J UST LOV E
J UST LOV E T R A NSFOR M I NG CI V IC V I RT U E
Ann Mongoven
I n di a na U n i v e r si t y Pr e s s Bloomington & Indianapolis
Indiana University Press 601 North Morton Street Bloomington, IN 47404-3797 USA
∞ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences —Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.
http://iupress.indiana.edu
Manufactured in the United States of America
This book is a publication of
Telephone orders 800-842-6796 Fax orders 812-855-7931 Orders by e-mail
[email protected] © 2009 by Ann M. Mongoven All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses’ Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.
Library of Congress Cataloging-inPublication Data Mongoven, Ann, date Just love : transforming civic virtue / Ann Mongoven. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-0-253-35325-2 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-253-22090-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Social ethics. 2. Social values. 3. Moral conditions. I. Title. HM665.M636 2009 179’.9—dc22 2009006762 1 2 3 4 5 14 13 12 11 10 09
To the most extraordinary “ordinary heroes” of my life, my family and friends
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ·
ix
Part I. Mad about MADD 1 Invisible Heroes: Mad about MADD
·
3
2 New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues ·
19
Part II. The Dilemma of Impartiality 3 The Dilemma of Impartiality: Legacy of the Bishop and the Chambermaid · 73 4 Impartiality-as-Standpoint and Lost (Again) Virtue
· 123
Part III. Resolving the Dilemma: Impartiality-as-Practice and the Transformation of Civic Virtue 5 Saving the Baby from the Bathwater: A Turn to Practice
·
173
6 Impartiality-as-Practice: The Lesson of Ordinary Moral Heroes · 203 7 Just Love: The Transformation of Civic Virtue · Appendix: Case Studies · 313 Notes · 365 References · 387 Index · 403
271
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This is a book about the power of ordinary heroes, and I am grateful to many heroes in my life who played crucial roles in its writing. Although it is customary to acknowledge institutional supporters and scholarly colleagues first, and personal supporters afterwards, I invert that order here. Of course, that deviation from tradition is not due to any lack of appreciation for either the considerable institutional support that enabled, or the remarkable scholars who informed, this project. Rather, it is in the spirit of the book to highlight the ethical import of caring labor that is sometimes taken for granted. Such caring labor is as essential to academic life as to civic life. My family schooled me in virtues long before “virtue theory” became a trajectory of scholarly revival. Thanks to all of you for supporting my academic quests: Edward Mongoven, Judith Schroeder, Mary and Tom Conroy, Patrick and Tracy Mongoven, Miki Weisstein, Eric and Fei Weisstein, Cecily and Bob Jenkins, Tony Weisstein and Jerry White, Richard and Jo Stelmach, and in loving memory of Carmen Kostner Mongoven. My daughter Kelsey Kai-Yuan Mongoven, age nine, deserves thanks not only for giving up playtime while sections were being completed and for searching pages for space breaks, but also for being a patient teacher of mothering. My scholarly interest in friendship was sparked as much by the blessing of my friends as by trends in contemporary ethical theory. As the saying goes, a friend who helps you move is a true friend indeed. Several ix
friends packed my house around me during three different moves while I was completing some stage of the manuscript: Donetta Cothran, Gretchen Horlacher, Rebecca Manring, Pam Kellett, Barbara Buhr, Maricel Cruz, Kerry and Kara Skora. Friends and family also provided child care during the writing, a gift to my daughter as well as to myself. Special thanks for child care to Dad, Judy, Xiu-Ying Dong, Mary and Tom, Donetta, Gretchen, Judy Andre, Bill and Peggy Diedrich, Char Muffitt, and Kathleen Lavey. Certain friends encouraged me to continue with this manuscript during difficult periods: Donetta when I suffered a medical setback; Thomas Grubb when I was editing in Japan far from my usual scholarly circles. Shu-Ming Chang and Heidi Doherty sustained final manuscript preparation. Many friends reached across geographic distance to cheerlead the project: Feng-Bang Lee, Michele Mack, Cynthia Martin, ZhaoYu Wan, Tammy Martin, Xiao-Ling Huang Early, Laura Pan Luo, Sylvia Griss. I am fortunate that my circle of personal and professional friends overlap. Special thanks to Helen Benet-Goodman, whose collegiality nurtured my soul and this project throughout its development. Friend and stepmother Judy generously invested her editorial acumen in the manuscript. Roz Lasker and Phil Lee reminded me to maintain the connection between my exploration of ethical theory and my practical interests in bioethical policy. In scholarly arenas, I am grateful for extensive institutional and personal support that enabled this project. A Jacob Javits Fellowship supported much of my graduate school training, while a University of Virginia Dissertation fellowship supported the first stages of this project in my Ph.D. dissertation. I owe gratitude beyond words to my dissertation director and great mentor James F. Childress, whose life as a teacher-scholar embodies the unity of virtue, character, and principles. I am grateful that my dissertation committee viewed scholarship as an adventure. Special thanks to committee members Larry Bouchard, Daniel Westberg, and Patricia Werhane. David Little’s smiling piques contributed to my thinking. Gene Rogers’s engagement spurred me on. Supporters of my Asian interests, especially Paul Groner and Ronald Dimberg, contributed to my evolving desire to articulate a conception of civic virtue adequately supple for a pluralistic democracy.
x
·
Acknowledgments
Graduate school colleagues—Aline Kalbian, Margaret Mohrmann, Felicia Cohn, George Randels, Jessica Pierce, Cecilia Moore, Sidney Brown, Mark Hanson, Jeffrey Greenman, Robert Tuttle, John Portmann, and Jeff Reynolds—pressed me intellectually in ways that gave birth to this project. Special thanks to Richard Brown, who wrapped editorial advice in personal encouragement. Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for Applied Ethics sponsored my participation in its 1997–98 cross-disciplinary seminar on civic virtue, the forum that first galvanized my interest in “transforming” civic virtue. I am grateful to facilitators Christopher Kulp and Philip Kain and to seminar co-participants for our conversations: Don Beggs, June Carbone, Jane L. Curry, Mickey Edwards, Nicholas F. Gier, John P. Langan, Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Mike Meyer, Larry Nelson, Helen Popper, Brad Wilburn. I owe special thanks to two featured guests of the seminar, Robert Audi and William Galston, who generously read and commented on drafts of this manuscript. Harvard Divinity School awarded me a Women’s Studies in Religion fellowship during the 1999–2000 academic year, an opportunity that fostered my vision for this book. I am particularly grateful to program director Anne Braude and to co-fellows Susan Sered, Amy Hollywood, Ulrike Strasser, and Gail Sutherland. Conversations with Karen King, Elisabeth Schussler-Fiorenza, Leila Ahmed, Ralph Potter, Arthur Dyck, and J. Bryan Hehir contributed to my arguments. I thank the divinity students in my “Just Love” seminar, whose conversations directly catalyzed my writing. Participation in a 2002 manuscript workshop sponsored by the University of Virginia PEW–funded Center on Religion and Democracy enabled constructive scholarly dialogue. Thanks to Center director and co-director James Davison Hunter and Joseph E. Davis, workshop facilitator Charles Mathewes, co-participants Pamela Haas Cochran, Eric Gregory, Paul Lichterman, and Brett Wilmot, and workshop assistant Shelley Reese. I spent the 2004–2005 academic year in Japan, exploring cross-cultural issues in bioethics with the support of an Abe Fellowship from the Japan Foundation for Global Partnership, hosted by Tokyo University’s 21st Century COE Project on Death and Life Studies. That year was not supposed to have anything to do with this book, but as it turned out, it did.
Acknowledgments
·
xi
The distance proved clarifying, reminding me why I felt it important to unmask culturally and religiously specific origins of conventional accounts of civic virtue. I am particularly grateful for conversations about Japanese perceptions of friendship and sacrifice with my fellowship mentor, Susumu Shimazono, and with Miyako Takahashi. Throughout my years on the faculty of religious studies at Indiana University, I benefited from the support of colleagues. David Smith, Richard Miller, Mary-Jo Weaver, and Constance Furey were careful readers and enthusiastic conversation partners. Stephen Stein and Robert Orsi supported my research as department chairs. I am particularly grateful to the graduate students in the “Track I Ethics” monthly colloquiums who provided astute feedback on draft chapters, especially Lisa Sideris, Mark Graham, Jennifer Girod, Mark Wilson, David Cockerham, and Mark King. Daniel Conkle and Susan Williams in the Law School, and Karen Hanson in the Philosophy Department were valued conversationalists. Holly Folk provided excellent research assistance. My current colleagues at Michigan State University energized final editing. I particularly benefited from Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences Director Tom Tomlinson’s support, Libby BogdanLovis’s “fresh eyes,” Judy Andre’s editorial assistance, Peggy Anderson’s computer skills, and Hilde Lindemann’s practical guidance through the publication process. Several colleagues in the Society of Christian Ethics encouraged work related to this book. Jeffrey Stout and William Werpehowski first sparked my interest in conceptions of love and justice when I was an undergraduate, as did Paul Ramsey whom I thank posthumously. Paul Lauritzen, Cristina Traina, Christine Gudorf, and Patricia Beattie Jung were valued conversation partners. I am grateful to many parties who contributed to revising and editing the manuscript. Four enthusiastic reviewers provided constructive critiques that improved the book: Andrew Flescher, Lisa Tessman, William Kabasenche, and an anonymous reviewer for Indiana University Press. The manuscript benefited from several editors before submission: Judy Schroeder, Judy Granbois, and Dawn Martin. The editorial staff at Indiana University Press wonderfully nurtured the project to press. Special thanks to editorial director Robert Sloan for
xii
·
Acknowledgments
his support, to Elizabeth Yoder for her elegant copyediting, to Miki Bird for her management of the editorial process, and to Anne Clemmer and Chandra Mevis for administrative support. Chris Corneal, a fine arts professor at Michigan State University, created the innovative cover design after taking time to distill the main arguments of the book. To all of these heroes, my thanks.
Acknowledgments
·
xiii
PART I MAD ABOUT MADD
1
INVISIBLE HEROES: MAD ABOUT MADD
Twenty years ago the thirteen-year-old daughter of suburban California housewife Candy Lightner was killed by a drunk driver. Mrs. Lightner was distraught to learn that the driver had been on the road despite having an extensive record of driving while intoxicated. Rather than simply wallow in her grief and anger, she founded an organization called Mothers Against Drunk Driving—MADD. The group’s membership grew not only by the addition of others who had lost children but also by an appeal to mothers as such. Currently, more than 400 chapters of MADD volunteers work within all fifty states and countless smaller localities. The organization operates at multiple levels of community: sponsoring educational initiatives in schools to prevent children from growing up to become adults who drink and drive; participating in driver re-education programs for drivers who have been disciplined or put on probation; pressing local media for coverage of drunk driving; and lobbying for state and national legislation to make the penalties for drunk driving more severe. The relationship between the work of MADD and reductions in drunk driving fatalities has been publicly acknowledged. For example, in October 2000, when President Bill Clinton signed legislation mandating lower maximum blood alcohol levels to establish drunk driving, he credited the work of MADD.1 On the face of it, there is something heroic about the work of MADD, something heroic about the transformation of a personal tragedy to public service in its history.2 MADD is but one of many grassroots movements in 3
which personal experience is nobly turned outward for the benefit of the community at large. The Anti-Defamation League—an organization that like MADD is the subject of a case study at the conclusion of this book— draws upon Jewish experience of genocidal anti-Semitism in the Holocaust to create public educational programs against all group hates. When former First Lady Betty Ford made her personal struggle against substance abuse a public story, she embodied the commitment of preexisting community organizations and also spawned new ones. In these organizations, former substance abusers offer support to recovering addicts as well as community education on substance abuse prevention and treatment. Public mentoring of the experienced to the inexperienced occurs when someone who has struggled with mental illness (or supported an affected love one) works a late-night shift on a mental-health-emergency hotline, when parents surprised to learn that their son or daughter is homosexual receive social support at a meeting of PFLAG (Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays), or the La Leche League sends an experienced nurser to the home of a new mother who has requested breast-feeding assistance. The list of people, movements, and organizations that convert personal moral experience into constructive public capital could go on and on. Yet the heroism of MADD and groups like it seems invisible in current discussions of civic virtue. Paradoxically, these discussions almost universally lament a perceived loss of civic virtue that is associated with losses of public civility and civic-mindedness, a family of related terms. Thus a mythological narrative of “the Fall” underlies current writing on civic virtue. T H E FA L L NA R R AT I V E OF C I V IC V I RT U E Social commentators participating in the fall narrative speculate on how we lost the civic virtue of some earlier golden age and they challenge us to recapture it. Significantly, the fall narrative is presumed by writers with perspectives from different fields—sociologists, political theorists, religious studies scholars. It is equally presumed by thinkers who otherwise occupy very different positions on the political spectrum or who are variously labeled by political theorists as “liberals,” “communitarians,” “civic republicans,” or “cultural conservatives.” Most straightforwardly, the “fall” 4
·
Mad about MADD
is perceived as an actual fall in levels of civic virtue among the citizenry. Alternatively, the fall is described as a retreat from public discourse about civic virtue—a retreat that, it is feared, will inevitably erode civic virtue itself. The following excerpts from contemporary literature demonstrate the rhetorical force of the fall narrative. Alasdair MacIntyre’s aptly titled After Virtue laments the modern underappreciation of how cultivated virtues shape moral life, dramatically equating the fall from virtue with a new Dark Ages (MacIntyre 1984, 263). In their national best-seller Habits of the Heart, sociologist Robert Bellah and his colleagues claim: Madison and the other founders [believed] our form of government was dependent on the existence of virtue among the people. . . . The tension between private interest and public good is never freely resolved in any society. But in a free republic, it is the task of the citizen, whether ruler or ruled, to cultivate civic virtue in order to mitigate the tension and render it manageable. . . . As the twentieth century has progressed, that understanding, so important throughout most of our history, has begun to slip from our grasp. (1996, 270)
Joan Williams notes the pervasiveness of a sense of decline in civic virtue even among those who disagree on what constitutes such virtue or what indicators best measure it: Substantial numbers on both the Right and the Left agree that something is amiss, something linked with selfishness and materialism. Cultural conservatives decry a lack of values and focus on the “breakdown of the family,” drugs, pornography, and abortion. Progressives focus on conspicuous consumption, rising infant mortality rates, homelessness, and other symbols and realities of the human cost of income redistribution in the favor of the wealthy. But both sides are deeply troubled by America’s loss of commitment to values other than self-interest, and both agree on the need for a vision of the public good. (1992, 310)3
The fall narrative is presumed in Amitai Etzioni’s ardent appeals to shore up America’s civic-mindedness with attention to social and political virtues: “We do require a set of social virtues, some basic settled values, that we as a community endorse and actively affirm. . . . Our society is suffering from a severe case of deficient we-ness and the values only communities can properly uphold” (1993, 25). Invisible Heroes
·
5
Even those who overtly contest the fall narrative implicitly presume some validity, as so-called liberal virtue theorists like Steven Macedo demonstrate: What is lost, allegedly, is the possibility of a moral community, a common devotion to shared values, and citizen virtues, with the attendant risks of stability problems and legitimation crises. . . . Liberals can reclaim a language which supposedly lies beyond the bounds of liberal politics, the language of virtue, citizenship, community, and human flourishing. (1991, 254; emphasis added)
Similarly, William Galston describes the fall of virtue from the radar of liberal political theory as an orthodoxy that he and other dissenters challenge.4 So-called communitarian thinkers also reinforce the fall narrative even while questioning it. For example, Michael Sandel, who explicitly challenges the nostalgia of the fall narrative, envisions his project in terms of “an attempt to revitalize the civic strand of freedom” and the “recrudescence of virtue,” projects that entail “reviving the political economy of citizenship” (1996, 317, 324, 329; emphasis added). That the breadth of the fall narrative extends beyond any ivory tower was vividly demonstrated by the 1992 presidential election, in which revived attention to civic virtue marked the campaigns of both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Both candidates called for a renewal of character in the citizenry. (In Clinton’s case, this call was linked to his description as a “New Democrat.”)5 Both presumed a fall from which we are called to redemption, a fall in the character of citizenship. Both Bush and Clinton formally sought the counsel of advisors who were thickly engaged in debates about the constitution of civic virtue: in Bush’s case, former Secretary of Education and ardent campaigner William Bennett, who subsequently authored The Children’s Book of Virtues (1995); in Clinton’s case, William Galston, a political theorist with published arguments for “liberal” civic virtue (Galston 1991). Following the election, Galston was appointed as a domestic policy advisor to Clinton.6 In the years since, conversations about civic virtue have remained commonplace in op-ed pieces as well as academic journals, in radio call-in shows as well as election campaigns. In response to the perceived fall, many simply reassert the need for civic virtue, presuming its nature to be obvious. More reflective thinkers 6
·
Mad about MADD
attempt to articulate theoretical criteria constitutive of civic virtue. I write as both a beneficiary and a critic of the burgeoning reflective conversation on civic virtue. In it I find many provocative starting points. Yet no contemporary account seems wholly satisfactory to me, because none adequately explains the civic virtue of MADD.
M A D A B OU T M A DD: OR DI NA RY H E ROE S A S A S TA RT I NG P OI N T FOR R E F L EC T ION ON C I V IC V I RT U E This book begins with my getting mad about MADD. “Mad about MADD” is a double shorthand. It both signals my discontent and employs “MADD” to represent not only its namesake organization but also the many civic movements that transform personal experience into positive civic perspective. I challenge readers to consider the puzzling disjuncture between the heroism of civic models like MADD and their invisibility in conversations on civic virtue. Healing this disjuncture requires changes in our understanding of civic virtue. My proposal is that civic virtue be redefined by considering ordinary moral heroes in our midst. My argument is two-pronged. First, civic virtue, clearly, has not fallen off the planet of our political world. If we prevent the fall narrative from obscuring our vision, we discover that exemplary citizens are cultivating civic virtue right under our noses. Second, reflection on examples set by those ordinary moral heroes forces us to reconceptualize civic virtue. Such examples defy conventional descriptions of what civic virtue is—of what cultivated moral habits constitute civic virtue. A robust articulation of the accomplishment of these ordinary heroes is a crucial first step toward fostering civic virtue. Similarly, such an articulation may help us to identify civic vices or villains that have remained unquestioned for too long, protected in the shadows of wrongful accounts of civic virtue. My basic aim is to convince readers of the need for transformed conceptions of civic virtue. This book is intended as an invitation to a public conversation on civic virtue. Since my strategy looks to ordinary moral heroes to elucidate civic virtue, the invitation is especially geared to ordinary people—in whom the extraordinary is inevitably found. Of course, the book is also geared to scholars of political theory, gender theory, religious Invisible Heroes
·
7
studies, and cultural studies, but its invitation to them is a humbling one. It requests that they position themselves as students of, rather than teachers of, ordinary moral heroes. The book particularly invites caretakers (of children, lovers, parents, friends, neighbors) into the conversation on civic virtue not only by drawing on the contemporary literature tagged “ethics of care” but also by appealing to the experience of ordinary caretakers. Since the publication of Carol Gilligan’s best-seller In a Different Voice in 1981, the term “ethics of care” has been prominent in ethical discourse. Gilligan contrasted a moral vocabulary she called “care” to a socially dominant moral vocabulary tagged “justice” and noted a gender pattern in which more women than men described ethical challenges in terms of care. According to Gilligan, the primary difference between the two moral outlooks is that justice reasoners begin from a stance of moral independence, a stance in which rules protecting liberty seem a natural starting point for ethics, and the moral skills of intimacy can be attained only through moral maturation. In contrast, care reasoners begin from a stance of moral relationality to others, a stance in which providing active care to others seems a natural starting point for ethics, and the development of a moral identity independent of one’s relational associations can be attained only through moral maturation. Gilligan cautioned that neither care nor justice is an inherently superior moral framework, but rather both entail characteristic strengths and weaknesses. While some explorers of care rejected that caution, celebrating care and suggesting its superiority, most who followed have developed one or several of the following critical perspectives: (1) an exploration of the relevance of care to particular areas of ethical thought; (2) a critique of care, further articulating ethical challenges of care as a moral perspective; (3) a challenge to conventional boundaries, which ascribe justice as a regulatory ideal for public life and care for private life; (4) an effort to integrate care and justice in a more comprehensive ethical approach; or (5) a questioning of whether the justice/care axis of discussion itself has become overly limiting of other moral vocabularies. In Christian theological ethics, a parallel conversation has occurred in which feminist theologians have questioned whether different patterns of sin may be associated with care and justice frameworks.7 My argument goes beyond the theoretical literature on care, actively seeking the input of people who tangibly care for children or other 8
·
Mad about MADD
dependents, of people who do the hard practical work of maintaining bonds of family and friendship. Throughout, I acknowledge that historically and presently, such caretakers have been and continue to be disproportionately—though not exclusively—women. Of course, to acknowledge this underlying gender pattern is not to argue that the moral work of care should be “women’s work.” But frankness about the gender patterning is necessary in order to ask the right questions about whose civic work has been wrongly taken for granted, and what kind of work that is; or conversely, to ask whose civic work and what kinds of work have been overextolled. And of course, since gender patterning transcends biological sex, men as well as women turn out to be taken for granted.8 In other words, current conversation on civic virtue may overreward women who adopt civic stances that are culturally coded as masculine and underacknowledge men who engage in caring labor. But significantly, women are disproportionately engaged in kinds of labor that the fall narrative of civic virtue renders invisible. Traditional gender biases have not only labeled caring a “private” activity, but they have also contrasted women’s participation in such “private” activity to men’s participation in “public” activity.9 This bifurcation continues to disconnect the moral lessons of care from conceptions of civic virtue, even as the associated gender valences are superficially questioned. Thus an organization like MADD, which bridges the realms of maternal care and public life, confounds established categories by which civic virtue is understood. I contend that it is the established categories that must be changed. T WO PROBL E M AT IC I DE OL O GI E S: GE N DE R A N D R E L IGION To launch my transformation of civic virtue, I explore historical and cultural factors that catalyze current calls to civic virtue and show that some of those influences simultaneously render the civic virtue of organizations like MADD invisible. In a curious way, current conversation on civic virtue is hamstrung. It recognizes the need for more attention to civic virtue, but it fails to recognize cultural factors that threaten the vitality—indeed, the coherence—of the term. Transformers of civic virtue must face the combined weight of two linked ideologies that together have narrowed the terrain of civic virtue such that there is little ground on which to stand: Invisible Heroes
·
9
an ideology of gender, and a religious ideology (both analyzed in more historical detail in chapter 2). The first is an ideology of gender that, following Joan Williams (2000), I call “domesticity.” Domesticity is a conceptual system that sharply distinguishes home labor from market and civic labor. It defines domestic labor, associated with femininity, as emotional labor to be governed by affection; and market and civic labor, associated with masculinity, to be governed by competition and rational civic commitment. Of course, domesticity is being challenged on many practical and theoretical fronts, but my contention is that it continues to shape conceptions of civic virtue, though its legacy is unacknowledged. Domesticity defines the socially constructed boundary of public and private along gender lines. Just as problematically, it also defines the civic realm as devoid of passion—dependent on a pristine rationality aimed at the public good. The problem with such a conceptual schema is that it cannot account for what, in the absence of some appropriate passion, could initially motivate a civically minded stance. It also cannot account for what a citizen may learn “rationally” from her care for particular others and the relevance that might have for visions of public good. The second problematic ideology is religious, with Christian roots and, increasingly, Christian critics. Its influence on contemporary conceptions of civic virtue is ironic, since the rhetoric of civic virtue demands that religious commitments of the citizen, like all “private” commitments, be suppressed when the citizen speaks and acts qua citizen. Yet in fact, this very dictate has religious roots. It derives from a celebration of sacrifice for the stranger-neighbor that came to dominate interpretations of agape, or Christian neighbor love, during the same period in the Enlightenment in which distinctively modern conceptions of civic virtue crystallized. This interpretation pitted agapic love for the stranger against the personal loves of the Christian—whereas older, classical interpretations of love in Christianity had sought the integration of personal loves and universal loves. The modern interpretation of agape severed biblically linked conceptions of love and justice in paradoxical ways. On the one hand, love came to be viewed as a natural affection that governed home and hearth; justice, as a more strenuous ethical demand for political community. On the other hand, Christian neighbor love (agape) was conceived as the basis for justice to the stranger, while it was deemed increasingly irrelevant—or 10
·
Mad about MADD
even antithetical—to intimate settings where the colloquial word “love” was most frequently employed. This celebration of disinterested love went hand in hand with a stress on universal moral ideals as the foundation of civic life. What I will call the ideology of agape became intertwined with the ideology of gender: stringently universalistic interpretations of agape bolstered the gendered moral division of labor defined by domesticity. Both becoming a virtuous citizen and becoming a universal lover became deemed dependent on the rational suppression of personal commitments, whether those commitments were to particular persons or to particular subcommunities. Being a woman, or doing “women’s work,” inherently disadvantaged one from attaining agapic love or civic virtue so defined. Of course, the problem of this dually ideological schema goes far beyond inequality of admission into the elevated category for women and caretakers. The conceptual categories themselves became grossly distorted, as both agape and civic virtue came to be understood as completely divorced from ordinary practices of care and nurture among families, friends, or other particular communities. A first step toward transforming civic virtue, then, is to unmask the disingenuousness of a rhetoric of civic virtue that on the surface is nongendered but that under the surface is deeply gendered, that on the surface is highly secular but that under the surface is deeply religious.
T H E SPI R A L OF DIC HOTOM I E S I N C ON T E M P OR A RY P OL I T IC A L T H E ORY Biases against women and caretakers, generated by dual ideologies of gender and religion, both participate in and are influenced by a spiral of related dichotomies that fragment contemporary political theory. Many so-called liberals and communitarians continue to separate along this series of poles, despite their oft-articulated frustration with the bipolar framework. For a generation now, American political theory has been shaped by conversation between liberals and communitarians, and by those who call for new frameworks that bypass the polarity between the two. Liberalism refers to the tradition of political theory that has largely shaped the experiment of American democracy: a tradition that emphasizes individual freedom to pursue diverse conceptions of the good life. Invisible Heroes
·
11
Contemporary liberals maintain an emphasis on individual freedom as they struggle with inherent democratic tensions between freedom and equality. The communitarian movement challenges the liberal tradition for having a too-atomized conception of the human individual, a tooprocedural conception of political life, and a too-self-deceptive conception of liberal “neutrality” toward diverse citizens’ ideas of the good life. Communitarians explore the importance of membership in civic communities that are less diffuse than that of the state, such as families, churches, clubs, and neighborhoods. While it has been linked with certain theorists, the term “communitarian” is often employed loosely, indicating a critique of liberal individualism rather than a comprehensive alternative political theory.10 Amid contemporary tensions between liberalism and communitarianism, many citizens whose civic stance defies the bipolar framework have difficulty garnering political attention, though they may be the ones most in need of being seen and heard. In short, political theory is cast as a series of “either-or” choices that allow women and caretakers to fall through the definitional cracks. Currently, political theorists debate whether the political self is prior to its chosen ends or whether that self is constituted by its discovered ends.11 But true civic virtue must allow people whose identity is wedded to particular histories and goals nonetheless to be critical of those histories and goals and to be critically open to the histories and goals of others. Political theorists debate whether the project of citizen formation is one of judgment or self-discovery.12 But true civic virtue must demand that citizens know themselves well enough to make judgments on both themselves and others and that they leave their self-identity open to ongoing revision in the light of judgment by themselves and others. Political theorists debate whether an increase in public reasonableness or an increase in public passion is needed to revitalize civic life.13 But true civic virtue must cultivate citizens both passionate enough to make civic commitments and reasonable enough to be transformed by the civic commitments of others. Political theorists debate the priority of care and justice as ethical ideals.14 But true civic virtue must mutually relate the moral skills of caring for particular others to the moral skills of broad political fairness. Political theorists debate whether the freedom of a multicultural democratic polity is primarily a freedom from certain kinds of impositions on the 12
·
Mad about MADD
individual or a freedom for a certain kind of creative civic commitment.15 But true civic virtue must encourage the use and maintenance of freedom “from” to facilitate freedom “for.” Political theorists debate the relative priority of civic virtue (positive citizen character traits), and civil society (positive civil milieus).16 But true civic virtue must fortify civil society, while healthy civil society must facilitate the development of civic virtue. The culturally prevalent though politically denied Christian ideology that portrays love as a zero-sum contest between personal and universal loves reinforces these fault lines and their implicit gendering. Disturbingly, the entire spiral of dichotomies supports entrenched, though challenged, cultural ideals of masculinity and femininity. It is commonly women whose identities are taken to be more given than chosen; whose very selves are assumed to be defined by their relational responsibilities more than by their deliberated judgments; whose fundamental challenge is taken to be discovering, rather than creating, their true nature; whose temperaments are assumed to be more passionate than reasonable; and whose commitments to the details of care for particular others are seen as obstructing their ability to see large issues of justice. While naive optimists may think such caricatures of masculinity and femininity are long outdated, the tenacity of related conceptual dichotomies attests to their real, if unembraced, influence. So one metaphorical way to cast current debate in political theory is to question whether politics should become more masculine or more feminine in order to be redeemed. If the explicit articulation of that underlying question causes many to bristle (as I think it should), then not only are many proposed “answers” in contemporary political theory problematic, but the axes of questioning are misguided. The entire spiral of dichotomies must be transcended in order to formulate a workable conception of civic virtue. Somehow, the “either-ors” must be changed to “both-ands.”
T R A NSCE N DI NG T H E SPI R A L OF DIC HOTOM I E S: DE- GE N DE R I NG C I V IC V I RT U E A S A “R E L IGIOUS ” I M PE R AT I V E If transformed civic virtue is to bridge dichotomies between selves-priorto-ends and selves-constituted-by-ends, between judgment and self-disInvisible Heroes
·
13
covery, public reasonableness and public passion, freedom from and freedom for, justice and care, civic virtue and civil society, liberalism and communitarianism, then it must also transcend problematic cultural coding of masculinity and femininity. In short, it must be de-gendered. In the course of this book, I speak of the necessary de-gendering of civic virtue in two ways. One way is straightforwardly literal. “Women’s work” (whether performed by women or men) and its civic contributions has been taken for granted or ignored in conventional accounts of civic virtue. De-gendered civic virtue must make that work and its political contribution visible while maintaining a critical moral stance on such work. At the same time, civic efforts seemingly motivated by a dispassionate concern for strangers must not be privileged, for such efforts may be misguided or even unjust. They demand the same level of public critical appraisal, for as the saying goes, the road to perdition is paved with good intentions. The second way in which I speak of de-gendering civic virtue is metaphorical. “De-gendering” will serve as a catchphrase to describe transcendence of the entire series of linked dichotomies that a new account of civic virtue must accomplish. That series of linked dichotomies must no longer be allowed to define questions regarding what constitutes civic virtue or who is civically virtuous. Since the problem of gendered civic virtue is religious, de-gendering civic virtue must necessarily also be religious. But whereas the problem of civic virtue lies in an unrecognized connection to thick religious ideology, the solution may be more thinly religious. (By “thick,” I mean indebted to particular institutionalized religious traditions or particular theological interpretations of human anthropology; by “thin,” I mean the structurally religious quest of integrating moral norms coherently and comprehensively.) The solution must be “religious,” at least metaphorically, in that it must redescribe the relationship between different kinds of human loves. Ultimately, it must describe this relationship between loves in such a way as to make the civic virtue of MADD visible. It need not, as current conceptions of civic virtue do, imply one thickly religious answer to the question of relationship between loves. Rather, it must seek to describe such relationships plausibly enough to resonate with many life experiences, generally enough to be informed by multiple thick religious frameworks, and structurally enough to be relevant to political reflection. Thus, many forums that explore the relationship between different loves 14
·
Mad about MADD
may be relevant to political theory: not just pristinely secular forums, but religious forums; not just pristinely philosophical forums, but art, literature, and other mediums of aesthetic reflection.
ROA DM A P FOR T H E A RGU M E N T OF T H E B O OK Before outlining my argument, I note that different reading strategies may be appropriate to different kinds of readers. Parts I and III together summarize my view of the problem of civic virtue and my proposed solution. Readers can get an overall sense of my argument by reading those parts. In part I, chapter 2 historically and philosophically fleshes out the ideologies of gender and religion first introduced in chapter 1. The two sections at the end of the chapter provide a critical segue between my account of the problem and my proposed constructive solution in part III. Part II of the book is a more scholarly section elaborating how entrenched the problems identified in part I remain in contemporary political theory. That section may be of more detailed interest to scholars engaged with the theorists addressed than to other readers. Headings flag terms and concepts that become important counterpoints to my reconstructive argument in part III. The book closes with three case studies, each designed to highlight civic heroes or expose civic vices that remain invisible in conventional accounts of civic virtue but that become apparent in my transformed account. Conceptually, I begin my transformation of civic virtue by considering factors underlying revived interest in civic virtue as a moral category. I introduce some promising contributions to the burgeoning conversation on civic virtue but demonstrate that none adequately accounts for the accomplishment of MADD’s founders. My investigation highlights the extent to which popular accounts of civic virtue presume a discredited conception of impartiality as a public ideal. Demanding that citizens adopt an “impartial standpoint” on public matters, this outdated conception defines impartiality in opposition to the personal commitments of the citizen. Thus the heroism of MADD is defined away, and commentators on civic virtue miss the heroes in their midst. Because it ignores limits of human finitude, I call the problematic conception of an impartial standpoint idolatrous. I argue that the rift between MADD’s service and the conversation on civic virtue can be healed only Invisible Heroes
·
15
by reassessing conceptions of public impartiality in light of an ethic of care. The result is neither the rejection of impartiality as an ideal nor the uncritical romanticization of care. Rather, I propose a reconceptualization of appropriate public impartiality and an associated transformation of civic virtue. Impartiality should be viewed as a moral practice rather than as an imaginative standpoint. This practice explicitly links appropriate partiality—that is, highly personal care—with appropriate impartiality. Thus it demonstrates how people can turn what they learn morally in their personal lives toward public good rather than presuming that public stances demand the suppression of personal commitments. At the same time, the practice of impartiality enables the reflexivity by which public norms can challenge or transform personal commitments. With impartiality properly understood as a practice, new virtues suggest themselves as constitutive of civic virtue. Impartiality itself becomes seen as a “linchpin” virtue, its cultivation connected to other civic virtues. Virtues of conceptual translation, structurally modeled on virtues of linguistic translation, are foundational to this family of virtues. The linguistic translator faces the challenge of comprehending multiple languages. The citizen in a multicultural democracy faces the challenge of comprehending multiple moral languages—even if expressed in a common tongue. The model of translation redefines traditional cardinal virtues of patience, humility, and prudence in an overtly political context. In particular, I argue for a redefinition of humility as self-restraint and a redefinition of courage as “disciplined vulnerability.” Disciplined vulnerability describes the character trait that allows a conceptual translator to accept for the moment—rather than to deny or to force-fittingly resolve—what at first appears untranslatable. It allows one to live with disjunctures in one’s political landscape because certain experiences, discourses, or actions by others do not fit into one’s previously established moral vocabulary. Over time, the disciplined vulnerable citizen may shape a new moral language that incorporates the erstwhile disjuncture as part of its linguistic structure. But the virtue itself weighs against overly hasty resolutions that deny the force of the initially untranslatable. Disciplined vulnerability contrasts both with liberal focus on moral autonomy and with communitarian focus on the moral authority of traditions. The cultivator of this virtue is neither an atomized individual nor a member of a particular community. Rather, she is a citizen-individual in 16
·
Mad about MADD
relationship to many overlapping communities, some evolving rather than established, some inchoate rather than institutionalized, some in tension with others. The courage of cultivated vulnerability allows this citizen to interrogate personal and civic moral commitments through analogical interplay among themselves and among the commitments of others. Conventional accounts of civic virtue correctly intuit that self-restraint in some way relates to citizen virtue. But rather than giving any prudential account of self-restraint as a cultivated moral habit, they “proceduralize” restraint. They suggest rules about how virtuous citizens should speak in public, restricting not only legitimate topics but also legitimate vocabularies for public discourse. That approach “loses virtue” even within an ostensibly virtue-based account, while it too narrowly describes the boundaries of the political in ways that inherently favor and disfavor some citizens. A transformed account of civic virtue demands that self-restraint be seen as a character trait, not as a set of discursive rules. As a corollary, the selfrestrained citizen is aware of discourse as evolving. Self-restraint entails a reflectiveness on the power dynamics of different kinds of discourses. It weighs against the desire to control the terms of discourse itself. It does not ask citizens to begin speaking in moral languages accessible to all, but poses accessibility as a longer-term goal. It allows the disciplined vulnerable citizen to accept being part of conversations that are not wholly transparent, so that transparency achieved over time will include as many citizens as possible. The articulation of these virtues integrates metaphors of visual perception and oral/aural discourse, both of which inform contemporary ethical theory, though currently as two separate critical vocabularies. These virtues promote a truly comprehensive “reflective equilibrium” that is also a “perceptive equilibrium.”17 In other words, they foster a mutual reinforcement between ethical theory and practice, and among the diverse kinds of ethical practices in which citizens engage. They allow citizens to pursue reflective equilibrium without the self-deception that is sometimes facilitated by overly rigid conceptions of public/private boundaries. They distinguish civic virtue from a facile conception of civility, since they demand engagement with, rather than dismissal of, citizen stances that at first shock, confuse, or affront. Yet simultaneously, they weigh against generally combative approaches to civic life. In short, these virtues allow one to engage in a reflective ordering of loves. Invisible Heroes
·
17
The related transformations of impartiality and civic virtue redirect spotlights on our political life in two ways. They highlight the accomplishment of groups like MADD, which is obscured by the fall narrative of civic virtue. But they also call into question the civic value of certain organizations or policies that have long remained unquestioned. For example, they may recast widespread policies to promote organ donation and transplantation as suspect forms of disordered love, lacking adequate justice to particular persons and groups. In religious terms, the transformation of civic virtue rejects a dichotomized view of love and justice in favor of a dialectical portrayal of their relationship. Instead of pitting citizen justice against personal love, it challenges virtuous citizens to cultivate just love for their political community.
18 · Mad about MADD
2
NEW CALLS FOR CIVIC VIRTUE, AND CALLS FOR NEW CIVIC VIRTUES
As chapter 1 elaborated, a pervasive fall narrative obscures the civic virtue of citizens like MADD’s founders. This mythology eulogizes the widespread cultivation of citizen virtue in some past golden age, lamenting a loss of civic character since then. The prevalence of the fall narrative raises two preliminary questions: First, what real malaise underlies the nostalgia of the fall narrative? Second, why is the language of “virtue”—a language that would have seemed quaint and prudish only a generation ago—enjoying a simultaneous renaissance in moral theory and popular culture? These two preliminary questions helpfully frame an introduction to the contemporary conversation on civic virtue. Nostalgia for a golden age impedes reflection on what civic virtue may mean in our times and obscures the real “here-and-now” civic heroism of organizations like MADD. Yet nostalgia, even false nostalgia, often reveals important information about communal values. Nostalgia signals a shared sense of something of value that is perceived to be missing. What does the fall narrative of civic virtue suggest is missing? It suggests longings for two missing values: a place for the public, and explicit attention to the character of citizens. Both of these should be understood in the broadest terms. A PL AC E FOR T H E PU BL IC While it is a mistake to believe that the golden age intimated by the fall narrative was a real historical period, the mythological importance of that 19
golden age is highly significant. The golden age seems to have offered a secure place for the public: space for a person to define herself as a citizen and to define her relationship to others, including strangers, as citizenry. This space for the public is in one sense a physical space, a place where citizens who may have no bond other than citizenship meet. Thus, many contemporary advocates of renewed civic virtue lament what they consider to be the decline in the number or quality of physical venues where the public meets as public: neighborhood parks, town halls, public schools. Others bemoan the dwindling of so-called intermediary institutions: voluntary associations such as Rotary clubs or church communities that give place for civic activity. In such places, people meet not only as business leaders or co-religionists, for example, but also as citizens. Of course, concern for the purported loss of intermediate institutions raises crucial questions about what kinds of intermediate institutions are acknowledged as “civic” organizations and why. (Why Rotary, but not MADD?) The longed-for public space is not only physical or institutional but also metaphorical. Many commentators focus on it as a space within discourse.1 Driving both the fall narrative and the renaissance of attention to civic virtue, then, is a widespread malaise with public discourse in our society. Many complain that public discourse increasingly resembles a giant episode of Crossfire, with everyone shouting and no one listening. Electoral candidates move from criticizing their opponents’ positions to attacking them as people. Paid lobbyists with enormous vested interests dictate the terms of many supposedly public debates. Commentators such as linguist Deborah Tannen note that metaphors of battle undergird conceptions of public argument in our society: The war on drugs, the war on cancer, the battle of the sexes, politicians’ turf battles—in the argument culture, war metaphors pervade our talk and shape our thinking. Nearly everything is framed as a battle or game in which winning or losing is the main concern. . . . Conflict and opposition are as necessary as cooperation and agreement, but the scale is off balance, with conflict and opposition over-weighted. (1998, 4) 2
This metaphorical grid both demonstrates and perpetuates a combative sense of political life. Public discourse becomes a battleground in which people who understand their interests fight for them in zero-sum games. Politics becomes a field on which agonistic contests are played by people who know their game well. 20
·
Mad about MADD
Amid the backdrop of such negativity there is even disagreement about what counts as public discourse in the first place. Is it public discourse when, with invited reporters along, the AIDS advocacy group ACT-UP tramples the communion bread at a public mass at St. Patrick’s Cathedral? Is it public discourse when demonstrators dressed as sea turtles block the entrance of the World Trade Association meeting place in Seattle? My point is not to condemn such tactics. In fact, I will criticize conceptions of civic virtue that would discourage such emotional, symbolic forms of protest. Here I simply propose that the atmosphere of conflict in more conventional venues of discourse dramatically influences popular interpretation of such events. In some ways, the intended shock of these protests is muted by the generally combative public atmosphere. Yet, paradoxically, some people may perceive that shock as more threatening because of the pervasive tenor of public conflict. In public discourse framed by metaphors of battle, there seems to be no safe place for the citizen who feels genuinely confused by the complexity of public issues, who acknowledges any ignorance, whose allegiances are multivalent or strained by internal tension. There is no forum for discourse aimed at genuine edification. There is no safe place in discourse to sort things out. In such an environment, it is not surprising that laments about the “uncivil” public have become commonplace among columnists, commentators, and ordinary citizens. Sometimes, then, the appeal for civic virtue is conflated with an appeal for public “civility.” But what public civility means or demands, and what virtues it entails, remain open to debate. As Tannen worries, “‘civility’ suggests a superficial, pinky-in-the-air veneer of politeness spread thin over human relations like a layer of marmalade over toast” (1998, 3). Thus a careful exploration of civic virtue must explore the connection between civic virtue and the atmosphere of public discourse without equating civic virtue with a facile notion of civility.
AT T E N T ION TO MOR A L CH A R AC T E R The second longing expressed in the fall narrative is a longing for explicit attention to questions of moral character. In the mythical golden age, there seems to have been some consensus on who exemplified virtues of citizenship and what those virtues were. There were recognizable models New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
21
for aspiring citizens to imitate in their civic life. There were, in short, clear heroes. Ironically, then, while the fall narrative problematically obscures real “here-and-now heroes” such as MADD, it also expresses a longing for heroes. By asking where all the heroes have gone, the fall narrative highlights the lacuna of attention to questions of civic character in much modern political theory. This is not merely an omission, but rather it is a consequence of certain tenets in the tradition of political liberalism to which we are heirs. Historically, liberalism was sparked by negative as well as positive catalysts, particularly by weariness with catastrophic religious warfare between Catholics and Protestants that marked the birth of modernism in seventeenthcentury Europe. This weariness prompted the search for bases of political life more narrowly circumscribed than comprehensive worldviews. Liberalism was designed to allow people to live together peaceably with others who they thought were going to hell. In an important sense, then, questions of character in the citizenry were deliberately deflected. Such deflection is embodied in the procedural focus of modern liberalism, which is characterized by an emphasis on fair laws, institutions, and policies to govern public life, coupled with a stated neutrality toward the different worldviews of its citizens. Liberal neutrality implies a reluctance to judge their characters save when they transgress the limiting laws, procedures, and policies. However, the history and goals of liberalism are complex. Ironically, or perhaps precisely because of the deliberate deflection of worldview, early modernism also sparked a revival of discussion about civic virtue. This revival presumed that certain virtues of citizenship must be desirable, even among citizens who were going to hell after this life. It presumed that freedom from enforced religious orthodoxy provided freedom for a different sort of public commitment. Some contemporary revivers of civic virtue consider themselves heirs to this so-called civic republicanism, which was closely linked to the birth of liberalism. In general, the term civic republicanism denotes an emphasis on what Isaiah Berlin (1969) termed freedom for, rather than an emphasis on freedom from, in the interpretation of liberty. Nevertheless, the term is a loose one. Some use it with nostalgic reference to certain communities deemed to have achieved widespread civic virtue: ancient Athens, or Renaissance Florence, or the earliest period of liberal history itself. Others use it more ideally, to denote an ethos of communal orientation and voluntary political participation. 22
·
Mad about MADD
The longing of the fall narrative is not merely for civic heroes but for a discussion of what traits of character render them admirable. This is dramatized in Michael Sandel’s version of the fall narrative. Sandel’s tale is particularly sophisticated because he readily admits that the golden age never really existed (1996, 6). Instead, Sandel is fascinated that the appeal to a golden age crosscuts discussions of civic virtue in various historical epochs. He interprets the resilience of nostalgia in discussions of civic virtue as sensitivity to its fragility. Sandel is bemused by the lamentation over lost civic virtue expressed by founders of the American republic such as John Adams, George Washington, and Benjamin Rush. Adams’s remarks, quoted by Sandel, could well be ripped from the past and plagiarized by a contemporary editorial columnist: Virtue and simplicity of manners are indispensably necessary in a republic among all orders and degrees of men. But there is so much rascality, so much venality and corruption, avarice and ambition, such a rage for profit and commerce among all ranks and degrees of men even in America, that I sometimes doubt whether there is public virtue enough to support a republic.
Sandel emphasizes that pessimism about civic virtue was one of the driving forces for a Constitutional Convention. Some founders viewed the Constitution as a necessary response to a negative impetus rather than as an ingenious response to a positive challenge. These framers considered the Constitution an instrument to govern a people whose political virtue was otherwise inadequate for governance (1996, 126–30). From Sandel’s point of view, then, the fall is not an absolute decline in civic virtue, with the meaning of that term presumed obvious. For him, the real fall is that somewhere along the way Americans stopped explicitly talking about civic virtue altogether. This mistake he refers to simultaneously as the “triumph and travail of the procedural republic” (1996, 274–316). According to Sandel, since the virtues that support democratic public life are both ambiguous in content and fragile in constitution, they demand continual public discussion as part of the democratic project.
T H E R E DIS C OV E R E D V I RT U E S OF V I RT U E The perceived need to reconsider public-mindedness noted by Sandel is now widely shared among political theorists and the general public. That New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
23
this exploration is frequently framed as a quest for civic virtue is highly significant. A generation ago the term “virtue” was rarely encountered in classrooms, political campaigns, or other public forums. What does the term connote, and why has it risen to the fore in discussion of public values? Contemporary discussions of civic virtue participate in a wider recovery of virtue as an ethical category.3 Virtue was the predominant concern of classical Greek ethics, a concern that through the heritage of the Greeks influenced subsequent Roman and Christian thought. In classical times, virtues were widely understood to be disciplined moral habits that, when cultivated appropriately, result in settled positive character traits.4 A virtue was thought to strike an appropriate mean between two excessive habits. For example, courage was the virtuous mean between cowardliness and brazen foolhardiness. The highest ethical aim was the full integration of virtues in an ideally good life. That integration marked virtue in its singular sense; conversely, the good life was defined by that integration. Significantly, people’s lives were assumed to be the fodder of ethics—the unit of analysis. Attention to virtue now crosscuts religious and philosophical ethics, political theory, and popular culture. Increasingly, appeals are made to reconsider lives as lived—rather than principles or theorems—as the basic currency of ethical reflection. The current renaissance of virtue was born out of widespread discontent with rule-based approaches to ethics. Such rule-based approaches include deontology and utilitarianism, two modes of ethical thinking that eclipsed others for several centuries after the Enlightenment. Both deontology and utilitarianism seek to articulate and defend universal principles of morality that should be affirmed by all reasonable people, regardless of religious or cultural background. Deontology, particularly in its Kantian form, proposes universalizability as the test of ethical maxims. Only principles that one could wish universalized are considered truly ethical.5 Utilitarianism proposes consequentialist prediction as the test of ethical maxims. Only those principles that in general promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number are considered truly ethical.6 In the last fifty years, deontology and utilitarianism have lost favor in the midst of general questioning of principle-based ethics. Methodological challenges have been launched not only by virtue theorists but by revivers 24
·
Mad about MADD
of casuistry, promoters of narrative ethics, and postmodern deconstructionists.7 Critics claim that principle-based approaches to ethics are overly minimalist. Ethical life, they insist, must be about more than playing by certain rules. They further argue that continued disagreement about the justification of deontological and utilitarian principles proves that the game of such justification cannot be part and parcel of ethics. The pessimism about rule-based ethics coincides with the emergence of postmodernism. Postmodernism demarks a family of intellectual traditions that play on the unstable, multivalent qualities of language to expose both the particular power differentials and the denial of real difference that are often masked by universal categories.8 Postmodernists highlight the historical and contingent nature of conceptions of rationality and the social struggles that underlie their solidification. They emphasize that universal rules and procedures can entrench de facto winners and losers through a guise of fairness. The cogency of that critique suggests a turn to concrete experience in ethical reflection. It suggests the value of considering thick accounts of virtue in all their particularity rather than speculating some “least common denominator” of ethical nature that transcends historical and cultural particularity. At the same time, virtue-based approaches to ethics strive to discern general traits of moral greatness that emerge out of richly considered ethical traditions and lives as lived.9 The turn to virtue thus may be an attempt to forge a middle way between the perceived arrogance of deductive universalism on the one hand, and the dearth of positive moral infrastructure in postmodernism’s unending spiral of deconstruction on the other. Thus, the fundamental questions of virtue ethics have regained ascendancy: What kind of person do I, or we, want to be? How have others answered that question and what can be learned from their answers? How do I, or we, actually attain the desired character? What moral habits are necessary, and how can they be cultivated? Since the tradition of political liberalism is historically indebted to both deontology and utilitarianism, it is not surprising that its contemporary criticism structurally parallels that of deontology and utilitarianism. Liberalism has become procedural in focus, asking what principles can govern procedures that fairly generate either the structure of public institutions or the content of public decision-making. Like those discontented New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
25
with principle-based ethics more generally, critics of liberalism assail this focus as minimalist. Like those who question the supposed universality of deontological or utilitarian principles, the critics of liberalism question the supposed neutrality of liberal procedure—its purported openness and accessibility to citizens with various conceptions of the good life.10 The interminability of debates about the justification of its root principles and procedures similarly affects assessments of liberalism: their very end lessness leads critics to suggest that such justification cannot be the essence of liberal political life.11 Thus the question of civic virtue arises: What kind of citizens should we be, in order, practically, to maintain a polity that allows for the simultaneous pursuit of various conceptions of the good life? How can I transform myself, or teach my children, to become such a citizen? Current interest in civic virtue thus invokes a classical ideal to address modern problems. For the classical thinkers, civic virtue denoted that subset of cultivated moral habits and associated character traits that allowed one to be a good citizen in the political community. This subset of general virtues facilitated the political cooperation of citizens in the activities of public discourse and governance. Thus the singular term, civic virtue, encapsulates an overall sense of character that results from the cultivation of more specific identifiable political virtues, plural. Aristotle called this integration of political virtues civic friendship. Friendship itself was a virtue for Aristotle: a practiced moral habit that results in the settled character trait of friendliness (Nichomachean Ethics, Book 8). Curiously, while many contemporaries seek to revive the language of civic virtue, few seek to revive the language of civic friendship, despite the classical linkage of the two. Of course, the notion of civic virtue as a subset of overall virtue changes significantly in a modern context. In modern multicultural democracies, one cannot presume any unified “thick” conception of the good life among the citizenry. In other words, one cannot presume any agreement on the full integration of virtues that mark an ideally good life, a presumption that is at the root of classical thought. In fact, one of the basic commitments of the multicultural democratic state is the commitment to allow various pursuits of the good to coexist and flourish. In the current context, then, the critical question of civic virtue is this: Are there any general virtues of citizenship—cultivated moral habits that result in settled character 26
·
Mad about MADD
traits—that are desirable for all citizens, regardless of their thick conceptions of the good life and the more idiosyncratic virtues intrinsic to their conception of the good life? In other words, are there virtues that contribute to the very possibility of democratic life in a multicultural polity? This challenge is both similar to and significantly different from its framing by the classical Greeks. It is similar in its concern for cultivated moral habits that result in desirable character traits. It is different in imagining that such traits might be definable separate from a more unified conception of goodness. The quest to define “the” good life singularly understood is now rightly presumed arrogant. In contemporary thought, one mean sought by civic virtue may lie between the extremes of “the syndrome of civic privatism,” and an evangelical zeal to enforce one’s personal view of the good as a political quest.12 The contemporary challenge of civic virtue is also both similar to and different from other articulated challenges to liberal democracy. Exemplified by John Rawls and his commentators, liberal theorists have sought to define a “thin” content of goodness—a shared sense of justice—that might be expected to be shared by holders of all legitimate “thick” conceptions of the good life. Theorists addressing civic virtue similarly question whether there is something that ought to be shared, morally, among a multicultural polity. However, their concern is not whether there is any overlapping subset among conceptions of the good, but rather whether there is any overlapping subset among ideals of character. They query whether certain character traits are desirable for all citizens in a pluralist polity. This question can be posed either to complement efforts at defining a thin theory of the good, as it is by liberal proponents of civic virtues; or it can be posed by critics of liberal paradigms who reject a priori attempts to define parameters of justice. Significantly, then, the question of what constitutes civic virtue has become a shared one that bridges work by contemporary liberals, communitarian critics of liberalism, and a variety of thinkers exploring the complex notion of civil society—that is, the layers of civic associations that are in some sense “public” without being “state.”
IS C I V IC V I RT U E I N NO C E N T ? The quest to define civic virtue is pervasive, even among thinkers who otherwise radically disagree in their political agendas. But it is certainly New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
27
not a universally endorsed quest. Paradoxically, renewed attention to civic virtue seems both a necessity and a danger of our times. Some conception of civic virtue seems necessary to articulate how citizens with various conceptions of the good life can interact with each other politically. But critics warn that specific conceptions of civic virtue may clandestinely favor some conceptions of the good life over others. Unreflective calls for civic virtue could marginalize, rather than empower, many citizens. Is Ci v ic V i rt u e E xclusi v e? Just as the promise of the term “civic virtue” may be linked to its classical roots, so its dangers may originate there as well. While contemporary revivers of civic virtue clearly hope to recall positive classical ideals, critics of renewed appeals to civic virtue stress the less-than-ideal social context that generated classical ideals.13 The connection to classical philosophy directly links the term “civic virtue” to the two longings expressed in the fall narrative: the longing for a place for the public, and the desire to explicitly consider desirable traits of character. The classical Greeks clearly conceived the polis to be both a physical and a discursive place for citizens to meet. They constructed public places to accommodate discussion among co-citizens and espoused public argument explicitly for the sake of edification. They articulated character traits of good citizens and lauded public heroes who were deemed to embody such traits. But critics worry that the Greeks did so within a context of political exclusivity, homogeneity, and insularity. Athens in the time of Aristotle typifies the exclusivity of concern. It was a patriarchal, slave-based society in which only a small group of males within the total population, defined by heredity, were considered citizens. Aristotle himself articulated the basic distinction between household and polis that continues to infect Western political theory, implying that women and children are not part of the political community (Politics, Book 1). Thus, those who invoke the classical language of civic virtue take on the burdens as well as the promises of history. They must make persuasive arguments that specified ideals of civic virtue can be workable in political communities that are less exclusive and homogeneous than those in which civic virtue was originally expounded, 28
·
Mad about MADD
or those later communities that continued to trumpet the term without challenging gender, racial, or class injustices. Is Ci v ic V i rt u e Ci v i l? Ironically, the appeal to develop civic virtue that transcends particular political alignments has been divisive. The language of virtue is itself controversial. Some argue that there is an obvious need to go beyond the discussion of particular political issues in order to consider character traits of good citizenship. Desirable traits are those that could facilitate productive discourse about, or creative resolution of, specific political issues. Yet others legitimately fear that the language of virtue can be employed as a restraint, with those failing or refusing to accord to conceptions of virtue labeled not only unvirtuous but implicitly noncitizens. The frequent linkage of civic virtue to notions of civility can contribute to such dismissiveness. Civility, with its connotations of manners and courtesy, might seem an obvious component of civic virtue sought as a tonic to the uncivil public. Certainly, a public in which no one is willing to politely encounter or listen to citizen-strangers is unlikely to flourish. But civility has a long history of manipulation. It has often been raised as a shield of the privileged to shut out the demands of the exploited. As Judith Martin (Miss Manners) has famously observed, civility understood as etiquette deliberately seeks to mask some genuine emotions for the sake of cooperation (1985). One shakes hands in the receiving line, even if with an internalized grimace. An oversimplistic extension of civility, understood as etiquette, to political ideals of civic virtue dangerously suggests that suppression of passion is itself characteristic of civic virtue. But passions may have legitimate moral grounds. Anger, sarcasm, and parody may be appropriate ethical responses to a variety of situations, but their passionate display is often labeled uncivil. Historically, suffragettes, civil rights protesters, anti-war demonstrators, feminists, homosexual rights advocates, environmentalists, and others with profound critiques of the status quo have been summarily dismissed as “uncivil.” The dismissive potential of appeals to public civility remains visible at the highest levels of government. In 1999, committee chair Senator Jesse Helms ordered security to remove ten congresswomen who had come to a Senate hearing to lobby for an international treaty against gender discrimination, New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
29
reprimanding them for “unladylike conduct.”14 At its worst, the frequent association of civic virtue and public civility could unfurl a banner under which a tyranny of civility marginalizes important voices. The relationship between civic virtue and civic activity is also disputed. Some claim that a decline in civic virtue lies behind the eclipse of many so-called intermediary institutions—community organizations that act as political forums between the level of individual and state. Yet others celebrate rather than mourn this change in the political landscape, claiming that the intermediate institutions of declining vitality—from churches to Rotary Clubs—are often themselves exclusive. (My argument will call into question what “counts” as an intermediary institution. Why Rotary Club, but not MADD?) So while many call for renewed attention to civic virtue, others balk at the rejuvenation of the term. Is Ci v ic V i rt u e Ge n de r e d? Of the critics of civic virtue, none are more vociferous than those who express concerns related to gender issues. Historically, civic virtue has been a masculine virtue. Indeed, the term “virtue” itself etymologically relates to “virility.” From ancient Greece to the founding of the American Republic, civic virtue was assumed to be a character trait of men and was defined in reference to male experience in societies with severe sex discrimination. Because of its association with masculinity, civic virtue became one of the conceptual categories that perpetuated rigid dichotomies severing the household from the political realm. Civic virtue has masculine overtones first and foremost because of its long-standing association with military virtues. In the words of Jean Bethke Elshtain, “The problem with civic virtue can be stated succinctly: that virtue is armed” (1988, 47–55).15 The ancient Greeks considered military courage a paradigm of civic virtue. The thought of eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau demonstrates the lingering influence of the military model through the Enlightenment. Rousseau advocated civil religion as a forum in which to develop civic virtue among the citizenry. Significantly, for Rousseau, civil religion was an explicit substitute for war. This replacement was intended to be totalizing and authoritarian even if not martial. Rousseau considered dissent from civil religion or ritual as the equivalent of civic draft-dodging (Social Contract, Book 8, 30
·
Mad about MADD
chap. 4). Thus, Rousseau might be viewed as “the exception that proves the rule” of civic virtue’s association with martial valor. The association between battlefield service and civic virtue is problematic for several reasons. It downplays the virtues of peacemakers, failing to recognize violent solutions to conflict as intrinsic tragedies. It marginalizes the worldview of those who define such tragedies as de facto moral failures. It deflects attention from the civic virtues of women, who at least historically have not participated in battle, and who arguably are more actively schooled in nonviolent virtues, particularly in virtues of communication. (This is not to argue that women are either naturally less violent or naturally more communicative than men, only to acknowledge that women and men continue to be socialized differently in ways that are relevant to discussions of virtue.) Complex tensions arose when the martial undertones of civic virtue diffused into liberal political theory’s desire to avoid war. The association with battle may underlie the pervasive idea that civic virtue is defined by one’s willingness to sacrifice one’s intimate associations for the sake of the public good. As we shall see, this problematic notion is supported by various other developments in the history of the term. Early liberalism had to negotiate other tensions relevant to the interpretation of virtue as well. Virtue traditions, from the time of the classical Greeks onward, aimed at nothing short of human excellence. Liberalism by its nature gives up on excellence, either because the definition of moral excellence is contested, or because the pursuit of excellence comes at too great a cost and risks too much coercion, or both. Liberalism seeks to form a “good enough” polity to allow all individuals to try, and some to succeed, at developing their own personal excellences. Yet war-avoiding tolerance and a good-enough polity may entail thicker rather than thinner virtues among citizens. In Peter Berkowitz’s terms, liberalism inherently begs an “embarrassment over virtue”: When it comes to virtue, liberalism finds itself in a bind. At its core, liberalism is a doctrine that aims to secure the conditions of personal freedom for all through limited constitutional government. In the liberal tradition, personal freedom or individual liberty is originally understood in opposition to dependence on the arbitrary will of other human beings or submission to the rule of capricious laws. However, freedom on this understanding does not occur spontaneously or arise necessarily; it is created
New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
31
and maintained by human beings, and to actualize it, citizens and officeholders must exercise a range of basic virtues. Moreover, because of the limitations which liberalism places on the state, liberal regimes depend on virtues they cannot, left to their own devices, summon easily or cultivate vigorously. Liberalism’s dependence on even a modest degree of virtue can be embarrassing because liberalism must restrain itself from taking all the necessary steps to insure that citizens will develop the virtues necessary to sustain it. This embarrassment over virtue is less a virtue among liberals than the beginning of wisdom about the problem of character as it arises in liberalism. (1999, 189)
While a variety of contemporaries assume that the tradition of political liberalism vanquished virtue, others stress the complex conceptual relationship between virtue and freedom in early liberal thought. According to Berkowitz, the Enlightenment giants whose thought continues to ground modern liberalism were far more sophisticated than their contemporary heirs in acknowledging the necessary marriage between virtue and judgment, or between virtue and constitutionalism. Thus, Thomas Hobbes developed enlightened self-interest into prudential virtue. John Locke emphasized the crucial civic role of parents who must school their children in virtues that enable self-government. Even Immanuel Kant—despite his rigid distinction between prudential morality and genuine goodness— acknowledged character traits necessary to enact what the will recognizes as good. And J. S. Mill grounded true liberty in disciplines of character that allow individuality to be understood as a full personal flourishing. All of these thinkers assumed some connection between personal virtue and the ability to pursue common goods. At the same time, differences in those accounts of virtue—some prudential, some perfectionist, some geared to other-regard, some to individual flourishing—are vast. They testify to a time of transition and fluidity in concepts of virtue. This complex, evolving nexus of interpretation opened up new possibilities for the gendering of civic virtue. Figures of the eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment developed notably countervailing strands in the history of civic virtue when they identified character traits now culturally coded feminine as intrinsic to civic virtue.16 In particular, they marked sympathy as the linchpin of public virtue. Adam Smith’s ideal ethical spectator became so through an elaborate extension of felt sentiments: In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this 32
·
Mad about MADD
last in some measure to assume those of the spectators. . . . As they are constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so he is as constantly led to imagine in what manner he could be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation. As their sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with their eyes. 17
Yet dueling with and ultimately vanquishing the so-called “moral sense tradition” was a competing view. The competing view sought wide-ranging benevolence through a suppression rather than an extension of felt sentiments. According to Joan Tronto—a contemporary reviver of the moral sense tradition—the more cosmopolitan eighteenth-century life became, the more daunting seemed the task of extending sympathy (1993, 50–52). The desire for an ethical “short-cut” favored rationalist accounts of civic virtue. These accounts claimed that reason should properly suppress passion, allowing ethical agents to deduce ethical norms that apply to all. The association of civic virtue with rational dispassion was associated not only with challenges of increasing cosmopolitanism but also with certain developments in modern science. Immanuel Kant’s deductive ethical universalism was modeled on the thought experiments of Newtonian physics, experiments that allowed the physicist to deduce laws of nature without observing or interacting with the whole of nature. Earlynineteenth-century utilitarianism adopted an inductive ethical approach from pioneers of modern biology such as Francis Bacon. Thus Jeremy Bentham characterized moral sympathy as a danger because it could distort the utilitarian calculus of ethical consequences in which every party should count as one and only one. Sympathy could lead one to treat one’s loved ones as more than one, thus distorting the inductive prediction of consequences. What both deductive and inductive modern science shared was a strong subject/object conceptual distinction, a distinction drawn between the scientist studying the world and the world that was studied. Both deontological and consequentialist ethical thinkers influenced by modern science urged a cultivated emotional detachment to insulate the ethical subject from the ethical data. They sought to make ethics itself an “objective” science. Ultimately, civic virtue became defined by the reasoned restraint of passion in public, in contrast to sentimental effusion associated with the New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
33
private womanly world of the home. Civic virtue was thus re-gendered as masculine rather than being de-gendered. This re-gendering hypermasculinized civic virtue to the extent that the concept became practically unworkable. The instability of the term at this time, including its unstable gendering, marks the turn from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century as a particularly significant period in the biography of civic virtue. Beneath the flowery accolades heaped upon civic virtue in the rhetoric of civic republicans of the time, the tensions of this instability spiraled toward incoherence. T WO I DE OL O GI E S ; M U LT I PL E I RON I E S Two conceptual changes during this period, interweaving with economic changes that progressively moved production outside the home, synergized in ways that ultimately would defeat the coherence of civic virtue. These changes were the simultaneous evolutions of a gendered conception of public and private spheres, and a Christian emphasis on radically disinterested love of neighbor. Of course, both of these changes had earlier roots. The theological contests of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation in Europe, and the period of state formation that followed, had initiated multiple changes that affected the social construction of public and private, understandings of gender roles, and theological interpretations of love. But the resulting social constellation that crystallized at the end of the eighteenth century in conjunction with the early beginnings of industrialization ultimately rendered the notion of civic virtue incoherent. A n I de ol o gy of Ge n de r : T h e R ise of D om e s t ici t y Joan Williams (2000) describes this cultural period as the advent of “domesticity,” her code word for a gendered moral division of labor and an associated division of socially constructed categories of public and private that became entrenched in American life. Domesticity would drastically affect the interpretation of civic virtue. While domesticity began to be discernible during the eighteenth century, it solidified in the nineteenth century. Evolving simultaneously with market capitalism, domesticity defined the realms of reproduction and production to be distinct. “Before then,” writes Williams, “market work 34
·
Mad about MADD
and family work were not sharply separated in space or time” (2000, 1). This novel distinction redefined the family as an emotional rather than an economic unit. Gendering became central to defining and maintaining the distinction. Women were accorded the nurturing work of caring for children and husbands at home. Within the context of developing market capitalism, men were expected to compete in the harsh world of production outside the home and then be humanized by the feminine touch at home. The division of productive and reproductive labor engendered a moral division of labor that became equated with conceptions of male and female essential natures: In eighteenth-century Europe and early nineteenth-century America, a striking rearrangement of gender identities and stereotypes occurred. To men were assigned all the character traits associated with competition: ambition, authority, power, vigor, calculation, instrumentalism, logic, and single-mindedness. To women were assigned all the traits associated with cooperation: gentleness, sensitivity, expressivism, altruism, empathy, personalism, and tenderness. (Williams 2000, 23; quoting historian Christine Stansell)
While domesticity remains so entrenched that many assume it reflects “nature,” or the way things always have been, Williams draws on a number of cultural historians to demonstrate how relatively new, and socially constructed, is the system of domesticity. To some extent the feminization of virtue was a discomfited effort to retain virtue in an age in which self-interest was increasingly accepted as the regulatory mechanism of public life. Williams quotes an early-nineteenth-century New England pastor: It is at home where man . . . seeks a refuge from the vexations and embarrassments of business, an enchanting repose from exertion, a relaxation from care by the interchange of affection; where some of his finest sympathies, tastes, and moral and religious feelings are formed and nourished— where is the treasury of pure and disinterested love, such as seldom found in the busy walks of a selfish and calculating world. (2000, 31)
The contemporary sociologist Christopher Lasch (1977), attesting to the ideal of home as a “haven in a heartless world,” demonstrates the continued traction of this view. The resilience of domesticity may relate to its rhetorical translation of power hierarchies into emotional terms. Evolving in tandem with liberal New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
35
notions of equality, domesticity became defended as itself embodying equality. The separate spheres of men and women were described as equal but different, with each gender reigning in his or her sphere. Conventions that gave decision-making power or inordinate economic resources to men—conventions that had previously been defended by bald appeal to God-ordained hierarchies—now became defended as emotional achievements. A striking example detailed by Williams is the convention of wives moving with their husbands. In earlier epochs, common law had decreed it a right of husbands that their wives would accompany them should they choose to relocate. With the advent of domesticity, the law actually gave women more power to resist coerced relocation. At the same time, accounts of feminine virtue heavily exhorted women to make personal sacrifices such as relocation for the sake of husband and family. Sociological data today indicate that women are still much more likely than men to move for the sake of a spouse’s career or educational goals. Yet while “selfish” women who refuse may remain the butt of gossip for “holding their husbands or family back,” the change in rhetoric allows the gendered pattern to be dismissed. If it is considered an emotional accomplishment for women to make such sacrifices for their loved ones, then it is also considered voluntary. The transformation of raw hierarchy into emotional sentiment dramatically affected household labor. As Williams bluntly says: “Domestic ideology turned labor into love” (2000, 117). According to Williams, this transformation allowed remnants of coverture, “the common-law system that defined the family property as belonging to the husband,” to be retained despite explicit disavowal: “Coverture began as an integral part of patriarchy, the starkly hierarchical gender ideology that preceded domesticity. . . . In a society that considered women inferior, it was natural to vest ownership in husbands, who were seen as having the wisdom to manage the family’s economic life” (2000, 116). Under the social system of domesticity, household economy no longer was discussed as such, and a husband’s “right” to his wife’s household labor was redescribed as the receipt of his wife’s affection. Thus the nineteenth-century Married Women’s Property Acts (MWPAs), passed throughout the United States and ostensibly ending coverture, were limited in both scope and effect. They were limited in scope because they 36
·
Mad about MADD
entitled wives only to wages earned or property derived from their participation in the labor market, not to full joint ownership of all family property. Champions of the latter position such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, arguing that home labor was indeed labor that enabled the holding of family property, lost sway to the redescription of labor as love (2000, 117). The MWPA laws were limited in effect because with labor defined as love, the “sacrifice” of the fruits of wives’ labor was portrayed as emotional maturity even when not legally demanded. Williams demonstrates that coverture went underground rather than being buried. The redescriptions involved in coverture’s disguise distinguished personal relationships such as those within the family from contractual relationships that mark the economic world. Indeed, the refusal to link work in the home to socioeconomic entitlements was defended as a moral protection of the home itself, to free it from the stain of market values.18 Of course, this was the ideal of an emerging middle class. In poor families, women as well as men needed to engage in market labor. In the richest families, a wider hospitality ethic and noblesse oblige balanced the emerging focus on the nuclear family that corresponded with a gendered division of moral labor. Domesticity both built upon and molded interpretations of social contract theory.19 In Carole Pateman’s words, the social contract presumed a sexual contract: In theory, liberalism and patriarchalism stand irrevocably opposed to each other. Liberalism is an individualistic, egalitarian, conventionalist doctrine; patriarchalism claims that hierarchical relations of subordination necessarily follow from the natural characteristics of men and women. In fact, the two doctrines were successfully reconciled through the answer given by the contract theorists in the seventeenth century to the subversive question of who counted as free and equal individuals. The conflict with the patriarchalists did not extend to women or conjugal relations; the latter were excluded from individualist arguments and the battle was fought out over the relation of adult sons to their fathers. (1987, 105–106)
Thus, claims Pateman, the term “fraternity” for citizenship should be understood literally. Both the state and civil society were conceived as realms populated by adult “brothers” (107–108).20 Both were defined by social contracts distinguished from the sexual contract that governed family life. Social contract theory itself, then, has bolstered the problematic notion that women are closer to nature and men to culture.21 New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
37
Domesticity continues to pervade American economic, cultural, and legal life. Unquestioned assumptions of domesticity are implicated in the glass ceiling, substandard day care, welfare policies that presume that women should be caregivers and then punish them for being caregivers, overly narrow identifications of male identity with work outside the home, and communications breakdowns between men and women who are schooled in different virtues. Coverture-gone-underground also results in starkly gendered results of divorce in the United States: divorce tends to dramatically lower the financial status of women and children, but not of men. Given the resilience of domesticity in other areas of cultural life, reflective rehabilitators of civic virtue must question its legacy among the ideals they trumpet. This is all the more true given domesticity’s proven track record in rhetorically redefining power hierarchies as emotional achievements, rendering those hierarchies subtly protected. Thus it is essential to consider how civic virtue fared during the advent of domesticity, and how it may be implicated. Domesticity dictated a dramatic gender reversal for the category of virtue, generally. Virtue lost its virility as emotional perception, responsiveness, and cultivation were relegated to spheres of life coded feminine. Virtue became associated with “virtuous wives,” women overflowing with maternal nurturance and restrained by sexual and emotional loyalty to their husbands. (Perhaps such gender caricatures underlie the rejection of virtue as a quaint and prudish category in the previous generation, before its provocative contemporary revival.) Most significantly, domesticity emasculated the legacy of the Scottish moral sense theorists. It defined their exhortation to attend to one’s sentiments as a feminine concern. Through its rigid dichotomies, it denied the very connection the moral sense theorists sought to foster: the connection between emotional perception in personal and political realms of life. The emasculation of the moral sense tradition was so thorough that most American schoolchildren today know only half of Adam Smith’s corpus. They know him as the author of Wealth of Nations and a founding father of market capitalism, not as the author of The Moral Sentiments and a thinker who considered cultivation of sympathy essential to community. They might be surprised to learn that in Smith’s mind, the two works were linked. To keep Smith a man, domesticity demanded the suppression of 38
·
Mad about MADD
one side of his work and the distortion of another side. The emasculation of the moral sense tradition has repercussions in contemporary political theory, in which feminist political theorists disproportionately engage in efforts to recover that tradition.22 Yet an outward cultivation of perceptive sympathy must in some way be related to the accomplishment of civic virtue. A n I de ol o gy of R e l igion: C h r is t i a n N e igh bor L ov e a s Disi n t er e st e d Sacr i f ici a l L ov e Domesticity became entrenched in tandem with a certain interpretation of agape, Christian love of neighbor. (The term, which comes from classical Greek, means “to love like God loves.” It was later Latinized as caritas, charity.) Like domesticity, this conception was a relatively new one, although it quickly came to be viewed as orthodoxy, particularly among certain politically powerful Protestant denominations. If domesticity contributed to the feminization of virtue, it contributed to the masculinization of neighbor love. For much of the Christian tradition, the challenge of love was considered to be its comprehensiveness. The task of the theologian was to explain structural connections between different kinds of loves, from passionate personal loves of spouses or parents to the love of the stranger or enemy demanded by Jesus, all of which were understood to be transformed by Christian commitments. This formulation of love’s challenge was common to Christian theologians across epochs and continents, from Augustine in fourth-century North Africa to Thomas Aquinas in medieval Italy. It continued to organize Protestant Reformation theology in the sixteenth century, even amid the stark view of human sinfulness emphasized by Martin Luther and John Calvin. For them, realistic assessment of human sin meant the process of integrating loves would necessarily be more fractured and fraught with danger, more in need of restraint against self-deception, and more marked by approximation than by accomplishment. But such integration, albeit imperfect in a sinful world, was still a recognizable goal. In modern theology of the post-Enlightenment period, the challenge of Christian love came to be perceived as its antagonism to “natural” loves: erotic love and friendship. Of course it was domesticity itself that made New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
39
such loves seem natural, and also naturally associated with women—since women were culturally constrained to realms defined by such attachments. Indeed, this also marks a role reversal for friendship, as compared to classical times when friendship was a manly virtue. Aristotle, in fact, doubted that women had the intellectual capacities necessary to be a friend. The re-gendering of friendship as feminine may explain the relative neglect of civic friendship in calls for the renewal of civic virtue, although in classical thought the two concepts were closely linked. Changes in Christian views of love were influenced not only by domesticity but also by the rise of modern science. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, scientific theories of the preceding centuries’ “scientific revolution” were solidified in popular culture and scientific training. Those theories presumed a strong separation between the scientific enquirer (subject) and the data studied (object), resulting in a view of strict scientific “objectivity.” Pressed to respond defensively to the increasing cultural power of secular science, Christian theology increasingly likened Christian neighbor love to the concept of detached scientific objectivity. (This connection will be discussed again in chapter 5 to initiate my reconstructive argument.) Increasingly, theologians demanded that, to be like Jesus, Christians were called to radically self-sacrificing, disinterested love. “Disinterested” has two important senses: disinterested lovers should be disinterested in the particular qualities of the beloved (since they are called to love all); and such lovers should be disinterested in receiving any “return” on their love. They must be willing to love anyone without hope of reciprocation. For convenience, I label the relevant contrast between premodern and modern theology as “comprehensive” versus “antagonistic” interpretations of Christian neighbor love. Comprehensive approaches presume that there is a connection between different kinds of proper loving, from the most personal loves to the broadest neighbor loves. Antagonistic approaches presume that neighbor love is antagonistic toward certain lesser, natural loves. The dramatic transition between these conceptions of love is embodied by the chasm between eighteenth-century Anglican Bishop Joseph Butler and nineteenth-century Danish Lutheran theologian Søren Kierkegaard, both of whom had wide influence in American as well as in European theological circles. Butler tried to shore up the comprehensive conception in the midst of social pressures working toward its erosion, 40
·
Mad about MADD
including the advent of domesticity and the empowerment of secular science. Kierkegaard most clearly articulated the modern antagonistic conception of Christian neighbor love. Butler denied that Christian neighbor love is rendered practically impossible by compulsions of self-love, defending the possibility of agape against the inevitability of hedonism. The very fact that Butler felt a need for such a defense is telling of the times. No longer was the biblical command “Love your neighbor as yourself” interpreted to presume appropriate self-love as a proper ethical starting point. Increasingly, it was interpreted to presume a great divide between self and neighbor love. The developing notion of a distinct, competitive economic sphere may well have contributed to this sense of divided loves. In such a framework, love for particular others such as spouses, friends, or children becomes a problem: are such loves closer to (bad) self-love or (good) neighbor love? Butler rejected that question by reaffirming the classical comprehensive conception of the theological challenge, albeit using the new Enlightenment language of “benevolence,” which he equated with charity, or neighbor love. Butler rejected a dichotomy between self-love and pursuit of other loves because the pursuit of self-love does not necessarily make one happy: “People may love themselves with the most entire and unbounded affection, and yet be extremely miserable” (1969, 367). Happiness comes indirectly from the gratification of other goods, including the good of loving others. In effect, Butler recognized the complex mutuality between lover and beloved: “That any affection tends to the happiness of another, does not hinder its tending to one’s own happiness too” (369). Butler understood benevolence as a virtue: a cultivated habit of concern for fellow creatures that resulted from reasoned discipline of passions for the other. This virtue was a classical Aristotelian mean: excessive love of particular others, or inadequate love of particular others, were both vices that could block its accomplishment. Particular affections were, for him, a central middle term between proper self-love and benevolence: Benevolence. . . . will lead us to consider both the distant consequences as well as the immediate tendency of an action; it will teach us that the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our charge by nature and Providence, as also that there are other circumstances, suppose friendship . . . which require that we do good to some, preferably to others. Reason, considered merely subservient to New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
41
benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us to have particular regard to these relations and circumstances, because it is plainly good for the world that they should be so regarded. (1969, 374)
Here Butler resists not only increasingly dichotomous portrayals of selflove and other-love among contemporary theologians but also the tendency in contemporaneously emerging utilitarian thought to distrust sympathy for particular others because it might distort efforts to consider social good.23 For Butler, Christian charity was not altogether different from friendship; rather, benevolence was friendship expanded to its broadest scope. Because he believed that appropriately disciplined passion governed all love from self-love to benevolence and that all right love contributed to personal happiness, Butler rejected the evolving language of “disinterested love”: “Therefore to those who are shocked to hear virtue [of benevolence] spoken of as disinterested, it may be allowed that it is indeed absurd to speak of it thus” (1969, 369). A century later, the polemic of Søren Kierkegaard smashed the defenses Butler so painstakingly built around classical conceptions of neighbor love. For Kierkegaard, it was not absurd to conceive of commanded neighbor love as “disinterested.” Rather, Christianity was absurd (a word he used frequently as a badge of valor) to demand such love. But it did demand it, and thus it demanded that Christians be willing to be “fools in the eyes of the world.” For Kierkegaard, the classical Christian conception of the challenge of love, the challenge of integrating loves, must be rejected as a remnant of paganism. All loves had to be categorized as selfish (and thus bad) or agapic and thus good. Particular love of family and friends got relegated to the category of selfish loves: One should rather take pains to clarify the point . . . that Christianity has thrust erotic love and friendship from the throne, the love rooted in mood and inclination, preferential love, in order to establish spiritual love in its place, love to one’s neighbor, a love which in all earnestness and truth is inwardly more tender in the union of two persons than erotic love is and more faithful in the sincerity of close relationship than the most famous friendship. One must rather take pains to make very clear that the praise of erotic love and friendship belong[s] to paganism, that the poet really belongs to paganism since his task belongs to it—in order with the sure spirit of conviction to give to Christianity what belongs to Christianity, love of one’s neighbor, of which love not a trace is found in paganism. (1962, 58) 42
·
Mad about MADD
Kierkegaard’s break from Butler is grounded on his singularly negative view of self-love, which taints relationships of intimacy to particular others: Erotic love and friendship are preferential and the passion of preference. Christian love is self-renunciation’s love. . . . Love and friendship are the very height of self-feeling, the I intoxicated in the other-I. . . . At the peak of love and selfishness, the two really become one self, one I . . . a new selfish self. (65, 68; emphasis Kierkegaard’s)
While Kierkegaard certainly challenged the bourgeois vestment of the Danish Lutheran church, he may have succumbed more to the social pressures of his time than he allowed, or than did his implied nemesis, Butler. If Kierkegaard’s Christianity was foolish, its absurdity had curious affinities to emerging rationalist traditions that demanded that ethical thinking suppress emotions and sacrifice intimacy. Just as rationalist traditions made ethics an incoherent ideal for home life, so too Kierkegaard’s conception of Christian love was defined over and against the home. Some interpreters of Kierkegaard believe his polemic against erotic love and friendship was intended to pave the way for a retrieval of those loves in a transformed agapic context rather than a straightforward condemnation of those loves against the standard of agape.24 But the rhetoric itself redefines the challenge of Christian love: now a challenge of resistance to certain forms of love rather than an appropriate integration of all kinds of love. If Christianity was uncomfortable with the accommodation to self-interest in the developing market realm, Kierkegaard responded by staunchly rejecting that self-interest while continuing to contrast it to the affection of private relations. Thus, instead of home affection balancing market rapaciousness, a view of totally disinterested love was contrasted to home affections. In contrast to the New England pastor who located love in the home, Kierkegaard gave love back its virility at the price of intimacy. A M a rt y r C om pl e x for C i v ic V i rt u e? While Kierkegaard took his audience as the church, his thought implies a radical transformation of sacrificial ideals for the civic public. Martial models of sacrifice underlying classical conceptions of civic virtue had become complicated by Enlightenment reaction against war, yet they still held considerable sway. Now sacrifice itself could be redefined and thus reclaimed as an essential element of civic love. The home became New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
43
defined as the realm of feminine sacrifice for particular others; through such sacrifice, a loving wife or mother could block the devolution of her love for family into pure self-love. The civic realm became defined as the moral space for the greatest sacrifice of all: the sacrifice of, not for, one’s particular loved ones, the place where one acts as a disinterested lover of all. Civic man would sacrifice not his body on the battlefield, but instead his particular attachments in the public sphere. Jesus’ crucifixion became identified as a paradigm that informed both kinds of sacrifice—sacrifice in the home and of the home—and particularly elevated the latter. In the interpretation of civic virtue, Butler lost and Kierkegaard won. The resulting paradigm infused notions of civic love with a not-so-subtle martyr complex. Kierkegaard’s theology directly influenced American theological and political thought through the mediation of Swedish theologian Anders Nygren (1890–1978), who was widely read in the United States.25 Through this lineage, the classic Lutheran conception of a split moral realm, church and world, became grafted onto a split conception of the nature of love itself. Reinhold Niebuhr, who achieved a status rarely rivaled as an American public intellectual in the mid-twentieth century, welded this theological split onto the modern social structure of domesticity. Niebuhr (1892–1971) was not only a professor of Christian ethics but also an advisor to four presidents, a noted public opinion columnist, and one recognized founder of a branch of political science called “realism.” Niebuhr reacted against the social gospel movement that had thrived earlier in the century.26 From his point of view, that movement’s desire to translate Christian neighbor love directly into institutional political life was naive. The horrors of world wars and economic depression, Niebuhr reasoned, dictated a more realistic theology. His “realism,” unfortunately, presumed that domesticity is reality—and thus made it more real. Niebuhr follows Kierkegaard in defining Christian love as self-sacrifice. But he rejects Kierkegaard’s claim that the Christian must simply dare to be absurd in the eyes of the world. Instead, Niebuhr’s complex theological anthropology led him to a view of “approximated” love. He defines two kinds of approximate love: mutual love and justice, which bifurcate precisely along the axis of domesticity. Niebuhr views the transcendent as a force that may intersect history as a tangent intersects a graph. The pointillon contact between history and 44
·
Mad about MADD
the transcendent, exemplified by the incarnation of Jesus, allows the transcendent to clarify ultimate norms—without allowing history to actualize those norms. Therefore, for Niebuhr it is impossible to “live the kingdom” in human history. True love, which he defines as self-sacrifice, will always result in martyrdom in the sinful world, just as it did for Jesus. Thus the paradox: “Love is the impossible possibility.”27 For Niebuhr, it is unrealistic to strive for simple imitation of such love in the world. However, since the transcendent and the historical are not completely disconnected, but intersected, Niebuhr claims there is a dialectical relationship between the two. This allows agape to “complete” other forms of love. More specifically, Niebuhr claims agapic motivations elevate otherwise selfish or competitive relationships, though true agape will never be realized. In intimate relations, Niebuhr thinks agapic motivation can lead to the approximation of love known as mutual love. In the broader political realm, agapic motivation can lead to justice, which is always imperfect and relative. Niebuhr’s understanding of mutual love and justice uncritically presumes the socially constructed boundaries of public/private defined by domesticity. Indeed, the title of his book Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) is premised on his view that larger social groups are inherently less moral than smaller ones. In context, Niebuhr seeks to pose his view of justice against the rapaciousness of unfettered market capitalism. But in effect he also poses domesticity’s “heartless world” over and against personal relationships in the home. Conceiving of political life as the constant evolving competition between subgroups, Niebuhr advocates a chastened commitment to justice, rather than love, in the political realm. This justice seeks the checking of powers against each other to avoid any one group achieving idolatrous power. Niebuhr uses the intriguing language of “paradoxical” and “dialectic” to describe the general relationship between love and justice. But in his description of the political realm, the two become virtually disconnected. Realistic justice aims at equality and freedom, not love. “Thus according to Niebuhr sacrificial love is the operating norm for personal life; justice, the standard for social life” (Andolsen 1981, 71). In several ways, Niebuhr’s formulations complete the conceptual disembowelment of civic virtue. His welding of a theological view of love onto the conceptual grid of domesticity hardens the distinction between New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
45
private life and political life that civic virtue seeks to bridge. It also cements implicit gender distinctions: the kind of mutual love homemakers, for example, might attain is different in kind from the kind of political justice civic man might attain. Most basically, Niebuhr’s retention of an ideal norm of self-sacrifice for political life, combined with his rejection of that norm’s actual possibility, renders the cultivation of civic virtue an impossible task. For Niebuhr, the challenge of political life becomes strategic realism in checking powers of injustice, not the cultivation of virtues that are transformative of the citizen as well as of the body politic. The extent of Niebuhr’s continued influence is evident even in the formulations of his contemporary theological critics. Stephen Pope’s recent elegant argument for the “inclusiveness of agape,” an argument for a return to classical, comprehensive understandings of agape, begins from the premise that different kinds of loves have come to be seen as antagonistic in Christian ethics. Pope’s synthesis of various interpretations of agape poses the integration of different kinds of love as both a goal and a challenge for contemporary Christian ethics (1997, 353–79). While Gene Outka (1972) challenges Niebuhr’s dim view of self-love and his implicit assumption that conflict is the defining feature of human social existence, Outka continues to cast intimate relationships as a challenge to Christian love. For Outka, such relationships may tempt against agape-as-equalregard, his favored formulation, which presses for a widely inclusive ethic. While Outka emphasizes how egalitarian concepts of agape may inform appropriate mutuality, he is less interested in how appropriate mutuality may inform agape. Even “Christian sectarian” critics of Niebuhr are so called precisely because they reject his framework. Thus, for example, Christian pacifist and virtue theorist Stanley Hauerwas—who argues that Christians should consider themselves “resident aliens” in American political culture—is frequently cast as a sectarian who wishes to insulate Christianity from political life. Hauerwas explicitly rejects this charge, arguing that Christian witness as he understands it has great relevance to the wider secular political community. He and co-author William H. Willimon explicitly frame their defense against accusations of sectarianism in reference to Niebuhr, calling Niebuhr’s political theory “a form of idolatry, public church” (Hauerwas and Willimon 1989, 31). Despite his articulateness, Hauerwas fails to escape the label of sectarianism ascribed to him because he rejects 46
·
Mad about MADD
the dominant Niebuhrian association between Christianity and one approach to political theory. The political marginalization of groups committed to some form of “witness,” whether thickly or thinly religious, has great implications for civic virtue. Like Hauerwas’s theological critics, conventional secular exponents of civic virtue assume that witness is outside politics. Thus they seek to articulate virtues consciously aimed at citizen formation, rather than considering whether virtues cultivated for other reasons may turn out to have political significance. Yet openness to the latter possibility might be essential if civic virtue is to be made coherent in a multicultural community that does not presume one unified view of the good life. Openness to the latter possibility might be essential if civic virtue is not to be defined as a preconceived limit on diversity. While feminist Christian theologians incessantly criticize Niebuhr’s failure to consider the need for justice in intimate relationships or the real relevance of love for political life, they continue to describe their complaints in reference to his categories of love and justice, public and private.28 Recasting the categories themselves is recognized to be an uphill challenge. Because of Niebuhr’s acute awareness of selfishness, especially corporate selfishness, where economics and government are concerned he reduced agape to a remote star. . . . Feminist work on the meaning of love presents a serious challenge to the dominant view of twentieth-century American ethicists. . . . Agape [appropriately] re-defined. . . . cannot be a norm applicable only in one sphere of life. It must serve as a norm for political and economic life as well as family life. (Andolsen 1981, 71, 79; emphasis added)
Niebuhr differentiated individual and group behavior primarily on the ground that the checks that serve to limit natural selfishness in personal situations do not exist, or at least not as strongly, in social situations. While he acknowledged that egoism rears its head in individual relations such as the family, he felt that there was a qualitative difference in favor of such individual relationships. While many attack Niebuhr’s assessment of social relations as the problem with his comparison, I would suggest that, in addition, he idealized individual relations. In the years since Niebuhr composed the bulk of his writings, we have learned a great deal more about the workings of the family. Millions of New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
47
children in this country alone have suffered from parental abuse. Thousands have died from it. Wife- and husband-beating are common occurrences. . . . The existence of this degree of sinfulness in individual relationships is not recognized in Niebuhr’s work. . . . And yet more and more we are coming to learn through history, sociology, and psychology that the family and other individual relationships cannot be understood separately from social relationships. (Gudorf 1985) 29
While feminist theologians continue straining against Niebuhr’s categories, they collectively develop one theme that challenges Kierkegaard’s influence at its core. They reject the definition of agape as self-sacrifice. Instead, they propose mutuality as the defining feature of Christian love, one that provides an ethical norm for all kinds of human love. They reject the proposition that true love always seeks no return, insisting that true love seeks the establishment of reciprocal community. Thus they reject antagonistic interpretations of agape and revive the classical quest to articulate a comprehensive interpretation. This revolt is so profound, and its implications for civic virtue so far-reaching, that it will be discussed in more detail in following chapters. Inadequately challenging the received categories of public and private, feminist theologians have elaborated their rejection of sacrificial ideals more concretely for personal than for political loves. They have investigated issues such as parenting, domestic violence, eating disorders, and gender inequalities in sexual giving and sexual satisfaction.30 But just as unhealthy self-sacrifice may prove—contra Niebuhr—depressingly possible rather than impossible in the home, so too it may in the body politic. Since the incoherence of civic virtue derives from a simultaneous acceptance (of the moral norm) and rejection (of the actual possibility) of sacrificial ideals, feminist critique raises challenges for the reconsideration of public loves as well. It raises challenges for the transformation of civic virtue. Christian conceptions of love have had and continue to have broad cultural influence beyond thickly Christian circles. Civic virtue is likely to remain an incoherent ideal as long as true love is assumed to be sacrificial love; as long as love is viewed as too stringent an ideal to be practically relevant to political life; as long as different kinds of human loves, ranging from the most intimate to the most political, are defined as categorically different from each other. These notions are widely accepted in contemporary political theory, with inadequate recognition that they are rooted in one particular lineage of Christian theology. 48
·
Mad about MADD
T H E L EGAC Y OF DUA L I DE OL O GI E S: I RON I E S OF C I V IC V I RT U E The simultaneous evolution of both an emphasis on radically disinterested love and a rigid gendered conception of public and private “spheres” spawned a series of related ironies that acts both as an organizing parameter for and as an outstanding challenge to my own reconstructive argument. The first irony is that the liberal tendency to demand suppression of one’s personal commitments in public life, including religious commitments, was itself indebted to a thickly religious ideal—albeit one that is hotly contested within the Christian tradition from which it partially derived. The second irony is that such a detached view of love paradoxically both structured public norms and weighed against love as a public norm. On the one hand, love of the public became associated with a sacrifice of private interests. On the other hand, love became viewed as an impossible ideal for the competitive realm of production, a realm in which it was more realistic to hold avarice in check than to cultivate virtuous humanism. Love and justice became polarized concepts, with love sentimentalized as an ideal for home and hearth, while justice was seen as the necessary moral restraint for the public realm. This led to the third irony: a gender reversal for the general category of virtue. Virtue became more coherent in the private realm that was culturally coded as feminine. The manly category of classical virtue lost ground to a focus on “feminine virtue” and “virtuous wives,” women whose specific virtues included chastity, loving tenderness, and loyalty to family. To prevent itself from being emasculated, civic virtue had to define itself in radical contrast to such feminine virtue. So the connotation of civic virtue as a dispassionate suppression of personal attachments became even more entrenched. In the context of an ideology of separate gender spheres that generally feminized virtue, civic virtue became hyper-masculinized. Taking for granted the affective passions necessary for intimate family life, proponents of civic virtue focused on its decorous emotional restraint. This emotional restraint was to allow room for reasoned public argument and to prevent personal rapaciousness from clouding consideration of the common good. Civic virtue, then, presumed a gendered moral division of labor that associated emotions with femaleness and household life. New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
49
I ron i e s L e a d t o I ron i e s: Ci v ic V i rt u e a n d Fa m i ly Va lu e s The lingering legacy of domesticity causes an ironic tension in the current revival of attention to civic virtue. On the one hand, a concern for “family values” across the political spectrum is clearly one impetus to the turn to virtue in political discourse. On the other hand, the historical linkage of civic virtue with dichotomized views of private and public life discourages careful attention to the relationship between personal character traits and creative citizenship. In this age in which marriage and divorce patterns are changing, in which geographic mobility is increasing, in which women demand a share of personal fulfillment undefined by their family relationships, in which economic pressures as well as changing gender roles constrain stay-at-home parenting among middle-class families (it always was a rarity among lower classes), in which consumer pressures are brought to bear on children in many forms of popular culture—in this age, the accomplishment of well-raised children can no longer be taken for granted by political theory. Negative stimuli such as shocking childhood addiction and suicide rates combine with positive stimuli, particularly public revaluing of the ethical work of care, to redirect attention to the fact that citizens begin as children. But the implications of that redirection remain undeveloped. The term civic virtue, with its implication of lifelong learning and cultivation, seems to point to connections between personal character traits and political virtues. It seems to invite discussion of which personal character traits might be relevant to citizenship and how their cultivation could be encouraged. It raises questions about whether there may be positive or negative spillover from the development of people, generally, to the development of citizens, more particularly. Yet at the same time, the term itself stands in the way of such investigations because embedded in its history are presumptions that define public life in opposition to private life. Thus, “add-civic-virtue-and-stir” approaches (those that advocate simply adding increased emphasis on civic virtue to dominant liberal political theory) are unlikely to be successful. Such approaches tend toward two diametrically opposed but axially related excesses. On the one hand, some accounts too directly relate conventional structures of home life to civic virtue. These accounts neglect the extent to which the social construction of domesticity has negatively 50
·
Mad about MADD
influenced the operative conception of private life. They thus mistake social structures (the nuclear family, heterosexual marriage, stay-at-home mothers, etc.) for social virtues, whereas true virtues might crosscut multiple social structures, embracing various private views of the good. Alternatively, other accounts too quickly assume that public virtues are radically different from private ones. Under such accounts, how one treats one’s spouse, children, and ethnic or religious community becomes irrelevant to civic virtue because, after all, the civically virtuous should cultivate wider political visions apart from such commitments. Developers of such accounts seem unembarrassed by the implication that a wife-beater could be a paragon of civic virtue. Both excesses presume the system of domesticity. Both dramatically take for granted the work of caregivers, disproportionately women. Both fail to dissolve the ironies that rendered civic virtue an incoherent category in the first place. Neither successfully de-genders the term. Truly reviving civic virtue poses dramatic challenges that, if met, will radically, not marginally, change political theory and political life. I ron i e s L e a d t o I ron i e s: Ci v ic V i rt u e a n d Ci v i l Soci et y Taking for granted their wives’ role in nurturing both themselves and their children, male citizens assumed that civic virtue was aimed at building “free” associations outside the family that would work toward the common good. First articulated and celebrated by the keen French observer Alexis de Tocqueville in his descriptions of early-nineteenth-century American life, the capacity for voluntary civic association is once again the subject of concerted attention in American political theory.31 Like Tocqueville, many contemporary political scientists believe that civil society is important precisely because it lies between the realm of family and state. MADD, however, does not seem the voluntary association that either Tocqueville or his contemporary heirs have in mind. In a technical sense, MADD members choose to associate freely and voluntarily as equal citizens. But their mission is tied to unchosen tragedies, nonvoluntary obligations to care for particular loved ones, and the dependence and vulnerability of those loved ones, especially children. MADD defies the stark distinction between home and political community that the rhetoric New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
51
of “free, voluntary” civic associations presumes. In fact, the conceptual infrastructure within which the call to revive civil society occurs is the infrastructure of domesticity—a schema that obfuscates how families, civic associations, and the state may be mutually formative. Significantly, the decline of civic virtue in political theory occurred in tandem with the rise of attention to civil society. Many assume the terms linked, and indeed they were in the writings of early civic republicans. However, increasingly, civil society became a focus that displaced civic virtue. If civic virtue seemed an increasingly impossible ideal, civil society seemed an increasingly necessary mediator between public rapaciousness and private affection. Tocqueville called civic associations “free institutions” that “recall to each citizen constantly and in a thousand ways that he lives in society” (2000, 485, 488). While many contemporary commentators assume civic virtue and civil society are connected, some dissidents articulate why, in fact, there is tension between the two. Gerard Hauser (1989) claims that civic virtue and civil society, as alternative political quests, emerged out of different historical epochs that presume different priorities of citizen allegiance. Hauser focuses on the “down sides” of the classical Greek communities that first generated ideals of civic virtue: they were exclusive, martially oriented, and demanded that citizenship be one’s primary identity. In contrast, the developing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century modern communities that increasingly focused on civil society were trading societies that embraced difference and border negotiations between different groups. Civil society provided the very terrain for such negotiation, a terrain that allows for multiple overlapping discourses to define, albeit never homogeneously, public opinion: The public sphere is not merely conceptual but has a specific historical referent linked to the Enlightenment’s emerging condition and theory of civil society. I will contend that civil society poses an alternative model to civic virtue, and that the civil society model requires revising our understanding of the public sphere’s discursive character. Finally, I will maintain that civil society suggests the public sphere, contrary to our understanding of it as a single discursive domain, is composed of nested arenas, with a reticulate structure. (Hauser 1998, 21)32
For Hauser, the frequent linkage of the two terms, civic virtue and civil society, is ironic because it ignores major differences in the rhetorical structures that rendered each coherent. 52
·
Mad about MADD
Yet both of these rhetorics could stretch themselves around domesticity: civic virtue, demanding the sacrifice of home to citizenship; civil society, posing itself as the mediator between home and citizenship. Civil society may have provided a more livable ethical turf than the sacrificial altar of civic virtue, but it still provided such a haven by defining itself against intimate associations, even if not demanding their utter sacrifice. Civil society was the crucial ethical terrain between family and state, crucial because it was neither of those—the one perceived as too passionate, the other as too demanding. Once again, the citizenship of those who concretely care for children, the ill, or other dependents was assumed to be second-class citizenship. (In fact, for women it was not defined as citizenship at all until the success of the suffrage movement in the twentieth century.) But as Hauser suggests, empirical observation of civil society may lead to questioning the tripartite conception of home, civil society, and state. MADD, for example, does not fit. Another dissident who questions the easy fit between civic virtue and civil society is Daniel Bell. Bell notes the presumption (Tocqueville’s legacy) that “one must look for such [civically virtuous] groups in civil society, the realm between the family and the state” (1998, 240). Yet in fact, he argues, some forms of civil society facilitate civic vices rather than civic virtues. At the same time, contra liberal assumptions, the state-at-large may appropriately facilitate the development of civic virtue. (Bell himself does not consider whether family, the other pole of conventional contrast to civil society, may appropriately facilitate civic virtue.) Bell develops two examples to challenge dominant assumptions. First, he considers residential community associations (RCAs) that have been formed by various suburban developments. He argues that RCAs often pull residents away from participation in broader community. In terms of security, recreation, and so forth, the RCA often works to insulate the residential community from the broader polity. Second, he considers the U.S. National Park Service (NPS). Bell claims the NPS, in which volunteers outnumber paid employees by five to one, successfully facilitates the cultivation of civic virtue even though it is a large federal bureaucracy. Significantly, the NPS preserves civic memory as well as natural preserves, since it maintains historical sites. Bell emphasizes that this mission, to be done well, may actually entail limiting, rather than encouraging, free association. Appropriate limits may include zoning limits or limits on commercial New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
53
activity (such as T-shirt sales) to maintain a proper atmosphere at the site (1998, 242–63). These complications suggest that the relationship between civic virtue and civil society may be less straightforward than is often assumed. Of course, it may be difficult to consider what kinds of civil societies are good for democracy without a sense of the civic virtues one hopes will be cultivated there. At the same time, it may be difficult to articulate concrete virtues without imagining what kinds of settings could promote them. Currently, the focus of American political theory is in transition. During the early to mid-1990s, civic virtue was an explicit emphasis; but since then, civil society has overtaken civic virtue as a focal point of discussion. This transition may not be the natural evolution many assume it to be. Rather, given the historical tension between civic virtue and civil society as alternative ideals, this change might simply indicate a failure of the conversation on civic virtue. Moreover, it might portend the failure of the conversation on civil society. That conversation is unlikely to be successful if it too easily presumes what kinds of civil societies are relevant (Rotary Club, but not MADD; neighborhood associations, not the National Park Service), or if it too presumptuously assumes that civil society automatically promotes civic virtue. The focus of my argument is civic virtue. But I propose that civic virtue must be explored in ways that revise terms of discussion about civil society. The fact that—despite tensions between them—both terms are implicated in domesticity may give a starting point for re-evaluation. Neither interpretations of civic virtue nor of civil society that take for granted the work of caregivers will suffice any longer; nor will interpretations of civic virtue and civil society that fail to consider how family, civil society, and state are mutually formative rather than pristinely distinct. Contemporary political theorists advance civil society over and against the retreat of civic virtue. But neither term is likely to be victorious if it does not begin to cooperate, rather than compete, with the other.
T R A NSFOR M I NG C I V IC V I RT U E : A C ONS T RUC T I V E C H A L L E NGE Because incoherent norms of civic virtue are tied to two problematic ideologies, one of gender and the other of religion, transforming civic virtue 54
·
Mad about MADD
will entail challenging those ideologies. While such a challenge is daunting, it underlies the promise of transformed civic virtue. A transformed interpretation of civic virtue will promote fairer gender relations in civic life. It will consider raising children well a political investment, not merely “an expensive private hobby.”33 It will provide a workable conception of just love for citizens—one that acknowledges the relevance of passion to politics but also demands the appropriate restraint provided by justice, itself understood as a virtue. It will promote a more sophisticated conversation on the complex relationship between civic virtue and civil society. And it will articulate the civic virtue of MADD that is obscured in the fall narratives of civic virtue. Aga i ns t a n I de ol o gy of Ge n de r : T r a nsfor m e d C i v ic V i rt u e a s N e c e s si t y, No t N e m e sis , for F e m i n ism I consider the critique of civic virtue from gender standpoints to be weighty without being devastating. Civic virtue is only one of a host of seemingly laudable terms that in fact has participated in patriarchy. A now timehonored strategy of feminism is to retrieve the critical power of terms that have become complicit. This critical retrieval can be accomplished through the willful “accenting” of positive strands among the complex and competing layered strands of meaning surrounding the term.34 For example, feminist political theorists and historians have demonstrated how the buzzwords of liberty and equality were used to undermine women’s position in liberal society, and how these terms have been tied to the same dichotomized view of household and political life that burdens conceptions of civic virtue. Ideologies of freedom and equality could serve to deflect attention from actual lack of freedom or equality—including, historically, chattel slavery and the political disenfranchisement of one sex. Retrieving the critical ideals of these terms by addressing the actual conditions that render people unfree or unequal has become a pivotal strategy for many feminists, from the suffragettes of a century ago to contemporary advocates. I am urging a similar critical retrieval of civic virtue.35 This critical retrieval could be positive for the history of feminism as well as for the history of civic virtue. Among the many strands of AngloAmerican feminism are two commonly designated as “liberal feminism” and “the ethic of care.” Liberal feminism has focused on opening “public” New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
55
positions to women and extending public conceptions of fairness and merit to women in educational, professional, and governmental positions. Care ethics has lamented the devaluation of “private” work traditionally done by women—which is not to say that only women should do such work—the hard work of nurturing intimate associations, including children, romantic partners, families, sick or elderly, and friends. Accordingly, care ethics has focused on highlighting the moral challenges and accomplishments of such caring labor. This division within feminism reflects not only positive differences of focus between liberal feminists and proponents of care but also the negative heritage of the ideology of domesticity. The divide between liberal feminism and the ethics of care presumes the dichotomized view of public and private life defined by that ideology, even as feminists within both strands try to call those socially constructed boundaries into question. The oft-repeated feminist invocations that justice and fairness should be demanded in intimate relationships and that caring should have public import could be given increased traction by a transformed conception of civic virtue that engages in critical retrieval while remaining sensitive to “gender baggage” in the history of the term. Some such critical retrieval is necessary in order to applaud how the “private” cares of mothers inspired the transformations accomplished by MADD in the public realms of school, courts, and legislatures. Aga i ns t a n I de ol o gy of R e l igion: T r a nsfor m e d C i v ic V i rt u e a n d t h e N e e d for a Nonse c ta r i a n V i e w of L ov e Since dominant conceptions of civic virtue have become infused with a martyr complex that derives historically from one interpretation of Christian neighbor love, it will not do to proclaim civic virtue a secular concern. To be transformed, civic virtue must be disentangled from the overcelebration of sacrifice that makes it a martyr’s ideal rather than an ideal for ordinary citizens. It must be disentangled from an implicit view of disinterested love that suggests that citizenship demands alienation from all one’s other loves. Thickly religious conversationalists can help here. Because the interpretation of agape that infuses dominant understandings of civic virtue is contested within Christianity itself, Christian critics often directly cut to the chase in challenging related distortions. In developing my argument, 56
·
Mad about MADD
I draw on Christian critics who criticize political distortions inherent in antagonistic conceptions of agape and give political reasons for reconsidering comprehensive interpretations. I draw heavily but not exclusively on feminist Christian theologians, since they most consciously connect the two ideologies at stake in the transformation of civic virtue: ideologies of religion and of gender. While thick religious conversationalists provide critical resources, ultimately the transformation of civic virtue must be only thinly religious. It must be “religious,” at least metaphorically, in presenting an ordered schema that relates different kinds of human commitments. But this religiosity must be “thin” in that, unlike conventional understandings of civic virtue, it must not be the legacy of one particular religious lineage. Transformed civic virtue must articulate a conceptual relationship between one’s most intimate and most broadly communal commitments that makes civic sense to people with many, or no, religious backgrounds. Transformed civic virtue must elaborate a conceptual relationship between love and justice that makes sense to people formed by various religious and cultural traditions. It must explain how love, understood as passionate appreciation for the unique in particular others, and justice, understood as fairness to multiple others, inform each other. Ultimately, civic virtue must be understood as a set of cultivated moral habits that allows such appropriate connections to be maintained. Rather than bifurcating love and justice along the axis of domesticity, the moral habits of transformed civic virtue must enable just love of fellow citizens.
C ON T E M P OR A RY T H E OR IS T S OF C I V IC V I RT U E : S T I L L M IS SI NG M A DD As this chapter has emphasized, the contemporary renewal of interest in civic virtue crosscuts diverse theorists in American political theory. This elasticity points to the great promise of a return to virtue in political life. Perhaps even if overlapping consensus on moral goods is elusive, an overlapping consensus on ideals of political character might be forged and might support democratic civic activity in a diverse society. In chapter 4 I look more closely at three groups of theorists who are reviving civic virtue as a moral category: liberal virtue theorists, communitarians (a label that overlaps with that of civic republicans), and select New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
57
theorists of civil society. Here I simply gesture toward the important strides made by each while emphasizing that none of their accounts explains the civic virtue of MADD. Liberal virtue theorists such as William Galston (1991) and Stephen Macedo (1991, 2000) highlight the inadequately acknowledged virtues that are necessary for political liberalism to function. They consider what kinds of virtues, or cultivated character traits, are necessary for citizens to become economically independent and intellectually reflective. Rejecting the idea that liberalism is neutral toward conceptions of the good, they seek ways to promote tolerance itself as a liberal virtue—albeit one that must recognize limits to toleration when central goods of liberalism are seriously threatened. While liberal theorists underscore that moral autonomy itself depends on the cultivation of virtue, they fail to question the extent to which autonomy should be accepted as definitive of citizenship. Communitarians appropriating traditions of civic republicanism criticize the voluntarist account of moral agency that survives liberal additions of civic virtue. Michael Sandel (1981, 1996), the paradigm of this view, encourages a more complex view of socially formed selves (a view often shorthanded as “the social self”). Whereas liberal virtue theorists (correctly) intuit that market capitalism depends on the cultivation of certain virtues that they wish to promote, Sandel (correctly) intuits that market capitalism may threaten important civic virtues. He focuses on virtues that facilitate commitment to a certain place, virtues that could support literal and metaphorical space for the public—other than shopping malls. Sandel worries about the denigration of care that remains entrenched in political and economic life. His work emphasizes that family, church, and neighborhood are important moral starting points of community. However, his concern to protect their place in the public sometimes leaves them protected from appropriate moral critique. Theorists of civil society are, like Sandel, concerned about what kinds of intermediate communities (communities between the level of individual and state) can foster civic virtue. However, they focus on different kinds of intermediate communities. Whereas civic republicans tend to focus on communities of place, many theorists of civil society focus on communities of choice. Benjamin Barber (1998) typifies this group in his indebtedness to Tocqueville—in particular, to Tocqueville’s celebration of voluntary associations. Barber eloquently articulates the civic importance of such 58
·
Mad about MADD
associations. But there is a disjunction between his account of the problems impeding cultivation of civic virtue, which includes insightful analyses of gender inequities and stress on family life, and his proposed solution. It is not clear how the increased involvement in voluntary associations that he advocates can transform nonvoluntary relationships in family life, given that Barber defines the two in contradistinction to each other. All of these theorists—liberal virtue theorists, revivers of civic republicanism, advocates of civil society—point in promising directions. They all participate in a recovery of virtue that refuses to disconnect persons from citizens. They all challenge the excesses of a highly dichotomized conception of public and private and, to some extent, the presumptions of domesticity that underlie that conception. Yet all are adversely influenced by lingering ideologies of gender and religion that survive “between the lines” of their accounts. None of them, nor any combination of them, articulate the civic accomplishment of MADD and its founders. This failure raises a number of warning flags: Who is being taken for granted in the invisibility of MADD’s founders? Mothers? Caregivers? Women? Children? MADD is not well characterized by liberal virtues. Its work is premised, not on independence and autonomy, but on dependence—particularly the dependence of children—and human vulnerability. MADD is not concerned about redressing premature limits on toleration but about redressing belated limitation of tolerance on activities that threaten life itself. If liberal virtues do not seem adequate to explain MADD’s civic value, neither do those implicitly proposed by communitarians, civic republicans, or advocates of civil society. MADD does not seem to be either the community of place held up as a forum of virtue by Sandel, nor the pristinely voluntary association lauded by Barber. (Certainly, it was the cruelest un-choice that launched the founders’ civic action.) Getting mad about MADD suggests turning to the critics of contemporary efforts to revive civic virtue. Can their warnings make sense of MADD’s puzzling invisibility? If so, can their insights be used to constructively modify, rather than to contest, the return to virtue?
S TA RT I NG W I T H T H E C R I T IC S The most vociferous critics of renewed calls for civic virtue actually suggest the most promising starting points for reconstructive formulations, since New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
59
they admit rather than ignore the ironies of civic virtue. In a series of classic essays, Iris Marion Young leads critics who condemn the language of civic virtue because they find it hopelessly wedded to political ideologies that have suppressed difference and marginalized many. 36 Her criticisms are particularly astute in relation to my project, since she sensitively considers gender issues that are neglected in conversations about civic virtue, and she adroitly considers how the history of the term may taint calls for its renewal. Most importantly, she notes how the ideologies of gender and religion that rendered civic virtue incoherent have become encapsulated in a conception of public impartiality. Ultimately, I reject Young’s rejection of civic virtue. But her crystallization of impartiality as a key background category proves crucial not only to skeptics but to those like myself who wish to revitalize civic virtue. Her diagnosis of a mutually destructive relationship between wrongheaded views of impartiality and wrongheaded views of civic-mindedness suggests that more constructive notions of impartiality and civic virtue must also be developed in tandem. Young situates her specific comments on impartiality and civic character within her broader call for a “politics of difference”: a politics that begins by adequately recognizing real differences among the citizenry. A feminist and political theorist greatly influenced by European postmodernism, she explores how ideals of community come to deny these differences. She fears that the longing for community “participates in what Derrida calls the metaphysics of presence and Adorno calls the logic of identity, a metaphysics that denies difference.” This metaphysics “consists in a desire to get things together in unity, to formulate a representation of the whole, a totality . . . a desire to bring things into unity generates a logic of hierarchical opposition. Any move to define an identity, a closed totality, always depends on excluding some elements” (1990a, 302–303). According to Young, liberalism and communitarianism turn out to be flip sides of the same coin in their joint clinging to a metaphysics of presence that denies difference. Liberal individualism denies difference in positing individuals as self-sufficient entities “leveled” under a common “measure” of rights. Communitarianism denies difference by conceiving of selves in relation to some identification with a common totality. Both fall prey to a nostalgia-for-what-was-never, the “desire for selves that are transparent to one another.” Feminists, according to Young, must resist 60
·
Mad about MADD
the metaphysics of presence and extol a “politics beyond community” that celebrates difference, a “politics of difference” (1990a, 299, 301). While she sympathizes with those who are exasperated by so-called interest group politics and the lack of civility in contemporary public life, Young criticizes the tradition of civic republicanism that they seek to revive in response. She emphasizes that the publicly spirited “fraternity” extolled by early civic republicans was anchored in a dangerously detached conception of “universal citizenship” that presumes a heavily gendered separation of private and public life: “Feminists in particular have analyzed how the discourse that links the civic public with fraternity is not merely metaphorical” (1990a, 301). Young laments that “universal citizenship” is often presumed to mean not only that everyone can be a citizen but also that “citizenship transcends particularity and difference.” What she calls “citizenshipas-generality” implicates communitarian as well as liberal visions, since communitarian citizens are thought to unite with some common group identity. Young argues that the general point of view demanded by universal citizenship thus holds the “tradition of civic republicanism in critical tension with the individualist contract theory of Hobbes and Locke” (1990a, 253). The polar tension between their respective foci on community and the individual derives from their shared metaphysics of presence. Both civic republicanism and social contract theory depend on a desire for illusory personal transparency that denies real difference in order to cling to that illusion. I m pa rt i a l i t y: C a n ’t L i v e w i t h I t . . . Young’s unique contribution is the explicit connection she draws between modern language and images of public impartiality, and prevalent notions of civic spirit. She argues that the dangerous mythology of universal citizenship, or citizenship-as-generality, is perpetuated by pervasive contemporary imagery of “an impartial standpoint” for public morality. This imagery defines impartiality as detachment from particular desires and perspectives. Young points out that exhortations for citizens to be more “civic-minded” are linked, explicitly or implicitly, to calls for impartiality so understood. This conception demands that when acting qua citizen, the citizen set aside more particular attachments to family, friends, coreligionists, sharers of an ethnic heritage, and so forth. Young’s analysis New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
61
demonstrates how, through the language of “impartiality,” contemporary calls for renewed civic virtue are connected to the same historical ironies of gender and religion that hamstrung it in the first place. No wonder it is difficult to revitalize the term. Young relentlessly demonstrates how ideals of civic character parasitic on the now conventional notion of impartiality replicate a series of problematic dichotomies: reason/affectivity, public/private, male/female. She particularly decries the dichotomized portrayal of reason and emotion that she claims robs politics of its motivating passion and distorts political rationality: Modern ethics defines impartiality as the hallmark of moral reason. . . . Impartiality names a point of view of reason that stands apart from any interests or desires. Not to be partial means being able to see the whole. . . . The impartial moral reasoner thus stands outside of and above the situation about which he or she reasons. (1987, 60)
She claims that such “deontological reason” denies difference in two ways, by denying the “irreducible specificity of situations” and by denying the “difference among moral subjects” (1987, 61). One can see large wholes only by standing back so far that the parts become invisible. It becomes a dangerous projection of fantasy to believe the outline seen is the true whole. Because it has encoded the dichotomies of domesticity, says Young, the “traditional public realm of universal citizenship has operated to exclude persons associated with the body and feeling—especially women, Blacks, American Indians, and Jews” (1990b, 97). An ideal of universality has become a mechanism for exclusion. Young stresses how the ideal of impartiality functions as an ideology by “supporting the idea of the neutral state,” “legitimizing bureaucratic authority,” and “hypostatizing the point of view of privileged groups into a universal position” (1990, 112). Young presciently sees that these problems contribute to an overly narrow construal of politics altogether. They support what she calls a “distributive paradigm,” in which politics is about having rather than doing (1990b, chap. 1). Young fears that this model of politics masks forms of oppression such as racism and domestic violence that distort distribution. Moreover, distribution narrowly conceived is not the only challenge of community. When distribution is the perceived object of politics, politics itself becomes conceived as the mere instrument of distribution—rather 62 · Mad about MADD
than as the creative intersubjectivity that sustains community in imaginative ways. Young’s insights succinctly summarize how modern conceptions of impartiality are linked to the incoherence of civic virtue and to the challenges of its renewal. Virtue as cultivated habit demands emotional participation, while impartiality defined as detached universal citizenship demands emotional repression. Virtue as cultivated habit demands a lived connection between public and private life, while impartiality demands severance. Citizen virtue must be relevant to citizens of all genders, but presumed definitions of impartiality revere traits culturally coded as masculine—detachment, omniscience, ability to generalize—rather than the ability to become entranced by the unique. Young’s criticisms clearly relate to the invisibility of organizations like MADD in the fall narrative of civic virtue. MADD members explicitly connect their political vision to their personal interest as “mothers.” Moreover, the emotional affectivity of their work is highlighted in their name, which is both an acronym and a homonym of “mad.” MADD’s multipronged efforts to transform education, law enforcement, and legislation regarding drunk driving are not encompassed by a distributive paradigm of political life. MADD’s activities do not advocate how to cut some distributive pie. In short, MADD defies the impartial stance widely presumed to be a prerequisite of citizen virtues. . . . C a n ’t L i v e w i t hou t I t Rejecting impartiality as a public ideal altogether, Young celebrates the vision of a politics that acknowledges group differences through conversation in a “wild” and “playful” public discourse. She rightfully points out that social groups defined by self-association and identification not only may have particular “selfish” interests to advance but may share nonselfish conceptions of justice and community that enrich wider public consideration of those terms. Young’s response to the problems she identifies is to reject impartiality as an ideal rather than to reconceptualize it.37 However, without any alternative conception, her own constructive efforts fall short. She rejects not only the presumption of a universal point of view but also the legitimacy of forging “shared subjectivities,” a project she views as itself denying New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
63
difference.38 In so doing, she deconstructs community to the point that there is no plank upon which to stand. She cannot explain why one should want to live with, much less listen or talk to, anyone in her visionary city of difference, if shared subjectivities are to have no place in the conversation. (What will be left to discuss? Simply lists of differences?) As anyone who has observed lovers or children can attest, passion and play can be forums for cruelty as well as for edification. Politics needs not only the restoration of passion and play, but also moral standards by which to judge them. Young cites the public parading of masked puppets as an example of the playful politics she extols. Undoubtedly her example was inspired by the renowned antimilitarist troupe “Bread and Puppets.”39 But the Ku Klux Klan also sponsors playful parades of costumed participants, and there is little in Young’s argument by which to distinguish the public value of one over the other. Some conception of public impartiality, understood as critical fair-mindedness, seems necessary. There is no reason that forged “shared subjectivities” must exclude difference. Consider, for example, Shaker Heights, Ohio, a community whose shared subjectivities include pride in the neighborhood’s racial integration and confidence in the moral value of integration. This shared subjectivity has given “impartial” standards to various political debates in that community as particular zoning, school, and development policies are considered in relationship to how they will affect racial integration. Or consider New York City, where appreciation of multi-ethnicity is a shared subjectivity reflected in such things as the annual ethnic food festival. Young’s later book, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), tacitly acknowledges the lack of a constructive alternative in her earlier writings on impartiality. In this book, she begins to articulate a positive vision of democratic reflection. Her “politics of inclusion” elaborates how an interest in the connection between identity and politics need not reinforce parochially understood “identity politics.” Young “disengages group difference from identity by suggesting that social groups do not themselves have substantive unified identities, but rather are constituted through differentiated relations” (2000, 99). This conceptual clarification allows her to explore how social difference can be a political resource. She urges sharing of cultural narratives among citizens with diverse histories, and renewed appreciation for rhetoric as a form of political discourse. Young provocatively suggests the facilitation of inclusion as the test of civic orientation, 64
·
Mad about MADD
redressing not only “external exclusion” (structural exclusion of some from the participatory process) but more insidious “internal exclusion” (2000, 53–57). Internal exclusion isolates marginalized people within the participatory process because “their experiences as relevant to the issues under discussion are so different from others in the public that their views are discounted” (2000, 55). Ultimately, Young locates the hope of inclusive democracy in a diverse civil public. Young’s discourse on inclusion suggests positive constructive directions in response to her critique of impartiality. But it also highlights the intractable problem she faces trying to develop a politics of inclusion while rejecting impartiality as a relevant ideal altogether. Could not some exclusion be important to the encouragement of inclusion? And if so, how does one morally negotiate that? What kinds of moral skills and dispositions enable one to share cultural narratives and facilitate inclusion? Young shies away from a consideration of the character traits necessary to answer such questions. Her writings explicitly demonstrate a movement that I have claimed is implicit in the broader conversation on civic virtue: the move from a focus on civic virtue to an alternative focus on civil society. That movement ultimately accepts a dichotomy between civic virtue and civil society that must be bridged in order to resolve the ironies of civic virtue. Young’s insights detail how entrenched conceptions of impartiality are wrongheaded in ways that discourage robust understandings of civic virtue. Her failures demonstrate that the solution cannot be a total rejection of impartiality as a political ideal. Some articulation of “impartiality,” understood as critical fair-mindedness, seems necessary for inclusive political life. Thus the dilemma of impartiality: can’t live with it; can’t live without it. The tension of this dilemma, so starkly illustrated in Young’s work, crosscuts a family of contemporary conversations among feminists, postmodernists, communitarians, and discourse theorists. I propose that if we can neither live with nor without impartiality, we must change it. We must consider more specifically what it is we can’t live with, and what it is we can’t live without. We must, so to speak, rescue the baby from the bathwater. Since the entrenched conception of impartiality acts as a linchpin connecting the nexus of ironies impeding a constructive account of civic virtue, revising that conception will allow us to unravel the ironies. The reclamation of impartiality is the first step toward a transformed understanding of civic virtue. New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
65
C A N ’ T L I V E W I T H I T; C A N ’ T L I V E W I T HOU T I T: T H E DI L E M M A OF I M PA RT I A L I T Y I N H IS TOR IC A L PE R SPEC T I V E The conception of impartiality that Young persuasively links to ideals of civic virtue has been a hallmark of Western political ethics for three hundred years. In general, impartiality is the ability to give due consideration to all interest holders. Of course, how one conceives that ability is exactly what is at stake. In modern political ethics, spatial metaphors have been employed to describe an impartial standpoint that would imaginatively afford a clear perspective on the full range of interest holders. These include the so-called God’s-eye point of view; the Archimedean point; the standpoint of the archangel; or the “impartial standpoint,” the symbol that so vexes Young. Another pervasive metaphor has been that of the “impartial judge.” The term “impartiality” has been used to describe the appropriate organization of political institutions: institutions that resist skewing to serve the special interests of subgroups. It has also been used to describe the appropriate stance of the citizen reasoner when called upon to make decisions for the common good. In this sense, appropriately impartial citizens are those who can speak and reason as citizens on questions of public good, separating themselves momentarily from the pull of potentially distorting particular attachments such as family, religious belief, class, or ethnicity. They can thus act according to general moral norms, applying the same assessments to relevant general classes of people, or according to universal moral principles, acting consistently similarly in similar situations. (Generality and universality are often confusingly conflated in articulations of impartiality.)40 Contemporary conversations questioning the stress on impartiality have moved beyond raising doubts about whether it is actually possible to attain the ideal, to a more radical questioning of the ideal itself. Young joins many contemporary ethical thinkers who question aloud whether impartiality might be a wrongheaded ideal altogether. Why, these radical questioners query, should imaginative detachment from others foster wide engagement with others? Since the Enlightenment, impartiality has been explicated through the use of a lineage of hypothetical cases that I tag the “stranger-versus-loved66
·
Mad about MADD
one” cases, or SVLO cases. In all renditions, these hypothetical cases pit the interest of a loved one against the interest of a stranger in some dire scenario. William Godwin founded this lineage in the eighteenth century by questioning whether one ought rescue one’s mother or a humanitarian archbishop if both were burning in the flames of a fire. The good impartialist, according to Godwin, ought to realize that the mother does not deserve special consideration just because she is your mother. Obvious parallels remain in the most recent descendant of this lineage, a case in which Bernard Williams (1981) asks whether one should rescue a stranger or one’s spouse first if both are drowning. Significantly, critics of impartiality as well as its defenders assume the appropriateness of the SVLO cases as prisms for reflection on impartiality. For example, Williams uses his case to philosophically applaud the philosophically naive man who plunges in unhesitatingly after his wife. Williams’s scenario neatly calls attention to a constellation of arguments on impartiality that are reproduced in contemporary political theory. Strikingly, the images, metaphors, and arguments of otherwise fierce opponents all presume that the stranger-versus-loved-one cases conceptually explicate the meaning of impartiality. Not only do impartialists (defenders of impartiality understood as a universalist ideal) and partialists (critics of impartiality who explore the importance of intimate, particular, and unique relationships in the moral life) construct SVLO cases to press their arguments,41 but also liberals and communitarian critics of liberalism presume the construction of those cases in their overtly political arguments about how to structure a just society. Moreover, I argue, political theorists attempting to revive civic virtue also presume the definitional axis of the SVLO cases. This, it turns out, is the fatal flaw that prevents an array of diverse thinkers from adequately recognizing the heroism of MADD. Two features of current conversation about impartiality are noteworthy. First, by assuming the definitional validity of the SVLO cases, otherwise diverse argument partners agree that impartiality is a “standpoint,” a vantage point—even if imaginary—for a certain kind of broad perception. Second, they assume that an impartial standpoint ultimately defines a choice between a stress on impartial, universal norms or on close personal attachments. Related conversations have been tagged the “partiality/impartiality debates,” where participants have been labeled “impartialists” New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
67
and “partialists,” depending on whether they ultimately prioritize impartial norms or personal relationships. Both partialists and impartialists question the labeling, since there seems something false about the choice between partiality and impartiality, after all.42 Most people assume that both universal moral norms and healthy close personal relationships are important in moral life. Certainly, the logically inverse implication of the SVLO cases is rarely argued: that liars and cheats have the most fulfilling personal relationships! Few partialists accept the characterization of themselves as defenders of the parochial, and few impartialists admit having no concern about people’s close personal relationships. Yet impartialists and partialists continue to differ in characteristic ways such that the labels make sense. Underlying the stubborn resistance of the labels is the conversationalists’ joint appeal to a “standpoint of impartiality,” as defined by the SVLO cases, and their divergent defense of the ethical turf on one side or another of that standpoint. Given their interest in the moral import of relationships that are close, personal, and highly affective, feminists are radically suspicious of impartiality as that ideal is portrayed in the stranger-versus-loved-one cases.43 Thus, several contemporary feminists join Williams in calling for a rejection of impartiality as an ideal.44 However, the dilemma of impartiality is particularly prickly for feminists. With no ideal of impartiality, it would seem impossible to condemn patriarchy. The accusation of patriarchy is the charge that certain institutions are not appropriately impartial among the sexes or are inappropriately partial to one sex. Impartiality, understood as critical fair-mindedness, is necessary to get not only feminist, but any critical agendas off the ground. Is there any way to save the baby, a pragmatic conception of impartiality as critical fair-mindedness, while draining the bathwater, the legacy of the SVLO cases? A first step may be to gain a clearer sense of what, in fact, is problematic in the SVLO cases and the extent to which their legacy still drives much of political theory. In the next two chapters, I elaborate that, focusing first on political theory generally (chapter 3) and then on the conversation about civic virtue more specifically (chapter 4). The “standpoint view” of impartiality entrenched in the SVLO cases perpetuates the ideologies of gender and religion that hamstrung civic virtue. The dichotomy between personal and political life that the standpoint delineates blocks 68
·
Mad about MADD
the very ethical intersection that civic virtue seeks to navigate. After all, “civic virtue” implies the goal of cultivating personal character traits to support healthy political involvement. As long as impartiality is framed in terms of the SVLO cases, virtue will be lost. In chapters 5 and 6, I propose an alternative way of conceiving impartiality. I argue that impartiality should be considered a moral practice, itself a virtue, rather than a proverbial “standpoint.” Impartiality-as-practice articulates critical fair-mindedness that does not demand sacrifice of the citizens’ loved ones on the public altar and does not render the hard work of caring for particular others politically moot. At the same time, it demands that close personal relationships be subject to universal norms that derive from the communal practice of impartiality. Impartiality-aspractice transcends the confines of the SVLO cases and thus the ideologies of gender and religion that have plagued civic virtue.
New Calls for Civic Virtue, and Calls for New Civic Virtues
·
69
PART II THE DILEMMA OF IMPARTIALITY
3
THE DILEMMA OF IMPARTIALITY: LEGACY OF THE BISHOP AND THE CHAMBERMAID
The conventional ideal of impartiality can’t be lived with because it demands superhuman detachment from one’s personal commitments, dismisses the ethical relevance of such commitments, and obfuscates real differences between citizens. On the other hand, it can’t be lived without because some notion of critical fair-mindedness is required for political life. Although the suspect lineage of the stranger-versus-loved-one (SVLO) cases seems on the face of it to encapsulate the biases of gender and religion that rendered civic virtue incoherent, both impartialist and partialist ethical reasoners continue to presume that they elucidate impartiality. Many partialists complain that the resulting view of impartiality is unattainable. This critique is insightful but inadequate. It is insightful because it calls attention to the chasm between the ideal of impartiality and the reality of how one might, pragmatically, cultivate that ideal. But it is inadequate in two ways: it fails to recognize the confusion in the ideal itself, and it fails to recognize that partialist ethical approaches often fall prey to the same confusion. What is impartiality? The failure of the SVLO cases to answer that question clearly has enormous ramifications, since the cases continue to infiltrate political theory. Thus, pervasive understandings of impartiality in political theory are ambiguous. 73
T H E BISHOP A N D T H E CH A M BE R M A I D: C ON F USION A M I D T H E F L A M E S Many problematic conflations are built into the very structure of the SVLO cases. Impartiality as a structural form of reasoning is conflated with impartiality perceived as a substantive moral norm. The distinction between universality and generality is unhelpfully blurred, and thus their relationship to impartiality remains unclear. Moral justification is conflated with moral motivation, despite critical differences between them. Impartiality itself is conflated with impersonality and dispassion. This formulation structurally precludes moral distillation of “reflective equilibrium,” a stable balance between moral experience and ethical reflection. It precludes any connection between the “heroes” of the cases and ordinary moral heroes such as MADD. Since Godwin’s case, first articulated in eighteenth-century England, is an “impartialist” vignette most frequently cited by contemporary “partialist” opponents, a careful analysis of that scenario can elucidate how SVLO cases skew both impartialist and partialist moral argument.1 Recall that Godwin asks readers to imagine they can save only one of two potential victims from a fire. The two caught in the flames are a well-known humanitarian archbishop and the rescuer’s chambermaid. Which ought be saved? Clearly, the archbishop, according to Godwin, who goes on to insist that the archbishop would remain the correct choice even if the chambermaid were the rescuer’s wife, mother, or benefactor: “Of what consequence is it that they are mine? What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’ to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth?” (Godwin 1926). I m pa rt i a l i t y: For m, Su b sta nce , or Bot h? Godwin’s partialist attackers assume his scenario demonstrates that impartiality precludes considering certain persons as special because of our particular relationship with them. Marcia Baron (1991) calls this assumption into question, wondering what Godwin’s answer would be if the alternative were between saving two chambermaids, one of whom was the rescuer’s mother and the other a stranger. Presumably, the rescuer would be free to save her mother, since the overall social utility of the two potential victims would be roughly equal. 74
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
Baron claims that in the end Godwin’s disdain for the pronoun “my” derives from his utilitarian sense of promoting the general good, not from a governing view of impartiality. (Contemporary partialists reproduce the conflation when they cite rigid utilitarians such as Peter Singer [1994] or Jonathan Glover [1977] as typical, rather than extreme, proponents of impartiality.) One could press Baron’s point by asking whether certain interpretations of impartiality might demand tossing a coin to choose the lucky rescuee—if, for example, the rescuer’s worldview demanded respect for the inherent sanctity of life rather than for aggregate utility. As Baron notes, it matters what question one asks from an impartial perspective. Thus, defenders of impartiality stress that requirements of impartial ethical justification do not, in fact, demand detachment from personal loves as a superior mode of living. Thomas Hill protests that: impartiality . . . is part of an ideal for moral legislation, or general debate about moral principles and values; it is not a recommended way of life. Unfortunately, some philosophers, including Kant, seem at times to conflate this ideal with another idea, which does not logically follow . . . the idea that in facing the moral choices of daily life we should constantly strive . . . to free ourselves of particular attachments, and to ignore the distinguishing features of individuals. Even from an impartial perspective, which gives no special advantage to interests because they are one’s own, one can see good reasons for principles such as “Be compassionate,” “Take responsibility, within limits, for your family, your country, and yourself,” “Don’t face concrete problems as if they were mathematical puzzles, but restructure them with sensitivity and find a caring solution.” (1987, 131–32)
Baron restates Hill’s point by invoking a distinction between “level 1” justification (the level of ethical principles) and “level 2” justification (“the level at which principles are chosen or affirmed”). She claims that many partialists assume that impartialists demand impartiality at both level 1 and level 2, while most so-called impartialists only require it at level 2. Principles at level 1 that invoke partial obligations to certain kinds of others might be accorded impartial assent at level 2 (1991, 843–44). While the distinction between justificatory levels may be a helpful nuance, even that distinction presumes an overly narrow “principlist” approach to ethics. Impartiality as critical fair-mindedness might prompt an appropriate spontaneous response to others by moral agents who never engage in reflection or articulation of principles.2 It might play a role in discerning the morally relevant particulars of a situation, or in deciding The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
75
which generally recognized principles are relevant, or in arbitrating perceived conflicts between moral principles. In short, it might invoke habits and virtues as well as principles. On the one hand, then, a clear discussion of impartiality should distinguish the quest for impartiality from other ethical values that specify the positive ethical goods or negative ethical burdens to be impartially distributed. This distinction allows that what proper impartiality actually governs may vary with the nature of ethical relationships, role responsibilities, and particular situations—the possibility that Godwin denies.3 On the other hand, partialist insistence that visions of impartiality inherently have normative implications must be taken seriously. As Godwin’s case itself demonstrates, notions of what it means to be impartial may be wedded subconsciously to substantive notions of the good. Ironically, we may simply weave our deepest biases into the speculative thinking by which we try to remove biases. Ge n e r a l i t y, U n i v e r sa l i t y, I m pa rt i a l i t y By simultaneously focusing on his disdain for the “my” and his assumption of the archbishop’s extraordinary social utility, Godwin blurs the moral relevance of universality and generality, and thus their relationship to impartiality. Is the problem for Godwin the specificity of the chambermaid, “my” wife or mother, and thus the particularity of my feelings for her? In other words, is the problem with a moral pull to my mother the fact that I cannot generalize it to others, even to other mothers? (If so, why is Godwin unconcerned with the specificity of the archbishop in the case as he constructed it—the Archbishop of Cambray, a noted humanitarian?) Or is the problem that one could not will to universalize that everyone in such situations save her mother? Godwin fails to distinguish the two questions.4 Let us consider the first possibility (the one Baron rejects): that Godwin objects to the specificity of the rescuer’s feelings for her mother. Imagine a third party reflecting on the Godwin case. This third party knows only that one victim is the potential rescuer’s archbishop and the other her mother. In other words, this moral reasoner assesses the case in reference to general categories. Who should be saved? A Confucian respondent to Godwin’s case might well advocate for the chambermaid, based on her membership in the general class of parents, 76
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
while failing to see any special moral relevance in the category of archbishop. While Godwin assumed it is an issue of impartiality to choose the archbishop, he would have difficulty in maintaining that against the Confucian. The Confucian is not gripped by any “my.” Moreover, the Confucian could be quite “impartial” in applying his conclusion, arguing that any rescuer should favor her parent over her archbishop. The confusion of generality and impartiality wrongly casts aspersions on personal loves while protecting all sorts of assumptions from critical reflection. In this case, for example, the partiality of the rescuer toward her specific mother has proven to be unassailable without additional, and contested, conceptions of a comprehensive good. Moreover, one might want to press whether archbishops as a class or mothers as a class deserve the standing granted them by Godwin or the Confucian, respectively. Could Godwin be slighting the work of motherhood? Could the Confucian be slighting the work of archbishophood? Could either of them be mistaken about the relevance of those categories to the situation at hand? Godwin and the hypothetical Confucian disagree precisely on the relevant general categories. Marilyn Friedman argues directly against generality as an adequate criterion for impartiality. She criticizes what she formulates as the “neutrality condition” of impartial justification, which correlates to “generality” as that term is used by R. M. Hare, Adrian Piper, and others.5 According to Friedman, the neutrality condition dictates that impartial reasons, in addition to applying to all within the relevant domain, must also “lack essential reference to particular or specifiable persons” (1993, 27–33). Generality as a proposed criterion for impartiality questions the power of the “my” per se. Friedman finds generality problematic as a criterion for impartiality not only because the particularity of one’s relationship to another might legitimately dictate moral demands, but even more ominously, she notes that “biases against whole groups of persons” survive generality requirements. Even if moral reasons were facially neutral, that is, lacking any essential reference to any individual persons or social groups, it would still be possible for the acceptance or advocacy of those reasons to manifest covert biases. Reasons can be couched in terms which are universal and neutral, yet still advance special interests. Certain “facts” make this possible, for The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
77
example, facts about the traits that correlate highly with certain types of persons, facts about preexisting social inequalities, and facts about the terms that merely seem, but are not genuinely, neutral. (1993, 29)
Much effort in fighting gender-based oppression is directed at discerning the subtle covert biases in programs, policies, and justifications that are phrased in general, or neutral, terms. Such covert biases may lie behind phenomena such as the “glass ceiling” in corporate management, or the gender imbalance among tenured academics, or the relative dearth of women on police forces. One concrete example of covert bias might be upper-arm-strength requirements for police. Proponents of the requirement argue that the criteria are general, neutral, and thus fair. Of course, given the physical differences between average men and women, it is usually more difficult for women to meet the strength requirements. Whether the requirements thus encourage legitimate or illegitimate gender bias depends on information external to the given justification itself. It depends on whether upper-arm strength is an important factor in competent police work. Much evidence casts doubt on this unstated assumption, from the preponderance of guns on the street to various studies suggesting that communicative skills may be more critical to effective policing. Let us return to the second possibility teased out of Godwin’s case: that Godwin really objects to failures to universalize moral norms. In this case, Godwin ultimately would abandon his diatribe against the “my” and would try to convince the Confucian that filial piety is the wrong universal ethical principle. In other words, Godwin would ultimately favor universalizability as definitive of impartiality rather than generality. Yet both Godwin and the Confucian might will for their solutions to be universalized. There seems to be something impartial in their internal consistency, though they disagree on the norm they attempt to apply universally. Similarly, two people with different assessments of the moral worth of a law might agree that a particular judge applies the law to relevant parties impartially.6 Only a monistic ethical thinker—someone who is convinced that one ethical value is higher in priority than all others—could completely equate impartiality with universalizability. (While such thinkers, act utilitarians and rigid Kantians alike, seem to be out of favor with the general public, 78
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
they are the favorite straw men for partialist attack.)7 Ethical thinkers who acknowledge the possibility of tension between multiple ethical goods cannot relate the two terms so simply. If morality sometimes demands deciding between goods, then proper impartiality must aid in those decisions.8 Thus, neither generality nor universalizability appears to capture impartiality adequately. The conflation of the three terms contributes both to an undue suspicion of personalism and to a too-easy acceptance of reasons that are cast in general or universal terms. Certainly, though, there is insight to the intuition that impartiality somehow interrelates to the ability to generalize and universalize appropriately, even if it is not the same thing. Proper generalization is necessary in order to treat similar cases similarly. And it is common sense to expect that impartiality warn against habitually granting ourselves and our loved ones exceptions to universal moral norms. A clear conceptualization of impartiality should suggest more precisely how impartiality as critical fair-mindedness relates to generalization and universalization. Mot i v e a n d J ust i f ic at ion Another distinction frequently glossed over in the impartiality/partiality debates is that between ethical motivation and ethical justification. Motivations are not logically required to be the same as their impartial justification in order to be ethically healthy. To consider this, let us return to the Godwin case, assuming one of Godwin’s given possibilities—that the chambermaid is the spouse of the would-be rescuer. Suppose that the rescuer does indeed favor the loved one. Would it be clear that only the pull of the “my” is at work, and that this precludes impartial justification? Perhaps not. The rescuer could argue along Kantian lines that the special marital vows she made to care for her spouse not only justify but demand that she save him first. In Kantian terms, the saving of the loved one would be the perfect duty demanded in this situation to uphold the imperfect duty to keep promises. Yet within the Kantian framework, the duty to uphold promises is itself derived on impartialist grounds, grounds generally applicable and irrespective of particular others. Of course, partialists would point out that it was a partial love that prompted our rescuer to make her marital vows in the first place. Moreover, they might add, it is unlikely that anyone faced with this situation The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
79
would stop to perform the thought experiment demanded by the categorical imperative (Kant’s theoretical test of universalizability). More than likely, the rescuer would immediately and unreflectively pursue the rescue of her husband, motivated by her love for him. And, canons of philosophy to the contrary, that might be a good thing. Bernard Williams (1981) advances such an argument when he constructs his contemporary hypothetical case that is clearly descendent from Godwin’s, albeit in reaction to it. Williams removes the utilitarian cast of the case by making the operating question whether to rescue one’s spouse (“wife,” in his version) or a stranger, both of whom are drowning. Wryly, Williams queries whether anyone who actually asks that question has not had “one thought too many.” For Williams, something is deeply troubling if the immediate motive of the actor is not an overwhelming instinct to save the spouse (“wife”). But there is no inherent conflict between a felt motive of affection and an “impartial” conception of duties to spouse. The clearest enemy of some partialists thus may not be a theoretical conception of impartiality but rather the Kantian dictum that only duty, impartially defined, is a morally good motive. Feminists in particular bristle at this suggestion, conflicting as it does with their sense of emotion as cognitive, their stress on the moral training of emotion, and their insistence that any generalized ethical principles should support the real moral knowledge gained in everyday experience.9 The conflation of motivation and justification not only can render affective motives unduly suspicious but also can facilitate covert biases that should be ethically suspect. Pernicious motivations can be hidden behind seemingly impartial justifications. I nst it u t ions , Rol e s , a n d Pr ac t ice s: L ay e r s of S o c i a l L i f e Alasdair MacIntyre questions what lies behind Williams’s assertion that “This is my wife” should be an adequate justification for her rescue. He wonders whether the stress is only on the “my,” or also on “wife.” MacIntyre notes that the unique institutional role of marriage in our society might be the unelaborated reason why a distant moral observer might readily accept “this is my wife” as an adequate reason (1983, 122). In this case, it may be 80
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
precisely because the agent’s inclinations are so aligned with an accepted cooperative social structure that the question of justification seems silly. MacIntyre thus laments the structure of the typical hypothetical dilemmas, which present society on a simple two-level model: the individual with his or her personal loves, and society-at-large. Missing are all the rich layers of institutional life that comprise communal life as we know it. In Williams’s example, the importance of marriage as an institution is perhaps inextricable from the presumed affection of the actor toward his spouse. So Williams himself evades consideration of any institutional ramifications of his case. But questions of appropriate partiality and impartiality arise in the context of all sorts of institutions, practices, or social roles, virtually all of which disappear in the loved-one-versus-stranger cases. To consider this, imagine that the fire department arrives on the scene of Godwin’s case, or the coast guard on the scene of Williams’s. We might expect both the most rigid utilitarian and the most sincere filial pietist to agree that the firemen or coast guard patrol should rescue first whichever victim they come upon first—even if some hysterical bystander is screaming that the victim over yonder is the archbishop or “my wife.” Yet neither Godwin’s nor Williams’s framework offers any explanation of this striking consensus, which derives from the agreed-upon social role of the fire department and coast guard. The consensus on the role of the coast guard and the fire department rests on a presumed but unacknowledged understanding of the importance of trust in ethical life.10 The SVLO scenarios ignore the social structuring of bases for communal trust. Marilyn Friedman recognizes that this omission cuts across both impartialists and partialists who structure debate around the stranger/beloved cases: Hypothetical disasters abound as thought experiments in these discussions. The moral world of mainstream ethics is a nightmare of plane crashes, train wrecks, and sinking ships. Wives and children drown in this literature at an alarming rate. The non-feminist impartiality critics never acknowledge how infrequent these emergencies are in daily moral life, nor, therefore, how infrequent is the need to sacrifice someone else’s wife to save one’s own. And for these infrequent occasions, the non-feminist impartiality critics never discuss the possibility of investing our moral energies in efforts to reduce beforehand those breathtaking contests for survival and love—for example, by better federal regulation of airline safety. (1993, 71)11
The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
81
While Friedman calls necessary attention to the gendering of the cases, which typically involve a male rescuer and female victims, the focus of her comments is the very structure of the SVLO cases. The cases impede thinking about how to organize moral life in ways that minimize zero-sum contests between obligations. R e f l e c t i v e E qu i l i br i u m : Bl ow i ng u p t h e Br i d ge s? The forced dilemmas of the stranger-versus-loved-one cases not only underattend impartiality as a challenge of everyday life, but because this lineage of cases equates impartiality with generality and universalizability, conflates motivation and justification, and ignores multiple levels of ethical reflection, it also presents impartiality in opposition to felt emotions. Thus, the challenge of ethics comes to be seen as making the hard choice for the impartial over the beloved, rather than as constructing a world where the two are balanced and mutually informative. These cases structurally preclude the moral pull to “reflective equilibrium,” if that is defined in any of the following ways: as mutual reinforcement between ethical theory and lived experience; as dynamic balance between the level of theoretical justification and the level of specific ethical principles; as a compatibility between ethical motivation and justification; or as a reciprocity between healthy political structures and personal flourishing.12 In fact, the structure of the SVLO cases may prevent us from noticing reflective disequilibrium. A healthy view of impartiality ought help us to organize our moral lives to facilitate reflective equilibrium rather than to fracture our lives into competing compartments. L e s s ons Lessons from the archbishop and the chambermaid warn us not to confuse impartial justification with the content of moral norms; not to oversimplify the relationship between impartiality, generality, and universality; not to equate ethical justification and motivation; and not to preclude structurally the moral pull to reflective equilibrium. In short, they warn us not to identify the “impartial” with the “impersonal,” for the extent of overlap between those two notions is one of the questions to be addressed. A pragmatic ideal of critical fair-mindedness must avoid these errors. 82
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
Yet the structure of the SVLO cases continues to pervade political theory. In the remainder of this chapter, I demonstrate the extent to which the ghosts of the bishop and the chambermaid continue to haunt. The “standpoint” view of impartiality is accepted by both liberal political theorists and their partialist critics. Contemporary liberal political theory perpetuates the legacy of the SVLO cases through its use of “ideal agents” as instructors in political impartiality. Partialists such as “integrity theorists” and “communitarians” fail to escape the parameters of the SVLO cases. They alternately argue for either personal integrity or communal traditions to trump impartiality, without adequately questioning how impartiality is conceived in the first place. The conversation between Williams and MacIntyre on the hypothetical drowning case succinctly captures dueling tendencies among partialists: they focus exclusively either on the personal or on the institutional aspects of one’s emotional commitments—only on the “my,” or only on the “wife.” In healthy ethical life, there should be some connection between the two. Some feminist developers of care ethics have (mistakenly) rallied to the partialist side of the impartialist/partialist tug-of-war. But to a great extent, feminists have been equal opportunity critics of both impartialists and partialists. This is not surprising, since the common ground between the two camps—the SVLO cases and the resulting conception of impartiality-as-standpoint—presumes disdain for caring labor. The double-edged feminist critique offers starting points for the development of an alternative view of impartiality. Since feminists do not clearly align themselves along the axes of the SVLO cases, I do not treat them as a separate group in this chapter. Rather, in later chapters I incorporate work by a number of feminist critics in my own proposed reconceptualization of impartiality.
L E S S T H A N I DE A L AGE N T S The forced dilemmas and the conceptual conflations of the SVLO cases have been worked into received political theory, which presumes the equation of the impersonal and the impartial. That equation is summarized in Thomas Nagel’s introduction to his book Equality and Partiality: Ethics, and the ethical basis of political theory, have to be understood as arising from a division in each individual between two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal. . . . The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
83
The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces, I shall claim, a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and idealization of such ideals. (1991, 3–4)
In his opening sentences, Nagel sweeps away all the ethical turf between self and universal. Impartiality is rendered irrelevant for negotiating the complex social terrain between the two—which itself is rendered politically irrelevant. Such forced antagonism between the impartial and the impersonal has been perpetuated in liberal political theory by the use of imaginary ideal agents. Spokesmen for both the deontological and the utilitarian philosophical traditions, as well as for the social contract tradition in political theory, have advocated imaginary ideal agents as instructors in appropriate political impartiality. These agents, it turns out, are ideal precisely in equating impartiality with impersonality and in triumphing impartiality over personal attachments. Two general types of ideal agents merit conceptual distinction, although they are often hybridized among both their advocates and their critics: “omniscient” models and “essential” models.13 Both omniscient and essential approaches are advanced in response to the presumed need for the moral agent to imagine herself in the “shoes” of others. They address two related moral challenges: the challenge of gathering and assessing morally relevant information, and the challenge of resisting morally inappropriate biases. The omniscient agent trumps the first challenge. Imagined as an ideal moral deliberator, the omniscient agent eliminates ignorance by attaining a standpoint revealing all relevant information and by having perfect means-to-end reasoning. The essential agent trumps the second challenge. Imagined as an abstracted human moral core, the essential agent eliminates bias by definitional insulation from potential sources of bias. The essential agent lacks certain individuating features of personhood such as race, class, or knowledge of particular attachments. The essential agent is, in a sense, “stripped down” to what are considered her most basic moral attributes. Advocates of ideal agents argue that the closer a person can, through imagination, asymptotically approach the perspective of the ideal agent, the more “impartial” she will be. Margaret Urban Walker 84
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
summarizes the imagination of ideal agents as “strategies of transcendence [omniscient agents] or encapsulation [essential agents]” (1991, 763). Omniscient agents equate impartiality with universality; essential agents equate it with neutrality/generality. Hybrid agents equate it with some combination of the two. Clearly, the vantage point of an omniscient agent would facilitate any utilitarian calculus, since all people, along with their pleasures and pains, could be viewed in a moment’s glance. Historically, though, the metaphorical imagery of the omniscient agent has been associated particularly strongly with deontological thought. The omniscient observer can compile all perspectives into one standpoint and thus fully comprehend what norms are universalizable duties. Two underlying presumptions merit attention. The first is the assumption that everyone’s perspective counts equally, implying that equal attention to all is a goal of impartiality. The second is the assumption that the compiled standpoints will in fact converge upon universals clear to someone with adequate breadth of vision. Oft-invoked images of omniscient agents in philosophical literature include the God’s-eye point of view, the archangel, the point of view of the universe, the ideal observer, and the impartial or third-person spectator.14 In contrast, essential agents highlight neutrality as definitional of impartiality. The presumption is that the impartial agent must begin from a stance of “neutrality” toward other people’s varied interests. Therefore, the essential agent limits her moral perspective to those factors most generally shared by all humans. Essential strategies are often associated with contractarian approaches in political theory. Implicitly, hypothetical contractors must negotiate political ground rules with those who are actually unknowns. This pushes them to weigh those features considered most generally associated with moral personhood in deriving impartial rules. The impartiality of the essential agent has been correlated with the purported neutrality of political liberalism toward varied views of the good life. Here again, the presumption is that all should be treated equally, and the thought experiments of the contractarian tradition—from the state of nature to the original position—are defined to enforce such equality.15 The first, and perhaps most purely “essential” agents were the hypothetical men in the pre-political “state of nature” imagined by Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
85
In contemporary political theory, John Rawls’s infamous “original position” is a hybrid that integrates aspects of both omniscient and essential models.16 The parties in the original position are ideal agents deriving the principles of justice for a fair society. Each party is rational, mutually disinterested in the others, and knows the general facts of society. However, insulated by a voluntarily donned imaginative “veil of ignorance,” he does not know “his place in society, his class position or social status . . . his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities” (1971, 12).17 The contractors in the original position are omniscient in that they are aware of the general facts of society. Rawls writes as if this is a mundane accomplishment, the real imaginary feat of the original position being the veil of ignorance. But certainly, for most of us, attaining a grasp on the general facts of our society remains an ongoing, never completed challenge. The parties in the original position are rendered essential by the imagined “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them the particularities of their social place. They know only that they have some overall conception of a good life, the particulars of which are hidden from them, and that they share with all others the desire for primary goods of rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect (1971, 62, 442). Rawls argues that parties in such an original position would affirm two principles of justice, prioritizing the first. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (1971, 60)
Unlike some moral theorists who use idealized strategies, Rawls does not claim the principles derived from the original position to be definitive for morality—only for the construction of the “basic structures of society.” He assumes that within the framework set by these basic structures, broader theories of comprehensive morality will coexist, bump, and compete. Stressing that the principles of justice derived in the original position represent a broad “overlapping consensus” among diverse comprehensive moralities, Rawls skirts the question of how much their regulative priority shapes or limits the development of comprehensive moral views. 86
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
Critics of ideal agents often underappreciate both the imaginative aspects that are entailed in such strategies and the moral challenges to which they respond. Yet their critiques are radically challenging. In short, critics ask how models that have lost their humanity can be models for humans. Ideal agents presume the same problematic conflation of universality, generality, and impartiality that is evident in the SVLO cases. They also presume that the goal of impartiality is equal regard to all. Given human finitude, one might wonder whether, alternatively, impartiality ought to help people decide on whom to focus their moral energies, since (unlike ideal agents), they cannot focus on them all. Or one might wonder whether impartiality should articulate a critical fair-mindedness that rightfully constrains intimate as well as political relationships. Om n is ci e nce: Is I t A l l I t ’s C r ack e d u p t o Be? The desire for an omniscient vantage point responds to a legitimate moral urge, the challenge of expanding one’s perception of morally relevant information. However, metaphors of omniscience obstruct rather than facilitate the human achievement of expansive perception in several ways. I consider the “God’s-eye point of view” as paradigmatic of metaphors for omniscience in the literature on impartiality, exploring it here as a quasisecular metaphor of all-seeingness. The quest for an omniscient viewpoint begins with the intuitive notion that impartiality requires us to imagine the position of others as they are affected by our actions. However, rather than acknowledge the epistemic challenges of expanding this imaginative role-playing outward to encompass ever-wider populations, the metaphorical imagery encourages a naively wishful shortcut. The tendency toward the shortcut is clear in the historical development of metaphors of omniscience as well as in the metaphors themselves. One might expect that the more religious language—“the God’s-eye point of view,” “the standpoint of an archangel”—historically preceded the secularized versions of ideal agents such as “the impartial spectator.” In fact, the reverse is true. The earliest versions of idealized agents were offered by the eighteenth-century moral sense theorists, who questioned the then pervasive view that morality was the will of God, knowable through The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
87
both revelation and reason. Their “impartial observers” were much less “ideal” than archangels, since their impetus to an appropriately impartial perspective began in their own felt moral sentiments and reverberated outward through the socialized correction of sentiments. As moral sense theory waned, the appeal of an ever-burgeoning secularized belief in universal human reason promised metaphysical support for the desired shortcut to an omniscient viewpoint. The compilation of multiple views no longer seemed to demand successful encounters with multiple others, but rather it could be properly envisioned through speculative Reason. Given the history behind it, the phrase “God’s-eye point of view” may be understood as a metaphor for such speculative Reason. The flight to the shortcut remains evident in contemporary thinkers. Lawrence Kohlberg describes the attention to others’ position demanded by impartiality as engagement in “moral musical chairs,” a wonderfully rich metaphor (1981, 199). However, Kohlberg’s equation of universalizable rules with both justice and the highest stages of moral reasoning proceeds quite independently of any actual wearying in actual games of moral musical chairs. Similarly, R. M. Hare discusses in great detail the actual challenges of trying to imagine being in a particular other’s moral situation (1981, esp. chap. 7). In addition to the problem of motivation—we do not always wish to empathize—there are problems of trying to understand another’s inner mind, which is an even more complex challenge than the demanding task of understanding “the situation.” But then he offers the standpoint of the archangel as one that can bypass the tedium of actual interpersonal comparisons: “The most that human beings can ask for, when they are trying to do the best critical thinking they can, is some way of approximating, perhaps not at all fully, the thought processes of an archangel” (1981, 122).18 Peculiarly, the quest for the omniscient moral standpoint has long survived the intensive contemporary criticism of the underlying Kantian metaphysics with its notion of “pure mind” and “pure object.” If only we could imagine the viewpoint of the “archangel” who hovers above it all, we need not go through all the trouble to learn the specific needs, wants, desires, fears, and vulnerabilities of all those specific others. Several problems challenge universalization through the use of omniscient agents: the problem of underdescription, the problem of overwhelming information, and the problem of judgment-less empathy. 88
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
The problem of underdescription applies equally to Hare’s archangel and to Rawls’s assumption that his contractors know “the general facts of society”: First, what we know about the standpoints of most other persons underdescribes those standpoints. . . . [M]ost of the people whose standpoints we have to consider for the purposes of normative theory are strangers known to us only under limited circumstantial descriptions that underdescribe the standpoints of the persons involved. (Friedman 1993, 21)
Can an affluent white suburban property holder really imagine what it is like to be an African American renter living in an inner-city area? Can someone with Blue Cross Gold Plan imagine the insecurity faced by the uninsured? Can men in our society who have never been sexually harassed imagine what women endure when they face such harassment? Can the able-bodied imagine what it would be like to be blind, deaf, or wheelchair bound? And, more fantastically, could someone simultaneously imagine all such differences and more? Faced with the demand to strive for the omniscient viewpoint, what would ensure that the deliberating agent who has never been touched by such situations would even realize they were part of what needed serious imagining? One of the greatest dangers of urging imaginative bolts to ideal standpoints is that people might actually come to believe they have gotten there. Marilyn Friedman stresses that there is no independent criterion by which mortal humans could know how closely or distantly they approach the asymptote of ideal viewing (1993, 19). This lack of any gauge for one’s success renders universalization an impracticable ideal. The omniscient standpoint may be impractical in another way: it conceals primary moral challenges of impartiality that humans face even if God does not. Suppose the moral agent could imaginatively bolt to an omniscient viewpoint. What would she do with all the information so encompassed? Unlike God, human moral agents are limited in the amount of information they can handle without mentally short-circuiting. Writes Margaret Urban Walker: The image of the God’s eye responds to the real problem of limited information in a particularly uninstructive way. The divine viewpoint is a pointlessly extravagant expression of the ideal of fully adequate information, for moral agents do not need to know the state of every leaf and sparrow, and there is the real problem of how much raw information it is The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
89
possible and optimal for a human agent to attempt to ponder in pursuit of a morally adequate view. (1991, 764)
Earthly people are confounded not only by incomplete information but by the daunting challenge of discerning the morally relevant in a neverending barrage of information, a challenge unaddressed by metaphors of the God’s-eye view. Moreover, God and archangels—at least as conceived in the religious tradition that so heavily influenced liberal philosophy—bring no moral debts to their processes of deliberation. Strategies of omniscience thus ignore the relevance of personal or social transgression and historical rivalries. They ignore legitimate quests for reconciliation, remedy, forgiveness. If a given person or group is in pain, it may not be adequate to incorporate that pain into my compiled empathy. If I, or my group, has caused or contributed to that pain, something more may be owed. As Margaret Urban Walker points out, while a mundane matter for humans, it would seem a joke to say of God’s pursuit of a certain course, “well, she or he will have to live with that . . .” (1991, 765). These practical problems intersect with a central theoretical limitation on strategies of omniscience. The universalization of omniscient agents attempts to extend human empathy to all. But the extension of empathy without constant critical judgment would be ethically unhealthy even if it were possible. “There is an important difference between those motives which are merely unfamiliar and those motives which seem corrupt or despicable,” writes Marilyn Friedman. “Should the victim of a brutal rape be, thus, required to adopt the standpoint of the rapist?” (1993, 22–23). We rightfully may decline to extend imaginative empathy to Ku Klux Klan members or child molesters. Refusing to empathize can be a morally courageous act that requires perceptive moral discrimination. In personal relationships, lack of such courageous discrimination results in “women who love too much.” There is no reason to expect that wider political life would be any better off without judgment of empathy. In short, pursuing a metaphorical God’s-eye point of view in political theory may entail a secular analogue to pride as that sin is envisioned within Christian theological traditions: the failure to recognize human limits that make one unlike God. Conversely, the drawbacks of the presumed view of God as a model for secular political life are among several 90
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
stimuli causing contemporary Christian theologians to question that view of God (see chapter 5). V e i l i ng: I s Et h ic a l Pu r da h Mode st y or Dis gu ise? Unlike omniscient agents, essential agents needn’t be superhuman in the breadth of their vision of and empathy toward others. Still, cognitive miracles are required of them and thus render them, too, an impractical ideal. Also similarly, the ideal itself may be less ideal than often assumed. How do we in fact know that we have successfully weeded out our particulars from moral reasoning when we attempt abstraction? An astute teacher presenting Rawls’s theory of justice graphically illustrated this problem when he asked students to put paper bags over their heads to simulate the original position’s “veil of ignorance.”19 (Did the students really not know who they were once the bags were donned?) Marilyn Friedman succinctly notes that the “veil of ignorance” would also have to be a “veil of influence” to be successful (1993, 24).20 Biases, including morally pernicious ones, can survive general formulation. This problem can be seen in a circular twist to the development of John Rawls’s thought. In his more historicist writings subsequent to the original Theory of Justice, Rawls concedes that the original position is not meant to model some pristine moral state, a bona fide metaphysical Archimedean point, but rather it concisely articulates certain core values that are embedded in Western liberal democratic tradition. “Justice as fairness . . . tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their interpretation. Justice as fairness is a political [not metaphysical] conception in part because it starts from within a certain political tradition” (1985, 225; emphasis added).21 The paradox here is that the “veil of ignorance” in the original position is developed as a model of ethical impartiality-qua-neutrality, but Rawls admits that it really is not neutral after all. The veil of ignorance serves as a veil of influence—a point that may be missed precisely because the historically latent ideals governing the construction of the hypothetical case are widely accepted in liberal society. Rawls may be correct to claim that his theory ought to be interpreted as “political, not metaphysical.” No one appreciates more than his critics The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
91
the contribution he has made by articulating latent ideals in American political culture so vividly in his formulation of the original position. But he misses a logical problem between his admission of the qualified nature of neutrality in the original position and the rest of his theory. Rawls’s claim for the priority of the principles of justice cannot withstand his admission of the cultural-historical factors in the construction of the original position. Rawls’s “reflective equilibrium” is constrained because after the original position is appropriately conceived, the knowledge of principles derived from it “may suggest further reflections that lead us to revise our considered judgements”; but he does not allow for the reverse, that considered judgments could call into question the principles of justice (1971, 49). That constraint becomes indefensible once Rawls admits the original position as a cultural/historical construct. In effect, Rawls’s constraint on reflective equilibrium protects those moral assumptions that are the most culturally pervasive from critical scrutiny. But in advance of scrutiny, there is no reason to affirm those presuppositions as correct and good— or “right.” Moreover, the culture and history of a people may legitimately change and evolve; there is no reason to expect “latent political ideals” to remain constant. If the original position is political and not metaphysical, there is no reason for it to be protected from reflexive critique. Feminists, advocates for racial and ethnic minorities, and communitarians unite in suggesting that even if we could successfully imaginatively abstract ourselves from our particulars, the result would be paralyzing rather than enabling. A lack of knowledge about one’s particulars would block not only morally illicit biases but also morally positive attachments that give us moral identity, reason for living, and incentive for public discourse in the first place. If the willful amnesia of the essential agent is successful, then not only pernicious moral discriminations will be lost but also the positive moral perspectives that one develops through one’s particular life experience. Ov e rge n e r a l i z i ng “E c onom ic M a n ” Emulating essential agents, moral reasoners may not only suppress morally relevant perspectives, underattend the moral relevance of differences among people, and lack adequate criteria for success, but they also may
92
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
err by assuming the wrong generalities of human agency to be paramount. This is an especially troubling danger, since it would fundamentally skew the entire exercise. Underlying the celebration of essential agents is a questionable assumption of “economic man” as the paradigm of what it means to be human.22 The assumption of economic man is clear in the “original position” of contract theory, the state of nature as variously imagined by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Contemporary essential agents are descendants of those first savage contractors. Despite varying degrees of optimism and pessimism, the early contractarians all envisioned the subjects of political organization to be isolated adult men competing for resources: from Hobbes’s anxious brutes, to Locke’s Swiss and Indian in the woods of America, to Rousseau’s noble savages. Hobbes actually announces his ignoring what the others simply ignore. He explicitly imagines that the state of “nature” somehow arose without sexual reproduction or child rearing: “Let us consider men . . . as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement with each other” (1972, 205). Feminists in particular wonder what indeed is natural about such a world: “This is a strange world; it is one in which individuals have grown up before they have been born; in which boys are men before they have been children; a world where neither mother, nor sister, nor wife exists” (Benhabib 1992, 157). It is also a world where love, friendship—even among men—and business cooperation do not exist. All such things are hypothetically defined to be less natural than self-interested competition. John Rawls’s veil of ignorance may hide the very economic man who emerged from the woods of the contractarian tradition’s earlier thought experiments. Economic man peeks out from the veil when Rawls occasionally lapses into the language of bargaining or game theory to characterize the parties in the original position, for example, when he says that “the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” (1971, 12; emphasis added). Sometimes Rawls argues that the construction of the original position forecloses the need for bargaining, but this implies that bargaining for advantage is somehow the primordial human state that the commitment to justice checks:
The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
93
We can, to make the circumstances [of the original position] more vivid, imagine that the parties are required to communicate with each other through a referee as intermediary. . . . But such a referee is actually superfluous, assuming that the deliberations of the parties are similar. Thus there follows the very important consequence that the parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual sense. (139)
Economic man may be ensconced in the original position most fundamentally by the assumption that the parties in the original position are “mutually disinterested.” Rawls claims this characterization accords with his “thin” metaphysical approach, his desire to assume as little as possible to initiate reflection on justice (18). He also claims that the “combination of mutual disinterest with the veil of ignorance achieves the same purpose as benevolence. For this combination of conditions forces each person in the original position to take the good of others into account” (148). Certainly, there is something paradoxical about translating mutual disinterest into empathy. But more question-begging is the felt necessity of the assumption of mutual disinterest, given that Rawls prides himself on his philosophical modesty. In the first place, human experience refutes the proposition that mutual disinterest is a basic starting point for human moral identity. After all, a central claim of those developing the ethics of care is that many moral reasoners cannot make sense of themselves as mutually disinterested. Few loving parents, for example, can imagine themselves as mutually disinterested from their children. Rawls’s assumption of mutual interest may be tied to his choice of “heads of households” as the relevant agents to devise basic principles of justice. (Certainly, he intends only to presume their disinterest toward other heads of households, not necessarily toward their own, albeit unknown, households?) This choice inherently disadvantages the perspectives of caregivers and children in the process by which principles of justice are discerned. It seems driven more by the legacy of domesticity than by the internal logic of Rawls’s theory. (Why should a veil of ignorance demand only that heads of households imagine being heads of different households, rather than demanding they imagine not being heads of households? Why assume that households have clear “heads” at all?) Even more fundamentally, the assumption of mutual disinterestedness is question-begging by its sheer superfluousness: why could not the veil of ignorance itself suffice to shield moral reasoners from undue 94
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
favoring of themselves or their loved ones in formulating the rules of justice? Why must they begin from a presumption of no interest in others, rather than simply from an ignorance of the others in whom they are interested?23 Alternatively, one could imagine considering affection for and wellbeing of beloveds as one of the primary goods that all the original parties desire. Conceivably, such goods are as generally important to humans as income and self-respect, which Rawls recognizes as primary goods. Including them in the list of primary goods might involve “thinner” assumptions than Rawls’s own approach. The superfluousness of the assumption of mutual disinterest suggests that Rawls may unwittingly privilege certain aspects of being human—those characteristic of “economic man” rather than those characteristic of “carers”—in his derivation of justice. Valorizing the ethical work of care entails radically calling into question a central tenet of the social contract tradition: the notion that the subjects of political life are “rational contractors.” The wrongful exclusiveness of economic man in political theory results from a double mistake: the mistake of defining public impartiality by criteria of generality, and then of picking the wrong generalization as relevant. Those who question the insidiousness of economic man in political theory play the role of the Confucian interrogator in the Godwin case. Several feminists challenge what Rawls, along with many other contractarians, assumes is incontrovertible: that principles of justice are those that would be assented to by “free and equal parties concerned to further their own interest” (1971, 11). They lament that this renders the unfree and unequal somehow outside the realm of justice, when one might have thought their vulnerability ought to render them particularly important subjects of justice. The contract model ignores how rational contractors, who actually do not sprout like mushrooms but are born irrational and dependent infants, ever become rational contractors. T h e I ron y of S ol o C onse nsus Both essential and omniscient ideal agents lack historicity. Ahistoricity characterizes the gaze of the omniscient agent, who sees the moral universe at once; and ahistoricity characterizes the very being of the essential agent, who has been created precisely by abstracting from historical The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
95
particulars. Here the strategies of omniscience and essentialism complement each other: either through compilation or through encapsulation, the moral views of all persons are assumed to converge. Thus the singular moral agent is conceived as capable of attaining the insight of genuine consensus through solo thought experiment. With intended irony, I tag this notion “solo consensus.” M i n i m i z i ng Di ff e r e nce The irony of solo consensus bears out Iris Young’s accusation: that conventional models of impartiality minimize the moral relevance of differences between people. Omniscient agents minimize difference by attempting to compile all views into one standpoint; essential agents strip their differences from view in the paring process that creates them. Seyla Benhabib (1992) succinctly describes this problem when she claims that conventional models of “the moral point of view” consider only the “generalized” other and not the “concrete” other. Benhabib targets both omniscient and essential strategies under the label “universalistic” models, while focusing her critique on the original position. She articulates a dramatic irony: “According to Kohlberg and Rawls, moral reciprocity involves the capacity to imaginatively take the place of the other, but under conditions of the “veil of ignorance,” the other as different from the self disappears. . . . Differences are not denied, they become irrelevant” (1992, 161).24 Benhabib describes this erased plurality as the problem of “definitional identity” or “substitutionalist universalism.” Definitional identity occurs through a substitution because one actually substitutes one’s self for the other in deciding norms of behavior toward the other. Benhabib does not wish to deny the importance of tending to “the generalized other,” which she considers a necessary but insufficient aspect of moral reasoning. However, she argues that the failure of ideal models to consider the concrete as well as the generalized other both presumes and generates morally corrupt stances. Ideal models deflect attention from the ethical task of critical needs assessment because “substitutionalist” selves are presumed to have the same needs. They thus generate a suspicion of caregivers, whose everyday work most directly defies the idealized viewpoint. 96
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
Both omniscient and essential agents ignore the task of moral perception, a discipline demanded by encounter with concrete others. In the face of overwhelming amounts of information, dialogue, gesture, and nuance that may be subtle as well as vast, deliberators employing metaphors of omniscience simply pretend that they see everything morally relevant at once. Deliberators relying on essential metaphors stick their heads in the sand and pretend that all those details must be irrelevant, simply because they are onerous. Thus, essential models invoke language of screening and reduction rather than acknowledging the discernment, sorting, and reconsideration of morally relevant details that is inherent in critical fairmindedness in everyday morality. Monol o gic a l R e a s on i ng: T h i n k i ng “For” R at h e r t h a n “W i t h ” Many criticisms of ideal agents are inseparable from the very form of moral reasoning entailed: the individual thought experiment. Feminists and discourse theorists lament the “monological” nature of such approaches and instead press toward dialogical methods to ground the development of impartiality.25 This critique is advanced through various colorful metaphors. Seyla Benhabib likens essential agents to “geometricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for themselves, all arrive at the same solution to the problem” (1992, 163). Margaret Urban Walker concisely articulates the problem of monological thinking when she notes that ideal agents think “for,” not “with,” others (1991, 768–69). Their insulation from real others is disturbing when one considers how often, in everyday life, input from others helps people to bypass ethical distortions and to make critical needs assessments. Monological models of impartiality ignore the fact that the most critical masters of many human practices have become masters by incorporating perspectives of others to constantly adjust, focus, and fine-tune their perspective. The best doctors consult with colleagues and encourage patients to get second opinions. The best lawyers engage in moot courts within their firm before taking a big case to trial. The best journalists have honed interviewing skills to obtain and sort relevant information from others. The best philosophers—even the best Kantian philosophers—read The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
97
the work of and correspond with fellow philosophers as they grapple with ideas. And best friends may correct each other in the most subtle ways: from tasting each others’ sauces and recommending the pinch of another spice, to highlighting positive or negative details of a lover’s attentions that the beloved has distortedly repressed from notice. Challenging monological models of impartiality, critics question the connection between “impartiality” and “autonomy” that is assumed in liberal theory. Critical moral knowledge may depend not only on one’s recognition of oneself as a self-legislating originator of valid moral claims but also on sensitively accepted vulnerability—the acknowledgment that the other may grasp me in ways that legitimately transform my view of the world.26 Understood as critical fair-mindedness, impartiality may demand that the moral reasoner delicately integrate two aspects of human agency: recognition of a self who is self-legislator, not exhausted by her social roles (what is lacking in “women who love too much”); and openness to being grasped by others in ways that dizzyingly set the moral world spinning, demanding reorientation. In everyday life, perspectives for moral critique emerge from interactions with others that are unpredictable and uncontrollable by a singular moral reasoner. Thus, critics of monological thought experiments insist that real dialogue with real persons plays a role in fostering impartiality. They suggest a critical linkage between the appropriate reconceptualization of impartiality and calls for “discourse ethics” or “dialogical politics.” T h e Fa i l ed Mode st y of t h e “Disi n t e r e st e d J u d ge” One ideal agent is more down-to-earth than archangels and more whole than those behind a veil of ignorance: the “disinterested judge.” Despite its greater modesty, this archetype nonetheless proves problematic. Its failure suggests that we must reject the quest for ideal agents altogether. The “disinterested judge” offers many improvements over more radically idealized models. In the first place, judges are real people; conversely, real people are judges. Moreover, both the “omniscient” and “essential” aspects of the disinterested judge do not strain credulity. The judge in criminal or civil court is not expected to see the moral globe at once, but only to know the relevant body of law that governs the case. Similarly, the 98
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
judge is not expected to be “neutral” among all persons and their interests, but only to have no attachment to the interests of particular plaintiffs and defendants whose cases she hears. While the judge is guided by the generalities of the law, the particularities of specific cases must necessarily instruct decisions as to when general criteria of the law have been met. The associated process of discernment demands a dialogical interaction not envisioned for radically ideal agents. The judge is dependent on a process of questioning and testimony that involves many others—plaintiffs, defendants, prosecutors, defense counsel—to reach an impartial verdict. Despite the improvement it offers over archangels, the model of the disinterested judge proves inadequate for a general understanding of critical fair-mindedness. In the first place, the conflict-of-interest stipulation that demands that a judge be unattached personally to plaintiffs and defendants is a special role-related requirement rather than a general norm of impartiality. Many of the others to whom we owe fairness are those to whom we are intimately attached. The model of the disinterested judge perpetuates the misguided notion that impartiality is not a relevant norm for close personal relationships. Moreover, the dialogical process of the courtroom is severely constrained compared to other processes of moral enquiry precisely because the governing questions are known in advance: Did the defendant commit such-and-such a crime, which is defined in such-and-such a way? Did the plaintiff suffer demonstrable damages of such-and-such type? These questions give ultimate criteria for what will count as relevant or irrelevant information. One of the judge’s primary jobs is to confine prosecutors and defendants alike to relevant information, with relevancy defined according to predetermined legal questions. Of course, legal standards of relevance themselves evolve culturally over time, but they function as stable standards for the considerations of specific cases.27 However, in the murkier moral world outside the courtroom, deciding the critical questions and what information is relevant to them cannot be known in advance. The moral process of discerning them evolves dialectically: certain information, details, or conversations strike one, prompting certain questions; those questions press one to notice other details in other conversations; they prompt new or reformulated questions, and so on. The unboundedness of the moral domain is a moral challenge to critical fairmindedness that must be accepted rather than artificially defined away. The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
99
R E F USI NG TO OV E R I DE A L I Z E I DE A L AGE N T S: P OSI T I V E DI R EC T IONS I N C ON T E M P OR A RY N E O -K A N T I A NS Given the indebtedness of ideal strategies to Kantian ethics, some critics aim their harshest critiques at Kantians. However, a number of contemporary neo-Kantians reappropriate the Kantian tradition in ways that are sensitive to the force of those criticisms. Several of these neo-Kantians are women who are in dialogue with theorists exploring the ethics of care: Marcia Baron (1991), Adrian Piper (1987 and 1991), and Barbara Herman (1983 and 1991). By integrating insights of the Kantian tradition with an appreciation for the role of close personal relationships in moral life, these reformers challenge the dichotomized labels “partialist” and “impartialist.” Ultimately, they offer a more processive account of impartiality than the “God’s-eye point of view.” Baron, Piper, and Hermann are aptly called neo-Kantians not only because of their avowed indebtedness to Kant but because they insist on impartiality, the primacy of moral duty, and universal principles as essential to morality. Nonetheless, in mining such terms these women challenge dominant interpretations of Kantian categories. Their elaboration of impartiality rejects dichotomies between rationality and desire. It also integrates Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of morality by insisting on the regulative priority of impartiality while suggesting that impartiality takes on characteristics of an Aristotelian virtue, a mean between extremes. While they (certainly with some warrant) consider themselves correcting caricatures of Kant, they also offer innovative re-castings of the Kantian tradition. Their thought presses beyond the legacy of the SVLO cases, but incompletely. These neo-Kantians insist that impartiality is a meta-ethical concept, not a substantive moral norm. That insistence is particularly clear in the work of Baron, who claims (good) impartiality at “level 2” moral reflection, “the level at which principles are chosen and affirmed,” is consistent with partial relationships at “level 1,” the level of lived experience” (1991, 843). For all three, the distinction is essential to making impartiality applicable to diverse kinds of relationships, thus resonating with moral intuitions in everyday life. For Piper, “strict impartiality” means paying attention
100
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
to “proper” attributes only (1991, 727). For Herman, it is treating all as rational and autonomous agents, and treating similar cases similarly (1991, 775–77). Of course, what it means for an attribute to be properly relevant or for a given case to be similar or different will depend on actual situations, and these theorists recognize that deliberative challenges are involved in determining such assessments. These thinkers acutely recognize that conventional interpretations of impartiality entail not only undue suspicion of partial affections but also undue romanticism of partial attachments. If impartiality is to embody a conception of critical fair-mindedness, they reason, it must apply in all kinds of human relationships, including relationships among intimates. As Herman emphasizes, natural relationships can be forums of abuse as well as of tenderness (1991, 788). Moreover, Baron stresses, even lovingly motivated judgments can be seriously misguided: “A loving parent may see his overweight child as adorably plump and fail to see that the child has a problem and needs his parents’ help. More serious, a mother may fail to detect signs that her lover or her father is molesting her daughter” (1991, 853). A definition of impartiality that offers no redress for such moral misperception is, from their point of view, obviously flawed. In fact, their collective effort to explain impartiality as a norm for close personal relationships is their biggest challenge to the legacy of the SVLO cases. Each of these thinkers seeks to defeat arguments that impartiality as an ethical norm ignores or blindsides attention to perception as a moral challenge. Explicitly or implicitly, they respond to Lawrence Blum, whom they fault for equating impartiality and indiscriminacy, and for contrasting impartiality with sympathy and compassion.28 In doing so, each moves toward a processive view of impartiality that challenges the coherence of the dominant metaphor for understanding impartiality, that of an impartial “standpoint.” Baron moves from an “impersonalist” stance that demands taking an “outsider’s view” on loved ones sometimes, but not always, to a suggestion that time—rather than distance—provides a prism for compassionate impartiality toward oneself and loved ones: A partialist may not object to trying to view the matter at a distance, if this amounts to asking “How will I feel about this in five years?” but might if it amounts to trying to take an impersonal perspective. (1991, 853)
The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
101
Herman and Piper more fully develop accounts of a moral process in which compassion and impartiality mutually inform each other, a process Herman calls “a deliberative field model of moral reasoning” and Piper calls “modal imagination.” What is striking about these accounts is their integration of Kantian stress on the importance of moral duty, a hallmark of deontological ethics, and Aristotelian characterization of ever-evolving practical moral reasoning. Herman rejects conceptions that pit impartiality against “the immediacy of connection” one feels for particular others: “And when impartiality wins, it is not only at the expense of what I most care about, it provides no deliberative space even to acknowledge my concerns” (1991, 783). According to her, this is an inaccurate model of Kantian deliberation. It fails to recognize that humans are active, not passive, with respect to their desires and that humans modify their ends in the light of other ends. Aiming to restore that Aristotelian insight to Kantianism, Herman simultaneously seeks to defeat what she considers Hume’s related excess: his suggestion that reasons may be built into desires. In Herman’s deliberative field model, one’s various moral and nonmoral claims are not inherently competing, but rather shape each other. “It is not that I care about my son and therefore when interests are to be weighed his weigh more. Rather, because I care about my son—his interests (his good) are part of my good, the good as I see it” (1991, 783). An agent’s deliberative field contains: everything that gives one reasons. Thus, in addition to interests and attachments, there are also grounds of obligation, principles of prudential rationality, and, depending on the individual, a more or less complex conception of the Good. Not everything that may seek a place on my deliberative field is good for me to have there: bad habits, destructive relationships, incompatible goals and projects. And if there is a real question about what enters (or remains) on the deliberative field—this is often a question about ends—the conditions for accepting desire or interests as ends may (and often will) shape the result. (783)
Since moral principles have helped shape one’s partial attachments and vice versa, Herman assumes that all-or-nothing duels between morality and personal attachments are rare. Hermann presents impartial rational principles as “limiting conditions” to the otherwise open-ended deliberation of the moral agent. Rather 102
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
than portraying them as “trump cards” against personal attachments, she claims they are secondary motives. Secondary motives constrain the partial motives that give reasons for acting and without which duty would have no locomotion. Her deliberative field model questions language of “natural” relationships precisely because there is no pristine “natural” relationship that has not been shaped by other moral commitments. Unfortunately, Herman does not press her rejection of “the natural” to its logical conclusions. She still gives “impartial” principles regulative priority over other commitments in the deliberative field (implausibly claiming that regulative priority does not imply “value priority”).29 While her account of deliberation is more satisfying than “the God’s-eye point of view,” Herman fails to acknowledge that partial attachments might serve as limiting conditions to universal principles. She overoptimistically assumes a proper derivation of universal principles, unskewed by inappropriate cultural bias. Consider the abolitionists’ rejection of the reigning universal principles of their day. Those principles were perceived to be governed by universal norms of respect for property and motivated by duty-against-emotion that demanded respect for property laws even among those with emotional reactions against slavery. It is difficult to explain the courage of the abolitionists as a moral accomplishment according to Herman’s model. To say universal principles of the day were wrong is to beg questions about the model. Adrian Piper more radically challenges the parameters of the SVLO cases, ultimately articulating compassion as a structural virtue rather than as a spontaneous feeling. Her strategy is to demonstrate an intrinsic connection between impartiality and compassion: she claims that compassion is essential to strict impartiality (judging in respect to appropriate attributes only), and that true compassion is characterized by strict impartiality. This dialectic is essential to “modal imagination,” the ability to imagine the possible as well as the actual, a capacity fundamental to “trying on other’s shoes” (1987, 726, 737). Finding interaction with real others necessary to modal imagination, Piper claims that compassion is constituted by three distinguishable responses: “empathetic understanding of the other’s condition,” “sympathetic fellow-feeling in reactions,” and “consequent disposition to render aid/mercy.” Such compassion demands “a disposition to impartiality of treatment” so that compassion to the other is “symmetrical,” that is, The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
103
proportional to the compassion-worthy attributes of a person or situation (743, 746). Provocatively, Piper suggests that compassion is a classical virtue, a cultivated habit that marks a mean between moral extremes and generates a certain disposition of character. She claims that compassion’s “symmetrical” imaginative involvement with the other’s inner states checks asymmetrical involvement that pushes the agent to one of two morally dangerous poles: self-absorption or vicarious self-possession. Significantly, these excesses correlate with “justice” and “care” moral orientations as those have been explored by Carol Gilligan and others. Against the SVLO cases, Piper assumes impartiality is the cultivation of symmetrical empathy for intimates and strangers alike, not arbitration between empathy for intimates and empathy for strangers. According to Piper, conversationalist Lawrence Blum wrongly dichotomizes impartiality and compassion because he assumes that impartiality demands giving equal weight to all. But with Piper’s definition of strict impartiality, judgment by proper attributes only, the imaginative involvement of symmetrical compassion demands impartiality, which may mean giving more attention to the more needy. Piper joins Baron and Herman in rejecting the notion that impartiality demands equal attention to all—one of the basic presumptions of the SVLO cases—without rejecting impartiality as a relevant moral norm. Piper argues that, in addition to compassion, other social virtues such as friendship and justice demand strict impartiality between one’s own and others’ inner states. She comes tantalizingly close to suggesting that impartiality itself is a virtue, not a “standpoint,” a snapshot view of the moral landscape, or a limit principle. In the end, the promising movement of the neo-Kantians toward a more processive view of impartiality is thwarted by their incomplete rejection of the parameters of the SVLO cases. Baron’s periodic reversions to “impersonality” and “outsider perspectives” to describe impartiality remain in tension with her portrayal of time as a critical prism that does not demand such impersonality. Herman’s model uses impartial principles to regulate partial attachments in a way that she does not allow to be reciprocated. Her “limit principles” are not “limited.” While Piper’s explicit turn to the language of virtue offers the greatest promise, she sidesteps important challenges that must be met to press her account toward 104
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
a comprehensive description of impartiality as a virtue. She evades the logical force of her requirement that the moral agent feel equal sympathy for both a friend and a stranger suffering equally. To be consistent, Piper should argue either that the common tendency of people to feel greater compassion for suffering friends than for suffering strangers is a moral weakness (reinforcing the presumptions of the SVLO cases), or alternatively, that compassion for friends has the potential to inform, not just to thwart, the development of compassion for strangers. Despite their failure to transcend the limits of the SVLO cases completely, the neo-Kantians suggest important directions for the development of a pragmatic, processive conception of impartiality as critical fair-mindedness.
PA RT I NG F ROM PA RT I A L IS T S So-called “partialists” share the desire to jettison, or de-prioritize, impartiality as a regulative idea in order to acknowledge the legitimate force of personal attachments in moral life. Of course, it is misleading to speak of partialists as one critical cohort. Such a characterization obscures major differences between partialists. Their critiques differ, and so do their weaknesses. Those closer to liberal presuppositions of autonomous selves tend, problematically, to assume proprietary conceptions of intimacy, with intimate loves somehow “belonging” to the lover who chooses them. They also tend to romanticize close personal relationships, unwarrantedly assuming their moral tenderness. Those at the other end of the spectrum, who adopt a more communal notion of moral selfhood, tend to overly quickly accept conventional social institutions, with inadequate attention to the oppressions worked into the fabric of those institutions. I focus on two groups of partialists who endorse different conceptions of “social selves”: integrity theorists, and communitarians.30 While they remain stymied by the SVLO cases, their perspectives offer important insights that begin to push past the “partiality/impartiality” framework. I n t e gr i t y T h e or ists One lineage has elucidated the perceived threat of dominant impartial models to conceptions of personal integrity. Bernard Williams is the patriarch of this lineage. His pioneering essays raise devastating questions: The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
105
Is the utilitarian and deontological presumption that we should consider other’s projects and attachments to have the same moral weight as our own not self-annihilating? How can one be true to oneself if one does not in fact morally prioritize those highly particular, non-universalizable attachments that give one a “reason for living?” What should one do if the demands of impartial morality conflict with a personal project the loss of which would destroy one’s particular character, particular reasons for living, particular integrity?31 The response of integrity theorists, including Williams (1981), Jeffrey Blustein (1991), and Lynne McFall (1987), includes the following elements: that every person has particular commitments that are for that person “identity-conferring”; that these identity-conferring “ground projects” are central to a person’s character; and that these commitments entail certain things that a person cannot imagine doing or, alternatively, ceasing to do, lest the person lose him or herself. Shaping a life in which one’s ground projects cohere comfortably is a complex moral challenge. A person’s “ground projects” need not be selfish; personal emotional attachments to particular others, such as family commitments or friendship, may be unselfish and yet not impartial ground projects. In general, claim the integrity theorists, we rightfully ascribe non-instrumental, “non-personal” value to the objects of our love, whether those objects are particular people, institutions, our own integrity, or universal moral principles. We appropriately see both our friends and our moral norms as having intrinsic value apart from our connection to them. The integrity theorists stress the unique irreplaceability of particular others and particular attachments in our lives and thus, conversely, the barrenness of lives unanchored by any particular intimacies.32 Jeffrey Blustein’s criticism of Kantian rationalism centers on its failure to recognize the radical irreplaceability of persons, a failure revealed by Kant’s equation of human dignity with the rationality that is shared across the species (1991, 209). Focusing on irreplaceability as it is made manifest by grieving for a dead loved one, Blustein celebrates the “particular stylization” of more universally valued traits that individuals embody.33 (We may all appreciate wit, and many may be witty, but no one is witty in exactly the same way as Aunt Flo.) What makes an individual irreplaceable is not only her particular stylizations but the fact that one has a shared history with her. 106
·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
As a group, integrity theorists explore many connections between personal identity, reasons for moral action, and self-knowledge. Williams stresses that our particular attachments impel our daily routines of work and living. We work hard in particular careers for our particular families; we devote creative energy to particular clubs and causes; and we socialize with particular friends. Without these particulars, claims Williams, we would be rendered paralyzed, lacking motivation for action of any kind. Certainly, few people get out of bed in the morning simply for “goodness,” “rightness,” “utility,” or “virtue.” Blustein notes how our identity-conferring commitments, particularly those to other people with whom we are intimate, promote self-knowledge: Relationships of personal love and friendship are especially important in providing means to the achievement of an enlightened self-concept. Friends and loved ones . . . see themselves in one another, and discover and measure their strengths and weaknesses in one another, through the continual and sensitive feedback each gives the other. This mutual monitoring, based on prolonged and deep familiarity, is perhaps the most potent source of objectivity about ourselves available to us. (1991, 56)
Modern moral philosophy, he claims, underappreciates the extent to which particular relationships make us who we are. “For many of us,” writes Lynne McFall, “friendship is an identity-conferring commitment. If we betrayed a friend in order to advance our careers, we could not ‘live with’ ourselves; we would not be the same persons we thought we were. This is what it means to have a ‘core’” (1987, 13). For any moral agent, commitments to multiple ground projects compete and demand trade-offs. Thus, the construction of a unified and coherent life confronts the agent as a challenge. Integrity theorists converge on coherence as a definition of integrity. The ground projects of a person of integrity cohere. Since ground projects are identity-conferring, failure to achieve such coherence may be identity-shattering. Coherence of a life is not a simple matter. As McFall notes, it demands an affective “first-person” acceptance of one’s commitments, coherence between commitments and action, coherence between commitments and motivation, and consistency (1987, 8). Both McFall and Blustein discuss the inherent tension between the richness of a life, in terms of the number of goods and commitments embraced, and “unity” defined as consistency. The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
107
Integrity becomes an impoverished concept if it is applied only to consistency, with no consideration of richness. At the same time, human limits constrain the richness of commitments that a person can handle without risking spiraling dissolution. Williams refers to the drive for coherence among one’s ground projects as “scalar negotiation.” “Scalar” means that “psychological connectedness . . . admits of degrees” (1981, 6). When a person’s mix of ground projects come under duress over time, there may be infinite possibilities of complex scalar negotiation that lie between the extremes of complete integrity, defined by coherence and consistency among all the person’s ground projects, and the complete loss of integrity, defined as the capitulation of one or more identity-conferring ground projects. By defining integrity as coherence among personal ground projects, integrity theorists give philosophical flesh to popular parlance about seeking “balance” in one’s life. Scalar negotiation might mean, for example, that one day I must stay home from work to care for my sick child, while another day I must hire a babysitter outside business hours to meet a professional deadline. Despite many resonances with everyday moral challenges, the account of integrity offered by these theorists inadequately challenges the legacy of the forced SVLO cases. This is most clear in Williams’s stark conclusion that personal integrity may simply clash with “impartial” public morality. Williams believes there are built-in limits to the process of scalar negotiation when one’s integrity comes under duress from impartial morality, since public morality does not grant special value to an individual’s ground projects. As Williams poses it, the potential dilemma between impartial morality and personal integrity may at times become so extreme that integrity must win out lest morality become a suicide tonic. But one may wonder why scalar negotiation does not include negotiation between public impartiality and personal integrity. The sensitivity of the integrity theorists to the “social self” is ultimately one-sided. While they rightly insist that a person’s primary attachments, including personal relationships, are “identity-conferring,” their notion of the relationship between a person and her primary attachments is surprisingly insulated. My ground projects define me; thus I am not an atomized self. But my ground projects are mine; thus with my ground project I am, in one way, an atomized unit. The tendency to view people’s particular commitments 108 ·
The Dilemma of Impartiality
as possessions of the individual distorts the thought of the integrity theorists in many ways. This disturbing tendency is evident in Williams’s language of “ground projects” as he applies that to personal relationships as well as to professions, hobbies, or institutions. “Projects” are generally undertakings that are chosen, directed, and managed toward some foreseen end. Commitments conceived as projects lose any sense of the ability to seize us, any sense of radical open-endedness, any sense of their capacity to transform our ends. However, in reality those dizzying potentials mark most intense attachments, especially personal relationships. The illusion of insulation results in inattention to the ways in which a ground project may naturally spill over into broadly “impartial” concerns, and vice versa. Consider the person who falls in love with an immigrant to her affluent country. On a visit to his homeland, she observes poverty more abject than she has ever witnessed before and is galvanized by this experience to become extensively involved in Oxfam.34 The involvement in Oxfam may be simultaneously a sensitivity to her lover, a response to some impartial moral dictum—“all people should have basic necessities”—and also a new personal ground project. Or, alternatively, imagine the idealistic young person who goes to work for Oxfam because of her adherence to some “impartial” standard of justice by which the world’s current skewed distribution of resources is condemned. On an extended overseas business trip for Oxfam, she meets and falls in love with a man from a poor country. Her commitment to him becomes a new personal ground project. Partialists and impartialists alike are not completely remiss to worry whether her love affair could ever become at odds with her impartially justified concerns for food distribution. (In the time-honored tradition of extreme hypotheticals, they could imagine a famine in which she can nourish him and his family adequately only by stealing Oxfam supplies headed to even more dire victims of the famine.) But certainly they miss something important in not entertaining the real possibility, and natural healthiness, of mutual reinforcement. That his people have suffered so may reinvigorate her commitment to new norms of international distributive justice. Such a mutual reinforcement seems to be the genuine sense of “reflective equilibrium.” However, integrity theorists deny the possibility of such reflective equilibrium as personal ground projects are pitted against The Dilemma of Impartiality
·
109
impartial morality (Williams), or as personal morality is pitted against social morality (McFall). These dichotomies buttress rather than challenge traditional social constructions of the boundary between public and private. In fact, the integrity theorists maintain the formulation of the SVLO cases as definitive of impartiality. And their turning the tables to side with the chambermaid rather than with the archbishop does not radically challenge gender biases in the construction of the SVLO cases themselves. Consider Williams’s famous example of moral luck, a hypothetical painter based on Gauguin (1981, 20–39). Williams suggests that the painter’s decision to abandon his family for exotic, art-inspiring voyages becomes justified by the moral luck of his subsequent artistic greatness. For Williams, Gauguin’s abandonment of his family was justified ex post facto for the preservation of his personal integrity against the threatening force of impartial morality. Certainly, feminists and child care advocates alike must carefully scrutinize any philosophical rationalization of “dead-beat dads.” There is something quite disturbing about the Gauguin example in an age when the excuse “I had to leave to be true to myself” is more readily accepted of men than of woman. Would Williams or his readers so easily condone his justification by moral luck if the artist who abandoned spouse and children were a woman?35 Is it not problematic to think of ground projects such as children as possessions—possessions that can be traded away for the sake of one’s overall “integrity?” By perceiving Gauguin’s plight as a dilemma between personal integrity and impartial morality, Williams allows the (over)indulged artist to prematurely curtail the delicate process of internal negotiation between scalar ground projects that Williams’s own analysis so helpfully details. Certainly, for the painter the pull of the marriage and children is not only the impartial norm that fathers be true to their families, but it is also the “identity-conferring” reality that these are his wife and his children. Did Gauguin investigate whether there was some way he could be artistically productive without abandoning his family? Did he fully imagine all the possibilities that might allow this? Williams’s dilemmatic formulation (integrity versus impartial morality) actually facilitates an escape from the rigors of personal integrity as he defines them. Should the reader who accept