Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War (St Antony's)

Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War The Loss of White Prestige

Suke Wolton

St Antony’s Series General Editor: Richard Clogg (1999– ), Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford Recent titles include: Craig Brandist and Galin Tihanov (editors) MATERIALIZING BAKHTIN Mark Brzezinski THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND Reinhard Drifte JAPAN’S QUEST FOR A PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL SEAT A Matter of Pride or Justice? Simon Duke THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY Marta Dyczok THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEES Ken Endo THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION UNDER JACQUES DELORS M. K. Flynn IDEOLOGY, MOBILIZATION AND THE NATION The Rise of Irish, Basque and Carlist Nationalist Movements in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries Anthony Forster BRITAIN AND THE MAASTRICHT NEGOTIATIONS Ricardo Ffrench-Davis REFORMING THE REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA Macroeconomics, Trade, Finance Azar Gat BRITISH ARMOUR THEORY AND THE RISE OF THE PANZER ARM Revising the Revisionists Fernando Guirao SPAIN AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1945–57 Anthony Kirk-Greene BRITAIN’S IMPERIAL ADMINISTRATORS, 1858–1966 Bernardo Kosacoff CORPORATE STRATEGIES UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN ARGENTINA Responses by Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties Huck-ju Kwon THE WELFARE STATE IN KOREA Cécile Laborde PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1900–25

Julio Crespo MacLennan SPAIN AND THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1957–85 Jennifer G. Mathers MOSCOW’S BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE POLICY The Cold War and Beyond Eiichi Motono CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SINO-BRITISH BUSINESS, 1860–1911 The Impact of the Pro-British Commercial Network in Shanghai C. S. Nicholls THE HISTORY OF ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD, 1950–2000 Laila Parsons THE DRUZE BETWEEN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL, 1947–49 Shane O’Rourke WARRIORS AND PEASANTS The Don Cossacks in Late Imperial Russia Karina Sonnenberg-Stern EMANCIPATION AND POVERTY The Ashkenazi Jews of Amsterdam, 1796–1850 Miguel Székely THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION IN MEXICO Ray Takeyh THE ORIGINS OF THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–57 Suke Wolton LORD HAILEY, THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE AND EMPIRE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR The Loss of White Prestige

St Antony’s Series Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71109–2 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the Politics of Race and Empire in the Second World War The Loss of White Prestige Suke Wolton

in association with ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–80016–8 First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–23214–4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wolton, Suke, 1962– Lord Hailey, the Colonial Office and the politics of race and empire in the Second World War : the loss of white prestige / Suke Wolton. p. cm. — (St. Antony’s series) Based on the author’s thesis (doctoral). Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–23214–4 (cloth) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Diplomatic history. 2. Hailey, William Malcolm Hailey, Baron, 1872–1969. 3. Great Britain—Colonies. 4. Race relations– –Political aspects. I. Title. II. Series. D750 .W35 2000 940.53'2—dc21 99–086154 © Suke Wolton 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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For Georgie and David

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Contents Preface

ix

1

Introduction

1

2

The Loss of White Prestige

35

3

The Question of Equal Treatment

65

4

Defending the Empire

94

5

Reformulating Imperial Authority

119

6

Conclusion

149

Notes

155

Bibliography

196

Index

213

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Preface More than any other war, before or since, the Second World War was a war fought ideologically as well as militarily. It involved not merely a clash of competing great powers but also a clash of competing political visions and systems. Ideological success was crucial because the Second World War was as much a civilian as a military war. Whole societies were mobilized for the war effort. Political and military leaders required the active engagement of the mass of the population to fight for territory on a global scale, to meet the production targets of an industrialized war, and to stay the course despite aerial bombardment, food rationing and slaughter on an unprecedented scale. It is unsurprising then that the Second World War was a turning point in the history of ideas. In Britain, for example, the war led to the abandonment of liberal laissez faire economics and the adoption of welfare statism as the ruling outlook. For Britain’s leaders successful mobilization of the population presented a considerable problem. Their manpower needs in the Second World War were phenomenal. Although the number of people in the armed services in Britain reached, at its height, only half a million more than in the First World War, the production levels had to be much greater to satisfy the needs of a technologically advanced war. Production was the key to winning, and the Axis powers were ‘ultimately overwhelmed by the sheer mass of Allied firepower’.1 Both in Britain and America, manpower was a constant worry, which in turn increased the pressure to improve productivity through encouragement and pep-talks. Moreover the seriousness of aerial bombing raids made for a far more devastating experience for civilians than the First World War. Although the number of deaths of British servicemen was half what it was in 1914–18, civilian deaths were multiplied forty-fold.2 In the face of these manpower needs, at the outset of the war the government found it difficult to counter the background of cynicism and disillusionment that had emerged after the First World War. As E. M. Forster commented on the war in 1940: ‘I don’t expect Victory (with a big V!), and I can’t join in any build-a-new-world stuff. Once in a lifetime one can swallow that, but not twice.’3 Paul Fussell has argued convincingly that ‘between the wars, “belief” itself [had been] eroded’. Even advertising reflected a mood of lost ideals.4 The ix

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economic stagnation and the Depression of the interwar years had not helped the authorities’ cause. It is against this background that the British government entered the Second World War. Over the course of the war, great efforts were made to ensure that the population believed nonetheless that they were fighting to ‘build a new world’. The defeat of Nazi tyranny was not just a struggle for political freedom but for freedom from the poverty and economic crisis that had characterized the twenties and thirties. The Beveridge Report symbolized that commitment in Britain; Keynesian economic management and the postwar welfare state were its outcome. The ruling economic ideas were not the only ones to be transformed by the experience of the war. Many of the traditions that were associated with the old order were also brought into question. Legitimate authority and hierarchical social relations could no longer be assumed, or articulated through the ideas that had been relied upon in an earlier era. The elites, particularly in Britain, sought to imagine themselves and their position of power through new ideas and in a new language. Before the Second World War, the idea that the white nations were superior to the non-white nations of the world was largely assumed in Britain and America. Colour bars and racial discrimination in the British Empire or the American South were official policy. The attitude in Britain in the thirties towards race issues was such that the eminent anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski could write in the Spectator that: ‘the colour bar is at present a necessity’.5 By the end of the war, however, the victorious Allied powers agreed to a Charter for the new United Nations Organization that included a clause enshrining the right to racial equality. This book deals with the transformation in the thinking of British policy-makers on the race question, and the events which forced that rethinking. In particular, it seeks to show how the emergence within the British establishment of a non-racial presentation of relations between Britain and the colonial empire was a response to the problem of defending that empire during the Second World War. Chapter 1 introduces and situates the themes of the book by briefly reviewing the academic literature on the relation of the Second World War and the race question, by explaining the usefulness of following Lord Hailey’s contribution to the wartime discussion of the problem, and by discussing some of the prewar trends that were to assume importance during the war.

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Chapter 2 considers the impact of Britain’s defeat by the Japanese in 1941–2 on the way in which colonial policy was perceived, and the reinterpretation of the role of colonial administration that resulted. Chapter 3 investigates how the experience of the American practice of race segregation impinged on British domestic politics, particularly the way that British resentment of the GIs emboldened the Colonial Office to take a clearer line on the problem of the colour bar. Chapter 4 focuses on the 1942 conference at the Institute of Pacific Relations and on how Lord Hailey used his experience to defend the British Empire in the face of American criticism. Chapter 5 outlines the themes which British officials developed during the war to establish a new language of authority and superiority. Finally, the conclusion assesses the significance that this wartime story has for our understanding of how racial thinking changes in specific historical circumstances. This book is based on my doctoral thesis. My supervisor, Professor Terence Ranger, showed uncalled-for faith when he took me on with my optimistic and overly ambitious plans. I hope this work has not proved too disappointing. Meanwhile, his work, both political and academic, continues to inspire me, as it does so many others. His ability to be precise, lucid and critical is a model for me and has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the asylum seekers’ charity that he and his wife, Shelagh, began. We talked of Campsfield House, Home Office policy and the detention of refugees today almost as much as of the attitude of the Colonial Office fifty years ago. Professor Andrew Porter, Dr David Washbrook, Gavin Williams, Professor Desmond King, Dr John Darwin, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Professor Robert Paul Wolff were all kind enough to give me comments and advice at various stages. They bravely tried to keep me focused. I am indebted to Dr Frank Furedi, James Heartfield and Kenan Malik for getting me to think about these issues in the first place. Dr Eugene Rogan at St Antony’s, and Tim Farmiloe at Macmillan gave me support and encouragement. Librarians are our unsung heroes. I had help from many: Bodleian (Oxford), British Library (London), India Office Library (London), Columbia University Library (New York), Schomburg Centre, New York Public Library (New York City), State Department Archives, National Records, Sutland and College Park (Maryland) – and especially those in Rhodes House (Oxford) and the Public Records Office in Kew (London). I owe thanks to all of them and I look forward to visiting them again. I would also like to thank St Antony’s, where I was a

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doctoral student, and St Cross, where I am a Junior Research Fellow, for their intellectual stimulation. My thanks to Judith Berry for her support and encouragement and to Lynn Revell. Peter Ramsay has tried to teach me how to edit – I have much to thank him for even though I clearly still have much to learn. I hope his patience with me continues. My family and friends helped more than they know, partly because their forgetfulness forced me to re-explain and re-justify my work, reminding me too of what it was about. My thanks to everyone. The responsibility, however, for any faults or weaknesses, lies with me.

1 Introduction

Many authors have commented on the Second World War’s significance in the transformation of racial thinking. The Nazi genocide is widely considered to have discredited racism. Elazar Barkan, the Cambridge historian of science, has remarked that: After World War II the painful recognition of what had been inflicted in the name of race led to the discrediting of racism in international politics and contributed to the decline and repudiation of scientific racism in intellectual discourse.1 Kenan Malik, in his history of racial thinking, has also confirmed that a significant shift took place at this time. No longer, after the horror of Nazi concentration camps, could racist attitudes be acceptable public commentary. Succinctly, Malik notes that: ‘After the deathcamps and the Holocaust it became nigh on impossible openly to espouse belief in racial superiority.’2 Paul Rich has noted the way that ‘British governmental thinking in the early 1940s came increasingly to emphasize the colour-blind nature both of British colonial policy and public attitudes in Britain in general’,3 while the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies has pointed out that even the Picture Post magazine expressed horror over the idea that there might still be a British colour bar in 1949.4 In America, too, great changes were taking place during the Second World War in the perception of racial segregation. The record of the United States was now on international display, in a fight against European tyranny, and the Americans were keen to present themselves in more egalitarian terms. Celeste Condit and John Lucaites have surveyed in detail the rhetoric of public America, of newspapers and politicians, 1

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Lord Hailey

and have concluded that: ‘The national press thus underwent a substantial, though still circumscribed, shift toward egalitarianism during World War II, and it maintained its new posture in the postwar era.’5 Desmond King confirms the importance of the Second World War in the transformation of the way that racial questions were seen. His book, Separate and Unequal, investigates the way that federal institutions of the United States were, before the Second World War, increasingly segregated, and after the war, gradually desegregated. For King, as well as many others, the war was the pivotal experience.6 In addition to observing the transformation in attitudes to race, these studies also offer some ideas as to why it happened. The most important conceptualization of the process of change in attitudes involves the rejection of Nazi ideas. Racism, along with eugenics, lost its respectability after it was associated with the doctrines of those who had committed the Holocaust. For example, as John Rex and Sally Tomlinson have stated: ‘The Allied nations had recently defeated Nazi Germany whose doctrines of racial supremacy were at odds with all three of the ideological traditions’ of ‘conservatives, liberals and socialists’ alike.7 Kenan Malik and Elazar Barkan also take the view that the genocide of the Nazis discredited the language, if not always the practice, of racism. Many others have tended to conceive of a clash of ideas, or a reaction to the Holocaust, disgracing the original notion of racial supremacy. It is significant, however, that during the Second World War many influential people began to change their ideas concerning race before the full horror of the Holocaust was known. In fact, as Paul Lauren points out: Scholars of the Holocaust . . . have demonstrated that although the Nazi plan to exterminate the Jews was documented beyond doubt by November 1942, this generally was downplayed by American and British leaders, and was ignored or buried in the mainstream English-language media until after Germany collapsed and Western correspondents actually entered the death camps. Periodicals that regularly featured accounts of Japanese atrocities gave negligible coverage to the genocide of the Jews, and the Holocaust was not even mentioned in the Why We Fight series Frank Capra directed for the US Army.8 Paul Rich has argued that there were wider influences on the perception of racial issues ‘as a result of the changed set of political

Introduction

3

configurations both in the Caribbean and internationally due to the war’.9 The present work attempts to get to grips with exactly what was the ‘changed set of political configurations’ that was so important. After the Second World War, the language of racial superiority became unacceptable in mainstream public and political discourse. Of course this did not bring to an end the practice of racial discrimination or the appeal of racist ideas to some, but it does mark an important turning point in the way race is imagined in Western societies. While anti-Nazi ideology was clearly of great significance during the war, the thesis proposed here is that it was not the decisive force in the rethinking of race by the Allies at the time. Exhaustion of the idea of white racial superiority occurred as one result of the military and political contingencies of the war. In particular, the old racial ideas proved to be ideologically inadequate for the new task of defending and justifying colonial empires in the context of the emergence of the USA as the globally dominant power. Too often we tend to read the assumptions of the present day into the past and presume the prevalent attitudes where we need to explain. We now take it for granted that racism and democracy are antithetical. But this was a novel point in the late 1930s. In fact, Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish demographer employed by the Carnegie Foundation to investigate race relations in the early forties, broke new ground when he made the contradiction central to the argument of his book, An American Dilemma. How these two concepts came to be seen as antagonistic involves the way that changes in the social and political framework of the time were understood. In America, there were two key developments that aided the change in perception: first, the wartime manpower shortage meant that black employment rose in the north; second, the end to American isolationism meant that it had become a global power and its domestic policies had an impact on its ability to gain authority abroad. As Condit and Lucaites put it, ‘As long as it treated colored people inequitably, the nation was highly vulnerable to foreign propaganda challenging the sincerity of its claim to democracy.’10 Desmond King makes the same point: Many Americans, including President Truman, appreciated the hollowness of US pretensions to promote democracy in the new global community while tolerating the suppression of civil rights domestically.11

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Lord Hailey

Gunnar Myrdal was perhaps one of the most forceful exponents of this view at the start of the war, particularly as he foresaw the challenge of the Soviet Union. The public promotion (if not the reality) of equal rights under ‘socialism’ and a lack of race discrimination laws were held up as a counter example to the common practice of the western nations. Arnold Rose, Myrdal’s colleague and editor who produced the condensed version of nearly 1600 pages of the Dilemma, summed up their argument thus: Until recently, what the colored peoples thought of us did not make much difference. Now it has become of crucial importance to us. Whatever Russia’s faults may be, she has no color prejudice. . . . To the colored peoples of the world, suffering under the double yoke of prejudice and colonial exploitation from white people, this attitude of Russia’s has strong appeal.12 International political considerations increasingly affected the way that members of the British establishment, as well as some Americans, saw the significance of the race issue. The debate in the 1930s over what to do with the former German colonies had raised the question of how the ‘natives’ were treated. The British reaction to German claims (which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2) was to try to distance British policy towards the ‘natives’ from the racial attitudes of Hitler’s Germany.13 Wartime criticism of the British Empire by Americans intensified the debate on colonial administration. This work focuses on the response by the British Colonial Office and, in particular, the impact this had on the political importance of race. Paul Rich has charted the historical development of the discussion of empire and of race over the period from 1890 to the late 1960s. The main influence on the liberalization of the British government is explained by Rich, in his chapter on ‘colonial development, war and black immigration’, as being the influx of black people to Britain. In the introduction he sums up his argument, saying: The arrival of some 17,000 black American troops in Britain by the end of 1942 produced a new race relations situation in Britain and there was a renewed impetus, especially from the Colonial Office, for the British government to pursue a clear liberal policy and resist any segregation of these black GIs, despite the fact that the American army had itself not yet been completely desegregated.14

Introduction

5

The relationship of the segregation of the American troops to colonial policy is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Rich’s analysis, however, poses the arrival of black people in Britain as the main impetus towards change. This is particularly the case after the war when the numbers of black people continued to rise.15 It is true that there was concern in some quarters that black people, many of them students, arriving in Britain should be given hospitality, for fear of creating a bad impression in the colonies. For example, Lord Listowel, after the arrival of the Empire Windrush immigrants in 1948, complained to the government: ‘We must see that the smoothest possible arrangements are made to minimise the risk of any undesirable incidents or complaints that the Mother country does not bother to look after colonial British subjects.’16 Sir Charles Jeffries put it somewhat more strongly in his book on the Colonial Office, Partners for Progress, published in 1949: On the kind of welcome they [3000 colonial students] receive in Britain, on the impressions which they form by their contacts with the people of Britain, the future relationship of Britain and the Colonies largely depends. Ignorant and foolish persons who treat these visitors with discourtesy are not merely guilty of bad manners: they are traitors to their country.17 What the fear of colonial repercussions does not explain, however, is why the Colonial Office back in 1942, with the arrival of the GIs, was concerned to resist segregation. The sensitivity of the Colonial Office to the race question cannot be explained by the issue of ‘social disruption’ caused by the new arrivals when they had only just arrived, nor by the fear of a reputation of ‘inhospitability’ returning to the colonies. After all, that fear had not prevented the common practice of discrimination on British ships and an almost total ban on air flights for black people.18 Although there was a small black population living in Britain, centred around certain ports, this too does not account for the way that attitudes towards race changed in this crucial period. In sum, it is clear from the overall perspective of the twentieth century that the Second World War was an important step in the transformation of ideas about race. But why that change took place during the war is less clear. Who drove the changes in official attitudes and in pursuit of which interests? This work is intended to begin to offer an answer to those questions by taking a closer look at this momentous period.

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Lord Hailey

Studying the change in racial views In seeking to understand the history of race it is necessary to consider what is not said as well as what is said. This is because the mainstream position is often taken to be common sense by those of the period. Therefore they have no need to argue for something that is agreed by all sides. To decipher these ‘common sense’ positions 50 years later it is necessary to look at how the protagonists in any debate establish a common ground and where they expect agreement. To some degree, this process is easier to work through at a time of changing ideas because the underlying assumptions are being reformed. As new ideas take hold, there is a moment beforehand where the old ideas no longer work. The Second World War was clearly one of these times. Often people today identify the racism of the prewar period with the scientific racism that attempted to codify a racial hierarchy in biological terms. Scientists tried to establish a set of ‘racial characteristics’ that included personality and intellectual ability in particular race categories. As it happened, despite the best efforts of these scientists, they found it extremely difficult to find any group of biological characteristics that could be classified into discrete groups or find features that were inherited with one another.19 Despite this lack of scientific evidence, not only were they a significant group in the 1920s and 1930s, but their ideas were influential in Europe, Britain and America.20 ‘Scientific racism’ was criticized as a pseudo-science in the 1930s by the biologist Julian Huxley. In the postwar period it has been decisively discredited as science – there simply are no biological characteristics that can be found in sufficiently well-defined groups to constitute the different races that racial biology claimed to study.21 However most people of the interwar period held the view that humanity was made up of a hierarchy of races without expressing that view in scientific language. The eugenicists, for example, although they were vocal and their views influenced government policy indirectly, were far from dominant in Britain. But a concept of racial categories and hierarchy was a widely held assumption. Even though no pseudoscientific rationale may have been claimed, attitudes as to racial categories and their meaning in terms of intellectual capabilities were nonetheless commonly expressed. Two important issues that often reveal underlying views about race are education and government. Both of these involve questions about the capability of people both now and in the future to make intelligent

Introduction

7

and responsible decisions. If it is assumed that a certain category of person cannot advance beyond a particular educational level then, it is argued, there is no point providing such high-level schooling. Furthermore, it is thought, how can such a person have the level of knowledge, experience or sensitivity to make sensible political decisions, which may have far-reaching consequences. The Colonial Office provides a pertinent example of the racialized discussion of education and government. The very presumption of colonial administration involved a notion of authority and superiority. Sometimes this involved a presumption about race – although this was not a necessary result.22 In the early nineteenth century the colonial relationship was theorized very differently to the late nineteenth century understanding. Richard Symonds, author of The British and Their Successors, makes the point that it was the later decades of the nineteenth century that saw the development of an assumption of racial difference between whites and ‘natives’. In contrast, Thomas Babington Macaulay, before his famous plan or ‘minute’ for education in India, told the House of Commons in 1833: we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government, that, having become instructed in European knowledge they may in some future age demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. Whenever it comes it will be the proudest day in English history.23 Edward Said has suggested the contrary interpretation of Macaulay noting that Macaulay’s assumption was that ‘“our native subjects” have more to learn from us than we do from them’.24 Said notes that Macaulay presumes that the Orient is unequal to European achievements. And indeed Macaulay did assume that an Indian required an English education, not because Indians were incapable of reaching high standards but the reverse. Macaulay presumed that Indians would someday be able to replace Englishmen and was outraged if this prospect were to be denied to them, demanding instead of the House of Commons: Are we to keep the people of India ignorant in order that we may keep them submissive? Or do we think that we can give them knowledge without awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition and to provide it with no legitimate vent? Who will answer any of these questions in the affirmative? Yet one of them

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must be answered affirmatively by every person who maintains that we ought to exclude the natives from high office.25 Moreover, Macaulay’s conceptualization of Indian potential differs starkly from the view that became popular after the experience of the Indian mutiny in 1857 and especially after the late 1880s. For example, as Sir John Strachey warned in his widely read book India: There never was a country and never will be in which the government of foreigners is really popular. It will be the beginning of the end of our empire when we forget this elementary fact and entrust the greater executive powers to the hands of natives on the assumption that they will always be faithful and strong supporters of our government.26 And when Joseph Chamberlain became secretary of state for the colonies in 1895 he confirmed this outlook, claiming that ‘the British race is the greatest of governing races the world has ever seen’.27 The tradition of merging a sense of authority with the white racial identity continued during the interwar years. George Orwell, who spent the years 1922–8 serving in the Indian Imperial Police in Burma, described this sentiment in his autobiographical tale ‘Shooting an Elephant’. His legitimacy as a representative of the rule of law, even when dealing with a mad elephant, seemed to be intimately bound up with the prestige of being white: But even then I was not thinking particularly of my own skin, only of the watchful yellow faces behind. For at that moment, with the crowd watching me, I was not afraid in the ordinary sense, as I would have been if I had been alone. A white man mustn’t be frightened in front of “natives”; and so, in general, he isn’t frightened. The sole thought in my mind was that if anything went wrong those two thousand Burmese would see me pursued, caught, trampled on and reduced to a grinning corpse like that Indian up the hill. And if that happened it was quite probable that some of them would laugh. That would never do. There was only one alternative. I shoved the cartridges into the magazine and lay down on the road to get a better aim.28 Chapter 2 focuses on how the defeat in the Far East during the Second World War affected the Colonial Office’s view of race discrimination

Introduction

9

within their own administration. In part, their own military weakness had been due to their underestimation of Japan, an attitude that was largely underpinned by racial prejudice. But it was the loss of the ‘loyal native’ and of deference to ‘white prestige’ that provoked the most rethinking on the purpose of local administration. Before the Second World War, it had usually been assumed that the ‘Westminster model’ of Parliament was inapplicable to ‘non-white’ races.29 Places without settler – that is white – populations were considered to have administrations rather than government and this was particularly the case for Africa. Although the question of legitimate rule had been raised in an acute form in India and less directly in the West Indies and Burma, it had not become of general concern until the war. Unrest, when it did occur, was likely to be interpreted as a local problem. The combined experience of the 1930s, of economic insecurity and political instability, and the vulnerability of Britain at the start of the war produced an unprecedented level of questioning in the Colonial Office on the future of its administrations. This discussion could not help but involve the fundamental attitude to the potentiality of other ‘races’. The Colonial Office discussion on the future of its administration during the Second World War provides a clear view of official attitudes to race during this crucial period. The discussion was an excuse for a variety of people to express their opinions in ways that would be influenced by their underlying conception of ‘race’. The problem for the researcher is then how to detect changes but not overestimate their significance. The Colonial Office itself also underwent a significant organizational transformation before and during the Second World War. From 1930 onwards it developed ‘subject’ departments such as welfare and personnel which worked alongside the existing geographical departments.30 Furthermore, the workload of the Office had massively expanded in the interwar years.31 The Colonial Office also created a new role – that of the expert adviser.32 Even within the confines of the Colonial Office, there were many different viewpoints, some more vocal than others. As for colonial policy, final decisions were more often than not marked by a simple yes or no in the margins of the files by the secretary of state. It was usually the task of a less senior official to write the memorandum on which the secretary of state would comment. As a result, the views expressed in arriving at policy and those behind the final decision were not one and the same thing. Within the Colonial Office, people held different views, arguing against one another, with the discussion sometimes never completely

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resolved. Conclusions, when they did occur, varied between the different secretaries of state who were in charge during the war: Malcolm MacDonald (May 1938 – May 1940) Lord Lloyd (May 1940 – Feb 1941) Lord Moyne (Feb 1941 – Feb 1942) Viscount Cranborne (Feb 1942 – Nov 1942) Oliver Stanley (Nov 1942 – Aug 1945) George Hall (Aug 1945 – Oct 1946). In the six years of the Second World War, not only was the international and domestic world changing, but the personnel who were responsible for policy during that time also changed. This book seeks to lessen the difficulties posed by the varying personnel and structures through which the wartime debate took place by focusing on the changing attitude of one important figure in the debate – Lord Hailey. Hailey acted as a Colonial Office adviser, and largely took over from Lord Lugard, who had been the chief Colonial Office ideologue of the interwar years. Hailey became useful to the Colonial Office, and his ideas became important for three main reasons. First, his breadth of imperial experience, having worked in India and Africa, was unequalled at the time and he had been schooled in the old traditions of colonial administration. Second, his age and stature meant that his ideas were taken seriously by others in the Colonial Office. Third, his war work for the Colonial Office, in defending the Empire against American criticisms, put him in a position to be at the forefront of developing new arguments for British interests. Hailey’s approach to the future of the Empire developed in relation to the social and political changes of the period. Moreover, some of his ideas were adopted by the Colonial Office, and so provide an illustration of the relationship between social changes and particular policy changes. Hailey’s contemporary significance, however, does not primarily derive from his influence over Colonial Office plans, although he undoubtedly did influence them at certain times. Hailey provides a useful prism through which to examine the changing racial and imperial concerns because he was not a maverick, nor an outsider, but one of the old establishment, who, despite his background, changed his views about colonial administration during the Second World War. The way that his ideas changed to fit in with the prevailing mood provides a guide to the process of transformation.

Introduction

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Lord Hailey Malcolm Hailey’s life, as John Cell’s biography points out, coincided with Britain’s imperialist period. Hailey was born the year that Disraeli is said to have launched New Imperialism in his Crystal Palace speech in 1872.33 Hailey worked for the Empire on two continents: India and Africa, and defended the record of the Empire in a third: the United States. By the time he died, in 1969, much of the Empire had gained self-government and some of the new states had used their new found freedom to leave the Commonwealth. Hailey’s early career was a rapid development through the rigid hierarchical structure of the Indian Civil Service while his later work in Africa and America forced him to rethink many of his early assumptions. In his youth, Hailey won a scholarship to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, then a first in Classics three years later and came third in the Indian Civil Service examinations. In 1895 he left for India, imbued, according to Cell, with Kipling’s ‘belief in the White Man’s burden’ as his inspiration.34 In the Punjab Hailey was assigned to the secretariat, but Cell reports that ‘the ideal officer was not a desk man’. The imperial administration in the Punjab took a particular form: it aimed to build a relationship between the British and local landowners and jointly maintain control. Cell recounts that: ‘with an enthusiasm that sometimes made it seem as though they might have invented the concepts, the Punjab school stressed authoritarianism and paternalism.’35 In this way, Hailey’s founding years in colonial administration were spent learning a paternalistic outlook. India seems to have taught Hailey two things that were to play an important part in his development during the Second World War. First, he was attuned to the question of minority groups and the idea of ‘race relations’. Second, he became aware of the issue of presentation and propaganda – which would become useful when defending the British Empire in the face of American criticism. A necessary consequence of British paternalism in India was the practice of ‘separate development’. Between 1901 and 1906, Hailey served as ‘first colonization officer’ in the Punjab. His job entailed the ‘social engineering’, under the 1900 Land Alienation Act, of a reclaimed area (opened up through the building of a new canal).36 The Land Alienation Act differentiated between ‘agricultural’ and ‘non-agricultural’ tribes. The idea behind the act was that the agricultural tribes (that is, the Muslims) would be prevented from becoming indebted to the nonagricultural tribe (the Hindus) and hence landless. The presumption was

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that development should take place within a particular framework to maintain social stability – and the framework the British used was religious and cultural.37 In this way, the British response to the fear of social instability was to further segregate different cultures. Hailey’s work in the Punjab was a success and in 1912 he was promoted to the post of Chief Commissioner of New Delhi. In 1919 Hailey was appointed the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Council. In 1922 he was knighted and made Home Member of the Council. He remembered the Punjab in his peerage – becoming Baron Hailey of Shahpur and Newport Pagnell (Shahpur in the Punjab, and his birthplace, Newport Pagnell). In 1924 he returned to the Punjab as Governor, ruling a population of 23 million. In 1928 Hailey was made Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh which then had a population of 48 million. As Governor, Hailey appears to have continued the habit of thinking that social stability was promoted by separating religious communities. For example, he agreed with Sir James Crerar, the Home Member of the Council, when he wrote to Hailey saying: If, for example, owing to a bad season or any other cause, there arose a grievance which pressed equally on the Mohammedan as well as the Hindu agrarian classes, there might be a possibility of their uniting. The danger seems considerably more remote than in the years from 1919 to 1933, but I should not be prepared to regard it as negligible.38 Hailey also noted the way in which the protection of minorities provided justification for Britain’s continued presence in India. Hailey wrote to Sir Michael O’Dwyer, the former Governor of the Punjab, when O’Dwyer was in London, commenting: I am sure that you are right, when dealing with the Labour Government, in making an appeal to Trusteeship . . . and I notice that Ramsay MacDonald is somewhat inclined to treat the Muslim position in India with an eye to the same policy of guaranteed minorities as obtains in Eastern Europe.39 Underlying Hailey’s conception of the usefulness of social segregation was an assumption that some of the Indian people were inferior and incapable of taking charge. After the First World War, having served as Commander of the Delhi volunteers, he claimed that Indian troops

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had not yet ‘proved their superiority to white troops’.40 Hailey further commented to Sir John Simon, who had been to India to investigate the possibilities of constitutional reform in 1927, ‘I have never been able to see where you were going to produce people there [in Bengal] who will be able to run a local government.’41 From Hailey’s experience it seemed that a politically aspirant people had been contained through exploiting differences. Hailey had also learned in India how important propaganda was in the practice of modern colonial government. As Chief Commissioner of New Delhi one of Hailey’s tasks had been to inform the public both in India and in England on the progress of constructing Lutyens’s new capital.42 He was first sensitized to the political importance of presenting a case in the press after the massacre at Amritsar in 1919. Hailey wrote to the Viceroy to complain that the Congress Party was ‘filling the Indian press with attacks on the Government, based on their own version on the incident’. Providing a government version of events was ‘necessary, not only for official publications in England, but for satisfying public opinion in India’.43 Hailey was dispatched to the Punjab to help prepare the case (both for immediate press use and for the Hunter Commission) defending Reginald Dyer’s order to fire nearly 2000 rounds directly into the crowd at the Jallianwala Bagh.44 Later, as Governor of the United Provinces, Hailey, anxious about the propaganda in the trials of ‘seditionists’ in Meerut,45 wrote to Sir Arthur Hirtzel at the India Office: ‘I wish we could get on with the Meerut trial which does undoubtedly form a kind of focus for the spread of ill-feeling.’46 Perhaps in considering public opinion, Hailey realized that ‘the strength with which opinion is held is of more importance than its logical basis’. Certainly he became aware, while he was stationed in Delhi, that there was a belief in a risorgimento of the East among the Indian intellectuals who repudiated the ‘tacit assumption that the east [was] inferior to the west’.47 Hailey finally retired from India in 1934 (he was 62 years old). The previous year he had agreed to direct a survey of colonial administration in Africa, later published as An African Survey, which was financed by the Carnegie Foundation.48 The research involved several trips to Africa and in 1936 Hailey succeeded Lord Lugard as the British representative on the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission. Hailey’s reputation as a conservative and experienced ruler in India meant that the Colonial Office saw in him a sober ally and welcomed his assessment of African administration.

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This was, in hindsight, quite an important moment. Lord Lugard, Hailey’s predecessor at the Mandates Commission, was also his predecessor in terms of his articulation of the direction of colonial administration. Lugard’s book, the Dual Mandate, had been the handbook of colonial administrators in the 1920s and 1930s.49 Hailey’s African Survey came to play the same role as the ‘bible of colonial administrators’ after it was published in 1938.50 Although both Lugard and Hailey brought issues of international politics to bear on Britain’s colonial plans, Hailey’s succession represented a transition to a new approach to colonial administration. Lugard’s views illustrate how the international concept of mandated territories, created after the First World War, had influenced British colonial policy. At the end of the First World War, the ‘civilization’ of the European powers had been called into question. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Japanese request for a clause to uphold racial equality in the Covenant for the League of Nations (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) was refused. Despite this rejection, there was, at the conference, a consciousness that white sovereignty over black was no longer acceptable in the way it had been before. The territories that were taken from Germany were distributed as ‘mandates’ rather than as colonies or protectorates. To distance themselves from the practice of an ‘imperialist carve-up’, the territories were given under mandate, that is, like wards of court to a guardian who was trusted to ensure their development. From this point on, colonial domination in Africa was increasingly justified ‘for the sake of the Africans’. The Archbishop of Canterbury suggested to the Colonial Office in 1923 the wording for the Duke of Devonshire’s declaration in support of ‘African paramountcy’. He pointed out, following an earlier suggestion to him from the missionary Joseph Oldham, ‘we are in East Africa for the sake of the Africans and that our position is that of trusteeship rather than primarily ownership or domination’.51 Although it is worth noting that the term ‘native paramountcy’ was palatable to the European community in Kenya because of its role in ‘counter[ing] Indian demands for equality’.52 Lugard’s Dual Mandate put paternalism at the centre of colonial policy. The imperial nation became a ‘trustee’ controlling African welfare, and trusteeship entailed, according to his interpretation, the preservation of African culture. Lugard’s new method of ‘indirect rule’ mediated British administration through local chiefs, thereby, supposedly, upholding the ‘traditional’ structures while under British overall administration (see Chapter 2). Lugard’s policy was largely developed

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in West Africa and was probably influenced by the cultural relativism of Mary Kingsley’s anthropology at the turn of the century.53 An African Survey was supposed to be the beginning of new direction in colonial policy. According to Lugard the Survey was meant to lead to ‘a clear and unequivocal statement of opinion as to the place which the African races are hereafter to occupy in the body politic’.54 During the Second World War, however, Hailey began to criticize Lugard’s idea of indirect rule and articulated a new notion of ‘partnership’ to replace trusteeship. But it is debatable whether the first edition of the Survey either expresses much of what Hailey thought at the time or much that is critical of the past forms of administration in Africa.55 John Cell makes the point that Hailey did not write much of the Survey because, after the death of his wife and overwork, he suffered a breakdown.56 Although An African Survey was consulted by colonial administrators, in itself, its wider significance, especially because of its length and lack of compact argument, is hard to judge. In Paul Rich’s view the Survey was meant to give coherence to empire administration because Hailey judged African administration with the eyes of an Indian specialist. Rich suggests that the comparison of Africa and India implied that what was under consideration was the broad issue of black/white relations.57 Rich’s argument that the Colonial Office was interested in promoting a ‘comprehensive’ policy may have been true prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, but during the war the Colonial Office followed a very different policy. First, while the question of selfgovernment was under debate in India and Burma, the Colonial Office was sceptical about considering it in the context of the African colonies, which were regarded as being ‘centuries away’ from that possibility. Second, during the war, the Colonial Office tried to deflect criticisms of the Far Eastern empire away from the African empire – especially as it was thought at the time that Britain might lose the colonies in the Far East.58 And third, the Colonial Office increasingly argued that colonial administration was much more ‘complex’ than the Americans realized, and different countries should not be ‘lumped together’ (an argument which is taken up in greater detail in the following chapters). From his diary, it is apparent that, at the start of the war, Hailey tended to reinforce this distinction between Africa and Asia, through his own prejudiced preference for India.59 Hailey’s wife died in 1941, after long years of deteriorating health following the death of their daughter. His remaining son, Billy, died in

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Lord Hailey

the RAF in 1943. Without a family, Hailey appeared to throw himself into work.60 He toured Africa in 1940 completing a single-volume survey of British administration, most of which the Colonial Office used as a confidential report for Governors.61 In 1941, he led the mission to the Belgian Congo to try to bring the Free French colony into the Anglo-American orbit of supply lines.62 He toured Canada and America in 1942. In 1946 he toured South West Africa to document the native administration and the desirability of integration with the Union of South Africa.63 He returned to America in 1944, and again in 1949 and 1953. Between 1950 and 1953, approaching eighty years old, he managed to document and produce a five-volume update on British administration arrangements.64 Lastly, he revised and republished An African Survey in 1957. In total, he completed four major studies on native administration in Africa. Hailey’s work, especially during the war years, was of some importance to the Colonial Office. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, a permanent under-secretary of state in the Colonial Office, recalled in his memoirs published in 1947 that Hailey was ‘one who holds a special position among those attached to the Colonial Office today’. Of his first hearing of Hailey, Parkinson said: ‘it was in 1933 that stories first came from the East of a new star of the first magnitude, which was going to make its appearance in the colonial firmament.’65 Hailey was made chairman of the Committee for Research and Development in Africa (sometimes called the Colonial Research Advisory Committee), set up to commission research in the wake of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Due to lack of personnel the Colonial Research Committee only started meeting in 1942.66 Lord Moyne also requested that Hailey chair the Committee for Post-War Reconstruction in the Colonies (often called the Postwar Problems Committee).67 Questions considered by this committee included: ‘What is the general objective of our social policy? Are we aiming at giving the Colonial peoples the same kind and quality of social services that we should consider desirable for this country? Is the underlying idea that they should participate in western civilization, or are they to be encouraged to develop a culture and civilization of their own?’ and ‘The desirability or otherwise of encouraging colonial students to come to the United Kingdom for education.’68 For the postwar problems committee Hailey wrote to colonial governors around the world to solicit their views on likely problems in the postwar world. Race issues cropped up time and again. Bermuda was concerned with ‘the question of the extension of the franchise, [and]

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the position of the coloured population’.69 Several colonies were concerned that demobilized African soldiers should not become a ‘law unto themselves’.70 These comments in turn produced further suggestions for inquiry by the Committee such as dealing with ‘the suitability of British parliamentary institutions and procedure as the models for any advances in Colonies where an indigenous native population predominates’.71 Furthermore, the minutes noted: The problem is complicated in some dependencies by the mixing of indigenous with Asiatic blood; and by the certainty that persons of mixed blood will increase at a much faster rate than Europeans against whom they often have a feeling of revenge for their neglect.72 Some of the work of the committee reached other departments. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission requested its important findings, but were told by an official that: ‘The memoranda prepared for it [the postwar problems committee] are of very unequal value. Some, prepared personally by Lord Hailey, are first class; others are of a very different calibre.’73 John Cell has argued, however, that after September 1944 Hailey was dropped as a spokesman for the Colonial Office under Oliver Stanley’s (then secretary of state) instructions and that his advisory role was virtually ignored.74 But Hailey was never officially accorded the role of a spokesman for the Colonial Office; only the secretary of state ever held such a position. His advice was still given great credibility and undoubtedly the Americans continued to regard him as a senior official even when his role was advisory rather than departmental. Each time that Hailey visited the States the Colonial Office covered his expenses and paid him a stipend.75 It appears that Hailey represented a significant outlook and influenced many members of the Colonial Office, even if Stanley thought that Hailey was ‘going rather beyond what we actually have in mind’. The context in which Stanley made this comment, however, suggests that it was not a particular criticism of Hailey but rather Stanley was using Hailey’s statements to put pressure on Churchill to approve Stanley’s own elaboration of colonial policy.76 One of the main arguments of this book is that Hailey’s views changed with the times. John Cell takes the view that, as Andrew Porter put it in his review of Cell’s book, ‘India permanently shaped Hailey’s outlook’.77 There is no doubt that Hailey’s experience in India

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influenced the insights and arguments that he was to develop later in relation to Africa. For example, one important issue was whether policy-makers for Africa could learn from India. At first Hailey saw Africa as fundamentally different. Later he began to see the international repercussions of Britain’s policy in India and started to consider how, in fact, the question of legitimacy and assimilation into the structures of power applied just as much to Africa as to India. He also began to question the paternalism that he had learned in the Punjab, a paternalism which, Cell argues, he never lost.78 As will be seen Hailey began to lean towards more egalitarian ideas upon which to base colonial administration. But he still retained a deep respect for Britain’s authority and an ingrained assumption about the importance of British rule for any indigenous people, particularly in the face of what he may have felt was American rivalry for global influence. For this reason, Hailey sought to modernize the form of rule, but saw the content (that is, rule by Britain) as unchanging. As a result he sought to highlight the problems facing indigenous peoples which would hinder their long-term ability to rule themselves (racial minorities, for example) and underplayed British responsibility for intensifying such divisions. In reposing the issue of race, Hailey also saw its political significance, not only in the danger of the colour bar to British imperial interests, but also as a way of stymieing American criticism of empire (discussed further in Chapter 4). For example, in The Times in July 1944, Hailey favourably quoted Wendell Willkie, President Roosevelt’s rival, without acknowledgement, to emphasize the significance of the race issue in modern international politics: Nor can we overlook the effect of the growing recognition by the American public that in a conflict which is so largely a war of ideas, their country occupies a somewhat exposed position as a defender of the democratic faith. “When we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations”, it has been said [by Willkie], “some of the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear that they can no longer be ignored”.79 What is interesting about the development of Hailey’s views on colonial policy during the war is that they brought together several different strands. Some of the influences on his thinking had built up during the interwar period, trends that involved discussions about the role of the state in society for example, while others involved his experience in combating the Indian Congress Party. These were the

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longer-term trends that came to fruition in the Second World War. There were also new experiences for Hailey. One of the most important was having to deal with the criticisms of the Empire from Americans, particularly after the collapse of the Far East to the Japanese, which also had ramifications for Britain’s policy towards India. It will be useful to introduce briefly some of these longer-term trends to set the stage for the developments of the war discussed in later chapters.

Interwar trends One effect of the Second World War on the Empire was the confluence of several apparently separate prewar developments into a single stream of political pressure on colonial administrators. The cumulative effect of this process was to force a profound change in the way race was perceived. Three interwar problems were to interact with particular force during the war: (a) colonial economic development and the Depression; (b) India’s constitutional position; (c) Britain’s relationship with America. There is a considerable literature associated with each of these themes and each involves many contested issues. Here it is necessary only to set the prewar scene for the wartime discussion of race and empire. Colonial economic development and the Depression The idea that the British state could and should play a role both in the economic development of the colonies and the welfare of its colonial subjects provided a new justification for imperial rule during the war and in the postwar period. As will be seen in subsequent chapters the adoption of a welfare and development policy stands in a significant relationship to the decline of racial thinking. However, some of the academic literature treats the ‘development idea’ as an already established prewar influence on policy. Certainly its roots lay in the prewar period. But it became Colonial Office policy only during the war, and saw fruition after the war in terms of direct investment in certain government-led schemes and the expansion of social services. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was the key development. The academic debate concerns whether this legislation was a reaction to the economic failures of the past, a reaction to the experience of the 1930s riots in the West Indies, or a more recent reaction to the anti-imperialist charge that Britain was

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exploiting the Empire. The answer seems to be that it was a mixture of all three factors, but a mixture that required the war as the catalyst for the adoption of the policy. The Colonial Office itself claimed the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act as another ‘stage’ in a British ‘tradition’.80 Postwar scholarship, for example the work of Kenneth Robinson, started to question this presentation and suggested instead that ‘British complacency’ had been given a ‘shock’ in the late 1930s by the riots and strikes that had spread from island to island in the West Indies.81 In Trinidad, for example, Uriah Butler had inspired island-wide action and ‘strident anti-white rhetoric’. The local black police refused to confront the demonstrators and it took six weeks for British soldiers to restore order.82 The Times confirmed Robinson’s view as to the significance of the West Indian troubles for the rest of the colonial empire: ‘Recent events in the West Indies have shaken the complacency with which most people in this country have been accustomed to regard the Colonial Empire.’83 There is undoubtedly some truth in the suggestion that the riots stemmed from the poor economic and social conditions. The recession of the early 1930s had hit the colonial empire very badly, particularly in areas where export was concentrated on one product.84 In the world economic slump, commodity prices fell and squeezed poor farmers with smallholdings, of which there were many in the West Indies, especially hard.85 The fear that such grievances might also be expressed in other colonies with similar resultant disruption worried the Colonial Office, but it was not necessarily the main cause of a new policy according to the historian, Michael Lee. Lee emphasizes the direct experience of the economic crisis of the early 1930s as key to the adoption of the ‘development’ policy by the ‘official classes’, rather than the later reaction to the West Indies.86 Certainly by the mid-1930s there was a growing section of the colonial establishment that thought that Britain needed to do more to prompt economic development in the colonies. Hailey confessed in the journal International Affairs: ‘I sometimes wish that we could place our hands on our hearts a little less, and set them to explore our pockets a little more.’87 What most historians seem to agree on, however, is that despite the fact that the 1940 Act held a similar title to the 1929 Colonial Development Act, it was actually very different. Stephen Constantine has pointed out that ‘In spite of its apparent pedigree leading back to the CDA of 1929 it is less the continuity than the novelty which

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should be emphasized.’88 The 1929 Act preserved the principle that colonies should be self-sufficient and even the Colonial Development Fund established by the Act did not in fact allow colonies to have any greater resources than those they could already afford.89 Constantine concludes that the 1929 Act had more to do with election constraints than colonial concerns and, moreover, the subsequent economic recession ‘discouraged’ colonial governments from indebting themselves by constructing infrastructure for primary production when prices were so low throughout the 1930s.90 The motivation behind the 1929 Act was the stimulation of the British economy through encouraging trade with the colonies with the aim of reducing unemployment at home, rather than the needs of the colonies per se.91 The experience of the 1930s did, however, undermine a belief that private enterprise would by itself create development.92 Instead, by the 1940s, many people, inspired by the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, started to look towards state intervention to boost the economy. It is arguable whether this alone would have been sufficient to shift colonial policy to state-led development, although the experience of the social crisis of the 1930s certainly forced people to look for new ideas.93 Dave Rampersad argues that the fact that the government agreed to send a Royal Commission to investigate the West Indies meant ‘an acceptance of the need to spend more money in developing the dependent empire’. He notes, however, that the Treasury continued its opposition to Colonial Office spending plans causing Arthur Dawe, the assistant under-secretary of state, to complain that ‘Politically the whole point is that we should make a big thing of the “welfare” side’. Without such an emphasis, as Rampersad comments, ‘Economic development on its own could be construed as a means of exploiting the colonies for the war effort.’94 It is clear that there was a change in policy between 1938 and 1943 but quite what was the deciding factor is hard to judge. Malcolm MacDonald’s reappointment as colonial secretary was the start of the process, as he provided ‘much of the incentive which set the Colonial Office thinking along new lines’.95 MacDonald managed to have a Royal Commission, led by Lord Moyne, investigate the riots in the West Indies, which had continued to erupt and grow from 1935 to 1938. The 1938 riots had produced widespread public discussion in London.96 Hailey’s African Survey also appeared that year to provide ‘further ammunition’ for MacDonald.97 It is questionable, however, whether these events alone could have produced the necessary political will without the war’s commencement.

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For Michael Lee, the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDW), was less a product of the war and more a consequence of changed attitudes precipitated by the prewar experiences.98 And certainly, the 1940 CDW Act emphasized, according to Butler’s new study, ‘welfare provision rather than economic development as such’.99 But, despite the ‘conversion’100 of the ‘official mind’ of the Colonial Office before the war, Constantine has pointed out that the Treasury remained opposed to such a policy change. If MacDonald were to succeed, he needed Treasury agreement. MacDonald was, nonetheless, deeply concerned, and complained: If we are not now going to do something fairly good for the Colonial Empire, and something which helps them to get proper social services, we shall deserve to lose the Colonies and it will only be a matter of time before we get what we deserve.101 With the demands of the war and rearmament, the Treasury’s response to the Colonial Office was: ‘We shall have to resign ourselves to stand still now, that we may have the power to progress in future.’ In turn the Colonial Office replied that it was the very fact of the war which made the changes in colonial development policy so necessary, warning the Treasury that: A contented and loyal Colonial Empire will, from the point of view both of production and of prestige, be a distinct asset to us in our struggle; any growth of discontent or disloyalty would damage us seriously and help the enemy.102 The effect of the war on the new development policy is complicated, however. On the one hand, the political importance of the colonies lent weight to the Colonial Office’s argument against the Treasury.103 This was a factor that grew in strength rather than diminished over the years 1939 to 1942. On the other hand, the strains on the British economy during the war, both in Britain and within the colonies, meant that there were limited prospects for investment and little money.104 As a result, it seems that the political effects of the 1940 Act ended up being more significant than its practical consequences on the colonial economies. Butler’s recent research highlights this last point. It is noticeable that only after the granting of military bases in the West Indies to the United States did Churchill instruct Lord Moyne, then secretary of

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state for the colonies, to implement the welfare proposals of the West India Royal Commission in order to minimize American criticisms of Empire.105 Furthermore, the Colonial Development and Welfare Advisory Committee, established in November 1941, was discovered in January 1942 to be meeting for only an hour a week as so few colonial governments were sending in suggestions. Only once colonial possessions began to be perceived as problematic, following the losses in the Far East (discussed in Chapter 2), did the Colonial Office respond by further emphasizing the need for more welfare programmes. When Oliver Stanley, the new secretary of state, proposed that the development policy be extended and greatly expanded, it was, as Butler has argued, ‘ultimately, on political grounds’.106 Stanley’s memorandum on the new bill was considered by the War Cabinet on 21 November 1944, and passed with substantial funding in early 1945.107 Stanley’s argument was that without welfare for the colonies, Britain’s future was at stake: without the Commonwealth and Empire, this country will play a small role in world affairs, and . . . here we have an opportunity which may never recur, at a cost which is not extravagant, of setting the Colonial Empire on lines of development which will keep it in close and loyal contact with us. To say now in 1945 that with these great stakes at issue we shall not be able to afford £15m in 1949 or £20m in 1953, is a confession of our national impotence in the future.108 The assumptions which lie behind the change in development policy are more important here than its origins. The shift towards welfare for the colonies was used, as the following chapters will argue, in a particular way to reveal a new conceptualization of the relationship of the colonial peoples to Britain. The discussion over the need to develop welfare in the colonies shows the way that many in the British establishment felt that colonial rule itself required new justification. But it also indicates that the relationship between Britain and the colonies was being reconceptualized because a welfare policy that had originated domestically was now considered relevant overseas. Prior to the Second World War, British institutions were not thought of as applicable to colonial situations (unless there was a significant settler – that is, white – population). Now certain policies were applicable across the colour bar. Even if the actual development programmes were slow, and

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sometimes ineffectual, the underlying assumption involved a qualitative transformation. While the transfer of British state-led welfare programmes to the colonial situation may have indicated that black people were now being considered in the same light as white British people, the necessity of the state-led intervention was further justification for colonial rule. This is perhaps the most interesting problematic. Colonial people were increasingly supposed to receive equal treatment but, at the same time, their relation to welfare from the British state had renewed their dependent relationship. As British authority in black–white relations was eroded ideologically, so the British authorities sought to enhance their legitimacy in the practical business of economic development and welfare provision to the poor. This was particularly pertinent at a time when Britain’s position in the world was being threatened by the United States. India’s constitutional position The question of self-government for India provides a valuable insight into how the British authorities regarded the race question. Moreover, it was a key political problem for the Empire during the war. The rise of Indian nationalism forced consideration of the constitutional issue on the British authorities in the interwar years. The attitude of the British to the argument that India was capable of self-government is indicative of the understanding of race. The Montagu Declaration of 1917 had suggested that Britain’s aim was to see India self-governing.109 The practical developments of the interwar period, however, implied that Britain’s view of India’s future was not quite this clear cut. In 1930 Lord Hailey was appointed as special adviser to the secretary of state for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, at the Round Table Conference on constitutional development in India. Hailey was experienced in the debate over constitutional status, having been the Home Member of the Government of India. Then, in 1924, he had reassured the India Office that the 1917 Montagu Declaration did not promise dominionhood because ‘full self-governing Dominion status’ was a step beyond responsible self-government.110 Not only was this a setback for the Indian independence movement, but the appointment of the Simon Commission, the statutory body to review the constitutional arrangement, exacerbated friction. The historian R. J. Moore has remarked: ‘the all-white complexion of the decennial review body, the Statutory Commission (1927–30), revealed only too clearly Britain’s persistent assumption of superiority.’111

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One of the reasons that dominion status was not synonymous with self-government for Hailey was that dominionhood had been extended to include an independent foreign policy (so that South Africa could survive as a dominion without the fear of the internal political problem that had been created in the First World War). The problem was that denying India dominion status, with or without an independent foreign policy, maintained a ‘gulf’, as noted by Kenneth Robinson, ‘that existed between what Milner in 1906 had described as “The Two Empires”, “the one”, to quote an Indian historian, “white and self-governing, the other non-white and dependent”’.112 The ostensible, rather than the strategic, reasons why India would be one step removed from dominionhood were, according to Hailey, Britain’s responsibilities in India, towards the minorities, the princely states and for India’s defence.113 This was an important argument, as it was to persist into the 1940s and perhaps, as some say, end up being responsible for a divided continent. The key question is, did Britain encourage the tensions in India in order to justify continued rule, or did Britain respond to the threat of conflict by feeling the burden of responsibility and keeping the peace for as long as possible? This question, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this work even though the answer informs the way that British arguments for racial superiority are evaluated here. As a result, I have tried to give a brief summary of the way that R. J. Moore has considered the evidence and judged the question. When, in 1929, Hailey tried to repair the damage done to relations between Britain and the emerging independence movement by suggesting for India’s position the wording: ‘in due season recognition as a self-governing Dominion’, the former Viceroy, Lord Reading, together with former prime minister Lloyd George, ensured that the precise wording was changed to reduce it to a mere reiteration of the 1917 statement.114 Even the Viceroy at the time, Lord Irwin, was concerned that Britain’s reluctance to state plainly the goal of Dominion status for India, even in the distant future, might be construed as intending that India ‘occupy a permanently subordinate place in an Empire of white nations’.115 In Britain, however, even Irwin’s reworded declaration was thought to have gone too far. The Daily Mail blamed Baldwin for the ‘blunder’ of promising ‘full Home Rule’ to the ‘natives’ and the ‘countless races’ of India without consulting the cabinet, while Birkenhead complained ‘We are not dealing with the case of a daughter nation of our own creed and of our own blood.’116 As Moore has noted:

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It is significant, however, that the racial test could not, in 1929, be swept contemptuously aside. Baldwin could not ignore it, and his Commons speech contained a long passage on the common Aryan background of Indians and Europeans.117 There were, however, serious constitutional problems in devolving government to India. The Indian Congress Party and Mohandas Gandhi were demanding full dominion status (although what this exactly entailed was not clear). The Muslims were wary of Hindu domination, via the Congress Party, especially in the northern states where the Muslim communities had formed a close working relationship with the British Raj. Finally, the princely states were the most difficult entities – having some measure of formal independence while dependent on British support for their survival and even their everyday functioning.118 Finding a constitutional agreement that would satisfy all three parties was never going to be easy – the question remains, however, whether the British conceded to princely and Muslim demands because, in the end, those were the least radical, and in doing so they further entrenched the division of India. The consequences of the ‘devolution of power by stages’ approach, was summed up by Moore: From 1920 Congress had rejected devolution by stages and demanded immediate Swaraj [freedom]. Britain was not prepared either to recognize Congress as the representative of India at large, nor to accept the possibility of India providing for its own defence, nor to jettison its own financial and commercial interests. The stability, security, and solvency of India continued to demand a gradual demission of empire. As the Congress would not co-operate the Raj must look to the minorities and the princes to help with the work of constitutional devolution. . . . In the absence of the Congress, the constitution that was made between 1930 and 1935 favoured the princes and the Muslims. It seemed to take India a step closer to responsible self-government but it really contributed to disunity.119 It is possible that the damage of the 1935 India Act, which had served to entrench Muslim and Hindu disunity, was so severe that a united India was no longer possible by the start of the Second World War. The way that the British government reacted to renewed demands for independence, however, now from the Americans as well as from Indians,

Introduction

27

seems to have continued to exploit that tension to slow down the process of change. This, and the contribution of Cripps’s mission, is discussed in Chapter 5. Moore blames Winston Churchill as the politician most responsible for sabotaging independence, as Churchill’s ‘constant interventions gave the Muslim League precious time in which to substantiate its claim to separate nationhood’.120 Churchill’s intransigence is not so surprising considering his declaration in the face of American antiimperialism: ‘We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.’121 But a great many other politicians and civil servants, while seemingly much more progressive than Churchill, effectively stalled on developing India’s position because they considered that Indian politicians could not be expected to handle the ‘responsibility’ of power without a (long) period of education. Hailey regretted that the Indianization of the Indian Civil Service had not taken place sooner so as to engender ‘responsible’ administration.122 For example, at the Round Table Conference in 1930, Hailey, chief adviser to the secretary of state for India, was convinced, as Moore puts it, that ‘a democratic legislature would be unable to find experienced ministers’ and he ended up favouring the ‘status quo, in spite of its disadvantages’.123 It is the way underlying assumptions about race – for example who is ‘responsible’ – were affected, and politicized, by developments in the Second World War that is the central theme of this book. Consequently, the questions of the historical record, like who, for example, was to blame for the failure of Cripps’s mission in 1942 to produce agreement on a declaration from all parties, are not at issue here. What I am trying to investigate is the way that the failure, once it had occurred, became an opportunity for a British official, such as Hailey, defending the Empire to American critics. The problem of disunity in India, a continuing conflict of the whole interwar period, was used in the Second World War, for the first time internationally, to promote Britain’s role as an umpire between competing factions. However, the development of this propaganda angle probably had more to do with facing down American criticisms than with new developments in India. Britain’s relationship with America Today the great alliance between Britain and America during the war and especially during the Cold War often obscures the history of

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tension between the two nations. In the interwar period there were two particular sources of conflict: the Japan Naval Treaty and the Ottawa agreement over trade in the Empire. What these represented, however, was the difficult balance between America’s potential for global power and the reality of isolationism after the First World War. British officials were on the one hand annoyed with the United States for not playing a larger role in maintaining a peaceful world order and, on the other hand, irritated by American pretensions to tell the British what to do especially within their own domain such as the Empire. The British undoubtedly looked down on Americans, seeing their system and their press, according to Donald Watt, as ‘embodying the rule of an ill-educated plebs’. Moreover, Watt continued, the Foreign Office ‘looked with near contempt on the American’s inability to handle their colonial problem in Cuba and the Philippines’.124 International affairs were indeed problematic for the United States in the interwar years. After the war with Spain, and the conquest of the Philippines in 1898, The Times had commented: ‘In future America will play a part in the general affairs of the world such as she has never played before.’125 Rudyard Kipling wrote ‘The White Man’s Burden’ especially for this occasion and it was printed by the New York Sun the day before the Senate agreed to make the Philippines a protectorate.126 America’s assistance during the First World War had been decisive but afterwards the United States retreated into isolationism. The British elite, according to Watt, had reacted with some disgust and caricatured America as ‘“Uncle Shylock”, the reluctant Achilles, the obstinate amateur, [and] the “uncertain ally”’.127 In reply, the General Board of the US Navy cynically suggested that ‘the idea’ behind British imperial policy was ‘that even the most unpromising detached ocean rock will, if kept long enough, develop some useful purpose’.128 The economic depression of the 1930s was a further cause of friction. The assumption in the United States was that Britain had fared better than the USA, even to the point where, as late as August 1944, President Roosevelt could write to Henry Morgenthau, the American secretary of the Treasury, to say: ‘I had no idea England was broke.’129 Meanwhile, conceding the Pacific arena to the United States, Britain had terminated the Anglo-Japanese alliance, permitted naval parity to America, and hoped that the States would aid Britain and France to rearm to deal with Europe. America’s Neutrality Act, however, made it difficult for Britain or France to use the productive capacity of the States in their rearmament programme. The Neutrality Act, amended in 1937, permitted America

Introduction

29

to trade with belligerent nations but without any credit. Nicknamed ‘cash and carry’, buyers had to pay cash and arrange delivery, that is airplanes, ships and munitions had to be collected in the States by the buyer – and once war broke out this process of collection was an expensive use of manpower.130 Roosevelt assumed that Britain and France could also evade the Johnson Act, which prohibited loans to defaulters on war debts. In fact, David Reynolds suggests, Roosevelt ‘attributed Britain’s problems [in 1939] less to a lack of power than to a lack of nerve’.131 Meanwhile, Oliver Stanley, then president of the Board of Trade in the British government, complained of ‘the state of bitterness and exasperation which usually results from dealing with the US government’.132 In the 1930s one of the ways that the United States justified its isolationism and started to articulate a sense of national pride was by eschewing the imperialism of the European nations. In 1934 Congress passed a bill which would grant the Philippines self-determination in 1946. Looking back on it, Foster Dulles claimed that America had been ‘denying her heritage’ in dominating the Philippines.133 And, he continued in a later volume, ‘the tremendous cost, in both lives and money, of subduing the Filipino revolt against American rule at the turn of the century had been an important factor leading to the popular revulsion against imperialism’.134 Surprising it might be, considering the treatment in the United States of black people and native Americans, but in the late 1930s anti-imperialism was an increasingly popular political stance. Within America, growing global influence was given a benevolent interpretation. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, theologian and philosopher, professed that the American people were ‘awkward imperialists’, not using force to exercise domination because ‘our legions are dollars’ and ‘it is our virtue rather than our power which the nations envy’.135 The Americans were also convinced that the British system of imperial preference was thwarting American trade.136 Even though the trade involved was small scale, once Britain’s position had been weakened by the start of the war, the States forced Britain to adopt an ‘open door’ policy and cut tariffs.137 Despite the tension, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt managed to form a working relationship. At the start of the war Roosevelt wrote to Churchill, who was head of the Admiralty at the time, saying that he would ‘welcome it if you will keep me in touch personally’.138 When Churchill became prime minister on 15 May 1940, his first order of business was to write to Roosevelt, particularly

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as, according to Watt, ‘Churchill was an unashamed Atlanticist; and his hopes of Britain’s survival and ultimate victory were pinned firmly on the US’.139 The correspondence of these two heads of state, though unusual, was probably essential to create an alliance out of two countries previously so out of step. According to David Reynolds, one of the foremost historians of the ‘special relationship’ of Britain and America, Churchill sent Roosevelt a message, on average, every 36 hours between May 1940 and April 1945. ‘No lover’, Churchill said after the war, ‘ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt.’140 America’s support for Britain was still not a foregone conclusion. Roosevelt, doubtful of Britain’s ‘nerve’ and capability, and concerned about his own position in an election against Wendell Willkie (which Roosevelt won 449 to 82 on 5 November 1940), waited until August 1940, two months after France had fallen, to vouchsafe some material support. Even then it took until 11 March 1941 to pass what was called ‘Lend-Lease’ through Congress and transfer 50 old destroyers to Britain (as it would have taken too long to build them from scratch) in exchange for leases on army bases in the West Indies.141 The bases in the West Indies were a source of some anxiety. The Governor of Trinidad, Hubert Young, reported that the ‘great question which is uppermost in everyone’s mind here’ was whether there was any ‘intention or possibility of this Colony being handed over to the United States after the war’.142 The Colonial Office promised him an announcement by Lord Moyne on the continued British sovereignty of the islands. The Americans, at least President Roosevelt, said they had ‘no desire to acquire the British West Indies’. In fact, it was reported, Roosevelt ‘regarded the Islands as headaches, and he wanted no “British headaches”’.143 William Roger Louis has looked extensively at the debate between Britain and America over the future of British colonies and provided a thorough account of the history of diplomatic relations between Britain and the States during the war. He describes this work, Imperialism at Bay: the United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941–45, as ‘an enquiry into the economic element of trusteeship in relation to strategic and ethical considerations’.144 Louis’s focus is the way that British officials interpreted American demands for international trusteeship for colonies as a covert interest in expanding their own influence in the Empire. However examining the same material that Louis has researched from the point of view of the changing perceptions of race – both in terms of the image of the

Introduction

31

‘natives’ and the self-image of the imperialists – leads to a rather different interpretation of the underlying issues. Louis tended to interpret the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office as being anxious about Britain’s future economic position and fearful of America’s expanding sphere of influence. The Colonial Office files of the period, however, reveal another anxiety. Especially after the loss of the Far Eastern empire, their concern is as much with their weakened authority in the colonies (discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). Particularly after the experience of the late 1930s, when the debate on colonial administration intensified over Germany’s colonial record and new riots flared up in the West Indies, many British officials were sensitized to the fact that certain questions only raised further questions. The very admission that an argument was required to justify imperial rule reflected a loss of assumed power. The Colonial and Foreign Offices instinctively avoided such a challenge to the assumption of rule – and, interestingly, tried to warn the Americans against entering into such a debate. This point can be clarified with the example of Foreign Office official Cavendish-Bentinck’s caustic comments on American plans: If Indo-China is not restored to France on the ground that ‘the poor Indo-Chinese’ have no education and no welfare (I have never heard that the Indo-Chinese were any more unhappy than the share-croppers of the Southern United States), the Dutch and ourselves may later on be told that the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo have never been properly developed, nor the rubber resources of Malaya, that the natives are insufficiently educated according to Washington standards and that these territories must be placed under United Nations trusteeship (perhaps with United States oil and rubber controllers).145 Louis interpreted this comment in the following way: ‘Thus the Foreign Office clearly identified the economic element in Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy.’ But the passage can be read in more than one way. First, Cavendish-Bentinck relativizes Roosevelt’s comment by stating that black workers in the Southern States are no better off than workers on rubber plantations in South East Asia, and therefore the Americans have no higher moral basis from which to criticize others. Second, he points out that once the Americans criticize the French empire in Indo-China they are opening Pandora’s box, since all colonial administrations could be investigated and found deficient on some grounds.

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It is important to consider the way that Cavendish-Bentinck’s response is motivated by a desire to defend a right to rule as much as by British economic concerns. His underlying assumption is that the right to rule is an unquestioned authority and he is doubtful if it can sustain interrogation. Chapter 4 looks at the way in which the issue of economic development became a new way to assert British authority, through welfarism rather than financial interests. This point is illustrated by Sir Edward Grigg when he justified British rule in the Middle East as a force for progress: Britain will stand or fall in the Middle East by her influence upon the promotion of social justice and betterment, claming no arbitrary power over or even open influence upon its national Governments, but helping and advising unobtrusively at request, so that all parts of the population can feel the benefit of progress in opportunity, education, living conditions and health.146 But Louis’s immediate comment on such a statement was: Did Grigg also see the purpose of this British presence as securing the oil resources of Iraq or, more remotely, the rubber and tin of Malaya? Certainly yes, for the wealth and prosperity of the British Empire were inseparably linked in his mind with its power as a force for good in the world.147 Now Louis is undoubtedly correct to say that the ‘wealth and prosperity’ of Britain was ‘inseparably linked in [Grigg’s] mind with its power as a force for good’, but perhaps what is more interesting is that Grigg felt the need to justify and say that Britain would be a force for progress. What is unusual is that Grigg fears the loss of Britain’s influence in the Middle East if Britain failed to provide an advisory and developmental role. It is this defensive tone that is new in the circles of the British establishment. Certainly it is not something that Hailey would have, for example, ever argued while a provincial governor in India – for even in the 1930s the British Raj did not really conceive of leaving India in the immediate future. The examination of the AngloAmerican debate during the Second World War in the present work is not intended to confirm or to challenge Louis’s presentation of the two countries’ competition for resources. It is intended to investigate the separate but related question as to how British officials gave

Introduction

33

expression to the assumption of their own authority, especially as the language of white superiority became increasingly unacceptable. The preoccupation with the fate of ‘white prestige’ in the Pacific has also been investigated by Christopher Thorne in his magisterial history of the Pacific War, Allies of a Kind. According to Thorne, both British and American officials shared a common interest in maintaining a sense of white superiority. Succinctly, Thorne notes: ‘Time and again, as will be seen, it was the threat to Western, white prestige that troubled those in power in Washington and London.’148 Where Thorne and Louis are primarily concerned with the military and diplomatic history of the period, the present work is entirely concerned with the form in which the imperialists imagined the source of their authority over the colonized peoples. The tension between America and Britain was essential to the process by which individuals in the Colonial Office came to view race as important. Under pressure to defend Britain’s position in world affairs, and in particular the ownership of the Empire, British officials shaped their arguments to fit the new circumstances. In countering the argument against empire Hailey played a important role, on the one hand, in taking on American criticisms and, on the other, bringing back his insights to the Colonial Office discussion. Hailey’s arguments were reinforced by a renewed sense of confidence in Britain as the war progressed. By the winter of 1942–3, several things had happened to strengthen Britain and the Colonial Office’s position. First, the war against the Nazis had begun to turn as Montgomery repulsed Rommel in North Africa and the Red Army overwhelmed the Germans at Stalingrad. Second, the alliance of Britain, America and the Soviet Union was beginning to outpace German production levels and the existence of the alliance had boosted the public’s confidence. Third, India had not fallen to the Japanese as first feared. Fourth, the Colonial Office had realized that the British public were not as racist as expected and, in fact, partly to do with resentments over rationing and shortages, were quite hostile to the American practice of racial segregation (see Chapter 3). To indicate just what a step this was, consider Lord Hailey’s own reaction at the start of the war to the French use of African troops: ‘very few Frenchmen seem to realize the political consequences involved in the conscription of big numbers of Africans; there is bound to be an unsettlement of ideas, a change of outlook, and increased demand in standards of living.’149 By the end of the war, the

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Colonial Office was trying (unsuccessfully), through the War Office, to get the West Indian troops into a position where they could be seen to be involved in active service so that ‘honour could be satisfied’. The transformation of the Colonial Office’s own attitude to black troops is revealing, as it illustrates how the interaction with the United States provided the mechanism for the development of new ideas. The new, slightly improved, position of the British establishment by 1943 gave them more confidence in relation to American criticisms. Instead of conceding, they began to develop new arguments to make the Americans think twice about their demands for change. It is the interaction of these ideas and their political context that provides the mechanism for the transformation of thinking about race. In the process, the British and Americans began to develop a new language of moral authority that superseded the old language of the ‘Anglo-Saxon alliance’.150 In public, racial language was largely unacceptable by the end of the Second World War, and race was clearly a political issue. The United States Armed Forces began the process of desegregation. Discrimination, in Britain, the United States and much of the Empire, continued in many arenas, but those that maintained the ‘colour bar’ were aware that it had to be discreet.151 More importantly, even colonial officials and men like Hailey saw their own work more in terms of a moral duty to the colonies than of some special right to rule which had often, in the past, been racially justified. What is important about understanding this process of change is that it brings out how imperial rule could continue while the authority upon which it was based was transformed from that of white race superiority to a new moral and developmental legitimacy.

2 The Loss of White Prestige

Introduction Colonial Office policy on ‘colour discrimination’ was never explicitly codified in any detail. Before the war, if asked, most colonial officials would probably have denied being in favour of ‘colour discrimination’ while condoning it in practice. At the same time, however, they would hold views on many administrative issues that assumed different racial capacities and therefore, of necessity, required different policies for different ‘races’. This chapter outlines how colonial policy on race discrimination began to change during the Second World War. One example of the prewar contrast between official policy and the underlying assumption is illustrated by Winston Churchill when he was the secretary of state for the colonies. In January 1922 Churchill claimed, in a speech at the Hotel Victoria in Uganda, that ‘the democratic principles of Europe are by no means suited to the development of Asiatic and African people’.1 In the same speech, however, Churchill made the point that the Colonial Office had ‘laid down the principle that, so far as is practicable throughout the whole range of the British Empire, colour is not by itself to be a bar’.2 So, according to Churchill, African and Asian people were not fit to have the vote but apparently it was not the colour of their skins that determined this. The key point here is that, as far as the British Colonial Office was concerned, colour by itself should not be the basis for discrimination. This did not mean, however, that there were not other factors, such as culture, that appeared, for the foreseeable future, to constitute sufficient grounds for differential treatment. Using material from the Public Record Office we can investigate the preoccupation with race in the colonial administration prior to the 35

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war, and how that influenced the reaction to Japan’s victories in the Pacific, especially in the context of American anti-imperialism. As a result of these events, the issues of colour and of discrimination began to take on a new political significance that forced the Colonial Office to reformulate some of its most fundamental ideas. Lord Hailey advised a new approach to native administration. The new approach involved rethinking both who could be part of the colonial administration and the role of the ‘Westminster model’ in the administration. Prior to the Second World War, Lord Lugard was considered to be the key policy adviser to the Colonial Office. Lugard was a former Governor of Nigeria and author of the doctrine of indirect rule. He explained his philosophy of separate development in an article in the Journal of Philosophical Studies. In spirit, he argued, ‘races’ were equal. In practical matters, they were not. In the arena of social interaction and the issue of the development of institutions, customs and laws, Lugard considered Africans to be intrinsically different. He supported the ideal of ‘equal opportunity for those who strive’ but contended that in ‘matters social and racial a separate path, each pursuing his own inherited traditions, preserving his own race purity and race pride’ was the proper approach. By excluding ‘matters social and racial’, Lugard confined the possibility of equal treatment to an ideal never realized, indeed a spiritual realm, as he concluded: ‘equality in things spiritual; agreed divergence in the physical and material.’3 Even Julian Huxley, the influential biologist known for his liberal ideas, was concerned that giving ‘equal rights for all men of equal civilization’ would, in the real sphere of politics, create future conflict.4 The step of ‘granting the franchise to educated Africans’, cautioned Huxley, ‘will eventually mean a large majority of native voters and presumably of native members of the assembly: And a parliament of whites, browns, and blacks is hardly calculated to promote peaceful interracial development.’5 In the 1920s, Lugard’s book The Dual Mandate, which explained the concept of indirect rule, was adopted as the handbook of colonial administrators. With hindsight, indirect rule is now generally interpreted as an administrative policy that aimed to constrain the effects of development and even slow political and economic progress to prevent political and social instability.6 At the time, indirect rule was posed as a progressive notion; adapted from the developmental concept of trusteeship from the mandate of the League of Nations and applied to day-to-day colonial administration. Britain’s duty to the League of Nations, to develop the mandated territories (in terms of

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‘social progress’7) was translated by the policy of indirect rule to an on-the-ground policy of separate development and, in practice, ‘ossification’.8 The colonial administration created a two-tier structure where white colonial administrators supervised ‘native authorities’.9 The ‘chiefs’ of certain tribes were given the responsibility to pursue certain government-backed policies and could in turn ask of the white administration certain considerations of his district.10 The ‘chief’, however, had little independent power, and the power of the people was strictly limited by the way in which successive chiefs were chosen, although this took a variety of different forms.11 Any emerging middle class was excluded from the political process by virtue of being outside the supposedly traditional ‘tribal’ structures. By maintaining African traditional community networks, indirect rule was supposed to maintain social stability and ‘race purity’ within a framework of ‘development’. It was in this context that Hailey started work on An African Survey, while maintaining the prevailing outlook of separate development.12 To Hailey, the basic idea of indirect rule was not unfamiliar as it had its roots in the Punjabi administration. The Punjab, where British rule relied on rural loyalties and existing hierarchies, had been Hailey’s formative experience. In the Punjab, Hailey had been schooled in the Land Alienation Act that protected the peasant from indebtedness to moneylenders. The idea that the ‘primitive’ people should be ‘protected’ from the forces of modernization was repeated in Lugard’s work.13 Indirect rule, like the Land Alienation Act, acted to preserve ‘custom’ by using ‘traditional’ practices to mediate British rule. Both in the Punjab and in Nigeria the system of administration was justified by a strong paternalistic outlook. Hailey’s attitudes were influenced by the common practice in the Punjab of the segregation of people of different cultures. His first posting in India with responsibility was the colonization of the Lower Jhelum colony in Jhech Doab tract lying between the Jhelum and Chenab rivers. His job was to construct a ‘new society’. The social engineering rested on the concept of segregation. John Cell records, in his biography of Hailey, the standard procedure: On the assumption that colonists would fare better if they settled in primary groups, the government tried to aggregate people from different religions and castes. The Chenab therefore became more segregated than the colonists’ original homes.14

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Although the primary reason for this segregation was an attempt to minimize social disruption, it could be said that the aggregate result had the opposite effect. In the long term, the impact of encouraging Muslim, Sikh and Hindu to view each other with suspicion had the most traumatic consequences for social stability. In December 1934, however, Hailey left India still confident in the Indian form of indirect rule, both in its tendency to segregate according to religion and in its use of ‘Native Princes’. In 1935–6, Hailey toured Africa to begin research for the African Survey. At this point, he made few criticisms of indirect rule and separate development. When he returned from Africa he proudly claimed that ‘our whole instinct is to encourage each unit to develop on its own lines’.15 As late as May 1941 Hailey referred to indirect rule as a ‘characteristically British doctrine’ and supported General Smuts’s opposition to ‘assimilation’.16 The Punjabi experience and indirect rule were icons, at the time, of the tradition of British ‘native administration’. As Penelope Hetherington has explained, indirect rule, although developed to fit in with the post-First World War developmental consensus, followed the British tradition of paternalism informed by a sense of racial superiority.17 W. M. Macmillan, the South African academic, admitted in the late 1930s that: ‘there are many Africans who suspect indirect rule of marking a departure from older ideals towards a new imperial version of South African “segregation”.’18 In so far as indirect rule was seen as characteristically British, Hailey continued to show support for the colonial policy. Privately, however, and in certain informed circles, Hailey began in the early 1940s to voice criticisms of administration by indirect rule and raise questions about its future in colonial policy. Indirect rule rested on the idea, as Sir Donald Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika in the 1920s and of Nigeria from 1931–5, put it, that colonial policy should involve ‘using their own indigenous institutions in order to promote higher standards of civilization amongst them’.19 In contrast, Hailey began to argue that the British state, rather than African institutions, ought to promote colonial development. As a result, he started to articulate a new understanding of the relationship between Britain and the colonies. Although Hailey was still strongly influenced by the tradition of paternalism, he began, during the Second World War, to move away from that outlook. Changing his earlier views, he began to disassociate British colonial policy from South African practices.20 As discussed in later chapters, Hailey put forward the idea that the relationship

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between colonies and Britain should be understood in terms of a ‘partnership’. Some of the new thinking was evident in Hailey’s 1940–2 report on African administration. It is the change in Hailey’s attitude, despite his training in an earlier tradition, which illustrates how much the Colonial Office was forced to rethink basic tenets of its administrative policy at this time. In particular, as we shall see, the question of race was key in the process of reformulating the common understanding of native administration. Hailey’s views on native administration during this crucial period of the Second World War were influenced by particular events and discussions in such a way as to illustrate the wider process of change. To put it bluntly, Hailey’s transformation, from segregationist to integrationist, is an indication of the shift in outlook of the British Colonial Office.

Disillusionment and the idea of the ‘race revolt’ When Hailey started work on the African Survey one of his briefs was to examine the importance of what was called the ‘Bantu problem’.21 He was to judge the significance of African nationalism and the role of the colonial administration in maintaining stability. Hailey had had experience of India in the 1920s and 1930s, at the height of Swarajist (independence) agitation, which had placed him amidst tense conflicts. After the Amritsar massacre, for example, Hailey produced the Indian Civil Service’s account to counter the pro-independence argument of the Congress Party.22 In Africa, Hailey perceived a very different situation. He wrote about ‘Nationalism in Africa’ for the Journal of the Royal African Society, where he was fairly dismissive of talk of insurgents in Africa and wrote that signs of nationalism were not ‘those incidents which have merely spelt trouble for the administrations’. Instead, he argued, nationalism is marked by movements ‘which have some real significance in that they testify to the growth of racial feeling’ or those that prove that ‘natives of different tribes or areas can combine on a common basis’.23 According to this criteria he had found no movements of ‘real significance’ in Africa. The way in which Hailey viewed the growth of nationalism, however, assumed a certain relationship between the colonial powers and Africans. Hailey presumed that anti-colonial feeling would develop along racial lines rather than within national borders. He expected that

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bonds would form between black Africans and against Europeans, rather than between only, for example, Yoruba and Ibo to form a community of Nigerians, or just against the Belgians in the Congo. His assumption, that all Africans would unite against all Europeans, indicates that he felt that Africans would reply to European racism by forming their own common bond. He predicted that ‘certain things we may reasonably foresee. Where there is inequality of treatment, or undue insistence on colour superiority, one may look to find a growth of resentment which will show itself in political discontent’.24 Hailey was not alone at this time in holding the view that some communal or nationalistic feeling was likely to be based on a sense of race community and perhaps race discontent. The presumption that political or social conflict would occur along race lines was particularly prevalent in the interwar period. This predisposition to fear race conflict was to become an important factor in the way that events of the Pacific theatre of the war were interpreted by the Colonial Office. Much of the interwar elite had had direct experience of the First World War.25 After that brutal experience, it was hard to conceive of abstract ideals such as civilization. Paul Fussell, in his book The Great War and Modern Memory, gives the example of Ernest Hemingway’s description in A Farewell to Arms: ‘abstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and the dates.’26 After the supposedly superior European nations had created such carnage, it was hard to think of Europe ‘civilizing’ the ‘dark continent’ of Africa. Morris Ginsberg, writing alongside Lugard in the Journal of Philosophical Studies, admitted that: ‘it is idle to maintain that the White peoples have undertaken the government of the simpler peoples from humanitarian motives or civilizing zeal.’27 In his book, Africa View, Julian Huxley regretted that white supremacy could no longer be taken for granted: In 1914 we Europeans could have pointed with some pride to the fact that we had for all practical purposes suppressed the constant violence of intertribal war in Africa. But by 1919 that boast seemed a little empty. . . . The native has lost his childlike belief in the white as an inherently superior being. He has become more critical and more restive; but we are to blame for the new spirit, not he.28 The new critical climate did not exist only in Africa. A disillusionment

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with the colonial empire was voiced by people who, a generation earlier, would have been loyal to the British establishment: men like John Hobson,29 Leonard Woolf and Leonard Barnes. Sir Edward Grigg complained in the House of Commons that: ‘the attack on our position in Africa is not, in my opinion, coming from Africans or from anybody outside ourselves. It is coming from within our own ranks.’30 Harold Macmillan, writing in 1938, also felt that the First World War had been a great trauma for colonialism: The Great War, which, by the horror and waste fully displayed to Africans, cost Europeans some of their old prestige in native Africa, also caused widespread disillusion in Europe about the bases of our own civilization and gravely weakened faith in the universal efficacy of democratic institutions.31 Hailey, in his confidential Colonial Office Report, 1940–2, echoed Huxley and Macmillan. ‘It seems certain’, Hailey wrote in his chapter on racial consciousness, ‘that the effect of the conflict between European nations, which extended to the soil of Africa itself and involved the use of native troops, must have affected the general prestige of Europeans.’ And, although it was ‘too early to judge the full reactions of the present war on the African outlook’, he continued, ‘they cannot fail to be far-reaching’.32 The idea of a black revolt against white racism tapped into a fear stimulated by the elite’s own disillusionment with the European order. This was intensified in the Second World War by the European powers’ failure to maintain their strength in the Far East against Japan. As a result, it was the sense of the loss of white prestige, and a loss in their own sense of confidence, which informed the assumption that anticolonial resentment would crystallize around ‘colour feeling’. Once the Colonial Office had made this assumption, their own sensitivity to the ‘colour bar’ increased so that ‘race consciousness’ really did become a measure, for administrators and policy-makers, of the level of discontent. In Africa, Hailey was concerned about the possibility of ‘Pan-African feeling’ despite the ‘lack of any common African culture’. Not only did he remark on the impact of the First and Second World Wars, but he also raised the ‘Russo-Japanese War’ and the ‘Italian invasion of Abyssinia’ as having possibly ‘evoked race solidarity among Africans’.33 Some people saw the Italian military campaign to annex Abyssinia in October 1935 as revenge for Italy’s defeat in 1896. In 1896, The

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Times had regretted the Italian humiliation, complaining of the disrepute it had brought to all white armies: ‘The chief feeling expressed is one of sincere regret, not merely because by this defeat the prestige of European arms as a whole is considerably impaired.’34 By the mid1930s, in the middle of the world economic crisis, Italy’s annexation was no longer respectable. The Times did not applaud Italy’s act of retaliation. But neither did any of the European countries, even those with colonies in Africa, try to restrain Italy. Either, as Hailey commented, France, Britain and Belgium were too weak to prevent Italy’s aggression, or they had consented to the further extension of imperial rule by force. Either way, it was inevitable, in Hailey’s eyes, that the June 1936 ‘All-Bantu Convention’ would pass a resolution ‘condemning imperialism’.35 William E. B. Du Bois, the American black academic, brought out the consequences of European racism in an article on the ‘Inter-racial implications of the Ethiopian crisis’ in the journal Foreign Affairs: The moral of this, as Negroes see it, is that if any colored nation expects to maintain itself against white Europe it need appeal neither to religion nor culture but only to force. That is why Japan today has the sympathy of the majority of mankind because that majority is colored.36 The sense of a racial divide in the interpretation of conflict was strengthened by the identification of the rioting West Indians with the people of Abyssinia. As late as 1938, when a British journalist, Arthur Calder-Marshall, visited Trinidad he was struck by the ‘fervent interest’ in the continuing war between Italy and Abyssinia. Calder-Marshall went so far as to claim that ‘Britain’s betrayal of Abyssinia is nearly as much to blame for the riots in Trinidad as the high cost of living’.37 As the Italian manoeuvres had demonstrated, and the Second World War was about to confirm, diplomacy could no longer contain the tensions among the European powers. One of the problems facing the British Colonial Office was that comparisons of the methods of colonial rule by different European countries had exacerbated, rather than resolved, existing tensions. Competition over colonial resources and imperial spheres of influence had spilled over into competing claims of superiority in ‘native administration’. This again was interpreted primarily as a question of the different ‘race relations’ involved in different nations’ colonial administrations. Hailey commented that:

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there is some tendency among English writers on African subjects to emphasize features in which foreign colonial administration is held to be superior to our own. They find typical instances of this in the relative absence of colour bar in French colonies, or in the character of the labour organization in Belgian mining centres, or in the systematic efforts made in the Congo to utilize native labour in skilled industrial employment.38 In 1890 transferring African territory between European powers was seen as unproblematic.39 By the 1930s, however, when Germany requested the return of colonies removed after the First World War and mandated under trust to other imperial powers, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, announced that he would not agree to Germany’s ‘repulsive talk of handing over millions of human souls irrespective of their wishes like cattle or slaves to new sovereignties’.40 The League of Nations arranged a conference in 1939 to investigate European demands for colonies and to conduct a ‘survey of international opinion on claims for relief from population pressure’. The debate between British delegates and German representatives at the League of Nations was fought over the treatment of the ‘natives’ by the colonial authorities. The Italian delegates repeated Virginio Gayda’s criticism that Britain was pursuing ‘strong racial tendencies’ because British emigration policy ‘favours the Anglo-Saxon and keeps the other races out of an empty Empire’. Margery Perham, the Oxford expert on colonial administration, responded that the only reason that Germany’s record was being ‘cleaned’ was because there had been an increase in ‘sympathy’ with the German claim for colonies. In fact, she replied, British administration was the ‘result of centuries of experience in the government of native peoples’ that was incomparable to the mere ‘thirty years of German occupation’.41 A disillusioned British politician, Lord Arnold, with a ‘gasp’, promptly counter-attacked and brought up the question of the colour bar in South Africa, the confiscation of the political rights of the Cape natives during the last two or three years, the forced labour which was still a part of British policy in certain African territories, and also the loss of the best territory in Kenya by the natives so that white settlers should be supplied with the best land. The British assumption of moral rectitude must be intolerable to Germany.42

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Discord between the imperial nations had created space for criticisms of each other’s colonial policies. The uneasy peace that had been brokered in 1919, and sealed with the redistribution of colonies as mandates, began to fall apart in the late 1930s. No longer, amid the claims and counterclaims, could imperial authority be assumed over the mandated territories. The future of the colonial relationship had been brought into question. In these conditions, of the breakdown of the fragile framework of the League of Nations, Asian and black rebellions began to symbolize a disintegration of the old order. Just as black people in Africa, Asia, the West Indies, America and India started to see themselves in solidarity with one another against white racism, so the Europeans found that they could no longer rely on each other to form a pro-imperialist consensus that might have maintained white prestige.43

The role of Japan in race relations The pro-imperialist consensus had first faced problems after the First World War. Then, the delegates to the League of Nations had put colour before colonialism and refused Japan’s request for a racial equality clause. Japan’s premier had announced before the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that Japan’s ‘inferiority must end’ and that they had ‘plans to gain equality’ at the negotiating table. But when it came to the vote, Wilson declared that Japan’s proposal for an amendment for a right of race equality had failed, despite 11 out of 17 in favour, because, he claimed, it needed unanimous approval – unlike two prior amendments. At the end of the conference all the imperial powers, however, remembered their common interest and simply succumbed to the ‘desire for territorial acquisition’. And, as Paul Lauren has explained, in case ‘this taking and trading appear too crass, the powers agreed not to call their new acquisitions colonial possessions, but rather mandates’.44 The position of Japan, and thereby racial equality, was thereby dismissed while the authority of imperial rule continued, albeit in a different form – one where the principle of mandates ensured that imperial powers gave formal progress reports to the League of Nations. After 1905 and the Russo-Japanese war, the growth of Japan’s economic and military strength had disturbed the international balance of power and had stimulated a certain racial anxiety.45 Some of the contemporary titles give an impression of the intensity of the fear of the decline of the ‘white race’.46 For example, Lothrop

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Stoddard produced two books titled: The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy (1920) and The Revolt Against Civilization: the Menace of the Under Man (1922) while Jack London wrote of the ‘Yellow Peril’.47 The success of Japan against Russia in 1905 and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria had not entirely dislodged the common view of Japan as a subordinate power. For example, the success of Chinese resistance to the Japanese campaign in 1937 encouraged a view in the West of a militarily incompetent Japan. Even after America had cancelled its 1911 trade agreement in 1939, Winston Churchill remained confident enough to remark: ‘Consider how vain is the menace that Japan will send a fleet and army to conquer Singapore. It is as far from Japan as Southampton is from New York. . . . Do not therefore let us worry about this bugbear.’ Christopher Thorne, the leading historian of the Pacific War, notes that as late as 25 July 1941, when Britain and the United States froze Japanese assets, ‘examples abound of complacency, even scorn, among those who were maintaining the position of the West in the Far East’.48 The view that the Japanese were inferior, or, as General Robert Brooke-Popham, commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Far East, described those he had seen in occupied China in December 1940, ‘sub-human specimens dressed in dirty grey uniform’, clouded the judgement of the Allied command. Brooke-Popham arrogantly concluded: ‘I cannot believe they would form an intelligent fighting force.’ Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office referred to the Japanese in his diary as ‘beastly little monkeys’ and ‘yellow dwarf slaves’.49 These sorts of assumption of racial inferiority were not uncommon at this time. For example, Hailey’s own diary of his research tour in Africa in the early months of 1940 gives many instances of his underlying racial prejudice against Africans.50 Winston Churchill was wont to use the words ‘baboos’, ‘Chinks’ or ‘pigtails’ instead of Indian or Chinese. According to Christopher Thorne, the racism of the Allies was not confined, however, to just a few ill-chosen phrases nor to a select group of people.51 Thorne and John Dower have made the point that the Pacific War of 1941 to 1945 can be seen as a ‘racial war’. This is not to argue that racist views alone were the cause of the war but that those views shaped the interpretations of the military developments. It was the question of perceived strength of the different ‘races’ that seemed to take priority over strategic issues. ‘Time and again,’ Thorne has noted,

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‘it was the threat to western white prestige that troubled those in power in Washington and London.’52 Just two warships were thought sufficient to deter the Japanese, the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, although it is doubtful whether the British had the resources available to strengthen their Far Eastern defences. The notion of racial superiority did not just lead to an underestimation of Japanese abilities, it also influenced considerations of manpower resources. According to the New Statesman and Nation in 1942, maintaining ‘white prestige’ was more important than increasing British forces in Malaya with Chinese troops. ‘The British authorities’, suggested the Diary Columnist, did not want to be seen relying on non-white assistance as they ‘thought that the Chinese Army would be bad for British “prestige” amongst the coloured people’.53 Three days after bombing Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on the 7 December 1941, the Japanese invaded Malaya and the Philippines, and sank the two British warships, losing only three aircraft. By 31 January 1942 they had reached the outskirts of Singapore. Less than 10 weeks after Pearl Harbor, Singapore surrendered. Since Hong Kong had fallen on Christmas Day 1941 after only three weeks of fighting, and Singapore, the so-called ‘fortress of the East’, had collapsed on 15 February 1942 after a campaign of just 70 days, it was clear that the Japanese had humiliated the British. Winston Churchill’s telegram to General Wavell in Singapore illustrates the degree of desperation: There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. . . . Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake. I rely on you to show no mercy to weakness in any form. With the Russians fighting as they are and the Americans so stubborn at Luzon, the whole reputation of our country and our race is involved.54 The Foreign Office itself admitted that: ‘The system in Singapore was faulty. The policy, laid down by the Services, was to emphasize and exaggerate the strength of our forces in this area. Japanese successes therefore came as a shock to the public.’55 The exaggeration itself, however, was a result of the assumption of racial superiority on the part of the British. For example, one soldier was quoted as saying: ‘a British soldier is equal to 10 Japanese, but unfortunately there are 11

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Japanese.’56 In fact, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival had 100 000 men in Singapore against Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 30 000.57

The post-Singapore world Immediately after the surrender of Singapore, Walter Lippmann, usually known for his column in the New York Herald Tribune, wrote an article in the Washington Post entitled ‘Today and tomorrow: the postSingapore war in the East’. In this article, which became widely talked about, he equated imperial rule with white prestige, referring to Kipling’s poem written especially for the States on the eve of the annexation of the Philippines. But unlike Winston Churchill’s aim to uphold the old honour, Lippmann sought to imagine afresh the role of the West rather than renovate an old one. He argued that: The United Nations [of the Allies] have found themselves in a position where they could be accused, not without warrant, of fighting to preserve the rule of the white man over the peoples of Asia and of being committed at fearful cost to a war for the restoration of empire. . . . For the western nations must now do what hitherto they lacked the will and the imagination to do: they must identify their cause with the freedom and the security of the peoples of the East, putting away the “white man’s burden” and purging themselves of the taint of an obsolete and obviously unworkable white man’s imperialism.58 More significantly, shortly after Singapore, Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s chief foreign policy adviser, used his Memorial Day Address at the Arlington National Amphitheatre on 30 May 1942, to restate the United States government’s war aims: If this war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples it must assure the sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world, as well as in the world of the Americas. Our victory must bring in its train the liberation of all peoples. Discrimination between peoples because of their race, creed or color must be abolished. The age of imperialism is ended.59 This statement was widely aired, reprinted in many newspapers, and certainly noted in Colonial Office circles. It held out the promise of

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two things: ‘the liberation of all peoples’ and the ‘abolition’ of discrimination between peoples. Welles had, in this short statement, made it clear that future liberation required ‘sovereign equality’ and an end to racial discrimination. The fall of Singapore thus symbolized, in the eyes of many, the beginning of the end of colonialism. Not only because colonial rule had collapsed in the Far East, but because colour was no longer an acceptable justification for the denial of sovereignty or the practice of discrimination. For example, in one of his weekly reports from Washington on American opinion of Britain, Isaiah Berlin stated that ‘in any postwar planning it is assumed that the white peoples have lost their Asiatic possessions forever’. In the margin beside Berlin’s comment in the Foreign Office file, ‘yes’ was pencilled in.60 Wendell Willkie, who had been President Roosevelt’s rival in the 1940 presidential election campaign, summed up the new status of white against black. ‘The day is gone’, he remarked in a speech in Rochester on 23 April 1942, ‘when men and women of whatever colour or creed can consider themselves the superior of other creeds or colours.’61 ‘Racially’ Pearl Harbor and Singapore marked the ‘end of an epoch’ to Walter White, the secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), in his letter to Fortune in May that year. ‘To assume’, he wrote, ‘that the postwar world will be determined and directed exclusively by so-called white peoples and nations with the acquiescence of black, brown and yellow peoples who constitute four-fifths of the world’s population is exceedingly dangerous.’62 In Britain some of these concerns had started a little earlier. The susceptibility of the Far Eastern empire to the propaganda of the Japanese had already rung warning bells in the Foreign Office in 1941. The slogan ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ used by the Japanese ‘certainly finds an echo among the people living in colonies or possessions of European nations’ according to one Foreign Office memorandum.63 The ‘natives’’ lack of loyalty to the British, French and Dutch imperial administrations was not only causing a military disaster but was forcing the administrators to think twice about colonialism. The first response by the British administration was to blame Japanese propaganda for the anti-European feeling. The head of the Ministry of Information section in Singapore, R. H. Scott, cabled to the Ministry in London that a fifth column was to blame for the collapse of Malaya. He telegrammed that: ‘Cunning use was made by the enemy – who had already planned a well-organized fifth column – of

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the weaknesses of our position to foster suspicion and distrust between races, and to excite anti-European feeling.’64 The British Foreign Office attempted to deal with the ‘cunning’ ploy of the Japanese by adjusting its own propaganda. In considering ‘political warfare’ for the Far East, one Foreign Office report (on the possibility of cartoon stories) made the point that even Germans should not be criticized: ‘It is, however, important at the present juncture that the enemy should not be depicted as a German or as a Japanese, the former because it might only arouse anti-Western feelings in general.’65 The India Office was of the same opinion as the Foreign Office that racial propaganda, particularly anything that denigrated Europeans, was problematic.66 Those producing British propaganda for the Far East seemed to oscillate between worrying about white prestige and self-representation and trying to affirm the savagery of their nonwhite enemy.67 The following year Isaiah Berlin noted that there were some in the United States who had similar fears of disloyalty about their own population. On 20 March 1942 he reported, in his usual abbreviated style: ‘Meanwhile both members of Administration and others are a good deal perturbed by development of Negro problem under influence of colour propaganda by Japanese.’68 According to Berlin, the concern over black agitation in the States was manifested by the administration in two ways: in encouraging employers to look more favourably on black workers; and in directing the criticisms elsewhere – to colonialism in Africa.69 The influential Phelps-Stokes Committee, in particular, produced a report ‘critical of British administration in Africa’.70 In October, Sir William McLean, head of the British Information Services in Washington and instructed on this occasion by the Colonial Office, replied to the Phelps-Stokes Fund. To Dr Jesse Jones, one of the directors, he wrote calmly: I note that your Report . . . refers to the newspaper reports, published at the time of the loss of Singapore, which suggested that our defeat was due to defects in our colonial administrative system and treatment of colonial peoples. These are now recognized as having given an untrue picture, and it is unfortunate that, in the shock of our defeat they were given undue prominence.71 Although this was the official response of the Colonial Office, it was not their internal assessment. Colin Thornley, a former district officer in Tanganyika, seconded to the Colonial Office during the war, was

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then principal private secretary to the secretary of state for the colonies. His memorandum reiterated the American criticisms. Frankly, Thornley wrote: The events of the last few months have shown the immense difficulty of successfully defending areas in which the native population is secretly hostile or sullenly indifferent. Our failure to win the sympathy and co-operation of the native inhabitants has largely contributed to the Japanese victories in the Far East.72 It was the phrase ‘secretly hostile and sullenly indifferent’ that seem to preoccupy the Colonial Office despite some evidence of local populations actually ‘taking up arms’ against British forces. Hostility and sullen indifference, rather than open conflict, were denied by Lord Cranborne, then secretary of state for the colonies, in the House of Lords.73 Nonetheless, it would prove to be a haunting phrase in future discussions on the empire. Moreover, the Colonial Office had been forewarned. In December of 1941, Scott, of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Ministry of Information, had written to London to suggest that all was not well: Public morale in Malaya: This is of paramount importance to the defence of Singapore, and therefore to the war in the Pacific. Of all forms of government a British Crown Colony is one of the worst fitted to cope with a crisis. It is neither a democratic partnership with the public, nor a dictatorship: it is a kind of mild and benevolent despotism, the people treated as children politically and the government regarding themselves as trustees, not as overlords.74 The expression of disillusionment with colonial administration among members of the British elite intensified after the fall of Singapore. Noel Sabine, who was head of the publicity committee in the Colonial Office, brought to the Office’s attention The Times’s phrase ‘out of touch’ which had often been repeated about the administration in the Far East. Sabine spelled out in his confidential report that ‘Criticism of the civil administration in Malaya (perhaps extended to colonial policy generally) will probably tend to be vague and difficult to answer’, and will assume the government ‘failed because it was out of touch with the mass of the Asiatic population’.75 The rapid loss of the Far Eastern colonies to Japan had a major impact on those concerned with colonial administration. Part of the

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shock at the defeat of Singapore was caused by underestimating Japanese military experience and capabilities, which was itself largely a result of racial views of the Japanese as inferior.76 The sense of crisis, however, was magnified by doubts about the future of colonial administration. A letter to the Manchester Guardian implied, according to Sabine, that ‘our whole colonial policy is at fault’.77 Hailey concurred in an article in the Spectator that: One of the first results of the shock caused by the late unhappy events in the Far East was to provoke a demand for a radical change in a colonial policy which seemed to have failed to rouse in the peoples concerned the necessary desire to defend themselves against Japanese aggression.78 Later that year, Hailey wrote Britain and Her Dependencies. His views expressed there indicate that the fall of Singapore had convinced him that even the work of a ‘disinterested and well-intentioned administration’ can be ‘nullified’ by ‘the contact of communities of a widely different racial composition’. He expressed some concern over racial discrimination and a separation from those in a ‘position of political or economic superiority’. Echoing The Times and Sabine, Hailey noted that, in the Far East, this separation been characterized as a ‘lack of touch’ between the government and the people where the resident Europeans ‘remained aloof from the native population’.79 As a solution, Hailey proposed ‘a new conception of a common citizenship and common ideals’. In particular, he suggested, local people ought to be employed in the administration: A new conception of our relationship, possessing the dynamic force that some have sought for it, may emerge as part of the movement for the betterment of the backward peoples of the world, which stands in the forefront of every enlightened programme for the planning of postwar conditions. But there are some points of immediate policy which demand our attention. We must in the first place expedite the process of associating the more advanced section of the peoples of the dependencies in the actual administration of their own affairs.80 Hailey was starting to develop a new mission for colonial administration – one that departed from the practice of indirect rule and one that tried to address the ‘task’, as he spelled it out in the Spectator, ‘of

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rehabilitating our rule in these territories, with the added drawback of a grave loss of prestige’.81

The impact of the fall of Singapore on native administration Native administration had been under discussion for some time, but the fall of Singapore was the event that retrospectively gave weight to those negotiations. There had been memoranda, meetings and committees to investigate the future for colonial administration but until Singapore they had been inconclusive. It was the pressure of criticism, from many sections of society, that forced the pace of decision-making after Singapore. There were three aspects to the discussion on native administration. The first was the broadest: the problem of a general direction of colonial policy and whether self-government, with its attendant political institutions, was thought to be viable in the colonies, especially in Africa. This meant deciding whether to maintain or discontinue the use of indirect rule. The second question was how to organize the administration to realize that aim – did this mean allowing Africans into the existing administration or building up separate African institutions? The third was a result of the discussion of question two. Once there was a new accord on the need to ‘Africanize’ colonial administrations, so imperial control could be expressed in a new rationale. The relationship of London and the colonies could be justified in terms of ‘partnership’ and state-led development. The transformation in the justification of colonial rule is both indicative of how far ideas on racial discrimination had changed and of the significance, in the longer term, of the change in those ideas. Note that here, however, what is under examination is how these relations were justified, not the actual practices of the time. Through studying the justification for the practice, the aim is to see how the elite anticipated or expected change to take place even if, in the end, they practised only the rhetoric or minimal levels of intervention. Shortly after the declaration of war against Germany, Malcolm MacDonald, then secretary of state for the colonies, had convened a special meeting to consider ‘Future policy in Africa’. MacDonald brought together, in the Carlton Hotel, the key thinkers on colonial administration: Lord Hailey, Lord Lugard, Professor Coupland, Professor Hancock, Dr Julian Huxley, Margery Perham; and from the Colonial Office: Sir Cosmo Parkinson, Arthur Dawe, Sir John

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Shuckburgh and Frederick Pedler.82 Huxley made the point that: ‘unless we could establish the dependent Empire on a firm moral basis, it would be a continual source of weakness.’83 Although the Carlton Hotel discussion was inconclusive, certain points achieved some consensus. Both Lugard and Hailey raised the issue of the suitability of parliamentary institutions.84 Lugard claimed that: ‘Parliamentary institutions were not, however, suited to Africans.’85 Later on, Hailey raised the problematic nature of the future of native administration, echoing his concern first voiced in the African Survey,86 and recommended that, instead of continuing with indirect rule, they should follow ‘the alternative course of integrating the native administration’.87 Margery Perham, in reply, voiced doubts about the desirability of integration. The political demands of the African intelligentsia were ‘rapidly acquiring political consciousness’ and, rather than ‘give in to them too soon’, she proposed ‘setting up large regional councils of native administration’ which should aim ‘to speed up the political education of the native authorities and to head off the intelligentsia from the state system’.88 Harold Butler commenting later on the minutes did not agree: ‘Indirect rule, to my mind, had better be used as a means to the end of educating Africans to take their parts in those institutions than as a means to preserving them as interesting museum exhibits.’89 Arthur Wright protested that ‘you cannot keep the educated African within the sphere marked out for him by anthropologists and politically nervous administrations’.90 This debate was unresolved in 1939, and Hailey was commissioned to research native administration in the British territories in Africa.91 Prior to the war, Hailey’s views seem to have contained a measure of criticism of the ‘orthodoxy’ of indirect rule but, at the same time, he viewed Africans as belonging to several distinct races.92 More importantly, Hailey doubted African administrative capability and feared the demand for elections, doubting Africans’ ability to handle democracy. The other unresolved issue discussed at the Carlton Hotel was the question of employing Africans in native administration.93 The Carlton Hotel group doubted whether Africans were ‘suited’ to democracy but, through the prism of political and economic expedience, they saw a certain advantage in increasing the numbers of Africans employed.94 Lugard was of the opinion that employing Africans in place of British staff, ‘especially in the technical and clerical posts’, would be the ‘best way’ of ‘effecting economies’. Hailey questioned the savings possible, but raised the more important political question of ‘what place Africans ought ultimately to fill in the services’. Anxious

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about future resentment, Hailey insisted there should be a ‘general determination to employ more Africans’.95 There was already a significant discussion within the Colonial Office on the topic of African employment. The discussion had begun as a result of two factors – neither a result of actual increased employment of Africans. First, the economic slump of the 1930s had put the principle of self-sufficiency of colonies under strain. Second, in an attempt to address economic and social problems, an expansion of the African social services was planned under the 1940 Colonial Welfare and Development Act, then under consideration.96 ‘As Lord Hailey has repeatedly pointed out,’ a Colonial Office memorandum explained, ‘the somewhat negative doctrine of political trusteeship has been transformed by the acceptance of our primary responsibility for the promotion of social welfare, which involves the abatement of poverty and the building-up of health and other services.’97 The importance of this discussion for the Colonial Office, despite the few posts involved, is shown by the number of files taken up with this topic. This discussion is also important because it is a useful indication of the Colonial Office’s general views and prejudices about Asian and African people. On 3 August 1939, G. L. M. Clauson produced a memorandum on the salaries of African civil servants and their relation to the expansion of the social services. He warned about the present arrangement where the majority of Africans earned, if anything at all, between £5 and £10 a year, while the small minority that had gained qualifications could expect as a Clerk in the Service between £27 and £200 (for example, in Nyasaland) or as an African Native Medical Officer between £200 and £720 (in Nigeria).98 To some extent this ‘great gulf’ was very rare as the higher salaries were only available to Africans who had been educated in Britain.99 But the common concern in the Colonial Office was, as Frederick Pedler (who travelled with Hailey on his 1940 research tour) put it, that ‘so long as you have Europeans on high salaries in Africa, the exceptional African will demand European standards or turn seditious’.100 It is noticeable that at this stage of the debate, in 1939, the concern was about the resentment of Africans at the obvious discrimination of being paid less than their European contemporaries. The Colonial Office aimed also to uphold colonial self-sufficiency and wanted to minimize the cost of civil servants. Eastwood minuted, quoting Hailey at the Education Committee, ‘the primary need of Africa was for more subordinate staff and not for superior staff’.101 This issue was complicated by the creation of the Unified Services which meant that a

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particular colonial service job in one country was formally equivalent to the same job in another country.102 Its introduction provided more career opportunities for the existing Colonial Service personnel. Inadvertently, however, it meant that a Nigerian employed by the Unified Service could be, or could apply to be, redeployed in Ceylon.103 The idea of inter-racial rivalry, within the existing context of a colour bar, provoked fears of conflict and further discontent.104 It was thought to be to the Colony’s advantage to have cheaper personnel. For this reason, supposedly, Africans were paid less than Europeans. In 1939 some of the Office wanted Africans to be excluded from the Unified Services with the idea that those posts would be phased out as African personnel were recruited.105 The official line was that Europeans and Africans were paid the same for the same job but Europeans received extra remuneration by virtue of an ‘expatriation allowance’.106 This, combined with the practice of employing Europeans on ‘work of an organizing or specialist character to differentiate them from Africans’, effectively adding extra grades, was thought to be the best way of giving Africans administrative work while maintaining a black/white distinction.107 The ‘most awkward single point in the whole problem’, according to Sir Thomas Lloyd, the assistant secretary, was ‘keeping down costs’ while providing an ‘answer to the criticism of the scheme that it is designed to debar Africans from the Unified Services’, which would be a ‘departure’ from the ‘avowed policy of equal opportunity for all, irrespective of colour’.108 The concept of ‘trusteeship’ was invoked to create another justification for the separate treatment of colonial people from Europeans. The Colonial Office worried that Indians employed in Africa would hinder ‘trusteeship’ – as if Indians were indeed to blame for lack of employment opportunities for Africans.109 Frederick Pedler thought that the Colonial Office might have some ‘embarrassing situations’ unless the European colleagues accepted the Africans ‘as equals’ and ‘where necessary as superiors professionally’. The problem, Pedler continued, was not the fault of the Colonial Office, it was that: most Africans are still savages and this sometimes renders it difficult to make an exception for the African who has acquired “culture”; and because it sometimes happens that although European and African men could get on well together, the wives on both sides are bundles of prejudice and ignorance.110

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But the cultured African was simply invoked to suit. Hailey argued the opposite point: he claimed that there was a ‘characteristically British desire to champion the merits of the unsophisticated against those of the sophisticated African’.111 Evidently, with or without ‘culture’, Africans were rarely considered polite company. Uniquely, Sir Alan Burns had tried to improve relations by starting a dining club for Africans and Europeans in Lagos.112 Burns’s meagre efforts were pretty isolated at that time. Discrimination was general practice. For example, Africans were forced to travel in French or Italian boats because of the ‘treatment on the British lines’. There were rail ‘restrictions’ for Africans, and until 1936 ‘Imperial Airways booking agents had instructions to turn away enquiries from Africans on the excuse that all seats were booked’.113 In the spring of 1940 the Colonial Office Committee on the Employment of Africans, which had been set up ‘with a view to the then Secretary of State making a public statement of policy’, was put on hold for two reasons:114 one, because they preferred ‘to wait for Lord Hailey’s return’ from Africa, and two, because the Committee needed a new chairman.115 And when, in November 1940, a message came from the Gold Coast asking for advice about whether Mr S. O. Quashie Idun, a District Magistrate, could become a member of the Colonial Legal Service, part of the Unified Service, the Colonial Office was still waiting for ‘Lord Hailey’s views’ before deciding.116 In the spring of 1941 the issue of employment resurfaced, partly, it seems, due to the persistent questioning of Dr Harold Moody of the League of Coloured Peoples. Dr Moody wrote often to the Colonial Office when he suspected ‘colour discrimination’, and although most of the replies were courteous, they were often vague and non-committal. In 1940, when the British Government felt isolated in the face of Germany aggression and rationing had begun, the Colonial Office were contemptuous of Dr Moody’s complaints. Sir John Shuckburgh, the deputy under-secretary of state for the colonies, sneered that: ‘Dr Moody is very glib about “justice” for the coloured man; he had better wait until it is rather more certain than at the moment that there is soon again going to be any justice for anybody.’117 The combination, in the spring of 1941, of Dr Moody’s collaboration with the magazine New Statesman and Nation, and the return of Hailey from his investigations into African native administration reinvigorated the internal Colonial Office discussion. Hailey had concluded from his African tour that Colonial Office ‘sincerity’ would be tested by the ‘readiness to admit Africans to such posts’ in the administration.118

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New Statesman and Nation revealed, however, that the Service regulations ‘stipulated that candidates must be of European descent’.119 Publicly, the Colonial Office disagreed with the New Statesman. Privately, Charles Jeffries, assistant under-secretary of state, admitted that ‘the difficulty in dealing with this sort of lie is that if one is to answer it properly, it is necessary to go into a certain amount of explanation which arouses suspicion that one is trying to evade the issue’. Instead, he suggested, Sabine, in charge of the Publicity and Information department, should try to see the editor to ‘make him understand the true position’.120 Lord Moyne, the secretary of state for the colonies, confessed to his staff that: Unfortunately we are on very weak ground in this matter. Paragraph 3 of Appendix III makes it clear that no one can be a candidate for admission to the united branches unless of European descent, etc. It is no remedy for this disqualification that the Secretary of State has discretion to admit non-Europeans under paragraph 4. The Secretary of State cannot know about suitable candidates under paragraph 4 if they are barred from applying under paragraph 3. I realize that these regulations are framed partly in view of Indian applications but as Indians are admitted to the Indian Civil Service, I don’t think there is any grievance if they are not given equal treatment in the Colonial Services.121 Throughout May and June of 1941, many in the Colonial Office attempted to rewrite the precise wording of the regulations so as to maintain the position of excluding Indians from the Unified Service while trying to uphold the principle of ending colour discrimination.122 Even Sir Owen Williams, one of the old generation, realized that ‘the African will be likely to attach a certain “prestige” to being a member of a Unified Service’.123 ‘An earlier concession’ to the idea of Africans being part of their administration could, suggested Hailey, ‘delay’ the demand for ‘popular institutions’ and the issue of independence.124 Furthermore, Hailey cautioned, ‘general discontent’ could impel ‘race consciousness to express itself in a permanent state of racial antagonism’.125 Jeffries, meanwhile, thought that the political issue could be defused by changing the wording alone. The Colonial Office could uphold the ‘principle that a coloured candidate is equally eligible with a white candidate for membership of a Unified Service’, proposed Jeffries, and, he continued, ‘there is no reason why we

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should not continue to exercise complete discretion both as to selection and as to the assignment of a selected candidate to a post in the Service’.126 In other words, the Colonial Office would avoid public criticism of its practice of discrimination because it had removed the necessity to discriminate from the regulations. Jeffries’s idea to remove the discriminatory language was too late to prevent further embarrassment. The League of Coloured Peoples published the correspondence between Dr Moody and Lord Moyne, and the New Statesman and Nation commented that the revised version, where ‘British protected persons’, ‘natives’ and ‘residents in the Empire’ were to be accepted as candidates, still involved wording which ‘separates Europeans from others’.127 By September 1941 J. J. Paskin, private secretary to the secretary of state and head of the Ceylon and Pacific department, admitted in his memorandum on the ‘colour bar’ that ‘it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the unification of the Colonial Services must necessarily restrict the opportunities of the advancement of coloured people in those Services’. Paskin was still, however, convinced that the secretary of state would be ‘ill-advised to come out with a strong public condemnation of all discrimination in the Colonies without a very careful consideration of the logical consequences of a determined attempt to do away with racial discrimination’.128 He, and others in the Service, proposed a different tactic to Jeffries’s rewriting of the rules. Either discrimination was problematic and the minister should set an example and try to eradicate it, or, as Paskin and Sir George Gater thought, discrimination was part of the service and a public condemnation would only lead to more charges of hypocrisy, thus raising the political temperature.129 A few months later, in the spring of 1942, the colour bar took on a new meaning. The loss of the Far Eastern empire, and more importantly the lack of loyalty displayed in the process, put everybody associated with colonial policy under new pressure. Colour discrimination was an obvious way in which the colonial administration had compelled the ‘natives’ to become ‘secretly hostile or sullenly indifferent’. The report from the American Phelps-Stokes Fund, published in August 1942, intensified the demand that ‘European officials should gradually give way to a trained native African Civil Service’ to forestall a ‘dangerous’ situation.130 Jeffries argued that ‘it is a case for playing for time’ while watching out for the ‘intolerable position in which the Secretary of State is placed if colourable charges of “racial discrimination” can be brought’.131

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The charge of ‘racial discrimination’ had only too visible consequences, particularly after it was known that ‘preference [had been] given to Europeans in evacuating from danger areas’ in Malaya.132 Learning the lessons of Singapore, Colin Thornley, principal private secretary, explained that ‘they cannot be certain that this is a black as well as a white man’s war, unless they are persuaded beyond a shadow of doubt that the peace which follows it will be a black as well as a white man’s peace’.133 The fall of Singapore had brought home the significance of racial discrimination and its importance for the relationship between the ‘natives’ and the colonial administration. Later in 1942, a black and white segregated American army arrived in Britain and ‘raised in an acute form’ the issue of discrimination within Britain (examined in Chapter 3). The new secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Cranborne, commented that ‘the full implication of this most unfortunate development of the war cannot yet be gauged’.134 What emerges from Chapter 3 is, however, that the Colonial Office, although initially dismissive of the problem of discriminatory treatment, changed their tack as the British public rejected American segregation.

A new language for the Colonial Service By August 1943 the draft White Paper on Colonial Service Reorganization included the statement that ‘the practice of distinguishing certain posts as normally filled by European Officers should be discontinued as should any other discriminatory reference in the title of posts as given in staff lists’.135 Jeffries noted that ‘instead of posts being classified as “European” and “African” appointments, new grades of an intermediate kind would be created’.136 In March 1944 Oliver Stanley, then secretary of state, sent this telegram to the Governors of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia: Following question is being asked in Parliament tomorrow. Begins. To ask the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he will now consider the removal of racial discrimination in the payment of salaries in the professions in West Africa, particularly in view of the fact that the development of these Colonies will largely depend upon increasing numbers of Africans qualifying for posts in these professions. Ends. Following will be my reply. Begins. I do not accept the suggestion that there is racial discrimination in West African salaries. The

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differentiation that exists is based on the factor of expatriation which affects staff recruited from outside West Africa. . . . I agree with my Honourable Friend as to the importance of stimulating and encouraging the staffing of the Colonial public services by the people of the Colonies themselves and I emphasized this in the House last July when speaking on the Colonial Office Estimates. Ends.137 The long internal discussion on African employment had finally concluded that there should be an end to the formal requirement of discrimination, although in practice salaries would still diverge. The Colonial Office had stuck to the point, as expressed by Hailey, that to pay ‘natives’ the ‘same salary, or something approaching it, as that formerly paid to Europeans’ would impose ‘an unreasonable burden on the finances of the territory’.138 Anxious of the consequences of this policy, however, the Colonial Office with the Ministry of Information had commissioned a pamphlet from Hailey on The British Colonial Empire – Some Problems.139 Much of this material, on the ‘race relationships’ of the West Indies, East and West Africa and Ceylon, was used again by Hailey in his book Britain and Her Dependencies. Despite the fact that Hailey thought that ‘racial self-respect’ was just a ‘natural outcome’, Hailey also counselled, to a Colonial Office that was increasingly attempting to change, that: No one can afford to belittle the formative influence which the grant of political responsibility can exercise in satisfying the spirit of racial self-respect, a force which can be as dangerous if thwarted as it can be beneficial if directed to constructive purposes.140 And it was after the experiences in the Far East that the question of political responsibility was raised in a concrete form in relation to Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Sir Alan Burns had been appointed Governor of the Gold Coast, from the autumn of 1942 and before he left for Africa, he pressed for permission to admit Africans to the Executive Council.141 He discussed his plan with Lord Moyne, then secretary of state for the colonies, who agreed in principle to his proposal. In February 1942, however, Moyne became the Deputy Minister in Cairo, and was replaced by Lord Cranborne as the secretary of state for the colonies. Cranborne decided to take advice from Hailey,142 rather than continue Moyne’s policy, particularly since, as Dawe advised Cranborne, Moyne had in fact ‘specifically charged

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Lord Hailey with the task of formulating a policy for Africa on exactly these questions’.143 Hailey accused Sir Bernard Bourdillon (then Governor of Nigeria) and Sir Alan Burns of political naivety for requesting changes that were not even being demanded by Africans at the time.144 Hailey was not against integrating Africans into the administration (which he had argued for earlier), but took a particular view as to how this process should take place.145 He argued against African admission to the executive, the ‘centre’ as he saw it. Instead, Hailey proposed that Africans become representatives in the legislature, where they would be forced to ‘take responsibility’ and learn the practice of compromise. This issue of responsibility had concerned Hailey since the interwar debates on the constitutional future of India. In 1930 he had argued that it had been a ‘tactical error for the Government of India to go to the [Round Table] Conference with any scheme for granting responsibility at the Centre, even on a modified scale’. As in Africa twelve years later, he thought the political focus on the centre, the pressure for change, would divert the delegates from autonomy on a provincial level; the place to start, according to Hailey, and ‘the only way of creating a sense of responsibility’.146 In the summer of 1942, when the legitimacy of colonial administration was at its nadir, the idea of developing responsibility appeared a luxury that those on the ground could ill afford. Burns wrote back to the Colonial Office requesting permission to ‘make this concession now, as a voluntary act, and not to wait until popular clamour has made it necessary’.147 Considering that Burns had already formulated his idea for constitutional change before arriving in the Gold Coast, and he also admitted that this was before popular demand arose, it seems that Burns was more influenced by international changes than those of a local nature. Burns’s telegram was fearful of ‘Negro resentment’ before it had developed, and he claimed that waiting for that anger to show itself would only make things worse.148 This anticipation of disaster seems to have been influenced by the loss of Singapore. Burns’s reaction and, more importantly, Cranborne’s agreement to his demands in September,149 were a distinct step away from the traditional path followed by the Colonial Office. It certainly was a break with the tradition that Hailey had seen in India. The main impact, however, of Colonial Office awareness of African discontent was, as Hailey had first pointed out, that the ‘native authorities’ were not proving to be suitable channels150 for the aspirations and activities of ‘politically minded Africans’.151 The question of

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‘acquiescence to our rule’, of which in 1940 Hailey was generally confident,152 was no longer, after the fall of Singapore in 1942, something that could be assumed. Hailey tried to emphasize the progress made by the Colonial Office towards employing non-Europeans.153 He argued that, for the future of the empire administration, the Colonial Office must ‘educate the European communities to realize that in the adjustment of racial differences social attitudes are fully as important as moral rectitude or political liberality’.154 The Colonial Office had also realized the importance of the public presentation of respect for colonial peoples. Having noted in 1940 that ‘generally speaking there is an unfortunate tendency to regard coloured people as belonging to a sub-species of the human race’, the Colonial Office began to suggest alternative presentations to the BBC.155 The Colonial Office requested that the Ministry of Information ‘allude on suitable occasions to the presence of Africans in the military and civilian defence services’.156 Meanwhile any use of the word ‘nigger’ in BBC broadcasts was discouraged, complaints having been received from George Ernest London, the colonial secretary in the Gold Coast (although he dismissed them as ‘African idiosyncrasies’)157 and from Sierra Leone.158 By March 1941, the BBC also considered the word ‘natives’ as derogatory and edited it out of Colonial Office radio talks.159 Hailey and Chatham House were encouraged to begin research on ‘colour discrimination’ that could be used to ‘stimulate a number of small improvements’,160 although it seems such a report appeared only in January 1947, and then only in a preliminary form.161 Hailey became sensitive to the question of language in stimulating ‘race consciousness’. In a debate in the House of Lords, he had brought up the problem of the unpopularity of the concept of trusteeship: ‘The use of the term is irritating to the Colonial people. It was intensely unpopular in India. It is becoming equally unpopular in the Colonies . . . if I were a native of the Colonies, I should equally resent [it].’162 This was an example of a break with old-fashioned paternalism. Hailey, now aware of race as a political issue, was searching for a new way to articulate the colonial relationship. In October 1941, Hailey had told the Royal Empire Society that it was time for ‘a new definition of the principle which inspired colonial policy, for the principle of trusteeship was not in its truest sense constructive’.163 Two years later, in his lecture at Toronto University in Canada, he pronounced that: There is no place in the British Commonwealth of Nations for peoples who are condemned to be permanently ‘backward’; nor for

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areas that must be always ‘depressed’. It can have no place for communities which cannot expect a future in which they will rank as free members of a society of free peoples.164 By this time, in 1943, Hailey had severed his allegiance to indirect rule and separate development. Now he was keen to claim that the ‘doctrine of segregation’ or ‘parallel rule’ could not be found in any of Britain’s dependencies.165 He replaced the concept of ‘trusteeship’, with its associated concepts of guardian and ward, with the idea of ‘partnership’ which, he hoped, would emphasize equal status.166 Hailey conceded that much of the rethinking of colonial affairs had arisen from the ‘shock’ and the ‘outburst of popular feeling produced by our military disasters in the Far East’.167 But he also suggested that he had lost his ‘loyalty to the policy of “indirect rule”’ because it had ‘limitations as a means of education in political self-rule’.168 As it was no longer a ‘basis for political advance’, Hailey was open to other ideas about developing African societies. Noticeably, apart from the concept of ‘partnership’, however, he did not attempt to systematize a new administrative system for Africa.169 In contrast to Hailey’s earlier doubts about the relevance of British parliamentary institutions for Africa, in his lecture at Princeton, he talked of how the conception of ‘the state as an agency for promoting the welfare and safeguarding the standards of living of the population’ had been ‘projected from domestic into colonial policy’.170 As Robert Pearce has remarked, ‘the most fundamental novelty after the war was the assumption that British methods and institutions were exportable to Africa.’171 Furthermore, Hailey also compared Britain’s relationship with its colonial people with America’s relations with its black population. Since ‘America has had similar experiences in many of its Southern States and among its Negro population’ so ‘both’ Britain and America needed to ‘revise their system’ to ‘enable the State to give more help to the development of under-privileged areas’.172 The way Hailey proposed that the state become an agency for development and protection will be further examined in Chapters 4 and 5. But it was the shock defeats by Japan – a non-white power – that forced the Colonial Office to rethink colonial administration. In the subsequent debate, Hailey pushed the need for increased African employment and also for a reconsideration of the assumption of separate development. Intertwined with Hailey’s notion of progressive state action was the idea that the same state which dealt with social questions in Britain could be relevant to people in Africa. Given the doubts

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that Hailey had expressed in the 1930s about the applicability of British institutions to Africa, this was quite a transformation in his views. Although in practice the need for Africans to learn ‘responsibility’ would, in Hailey’s eyes, delay independence, nonetheless starting to see British ways as applicable to Africans was an important step in the dismantling of the colour bar.

3 The Question of Equal Treatment

Introduction When Lord Hailey was in America in the winter of 1942–3 he visited several major universities and was invited to many important gatherings of businessmen, politicians and journalists as well as the crucial Institute of Pacific Relations conference (which is discussed in the next chapter). Arranged by the British Embassy and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, they gave Hailey the opportunity to put the case for the British Empire in America. One of his important messages, however, related to the United States rather than the British Empire. Hailey argued for conserving the status quo to prevent further instability, already increasingly apparent within America. Hailey was conscious of the black–white tension in the States when he warned his Princeton audience that: ‘it may well be found that the matters which cause unrest and unsettlement in the world arise mainly within the borders of its major powers.’1 This chapter provides the background to that comment of Hailey’s. Segregation in America and the British response to GI segregation in Britain was the backdrop to the changed outlook of Hailey and the Colonial Office. In particular, this chapter explains how the moral balance of power seemed to shift between 1942 and 1944. In 1942, American critics of British imperialism had the upper hand. But by 1944, the American criticisms were far more muted and, in some areas, the British were setting the agenda. The apparent success of Hailey’s arguments was not, however, due to his particular insight. It was the social, military and political circumstances that gave his arguments substance. American criticisms of the British Empire had implied that the 65

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‘natives’ were unhappy with imperial rule and would be better served by a new international body. Hailey used his trip in America to point out that the real test of a future international body would be ‘seen in the measure of the compliance accorded by the major powers of the world to its recommendations regarding disabilities existing within their own borders and arising from their own domestic policy’.2 In other words, international authority would be tested by control over the United States as well as elsewhere. Perhaps, Hailey thought that the vision of being told how to treat black people inside America would persuade the Stateside critics to be more careful with their words. The issue of equal treatment, however, was not just raised by Hailey, but also by the changes that were taking place during the war. This chapter examines the way in which equal treatment became an important political demand in the Second World War and how Hailey and the Colonial Office reacted to this pressure. Hailey, before this important trip to America, had been briefed by the Foreign Office and Colonial Office about American public opinion and given newspaper clippings of important articles. From this material he had an idea of some of the changes that were affecting the United States and the way that these developments had impacted on popular opinion. One of the issues in which Hailey was interested was the position of black people in the States. Some of his interest had been prompted by his investigation of the discussion in the West Indies about the effect of American bases there. His own research into the assimilation of ‘natives’ into the colonial administration had made him aware of the problem of segregated development. Moreover, a dominant issue in the American press was the issue of black employment in the war industries and in the armed forces.

Race in America Increased production in America in readiness for war had started to eat into the unemployment left over by the Depression. Black people had been hit hardest by the Depression. In desperation thousands of black people from the southern States moved north to look for work. The manpower needs of the American government combined with the continuing struggle for jobs, created tensions, as Desmond King has noted: The number of black Americans working in Government rose from approximately 40,000 in 1938 to over 300,000 during the war.

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However, racial tension was palpable, frequently exploding into riots, both in southern towns with training camps and in northern cities with defence production industries.3 The Carnegie Foundation had, since its inauguration in 1911, exhibited concern over the conflict of black–white relations.4 Dr Frederick Keppel, president of the Foundation from 1923 to 1941, helped to set up the Carnegie Poor White Commission that published five volumes on South African poor whites.5 Keppel was also key in financing Hailey’s study, An African Survey (1938). After Gunnar Myrdal had delivered the Godkin lectures at Harvard University in 1938,6 Dr Keppel suggested that the Swedish social scientist would be the ideal person to dispassionately investigate the race question in the United States.7 Although much of the research was delegated, Dr Keppel was insistent that Myrdal and his wife tour America in 1939 to form his own opinion before reading any ‘biased literature’. Myrdal agreed, reasoning, so David Southern reports, that ‘if Americans could go into a foreign country and inoculate the people to protect them from deadly pathogens, two Swedish scholars might be able to do the same for the disease of American racism.’8 Myrdal’s own work, and those of his commissioned authors, was largely written in 1942, a time when, after the fall of Singapore, there was a certain sensitivity to the strategic importance of race.9 His book, An American Dilemma; the Negro Problem and American Democracy, was finally published in 1944, but it maintained that spirit, established at a key moment, of warning the West that race would be crucial to the postwar world: Whether any promises to the Negro are fulfilled or not, it can be predicted with a fairly high degree of certainty that this War, when and if it is won, and its sour aftermath will act like the First World War did – as a great shock to the Negro people and as a stimulant to their protest.10 Apparently, according to Myrdal, the war had created a new restlessness amongst black domestic workers. He remarked, sardonically, that ‘many white housewives notice strange thoughts and behaviour on the part of their Negro servants these days.’11 More importantly, however, as the defence industries grew so did the demand for equal access to employment, particularly as black people had been excluded from the jobs created in the New Deal.12 According to Southern, the trip did indeed make a deep impression on Myrdal as he found that the

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‘race problem was worse than he had imagined’.13 In An American Dilemma Myrdal echoed the concern the British had voiced about Malaya: Reading the Negro press and hearing all the reports from observers who have been out among common Negroes in the South and the North convinces me that there is much sullen scepticism, and even cynicism, and vague, tired, angry dissatisfaction among American Negroes today.14 Before America entered the war, black employment had become a source of tension as black people experienced, in the supposed free North, segregation in jobs, the army and housing.15 In January 1941 Asa Philip Randolph, leader of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters’ Union and former president of the National Negro Congress, started to organize for a march of black people on Washington to ‘exact their rights’, forming the March on Washington Movement (MOWM).16 Although the march was eventually called off after Roosevelt met with the march leaders, the committee continued to apply pressure and organize local demonstrations throughout the war.17 The March on Washington Movement clearly worried the American State Department. On 25 June 1941 President Roosevelt, the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox and the Assistant Secretary of War Robert Patterson met Asa Philip Randolph, Walter White, of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and T. Arnold Hill, the leaders of MOWM, to discuss the issue of employment discrimination in both war industries and the army. After the meeting Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 ‘Reaffirming Policy of Full Participation in the Defense Program by All Persons Regardless of Race, Creed, Color, or National Origin’ and creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee. The Assistant Secretary of War issued a press statement that agreed to ensure that the War Department’s policies toward the services of Negroes would be on a ‘fair and equitable basis’. The Armed Forces, however, would remain segregated because, the War Department claimed, ‘no experiments should be tried with the organizational set-up of these units at these critical times’.18 In the defence-related industries and in the civil service, discrimination was outlawed by the Ramspeck Act (November 1940) and the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). As employment practices changed, due largely to the chronic shortage of labour, so the

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representation of black people in the media improved, according to Celeste Condit and John Lucaites.19 By 1942 the United States Office of War Information (OWI)20 admitted that a ‘narrow majority’ of newspapers were ‘supporting various phases of the demand for improved status for Negroes’.21 The bill, however, which planned to outlaw lynching was filibustered out of the Senate.22 Once America had officially entered the war, racial discrimination became more important as internal issues gained an international hearing. At the same time, however, restrictions on travel and on political opposition during the war made it harder for black organizations inside the United States to criticize racist policies. For example, such a March on Washington would have been prevented by rationing of train travel; moreover, it would have been taken as virtually treasonous in wartime conditions.23 Outside the States, however, US race discrimination, known as Jim Crow, had become politically much more significant. First, emigration of black people to northern cities made segregation and job discrimination into a live issue in the north. Racial antagonism was no longer a peculiarity of the South, it was now a central issue, particularly in the run-up to the 1940 presidential election, in the industrial and political heartland of America. Second, the political message of the war mobilization, crucial in turning Americans away from the previously isolationist consensus, was that America was going to fight the tyranny of the Axis powers. The main argument against tyranny at the time involved championing democracy – but democracy in the States was a hollow slogan when, because of the poll tax, few black people could vote. Furthermore, events in the Pacific arena had put race equality on the international agenda. The Japanese attack on American warships at Pearl Harbor and the rapid success of the Japanese in South-East Asia undermined white prestige both in Britain and in America. Myrdal warned of the growing political consciousness, awakened by recent international developments: In this war there was a ‘colored’ nation on the other side – Japan. And that nation had started out by beating the white Anglo-Saxons on their own ground. The smouldering revolt in India against British rule had significance for the American Negroes, and so had other ‘color’ incidents in the world conflict: the wavering sympathies of several native populations in the Dutch and British possessions in the Pacific, the mistrust against Great Britain among

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the Arab peoples, the first abandonment of Ethiopia, and the ambiguity of the plans for the colonial chessboard of Africa. Even unsophisticated Negroes began to see vaguely a color scheme in world events, although their thoughts are usually not yet organized in a definite pattern.24 Even if Myrdal exaggerated, many others, often influential, echoed his views. Some of the philanthropic foundations hoped that after the war Africa might look to the United States for development programmes, and race relations would matter far more for America’s international reputation.25 Meanwhile the US War Department complained of a ‘serious morale problem among Negro troops’ in the summer of 1942.26 Isaiah Berlin, reporting from Washington, smugly recounted (although using a capital letter for Negro for the first time27) that: Americans who are fond of criticizing the treatment of subject races by other people found similar troubles nearer to home this week. The Navy authorized for the first time the enlistment of negroes for general service, though not for commissioned rank, and this concession was criticized as both belated and inadequate by the negro organizations. On 12 April the Administration found it necessary to warn ten industrial concerns holding big war contracts that they would incur severe penalties if they did not cease discriminating against Negro, Jewish and Catholic workers.28 What was perhaps most worrying for the American establishment was Myrdal’s report of virtually treasonous sentiments: ‘There have been reports that poor Negro sharecroppers in the South sometimes indulge in dreams of a Japanese army marching though the South and killing off a number of “crackers” [southern whites].’29 Myrdal was not alone. Harold Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, felt that disloyalty was a problem in Washington. ‘There seems to be a feeling that the Japanese’, he wrote in his diary, ‘are doing a good deal of disturbing undercover work among the Negroes.’30 Berlin reported to the British Foreign Office that: ‘both members of administration and others are a good deal perturbed by development of negro problem under influence of colour propaganda by Japanese.’31 The preoccupation with Japanese influence indicates how many Americans sought to locate the problem of race relations outside the United States. By blaming Japanese undercover agents, the Washington establishment could ignore the conditions that black

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people faced in the USA and the inspiration that Japan offered the oppressed. Japanese-Americans were confirmed as the problem by Executive Order 9066, signed by President Roosevelt four days after the fall of Singapore, which interned all enemy-aliens in the States. The next order gave a special exemption to 80 000 German and Italian residents, leaving 110 000 Japanese-Americans (including 71 000 citizens) to face the camps in the desert.32 After the establishment of the FEPC, the focus of discontent became the Armed Forces. It was not until April 1942 that black Americans became eligible to join the Marines and as late as 1949 there was only one black officer out of 8200 officers in the Marines (75 000 total strength).33 The US Air Force was even more restrictive.34 Throughout the armed forces black people were confined to menial tasks, and when America entered the war there were only five black officers in its entire army, three of whom were chaplains.35 During most of the Second World War, black citizens of the USA were denied a fighting role. This was in contrast to the American Civil War. Then, there had been two black regiments (the 54th Massachusetts – freemen, and the 1st South Carolina – ex-slave) and many medals of distinction had been awarded.36 The twentiethcentury segregation of black and white personnel led to a systematic marginalization of black soldiers.37 There were few openings for black officers, barred, as they were, from leading white men.38 Even the placement of enlisted men was difficult for an army preoccupied with maintaining the ‘colour line’. The official guidelines given to white field-grade officers in charge of black men indicates the contempt that was rife in high command: As an individual the negro is docile, tractable, lighthearted, carefree and good-natured. If unjustly treated he is likely to become surly and stubborn, though this is usually a temporary phase. He is careless, shiftless, irresponsible and secretive. He resents censure and is best handled with praise and by ridicule. He is immoral, untruthful, and his sense of right doing is relatively inferior.39 The ‘most bitterly resented aspects of American racism’ were, according to Harvard Sitkoff, discrimination in the armed services and the lack of black combat units. Riots and racial violence at the military bases in America grew through 1941 and 1942 until, ‘after a bitter summer of violence, the war department officially acknowledged the existence of a serious morale problem among Negro troops and

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urged all white officers to treat blacks with the utmost care and diplomacy’.40 There was much resentment of the way in which black divisions were manoeuvred to keep them out of combat.41 When one division, for example, arrived in North Africa they were redesignated service troops and assigned the work of unloading ships in the Port of Oran.42 Just before the Battle of the Bulge, however, General Eisenhower ‘offered’ a ‘limited number of coloured troops who have had infantry training, the privilege of joining our veteran units at the front to deliver the knockout blow’. According to Russell Buchanan, though, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) thought that dropping the colour bar ‘might embarrass the War Department’ and General Eisenhower was persuaded to rewrite the directive. In the end, over four and a half thousand black troops volunteered before the revision and were trained and fought alongside white men.43 This, the only unsegregated unit in the American Army, fought successfully from March to VE Day and ‘interviewers later found that attitudes of whites toward Negroes improved during this exposure to coloured men in combat’.44 Despite this, the Pentagon moved them back into segregated regiments for the journey home. When the US Navy decided to permit black enlistment, there was a modicum of improvement. Previously the Navy had restricted black recruitment to menial jobs like cooks and stewards. Finally, on 7 April 1942, the Navy agreed to enlist black personnel for more positions, including the Coast Guard and the Marines. Initially the Navy attempted to segregate its personnel by trying to create black ships and submarines, which were staffed by white officers until sufficient black officers had been trained. The shortage, however, of trained black men meant that the Navy began to assign men to white ships without segregation (although with a limit of 10 per cent). The success of this policy and the increasing shortage of men meant that eventually, in July 1944, the Navy was training its black and white personnel together.45 Right from the start of the war, however, black people had tried to fight. The eyewitness account of the sinking of the battleship Arizona at the battle at Pearl Harbor, published in the New York Times, told how a ‘Negro mess attendant who never before had fired a gun manned a machine gun on the bridge until his ammunition was exhausted’.46 Dorie Miller, the first hero of the war in America, was a sharecropper’s son awarded the Navy Cross. He was finally killed in action in the South Pacific, still a messman and still barred from carrying a loaded gun because he was black.

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The experience of the war, however, ‘revolutionized the way that Americans talked about equality’.47 Wendell Willkie, the former presidential candidate, proclaimed towards the end of the war that: ‘every time some race-baiter ill-treats some man in America he lessens the ability of America to lead the world to freedom.’48 Under the leadership of Dr Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund and Father John LaFarge, Chairman of the Committee on Employment and Vocational Guidance of the New York Welfare Council, a select few ‘men and women carrying weight in the fields of industry, labor, education and the formation of public opinion’ signed a statement putting the case for the ‘rights of minorities’. The statement illustrated the way that the international politics of the war impacted on American domestic politics – it stated that: Dictatorship aims to dominate the world by force, and to condemn certain racial groups permanently to subservient and inferior status. If we oppose Axis doctrines we must, to be consistent, oppose all race prejudice at home.49 Celeste Condit and John Lucaites, historians of political rhetoric, have pointed out that: Concerns about international ethos greatly amplified the issue of internal consistency. As long as it treated colored people inequitably, the nation was highly vulnerable to foreign propaganda challenging the sincerity of its claim to democracy.50 And one of the ways in which the importance of ‘international ethos’ was brought home to the Americans was through their relationship with Britain and with China. While American critics of empire were having an impact on British policy, British criticisms of segregation were weakening American resolve. Both the critics and the policymakers were influenced by the circumstances of the debate. They were engaged in a war fought for a ‘new world order’ where support from China and India, two non-white nations, was essential.

Race as an international issue The initial response in America to the fall of Singapore was that the problem of race discrimination was a British, not an American, problem. It appeared, from across the Atlantic, that the collapse of the

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Far Eastern empire was due to poor race relations. Raymond Buell, the American sociologist, famous for his book The Native Problem in Africa,51 followed up Walter Lippmann’s attack in the Washington Post (see Chapter 2) with an article damning British, and more importantly, white, imperialism in Fortune magazine in May 1942. He presented the argument that: The aim of this proposal is not to revive a dead or dying imperialism nor to impose a white man’s peace on a world that is only half white. Its aim is to cut the remnant cords of white imperialism, so that the nations of the world may become more nearly equal. Its immediate aim is to enlarge the practical area of human freedom. Its ultimate goal is the collective security of equal, self-respecting nations.52 One reason that Buell and Lippmann were prepared to criticize ‘white man’s imperialism’ was because it appeared to legitimate American leadership. As Lippmann put it, for ‘this drastic reorientation of war policy, the leadership of the western nations must be taken by the USA’.53 It was precisely this assumption of American superiority that worried the British Foreign Office. One response of the Foreign Office was, in contrast to Buell and Lippmann, to say that Britain’s interests were best served by promoting a language of equal relations so that Britain could maintain its status in relation to the United States.54 The discourse of equal rights did not, however, come easily to the British establishment. First, there was the question of India (discussed in Chapter 5). From the point of view of the American press, and particularly the black press, Britain seemed to be wilfully refusing to grant India independence from the Empire.55 Stories of disloyal ‘natives’ during the fall of Singapore only served to entrench the opinion that the British maltreated Asians and Africans. Second, the British had had interwar treaties with Japan, and did not easily transfer their allegiance to China. In contrast, the Americans felt that courting China was essential to stop the development of a war of ‘yellow against white’ in the Pacific. Lippmann, in his famous Washington Post article, had argued that American’s sincerity towards Asian peoples could be seen in the loyalty to China shown by the United States. Instead of the ‘black treachery’ of a bargain with Japan, the US had avoided a ‘terrible and endless struggle of the white and yellow peoples’ and ‘thus’, Lippmann claimed, ‘we are at war with Japan because we would not and could not betray China, and these are

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the credentials of our sincerity in our alliance with the peoples of Asia.’56 The American State Department concurred with Lippmann, the Joint Intelligence Committee stating that ‘China’s position as a member of the United Nations is of definite aid in favorably affecting public sentiment towards the United Nations among Asiatic peoples.’57 American sympathy for China was, however, a new position for the United States. When Lord Halifax (later the British ambassador to Washington) was charged to ‘sound out the Americans with respect to a £3m Chinese loan’ to support their war effort after the Japanese invasion in 1937, the diplomats in Washington responded, according to Ian Drummond and Norman Hillmer, only ‘after a long delay’ and then only opted for a ‘parallel and simultaneous but not identical action’.58 Once the Pacific War had begun, however, the alliance with China became crucial. In September 1942, Ashley Clarke, for the British Foreign Office, met with Walter Lippmann to discuss Far Eastern policy. Lippmann was concerned that ‘without China you would inevitably get a set up of east against west’, which is what prompted an ‘interest in China in America [that] was profound as well as widespread’.59 The need for the Chinese alliance was no longer a point of dispute. The disagreement was over the future of Hong Kong. Ashley Clarke and the Colonial Office wanted to wait and see the ‘state of affairs in China after the war’ and whether Hong Kong might have some ‘special role’ to play in the relationship between the USA, China, Britain and Russia. In reality, the Foreign Office did not want to lose the emblem of British achievement that Hong Kong represented. ‘Psychologically at the back of all English thought on this subject’, Clarke explained, was the idea that ‘Hong Kong was a barren island when we took it over and that we had created and built up the Hong Kong of today.’60 The combination of strategic and ‘psychological’ interests meant that Britain refused to transfer its sovereign rights over Hong Kong to China. Both Britain and the United States, however, agreed to make ‘a symbolic gesture toward China’s equality’61 and gave public ‘declarations of intention to give up extraterritorial rights in China’.62 Although these were only statements of intent they were greeted, especially in the States, as ‘tangible evidence that the old age imperialism is ended’.63 In private, Washington was putting pressure on British officials to let go of Hong Kong. In public, however, the State Department was

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attempting to reform America’s own anti-Chinese legislation. In 1882, Congress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which made further Chinese immigration illegal and forbade first generation Chinese to become citizens or own property.64 It was not until late in 1943 that the US Congress finally annulled some of the restrictions on Chinese immigration – a restriction that was largely seen, according to John Dower, Pacific war historian, as a ‘pure “colour” law’ that ‘placed a “stigma of biological inferiority” on the yellow races’.65 The racism of America’s immigration controls was common knowledge at the time. Even the Report of the Detroit Committee (a number of ‘leading professional and business men’ who were in the Foreign Office’s opinion ‘a good cross section of the views of the leaders there’) admitted that: ‘As for Orientals it is well known that for many years they have been personae non gratae. Our immigration laws now exclude them both from entry and from becoming US citizens.’66 After the experience of the 1943 summer of very intense race riots and a palpable black–white tension in the United States, the Detroit Committee appear to have been almost relieved to point out that the ‘conflict between Japan and China demonstrates clearly that colour and racial ties are not a binding force’.67 The recognition of the significance of China in the Pacific alliance was not without its ramifications for British imperial relations. In February 1942 Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour Party and Lord Privy Seal, made the point to the prime minister, Winston Churchill, that: The fact that we are now accepting Chinese aid in our war against the Axis powers and are necessarily driven to a belated recognition of China as an equal and of Chinese as fellow fighters for civilization against barbarism, makes the Indian ask why he too cannot be master in his own home.68 The status of the Asian nations was further highlighted when the American State Department suggested to Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, that America and Britain produce a new colonial charter (examined in Chapter 5). Cordell Hull, from the State Department, suggested to Halifax that, once the joint statement had been worked out between Britain and the United States, other nations could be approached and included in its public signing. In particular, Hull was keen to involve the Chinese, who, he claimed, ‘always had an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the United States and ourselves and he would

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like to bring them into it. They would not do any harm. It would soothe feeling’.69 By gaining the support of an Asian nation such as China, the United States was hoping to show that the Pacific War was neither racist nor directly pro-imperialist. Lord Halifax, however, as Britain’s representative, was uncomfortable with this idea. The issue was not just race relations – imperial prerogative was also at stake. Halifax hoped that ‘not all’ of the United Nations would be invited to sign, and Halifax agreed that just ‘a few of the principal nations’ would be included. Halifax admitted that the British were ‘very conscious’ of certain ‘dangers’, one of which was ‘giving any encouragement to Chiang Kai-shek that it was his job to run empire or tell us how to do it’.70 In Britain, the connection between race and international politics had already been established by the war effort support provided by people from the colonies. Already, in late 1941, the Minister of Labour, Ernest Bevin, had taken the US ambassador, John Winant, to visit a training centre ‘for coloured workers brought over from India and the Colonies for war work’. In Winant’s company, Bevin announced that ‘in future Indians were not to be referred to as “coolies” and Africans as “niggers”, but as the great peoples they are’. Winant followed suit and talked of the recent foundation of the FEPC in the United States. According to the West African Pilot this news was appreciated: ‘the coloured workers said that they were glad to hear this, and following the President’s policy on the “race question” in America with keen interests, as it is bound to have great influence on the British colour bar policy in the Colonies.’71

Segregation comes to Britain In the summer of 1942, American segregated troops started arriving in Britain. The reaction of the British public to Jim Crow segregation came, in the long term, to affect the way in which the Colonial Office responded to American criticisms of imperial race relations. Public opinion seemed to give the Colonial Office a new-found confidence. The rough treatment of black soldiers from the colonies by the US Army, in particular, gave the Colonial Office a certain leverage with the Americans which they had previously lacked. Time magazine, for example, commented that ‘it seemed as if the English people and American Negroes, if uninterrupted, might teach anybody something about democratic possibilities’. The problem

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seemed to be no longer the Blimpish Imperialists, but ‘the fact that Southern soldiers have carried anti-Negro attitudes to England’.72 The Colonial Office, and particularly John Lucien Keith from the Welfare Department, were alarmed by reports of the ‘generally rude attitude’ of the American soldiers toward ‘coloured Colonial people’. Keith made a representation to the secretary of the Victoria League, Miss Leaf, to restrict the hostel accommodation of the Victoria League to ‘Dominion and Colonial people’ so that the Americans did not turf out the ‘coloured Servicemen’. The War Office, however, had a very different outlook on the matter to the Colonial Office. While the Colonial Office presupposed that American policy was the opposite of British policy,73 the War Office was ‘endeavouring to’ improve relations with the US authorities ‘by arranging for lectures to be given by Americans on the colour question’. In addition, the War Office would take ‘unobtrusive steps’ to find out the location of ‘coloured British soldiers or airmen’ so as to ‘avoid bringing together American white troops and our Colonial troops’.74 In other words, the War Office was of the opinion that Britain should begin to follow America’s example and introduce segregation. Keith, at the Colonial Office, was critical of the War Office policy. By the middle of 1942, Keith wrote, ‘the presence of large numbers of American negro troops in this country is already having repercussions on our work for coloured Colonial people, and the treatment the Americans mete out to their negroes is the subject of comment by coloured Colonials’. Keith was adamant that ‘it would be very undesirable for the Americans to lecture British people on colour bar!’ Moreover, he argued: Any open attempt to segregate the coloured American troops and keep them away from British civilians, white or coloured, or out of cinemas, etc, will I believe result in lively resentment in many quarters. Above all I think we should prevent Americans from instilling their colour bar ideas among British troops or civilians.75 Keith also raised the fact that British Honduras Foresters had been ousted from the Scottish Rest House for Servicemen and that ‘coloured civilians complain bitterly about the attitude and rudeness of American white troops towards them’.76 But W. L. Rolleston advised ‘considerable caution’ because ‘any attempt to “educate” the Americans would be greatly resented’.77 Sir George Henry Gater, the permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies, tried to maintain

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that ‘our principal objective should be to safeguard the interests of our Colonial coloured people who are resident in this country and maintain for them the policy that there should be no discrimination on the ground of colour’. But while he thought that ‘this does not mean, however, that we should accept any differentiation in our attitude towards white or coloured American troops’, he also considered, pragmatically, ‘if our hostels for Colonial people can in an emergency be used for negroes, I do not think that we ought raise any difficulty’.78 In other words, the Colonial Office would, in effect, sanction the American policy of segregating troops by providing hostel accommodation for United States’ black troops with their own Colonial servicemen. This discussion, by August 1942, was no longer confined to the Colonial Office. The Bolero Combined Committee, the ‘most important body dealing with the reception, accommodation and maintenance of the US forces in Great Britain’, devoted ‘one special meeting and parts of many others to racial issues’.79 What was absent from this distinguished committee of civil servants and military men was any representative of the Colonial Office. The conclusions drawn from the committee, in its pro-American stance, indicate a lack of sensitivity to the issue of racial equality in Britain. The Bolero special meeting concluded that ‘the American attitude to the coloured problem should be explained to the British public’ and US segregation followed as far as ‘practicable’.80 The Colonial Office, led by Lord Cranborne, the secretary of state for the colonies, rejected the Bolero conclusions. Cranborne’s paper, for the War Cabinet, insisted that ‘British coloured persons in the UK and in the Colonies are extremely sensitive to colour discrimination’, and that the aim of the Colonial Office was to ‘secure’ the ‘equality of treatment for all races’. Any plan to ask people in Britain to ‘adopt’ the attitude of the US Army was ‘likely to cause serious resentment’ and even ‘a reaction gravely prejudicial to Anglo-American relations’. Cranborne brought to the Cabinet’s attention the broadcast, on the 28 July 1942, made by Harold Macmillan, then parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies, and the recent article by Brendan Bracken, minister for information, in the Sunday Express, ‘both of which express very clearly the attitude which we would like the British public to take towards our own coloured people’.81 In the end the Cabinet agreed on a compromise wording: The Americans are making a great experiment in working out a democratic way of life in a mixed community, with races of very

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different characteristics and traditions. In doing so they have to take account of the legacy of the past and fears of the future. It is a difficult task and it is not for us to embarrass them, even if we have different views on how race relationships should be treated in our own country and in the Empire.82 One of the reasons for Cranborne’s insistence was that the Colonial Office was already sensitized to the issue of discrimination and that it had also spent some time considering the question of black recruitment into the services from British colonies. Like the issue of native administration discussed in the previous chapter, the war had forced the Colonial Office to reconsider its attitude to the treatment of black people from the colonies.

British black servicemen Before the segregated American forces arrived in Britain, the Colonial Office had had to consider the question of black recruitment. In general the Colonial Office advocated support for the war effort by colonial people while, at the same time, being reluctant to train them in the skills of warfare. The issue was further complicated by the War Office, which was hostile to black troops, believing them to be less competent than white soldiers. Gradually the Colonial Office realized that the accusation of colour discrimination caused political problems, although it was doubtful of the value of stating any unequivocal opposition to the colour bar. In October 1939 the government ‘clearly stated’ that its policy was that ‘candidates from the colonies, including those not of pure European descent, would be placed on the same footing for voluntary enlistment into the armed forces and for the grant of emergency commissions as British subjects belonging to the United Kingdom’.83 But in January 1940 Hilton Poynton of the Colonial Office realized, after Parliamentary Question Time, that the rules of the Admiralty did not fulfil these conditions. The rules for eligible enlistment were different for those of ‘pure European descent’.84 Although the conditions in question were fairly obscure, Poynton persisted, complaining: ‘I do not see that there is any logic in the argument and in the second place I do not think we can accept the resultant colour discrimination which is now reintroduced.’85 John Alexander Calder, however, cautioned Poynton that it was ‘their business’ how the Admiralty dealt with the apparent lack of

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‘logic’ and ‘at the most we might ask that they should not publish that they make special exceptions in the case of Europeans only’.86 Sir George Gater backed the attempt to avoid publicity.87 Malcolm MacDonald, the secretary of state for the colonies at that time, was more doubtful about whether publicity could be sidestepped and whether the Colonial Office might be charged with a ‘breach of faith’.88 Despite this apparent desire on the part of the Colonial Office to appear in favour of equal treatment, in fact it had strong reservations about black recruitment when it came to the issue of a West Indian contingent. There had been some possibility in 1940 of funds being raised in Trinidad to pay for a contingent to travel to Britain – but then Sir Alan Burns, then assistant under-secretary of state, realized that ‘the coloured men would certainly resent not being included in the contingent’ and that ‘if the War Office were to refuse such coloured men the effect in the Colonies would be most unfortunate’.89 The view taken by the Colonial Office and the War Office, in the end, was that: while [the War Office] welcome any white volunteer who arrives here, they do not think that for the sake of a few hundred white recruits it is worth running the risk of having to take coloured West Indians. They deprecate any organized move in the West Indies to send over white contingents, unless they can be assured that it will not give rise to colour difficulties.90 From this correspondence, however, it is apparent that the Colonial Office’s only worry about a white Caribbean contingent at this time concerned ‘irritating the native population’.91 In 1940, the immorality of such discrimination was not under debate. Instead the War Office assumed that black West Indians were unsuitable because, they remarked, black men did not have the ‘capacity to stand cold climate’92 and they preferred ‘white men who are better fighting material’.93 Although, later, after the fall of Singapore, Noel Sabine of the publicity department of the Colonial Office reacted defensively to the criticism that Britain had been ‘afraid’ to ‘arm the natives’ and claimed that ‘fear lest the arms be turned against ourselves was not a factor’.94 In retrospect, various people in the Colonial Office did feel the weight of American criticism as they, in contrast, had armed people in the Philippines. Hailey, too, commented in the Spectator that: ‘subsequent reflection has no doubt served to suggest that the attitude of the population might well have been different if Imperial military policy

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had foreseen the need for equipping the native population for its own defence.’95 In the early years of the war, however, it is evident that discrimination was not a real problem in the eyes of the Colonial Office. This can also be seen in relation to the treatment that colonial people experienced on British ships and in British hotels (see Chapter 1). In 1938, the Colonial Office had conferred with the India Office on the level of ‘colour discrimination’ producing a report that significantly downplayed existing discriminatory actions. The report claimed, for example: We do not know of any education institution that rejects applicants on grounds of colour alone. . . . The number of House Posts in hospitals is very small compared with the number of eligible candidates and competition is accordingly keen. But Indian students are from time to time selected . . . A difficulty in placing students in India for training as chartered accountants arises from the fact that reputable firms always insist on a personal interview before coming to a decision, but it has always been possible to place qualified candidates able to pay the necessary premiums. . . . Colour discrimination in Ships. No such case has been brought to our notice.96 From letters that the Colonial Office received on a regular basis from Harold Moody, the National Secretary of the League of Coloured Peoples, it is clear that complaints had been made about specific cases. When cases of discrimination did occur, however, the Colonial Office tended to assume that the problem was merely one of etiquette. For example, in the case of segregation on board British ships, one Colonial Office response was to exclaim: ‘after all we cannot undertake to teach good manners!’97 The notion, in the first few years of the war, that racial discrimination could be put down to discourtesy continued to influence Colonial Office discussions on the matter. In 1941, the Colonial Office began to take the question of colour discrimination more seriously as people arrived from the colonies to help in the war effort. Despite a long period of sending notes back and forth on the usefulness of new legislation, the Colonial Office, generally, however, continued to hold the opinion that Sir Alan Burns expressed:98 I doubt whether we can improve people’s manners any more than their morals by passing laws. If our manners were better we would have less political trouble in the colonies.99

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Nevertheless concern was shown by the Colonial Office over the treatment of colonial people in Britain, especially after the case of discrimination of Sir Hari Singh Gour. Lord Moyne, the secretary of state for the colonies, admitted to the Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, that: So many cases are brought to our notice that there should be little difficulty in bringing prosecutions if the law were defined and simple machinery provided for its enforcement. Our Assistance Welfare Officer who is a coloured man was quite recently refused accommodation in an hotel in the north of England, but when the management learned that he was employed by the Colonial Office they changed their ground and gave him a room.100 In the summer of 1941, the Colonial Office had tried, but failed, to persuade the India, Home and Scottish offices to agree to the introduction of legislation against colour discrimination. Moyne had hoped that legislation would act as a ‘deterrent against this form of racial discrimination’. It was raised, however, that the legislation would not work, as hotels were in effect private clubs (and ‘cater for guests of a particular class’) and only inns could be imposed upon legally to accept applications for accommodation. The India Office, with Home Office support, assured the other departments that the problem arose mainly in middle-class hotels for which ‘the legislation would be to a great extent ineffective because, once it was passed, hotel managers would be very careful to avoid refusing admission to a coloured person on the grounds of his race and would find some other excuse’.101 The Colonial Office then tried to persuade the other departments on the basis that the legislation would be largely ‘declamatory’, as a ‘political gesture on the part of the Government, as indicating its views on the question of colour prejudice, and as a means of educating public opinion’. The India Office resisted this suggestion, saying that Minister of Labour Ernest Bevin’s speech a short while ago should be enough. Furthermore, they thought that it was problematic to ‘legislate with reference to colour’ and that such a law might ‘do more harm than good by crystallizing colour prejudice in cases where it already exists’. The only conclusion that the meeting could arrive at was that ‘the real remedy lies in the steady education of public opinion’.102 What this actually meant was left traditionally vague. The discussion continued in the Colonial Office after this meeting, largely as officials, such as John Keith, felt thwarted by such a ‘negative’

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response at the meeting. Most of all, Keith wanted some sort of ‘declamatory’ legislation which would have ‘the effect of preventing insults to colonial people by telling them that they are not acceptable because of the colour of their skins’. Keith viewed it as a ‘matter of high policy that colonial people should not be insulted’.103 Jeffries largely agreed with Keith, desiring ‘some sort of much more general law to be introduced which would have much the same effect for coloured people as the Sex Equality Act had for women’.104 Owen Williams, however, was adamant that to enact a law ‘so patently ineffective’ would have been greeted as ‘further evidence of our national hypocrisy’. He claimed that he too was ‘for educating public opinion’ but also said that ‘we must have some kind of snobbery to keep us going and the more levelling there is of class distinctions the more racial distinctions are likely to acquire snobbery value’.105 At least Owen Williams gave an honest reply. Most of the other contributions to the circulating minutes tended to put off the issue, as did Sir Cosmo Parkinson, by pronouncing that ‘the only way to get rid of colour prejudice is by education. It will take at least a generation to do that’.106 John Paskin concurred, saying that ‘the more unobtrusive our propaganda on this matter is, the more effective it is likely to be’.107 Meanwhile Miss Audrey Richards, the government anthropologist, proposed that Lord Hailey and Chatham House commission some further research – especially on the practice of the colour bar in the colonies.108 Finally, after a copy of Norman Ley’s book, The Colour Bar in East Africa, had circulated through the department, in the autumn of 1941, Paskin wrote a long memorandum where he admitted that the colour bar in the colonies was a ‘thorny question’. Paskin made a distinction between ‘the purely social problem which its manifestation is a disinclination on the part of white people to be brought into close association, socially, with coloured people’ and the policy implications of removing the colour bar in the colonies. He tried, for example, to show how housing segregation in Accra, Nairobi and Mombasa could be maintained without a formal colour bar since colonial governments could ‘substitute for the restrictive covenants a strict enforcement of sanitary rules’ which would separate out ‘Africans with primitive ideas of sanitation’.109 Paskin conceded that there was a ‘very strong and bitter feeling’ caused by the fact ‘largely owing to racial prejudice that such a small proportion of higher appointments in the Colonial Service go to persons of colour’. Another problem, to which the others were

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‘insignificant by comparison’, was the ‘questions of high politics’ such as the ‘reservation of the Kenya Highlands for European occupation’. As a result, Paskin cautioned that ‘the secretary of state would be illadvised to come out with a strong public condemnation of all discrimination in the colonies without very careful consideration of the logical consequences of a determined attempt to do away with racial discrimination’. In the end a ‘dispassionate review of every form of colour or racial discrimination in the colonies’, assigned to Hailey’s committee, seemed the preferable course of action.110

The Constantine affair The Colonial Office never quite managed to put aside the question of the colour bar for a committee to consider quietly. In 1942 American troops arrived in Britain. By the summer of 1943, people in Britain had become familiar with the American practice of segregation, and, at the same time, rather envious and irritated by the relative wealth of the average GI. It was in this context that the discrimination against Leary Constantine hit the headlines. In August 1943, Mr and Mrs Leary Constantine and their daughter were refused accommodation by the Imperial Hotel, Russell Square, London, on the grounds that the manageress ‘could not accept the coloured members of the party in the hotel, as the presence of “niggers” would cause trouble with the Americans who frequented the place’.111 Leary Constantine was a ‘cricketer of international reputation’ from Trinidad who had been working as a welfare officer for the Ministry of Labour, looking after West Indians recruited for work in Liverpool, since 1942.112 The insult caused a ‘great deal of comment amongst colonials’, who had to be ‘restrained from making a demonstration against the hotel’.113 The Constantine case became a cause célèbre and appeared in many newspapers.114 Constantine gave a talk on the BBC Home Service115 on which Labour MP Tom Driberg commented that ‘the paltriness of the hotel-keeper’s conduct became the more conspicuous in contrast with the dignity and humanity of the Negro’s broadcast’.116 Even the Evening Standard remarked that the name Imperial was ‘inappropriate for this particular hotel’117 and David Low satirized the Hotel in a cartoon where the reception gave out pamphlets on ‘Hitler’s race theories’.118 Noel Sabine, of the publicity department of the Colonial Office, suggested:

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we should consider the possibility of a speech at an early date by the acting Secretary of State in which as clear an exposition as possible should be made of the legal position and a strong statement of our views made: this should stress the recognition of the right of coloured people in this country for absolute equality of treatment and an appeal to all people of good will to welcome our guests many of whom are in this country often at their own expense and all of their own free will to help us in the war.119 This time around the Colonial Office was a bit more prepared to make this a ‘test case’. They realized that, since Constantine was so well known and admired, ‘public opinion would undoubtedly be on his side’ and realized that the Imperial Hotel was ‘in the legal position of an inn, and [was] therefore under an obligation to accommodate any person who applies for rooms’.120 The only drawback was the legal issue of a civil claim for material damages because Arnold Watson, the accompanying Ministry of Labour official, had persuaded Constantine to accept alternative accommodation that night.121 On this occasion, however, the Colonial Office’s political concerns were not so much about the repercussions in the colonies, but whether or not it was ‘undesirable to have the attitude of Americans towards coloured people discussed in open court’.122 The Colonial Office’s willingness to stand by Constantine was possibly due to the fact that, with the arrival of the segregated American troops in Britain, it had perceived a certain anti-Americanism that had fuelled anti-segregation feeling. In the autumn of 1942 Jeffries made the point that already ‘things have moved a bit lately’ and that: It is probably true that there is less colour prejudice in this country than ever before. This is due (a) to the presence of colonial people in this country for war work; (b) to the reaction caused by the attitude of the Americans.123 John Costello, Second World War historian, has researched the relationship between the British and the American soldiers stationed in Britain, typified by the then common slogan of ‘oversexed, overpaid and over here’. He recounts that ‘Popular opinion remained steadfastly on the side of the oppressed black regiments’ even to the extent of supporting, in a campaign run by the Daily Mirror, a black GI accused of raping a white woman.124 Ian McLaine’s work on the Ministry of Information confirms this

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reaction. The reports reaching the Ministry, showed that race discrimination was ‘by far the most important’ factor contributing to ‘tension between the civil population and the Americans’, which led to ‘strong feeling’ and ‘considerable indignation’.125 Peter Fryer, historian of the West Indies’ relationship to Britain, confirms the resistance to segregation in Britain, and tells of a West Country farmer who said: ‘I love the Americans but I don’t like those white ones they’ve brought with them.’ Apparently, some pubs displayed signs reading: ‘For British people and coloured Americans only.’126 This was the background to the Constantine case, and it meant that the Colonial Office for the first time seriously considered standing up to American opinion. Apparently there were, however, ‘grave difficulties’, wrote Sabine, ‘attending this course of action’. Frankly, Sabine minuted, there were two issues: (a) American opinion: on this I should like to see a broad hint given to our American visitors that while in this country, they should observe our customs and conventions rather than their own (as indeed we should certainly do in theirs) (b) Colour prejudice in the colonies: on this I think the least said the better.127 In the end – partly because, so Jeffries claimed, Constantine was taking legal proceedings and ‘it would not be proper for any comment to be made in reply to these questions on the incident which is now sub judice’128 – the Colonial Office, according to Graham Smith, author of When Jim Crow met John Bull, decided against saying ‘anything to the US authorities and therefore acquiescing in their treatment of British blacks’.129 Despite the realization of the significance of the issue both in Britain and in the colonies, the Colonial Office had decided to maintain the policy that Cranborne, the secretary of state, had laid down the previous summer when he had stated that: A public declaration, at the present juncture, by HMG that they are opposed to any form of colour bar is likely to be interpreted by white American troops in this country as a direct rebuke, indeed, insult to them, and can only have the result of exacerbating an already sufficiently difficult situation.130 By the summer of 1943, however, it appears that the Americans had begun to feel a little embarrassed by their colour bar policy that was

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causing so many problems in Britain.131 The Americans decided to cooperate with the Ministry of Information’s new film, Welcome to Britain, produced by Stand films and directed by Anthony Asquith. It was an hour-long film for newly arrived American servicemen which ‘included a quite remarkable sequence on race, asking the American soldiers to respect the different attitudes they would find in Britain’.132 The American actor Burgess Meredith says, face to the camera, after a scene where a white Englishwoman invites a black GI to tea: You hear an Englishwoman asking a coloured boy to tea. She was polite about it and he was polite about it. Now . . . look; that might not happen at home but the . . . point is, we’re not at home, and the point is too, if we bring a lot of prejudices here what are we gonna do about ’em?133 The film is an illustration of how much had changed. The very fact that social segregation was referred to as ‘prejudice’ in the film rather than a ‘way of life’, which had been the Cabinet’s initial position, indicates the transformation in the moral and political framework surrounding race issues. Previously the War Cabinet’s policy was to educate British servicemen and the British public in America’s ‘great experiment in working out a democratic way of life in a mixed community’.134 After just over a year of the experience of Jim Crow practice in Britain, as Smith points out, the Ministry of Information had made a film with ‘American actors and senior American staff officers, encouraging the Americans to respect racial integration in Britain because that was the British way’.135 Although the Colonial Office may have continued to worry about the ‘grave difficulty’ involved in questioning Jim Crow, colonial officials felt that they were at last beginning to regain their confidence. After having received so much criticism during 1942 for the Empire, they could now take their turn in criticizing the Americans.

Welfare for colonials in Britain This is not to say that the Colonial Office had eradicated the colour bar in Britain, nor even begun to properly investigate the issue in the colonies. It was more that the Colonial Office had become aware that black people were treated marginally better in Britain than in the United States and, most importantly, that this was now widely known by the British public. As a result, it was harder for Americans to take

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the moral high ground in relation to their British hosts. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the grand ideals of freedom, with which America had entered the war, no longer appeared so threatening to the imperial way of life.136 The shift in the attitude towards racial segregation and its relationship to Anglo-American relations was complemented by military developments. By the summer of 1943, with Allied production surpassing what the German U-boat campaign could destroy and the victory in the battle of the Atlantic, the war was moving into a new phase. Although there was still much for the Allies to do, the Axis powers were on the defensive after July 1943. The Allies decision, in January 1943, to pursue the war until they won an ‘unconditional surrender’ was a measure of their confidence in ultimate victory. In particular, in August 1942 Montgomery had taken over the Eighth Army at El Alamein in Egypt and managed to turn the previous summer’s defeats into winter victories, leading ultimately to the complete defeat of German forces in North Africa by the Allies on 12 May 1943.137 Although the American press had failed to credit the British for the success of the North Africa campaign, especially before the AngloAmerican landings in Morocco on 8 November,138 the news in Britain was a great boost to morale.139 It meant that for the first time, especially since Hong Kong and Singapore, the British could conceive of themselves as having a part to play in building the postwar order. The greater confidence within the Colonial Office, also seen by L. J. Butler,140 meant that some problems, like that of fair treatment of colonial soldiers, which had been dismissed before as trivial, began to be constructively considered. At the start of 1944, the Colonial Office expanded its welfare department to deal with the increasing enquiries and problems of colonial servicemen and also persuaded the Air Ministry to set up a liaison officer to have ‘special responsibility for colonial personnel and particularly coloured personnel’.141 Wing Commander Gibb, himself a white Jamaican, professed that in the RAF there was a ‘certain amount of colour prejudice’ which he thought ‘he could help to remove if he were allowed to do so’. Keith, reporting on this to Poynton, commented that the complaints of the colonial RAF men were usually of a ‘very small nature’, but that ‘every now and then we have a difficult case where there is a definite allegation of colour prejudice or unfair treatment’. Keith proposed that Wing Commander Gibb could deal with these cases on the spot by being recognized as the ‘father’ of the West Indians because he ‘understands the mentality of his compatriots’.142 A letter from Gibb to

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Colonel Stanley, secretary of state for the colonies, later that year gives an idea of what Keith meant by ‘understanding his compatriots’. Gibb wrote, requesting again that his position be made official: ‘surely the coloured West Indian, especially, needs help. He is far more simple in mind than his brother from the Dominions.’143 At the time, Poynton preferred to ‘let matters drop’ as he felt that: Compared with the ‘blimpish’ attitude hitherto shown by the Admiralty and the War Office on the colour question, the Air Ministry’s record as been quite magnificent. The manner in which they have taken coloured men into the Air Force and have recognized their merits by the very large number of decorations for operational duties, has been one of the biggest contributions to the colonial empire during the war. Most of the complaints that I have seen have been for mere disciplinary matters affecting coloured people rather than colour problems proper. The serious colour cases that I have seen in respect of members of the RAF have been cases where the offending party was not another member of the RAF at all but, eg, neighbouring American troops.144 By the autumn of 1945, however, the Welfare Department of the Colonial Office had seconded four RAF officers: Wing Commanders Links, Gibb and Shone and Flight Lieutenant Cross to deal with enquiries from the ‘7000 odd West Indians in the RAF’145 (although 2000 men had been recruited only a year before for ground staff duties146). Despite the increased personnel, discrimination still remained a problem. On the one hand some thought that it was ‘important that colonials calling at the Colonial Office should go away satisfied, otherwise they will complain about their treatment when they get back to the Colonies’.147 On the other hand, Poynton replied, and Keith agreed, that ‘it would be most undesirable to draw a distinction of functions between the Welfare Department and the Defence Department by the criterion of the race of the persons whose cases they deal with’.148 Providing a different complaints procedure for black servicemen could involve the office in ‘unpleasant charges of racial discrimination’.149 As the war was drawing to a close, the Commander in Chief of the Middle East Forces, J. Paget, reported back to the War Office the problems he was having with the Caribbean regiment. The unit was concerned about its future as it was apparently insufficiently trained to take part in the Italian offensive and then there was the question,

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given that the unit had been raised especially to satisfy ‘demand from the colonies’ for ‘more active participation’, of whether to send the men home or on to the Far East. What the Commander in Chief was also finding especially difficult was the question of segregation – because it was not on the grounds of colour. He said that he found it problematic, with both Caribbean and African troops present in the Middle East, to insist ‘on dual standards for troops of the same colour’. He complained that: The question of ‘colour’ is raising a very difficult problem affecting not only the Caribbean, but also African and white troops stationed in same neighbourhood. Though mostly black, the Caribbeans are extremely colour conscious and expect to be treated in every respect as UK soldiers on the grounds that no official colour bar exists in their territories. In the Middle East certain restrictions have necessarily been imposed on African troops, and, in view of the similarity in colour, these restrictions are naturally apt to be made applicable to the Caribbeans. Every endeavour is made to avoid difficulty on this head, but in doing so we are faced firstly with the resentment of African troops who, quite naturally, fail to understand why a restriction placed on one type of black troops is not applied equally to others of the same colour, and secondly with the objection of white troops, particularly those of the UDF and the Women’s Services, to sharing their amenities with coloured soldiers.150 The Colonial Office was more concerned about the pressing issue of whether the colonial troops were going to be allowed to participate in an ‘operational role’.151 The Colonial Office realized that it was an ‘open secret’ that the Middle East command was ‘only too glad to get rid of the West Indians’ and wanted to avoid South East Asia Command being ‘prejudiced against them before they arrive’.152 In March 1945, the War Office agreed to send the unit to Italy as ‘owing to the difficulties of colour it is inadvisable to attach it to an Indian formation’. The regiment was held up until the ‘weather, which previously was not suitable, should have improved’153 because the War Office was convinced that black West Indians were particularly susceptible to cold weather.154 But by the time they were due to arrive in Italy, the war in Europe would be over.155 The War Office cabled, pleadingly, that ‘honour would be satisfied if this regiment was used in any minor op in the Aegean or to take part in receiving capitulation

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of Crete’.156 In the end the regiment was forced to stay in the Middle East to guard German prisoners.157 The Colonial Office spent the next few months trying to persuade the War Office to make a quick decision on the future of the regiment158 – particularly because it was anxious about the morale of the troops and the Governor of Trinidad had requested that the formation be broken up on return as otherwise it might ‘supply focus for discontent’.159 Neither the Americans, with Jim Crow segregation, nor the British, with a discarded regiment in the Middle East, could claim the moral high ground in terms of race discrimination. But the experience of the GIs in Britain had demonstrated one important thing to the Colonial Office: they were not alone. The United States could no longer criticize colonial policy with equanimity, fearing criticisms of their own treatment of ‘non-white’ people. As a result, Hailey, especially when he visited America, and others in the Colonial Office, were given the confidence to challenge Americans’ arguments over high-sounding ideals such as freedom and equality. Britain’s own treatment of its colonial troops, particularly outside the RAF where the manpower question was not so acute, was nothing to be proud of – but this had only become apparent when all eyes were turning to the military successes of the war and away from the failures and difficulties of the 1941–2 period. At the end of the war, the Colonial Office did start to direct some resources into an investigation of how much race discrimination actually existed in the colonies. In 1940, Keith’s report on colour prejudice had hoped for an ‘improvement of public taste and knowledge’ to tackle a problem he then considered ‘largely educational’.160 Only in May 1946, after some initial survey work by Hailey’s committee on Postwar Reconstruction, did the welfare department of the Colonial Office produce a survey of race discrimination during the war, which finished by arguing: Now that the war has ended, the feeling among coloured Colonial people in this country about their relationship with the English people is one of paramount importance to them, and one which engages their close and constant attention. It is also related in a very real way to the delicate position of the racial relationships in the colonies.161 In the end, the Colonial Office had largely managed to maintain control, organize welfare and keep the discussion on discrimination to

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a manageable level, despite virtual riots and quite regular race fights across Britain. This may have encouraged the department to eventually consider race relations not only as something politically important but also as something that they could contain. Certainly, in relation to American criticisms of the Empire, the question of race relations as we shall see eventually proved to be more of an asset than a liability. This result was probably due more to the reaction of the British public at home than to any common practice in the colonies, which largely continued to operate colour bars in hotels and restaurants and clubs until independence from Britain.162 In 1947, the Colonial Office started to produce a memorandum cataloguing legislation which defined racial categories or created racial discrimination in the colonies.163 The new United Nations Organization, with its Commission on Human Rights, was thought likely to pursue ‘the question of removing discriminatory legislation’ and Arthur Creech Jones, the new secretary of state for the colonies, wanted to be ‘fully seized of the implications of this question in relation to colonial territories’.164 The experience of the war had suggested that having the moral edge, being able to maintain morale and control in the face of the critics, was perhaps more important than the increasingly redundant ‘white prestige’.

4 Defending the Empire

Introduction This chapter concentrates on the debate at the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) conference at Mont Tremblant, Canada in December 1942. The arguments raised at the conference engaged many of the issues of race and empire at stake during the war. The conference and Hailey have hitherto been regarded from separate fields of enquiry. Hailey has been recognized as a leading articulator of and influence upon British colonial policy. IPR conferences were supposedly unofficial. However, the conference of December 1942 was different providing an important forum for the development of postwar international policy. Hailey’s presence as leader of the British delegation allows us an entry to the key moment of transition in the Atlantic debate on race and empire. Returning to this period to look again at the arguments, it is hard not to prejudge them according to the present-day relationship between Britain and America. Britain’s status, economic power and international influence have all declined in the postwar world and it is hard not to see this as the issue when examining the archive material. It is important to try to imagine what these debates meant from the standpoint of participants who had experienced the Depression, survived the Axis onslaught and were not yet guaranteed victory. In the midst of the Cold War, when international politics was dominated by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for spheres of influence, it was possible to see the AngloAmerican rivalry during the Second World War in a similar light, as did William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson.1 This is not to say that there was not an element of competition between the two great 94

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powers.2 Here, however, the material is examined from the point of view of the British participants’ problem of imperial authority and the perceived loss of it. Much of the wartime discussion was imbued with a deep sense of crisis, a sense that the structures of the past were unlikely to continue into the postwar period. This sentiment had been influenced by the experience of the 1930s – which both Gabriel Kolko and Donald Watt have emphasized was a time of social upheaval – and by wartime defeats.3 As a result, the Anglo-American debate did not have a clear framework. There were few institutions, particularly in the international arena, on which officials could depend. In the early years of the war, it may have seemed that everything was open to question. Without traditional rules or guidelines, competition between Britain and America was not always the primary issue. The matter at hand was to establish a framework for discussing the shape of the postwar world. For instance, it must have been hard to conceptualize competing over spheres of influence when the means by which that influence was to be exerted was still under debate. International dialogue, in this context, became particularly important because it was a forum where the rules and boundaries of the new framework could be worked out. Furthermore, the postwar arrangement could not rest on tradition for its justification. The failure of tradition can be seen in the fact that much of the discussion at this time contained a strong emphasis on a new morality. With a wide acceptance that the world needed changing, many people were anxious to work out how it should change and therefore on what basis, on what grounds, it should change. The ethical component of the Anglo-American debate was not simply a ‘cover’ for economic self-interest – it indicates that there were doubts and disagreements not just as to who would influence which region but on whether the imperial powers would have any continuing authority to interfere in the colonized countries. Establishing the framework in which this authority could be sustained was central to the Anglo-American debate because, in the end, the white Western elites still believed in their fundamental superiority. Understanding how the elite saw its own position and status is the object of this study. Prior to the war, the language of racial groups had been relied upon to articulate a position of superiority. Realizing that race was a political issue, particularly after the fall of Singapore, the British elite was forced to look for new ways to assert its superiority. To establish this new language of authority on a firm foundation it was important that there was agreement between the major powers,

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especially between Britain and America. The Institute of Pacific Relations conference, provides a window on to the debate, and offers an insight into how agreement was achieved. On 10 June 1942, Lord Hailey was invited by Lionel Curtis (who had asked Hailey to direct the African Survey) to head the British delegation to the Institute of Pacific Relations conference that winter.4 Hailey’s career had already covered more empire administration than almost any other individual. After his ‘brilliant career’ in the Indian Civil Service, and the publication of An African Survey in 1938 Hailey, according to John Cell, came to be ‘regarded as a principal spokesman for colonial reform and development, which in turn became the prevailing rationale and ideology of empire during and after World War II’.5 During the Second World War, his first-hand knowledge of both India and Africa put him a unique position to advise the Colonial Office on defending the Empire. He was considered a leading expert on empire by his contemporaries, and his ideas often influenced policy. The IPR conference was a two-yearly event, usually a low-key affair of intellectuals and academics with some business interests, with the Royal Institute of International Affairs (often called Chatham House, the site of the RIIA) acting as the British representatives of the IPR. In 1942, however, so soon after the fall of Singapore and America’s entry into the war, the conference was taken far more seriously.6 The socalled ‘unofficial’ delegates from the various countries were in fact handpicked by the relevant government departments.7 Both Chatham House and the Colonial Office regarded the conference as ‘a most opportune chance of combating some of the opinions held about the British Empire’8 and they were most ‘anxious’ that Hailey be persuaded to be the leader of the delegation.9 The secretary of state for the colonies, Viscount Cranborne, ‘warmly’10 supported this proposal with the note ‘no one could do it better’.11 The IPR conference, held in Mont Tremblant, Canada, was promoted as an unofficial discussion on international cooperation in relation to the Pacific and the Far East, but the British government was not about to leave their case up to chance. One memorandum on the need for a clear policy remarked that the ‘conference presents a danger and an opportunity’.12 Suggestions as to the composition of the delegation were discussed in the Colonial Office and the then permanent undersecretary of state, Sir George Gater, liaised with the Foreign Office, who were also most concerned that a ‘really adequate group’ should attend the conference.13 The personnel list was finally decided through consultation between the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, the India

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Office,14 the Ministry of Information, the secretary of state for the colonies, the secretary of state for the dominions,15 the Deputy Prime Minister Mr Attlee,16 Chatham House and Lord Hailey.17 But sorting out the delegates18 was only half the task; the main work was formulating the arguments. The key assumption that needed to be challenged, especially with Americans, as Ashley Clarke saw it, was that: the Asiatic possessions of the white peoples will be lost to them for ever. This is a form of loose thinking which may gradually harden and against which I have suggested that, at the proposed IPR conference and in other ways, we must prepare a counter-offensive by producing new and positive ideas of our own.19 In the event, at the conference, Hailey’s counter-offensive would both make use of American criticisms to bolster Britain’s position and argue for the ‘new and positive’ idea that the British Empire was engaged in a mission to promote the economic and social development of the colonies.

American criticisms of colonial policy By 1942, when the IPR conference was being planned, there were several major political problems facing the Colonial Office in particular, and British policy-makers more generally. First, the rhetoric of the Allies against the Axis powers pitted the forces of democracy and progress against tyranny and backwardness. According to most Americans the British Empire appeared to be the epitome of backwardness. Second, the fall of Singapore had stimulated American anti-imperialist criticism of the lack of loyal relations between the British and their subjects. Third, for many British officials, relations between Britain and America generally needed to improve for further wartime cooperation and for future international stability. One of the ways that the Allies tried to build up an association between their war aims and the idea of a ‘free world’ was the declaration that they were fighting for ‘Four Freedoms’. This idea was first articulated by President Roosevelt, in a broadcast in January 1941, to gain American support for Britain, which was later firmed up in the formal arrangement of Lend-Lease. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms were:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

Freedom Freedom Freedom Freedom

of speech; of worship; from want; from fear (of other nations).

It was the last two ‘freedoms’ that were stressed during the war. To be ‘free from want’ was a guarantee that the experience of the Depression would not be repeated and that the Allies were committed to economic development and not ‘exploitation’. The slogan was an important message to say that the postwar world would not be a return to the deprivation of the prewar years. The fourth ‘freedom from fear’ was written as a clear criticism of Nazi Germany, its attacks on the Jewish population of Europe and its forcible occupation of large parts of the European continent. It contained the idea that international peace, and the means to enforce it, was one of the clear aims of the Allies (who were then known as the United Nations which subsequently became the title of the international organization with greater powers than its predecessor, the League of Nations). These ‘Four Freedoms’ were expressly directed at the American public and after that the European nations. They could, however, be interpreted by other countries further afield as indicating that they too should be able to end foreign domination. This definition of the fourth ‘freedom’ was apparently confirmed by the Atlantic Charter. Since 1940, when France had surrendered to Germany, Britain had been desperate for America to enter the war. As an interim measure, on 14 August 1941,20 Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter to show a symbolic alliance of common democratic goals, demonstrating to the Axis countries a strong formal, if not yet military, opposition. When Roosevelt and Churchill met in Argentia in Newfoundland they aimed to lay down ‘certain broad principles’ to outline the war aims of both countries.21 Despite the careful wording, however, by Sir Alexander Cadogan and the amendments by Sumner Welles, directed by Roosevelt,22 the Atlantic Charter proved to be a further source of friction. The Atlantic Charter aimed to make an explicit treaty out of the basic ideas contained in the Four Freedoms. The first three articles repudiated territorial ‘aggrandizement’ through force or against the wishes of the people. The fourth and fifth articles supported free trade to stimulate economic growth, and an end to the protectionism that was often blamed for the friction between nations leading to war. The

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sixth, seventh and eighth articles enshrined the building of a peace which would enable people to live free from fear, by producing an international system of security with national disarmament. Along with such peace, the fifth and sixth articles gave commitment to social security, economic advancement, improved labour standards and a general freedom from ‘want’. On the whole the wording was grand but vague and therefore left the future open to a certain amount of interpretation. The third article, however, was one of the clearer ones, specifying that America and Britain ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they [the US and UK] wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’.23 The article was not a demand but a wish because at this stage America was not formally at war with the Axis countries and, although the Charter was meant as a statement of intent, it was not intended to bring the States automatically into the war. It was the phrase ‘sovereign rights and self-government’, however, which was to cause most indignation. William Roger Louis explains that it was Churchill who inserted the phrase ‘sovereign rights’ intending, according to Louis, to make the clause ‘inapplicable to the dependent British Empire’. Furthermore, the American press, according to Louis, ‘saw the Atlantic Charter almost totally as a European document’.24 Having raised the issue of ‘self-government’, however, other people questioned whether it did apply to the colonies. Lord Moyne later commented that: The phrase in Point III of the Atlantic Charter that we ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’ is frankly an unfortunate one from the colonial point of view. It was, of course, used, as is obvious from the context, with the nations of Europe in mind. But in the colonies we cannot admit a right of unfettered choice to those who, in the words of the League of Nations Covenant, are ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’.25 But many people, particularly in America, did not agree with Moyne and saw the Charter as a promise of liberation given to the colonies. For example, two days after the signing of the Charter, the Daily Herald headlined: ‘The Atlantic Charter: it means the dark races as well.’26 Louis has documented the debate that ensued between different sections of the government, especially between the ‘staunchest of all British

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imperialists’, Leopold Amery, secretary of state for India and Burma, and Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, and Arthur Creech Jones, who went with Hailey to the IPR conference and later became the first postwar secretary of state for colonies.27 Disconcertingly for the Colonial Office, for example, the Governor of Nigeria, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, cabled Winston Churchill to ask ‘Are we fighting for security of Europeans to enjoy the four freedoms while West Africa continues on a prewar status?’28 Leo Amery, concerned about the way that the Atlantic Charter had ‘let loose a lot of questions about its application to the Empire’, wrote a memorandum for the War Cabinet to examine what he saw as the destructive impact of the Charter and to propose some ‘guidelines’ for the colonies, for example: It will be seen from the telegrams appended that Point III of the Eight-Point Declaration has already been fastened upon by the Burman Ministers as an argument for a promise forthwith of full self-government immediately after the war, regardless of the actual circumstances whether of Burma itself or of the international situation.29 But the guidelines themselves had also to take into consideration American opinion as well as views in the colonies. The Ministry of Information, in its confidential digest of transatlantic letters through the censors, noted that: ‘few people in England have any conception of the reality of the Empire bogey in the American mind and elsewhere. The Nazi radio keeps at it all the time and upon this topic it is effective.’30 In the eyes of the censors, one of ‘the chief obstacles in the way of 100 per cent American co-operation’ was ‘mainly British imperialism’.31 The reluctance of the British establishment to embrace Article Three of the Atlantic Charter only further confirmed, in the eyes of many Americans, the anti-democratic nature of the British Empire. Even before the Charter, many British officials were aware of the negative image held in the USA of the Empire. Americans doubted the possibility of forming a pro-democracy alliance against the Axis powers if Britain’s empire was itself undemocratic. A confidential report from the Ministry of Information’s American department recorded as ‘typical’ the comment that ‘British tyranny in India is an argument used with terrible effect by the Nazis to make British democracy appear hypocritical.’32

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Meanwhile, British officials, who doubted America’s willingness to come to the aid of Europe under siege, worried about the possibility of forming a postwar peace without substantive agreement between the two major powers. In May 1941, the deputy parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies, Sir John Shuckburgh, noted that an Anglo-American consensus would be essential for the survival of the British Empire after the war.33 Certainly the debate between Britain and America meant much more than just an article in a charter. Nor was it just the question of which colonies were associated with which countries. Sorting out the debate between Britain and America was at base about which country would shape the postwar world and who would underwrite that peace. The desperate position of Britain in 1941, so soon after the First World War, signalled that Britain could no longer guarantee peace alone. The editors of Fortune magazine in the States advised that ‘America . . . owes the world a substitute for the Pax Britannica, which is dead’.34 The United States was certain to be the predominant force in any postwar settlement – the question remained whether Britain would have much say in that arrangement. In 1941–2, after the Atlantic Charter and the ignominy of the fall of Singapore, it seemed likely that any future rules would be anti-imperialistic and would undermine, as a consequence, Britain’s postwar status. For instance, William Keith Hancock, the Oxford professor of colonial history, was deeply troubled by what was at stake: For let us make no mistake: the debate [over the empire] is an important one, so very important that we must take sides in it. It isn’t merely concerned with the destiny of those territories which happen to be marked red on the map. It raises the deepest issues of human freedom.35 Although Pearl Harbor ended the problem of American isolationism,36 the subsequent victories of Japan over the Far Eastern empire had weakened Britain’s standing in the world still further.37 In May 1942, Isaiah Berlin wrote a report titled ‘Things which the Americans hold against the British’. His first point was that Americans thought that ‘British colonial policy has been oppressive, stupid, inefficient and insulting to the natives, with the result that Malays and Burmese have been conspicuously disloyal in contrast to the loyalty of the Filipinos.’38 The Colonial Office and the Ministry of Information were well aware that American opinion had tended to suppose that imperialism meant

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exploitation and backwardness. For example, at one meeting at the Ministry of Information to discuss propaganda on the empire, the minutes illustrate their main concerns: Firstly it was necessary to show the American people what was being done in the British colonial empire since there was a tendency to believe that this colonial empire was the subject of exploitation. Secondly, we should show that we are not backward (generally speaking) in our methods of colonial administration, and that we are prepared at all times to receive new ideas from any quarter. Thirdly, that we should convince the USA that in the British Empire in general, and the British colonial empire in particular, she has a good ally.39 Noel Sabine, head of publicity in the Colonial Office, was of the opinion that ‘a firm basis for Anglo-American friendship’ was of the ‘highest conceivable importance’ and therefore ‘every source of misapprehension or misunderstanding should be resolutely attacked’. At the same time, however, Sabine was optimistic that it was simply a question of making a ‘comprehensive effort to let America know all about our colonial policy’ to gain their confidence and produce a basis even for other, ‘more fruitful’, forms of cooperation.40 Sabine’s optimism, however, was expressed before the fall of Singapore. The collapse of the Far Eastern empire undermined British confidence and caused a wave of criticism of the Empire in the USA. Margery Perham provides an example of the crisis in British self-confidence. Perham, a friend of Lord Lugard and Donald Cameron, Governor of Tanganyika in the 1920s, had travelled in Africa and taught colonial administration in Oxford. She had had little sympathy for Fabian-type criticisms of the Empire in the interwar years. At a League of Nations conference in 1939, she had proudly defended Britain’s colonial record. On 13 March 1942, however, four weeks after the surrender of Singapore, Perham started her article in The Times with the comment that ‘the Malayan disaster has shocked us into sudden attention to the structure of our colonial empire’. She admitted that, if she were to imagine the Japanese Navy at Mombasa harbour in Kenya, she doubted whether the whole community would fight ‘shoulder to shoulder with the Europeans’.41 If Hailey was going to make Sabine’s ‘comprehensive effort’ to tell Americans about Britain’s colonial policy, then he was going to have to override the fears and deal with the criticisms. This meant working

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out ‘a clear statement of our postwar policy in relation to the colonies’,42 creating more pressure on Hailey’s Committee for Postwar Reconstruction. Especially since the Foreign Office was, according to Gerard Gent, ‘extremely nervous at the prospect of having to formulate even the outline of one [policy] for the forthcoming Pacific Relations Conference’.43 After Singapore, many Americans assumed that the unpopularity of the colonial administration had simply paved the way for the Japanese. More importantly, many people within Britain were also beginning to have doubts about colonialism. ‘To many here and in the colonies’, said Sir Cosmo Parkinson, under-secretary of state for the colonies, ‘the loss of the great naval base of Singapore’ on 15 February 1942 was ‘the worst moment of the war.’44 And Captain Gammans, the Conservative MP who later joined the team for the IPR conference, wrote a letter to The Times saying that: When the Union Jack was lowered on Fort Canning, in Singapore, on that Sunday morning, it marked the sudden and dramatic end of an epoch in our colonial empire. . . . The fall of Singapore is either the end of our colonial empire, or the beginning of a new chapter which can be even more honourable and glorious than the past.45 So that Hailey would know exactly what to expect from the Americans, he was kept informed of American opinion.46 In particular, the Foreign Office and Colonial Office worked together to ensure that Hailey had reports from the British Information Service in America, reports on the ‘call for a Pacific Charter’, and access to the correspondence about ‘conditions in the British West Indies’.47 These reports were vital because Hailey needed to be able to judge whether he could challenge the idea that, as Professor Tawney described it, ‘the British Imperial game is up and that it is to America that the world will look for political and economic leadership’.48

Hailey at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference At the conference Hailey challenged the Americans’ claim to moral authority on three issues: security, race relations and their monopoly on humanitarianism. Although Hailey may not have convinced all of the delegates of his case at the time, some of the themes that Hailey developed reappeared in the later compromise position taken by the Americans.

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Hailey made one of the opening statements to the conference (the other was made by China’s representative) and his first words were that ‘the fundamental consideration on which we must proceed is that of security’. Hailey talked of the need for ‘collective security’ and argued that security was the ‘basis of the Four Freedoms’.49 This may seem like an innocuous point but for government delegates at that time it was loaded with meaning. Hailey, by using the issue of security, was pointing to the Americans’ interwar isolationism, their lack of support for the League of Nations, as a key factor in the transformation of international tensions into world war. He avoided the loyalty issue in relation to the defeats in Malaya and Singapore, and instead tried to put the Americans on the defensive. His approach echoed that of Lord Cranborne, then secretary of state for the colonies, in the House of Lords: As we both know, the chief sinner was the United States. Had she been willing to throw in her weight in the Pacific in the years preceding the war, when we were preoccupied with the deteriorating situation in Europe and she was not, the Japanese menace might have been strangled before it became really dangerous.50 Towards the end of the conference, this argument was repeated by one of the other British delegates when he complained, throwing Article Six of the Charter back at the Americans, ‘what meaning is there in the words freedom from fear for the peoples of the world if the United States goes back to isolationism?’ The success of Hailey’s tactic was shown by the response of one of the Canadian delegates to this discussion. He turned to the Americans and protested: ‘frankly, you haven’t given us the kind of leadership we expected here. The British came here on the defensive and then passed the blame to the Americans who have remained on the defensive ever since.’51 The turn away from isolationism in America had been so rapid that perhaps they were indeed embarrassed by their previous isolationist stance, and therefore easily placed on the defensive with this criticism. The issue of security and defence of the world order was not the only way that Hailey tried to humble the Americans. He included hints and innuendoes concerning race relations to try to keep the Americans off the moral high ground. By the winter of 1942–3 the race tensions in America, American reluctance to permit blacks to fight and the experience of American segregation in Britain were known to Hailey. He felt that America had more to answer for than

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Britain had and he was determined to face down their assumption of superiority. There were several ways that Hailey would have been informed of the discussion on race in the United States. The Foreign Office passed on Isaiah Berlin’s reports amongst others. Also, Edgar Tarr, who had been working with Edward Carter, the director of the Institute of Pacific Relations, to organize the forthcoming conference, had written to Ivison Macadam, the British IPR representative, warning him that: ‘the fundamental weakness in our cause is the Anglo-American-Dutch counterpart of the German theory of the master race.’ It was ‘vital’, in Tarr’s view, to establish ‘the laying of a foundation for real cooperation with the Pacific peoples on the basis of genuine equality’.52 Tarr had also tried to persuade Carter to place the issue of race under the ‘spotlight’ at the conference by reorganizing the agenda: It seems to me that an important feature of the agenda would be to place Canada, the United States, and Australia in the positions of defendants with respect to their policies of racial discrimination, and the white races generally as defendants because of their attitude of superiority.53 Carter did not accept Tarr’s plan, even though, at the Mont Tremblant conference, Tarr was elected the new president of the IPR, which shows the influence of his ideas.54 Tarr’s comments serve as a useful indicator of the mood of some of the delegates. Hailey played on the sensitivity to the issue of race discrimination without openly criticizing the Americans, which could have been problematic. The first issue that Hailey raised was that of arming the ‘natives’. He made the point in his opening statement that ‘dependent peoples’ must be given the ‘means to organize for their own defence’.55 This may not seem like a pointedly anti-American thing to say, but denial of combat to non-whites was already something of an issue. The second point that Hailey brought up was the issue of immigration. At the IPR conference, various people were already aware that ‘to the Chinese and the Indians present, the question of immigration was largely one of racial discrimination’.56 The infamous ‘white Australia’ policy and the quota laws in the States had already made the connection between discrimination and immigration. Even though Britain and America had cancelled their extra-territorial rights in China to try to signal its equal status, the refusal of the United States to allow

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Chinese immigration was seen as a reminder that the ‘yellow peril’ was still a factor in American politics.57 When Hailey spoke of the ‘critical issue’ in his opening statement of the ‘status to be held by Chinese emigrants domiciled in countries to which they have emigrated’, he was not only referring to the Chinese minorities in Burma, Malaya and the Philippines, but also to those inside the United States.58 The report of Sir George Sansom, stationed at the Foreign Office in Washington, confirms that this issue of immigration was particularly sensitive. He noted in his report on the IPR conference that: The problem of Asiatic immigration into ‘Western’ countries was too delicate for thorough discussion, but there was a general disposition among Americans, Australians and Canadians to condemn discriminatory immigration laws in principle, while hoping that in practice it would be possible to keep Asiatics out of their respective countries.59 In this way Hailey used issues like security and race to show the delegates from the United States that they could not assume the moral high ground with the British delegation. The record of the Americans on segregation and isolationism meant that when these issues were raised, albeit in a subtle fashion, the American delegates were forced onto the defensive. This allowed Hailey the space to argue for a positive role for Britain in the working out of the postwar order. Hailey reinforced this point by reminding the Americans that they could not claim sole ownership of an ethical stance. Instead, he implied, Britain and America could boost each other’s humanitarian reputation by avoiding criticizing each other. For example, Hailey announced that: ‘we cannot allow the present-day advocates of this demand [for selfdetermination] the sole prerogative of its authorship. It is all in line with our own tradition.’60 The tone of Hailey’s claim stands out in contrast with, in fact, his own background. Hailey had spent the 1930s trying to thwart Indian independence. This is the man who wrote of Gandhi’s hunger strike that ‘we should lose less by his death than by allowing India to believe that he has forced the hand of Her Majesty’s Government by the threat of suicide’.61 At the IPR conference, however, Hailey quietly put aside his own experience and spoke of the ‘moral principle of trusteeship’ that had ‘always’ guided British imperial policy. Undoubtedly, Hailey intended his political manoeuvre to take the moral high ground. Once Hailey had established a relatively authoritative moral position

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for the British delegates, he invited the other countries’ delegates to consider what to do with ‘dependent peoples’. Hailey already knew that Cordell Hull, in the autumn of 1942, had suggested approvingly the phrase ‘parent state’ to conceptualize the relationship of imperial nation to its colonies.62 Hailey’s presentation of the problem rested on the idea that ultimately both the British and the Americans were paternalistic towards undeveloped areas. Hailey mentioned self-government, but only as the ‘natural destiny’ of a dependent unit – in practice a question for the distant future. As far as Hailey was concerned, ‘political liberties are meaningless unless they can be built up on a better foundation of social and economic progress’.63 In other words, self-determination and other such liberties had to wait, as Hailey saw it, for social developments to be engineered by the imperial senior partner (the discussion on ‘partnership’ will be developed in the next chapter). Hailey reinforced, in his last few sentences, the importance of restricting the demand for self-determination: That does not mean that we have not a high purpose and high hopes of what may be achieved for the peoples whose future we are considering. But while we keep our eyes on the heights, let us not forget the realities with which we have to deal in seeking to attain them. Many of these peoples have had an unfortunate past. Many of them are now suffering the Calvary of an aggressive war. Do not let us add to that the tragedy of disillusionment.64 This was Hailey’s warning to the Americans. Many of the people who had ‘had an unfortunate past’, such as the experience of slavery, were inside the United States and they were now campaigning for equal rights and an end to discrimination. Some of them had become influential in their campaigns for equal rights, while others had demanded an independent state for black Americans.65 One report from the Office of War Information that had been passed back to the Foreign Office, and from there on to Hailey, noted that in the November issue of Collier’s, the magazine with the largest circulation in the United States, a leading article had commented: If anyone tells you that a common enemy has united the United States so solidly that the Negro problem is in abeyance for the duration, you may assume correctly that either he is making a political campaign speech or is a very unreliable source of information or both.66

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Another report that Hailey had seen was from Sir R. I. Campbell, the British Minister in Washington. Concerned with America’s interest in the West Indies, Campbell reported back in October 1942 that the Americans ‘don’t want discontent and racial effervescence among the Negroes’, and ‘they don’t want bad health or social conditions near them (especially among Negroes)’.67 Armed with this knowledge, Hailey aimed to establish common ground with the Americans. This new common ground was to be based on an agreement that they should avoid raising the aspiration for political independence of certain peoples, the non-whites, and instead look for ways to promote stability in the postwar world. Hailey continued this theme with a remark at a lecture at Princeton University the following month: ‘It may well be found that the matters which cause unrest and unsettlement in the world arise mainly within the borders of its major powers.’68 Here Hailey was indicating that, while Britain might have distant colonies that wished for independence, America’s propaganda on the issue of self-determination could create unrest within America – potentially a much greater problem. As Christopher Thorne, the historian of the Pacific War, has noted, Hailey calculated that ‘there were those in Washington who feared that, given a chance, America’s blacks, too, would side with Japan’.69 Since Hailey had managed to put America on the defensive about the race issue – which was evident in the way that the Americans at the conference tried to patronize China as a nation of ‘saints and heroes’70 – he could concentrate on explaining, and justifying, Britain’s role in the colonies on a different terrain, that of social and economic development. In some ways, the Colonial Office was not unprepared for the critical discussions at the IPR conference, although the speed of the developments and the depth of the crisis in early 1942 were unexpected. As we have seen, as early as March 1941 the Office had set up a new Departmental Committee on Postwar Reconstruction in the Colonies that was headed by Hailey.71 Lord Moyne, the secretary of state for the colonies, had written a lengthy ‘memorandum on the Constitutional Future of the Colonies’ to inform the War Cabinet and to encourage further discussion in the Colonial Office.72 Moyne was anxious to give guidance ‘as to what to say and what to avoid saying’ and recommended Hailey’s Romanes Lecture as having ‘given expression’ to some of the Colonial Office’s ideas.73 In the Romanes lecture, Hailey had concluded with the ‘hope’ that ‘we should not give our native population cause to complain that

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when they had asked for bread, we had offered them a vote’.74 This was Hailey’s way of turning the tables on those who put forward selfgovernment as the immediate goal of the colonies. Instead of stressing political development, Hailey put the emphasis on the need to develop the economy of the colonies. Sir R. I. Campbell noted Hailey’s point and its usefulness in relation to American criticisms, in his ‘Memorandum on British imperialism and its relation to American opinion’, when he commented that: This suggested distinction in the American mind between emphasis on political progressiveness and economic progressiveness in respect of the Empire and the possible difference of outlook between Americans and British are illustrated in Lord Hailey’s Romanes lecture of May 1941.75 Instead of political independence, Hailey argued, ‘our’ goal is the ‘active and systematic promotion of native welfare’.76 In this way, Hailey justified Britain’s role in the colonies as the stimulator of economic development, and, he implied, this process was a necessary condition before political development could begin. The separation of political development from economic development was not something unusual or dreamed up by Hailey. What was unusual was Hailey’s emphasis that economic development needed to precede political development. The American traditional view of democracy, particularly influenced by the history of the United States, was the reverse: that economic development followed political independence. By stressing the third and fourth freedoms, the need for people to live ‘free from fear and want’, however, Britain could place the focus on economic development and put aside the difficult question of the rights of the individuals who happened to live in the colonies. The Atlantic Charter reaffirmed this emphasis by stating in Article Six that: ‘all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.’77 This notion of ‘freedom from fear and want’ would play an increasingly important part in the justification of postwar imperial rule. At the start of the war, some were opposed to this direction. For example, in the British Colonial Office, Gerard Gent, the assistant under-secretary of state, commented that the Colonial Office should ‘face frankly the political problem and [should] not take refuge in economic ideals of material betterment’.78 But Hailey found it an essential argument in the face of American criticisms and, towards

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the end of the war, the Americans started to concede. The important evidence for Hailey’s presentation of Britain as a colonial power where the state’s ‘primary function’ was to ‘concentrate its attention on the improvement of the standards of living and the extension of the social services in the Dependencies’79 was the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act.

Prioritizing economic development The 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act was in some ways more of a response to the 1930s than the war (see Chapter 1 for the Act’s origins). One of the most important influences on both American and British thinking during the Second World War had been the experience of the Depression in the 1930s. The experience of the economic slump with the spectre of unemployment (and possible social unrest) haunted those in power. Melodramatically The Times recalled in 1943 that ‘next to war, unemployment has been the most widespread, the most insidious, and the most corroding malady of our generation: it is the specific social disease of Western civilization in our time’.80 The concern of the authorities to avoid a repetition of the slump shaped much of the response to the problem of the Second World War. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act proved to be very timely in 1940. Although many of the elements of the act had been planned for some time, it was a tremendous aid to the Colonial Office in substantiating their claim to be developing the colonies, particularly once its budget for research had been increased. Christopher Thorne called the budget a ‘niggardly amount’,81 although Viscount Bledisloe proudly claimed that ‘no country except Great Britain would dream of embarking during a great war on social and industrial development involving a great outlay from the national exchequer’.82 The interesting point about the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was the recognition of the importance of the propagandistic element of economic policy. Malcolm MacDonald, when he spoke for it in the House of Commons, argued that the bill ‘breaks new ground’. In particular, he emphasized that the bill would increase the cost to the taxpayer of bringing about colonial development – implying that this was the morally higher goal.83 When later, in 1942, Harold Macmillan reiterated the need for the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, he reminded the House of Commons of the political embarrassment of the problem of poverty and exploitation in the colonies.84

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Given that rights, citizenship and political status were major demands, it is significant that the Colonial Development and Welfare Act proposed changes on the level of economic support rather than increased moves towards self-government and equal political status. One of the expenses of the Act, however, was to establish a research committee to investigate both political and economic development. Hailey was appointed to chair and organize this committee once he had returned from a fact-finding mission in Africa to investigate ‘the volume and tempo of calls for self-government in the colonies’ and the future policy for native administration.85 In his report, he presented colonial policy as changing as a result of changed domestic politics, which viewed the ‘government as an agency for the active promotion of social welfare’.86 Hailey recognized that economic development was a way of reinvigorating the imperial relationship, of reposing in this ‘new conception’ the ‘basis of a new philosophy of colonial rule’,87 as the Colonial Office repositioned itself as a vital guide in the path towards independence: The interest now taken in this must not be viewed merely as the outcome of a humanitarian impulse or a manifestation of the general sentiment of ‘trusteeship’. This improvement of the economic and social life of the colonial population is an essential part of the policy, to which we stand committed, of fitting them to achieve a self-governing status.88 The need to distance the Empire from any association with ‘exploitation’,89 particularly in the eyes of America, was not just a semantic question. Lord Bledisloe, in his attempt to back up Hailey’s argument for a ‘constructive interpretation’ of colonial trusteeship and, in particular, for the budget earmarked for colonial development and welfare, told the House of Lords frankly that: Enemy propaganda which tried to disparage our treatment of the native races, and, on the other hand, the magnificent support in money, material and endeavour which the native races had afforded this country, made it desirable to emphasize that this was not a window-dressing policy which it was not our intention to carry out.90 Hailey even claimed that the existence of racial consciousness in the colonies was itself proof of economic growth that had improved

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education and living standards.91 Hailey was using the policy of planned economic development to explain Britain’s future action in the colonies and to morally justify past colonial rule. Explicitly, Hailey argued at the end of the war, that, for him, the Empire: has a great mission in the world, a mission it can only fulfil if it maintains its moral leadership. And its influence is impaired so long as it includes within its orbit units which are weak in their resources, with low economic standards, and of marked inferiority in their social conditions.92 This meant, according to Hailey, that the colonies could only develop with British help – help that was ethical because it was developing the colonies. In other words, the new morality of British rule was that it was going to promote development, although development was limited to economic growth before steps could be taken towards political independence. The British had insisted upon the separation of the goal of independence and its precondition, and then determined that the precondition required British rule. In the final analysis, British rule was still justified by British rule. Economic development may well have been desired by people in the colonies, but the British were more concerned with justification than effect and rarely, if ever, considered the possibility that imperial rule may have hindered economic or political development. It was not until later, Kenneth Robinson points out, that the failure of imperial rule to benefit the local economy was recognized.93 The argument that an increased level of state intervention could take the colonies towards, rather than away from, self-government was to facilitate the setting up of a new framework for postwar cooperation between Britain and America. Part of the reason for the new justification was the way that the image of the state had been transformed during the war and by the experience of the 1930s. This was expressed in the popularity of Keynesianism that had been further stimulated by the publication of the Beveridge Report on social security in November 1942. The real effect of such a policy direction was, however, the expansion of the colonial administrative apparatus in the immediate postwar period which John Lonsdale, the Cambridge historian of Africa, has called the ‘second colonial occupation’.94 The increase in the numbers of personnel following the war has been documented by Anthony Kirk-Greene who notes, despite Hailey’s wartime call to

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Africanize the administration, that ‘it was after rather than by independence that most provincial administrations passed the 50:50 ratio of African to expatriate DCs [District Commissioners]’.95 The increase in investment and administration was proposed, according to Hailey, as a way of developing colonies to prepare for self-government. In practice, the increased level of intervention may have been one of the contributing causes to the development of mass independence movements that rejected this level of interference in the life of the people. At this stage, putting social and economic development first was useful for the British administration because it sidetracked the issue of political independence, and thereby postponed self-determination. More importantly, in providing a clear reason for intervention, development maintained Britain’s ‘unquestioned right to administer’ its colonies. This was the ‘principle’ that the Colonial Office were so desperate for the Americans to acknowledge.96 In this light, we can see that promoting economic rather than political development was in Britain’s interest at this time because it put aside the question of selfdetermination, the earlier pressure point for US criticisms. By the end of the war the Americans had come to see that collaboration with Britain would be essential in rebuilding postwar stability. By the next IPR conference, in Atlantic City in 1944, British and American interests had converged. The Rapporteur’s report on the conference discussion noted that: ‘It was generally agreed that a radical change has taken place by the general acceptance of the necessity for international collaboration in the future.’97 There were still many disagreements on details, but there was a consensus on the essential direction of withholding political independence.98 One of the reasons for the new convergence was the United States’ interest in the Pacific islands which had already been noted by the Colonial Office in one memorandum that suggested that ‘if the Americans needed stronger supervisory powers for the Pacific islands’ then that would ‘fit’ in with the ‘idea of dividing the world into several regions for postwar security and political purposes’.99 The issue of regional authorities overseeing colonial territories will be considered in Chapter 5; the point here is that as the interests of Britain and America converged towards the end of the war, so they came to an agreement on the language that would underpin the new international framework. The compromise position was that colonial rule was now underwritten by a new morality rather than by race superiority. The moral aim, declared by all, was that colonial rule was to ensure economic

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development primarily, with political development being a secondary and more long-term goal. Still using the terms of the Atlantic Charter, but by concentrating on Article Six and the ‘hope’ that ‘the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want’, the British and the Americans had managed quietly to put aside the terms of Article Three and the idea of ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’. The Foreign Office had succeeded in its avowed aim to ‘concentrate in these backward territories on freedom from fear and freedom from want’.100 Indeed, this was the very phrase to which the American state department agreed. In the spring of 1944 Dr Isaiah Bowman, whom Hailey had met just after the IPR conference in January 1943,101 visited London and conferred with the Foreign Office. Richard Law reported on this meeting to the Colonial Office: In talking to us, Dr Bowman has told us that the State Department have now come round to the view that the colonial problem should not be approached from the point of view of the rate at which we should aim at granting political independence to the territories in question. They think that the approach should rather be from the angles of Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear. This is, of course, eminently satisfactory as far as it goes. . . . He pointed out that while the normal American approach to colonial questions was a political one, the President and the State Department realized that such an approach was unpalatable to us and was probably, in any case, out of date. That was why they were now advocating an economic approach from the point of view of resources, standards of life, and so on, instead of the purely political approach which they had hitherto favoured. Dr Bowman told me that he had been charged by the President with the task of discovering whether there was not some common ground in colonial questions upon which we could both take our stand.102 Eighteen months earlier Hailey had insisted upon this very point to the Americans on the conference floor. Evidently, the real complaint of a critical observer who had written home that ‘The worst thing of all was that the British reported that they had won a complete victory at the conference’103 was that the British claims were true, even if the effects were not obvious until a certain time later.

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Hailey’s impact In January and February of 1943 Hailey visited New York, Boston, Chicago, Providence, Princeton, New Haven and Washington, giving many university lectures and after-dinner speeches.104 From the lists of dinner guests and the letters of thanks from universities and others, it is apparent that Hailey made an impact on the many influential people that he met. While in America he wrote an unsigned editorial for Reader’s Digest and an article for Foreign Affairs. He gained essential first-hand experience of defending Britain and the Empire before some of the more hostile audiences. Even in 1953, when Hailey opened the Chicago conference on Africa in the Modern World, his apparently popular address was broadcast over 150 radio stations. Through this sort of discussion, the American and British diplomats began to learn how to work with each other in the context of their new relative positions of power and the new international framework. After the initial shock to the system, especially after the Allied Forces had regained some of their early losses, extensive work was done on the plans for postwar reconstruction. During his trip in 1942–3, Hailey, as chair of the Colonial Committee for Postwar Reconstruction, talked with Stanley Hornbeck who was an important member of the American Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, among others, at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference. The debate, at times, was heated and some people doubted whether Americans would ever concede the return of the Empire to Britain. But the criticisms were also the seed of a new solution. Even before Hailey’s American tour, the IPR conference had had a certain impact. After all it had, for the first time, a ‘considerable official element, though, of course, it remained technically an “unofficial body”’.105 One anti-British letter, intercepted by the censors, admitted that the ‘British sent a strong delegation that had prepared its line for months in advance’.106 D. M. MacDougall, Head of the British Information Service in the United States, who had been part of the British delegation, supported Hailey’s leadership, writing back to the Colonial Office that: ‘only Hailey’s generalship succeeded in dragging out for a share in the unfriendly limelight America’s complete inability to say whether she would take part in postwar world security arrangements, or retreat again to isolation.’107 But then, MacDougall was a particular fan of Hailey and his work at the conference.108 More importantly, the representative from Thailand and the Indian delegation had backed up the British argument, and this was without

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Hailey visiting India beforehand to brief the delegation as the undersecretary of state for India had suggested.109 For example, the Thai Minister had argued against international administration because, as he put it, ‘we prefer to deal with the one devil we know than with 15 or 16 we haven’t yet met.’110 This point was reiterated by Hailey when lecturing at Princeton, when he claimed that the colonies ‘have stated that they have greater confidence in the intention of the British government to promote self-governing institutions than they could feel in an international body with the members of which they have had no previous contact’.111 The Indian delegation did not include any Congress members – in fact, the opposite. The British had, as ‘a clever move’, brought over ‘a sweet but self-conscious untouchable, the most anti-Congress of all’, as described by one critical observer.112 According to Sir George Sansom’s conference report, the Indian delegation had made the Americans and Canadians, the biggest critics of the British Empire, quite uncomfortable: Before the meeting it had been supposed by some American and Canadian members that the Indian representatives were poor, deluded ‘stooges’ of the British, who would welcome advice and comfort from their American friends. These friends were soon undeceived when they discovered that the Indian delegation included men of high calibre and independent mind who had great experience of affairs and were quite capable of holding their own. It was made very clear that the Indian situation was much more complex than the Americans in general supposed, and that it was not one in which they could meddle without risk.113 In particular, one Indian delegate had raised a similar point to Hailey’s earlier comments about race by suggesting that ‘America had better solve her own communal problems before proffering advice to others.’114 The other ‘delicate’ subject, confirmed by Sir George Sansom, had been that the ‘question of racial discrimination was touched on by Indian delegates in reference to immigration and other issues’.115 The issue of race was clearly one that simmered under the surface at the conference. Although either side of the debate could have charged the other with racial discrimination116 – America at home and in its army, Britain in the colonies and in colonial administration – neither could comfortably speak openly about it for fear of awakening a wider discussion amongst all the delegates, particularly the Chinese

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and Indians. Using it to score points was, however, par for the course, as is illustrated by MacDougall’s remark on defending the Empire at the conference: ‘How much would any of us at Mont Tremblant have given to have been able to quote a coloured politico in this sense!’117 It seems that Hailey established, in this way, a certain space for Britain to reclaim some of the moral authority that had been lost during the military defeats of the early years of the war. Lord Halifax, Ambassador in Washington, noted that ‘the conference which was originally designed to some extent as a forum for an indictment of British policy, eventually moved to a more realistic and appreciative attitude towards that policy’.118 And by the end of the conference, Sir George Sansom recalled that: ‘Dr Hornbeck [of the US delegation] even found himself defending the past record of the British Empire and pointing out the contribution made by Great Britain to the world’s stock of progressive ideas and liberal institutions.’119 The key mechanism that Hailey found for defending the Empire was the adoption of a moral tone and the ability to use the terms that were under scrutiny, those that Sansom listed as: ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘racial equality’, ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’.120 Hailey was able to undermine America’s monopoly on these terms by redefining Britain’s imperial mission . At Princeton Hailey tried to evoke the ‘better qualities’ of colonial rule by talking of Lord Lothian’s ideas of ‘heroism’ and ‘devotion to the cause of weaker peoples’.121 Hailey used his experience gained in India, not in administration but in propaganda, to retake the moral high ground from the Americans. It is this new language of morality that is the focus for the next chapter. Hailey had realized, in the reappropriation of this moral rhetoric, as had Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist working for the Carnegie Foundation, the importance of the race question in international politics. Hailey had worked with Dr Keppel of the Carnegie Foundation for the African Survey,122 and now Keppel was working with Myrdal on An American Dilemma on the position of black people in America. In this book, Myrdal wrote of the implications of the morality of racial discrimination that: The main international implication is, instead, that America, for its international prestige, power, and future security, needs to demonstrate to the world that American Negroes can be satisfactorily integrated into its democracy. . . . The treatment of the Negro in America has not made good propaganda for America abroad and particularly not among colored nations.123

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The Institute of Pacific Relations conference had been an opportunity for a skilled operator, such as Hailey, to take Myrdal’s problematic and use it against the American delegates. The fact that some of his ideas and methods of presentation, such as prioritizing economic rather than political development, became important later has more to do with the broader geopolitical convergence of British and American interests. Looking at the arguments involved, however, provides a way to understand how issues that involved national interest were actually perceived and expressed at the time. The conference illustrates how, once politicized, the issue of race was a useful tool for intellectual combatants, such as Hailey, to set out a new framework for negotiation.

5 Reformulating Imperial Authority

Introduction The British Colonial Office was sensitive to the need to fight an ideological battle for the Empire. Stressing Britain’s commitment to enhance rather than ‘exploit’ the colonies had become crucial after Roosevelt’s Four Freedom declaration. The idea that the Allies made up the ‘free’ world while the Axis powers ‘enslaved’ the others, did not quite square with the image of the British Empire especially within the United States. The Colonial Office tried to forge a new language to articulate their authority since the old expression had been discredited. It is not possible here to attempt to assess the influence of these ideas on actual administrative practice. The task here is to reconstruct the history of the ideas deployed to justify empire rather than the actual methods used. As the war continued, the British sought to find common ground with the Americans on questions of colonial policy for the postwar period. The debate over race and empire provided the means to find a new language of imperial authority, untainted by the notion of white racial superiority, as new themes came to the fore in response to the political pressures of the day. This chapter examines the related themes of ‘partnership’ in the Empire; the postponing of self-government through the issue of minority protection; and the question of jurisdiction.

The idea of a colonial charter One of the problems facing the Colonial Office in the early phase of the war was the Atlantic Charter, which Britain had signed. The 119

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wording in Article Three of the Charter seemed to promise liberation to all countries in the world including the colonies. As the Charter was not specific about its application, however, many people called on the Colonial Office to spell out a new charter for the colonies. The Colonial Office sought to put together a ‘colonial charter’ jointly with the India Office as an ‘authoritative interpretation’ for the War Cabinet.1 The India Office and the Colonial Office, however, held different underlying concerns about the current political situation. Leo Amery, of the India Office, was anxious to limit the application of the Atlantic Charter while not causing any inflammation of Indian nationalist sentiment. The Colonial Office, meanwhile, assumed that independence was a distant and even impossible issue for most of the dependent empire and especially for Africa. Amery drafted the first attempt at a ‘colonial charter’. He opened the document with the statement: Though animated by the same spirit of liberty that has guided the development of self-governing institutions in the British Empire – with regard to which both the general aim of our policy and its particular application in the case of India, Burma and certain of the more fully developed Crown Colonies, has been made abundantly clear – [the Charter] has no direct reference to that process.2 Despite wishing to ‘agree to a formula over both India and the Colonies’, Lord Moyne, the secretary of state for the colonies, could not accept Amery’s first two sentences. Fundamentally, for Moyne, self-government was not the ‘general aim of our policy’. Frankly, he wrote: Some Colonies are so small, or strategically so important, that complete self-government seems out of the question; and I cannot, for instance, imagine any conditions under which we would give dominion status to Aden, Gibraltar, the Gambia or British Honduras.3 Instead, Moyne proposed the condition that: ‘while not in any way whittling down the principle which, as has been stated, they regard as of universal application, HMG must retain to themselves the right to judge whether any such request is justified by the capabilities of the people in question.’4 Amery’s prompt reaction was that such a statement would ‘send both India and Burma right off the deep end’ as it

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implied that Britain was still of the view that non-Europeans could not administer their own countries.5 After another attempt from both sides of the debate, Moyne finally admitted that they could not express in one paper ‘two divergent ideas’. It was clear, instead, that: In India and Burma, the people definitely demand self-government and you are committed to grant it. In the colonies, it is otherwise. The right to choose the form of government has never till now been definitely laid down and, unlike you, we are not committed, in your words at the top of the paragraph of the second page, to a declared policy of ‘development of self-governing institutions to the fullest practicable extent within the British Empire’.6 The problem of the issue of self-government could not, however, be ignored. Amery warned Moyne that Winston Churchill was bound to be questioned on this issue on 9 September 1941 in parliament – although at that stage Amery wondered whether both Amery and Moyne should make separate statements and ‘if Winston does make a statement we can leave it to him to combine the two in whatever fashion he pleases’.7 In the end, Hailey,8 the Viceroy of India,9 and the rest of the War Cabinet were drafted in, where the India and Colonial Offices had failed, to try to create a consensus before Parliamentary Question Time. The final statement drafted for the Prime Minister dealt with the issue of colonial self-government in two steps. First, Churchill noted, the Atlantic Charter did ‘not try to explain how the broad principles proclaimed by it are to be applied to each and every case, which will have to be dealt with when the war comes to an end’.10 In other words, the application of the Joint Declaration of the Atlantic Charter depended on circumstance, which would be judged by the British government. The condition was modified for India and Burma so as not to further antagonize relations.11 Second, Churchill claimed that: We have made declarations on these matters which are complete in themselves, free from ambiguity; and related to the conditions and circumstances of the territories and peoples affected. They will be found to be entirely in harmony with the high conception of freedom and justice which inspired the Joint Declaration.12 This final comment was not a rhetorical flourish, nor an off-the-cuff overstatement, but a precise wording that had been agreed by the War

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Cabinet – even though, as the Colonial Office quickly realized, it was entirely without foundation.13 Five months later, when Lord Cranborne took over the position of secretary of state for the colonies, the lack of colonial promises was thought to be ‘embarrassing’ and Cranborne complained that ‘declarations on colonial policy seem to have been mainly conspicuous by their absence, and, when any have been made, they are vague in the extreme’.14 The lack of clear declarations was a problem particularly in the face of American criticisms. The preference on the part of the Americans for ‘slogans’, as Harold Butler stationed in Washington put it, exacerbated the sense of weakness in the colonial office. If only the office could, as Butler proposed, simply ‘show that [the Atlantic Charter] is applicable to our colonial policy’, then perhaps, as Butler hoped, ‘three quarters of the talk about “imperialism” will evaporate’.15 The fact that the Colonial Office had agreed to Churchill’s parliamentary statement, claiming that the declarations existed when they clearly did not, indicates the level of pressure that the Colonial Office, in particular, faced over this issue of self-government. Not only was there pressure from the colonies (although that was more a problem for the India Office), but the ideals of ‘freedom and justice’ were being held up by the Americans as the only justification for foreign intervention. For example, the Washington Post argued that: ‘if India does not get her freedom then this war of freedom which we are waging would be a fraud and a delusion.’16

The idea of partnership By replacing the term ‘trusteeship’ with ‘partnership’, Lord Hailey attempted to rephrase Britain’s colonial policy. Hailey, according to Michael Lee and Martin Petter, tried to ‘convey “a new vision of the future” which might serve as the basis of a Colonial Charter’.17 Not only was the term partnership used by Harold Macmillan, in a Commons debate in June 1942, but it was also adopted by Arthur Creech Jones, Labour Party spokesman on the colonies, who wanted a term that expressed ‘equality and friendship, the idea of service and practical assistance and which expresses it in dynamic and constructive terms’.18 As early as May 1942, Hailey had begun to note the inadequacy of ‘trusteeship’, particularly when he needed to promote the role of the Colonial Office. At the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, for example, Hailey, in his address, announced that:

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with the progress of events our relations to the dependencies are now coming under the influence of a conception which if it should not be considered as replacing that of trusteeship, at all events embodies a more constructive interpretation of it.19 Hailey regarded partnership as giving a ‘more constructive interpretation’ to the Colonial Office role for two reasons. First, the notion of partnership suggested that, although initially there would be senior and junior partners, eventually they could become equal partners. Unlike the notion of trustee and ward, which seemed to imply a fixed hierarchical relationship, Hailey wanted to capture the notion of development. The racial, and propagandistic, significance of the question of development was picked up by Moyne, the secretary of state for the colonies, at a meeting of the Royal Empire Society. After Hailey had spoken, Moyne, who was chairing, commented: if we were fighting for liberty we could not set bounds to the advance of other races. We must avoid any reproach that, when we blamed Hitler for his poisonous doctrine of the Herrenvolk, we had a similar doctrine lurking in our own hearts.20 Second, by introducing the notion of development Hailey was placing stress on the economic sphere as well as the political. Hailey emphasized this type of development by using the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940. The new role of the Colonial Office was to stimulate economic growth and a social welfare programme, just as domestic ministries were planning for postwar Britain. Hailey supported this domestic policy and argued for its extension, thus producing a: conception of the State not merely as an agency for maintaining justice and equal rights, or for preventing abuse, as it was held to be in earlier political theory, but as the most active agency for promoting social welfare and improving the general standard of living. That is a conception which increasingly dominates our domestic policy, and it is forcing its way from domestic into colonial policy.21 As the British government stepped in to promote the welfare of the people of the colonies, so Hailey envisaged the beginning of a new relationship between the centre and the periphery – where the state

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regarded ‘standards of living in its own domestic backward areas’ in the same light as poverty in the Empire.22 The extension of domestic policy into the colonial arena, treating British and colonial people as equally deserving of welfare, showed how Hailey dismissed, as Moyne had suggested, ‘the bounds to the advance of other races’, considering instead that ‘other races’ required the same welfare as the ‘poor whites’ back home. The development of the ‘native races’ was, however, thought to be limited in one important respect: the sphere of politics. Hailey was not sure whether, in the political sphere, the colonies ought to have the same political institutions as the British. Instead, he feared that: an attempt to develop a parliamentary system of government based on representation of the usual type may produce situations which, so far from assisting a community on the road to self-government, may in the end create an argument for withholding it.23 Hailey maintained this doubt about the capabilities of the colonial people, but learned to couch it in terms of the possibility of improvement, through his idea of partnership. For example, Hailey used to suggest that the interwar system of ‘indirect rule’, based on separate paths of development for different races, could provide ‘a structure better suited to the conditions of certain of the dependencies than that based on the methods of representation which we ourselves follow’.24 Given Hailey’s presumption of racial difference, it was not surprising that he still doubted the capacity of colonial people for self-government and objected to the fact that ‘America is now interested mainly in the question of political status’, because, by implication, a significant change in the political status of the colonies would have caused the disintegration of the Empire.25 One of the important audiences for the concept of partnership was the Americans, and Hailey used the Institute of Pacific Relations conference at the end of 1942 to promote his ideas.26 Even before the conference, the ‘partnership’ concept had been appreciated in the USA according to the Foreign Office.27 The pressure by the United States for independent political status for the colonies, and in particular India, did not entirely eclipse issues of economic poverty. For example, Americans were horrified at conditions in West Africa. What really embarrassed the Colonial Office was the fact that on ‘several occasions’ Americans had remarked that the British ‘should do more for these people’. Lieutenant Colonel Cantlie,

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reporting to the Colonial Office, blamed the ‘primitive tribes’ because Americans ‘compare the West Africans, who a few years ago were living a primitive tribal existence, with their own coloured people who have been at least semi-civilised for 100 years’. But Cantlie also noted that the Americans’ attitude was ‘curious in that they fraternize to a great extent with the Indians, while at the same time refusing their own coloured troops the right of remaining in public places with themselves’.28 It was this discrepancy in American racial attitudes that had proved so useful to the Colonial Office delegates to the Institute of Pacific Relations conference.

Finding a compromise After Britain’s loss of Singapore, many Americans proudly defended their relationship with the Pacific islanders who fought with the US Army. The Americans shared much of British paternalism towards colonial peoples but, particularly after Singapore, feared that British incompetence would bring white prestige as a whole into disrepute. For example, P. D. Butler, stationed in Cairo, reported that: The Americans feel that they have got to win this war; Malaya, etc, has convinced them that we are not only Imperialists, but bungling Imperialists (in the past they had always given us credit for knowing our Imperialist job), and they are thinking of and discussing futures for our colonies in which we play no very prominent part.29 In contrast, the United States administration put itself forward as the agency for liberation. An example was the new pro-self-government policy for Puerto Rico, celebrated by, for example, Anne O’Hare McCormick in the New York Times: The proposal to extend a large measure of self-government to the people of Puerto Rico implies more than a change of status for the largest America possession in the Caribbean. It is at once a reaction to the events that have shaken the pillars of power in the Pacific, a sign of our own good intentions in respect to a new postwar order, and a clear suggestion to other colonial powers to go and do likewise.30 In the summer of 1942, with the added pressure of the defeats in the Pacific, the debate over a public statement on the future of ‘colonial

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peoples’ was revived. This time British and American officials aimed to produce a joint colonial charter, one that could both re-express their common front and involve China thereby demonstrating an alliance with the East. The hope was to issue a statement against the view that the Pacific War was a war of white against Asian. Some officials also saw it as a way of patching up the differences of opinion between Britain and America. For the British Foreign and Colonial Office, advice was not something they appreciated. The question of ‘being told how to run empire’ was something on which the British Foreign and Colonial Offices were particularly sensitive. One reason given was that they felt that nobody else appreciated the complexity and the variety of imperial rule and instead, as Halifax complained, others attempted an ‘over-simplification which would fit India, Jamaica and Nyasaland all at once’.31 In the summer of 1942, Cordell Hull, US secretary of state, talked with ambassador Lord Halifax, about how they needed to ‘guide opinion wisely in relation to backward peoples of differing grades and capacities’. According to Halifax, Hull, ‘with an eye on India’, wanted to ‘reassert some of the principles of his speech, ie, necessity of fitness for and willingness to fight for freedom’ as a condition for self-government. Hull shared Halifax’s conception that they were dealing with ‘backward peoples’ and proposed that the British could improve their relations with India by withholding the promise of self-government until India joined forces in the fight against Japan.32 Encouragingly for the British officials, Hull had introduced the phrase ‘parent states’ as a euphemism for the imperial nation. This was positively received in British official circles because it upheld imperial hierarchy.33 The Foreign Office (informed by the Colonial Office) argued that any process of changeover to an international body could delay the development of self-governing institutions. Arnold Toynbee, stationed at the British Embassy in Washington, was commissioned to discuss this point with Benjamin Gerig, the ‘wise man’ at the American state department, and he requested that Hailey also see Gerig when Hailey was over for the IPR conference.34 Toynbee reported that Gerig had conceded that ‘the Western-educated native intelligentsia doesn’t like the idea of international administration, because it thinks this would delay full self-government’.35 Arriving at a joint statement had already proved impossible for the Colonial and India Office – this time they were hoping to overcome their differences and accommodate the views of the Americans. There was, however, a certain impetus to the process this time around. First,

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the Foreign Office wanted to have some sort of draft statement with which to brief Hailey and the delegation to the IPR conference in December 1942.36 Second, the overture had originated with the US State Department and there was some fear that if the British did not provide a response quickly, then they might ‘be confronted by a draft Declaration composed by the Americans which may be far less satisfactory from our point of view’.37 The two factors combined pushed the secretaries of state concerned to work much harder at achieving a consensus for the cabinet draft.38 Lord Cranborne suggested the use of regional committees, after Hailey’s proposal, to organize international influence over colonial areas. The advantage was thought to be that they would involve ‘no explicit derogation of sovereignty’ but by using ‘consultative committees’, Cranborne thought it would ‘be acceptable to Attlee and the Left, for it has in it the element of internationalism’. More importantly the regional committees would involve the Americans – but only in certain areas, so that: ‘no doubt, the Americans would be a great nuisance to us on the Caribbean Committee, where they would constantly be interfering in the internal affairs of our West Indian Colonies. But they will do that in any case.’39 Despite the use of the regional committees, the inclusion of ‘parent states’ and the committee’s power to be ‘co-ordinating the policies’ (rather than just the ‘collaboration and consultation between’), and the fear that ‘if we submit to them too bare a platter, they may reject it out of hand’,40 the Americans did just that. In March 1943, the Foreign Office received a draft declaration from the US state department, ‘which it is true takes some cognizance of our draft, but its basic idea is wholly different’.41 Sir George Gater, permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies, minuted dramatically: After reading the American draft two or three times, I am left with a feeling of complete hopelessness. I do not think it is possible to secure such amendment of the draft as would make it acceptable to us and, I would add, to the colonies. The whole theme of the draft is wrongly conceived and exhibits on the part of the draftsmen ignorance of actual conditions in British colonies. It is only necessary to think of applying its principles to colonies like Mauritius to realize its full absurdity.42

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The American colonial charter On 3 May 1943, Attlee, Eden, Cranborne, Stanley, Jebb and Eastwood met to discuss the American draft. Mr Winant of the US State Department had already held a brief discussion with Cranborne who had complained that the ‘emphasis on independence seemed to him most unfortunate’, as he thought ‘it was likely to encourage half-baked ideas in many colonial dependencies’.43 At the meeting at 11 Downing Street, the secretaries of states decided that the American draft was altogether unsatisfactory for several reasons. The consensus at the meeting was that the draft, which covered both ideas of independence44 and liberation, was apparently intended to apply to colonial dependencies and to enemy-occupied states. The ministers present considered it ‘quite unrealistic to deal in one document with Czechoslovakia and the Gambia, Poland and Barbados’. It was also assumed that the result would be the impracticable ‘multiplication of small and completely independent entities all over the world’ which would be a ‘retrograde step’ in establishing an ‘enduring security system’. The ministers feared that the American draft would ‘encourage separatist tendencies all over the world’ and the idea of a ‘definite timetable’ towards independence, or even the possible use of the more ‘acceptable’ term ‘self-government’, was seen as ‘quite unacceptable to Her Majesty’s Government’. Not only was it ‘not possible to say when that time will be’ that colonial dependencies ‘might be ready’ for self-government, but, it was said, ‘many parts of the colonial empire are still so little removed from their primitive state that it must be a matter of many generations before they are ready for anything like full self-government’.45 As a consequence of their discussion, the secretaries of state decided not to report to the War Cabinet but instead to approach John Winant, then American ambassador, and, once told of their objections, ‘ask his advice on how we ought to proceed’. 46 Hailey, on the recommendation of Lord Halifax, was also given a copy of the American draft and asked for his interpretation, especially in the light of his experience of talking with the Americans in the winter of 1942–3.47 Despite many criticisms, Hailey was not quite as despairing as his colleagues in government. On the issue of independence, he agreed that ‘it is one thing to propose international control for the ex-Italian areas; it is another to contemplate it for British, French or Dutch areas recovered from the Japanese’. Although Hailey was against the ‘attempt to insist on fixing dates upon which the colonial

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peoples shall be accorded the status of “full independence within a system of general security”’, he was also doubtful ‘whether the President himself would insist on this; he has spoken rather about the necessity for a period of “graded education” than about the need for “liberation”’.48 Hailey also recognized that it would be difficult for Britain to distance itself from the common interpretation of Article Three of the Atlantic Charter. Furthermore, Hailey argued, ‘to imply that there is a distinction between self-government and independence suggests a refinement which will be viewed with a great deal of suspicion in the USA’. The problem, as he saw it, was that ‘the use of the word “independence” may create an awkward reaction in some of the colonies’. On the other hand, any redefinition away from Article Three would be seen as the British refusing to ‘toe the line’. Hailey advised that a unilateral declaration would not ‘carry weight’ with the Americans and the only purpose would be to make ‘our position clear to the people of the colonies’.49 Hailey’s concern about the impact of the Anglo-American debate on the colonies echoed Cranborne’s views when secretary of state for the colonies in October 1942. Cranborne had commented then that the phrase ‘as yet unable to bear the full burden of complete independence’ would encourage the colonies to ‘keep up a simmering agitation’. As far as Cranborne was concerned he ‘could not agree to a phrase which is likely to have such deplorable effects, just to placate the Americans, who do not understand the conditions under which we have to work’. The underlying issue was, for Cranborne, in his ‘heart of hearts’, that ‘most of the colonies, especially in Africa, will probably not be fit for complete independence for centuries’.50 By the spring of 1943, however, Hailey had experienced at first hand the debate at the IPR conference in Canada. As a result, Hailey was inclined to go beyond Cranborne’s conservative viewpoint. In contrast to the Colonial Office’s crisis mentality, Hailey was beginning to put together a constructive role for colonial administration. Hailey, echoing the climate in Britain of increasing self-confidence by 1943, began to argue that the development of ‘backward and dependent peoples’ was in fact the way that Britain could both reduce political tension in the colonies and advance the presentation of the Empire in America. Hailey’s approach was to focus on Britain’s role in developing the colonial economy rather than on the formal political relationship of Britain with the colonies. In discussion with Hailey, the Foreign Office in Washington reported back that:

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While therefore placing due stress on defence, it will be advisable to show that in our view security depends not only upon provision of means for preventing aggression, but also on attaining improved social and political conditions amongst backward and dependent peoples.51 Christopher Eastwood had pointed out that ‘the Americans are quite ready to make their dependencies politically “independent” while economically bound hand and foot to them and see no inconsistency in this’.52 Hailey, however, had taken advantage of the American attitude while in America. He had sought to establish common ground while also maintaining the right-to-rule principle that was essential for Britain (and, as Eastwood had seen, also for the United States). What Hailey took from his long experience in colonial administration was that the issue of control was more important than its particular form. How control was practically achieved seemed to matter less than the principle at stake. Whereas officials such as Eastwood saw only the dangers associated with American criticisms of empire, and then were angry at apparent American hypocrisy, Hailey, after his intense discussions in America, had realized that what appeared as hypocrisy to Eastwood was, in fact, the basis for a new working relationship. At base, according to Hailey, the British and the Americans were concerned to maintain a certain level of control over their effective empires. This had, for the British Empire, been expressed in the past through political and racial subordination. Hailey, in dialogue with US policy-makers, had grasped that in essence imperial authority could be maintained by a new form of state intervention – one that had the authority to intervene because it was promoting the colonial economy. Britain and America never did manage to agree on a colonial charter per se, although they did, much later, settle on the preamble for the founding of the United Nations. The important question, however, is how, despite the lack of a colonial charter, both Britain and America came to agree on central issues. These issues were important because they expressed the language of concern and humanitarianism, appropriate to the emerging postwar world, and, at the same time, maintained the authority of the key imperialist powers. The major powers would continue to be able to determine the future of the colonial territories – only this time the source of their legitimacy was based less on racial difference and more on their new role as protector and developmental economist.

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We can see this trend when we consider the debate in the Colonial Office over the American draft of the colonial charter. Hailey’s suggestions included a change in substance as well as in form. Most of the discussion in the Colonial Office had been of whether it was possible to shift the Americans to use the words ‘self-government’ instead of ‘independence’.53 Again, in comparing Eastwood’s views with Hailey’s, we can see the difference in approach. Hailey’s instinct was to sidestep the semantic issue of the title of the goal and shift the focus of discussion onto the new arena of the future role of Britain. Whereas Eastwood, pessimistically and honestly, admitted that: It seems to me utterly wrong to set up independence as the goal for the greater number of the colonies and even if we had said something of this sort in the past (which I do not think we have) I think it would be great mistake to say it again. I do not think the phrase ‘self-government’ is really much better. I suppose it does leave a loop-hole for arguing that what we really mean is only local selfgovernment, but that would not be a very honest interpretation of the phrase.54 Hailey had, in contrast, attempted to lead the Colonial Office into incorporating, rather than reacting to, American thinking. Hailey’s submission was circulated to the ministers,55 but they decided, against Hailey’s advice, to make a unilateral statement and forgo an AngloAmerican charter at this time.56 Stanley made a statement to the House of Commons on 13 July 1943, having told Winant, the US ambassador, of the rejection of the American draft in May. As Hailey had predicted, Stanley’s statement went ‘unnoticed’ and in November, when the Prime Minister was in Canada, Roosevelt handed Churchill a document entitled ‘Declaration by the United Nations on International Independence’.57 To the surprise of British officials, the ‘new’ document was much the same as the last, and the Americans had made no attempt to incorporate Stanley’s comments. Hailey was thus not entirely successful by himself in shifting policy, but other events helped to nudge the Colonial Office in Hailey’s direction.

Withholding political independence Hailey, through his discussions at the IPR conference and after, was sensitized to the question of political control and racial discrimination. This was partly due to his experience of the Indian independence

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movement, but also partly because the impact of the war had changed his opinions. Hailey’s approach, at the start of the war, was to withhold political independence because, he claimed, it would give political power to a minority over an uneducated majority. In particular, Hailey argued: There is always some temptation to seek to reach a further stage on the road by entrusting political powers to a dominant section of the population, or to an elite which commends itself by its superior education or its closer contact with European ways of life.58 Though Hailey was doubtful of the wisdom of the transference of political power to the indigenous people, the argument he directed at the Americans was more subtle. Rather than concentrate on the inability, in his eyes, of the colonial people to handle political responsibility, he focused on the positive role that the imperial power needed to play in developing the right conditions. For this relationship was, according to Hailey, common to both powers: America has had similar experiences in many of its Southern States and among its Negro population. Both in Great Britain and in the United States we now realize that it is necessary to revise our system so far as will enable the State to give more help to the development of the under-privileged areas or communities without affecting the vitality of private enterprise and initiative.59 By comparing the situation in Africa to that in the southern United States, Hailey was using the underlying race prejudice of the American officials to gain support for his ideas. At the IPR conference in December 1942, Hailey had met Dr Stanley Hornbeck, the adviser on Far Eastern Affairs at the US State Department. They both shared a common prejudice that only white people could develop the colonial economy. Only the previous summer, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, Hornbeck had argued: On the one hand, we want to do away with imperialism and on the other we want to develop freedom and also want all peoples of the world better off in every way. Now when it comes to the economic matter the more freedom some peoples have the less well off they are economically. The average negro does enough work to get enough to live on and no more. Peoples of the South Seas are

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similar. He is not interested in property or culture and you have to impair his freedom to make his economic standards higher.60 When Hailey argued that the priority was economic development rather than political freedom, he was tapping into the racist viewpoint that believed that black people were unable to develop the economy on their own. But the emphasis on state provision and on development and welfare made Hailey’s presentation appear progressive for its time. One other major factor is the way in which domestic policy in regards to the role of the state was also transformed at this period. The plans, through the war, for the welfare state and the reorganization of British industry through state intervention, were based on support across the political spectrum for a new conception of the role of the state. The move away from laissez-faire economics and towards Keynesianism implied that the state was no longer seen as a neutral arbiter, standing back from the proceedings of modern life, but instead had become a state whose function was to promote development in all areas of society. The fact that this new, interventionist state operated in Africa as well as in Britain would also transform the colonial relationship in the postwar period. Hailey himself referred to this process, noting: ‘It seems to me that our own outlook on colonial policy is in the process of being recast; partly because of the new conception . . . of the position which the state must occupy as an agency for social welfare.’61 In America in 1943, and also in Britain later that year, Hailey emphasized the role of the state not only in terms of the ‘treatment’ of its own ‘depressed areas’,62 but also in terms of maintaining security. This, in the middle of the war, was obviously an important point to both people at home and in the colonies. Hailey’s comment that ‘independence is meaningless without external security’ was especially directed at India,63 which in many ways had been the focus for American criticism of the British Empire. Both in terms of state-led development and in terms of keeping the peace, Hailey was raising issues that, in the long run, would serve to stress the dependent relationship of the colonies to Britain. Although the imperial relationship was presented in a new form, in essence Hailey was trying to uphold the integrity of imperial authority. The general feeling in the United States before April 1942 was that Britain should grant India independence. Fuelled by the rapid collapse of the Far Eastern empire in the face of Japan’s advance, many Americans saw British unpopularity as the root of the problem. In

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1939, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, had brought India into the war without consulting the Indian National Congress Party. In response, Congress opposed India’s participation in the war and distrusted Britain’s promise of dominion status ‘at the end of the war’. The British replied by arresting Gandhi and other Congress leaders. Once America had entered the war and, more importantly, Japan’s advance started to approach India’s frontiers, India’s political situation developed a strategic importance for the Allies. The Indian National Army, led by Subhas Chandra Bose, decided, although a minority movement, to take sides with the Japanese and against the British. Meanwhile, Gandhi, a pacifist, argued that if Britain were to ‘quit India’ then the Indians would have nothing to fear from the Japanese as they would not invade. Many Americans, shocked by the rate at which Britain had lost the apparently loyal dependencies of Burma, Malaya and Singapore, thought that Britain could only redeem its status and perhaps some loyal defence in the Far East by granting freedom to India. For example, Isaiah Berlin reported that Sumner Welles, of the US State Department, had said that ‘the offer to India should have been made sooner and endorsed the view that some dramatic statement should have been made to rally the Eastern peoples to the war against the Axis’.64 In April 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps, a Labour member of the cabinet, went to India to try to arrange a compromise. Cripps had met Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of the Indian Congress Party, in 1938 in London and had corresponded occasionally since then while also writing articles on Indian freedom for Tribune, a Labour newspaper. After the fall of Singapore, Labour Party and American pressures on the government increased and Cripps, who had returned from an ambassadorship in Moscow, was appointed to a new India Committee of the War Cabinet, set up on 26 February 1942, with the aim of drafting a new constitutional statement.65 The draft declaration that Cripps took to India in April 1942 was an advance on previous offers. For the first time, according to R. J. Moore, Muslim majority provinces could ‘opt out of the new Union once the constitution was formed’. The formation of the constitution was ‘solely’ the responsibility of Indian political groups, but under the condition it had to be accepted unanimously (although the consitution could, for the first time, admit ‘plural dominionhood’).66 The main problem at this stage, after 25 years of prevarication since the Montagu declaration and the imprisonment of some 23 000 people, was a lack of trust between the involved parties.

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Moore argues that Cripps went to India thinking that he could negotiate with the Indian leaders. The War Cabinet was of the view that Cripps was simply going to ‘discuss matters’ because negotiation implied an elevation of the Indian parties to equal status.67 The Cabinet wanted India’s independence on British, not Indian, terms. Cripps attempted to woo Indian support by planning a new Indian executive but the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, felt this was undermining his authority. More importantly, Cripps had gone so far as to see the new Indian executive as being in the position of an Indian cabinet or national government, even having a limited power over defence, something over which the British Cabinet had planned to retain control. Churchill’s renunciation of Cripps’s position as negotiator, after Linlithgow had reported that Cripps was forming a ‘national government’, made the Congress Party suspicious and the offer was rejected.68 Lord Wavell, who was at the time Commander-in-Chief and later took over as Viceroy from Linlithgow in 1943, sided with Cripps, however, admitting: ‘I have discovered that the cabinet is not honest in its expressed desire to make progress in India.’69 The Indian Congress Party and the Muslim League dismissed Cripps’s offer by 11 April 1942. As a move towards Indian independence, the Cripps mission was a failure. In a significant arena, however, in the eyes of Americans, the Cripps mission succeeded in demonstrating that Indian opinion was itself divided. Isaiah Berlin reported back from Washington that: The breakdown in India is generally regretted, but Sir Stafford Cripps’s final statement was very well received and so far there has been no disposition to blame His Majesty’s Government. . . . Never again should glib generalizations about the simplicity of the Indian problem be accepted by the majority of people and never again should the Congress emissaries find it as easy to sow mistrust of Britain here. America has become better educated about India this past month.70 The benefit of the Cripps mission was that it made disunity in India, rather than British colonialism, liable for hindering Indian independence. Britain’s message to the Indians, as presented by Hailey, was ‘you are to frame your constitution and to choose independence if you so desire’.71 To the American public, it signalled that the British government would listen to Indian wishes. The India Office, the British government and Hailey were quite aware, however, that the

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internal tensions within India between the Hindus, Muslims and the princely states had made building any constitutional framework into a minefield. The idea of Indian ‘choice’ or ‘desire’ was not, despite Hailey’s assertions, really part of the process of gaining independence, given the terms set by Britain. The Indian internal conflicts had, however, been exacerbated by imperial intervention, and were therefore Britain’s responsibility. Britain had, in many ways, brought modernization to India but it had tried to maintain control over a rapidly changing social system by backing social traditions of the past. Religious communities and princes were thought to be easier to negotiate with than a dislocated modern society.72 Hailey, in his early career, had been party to resettlement programmes that ended up creating more segregated religious communities than had previously existed (see Chapter 2).73 The irony of the British involvement in reifying ‘communal tensions’ was that these very tensions were exploited by Britain to maintain control.74 Even as late as the 1920s, British manipulation of the Muslim community and the princely states had brought, according to Moore, ‘two Indias’ into being.75 Churchill, according to Christopher Thorne, gained satisfaction from the Hindu–Muslim feud, calling it ‘the bulwark of British rule in India’.76 President Roosevelt, however, hearing from his personal representative in India, Colonel Louis Johnson, that ‘London wanted a Congress refusal’, was less taken in by the positive reception of the US press. Roosevelt complained to Churchill that ‘the deadlock has been due to the British Government’s unwillingness to concede the right of selfgovernment to the Indians’. Churchill’s reply was that only the Muslims, ‘the military classes’, could be trusted, while the Congress party only ‘represents mainly the intelligentsia of non-fighting Hindu elements, and they can neither defend India nor raise a revolt’.77 When Chiang Kai-shek pressured Roosevelt again on the Indian question, Churchill’s reaction was a further attack on Congress: You could remind Chiang that Gandhi was prepared to negotiate with Japan on the basis of a free passage for Japanese troops through India in the hopes of their joining hands with Hitler. Personally, I have no doubt that in addition there would have been an understanding [between Gandhi and the Japanese] that the Congress would have the use of sufficient Japanese troops to keep down the composite minority of 90 million Moslems, 40 million untouchables, and 90 million in the Princes’ States.78

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The combination of Churchill’s direct put-down of Congress in his private correspondence with Roosevelt, the propagandistic success of the Cripps mission (so much so that Churchill told Cripps not to bother with reporting back to the Cabinet), and, most importantly, the failure of the Japanese to continue their advance meant that the pressure from the United States on Britain in relation to India had ‘passed its peak’ by the autumn of 1942.79 The Office of War Information noted that the presentation of India in the United States’ newspapers was often insulting and racist.80 From Berlin’s weekly reports, it is also clear that American criticisms of British policy in India did continue, but in a more muted fashion. Hailey, too, remarked in the House of Lords, that despite having ‘failed in their main objective’, the main reward of the Cripps mission had been that ‘we had regained the political initiative’.81 As the war shifted in the Allies’ favour, so the political pressure that had been caused by earlier failures started to deflate.82 The form that the debate had taken, however, was to influence much of the tone of the following discussion on Britain’s postwar imperial role. This is not to say that the protection of minorities was a new development in the language of the Colonial Office – far from it. For example, Hailey often commented on the diversity within the empire, of ‘communities which are divided by strong differences of racial origin, reproduced in equally strong differences of tradition and social habit’. And he had already judged that ‘representation through an electoral system’ was inapplicable where people were ‘divided by strong racial or cultural differences’.83 But after the experience of India in 1942, the protection of minority groups was more than just a barrier to representative self-government, it created a new essential role for Britain. The lesson of India, even if short-lived as a tactic there, could be applied elsewhere to create a new role for imperial rule as arbiter. As Hailey now argued in the House of Lords: ‘any scheme put forward must recognize our obligations to the great minorities. That was not merely a question of moral justice but of political necessity.’84 And the ‘political necessity’ was Britain’s international reputation, more than the conditions in India.

Protecting minority groups One way that the change in the Colonial Office’s view of race relations can be seen most clearly is through the issue of minority groups. Immigrant groups, especially Indians and Chinese, had often been used in other parts of the colonial empire to aid in the administration

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of a colony, but their demands were often seen as troublesome: for example, the Asians in Kenya had challenged the supremacy and land rights of the white settlers. Britain had traditionally backed the settlers because, to Arthur Dawe of the Colonial Office, ‘it seems unthinkable that any British government would bring military force to bear upon a community of our blood’.85 Prior to the Second World War, ‘race relations’ was a term used to describe the mapping of characteristics to ‘races’. Now, in the midst of global conflict, ‘race relations’ was seen as the study of the conflict between the so-called races as British colonial officials saw themselves as peacekeepers. Lord Halifax, ambassador to the United States and former Viceroy of India (1926–31), was so impressed with the way that the realization of the Muslim–Hindu divide in India impacted on American opinion, that he suggested that a similar tactic be used for other parts of the Empire. He cabled the Ministry of Information in London to bring to their attention that: Americans who have hitherto been overwhelmingly pro-Hindu have at last realized that there is a Moslem problem in India. Now might be the time not only to keep the Moslem problem in India constantly before the American public but to point out the existence of a Moslem problem in Palestine.86 Lord Hailey had been appointed Lord Lugard’s successor at the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) at a time, in 1937, when the riots of Palestine had been a particular issue. Palestine was then a mandate and Hailey’s task was to justify British actions in the territory before the international commission. His experience in India and then of Palestine, even before the war, probably predisposed Hailey to see ‘race relations’ as a conflict that only Britain could sort out. The idea that ‘diversity’ was a problem for the political development of the colonies had already been noted by Hailey in his investigation into native administration in Africa in 1940. Hailey’s initial reaction was that the divisions in Africa would be less entrenched and less problematic than those in India.87 By 1943, however, Hailey was concerned that India was ‘an example’ of what might happen in Africa without ‘serious study’ and ‘conscious experiment’ by, of course, the Colonial Office.88 Michael Lee confirms that colonial policy became preoccupied with the problem of ‘plural societies’.89 In 1959, on practically the eve of decolonization, Hailey took this point to its extreme, arguing that: ‘The great diversity in the policies

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and the political circumstances of the many countries comprised in Africa makes it impossible to accept the conclusion, now so often advanced with complete confidence, that we are within sight of the end of the colonial system throughout the continent.’90 In 1943, in regard to India, Hailey was proud that a few ‘reserved’ powers remained in the hands of the British for the purpose of the ‘protection of minorities’.91 In fact, Hailey continued, the ‘sectarian divisions which are an obstacle to the working of democracy’ were a result ‘largely due to the substitution of a political for administrative regime, in which the British held the dominant part and kept the peace’.92 As far as Hailey was concerned, Indian political control exercised by sectional parties had intensified the problem and, instead, Britain should have maintained the Indian polity as largely administrative. The Colonial Office maintained the argument that it was ‘our responsibility’ to be the guarantor of peace in these divided communities. The Colonial Office saw themselves as the friend of the minority. For example, ‘even in Ceylon where responsible government is in fact demanded by the Sinhalese majority, no solution has yet been found to secure the interests of Tamil and other minorities’.93 Colonel Oliver Stanley, in early 1943, who had recently taken over the position of secretary of state for the colonies, echoed Hailey’s emphasis on diversity in his lecture at Princeton: There is a great diversity in the resources of the colonies; there is an equal diversity in the ability of their peoples to adjust themselves to the conditions and the needs of the modern civilization with which they are now in contact.94 Stanley maintained, when he spoke at the Conservative Association in Oxford, that such diversity in the colonies ruled out the single, simple solution of self-government: The first thing that strikes anyone in a study of our colonial Empire is its infinite variety. Over 50 territories of every size, of every climate, of every race, of every stage of economic and social development. Neither in politics, in economics, nor in social welfare is it possible to find any common yardstick, any one measure, that is applicable to all. In each one of them the problems are quite different, and so in each one of them will have to be the solutions.95

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Since every territory required a different political arrangement, to suit the different ‘races’ and the ‘plurality of races’, so each colony could not presume that self-government would be the ultimate goal. In Stanley’s words, the reason was that ‘the stages by which we advance must be necessarily slow’, and ‘in our 50 territories today we find all differing stages of political development’. ‘Self-government’, Stanley argued, is ‘a responsibility’, and Britain’s responsible action, according to Stanley, was to maintain differences between Englishmen and Africans: Now, lastly, with regard to social development our object is to see the various peoples of the various territories develop themselves – develop along the lines of their own national aptitude, of their own culture and of their own tradition. In other words we want to see good Africans, good West Indians, good Malayans, and not imitation Englishmen.96 That winter of 1942–3, while Hailey had been defending the Empire in North America, there had been a discussion between the Colonial Office and the Cabinet on the regional committees that Hailey had originally suggested to monitor colonial development (as an alternative to administration by an international body). These regional bodies were never to happen, but in 1943 they still appeared to be an option for the British Cabinet most unwilling to let the British Empire be taken over by an international administration which was bound to be dominated by the Americans.97 The regional commissions were likely to have an effect on Britain’s role in both developing the colonies and, in particular, protecting minorities. The problem, as the Cabinet saw it, was who else should be in these regional commissions. They were prepared to receive comments from Australia and New Zealand and from the European colonial powers. What they were concerned about was that the newly emerging powers, that is, the non-white powers, such as China and India, should be prevented from interfering in colonial administration. It is noticeable, from the Office minutes, that the decision to exclude India was made before the Cabinet discussed why. Or rather, the real reason, that India had not ‘the requisite status for membership’ could not be admitted in public. It was not just the fact that India had ‘no knowledge or experience of colonial administration’, but the fear that: If we open the door to her, we shall have to open it to many other

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nations, both in the Pacific and in other colonial areas where Regional Commissions are to be set up.98 The Cabinet was concerned that India might have a ‘claim’ to membership of the regional commission on the grounds of ‘the considerable Indian population in Malaya’. The Cabinet draft policy paper gave the assurance that ‘the British Government, which will be responsible for the administration of the Malayan Peninsula, can be trusted to look after this element, and it is better that we should do so’.99 But Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state for the colonies, when he wrote to Lord Cranborne, the former minister for the colonies and then Lord Privy Seal, was much more direct and to the point: But if we concede [to India] a right to membership on the specific ground that there is a large Indian population in Malaya with whose conditions she may properly concern herself – and to my mind this is the only respect in which she has a greater economic interest than numbers of other States, who are equally buyers of rubber and tin – then we shall have to concede the same right to China, which has also a large population in Malaya. This would be sealing the pass, for it would mean legalizing interference by members in the internal affairs of territories of other members, the one thing which we are both, I gather, anxious to avoid.100 This discussion reveals that the crucial issue for the Colonial Office was their right to determine policy without interference. Although neither the British nor the Americans wanted to make public their fears about immigration, it is clear that in private they shared the same concern that non-whites could move to Britain and America.101 While hostile to any idea that Indian or Chinese immigration should give India or China influence in Malaya, by contrast, their own emigrants, the settlers in East and Southern Africa, were very much a reason for Britain’s involvement in those areas. Eventually the language of ‘protecting minorities’ spread across the Atlantic. For example, Celeste Condit and John Lucaites’s study of the rhetoric of newspapers notes that ‘minorities’ became an issue in postwar America. They argue that ‘Finally, they were able to transcend the rhetoric of black/white difference with the broader concept of “minorities”.’102 For the British War Cabinet, the language of minority protection provided a new way of confirming Britain’s prerogative. In this light,

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it is clear that the minority issue was another means by which a sense of British predominance could be spelled out without having to invoke the old language of white prestige.

Upholding Britain’s prerogative This is not to say that the Colonial Office and Foreign Office connived to make minorities into an important issue in itself. The very development of the idea in relation to India and Palestine, two regions with a long history of British involvement, shows that similar ideas had been current for some time. This idea gained in importance, however, at a time when Britain needed a new justification for imperial rule. Also, the sequence of events, particularly in relation to Japan and India, meant that these were the ideas available just at the time that these authorities began to regain their confidence. As the war started to shift in the Allies’ favour at the end of 1942, and the Colonial Office started to feel that the charge of exploitation of the colonies was no worse than the American practice of segregation, so the British government began to consider political questions with a more robust attitude. More and more, the postwar position and integrity of Britain and the Empire became a nonnegotiable quantity. As a result, increasingly the role of Britain in relation to the colonies was upheld with whatever material was to hand. For example, in 1945 Hailey raised similar fears but this time about Burma. He claimed, in the House of Lords, that the idea that all Burma was demanding ‘immediate independence’ was ‘not perhaps quite realistic’. Furthermore, he hoped that there would be ‘some treaty of understanding to protect Indian rights in Burma, and that particular care would be taken in dealing with the Shan States’.103 When the discussion returned to Malaya and its future at the start of 1946, Hailey again noted the importance of the position of minority immigrants. In the House of Lords, he argued that: As regarded the new conditions of citizenship, we must recognize the political rights of the immigrants, but due regard should be had for our obligations to the Malays. We must endeavour to secure that political advance was achieved in a form which would neither injure the self-respect of the original inhabitants nor impair the value of their cooperation in achieving the defence of the country.104 Controlling immigration and, through the minority, the political position of the majority population, had become an important strategy by

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the end of the war, and it was one backed by the United States government. Sir Gerard Gent, the under-secretary of state for the colonies, had met up with Dr Stanley Hornbeck, chief of the State Department’s Far Eastern division, during his visit to London at the end of 1943. Gent reported: On Chinese immigration in the future Dr Hornbeck said that opinion in the US was definitely against any extension of the admission of Orientals to US territory and indeed in favour of further restriction. He did not see how there could be any American criticism of control of Chinese immigration into British territories.105 The most important question underlying the discussion on immigration was the question of sovereignty – who would have control over the flow of people. In this matter, the British government considered that its prerogative should be maintained, and that it would not allow any interference in its internal affairs. When the race equality clause came up for discussion at the San Francisco conference, when writing the founding document for the United Nations, Sir Alexander Cadogan cabled the Foreign Office to warn: Argument strongly advanced is that it would be against our interest and tradition as a liberal power to oppose the expression of a principle denial of which figures so predominantly in Nazi philosophy and is repugnant to the mass of British and foreign opinion. . . . Recognition of the principle commits us to nothing more than we have always stood for. But there might be a revival of the quite unfounded fears of 1919 that immigration problems are involved. These are, of course, matters of domestic jurisdiction and would be covered if a satisfactory solution of this question is reached. We may be sure that if it were thought that such question were involved by the recognition of the principle, the United States Delegation would oppose it.106 So the Colonial Office was prepared to agree to the principle of race equality on the condition that such a principle would not have the power to affect issues of domestic jurisdiction. In other words, within the Empire, particularly in relation to challenging the way that immigration laws tended to discriminate on grounds of race, the clause, as far as the British government were concerned, would have little

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impact. The Americans, who also had discriminatory laws, were insistent that the UN Charter would not have such power. Britain and America clearly shared the same point of view – to uphold their rights in regards to their own ‘backward’ areas, they were prepared to come to a compromise position. They had rejected the language of white race superiority while managing to invigorate an imperial authority based on the protection of minorities and the evasion of any investigation into domestic affairs. In the meantime, and despite taking on board the race equality clause, the Colonial Office’s investigation into this issue had already revealed that the ‘protection’ slant offered a possible mitigation of the charge of racial discrimination. As early as October 1941, C. J. Jeffries, in his summation of the ‘colour problem’ in the colonies, had commented that ‘Mr Paskin’s point about discrimination in the interests of the natives is a good one’ but doubted its practical use for the Office.107 Then Jeffries went on to conclude that such ‘protective legislation would be unnecessary if the natives had the full rights of citizens’. This simple point would be forgotten by the end of the war when protection issues had become so much more useful. After the war’s end, the Colonial Office recognized that ‘racial discrimination is one of the subjects which has been specifically remitted for examination’ by the UN Commission on Human Rights. To this end, the Colonial Office began a study of the way that legislation in colonial territories discriminated ‘between different races, more especially between Europeans and non-Europeans’. A survey was sent out to Colonial Governors for comments in January 1947. Arthur Creech Jones, by then Labour secretary of state for the colonies, reassured the Governors by commenting: ‘I am far from suggesting that all discriminatory legislation can be immediately swept away in colonial territories. Some may be required in the interests of the local or non-European races.’108 Creech Jones, as a last resort, had repeated Paskin’s earlier point that the last refuge of race discrimination might be found in the language of protection. In fact, as Clive Harris has pointed out, discrimination in employment in the colonial and civil service continued as standard after the war, the only difference being that colour was no longer specified in the rules, it was just noted at the interview.109 The moral justification, however, that gave a sense of authority to the officials had changed, by using security issues and protection of minorities, but in either case, the role of protector had replaced the old idea of white prestige. As a result, despite the antagonism between America and Britain over empire at the start of the war, imperial authority had been

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reformulated. In 1941, it had appeared that postwar legitimacy would be founded on anti-imperialism. In contrast, by the end of the war, France and Britain were able to rebuild their Far Eastern empires, and the colour bar, if not eradicated, had been fatally discredited. As the end of the war approached, United States officials, planning for the future peace, started to see that Britain’s stability in a war-torn world was going to be a crucial asset. Instead of overturning yet another prewar institution, the European empires, the Americans decided that listening to British ways of maintaining stability and emphasizing continuity was worthwhile. As Gabriel Kolko has outlined in the Limits of Power, the United States, although the largest economic power at the end of the Second World War, could not dominate the whole world.110 Instead, it settled on a compromise position. It allowed Britain to maintain its sterling bloc, which aimed to stabilize the British postwar economy. With the Marshall Plan America focused its resources on rebuilding Western Europe, leaving the Soviet Union to maintain social stability in the other half. America occupied Japan, but its Marshall Plan to China was insignificant in comparison with Europe’s, and could not bolster Chiang Kai-shek’s ailing regime. Despite America’s difficulties, permission for Britain, France and the Netherlands to rebuild their empires in the Far East was a distinct change of policy for the United States. Earlier in the war, cynical soldiers stationed in the Pacific arena nicknamed the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) ‘Save England’s Asiatic Colonies’. Even as late as 1945, General Wedemeyer stopped supplies being flown in by American planes to the French resistance to the Japanese in IndoChina for fear that it would encourage the French to rebuild their empire there.111 By the end of the war, however, the American forces were overstretched. More importantly, planners in the State Department for the postwar world began to reconsider their task. Ending the war was one thing, maintaining world peace was quite another. Institutions that could be relied upon to maintain stability were now essential. For example the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA, admitted that ‘the world requires the maintenance of the British Empire as a going concern’. Furthermore, the OSS report continued, interestingly using the term ‘partners’ that Hailey had tried to popularize: In a world threatened mainly by disintegration, such integrations as history has left should not be lightly torn apart. They should

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instead be made the nucleus of large integrations of associations in which none shall dominate but all be partners. Americans are reminded that the British Empire saved the world from the threat of Nazi dominance and that American economic and political security partially depend on the continuation of a stable and integrated British empire.112 This was a very different attitude to that expressed only two years earlier. American critics of imperialism, although shocked by the speed of Japanese attacks, were smug in their criticisms of European colonial administrations that had collapsed so quickly. Some thought that the colonial powers had only themselves to blame for the disloyalty of their ‘natives’. Two years later, however, US officials concurred with British officials that the principle of Western authority was more important than the question of self-government. To maintain the position of European powers, and to leave unquestioned their authority, the United States government had allowed the reinstatement of the European empires in the Far East. Control and administration, however, was no longer legitimized in terms of superior civilization or race; instead they had developed a new language of development and of protecting minority groups. An example of the change in outlook on the colonies is the conflicting reports on the capability of the Vietnamese to hold political power. Christopher Thorne has investigated the changing views of the Americans in relation to Indo-China. In March 1942 when criticisms of the British and French empires were at their height, an OSS report recommended that ‘the Annamites have proven themselves capable of self-government’. By August of 1944, however, despite continuing strong criticisms of the French colonial record, William Langdon, the consul general in Kunming, wrote in a ‘highly-praised’ dispatch that: the Annamites are not yet materially or politically prepared for independence or capable of resisting aggression from neighbours. Nor would they be able to alone hold back the peaceful but nonetheless racially annihilating, smothering penetration of Chinese immigration. Therefore . . . independence at this time would be doing the Annamite people no real kindness . . . a further period of dependence and protection seems to be the only logical proposition . . . As to which power should exercise this temporary dominion, obviously must be France for practical reasons.113

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This example confirms the tactic taken by Hailey at the Institute of Pacific Relations conference in the winter of 1942. The ground that was common to both Britain and America, in the end, was that of a shared paternalism towards the non-white peoples. The way that this superiority was justified, however, was no longer in the language of race. Instead, taking his cue from the terms already available, Hailey emphasized economic and practical dependence of the colonial peoples. Promoting freedom from fear and want, Article Six rather than Article Three of the Atlantic Charter, the British explained to the Americans that the imperial relation involved protecting small nations from invasion and maintaining the peace between different racial groups in the colony. In Langdon’s assessment of Indo-China, and the reason why France should be reinstated as the colonial power, the same themes had been repeated. In the final analysis, however, it is possible that it was not the influence of these arguments that led America to return Indo-China to France but the direct exigencies of war. According to Thorne, even Roosevelt, who had been adamantly anti-French, shifted his ground and authorized American aid for the French Resistance, conceding to his closest advisers that following the war, France would have IndoChina, as the United States Army was increasingly occupied with mainland Japan.114 The other concern of the US Navy and War departments, to control the Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific, contributed to the pressure on the US State Department to quietly drop the issue of independence for the colonies. Gabriel and Joyce Kolko explain that: The broader issue of colonialism at the end of the war seemed to Washington, by comparison, very minor in importance. During the last months of the war the United States had arranged a quid pro quo with England, and then France, to obtain support of a transfer of the Japanese-mandated islands to American control, or opening the economic resources of the colonial regions to American interests, in return for a tacit approval of a continuation of colonialism suitably updated with United Nations (UN) rhetoric and sanctions.115 Dr Isaiah Bowman, the special adviser to the US State Department, who met Hailey on his trip to the States in the winter of 1942–3, visited Britain in the spring of 1944 with a view to arriving at an agreement on international affairs. Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state for the colonies, reported on his conversation with Bowman that:

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‘Although wrapped up in a rather diaphanous cover of the usual idealism, it was plain that the real object of any Colonial plan is to enable the United States to get away with the retention of the Marshalls and Carolines.’116 The Foreign Office concurred with Stanley’s assessment of American foreign policy that: ‘It was essential in their view that the US should by one means or another control the Japanese Islands in the Pacific.’117 Through a common language of paternalism, America and Britain could avoid criticizing colonialism as such. The United Nations Charter backed an end to colour discrimination. But the notion of superiority still underpinned the Colonial Office’s assumption of paternalism, only now it was justified by the plan to develop the colonies’ economy. The politicization of the issue of race may have provided the means by which a new language of authority emerged suited to the new world order.

6 Conclusion

In 1941 the postwar survival of the European empires seemed doomed by American hostility to colonialism. It appeared that the legitimacy of the postwar world order would be founded on anti-imperialism. In fact by the end of the war, France and Britain were able to rebuild their Far Eastern empires, while the colour bar, although not abolished, had been politically rejected. This book has explained how the undermining of empire was transformed into the discrediting of race. It seems that dealing with race-sensitivity was the mediating link between the experience of the Second World War and the development of a new discourse concerning race, and eventually new policies against discrimination. The horror of the Holocaust, when it was fully in the public eye after the war had ended, reaffirmed the new moral language adopted by Britain and America. But the framework of the new world order, which saw a continuation of European empires but the discrediting of colour discrimination, had been established in the later years of the war. The step between the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s and the new ideology of race and empire has not been elucidated before. With hindsight it has been too easy to see the anti-Nazi alliance and to equate that with the development of anti-race discrimination ideas in the Allied nations. Contemporary discussion of the Second World War invariably involves discussion of the Nazi genocide. The Holocaust has become a symbol of barbarity, of hell, for a modern largely secular world. As an article in the Sunday Times put it, ‘the constant reference to the Holocaust, [is] the one determining moral boundary we can all agree upon.’1 As a result, there is nothing but disgust for the associated ideas of racial categorization. It has become easy to assume that a rejection of Nazi ideas involved a reaction to their racism. Elazar Barkan has pointed out: 149

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Because racism nowadays is perceived as irrational and unscientific, its elimination from culture and science is deemed, at least implicitly, to have been inevitable: once Nazi atrocities had been revealed, racism was rejected. An extension of this view is the historical misconception that Nazi racism was renounced as early as the 1930s. In fact, the response in both the United States and Britain was neither immediate nor of sufficient strength to discredit theories of racial superiority.2 Today, the idea of the Holocaust appears to have an even greater effect on us. The Holocaust is more widely talked about today and discussed than it has ever been.3 The Holocaust today does seem to represent something that appears, in this time of sleaze, fat cats and miscarriages of justice, a moral benchmark which is unquestioned and universal. For example, Zygmunt Bauman, the sociologist, argues that ‘the present-day significance of the Holocaust is the lesson it contains for the whole of humanity.’4 The Holocaust symbolizes evil in a world that has secularized its morality. The image of the Holocaust has become part of our lives, and it seems that, even as an image rather than as a direct experience, it cannot but have shaped our world. For us today, it is hard to conceive of a world where the Holocaust did not symbolize a modern hell. Yet the Second World War was just such a time. Although some people knew about ‘The Final Solution’ and were trying to evacuate Jews from German occupied areas, the Holocaust, or the Nazis’ plans for it, was not central in British or American propaganda.5 In particular, although the Nazis were known to base their philosophy on racial purity and supremacy, anti-Nazi propaganda did not use this as a starting point. For example, one of the Ministry of Information’s pamphlets at the start of the war claimed that ‘National Socialism began as an honourable experiment.’ The secretary of state for the ministry, Lord Macmillan, produced a summary of his department’s propaganda in 1939 which, as well as failing to inspire, made little mention of Nazi policies.6 The moral opprobrium heaped on fascism today did not exist in Britain in the late 1930s. Although a section of British society opposed Nazi ideas, fascism was regarded as a pressing political issue of the time, not, as it is today, a settled issue – a universal ‘moral boundary’. From today’s standpoint, it is possible to look back on the war and imagine that the moral divide was as clear then. But this was not the case. As a result, the Holocaust in itself does not explain how racial discrimination came to be seen as politically problematic.

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The Nazi doctrine of purifying an ‘Aryan race’ did have an impact in Britain, particularly because, once at war, almost everything German was despised. The association of racial policies with the German state meant that it became increasingly difficult to expound such arguments in Britain without being accused of having German, and therefore treasonous, associations. For example, Lord Moyne, secretary of state for the colonies, was adamant that ‘the Nazis with their false doctrine of the Herrenvolk have made it clear that there is no place in our conception of life for the doctrine that any one race is inherently superior to any other.’ But in the same document, Moyne could assert that ‘the idea of election is quite foreign to the African mind’.7 In fact, ‘racism did not disappear,’ as Elazar Barkan has noted, ‘but racial ideologies ceased to command respectability.’8 For those in the Colonial Office, the awareness of race discrimination as a political problem resulted not so much from hostility to Nazi racism, as from their own experience of trying to uphold British colonial rule. It was in the context of the crisis of the old imperial legitimacy, when new ideas were paramount, that Margery Perham could speak of the ‘reforming spirit, to which Lord Hailey has done much to give substance, [which] has lately appeared in this country and needs reinforcement from the new intolerance of official delay and privileged incompetence which the present crisis has aroused within Britain.’9 Developing mechanisms for maintaining, as Hailey put it, ‘acquiescence to our rule’10 was more important in the long run than a commitment to racial segregation. What the archives show is that race became a political issue during the war, not because conscience demanded the abandonment of the old ideas in the face of the Nazi atrocities but because of the combined experience of three factors: the importance of being anti-German and therefore anti-Nazi, the fear of revolt in the colonies, and the sense of failure of the old imperial system and thus the need for a new language to fit a new world system. This study has concentrated on explaining the last two, largely unrecognized, factors that demonstrate how race became a sensitive issue in the ‘official mind’ of the Colonial Office. The particular circumstances at the start of the war had put the future of the Empire in question. By mid-1941, Britain had begun to establish an alliance with the United States, on which Britain depended to win the war. Opinion in the States, however, was already hostile to European imperialism. The United States had developed a self-image, particularly in the years of interwar isolationism, which distanced America from the international interests of the European

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powers and celebrated the history of America’s independence from Britain. Hostility to imperialism in America presented a problem for the British Colonial Office, interested in promoting an AngloAmerican alliance for the war, while remaining doubtful about the sincerity of American anti-imperialism when it came to expanding the States’ global influence in the postwar order. When Britain lost the Far Eastern empire, and particularly Singapore, to the Japanese in early 1942, American criticisms of imperialism only strengthened. The situation seemed to confirm the worst fears of the Colonial Office. The colonial administration had proved to be unpopular with the ‘natives’ and some had even joined a fifth column. The fears of a ‘race revolt’, stimulated by the riots in the West Indies in the 1930s, were confirmed in the eyes of certain colonial officials. The assumption of white race superiority, which had underpinned the arrogance of so many colonial administrators, was now challenged by the military effectiveness of a non-white power, Japan. For the Colonial Office at this time, it was assumed that they had lost forever much of the Far Eastern empire. With it, many thought at the time, had gone the argument for empire. The exhaustion of the old racial ideology of imperialism had not, however, diminished the underlying paternalism of the Colonial Office. What had become apparent, though, was that the charge of racial discrimination was a political liability. The fall of Singapore had discredited what was seen as ‘white imperialism’. Colonial officials argued that it was the practice of the colour bar that had alienated the population. One solution proposed was to employ more of the locals in the administration to establish loyal ties. The discussion in the Colonial Office centred on reorganizing imperial rule in order to save its legitimacy. As the discussion within the Colonial Office continued, officials like Lord Hailey were involved in debates with Americans. Learning more about American attitudes to race allowed Hailey to develop new arguments to justify imperial rule, using the issues of the time. One important factor in the debate was that although Americans were keen to criticize the Empire, they also practised racial discrimination and segregation. The Colonial Office learned first-hand about American segregation once GIs were stationed in Britain following the summer of 1942. Public opinion in Britain was generally hostile to the American attitude towards their black soldiers, and race attitudes were often the cause of local disputes and fights. The Colonial Office, which had

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increasingly argued with the War Office against its practice of discrimination, was now in a position to criticize the Americans, although this never became a public debate. The common problem, however, of the colour bar did allow British officials to deflect the charge of ‘white imperialism’ and develop a new justification of empire with renewed confidence. Since both America and Britain were tainted by the colour bar, officials on both sides of the Atlantic were looking for a new moral language to express legitimate authority. The political crisis in India during the war was used as an opportunity by the British to exploit the existing problems they faced in the Empire as an education, for the Americans, in the difficulties of granting independence to the colonies. The sectarian political division, which had been fostered under British rule, became the basis of an argument that imperial rule was necessary to prevent conflict between local parties and prevent instability. The presumption of the problem of racial, now redefined as ethnic, conflict within the colonies reinforced the paternal role of the imperial administration, justifying its existence in more ‘humanitarian’ terms. The Colonial Office also adapted ideas that were already being used to promise a new postwar order, such as welfarism, which gave a new active role for the metropolitan state both at home and abroad. Hailey emphasized the role of the state in developing certain ‘backward’ areas. By focusing on the ‘active’ state, Hailey avoided relinquishing the key question of sovereignty over the colonies. But by looking at the relationship in terms of the question of development and progress, Hailey had modernized the argument for empire and given it appeal to a New Deal-style politics. The policy of state-led development gained supporters both in Britain and America during the war. Hailey took this idea and applied it to the colonial situation. It meant that he had overturned the idea of ‘separate development’ of indigenous people. The idea of the colour bar in local administration, and even in some social arenas, had also been undermined. Instead the new plan was that colonial people would receive the same assistance that British people were about to receive with the building of the welfare state. It was a revolution in the Colonial Office’s way of thinking about race relations. Perham had been right when she had interpreted the fall of Singapore as ‘a very practical revolution in race relationships’.11 It was not, however, to be any revolution in the degree of control that the Office had over the colonies; the immediate postwar increase in interference has been named the ‘second colonial occupation’.12

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Lord Hailey

Once the Americans were faced with the task of reconstructing a peaceful world order, they began to look more sympathetically towards the European empires as institutions of stability. In this light, they too picked up on the issues first presented by the British as reasons for delaying colonial independence. Since they also shared the racial prejudices, so they were inclined to agree with British paternalism. What the war had shown, however, was that white racial superiority was no longer publicly acceptable. The paternalism of the postwar language no longer rested on racial superiority and the colour bar. The new welfarism and the protection of minority peoples provided justification enough for the European powers to re-establish their empires, at least for the immediate postwar period. The combination of defeat by the Japanese, the fears for the Empire and the difficulties presented by the Allies’ own war aims turned race from a set of assumptions in the British official mind into a political issue. Nothing in the new language of racial equality was entirely new. Elements of prewar thinking were forged into a new synthesis under the intense political pressures of defending both Britain’s Empire and America’s position as the standard bearer of ‘the free world’ during a world war in which the Anglo-Saxon powers were at once rivals and allies, threatened by and allied to non-white nations. Those very specific political circumstances forced upon British imperialists, such as Hailey, the abandonment in public of the old racial ideology. The immediate significance of these changes in the practice of race relations was no doubt very limited, but the language of racial superiority was gone from official discourse and so far it has not returned.

Notes PREFACE 1. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 458. 2. In the First World War deaths of UK service personnel were 722 785, and civilians’ 1414. Whereas in the Second World War deaths of UK service personnel were (including merchant navy) 336 642 while civilian deaths were 60 284. Thorpe, Britain in the Era of the Two World Wars, pp. 49–50. 3. Cited in Fussell, Wartime, p. 131. 4. Fussell, Wartime, p. 140. 5. Malinowski, ‘A Plea for an Effective Colour Bar’, Spectator, 27 June 1931.

CHAPTER 1 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

INTRODUCTION

Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, p. 1. Malik, The Meaning of Race, p. 124. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 149. ‘On 2 July 1949, for example, the Picture Post enquired “Is there a BRITISH COLOUR BAR?” and found to their evident surprise that indeed there was.’ CCCS, The Empire Strikes Back, pp. 68–9. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 173. King, Separate and Unequal, p. 113. Rex and Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a British City, p. 38. Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 35. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 149. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 171. King, Separate and Unequal, p. 114. Rose, The Negro in America, pp. 320–1. ‘The intense phase of racial prejudice in the British Empire did not last very long. By the 1930s, as Dr. Perham has pointed out, the interest of the British in continuing to occupy the former German colonies caused them to emphasize the difference between their own racial attitudes and those of Hitler’s Germany.’ Symonds, The British and Their Successors, p. 237. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 9. Rich records government estimates in July 1950 as stating there were 30 000 black people in Britain (Merseyside 10 000, London 5000, Cardiff 5000 and Tyneside 2000). Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 167. Lord Listowel to Edwards, 5 June 1948, LAB 20/218, cited in Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 164. Jeffries, Partners for Progress, p. 197. The first investigations by the Colonial Office on the ‘colour bar’ suggested that a colour bar either did not exist or was a problem of badmannered Africans. For example, J. E. W. Hood, Crown Agent for the Colonies, wrote to C. G. Eastwood, Colonial Office, on 1 February 1939 to say of his representative (in CO 323/1613/7): 155

156

Notes to pp. 6–8 he has never in his experience heard of any case of difficulty owing to colour. In fact, the impression he had got is that these students are exceptionally well looked after on board ship, and are treated with great kindness both by the crew and the passengers. He thinks, as I do, that any trouble that there is does not arise from the actions or possible actions of the ship’s company, but from unmannerly passengers, and no amount of representations from the SofS to the shipping companies could have much effect thereon. Another thing is that when a coloured gentleman complains of being despised, it is very frequently his own fault for making himself aggressive, but that is not a matter over which official action could have any effect. But some of the younger officials in the Colonial Office realized that colonial students chose not to travel on British ships because of discrimination and the students were often told that flights were unavailable. For example, Pedler, working in the personnel department, prepared a memorandum on Employment of Africans in the Higher Ranks of Service (Memorandum by Pedler, 16 December 1939, CO 850/137/10):

19. 20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

When Africans wish to travel from East Africa to the UK they usually come by French or Italian boats because of the difficulty of securing suitable accommodation and treatment on the British lines. In 1936 it was discovered that Imperial Airways booking agents had instructions to turn away inquiries from Africans on the excuse that all seats were booked, but representations by Lord De La Warr to the London Office immediately secured accommodation for the African member of the Makerere Commission. Restrictions are sometimes imposed on educated Africans travelling by rail. Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, p. 29. Recent newspaper revelations have indicated that Winston Churchill was in favour of enforced sterilization of the mentally insane and thirty American States sterilized mental patients without their consent or knowledge in the 1920 and 1930s. As late as 1972, Alberta, Canada, continued the practice started with the Sexual Sterilisation Act, 1928. Buchanan, The Guardian, 25 February 1997. See Richardson and Spears (eds), Race, Culture and Intelligence; Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought; Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science; Gould, The Mismeasure of Man; Rose et al., Not in Our Genes; Jones, In the Blood. As Anthony Kirk-Greene has commented: ‘At the end of the day it may be that the most revealing way of analysing colonial administration and race relations is to interpret them through the prism of class, that amalgam of professional, bourgeois, middle-to-upper-class family, friends, values, ethos and duty in which the average British District Officer had, at least to 1945, been brought up.’ Kirk-Greene, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.9, no.3, July 1986, p. 280. Macaulay, (House of Commons, 10 July 1833), cited in Symonds, Oxford and Empire, p. 294. Said, Orientalism, p. 152. Macaulay, (House of Commons, 10 July 1833), cited in Symonds, The British and Their Successors, p. 18.

Notes to pp. 8–13

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26. Strachey, India, London 1888, p. 359 cited in Symonds, The British and Their Successors, p. 36. 27. Cited in Symonds, The British and Their Successors, p. 125. 28. Orwell, Inside the Whale and Other Essays, pp. 96–7. 29. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, p. 1. 30. ‘Between April 1939 and December 1942 the number of administrative class officers on the “geographical” side was reduced from 73 to 53, and in personnel from 83 to 53, while those in the “subject” departments increased from 66 to 170.’ Lee, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.6, no.1, October 1977, p. 66. 31. Colonial Office mail rose from 93 053 items in 1909 to 300 841 items in 1939 according to Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, p. 53. 32. Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, p. 56. Also Lee notes that: ‘the office housed an increasing number of advisers who were appointed by the secretary of state in various technical fields. . . . Twenty-five advisers and assistant advisers were listed in the 1946 office directory . . .’ Lee, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.6, no.1, October 1977, p. 66. Moreover, from 1909 to 1937, 17 new advisory committees were set up to add specialist knowledge to the Colonial Office’s work, such as the Imperial Bureau of Mycology, the Imperial Forestry Institute, and the Colonial Advisory Council of Agricultural and Animal Health. For full list and dates see Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 282. 33. Cell, Hailey, p. xi. 34. Cell, Hailey, p. 3. 35. Cell, Hailey, p. 4. 36. Hailey referred to his work as ‘complex social graduations properly adjusted’, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/6c, p. 342. 37. ‘As a press communiqué of 1914 put it, selecting colonists from the landless would lower the quantity and raise the price of agricultural labor, it being obviously inappropriate for the government to “upset the existing social and economic order.” The Chenab colony reflected the Punjab tradition, which it was intended to reinforce.’ Cell, Hailey, p. 18. 38. Letter to Hailey from Sir James Crerar, Home Member of the Council, in Simla, 3 July 1929, India Office Library, Hailey MSS Eur E/22015B (emphasis added). 39. Letter from Hailey to Sir Michael O’Dwyer, London, 11 July 1929, India Office Library, Hailey MSS Eur E/220/15B. 40. Undated letter, India Office Library, Hailey MSS Eur E/220/1B, p. 299. 41. Letter from Hailey to Sir John Simon, 29 August 1931, India Office Library, Hailey MSS Eur E/220/21B, p. 467. 42. Articles from the Times of India, 1911, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/1B, see also cartoon by W. Wicloth of Hailey and Lutyens as Tweedledum and Tweedledee, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/1A, p. 336. 43. Note on Amritsar written by Hailey, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/57, p. 1. 44. Hailey’s Report on the Punjab Disturbances (Confidential), April 1919, India Office Library, Hailey Mss Eur. E/220/57, p. 40. The massacre

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45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59.

60. 61.

Notes to pp. 13–16 happened on 13 April 1919 and the Hunter Commission was appointed on 14 October 1919. Despite being the author of the official report, Hailey was not called to give evidence to the Hunter Commission. Meerut was also the place where the Indian Mutiny had begun on 10 May 1857. Letter from Hailey to Sir Arthur Hirtzel, India Office, London, 18 July 1929. Hailey also wrote to Sir Geoffrey de Montmorency, the Governor of the Punjab, on the same theme on 12 July 1929: ‘I see that you have begun your Saunders trial. I suppose it was necessary to give it so wide a range, but it looks to me as if it is bound to drag on a very long time, like the trial at Meerut. I am a little disturbed about the latter; but it seems to me that the prosecution is concentrating on propaganda rather than on conviction, and for publicity purposes their stuff will become horribly stale before they are finished, with the result that it will lose entirely its value as propaganda.’ India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/15B. Memorandum on Indian loyalty for the Viceroy Viscount Chelmsford by Hailey, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/1B, p. 298. The Carnegie Foundation agreed to fund $75 000 for the survey. ‘Next to Lugard the most influential administrator who joined the debate about African colonial policies was Lord Hailey’ Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, p. 17. Sir Frederick Sykes, Chairman of the Royal Empire Society, reported in United Empire, New Series, vol.30, 1939, p. xi. Cell (ed.), By Kenya Possessed, p. 50. Gregory, India and East Africa, p. 496, p. 246 and p. 495 respectively. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 31. Notes of informal discussions on Survey, 15–16 July 1933, CO 847/2/4204 cited in Cell, African Affairs, vol.88, no.353, 1989, p. 491. Cell, Hailey, p. 231. Cell, African Affairs, vol.88, no.353, 1989, p. 481. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 148. Louis confirms this point, noting that: ‘there developed an ideological split of the first magnitude. Cranborne wanted to keep Far Eastern questions separate from those of Africa. By opening the international door in Asia he did not intend to welcome the Americans into Africa. “Conditions varied widely in the different colonies,” Cranborne stated, “especially in regard to their capacity for self-government.”’ Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 192. For example: ‘the African servants are a very, very long way behind those in India.’ Also: ‘The African intellectuals cannot at present compete with the Indian, and may never do so. But the ordinary peasant is equalitarian [sic]; he is as good as his neighbour, and likes to show it; he can keep his independence and respect in the face of authority. If his practical ability and sense of business were anything like his deliberative capacity, he would do well.’ Hailey, Diary, 13 and 19 February 1940, Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, MSS Brit. Emp s.342 correspondence, §7, p. 6 and p. 11. Cell, Hailey, p. xiii. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa.

Notes to pp. 16–17

159

62. Lee, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.6, no.1, October 1977, p. 68. 63. Hailey, A Survey of Native Affairs in South West Africa. 64. Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories. 65. Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, p. 121. 66. Jeffries (ed.), A Review of Colonial Research, Appendix 1. See also Rampersad, Colonial Economic Development and Social Welfare, pp. 225–6. 67. ‘I am sending you this now to say how glad I am that you are willing to be Chairman of a Departmental Committee here to advise on post-war reconstruction in the Colonies. There is no one whose help I should value more, and I am indeed most grateful to you.’ Letter from Lord Moyne to Hailey, 19 March 1941, CO 323/1858/12. 68. CO 323/1858/12. 69. Letter to Hailey from Governor Knollup, Bermuda, 28 April 1942, CO 323/1858/13. 70. Letter to Hailey from Governor Barton, Zomba, Nyasaland, 22 July 1942, CO 323/1858/13. 71. Suggestions for study, category B, CO 323/1858/13. 72. Suggestions for study, category B, CO 323/1858/13. 73. Letter from the Colonial Office to Eric Hazelton, Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (British Section), 9 February 1943, CO 323/1858/13. 74. ‘Finally, in September 1944, on specific instructions from the Colonial Office, Poynton told an American that Hailey was a private individual who spoke only for himself. . . . The last two years of the war can therefore be treated rather briefly, summarizing his attitudes on specific issues instead of connecting them to a narrative of events in which, after all, he was playing little part.’ Cell, Hailey, p. 274 citing evidence from Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 384–5. I am not convinced by this point. First, it was standard Colonial Office procedure to disown statements, unless made by a secretary of state, which they did, for example, after General Smuts’s speech in America for which he had, in fact, been briefed beforehand. Noel Sabine minuted, after briefing the BBC, that ‘the general line we shall take with the Press in case of enquiries will be designed to avoid any impression that we are unduly concerned about the content of the article. If they ask whether the article was written with the approval or authority of HMG, we shall tell them that General Smuts does not need anyone’s approval to express his opinions and that in any case this would not apply to a newspaper article.’ 24 December 1942 and later a note confirms that Smuts’s talk with Lord Cranborne should not be discussed with the press, 26 December 1942, CO 323/1858/22. Second, and more importantly, it seems from the Colonial Office files and the Hailey Papers that Hailey did continue to play a useful advisory role, albeit that his increasing age must have caused certain restrictions. 75. See correspondence in Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, MSS. Amer. s.5. 76. ‘I am likely [in Parliamentary Question time] to be pressed for a further definition of the international co-operation in the Colonial field, to which you referred in your Parliamentary Answer on the 17th March last. Various people, including Field Marshal Smuts and Lord Hailey, have

160

77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93.

94. 95. 96. 97. 98.

Notes to pp. 17–22 made statements on this subject, going rather beyond what we actually have in mind, and I think it would be all to the good if the matter could be put in proper perspective. I do not intend to raise the subject myself, but if I am pressed on it, I should like with your permission to deal with it on the lines agreed by the War Cabinet in the discussion upon a possible Anglo-American declaration.’ This is the full text of the letter that Cell (p. 274) uses to justify the argument that Stanley effectively dismissed Hailey from his position as adviser. Letter from Stanley to Churchill, first drafted 2 July 1943, sent 9 July 1943, CO 323/1858/23. Porter, Journal of African History, vol.35, no.1, 1994, p. 165. Cell, Hailey, p. 213. Hailey, ‘America’s Colour Problem: review of Myrdal’s American Dilemma’, Times, 25 July 1944, p. 5. The quote is from a speech by Wendell Willkie to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in July 1942, cited in Myrdal, An American Dilemma, p. 1009. Lee, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.6, no.1, Oct 1977, p. 66. Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, p. 52. Palmer, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.14, no.3, May 1986, p. 206. The Times cited in Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 231. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, p. 19. Macmillan, Warning from the West Indies, p. 88. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, p. 44. Hailey, ‘Some Problems Dealt with in the African Survey’, International Affairs, vol.18, 1939, p. 201. Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 258. Johnson, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.15, no.1, March 1977, p. 65 (reference Cmd 6175, 1940, p. 5). Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, p. 179 and p. 204. Robinson notes that ‘When he introduced the 1940 Act, the secretary of state, Malcolm MacDonald, claimed that the primary purpose of the earlier [1929] Act was “not to help colonial development . . . but . . . to solve our own unemployment problem”.’ Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, p. 56. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, p. 21. Watt argues that the whole of Europe felt, during the 1930s, ‘a dissolution of the normal social and political processes in civil disorder or civil strife.’ Watt, Too Serious a Business, p. 15. Rampersad, Colonial Economic Development and Social Welfare, p. 170, citing Dawe,12 January 1940, p. 199. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 2. Johnson, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol.15, no.1, March 1977, p. 56. Cell, African Affairs, vol.88, no.353, 1989, p. 505. ‘Although it was passed only six weeks after the battle of Dunkirk, it [the 1940 Act] represented not war-time expediency but a change of opinion in

Notes to pp. 22–5

99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104.

105. 106. 107.

108. 109.

110. 111. 112.

161

official circles which had taken place during the preceding five years.’ Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, p. 6. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, p. 21. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, p. 41. Minute by MacDonald, 14 January 1940, CO 859/19/7475 cited in Lee and Petter, The Colonial Office, War, and Development Policy, p. 45. Correspondence between CO and Treasury in September and October 1939, cited in Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, pp. 248–50. Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 204. Paskin minuted, in a review of the Act’s impact, 4 March 1941: ‘The “blitzkrieg” circular telegram of the 5 June 1940, included the following passage in relation to the Colonial Development Bill which had just received its Second Reading: “it is clear that at present it will not be possible to make any substantial progress under the new policy . . . Many Colonial Governments will not at present be in a position to prepare development programmes, though I am anxious that where this can be done without detriment to the war effort, the preparation plans for the future should be continued.” Then again in our circular despatch of the 10th Sept. 1940 . . . the following passage appeared: “So large a part of the energies of Colonial government has now been diverted, to a greater or less degree, to work directly related to the prosecution of the war, that it will have little or no opportunity to prepare long term programmes of development”.’ CO 859/80/3. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, pp. 58–9. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, pp. 141–2. ‘The new Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed early in 1945. In place of the fixed maximum of £5 millions for development and welfare and £500,000 for research in any one financial year under the old Act, it made available a total of £120 millions over a period of ten years ending on 31 March 1956. These funds could be drawn upon at any time but were not to exceed £17.5 millions for development and welfare and £1 million for research in any one year. Allocations would be made to individual colonies to enable them to plan for the future.’ Rampersad, Colonial Economic Development and Social Welfare, p. 358. Stanley (in CAB 65/44) cited in Havinden and Meredith, Colonialism and Development, p. 226. ‘The earliest official statement on India’s eventual status was the declaration of Edwin Montagu (Secretary of State, 1917–22) on 20 August 1917 that Britain’s policy was “the progressive realization of responsible government”. It was incorporated in the Preamble to the India Act of 1919, with the condition that Parliament was to decide the time and nature of each successive advance.’ Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 10. Hailey’s memorandum, 27 October 1928, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/30. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 11. Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, pp. 9–10 citing S. R. Mehrotra, ‘Imperial Federation and India 1868–1917’, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol.1, 1961, p. 34.

162

Notes to pp. 25–30

113. Moore, Endgames of Empire, pp. 10–11 and see Hailey’s memorandum, 27 October 1928, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/30. 114. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 68–9. 115. Irwin, 4 October 1929, cited in Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 70. 116. Daily Mail and Birkenhead (House of Commons, 7 November 1929) cited in Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, pp. 80–1 and p. 94 respectively. 117. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 94. 118. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 174. 119. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 15. 120. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 105. 121. Churchill, reported in The Times, 11 November 1942. 122. ‘Unfortunately’, Indianization had come ‘very late in the day’ according to Hailey and, Indians of the ‘right class’, if it had been earlier, ‘could possibly though by no means certainly, have prevented the rise of a large class of agitators and politicians whose sole program was opposition to an alien government.’ Letter from Hailey to Colonel W. Palin, 13 July 1927, India Office Library, Hailey MSS. Eur. E/220/15B, pp. 1–2. 123. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity, p. 148. 124. Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 29. 125. Cited in May, Imperial Democracy, p. 221. 126. New York Sun, 5 February 1899, according to Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Nostalgia, p. 67. 127. Watt, Personalities and Policies, pp. 41–2. The term ‘Uncle Shylock’ referred to the US demand to have Britain pay war debts from the First World War which Britain and France felt should be written off as ‘what the US had provided in gold, they had given in blood’. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 15. 128. General Board of the US Navy, memorandum 24 January 1918, GB 414-3, serial 780, cited in Watt, Royal United Service Institutional Journal, vol.108, no.631, August 1963, p. 224. 129. Cited in Watt, Succeeding John Bull, p. 82, citing Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, vol.1, p. 308. 130. Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, pp. 122–3. 131. Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 43. 132. Cited in Watt, Succeeding John Bull, p. 85. 133. Dulles, America in the Pacific, p. 264. 134. Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, p. 135. 135. Niebuhr, Atlantic Monthly, vol.145, May 1930, p. 670 cited in Dulles, America’s Rise to World Power, p. 143. 136. ‘. . . even if a tariff cut were to double Britain’s imports – a most implausible outcome – the US gain would be insignificantly small.’ Drummond and Hillmer, Negotiating Freer Trade, p. 153. 137. Drummond and Hillmer, Negotiating Freer Trade, p. 158. 138. Roosevelt to Churchill, 11 September 1939, cited in Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Nostalgia, p. 205. 139. Watt, Succeeding John Bull, p. 89. 140. Cited in Dimbleby and Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, p. 125. 141. See Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 287–8. 142. Letter from Hubert Young, Governor of Trinidad, to Hailey, Postwar

Notes to pp. 30–7

163

Problems Committee, 4 February 1942, CO 323/1858/13. 143. Report by Sir George Gater on visit to Washington, October/November 1942, Appendix 1: note of interview with the President on 27 October 1942, CO 318/455/8 (71318). 144. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. vii. Further examples include: ‘To ask the key question for the present work, how important was the economic element in trusteeship, especially in relation to the ethical factor?’; ‘Such are the dialectics that have to be borne in mind in attempting to get at the economic element in trusteeship.’; ‘As they debated “trusteeship” and the ethics of empire, British officials readily acknowledged the economic basis of British Imperialism.’; ‘Particular attention will again be paid to the economic element in trusteeship as viewed by the wartime protagonists.’ Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 23, pp. 24–5, p. 31 and p. 48 respectively. 145. Cavendish Bentinck, 22 December 1943, FO 371/35921 cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 39. 146. Grigg, ‘British Policy and Organization in the Middle East’, 2 September 1945, CO 732/88/79338 cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 51. 147. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 51. 148. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 7. 149. Hailey, Diary, 3 February 1940, Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, MSS Brit. Emp. s.342 correspondence, §7, p. 4. 150. Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, pp. 50–9. 151. Harris describes how the Civil Service Commission, responsible for appointments, marked down black candidates or rejected them at interview stage, in order to avoid recruiting black people to the Civil Service without having to specify discrimination in the rules. Clive Harris, Race & Class, vol.33, no.1, 1991, pp. 1–30.

CHAPTER 2

THE LOSS OF WHITE PRESTIGE

1. Winston Churchill (secretary of state for the colonies 14 February 1921 – 24 October 1922), speech at Kenya Colony and Uganda dinner, Hotel Victoria, 27 January 1922, CO 323/1858/27. 2. Churchill, Hotel Victoria, 27 January 1922, CO 323/1858/27. 3. Lugard, ‘The Problem of Colour in Relation to the Idea of Equality’, Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol.1, no.2, April 1926, p. 213. 4. Although Huxley was generally known for his liberalism and concern for ‘native welfare’, he wrote: ‘I am bound to confess that this first experience of mine of being in a small minority among human beings of another colour . . . gave me an emotional jolt; and I began . . . to understand why white men living in such circumstances generally took to carrying revolvers and developed a race-complex.’ Huxley, Africa View, p. 378. 5. Huxley, Africa View, p. 407. 6. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 216. 7. ‘The text of the mandates adopted in 1920 and 1922, whereby the Council determined the rights and obligations of the mandatory Powers, were somewhat more specific in this respect. Thus, the “C” mandates lay down that: “The Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory.” This

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8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Notes to pp. 37–41 text is repeated in a slightly different form in the “B” Mandates: “The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.” On the other hand, the “A” Mandates contain no explicit clause of this kind. In view of the special character of these mandates, the idea was rather, in principle, to leave the inhabitants of these territories – of course with the protection and advice of the Mandatory – to provide for their own well-being and development.’ League of Nations, The Mandates System, p. 52. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 25. Huxley, Africa View, p. 105. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, p. 201. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 32. Hailey was concerned that the administrative system should: ‘seek to moderate the pace of change, and allow full scope for the innate characteristics of the people to assert themselves in the conflict of forces that must ensue’, Hailey, An African Survey, p. 1281. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 8. Cell, Hailey, p. 19. Hailey, ‘Nationalism in Africa’, Journal of the Royal African Society, vol.36, no.143, April 1937, p. 145. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 28 and p. 34. Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa (particularly chapters 3 and 8). Macmillan, Africa Emergent, p. 298. Cameron cited in Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, p. 143. For example: ‘It would at the same time be contrary to our own tradition if we were to resort to the system of “parallel” rule favoured in the philosophy of the Union of South Africa.’ Hailey, Britain and her Dependencies, p. 44. Cell, Hailey, p. 221. Note on Amritsar (written by Hailey in 1965), India Office Library, Hailey MSS Eur. E/220/57, p. 1. Hailey, ‘Nationalism in Africa’, Journal of the Royal African Society, vol.36, no.143, April 1937, p. 137. Hailey, Journal of the Royal African Society, vol.36, no.143, April 1937, p. 146. Watt, Too Serious a Business, p. 86. Hemingway cited in Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p. 21. Ginsberg, ‘The Problem of Colour in Relation to the Idea of Equality’, Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol.1, no.2, April 1926, p. 220. Huxley, Africa View, p. 438. Hobson (1858–1940) famous for his book, Imperialism, London, 1902, which blamed capitalism for recession and international conflict. Grigg cited in Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 12. Macmillan, Africa Emergent, p. 14. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 10. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 10.

Notes to pp. 42–4

165

34. The Times, 4 March 1896. 35. Hailey refers to this convention occurring in 1935 (p. 139) and in 1936 (p. 143). The convention itself originated, according to Hailey, from the All-Bantu Union (which was formed in 1919 to send a delegation from South Africa to the Paris Peace Conference) coming together with the African National Congress (ANC) and the Industrial and Commercial workers Union (ICU) to campaign for legal rights in South Africa. Hailey, Journal of the Royal African Society, vol.36, no.143, April 1937, pp. 134–47. 36. Du Bois, ‘Inter-racial Implications of the Ethiopian Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, vol.14, no.1, 1935, p. 89. 37. Arthur Calder-Marshall cited in Palmer, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.14, no.3, May 1986, pp. 207–8. 38. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 10. 39. According to Pakenham, it was pointed out to Her Majesty Queen Victoria that she was gaining ‘three new protectorates (Zanzibar, Uganda and Equatoria) covering at least 100,000 square miles of Africa, in exchange for three square miles of Europe’. Furthermore, in August 1890, Britain signed an agreement with the French ‘giving them a “sphere of influence” covering nearly a quarter of the continent, including several million square miles of the Sahara – “what agriculturists would call very ‘light’ land”, as he [Lord Salisbury] described in the Lords when asked why he had been so generous.’ Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa, p. 357. 40. Churchill cited in Lugard, ‘The Basis of the Claim for Colonies’, International Affairs, vol.15, 1936, pp. 3–17. 41. Cited in Wright (ed.), Population and Peace, p. 126, and p. 127. Virginio Gayda wrote for the newspaper Giornale d’Italia and had been cited in The Times, 1 August 1938. 42. Arnold cited in Wright (ed.), Population and Peace, pp. 127–8. Sydney Arnold (1878–1945) had been a Liberal MP from 1912 to 1921. He then resigned his seat due to ill health and in 1922 joined the Labour Party. In 1924, with the new Labour government, he was made a peer (Baron Arnold of Hale) and became the under-secretary of state for the colonies. In 1938 he left the Labour Party citing disagreement with its foreign policy. 43.Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order, p. 9. 44. Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 93 and p. 97 (his emphasis). 45. Beloff, Britain’s Liberal Empire, p. 345. 46. A selection of the books published in Britain and America between 1905 and 1945 include: Richard J. Anderson, The Fate of the White Race, 1910; Alexander G. Bell, How to Improve the Race, 1914; Viscount James Bryce, Race Sentiment as a Factor in History, 1915; Clinton Burr, America’s Racial Heritage, 1922; James H. Curle, To-day and To-morrow: the testing period of the white race, 1926; Hannibal G. Duncan, Race and Population Problems, 1929; Henry H. Ellis, The Problem of Race-Regeneration, 1911; Ralph Gabriel, The Lure of the Frontier: a story of race conflict, 1929; Mary H. Gayer, The Heritage of the Anglo-Saxon Race, 1928; John E. Gorst, Education and RaceRegeneration, 1913; Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race or the Racial Basis of European History, 1917; Dr Isaac Harris, Race and Civilisation,

166

47. 48. 49. 50.

Notes to p. 45 1939; John O. Hartes, The People of Destiny or the Goodly Heritage of the British Race, 1924; Charles E. Hect (ed.), Rearing an Imperial Race, 1913; Friedrich O. Hertz, Race and Civilisation, 1928; Robert F. Horton, National Ideals and Race-Regeneration, 1912; James W. Johnson, The Race Problem and Peace, 1924; Charles C. Josey, Race and National Solidarity, 1923; George F. MacCleary, Race Suicide?, 1945; David MacConnel, Race Making, 1927; William M. P. MacFee, Race, 1924; Basil J. Mathews, The Clash of Colour, 1924 and The Race of Heroes, 1924; John M. Mecklin, Democracy and Race Friction, 1914; Frederick B. Meyer, Religion and Race-Regeneration, 1912; Dora B. Montefiore, Race Motherhood, 1920; Earl Edward Muntz, Race Contact, 1927; Lawrence W. Neff, Race Relations at Close Range, 1931; John Oakesmith, Race and Nationality, 1919; Baroness Emmuska Orczy, Pride of Race, 1942; Edward B. Reuter (ed.), Race and Culture Contacts, 1934 and Race Mixture, 1931; Thurman B. Rice, Racial Hygiene, 1929; William S. Sadler, Race Decadence, 1922; Caleb W. Saleeby, The Methods of RaceRegeneration, 1911; James D. Sayers, Can the White Race Survive?, 1929; Mary D. Scharlieb, Womanhood and Race-Regeneration, 1912; Edward J. Smith, Race Regeneration, 1918; George Whitehead FRS, Birth Control and Race Culture, 1925; Harris H. Wilder, The Pedigree of the Human Race, 1926; Charles Williams, The Coming End of the Age: its imminent nearness and what it means for our race, 1916; A. F. Wilson, Our Predestined British Empire, 1916; Arthur C. Wire, The Genius of the British Race, 1917; and Baron John Wrottesley, The English Race, 1939. Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order, p. 7. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 3 and p. 4. Cited in Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 99 and p. 84. Examples, Hailey’s diary, Rhodes House, MSS Brit. Emp. s.342 Correspondence: Lagos 6 Feb 1940: ‘There is something very engaging about the breadth of his [the African’s] smile. But he does get most powerfully hot in a ceremonial dinner of this kind!’ Lagos 13 Feb 1940: ‘I am sorry to say that I did not need to resort to the services of sight and sound to realise that I was sitting next to an African; that is a feature of the country which I have not yet learnt to bear with equanimity.’ Lagos 13 Feb 1940: ‘The African servants are a very, very long way behind those in India. The whole life indeed in Africa is very crude and uncivilised compared to India, even in a place so civilised as Lagos.’ Enugu 19 Feb 1940: ‘The African intellectuals cannot at present compete with the Indian, and may never do so.’ Accra 25 Feb 1940: on the famous school at Achimota: ‘It had always struck me as a very idealistic effort, which could with difficulty justify the three quarters of a million it had cost.’ Cape Coast 26 Feb 1940: ‘We were accompanied by our temporary servant, Paul, a melancholy long face creature with a mouth like a mud-fish, and upper lip of portentous size and gravity.’ Sierra Leone 7 March 1940: ‘The Judge looked like the man of whom it was said that God started to make a gorilla, but changed His mind before He had quite finished’, and ‘One was struck all the more with amazement

Notes to pp. 45–9

51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59.

60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

167

when three of their bandy legged Mandingos walked smartly forward, saluted with military precision, and proceeded to croon in English the words of the Lambeth Walk! Honestly, I do not think that this is the right way to treat a decent and self respecting set of cannibals.’ Bo, Nigeria 11 March 1940: ‘Two of the chiefs I saw were quite unexpectedly intelligent.’ Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 5 and p. 6. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 7. ‘Correspondents report to us that no foreign troops had ever been allowed in Malaya, while local Chinese newspapers have been “discouraged” . . . when they suggested that troops of the regular Chinese army should be invited to Malaya to join the Allied defence. The British authorities thought that the Chinese Army would be bad for British “prestige” amongst the coloured people.’ New Statesman and Nation, ‘A London Diary’, 17 January 1942, vol.23, p. 37. Churchill to Wavell, 10 February 1942, cited in Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia, p. 213. Paper F 1345, FO 371/31754. Cited in Dower, War without Mercy, p. 111. Pimlott, Atlas of World War II, p. 90. Lippmann, Washington Post, 21 Feb 1942, cited in CO 875/18/10. Rudyard Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ was published in the New York Sun on 5 February 1899, the day before the US Senate agreed to make the Philippines an American protectorate after winning the Spanish-American war. Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Nostalgia, p. 67. Welles, reprinted in Holborn, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, p. 90 (Welles was the only man Roosevelt trusted according to Sir Isaiah Berlin (stationed in Washington from 1942 to report on American opinion of Britain). Interview with author, 3 November 1994). Berlin, 14 May 1942, FO 371/30652. Berlin, FO 371/30652, 30 April 1942. Berlin’s report was noted by both M. Butler and F. E. Evans, who briefed the delegates to the IPR conference (see Chapter 4). Walter White cited in FO 371/30656. FO 371/31770, Japanese propaganda in the Far East, 15 November 1941, p. 12. R. H. Scott, Ministry of Information, Singapore to London, 31 December 1941, FO 37131754, paper F 1345. FO 371/31770, Japanese propaganda in the Far East, 15 November 1941 p. 29 (emphasis in original). The IO report ‘issues warning against risk of unintentionally helping Japanese racial propaganda by repetition of such stories as that of severe treatment of Europeans in Manila, on the other hand stories of Japanese brutality towards Asiatics would furnish excellent British propaganda.’ ‘Japanese propaganda in the Far East’ Report from India Office, 17 January 1942, FO 371/31770/560. For example, the Consul-General was recorded as saying that ‘pictures of horrors should be avoided as they only terrify and paralyse the natives’. Japanese propaganda in the Far East, 15 November 1941, FO 371/31770, p. 29.

168

Notes to pp. 49–53

68. Berlin, 20 March 1942 in Nicholas (ed.), Washington Despatches, p. 27. 69. ‘The influential Phelps-Stokes Committee has been stimulated to prepare a report on the future of Africa, which will shortly appear as part of campaign to arouse favourable interest in Negro problem among general public. Findings of this Committee are said to be critical of British administration in Africa.’ Berlin, 20 June 1942, in Nicholas (ed.), Washington Despatches, pp. 47–8. Whereas Perham thought favourably of the PhelpsStokes report on Africa: ‘a very well informed and appreciative analysis of our African Administration has recently appeared entitled The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American standpoint.’ Perham, Colonial Sequence, p. 238. 70. Berlin reported that they were: ‘a distinguished and influential committee of forty Americans, under the chairmanship of Dr Anson Phelps-Stokes, President of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, an American foundation which has shown an active interest in African affairs for more than a quarter of a century.’ CO 875/18/10. According to Berman: ‘From its incorporation in 1911 until 1945 the Phelps-Stokes Fund based its actions on several premises: (1) that the experience of the Negro South was directly relevant to black Africa; (2) that neither the African nor the American Negro would be self-governing, or even have a large say in his welfare, in the foreseeable future; and (3) that a narrowly defined vocational education could be used to train American Negroes and Africans to become productive, docile, and permanent underclasses in their respective societies.’ Edward Berman, ‘Educational Colonialism in Africa: The Role of American Foundations, 1910–1945’ in Arnove (ed.), Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism, pp. 194–5. 71. McLean to Jones, 29 October 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 72. Thornley, 14 May 1942, Memorandum, CO 323/1858/25. 73. Cranborne, House of Lords, 20 May 1942: ‘So far as Malaya is concerned . . . I do not think there is any evidence at present that the population as a whole was either secretly hostile or indifferent. On the contrary it remained perfectly friendly throughout.’ cited in CO 323/1858/22. 74. R. H. Scott, Far Eastern Bureau to MoI, London, 31 December 1941, Paper F 1345, FO 371/31754. 75. J. B. Sabine, confidential report, CO 875/18/10. 76. Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 108–12. 77. Sabine, 26 February 1942, CO 875/18/10. 78. Hailey, ‘The Colonial Problem’, Spectator, 27 March 1942, p. 298. 79. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 35. 80. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 37. 81. Hailey, Spectator, 27 March 1942, p. 298. 82. Carlton Hotel minutes, 6 October 1939, CO 847/17/11 (extracts in CO 850/137/10). 83. Carlton Hotel minutes, p. 12, CO 847/17/11. 84. ‘He had never seen any attempt to square native administration as we see it now with the development of Parliamentary institutions. Any investigation of this question must assume that the ultimate object is self-government. But must we assume that the form of self-government should be Parliamentary?’ Carlton Hotel minutes, pp. 5–6, CO 847/17/11.

Notes to pp. 53–4

169

85. Carlton Hotel minutes, p. 5, CO 847/17/11. 86. ‘Great Britain, in fostering the system of indirect rule, is promoting a widespread agency of local self-government for which a place will eventually have to be found in the political organization of the colonies . . . there is much that is difficult to foresee in the future of indirect rule; but possibly the most difficult problem of all, is to envisage the feasibility of integrating the system with the normal type of Parliamentary institutions.’ Hailey, An African Survey, p. 252. 87. Carlton Hotel minutes, p. 10, CO 847/17/11. 88. Carlton Hotel minutes, p. 11, CO 847/17/11. 89. Butler, warden of Nuffield College, Oxford, (later stationed in Washington) comment on Carlton Hotel minutes, 7 November 1939, CO 847/17/11. 90. Arthur Wright, comment on Carlton Hotel minutes, 2 November 1939, CO 847/17/11. 91. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 46 and p. 48. 92. ‘The peoples of Africa are believed to have been derived from three principal stocks – Bushman, Negro and Hamite . . . there are few parts of the continent in which adequate surveys of the physical characters of the inhabitants have been made, and it is therefore impossible to classify the different tribes accurately on a such a basis. Thus it is inevitable that language and culture traits should be used as a basis for ethnic classification, however unsatisfactory this may be from a scientific point of view.’ Hailey, An African Survey, p. 18. 93. Native administration and African employment had been linked in F. J. Pedler’s memorandum on the ‘Employment of Africans in the Higher Ranks of the Service’, paragraph 27: ‘Native authorities cannot hope to keep up with the times unless they secure the services of highly educated Africans; if the Government services absorbed all the available African diplomats and graduates the native authorities would be left as curious survivals of tribal ignorance. It ought therefore to be one of the objectives of native policy to ensure that the native authorities and the educated African class consist of the same people, so that no conflict can arise.’ 16 December 1939, CO 850/137/10. 94. J. L. Keith, head of the welfare department, expressed the political expediency of employing Africans: ‘Unless Africans can be brought into the services of the central Government in large numbers and feel that they have a growing interest therein and that all posts are open to them when they are qualified to take them, they will look upon the central Government as an alien institution and give vent to their feelings in political agitation.’ Memo on Africans in Government Services, 22 January 1940, CO 850/137/10. 95. Extract of Carlton Hotel minutes, 6 October 1939, CO 850/137/10. 96. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, pp. 224–32. 97. C. H. Thornley, 14 May 1942, CO 323/1858/25. 98. ‘It was to a large extent this organization of society that caused the Bolshevik Revolution.’ G. L. M. Clauson, CO 850/153/10. 99. A. J. Roysten, 4 August 1939, CO 850/153/10. 100. F. J. Pedler, 7 August 1939, and Gerald Creasy commented ‘I don’t think it

170

101. 102.

103. 104.

105.

106. 107.

108. 109.

110. 111. 112.

113.

Notes to pp. 54–6 will necessarily be only the “exceptional” African’, 8 August 1939 CO 850/153/10. Eastwood, 29 September 1939, CO 850/153/10 and supported by G. Creasy, 7 February 1940, CO 850/137/10. Lord Passfield, secretary of state for the colonies, had introduced the idea of ‘unification’ of the colonial services in 1930. Services were unified around a particular function, starting with the Colonial Administrative Service in 1932 and ending with the Colonial Civil Aviation Service after 1945. Jeffries, Partners for Progress, p. 42. Seel, spring 1940, CO 850/137/10. ‘He [Mr Small, colonial secretary, Straits, Malaya] said that if we at this end sent out a man who showed a trace of colour to fill a post normally filled by pure Europeans, i.e. a post for which no local man of colour would be recruited, there might be considerable discontent among people of the latter class, who might not unreasonably complain that a post for which they would not be considered eligible should not be given to a man showing obvious traces of colour. Mr Small’s reasoning seemed to me to be sound, and I hope it will give you a sufficiently clear line in dealing with such cases in the future.’ 11 February 1938, CO 850/134/15. ‘I have always, myself, pictured the United Services as a diminishing factor as and when the various members of the Colonial Empire begin “to stand on their own feet”.’ Seel, spring 1940, CO 850/137/10. T. I. K. Lloyd, 3 January 1940, CO 850/137/10. Pedler, ‘Employment of Africans in the Higher Ranks of the Service’, paragraph 25, 16 December 1939 and TIK Lloyd, 3 January 1940, CO 850/137/10. Lloyd, 3 January 1940, CO 850/137/10. ‘. . . if it became the practice to treat the Colonial Empire as a unit so far as the appointment of non-Europeans are concerned, there would surely be the risk of starting a cross current working against the general policy of trusteeship? It is one thing to maintain a gradually diminishing European Service in a territory until the inhabitants can run it themselves: it is very different to open the door to an increasing stream of non-European officials from other territories or belonging to other races.’ R. D. Furse, 15 May 1951, CO 850/193/2. Pedler, ‘Employment of Africans in the Higher Ranks of the Service’, paragraph 27, 16 December 1939, CO 850/137/10. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 19. Sir Alan Burns, 21 February 1940: ‘While I fully appreciate the importance of the economic question, I am convinced that the real problem is colour prejudice. . . . Governors should make it clear to heads of departments and others that they will not tolerate colour prejudice in the Service and should endeavour to encourage those who are trying to overcome it. I received scant encouragement when I started the Inter-racial Dining Club in Lagos, referred to in paragraph 40 of Mr Pedler’s memorandum, it has, however, done a lot of good and believe it is still flourishing.’ CO 850/137/10. Pedler, ‘Employment of Africans in the Higher Ranks of the Service’, paragraph 38, 16 December 1939, CO 850/137/10.

Notes to pp. 56–61

171

114. J. B. Sidebotham, 20 April 1940, and A. C. Talbot Edwards, 26 June 1940, CO 850/137/10. 115. Lord Dufferin, the former chairman, was no longer the parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies. J. B. Sidebotham, 20 April 1940, and Gerald Creasy, assistant secretary, 20 May 1940, CO 850/137/10. 116. Letter to Lord Lloyd from Accra, Gold Coast, 16 November 1940 and note, Luke, 16 December 1940, in CO 850/192/10. 117. Sir John E. Shuckburgh, 13 April 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 118. Although according to Sir Arthur Dawe, assistant under-secretary of state, 26 February 1941, Hailey thought that ‘Africans in the public service should only look for advancement in the colony to which they belong’, CO 850/192/10. 119. New Statesman, 5 March 1941, Copy in CO 850/193/2. 120. C. J. Jeffries, 7 April 1941, CO 850/193/2. 121. Moyne, 10 April 1941, CO 850/193/2. 122. See CO 850/192/10 and CO 850/193/2. 123. O. G. R. Williams, 1 July 1941, CO 850/192/10, who in one file remarked: ‘No doubt the Creole type is inclined to be insolent,’ 7 October 1940, CO 850/179/13, and in another: ‘As for educating public opinion (including my own prejudices) into a more tolerant attitude, I am all for it, but how is it to be done?’, 29 August 1941, CO 859/70/7. 124. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 47. 125. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 8. 126. C. J. Jeffries, 16 May 1941, CO 850/193/2. 127. New Statesman and Nation, 16 August 1941, copy in CO 850/193/2. 128. J. J. Paskin, 26 September 1941, CO 859/80/13. 129. Paskin, 26 September 1941, CO 859/80/13 and Sir George Gater, 20 August 1942, CO 859/80/13. 130. Berlin, CO 875/18/10. 131. C. J. Jeffries, 25 November 1942, CO 850/192/10. 132. Scott, Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information, Singapore, 31 December 1941, Paper F 1345, FO 371/31754. 133. C. H. Thornley, 14 May 1942, CO 323/1858/25. 134. Cranborne, 27 August 1942, CO 859/80/13. 135. R. A. Whittle, 4 August 1943, CO 850/193/3. 136. Jeffries, ‘Relationship of European and African Salaries in West Africa’, 12 June 1944, CO 850/217/8. 137. Telegram 7 March 1944, CO 850/193/3. 138. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 37. 139. See discussion February 1942, CO 875/18/10. 140. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 36 and p. 7 respectively. 141. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 115. 142. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 118. 143. Dawe, 13 May 1942, CO 554/131/4. 144. ‘Lord Hailey feels that if we make the concession now it may only encourage agitation for further concessions: and it will be difficult for us to know what more to concede. He argues that it is a great mistake to move in

172

145.

146.

147. 148.

149.

150.

151.

152.

153.

Notes to pp. 61–2 advance of agitation and that it is best to keep concessions in reserve so that when the agitation arises there will, if necessary, be something to give.’ Dawe reporting on meeting with Hailey, 13 May 1942, CO 554/131/4. ‘We ought to avoid bringing in Africans at the centre too early and thus endeavour not to repeat the mistakes made in India. If Africans are to come in at the centre, then they should not be brought on the Executive Councils but onto the Legislative Councils, the representative basis of which can be altered gradually and naturally to meet the pressure.’ Dawe reporting on meeting with Hailey, 13 May 1942, CO 554/131/4. Letter from Hailey to Sir Findlater Stewart (permanent under-secretary of State for India 1930–42), 1 August 1930, India Office, Hailey MSS Eur. E/220/19A, pp. 76–7. Burns to Cranborne (his emphasis), 30 June 1942, CO 554/131/33702 cited in Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 123. ‘I believe that the rising tide of Negro resentment of the British government, and the disturbances which in recent years have been symptoms of this resentment, are due to the policy of deferring constitutional concessions until it’s too late for them to be appreciated by the people. The Negro peoples, both in the West Indies and in West Africa, are learning that the colonial administrations take no notice of popular feelings until this feeling is manifested in disturbances. This is one of the principle reasons why the people of these colonies choose as their leaders, not the moderate and reasonable men, but those irresponsible agitators who stimulate racial feelings against the whites and political movements against the government.’ Burns to Cranborne cited in Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 123. Nordman, Prelude to Decolonisation in West Africa, p. 127. According to Nordman, Africans were also admitted to the Executive Council in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, p. 130. ‘But they [native authorities] have a second and certainly not less important function, in providing an avenue by which native opinion can be expressed and to a certain extent “canalised”.’ Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 11. ‘But the prospect which it [the native authority] opens to the more highly educated and politically minded African of the towns, and even to the middle class African in rural areas, is not one with which we can expect him to remain content. Their dissatisfaction might take the form of an active campaign to rouse a popular feeling against the native authorities which would gravely impair their value as administrative agencies, and as the means of introducing social reforms.’ Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 45. ‘The general atmosphere of acquiescence which our rule now enjoys owes much to the opportunities provided by the native authority system for the expression of native opinion.’ Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 11. ‘There are some territories in which this process has already gone further than is usually believed. In Ceylon, for instance, there has been for some years practically no recruitment from Europe for the State services. In the

Notes to pp. 62–6

154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165.

166.

167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172.

173

West Indies, the services are predominantly of local origin. Even in Africa, where circumstances have hitherto provided a much more limited field for local recruitment for the more responsible posts, we have in the Gold Coast and Nigeria between thirty and forty Africans holding medical and judicial appointments of a class normally filled by Europeans, and Africans have recently been admitted to the superior administrative service.’ Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 37. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 37. J. L. Keith, 7 November 1940 to Ministry of Information, for guidance for Joint Broadcasting Committee , CO 859/40/4. Arthur Dawe, assistant under-secretary of state, May 1940, CO 859/39/14. Telegram from Gold Coast, 14 January 1941, to O. G. R. Williams after use on 10 December 1940. BBC sent apology, 6 March 1941, CO 875/18/5. O. G. R. Williams, 19 March 1941, CO 859/40/4. N. J. B. Sabine, Head of Publicity department, 24 March 1941, CO 859/40/4. The Americans decided to do the same on 5 December 1942 according to Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 185. Miss Audrey Richards, 17 September 1941, CO 859/80/13. A. Creech Jones, secretary of state, Memorandum on Legislation involving Colour Discrimination, 8 January 1947, CO 323/1879/5. Hailey, 20 May 1942 cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 140. Reported in the Manchester Guardian, 29 October 1941, copy CO 323/1858/27. Hailey, Great Britain, India, and the Colonial Dependencies in the Post-War World, p. 29. ‘In none of our dependencies are there conditions such as those which are characteristic of the Union of South Africa, where the doctrine of “segregation” or “parallel rule” finds its practical expression in the refusal to allow to the native any share in the political institutions of government, and in the passing of “colour bar” legislation to regulate his position in industry.’ Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 36. ‘If we need to express ourselves in a formula at all, let our relations be those of senior and junior partners in the same enterprise, and let it be said that our contract of partnership involves the progressive increase of the share which the junior partners have in the conduct of the undertaking.’ House of Lords, Hansard, 20 May 1942, cols 1095–6, and see Hailey’s Opening Statement, War and Peace in the Pacific, pp. 11–12. Hailey, A Colonial Charter, p. 3. Hailey, ‘British Colonial Policy’, in Colonial Administration by European Powers, p. 96. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 156. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 53. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 205. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 12.

CHAPTER 3

THE QUESTION OF EQUAL TREATMENT

1. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 57 (author’s emphasis). 2. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 56 (author’s emphasis).

174

Notes to pp. 66–9

3. King, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol.6, no.2, 1993, p. 125. 4. ‘From its [Carnegie’s] founding in 1911, the foundation had shown, as one analyst put it, a “benign but fluctuating interest in the Negro”.’ Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black–White Relations, p. 2. See also Lagemann, The Politics of Philanthropy. 5. Carnegie Commission, The Poor White Problem in South Africa, Stellenbosch, 1932 – see Miller, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol.19, no.4, December 1993. 6. Myrdal, Population. 7. Hailey reviewed Myrdal’s book saying: ‘In order that it should be as objective a basis as possible, its direction was entrusted to Dr Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish sociologist of high international reputation. It is now possible to draw from its massive material a factual picture of the position actually occupied by the American Negro today.’ The Times, 25 July 1944, p. 5. 8. Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black–White Relations, p. 8 and p. 6 respectively. 9. According to Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 9. 10. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 756 (his italics). 11. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 1007. 12. King, Separate and Unequal, p. 31. 13. Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black–White Relations, p. 8. 14. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 1006. 15. ‘In fact the Court had issued rulings with anti-segregation implications: in Buchanan v. Warley, decided in 1917, the Court ruled that Black Americans had the right to occupy housing in any part of a city and disallowed the municipal practice of ‘racial zoning’, dividing residence into White and Black sections. In practice, contra this ruling, until 1948 residential segregation was accentuated by including restrictive covenants (specifying that a property could not be sold subsequently to a Black American buyer) in property ownership. Such convenants were outlawed by the Supreme Court in 1948, but those existing prior to the ruling limited Black buyers’ choices and the Court ruling in 1917 outlawing racial zoning had actually encouraged a greater use of covenants.’ King, Separate and Unequal, p. 19. 16. Cited in Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 18. 17. The MOWM finally dissolved in late 1947. See James et al., Fighting Racism in World War II, p. 21. 18. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 16. 19. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 172. 20. The Office of War Information was established by executive order on 13 June 1942. Foreign propaganda activities were at first divided between the Office of Strategic Services and the OWI – the OSS dealt with secret activities and the OWI was limited to ‘open’ work. After 9 March 1943 OWI conducted all propaganda abroad. The OWI was closed down on 15 September 1945 and its files were transferred, after a short interim, to the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (State Department). 21. OWI reports, 24 October 1942, on Negroes in the media, paper 10131, FO 371/30689: ‘The period since Sept 1 has brought to the fore a number of issues which have tested newspaper attitudes toward Negro relations. Most

Notes to pp. 69–71

22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

175

notable has been the struggle of the poll tax, first in connection with the vote for soldiers, and second in connection with the Congressional fight to ban this tax in national elections. Concurrently there has been the Talmadge defeat in Georgia, the friction between colored and white soldiers in Great Britain, the arrest of 81 members of the Ethiopian Peace League in Chicago, and more recently the three lynchings in Mississippi and the attempted lynching in Tennessee. In addition to these events there have been less dramatic ones, such as the DAR’s [Daughter’s of the American Revolution] invitation to Marion Anderson, naming of the Booker T Washington, and the appointment of a Negro as this ship’s captain. In view of the evidence of growing tension, a survey has been made of the treatment of these topics between Sept 1 and Oct 20 . . . It shows that a narrow majority [of newspapers] are supporting various phases of the demand for improved status for Negroes . . . (on the friction between colored and white soldiers in Great Britain no comment was noted) . . . The papers are still doing little for the positive contribution of Negroes to American Society. This fact is brought out clearly in the chart on page four. Despite the continued growth of Negro participation in the war, manifested in such events as the effective organization of civilian defense in Harlem, the increased participation of Negro women in voluntary nursing, the widespread entrances of Negroes into Industry, and the greatly augmented representation of Negroes in the navy, news stories signalising such developments are extremely rare.’ See James et al., Fighting Racism in World War II, p. 53. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 25. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 1006. The Phelps-Stokes report on Africa was, according to Berlin, a ‘call to America to prepare herself for an increasing share in a constructive attack on African poverty and backwardness’ CO 875/18/10. King, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol.6, no.2, June 1993, p. 139. See also chapter 4 in King, Separate and Unequal. ‘In the correspondence of the war department officials, for example, oftentimes the word Negro was written with a small n. Although I cannot prove it, the use of the small n probably indicated contempt for blacks in and out of uniform.’ McGuire, He, Too, Spoke for Democracy, p. xvi. I, too, have found that a small n was largely used until 1942. Only after this date, when black demands were increasingly recognized do official reports start to use a capital N for Negro. Furthermore, when Myrdal started on his research, ‘One of his first acts as director was to order all personnel connected with the Carnegie project to capitalize the world “Negro”.’ Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black–White Relations, p. 20. Weekly report from Berlin, FO 371/30652, 17 April 1942. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 1007. Cited in Thorne, Proceedings of the British Council, vol.80, 1986, p. 354. Berlin, 20 March 1942, FO 371/30652. Dower, War without Mercy, p. 79 and Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order, pp. 44–5. King, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol.6, no.2, 1993, p. 144. King, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol.6, no.2, 1993, p. 140.

176

Notes to pp. 71–5

35. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 78. 36. ‘The heroism of black soldiers in America’s wars is attested by the records of the highest decorations awarded to American fighting men. Twenty black soldiers won the Congressional Medal of Honor during the Civil War. Twenty black soldiers won the medal during the Indian campaign from 1866 to 1890. Eight won the Congressional Medal during the Spanish–American War of 1898. No black soldier was awarded the medal during World Wars I and II; however, sixteen won it in the Korean and Viet Nam wars.’ Motley (ed.), The Invisible Soldier, p. 17. 37. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 59. 38. McGuire, He, Too, Spoke for Democracy, p. 39. 39. Motley (ed.), The Invisible Soldier, p. 16. 40. Sitkoff, Journal of American History, vol.58, 1971, p. 666 and p. 669. 41. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 92. 42. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, p. 25. 43. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, p. 98. 44. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the US Armed Forces, p. 29. 45. Buchanan, Black Americans in World War II, pp. 84–5. 46. James et al., Fighting Racism in World War II, p. 147. 47. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 171. 48. Cited in Southern, Gunnar Myrdal and Black–White Relations, p. 49. 49. Statement of Committee on Status of Negro Americans in War Industries as adopted 29 March 1941, ‘National Defense and Negro Americans’, Phelps-Stokes Fund Records, Box 38 Folder 1, Committee on the American Negro in Defense Industries 1941–1944, minutes 1941, Papers in the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public Library. 50. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 171. 51. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, 1928. 52. Buell, ‘An American Proposal’, Fortune, May 1942: cited in FO 371/30656. 53. Walter Lippmann, ‘The Post-Singapore War in the East’, Washington Post, 21 February 1942, CO 875/18/10. 54. As F. Darvall, Ministry of Information working in America, wrote to the Foreign Office, 13 June 1942: ‘We also had very much in mind of the danger that the US might go imperialist after the war and accept collaboration with Britain only on terms of superiority. For this reason it was expressly stated in our list of aims that we should seek to create a popular basis in both countries for collaboration between the UK and the US during and after the war on terms of equality.’ FO 371/30669 paper 5722 (author’s emphasis). 55. ‘. . . New York Daily News, the white paper with largest Negro circulation of any, has not been slow to exploit alleged inconsistency between our treatment of Congress Party demands and the Four Freedoms.’ Berlin, 22 August 1942 in Nicholas (ed.), Washington Despatches, p. 73. 56. Walter Lippmann, ‘The Post-Singapore War in the East’, Washington Post, 21 February 1942, CO 875/18/10. 57. Joint Intelligence Committee, Paper on ‘China’s relation to the United Nations in the war against Japan’, JIC 154/2, Adopted by Committee 31 December 1943, p. 9, National Archives, Joint Chief of Staff Geographical Files, RG 218, Box 28, Sutland, Maryland, USA.

Notes to pp. 75–9

177

58. Drummond and Hillmer, Negotiating Freer Trade, p. 160. 59. Notes from meeting of Ashley Clarke with Walter Lippmann, 15 September 1942, CO 875/18/10. 60. Notes from meeting of Ashley Clarke with Walter Lippmann, 15 September 1942, CO 875/18/10. 61. Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 164. 62. ‘They [media observers] greeted the British and American declarations of intention to give up extraterritorial rights in China as evidence of the end of the imperialism of the past and as proof that the American and British Governments are sincere in pledging free new world after the war.’ Office of War Information, Bureau of Intelligence, 17 October 1942 cited in FO 371/30689. 63. ‘In all the media there was agreement with the Richmond Times Dispatch’s interpretation (11 Oct) that the declaration was “tangible evidence that the old age imperialism is ended, and that the world will enter a new era when peace returns”.’ Office of War Information, Bureau of Intelligence, 17 October 1942 cited in FO 371/30689. 64. Tinker, Race, Conflict, and the International Order, p. 19. 65. Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 164. 66. Report of the ‘Detroit Committee for 1943’ passed on to Colonial Office from Alan Dudley, Foreign Office, 10 September 1943 with comment on the Detroit Committee from the Consul General in Detroit, CO 875/19/3. 67. Report of the Detroit Committee passed on to CO via FO, 10 September 1943, CO 875/19/3. 68. Cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 61. 69. Reported in the telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 25 August 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 70. Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 25 August 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 71. Extract of West African Pilot, 11 December 1941, CO 859/80/7. 72. ‘Describing the fact that Southern soldiers have carried anti-Negro attitudes to England, to the surprise of Englishmen who “had got along excellently” with Negroes, Time (19 Oct) said, “it seemed as if the English people and American Negroes, if uninterrupted, might teach anybody something about democratic possibilities”.’ Office of War Information report, 24 October 1942, file 10131, FO 371/30689. 73. ‘It is clear, however, that the official policy of the American military authorities is that white and coloured troops should not consort together. This, of course, is the reverse of our policy, which makes no distinction whatever on the question of colour amongst troops in the armed forces.’ Note of interview with the Adjutant-General, War Office, 25 July 1942, CO 876/14. 74. Note of interview with the Adjutant-General, War Office, 25 July 1942, CO 876/14. 75. J. L. Keith to C. Jeffries, 31 July 1942, CO 876/14. 76. Memo J. L. Keith, 5 August 1942, CO 876/14. 77. Comment W. L. Rolleston, 10 August 1942, CO 876/14. 78. Comment Sir George Henry Gater, 11 August 1942, CO 876/14. 79. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 62.

178

Notes to pp. 79–82

80. Minutes of the Bolero Combined Committee, 12 August 1942 on the ‘problem of American coloured troops’ in CO 876/14. 81. Paper prepared for the War Cabinet WP (42) 442, 2 October 1942 on United States Coloured Troops in the UK by Lord Cranborne, CO 876/14. 82. The final paper used the Lord Privy Seal’s suggestion, WP (42) 473, October 1942, CO 876/14. 83. A. H. Poynton to Mr Calder, 30 January 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 84. ‘The Private Secretary at the Admiralty then said that this would make the reply inaccurate, as persons of pure European descent were eligible provided they were British born themselves, and their fathers were British either by birth or by naturalisation, whereas coloured persons could only be accepted provided that they and their fathers were British by birth.’ Poynton to Calder, (his emphasis) 30 January 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 85. A. H. Poynton, 5 April 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 86. Calder in reply to Poynton, 13 April 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 87. ‘I think that we might indicate that any publication of the special exceptions made in the case of Europeans only could be highly embarrassing to us, and that, as Mr Calder suggests we might ask the Admiralty to avoid any publicity on the subject.’ Sir George Henry Gater, 15 April 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 88. Malcolm MacDonald, secretary of state for the colonies, 16 April 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 89. Sir A. Burns to Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 29 May 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 90. John Calder, 11 June 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 91. Sir A. Burns to Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 29 May 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 92. Telegram from the Governor of Trinidad to secretary of state for the colonies, 2 June 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 93. Sir Cosmo Parkinson to secretary of state, 1 July 1940, CO 323/1801/13. 94. N. J. Sabine, 26 February 1942, CO 875/18/10. 95. Hailey, ‘The Colonial Problem’, Spectator, 27 March 1942, p. 298. 96. A. C. B. Symm, India Office to Trafford Smith, 23 December 1938, CO 323/1613/7. 97. J. E. W. Hood, Crown Agents to the Colonies, to E. B. Bowyer, 15 September 1938, CO 323/1613/7. 98. Sir Cosmo Parkinson agreed: ‘As Sir A. Burns says, it is largely a question of manners, and you cannot legislate for that.’ 29 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. 99. Sir A. Burns, 29 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. Sir Alan Burns, the Governor and then Commander in Chief of the Gold Coast, seems to have maintained his preoccupation with manners. Even in his book, published after the war’s end, he maintained that: ‘It may be impossible to eradicate colour-prejudice altogether, but it should be easy, given sufficient goodwill, to remove some of its more unpleasant manifestations, and so lessen its effect, by no more than the avoidance of discourtesy.’ Burns, Colour Prejudice, p. 12. Although, the fact that he wrote such a book indicates his awareness of the importance of the issue and he did also write that ‘a civilisation which denies such equality of right to men of a certain colour, because of that colour, is not logical and cannot be enduring.’ Ibid., p. 149 (his italics).

Notes to pp. 83–5

179

100. Lord Moyne to Herbert Morrison, 27 June 1941 (and copy to Amery, Dominions Office) CO 859/80/7. 101. Minutes of meeting in the Colonial Office on Question of Introducing Legislation regarding the admission of coloured persons to hotels etc. Present: Mr Jeffries, Sir Grattan Bushe, Mr Paskin (all CO), Mr Mannatyne, Miss Goode (HO), Mr Field (IO), Mr Lewis (Scottish Office), Mr Innes (Lord Advocates Dept), 14 July 1941, CO 859/80/7. 102. Minutes of meeting on Question of Introducing Legislation regarding the admission of coloured persons to hotels, 14 July 1941, CO 859/80/7. 103. J. L. Keith, 22 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. 104. C. J. Jeffries, 27 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. 105. O. G. R. Williams, 29 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. 106. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 29 August 1941, CO 859/80/7. 107. J. J. Paskin, 16 September 1941, CO 859/80/7. 108. A. Richards, 17 September 1941, CO 859/80/13. 109. John Paskin, 26 September 1941, CO 859/80/13. 110. John Paskin, 26 September 1941, CO 859/80/13. After Parliamentary Questions, 7 December 1941, where ‘Mr Sorensen asked the UnderSecretary of State for the Colonies whether the Government will consider the desirability of making a pronouncement at an early date to the coloured races of the Colonial Empire conveying the assurance that the principles contained the Atlantic Charter shall be progressively implemented respecting them, and that no fundamental distinction will be recognised between the political and economic rights of white and coloured peoples?’, J. B. Sidebotham noted that: ‘The work of collating the various statements of declarations which have been made by HMG at different times in this connection has been undertaken by Lord Hailey’s Committee, and this is still in progress, Mr Pedler informs me.’ 16 December 1941, CO 323/1858/21. 111. J. L. Keith to Sir C Jeffries, 6 August 1943, CO 859/80/8. 112. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 86. Although Reynolds refers to Learie Constantine and reports that he had been working in Lancashire during the 1930s. Reynolds, Rich Relations, p. 306. 113. J. L. Keith to Sir C Jeffries, 6 August 1943, CO 859/80/8. 114. Evening Standard, 2 September 1943, Daily Worker, 20 and 23 September 1943, Reynolds News, 19 August and 26 September 1943, The Times, 14 and 21 October 1943, Daily Mirror, 27 October 1943, Daily Herald, 28 October, 12 and 18 November 1943, Daily Mirror, 30 October 1943, Guardian, 5 November 1943, Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1943. Recorded in CO 859/80/8. 115. ‘On the evening of 3 Sept, Mr Constantine broadcast a talk on the BBC Home Service in which he dealt mainly with colour prejudice. I saw the script but was not able to hear the talk. I have heard from many sources that it was restrained moving and effective. The broadcast naturally led to renewed comment in the Press on Saturday morning. Here again comment was objective and restrained.’ Noel J. Sabine, publicity department, Colonial Office, 20 September 1943, CO 859/80/8. 116. Tom Driberg, MP, 5 September 1943 reported in CO 859/80/8. 117. Noel J. Sabine, 20 September 1943, CO 859/80/8.

180

Notes to pp. 85–90

118. Copy of cartoon on title page of Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. iii. 119. Noel J. Sabine, 20 September 1943, CO 859/80/8. 120. C. J. Jeffries to Sir G Gater, 7 August 1943, CO 859/80/8. 121. J. L. Keith, 13 September 1943, CO 859/80/8. 122. C. J. Jeffries to Sir G. Gater, 7 August 1943, CO 859/80/8. 123. C. J. Jeffries, 30 September 1942, CO 859/80/7. 124. Costello, Love, Sex and War, p. 319. 125. McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p. 270 citing Home Intelligence Weekly Reports, 25 August – 8 September 1942, INF 1/292. 126. Peter Fryer, New Statesman, 4 December 1987, p. 29. 127. Noel J. Sabine, 20 September 1943, CO 859/80/8. 128. C. J. Jeffries, 17 September 1943, CO 859/80/8. Rich notes that Constantine was awarded £5 damages. Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, p. 161. 129. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 87. 130. Lord Cranborne, 27 August 1942, CO 859/80/13. 131. A special survey of the Office of the Inspector General of the US Army of racial incidents over three months from 19 November 1943 to 19 February 1944 showed an average of four incidents a week. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 140 and pp. 138–151. 132. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 86. 133. Cited in Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 86. 134. WP (42) 473, October 1942, CO 876/14. 135. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull, p. 89. 136. Thorne, New Community, vol.3, no.3, Summer 1974, p. 270. 137. Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 439–46. 138. The Office of War Information (USA) admitted, in its report of 14 November 1942, that: ‘the success of the British in defeating Rommel in Egypt has been widely commented on in all media, but they differ sharply in awarding credit for the victory . . . Editors and columnists, on the contrary [to the radio], did not consider the victory as a totally British achievement and few were inclined to credit British generalship with the success of the drive. Out of 52 newspapers commenting: 24 called it an Allied victory, 15 called it a British victory, and 13 called it an Axis defeat.’ OWI report, FO 371/30689 Paper 11204. 139. McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p. 257. 140. Butler seems to support my thesis that after 1943 the Colonial Office became more ‘adventurous’ in terms of thinking about postwar reconstruction. Butler, Industrialisation and the British Colonial State, p. 5. 141. Air Ministry reply to Colonial Office, 4 April 1944, CO 537/1223. 142. J. L. Keith to Poynton, 9 March 1944, CO 537/1223. 143. Wing Commander J. C. M. Gibb to Stanley, 30 November 1944, CO 537/1223. 144. A. H. Poynton, 17 March 1944, CO 537/1223. 145. P. Wilkins to Poynton, 10 October 1945, CO 537/1223. 146. Keith to A. E. Beattie, Edinburgh office of the Colonial Office, September 1944, CO 537/1223. 147. P. Wilkins to A. H. Poynton, 10 October 1945, CO 537/1223.

Notes to pp. 90–6

181

148. A. H. Poynton to Keith, Cohen, Sir George Gater and Sir C. Jeffries, 10 October 1945, CO 537/1223. 149. J. L. Keith, 16 October 1945, CO 537/1223. 150. Report by J. Paget, Commander in Chief of the Middle East Forces, to the War Office, 28 December 1944, CO 537/1266. 151. F. H. Anderson, 10 February 1945, CO 537/1266. 152. Sabben-Clare, 12 February 1945, CO 537/1266. 153. GHQ, Middle East to War Office, 26 March 1945, CO 537/1266. 154. Telegram from War Office to Commander in Chief, India, 17 February 1945, CO 537/1266. 155. Telegram from GHQ, Middle East, to War Office, 15 April 1945, CO 537/1266. 156. Telegram from War Office to AFHQ, 6 May 1945, CO 537/1266. 157. Telegram from AFHQ to War Office, 9 May 1945, CO 537/1266. 158. E. B. Sabben-Clare, 29 November 1945, CO 537/1266. 159. Telegram from Trinidad to secretary of state for the colonies, 28 June 1945, CO 537/1266. 160. J. L. Keith, 7 November 1940, Report on the guidance of the Joint Broadcasting Committee, CO 859/40/4. 161. Confidential Report on Colour Discrimination, welfare department of the Colonial Office, May 1946, CO 537/1224. 162. Kirk-Greene, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol.9, no.3, July 1986, p. 282. 163. Circular to the Colonies from A. Creech Jones, secretary of state for the colonies, 8 January 1947 and Memorandum on Legislation involving Colour Discrimination, 8 January 1947, CO 323/1879/5. 164. Circular to the Colonies from A. Creech Jones, 8 January 1947, CO 323/1879/5.

CHAPTER 4

DEFENDING THE EMPIRE

1. ‘At Bretton Woods and later during the period of the Anglo-American loan, both sides displayed a keen sense of economic self-interest which enabled critics to see the rise of a new American informal Empire, or to hear the death rattle of British Imperialism. Such are the dialectics that have to be borne in mind in attempting to get at the economic element in trusteeship.’ Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 24–5. Also see Louis and Robinson, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.22, no.3, September 1994, pp. 462–511. 2. See Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance. 3. See Watt, Too Serious a Business, Kolko, Century of War and Kolko, The Politics of War. 4. Letter from Ivison Macadam, Chatham House to Viscount Cranborne, secretary of state for the colonies, 11 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. 5. Cell, Hailey, p. 236. 6. In the preface to the preliminary report of the conference, W. L. Holland, the IPR Research Secretary, wrote ‘An important departure from previous IPR practice was authorized in inviting persons holding government positions to participate in the discussions, though only in their personal capacities.’ Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War

182

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

31.

Notes to pp. 96–100 and Peace in the Pacific, p. vi. 4 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Sabine, 23 May 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Sabine, 4 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Thornley, 10 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. Letter from Cranborne to Macadam, 15 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. Memorandum (unsigned – possibly by Basil Newton), October 1942, in CO 825/35/5. Minute by Gater, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Sabine, 12 June 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Cranborne, 29 July 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Thornley, 10 September 1942, CO 875/18/13. Minute by Gent, 15 July 1942, CO 875/18/13. The full list of the British delegation was: Lord Hailey, H. B. Butler, H. Byas, Sir J. Clague, L. D. Gammans MP(C), A. Creech Jones MP(L), Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, I. S. Macadam, D. M. MacDougall, I. Maclennan, R. Opie, Sir J. Pratt, Sir G. Sansom, Sir Frederick Whyte, Miss Margaret Wrong. Note by Ashley Clarke, 20 June 1942, in FO 371/30652, paper A 5374. Roosevelt and Churchill met over a couple of days. In his speech on 9 September in Parliament, Churchill stated that the Declaration was signed on 12 August – see Cmd.6321, Parliamentary Papers (1940–1) VIII, p. 591. Its signing was publicized on 14 August 1941 according to Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, vol.1, p. 102. Roosevelt cited in Balfour, Propaganda in War, p. 231. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 123. Article Three of the Atlantic Charter, reproduced in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, vol.1, p. 101. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 123 and pp. 124-5. Lord Moyne, Memorandum on the Constitutional Future of the Colonies, undated – probably late 1941 or early 1942, CO 323/1858/20. Daily Herald, 16 August 1941, cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 125. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, pp. 121–33. Telegram from Sir B. Bourdillon, 15 November 1941, CO 323/1858/20. L. S. Amery to Lord Moyne, 25 August 1941, with suggested memorandum titled: Post-War Policy and Reconstruction. Constitutional Development in Relation to the Colonies. Ministerial Statements. CO 323/1858/20. The telegram from Burma, 26 September 1941, complains that: ‘all Burmese papers except Sun unanimously condemn Prime Minister’s statement of 9th September [about the liquidation of the Empire] in no uncertain terms. For example, New Light of Burma says: “. . . It is deplorable that Mr Churchill does not realise that in such a war it is necessary to enlist the whole-hearted support of the subject countries and that in order to win such support freedom should be granted to these countries which we [are] no less worthy of the same than the European countries.”’ Confidential digest of the material passed through the American Division of the Ministry of Information in the month of April 1941: ‘It is based on incoming letters from the US.’ CO 875/11/13. CO 875/11/13.

Notes to pp. 100–2

183

32. Ministry of Information report on censors findings for April 1941, CO 875/11/13. 33. ‘As I understand the proposition [of propaganda in the USA], it does not look merely to immediate results, ie. American co-operation during the war, but to the more remote postwar future when we may have to defend our Colonial position in the eyes of the world and when American opinion may count for more than anything else.’ Minute by J. E. Shuckburgh, 13 May 1941, CO 875/11/13. 34. Editors, Fortune, May 1942, p. 59, cited in Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class, p. 117. 35. Hancock, Argument of Empire, p. 8. 36. For example, printed Memorandum by T. North Whitehead, Foreign Office, dated 6 July 1942, CO 875/18/10. Whitehead notes: ‘By their attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese not only brought every American into the war, but, for the time being at least, they have killed the traditional concept of American isolation in world affairs.’ Also, M. Butler notes on file FO 371/30652, 22 May 1942: ‘The point about both the Wallace and the Henry Luce schools is that they are both Interventionist, and we ought to be able to work with either of them, especially as Henry Luce has just come out with a full blooded plan for Anglo-American cooperation . . . I don’t think we have yet heard any American ideas as to who is to rule or control the “Asiatic possessions”. American imperialism has not so far been territorial outside the Western Hemisphere, but rather economic or commercial.’ 37. F. E. Evans, 6 June 1942 notes in file FO 371/30652 paper A 5312: ‘The depth of American ignorance of our Colonial practice is impressive and stressing and the criticism of those who have attributed the loss of our Eastern territories to the failure of our system of Colonial government drowns the voices of the few who are informed of our contribution to the advance and protection of backward peoples.’ 38. Isaiah Berlin, ‘Things which Americans hold Against the British’, May 1942, FO 371/30656 paper A6681. 39. Minutes of a meeting held on 13 February 1942 at Ministry of Information to discuss propaganda regarding the British Colonial Empire in the USA. Present: Lord Dufferin (chair, MoI, Empire Division), Sir Donald Cameron (MoI, Empire Division), Mr Usill (MoI, Empire Division), Mr Darvall (MoI, American Division), Capt. Hamilton (MoI, American Division), Mr Sidebotham (CO), Mr Sabine (CO, Publicity Committee), Mr Vernon MacKenzie (British Library of Information, New York), in CO 875/18/10. 40. ‘It has occurred to me that since in the immediate and the more remote future it is going to be of the highest conceivable importance that there should be a firm basis for Anglo-American friendship, any and every source of misapprehension or misunderstanding should be resolutely attacked. There can be little doubt that the Colonial question is such a source; and it may be that we could not only remove a cause of friction and lack of understanding but that by making a really determined and comprehensive effort to let America know all about our Colonial policy we could make of it a common meeting-ground for the exchange of ideas which would at the same time gain their confidence and perhaps serve as

184

41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

Notes to pp. 102–7 a basis for other and even more fruitful forms of cooperation.’ Minute by N Sabine, 28 April 1941, CO 875/11/13. Perham, The Times, 13 March 1942, reprinted in Colonial Sequence, pp. 225–6. Minute by J. B. Sidebotham, 15 June 1942, CO 875/18/10. Minute by G. E. Gent, 17 June 1942, CO 875/18/10. Parkinson, The Colonial Office from Within, p. 87. Captain Gammans, MP, The Times (between 15 February and 10 March 1942) cited by Elspeth Huxley in her first correspondence with Margery Perham which began their exchange published as, Race and Politics in Kenya, p. 15. Minute by C. G. Eastwood, 17 August 1942, CO 875/18/10, ‘As you know, I think, Lord Hailey is going to America this winter to attend a conference at the Institute of Pacific Relations and it is important for him, therefore, to be kept in touch with American opinion.’ Letter from Neville Butler, Foreign Office to G. E. J. Gent, Colonial Office, 8 October 1942, CO 875/18/10. Professor Tawney, working for the Foreign Office in the United States, wrote to Dr Tom Jones describing the American attitude to Britain on 22 March 1942. Censorship record of letter in FO 371/30669 paper 4406. Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 4. Cranborne, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 24 February 1942, cols. 16–24. Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 123 and p. 125 respectively. Letter from E. J. Tarr to I. S. Macadam, 4 July 1942, IPR Collection, Box 62 Mont Tremblant Conference II – Tarr, Edgar J., Papers in Columbia University Library. Letter from E. J. Tarr to Edward C. Carter, 23 September 1942, IPR Collection, Box 62 Mont Tremblant Conference II – Tarr, Edgar J., Papers in Columbia University Library, New York. Edgar Jordan Tarr (1881–1950), obituary in New York Times, 9 November 1950, p. 33 col.5. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 4. Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 74. ‘As was noted during the congressional debates of 1942–3, the naturalization law amounted to a pure “color” law, and placed a “stigma of biological inferiority” on the yellow races.’ Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 164. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 7. Sir George Sansom, Foreign Office in Washington, report on the IPR Conference, CO 875/18/14. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, 1943, p. 9. Cited in Cell, Hailey, p. 202. ‘We are greatly attracted by Mr Hull’s conception of “Parent States”, and

Notes to pp. 107–10

63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

185

something on the lines of his remarks on that point would be essential basis of any Declaration.’ Draft telegram for Washington, October 1942, CO 323/1858/22. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 10 and p. 12. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, p. 15. Marcus Garvey had organized a mass black separatist movement amongst poor blacks in Harlem, New York City, in the 1920s which argued for black people to return to Africa and found their own independent state. Myrdal wrote in 1943 of Garvey’s movement that: ‘It testifies to the basic unrest in the Negro community. It tells of dissatisfaction so deep that it amounts to virtual hopelessness of gaining a full life in America.’ Myrdal and Rose, The Negro in America, p. 243. Walter Davenport, Collier’s, 21 November 1942, cited in OWI Weekly Reports 21 November 1942, copy in file FO 371/30689 paper A11371, p. 29. Memorandum by Sir R. I. Campbell, 14 October 1942, CO 875/18/19. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 56. Thorne, Proceedings of the British Council, vol.80, 1986, p. 354. Letter from D. M. MacDougall, BIS in Washington, to Sabine, Colonial Office, 22 December 1942: ‘The conference was conducted against a background of two prevailing feelings. The first was reverence for China. The Chinese have taken American sympathy by storm: in American eyes, the Chinese are a nation of saints and heroes, above and beyond reproach.’ CO 875/18/14. Letter from the secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Moyne, to Lord Hailey, 19 March 1941, CO 323/1858/12. See CO 323/1858/20. Introductory paragraphs to ‘The Constitutional Future of the Colonial Empire’ by Lord Moyne, in CO 323/1858/20. Hailey’s Romanes Lecture was delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford on 14 May 1941 on ‘The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations’. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 41. Sir R. I. Campbell, ‘Memorandum on British Imperialism and its relation to American Opinion’, 14 October 1942, CO 875/18/19. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 11. The Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941, reprinted in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, vol.1, p. 101. Minute by G. E. Gent, 17 June 1942, CO 875/18/10. Hailey, United Empire, vol.32, no.8, Nov–Dec 1941, p. 165. The Times, 23 January 1943, cited in Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 85. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 211. Lord Bledisloe’s speech, House of Lords, reported in The Times, 10 July 1941, p. 2. ‘In that respect, as in other respects, the Bill which we are discussing this afternoon breaks new ground. It establishes the duty of taxpayers in this country to contribute directly and for its own sake towards the development in the widest sense of the word of the colonial peoples for whose good government taxpayers of this country are ultimately responsible.’

186

84.

85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92. 93.

94. 95. 96.

Notes to pp. 110–13 Speech by Malcolm MacDonald, former secretary of state for the colonies by four days and then Minister for Health, in the House of Commons on the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill, 21 May 1940, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1939–40, vol.361, cols 41–8, 50–1. ‘Before the passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act there was too much tendency to think of each Colony as a separate financial proposition instead of thinking of the show as a whole. Some of the Colonies are poor and some rich. The estate must be considered as a whole. We want no depressed areas in the Colonial Empire.’ Speech by Harold Macmillan, under-secretary of state for the colonies, House of Commons, 24 June 1942, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1942, vol.380, cols 2002–20. According to Kirk-Greene’s introduction and notes from MacDonald’s memorandum to the Treasury (CO 554/116/33501/68) this was the purpose of the research which became: Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. xi. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 3. Hailey, meeting of the Royal Empire Society, reported by The Times, 29 October 1941. Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 5. For example, Lord Moyne: ‘we should refuse the libels about our alleged Colonial exploitation’ reported in The Times, 10 July 1941. Lord Bledisloe’s speech, House of Lords, reported in The Times, 10 July 1941, p. 2. ‘Where the sentiment [of racial consciousness] occurs, it has tended to manifest itself most clearly as the people of the dependencies advance in education and standard of living.’ Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 36. Hailey, World Thought on the Colonial Question, p. 11. ‘In 1946 an economist made a pioneer investigation of the national income of Northern Rhodesia, and calculated that the output of the highly successful mining industry of that country had a gross value of £14.5 million. Only £6.5m of this was however spent in Northern Rhodesia and of that the share of African employees was less than a fifth. Her calculations showed that £10.4m of Nyasaland’s territorial income of £13.8m in 1948 was earned by Africans. In Northern Rhodesia, with an African population four-fifths that of Nyasaland, the total territorial income was £39m but only £11.5m was earned by Africans. There were great problems about calculations of this kind, notably in the valuation of subsistence production; but none the less it seemed safe to assume that the benefit of the copper industry had not, at that stage, been shared to any significant extent by the African population as a whole.’ Robinson, The Dilemmas of Trusteeship, p. 85. Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, p. 165. Kirk-Greene, African Affairs, vol.79, no.314, January 1980, p. 30 and see tables II and III. ‘it is desirable to commit the Americans, if possible, to the principle that

Notes to pp. 113–15

97.

98.

99. 100. 101. 102.

103.

104.

187

we and the other colonial powers concerned should have the unquestioned right to administer our own colonies, including those which we have temporarily lost to the Japanese.’ Draft Statement for the War Cabinet, 6 November 1942 (final version 5 December 1942), WP (42) 544 in CO 323/1858/22. Rapporteur’s report of round table 1, p. 1 and, for example, ‘The British position, in its general features, did not differ very much from the American. Whatever divergence there may have been largely revolved around the coloration of British thinking on specific issues by the uniquely British concept of the Commonwealth’, p. 23 of Rapporteur’s report on round table 5a, IPR conference papers (confidential report – subject to revision), IPR Conference, Atlantic City, 1944, IPR papers in Columbia University Library. ‘In other words, it was agreed that nothing should be promised to the dependent peoples during the period of the prosecution of the war, which the nations will not later be fully prepared to give.’ Rapporteur’s report on round table 5a, IPR conference papers p. 21 (confidential report – subject to revision), IPR Conference, Atlantic City, 1944, IPR papers in Columbia University Library. Unsigned and undated (probably 1944) memo on International Supervision, CO 323/1877/4. See letter from Arnold Toynbee, British Embassy, Washington to Nigel Ronald, Foreign Office, 12 September 1942, CO 875/18/10. On 6 January 1943, Hailey was guest of honour at the Dinner Council of Foreign Relations, New York City, where Isaiah Bowman was the president. Letter from Richard Law, Foreign Office to Colonel Oliver Stanley, secretary of state for the colonies, 11 April 1944 in CO 323/1877/4, emphasis added. ‘Americans left the conference very depressed. The worst thing of all was that the British reported that they had won a complete victory at the conference.’ Letter to ‘Ma and Len’ from ‘Mike’, Mont Tremblant, 1 January 1943, copy of letter in CO 875/18/14. Hailey spoke at Princeton University, published as The Future of Colonial Peoples and, before that, at the University of Toronto, published as Great Britain, India, and the Colonial Dependencies in the Post-War World. He spoke informally after dinner at Columbia University, at the Council of Foreign Relations, at the Ethnogeographic Board, at the Foreign Policy Association, at the Fourth Africa Dinner, and after lunch at Brown University. In a full itinerary, largely organized by Chatham House for the Colonial Office (IS Macadam, RIIA, to Miss Cleeve, Colonial Office, 10 December 1942, CO 875/18/13), Hailey also had occasion to meet many of America’s influential and important businessmen and policymakers, such as Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of Foreign Affairs; Dr John Foster Dulles, Chairman of Commission to Study Basis for Just and Durable Peace; Dr Keppel, Director of the Carnegie Foundation; Isaiah Bowman, President of the Council of Foreign Relations; Dr Fosdick and Mr Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation; and Dr Anson Phelps Stokes of the Phelps-Stokes Fund. See itinerary and guest lists in Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, HP Mss. Am.s.5.

188

Notes to pp. 115–17

105. Minute by C. G. Eastwood, 28 May 1943, CO 875/18/13. 106. Letter to ‘Ma and Len’ from ‘Mike’, 1 January 1943, Mont Tremblant, Canada, copy of letter in CO 875/18/14. 107. Letter from D. M. MacDougall, BIS in Washington, to Sabine, Colonial Office, 22 December 1942, CO 875/18/14. 108. ‘Hailey throughout was truly superb. There was a good deal of intrigue at Mont Tremblant: it was an education to watch Hailey deal with it. I had no idea he was so effective in debate. If he had a fault it was that he was too obviously head and shoulders above anyone at the Conference: even his accomplished technique could never quite conceal the fact that much of the time he was tucking up his mental trousers to step gingerly through a great deal of intellectual ditch-water.’ D. M. MacDougall, BIS in Washington, to Sabine, Colonial Office, 22 December 1942, CO 875/18/14. 109. Letter from D. T. Monteath to Hailey, 16 June 1942, permanent undersecretary of state collection, India Office Library, MSS Eur. D 714/25. 110. Quoted in letter from D. M. MacDougall, BIS in Washington, to Sabine, Colonial Office, 22 December 1942, CO 875/18/14. 111. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 58. 112. Letter to ‘Ma and Len’ from ‘Mike’, 1 January 1943, Mont Tremblant, Canada, copy of letter in CO 875/18/14. 113. Report on IPR Conference by Sir George Sansom, Foreign Office, Washington, 3 February 1943, CO 875/18/14. 114. Quoted in report on IPR Conference by Sansom, Washington, 3 February 1943, CO 875/18/14. 115. Report on IPR Conference by Sansom, Washington, 3 February 1943, CO 875/18/14. 116. For example, see note by W. L. Rolleston, 10 August 1942: ‘From a preliminary talk I had with him [Lt-Col. Rowe], I think he will advise considerable caution. The American and British points of view are so different (though the Americans consider we have pretty effective colour bar in some Colonies!) that he considers give and take on both sides to be necessary. Any attempt to “educate” the Americans [against segregating troops] would be greatly resented.’ CO 876/14. 117. Letter from MacDougall, BIS in Washington, to Sabine, Colonial Office, 24 February 1943, CO 875/19/14. 118. Accompanying letter by Lord Halifax to Sansom’s report on IPR Conference, sent to Foreign Office, 3 February 1943. Also Sir J. Pratt wrote to Ashley Clarke, Foreign Office, 29 January 1943 to say: ‘We are therefore half way through the Conference and I am happy to report, that we have achieved a very considerable measure of success . . . They no longer believe that an immediate liquidation of the British Empire will provide a simple remedy for all difficulties and to some extent we have been able to turn the tables on the Americans and make them realize that it is American isolationism and not British Imperialism that is the real culprit in the Dock.’ CO 875/18/13. 119. Report on IPR Conference by Sansom, Washington, 3 February 1943, CO 875/18/14. 120. Report on IPR Conference by Sansom, Washington, 3 February 1943, CO 875/18/14.

Notes to pp. 117–22

189

121. ‘As Lord Lothian once said, if the rule of dependencies has at times excited the baser feelings of greed, of political passion, and of scramble for control, it has also evoked many proofs of heroism, of devotion to the cause of weaker peoples, and of disinterested administration.’ Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 11. 122. Hailey presented Dr Keppel with a special bound edition of An African Survey while in the United States on this trip. See letter from Walter A. Jessup, President of the Carnegie Corporation to Hailey, 23 January 1943 in Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, Oxford, HP MSS Am. s.5. 123. Myrdal, The American Dilemma, p. 1016.

CHAPTER 5 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

REFORMULATING IMPERIAL AUTHORITY

L. S. Amery, 25 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. L. S. Amery, 25 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Lord Moyne to Amery, 26 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Lord Moyne to Amery, 26 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. L. S. Amery to Lord Moyne, 27 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Lord Moyne to Amery, 29 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20 and he continued. ‘There are many Colonies where, for strategic reasons, we cannot waive our reserve powers and there are others where we cannot renounce the right to guide “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves in the difficult conditions of the modern world”.’ Amery to Moyne, 29 August 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Moyne instructed Christopher Eastwood to send both US and UK draft memorandums to Hailey, 3 September 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Telegram from the Viceroy, 3 September 1941, CO 323/1858/20. Statement of prime minister on Point III of the Atlantic Charter, CO 323/1858/20. See also Hansard Parliamentary Debates, vol.372, cols 67–9, 9 September 1941. ‘. . . the Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or other parts of the British Empire.’ Statement of prime minister on Point III of the Atlantic Charter, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, vol.372, cols 67–9, 9 September 1941. Statement of prime minister on Point III of the Atlantic Charter, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, vol.372, cols 67–9, 9 September 1941. The Colonial Office attempted to bring together past statements on policy on political advancement of the colonies. According to Louis, there was a ‘pandemonium’ caused in the Colonial Office by the search for suitable ‘declarations’, after prime minister Winston Churchill had stated in Parliament that a ‘colonial charter’ was unnecessary. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 130. Minute by Cranborne, 4 September 1942, CO 323/1848 cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 133. Letter to Sir George Gater, Colonial Office from Harold Butler, British Embassy, Washington, 15 February 1943: ‘As you know, American thinking is apt to work on slogans. The Atlantic Charter is one of them. If we

190

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34.

35.

Notes to pp. 122–6 can show that it is applicable to our colonial policy, three quarters of the talk about “imperialism” will evaporate.’ CO 323/1858/23. Washington Post, 15 October 1942, cited in OWI report, 24 October 1942, Paper 10131, FO 371/30689. Lee and Petter, The Colonial Office, War, and Development Policy, p. 126. Cited in Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, p. 27. Hailey, A Colonial Charter, p. 5. Lord Moyne, reported in The Times, 29 October 1941. Hailey, A Colonial Charter, p. 5. Hailey, A Colonial Charter, p. 7. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 26. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 45. Hailey, Foreign Affairs, vol.21 April 1943, p. 409. Hailey’s Opening Statement, Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of the IPR, War and Peace in the Pacific, pp. 11–12. ‘A significant minority of educated people would subscribe to a statement recently attributed to Lord Hailey, to the effect that in colonial relations the doctrine of trusteeship should give way to a new doctrine of partnership.’ T. North Whitehead, Foreign Office report, on visit in June to the US, 6 July 1942 (U92/27/70), copy in CO 875/18/10. Lt-Col. Cantlie’s Report on Anglo-American relations in West and East Africa, June 1943, CO 875/19/3. Letter from P. D. Butler, in Cairo, to Sir D. Scott, 22 June, FO 371/30652. McCormick, ‘Abroad’, New York Times, 6 July 1942, extract in CO 875/18/10. Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 25 August 1942, CO 323/1858/22. Telegram from Halifax to Foreign Office, 25 August 1942, in Postwar Policy and Reconstruction, Joint Anglo-US Declaration on Colonies, CO 323/1858/22. ‘We are greatly attracted by Mr Hull’s conception of “Parent States”, and something on the lines of his remarks on that point would be essential basis of any Declaration.’ Draft telegram for Washington, October 1942, CO 323/1858/22. Letter from Arnold Toynbee, 5 September 1942, CO 323/1858/22, also see letter from Christopher Eastwood to G. Gent, 18 September 1942: ‘I have shown this to Lord Hailey, who will certainly make a point of seeing Gerig when he is in America.’ CO 323/1858/22. Letter from Arnold Toynbee, stationed at the British Embassy in Washington, to Nigel Ronald at the Foreign Office after having talked with B. Gerig: ‘He had already taken the point that opinion in Great Britain, from the Colonial Office to the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau inclusive, is unanimously against international government and in favour of keeping dependencies under the existing national administrations of the Colonial Powers while raising them as quickly as practicable to something like dominion Status. He also realized that the Western-educated native intelligentsia doesn’t like the idea of international administration, because it thinks this would delay full self-government.’ 5 September 1942, CO 323/1858/22.

Notes to pp. 127–9

191

36. Letter from Nigel Ronald, Foreign Office to G. E. J. Gent, Colonial Office, 15 September 1942, ‘requiring ministerial blessing for the purpose of determining the instructions to be issued to the British representatives attending the unofficial Pacific Relations conference in December and not in connection with the projected Declaration.’ CO 323/1858/22 (emphasis in original). 37. Letter from R. K. Law, Foreign Office, to P. Emrys-Evans MP, Dominions Office, 12 September 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 38. For example, Paul Emrys-Evans MP planning with Lord Cranborne (written to as Bobbety), 8 September 1942, writes that: ‘Attlee, however, said that you were the man to find a way out and I gathered he would go a long way to meet you. I was delighted to hear this and Dick thinks that the best thing is for Anthony to ask you and Attlee to dinner early next week. Leo could be dealt with separately, I think once a policy had been agreed between the three of you, Leo would not be obstructive.’ CO 323/1858/22. 39. Letter from Lord Cranborne to P. V. Emrys-Evans MP, 9 October 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 40. Letter from Anthony Eden, Foreign Office to Attlee: ‘The other alternation is the use of the phrase “co-ordinating the policies of the parent States” instead of “collaboration and consultation between”. You may think that this is going beyond what we agreed upon, but I feel fairly sure that it is not going very far beyond it, and that we ought to go at least as far as this to try and meet the American point of view. I am afraid that if we submit to them too bare a platter, they may reject it out of hand.’ 25 October 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 41. Note by Sir George Henry Gater, the permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies, 27 April 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 42. Sir George Henry Gater, 27 April 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 43. Minutes of a meeting, 3 May 1943, 11 Downing Street, with chairman: Attlee (deputy prime minister), Eden (secretary of state for foreign affairs), Lord Cranborne (Lord Privy Seal), Colonel Stanley (secretary of state for the colonies) and Mr Jebb (FO), and Mr Eastwood (CO), CO 323/1858/23. 44. Much to Christopher Eastwood’s horror ‘The theme of the preamble and, indeed, of the whole draft is independence. The word “independent” and “independence” are, indeed, mentioned 19 times in the [US] draft. We did not use the word once.’ Comments on the American Draft, 21 April 1943, CO 323/1858/23 (emphasis in original). 45. Minutes, 3 May 1943 at 11 Downing Street, CO 323/1858/23. 46. Minutes, 3 May 1943, 11 Downing Street: ‘it was not necessary at this stage to report to the War Cabinet. It would, indeed, strengthen our position if we could say that, while the American draft had not been seen by the President, our reactions to it had not been seen by the War Cabinet.’ CO 323/1858/23. 47. Minute by Christopher Eastwood, 5 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 48. Hailey on the American Draft declaration, 5 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 49. Hailey on the American Draft declaration, 5 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 50. Letter from Cranborne to Anthony Eden, 28 October 1942, CO 323/1858/22.

192

Notes to pp. 130–7

51. Telegram (no.6230) from Washington to London Foreign Office, 24 December 1942, CO 323/1858/23. 52. Comments on the American Draft by Christopher Eastwood, 21 April 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 53. Minute by Thomas K. Lloyd, 7 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 54. Minute by Christopher Eastwood, 5 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 55. Minute by T. K. Lloyd, 7 May 1943, CO 323/1858/23. 56. The speech is reproduced in Porter and Stockwell, British Imperial Policy and Decolonization, vol.1, pp. 156–67. 57. Minute by C. Eastwood, 9 November 1943, CO 323/1859/8. 58. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 26. 59. Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, p. 12. 60. S. Hornbeck, 8 August 1942, cited by Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 166. 61.Hailey to Wilfrid Benson, 27 May 1942, Hailey Papers, Rhodes House, Papers on African Survey 600.18 s.20. 62. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 53. 63. Hailey, reported in The Times, 14 December 1943. 64. Berlin, 23 April 1942, in Nicholas, Washington Despatches, p. 34. 65. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 19 and pp. 25–6. 66. Moore, Endgames of Empire, pp. 27–8. 67. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 89 and p. 90. 68. Moore, Endgames of Empire, pp. 91–9. 69. Wavell’s diary, 8 October 1943, cited in Thorne, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.10, no.3, May 1982, p. 345. 70. Berlin, 16 April 1942, in Nicholas, Washington Despatches, p. 31. 71. Hailey, reported in The Times, 14 December 1943. 72. Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Representing Authority in Victorian India’, in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, p. 190. 73. See discussion in Chapter 2 and Cell, Hailey, p. 19. 74. The tragedy was that Britain further promoted tension between Hindus and Muslims since: ‘The Government of India took advantage of its wartime emergency powers to suppress opposition, following the Quit India campaign of 1942–3, and coupled this with a further attempt to promote the Muslim League, which was regarded as being a more congenial associate than Congress.’ Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 195. 75. Moore, Endgames of Empire, p. 14. 76. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 243. 77. Cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 242, 235 and 244 respectively. 78. Cited in Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 245. 79. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, pp. 236 and 248 respectively. 80. Although generally US opinion had been critical of British policy in relation to India, certainly by August 1942 after Cripps’s mission, the US public and their newspapers held a low estimation of Indians. The Office of War Information’s survey of magazines and newspapers for that month indicated that, while 11 per cent of cartoons were on the Indian situation, 38 per cent of them ‘definitely showed a favourable attitude toward Britain’. The report noted that: ‘Related to the theme that England is being opposed by India despite the stupidity of such a course are a number of

Notes to pp. 137–9

81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87.

88.

89. 90. 91. 92.

193

cartoons which show Gandhi destroying the structure which Britain has built in India. . . . And Hungerford of the Toledo Blade shows Gandhi, a little rat-like man, hoping to get along with the Japanese snake while the British lion, nonplussed, looks on in amazement. . . . Extremely few of the cartoons favor India. Only five cartoons, or 3 per cent of the group, took stands favoring India and Gandhi. The Chicago Tribune Syndicate showed India as faced with a difficult problem having to choose between the frying pan of the British and the fire of Japan. Another cartoon from this syndicate raises the question of the application of the Four Freedoms to India. (This is the only cartoon in the entire group surveyed which made an effort to show Gandhi as an intelligent human being; in all the others he is caricatured in varying degrees of ridicule.) . . . Finally, in this group, is one cartoon from the New York Daily Worker which demands that India be freed in order to defend herself. This is the only cartoon which even remotely suggests that India could defend herself, depicting it as a powerful man. Most of the other cartoons symbolize India as an elephant when depicting it as stupid and recalcitrant and as a pretty and helpless Indian woman when she is shown as a helpless victim of the oncoming Japanese. . . . In all of these [Gandhi] is made to appear as ridiculous in his person and policies as possible. . . . Here he has been given the stereotyped Semitic nose and facial structure and made to look a fool who could not possibly guide a country through a crisis.’ Copy of OWI report, 22 August 1942, in FO 371/30689, Paper A 8246. Hailey reported in The Times, 30 April 1942. For example, see Berlin, 29 November 1942, in Nicholas, Washington Despatches, p. 120. Hailey, The Position of Colonies in a British Commonwealth of Nations, p. 25 and p. 26. Hailey reported in The Times, 27 February 1942, p. 8. Arthur Dawe, Memo on a Federal Solution for East Africa, July 1942, cited in Robinson, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol.8, no.1, October 1979, p. 100. Lord Halifax to Ministry of Information, 20 April 1942, FO 371/30669 paper 3903. ‘It is unlikely that we shall see in Africa a resistance to change so sustained as that which has preserved the caste system in India, or the mystical value ascribed to the cow. We need not expect to see an attachment to forms of religious faith so pronounced as that which has driven the Moslems and Hindus of India into two apparently irreconcilable political camps.’ Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 3. Hailey speaking on ‘The Future of British Dependencies in Africa’ at a luncheon of the Royal African Society, Connaught Rooms with Oliver Stanley, secretary of state for the colonies, presiding. Reported in The Times, 13 April 1943. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government, p. 189. Hailey, Year Book of World Affairs, vol.12, 1959, p. 23. Hailey, Foreign Affairs, vol.21 April 1943, p. 409. Hailey, Foreign Affairs, vol.21 April 1943, p. 410. And in Hailey, Great Britain, India and the Colonial Dependencies in the Post-War World, p. 23.

194

Notes to pp. 139–48

93. Colonial Office memorandum for the War Cabinet, 2 September 1941, in Postwar Policy and Reconstruction (Hailey’s committee), CO 323/1858/20. 94. Hailey, The Future of Colonial Peoples, p. 62. 95. Colonel Oliver Stanley, secretary of state for the colonies, speaking at Oxford Conservative Association, 5 March 1943, CO 825/38/7. 96. Colonel Oliver Stanley, Oxford Conservative Association, 5 March 1943, CO 825/38/7. 97. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 213. 98. War Cabinet Colonial Policy, Draft WP (42) 614, 29 December 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 99. War Cabinet Colonial Policy, Draft WP (42) 614, 29 December 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 100. Letter from Colonel Stanley to Bobbety (Cranborne), 30 December 1942, CO 323/1858/22. 101. For example Hornbeck was also worried about the impact of ‘free immigration’ noting that ‘if the principle of equality is applied, any Japanese or Negroes might also go.’ Cited in Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 174 footnote 53. 102. Condit and Lucaites, Crafting Equality, p. 174. 103. Hailey, House of Lords, reported in The Times, 8 June 1945. 104. Hailey, House of Lords, reported in The Times, 30 January 1946. 105. Minute by G. W. Gent, 14 October 1943, CO 825/38/20. 106. Cited in Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 148. 107. Memo by C. J. Jeffries, 8 October 1941: ‘Mr Paskin’s point about discrimination in the interests of the natives is a good one; but it is one to be considered in connection with subsequent practical action rather than in connection with the general declaration of policy.’ CO 859/80/13. 108. Circular from A. Creech Jones, 8 January 1947, CO 323/1879/5. 109. Harris, Race & Class, vol.33, no.1, 1991, (pp. 1–30) p. 14. 110. ‘. . . Washington’s first perceived great postwar challenge. Not the threat of revolution or the collapse of capitalism, but the failure of integration was the initial and most basic issue at stake in Western Europe – and it was never to disappear.’ Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, p. 712. 111. Thorne, Pacific Historical Review, vol.45, no.1, February 1976, p. 75 and p. 80. 112. Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch (R&A no.1398), ‘British Colonial Policy’, 28 April 1944, p. 34, Notter Files, RG59, Box 66, File 484, Sutland, Maryland, USA. 113. Cited in Thorne, Pacific Historical Review, vol.45, no.1, February 1976, p. 82. 114. Thorne, Pacific Historical Review, vol.45, no.1, February 1976, pp. 90–3. 115. Kolko and Kolko, The Limits of Power, p. 35. 116. Note of conversation between Oliver Stanley and Dr Bowman, Colonial Office, 18 April 1944, CO 323/1877/4. 117. Report of a conversation between Dr Isaiah Bowman and Mr Jebb, Foreign Office, 12 April 1944, CO 323/1877/4.

Notes to pp. 149–53

CHAPTER 6

195

CONCLUSION

1. Sunday Times, 16 August 1992. 2. Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, p. 1. 3. Take newspapers, for example. Over the past ten years there has been a steady increase in the use of the word ‘holocaust’ to tenfold what it used to be. Using the Financial Times database Profile to search English language newspapers in Britain from 1984 to 1993 for the key word ‘holocaust’ provided these results. The number of articles using the word ‘holocaust’ increased tenfold in those years. The average number of articles (per month) rose steadily: 6 in 1984, 13 in 1985, 21 in 1986, 33 in 1987, 34 in 1988, 36 in 1989, 50 in 1990, 54 in 1991, 76 in 1992 and 80 a month in the first four months of 1993. Comparing 68 articles from 1984 and 1024 articles from 1992–3, indicated three main categories. Reference to a ‘nuclear holocaust’ went from 54 per cent in 1984 to 6 per cent in 1992/93, but doubled in actual numbers. References to the genocide of the Jews in the Second World War went from 24 per cent to 83 per cent of the articles. The remaining use of the word ‘holocaust’ increased almost tenfold, although its percentage of the total declined slightly from 22 per cent to 18 per cent. Overall the significant change was the increasing reference to the Second World War. This is not due to 50-year anniversaries, as it is largely fictional accounts that have increased. As recorded by one journalist, ‘despite Adorno’s contention that “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”, the Holocaust has proved an inspiration to a whole range of poets, novelists, composers and visual artists’ (Independent on Sunday, 26 January 1992). 4. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 206 (his emphasis). 5. Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 35. and Lauren, Power and Prejudice, p. 144. 6. The themes were: ‘(a) the sanctity of absolute values, (b) the sanctity of the individual and of the family, [and] (c) the comity of nations.’ Minister of Information, 20 September 1939, cited in McLaine, Ministry of Morale, p. 141. 7. Lord Moyne, Memorandum on the Constitutional Future of the Colonies, CO 323/1858/20. 8. Barkan, The Retreat of Scientific Racism, p. xi. 9. Perham, Colonial Sequence, p. 230. 10. ‘The general atmosphere of acquiescence which our rule now enjoys owes much to the opportunities provided by the native authority system for the expression of native opinion.’ Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, p. 11. 11. Perham, The Times, 14 March 1942, reprinted in Colonial Sequence, pp. 228–31. 12. Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, p. 165.

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Index Abyssinia, see Ethiopia Aden, 120 Amery, Leopold, 100, 120–1 Annamites, 146 Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 122 Arnold, Lord, 43 Asquith, Anthony, 88 Atlantic Charter, 98–101, 104, 109, 114, 119–22, 147 Attlee, Clement, 76, 97, 100, 127, 128 Baldwin, Stanley, 25 Barkan, Elazar, 1, 2, 149–50, 151 Barnes, Leonard, 41 Bauman, Zygmunt, 150 BBC, 62, 85 Berlin, Isaiah, 48, 49, 70, 101, 105, 134, 135, 137 Bermuda, 16 Beveridge Report, x, 112 Bevin, Ernest, 77, 83 Birkenhead, Lord, 25 Bledisloe, Lord, 110, 111 Bolero Combined Committee, 79 Borneo, 31 Bourdillon, Sir Bernard, 61, 100 Bowman, Dr Isaiah, 114, 147 Bracken, Brendan, 79 British Admiralty, 80, 90 British Air Ministry, 89, 90 British Empire, fear of loss, 101, 102, 103, see also Singapore, fall of British Honduras, 120 British Honduras Foresters, 78 British Information Service, 103, 115 Brooke-Popham, General Robert, 45 Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters’ Union, 68 Buchanan, Russell, 72 Buell, Raymond, 74 Burma, 8, 15, 100, 106, 120–1, 134, 142

Burns, Sir Alan, 56, 60, 61, 82 Butler, Harold, 53, 122 Butler, L. J., 22–3, 89 Butler, P. D., 125 Butler, Uriah, 20 Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 45, 98 Calder, John Alexander, 80 Calder-Marshall, Arthur, 42 Cameron, Sir Donald, 38, 102 Campbell, Sir R. I., 108, 109 Canadian delegates to Institute of Pacific Relations conference, 104, 116 Cantlie, Lieutenant-Colonel, 124–5 Capra, Frank, 2 Carnegie Foundation, 3, 13, 67, 117 Poor White Commission, 67 Carter, Edward, 105 Cell, John, 11, 15, 17–18, 96 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1 Ceylon, 139 Chamberlain, Joseph, 8 Chandra Bose, Subhas, 134 Chatham House, see Royal Institute of International Affairs Chiang Kai-shek, 77, 136, 145 China, 74, 75, 76, 104 international relations, 74–6, 105, 108, 140 Chinese immigration, 76, 106, 142, 146 Chinese minorities, 105–6, 137–8, 141 Churchill, Winston, 17, 22, 27, 29, 35, 42, 45, 46, 47, 76, 98, 99, 100, 121, 122, 131, 135–7 Clarke, Ashley, 75, 97 Clauson, Gerard L. M., 54 Cold War, 94 Colonial Development Act (1929), 20–1

213

214

Index

Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940), 19–24, 54, 110–11, 123 Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945), 23 Colonial Office, arguing for empire, 96, 101–3 discussion at Carlton Hotel, 52–3 discussion on colonial charter, 120–1 fear of armed resistance, 81–2 official mind, 5, 22, 151, 154 organizational changes, 9, 53–9, 112–13 reaction to fall of Singapore, 49–52, 81 sensitivity to race issue, 41, 57–8, 62, 79, 80, 81, 84–5, 116, 151 welfare department, 89, 90, 92 Colonial Office Committees, Colonial Development and Welfare Advisory (also known as Research and Development or Research Advisory), 16, 23, 111 Education, 54 Employment of Africans, 56 Postwar Problems (also known as Postwar Reconstruction), 16, 17, 103, 108, 115 Colonial Office policy, expatriation allowances, 55, 59–60 in relation to America, 113 indirect rule, 13–15, 36–8 on African employment, 53–60, 84, 113 on colonial self-government, 36, 61, 93, 99, 111, 112, 124, 128–9, 130–1, 139–40 on native administration, 42–3, 52–3, 61 on the Unified Services, 54–9 partnership, 15, 38, 51, 63, 119, 122–4, 146 policy making, 9, 110–11 possible statement on race discrimination, 83–8, 143 promoting colonial welfare, 54, 110–12, 122–4

protecting minorities, 119, 137–42, 144, 147, 153 relation to colour bar, 1, 35, 52, 55–60, 77, 82–93, 138, 143–4 separate development, 36–8, 133, 147 towards black troops, 34, 77–84, 90–2 towards colonial recruits, 80–4 towards race relations, 138 towards US segregation, 78–80, 85–8, 142 trusteeship, 55, 111 colonies, disloyalty, 74, 101, 146, 152 in war, 77, 81–2, 105 independence issue, 93, 111, 112, 128–9 colour bar, x, 1, 2, 5, 33–5, 38, 48, 55–60, 63, 64, 68–73, 77, 80–93, 105, 106, 116, 125, 144, 145, 149, 152, 154 discreet operation, 34, 153–4 in colonial context, 1, 35, 52, 55–60, 77, 82–93, 138, 143–4 Condit, Celeste, 1, 3, 69, 73, 141 Constantine, Leary, 85–7 Constantine, Stephen, 20–1, 22 Costello, John, 86 Coupland, Professor Reginald, 52 Cranborne, Lord, 9, 59, 60, 61, 79, 80, 87, 96, 104, 122, 127, 128, 129, 141 Creech Jones, Arthur, 93, 100, 122, 144 Crerar, Sir James, 12 Crete, 92 Cripps, Sir Stafford, 134–5 Cross, Flight Lieutenant, 90 Crown colonies, 50 Cuba, 28 Curtis, Lionel, 96 Dawe, Arthur, 21, 52, 60, 138 Depression of 1930s, x, 20, 28, 66, 94, 98, 110 Devonshire, Duke of, 14 Dower, John, 45, 76 Driberg, Tom, 85

Index Drummond, Ian, 75 Du Bois, William E. B., 42 Dulles, Foster Rhea, 29 Dutch East Indies, 31 Dyer, Reginald, 13 Eastwood, Christopher, 54, 128, 130–1 Eden, Sir Anthony, 128 Eisenhower, General, 72 empire, diverse societies, 138–40 Fabian criticisms of empire, 41, 102 Far Eastern empire, 31, 45, 48, 58, 74, 97, 101, 102, 133, 145–6, 149, 152 impact of Depression, 20–1, 54 Empire Windrush, 5 Ethiopia, 41–2, 70 fascism, 150–1 fifth column, 152 First World War, 28, 101 civilian deaths, ix reaction to, ix, 38, 40–1, 67 Foreign Office, 28, 31, 48, 49, 75, 96, 103, 104, 114, 124, 126, 127, 142, 148 Forster, E. M., ix France, 98, 145, 146, 147, 149 free trade, 98 Fryer, Peter, 87 Fussell, Paul, ix, 40 Gambia, 59, 120 Gammans, Captain, 103 Gandhi, Mohandas, 26, 106, 134, 136 Gater, Sir George Henry, 58, 78, 81, 96, 127 Gayda, Virginio, 43 Gent, Sir Gerard, 103, 109, 143 George, Lloyd, 25 Gerig, Benjamin, 126 German colonies, 4, 43 Germany, in propaganda, 49, 151 Gibb, Wing Commander, 89–90 Gibraltar, 120

215

Ginsberg, Morris, 40 Gold Coast, 56, 59, 61, 62, 84 Gour, Sir Hari Singh, 83 Grigg, Sir Edward, 32, 41 Hailey, Lord An African Survey, 13–15, 16, 21, 37, 38, 39, 53, 67, 96, 117 as chief ideologue, 10, 51, 52, 54, 56, 60, 96, 97, 108, 115, 117 at Institute of Pacific Relations conference, 94, 96, 97, 100, 103–10, 114, 115, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 147 at Permanent Mandates Commission, 13, 138 at Princeton University, 63, 108, 115, 116, 117, 139 at Toronto University, 62 comparing Africa and India, 15, 138 critical of trusteeship, 62, 111, 122–3 defending the Empire, 103–10, 115–18, 129, 140 diary, 15, 45 expert adviser, 10, 11, 16, 17, 84, 121, 128 in America, 33, 65, 92, 130 in India, 11–12, 24–5, 32, 37–8, 39, 96, 106, 136 on ‘arming the natives’, 80–1 on American race relations, 63, 65–6, 104–8, 132 on Colonial Office committees, 16, 54, 84–5, 92, 103, 108, 115 on fall of Singapore, 51 on imperial mission, 112, 117, 131, 151 on indirect rule, 38, 63, 124 on international organisation, 66 on nationalism, 39 on native administration, 36, 38–9, 53, 61, 111, 138 on partnership. 15, 51, 63, 122–4 on racial feeling, 39–40, 41, 51, 60, 62, 65, 111, 137–9 on regional committees for international administration, 127, 140

216

Index

Hailey, Lord – continued on roots of racial thinking, 40, 57, 60, 66 promoting development, 106, 109–10, 112–13, 118, 123, 129–30, 132–3, 153 promoting welfare in the colonies, 110–11, 123–4, 133, 153 protecting minorities, 139, 142 representative of official mind, 34, 39, 61 withholding independence, 130–3, 135, 136, 137, 142, 153 Halifax, Lord, 75, 76, 77, 117, 126, 128, 138 Hall, George, 9 Hancock, Professor William Keith, 52, 101 Harris, Clive, 144 Hemingway, Ernest, 40 Hetherington, Penelope, 38 Hill, Arnold T, 68 Hillmer, Norman, 75 Hirtzel, Sir Arthur, 13 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 24 Hobson, John, 41 Holocaust, 2, 149–51 Home Office, 83 Hong Kong, 46, 75, 89 Hornbeck, Dr Stanley, 115, 117, 132, 143 Hull, Cordell, 76, 107, 126 humanitarianism, 103, 111–12, 130, 153 Huxley, Julian, 6, 36, 40, 52, 53 Ickes, Harold, 70 Idun, S. O. Quashie, 56 immigration, as colour bar, 105–6, 116, 143 imperial mission, 112, 117 imperial policy, Anglo-American colonial charter, 125–31 assumption of superiority, 24, 76, 105–6, 113, 117, 140, 146, 148 colonial charter, 120–1 development idea, 19–24, 110–11, 130, 146, 148, 153

imperial preference, 29 international administration, 30, 116, 126, 128, 131, 140–1 minority protection, 119, 137–42, 144, 147, 153 open door policy, 29 Ottawa agreement, 28 partnership, 15, 38, 51, 63, 119, 122–4, 146 paternalism, 14, 18, 37–8, 62, 106, 125, 132, 141, 144, 147–8, 152, 154 postponing colonial independence, 112–13, 119–21, 124, 126, 128–9, 154 relation of Africa and India, 15, 18, 138 separation of political and economic development, 109–14, 133 welfare for colonies, 22–4, 54, 63–4, 106, 110–12, 122–4, 133, 153–4 imperial prerogative, 77, 113, 126–7, 133, 141, 143, 146, 153 India, Amritsar massacre, 13 at war with Japan, 25, 126, 133, 134, 136 British Raj, 26, 32, 100 Chenab, 37 communal division, 37–8, 136, 137, 153 Congress Party, 18, 26, 18, 116, 134–7 Cripps’s mission, 27, 134–5, 137 delegation to Institute of Pacific Relations conference, 115–16 dominionhood, 24–7 Hunter Commission, 13 independence demands, 7, 15, 24–7, 32, 39, 69, 74, 76, 120–2, 134–5, 140 India Act (1935), 26 Indian minorities outside India, 14, 55, 137, 141 Indianization of Indian Civil Service, 27, 57

Index Indians in Africa, 55, 138 Land Alienation Act (1900), 11 minorities, 25, 26, 134–7, 142 Montagu Declaration, 24 Muslim League, 27, 135 princely states, 26, 135–6 ‘race consciousness’, 44, 62 Round Table Conference, 24, 27, 61 Simon Commission, 24 social engineering, 11, 37 ‘untouchables’, 116 Viceroy of India, 121, 134, 135 India Office, 82, 83, 96, 100, 120–2, 135 Indian National Army, 134 Indo-China, 31, 145–7 Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), 1942 conference, Mont Tremblant, 65, 94, 96–7, 103–10, 115–18, 124, 125 1944 conference, Atlantic City, 113 international administration, 30, 116, 126, 128, 131, 140–1 Iraq, 32 Irwin, Lord, 25 Italy, 41–2 Jamaica, 89 Japan, American occupation, 145 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 28, 74 Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty, 28 as non-white symbol, 42, 48, 71 occupation of Manchuria, 45 reports of atrocities, 2 request for race equality clause, 14, 44 victories in South Pacific, 36, 45–51, 59, 61, 62, 63, 67, 69, 71, 73, 81, 89, 95, 97, 101, 103, 104, 125, 133, 134, 152, 153, 154 Japanese, in propaganda, 49 mandated islands, 147–8 racist descriptions of, 45, 51 supposed influence, 49, 70

217

Jebb, Gladwyn, 128 Jeffries, Sir Charles, 5, 57, 58, 84, 86, 144 Jesse Jones, Dr Thomas, 49, 73 Jews, treatment during war, 98, 150 Johnson, Colonel Louis, 136 Keith, John Lucien, 78, 83, 84, 89, 90, 92 Kenya, 43, 84, 85, 138 Keppel, Dr Frederick, 67, 117 Keynes, John Maynard, 21 Keynesianism, 112, 133 King, Desmond, 2, 3 Kingsley, Mary, 15 Kipling, Rudyard, 11, 28, 47 Kirk-Greene, Anthony, 112 Knox, Frank, 68 Kolko, Gabriel, 95, 145, 147 Kolko, Joyce, 147 Labour Party, 76, 100 LaFarge, Father John Lagos, 56 Langdon, William, 146–7 Lauren, Paul, 2, 44 Law, Richard, 114 League of Coloured Peoples, 56, 58, 82 League of Nations, 36, 43–4, 98 mandated territories, 44, 99 Permanent Mandates Commission, 138 Lee, Michael, 20, 22, 122, 138 Leys, Norman, 84 Links, Wing Commander, 90 Linlithgow, Lord, 134, 135 Lippmann, Walter, 47, 74, 75 Listowel, Lord, 5 Lloyd, Sir Thomas, 9, 55 London, George Ernest, 62 Lonsdale, John, 112 Lothian, Lord, 117 Louis, Wm. Roger, 30–3, 94, 99 Low, David, 85 Lucaites, John, 1, 3, 69, 73, 141 Lugard, Lord, 53, 138 chief ideologue of Colonial Office, 13–15, 36, 52, 102

218

Index

Macadam, Ivison, 105 Macauley, Thomas Babington, 7–8 MacDonald, Malcolm, 9, 21, 22, 52, 81, 110 MacDougall, D. M., 115, 117 Macmillan, Harold, 41, 79, 110, 122, Macmillan, Lord, 150 Macmillan, W. M., 38 Malaya, 31, 32, 46, 48, 50, 59, 68, 104, 106, 125, 134, 141, 142 Malik, Kenan, 1, 2 Malinowski, Bronislaw, x Marshall islands, 148 Mauritius, 127 McLaine, Ian, 86 McLean, Sir William, 49 Meredith, Burgess, 88 Middle East, 32 Miller, Dorie, 72 Milner, Lord, 25 Ministry of Information, 50, 62, 79, 86, 88, 97, 100, 101–2, 138, 150 Montgomery, General, 89 Moody, Dr Harold, 56, 58, 82 Moore, R. J., 24–7, 134–6 Morgenthau, Henry, 28 Morocco, 89 Morrison, Herbert, 83 Moyne, Lord, 9, 16, 21, 22, 30, 57, 58, 60, 83, 99, 108, 120–1, 123, 124, 151 Myrdal, Gunnar, 3–4, 67–8, 69, 117–18 Nazi genocide, 1, 149 Nazi Germany, 98 Nazis, 100 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 134 Netherlands, 145 Newfoundland, Argentia, 98 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 29 Nigeria, 37, 38, 54, 59, 100 Nyasaland, 54 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael, 12 O’Hare McCormick, Anne, 125 Oldham, Joseph, 14 Orwell, George, 8

Paget, Commander in Chief, 90 Palestine, 138, 142 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 14, 44 Parkinson, Sir Cosmo, 16, 52, 84, 103 Paskin, John J., 58, 84, 85, 144 paternalism, see Imperial policy Patterson, Robert, 68 Pax Britannica, 101 Pearce, Robert, 63 Pedler, Frederick, 53, 54, 55 Percival, Lieutenant-General Arthur, 47 Perham, Margery, 43, 52–3, 102, 151, 153 Petter, Martin, 122 Phelps-Stokes Committee, 49, 58, 73 Philippines, 28–9, 46, 47, 106 plural societies, 138–9 Porter, Andrew, 17 Poynton, Hilton, 80, 89, 90 Prince of Wales, 46 Princeton University, 63, 108, 115, 116, 117, 139 Puerto Rico, 125 race equality clause, 14, 44, 143, 154 race relations, 3, 5, 9, 36, 39, 50–1, 93, 102, 103, 152 etiquette, 5, 82 world divide, 44, 74, 76 racial discrimination, x, 1, 2, 5, 33–5, 38, 48, 55–60, 63, 64, 68–73, 77, 80–93, 105, 106, 116, 125, 144, 145, 149, 152, 154 covert, 34, 153–4 in Britain, 5, 56, 80–93, 105 in Colonial Services, 55–60, 144 in colonies, 35, 48, 57–9, 77, 84, 90, 92–3, 116, 144 in Soviet Union, 4 in United States, 2, 33–4, 63, 68–73, 77, 85, 88, 92, 106, 116, 125, 144, 152 in US armed forces, 4, 5, 33–4, 59, 65, 68–9, 71, 77–80, 85–8, 152 two empires, 25, 90, 100 racial images of India, 137 racial thinking, 6–8, 132, 152 changes, 6, 7, 153–4

Index in colonial policy, 23, 130, 144, 151 Nazi ideology, 143, 150–1 scientific racism, 2, 6, 150 sensitivity to colour bar, 41, 57–8, 62, 79, 80, 81, 84–5, 116, 151 RAF, black recruitment, 89–90, 92 Rampersad, Dave, 21 Randolph, Asa Philip, 68 Reading, Lord, 25 Repulse, 46 Rex, John, 2 Reynolds, David, 29, 30 Rich, Paul, 1, 2, 4, 5, 15 Richards, Audrey, 84 Robinson, Kenneth, 20, 25, 112 Robinson, Ronald, 94 Rolleston, W. L., 78 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 18, 28, 29, 31, 47, 68, 71, 97, 98, 131, 136–7, 147 Rose, Arnold, 4 Royal Empire Society, 62, 123 Royal Institute of International Affairs (also known as Chatham House), 62, 65, 84, 96 Russia, 75 Russo-Japanese War, 41, 44–5 Sabine, Noel, 50, 57, 81, 85, 87, 102 Said, Edward, 7 Sansom, Sir George, 116, 117 Scott, R. H., 48, 50 Scottish Office, 83 Second World War, battle of the Atlantic, 89 civilian deaths, ix fifth columnists, 48 ideology, ix–x impact on racial thinking, 41, 67 North Africa campaign, 89 Pacific War, 45–6, 69, 77, 101, 126 see also Singapore Pearl Harbor, 46, 48, 72, 101 production levels, ix, 89 turning point, 89, 115, 142 self-government, see Colonial Office policy Sex Equality Act, 84

219

Shone, Wing Commander, 90 Shuckburgh, Sir John, 53, 56, 101 Sierra Leone, 59, 62 Simon, Sir John, 13 Singapore, as symbol, 48, 69, 125 Singapore, fall of, 45–51, 59, 61, 62, 67, 71, 73, 81, 89, 95, 97, 101, 103, 104, 125, 134, 152, 153 Sitkoff, Harvard, 71 Smith, Graham, 87, 88 Smuts, General, 38 South Africa, 43, 38 Southern, David, 67 Soviet Union, 145 Spain, 28 Stand films, 88 Stanley, Colonel Oliver, 9, 17, 23, 29, 59, 90, 128, 131, 139, 140, 141, 147, 148 Stoddard, Lothrop, 44 Strachey, Sir John, 8 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, 72 Symonds, Richard, 7 Tanganyika, 38, 49, 102 Tarr, Edgar J., 105 Tawney, Professor, 103 Thailand, 115 Thorne, Christopher, 33, 46, 108, 110, 136, 146, 147 Thornley, Colin, 49, 50, 59 Tomlinson, Sally, 2 Toronto University, 62 Toynbee, Arnold, 126 Treasury, 21–2 Truman, Harry S., 3 Uganda, 35 United Nations, 31, 147 Commission on Human Rights, 93, 144 United Nations Charter, x, 130, 143–4, 148 United Nations of the Allied Forces, 47, 77, 98 United States, Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, 115

220

Index

United States – continued Anglo-American agreement on immigration, 143 Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, 17 Anglo-American colonial charter, 76, 126–31 Anglo-American common paternalism, 106, 125, 132, 141, 144, 147–8, 154 Anglo-American debate, 32–3, 74, 94, 128–9, 144 Anglo-American relationship, 27–30, 34, 73, 95, 101, 102 Anglo-American relationship, Atlantic Charter, 98–101, 104, 109, 114, 119–22, 147 Anglo-American relationship, new framework, 112–14, 118, 130, 149, 153–4 anti-Chinese legislation, 76 anti-imperialism, 4, 29, 34, 47, 65, 88, 93, 97, 100, 102, 119, 122, 124, 133, 145–6, 149, 151–2 armed forces, 28, 33–4, 70, 71, 72, 147 attitude to Indian independence, 133–7 black resentment, 67–8 black soldiers, 4, 5, 59, 65, 71, 77–80, 85–8, 152 cash and carry legislation, 29 Fair Employment Practices Committee, 68, 71, 77 Four Freedoms, 89, 97–8, 100, 104, 119 image abroad, 1, 3, 69–70, 73, 105, 107, 108, 116–17 internment of Japanese-Americans, 71 isolationism, 3, 28–9, 69, 101, 104, 106, 115, 151 Jim Crow, 69, 77, 88, 92 see also Race discrimination Johnson Act, 29 Lend-Lease, 30, 97 lynching, 69 manpower shortages, 3

March on Washington Movement, 68–9 Marshall Plan, 145 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 48, 68 National Negro Congress, 68 Neutrality Act, 28 New Deal, 67 New York Welfare Council, 73 Office of Strategic Services, 145–6 Office of War Information, 69, 137 pro-empire, 113, 125, 146, 147–8 race discrimination, 2, 33–4, 63, 68–70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 85, 88, 92, 106, 116, 125, 144, 152 race riots, 67, 71, 76 Ramspeck Act (1940), 68 relationship with China, 73, 75–7, 126 segregation, 33–4, 63, 69, 71, 72, 85, 106, 125, 152 sensitivity to race issue, 73, 105, 107, 108, 116–17 sharecroppers, 70, 72 slavery, 107 trade agreement with Japan, 45 treatment of black people in Britain, 85–8, 90 US State Department, 75, 76, 127, 128, 132, 143, 145, 147 US War Department, 68, 69, 72, 147 Victoria, League, 78 Vietnamese, 146 War Cabinet, 78, 88, 108, 120, 121, 128, 134, 135, 140–1 War Office, 78, 80, 81, 90, 91, 92, 153 Watson, Arnold, 86 Watt, Donald, 28, 95 Wavell, Lord, 46, 135 Wedemeyer, General, 145 welfare statism, ix-x, 63 Welles, Sumner, 47, 98, 134 West Indies, 30, 42, 81, 92, 103 Caribbean contingent, 81, 90–2

Index in solidarity with other nonwhites, 44 relationship with United States, 22, 30, 66, 108, 125, 127 riots in 1930s, 20, 42 Royal Commission, 21–2 war workers in Britain, 85 western authority, 24, 105–6, 113, 117, 140, 146, 148 White, Walter, 48, 68 white Australia policy, 105 white imperialism, 47, 74, 152–3

221

white prestige, 8, 9, 33, 41–2, 44, 46–52, 93, 95, 125, 141, 144, 152 Williams, Sir Owen, 57, 84 Willkie, Wendell, 18, 30, 48, 73 Wilson, Woodrow, 44 Winant, John, 77, 128, 131 Woolf, Leonard, 41 Wright, Arthur, 53 Yamashita, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki, 47 Young, Hubert, 30