Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series. E: Human and Soc)

RISK ASSESSMENT AS A BASIS FOR THE FORECAST AND PREVENTION OF CATASTROPHIES

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 35

ISSN 1874-6276

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies

Edited by

Ion Apostol Deputy Head of Civil Protection Inspectorate, Department of Emergency Situations, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

Wilhelm G. Coldewey Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Geologisch Paläontologisches Institut, Münster, Germany

David L. Barry Director, DLB Environmental, Cranleigh, Surrey, United Kingdom

and

Dieter Reimer UWIK-CONSULTING, Bonn, Germany

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Risk Assessment as a Basis for Elaboration of Recommendations for Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies Chisinau, Moldova 25–27 April 2007

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-844-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008922181 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

v

Acknowledgements The transfer of scientific awareness to politics, economics and business was a key aspect of our Advanced Research Workshop. Scientists from all branches were able to match the results of their research studies with the requirements of catastrophe precautions and prevention, or were able to develop new ideas. In June 2006 Prof. F. Carvalho Rodrigues, Director of Programming Threats and Challenges Public Diplomacy Division, gave a strong impetus for the planning and implementation of this NATO-Advanced Research Workshop. Therefore, sincere thanks to him on behalf of all the consultants. Individual thanks to Mr. Dipl.-Ing. Winkelmann-Oei, Chairman of the UNECE Joint ad hoc Expert Group, for his help in the elaboration of references. At the same time many thanks to all who helped organize this event, and especially Mr. Andrei Sumleanschi, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Mr. Vasile Buza, Head of Civil Protection Directorate, Department of Emergency Situations, Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as all members of the compilation committee, for their commitment and for the quality of their work. We also wish to thank all authors for their contributions, many of which have been edited technically, and for language, but with no intentional changes made to their content. Finally, our very warmest thanks go to Prof. Dr. Wilhelm G. Coldewey, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Geologisch Paläontologisches Institut, Mr. David Barry, DLB Environmental (UK), and Mr. Ghenadi Slobodeniuc, Department of Political Studies, Moldova State University for their technical expertise and support in checking and editing the contributions, and for their other most helpful advice. Ion Apostol Co-Director Moldova

Dieter Reimer Co-Director Germany

vi

Redaction committee:

COLDEWEY Wilhelm G.

Professor, Dr.

OZUNU Alexandru

Professor, Ph.D.

TOMA Ovidiu

Professor, Ph.D., Coordinator of Regional Research Consortium for Environment Monitoring and Protection Ph.D.

MELIAN Ruslan SLOBODENIUC Ghenadie

Ph.D.

KHACHATRIAN Dmitri

Professor, Ph.D.

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Geologisch Paläontologisches Institut, 24, Corrensstrass, D-48149, Munster, GERMANY “Babes-Bolyai” University, Faculty of Environmental Science, Research Center for Major Industrial Accident Prevention, 1, Mihail Kogalniceanu, Cluj-Napoca, ROMANIA “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University, Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology 20A, Bd.Carol I, 700505, Iasi, ROMANIA

Institut “Acvaproeict” REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA Moldova State University, Faculty International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences. MD2009, str.Testemitanu 6, Chisinau, REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA ARMENIA

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

vii

Preface The increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters during the last 15 years in the Republic of Moldova, combined with limited resources for the prevention and mitigation of their impact, has increased the level of vulnerability of the population. Concerted efforts are to be made to decrease the vulnerability of the population through a deeper study of human and societal dynamics, different methodologies of disaster forecast and prevention and the transfer of technology and knowledge. The first Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) within the framework of the NATO Programme Security Through Science took place in the Republic of Moldova and dealt with the topic: “Risk Assessment as a Basis for Elaboration of Recommendations for Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophes” (25–27 April 2007, Chisinau). This ARW was charged with the analysis of accumulated theoretical knowledge and practical experience in the field of disasters within Europe, thereby enabling the elaboration of practical recommendations. A total of 32 participants from 9 different European countries attended this meeting, which comprised social and sociological aspects, positive attitude of population to the events and territorial particularities. Accumulated experience in the participating countries (Germany, Netherlands, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia) in the field of combating catastrophes should be assessed and adapted to specific conditions in the Republic of Moldova. Over the course of 3 days, experiences with respect to overcoming natural and anthropogenic disasters were presented and discussed within the framework of presentations and work groups. During the workshop, theoretical knowledge and practical experiences in the area of natural and anthropogenic disasters were analysed and practical recommendations were developed for the prevention of negative effects on the environment and society. Seminars demonstrated that international security policy is not just limited to regional security, it means “Global Security” and efficient international cooperation is needed to ensure it. The Agenda of ARW consisted of three main syndicates: Forecast, prevention, mitigation of natural disasters (studying of natural catastrophes such as extreme weather conditions, primary and secondary damage due to geophysical events, meteorological and anthropogenic influences as well as land-spreading or world-wide epidemic diseases.), Forecast and prevention of manmade disasters (studying human and technical failures such as the release of dangerous materials whether biological, chemical or radiological, explosion sequences due to human and technical failure inclusive revolution, accidents and those due to traffic and industrial accidents.), Disasters and Society (studying effects on society such as the protection of critical infrastructures against criminal actions, endangerment analyses and risk management systems, preventive measures, crisis communication and reduction of psychological impact by media). The scientific content of the presentations and, consecutively, of the papers focused on: risk assessment as part of national policies regarding the protection of man and environment, necessity of good cooperation at international and national level, presentation of essential modalities to secure financial support and capacity resources,

viii

information sharing networking and vulnerability as a moderating factor in risk assessment. The great importance of this event was evidenced by the participation of the ministers: 1. 2.

Dr. Constantin Mihailescu, Minister for the Environment of the Republic of Moldova; Semion Carp, Colonel of Police, Representative Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova.

Furthermore, 3.

Dr. Emil Druc, Multilateral Coordination Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova took part in the event.

From the diplomatic corps: 4. 5.

Mrs. Monica Sitaru, First Secretary of the Embassy of Romania NATOContact-Point of the Republic of Moldova and Mr. Michael Pleban, German Embassy in the Republic of Moldova.

In addition, Dipl.-Ing. Gerhard Winkelmann-Oei, Chairman of the UNECE Joint ad hoc Expert Group, Federal Environmental Agency, Germany, participated as the UNECE representative. The organisers consider that the Advanced Research Workshop was a complete success and the intention is to extend and continue with other themes for workshops.

ix

Contents Redaction Committee

vi

Preface

vii

Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management Vasile Alcaz, Anton Zaicenco and Eugen Isiciko

1

Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records Anton Zaicenco and Ilie Sandu

12

Seismotectonic Conditions and Seismic Risk for Cities in Georgia Otar Varazanashvili, Nino Tsereteli and Teimuraz Muchadze

26

Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia Ivanka Paskaleva

35

Earthquakes and the Vulnerability of Industries – A Concept for the German Mining Industry Tobias Rudolph

62

Main Foundations of Ecological Safety of Environment and Residents in an Area Influenced by Tailing Deposits of Radioactive Waste Ol’ga Anishchenko

73

Ecological Risks from Hazardous Features in Ukraine That May Be Targets for Acts of Terrorism Grigory Shmatkov

81

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for Fire Brigades and Fire-Fighting Actions Wilhelm G. Coldewey

84

Conclusions After the Fuel Depot Fire at Buncefield (GB), December 2005 Kerstin Tschiedel

91

Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites André Dahn

101

The SANDOZ Catastrophe and the Consequences for the River Rhine Walter Reinhard

113

The Latest Hesse Water and Soil Protection Guidelines Walter Reinhard

122

Hazard Prevention and Emergency Planning on Transboundary Rivers in the UNECE Region Gerhard Winkelmann-Oei Preventive Measures Are the Best Disaster Control – The Checklist Method Jurg Platkowski

129 134

x

Utilisation of Industrial Waste Products as an Effective Method of Ecological Disaster Prevention A.I. Burya, M.V. Burmistr, N.G. Cherkassova and A.V. Zhukova The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia) for Environmental Monitoring and Protection – As a Premise for the Optimisation of Living Conditions Through the Prevention of Natural and Human Ecological Catastrophes Ovidiu Toma Preliminary Study Regarding Local Potential for the Use of Wood Waste for the Generation of Energy as an Alternative to Energy Which Produces Gas Emissions – A Man Made Disaster Mugurel Rotariu, Lavinia Tofan and Ovidiu Toma Impact of Sewage from the Town of Iaşi – At the Limit of Man Made Disaster – On the Microbiota of the River Bahlui Simona Dunca, Marius Ştefan and Ovidiu Toma

145

149

154

162

Natural and Man Made Disasters in the Moldova Area of Romania Brian Douglas and Ovidiu Toma

172

Vulnerability Mitigation and Risk Assessment of Technological Disaster Alexandru Ozunu, Zoltán Török, Viorel Coşara, Emil Cordoş and Alexis Dutrieux

177

Environmental Negotiations and Their Connection with Climate Change Risks Dacinia Crina Petrescu and Alexandru Ozunu

187

Geophysical Investigation Methods for the Assessment of Risks in an Area Used for the Disposal of Hazardous Chemical Wastes Dimitri A. Khachatryan and Vilen E. Stepanyan

195

Risk Management of Natural and Man Made Processes – The Basis of Population and Territorial Protection in the Republic of Armenia 205 Arman Artashes Avagyan Monitoring Dangerous Geological Processes in Moldova Alexander P. Sudarev, Eugen N. Seremet and V.A. Osyiuk

210

Results of a Performed Course of Pectin-Prophylaxis in Preschool Children of an Industrial City Eleonora M. Biletska and V.I. Glavatska

226

Environmental Hazards and Safety in Ukraine: Scientific and Educational Aspects Vladimir Nekos

242

Learning from Disasters – Information Management in Emergency Planning Christoph Hagen Mass Media and Catastrophe Prevention. How to Avoid the Crisis After the Crisis Henrike Viehrig

247

258

xi

Global Sustainable Development and the Main National Strategies for the Environment in the Republic of Moldova Ghenadie Slobodeniuc

268

Conclusion

275

Author Index

277

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-1

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Earthquake loss modelling for Seismic risk Management Vasile ALCAZ, Anton ZAICENCO and Eugen ISICIKO Institute of Geology & Seismology, Moldavian Academy of Sciences, MD-2028, Academiei str., 3, Kishinev, Republic of Moldova Email:[email protected]

Abstract. Methodology for earthquake loss assessment has been developed in order to control and reduce the seismic risk. The application evaluates damage to built facilities and casualties from scenario (or historical) earthquakes. The probability of damage suffered by the structures for a given level of seismic hazard is evaluated using response spectra or macroseismic intensity. Keywords: seismic hazard, microzonation, vulnerability, damage loss, seismic risk.

Introduction Chisinau City, the capital of the Republic of Moldova, with a total area of 220 km 2 and 0.7 million inhabitants, is the test area for the assessment of vulnerability of buildings to seismic impact according to proposed methodology. The territory of the City is subject to recurrent heavy damage and losses caused by the intermediate depth earthquake sources located in the Vrancea zone, Romania. For example, the earthquake of November 10, 1940 caused damage to 2795 buildings in Chisinau, of which 172 were totally ruined. There were about 78 victims and almost 1,000 injured (note that this data is incomplete). The demand and shear capacity as basic factors determining vulnerability of buildings to seismic impact, include: (i) structural loads expected for the given site and (ii) ability of the structure to respond within acceptable damage limits. Structural seismic loads depend on the site ground motion and its parameters which are mainly influenced by: seismic source mechanism, geological structure of the region, local soft soil conditions, site topography, etc. Seismic microzonation allows us to conduct detailed research of the influence of soft soils on the spectral and amplitude level of ground motion. The structural damage associated with this shaking could, for example, be derived by using correlation between ground motion parameters, damage functions [Kircher et al., 1997], or non-linear time-history analysis. In this research an effort was made to develop and test new procedures and software that would allow us to assess seismic risk in urban areas.

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V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

1. Site Dependent seismic Hazard study 1.1. Geological and Geotechnical Research Within the framework of seismic risk assessment the influence of local soils condition on the seismic effect is of prime importance. Detailed geological and geotechnical data was collected to determine soil variation on 1210 sites. Likewise conducted were special drilling and laboratory tests (see Table 1). From the geological standpoint the area of study is built on sedimentary rocks. The surface deposits are represented by alternating loam, sand loam, sands, clays and silts. These sandy-clay loose deposits overlay the rocks: Sarmathian limestone (seismic bedrock of Chisinau City area). Table 1: Geotechnical parameters available for studied zone for seismic response studies Availability Parameter Shear wave velocity (in-situ tests), VS Mass density, ρ Shear modulus vs. shear strain relations, G-γ

• • •

Plasticity index, Pi Water table level Stratification Index of porosity Index of porosity

∗ • • ∗ ∗

Note: • - measured; ∗ - calculated. Special distinctive features of the soil structure in this territory are stratification and the substantial variations of the thickness of sandy-clay deposits within a small area: from 0m in the flood area of the city to 200 m on the watersheds. The depth of the water table has been located at different depths throughout the territory of the city. On watersheds and high parts of the slopes the depth is 10-15 m or more, while on lower sites it is 0-5 m. The share-wave velocity, Vs, in covering loose deposits is 130-500 m/s and on bedrock (limestone) it is 700-1300 m/s. 1.2. Aspects of Microzonation Methodology The quality of microzonation is basically determined by the availability of the methodology adequately accounting for the specifics of the region. As was already mentioned [Alkaz et al., 1987, 1999] application of microzonation methods based on investigations of the influence of the upper 20-30 m of soil proves ineffective for the Moldovan territory. For this case the methodology provides an estimation of seismic properties of soil at greater depths (down to the seismic bedrock – limestone layers) (low-frequency microzoning). Different techniques, amending and cross-checking each other are implemented in the Republic of Moldova (see Table 2).

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Table 2: Methodology of Seismic Microzonation 1

2

3 4

Type of Investigation Geological and Geotechnical Studies

Applied Techniques Geophysical and Geotechnical Prospecting, Laboratory Testing

Instrumental Seismological Studies (earthquakes, microtremors, controlled and industrial blasts) Macroseismic Studies Theoretical Studies

Site-Reference, Nakamura's Technique

Shebalin's Technique 1D, 2D modelling

Output Geotechnical Map, Velocity Vp, Vs Distribution Intensity Correction, Empirical Transfer Functions

Intensity Correction Analytical Transfer Functions, Response Spectra

1.3. Empirical and Analytical Site Response Based on the geological and geotechnical information, lithologically homogenous units were selected for instrumental measurements. Earthquake ground motions were recorded for 14 sites; measurements of microtremors were performed for 85 sites. For each point the empirical site response was evaluated using different techniques (sediment - bedrock spectral ratio, Nakamura's method [Nakamura, 1989]. Also, the set of analytical amplification function for horizontal ground motion were constructed on the basis of log data and 1-D [Ratnikova, 1974] and 2-D [Sagradnik, 1985] modelling. In the majority of the measured points a satisfactory fit between the empirical and analytical predominant periods, as well as for amplification levels was established. The site response spectra exhibit peaks between 0.5 and 8.0 Hz: amplification factors range from 3 to 7. Examples of soil properties used for calculation are given in Tables 3 and 4; examples of calculated and empirical transfer function - in Figure 1. Table 3: Soil Properties: Chisinau, Site 1 Vp, km/s

ρ, g/cm3

Vs, km/s

H, km

Δp

Δs

0.29 0.48 2.00

0.18 0.18 0.24

1.69 1.72 2

0.004 0.004 0.004

0.7 0.55 0.2

0.55 0.5 0.3

0.84 0.84 1.86 1.10 1.76

0.40 0.52 0.53 0.44 0.63

1.95 2 2.1 1.97 2.25

0.006 0.021 0.02 0.011 0.017

0.3 0.3 0.2 0.25 0.15

0.3 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.15

2.80

1.37

2.5

Loamy ground Friable clay Water saturated clay Neogene clay Sands, clay Clay, loam Clay, sand Clay, sand, silts Limestone

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V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

Table 4: Soil Properties: Chisinau, Site 2 Vp, km/s

Vs, km/s

ρ, g/cm3

H, km

Δp

Δs

0.22 0.38 1.5 1.6 2.5

0.125 0.20 0.26 0.48 1.1

1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4

0.002 0.002 0.008 0.008

0.8 0.65 0.6 0.25

0.7 0.4 1.2 0.25

4

4

1

3.5

2

3.5

3

3

2.5 Calculated 2

Empirical

1.5 1 0.5

Amplification coefficient

Amplification coefficient

y Made ground Loam Clay Aleuritic clay Limestone

2.5 Calculated 2

Empirical

1.5 1 0.5

0

0 0

2

4

6

8

f, Hz

10

0

2

4

6

8

10

f, Hz

Figure 1: Examples of empirical and calculated amplification functions for different sites within studied area: 1, 2- sites described in Tables 3, 4

1.4. Ground Motion Parameters Ground motion, represented by response spectrum expected for the given site, is the demand factor determining vulnerability of buildings to seismic impact. In the current study, response spectrum for the medium soil conditions is calculated on the basis of attenuation function of Peak Ground Accelerations (PGA) from Vrancea source for the sector containing Moldova [Lungu et al., 1997]: ln (PGA) = c1 + c2 Mw + c3 lnR + c4 H + ε (1) where: PGA is the peak ground acceleration at the site, Mw- the moment magnitude, R the hypo-central distance to the site, H - the focal depth, c1, c2, c3, c4 - data dependent coefficients and ε –random variable with zero mean and standard deviation: с1=4.150, с2=0.913, с3= -0.962, с4=-0.006, ε=4.15. Normalized response spectrum shape (ξ=0.05) compatible with Eurocode-8 format is obtained [Lungu et al., 1997] on the basis of the statistical analysis of 20 components of seismic records from the Republic of Moldova and neighbouring Romanian Moldova. Influence of local soft soil conditions is considered by convoluting bedrock spectrum with soil amplification function in frequency domain. A corresponding database of these functions is compiled for the test area.

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The procedure of calculating the free-field acceleration damped response spectra, taking into account the influence of soft soil, is as follows: 1.

Normalised response spectrum for the target site is multiplied by the corresponding value of the PGA from the attenuation function, yielding spectrum for medium soil conditions at given hypocentral distance and particular earthquake magnitude. The calculated spectrum is scaled afterwards to obtain the spectrum on the bedrock

2.

Bedrock spectrum is converted into Power spectrum density function, PSD [Vanmarcke, 1997] PSD is convoluted with the transfer function of the soft soil column in frequency domain yielding PSD of the free-field motion PSD is converted back into damped response spectrum (Figure 2).

3. 4.

1000 Simulated spectrum 800

ISS-1, NS record

600 SA, cm/s

2

Bedrock spectrum

400

200

0 0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Period, s

Figure 2: Free-field acceleration damped response spectra: simulation vs. record (August 30, 1986 Vrancea earthquake, engineering seismometric station 1- ISS-1)

The applied procedure does not yet take into consideration the non-linearity of soil dynamic behaviour, which is acceptable for medium hypocentral distance of test site, when small non-linearity in soil behaviour are expected for interval T=475yr. The degree of structural damage is studied in the context of the level of ground shaking expressed in terms of response spectrum, SA2Hz, for the natural period of buildings. 2. Vulnerability of buildings Current research uses European Macroseismic Scale, EMS-92 [Grunthal, 1993] and its buildings’ damage classification for damage assessment of the existing building stock in Chisinau. The block of buildings chosen for the preliminary evaluation of seismic risk in Chisinau city is composed of various buildings. The total amount of records achieved 1870, while vulnerability class B (masonry) buildings, constituting ≈45% of the total, were chosen as the sample space, as providing the most reliable

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V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

information both from the point of view of spatial distribution as well as structural uniformity. The fragility curves method [Kircher, 1997], taking into account the design spectra as used in the present research. Fig.3 provide design response spectra incorporated into the building code SNiP II-7-81 according to which the majority of structures in Moldova were designed. 0.6 0.5 0.4 S oil ty pe 3 SA0.3 , g 's 0.2

S oil ty pe 2 S oil ty pe 1

0.1 0 0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

T, s

Figure 3: Curves of spectral accelerations (g’s) for intensity VIII MSK according to SNiP II-7-81

Probability

Recent update of the code did not result in significant change of spectral shape, which was accepted with control period TC=0.5 s. The structural response is defined by the intersection of design spectrum and building capacity curve. The design spectrum is defined as having 5% critical damping taking into consideration attenuation law, source effects, local soil conditions, etc. 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

Type B buildings

Slight Moderate Extensive Complete

0

0.1

0.2 0.3 Spectral response, m

Figure 4: Type B buildings (classification EMS-92): fragility curves.

0.4

1 0.5

V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

7

3. Estimating losses from future earthquakes 3.1. Damage Estimation Using Response Spectra Simulation of free-field damped response spectra for scenario M G=7.0 (GutenbergRichter) earthquakes was performed, resulting in mapping of shaking parameters. Software with a GIS interface allows the interpolation of selected spectral parameters for each grid point within studied area (Figure 5) and building damage degree calculations, di.(Table 5). The degree of structural damage is studied in the context of the level of ground shaking expressed in terms of response spectrum, SA2Hz, for the natural period of building’s vibration. Correlation between simulation and real data is quite good: 0.89.

Figure 5: Map of simulated values of response spectra at T=0.4s for the central part of Chisinau.

Table 5: Simulated and recorded damages of buildings using spectral response: type B. Chisinau City Centre, August 30, 1986 Vrancea Earthquake (MG=7.0). Damage degree Simulation scenario (MG= 7), % of buildings Real Data, % of buildings

0

1

2

3

4

7.8 4.5

32.8 27.2

41.4 41.1

11.7 25.1

6.3 2.1

3.2. Damage estimation using MSK-intensity Above, the probability of damage suffered by the structures for a given level of seismic hazard is evaluated using response spectra (fragility functions). However, until

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V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

now most damage estimation has been done using macroseismic intensity. MSK-based software application for the estimation of damage-loss and human casualties from strong Vrancea earthquakes on the territory of the Republic of Moldova has also been developed. The application evaluates damages and casualties on the base of seismic hazard assessment of Vrancea zone, taking into account directivity effects, local soil conditions and vulnerability of the existing building stock in Moldova. i) Directivity effects. MSK- intensity attenuation relationship based on [Shebalin, 1997], model for Vrancea - Republic of Moldova azimuth was developed:

I = 1.3M − 4.6 lg ( H 2 + R 2 ) + 8.4 (1) were: M – is the Gutenberg-Richter magnitude, H - is the focal depth, R - the epicentral distance. ii) Local soil conditions. Based on the seismic attenuation law we can only get the basic intensity distribution. To take the influence of site geology into account in the methodology of forecasting of losses the map of seismic mirozonation is used. The map of seismic microzonation of Chisinau City (Central area) is given in Figure 6. According to this, in the area under investigation (Center of Chisinau) the basic MSK-intensity has respectively 0 and 1.0 degree changes.

7, 8 MSK Intensity

1km

Figure 6: Map of seismic microzonation of Chisinau City Centre

V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

9

iii)

Vulnerability. The functions of vulnerability used in the present study (damage matrix of buildings and matrix of casualties) are given in [Alkaz et all, 2006]. There are different ways of classifying the degree of damage to buildings and structures. The algorithm offered is based on a scale with 6 degrees, namely: 0 – intact, 1 – light damage, 2 – moderate damage, 3 – heavy damage, 4 – destruction and 5 – collapse. The result of damage-loss simulation for Centre test area using MSK- intensity is presented in Table 6. Table 6: Simulated and recorded damages of buildings using MSK-intensity: type B. Chisinau City Centre, August 30, 1986 Vrancea Earthquake (MG=7.0) Damage degree Simulation scenario (MG= 7), % of buildings Real Data

0

1

2

3

4

10.2 4.5

29.5 27.2

37.6 41.1

19.8 25.1

2.9 2.1

3.3. Comparison of recorded and simulated damages In order to assess the efficiency of the offered methodology the comparison of predicted damage for the strong Vrancea earthquake of August 30, 1986 with real observations in the field was carried out. The results of the comparisons are given in Tables 5, 6 and Figure 7. Generally, the comparison revealed a satisfactory fit between real and predicted damage by both algorithms. 45 40 35 30 Real Data,% 25

Simulated (RS),% Simulated (MSK), %

20 15 10 5 0

0

1

2

3

4

Damage Figure 7: Comparison of recorded and simulated damage to buildings using different ground motion parameters (response spectra, MSK-intensity): type B, Chisinau City Centre, August 30, 1986 Vrancea earthquake (MG=7.0)

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V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

3.4. Simulation of Earthquake Scenarios The same partial evaluations of the expected loss for Chisinau City buildings from historical and scenario earthquakes were also performed using the methodology illustrated in paragraph 4.2. The aim of this first risk evaluation was to estimate the order of magnitude of damage and casualties expected in Chisinau City territory. The results of the calculation of expected damage-loss and human casualties from earthquakes analogous to the November, 1940 earthquake (MG =7.4) are shown in Tables 7, 8 while the results from a probable major Vrancea earthquake (MG=7.8) are shown in Table 9 and 10.

Table 7: Expected damage from earthquakes analogous to the November 1940: Vrancea earthquake (MG=7.4). Chisinau City, existing building stock Damage degree

Number of damaged buildings Type A Type B Type C

0

1

2

3

4

5

0 267 380

214 2514 596

2014 4361 288

3494 2095 39

1878 26 0

229 0 0

Table 8: Expected casualties from an earthquake analogous to the November 1940: Vrancea earthquake (MG = 7.4). Chisinau City, existing building stock People Human casualties Buildings type A

Buildings type B

Buildings type C

Total

Injured

1938

286

586

2809

Victims

48

0

0

48

Total inhabitants

76280

190420

390600

657300

Table 9: Expected damage from probable major Vrancea earthquake (MG=7.8). Chisinau City, existing building stock Damage degree

Number of damaged buildings

0

1

2

3

4

5

Type A Type B Type C

0 38 99

31 686 487

549 3561 599

2853 4380 117

3509 857 0

687 0 0

11

V. Alcaz et al. / Earthquake Loss Modelling for Seismic Risk Management

Table 10: Expected casualties from probable major Vrancea earthquake (MG=7.8). Chisinau City, existing building stock People Human casualties

Buildings type A

Buildings type B

Buildings type C

Total

Injured

5050

857

1758

7664

Victims

137

0

0

137

Total inhabitants

76280

190420

390600

657300

References Alkaz, V., Boguslavsky, F., and Boldirev, O. (1987), An Experience of Seismic Microzonation in the Condition of Multilayred Soils, J. Seismological Researches, 10, 54 -57(in Russian). Alkaz, V., (1999), Influence of Local soil Conditions on Earthquake Motion in the Territory of Moldova Republic. In: Vrancea Earthquakes: Tectonics, Hazard and Risk Mitigation. Ed.: F.Wenzel, D.Lungu, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, 187-195. Alkaz, V. (2006), Scientific - methodological bases of seismic hazard and risk evaluation of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, PH.D. Thesis, Chisinau (in Russian with an English summary). Alkaz, V., Boguslavdky, F., and Boldirev, O.(1990), The Seismic Intensity Distribution of Vrancea August 30, 1986 Earthquake on the Kishinev City Territory. In: Drumea (ed.) The August 30, 1986 Earthquake. Stiinta, Chisinau. Grunthal, G., et al. (1993), European Macroseismic Scale 1992. Kircher, A., Nassar A., Kustu O & Holmes W., (1997), Development of Building Damage Functions for Earthquake Loss Estimation, Earthquake Spectra, Vol.13, November 4, 643-663. Lungu D., Cornea T., Aldea A., Zaicenco A., (1997), Basic representation of seismic action. In: Design of structures in seismic zones: Eurocode 8 - Worked examples. TEMPUS PHARE CM Project 01198: Implementing of structural Eurocodes in Romanian civil engineering standards. Edited by D.Lungu, F.Mazzolani and S.Savidis. Bridgeman Ltd., Timisoara, 1-60. Nakamura, Y., (1989), A method for dynamic characteristics estimation of subsurface using microtremor on the ground surface. QR of RTRI, Vol.30, No.1, 25-33. Ratnikova, L., (1973), The methods for estimation of ground response. M., Nauka (in Russian). Shebalin, N., (1997), Selected papers, Moscow (in Russian). Vanmarcke E.., (1974), Structural Response to Earthquakes, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., USA. Zagradnik, J., (1985), Soft for analysis of two-dimensional absorbing structures. Soft for interpretation of seismic data., Nauka, V.3, 124-186 (in Russian), Leningrad.

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-12

Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records Anton ZAICENCO and Ilie SANDU Institute of Geology and Seismology, Academy of Sciences of Moldova Str. Academiei 3, MD-2028, Chisinau, Moldova

Abstract. The seismo-tectonics of the Vrancea source is described by the collision of 3 tectonic plates: Moesian, East-European and Intra-Alpine. Analysis of the seismic records of earthquakes originating in the Vrancea zone allows for assessment of seismic hazard from the intermediate-depth source influencing the south eastern region of Europe. An important component of such analysis is the database of focal mechanisms for both crustal and sub-crustal events. The polarity data of P- first motion for the period 1967–2006 were used to compile the new catalogue, which is compared to the existing ones. The stochastic method for computing the total spectrum of the seismic motion at the site is discussed in the context of the studied area. Recurrence intervals for the sub-crustal seismicity and attenuation functions of the peak values of ground motion are presented. Importance of 2D and 3D models for the assessment of site-effects is emphasised and the numerical example for the data from the city of Kishinev is provided. Keywords. Seismic hazard, seismic ground motion, focal mechanism

Introduction The countries of the south eastern part of Europe are periodically shaken by strong earthquakes originating in the place where the Carpathian arc bends, known in seismological literature as the Vrancea zone (Riznicenko et al., 1976, Muller et al., 1978, Constantinescu et al., 1985). Statistical information about seismic activity in the Vrancea zone is available from approximately the year 1000 A.D. On average, strong earthquakes of magnitude Mw > 6.0 take place at least 5 times per century (Wenzel et al., 1999). The same character of seismic activity was observed in the 20th century, when 5 severe (Mw > 6.5) events were observed: November 10, 1940; September 7, 1945, March 4, 1977, August 31, 1986 and May 30, 1990. The maximum seismic intensity achieves the level of 8–9 degrees according to the EMS intensity scale (Grunthal et al., 1998). The total area of the territory influenced by Vrancea earthquakes comprises 300,000km2, and is populated by at least 25 million people. Earthquakes originating from this source have theoretical and applied interest, due to their social and economic influence on the territory of the countries in the region. The detailed study of seismic events for the Vrancea zone allows a more objective estimation of the seismic risk and seismic hazard in the region.

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

13

Figure 1. The seismic activity of the SE Carpathian area.

At a regional level, the Vrancea zone is characterised by a very compact planar distribution of earthquake epicentres, 60 × 30 km, with achieved depth of 180 km (Drumea et al., 2003), Fig. 1. The strongest of these are distributed in the depth interval of 80–150 km, and their maximum magnitude achieves M = 7.5–7.8 (Gutenberg-Richter magnitude scale). The seismo-tectonic interpretation of the Vrancea seismic source is described by the process of collision of 3 tectonic plates: Moesian, East-European and Intra-Alpine. The tectonic model of plate collision explains clearly the process of seismic energy release.

1. Seismicity The nature of the studied earthquakes is different, and one can distinguish 2 groups of events, which represent crustal and subcrustal seismicity. The region of interest at the level of crust (h < 60 km) is characterised by 2 major tectonic units: Orogen (Carpathian and North Dobrogea Orogen) and platform regions (East-European and Moesian platforms), (Polonic, 2002).

14

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

The contacts between them is expected to be the most mobile and seismically active (Radulian et al., 1996). The energy released by crustal earthquakes, which do not exceed magnitude level M < 5.0 on Gutenberg-Richter scale (Riznicenco et al., 1976), is substantially lower as compared with the corresponding energy release at intermediate depths and is somewhat more diffuse (Radulian et al., 1996). Low-energy crustal earthquakes are associated predominantly with intra-crustal un-welded faults with a depth of up to 30 km (particularly in the Dobrogea region). The faults that form a significant angle with the direction of propagation of seismic waves originating from intermediate-depth Vrancea source act as an energy absorbers, while normal faults that form a small incidence angle with these seismic waves are “channelling” energy in the corresponding direction via multiple reflections along the faults (Radu, 1982) also, the direct correlation between the horizontal movements of the crust (reported by GPS networks (van der Hoeven et al., 2004), and active faults’ dynamics from focal mechanism solutions has been observed by the authors. At regional level the seismic hazard is shaped by intermediate depth earthquakes (60 < h < 200 km), which are concentrated in a relatively small epicentral area of about 3000 km2, situated at the sharp bend of the Eastern Carpathian arc known as Vrancea region (45.0–46.0 N, 26.0–27.0 E). The spatial distribution of earthquakes in this region is graphically illustrated by a vertical column-like contour shape (Wenzel et al., 1999). The origin of the seismogenic structure can be explained by the laminar and separation process of a considerable part of material from the inferior lithosphere of the Intra-Alpine Plate. This process is coupled with the influence of high mechanical stress on the join process of the separated part to the East-European plate body. The down-going movement of this body through the superior mantle is stimulated by magma convection and the self-gravity forces interactions, during (~10 My), which gives it an appropriate vertical position (Chalot-Prat et al., 2000). The cumulative mechanical moment, by down-going process of the structure is released periodically, through strong earthquakes with Mw = 7.0–7.5 (Purcaru, 1979, Marza, 1995) on the upper part of the “body” (80–110 km) and the bottom part of the “body” (130–170 km), which are considered the most active segments of the Vrancea region (Trifu et al., 1989), and are the basic element of the seismic hazard estimations at the regional scale. The depth interval between 110 and 130 km has remained unruptured, possibly throughout the last 150 years. This depth is a natural candidate for the next strong Vrancea event (Wenzel et al., 1999). The macroseismic intensity fields and instrumental records show a predominant directivity N45E (Muller et al., 1978), which is strongly correlated with the source proprieties.

2. Stochastic Method for Earthquake Ground Motion Modelling The stochastic method presented in the current chapter is based on the work of Hanks and McGuire (Hanks et al., 1979, McGuire et al., 1980). They combined seismological models of ground motion in frequency domain with the engineering interpretation of the random nature of high-frequency motions.

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

15

The total spectrum of seismic motion at the site (Y (M0, R, f )) can be broken down into contributions from earthquake source (E), path (P), and site (G), (Makris, 1997), so that: Y(M0, R, f ) = E(M0, f ) P(R,f ) G(f )

(1)

where M0 is the seismic moment, f – frequency, and R – hypocentral distance. Source: E(M0, f ) The most commonly used model of the earthquake source spectrum is the ω-square model, (Aki, 1967), where corner frequency f0 depends on seismic moment, and similarity in the earthquake source implies that M0f03 = const. The corner frequency is function of the share-wave velocity in the vicinity of the source, βs, stress drop, Δσ, and M0, (Brune, 1971): E(M0, f ) = C M0 S(M0, f ) = C M0 Sa(M0, f ) Sb(M0, f )

(2)

where: C is a constant, and S(M0; f ) is the displacement source spectrum, (Frankel et al., 1996). The seismic moment is related to moment magnitude as, (Hanks et al., 1979): M =

2 log M 0 − 10.7 3

(3)

The stress parameter Δσ, which controls high-frequency spectral amplitudes in the model, should be considered as a magnitude-dependent quantity for Vrancea earthquakes. The value of stress increases with magnitude from 20–30 bars for Mw ≤ 3.5 up to 200–250 bars for Mw 4.8–5.3 and up to 1000 bars for the case of large (Mw > 6.0–6.5) events (Sokolov et al., 2005). Path: P(R, f ), duration The effects of the path might be represented, generally, by simple functions that account for geometrical spreading, attenuation, and the general increase of duration with distance due to wave propagation and scattering, (Boore, 2003). The simplified path effect is: P ( R, f ) = P ( f ) exp ( −π fR /[Q ( f ) β ])

(4)

where R is taken as the closest distance to the rupture surface, and Q is an attenuation operator. Three-layer Q models for Vrancea zone were provided in Sokolov et al., 2005 for the depth intervals 0–40, 40–100, and 100–200 km in the format Q = A⋅f 0.8. The value of A varies within limits 100 ÷ 500. High-frequency amplitudes are reduced through the kappa operator (κ) incorporated into the factor P(f ): P(f ) = exp(–πκf )

(5)

16

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

where κ is a region-dependent parameter. The value of κ has a region- and sitedependent character. The values vary from station to station within a broad range, namely: from 0.0001, which is typical for very hard rock, to 0.068, which characterises soil site (Sokolov et al., 2005). The ground-motion duration is the sum of the source duration, related to the inverse of a corner frequency, 1 = f0, and a path-dependent duration αR, (Atkinson et al., 1995). Site: G(f ) Site effect is usually separated from path effects and accounts for the modification due to local site geology. A simplified function can be used to describe the frequencydependent modifications of the seismic spectrum, (Boore, 2003): G(f ) = A(f ) D(f )

(6)

where: A(f ) is the amplification function depending on shear-wave velocity distribution vs. depth, and D(f ) accounts for the path-independent loss of high-frequency in the ground motions. D(f ) might be due to a source effect, (Papageorgiou et al., 1983), site effect, (Hanks, 1982), or both.

3. Focal Mechanism Solutions A fault plane solution is a way of showing the fault and the direction of slip on it from an earthquake, using circles with two intersecting curves that look like beach balls. Computer code FOCAL (Suetsugu, 1995) updated by the authors (Sandu, 2006) was used in the current study to compute directly such fault plane parameters as slip, dip, strike, and azimuth, plunge, represented graphically in Fig. 3, by using the P- first motion polarity data for surface and body waves and stereographic projections model. The polarity data of P- first motion for the period 1967–2006 were analyzed numerically using computer code FOCAL. The fault plane solutions for 290 seismic events with magnitude Mw > 3.0 reported by the ISC bulletin have been computed. Table 1. Focal mechanism parameters for selected strong earthquakes from intermediate-depth Vrancea seismic source yyyy/mm/dd

Mw

Strike 1/2

Dip 1/2

Rake 1/2

1973/08/20

5.4

263/168

19/88

–174/–71

1977/03/04

7.5

279/52

75/21

105/46

1979/05/31

5.2

249/73

67/23

88/94

1981/11/13

5.3

0/158

75/16

96/69

1986/08/30

7.0

248/28

70/26

106/52

1990/05/30

7.3

227/13

60/35

109/61

1990/05/31

6.1

304/105

66/25

98/72

2004/10/27

5.6

337/181

24/67

68/100

2005/05/14

5.2

207/17

72/18

93/80

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

17

Figure 2. P-axes distribution: depth 100–150 km.

4. Recurrence Intervals for Sub-Crustal Seismicity The magnitude-frequency regression analysis uses Gutenberg-Richter model: log N(≥ M) = a – bM

(7)

where: N – number of earthquakes per year with a magnitude equal or mare than M, a, b – coefficients that depend on observation term and magnitude interval considered in the analysis. Equation (6) could be presented in the following form for Vrancea source for the depth interval 60–170 km (Ghinsari, 2006): log N(≥ M) = 3.958 – 0.769 Mw

(8)

Romplus catalogue is used as the primary data set for the time interval 1954–2004.

18

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

1973/08/20

1977/03/04

1979/05/31

1981/11/13

1986/08/30

1990/05/30

1990/05/31

2004/10/27

2005/05/14

Figure 3. Focal mechanism solutions for selected strong earthquakes from intermediate-depth Vrancea seismic source.

As Eq. (7) does not limit the magnitude values by a possible maximum (Mmax), the following equation proposed by Hwan and Huo in 1994 improves asymptotic regression curve and has more rigorous mathematical sense: N (≥ M ) = eα − β M

1 − e − β ( M max − M ) 1 − e − β ( M max − M 0 )

(9)

where: Mmax – maximum credible magnitude of the source, M0 – lower bound of magnitude used in the regression model (6), α = a ln(10) = 9.118, β = b ln(10) = 1.771. Among other works, application of Eq. (9) to the dataset from Vrancea has been applied by (Elnashai, Lungu, 1995). Taking into account the most severe earthquakes, which took place in the last centuries, maximum credible magnitude of Vrancea source could be accepted as equal to Mw ≈ 8.0. In this case Eq. (9) takes the following form: N (≥ M) = e9.118 −1.771M w where: M0 = 3.0.

1 − e −1.771(8.0 − M w ) 1 − e −1.771(8.0 −3.0)

(10)

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

19

Table 2. Mean return periods for different levels of maximum credible magnitude (grey cells indicate return periods close to 475yrs as stated in Eurocode-8) Maximum credible magnitude, Mmax, (Mw) 8.0

8.1

8.2

8.3

7.2

50

47

46

44

7.3

64

60

57

54

7.4

82

76

71

68

7.5

110

98

91

85

7.6

151

131

117

108

7.7

223

181

156

140

7.8

367

266

216

186

7.9

805

438

317

258

8.0

–

961

523

379

8.1

–

–

1147

624

Mean return period (years) of earthquakes with magnitude more or equal to M, is: T (≥ M ) =

1 N (≥ M )

(11)

Mean return periods defined by Eq. (11) are presented in Table 2. The values that correspond to return periods 475 yrs (Eurocode-8 demands) are shown in grey.

5. Attenuation of Peak Parameters of Horizontal Ground Motion 5.1. Models for Attenuation Analysis The attenuation law of ground motion parameters, as a function of epicentral distance is a smoothed curve obtained through the non-linear regression procedure. This curve is used for prediction of values as a function of specific conditions of magnitude, distance and local soil. The parameters, which could be used in the attenuation analysis, are the following: 1 2 3

peak ground acceleration (PGA); effective peak acceleration (EPA); effective peak velocity (EPV), etc.

Besides spectral ordinates SA and SV for specific periods (0.3, 0.6, 1.0 s, etc.) could be used or even seismic intensity according to different scales (MM, EMS, etc.). For the analysis of attenuation phenomenon the following models could be employed: (i)

Joyner-Boore model:

20

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

ln PGP = c1 + c2 M + c3 lnR + c4 R + ε ln PGP = c1 + c2 M + c3 lnR + c5 h + ε ln PGP = c1 + c2 M + c3 lnR + c4 R + c5 h + ε ln PGP = c1 + c2 M + c3 lnR + c4 R + c6 ec7M + ε (ii)

(12)

McGuire and Campbell model: ln PGP = a1 + a2 M + a3 ln(Ra4 + a5 ea6M) + ε

(13)

(iii) Annaka and Nozawa model: ln PGP = a1 + a2 M + a3 ln(R1.0 + a5 ea6M) + a7 h + ε

(14)

(iv) Fukushima and Tanaka model: ln PGP = a1 + a2 M + a3 ln(R1.0 + a5 ea6M) + a8 R + ε

(15)

where: PGP is the value of peak ground motion parameter, R – hypocentral distance, M – magnitude, h – focal depth, ε – binary variable equal to zero for prediction of mean values of PGP, and equal to standard deviation of ln PGP for prediction of mean plus one standard deviation values (0.1 probability of exceedance), c1 – c4 and a1 – a8 are data dependent coefficients. Obviously, the decimal logarithm could be used instead of a natural logarithm in Eqs (12)–(15). Reliability of the attenuation relationship could be improved by evaluation of standard deviation of attenuation function, se. As a consequence, attenuation function could be calculated as mean (50% fractile) or as mean plus one standard deviation (84% fractile). In second-order moment format, standard deviation of PGA values is approximately equal to coefficient of variation of PGA: σln PGA ≅ VPGA. 84% fractile function is (1 + V) higher than mean function. 5.2. Data for the Attenuation Model Analysis of peak parameters that characterise intermediate depth Vrancea earthquakes on the basis of seismic records from 1977, 1986 and 1990 is presented. Data was provided by INFP, INCERC, GEOTEC (all Romania), IGG (Republic of Moldova) and Bulgaria. Vrancea earthquakes with magnitude 7.2, 7.0 and 6.7 (Gutenberg-Richter) which took place in 1977, 1986 and 1990, represent significant seismic events that influenced a large area of Romania and the Republic of Moldova; densely populated and important from an industrial point of view.

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

21

Table 3. Attenuation coefficients for peak ground acceleration (PGA) Complete set of data

Sectors: SW + NE

Number of records

104

79

B0

5.128

4.601

B1

1.063

0.929

B2

–1.297

–1.030

B3

–0.009

–0.008

σln PGA

0.449

0.465

The seismic record from 1977 was obtained at station INCERC-Bucharest, while other observations were obtained in seismic networks in Romania installed after 1977 (INFP, INCERC, GEOTEC). Distribution of epicentral distances for seismic stations within limits 42–316 km evidences attenuation functions on a large territory of the external part of the Carpathian arc. For the SW sector (due to more than 10 seismic stations in the city of Bucharest) statistical data are more numerous (46 records), while for SE and NE sectors statistical data are scantier (25 records). The epicentral zone, being the core of all sectors, includes 8 stations. Future seismic events will, obviously, enrich the available database and will allow the derivation of more exact polynomial coefficients. In this study, the model used for the attenuation analysis is based on the wave model from the point source in the elastic medium (Joyner & Boore, 1988): ln y = b0 + b1 M + b2 ln R + b3 h + σln y P

(16)

where: y is the peak parameter characterizing the ground motion. In this study y is the maximum value of the horizontal components of ground acceleration, M – Gutenberg-Richter magnitude, R – hypocentral distance, h – focal depth, bi – coefficients dependent on measured parameters. σln y P represents standard deviation of ln y multiplied by factor P, which is equal to 0 for mean values and 1(–1) for mean plus (minus) one standard deviation values. The idea of a separation of complete sets of data in three sectors: SW, SE and NE is based on the previous investigation. It has been proved that sector attenuation is different along these directions, which is the consequence of source mechanism and different propagation path conditions. Regression analysis is presented using least-squares method for peak horizontal accelerations for each of these sectors separately and for the complete data set. The results of analysis are presented in Table 3. Mean return periods for magnitudes M are calculated according to Eq. (7). It should be emphasised that a regression model should be used for focal depths, which has physical sense for a certain magnitude level.

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A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

6. Site Effects Theoretical, as well as practical studies have demonstrated that soft soils, as a function of physical properties and thickness of strata, amplify seismic waves for certain frequencies and contribute to the deterioration of structures. Numerous cities in Romania as well as in the Republic of Moldova are situated on a soft soil geological strata. As a result, engineers as well as seismologists are interested in understanding linear and non-linear response characteristics of soft soils for seismic excitations. The acceptance of linear elasticity models in seismology was justified at the first stage, as a linear approach offers a simple and at the same time powerful instrument for the practical solution of seismological problems. In the earthquake-resistant design of structures the lateral forces are usually defined through seismic design spectra of ground motion that can be expected in the vicinity of the structure. Therefore, the knowledge of the ground motion is critical for reducing earthquake risk. Seismologists have achieved significant progress in simulating ground motion by a number of simplified analytical and numerical methods such as one and two dimensional models, which can explain soil behaviour in certain situations. Seismic records of ground motion during recent strong earthquakes have shown that 2-D 3-D local site effects can be extremely important, and can negatively affect structural safety. A three dimensional homogeneous vector equation of motion for a uniform, isotropic, linear elastic medium has the following form: ρь = (λ + μ)∇(∇⋅u) + μ∇2u

(17)

Numerical solution of this wave equation could be done using the finite element method. The major challenges would be related to mesh generation to match realistic topography, balance between model size and frequency resolution, and non-reflective boundary conditions. It is assumed that local velocity structure of the medium is known and is deterministic. These assumptions simplify the computations and design of the appropriate numerical algorithms. The presence of geotechnical boreholes in the vicinity of the seismic stations from Kishinev city (capital of the Republic of Moldova) allows evaluation of the local soil conditions on spectral content of seismic motion. The analysis of seismic response of the soil was performed for determination of shear efforts in each soil strata. For such type of analysis it is necessary to know the dynamic properties of the soil, which are determined from the in-situ tests combined with laboratory tests (resonant column). The effect of the soil deposits is manifested in filtering of the seismic waves, amplifying some of the frequencies and reducing others. If the geological profile is known, together with the mechanical and physical parameters of each stratum, the response of the soil is evaluated on the surface from the excitation at the level of bedrock. Numerical analysis of 2D seismic response of the soft soil in the central part of Kishinev city (Fig. 4) excited by horizontal motion at the bedrock is shown in Fig. 5. The complexity of 2D effects proves the necessity of comprehensive models in the assessment of local site effects.

A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

Figure 4. 3D model of the central part of Kishinev city.

Figure 5. Ground response at free surface (horizontal and vertical displacements).

23

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A. Zaicenco and I. Sandu / Analysis of Vrancea Seismic Source Based on Seismological Records

7. Acknowledgements This research is sponsored by NATO’s Scientific Affairs Division in the framework of the Science for Peace Programme, project SfP-980468 and INTAS project 05-104-7584.

References [1] Aki K., (1967). Scaling Law of Seismic Spectrum, J Geophys. Res. 72, 1217-1231. [2] Ambraseys N.N., and Bommer J.J., (1995). Attenuation relations for use in Europe: an overview. European seismic design practice, A. Elnashai ed., Balkema, Rotterdam, p. 67-74. [3] Atkinson G.M., and Boore D.M., (1995). Ground Motion Relations for Eastern North America, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 85, 17-30. [4] Boore D.M., (2003). Simulation of Ground Motion Using the Stochastic Method, Pure appl. geophys. 160, 635-676. [5] Brune J.N., (1971). Correction, J. Geophys. Res. 76, 5002. [6] Chalot-Prat F., and Girbacea R., (2000). Partial delamination of Continental mantle lithosphere, upliftrelated crust-mantle decupling, volcanism and basin formation: a new model for the PlioceneQuaternary evolution of the southern East-Carpathians, Romania, Tectonophysics 327, p. 83-107. [7] Constantinescu L., and Enescu D., (1985). The Vrancea earthquakes within their scientific and technological framework, Bucuresti. [8] Drumea A., Ginsari V., and Zaicenco A., (2003). International Handbook of EES, Part B, 79.39 Moldova. [9] Elnashai A., and Lungu D., (1995). Zonation as a tool for retrofit and design of new facilities. Report of the Session A.1.2. 5th International Conference on Seismic Zonation, Nice, France, Oct. 16-19, Proceedings Vol. 3, Ouest Editions, Preses Academiques, p. 2057-2082. [10] Frankel A., Mueller C., Barnhard T., Perkins D., Leyendecker E., Dickman N., Hanson S., and Hopper M., (1996). National Seismic Hazard Maps: Documentation June 1996, U.S. Geol. Surv. Open-File Rept. 96-532, 69 pp. [11] Grunthal, G. et al., (1998). European Macroseismic Scale EMS-1998, Luxemburg. [12] Hanks T.C., and Kanamori H., (1979). A Moment Magnitude Scale, J. Geophys. Res. 84, 2348-2350. [13] Hanks T.C., (1982). fmax, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 72, 1867-1879. [14] Hwang H.H.M., and Huo J.R., (1994). Generation of hazard-consistent fragility curves for seismic loss estimation studies. Technical Report NCEER-94-0015. National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research, State University of New York at Buffalo, Aug. [15] Lungu D., Cornea T., Aldea A., and Zaicenco A., (1997). Basic representation of seismic action. In: Design of structures in seismic zones: Eurocode 8 – Worked examples. TEMPUS PHARE CM Project 01198: Implementing of structural Eurocodes in Romanian civil engineering standards. Edited by D. Lungu, F. Mazzolani and S. Savidis. Bridgeman Ltd., Timisoara, p. 1-60. [16] Makris N., (1997). Rigidity-plasticity-viscosity: can electrorheological dampers protect base-isolated structures from near-source ground motions? Earthquake Eng. Struct. Dyn. 26, 571-591. [17] McGuire R.K., and Hanks T.C., (1980). RMS Accelerations and Spectral Amplitudes of Strong Ground Motion during the San Fernando, California Earthquake, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 70, 1907-1919. [18] Muller G., Bonjer K., Stockl H., and Enescu D., (1978). The Romanian Earthquake of March 4, 1977, J. Geophys. 44, 203-208. [19] Papageorgiou A.S., and Aki K., (1983). A Specific Barrier Model for the Quantitative Description of Inhomogeneous Faulting and the Prediction of Strong Ground Motion. I. Description of the Model, Bull. Seismol. Soc. Am. 73, 693-722. [20] Polonic G., (2002). The structural and morphological map of the crystaline basement in the bending area of the Eastern Carpathians, Studii si Cercetari de Geofizica, v. 40, p. 27. [21] Purcaru G., (1979). The Vrancea, Romania, earthquake of March 4, 1977 – a quite successful prediction, Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors, 18, 274-287. [22] Radu C., (1982). Seismicitatea teritoriului Romaniei cu referire speciala la regiunea Vrancea. In: Cutremurul de pamant din Romania de la 4 martie 1977. Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, Bucuresti, p. 75-134. [23] Radulian M., and Mindrescu N., et al., (1996). Seismic Activity and Stress Field Characteristics for the Seismogenic Zones of Romania, International Center for Theoretical Physiscs, Miramare-Trieste, December, IC/96/256.

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[24] Riznicenko Yu.V., and Drumea A.V., (1976). Seismichnosti i Sotreasaemosti Carpato-Balkanskogo regiona, Chisinau. [25] Sandu I., (2006). Composite fault plane Solutions for Earthquakes in the Republic of Moldova, First European Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Geneva, Switzerland, (ID-369), p. 266. [26] Sokolov V., Bonjer K.P., Oncescu M., and Rizescu, M. (2005). Hard Rock Spectral Models for Intermediate-Depth Vrancea, Romania, Earthquakes. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, Vol. 95, No. 5, pp. 1749–1765, October. [27] Suetsugu, D., (1995). Source Mechanism Practice, IISEE, Tsukuba, Japan. [28] Trifu C.I., and Radulean M., (1989). Asperity distribution and percolation as fundamentals of earthquake cycle, Phys. Earth Planet. Int., 58:277-288, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Netherlands. [29] Van der Hoeven A., Schmitt G., Dinter G., Mocanu V., and Spakman W., (2004). GPS probes the kinematics of the Vrancea Seismogenic zone, Eos, Vol. 85, No. 19, May 11. [30] Wenzel F., Lorentz F.P., Sperner B., and Oncescu M.C., (1999). Seismotectonics of the Romanian Vrancea Area, in: Vrancea Earthquakes: Tectonics, Hazard and Risk Mitigation, 15-25, Wenzel et al. (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands. [31] Zaicenco A., Lungu D., Cornea T., and Alkaz V., (1998). Classification and evaluation of Vrancea earthquake records from Republic of Moldova. In: Vrancea Earthquakes. Tectonics, Hazard and Risk Mitigation, Kluwer Academic publishers (Wenzel F., Lungu D.).

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-26

Seismotectonic Conditions and Seismic Risk for Cities in Georgia Otar VARAZANASHVILI a, Nino TSERETELI a and Teimuraz MUCHADZE b a Senior researcher. Mikheil Nodia Institute of Geophysics, Tbilisi, Georgia b Senior researcher. Kiriak Zavriev Institute of Structural Mechanics and Earthquake Engineering, Tbilisi, Georgia

Abstract. At 22:41 local time, on Tuesday, April 25, 2002, a moderate earthquake with magnitude M = 4.6 took place in the Tbilisi area. This was the strongest instrumentally recorded seismic event ever in this region, causing 7 deaths, making 2446 people homeless and causing 180 million US$ worth of damage. The Tbilisi earthquake was a strike-slip earthquake that took place on the NW-SE TbilsiMtkvari fault that dips to the northeast. The focal mechanism and shape of the isoseismals confirm this. A year before the Tbilisi earthquake of 2002 a seismic risk was evaluated for the town. In particular, the distribution of social-economic damage in the territory of the town in case of single earthquakes with intensities 7 and 8, i.e. so called “scenario” earthquakes, was determined. Obtained schematic map of the direct economic loss on the territory of the town gives the distribution of the relative seismic risk in the territory of the town and shows well the most vulnerable parts of the town in case of an earthquake with intensity 7. Calculated for them, potential direct economic loss is of the same order as that received by risk calculations according to official data after the Tbilisi earthquake of 2002 (April 25). For comparison, according to calculations in case of an earthquake with intensity 8 direct economic loss from destruction and damage of buildings only could exceed milliard dollars in the territory of Tbilisi. At 11:44 local time, February 20, 1920, a strong earthquake with magnitude Ms = 6.2 took place in the Gori area. The seismic intensity of this earthquake was estimated as IIX on the MSK scale in Gori. Half of the thousand apartment houses in the town were ruined and others were damaged. This event caused 114 deaths in the Gori area, half of them in the town of Gori. Perspective development of Gori requires the estimation of seismic risk for this territory. Existing data makes it possible to estimate the levels of economic loss caused directly by damaged and ruined buildings that in turn would be generated by earthquakes of various intensities. Particularly, the seismic risk for Gori has been estimated for scenario earthquakes with intensity 7, 8 and 9. Estimated value of losses for earthquakes with intensity 7. 8 and 9 are 60, 170 and 300 million US dollars respectively. The direct economic loss to Gori, caused by the Qartli earthquake of 1920, is estimated (at current prices) at 30 million US dollars. The maps of seismic risk for Gori give a visual demonstration of the most damaged areas. Hence, it is of great importance to establish a system of preventive practical measures which will make it possible to decrease the destructive effect of earthquakes in Tbilisi and Gori. Results of distribution of quantitative values of potential detriment to the cities’ territories, which are received on the basis of seismic risk assessment, create necessary prerequisites for solving this problem. Keywords. Georgia, earthquake, seismotectonics, fault-plane solution, macroseismic, isoseismal, intensity, probability, seismic risk

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Introduction The territory of Georgia is prone to a number of hazards, which have to be taken into account when planning sustainable development of the country. Regional urbanisation and the decision that large pipelines will have to cross the territory of Georgia make this problem very urgent. One of the most important of these hazards is a seismic one. Georgia is situated in one of the most seismically active regions (Caucuses) of the Alpine-Himalayan collision zone. The tectonics and recent geodynamics of the Caucasus is determined by its position between the still converging Eurasian and AfricanArabian plates. The area consists of inverted relief created as a result of continental collision in the area of the pre-Early Cenozoic Tethys Ocean, which created the Greater and Lesser Caucasus fold-thrust belts and continental basins (Khain, 1975; Adamia et al., 1981; Dercourt et al., 1990; Philip et al., 1989; Cisternas et al., 1997). Continued northward movement of the Afro-Arabian plate and post-Cretaceous sub horizontal shortening of 1000 km of the Caucasus has occurred (Dercout et al., 1990). This shortening takes place by the formation of compression structures (folds and reverse faults) and by the deformation and displacement of crustal blocks. Geodetic data place the rate of convergence at 20–30 mm/yr, of which 10–15 mm/yr is probably taken up south of the Lesser Caucasus ophiolitic suture, mainly in South Armenia, Nakhchivan, NW Iran and Eastern Turkey. The rest of the S/N directed relative plate motion has been accommodated in the Caucasus chiefly by crustal shortening (DeMets et al., 1990; Jackson and Ambraseis, 1997; Allen et al., 2004). The northern part of the Afro-Arabian plate constitutes an indentor (Morelli&Bareier, 2004), and at the edge of this indentor all structures have an arcuate, northerly convex shape. Farther north, however, the geometry of the fold-thrust belts is somewhat different. The region consists of three principal trends of active structures. The first trend is WNW-ESE and W-E and is compressional (reverse faults, thrusts, fault-propagation folds). The second and third trends are transversal (NE-SW and NW-SE) and are extensional, and are typically strike-slip faults (McClusky et al., 2000; Trifonov et al., 1999; Kharakhalian et al., 2004). Focal mechanisms of strong earthquakes in the region show that crustal blocks are escaping to the west and east, either side of the Afro-Arabian indentor (Adamia et al., 2004). This is corroborated by GPS measurements (McClusky et al., 2000). The present study examines the seismic history and seismotectonic conditions of earthquake initiation in Tbilisi and Gori. These cities belongs to the Achara-Trialeti fold-thrust belt. The levels of seismic risk of 7, 8 and 9 intensity scenario earthquakes are estimated in these cities.

1. Seismic History and Seismoteconic Conditions of Tbilisi and Gori The Tbilisi area has been considered as a region of relatively low seismicity. During the historical period, earthquakes with seismic intensity VII in the MSK scale have occurred approximately once every 85 years in this region (Varazanashvili and Kupradze, 2005). Shaking with such macroseismic intensities could be caused by strong regional earthquakes sources (M > 6), as well as by the moderate local earthquakes (4 < M ≤ 5). This is confirmed by a map of isoseismals of the mentioned earthquake (Fig. 1) given in the work Nikonov, 1987.

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Figure 1. A map of summary isoseismals for earthquakes which had macroseismic effect in Tbilisi with intensity 7 in years 1668–2002.

Tbilisi lies at the eastern end of the Achara-Trialeti fold-thrust belt. The North Achara-Trialeti (NAT) thrust separates the Achara-Trialeti belt from the Georgian block to the north. The South Achara-Trialeti (SAT) thrust separates the AcharaTrialeti belt from the Artvin-Bolnisi block to the south. Tbilisi lies between the eastern terminations of these two thrusts (Fig. 2). The two thrusts are linked by the NE-dipping Tbilisi-Mtkvari dextral strike-slip fault, which trends NW-SE (Rastsvetaev, 1989; Adamia et al., 2005). Historical seismicity in this area has been recorded since the 13thC and all known strong (M > 5) earthquakes in this area are associated with the abovementioned faults. Especially important is the earthquake cluster around Mtsketa, 15 km north of Tbilisi (Fig. 2). One of these earthquakes probably generated an MSK intensity of VIII (New catalog…, 1982). This cluster of earthquakes is related to the junction between the NAT thrust and the Tbilsi-Mtkvari fault. Strong historical seismicity also occurred on the SAT thrust (e.g., the 1896 Ms = 6.3 event). A third group of historical earthquakes (1682, 1803, 1804, 1819; MS = 3.5 ÷ 4.5) is located immediately beneath Tbilisi and is related to the Tbilsi-Mtkvari fault. The 2002 Tbilisi earthquake demonstrates continued activity on this fault (Fig. 2). Figure 3 shows calculated values of the seismic hazard’s graphic for Tbilisi, which were arrived at by various authors, at different times and by various methods (Butikashvili, 1990; Jibladze, 1980; Varazanashvili O., 1999). Observed values of these quantities are given here too. Co-ordination of all theoretical results and observed data witnesses the stability of assessments of seismic shaking of Tbilisi. Established regularity of recurrence of earthquake with intensity 7 in Tbilisi and supposed values of average periods of recurrence of earthquake with intensity 8 made it possible to evaluate in

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Figure 2. Seismotectonic map of Tbilisi and surrounding area.

Figure 3. Seismic hazard graphic for Tbilisi (1–4 calculated value, 5 observed value).

the first approximation (according to methods described in the work Papazachos et al. 1987) conditional probabilities of the origin of such earthquakes in the town. If we take into account that the last earthquake with intensity 7 occurred in Tbilisi in 2002 and the earthquake with intensity 8 could have happened in Tbilisi in the 13th century, then conditional probability of occurrence of an earthquake with intensity 7 within the next 20 years is only 20%, whereas for an earthquake with intensity 8 it is three times higher. The seismic history of Gori and its adjacent area (within a radius of 30 km) has been described in details throughout the last 200 years (Aivazishvili et al., 1975). Figure 4 represents the epicentres of the earthquakes with magnitude M ≥ 3.5 for this

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Figure 4. Seismotectonic map of Gori and surrounding area.

region. The theoretical isoseismals of the newly discovered destructive Tachtisdziri earthquake (84 A. D. φ = 42.1o, λ = 43.9o (∆E = ±0.2o); depth – h = 15 km (ΔE = ± 0.2o); epicentre intensity – Io = 9 – 10 (ΔIo = ± 1)) and observation isoseismals of the destructive Qartli earthquake of 1920 are also shown here. Gori is bordered by the Georgian belt to the north. That is more stable and rigid from a tectonic point of view. The greater part of the Gori area is located in the AcharaTrialeti fold-thrust belt that is tectonically more unstable. The border of this area and of the Georgian belt represents the active fault zone – the northern faults of Achra-Trialeti. Half of all earthquakes (84, 1881, 1891, 1920, 1958, 1968 and 1983) in the Gori area with magnitude M ≥ 3.5 have happened along this fault zone. Other earthquakes belong to the medium faults zones of the Achara-Trialeti fold-thrust belt (1805, 1912, 1921, 1940, 1953, 1959, 1977, and 1978). All the faults described above represent thrust fault kinematically. This is proved by the fault plane solutions of earthquakes that occurred along these faults zones. The seismic regimes and their parameters of these two zones are different. The slop of earthquake recurrence law of the Georgian belt is b = 0.99. The seismic potential of its most part is Mmax = 4.5. For the Achara-Trialety fold-thrust system these parameters are: b = 0.82, Mmax = 6.0. For the transition boundary zone – b = 0.82, Mmax = 7.0. There are some similarities in the characteristics for these zones. Particularly, their current average seismic activity (ao = 1.5) is low in comparison with the surrounding area. It indicates that the Gori area represents a seismic calm zone nowadays. Figure 5 represents the seismic hazard graphic for Gori. As we see, the curve of observed data is a bit higher than the level of the calculated ones. The reason for this is the relatively low value of the average seismic activity of the Gori region. According to the curve of observed data the average recurrence period of earthquakes with intensity Io = 8 is T ≈ 200 years. To take into account that the last destructive earthquake happened in 1920 or in other words 85 years ago the conditional probability of the occurrence of an earthquake with the same intensity is more than 40% in the next 20 years.

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Figure 5. Seismic hazard graphic of Gori.

2. Seismic Risk of Tbilisi and Gori Existing data makes it possible to estimate the levels of economic loss caused directly by damaged and ruined buildings that in turn are generated by earthquakes of various intensities. Particularly, the seismic risk to the cities has been estimated for scenario earthquakes with intensities VII, VIII and IX on the MSK scale on the basis of two main parameters: 1. 2. 3.

Probable seismic hazard for Tbilisi and Gori. Vulnerability of buildings in Tbilisi and Gori estimated according to the current technical conditions and types of construction (Mukhadz. 2002). Seismic risk, expressed with direct economic loss, has been estimated with the following equation (Sobolev G.1997): R = Σ Σ kij vij cij , where kij is the number of j constructions in the zone with intensity i; vij, cij are the values of costs and damages for each type of construction.

A year before the Tbilisi earthquake of 2002 the seismic risk for the town was evaluated. In particular, distribution of social-economic damage within the territory of the town in case of single earthquakes with intensities 7 and 8, i.e. so called “scenario” earthquakes, was determined. (Assessment…, 2001). Figure 6 gives a schematic map of the direct economic loss within the territory of the town which was caused by damage (or destruction) of buildings after the earthquake with intensity 7. It gives the destruction of the relative seismic risk in the territory of the town and shows well the most vulnerable parts of the town in the event of an earthquake with intensity 7. On the map the Nadzaladevi, Chugureti, Isani and Mtatsminda districts of Tbilisi (according to the old division into districts) are marked

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Figure 6. Map of seismic risk for Tbilisi in case of single scenario earthquake with intensity 7.

out as sectors of high risk. Calculated for them, the potential direct economic loss from destruction and damage to buildings reached 150 million US dollars. As is already known, the Tbilisi earthquake of 2002 (April 25) had effect with intensity 7 in these districts of the town, and detriment from destruction and damage to buildings according to official data was of the same order as that arrived at by risk calculations. For comparison, according to calculations in the event of an earthquake with intensity 8, direct economic detriment from destruction and damage to buildings only could exceed milliard dollars in the territory of Tbilisi. Figure 7 represents a schematic map of Gori and the distribution of direct economic losses for this territory caused by a scenario earthquake with intensity 8. Also given are the probable borders of the town in 1920. The analysis of potential losses caused by the ruined and damaged apartment houses in various districts of Gori show the highest level of the risk (the maximum value of direct losses) in the central part of the town. This part of Gori includes the territory of the old town. Estimated value of losses in this case is 170 million US dollars. Estimated value of losses for earthquakes with intensity 7 and 9 are 60 and 300 million US dollars respectively. The direct economic loss for Gori, caused by the Qartli earthquake of 1920, is estimated (at current prices) at 30 million US dollars.

Conclusion The map of seismic risk for Tbilisi and Gori gives a visual demonstration of the most damaged areas. Results of seismic risk, calculated for an earthquake with intensity 7, proved to be in accordance with the existing official data for the Tbilisi earthquake

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Figure 7. Map of seismic risk of Gori case of single scenario earthquake with intensity 8.

(April 25, 2002) manifestation and damage caused by it. Some conformity exists in the calculation of seismic risk for Gori. Estimated value of losses for earthquakes with intensity 8 is 170 million US dollars. The direct economic loss for Gori, caused by the Qartli earthquake of 1920, estimated at current prices, is 30 million US dollars. The old town was situated in the 25 km2 around the Gori fortress. Today the town is located on both sides of the Liachvi and Mtkvari rivers and occupies about 135 km2. This new city occupies five times more territory and the value of direct losses is of approximately the same magnitude. This allows us to estimate the potential loss caused be earthquakes of various intensity. As we see it is of great importance to establish a system of preventive practical measures which will make it possible to decrease the destructive effect of earthquakes in Tbilisi and Gori. Results of distribution of quantitative values of potential detriment in the territory of the cities, which are arrived at on the basis of seismic risk assessment, create the necessary prerequisites for solving this problem.

References Adamia, Sh.A., Chkhotua, T., Kekelia, M., Lordkipanidze, M., Shavishvili, I., Zakariadze, G., 1981. Tectonics of the Caucasus and adjoining regions: implications for the evolution of the Tethys ocean. J. Struct. Geol. 3 (4), 437-447. Adamia, Sh., Alania, V., Chabukiani, A., Kuloshvili, S., Maisuradze, G., Gotsiridze, G., 2004. Seismic source zone midels of recent earthquakes of Georgia. In: Chatzipetrous, A.A., Pavlides, S.B. (Ed.), Proceedings. 5th International Symposium of Eastern Mediterranean Geology. Thessalonica, Greece. 14-29 April, 545-548.

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Adamia, Sh., Chabukiani, A., Kuloshvili, S., Maisuradze, G., 2005. Elicitation of alternative seismic sources interpretations and characterization. ISTC CauSin Project CA-651, Final Report. Aivazishvili, I., Papalashvili, V., 1975. Ocherk seismicheskoi aktivnosti g. Gori. Tbilisi, 26 (Russian). Allen, M., Jackson, J., Walker, R., 2004. Late Cenozoic reorganization of the Arabia-Eurasia collision and the comparison of shout term and long-term deformation rates. Tectonics. 23, 1-16. Assessment of seismic risk of important objects disposed on the territory of the Caucasus. Report. Funds of IG of Acad. of Sciences of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2001 (in Georgian). Butikashvili, N.K., 1990. Assessment of seismic hazard according to quantitative characteristics of ground motions. These for a candidate’s degree. Funds of IG GSSR, Tbilisi, pp. 104-105 (in Russian). Cisternas, A., Philip, H., 1997. Seismotectonices of the Mediterranean Region and the Caucasus. In: Giardani, D., Balassanian, S. (Eds.), Historical and Prehistorical Earthquakes in the Caucasus. Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 39-78. DeMets, C., Gordon, R., Argus, D., Stein, S., 1990. Current plate motions. Geophys. J. Int. 101, 425-478. Dercourt, J., Ricou, L.E., Adamia Sh., Csaszar, G., Funk, H., Lefeld, J., Rakus, M., Sandulescu, M., Tollman, A., Tchoumacheko P., 1990. Anisian to Oligosene paleogeography of the European margin of Tethys (Geneva to Baku). In: Dercourt, J. (Ed.), IGCP Project 198. Evolution of the northern margin of Tethys. Memoires de la Societe Geologique de France, Paris, Nouvelle serie 154. Occasional Publications ESRI, New Series 5, pp. 159-190. Jackson, J., Ambraseys, N., 1997. Convergence between Eurasia and Arabia in eastern Turkey and the Caucasus. In: Giardani, D., Balassanian, S. (Eds.), Historical and Prehistorical Earthquakes in the Caucasus. Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 79-90. Jibladze, E.A., 1980. Energy of earthquakes, seismic regime and sesismotectonic motions in the Caucasus. Tbilisi, (in Russian). Karakhelian, A.S., Trifonov, V.G., Philip, H., Avagyan, A., Hessami, K., Jamali, F., Bayraktutan, M.S., Bagdassarian, H., Arakelian, S., Davtian, V., Adilkhanyan, A., 2004. Active faulting and natural hazards in Armenia, eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran. Tectonophysics. 380, 189-219. Khain, V.E., 1975. Structure and main stages in the tectono-magmatic development at of the Caucasus: An attempt geodynamic interpretation. American Jour. Sci. 275 A, 131-156. McClusky, S., Balassanian, S., Barka, A., Demir, C., Ergintav, S., Georgiev, I., Gurkan, O., Hamburger, M., Hurst, K., Kahle, H., Kastens, K., Kekelidze, G., King, R., Kotzev, V., Lenko, O., Mahmoud, S., Mishin, A., Nadazia, M., Ouzouris, A., Paradissis, D., Peter, Y., Pzilepin, M., Reilinger, R., Sanli, I., Seeger, H., Tealeb, A., Toksoz, M.N., Veis, G., 2000. Global positioning system constraints on plate kinematics and dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean and Caucasus. J. Geophys. Res. 105 B3, 5695-5719. Morelli, A., Barrier, E., 2004. Geodinamic map of the Mediterranean. Sheet2. Commission for the geological map of the World. Web site: http://ccgm.org. Mukhadz., T., 2002. ISMEE Report. Tbilisi, 38 (Georgian). New Catalogue of strong Earthquakes in the USSR from Ancient Times through 1977. 1982. WDC A for Solid Earth Geophysies, Bolder, pp. 1-27. Nikonov, A.A., 1987. The strongest historic earthquakes in the Caucasus. Bullettino di Geofisica teorica ed Applicata. Vol. XXIX, №116, pp. 333-339. Papazachos, B.C., et al. 1987. Probabilities of occurrence of longer earthquakes in the Aegean andsurrounding area during the period 1986-2006. Pageoph. Vol. 125, No. 4, pp. 597-618. Philip, H., Cisternas, A., Gvishiani A., Garshkov, A., 1989. The Caucasus: an actual example of the initial stages of continental collision. Tectonophysics. 161, 1-21. Rastsvetaev, L., 1989. Shifts and Alpine geodinamics in the Caucasus region. In: Belov, A., Satian, A. (Eds.), The Caucasus geodynamics. Nauka Publ. House. Moscow, pp. 106-113. Sobolev, G., 1997. Otsenka seismicheskoi opasnosti i seismicheskogo riska. ed. – G. Sobolev. Moscow, 53 (Russian). Trifonov, V.G., Vostrikov, G.A., Trifonov, R.V., Karakhanian, A.S., Soboleva, O.V., 1999. Recent geodinamic characteristics in the Arabian-Eurasian and Indian-Eurasian collision region by active fault data. Tectonofysics. 308, 119-131. Varazanashvili, O., Kupradze, M., 2005. Seismic history of Tbilisi. Bull. the Georgian Academy of Sciences 172 (1), 76-79. Varazanashvili, O., 1999. Seismic hazard assessment of Georgia by deterministic and probabilistic methods. Journal of Georgian Geophysical Society (A), Vol. 4, pp. 35-46 (223 p.).

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-35

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Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia Ivanka PASKALEVA Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Central Laboratory for Seismic Mechanics and Earthquake Engineering, Sofia 1113, Acad. G. Bonchev str. Block 3 E-mail: [email protected] and [email protected] Abstract. The study of site effects and the microzonation of a part of metropolitan Sofia, based on the modelling of seismic ground motion along three cross sections are performed. Realistic synthetic strong motion waveforms are computed for scenario earthquakes (M = 7) applying a hybrid modelling method, based on the modal summation technique and finite differences scheme. The synthesised ground motion time histories are source and site specific. The site amplification is determined in terms of response spectra ratio (RSR). A suite of time histories and quantities of earthquake engineering interest are provided. The results of this study constitute a database that describes the ground shaking of the urban area. Using this database, the problem of estimation of seismic wave’s behaviour for the Sofia region is discussed. We employed synthetic velocigrams to extract maximum particle velocities distribution has to calculate horizontal strain factor Log10ε distribution, using simplified relation between particle velocity and velocity of shear waves in the surface layer. It is shown that it is possible to estimate liquefaction susceptibility in terms of standard penetration values and initial overburden stress. The results can be used for microzonation purposes as well for determination main parameters of structural control devices in the Sofia region. Keywords. Bulgaria, Sofia, seismic hazard, ground motion modelling, hybrid approach, vulnerability, damage estimations, surface strain

Introduction The city of Sofia is Bulgaria’s main administrative centre, and has the greatest population density in the country. The Greater Sofia Municipality includes 61 settlements, 4 of which are towns. More than 1.5 million people live in the Municipality in an area of 1310 km2, so the population density is about 1145 per km2. City housing consists of 475,900 units covering an area of approximately 30 km2. Sofia has dense infrastructure connected to important international railway and automobile routes from Western Europe to Istanbul via Belgrade, and from Greece and Macedonia to the Middle East. Large industrial zones are located in its vicinity. Therefore a strong earthquake that might occur in the Sofia seismogenic area could produce disastrous damage in a large region, followed by numerous serious consequences for an even broader region as regards communications, lifelines, etc. Recent earthquakes e.g. Kobe (17.1.1995), Gujarat (26.1.2001), Boumerdes (21.5.2003) and Bam (26.12.2003) have proved once more that for urban areas to be safe and sustainable, long-range urban planning must be implemented, based on multidisciplinary risk assessment tools. The challenge of urban hazard mapping is to predict the ground motion effects related to various sources, path and site characteristics,

36

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

not just at a single site but over an extended region, and to do so with an acceptable level of reliability. Seismic zonation consists of linking together site-by-site estimates of site response. Practice has shown that such an approach may significantly underestimate the amplitudes and durations of strong ground motion, with energy getting trapped within sedimentary basins due to critical reflections at the edges of the basin. The rapid increase in the development of efficient computational methods and procedures for modelling seismic wave propagation in laterally varying geological structures enables us to model the effects of sedimentary basins on the ground motion generated by scenario earthquakes. In general there are two main classes of methods used to generate synthetic ground motion: numerical and analytical methods. In this study the synthetic ground motion is generated applying a hybrid technique (Fäh et al. 1993, 1995a, 1995b). It combines the modal summation technique (Panza, 1985, Panza and Suhadolc, 1987 Panza et al. 2000), used to describe the seismic wave propagation in the anelastic bedrock structure with the finite difference method (Virieux 1984, 1986, Levander 1988) used for the computation of wave propagation in the anelastic, laterally inhomogeneous sedimentary media. The hybrid approach applied in this study already validated its capabilities, in the framework of the UNESCO-IUGS-IGCP project 414, for several major cities in different regions: Mexico City (Fäh et al. 1995b), Rome and Naples (Fäh et al. 1995a, Vaccari et al. 1995, PAGEOPH 2004), Bucharest (Panza et al. 2001), Thessaloniki (Triantafyllidis et al. 1998), Beijing (Sun et al. 1998), Zagreb (Lokmer et al. 2002), Russe and Sofia (Paskaleva and Kouteva 2001, Paskaleva 2002, Paskaleva et al. 2004a, 2004b). The hybrid approach is increasingly being used to move those aspects of ground motion prediction that are poorly constrained by recorded strong motion data, as in the case of Sofia City (Nenov et al. 1990). So the main purpose of this work is to study site effects phenomena due to the impedance contrasts, surface topography, lateral inhomogeneity and non-parallel layering. Therefore, the aim of this study is to: (1) contribute to the earthquake hazard assessment of Sofia, providing earthquake scenarios consistent with the recent geological outline and the regional earthquake hazard for Sofia; (2) supply synthetic seismic signals computed using available source and structural model; (3) provide site response estimates for Sofia resulting from the chosen earthquake scenarios and assess the damage expected. The city of Sofia is exposed to a high seismic risk (Paskaleva 2002, Paskaleva et al. 2003). The lack of instrumental recordings of regional seismicity (Nenov et al. 1990) demands development of ground motion models and methods for their solution in order to evaluate the Sofia seismic input. The hybrid approach (Fäh et al. 1993, 1995a, 1995b, Panza 1985, Panza and Suhadolc 1987, Panza et al. 2000), is applied to three local geological models (Fig. 1a, 1b) with different geometry and situated in different areas of Sofia city, where detailed knowledge of the realistic soil properties are available (Table 1). In Fig. 1b Sofia area is given with the profiles superimposed. The three representative geological cross-sections in the central part of the city of Sofia are used. MODEL 1A-1B (M1) and MODEL 2C-2D (M2) are placed on Western mega block, especially on Ljulin first rank block, which is tied by the North Vitosha, Obelja and Novi Iskar faults of the basement. The two models (M1) and (M2) W-E crosssections around 12–14 km run from Obelia and Ovcha kupel through the City. MODEL 3E-3F (M3) – S-N cross-section passes from Zemliane to Kubratovo. The profiles reach bedrock depth (up to 650m from the surface). The rocks constituting the basement are known by densities varying from 2500–2600 kg/m3.

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

Figure 1a. Map of Europe indicating the position of Bulgaria.

37

Figure 1b. City sketch with the location of the profiles used in numerical simulations: 1A-1B and 2C-2D, parallel and about 3.5 km apart. The ticks on the frame of the figure are: 7.0;

locations of the epicentre for the scenario M =

– location of the epicentre of the first recorded accelerogram M = 3.7

(preliminary assessment); event 27/04/2006.

– location of the recording station of the seismic

Table 1. The Generalised characteristics for the 2D models corresponding to the profiles 1A-1B, 2C-2D and 3E-3F shown in Fig. 1b M1 “Sofia 1” W-E Model sed1 sed2 sed3 sed.4 sed5 sed6 sed7 sed8 sed9 sed10 sed11 sed12

Density g/cm3 1.87 1.93 1.93 1.92 1.94 1.94 1.95 1.97 2.04 2.05 2.10 2.56

Vp km/s 0.900 1.580 1.580 1.650 1.650 1.800 1.800 1.900 2.000 2.100 2.100 4.000

M2 “SOFIA 2” W-E Vs km/s 0.330 0.400 0.400 0.480 0.480 0.600 0.640 0.680 0.700 0.700 0.720 1.900

sed1 sed2 sed3 sed.4 sed5 sed6 sed7 sed8 sed9 sed10 sed11 sed12 sed13 sed14 sed15 sed16 sed17

1.93 1.90 1.90 1.91 1.94 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.94 2.60 2.56 2.06 2.12 2.52 2.6

1.700 0.650 0.850 0.750 0.900 1.720 1.650 1.675 1.800 1.900 1.800 4.000 4.100 2.000 2.050 3.800 4.200

0.30 0.30 0.425 0.375 0.45 0.50 0.475 0.50 0.55 0.68 0.575 2.6 1.90 0.68 0.80 1.80 2.35

M3 “SOFIA 3” S-N sed1 sed2 sed3 sed.4 sed5 sed6 sed7 sed8 sed9 sed10 sed11 sed12 sed13 sed14 sed15 sed16

1.91 0.650 0.300 1.95 1.550 0.390 1.91 1.550 0.350 1.91 1.590 0.420 1.93 1.680 0.450 1.91 1.610 0.450 1.93 1.720 0.500 1.93 1.800 0.550 1.93 1.700 0.480 1.94 1.800 0.590 1.96 1.900 0.680 1.95 1.800 0.640 2.05 2.000 0.690 2.56 4100 1.900 2.12 2.0500 0.780 2.60 4.800 2.600

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

We cannot ignore examples from the past. We have to live with natural hazards. Unfortunately more than 60 types of destructive process can be observed in the territory of Bulgaria (Brankov et al. 1983, Broutchev and et al. 1994, 1995). Earthquakes, landslides, erosion, abrasion, loess collapses or any phenomena associated with specific soils not resistant to pressure, are assumed to be the major destructive processes in Bulgaria. That means that it is necessary to improve capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate damage data, to establish a recovery/reconstruction plan for every major urban centre, to improve interim and long-term housing for the recovery/reconstruction period and to ensure accurate and timely information during, and after natural disasters. All these tasks are oriented to the idea of buildings having to withstand the potential natural disaster hazards. This means promoting the development of cost-effective methodologies for mitigation; upgrading vulnerable buildings and other structures; ensuring the safety of all new construction; developing an integrated approach to natural hazard-resistant design; adopting country-specific standards; establishing performance standards for infrastructure; understanding the secondary effects of each natural hazard; retrofit, repair, and strengthening; implementing the scenarios that facilitate planning for the expected and the unexpected. А strong earthquake of the magnitude that might occur in the Sofia seismic area could produce disastrous damage within a large region, followed by numerous serious consequences for a broader region as regards communications, lifelines, etc. The population of Sofia is expanding and has a strong tendency to live in everlarger and more complex urban settings. The decision makers at all levels and the scientific community, must recognise that Sofia has a set of urban systems related to security, energy, water, nutrition, economics and environment, and that in future Sofia’s urban “system of systems” will become more and more vulnerable to seismic hazard. Recent earthquakes prove once more that for urban areas to be safe and sustainable, long-range urban planning must be implemented, based on multidisciplinary risk assessment tools. The city of Sofia is the main administrative centre of Bulgaria, with the greatest density of population in the country. The Greater Sofia Municipality includes 61 settlements, of which 4 are towns – Sofia, Bankya, Buhovo and Novi Iskar. More than 1.5 million people live in the Municipality in an area of 1310 km2, so the population density is about 1145 per km2. City housing consists of 475,900 units covering an area of approximately 30 km2. Sofia is a major administrative centre with a dense infrastructure connected to important international railway and automobile routes from Western Europe to Istanbul via Belgrade, and from Greece and Macedonia to the Middle East. Large industrial zones are located in its vicinity. The challenge of urban hazard mapping (Bonchev et al. 1982) is to predict the ground motion effects related to various sources, path and site characteristics, not just at a single site but over an extended region, and to do so with an acceptable level of reliability. The difficulty of this challenge is manifested in the spatially irregular patterns of damage that are typically observed after major earthquakes. The conventional approach to zonation of ground shaking hazards in urban regions assumes also that the geology can be characterised by a horizontally stratified medium and that only the few most superficial tens of meters influence the ground motion characteristics. Seismic zonation consists of linking together site-by-site estimates of site response. Practice has shown that such an approach may significantly underestimate the amplitude and duration of strong ground motion, with energy getting trapped within sedimentary basins due to critical reflections at the edges of the basin. The rapid increase in the develop-

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

39

ment of efficient computational methods and procedures for modelling seismic wave propagation in laterally varying geological structures, enables us to model the effects of sedimentary basins on the ground motion generated by scenario earthquakes. In general there are two main classes of methods used to generate synthetic ground motion: numerical and analytical methods. To make use of the advantages of each method, analytical and numerical approaches can be combined in the so-called hybrid techniques. Fäh et al. (1993, 1994) developed a hybrid method that combines the modal summation technique (Panza 198, Panza and Suhadolc 1987, Florsch et al. 1991, Panza et al. 2000), used to describe the seismic wave propagation in the anelastic bedrock structure with the finite difference method (Virieux 1986, Levander 1988) used for the computation of wave propagation in the anelastic, laterally inhomogeneous sedimentary media. The calculations are performed separately for the SH and P-SV waves. By using finite difference techniques it is possible to compute the complete wave field up to a given frequency threshold throughout an entire urban region. The hybrid approach, applied in this study has already proved its capabilities for several major sites in different regions: Mexico City, Rome and Naples, Bucharest, Thessaloniki, Beijing, Ruse (Kouteva et al. 2004), Sofia (Paskaleva 2002). The hybrid approach is increasingly being used to constrain those aspects of ground motion prediction that are poorly constrained by recorded strong motion data, as in the case of Sofia city (Nenov et al. 1990). Therefore, the aim of this study is to: (1) contribute to the earthquake hazard assessment of Sofia, providing earthquake scenarios consistent with the recent geological outline and the regional earthquake hazard at Sofia; (2) supply synthetic seismic signals computed using available sources and structural models; (3) provide site response estimates for Sofia based on the chosen earthquake scenarios; (4) show how to use the created database of seismic and seismic engineering parameters. The recent deterministic calculations (Panza et al. 2000) show a significant range (15–30 cm) of maximum displacements in the Sofia region. This study considers shallow seismicity, limiting the computations to epicentral distances shorter than 90 km. The hypocentral depth considered is 10km for events with magnitude less than M = 7, and 15 km for larger events. The subject of this work is to demonstrate some assessments of the maximum expected displacements for the central part of the capital of Sofia using the uniform risk spectrum (Josifov, Paskaleva 1999), taking into account recent manifestations of seismotectonic activity (Matova 2001) and local geological conditions (Ivanov et al. 1998, Frangov, Ivanov 1999). The accelerated, and often uncontrolled, growth of cities has contributed to the ecological transformation of their immediate surroundings. Factors contributing to urban vulnerability include: sinking or rising of the water table, subsidence, loss of bearing capacity of soil foundations and instability of slopes. Recent catastrophic earthquakes highlight other key deficiencies and trends in the approach to disaster risk reduction, such as a poor understanding by decision makers of seismic related risk, as well as the tendency of some builders to use the cheapest designs and construction materials to increase short-term economic returns on their investment. There is a wide variety of ways in which disaster risk can be reduced as part of development policies. These involve gender-sensitive regulatory and legal measures, institutional reforms, improved analytical and methodological capabilities, education, awareness, financial planning and political commitment. Disaster reduction is aimed at motivating societies at risk to become engaged in the conscious management of risk

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

and reduction of vulnerability. This calls for strong coordination mechanisms, such as appropriate institutional structures for disaster management, preparedness, emergency response and early warning, as well as the incorporation of disaster reduction concerns in national planning processes. As location is the key factor determining the level of risk associated with a hazard, land-use plans and mapping should be used as tools to identify the most suitable usage for vulnerable areas (e.g., location of buildings, roads, power plants, storage of fuels). Therefore the present collection of papers contributes state of the art information about seismic hazard mapping in the megacities studied and other large urban areas. Losses from earthquakes will continue to increase if we do not shift towards proactive solutions. Disaster reduction is both an issue for consideration in the sustainable development agenda and a crosscutting issue relating to the social, economic, environmental and humanitarian sectors.

Geological Outline The input data, necessary for ground motion simulation with the hybrid approach, consist of the regional bedrock model, the laterally heterogeneous local model, and the earthquake source model. To prepare the input data for this study, a broad range of information recently collected for the Sofia valley has been analyzed and assessed (Shanov et al. 1998, Ilieva and Josifov 1998, Solakov et al. 2001. Sofia city is situated in the central southern part of the Sofia kettle, a continental basin in southern Bulgaria, filled with Miocene-Pliocene sediments. The bedrock is represented by heterogeneous (in composition) and different (in age) rocks, which outcrop within the depression. The Sofia kettle is filled with Neogene and Quaternary sediments and its thickness reaches 1200m near the town of Elin Pelin. From the structural point of view, the Sofia kettle represents a complex, asymmetric block structure graben, located in the West Srednogorie region, with an average altitude of about 550 m. Active tectonic movements affected the basement of the kettle and formed its block structure (Ilieva and Josifov 1998). The most uplifted block is the one in the centre of the capital, near the Sofia thermal spring, and the most subsided one is in the region of the town of Elin Pelin. During the last 25–30 years large amounts of geological and geophysical data have been collected: 180 boreholes have been drilled down to the Preneogene basement, and 354 km of seismic profiles have been analyzed. The seismotectonic conditions are most dangerous in the middle and in the southern parts of the Sofia graben, where the city of Sofia is situated. The Sofia valley is situated in the northernmost part of the Central-Balkan neotectonic region. Following the investigations carried out on the recent geodynamic features of the Sofia complex a geological and geophysical 3D model of the Earth’s crust for that region has been derived (Shanov et al. 1998). The analysis of the seismotectonic setting and of the structure of the basement of the Sofia depression is used to specify the reference structural model. The P-wave velocities of the 1D regional structural model are taken from Shanov et al. 1998. The data for the quality factor for P-waves, Qp, have been taken from (Dziewonski and Anderson 1981). The Sofia area, with the traces of the considered profiles, is shown in Fig. 1b. The laterally heterogeneous models, corresponding to the profiles, are defined from in-situ and standard laboratory tests given in Table 1 (Ivanov 1998, Ivanov et al. 1998, Paskaleva et al. 2004a, 2004b).

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

41

Table 2. The most destructive historical earthquakes which occurred on the territory of Bulgaria Year

Place

Magnitude

536

NE Bulgaria

7.5

542

NE Bulgaria

7.5

553

NE Bulgaria

7.5

1444

NE Bulgaria

7.5

1641

S Bulgaria

7.0

1750

S Bulgaria

7.5

1858

Sofia

6.5

1901

Shabla

7.2

1904

Kresna

7.8

1913

G. Oriahovitza

7.0

1928

Chirpan

7.0

1986/Feb

Strazhitza

5.5

1986/Dec

Strazhitza

5.7

Local Seismicity Bulgaria is a country with a high level of seismic hazard (Bonchev et al. 1982). In fact the strongest earthquake in Europe, Kresna 1904, M = 7.8 originated in Bulgaria. The most destructive historical earthquakes to have occurred on Bulgarian territory are listed in Table 2 (after Orozova et al. 1996). Strong earthquakes, with a magnitude of up to M 7, have hit Sofia in past centuries. During the 19th century there were two destructive earthquakes, in 1818 (M s ~ 6.0) and 1858 (M s ~ 6.5), and several others with macroseismic intensity between I and VI – VII (MSK – 6.4) have been reported (Watzov 1902, Bonchev et al. 1982, Shebalin et al. 1998, Solakov et al. 2001. The strongest events which occurred in the region are the earthquakes of 18/30.9.1858. The hypocenters were under the town itself and the intensity is evaluated to be IX MSK (Christoskov et al. 1989). The detailed description and summary of the local seismicity in the vicinity of Sofia can be found in Solakov et al. 2001, Slavov et al. 2004. The strong and moderate earthquake epicentres are concentrated along the faults and in the fault crossing joints, mainly in the central and in the southern parts of the Sofia graben. In the recently compiled earthquake catalogue (Shebalin et al. 1998) for the region of Sofia, limited by the rectangle 42.25 N, 22.75 E – 43.25 N, 24.00 E, 79 events within the magnitude interval M = 4.0–7.0 have been detected for the time period 1687–1990. An epicentral map of all reported seismic events with magnitude, M, in the range 4.0–7.0 are given in Matova 2001. There is a mobile sector of the Vitosha faults in the vicinity of the Boyana quarter of the Sofia City, that can be related to the 1858 Sofia earthquake (M = 6.5–7.0). Parameterization of the Earthquake Scenarios When the ground motions for evaluation and design are characterised by a scenario earthquake, the primary earthquake source parameter is the magnitude or seismic mo-

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

ment of the scenario earthquake. In a deterministic analysis, the scenario earthquake is typically the largest earthquake that is expected to occur on the source that controls the seismic hazard around the city. Alternatively, a possible scale of scenario earthquakes is: disastrous (average return period about 500 years), very strong (average return period 200–250 years), strong (average return period 120–140 years) and frequent (average return period 50–60 years). The maximum macroseismic intensity at Sofia, I = IX (MSK), observed in 1858 (Bonchev et al. 1982), can be expected to occur with a return period of 150 years (Christoskov et al. 1989), i.e. it could correspond to the strong scenario earthquake. Recently seismic hazard maps of the Circum – Pannonian Region (Panza and Vaccari 1995, Gorshkov et al. 2000), show that Sofia is placed in a node having potential for the occurrence of an earthquake with M > 6.5 and that it could suffer macroseismic intensity up to X. The seismicity of the Sofia region is limited to the upper 20–30 km of the lithosphere. A maximum macroseismic intensity I = VIII can be expected at Sofia (Glavcheva and Dimova 2003), if an earthquake with maximum magnitude Mmax = 7 (Bonchev et al. 1982) occurs at a depth of about 20 km, and a maximum macroseismic intensity IX (and higher) can be provoked by an event with Mmax = 7 and focal depth around 10 km. In the computations carried out in this study, on the basis of the earthquake history at Sofia and on the available seismic hazard assessments provided in the literature, earthquake scenarios have been considered to correspond to seismic sources, located at 10 km distance from the centre of the city in the West and South directions (Christoskov et al. 1989, Alexiev and Georgiev 1997, Slavov 2004, Matova 2001, Solakov et al. 2001). To complete scenarios the conservative combinations of information available in the literature (Alexiev and Georgiev 1997, Slavov 2000) has been considered. The assumed source parameters, common to all cases, are chosen to approximate the seismic event which hit Sofia in 1858. The parameters of the source mechanism adopted are: strike angle 340°, fault dip 77° and rake (with respect to strike) 285°. This source mechanism conditionally called “SM3” has been used to generate seismograms along the profiles shown in Fig. 1b and named: 1A-1B “Sofia 1” (M1), 2C-2D “Sofia 2” (M2) and 3E-3F “Sofia 3” (M3).

The Results Realistic synthetic seismic signals have been generated for all sites of interest along the profiles shown in Fig. 1 (~ 100 sites per profile), adopting the parameters: M = 7, hypocentral depth 10 km, epicentral distance from the beginning of each profile 10 km (Paskaleva 2002). Two groups of experiments have been performed: (A) ground motion modelling in 1D layered anelastic media, applying an algorithm based on the modal summation method (Panza 1995, Panza and Suhadolc 1987), and (B) modelling in laterally heterogeneous media, making use of the hybrid technique (Fäh et al. 1993, 1995a, 1995b) (see Fig. 2). The chosen frequency range (up to 5 Hz) comprehends the free period of oscillation of the built environment elements present in Sofia. Along the profiles (Fig. 1) time histories for acceleration, velocity and displacement are computed for all ground motion components: transverse (TRA), radial (RAD) and vertical (VERT). Different quantities of earthquake engineering interest, like peak ground accelerations (PGA), peak

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

43

Figure 2. General scheme of the model adopted for the numerical experiments.

ground velocities (PGV) and response spectra amplitudes (SA) are derived from the computed seismic signals. The maximum PGA is obtained for model M2 in the RAD component (PGA = 932 cm/s2 and mean PGA as mean from PGA from the all receivers along the profile M2 (PGAmean = 453 cm/s2). Such high values of PGA are in agreement with the reports (Petkov and Christoskov 1965, Petrov and Iliev 1970, Christoskov et al. 1989, Matova 2001, Todorovska et al. 1995) about the damage caused by the 1858 earthquake. This event allowed for some quite reliable magnitude and intensity estimations (M = 6.5–7.0 and I0~IX MSK) (Solakov et al. 2001). The PGV for the horizontal components reaches 60.3 cm/s for the model M3 while for the vertical component, for model M1, PGV is 65 cm/s. The site amplification is determined in terms of response spectra ratio (RSR) (i.e. the response spectra computed from the signals synthesised along the laterally varying section and normalised by the response spectra computed from the corresponding signals, synthesised for the bedrock reference regional model) have been determined. The peak values of the RSR increase by more than a factor of two along the profile M3 from South to North, following the deepening of the sedimentary basin. There are sites, at epicentral distances between 12 km and 17 km, where the amplification is relevant in both horizontal components RAD and TRA. The maximum amplifications are found in M1 for the vertical component (VERT) (RSR~1.6) and for the transverse component (TRA) (RSR~ 5.6), while the maximum value is found in M2 (RSR~2.7) for the radial component (RAD).

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

The site amplification estimated in terms of the distribution of RSR versus frequency along the profile M1 shows that the RAD amplification reaches 2.5 (1.0–2.75 Hz), The TRA component is amplified up to 3.3 (1.5–2.5 Hz), and the VERT RSR goes up to 4 within the frequency interval 0.5–4.0 Hz. If the scenario earthquake strikes the profile Sofia 1 then the ground motion at the site for VERT can be amplified up to more than 16 times within the frequency interval 1.25–2 Hz. Realistic synthetic seismic signals have been generated for all sites of interest along the profiles as shown in Fig. 5 (~100 sites per profile), adopting the following source parameters: M = 7, hypocentral depth 10 km, epicentral distance to the beginning of each profile: 10 km (Paskaleva 2002). Two groups of experiments have been performed: (A) ground motion modelling in 1D layered anelastic media, applying an algorithm based on the modal summation method (Panza 1985, Panza and Suhadolc 1987), and (B) modelling in 2-D laterally heterogeneous media, making use of the hybrid technique (Fäh et al. 1993, 1994 a, b). The chosen frequency range (up to 5 Hz) comprehends the proper period of oscillation of the built environment elements present in Sofia. Synthetic accelerograms at selected receivers along the profiles investigated for M1 are illustrated in Fig. 3. The laterally varying part of the M1 is shown on the left. For all three profiles acceleration, velocity and displacement time histories are obtained for all ground motion components: transverse (TRA), radial (RAD) and vertical (VERT). Different quantities of earthquake engineering interest, like peak ground accelerations (PGA), peak ground velocities (PGV) and response spectra amplitudes (SA) are derived from the computed seismic signals. For this study a scaled point source is assumed. The scaling is done as empirically determined from global observations (Gusev A. 1983). Comparison between 2-D spectral acceleration values computed with the velocity profiles M1, M2, M3 one-dimensional calculations WAVES technique for three stations placed on the profiles (see Fig. 4). The maximum of the predominant period in the response spectrum for the horizontal components is T = 0.42–0.95 s and mean T = 0.28–0.47 s. Most of the values of the predominant first period for depth 30m from the surface Fig. 7, calculated using WAVES program are very closed to the mean period of this study which stress on the possibility of resonance in the area included between the three models under consideration for this seismic scenario. The comparison between the response spectrum along the profiles from this study and the spectrum in the Bulgarian code’87 spectrum for Sofia “B” soil conditions show that the synthetic spectrum RAD component is dominant almost for the full length of the profiles. For TRA component scenario spectrum is dominant only to the distance 15 km from the source. For the discussed earthquake scenario, six homogeneous zones could be identified (Fig. 5, lower left frame), and the average and maximum response spectra have been computed for each zone. The maximum response spectra for 5% damping for the zones is shown in Fig. 5. With a solid line the result from this study is shown. The thin line is the BG code’87 design spectrum. For each spectrum the distance range R (km), measured from the beginning of the profile, where the spectrum is applicable, is specified. The maximum particle velocity for the zone as an indicator of the strain is written too.

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

Figure 3.

T max (sec)

1

Tmin = 0.20 sec Tmax = 0.75 sec Tmean = 0.47 sec sigma =0.22 sec

0.8 0.6

T30 =0.8 sec

0.4 0.2

SF1 TRA

0 10

12

14

16

18

20

22

24

Distance from the source (km) Figure 4a. The maximum of the predominant period in the response spectrum for the TRA horizontal component model M1. Star shaped -predominant first period for depth 30 m from the surface using WAVES program.

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I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

1

Tmin = 0.17 sec Tmax = 0.42 sec Tmean= 0.29 sec sigma =0.07 sec

T m ax (s ec)

0.8 0.6

T30=0.30 sec

0.4 0.2

SF1 RAD

0 10

12

14

16 18 Distance from the source (km)

20

22

24

Figure 4b. The maximum of the predominant period in the response spectrum for the RAD horizontal component model M1. Star shaped -predominant first period for depth 30 m from the surface using WAVES program.

T m ax (sec)

1

Tmin= 0.18 sec T30=1.04 sec Tmax= 0.60 sec Tmean= 0.35 sec sigma =0.142 sec

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

T30=0.30 sec

SF2 TRA

0 10

12

14

16

T30=0.28 sec

18

20

22

Figure 4c. Same as Fig. 4a for TRA horizontal component model M2.

T m a x ( se c )

1

Tmin = 0.17 sec Tmax = 0.95 sec Tmean= 0.32 sec sigma =0.157 sec

T30=1.04 sec

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

T30=0.30 sec

T30=0.28 sec

SF2 RAD 10

12

14

16

18

20

Figure 4d. Same as Fig. 4b RAD horizontal component model M2.

22

47

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

T m ax (sec)

1 0.8

T30=0.72 sec

T30=0.8 sec

T30=1.0 sec

0.6

Tmin = 0.17 sec Tmax = 0.75 sec Tmean = 0.36 sec sigma =0.21 sec

0.4 0.2

SF3 TRA

0 10

12

14

16

18

20

22

Figure 4e. Same as Fig. 4a TRA horizontal component model M3.

T m a x ( se c )

1 0.8

T30=0.72 sec

Tmin = 0.18 sec T30=0.8 sec Tmax = 0.50 sec Tmean= 0.28 sec sigma =0.09 sec

T30=1.0 sec

0.6 0.4 0.2

SF3 RAD

0 10

12

14

16

18

20

22

Figure 4f. Same as Fig. 4b RAD horizontal component model M3.

Some Applications of the Database The standard approach of scaling earthquake ground motion for design applications and earthquake preparedness is based on peak ground acceleration (PGA). This approach is reliable when the physics of the problem depend linearly only on the nature of the low period inertial part of the shaking. The seismic design calculations for special structures start with a selection of a design earthquake that adequately represents the ground motion expected at a particular site that would drive the structure to its critical response, resulting in the highest damage potential (Decanini et al. 2001). This task is not easy and requires a good understanding of the motion parameters that characterise the severity and the damage potential of the earthquake ground motion. Early reliance on PGA seemed very natural to engineers since Newton’s Second Law clearly sets acceleration and the resulting forces in direct proportion. But more often than not, PGA is recognised as a poor parameter for evaluating the damage potential. For example, a large recorded PGA may associate with a short duration impulse of high frequency (so-called acceleration spike) or with a long duration impulse of low frequency (acceleration pulse). In the first case, most of the impulse is absorbed by the inertia of the structure with little deformation since in the second a more moderate acceleration result in significant deformation of the structure. For the second case to use the maximum incremental velocity ( Δ V) is suggested. Incremental velocity represents the area under an acceleration pulse It is well recognised that earthquake ground motion attributes such

48

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

Figure 5. Maximum response spectra for acceleration for the zones defined (left corner of the figure) for 5% damping. The lines: solid-this study; thin BG code’87 design spectrum; R-distance range from the beginning of the profile where spectra is applicable.

as frequency content, duration, velocity, displacement, incremental and Δ V can have profound effects on the structural response than the PGA, particularly in the inelastic range. For long structure and for the nonlinear response analysis the representative surface strain (i.e. ~ velocity) and number of stress reversals that relate to the duration of the ground motion have to be considered too. Practice shows that in long plan structures (life line systems, bridges, dams etc.), the quasi-static deformation of the complete structure may contribute to the largest design levels. Therefore, every sound design approach has to consider all the relevant scaling parameters. In this study the above state is illustrated on examples of Bulgaria and Sofia City. The higher degree of seismic hazard for the territory of Bulgaria (see Table 2) and expected development of the infrastructure forced the investigations of the seismic risk mitigation and safety management. Seismic safety of buried lifeline systems: tunnels, water, gas, oil, power and communication lines, is an important element of earthquake hazard reduction. For the operation of these lifelines during and after an earthquake it is very important to avoid other hazards (fire, environmental problems, etc.). On the other hand the response of pipelines, tunnels, underground facilities, long span bridges and large dams does not depend only on the ground acceleration, but also on the differential motion of the foundations. Usually the efforts are concentrated on mapping the parameter of peak ground accelerations. These types of civil structures are more sensitive to strains in soils than to PGA or response spectrum amplitudes. A simplified procedure for estimation of maximum strains in the soil was proposed by Newmark (1971). Measurements of surface strains from strong ground records in pipes, tunnels and underground structures have been described by Nakamura et al. (1981). The Northridge earthquake (17 Janu-

49

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

ary, 1994 Ml = 6.4, h = 18 km) provided a set of ground-motion recordings with peak ground velocity (PGV) at the surface that exceeded 120 m/s for 31 sites within 40 km from the epicentre. As the largest near-source (Sofia’s maximum expected scenario is stronger M = 6.5–7), strong-motion set yet collected, these recordings provide an important basis for empirical estimates of the site-specific coefficients and damages (Borcherdt 2002). The peak velocities and peak surface strains distribution during the Northridge, California earthquake have been studied by Trifunac and Todorovska 1998, for particular scenario earthquakes as well as for synthetic strong motion time histories (Trifunac and Lee, 1996). The effects of strains in the foundation soil on the deformation and response of extended structures has been studied Trifunac (1990). Todorovska and Trifunac 1996 have compiled the seismic hazard maps of normalised peak strain in the soils during earthquakes for microzonation purposes of Los Angeles. Such maps drawn on the basis of a deterministic or probabilistic approach can be used for design or retrofit structures sensitive to strain differential ground motions (bridges, tunnels, dams, pipelines etc.). The peaks of horizontal strain components, associated with propagation earthquake waves can be approximated by ε ≈ A x /C, where, x is the peak of particle velocity, C is ‘propagation speed’ of strong motion waves in the medium and A is some empirical scaling function (Newmark 1971). The relation between the particle velocity and the strain amplitude is derived by Niemunis 1995. Analyses of the measured and observed strains during the earthquakes can be found in the papers of Nakamura et al. 1981, EERI 1994 and Trifunac et al. 1996, 1998. It is shown that displacements were sufficient to cause loss of bearing support at the ≈ 21 cm hinge seats (EERI, 1994) caused by peak longitudinal strain factor εH ≈ 10–2.5. This value of strain could cause relative motion of about ≈ 20 cm for effective separation length of 70 m, without any contribution from inertial forces. A lot of estimations of the damage provoked by horizontal strain factor εH ≈ 10–2.5–10–2.2 and for vertical εv ≈ 10–3.7 show those differential motions of bridge supports (caused by large strains in the foundation materials) may be large enough to warrant detailed consideration in the design of new structures or in retrofitting of the existing bridges. To interpret the complete problem of the expected damage by the shear strain is beyond the scope of this work. In Table 3, damage criteria observations of Duvall and Fogelson 1962, and Nakamura et al. 1981 and Trifunac et al. 1996 are summarised. In Table 3 the summary of Table 3. Some damage criteria for residential buildings and soils summarised after Duvalland and Fogelson 1962, Nakamura et al. 1981 and Trifunac et al. 1996, 1998 Duvall and Fogelson (1962) estimates V Degree of damage (cm/s) for residential buildings Major > 20

Minor

14 < V < 20

First signs of minor damage

5 < V < 14

Nakamura et al. 1981, Trifunac et al. 1996,1998 observations Type of Soil damage

V (cm/s)

Soil failure, detachment and down – slope movement of soil over bed rock Liquefaction induced sand boils alluvial slide and ground cracking

VH ~ 50 120 VV ~ 15–30

VH ~ 5–115 Vv ~15–30 VH ~ 5–120 Vv ~ 5–50

Strain

10–3.75 < εH > 10–2.40

10–4.25 < εH > 10–3.25 εH > 10–2.20

50

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

strain levels are derived for average shear wave velocity Vs = 200 cm/s. It can be stated Trifunac et al. 1996 that approximate damage criteria of Duvall and Fogelson 1962 (Table 3) are applicable to older buildings and to the construction time before modern earthquake resistant design provisions were implemented. In places where the buildings are more modern and the peak ground velocity reaches values bigger than 50 cm/s such damage criteria may not apply, except to some older buildings. There is no data about the role of the vertical velocity Vv in the damage process. Nakamura et al. (1981), concluded from the measurements in the range εH < 10–4.0 and PGA < 100 cm/s2 that the strain in pipes during earthquake shaking is almost the same as the strain in the surrounding ground. Nakamura et al. (1981), note that peak strains correlate better with PGV than PGA. Since the database from real recordings for Bulgaria and Sofia is limited (Nenov, 1991) in this work we estimate peak amplitudes of strain functions in time, by synthetic seismograms. To estimate surface strain, we use the ratio between PGV, computed from synthetic velocigrams, and average shear wave velocity in the top 30 m beneath the receiver stations, Vs30mean, for horizontal motions (code provisions suggestion).

Seismic Hazard Computations To create a “database” with a set of the synthetic seismograms for analysis of peak strain, two programs have been applied. A programme for deterministic seismic zoning of the territory of Bulgaria and a programme applying a hybrid technique, based on the modal summation technique and finite differences for maximum expected scenario (M = 7) for Sofia were used (Panza 1985, Panza et al. 2001, Paskaleva et al. 2004). Starting from the structural models and seismic sources, synthetic seismograms are computed on a dense grid with cells 0.20 × 0.20 by modal summation method (Panza, 1985) for point double – couple sources. The computations are made for the frequency range from 0.005 to 1.0 Hz. The peak velocities were found at many receivers of grid with cells 0.20 × 0.20 on the surface throughout the whole of the country. In this way we created a database which can be used to compute surface peak strains. Horizontal Vmax distributions obtained as a result of the deterministic zonation and from the computed synthetic velocigrams are shown in Fig. 6 for the case when seismic sources in Bulgaria only are taken and Fig. 6 include Vrancea seismic source. Neglecting the Vrancea source would seriously underestimate the hazard and severity of the seismic shaking specially for N-E Bulgaria. The values of horizontal strain factor Log10ε were estimated from velocity map Fig. 6. The strain factor Log10ε distribution is shown in Fig. 7 supposing Vs = 200 m/s for the first 2 to 3 meters. The largest computed surface strain factor Log 10ε = –2.3 was seen at the receivers around North part of Bulgaria due to Vrancea source. The areas with very low strain Log10ε > –3.5 are placed in East - South and West - North part of the country. The strain factor reaching –2.8 < Log10ε > –2.5 in a very big area related to Kresna and Sofia seismic sources. The largest surface strain can be found around the towns of Sofia and Russe. As it is seen from the Fig. 6 a fluctuations of the peak strains leading to “spots” of high and low strain areas of irregular shape following the seismic zones. It is evident that the strain distribution on North Bulgaria depends mainly from the Vrancea source (Fig. 6).

51

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

44

ROMANIA

5 5 6

94 92 90 85 80 73

53Ruse 58 61 62 61 64 64 62 58 50 38

Kozloduj

43

F. YUGOSLAVIA

4 5 5 5 7 8 10 12 14 16 19 22 24 28 34 40 44 46 48 49 49 49 48 44 38 33 32 29 25 31 6 5 5 5 8 9 11 13 15 17 19 20 22 24 26 27 28 28 28 27 28 28 27 26 24 23 20 19 31 9 17 18 15 9 10 11 13 14 16 18 19 20 21 22 22 22 22 21 20 20 31 28 25 19 Varna 14 20 23 20 18 15 12 11 12 13 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 17 16 15 14 12 18 20 17 16 21 39 27 23 23 20 12 9 8 11 17 17 17 17 17 17 15 15 14 14 13 12 11 10 11

SOFIA

25 34 21 48 39 39 27 15 13 13 26 23 12 10 8 9 12 13 12 12 12 11 10 10 6 7 42 36 34 49 49 49 23 23 16 15 26 23 14 14 14 14 13 9 6 7 7 8 6 3 3 3

Black Sea

23 26 26 36 42 42 42 27 24 28 28 28 Plovdiv 28 28 28 27 13 9 8 10 9 9 5 3 1

42

34 34 34 34 33 33 25 21 28 28 28 28 28 23 20 15 11 13 13 13 6 34 34 34 34 34 22 16 18 21 22 37 32 28 24 18 13 14 14 34 34 34 24 22 22 16 20 37 37 28 28 18 15 10 34 34 34

24 21 15 21 20 17 11

GREECE

41 22

23

24

25

26

TURKEY 27

28

29

Figure 6. Horizontal PGV distribution (cm/s), obtained as a result of the deterministic zonation, for seismic sources in Bulgaria and including Vrancea source (Panza, G., Vaccary 2000).

44

ROMANIA

-3.9

-2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7

Ruse

-3.8 -3.7

-2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -3.0

Kozloduj

43

42

F. YUGOSLAVIA

-4.0 -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 -3.8 -3.7 -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.1 -3.8 -3.9 -3.9 -3.9 -3.7 -3.9 -4.0 -3.6 -3.5 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.1 -3.7 -3.4 -3.3 -3.4 -3.7 -3.6 -3.6 -3.5 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3Varna -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.5 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.4 -3.5 -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.6 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.5 -3.6 -3.7 -3.5

SOFIA

-3.2 -3.1 -3.3 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0 -3.2 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.2 -3.2 -3.5 -3.6 -3.7 -3.7 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 -3.2 -3.4 -3.4 -3.2 -3.2 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.6 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.7 -3.8

-3.8 -4.2 -4.2

Plovdiv -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.5 -3.6 -3.7 -3.6 -3.6 -3.7 -3.9 -4.1 -4.5 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2

Black Sea

-3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.8 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.4 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.0 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.6 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1

GREECE

41 22

23

24

-3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.4 -3.6

TURKEY

Log strain for soil "A" surface Vs=400m/s 25

26

27

28 BG&VR 29

Figure 7. Horizontal strain factor Log10 ε distribution, obtained as a result of the deterministic zonation, model rock (soil “A”Vs = 400 m/sec) – seismic sources in Bulgaria and including Vrancea source.

Using the strain distribution factor, an illustration for a long structure with span 70 m will cause separation around Russe, about 20cm and for the region around Sofia – 17 cm. Assuming that ground failure is initiated for surface strains ≈ 10–3 and that failure occurs for strains equal to and larger than ≈ 10–2.25 the results can also be used to describe approximately the seismic hazard associated with the initiation of lateral spreading. Vice versa, if the collected post earthquake observations show that the areas under

52

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

44

ROMANIA

-3.6

Ruse

43

F. YUGOSLAVIA

-3.5 -3.4

-2.3 -2.3 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4

-2.6 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.5 -2.6 -2.7

Kozloduj

-3.7 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.5 -3.4 -3.3 -3.2 -3.2 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -2.8 -3.5 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.4 -3.7 -3.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0 -2.8 -3.3 -3.1 -3.0 -3.1 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0Varna -3.0 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 -3.3 -3.2 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.0 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.1 -3.0 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -2.7 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3

SOFIA

-2.9 -2.8 -3.0 -2.6 -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.4 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.3 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.9 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -3.5 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -3.5

-3.5 -3.9 -3.9

Plovdiv -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.2 -3.3 -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.4 -3.6 -3.8 -4.2 42

Black Sea

-2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -3.0 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.0 -3.1 -3.3 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.5 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -2.7 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -3.1 -3.0 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.9 -3.0 -3.1 -3.3 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8

GREECE

41 22

23

24

-2.9 -3.0 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -3.1 -3.3

TURKEY

Log strain soil "C" Vs=200m/s 25

26

27

28 BG&VR29

Figure 8. Horizontal strain factor Log10ε distribution, obtained as a result of the deterministic zonation, (soil “C” Vs = 200 m/s) – seismic sources in Bulgaria and including Vrancea source.

investigation experience severe non-linear deformation of soil near the surface then it can be postulated (ERRI 1994, Trifunac et al. 1998, Borcherdt 2002) that these sites may have experienced strain factors between 10–2.7–10–2.25.

Numerical Simulations for the City of Sofia Calculations have been performed separately for the SH and P-SV waves. By using finite difference techniques it is possible to compute the complete wave field up to a given frequency threshold throughout an entire urban region. Realistic SH- and P-SV – wave signals have been computed for three cross – sections located in central part of Sofia City for one possible source mechanism and maximum expected scenario with magnitude M = 7. The hybrid method used in this approach to model the ground motion at Sofia has the capability to provide realistic acceleration, velocity, and displacement time histories and related quantities of earthquake engineering interest. The crated database, for Sofia, which takes data simultaneously from many disciplines for this scenario, contains important parameters for practical use. Their proper use will lead to an effective reduction in seismic vulnerability. The maximum particle velocities distribution has been used to calculate horizontal strain factor Log10ε distribution, obtained as a result of the 2D zonation of Sofia, given in Fig. 9. The obtained distribution of the surface strain for Bulgaria and for Sofia can be used for assessments of liquefaction susceptibility. The problem of liquefaction exists for the entire territory of Bulgaria as well as for Sofia. The illustration of this real danger is shown in maps Fig. 10 for Bulgaria and the recently drawn Fig. 12 for Sofia.

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

53

Figure 9. Horizontal strain factor Log10ε distribution, obtained as a result of the 2D zonation of Sofia.

Figure 10. A scheme of the distribution of subsiding, collapsible and liquefying sediments on Bulgarian territory (Kamenov, B., and Kojumdjieva, N. (1983) and reference:): 1. Alluvial deposits; clays, sands and gravels (Q); 2. Marine and river clays, sills and sands (Q); 3. Loess sediments (Q); 4. Lake clays, sills, sands and gravels (P).

Liquefaction Susceptibility The energy arriving at a site receiver will be dissipated in the soil and part of this energy will contribute to case increasing in the pore pressure. In the absence of the loads, on the surface the increase in pore pressure can lead to liquefaction. From the map in Fig. 10 of the distribution of subsiding, collapsible and liquefying sediments on Bulgarian territory (Kamenov, Iliev; Minkov 1968), it is evident that more than 40–45% of

54

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

44

ROMANIA

6

Ruse

6 7

24 24 24 23 22 21

18 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 18 16

Kozloduj

43

42

F. YUGOSLAVIA

5 6 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 17 17 18 18 18 17 17 16 15 14 14 13 14 6 6 6 6 76 6 9 9 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 11 14 8 11 11 10 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13 13 11 Varna 10 11 11 10 10 11 9 11 12 12 12 12 11 10 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 12 16 13 12 12 12 9 8 8 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 8 9

SOFIA

13 15 12 18 16 16 13 10 9 9 13 12 9 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 16 15 15 18 18 18 12 12 11 10 13 12 10 10 10 10 9 8 7 7 7 8 6

7 4 4

13 13 13 13 9 8 8 8 8 8 6 5 3 12 13 13 15 16 16 16 13 12 14 14 13 Plovdiv

Black Sea

15 15 15 15 15 15 13 12 14 13 13 13 13 12 11 10 8 9 9 9 7 15 15 15 15 15 12 10 11 12 12 15 14 14 13 11 10 10 10 15 15 15 13 12 12 10 12 15 15 14 13 11 10 8 15 15 15

GREECE

41 22

12 12 10 12 12 11 9

TURKEY

SPT soil "C" overburden 50kPa; Vs=200m/sec 23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Figure 11. Maximum SPT values supposing last 9m with Vs = 200 m/s and overburden pressure σ0 = 50 kPa.

the territory is subject to different geotechnical hazards and can suffer from phenomena such as liquefaction. We have to point out that the capital of the country Sofia is in place subject to such a risk. Figure 11 (the areas confined in a rectangle). There are many places with a capacity for liquefaction. Unfortunately these spots are in the most densely populated parts of the city. As the theory and experience of what leads to liquefaction are still developing we accept in this work the criteria for the initiation of liquefaction when the pore pressure in water-saturated sands reaches the effective confining pressure. The analyses dealing with liquefaction can be divided into two groups: first; estimates of shear stress expected during designed earthquake motion, second; assessed soil strength capacity in terms of the standard penetration tests (SPT). The first method used the results from laboratory-tested samples to establish the level beyond which liquefaction will occur (Seer and Idriss 1982). This level is than related to the expected PGA at the site, and the liquefaction potential is evaluated. In the second approach the empirical results on SPT are related to the stresses in the soil during the ground motion (Iwasaki et al. 1978) or the energy dissipated in the soil by the incident seismic waves (Davis and Berrill 1982, Trifunac 1995). The last method is simple, direct, general and reliable but requires one too employ powerful methods for the evaluation of the expected seismic energy (Berrill, Davis 1995). If the seismic wave energy recorded or calculated at the site receiver is approximated by PGV, E ≈ Vmax 2 dur , dur (represents duration of strong motion as used by Novikova and Trifunac, 1993), the shear stress on the horizontal surface in the layer of sand is proportional to the shear strain (ε) and Lame constant (μ) and the duration of strong motion. Then through the cyclic stress ratio τ/ σ0  a corrected SPT, N values for the overburden pressure (σ0) can be considered in the form N = c (V m ax μ dur / σ 0 ) 1 / n , where c = 0.313 and n = 2.10 are constants from the regression of the observed data on liquefaction (Davis and Berill 1982), Berill and Davis 1985).

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

55

Figure 12. Map of some geological effects in the Sofia city (drawn by Paskaleva, 2002): • 0-clear point; • 0.5-potential land slide; • 1.0-active land slide; • 1.5 potential fault; • 2.5-potential land slide; • 3.5-cros of active and potential faults; • 4-cros of active and potential faults and land slide.

The data gathered by Davis and Berill 1982, Berill and Davis 1985 show that the liquefaction is not likely occur if we have case M < 5.5, σ0 > 150 kPa and corrected SPT values for the target site N > 35. The results as SPT values distribution are shown in Fig. 11 for Bulgaria and Fig. 13 for Sofia, and can support many engineering and managing purposes such as urban planning and earthquake preparedness. To demonstrate another practical application of the database created from generated signals for engineering purposes, urban planning and earthquake preparedness; a code for the computation of the mean number of expected pipe breaks/km2 and the assessment of the expected number of red-tagged buildings has been made on the basis of Dewey et al. (1996) and Bardet and Davis (1996) observations, and Trifunac and Todorovska (1998) analyses. The relations that have been used to assess pipe breaks are derived from the data taken only from the Northridge earthquake (near field area as in the case of Sofia), taking into consideration that the density of the pipes throughout the area is uniform. The relations do not take into account the types of pipes, their age and the nature of breaks. It is assumed also that cell 1 × 1 km2 area act as smoothing filters, eliminating excessive contributions from smaller areas with very large number or with no pipe breaks (Trifunac, Todorovska 1996). The distribution of the number of the pipe breaks for the estimated surface strain field for Sofia is illustrated in Fig. 14. For example if we consider an area 100 km 2, the

56

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

Figure13. Maximum SPT values for Sofia supposing overburden pressure σ0= 25 kPa.

Figure 14. Sofia map of pipe breaks per km2 for synthetic velocigrams (data from all models). The solid line indicates intensity higher than VIII (Northridge earthquake data). In area 100km2 expected min pipe breaks 162, mean 222, maximum 280.

I. Paskaleva / Earthquake Scenarios for the Microzonation of Sofia

57

Figure 15. Sofia map of red-tagged buildings per km2 for synthetic velocigrams (data from all models). In area 100 km2 expected min red-tagged buildings 33, mean 56 maximum 93.

expected minimum pipe breaks are 162, mean 222, maximum 280. And vice versa, the mean number of pipe breaks after the earthquake can be used to estimate surface strain field. The estimated surface strain field for Sofia can also be used to estimate the redtagged buildings distribution over 1 km2. The illustration for Sofia is shown in Fig. 15. From this result for area of 100 km2 expected minimum red-tagged buildings is 33, mean 56 and maximum 93.

Conclusion Sofia is a typical example of large city that is located in a seismic area which could suffer serious damage because of soil conditions, with deep soil deposits and severe local site amplification. The work demonstrates the most recent investigations of the seismicity, seismotectonic and local geological conditions for the Sofia region. The work illustrates the simulation of the ground motion along three cross-sections located in Sofia City. Realistic SH- and P-SV- wave signals are computed for a possible source mechanism and expected scenario with magnitude M = 7. The approach used to model the ground motion at Sofia has proved capable of providing realistic acceleration, velocity, and displacement time histories and related quantities of earthquake engineering interest. The main characteristic of the acceleration time histories is a near-fault impulse type. This means that the input ground motion will generate a sudden burst of energy into the structures, which must be dissipated immediately. This is usually characterised by a single unidirectional large yield excursion in the structural behaviour. The time histories vary significantly between sites, particularly for the small epicentral distances 11–14 km. The motions contain high PGA values, and short duration pulses that can be recognised as acceleration spikes. By taking into account parametric studies, regarding the focal mechanism of the source and the velocity model, it is shown that the hybrid method is a powerful ap-

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proach that may be considered fundamental when adding information to the multidisciplinary database that must be defined for microzonation purposes. The results of this study can readily be applied to site-specific design spectra based on average or maximum amplification and should be followed for site-specific design procedures especially for long structures and underground life line systems more sensitive to near surface stains than to maximum peak ground acceleration. This is a good starting point for the microzonation of Sofia, many more cross-sections and 3-D studies will be required to cover the whole city for the purpose to be clarified and to estimate the maximum expected risk. The obtained results can be used to assess strain surface distribution and liquefaction susceptibility, information that will support many engineering and management purposes such as urban planning and earthquake preparedness. The resulting database, with synthetic accelerograms, which simultaneously takes data from many disciplines, constructs important parameters for practical use. The proper use of these will lead to an effective reduction in seismic vulnerability and to better earthquake preparedness.

Acknowledgements These investigations were carried out with financial support from: NATO SfP project N980468: “Harmonization of the Seismic Hazard and Risk Reduction in Countries Influenced by Vrancea Earthquakes”, ESP CLG N 981966 Vulnerability of High Risk Structures; INTAS- Moldova 2005/05-104-7584: “Numerical Analysis of 3D seismic wave propagation using Modal Summation, Finite Elements and Finite Differences Method”.

References Alexiev, G. and Georgiev, Tz. (1997). Morphotectonics and seismic activity of the Sofia depression. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, J. Problems of geography 1-2, 60-69. Bardet, J. and Davis, C. (1996). Engineering observations of ground motion at the Van Normal complex after the 1994 Nothridge earthquake. Bulletin of the seismological Society of America, 86 (1B), S333-S349. Berrill, J. and Davis, R. (1985). Energy dissipation and seismic liquefaction of sands, revised model, soils and foundations. Jap. Soc. Soil Mech. Found. Eng., 25 (2), pp. 106. Bonchev E., Bune V.I., Christoskov L, Karajuiliva J., Kostadinov V., Reisner G.I., Rizhikova S., Shebalin N., Sholpo V., and Sokerova D. (1982). A method for compilation of seismic zoning prognostic maps for the territory of Bulgaria, Geologica Balkanica 12(2), 3-48. Brankov, G., Vrancea Earthquake in 1977. Its after-effects in the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. (Publ. House of the BAS, Sofia (Red.). 1983), 428 p., (in Bulgarian with English and Russian abstracts). Broutchev, I., Geological hazards in Bulgaria, BAS, (Publishing House of the BAS, Sofia, Editor (1994). Broutchev, I., Tzankov, T., Hristoskov, L., Vaptzarov, I., Paskaleva, I. and Milev, G. (1995). Natural hazards in the Lithosphere on the territory of Bulgaria, Journal of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, CVIII, Vol. 1 (in Bulgarian with English abstract). Bulgarian Seismic Code for design and construction in seismic regions 1987, Sofia. Christoskov, L., Georgiev, Tzv., Deneva, D. and Babachkova, B. (1989). On the seismicity and seismic hazard of Sofia valley, Proc. Of the 4th Int. Symposium on the Analysis of seismicity and seismic risk, Bechyne castle, CSSR, IX, 448-454. Davis, R. and Berrill, J. (1982). Energy dissipation and seismic liquefaction in sands. Earth. Eng. Struct. Dyn., 1982, 10, 51-68. Decanini, L., Mollaioli, F., Panza, G.F., F. Romanelli and Vaccari, F. (2001). Probabilistic vs. deterministic evaluation of seismic hazard and damage earthquake scenarios: a general problem, particularly relevant for seismic isolation, Proc. 7th International Seminar on Seismic Isolation, Passive Energy Dissipation and Active Control of Vibrations of Structures, Assisi, Italy, October 2-5, 2001.

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Dewey, J., Reagor, B. and Dengler, L. (1994). Isoseismal map of the Northridge, California, Earhquake of January 17, 1994.Presented to the Annual Meeting of Seismological Society of America, also reproduced in the introduction of “Northreadge Earthquake Reconnaissance report”, Vol. 1 of Supplement C to Vol. 11 of Eartquake Spectra, April 1995. Duvall, W. and Fogelson, D. (1962). Review of criteria for estimating damage to residence from blasting vibrations, U. S. Dept. of Interior report 5968. Dziewonski, A. and Anderson, D. (1981). Preliminary reference earth model. Phys Earth Planet Int; 25, 297-356. Earthquake Eng. Research Institute (1994). Northridge Earthquake January 17, 1994, Preliminary Reconnaissance Report, EERI 94-01, Oakland, California. Fäh, D., Iodice, C., Suhadolc, P., Panza, G.F. (1993). A new method for the realistic estimation of seismic ground motion in megacities: The case of Rome, Earthquake Spectra 9, 1993: 643-668. Fäh, D., Iodice, C., Suhadolc, P. and Panza, G.F. (1995a). Application of numerical simulations for a tentative seismic microzonation of the City of Rome, Annali di geofisica, Vol. XXXVIII, N. 5-6, Nov. Dec. 1995, 607-615. Fäh, D., Suhadolc, P., Mueller, St. and Panza, G.F. (1995b). A hybrid method for the estimation of ground motion in sedimentary basins; quantitative modelling for Mexico city, BSSA, 84, 383-399. Frangov, G. and Ivanov, Pl. (1999). Engineering Geological Modelling of the Conditions in the Sofia Graben and Land Subsidence Prognoses, Proc. 4rthWG Meeting, Dec. 3-6, 1999, Sofia, 17-13. Glavcheva R. and Dimova S.L. (2003). Seismic risk of the wide-spread residential buildings in Bulgaria. Proceedings of the First International Conference “Natural Risks: Developments, Tools and Technologies in the CEI Area”, Sofia, 4-5 of Nov. 2003. Gorshkov, A., Kuznetzov, I., Panza, G.F. and Soloviev, A. (2000). Identification of future earthquake sources in the Carpatho-Balkan Orogenic belt using Morphostructural criteria. Seismic Hazard of the Circumpannonian Region, PAGEOPH Topical Volumes, Birkhauser Verlag, 79-85. Ilieva, M. and Josifov, D. (1998). Structure of the Preneogene basement in the Sofia depression. Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgarian Geophysical Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1–2 Sofia, 109-120. Ivanov, P. (1997). Assessment of the geological conditions in the Sofia Kettle under seismic impact. Proc. International IAEG Conference, Athens, Balkema, Rotterdam, 1265-1270. Ivanov, Pl., Frangov, G. and Yaneva, M. (1998). Engineering geological characteristics of quaternary sediments in the Sofia graben. Proc. 3rd WG Meeting, Dec. 2-5, Sofia, 33-37. Gusev, A. (1983). Descriptive statistical model of earthquake source radiation and its application to estimation of short—period strong motion, Geophys. J. R. Astron. Soc. 74, 787-800. Levander, A.R. (1988). Fourth-order finite-difference P-SV seismograms. Geophysics, 53, 1425-1436. Lokmer, I., Herak, M., Panza, G.F. and Vaccari, F. (2002). Amplification of strong ground motion in the city of Zagreb, Croatia, estimated by computation of synthetic seismograms. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering 22: 105-113. Ivanov, Pl., Frangov, G. and Yaneva, M. (1998). Engineering geological characteristics of quaternary sediments in the Sofia graben, Proc. 3rd WG Meeting, Dec. 2-5, Sofia, 33-37. Iwasaki, T., Tatsuoka, F., Takida, K. and Yasuda, S. (1978). A practical method for assessing soil liquefaction potential based on case histories at various sites in Japan. Proc. 2nd Int. Conf. Microzonation for Safer Construction Research and Applications, Vol. 2, 885-896. Kamenov, B., and Kojumdjieva, N. (1983), Stratigraphy of the Neogene in Sofia basin, paleontology, stratigraphy and lithology 18, 69-85. Kouteva, M., Panza, G.F., Paskaleva, I. and Romanelli, F. (2004). Modelling of the ground motion at Russe site (NE Bulgaria) due to Vrancea Earthquakes. Journal of Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 8, N 2, 209-229. Matova, M. (2001). Recent manifestations of seismotectonic activity in Sofia region and their land subsidence potential. Proc. Final Conf. of UNESCO -BAS Project on land subsidence, June 27-30, 2001, Sofia, 93-98. Nakamura, Y. (1989). A method for dynamic characteristics estimation of subsurface using microtremor on the ground surface, Q. Rept. Railway Tech. Res. Inst., 30, 25-33. Nakamura, M., Katayama, T. and Kubo, K. (1981). Quantitative analysis of observed seismic strains in underground structures, Bull. Earthqu. Structure research Center, N 14, 55-77, Institute of industrial Science, University of Tokyo. Newmark, N. and Rosenblueth, E. (1971). Fundamentals of Earthquake Engineering, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Niemunis, A. (1995). On estimation of the amplitudes of shear strain from measurements in situ, Soil Dynamics Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 14, 1-3. Novikova and Trifunac, M. (1993). Duration of strong earthquake ground motion: physical basis and empirical equations. Dept. of Civil Eng., Rep. NCE93-02. Univ. Southern Cal., LA, California.

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Nenov, D., Georgiev, G., Paskaleva, I., Lee, V. and Trifunac, M. (1990). Strong ground motion data in EQINFOS: Accelerograms recorded in Bulgaria between 1981–1987, Rep. No 90-02, Univ. of South. California. PAGEOPH Seismic Ground Motion in Large Urban Areas, Editors: G. F. Panza, I. Paskaleva and C. Nunziata, PAGEOPH Topical Volume 161, N5/6, 2004; Birkhauser Verlag. Panza, G.F. (1985). Synthetic seismograms: The Rayleigh waves model summation. Journal of Geophysics, 58, 125-145. Panza, G.F. and Suhadolc, P. (1987). Complete strong motion synthetics, in seismic strong motion synthetics, B.A. Bolt (Editor), Academic Press, Orlando, Computational Techniques 4, 153-204. Panza, G.F. and Vaccari F. (2000). Introduction in seismic hazard of the Circum-pannonian region (Editors: G.F. Panza, M. Radulian and C. Trifu), PAGEOPH Topical Volumes, Birkhauser Verlag, 5-10. Panza, G.F., Romanelli, F. and Vaccari, F. (2001) “Seismic wave propagation in laterally heterogeneous anelastic media: theory and applications to the seismic zonation”, Advances in Geophysics, Academic press, 43, 1-95. Paskaleva, I. and Kouteva, M. (2001). A contribution to the seismic risk assessment of Sofia region and the town of Russe from deterministic modelling, Report on bilateral project “Engineering seismic hazard and risk assessment of selected cities in the Balkan region”, May-June, 1-100. Paskaleva I. (2002). Contribution to the seismic risk assessment of the Sofia city. Report on CNR- NATO program, 65, Announcement, 219.33, May-October 1-100. Paskaleva I., Matova, M. and Frangov, G. (2004a). Expert assessment of the displacements provoked by seismic events: Case study for the Sofia metropolitan area. PAGEOPH, 161, N5/6: 1265-1283. Paskaleva I., Panza G.F., Vaccari, F. and Ivanov, P. (2004b). Deterministic modelling for microzonation of Sofia – an expected earthquake scenario. Acta Geod. Geoph. Hung., Vol. 39(2-3): 275-295. Petkov, I. and Christoskov, L. (1965). On seismicity in the region of the town of Sofia concerning the macroseismic zoning. Annaly Sofia University, 58: 163-179. Petrov, P. and Iliev, I. (1970). The effect of engineering geological conditions on seismic microzoning in Sofia, Proc. of the 3rd Eur. Symposium on EE, Sofia, Sept. 14-17, 79-86. Shanov, S., Tzankov, Tz., Nikolov, G., Bojkova, A. and Kurtev, K. (1998). Character of the recent geodynamics of Sofia complex graben. Review of the Bulgarian Geological Society, Vol. 59, part I, 3-12. Shebalin, N., Leydecker, G., Mokrushina, N. Tatevossian, R., Erteleva, O. and Vassiliev, V., (1999). Earthquake Catalogue for Central and Southeastern Europe 342 BC – 1990 AD, European Commission, Report No. ETNU CT 93 – 0087. Slavov, Sl., Paskaleva, I., Vaccari, F., Kouteva, M. and Panza, G.F. (2004). Deterministic earthquake scenarios for the city of Sofia, PAGEOPH 161, N5/6, 1221-1237. Solakov D., Simeonova, St. and Christoskov, L. (2001). Seismic hazard assessment for the Sofia area. Annali di Geofisica; Vol. 44, No. 3: 541-556. Stanishkova, I. and Slejko, D. (1991). Seismic hazard of the main Bulgarian cities, atti del 10o Convegno Annuale del Gruppo Nazionale di geologica della terra solida; Roma. Sun, R., Vaccari, F., Marrara, F. and Panza, G.F. (1998). The Main features of the local geological conditions can explain the macroseismic intensity caused in Xiji-langfu (Beijing) by the MS = 7.7 Tangshan 1996 earthquake, PAGEOPH, 152: 507-521. Todorovska, M., Paskaleva, I. and Glavcheva, R. (1995). Earthquake source parameters for seismic hazard assessment: examples of Bulgaria, Proc.10th ECEEAug.28-Sept.2, Vienna, Austria. Todorovska M. and Trifunac, M. (1996). Hazard mapping of normalised peak strain in soils during earthquakes: microzonation of a metropolitan area. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 15, 321-329. Triantafyllidis, P., Hatzidimitriou, P.M., Suhadolc, P. and Theodulidis, N., Pitilakis, (1998). Comparison between 1-D and 2-D site effects modelling of Thessaloniki, in: the effects of the surface geology on seismic motion, (Editors: K. Irikura, K.) Balkema, Rotterdam, 2, 981-986. Trifunac, M. (1990). How to model amplification of strong earthquake ground motion by local soil and geologic site conditions, Earthqu. Eng. Struct. Dynam., 19(6): 833-846. Trifunac, M. and W. Lee. (1996). Peak surface strains during strong earthquake motion, Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 15, 311-319. Trifunac, M. and Todorovska, M. (1996) Nonlinear soil response – 1994 Northridge California, Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, 725-735. Trifunac, M. and Todorovska, M. (1998). Amplification of strong ground motion and damage patterns during the 1994 Northridge California, Earthquake. Proc. 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Trifunac, M. and Todorovska, M. (1997b). Northridge California, earthquake 1994: density of pipe breaks and surface strains. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 16 193-207. Trifunac, M., Todorovska, M. and Ivanovic, S. (1996). Peak velocities and peak surface strains during Northridge California, earthquake 1994. Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 15 p. 301-310. Vaccari, F., Gregersen, S., Furlan, M. and Panza, G.F. (1989). Synthetic seismograms in laterally heterogeneous, anelsatic media by modal summation of P-SV waves, Geoph. J. Int. 99, 285-295. Vaccari, F., Nunziata, C., Fäh D., Panza, G.F. (1995). Reduction of seismic vulnerability of megacities: the cases of Rome and Naples, Proc. 5th Int. Conf. on Seismic Zonation, EERI, Oct., Nice, France, 1392-1399. Virieux, J. (1984). SH-velocity-stress Finite-difference method: velocity-stress finite-difference method, Geophysics; 49: 1933-1957. Virieux, J. (1986). “P-SV wave propagation in heterogeneous media: velocity-stress finite-difference method”, Geophysics; 51: 889-901. Watzov, Sp. (1902). Tremblements de terre en Bulgaria au XIX siecle, IMPR. DE L’ETAT, Sofia, Bulg., 95 (in Bulgarian). Yossifov D. and Paskaleva, I. (1999). “Real Danger for Sofia, Journal Mining and Geology”, 22-27, Vol. 9.

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-62

Earthquakes and the Vulnerability of Industries – A Concept for the German Mining Industry Tobias RUDOLPH 1

Abstract. In general analyses of earthquakes often only the vulnerability of surface installations is considered, without subsurface installations. But in the last decades, insurance assessments of losses due to earthquake catastrophes showed the need for a more detailed assessment of vulnerability to earthquakes. Therefore it is also necessary to precisely understand the exposure of subsurface installations. Research results identified the possibility of a categorisation and classification of damage to surface and subsurface installations of mines related to tectonic earthquakes. Collapses have the biggest impact for underground structures, whereas the surface installations suffer from damage to buildings and their contents. An interesting feature is the link between surface and subsurface damage scenarios. This leads to extensive economic loss, which could influence a whole region. The transposition of the loss scenarios to the German Mining industry indicated only a minor vulnerability. This is due to lower earthquake intensities. Keywords. Earthquakes, Mining Industry, Germany, Risk-Index

Introduction Earthquakes are natural hazards which cause damage to people, environment and objects. The most important natural hazards are: − − − − − − − − − − −

Earthquakes Volcanic eruptions Mass movements Subsidence Storms Lighting Heavy rain Flood Storm surges Frost Fire

The probability of the occurrence of natural catastrophes is not always the same, but depend on the environment. The occurrences of natural catastrophes of high intensity together with dense populations and high accumulation of property are the re1 Dr. Tobias Rudolph, De Perponcherstraat 79-1, 2518 SP Den Haag, The Netherlands, [email protected].

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Table 1. The costliest natural catastrophes in history, ranked by economic loss (MUNICH RE 2005, 2006) Economic Losses1

Insured Losses1

Year

County, Region

Event

2005

USA

Hurricane Katrina

1995

Japan, Kobe

Earthquake

1994

USA, California

1998

China

2004

Japan, Niigata

Earthquake

28,000

450

1992

USA

Hurricane Andrew

26,500

17,000

1996

China

Floods

24,000

445

2004

USA, Caribbean

Hurricane Ivan

23,000

11,500

1993

USA

Floods

21,000

1,270

2004

USA, Caribbean

Hurricane Charley

18,000

8,000

1

125,000

60,000

> 100,000

3,000

Earthquake

44,000

15,300

Floods

30,700

1,000

Original losses in Million US $

quirements for a catastrophic event. The ranking of the impact of earthquake catastrophes of the 20th and 21st century shows that the economic loss due to the Earthquake at Kobe, Japan in 1995 and the earthquake at Los Angeles/Northridge, USA, 1994 are as high as of losses due to hurricanes (Table 1). The reasons for the increase of losses due to natural catastrophes are: (a) the increase in population, (b) the rise in property values and the concentration in cities and regions with a high exposure, (c) the increase of insurance and (d) the increase of insurance coverage. Earthquakes Earthquakes are natural events which generally occur without warning. They are spontaneous and are triggered by tectonic or volcanic events or collapses in shallow subsurface structures. Besides these natural events, earthquakes of less magnitude can also be human induced. But such non-natural events are not covered by this paper. The consequences of earthquakes include several seismic effects. Mostly these are the ground motions and the reactivations of faults which cause mass movements and liquefactions of soils. Liquefaction is an effect in water saturated soils where the seismic motions change solid soils to viscous liquids. Earthquakes do not have a direct impact for people, because the ground motions themselves are not dangerous, but the consequences of damage may harm people. Therefore earthquakes can cause damage to people, objects and also result in economic loss. But it is important to differentiate between primary losses like the direct impact of the seismic wave and secondary losses such as the consequences of the primary losses. Therefore the secondary losses have more impact than the primary losses. The loss potential of an earthquake depends on the location and the quality of the structure and the infrastructure. Earthquakes with the same ground motions cause different damage to buildings with different structures (GRÜNTHAL 1998). The visible damages due to Earthquakes are described by the intensity and the strength is measured as the magnitude. But the classification of the vulnerability of subsurface installations is different, because they represent a small hole with special dynamics. Damages are generally in-

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Figure 1. Earthquake zonation in Germany. The probability of occurrence is once in 475 years (after Munich Re 2000).

fluenced by: (a) the structure and the depth of the mine, (b) the properties of the subsurface geology, (c) the tectonic setting and (d) the ground motion. The earthquake situation in Europe is that of an intra plate region and the seismic activity is based on the orogenetic activity of the European Alps. In Germany, earthquakes occur along the river Rhine, in the foothills of the Alps and in the Vogtland, Saxony. Figure 1 shows as an example a model of the earthquake zonation of Germany from Munich Reinsurance.

Subsurface Damage Subsurface earthquake damage can be found in the historic literature (R UDOLPH 2002). But it is difficult to extrapolate these damages to the present day because the structure of mines has changed radically through the last centuries. So it is better to evaluate the earthquake damage of more recent events in other countries with a mining industry (Table 2).

T. Rudolph / Earthquakes and the Vulnerability of Industries

65

Table 2. Selection of important subsurface loss events in mining areas Date

Location

Jul 27, 1976 Tangshan, – Jul 28, China 1976

Magnitude

Description

Reference

m1 = 8.0 m2 = 7.4

– Destruction of surface installations – Water inflow due to power failure – Collapse of mine sections – Reactivation of faults

SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Aug 10, 1976 NEIC 2002 YONG et al. 1998 SWISS RE 1992 MRNatCat Service, 2002 (MR197607A001*)

Dec 8, 1976 President m = 5.2 Brand Gold Mine, Welkom, Freestate, South Africa

– Destruction of surface installations LLOYDS WEEKLY Dec 8, 1976 – Reactivation of a fault NEIC 2005 – Collapse of mine sections – Three miners trapped

Apr 13, 1982

Geduld Gold Mine, Welkom, Freestate

m = 5.0

– Heavy damage to shafts and conveyer belts – 2,000 miners trapped, 23 heavy injuries, 4 fatalities

MR-INFORMATIONSBLATT Nr. 9/10 1982 MRNatCat Service 2002 (MR198204A035*) NEIC 2005

Nov 12, 1996

Lima, Peru

m = 6.5

– Collapse of tunnels – 300 miners trapped – Landslides

REUTERS NEWS SERVICE Nov 13-14, 1996 MRNatCat Service 2002 (199611A003*) NEIC 1996

Apr 22, 1999

Matjhabens m = 5,7 Mine, Welkom, Freestate, South Africa

– Collapse of the power system – Jamming of the shafts – Rock falls and landslides – 1,000 miners trapped, 2 fatalities

ASSOCIATED PRESS Apr 23, 1999 MRNatCat Service 2002 (MR199904A028) NEIC 2005

Mar 9, 2005

North West m = 5.0 Operations, Stilfontein, North West Province, South Africa

NEIC 2005 – Reactivation of a fault MINING WEEKLY Mar 8–14, – Rock falls and serious damage – Further earth tremors 2005 – 42 Miners stuck in collapsed shafts – Miners trapped at 2,400 m depth, – 40 Miners injured, 2 fatalities – Losses of 231,000 ZAR (38,000 US$) a day, because of a closed shaft

* Database MRNatCatService 2002

The areas with the highest damage impact are the parts of the mine with complete collapses, rock falls and collapses of shafts (Fig. 2). Collapses or movements of parts of mine sections often occur in the shallower subsurface structures. The collapse of shafts and consequent blockage halts production and the transport of material and personnel. This can even happen without damage to deeper subsurface structures. Often heavily supported subsurface structures move together with the surrounding rocks, but the connections are vulnerable. In areas with roof bolts as the only support the probability of rock falls is high. Hence the factor with the highest impact on vulnerability is the geology. Whether the mine is constructed in an area mostly containing sedimentary or hard rocks is very important, because the sedimentary rocks amplify the ground motions (CHEN & SONG 1992). It is also impor-

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Figure 2. Collapse of a mining section during the Tangshan earthquake (YONG et al. 1988).

tant to consider whether or not the rocks are laminated and contain a high number of tectonic elements, because in such areas the probability of ground motion is higher than in homogenetic and thick rocks. It is also significant whether the mine is located in an area with active faulting and folding. A high throw along faults could cause complete destruction of the subsurface installations. Therefore sometimes the only solution is to rebuild the whole mine, as happened after the earthquake of Tangshan (SWISS RE 1992). In addition it is important to consider that the surrounding rocks may have a different stability after the earthquake than they did before it. During the subsurface work, mine water and methane will continue to flow into the mine. In shallow sedimentary areas groundwater will also flow into the mine. Earthquake events can emphasise these inflows (CHEN & SONG 1992). In addition the destruction of the ventilation and drainage systems could cause more damage. The main transportation systems in mines are rail tracks and conveyer belts. Seismic effects could destroy these systems where crossing of an active fault generates large dislocations. The chance of machinery turning over is not very likely because of the low centre of gravity and the available space (SWISS RE 1992). Earthquakes could damage or destroy the ventilation, communication, power and drainage systems and directly affect not only the subsurface working conditions but also delay rescue operations. Therefore this kind of damage has the highest impact and could exceed the initial damage. Another risk, which could be significant, is an increased number of earth tremors, dependent on the subsurface geology. Research in the ore mining industry in Austria showed a link between tectonic earthquakes and earth tremors. Here an increase of the number of earth tremors before and after an earthquake was seen (RAINER 1974). The economic losses due to subsurface damage can be very varied. This could have an impact not only for the earthquake region but also outside that region, including, for example, the cost of interruptions to business not only for the mine itself but also for all companies linked to the mine.

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Table 3. Selection of important surface loss events in mining areas Date

Location

Magnitude

Description

Reference

Mar 18, 1971

Chungar, Peru

n.n.

– Landslide caused the break of a tailing dam – Tailing mud destroyed mine buildings and flew into the shafts – Only 25 miners survived

SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG Mar 22, 1971

Dec 8, 1976

President Brand Gold Mine, Welkom, Freestate, South Africa

m = 5.2

– Destruction of surface installations – Reactivation of a fault – Collapse of the mine – Three miners trapped

LLOYDS WEEKLY Dec 8, 1976 NEIC 2005

Surface Damage The damage to the surface installations of mines are similar to normal earthquake damage, but the special local setting of a mine could cause different damage to mines and to the surrounding area (Table 3). The possibility of a damage link between surface and subsurface installations is high. Earthquakes could trigger mass movements along slopes in open pit mines which lead to the destruction of machinery. Often a small event can lead to the collapse of the slope because of the labile balance. The highest vulnerability exists for machinery with a high centre of gravity due to the possibility of turn-overs. It is also possible that extensions or arms of machinery could bend, causing the collapse of the whole unit (SWISS RE 1992). The ground motion may perhaps also destroy transportation units such as rail tracks and conveyer belts. The destruction of communication and supply systems as well as buildings could influence the operability of the mine. The highest vulnerability is that of buildings consisting of different foundations and different heights (Fig. 3). The destruction of buildings could cause secondary damage like fires and explosions. Because the water supply system has probably also been destroyed the losses will increase. Damage to preparation plants could additionally affect the environment. Mass movements at dumps could flow into shafts and block the whole mine subsurface (Table 1). Economic losses, as already described in the previous section, are a problem, because the cost of business interruptions could be huge. An example is the interruption of the coal supply for a region or country.

Discussion of the Vulnerability of Mines with Respect to the German Mining Industry The earthquake exposure of Germany is relatively low, but the direct hit of an earthquake could have a huge impact in a densely populated and highly industrialised region which also then affects mines. The need for an evaluation of the vulnerability of mines was shown in the research of DAENICKE et al. (1999), about the stability of the largest European tailing in Saxony, Germany. This research was the first to demonstrate a link between earthquakes and mines and showed the possible consequences. Based on these

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Figure 3. The Xinfeng shaft tower after the quake (Left figure: Dotted line denotes the tower after the earthquake; solid line denotes the tower before the earthquake) (HUIXIAN et al. 2002).

results the research was continued. The flowchart in Fig. 4 visualises and summarises possible consequences of the different seismic effects. This figure also enables a review of existing mine installations with respect to earthquake resistance. Surface installations are damaged by ground motion, reactivation of faults, landslides, liquefaction and subsidence, whereas the damage to subsurface installations is caused by ground motion, reactivation of faults and mass movements. For a better understanding of the vulnerability and a ranking of the damage the risk index of CHEN & SONG (1992) can be used (Fig. 5). As an example for this calculation the earthquake with the highest observed intensity of I = VIII in Germany is used (Fig. 1). The range of the risk index is between 0.171 and 0.303. The subsurface installations have a “slight damage” risk. The risk index shows that the parameters with the highest impact are the type of crossings, the type of support and the depth of the mine. Local parameters could push the range in either direction. For this example an increase of the earthquake intensity by one unit changes only the range but not the level of the risk index. The most important parameter for the evaluation of the range of damage is depth. An increase of depth indicates a decrease of the earthquake intensity. For the Tangshan earthquake of 1976 WANG (1985) calculated a decrease of the intensity by one unit each 200 meters. An even more conservative approach of a decrease in intensity of only 0.5–1 unit each 200 metres indicates, at a depth of 1,000 metres, only intensities between I =V to I =III for the German Mines (RUDOLPH, SMOLKA & COLDEWEY 2005).

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Figure 4. Flowchart of variations in earthquake damages.

But for the less deep subsurface structures the exposure is higher because of the loose soil layers. The damage to underground installations often occurs not because of the direct destruction but due to the inaccessibility and damaged transportation systems. If the mine is not built with redundancy, the collapse of sections could cause a complete loss. Additional losses could arise due to secondary damage. The additional probability of earth tremors is less in Germany because of the less active tectonic situation. Due to the geographical situation, the vulnerability of subsurface installations to mass movements is also less in Germany. But damage to subsurface parts of mines could cause economic losses with huge impact. Business interruptions are very expensive for the period of lost production. These periods could be extensive because the reopening and rebuilding are very complex. IBNR (incurred but not reported damages) also belong to the economic losses. These damages are not discovered during the first check but could have structural impact and cause a higher vulnerability to following earthquake events. Damage to surface installations happens because of ground motions, mass movements, liquefactions and subsidence. The complexity could increase because of the impact for the subsurface installations. Open pits and their installations are vulnerable to several seismic effects. The German lignite mining industry is located in the area with the highest earthquake probability, therefore the installations are mainly exposed to mass movements and the destruction of transport systems. Transport systems like conveyer belts can be damaged by relatively small ground motions. Machinery with long extensions has the highest exposure. Buildings show normal earthquake damage

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Figure 5. Schematic of risk index of exposure of mines. The selected boxes show the risk index which are used for German mines.

caused by ground motion, mass movements, liquefactions and subsidence. These damages will be measured with the intensity scale (Fig. 6). The figure shows the average percentages of damage to building classes at different earthquake intensities. The damage ratio depends on the type of building. Therefore an adobe building, which is built to older standards, has a higher damage ratio than a modern reinforced building. Modern standards are Eurocode 8 and the German Standard DIN 4149 which give recommendations for constructions in areas subject to earthquakes. Figure 6 shows three different classes of damage for Germany with an earthquake intensity of I = VIII. The first class shows a damage ratio between 30% and 40% for adobe buildings. The second class includes damage ratios of 10% to 20% for reinforced buildings. The third class with earthquake resistant buildings shows average damage ratios between 5% and 9%. The fact that most of the buildings are not earthquake resistant in Germany leads to a higher percentage of damage. Most of the contents of these buildings, their transport and processing systems are also very vulnerable because they are not protected against the ground motion. For the processing systems it is important that damage could have negative environmental consequences. The exposure to mass movements is small because of the geographical situation of Germany. The combination of damage to surface and subsurface installations which could cause the loss of a whole mine is probable in Germany. The economic losses due to lost production, repairs and maintenance are potentially high because of the close relation of the Germany Mining industry to other industries and the use of coal for power generation.

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Figure 6. Average damage ratio relationship (SAUTER 1979).

Summary The available concept shows the possible consequences of tectonic earthquakes. The main risk for subsurface installations is damage due to ground motion or the reactivation of faults. Mass movements or liquefactions have only a minor impact on subsurface installations. The consequences of ground motions are so high because all installations could easily be damaged and, without redundancy, no longer accessible. The shafts are the most vulnerable parts of mines. Damage to surface installations are caused by ground motions, mass movements, liquefactions and subsidence. In contrast to subsurface damages secondary damages like fires have a higher impact. These damages could also influence areas not affected by the direct destruction of the earthquake. The economic losses are high due to loss of production. This also influences the parts of industries not directly affected by the earthquake event itself. Special damages occur if damages of surface and subsurface installations are linked. For example, nonaccessible shafts or destroyed supply units lead to a cessation of production.

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To summarise, German mines are in principle exposed to earthquakes, but the exposure is not as high as in countries such as Japan or the USA. In Germany mining is regulated by complex standards and regulations, but the high integration of industries could lead to damage with a wide range of economic loss.

References [1] ASSOCIATED PRESS 25. September 1999: 1000 südafrikanische Berglaute nach Beben eingeschlossen. [2] CHEN, Z., SONG, D. (1992): Earthquake disaster research of shaft and tunnel engineering in mining area. – Proceedings of the tenth world conference on earthquake engineering, 19-24 July 1992, Madrid, 9: 5071-5074, 2 tab.; Rotterdam (Balkema). [3] DAENECKE, LOBIN, KLAPPERICH, SAVIDIS (1999): Sustainable stability of highest tailings dam in Europe. – Proceedings of 9th. Congres International de Mechanique des Roches: 83-86, 4 fig.; Rotterdam (Balkema). [4] DIN 4149-1 (1981): Bauten in deutschen Erdbebengebieten, Lastannahmen, Bemessung und Ausführung üblicher Hochbauten. – 14 p. Berlin (Beuth). [5] EUROCODE 8 (1988): Bauten in Erdbebengebieten – Entwurf und Planung, Teil 1 Allgemeines und Gebäude. – 327 p.; Brüssel. [6] GRÜNTHAL, G. (1998): European Macroseismic Scale 1998. – 99 p., 41 fig., 3 tab.; Luxembourg (Musée National d’Histoire Naturelle Section Astrophysique et Géophysique). [7] HUIXIAN, L., HOUSNER, G.W., LILI, X. & DUXIN, H. (2002): The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976. Technical Report: CaltechEERL:EERL.2002.001. California Institute of Technology. – [Online in the Internet: http://caltecheerl.library.caltech.edu/353/, Status: 10. April 2007]. [8] LLOYDS WEEKLY 8. Dezember 1976: Earth tremors in Welkom area, South Africa. [9] MINING WEEKLY (2005): DRDGold losing R231,000 a day after quake. – Press Release March 14, 2005. [Online in the Internet: http://www.miningweekly.co.za/componets/print.asp?id=64333, Status: 16. March 2005]. [10] MR-INFORMATIONSBLATT Nr. 9/10 (1982): Erdbeben in südafrikanischer Goldmine verdeutlichen die Gefahr von “Gebirgsschlägen”. [unpub.]. [11] MUNICH RE (2000): Welt der Naturgefahren, CD-Rom; München. [12] MUNICH RE (2005): Topics Geo Annual review: Natural catastrophes 2004. – 60 p. München. [13] MUNICH RE (2006): Topics Geo Annual review: Natural catastrophes 2005. – 56 p. München. [14] NEIC (1996): National Earthquake Information Center, 1996 Significant Earthquakes of the world. – [Online in the Internet: http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/sig_1996.html Status 17. June 2002]. [15] NEIC (2002): National Earthquake Information Center, Earthquakes Search. – [Online in the Internet: http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/epic/epic.html, Status 17. June 2002]. [16] NEIC (2005): National Earthquake Information Center, Earthquakes Search. – [Online in the Internet: http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/epic/epic_global.html, Status 1. June 2005]. [17] RAINER, H. (1974): Gibt es Zusammenhänge zwischen Erdbeben und Gebirgsschlaghäufungen im Bergbau Bleiberg? – Rock Mechanics, 6: 91-100, 7 fig.; Berlin (Springer). [18] REUTERS NEWS SERVICE 13. November 1996: Peru: Earthquake. [19] REUTERS NEWS SERVICE 14. November 1996: Tremors hamper rescue of peruvian miners. [20] RUDOLPH, T. (2002): Erdbebenrisiken in Deutschland mit besonderem Bezug zur Bergbautätigkeit. – 111 p., 26 fig., 12 tab., 8 encl.; Münster [unpub. Diploma thesis]. [21] RUDOLPH, T., SMOLKA, A. & COLDEWEY, W.G. (2005): Entwicklung eines Konzeptes zur Beurteilung der Erdbebenrisiken im deutschen Bergbau. – Glückauf; 66, 27-34, 4 fig., 5 tab.; Essen. [22] SAUTER, F. (1979): Damage Prediction for Earthquake Insurance. – Proceedings of the 2nd U.S. National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, 22-24 August 1979, Stanford University, California: 99108, 8 fig.; Berkely. [23] SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 22. März 1971: Hunderte Tote in den Anden. [24] SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 10. August 1976: China feiert die Rettung von 10.000 Bergleuten. [25] SWISS RE (1992): Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions; A handbook on Risk Assessment. – 951 S., 674 fig., 68 tab., 40 encl.; Zürich. [26] WANG, J.-M. (1985): The Distribution of Earthquake Damage to Underground Facilities During the 1976 Tang-Shan Earthquake. – In: THIEL, C.-C. [Hrsg]: Earthquake Spectra, 1(4): 741-757, 13 fig.; Berkeley. [27] YONG, C., TSOI, K., FEIBI, C., ZHENHUAN, G., QIJIA, Z., ZHANGLI, C. (1988): The great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976. – 153 p., 116 fig.; Oxford (Pergamon Press).

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-73

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Main foundations of ecological safety of environment and residents in an area influenced by tailing deposits of radioactive waste Ol'ga ANISHCHENKO Associate professor Chair of geoecology and efficient nature management Dniepropetrovsk National University Abstract: The purpose of this research is the estimation and forecasting of the level of environmental contamination for the elaboration of a local system of geoecological environment monitoring in an area influenced by the storage of radioactive waste products. As result, the main foundations for the ecological safety of the environment and inhabitants in an area influenced by tailing deposits of radioactive waste from the uranium-mining industry and the uraniumconcentrating industry have been formulated. Keywords: Ecological foundations, radiation, radioecological situation in Dniporodzerzhynsk.

Introduction The ecological state of areas contiguous to tailing deposits of radioactive waste in the Ukraine gives some cause for alarm. These remnants of a former militaryindustrial complex contain radioactive waste from the processing and enrichment of uranium ores, and the radiation danger in the contents is represented by long life (U238, Th-230, Ra-226), medium life (Pb-210) and short-life (Po-210) radionuclides. An important factor for the radiation influence of tailing deposits is also the entry of radon and its affiliated products of disintegration into atmospheric air. It should be noted that policies for the maintenance of ecological safety in areas of tailing deposits containing radioactive waste should be decided at scientific, technical and administrative levels simultaneously. The main foundations of ecological safety are necessary and should be sufficient for the security of man and to protect the ecological system, such as parts of the biosphere, from harmful human influence. The distribution of radioactive substances from tailing deposits containing radioactive waste has the greatest importance in the researched area, but they may also cause chemical pollution of the environment and change the hydrological characteristics of contiguous areas. In other words, all human influences on the ecological well being of the environment and population are complex. As a result of the enduring influence (since the middle of the twentieth century) of tailing deposits of radioactive waste, there is pollution of atmospheric air, superficial and underground waters, soils and vegetation, and this is reflected in the health of the population.

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The radioecological situation in Dniprodzerzhynsk and nearby areas is extreme as regards its complexity and the danger for the environment and the health of the population, including future generations. It results from the fact that enrichment of uranium ores and manufacture of uranium salts from slag was carried out on the territory of the city for more than 50 years. The smelting of uranium ores began in 1948 with the introduction of the activities of the Prydneprovsky chemical plant. Besides salts of uranium, manufacturing processes included mineral fertilizers and sodium saltpeter, which were by products of the technological solutions of uranium manufacture. Thus nitrate and ammonium nitrogen from these manufactures were utilised in shops № 3 of the jointstock company Dneproazot with reception of fertilizers. The activity of the Prydneprovsky chemical plant was kept secret. The opportunity to examine authentic information on the radioecological situation related to the activities of the factory and to begin the first steps towards the maintenance of radioecological safety has occurred only within the last few years. While the Prydneprovsky chemical plant was most active, standard technical specifications for the handling of radioactive waste were completely absent. In this connection, radioactive wastes produced (dominant structure: uranium, radium, thorium and products of their disintegration) were stored in ravines or clay careers in the direct vicinity of the enterprise. As a result of this, a tailing deposit, given the name "Western" was formed. For example: as a whole, about 42,12 mln t of tailings from the enrichment of uranium ores by general activity, 3,17 1015 Becquerel, were produced during the period of uranium processing from raw materials (1948 -1991). They are situated in 9 tailing deposits in Dnieprodzerzhinsk, in the settlements of Taromskoye and Sukhachovka in the Dnepropetrovsk region. The object of our research is the tailing deposit of radioactive waste «С» situated on the right bank of the river Dnieper, 5 km south-east of Dnieprodzerzhinsk (figure 1). The tailing deposit «С» consists of two sections, located next to each other and divided by a bulk dam, its extent is about 4,8 km. The area of ground under the tailing deposit is 492 hectares.

Figure 1. The tailing deposit of radioactive waste «С» ( Dnieprodzerzhinsk)

Tailing deposit "С" has been in operation since 1968. The first section was maintained from 1968-1983, covers an area of 900 000 m2, is filled up to designated

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marks and contains 19 000 000 t of radiation waste with a general activity of 7,1•1014 Becquerel. The tailing deposit is not covered, the value of capacity of exposure dose of γ-radiation on its surface makes 100 - 1800 microroentgen/ h (figure 2). The second section has been maintained from 1983 to the present and covers an area of 700 000 m2. The second section and the protecting dams are equipped with antifiltering elements. 5,6 mln t of firm radioactive tailings with general activity 2,7•1014 Becquerel are stored in this tailing deposit. The superficial layer is covered by non-radioactive tailings (phosphogypsum) to a depth of 4-5 meters. The radiation situation is characterised by background parameters.

Figure 2. The value of capacity of exposure dose of γ-radiation on the territory near the tailing deposit of radioactive waste «С» ( Dnieprodzerzhinsk)

There are agricultural areas around this working zone of 100 - 300 meters. Of this area of farmland about 90 % is ploughed and under cultivation; mainly for grain production (wheat, barley, corn, oats). The rest is used for technical and fodder purposes. The slopes and areas which are not ploughed are used for haymaking and cattle pasture. The population living within the limits of the zone of supervision is engaged mainly in agriculture. For the most part this population lives in individual houses with plots of land attached. Following a number of failures in the nuclear power industry and other potentially dangerous industries it was realised that earlier concepts of safety measures based on the principle of reacting and correcting did not meet the requirements for timely intervention. Society demands a reduction of damage from dangerous and

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harmful production factors by the introduction of appropriate protection measures. In an approach focused on a source of danger the basic methods of maintaining safety are characterised by trial and error. Passivity and the concentration of attention only on the empirical data have put the experts concerned in the situation of a fire-fighting team, feverishly reacting to crisis situations. The way out of this situation that has been created is a new concept of acceptable risk, in which the basic principle is to foresee and to warn. It is based on knowledge of the nature of objectively existing dangers, laws of occurrence and reduction of the damage. The safety system should be focused on the objects exposed to influence, that is to say on the population and the environment, instead of on the source. In defining such a system, an approach is required which accounts not only for engineering and economic factors, but also for ecological and social factors. It is necessary to estimate the danger quantitatively beforehand, then an objective decision can be taken which will reduce the weight of consequence of failures (reduction of the probable realization of potentially damaging action due to modern industrial objects and rational preparation for action in extreme situations). Thus, necessarily, the methods for quantitatively estimating the potential danger posed by industrial objects should be, whenever possible, able to perceive organizational and non-production measures for decreasing that potential danger. The standard characteristics of danger level in the world are the estimation of risk. They allow for the carrying out of quantitative analysis of a danger level for concrete recipients of risk. The analysis of estimations of risk is firstly able to differentiate dangerous man made objects by the threat which they represent for the population and the natural environment, and it also allows for the differentiation of territories on a level of potential danger. The criteria for safety are determined in terms of risk estimation. The variety of danger manifestations conforms to a variety of risk estimations. It has found its reflection in the classification of estimations. There are estimations of real risk connected to a regular mode of functioning of object, and estimations of potential risk describing the consequences which could result from the failure of an object. It depends on the mode of functioning of the industrial object being researched. Risk estimations can be classified by an attribute: who or what perceives danger, in other words who or what is the recipient of the risk. So it is possible to determine risk estimations concerning the state of a population’s health or to estimate risk concerning a condition of the natural environment etc. Finally, the last of the basic attributes on which an estimate of risk depends is the measure of damage. If it is a question of the consequences of failure concerning the population, the measure of damage is a unit of measurements of consequences concerning the state of that population’s health. Each undesirable event takes place in relation to a certain victim – the object of risk. The correlation of risk objects and undesirable events allows us to distinguish individual, technical, ecological, social and economic risks. Each kind is caused by characteristic sources and factors of risk. We shall consider the individual risk in more detail; that is, the description and characteristics of individual risk. An individual risk is caused by the probability of a realization of potential hazards at or following the occurrence of dangerous situations. The sources and factors of individual risk are given in tab. 1.

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The individual risk can be voluntary if it is caused by the activities of man on a voluntary basis, and compelled, if man is exposed to the risk as a part of a society (for example, living in ecologically adverse regions, near to a source, or sources of the increased danger). Table 1. Sources and factors of individual risk Individual risk resource Inner environment of human being organism Victimization Habits Social ecology Professional activity Means of transport Non professional activity Social environment Environment

The most popular factor of death risk Genetic psychomatic illnesses, aging Combination of personal characteristics of human being as victim of potential danger Smoking, alcohol, drug usage, irrational nutrition Polluted air, water, foodstuff, virus infections, household traumas, fires Dangerous and harmful industrial factors Traffic accidents, their collapse with human being Sport and tourist traumas and other mutilations Armed conflict, crime, suicide, murder Earthquake, volcanic eruption, flood, landslip, hurricane, disaster, etc.

The important aspect of the concept; the danger caused by the object, for example, a tailing deposit of radioactive waste, is connected with the perception of danger by the recipient of risk. Man, as the recipient of risk, perceives the level of danger imposed on him by circumstances differently than the level of danger he has engendered voluntarily. So, a man agrees to put up with a high level of danger caused, for example, by trip in the car on a busy road, but is not prepared to put up with the smaller danger caused by a nearby industrial object. Further, it is possible to expect that employees working on an industrial object and receiving a salary will agree to be reconciled to a rather higher degree of danger than the population that lives in the area of this industrial object. Hence, we can’t rely on man’s assessment of danger perception. But it is necessary to take into account that the level of danger from another object will always be perceived by the population as more serious than the level of a danger voluntarily entered into (even if the first is less significant). On a basis of normative materials on radiation safety, the idea is that the weakest part of the biosphere is man, who needs to be protected in all possible ways. It is considered that if man is properly protected from harmful influences, the environment will also be protected, as the radio resistance of ecosystem elements, as a rule, is much higher than that of man. But it is necessary to take into account that ecosystems don’t have the opportunities that people do to react quickly and in a reasoned way to radiation danger. The state of health of the population is a reflection of a complex of phenomena occurring in an environment. It is characterised by demographic parameters: by birth rate, death-rate, infant death-rate and natural increase of the population. The chronic action death-rate has been investigated in Dnieprodzerzhinsk, 5 - 7 kilometres from the tailing deposits of radioactive waste "С". The demographic situation in this city is difficult. For the period from 1993 to 2002 the population of the city was reduced to 33,000 (figure 3). For ten years the population of the city decreased by 11.2 %, whilst the average level of population decrease in the Ukraine equalled 4%. The reduction of the population was generated by the death-rate exceeding birth rate and also by a negative balance of migration of the population.

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Figure 3. The changes in population, Dnieprodzerzhinsk from 1990 to 2002: unit = thousand

In Dnieprodzerzhinsk the profound statistical analysis of sickness rate of population for malignant neoplasm was carried out. Sickness rate was characterised by a relative constancy, remaining approximately at an average long-term level (346,1 per 100 thousand population), except for 1998 - 1999, when the parameter grew and reached 360 per 100 thousand population which, at 11 %, is above average for the area. The radioactive gas radon harms the most people at all the deposits. The degree of radon danger in a deposit of radioactive waste must be one of the basic criteria for the definition of the ecological danger of the object. It has been demonstrated that there is a connection between the raised risk of lung cancer of uranium miners and doses of irradiation by radon and the products of its disintegration. The total dose to the population owing to dust and radon emissions from the surface of radioactive waste tailing deposit "С" averages from 0,77 mZv /year for newborns to 1,66 mZv/year for adults. This exceeds the dose limit in all ways established by the radiation safety standards of the Ukraine, 1997. (Table 2). Table 2. Total effective doses on the population of Dnieprodzerzhinsk. Group under consideration Dose, mZv /years Newborns

0,77

Children 1 year old

1,12

Children 5 years old

1,19

Children 10 years old

1,36

Children 15 years old

1,70

Adults

1,66

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The accounts carried out characterise radioactive waste tailing deposit "С" as a source of radiation influence on the population. A similar picture was observed near to the majority of tailing deposits of radioactive waste from the uranium mining industry in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Table 3 was compiled using data from the Internet. It makes it possible to compare the areas of the grounds allocated to stores, volume and total activity of stored waste in tailing deposits of radioactive waste in the different countries of the former USSR. Table 3. Comparative characteristics of the tailing deposits of radioactive waste of different countries Radioactive waste

Country

Kazakhstan

Location

Area of allocated grounds, hectares

Stepnogorsk

800

"Coshkar-Ata" near Aktau

Uzbekistan Near Navoje (23 tailing deposits Majluu river valley,

1000

630 no information

1374

Near Issik-Cul

no information

150

Near Min-Cush (4 tailing deposits) Beshtau

no information

1250

Suu

Kirgizia

Russia

Total activity, Becquerel capacity Weight, thousand m3 million tones

84,0

45,0

55,5⋅1014

360,0

4,07⋅1014

59,7

59,2⋅1014

33,0⋅1014

1,47⋅1014 14,0

no information

Ukraine Tailing deposit "С", Dnieprod zerzhinsk

section І

90,68

8550

19,07

7,1⋅1014

section ІІ

69,88

4400

9,6

2,7⋅1014

We shall consider the largest store of radioactive waste in Kazakhstan, that of the former Celinniy Mining and chemical enterprise, for comparison with tailing deposit "С". There is a critical situation there at present. Situated 25 kilometres from Stepnogorsk this tailing deposit from uranium manufacture has an area of about 800 hectares with a volume of 45 million tons of radioactive pulp (total radioactivity 150 thousand Ku). It can be kept ecologically safe only if it is constantly sprayed with water. Today two thirds of this tailing deposit, an area of 500 hectares, represent a dustforming radioactive beach. The level of oncological diseases in the city and in villages near the tailing deposit is high . The population of the country already has an extremely negative image of this city, where it is dangerous to live.

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As a result, the ecological factor is one of the reasons for the outflow of the population from this city. The safety of the population and the protection of the environment against the harmful effects of this tailing deposit is a serious task on which a decision is necessary immediately. The researching of ecological safety of the population should be one of the major components in a system for monitoring objects of a similar type. The project of the state programme for liquidation of dangerous radiation objects of the former Prydneprovsky chemical plant to which tailing deposit "С" belonged is now ready. The term for the realisation of this programme is until 2013. The programme stipulates: 1. Realization of urgent measures directed at the prevention of radiation failures, decontamination of territory of an industrial site and decrease of dosage to the population in zones of influence of uranium objects 2. Creation and introduction of a system of radiation monitoring for uranium objects and informing of the population about the conditions of radiation safety. The services for the local and regional monitoring of the environment should play an important role in work for the improvement of the environment and restriction of the influences of tailing deposits of radioactive waste on the biosphere and man. These services, armed with modern measuring technology and control devices, should operatively inform the population in all cases of the approximation of parameters of the environment to a dangerous level. More profound study of population health in all nearby settlements is also necessary.

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-81

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Ecological risks from hazardous features in Ukraine that may be targets for acts of terrorism Prof. G. SHMATKOV Director of the Centre of Ecological Audit

Abstract: Ecologically at-risk features are those where the occurrence of failures can result in significant, and sometimes catastrophic, chemical environmental contamination. Often these failures can also have human victims such as company personnel and inhabitants of nearby settlements, as was the case, for example, with the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine. It is well known that the economy of the Ukraine is based on mineral extraction and heavy industries, such as metallurgical, chemical, heat, power, and heavy mechanical engineering. These industries are the most dangerous to the environment and also those which have a negative influence on all environmental components: atmosphere, water resources, lakes, soil, flora and fauna. At these companies millions of tons of waste with danger classes I-IV are collected in special sediment containers, stores, and storage areas where volumes frequently amount to hundreds, thousands or millions of cubic meters. The height of the protecting dams for many storage areas or repositories of waste from the mining and processing of iron ore reach a hundred meters.

Keywords: hazardous objects, harmful substances, river Dnepr, Ukraine.

Ecologically at-risk features are those where the occurrence of failures can result in significant, and sometimes catastrophic, chemical environmental contamination. Often these failures can also have human victims such as company personnel and inhabitants of nearby settlements, as was the case, for example, with the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in Ukraine and at a factory manufacturing pesticides in the Indian city of Bhopal. We shall consider a situation where this particular problem has developed in Ukraine. Ukraine is largest of the Eastern European countries which border on the countries of the European Union (EU). Her territory is larger than any EU country, having an area of 603,700 km2, compared with France, 543 965 km2 or Germany, 356 733 km2. The economy of Ukraine is based, primarily, on mineral extraction and heavy industries, such as metallurgical, chemical, heat, power, and heavy mechanical engineering. It is well known which of these industries are the most dangerous to the environment and which have a negative influence on all environmental components: atmosphere, water resources, lakes, soil, flora and fauna. At these companies, millions

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of tons of waste with danger classes I-IV are collected in special sediment containers, stores, and storage areas where volumes frequently amount to hundreds, thousands or millions of cubic meters. The height of the protecting dams for many storage areas or repositories of waste from the mining and processing of iron ore reach a hundred meters. A failure in these dams would present a powerful threat of mud flows that could cover nearby settlements and also enter surface reservoirs, because the majority of these huge repositories are located near to water features, ravines, and small rivers running into the river Dnepr. In the Dnepropetrovsk area there are more than 8.5 billion tons of waste stored, with different classes of danger. These wastes have caused the pollution of underground waters in an area extending over some hundreds of square kilometres. The concentrations of harmful substances: oil and its products, chlorides, sulphates, heavy metals, are much higher than admissible norms. These harmful substances get into soils, plants and food for human consumption. In terms of remote consequences, the storage areas containing radioactive waste located near to river channels are especially dangerous, i.e. the Dnepr or the small rivers in the catchment of the Dnepr. In our area up to 80 million tons of radioactive waste is stored, all of which is located near to cities and settlements. These storage areas cause pollution of underground waters and dust is also blown onto inhabited land. The dams of many tailings lagoons and storage areas for toxic and radioactive wastes are in an extremely unsatisfactory condition. With enough small natural effects (such as minor earthquakes, flooding, and rising groundwater) or artificial effects (such as acts of terrorism using explosives) they could easily be destroyed with all subsequent consequences. Another class of ecologically hazardous objects is the storage of finished goods in the form of toxic, explosive and combustible substances. In Ukraine these include storage of benzene, oil and mineral oil, ammonia, inorganic acids, rubber, pesticides, mineral fertilizers and many other things. The volume of substances in these stores amount to tens and hundreds of tons. Many of them are located near to valleys containing reservoirs for drinking water. They present both an ecologicall risk and a potentially attractive target for acts of terrorism. If they were destroyed, the resulting chemical environmental contamination could affect large areas of land and water and create an extremely dangerous situation for the population. In Ukraine there are more than 400 potentially dangerous industrial targets, among them 27 with the greatest risk of occurrence of failure with catastrophic consequences. For the last three years the number of extreme situations of a natural character has reached 74, and of a technogenic character it has reached 123, i.e. almost twice as much. It clearly shows that the technical condition of potentially dangerous objects is extremely unsatisfactory. The third most potentially dangerous kinds of feature are the main pipelines. In Ukraine there are pipelines that extend tens, hundreds and even thousands of kilometres. Every year, hundreds, thousands and millions of cubic meters of oil, gas condensate, gas, ammonia, toxic chemical waste and wastes from the enrichment of mineral ores, including radioactive ones, are pumped over huge distances. The systems of the pipeline routing are very variable: underground, elevated, underwater and on the surface. Many of them pass near to settlements, cross the beds of small and large rivers, including the Dnepr, and approach the coast of the Black Sea.

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The destruction of these pipelines could lead to large-scale poisoning of reservoirs, underground water basins - including drinking water zones - and the poisoning of fertile soils. Some of the pumped products are light gasification substances (for example, ammonia) and could overwhelm the population through an atmospheric route. For example: the pipeline in which liquid ammonia from Tolyatti (Russia) is pumped crosses the river Dnepr on pendant pipes. It would be very easy to destroy this and it would lead to a major accident. The pipeline could also be damaged by a minor earthquake or strong flooding. These long distance pipelines, which often pass through deserted places, could become easy targets for acts of terrorism, with catastrophic consequences from the point of view of chemical destruction of land, water reservoirs, and the population. In Ukraine there is a major problem with the recycling of pesticides and hazardous chemicals that have become unfit for use or which have reached the end of their working life. Ukraine has collected about 20,000 tons of such substances. The majority of these pesticide warehouses are arranged in violation of elementary ecological safety norms. Many of them are stored in the open air and are located near to reservoirs. They are sources of pollution for water, atmosphere and soil. Technologies for the ecologically safe destruction of these substances are necessary for the elimination of the storage facilities and re-cultivation of the land on which these facilities are located. An even greater danger to the environment and the inhabited areas are the sites of former military objects: military air stations, military ranges, oil depots, storehouses of rocket fuel, warehouses for poisons, explosives and many other things. It is necessary to carry out deep complex scientific research into these areas and to develop a programme for their sanitation and re-cultivation. Now the most acute necessity is for the development of a state programme for Ukraine for the safety of ecologically hazardous features which have become more attractive targets for acts of terrorism.

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Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for Fire Brigades and Fire-Fighting Actions Wilhelm G. COLDEWEY

Abstract. In making effective decisions on fire-fighting actions on major fires, such as the choice of appropriate extinguishing agents, detailed knowledge about possible risks to people, buildings and the environment are essential. Thus, advance information about the potential emissions of various pollutants that are generated as a result of these actions, is particularly important. This is because the overall emissions can depend on various combustion processes and on the tactics adopted in fighting the fire. The evaluation of the environmental risks requires data on both the nature and amount of potentially harmful emissions and the pathways followed by those emissions. Thus, to achieve effective preventative actions, both in temporal and practical terms, information on the following factors is essential: • materials being combusted; • combustion conditions; • pathways of emitted pollutants; and • site factors. Recent research at the University of Münster has highlighted the importance of pollution effects with respect to vulnerable soils, surface water and groundwater regimes. Information on topography, drainage and hydrogeological parameters can be noted on a digitised map (the so-called Environmental Protection Map) and can then be assessed from a fire engineering point of view. This map would, therefore, give the fire service an additional powerful design tool for helping minimising possible secondary damage to the relevant soil and water bodies. Keywords. Major fires, pollutants, vulnerability, hydrogeological aspects, environmental risks, geographical information systems (GIS)

1. Dangerous Substances in the Case of Fire Operations In the event of a hostile fire, the combustion process yields a multitude of different products. These products result from burning, carbonisation (in the case of oxygen deficiency), disintegration and pyrolysis (in the absence of oxygen) (VFDB GUIDELINE 10/03 1997 – The Association for the Advancement of Fire Protection). The range of resultant products encompasses many substances that are detrimental to human health, and are toxic and hazardous to the environment and water bodies. These harmful products can be contained in the smoke/gases, in soot and ashes, in the fire-fighting water and also in the combustion residues. The materials that are burnt, and the fire conditions, determine the type, quantity and composition of the combustion products. As they run their course, fires can be divided into five different phases from a time perspective (VFDB GUIDELINE 10/03 1997). During these different phases, and subject to the composition of the materials that are on fire, the fire temperature, the oxygen supply and the rate of combustion, a complex mixture of smoke emerges from

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the fire and, in aggregated conditions, includes unburnt substances in vapour form and entrained gaseous, solid and fluid elements. According to the VFDB GUIDELINE 10/03 (1997), essentially six material categories that could contain substances that are toxic and hazardous to the environment and/or waters can be expected in the event of fire.

2. Dangerous Substances: Emergence and Spread in Fire Service Operations In principle, the emergence of a dangerous substance as a result of using a dangerous material. For example, the emergence of dangerous substances can occur due to damage to and leakage from fixed repositories underground tanks etc., and also as a result of accidents during transportation (Fig. 1). The emergence of fire-induced dangerous substances takes place primarily via the extinguishing agent used – principally water (Fig. 2), but also via the smoke/gas/vapour cloud (Fig. 3). The emergence of dangerous substances should be viewed as particularly critical, as often large quantities are released in concentrated form. In most cases, however, the type, quantity and composition of the respective dangerous material are known and can be researched using the information system presented later in Section 4. It is significantly more difficult to measure the emergence of fire-induced dangerous substances as a result of the different burnt materials, the differing fire and combustion conditions, as well as the extinguishing agents used. Therefore, every fire scene at which large quantities of fire-fighting water or foam are used, should throw up the question of possible contamination of the out-flowing fire-fighting water as well as the sub-surface. A detailed analysis of the out-flowing fire-fighting water and the ‘smoke’ cloud is neither meaningful nor imperative in order to evaluate the environmental threat. Often conclusions about possible contamination of the fire-fighting water can be drawn on the basis of the burnt material as well as the fire and combustion conditions. These conclusions must, however, be verified by means of on-site chemical analysis. Such analysis is limited exclusively to a few screening processes (for example oil indicator paper, and test sticks) as well as to physical, chemical and biological summary parameters (WIENEKE 1999).

3. Evaluation of the Risk Potential as a Basis for Risk-Adjusted Measures A comprehensive evaluation of the risk potential is of particular importance in relation to the time-based and instrument-based implementation of risk-adjusted measures. For this, the following parameters are to be measured, evaluated and correlated with respect to the potential threat situation: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Burnt material; Fire and combustion conditions; Dangerous materials/goods; Specific properties of substances; Discharge paths of the dangerous substances; General location factors; and Specific location factors.

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Figure 1. Accidents involving dangerous substances/goods.

3.1. Burnt Material In addition to the fire and combustion conditions, the type and quantity of the burnt material is of decisive importance in the formation of potentially dangerous substances. According to VDS Guideline 2357 (2002), different danger areas are defined subject to the type and quantity of the burnt material. Danger area Danger area Danger area Danger area

0 1 2 3

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Figure 2. Emergence of fire-induced dangerous substances via the primary extinguishing agent used (mainly water).

Figure 3. Emergence of fire-induced dangerous substances via the ‘smoke’ cloud.

3.2. Fire and Combustion Conditions During a fire, there is a time-related change in the temperature and oxygen conditions. The higher the temperature and oxygen content of the combustion, the lower the formation of dangerous substances. Thus, the diminishing temperature and a decline in the oxygen content, results in an increased formation of dangerous substances under smouldering fire conditions (VFDB 1997).

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3.3. Dangerous Goods In relation to the release of dangerous substances, an estimation of the threat is made directly based on the type, quantity and composition of the materials being burned. In particular, dangerous substances that are characterised by properties that are hazardous to the environment and water bodies and which are released in large quantities are to be classified as especially critical. 3.4. Specific Substance Properties In order to estimate the risk potential, the substance-specific properties, which significantly influence the spread behaviour of the dangerous substances, must be measured. These are the mobility, viscosity and water solubility of the dangerous substances that are released or formed. Dangerous substances that have high mobility and low viscosity present particular threats. As a result of water solubility, significant transport can take place via the firefighting water. On the other hand, however, dilution of the dangerous substances also occurs, which positively counteracts the threat to the ground and groundwater. 3.5. Discharge Paths of the Dangerous Substances The discharge paths, where a damaging substance is particularly mobile, present the greatest risk potential. Here, in addition to the air path (i.e. ‘smoke’ cloud), the discharge of dangerous substances via the fire-fighting water deserves special mention. Contaminated fire-fighting water can load large areas in a short space of time and poses a particular threat to both ground and groundwater due to the infiltration potential of the water. Surface water also can be particularly threatened by the uncontrolled flow of firefighting water. The mobility of fire extinguishing foam is far lower, depending on the foaming rate. Nonetheless, extinguishing foam also poses a threat due to its composition, which is endangering to water. The tenside chemicals in the foam are also harmful, because they can act as a solubiliser for dangerous substances. 3.6. General Location Factors General location factors refer to the spatial location of potential scenes of operations in relation to particularly vulnerable environments. These are, in particular, water and nature protection areas (WSG & NSG), drinking water and sewage treatment plants, as well as areas with intensive land and water utilisation. 3.7. Specific Location Factors Specific location factors comprise the surface formation, the connection of surface drains to the rain and sewage systems, in addition to the natural and/or artificial water distribution networks. Furthermore, the significant hydrogeological parameters – groundwater level and the hydraulic permeability of the subsurface – are also relevant here.

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Figure 4. Section of an environmental protection map for a motorway interchange scenario (MELCHERS et al. 2005).

The flow direction of surface water and groundwater is also of key importance, because dangerous substances could reach particularly vulnerable areas. EMMERT & REICHELT (1999) describe such an incident on the BAB 8 near Munich, where an oil spill led to the contamination of groundwater and the threat to two drinking water protection areas. With respect to estimating the risk potential, a natural unsealed ground surface is to be categorised as critical, because dangerous substances can directly infiltrate the ground. The emergence of dangerous substances in water must also always to be viewed as particularly critical because, on the one hand, this is associated with immediate damage to the sensitive water ecology, and on the other hand, a rapid and generally uncontrollable transport of the dangerous substance takes place via the waters. The hydrogeological characteristics are of crucial importance in estimating the spread of dangerous substances in the subsurface, as are the specific characteristics of the substance. High permeability, combined with deep groundwater levels, poses a particular threat in this context.

4. Risk-Adjusted Environmental Protection Measures A Risk GIS can be developed using simple means and at low expense, as scores of individual pieces of information are generally already available. The job is then to evaluate this information. The results of the risk evaluation are presented by means of geo-information systems and divided into corresponding danger surface areas (Fig. 4). The risk areas thus generated can be directly referenced for operational evaluation and tactics (MELCHERS, GÖBEL & SCHÄFER 2004).

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With the generation of such a geo-information system, the fire service has a powerful instrument which helps ensure enhanced environmental protection and the minimisation of possible consequential damages and costs. In this context, in particular, the shaping of awareness for a direct connection between operational tactics and the extent of possible consequential damages and costs is crucially important.

References COLDEWEY, W. G. & SCHÜTZ, H. G. (1990): Untersuchungen der hydrologischen, hydrogeologischen und hydrochemischen Verhältnisse kontaminierter Standorte; Müll und Abfall Heft 1, 12 S., 10 Abb. EMMERT, M. & REICHELT, H. (1999): Ein Unfall auf der Autobahn A 8 und seine Folgen für die Wasserwirtschaft. – Wasserwirtschaft 89: 286-290, 7 Abb., Stuttgart. MELCHERS, Ch. (2003): Risikoabschätzung des Gefahrenpotentials für die mögliche Kontamination des Bodens und des Grundwassers durch den Eintrag “kontaminierter Löschwässer” und “gefährlicher Stoffe und Güter” unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der geologischen und hydrogeologischen Gegebenheiten. – XV + 122 S., 27 Abb., 16 Tab., 92 S. Anh., Anl. I – V; Münster.- [unveröffent. Diplomarbeit]. MELCHERS, CH., GÖBEL, P. & SCHÄFER, K. (2004): Development of a Concept for the Environment during Fire Fighting Action from a Hydro-Geological Point of View. – vfdb-Zeitschrift 3/2004:143-148, 5 Abb., Stuttgart. MELCHERS, CH., RUDOLPH, T. & COLDEWEY, W. G: (2005): Geologische Aspekte der angewandten Riskobewertung. – Münster. Forsch. Geol. Paläo. 100: 7-14, 7 Abb.; Münster. VDS Guideline 2357 (2002): Richtlinie zur Brandschadensanierung. – 50 S., 11 Anh.; Köln. VFDB- Guideline 10/03 (1997): Schadstoffe bei Bränden; Verein zur Förderung des Deutschen Brandschutzes, vfdb-Zeitschrift 3/1997: 102 bis 111, 16 Tab.; Stuttgart. WIENEKE, A. (1996): Analytik kontaminierter Löschwässer; “brandschutz” / Deutsche Feuerwehr-Zeitung 11/1996; 846 bis 848, 4 Tab., Stuttgart.

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-91

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Conclusions After the Fuel Depot Fire at Buncefield (GB), December 2005 Kerstin TSCHIEDEL Regional Environment Authorities Brandenburg, Regional Unit East

Abstract. On December 11, 2005 several explosions took place in Buncefield Oil Storage Depot. It was the largest fire that Europe has seen in over 60 years. No concluding reports regarding the negative impact on the environment (especially on the ground water, caused by the intense fire-fighting measures and the air pollution, caused by the smoke) have yet been provided. The investigations of the accident are being performed by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in collaboration with the Environment Agency. The supervision committee for the investigations is the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB), consisting of independent experts, as well as HSE and EA employees. The MIIB has so far published three Progress Reports and one interim report. Keywords. Explosion, fire-fighting, air pollution, fuel, tank storage

The Accident Several explosions took place in the fuel storage tanks at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, in Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire, on Sunday, December 11th 2005, at around 6 a.m. A blaze broke out, which spread to more than 20 large fuel storage tanks. It was to become the largest fire Europe has seen in over 60 years.

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Forty-three people suffered minor injuries but luckily nobody died. The Emergency Services ordered the evacuation of the surrounding area, which included over 2000 people. Some parts of the M1 motorway were closed to traffic. The fire burned for several days and destroyed the plant for the most part. Huge, black clouds of smoke ascended into the atmosphere and covered the whole of southern England and beyond. Huge amounts of water and foam were used for the fire fighting, which caused the pollution of surface and ground waters. No concluding reports regarding the negative impact on the environment (especially on the ground water – caused by the intense fire-fighting measures, and the air pollution – caused by the smoke) have been yet provided. In the neighbourhood of the Buncefield fuel storage depot, lies a large industrial estate, housing 630 companies with about 16,500 employees. The commercial units of 20 companies, with 500 employees, were completely destroyed by the fire and another 60 buildings of companies, employing 3,500 people were damaged. The accident also caused considerable damage to buildings nearby; at least 300 houses also had minor damage. Due to the fire, the fuel supply for London and the south of England, especially for Heathrow airport, was interrupted. To assure normal air traffic, the British Aviation Authority had to ration fuel.

The Storage Tank Mineral oils had been stored at Buncefield, about 40 km north of London, since 1968. The affected storage depot, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal Limited (HOSL) was the fifth biggest complex of mineral oil storage tanks in the UK and had a capacity of 273 million litres of fuel. Two companies, Total (with 60%) and Texaco (with 40%) held a share in the HOSL storage depot – consisting of HOSL-West and HOSL-East. Before the accident, the plant handled about 2.37 million tons of fuel a year. Storage tanks belonging to the British Pipeline Agency (BPA) and the British Petroleum Oil UK Limited were also located here. Approved storage amounts: HOSL

34,000 t Otto fuel 15,000 t Kerosene

BPA

70,000 t Otto and other fuels

BP

75, 000 t Otto fuel

The fuels were delivered by three separate pipeline systems: − − −

10” Pipeline, which ended in the area of HOSL West 10” Pipeline, which ended in the area of Cherry Tree Farm of BPA 14” Pipeline, which ended in the main area of the BPA.

The three pipelines worked by the ‘batch principle’, which is to say that the mineral oil products were forwarded in separate batches, under pressure and in a known amount. The wreaths were separated by interfaces, composed of small amounts of mixed products. When the wreaths reached the storage tanks, they were emptied into the specific containers for each mineral oil product. The accruing interface mixture was

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Fire-fighting water pool

Tank yard A

Catherine House Tank 12 Fuji-Building Keystone House

Tank yard B

Tank 912

British Pipelines Agency (BPA)

NorthgateBuilding

3-Com-Building RO-Building

Embarkation

HOSL West and East

Picture 1. Site plan of the depot and surroundings. Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/report3.pdf.

added in small amounts to the larger product tanks, as far as the specification allowed that, or were sent back to the refinery as slop, for reprocessing. The fuels stored in Buncefield were then delivered by 400 tanker trucks daily. The largest proportion of the aviation fuel was delivered to the London airports, Heathrow and Gatwick, via two 6” pipelines, run by BPA.

The Causes and Effects Investigations into the accident are being performed by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), in collaboration with the Environment Agency. The supervision committee for the investigations is the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB), which consists of independent experts, as well as HSE and EA employees. The MIIB has so far published three progress reports and one interim report. The report issued on February 21st 2006 describes the accident and the emergency measures taken. The second report, dating from April 11th 2006, presents the impact the accident had on the environment and questions the defective leakage protection of a number of the tank yards. The third report, issued on May 9th 2006, describes where and how the fuel leaked, how it vaporised and so produced a flammable mixture, which then ignited, at around 6 a.m.

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The cause of the accident was the overfilling of storage tank 912, in tank yard A, which was filled by a pipeline. Around 300 tons of unleaded petrol were released. The mixture of petrol and air then exploded and caused major damage to the tanks in the neighbourhood. As the tanks became damaged, other mineral oil products were released and this led to two other explosions and a huge fire, that also spread to the surrounding industrial estate. Picture 2 shows the main structure of Tank 912. We are talking about a tank with attached roofing and an interior floating coat, to minimise emissions. According to the MIIB reports, the causes and effects of the accident are: −

−

−

−

Failure of the filling level measuring device Tank 912 was equipped with, among other things, devices for measuring the filling level and the temperature of the liquid inside the tank. Like all other tanks at this plant, the devices in Tank 912 were linked to an automatic tank measuring system (ATG). The levels in the tank were also monitored from a control room. Based on the monitoring data available, it could be seen that the tank continued to fill, via pipeline, even though the filling level measurement already showed that 2/3 of the maximum level had been reached at around 3 a.m. Failure of the overfill safety device Additional to the filling level measuring device, Tank 912 was equipped with an independent overfill safety device (visual and audible End-Peak-Alert, as well as safety switches) which was meant to alert the supervisor in the control room as soon as the maximum filling level was reached. This alert was also meant to initiate the closure of the valves on the active pipelines. These alarm signals of the HOSL West tanks were normally also sent to a monitoring and protocol system, linked to the pipelines. After the investigations it was ascertained that no End-Peak-Alert had been received. Operating failure, insufficient monitoring by the personnel The personnel did not respond to the obvious failure of the filling level measuring device: the device had not displayed any changes in the filling level for over 3 hours, even though the tank had kept on filling. The leaking of substances, which lasted for about 40 minutes, wasn’t noticed by the personnel either. We can make the assumption that the preliminary planning was insufficient as well, since the personnel did not know how much time it took to completely fill the tank. Further information about the chain of technical causes and the failure of the personnel have not been disclosed yet, due to continuing legal investigations. Mixture of substances and the forming of the fuel-air cloud Huge amounts of petrol leaked through the vent holes in the roof of Tank 912 and ran down the exterior wall of the tank (Picture 3). Due to the add-ons and guiding plates on the exterior wall of the tank, which had been built for a better distribution of fire-fighting water, in the event of a fire outbreak, the leaking petrol started spraying and mixing with air. This caused the formation of a very explosive fuel-air cloud. As a result of the evaporation of the fuel, the air cooled down to approximately zero degrees Celsius and fog surrounded Tank 912. The fog was also recorded by the surveillance cameras.

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Picture 2. Main structure of Tank 912, Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/report3.pdf

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Picture 3. Liquid stream during the overfilling of a tank. Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/report3.pdf.

−

−

Avoiding sources of ignition The overfilling led to the formation of a large and extremely explosive fuel-air cloud, which covered not only the area of the plant, but also the nearby industrial estate. The evaluation of the available information showed that the cloud stretched over an area of more than 80,000 m2 with a depth of between 1 and 7 metres, and looked like fog. There must surely have been more than one source of ignition within the area covered by the cloud. The initial source of ignition could not be determined, due to the level of destruction after the fire. Unexpected high explosion pressure The main explosion took place at 06:01:32 a.m. and measured 2.4 on the Richter Scale, according to the British Geological Survey Service. After the evaluation of the accident, it was noticed that the pressure of the explosion was 10 times higher that the preliminary expectations and calculations. As far as is known to date, the over pressure is situated somewhere around −

700 to 1000 mbar: on the parking lots nearby, where buildings were seriously damaged − 7 to 10 mbar: 2 km away, where the power of the explosion caused broken windows. The British authorities have initiated major investigations into this case. After the results of these are published it will be decided if the calculation methods and the safety margins in technical policies need to be changed.

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Picture 4. Proportion of the fire damage (shown by the yellow circle). Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/report3.pdf.

−

−

Destruction of the stationary fire fighting devices Due to the explosions and the high pressure, not only the tanks nearby, but also the stationary and half stationary fire fighting devices and the pump house, with the fire fighting pumps, were damaged severely, so that they could not be used for fire fighting. The blaze had to be fought with the help of mobile fire fighting devices. Failure of the tank yards At the moment of the overfilling, the secondary containment (tank yard A) assured the retention of the leaking substances. Due to the explosion, the damage to neighbouring tanks and the delay of the fire fighters, these secondary containments had to withstand a long heat impact. The joint sealing between the concrete elements of the tank yards could not withstand the heat in some places (Picture 5) and large amounts of mineral oil products and fire fighting water (partially contaminated with Perfluoroktansulfonate) were released. This led to major ground and groundwater contaminations.

The Situation in Germany On Dec 13th 2005, the Federal Environment Minister asked for a statement from the Committee for Plant Safety (KAS), as to whether a fire like the one at Buncefield was conceivable in Germany.

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Picture 5. Damaged join sealing, on the concrete elements of the tank yard. Source: www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/report2.pdf.

The KAS initiated the workshop Tank Storage (AK-TL). The AK-TL focused on tank storage facilities for highly flammable liquids, which are covered by the Obligations in case of Accidents Regulation (12th Federal Emission Protection Regulation). This document concerns areas operating with more than 25,000 tons of Otto fuel. The second interim report of the AK-TL was issued in November 2006. The report contains conclusions and recommendations especially for big tank storage depots, storing Otto fuel or other highly flammable liquids. At this time, around 50 tank storage facilities for mineral oil products in Germany are covered by the obligations of the 12th Federal Emission Protection Regulation, due to the large amount of stored substances. As components of operational areas, another 16 comparable tank storage facilities in refineries have to comply with the obligations of the 12th Federal Emission Protection Regulation. The recommendations and conclusions of the AK-TL can be summed up as follows: 1. Secure prevention of overfilling a) Through appropriate technical measures:  the tanks have to be equipped with an overfill indicator and an overfill protection device  the function of remote-controlled valves have to be additionally protected by a feedback fail-safe switch. When using fast closing valves the pres-

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sure has to be monitored and it has to be assured that, after closing the inlet valve, the feed pump is closed too  malfunctions of the filling indicator, the overfill safety and the relevant valves have to be quickly and safely recognisable by personnel. b) Through appropriate organisational measures:  the management of the storage facility has to ensure, before each filling, that only the amount that can be stored in the tank is being filled up  when filling is being effected through a pipeline, communication between the delivering company and the receiving company has to work perfectly and in case of emergency, the personnel of the receiving company have to have the option of cancelling the transfer  it has to be proved that the number of personnel needed in case of an emergency is always available and that the employees are trained for these cases  during maintenance, inspection, repair and cleaning, no additional dangers should occur and after finishing these works, the operational conditions have to be fully guaranteed. 2. Identification of leakages and retention of substances For the operators of tank storage for Otto fuel, which are covered by the obligations, it is recommended that they check, within the framework of their safety concept, whether the additional equipment of tanks needs leakage indicators. In particular cases, the sheathing of a tank with a ring coat can be useful. The space between tank and coating should be equipped with a leakage indicator alert, as well as with a (half) stationary foam fire-fighting facility. 3. Prevention of mixtures and further critical distribution effects In Germany, Otto fuel is stored in tanks with a floating or attached roof, connected to a vapour recovery facility. Venting holes like the ones at Buncefield are not usually present. The operators of storage tanks and the producers of large tanks are being recommended to check whether the tank model has features that could cause the fine distribution of leaking substances. Hereby they have to consider the desired cooling effects of such tank models. 4. Safety margins, averting of dangers, fire-fighting and emergency planning According to § 50 of the Federal Emission Protection Law, the safety margins between the tanks and surrounding objects outside the operating area, have to be appropriate. The Otto fuel storage tanks, which are covered by the extended obligations of the 12th Federal Emission Protection Regulation, relating to safety, have to check the following: − − −

guarantee the immediate cooling of the tank, in case of an outbreak of fire, preferably by automatic, half-stationary or at least remote-controlled facilities, availability of fire fighting facilities ensure the capturing and environmentally friendly disposal of fire fighting substances, in larger amounts

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− −

−

availability of sufficient material and human resources (machines, extinguishing agents, transport infrastructure, personnel capacity) or the option of quick access to these resources check whether explosions and their consequences (such as the immediate outbreak of fire and the simultaneous burning of more tanks, with negative consequences for the neighbourhood) are possible and whether the secondary containments might fail as a consequence of fire impact including the results of such checks in consultations with the authorities responsible for the alert and danger prevention planning.

In the second interim report of the AK-TL, the surveillance authorities, in each particular federal state, are being recommended to perform inspections in the corresponding storage tanks and to request safety reports and other documentation for alert and danger prevention planning.

References [1] The Buncefield Investigation – Progress report (www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/report.pdf). [2] The Buncefield Investigation – Second Progress report (www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/ report2.pdf). [3] The Buncefield Investigation – Third Progress report (www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/ report3.pdf). [4] Initial report – recommendations requiring immediate action (www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/ bstg1.htm). [5] Tank storage requirements for flammable liquids (http://www.lanuv.nrw.de/anlagen/Tanklager.pdf). [6] Buncefield Fire – Quick Look Report (http://www.bbs-engineering.ch/pdf/buncefieldfire_d.pdf). [7] Interim Report (June 2006) of the AK Tank storage Committee for Plant Safety (KAS) – First conclusions of the tank farm fire in Buncefield/GB (www.kas-bmu.de/publikationen/andere/ KASAKTLZWB01.pdf). [8] Second Interim Report (November 2006) of the AK Tank storage Committee for Plant Safety (KAS) – Preliminary evaluation of the depot fire at Buncefield/GB, on the 11th of Dec, 2005 and the recommendations for large German tank storage for otto fuel, derived from this report (www.kas-bmu.de/ publikationen/andere/KASAKTLZWB02.pdf). [9] Hailwood, M.: The Blaze of the Storage Tank in Buncefield. TÜ Bd. 47 (2006) Nr. 11/12, S. 10-13 (www.netinform.de/GW/files/pdf/Grossbrand_Buncefield_Hailwood_11_12_2006.pdf).

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-101

101

Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites André DAHN, Dipl. Ing. Mull & Partner Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH

Abstract. The investigations were performed on sites contaminated with explosives and their related metabolites. My presentation consists of the following chapters. Firstly, I give some information about the Situation in Germany as regards explosive contaminated sites. Further, I describe the processing phases for the site investigation, in brief and then examining some examples of processes for historic inquiry, orientation and detailed investigation and a remedial investigation. The last mentioned was funded as a project by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research – Investigation on Remediation of Explosive Contaminated soil, including the testing of large scale remediation methods. Finally I give some information in brief about a project where natural attenuation processes in explosive contaminated sites were investigated, and some results in the summary. Before starting my presentation, I give a brief description of our firm’s credentials in the field. Keywords. Risk investigation, explosive contamination, soil

Introduction Due to the topic of this workshop: dealing with Risk assessment and prevention of catastrophes with respect to local conditions I will present some experiences from Germany in the field of site investigations, where the risks to protected objects like water, groundwater, soil and humans were investigated in different detailed stages. The investigations were performed on sites contaminated with explosives and their related metabolites. My article consists of the following three sections. Firstly, I provide information about the situation in Germany as regards explosive contaminated sites. Secondly, I give a description of the process phases for the site investigation, at first in brief and then examining some examples of historical inquiry, orientation and detailed investigation and a remediation investigation (The last-mentioned was funded as a project by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research – Investigation on Remediation of Explosive Contaminated Soil, where large scale example remediation methods were also tested). Lastly, I will give some information in brief about a project where natural attenuation processes in explosive contaminated sites were investigated, with some results in summary. But before starting my presentation let me give a brief description of our firm’s credentials Our company was responsible, on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Defence, the Federal Ministry for Transport, Construction and Urban Development via Higher Financial Directorate Hanover, for the project management of the execution of approximately 15 UXO-clearance projects in Germany, including the historical inquiry, aerial photograph analysis and planning services. We monitored technical investigations, pre-

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K rü m m e l D ö m itz D ra g a h n P la u e G üsen Schönebeck C la u s th a l

R e in s d o r f E ls n ig

B o m m e rn S c h le b u s c h W ahn

H ir s c h h a g e n S ta d ta lle n d o r f

H a lls c h la g H öchst

G r ie s h e i m O ffe n b a c h

S a a r w e l li n g e n

Thansau

Figure 1. Former operational explosive factories in Germany.

pared bidding documents and participated in tender procedures. In several project we supervised the removal of unexploded ordnance. We also prepared a complete UXO-clearance concept for the inland waterway transport system of the Republic of Serbia. Site management of such a site conversion includes services like: • • • • • •

Historical inquiry, including analysis of aerial photographs; Planning of test field investigations; Development of tender procedure documents; Project management of all phases including construction supervision; Quality control; and Preparation of reports.

According to this procedure we have managed redevelopment projects for contaminated former military sites, which had been used by the former WGT-West Group of the Troops of the Red Army, former National People’s Army or the Federal Armed Forces, West Allied Forces (NATO). More than 1,000 armament-related contaminated sites have been redeveloped since 1991/92.

1. Situation in Germany Figure 1 shows the locations of the explosive factory sites formerly operating in Germany. Looking at the present situation in Germany, one can see that the problem of sites contaminated with explosive might not be as serious as discussion would suggest

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A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

Bi W a e le n w s s e r ie s e D r la u f 2

Fr

an

z -A u

gu

st -S

tol

len

Photo 1. Typical water-sensitive location of factories.

U n te re r

Di

D 1

P fa u e n te ic h W M ittle r e r 3 P fa u e n te ic h

D 7

O berer P fa u e n te ic h

W 5

et

r ic

hs

be

rg

er

W

as

se

r la F o r t u n e r uf T e ic h

D 4 F o r tu n e r W a ss e r la u f

W 6

Figure 2. Water-sensitive neighbourhood of factory.

it is, but if you consider that those industrial facilities are predominantly located in water-sensitive regions, the dangers for protected objects are much higher than indicated by first impressions (Photo 1 and Fig. 2). Besides the locations shown, more than 350 suspected sites where ammunition fabrication and storage facilities and also fabrication sites for propellants, explosives, poison gas and smoke bombs were situated also have to be taken into consideration. All in all you can say that armament-related sites are characterised as follows: • • •

They are located near to water protection zones or other protective zones, so a high contamination risk is indicated; Different types of explosive-related contaminations from homogeneous site contamination to hot spots, or even complete dumps, can be observed; and Results of the latest research on records of present situations on site, and suitable remediation technologies, provide information about remediation measures from a socio-economic perspective.

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площади, на которых подозреваются старые военные объекты/ Suspected armament site в первую очередь

preliminary assessment

историческая разведка/ historic inquiry Оценка/ screening

ориентировчное исследование/ orientation investigation Оценка/ evaluation

подробное исследование/ detail investigation Оценка/risk assessment

исследование по санированию/ remediation investigation оценка

Санация/ remediation Контроль выполнения/

performance control

Figure 3. Sequence of assessment stages.

The first typical example is that of the armament site WASAG Elsnig near Torgau/Saxony. During the Second World War a contamination of 2,6 DNT and RDX was caused by production activities; this is still effective after 60 years. The contamination impacts on groundwater and surface water, which is relevant for drinking water supply. A second site lies in Stadtallendorf in the Federal State of Hesse. The bedrock in that location is contaminated by nitro-aromatic compounds. The contamination in the groundwater leads to a risk for the drinking water basin in this region. High baseloading in the settlement areas forces the inhabitants to avoid agricultural use. The third example is that of the explosive factory “Werk Tanne” near ClausthalZellerfeld. The area of this factory is primarily characterised by a top soil contamination with nitro-aromatic compounds and soluble oxidized nitro-aromatic metabolites. These substances lead to a high risk potential for the water protection zone (neighbouring surface water) (Fig. 2) especially in the case of a flood incident or high precipitation load. The flood potential in the event of high amounts of precipitation is very high in this region. Therefore, the danger potential must also be expected to be very high.

2. Assessment Phases Before the aforementioned sites were identified as hazardous they were investigated according to the sequence shown in Fig. 3. The investigation to identify the potential for hazard to protected objects of suspected contaminated sites is divided into the following stages:

A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

105

Figure 4. Typical location plan gained from historical inquiry.

• • • • •

Preliminary assessment; Historical inquiry; Orientation investigation; Detailed investigation; and Remediation investigation.

Each step of the investigation is performed only if the previous step confirms a probable hazard. In the following, some examples of the investigation steps are shown. 2.1. Historical Inquiry For a historical inquiry, a unit location plan has to be elaborated where the historical background of occupancy is documented. In Fig. 4 an example of the work at Schönebeck is illustrated. Explosive contamination was anticipated in specific buildings with significant production facilities which had to be investigated further to confirm/exclude hazard potential. 2.2. Orientation/Preliminary Investigation A further investigation for proving a probable hazard is performed by means of an orientation stage when a relatively small number of soil samples have to be taken at the significant facilities or in the neighbouring area (Fig. 5).

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Figure 5. Preliminary soil sampling exercise.

If the chemical analyses confirm contamination in the sampled area a detailed investigation is needed to determine the degree and volume of the contamination. 2.3. Detailed Investigation Based on the results of the prliminary investigation a plan for the detailed investigation (Fig. 6) is prepared where an increased number of samples is required and is aimed at: • • • •

An accurate deliniation of the contaminated areas; A detailed record of the nature of contamination; A risk assessment with respect to protected features or organisms; and, therefore; An assessment which includes a final confirmation or exclusion of the suspected hazard.

Another example of an investigation plan for the review of sewer systems and piping involved a quick test demanded for an ‘on-the-spot’ (or real time) inventory,which was performed by a TNT Rapid diagnostic test, which is based on a colour reaction (Photo 2). 2.4. Remediation Investigation If contamination is analysed, the volume involved is determined and the hazard to protected objects is confirmed, the area has to be remediated using a suitable method,

A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

Figure 6. Detailed soils investigation stage.

Photo 2. Colour-based rapid TNT diagnostic test.

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where socio-economic aspects must also be considered. The following processes have been discussed with respect to their suitability in the time frame 1990 until now: Off site process = Remediation outside of the site • Combustion of material where <5% mass is explosive; • Soil washing methods: Purification of coarse grit and accumulation of the pollutant coarse silt; • Chemical decomposition, which results only in explosive deactivation and does not mitigate toxicity; and • Bioremediation in static or dynamic press, which leads to metabolising of the explosives and fixing of the metabolites in the soil. In the time between 1998 and 2001 a large sample test was performed, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research, and aimed to prove the technical feasibility of three different biological remediation methods. The Bioremediation test area was located in the area of the former explosive fabrication “Werk Tanne” near Clausthal-Zellerfeld in the Harz Mountains. The test consisted of the following phases: • • •

Identification and excavation of contaminated soil; Treatment of representative soil fractions in a tent; and Performance control and proof of successful remediation.

The soil material from the excavated area was also sieved and for the quick determination of contamination the TNT rapid diagnostic test was used. The excavated soil material was sampled from one pit, which was divided into seven parts. These parts were treated in the processes illustrated in Figs 7, 8 and 9: структурный материал structure material

Доставка Delivery

I

II

повторное использование Recycling

Субстраты substrate I

минеральные Вещества

II Mineral substances I

Скрап scrap

камни rocks

Грунт soil

Приготовление preparation

сепарация separation

подготовка заполнителей treatment of additives Очистка отход- ящего воздуха микробиологическая обработка Purification of exhaust air (анаэробный/ aэробный метод) здание обработки Microbial treatment (anaerobic/aerobic procedures operation hall

Figure 7. Dynamic soil clamp process of the former Company Umweltschutz Nord.

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109

Анаэробный/ аэробный динамический метод компостирования Anaerobic / aerobic dynamic soil clamp procedure Технологическая схема/ flow chart Выемка грунта Excavation магнитный сепаратор separator

Fe-скрап для использования Iron for recycling

Субстраты

просеянная почва

очищенный отходящий воздух

Sieved soil

Purified exhaust gas

substrate Вода/ water

почва для повторного использования

Заполнителы aggregates

Soil for refilling анаэробный / аэробныйтметод обработки почвы Anaerobic/aerobic soil remediation method

Figure 8. Anaerobic/aerobic soil remediation method of the Company Plambeck.

It could be shown that the processes were successful in cleaning the soil, but the cost of excavating the soil material was very high. Because of this the bioremediation of soil on site should only be used for so called “hot spots” of contamination. Another Project is shown in Fig. 10 where a remediation of arsenic warfare agents has taken place. Site preparation was needed before remediation, whereby the clearance of explosive ordnance was conducted. After that the safe excavation of the area was possible.

3. Natural Attenuation of TNT Metabolites Since 2001 the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research has funded a project dealing with the natural attenuation processes of explosive substances and their related metabolites with regard to their feasibility for degradation and detoxification. As shown in Fig. 11 TNT solids are steadily impacted by the alternation of dry periods and precipitation, where chemical oxidisation of the surface of the TNT solids and transport processes take place and lead to a slow but constant degradation and mitigation of the potential hazard in the contaminated area. The surface consists of the oxidised nitro-aromatic compounds, which are readily soluble in water. They can be easily mobilised through heavy rainfall incidents. The target of this R+D project is to show that the contaminants can be metabolised to non-toxic substances which will lead to a mitigation of harm in the subsoil and in the groundwater. Different reaction products can be expected as shown in Fig. 12, where the different possible pathways of the TNT metabolisation are illustrated. Some of the metabolites are significantly more toxic than TNT itself, but in the end it is still expected that the final products will not be harmful.

110 A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

Figure 9. Bioremediation process with fungi in a static clamp (Company AWIA).

A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

Figure 10. Arsenic contamination zoning.

Figure 11. Cycle of weather effects on TNT solids.

111

112

A. Dahn / Procedures for the Handling of Contaminated Armament Related Sites

2,4,6-TNT

DNT, DNP (Emmrich, 2000)

2,4,6-TN-Benzylalkohol (Bruns-Nagel 1998)

2,4,6-TNBS

2-ADNBS 4ADNBS

(Bruns-Nagel 1998) (Emmrich, 2001) (Godejohann,Preiss 1996)

1,3,5-TNB (Steinbach 1997)

Аэроб aerobic

2-ADNT

(Knackmus und Lenke 1995) (Breitung, Bruns-Nagel, von Löw 1995)

4-ADNT

Анаэроб anaerobic

(Emmrich, 1999,2001)

включение в глинистые Dinitro-Aniline минералы или гумус

2,4-DANT

2,6-DANT

(Knackmus und Lenke 1995)

TAT (Drzyzga, Bruns(Gorontzy, Nagel, Blotevogel 1995) Gorontzy 1998/1999)

Figure 12. Range of TNT reaction products.

4. Conclusions As a result of the experiences described above it can be stated: • Cost-intensive excavation and subsequent treatment of contaminated soil material has to be limited to those areas which are of most risk to protected objects. Excavation is limited to, so called, “hot spots”; • Hot spots are identified by detailed specification of contaminated areas; • Contaminated excavated material is to be treated on-site if site development schedule allows (duration of the soil treatment is approximately 4–6 months); • Contaminated material has to be treated off-site if development schedule is restricted; and • Non-point contaminated areas have to be investigated with regard to natural attenuation processes (and monitored).

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-113

113

The SANDOZ Catastrophe and the Consequences for the River Rhine Walter REINHARD, Dipl. Ing. Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt, Department for Environment, Upper Water Authority, Wilhelminenstr. 1-3, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany

Abstract. On 1st November 1986 a stockroom of the chemical company SANDOZ near Basle (Switzerland) burned down; it contained 1,200 tons of pesticides, solvents and other toxic chemicals. 10,000–20,000 m³ water for fire fighting contaminated with approximately 30 tons of pesticides and 200kg of mercury flowed into the river Rhine. Unknown amounts of persistent organic pollutants infiltrated the groundwater. Three days later SANDOZ informed the drinking water companies along the River Rhine about the toxic flood. Approximately 150,000 eels died in the Upper Rhine. This also meant the extinction of all species in the water, as it was later reported by a speaker of the German Ministry of the Environment. On 5th November the pollution of the river had spread about 400 kilometres. Waterworks in the Middle and Lower Rhine began to close their water intakes. The President of SANDOZ announced intensified controls for chemical stockrooms. The German chemical industry worried about the tightening of environmental laws as a result of the SANDOZ catastrophe. About 25,000 inhabitants of a village in the Middle Rhine area were supplied with drinking water by tanker lorries after the closure of the (bank filtrate) fountains. On 8th November in Basle up to 1,000 people took part in a demonstration against the “Arrogance of Power”. On 18th November SANDOZ reported for the first time that the stock room also contained 1.9 tons of the highly toxic insecticide ENDOSULFAN. The removal of the contaminated sludge started and the sludge was brought to a dumping site. Special “vacuum sludge cleaners” were used to prevent the highly contaminated sludge being dispersed during the next flood. It took eight months until they could find mussels, small cancers and insect larvae within the polluted stretch of the River Rhine. In the following years the colonisation by means of tributaries was completed and the situation of fauna and flora of the river has been normalised. Lasting results of the SANDOZ disaster: improvement of international agreements and collaboration like ICPR (Improvement of Alarm System), River Rhine Action Programme and the programme “Salmon 2000”. Furthermore, technological requests emerged for enterprises like appropriate retention tanks for water for fire fighting and for cases of malfunctions. Keywords. Big fire, chemical enterprise, toxic substances, contaminated water for fire fighting, River Rhine, ecological catastrophe, future prevention measures, early warning system, reliable storage of hazardous substances, storage of water for fire fighting

Introduction The Rhine is one of the major rivers in Europe. Its course of 1,320 km takes it through six different countries. The entire catchment area (Picture 1) of 185,000 km² is home to approximately 50 million people. Previously, the riverside was characterized by fishermen’s huts and barges. Today these have given way to towns and cities, industry and

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W. Reinhard / The SANDOZ Catastrophe and the Consequences for the River Rhine

Picture 1. Rhine Catchment Area.

cargo vessels. Fifty percent of all Europe’s chemical industry is now located on the Rhine. At the same time, the Rhine is a source of re-treated drinking water for approximately 20 million people, 5.5 million of them getting their drinking water directly from the flowing river. About 11,000 ships carry approximately 175 million tonnes of goods every year, many of them loaded with hazardous chemical substances. For the protection of the river’s ecology and water quality, which means protection of the people living by and from the river, intensive international cooperation is essential. The problems of water body protection become apparent by looking at the many ways in which the Rhine is used: as a waterway for leisure and recreation, as a habitat for plants and animals, as a reservoir for drinking and cooling water, for hydropower, and for the discharge of waste-water (Picture 2). The intensive use of the river has almost led to its biological death. In the mid-1970s certain sections were considered highly polluted, but various efforts helped it to recover by and large. Today it is the habitat of many different forms of life. The improvement was only possible with international cooperation, and continuing in the future is an essential condition for the performance of the European Directive 2000/60/EC. This European Water Framework Directive (WFD) demands of the member states that “basic measures” shall consist of “…any measures required … to prevent and/or to reduce the impact of accidental pollution incidents … including through systems to detect or give warning of such events…” (Article 11, paragraph 3 (1) WFD). The continuous chemical and biological monitoring at the River Rhine dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, beginning with conventional techniques for obtaining water samples to monitor trends through collected data. The major reasons for improvements in river monitoring in the Rhine basin are the establishment of international monitoring along the river and its tributaries, improvements in the regulatory policies of regional and national governments, and stricter regulations on industrial and municipal wastewater emissions. Consequently, from the 1960s until the 1980s an off-line and on-line monitoring network was established along the Rhine, as had been the case along most of the major river systems in Europe. Today the Rhine is investigated using sophisticated technologies, extending from detailed chemical investigations of water (e.g. more than 300 parameters are routinely analyzed) to sediment, biota, and comprehensive biological surveys.

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Picture 2. Central industrial waste-water treatment plant in the catchment area of the Rhine.

In addition to the water monitoring programmes of the state authorities, many of the users of Rhine water run their own monitoring programmes. This was especially true of the waterworks, which developed a sophisticated monitoring programme in order to get an overview of the common loads as well as information about compounds not commonly analyzed in the routine programmes of the authorities. A particular strain on water quality stems from industrial companies and from high-level shipping activity. Industrial incidents or shipping accidents can lead to spills of substances that are harmful to water. If the contamination is detected at an early stage, the alarm can be triggered and measures can be taken in order to protect the drinking water supply and, partly, the ecosystem of the Rhine. The earlier that the information about the sources of the spill is available, the sooner efforts to stop the discharge can be successfully implemented.

1. The Sandoz Accident All improvements of the biological situation of the Rhine were destroyed by one incident in one day: on 1st November 1986 a stockroom of the chemistry company SANDOZ near Basle (Switzerland) burned down; it contained 1,200 tons of pesticides, solvents and other toxic chemicals (Picture 3). 10.000–20.000 m³ water for fire fighting contaminated with approximately 30 tons of pesticides and 200 kg of mercury flowed into the river Rhine. Amounts of persistent organic pollutants that could not assessed, infiltrated the groundwater. Three days later SANDOZ informed the drinking water companies along the River Rhine about the toxic flood. Approximately 150,000 eels, i.e. the entire eel population (specialized benthos feeder) were completely eradicated in the upper Rhine (Picture 4).

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W. Reinhard / The SANDOZ Catastrophe and the Consequences for the River Rhine

Picture 3. SANDOZ fire.

Picture 4. Dead eels.

Even 500 km downstream, in the German Federal State Nordrhein-Westfalen, the dynamic daphnia tests in operation registered an “alarm” situation. This also had meant the extinction of all species in the water, as it was later reported by a speaker of the German Ministry of the Environment. On 5th November the pollution of the river had spread about 400 kilometres. Waterworks in the Middle and Lower Rhine began to close their water intakes. The President of SANDOZ announced intensified controls for

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117

chemical stockrooms. The German chemical industry worried about the tightening of environmental laws as a result of the SANDOZ catastrophe. About 25,000 inhabitants of a village at the Middle Rhine area were supplied with drinking water by tanker trucks after the closure of the (bank filtrate) fountains. On 8th November in Basle up to 10,000 people took part in a demonstration against the “Arrogance of Power”. On 18th November SANDOZ reported for the first time that the stock room also contained 1.9 tonnes of the highly toxic insecticide ENDOSULFAN. The removal of the contaminated sludge started and the sludge was brought to a dumping site. Special “vacuum sludge cleaners” were used to prevent the highly contaminated sludge from being dispersed during the next flood. It took eight months before they could find mussels, small cancers and insect larvae within the polluted stretch of the River Rhine. In the following years the colonisation by means of tributaries was completed and the situation of fauna and flora of the river has been normalised. The lasting results of the SANDOZ disaster are: improvement of international agreements and collaboration like ICPR (Improvement of Alarm System), River Rhine Action Programme and the programme “Salmon 2000”. Furthermore, technological requests have emerged for enterprises like appropriate retention tanks for water for fire fighting and for cases of malfunctions.

2. The International Warning and Alarm Plan Rhine (WAP) (Improvement of Alarm System) In spite of the action intended to prevent polluted water from flowing into the River Rhine, this may well still happen. If and when it does, time is of the essence in addressing the pollution. Above all, those concerned downstream must be informed, especially authorities responsible for the struggle against pollution and the waterworks that take Rhine water for drinking water supplies. Therefore, the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) has installed the International Warning and Alarm Plan “Rhine” (WAP Rhine). The first version was officially introduced in 1986 after the SANDOZ disaster; the recent version dates from 2005. The goals of the WAP are: averting danger, detection of causes, investigation into the cause, and taking measures to remove damage, to avoid or reduce damage, and to avoid consequential damage. In addition, damage events that are expected to lead to higher public interest should be passed on. Between Basel (Switzerland) and the German-Dutch frontier, seven International Main Warning Centers (IMWCs) “share” the Rhine (Table 1, and Picture 5). Two more such warning centres are located on the tributary Moselle coming from France, forming the spine of the Warning and Alarm Plan “Moselle”. Each IMWC is responsible for a certain part of the Rhine or for the tributaries. The IMWC on whose territory the spill happened sends a “first report” to all centres downstream as well as to the ICPR secretariat in Koblenz. The WAP Rhine regulates in detail the procedures of reporting: language, forms, technical means, time windows, distribution, addresses and telephone/fax numbers, definitions of the “all clear” signal, guidance values for loads and concentrations, regulations for special cases, and so forth.

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W. Reinhard / The SANDOZ Catastrophe and the Consequences for the River Rhine

Table 1. International Main Warning Centres according to the International Warning and Alarm Plan Rhine Country

Name

Operator

Switzerland

R1

Office for Environment and Energy (Amt für Umwelt und Energie) of Canton Basel-Stadt

France

R2

Prefecture for the Department Bas-Rhin (Préfecture du Bas-Rhin), Strasbourg

Germany, Baden-Württemberg

R3

State Water Guard Head Office (Wasserschutzpolizeidirektion) Karlsruhe

Germany, Hessen

R4

Water Guard Station (Wasserschutzpolizeistation) Wiesbaden

Germany, Rheinland-Pfalz

R5

Water Guard Station (Wasserschutzpolizeistation) Koblenz

Germany, Nordrhein-Westfalen

R5

District Government (Bezirksregierung) Düsseldorf

The Netherlands

R7

Water Authority Head Office (Rijkswaterstaat directie) Oost-Nederland, Arnhem

S

Secretariat of the ICPR, Koblenz

R 7 R ijk s w a te r s t a a t A rn h em

R 6 B e z irk s r e g ie ru n g D ü s s e ld o r f

R 5 W a s s e r s c h u tz p o liz e i K o b le n z R 4 W a s s e r s c h u tz p o liz e i W ie s b a d e n R 3 W a s s e rs c h u tz p o liz e i K a rls ru h e

R 2 P r é fe c tu r e d u B a s - R h in S tra s b o u rg

R 1 A m t fü r U m w e lt u n d E n e rg ie B a s e l- S t a d t

Picture 5. Location of International Main Warning Centres according to the WAP Rhine.

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In the following paragraphs the most important regulations of the WAP Rhine are described. Language: The WAP Rhine consistently uses the three languages of the river basin area in parallel: French, German, and Dutch. All forms are available in three languages; most of them are in fact tri-lingual. Forms: The reports have to be written by using special tri-lingual forms, which are also available on an electronic basis. The paragraphs of the main report are numerically coded so that – independently from knowledge of the language – it is possible to add all relevant information to the form at the correct place. Staff and material: The WAP Rhine demands of the IMWSs that they are manned 24 hours a day, and that they are well-equipped with handbooks, databases of hazardous goods, and lists of substance-identifying numbers (CAS, as well as with the computer-based flow-time model, the Rhine Alarm Model. Protocol: For each alarm a chronological diary has to be kept. Case of triggering an alarm: In order to facilitate the decision as to whether or not an alarm should be triggered, the ICPR defined “guidance values” for loads and concentrations for several groups of hazardous substances. The guidance values are related to discharges of compounds that are not allowed and are caused by accidents, malfunctions, or illegal acts. At present the guidance values are in a state of revision. The number of WAP alarms caused by the chemical industry has decreased within the last 15 years (1989, n = 33; and 2002, n = 3) whereas the spills caused by ships have remained more ore les constant (1989, n = 6; 2002, n = 4).

3. The Rhine Action Programme and the Programme Salmon 2000 After the disastrous fire at the chemical giant Sandoz the public was shocked. For many people, this catastrophe proved to be traumatic: In the weeks after the Sandoz catastrophe, chemicals emissions were reported from all major chemical industries in the Rhine river basin, in which is concentrated nearly 20 percent of worldwide chemical production capacity. Besides huge demonstrations all along the Rhine (Picture 6), a water trial was held in Straßburg, France, condemning the chemical industry, bureaucrats and politicians from all established parties as being guilty of neglect. Consequently, politicians from all riparian states were seeking ways to effectively appease environmentally-minded voters. Seven weeks after the Sandoz catastrophe, the Dutch Minister for Environmental Affairs invited his colleagues and busses full of journalists to Rotterdam. Ministers and journalists were driven to the harbour storage site where contaminated river and harbour sludge had to be dumped. After their return to the Rotterdam City Hall, the Dutch Minister made an impressive speech that culminated in the demand for bringing back salmon to the Rhine within 10 years. The return of the salmon was established as Germany’s most important symbol for environmental improvement in the eighties. In stark contrast with traditional means of international cooperation, the ICPR refrained from new treaties on emission norms. Instead, it worked out a much more flexible “Action Programme for the River Rhine” which focused on common objectives of all riparian states. After the objectives had been established by the ICPR working groups and the ICPR plenary session, every member state decided on its own how the objectives could be reached most efficiently. Important milestones for the imple-

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Picture 6. Demonstration in Basel.

Picture 7. Special devices for storage for water for fire fighting.

mentation of the Action Programme were inventories of all kinds, definitions of stateof the-art techniques for production with high environmental impact – e.g. pulp and paper – and the development of further–reaching objectives. Technical improvements concerning the storage of contaminated water for firefighting (in special tanks at ore installations) were also demanded by the competent authorities (Picture 7). After only a few years, the Action Programme led to significant improvements of the Rhine water quality, the salmon – a living symbol for a clean Rhine – returned and became very popular. After the disaster at Sandoz, which led to a considerable loss of

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politicians’ credibility in environmental matters, the idea to use the salmon as a bioindicator for good water quality convinced even sceptical groups of the governments’ efforts to restore the Rhine ecosystem.

References [1] Putz, Rainer, Regenwaldinstitut Freiburg. Lecture “Tercer Encuentro de los Ríos Mundiales” 2002, Bógotá, Colombia. [2] Peter Diehl et. al. Hdb Env Chem Vol. 5 Part XX (2005): 1 – x DOI 10.1007/015 Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005. [3] Rainer Durth inWent Texts and Reports. [4] Fotos: Ifraserv Wiesbaden, ICPR, Putz, Rainer.

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The Latest Hesse Water and Soil Protection Guidelines Walter REINHARD Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt, Department for Environment, Upper Water Authority, Wilhelminenstr. 1-3, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany [email protected]

Introduction The direct link between the creation of a warning plan and protection measures for water and soil against adverse environmental factors lies especially in the “International Plan of the Alarm and Warning on the Rhine River” and “The Warning Plan of the Weser”. The development of the warning plan is needed so that, when followed, it will guarantee a rapid process of coordination in the event of pollution. Because of the legal transposition of claims, the quality of the surface water has improved over recent years and there have been many technical initiatives relating to the inflow of industrial waters by the building of decentralised and centralised water treatment stations. Today many industries also have on-site stations and water reserves, as well as having treatment stations for hazardous sewage types. In spite of the applied techniques, the pollution risks still reappear through unmonitored and non-permissible emissions of wastewater into drinking water supplies and these can have serious effects on water quality. Thus, it is necessary to have a rapid and qualified warning system so as to minimise the pollution effects and help eliminate the risks by managing urgent measures in relevant places. It is also accepted that protection of soil and groundwater through transposition of demands DAWS (1) was reaching a high standard of security. However, substances that are harmful to groundwater can also cause unintentional contamination of soils and surface water bodies. Furthermore, the transportation of dangerous goods through the country can cause water bodies to be at critical risk from these two environmental factors, as well as presenting risks to federal roads themselves.

1. Foundation of Warning Systems In 1974 Hesse introduced the first direct warning system for water protection. The final variation came on 25 June 1991 when, after assessment, new laws and different local decision-making took account of practical experience. Taken into consideration were the following essential elements: • • •

Federal laws on soil protection (BBodSchG) (2) and Federal/local laws on soil protection and unauthorized disposal of rubbish (3); Local law on cleaning controls for wastewater (4); Local law on sturgeon case (12.BlmSch) (5);

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Reorganization and new responsibility in internal administration of Hesse’s environment; Questions of delimitation between participating authorities; Extension of harmful substances list for the environment (not only for water, but now is different); A model as a plan of alarm.

The Ministry of Ecology, Agriculture and Forestry from Hesse created a group of engineers, scientists and administrators in the town for the fundamental implementation of this approach. This group was able to present the Ministry with a new project about this approach within a year.

2. Approach to Warning Guidelines Generally, this approach had clear divisions in the planned guideline structure: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)

General; Aims; Announcement obligations; Responsibilities; Alarm notices; Alarm plan; Immediate measures; Expense restitution; and Obligation to report and to inform.

2.1. General Water and soil protection, as well as water supply and stations for wastewater that can pollute the environment, especially with harmful substances to water which are classified as being of a general danger, must cause the release of the alarm and often the danger can then be stopped. This guideline requires that for exceptional situations and damage cases, the following must be known: − − − −

Substances prescription; Substance quantity; Emplacement prescription; and Spatial spread.

Harmful substances to waters are those which are not compliant with the law on waters for housekeeping and administration, (WHG) from §19g, paragraph 5. 2.2. Aims As already mentioned, this guideline for alarms on water and soil protection match the framework for representatives from board of directors and town mayors’ effective administration. Alarm plans regulate the measures taken in the event of an alarm. Alarm plans must also use other plans of administration that follow the guidelines for water (6).

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2.3. Announcement Obligations It is necessary to inform the authorities about something bad. The most publicised obligation to inform is defined by the Hesse water law (HWG), §31 paragraph 6, where it announces the removal of harmful liquids from stations. Other resulting obligations relate to: − − − − −

Wastewaters; dates after water law for domestic and farm usage (WHG) (8)/HWG; § 7 Control resolution about wastewaters; §19 paragraph 1. Resolution in the case of abandonment; The right of goods transportation on roads and on roads near rivers; for example, resolution of highway dangers (9) and new ADR (10); The right of stream course, for example §1.15 and § 8.09 Decision of navigation police on the Rhine (11), § 11 paragraph about police station on the river.

As a rule, an infringement of this obligation is punished in accordance with the law. 2.4. Responsibilities In the case of an emerging alarm, it is necessary that all institutions are informed and know their professional responsibilities, and can quote responsibilities. This approach requires new collaboration between authorities and the transmission of information about any hazards and risks. In 1997 Hesse achieved a new reform on the administration of the environment, especially the financial administration of polluted water. In large measure, the charging was divided, by committee rules, between districts and cities with proper administration but there are questions about delimitation, though the resolution of responsibilities was omitted. In concord with HWB, district councils and cities with proper administration are responsible for risks to water (also for steam accidents in the channel) where the company releases from petrol stations are less than 20.000 EW. Rules committees are responsible for hazards which are >20.000EW in communal domains of wastewater stations, but also in industrial stations. It can meane a double responsibility. If there is visible pollution of water, the authority’s responsibility is to inform about this danger. In the last relation of HWG about the guideline, the quality of waters in the federal channel was transmitted from water authorities to the rules committee, because these are all the initiators of Einleiter in these waters, but have no importance. The rules committee is responsible for the execution of BBodSchG, especially for reclamation and other damaging/polluting effects on soil. District councils and cities with proper administration find their responsibility in §1 paragraph 2 resolution about authority responsibility after BBodSchG. First of all there are town’s authorities and police! Professional consultation concerning volumetric results of damage put, in agreement, the question to the district service for environment and geology (HLUG). Also it concerns surface waters, the structure of subsoil and the quality of water (www.hlug.de).

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2.5. Alarm Notice The police, firemen and soil protection authority are informed through a coded alarm system (the code relates to protection of water and soil. Those who inform using that code, must give details of: − − − − − − − −

their job, name and notice accessibility; date and hour of damage – the place of damage; description of incident (for example, an accident to a tank of fuel or hermetic container, accident on a railway, steam collisions); type and quantity of harmful substances; damage scope (to groundwater, water and soil), station of water supply, sewerage, station of clean water, soils damage by burning or land explosion; special indications (for example, elimination measures); tests and investigations carried out; and well-known places.

The Rhine is in an international domain, and the rules committee of Darmstadt and Gieben (Lahn) release a warning after “Alarm Plan and warning on Rhine River”. News is distributed by the police for water protection. Wiesbaden in Mainz-Kastel is a Principal Station of advertising in Hesse (LHWZ). LHWZ inform the affected place in Hesse after the alarm plan of the Principal International Station (IHWZ)R4 and water protection from Koblenz. Because of the geographic position of station LHWZ, Hesse requires from the International Committee of protection on the Rhine that station LHWZ should be in Rhine/Main. In regard to water pollution and other damage to waters in Weser, Werra, Fulda advise the committee of Kassel in “Warnplanes Weser” to notify the central police station in Hesse – North as a LHWZ. 2.6. Alarm Plan Alarm plans elaborated for waters and soil protection must correspond in essence and structure with the alarm plan annex to Annex 1 of those guidelines and must be completed in the course of the year. Thus the essential elements include the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Domain of importance; Obligations to advertise; Responsibilities; Alarm notice; Immediate measures; Special rules (for example, regional features); Restitution of costs; Obligation to report and to inform; Alarm plan and the mode; Station and specific region (the territories of water protection, wastewater, gases, etc.); 11. Noticed places (e.g. police, firemen, HLUG, and fishing authority); 12. Firms and institutions which help removal of danger (construction companies, specialist firms, laboratories, THW, etc); 13. List of questions about damage and accident notice;

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14. To notice immediately the industry and individual enterprise (list of questions); 15. To report immediately the Ministry of Ecology of Hesse (list of questions). 16. List of questions for statistical bureau of Hesse; 17. Measurement place of the first category (station of water test HLUG); 18. For inhabitants of Rhine, Main and Lahn “International plan of alarm on the Rhine”, for Wesr’s inhabitants “Advertising plan of Weser”. Industrial enterprises were examined to advertise the report to committee about cases of abandonment (SFK –GS – 18) (www.sfk-taa.de). 2.7. Immediate Measures This section presents the important measures of prevention which relate to the following elements: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

regulating water and/or soil usage; other stations of the company (e.g. warehouse, production unit, residual station of water, etc); security and the suspension of damaging activity; preventing damage spread; eliminaing pollution in easy accessible regions and stop it. forming funnel of extraction; and securing damage domain against intervention.

The report on immediate measures, to call the authorities’ attention to its activity in connection with this charging, must be assured for work security for the group of workers. 2.8. Expenses Restitution The authorities employ the elaboration of immediate measures by regression and financial potential. Necessary measures for damage removal and expenses are sent to those who are responsible. Also, the assumption of expenses can be placed on an individual, a province and a commune. Maybe there is a clear channel, following pollution of oil, for the banks of Germany to present this phenomenon through Direction of steams and water for such a destructive situation. 2.9. Obligation to Inform and to Report For all different incidents, it is probably necessary to: 1) 2) 3)

find the state of importance of public opinion and environment; discuss with the government of a province; state the importance of the extension to a province which is presented in a Ministry of Ecology report.

3. International and State Warning Plans For the Rhine and Elbe rivers, there are experienced plans of alarm which assure that the pollution which presents risks to water is presented in terms of the quantity of con-

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centration that can influence the quality of water. On the Rhine there are six partners, so-called International Station of Principal Advertising (IHWZ) in: Basel, Strasbourg, Mannheim, Koblenz, Dusseldorf and Arnheim, as well as the Secretariat of the International Committee for protection of the Rhine in Koblenz (IKSR). Authorities and responsible posts for incident control against damage will warn of: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Protection against danger; Case constation; Measures for damage exclusion; Avoidance of consequences following production damage to be planned.

The implementation of the alarm signal on the Rhine was proposed to IKSR at the 67th Plenary Meeting in June 2001. There were proposed orientation values concerning Service Reference of Measure Lobith, at the German–Dutch border and especially an international alarm and advertising plan on the Rhine. In principle, this “step” was welcome as an “instrument” of rapid assessment of alarm release to responsible posts. Regretfully, the charges which accompany the alarm release are fixed at a high level (for example, cadmium 300 kg/d, and cyanide 500 kg/d). Thus, workers must manage to lead men’s experiments of alarm release. Suppose that approximately a half of ton of cyanide had drained in a industrial enterprise from Hesse on the Rhine and the worker there tried to release the alarm on the Rhine. Both political and personal consequences can be foreseen.

Figure 1. International stations for principal warning on the Rhine.

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4. Summary Unforeseen events without permission for soil and water usage can destroy environmental aims and cause damage to flora and fauna systems. This type of incident is part of the history of European states; for example, we had once more a catastrophe from Sandoz on November 1986 (the Rhine) and cyanide poisoning of all Tirza (Theib) in January 2000. The last case was caused by a Romanian-Austrian gold pit into a pier break of a basin with mud cyanide. Advertising by responsible persons in Hungary had considerably protracted the timescales. Each case of alarm will be distinguishable always from office work and take new reference correspondents. The direct line for alarm plan elaboration and for measures of water and soil protection for harmful substances to environment, especially International plan alarm and advertising Plan, must help responsible authorities to establish leadership guidelines and to achieve clean water. It will guarantee wage-earner transparency, and organization mode. Within the framework of this Workshop, the material relates to a year’s study of examples and models. The new line of alarm of water and soil protection is introduced on the website of the Ministry of Ecology, Agriculture and Forestry of Hesse (www.mulf.hessen.de).

List of Law and Decisions 1. Disposal about stations in connection with harmful waters and about companies in such domains (stations disposal – DAWS), 19 September 1993; modified 31 March 2000 (GVB1.IS.269); 2. Protection law of soil, 17 March 1988 (BGBI.IS.5029); 3. Federal decision of soil protection from unauthorized rubbish, 12 July 1999 (BGB1.IS.1554); 4. Decision of Hesse about proper control of residual station water (EVKO), 21 January 2000; modified 7 November 2002 (GVB1.IS.693); 5. Decision to realize regulations EG concerning damage in the event of accidents with harmful substances 12 BISchV, 26 April 2000 (BIB1.IS.603); 6. Directive 2000/60/EG of European Council and Parliament, 23 October 2000, for development of water protection measures (Amstbl.Der EGL 327/1); 7. Hesse Water Law, 22 January 1990; modified 18 June 2002 (GVB1.IS.324); 8. Water law from housekeeping and administration, 19 August 2002 (BGB1.IS.3245); 9. Decision about transportation of noxious goods of the pays boundary, 22 December 1998; modified 23 June 1999 (BGB1.IS.1435); 10. ADR – European Accord of international transportation of dangerous materials 13. ADR – amended decision, 20 December 1996 (BGB1.IIS.2787); 11. Decision to navigate on the Rhine, 19 December 1994; modified 18 December 2002, (BGB1.IS.4580); 12. Decision of police station on the Rhine from 29 June 1989 (GVB1.IS.209).

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Hazard Prevention and Emergency Planning on Transboundary Rivers in the UNECE Region Gerhard WINKELMANN-OEI

Abstract. Hazard prevention and emergency planning in the UNECE region are focused on the following key elements: 1. Identification and notification of accidental risk sites (ARS) 2. Guidelines for safety measures minimizing the risk potential 3. Emergency preparedness in the case of an accident and mutual assistance. Keywords. UNECE, hazard prevention, transboundary rivers

Introduction 1. Major industrial accidents may cause far-reaching transboundary effects and may lead to accidental water pollution. Therefore, the signatories to the Industrial Accidents Convention and the parties to the Water Convention decided to cooperate on issues related to the prevention of accidental pollution of transboundary waters. 2. As a result of this cooperation, a workshop on the prevention of chemical accidents and limitation of their impact on transboundary waters was held in Berlin (7–9 May 1998). Taking into account the results of this workshop, the seventh meeting of the signatories to the Industrial Accidents Convention (13–15 May 1998) proposed that a joint ad hoc expert group on water and industrial accidents (Joint Expert Group) be established under both conventions. This proposal was endorsed by the first meeting of the Working Group on Water Management, established under the Water Convention, in July 1998. Subsequently, two meetings of the Joint Expert Group were held, during which the seminar on the prevention of chemical accidents and the limitation of their impact on transboundary waters (Hamburg, 4–6 October 1999) was prepared. The conclusions and recommendations of this seminar were then adopted at the second meeting of the parties to the Water Convention, held in The Hague (23–25 March 2000) and endorsed by the first meeting of the conference of the parties to the Industrial Accidents Convention, held in Brussels (22–24 November 2000). 3. The parties to both conventions extended the mandate of the Joint Expert Group to support and provide guidance in the implementation of the above recommendations and agreed on the group’s future work plan as contained in decision 2000/5 on the prevention of accidental water pollution taken by the first meeting of the conference of the parties to the Industrial Accidents Convention (ECE/CP.TEIA/2 Annex VI).

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1. Major Accomplishments 4. An inventory of existing safety guidelines and best practices for the prevention of accidental transboundary water pollution was developed and made available via the Internet (http://www.unece.org/env/teia/water.htm) by the secretariats of the two conventions. The aim was to create an information platform concerning guidelines for the prevention of accidental water pollution. According to the decision of the Joint Expert Group, the inventory has the following four sections: (a) UNECE regional safety guidelines (e.g. recommendations of the Hamburg seminar). (b) Safety guidelines adopted by international river commissions (e.g. joint bodies for the Elbe, Danube, Odra and Rhine Rivers). (c) Safety guidelines adopted by bilateral bodies. (d) National safety guidelines and/or technical standards. 5. The Joint Expert Group provided the input for levels (i) and (ii) of the inventory. Upon the group’s request, focal points under the two conventions provided information concerning levels (iii) and (iv). This process should be considered as an ongoing one and all countries are welcome to provide further relevant information in order to make this inventory even more meaningful. 6. The Joint Expert Group was kept informed, provided guidance and promoted bilateral and multilateral projects to assist countries with economies in transition to introduce safety measures for hazardous activities with a special emphasis on the prevention of accidental water pollution. 7. In order to properly address the safety of pipelines, the Joint Expert Group drew up the safety guidelines and good practices for pipelines (ECE/CP.TEIA/2006/11). In doing so, they took into account, amongst others, the input provided by authorities, pipeline operators, research institutions and non-governmental organizations provided at and as a follow up to two workshops on: (i) The prevention of water pollution due to pipeline accidents, held in Berlin on 8–9 June 2005 and (ii) The prevention of accidents of gas transmission pipelines, held in The Hague on 8–9 March 2006. 8. The Joint Expert Group also commenced work aimed at drawing up guidelines and good practices for tailing dams. A workshop in 2007 in Armenia is foreseen in order to seek the necessary input of all stakeholders. 9. The Joint Expert Group considered that adequate response measures to industrial accidents often depend on the effectiveness of early warning and alarm systems. To this end, it stressed that the UNECE Industrial Accident Notification System and river alarm systems should be as effective as possible and operational at all times. The Joint Expert Group also agreed that there is room for further cooperation between the network of points of contact under the UNECE Industrial Accident Notification System and the focal points of river alarm systems.

2. Future Activities 10. The Joint Expert Group, at its seventh meeting in Geneva on 10–11 April 2006, reviewed the tasks in its current work plan. It considered the tasks which were accomplished, those that needed further work and finally those that require ongoing attention

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from the group. It also considered new proposals suggested by the group’s members. Based on the above review and discussion on the future priorities, the Joint Expert Group agreed to include the following elements in its draft work plan to be considered and subsequently adopted by the conference of the parties to the Industrial Accidents Convention and the meeting of the parties to the Water Convention: (a) Provision of guidance and assistance to countries with economies in transition in the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations of the Hamburg seminar. (b) Drawing up guidelines and good practices for tailing dams. (c) Facilitation of the exchange of information on the functioning of alarm and notification systems at the national, regional and local levels established within the framework of the two Conventions and/or international river commissions (e.g. Rhine, Elbe and Danube) through joint consultations of representatives of points of contact designated under the UNECE Industrial Accident Notification System and river alarm systems. (d) Provision of guidance for establishing cross-border contingency plans. (e) Promotion of the organization of response exercises, in particular in the transboundary context. (f) Drawing up guidelines and good practices for the navigation of ships on rivers (g) Maintenance and updating of existing safety guidelines and good practices for the prevention of accidental transboundary water pollution and provision of guidance on their adaptation to the specific needs and circumstances in river basins. (h) Development of methodologies to identify hazardous activities that handle smaller amounts of substances than those specified in Annex I to the Industrial Accidents Convention.

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Cyanide-Accident at Kolin, January 2006

Gerd Winkelmann-Oei, German EPA

NATO-Workshop Chisinau, 25-27 April 2007

Case of SPOLANA Neratovice

Gerd Winkelmann-Oei, German EPA

Spolana in floods

NATO-Workshop Chisinau, 25-27 April 2007

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Gerd Winkelmann-Oei, German EPA

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Preventive Measures are the best Disaster control - the Checklist method Jurg PLATKOWSKI Abstract: Preventive measures are the best disaster control. For this reason the principal aim of the project “Technology Transfer for Plant-related Water Protection in Moldavia, Romania and the Ukraine” was the development of a simple and clearly structured method for water analysis, with regard to the safety of ground and surface water, which is adaptable to the economic and technological capabilities in the participating countries. Based on international recommendations, e.g. the Joint River Bodies, we elaborated the so called Checklist Method. Keywords: Water protection, industrial accident.

Introduction The German Federal Environmental Office initiated the project “Technology transfer for plant-related water protection in Romania, Moldavia and the Ukraine” after the accident in Baia Mare (Romania), to improve the conditions for plant safety regarding water protection. The main aim of the project, together with other projects sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Reactor Safety, is to increase the safety level in these countries, in this case the Ukraine, adapting them, in the medium term, to the level of other EU member states. The target of this project is to adapt the plant safety level, especially with regard to water protection, in the Ukraine, to the Central European standard. For that purpose, plants handling dangerous and water endangering substances and dangerous waste waters have been identified in the Ukraine. Through these examples, the level of plant safety, as regards water protection, should be improved. The three rivers, Dnepr, Dnestr and Theiss are the main locations for these activities. An essential task was raising the standard to an intermediate level and training a complex safety management team, as regards substances hazardous to water. This means that a method for plant inspection, which also contains suggestions for measures to be taken in case of need, had to be elaborated and presented. Background The project was implemented within the scope of the Federal Government’s Consultation Help Programme: Technology Transfer for Plant-Related Water Protection in Romania, Moldavia und the Ukraine. The initial phase of the project (2000-2001) in Romania and Moldavia, first delivered practical experience for the methodical inspection of a plant handling substances hazardous to water, to the East European level; experiences which could be worked on. During these first projects, R&D worked partially on issues in the development area and on the testing of an evaluation method and the experience gained, which could be applied within the new project. It is indisputable that industrial activity can cause huge damage to water resources. A

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fresh example of this was the accident in Baia Mare (Romania), where 100,000 cubic metres of water polluted with cyanide escaped from a mining company into the Danube via its tributaries, the river Somes and the river Theiss. Other accidents, like the one in Sandoz more than 10 years ago, should also not be forgotten. The second phase (2002-2005) concentrated on larger plants, which typically handle larger amounts of substances, as they are presented in Column 3, Appendix I of the Seveso Guidelines (complies with Column 5, Appendix I for Accident V). A sample calculation shows that even small amounts of leakage which could cause water polluting accidents, can be detected. This project’s aim is to work out a suitable method for inspecting water plants, especially in the Ukraine. By means of sample plant inspections, by local authorities from the Ukraine and from Germany, together with experts from the industry, the appreciation of the problem and a method for checking the level of plant-related water protection in the Ukraine, together with appropriate training, was to be improved upon.

International Recommendations In daily practice, accidents in industrial plants can lead to extensive trans-national effects in lakes and rivers - in particular leading to a restriction of their use as drinking or industrial water as well as causing damage to the ecosystem. A notable example is the fire disaster at Sandoz in Switzerland in 1986, which caused serious pollution of the Rhine. Fishing in and using the Rhine as a source of drinking water had to be interrupted for several days up to a distance of about 1,000 km, extending into the Netherlands. This and other events made it necessary to give the development of an international safety standard a clear direction. The river basin committees for the Elbe, Rhine and Danube can issue recommendations on different aspects of plant safety based on the results of the water and industrial accidents conventions. The Black Sea commission and other international committees can of course also make recommendations based on the results of the above-mentioned conventions.

Water Convention and Industrial Accidents Convention

Joint River Bodies

Elbe

Rhine

Black Sea Commission

Joint Expert Group

Danube

Recommendations

UNECE

Recommendations

Recommendations

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The recommendations of international groups can therefore serve as a manual of recommendations for improving and updating the international safety standards in the area of plant related water pollution control. Because safety measures are not specific to a particular river basin area alone, these recommendations for the Rhine, Elbe and Danube can be used for other areas too. The following recommendations describe the technical and organisational precautions to be taken when operating industrial plants handling substances hazardous to water. They are based on a concept with which chemical danger potentials are controlled by means of a multi staged technical and organisational safety system. The recommendations can be divided into three major groups: •

Recommendations for Functional units (e. g. storage, sealing systems, fire prevention etc.)

•

Recommendations for Branches (e. g. cellulose industry)

•

Recommendations for Risk areas (e. g. contaminated surfaces)

The recommendations can be used by any company handling substances hazardous to water and can be considered as the basis for safety policies in the area of plant related water pollution control.

The Checklist Method Application of the checklists method allows the verification of compliancy with basic safety precautions by small plants as well as complex industrial plants with additional plant safety precautions because of the modular structure of the checklists. Suitable checklists were formulated based on the recommendations of the river basin committees (UNECE). Recommendation Definition of substances hazardous to water Licensing procedures for accident relevant plants Over-fill safety Indoor Pipeline safety Join storage Sealing Systems Waste water streams Transhipment Fire prevention Plant surveillance Plant alarm and averting of

Join River Bodies

Issued

Checklist

ICPR

1996

dt, engl, rus,

1999 2001

dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus, dt, engl, rus,

ICPR ICPR / ICPE ICPR / ICPE ICPR ICPR ICPR ICPR ICPR / ICPE ICPR ICPR / ICPE

1994 1994 1993 1993 1989 1997

J. Platkowski / Preventive Measures Are the Best Disaster Control – The Checklist Method

danger planning Tank equipment Improving the current accident prevention strategy on the river Elbe Requirements for plants, regarding the handling of substances hazardous to water, in flood or over-fill endangered areas Storage facilities for substances hazardous to water/hazardous materials Organisational measures and basic requirements for the prevention of accidents caused by substances hazardous to water Fundamental elaboration of safety reports in view of water protection Basic requirements for plants, regarding the handling of substances hazardous to water Safety Requirements for Contaminated Sites in Floodrisk Areas Cellulose and paper industry Refinery

ICPE ICPE

Entwurf 1994

dt, engl, rus,

ICPE

dt, engl, rus,

ICPDR, ICPO

1998 (revised 2002)

ICPE

2004

dt, engl, rus,

ICPE

2000

ICPE

1996

ICPE

2002

ICPDR

ICPDR

137

dt, engl, rus,

engl

Draft

dt, ru engl

Table 1: Compilation of the recommendations of the international river basin commissions and the developed check lists

The checklists are divided into 4 major parts: 1.

The first part consists of organisational and technical recommendations. These will be quoted from the original text.

2.

The second part is the method of querying to ascertain whether the recommendations have been complied with.

3.

The measures to be taken are recommended according to the problem. These are organisational and technical measures which are graded in short, medium and long term measures. They can be used by plant operators in an investment plan and by the authority as catalogues of demand.

4.

The recommendation will determine the risk category, after examining a sub item (see Determination of real risk).

The sequence and the numbering of the single questions within the checklists follows

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the enumeration of the recommendations. The available checklists are meant to help create a systematic and unitary procedure for the evaluation and assessment of the state of a plant handling substances hazardous to water. Measures and Measure Catalogue If the requirements of the recommendations are not or only partially complied with, appropriate measures have to be taken by the inspectors. The measures should be differentiated into short term, mid term and long term measures. In terms of timescale, the classification should follow these criteria: Short term Measures The short term measures will mostly be low cost measures. They can be easily implemented by the plant without external help. These simple technical or organisational measures are meant to immediately improve the situation of the plant, with regard to water protection. Mid term Measures The mid term measures are technical and/or organisational measures which purpose is to implement the requirements given in the recommendations. The economic productivity of the plant has to be factored in. Long term Measures The long term measures are intended to implement the technical recommendations given after the inspection, aiming to comply with the European standards for plant-related water protection. The example measures mentioned in the checklists are meant to be a support for the operator of the checklists, for every single situation that may occur. Plant Checks In the scope of the plant checks, the suitability and applicability of the checklists has been reviewed. In the selected plants, the checklist method was applied by the experts from R+D and the national experts (the RIZIKON Company). Both the strengths and weaknesses were documented. The focus of the plant visits was to identify sources of danger which could lead to major water damages. In terms of method, the inspections represented safety and environment protection audits, focusing on potential water damage. Concerning the contents, all plant checks had previously been attuned to the particular plant that was to be inspected. The following were present at the plant check: •

A senior plant employee

•

The responsible representative of the environment authority

•

A representative of the RIZIKON company

•

A representative of R+D Industry Consult

•

An interpreter

The temporal and organisational sequence of the plant check was determined by the type of plant units to be inspected. The plant inspection was executed within 1-2 days.

J. Platkowski / Preventive Measures Are the Best Disaster Control – The Checklist Method

139

An expert from R+D was present at all times. In response to suggestions from the countries involved, the analyses concentrated on hazard relevant industrial plants in the pharmaceutical, chemical, copper processing and paper producing industries as well as those with storage facilities for flammable liquids. All plant checks have been evaluated by the R+D experts, with the attendance of an expert from the host country. The evaluation is made within teams, considering every single case. The results of the evaluations have been clearly documented in written form, so that they can be further presented at international seminars and workshops. Numerous pictures for each checked plant have been added to the documentation. The most common deficiencies found at the evaluated plants were: •

Damaged sealing surfaces

•

Missing secondary containments

•

Leakages in the secondary containments

•

Pipeline penetrations through sealing surfaces

•

Single shell underground containers

•

Single shell underground pipelines

•

Missing vehicle collision protection

•

No leakage surveillance system for the bottom of flat bottomed tanks

•

No risk free waste disposal

•

Corrosion of part of the plant

•

Missing labelling

The available documentation found at the plants is mostly elaborated, but needs an update. Some eventualities are just not taken into account, such as the leakage of single shell containers.

Careless handling of water polluting materials A problem we were constantly confronted with in the Ukraine was the really careless handling of water polluting materials. For example, we saw a storage tank near the River Theiss that had been destroyed in a fire and, even after many years, what was left of this structure still contained a mixture of fire extinguishing water and water polluting materials.

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Figure 1. Destroyed Tank near the river Theiss

We also saw a storage tank that had broken apart during construction work. Here too, the water polluting medium was still present after a period of many years.

Figure 2. Broken storage tank

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141

In addition, we saw leaks and spills that had not been cleaned up.

Figure 3. Leaks and spills

This is all proof that we need alarm and hazard control planning. In addition there is also a check list.

Alarm and Hazard control planning Internal alarm and hazard control planning belong to one of the basic responsibilities of operators of accident-prone plants. This should include the type and procedure of planned organisational and technical measures after detecting a hazardous situation which could lead to an accident or that could be caused by an accident that has already occurred.

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The International River Basin commission recommends the following points for internal alarm and hazard control planning:

1.

• • •

• • • • • •

•

The internal alarm and hazard control plan must guarantee the rapid reporting of hazards to the internal and/or external organ designated to receive such reports immediately. 2. The internal alarm plan and hazard control plan must contain precise instructions related to specific plants and/or groups of plants for those persons or groups of persons in charge of passing on all messages in case of emergency. 3. Depending on the scope of the anticipated impacts, different alert levels must be fixed in agreement with the authorities responsible for disaster control. For such situations various coordinated alarm procedures are needed (e.g. Rhine warning and alarm system). 4. The plant operator must specify, jointly with the authorities, who is responsible for which measures in the event of an industrial accident. 5. For the internal alarm and hazard control plan it is necessary to specify the persons in charge, their functions and responsibilities, their availability, meeting points and tasks for special squads of the emergency team. In addition, special experts must be listed by name and a schedule for their assignment specified. 6. Specify the method of warning and raising the alarm of the water users affected by an industrial accident, as well as informing the public. 7. For a plant-related hazard prevention plan, the following general information is necessary, amongst others: Listing of available emergency resources A description of the waters in the vicinity of the installation and any special uses (e.g. drinking water protection area) Nature and quantity of substances in the fire sector and storage facilities of the plants, including safety data sheets and, as the case may be, also in-house information on the substance. 8. For every plant site or unit where there is a high danger risk in the event of accidental release of substances hazardous to water, the following information must be provided: Fire brigade plans (highly dangerous areas, permitted fire fighting means etc.) Water supply (e.g. fire-fighting water, availability of cooling water) Power supply (e.g. emergency power supply, voltage switch) Drainage plans (e.g. shut-off devices, containment facilities and highly dangerous areas) In-plant alarm and warning equipment Emergency shut-down of hazardous installations (e.g. reactors). 9. The main emphasis when specifying hazard control plans must be on the relevant substances hazardous to water and the relevant dangerous technical facilities. The crucial factors here are: The nature and quantity of potentially hazardous substances and their effects. Dispersion behaviour of substances, possibilities of managing the damage and further possible consequences.

J. Platkowski / Preventive Measures Are the Best Disaster Control – The Checklist Method

•

143

Nature of installation 10. Description of the industrial accident scenarios and the corresponding consideration of the impacts of accidental release of substances hazardous to water into surface waters (in terms of how long it takes for it to spread and how far it could spread). 11. Description of measures to limit the effects of industrial accidents (e.g. facilities for containing fire fighting water, collecting tanks, fire fighting systems) on the basis of the relevant industrial accident scenarios such as: • Leakage • Overfilling • Total failure of vessels, containers, pipelines or other portion of the plant • Fire outbreak and the amount of water needed to combat the fire • Accidents during in-house transportation of hazardous goods. 12. Training at regular intervals on how to respond to and the measures to be taken in the event of industrial accidents. 13. Regular update of the internal alarm and hazard control plans. 14. Ensure that the local authority and the personnel are informed about the alarm and hazard control plans.

Conclusions To remove the deficiencies in the safety standards of Eastern European countries, we initiated the project Technology Transfer for Plant-Related Water Protection in Romania, Moldavia and the Ukraine. The main target of this project is to increase the safety standard in the field of plant-related water protection. The checklist method is a big help for systematic and structured plant inspections, with various aspects of the safety related examination and evaluation of water protection related plants. The method contains both a checklist for relevant plant units, such as sealing systems, over-fill safety, trans-shipment of substances hazardous to water, pipeline safety, waste water streams, storage facilities and equipment of tanks, and organisational concepts for the whole plant, such as fire fighting concept, aspects for joint storage, plant monitoring, as well as plant alert and risk precaution planning. The risk aspects of substances are evaluated in the checklist: Substances Hazardous to Water, and specific requirements for flood endangered areas will be found in the checklist Requirements for plants in flood risk areas. The deficits of the inspected plants are perceived objectively and thoroughly. On the basis of these deficits, we elaborated measure catalogues, with short, mid and long term measures for the improvement of the safety level of the plants. The so called ‘low cost’ measures for increasing the safety level are preferred. On the basis of the check lists it can be established whether the recommendations of the Joint River Bodies have been implemented. An example is the check list Internal alarm and hazard control planning. With the help of check list 10 the owner or the authority can determine whether all necessary organisational measures are met. Internal alarm and hazard control planning belongs to one of the basic responsibilities of operators of accident-prone plants. It should include the type and procedure of planned

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organisational and technical measures after detecting a hazardous situation which could lead to an accident or that could be caused by an accident that has already occurred.

You will find all recommendations, checklists and explanations at: http://www.rdumweltschutz.de/index.php?id=5 or http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/anlagen/Checklistenmethode/homeen.html References: 1

Final report for the project “Technology Transfer for Plant-related Water Protection in Moldavia, Romania and the Ukraine, Part 2 Ukraine” Checklist 10 “Internal Alarm and Hazard Control Planning”, Federal Environmental Agency of Germany (UBA).

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-145

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Utilisation of Industrial Waste Products as an Effective Method of Ecological Disaster Prevention A.I. BURYA, M.V. BURMISTR, N.G. CHERKASSOVA and A.V. ZHUKOVA Dnipropetrovskiy National University of Chemistry Technology Abstract. The possibility of using fibre production wastes as polymeric compositional materials (PCM) was studied with the purpose of minimising ecological risks through the rational utilisation of production wastes and the reduction of biologically irresolvable materials in the environment. The articles of PCM were tested and used in the friction units of metallurgical, chemical and mining equipment in the construction of the machines. These articles can be used instead of ferrous or non-ferrous metals and textolite. The use of PCM as a bearing shell for spindle support in pilger mills, hemispheres of half-couplings pilger mills, cartridges, rollers of piercing mills, seats of pipe-cutting machines, friction-bearings in the rollers of rollerbeds in ovens, conveyor rollers of etching sections in tin-zinc production, in the production of ammonia saltpetre in oven rollers of electricinsulation aggregate, supports of blocks of de-fatting units in tower ovens, cleaning blocks in foundries, rotor plates in rotation compressors, cartridges of rollers in mining conveyor belts, in pumps of acid transition, sweet water and sea water, press-on bushes and guide bushes, hydroplungers of water-pumps increased the service life of these units by 3 – 6 times. Keywords. Polymeric composition materials (PCM), fibre materials

The possibility of using fibre production wastes such as polymeric compositional materials (PCM) was studied with the purpose of minimising ecological risks through the rational utilisation of production wastes and the reduction of biologically irresolvable materials in the environment. The use of fibre wastes and fibrous materials allows the widening of the raw-material base for PCM and reduces their cost. All this results in their wider usage. PCMs of the thermo-reactive connectors (e.g. phynol, epoxide oligomers and their modifications produced serially) were taken as the objects tested. They were randomly reinforced by chemical fibre wastes (e.g. carbonic, reinforced, polyamidic, polyetheric, and polyvinyl chloric). The chosen reinforcing scheme allows not only the use of chemical fibre wastes as fillers but provides plastic property isotropy which allows parts of complicated configuration to be made without additional mechanical processing. The technology for obtaining the PCM articles consists of the following steps: − − − −

reducing the fillers to fragments of a given length saturating with the prepared connector solution fibre fibre drying part pressing.

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The research of physico-mechanical, tribo-technical and heating-physical properties of PCM chemical resistance proved that carbo-plastics (CP) based on GZ and PAN of carbonic fibre wastes, do not yield to CP on the basis of the conditioning fibres. The compounds basing of UUT-2 and Utr3/2-15 wastes were the exception and this is explained by the low strength of the filler. (See Table 1.) It was stated that organo-plastics (OP) based on polyamidic, polyetheric and aramidic fibres, having passed the technological stage of thermo-extracting, do not differ, in practical terms, from OP conditioning fibres according to the following characteristics: − − − −

limiting tension, when compressed: 170–230 MPa under bending: 130–200 MPa striking viscosity: 40–100 kJ/m2 heat resistance by Martense: 4230–4830 K.

The PCMs tested have high water, chemical and wear resistance. These materials are resistant to the influence of concentrated solutions of organic and mineral acids (e.g. sulphuric, dissolved nitric and phosphoric acids and alkalis, salty solutions, and organic oil solvents). The use of PHV fibre wastes is promising for obtaining self-reinforced materials (SRM). Their initial fibre serves both as a polymeric mould and a reinforced filler at the same time. Reinforcement of SRM with carbonic and aramidic fibre wastes increases their heat and wear resistance. The properties of the plastics tested and their efficiency range can vary greatly due to changes in the the composition of the geometric polymers of fibrous filler, the regulation of technological parameters, the modification of constituent components and the surface of phase divisions: the polymer matrix-chemical fibre. For example, dressing of aramide fibres by polyvinyl alcohol leads to an improvement of moistening of the surface. The properties of plastics, in terms of the limits of their working capacity, vary by a large scale by means of the changes in their composition, geometrically directed modification of the constituent components and the surface of the dividing phases: geometric matrix-chemical fibre the regulation of technological parameters and processing of prepress. Dressing of aramide fibres by polyvinyl alcohol leads to an improvement of the moistening of the fibre surface by oligomeric binding, an increase in strength properties by between 25–30%, and heat resistance by up to 30–40°. The dressing of carbonic fibres by thermoplastic polymers leads to the improvement of impact resistance by between 25–43%, and a decrease in water absorption by 2–4 times. The introduction of the target additives of copper phthalacyanine and polyalcylenpolyamine leads to an increase in strength properties and an improvement in antifriction properties (e.g. the wear resistance increases by a factor of 2, and the friction coefficient decreases from 0.13 to 0.07). The articles of PCM were tested and used in the friction units of metallurgical, chemical and mining equipment in the construction of the machines.

Table 1. Properties of carbon-plastics on the bases of carbon fibre materials PAN – UVM

Mean

GZ – UVM

UKN-30

URAL n

URAL n-24

UT-22

UUT-2

UTr3

Density (kg/m3)

1460 1500

1460 1500

1360 1400

130-1330 1340-1400

1330 1350

1320 1330

1330 1350

Impact resistance (Joule/m3)

40-70 30-70

35-60 30-55

30-50 25-45

35-65 30-60

25-35 15-20

13-22 9-15

17-20 5-10

Rupture stress (MPa) By bending

150-250 140-250

125-190 100-125

90-195 70-130

95-185 50-130

80-100 60-95

70-110 60-100

60-85 50-80

By compressing

100-150 60-110

90-125 60-120

80-125 60-110

80-125 60-110

70-90 60-80

90-115 80-110

120-130 110-125

Heat resistance by Martense (°K)

110-125 200-290

125-150 190-260

110-150 160-220

130-170 190-260

110-115 170-180

85-95 170-190

90-100 180-210

Water absorbtion 24 hours (%)

0.1-0.06 0.15-0.2

0.1-0.15 0.3-0.4

0.04-0.09 0.1-0.2

0.07-0.09 0.2-0.3

0.1 0.2

0.09 0.25

0.1 0.1-0.3

Coefficient of friction in dry condition without lubricant

0.26

* numerator – epoxiplastics, denominator – pheno-plastics.

0.12

A.I. Burya et al. / Utilisation of Industrial Waste Products

LU-2

147

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A.I. Burya et al. / Utilisation of Industrial Waste Products

These articles can be used instead of ferrous or non-ferrous metals and textolite. The use of PCM as:        

bearing shells for spindle support in pilger mills hemispheres of half-couplings pilger mills cartridges rollers of piercing mills seats of pipe-cutting machines friction-bearing in the rollers of rollerbeds in ovens conveyor rollers of etching sections in tin-zinc production oven rollers of electric-insulation aggregate in the production of ammonia saltpetre  block supports of de-fatting units in tower ovens  cleaning blocks in foundries  rotor plates in rotation compressors  cartridges of rollers in mining conveyor belts  in pumps of acid transition, sweet water and sea water  press-on bushes and guide bushes  hydroplungers of water-pumps increased the service life of these units by 3–6 times.

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-149

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The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia) for Environmental Monitoring and Protection - as a premise for the optimisation of living conditions through the prevention of natural and human ecological catastrophes Ovidiu TOMA

Abstract: The flooding of the river Bistrita in the Moldavia region of Romania, resulted in an ecological catastrophe. One effect was to accumulate different waste products from all the villages in the area of the river - especially poliethylentereftalat (P.E.T.) bottles - and to deposit them in the Bicaz Lake. Now some parts of Bicaz Lake are partially covered with millions of PET bottles. Our Consortium was already involved in some ecologizations but our operations in this area have had to be extended due to the macrodimension of this damage. Keywords: regional research consortium, environment, monitoring and protection, natural and human ecological catastrophes, living conditions and life, ecologizations, optimization.

Introduction At Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iaúi, Romania, a project was implemented in 2004, creating an organizational structure named The Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia) for Environmental Monitoring and Protection (“ConsorĠiul de Cercetare Regional de Monitorizare úi ProtecĠie a Mediului ” – C.C.R.M.P.M.). As initiator, promoter and coordinator of CCRMPM, I have succeeded in attracting 14 education and research institutions to this consortium (6 faculties from 3 universities and 2 research institutes, 4 research units, a museum and a botanical garden) both from our city and from other parts of Moldavia, as well as students from our Faculty of Biology - specialists in Biology, Ecology and Biochemistry – all of them members of the Romanian Students’ Association of Young Ecologists (AsociaĠia “Tinerii Ecologi Romani din Iaúi” – T.E.R.IS.). Due to their affiliation to a higher interdisciplinary university structure, this has become a beneficial partnership from the points of view of research cooperation and of the implication for the level of environmental monitoring and protection as well as for interventions connected to natural and consecutively human ecological catastrophes.

150

O. Toma / The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia)

Results After last spring’s natural disaster: the flooding of the river Bistrita (2004-2006) in the Moldavia region of Romania, a significant ecological catastrophe was produced (see : photos 1, 2) .

Photo 1

Photo 2

One effect of the floods was to collect different waste products, such as rubbish stored behind houses, restaurants and motels, from villages in areas along the river especially poliethylentereftalat (P.E.T.) bottles - and to transport them to the Bicaz Lake. Now some areas of this lake are partially covered with millions of PET bottles ( see : photos 3, 4, 5, 6 ). In the period of 28 August - 08 September 2006, in addition to the normal theoretical and practical programme of the Romanian-German Limno-Ecological Summer School, held in cooperation with our partners from the University of Konstanz, Germany, we organised some ecological activities at Bicaz Lake on the border of the Ceahlau Mountain area, to collect some of the poliethylentereftalat (P.E.T.) bottles. Poliethylentereftalat (P.E.T.) bottles are theoretically considered to biodegrade only after 350-400 years.

Photo 3

Photo 4

O. Toma / The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia)

Photo 5

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Photo 6

Additional financial aid for students involved in preventive and interventional action in natural catastrophes can be obtained due to T.E.R.IS. students’ involvement as partners in various contracts and scientific grants. Due to their partnership status to CCRMPM, the students can meet and work with academics and researchers, being thus better informed and prepared for making a choice for their professional career. It is, at the same time, a great opportunity for the students to be able to participate in various interdisciplinary scientific meetings and particular or general interventions in cases of catastrophes, both at national and international level, that are promoted by the Consortium. They are also able to meet important personalities from Romanian and European academic life or members of intervention teams involved in catastrophe prevention. Teaching staff and students who interact with each other in various human ecological catastrophe interventions at the level of the Consortium will ensure a better contact within their fields of interest. This is of benefit for future job opportunities as well as for the accumulation of better experience and expertise in environmental monitoring and protection as well as catastrophe prevention and intervention. The students are also stimulated to come into contact with their colleagues from abroad, to take into consideration opportunities for study mobility in the field of environmental studies offered by the European Program SOCRATES and by bilateral cooperation agreements, to learn more foreign languages (English, German, French, Spanish, Italian, etc.) with a view to interacting and cooperating better in eventual cases of trans-frontier catastrophes. Every effort is made to enable them to take up course modules offered by our EU partners . Students are also invited to participate in many other interventions, connected, for example, to others similar ecologizations, such as the collection of poliethylentereftalat (P.E.T.) bottles in the Ceahlau Mountain (Oriental Carpathians), with a view to combating human ecological catastrophes (see : photos 7, 8 )

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O. Toma / The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia)

Photo 7 Photo 8 It must be stressed that training activities have not been forgotten or left aside and this work is in direct connection with scientific research as well as with student physical conditions, leading, as it does, to amelioration in the case of catastrophe prevention and intervention. The Consortium also benefits from the facilities offered by the Biological Research Unit of Al.I.Cuza University, situated at Potoci, in the Oriental Carpathian Mountains, by the (artificial) lake of Bicaz. For the last 15 years, a summer school for divers has been organised (theoretical courses, practical training, equipment and accommodation are all free of charge for the students) within the framework of the Salmo Association of Ecologist Divers (AsociaĠia Plonjorilor Ecologiúti Salmo- A.P.E.S.). The certificates obtained on completion are widely recognised and the divers are qualified to carry out (sub)aquatic interventions in cases of natural catastrophe. Conclusion For the future, my intention is to widen the cooperation of our University Consortium with other international bodies, find further financial support with a view to offering even more students better motivation and opportunities to be involved in our joint projects as well in national or international projects concerning natural and human ecological catastrophe prevention and intervention.

References 1. Toma, Ovidiu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania , ”Consortium Regional de Recherche Moldova - pour la Monitorisation et Protection d’Environnement – pour une meilleure gestion de la biodiversite” . Confɣrence internationale, sous le haut patronage de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, President de la Rɣpublique franɡaise, et de Monsieur Koɩchiro Matsuura, Directeur general de l'UNESCO, « Biodiversite: science et gouvernance », 2005, UNESCO, Paris, France

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2. Toma Ovidiu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, ”CCRMPM & Biochemische Monitorisation der Bivalven (Mytylus galloprovincialis) hinsichtlich die eventuellen Pollution am Schwarzen Meer”, 2005, Konstanz, Germany 3. Toma Ovidiu , Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, ”The University Regional Consortium (Moldavia) for Environment Monitoring and Protection – as a premise for the optimisation of living conditions and life”. The World Conference on Ecological Restoration «Ecological Restoration – A Global Challenge», 2005, Zaragoza, Spain. 4. Toma Ovidiu , Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, ”The Moldavian University Regional Consortium for Environment Monitoring and Protection – as a premise for the optimisation of living conditions and life and for student service improvement”. 1st Biennial Conference of the International EcoHealth and Ecology, «EcoHealth ONE: Forging Collaboration Between Ecology and Health» University of Wisconsin, 2006, Wisconsin-Madison, USA 5. Toma Ovidiu , Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, ” Recherche rɣgionale pour la monitorisation et protection de l’environnement, gestion biodiversite”. Journes scientifiques « Recherche et developpement durable: approches, methodologies, strategies d’action et de formation », Centre de Recherches et de transferts technologies de l’Universite Abdelhamid IBN BADIS-Chemin des Cretes-Mostaganem, 2006, Mostaganem, Algeria

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-154

Preliminary Study Regarding Local Potential for the Use of Wood Waste for the Generation of Energy as an Alternative to Energy Which Produces Gas Emissions – A Man Made Disaster Mugurel ROTARIU a, Lavinia TOFAN b and Ovidiu TOMA c Associate professor, Faculty of Electric Engineering, Department of Energy “Gh. Asachi” Technical University of Iaşi, Bd. D. Mangeron, nr. 51-53, 700505 IASI/ROMANIA, Tel: (0040 232) 278680, Fax: (0040 232) 236283 E-mail: [email protected] b Associate professor, Faculty of Chemical Engineering, “Gh. Asachi” Technical University of Iaşi, Bd. D. Mangeron, nr. 71 A, IASI/ROMANIA, Tel: (0040 232) 278680 c Professor, Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi, Bd. Carol I, Nr. 20 A, 700505 IASI/ROMANIA, Tel: (+40 232) 201630; Fax: (+40 232) 201472 E-mail: [email protected], http://www.bio.uaic.ro; http://www.bio.uaic.ro/content/view/46/43/ a

Abstract. This paper presents a study made of two villages in the Bucovine region, Bilca and Vicov, regarding gas emissions – a man made disaster – their reduction, and the possibility of recovering wood waste in order to use it as resource. We present an assessment of the recoverable quantity and a rate of the calorific power calculation. In the last chapter, we present a couple of ideas for steam and hot water boilers, using combustible wood waste as fuel, and the most important direction for use of this energy in the manufacturing of wood products (like dryers, heat exchangers) Keywords. Waste wood, sawdust, timber waste, cogeneration

Introduction In the actual world context of the reduction of gas emissions – a man made disaster – and a better use of energy resources, the area of using industrial and domestic waste as an energy generating resource is of major interest. In this general context, developing the use of wood waste acquires a new dimension. The reduced quantities of pollutants released from timber combustion and the direct impact on soil and water quality by better use of wood waste proposes a new energy policy as a viable alternative to the extremely pollutant systems and technologies used in the conversion of fossil fuels into energy.

M. Rotariu et al. / Preliminary Study Regarding Local Potential for the Use of Wood Waste

Figure 1. Sawdust warehouse planks ends.

155

Figure 2. Timber waste and warehouse.

Figure 3. Sawdust pollution of a valley.

The main objective of the study is the analysis of the development possibilities for timber energy in both Bilca and Vicovul de Sus, with a simultaneous decrease in the environment impact caused by timber offal and sawdust. As shown in Figs 1, 2 and 3 as a result of wood conversion capacity (log ends, branches, barks), large amount of timber offal are produced and manufacturing and smoothing processes result in sawdusts of different qualities. The environmental impact of these wastes is very high, particularly that of the sawdust, which causes river pollution, especially during rainy seasons (spring and autumn), when some of the sawdust from the warehouses is washed away by the waters running off the mountains. The improved use of timber waste is based on: 1

the existence of systematic timber manufacturing activities in woodland exploitation within the specified area, which have, as a by product, large quantities of sawdust and timber offal;

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M. Rotariu et al. / Preliminary Study Regarding Local Potential for the Use of Wood Waste

2

3

the existence of a high risk of pollution with sawdust of the surrounding rivers, especially during rainy seasons (spring and autumn), when sawdust from the warehouses is washed away by the run-off water from the mountains. the existence of local electric and thermal energy demands, which can be met by developing a waste wood – energy channel.

Both villages, Bilca and Vicovul de Sus, are located near the Ukraine border in the Suceava district, in the northern region of Romania on the road that connects the Suceava plain with the northern region of the East Carpathians. The Suceava district is the largest area of forest in the country, followed by Neamt and Covasna districts. The reclamation of a proper climate depends on the development of an infrastructure for the use of timber offal as an energy resource, taking into account the high level of timber exploitation activities in the area. The study refers to two administrative units: Bilca and Vicovul de Sus (Bivolarie) which are adjacent to each other and have similar social and economic situations. Table 1 show the principal social – geographic coordinates of the two villages, with specific details about Bivolarie village. Beside agriculture, which is the main economic activity in the specified area, another important activity is timber manufacturing. The main timber resources are the woods of Putna and Brodina. There are in the area some 20 units manufacturing lumber from primary timber. One of the main problems these units encounter is the impossibility of fast drying the lumber. Therefore, these units are forced to sell green wood, restricting the activity of the furniture and carpentry industries.

Figure 4. Territorial location of Bilca and Vicovul de Sus. Table 1. Vicovul de Sus

Bilca

10450 (2717 loc. Bivolărie)

3671

Total Area

4255 ha

2266 ha

Forest area

10%

1,8%

Agricultural land

75% (3190 ha)

81% (1834 ha)

Population density

245 loc/kmp (Bivolărie)

162 loc/kmp

Number of inhabitants

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157

Material and Methods For a better evaluation of the situation of the wood industry in this area, we carried out a specific site questionnaire, applied to 19 local companies (7 from Bilca village and 12 from Vicovul de Sus village); the principal questions where: 1 2 3

what are the quantities of waste wood resulting from wood processing; what are the quantities of steam, hot and warm water and electrical energy required for the processes what are the most important requirements in technology and energy resources.

The results are presented in Table 2. There is high potential in this area for developing energy generation using the wood waste: 1077,5 mc of total waste wood and 500 mc of sawdust resultant from the industrial process. For a better appreciation of these quantities, we transformed them into tonne equivalent oil (toe). Generally, the waste wood has a certain degree of humidity, so that we made the following estimates: −

− −

1 ton of wood chips is equivalent to: 1. 0,189–0,240 toe at 40–50% humidity; 2. 0,284–0,335 toe at 20–30% humidity; 1 mc wood chips and scobs it is equivalent to 300–400 kg; 1 mc sawdust ( ≈ 600 .. 700 kg sawdust) it is equivalent to: 1. 0,395 toe for less than 10% humidity; 2. 0,200–0,250 toe for “green” sawdust (30–40% humidity).

Based on these calculation hypotheses, the evaluation of total wood waste quantities is shown in Table 3.

Results The analysis of the technical inventory performed at these 17 companies leads us to the identification of the most important technological necessities in relation to the possibility of supplying the heating requirements from the wood waste. These directions are: o o o o

steam flow for woods dryers; small scale cogeneration plants, in order to produce thermal and electrical energy; the acquisition of a pressed wood machine; steam, hot and warm water boiler for technological utilization and residential heating.

These results are shown in Fig. 5. In the meantime, there has been a decrease of the quantity of wood available for manufacturing. This has come about through new legislation concerning deforestation on Romanian territory, according to the environment protection law of the Romanian Ministry for Water and Forests.

158

Table 2.

SC Bilcanul Prod Impex SRL AF Balici SC Golden-Wood International SRL SC Levrus Prodcom SRL SC Prod-prest SRL

Raw stock Final products Electrical resinous timber sawn wood, small consumption [mc/month] furniture [mc/month] [kWh/month]

Wood refuse [mc/Month]

Type of waste wood

Amount of sawdust Amount of sawdust utilised [mc/month] [mc/month]

450

370

3300

0

sawdust, wood refuse

70

0

125

100

1600

0

sawdust, wood refuse

30

0

600

440

16000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

230

0

750

600

8000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

140

0

200

140

7000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

40

0

AF Crasnean

150

110

1500

0

sawdust, wood refuse

30

0

SC Galovi SRL

50

40

1500

2

sawdust, wood chips

10

2

AF Chirila

12

8

3500

7

sawdust, wood chips

7,5

7,5

SC Braduletu SRL

750

620

4000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

130

0

AF Calancea Viorel

150

120

200

0

sawdust, wood refuse

30

0

SC Amcorames SRL

100

78

1000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

20

0

SC Coredal SRL

100

75

850

0

sawdust, wood refuse

25

0

AF Burciu Vasile

110

70

1400

0

sawdust, wood refuse

40

0

SC Cвrdei

300

200

12000

35

sawdust, wood refuse

35

35

SC Camelco SRL

125

80

1700

0

sawdust, wood refuse

50

0

SC Cesticom SRL

300

210

4000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

90

0

AF Calancea

300

200

1000

0

sawdust, wood refuse

100

0

TOTAL

4572

3461

68550

44

1077,5

44,5

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COMPANY

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159

Table 3. Energetically value (toe) “Wet” waste*

Dry waste*

Snag, scrap, trash, chip of wood Sawdust

577,5 500

35–58 60–87,5

49–77,5 125–130

TOTAL

1077,5

95–145,5

174–207,5

* according to upper hypothesis. 88%

82% 64%

47%

11%

briqueting plant

cogeneration

wood dryer

heating and warm water boyler

others

Figure 5. Principal directions for recovery of wood waste for energy generation.

Figure 6. Warm water boiler. 1 – timber offal warehouse; 2 – hydraulic extractor; 3 – conveyer band; 4 – access chamber; 5 – furnace; 6 – burning grill; 7 – heat exchanger; 8 – dust chamber for burned gases; 9 – exhaust; 10 – smoke stack; 11 – safe evacuation; 12 – dust evacuation.

Taking into account the geographical position of these villages (in the mountains, far from thermal sources), the most interesting recovery is in the field of energy generation. This means to obtain a thermal flow, such as hot water, warm water or low or medium pressure steam. For further explication, we will show a few examples of hot water and steam boilers of low and medium power (Figs 6–8).

160

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Figure 7. Steam boiler. 1 – timber offal warehouse; 2 – hydraulic extractor; 3 – conveyer band; 4 – access chamber; 5 – furnace; 6 – burning grill; 7 –steam boiler; 8 – dust chamber for burned gases; 9 - exhaust; 10 – smoke stack; 11 – safe burning gas evacuation; 12 – safe evacuation.

Figure 8. Hot water boiler. 1 – timber offal warehouse; 2 – hydraulic extractor; 3 – batch meter; 4 – hydraulic transporter; 5 – boiler; 6 – dust chamber for burned gases; 7 – exhaust; 8 – smoke stack.

All boilers shown above are equipped with the necessary automation (devices for burning gas evacuation directly to the smoke stack) for safe functioning, if there is a shortage of electric power, if the water pumps stop, if there is an abnormal overheat of the boiler etc. The entire installation can function completely automatically, without the need for permanent staff on the boiler section.

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Conclusion A very important category of potential consumers for this energy, as an alternative to energy producing gas emissions – a man made disaster – is public buildings, such as schools and kindergartens, municipal buildings, medical offices, and hospitals. References [1] *** – Dossier bois – nergie – Energie Plus, n° 271, 2001, France. [2] M. Rotariu, C. Diaconu – “Studiu privind filiera lemn – energie”, Colocviul Energie – Mediu, Centrul de Resurse pentru Mediu – CEREM, 2003, Iasi, Romania. [3] *** – Compte R., Chaudieres biomasse, 2003, Arlanc, France.

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-162

Impact of sewage from the town of Iaúi - at the limit of man made disaster – on the microbiota of the River Bahlui Simona DUNCA1, Marius ùTEFAN 2 , Ovidiu TOMA 3 1

Associate professor Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Bd. Carol I , Nr. 20 A , 700505 IASI / ROMANIA Tel. (+40 232) 201524 ; Fax (+40 232) 201472 E-mail : [email protected] 2

Lecturer Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Bd. Carol I , Nr. 20 A , 700505 IASI / ROMANIA Tel. (+40 232) 201524 ; Fax (+40 232) 201472 E-mail : [email protected] 3

Professor Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Bd. Carol I , Nr. 20 A , 700505 IASI / ROMANIA Tel. (+40 232) 201630 ; Fax (+40 232) 201472 E-mail : [email protected] http://www.bio.uaic.ro ; http://www.bio.uaic.ro/content/view/46/43/

Abstract: This paper presents a study focused on the process of water contamination as a consequence of human activities at the limit of man made disaster, concerning pollutant diversification as a result of the development of manufacturing processes. The investigations were focused on the evaluation of the pollution level as well as the self-purification (eutrophication) capacity of the Bahlui river waters in Iaúi, Romania, by means of quantitative assessment of certain ecophysiological groups of bacteria involved in organic residue recycling, also by determining of sanitary-bacteriological attributes describing the quality of water. Keywords : man made disaster, water, pollution, pH, organic load, ammonifying microflora, proteolytic microflora, aerobic microflora, anaerobic microflora, coliform group.

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Introduction Water contamination is one of the worst types of environmental pollution because of its deleterious effects. Ever increasing quantitative and qualitative water requirements impose particular attention in this respect. As a consequence of human activity, the problem of water contamination is still increasing and its future magnitude and extent is hard to forecast. A characteristic feature of this process is the diversification of pollutants as a result of developments in manufacturing processes. Hence the necessity of a sustained development and refinement of research aimed at understanding both the short term and longer lasting effects of various pollutants on the aquatic basins. Our investigations had the aim of evaluating the pollution level and the selfpurification (eutrophication) capacity of the water in the River Bahlui by means of quantitative assessment of certain ecophysiological groups of bacteria involved in organic residue recycling, also by the determination of sanitary-bacteriological attributes describing the quality of water. The River Bahlui is the sole water course flowing through the town of Iasi and thus collects all the municipal and industrial waste waters (i.e. 80% of water discharges within the Iasi District). The river is about 130 km long and enters the town of Iasi 106 km from the source. The intra-urban portion is 10 km, and it discharges into the River Jijia after a further 14 km. The Bahlui river system is contaminated with random, uncontrolled discharges over its entire length. Additional contaminations are due to significant pollution within the urban area of Iasi. Before the river enters Iasi the most important sources of pollution are from the localities of Harlau and Podu Iloaiei. The major contamination happens within the Iasi urban area where the river collects both the municipal and industrial wastewaters which totally alters the physical, chemical and microbiological features of the river water. The following effluents are among the most important sources of pollution within the Iasi area and are listed below in sequential order of their discharge. Effluent from: -

Tigaretes Manufacturing Plant – S.C. "TIGARETE" S.A; Railway Roundhouse; Mechanical Transport Depot No.2 – S.C. "AUTOTRANS" S.A; Wine Processing Plant – S.C. "VINIA" S.A.; Synthetic Fibres Works – S.C. "TEROM" S.A.; Metallurgical Works – S.C. "TEPRO" S.A.; Ceramics Manufacturing Plant – S.C. "CERAMICA" S.A.; Edible Sunflower Oil Factory – S.C. "UNIREA" S.A.; Municipal Slaughter-house; Swine Livestock Farm Tomesti – S.C. "COMTOM" S.A.; Antibiotics Manufacturing Company – S.C. "ANTIBIOTICE' S.A..

The last two effluents are the most important sources with regard to pollution with organic matter and microorganisms of the Bahlui river system.

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Material and methods The objective of our study was to assess how waste waters originating from the Iasi area affect the River Bahlui's water quality by monitoring certain microbiological indexes over a 9 month period (October 1999 through June 2000). Three sampling sites with the following locations were selected: - station I - about 3 km upstream from town - station II - downstream from Iasi and upstream from S.C. "COMTOM" S.A. IASI - station III - about 3 km downstream from S.C. "COMTOM" S.A. IASI. The presence of ammonifying, proteolytic, aerobic and anaerobic heterotrophic bacteria was determined on selective culture media by decimal sequential dilutions (Pochon et Tardieu, 1962; Rodina, 1965; Sorokin et Kadota, 1972). The count values of the organisms belonging to the above mentioned groups were calculated by McCrady's tables (Collins & Patricia M. Lyne, 1970). We focused our attention on these groups because, on the one hand they prevail in organically rich environments (hence signalling organic contamination) and on the other hand, the rate and intensity of biochemical activity represent an indication of mineralisation level of the organic matters, implicitly the self-purification (eutrophication) capacity of the surface waters. The most probable coliform count (most probable number - MPN) was determined by a presumtive test (preliminary assessment) followed by a confirmation test (final assessment). The data interpretation was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Romanian Standard STAS 4706/1988.

Results and Discussions - pH of water The pH values measured at all three monitoring stations revealed the active reaction of the Bahlui river water ranged from 5.8 to 6.8 Fairly large variations were recorded at all stations, mainly at upstream (station II) and downstream (station III) from "COMTOM" S.A. (i.e. 6.0 - 6.7 and 5.8 - 6.5, respectively). At station I, upstream from Iasi, the pH variations fell within narrower limits (i.e. 6.2 - 6.5). The pH fluctuations recorded downstream from the town are due to the changes resulting from industrial and domestic wastewaters discharged into the River Bahlui. The pH values recorded at all stations are given in figure 1.

Figure 1. Water pH variations

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165

- Organic load The organic matter present in aquatic basins consists of living organisms and dead matter in various stages of decomposition. The source of the water borne organic matter may be autochtonous, however, in recent years, the major part of the organic matter present in rivers is allochtonous due to the drainage of residual waters with a high organic load. The water of the River Bahlui has a relatively high content of organic matter (as was found at all the survey stations). It has been observed that that TOC (Total Organic Content) ranges from 49.75 mg/L (the lowest value recorded at station I) to 97,48 mg/L (the highest value - downstream from S.C. "COMTOM" S.A. - station III), (fig. 2).

Figure 2. Organic matter content variations (mg/L)

As the maximum values (80 - 96 mg/L) were recorded at station III (downstream from S.C. "COMTOM" S.A.) one may draw the conclusion that the purification process of the residual waters discharged from the Swine Livestock Farm - S.C. "COMTOM" S.A.) is ineffective, as about 2 km downstream, the TOC values are still high. Nevertheless, the high TOC values recorded at stations II and III correlate well with low dissolved oxygen concentrations as it is utilised for organic matter oxidation. - Proteolytic microflora evolution The protein decomposition carried out by microorganisms follows several subsequent degradation steps up to lower and lower molecular weight compounds, eventually amino acids and even NH3. The ability to decompose proteins its strictly specific to heterotrophic organisms; the autotrophes are unable to catabolise organic compounds. Due to the lack of specific enzymes, some pathogenic heterotrophs are unable to perform major transformations of proteins; other saprophytic pathogens are able to actively decompose proteins by means of protheolytic processes. Most frequently, in the presence of microorganisms, the protein-hydrolytic processes undergo oxidation and reduction reactions, thus resulting in various foetid or pestilent compounds, generally linked to putrefaction processes (NH2, CO2, H2S, methane, phenols, indole, scatol, etc.). The putrefaction linked microflora is represented by anaerobes (Clostridium putrificum), facultative anaerobes (Proteus vulgaris, Bacillus mycoides) and aerobes (Bacillus subtilis, Bacillus cereus). According to the data illustrated in the figures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, the microflora proteolytic activity is quite slow; over a period of 6 - 7 days, accompanied by the

166

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liquefaction of the culture media. The recorded inter station variations show that proteolytic activities are more intense at station III and slower at station I (upstream of the town). A possible explanation of these findings may be that the aqueous environments with a comparatively higher content of protein resulted from organic matter decay (which is prevalent) also favouring the proteolytic microflora activity. With reference to the relationship between: the maximum organic content, sampling dates and the monitored Stations, the following conclusions may be drawn: station III - maximum organism counts were recorded in October and June (14,000’000 total counts/L) station II - same as above (in June) station I - much lower values (950,000 counts/L – October and June. - Ammonifying microflora evolution The ammonifying microflora activity is mostly similar to the proteolytic one with a growth period of 5 – 7 days. During this period, the characteristic colour due to the presence of HN3 becomes intense. Conversely, as compared with above mentioned findings, the most intense proteolytic activities were recorded at station I, i.e.: from 750,000 g/L in December to 14,000,000 g/L in April and lower values at station III, i.e.: from 450,000 in December to 1,400,000 g/L in June (fig. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7). - Aerobic and anaerobic microflora assessment The aerobic and anaerobic microflora distribution at the survey stations over the months and the aerobes:anaerobes count ratios are presented in figures 8 and 9. From figure 8 one can observe that, in general, the aerobes count in the Bahlui river water is high, reaching peak values at station I in June (930,000 counts/ml) and 980,000 anaerobes counts/ml at station III in October (downstream from Tomesti). The lowest recorded values were about 160,000 aerobes counts/ml at station III (in June) and 170,000 anaerobes counts/ml at station I (in February). It is evident that the aerobes count is generally higher than the anaerobes at station I (upstream from Iasi) followed by a slight balance (station II). The reverse picture is observed at station III (the ratio aerobes : anaerobes becomes < 1). Referring to the data depicted in figure 9, at station I the ratio of aerobes:anaerobes count is higher than 1 (from 1.9 to 4.0) where the dissolved oxygen concentration also reaches higher levels as compared to stations II and III. At station II, the aerobes:anaerobes ratio fluctuates around 1.0 (from 0.5 to 1.2) and for station III this ratio is < 1 (i.e.: 0.4 – 0.8). This picture allows us to conclude that the low amounts of dissolved O2 in this segment of the River Bahlui (around station III) induce a decrease of the aerobic organisms count as compared with the anaerobic, which exhibits an obvious increase. - Coliform group assessment The coliform group of bacteria is the most utilised parameter for the detection of faecaloid pollution of water courses. Although the coliforms are harmless in themselves, high counts exceeding the accepted limits signal a high level of water pollution; certain strains of colibacilli are likely to be pathogenic, causing gastrointestinal illness.

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167

High colibacilli counts were recorded in the River Bahlui (6 x 105 counts/L – 9 x 10 counts/L). From the data analysis (see figures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, where the counts distribution over the 3 surveyed stations are also presented) it was found that the highest values were recorded at stations II (3.500.000 bacteria/L in June) and III (9.500.000 bacteria/L in December). As even at station I relatively high levels of colibacilli were found (1.700.000 counts/L in December) we are entitled to assume that the river water enters Iasi already loaded with a large amount of colibacilli. Due to the domestic wastewaters discharged (sewage from a population of over 300,000 inhabitants) in addition to the industrial wastewaters, the River Bahlui carries a fairly steady high load of colibacilli along its entire length. 5

Figure 3. Quantitative distribution of the proteolytic, ammonifying bacteria and coliforms in October

Figure 4. Quantitative distribution of the proteolytic, ammonifying bacteria and coliforms in December

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S. Dunca et al. / Impact of Sewage from the Town of Ia¸si – At the Limit of Man Made Disaster

Figure 5. Quantitative distribution of the proteolytic, ammonifying bacteria and coliforms in February

Figure 6. Quantitative distribution of the proteolytic, ammonifying bacteria and coliforms in April

Figure 7. Quantitative distribution of the proteolytic, ammonifying bacteria and coliforms in June

S. Dunca et al. / Impact of Sewage from the Town of Ia¸si – At the Limit of Man Made Disaster

Figure 8. Numeric deviation between aerobes and anaerobes microflora

Figure 9. Ratio aerobic - anaerobic microflora

169

170

S. Dunca et al. / Impact of Sewage from the Town of Ia¸si – At the Limit of Man Made Disaster

Conclusions The analyses carried out on the contamination of the River Bahlui caused by the wastewaters draining from the town of Iasi, led us to the following conclusions: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

As the treatment of waste water prior to discharge into the river and the dilution process developed between the effluent and outlet are both ineffective, all the microbiological features are severely altered downstream from the residual water’s discharge. The River Bahlui has a relatively high organic load at stations II and III (98 mg/L) as a result of the high organic content discharge of effluents from S.C. "ANTIBIOTICE" S.A. and S.C. "COMTOM" S.A. IASI and the additional domestic wastewater. The activities of proteolytic and ammonifying microflora recorded at stations I and II are relatively slow and exhibit similar dynamics, except for station III where the microflora activity is more intense. The ratio of aerobic to anaerobic counts changes from one station to another. At station I, this ratio is higher than unit, equals the unit at station II and is lower than unit at station III (here the discharged waste water from S.C. "COMTOM" sets up favourable conditions for an abundant anaerobic microflora growth). High counts of colibacilli were recorded at stations I, II and III (17 x 104; 35 x 105 and 95 x 105 counts/l, respectively) and reveal a severe faecaloid contamination of the Bahlui river water over its entire length. The numerous pollution sources present along the river basin and the complex composition of the discharged waters spoil the river water thus converting it into a potential infectious and toxicological risk.

References

1.

2.

3.

4.

5. 6.

AILIESEI OCTAVITA, ERICA NIMITAN, ELENA MARIN, SIMONA DUNCA, 1993, “Microbiological investigation in the waters and sediments of the Black Sea, along the Romanian shore, for the analysis of the self- purging capacity”- Analele Stiintifice ale Univ. “Al.I.Cuza” Iasi, T.XXXIX, s. II-a, Biologie vegetala, pp: 8590. AILIESEI OCTAVITA, ERICA NIMITAN, MIRON I., SIMONA DUNCA, OANA MITITIUC, 1995, “Determination of the marine groups of microorganisms as indicators of the environment and marine epibiosis quality”- Analele Stiintifice ale Univ. “Al.I.Cuza” Iasi, T. XLI, s. II-a, Biologie vegetala, pp: 91-96. AILIESEI OCTAVITA, ERICA NIMITAN, SIMONA DUNCA, COMANESCU ST., 1997, “Metode si tehnici de microbiologie”- Ed. Universitatii “Al.I.Cuza” Iasi, Facultatea de Biologie, pp: 134-145. FRANZBLAU S.G., HINNEBUSCH B.J., KELLEZ L.M., SINCLAIR N.A., 1984, “Effect of non coliforms or coliforms detection in potable ground water”- Appl. Environ. Microbiol., pp: 142-148. KONEMAN W.E., ALLEN D.S., 1992, “Diagnostic Microbiology” - (4th ed.), J.B. Lippinco H Company, Washington, pp: 317-343. LASSUS P., BOGE G., GENTIEN P., LOARER R., PAGANO G., QUINION F.,

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7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

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1991, “Toxicitɣ des rejets urbains”- IFREMER, Actes de Colloques 11, “Le mer et le rejets urbains” Bendor 13-15 Juin, 1990, pp: 171-186. PEPPER I.L., GERBA C.P., BRENDECKE J.W., 1995, “Environmental Microbiology”- Academic Press, Inc., San Diego, California, pp: 233-278. ROSENBERG E., 1993, “Microorganisms to combat poluttion”- Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, pp: 1-11. ZARNEA G., 1994, “Tratat de microbiologie generala”- vol. 5, Ed. Academiei Romɜne, Bucuresti, pp: 245-267. XXX, 1985, “Reference methods for marine poluttion studies”- nr. 21, 22, 23. XXX, 1988, STAS 4796- “Ape de suprafata” - Ed. Oficiala . Comit. Nat. Ptr. Stiinta si Tehnologie, Institutul Romɜn de Standardizare. COLLINS C.H., PATRICIA M.LYNE, 1970, “Microbiological methods” - Third ed., Butterworths. London.University Park Press. Baltimore. 3-212. POCHON J., TARDIEUX P., 1962, “Techniques d’analyses en microbiologie du sol”. St. Mande. Paris. RODINA A.G., 1965, “Metod vodnoi mikrobiologhiji” - Prakticeskoe rukovodstvo. Izd. “Nauka”. Moskva. 355 SOROKIN Y.I., KADOTA H., 1972, “Techniques for the assessment of microbial production and decompositionin freshwaters”- IBP Handbook, 23, 105. QUEEN B., 1999, “Disolved Oxygen Levels and Fecal Coliform Count”- Natural Environement Indicator No. 8. CAPUCINO J.G., N. SHERMAN, 1992, “Microbiology: A Laboratory Manual” – 3rd ed., New York, The Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company, Inc., 287-300. PRESCOTT, L.M. HARLEY, D.A. KLEIN, 1996, “Microbiology. 3rd ed. Boston:Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 843-853.

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Natural and man made disasters in the Moldova area of Romania Brian DOUGLAS 1 , Ovidiu TOMA 2 1

2

Director RCHF-United Kingdom NGO Iasi Romania Bd Carol I, Nr 36., 700482 Iasi / Romania Tel +40 744-963425. E-mail [email protected] http:// www.rchf.fusiveweb.co.uk

Faculty of Biology, Department of Molecular and Experimental Biology, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Bd. Carol I , Nr. 20 A , 700505 Iasi / Romania Tel. (+40 232) 201630 ; Fax (+40 232) 201472 E-mail : [email protected] http://www.bio.uaic.ro; http://www.bio.uaic.ro/content/view/46/43/

Abstract: We take a look at the causes and effects of both natural and man made disasters in recent times in the Moldova region of Romania. In this document we hope to highlight the lessons which can be learned to help avoid future disasters, both natural and of a man made nature. Keywords: Natural disasters, man made disasters, flooding, emergency aid, displaced people, environmental monitoring and protection of species, animals, livestock, agriculture.

Introduction In 2005 Romania was a country still recovering from a major wave of flooding in April, and continuing heavy rains caused further flooding and destruction in a total of 31 counties in Romania. During the period 9-15 July some 468 localities were affected, 20 people died, 4 were reported missing and 7,029 evacuated from their homes.A total of 14,669 households were affected. The flooding caused havoc to communication lines and infrastructure: the water supply, electricity, gas and telephone networks had been brought to a standstill in the flooded regions, access to the areas remained difficult at the time with 1,097 bridges and 1,056 km of roads damaged. 13,138 houses and 53,782 hectares of agricultural land were affected, 11,189 wells flooded, 3,073 animals and birds killed and 141 social institutions affected. A children’s holiday camp, 10 villages and 30 families remained isolated.

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We must take particular note of why such a disaster occurred, as the heavy rains actually started some 3 months before the real disaster occurred and with foresight this disaster may have been averted, and the risk to both human and animal life reduced. Generalities and particularities The North East of Romania, known as Moldova, is a green fertile area admired in former times for its high yield of agricultural produce. Since the end of communism in late 1989, the counties of Moldova have failed to develop in the new millennium through lack of investment, both state and private, in most sectors rural villages still lack basic facilities in real terms. Unemployment is high in rural areas and urban areas alike. Natural and man made disasters are not new to the Moldova area of Romania; either as flooding also occurred in 2004 resulting in heavy loss to the population in real terms and to the ecological life. Romania has in recent years [1, 2] suffered from long hard dry spells followed by almost instant flash flood type weather and monsoon conditions, which can in some cases last either, days, weeks or months, after which the weather completely turns around to become hot and dry again. The ongoing result in the heavy hot droughty times is that the land has no water intake and crops fail to grow, causing an ongoing financial problem for the nation as production is lost and crops like maize, wheat and sunflower oil have to be imported. The result in the heavy flash floods that hit Romania, sweeping everything away in their path, is likewise a total loss of both crops and animal production as well as catastrophic consequences for the population in the affected areas of Romanian Moldova, who lose all their possessions including their dwellings. One must mention here also the high risk to human life. Below in pictures 1 and 2 one can see Romanian soldiers battling to shore up defences against the broken river bank in 2005 and a refugee home for families that lost their homes in the floods.

Picture 1

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Picture 2

Results and discussions Clearly, looking with hindsight at the 2005 Moldova floods in Romania one can see that not only was this caused by a natural disaster in the heavy rainfall between April and August, but by a man made disaster too in the failure of anyone to react in the first instance to the disaster, perhaps thinking that the heavy rain would not last so long. By the time it was realised it was too late, as water levels were far too high and a lack of water pumps in rural areas left communities with nothing more than sandbags as a means of averting disaster. One can see a second man made disaster when one looks back to communist times when thousands of acres of land were irrigated with a piped and canal water supply, which took excess water away from the rivers and kept the crops watered, resulting in high yields. After the fall of communism these irrigation systems fell into disrepair, were stolen or simply not attended to. This was a mistake as many of these canals, which now no longer exist could, in both 2004 and 2005, have taken a great deal of water from the rivers that burst their banks thereby averting the massive flooding. There can be no doubt that with so many unemployed people in the Moldova area and the known effects of natural and man made disasters, such as has happened in 2005, that investment must be found both at governmental and private sector level to raise the level of defences against such flash type floods and in doing so not only raise river banks in low lying areas, but also re-equip the land with a full irrigation system to save crop production in the drought season. New laws need to be brought into force to forbid people to build dwellings on land lower than the water levels as these homes are the first to be hit by even the lightest of rainstorms . Wells providing water for both human and animal consumption also need to be on ground above water table levels.

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The cost of such a programme in the Moldova County of Romania is high, but not nearly as high as the cost to the nation of rebuilding all the homes washed away in the 2005 floods, and would be a once only cost rather than the nation sustaining disaster costs from flooding year after year, not to mention lost production costs, which affect the nation’s entire population as they result in produce price increases. Conclusions For many years Romanian Moldova has suffered from extreme weather patterns. On the one hand we have long, very dry and hot periods every year with temperatures between 25 and 40c, causing heavy drought and affects all agricultural production within Romanian Moldova, Transport and travel by train are also affected, both for the population and for the movement of consumable goods caused by restrictions placed in such times to conserve the road and rail network. The population, which survives on a pittance of a salary or low state benefit, suffers directly as a result of all of these events from rising costs passed directly to the customer in the supermarket. The other extreme of the weather in Romanian Moldova can be seen clearly in the heavy flash floods that sweep the country at short notice, destroying further agriculture and wildlife, causing loss of life in certain cases to both humans and animals and destroying whole communities which quickly become inundated. Romania therefore needs a viable plan to re-irrigate the land with excess water from rivers to help develop agriculture, plus it needs to act now rather than wait for the next disaster in real terms by raising the river banks to the highest level to contain the overflow of water in times of extreme rainfall. By acting on the above, further disasters can be averted and the benefit will be seen in higher agricultural yields, thus helping keep prices down on the home market to benefit the population. A study needs to be undertaken to cost the above idea, and Romania must look seriously at the siting of dwellings in rural areas. New laws should be passed to forbid the building of domestic dwellings and water wells on low lying ground. A full system of drainage needs to be put into any future plan as none exists in rural areas to take away rain water, which could be taken via pipes direct to a pumping station for recycling to consumption within localities. We strongly believe that the costs would prove to be far less for the above than the heavy cost of emergency aid, not to mention annual cost to the nation in lost production caused by extreme weather. References 1.

Toma Ovidiu, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania, ”The University Regional Research Consortium (Moldavia) for Environment Monitoring and Protection – as a premise for the optimisation of living conditions because of the prevention of natural and human ecological catastrophes. NATO Security through Science Book, IOS Press, 2007, Amsterdam, Holland

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2.

*** Romania Floods OCHA - Geneva Situation Report No. 215 July,1999, Switzerland.

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Vulnerability Mitigation and Risk Assessment of Technological Disaster Alexandru OZUNU a, Zoltán TÖRÖK a, Viorel COŞARA a, Emil CORDOŞ b and Alexis DUTRIEUX c a Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Environmental Sciences, Romania, Cluj-Napoca, No. 4 Stefan cel Mare Street, Postcode 400192, Tel: +40 264-405 300 Extension 5444, Fax: +40264-599 444, [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] b CRAIM Association, Regional Centre for Major Industrial Accidents Prevention, Romania, Cluj-Napoca, No. 67 Donath Street, Postcode 400293, Tel: +40 264-420 590 Extension 20, Fax: +40 264-420 667, [email protected] c ATM-PRO sprl, Belgium, Nivelles, No. 7 Rue Saint-André, Tel: +32 067843304, Fax: +32 067843309, [email protected]

Abstract. Risk calculation as a function of probability and magnitude of consequences is an important step in technological risk management. Taking into account the importance of the local communities’ role in Emergency Response Plans, it appears that vulnerability should be an important new factor in the technological risk formula. The paper presents a case study for the improvement of technological risk calculation taking vulnerability into account. Keywords. Vulnerability mitigation, technological hazards, risk analysis, chlorine

Introduction Risk Management can be defined as the systematic implementation of management procedures with the purpose of analysing, assessing, controlling and reducing risk in order to protect the public (employees, local community), the environment and the company’s assets. The standard definition of risk, used in risk analysis, is as follows: risk is the combination of event, probability and consequences [1]. Focusing on human life and health, the calculation formula for risk is the following equation: R = F * C (victims/year)

(1)

where: F – frequency or probability of the accident (event/year), C – consequences of accident, magnitude of the loss or injury (victims/event). The risk can be presented as a single number index, a table, a graph (F-N plot) or a risk map. Vulnerability should be adopted as a third term in the risk calculation:

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R = F * C * V (victims/year)

(2)

where V is the vulnerability of the local community or workers. Vulnerability is a moderating factor in risk assessment. By mitigating the vulnerability we reduce the risk. In a quantitative risk analysis the vulnerability factor should be adopted in a strict relation with the estimation of the risk of technological disasters. Therefore, a methodology should be developed for estimating the vulnerability factor, quantifying it with respect to the risk calculation formula.

Estimation of Vulnerability Vulnerability can be defined as a potential to experience adverse impacts, or as the characteristics of a person or a group to anticipate, cope with, resist and recuperate from a hazardous impact. Vulnerability involves a combination of factors which determine the level of the hazard for health, life, and damage of property following an incident. Quantitatively, vulnerability can be expressed as a number between (0.1) or 0%–100%. Vulnerability depends on the infrastructure and socio-economic conditions of the area. When reducing the hazards we are reducing the vulnerability too. In many cases the increased number of victims is not due to greater hazards, but to the amplification of vulnerability of the population. Some social groups are more vulnerable than others, depending on sex, age, physical condition etc. A major component of a risk assessment is evaluating the area’s vulnerability to hazards. Regional vulnerability is determined by evaluating hazard exposure and coping capacity. In order to determine the vulnerability, a set of indicators can be selected. In the case of technological disasters these indicators can differ from case to case, depending on the potential consequences of the accident. For example, in the case of a toxic dispersion, different indicators would be selected than in the case of an explosion. In Table 1 some important indicators of vulnerability regarding technological disasters are presented. In risk calculation the presence of the population should be surveyed with the following rules [5]: 1.

2.

3. 4.

The population of future residential areas should be taken into account. The estimation of population can be done taking into account the existing spatial plans or default values in the absence of the spatial plans. The population in recreational areas should be taken into account. The values for the population density should be estimated taking seasonal variations into account. Considering the current legislation, the presence of the population in industrial areas, hospitals, schools, offices, motorways etc. should be taken into account. The variation of the population presence should be estimated by the following rules: daytime – between 8.00 and 18.30, and night time – between 18.30 and 8.00.

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Table 1. Indicators of technological vulnerabilities Indicator

Description

Distance from accident source

The further the distance, the less the vulnerability

Distance from the contaminated area’s boundary

The time of evacuation depends on these distances

Access to evacuation routes

The time of evacuation depends on these routes

The existence of means of evacuation/vehicles

The use of vehicles or other means of evacuation decreases the time of exposure

State of health of population – possibility of autoevacuation (outpatients, old people, children, handicapped persons)

The intervention of a supplementary rescue team will be necessary

Type of buildings – isolation properties, nr. of levels, shelters etc.

Possibility of evacuation to higher levels or into isolated shelters

Existence of individual protection equipment

Increases the level of personal protection

Level of training of the population for emergency situations

The proper training of the population decreases vulnerability

Existence of warning plans

Timely warning of population can reduce vulnerability

Existence of intervention, evacuation and rescue plans

Efficient intervention and evacuation reduces vulnerability

Population’s awareness of rescue plans

If they are aware of the rescue plan, the population can be evacuated more efficiently

Participation of population in simulations of emergency situations

Learning the rescue procedures

Time of accident – day, night, weekend, public holidays

Accidents occurring at night, in the weekend or on holidays has a negative influence on implementation of rescue plans

Existence of alarm systems

Warning the population by means of alarms is an important factor

Existence of special rescue teams and level of training

Efficient intervention in case of accidents

Existence of special medical units

Insures adequate medical assistance

The type of the accident: sudden explosion, or slow gas dispersion

Vulnerability depends on propagation time of the effects

The fraction of the present population varies as it follows: − −

Residential areas; daytime = 0.7; night time = 1.0; the presence of schools, hospitals and places of work should be taken into account. Industrial areas; daytime = 1.0; night time with shift work = 0.2; night time without shift work = 0.

Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can be very useful in processing population data and estimating vulnerability.

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Case Study The paper discusses a potential chemical accident at a liquefied chlorine storage tank, located in the industrial area of Turda, Romania. The town has about 55,900 inhabitants [8] and it is located 30 km to South-East of the city of Cluj-Napoca. The simulation of chlorine release and dispersion: The models used in the simulation of the chemical accident with chlorine release and dispersion are the two dimensional Slab model and the SEVEX (SEVeso EXpert) complex 3D terrain dispersion model. The Slab model is an atmospheric dispersion model for denser-than-air releases over flat terrain. The Slab model does not calculate source emission rates. It assumes that all source input conditions have been previously determined. Therefore we used the SEVEX model to calculate source emission rates. Three modules are included in SEVEX [7]: The SEVEX-Meso is a complex 3D terrain and meteorological model which solves the Navier-Stokes equations, considering the terrain roughness (the topography of the terrain), the land use of the terrain (five categories: water, forest, urban, grassland and a mixture of these four) and the solar radiation and heat transfer between the ground and the atmosphere. The SEVEX-Toxic module is a Lagrangian 3D dispersion model that simulates the passive transport and dispersion of toxic and flammable material. The SEVEX-Source module simulates different types of releases, effects and consequences of accidents. These three modules combined in SEVEX View software compute the worst-case realistic conditions of an accident. SEVEX View is the only software that considers both the SEVESO directives of the European Commission, and U.S. EPA guidelines. The software was built to simulate major industrial accidents, so the model is designed for impact zones from 1 to 18 km.

Simulation Parameters The storage vessel has the following technical characteristics: length, L = 10 m, diameter d = 2.5 m, maximum capacity of storage is equal to 56.15 tons of chlorine at 15 oC storage temperature, 80% filling level and at 6.5 bar service pressure. The site is located at a height of 330 m above sea level. The climatology studies showed that the dominant wind direction is NW, with an annual mean velocity between 2–3 m/s. The secondary wind direction is SE, with an annual mean velocity between 1–2 m/s. The dominant atmospheric stability conditions are class E (slightly stable) and F (stable). The simulation parameters were selected considering the worst case scenario with the following conditions: daytime – complete cloud cover, 70% relative humidity, 20 oC ambient temperature, neutral atmosphere (class D); night time – zero cloud cover, 90% relative humidity, 10oC ambient temperature and stable atmosphere (class F). The 2 m/s average velocity can be considered as low wind condition. The release scenario takes into consideration the rupture of the transport pipe and the failure of the safety systems, followed by the release of the entire quantity of liquefied chlorine.

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The following input data were used: Release: Continuous release from 0.1 m long ruptured pipe with 5 cm diameter. The fallout from the cloud was assumed to be 0%. In the dispersion modelling the jet modelling was also calculated. Dispersion: 2D and 3D modelling for day and night time release scenarios, under the above mentioned meteorological conditions.

Results and Discussion For comparison of the two different models we performed the simulation of the accident, considering the worst case scenario principle using the low wind condition, with the two dimensional Slab dense gas dispersion model (see Fig. 1 – daytime accident, Fig. 2 – night time accident) and with the three dimensional SEVEX model (see Fig. 3 – daytime accident, Fig. 4 – night time accident). The Slab simulation provides the footprints (concentration of level of concern for a time period) of the affected areas considering only one type of surface roughness and only one wind direction. On the other hand, the SEVEX simulation considers the complex topography and the land use of the terrain, calculating the wind direction and velocity for every 1 × 1 km square. In the SEVEX simulations, the wind speeds for 36 directions were computed, in every 10o, from 0o to 360o. For this reason, in the case of the 3D simulation, the overall area of danger is estimated based on a discrete set of result, so called plume fingers. The 2D results are given with full wind roses insofar as the direction does not influence the results. Three different concentration levels were selected, 30 ppm for dangerous concentration indoor (evacuation of population is necessary), 10 ppm for IDLH (Immediately Dangerous for Life and Health concentration – self confinement exclusion) and 2 ppm causing temporary diseases (avoiding exposure is advised), representing dangerous concentrations for 60 minutes exposure. In all of the simulation cases a map with 21 × 21 km area was used. In case of the Slab simulations the following results were obtained: For daytime simulation (Fig. 1) the cloud covers the industrial area of the Turda, Sânduleşti, Oprişani, Sf. Ioan – Hărcana, Turda veche neighbourhoods with concentrations higher than 30 ppm for one hour, affecting about 12,000 inhabitants. The area of this danger zone is 30.764 km2. The second danger zone (10–30 ppm) has an area of 112.20 km2, affecting about 30,000 inhabitants in the Poiana, Turda Veche, Băile Sărate, Turda nouă neighbourhoods and Mihai Viteazu village. The third danger zone, being larger, can not be shown on the map. For night time simulation (Fig. 2) the high concentration centre of the cloud (>30ppm) covers an area of 337.236 km2, including Turda city and Mihai Viteazu, Copăceni and Sânduleşti villages. The other two danger zones, being larger, can not be shown on the map.

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Figure 1. Slab – Daytime low wind condition dispersion.

In the case of the SEVEX simulations the following results were obtained: For daytime simulation (Fig. 3) the cloud travels through the industrial area of Turda city, Sânduleşti, Turda centre and Turda Nouă neighbourhoods, affecting during the daytime approximately 12,250 inhabitants. The high concentration centre reaches Mihai Viteazu village in an hour, affecting approximately 2,000 inhabitants. The overall estimated area of this danger zone is 13.83 km2. Concentrations between 10–30 ppm will affect Cheia, Sânduleşti and Copăceni villages. Self exclusion confinement is advised for approximately 3,400 inhabitants, in a 42.73 km2 estimated area. The estimated area of the third danger zone is 101.7 km2, where avoiding exposure is advised. The night time scenario (Fig. 4) is more dangerous; the cloud travels south west from the site, along the river basin, being carried by the catabatic wind. The cloud could affect about 38,500 inhabitants with high toxic concentrations in the following areas: industrial area, Sânduleşti, Turda centre, Turda Nouă, Sfântu Ioan – Hărcana, Băile Sărate and Oprişani neighbourhoods, Mihai Viteazu, Cheia, Plăieşti villages. The estimated area of the third danger zone is 52.66 km2.

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Figure 2. Slab – Night time low wind condition dispersion.

The second zone with dangerous concentration could affect about 1,000 inhabitants in Corneşti and Bădeni villages, covering an area of 16.96 km2. The estimated area of the third danger zone is 20.38 km2, where avoiding exposure is advised. The vulnerability mitigates from the source of the accident to the surrounding neighbourhoods and villages. The most vulnerable population lives in the industrial area of the city (about 1,800 inhabitants). The high concentration cloud covers this area in all the simulation cases. The poorer people of the city live in this area and the vulnerability is increased by the weak infrastructure. The next areas with high vulnerability are the Sânduleşti neighbourhood (1,230 inhabitants), and Turda centre (8,400 inhabitants), close to the industrial area, covered by the cloud in almost all the simulations. The vulnerability decreases from Turda centre to the Turda Nouă (6,135 inhabitants) and Oprişani neighbourhoods (15,000 inhabitants) due to the existing possible evacuation routes, in this case the E60 road in the direction of Cluj-Napoca and Câmpia Turzii. The next highly vulnerable area is Mihai Viteazu village, 2 km in a SW direction from Turda. This village should be evacuated, too, in the event of an accident with the corresponding wind direction.

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Figure 3. SEVEX – Daytime low wind condition dispersion.

Conclusions For the estimation of vulnerability it is important to know the most affected areas, so we need the best available techniques. The simple 2D dispersion models are not capable of providing realistic results for major accident consequences. Using a single surface roughness, the results are not realistic for long distance dispersions, because the complex terrain affects the dispersion in a significant way. The areas of the danger zones are overestimated in both scenarios,

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Figure 4. SEVEX – Night time low wind condition dispersion.

daytime and night time. Using these results in Emergency Response Plans is not advised, because it leads to loss of efficiency and the making of wrong decisions. The new complex 3D Model SEVEX takes into consideration the topography, land use and meteorological phenomena during the dispersion simulation. The areas of the danger zones were reduced, representing a more realistic situation. The results meet the efficiency and safety requirements which are very important in emergency planning and response. Vulnerability is connected to the type of technological disaster. In the case of a toxic dispersion the affected area is larger than in the case of an explosion or a fire, but the evacuation of the inhabitants can be implemented progressively with the spreading

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of a toxic cloud. In the case of an explosion the impacted area may be smaller, but the time period of the accident occurrence is small and the effects are immediate. In the case study we have shown that the most affected territory, the industrial area of the city, coincides with the most vulnerable area due to the fact that is populated by the poorest people in the city. This is a situation frequently found in industrial cities. This paper proposes the development of a new methodology for estimating the risk of technological disasters, taking into consideration the vulnerability factor. The Emergency Response Plans should be developed first taking into consideration the areas with the maximum vulnerability, which constitute a greater risk, and acting according to this principle.

References [1] Alexandru Ozunu: Hazard and Risk Aspects in Polluting Industries, Accent, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2001. [2] Van den Bosch, C.J.H., Weterings, R.A.P.M: “Yellow Book”: Methods for the Calculation of Physical Effects, Third edition, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Netherlands, 1997. [3] Uijit de Haag, P.A.M., Ale, B.J.M.: “Purple Book”: Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, First edition, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, Hague, 1999. [4] Crowl, D., Louvar, J.: Chemical Process Safety, Fundamental with Application, Prentice Hale, 1990. [5] American Institute of Chemical Engineers: Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, New York, 1989. [6] Jörn Birkmann: Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies, United Nations University Press, 2006. [7] SEVEX View: http://www.atmpro.be/, 2006. [8] Census Romania, 2002.

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Environmental Negotiations and their Connection with Climate Change Risks Dacinia Crina PETRESCU1, Alexandru OZUNU2 1

Babeú-Bolyai University, Faculty of Economics, Romania, Cluj-Napoca, UCDC Bucharest 2 Babeú-Bolyai University, Faculty of Environmental Sciences, Romania, Cluj-Napoca, No. 4 Stefan cel Mare Street, Postcode 400192, Tel: +40 264-405 300 Extension 5444, Fax: +40264-599 444, [email protected]

Abstract: For more than half a century we have been witnessing a globalisation process not only in the economy, but also in ecology. The disappearance of frontiers in relation to the effects of human activities on the environment and the use of the common resources of the planet: air, oceans etc., make international environmental negotiations very important. The increasing intensity and frequency of the consequences of climate change have led to a higher awareness and commitment to reduce them in many countries, including Romania. On July 2007, the meteorological red code warning was enforced for the first time in Romania, in the south of the country. The unusually high temperature registered for a long period of time throughout the country and the prolonged drought of 2007 are two of the most recent effects of global warming visible in Romania. Negotiations focused on reducing the consequences of the extremely hot weather and drought had as a first result the Government’s approval for the National Strategy and the Action Programme for Conception of Anti-Drought Strategy in the Short and Medium Term Keywords: environmental negotiations, sustainable development, climate change, Romania, extremely hot weather, drought

Introduction Negotiation has been a part of people’s life from the very beginning of human society. Initially, it was related to politics, military and commercial issues, but nowadays is deeply involved in all aspects of human life, from economic to social and from military to environmental fields. Many decades ago, negotiation was seen as an instrument used to solve disputes. Currently, a more advanced vision is accepted, according to which negotiation is a managerial instrument for dialogue and progress; a cooperative search for a convenient solution and not a process focused on gaining points in a competition. Negotiation requires that the negotiator creates a proper environment of conciliation in order to bring the different positions of the participants to an agreement. For more than half a century we have been witnessing a globalisation process not only in economy, but also in ecology. The disappearance of frontiers in relation to the effects of human activities on the environment and the use of the common

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resources of the planet: air, oceans etc., make international environmental negotiations very important. A relevant example is the presence of environmental negotiations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the Doha Round1 , for instance, the impact of trade on the environment was examined, as well as that of the environment on trade; WTO members agreed upon the fact that sustainable development can be strongly supported by commerce if certain conditions are fulfilled. It is easy to see that environmental negotiations are no longer an exception in the relationships between institutions, companies, governments etc.; they are always present at a local, regional, national, and international level.

The relationship between environmental negotiations, sustainable development and climate change The concept of sustainable development opened a new path in the relationship between man and the environment because it is an original concept that reunites social, economic and ecological aspects [6]. The first important international event for the evolution and use of the concept of sustainable development was the United Nations Conference (1972) where the Stockholm Declaration was signed (even though the signatories didn’t assume a limitation of their economic growth). On this occasion, the countries considered how human activity was affecting the global environment. Synthesizing the milestones of sustainable development, Mancebo [5] mentions at least 12 international events between 1972-2002. From these we can recall: the Brundtland Report Our Common Future (1987), which formally broadcast the concept of sustainable development, the Rio Earth Summit (1992) 2 , which reaffirmed in its ‘Principle 3’ the Brundtland Report’s message on sustainable development: “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations” [33], the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change (1997) 3 , which highlighted the importance of international negotiations focused on diminishing greenhouse gas emissions and the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002)4. Climate change risk represents a hot spot targeted by sustainable development. The gravity of the potential consequences of climate change and the importance given by specialists to the reduction of climate change effects are revealed by the numerous researches, conferences, conventions signed, strategies and action plans implemented, reports, books, web pages etc. Each convention signed, strategy or action plan 1

The Doha Round began with a ministerial level meeting in Doha (Qatar) in 2001, with subsequent meetings in Cancun (Mexico) in 2003 and Hong Kong (China) in 2005. Related negotiations took place in Geneva (Switzerland) in 2004, Paris (France) in 2005 and again in Geneva in 2006, and in Potsdam (Germany) in 2007. 2 The Rio Earth Summit was focused on social equality, economic development and environmental protection. It led to important agreements on climate change, biodiversity and Agenda 21 - an agreement for sustainable development in the 21st century. 3 The Kyoto Protocol deals with climate change and global warming. Agreements were made to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, including reversing carbon dioxide emissions, to their 1990 levels, by the year 2012. 4 This conference, also called Rio +10, discussed mainly social issues. Targets were set to reduce poverty and increase people's access to safe drinking water and sanitation.

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implemented is the result of a negotiation process. As the Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997 and coming into force in 2005, agreed on a reduction by 5.2% of the GHG emissions (base 1989) of developed countries for 2008-2012, we can confirm that the beginnings of international environmental negotiations focused on climate change are on the right track so far. In order to evaluate the consequences of the sudden warming in recent years, we take the example of the extremely hot weather of summer 2003 in France, when the number of victims reached 14,802. Research carried out in France revealed a high sensitivity of the population to high temperatures (over 40 oC), especially people over 75: 81% of the victims were over 75. This is worrying, as in 2003 this age group numbered 1.2 million and in 2050 they will be 4.5 million (however, the mortality rate will not increase, but will change its peak from winter to summer) [15]. We must remember that the Fourth Assessment Report Climate Change 2007 (February 2007) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the average global temperature will have risen between 1.8 oC (low scenario) and 4 oC (high scenario) by 2100 [15]. The high sensitivity of our society to climate conditions is evident from other points of view: social, economic, political etc. Among these, the impact of climate change on economic activity is very important. Agricultural production, patterns of consumption, the productivity of different sectors etc. are all affected by the climate. If we take as an example only the risk of meteorological variations we notice that the experts have already created specific instruments to cover it; the results of research on climate change are also taken into account. However, companies are still reluctant to implement a policy which takes account of the risk of climate change [4]. This leaves broad scope for negotiations focused on solving the problems generated by climate change.

Romania and environmental negotiations Within international relations, one of the most important areas of negotiation carried out by Romania in the environment field, due to its economic, environmental, social and political consequences, and because of the power and status of the participants, was the negotiation with the European Union before accession (1st of January 2007). The environment is included in Chapter 22 of the chapters for adoption of the acquis communautaire by candidate countries. In Romania, the Ministry of European Integration and the National Delegation for the Negotiation of Romania’s Accession to the EU were responsible for the coordination of negotiations and for Romania’s preparation for accession. The National Delegation drafted the position papers; the official documents through which Romania presented its position regarding each chapter, the stage of adoption of EU legislation, the calendar and the terms of adoption and application of the acquis not yet implemented. The position papers were discussed within parliamentary committees, trade unions, employers’ associations and NGOs. To facilitate this consultation, a Consultative Council for the Negotiation of EU Accession was established. The position papers were subsequently adopted by the Government of Romania and submitted to the EU [3].

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Environmental negotiations for Romania started in March 2002 and were closed in December 2004. Transitional arrangement were negotiated and agreed for: ƒ emissions of volatile organic compounds from storage of petrol until 2009 ƒ recovery and recycling of packaging waste (amended Directive) until 2013 ƒ landfill of certain liquid wastes until 2013 ƒ waste landfills until July 2017 (instead of 2009 for Member States) ƒ shipment of waste until 2011 ƒ waste electrical and electronic equipment until 2008 ƒ integrated pollution prevention and control until 2015 ƒ treatment of urban waste water until 2018 ƒ quality of drinking water until 2015 ƒ discharges of dangerous substances into surface water until 2009 ƒ air pollution from large combustion plants until 2013 and 2016-2017 ƒ incineration of hazardous medical waste until 2009 [21]. As regards air pollution and climate change the Romanian legislation is focused primarily on prevention and for the most part has already fulfilled the EU requirement [3]. During the process of accession to the European Union, Romania implemented specific actions, such as the development of the National Strategy and Action Plan on Climate Change – adopted by Governmental Decisions – and started the implementation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme as well as other climate change related actions promoted by the EU [14]. Even before the start of negotiations for EU accession, Romania had become involved in conventions, protocols and actions towards reducing the effects of climate change. In 1992, at the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit, Romania signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and ratified it by Law no. 24/1994. Romania was the first country included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed and economies in transition countries) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, committing itself to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 8% during the first commitment period 2008-2012, compared to the base year 1989 [14]. The economic decline of the years which followed generated an important decrease in the GHG emissions. In addition, in the last decade Romania has engaged in a social, economic and financial reform that has also contributed to the reduction of emissions. The main Romanian actors involved in environmental negotiations (national and international) are: ƒ Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development ƒ National Environmental Protection Agency ƒ National Commission on Climate Change ƒ regional and local authorities (especially the municipalities) ƒ research institutions (such as the National Research and Development Institute for Environmental Protection ƒ National Administration for Meteorology ƒ Institute for Research on Forestry Management.

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Responsibility for implementing the environmental measures established within the National Strategy on Climate Change and other agreements also belongs with the citizens, NGOs, business and industry etc. The outcomes of environmental negotiations on climate change are, on the one hand, the organisations, committees etc. founded and on the other hand, the legal acts already adopted and those due to be adopted in the near future; they will support the reduction of climate change effects. Among these, we can mention the National Commission on Climate Change, created in 1996, through the governmental decision (HG no 1275/1996). Its role is to promote the measures and actions for a unitary implementation in Romania of the objectives and requirements of the Convention and Protocol. One of the most important documents underlying Romania’s progress on reducing climate change effects is the National Communication, written by the Ministry of Environment and Water Management (now the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development). The first three volumes were sent to the UNFCCC Secretariat: the first in 1995, the second in 1996 and the third National Communication of Romania in 2005. The Romanian legislation adopted for compliance with the Convention and Protocol commitments is composed of primary legislation including specific acts on climate change, general environmental regulations including climate change aspects, specific legislation related to energy, transport, agriculture, and waste5. At national level, one of the most recent environmental negotiation processes was initiated with the purpose of finding ways of reducing the consequences of the extremely hot weather and drought. The unusually high temperatures registered for a long period of time throughout the country and the prolonged drought of 2007 are two of the most recent effects of the global warming visible in Romania. This year, the meteorological red code warning was enforced for the first time 5

Some of the most important legal acts are: Law No. 24/1994 ratifying the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change; Law No. 3/2001 ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC; Governmental Decision No. 1275/1996 regarding the establishment and the functioning of the National Commission for Climate Change. The Commission promotes the necessary measures and actions for a unitary implementation of the UNFCCC’s objectives; Governmental Decision No. 645/2005 regarding the approval of the National Strategy of Romania on Climate Change; Governmental Decision No. 1877/2005 regarding the approval of the National Action Plan of Romania on Climate Change; Law No. 111/1998 ratifying the UN Convention to Combat Desertification; Law No. 58/1994 ratifying the UN Convention on Biological Diversity; Law No. 84/1993 ratifying the UN Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer; Law No.137/1995 on Environmental Protection, as amended by Emergency Governmental Ordinance No. 195/2005 - contains a special chapter regarding atmosphere protection, climate change, emissions trading, national registry, national inventory and the general requirements concerning the environmental permit, and the control procedure, etc; Law No. 655/2001 on Atmosphere Protection - represents the framework atmosphere protection act aiming “to prevent, eliminate, limit deterioration and improve air quality, in order to avoid negative impacts on human health and the environment”. The law required the establishment of the National System for Integrated Air Quality Assessment and Management (Governmental Decision No. 586/2004), coordinated by the Ministry of Environment and Water Management; Law No. 645/2002 regarding the integrated pollution prevention and control (transposing the EU IPPC Directive); Law No. 287/2002 regarding the establishment, organisation and functioning of The Romanian Energy Efficiency Fund; Law No. 199/2000 regarding the efficient use of energy; Law No. 318/2003 regarding electric energy; Governmental Decision No. 443/2003 regarding the promotion of energy form renewable sources (transposing the EU Directive 2001/77/EC); Governmental Decision No. 162/2002 on land-filling of waste; Governmental Decision No. 541/2003 on limitation of emissions from large combustion plants (transposing the EU Directive 2001/80/EC); Law no. 26/1996 – The Forest Management Code.

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in Romania, in the south of the country – for Bucharest and 5 counties (Dolj, Olt, Teleorman, Giurgiu and Ilfov; see Figure 1).

The red code refers to dangerous meteorological phenomena, with very high intensity and disastrous effects, wind, torrential rain, lightening, with major risk of high flood and material damage. The orange code warns on meteorological phenomena of high intensity, with wind, heavy rain, lightening, that may cause high flood on small rivers. The yellow code means high risk of high flow and level, with the risk of high flood, but without significant damage. Figure 1. The distribution of the red, orange and yellow code warning for the 24th of July 2007, Source: [22].

On the 24th of July 2007 the highest recorded July temperature in Romania was registered: 44.2 oC at Calafat (in the south of Dolj county). The old July record was 43.5 oC (in Giurgiu, 2000). On the same day, other meteorological stations in Romania registered temperatures over 41 oC: 44.2 oC in Bechet, 44 oC in Moldova Noua and in Bailesti, 41.3 oC in Giurgiu, 41.5 oC in Caracal, 41.6 oC in Rosiorii de Vede and 41.2 in Bucharest [29]. However, the highest temperature in Romania, regardless of month, was not exceeded: on the 10th of August 1951 the meteorological thermometer showed 44.5 oC in Braila (Ion S. Ion station). According to the Ministry of Health, the heat of July 2007 claimed 33 victims in Romania [27]. Analysing the data from nine Romanian meteorological stations (with long series data from over 100 years and representative for Romania) the researchers reached the conclusion that the maximum length of the period of days with tropical temperatures (maximum daytime temperature equal to or higher than 30 oC) in July was as follows: in 1904; 24 days at Drobeta-Turnu-Severin (southwest Romania), in 2002; 22 days at Bucharest – Filaret, 19 days at Calarasi (south Romania), 12 days at Constanta (southeast Romania) [25]. These observations reveal a rise of the frequency and intensity of extreme weather phenomena, aggravated by global warming. Other research conducted by climatologists from the National Meteorology Administration (of Romania), using long series data from 14 meteorological stations

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between 1900-2000, showed a national average warming of 0.3 oC. This warming is higher (and statistically significant) in the east of the country: 0.8 oC at BucharestFilaret, Constanta and Roman. In the intra-Carpathian region the warming is not significant, except at Baia Mare, where a warming of 0.7 oC was found, attributed to the industrial activity in that area [24]. In 2007 Romania also registered the highest pluviometric deficit of the last 150 years. The measurements of annual precipitation show a decreasing tendency, stronger in the centre of the country, the north east and some regions of the south [24]. The depth levels of ground water are increasing. According to the National Institute of Hydrology and Water Management, in some counties in the south of Romania the depth of the borehole for ground waters reaches 200-300 metres. Under the circumstances, where 40% of Romanian households have a traditional well as their water source, the lack of precipitation has a serious impact on their life. Wells of less than 10-15 meters will probably dry up; already in some regions people have tried to dig new wells, but the water can be found only at great depths: over 60 meters [30]. In combination with the high temperatures, the extended drought worsened the situation. Official reports issued in June 2007 showed that the drought affected over 60% of the crops planted in autumn 2006: of 2.8 million hectares of wheat, rye, triticale, barley, two-row barley and rape, around 1.7 million hectares were destroyed [26]. Damage caused by drought in agriculture exceeded 500 million lei (around 165 million euro). This crisis situation generated a negotiation process focused on designing a strategy for the reduction of the effects of the drought. We can distinguish on the one hand those who allocate the money and on the other those who receive it. The result of the first round of negotiations was the government’s approval for a National Strategy and the Action Programme for Conception of Anti-Drought Strategy in the Short and Medium Term (on 25.07.2007, one day after the warmest July day in Romania). It was decided that the project of the National Strategy will be presented for approval to the government after 3 months, which means that the measures included in this strategy will not help the farmers affected by the current drought. Instead, the ones who requested support obtained it: 121 million lei (around 40 million euro) was allocated by the Ministry of Agriculture for the 348,000 hectares of crops destroyed by drought. Unfortunately, only farmers that had used varieties approved by the Ministry received this money; this situation caused problems for a large number of farmers. Due to such issues, the negotiation process cannot yet be seen as successfully concluded; the parties involved have not reached a satisfactory agreement and they are still trying to reach a common position.

Conclusions As climate change effects have a long term impact on the environment and human society and they do not solve themselves, it is obvious that environmental negotiations on climate change will intensify and will require accurate information on current situations and on tendencies, excellence among professionals and increased public awareness of the topic. Environmental negotiations have significant consequences at an economic and social level and often have to be carefully and rapidly adjusted to any crisis situation that may occur. The experience gained and the dedication of the parties involved helps

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in finding appropriate solutions for all participants. The awareness of citizens and institutions in Romania of environmental protection in general and climate change in particular has increased significantly in recent years [8]. Awareness is one of the most powerful instruments in creating an environmentally oriented behaviour. This will facilitate and support successful environmental negotiations. References [1] Calin, R., Teodor, C. (2007), Politica de mediu, 132 p., Ed. Tritonic, Bucuresti. [2] Codoban, A. (2007): Comunicare úi negociere în afaceri, 242 p., Ed. Risoprint, Cluj-Napoca. [3] Le Bihan, G., Les grandes négociations internationales autour de l’environnement. Le point de vue d’un chercheur indien, available at http://base.d-p-h.info/fr/fiches/premierdph/fiche-premierdph-5306.html [4] Marteau, D., Carle, J., Fourneaux, S., Holz, R., Moreno, M. (2004), La gestion du risque climatique, 211 p., Ed. Economica, Paris. [5] Mancebo, Fr. (2006), Le developpement durable, 270 p., Ed. A. Colin, Paris. [6] Negucioiu, A., Petrescu, D. C. (2006): Introducere în Eco-Economie, 256 p., EFES, Cluj-Napoca. [7] Nistoreanu, P. (2005), Negocierea în afaceri, 108 p., Ed. ASE, Bucureúti. [8] Petrescu, D. C. (2006), Clean Water and Polluted Water: from Confusion to Awareness. A Survey Carried on in Cluj-Napoca, Environment&Progress, nr. 8/2006, EFES, Cluj-Napoca. [9] Petrescu, D. C. (2002), Creativitate úi investigare în publicitate, 214 p., Ed. Carpatica, Cluj-Napoca. [10] Plăiaú, I. (200), Negocierea afacerilor, 380. p., Ed. Risoprint, Cluj-Napoca. [11] Porumb, E. M. (2006), Teoria si practica negocierilor, 182 p., EFES, Cluj-Napoca [12] Prutianu, ùt. (2000), Manual de comuniacre úi negociere în afaceri, vol. 2 – Negocierea, 277 p., Ed. Polirom, Iaúi. [13] Puúcaú, V. (2003), Negociind cu Uniunea Europeană, vol. 1, 826 p., Ed. Economică, Bucureúti. [14] Proorocu, M., Ozunu, Al., (Editors) (2006), Implemetation of the Kyoto Protocol and the European Union Directives on Emission trading in Romania, Ed. Accent, Cluj-Napoca. [15] Sciana, Y., Bellanger, B., Haentjens, E., Denigot, G.-H., Grumberg, P. (2007), Vers la fin des saisons?, Science et Vie, no. 1075, avril, 2007, p. 60-79. [16] Schaffzin, N. R. (2007), Negociază inteligent, 176 p., Ed. All, Bucureúti. [17] Smith, P. R., Taylor, J. (2002), Marketing Communication. An Integrated Approach, third edition, 640 p., Kogan Page, Lodon. [18] Vasiliu, C. (2003), Tehnici de negociere úi comunicare în afaceri, 110 p., Ed. ASE, Bucureúti. [19] *** (2005), Quarterly Report, January - March 2005, ANNEX - A Public Relations ISPA Promotion, Cluj-Napoca, April 2005. [20] http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/ [21]http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulga ria_romania/chapters/chap_22_en.htm [22] http://www.e-transport.ro/COD_ROSU_DE_CANICULA_IN_BUCURESTI_SI_5_JUDETE-news37i6572-l1.html [23] http://www.infoportal.ro/articol~din-actualitate~info-301506~cod-rosu.html [24] http://www.inmh.ro/index.php?id=404 [25] http://www.inmh.ro/index.php?id=428 [26] www.mediafax.ro (published on 27.07.2007) [27] http://www.mediafax.ro/decese.html?q=tags%3ADECESE (published on 25.07.2007) [28] http://www.mmediu.ro/integrare/comp2/3_Document_pozitie/position%20paper%20original.pdf [29] www.mediafax.ro/social/44-grade-calafat-record-absolul-temperatura-iulie-video.html?1688;862528 (published on 24.07.2007) [30] http://www.stiri24.ro/article.php?id=344934 (published on 10.07.2007) [31] http://www.sustainability-ed.org/pages/what1-1.htm#timeline [32] http://www.tvr.ro/articol.php?id=12797 [33] http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 [34] http://www.unu.edu/unupress/backlist/ab-earth.html [35] http://www.vertigo.uqam.ca/vol5no2/framerevue.html [36] http://www.wto.org/spanish/tratop_s/envir_s/envir_negotiations_s.htm

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-195

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Geophysical Investigation Methods for the Assessment of Risks in an Area Used for the Disposal of Hazardous Chemical Wastes Dimitri A. KHACHATRYAN a,1 and Vilen E. STEPANYAN b Dr., Prof., Academician of International Academy of Ecology and Life Protection Science; Expert Geophysicist of Armenian Rescues Service b Dr., Prof., Academician of International Academy of Ecology and Life Protection Sciences; Top Expert of Armenian Rescues Service a

Abstract. The objective of the geophysical investigation method was the determination of the presence of a concrete covering over an insecticide burial place, the thickness of the cover, and depth of the landslide body. Results of measurements by magnetic survey (MS), electrical sounding (ES), and electrical profiling (mapping) showed an absence of concrete cover but a subsoil layer of loam and clay 2.8–3.0 m thick. The formation of fissures in the cover has helped rainfall to penetrate into the pesticides, turning them into paste and liquid forms. The depth of the burial place changes from 7.8 m to 10.4 m and the base is in the upper layer of landslide cover). The second and older active landslide layer is at a depth of 13–18 m. An unexpected fracture in the burial place, which is on an active landslide, could cause an ecological disaster which could endanger the populations of the Shoraxbyur, Vardashen, and Erebuny suburbs of Yerevan, capital of Armenia. Keywords. Geophysical investigations; assessment of risks; hazardous chemical materials; pesticides; landslides; Republic of Armenia

Introduction A strip of land in the area of the Gegadir landslide, in the Kotayk region of Armenia (Pictures 1 & 2), was selected in 1976 for the burial of more 500 tonnes of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), and other wastes from the chemical industry. The size of the burial area is 110 m long by 10–15 m wide. Preliminary investigations in 2003 revealed an active landslide process when numerous fissures, an outcrop spring, and other features were evident. Activation of the landslide in the burial place caused the damming up of a water spring (Picture 3) and the bursting of a trunk irrigation pipeline in the upper ground level (Picture 4), the spreading of soil over the entire burial place, the infilling of a flood drain and other effects. The unexpected rupture of the burial

1 Dimitri A. Khachatryan, 97, Str. V. Hambarcumyan, 375033 Yerevan, Republic of Armenia; E-mail: [email protected].

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Picture 1. Area of the insecticide burial place in Armenia. Source: D.A. Khachatryan, in base of Microsoft Encarta Premium 2006 map.

Picture 2. Area of the Gegadir landslide. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: Archives of Armenian Rescue Service (ARS).

place, which is in an active landslide area, could bring an ecological disaster that could endanger the population of the Shoraxbyur, Vardashen, and Erebuny suburbs of Yerevan, capital of Armenia.

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Picture 3. Damming effect of spring waters. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: Archives of ARS.

Picture 4. Results of bursting trunk irrigation pipeline at higher ground level. Source: Photo D.G. Arakelyan: Archives of ARS.

1. Physicial, Geographical and Geological Conditions in the Area of Investigation The Gegadir landslide area is in the Central Volcanic Plateau [1] and includes the inhabited localities of Yerevan-Dzoraxpyur-Voxchaberd-Gexarot-Acavan-Garny [1,2]. The current geodynamic zone is situated near the Verevan tectonic fault in the sub-

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Picture 5. Fissure alongside cemetery (within white lines). Source: En base of Photo D.A. Arakelyan: Archives of ARS.

Caucasian direction and the active large Djrvej fault at great depth in the antiCaucasian direction [1,3]. The area lies in part of the geological formation of Paleozoic, Mesozoic, and Phanerozoic rocks. The initial investigation uncovered rocks of the Miocene and the Pleistocene eras as well as clay, sandy clay and clayey sand [3]. Quaternary rocks create the formation to the alluvium, diluvium and proluvium layers.which extend into the landslide and man-made formations [2,4]. Within a 100 km radius of the area of investigation there have been powerful, slow and impulsive landslides which entailed loss of life. Some of those recorded (with Richter scales) were: Vayocdzor in 732 (М = 6,5); Dvin in 893 (М = 6,5); Any in 1064 (М = 6.5); Garny in 1679 (М = 7.0); Tcaxkadzor in 1827 (М = 6.5); Ararat in 1840 (М = 7.0); Spitak in 1988 (М = 7.5); and Noyemberian in 1997 (М = 6.1) [4]. Over the past ten years, the intensively destructive earthquakes in Armenia, and in the whole region, activated secondary processes, including landslides in this region (Pictures 5 & 6). All things considered, a programme was developed for the investigation in the area of the landslide for the purposes of estimating and assessing the dynamic technical conditions of the burial place and developing engineering protection measures for the site, as well as stabilising the landslide processes, all with the purpose of preventing an emergency. The programme was considered and approved by the Emergency Managements Administration (EMA) RA, currently called the Armenian Rescue Service (ARS).

2. Geophysical Methods Investigation of the Burial Place The objectives of the geophysical methods are: determining the existence (or otherwise) of a concrete covering over the burial place, the thickness of that concrete covering, and the depth of the landslide body. For solving the problem a magnetic survey (MS) was used involving electrical sounding (ES), electrical profiling (mapping), and self–potential methods (SP) [5–8]. However, it is possible that some of the results of

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Picture 6. Fissures in parts of old landslide (in phase of activation). Source: Photo D.G. Arakelyan: Archives of ARS. Table1. Resistivity results found in areas of landslides in Armenia Soils and Rock formations

Electrical resistivity (Ohm.m) Outside landslide

On landslide

Kapan area Soil

30–150

Outside landslide

On landslide

Gexadir – Voxchaberd areas 25–30

20–160

15–25

Clay

4–15

4–8

1–3

1–3

Sandy clay

10–15

10–20

4–15

5–10

Clay sand

20–50

10–25

20–30

5–10

Scoria

40–120

15–30

–

–

Porphyry and Breccias tuff

110–500

80–220

–

–

80–200

30–80

Talus

Source: V.E. Stepanyan, D.A.Khachatryan, M. Biglaryan, Kenehi Isajara [6–8].

the method SP are unacceptable because the survey was carried out in sub-zero conditions. For determining the existence of the covering concrete, a magnetic survey was used because the steel reinforcing bars have a magnetic susceptibility 1,000 times that of rock formations (e.g. clay, sandy clay, and clay sand). The use of the electrical survey differentiates between the electrical resistivity of rock formations (clay, sandy clay, and clayey sand) and that of the covering concrete, as well as the electro-chemical effects of the deeper geological media. Some values of resistivity found in the landslide area are shown in Table 1 [6–8].

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Legend: 4 = ES points; XI = Lines of study Picture 7. Schematic of geophysical study. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

The magnetic survey used a proton magnetometer (Geometrics G816/826) on a grid system of 10 × 10 m, and nearby the perimeter of burial place it was 5 × 1 m. Measurement locations were the points of intersection between the longitudinal and transverse profiles. Lines of measurement are shown in Picture 7. The accuracy of measuring is 3%. The electrical survey (ES) was achieved with an electronic avtokompensator AE-72 made in the former USSR. It has an accuracy of measurement of 2–3%. Electrical mapping was made through one longitudinal profile using Shlumberger array (AB = 40 m, MN = 10 m, dx = 10 m). An array of parameters was determined through the analysis of the ES curves. The lines of electrical mapping are shown in Picture 7. They have an accuracy of 3%. Electrical soundings gave one longitudinal profile. Maximum distances of electrode currents varied between 150 m and 200 m. The azimuth of the alimentation line coincided with the line profile. A schematic of the geophysical study is shown in Picture 7. The ES curves showed multi-layer types (Picture 8), the interpretations of which were made by using program IPI2Win v. 2.0 of the Lomonosov University Estate of Moscow [9,10]. 3. Results of Geophysical Investigation The results of measurements from the magnetic survey in the investigation area were taken from intercepts on the graph of magnetic measurement along the line of the pesticide burial area (Picture 9), and by mapping the differences in total vector magnetic fields (Picture 10). Analysis of the graphs and maps of the magnetic measurements

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O m

,m

100

a

b

c

d

10

95 AB /2

65

45

30

20

9 10 14 .2

8

6.

3

4.

2 2.

3.

5 1.

1

Legend: a – representative ES curve of the outside (top) of landslide;b – ES curve on the nearside; c – ES curve in cemetery; d – ES curve above cemetery. Picture 8. Representative ES curves in area of investigation. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

Picture 9. Graphic of dT in area of investigation along line of the burial area. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

showed the absence of a concrete covering to the burial area. The local maxima in the points of observation 14, 23, 24, 27 (see Picture 9) in the central [X = 7, Y = 12] and northern parts of the burial area (Picture 10) could be explained by the metallic tare of the poisonous chemicals, or spoiled metallic equipment, or pieces of concrete buried with the chemicals. The northern anomaly dT could be connected with the concrete canal water transfer pipes that were replaced and buried by a small landslide. All this shows the absence of the concrete cover over the burial area. As it is seen in Pictures 11 & 12, the character of the geo-electrical sections in the limits of the burial place (ES 8-ES 5) distinguishes them from the local environment (ES 9 and ES 4). To the south of the burial place (ES 9), under the soil there are layers with electrical resistance of 5.9 Ohm.m at 3.0 m depth, and 3.05 Ohm.m at a depth of 14.3 m. The electrical resistance of the last layer is 1.6 Ohm.m.

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Picture 10. Map of the differences in total vector magnetic field. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

Picture 11. Graphic of the electrical mapping in burial area. Notes: AB = 40 m. MN = 10 m, dX = 10 m. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

Picture 12. Geo-electrical section along burial area. Source: D.A. Khachatryan: ARS Archives.

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203

To the north of the burial place under the layer of soil with electrical resistivity of 132.2 Ohm.m and a depth of 0.75 m, there is some resistance 9.9 Ohm.m at a depth of 4.4 m. The resistivity of the third layer is 2.8 Ohm.m., at a depth of 6.7 m. The last layer has an electrical resistivity of 1.6 Ohm.m.: all the layers are clays and loams. The changes in the resistivity results are due to the fissures and to changes in their granular size structure and wetness. On the boundary of the burial place, the depth of the soil layer changes to 0.75–0.8 m, and its electrical resistivity is 33.7–74.4 Ohm.m. The parameters of the second layer are; depth from 1.9 m to 5.1 m with resistivity of 5.8–11.6 Ohm.m. This layer is represented by clays, and at the limits of ES 7 and ES 6 from the depth of 2.8 m. The paste of poisonous chemicals, with traces of plastic bags, are at a depth of 2.9–3.0 m. near point ES 8. The depth of the hand boring was 3 m. This means that the scale of the cover of the burial place is 2.8–3.2 m. As chemical weed-killers in dry powder form are not mobile, and their paste has a resistivity 5.8–11.6 Ohm.m., the weed-killer layer under it, which has a resistivity 1.3–2.4 Ohm.m., must be in more liquid form than the paste. Under the third layer are places where the resistance changes from 4.5 to 8.9 Om.m and they can be due to the depth of landslide covering layer.

4. Conclusions Generalising the analysis of the geophysical investigations it can be concluded that: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

There is an absence of a concrete cover over the burial place. The cover is a subsoil layer of loam in the order of 0.75–0.8 m thick and clay some 2.0–3.0 m thick; the total depth changes from 2.8 m to 3.2 m. The formation of fissures in the cover helps rainfall to penetrate into the pesticides turning them into paste and liquid forms. The depth of the burial place, measured by ES, changes from 7.8 m to 10.4 m. The base is in the first layer of landslide cover. The second old active cover of sliding is at a depth of 13–18 m. An unexpected break of the burial place which is in the active landslide could cause an ecological disaster which could endanger the populations of the Shoraxbyur, Vardashen, and Erebuny suburbs of Yerevan, capital of Armenia.

For the purposes of revealing the aerial distribution dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), hexachord benzole, hexachloro- tciklogeksano, nitrite, nitrate, ammonia, non-ferrous and heavy metals, and pH, determinations must be made of chemical, spectral and biochemical analysis of the ground and soil to a depth of 1m, in the burial place within a radius 200m. Maximum allowable concentrations (MAC), admissible concentration limits (ACL) and maximum content for some of the chemicals are presented in Table 2. The maximum content of all pesticides are within the admissible concentration limits but to determine the content of pesticides at a depth greater than 1m, it is necessary to carry out subsidiary investigations. At present, with the aim of protecting the population, restoration and purifying works are carried out for the water-transfer canals around the burial place (Picture 2, in the background) and in the northern part, wire netting and other measures are implemented.

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Table 2. Maximum allowable concentration (MAC) and their maximum contents in the ground of the burial area Pesticide

Maximum allowable concentration (MAC) (mg/kg)

Maximum content (mg/kg)

Ddichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT)

0.1

0.0197

Heksachloro benzole

0..1

0.0148

Heksachloro ticklehhexanel

0.1

0.00268

Lindan

0.1

0.00063

Source: Archives of Armenian Rescue Service.

With the aim of stabilizing the landslide where the pesticides are buried, the following must be done: ∗ ∗ ∗

Detailed geophysical and engineering-geological investigations of the landslide; Counter landslide measures on the landslide; and Counter-filtration measures on the landslide parts of the burial place.

References [1] Асланян А.Т. История тектонического развития Тавро-Кав-казской области. Изд. АН Арм. ССР, 1984. [2] Гюрджян Ю.Г., Степанян В.Э., Хачатрян Д.А. и др. Мелиоративные мероприятия по стабилизации оползневых склонов в Армении. Вестник Международной Академии Наyк Экологии и безопасности жизнедеятельности (МАНЭБ). Т 9, No 8, Санкт-Перербург, 2004. [3] Саркисян О.А. Региональная геотектоника Армении.. Изд. ЕГУ. 1989. [4] Степанян В.Э., Месчян, и др. Научно методическое обоснование комплесной программы инженерной защиты территории РА от опасных геологических процессов. Том.1., “Оползневые процессы” Ереван, 1999. [5] Огильви А.АОсновы инженерной геофизики. М. “Недра”, 1990. [6] Степанян В.Э., Хачатрян Д.А. и др. Методология комплексирова-ния геофизических исследований в системе инженерно-геологического мониторинга. Вестник Международной Академии Наyк Экологии и безопасности жизнедеятельности (МАНЭБ). Т 9, No 8, СанктПерербург, 2004. [7] Хачатрян Д.А., Бегларян М., Кенехи Исихара Изучение устойчивости склонов и оползневых процессов геофизическими методами в Армении и в Иране. Материалы 9-ого Международного симпозиума иранских геофизиков. (На персидском яз.), Тегран, Иран, 1996. [8] Хачатрян Д.А., Бегларян М. Геоэлектрические и геотехнические исс-ледования при изучении оползневых процессов в Армении и в Иране. Материалы 2-ого семинара по оползням и уменьшению опасности от них в Иране. Т.1. (На персидском яз.), Тегран, Иран, 1997. [9] Alexei A. Bobachev, Igor. N. Modin, Vladimir A. Shevnin, 1990-2001. Geoscan-M Ltd. Moscow, Russia. [10] Куффуд О Зондирование методом сопротивления. “Недра”, М., 1984. This paper was prepared through encouragement from Sr. Albert B. Petrossian (Glendel, CA, USA), to whom we express our thanks.

Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-205

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Risk management of natural and man made processes – the basis of population and territorial protection in the Republic of Armenia Arman Artashes AVAGYAN Head of International Cooperation Department of Armenian Rescue Service of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Republic of Armenia. Abstract: Estimation of natural and man-made processes which have occurred in the territory of Armenia are presented, as well as planning measures for risk reduction in the case of emergencies in the structure of ARS of the Ministry of Territorial Administration of RA. Key words: natural disasters, man made disasters, seismic hazards, national crisis management system, risk management systems, international cooperation, legislative base in the field of emergencies, Crisis management academy, programme on preparation of specialists.

Introduction

During the past decade the number of active natural disasters in the world has reached an all time high. Based on data from the World Bank, it is estimated that more than 1 million people became the victims of natural disasters and damage equal to $780 (US) was caused to the economy of developing countries. As the demand for the equipment to deal with or eliminate the consequences of such disasters increases, it makes it necessary to take into consideration the danger of the possibility of natural disasters occurring, and to define the vulnerability of territories and infrastructures for each country. As for warning and consequence reduction systems, they must become a most important part of national programmes, plans and strategy of development. The strategy for risk management of natural and man made disasters is a comparatively new approach, the main point of which is the management of the above mentioned risks; the improvement of methods for reducing the economic and social consequences of natural and man made cataclysms. Armenia actively participates in the process of realising intergovernmental programmes on safety provision, risk reduction and mitigation of emergencies. In the framework of this programme, the establishment of a joint intergovernmental base for legal and normative-technical fields for monitoring, modelling, forecasting, analysing and the management of risk reduction process has been designed [1]. Under the above mentioned programme, Armenia is obliged to develop one of the most important systems for the quantitative assessment of risks and hazards in the territory of the Republic of Armenia. On the basis of information technologies in the framework of GIS, with the development of an electrical non-uniformly scaled map, distinguishing natural habitats

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of possible influence on natural processes and modelling of their negative influence (earthquakes, exogenous processes, floods). This kind of approach considers the implementation of the following main points: - Preparedness for natural disasters, taking into consideration the fact that they occur. A national programme must be developed with the formation of technical, social and organisational methods for warning or consequence-mitigation systems - Provision of a constant enhanced preparedness of risk management capacities of corresponding systems in case of emergencies - National socio-economic development programmes must favour risk reduction process for the influence of natural disasters, reduction of the vulnerability of territories and infrastructures - Enhancement of the adaptation and awareness level of population, rescue units, authorities for crisis management activities, special training programme development systems as well as institutional training for adaptation in crisis situations during emergencies. The problems of safety and risk management of emergencies reduction in RA The territory of Armenia, with an area of 29,800km2, is prone to the serious influence of a wide spectrum of natural disasters; from earthquakes to avalanches. According to the data of the Armenian Rescue Service, Ministry of Territorial Administration, during the last 20 years, about 8 types of natural disasters can be distinguished systemised according to the level of the damage which occurred (Table 1) [2]. Table 1. The list of natural disasters during last 20 years in Armenia, arranged according to damage level N

Type of natural disasters

% damage

1. 2.

Earthquake Unfavourable weather conditions (hail) Landslides Mudslides Salting and desertification of the territory Floods Inundations Stone falls, erosion

82.65 4.5

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

3.9 3.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.45

Among basic factors contributing to the activation of dangerous natural processes are the following: - High geodynamic activity in the territory of the Republic (earthquakes in Spitak,1988 and Noyemberyan,1997) and in the region as a whole: Georgia, (1991 and1994) Turkey (1990,1992,1996) and Iran (2002,2004) - Complicated relief of the territory i.e. 350-4,000 metres above sea level - Negative hydro meteorological and climatic conditions caused by global warming and active sun energy.

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The catalogue of historical and present day earthquakes with a magnitude of M=5-6 and above, in Armenia and neighbouring countries, confirms the major threat of disastrous seismic events for the Republic. In 1992, а National Service of Seismic Protection (NSSP) was formed, which worked out a long term programme of seismic protection for the Republic of Armenia and, in particular, for the capital Yerevan, as well as a predicted evaluation of earthquakes, the mid term and long term broadcasting of seismic events, a detailed micro seism region, as well as an evaluation of the seismic stability of existing dwellings and industrial resources. New seismic norms and rules were established in 1994 (02.02.04) [3] according to which the indicators of background magnitude of seismic intensity for the territory of the Republic were worked out. In 2004 a law on seismic protection was adopted. 65% of the territory of the Republic consists of hills and foothills and is differentiated by strong crossed landscapes, with high relief (20-32º) and a high level of development of erosion processes, which contributes to the active occurrence of landslides and mudslides. According to the inventory of 2004 [4], in terms of seismoactive constructions, 2,500 landslides were established in the territory of the Republic, 131 of which are in a stage of active development. According to the data of the Armenian Rescue Service of the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Republic of Armenia [5] the annual economic damage to socio-economic structures of the republic caused by landslides, is 10million dollars. Negative climate changes of recent years (2001-2006), connected with global warming, affected the activation of natural atmospheric processes. Particularly, in 2003, damage caused by flooding was 1 billion 718 drams and during the spring inundations, damage in the northern territories was quite serious and cost 1 billion 657 drams. Strong winds, thunder, heavy and persistent rain and hail cause a lot of damage. Vivid example of such adverse weather is the rain, which fell on Idjevan city (Tavush region of the RA) and its surroundings in May 2003 and April 2004, accompanied by hail, winds, mudslides and a catastrophic rise of the water level in the rivers with flooding of vast territories and considerable damage to buildings, artificial constructions, roads and transport communications, agricultural products etc. The main reason for dangerous man made disasters is the anthropogenic factor, lack of main industrial funds, considerable decrease of material-technical supply, as well as the rapid decrease of the level of industrial technological discipline and security procedures, neglect of the normative exploitation requirements as regards the work of the mechanism, their prophylactic control, and the absence of planned damage prevention. The lack of sufficient financial and material means has resulted in a huge number of stations for observation and laboratory control being made obsolete and closing, which does not allow for monitoring activities to be fully carried out in terms of, forecasting and the prevention of emergency situations of a natural and economic character. The probability method of risk analysis is widely used in Armenia. This presupposes both the evaluation of the likely occurrence of a relevant emergency situation and the calculation of the relative probability of the process developing in a number of different ways. Calculated mathematical models can be made rather easily (in comparison with deterministic) but they lack the accuracy of evaluation, which is completed with functional information on the actual state of the system.

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A number of laws related to the field of emergency situations function in the Republic of Armenia are listed below: • Population Protection in Emergency Situations • Civil Defence • Seismic Protection • Firefighting Security • Rescue Forces and Status of Rescuers • Armenian Rescue Service • Population Protection • Martial Law • Police of the Republic of Armenia • Internal Forces • Urban Development • Local Authorities. In the sphere of the regulation of hazards and management of risks, the Armenian Rescue Service collaborates with a number of international organisations, such as UNDP, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent, Open Agreement with European Union on combating major disasters, NATO/PfP, OSCE, IAEA, Doctors without Frontiers, BSEC, CIS Intergovernmental Council on natural and man made disasters, as well as similar organisations of foreign countries such as the USA, Argentina, the Russian Federation, Italy, Belarus, the Ukraine, Georgia, France, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Romania, Hungry, Great Britain, Estonia, Belgium, Japan and China. The Government of the Republic of Armenia attaches great importance to the preparation of high-level specialists for forming rescue forces for the professional management of various types of situation, as well as specialists in the field of population protection and civil defence. For that purpose on the basis of the training centre Rescuer (established in 1992) a Crisis Management State Academy higher educational institution was set up in 2005, where training is carried out in the following fields: • Re-qualification of specialists of the Service and republican authorities of different Ministries as well as local authorities (1,700 people a year) • Re-qualification and training of fire fighters/rescuers (350-400 people a year) • Training of specialists with higher education (bachelor and master) • Training of population carried out by means of mass media, booklets, posters, reference books etc (more than 20,000 are trained every year within the framework of this programme); The Academy coordinates training in the sphere of population protection in schools, colleges and universities. References [1] Interstate interrelation of CIS countries on problems of emergency situations. Inforizdat, M. 2005, p. 534. [2] Stepanyan V.E., Azaryan S.N., Gyurjyan Yu.G., Sngryan E.E. “Risk of the occurrence of emergency situations on Armenia”. VI international scientificmethodological conference “Security of vital activity” Kiev, 2007, p. 212. [3] Seismic norms of the Republic of Armenia II 02.2-94 “Seismic norms and rules on seismoactive construction”, Y. 2005. [4] Stepanyan V.E., Azaryan S.N. “To the question of the national policy processing problem in the field of population protection from emergency situations”. A talk

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during the conference devoted to the 70th anniversary of Yerevan State University, Y. 2005, p. 16-19. [5] Stepanyan V.E., Gyurjyan Yu.G., Sngryan E.E. “Conceptual approached to the problem of risk management from the occurrence of natural avalanche-landslide phenomena”. Works of the 3rd Central Asian international symposium, Volume 1, Dushanbe, 2005, p. 26-28.

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Monitoring Dangerous Geological Processes in Moldova Alexander P. SUDAREV, Eugen N. SEREMET and V.A. OSYIUK Moldavian Hydrogeological Expedition EHGeoM, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract. The high degree of development of the territory of the Republic of Moldova and the limited availability of lands favourable for agriculture stipulate the necessity of introducing potentially unstable slopes, exhausted quarries and wetlands into extensive agricultural and building use. However, this is often hindered by a wide spread of exogenous processes significantly complicating normal land use. Such processes result in human-caused damage as well as decreasing the crop capacity of agricultural lands with negative consequences for the national economy. Keywords. Dangerous geological process (DGP), hazard, landslides, methods, management, risk, slope

Dangerous Geological Processes Development in Moldova There are at present about 65,000 to 75,000 ravines with a surface of 17,000 hectares as well as more than 16,000 current landslides with a total area of over 83,000 hectares within the region. Landslides cover 2.35% of the whole territory of the country and the area of ancient (old) landslides comes to 731,200 hectares (or 21.3%). The area of active landslides (about 12,400 hectares) is developed within populated areas. In general 43.7% of settlements are endangered by landslides and in the Codru area this value reaches 98% (Fig. 1). Territorial studies carried out by units of the State Agency of Geology of Republic of Moldova (AgeoM) from 1970 to 2006 showed the sustainable expansion of landslide areas. For example, in the Criuleni district 52% of settlements were involved in landslide process in 1971 but by 1997 this value had increased up to 78%; in Orhei district the figure was 45% in 1972 and became 59% of landslides in 1999; in the Straseni district 85% became 97.3%. Within settlements of the Hincesti district there was 87.9% of landslides in 1972 but this value had increased up to 93.4% by 2002 and the area of active landslides rose from 7.9% to 13.7%. Examples of landslide activity events are given in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Processes of outwash are revealed within an area of 680,000 hectares of which 44,000 hectares are exposed to outwash processes of a moderate and high degree. Current deposit accumulation takes place within more than 3,500 artificial reservoirs with a general water surface of 462.4 km2, the area of periodically flooded lands reaches 92.4 km2.

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Figure 1. Map of ancient and modern landslides in the Republic of Moldova.

Figure 2. Landslide area Nisporeni, 2006.

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Figure 3. Separation of parent material along the landslide scarp, Malaesti, 2006.

The modern concept of hazard means a process, property or state of nature, society or engineering that constitutes a menace to the life, health or wealth of a human population and to economic objects or to the environment. Dangerous geological processes (or dangerous natural processes) means any change in the near-surface part of the lithosphere (geological environment) caused by natural factors and which can lead to negative consequences for the human population, economic objects and environment. Risk is a probable degree of danger or total dangers which is determined for a defined object in terms of possible losses within a defined period of time. Vulnerability is the property of an object to lose the ability of its natural or artificially set up functions as a result of the effects of a hazard of a defined genesis of intensity and continuance of influence [7,8]. The degree of hazard of any exogenous process is defined by its extensity and intensity as well as by the size of the occurred phenomena and probable consequences and damage to settlements from destruction, separate buildings and valuable agricultural lands as well as the complexity and value of engineering protection measures. Taking into account the specifics of natural conditions in Moldova: landslides, ravines, slope outwash as well as karst phenomena within river valleys in northern regions of the country and soil subsidence in loess formations in southern parts of the country should all be considered as dangerous geological phenomena. It is necessary to note that ravine formation and outwash are closely connected with the process of flooding by heavy rains and flood water and the underflooding process is always attended by subsidence and landslides within the slopes.

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Nowadays various countries have two ways of approaching the definition and organisation of a system for monitoring the geological environment and dangerous natural and man made processes. The first approach to monitoring is the system of observation, assessment of status and prediction of changes to the environment under the impact of natural and man made factors. The second is a system of control by means of regime observations at a network of stationary sites, and management by regulation of economic activity or the realisation of protective engineering measures. The first approach was used by the Ministry of Geology of the USSR (A.I. Sheko et al. 1988, D.I. Peresunyko, K.I. Sychev, 1989 et al.). Many independent academics and university scientists (G.L. Koff, 1983; A.M. Grin, N.N. Klyuev et al., 1989; V.K. Epishin, V.T. Trofimov, 1985; A.L. Ragozin, 1993; G.I. Rudyko, 1999) were adherents of the second approach to monitoring, as a system of management and control of the environment and dangerous processes. Management was acknowledged as one of monitoring tasks in early 1970th by UNEP – the United Nations Environment Programme. In the Republic of Moldova the relevance of the problem of protection from dangerous geological processes (DGP) is underlined in Governmental Regulation № 536 of 22.07.1994, concerning working out a Programme of Protection of the Territory of the Republic of Moldova from DGP impact. Governmental Regulations have been adopted directed to the mitigation of these negative processes for the last decade in Moldova. One of these Regulations (№ 952 from 15.10.1999) is directed to the protection of settlements from DGP. Continuous measurements of a precautionary character were proposed, directed to the mitigation of loss. The list of measurements as well as executors was also adopted. A Concept for Ecological Monitoring has now been formulated and is stated in Regulation of System of Integrated Ecological Monitoring and adopted by Order № 20 from 10.11.1998 of the Ministry of Environment (Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources). Integrated Ecological Monitoring is a complex system, by means of which the State carries out continuous observation of the environment, natural resources and anthropogenic impact based on parameters and indices of spatial and temporal action. These provide the database necessary for the development of a precautionary strategy and tactics for the liquidation of anthropogenic activity and the consequences of natural calamities, as well as for working out the predictions and providing operative control to ensure the efficiency of measures undertaken to improve environmental conditions. Environmental monitoring is realised by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources as well as by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and the State Agency of Geology (AGeoM) and the State Agency of Forestry (MoldSilva) and Academy of Sciences of Moldova. In recent decades, control of DGP development has been carried out by the following institutions: • • •

AGeoM and EHGeoM observe exogenous processes (landslides and ravines) on pilot sites and within settlements as well as controlling reservoir bank transformation. N.A. Dimo Institute of Soil Study researches the erosion of agricultural lands. Road exploitation services of the Ministry of Transport and Roads control landslides near roads and highways.

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Figure 4. Conceptual scheme of the DGP Monitoring in Moldova.

• •

Public Enterprise Railways of Moldova controls landslides near railways. Institution Apele Moldovei takes observations for irrigating land and underflooding territories drying up.

The conceptual scheme of DGP monitoring is given in Fig. 4. There should be several different levels in a complex regime of observations within the territory of Moldova. In spatial terms these are the national, district and local observations. In terms of timescale and these are long term and within-year observations. In collaboration with end use, supporting and specialised observation networks are set up. The first one is intended for the stable and systematic study of general regularities of DGP development within the territory of Moldova, with a full complex of

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observations carried out by units of SAG, AGeoM. The second is set up, if necessary, by different institutions to observe direct threats by DGP to separate objects of national economic importance that are managed by those institutions. In terms of time the regime of DGP development can be long term, within a year, within a season, daily etc. [6]. The zoning maps of conditions and regime of DGP development for the territory are the engineering base for supporting observation network allocation. The most important criteria for the choice of observation sites (study areas) are their engineering and geological conditions and activity of DGP development as well as the practical value of those objects in terms of production and economic expediency. When grounding the monitoring network allocation it is important to take into account three possible types of DGP activity: • •

•

Development of existing geological objects that are under observation (individual forms of DGP) Rise of new forms of the process within the same geological formation, affected by given process. Objects of observation are the territories of prior spread of formations of definite stratigraphic complexes being the environment of the process development Forms of DGP development within geological bodies that are not the environment of the given process development but where this process is potentially possible. Objects of observation are territories with the same regime of process-forming factors (Table 1).

The supporting observation network is created on the basis of general supporting sites of three categories (the numbers of sites in correspondence with EHGeoM Inventory are given in brackets): • •

•

•

The site of the 1st category is the territory of Moldova. The sites of the 2nd category: Ocnita (3), Donduseni (4), Camenca (5), Hristici (6), Sturzesti (8), Marandeni (12), Pepeni (15), Calarasi (19), Nisporeni (21), Baltata (22), Djamana (24), Larguta (28), Comrat (31), Lunga (32), Costesti (33), Marcauti (79). The sites of the 3rd category: Durlesti (2), Ocnita (3), Donduseni (4), Camenca (5), Ursoaea (6), Sturzesti (8), Nisporeni (21), Djamana (24), Pepeni (75), Malaesti (78), Marcauti (79), Parcani (83), Soroca (85), Avdarma (92), Larguta (94), Baimaclia (95), Comrat-1 (96), Proscureni (100), Costesti (101). Out of category sites: Leuseni, Ghidighici (35), Bucovat (77), Buiucani Veche (86), Buiucani Noua (87) and “Station of Plants Protection” (88).

Monitoring sites of the 1st category is carried out for engineering and geological regions in scale of 1:200,000 (the scale of basic cartographic material, i.e. graphics and mathematical models of exogenous geodynamic environment) and predestined for grounding of long-term (up to 50 years) regional predictions of DGP development and for choosing the principal ways of engineering protection for objects of national economic importance and land. The spatial engineering and geological basis for site model serves the map of solid zoning under conditions of development of DGP and their genetic complexes. Zoning is carried out by geomorphological and geological features, i.e. structural features of the territory, and by types of rock sequence which can stipulate the DGP development. The analysis of basic quick changing factors (triggering factors),

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Table 1. Organisation of DGP Monitoring in Moldova Monitoring level

Monitoring object Regional (national) (1:200,000)

Sub-regional (1:50, 000 and 1:25,000)

Local (1:10,000 and larger scale)

1

2

3

4

DGP and their genetic complexes − landslides − ravine-forming − slope outwash − karst (in the north of the country) − underflooding territories and subsidence in loess formations − reservoir bank transformation − reservoir siltation

Network of supporting sites of the 1st category to control the features the large masses of formations and water within the whole territory of republic and factors (especially climatic and hydrologic and technogenic) dynamics as well as definition of basic types of DGP and their genetic complexes, trends and stages of their development, interconnections and correlation dependence to acting factors to predicting. Creation of system of new movable mechanised columns (MMC) to carry out engineering operations on DGP management.

One station and several (2–3) stationary posts to control the quantitative characteristics of DGP and their genetic complexes (volumes of formations and water; dimensions of phenomena and terrain mesa-forms; direction and rate of mass movement in space) within one engineering and geological region; 2–3 MMC with equipment and materials to carry out engineering measurements on DGP management

One stationary post to control the quantitative characteristics (volumes of formations or water; dimensions of phenomena and terrain micro forms; direction and rate of mass movement in space)

defining the activation of such or another DGP type or genetic association, is completed by zoning the territory on DGP regime (Fig. 5). The revealed temporal mechanism of a regime of quick changing factors should be considered jointly with the special features of taxons previously chosen (when zoning the territory under conditions of DGP development) and the result is the extrapolation of these mechanisms to specified term. The 1st category sites are characterised by the same geomorphological conditions and the same regime of basic quick changing factors (precipitation, temperature etc.) and expanded engineering and geological region or its part. Periods of abnormal factors displayed within the sites of this category come simultaneously. The 2nd category sites are within the sites of the 1st category and have special features of geological structure and expanded engineering and geological region, or its part the most affected by any geological process. The engineering base for spatial estimation of probability of DGP occurrence are the maps of exogeodynamic potential, and some another parameters. These maps are designed to a scale of 1:25,000 and 1:50,000. At artificial impact additional sites to research this impact on DGP development mechanism marked. The basic characteristics of the 2nd category sites are the quantity of forms or phenomena and their types, sizes, rates of development and interconnections between processes and process-forming factors. There is a specialised engineering map designed for each site, that shows the basic types and the largest forms of DGP as well as their quantitative characteristics (extensity and intensity).

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Figure 5. Scheme of allocation of recommended DGP monitoring network in Moldova.

The 3rd category sites are within the sites of the 2nd category and are used for monitoring separate genetic DGP types or their genetic complexes. For instance, for landslide process this is a separate landslide formed on a slope with adjoining parts of divided surface and floodplain, or it is a landslide developed on a ravine board which activation alternates with the process of ravine-forming. Engineering base for this category of sites is a map of scale 1:1000 and 1:5000 depending on the dimensions of phenomena formed by DGP of any kind. Stationary sites are equipped with special instruments and sensors to carry out regular instrumental and semi-instrumental observations of local activity of a defined process or process combination (ravine-forming and landslides, outwash, ravine-forming and cumulation, weathering). Methodology and instruments for regime observations are described in detail in the literature [1–4]. General kinds of control of DGP development are given in Table 2.

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Table 2. General aspects (regime observations) of DGP development Supporting sites category

Operation types, methods of obtaining the information

General information and return

Field works 1st category sites

Frequency of observations is once a year 1. Aerial photography and satellite imagery of the site 2. Visual observation from air in scale 1:50,000 3. Repeat aerial photography 4. On ground observations in scale 1:50,000

2nd category sites

Frequency of observations is 2 or 3 times a year (according to the number of hazardous seasons) 5. Specialised survey, scale 1:5000 and 1:10,000 6. On ground (repeated) route observations, scale 1:5000 and 1:10,000 7. Visual observations from air and aerial photography

3rd category sites

1. Space and aerial photography geological maps and schemes 2. General information on areas, character and DGP development trends 3. The same but in defined intervals of time 4. Field maps and schemes of conditions and factors of DGP development

5. Special maps on genetic types of DGP 6. Field maps and schemes of conditions, factors and dynamics of DGP 7. Aerial photography geological maps and schemes

Frequency of observations no less than once a month

8. Specialised survey in scale 1:500 and 1:2000 9. On ground (repeated) route observations in scale 1:500 and 1:2000 10. Topographical and geodesy operations 11. Theodolite survey (repeated) 12. Measurements in observation hydrogeological boreholes 13. Measurements in boreholes equipped for isotopic measurements, as well as for tensiometry and for directional survey and other special observations 14. Works on photographic grounds 15. Meterage of special devices, equipment and sensors 16. Efficiency measurements on DGP management control

8. Special maps on DGP complexes 9. Field maps and schemes of DGP development 10. Time series of DGP dynamic parameters 11. Synthetic maps of DGP dynamics 12. Tables and schedules of water table fluctuations 13. Tables and schedules of physical, mechanical and other properties

14. Maps and schemes of DGP dynamics 15. Schedules and metrage registration 16. Schedules, tables and schemes of DGP parameters variations

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Table 2. (Continued.) Office studies for all categories of sites 1st, 2nd and 3rd category sites

17. Working up and processing of time series of long-term and within-year DGP regime 18. Working up conclusions, expert and predictions assessment of national economy objects subjected to DGP influence as well as giving operative recommendations on protection of objects and geological environment 19. Working up of operative and precaution information about the possibility of DGP activation 20. Organisation and DGP database renewal 21. Working up DGP predictions

22. Generalisation of results on works in DGP monitoring system

17. Time series of DGP different parameters 18. Conclusions, predictions and recommendations

19. Information on DGP process development 20. PC database 21. Engineering and geological prediction maps of DGP dynamics, diagrams 22. Reports, summaries and data bulletins on DGP development and schemes of recommended measurements on DGP management and protection the objects and lands

Data obtained during DGP study must correspond to the following requirements: • • • •

To reflect quantitative well fixing indices of process activity with necessary accuracy and be the basis for time series of studying process. To be impressive for large areas, i.e. to characterise the process within the whole region. To give an idea of inter-annual spread of process activity with the aim of revealing dangerous seasons. To give objective characteristics of process development in time scale.

The basic way to define the regional and sub-regional regime is a complex of remote sensing techniques (space, aerial and photogrammetry) and field works giving the opportunity to characterise regional conformities of geological processes development. Local and elementary regime is studied as at repeated field observations with use of instrumental techniques of obtaining information by means of non-stop instrumental registration. Moldova has experience in carrying out this kind of work [3,4], and [6]. There is experience in the provision of stationary sites with equipment to measure pore pressure, formation strength and deep displacement in formation, as well as magnetic benchmarks and geophysical methods of study of structure, physical and mechanical properties and inner dynamics of landslides with analysis of efficiency [5]. The objectives of geological monitoring also include engineering control of engineering protection and its efficiency, whilst taking into account changes of geological environment [3].

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Dangerous Geological Processes Prediction Prediction of dangerous geological processes includes scientifically based prediction of their types, character and scale, as well as the place and time of their occurrence, as a result of the impact of natural (climatic and hydrologic) or artificial factors, and is one of the components of DGP monitoring. To date, methods of DGP prediction have started from the deterministic examination of their essence, which supposed the possibility of describing the process mathematically using the laws of mechanics, physics, chemistry or thermodynamics. The insufficient accuracy of the methods described is characterised by poor control procedures for taking into account the external factors of geological hazard development. Nevertheless such methods, if forming part of a complex with geological methods (comparative geological and method of natural analogues etc.) do allow for the possibility of quite satisfactory determination of the occurrence of some processes with a defined intensity, and the effect on any given surface area by these processes. Probabilistic and statistical (stochastic) methods, as an alternative to deterministic methods of DGP prediction, also have significant drawbacks. These methods demand the use of a series of observations of processes and their determining factors over the long-term in prediction models. The different degrees of certainty and fortuity of DGPs are not practically taken into account either in deterministic or in probabilistic and stochastic methods of process prediction, and this leads to their limited value. That is why in order to raise the degree of relevance and precision of prediction assessment of geological processes, and a proper risk evaluation for losses in the current field of natural sciences development, the inter-correction and joint use of the methods mentioned is recommended. Currently, Moldova is working on both regional and local predictions. The first is determined for the country as a whole and based upon probabilistic and stochastic models. The local predictions are given for the specific sites of engineering objects, and predictions are made on the basis of research results of natural analogues, physical models of equivalent materials and on quantitative calculations on deterministic mathematical models of typical DGP. DGP development is to be predicted in accordance to the following principles: • • • •

•

System: Interconnection and hierarchy of prediction process or DGP genetic complex and engineering and geological conditions and factors stipulating their development. Selectivity: Choice of essential parameters determining the development of any kind of DGP and not taking into account secondary features dependent on demands of engineering and geological prediction content. Interconnecting: Necessity of choosing and applying the rational complex of prediction methods to provide the solution to tasks on the basis of complimentary and trade off. Variance and permanency: Plurality of prediction variants corresponding to possible variants of changing engineering and geological conditions defining a similar or different kind of DGP, and permanent updating of predictions with regard to new data on predicted process development. Approximation and consistency: Successive approach to the most reliable prediction parameters as regards refinement of engineering and geological re-

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Table 3. Systematisation of DGP engineering and geological methods of prediction Prediction tasks

Particular methods of prediction

Long-term

Definition of engineering and geological conditions and possible ways of DGP development. Ascertain the character and directivity of DGP development.

Sub-regional and local

Long-term and short-term

Specification of DGP development spatial and temporal parameters their analysis and extrapolation for planning period.

Local

Long-term, short-term, current and operative

Assessment of expectant impact to engineering objects and influence of natural territorial complexes on DGP development Definition of time of DGP activation as well as spatial and kinematics parameters.

Group of methods of natural (geological) analogues: historical and geological; comparative and geological, comparative; natural analogues; zoning on DGP genetic complexes. Probabilistic and stochastic methods of analysis of the periods of activity. Forecasting cartography taking into account probabilistic DGP parameters. Group of methods of natural analogues as well as physical and mathematical modelling. Forecasting cartography on a large scale. Probabilistic and stochastic methods of defining periods of activity. Equivalent materials modelling and computer simulation.

Levels of DGP monitoring

Kinds of predictions Spatial

Temporal

Regional (national)

Regional

Sub-regional (district)

Local

•

search and coordination predictions of different term of action and different scale. Verification and efficiency: Validity, reliability and accuracy of predictions and the economical benefits deriving from their use, as set against the expense of obtaining and processing data [4].

Because of the lack of a unified method for prediction, the problem must be solved by the combined use of different prediction methods for different DGPs, accounting for different monitoring levels and specific stages of engineering and economic development of territory. A systematisation of engineering methods and geological prediction of DGP is given in Table 3. Theoretical, methodical and applied calculations and results achieved in the field with the application of different methods of DGP prediction are analyzed, systematised and generalised in the work of K.A. Gulakyan, V.V. Zuev, V.A. Osiyuk (1992) where conclusions and recommendations on perspective ways of solving this problem are also given.

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The workings, map models and other materials devoted to natural processes hazard and risk assessment have been frequently described during the last ten years [7,8].

Management of DGP Development Management of DGP development implies a complex of scientific, research, engineering and technical works directed to the regulation of activity or velocity of DGP behaviour with the aims of achieving optimal engineering and geological conditions within the defined terrains, enabling intensive, safe and the most economically efficient use of land to be attained. The management of the required technology represents a series of consistent operations that include the drawing up of a project-scheme of processes management as well as the choice and engineering grounds of methods, and the sequence of their spatial and temporal realisation and control during protective management measurements. Systems of measurements for the management of DGP development must meet the following requirements [6]: • • • •

Technical reliability: Security of admissible and specified parameters of extensity and intensity of DGP development for the whole period of economic land use. Economic expediency: Achievement of maximum economic effect. Manufacturability: Comparatively simple technology for carrying out works and availability of equipment and materials needed to achieve results in the short term. Generality: Solution not only of a single problem but of a complex of engineering problems connected with controlled DGP development within a given territory and applying to different kinds of economic use.

A complex of measures for management of DGP development must necessarily anticipate preventive measures or a system of active engineering measures, as well as ways of solving the problem of rational use of the territory and the refinement of land disturbed by natural phenomena or human impact. The management of defective slope formations must be carried out by means of different planning measures and the construction of supporting walls and counter embankments of improved design. For landslides it is possible to increase the stability of bodies by means of direct technical amelioration (baking, electro osmosis etc.) as well as by indirect methods, which include drainage, or the setting of concrete piles into boreholes [6]. Landslide prevention measures must be chosen which correspond to the genetic type and mechanism of landslide movement. Even negligible errors in reconnaissance, projecting and the collection of anti-landslide measurements can obstruct the achievement of the required results. This explains why, of 31 landslides in Chisinau where landslide prevention measures were undertaken, only some were successful. Measures for the management of development of debris flows and landslips of limited volume in the northern part of Moldova must include the construction of protective walls and trenches within the slopes and nearby roads, as well as the covering of intensively weathering formations and slopes with pneumatically applied concrete, regular replacement of unstable blocks from the slopes and the mounting of anchored metal racks.

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The principal applications for the regulation of slope outwash and ravine forming processes must include: • •

Artificial increase of erosion resistance to washing of sandy, clayey and loamy formations, applying agricultural methods and technical amelioration. Management of surface water rate, water flow and outwash energy, applying different engineering measures and constructions.

Much experience of erosion management applying up-to-date techniques and technological schemes, with the aim of protecting soil and valuable agricultural land has been accumulated in Moldova [1]. Erosion prevention measures are to be applied over the whole basin area and include land treatment and forest amelioration as well as the construction of simple hydraulic engineering constructions and terracing. For rational use of short-term underflooded and flooding areas, it is expedient to implement forest amelioration measures and hydraulic engineering (supporting constructions and sludge chambers) which are an important link in the optimisation of the water-management system balance of the region. In the south and south eastern districts it is necessary to implement different precautionary measures for the elimination of subsidence (preliminary wetting with further mechanical thickening, injecting of silicate or other solutions such as hydraulic protection of pipelines with polymeric films, special design of foundations etc.) at sites for residential constructions, in settlements, industrial projects and on elevated and terraced surfaces.

Ways of Perfecting DGP Monitoring Observations of DGP have been carried out in Moldova throughout the last decades by different institutions of the Academy of Sciences, the State Agency of Geology of Republic of Moldova (AgeoM) and other institutions. It is important to define clearly, and to determine in detail, their roles and responsibility in the realisation of monitoring programmes. The problem of coordination between ministries must be addressed, as well as clearly defining the legislative basis to coordinate the programmes and methodologies. The principal part in this must be given to the Centre for Complex Ecological Monitoring at the National Institute of Ecology of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. Institutions carrying out observations at a national level must direct their attention to the following tasks:    

Detection of long term trends. Assessment of national policy for prevention of DGP development. Coordination and management by local monitoring networks and use of the results of monitoring. Provision of data to all potential users, including scientists and media, regarding the results of local monitoring programmes.

DGP monitoring at a national scale must be financed from the national budget by those institutions which are responsible for monitoring in accordance with existing legislation. National budget should also finance research programmes on DGP monitoring

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to reveal the mechanism of the development of these processes and to work out effective preventive measures. The successful cooperation with Moldova of international organisations, such as IAEA, which assists in the technical implementation of DGP monitoring, is greatly appreciated. In the situation of a developing economy, it is extremely important to search for new ways of reducing the cost of DGP monitoring. This is possible by means of:    

Exchange of experience and techniques for development, management and functioning of a monitoring system. Revision and optimisation of the supporting observation network as well as sites of all categories and different departments. Coordination and specialisation of research work within the framework of DGP monitoring. Working out the GIS Geology, including the module Dangerous Geological Processes within the framework of the National Geographic Information System.

Some countries have created special, non-budget funds for environmental monitoring. It is necessary to create a similar fund for DGP monitoring, with regard to the experiences of these countries, where the finance for institutions involved in DGP monitoring can be collected. Concentration of these financial means, especially at a local level of monitoring, will enable the opportunity to organise an effective DGP development observation system and to work out corresponding predictions and devise preventive measures. Among the unsolved problems occurring within DGP monitoring it is important to mention that there is a lack of unified engineering and geological, hydro meteorological, software. The current economic circumstances in Moldova do not allow for assigning funding for research in the field of DGP monitoring. In particular, the scale of works carried out by different research institutions were reduced in this direction, and they are forced to mainly use remote sensing techniques and methods of modelling and extrapolation. The same reduction of works has affected EHGeoM, the unique specialised organisation which observes DGP, among its other tasks. In present economic conditions, where a critical lack of means prevails, the quick creation of a National DGP Monitoring System is unlikely. However, it is quite important to have clear idea of how such a system might operate, and to lay the foundations for the necessary normative and organisational aspects for the future, as well as to define the most appropriate methodological approaches and recommendations that will allow for the creation of such a system at minimal cost, with a view too upgrading it later, when the economic climate allows. References [1] Заславский М.Н. Эрозиоведение. Основы противоэрозионного земледелия. – М.: Высшая школа, 1987. – 375 с. [2] Золотарев Г.С. Методика инженерно-геологических исследований. – М.: Изд-во МГУ, 1990. – 384 с. [3] Круподеров В.С. Научно-методические основы изучения режима экзогенных геологических процессов. Дисс. в виде научн. докл. на соиск. уч. степени докт. геол.-мин. наук: 04.00.07/ ВСЕГИНГЕО. – Моск. обл., п. Зеленый, 2001. – 79 с.

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[4] Методика изучения и прогноза экзогенных геологических процессов/Под ред.А.И. Шеко, С.Е. Гречищева. – М.: Недра, 1988. – 21б с. [5] Методическое пособие по инженерно-геологическому изучению горных пород: В 2-х томах. Под ред. Е.М. Сергеева. – М.: Недра, 1984. – 438 с. [6] Осиюк В.А., Сударев А.П., Шеремет Е.Н.. Мониторинг опасных геологических процессов на территории Молдовы. Кишинев, 2006. – (Обзор. информ./ГАГ “AGeoM”). [7] Природные опасности России. Монография в 6 томах./Под ред. В.И. Осипова и С.К. Шойгу. – М.: Издательская фирма «КРУК», 2002–2003. [8] Рекомендации по оценке геологического риска на территории г. Москвы/Под редакцией д.г.-м.н. А.Л. Рагозина/Москомархитектура, ГУ ГО ЧС г. Москвы. М.: Изд-во ГУП НИАЦ, 2002. – 49 с.

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-226

Results of a performed course of pectin-prophylaxis in preschool children of an industrial city Eleonora M. BILETSKA, V.I. GLAVATSKA

Abstract: This manuscript is devoted to the study of regional peculiarities of lead prevalence in the environment of industrial regions of the city, in dynamics and the ascertainment of its complex impact on donosologic findings of the health of preschool children. In this work the dependence between changes in the health of children, living in an ecologically unfavourable region and the lead content in the environment and in the human system is investigated. It is determined that despite relatively low concentrations of lead in the objects of the environment, in the children’s bodies, this abiotic metal is determined in increased concentrations and negatively impacts on immunological, biochemical, psychophysiological data and micro element status of preschool children. This leads to decreased levels of the substances that have a protective action and limit absorption of lead. The necessity of performing individual bioprophylaxis in children subjected to lead impact is substantiated. The data proves the efficacy of using pectin food additives as a means of improving children’s health. Keywords: lead, environment, donosologic findings, health of preschool children, pectin prophylaxis.

Deterioration of the environment, especially in industrial regions, leads to an increase in xeno biotics entering the human system. This enhances the growth of ecologically dependent pathologies, complicates the course of various diseases and causes changes in non-specific resistance. The prolonged action of small doses of these substances causes the development of a non-specific syndrome of functional disadaptation in the population. Among the heavy metal (HM) pollutants of the environment, the most prevalent, lead, occupies a special place. This toxicant belongs to a group of highly cumulative substances with polytropic actions. It is listed as a priority contaminant substance by a number of international organisations, including the WHO and UNEPT [8, 10, 20]. In many countries such as the USA, Russia, Germany, Australia and Mexico, there are extensive national programmes aimed at decreasing contamination of the environment with lead and limiting its negative impact on the health of the population [8, 18, 33, 42]. In recent years this xenobiotic became the most prevalent of the group of HMs in life supporting environmental milieus of the Ukrainian region, including the city of Dnipropetrovsk. Significantly, a worsening level of children’s health has provided evidence of chemical loading of the environment in this process. Children of preschool age, living in ecologically unfavourable conditions, constitute a risk group for the failure of hemostatic mechanisms of adaptation. Even in small doses, lead causes an unfavourable impact on children’s health, resulting in disorders of mental, physical and

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psychophysiologic development, a decrease of the intensity of heme synthesis and development of anaemias, a rise in the hearing perception threshold and a decrease of vitamin D in the blood (Xintas C., 1999; Снакин В.В.,1999; Розанов В.А.,1999). That is why urgent active preventive measures are necessary to increase adaptation reserves, alongside implementation of effective rehabilitative measures to forestall ecologically dependent pathology and improve the health of children in the population. Doubtless giving priority to technical and sanitary hygienic measures aimed at decreasing external exposure of the population to HMs, specialists more often pay attention to means of individual bioprophylaxis [22, 51]. It is valid to present the results of the implementation of the national programmes “Health for All” which have been realised in the developed countries of Europe and in the USA and Canada in recent years as an argument in favour of optimisation of the population’s nutrition. Strong evidence exists of a decrease in morbidity and mortality due to cardio vascular diseases of 30-50% which has been reached 38 % by nutrient budget correction and 48% by sanitisation of the environment, and only by 3% and 11% at the expense of surgical and therapeutic aid respectively. Research institutions have worked out a wide spectrum of various sorbents for the ecologic defense of human beings, which allow for the successful solving of problems such as prophylaxis for the accumulation and accelerated removal of radionucleides, HMs and pesticides from the system and simultaneous normalisation of the metabolism. There is a wide usage of additives, together with food, which are obtained by means of chemical modification of natural minerals, clay, nutrient fibres and other raw vegetable products by selective ion exchange substances, which have better eliminating properties with regard to toxic HMs and radionucleides [43, 46, 47, 48]. But we are still searching for methods and means which will impede the intake of HMs, including lead, into the human system; the ones that will enhance its excretion. Enterosorption has been developing fast over the last few years as a trend in detoxification pharmacology (Беляков Н.А.,1991). A sorptive agent, entering the gastro intestinal tract, absorbs toxic substances, and by this means it becomes possible to correct the lead level in the blood (Захараш М.П. и др.,1988). But non-specificity of absorption is a weakness of this method, because it tends also to remove essential elements and vitamins from the system, which may impact unfavourably on the state of a growing child. In modern practice various enterosorbents are widely used, natural and synthetic, for example, complex-forming compounds of vegetable origin, pectin preparations, artichoke tea and absorbent carbon. Among them, in particular preparations based on pectin have a wide spectrum of therapeutic and prophylaxis effects [45, 51]. Pectins are the natural basis of the cellular membrane of higher plants, and in their chemical structure they present methyl ethers of polygalacturonic acids. Pectin molecules consists of chains of galacturonic acids and hydrides combined with glycosid, lightly-hydrolyzing connections. Pectins form insoluble compounds with metal salts – metal pectinates – which are not absorbed in the intestine, this is due to the presence in the molecules of polymerapectin carboxyl and hydrocarboxyl groups of galacturonic acid. Chelatic activity depends on the stage of pectin etherification: the more free groups, the more easily metal chelates are formed. As the research results performed by М. Макаров и др. show [16] the most favourable impact on chelate formation (maximal removal of lead in urine and faeces) is achieved at the stage of etherification of 50% to 60%. Physical features of pectins are manifested as hydrophilic colloid, which has a big absorptive capacity. Low etherificated pectin forms metal pectinates, including those of

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lead, and highly etherificative pectin, enveloping the intestinal wall and, due to the mechanism of gel-filtration, promotes reabsorption of small molecules, such as HMs and radionucleides. So, pectins will bind HMs which enter the gastro intestinal tract from outside and prevent secondary reabsorption by them combining with bile, removing them with faeces [1]. Pectins are fully broken down by the microflora of a large intestine and play an important regulatory role in the system. Sources of pectins are: products of apples, citrus fruits and sugar beet processing. As a component of plants, pectins have always been a part of human nutrition. They are well tolerated and have no contraindications [1, 17]. Pectin preparations are successfully used as a therapeutic agent in different forms of intestinal diseases [41], and as natural hypocholesterenemic agents [45]. A number of authors note a positive impact of pectins on the glycose level in the blood and an increase of the system’s sensitivity to insulin [18, 51, 55]. Use of pectin preparations is connected with the ability to accelerate blood coagulation in vivo, this explains their use in the first half of the 20 th century in France and, Germany as a coagulent (1,5 and 5% solutions). A high efficacy of apple pectin in the treatment of various skin lesions (postradial epidermites, burns, traumas, trophic disorders, etc.) has been proved [1]. So, pectins as an evolutionary component of human nutrition, are an irreplaceable regulator of intenstinal peristasis, lipid and carbohydrate exchange; detoxicant, they have a repairing effect for skin and they are a blood-stopping agent. The first experimental evidence of mechanisms of lead elimination under the impact of pectins were obtained in 1960 [1]. Evidence exists of pectin-containing preparations having a number of essential experimental and clinical advantages as compared to such nutritional additives as licoric (product of liquorice) and Multi-Green (product of chlorella, spirulina, oats, lucerne), methylcellulose, cellulose of maize, modyfilan (preparation from seaweeds) and many others. (The number available in the Ukrainian market is over 200) [7]. Despite the great number of advantages of pectin preparations (their natural origin, mild action, versatility) the data on their use in practice and assessment of their efficacy in the population are rather limited. In Russia, Б.А. Кацнельсон (1999) fundamentally investigated means of individual prophylaxis of intoxications with toxic metals of occupational and ecological origin. A concept of bioprophylaxis as a complex of methods directed at increase of individual and/or population resistance to HMs was worked out, and pilot evidence of pectin efficacy in children with an increased lead content in the blood was gained [111]. In the Ukraine, significantly more observations of the prophylactic use of pectin preparations in clinical practice and in experiment have been gathered. Priority of this direction belongs to the Institute of Occupational Medicine in which, under the supervision of Academician I. M. Trakhtenberg, fundamental investigations on the study of mechanisms of HM action on the system have been carried out, aimed at searching for and developing a new effective means of prophylaxis and treatment [25, 36]. The highly protective properties of pectin medetopect used in pregnant workers, were revealed [7, 16, 25, 41]. Further developments from investigations of pectin derivate pectodent were gained in the work of Г.М. Гаврилив, 2000 [7]. An effect of the improvement of microelemental homeostasis in the system by means of removal, activation and resumption prevention of lead excesses by 20-69% was established. From analysis of a considerable body of scientific publications, devoted to the various therapeutic properties of pectin preparations, and active elaborations of the new compositions of these substances, it should be underlined, that experience of their

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actual use as a prophylactic agent in the populations of technogenically polluted territories, such as are found in the Ukraine, especially in children, the most sensitive members of those populations, is unfortunately practically absent. That is why, our purpose was the elaboration, physiologic hygienic assessment and introduction of prophylactic means for the increase of adaptive possibilities of children’s system, subjected to technogenic pressure. Material and Methods. The investigations were performed among a group of children from two industrial districts of Dnipropetrovsk (272 children). Selection of children was performed according to the requirements of analytical epidemiology by the principle of homogenity:  unitary district and length of residence (not less than 3-6 years)  age – 5-6 years  absence of occupational hazards and harmful habits in parents  average material security of the family  absence of chronic disease (1-2 health group). Along with this, written agreement of parents was obtained on pursuance of children’s examination, which corresponds to existing ethical and legal principles for comparable investigations involving children. Of great importance for the assessment of HM impact on a child’s system is the establishment of the level of indicator elements contained in biological environments. As for lead, one of the best indicators of the dose received is the level of this metal in the blood. Lead level in the urine is also a sensitive and informative index, because the greatest amount of it (nearly 70%) is removed from the system by the kidneys. Lead content in another biological environment, the hair, is of interest too, as on the one hand, hair actively accumulates HM, and on the other hand, it performs an eliminative function. Disorders of heme biosynthesis with toxic doses of lead causes an accumulation in blood and bone marrow of intermediate products of its metabolism, principally – δ-ALA and its removal in the urine even if the evident signs of toxicosis are absent. This allows the determinative use of this index as a sensitive and informative diagnostic test in cases of lead poisoning, to solve questions of prevention. That is why we performed biomonitoring of Pb, Cu and Zn content in indicator biosubstrates: blood, urine and hair of the preschool children before and after the course of pectin prophylaxis, using atomic absorption spectrophotometry on AAS-1N in a propane/butane/air mixture according to procedures [1]. Efficacy assessment of pectin-prophylaxis was performed by comparison of results of HM content in biosubstrates in respect to exit data, with corresponding statistical processing. For obvious ethical reasons a control group of children who did not undergo a course of pectin prophylaxis was absent. The purpose of investigating psychophysiologic state was to study the unfavourable impact of lead on psychological health of preschool age children and the possibility of its correction by use of preventive means. Psychophysiologic testing was performed in the morning and in the afternoon individually in special premises. Two examinations were performed : before and after pectin-prophylaxis. Peculiarities of thinking (Raven’s test, combinatorics, comparison by form), attention (correcturn test, “Confused lines”), peculiarities of memory (“Verbal memory”), level of general informativity (“Talk”), level of ability to work, level of endurance (tapping-test), level of speech development. It is known that psychologists distinguish many components:

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readiness to study at school, physical development, motivation to study, readiness to receive new social position and development of intellectual and volitional spheres [11, 13,14, 19]. In our testing we used tests which help to assess two components, namely the level of development of intellectual abilities (attention, thinking, hearing and visual memory), and arbitrary regulation of activity (ability to subject own actions to the task set), strength and endurance of the nervous system. A three component pectin containing biological additive was chosen – pectin dragec, containing sugar beet, apple and pumpkin pectins, produced by the company Sum of Technologies, (Kiev, TUU 15.8-16475490.001-2001; conclusion of state sanitary-hygiene expertise from 07.09.2001№ 5.10/134). The scheme of PP was the following: children used pectin dragec 1 at breakfast, 2 at lunch, 1 in the afternoon after a meal, taken with 0.5 of a glass of boiled water. The term of PP was 28 days. Statistical processing and analysis of the results was performed by generally accepted procedures [2]. Results and Discussion. Results of our researches over a 15-year period testify to a constant presence of lead in the objects of the environment of the districts, observed in concentrations not exceeding existing hygienic norms, but higher than background levels for non-polluted territories [3, 4, 29]. Analysis of this xenobiotic dynamics in different life sustaining environments points to its disputable dependence, namely: gradual increase of metal content in water, water sources and food products, especially of animal origin, but a decrease of it in the atmospheric air. In time dynamics a significant decrease is observed of such micro element content as copper and zinc in food products of a locality. So, in terms of investigation, a two fold unfavourable coincidence of results occurs: the children of Dnipropetrovsk get a sharply decreased amount of a microelement important for their development, such as zinc, in a background of an increased loading of their system with lead. Summary daily intake (SDE) of lead into the system of children in industrial regions consists of 0.08 and 0.09 mg/daily, this in the first district does not exceed ADE, but in the other it exceeds it by 12.5% and in the maximum, by nearly 2 times for this group. The data obtained do not exceed those in the literature, which testify that the amount of lead intake into the systems of children of the Lvov region is 0.143 mg/daily [12], Donetsk: 0.06-0.09 mg/daily [34], western regions of Ukraine: 0.15-0.28 mg/daily, central: 0.128-0.64 mg/daily [34], Russia: 0.14-0.64 mg/daily [6], Poland: 0.11 mg/daily [54] SDE of this metal does not exceed the one recommended by FAO/WHO, but in maximal content it is 1.8 times higher. The ways of intake are different. The highest is with food and comprises 98.8% and 93.8%. Lead is not present in the drinking water in significant quantities. Alongside this, the amount of lead which enters in air comprises only 0.025%. Children of the control district receive daily 0.05 mg of lead on average, this does not exceed ADE and is lower by 22.2% than the SDE of this metal for preschool children of industrial districts. SDE of copper intake for children of industrial and control districts corresponds practically by average values to the physiological requirement (1.3-1.6 mg/daily), but zinc intake, at -1.5 mg/daily, is lower than necessary for a healthy child (in industrial district by 5 times). Insufficient zinc in a child’s system may have the consequence of a zinc deficiency occurring, disturbing the growth and development of the child, decreasing immunity and lowering defences under the impact of contaminants of the surrounding environment.

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The data from the biomonitoring which we performed confirmed the suggestion of the more substantial technogenic loading of the children’s systems in conditions of industrial districts of the city. Analysing the results, an increased content of lead in the biosubstrates of examined children of industrial districts was noted, it is higher than normal values and the values of the control district. These data confirm systemic intake of lead from different objects of the environment. So, average content of lead in the blood of the children examined in the first industrial district was by 1.6 times, and of the second, by 5 times higher than normal (p<0.001), this is, probably, caused by the peculiarity of a commercial pollutant, located in the district. In the blood of children of a control district lead was detected in average amounts, this corresponds to a limit of physiological fluctuation and background levels in children of non polluted areas. 70%-100% of the children examined in industrial districts have lead concentration in the blood at a level, which causes disorders of intellectual development (assessment scales, Agency on morbidity control, USA, adopted by WHO). These children are a risk group for the development of chronic lead intoxication. And 20% of children of the first district had a level of lead in the blood 710mkg/daily, i.e. they belong to a group of potential risk. Average content of copper in the blood was at the level of that in children of all districts under supervision. The level of zinc was lower than normal by 7-49% (p<0.001), this may cause development of zinc-deficiency in the children. As for the Cu : Zn ratio, it does not correspond to the norm and testifies to the presence of an imbalance of microelements in the children examined. Analysis of results of lead content in urine of the children examined in both the industrial and control districts showed that it is detected in concentrations which are higher than physiologic [113,160] by 6.4-11.2-12.8 times (p<0.001) accordingly and this may be considered as metal carrier or the initial stages of intoxication. These data are characteristic for 33-66% of pre school children of industrial districts and 12% of the control. The fact that lead content in the urine of children of conditionally clean districts also exceeds the norm, may be evidence of a long term intake of small concentrations of this xenobiotic from the objects of the environment, and confirms the proposition that automobile transport is more and more significant in etiology of lead intoxication. As for copper and zinc, their average concentrations in children of different districts are on the level which exceeds limit of physiologic fluctuations, this confirms the assumption about antagonistic interactions of these microelements with lead. Hair of the preschool children examined contained lead in concentrations which were 2-3.5 times higher than in the children of the control district, but at the limiting level of 8-9 mkg/g as recommended by I.M. Trakhtenberg and B.A. Revych. It should be underlined, that in 73-78% of the children from the industrial districts, the lead content in hair was higher than the norms mentioned. Average zinc content in the hair of children from the second industrial district was at 80% of physiologic value, in the hair of children from the first district, the concentration of zinc was even lower and comprised only 40% of the normal value. Copper content in the first district conforms to norm, in the second it was at 48% of the norm. This deficit of microelements is probably connected with a deficit in the children’s nutrition, which is unbalanced, with a restricted amount of vitamin A and metabolic disorders in the system, this is caused by biologic antagonism of these elements with lead.

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Increase of lead concentrations in biosubstrates of the children examined was regularly accompanied by an increase of δ-aminolevulenic acid (δ-ALA) in urine. Its level was higher than the norm recommended (1.6 mg/g of creatinine) for the children of industrial districts by 1.2 and 1.9 times [9, 15, 37]. It should be underlined, that an increase of δ-ALA concentrations was detected in 51% of the children examined in the first industrial district and 89% of the second group, and this testifies to porphyrin exchange tension in their systems due to lead impact. For children of the control district this value was reliably lower. δ-ALA level in urine of these children did not exceed the norm in all children examined. Examining these biomonitoring results one can draw a conclusion: despite a relatively low external concentration of HM in the objects of the environment, abiotic metal, such as lead, was detected in increased concentrations. This may be explained by its long term and constant intake with air, water and food into the children’s system. In children living in industrial districts of the city, there was detected an excess of normative values in blood by 60-100%, in urine by 33-66%, in hair by 73,1-78,6%, in teeth in 100% of the examined children. A statistically plausible (p<0.001) excess of lead content was detected in biosubstrates of children from the industrial districts as compared to those of the control district. That lead was detected both in children living in technogenically loaded districts and in conditionally clean ones is further evidence of the global prevalence of lead in life sustaining environments, and this underlines the potential danger of even small concentrations of this element in the environment. Despite relatively low external concentrations of lead in the objects of the environment, in a complex impact, i.e. SDE of this abiotic metal in a child’s system, its internal content exceeds allowable levels, this is confirmed by the presence of increased concentration in biosubstrates. Mathematical processing of the data obtained proved the existence of a qualitative interconnection of concentrations with its content in biosubstrates, this allowed us to define thresholds of lead content in the air, where their internal exposures may be beyond the limits of normatives. So threshold concentrations for the air are defined at the level: 0.012 mkg/m3 – optimal, 0.023 mkg/m3 – maximal; for a SDE – 0.02-0.03 mg/daily – optimal values; 0.04-0.06 mg/daily – maximal ones; with daily nutrition budget – 0.02 mg/daily as optimal and 0.04 mg/daily as maximal. Psychophysiologic investigation determined a weak type of nervous system, low level of ability to learn, disorders of logic succession and task fulfilling, badly developed visual memory in 34-45% of the children from the industrial districts. Only 36.7% of children from the industrially polluted districts had well developed abilities to work and to analyse subjects by form, size and colour. 89% of children from the control district had moderate and strong type of nervous system, 70% had developed thinking, ability to learn and visual memory. On the basis of the results obtained using correlation regressive analysis it was proved that the accumulation of lead in a child’s system impacts the functional state of CNS; this is reflected in their mental ability to work and ability to study. These data coincide with the conclusions of other scientists and WHO experts [24, 27, 28, 35, 50, 52] about the decrease of mental development of children under lead impact, even with a small intake. So, increased loading with lead of the system of preschool children, living in an industrial city, as compared to a control group, is accompanied not only by a reliably higher incidence of disorders of psychophysiologic indices, but it is correlatively connected with a content of this toxicant in the air, food products and its summary daily intake. Assessment of detected qualitative associations of external and

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internal loading with the metal in children together with other facts, confirms the conclusions about the negative impact of lead on children’s health in conditions of technogenic pollution. Results from the first stage of examination of children from industrial districts allowed us to ground metal correction performed in preschool children, subject to a complex lead impact. So, data from hygienic investigations on contamination of the environment, its summary daily intake in connection with revealed disorders of porphyrin exchange, increased content changes of physiologic status in children from the industrial districts as compared to control examined, illustrated the advisability and necessity of PP performance for rehabilitation of ecologically dependent states, increase of resistance and adaptation possibilities of the child’s system. The results obtained testify that a course of PP carried out in preschool children positively impacted on the HM content in indicator environments and the porphyrin exchange of children examined. The results obtained and their statistical processing and analysis (table 1) testify that usage of pectin dragec by the children from industrial districts led to a statistically plausible (p<0.01) decrease of lead concentration in blood from 15.61±3.64 mkg/dl to 10.6±2.93 mkg/dl, i.e. by 5.01 mkg/dl. Before PP, the lead content in the blood exceeded normal values in 70% of the preschoolers examined, after PP, in only 40%. It should be noted that PP also impacted on concentrations of essential microelements in the blood of the children examined: copper content increased by 4.2 mkg/dl from 60.00±12.72 mkg/dl to 64.20±12.12 mkg/dl, that of zinc by 8.66 mkg/dl from 108.20±13.53 mkg/dl to 116.83±8.45 mkg/dl. It is not proved statistically, but microelement content improved in 10% of children for copper and in 20% for zinc. The natural antagonism of lead and zinc is well known, and one may assume, that by binding lead in the large intestine, pectin favours zinc reabsorption. Considering the constant zinc deficit in the nutrition budget of the children examined [3, 5, 29], this effect should be assessed as positive. Table 1. Results of HM biomonitoring in the blood of children before and after PP

Before pectin prophylaxis

After pectin

Lead

15.60±3.64

10.60±2.93*

70/40

Copper

60.00±12.72

64.20±12.12

60/50

Zinc

108.17±13.53

116.30±8.45

30/10

Concentration of HM, mkg/dl

N1/N2

Normative content

prophylaxis

10,0 60-100 70-150

Note. N1/N2 – number of people with increase (lack) of allowable level of HM before and after pectinprophylaxis (%). *- p< 0.05.

Average concentration of lead in urine (table 2), vice versa, increased in the children of both districts. Enhancement of lead excretion is regular a result of its compounds entry from deputing tissues and may be considered a result of PP.

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Table 2. Results of HM biomonitoring in urine of children before and after PP Group of children selected for pectin prophylaxis

Concentration of HM, mkg/ml Lead

Before pectin Prophylaxis

Copper

Zinc

Industrial №1

0.28±0.05

0.03±0.004

0.54±0.04

Industrial №2

0.23±0.04

0.040±0.012

0.43±0.06

0.26±0.04

0.040±0.006

0.490±0.03

Industrial №1

0.30±0.03

0.030±0.003

0.50 ±0.04

Industrial №2

0.30±0.03*

0.04±0.01

0.43±0.05

0.30±0.02

0.040±0.005

0.470±0.03

78/100

18/11

Total

After pectin prophylaxis

Total N1/N2 Normative content

0.001-0.025

0.026±0.028

44/38 0.450±0.066

Note. N1/N2 – number of people with increase (lack) of allowable level of HM before and after pectinprophylaxis (%). *- p< 0.05.

Average level of lead in urine of children examined before PP was 0.26±0.04 mkg/ml, i.e. increased by 1.15 times. This finding increased in 36.3% of children examined. Statistic authenticity of this finding was confirmed only in children from the second industrial district (p<0.001). It should be underlined, that in our investigations, PP did not impact on concentrations of copper and zinc in urine, this is also considered as a positive result of pectins use as the majority of sorbents have this side effect [1, 32, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 55]. Concentration of copper in urine before PP = 0.040 ±0.006 mkg/ml, after = 0.040±0.005, that of zinc: 0.490±0.033 mkg/dl and 0.470±0.032 mkg/ml respectively. Tendency to decrease of lead concentration in the blood, enhancement of its elimination through the kidneys occurred on the background of porphyrin exchange tension, there with activity of δ-ALA is its biochemical marker (table 3). So, if before rehabilitative and preventive measures an average concentration of δALA in urine of children examined was 2.74±0.13 mg/g of creatinine (higher than the norm by 1.7 times), after the course of prophylaxis this value decreased to 1.820±0.104 mg/g of creatinine (p< 0.01), this testifies that before performed PP an increased content of δ-ALA in urine of children examined was denoted in all, 94.6%, and after PP in only 54.7%. This finding normalised in almost 40% of them.

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Table 3. Concentration of δ-ALA in urine of children before and after PP Concentrations of δ-ALA in urine mg/g creatinine

N1/N2

before PP

after PP

Industrial №1

2.23±0.12

3.19±0.18

Industrial №2

1.40±0.13***

2.25±0.13***

2.74±0.13

1.82±0.104***

Total

Normative content

Note. N1/N2 - number of children with excess of allowable level of HM before and after PP (%); *** p< 0.001.

To study the impact of PP on the chemical composition of hair, repeated selection of it was made on the same areas of the children’s heads. Analysis of the data obtained (table 4) testifies that average lead concentration after PP course decreased from 8.5±0.78 mkg/g to 5.83± 0.57 mkg/g, this was confirmed statistically (p< 0.001). Lead content over limiting level before PP was in 46% of children, after in 33%. Dynamics of content of metals of essential significance has a definite regularity, namely: copper content increased from 4.58±0.58 mkg/g to 5.41±0.86 mkg/g per 0.83 mkg/g, that of zinc – from 78.48±5.37 mkg/g to 92.32±6.49 mkg/g (p< 0.001) by 1.2 times. Table 4. Results of HM biomonitoring in hair of children before and after PP Group of children selected for pectin prophylaxis

Before pectin prophylaxis

Concentration of HM, mkg/mg Lead

Copper

Industrial №1

8.04±0.99

7.33±0.93

50.20±4.41

Industrial №2

8.87±1.13

2.56±0.48

99.93±6.43

8.52±0.78

4.58±0.58

78.48±5.37

Industrial №1

7.94±0.64

8.67±1.67

52.00±4.33

Industrial №2

4.59±0.79

3.17±0.59

122.20±97. 15

5.83±0.57***

5.41±0.86

92.32±6.49

46/33

76.5/48.8

84.6/34.6

6.96±0.66

130.38±9.50

Total

After pectin prophylaxis

Zinc

Total N1/N2 Normative content

4.33±0.80

Note. N1/N2 – number of people with increase (lack) of allowable level of HM before and after pectinprophylaxis (%). *- p< 0.001.

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Before PP zinc content in the hair was lower than the level of 125 mkg/g in 85% of the children examined. This is considered to be the lowest level, below which zinc deficiency is indicated. After PP, average zinc concentration did not reach the norm in only 35% of the children examined. This may be regarded as a process of normalisation of microelement exchange under the impact of PP. Comparing the results and conclusions of various scientists [132, 135, 179], in our investigations there were no manifestations of antagonism between copper and zinc. Maybe this is connected either with insufficient volume of selected data or with very complicated and not yet defined mechanism of toxico kinetics of these metals under the impact of lead in the human system. So, after the performed course of PP, average concentration of lead in the blood of preschool children decreased by 32% i.e. in 30% of the examined. Concentration of copper and zinc in the blood increased by 7-8% in decreased excretion with urine. In parallel with this, there was an observed decrease of δ-ALA level in urine by 66.4% in 40% of children. Performed psychophysiologic testing of children allowed us to reveal definite changes in the findings before and after the PP course (fig 1). So, in the course of background examination of children from the industrial district it was determined that every second child in intensive psychoemotional loadings has a tendency to tire quickly (45%). Before PP in 88.2% of children there was revealed high and moderate level of memory development, in 86.3%, the same level of hearing memory, 84% of children showed a high and moderate level of perception of forms of objects, in 94.1% sufficient development of general erudition, in every second child (55%) low level of attention concentration. Besides, in 39.2% of children there was determined a low level of operative processing of new information, this testifies to an insufficient development of operative memory, thinking and attention.

Figure 1. Dynamics of psychophysiologic findings before and after PP

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237

After the course of PP it was determined that findings of ability to work and endurance increased in 89% of children examined (p<0.001). As far as peculiarities of thinking connected with the processing of new information is concerned, after usage of pectin preparations this finding improved almost twice. If before pectins usage a sufficiently high level of non verbal intellect was revealed in every third child, after the course of PP 64.4% of children showed good results. After the course of PP, the index of attention concentration increased in 43.8% of children (p<0.001), and in 56.2% it decreased, this may be explained by the individual peculiarities of development of children, when level of attention concentration may be unstable and depend on different psychic processes and individual peculiarities of a child. So, after PP. in 91% of children examined the findings of psychophysiologic testing increased, this points to a great efficacy of pectin preparations. Summary. The data presented, which were obtained after the course of performed PP in preschool children, testify to the efficacy of the proposed agent used. Its usage decreases reabsorption of toxic lead, enhances its renal elimination from the system on the background of microelemental exchange. Taking into account the absence of contraindications, a systemic pectin prophylaxis is recommended for the children of industrially polluted territories. PP has an ability to biologically bind HMs in the system and accelerate their elimination, this favours the increase of adaptation compensatory reserves of a system, acceleration of rehabilitation and an improvement in children’s health.

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23. Перечень приоритетных показателей для выявления изменений состояния здоровья детского населения при вредном воздействии ряда химических факторов среды обитания: Метод. рекомендации. – М., 2000. 24. Попов О.И. О влиянии окружающей среды на состояние здоровья и развитие детей дошкольного возраста // Довкілля та здоров’я. – 1998. – № 2 (5). – С. 22-23. 25. Профилактическое применение пектина при хроническом воздействии свинца на производстве / И.М. Трахтенберг, В.П. Луковенко, Т.К. Короленко и др. // На допомогу практичному лікареві: – К.: Б.В., 1995. – С. 132-135. 26. Ревич Б.А. Биомониторинг токсичных веществ в организме человека // Гигиена и санитария. – 2004. – №6. – С. 26-31. 27. Розанов В.А. Насущные проблемы нейротоксического влияния свинца на детей (международный опыт контроля и предупреждения неблагоприятного воздействия) / Метеорология, климатология и гидрология. – 1999. – №37. – С. 6-14. 28. Розанов В.А. Нейротоксичность свинца в детском возрасте: эпидемиологические, клиничекие и нейрохимические аспекты // Укр. мед. часопис. – 2000. – Т.IX/X, №5. – С. 9-17. 29. Рублевська Н.І. Сумарне добове надходження важких металів до дитячого організму в умовах промислового міста // Медичні перспективи. – 1997. – №2. – С. 93-95. 30. Руководство по контролю загрязнения атмосферы: РД 52.04.186–89.– М.: Госкомгидромет СССР., 1991. – 693 с. 31. Сает Ю.Е. Антропогенные геохимические аномалии свинца // Свинец в окружающей среде.– М.: Наука, 1987.– С. 92-94. 32. Скальный А.В. Микроэлементозы человека, диагностика, лечение. – М.: Издательство КМК, 1999. – 96 с. 33. Снакин В.В. Загрязнение биосферы свинцом: масштабы и перспективы 34. для России / Медицина труда и пром. экология. – 1999. – №5. – С. 21-27. 35. Степанова М.Г. Гігієнічна оцінка забруднення навколишнього середовища важкими металами та його впливу на здоров’я населення Донецької області: Автореф. дис. ... канд. мед. наук / Укр. наук. гігієн. центр. – Київ., 2004. – 19 с. 36. Трахтенберг И.М., Колесников С.В., Луковенко В.П. Тяжёлые металлы во внешней среде, современные гигиенические токсикологические аспекты.– Минск: Навука и тэхніка, 1994. – 285 с. 37. Трахтенберг И.М., Демченко П.И., Козлов К.П. Применение пектинсодержащих энтеросорбентов в целях профилактики нарушения здоровья при сочетанном действии тяжёлых металлов, пестицидов и радиации: Информац. письмо Министерства по делам науки и технологий №4-97. – К., 1997. – 2 с. 38. Трахтенберг И.М. Тяжёлые металлы как химические загрязнители производственной и окружающей среды (эколого-гигиенические аспекты) // Довкілля та здоров’я. – 1997.– №2. – С. 48-51. 39. Штабский Б.М. О ПДК свинца и проблеме малых доз в токсикологии ксенобиотиков (к проблеме «романтиков» и «рационалистов») // Токсикологический вестник. – 1998. – №2. – С. 23-31.

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40. Штабський Б.М., Федоренко В.І. Обмін свинцю і завдання профілактичної та клінічної медицини // Експериментальна та клінічна фізіологія і біохімія. – 2000. – №2. – С. 109-111. 41. Экспериментальное обоснование допустимых суточных доз свинца и кадмия при поступлении в организм с пищей / Б.М. Штабский, В.И. Федоренко, В.А. Самойлюк и др. // Охрана окружающей среды и здоровье населения – Матер. конф. Тарту. – 1990. – С. 127-130. 42. Эффективность яблочного пектина медетопекта для профилактики инкорпорации свинца в организме рабочих / В.А. Остапенко, А.И. Тепляков, А.С. Прокопович, Т.И. Чегерова // Медицина труда и промышленная экология. – 2001. – №5. – С.44-47. 43. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). The nature and extend of lead poisoning in children in the Undated States // A report to Congress. – July, 1988. 44. Aposhian H.V., Aposhian M.M. Meso-2,3-dimercaptosuccinic acid; pharmacological and toxicological properties of an orally effective chelating agent // Annual Review Pharmacology Toxicology – 1990. – №30. – Р. 279306. 45. Blood lead tooth relationship among Boston children / B.Michael, A.Leviton, D.Bellingez // Bull. Environment and Toxicology. – 1989. – 43, №4. – Р. 485492. 46. Circulation / J.J Cerda, S.J. Norman, M.S. Sullivan et al. // 1994. – V. 89, № 3. – Р. 1247 – 1253. 47. Controlled study of meso-2,3-dimercaptosuccinic acid for the management of childhood lead intoxication / J.C. Graciano, N.L. LoIacono, T. Moulton et al. // Journal Pediatrics. – 1992, №120. – Р. 133-139. 48. Dubrowska-Bouta B., Struczynska L., Rafalowska U. Effect of acute and chronic lead exposure on the level of sulfhydryl groups in the brain // Acta Neurobiology Exp. (Warsz). – 1996, № 56 (1). – Р. 233-236. 49. Edelson S.B. Chelation therapy // Environmental and Preventive Health Center of Atlanta. – 1999. – www. ephca.com. 50. Effects of calcium disodium versenate (CaNa2EDTA) chelation in moderate childhood lead poisoning / M.E. Markowitz, P.E. Bijur, H. Ruff et al. // Pediatrics. – 1992. – №99 ( 2). – Р. 265-270. 51. Indepedent effects of lead exposure and iron deficiency on developmental outcome at age two / G. Wasserman, J.H. Graziano, P. Factor-Litvak et al. // Journal Pediatrics. – 1992. – №121. – Р. 695-703. 52. Jrudeva – Ponova J., Sirakova J. Effect of pectin on some electrolytes and trace elements in patients with hyperlipoproteinemia // Folia Med. – 1998. – V. 1. – Р. 41-45. 53. Low level lead exposure in the prenatal and early preschool periods: Early preschool development / C.B. Ernhart, M. Morrow-Tluchak, M.R. Marler et al. // Neurotoxicology Teratology. – 1987. – № 9. – Р. 259-270. 54. Rosen J. F., Markowitz M.E. Trends in the management of childhood lead poisoning // Journal Neurotoxicololy. – 1993. – №14 (2-3). – Р. 211-217. 55. Stoltenburg-Didinger G. Morphological and physiological changes in hyppocampus of chronically lead-exposed rats // In.: 4th European Meeting

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Neuropathologysts, Berlin, July 14-18, Journal Clin. Neuropathology. – 1992. – №11 (4). – Р. 175-175. 56. The Lancet / D.J.A. Genkins, T. D.R. Hockaday, R. Howarh et al. // Neurotoxicology. – 1977. – V. 3, №8042. – Р. 779-780.

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Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophies I. Apostol et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-844-1-242

Environmental Hazards and Safety in Ukraine: Scientific and Educational Aspects Dr. Vladimir NEKOS Kharkiv Karazin National University, Ukraine

Abstract. Humanity has known a lot of catastrophes and failures of natural elements but there also invisible dangers which constantly, and gradually, become very dangerous for vital social functions. These include ‘artificial earthquakes’ from explosions, and the role of vegetable products with chemical contamination, on which the population needs appropriate ecological education. In this article the theoretical questions on research of these invisible ecological hazards in the Ukraine are expounded, as are questions on biological risks related to the population’s use of heavy metals and other chemical elements in terms of plant- and vegetable-growing and the like. The questions of generating ecological consciousness are expounded through the creation of new technology for ecological and general education. Keywords. Invisible ecological hazards, consumption of contaminated vegetables, heavy metals, forming ecological consciousness, new technology of higher ecological education

Introduction Environmental hazards in Ukraine are formed by a variety of natural and humanrelated phenomena and processes. Among the most significant ones are: earthquakes, including artificial ones (due to explosions, for example); radiation hazards and risks related to the accumulation of wastes; contamination of air, soils, surface water and groundwater; hazards connected with pollution of plant foodstuff grown and consumed by the population; fire risks and infectious diseases of animals; landslide processes; water and tailings impoundments; and subsidence, floods and snow avalanches. Such a diversity of phenomena and processes, which form environmentally negative situations, has required the improvement of existing theoretical backgrounds for the gradual formation of an environmental safety strategy. The most important controls in the formation of a policy for managing environmental hazards in Ukraine [1,2] are the following: • •

regionalisation of hazards (i.e. each region is characterised by a specific set of priorities and a hierarchy of hazardous structures which determine the specificity and analysis of the possible risks); territorial and time-structuring of the hazard (i.e. totality of environmentally hazardous objects of every origin which, through the interaction and mutual influence, form the situations that are dangerous for the life of biota and create

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the risks for the effective functioning of each construction and feature, for example); positioning hazard sources (i.e. taking into the consideration not only the location of the sources in relation to different objects, but also the characteristics of the environment in which the hazards are distributed); identifying the different quality and order levels of hazard sources (for instance, granite open-cast mines or gravel extraction sites); neighbourhoods, i.e. relative locations and combination of different components; and profiling of regions (depending on the conditions of the hazard formation).

1. Ecological Risks Among the ecological risks gaining worldwide publicity in the past few decades are bio-risks which, generally, are linked to genetically modified organisms (GMO). Starting in 1972 at Stanford University (USA), up to the present genetically modified technologies have broadened substantially. The questions of harmfulness of GMO have intensified at the same time as to whether there is a threat to human health or to the natural environment. It is necessary to emphasise the attention that is needed on other aspects of bio-risks such as the population’s consumption of heavy metals and other chemical elements in produce from plant and vegetable growing, and the like; in other words, those products which are produced by a population for their own needs and the needs of society generally. In Kharkov National University, over the space of a few years, research on th prevalence of chemical elements was conducted on a range of vegetables and fruits. The prevalence of chemical elements was studied in terms of growing these products nearby to motorways, in city areas, in agricultural fields, in different types of soils, on different geomorphological levels, and the like. Extraordinarily important conformities with the law of accumulation of chemical elements were established, principally with respect to Fe, Мn, Nі, Сu, Pb, Zu, Co, Сr, etc. (21 chemical elements in all) in the conditions with elevated concentrations. It was established that in many cases the heavy metal content in plants was greater than in soil which testify to very complex dependencies. First of all, ecological risk is connected with the accumulation of chemical elements in soils and vegetable products and is subordinate to natural zoning; that is extremely important in working out measures for warming against and eliminating ecological risks associated with the consumption of vegetable-based products. At the same time a definite differentiation was identified in regard to the accumulation of different chemical elements in vegetables and fruit growing on land of different natural zones. For instance, potatoes were characterized by naturally-determined decreases in the average content of heavy metals from forest to forest-steppe and to steppe zones. The great relevance of the quantity of the investigated chemical elements in forest zones is highlighted by the fact that potato is one of the main food stuffs here. Comparing the average content of heavy metals with the permissible concentrations for different chemical elements in vegetables, showed that Fe in 25% of potato samples exceeds the permitted limit. Thus, a quarter of the researched production is ecologically risky for the population’s health; there is an analogous situation with Ni, Pb and Cd, but Zn is rarely found in about 30% of the assays that had considerably

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exceeded the permitted concentrations. Cu, in 6% of assays, was found to be 2.4 times higher than the standard but, for example, the quantity of Mn and Cr in this kind of vegetable production was found to be ecologically safe. It is interesting to know that higher accumulations are characterised for different chemical elements in forest-steppe and steppe zones. Thus, for example, in one case an excess of the permissible concentration of Fe in potatoes was inherent to forest-steppe zone, while, in another case, no excess of Fe was inherent to the steppe zone. But while the principal excess is Ni which had excesses over the permissible concentrations in more than in 71% of assays, Cu, Pb and Zn had excesses in only 14% of the assays. As for Ni, even the average zonal quantity exceeded permissible concentrations, indicating serious ecological and human risks from this chemical element.

2. Educational Aspects Success in the formation of a significant environmental safety policy in specific regions, and the country as the whole, depends on the level of environmental awareness of the population. For this reason Ukraine introduced some years ago a system of ecological (environmental) education and upbringing [3]. In 2006 the bachelor degree direction on “Ecology” was specified and significantly extended. With a corresponding resolution by the national government, this educational direction has now been assigned the following title: “Ecology, protection of the environment and balanced use of nature”. Therefore, on the state level, the inter-disciplinarily nature of the earlier biologically-based discipline ‘ecology’ was established. In accord with that, the ideal preconditions were formed for further development and the creation of the neo-ecological direction, which had already existed in Ukraine for many years. Meanwhile it has been formed into the independent science of “neo-ecology” with its own object, subject, methods and terminology, for example [4]. For solving the problem set by this ARWseminar this is of extreme importance because the environmental risks and safety issues need a really inter-disciplinary approach, and not the approach of classical Haeckelic ecology. At the MSc. level in higher education it is planned to introduce several programmes, including one entitled “Environmental safety”. Thus, further development of the problem under discussion is supported by the education of profile specialists. In order to ensure the high quality for the basis of knowledge and skills of future ecology specialists, the new national technology of obtaining of higher school degree was developed and introduced into the educational process at Kharkiv Karazin National University [5]. The developed technology includes the best achievements in educational processes, whether of national and foreign origins. The technology is based, first of all, upon the full interaction between the teacher and student in the framework of the educational and scientific process. Students, together with teachers, take the nonintermediate part in the formation of the tests and controlling colloquia, in the checking and assessing of the accomplished tasks, in the assessment and review of scientific material, and in summarising results, for example. The new educational mechanism for the preparation of future ecologists, including specialists in the sphere of environmental safety, includes: justification of the amount of educational and scientific information which a student is able to accept and grasp, as being the basis for justifying the improved developments of psychologists [6] and cybernetics-scientists [7] regarding the limits of acceptance. As well as the organisation of the consultative academic hours, the focus has been on preparation for the written

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test-based control of knowledge and skills related to this module, carrying out written testing control, analysis of the results of the testing control, and ensuring the reception of additional information regarding the non-satisfactory acceptance of the acquired materials. It is followed then by the mastering of the next module of the educational programme. This algorithm example is related only to the theoretical (i.e. auditoriumbased) part of the learning discipline. Algorithms, which are near to the one outlined, exist also for the practical and scientific sections, with a corresponding level of detailed elaboration and development.

3. Concluding Comments We assume that experience of joining the scientific and educational aspects in solving problems of environmental safety and risks could ensure their effective solution, both at regional and country levels. Scientific developments which are dedicated to the problems of management of environmental safety, and included into the educational process, are called to serve the formation of the environmental awareness, not only among the youth, which obtains the higher education, but also its further transformation towards the general public.

References [1] Шмандій В.М. Управління екологічною безпекою на регіональному рівні (теоретичні та практичні аспекти) // Дис. на здобуття наук. ступ. д. т. н. за спеціальністю 21.06.01 – екологічна безпека. – Харків, 2003. – 356 с. (Shmandiy V.М. Management of ecological safety at regional level (theoretical and practical aspects) // PhD dissertation in technical sciences in specialty of 21.06.01 – “Environmental Safety”. – Kharkov, 2003. – 356 p.). [2] Шмандій В.М., Некос В.Ю. Екологічна безпека: Підручник для студентів екологічних спеціальностей вищих навчальних закладів. − Харків, Харківський нац. ун-т ім. В.Н. Каразіна, 2007. – 386 с. (Shmandiy V.М. Management of ecological safety at regional level (theoretical and practical aspects) // PhD dissertation in technical sciences in specialty of 21.06.01 – “Environmental Safety”. – Kharkov, 2003. – 356 p.). [3] Проблемы создания единой системы экологического образования и воспитания в Украине // Тез. докл. редак. кол. Некос В.Е. (отв.ред.), Астахова В.И., и др. – Харьков, 1994. – 194 с. (Problems of creating a united system of ecological education and upbringing in Ukraine // Abstracts of presentations. Editing board: Nekos V.E. (responsible editor), Astahova V.I. and others. – Kharkiv, 1994. – 194 p.). [4] Некос В.Е. Основы общей экологии и неоэкологии. Учебное пособие в 2-х частях. – Ч.2. – Основы общей экологии и неоэкологии. – Изд. 2-ое, доп. и перераб. – Харьков: Прапор, 2001. – 287 с. (Nekos V.E. Basics of the general ecology and neo-ecology. Teaching Guide in 2 parts. – Part 2. – Second edition, extended and revised. – Kharkov, Prapor, 2001. – 287 p.). [5] Некос А.Н. Теория и практика внедрения нового механизма подготовки специалистов международного уровня // Людина і довкілля. Проблеми неоекології. Вип. 8 – Харків: Видавництво ХНУ ім. В.Н. Каразіна, 2006. − С.92-97. (Nekos A.N. Theory and practice of introduction of new mechanism of education of specialists of international level. // Person and Environment. Problems of the neo-ecology. Issue 8. – Kharkov: Khrarkov Karazin National University. P. 92-97.). [6] Miller G.A. The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, “Psycholog. Review”, 63, − № 2, 1956. P. 81 – 97. [7] Крайзмер Л.П. Хранение информации в кибернетических системах. // Информация и кибернетика. Сб. стат./Под ред. акад. А.И. Берга. – М.: Сов. радио, 1967. – C. 127-198. (Kraismer L.P. Storage of information in the cybernetic systems. Information and cybernetics. // Collection of articles edited by A.I. Berg. – Moscow, Soviet Radio, 1967. P. 126-198).

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Other relevant reference material •

• • • •

Стан та проблеми нормування кількості навчальної інформації стосовно формування висококваліфікованого фахівця міжнародного рівня // Захист довкілля від антропогенного навантаження. Вип. 9 (11). – Харків-Кременчуг: ПП “Швидка”. – с. 9 – 16. (State and problems of setting of norms of amount of educational information concerning formuvannya of highly skilled specialist of international level // Protecting of environment from the anthropogenic loading. Issue 9 (11). – Kharkiv-Kremenchug: PP “Fast ”. P. 9 – 16.). Эшби У.Р. Введение в кибернетику. – М.: Изд-во иностр. литер., 1959. – 432 с. (Ashbee U.R. Introduction to cybernetics. – М.: P.h. of foreign literature., 1959. – 432 p.). Шенон К Работы по теории информации и кибернетики. – М.: Изд-во иностр. литер., 1963. – 829 с. (Shenon K To work on the theory of information and cybernetics. – M.: P.h. of foreign literature, 1963. – 829 p.). Ферстер Г.О. О самоорганизации систем и их окружении // Самоорганизация систем. – М.: Мир, 1964. – С. 113 – 139. (Ferster G.O. About self-organization of the systems and their surroundings // Self-organization of the systems. – М.: Mir, 1964. – P. 113 – 139.). Малашевич Е.В. Краткий словарь-справочник по охране природы. – Мн.: Ураджай, 1987. – 223 с. (Malashevich E.V. The Short dictionary-reference book on conservancy. – Mn.: Urad-zhay, 1987. – 223 p.).

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Learning from Disasters – Information Management in Emergency Planning Christoph HAGEN Abstract. The successful management of disasters greatly depends on obtaining and communicating information. Establishing an effective information management system plays a major role for a functioning and viable disaster management. Lessons learned from specific emergency incidents may provide an essential basis for improvement of disaster prevention and control. The experiences and findings from specific disasters, as well as from emergency practices, are vitally important for the improvement of disaster management. Hence, the presentation will discuss substantial conditions for successful implementation of the findings. Keywords. information management, lessons learned, disaster management, communication, coordination, organisational learning

Introduction The successful management of disasters greatly depends on obtaining and communicating information. Establishing an effective information management system plays a major role for a functioning and viable disaster management. Lessons learned from specific emergency incidents may provide an essential basis for improvement of disaster prevention and control. The precise understanding of how information is handled can be seen as the fundamental requirement for manipulating information management. This does not only apply to the agencies responsible for emergency management; it also applies to the general public, media, and businesses. The analysis of informational structures can foster the creation of a functioning and viable emergency management system. Studies on civil protection and emergency services have been sporadic and uncoordinated. An assessment of Germany’s emergency preparedness found a number of deficits, including information shortages and poor communication among participating agencies and the public (Dombrowsky/Brauner 1996). The evaluation of specific incidents, however, such as the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington (The 9/11 Commission Report 2004), Hurricane Katrina (President of the United States 2006; Daniels 2006) or the flooding in Saxony in 2002 (von Kirchbach 2002), have not yet been systematically compared and evaluated. Neither has there been a systematic study of information management in civil protection and emergency services. This contribution will assume some considerations about the field of disaster management, information management, and learning organisations in order to contribute to the further development of disaster management. Development means in

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this context the improved performance and a more effectively designed system of disaster management.

1. Organisation and Structure of Disaster Management Disaster management can described as a highly complex task confronting all involved organisations and actors with tremendous challenges. There are four phases in emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Emergency management can be understood as the joint task of various agencies and institutions. Together, these actors constitute the emergency management system.

Figure 1. Schematic Structure of Emergency Management

Emergency management includes the organisation and management of resources and responsibilities pertaining to all aspects of emergency situations, from preparation and planning to control and reconstruction. Emergency management encompasses all those structures and networks that help with the coordination of the efforts of the government and the private sector, so that they can meet the needs which arise during an emergency. The multitude of involved actors requires a high-level coordination to adjust the individual contributions of each actor. To advance disaster management, an extensive analysis of the constellations and interactions is needed. The approach of Social Network Analysis in combination with a Network management can provide valuable insights (Kapucu 2005; Dombrowsky et al. 2003; figure 2).

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Critical incidents are always distinguished by high-complexity tasks to cope with. To clarify this complexity the wide range of responsibilities of all leaders in crisis situations is to be considered. Five critical challenges can be emphasised (Boin et al. 2005: 10): 1 Making Sense Leaders have to assess signals accurately to take the adequate measures. The complexity of crisis situations makes a precise interpretation of events difficult. “How to distil cogent signals from the noise of crisis?” (Boin et al. 2005:11). In particular at the beginning a crisis is hard to detect. 2 Decision Making During a crisis, leaders are confronted with exceptional situations. They have to take decisions under pressure of time. Often there remains little time to think, to consult, and to gain acceptability. Further more decisions must be coordinated with other organisations to assure effective implementation. Many organisations are established to conduct routine business. “Getting public bureaucracies to adapt to crisis circumstances is a daunting – some say impossible – task in itself. The management of crisis requires flexibility, improvisation, redundancy, and the breaking of rules” (Boin et al 2005:11). Critical incidents are always distinguished by high-complexity tasks to cope with. To clarify this complexity the wide range of responsibilities of all leaders in crisis situations is to be considered. 3 Making Meaning Leaders have to build a coherent picture and communicate that picture to the public in order to make their assessment of the situation and the chosen measurements understandable and acceptable. Leaders must keep control of the meaningmaking process. 4 Terminating The state of emergency can only be enforced for a certain time. After some time it is necessary to shift back from emergency to routine business: “This requires some form of downsizing of crisis operation. It also requires rendering an account of what has happened and gaining acceptance for this account” (Boin et al. 2005:14). 5 Learning Another task is to draw political and organisational lessons. Experiences gained in disasters provides a lot of potential lessons which can be introduced into training arrangements, organisational practice, politics, and laws. But there are many constraints which hinder the learning, such as cognitive and institutional barriers to learning and political constraints. The question is whether a critical debate and an initiation of reforms are desirable if own failures have to be admitted.

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internal Data acquirement and data analysis

Quantitative

external

Qualitative

Controlling

Strength/Weakness profile

Social Network Development Aims planning Action planning Implementation

Process assistance

Workshops Figure 2. Social Network Management

Working groups

Coaching

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Social Network Analysis

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2. Information Management The successful management of disasters—whether with regard to preparation, prevention, or control—greatly depends on obtaining and communicating information. To prevent disasters from becoming informational disasters as well, it is imperative that all necessary information must be available and its effective communication ensured. The communication of information—the human ability to process and share information—possesses both an internal and an external level. The precise understanding of how information is handled can be seen as the fundamental requirement for manipulating information management. This does not only apply to the agencies responsible for emergency management; it also applies to the general public, media, and businesses. The analysis of informational structures can foster the creation of a functioning and viable emergency management system. Information can be defined as knowledge used to achieve a certain purpose (Wittmann 1959). There are three basic ways of handling information: acquirement, processing, and dissemination. The term “information management” refers to the ordering and organising needed for the efficient coordination of information (Pietsch et al. 2004). The analysis of information management must consider its human, organisational, and technological aspects. We will implement both an actual state and a target state analysis based on information management components. The analysis of information use in emergency management can take the form of a strength/weakness analysis. In doing so, informational structures and processes must be identified and categorised. Figure 3 shows a simplified draft of the framework to be used. To determine the needs, it is necessary to identify the target groups. Therefore not only the agencies and institutions involved in the emergency management are relevant; the zone of relevant target groups should be enlarged and include the general public, businesses, media, hospitals, and banks. A main selection criterion will be whether an actor possesses its own safety and communication structures. Conceivable target groups are:  Politics  Public Administration (municipality, headquarters, district government)  Operative level/operative forces (fire brigade, police, and volunteer groups)  Media (press, radio, TV etc.)  Population of the target area  Business (public utility companies, companies with affected infrastructure); The needs of potential users are crucial for functionality and performance. Moreover, we assume that there is a connection between a successful implementation of an information system and the expectations and needs of the users. For the implementation of an information system to count as successful, users must recognise its added value. This is the standard to which information system requirements must be raised. We will handle the following aspects of the target groups’ needs:  What information is needed?  In what form will the information be needed?  How should the information be transferred? Which information medium should be used?

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Building blocks

Man Status quo

Organisations Needs

Status quo

Needs

Technology Status quo

Needs

Information acquirement Preparation Response

Recovery Information processing Preparation Response

Recovery Information dissemination Preparation Response

Recovery Figure 3. Framework for Analysis of the Structures of Information Management

3. Learning in Emergency Management Three questions take centre stage in dealing with learning in disaster management: 1 How can organisational learning improve the effectiveness in Disaster Management? 2 What conditions must be present? 3 How can individual learning be transformed into organisational learning? Learning is "a relatively permanent change in behaviour occurring as a result of experience" (Nelson 1991:505). The experiences and findings from specific disasters, as well as from emergency practices, are vitally important for the improvement of disaster management. Hence, the presentation will discuss substantive conditions for

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successful implementation of the findings. Learning is an elementary part of daily life and can be defined as a permanent change in behaviour occurring as a result of experience. Thus change in behaviour as the result or outcome and experience as the instrument are the determining factors of learning. In general, learning is an individual activity. That means if we come to the term “organisational learning” (Argyris1992) or “learning organisation” only the members of organisations are able to learn, not an organisation itself. But on the other hand a learning organisation is more than the sum of its parts. Individual learning is transferred into organisational learning if the following conditions are fulfilled: 1 Experiences or lessons learned must be available to other members of the organisation (sharing of experiences) 2 Experiences must be transferred into norms, customs, rules, regulations Individual knowledge has to be transferred into an organisational memory in order to utilise it and to save it – even if members are leaving the organisation. The assumptions of a learning organisation are that learning is valuable, continuous, and most effective when shared and that every experience is an opportunity to learn (Smith 2001). In short a learning organisation is an organisation where great importance is attached to learning aspects and where appropriate conditions and structures are given, are supported and where a continuous learning – individual and collective – is desired and is possible. How can something be learned from experience gained in specific incidents? In general there are three different levels of analysis (Toft/Reynolds 1997:54): 1

2

3

Organisation specific learning: Several organisations can draw their own lessons from events in which they were involved Isomorphic learning: On a second level by the analysis of responsible factors of a specific failure of an organisation more universally applicable lessons can be drawn Iconic learning: On the most general and broadest level the simple information that a negative event has happened can be understood as a form of learning.

Two different types of learning can be distinguished: passive learning and active learning. Passive learning means to know about something, active learning means to know about something and “take remedial action to rectify the deficiencies that have been uncovered” (Toft/Rynolds 1997:55). It seems obvious that only passive learning without the implementation of the lessons learned into adequate organisational changes is insufficient. The isomorphic level of learning has a particular meaning for organisational learning. By analyzing experiences of other organisations valuable conclusions can be drawn without re-inventing the wheel. The vital point is that there are multitudes of learning opportunities which can and should be used to improve the efficiency of an organisation. With regard to disaster management, isomorphic learning seems to be a

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particular important or suitable approach. Learning situations and opportunities, especially with regard to practical experience of great incidents are very limited. Thus the use made by similar organisations of lessons learned in similar events seems to be reasonable in the field of disaster management. But on the other hand there might be some problems dealing with lessons learned others have made: 1.

2. 3. 4.

Accessibility and availability: do I have access to information? (public inquiries, reports, publications, evaluations or other sources of information) Credibility: how credible is the information? How complete and accurate is the information? Generalisation: at what level of abstraction is the information presented? Is this adequate and useful? How was the data processed? Transferability: is the information transferable or too specific?

The implementation of lessons learned into organisational changes might be a difficult undertaking. External and internal constraints on organisational change could be a shortage of money and technological capabilities, cognitive and institutional barriers of learning, and political constraints as well as a strong persistence. Learning in organisations - as all learning processes - has a strong relation to change. Therefore the tension between new and old, between innovations and approved routines (“we have always done it this way, why should we change anything?”) needs great attention. Learning and implementing new attitudes always means a process of learning to forget. Conflicts may occur due to this contradiction between new and old in an organisation. These conflicts have to be taken seriously and ways to resolve them must be found. The following general conditions can be formulated for an effective learning process: 1. Willingness for detailed analysis and reform 2. Adequate reporting of experiences 3. Adequate instruments and processes for an effective implementation 4. Continuous learning opportunities 5. Linkage between individual and organisational performance 4. New Approaches to Information Management in Emergency Planning The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed expectations and initiated new discussions about defending civilians and handling emergencies. As a response to the new security and political surroundings a reorientation of emergency management has been started. Some examples of this redirection are the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the USA or the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) in Germany. Beside the financial, technical, and personnel setting of the emergency institutions the coordination and communication between the different organisations is a central challenge for the system. With regard to the discussed issues of information management and learning from disasters we are also observing new approaches in the structural reforms of the emergency system. Some examples from Germany and the United States follow:

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4.1 German Joint Information and Situation Centre (Gemeinsames Melde- und Lagezentrum GMLZ)

In 2002 the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) launched the German Joint Information and Situation Centre (GMLZ). The GMLZ is a service centre for State, Federal State and organisations to warrant the comprehensive information and resource management during large incidents. Its functions are the operation of a constantly accessible service reporting office, the generation of updated situation pictures and damage prognosis, the procurement of resources for hazard defence, and the advancement of transnational cooperation. (http://www.bbk.bund.de)

4.2 Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum GTAZ) The Joint Counter Terrorism Centre was established in 2004. By an intensive cooperation between different institutions, information dissemination should be accelerated and the competence in fighting terrorism strengthened and combined. Altogether, about 190 analysts from several Federal and state organisations such as the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are working with GTAZ. The tasks of GTAZ are daily briefings, threat assessments, operative information exchange, structure analyses and resource bundling (http://www.bmi.bund.de).

4.3 German Emergency Prevention Information System (Deutsches NotfallvorsorgeInformationssystem deNIS) The German Emergency Prevention Information System (deNIS) should assist federal and state decision makers in major incidents in order to secure the coordination of measurements. deNIS provides important information to state and federal decision makers during major incidents to secure the coordination of supporting measures. Another function is to offer important information about threats, safety measures, and rules of conduct via Internet to the public (http://www.denis.bund.de).

4.4 Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS), USA The Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) is relevant to homeland security responders, planners, and healthcare professionals. The LLIS is a national network of lessons learned and best practices with restricted access for experts and peer-validated content. The LLIS provides After Action Reports and achieves the function of an information clearing house (https://www.llis.gov).

4.5 National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center (NIC), USA The National Incident Management System was developed to enhance the cooperation

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of responders from different jurisdictions and disciplines. The NIMS Integration Center (NIC), established by the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a unified approach to incident management, standard command and management structures, and emphasis on preparedness, mutual aid and resource management. The NIMS Integration Center is responsible for facilitating the development and adoption of standards at a national level, guidelines and protocols (http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims). 4.6 Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTP) The Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) is designed to improve interoperable communications among Federal, State, and local emergency responders and public safety officials. The goal of the programme is to provide guidance and suggestions to the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) sites and to enable local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond to disasters. ICTAP should enhance the overall capacity for agencies and individuals to communicate with one another (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/ta_ictap.htm). 5. Conclusions Information management has become an increasingly critical function in disaster management. The systematic acquirement, processing and dissemination of information in all phases of disaster management are necessary for an efficient and effective disaster mitigation, response and recovery. Learning from the experiences of previous incidents can provide an informative basis for organisational change and reforms. For this a variety of learning forms should be practiced to improve emergency management. Information management and organisational learning can improve performance in disaster management. But neither concept is automatic: while of course each individual and each organisation operates a kind of information management and carries out learning processes – some better than others – it is critical that both activities are designed and conducted more actively or in a more structured manner. That means the concepts should be initiated purposefully and strategically. In the field of organisational learning the implementation of extensive learning structures and learning strategies is required. Constraints must be overcome and various learning situations must be connected. All these recommendations lead to the way towards a learning organisation. References Argyris, Chris (1992): On Organizational Learning. Cambridge. Boin, Arjen; ґt Hart, Paul; Stern, Eric; Sundelius, Bengt (2005): The Politics of Crisis Management. Public Leadership under Pressure. Cambridge. Daniels, Ronald R.; Kettl, Daniel F.; Kunreuther, Howard (Eds.)(2006): On Risk and Disaster. Lessons from Hurricane Katrina. Philadelphia, Pa. Dombrowsky, Wolf R.; Horenczuk, Jцrg; Streitz, Willi (2003): Erstellung eines Schutzdatenatlasses. Zivilschutzforschung Neue Folge Bd. 42, Schriftenreihe der

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Schutzkommission beim Bundesminister des Innern, hrsg. vom Bundesamt fьr Zivilschutz. Bonn. Dombrowsky, Wolf R.; Brauner Christian (1996): Defizite der Katastrophenvorsorge in Industriegesellschaften am Beispiel Deutschlands. Untersuchungen und Empfehlungen zu methodischen und inhaltlichen Grundsatzfragen. Gutachten im Auftrag des Deutschen IDNDR-Komitees fьr Katastrophenvorbeugung e.V. (Langfassung). Deutsche IDNDR-Reihe Nr. 3b, Bonn. Kapucu, Naim (2005): Interorganizational Coordination in Dynamic Context: Networks in Emergency Response Management. CONNECTIONS 26(2): 33-48. Nelson, R. Ryan (1991). "Educational Needs as Perceived by IS and End-User Personnel: A Survey of Knowledge and Skill Requirements," MIS Quarterly, 15(4), December, 503-525. Pietsch, Thomas; Martiny, Lutz; Klotz, Michael (2004): Strategisches Informationsmanagement. Bedeutung, Konzeption und Umsetzung. Berlin. President of the United States (2006): The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington. Smith, M. K. (2001): The learning organization. In: The encyclopedia of informal education, http://www.infed.org/biblio/learning-organization.htm. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004): Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Baton Rouge, L.A. Toft, Brian; Reynolds, Simon (1997): Learning from Disasters. A Management Approach. 2nd edition. Leicester. von Kirchbach, Hans-Peter (2002): Bericht der Unabhдngigen Kommission der Sдchsischen Staatsregierung Flutkatastrophe. Dresden. Wittmann, Waldemar (1959): Unternehmung und unvollkommene Information. Kцln und Opladen.

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Mass Media and Catastrophe Prevention. How to avoid the crisis after the crisis Henrike VIEHRIG1 Abstract. Catastrophe prevention is not an interesting topic for broadcasting companies, but catastrophe coverage is. Catastrophe prevention cannot take place via mass media communications, but has to be prepared within the relevant institutions during “good times”. But in the event of an emergency and the subsequent high level of media interest, media management has to be coherent and credibility-oriented. Keywords: Media coverage, information policy, credibility, news value, political communication

Introduction How can mass media help to prevent or forecast catastrophes? The sobering answer is not to count too much on the mass media when planning the prevention of catastrophes. Since the main function of the media is to select, from a multitude of themes, those facts which will be of most interest to the general public, enumerations of security measures or emergency operations will probably never make it onto the front pages or into prime time news. This paper is about the moment just after an emergency has happened, because that is when the media become most important. It presents an academic point of view, referring to communication theories and expertise from existing crisis communication studies. The main assumption here is that the underlying logic of the mass media system is quite different from other administrative logics, i.e. governmental logic or public logic. Why is it so important to delve into media logic? Studies have shown that crises and catastrophes become increasingly medialized and consequently politicised. They are no longer seen as “bad luck” or the “sad consequence of human error” (Rosenthal 2003: 133), rather there is always a political component: “In crisis situations, communication and coordination are double-edged swords, being both the solution and the problem” (Quarantelli, cit. in Rosenthal 2003: 140). So from the point immediately after a catastrophe onwards – when mass media interest is greatest and media attention is exclusively focused on reporting the damage done to persons or property – disaster management may turn into politics. If catastrophe management and the associated outbound communication is not properly 1 Research Assistant at the University of Cologne, Chair of International Politics and Foreign Policy Studies (Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger), Gottfried-Keller-Straße 6, D-50931 Cologne, Germany, Phone +49 (221) 470-6940, Fax +49 (221) 470-6732; E-Mail: [email protected].

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prepared, there may be a second catastrophe on the way: the crisis after the crisis. Therefore, thinking about mass media is a part of catastrophe prevention. To avoid the crisis after the crisis, I want first to present some crucial media logic; second, I try to apply this to catastrophe and crisis management and third, I want to give some positive and negative examples of recent interplays between media and crisis management.

1.

Some basic media functions

In the realm of political communication the mass media constitutes a nexus between politics (or the government) and the public. The relationship between government, media and public can be thought of in form of a triangle, because each actor depends on the other two actors (cf. fig. 1).

Figure 1. Triangle of political communication

Normally, the media receive information from the government (and associated organs) but also from other sources (witnesses, other journalists, NGOs). In the case of an emergency, the prime source for information will be the government or the respective agency handling the catastrophe (i.e. Emergency Operations Centre). Therefore, the model disregards other possible information sources. If those agencies fail to provide enough information, media will look for it on their own account, or will try to set a distinct theme agenda, thereby limiting the room for manoeuvre of the crisis management centre. The public acts mainly as a recipient of information provided by the news media. The media try to present facts and aspects designed to hold the recipients’ interest, because circulation numbers, TV or Radio quotas as well as web page visits represent direct or indirect revenues for media companies. Direct revenues occur if a recipient buys a

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newspaper or an online article or if they subscribe to a TV channel. Indirect revenues flow if the information comes free to the consumer but is financed through advertising. In that case, the amount of attention paid to certain media content generates the amount of money paid by advertisers to the corresponding media outlet. News media companies have a vested interest in maximising their publicity because publicity means income. The ultimate rationale of news media companies resembles that of any economic enterprise: the safeguarding of economic survival. Maximum publicity is ensured by reports that arouse the interest of the recipients. But how is this interest stimulated? Answers to that question are provided by theories about newsworthiness or news value (Schulz 1976). News value is a term to describe selection criteria applied by journalists. It consists of several factors that define the probability of an event becoming news. Journalists, and especially editors, have to choose their key theme from many possible themes. And for any one item to become top news, that information needs to have a high news value. Possible factors affecting news value are: x x x x

surprise (negative or positive) familiarity (geographical, cultural or political proximity) source status (high status ensures more publicity) relevance (potential or real effects of the reported fact on the average recipient)

Catastrophes have a very high news value. They unite the factors surprise, relevance and familiarity, especially if the catastrophe happens within surroundings familiar to recipients. On the other hand, administrative measures to prevent catastrophes – such as guidelines, agency responsibilities or recommendations – do not possess such value, unless they are quite outstanding or regarded as inadequate and likely to result in disaster. Therefore, mass media cannot be relied upon for the communication of preventive countermeasures. Such measures have no news value or newsworthiness for the clients of mass media products. News producers are constantly in search of conflicts and disasters, because these topics possess a high news value. In the event of disasters, the media suspend the usual programmes and report exclusively from the disaster site. Once an incident gets labelled as “disaster” – and such labelling is often done by the journalists themselves – news producers search for audiovisual material that fits the label. Such material may include images or reports about chaos, irrational behaviour, crime and damage. Though it has been scientifically observed that most people do behave rationally even in extreme situations (Fischer 2002: 124), content analyses of mass media reporting exhibit the media’s zeal for any material about irrational behaviour. This is due to the fact that only such information stands out from the usual reporting and is newsworthy – which refers again to the news factor surprise. After an urban catastrophe for example, the media search for “looters” and generally find one or two, even if thousands of people continue to behave according to the law. Another problem is that reporting rumour tends to be much more interesting than verified story reporting, so that rumours – even if clearly labelled as such – may be perceived to be as real as fact based reporting. One could argue that during a real catastrophe the emergency management headquarters should not engage with the media, but with regard to some past cases of catastrophe management it can be observed that not to care about mass media in times

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of emergency is to add a second catastrophe – the media catastrophe – to the already tense primary situation. And that “second catastrophe management”; influencing what will be seen in media reports, often determines the perception and thinking for many years and entails long term political consequences.

2.

What to do in case of emergency?

The first moments of media reporting about the management of a catastrophe will usually define how that management will be perceived by the public in the long run. In these crucial first moments, the person in charge and journalists may be the first to translate the observed mishap into words that will be read or listened to by many. These words have to be chosen carefully. It may be useful to establish a previously prescribed terminology for certain kinds of events. And there is a second significance of the first reported instances: all reports which follow about that event will be built upon that previously established framework. Unfortunately, the course of a crisis management cannot be forecast. That represents a problem for crisis managers and an occasion for journalists, who otherwise would not feature that process. Media are always alert for new information – often conflictive and negative information as well as personal stories – that is closely connected to peoples’ lives. It would be wise to prepare some information about prevention and organisational routines before an emergency takes place. Mass media can react very fast to any new situation or to emerging new facts. Crisis management – on the other hand – may not be similarly responsive because of the exceptional situation and requirements. Since new information from a top official always has a higher news value and will appear more prominently or more frequently (news factor source status), it might be an option to do without the “spokesperson” for the press, and instead, train every member of the emergency operations centre properly for contact with the TV camera and journalists. Then every member of the team would be equally able to relay new information. A media spokesperson informing about the state of affairs might be a practical solution from the intra-institutional perspective, but a statement from a top official will always outperform a spokesperson’s statement. Even if the course and the evolution of a catastrophe are not predictable, and some errors are highly probable, it is imperative for actors to maintain their credibility and a trustworthy appearance the whole time. Communicators or press contact persons should not deny errors or shortcomings if questions are asked. It is also advisable always to have some new information to hand that can be released to the media. Jarol B. Manheim has done extensive research on the image management of various countries, which is applicable to crisis management as well (Manheim 1994). He distinguishes two dimensions of media coverage: visibility and valence. Visibility can have high or low values; valence can be positive or negative. Manheim recommends working on both dimensions in order to influence one’s own media image: If an institution faces high visibility coupled with negative reporting (i.e. many negative reports in TV or press), it should not immediately try to “spin” the media coverage into positive reporting. That might well be perceived as propaganda and be rejected by the public (Manheim 1994: 132). He rather recommends lowering media visibility and consequently removing oneself from the focus of attention. Only from that point of lower visibility does he advise the sending out of positive messages and – assuming the institution does reach a positive valence dimension –trying to elevate media visibility

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bit by bit. There is no such thing as a secure “media strategy”. An emergency means that things are out of control, whereas a “strategy” suggests that an institution can maintain control of events. But media operations can be prepared during “good times”, that is before a catastrophe occurs. It can take the form of a Media Centre or an ombudsman for the media who can establish personal contacts and trusted relationships (Schober 2002: 103).

3.

Examples

I want to present four brief examples of media management in cases of disaster. I have chosen two examples of successful media management – the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, USA, and of July 7th, 2005, London, UK. The negative examples are the media management after hurricane Katrina, August/September 2005, Louisiana, USA, and the Madrid terrorist attacks, March 11th, 2004, Spain. 3.1. Positive examples The first of the positive examples is the media management after the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th in New York and Washington. “Positive” in this context can be understood as: the government institutions coping with the disastrous effects of the catastrophe were able to maintain control over media content and place their messages with a certain degree of autonomy. Shortly after the two planes crashed into the World Trade Centre, all the main TV stations rushed to report what was happening. The lack of explanations and the shocking situation created a high level of attention to everything President George W. Bush or the New York mayor Rudy Giuliani said in public. The situation was exceptional and enhanced the relatively stark orientation towards the nation’s leaders. One means for the president to obtain overall attention was to shift the focus from what had happened (and who had failed) to how “America” would respond to these terrorist attacks. The four crashed planes were not an issue for New York, Washington or Shanksville, but an issue concerning the whole nation. For example, the first words that President Bush uttered publicly after the attacks were: “Ladies and gentlemen, this is a difficult moment for America” (Bush 2001a). Later that day the president continued to praise American values and America’s strength in being opposed to the “evil” terrorists. At the end of that speech he mentioned several counter measures, but most remarkably, he spoke about the war on terror : “…and we stand together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush 2001b). Bush found himself in a position where he was able to fulfil a strong leadership position. The news media found themselves in a situation where they could portray him in that role throughout the world. By contrast, the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Joseph Allbaugh, gave a press conference the same day, but due to its lower source status he was not as visibly reported as the president. In the end, a clear cut catastrophe became a long term war, and what could have turned into a debate over administrative failure was ultimately turned into a longer term boost to the power of President Bush. The second positive example is the media management after the 2005 London Underground bombings, July 7th. These attacks occurred at a time when national and

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international attention was already focused on the United Kingdom. One day before the attacks, on July 6th, London was chosen to host the 2012 Olympic Games. The same night, major public celebrations were held in the centre of London and were reported all over the world. On July 7th, national and international attention turned to Gleneagles, Scotland, where Prime Minister Tony Blair presided over the G8 summit. The aim of that summit was to double aid for Africa and agree on debt cancellation for the world’s poorest countries (Baldwin/Webster 2005). While hosting one of the first sessions of the G8 summit, news of a major incident in the London tube reached Prime Minister Tony Blair at Gleneagles. This first official version – which was propagated by the news media – stated that a “power surge” (a quite common incident at the London tube) had forced all underground traffic to stop. This coded information was deliberately designed by local officials to reduce potential panic in the event of a terrorist attack. Meanwhile, the deputy prime minister, other ministers and an emergency command team were able to meet secretly and prepare statements for the news media whilst maintaining control over the flow of information. The outgoing messages which followed were all coordinated and basically said the same thing: remain calm, stay at home for the day and resume normal life from the next day on. Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a living example to this message: on July 7th, he travelled to London to preside over an emergency meeting, but that same evening he returned to Gleneagles to resume negotiations on development aid in Africa. Media coverage of rescue workers and politicians alike was outstandingly positive (The Times 2005) and even among themselves the media praised each other for correct reporting (Campling 2005). Apart from some amateur videos recorded by passengers with their mobile phones there were no immediate pictures of the catastrophe. All footage accompanying catastrophe reporting was taken outside the tube and thereby mainly covered rescue workers or volunteer helpers. As a result, almost no negative, chaotic images were distributed and the remaining pictures reinforced the impression of a coordinated emergency management. The response to the London attack may serve as an example in several ways. First, the attacks were not completely unexpected. The capital of the UK had long been aware that it was a target for national or international terrorism. There had been many rehearsals since 9/11, especially for an attack on the London tube (Langenau 2005). Attacks in other capitals – Istanbul 2003, Madrid 2004 – heightened attention and preparedness. Second, this preparedness could be coupled with a benign public opinion at the time of the attack as a result of the international attention being focused on the UK because of the Olympic announcement and the G8 summit. Third, official behaviour served as an example for the local population to remain calm and not to panic – maybe an intentional contrast to the American patriotism after 9/11. 3.2 Negative examples There are two negative cases of media management after catastrophes that give an example of how a disaster can become politicised in the crisis after the crisis. The first negative example describes the handling of the Madrid terrorist attacks on March 11th, 2004. Spain has a long history of experience with terrorist attacks and the Spanish population is very attentive to any security measures, attribution of responsibility and common patterns of such attacks. The then incumbent Aznar government had a vested interest in attributing responsibility for the March 11th attacks to ETA (the Basque separatist organisation), even if the evidence pointed in the

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direction of Al-Qaeda. The rationale of the Aznar government was not to jeopardise the ruling Partido Popular’s advantage in the elections that were to take place three days later. A few hours after the attacks, Aznar himself made phone calls to all the major Spanish press chiefs and editors and told them that there was no doubt that ETA was responsible for the Madrid train bombings (Bassets 2004). Most of the newspapers trusted his opinion and published these assertions, which later proved to be false. The day after the attacks, Foreign Minister Ana Palacios sent telegrams to all Spanish Ambassadors stating that ETA held full responsibility for the bombings. Beyond that, she emphasised that information suggesting otherwise was probably politically motivated and should be disregarded (Ingendaay 2004). During the next few days there were several visible indications of an Al-Qaeda sponsorship of the terrorist attacks and the public grew suspicious of the government assurances. Furthermore, the Spanish government pressed the UN Security Council to condemn ETA as a result of the train bombing (Sciolino 2004) – contrary to the UN practice only to condemn violent attacks, but not the organisations themselves. Afterwards, Kofi Annan regretted the hasty statement he had been urged to make (FAZ.net 2004). The leading Spanish newspaper – El País – later referred to this manipulation by the Aznar Government as “Atochagate”, referring to the main commuter train station, where most of the explosions occurred (Ekaizer 2004). In the case of the Madrid train bombings, the Aznar government risked its credibility and trustworthiness by trying to endorse false statements out of fear that the truth might be harmful for their re-election. Additionally, the government immediately tried to spin a high visibility/negative valence situation into a high visibility/positive valence situation (cf. Manheim 1994). By acting in this way, the Spanish government tried to affect only the valence dimension, disregarding the visibility dimension. In the end, the government could not uphold its version about ETA responsibility long enough and lost the elections three days later. The second negative example refers to the media management after hurricane Katrina at the end of August and the beginning of September 2005, in Louisiana, USA. The situation there became truly calamitous, both before and after the hurricane. First, the mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans was given too late and no provision had been made for people who could not arrange their own evacuation. Public shelters such as the New Orleans Superdome were designated to house all the people who could not be evacuated, but officials failed to provide enough water and food to enable people to survive there for several days. After the hurricane had passed and the city began to flood, the shortcomings of the catastrophe management became visible to the world. There were not enough rescue teams. Consequently, often journalists were the first to witnesses the deprivation and violence which ensued and transmitted those stark images via satellite to the news channels. There was no locally functioning catastrophe headquarters, let alone a communications headquarters. Officials in Washington were not aware of the situation in the congress centre until they saw it in the media (Gelinsky 2005). The indispensable situation review for New Orleans had been made largely by the media. Subsequently, a lot of the information reached the officials in charge at the same time as it became available to the general public, leaving officials no time for consultation before making crucial decisions. Officials were later blamed for having reacted too slowly and for having deliberately delayed aid from both private and public donor agencies (Shane 2005), which contributed to the negative image of that catastrophe management.

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The New Orleans images of deprivation and violence coincided with the news factor surprise because such images were virtually unknown from within the U.S. either inside or outside America. Several institutions – federal, state and local agencies – blamed each other publicly for insufficient management and errors. This conflict of responsibility was played out and enhanced via mass media; meanwhile all the rescue efforts and heroic evacuation work was put into a very negative light. The political consequences were the resignation of FEMA chief Michael Brown and declining approval rates for President Bush (Gallup 2005). Some parallels can be drawn between these two negative cases: in both situations, the catastrophes – terrorist bombings and a hurricane – served as catalytic events to address severe criticism towards the government. The discontent stemmed not only from inadequate media or catastrophe management, but from multiple factors. In Spain, there had been an underlying dissatisfaction with the Aznar government since the prestige oil catastrophe in 2002, the death of 75 troops returning from Afghanistan in a plane crash in 2003 and the participation in the Iraq war, which was opposed by 90% of the Spanish public. In the U.S. there was also a growing dissatisfaction with the situation in Iraq. Taking into account that after 9/11 many news media had abstained from criticising the Bush administration, the mismanagement after hurricane Katrina was the first opportunity for many journalists to openly criticise their government – a chance they did not miss. The main difference between the two positive and the two negative cases is that the catastrophe management itself did not become a topic in the positive cases, whereas intended manipulation or questionable competence during the emergency management represented a large part of the reporting in Madrid and post-Katrina. Taking into account the Manheim criteria (1994: 132) for managing image, both negative examples display a high visibility/negative valence dimension. Following Manheim’s logic it would have been advisable to first lower visibility and then alter media reporting to the point of positive valence. But that logic reveals a profound dilemma of crisis management; it is a high visibility topic, and therefore hard to oust from news coverage. One implication may be to centre information policy on the disaster itself and to try to keep the background management out of media focus.

4.

Conclusion

Dealing with the media is important for everyone who is involved in politics. Nationally administered catastrophe management is definitely a part of politics and therefore susceptible to any changes of public opinion or official policy. Being part of the media debate means being part of politics (Reichertz 2007: 27). And media coverage often determines the influence and room for manoeuvre of a specific institution. Analyzing the four cases, we can infer several conclusions, and comparing the cases of Madrid (negative) and London (positive) reveals a stunning number of similarities. Both countries – the United Kingdom and Spain – have considerable experience of nationalist terrorism: Spain with ETA and the United Kingdom with the IRA. Both governments joined the United States in the war in Iraq, and both governments did it despite negative public opinion. Both capitals suffered attacks on their public transport system, but in the case of the Madrid attacks Prime Minister Aznar’s Partido Popular was voted out (even though it previously had a secure lead according to pre-election

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polls), whereas in London, the British cooperation in Iraq did not become a public issue at that point. The main reason for this may be that Tony Blair managed to maintain credibility and the mood of public opinion was favourable during the time of the attacks. In Madrid, by contrast, initially benign public opinion became very unfavourable and made immediate use of the opportunity to unseat that government. Comparing the remaining two cases; President Bush after 9/11 (positive) and President Bush after Katrina 2005 (negative), gives an idea of how very successful media management may hinder future catastrophe prevention. Because 9/11 terrorism had become the overarching theme in American public policy discourse, the newly created Department of Homeland Security and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had tied up a lot of resources that could otherwise have been used in New Orleans. The outstandingly positive press after 9/11 was turned upside down in the aftermath of Katrina, when reporters were the first to criticise the deficient catastrophe management which thereby got caught in the high visibility/negative valence trap. In conclusion, I would like to highlight three core recommendations to avoid “the crisis after the crisis”. First: maintain credibility, second: prevention cannot take place via the mass media and third: catastrophe management itself should not become a media topic.

References Baldwin, Tom/Webster, Philip (2005): Blair faces backlash if Africa fails to get the help it needs, The Times (London), 6 July, Home news, 6. Bassets, Marc, (2004): Vom Leugnen und Lügen, message, 2, 10-15. Bush, George W. (2001a): Remarks by the President After Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Centre, http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/ 20010911.html (Access 30 Mar 07) Bush, George W. (2001b): Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, http:www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911.html (Access 30 Mar 07). Camplin, Chris (2005): Radio Five Live coped admirably in a crisis, The Times (London), 12 July, Features, Times2, 16. Ekaizer, Ernesto (2004): ‚Atochagate’, la manipulación dentro de la manipulación, El País, 22 March, 27. FAZ.net (2004): Anschläge in Madrid. Zensurvorwürfe gegen Aznar, FAZ.net, 17 March, http://www.faz.net/IN/INtemplates/faznet/default.asp?tpl=common/ zwischenseite.asp&dox={8D5C0118-57F4-3D44-60BB-53895620036B}&rub= {28FC7689-42F34C5B-8297-CC6E16FFC8B4} (Access 29 Mar 07). Fischer, Henry W. III (2002): Terrorism and 11 September 2001: does the ‚behavioral response to disaster’ model fit?, Disaster Prevention and Management, 11 (2), 123-127. Gallup (2005): Bush Ratings Reach Low Point of Presidency, The Gallup Poll, 20.9.2005. Gelinsky, Katja (2005): Zerstörerische Fehler. Wie der Hurrikan ‚Katrina’ zu einer Naturkatastrophe gemacht wurde, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 September, (210), 9. Ingendaay, Paul (2004): Gib es weiter! Achtzig Stunden Delirium: Das Drama vor der spanischen Wahl, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 March, (70) 37. Langenau, Lars (2005): How London Prepared for Terror, Spiegel Online, 7 July, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,364214,00.html (Access 2 Apr 07). Manheim, Jarol B. (1994): Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reichertz, Jo (2007): Die Medien als selbständige Akteure, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 12, 19 March, 2531. Rosenthal, Uriel (2003): „September 11: Public Administration and the Study of Crises and Crisis Management“, Administration & Society, 35, 129-143. Schober, Wolfgang (2002): Die 4. Front: Die PR der NATO im Krieg, Wien: Literas Universitätsverlag. Schulz, Winfried (1976): Die Konstruktion von Realität in den Nachrichtenmedien: Analyse der aktuellen Berichterstattung, Freiburg, München: Alber.

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Sciolino, Elaine (2004): Spain Will Loosen Its Alliance With U.S., Premier-Elect Says, New York Times, 16 March, Foreign Desk, A1. Shane, Scott (2005): After Failures, Officials Play Blame Game, New York Times, 5 September, National Desk, A1. The Times (2005): Revulsion and Resolve, 8 July, (London), Features, 23.

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Global Sustainable Development and the Main National Strategies for the Environment in the Republic of Moldova Ghenadie SLOBODENIUC Ph.D Assistant Moldova State University Faculty International Relations, Political and Administrative Sciences Abstract. Besides representing the object of scientific study, the phenomenon of globalisation is a real and an inevitable process for the whole of humanity. In this context, the practical question is raised: how does the new political entity that is the Republic of Moldova integrate and take part in the accomplishment of the mega tendencies of global development and what new socio-political mechanisms are necessary to find a prompt answer to the challenges of the modern world, such as international terrorism, poverty and unemployment, international migration, environmental pollution, etc. This study has tried to avoid the simple affirmation and description of facts confirming the slow rhythm of institutional reforms in the Republic of Moldova. There are other scientific concepts of a more practical nature. Key barriers that stop the process of multidimensional development and placement of the Republic of Moldova in the category of developing countries are identified, systematised and analysed. The authors of the research have based their conclusion on the fundamental idea that state capacity for self-development of the Republic of Moldova will depend on investment in the development of human potential and authentic management of human resources. Thus, democracy is not perceived as people’s welfare; rather the system of democratic values represents the formula for conditions necessary for communication and collaboration in the joint fight against the main global challenges for humanity: poverty, environmental pollution, international terrorism and organised crime, etc. Keywords. Globalisation, sustainable development, national strategy, Republic of Moldova.

Introduction It is an historical fact that on the 27th of August 1991, a new actor in contemporary international relations appeared in the world political arena. During the period of independence which followed, the Moldovan Government has elaborated more than 47 national strategies and programmes for development of the country. Main Resources of the country The Republic has 3 significant resources upon which it can depend for change: „ Human/intellectual potential: population = 3,386,100 citizens „ Natural resources: (5 essential scientific reservations, 63 natural reservations, 41 landscape reservations)

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Economic Resources

Chronology of the basic global documents signed by the Republic of Moldova „ 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil – World Summit on Environment and Development „ 2000, New York – Millennium Developments Goals (New York, USA); (Goal 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability) „ 2002, Johannesburg - World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) „ 2004, Kyoto Protocol (started in the Republic of Moldova in 2005) „ To date the Republic of Moldova has signed and ratified 18 international conventions and documents on the environment. The list of global and regional conventions are published on the website: www.mediu.gov.md/index/47/339/ Environmental Policy in the Republic of Moldova „ „ „ „

Law of Environmental Protection (1993) National Programme of Strategic Actions for the Protection of the Environment (1995) National Action Plan for Environmental Protection (1996) The Republic of Moldova’s Strategy on Environment Protection (2001).

The goal of the new Republic of Moldova is: To contribute to sustainable development in the country whilst promoting the social and political mechanism of rational consumption of the natural and energy resources. Cooperation at international level and main National Projects provided by UNDP (2002 -2006) „ National Capacity Self-assessment of Global Environmental Management (Initiative by UNDP and the Global Environmental Fund) The aim was to implement three world environmental conventions in Moldova: 1. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 2. Convention on Biological Diversity 3. UN Convention to Combat Desertification. „ Implementation of the Refrigerant Management Plan At the UN Summit of 2000, the Republic of Moldova signed the Millennium Declaration. In this study we concentrate on Goal 7: Ensure a sustainable environment. • Integrate the principles of sustainable development into the country’s policies and programmes and reduce the degradation of natural resources • Halve the number of people who do not have secure access to safe water • Halve the number of people who do not have access to quality sanitation and waste disposal systems.

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Solutions and recommendations The main question is, what we can do together to promote sustainable development at local, national and international levels, to prevent catastrophes in the Republic of Moldova? My view is that we need to develop new relationships and to extend them vertically and horizontally at the different levels (local, national and global). Based on long term actions: 1. Promoting the principles of sustainable development in educational institutions at all levels and specialties in ecological issues 2. Extending dialogue and cooperation between the main actors (international organisations, state and civil society institutions, private companies, etc). The Republic of Moldova can explore the experience it accumulated whilst implementing the concept of “civic engagement”. This concept was elaborated and developed during the international partnership between Moldova State University and Rutgers University (New Jersey, USA). The aim of this international project was modernisation of the education system. The modernisation means a transfer from passivity to actively engaging in the social life of the main actors, i.e. students and professors. The area of civic engagement includes the question of the environment at a national level. Active participation helps the students to assimilate knowledge about the social reality and its problems and to identify possible solutions. This is very important for developing a new attitude, at the individual and collective level, towards preventing ecological problems in the country. The main agents in the complex connections of the Environmental National Programmes are: A) State: Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources and its basic institutions – (for structure see www.mediu.gov.md); B) Non-governmental organisations C) Private companies, national and international D) Educational institutions – schools, colleges and universities – concept of civic engagement (CEPO). As an example I will describe Global Youth Service Day, organised on the 11th to 13th of April 2006, in the community of Cosnita, Republic of Moldova. The goal of this project was to mobilise human potential at a local level. During the 3 days, students from Moldova State University and from Ion Creanga Lyceum realised a social, ecological and cultural programme. Conclusion The education system must become central to the ecological education of the new generation. We need to involve the country’s youth in the elaboration of decision making on the question of preventing an ecological catastrophe at a national and international level. For this to happen it is important to extend public financial support for universities and schools throughout the country. It is important to develop and realise human potential on environmental questions.

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Picture 1. Student group from Moldova State University at the seminar for Ion Creanga Lyceym, Cosnita explain the programme of environmental activities during the Global Youth Service Day

Picture 2. Children from the Lyceum cleaning

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Picture 3a. Participants in Global Youth Service Day (21 April 2006) in Cosnita, Republic of Moldova

Picture 3b. Participants in Global Youth Service Day (21 April 2006) in Cosnita, Republic of Moldova

References 1. UNDP Moldova: partnering for development. A review of the 2002-2006 country cooperation framework of the United Nations Development Programme – www.undp.md; 2. The First National Report. Millennium Development Goals in the Republic of Moldova – www.un.md;

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www.statistica.md www.mediu.gov.md

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Conclusion 1.

2. 3.

4.

Risk assessment should be a part of national policy regarding the protection of man and environment. It requires good strategic planning (e.g. land use planning) and action plans. It should be implemented into national legislation as a regulatory technique for risk zones. Good cooperation and joint bodies are required at international, national and regional levels for the risk assessment process. Risk assessment is an important tool for the identification of “accidental risk spots”. This helps to direct limited financial and capacity resources to areas of highest risk. For efficient risk assessment, the following tools and actions are necessary:    

5.

For preparedness in case of catastrophes it is necessary to create:   

6.

Information and technology transfer on a national and international level; Further development and harmonization of the methodologies within the framework of international cooperation; Measures to minimise human failure (e.g. avoidance of monotonousous procedures, rotating systems); The implementation of basic safety requirements, monitoring and inspection systems as preconditions.

an operational common e-data base for accurate information; a multilevel network should support specialized sections (natural and manmade disasters); a functional mechanism of institutional contacts between operators, authorities and mass-media to present credible information;

In the case of catastrophes, the vulnerability of critical infrastructures is most important. Therefore a baseline protection concept should be worked out.

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Author Index Alcaz, V. Anishchenko, O. Apostol, I. Avagyan, A.A. Biletska, E.M. Burmistr, M.V. Burya, A.I. Cherkassova, N.G. Coldewey, W.G. Cordoş, E. Coşara, V. Dahn, A. Douglas, B. Dunca, S. Dutrieux, A. Glavatska, V.I. Hagen, C. Isiciko, E. Khachatryan, D.A. Muchadze, T. Nekos, V. Osyiuk, V.A. Ozunu, A. Paskaleva, I.

1 73 v 205 226 145 145 145 84 177 177 101 172 162 177 226 247 1 195 26 242 210 177, 187 35

Petrescu, D.C. 187 Platkowski, J. 134 Reimer, D. v Reinhard, W. 113, 122 Rotariu, M. 154 Rudolph, T. 62 Sandu, I. 12 Seremet, E.N. 210 Shmatkov, G. 81 Slobodeniuc, G. 268 Ştefan, M. 162 Stepanyan, V.E. 195 Sudarev, A.P. 210 Tofan, L. 154 Toma, O. 149, 154, 162, 172 Török, Z. 177 Tschiedel, K. 91 Tsereteli, N. 26 Varazanashvili, O. 26 Viehrig, H. 258 Winkelmann-Oei, G. 129 Zaicenco, A. 1, 12 Zhukova, A.V. 145

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