LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS George J. Annas
Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02118, USA
Robert Baker
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS George J. Annas
Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02118, USA
Robert Baker
Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany, New York, USA Union Graduate College, Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308, USA
John Balint
Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical College, Albany, NY 12208, USA
Angela Ballantyne
Department of Medical Education, Flinders University, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia
Chalmers C. Clark
Center for Philosophy and History of Science, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308
Paul J. Edelson
Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons, New York, NY 10032, USA
Daniel W. Fitzgerald
Division of International Medicine and Infectious Diseases, Weill Medical College of Cornell University, New York, NY 10021, USA
Shane K. Green
Social Impact Programs, Ontario Genomics Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5G 1L7
Jaro Kotalik
Centre for Health Care Ethics, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada P7B 5E1
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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Jacob F. Kurlander
Institute for Ethics, American Medical Association, Chicago, IL 60610, USA
Laurence B. McCullough
Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX 77030, USA
Sean Philpott
Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical College, Albany, NY 12208, USA
Nola M. Ries
Health Law Institute, Law Centre, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H5
Martin Strosberg
Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany, New York, USA Union Graduate College, Union College, Schenectady, NY 12308, USA
Angela Wasunna
The Hastings Center, Garrison, NY 10524, USA
Matthew K. Wynia
Institute for Ethics, American Medical Association, Chicago, IL 60610, USA
Laurie Zoloth
Center for Bioethics, Science Society, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL 60611, USA
Stephen Zoloth
Office of the Dean, Bouve´ College of Health Sciences, Northeastern University, Boston, MA 02115, USA
INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS AND EPIDEMICS This volume of essays is based upon the proceedings of a conference on ‘‘Ethics and Epidemics’’ hosted in March 2004 by Albany Medical College and the Graduate College of Union University in the wake of the SARS epidemic. The SARS epidemic was a stark reminder of how quickly infectious disease can spread in our era of fast and frequent worldwide travel. Furthermore, it reawakened interest in and debate about major ethical, policy, political and social issues that arise as societies respond to such acute threats to health, life and liberty. Current concerns about the threat of avian influenza, due to the H5N1 virus, and its potential to evolve into a worldwide pandemic highlight the urgent need to address these issues. Epidemics and pandemics – uncommonly large outbreaks of common or emergent infectious diseases that are either locally contained or that spread worldwide – have not only affected the demographic development of mankind, as highlighted in Table 1, but these oft-described ‘‘plagues’’ also have helped shape our cultural values and our political practices. Epidemic and pandemic diseases have devastated the economies of city–states and nations, reined in or silenced the dogs of war and even caused entire empires to fall into ruin. From Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, for example, we know that the Plague of Athens contributed to the end of the Golden Age of Greece. This epidemic, which we now believe to have been caused by a particularly virulent strain of typhoid fever, killed an estimated quarter of the Athenian population, including Pericles, the military and political leader of the Attican forces. A subsequent succession of weak leaders allowed Sparta and its allies to emerge victorious, but the Plague of Athens had a social and political impact that went far beyond simple regime change. Epidemic disease also sowed the seeds of communal strife; Athenians felt abandoned by the Olympian gods and began to turn away from them, and the strain of living under a perceived death sentence lead many to lose their fear of and traditional obedience to religious and political authority figures. Even the mere threat or fear of epidemic disease can have major political and social consequences. In February of 1976, for instance, officials at the xiii
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Table 1. Year(s)
Historical Epidemicsa.
Location
430 BCE
Athens
165–180
Italy/Roman Empire
251–266
Roman Empire
541–542
Constantinople/ Eastern Roman Empire Europe
1347–1348 1519
Disease Plague of Athens (Smallpox? Typhoid Fever?) Antonine Plague (Smallpox? Measles?) Plague of Cyprian (Smallpox? Measles?) Plague of Justinian (Bubonic plague?) Black Death (Bubonic plague) Smallpox
1600s
Central America/ Aztec Empire South America/Inca Empire Europe
1629–1631
Northern Italy
1665–1666
Great Britain
1679
Austria
1690–1878 1720–1722
Eastern and Southern United States Southern France
1816–1826
India/East Asia
Great Plague of Marseilles Cholera
1829–1851
Europe/Russia
Cholera
1852–1860 1837
Russia North America
Cholera Smallpox
1889–1890 1918–1919 1957–1958 1868–1869
Worldwide Worldwide Worldwide Worldwide
1981
Worldwide
Asiatic flu (Influenza?) Spanish flu (Influenza) Asian flu (Influenza) Hong Kong flu (Influenza) HIV/AIDS
1525–1526
a
Est. Number of Deaths 150,000
5 million 3–5 million Up to 25 million 34 million 22 million
Smallpox
3–7 million
Black Bane (Anthrax) Great Plague of Milan (Bubonic plague) Great Plague of London (Bubonic plague) Great Plague of Vienna (Bubonic plague) Yellow Fever
60,000 280,000 75,000–100,000 76,000 50,000–75,000 100,000 Unknown; 100,000 recorded for British Army in Asia Unknown; 26,101 deaths in London alone in 1831–1832 1 million Unknown; Native American tribes decimated 250,000–500,000 21–40 million 1–4 million 1–2 million Over 25 million to date
This list of historical epidemics should, by no means, be considered complete. Many major epidemics have never made it into the history books. For our purposes, we have limited this table to some of the epidemics and pandemics for which we have historical records and which were estimated to have killed at least 50,000 individuals. Many epidemic and endemic diseases, such as yellow fever, are also under-represented.
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U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that swine flu had infected several army recruits in Fort Dix, New Jersey. A handful of prominent scientists predicted that a pandemic as destructive as the ‘‘killer flu’’ of 1918 could start within a few months, prompting then President Gerald Ford to sign the National Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP). The NIIP, which appropriated $135 million for mass vaccination of Americans against swine flu, was an effort unprecedented in the annals of public health programs, both in scope and in alacrity. It also was completely unnecessary – there was no swine flu epidemic. A single soldier at Fort Dix died of swine flu, whereas the government’s hastily implemented inoculation program left hundreds of Americans dead or disabled from Guillain–Barre syndrome, a rare neurological disorder triggered by the swine flu vaccine. The swine flu fiasco also reduced public confidence in the federal government and helped foster a cynicism about public health policy that still lingers. The recent failures of the U.S. government in preparing for and responding to crises, such as the shortfall of influenza vaccine in 2004 and the devastation of the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina, have further eroded public confidence in the public health planning process. In order to achieve the critical goal of gaining – or regaining – the public’s trust in governmental health policy, there must be open discussion of the ethical, legal and scientific issues that will set the parameters within which acceptable and (hopefully) effective plans to combat epidemic disease will be developed. The ethical issues discussed in this volume and the policy options suggested to address them offer a good starting point. Public education and open discussion of these topics are necessary, particularly if the need for rapid but effective public health policy development and implementation should arise. The pivotal moral, political, societal and policy issues raised by grave epidemics can be classified into four major areas: (1) the clash of individual liberty and autonomy with public safety; (2) government responsibility for advance planning, education and building of public confidence and trust; (3) the professional responsibilities and duties, and the limits of altruism, of physicians, nurses and other public service personnel during an epidemic; and (4) the ethical, social, economic and infrastructure issues that arise when conducting clinical research in developing countries, which often are the most affected by outbreaks of infectious disease and yet are the least prepared to deal with them. Because of severe constraints on resources, these countries face the difficult task of unavoidable rationing of care. Each of these ethical, legal and social issues is addressed sequentially in the following chapters.
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The first group of issues relates to the clash between individual autonomy and rights on the one hand, and public health, societal welfare and government authority on the other. These conflicting interests concern the limits on restraints on individual freedom and liberties, such as mandatory isolation or quarantine of infected or exposed individuals, or mandated immunization of front-line healthcare workers. Should there be limits both to individual autonomy and government power? Where should the balance be between individual rights and public health? The conflict between personal rights versus public authority are addressed in extensive discussions of the specific issues involved in protecting civil liberties while still giving the government the necessary authority to deal with public health issues, as presented by George Annas in Chapter 1 and Paul Edelson in Chapter 2. Both authors offer arguments to support a compromise position on the balance between individual rights and societal needs. The next two chapters address the second group of policy issues brought to light by the SARS epidemic. These concern governmental responsibilities for public education and preparation. In Chapter 3, Nola Ries reviews the lessons learned from the Canadian experience with trying to control the outbreak with quarantine. She argues for the need for careful advance planning, societal education and compromise. In Chapter 4, Jaro Kotalik discusses issues raised by attempts to compel front-line healthcare workers and civil defense workers to accept immunization. He also advocates public education and compromise based on the lack of sufficient empiric data to support a policy of mandatory vaccination. A third set of major ethical and moral issues concerns the professional responsibilities and other duties of physicians and other healthcare professionals in regard to the health and welfare of patients, and to society as a whole during an epidemic. While there are many accounts of individual dedication at great personal risk in such situations, such stories of medical heroism are a historical anachronism. It was not until 1847 that the American Medical Association (AMA) became the first professional organization to promulgate a set of ethical rules outlining a physician’s responsibilities during an epidemic. Robert Baker sets the stage for discussing professional duties by providing an historic overview of physicians’ changing moral and ethical responsibilities in Chapter 5. The inherent conflicts between professional duty, reasonable risk and responsibility to family and self then are discussed in detail by Matthew Wynia and colleagues in Chapter 6, Chalmers Clark in Chapter 7 and Laurence McCullough in Chapter 8. They examine the AMA’s original 1847 edict and its subsequent amendment,
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exploring the implications of the AMA’s rules and contrasting these with the requirements of a policy of reasonable risk. These chapters also examine the problems of governmental responsibility in preparation for and quick effective action during an epidemic. Failure to think ahead and to adequately prepare for an outbreak, or to provide clear and cogent leadership can lead to confusion and great public anxiety, as happened with the response to the bioterror attacks in 2001 and the flu vaccine shortage in 2004. In the latter case, a major health calamity was avoided only because of the good fortune of a mild influenza season. The importance of thoughtful, understandable and continuing public education about impending or potential epidemics is illustrated by the current concerns about avian flu, as discussed by Laurie and Stephen Zoloth in the closing chapter of this volume, 11, as well as by Nola Ries in Chapter 3. Governments must ensure a clear, complete and trustworthy flow of information to the public about preparations for a possible epidemic, the role of potential therapies and vaccinations, and potential restrictions on individual rights. The fourth group of ethical issues relates to clinical research in developing nations, whose citizens are often the first and the most severely affected by epidemics. Clinical trials of vaccines and of possible treatments are often appropriate in such communities, especially if they address diseases prevalent in the population to be tested. But undertaking such trials in the cultural, social and economic settings of these communities present their own unique set of ethical and moral issues. For example, there is often the problem of obtaining free and informed consent for participation in clinical trials. Many of these societies are patriarchal, where the head of the community makes decisions for or against participation, so that it is sometimes difficult to know how truly informed and willing the individuals in the community are when they participate in clinical research. We also should be concerned with the development of rules that govern such clinical research. This became a major issue during recent clinical trials of short-term antiretroviral treatment to prevent perinatal transmission of HIV-1. Although intensive pre- and post-natal treatment with AZT had been shown to be highly effective in preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV-1 in the United States, it was considered too cumbersome and expensive to be used in the developing world. When designing clinical trials to test the efficacy of short-course antiretroviral treatment in preventing perinatal transmission of HIV-1 in Thailand and Cameroon, however, the researchers elected for reasons of cost and expediency to use a placebo-control protocol. Such a study design would have been unacceptable in Europe or the U.S.
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In addition to the problems associated with clinical research in poor countries, there also are huge ethical issues associated with the delivery of health care throughout most of the world. Economic limitations raise obvious questions of distributive justice when deciding how to allocate scarce healthcare resources to the residents of developing nations. Finally, there is the issue of appropriate compensation for participating communities, many of which lack the necessary infrastructure to provide ongoing medical care for their citizens. Since performing clinical trials in developing nations is generally less costly than similar trials in developed countries, would it be appropriate to require the sponsors of trials in developing nations to invest a proportion of their savings in the development of the human and physical infrastructure needed to allow the participating community to provide such care? Angela Wassuna and Daniel Fitzgerald in Chapter 9 and Angela Ballantyne in Chapter 10 address these issues. In the final chapter, Laurie and Stephen Zoloth examine the issues raised in the preceding chapters from the point of view of the responsibilities these issues place upon the bioethics community. They conclude that bioethicists must reflect on their responsibilities to help societies prepare for what they believe is an inevitable major epidemic or terrorist attack and thus moderate the magnitude of damage to society. The bioethics community can help bridge the divide between the supporters of a libertarian view of society and those who favor a communitarian approach. Epidemic and pandemic disease, whether viral or bacterial, naturally occurring or the result of a bioterrorist attack, will not respect social or political boundaries. To deal with the disruption caused by an outbreak on the scale of, or even larger than, the 1918 flu pandemic will need unprecedented social and political solidarity. Long before such an outbreak occurs, scientists, politicians, epidemiologists, bioethicists and the public need to discuss the ethical, legal and social issues raised and to reach compromises that will allow effective public health measures to be deployed. John Balint Sean Philpott Martin Strosberg
CHAPTER 1 THE STATUE OF SECURITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POST-9/11 EPIDEMICS$ George J. Annas Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country and our people, and neither do we. President George W. Bush on signing the Defense Appropriations Act, August 5, 2004
Immediately after September 11, 2001 the U.S. government closed the Statue of Liberty to the public. It took almost three years to reopen Liberty Island, just in time for the Republican National Convention. The public can again visit, but little is the same. Those wishing to take the ferry to the island, for example, must submit to airport–like screening, as well as bag checks, including bomb-sniffing dogs, upon arrival. On the boat trip, the National Park Service has a new recorded ‘‘welcome’’ which asserts that although historically the Statue of Liberty symbolized freedom, it is now ‘‘a symbol of America’s freedom, safety, and security.’’ Similar screening is also $
Based on presentation at ‘‘Ethics and Epidemics’’ conference at Union University, March 26, 2004. Portions of this chapter are adapted from ‘‘Human Rights and Health’’ (in) George J. Annas, American Bioethics: Crossing Human Rights and Health Law Boundaries, Oxford U. Press, NY, 2005, 19–26; Annas, G. J., Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the twenty-first century, Health Matrix: J. of Law-Medicine 2003; 13: 33–70; and Annas, G. J., Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health, Florida Law Rev. 2003; 55: 1171–1190.
Ethics and Epidemics Advances in Bioethics, Volume 9, 3–28 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3709/doi:10.1016/S1479-3709(06)09001-7
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required to view the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia. We have not yet renamed the Statue of Liberty, the ‘‘Statue of Security’’; or the Liberty Bell, the ‘‘Safety Bell,’’ but safety and security have been consistently promoted as at least as important as liberty, and often more important, since 9/11. The next stop after Liberty Island is Ellis Island, the site of screening for more than two million immigrants to America in the early twentieth century. The most rigorous part of screening immigrants involved federal uniformed public health service physicians whose main duty was to prevent immigrants with contagious diseases from entering the country. Few federal public health officials other than the Surgeon General any longer wear military uniforms, and most public health activities now are done under state or local jurisdiction. But 9/11 has affected public health as well, as public health has been called upon to prepare the nation for a ‘‘bioterrorist attack’’ utilizing lethal disease agents, like smallpox or anthrax. Many public health officials hope that public health can take advantage of the new funding available for terrorism preparedness, and not only do its part in national security, but also make ‘‘dual use’’ of the funding to help it fulfill its core missions of protecting the publics’ health and preparing for ‘‘natural’’ epidemics. September 11 was an event, not an epidemic, but the U.S. reacted to it as if it portends an actual epidemic of terrorist attacks against us. September 11 has been viewed by many in the public health community as a signal of a coming pandemic: akin to the rise of SARS in China, or a novel form of bird flu in Asia (Garrett, 1994; Markel, 2004). The public health service has been asked to prepare for both natural and terrorist-induced epidemics simultaneously. Does 9/11 mean we must make fundamental changes in public health practice regarding epidemic control and revert to nineteenth century Ellis Island-type quarantine and forced treatment? Must we trade off human rights and civil liberties for increased safety and security? These are important and complex questions. In this chapter I will argue that the answer to both these questions is no, the movement in public health toward the adoption of a modern health and human rights ethical framework begun before 9/11 should continue. Osama bin Laden and his homicidal al-Qaeda followers present a real danger to Americans and the U.S. should bring them to justice for their crimes. The U.S. is more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than we had believed; and so we should strengthen our defenses. But we should not undermine our lives and our values by overreacting to the threat of terrorism. Preserving a human rights framework in the war on terrorists both preserves core American values and makes it more likely that we will prevail in the long run. Ignoring or marginalizing human and constitutional rights, and
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treating Americans themselves as suspects or actual enemies is counterproductive and dangerous in itself. I will support this conclusion with specific post-9/11 examples, such as public health preparedness plans for mass smallpox vaccination, the experiences of public health in the SARS epidemic, the enactment of new state public health vaccination and quarantine laws, and the use of torture on terrorist suspects and prisoners of war. Public health professionals are the ‘‘good guys’’ and rightly want to protect the publics’ health. However, the world has changed since the early nineteenth century, and reliance on coercion rather than education is no longer either legally justifiable or likely to be effective. In this regard, what might be labeled ‘‘public health fundamentalism’’ is as dangerous to the health and safety of Americans as Islamic religious fundamentalism. The language of human rights also has the great advantage of being universal and thus global. Neither the fight against terrorists, nor the fight against epidemics, can be successfully waged on a local, state, or even national level alone. Terrorists and pathogens alike easily cross national boundaries and both can only be effectively confronted by a global, cooperative strategy. ‘‘Safety first’’ is a good thought, as is the Hippocratic injunction, ‘‘first, do no harm’’; but neither safety nor inaction are ends in themselves, only means to promote health and human rights. Sacrificing human rights for safety is almost never necessary and almost always counterproductive in a free society. Benjamin Franklin went further in expressing an American thought from ‘‘the land of the free and the home of the brave,’’ saying, ‘‘Those who would give up an essential liberty to purchase temporary security deserve neither liberty nor security.’’
THE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK The modern human rights movement, like American bioethics, was born from the devastation of World War II. The multinational trial of the major Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg following World War II was held on the premise that there is a higher law of humanity (derived from natural law rules based on an understanding of the essential nature of humans), and that individuals may be properly tried for violating that law. Universal criminal law includes crimes against humanity, such as murder, genocide, torture, and slavery. Obeying the orders of superiors is no defense: the state cannot shield its agents from prosecution for crimes against humanity. The United Nations was formed almost immediately after World War II. Its Charter, signed by the 50 original member nations in San Francisco on
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June 26, 1945, spells out the goals of the United Nations. The first two are: ‘‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of wary; and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.’’ After the charter was signed, the adoption of an international bill of rights with legal authority proceeded in three steps: a declaration, two treaties, and implementation measures. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 without dissent, as a ‘‘common standard for all peoples and nations.’’ As international law expert Henry Steiner notes, ‘‘No other document has so caught the historical moment, achieved the same moral and rhetorical force, or exerted so much influence on the human rights movement as a whole’’ (Steiner, 1998). The rights spelled out in the declaration ‘‘stem from the cardinal axiom that all human beings are born free and equal, in dignity and rights, and are endowed with reason and conscience. All the rights and freedoms belong to everybody y’’ (Steiner, 1998). Unlike ethical precepts that primarily govern individual conduct, human rights are primarily rights individuals have against governments. Human rights require governments to respect these rights by refraining from doing certain things, such as engaging in torture or limiting freedom of religion. Governments also need to protect human rights by preventing their violation by private actors, and they need to fulfill human rights by providing education and nutrition programs. The United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a statement of aspirations. Legal obligations of governments were to derive from formal treaties that member nations would individually sign and incorporate into their domestic law. Because of the cold war, with its conflicting governmental ideologies, it took almost 20 years to get agreement on the texts of the two major human rights treaties. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on December 16, 1966. The United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, but not surprisingly given our capitalist economic system with its emphasis on private property, has yet to act on the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The United States has, nonetheless, signed other treaties that have special significance in the war on terror, including the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Treaty, and the Torture Treaty. The rights spelled out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights include rights to equality, rights to liberty and security of person,
Human Rights and Post-9/11 Epidemics
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rights to freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights focuses on human well-being, including the right to work, the right to fair wages, the right to a decent living, the right to safe and healthy working conditions, and the right to be free from hunger. It also includes the right to education and ‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.’’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two subsequent treaties form a global human rights framework for action that has special relevance to global health. The relationship between health and human rights has been most persuasively articulated and most tirelessly championed by my colleague Jonathan Mann, the first director of the World Health Organization’s Global Program on AIDS, whose life was tragically cut short in the September 1998 crash of Swiss Air flight 111. The World Health Organization has since adopted the health and human rights framework as its own. By broadening our perspective, human rights language highlights not only human freedoms, such as self-determination, but also basic human needs, such as equality, education, nutrition, and sanitation, whose improvement will have a major impact on improving human health. World War II, arguably the first truly global war, led to a global acknowledgment of the universality of human rights and the responsibility of governments to promote them. Jonathan Mann perceptively noted that the AIDS epidemic can be viewed as the first global epidemic because it is taking place at a time when all countries are linked both electronically and by easy transportation (Mann, Gruskin, Grodin, & Annas, 1999). Like World War II, this worldwide epidemic requires us to think in new ways and to develop effective methods to treat and prevent disease on a global level. Globalization is a mercantile and ecological fact; it is also becoming a health care reality. The challenge facing medicine and health care, both before and after 9/11, is to develop a global language and a global strategy that can help to improve the health of all of the world’s citizens. Clinical medicine is practiced one patient at a time, and the language of medical ethics is the language of self-determination and beneficence: doing what is in the best interests of the patient with the patient’s informed consent. This is powerful, but has little direct application in countries where physicians are scarce and medical resources extremely limited. Public health deals with populations and prevention – the necessary frame of reference in the global context. In a one-to-one doctor–patient relationship, for example, a combination of anti-retroviral drugs for AIDS treatment makes sense. In the worldwide pandemic, however, such treatment
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may be available to fewer than 5% of the world’s people with AIDS. The availability of a vaccine against a pandemic flu will also be severely limited. This is not just a matter of money, but also a matter of health care infrastructure and a lack of basic knowledge regarding how to effectively deliver drugs. In dealing with the AIDS pandemic, it became necessary to deal directly with such issues as discrimination, immigration status, the rights of women, rights to privacy and informed consent. It was also necessary to address issues of education and access to health care. Although it is easy to recognize that population-based prevention is required to effectively address the AIDS epidemic on a global level (as well as, e.g., tuberculosis, malaria, and tobacco-related illness), it has been much harder to articulate a global public health ethic, and public health itself has had an extraordinarily difficult time developing its own ethical language. Because of its universality and its emphasis on equality and human dignity, the language of human rights is well suited to public health and to serve as the basis of public health ethics. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1998, I suggested that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself sets forth the ethics of public health, since its goal is to provide the conditions under which humans can flourish. This is also the goal of public health. The unification of public health and human rights workers around the globe would be a powerful force to improve the lives of everyone. Without, I think, being seduced into wishful thinking, it should be stressed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a much more powerful document than it was in 1948 because both global interdependence and human equality are much better recognized today. Cynicism is understandable, but even our 2003 pre-emptive war on Iraq was often justified as a human rights war when weapons of mass destruction could not be found. Not only are human rights being taken more seriously by governments, but they are also increasingly a major driving force in private, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Of course, there are different kinds of rights and more effective and less effective ways to enforce them. The new International Criminal Court can, for example, help to deter and punish those who engage in torture and genocide, but can do nothing to governments who fail to provide basic health care to their citizens. Moreover, to conclude that human rights is a more powerful language for good than medical ethics is not to conclude that medical ethics is irrelevant. On the contrary, medical ethics not only is necessary to make basic human rights a reality (e.g., by prohibiting physician involvement in torture and executions), but also can advance an anti-paternalistic public health agenda
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that supports public education and democracy in public health practice. It thus seems more fruitful to explore the ways in which bioethics and human rights can work together synergistically in preparing for and coping with epidemics than to ignore either of them.
BIOTERRORISM In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it was easy for human rights advocates and civil libertarians to despair. Congress almost immediately passed the Orwellian-named USA Patriot Act, it had authorized an international (and 1984-like perpetual) global war on terror, and the Bush Administration had also announced that it would disregard not only the United Nations but also fundamental international human rights and humanitarian law as expressed in the Geneva Conventions. More recently, however, the tide seems to be turning. Many governmental actions are now met with considerable skepticism and even active resistance. The color-coded terrorist warning system has been all but abandoned as too vague to do any more than scare the public. A proposal to enlist mail carriers and TV repair persons as ‘‘tipsters’’ (the so-called ‘‘TIPS’’ program) has been abandoned. Duct tape and plastic sheeting remain punch lines in jokes about personal protection from chemical and biological agents. We continue to be bombarded with bioterrorism doomsday scenarios, although the major terrorist threats are not from biological agents. Rather they are from conventional weapons (e.g., firearms and bombs – including ‘‘dirty bombs,’’ conventional explosives containing radioactive material) delivered either in trucks on by individual suicide bombers, as evidenced by terrorist activities in Israel for decades, by insurgent attacks in Iraq, and by terrorists worldwide. These attacks create panic, but the most dangerous weapons are not chemical or biological, but nuclear. Our government knows this. Although there were many inconsistent rationales given for going to war with Iraq, no one suggested it was because they possessed chemical or biological weapons: we have known about these weapons for more than two decades, and Iraq has actually used their chemical weapons on both civilian and military targets. It was the future prospect of possessing nuclear weapons that ultimately moved us to war. Bioterrorism, nonetheless, continues to be hyped beyond all scientific or historic reality, even in the public health community which should know better. A leading public health lawyer, for example, has asserted that ‘‘a single gram of crystalline botulinum toxin, evenly dispersed and inhaled,
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could kill more than one million people’’ (Gostin, 2003). But, when looking at actual data, that same lawyer admits that in fact, when Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese terrorist cult, actually ‘‘attempted to disperse aerosolized botulinum toxin both in Tokyo and at several military installations in Japan’’ the result was not millions dead, or even thousands or hundreds: rather all of these attacks ‘‘failed to kill anyone’’ (Gostin, 2003). Likewise, it has been asserted that the release of 100 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax over Washington, D.C. could kill up to three million people. The real anthrax attacks through the U.S. mails were highly effective in sowing terror in the populations, but resulted in only five deaths (the number killed in American hospitals by negligence every 30 minutes or on our nation’s highways every hour). The scariest scenario involves smallpox because, unlike botulinum or anthrax, smallpox can be transmitted from one person to another. This is why the Bush administration used the threat of a smallpox attack from Iraq as one reason for us to fear Iraq, and as the almost sole justification for its massive three-phase smallpox vaccination program. That now-abandoned program was a public policy and public relations disaster, vaccinating only about 4,000 of the initially proposed 500,000 health care workers the government planned to have vaccinated with the smallpox vaccine during phase one – phase two would have encompassed up to ten million first responders and public safety personnel, and phase three would have included all willing civilians (McNeil, 2003; Stevenson & Stolberg, 2002). Why? I think the major reason is that the administration failed to persuade physicians and nurses that the known risks of serious side effects with the vaccine were justified given the fact that there is no evidence that Iraq (or anyone else) has both smallpox virus and the wish to use it in a terrorist attack. The information provided on this issue to the physicians and nurses was in the same spirit as the Iraq nuclear threat information, except that it contained no facts at all, not even misleading or phony ones. The Director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the person in charge of the smallpox vaccination program, for example, told a U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on January 29, 2003, about a month after the smallpox vaccination campaign began: I can’t discuss all of the details because some of the information is, of course, classified. But I think our reading of the intelligence that we share with the intelligence community is that there is a real possibility of a smallpox attack from either nations that are likely to be harboring the virus or from individual entities, such as terrorist cells that could have access to the virus. So we know it’s not zero. And I think that’s really what we can say with absolute certainty: that there is not a zero risk of a smallpox attack.
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This is wonderful doubletalk that proves nothing except that the CDC Director does not know much about the risk of a smallpox attack. Most importantly, however, is that if the U.S. government knows that an individual, group, or nation has smallpox and is working to make it into a weapon, this information should be made public. It is the terrorists who want to keep their methods and intentions secret: the best defense from a potential target is to make this information public. Since most Americans probably know this, the failure of the administration to offer any evidence at all of anyone possessing weaponized smallpox meant it was highly probable that the administration had no such evidence. Thus, the real risks of the vaccine could not be offset by any measurable benefit. Few were surprised then when after the Iraq war, in August 2003, an Institute of Medicine panel recommended that smallpox vaccination for civilians be abandoned; and by the summer of 2004 the entire effort was abandoned (Calabresi & August, 2004). The bottom line is that the potential for biological terrorism is real (i.e., it is greater than zero), but it is very low. In almost any foreseeable attack the number of deaths from a bioterrorist attack is likely to be low (as evidenced in the only real biological attacks to date, in which between zero and five people died). Planning is reasonable; overreaction creates more problems than it solves – including predictable adverse reactions to the vaccinations themselves.
BIOTERRORISM AND EPIDEMICS But what about a ‘‘real’’ epidemic, such as a new, worldwide pandemic? A repeat of the 1918 flu epidemic is likely at some point, and could prove devastating. We can and should produce vaccines against the flu. Our new emphasis on bioterrorism, however, has actually drained public health resources away from this effective vaccine. As the World Health Organization warned in late 2004, we need much better planning, and international cooperation, to prepare for an influenza pandemic (World Health Organization, 2004). Instead we are diverting funds away from this traditional public health concern which involves tens of thousands of deaths a year in the U.S. alone, and a predictable worldwide pandemic at some point, trying to protect against an extremely unlikely bioterrorist attack. It is here that we can determine whether or not ‘‘dual use’’ is a reality or just a marketing slogan. I agree with those who say that public health infrastructure generally must be improved for the sake of the nation’s health. But where I disagree is on what effect bioterrorism preparation will actually have on public health infrastructure.
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I wrongly and naively (it turns out) expected the federal government to provide increased funding for public health in the wake of 9/11. There has been some funding for bioterrorism, but mostly public health departments have been struggling with more unfunded federal mandates and suggestions, and have had to actually divert funds from public health programs we know work to save lives and improve health, to bioterrorism preparation which has little or no public health payoff. My own state of Massachusetts, always a national leader in public health, has made major cuts in tobacco control, domestic violence prevention, and immunizations against pneumonia and hepatitis A and B. Public health dollars have shrunk 30 million dollars in two years, during which time Massachusetts has received $21 million for bioterrorism-related activities, some of which could be categorized as ‘‘dual-use.’’ Public health expert David Ozonoff of the Boston University School of Public Health accurately describes what is happening: ‘‘The whole bioterrorism initiative and what it’s doing to public health is a cancer, it’s hollowing out public health from within y This is a catastrophe for American public health’’ (Smith, 2003b). This was dramatically demonstrated nationally in the fall of 2004 when the U.S. experienced a shortage of flu vaccine and was forced to ration it to those Americans most at risk of death and hospitalization from the flu. Cartoonist Matt Davies caught the irony in his cartoon picturing a citizen coming to the door of the ‘‘Homeland Security Bio Terror Readiness Unit’’ only to be greeted by a note pinned to the door reading, ‘‘Out with the flu.’’ Other public health experts have put the weakening of public health in even most disturbing terms, noting ‘‘Worse, in response to bioterrorism preparedness, public health institutions are being reorganized along a military or police model that subverts the relationships between public health providers and the communities they serve’’ (Cohen, Gould, & Sidel, 2004). To the extent that these experts are correct, and I think they are, exaggerated fear of bioterrorism is resulting in overreaction that is already counterproductive in that it is harming both the public health service’s effectiveness and its relationship with the communities it serves. Exaggerated risks produce extreme responses that are based more on fear than facts, so it is not surprisingly that they have unintended consequences (Annas, 2006). Public health planning should be based on science not freefloating anxiety and fear. Instead of using the tools of public health, especially epidemiology to gather data and risk-assessment, to identify most likely risks and work on them, our government seems to have adopted the bizarre notion that all threats are equal and that all states and localities should equally prepare for all of them. This philosophy has produced two
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interrelated epidemics in the U.S. today: an epidemic of fear, and an epidemic of security screening.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SARS EPIDEMIC The SARS epidemic was our first, and so far only, post-9/11 contagious disease epidemic, but it also returned us to late nineteenth century Ellis Island days in that its cause and mode of transmission were initially unknown, there is no diagnostic test for it, there is no vaccine, and there is no effective treatment. But SARS also appeared in a society equipped with instant global communication that made management of people through information much more important than management of people through police actions. With the internet information now spreads like a virus, but much faster. It is probably too early to reach firm conclusions about which containment methods were or were not the most effective in containing the disease. Nonetheless, since the epidemic has ended in all 30 countries in which suspected SARS cases were reported, and only a few countries used quarantine (detained individuals who showed no symptoms), it seems reasonable to conclude that quarantining ‘‘contacts’’ or even ‘‘close contacts’’ was unnecessarily harmful to those affected. Decisions about quarantine affect not only liberty but also the effectiveness of public health itself in the twentyfirst century. This is because, to be effective in preventing the spread of disease spread from either a new epidemic or a bioterrorist attack, public health officials must also prevent the spread of fear and panic. Maintenance of public trust is essential. When any new contagious disease appears, public health officials must answer three related questions: should contacts be quarantined? What test should be used to determine who qualifies as a ‘‘contact?’’ Should quarantine be voluntary or mandatory? China has been rightly criticized for failing to promptly alert the international community to the existence of a possibly new and contagious virus. Had information about the initial outbreak been properly shared, SARS might never have spread beyond China. Nonetheless when, with the active intervention of the World Health Organization, the epidemic was publicly recognized, China reacted vigorously, even harshly, especially in Beijing and Hong Kong. Mass quarantines were initiated involving two universities, four hospitals, seven construction sites, and other facilities, like apartment complexes. Sixty percent of the approximately 30,000 people quarantined in China were detained at centralized
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facilities; the rest were permitted to stay at home. Those quarantined were ‘‘close contacts,’’ defined as someone who has shared meals, utensils, place of residence, a hospital room, or a transportation vehicle with a probable SARS patient, or visited a SARS patient or been in contact with the secretions of a SARS patient anytime after 14 days before the SARS patient developed symptoms. Based on the evidence available, it seems reasonable to conclude that these mass quarantines in China had little or no effect on the epidemic. Moreover, the imposition of quarantine led to panic that could have spread the disease if identification of contacts was necessary to contain SARS. When a rumor spread that Beijing itself might be placed under martial law, China News Service reported that 245,000 migrant workers from impoverished Henan province fled the city to return home. Even in Hong Kong’s Amory Gardens, the site of the initial cluster of SARS cases in Hong Kong, when officials came to relocate residents to a quarantine facility they found no one at home in more than half of the complex’s 264 apartments (Chang, 2003; Hutzler, 2003). People were able to evade the police even though the police were working closely with public health officials. Canada had the only major outbreak of SARS outside of Asia, and it was limited to the Toronto area. Canada had about 440 probable or suspect SARS cases, resulting in 40 deaths, but many more lives were directly affected. Approximately 30,000 people were quarantined, although unlike China, almost all Canadians who were quarantined were confined to their own homes – and staying home, or ‘‘sheltering in place’’ seems to have become the new standard for isolating and protecting individuals in public health emergencies, at least in democracies. Canadian officials were generally levelheaded in their advice to the public, but seem to have overreacted on two occasions. In mid-April 2003, before Easter, Ontario health officials published full-page newspaper ads asking anyone who had even one symptom of SARS (severe headache, severe fatigue, muscle aches and pains, fever of 38 Celsius or higher, dry cough and shortness of breath) to stay home for a few days. Ontario’s health minister said, ‘‘This is a time when the needs of a community outweigh those of a single person’’ (Altman, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Again, in June, during the second wave of infections in Ontario, the health minister, responding to reports that some people were not completing their ten-day home quarantines, said ‘‘I don’t know how people will like this, but we can chain them to a bed if that’s what it takes’’ (BBC News, 2003). While the request may have arguably been reasonable, the threat was not. At a June 2003 WHO meeting on SARS, Health Canada’s senior director general, Paul Gully, noted that
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intra-hospital transmission was the ‘‘most important amplifier of SARS infections’’ and wondered aloud about the utility of the widespread home quarantines during the Canadian epidemic. His reasoning was that very few of those quarantined wound up exhibiting symptoms of SARS (Cohn, 2003a, 2003b). There were few cases of SARS in the U.S. and no deaths. The CDC worked with the World Health Organization and other countries to identify the SARS virus, and issued guidelines and recommendations in press conferences and on its website. Perhaps the most important involved travel. In this category the CDC issued both travel alerts (which consists of a notification of an outbreak of a specific disease in a geographic area and suggests ways to reduce the risk of infection and what to do if you become ill) and travel advisories (which include the same information, but further recommend against nonessential travel because the risk of disease transmission is considered too high). No attempt was ever made to prohibit Americans from traveling anywhere, although the federal government probably has the authority to do this for international travel (e.g., through passport limitations) should the risk of disease become extreme. Nor do there seem to have been any attempts in the U.S. by public health officials to quarantine asymptomatic contacts of SARS patients. The CDC also issued reasonable guidance to businesses with employees returning from areas affected with SARS, recommending that while in areas with SARS those ‘‘with fever or respiratory symptoms should not travel and should seek medical attention’’ and upon return asymptomatic travelers ‘‘should be vigilant for fever and respiratory symptoms over the 10 days after departure.’’ Most important, the CDC noted that ‘‘those persons need not limit their activities and should not be excluded from work, meetings, or other public areas, unless fever or respiratory symptoms develop.’’ In bold letters on its guidelines it underlined the point: ‘‘At this time, CDC is not recommending quarantine of persons returning from areas with SARS.’’ The president did, nonetheless, add SARS to the outdated federal list of ‘‘quarantinable communicable diseases’’ on April 4, 2003, and customs and immigration officials were given the authority to detain those entering the U.S. who were suspected of having SARS. This authority was not exercised. Of course, the public can overreact on its own, and in some cases clearly did – as restaurants in Chinatowns in New York and Boston were virtually empty for a time. The worst offenders were not the uninformed public, however, but academic institutions, some of which forbade their faculty and students to travel to areas that had SARS cases, or required them to spend ten days after they returned in self-imposed quarantine and obtain a
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physician’s certificate that they did not have SARS before returning to campus. Academic institutions with similar policies included both Harvard and Boston University, even though the Boston Public Health Commission had reasonably advised on April 9, 2003: At this point there is no evidence to suggest that a person without symptoms may infect others with SARS. In the absence of fever or respiratory symptoms, anyone who has traveled to high-risk areas or has been exposed to SARS patients may continue normal activities – isolation or quarantine is not recommended. Persons should not be excluded from school or work.
Anita Barry, director of communicable disease control at the Boston Public Health Commission had warned only four days earlier: ‘‘The biggest challenge for now with SARS is fear and rumor and panic’’ (Smith, 2003a). As a general matter, local public health officials acted very responsibly, even under extreme pressure. Although there were no quarantines in the U.S., there were cases in which isolation of symptomatic individuals was advised or mandated by local public health departments. In New York, 27 people were advised by the city health department to stay home for a period of ten days after their SARS fever had returned to normal. In addition, two individuals in New York City and one in Dallas were ordered to be isolated in hospitals because it was suspected they had SARS. The first of these was a young student on a tour around the world. He sought medical care in a New York City hospital and was diagnosed as a suspect case. He would have been quarantined at home, but had none, so he was ordered by the Department to remain in the hospital for ten days after his fever abated, and an unarmed security guard was posted at his door to enforce the order. He was offered an attorney to advise him about fighting the order, but refused. Ten days after the resolution of his fever he left town and has not been heard of since. The second case involved a person who was voluntarily in the hospital, but who became restless and wanted to leave before the ten days was up. He was ordered to stay, and put under guard as well (Altman, 2003b). The third case, from Dallas, also sought care in a hospital and was diagnosed as a suspect case. He gave a false address. The Dallas County Department of Health and Human Services sought and obtained a court order requiring him to remain in the hospital for ten days. At the hearing all in attendance (including the judge) ‘‘were provided with protective gear to wear to avoid any possible exposure to the disease while in the presence of the patient’’ (Dallas County Department of Health and Human Services, 2003). This alone made it virtually certain that the judge would find the patient a potential danger to the public and order continued isolation, which he did.
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In the midst of the SARS epidemic, New York City did, however, change its health code to permit the city’s health commissioner to order the quarantine of individuals who ‘‘may’’ endanger the public health because of smallpox, pneumonic plague, or other severe communicable disease. In addition, a contact may also be quarantined: someone who ‘‘has been or may have been’’ in ‘‘close, prolonged, or repeated association with a case or carrier.’’ This change in the code from permitting the quarantine of people who actually pose a danger to the public health and who have actually been in close contact with infected individuals, to those who ‘‘may’’ pose a danger and those who ‘‘may’’ have been in close contact with them is breathtaking in its invitation to arbitrariness. Given this, it is disturbing that not one person showed up to testify at the April 28, 2003 public hearing on this change. In the case of SARS, for example, which the revised rules specifically reference in a section on ‘‘post-publication changes,’’ the new regulation would have permitted the department to quarantine New York’s entire Chinatown area since all residents there ‘‘may’’ have been in contact with someone who ‘‘may’’ have SARS. No one (thankfully) seems to have even suggested such a rerun of the totally arbitrary San Francisco Chinatown quarantine, allegedly for plague. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that even nineteenth century U.S. courts, while granting extremely broad powers to public health agencies, condemned the arbitrary use of quarantine, even for smallpox, requiring public health officials to show ‘‘facts which warranted isolation’’ (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board of Health, 2003). SARS may return, but the CDC is to be commended for providing the U.S. with a credible and open official (the CDC director, Julie Gerberding, herself) who informed Americans about what they could voluntarily do to avoid contracting or spreading the disease. Nationally, encouragement of sensible voluntary responses became policy, and no state invoked any emergency powers, including quarantine, in response to SARS. As a general rule, sick people seek treatment and accept isolation to obtain it – people do not want to infect others, especially their family members, and will voluntarily follow reasonable public health advice to avoid spreading disease. SARS emphasizes that effective public health today must rely on actions taken at the national and international level, and that public health should be seen primarily as a global issue. Virtually, every country in the world had to take some action to limit the exposure of its people to the disease. SARS was a major public health challenge, but it is no less a medical challenge. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, sick people seek medical care. Individuals believed to be infected with the disease were (and
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continue to be) cared for one-by-one by physicians and nurses in hospitals. In fact, one of the salient aspects of the SARS epidemic is that many (in some countries, most) infections were actually acquired in hospitals, and many of those infected, and some who died, were physicians and nurses who cared for the patients. The dedication of the physicians and nurses who treated SARS patients was exemplary. Neither public health nor medicine alone could have effectively dealt with SARS. The old distinctions between medicine and public health are blurring, and perhaps the most important message is that public health and medicine must work together to be effective (Mariner, 2003). Of course, SARS is not HIV/AIDS, which is not smallpox, which is not plague or tuberculosis, or bioterrorism. Each infectious disease is different, and epidemiology provides the key to any effective public health and medical response to a new disease. The rapid exchange of information, made possible by the Internet and an interconnected group of laboratories around the world (set up primarily for influenza identification and tracking), were critical to combating fear with knowledge. Information really does travel faster than even a new virus, and managing information is the most important task of modern public health officials. People around the world, provided with truthful, reasonable information by public health officials who are interested in both their health and human rights will follow their advice. Isolating sick people seems to have been critical to containing SARS, but better infection-control techniques in hospitals, and adherence to them, are equally necessary. Quarantining contacts, where it was attempted, seems to have been both ineffective (in that many, if not most, contacts eluded quarantine) and useless (in that almost none of those quarantined developed SARS). Mass quarantine is a relic of the past that seems to have outlived its usefulness. Attempts at mass quarantine, as evidenced by the experience in China, are now likely to create more harm than they prevent. They do this both by imposing unnecessary restrictions on liberty on those quarantined, and by encouraging potentially infected people to flee from public health officials. In the midst of concern over bioterrorism, but after the SARS epidemic, the New York Academy of Medicine did a survey of the American public asking how they would respond to two types of terrorist attacks: smallpox and a dirty bomb. Published in September 2004, the surveys results support two lessons that were apparent on 9/11: (1) the primary concern Americans have in a crisis is the safety of their family members; and (2) the most important predictor of whether they will follow the advice of public officials
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is if they trust them to be telling the truth and to be guided by their welfare. Specifically, the survey found that only 40% of Americans would go to a vaccination site in a smallpox outbreak if told to do so, and only 60% would shelter in place for as long as they were told to in the event of a dirty bomb explosion. The reasons given for not following advice are instructive. In the smallpox scenario, 60% had worries about the safety of the vaccine itself – twice as many as those who worried about actually getting smallpox. The respondents also suggested ways to make them more likely to cooperate. For smallpox, overwhelming majorities (94% and 88%) wanted to speak with someone who knew a lot about smallpox and who they trusted to want what was best for them. A physician not working for the government would fit the bill. In the dirty bomb case, the primary concern respondents had was the safety of their family members. 75% of those who would not shelter in place said they would do so if they could communicate with people they care about or if they knew they were safe. Overall the study concluded that ‘‘people are more likely to follow official instructions when they have a lot of trust in what officials tell them to do and are confident that their community is prepared to meet their needs if a terrorist attack occurs’’ (Lasker, 2004). These survey results are consistent with past bioterrorist exercises as well. As Senator Sam Nunn, who played the part of the president in the smallpox exercise, Dark Winter, in which mass quarantine failed: ‘‘There is no force on earth that can make Americans do something that they do not believe is in their own best interests and that of their families.’’ Given the data from real world events, public opinion surveys, and mock exercises, it is quite remarkable that some public health officials are still at home with draconian nineteenth-century quarantine and compulsory treatment methods. This is likely because public health officials, who believe all their actions are designed to protect the public, are much more concerned with false positives (failing to treat or detain someone who actually has a communicable disease) than with false negatives (detaining someone who actually does not have a communicable disease). They believe that brute force can effectively control the behavior of Americans in an epidemic or bioterrorist attack. To the extent this faith in coercion remains alive in the public health community, it is predictable that public health officials with the power to arbitrarily quarantine large numbers of people in an emergency will use it immediately, whether it is warranted or not. From their perspective, protecting public health is more important than protecting liberty, and as public health officials they may really believe they have nothing to lose. But abuse of power will predictably destroy public trust and instill panic.
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Even totalitarian dictatorships like China cannot control their populations in epidemics by fear alone in the twenty-first century. It cannot be emphasized enough that the primary goal and purpose of public health is prevention of disease in the first place. In the case of bioterrorism, this means prevention of the attack is much more important (to public health) than responding to it after the fact. Contemporary public health prevention of epidemics and bioterrorism is not primarily a local or state issue at all. It is fundamentally a global security issue that must be dealt with by the community of nations working together. National laws and treaties, with realistic inspection and sanctions, devoted to preventing the development and production of biological weapons are the most important tool in the prevention of bioterrorism. We are also right to want to modernize the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations: but, as WHO recognizes, to be effective revised regulations must be founded on respecting and protecting human rights, not trampling them. State laws, no matter what they say, and no matter what the CDC says, simply cannot prevent or control bioterrorism. Moreover, by seeming to grant unconstitutional power over citizens’ lives and liberty, bad state public health emergency laws undermine public trust and are thus a danger to public health itself. Florida’s crude summary of CDC’s-sponsored ‘‘model act’’ which seeks to trade off human rights for safety and security, provides the country’s starkest example, and thus helps illustrate why honoring rather than destroying human rights is essential to effective public health action in the twenty-first century.
FLORIDA’S PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY STATUTE There has been an epidemic of new state laws addressing public health powers in the event of a bioterrorist attack or epidemic since 9/11. Florida’s is by far the most extreme. Perhaps because it was the site of the first anthrax letter attack, Florida was fertile grounds for all sorts on so-called anti-terrorist legislation. Within a year of September 11, the Florida legislature passed, and Governor John Ellis ‘‘Jeb’’ Bush signed, 21 bills related to terrorism. One of these 21 bills, Bill 2002-269, was based at least in part on the CDC-sponsored model, adopting the scheme of declaring a public health emergency to trigger additional government powers, and vesting this power in the state’s ‘‘health officer.’’ The state officer’s emergency powers are in four categories: (1) the shipment of drugs in the state; (2) the provision of bulk drugs by pharmacists;
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(3) the temporary licensing of certain health care practitioners; and (4) power over individuals (Laws of Florida, 2003, Chapter 2002-269). There are major problems with all of the provisions (especially the extraordinarily broad definition of ‘‘public health emergency’’ which, for example, would include the annual flu epidemics and HIV disease), but Section 2, Sub-section 4, on the power over individuals, is so out of step with anything else in the rest of the country, and so inconsistent with basic human rights and constitutional law, that it warrants scrutiny. The operative section gives the State Health Officer the following power over individuals in a public health emergency: 4. Ordering an individual to be examined, tested, vaccinated, treated, or quarantined for communicable diseases that have significant morbidity or mortality and present a severe danger to public health. Individuals who are unable or unwilling to be examined, tested, vaccinated, or treated for reasons of health, religion, or conscience may be subjected to quarantine. a. Examination, testing, vaccination, or treatment may be performed by any qualified person authorized by the State Health Officer. b. If the individual poses a danger to the public health, the State Health Officer may subject the individual to quarantine. If there is no practical method to quarantine the individual, the State Health Officer may use any means necessary to treat the individual. Any order of the State Health Officer given to effectuate this paragraph shall be immediately enforceable by a law enforcement officer y (Laws of Florida, Chapter 2002-269. Section 2.4)
This section of the Florida law can be usefully contrasted to a Minnesota law on the same subject, which rather than trading off civil liberties for security, takes a human rights and health approach. Specifically, the Minnesota law provides: ‘‘individuals have a fundamental right to refuse medical treatment, testing, physical or mental examination, vaccination, participation in experimental procedures and protocols, collection of specimens and preventative programs’’ even in a public health emergency (Minnesota Statute Sec 12.39, 2003). All four parts of the Florida law are extreme, and each shows how public health can drastically overreact to a perceived threat in ways that are counterproductive to public health and devastating to human rights. The first part, relating the ‘‘ordering an individual to be examined y’’ makes no public health sense at all, because there is no characteristic of the individual that gives rise to any suspicion or reason to believe that the individual either has the disease in question or has been exposed to the disease. Instead, the mere presence of a disease in Florida that the state health officer designates as creating a ‘‘public health emergency’’ authorizes anyone designated as ‘‘qualified’’ by the state health officer to order anyone to be ‘‘examined,
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tested, vaccinated, treated, or quarantined.’’ Mere refusal results in quarantine, without any evidence even of exposure to disease, let alone that the person is a threat to others. This is not public health, but authorization for a public health police state. This police-suspect model is the core mistake of the entire approach: Americans (Floridians) are not the enemy in a bioterrorist attack, and to prearrange a response that has the police seek out, confine, and forcibly inject innocent Floridians makes no scientific or public health sense. The enemy is the bioterrorist – although neither current law, nor this Florida statute, would permit police to do the things to a suspected bioterrorist it authorizes police to do to innocent Floridians. This law not only misses the target, in shots in the wrong direction altogether. But the third part, 4(b), is the most extreme and offensive and it is difficult to believe that anyone in the legislature actually read it. The first sentence makes perfect sense, and summarizes the law in virtually every state: ‘‘If the individual poses a danger to the public health, the State Health Officer may subject the individual to quarantine,’’ at least so long as the phrase ‘‘provided this is the least restrictive alternative available’’ is understood. But the second sentence has no legal pedigree at all (at least outside of totalitarian states): ‘‘If there is no practical method to quarantine the individual, the State Health Officer may use any means to vaccinate or treat the individual.’’ This could be labeled the ‘‘torture exception.’’ If the risk is big enough to society, we can torture bioterrorists (and their victims!). But governments cannot engage in torture (or slavery or murder) under any circumstances under applicable international human rights treaties, even where the very survival of their country is at risk. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is unambiguous: ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.’’ And Article 7 is one of the articles from which no derogation is permitted, even ‘‘in time of a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation’’ (United Nations, 1976). Because this section authorizes the violation of international law prohibition on torture, it is shocking to see it as part of a public health law (Annas, 2005). For almost all potential bioterrorist agents there is neither a vaccine nor an effective treatment; and even for garden variety new epidemics that could qualify as public health emergencies under the statute, like SARS, no approved treatment exists. So, what can this provision possibly mean? That the state health officer can compel the use of potentially dangerous experimental drugs? But this is a fundamental violation not only of international law, but also of basic U.S. constitutional law, and U.S. federal drug law. No state
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law can, of course, overturn any, let alone all, of these higher laws. Even assuming that there is an approved vaccine that could also serve as a treatment if delivered to an exposed person quickly (the smallpox vaccine seems to have been what whoever drafted this language was likely thinking about), what justification can there be for forcing the vaccination ‘‘by any means?’’ The state gives only one, ‘‘if there is no practical method to quarantine the individual.’’ But the entire statute is based on the premise that state public health officials know how to respond to a public health emergency, and should have the power to quarantine if needed. This provision undercuts the assumption that state public health officials have done any planning at all, and instead assumes that the state will not be able to even provide quarantine facilities where needed – although it can also be read more cynically, to say the state need not provide quarantine for vaccination refusers but can simply force vaccination on everyone. Either way, there is no constitutional or human rights justification for forced treatment. Americans have a constitutional right to refuse any medical treatment, even lifesaving treatment. It is also a fundamental principle of medical ethics that patients have the right to informed choice, and the right to refuse any medical intervention. An emergency may justify very short periods of confinement of individuals who public health officials believe pose a risk to others, but nothing justifies this type of ‘‘treatment.’’ Perhaps the only good news about the Florida statute is that even in the wake of 9/11 and the drumbeat of the threat of a possible smallpox attack, no other state has passed anything like this statute. The Florida legislature should be ashamed of itself.
TERRORISM AND TORTURE My use of the word ‘‘torture’’ in the context of public health emergencies may strike readers as extreme. In the post-9/11 context, however, Florida’s public health law can be seen as consistent with Bush administration antiterror policy, that has condoned torture in other contexts, and that has only been subject to serious court reviews in 2004. So far most American courts have, rightly I think, insisted that U.S. constitutional rights, and international human rights, must be respected, even when dealing with a suspected terrorist. In the wake of the September 11, the White House legal counsel argued that the Geneva Conventions (which prohibit not only torture, but all inhumane and degrading treatment) do not apply in the war on terror, with specific application to the prisoners held at Guantanamo; and Justice
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Department lawyers went even further, arguing that the President as Commander-in-Chief had the authority to order torture of prisoners, and that obeying such an order would be a valid defense to a war crime or crime against humanity charge. In the language of the memorandum, the criminal anti-torture statute ‘‘does not apply to the President’s detention and interrogation of enemy combatants pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority’’ (Gonzales, 2002). The road to the Abu Ghraib torture scandal began when the president decided in February 2002 that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to ‘‘enemy combatants’’ jailed in Guantanamo. This decision was made over the strong objections of the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and without any meaningful input from the career lawyers in the armed forces, all of whom objected to jettisoning the Geneva Conventions, a treaty we had honored for more than 50 years. The reason given for taking prisoners to Guantanamo was that the global war on terror was a ‘‘new kind of war’’ that made the Geneva Conventions inapplicable, and that Guantanamo could and should be used as an interrogation center outside the jurisdiction and thus the oversight of the U.S. courts. The rationale was that if neither the U.S. Constitution nor international law applied in Guantanamo, the administration could write its own rules of conduct for the prison, and it did. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for example, specifically approved types of torture that could be used in the interrogations there, and specifically involved physicians in it by requiring that prisoners obtain ‘‘medical clearance’’ prior to having these techniques applied to them. In the words of his directive, the new techniques can only be used after, among other things, the detainee is medically and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques to be used in combination). Although these torture techniques were only approved for Guantanamo, they ultimately made their way to Abu Ghraib. The Geneva Conventions were to apply in Iraq, according to the administration. Had they been followed, the torture and abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib would not have occurred. Had the physician and nurse military officers at Abu Ghraib been more knowledgeable about the Conventions, and more confident about their roles as both healers and officers, it is also likely that the abuses would have been halted much sooner than they were. Not only do the conventions prohibit torture and abusive and humiliating treatment of prisoners of war, they also specifically protect physicians who follow medical ethics. In the early summer of 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that prisoners at Guantanamo could bring habeas corpus actions in U.S. courts (BBC
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News Online, 2004). It thus rejected the position of the Bush administration, as stated in oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, that even if the U.S. was engaged in ‘‘murder and torture’’ at Guantanamo, U.S. courts could not interfere. In another case decided that same day, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a U.S. citizen captured on the battlefield, and originally held at Guantanamo, had a right to a fair hearing under the U.S. Constitution to contest his status as an ‘‘enemy combatant’’ (Hamadi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 519, 2004). The prisoner who brought this case, Yaser Esam Hamadi, has since been released without charges ever having been filed against him. Although it did not have to rely on it for its conclusion, in its opinion the U.S. Supreme Court cited provisions of the Geneva Convention III (relative to prisoners of war) as authoritative on the ‘‘law of war.’’ In June 2006, in a flat rejection of the Bush administration’s position, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Geneva Conventions must be followed at Guantanamo (Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 2006). It is important for U.S. courts to continue to recognize international law as our own, and to provide even non-U.S. citizens with a judicial remedy for extreme unlawful acts such as torture and murder. Thus, prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo who were tortured can sue their torturers in U.S. courts for money damages. Compensation is important to victims, as is having their day in court. Of course, torture and abuse of prisoners is also a crime, and the perpetrators can be prosecuted – as some of the soldiers involved in the abuses at Abu Ghraib have been. Most important, however, is prevention. Torture, like terrorism, remains widely practiced around the world, even though universally condemned. Amnesty International, for example, estimates that 150 countries may condone torture. Physicians, unlike the Red Cross, are present in almost every prison in the world; and because torturers often rely on physicians to help them, physicians are in a unique position to prevent torture (Miles, 2006). Under international medical ethics, international law, including the Geneva Conventions, and U.S. military doctrine, and no other profession has the moral and societal warrant to be effective in torture prevention. Lawyers also have special obligations to help protect physicians – because of their role in upholding the rule of law, including international humanitarian law. The challenges of the war on terror present an opportunity for medical and legal professional organizations to work together trans-nationally to up hold both medical ethics and international humanitarian law (Annas, 2005). Federal policies that violate international human rights and humanitarian law are both illegal and immoral. I think the same can be said for the states that have adopted provisions that make public health officials immune from lawsuits for any action taken during a public health emergency that injures
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members of the public – even for forced ‘‘treatment’’ amounting to torture. Immunity encourages unlawful and arbitrary action, neither of which have any place in public health or medicine.
CONCLUSION At the outset of the twenty-first-century bioterrorism, although only one threat to public health, can be the catalyst to effectively federalize and integrate much of what is now uncoordinated and piecemeal state and local public health programs. This should include a renewed effort for national health insurance, national licensure for physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals, and national patient safety standards. Federal public health leadership will also encourage us to look outward, and to recognize that prevention of future bioterrorist attacks and even ordinary epidemics will require international cooperation. As the SARS epidemic illustrates, it is time not only to federalize public health, but to globalize it as well. Universal human rights is the proper foundation for a new global public health ethics. Our new kind of war against bioterrorism should be built on a goal of protecting liberty, not depriving Americans of it. There is a knee jerk tendency in times of war and national emergencies to restrict civil liberties as the most effective way to counteract the threat. But history has taught us that such restrictions are almost always useless and often counterproductive, and we usually wind up with deep regrets for our action. The tendency to return to the days before liberty and informed consent were taken seriously has been evident both in the immediate aftermath of 9/1l. Arbitrary and unlawful responses have not, however, helped make Americans safer or more secure, instead they threaten the very liberties that make our country worth protecting. America is strong because its people are free, and to be both moral and effective public planning for war and public health emergencies must be based on respecting freedom and trusting our fellow citizens. The United States should lead the world in proclaiming a new, global public health, based on transparency, trust, and science, and most importantly, based on respect for human rights. We do not need a new Statue of Security: the Statue of Liberty is just fine.
REFERENCES Altman, L. K. (2003a). Fearing SARS, Ontario urges wider quarantines. New York Times, April 18, Al.
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Altman, L. K. (2003b). Public health fears cause New York officials to detain foreign tourist. New York Times, April 28, A5. Annas, G. J. (2005). Unspeakably Cruel: Torture, medical ethics and the law. New England Journal of Medicine, 352, 2127–2132. Annas, G. J. (2006). Bioterror and Bioart: A plague o’ both your houses. New England Journal of Medicine, 354, 2715–2720. BBC News. (2003). ‘‘Bed Chains’’ for Canada SARS violators. BBC News, June 1. BBC News Online. (2004). U.S. Supreme Court Guantanamo Ruling. July 8. http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/americas/3867067.stm Calabresi, M., & August, M. (2004). Was smallpox overhyped? Time, July 26, 16 Chang, L. (2003). In the face of SARS, Beijing reverts to a quite village, Wall Street Journal, May 12, A1. Cohen, H. W., Gould, R. M., & Sidel, V. W. (2004). The pitfalls of bioterrorism preparedness: The anthrax and smallpox experiences. American Journal of Public Health, 94, 1667–1671. Cohn, M. R. (2003a). Nations must stay on SARS alert: WHO. Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada), June 18, D1. Cohn, M. R. (2003b). Personal communication, July 16. Dallas County Department of Health and Human Services. (2003). CDC says possible SARS patient test results are negative for SARS. Press Release, July 14. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board of Health. (2003). Notice of adoption of amendments to Sections 11.01 and 11.55 of the New York City Health Code. http:// www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption.pdf Accessed 3/30/06. Garrett, L. (1994). The coming plague: Newly emerging diseases in a world out of balance. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Gonzales. A. R. (2002). Memorandum for the President from Alberto R. Gonzales. Decision re application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Jan. 25. http://www.hereinreality.com/alberto_gonzales_torture_ memo.html Accessed 3/30/06. Gostin, L. (2003). When terrorism threatens health: How far are limitations on personal and economic liberties justified. Florida Law Review, 55, 1105–1169. Hamadi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 519. (2004). Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. (2006). Hutzler, C. (2003). China reverts to top-down rule with heavy hand to fight SARS. Wall Street Journal, May 8, Al. Lasker, R. D. (2004). Redefining readiness: Terrorism planning through the eyes of the public. New York: Center for Advanced Collaborative Strategies in Health, New York Academy of Medicine. http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/RedefiningReadinessStudy.pdf Accessed 3/30/06. Laws of Florida. (2003). Chapter 2002-269. Health Emergency Act. http://election.dos.state. fl.us/laws/02laws/ch_2002-269.pdf Accessed 3/30/06. Mann, J., Gruskin, S., Grodin, M., & Annas, G. (1999). Health and human rights: A reader. New York: Routledge. Markel, H. (2004). When germs travel: Six major epidemics that have invaded America since 1900 and the fears they have unleashed. New York: Pantheon Books. Mariner, W. K. (2003). Public health and law: Past and future visions. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28, 525, 550.
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McNeil, D. (2003). After the war: Biological defenses: Two programs to vaccinate for smallpox come to a halt. New York Times, (June 19), A13. Miles, S. H. (2006). Oath betrayed: Torture, medical complicity, and the war on terror. New York: Random House. Minnesota Statute Sec. 12.39. (2003). 2002 Minnesota Chapter Law 402. Smith, S. (2003a). US allows for SARS quarantines. Boston Globe, April 5, A2. Smith, S. (2003b). Anthrax vs. the flu: As state governments slash their public health budgets, federal money is pouring in for bioterror preparedness. Boston Globe, July 29, C1, C4. Steiner, H. (1998). Securing human rights. Harvard Magazine, Sept–Oct., 45–46. Stevenson, R., & Stolberg, S. (2002). Bush lays out plan on smallpox shots: Military is first. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1A. United Nations. (1976). International covenant on civil and political rights. http://www. unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm Accessed 3/30/06. World Health Organization. (2004). Consultation on priority public health interventions before and during an influenza pandemic. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ consultation/en/ Accessed 3/30/06.
CHAPTER 2 QUARANTINE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES Paul J. Edelson 1. QUARANTINE IN A FREE SOCIETY With the recent outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and on-going concerns about influenza and the use of pathogenic organisms as weapons, the management of outbreaks of contagious diseases has recently taken on a new urgency (Barbera et al., 2001). However, the public health law concerning disease outbreaks is still based on the perspectives, and often the words, of the early twentieth century, when most public officials saw little option but to take a very authoritarian approach to the protection of the public’s health. Over the past 40 years, the jurisprudence of involuntary non-criminal incarceration, for example for the treatment of tuberculosis or as a result of mental disease, has changed dramatically, as basic concepts of due process have been incorporated into the process of civil commitment (Gostin, Burris, & Lazzarini, 1999). There is, therefore, a pressing need to rethink the approaches traditionally taken to the control of infectious disease outbreaks to address this gap between the old assumptions of plenary power to act in the public’s interests and the rights of individuals threatened with state actions (Davis & Kumar, 2003). It is a canard sometimes used to justify authoritarian actions that the public responds to emergencies by losing control and panicking; indeed it is the consensus of social scientists that people in emergency situations tend to be more cooperative Ethics and Epidemics Advances in Bioethics, Volume 9, 29–42 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3709/doi:10.1016/S1479-3709(06)09002-9
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and more generous toward others than they may normally be (Smith, 2001; Clarke, 2002). If anything, it is my reading of such experiences as the bomb attacks on London during World War II (Harrisson, 1989) that it is the poorly prepared and under-supported public officials who are most likely to act in unproductive and socially divisive ways during public emergencies. An American example of how misdirected and incompetent quarantine measures can be is the quarantine imposed on Chinese and Japanese residents of San Francisco during the outbreak of plague in that city in 1900 (Risse, 1992; Edelson, 2003). Supported by such pseudoscientific notions as that persons whose diet was based on rice comprised ‘‘races liable to the plague’’, the federal government issued an order forbidding the travel of Asians on public transportation out of the city. Remarkably in this case the Federal district court found the order a clear violation of the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and struck it down (McClain, 1988). But far more often, courts have accepted uncritically the claims of scientific necessity to justify intrusions on personal liberties in connection with disease outbreaks. One of the reasons for this, perhaps, is that public health decisions have been understood to be based on objective scientific facts which directly imply a particular strategy for control. In fact, even when the science is well understood, there may be a variety of strategic implications among which policy choices must be made which are not determined by scientific necessity and which should be subject to careful review by the courts. This is particularly true in dealing with an apparently new infectious agent, where such key epidemiologic information as the route of transmission, the transmissibility of the agent, the incubation period and the period of infectiousness are all likely to be unknown, and where evidence may be sparse or conflicting (Wenzel & Edmond, 2003a). Efforts at infection control may require the benefit of the doubt when first undertaken, but should be flexible enough so that they can be refocused quickly in response to evolving scientific knowledge. Perhaps it is helpful to begin with some conventional wisdom about the use of quarantines which recent experience with SARS outbreaks has put to the test. It has traditionally been considered that involuntary quarantine is the principal tool to control rapidly spreading disease outbreaks. Of course, the use of vaccines, as with smallpox introductions in the 1940s (Weinstein, 1947) or, more recently, measles outbreaks among displaced persons (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003), or of prophylactic antibiotics have been highly effective in specific settings. But, particularly where the agent is unknown, or is not susceptible to antibiotics or antivirals, both of which were true at the onset of the SARS outbreak,
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quarantine is often considered to be the only responsible action to protect the public’s health, and plans for dealing with bioterrorism attacks or natural outbreaks of disease include provisions for quarantine (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004a, 2004b; WHO, 2004). However, modern analyses raise important questions about the effectiveness of quarantine in past outbreaks (Oregon Department of Human Services, 2002), the value of quarantine and similar widespread approaches to infection control in the SARS outbreaks (Bell, 2004) or their likely benefits in future events (Lloyd-Smith, Galvani, & Getz, 2003). Lloyd-Smith and his colleagues emphasize the need to consider quarantine within the very specific conditions of the particular outbreak involved, the details of the quarantine plan, and the stage of the outbreak which has been reached at the time quarantine is being considered. For example, the utility of quarantine in a smallpox outbreak is limited by its relatively long, two-week incubation period, meaning that many infected persons who are not yet symptomatic could have moved away from their site of exposure before their symptoms appear. Second- and third-generation cases could then appear far from the site of the original epidemic focus, potentially exposing a great many persons who would not be located within a specific population or geographic area and making it impossible to identify a reasonable group of people for quarantine. During the recent SARS outbreak, several countries established strict quarantine regimens for persons who were in the general vicinity of SARS cases – including not only household members, visitors, or co-workers, but even people using the same trolley or bus as a person with SARS (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003a). In China, about 30,000 residents of Beijing were quarantined either at their homes or at congregate quarantine facilities for a median of 14 days as a result of such regulations. A recent survey of one district showed that about 2.3% of quarantinees developed SARS, suggesting that about 44 persons were held in quarantine for each person who eventually became ill. Thus, the efficiency of quarantine was extremely low. Similar data from Taiwan (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003b) are consistent with this conclusion. Of the 131,132 persons quarantined, 133 eventually developed SARS, or about 1 in 1000. Yet, despite these extensive uses of quarantine, the outbreaks continued to grow in both Beijing and Taiwan, suggesting that quarantine had little impact on the dynamics of disease spread. It should be pointed out that a study of the Hong Kong experience concluded that restriction of interpersonal contact did play an important role in controlling the outbreak (Riley et al., 2003). However, the study did not allow a clear distinction to be made
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between the contribution of isolation, restricting access to persons already symptomatic, and quarantine, or restrictions on well persons who are thought to be at risk for developing the disease. In fact, control efforts in many countries went beyond efforts to quarantine ‘contacts’ as broadly defined, and included efforts to restrict the movement of all persons with fever by screening travelers at airports, checking the temperatures of people visiting hospitals or public buildings, or even by screening the general public at ‘‘fever stations’’ established on busy city streets. Persons found to be febrile might be restricted to their own homes for more intensive surveillance, or be placed into quarantine. These efforts, too, appear to have had very limited effect on controlling the epidemic (Bell et al., 2004). Of 14 million travelers screened in China, only 12 cases of SARS were identified, or about 1 case per million. These 12 cases represented 0.4% of all SARS cases in China. Indeed, some clusters of cases were traced back to contact among persons waiting to be screened at the street corner ‘fever stations’. Thus, on balance, it is not clear whether such interventions may have increased rather than diminished disease transmission. The key to controlling SARS, as subsequent experience taught us, was the control of hospital transmission from ill patients (Wenzel & Edmond, 2003b; Svoboda et al., 2004). As asymptomatic contacts appear to be noninfectious and infectiousness presumably increases with increasing viral loads as the disease progresses (Peiris et al., 2003), in retrospect quarantine may not have accomplished more than shortening the time between the onset of symptoms and the institution of hospital isolation. A second perspective to bring to the issue of quarantine is to ask what factors make it difficult to maintain quarantine, of an individual or a group, when it is necessary. One clear issue is the reluctance of people to be separated from their loved ones during a period of crisis. Separation of children from parents or of husbands from wives was a continuing theme in immigrant community newspapers’ criticism of quarantine procedures in the early twentieth century (Markel, 1997), and continues to be an important factor in the preference for home quarantine whenever possible. Another important issue, discussed both by commentators on the SARS outbreak in Hong Kong (Canham, 2003), and the outbreak in Toronto (Rothstein et al., 2003) is the need to maintain personal income during emergencies. While persons with permanent positions often have sick leave or other mechanisms of maintaining their salaries, many persons working for an hourly wage, those working on a daily basis and the self-employed may lose most or all of their income during a quarantine. The need to assure income during a period of quarantine is essential to gain broad public cooperation, and
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mechanisms for doing this, even for undocumented workers, must be part of equitable quarantine planning. It is also a generally agreed upon principle of quarantine that the state must accept the responsibility for the well-being of persons whose activities are restricted. On the one hand, this means that it is never permissible to mix asymptomatic individuals who are at risk for disease because of their previous contacts with already ill persons who are not in quarantine, but are in isolation. Unfortunately, failure to respect this distinction characterized some of the hastily organized procedures in several areas where SARS outbreaks occurred. It is also essential to recognize the serious psychological impact quarantine may have (Hawryluck et al., 2004), and to provide appropriate resources to maintain social support among persons in quarantine and communication between them and the general community. In the United States, SARS cases were extremely rare, and there were no outbreaks (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003c). However, with many travelers arriving from outbreak areas, confusions over the risk factors to apply in evaluating ill travelers, and little or no preparation in many areas of the country, several hundreds of people were restricted as ‘‘possible’’ SARS cases or contacts. In some cases, these decisions were made by ambulance attendants or EMT personnel, sometimes at the behest of airline staff (Wichita (KS) Eagle, 2004); in other areas, popular anxieties forced the isolation of travelers returning from China even when there was no longer a rationale for such restrictions; in many areas public health authorities failed to exercise their authority or responsibility by establishing appropriate screening criteria for sick passengers, by clarifying the status of returning travelers, or by intervening in decision making by ill-informed and unauthorized persons. It should be noted that when experienced public health officials took the lead, potentially difficult situations were handled professionally, limiting the harms which travelers or the general public might experience (San Diego (CA) Union-Tribune, 2003). While public health emergencies arising from natural infections are far more likely, intentional uses of microbes as weapons are in many ways more problematic challenges for public health officials. First, the recognition that such events represent criminal behavior, or even attacks on the security of the United States, means that law enforcement and military personnel will be involved in formulating the official response, as the FBI was in the anthrax mailings in 2001 (Butler, Cohen, Friedman, Scripp, & Walz, 2002). Unfortunately, this may complicate the obligation of public health officials to protect the health of the community within the appropriate limits of due process. While many police officials are sensitive to due process issues, the
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military has little experience in this area, and based on past planning for civil emergencies, appears more likely to neglect these matters in an effort to accomplish its mission (Department of the Army, 1984). It is therefore extremely important that decisions with regard to activities directly affecting the public’s health be vested in public health officers under the supervision of elected officials and the courts. And it is equally important that impartial judicial oversight of quarantine be assured. This is an aspect of emergency planning which has as yet had only limited implementation in this country (Matthews, 2003), although it has been incorporated into the international understanding of civil rights for nearly two decades as the ‘Siracusa principles’ (UN Economic and Social Council, 1985). While the ethos of public health officials is one of the application of science in the service of the community, their actions have at times been inequitable, based on unscientific attitudes about the predisposition of various ethnic groups to disease, or ineffective because of misunderstandings about the route of disease spread, the timing of contagiousness, or profound social and cultural gaps between the officials and the communities they served. Such inequities are quickly recognized by the public and can work to undermine its confidence in official decisions and its willingness to cooperate with them.
2. APPROACHES TO IMPROVING QUARANTINE It should be central to our planning for public health emergencies that disease control should be accomplished by ‘‘the least intrusive method’’. Quarantine is a last resort, involving huge costs, both financial and social, and, in some cases, only of uncertain value in helping to control disease outbreaks. Quarantine is strictly a tool for control of certain types of contagious diseases. It is not and never should be used as a method of ensuring control over civilian populations or in a misguided effort to reduce the chances of civil unrest or disorder. Indeed, the inappropriate or poorly effected use of quarantine is more likely to provoke turmoil than is the threat of epidemic disease itself (Leavitt, 2003; Colgrove, 2004). As a public health function, it should be the responsibility of public health officials. A crucial factor in the acceptability and effectiveness of any strategy used to address a public emergency is the establishment of mutual trust between the public and civil authorities. Such trust requires at least three things: responsible decision making which fairly distributes burdens and awards benefits on the bases of capacity to contribute and need for assistance, a firm commitment to open and honest public communications, and respect for the
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capacities of individuals and communities to best judge their own needs and to play a major, and sometimes a lead, role in addressing them (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2001). Decisions about controlling a disease outbreak rest not only on scientific knowledge, but also on social and political judgments. In a democracy the public are entitled to know clearly the purpose of a quarantine, the criteria for quarantine, the persons responsible for carrying out the quarantine, and the criteria which would allow the quarantine to be lifted. Public trust is also founded on the commitment of officials to use objective knowledge to the greatest extent possible to legitimate their decisions. It is clear now that many of the control measures used in the SARS outbreak were ineffective, or erroneous, including fever screening of travelers or city residents, extending quarantine beyond persons in direct face-to-face contact with persons ill with SARS, or assuming that persons were infectious even before they became symptomatic. Early in the course of any disease outbreak we can expect that measures will be taken which subsequently are found to be unnecessary or ineffective. Officials should be prepared to modify regimens as soon as scientific evidence warrants. Credibility is more likely to be maintained when new knowledge is applied to correct previous inaccurate assumptions than when decisions are rigidly maintained in the face of contrary evidence. It is possible that political leaders will insist on certain measures because of their symbolic significance or because of misunderstandings of their previous effectiveness (WHO, 2004). While all official actions are ultimately the responsibility of the elected officials, it is important for public health experts not to rationalize political decisions with dubious science. Our experiences with SARS, as well as more sophisticated analyses of previous epidemics, like the Influenza Epidemic of 1918–1919, offer us more solid scientific ground on which to base quarantine decisions, as well as better understanding of the policy implications such decisions carry. There are both scientific and social aspects of quarantine which should be modified in order to improve the likelihood of public acceptance, to assure equitable application of quarantine, and to ameliorate the harm which quarantine can be expected to cause. The recent experience with SARS emphasized the practicability of home quarantine, reserving congregate quarantine only for those who are homeless, for travelers, or as an alternative for those who live alone or who prefer not to remain at home. Public acceptance will require a clear presentation by expert officials of the rationale for quarantine. Wide variations in quarantine arrangements within some countries were felt to undermine public confidence in the rationale for and fair application of quarantine (Rothstein et al., 2003). It
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will also require a comprehensive plan for addressing the needs of persons who may be quarantined – including such things as protection of people’s jobs and income during quarantine, assuring delivery of food and fuel, and making the widest possible use of home-based quarantine which will help to keep families together. Persons under quarantine orders should have reasonable access to due process proceedings under which they may challenge such orders or apply for release. Therefore, courts and legal counsel must be prepared, both intellectually and practically, to participate in such proceedings. Courts need to have a solid understanding of the technical as well as the legal bases for quarantine. Arrangements should be available for electronic court appearances by quarantinees. And, counsel should be available to persons challenging quarantine orders. Better technical understanding will require educational efforts by public health experts for both judges and attorneys. While some efforts have been made to educate legal counsel in public health departments (Matthews, 2003; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004c), there is still a great need to educate attorneys who could speak for quarantinees. Local bar associations and civil liberties groups should work with public health and other legal experts to provide this training and to develop a roster of counsel who would be available to take such cases on a pro bono basis in an emergency. Consideration might also be given to assigning jurisdiction in such cases to a single court easily accessible both to state officials and to counsel for petitioners, as has been done in Minnesota (Gustafson, 2004). State laws protecting jobs and assuring family income during quarantine are essential, as demonstrated recently in Canada (Rothstein et al., 2003) and Hong Kong (Canham, 2003). In one survey of 111 people in Toronto who were quarantined or had a family member or close friend quarantined, the leading problems associated with quarantine were ‘‘emotional difficulty being confined’’ and ‘‘did not get paid due to missing work’’ (Blendon, Benson, DesRoches, Raleigh, & Taylor-Clark, 2004). Such protection should include not only quarantinees themselves, but also persons who may be needed to remain at home to look after quarantined persons. Such protections will be especially important in encouraging voluntary absences for people whose jobs would not allow them to work from home (New Mexico Employment Law Letter, 2003). It is also important that plans for quarantine include provision of social and psychological support to quarantinees and their families. The psychological impact, often strong throughout the affected community, can be especially severe for persons quarantined as being at risk for developing illness, with substantial numbers of persons quarantined in Canada
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experiencing depression or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Hawryluck et al., 2004). Efforts need to be planned for in advance to reduce the psychological impact of quarantine, for example by making arrangements for electronic contact of quarantinees with the general community through videophone and internet connections. Professional support by social workers should be routinely provided to assist quarantinees and their families, and provisions for referral to clinical psychologists and psychiatrists should be in place for persons showing evidence of more severe emotional impact. There is a considerable likelihood that people will make every effort to avoid houses where quarantinees are living. Quarantinees and their families need to be assured of regular deliveries of food, fuel, and medications, regular postal delivery service, and the maintenance of regular trash pickups. Assurances will also need to be provided to other residents in buildings housing quarantinees that they and their families are not being put at risk by the persons under quarantine living there. All residents will need prompt access to knowledgeable public health and medical advice to help address their concerns. It would seem appropriate to treat quarantinees and their families as public benefactors, assuming burdensome restrictions in order to protect the health of the larger community. As such, they should be entitled to every consideration while undergoing these restrictions. Under no circumstances should quarantinees and persons in isolation, who are actively ill, be held together, a procedure which would only increase the risk to the health of quarantinees, as it has in past outbreaks (Markel, 1997). It is especially important that persons in quarantine and their families receive priority for medical attention, whether related to the outbreak or not, and for preventive or therapeutic agents which emerge as helpful as the outbreak progresses.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO DISEASE CONTROL IN EMERGENCIES There are a wide range of tools available to help control disease outbreaks. Methods of increasing ‘‘social distance’’, such as ‘‘snow days’’, school closings, rescheduling large public gatherings, encouraging people to work at home when possible, and suspending public transportation, are all potentially of use, and are likely to be less disruptive and more acceptable than impositions of quarantine. Even personal separation of high-risk ‘‘contacts’’ can be accomplished without conventional involuntary incarceration, using
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voluntary or supervised home quarantine as was done so successfully in Toronto (Svoboda et al., 2004). On the other hand, authoritarian procedures to quarantine large numbers of people indiscriminately can be counterproductive, as was exemplified at the Amoy Gardens apartment house (Government of Hong Kong, 2003) where a large number of residents fled the building in anticipation before the quarantine could be put in place (Mandavilli, 2003). Similar behavior to avoid drastic quarantine occurred in Taiwan (McNeil, 2003). The use of vaccines or immune globulins or of prophylactic antibiotics or antivirals may also have important roles to play in some outbreak situations. Control of insect or animal reservoirs of infection may be crucial in particular cases, as with West Nile Virus or Avian Influenza. However, comprehensive planning for future outbreaks must include certain factors which are likely to play a role no matter what the infectious agent is. These factors include the confusion and uncertainty of the early phase of any disease outbreak, and public concerns about the risks of infection, coupled with long held attitudes (Lasker, 2004) about the trustworthiness of public officials, the likelihood of equitable or inequitable solutions to community problems, the personal economic impact of proposed strategies, and the basic needs which individuals and families have for reassurance, for protection, and for support. Thus, a key element in a comprehensive disease control program is a plan for effective, reliable, and trustworthy public communication (Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, & Hyde, 2001). A second key element is a form of creative leadership which is uncommon, but essential in an emergency. One of the most remarkable stories of the response to the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 was the spontaneous organization of the evacuation of several hundred thousand persons by boat from lower Manhattan. This successful example of innovative public responsiveness to a disaster of enormous magnitude was in large part due to the effective actions of the Coast Guard Commandant who was captain of the Port of New York. This man recognized that his most valuable contribution as a professional was not to take over the evacuation, but to support it, allowing the public broad latitude to make its own decisions, as circumstances demanded, while providing whatever technical support was necessary to support the safety and efficiency of the operation (Kendra, Wachtendorf, & Quarantelli, 2003). Such intelligent and timely support can be an example to other public servants in their role of aiding the public in its response to emergencies. While public health authorities have invaluable specialized information, and, at times, may need to make authoritative decisions for the entire community, every effort should be made to respect
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the preferences of the public to the greatest extent possible, and to recognize that sometimes the most valuable contribution public servants can make is simply to serve the public.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The research on which this article is based was supported in part under a Cooperative Agreement between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Association of Schools of Public Health providing for Academic Centers for Public Health Preparedness.
REFERENCES Barbera, J., Macintyre, A., Gostin, L., Inglesby, T., O’Toole, T., DeAtley, C., Tonat, K., & Layton, M. (2001). Large-scale quarantine following biological terrorism in the United States: Scientific examination, logistic and legal limits, and possible consequences. Journal of the American Medical Association, 286, 2711–2717. Bell, D. M., & World Health Organization Working Group on International and Community Transmission of SARS. (2004). Public health interventions and SARS spread, 2003. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 10(11), 1900–1906. Blendon, R. J., Benson, J. M., DesRoches, C. M., Raleigh, E., & Taylor-Clark, K. (2004). The public’s response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Toronto and the United States. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 38, 925–931. Butler, J. C., Cohen, M. L., Friedman, C. R., Scripp, R. M., & Walz, C. G. (2002). Collaboration between public health and law enforcement: New paradigms and partnerships for bioterrorism planning and response. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8, 1152–1156. Canham, J. (2003). SARS – Legal obligations and implications for employers. Hong Kong Lawyer (May) 2003. http://www.hk-lawyer.com/2003-5/May03-phprac.htm (accessed on February 21, 2004). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003a). Efficiency of quarantine during an epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – Beijing, China, 2003. Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report, 53, 1037–1040. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003b). Use of quarantine to prevent transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – Taiwan, 2003. Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report, 52, 680–683. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003c). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) report of cases in the United States. Final Report: October 1, 2003. http:// www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/sars/cases.htm (accessed on February 21, 2004). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2004a). Public health guidance for communitylevel preparedness and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2, Supplement D: Community containment measures, including non- hospital isolation and quarantine, January 8, 2004. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/d/pdf/d.pdf (accessed on December 1, 2004).
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2004b). Postexposure prophylaxis, isolation, and quarantine to control an import-associated measles outbreak – Iowa, 2004. Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report, 53, 969–971. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2004c). Public health legal preparedness materials: Materials related to quarantine and isolation. http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/od/phlp/ QuarantineIsolation.asp (accessed on November 26, 2004). Clarke, L. (2002). Panic: Myth or reality? Contexts I. http://www.contextsmagazine.org/content sample v1-3.php (accessed on September 27, 2004). Colgrove, J. (2004). Between persuasion and compulsion: Smallpox control in Brooklyn and New York, 1894–1902. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 78, 349–378. Covello, V. T., Peters, R. G., Wojtecki, J. G., & Hyde, R. C. (2001). Risk communication, the West Nile virus epidemic, and bioterrorism: Responding to the communication challenges posed by the intentional or unintentional release of a pathogen in an urban setting. Journal of Urban Health, 78, 382–391. Davis, M. C., & Kumar, R. C. (2003). The scars of SARS: Balancing human rights and public health concerns. Hong Kong Lawyer (May) 2003. http://www.hk-lawver.com/2003-5/ MayO3-phprac.htm (accessed on February 21, 2004). Department of the Army. (1984). Operation Garden Plot. The United States Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2. June 1, 1984. http://www.cafes.net/mo/Gardenplot.htm (accessed on August 8, 2004). Edelson, P. J. (2003). Quarantine and social inequity. JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association, 290, 2874. Glass, T. A., & Schoch-Spana, M. (2001). Bioterrorism and the people: How to vaccinate a city against panic. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 34, 217–223. Gostin, L. O., Burris, S., & Lazzarini, Z. (1999). The law and the public’s health: A study of infectious disease law in the United States. Columbia Law Review, 99(1), 59–128. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Department of Health. (2003). Outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) at Amoy Gardens, Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. Main findings of the investigation. http://www.info.gov.hk/info/ap/pdf/ amoy e.pdf (accessed on September 27, 2004). Gustafson, P. (2004). A quiet study of new quarantine law; State officials are sketching out plans for quarantine hearings in case a SARS-like disease reaches Minnesota. Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN), February 2, p. lB. Harrisson, T. (1989). Living through the blitz. New York, NY: Schocken Books. Hawryluck, L., Gold, W. L., Robinson, S., Pogorski, S., Galea, S., & Styra, R. (2004). SARS control and psychological effects of quarantine, Toronto, Canada. Emerging infectious disease [serial on the Internet]. 10. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol10no7/03-0703.htm (accessed on September 27, 2004). Kendra, J., Wachtendorf, T., & Quarantelli, E. L. (2003). The evacuation of lower Manhattan by water transport on September 11: An unplanned ‘‘success’’. Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Safety, 29, 316–320. Lasker, R. (2004). Redefining readiness: Terrorism planning through the eyes of the public. Center for the advancement of collaborative strategies in health. The New York Academy of Medicine. http://www.cacsh.org/pdf/redefiningreadinessstudy.pdf (accessed on December 1, 2004). Leavitt, J. W. (2003). Public resistance or cooperation? A tale of smallpox in two cities. Biosecurity & Bioterrorism, 1(3), 185–192.
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Lloyd-Smith, J. O., Galvani, A. P., & Getz, W. M. (2003). Curtailing transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome within a community and its hospital. Proceedings. Biological Sciences/The Royal Society, 270(1528), 1979–1989. Mandavilli, A. (2003). SARS epidemic unmasks age-old quarantine conundrum. Nature Medicine, 9, 487. Markel, H. (1997). Quarantine! European Jewish immigrants and the New York City epidemics of 1892. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Matthews, G. W. (2003). Public health law. Presented at the CDC public health law conference: June 16–18, 2003. http://www.phppo.cdc.gov/od/phlp/conference03/ (accessed on February 21, 2004). McClain, C. (1988). Of medicine, race, and American law: The bubonic plague outbreak of 1900. Law Social Inquiry: Journal of the American Bar Foundation, 13, 447–513. McNeil, D. G. (2003). Fight in Taiwan is impeded by resistance to isolation. New York Times, May 12, p. A12. New Mexico Employment Law Letter. (2003). Health epidemics raise employment law issues. New Mexico Employment Law Letter 9. Oregon Department of Human Services. (2002). Smallpox: Spread, control and counterintuition. CD Summary, 51, 1–2. Peiris, J. S. M., Chu, C. M., Cheng, V. C. C., Chan, K. S., Poon, L. L. M., Law, K. L., Tang, S. F., Hon, T. Y. W., Chan, C. S., Chan, K. H., Ng, J. S. C., Zheng, B. J., Ng, W. I., Lai, R. W. M., Guan, Y., Yuen, K. Y., & members of the Hong Kong University/United Christian Hospital SARS Study Group. (2003). Clinical progression and viral load in a community outbreak of coronavirus-associated SARS pneumonia: A prospective study. Lancet, 363, 1767–1772. Riley, S., Fraser, C., Donnelly, C. A., Ghani, A. C., Abu-Raddad, L. I., Hedley, A. J., Leung, G. M., Ho, L. M., Lam, T. H., Thach, T. Q., Chau, P., Chan, K. P., Lo, S. V., Leung, P. Y., Tsang, T., Ho, W., Lee, K. H., Lau, E. M. C., Ferguson, N. M., & Anderson, R. M. (2003). Transmission dynamics of the etiological agent of SARS in Hong Kong: Impact of public health interventions. Science, 300(5627), 1961–1966. Risse, G. B. (1992). ‘‘A long pull, a strong pull, and all together’’: San Francisco and bubonic plague, 1907–1908. Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 66, 260–286. Rothstein, M. A., Alcalde, M. G., Elster, N. R., Majumder, M. A., Palmer, L. I., Stone, T. H., & Hoffman, R. E. (2003). Quarantine and isolation: Lessons learned from SARS. Unpublished report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. http://www.louisville.edu/ medschool/ibhpl/images/pdf/SARS REPORT.pdf (accessed on September 26, 2004). San Diego Union-Tribune. (2003). San Jose airport quarantines Asian flight. San Diego UnionTribune, April 7. Smith, C. (2001). Faith and doubt: The imaginative dimensions of the Great Chicago fire. In: S. Biel (Ed.), American disasters (pp. 129–169). New York: New York University Press. Svoboda, T., Henry, B., Shulman, L., Kennedy, E., Rea, E., Ng, W., Wallington, T., Yaffe, B., Gournis, E., Vicencio, E., Basrur, S., & Glazier, R. H. (2004). Public health measures to control the spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto. New England Journal of Medicine, 350, 2352–2361. UN Economic and Social Council. (1985). United Nations, Economic and Social Council, subcommission on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities, Siracusa principles on the limitation and derogation of provisions in the international covenant on civil and political rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4. http://www.umn.edu/ humanrts/instree/siracusaprinciples.html (accessed on September 26, 2004).
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UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2003). Tajikistan: Measles outbreak contained by mass vaccination. http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID ¼ 31818&SelectRegion ¼ CentralAsia&SelectCountry ¼ TAJAKISTAN (accessed on September 27, 2004). Weinstein, I. (1947). An outbreak of smallpox in New York City. American Journal of Public Health, 37, 1347–1384. Wenzel, R. P., & Edmond, M. B. (2003a). Managing SARS amidst uncertainty. New England Journal of Medicine, 348, 1947–1948. Wenzel, R. P., & Edmond, M. B. (2003b). Listening to SARS: Lessons for infection control. Annals of Internal Medicine, 139, 592–593. Wichita (KS) Eagle (2004). SARS scare hits family in pocketbook. Wichita (KS) Eagle, February 2, 1A. World Health Organization (WHO). (2004). WHO consultation on priority public health interventions before and during an Influenza pandemic. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 16–18 March. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian influenza/en/final.pdf (accessed on December 1, 2004).
CHAPTER 3 THE 2003 SARS OUTBREAK IN CANADA: LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS ABOUT THE USE OF QUARANTINE Nola M. Ries It is not surprising that the advent of a frightening, seemingly new public health menace has prompted consideration of coercive measures. Throughout history, plagues have been met with restrictions upon individual liberties. (Parmet, 2003, p. 95)
INTRODUCTION The 2003 global outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was an abrupt reminder that infectious diseases pose a continuing threat to human health. In 1967, U.S. Surgeon General William H. Stewart declared ‘‘it was time to close the book on infectious diseases’’ (Garrett, 1994, citing W.H. Stewart, ‘‘A Mandate for State Action,’’ presented at the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, Washington, DC, December 4, 1967). In the latter half of the twentieth century, many shared this bold view that medical science had vanquished infectious disease. As a result, public health struggled to remain relevant in the face of advances in pharmaceuticals, surgery, genetics and other areas that were becoming increasingly dominant in the quest to extend and enhance human life. SARS forced many to rethink the significance of public health and the crisis, though Ethics and Epidemics Advances in Bioethics, Volume 9, 43–67 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3709/doi:10.1016/S1479-3709(06)09003-0
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relatively short-lived, (for commentary on the disparities between the responses to HIV and SARS, see e.g. Altman (2003)) underscored the need to rebuild public health capacity that had been allowed to slip down the health system priority list. Outside Asia, Canada was the country hardest hit by SARS. The outbreak took 44 lives, threatened many others and created numerous challenges for public health officials and for the acute health care system. In particular, SARS highlighted serious deficiencies in public health infrastructure and preparedness. As in other countries, officials in Canada were required to weigh and implement various interventions to control the spread of the disease, including quarantine. In this chapter, I provide a legal and ethical discussion of the use of quarantine to control infectious disease outbreaks, using the Canadian experience with SARS as a case example. Quarantine represents the archetypal conflict that confronts public health: the tension between society’s dual interests in safeguarding individual liberty while protecting and promoting the health of its citizens. I identify legislative authority for imposing quarantine on individuals and discuss limits on its use. Although the law may confer broad authority on public health officials to impose measures like quarantine, I argue those officials ought to be guided by ethical principles in considering when to use coercive powers that abrogate individual liberties. To this end, I discuss ethical frameworks to guide and inform public health decision making. Finally, I comment on quarantine’s impact on individuals, including psychological and economic impacts as well as its effect on the health care system.
SARS IN CANADA: A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY SARS emerged in China in November 2002. The disease traveled to Canada in late February 2003 when an elderly woman who acquired the disease in Hong Kong returned to her home in Toronto, Ontario, Canada’s most populous metropolitan area with approximately 4.6 million people. She died 10 days after her return. Two days later, her 44-year-old son went to the emergency department of a major Toronto hospital, exhibiting high fever, a severe cough and difficulty in breathing – symptoms that a couple of weeks later would trigger alarm bells as a potential SARS case, but, at the time, health care workers did not know what confronted them. While awaiting admission, the man remained in an open area of a busy emergency department for 18–20 hours. This delay in admitting and isolating him was due, in
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part, to hospital overcrowding. Many patients and staff were exposed to the man before he was isolated. This patient died a week later. By then, public health officials realized that the mysterious disease outbreak in Asia had gained a foothold in Canada.1 SARS began to spread to patients, health care workers and visitors in several hospitals in the Toronto area. Hospitals at the epicenter of the outbreak began closing emergency and intensive care services and refused new admissions. By late March 2003, the Ontario government amended its public health statute, the Health Protection and Promotion Act, to classify SARS as a reportable, communicable disease. With the addition of SARS to the statute, public health officials could trace infected individuals and their contacts and use measures, including quarantine, to try to limit the spread of disease. On March 26, 2003, the Ontario government declared a provincial state of emergency under the Emergency Management Act (1990). The government then ordered all hospitals in the Greater Toronto area to activate ‘‘Code Orange’’ emergency plans that required them to suspend non-essential services, restrict visitors, and create isolation units for SARS patients. Several days later, all hospitals in Ontario were required to implement access restrictions. In short, [t]he hospital milieu changed abruptly in late March. A command structure was put in place in the hospital and public health directives from the province enacted authoritatively. Physical access to the hospital was restricted to a single entrance. [Those] whose work was deemed non-essential were told to stay at home. Visitors were not allowed, with some exceptions. Surgical procedures and outpatient appointments were cancelled. The cafeteria was closed y infection control procedures took precedence over almost all other aspects of hospital function. (Maunder, 2004, p. 1118)
Quarantine was used extensively during the outbreak, with tens of thousands of individuals observing quarantine. For example, anyone who had visited certain hospitals during specific time periods was asked to observe quarantine. One thousand and seven hundred high school students were quarantined after one student at the school became ill. In most cases, individuals complied with quarantine on a voluntary basis, but public health officials sought legally enforceable quarantine orders in a small number of cases. Svoboda et al. (2004) note that over 13,000 Toronto residents voluntarily complied with quarantine, and the city’s public health department had to resort to mandatory orders in only 27 cases. This accounted for just 0.1% of individuals in the metropolitan region requiring quarantine. In contrast with other countries where quarantine was enforced more oppressively, in Canada, individuals were not threatened with imprisonment
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or execution, as was the case in China (Mitka, 2003). In Canada, there were no barricades and tape to seal people inside buildings as occurred in Hong Kong (Mandavalli, 2003). There was no issue of electronic wrist tags as in Singapore and no contracting of security companies to install surveillance cameras. Many health care workers in the Toronto region were quarantined. ‘‘Work quarantine’’ also was imposed, which required health workers to travel directly between work and home without using public transit and without stopping at any other destination. They also had to separate themselves from family members while at home, wear masks when in contact with others in their household, and not have visitors. Over half of Toronto’s 850 paramedics ended up under 10-day home quarantine during the outbreak (Silverman, Simor, & Loufty, 2004). In total, Canada had 438 cases of SARS; 251 of those were probable and 187 suspected. Ultimately, 44 people died from the disease.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUARANTINE Quarantine is one of the oldest public health tools, used by authorities to quell the spread of disease long before microscopic agents were understood as the source of contagion (Sehdev, 2002; Clemow, 1929). Its roots are in the quarantine of shipping vessels, primarily to prevent spread of contagion via infested cargo and persons. One commentator notes that quarantine practices have long been notorious for their ill-treatment of and cruelty to travelers. For centuries, travelers faced involuntary isolation based on arbitrary regulations and irrational fears in often unhealthy, degrading conditions, sometimes reinforced by the threat of execution. (Fidler, 2000, p. 289)
Indeed, quarantine has a history of being imposed with a heavy hand by officials motivated by fear and prejudice rather than medical fact. In 1900, after the body of a bubonic plague victim was discovered in San Francisco’s Chinatown, the U.S. President ordered quarantine of all Chinese and Japanese residents of the city based, in part, on ‘‘the notion that Asians were particularly susceptible to plague because of their dietary reliance on rice rather than animal protein’’ (Edelson, 2003, p. 2874). Further evidence of questionable attitudes toward and uses of quarantine emerged in the earlier years of the HIV pandemic. American public opinion polls in the l980s revealed that ‘‘28 to 54 percent of the respondents favored ‘quarantine’ of people with AIDS in ‘special places to keep them away from the general public’’’ (Gostin & Zeigler, 1987, p. 11).
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The nation of Cuba did, in fact, institute mandatory quarantine for HIVpositive persons between 1986 and 1994, but ‘‘no systematic epidemiological studies of HIV infection in Cuba have been published that would clarify the relative effects of quarantine’’ and other measures (Hansen & Groce, 2003, p. 2875). There is no evidence that quarantine was applied in a discriminatory manner in Canada during the 2003 SARS outbreak. In fact, those who were asked to observe quarantine represented a wide cross-section of the population and individuals disadvantaged by poverty, race or disability were not disproportionately represented. One survey of over a hundred Torontonians who were in quarantine revealed that 72% had a college education or higher and 48% had an annual household income of more than C$75,000 (Hawryluck et al., 2004). Although the sample size was relatively small, these findings were not surprising considering that health care workers comprised a large number of people who observed quarantine. Nonetheless, the lessons of history remain instructive to ensure that past prejudices are not repeated.
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY FOR QUARANTINE IN CANADA The Canadian Constitution divides authority over various subjects between the federal government and provincial governments (Constitution Act, 1867). The provinces have primary authority over health care, though the federal government exercises some authority in the health sphere through its spending powers (i.e. the ability to tax citizens and redistribute funds to provincial governments for health-related programs), criminal law power, and ‘‘peace, order and good government power,’’ which authorizes the federal government to act during times of national emergency (Jackman, 2000). The federal government also has explicit constitutional authority to quarantine persons and conveyances (such as airplanes and shipping vessels) entering and leaving the country. While provincial governments have authority to impose quarantine within provincial borders, the federal government’s quarantine powers are concerned with the international movement of people and goods. Both federal and provincial quarantine powers came into play during the 2003 SARS outbreak. The federal Quarantine Act and regulations authorize the government of Canada to appoint quarantine officers who may detain and assess individuals entering and leaving the country who are suspected of having a contagious disease listed in the regulations (cholera, plague, smallpox and
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yellow fever) or any other dangerous disease (Quarantine Act, 1985, Sections 8, 11). A ‘‘dangerous disease’’ is defined as one whose introduction to Canada ‘‘would, in the opinion of the quarantine officer concerned, constitute a grave danger to public health in Canada’’ (Quarantine Act, 1985, Section 2). Persons who are quarantined may appeal their detention to the federal Deputy Minister of Health or the Deputy’s designate (Quarantine Act, 1985, Section 9, 1368). Officers may also hold and inspect conveyances suspected of carrying persons or cargo that may be infected. In June 2003, the Canadian government amended the Quarantine Act regulations to add SARS to the list of contagious diseases. The incubation period of SARS was described as 20 days, meaning a quarantine officer could detain a person suspected of having SARS up to that period of time. In its public notices about amendments to the Quarantine Act, the federal government acknowledged that the World Health Organization recommended a quarantine period of 10 days and advised that quarantine officers would take that recommendation into account if an order had to be made. At the provincial level in Ontario, individuals were asked to observe a 10-day period of quarantine. Fortunately, during the outbreak, no federal quarantine officer faced a situation requiring the issuance of a quarantine order against an individual (Health Canada Fact Sheet, 2003). At the Vancouver International Airport, federal health officials relied on the Quarantine Act to detain an aircraft for decontamination because one passenger had SARS-like symptoms. Various criticisms have been directed at the adequacy and effectiveness of the Canadian response at airports. First, in 2002, the year prior to the SARS outbreak, the federal government transferred airport quarantine duties to customs officials with no special training to carry out those responsibilities (National Advisory Committee, 2003, p. 205). When the SARS outbreak occurred, ‘‘quarantine officers were quickly overextended and eventually needed additional assistance’’ to carry out their duties (National Advisory Committee, 2003, p. 205). Additionally, early in the outbreak, before the cause of SARS was known, federal health officials could not provide definitive decontamination protocols for aircraft, cruise ships or other conveyances. Thermal scanning devices were deployed at the international airports in Toronto and Vancouver to screen for passengers with high temperature. Of approximately 2.4 million air travelers, 832 were identified as requiring further assessment due to high temperature. None had SARS (National Advisory Committee, 2003, p. 206). Some have questioned the utility of large-scale thermal scanning. In a thorough review of the epidemiology,
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transmission and control of SARS, Anderson and colleagues (2004) note that ‘‘the effectiveness of temperature screening at points of entry and exit as a control measure to limit between-country transmission is uncertain at present’’ (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 1104). In the wake of the SARS experience, the National Advisory Commission recommended the federal government ought to ensure that fully trained and informed quarantine officers should be available at airports [and other ports of entry] to deal with health threats, to provide information to and educate airport staff, customs officials, and airline personnel concerning the recognition of illness and measures to be taken to contain risk.’’ (National Advisory Committee, 2003, p. 207)
Before the SARS outbreak occurred, the Canadian government was in the process of reviewing its public health legislation, including the Quarantine Act. The emergence of SARS spurred the government to expedite legislative reform of the quarantine law, which was first enacted in 1872. In May 2004, the federal Minister of Health introduced a modernized statute in the Canadian Parliament, titled ‘‘An Act to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable diseases’’ (Bill C-36). This law is aimed at focusing greater emphasis on air travel, the modern mode of global disease spread (Health Canada News Release, 2004). The revised legislation also has a more extensive list of contagious diseases (which includes active pulmonary tuberculosis, anthrax, diphtheria, measles and poliomyelitis) and empowers the federal government to go so far as to close Canadian entry points to arrivals from a jurisdiction with an infectious disease outbreak. The federal government acknowledges that this would be ‘‘an extreme measure’’ (Health Canada News Release, 2004). In introducing the revised quarantine legislation in the Canadian Parliament, the Minister of State for Public Health remarked that the Quarantine Act was first drafted at a time when automobiles and jetliners were the stuff of science fiction. Needless to say, times have changed. We live in an age when people move from continent to continent in hours and days rather than weeks or months, often in airplanes and ships whose confined spaces provide a perfect breeding ground for highly communicable diseases to spread. Infectious diseases move like wildfire across the planet today. Diseases do not respect borders, so we know that we will face repeated threats to public health in the future. Among the hard lessons learned from the experience of SARS is the need to strengthen our quarantine legislation to help prevent the introduction and spread of both emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases (Hansard, 2004).
The proposed legislation must be reviewed by a parliamentary committee on health and then be approved by the Canadian House of Commons and Senate before being proclaimed into law.
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Each province and territory in Canada has public health legislation that establishes the powers of public health officials to carry out various functions including communicable disease control. This encompasses the authority to issue isolation and quarantine orders. In the province of Ontario, the Health Protection and Promotion Act empowers a medical health officer to order a person who is or may be infected with a communicable disease to ‘‘isolate himself or herself and remain in isolation from other persons’’; otherwise ‘‘conduct himself or herself in such a manner as not to expose another person to infection’’; undergo a medical examination; and submit to necessary treatment (Health Protection and Promotion Act, 1990, Section 22(4)). The medical health officer may issue such an order if she or he has reasonable and probable grounds to believe three conditions exist: (1) ‘‘a communicable disease exists or may exist or that there is an immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease’’; (2) ‘‘the communicable disease presents a risk to the health of persons’’; and (3) ‘‘the requirements specified in the order are necessary in order to decrease or eliminate the risk to health presented by the communicable disease’’ (Health Protection and Promotion Act, 1990, Section 22(2)). The Health Protection and Promotion Act was amended during the 2003 SARS outbreak to specify that an order may be directed at an individual or a class of persons [Section 22 (5.0.1), amended, 2003, Chapter l, Section 15(1)]. This amendment was critical to enable public health officials to deal with situations involving hundreds or thousands of people who may have been exposed to an infectious disease, such as 1,700 high school students. The statutory amendment stipulates that notice may be communicated through the media or other public mechanism when the delay involved in notifying persons individually is ‘‘likely to cause a delay that could, in the opinion of the medical officer of health, significantly increase the risk to the health of any person’’ (Section 5.0.3). Under Ontario’s statute, a medical health officer must inform individuals subject to a quarantine order of their right to a hearing before the Health Services Appeal and Review Board, an administrative tribunal composed of 12 members appointed by the government (Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998). The individual must request a hearing in writing within 15 days of receiving notice of an order. In turn, the Board is obliged to hold a hearing within 15 days of receiving a hearing request and has authority to uphold, vary or rescind the order (Section 44). Despite efforts to safeguard the rights of those who are subject to quarantine orders, some legislative gaps and shortcomings are apparent. For instance, though individuals typically have a right to appeal an order, this
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protection may be illusory in many cases. A person may be ordered to observe quarantine for a period of 10 or 15 days from the date of the notice. Under Ontario’s legislation, the order takes effect immediately, even if the person subject to the order evinces an intention to appeal the order [Section 44 (3)]. After the Health Services Appeal and Review Board receives the notice of hearing, the Board has discretion to suspend the quarantine order, but is not bound to do so. By the time the Board hears the appeal, the matter may well be moot since the quarantine period will likely have passed. In addition, Ontario’s legislation and the federal Quarantine Act are silent with regard to obligations to assure acceptable detention conditions for persons under quarantine outside their homes. Model emergency health powers legislation developed by public health legal experts in the United States provides a template for legislative authority during an event such as an infectious disease outbreak (Gostin et al., 2002). This legislation explicitly addresses responsibilities of public health officials toward individuals who must comply with mandatory quarantine orders. For example, if an individual must wait out the quarantine period in a location other than her or his home, authorities must ensure those premises are safe and hygienic and provide individuals with necessities such as food, clothing, medication and means to communicate with the outside world. In addition, the model U.S. legislation provides for expedited judicial review of quarantine orders and entitles individuals to legal representation. Such legislative protections advance principles of fairness, due process and respect for persons.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO QUARANTINE ORDERS Quarantine orders may be challenged on various legal grounds, but I focus briefly here on constitutional challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (the ‘‘Charter’’). The Charter, which became part of Canada’s Constitution in 1982, guarantees a number of fundamental rights with which the state cannot unjustifiably interfere. Quarantine orders may infringe on various rights protected under the Charter, including the freedom of assembly and association (Section 2), mobility rights (Section 6), rights to liberty and personal security (Section 7), freedom from arbitrary detention (Section 9), freedom from cruel and unusual treatment (Section 9), and equality rights (Section 15). The most likely constitutional basis for challenging a quarantine order is Section 7 of the Charter, which states ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in
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accordance with principles of fundamental justice.’’ Section 7 protects against unreasonable, state-imposed restraints on liberty as well as government action that imposes severe psychological stress (New Brunswick v. JG., 1999; Blencoe v. British Columbia, 2000). Charter rights are not absolute and may be justified under Section 1 of the Charter, which states: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
Under Section 1, the state may justify a Charter violation by convincing a court of four points: its action was based on a pressing and substantial concern; its goal was rationally connected to the limitation imposed on an individual’s rights; the limitation impairs the individual right in a minimal fashion; and there is proportionality between the benefits of the limitation and its harmful impact (R. v. Oakes, 1986). The key challenge under Section 1 is to balance the rights of individuals with the competing interests of society as expressed through government action. A former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada has advised that ‘‘[i]t may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance’’ (R. v. Oakes, 136). The Supreme Court of Canada has further instructed that in justifying a limitation on a Charter right, the government need not provide ‘‘scientific demonstration’’; rather, it can defend its actions ‘‘by the application of common sense to what is known, even though what is known may be deficient from a scientific point of view’’ (RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1995, para. 137). Clearly, in implementing control measures during the early stages of a novel disease outbreak, public health authorities will often lack scientific facts and must make judgment calls about restricting individual liberties in the name of protecting the population as a whole. Despite this general guidance as to how Charter infringements may be justified, there is little Canadian jurisprudence directly addressing potential constitutional violations in the public health context. Consequently, Canada does not have a corpus of legal rulings that instruct how to apply specific Charter rights and the Section 1 justification test in regard to public health interventions. This contrasts with the United States, where courts have given specific instruction as to how to balance competing interests at stake in public health. For example, it has been noted that
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[t]he judge must defer to public health authorities on their choice of public health strategies. Public health orders get the most permissive judicial review y because they are based on objective criteria, are usually of limited duration, and are necessary to prevent imminent harm. (Richards & Rathbun, 2004, p. 356; Gostin, 2000)
In two cases where courts have balanced claims of individual Charter rights against a broader public health interest, the latter has prevailed. The 1995 Ontario court decision in Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario involved HIV testing of stored blood that had been donated some 11 years previously. When the blood was collected from the donors between 1984 and 1985, they were not advised that the blood would be tested for HIV as no such testing capacity existed at that time. When testing became available, the Canadian Red Cross Society tested the stored samples to trace any recipients of contaminated blood. Twenty-two HIV-positive donors were identified; nine of whom had previously been identified, leaving 13 remaining donors. The issue that arose in this case was whether the Red Cross should notify the donors and report them to the Province of Ontario in accordance with the Health Protection and Promotion Act. The Canadian AIDS Society objected to donor notification and reporting on the basis that the donors had not consented to testing their blood for HIV, and notification and reporting would violate the donors’ privacy rights. The Court accepted that Section 7 of the Charter may be interpreted to recognize a blood donor’s privacy interest in regard to personal information revealed through testing their blood samples. However, the Court went on to rule that the public interest in mandatory reporting of HIV cases to public health authorities outweighed the individual donors’ privacy interests. The Court noted that ‘‘although due consideration will be given to the privacy rights of individuals, the state objective of promoting public health for the safety of all will be given great weight’’ (Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario, 1995, para. 133). In 2002, a court in Ontario applied similar logic in adjudicating a Charter challenge by a tuberculosis patient who was under detention for treatment (Toronto (City, Medical Officer of Health) v. Deakin). The patient, who had consented to a four-month detention and treatment order by the medical health officer, challenged a four-month extension to the order that health professionals believed was necessary to control his tuberculosis. The patient, who had been physically restrained during several violent outbursts and was routinely restrained during ‘‘smoke breaks’’ to prevent escape (which he had done once to buy beer), argued the restraints and continued detention violated his constitutional liberty rights. In a brief judgment, the Court
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accepted his rights were violated, but concluded the infringement was justified under Section 1 of the Charter. The Court stated: What was done to [the patient] was carried out for the protection of public health and the prevention of the spread of tuberculosis, a disease that [a medical specialist] described as extremely contagious. [The patient] is in the early stages of the disease, it is eminently treatable now, but will become less responsive and more virulent if not treated. (Toronto (City, Medical Officer of Health) v. Deakin, 2002, para. 26)
Despite the dearth of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence in the public health context, it appears that courts will recognize the need to balance competing interests and will likely give deference to public health officials who must act during times of uncertainty and possible emergency. Only in situations involving arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of public health powers are courts likely to find a breach of rights protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION Lawrence Gostin, a leading public health law expert, counsels that ‘‘[i]n a democratic society, coercive [public health] powers should be carefully justified. We have to balance the public health interests of society against the freedom of the individual’’ (Gostin, 2002, p. 415). Indeed, while the law may give sweeping powers to public health officials, those officials ought to weigh ethical considerations in deciding what public health interventions are justified in particular situations. The field of public health ethics, compared to clinical ethics, is relatively nascent. Only in the past several years have theorists attempted to formulate ethical frameworks for the justification of public health interventions (Kass, 2001; Callahan & Jennings, 2002; Uphsur, 2002). In the wake of the SARS outbreak, specific efforts have been made to identify ethical principles relevant to infectious disease outbreaks (Singer et al., 2003; Gostin et al., 2003). Callahan and Jennings (2002) note that public health is one of few professions backed by the coercive power of the state; the legal authority of public health officials to impose quarantine is one relevant example. They contend that, [b]ecause of its public and governmental roles, public health has ethical problems unlike those of most other professions. The relationship between ethics and law is a long and tangled one, but it is safe to say that most public health laws and regulations have behind them an explicitly moral purpose: that of promoting and protecting the lives of citizens. (Callahan & Jennings, 2002, p. 173)
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Kass (2001) also situates the need for a public health ethics framework in the coercive nature of many public health interventions: Indeed, it is in great part because such power is vested in public health by law that a code or framework of ethics designed specifically for public health is so very important. The need for a code of ethics for public health, then, might be viewed as a code of restraint, a code to preserve fairly and appropriately the negative rights of citizens to noninterference. (Kass, 2001, p. 1777)
Clearly, a number of ethical values come into play in the public health response to outbreaks of infectious diseases like SARS. Members of the Joint Centre for Bioethics at the University of Toronto have enumerated the following as ten key values: individual liberty; protection of the public from harm; proportionality; reciprocity; transparency; privacy; protection of communities from undue stigmatization; duty to provide care; equity; and solidarity (Singer et al., 2003). Gostin, Bayer, and Fairchild (2003) detail similar values. They cite the precautionary principle as central to public health ethics, which requires that steps be taken to protect the public against reasonably foreseeable threats, even in a climate of medical and scientific uncertainty. They emphasize principles of ‘‘least restrictive alternatives,’’ justice, and transparency, within which are subsumed concerns with individual liberty, fairness, privacy and due process. Kass (2001) suggests a six-step framework to guide public health officials in choosing an ethically-sound course of action by evaluating the various options available to them. She argues first that the goals of a public health intervention must be identified. In the context of quarantine, the purpose is to limit the spread of an infectious disease by segregating those who may carry the disease from uninfected individuals. Next, officials ought to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention in achieving its goals. Quarantine clearly will not be effective in reducing spread of a disease that is not transmissible by ordinary community contact. Kass states that ‘‘[t]he question for policy and ethics analysis, then, is what quantity of data is enough to justify a program’s implementation? As a rule of thumb, the greater the burdens posed by a program the stronger the evidence must be to demonstrate that the program will achieve its goals’’ (Kass, 2001, p. 1778). Public health officials must also weigh the burdens or harms the intervention may place on individuals. Quarantine restricts individual liberty by limiting freedom of movement, and imposes various psychosocial burdens that I discuss in greater detail below. As the fourth step in the analysis, it is important to consider whether the burdens of an intervention can be minimized while retaining its efficacy. As Kass (2001) points out: ‘‘If 2 options
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exist to address a public health problem, we are required, ethically, to choose the approach that poses fewer risks to other moral claims, such as liberty, privacy, opportunity and justice. Making this assessment relies on the existence of sound data’’ (p. 1780). As well as being more ethically defensible, a less restrictive intervention is also more likely to withstand legal challenge. The penultimate step in Kass’ framework requires assessing how to implement an intervention in a fair manner that does not unjustifiably discriminate against specific groups. As history reveals, quarantine has been imposed unfairly for inexcusable reasons. Finally, public health officials must consider whether the benefits of an intervention outweigh the burdens. Kass (2001) also acknowledges that, ‘‘public health ethics must emphasize positive rights as well y . Public health has affirmative obligations to improve the public’s health and, arguably, to reduce certain social inequities’’ (2001, p. 1777; emphasis in original). In the specific context of large-scale quarantine, Barbera and colleagues (2001) argue public health authorities should address three key questions. First, does medical evidence indicate that quarantine is likely to be effective in limiting the spread of disease? Second, from a logistical perspective, can officials safely and effectively quarantine large numbers of people? Third, mirroring the last step of Kass’ framework, the adverse consequences of quarantine must be balanced against its potential benefits. It is arguable that the wide-scale imposition of quarantine during the SARS outbreak in Canada, albeit mostly voluntary, was used excessively and, in some cases, would fail to pass the threshold question of being an effective measure to diminish disease transmission. Beijing and Toronto both quarantined around 30,000 people, but Beijing had 10 times as many SARS cases as Toronto: 2,500 compared to Toronto’s 250. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has suggested ‘‘that only a third of the 30,000 Beijing residents quarantined during the SARS outbreak faced significant risk of contracting [the disease because] only residents who came into direct contact with a symptomatic patient were later infected; those who cared for a SARS patient carried the highest risk’’ (Diamond, 2003, citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). So if Beijing used quarantine too often, then Toronto’s even greater use is perhaps subject to even more criticism. It also may be contended that quarantine on this scale was unenforceable; indeed, research describes the inability of public health officials to contact individuals in a timely manner to advise them to observe quarantine. In Toronto, the Department of Public Health identified over 23,000 persons
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who were contacts of SARS patients and, arguably, ought to have been quarantined (Svoboda et al., 2004). Of these, approximately 9,000 could not be reached at all by public health officials, or only after the 10-day quarantine period had expired. Finally, evidence indicates that people with SARS are most infectious 5–10 days after developing symptoms (Peiris et al., 2003) and there are no documented cases of an asymptomatic individual transmitting the disease to another (Ksiazek et al., 2003). This knowledge suggests that quarantining people who have no symptoms will be of little utility. As a consequence, resources ought to be directed at segregating and caring for persons with symptoms and at public education strategies to ensure people can recognize symptoms of the disease and know when to seek medical attention.
THE IMPACT OF QUARANTINE The harsh toll SARS exacted, including the many detrimental impacts of quarantine, came to be termed the ‘‘collateral damage’’ of the outbreak (Bernstein, 2003). In this section, I highlight some of the consequences of quarantine, both for health care workers and others. Hawryluck et al. (2004, p. 1206) emphasize that ‘‘[k]nowledge and understanding of the experiences of quarantined persons are critical to maximize infectious disease containment and minimize the negative effects on those quarantined, their families and social networks.’’ It has been noted that, ‘‘the SARS outbreak is unique in recent history in its rapidity of transmission, its concentration in health settings and the large number of health care workers who have been infected’’ (Maunder et al., 2003, p. 1245). In fact, health care workers accounted for over 40% of SARS cases in the Toronto area and a key challenge was ‘‘to manage and allocate health care staff as the illness forced quarantine of dozens of SARSexposed workers’’ (Mackay, 2003, p. 1308). Many health care workers were isolated or quarantined, including those with infection control and microbiology expertise whose skills were desperately needed during the outbreak. Recent studies have assessed the impact of quarantine (and other measures associated with control of SARS) on health care workers and others (Nickell et al., 2004; Maunder et al., 2003; Maunder, 2004). In general, the unsurprising conclusion is that ‘‘the effect of SARS on the health care system in the greater Toronto area was dramatic y the SARS outbreak had significant psychosocial effects on hospital staff y . The effects on families and lifestyle was also substantial’’ (Nickell, et al., 2004, p. 793). Further, the
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National Advisory Commission (2003, p. 155) cautions that ‘‘the impact of SARS on individuals working within the health system should not be underestimated.’’ In regard to the specific impact of quarantine, an editorial in a Canadian nursing journal comments that: The procedure of quarantine, from its beginnings, seems to have been imposed from the outside, as a law or interdict, and resulted in, or at the very least represented, segregation, social and psychological isolation, stigma, reduced status, and the potential powerlessness of those affected. (Wynn & Peter, 2003, p. 207)
One nurse expresses her views as follows: ‘‘I am ordered into quarantine and feel as though such a restriction could apply only to some plague-threatened inhabitant of the Middle Ages’’ (Ellacott, 2003, p. 14). Health care workers in quarantine reported feeling disconnected and at a disadvantage when they returned to work because they were not up to date on key information, including latest infection control protocols. This reaction demonstrates the need for ongoing communication with workers who are in quarantine so that if they do not become ill, they can return to work feeling ready to do so. Physicians in quarantine who were interviewed at the height of the outbreak ‘‘described anxiety about the wellbeing of ill colleagues and their frustration in not being able to elicit details about their condition’’ (Straus, et al., 2004). While patient confidentiality must be respected, health care facilities ought to be aware that ‘‘for those quarantined, knowledge of how their colleagues were faring may have alleviated some of their stress y .’’ (Straus, et al., 2004). One Toronto hospital experimented with maintaining communication with health care workers during the quarantine. A number of our staff were put on home isolation after having unprotected exposure to a patient in our Intensive Care Unit y . Suddenly we were faced with a whole new challenge – how to communicate with large numbers of staff at home y . The hospital’s informatics staff quickly established a ‘‘lifeline’’ for staff by providing access to their hospital email from home and created a password-protected SARS Internet site through our website. This enabled staff to stay on top of what was happening at the hospital during their absence and reduced their reliance on media for information. (McBride, 2003, p. 52)
In addition to psychosocial impacts on health care workers, quarantine and other measures used to control the spread of SARS had major consequences on access to health care. The ‘‘Code Orange’’ directive that required hospitals to restrict access to all but the most critically ill patients meant that a vast number of services, including surgeries and other procedures such as radiation therapy for cancer patients, were cancelled (Bernstein, 2003). The
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quarantine of health care workers exacerbated this already difficult situation. The National Advisory Commission (2003, pp. 155–160) estimates the cost of addressing the surgical backlog at $32.1 million. In addition, family and friends of patients in hospital were either not allowed to visit, or access for visitors was severely restricted (Bernstein, 2003). When hospital services began returning to normal, surgeries that had been cancelled had to be rescheduled. One contentious point is that ‘‘patients were often allocated to operating rooms not based on urgency of their condition but based on an equitable distribution of finite operating resources within different surgical divisions (e.g. orthopaedics, neurosurgery, plastic surgery, and so on. Many felt this was not fair or appropriate resource allocation’’ (Bernstein, 2003, p. 39). Overall, ‘‘in the public perception, the SARS outbreak turned the modern world of healthcare on its head in Toronto, in the sense that healthcare workers were seen as victims and vectors of disease rather than healers, and hospitals were seen as contaminated areas rather than places fostering health.’’ (Maunder, 2004, p. 1122)
While quarantine during SARS had a unique impact on workers and patients within the health care system, it also disrupted the lives of ordinary citizens who faced over a week of segregation because they had the misfortune of possible exposure to SARS. Studies have focused on assessing the effect of quarantine on health care workers, but some research has attempted to explore the experiences of others who observed quarantine. The findings of one Toronto survey are not unexpected: All respondents described a sense of isolation. The mandated lack of social and, especially, the lack of any physical contact with family members were identified as particularly difficult. Confinement within the home or between work and home, not being able to see friends, not being able to shop for basic necessities of everyday life enhanced their feeling of distance from the outside world. (Hawryluck et al., 2004, p. 1210)
Quarantine also had significant economic consequences. Thousands of employees lost income while they stayed home to observe quarantine or provide care for others who were quarantined. It has been argued that the ethical value of reciprocity demands that the state compensate those whom it asks to stay home from work to comply with quarantine (Singer et al., 2003). Expressed in practical terms, [a] person potentially missing a mortgage or car payment may face a strong temptation to break quarantine in order not to lose earnings. By promising compensation, the government creates incentives to stay home, and thereby limits the risk that SARS may spread, thus reducing the economic dislocation caused by the disease. (Iacobucci, 2003, p. A24)
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Some people had to use vacation time or take unpaid leave in order to observe quarantine. It has been observed that ‘‘the initial refusal of governments to recognize the lack of an income cushion for Torontonians obeying quarantine orders clearly contributed to reluctance of some to stay away from work, further spreading SARS’’ (Canadian Public Health Association, 2003, p. 12). This view is echoed by legal counsel for the City of Toronto who was involved in drafted mandatory quarantine orders when individuals failed to accede to voluntary requests: People were cooperative, but among other things, the voluntary isolation presented financial hardships for families with one income earner who was suddenly placed under home isolation. The situation became extraordinarily difficult, and public health authorities found that a few circumstances required legal intervention. (Speakman, 2003, p. 63)
The government of Ontario enacted new legislation, the SARS Assistance and Recovery Act 2003, to give job protection to employees who were observing quarantine or had to stay home from work to care for another individual, such as a child, who was quarantined. This law, which came into force on May 5, 2003, had retroactive effect to March 26, 2003, to authorize unpaid leaves of absence for employees in various circumstances, including those observing quarantine or receiving treatment for SARS. A SARS Assistance Plan was also announced to offer some financial compensation to people who lost income during periods of quarantine.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE The 2003 global outbreak of SARS forced public health systems worldwide to evaluate their capacity to respond to a novel disease crisis. As with other countries hit hard by the outbreak, quarantine was heavily used as a public health intervention to attempt to control the disease in Toronto, Canada. Individuals in Canada and other countries were extremely compliant in voluntarily accepting a temporary restriction on their liberty for the broader benefit of their communities. However, public health officials cannot always assume individuals will not resist coercive restrictions. Anderson and colleagues (2004) give the following caution: y it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the world community was very lucky this time round, given the very low transmissibility of the agent, plus the fact that fairly draconian public health measures could be put in place with great efficiency in Asian regions where the epidemic originated. Given the litigious nature of people in North
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America in particular, and to a lesser degree in western Europe, the control of SSEs [super-spreading events] in these regions might have presented greater problems if mass quarantining had been required. (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 1104)
A representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, echoing this concern, points out that ‘‘North American litigiousness’’ is far more characteristic of the United States than Canada: ‘‘I think Americans will be more skeptical about quarantine proposals than Canadians are, and probably more anxious to exercise their legal rights’’ (Tuller, 2003, p. Fl). Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that the law, particularly constitutionally-entrenched rights and freedoms, places important limits on the use of coercive public health interventions. As well, ethical principles serve to restrain the exercise of public health powers. In deciding whether to interfere with individual liberty during a disease outbreak, law and ethics both demand that officials ask themselves the following question: ‘‘Does a coercive intervention truly reduce aggregate health risks, and what, if any, less intrusive interventions might reduce those risks as well or better?’’ (Gostin, 2000, p. 20) It is arguable that quarantine was overused during the SARS outbreak and, in many cases, was likely not a truly effective measure in reducing disease spread. Commentators have suggested that ‘‘in hindsight, overrecognition of contacts, especially in two hospital-wide quarantine efforts, may have resulted in an overestimate of the number of persons requiring quarantine’’ (Svoboda et al., 2004, p. 2360). Yet, the phrase ‘‘in hindsight’’ is significant and public health officials clearly must have some degree of latitude when responding to a novel disease outbreak. Interventions that are based on up-to-date evidence and that are not applied in an arbitrary, unfair or discriminatory manner are most likely to pass legal and ethical scrutiny. Various examples from Toronto’s experience with SARS demonstrate that public health officials were concerned with applying quarantine fairly. For instance, although the outbreak had a major economic impact on businesses in Toronto’s Chinatown, quarantine was not applied in a discriminatory manner against Chinese Canadians. Historical practices of quarantine based on racial prejudices were not repeated. As well, public health officials strove to apply evidence-based quarantine. Despite the retrospective observation that quarantine may have been implemented too broadly, officials resisted ‘‘pressure to lengthen the quarantine period to 14 days [because] data did not support a quarantine period longer than 10 days’’ (Svoboda et al., 2004, p. 2360). After successfully containing SARS, public health authorities and legislators have focused attention on the need to renew and modernize public
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health legislation. Matthews et al. (2002) observe that ‘‘[l]aw is an essential tool for public health. Law sets the structure within which public health officials, regulators and private citizens act to protect the population’s health. Law can impede that process y or it can enhance it y’’ The crucial role of law in public health is highlighted by the national and provincial commissions of inquiry that have analyzed the Canadian SARS outbreak and recommended strategies to equip the public health system for the next outbreak. For example, the National Advisory Commission (2003) comments on a number of legal and ethical issues associated with the outbreak and in a discussion aptly titled ‘‘Legal Confusion,’’ the Ontario SARS Commission (2004) highlights legal ambiguities that hindered an effective outbreak response. These include concerns as to which level of government was ultimately in charge of the outbreak and the lawful authority of public health officials to take steps to control the disease. A key initiative underway in Canada is the development of a national Public Health Agency to be tasked with responsibilities related to infectious and chronic diseases and emergency planning and response (Public Health Agency Backgrounder, 2004). Canada’s first Chief Public Health Officer was appointed in late September 2004 (Public Health Agency News Release, 2004). Although details about the precise functions and authority of the Agency have not been announced, this body has potential to serve a key role in enhancing national readiness and coordinating future outbreak response. Indeed, it has been noted that ‘‘[a]t least one positive development might emerge from Canada’s recent outbreak of [SARS]: the creation of a national disease control centre similar to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the US’’ (Wharry, 2003). However, as provinces have primary constitutional authority over health, a federal agency will face legal limits on its ability to act unilaterally and will likely strive to collaborate, rather than dictate. Needed efforts to renew and modernize public health laws are also underway in Canada, with the federal government introducing an updated quarantine statute and continuing its work toward enacting comprehensive health protection legislation to replace existing laws governing food, drugs and hazardous products. Various provincial governments also are reviewing their public health laws. The SARS experience taught officials that legislation authorizing public health interventions like screening, isolation, quarantine and treatment must be sufficiently flexible to allow rapid response to a new infectious agent. For example, many public health statutes have schedules listing various infectious diseases for which coercive interventions are warranted. Such lists must be capable of swift amendment so that officials are not hamstrung in their ability to respond to a disease
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outbreak because a novel agent is not yet covered by public health legislation. Similarly, the SARS experience reveals that officials ought to have the legal authority to implement class quarantine orders as it may be unworkable to issue individual orders to thousands of people. The mandated length of quarantine must be based on the best available evidence in order to ensure that individual liberty is not restricted longer than necessary. Government officials who impose restrictive measures like quarantine should concurrently offer resources to mitigate individual hardships. Workers who cannot report to work because they are in quarantine face, at a minimum, income interruption and, at worst, job loss. Legal mechanisms may be necessary to protect employees’ jobs and compensate them for lost income during periods of quarantine. If the next disease is more virulent than SARS, then public health officials cannot afford the consequences of individuals breaking quarantine to go to work so they can buy groceries for their families. Outside Canada, numerous other jurisdictions are also engaged in processes of public health renewal. At the international level, the World Health Organization is revising its International Health Regulations, which some have criticized as ‘‘nonresponsive to the major challenges of emerging infectious diseases’’ (Gostin, 2004, p. 2623). In fall 2004, the European Union launched its Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in Stockholm, Sweden (European Public Health Alliance News Release, 2004). Canada’s new Public Health Agency emphasizes the need for international public health collaboration and intends to ‘‘play a leadership role with global partners, such as the World Health Organization and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and new European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control as well as other public health agencies’’ (Public Health Agency Backgrounder, 2004). The fact that our world is a global village is a boon to infectious agents driven to replicate and spread to as many hosts as possible. At the same time, international connectedness is crucial to the worldwide communication and cooperation necessary to mobilize an effective disease outbreak response. Looking back on SARS, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the following caution: ‘‘In the next global epidemic y we may not be so lucky y .Thus one of the major dangers arising from the effective control of SARS is complacency. Sentiments of the type ‘we have been successful once – we will be again’ may be far from the truth’’ (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 1104). Clearly, public health authorities at local, national and international levels must remain vigilant to respond to the next, novel infectious agent when – not if – it happens again. In responding to these threats through the use of powers such as quarantine, officials must likewise remain vigilant to comply with legal
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and ethical principles that require balancing public health protection with individual rights and liberties.
NOTE 1. For a comprehensive discussion of the SARS outbreak in Canada, see National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health (2003). Information in this summary is drawn largely from this report.
REFERENCES Altman, L. K. (2003). Lessons of AIDS, applied to SARS. The New York Times, May 6, p. Fl. Barbera, J., Macintyre, A., Gostin, L., Inglesby, T., O’Toole, 1., DeAtley, C., Tonat, K., & Layton, M. (2001). Large-scale quarantine following biological terrorism in the United States. Journal of the American Medical Association, 286(21), 2711–2717. Bernstein, M. (2003). SARS and ethics. Hospital Quarterly, 7(1), 38–40. Callahan, D., & Jennings, B. (2002). Ethics and public health: Forging a strong relationship. American Journal of Public Health, 92(2), 169–176. Canadian Public Health Association. (2003). Public health in the public interest: A contribution from the Canadian Public Health Association to the National Advisory Committee on SARS and public health. Online: http://www.cpha.ca/englishlsars/brief_e.pdf Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003). Efficiency of quarantine during an epidemic of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – Beijing, China, 2003. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 52(43), 1037–1040. Clemow, F. G. (1929). The origin of ‘‘quarantine’’. British Medical Journal, 1, 122–123. Diamond, B. (2003). SARS spreads new outlook on quarantine models. Nature Medicine, 9, 1441. Edelson, P. J. (2003). Quarantine and social inequity. Journal of the American Medical Association, 290(21), 2874. Ellacott, K. (2003). Behind the mask. Registered Nurses Journal, 15, 12–16. European Public Health Alliance News Release. (2004). European centre for disease prevention and control launched. Online: http://www.epha.org/a/1454 Fidler, D. P. (2000). International law and public health: Materials on and analysis of global health jurisprudence. Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers Inc. Garrett, L. (1994). The coming plague: Newly emerging diseases in a world out of balance. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. Gostin, L., & Zeigler, A. (1987). A review of AIDS-related legislative and regulatory policy in the United States. Law, Medicine and Health Care, 15, 5. Gostin, L. O. (2000). Public health law: Power, duty, restraint. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gostin, L. O. (Ed.) (2002). Public health law and ethics: A reader. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gostin, L. O. (2004). International infectious disease law: Revision of the World Health Organization’s international health regulations. Journal of the American Medical Association, 291(21), 2623–2627.
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Gostin, L. O., Bayer, R., & Fairchild, A. L. (2003). Ethical and legal challenges posed by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the control of severe infectious disease threats. Journal of the American Medical Association, 290(24), 3229–3237. Gostin, L. O., Sapsin, J. W., Teret, S. P., Burns, S., Mair, J. S., Hodge, J. G., & Vernick, J. S. (2002). The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act. Journal of the American Medical Association, 288(5), 622–628. Hansard. (2004). Speech by the Honourable Carolyn Bennett, Minister of State for Public Health. Online: http://www.parl.gc.c&37/3fparlbus/chambus/house/debates/0552004-05-14/ han0551250-E.htm Hansen, H., & Groce, N. (2003). Human immunodeficiency virus and quarantine in Cuba. Journal of the American Medical Association, 290, 2875. Hawryluck, L., Gold, W. L., Robinson, S., Pogorski, S., Galea, S., & Styra, R. (2004). SARS control and psychological effects of quarantine, Toronto, Canada. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 10(7), 1206–1212. Health Canada Fact Sheet. (2003). Quarantine Act and Regulations – SARS amendment. Online: http://www.hc-sc.gc.c&english/protectionlwarnings/sars/fact_sheet.html Health Canada News Release. (2004). Questions and answers updated. Quarantine Act. Online: http://www.hc-scgc.ca/english/medialreleases/2004/2004_23bk1.htm Iacobucci, E. (2003). Do SARS bailouts make sense? National Post, May 3, p. A24. Jackman, M. (2000). Constitutional jurisdiction over health in Canada. Health Law Journal, 8, 95–117. Kass, N. E. (2001). An ethics framework for public health. American Journal of Public Health, 91(11), l776–l782. Ksiazek, T. G., Erdman, D., Goldsmith, C. S., Zaki, S. R., Peret, T., Emery, S., Tong, S., Urbani, C., Comer, J. A., Lim, W., Rollin, P. E., Dowell, S. F., Ling, A.-E., Humphery, C. D., Shieh, W.-J., Guarner, J., Paddock, C. D., Rota, P., Fields, B., DeRisi, J., Yang, J.-Y., Cox, N., Hughes, J. M., LeDuc, J. W., Bellini, W. J., Anderson, L. J., and the SARS Working Group. (2003). A novel coronavirus associated with severe acute respiratory syndrome. New England Journal of Medicine, 348, 1953–1966. Mackay, B. (2003). SARS: ‘A domino effect through entire system’. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 168, 1308. Mandavalli, A. (2003). SARS epidemic unmasks age-old quarantine conundrum. Nature Medicine, 9(5), 487. Matthews, G. W., et al. (2002). Legal preparedness for bioterrorism. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 30(3), 52. Maunder, R. (2004). The experience of the 2003 SARS outbreak as a traumatic stress among frontline healthcare workers in Toronto: Lessons learned. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 359, 1117–1125. Maunder, R., Hunter, J., Vincent, L., Bennett, J., Peladeau, N., Leszcz, M., Sadavoy, J., Verhaeghe, L. M., Steinberg, R., & Mazzulli, T. (2003). The immediate psychological and occupational impact of the 2003 SARS outbreak in a teaching hospital. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 168(10), 1245–1251. McBride, F. (2003). Communicating during a crisis – the SARS story at Mount Sinai hospital. Hospital Quarterly, 6(4), 51–52. Mitka, M. (2003). SARS thrusts quarantine into the limelight. Journal of the American Medical Association, 290(13), 1696–1698.
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National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. (2003). Learning from SARS: Renewal of public health in Canada. A Report of the National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health. Health Canada, Ottawa. Online: http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/ english/protection/warningsfsars/learning.html Nickell, L. A., Crighton, J., Shawn Tracy, C., Al-Enazy, H., Bolaji, Y., Hanjrah, S., Hussain, A., Makhlouf, S., & Upshur, R. E. G. (2004). Psychosocial effects of SARS on hospital staff: Survey of a large tertiary care institution. Canadian Medical Association Journal, l70(5), 793–798. Ontario SARS Commission. (2004). Interim report on SARS and public health in Ontario. Online: http://www.heaith.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/campbell04.pdf Parmet, W. E. (2003). Quarantine redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the curtailment of individual liberty in the name of public health. Health Matrix, 13, 85. Peiris, J. S. M., et al. (2003). Clinical progression and viral load in a community outbreak of coronavirus-associated SARS pneumonia: A prospective study. Lancet, 361, 1767–1772. Public Health Agency Backgrounder. (2004). The public health agency of Canada. Online: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-rp/phac_e.html Public Health Agency News Release. (2004). Government of Canada appoints first chief public health officer to head public health agency of Canada. Online: http://www.phacaspc. gc.ca/media/nr-rp/phac_nr_e.html Richards, E. P., & Rathbun, K. C. (2004). Making state public health laws work for SARS outbreaks. Emerging Infectious Diseases. Sehdev, P. S. (2002). The origin of quarantine. Clinical Infectious Diseases, 35, 1071–1072. Silverman, A., Simor, A., & Loufty, M. (2004). Toronto emergency medical services and SARS. Letter to the editor. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 10(9), 1688–1689. Singer, P. A., Benatar, S. R., Bernstein, M., Daar, A. S., Dickens, B. M., MacRae, S. K., Uphsur, R. E. G., Wright, L., & Zlotnik, S. R. (2003). Ethics and SARS: Lessons from Toronto. British Medical Journal, 327, 1342–1344. Speakman, J. (2003). Quarantine in Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and other emerging infectious diseases. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics ðSpecial SupplementÞ, 31(4), 63–64. Straus, S. E., Wilson, K., Rambaldini, G., Rath, D., Lin, Y., Gold, W. L., & Kapral, M. K. (2004). Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and its impact on professionalism: Qualitative study of physicians’ behaviour during an emerging healthcare crisis. British Medical Journal, 329, 83. Svoboda, T., Henry, B., Shulman, L., Kennedy, E., Rea, E., Ng, W., Wallington, T., Yaffe, B., Gournis, E., Vincencio, E., Basrur, S., & Glazier, R. (2004). Public health measures to control the spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome during the outbreak in Toronto. New England Journal of Medicine, 350(23), 2352–2361. Tuller, D. (2003). If SARS hits U.S., quarantine could too. New York Times. December 9, p. Fl. Uphsur, R. E. (2002). Principles for the justification of public health intervention. Canadian Journal of Public Health, 93, 101–103. Wharry, S. (2003). Will SARS crisis give Canada its own CDC? Canadian Medical Association Journal, l68(12), 1581. Wynn, F., & Peter, E. (2003). Nurses and quarantine: Reflections upon the SARS crisis in Toronto. Nursing Inquiry, 10(4), 207–208.
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Legislation Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Constitution Act 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. Emergency Management Act, K.S.O. 1990, c. E.9. Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.7. Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act, SO. 1998, c. 18. Quarantine Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Q-l. Quarantine Act Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1368.
Case Law Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307. Canadian AIDS Society v. Ontario (1995), 25 O.K. (3d) 388 (Gen. Div.). New Brunswick v. JG., [1999] 13 5CR. 46. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 5CR. 103. RJR -MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 5CR. 199. Toronto (City, Medical Officer of Health) v. Deakin, [2002] O.J. No. 2777 (Ct. Just.) (QL).
CHAPTER 4 CAN MANDATORY VACCINATION OF HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC EVER BE JUSTIFIED? Jaro Kotalik ABSTRACT Objectives: To discuss whether, during an influenza pandemic, public health authorities could be ethically justified in implementing a mandatory vaccination program directed at health care professionals. Methods: Ethical analysis is carried out by examining arguments that can be made in favor or against such a mandatory measure and by seeking a reasonably balanced position between them. Arguments under consideration are based on the duties of health professionals and public health authorities, the consequences of their actions and on other ethical principles. The importance of relevant empirical data is stressed without any attempt to review or analyze them systematically. Results: Mandatory vaccination of some health care professionals during a serious pandemic of influenza can be justified, but only under certain limited conditions. Conclusions: In the throes of an influenza pandemic, health care professionals (and to a variable degree, other health care workers) have an Ethics and Epidemics Advances in Bioethics, Volume 9, 69–89 Copyright r 2006 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1479-3709/doi:10.1016/S1479-3709(06)09004-2
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ethical obligation to accept influenza vaccination if it is reasonably safe and effective. The ethical responsibility of public health authorities is to limit the impact of a pandemic on the population by all reasonable means, which clearly includes the appropriate use of vaccine. Consequently, the vaccination of health care staff can be made mandatory under certain conditions. However, a critical objection to this conclusion, which upholds that a voluntary vaccination program (an ethically much less problematic intervention) is just as effective, needs to be addressed.
1. INTRODUCTION Influenza A viruses are unique in their ability to cause not only seasonal yearly outbreaks, but also periodic global epidemics – often called pandemics. In the past century, there have been three pandemics (1918, 1957 and 1968), one of which – the infamous ‘‘Spanish flu’’ of 1918 – was responsible for 450,000 deaths in the US and 50–100 million worldwide (Last, 1986; Potter, 1998; EURO ELSAV, 2002; Osterholm, 2005). A pandemic will likely occur again when the virus undergoes a major change, a so-called antigenic shift, and this will make the whole population of the world, even those who acquired immunity from annual outbreaks, highly susceptible. Although unable to predict the exact time or severity of the next pandemic, most experts agree that it may occur at any time (Dowdle, 2001). The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate that in the US, when it will occur, 40–100 million persons will become ill, 300,000–800,000 persons will be hospitalized, and 88,000–300,000 persons will die (Meltzer, Cox, & Fukuda, 2000). A more recent estimate, based on the probability that the current avian flu strain H5NI could lead to a pandemic that would mimic the one of 1918, puts the possible death toll to 1.7 million in the United States alone (Osterholm, 2005). It is to be expected that illnesses and deaths, combined with the population’s reaction to them, will cause a major disruption to social and economic life as well as to national and international infrastructures. In anticipation of and in response to a possible pandemic, many countries in the world have been developing coordinated strategies that represent major, complex, public policies that in turn will affect the life of virtually every citizen. Unavoidably, these plans incorporate many ethical values and preferences, refer to rights and responsibilities and create expectations and obligations. Many ethical issues that emerge from pandemic plans deserve urgent attention (Kotalik, 2005; Tracy, Upshur, & Daar, 2005). This paper
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will discuss only one of the many issues. Albeit a rather narrow topic, it is one which, hopefully, will provide a window into some of the moral complexities of public health interventions designed to control a pandemic and/ or outbreaks of infectious diseases in general. One of the effects of an influenza pandemic is that it will create enormous demands on health care systems and health care workers and will do so for a protracted period, perhaps 12–24 months. Not only will there be an unprecedented number of sick that require care, there will also be fewer health care workers available to take care of them because health care workers themselves – when caring for the infected – are at a higher risk of infection, illness and death than the general population. Understandably, a major concern addressed in pandemic plans is to find ways to protect health care workers and to make them available for service. There appears to be a consensus that the most useful tool to keep people well during a pandemic is an effective vaccine – if one can be successfully developed (Ghendon, 1994). But, production of a vaccine can only start after the pandemic virus is identified. This is a slow and complex process, so that the first batches will likely be available only four to six months after the new virus is isolated. Because, in the early stages of a pandemic, the influenza vaccine will be in short supply, a regular feature of pandemic plans is a prioritization scheme. The pandemic plans of Canada (Health Canada, 2004), the US (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2004) and the UK (Departments, 2005) all have identified health care workers as the highest priority group. There is a strong probability that, if the pandemic virus is proven to be highly lethal, everyone who will be given an opportunity to receive the new vaccine will gladly accept it. However, if the new virus is not likely to cause deaths to healthy people of middle age, or if the efficacy or safety of the vaccine is suspicious, then health care workers may not embrace the idea of a preventive vaccination. Yet, in such situations, there may be strong epidemiological and operational reasons to make it desirable for all staff members that are in patient contact to be immunized. Health care planners need to be concerned about this type of situation because, as it stands, the acceptance of yearly vaccination against influenza among health care professionals and other health care workers has been chronically low even if vaccination is highly recommended by authorities. It was estimated, at a recent meeting of the US Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, that only 36% of hospital workers are vaccinated each year against influenza (Fox, 2004). The vaccination rate of Canadian health care workers during the 2000–2001 influenza season was reported to be 55% (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2001). Will health care workers
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respond differently during a pandemic and will they all be voluntarily vaccinated? We do not know. But, we do know that an unwillingness to accept vaccination will add to the already worrisome ‘‘ethical barriers to preparedness’’ (Wynia, 2003). To address this unpredictable factor, pandemic planners in United States and Canada are cautiously looking into the possibility of using a law to make such a vaccination compulsory. Typically, the United States’ guide for local- and state-wide pandemic planning poses this question: ‘‘Does State law allow for ‘mandatory’ vaccination of certain groups if vaccination of such groups is viewed by State public health officials as being ‘essential’ for public safety?’’ (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). The question in the title of this paper, therefore, has a practical significance for the current development of public health policies. But, it is also of theoretical interest because it can serve as an opportunity to examine the ethical acceptability of compulsory measures in unusual but very serious health situations. This issue is to be seen against the background of a larger ongoing debate that is taking place in most countries between those who promote legally mandatory vaccinations for various infectious diseases and those who insist that vaccination programs remain voluntary (Bradley, 1999; EURO ELSAV, 2002). Given that this is not a legal paper, and accepting the premise that ‘‘(t)he law relating to public health should be based on ethical values’’ (Gostin, 2002), I will focus on the ethical acceptability of mandatory vaccination of health care professionals. I will first examine some principal arguments suggesting that health care professionals have a moral obligation to accept vaccination and that public health authorities have an ethical obligation to assure that these people are vaccinated. I will consider if these arguments can ever be used to justify the imposing of vaccination by law and examine both the condition for such an imposition and the limits of enforcement. Then, I will discuss arguments that assert that vaccination during a pandemic must remain voluntary. Finally, I will make some general observations about these arguments, attempt to create a balanced position and provide a tentative answer to the question posed in the title of this paper.
2. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MANDATORY VACCINATION To defend mandatory vaccination, we need to assert that both health care professionals and public health care authorities have an ethical obligation to assure that such vaccination takes place and that a mandatory approach is
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the only way to assure that this obligation is fulfilled. There are several steps required toward such a conclusion. 2.1. Professionalism and the Obligation to Serve The first argument that upholds that health care workers have a strong ethical obligation to accept influenza vaccination is grounded in the notion of professionalism, and it is simply this: at the time of a flu pandemic, health care workers have a strong moral obligation to make themselves available to serve; this obligation in turn creates an obligation to take all the necessary measures to remain fit and to avoid illness, including the acceptance of vaccination. Three points support this argument. Firstly, to be a professional means to be someone who professes. Health professionals explicitly make such an act of profession when they are accepting an academic degree or graduating, but also, implicitly, on a daily basis, in the community or organization where they accept patients. They are professing, that is, declaring their preparedness and readiness to serve the needs of others (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1988). This duty, which every health care professional (in the strong sense of the word ‘‘professional’’ as advocated by Pellegrino and others) has taken on, is proportionate to the need for his or her services. Secondly, it appears that a major flu pandemic will be a public health emergency like no other. The figures provided above indicate that, except for a major war, no other foreseeable incident would cause a comparable amount of suffering, death and social disruption. But, influenza pandemics are infrequent, surfacing about every 30 years or so. Therefore, a health care worker will likely encounter this situation only once or twice in his or her professional career. Such a rare, but extremely severe situation calls for a meticulous adherence to professional duties. The need for services will hardly ever be greater than in a pandemic situation, so, if there was ever a time to demonstrate professionalism and a willingness to put the needs of others first, then it is at the time of a pandemic. The obligation of medical professionals to tend to the sick during epidemics, in spite of the increased risks, is also argued by Clark, McCullough and Wynia elsewhere in this volume. Thirdly, in order to be able to serve, the health care professional has an ongoing responsibility to take care of oneself by choice of lifestyle, and to adopt measures that promote one’s physical, mental and spiritual health. Vaccination during a normal influenza season was found – at least in some studies (Pachucki et al., 1989) – to reduce employee absenteeism, so, it would very likely also reduce sick time during a pandemic. Also, a meta-analysis
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of numerous clinical trials indicates that influenza vaccination is moderately effective in preventing influenza in the general population (Langley & Faughnan, 2004). Hence, if vaccination is available, then the health care worker has an obligation to receive it, unless it is medically contraindicated. Another way to formulate this obligation would be to say that the obligation arises from an unwritten social contract between health professionals and society, which requires that professionals keep themselves always ready to serve. 2.2. Nonmaleficence and Obligation not to Infect Others The second argument is based on the principle of nonmaleficence: do not cause unnecessary harm or expose patients to avoidable risks. Unvaccinated health care workers pose a risk to others and could harm the very patients they care for, thus violating this principle. If vaccination minimizes a risk to patients, then health care workers have an obligation to accept it. The ‘‘do no harm’’ principle is usually applied only to interventions that are carried out by health care workers, yet, it is obviously also relevant in situations where health care workers themselves can become instruments of harm. It has been suggested that everyone has a moral obligation not to transmit a communicable disease, if one can avoid it, even for such mild conditions as a common cold (Harris & Holm, 1995). If there is such an obligation, then it will have an even stronger moral claim on health care staff than on other people (Rea & Upshur, 2001). In order for this argument be valid, it needs to be shown that front line health care professionals who are not vaccinated will very likely get infected with the virus, transfer the virus to their patients and cause illnesses or deaths of patients that would not otherwise occur. It has been difficult to obtain such evidence for the annual influenza seasonal infections, but most observers feel that such evidence is now indeed available, and that the transfer of an influenza virus from staff to patients is not just a theoretical risk. A recent report of the National Foundation for Infectious Diseases has identified this problem and has recorded a case study from a pediatric service (Fox, 2004). Nursing home outbreaks have been traced to infected staff (Coles, Balzano, & Morse, 1992). A jury in a Coroner’s Inquest in Ontario, Canada determined that staff had played a key role in an outbreak of influenza leading to deaths in a long-term care facility, and it called for mandatory vaccination (Marsh Canada Limited, 1999). There are several studies suggesting that if health care workers in long-term care facilities do get vaccinated, the overall death rate of residents in these facilities during an influenza season is reduced (Patriarca et al.,
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1986; Potter et al., 1997; Carman et al., 2000). As a result, the American and Canadian advisory committees on immunization practices and the American Academy of Pediatrics recommend annual influenza vaccination for health care workers (McMillan, 2000). Researchers have also found that about a third of front line health care workers develop symptoms during an influenza season and yet three-quarters of them do not stay home from work. It appears that peer pressure in health care institutions persuades staff members to keep on working unless an illness becomes seriously incapacitating. This behavior would be commendable if it did not further increase the chances of patients getting exposed to the virus (Herwaldt, 1993). The refusal to be vaccinated would be particularly ethically troublesome during a pandemic if the vaccine were made preferentially available to health care workers but not to the general population from which patients come. Immunization against hepatitis B has been identified to be an ethical obligation of health care providers, based on a duty not to expose patients to unacceptable risks (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 1998) and the same duty could be postulated to exist during an influenza pandemic. To summarize, it could be argued, on the basis of this data, that health care workers who reject available vaccination during the regular annual influenza outbreaks are transgressing the important ethical principle of nonmaleficence, and that this would be the case also during a pandemic. 2.3. Patient’s Vulnerability The third argument, not entirely independent, but supportive of the previous arguments, suggests that the obligation of health care professionals to receive vaccinations during a pandemic stems from a recognition of the patients’ vulnerability on one hand and professionals’ accountability on the other. As such, it should be included among the ethically relevant subject matters that health care professionals are accountable to patients, employers, professions and society (Emanuel, 1996). Getting infected from a professional could represent a major burden or risk of death to a vulnerable patient, yet the burden of vaccination on a professional is very slight because the procedure is rapid and has only minimal side effects (Rea & Upshur, 2001). 2.4. Responsibility of Public Health Authorities So far, I have addressed the obligation of health care professionals, but the fourth argument is based on the ethical obligations of public health authorities. Their role, stated most broadly, is to promote and preserve the
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good health of all citizens, balancing the rights of individuals with the needs of communities (Last, 1986). Historically, the prevention and control of outbreaks of infectious diseases have been among the first tasks in the purview of public health services and still remains an important contribution to public well-being. Failing to control an epidemic, if an opportunity to do so were available, means failing an ethical obligation. The desire not to interfere with any personal liberties is not sufficient justification to avoid taking action. Hence, if epidemiological knowledge concerning an influenza pandemic provides a strong indication that the burden to the population could be reduced by vaccination of health care professionals, then it can be argued that public health service has an ethical obligation to take all reasonable measures necessary to vaccinate this group. 2.5. Legal Enforcement If indeed there is a strong moral obligation for health care workers to accept vaccination, and if public health authorities have a moral obligation to ensure that a vaccination will be delivered as these arguments suggest, we must ask if there is any justification for passing a law that will allow making vaccination mandatory. This raises the complex issue of the relationship between ethics and law that cannot be elaborated upon here. It is also not possible to discuss the long history of compulsory vaccination practices that in North America go back more than a hundred years. It was in 1905, that the US Supreme Court examined a state-enacted, mandatory vaccination against smallpox, and held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the State’s ‘‘police power’’ to protect the health of its citizens (Gostin, 2000; Welborn, 2005). Since that time, this power of the state has been challenged many times or occasionally reduced, yet it has never disappeared (Parmet, Goodman, & Farber, 2005). The possibility of bioterrorism and new infectious diseases further advanced this cause, and mandatory vaccination is a measure recommended to all American states in the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (Gostin et al., 2002). During a pandemic situation, it can be argued that public health authorities should have available to them a legal tool that can be used if it is foreseen that non-compliance with this pressing moral obligation to accept vaccination would likely cause severe or irreparable damage to society, such as deaths that could otherwise be avoided. A support for the conclusion that legal enforcement is acceptable presupposes that influenza vaccination has a highly favorable harm/benefit ratio. Indeed, the inoculation of an individual is a very minor procedure,
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with slight discomfort and only remote risks of serious side effects. Even if it were administered against a person’s wishes, this does not represent a wreckage of some fundamental interests of that person for the benefit of society (Gostin, 2001). On other hand, the benefits to society (and also to the vaccinated person) could be major, especially if the virus that causes the pandemic is highly contagious and frequently kills. Another way to examine the issue of the acceptability of legal enforcement of vaccination is to consider the status of social free-riding. This term refers to the situation when a large majority of health professionals voluntarily collaborate in an effort that is beneficial for society, but a few are trying to get a free ride, that is, not participating in order not to inconvenience themselves, yet expecting to be well regarded and receive the same benefits or privileges as the participants. Such behavior is contrary to ordinary moral intuition. It is not defensible in common morality nor by deontological systems, and is problematic even in some interpretations of act-utilitarianism (Kornegay, 2004). If refusal of vaccination is comparable to free-riding, which is morally indefensible, then legal steps to discourage such behavior seems warranted. 2.6. Objections to the above Arguments However, a number of things could be said to weaken the above arguments favoring mandatory vaccination: (a) The influenza pandemic will not be a unique event and not likely that severe; therefore, no extraordinary moral duties will be generated and no extraordinary measures should be taken. Experts tend to exaggerate the risk in order to draw attention and resources to the programs in which they are involved. (b) Public health officials are exaggerating the efficacy of a vaccination to alter the course of a pandemic. Some critics maintain that the efficacy of the annual influenza vaccination of health care staff is at best only marginal (Nicholson, 2000; Demicheli, 2001), and vaccination during a pandemic has never been scientifically tested, mainly because in previous pandemics there was never enough vaccine available. Pandemic plans of Canada and US do not provide any indication as to what effectiveness could be achieved during a pandemic, even if a theoretical impact of vaccination was incorporated into some calculation of economic consequences of pandemic (Meltzer, Cox, & Fukudo, 2000). Under those circumstances the vaccine does not warrant any special moral or legal considerations.
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(c) A vaccine manufactured for a pandemic is not likely to be entirely safe, and therefore, each potential recipient should be allowed to make a judgment based on personal assessment of risks and benefits. Drug research is now market driven, and a declaration by any party that a new vaccine is safe cannot be trusted. ‘‘Transparency has become a substitute for trust’’ (Pope, 2003) and the processes of manufacturing and testing vaccines are not currently transparent. There will not be sufficient time in a pandemic situation for proper clinical trials and, as a result, priority recipients, like health care professionals, will in fact serve unwittingly as research subjects. New batches of vaccine sometimes have new side effects that cannot be anticipated, such as the oculorespiratory syndrome caused by a vaccination in 2001 (Skowronski, Bjornson, Husain, Metzger, & Scheifele, 2004). An unexpected risk of vaccination can sometimes emerge only many years later, as was the case with the virus-contaminated polio vaccines (McCarthy, 2002; Dang-Tan, Mahmud, Puntoni, & Franco, 2004). Reporting adverse events is not mandatory and these events are likely underreported and underestimated. (d) There will be a scarcity of vaccine during a pandemic, and not even all those who desire it will be able to receive it. Therefore, mandatory vaccination will be unnecessary. (e) An infected health care worker will not be a significant source of infection because during a pandemic the virus will be ubiquitous. (f) Those health professionals who do not wish to be vaccinated could be offered prolonged prophylactic therapy with antiviral drugs, with benefits similar to vaccination. (g) Health care professionals will not be infecting their patients if they use infection control procedures and if management policies do not effectively prevent health care workers from taking time off when ill (Diodati, 2002). (h) The notion of professionalism as used in some of the above arguments is outdated; contemporary health care professionals do not have more obligations than workers in other sectors to guard their own health or avoid infecting others. It should be noted that all of these objections except ‘‘(h)’’ attempt to undermine my earlier arguments by rejecting some factual assumptions about an influenza pandemic and vaccination or by interjecting some additional facts. I will return to this problem in the final section of this paper.
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3. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY VACCINATION 3.1. Principle of Autonomy The first and the most obvious argument against mandatory vaccination is based on the principle of respect for autonomy. We can say that mandatory vaccination of health care professionals would be a blatant and large-scale transgression of the most important principle of health care ethics. It would represent a severe and unacceptable affront to the personal liberty and autonomy of a whole class of citizens. When a health care professional is facing a sharp end of a needle, he or she is a patient and deserves all the ethical considerations given to patients. Vaccination without consent would be an attempted invasion of bodily integrity and as such, completely out of line with current standards of patient care. Treating health care professionals in this way would simply be offensive. In support of this argument could be cited voluminous literature; the defense of patients’ self-determination has been a prevailing concern of bioethics for at least the first two decades of the history of this discipline since the term ‘‘bioethics’’ was coined in 1970s (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). While the position of this principle is perhaps less dominant, there are still strong voices suggesting that this principle is the most important one, ‘‘the first among equals’’ (Gillon, 2003). Even those theorists who are critical of the principle of respect for autonomy as a centerpiece of ‘‘principlism’’ agree that it is necessary to protect the patients’ self-determination. They would likely support the prohibition of mandatory vaccination along the same ethical lines as breaking a rule like ‘‘do not deprive of freedom’’ (Gert, Culver, & Clouser, 1997). 3.2. Principle of Least Infringement The second argument against mandatory vaccination is based on the principle of least infringement, which states that a public health intervention that infringes on liberty, privacy, autonomy and justice is permissible only if no other intervention, which is as effective but which infringes less on these moral claims, is possible (Childress et al., 2002). It is argued that mandatory vaccination is unacceptable because it fails to respect the principle of least infringement. There is another intervention, voluntary vaccination, which would achieve the goal of mandatory vaccination with less infringement on individual rights. The proponent of this argument will have to admit that the equivalency of mandatory and voluntary vaccination in terms of
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outcome is not proven; however, it is also not proven that mandatory vaccination of professionals would achieve a higher success rate than voluntary vaccination. In the absence of such evidence, one way or another, the least infringing and least burdensome intervention must be preferred. This position can be supported by numerous studies that indicate that undue concern about efficiency, adverse effects, misinformation, barriers and disincentives to vaccination were factors that played a role in the current low rate of acceptance of influenza vaccination among health care staff. The same and other studies also reported an improvement of vaccination rates among health care workers if some of these problems were addressed (Harbath, Siegrist, Schira, Wunderli, & Pittet, 1998; Beguin, Boland, & Ninane, 1989; Girasek, 1990; Eisenfeld et al., 1994; Nichol & Hauge, 1997; Tamblyn, 1997; Carman et al., 2000; Habib, Rishpon, & Rubin, 2000). Generally, all these interventions to increase vaccination rates were a part of a research study and they were not permanent, system wide or comprehensive. To buttress this argument, one can point to the fact that health care professionals have not yet recognized that vaccination acceptance is a matter of professional ethics. The ethical responsibilities of health care workers arising out of the availability of influenza vaccination (or other vaccinations) are not referred to by the codes of medical ethics in the US (American Medical Association, 2001) or in Canada (Canadian Medical Association, 2005). With few exceptions, the ethical relevance of vaccination has not been discussed in medical literature (Herwaldt, 1993; Rea & Upshur, 2001). As a result, health care workers do not currently have an ethical motivation to be vaccinated. If all issues that hinder the acceptance of voluntary vaccination are properly dealt with, then, the argument goes, a voluntary vaccination program will be just as effective as a mandatory one in assuring that almost all workers, at least those without medical contraindications, will be vaccinated. If this is the case, then the only ethically acceptable vaccination program is a voluntary one because it does not infringe on health care workers’ personal liberty and autonomy. 3.3. Utilitarian Objections The third argument against mandatory vaccination is based on utilitarian reasoning, and asserts that when the negative effects of compulsion are counted in, there will be no overall benefit to mandatory vaccination over voluntary vaccination. Firstly, such a forced measure would give the message that in our society, personal autonomy is really not that important; it could encourage health care workers themselves to impose unwanted
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interventions on their patients. Such an approach would erode the respect for autonomy in health care in general. In addition, such forceful measures would demoralize health care workers and make them less effective caregivers. Coercive measures used on emergency physicians in Quebec and hospital nurses in Ontario were strongly resisted by the respective professions and thought to have undesirable side effects (Editorial, 2002; Pengelley & Whary, 2002). In addition, the mandatory approach would require surveillance and enforcement that would increase the cost of pandemic response measures and interfere with the provision of patient care. 3.4. Principle of Justice The fourth argument against mandatory vaccination is based on the principle of justice. It declares that it would be unjust to single out health care professionals for mandatory vaccination if people in other groups are not treated in the same fashion. It can be argued that, for example, hairdressers and waiters are in just as much personal contact with large numbers of people who could be infected by them, and that firefighters and policemen, for example, are just as essential to the well-being of society as health care professionals. Consequently, there is not a sufficient morally significant difference between health care workers and many other categories of workers to justify treating health professionals differently. 3.5. Safety and Appropriateness The final argument is a historical one, which states that public health services, at least in North America, have a poor record of making the right decision about the nature of threat to the population and the appropriateness of mass vaccination. In recent memory, two major national vaccination programs were launched as an emergency measure, yet eventually, these programs turned out to be unnecessary and risky. In 1976, when a new strain of influenza with pandemic capacity was detected, 46 million Americans and several million Canadians, on the urging of their governments, accepted emergency vaccination. But the vaccination campaign came to a premature halt because of the vaccine’s side effects. On the final count, over 500 cases of Guillain-Barre´ syndrome and 32 deaths were attributed in the US to this intervention. In addition, the new virus was never detected outside of the initial isolated outbreak, so there was no pandemic (Morrison, Liston, & Abbott, 1976; Bernstein, 1981). In 2002, the US administration announced a smallpox vaccination plan to protect Americans
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because of the threat of a terrorist attack. It expected to administer 450,000 doses of vaccine to health workers who would be thus prepared to care for patients infected with the virus. However, the plan ran into opposition. Its acceptance further dropped after reports of unexpected heart problems possibly associated with the vaccine, and after the threat of terrorists’ attacks did not materialize. At the end of the year, the program succeeded in vaccinating only about 10% of the target population and it came to an end (Manning, 2003; Matthews, Murphy, Lopez, & Orenstein, 2003). An argument can be made that the harm and burden of these vaccination programs, which in retrospect were unnecessary, were reduced because the programs were voluntary. If these programs would have been implemented as mandatory measures, the burden would have been more severe and the moral culpability of the experts and decision-makers would be much greater. Hence, mass vaccination programs should remain voluntary. 3.6. Objections to above Arguments A number of objections can be raised against the validity of the above arguments: (a) The influenza pandemic is such an extraordinarily severe threat to our society, and its control is so crucial that, if there is a single situation when public interest should prevail against all personal interest and autonomy, this is the situation. (b) Because ‘‘good health is a form of liberty for all peoples’’ (EURO ELSAV, 2002), mandatory vaccination will not be an affront to personal liberty if it significantly enhances the health of society. The autonomy of an individual is expressed foremost by a person’s free decision to be a member of a particular community and by freedom to leave it. But as long as a person remains a member of a community, the social contract binds him to accept obligations requested by society together with benefits provided by that society (EURO ELSAV, 2002). (c) Health care professionals, indeed, are a special category of the population, with manifestly different rights and obligations than other workers in personal services. Therefore, they can be treated differently than other groups, and this includes having vaccination imposed on them, without committing an injustice. (d) The principle of the least infringement does not apply because mandatory and voluntary vaccination programs are not equally efficient at achieving the goal of vaccination. At least, there is no proof that a voluntary
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vaccination program, even if could be made more acceptable, would ever come close to recruiting 100% of health care workers. In the absence of such proof, and given the gravity of the threat from influenza, we have to err on the side of caution and implement mandatory vaccination.
4. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS When we survey various positions on mandatory vaccination, it becomes apparent that there is a close and critical relationship between empirical data on the one hand and normative positions on the other. The following two points attempt to address this conundrum. 4.1. The Need to Reduce Uncertainty Many of these contradictory arguments and objections can be raised only because of the uncertainty about empirical facts related to influenza, influenza pandemic and vaccination. I did not attempt to provide a comprehensive review and interpretation of existing empirical data. When I refer to empirical information in this paper, it is mainly to show how critical it is to have full and correct data in order to reach a reasoned ethical assessment. Issues of ethics and policy, of course, cannot be settled just by clarifying empirical data. However, acceptance of a certain set of empirical data is an important step that makes it possible to concentrate on discussion of values, interests, rights, duties and utility when looking for ethically appropriate public health measures. It is understood that it will be impossible to achieve complete certainty about many factors, be it the benefits and burdens of vaccination or the magnitude of future pandemics. Public policy makers have to act in spite of a residual, perhaps even major, uncertainty (Last, 1986; Dare, 1998). But assessment of the degree of the probability of various scenarios and the reduction of uncertainty as much as science permits are extremely important tasks from an ethics and public health law perspective (Gerberding, 2002). 4.2. Importance of Empirical Data Concerning annual vaccination, it was stated ‘‘(d)espite the enormous burden from influenza, the efficacy, effectiveness and cost benefit of immunizing health care workers has been little studied’’ (Nicholson, 2000). Similarly, it has to be noted that the national influenza pandemic plans of Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom do not provide (or refer a reader to)
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the kind of empirical data that would make it possible to assess the ethical acceptability of some of the measures that are proposed by these plans, vaccination being one of them. Particularly, these plans do not provide any estimates of staff shortages likely to be caused by influenza, of the benefits of vaccination in the reduction of absenteeism, of the benefits of diminishing an infection transfer from staff to patients, of the burdens and risks of vaccination and so on. Yet, any proposed public health intervention needs to have a significant probability of benefits and a strong likelihood of a positive risk/benefit ratio in order to be ethically acceptable. This will be true for measures that will be offered to the population for voluntary participation; for compulsory measures, the standard has to be even higher.
5. CONCLUSIONS With these reservations, how can we reply to the question in the title of this paper? It seems that the arguments in favor of mandatory vaccination do not trump the arguments that are against mandatory vaccination, and vice versa. In such a situation, each of us is likely to make a personal choice based on our deepest values. Those who favor an individualistic interpretation of autonomy and strongly believe in the dominant role of self-determination as a moral foundation of a free society will likely oppose mandatory measures. My personal preference is a society ‘‘which not only promotes individual rights but accepts collective responsibility to live a collaborative life which promotes autonomy’’ (Doucet & Melchin, 1995), and if necessary, I am prepared to prescribe the collaboration in communal interest (Tauber, 2002). Hence, I suggest that on balance, the arguments presented in favor of mandatory vaccination are more convincing than those against the mandatory approach, providing certain assumptions about pandemic and vaccination are indeed correct. Of all the objections against this position, I believe the weightiest one is the assertion that if a voluntary vaccination program for health care workers were fully implemented, it would be just as effective as a mandatory program, without the drawbacks of compulsion and enforcement. Is it possible then, to arrive at an objective position on the question of mandatory vaccination that could lead to the formation of a legitimate public policy? I think so. This can be achieved by constructing a position that respects all reasonable arguments and gives each of them some role in defining the limits or conditions of the mandatory measure.
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One way by which this could be achieved is to suggest that, in the event of an influenza pandemic, mandatory vaccination of health care workers is ethically justified only if and when all of the following conditions are met with a reasonable degree of probability: (a) The pandemic appears to be so serious that staff absences due to illness would compromise care and increase morbidity. (b) The pandemic influenza vaccine is effective in terms of preventing clinical illness and reducing absences from the workplace. (c) The pandemic influenza vaccine is safe, with the understanding that the urgency of the situation permits only a limited amount of time for testing. (d) The mandatory vaccination program is proven to produce a significantly higher participation rate than a voluntary program, and this difference is important in meeting essential objectives of the vaccination program. The justification of the mandatory program will be further strengthened if, (e) Under conditions of pandemic, unvaccinated health care workers will represent a significant risk to their patients. In addition, the justification of a mandatory vaccination would have to be presented in a manner that allows for scrutiny of the population affected by the measure, and steps would have to be taken to apply the mandatory vaccination in a consistent way (Childress et al., 2002). The meaning of the term ‘‘reasonable degree of probability’’ in this context would have to refer not only to the opinion of experts but to the views of the population. The above proposal does not claim to be the only possible way of striking the right balance. There are probably other ways by which the conditions for mandatory vaccination could be set that would take into consideration the objections without allowing the objections to defeat the purpose of mandatory vaccination. Finally, I would like to comment on the practical implication of the above appraisal of arguments. Given the difficulties to ethically defend and to sensibly implement mandatory vaccination, it would be best if mandatory vaccination could be avoided and its goals achieved by voluntary participation. An important step in this direction is to initiate, among health care professionals, thorough discussions about an influenza pandemic in general and about the ethical aspects of vaccination as well as other personal measures that could minimize the impact of the pandemic. Hopefully, if we have enough time before the pandemic arrives, this effort can lead to the development of such a high level of moral commitment of health professionals to the response measures that mandatory vaccination will be found unnecessary.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my sincere thanks to Dr. Renzo Pegoraro, President of Fondazione Lanza, Padova, Italy, as well as his colleagues and staff for providing me with the opportunity to work in such a stimulating and caring environment during my two months stay as a visiting scholar. I am also thankful to my wife, Louisa Pedri, MA, who edited my text and helped me greatly by many thoughtful suggestions during our discussions of the subject.
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Kornegay, R. J. (2004). Hare’s utilitarianism and the free-rider problem. Dialogue, XLIII, 419–442. Kotalik, J. F. (2005). Preparing for an influenza pandemic: Ethical issues. Bioethics, 19(4), 422–431. Langley, J. M., & Faughnan, M. E. (2004). Prevention of influenza in the general population. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 171, 1213–1222. Last, J. M. (1986). Ethics and public health policy. Maxcy-Rosenau public health and preventive medicine. Norwalk, CT: Appleton-Century Crofts. Manning, A. (2003). Smallpox vaccination plan ‘ceased’. USA Today, October 15, A1. Marsh Canada Limited. (1999). Coroner’s Inquest – influenza and long term care facility. Long Term Care Risk Management & Legal Update, 3(1), 1–2. Matthews, G. W., Murphy, A. M., Lopez, W., & Orenstein, W. (2003). Workshop on smallpox legal preparedness: What have we learned? Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 31, 39–41. McCarthy, M. (2002). Unclear whether monkey virus in old polio vaccine caused cancer, says IOM. Lancet, 360, 1307. McMillan, J. (2000). Should health care workers be immunized against influenza? Pediatric Annals, 29, 699–702. Meltzer, M. I., Cox, N. J., & Fukuda, K. (2000). The economic impact of pandemic influenza in the United States: Priorities for intervention. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 1, 1–18. Morrison, A., Liston, A., & Abbott, J. (1976). The Canadian influenza decision, 1976. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 115. Nichol, K., & Hauge, M. (1997). Influenza vaccination of health care workers. Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, 18, 189–194. Nicholson, K. G. (2000). Should staff in long-term hospitals for elderly patients be vaccinated against influenza? Lancet, 355, 83–84. Osterholm, M. T. (2005). Preparing for the next pandemic. New England Journal of Medicine, 352, 1839–1842. Pachucki, C., Pappas, S., Fuller, F., Krause, S., Lentino, J., & Shaff, D. (1989). Influenza A among hospital personnel and patients: Implications for recognition, prevention, and control. Archives of Internal Medicine, 149, 77–80. Parmet, W., Goodman, R., & Farber, A. (2005). Individual rights versus the public health-100 years after Jacobson v. Massachusetts. New England Journal of Medicine, 352, 652–654. Patriarca, P., Weber, J., Parker, R., Orenstein, W., Hall, W., & Kendal, A. P. (1986). Risk factors for outbreaks of influenza in nursing homes: A case control study. American Journal of Epidemiology, 124, 114–119. Pellegrino, E. D., & Thomasma, D. C. (1988). For the patient’s good. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Pengelley, H., & Whary, S. (2002). Battle rages against Quebec legislation. CMA Interface, 3, 1–4. Pope, J. (2003). Global Corruption Report, Transparency International, 14. Potter, C. (1998). Chronicle of influenza pandemics. In: K. Nicholson, R. Webster & A. Hay (Eds), Textbook of influenza (pp. 3–18). New York, NY: Blackwell Science, Inc. Potter, J., Stott, D., Roberts, M., Elder, A., O’Donnel, B., Knight, P., Nicholson, K. G., Webster, R. G., & Hay, A. J. (1997). Influenza vaccination of health care workers in long-term care hospitals reduces the mortality of elderly patients. Journal of Infectious Diseases, 175, 1–6. Public Health Agency of Canada. (2001). Canada Communicable Disease Report, May 15.
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Rea, E., & Upshur, R. (2001). Semmwlweis revisited: The ethics of infection prevention among health care workers. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 164, 1447–1448. Skowronski, D. M., Bjornson, G., Husain, F., Metzger, D., & Scheifele, D. (2004). Occulorespiratory syndrome after influenza immunization in children. Archives of Internal Medicine, 24, 63–69. Tamblyn, S. (1997). Preventing influenza outbreak in long-term care facilities. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 157, 927. Tauber, A. I. (2002). Medicine, public health, and the ethics of rationing. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 45, 16–30. Tracy, C., Upshur, R., & Daar, A. (2005). Avian influenza and pandemics – research needs and opportunities. New England Journal of Medicine, 352, 405–407. United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2004). N.V.P.O., 2004. Washington, DC: United States Department of Health and Human Services, 26. Welborn, A. A. (2005). Mandatory vaccination: Precedent and current laws. Congressional Research Service Report to the Congress. The Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Wynia, M. K. (2003). Ready and willing? Physicians sense of preparedness for bioterrorism. Health Affairs, 22, 189–197.
CHAPTER 5 MEDICAL ETHICS AND EPIDEMICS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Robert Baker Black Death: Florence, 1313. Some again, the most sound, perhaps, in judgment y affirmed that there was no medicine for the disease superior or equal in efficacy to flight; following which prescription a multitude of men and women, negligent of all but themselves, deserted their city, their houses, their estates, their kinsfolk, their goods, and went into voluntary exiley it was now time for all to flee from it, and that its last hour was come (Boccaccio [1348] 1921, pp. 5–11). –Decameron (1348) Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375). Black Death: London, 1603. Never let any man aske me what became of our Phisitions in this Massacre, they hid their Synodicall heads as well as the prowdest: and I can not blame them, for their y drugs turned to dirt: Galen could do no more good than Sir Giles Goosecap: Hippocrates, Avicen, Paracelsus, Rasis, Fernelius, with all their succeeding rabble of Doctorsywere at their wits end, for not one of them durst peepe abroad; and if anyone take upon him to play the ventrous Knight, the Plague put him to his Nonplus [i.e., confounded him] (Dekker [1603] 1925, pp. 36–37). –Thomas Dekker (1570?–1632). Black Death: London, 1665. The plague defied all medicines; the very physicians were seized with it, with their preservatives in their mouths; and men went about prescribing to others and telling them what to do, ‘till y they dropped down dead, destroyed by that very enemy they directed others to oppose. This was the case of several physicians, even
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ROBERT BAKER some of them the most eminent, and of several of the most skilful surgeons’’ (Defoe [1722] 1904, pp. 40–41). –A Journal of the Plague Year, Daniel Defoe (1660?–1731). Small Pox: London, Circa 1715. [Jasilla: Should the physician attend] ‘‘in Epidemical Cases when there’s a dreadful and general Mortality raging about?’’ [Olympia replies] ‘‘Your Question’s perhaps more perplexing than you imagine. And I know not whether ‘twas ever well Weigh’d and Resolv’d yet y Conduct seems to be more generally under the Direction of Prudential Choice than Moral Obligation [since] ‘Tis [physicians’] Duty, to consult their own Safety first y the more they can reconcile Distance with Action...the Truer they are, as they ought to be, to their own and the Publick Interest y And yet they should not be so intent upon That neither, as not to visit where they have Reason to believe their presence may be of utmost Consequence to the Recovery of others, and not extreamly or immediately Dangerous to themselves. And surely they have less reason to fear the Foe, being doubly Arm’d with Preservatives as well as Restoratives’’ (Parker, 1715, pp. 68–69). Yellow Fever: Philadelphia, 1793. Hereafter my name should be Shadrach, Meshach, or Abednego, for I am sure the preservation of those men from death by fire was not a greater miracle that my preservation from the infection of the prevailing disorder. I have lived to see the close of another day, more awful than any I have seen yet. Forty persons it is said have been buried this day, and I have visited and prescribed for more than 100 patients y Amidst my numerous calls to the wealthy and powerful, I do not forget the poor (Rush [1793] 1951, pp. 655–656). –Benjamin Rush (1746–1813). Letter to Mrs. Rush, September 8, 1793. Yellow Fever: New York, 1795, 1798. During those memorable visitations of God’s providence on our city, in 1795 and 1798, when pestilence spread its devastation upon our shores, though fully conscious of the danger, he abided with us; and no consideration whatever could induce his to swerve from his duty – a faithful sentinel, he remained as his post – amidst the distressing and fatal ravage of the yellow-fever, Dr. Tillary spared no exertions that could contribute to the comfort of his suffering fellow-citizens. He visited and attended with unceasing assiduity all who called for his professional services, without reserve; and it may be added, that to the poor and forsaken, from whom no recompense could be expected, his labours were for the most part devoted; the more wealthy, who were able to remunerate him, having chiefly abandoned the city, the scene of desolation (Hosack, 1818, pp. 9–10). –David Hosack, Funeral Address for Dr. James Tillary (1756–1818) Cholera: 1832–1834: Cincinnati, Chicago, New York, other urban centers: y it is the duty of physicians to be ever vigilant for the welfare of the community y ever ready to give counsel to the public in relation to matters especially appertaining to their profession, as on subjects of medical police, public hygiene, and legal medicine y and when pestilence prevails, it is their duty to face the danger, and to continue their labors for the alleviation of the suffering, even at the jeopardy of their own lives (Baker et al., 1999, p. 333). –American Medical Association, 1847.
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CHALLENGES IN CONSTRUCTING A HISTORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND EPIDEMICS Karl Marx could only pen the memorable line, ‘‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’’ because he was heir to the sanitary and public health reforms of the nineteenth century (Marx [1848] 1972, p. 335). The Black Death, which had wiped out much of fourteenthcentury Florence and which had regularly decimated sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London, was now but a faint memory. Yet had a historian of some earlier period of European history thought to pen a line as presumptuous as Marx’s, it might have read: ‘‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of struggle with plague or pestilence.’’ Epidemics and pandemics have haunted human societies from their beginnings. The congregation of large masses of humans in urban settings, in fact, made the evolution of human infectious disease microorganisms biologically possible (McNeill, 1976; Porter, 1997, pp. 22–25). Epidemics have been as determinative of the course of economic, social, military and political history as any other single factor – emptying cities, decimating armies, wiping out generations and destroying civilizations. Given the extraordinary role epidemics played in the life and death of peoples and cultures, one might reasonably expect an extensive literature on epidemics. One also might expect that much of this literature was written by health care practitioners, that it would include some discussion of the ethics of health care practice during epidemics, and that we by now would have a well-settled historical account of medical ethics during epidemics. All of these beliefs are correct – except for the last. At present, we have no settled historical account of medical ethics during epidemics. One reason for the absence of any such account is the difficulty of assembling the evidence from which one can construct a history of practitioner norms and practices during epidemics. The best evidence for practitioners’ practices lies in account books, bills of mortality, census data, church records, contracts, lawsuits, medical books and the like. Evidence of practitioner and public beliefs about norms appropriate to practitioner conduct during epidemics, on the other hand, lies in a somewhat different evidentiary base: diaries, eulogies, lectures, letters, obituaries, sermons and a body of literature known as ‘‘plague tracts’’ or ‘‘pest tractate.’’ Plague tracts are small mass-market tracts or pamphlets written about the plague. They were published in Latin and in most of the vernacular
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languages of Europe from the time of the arrival of the Black Death in Europe in the fourteenth through eighteenth century (Slack, 1979, 1985; Wilson, 1925; Keiser, 2003 – the Parker passage in the prefatory quotations is an example). The earliest known English-language medical plague tract, Little Book, was published in 1486 (Slack, 1979, p. 239). Of all the medical titles published in English between 1486 and 1605, 15% are plague tracts in the sense that they dealt with epidemics (exclusive of syphilis); 10.7% of all books published in English before 1605 were plague tracts, which makes this category the second largest selling category of titles, and the third largest selling set of editions published. Put another way, during this period, 7.5% of the total medical literature published in octavo or smaller (i.e. the ‘‘mass market’’) were plague tracts, which makes them the third largest category of mass-market titles published in English during that period (Slack, 1979). Supplementing these mass-market publications are literary accounts of the plague by authors like Boccaccio and Defoe that appeal to higher end of the market. Scholars of the history of medical ethics during epidemics, inspired by such contemporary controversies as the whether physicians have a duty to treat patients suffering from AIDS or to serve the public during a bioterrorist attack, have drawn on plague tracts and other evidentiary materials to construct a handful of studies. Not surprisingly, since these studies are inspired by different events, address somewhat different questions to the evidence, and are viewed from the perspective of scholars of different backgrounds, training and methodological approaches, these accounts are often at odds with each other. This chapter offers an overview of the history of medical ethics in epidemics, analyzing contention and consensus to offer a somewhat different account of the evolution of practitioner ethics in times of epidemics.
POINTS OF CONSENSUS ON THE HISTORY OF PRACTITIONER ETHICS DURING EPIDEMICS It is generally agreed that the Hippocratic corpus offers medical practitioners no moral guidance, specifically addressing proper practitioner conduct during epidemics. A host of questions that would vex later ages are not addressed. Not a word can be found about the wisdom of warning the public about the danger of plague. There is no discussion of the ethics of quarantine and isolation, nor is there any reflection on whether the dangers of epidemics justify exemptions from normal standards of propriety with
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respect to confidentiality and fees. There also is no discussion of whether practitioners have a duty to place themselves at risk to care for the plaguestricken. In their perceptive analysis of the history of practitioner’s duties to care for plague-stricken people, Samuel Huber and Matthew Wynia explain the absence of such discussions in the Hippocratic corpus by arguing that at least two of the three conceptual requisites for a duty to treat were missing from ancient medicine. ‘‘For physician acceptance of the duty to treat in epidemics: [1] physicians’ [must have] recognition of infectious risk, [2] an organized professional identity, and [3] a public expectation of the duty’’ (Huber & Wynia, 2004, p. W5). ‘‘Physicians’’ in the ancient world, they argue, ‘‘did not perceive patients to be ‘infectious,’’’ and so they had no reason to believe that a special ethics for epidemics was required. It also is agreed that ethical standards dealing specifically with practitioner conduct during epidemics had become evident by the mid-nineteenth century. The most famous statement of physicians, professional obligation to care for the plague-stricken is in the American Medical Association’s 1847 Code of Ethics: ‘‘When pestilence prevails, it is [physicians’] duty to face the danger, and to continue their labors for the alleviation of suffering, even at jeopardy of their own lives’’ (Huber & Wynia, 2004, p. W5; Jonsen, 2000, p. 47). There is also little doubt that practitioners’ acceptance of their duties to treat the epidemic-stricken atrophied in the latter part of the twentieth century. One explanation is that doctors had come to believe – mistakenly as it turned out – that antibiotics and vaccines would soon eliminate the threat of infectious epidemics and pandemics. Thus, medical ethics specifically addressing practitioner conduct during epidemics appeared to be dated and gratuitous – until HIV/AIDS made its presence felt in the late 1980s. Between these points of consensus lies the vast expanse of medical history between the Hippocratic corpus (which dates to about the fourth century BCE) and the nineteenth century (CE); i.e. most of the history of Western medical ethics. The scant scholarly literature covering this terrain can be divided between two strands of thought: nihilist and traditionalist. Nihilists claim that there were no moral norms specific to the conduct of medical practitioners during epidemics before the mid-nineteenth century. Traditionalists, by contrast, believe that a continuous tradition of practitioner medical ethics during epidemics is discernable from the fourteenth century onward.
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TRADITIONALISM: THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY ORIGIN OF THE ETHICS OF EPIDEMICS The case for a fourteenth century origin of norms of medical ethics specific to epidemics is spelled out in a 1977 essay by Darrel Amundsen, reprinted in 1996 (Amundsen, 1977, 1996). The gist of Amundsen’s case for a medical ethical obligation to treat the plague-stricken is laid out in the following passage. From the tone of various historical sources, physicians who fled during the plague seem to have been viewed as acting shamefully, both by the public and by colleagues. When writers commented on instances of physicians who fled from the plague, their tone was condemnatory. The extent to which physicians did flee cannot be determined from the evidence with any certainty. The number of physicians who did flee from plague-ridden cities may have been relatively small y . Many of the authors of the pest tractate seem to have assumed that their readers would have access to physicians during a time of plague y the author of an anonymous pest tractate of the first half of the fifteenth century urged the sick to ‘‘follow the advice of a ‘good physician’’’ (Amundsen, 1977, pp. 409–410; 1996, pp. 294–295).
Having established that it was considered shameful not to treat the afflicted during times of epidemics, Amundsen then looks for evidence of other aspects of a fourteenth-century medical ethics of epidemics. He observes that plague tracts recommend eschewing avarice and cupidity during epidemics. A fourteenth-century tract by d’Agramont (1348) warns physicians ‘‘[to] guard, in times of pestilence against financial cupidity [or risk courting a reputation as] a son of avarice and greed’’ (Amundsen, 1977, p. 418; 1996, p. 299). Charges of physician avarice and cupidity during epidemics appear to have had resonance in popular culture. The ‘‘verry parfit praktisour,’’ the very perfect practitioner of Geoffrey Chaucer’s (ca. 1343–1400) Canterbury Tales, is portrayed as having ‘‘kepte the gold he wan in pestilence, for gold in physik is a cordial, therefore he loved gold in special’’ (Jonsen, 2000). Historians of ethics during epidemics have not been persuaded by Amundsen’s analysis (Fox, 1988; Wallis, 2006, note 32). We argue this point, in part, because seventeenth- and eighteenth-century commentators on practitioner flight treat the issue as novel. For example, the English physician Samuel Parker (1681–1730) has Jasilla, his spokeswoman for the public, ra