man's rational capacity, the height of Man's ability to reason logically. In the same vein, it has long been argued that underlying the counterfactual conditional is a similar, and perhaps even more logically complex type of reasoning, engendering such analytical sentences as in (1), from Fauconnier (1985: 118). (1) A:
If Napoleon had been the son ofAlexander,
he would have won the battle of Waterloo. B: But he would have died long before that. A: Well, suppose he lived a very long life, without ever ageing, or that Alexander was resurrected in Corsica in the eighteenth century.
206 Noriko McCawley Akatsuka and Susan Strauss
Obviously, this string of utterances for Fauconnier represents a typical instance of counterfactual conditionality. The utterance is clearly an invented dialogue in which both participants realize the gross counterfactuality (and absurdity) of the proposition 'if p'. And while the type of reasoning displayed here could indeed be considered "complex," the view of counterfactual conditionality that we adopt actually has little to do with this type of exercise in logic, truth values, and absurdity. Based on the discourse data that we collected in American English, Korean, and Japanese just following the 1994 Los Angeles earthquake (hereafter, the earthquake data), we will show how and to what degree a qualitative, cross-linguistic analysis can illuminate the role of the speaker's evaluative stance of desirability. More specifically, we will demonstrate the importance of the dichotomy of desirable/undesirable in understanding the inherent ·relationship between counterfactual thinking and everyday human existence. The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we will introduce Fauconnier's (1985) "mental spaces" hypothesis as one current view on counterfactuals. We will show first that while Fauconnier considers his framework as "cognitive," it is actually inherently non-cognitive. We will systematically demonstrate why this is so and why the framework fails to account for usages of counterfactuals in everyday situations, by introducing and then explicating a number of his invented examples in the light of Akatsuka's desirability framework. In section 3, we will examine spontaneous instances of counterfactual conditionals in the earthquake data in the three languages (English, Korean, and Japanese) and will contrast these with Fauconnier's constructed examples. We will also present a discussion of the theoretical implications of this study. In section 4, we will demonstrate that the present study sheds critical light on the treatment of counterfactuals in Ford and Thompson (1986) and Labov (1972). Section 5 is the conclusion.
2.
Fauconnier (1985) and counterfactuality
2.1.
Fauconnier (1985) and the tradition offormallogic
A close and careful examination of Fauconnier's (1985) analysis of counterfactuality reveals that his approach is actually inseparable from the tradition of formal logic. That is, the major concern of previous scholars in philosophy and logic has centered on the logical problem of truth conditions. Within that discipline, the primary aim was to specify under
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what strict conditions a particular counterfactual statement can be viewed as a case of 'true' or 'valid' reasoning (cf Jackson 1991; Fauconnier 1985; McCawley 1981). Example (2) excerpted from Fauconnier (1985: 109) encapsulates his approach to the phenomenon of counterfactuality. As is clearly stated, rather than grappling with issues of logic and truth conditions, the focus of analysis shifts to the process by which we establish "counterfactual spaces"-an issue which Fauconnier labels a "cognitive semantic question."
(2) Linguistically, we do not directly tackle the logical problem of truth conditions for counterfactuals, but rather the cognitive semantic question of how counterfactual spaces are set up and structured...Counterfactuality is a case of forced incompatibility between spaces (emphasis added); a space Ml is incompatible with another space M2 if some relation explicitly specified in Ml is not satisfied for the corresponding elements in M2 (1985:109).
Thus, he solves the truth conditional problem of logic by simply proposing a hypothetical world. What is crucial here is that he characterizes counterfactuality as a case of "forced incompatibility between spaces." He does not, however, specify any other conditions relating to the spaces M1 and M2, so that it is irrelevant which of the two 2 is the real world, R, and which is a hypothetical world, H. Further, in spite of his labeling the problem as a "cognitive semantic" one, we actually find no evidence of a true theoretical attempt to illuminate the notion of counterfactuality from a cognitive semantic point of view. We discuss this in detail in the next section.
2.2.
"Space-builders"
In order to understand Fauconnier's view of counterfactuality, it is perhaps best to first examine his theoretical construct "space-builders." According to this framework, "space-builders" include various linguistic elements such as conditionals (if ), verbs like wish, and negatives such as not and prevent. The particular semantic properties of these elements, according to Fauconnier, are supposed to be capable of setting up a counterfactual mental space which functions in such a way that 'some relation,' which does not hold in the parent space, may be satisfied in the newly created counterfactual space. In this light, consider the utterances listed in (3a)-(3d), which appear in the original as examples (3), (4), (5) and (6), respectively (1985: 109-110).
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(3) a. If Lucky had won, I would be rich. I would have moved to Tahiti. b. I wish Lucky had won. I would be rich. c. Fortunately, the fire did not cross the highway. My house would have been destroyed. d. Luckily, the fire was prevented from crossing the highway. My house would have been destroyed. According to this framework, it is simply the linguistic elements not in italics which are assumed to create the so-called counterfactual spacethat is, the conditional element if in (3 a), the verb wish in (3b), the negation not in (3c), and the verb prevent in (3d). However, there is one crucial observation missing here: what these examples have in common is the fact that they are all subjective statements. Utterances such as (3a) through (3d) can by no means be construed as objective descriptions, whether invented by the researcher or culled from spontaneous discourse data. In other words, the speaker of (3a) and (3b) sounds unhappy or disappointed because what s/he was hoping to happen did not actually happen. Conversely, the speaker of (3c) and (3d) sounds happy and relieved because his/her home was not destroyed by a particular fire which did not cross a particular highway. In this light, Fauconnier's framework of mental spaces takes no account whatsoever of an individual speaker's mental attitude, and thus pays no special attention to the function of the adverbs fortunately and luckily, which figure overtly in his own constructed examples (3 c) and (3d). The function of these adverbials also accounts for analytic gaps in examples (3a) and (3b). We will explicate this function in the next section from the perspective of the concept of desirability.
2.3.
Desirability and conditionals
We will begin this discussion by examining Fauconnier's analysis of (3c) and (3d). According to Fauconnier, the lexical items not and prevent represent the strongest type of lexical space-builder by virtue of the fact that they deal in the domain of negation, and hence counterfactuality, since semantically they are capable of reversing and/or negating some expression of reality (i.e., factuality). Accordingly, lexical items such as these are much stronger than the if and wish types, since the latter do not always build counterfactual space. Fauconnier states:
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(4) Clearly, counterfactuality may be lexically imposed, as it is by strong negatives such as not and prevent in (5) [i.e., our (3c)] and (6) [i.e., our (3d)] (1985: Ill). What is interesting here is the focused concentration on negation markers as lexical agents for the construction of this so-called counterfactual space. However, close examination of these sample sentences reveals the force of other semantic factors beyond these negators which playa significant role, if not a more significant role, in the expression of counterfactuality. To illustrate, let us begin by omitting the attitudinal adverbs fortunately and luckily from Fauconnier's examples in (3c) and (3d). The sentences so altered appear as (5a) and (5b) below:
(5) a. ??Thefire did not cross the highway. My house would have been destroyed. b. ?? The fire was prevented from crossing the highway. My house would have been destroyed. While the change consists simply of a seemingly minor lexical deletion, the occurrence of the counterfactual in the second sentence is rendered unnatural in both examples. The negation markers nonetheless are still intact-a fact which now casts serious doubt on the claim that counterfactuality is 'lexically imposed' by such elements as negatives. We propose instead that the phenomenon of counterfactuality is inherently related to the critical role of the speaker's stance of desirability. And while we do not deny the importance of negation in this phenomenon, we do not recognize negation as the single factor involved. That is, negation comes into play in conjunction with, and only in conjunction with, an expression of the speaker's stance of desirable vs. undesirable. This becomes much clearer when we comp