Selling a 'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention

Selling a ‘Just’ War

Also by Michael Butler INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Selling a ‘Just’ War Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention Michael J. Butler Assistant Professor of Political Science, Clark University, USA

© Michael J. Butler 2012 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2012 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-0-230-36064-8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 21

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

To Ethan and Ben That your world may know more justice, and experience less war

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Contents List of Figures and Tables

viii

Preface and Acknowledgments

x

List of Acronyms

xiii

1

Introduction

1

2

Entering the Just War Conversation

18

3

Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars

46

4

Analyzing the Just War Frame

71

5

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

99

6

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil

141

7

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice

180

Conclusion: Selling a Just War

211

Notes

228

Bibliography

247

Index

271

vii

List of Figures and Tables Figures 1.1 1.2 3.1 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 7.1 7.2

Support for US troop use—2010 Support for US troop use—2006 The framing continuum Research design and questions Speech-acts referencing ‘Iraq/Gulf War’—POTUS November 8, 1990–April 11, 1991 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria) Speech-acts—primary audience (just cause criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion) Chronological effects, by month (all criteria) Just war significations by precept—November 1990 Just war significations by precept—December 1990 Just war significations by precept—January 1991 Just war significations by precept—February 1991 Just war significations by precept—March 1991 Just war significations by precept—April 1991 Speech-acts referencing ‘Kosovo’—POTUS March 24, 1999–June 10, 1999 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria) Speech-acts—primary audience (just cause criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion) Chronological effects, by month ( JW significations—all criteria) Just war significations by precept—March 1999 Just war significations by precept—April 1999 Just war significations by precept—May 1999 Just war significations by precept—June 1999 Speech-acts referencing ‘Afghanistan’—POTUS October 7, 2001–December 7, 2001 Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria) viii

7 8 59 97 111 116 117 121 122 125 127 127 128 128 129 129 156 160 162 164 165 167 168 169 169 170 189 192

List of Figures and Tables ix

7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 C.1

Speech-acts—primary audience (JW criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion) Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion) Chronological effects, by month ( JW significations—all criteria) Just war significations, by precept—October 2001 Just war significations, by precept—November 2001 Just war significations, by precept—December 2001 Evaluating frame application

194 195 196 198 200 200 201 213

Tables 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Operationalizing the just war frame Population of eligible cases Crisis profile: Gulf War Mono-applications and interactions Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience Distribution of just war significations by month and criteria Crisis profile: Kosovo Mono-applications and interactions Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience Distribution of just war significations by month and criteria Crisis profile: Afghanistan–USA Mono-applications and interactions Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience Distribution of just war significations by month and criteria

80 92 99 114 115 132 145 159 159 172 181 191 192 203

Preface and Acknowledgments In the words of Yeats, we make out of the quarrel with others rhetoric, but of the quarrel with ourselves, poetry. What follows is hardly poetic, but every bit the product of a prolonged (and sometimes seemingly intractable) self-quarrel. The gripping question of ‘why we fight’ has been a preoccupation of mine since a very young age—with the encroachment of moral considerations as well as justifications (which, as this book makes plain, are decidedly not the same thing) into that intellectual domain occurring in rough synchronicity with my own emergent and evolving understanding of morality and ethics. The chief by-product of the fusion of these two concerns has been a sustained research agenda defined by nearly a decade of rumination, dialogue, and investigation concerning the intersection of morality and war, and the utility, significance, and seeming ubiquity of just war theory in the American context in particular. This research agenda has evolved a great deal since its inception. Indeed, this particular installment in that agenda has itself undergone significant alterations in pivotal details pertaining to research design, methodology, data collection, and the like. Yet what has remained constant throughout is my central concern with attempting to unpack the timeless and timely question of what, if anything, makes the resort to war ‘just’—particularly in the view of those responsible for such a decision, as well as the rest of us who are impacted in manifold ways by it. After all, the decision to go to war, and the rationales affixed to those decisions after they are made, cannot be divorced from the larger political, social, and cultural context that spawn them. From that simple yet powerful realization, the question of how US foreign policy decision-makers ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience has come to occupy most of my waking hours for the past few years. This preoccupation only grew as I bore witness to the undertaking of three significant military operations by the US (in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya) in ‘real time’ while conceiving, researching, and eventually sitting down to write this book. The material costs—financial, and more importantly, human—of these military operations are at once staggering and sobering. Such adjectives can also be applied to their potential consequences for America’s credibility and legitimacy, especially in light of the sometimes profound gap between the x

Preface and Acknowledgments xi

objective realities of America’s wars and the justifications associated with them. It is to the pursuit of a better understanding of the space between, and the efforts of political leaders to close it, that this book is dedicated. I would like to specifically recognize the contributions of those without whom this book would never have come to be. The impetus for this project dates back several years, with the earliest stirrings occurring in a graduate seminar on conflict and cooperation at the University of Connecticut led by my dissertation chair, mentor, co-author, and above all friend, Mark Boyer. From the earliest kernel of a research question to the final stages of manuscript preparation, Mark has been a sounding board and source of sagacity on matters great and small. My debt of gratitude is boundless. So too must I extend great thanks to Garry Clifford and Betty Hanson, who each provided unique and crucial insights during the earliest stages of the project and timely words of encouragement as it took shape (and yes, Garry, you were right about the case studies). Two friends and collaborators, Natalie Florea Hudson and Anat Niv-Solomon, have also left their imprint on different components of the finished product—no doubt all to the good. I have also benefited greatly from outstanding research assistance from Larissa Forster and Avril Perez, each of whom contributed support with unfailing good humor at different and critical times in the development of the project. I would also like to acknowledge the team at Palgrave Macmillan, in particular Christina M. Brian and Renée Takken, for their faithful commitment to this book. One would be hard pressed to find a more supportive or responsive editor than Christina. I also extend my gratitute to those in the field and profession whom I have consulted along the way, and who have provided valuable feedback. At the risk of inevitably excluding someone from whose input I have benefited, I specifically would like to thank Babak Bahador, Alex Bellamy, Scott Brown, Melissa Butler, Toni Erskine, Fran Harbour, Rich Hiskes, Tony Lang, Doug Little, Cian O’Driscoll, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Ernie Zirakzadeh, and the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their careful and constructive critiques. Two scholars from outside the field and discipline (respectively), Erin Kirby Knight and Christopher Knight, also provided fresh perspective as well as remaining two of my oldest and dearest friends. Though of course the finished product remains flawed, those flaws persist in spite of the efforts of each of these outstanding scholars. I would be remiss in not also acknowledging my terrific colleagues in the Political Science department at Clark. Their uniform commitment to excellence in scholarship is truly remarkable. This book would not have

xii Preface and Acknowledgments

been possible without generous support from the Francis A. Harrington Public Affairs Fund as well as receipt of a Faculty Development Grant from Clark University. I am also grateful for the perceptive insights concerning military intervention, particularly in the American context, of the students in my spring 2009 capstone seminar ‘Intervention in World Politics’ as well as those in my spring 2011 US Foreign Policy course. Most importantly, I thank my family. My parents, Robert and Eileen, get the credit/blame for nurturing a young boy with an abiding curiosity in war which undoubtedly must have given them pause at times. Dad remains ever wise on the subject; Mom remains deeply loved and missed. My in-laws, Dennis and Sandy, have provided tremendous support to my family in my frequent absences. My wife Melissa has not only been the greatest partner and friend one could ever ask for, but also a continual source of constructive criticism and astute insight on matters of both substance and design. Moreover, she is herself a moral force and a seeker of justice. This book bears her imprint in many, many ways. In closing, I must pay heed to the burden borne so graciously by my sons, Ethan and Ben, while I have been whiling away at this project for too long. That burden has been tremendous, especially in the time lost that can never be reclaimed. I thank them for a patience and maturity beyond their years. So it is to them that I dedicate this book, with the hopes that they and their generation might know more of justice, and less of the sword. Michael J. Butler Worcester, MA USA

List of Acronyms APEC CCGA CENTCOM CIDCM CSCE/OSCE

EU FRY GWO ICTY IICK JW KLA NAR NATO NCCB POTUS SAD SIPRI UNIKOM UNPREDEP UNSC UPI USSOCOM VFW

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Chicago Council on Global Affairs United States Central Command Center for International Development and Conflict Management Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe European Union Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Global War on Terrorism International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Independent International Commission on Kosovo Just war Kosovo Liberation Army National Archives and Records Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Conference of Catholic Bishops President of the United States Special Activities Division Stockholm International Peace Research Institute United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Preventative Development Force (Republic of Macedonia) United Nations Security Council United Press International US Special Operations Command Veterans of Foreign Wars

xiii

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1 Introduction

The persistent problem of war Few if any concerns are more timeless or resonate more broadly in the study of foreign policy than the decision by states and their leaders to go to war. In no small part the timeless nature of this concern can be attributed to the fact that military force has long been and remains central to the practice of statecraft. The collective pursuit of organized armed violence to some defined end has proven a recurring feature of international society since the codification of the rules and practices of a state-based system in the Treaties of Westphalia. War has maintained its viability in the face of numerous supposed portents of its demise. Examples of such portents include (but are not limited to) the dawn of the Enlightenment and the birth of popular sovereignty in the latter half of the 18th century, the founding of the ‘Concert of Europe’ in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, and the convening of a series of peace conferences beginning in the late 19th century (such as the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907). For its part, the 20th century featured the most extensive evidence of war’s allegedly approaching obsolescence (Mueller, 1990). In this vein, one can point to the persistence of war in the face of the formation of not one but two international organizations (the League of Nations in 1919, the United Nations in 1945) as well as numerous non-governmental organizations dedicated to the pursuit of peace. Further evidence to this effect includes the establishment of the so-called ‘North American security community’ (epitomized by the founding of NATO in 1949, and the entire European integration process beginning in the early 1950s), as well as successive ‘waves’ of democratization expanding the liberal ‘zone of peace’ and supporting assertions of the ‘iron law’ of the 1

2 Selling a ‘Just’ War

democratic peace (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b; Levy, 1988). However, the persistence of warfare despite these developments has confined anticipations of a more stable and pacific world order largely to the realm of the ideal.1 So too did the sudden and extensive proliferation of armed conflict unleashed with the welcome demise of the Cold War quickly expose the fallacy of triumphal proclamations of the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989). Despite the purported ascendance of pacific values and institutions, then, warfare endures. Since 1990, almost four million people have died in wars (90 per cent of them civilians), while over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a direct result of conflict (Sheehan, 2008). While empirical data suggests that both the aggregate number of armed conflicts and the incidence of traditional interstate wars are declining (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010), since the end of the Cold War the use of force—in particular intra-state armed conflicts or military interventions—remains pervasive.2 As this data indicates, the use (and threatened use) of military force is still the ultima ratio in the contemporary international system. It is a tool that is available to and employed by the leaders of nearly all states regardless of regime type, level of economic development, geographic location, population size, and any other indicator one might employ to distinguish states from one another (Hewitt et al., 2010). The continuing utility and appeal of military force as an implement of statecraft is brought into greater relief when one narrows the focus to recent and contemporary US foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, the US has stood apart from the rest of the international community in terms of both the frequency and magnitude of its military commitments (Butler, 2003). While military force retains great utility for most states, the United States undoubtedly stands alone in its capacity and seeming willingness to employ military force, characteristics that remain undiminished even with the end of the Cold War (von Hippel, 2000). As this book was completed in the summer of 2011, the US was involved in yet another military intervention in response to a crisis, as part of a NATO operation (‘Operation Unified Protector’) contributing to the end of Moammar Gaddafi’s four decades of autocratic rule in Libya.

War and the liberal contradiction Such persistent realities concerning the utility of military force as an instrument of statecraft and as a centerpiece of US foreign policy are

Introduction 3

not in and of themselves noteworthy, unless one considers them in light of the emergence and intensification of liberal norms and values within the international system over the past several decades. Given their substantive content, one would be right to expect that the conditioning influence of liberal norms and values on state behavior would restrain and even inhibit the use of force in liberal societies such as the United States. This claim has a basis in centuries of liberal thought and decades of empirical research (Russett and Oneal, 2001; Doyle, 1986). Taken to their logical extent, theoretical articulations and empirical refinements in this research tradition suggest that the emphasis on the non-violent resolution of disputes and the cultivation of a cosmopolitan world order should make the continued practice of war increasingly unpalatable in liberal societies, to citizens and leaders alike (Russett, 1993; Dixon, 1994; Weart, 1998). Viewed from the Kantian position underpinning much contemporary liberal thought on questions of war and peace, the use of force in pursuit of the national interest poses a particularly insidious problem. In the liberal view the use of military force is considered an anachronistic endeavor, the utility of which—in a world characterized by an expanding ‘zone of peace’—is in steep decline (Doyle, 1983a, 1983b). The essential basis for this assessment stems from an alleged incompatibility between the underlying norms and reinforcing institutions of liberal democracy on one hand, and the admissibility of violence as an instrument for resolving political and social grievances on the other (Russett and Oneal, 2001).3 Furthermore, the principle of nonintervention (steeped in the classical dictum cuius regio eius religio, or ‘to each prince, his own religion’) has remained a central tenet of international law in the Westphalian order, as codified in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter and elsewhere (von Hippel, 2000). Yet in terms of actual practice, it is a well-chronicled fact that liberal states retain extensive and sophisticated military arsenals that they readily employ (Gleditsch, 2008). This is especially true of the United States, the world’s singular military power as well as its most frequent practitioner of military force. It is this stark contradiction between the ‘normative logic’ of the liberal peace (Rosato, 2003) and the empirical record of contemporary American foreign policy that is the point of origin for this inquiry. Neither this contradiction nor its potential ramifications for the conduct of liberal statecraft is particularly new; indeed, they are long-standing by-products of the incompatibility between the Clausewitzian view of military force as an extension of policy and the Kantian faith that societies governed

4 Selling a ‘Just’ War

by liberal norms and republican institutions will evolve to adopt nonviolent methods of dispute resolution even in the conduct of foreign policy (Clausewitz, 1984; Covell, 1998). The central place of this fundamental contradiction within US foreign policy in particular has been well-chronicled by realists and critical theorists alike, such that it can be accepted on an a priori basis without much hazard. Morgenthau (1946: 51) considered such Wilsonian rhetoric the outward ‘expression of an eschatological hope deeply imbedded in the very foundations of liberal foreign policy’; that ‘hope’ being the prospect of bending war to the pursuit of perpetual peace. In reassessing the tradition that produced thinkers such as Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, Tjalve (2008) lauds their efforts at ‘cutting down the national ego’ perpetuated by the ‘Believers’ and ‘Technicians’ of a liberal (and more recently, neo-conservative) bent, and the contradictory position on the legitimacy of war and imperial dominion in mainstream American liberalism that a fusion of the two ethos abstracts away through assumption and assertion of its own inherent virtue (Bishai, 2004; Smith, 2007). At one time, this contradiction troubled even liberals. For his part, Kant (1905) eschewed the idea of realizing a ‘league of nations’ through anything other than evolutionary and non-coercive means. Mill’s classic essay ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ (1859) underscored the incompatibility of the liberal goal of fostering national self-determination through coercive means (if for no other reason than the reality that a nation requiring outside assistance is not yet ready for self-determination). While more recent appraisals by prominent liberal theorists have proven relatively more generous in seeking to define the conditions where the use of force can be considered consonant with liberal values, they have generally accepted the inadmissibility of military coercion outside of strictly defined exceptions to the ‘legalist paradigm’ (Walzer, 1977; Rawls, 1993). Yet it is the magnification and intensification of this contradiction in the practice of contemporary (post-Cold War) American foreign policy, borne out in the highly idealistic nature of the policy discourse and the frequency and magnitude of US military engagements, which makes it of pre-eminent concern.4

Problematizing the war-decision The starting point for this research is this profound gap between stated norms and actual behavior with respect to the use of force in contemporary US foreign policy—a juxtaposition between liberal values and illiberal policies at the very heart of contemporary US foreign policy

Introduction 5

(Desch, 2008). The decision to go to war, and the factors underlying that decision, have been subjects of paramount interest amongst scholars of international relations, so much so that the study of war and of international relations have been deemed ‘coterminous’ (Vasquez, 2004). The war-decision has received extensive attention from scholars of international conflict and foreign policy interested in advancing our collective understanding of empirical patterns and processes of conflict behavior, not to mention foreign policy decision-making (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Huth, 1996; Leng, 1993; Vasquez, 1993; Levy, 1983; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). As the empirical record indicates, the utility of military force as well as the desire of decision-makers to retain as much sovereign authority as possible over the war-decision are central to the practice of foreign policy in all states with any discernable military capabilities, irrespective of regime type (Rosato, 2003). The ‘crisis of legitimacy’ The claim that foreign policy decision-makers in the United States wish to possess and retain extensive decision-making authority over the wardecision is hardly debatable. Yet as liberal states such as the United States employ military force on a routine basis while continuing to publicly champion the benefits of cooperation, the implications of the aforementioned ‘liberal contradiction’ for the continued ability of US foreign policy decision-makers to use military force have grown apace (Ikenberry, 2006). To the extent that the use of force in the pursuit of national interests seems at odds with the foundational precepts of political liberalism, the continued reliance on the use of coercive military force in the pursuit or defense of foreign policy interests and strategic objectives by the US and other liberal democracies inevitably raises the specter of hypocrisy. This is especially the case if that decision cannot be grounded in conditions approximating a plausibly legitimate casus belli. At the heart of the matter lies a practical problem confronting decisionmakers in the US, and indeed any liberal democracy: the difficulty of implementing a policy decision when the decision and/or its objectives are perceived as lacking in legitimacy due to their seeming contrast with the liberal faith in ‘progress’––in this case, a more pacific world (Bukovansky, 2002). In light of the proliferation of liberal norms and institutions in both the domestic and international arena, the continued reliance on military force by liberal states constitutes a violation of the liberal creed, evoking a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ for liberal states with respect to their foreign policy behavior (Rosato, 2003; Bukovansky, 2007;

6 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Hurd, 2007). That such a problem might be described in crisis terms conveys the extent to which legitimacy has become a paramount concern in assessing US foreign policy, where the seeds of the liberal contradiction on the use of force have in recent years come to bear bitter fruit through ‘revisionist’ norm-breaking (Hurd, 2007). Defined by Hurd (1999: 381) as ‘the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’, the subjective and perceptual aspect of legitimacy comes to matter in behavioral terms when social convictions about what constitutes legitimate (and, for that matter, illegitimate) interests or actions become individually and collectively internalized by decision-makers and citizens. This social inculcation of what constitutes a legitimate interest, decision, or behavior is clearly influential for foreign policy decisions and international power relations, helping define the realm of the possible (Lake, 2009). The importance of legitimacy in the policy domain, as well as its inherently contested nature, itself reveals how and why the framing of decisions is crucial for effective policy implementation in liberal societies. The implementation problem US military engagements are hardly infrequent occurrences. Furthermore, as Mueller (2002) contends, Presidents do not necessarily need extensive public support in order to initiate a military venture. Within the contemporary American context the commitment of military force by foreign policy decision-makers typically confronts extensive domestic opposition from the public, the minority party, or in the media only when efforts on the battlefield begin to bog down, result in mounting casualties, or are waged for under-specified causes (Holsti, 2004; Mueller, 2002; Jentleson and Britton, 1998; Jentleson, 1992). In light of all this, does the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ suggested above pose an obstacle to foreign policy decisionmakers seeking to go to war? Aside from defeat (actual, potential, or perceived) on the battlefield, a chief source of domestic opposition to the use of force in the contemporary American context is a latent societal ambivalence toward war, borne of the aforementioned ‘liberal contradiction’. Perhaps paradoxically, it is the very persistence and frequency of war-making by the US that sows the seeds for this ambivalence. Indeed, in the view of one of the great living historians of war, the prominence of military force in the policy toolkit of liberal states has elicited a ‘pang of conscience’ producing a distinctively negative representation of warfare in the public domain of modern liberal societies (Howard, 1978). In the process, the continuing primacy of war has produced (and continues to produce)

Introduction 7

the conditions for a latent and generalized diminution in societal support for that endeavor (ibid.). Evidence of this growing ambivalence toward war abounds even in the US, where the resort to war is most frequent and popular support for war seemingly greatest. For example, the latest installment of the ‘Global Views’ survey administered by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs offers clear evidence of a generalized diminution in societal support for war across a number of indicators (CCGA, 2010). The most direct evidence are prevailing attitudes toward the appropriate use of US military force (see Figure 1.1). Presented with a number of scenarios for the use of force, a majority of respondents oppose committing US troops even to the highly conventional and seemingly justifiable cause of defending important allies such as Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan (ibid.). This seemingly surprising result was confirmed in a broad range of findings relative to other similar questions. A majority (56 per cent) oppose US intervention in the event of a war between Israel and Iran; over two-thirds (67 per cent) favor completely withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan immediately or within two years. Likewise, anywhere from 40 per cent to 76 per cent consider any hypothesized positive outcomes from a US military strike on Iran either ‘not very likely’ or ‘not at all likely’, and nearly half the respondents oppose long-term military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Japan (ibid.). While such findings might be partly attributable to war fatigue relative to campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq or the current economic downturn (which often corresponds with decreased support for international Figure 1.1

Support for US troop use—2010 (adapted from CCGA, 2010)

Percentage supporting/opposing the use of US troops in each of the following scenarios. If China invaded Taiwan

If North Korea invaded South Korea

Favor Oppose

If Israel were attacked by its neighbors

Part of international peacekeeping force to enforce peace agreement between Israel and Palestinians

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Introduction 9

for unclear or debatable causes or undertaken with questionable authority or objectives. Effective implementation of the decision to go to war is inextricably linked to the perceived legitimacy of that decision within American society. Military campaigns that are accepted as legitimate and necessary by society at-large are more likely to prove successful. This is far from an idle or specious claim; none other than the 19th century Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself stressed the importance of attracting and maintaining broad societal support in order to increase the odds of victorious military campaigns. Consequently, emergent ambivalence towards the use of force in American society poses a significant obstacle to US foreign policy decision-makers, both in advancing the decision to use military force in discrete applications as well as in securing its continued pre-eminence in the foreign policy toolkit. War as social practice The twinned problems of legitimacy and implementation relative to the war-decision underscore the extent to which war should be understood as a fundamentally social practice (Vasquez, 2004; Mann, 1993; Buzan, 1983). Indeed, in studying the (affirmative) war-decision we can discern a great deal not only about the choices and preferences of authoritative decision-units (Hermann et al., 2001), but also the social bases of those choices and preferences. Prevailing conceptions of the ‘national interest’, the decisions these conceptions precipitate, and especially the rationales affixed to those decisions after they are made are all concerns which cannot be divorced from the larger political, social, and cultural context that spawn them (Hess, 2009; Finnemore, 2003; Hoffmann, 2003; Campbell, 1998). As Clausewitz (1984) reminded us well over a century ago, the success of any prominent and sustained application of military force demands that political leaders not only draw upon the forces of creativity associated with military strategists but also tap into and bridle the forces of passion embodied in the nation. This dictum is no less true of contemporary warfare (Posen, 2003). Wars which are thought to be in some sense legitimate in the eyes of the society waging them are, from a strategic sense, wars which are typically easier to prosecute, more widely supported at home, and accordingly more likely to succeed in fulfilling their objectives. Whether in seeking to amass a sufficient reserve of tangible (troops, money) or intangible (morale) resources, the ability to effectively utilize military force as an instrument of statecraft remains contingent on the ability of decision-makers to cultivate and sustain a broad-based, enduring, and resilient reserve of societal support—a reserve of support undoubtedly contingent on prevailing perceptions of the legitimacy of the initial decision to go to war.

10 Selling a ‘Just’ War

A key requisite for obtaining that support is that the society at-large believes the initial decision to start the war to be legitimate and correct (Gelpi et al., 2009). As was discussed earlier, the evident disjuncture between stated societal values and actual state behavior concerning war in the American context fosters a predisposition against war-decisions advanced without an adequate rationale. The decision to employ military force, while far from uncommon, is nonetheless largely understood to be undesirable. The most basic expression of this normative position is that war is something requiring justification, and as such is something to be restricted rather than promoted, and undertaken carefully and soberly (if at all). This expressed position relative to war and the war-decision has two major and distinctive sources, each rooted in the liberal tradition. The first is moral-ethical; in this view, the decision to go to war is appraised in light of a ‘categorical imperative’ in which some universal code of conduct (often steeped in natural law) should provide the lodestar for evaluation.5 The second source is utilitarian in nature. In this translation, war-avoidance is desirable for practical reasons; irrespective of whether war violates any defined notion of what is ‘right’ or ‘good’ it is costly, and those costs must be identified in full and balanced against war’s attendant and presumed benefits.6 These considerations create and sustain an environment of ‘norm contestation’ (Hoffmann, 2007) bounding the practice of war in liberal societies. The chief implication of this normative contestation in the American context is that it produces and sustains a definitive and consequential societal standard that must be accounted for and met by decision-makers wishing to employ military force. While decision-makers can and sometimes do railroad the war-decision through the political process without effectively attempting to ‘sell’ that decision to the public, doing so jeopardizes the military operation itself, the strategic and policy objectives associated with it, and the political fortunes of those responsible for the decision. This seems especially the case for liberal democracies like the United States. A decidedly public (and occasionally doctrinaire) adherence to the notion of popular sovereignty and the introduction of institutions of republican government have made it increasingly imperative for American foreign policy decision-makers seeking to effectively advance and implement the war-decision to justify that decision in a way that appeals to the populace, so as to elicit a necessary (if not sufficient) measure of societal support. In light of this, the public presentation of the war-decision should be understood as, in fact, a matter of vital and practical importance to the effective conduct of statecraft.

Introduction 11

Given the importance of securing broad societal support to the effective conduct of any war and to sustaining the practice of war in general, a pervasive if latent societal ambivalence about the decision to go to war poses a clear and significant problem for US foreign policy decision-makers. In a nod to Doyle (1983b), in the American context it would seem imperative not only that liberal wars be fought for liberal purposes, but also (and perhaps more importantly) that liberal wars be justified on liberal grounds. How, precisely, can the stark contradiction between the values liberal leaders and societies profess to adhere to and the continued prosecution of a highly militarized and self-interested US foreign policy be reconciled?

Framing a solution The importance of effectively ‘selling’ the war-decision within the context of US foreign policy is greatly magnified by the uneasy place of residence of military force in the liberal imagination. In the end, the fact that the conduct of US foreign policy rests so heavily on the ideological firmament of liberal values and ideals makes the specter of betraying those values and ideals qualitatively significant. With the American ‘national interest’ so thoroughly infused with liberal ideals, the betrayal of those ideals (defined as the naked use of aggression without an accompanying justificatory rationale) would constitute a significant failure in policy terms, relative to securing those interests. In light of this challenge, the war-decision generates a particularly pernicious dilemma for American foreign policy decision-makers: namely, how to ‘sell’ that decision and its attendant risks and costs to constituent audiences who may not fully comprehend the rationale for it, or who may oppose the use of military force (Berinsky, 2007). Accordingly, this research is primarily concerned with explaining how the contradiction at the heart of liberal statecraft described here is reconciled within contemporary American foreign policy and society, such that the use of force has retained (and is likely to continue to retain) its utility and appeal. This research advances an answer to that question, in the form of the ‘just war frame’. Grounded in a centuries-old ‘conversation’ concerning the legitimacy of war and drawing from the language and concepts of the highly mutable set of applied ethical criteria, this frame plays a key role in the ‘politics of signification’ concerning war in the American context (Hall, 1997). This contention thus informs the main hypothesis which this inquiry seeks to confirm: namely, that the just war frame is the central mechanism employed by US foreign policy decision-makers in ‘selling’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience.

12 Selling a ‘Just’ War

This hypothesis rests on several simple if key underlying assumptions. The first of these is that the conduct of American foreign policy has been and remains fundamentally dependent on and linked to military force and its expedient projection in ‘wars of choice’. As such, foreign policy principals with a major role in the war-decision wish to retain sovereign agency over that decision; so much as to occasionally, or perhaps frequently, prompt them to lie to the domestic audience (Mearsheimer, 2011). These are closely related objectives that I contend are enduring over time and which transcend political party and ideology, at least among those individuals who ascend to a position of significant decisionmaking authority relative to the war-decision. They are also objectives that I contend remain relatively unaffected by the pangs of the ‘liberal conscience’ (Howard, 1978) or whatever degree of normative contestation surround the use of force may exist within American society. This is not to say that foreign policy decision-makers in the US are unaffected by liberal values and ideals, or unmoved by them in terms of charting a foreign policy course of action. Rather, the distinction of relevance here is that the conduct of statecraft as well as the discharge of responsibility to ensure the national security and to pursue the national interest requires a degree of pragmatism and appreciation for maximizing and wielding power––and there is no greater measure or translation of power in the continued anarchy that is the international system than military force. As a result, even leaders in liberal societies like the US—where interests are defined in ideational terms, and where ideological crusades are advanced on a quasi-regular basis—are driven by strategic considerations to consolidate their position atop the Clausewitzian ‘trinity’, even through deception if necessary (Mearsheimer, 2011). The second assumption underpinning this hypothesis is that the pangs of ‘liberal conscience’ on the war-question, and the societal norms delineating the use of force as a generally undesirable course of action, actually matter in that they generate real political costs and operational constraints. In other words, the specter of hypocrisy and the crisis of liberalism it reveals have ‘real world’ implications, generating political costs and operational constraints for war-decisions that are or appear to be illconceived and especially those that are under-justified or even unjustified. Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’ again proves instructive in reminding us of the nexus between the state, military leaders, and the populace. A lack of broad, enduring, and resilient support within domestic society can have damaging if not devastating effects both for the military operation and the individuals and/or political parties responsible for it, as

Introduction 13

military campaigns in Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq among others have demonstrated. As even casual observation attests, just war language abounds in the public rhetoric of recent US Presidents and other foreign policy decisionmakers (Lakoff and Frisch, 2006; Bellamy, 2005; Galston, 2002; Ratner, 2002; Russett and Starr, 1992). Some analysts have gone as far as to suggest the use of moralistic language in conjunction with war reflects a historically unprecedented ‘moralist turn’ (Flint and Falah, 2004; Crawford, 2003; Bennett, 2002). This thesis has been widely circulated among journalists and pundits (Schneider, 2005; Feldmann, 2004; Beatty, 2003) as well as scholars (Rengger, 2002; Salter, 2002). While in recent years this claim was most often advanced in relation to the George W. Bush Administration and in particular President Bush (Dolan, 2005; Bovard, 2004; Singer, 2004; Zarefsky, 2004; Cienki, 2004), the tendency of American political elites to rely on moral language to justify policy decisions of broad social import (especially foreign policy and war) in both the public and private sphere is a phenomenon of long-standing concern (Burke, 2004; Niebuhr, 2002; Campbell, 1998; Morgenthau, 1946). Notwithstanding these important contributions, the central claim advanced here concerning the importance of just war theory for US foreign policy decision-makers speaks to a somewhat different concern. This research does not contend with the question of whether or not war in general, or particular war-decisions, are just or unjust. Nor do I seek to restate the well-worn argument that the morally charged language and concepts of just war theory are important to US foreign policy. Rather, in invoking, operationalizing, and empirically evaluating the ‘just war frame’, I seek to examine not whether but instead how and to what degree the language and concepts of just war theory are utilized as instruments of meaning-making to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience. While the claim that just war theory has long been and remains central to both US foreign policy is firmly established (Wells, 1969), how it has been employed in the service of generating broad societal support for particular war-decisions is a phenomenon that is less well-understood. The pursuit of an answer to this overarching question uncovers other important and related considerations of concern in the process. While the question of whether just war theory ‘matters’ for US foreign policy and the discourse enveloping it can be more or less accepted affirmatively on an a priori basis, what do we know about how it matters? Do foreign policy decision-makers employ just war language in a purposeful, intentional, and systematic way to ‘sell’ their decisions to go to

14 Selling a ‘Just’ War

war? If they do, which components of the theory matter most, and translate the best—and in which circumstances? Do certain aspects of just war theory and its various translations matter more, or resonate more widely, in some types or cases of conflicts than others? If so, which ones and in which circumstances? How do various components of the notion of the ‘just war’ translate to different audiences? Does the appeal of just war concepts and language differ in discernable ways with respect to the mass public, opinion leaders, or the mainstream media—and if so, in what ways? Do just war concepts and rhetoric change appreciably over the span of their use by decision-makers in conjunction with a particular conflict? Investigating these questions requires a systematic and rigorous empirical examination, one informed by a robust appreciation of framing and frames relative to foreign policy and in particular the decision to go to war. Several recent and noteworthy exceptions notwithstanding (Western, 2005; Entman, 2004; Baum, 2003; Allen et al., 1994), for the most part the construction of frames and their application to the decision to go to war by agents of the state remains an under-examined dimension of US foreign policy decision-making. Through introduction of the just war frame, this research seeks to rigorously and critically evaluate just war theory as a policy tool. In doing so, I will draw from the rich theoretical insights of the just war literature (see Ramsey, 1968; Walzer, 1977; Bull, 1979; Falk, 2004) and related investigations of the relationship between societal norms and US foreign policy (Tucker, 1960; Osgood and Tucker, 1967; Cohen, 1984; Payne, 1995; Glennon, 1999; Fager, 2002) while simultaneously aspiring to the empirical sophistication of leading studies of US military intervention (Regan, 1998; Haass, 1999; Peceny, 1999a; Chatterjee and Scheid, 2003; Meernik, 2004). Many scholars of just war theory consider the theory’s power to emanate from its potential to offer the philosopher, the statesperson, and the citizen alike an objective standard for ascertaining the conditions in which war might be considered ethically and morally permissible. This is accurate, to the extent that one remains in the realm of the abstract. Yet for those who may seek to apply this (or any) theory to the ‘real world’, and test its utility within the realm of state behavior and foreign policy, such reification suggests a misinterpretation of the actual purpose and power of just war theory. In seeking to distill just war theory into a device useful for social scientific inquiry, such a view of the theory would be wrong-headed. In an application such as this, just war theory is better engaged from a critical vantage point, and viewed as a subjective social construct that can be employed (to varying effect) by

Introduction 15

foreign policy decision-makers to the end of crafting inter-subjective meaning about the fundamentally social practice of war. In the realm of foreign policy, wars that are thought to be ‘just’ (or, perhaps more accurately, wars made out to be just by those interested in prosecuting them) are wars which important constituents of the society waging them are likely to support, and wars which are more likely to satisfy the objectives with which they are associated. It is therefore hardly a stretch to conclude from this that wars which are thought to be ‘just’ possess something of a reflected glow, in that the society waging them are more likely to embrace them because they are seen as legitimate. In turn it is this ‘reflected glow’ which is important—nee, vital—not only to the success of discrete wars or military campaigns, but beyond that to maintaining the legitimacy and by extension the utility of the larger enterprise and of war.

Interrogating the just war This book stands as a testimony to the conviction that greater heed should be paid to framing within the realm of US foreign policy, and in particular the framing of the most significant foreign policy decision of all: the decision to go to war. Careful examination of the application of the ‘just war frame’ can also shed light on whether and to what degree decision-makers find that particular framing useful, in what circumstances, and why. Characterized in the broadest terms, this book seeks to advance our understanding of US foreign policy decision-making through an empirically grounded constructivist inquiry designed to demonstrate in detail how and why the framing of foreign policy decisions entailing the use of military force ‘matters’. Exploring the construction and effects of a foreign policy frame such as the ‘just war’ frame is important in that it helps identify the larger social forces that establish the parameters of the possible and define the limits of the legitimate with respect to the resort to war. In the words of Hans Morgenthau (1945: 1), ‘It is the task of every generation to rediscover and reformulate the perennial problems of political ethics and answer them in the light of the experience of the age.’ As the point of departure for this analysis, Chapter 2 (Entering the Just War ‘Conversation’), seeks to grapple with that task by unpacking the fundamentally social basis of war, the war-decision, and the veritable notion of a ‘just war’ in liberal societies. This chapter provides a thorough exposition of the centuries-old ‘conversation’ concerning the legitimacy of war in the Western sociohistorical context referred to by James Turner Johnson (among others) as

16 Selling a ‘Just’ War

the just war tradition. This conversation concerning the legitimacy of war is of course intimately linked with just war theory itself, emanating from while also itself shaping that theory’s internal logic and external application. Chapter 2 thereby seeks to provide both a comprehensive appraisal both of the origins, evolution, modification, and application of just war theory over the centuries as well as the socio-historical narrative in which that theory and its origins, evolution, modification, and application was embedded. Chapter 3 (Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars) begins with an examination of frames as concepts and framing as a process, taking into account not only what constitutes a ‘frame’ but also the particular (if oft-overlooked) relevance of frames to foreign policy analysis. The employment of socially and culturally resonant ideas, values, and narratives to frame the benefits of, and cultivate public support for, any proposed policy by the proponents of that policy are crucial determinants of whether or not that policy is adopted and effectively implemented (at least if the polity is operating as intended and designed). As such, frames serve as the key conduit between policy elites and the domestic audience, constructing and conveying meaning about the problem at hand, the merits of the proposed policy solution, and the pitfalls of alternative courses of action. In seeking to systematically investigate the constellation of ideas, values, beliefs, and symbols that US decisionmakers rely on in order to ‘sell’ the public on the merits of the use of force, the concept of framing provides the best and most logical entrée. Chapter 4 (Analyzing the Just War Frame) turns directly to the task of operationalizing the mechanism that I contend is expressly used by US foreign policy decision-makers to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience. In light of the decidedly applied nature of the just war theory and tradition from which it is drawn, this chapter demonstrates how the just war frame and the specific translations of the basic criteria of just war theory (just cause, competent authority, right intention) that comprise it can be thought of as a viable device for assessing the representation and signification of affirmative wardecisions in contemporary American foreign policy and society. Upon establishing the function and form of the just war frame, this chapter also provides a detailed explanation of the terms and parameters structuring the analysis of that frame’s application to military intervention decisions. That analysis of the application of the just war frame to affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign policy is executed here through employment of a multi-case study research design. The first of the three

Introduction 17

case studies of affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign policy comprising the empirical testing ground for the claims at the heart of this inquiry is advanced in Chapter 5 (The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm). This case study, like the two that follow it (Chapter 6, Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil and Chapter 7, Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice), draws upon an array of primary and secondary sources in crafting an analysis of the use of the just war frame to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in response to these three US foreign policy crises. As such, the three case study chapters (each drawing their titles from the operational monikers of the respective military interventions of concern) are structured around a content analysis of the employment of the just war frame by the President to define the wardecision as ‘just’ for public consumption, taking into account factors such as differential points of emphasis within the frame, disparate target audiences, and the dynamic evolution of the crisis itself. These case studies are not concerned with a full profile of the crises themselves or an inventory of the causes or triggers of the US military response, but rather with rigorously examining the application of the just war frame and its utility as a mechanism for ‘selling’ decisions to go to war on an ex post facto basis. The temporal span of the three case studies, as well as the future oriented nature of an inquiry concerned with assessing the claim that the just war frame is the chief mechanism ensuring the continued appeal of military force in American foreign policy and society, requires higherorder consideration of the just war frame. Whereas the preceding chapters permit in-depth consideration of the use and utility of the just war frame in each discrete application, the Conclusion appraises the specific insights about the frame’s application gleaned from those case studies in light of the evolution of US foreign policy over the 20-year period since the end of the Cold War. In drawing together the most significant empirical and theoretical findings gleaned from the individual case studies, the concluding chapter provides an opportunity to assess the tasks and attributes of the just war frame, evaluate the just war frame’s credibility, salience, and dynamism, and reflect on the overarching questions and propositions concerning the utility and appeal of military force in contemporary US foreign policy that are the catalysts for this investigation.

2 Entering the Just War Conversation

The core function of any frame is to advance a collective perception of some problem as well as a consensus concerning its optimal solution (Benford, 1987; Nepstad, 1997). As such, the claim that a consensus concerning the war problématique in US foreign policy has been cultivated through use of the ‘just war frame’ requires one to first assess when and under what conditions the resort to war is deemed legitimate in the American context, and whether that narrative exhibits fidelity with the hypothesized just war frame (Campbell, 1988; Rudé, 1980; Gouldner, 1970). Evaluating the application of the just war frame as an instrument of the ‘politics of signification’ (Hall, 1997) ultimately requires one to consider the broad parameters of the social narrative within which the signifying frame in question might be embedded. Before turning to that consideration, however, a point of clarification is in order. The main intention of this chapter is not to provide a thorough account of just war theory. Rather, this chapter seeks to identify and contextualize the major historical installments in the just war tradition, defined for the purposes of this inquiry as a ‘conversation about the legitimacy of war’ (Bellamy, 2006: 2) intended to provide a ‘cultural regulation of violence’ (Johnson, 1981). In favoring the metaphor of conversation over that of theory, this research stakes out an ontological position that the just war criteria are better thought of as the by-products of a long-running and fully mutable social narrative, rather than the fixed output of an unyielding scientific proposition defined by an unyielding set of laws (Rodin, 2005). Given this ontological position, consideration of the emergence and evolution of the just war tradition, and the ways in which it informs a broader social narrative concerning the legitimacy, permissibility, and even desirability of war is instrumental in setting the stage for the empirical appraisal of the ‘just war frame’ that follows. 18

Entering the Just War Conversation 19

Birthing a narrative The prevailing normative and legal perspective within liberal societies on the question of what constitutes a ‘legitimate’ or socially acceptable casus belli stems from and is approximated by the just war tradition (Forsyth, 1992; Davis et al., 2001). This is not to say that just war theory provides a complete and total account of all possible considerations that influence decision-makers and their constituents contemplating the decision of whether or not to use military force. Still, the theory’s paramount concern with outlining the circumstances in which the decision to go to war may be justified (the jus ad bellum criteria) make it a natural and logical starting point for deliberation concerning the question of what, if anything, precipitates a legitimate use of organized military force.1 Antecedents The origin of an explicit theory of a just war is most often located in the early Roman church, beginning with the theological labors of Augustine of Hippo in the 5th century. However, this starting point obscures the theory’s antecedents in the ancient Chinese, Hindu and Egyptian civilizations, among others (Christopher, 1994). Historical inquiry convincingly reveals that these civilizations clearly grappled with moral quandaries such as how to treat prisoners humanely, as well as how to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (French, 2005). Indeed, the range of considerations concerning the proper conduct of war (ultimately embodied in the jus in bello component of just war theory) originally gained traction through the so-called ‘warrior’s code’ advanced to enhance the social status of warriors by distinguishing them from common criminals and other purveyors of violence (ibid.). Relative to the focus of this inquiry, the Hebrew, Greek, and to a lesser degree imperial Roman civilizations serve as the wellsprings of the aforementioned ‘conversation’ concerning the question of what makes the resort to (rather than the conduct of) war ‘just’.2 Perhaps the earliest recorded narratives concerning the defining criteria for a ‘just war’ can be found in the Torah as well as some of the foremost surviving works of classical Greece. Within the Hebraic tradition, the inherent virtue of the pursuit of justice in the temporal sphere stemmed from the degree to which such a pursuit both furthered social harmony and forestalled divine retribution. This emphasis on justice in social relations transcended the Jewish nation and tended toward universality, at least in

20 Selling a ‘Just’ War

theory; for instance, Deuteronomy (Deut. 10: 16–20) explicitly stated that: God does not treat one person differently from another. He loves all people. He expects us to behave the same way. Treat everyone fairly, even foreigners and strangers. While relative to the nexus of justice and war Deuteronomy is much better known for its admonitions to the Israelites (Deut. 20) to conquer the ‘promised land’ and vanquish the Canaanites, it also endeavors to provide a casus belli in the process. Though it may seem an absurdly fine distinction from our contemporary vantage point, the Israelites are not led to destroy the Canaanites because they are unbelievers, but rather because they are seen as direct threats to the Jewish nation and way of life. And, further to the point of the just war tradition as ‘conversation’, it must be pointed out that both Saul and Ahab openly challenged what they perceived to be the ruthlessness and ‘radicalism of the writing desk’ contained within Deuteronomy; so too, albeit obliquely and through interpretation, did many rabbis of the time (Weinfeld, 1972: 51; Solomon, 2005). On an intra-national basis, the Hebrew prophet Isaiah (Is. 32: 15–18, 20) argued that the warring tribes of Israel should dedicate themselves to just conduct even in martial endeavors, so that ‘…right will dwell in the desert, and justice abide in the orchard. Justice will bring about peace; right will produce calm and security’ (emphasis added). Similarly, the book of Hosea (Hs. 4: 1–3) identifies the dangers attendant in wars that are fought unjustly or for unjust purposes, warning ‘…injustice and lack of mercy among people results in desolation of the land and suffering for all creation’. Further to the emergent conversation, prominent Hebrew teachings calling for limits to destruction and violence in the conquest of Canaan (Deut. 2) as well as condemnation of atrocities committed in war (Amos 1–2) were buttressed by the lamentations of the Psalmists concerning the resort to war, as well as appeals for interdiction to the God who can bring war to an end and destroy its implements (Ps. 46, 120). Such appeals served to highlight the degree to which what we would now consider jus in bello concerns were linked to considerations of the legitimacy of the initial resort to war in early Hebrew thought and discourse. Further nuance was added to the conversation through rabbinic interpretations of Scripture, as reflected in the evolutionary composition of the Talmud wherein distinctive categories of war were identified: milhemet

Entering the Just War Conversation 21

hova (obligatory war); milhemet reshut (optional war); and pre-emptive war. As Solomon (2005) notes, there is some resonance between the Talmudic schema and the (later) Roman notion of just wars, though the chief distinction is obligatory/optional rather than just/unjust. Nevertheless, extensive debates over the ‘obligatory’ (just) character of preemptive war or the morality of the expansionist wars of David within the Jewish tradition underscore the degree to which the constitution of a ‘just’ or permissible war was something that has remained subject to interpretation over subsequent millenia. Given the profound influence of the Hebrew prophets on JudeoChristian philosophy and by extension the development of Western political thought, it is not surprising that these meditations and laments on justice and war proved enduring. A similarly enduring influence stems from classical Greek thought concerning the war-decision. In particular, Plato stands apart in the degree to which he exalts the philosophical and practical virtues of justice-seeking. In the Platonic conception justice should govern not only the conduct of the individual but also that of the social organism and that organism’s relations with other societies (Plato; tr. by Grube, 1974). Plato’s dissatisfaction with what he viewed as the degeneration of Athenian civic life (reflected in the unraveling of the Hellenic society amidst the Peloponnesian wars chronicled by Thucydides; see Price, 2001) led him to conclude that Athens, and by extension Greek civilization, could only be saved by turning from the moral bankruptcy of imperial conquest to a primary emphasis on justice and fairness in all individual and collective dealings. Though this concern was chiefly relevant for governing social relations among Greeks, it was advanced (albeit to a lesser extent) to govern intercourse with ‘barbarians’ as well (Pappas, 1995). Plato identified justice as a cardinal virtue; e.g., a good upon which all aspects of human life must and necessarily does hinge (Plato, 1974: 427e). Aristotle further refined the Platonic concern with justice as social ideal, arguing that it could only be perfected by habit or practice and in relation to others. The faith in rationality that underpins this approach is evident in the notion that it is possible to not only discern but also to protect and promote justice even within the midst of war. In light of the just war tradition, the Aristotelian emphasis on praxis proved especially crucial to his efforts to advance five pretexts for a ‘just war’, including amongst those conditions that of self-defense and the defense of allies.3 For both the Hebrews and the Greeks, justice was to be actively promoted and would ideally prevail, even amidst the most destructive of

22 Selling a ‘Just’ War

all social endeavors—namely, war. That the quest for justice even in the midst of war should be taken up and sustained by these ancient societies speaks to a vitally important thread running through and connecting the Hebrew and Greek traditions with modern liberal sensibilities. What is reflected even in these earliest installments of the just war ‘conversation’ is the emergence of belief in the possibility of securing justice amidst war through the cultivation of, and adherence to, a collective morality or common set of moral standards. While the Hebrews and Greeks differed in their conception of how such an outcome might obtain (with the Hebrews relying heavily on the prospects of divine retribution, and the Greeks appealing to rationality and discourse), they shared the idea that pursuing justice in any and all circumstances, even (if not especially) in war, is a vital duty of the warrior that must not be neglected.4 This timeless proposition originating in the West with the Hebrew and Greek civilizations has had preponderant influence on the development of norms and law pertaining to conduct in wartime, from The Republic and the Talmud to the Geneva Conventions and beyond. Augustine and Aquinas As even this cursory portrayal of Hebrew and Greek thought and discourse on the question of war suggests, the ‘conversation’ at the heart of the just war tradition has long been punctuated by common concerns including (but not limited to) that of when and under what conditions war is acceptable, if and to what degree war should be restrained, and to whom these and other considerations pertain. Beginning with the formative contributions of Augustine of Hippo (354–430), and taken up in full by Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), attempts at formulating a set of criteria defining a ‘just’ war originating from the idea of some ‘categorical imperative’ predominated in Europe at least until the 17th century. It was in the midst of this turn in the just war tradition that medieval and classical just war theory was advanced and modified, seeking to outline with some clarity and authority the conditions that make a war ‘just’, such that a believer could embark upon and conduct war with a clear conscience. In the main, this installment of the conversation adhered to the concept of war as a last resort, permissible in advancing the cause of the Church against heretics, infidels, and the like (Howard, 1994). Antecedents to the theory of the just war within the Christian tradition can be located long before Augustine or Aquinas (Johnson, 1987). However, it is undoubtedly these two theologians and the common theme that binds them across the centuries (e.g., that a fallen humanity is nonetheless worth preserving through an attempt at establishing and main-

Entering the Just War Conversation 23

taining peace and order according to the dictates of the divine and eternal law) that catalyzed just war theory. Indeed, the origins of what we would today recognize as a theory of the ‘just war’ can be located in Augustine’s notion of ‘the Two Cities’, in which justice can only be gained in the temporal sphere through the measured and ethical conduct of statecraft (Phillips, 1984). Aside from providing the first tangible elements of just war theory, Augustinian thought on the morality of war represents an important new direction in the just war tradition. Because, as Augustine stated, ‘we can make use of the peace of Babylon to steel ourselves in the pursuit of the City of God’, justice in civic life remains worth pursuing (Augustine, tr. Walsh et al., 1958). However, Augustine also contended that justice in the midst of war, or in any other social endeavor, must be seen as an ideal rather than something that is truly attainable. So it was that the father of classical just war theory operated from a basic presumption that justice in war is likely to be elusive. In the Augustinian tradition, while justice is an objectively discernable virtue, it is also in practical terms a state of affairs that is imperfect and incomplete at best. In seeking to reconcile the apparent contradiction of a simultaneous adherence to a discernable objective standard of justice with a recognition of the impossibility of meeting that standard (a contradiction which has remained central to the just war ever since), Augustine proffered a formula for the just war as one expressly limited by purpose, authority, and conduct. In spite of the apparent contradiction noted above (or perhaps because of it), Augustine crafted a set of criteria that at once were definitive and clear, yet also allowed for room for interpretation on the part of those in a position to implement them. Augustine stressed that war properly conducted must be led by rulers of nations, who by virtue of their position are obliged to maintain peace and pursue justice (Augustine, tr. Walsh et al., 1958). Such rulers may prosecute war to revenge wrongs and undo injustices, but never in the spirit of vengeance (ibid.). In this sense it is possible to interpret Augustine not only as an important figure in the promulgation of a set of definitive proscriptions related to the conduct of war (e.g., the ‘just war theory’), but also as an important contributor to the decidedly more nebulous ‘conversation’ that is the just war tradition. In taking up and advancing Augustinian thought, Aquinas offered a degree of clarification and elaboration befitting his prominent association with just war theory. Under the heading ‘Of War’ in Part II, Question 40 in his 13th century masterwork Summa Theologica (Aquinas, tr. Sullivan, 1952), Aquinas specified three clear and irrefutable conditions for waging a just war that would not only remain the central tenets of just war

24 Selling a ‘Just’ War

theory, but a lodestar for the just war tradition. In order to possess any such claim, a ‘just war’ must: (a) stem from legitimate authority received from the sovereign; (b) originate from a just cause; and (c) be guided by a rightful intention, so that the advancement of virtue is the sole purpose of going to war. Further to these criteria, Aquinas exhausts the possibilities of what might legitimately fall under each heading, as well as that which should be expressly excluded, providing a clear and expansive blueprint for the conduct of a virtuous and divinely sanctioned war (ibid.). It is chiefly the latter of these three criteria (right intent) that represented a major point of departure from Augustinian thought, through the doctrine of ‘double-effect’; e.g., the idea that acts may have two sets of consequences, both intended and unintended, both of which should be accounted for within any calculus pertaining to the wardecision (Aquinas, 2002). In stating these general precepts of the just war and fleshing out their underlying propositions, Aquinas was seeking to explore the possibilities of his distinction between Human and Natural Law on the one hand and Eternal Law on the other. Though the resort to war if not its very existence reflects humanity’s fallen condition, the possibility that a war can be conducted justly is consistent with Aquinas’ scholastic belief that humans can and should strive through the use of reason and intellect to discipline Human Law (laws enacted by governments) to the strictures of Natural Law (humanity’s best attempt at replicating Eternal Law in the temporal sphere). To that end, Aquinas’ contribution to the just war tradition was pivotal not only for the specificity it leant to just war theory, but also for the degree to which it incorporated into the just war conversation a philosophical consideration of the possibility for human rationality to discern universal normative and legal standards relative to the conduct of war. Though Aquinas’ unique contributions to both the theory of the just war and the social conversation enveloping it should not be overlooked, it is also important to acknowledge the extent to which the narrative he advanced was faithful to that which he had inherited from his forebears within the Roman church. Like Augustine, Aquinas labored intensively to sustain the notion that the pursuit of justice in social relations including war is a worthwhile endeavor. To the extent that Aquinas was able to deliver an explicit set of criteria dedicated to that end, in which a just war is one waged as a last resort, he largely succeeded. At the same time, Aquinas categorically rejected the idea that any perfect or complete attainment of justice in concert with the prosecution of war was possible; in modern lexicon, when it comes to war

Entering the Just War Conversation 25

some form of (moral) ‘collateral damage’ is always an attendant possibility, if not likelihood. In the end, Aquinas’ contribution to the just war ‘conversation’––which accepts with resignation the likelihood of ‘satisficing’ behavior (Simon, 1957) on the part of the agents to whom the objective standard he advances is directed—is noteworthy for the extent to which it recognizes an inversion between the precise criteria of the just war theory and the ‘gray area’ surrounding its application.

A maturing conversation The neo-scholastics In seeking to advance a clear and irrefutable set of conditions defining a ‘just war’, Augustine and Aquinas greatly advanced just war theory. Yet it was only through the subsequent contributions of the medieval theorists such as Francisco de Vitoria (1492–1546) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) that a comprehensive theory of a just war defining and extending the parameters of legitimacy relative to the war-decision emerged. Neo-scholastics such as Vitoria and Suárez sought to encapsulate and refine the work of Augustine and Aquinas in light of the sweeping social transformations wrought by the Reformation and, later, the Enlightenment. Their efforts were primarily aimed at further edification of the moral and ethical duties attendant in commissioning various forms of war, development of the ‘prudential’ aspects of the jus ad bellum convention for use (with some discretion) by decision-makers, and acknowledgement of the dilemmas associated with war’s initiation (and, later, its conduct) within a changing social environment (Johnson, 1975). One embodiment of this important turn in the just war tradition was the moral distinction drawn between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ wars. Reflecting the iterative nature of the just war conversation, this distinction was not new, receiving attention in both Hebrew and Roman thought; what was new was the extent to which the medievalists openly acknowledged and contended with the moral indeterminacy associated with each. On the former score, defensive wars were defined as military responses prompted by an armed attack against a pacific and innocent society; these, medieval just war theorists contended, require no special moral justification, as their legitimacy was self-evident (Vitoria, 1991). The practical implications of this conclusion were nothing less than revolutionary, since the logical extension, writ large in Vitoria’s De Indis et De Jure Belli, was that non-Christian sovereign authorities (such as the indigenous peoples of the Americas) could wage ‘just wars’ they were prompted by self-defense (Vitoria, 1917). Suárez’s reaffirmation that

26 Selling a ‘Just’ War

all peoples and nations had a basic right to defend themselves furthered this unprecedented recasting of the just war tradition towards a concern with the pursuit and conduct of war even relative to those peoples generally considered ‘beyond the pale’.5 No less problematic was the subject of ‘offensive’ wars, defined by the medievalists as an armed response to some perceived (rather than actual) injury. It was through the introduction of the notion of ‘offensive’ wars that medieval theorists ushered into the conversation the possibility that a pre-emptive war launched by ‘legitimate’ authorities is not ipso facto just, as was alleged relative to the Crusades.6 In defining ‘legitimate’ offensive wars as those representing an extension of selfdefense, the neo-scholastics infused into the just war tradition heightened debate over the notion and relative merits of retributive justice as well as that of the ‘punishment of evil’ (or of non-believers) as a legitimate casus belli.7 The distinction drawn by the neo-scholastics between defensive and offensive wars highlights the degree to which they sought to confront the trend of ecclesiastical authorities appropriating just war theory for the purposes of justifying ‘offensive’ wars against opponents outside Christendom, and to reclaim the original, restrictive orientation of just war theory in the process. While they retained the Augustinian conception that the only just cause for war was righting a previous wrong, the neo-scholastics also drew from the philosophical complexity of Aquinas in contending that not all wrongs provided sufficient grounds for war. Further, while retaining the Augustinian contention that sovereigns rather than subjects are responsible for ascertaining what constitutes a ‘just’ cause for war, they asserted that sovereign authorities are not and cannot always be certain of what is just or unjust (Johnson, 1975; Norena, 1975). These efforts by medieval just war theorists to contest the appropriation of the just war tradition to support military adventurism were not rooted in a concern with theological or theoretical purity, but rather pragmatism. In the end, the goal of the neo-scholastics was the preservation of the influence of the Church and its teachings on social behavior in the face of extant challenges.8 This pragmatic objective was especially important with regard to the conduct of war, as a moral quandary that was long subject to Church dictates. With challenges to papal authority emanating from the Holy Roman Empire beginning in the 11th century, and proliferating throughout much of medieval Europe after the Reformation, the neo-scholastics feared that the era of theological jurisprudence was coming to a close, with weighty matters such as the question of what makes a war ‘just’ no longer the sole province

Entering the Just War Conversation 27

of religious authorities. As a result the theory could no longer serve merely as an outline of the conditions that made a war consonant with the teachings of the Church; rather, its scope had to be broadened. Medieval theorists therefore faced a conundrum: namely, how to adapt the theory of the just war to the realities of a fragmented Christendom and a Western civilization undergoing tenuous secularization, while still retaining moral authority over war-decisions for the Church. The ‘law of nations’ and the just war The aforementioned balancing act of the medieval just war theorists helped flesh out the specific criteria defining a morally permissible resort to war. In the end, the additional refinement of the already specific criteria advanced by Aquinas established just war theory as the lodestar for moral deliberations on war in the Western world. Furthermore, their deft attempts to render the theory widely applicable for political authorities while still reserving ultimate say over the morality of war for the Church had the additional effect of affirming the link between just war theory and natural law (Christopher, 1994). As deliberations over the legitimacy of offensive and defensive wars (among other applications of the theory) suggest, the medievalists relied heavily on the idea of a universal moral standard applicable to and transcending any and all social and political divisions, whether in supporting ‘defensive’ wars of self-defense or ‘offensive’ wars launched proactively to uphold and impose order and peace (Suárez, 1944). At the same time, the medievalist contribution to the just war tradition serves as a prime illustration of the subjectivity of just war proscriptions in application, in the process reminding us that we are better served by the metaphor of ‘conversation’ than scientific theory (Clark, 2005; Evans, 2005). While the efforts of the medievalists to extend the scope of just war theory while preserving papal authority over the great moral dilemma of war may have preserved the theory, they did not (and in fact could not) arrest the rapid and radical changes afoot in society. Indeed, the case can be made that the aforementioned ‘balancing act’ of the medievalists, rather than aiding the Church’s attempt at retaining its sway over the politics of post-Reformation/pre-Westphalian Europe, actually helped pave the way for gradual secularization of the just war tradition (Bull et al., 1990). Like the medievalists who preceded them, the main architects of the emergent body of public international law—most notably the Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), his Dutch compatriot Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), and, later, the Swiss legal philosopher Emerich de Vattel

28 Selling a ‘Just’ War

(1714–1767)—each confronted the challenge of the age relative to justice and war; namely, how to adapt and advance effective standards for the conduct of war within a radically changing social milieu. Yet while the neo-scholastics adhered to the notion of a common morality and a common locus of moral and legal authority in the Church, the so-called Grotian school instead embraced that changing milieu in promulgating a set of rules to govern an emergent international society dubbed the ‘law of nations’. The fashioning of the ‘law of nations’ was primarily a reaction to the expressed limitations of canon law (formalized in the 11th century by Pope Gregory VII) for governing relations including the conduct of war between nations in an emerging international system. The main limitation identified by Grotius himself was not canon law’s association with the natural law tradition per se, but rather the unshakeable conviction that the divination of the universal moral standard at the heart of natural law was the sole province of religious authorities. In seeking to address this problem (and the resulting abuse of authority over the war-decision it engendered), Grotius articulated two primary alternatives: the ‘law of nature’ and the ‘law of nations’ (Bull et al., 1990; Parker, 1994). For Grotius, the ‘law of nature’ originates in and embodies certain universals derived from the innate sociability and desire for selfpreservation that characterizes the broad swath of humanity. Though decidedly non-religious in its overtones, the logic of the ‘law of nature’ echoes the contention of the jus gentium that universal moral and ethical standards exist, can be divined, and should inform the prevailing body of law. Complementary to and in some ways superceding the ‘law of nature’ was the ‘law of nations’, Grotius’ embrace of Gentili’s previous argument for a body of law defined by customary practices and volitional agreements between states and sovereigns (Van Der Molen, 1968). Grotius contended that it was the ‘law of nations’ that should take precedent in regulating the relations between nations and their sovereigns (e.g., diplomacy and statecraft), in that doing so portends greater potential jurisprudence between and among nations in the likely instance that moral consensus does not entail. Though the ‘law of nations’ is responsible for the emergence of international legal positivism, natural law did retain a place within Grotian thought. This was mainly through the contention that certain behaviors and practices between and among nations might be universally acceptable (or unacceptable) even within the bounds of a largely positivist framework. For his part, Gentili had already leaned heavily on

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the universalism of natural law to argue against a carte blanche right of sovereigns to resort to war, contending that while Machiavelli’s ‘prince’ may not be bound by positive law, he nevertheless remained subject to the dictates of natural law and volitional international law (Boyle, 1992). This dual aspect of the ‘law of nations’ should not be overlooked, as it reflects the degree to which the Grotian installment of the just war ‘conversation’ was shaped by many of the same tensions confronting the neo-scholastic theologians of the day (Bellamy, 2006). Yet unlike the medieval just war theorists, the changes embodied in the ‘law of nations’ were consonant with the broader changes afoot in Western society. Shifting the locus of authority and responsibility for the rightful conduct of war from the papacy and church hierarchy to the newly emerging nation-state, the ‘law of nations’ retooled existing legal doctrine (including the theory of the just war) in a volitional and positivist direction in order to regulate the conduct of the secular sovereign entities that would come to dominate a Westphalian order (Vattel, 1916). The so-called ‘laws of war’ advanced through the codification of the ‘law of nations’ were clearly informed by the just war tradition, as is evinced in Gentili’s De Jure Belli (1589) and Grotius’ ‘The Law of War and Peace’ (De Jure Belli ac Pacis), in 1625. The main contribution of the Grotian school to the just war ‘conversation’ was this translation of the moral and ethical concerns at the heart of classical and medieval just war theory into a set of rational-legal conventions regulating interactions between sovereigns concerning the use of force (Bull et al., 1990). Particularly telling was the degree to which Europe’s disastrous holy wars informed this transformation of war from a theological to judicial concern, so as to reverse the trend toward unconstrained wars waged at the whims of the sovereign (Edwards, 1981). In this, the attempts of the Grotian school to advance the just war tradition can be interpreted as chiefly motivated by a desire to reclaim the theory from the abuses that had come to define it (Grotius, 1925). Such attempts were concentrated on using just war theory as a platform for developing legal restraints on conduct on the battlefield, as well as in holding sovereigns to account for their war-decisions. In the latter case, they reaffirmed the importance of just cause, right intention, and proportionality of ends independently as well as collectively. In seeking to advance the contention that possessing competent authority alone is not a sufficient basis to launch a war, the treatment of the war-decision within the Grotian school reaffirmed the breadth and complexity of the just war tradition.

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While the efforts to introduce and develop a secularized ‘law of nations’ had a major impact on the evolution of international legal conventions on war, it also proved vital to the just war ‘conversation’, decoupling the quest for establishing constraints on war from an explicitly religious basis and rooting them instead in appeals to human rationality. In the end, the Grotian legacy relative to the just war tradition is Janus-faced. Its reclamation of the just war tradition served to advance international public law, while at the same time codifying within that body of law important features of the Augustinian and scholastic elements of the just war. Thus, while the introduction and profusion of Grotian thought paved the way for the crafting of the Geneva and Hague Conventions in the 19th and 20th centuries, it also helped infuse the particularistic tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition into a body of international legal conventions intended to regulate the conduct of war among secular states (Phillips, 1984). This complexity undoubtedly affirms the embeddedness of the just war tradition within the Western historical and cultural milieu, while also suggesting a basis for the continuing discord over, and non-compliance with, the ‘laws of war’ within contemporary international society.

Pardon the interruption: Demise of the just war The intensive and extensive transformation of Western society which prompted the development of the ‘law of nations’ (and the subsuming of elements of the just war tradition within that law) by the Grotian school continued in the years leading up to and following the Enlightenment, profoundly impacting the just war tradition in the process. Whereas Gentili and Grotius sought to straddle the divide between the universalist epistemology of the classical and medieval just war theorists and the fragmented social realm they inhabited, by the 18th century the ‘law of nations’ took a decidedly positivist turn, embodied in the publication of Emmerich de Vattel’s Le Droit des Gens (1758). The rise of positivism Relative to the war-decision, the heightened emphasis on popular sovereignty produced by the age of Enlightenment proved a damaging if not fatal blow to any remaining credibility associated with divine authority concerning the matter of war. The concomitant rise of nations that followed in the wake of the American and French Revolutions effectively severed the connection between the war-decision and any sense or source of universal moral standards associated with it; war,

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like other transactions in the political sphere, should be conducted at the behest of the people. In responding to the consolidation of the early nation-state after the peace of Westphalia, Vattel’s vision of what constituted the conditions for a ‘just war’ as reflected in Le Droit des Gens (a definitive source of international jurisprudence for two centuries after its publication) eliminated any residual traces of natural law. This second iteration of the ‘law of nations’ advanced a robustly positivist orientation that relied chiefly on a conception of legal sovereignty predicated on the assumption of functional equality (Vattel, 1916). Vattel’s transformation of the ‘law of nations’ relative to the war-decision represents a pivotal turn in the just war narrative. Vattel did not declare the subject of war to be amoral, nor did he dismiss the idea of constraining war; indeed, he continued to adhere to the idea that sovereigns had an incumbent duty to take into account classical considerations of just cause and right intention. So it was that Vattel’s version of the ‘law of nations’ could simultaneously feature an appeal to sovereigns to continue to recognize the just war criteria alongside an insistence that sovereigns had an inherent right to wage war whenever they deemed it necessary. Beyond Vattel, the philosophers Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Christian Wolff (1679–1754) were also key contributors in this positivist appropriation of just war theory as the basis for the laws governing war in an international system oriented around nation-states (Nardin, 2003). The emphasis on the centrality of national sovereigns and the volitional legal orientation necessitated by it purged from the just war ‘conversation’ any vestiges of a universal standard underpinning these considerations. Rather, the primary moral concern relative to the war-decision was the duty of the state to ensure the wellbeing of the population to which it was beholden—a duty which legitimated war, in the event the sovereign determined it necessary for that purpose.9 Raison d’état With the state emerging as the central vehicle of political authority in the Treaty of Westphalia (an arrangement repeatedly reaffirmed thereafter, including at the Congress of Vienna), deliberation over the justice of the war-decision was effectively banished from legal and political discourse. What emerged was something close to a tautology sparked by the fusion of popular and state sovereignty in liberal thought and practice. States were both the most powerful and most legitimate form of political

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authority; ipso facto, they should be able to act as they see fit, since as powerful and legitimate representatives of the nation, their actions would naturally be ‘just’ to the extent they reflected the popular will. Within an international political environment where the construct of ‘the state’ possessed independent, unrivaled, and more or less unquestioned status, power, and responsibilities, the jus ad bellum convention and the type of moral inquiry it represented possessed little relevance (Forsyth, 1992). The pre-eminent position afforded to the nation-state within the second iteration of the ‘law of nations’ informed and affirmed the doctrine of raison d’état that dominated the war-decision and deliberation about war throughout the 19th and early 20th century. It also reflected the degree to which war, formerly a contest of honor and skill as well as a display of power launched by vassals at the behest of monarchs and waged through the proxy of knights and mercenaries, had come to be harnessed under the yoke of the modern state. The emergence of the state to a position as the primary unit of political organization in the international system is closely intertwined with the evolution of modern warfare; consider, for instance, such 19th century developments as the formation of professional standing armies to wage war, the creation of public sector finance and the establishment of permanent systems of taxation to fund those armies and their military campaigns, and especially the introduction of the convention of raison d’état as a sufficient justification for war (Mann, 1993). It is yet further affirmed by the degree to which the very authority of the state depended, as Weber (1958) contended, on the possession of a monopoly on the legitimate employment of organized violence.10 By virtue of possessing this ‘monopoly’, the state was able to secure its interests and protect its sovereignty while also advancing its position as the central actor on the world stage—and by extension, the sole legitimate source of authority over the war-decision. Given the centrality of violence in the formation and evolution of the modern state, it is not hard to envision how war came to be seen as little more than another policy instrument in the toolkit of statesmen (Clausewitz, 1984). The archetype of the Clausewitzian ‘old’ war held that wars were the product of rational calculation. Political leaders utilized the tools of the state over which they presided (professional standing armies and national economies of scale) to deploy overwhelming force against similarly organized opponents in a contest over some discernable national interest(s). This dominant representation eliminated the need for deliberation about war (moral or otherwise) beyond

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consideration of its strategic implications and its utility in advancing the interests of the nation-state; e.g., ‘…if war is part of policy, than policy will determine its character’ (Clausewitz, 1984: 605–606). This stark departure from five centuries of challenges to the unchecked authority of the sovereign over the war-decision within the just war tradition notwithstanding, the larger point here is the incompatibility of the concerns at the heart of the just war tradition and ‘conversation’ with a ‘thick’ legal positivism in which national sovereigns serve as judge, jury, and in the event that war occurs, executioner. In light of this irreconcilability, the extent to which the evolutionary turn toward positive law in the 17th and 18th century international system consigned the jus ad bellum convention and its natural law foundation to irrelevance cannot be understated. What followed logically from the attempt to sustain the just war tradition in the midst of an international order oriented around the unchallenged power of the Weberian state to declare and prosecute Clausewitzian wars of strategic gain was its effective negation.

The modern resurgence: Just war revisited The near total approximation of Hobbesian anarchy defining the international system beginning in the 18th century accounted for numerous major conflicts and near-conflicts, sustained a climate of overt military intervention, and culminated in two devastating world wars. The anarchical nature of the international system during this period left it to enlightened and representative statesmen to navigate calculations on when to use force solely in accordance with their assessment of the national interest. The pursuit of self-determination and statebuilding and the construction and deconstruction of empires that marked that period were bloody endeavors, and military force was an instrument of vital importance to sovereign authorities engaged in them. Since war was particularly useful to such projects, statesmen saw no compelling reason to seek its restraint. As such, the primary concern became not whether a potential war was just, but rather whether it was likely to succeed. As Walzer notes, the assumption pervading ‘the age of Vattel to that of Oppenheim is that states always have, like Hobbist individuals, the right to fight’ (Walzer, 1977: 63). However, in contrast to some prevailing characterizations (Bellamy, 2006), the just war ‘conversation’ did not completely disappear from Western discourse in the 18th century. Indeed, the very transcendence of anarchy and the pervasive systemic violence it permitted proved crucial to the resumption of the just war

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‘conversation’. With the reallocation of political authority to the modern state complete and total, the modern resurgence of just war theory was prompted not by the original motive of the classical and medieval just war theorists to discern and apply universal constraints on the wardecision but rather out of a desire to advance a compelling rationale for the use of force. War in the liberal age While the maturation of the modern state in the Westphalian order seemingly relegated moral deliberation over the war-decision to the dustbin of history, the internal contradictions of liberalism relative to the conduct of statecraft and the use of force effectively reconstituted it. Within a systemic environment defined by persistent instability and violence, the utility of the use of force in the pursuit of the national interest as well as the frequency with which it was employed were beyond dispute. However, such realities proved problematic in the degree to which they contradicted and undermined the Kantian premises of a progressive, cooperative order on which Western liberal thought and practice depended. Thus, the modern resumption of the just war ‘conversation’ beginning in the 19th century was prompted by a logical conundrum that had come to vex liberal statesmen: namely, how the gospel of ‘progress’ to which liberal societies were beholden could be preserved and even expanded within an anarchical international system in which the use of force was not only commonplace, but necessary and even desirable. Foreshadowing the discussion of the ‘just war frame’, the ‘solution’ to that conundrum was found in a return to the just war tradition. The resurgence of the language and concepts of just war theory in the late 19th century rested largely on two inter-related propositions: one, that the inherent virtue and universal appeal of liberal values and institutions conferred greater legitimacy on the foreign policy interests and actions of Western liberal states; and two, the need to promote and project liberal norms and institutional arrangements externally to provide for and ensure a just, stable, and pacific international order (Lang, 1985). Animated by these two propositions, by the late 19th century the reconstituted just war ‘conversation’ again permeated the social narrative concerning the war-decision in the West, especially in Britain, America and, to a lesser degree, France.11 As translated through the rhetoric of liberals such as William Gladstone, the just war tradition became an animating vehicle for the forcible export of the ‘social contract’, even in embryonic nations whose self-determination had not yet been granted (Howard, 1978; Johnson, 1999).12 Leading the

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charge were radical British liberals such as H.N. Brailsford, J.A. Hobson, T.H. Green, and David Lloyd George, all of whom identified the chief foreign policy concern of Britain and indeed all liberal societies as the duty of defending and expanding liberal values, including national self-determination. Contradicting the admonitions of Mill, Bentham, and Richard Cobden on the dangers inherent in foreign intervention (admonitions which Hobson rejected and Brailsford condemned as a ‘sterile and impracticable ideal’; Leventhal, 1974), British liberals were particularly eager to employ force across the Continent in the face of persistent challenges to liberal ideals by barbarous (Ottoman) and backward (Russian) empires (Dangerfield, 1997). In the American context, this radical liberal internationalism took root in the jingoistic ‘New Whiggery’ that defined American foreign policy in the latter half of the 19th century, linking imperial ambition with liberal ideology (Hartz, 1955; Bukovansky, 2002). The sense of natural duty ascribed to a dynamic liberal republic such as the United States provided the ideological firmament necessary to transform the US into a major world power after the Spanish-American War, while at the same time exposing the peculiar contradiction of a liberal society bent on expanding its ideals through force of arms. As in Gladstone’s England, appeals to the just war tradition in constructing an argument in favor of the use of force (rather than one seeking to limit it) helped reconcile this contradiction. President McKinley, in promoting war with Spain over Cuba in 1898, rooted the debate in moral universalism, contending the necessity of the war stemmed from ‘obligations we cannot disregard’ (McKinley, 1898; quoted in Hunt, 1987: 38). More explicitly, control of the spoils of this obligation (annexation and control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines) represented a ‘great trust’ carried by the nation ‘under the providence of God and in the name of human progress and civilization’ (ibid.). Similarly, turn-of-the-century Senator Albert Beveridge (R-Indiana) argued in favor of a moral duty to undertake the Spanish-American War to subdue and defeat the ‘infidels to the gospel of liberty’ (Beveridge, 1908).13 In light of this radical liberal appropriation of the just war tradition, ‘just causes’ were readily advanced in conjunction with the war-decisions of the late 19th and early 20th century, including (but not limited to) the use of force to promote self-determination for the Serbs and Bulgarians living under Ottoman rule, the liberation of Italy from Austrian control, and the ‘civilization’ of Cuba and the Philippines. So it was that liberal statesmen could condemn imperialism while participating in the Boxer Rebellion and the Boer War, champion international peace

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conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 while engaging in arms races and wars of colonial ambition, and seek a transnational ‘public law’ for Europe while enmeshing themselves in entangling and ultimately disastrous alliances. In so recasting the just war tradition, liberal statesmen identified a convenient, effective, and culturally resonant tool to balance interests and ideals, as well as to reconcile the seemingly contradictory impulses of might and right. Purpose wedded to power became a liberal cause célèbre, foreshadowing the rise of the ‘declaratory tradition’ in 20th century international law (Jones, 1992). Just wars and world wars The early and mid-20th century was defined by profound dualism and vacillation within the just war ‘conversation’. While the decision to employ military force to support the export of liberal values (such as in support of nations seeking self-determination) was rendered ‘just’ if not obligatory by liberal statesmen, conventional wars between major powers remained unconscionable. No doubt this was due to the greater magnitude and implications attached to conventional inter-state war relative to military intervention. Such differences restricted the degree of agency or choice associated with the former in comparison to the latter. Whereas military intervention might plausibly be interpreted by decision-makers or sold to the public as an opportunity to forcibly advance or defend the liberal sphere, inter-state wars clearly threatened not only relations between nations but also the very premises on which liberalism (interdependence) and modernity (progress) depended.14 While the forcible export of democracy retained a decided appeal, the prospect of major war remained an atavistic evil (Peceny, 1999b). This prevailing view of the evils of conventional war was further underscored by the unprecedented devastation wrought by World War I. With the legacy of ‘total’ war weighing heavily on the collective psyche of the West in the aftermath of the Great War, liberal statesmen again turned to the just war tradition—this time, as a means of defining a set of workable constraints on the decision to go to war that could be embedded within a collective security system. The League of Nations arrangement that emerged from the ashes of total war directly reflected this impetus. As has been well chronicled, the League’s raison d’être of collective security provision and restraint of inter-state disputes was not complemented by effective capacity to deal directly with the use of force by states. Yet just as damaging from the standpoint of the League’s effectiveness was the extent to which the alleged justice of liberal interventionism continued to inform the views of the League’s architects, Wilson chief among them.

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Established by early 20th century liberal internationalists, the League proved to be an institutional embodiment of the very duality that permeated that ideology. Created to serve as a ‘general association of nations’ designed to prevent or limit war, the League was also envisioned as the chief implement to promote Wilson’s admonition (contemporaneously expressed in the Fourteen Points) that Western nations take up the virtuous cause of any and all nations seeking political self-determination through whatever means necessary (Calhoun, 1986; Fitzsimons, 1995). This fundamental contradiction within liberal thought concerning the war-decision proved debilitating to the League of Nations, but was hardly unprecedented; indeed, a similar tension undermined the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, and would later serve as the basis for the derisive reception afforded to the Kellogg-Briand pact upon its introduction in 1928 (Cohen, 1989). Each of these attempts to constrain the war-decision sought support from the classical (restraintist) orientation of the just war tradition. Yet each was summarily undermined not only by the contradictory actions of liberal states (who continued to employ force in conjunction with the doctrine of raison d’état, such as in the joint Allied military efforts against the Bolsheviks in Russia) but also by persistent appeals to the just war tradition to rationalize those actions. While renewed emphasis on war as a last resort during the inter-war period represented something of a counter-point in the resumed just war ‘conversation’, that counter-point proved a minority view inconsistent with the broader social narrative enveloping the war-decision. Indeed, the very fact that efforts to limit war through renewed appeals to the just war tradition after World War I occurred within the confines of an anarchical international system and positivist international legal framework, reinforcing both the place of military force and the perceived ‘right’ of statesmen to employ it had much to do with the shortcomings of efforts to advance international legal and institutional restraints on war and the war-decision during the inter-war period. The inchoate nature of the just war ‘conversation’ during that period reflected the absence of any shared agreement in Western liberal society concerning the morality of the war-decision. This disconnect became particularly evident with the collapse of the League and the coterminous ascent of fascism in the 1930s (Johnson, 1975). The provocations of fascism evident in Spain, Ethiopia, Manchuria, the Sudetenland, and beyond provided the conditions in which the potential for social consensus on the subject of war necessary to sustain the just war ‘conversation’ in earnest returned. Again, as in the late 19th century, the just war tradition became the basis for appeals favoring military

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action rather than arguing for its limitation. Prompted largely by revulsion to the internal nature of fascist regimes as well to their increasingly belligerent conduct in foreign relations, Western liberals returned anew to the language and logic of jus ad bellum as a means to justify the use of force. Even before the Nazi assault on Poland that sparked World War II, such appeals demonstrated a broader resonance and greater potential for majority support than did preceding efforts to recycle the just war tradition into a framework to constrain war. This was due in no small part to the growing perception that confronting fascism was a moral duty in that it was the only hope for a lasting peace.15 Indeed, as Howard (1978) contends, it was largely the pangs of liberal conscience alongside a militant dedication to the correction of injustice through whatever means necessary that closed the book on pacifism after Hitler’s dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. World War II represented a historical watershed in the just war ‘conversation’. Throughout the first half of the century, the linkage between moral deliberation and the use of force was used instrumentally by Western liberal states as a means of justifying an activist, messianic liberalism committed to demonstrating the dangers of non-intervention. Even the horrors of World War I only led to a temporary abatement in this practice, with the aberration of the counter-point of the 1920s passing quickly away with the advent of the fascist threat in the 1930s. Undoubtedly due to this gradual buildup of moral justifications for the use of military force by Western liberal democracies throughout the first four decades of the 20th century, World War II proved to be the most prominent example of a modern war sustained by direct and frequent appeals to the just war tradition (Walzer, 1977). The prominence of this representation of the war is borne out both by the degree to which it remains the ‘gold standard’ for a just war in the Western popular imagination, as well as by the extent of historical revisionism and mythmaking which has obscured the evident fact that, in just war terms, the war was one of the least justly prosecuted wars in history (ibid.). In the view of Allied leaders and publics alike, the war itself was justified by transgressions against the ‘law of nations’ by the Axis powers (both in their internal and external conduct). Those transgressions, ubiquitous and chilling on the part of the Axis powers, allowed for an exceedingly convincing case to be made that the conditions precipitating the war were ‘just’ in accordance with the ad bellum convention (though perhaps the most ‘just’ of the war’s just causes, the systematic atrocities carried out against Jews and others by the Nazi regime, hardly registered in the calculations of the Allies to declare war). This claim was crucial

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not only in rendering and sustaining a popular representation of the war as ‘just’, but also in catalyzing a resurgence of natural law and the conception of universal morality on which it depended.16 From the standpoint of the just war ‘conversation’, World War II reflects two important and related truths for the modern era. The first is that wars that are successfully attached in the broader social narrative and popular imagination to just war conventions are likely to have widespread if not universal appeal and support. The second is that a successful and effective application of the just war tradition to the war-decision is likely to limit and obscure widespread social consideration of conditions related to the war’s actual conduct, once initiated. The continued reverberations within the consciousness of the nation of its righteousness in going to war often leads to a de facto obviation of the moral compulsion for combatants and those responsible for the conduct of the war to exercise restraint once that war has begun (Walzer, 1977). In the prosecution of World War II, Thorstein Veblen’s stark and radical admonitions on the eve of American entry into World War I in 1917—that peace would and could only come through the utter destruction of warlike nations like Germany, as well as any voices of moderation at home—seem to have found their translation in the conduct of the Allies (Veblen, 1945). In this regard, World War II not only represents a historical watershed in the just war ‘conversation’, but also a future blueprint for liberal statesmen relative to the framing of the war-decision. From World War II onward, decision-makers in Western liberal states have disproportionately appealed to jus ad bellum considerations to sell the war-decision, while skirting jus in bello concerns relative to the conduct of the war after that decision has been made. Like most of the wars that have followed it, World War II was cast as a ‘just’ war by those responsible for waging it chiefly (if not solely) due to its satisfaction of criteria such as just cause and right intent; so cast, no further moral deliberation or reflection would seem necessary.17

Continuing the conversation The enduring resonance of the just war tradition proved indispensable to the post-war effort to curtail the excesses of international anarchy (unrestrained warfare chief among them). Indeed, the influence of the jus ad bellum convention on the architects and architecture of the postwar international order to the war-decision is evident, and represents the first effective reference to the restrictive interpretation of that convention since the rehabilitation of the just war tradition in the late 19th century.

40 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Shaping the post-war order If World War II demonstrates the potential for widely accepted just causes to enable and sustain a close approximation of total war, then the institutions introduced in the aftermath of World War II demonstrate the degree to which liberal statesmen learned from previous (failed) attempts at establishing the conditions deemed necessary to sustain a long peace. Foremost among the failings of the League of Nations was that institution’s inability to inhibit the unsanctioned use of force by states—a shortcoming deemed paramount for any successor organization to avoid. It was on that premise that the notion of collective security articulated in the United Nations Charter, and in particular the authority of the fledgling United Nations Organization relative to the war-decision, was based. On that front, as Henkin (1991) notes, the principal purpose of the UN Charter was to advance the norm of self-defense as the sole lawful cause for a resort to war by sovereign states.18 That claim is evident in the predisposition of the UN Charter against the use of force as well as its emphasis on the principle of last resort and the doctrine of non-intervention. As Article 2(4) of the Charter stipulates: All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.19 The influence of the just war tradition on the ‘law of armed conflict’ generated after World War II was also evident in the Charter’s explicit articulation of the (limited) possibility for exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. Such exceptions were only permissible in conjunction with authorization from the Security Council, as mandated under Article VII. Extending the sole custodial obligation to attend to threats to ‘international peace and security’ to the Security Council is particularly significant, since it reflects the intention of the UN’s architects to embed within the Security Council the ‘competent’ or legitimate authority of a sovereign—an authority crucial to the classical (natural law-based) interpretation of just war theory, and one that had been long missing from the just war ‘conversation’ (Claude, 1961; Nardin, 1992).20 Accordingly, and in line with classical translations of the ad bellum convention, the use of force was held out as acceptable and legitimate in two primary instances: in self-defense by the victim of an attack,

Entering the Just War Conversation 41

and in collective defense of the victim of that attack by other (or all) states. The reliance on the jus ad bellum convention even in articulating possible exceptions to the principle of non-intervention further conveys the impact of the just war tradition in advancing and shaping the ‘law of armed conflict’ as well as prevailing norms concerning the use of force in the post-World War II international system (Gray, 2008). Reflecting the changed perception of the UN’s (primarily Western liberal) architects toward the war-decision, the institution of the United Nations and the international order it seeks to promote remain prime embodiments of the return of the jus ad bellum convention in a restrictive sense to international political discourse and to the ongoing effort to constrain the use of force by states. Rather than drawing from the just war tradition instrumentally to provide moral ‘cover’ for the pursuit of messianic liberalism and/or raison d’état, the explicit intention of the UN’s architects in rehabilitating the restrictive version of the jus ad bellum to international law and organization was to provide a (secular) natural law basis for the definition and provision of collective security. In doing so, they hoped to provide a moral and legal basis for the prevailing view that, in the future, attempts to alter the status quo or advance the interests of the state through the unsanctioned use of force should be considered illegal and worthy of sanction (Cohen, 1989). As such, one can safely conclude that the just war tradition helps underpin a legal and normative framework that has survived the Cold War and which remains largely intact today, shortcomings and challenges to it notwithstanding. Prolonging the conversation Aside from its contribution to the prevailing institutional and legal conventions, the restraintist strain within the just war tradition has enjoyed a further renaissance within the social narrative surrounding the war-decision since the end of World War II. This renaissance began in earnest in the United States in the Vietnam War era, kindled largely by academics and theologians concerned with the insularity and immorality of the war-decision, as well as popular perception that applications of military force in that conflict were made in a deliberative void (Osgood and Tucker, 1967; Ramsey, 1968; Cohen et al., 1974; O’Brien, 1979a). Emblematic of this narrative renaissance was Walzer’s seminal Just and Unjust Wars, originally appearing in 1977. Dedicated largely to the task of reclaiming the war-decision from those who would deny the importance of moral deliberation to it, Walzer attempted to reconcile nearly

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three centuries of tension within the just war ‘conversation’ by advancing both a strong defense of the restraintist orientation of the jus ad bellum convention and identifying and arguing for a set of exceptions (e.g., ‘just causes’) to that set of restraints. On the former score, Walzer sought to elucidate the utility of just war theory by introducing the ‘theory of aggression’, which he contended serves as the epistemological basis for thinking about war within the prevailing Westphalian system. The roots of the theory of aggression in the just war tradition are evident in its contention that aggressive war is a crime—meaning that, by extension, wars fought in self-defense against aggression, to enforce the law against aggression, and to punish the aggressor are justifiable. Walzer’s chief contribution on the latter point is the claim the theory of aggression and the law of armed conflict it produced has proven overly restrictive in contemporary application—emasculating just war theory by rendering it useless for all but the promotion of a strict legalist paradigm governing the use of force. In Walzer’s view, if the strict legalist paradigm of self-defense contingent on state sovereignty remains the sole basis for determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of war, we are bound to see the indiscriminant use of force by states continue. In confining ourselves to the legalist paradigm, we effectively give our blessing to unrestrained warfare, since it contains no restrictive conditions aside from the violation of state sovereignty. Walzer contends that this paradox borne of the legalist paradigm (e.g., that of an overly restrictive conception of when force is acceptable in fact producing a context in which force can be employed with few restraints and little deliberation) can be solved by drawing from the just war tradition in order to identify exceptional circumstances in which the use of force is justified. Walzer’s potential exceptions to the strict legalist paradigm include the use of force in ‘anticipation’ (e.g., pre-emption), in support of secession or national liberation, for the purpose of counter-intervention, or as a means of humanitarian intervention. Still, in all such cases, the use of force, while not automatically criminal, must be justified, with the burden of proof on the user (1977: 86). Such potential exceptions to the legalist paradigm allow for restoration of the prudential element of just war theory and, more broadly, the applicability of moral deliberation and contemplation to the wardecision calculus. To that end, Walzer provides both theoretical and empirical accounts of the potential admissibility of force in a first-strike capacity (in the event territorial integrity and/or political independence is threatened), to support ‘a community…whose members are committed

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to independence and ready and able to determine the conditions of their own existence’ (1977: 93), to protect the integrity a state that has already been invaded by an outside power, or to stop or reverse acts that ‘shock the conscience of mankind’, including the gross violation of human rights (1977: 101). The just war tradition has long broached the war-decision relative to many of these circumstances, Walzer’s contribution to the contemporary just war ‘conversation’ is rehabilitative rather than revolutionary (O’Brien, 1979b).21 Furthermore, he was clearly preoccupied with the debate surrounding just causes—a preoccupation he shared with many decision-makers at the time (and since), largely at the expense of the remainder of the ad bellum criteria. Still, in identifying and edifying a set of revisions to the theory of aggression, Walzer established the relevance of the just war tradition for practical application to the pressing problems of the modern age (Orend, 2000). Arguments attesting to the applicability of the just war tradition to the contemporary dilemmas produced by and associated with war were subsequently extended by Doyle (1983a, 1983b), Cohen (1984), and Elshtain (1991), among others. The intensification of the just war ‘conversation’ in the 1980s and 1990s was clearly a product of the renewed and expanded concern over the means and ends of modern war after the decline of détente in the 1970s and the massive buildup of American and Soviet nuclear stockpiles that followed (Tucker, 1985; Finnis et al., 1987). One widely resonant contribution to the just war ‘conversation’ elicited by that particular concern was the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (NCCB, 1983). This letter, as well as similar subsequent missives from the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the question(s) of war sought to elucidate the transcendent universality of the principles of the just war tradition while reaffirming the currency of its application to modern methods of war. Moreover, echoing the Augustinian tradition which inspired it, the letter exhorts those concerned with curbing the savagery of war to ‘look at the world as it is, not simply as we would want it to be’ (NCCB, 1983: 22). The return of the just war tradition to the forefront of public consciousness in the aftermath of Vietnam and in the face of potential nuclear catastrophe reflected the reality that at the core of the just war theory lies a blueprint for informed inquiry into the moral legitimacy of the wardecision (Ramsey, 1968). To that end, the resurgence of the just war ‘conversation’ has continued into the post-Cold War era, remaining at the forefront of the prevailing social narrative surrounding most if not all of the major questions associated with the legality and legitimacy of

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contemporary warfare and military intervention (Hudson, 2009; Falk, 2001). The just war tradition has been invoked relative to the debate over pre-emptive wars, forced democratization, and regime change (Elshtain, 2003; Buchanan, 2006; Mellow, 2006), military responses to transnational terrorism, failed states, and other ‘new’ security challenges (O’Driscoll, 2008; Patterson, 2007; Posner and Sykes, 2004; Crawford, 2003), the role of non-state actors in authorizing or participating in war (Pattison, 2008; Orend, 2006), humanitarian intervention (Nardin, 2003; Chesterman, 2003; Miller, 2000), and the connection between the war decision and the obligations of jus post bellum (Orend, 2002; Walzer, 2004; Williams and Caldwell, 2006). It has also been taken to task by critics contending it is largely a gendered implement promoting a male heroism that systematically excludes issues of concern to women (Sjoberg, 2006) or, even more fundamentally, a coherent mythology of illusion regarding the prospects for moral conduct relative to war (Fiala, 2008). In sum, as this discussion of the ever-evolving just war tradition demonstrates, the notion of the ‘just war’ has been and remains embedded within a subjective and highly changeable narrative enveloping the war-decision. Throughout history, the social narrative concerning the legitimate basis for war prevailing in Western civilization has been defined and propelled by the just war tradition, which (like the narrative it shapes) has swung pendulum-like from a restraining position to a facilitative one. With the pragmatic appreciation for its utility in advancing and sustaining the case for war on the part of liberal statesmen ushering in its modern resurgence beginning in the late 19th century, the pendulum has clearly shifted in the latter (facilitative) direction. This is evident both in the degree to which the language and concepts of just war theory were affixed to military intervention in service of liberal internationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century, as well as the part it played in mobilizing popular support for the prosecution of ‘total’ war (World War II) and for the various war-decisions subsumed within the long ideological struggle of the Cold War that followed it. The restrictive strain within the just war ‘conversation’ has had its moments, namely in its influence on the architects of the United Nations system, pursuant to disastrous military campaigns in Vietnam and Iraq, and in relation to the specter of nuclear holocaust. Such installments in the recent and contemporary just war ‘conversation’ uphold the pendulum metaphor, and the continuation of the longstanding struggle between the restraintist inclinations of many just war theorists and the utilitarian impulses of statesmen interested in appropriating the just war tradition to legitimate the use of military force

Entering the Just War Conversation 45

that metaphor seeks to describe. Still, in the end, the modern resurgence of the just war tradition undoubtedly has much to do with its relevance and perceived utility for the politics of signification and the reconciliation of the war-decision with the professed values of liberal societies. As an instrument for that reconciliation, it is to the process of framing, and specifically the mechanism of the ‘just war frame’, that I now turn.

3 Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars

While extant changes in the views of liberal societies toward the practice of war suggest that the utility and by extension the practice of war could or perhaps should be in jeopardy in the United States (and potentially other liberal societies), this is clearly not the case. The origins of the reason it is not, I contend, can be found in the continued prominence of the just war tradition and the discursive forum it provides for considerations of and arguments for war’s continued legitimacy. Yet beyond that sustained and even resurgent ‘conversation’ concerning the acceptable conditions for war in modern liberal societies, it is the concerted effort of foreign policy decision-makers to tap into that tradition in seeking to ‘frame’ decisions to go to war that provides the crucial animus for war’s persistence and prominence. As the analytical device at the heart of this research, framing occupies a crucial space as a bridge between foreign policy decisions and society, in the process telling us much about the reciprocal interplay between the two. In seeking to systematically investigate the constellation of ideas, values, beliefs, and symbols that decision-makers rely on in order to frame (and legitimize) the decision to employ military force in response to foreign policy crises, the concept of framing provides a logical starting point. What are frames? How are they made and used, and to what end? How do they differ in their defining characteristics and effects—and how do we evaluate them, particularly within a foreign policy context?

Defining frames Framing across the disciplines As befits what one of the foremost scholars of framing effects referred to as its ‘scattered conceptualization’ (Entman, 1993), there is no single 46

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definition of, or common approach to, framing. Indeed, the concept of frames and the study of their application and utility spans the social sciences, with important and relatively distinct translations in disciplines including sociology, psychology, and somewhat more recently political science, as well as in fields such as communications and media studies and linguistics. In the sociological literature, frames are most often invoked (and studied) by social movement theorists, who view the utilization of frames as a crucial determinant of the prospects for (and limits to) political mobilization and collective action. Appropriating a working definition of frames clearly discernable in the work of Erving Goffman and Kenneth Boulding, among others, this robust body of research generally treats the frame as a dependent variable––meaning that the frame itself serves as the object of study, with independent factors identified and investigated in light of their impact on dimensions such as the process of frame formation, framing objectives, and how frames work. Frames have been associated with sociological inquiry and the study of social movements in conjunction with what Mayer Zald (1996) dubbed four ‘traditions’ in framing research.1 While these ‘traditions’ approach social movements and the essence and importance of frames in accordance with them in significantly different ways, each share at base Goffman’s view of frames as ‘schemata of interpretation’ which provide a necessary backdrop for understanding so as to enable individuals to ‘locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their lifespace and the world at-large’ (Goffman, 1974: 21). While the emphasis of sociology in general, and social movement theorizing in particular, on the frame as a dependent variable worthy of direct consideration and analysis has arguably advanced the concept of framing the furthest, one would be remiss in not acknowledging the contributions of other social scientists to the cumulation of knowledge about the dynamics and especially the effects of frames. Two disciplinary traditions in particular—psychology and political science—stand out in this regard, each motivated by different concerns about frame effects while at the same time similarly considering them from the standpoint of independent variables. Within the psychological literature, frames have largely been introduced and advanced as devices that significantly impinge upon and alter individual perceptions and, by extension, the individual’s decision-making calculus, thereby calling into question assumptions of rationality. Perhaps the apex of psychological research in framing effects to date is the Nobel Prize-winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) on framing, prospect theory, and individual choice, which found among other things that different presentations of identical decision-making scenarios

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significantly impact people’s choices and evaluations of the options presented to them. Though arriving to the scene a bit later, in recent years political scientists have warmed to the importance of frames—largely in conjunction with, and as a means for, increased scrutiny of the agendasetting function of the mass media and the interactive dynamics between the media, public opinion, and policy-making. Like psychologists, political scientists by and large have not been directly concerned with frames themselves, but rather the notion that frames provide ‘alternative phrasing’ of policy dilemmas and their solutions. These may effect, or interact with, media representation of those dilemmas and solutions, public opinion and attitudes regarding them, and the mobilization and contribution of interest groups to the discourse and debate surrounding them (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 9). In parallel with the psychological interest in individual choice, for most political scientists frames are of interest for the effect they have on the primary concern––the policy process and its outcomes—with relatively less interest paid to how frames emerge or their content and structure. This admittedly cursory treatment of framing across the disciplines in which it has been most directly utilized reveals two distinct ‘truths’ about framing research. The first is that a more comprehensive treatment of framing—one which knits together the sociological emphasis on frame formation, process and content, and the focus of political scientists and psychologists on framing effects—is crucial in order to obtain a better and more complete picture of how framing actually works and why it is important. Indeed, it was precisely this point that resided at the heart of a ‘call to arms’ to political scientists in a recent overview of framing research, structured around questions such as ‘what makes a strong frame?’, ‘how are frames produced?’, and ‘how are frames employed strategically?’ (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Given the expansiveness of such an endeavor, it seems only possible to carry it off within a narrowly defined purview—such as the problem at the heart of this research. Thus, the limited focus of this inquiry on one important but unique type of policy dilemma and decision (the decision to use military force) allows for a fuller analysis of the intersection between that decision and the frame producing and enveloping it. The result is an analysis that can be broadened to encompass not just the framing of affirmative war-decisions, but also to account for the formation, content, and objectives of the frame employed. As such, at least indirectly, this book seeks to contribute to a marrying of disparate points of emphasis within the literature on framing, as well as the more direct

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concern with US foreign policy decision-making. The second evident ‘truth’ suggested by this rudimentary overview is the degree to which framing is an emergent concept in the social sciences, but one which has been defined and examined in very different ways. It is to the process of sifting through those disparate treatments of framing and identifying a clearer picture of what defines a frame that I now turn. Frames and related concepts A public sphere oriented around the struggle to convey multiple and highly contested ideas, concepts, and even ‘realities’ produces a politics defined (if not consumed) by the attempt to render meaning. This can lead to potential confusion as to what distinguishes frames from other, related concepts such as ‘schema’ and framing from similar processes such as ‘priming’, each in their own right introduced as heuristic devices attempting to systematize and categorize the ‘politics of signification’ (Hall, 1997). These areas of possible confusion are not insignificant, in that lacking such distinction one may draw the conclusion that framing itself does not stand up as a viable concept; i.e., that there is no substance to the very device around which this research is structured. Fortunately, more rigorous observations and applications of framing have advanced important qualifiers permitting one to distinguish framing from related devices. With respect to the difference between frames and ‘schema’, Klandermans (Johnston, 1995; Klandermans, 1997) has rightfully pointed to a distinction in scale. While schema represent participant expectations about people, objects, events, and settings in the world, frames are higher-order alignments of schema negotiated in particular interactions. As Entman (1993; emphasis added) phrased it, schema are ‘mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual processing of information’. In other words, frames are the product of concerted efforts to organize and arrange schema, providing an independent interpretive footing borne of the alignment of schemas across, and potentially within, individuals. While frames are shaped by schema and, as we shall see below, must tap into or reinforce existing schema in order to achieve broad resonance (Tannen and Wallat, 1993), it is important to keep in mind the aggregating and cumulating function of knowledge production associated with frames and framing. A second area of potential overlap and confusion lies at the process level, in the seeming interchangeability of framing and other processes such as priming and agenda-setting. Derived largely from the field of communication and media studies, priming refers chiefly to ‘changes

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in the standards that people use to make political evaluations’ (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987: 63). As Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007: 11) note, ‘priming occurs when news content suggests to audiences that they ought to use specific issues as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments’. Unlike priming, agenda-setting is a less restrictive and more subtle and complex process, one which is open to influence by interest groups, policy and norm entrepreneurs, and political elites as well as the mass media. At the same time, agendasetting as generally understood shares with priming the defining characteristics of what Scheufele and Tewksbury (ibid.) call ‘accessibility-based models’—namely, models which are limited to a concern with the correlation between attention directed at a particular issue, problem, or policy and the importance attributed to that phenomenon by relevant audiences. Both process models attempt to describe what people determine to be ‘important’, and how the media (in the case of priming) or other opinion-leaders (in the case of agenda-setting) contribute to that determination. Conversely, framing seeks to capture a broader picture of information processing and the construction of social knowledge in light of life experiences and individual knowledge, folding in psychological and social processes and factors that intervene in, and impinge upon, that process. Because the act of framing is deeply rooted in and fueled by a larger social context, this defining feature of frames should not be overlooked. Like the individual and social knowledge to which it is linked, the process of framing and the particular frame or frames it produces, advances, and modifies is dynamic and embedded within a larger structural and cultural context. This is borne out in the very terminology surrounding the study of frames, and recurring efforts to distinguish between the individual and social dimensions of the framing process. Gamson and Modigliani (1989) refer to that difference as the ‘frame in thought’ (dimensions of a frame that effect an individual’s evaluation) versus the ‘frame in communication’ (dimensions of a frame that seek to organize everyday reality at the societal level). Kinder and Sanders (1990: 74) talk about the ways in which frames are simultaneously embedded in political discourse and the ‘internal structures of the mind’, and Scheufele (1999) describes the distinctive ways in which frames effect and interact with both media representations and individual perceptions. Important differences in these clarifications notwithstanding, they all concur that frames occupy a crucial space astride two distinct but closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing, knowledge spaces.

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Frames and their function(s) Despite the overarching differences characterizing the ever-expanding application of framing across the social science literature, it is possible to identify recurring elements common to almost all explorations of framing, whether concerned with the process of framing or framing effects. At base, frames ‘help to render events or occurrences meaningful’, in the process functioning so as to organize experience and guide action (Benford and Snow, 2000). As Stuart Hall (1997) suggests, frames act as a central mechanism in a ‘politics of signification’—a politics borne of the dueling discourses and contestation that pervade the public arena, particularly in post-industrial societies. As a part of the politics of signification, it is important to remember that frames are not extant phenomena, but instead are very much products of the efforts of agents concerned with, and actively engaged in, the production of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders/ observers (Snow and Benford, 1988). This production of meaning is defined as much by what frames exclude as what they include. Among its many contributions, Kahneman and Tversky’s experimentation (1984) shows that at the same time frames select and call attention to particular aspects of reality, they also direct attention away from other aspects. In their totality, frames are very much constructed entities, emanating from source communicators, disseminated through ‘texts’ (written or verbal), and received by one or more target audiences—all while being shaped by, and shaping, the socio-cultural context within which transmission occurs. Perhaps the most in-depth treatment of the functions associated with frames was advanced in the form of a schematic representation of the ‘core tasks’ of frames (Snow and Benford, 1988). They grouped framing in accordance with three primary functions: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic frames are chiefly concerned with identifying problems and attributing their causes. Subsequent studies have advanced our understanding of the diagnostic task of frames through the study of ‘injustice frames’ (Anheier et al., 1998; Cable and Shriver, 1995; Carroll and Ratner, 1996; Klandermans and Goslinga, 1996), designed largely to infuse a normative and even moral dimension into the process of problem identification by the identification of ‘victims’ (Benford and Hunt, 1992; Hunt et al., 1994). Relatedly, another extension of diagnostic framing comes in the form of attributional and adversarial/boundary frames, which seek (respectively) to identify and attribute causality, blame, and culpability for the injustice in question so as to cultivate a consensus on the source of the problem and to delineate between ‘good’

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and ‘evil’ (or, at a minimum, to identify protagonists and antagonists) in the problem narrative (Gamson, 1995). Following from the catalytic function of diagnosis, Snow and Benford (1988) pointed to two additional ‘core tasks’ of frames: namely, prognosis and motivation. Prognostic frames build upon the diagnosis of a problem which logically precedes them, in the process articulating (or seeking to articulate) a proposed solution or solutions to that problem(s). As some of the leading studies of the prognostic function of frames have pointed out, however, there is less leeway for framing agents on these grounds than there is in diagnosis. To some extent, the range of possible responses to be articulated in the prognostic frame is dictated by the nature or content of the diagnostic frame (Nepstad, 1997). In a similar vein, motivational frames—which attempt to provide a rationale for engaging in the proscribed action, including the generation of an appropriate and effective vocabulary of motive—are, at least to an extent, products of the diagnostic frame. At the same time, however, one should not overlook the degree of discretion and range of action which framing agents have at their disposal in articulating either prognostic or motivational frames (Gamson, 1995). While the parameters of the possible may be established by a diagnostic frame, prognostic and/or motivational frames can be manipulated to great effect as well, either with respect to framing the intended solution(s) or cajoling audience members into action in pursuit of it (them). These manipulations can in turn have interactive effects (intended or not) with the diagnostic frame, sometimes even altering to a degree the ways in which the problem was initially defined.2 Process models As frames lie at the heart of a process by which ‘…people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue’ (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 104), the manner in which frames are constructed itself demands attention, if for no other reason than to gain purchase as to how and why that conceptualization or reorientation is advanced. Perhaps not surprisingly, views of frame construction vary in accordance with the prevailing view of what is important about frames from a functional standpoint. For instance, Scheufele (1999) offers a rational and orderly conception of the framing process, with frames advanced sequentially along the trajectory of frame building (introduction) and setting (consolidation), proceeding through individual-level filtering and processing, and finally circulating back from audiences to the media and opinion leaders who originated the frame. Such a linear depiction is

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undoubtedly a function of the more limited and narrow focus on the intersection of framing and the mass media typifying his research agenda. Conversely, other treatments of framing assume a broader and more nuanced view of the process of frame construction, treating that process as a complex set of linked or related processes. Those emphasizing the discursive nature of frames point to the advancement of speech acts and written communications to define a problem—or, more accurately to establish the dominant discourse enveloping that problem. The emphasis on the discursive function of frames highlights the twin processes of articulation (connecting events and experiences in a compelling fashion into a ‘package’ for audience consumption) and amplification (accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as more salient than others), processes which Goffman (1974) fused under the heading of ‘keying’. Clearly these processes are linked and mutually reinforcing, and are crucial not only to building a frame but also to sustaining its resonance and importance over time (Hart, 1996). Studies of framing emphasizing their strategic element such as those associated with the study of social movements advance a portrayal of the framing process as something that is above all deliberative and goal directed, with frames developed to achieve a specific objective. Such models focus less on the genesis of frames, instead emphasizing the process by which already-articulated frames are ‘aligned’ and deployed for political purposes (Snow et al., 1986). Encompassing a series of stages (bridging, amplification, extension, transformation), frame alignment models seek to capture the machinations of framing agents and, by extension, the synchronicity (or lack thereof) between these machinations and various ‘issue agendas’ associated with the media, governmental sector, elected officials, and the general public (McCarthy et al., 1996: 293). Among their other contributions, studies of framing as a strategic process suggest that the effects of framing are greatest on socalled ‘valence issues’, wherein they are deployed with a lack of specificity to (re)affirm basic civic ideals, as well as on ‘easy’ issues in which only a minimal amount of cognitive effort by the audience is necessary to process the frame (McCarthy et al., 1996; Nelson, 1984). Extending still further along the continuum of process models points one in the direction of studies chiefly interested in the contested nature of frames, and the aforementioned ‘signification’ function that characterizes both frame construction and deployment. Building upon the insights of strategic process models, these studies embed frames—from their development and generation through their strategic deployment, alignment, and realignment—within a robust conception of political and social

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contestation in which frames are implements used by multiple agents to advance multiple versions of reality, often concurrently. In this way, frames can be advanced not only to render meaning, but to challenge or compete with other potentially contradictory or threatening renderings (Sniderman and Theriault, 2004), whether by ‘counterframing’ (Benford, 1987) or ‘reframing’ (Benford and Hunt, 1992). A more recent and promising addition to studies of the framing process is the idea that frames and their effects are cascading (Entman, 2004). Entman’s ‘cascade model’ differs from other depictions of the framing process chiefly in the degree that it seeks to account for the effects of time, reciprocity, and audience feedback which he asserts are central to the spiraling dynamic of framing. Entman advances a depiction of the framing process with respect to foreign policy (though a similar process would conceivably apply to domestic issues as well) in which frames originate from high-level decision-makers, in the process shaping and orienting the frames used by other opinion leaders, the media, and the general public.3 This reciprocal effect captured by the cascade model postulates a less top-heavy view of the framing process, instead presenting framing as a two-way street in which the meaning-rendering efforts of policy elites are subjected to societal scrutiny and are influenced, and perhaps even revised, as a function of that feedback. The prevailing dynamic associated with the cascade model in turn determines the amount of contestation surround the issue or policy concern; minimal, if a single frame dominates (e.g., if elite and public frames are in relative harmony with one another) or extensive if there is parity or competition between frames (e.g., at the elite level) or ‘dissensus’ between elite and public frames (Larson, 1996).

Evaluating frame application Having established the growing importance of framing to social scientific inquiry and to foreign policy analysis specifically, the next logical step is to consider the ways in which foreign policy frames can be evaluated. What factors explain why some frames are employed in certain instances, and others not? Likewise, what makes some frames effective, and others not? What explains the repeated application of a particular frame relative to the same (or a similar) problem or decision over time? Can the same frame be employed in different ways with respect to its internal content, target audience, or in conjunction with changing contextual circumstances? Given the overriding objective of this research with investigating the application of the ‘just war’ frame, it is impera-

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tive to consider the criteria by which frame applications can be and are evaluated. The application of any frame (irrespective of content) is first dictated by the perception of its authors and articulators that it will be well received in the target audience(s) to which the frame is directed. In this vein, Chong and Druckman (2007) advance three key conditions which frame authors and articulators must (and do) take into account: the consideration(s), concept(s), or idea(s) which lie at the heart of the frame and make up its message must already be stored in individual memories; they must have ‘activation potential’ (meaning, they must be readily accessible by those individuals); and they must be relevant or applicable to the situation at hand (e.g., to the ‘real world’ empirical problem, solution, or strategy around which the framing agent seeks to construct meaning). Not surprisingly, in seeking to effectively satisfy these three conditions, framing agents often resort to symbols, ideological appeals, or other heuristic devices as a supplement to (or even in lieu of) the direct delivery of substantive information. As Chong and Druckman conceive of it, the application of a frame is decidedly contingent on the alignment of these three conditions, in point of fact resembling art as much as science: …people draw their opinions from the set of available beliefs stored in memory. Only some beliefs become accessible at a given moment. Out of the set of accessible beliefs, only some are strong enough to be judged relevant or applicable to the subject at hand. Framing can work on all three levels, by making new beliefs available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs applicable or ‘strong’ in people’s evaluations. (Chong and Druckman, 2007: 111) At the same time, a more general evaluation of frame application is possible if one takes into account the three main criteria by which frames can be evaluated, as well as ways in which these criteria have been operationalized and measured. Credibility As Downs (1957) notes, the credibility of leaders is an essential consideration taken into account by the public when seeking reliable cues on complex issues, serving as a shortcut that reduces information-gathering costs. Frame credibility is in actuality a dual phenomenon, reflected both in the degree to which the intended audience(s) finds the content or message of the frame credible, as well as to by the level or extent of the credibility of the architects of the frame among audience members.

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Obviously, these two conditions are closely intertwined, and indeed the credibility of frame architects might even be considered a necessary (though not sufficient) and logically a priori requirement for assessing the credibility of any frame in application. If we are to understand those who construct and advance a frame as in some sense ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Zald, 1996: 269), or even merely policy entrepreneurs involved in the ‘politics of signification’, then it would seem that the credibility of the claim-maker in the view of the audience is essential to the credibility of the claim being advanced.4 In seeking to operationalize credibility with respect to the importance of frame architects, Lupia (2000) rightfully points to two critical considerations: one, that the target audience(s) must believe that the frame architect(s) possess knowledge about what considerations are most relevant to the issue(s) at hand; and two, that the target audience(s) believe that the architect(s) can be trusted to reveal what he/she/they actually knows with respect to that issue (or issues). Thus, the credibility of the frame architect is derived from perceptions that she or he is an authority on the issue or subject at hand––but at the same time, an authority that is perceived to operate in a forthright manner, and one who is not entirely motivated by self-interest. In light of the substance of the frame itself, two factors must be taken into account when evaluating frame credibility. The first is the internal harmony of the claims, ideas, beliefs, or values advanced by a frame (e.g., frame consistency). Not surprisingly, a frame advancing incompatible or even contradictory information is unlikely to make the grade, such that the audience is likely to discredit it out of hand. The second relevant factor with respect to the substantive credibility of a frame is the degree to which those claims, ideas, beliefs, and values central to the frame (the frame’s ‘message’) comport with and are verified by the actual events in the ‘real world’ that they are designed to filter, interpret, and organize in meaningful, and meaning-filled, ways (e.g., empirical credibility). In evaluating the credibility of frames on these grounds, we are reminded of the significant role for agency in the framing process, at both ends of that spectrum. If frames reflect an effort to construct social knowledge, the knowledge they project must be both logically coherent and empirically grounded in the judgment of the intended audience(s) in order to serve that function. Salience A second, and closely related, criterion for evaluating any frame is the relative salience of the frame under examination. The first determinant

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of whether or not a frame is salient is its centrality—e.g., the occurrence that the core beliefs, values, claims, and/or ideas associated with a frame are consistent to the core beliefs, values, claims, and/or ideas prevailing in the targeted audiences. A second and closely related consideration is the experiential commensurability of the specific frame. Is the framing congruent with the everyday experiences of audience members, or are they too abstract or distant from the lives of the target audience? The third condition of relevance is narrative fidelity, or the extent to which the proffered framing is culturally resonant. In Entman’s (2004) words, what is the magnitude of the frame; does the content or substance of a frame repeatedly reinforce the ‘cultural myths’ (Campbell, 1988), ‘inherent ideology’ (Rudé, 1980), or ‘domain assumptions’ (Gouldner, 1970) that define a particular socio-cultural milieu—or do they challenge or contradict the prevailing social and cultural narrative? Further, what efforts have been made to publicly elaborate and repeatedly clarify that similarity, or, conversely, to attempt to narrow it? As Entman (1993: 53) points out, ‘…texts can make information more salient by placement, repetition, or by association with culturally familiar symbols;’ absent these explicit connections, they may lack salience. Taken together, these factors strongly suggest that in the vast majority of cases, the closer the central frame message is to the existence and experiences of the audience, their own core belief system, and the prevailing cultural narrative of the society in question, the more likely it is that message will ‘stick’ as a method of signification (Benford and Snow, 2000). Indeed, highly salient frames which reflect requisite levels of consistency, commensurability, and fidelity can in some cases themselves be absorbed into the general ‘cultural stock’, subverting and even transcending the distinction between frame and extant culture (Zald, 1996). All of this is not to say that a counter-intuitive or countercultural frame cannot prevail; of course, numerous examples to the contrary exist. Rather, the larger point is that such a frame has to overcome the significant obstacle of possessing a lesser degree of immediate or ‘natural’ salience that a frame whose content is more consistent with core beliefs, experiences, and cultural narratives might not. Dynamism The third major consideration in assessing the application of a frame is the level of dynamism it does or does not exhibit. To a much greater degree than the preceding criteria (credibility and salience), this consideration attempts to capture the extent to which a frame’s content can be (and is) manipulated by the frame architect, thereby reflecting

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the idea that frames are not static but evolutionary. There are two parallel axes on which frame dynamism can be evaluated: inclusivity/ exclusivity and flexibility/rigidity. As Benford and Snow (2000) point out, frames that demonstrate greater inclusivity (that is, frames that feature a message with the potential for wide applicability across multiple social strata, including race, class, gender, and age) and greater flexibility (e.g., frames with a message that can be adapted to accommodate divergent strains within the target audience, without losing features contributing to their credibility and salience) are more likely to attain (and retain) the resonance necessary to achieve ‘master frame’ status (discussed in greater detail below). Conversely, a frame constructed in such a fashion that it is saddled with intrinsic limitations (whether in the potential appeal of its particular signification, or in the potential for that signification to be modified) is unlikely to attain that degree of resonance. In this way, the extent to which a frame can be or is adapted to accommodate a broader audience without losing the essence of its signification is a crucial measure of its utility. Further, as Swart (1995) suggests, frame dynamism is intricately linked to credibility and especially salience; it stands to reason that the more adaptive the frame is in application, the more likely audience members will identify consistencies and continuities between their own beliefs and experiences and those highlighted by the frame. Suggesting the iterative and reciprocal aspects of effective framing, the more dynamic the frame (that is, the more inclusive and flexible it proves to be in application), the greater chance it has for achieving fidelity with the relevant prevailing cultural narrative; its very adaptation increases its prospects for survival, resonance, and by extension its chances to reinforce (or revise) that narrative. Limits to effectiveness As Benford and Snow (2000: 618–619) point out, frames which attain and retain high levels of salience are viewed as thoroughly credible, and perhaps most importantly are open to the prospect of revision. Such frames are dynamic and adaptable enough to be considered ‘master frames’. Those frames that do attain ‘master frame’ status demonstrate a combined elasticity and breadth such that they are thought to subsume other, more limited and targeted frames and appeal to a far-reaching swath of society, as a function of their resonance throughout the prevailing socio-historical milieu in which they were introduced and in which they operate. Few frames can be said to attain and sustain such a lofty and rarified position, with even strongly resonant frames rarely achieving the unique and tenuous balance of message and messenger credibility, overlap with the

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beliefs and experiences of audience members, fidelity with master narratives, and breadth and flexibility of interpretive scope necessary to be considered in this light.5 If frame resonance can be thought of as unfolding along a continuum, then the vast majority of frames must be located somewhere further down that continuum from the rarified extreme of the ‘master frame’ (see Figure 3.1). This may be, and often is, a result of the failure of the frame to attain the degree of credibility or salience, or to display the extent of dynamism, necessary for its particular signification (the knowledge about an issue or problem it seeks to generate, disseminate, and perpetuate) to prevail in light of alternative framings. Those frames with a sufficient level of attainment on the three indicators of concern here (and their components) tend to fall into the category of ‘inducing frames’, such that they effectively convey frame content and induce at least some proportion of the intended audience(s) to accept the frame message, though not to a degree that they do not have to contend with equally or nearly viable counter-framings. The least viable frames (‘discordant frames’) lack a necessary minimum standard of credibility, salience, and dynamism so as to effectively transmit a frame message in a way that is resilient and persuasive; rather, the framing proves discordant with the audience, and withers away with little impact. Of course, in some situations impediments to frame effectiveness exist, irrespective of anything to do with the credibility of the frame/framer or the salience and dynamism of the frame. Akin to what statisticians Figure 3.1

The framing continuum resonance

low

Discordant Frames

Inducing Frames

Master Frames

• Frame lacks requisite measure of credibility, salience, and dynamism to influence intended audience(s)

• Frame possesses sufficient levels of credibility, salience and dynamism to influence intended audience(s)

• Frame exhibits high degree of credibility, salience, and dynamism necessary to strongly persuade intended audience(s)

• Frame message is not viable for contestation

high

high

• Frame message subjected to contestation by other effective frames

competition

• Frame message is widely accepted and faces little to no contestation from other frames

low

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refer to as random error or ‘noise’, factors such as the existence of unpredictable and resilient predispositions regarding a problem or topic within the audience may create intractable problems for a frame or its architects; susceptibility to framing is greatly increased on issues about which a settled interpretation is lacking. Random error notwithstanding, in most cases it is precisely the factors outlined in this chapter (credibility, salience, and dynamism) that providing the overarching structure by which frames in application can be evaluated.

Framing and foreign policy analysis High stakes, low salience Framing is a vital, if often overlooked, aspect of the foreign policy process. As is also true in other policy arenas, framing is a crucial aspect of the formulation of foreign policy decisions and alternatives, in that the ‘decision frame’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) articulated by an individual decision-maker or by principals in the core decision-making unit is at once a reflection of the prevailing conception of the acts, outcomes, and possible contingencies associated with a particular choice on the part of that individual decision-maker or decision-making unit. As with any frame, decision frames are constituted by equal parts personal/individual (belief systems, habits and personality characteristics, prevailing norms and values, life experiences, etc.) and social (effect of prevailing cultural narrative, concordance with social norms, etc.) factors, each shaping the formulation and interpretation of a problem and its causes, and the identification of its possible and desirable solutions. However, as a function of their prominence, power, and influence, as well as by the potentially far-reaching scope and implications of their decisions, the decision frames of high-ranking policy-makers differ by orders of magnitude from those making decisions with lower stakes and a far more constrained set of potentially affected parties. This is especially true with respect to foreign policy decisions, in which the national interest is presumably at stake—and undoubtedly so with the decision to employ military force in international crisis, given the obvious risks and costs associated with the former, and the high stakes and grave threats corresponding by definition with the latter (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000). Further, foreign policy decisions typically are made amidst a void of information and low public salience compared with domestic policy issues. As public opinion data has reliably demonstrated, public attitudes concerning foreign policy issues in most societies including the US, while consistent, are less strongly held than on domestic issues

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(Holsti, 1996). Further, foreign policy issues and problems in general are much less likely to register among the most important policy issues and problems than domestic problems, and when they do, tend to occupy that place for relatively short durations (Soroka, 2003). Considering the high stakes/low salience attributes of foreign policy decisions (including and especially the decision to employ military force) it would seem that framing is especially important. In a circumstance where political decision-makers are contemplating the use of military force, public support for that option is desired for a variety of reasons (both political and operational), and public attitudes toward the issues at stake and/or the potential theater for the operation are relatively weak, framing is likely to take on added importance along with other domestic political considerations (Risse-Kappen, 1991). In a relative void of durable attitudes and accessible information, decisions of great magnitude and consequence such as the decision to resort to military force are likely to invoke framing efforts by decision-makers tasked with the responsibility to act, especially in liberal societies where said decision-makers are also responsible for presenting a public rationale for their action(s) to their constituents. This public rationale is particularly crucial in cases involving the potential for military intervention. As has been borne out empirically, the most important determinant of public support for the use of force in the American context is the ‘principal policy objective’ associated with the use of military force as communicated by decision-makers (Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998). For all of these reasons and more, then, it seems exceedingly likely that decision-makers will be prone to rely on the signifying function and power of frames in such circumstances, generating a shared collective understanding of the problem at hand and leading the nation to what decision-makers perceive to be the best course of action (Sobel, 2001). From the standpoint of foreign policy analysis, all of this points to the necessity for a better understanding of the contribution of frames to the construction of meaning and the politics of signification. The agency/structure debate A more robust and rigorous consideration of framing, extending from considerations of frame formulation and the framing process through to frame effects, presents significant potential benefit from a theoretical standpoint. Applied to investigation of foreign policy decisions and outcomes, frame analysis has the potential to synthesize and integrate agency and structure considerations and concerns—in the process

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bridging a divide that has long vexed international relations scholars interested in exploring foreign policy behavior. As noted above, frames are socially constituted entities, meaning they are most decidedly byproducts of a collision between the structural imperatives of the sociocultural context in which they are embedded and the cognitive processes and choices of individuals engaged in an effort at ‘sense-making’. On the former score, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any frame is at least in part contingent on the design and functioning of political institutions and the unfolding of informal processes central to any political system. Gamson and Meyer (1996) go so far as to argue that these institutional and process variables, reinforced by the prevailing political culture, converge to a ‘political opportunity structure’ which explains, at least in part, the production and effectiveness of frames in attaining resonance and shaping public policy and/or political decisions. They point to the emergence of such opportunity structures as a crucial determinant in the life cycle and resonance of any frame—a conclusion which highlights the importance of social structure to effective framing efforts, apart from any consideration of frame content, the identity and credibility of framing agents, or the level of receptivity among audience members. Apart from purely political institutions and processes, as is discussed elsewhere in this chapter, extant cultural factors also greatly impinge upon the framing process and the design, articulation, revision, and reception of particular frames. Citing the work of Jasper and his colleagues (Jasper, 1997; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999) and Swidler (1986), Benford and Snow (2000: 629) point out that ‘cultural material’ such as the stock of meanings, beliefs, practices, values, myths, and narratives can be ‘construed as part of a metaphorical toolkit…which constitute the cultural resource base from which new cultural elements are fashioned, as well as the lens through which framings are interpreted and evaluated’. As they suggest, the pervasive if elusive effects of culture represent yet another key structural parameter shaping the framing process (Berbrier, 1998; Kubal, 1998; Nepstad, 1997; Taylor, 1999). Among those cultural considerations receiving the most attention is the impact of ideology on frame construction and effectiveness (Oliver and Johnston, 2005; Zald, 1996). As a broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs that affect one’s orientation to political phenomena (Geertz, 1973), ideology can either provide a crucial source of sustenance to a frame, or effectively constrain it; in either case, frames are embedded within a broader and more complex ideology, which itself is embedded within the larger culture. As an inherently structural variable, ideology provides a cultural touchstone for frame articulation—with effective frames frequently providing

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innovative amplifications or extensions of prevailing ideological precepts and tenets, and ineffective frames oftentimes out-of-sync with or in contradiction to same (Oliver and Johnston, 2005). On the agency side of the ledger, the active and iterative dimension of framing is crucial. As Benford and Snow (2000) suggest, framing is a ‘processual phenomenon’ that at its very base assumes (and confers) agency on the participants at both ends of the process. Agency, defined simply in the context of this research as significant freedom of choice accruing to the individual, is clearly discernable in the efforts of framemakers—whether social movement operatives, interest groups, media elite, or representatives of the state (or all of the above). Indeed, as a crucial tool of the ‘politics of signification’, as discussed above, framing can be thought of at a basic level as an implement designed to make political opportunities (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). At the same time, agency abounds among audience members as well, who are free to determine whether a frame message is credible, commensurate with personal experiences and beliefs, and so forth—and to accept or reject the message accordingly. On the audience side, while agency may be obviously pervasive with respect to contested frames, so too is it evident in conformity-inducing ‘master frames’. Whether the choices of audience members converge or diverge, the larger point is that framing is as much about the sense-making efforts of audience members as it is the signification or knowledge-generation efforts of framing agents; in the dynamic realm of framing, agents abound.

Introducing the just war frame As Fiss and Hirsch (2005: 31) point out, through a fusion of the concern with the cognitive processing and decision-making process of individuals involved in ‘sense-making’ with an explicit recognition of the role of structural factors in shaping that endeavor, frame analysis allows us to explore the politics of signification with respect to the affirmative wardecision in a novel but contextually sensitive way. The construction and application of a frame for application to the affirmative war-decision, as with any policy decision, may be undertaken for various purposes. Most prominent among these are: forging a shared understanding of some problem or situation; making attributions about the causes of or sources of said problem or situation; articulating a response to that problem or situation, and; urging members of the audience to which the frame is being applied to act, typically in accordance with that articulated, favored response (Benford and Snow, 2000).

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In what is probably the best recent application of framing analysis to foreign policy (though concerned primarily with the role of the media), Entman (2004) offers a strikingly similar depiction of the major functions of frames: Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating ‘text’, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993: 52). Clearly these operational definitions underscore the utility of framing for investigation of the ‘selling’ of affirmative war-decisions to the American public by those responsible for making them. As Bartholomew and Mayer (1992: 153) point out, framing analysis allows us to shift our attention ‘…away from what structures have done to actors to what actors do within the space produced by the limits and possibilities thrown up by structures’. And, from an analytical perspective, the emphasis placed by framing analysis on the idea that frames serve both in the abstract and in application as mechanisms for defining ‘problems’ and their proscribed ‘solutions’ for public consumption suggests that the concept of framing itself is particularly applicable to the central concern of this research. The ‘just war’ as social construct As the discussion of the just war ‘conversation’ in the preceding chapter demonstrated, the just war tradition has long been the central thread in the narrative tapestry woven around the practice of war in the Western socio-historical context. So too does that ‘conversation’ remain vitally important to decision-makers and citizens in liberal societies as well as the international legal and normative order that these societies have erected and seek to uphold (Forsyth, 1992; Davis et al., 2001). Michael Howard (1979) asserts as much through his contention that at least since the Middle Ages, war in the Western mindset has failed to assume the condition of generalized and random violence as alleged in the Hobbesian state of nature, but rather has featured highly public debates and considerations over proper restraint. Thus war has long taken on the attributes of liberal societies, a foundational argument perhaps most often associated with Rousseau (1970) and Montesquieu (1989), who each concluded (though for differing reasons) that it was the state of society rather than the state of nature that determines and encourages war. Given the long-standing and persistent resonance not only of the core precepts of

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just war theory but also the larger narrative tradition enveloping them within liberal societies, the supposition that a signifying frame drawn from and dependent on the centuries-old theory of a just war plays the predominant role in the legitimization of the use of force within American society appears wholly plausible and worthy of further consideration. Yet as the preceding consideration of the just war ‘conversation’ also illustrates, the notion of a ‘just’ war, like the practice of war in general, is a social construct central to and largely produced and shaped by that very conversation. In dispensing with the understanding of the just war as an objective theoretical proposition (and the fixed and rigorous standards ostensibly associated with such a proposition) and instead embracing the evolutionary and inherently social (read: subjective) nature of the ‘just war’, it follows that a ‘just’ war is any war waged in accordance with the standards that the majority of the members of the society in question perceive or accept as legitimate. As such, one must acknowledge (as just war thinkers dating at least to Augustine have) that the representation of what constitutes a legitimate and socially permissible war within the just war tradition, while central and essential to that tradition, has never been sacrosanct in application (Wells, 1969). If we accept the logical proposition of constructivist theory expressed in the pithy slogan ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992), and infuse that proposition with an equivalent appreciation for the empirical reality that war is a frequent by-product of the permissive conditions entailed by the anarchical structure of the international system, then it stands to reason that the social practice of war (including, if not especially, the presentation of a rationale for the decision to go to war) is defined by an inter-subjective understanding primarily directed by the state and its leaders (Finnemore, 2003).6 While just war theory itself is arrayed around paramount concerns with the circumstances in which the decision to go to war may be justified (the ad bellum criteria), the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct during war (the in bello criteria), and the just termination and settlement of war (the post bellum criteria), the just war tradition is better understood as a bellweather reflecting the prevailing social norms enveloping the practice of war at any given time period. In other words, if the specific criteria associated with just war theory have remained essentially constant over the centuries, the application of those standards (which is the chief concern of this research) can be and has been renegotiated in conjunction with changing social practices, conditions, and structures (O’Driscoll, 2008). It is precisely this social (and, by definition, subjective and mutable) dimension of the just war tradition that makes the just war

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frame possible, and beyond that, makes it particularly suitable for a study of the social (and subjective) ‘event’ that is the affirmative wardecision. Just wars and ‘the American experience’ The utility of the ‘just war frame’ as an analytical device designed to shed light on how foreign policy decision-makers ‘sell’ the decision to go to war is greatly enhanced given the targeted focus of this inquiry on the United States. The decision to limit the focus of this study in this way was based largely on the centrality of military force to, as well as the highly ideological tenor and content of, contemporary US foreign policy. Still, the preponderance of material power, the rhetorical emphasis on liberal ideals, and especially the marriage of the two has long defined and distinguished American foreign policy, lending further support to the introduction and analysis of such a frame. By presenting foreign policy elites with the evident need to reconcile their frequent use of military power with professed commitments to the promotion of a peaceful and just world order for domestic audiences, these factors—while not necessarily unique to the American context—undoubtedly make the US the most appropriate starting point for such an investigation. In the absence of such reconciliation, either of the two most likely results—an unrepentant realpolitik orientation negating the idealistic (if not messianic) script equating America’s interests with the world’s, or an unfettered liberalism which could potentially limit or constrain the ability of decision-makers to go to war—would be sub-optimal from the standpoint of the effective conduct of statecraft. The importance of wedding power to ideals in US foreign policy is evident not only in the undesirable hypothetical scenarios that might result from failing to do so, but also (and more convincingly) in the reality that attempts at striking this balance have deep and long roots in American history (Davis and Lynn-Jones, 1987). Appeals to national greatness and indeed millennial destiny, introduced by political (John Winthrop, Benjamin Franklin) and religious (Jonathan Mayhew, Peter Muhlenberg) authorities alike, were ubiquitous prior to and during the Revolution, providing moral justification for resistance against a divinely sanctioned King George III. The paramount figure in marshaling these sentiments into an ideological basis for American foreign policy was the liberal theorist and revolutionary pamphleteer Thomas Paine (Bloch, 1985). Relative to the war-decision, Paine was especially concerned with the exercise of power by the state and viewed warfare as a singularly exploitative practice requiring restraint, which

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free peoples should shun (Fitzsimons, 1995: 578). Yet in a peculiar twist of logic, it was Paine’s very concern with the predations of war as practiced in the Old World that would provide the basis for his main contribution to the just war narrative in the New.7 Though Paine did not advocate military adventurism in the promotion of liberal principles, his belief in the inherent virtue of the American experiment provided the ideological firmament for outward expansion as the nation, and its power and interests, matured (Hartz, 1955). Whether in references to manifest destiny or the aggressive expansionism of Polk in the 1840s, Seward’s recycling of the Monroe Doctrine in the 1850s, or the birthpangs of empire at the end of the 19th century and the dawn of the 20th, the vision of greatness espoused by Paine was steadily and gradually transformed into a moral justification for nationalist expansion, often through military engagements. Apart from any economic and strategic imperatives, the cause of liberty and freedom around the world required extending the American enterprise progressively outward and justified America’s ‘peculiar aptitude for expansion’ (Sen. Sidney Breese, D-IL, 14 Feb 1848; quoted in Hunt, 1987: 42). What this cursory sketch reveals is the degree to which the historical phenomenon of American exceptionalism has infused American thought about the legitimacy of war (Payne, 1995; Lepgold and McKeown, 1995). The enduring influence of American exceptionalism in turn reveals a truly unique characteristic of war in the American context, beyond the frequency or level of violence the US has employed: the quest to harmonize applications of military power and the stated American (and liberal) desire for a cooperative, peaceful, and just world order through all means necessary, even the deception of ‘liberal lies’ described by Mearsheimer (2011). This orientation has entailed among those with the ultimate say over whether, where, and when to employ military force without regard to contextual factors or ideological disposition, manifesting itself primarily in appeals for popular support and public rationalizations for military adventures. Such appeals and rationales have emanated with equal frequency and magnitude from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, FDR and Eisenhower, JFK and Ronald Reagan, buttressing 20th century military engagements in Cuba and the Philippines, Korea and Vietnam, and Somalia and Kosovo. Given the degree to which the just war tradition continues to dominate debate and discussion concerning war within American society, the application and effectiveness of the just war frame relative to this evident need seems particularly worthy of consideration (Rengger, 2002).

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One frame among many? The inherently social character of the practice of war and the just war construct itself underscore the extent to which the war-decision has long been a source of contestation in Western and American thought, discourse, and practice. Beginning with the age of Enlightenment and the modern, secular, bureaucratic, and pluralistic societies it begat, multiple and varied ‘significations’ of the practice of and rationale for war apart from those associated with the just war tradition began to gain increasing traction within Western society. Whereas a priori deliberation over the legitimacy of war had once been common cause for religious thinkers, legal theorists, and sovereign governing authorities, by the 19th century changing social structures and sources of authority rendered the just war ‘conversation’ anachronistic (Bull, 1979). In its place, realism, liberalism, pacifism, Marxism, and other emergent epistemologies seeking to advance their own defining representation of war (Cooper, 1991; Doyle, 1997; Balibar, 2010). It is therefore crucial to acknowledge that while the just war tradition has returned to a place of prominence as a source of meaning-making relative to war, the rationale for going to war in Western liberal societies (including the United States) remains open to alternative interpretations and, by extension, alternative framings. Within the contemporary American social context, three distinctive alternative frames for the affirmative war-decision are discernable: the structural realist, hegemonic power, and ideological conflict frames (Hoffman, 1984). The structural realist frame places an emphasis on the stabilizing function of military force for securing existing polarity arrangements favorable to US interests within an anarchical international system (Waltz, 1979; Linklater, 1995; Huth, 1998). Tillema and Van Wingen concluded that the rationales employed by states using armed intervention are ‘… primarily affected by the opportunities and obstacles afforded by the recognized distribution of power among states in the international system’ (1982: 221). Scott (1982) cited the inclination of powerful actors toward ‘intra-bloc maintenance’ as a factor leading them to define the use of force as a powerful instrument employed to reaffirm the ‘rules of the game’. Modelski (1970) offered a similar characterization of the public representation of the decision to use force by states within alliance structures. A second alternative framing of affirmative war-decisions within the context of US foreign policy draws upon the notion of hegemonic power. Within the bounds of this frame, as Luard (1988) and Petersen (1976) contend, US foreign policy decision-makers publicly define the decision to use military force as a form of ‘policing’, framing it as a necessary prac-

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tice to defend the hegemonic order and rules undergirding it, particularly when challenges to that order or rules occur in an overt sphere of US interest (Windsor, 1984).8 Within the hegemonic power frame, the affirmative war-decision represents a paramount service over which the US enjoys a monopoly or near-monopoly, but from which other states benefit. As Leurdijk notes, the use of military force by the US throughout the 20th century tended to be advanced in conjunction with established and publicly articulated doctrines helping to ‘…formulate more or less explicitly the conditions of interference in the internal affairs of other states…frequently their geographical sphere of action can also be inferred from them’ (1986: 201). Finally, a third alternative framing of the affirmative war-decision within the American foreign policy context rests on notions of ideological conflict, with the decision to employ military force framed in terms suggestive of a zealous desire to spread liberal, free-market democracy combined with the perceived need to convey resolve to real or potential adversaries (Kegley, 1994; Katz, 1991; Huntington, 1987). Even a hardened realist such as Morgenthau conceded that ideology provided a unique and compelling frame for the decision to employ military force, noting that ‘…interventions serving national power interests have sometimes been masked by the ideologies of communism and anti-communism’ (1967: 428). The English school theorist Hedley Bull advanced a similar point, arguing that wars ‘have and will always be fought to promote ideological objectives…in the post-1945 period [they] have been fought to advance communism and its inverse and to liberate peoples from colonial rule…resort to war to spread an ideology has typically taken the form of intervention’ (1977: 188–189). Within the American context, typical applications of this frame are associated with the embrace of the economic and military leadership of the Western alliance after World War II, with the bold pronouncements of the Truman and Reagan Doctrines concerning the legitimate use of American military might representing convincing (if anecdotal) evidence to that effect. The possibility that frames other than those derived from the just war tradition might be employed within the context of contemporary American society to affix meaning and legitimize the decision to use military force highlights an important ‘wrinkle’ in this analysis. If framing can be understood as a process used to ‘sell’ major foreign policy decisions (such as the decision to go to war) to domestic audiences, this begs the question as to what (if any) frame is most effective—and, by extension, what ideas, values, beliefs, and symbols populate that frame. By investigating not whether but rather how the just war frame is applied in conjunction with

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the war-decision in contemporary US foreign policy, this analysis should provide a basis for drawing some conclusions concerning the effectiveness of the just war frame—thereby establishing a baseline of sorts for further consideration and evaluation of that frame in conjunction with the others with which it primarily contends within the ‘politics of signification’ concerning the war-decision in American society.

4 Analyzing the Just War Frame

Defining the just war frame At the simplest and most fundamental level, the importance I attribute to the just war frame is due to the unconscious appeal of the just war tradition within the Western liberal imagination. There is no comparable logic and set of ideas available to those in positions of authority in Western liberal societies who wish to forge a shared understanding of the conditions making a resort to war legitimate, the actors or conditions making that resort to war necessary, why it is the best course of action, and ultimately why all members of the society in question should support the decision (Kennedy, 2006). Indeed, the extent to which American decision-makers, opinion-leaders, and the public at-large automatically and reflexively draw upon the language and logic of the just war as a heuristic device when war enters the realm of the possible is striking, and speaks to this point (Hudson, 2009). Frame function What explains the broad and enduring resonance and appeal of a seemingly antiquated construct such as the ‘just war’ within contemporary American society, such that it can be translated into a palatable frame affixed to such a controversial and high-stakes decision? The answer to this question resides in the Aristotlean notion of praxis and its importance to the concept of natural philosophy, an endeavor pursued by Aristotle in seeking answers to timeless concerns including (at least in a rudimentary sense) the defining conditions of a ‘just war’ (Hamburger, 1951). In a philosophical departure from his mentor Plato, Aristotle contended that universal concepts such as justice could be divined in the particular (e.g., within the defined parameters of 71

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phenomenological ‘forms’ such as the social practice of war) rather than remaining ethereal. As Aristotle himself notes in The Nicomachean Ethics, …the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged is not, like the others, theoretical in its aim—because we are studying not to know what goodness is, but how to become good men, since otherwise it would be useless—we must apply our minds to the problem of how our actions should be performed, because, as we have just said, it is these that actually determine our dispositions (Aristotle, tr. by Ostwald, 1962: II, ii). Undoubtedly, the timeless debate concerning the legitimate basis for war that resides at the heart of the just war tradition has always been, and remains, a practical question of (and for) applied ethics as much as or more than an abstract question of metaphysical origin. If for no other reason, the material costs and consequences of war force the questions surrounding war and its legitimacy from the immaterial (metaphysical) to the material (empirical) realm. Given the central focus of the just war tradition on these material and empirical considerations, it would seem as if the conversation at the heart of that tradition as well as the theoretical construct of the ‘just war’ that it seeks to define is are, and have always been, endeavors in applied rather than theoretical morality. It is this very characteristic that facilitates the nexus between the just war ‘conversation’ and war in American foreign policy discourse (Burke, 2004). In light of its basis in applied ethics and morality, the just war tradition possesses and retains a currency relative to the social practice of war that is quite unlike other philosophical positions concerning war and the war-decision. Because it features a specific representation of the wardecision that stems from and reflects an attempt to render that decision virtuous, the construct of the just war has both utility and appeal within that context. Indeed, what is unique about the representation of the wardecision advanced and sustained by the just war tradition within the narrative clamor surrounding war is the degree to which it is singularly concerned with specifying the conditions that make the resort to war permissible, legitimate, even virtuous. Frame components At its core, the just war tradition is concerned with the very same dilemma as the decision-makers who draw upon it to frame the wardecision—defining the conditions that make war legitimate and accept-

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able for the society considering or embarking upon war. Unlike other prevailing representations of the war-decision, the just war tradition meets a manifest need by providing a clear, appealing, and culturally resonant mechanism for defining the use of force as an acceptable, legitimate, and perhaps even obligatory exercise. As such, it provides the intellectual, rhetorical, and moral firmament needed to ‘frame’ war as an appropriate, legitimate, and even desirable ‘solution’ to some extant problem or problems confronting society. What then does that frame consist of? Jus ad bellum convention This research aims to define and empirically evaluate the use of the ‘just war frame’ in contemporary US foreign policy. In light of the unit of analysis (the ‘affirmative war-decision’) and overarching concern of this research (assessing the just war frame as an ex post facto means of ‘selling’ the use of force to the domestic audience), the most relevant and applicable component of the just war tradition and theory is the jus ad bellum convention. Deeply embedded in international legal conventions concerning the use of force and referred to variously as the basis of the ‘theory of aggression’ (Walzer, 1977) as well as the ‘war-decision law’ within the context of Western liberal societies (O’Brien, 1979a), the jus ad bellum convention advances a set of criteria which can be used to examine the legitimacy of an actor’s cause and motives when considering the grave matter of the resort to war, as well as whether one possesses the requisite moral authority to do so. The concern at the heart of the jus ad bellum convention with the legitimacy of the resort to war, as well as the specific criteria it advances to articulate those conditions, make the jus ad bellum convention a logical and natural source for the substantive content and form of the ‘just war frame’. Though hardly alone in this regard, the establishment of the jus ad bellum in its entirety as well as the articulation of its component criteria can be traced chiefly to the contributions of Augustine and, later, Aquinas. Prompted by a mix of moral and instrumental reasons, the primary concern of these two theologians and their proponents lie in establishing the righteousness of one’s cause (in essence identifying a priori whose cause was deemed ‘just’ by God) rather than regulating conduct within war.1 The main criteria around which the jus ad bellum was established remain both central to that convention and largely unchanged over the centuries. Within the context of the just war tradition, evidence of these criteria enhance the ‘just’ nature of any war, thereby increasing

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the moral permissibility and perceived legitimacy of the resort to war. As rudimentarily established by Augustine and later more definitively characterized by Aquinas, these criteria are: (1) Just cause: discernment and possession of a ‘just cause’ for war; (2) Competent authority: the sanctioning of war by a proper or what Aquinas would term a ‘legitimate authority’, or an authority possessing a right to rule on such a question on the basis of its sovereignty; (3) Right intention: the actor’s motivation for war as stemming from a ‘right intention’, defined as a just motivation; (4) Reasonable hope for success: a priori evidence of at least a reasonable hope for a successful outcome to the war; and (5) Proportionality (of ends desired): the relative proportionality of the end or ends desired from the war relative to the means of war which would be employed to attain them. Basic v. prudential criteria For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to distinguish between the ‘basic’ and ‘prudential’ criteria within the jus ad bellum convention (Johnson, 1999). This distinction, which sorts ‘just cause’, ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ into the former category and ‘reasonable hope of success’ and ‘proportionality of ends’ into the latter, is subtle yet critical for this analysis of the just war frame. In the case of the ‘basic’ category, each of the criteria pertains to essential and generally demonstrable features of a war. Though reasonable people may and often do differ over the constitutive aspects of the basic criteria, it is possible to sift through the empirical evidence pertaining to the war-decision and look for their presence (or note their absence) within the framing affixed to a war-decision.2 While debate may rage over what constitutes a truly ‘just’ cause for war, what sources of political authority are ‘competent’ to authorize war, and especially how it is possible to ascertain an actor’s real intentions (not to mention their morality or immorality) when resorting to war, all three considerations have at least some degree of discernable referent, therefore lending themselves to empirical application. The same cannot be said for the criteria included within the ‘prudential’ category, which are largely concerned with the secondary calculations of those actors contemplating the use of force (e.g., with the likelihood of success, or the ratio of the objectives sought by war to the decision to go to war in the first place) rather than primary (and tangible and measurable) outcomes resulting from the decision (Reichberg, 2002). The considerations pertinent in these two criteria are entirely contingent on perception and advance calculation about the likelihood of a war’s success, or about what tactics might be needed and whether they are on

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par with the goals prompting the use of force. Lacking definitive empirical referents, the prudential criteria resonate deeply in the internalized logic of the decision-maker, and thus relate to the thought processes and calculations of the actors contemplating the use of force rather than the public representation of the conditions or characteristics legitimizing war in the view of those actors (Johnson, 1999). While fully relevant from the standpoint of an abstract morality, such concerns next to impossible to analyze empirically.3 Because they speak directly to the concerns of this research and are easier to operationalize and empirically analyze, the basic criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority, and right intention) provide the form and content for the just war frame. Causes of war are generally established publicly by the protagonist, while legitimate sanctioning authority is (at least in the historical period of concern here), typically a matter of public record; even the most potentially problematic of the three (right intention) can be gauged at least to some degree by assessing the statements of decision-makers prior to committing military force. As such, these three criteria are at once both strongly representative of just war thinking relative to the war-decision, and equally as useful from the standpoint of systematic empirical research. Just cause Possessing just cause is the first and arguably most important jus ad bellum requirement. In essence it serves as the catalyst for war, since logically the just cause condition must be satisfied before the actor(s) contemplating the use of force can proceed to other considerations—an observation first drawn by Aquinas in Question 40 of the Summa theologiae (1952). The most common translation of ‘just cause’ is that of self-defense in the face of aggression, with the latter representing an unacceptable act both in customary and treaty law (including, but not limited to, the UN Charter). This is hardly surprising, given the near uniform agreement among just war theorists that unprovoked acts of aggression by one state or political entity against another is unjust and inherently provides the transgressed party or parties with a just cause for military retaliation.4 This contention has been embedded, with the help of liberal thought, into the norms and laws of the contemporary international political system via an extension of the social contract idea(l).5 However, widespread agreement about the ‘just cause’ of self-defense breaks down with respect to the standard for aggression necessitating self-defense, undoubtedly as a function of the larger debate over what constitutes aggression in

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international law (Leonard, 2007).6 Similarly contentious is the inclusion within the ‘just cause’ criterion the notion of anticipatory self-defense, or defense against acts of violence that are perceived by the target state as incipient. While this extended translation remains a subject of debate amongst just war theorists, it has been relied on to legitimate pre-emptive military strikes, most frequently and prominently by Israel in the Six Day War and against Hezbollah in Lebanon (on several occasions) and by the US in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Beyond self-defense, most just war theorists concur that initiation of physical force in order to threaten or usurp another state or actor’s territory, property, or persons is inadmissible and may justify the use of force in response (Walzer, 1977). Indeed, in Johnson’s (1999) view, a ‘just cause’ for war has classically reflected three possible realities: as a defense against wrongful attack, to retake something wrongfully taken, or to advance good and punish evil.7 These translations of just cause certainly persist in contemporary practice. While ‘defense against wrongful attack’ can be equated with the fundamental notion of self-help, so might ‘retaking something wrongfully taken’ overlap with the use of military force in retribution following the usurpation of territory (e.g., ‘reclaiming’ Kuwait from Iraqi invasion in 1991) or attempts to rescue hostages (e.g., the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976); furthermore the ‘punishment of evil’ consorts at some level and in some cases with retaliatory strikes (e.g., by the Front-Line States in response to frequent incursions by the apartheid regime in South Africa, or the US-led military strike on al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan after 9/11). Competent authority Aquinas was the first to focus extensively on authorization for the wardecision, articulating the criterion establishing the rightful standardbearers of the awful responsibility to recourse by the sword. This endeavor has remained front-and-center within the just war tradition, reflecting the degree to which the just war tradition has been and remains concerned with determining the source of legitimate authorization for the resort to war, as well as the extent to which considerations of the common good have factored into that determination. Beginning with the attempts of classical just war theorists to yoke the war-decision to a divine purpose, considerations of competent authority have held fast to the notion that the war-decision is a matter suitable for consideration only by the supreme political authority. Because the sovereign possesses the primary responsibility to provide for the security and welfare of its subjects/citizens, including their protection through force of arms when necessary, competent

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authority over the war-decision must necessarily and only reside with the sovereign. Moreover, regardless of form, a true sovereign authority has no superior, meaning that logically speaking no other authority is qualified or even able to rule on the war-decision (Johnson, 1999). In so demarcating legitimate agency over the war-decision, the criterion of competent authority has proved instrumentally valuable to existing and established sources of political authority, propelling the social practice and societal perception of war toward centralization under the guise of the state.8 With the ascent of liberalism and associated notions of representative government and national self-determination, the competency of the state to deal with the war-decision was only further reinforced. In the liberal view the right of the sovereign state to rule on questions of war rests on the consent of the governed, consent typically extended in conjunction with the state’s fulfillment of its own obligations via the social contract (Walzer, 1970). By virtue of the fact that it governs in a transparent and accountable fashion, the most competent authority for the war-decision in contemporary liberal thought is the liberal republic. Conversely, the more removed a state is from this form of governing arrangement, the less disposed it is to maintain its end of the social contract—thereby undermining its claim to sovereignty and by extension its competence to rule on matters of war, particularly if the state in question is corrupt and rules arbitrarily (Weiss and Hubert, 2001). The repository of competent authority over the war-decision has clearly evolved over time from church to emperor to sovereign state to liberal republic. What this suggests in light of the changing nature of power and authority in the international system is the possibility of emergent sources of competent authority apart from the state. Given their composition as member-state organizations as well as their liberal ideological bent, perhaps the strongest prospects in this vein are the varied and expanding organs of regional, international, and supranational governance populating the contemporary international landscape. As embodied in the norms and institutions of the post-World War II international system, the pre-eminence of the notion of collective security makes it possible to advance a plausible claim that political units residing ‘above’ the level of the state—most notably the United Nations—possess some modicum of legitimate authority relative to the war-decision.9 Undoubtedly, the UN Security Council does not possess sovereign authority as typically understood within the purviews of classical just war theory, nor is such authority embedded within other international and regional governing organizations. Yet contemporary just war theorists have proven increasingly receptive to the idea

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that in the event that they reflect a broad consensus among their memberstates on the legitimacy of a particular application of military force, such organizations may provide a supplementary source of competent authority (Kelsen, 1964; Regan, 1996).10 Right intention Satisfaction of the right intention criterion requires a concern with securing just outcomes on the part of those authorizing the resort to war. As such, the resort to war cannot be considered legitimate if narrow selfinterest is paramount in the decision-making calculus, and subsumes, displaces, or otherwise unduly impacts considerations of justice inherent in the other jus ad bellum criteria. Since the just war tradition has stemmed from and continues to adhere to the idea that the practice of war is always undesirable (even if it can be justified as a permissible last resort in some cases), the decision to go to war must be accompanied by a prevailing concern on the part of decision-makers with securing and promoting just, orderly, and peaceful outcomes in advance of their decision to commit military force. As in the more prominent translations of ‘just cause’ discussed above, the right intention criterion has historically been elaborated in a twodimensional fashion. In the negative sense, ‘right intention’ refers to the avoidance of ill intent or motivation when launching a war; as Augustine described it, the need to avoid ‘the passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit…’ (Johnson, 1999: 33). Acting in accordance with right intention requires decision-makers to eschew the naked use of aggression solely or chiefly in pursuit of national interest, aggrandizement, or the extension of a particular ideology (Phillips, 1984). In its positive connotation, the criterion refers to a more proactive goal, namely serving the ends of justice in the temporal sphere through the use of force. In revisiting Augustine, ‘…true religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil, and of uplifting the good’ (Johnson, 1999: 33). While both the negative and positive translations of right intention were initially developed to govern the conduct of individual warriors, since Aquinas’ time it has been applied to the dispatch of the wardecision by sovereign political authorities. Evaluation of the criterion has proven a thorny problem, however, given the difficulty of accurately gauging the intentions of statesmen relative to the war-decision. This difficulty in discerning right intention has increased alongside the increased opacity of the modern state, in which the intentional effects of justice and interest calculations (not to mention the relationship

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between them) are exceedingly difficult to decipher. This is especially problematic with regard to the war-decisions of liberal states, whose leaders are prone to conflate the two considerations given their ideological commitment to, and receipt of material benefit from, liberal values and the institutional arrangements on which they rest (Rawls, 1993). In light of all this, empirical assessment of the right intention criterion within the just war frame is tricky. Examining the ‘right intention’ criterion requires one to take into account indications of the intentionality of decision-makers as well as the outcomes engendered by the use of force.

Operationalization and evaluation The preceding consideration of the jus ad bellum convention and the three ‘basic’ criteria of just cause, competent authority, and right intention provide the defining parameters of the just war frame. Relative to the ‘problem’ of the war-decision in the American context (e.g., the need to legitimize commitments of military force for a domestic audience), the just war tradition as translated through the just war frame provides an unparalleled instrument of, and for, ‘meaning-making’ on the part of those seeking to imbue the decision to go to war with broad social legitimacy. Yet the focal point of this analysis is not the dynamics of war or even the war-decision but rather the dynamics of the application of the just war frame to the war-decision. As such, I seek to assess precisely how the just war frame has been employed by contemporary US foreign policy decision-makers in an effort to generate and sustain broad support for a policy action—the decision to go to war. Operationalizing the frame Evaluating the application of the just war frame in conjunction with specific affirmative war-decisions in contemporary US foreign policy requires operationalization of that frame and the (basic) jus ad bellum criteria that lend it substance (see Table 4.1). That operationalization rests on a set of 15 indicators drawn from previous empirical research on the relationship between the jus ad bellum criteria and US military engagements (Butler, 2003, 2005) as well as from the just war literature in general (Ramsey, 1968; Walzer, 1977; O’Brien, 1979a; Johnson, 1981; Regan, 1996; Bellamy, 2006). While these indicators are hardly all-encompassing (e.g., other translations of just cause, competent authority, and right intention are certainly possible), these indicators and the significations they are associated with provide a basis for translating and analyzing the application of the just war frame relative to specific war-decisions.

80 Selling a ‘Just’ War Table 4.1

Operationalizing the just war frame

Indicator

Signification/Representation

Just cause Self-defense (JC1)

The vital security and national defense of the US is at stake in the crisis.

Direct violent crisis trigger (JC 2)

An act of direct and extreme violence precipitated foreign policy crisis for the US.

Significant power discrepancy between trigger and target (JC 3)

The actor triggering a foreign policy crisis is significantly more powerful than other involved parties (e.g., the classic ‘bullying’ scenario).

Territory seized (JC 4)

Territory belonging to US was targeted and/or seized by another actor in the crisis.

Property/persons seized (JC 5)

Property and/or persons belonging to the US was/were appropriated.

Authoritarian/military regime involvement (JC 6)

Authoritarian/military regime responsible for the crisis.

Response to/punishment of evil (JC 7)

Evil acts flouting basic ethical and moral conventions have been perpetuated against the US, American citizens, and/or other innocents.

Competent authority Global authority (CA 1)

Authorization for US military action by the international community and/or international governmental authority present.

Regional authority (CA 2)

Authorization for US military action by one or more regional actors and/or relevant regional governmental authority present.

Target authority (CA 3)

Authorization for US military action by one or more sovereign states or recognized authorities directly affected by the crisis.

Right intention Last resort (RI 1)

US military engagement undertaken as a last resort.

Post-hoc satisfaction (RI 2) Other crisis actors satisfied with the US military engagement. Post-hoc tension reduction (RI 3)

Tension among crisis actors reduced by US military engagement.

Formality of outcome (RI 4) US military engagement intended to (or is) promote (promoting) formal outcome acceptable to all involved parties. Pace of abatement (RI 5) US military engagement intended to (or is) contribute (contributing) to crisis abatement.

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Just cause The notion of just cause is the catalyst for the jus ad bellum convention in its conventional application as a war-decision law, representing a necessary and sufficient condition for further deliberation and potential action. The most common translations of ‘just cause’ include the defense of the innocent against wrongful attack, the reclamation of persons, property, or other things of value which were wrongly taken, and the punishment of fundamentally ‘evil’ acts against humanity (Walzer, 1977). The multiple forms that this catalytic criterion can assume similarly require multiple translations when seeking to approximate the place of ‘just causes’ relative to the framing of affirmative war-decisions. The indicators introduced here as approximations of just cause therefore can be grouped in accordance with these three broad categories. Defense of the innocent against wrongful attack – self-defense – direct violent crisis trigger – significant power discrepancy (between trigger and target) This aspect of the just cause criterion attests to the presence of a wrongful attack against innocent parties, which in turn justifies the use of military force in response. In light of this, a public representation of a ‘wrongful attack’ on innocent parties is likely to hinge on assertions of a self-defense imperative and/or the commission of a direct act of violence as the trigger for a foreign policy crisis. Important as well to this representation of a just cause are assertions of a significant discrepancy in power (including, but not limited to, broad discrepancies in GDP, geographic size, military expenditures, and so forth) between the actor(s) triggering a crisis and the actor(s) targeted by that protagonist—such that those under attack are at a demonstrable disadvantage, denoting them at least as disadvantaged victims, if not ‘innocent’. Reclaiming something wrongfully taken – territory seized – property/persons seized As noted above, the principle of just cause for a resort to war is most often characterized (and possibly most easily understood) when that cause is a defense against wrongful attack. Apart from defending the ‘innocent’, another important translation of just cause is as a means to

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reclaim something wrongfully (typically forcibly) taken from one actor by another. The most obvious and desired target of such wrongful action, particularly in conceiving of that wrongfulness within the bounds of the contemporary international system, is territory. Another clear and recurring articulation of a ‘just cause’ in accordance with just war theory is to recover one’s own property or personnel when seized by another actor.

Punishment of evil – authoritarian/military regime involvement – response to/punishment of ‘evil’ The characterization of the ‘just cause’ criterion as solely concerned with the application of military force in response to wrongful attack or the recovery of material losses overlooks the fact that the notion of a ‘just cause’ also hinges at least in part on establishing a tenuous grasp on immoral or ‘evil’ behavior relative to the conduct of international relations, so as to define war as a legitimate means of retributive justice. To be sure, workable approximations of the presence of ‘evil’ in international relations are difficult if not impossible to identify, and highly problematic in application. Still, the extent to which this concern is reflected in the jus ad bellum decision-law requires some such approximation of irredeemable behavior in international relations in order to assess whether this element of the just war frame is being used, and to what end. For the purposes of this study, any indicator seeking to approximate the signification of ‘evil’ or immoral behavior within the framing of a resort to war must reflect conceptions of ‘evil’ or immoral behavior consonant with the Western socio-historical context. In light of the privileged position of liberal democracy within that context, one loose approximation of ‘evil’ (or at least, immoral) behavior in international relations are the actions of authoritarian and military regimes. In conducting statecraft in a void of representative governance (e.g., in the absence of competitive elections, pluralist representation, competitive parties, a free press and, in the case of military dictatorships, the overt domination of political decision-making by the armed forces), authoritarian and military regimes operate from a position of moral inferiority, at least as seen through a liberal lens. Therefore, the involvement and actions of an authoritarian or military regime (or regimes)—particularly when they cause or worsen a foreign policy crisis—represents one alternative for assessing this translation of just cause within the just

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war frame. So too would violations of widely accepted international norms or laws, including (but not limited to) acts constituting ‘crimes against humanity’ or acts in direct contradiction to the standards established in framework conventions such as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, and so forth.11 Competent authority – Global authority – Regional authority – Target authority The ‘competent authority’ criterion of the jus ad bellum convention requires that military action be clearly sanctioned by a duly authorized representative of some sovereign political authority. In this sense, the ‘competent authority’ criterion is consonant with the just war tradition’s interest in imparting purpose to war. Through the articulation and application of this precept, only a sovereign authority could authorize war because only a sovereign possessed a responsibility to provide for the common good of his subjects and therefore protect them through force of arms when required. Moreover, a true sovereign had no superior, so no other authority would be logically qualified to rule on the question (Johnson, 1999). The authority precept explicitly defines resort to force without sanction of this sort as an immoral and unjust act. Based on the fusion of the just war tradition and international law, three legitimate sources of authority for military intervention by one state into a conflict can be discerned here: an international governing organization or organ thereof (in this case, the United Nations); a regional governing organization or organ thereof (in this case, the Organization of American States, Organization for African Unity, etc.); or a sovereign (target) state itself.12 While applying the concept of sovereignty to global and regional organizations as done here may be troubling for some, it need not be. The competent authority criterion, like the other components of just war theory, has evolved in relation to broader transformations in society. As such, leading intervention and just war theorists have persuasively argued that it may be translated so as to include any politically legitimate actor or body, rejecting the strict interpretation of the term in which authority can only be extended by nation-states (Bull, 1984; Johnson, 1999).

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Right intention – – – – –

last resort post-hoc satisfaction post-hoc tension formality of outcome pace of abatement

Whether one is interested in contending with the jus ad bellum as a decision-law for war, or in this application as the source of a frame used to ‘sell’ affirmative war-decisions, the ‘right intention’ criterion is inarguably the most difficult of the basic jus ad bellum criteria to approximate. This problem stems in part from the reality that the ‘right intention’ criterion has two dimensions. On the negative dimension, a ‘just’ resort to force is one marked by the absence of aggressive or offensive intent, emblematized by territorial acquisition, intimidation or coercion, or exhibitions of cruelty, hate, or vengeance (Johnson, 1999). In its positive translation, ‘right intentions’ are those in which the resort to force is employed to promote peace and justice (ibid.). The most pernicious aspect of this problem in translation comes in attempting to discern the negative conception of ‘right intention’, since this dimension of the criteria refers to what outcomes an actor is seeking to avoid, rather than what outcomes the actor is seeking to impart. Indeed, it is hard to define (and harder to empirically confirm) the intention(s) an actor seeks to avoid in a given circumstance. Furthermore, while a consideration of the intentions that an actor seeks to avoid may be relevant in attempting to assess right intention as a ‘decision-law’, it seems largely irrelevant for an attempt at assessing the framing of an action already taken. Therefore, to the extent that right intention can be explored empirically as a component of the just war frame, the positive dimension of that criterion seems to provide a better source for the identification and application of useful translations. Assessing the positive dimension of ‘right intention’ and its place within the framing of affirmative war-decisions requires one to impute intention from outcomes, at least to some degree. For one to conclude that the resort to war was ‘sold’ by foreign policy decision-makers on the basis of its reflection of right intention, presumably the articulators and users of the frame would emphasize the degree to which the situation ‘on the ground’ in the aftermath of the use of force reflected a condition in which most parties are perceptibly better off than they were beforehand. The indicators introduced here as proxy measures of the right intention criterion reflect this emphasis. Clearly, the framing of the war-decision in line with ‘right intention’ would necessitate that

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such an action be represented as a last resort. ‘Post-hoc satisfaction’ approximates (alleged) satisfaction among crisis actors with the outcomes resulting from the commitment of US military force within the ex post facto framing of the war-decision. Similarly, ‘post-hoc tension’ reflects an attempt to capture the extent to which tensions between crisis actors are (again, alleged) to be reduced or eliminated as a result of the use of US military force in responding to the crisis. The ‘formality of outcome’ indicator reflects the degree to which the just war frame includes reference to/ emphasis of formal outcomes to the crisis brought about in conjunction with the use of US military force, and attempts to link the two as a means of ‘selling’ the decision to resort to war. Finally, the ‘pace of abatement’ indicator is introduced as a means of gauging whether the ‘framing’ of the decision is based in claims that the US military engagement contributed (positively) to crisis abatement.

Analytical scope Parameters of this inquiry In conducting a systematic inquiry of the place of the just war frame within contemporary US foreign policy decision-making, it is important to begin by acknowledging what I am not seeking to do.13 To that end, the analysis that follows this chapter is not strictly concerned with US military interventions, or the foreign policy crises precipitating them. I am also decidedly not evaluating whether the three basic criteria (just cause, competent authority, and right intention) and their main signifiers (detailed above) are actually reflected in any meaningful and demonstrable fashion in the scenarios in which the decision to use military force is rendered. To that end, this is also not an investigation that seeks to prove or disprove the claim that the decision to go to war itself is in any sense ‘explained by’ just war theory, if for no other reason than the fact that I find the proposition that US foreign policy decision-makers (or, indeed, their counterparts in any state possessing significant military capabilities) would commit the nation to war solely or even primarily out of a concern with exacting justice implausible. Rather, the central concern here is with examining to how and to what effect the just war frame is employed in an attempt to procure and sustain broad societal support for the decision to go to war once that decision has been made. This is a vital consideration since domestic support for war in both the immediate context of a particular war as well as in the larger sense (as a social practice) can hardly be assumed within contemporary liberal societies. What is at issue here is not establishing whether the just war frame is evident on an anecdotal basis as ‘rhetorical chatter’ in the American social context, but instead establishing how it is employed,

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and whether and to what extent it can be said that it is an effective means for generating and sustaining broad societal support for war. Identifying the extent of the application of the just war frame to affirmative wardecisions, as well as variations in the degree to which different translations of the frame are applied or not in particular cases, helps to go beyond the anecdotal accounts that suggest (but by definition cannot ‘prove’) the ubiquity of just war language and logic in contemporary American foreign policy discourse. Affirmative war-decisions The central concern with how the just war frame is applied to the decision to go to war necessitates difficult choices concerning what to include and what to exclude from the present analysis. For starters, it requires ruling out instances of major decision-events wherein the prospect of war was considered but war did not actually occur. The rationale for this decision is relatively straightforward; after all, it is war and its social status, perceived legitimacy, and especially the effort to sell it to domestic audiences by those launching it that are of chief concern here. Therefore, examining the justification of the decision to go to war through the application of the just war frame by default requires a narrow purview in which only ‘affirmative’ war-decisions are relevant, and are analyzed on an ex post facto basis for the degree to which they featured the just war frame and its various components. This makes sense not only from a logical standpoint, but also given the object of concern to the just war frame and the ‘conversation’ from which it is derived. The just war frame and conversation have little if any relevance for actions short of war. Similarly, my interest in extending the notion of framing to the war-decision stems from a logical assumption that framing as a concept and process can shed new light on the manner in which war is being ‘sold’ by decision-makers to domestic audiences. Given that decision-makers can’t and don’t seek to frame or ‘sell’ actions which they do not intend to undertake (they would seemingly have no reason to), and since we can’t analyze the outcomes of events which did not happen, the case for an ex post facto analysis of the just war frame after the decision to go to war has been rendered seems clear.14 In focusing on only one branch of a dichotomous decision tree, the approach undertaken here raises the possibility of selection bias relative to the decision-events included (and excluded) from the analysis. That potential selection bias is offset by the fact that this is not an analysis of the causes or catalysts of the foreign policy decision from which that decision tree springs (e.g., the resort to war), which is to be sure well-

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trod ground (James and Hristoulas, 1994; DeRouen, 1995; Wang, 1996; Fordham, 1998; Meernik, 2001; Mitchell and Moore, 2002; Brulé, 2008; Koch and Sullivan, 2010). Rather, this study attempts to foray in a less traveled direction by examining the attempt to manage the effects of that decision once it is made by those who made it, through the construction of an appealing rationale to engender support for it. In returning to the metaphor one final time, this analysis does not set out to explain why the war (as opposed to ‘not-war’) branch of the decision-tree is actualized, but rather how those who make that decision contend with the related problem of how best to justify it to the domestic audience. Single frame focus Another necessary if difficult decision concerning the exclusion of a potentially important consideration from the purview of this study is the isolation on the just war frame, apart from other potential alternative framings of the affirmative war decision. As discussed above, in light of the contested nature of the war-decision, there are certainly multiple alternative frames associated with war and the resort to war that could potentially resonate within contemporary American society. Still, no other conceivable war-decision frame has the potential to exhibit the consistent and verifiable message, fidelity with existing beliefs and narratives, and adaptive quality that the just war frame possesses. This is not to say that other frames don’t in some sense ‘matter’; indeed, they may in fact matter very much (and deserve careful analysis), especially if the present investigation of the just war frame points toward a conclusion that the just war frame is insufficiently, sporadically, or ineffectively applied. Still, the admittedly exploratory nature of this inquiry, and its stated concern with analyzing framing within the context of contemporary US foreign policy and in particular the application of framing to the decision to go to war, must necessarily identify and start with the frame which has the greatest potential for effective signification. Given its derivation from a centuries-old conversation about the legitimacy of war itself steeped and forged in the Aristotlean tradition of praxis, the just war frame seems the most appropriate starting point. Contemporary US foreign policy Extensive foreign policy commitments in concert with unparalleled military capabilities explain the sustained frequency and magnitude of US military engagements and, by extension, the paramount importance of military force and the war-decision in contemporary US foreign policy (Regan, 1996; Yoon, 1997). At the same time, the enduring and

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well-chronicled tendency of US foreign policy decision-makers to rely on highly moralistic and ideological rhetoric to advance the case for war makes the US a natural setting for an investigation of the mechanism through which the decision to employ military force is presented to the public (Russett and Starr, 1992; Meernik, 1996; Bukovansky, 2002). These factors have converged, and consequently been magnified, during what I refer to throughout this study as the ‘contemporary’ era of US foreign policy, defined here as the post-Cold War period (1989–present). During the Cold War, the US occupied a unique geopolitical position as one of the two military superpowers in a bipolar international system, as well as leader and guarantor of the Western security and economic alliance and self-appointed champion of the ‘free world’. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the dawn of what some called a ‘unipolar moment’ (Krauthammer, 1990) saw the US transition to the role of hegemonic power. While the introduction of a precise temporal parameter runs the risk of speciousness, it is widely accepted that the post-Cold War period has been unique and defining for US foreign policy, with profoundly ideological goals dovetailing to an unparalleled degree with preponderant military capabilities. While the attempted marriage of power and principle (Wittkopf et al., 2003; Jentleson, 2010) has deep roots in the American experience (Kennan, 1951; Hartz, 1955; Tucker, 1971), the qualitative sea-change in both material capabilities and ideational objectives defining post-Cold War US foreign policy make that timeframe uniquely suited for this inquiry. It is not only or even chiefly the frequency with which the US has resorted to force during this period that is of chief importance for this study. Rather, what makes post-Cold War US foreign policy the best laboratory for investigation of the application of the just war frame is the propensity of US foreign policy decision-makers to seek to harmonize pragmatic applications of military might and a stated belief in peace and stability for public consumption. In returning to the leading propositions of this study as outlined in the introductory chapter, the classic contradiction of liberal statecraft is only heightened by the preponderant military power of the US during the post-Cold War era. Whereas this degree of power which would seemingly confer the ability of the US to resort to war with impunity, in light of that contradiction—as well as the related need for a liberal hegemon to abide by their own rules in order to sustain the hegemonic arrangement (Snidal, 1985; Lake, 2006)—such preponderant power makes the need for crafting a public rationale and justification for war all the more significant. Rigorous assessments of this phenomenon have demonstrated the tendency of US

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decision leaders to draw upon the just war tradition to garner support for post-Cold War military engagements, typically with great success (Russett and Starr, 1992; The Gallup Organization, February 1991). Such efforts, which have long buttressed the decision to use military force have only persisted and intensified since the end of the Cold War.15 Foreign policy crisis An additional and important decision narrowing the scope of this research was limiting the empirical focus of this study to documented cases of foreign policy crisis. As defined by Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 3–5), foreign policy crises are situations concerning an individual state in which three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in that state’s internal or external environment entail. These conditions are perceptual, as received by the highest-level decision-makers of the state in question. These conditions are: a threat to one or more basic values; awareness of a finite time for response to said value threat; heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (ibid.).16 The determination to narrow the focus to the decision-event of a foreign policy crisis was dictated largely by the choice of the ‘war-decision’ as the central unit of analysis in this research, and the related realization that such decision-events provide the most suitable laboratory for exploring the application of framing in general, and the just war frame in particular, to affirmative war-decisions. As is well-established in the foreign policy literature (Hermann, 1969; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Lebow, 1981; James and Rioux, 1998; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000), foreign policy crises by definition necessitate the promulgation of decisions by an isolated group of key principals, undertaken along a (relatively) compressed timeframe, with significant stakes attached to them. Further, as the definition of foreign policy crisis above indicates, these are events in which the perceptions of foreign policy principals of the event and contextual changes spawned by or associated with it are definitive. Such conditions, typical of crisis settings, have the important effect relative to this research of maximizing the importance of decisionmaker agency and discretion amongst a narrow circle of key decisionmakers. This is especially true in relation to non-crisis decision-events, wherein institutional and structural factors and considerations are likely to play a greater role—thereby negating or at least greatly limiting the importance of discretion and agency on the part of key individual decisionmakers. Thus it would seem that foreign policy crises afford the best opportunity to intensively probe the efforts of a narrow slice of the highest-

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ranking decision-makers to frame the decision to go to war for domestic consumption, in that they are events in which such decisionmakers enjoy extensive influence (Hermann et al., 2001). In light of this rationale and the resulting limitation of the focus of this study to foreign policy crises, it is also important to note that the ex post facto analysis of the affirmative war-decision must necessarily be bound by the temporal parameters of the foreign policy crises subjected to analysis here. Whereas by definition the termination of a foreign policy crisis is almost certain to occur prior to the actual termination of the military operation and the withdrawal of US military forces, this condition is an important one to impose. While the post-crisis phase of US military engagements may have much to offer observers interested in the intersection of framing and war, in order to satisfy the concern of this inquiry with the framing of decisions to go to war (rather than wars or enduring military occupations), some temporal limit allowing for intensive focus on the immediate (or relatively immediate) implementation of the decision is needed. Establishing that limit as the date on which the condition of crisis was terminated makes sense in that regard, particularly given the unique laboratory for the study of foreign policy decision-making that is afforded by the study of crisis situations.17 Case selection The determination to narrow the focus of this inquiry in the manner outlined above has important ramifications for the design and execution of the research. The decisions to limit this study to affirmative war-decisions rendered by US foreign policy decision-makers in response to foreign policy crises occurring since the end of the Cold War, and to solely analyze the application of the just war frame to those decisions, are decisions which have direct ramifications for case selection—thereby necessitating the formulation and application of several criteria used in that process. Primary criteria The preliminary criteria used in determining the population of affirmative war-decisions relevant for potential inclusion are that such decisions must be made by the United States, and made since 1989.18 Beyond that, two main selection criteria were employed to identify foreign policy crises most relevant for this analysis; these criteria were that the crisis must feature a direct, overt use of military force by the US and that the US was a direct crisis actor. The former criterion is clearly crucial to the execution of the research, in that excluding from potential consideration decision-events in which the outcome was solely or primar-

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ily a non-military response (e.g., diplomatic condemnation, economic sanctions, covert intervention) allowed for significant narrowing of the population of potential cases for empirical analysis.19 In light of the definition of the ‘war-decision’ as a decision-event in which an affirmative decision authorizes the overt use of military forces in significant numbers and for a significant duration of time in the service of some stated national interest or interests, this research necessarily excludes events which do not result in the use of military force. By contrast, the second main criterion (that the US was a direct actor in the crisis) is less obvious, but no less important. The rationale for this criterion was driven by a desire to limit consideration only to those US military engagements in which the war-decision was imperative; whereas the US can (and did) deploy military force in numerous foreign policy crises in which the conditions of crisis were not directly perceived or ‘felt’ by the US itself, those which were of direct concern to the US undoubtedly represent cases in which the stakes were higher—and by extension, the need to effectively ‘frame’ the affirmative war-decision greater. The decision to limit the empirical focus of this research to foreign policy crises involving the US has the additional benefit of allowing for the most recent iteration (version 10.0, released July 2010) of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (see http://www.cidcm.umd. edu/icb/) to be used to systematically mine the population of possible foreign policy crises relevant to this analysis, given the aforementioned parameters. This dataset, which has long served as the primary repository for empirical data concerning international and foreign policy crisis, includes data on 452 cases of international crisis and 994 crisis actors (e.g., actors experiencing foreign policy crises) ranging from the onset of the Russian civil war in 1918 to a fourth crisis between Chad and Sudan spawned by mutual recriminations in 2007. While the dataset serves chiefly as a launching pad for quantitative study of crisis behavior, its comprehensive and systematic catalogue of objective conditions pertaining to such a vast array of international and foreign policy crises alike afford it great utility as employed here—as a mechanism for classifying and selecting empirical events for qualitative research. In setting aside the data concerning international crises and concentrating solely on foreign policy crises during the period of concern here (1989–2007), the US experienced 15 foreign policy crises (out of a total population of 65 crises experienced by all actors in the system during this period).20 As a subset of these 15 crises, 11 featured a direct overt use of military force by the US. In taking into account the main selection criteria employed in this study, in which the analysis was limited only to cases in which the US was directly involved as a crisis actor and made the

92 Selling a ‘Just’ War Table 4.2

Population of eligible cases

Invasion of Panama

1989

Gulf War

1990

Haiti military regime

1994

Desert Strike

1996

US Embassy bombings

1998

UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox

1998

Kosovo

1999

Afghanistan–USA

2001

Iraq Regime Change

2002

decision to employ military force in response to the crisis, the aggregate population of cases eligible for analysis here includes nine cases (see Table 4.2).21 Secondary criteria Having identified the general population of foreign policy crises pertinent to this analysis through application of the main selection criteria, additional criteria were employed in order to winnow down this general population to a more specific subset of cases that comport with the objectives of this research. Where appropriate, these criteria feature a requisite degree of variance in order to avoid selection bias. Whereas I see no problem in limiting a study of the just war frame only to cases of affirmative war-decisions (in that the just war frame, like the tradition spawning it, is solely concerned with war), other important factors associated with such responses to foreign policy crises must necessarily be incorporated into the research and allowed to vary. One such factor is the geographic location/region in which the crisis occurs. Analyzing cases of foreign policy crises occurring solely within one geographic region (e.g., the Middle East) would equate with the imposition of another limiting parameter on the study that might prove counter-productive, in that any findings gleaned from the analysis might be attributable to region-specific factors. Rather than seeking to ‘control’ for such potential variables, it seems more sensible to draw upon cases which satisfy the two main selection criteria (US as direct crisis actor; US employs overt direct military force) while also exhibiting variance in terms of geographic dispersion. Another secondary criteria in which intentional variance was crucial was related to domestic politics; namely that of the Presidential adminis-

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tration at the time of the affirmative war-decision, and in particular the party affiliation of the Administration in power. Whereas a great deal of attention has been devoted to the relationship between political parties, party affiliation, and partisanship and the use of force (Koch and Sullivan, 2010; Foster and Palmer, 2006; Fordham, 2002), this research operates from the premise that the party affiliation of a Presidential administration is not of great significance relative to how the just war frame was used to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience. Indeed, for reasons discussed above, if the just war frame is employed to great effect in framing the war-decision, it is highly likely to transcend partisan politics in light of the contribution of the frame to the conduct of liberal statecraft. In light of this, it seems important to establish a criterion for case selection in which the foreign policy crises included in the study are balanced relative to the party affiliation of the Presidential administration in power at the inception of the crisis. An additional defining feature of foreign policy crises useful in this ‘winnowing’ process is what Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) call the ‘gravity’ of the crisis for the crisis actor of concern (here, the US). Within the ICB dataset, the ‘gravity’ variable identifies the object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis as perceived by the principal decisionmakers of the crisis actor. In this study, this crisis variable is used as a proxy indicator of prominent, ‘high profile’ crises. Unlike the other secondary criteria, this consideration was explicitly held constant. Whereas an analysis primarily concerned with crisis dynamics would likely want to allow the gravity of the crisis to vary across the range of possible values, the concern of this research with the just war frame is best served by analyzing only ‘high profile’ crises.22 One means of discerning such cases, employed here, is by the perception of involved decision-makers of the gravity of the threat posed by the crisis. Prominent, ‘high profile’ cases are those crises in which the crisis featured at a minimum a threat to territory, and beyond that (in order of increasing magnitude) a threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem, a threat of grave damage, or even a threat to existence.23 An additional crisis variable featured in the ICB dataset and employed in this winnowing process is that of triggering entity. This variable refers to the entity triggering the crisis in question; e.g., the actor (or actors) initiating the act(s) which was (were) perceived by the earliest crisis actor as involving a threat to basic values, a heightened probability of military hostilities, and a finite time for response. Triggering entities can be either state or non-state actors. In light of the emphasis on framing affirmative war-decisions, the determination was made to exclude from consideration

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any cases of crisis in which the triggering entity of the crisis was the US. Logically, the concern with analyzing the framing of an affirmative wardecision as a response to foreign policy crisis does not hold up if in fact the US provoked the crisis. While the employment of the just war frame relative to such cases would undoubtedly be worthy of further investigation, the interest here in analyzing the construction of a rationale around war-decisions in which American foreign policy decision-makers retained a significant degree of discretion over the ‘choice’ to employ military force necessitates excluding such cases from the present analysis. The sole instance of a crisis occurring during the post-Cold War era excluded on that basis was the IRAQ REGIME crisis (2002).24 In subjecting all foreign policy crises occurring since 1989 to the two main selection criteria outlined above (direct overt use of military force by US; US direct crisis actor) as well as evaluating those crises in light of the secondary criteria identified here (variable geographic location of crisis; variable party in power; crisis triggered by ‘grave’ threat; crisis not triggered by US), three distinct foreign policy crises featuring affirmative war-decisions presented themselves as profoundly appropriate subjects for further inquiry: GULF WAR (1990–91); KOSOVO (1999); AFGHANISTAN–USA (2001). In an aggregate sense all three cases meet or surpass both the main and secondary conditions outlined above. Geographic variability is evident, with one crisis occurring in the Middle East, one in the Balkans, and one in South-central Asia; so too do the crises vary temporally across the period of study.25 Two cases featured affirmative war-decisions by Republican Administrations (George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush) and one by a Democratic Administration (Bill Clinton). All three crises posed ‘grave’ threats in that they represented at a minimum a threat to US influence in the relevant regional subsystem and/or global system (GULF WAR; KOSOVO), if not a threat of direct material damage to the US (AFGHANISTAN–USA); additionally, none of the crises were directly triggered by US actions. And, while all three cases featured varying degrees of multilateral authorization and involvement, none can be characterized as a predominantly multilateral operation; to the contrary, the US was the catalyst for and operated with great latitude and discretion in all three instances.

Research design Methodology The concern of this research with analyzing the socially constructed notion of the ‘just war’ as the basis for a frame used to ‘sell’ war by US

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foreign policy decision-makers supports the use of a case study research design in which content analysis is employed to empirically investigate the application of the just war frame in a carefully selected subset of affirmative war-decisions. The case study approach is most applicable when the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and/or ‘why’ questions, when the researcher cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study, and (as is especially important from a constructivist angle) when contextual conditions are especially relevant to understanding the phenomenon being studied, and the boundaries between that phenomenon and the larger context in which it is embedded are unclear (King et al., 1994; Baxter and Jack, 2008). Furthermore, the case study method is facilitated by (and particularly useful for) analyzing phenomena in which the number of active participants are relatively few (ibid.). All of these conditions are clearly satisfied by this research, which seeks to explain how the just war frame is used to ‘sell’ affirmative war-decisions in the contemporary American context—a phenomenon which, if evident, would certainly be both dependent on and inter-related with that social context and, just as certainly, beyond the ability of the researcher to manipulate. The satisfaction of these conditions, in addition to my related interest in ‘structured, focused comparison’ (George and Bennett, 2005; George and McKeown, 1985) of the public rationale for affirmative war-decisions, provides the basis for development of three case studies profiling the use of the just war frame in conjunction with three distinct foreign policy crises (GULF WAR, 1990–91; KOSOVO, 1999; AFGHANISTAN–USA, 2001). As Yin (2009) notes, a multi-case study research design such as that employed here facilitates the processes of pattern-seeking, inferential explanation building, and cross-case comparison and synthesis (the latter allowing for assessment of the application and resonance of the just war frame across the cases as well as within them). In this particular analysis, it should also be noted that the case study design (and these three case studies in particular) serve what Stake (1995) refers to as an ‘instrumental’ function—meaning that the particular situations subjected to analysis (e.g., the foreign policy crises) are secondary to the insight into the framing of the affirmative war-decision that they provide. Data collection and analysis A hallmark of case study research is its reliance on multiple data sources, so as to enhance the credibility of the data employed as well as to allow for an integrated, synthetic, and contextually-sensitive portrayal of the phenomenon of concern (Patton, 1990). Potential data sources of use in developing case studies may include, but are not limited to: primary

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source documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observations, and participant-observation (Yin, 2009). In developing case studies profiling the framing of a particular form of foreign policy decision (the decision to go to war), the chief data sources employed here are primary sources likely to reflect the crafting and application of the just war frame; hence, an emphasis was placed on what linguists and others refer to as ‘speech-acts’—that is, public statements expressly intended to establish, advance, or otherwise contribute to a dominant discourse or narrative concerning a particular subject (Frohmann, 1994; Campbell, 1998; Austin, 2005). This investigation of the just war frame rests on the probing of the documentary record of ‘speech-acts’ advanced relative to affirmative war-decisions in foreign policy crises in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Data sources relied on especially heavily in the collection of relevant data in light of this emphasis on ‘speech-acts’ which included documented instances of public speeches and addresses (including televised and radio addresses); media interviews; press conferences, briefings and releases; official administration papers including Executive Orders, Proclamations, Signing Statements, and Statements of Administration Policy; and archived transcripts of statements made at other public appearances. Speech-acts considered relevant for inclusion in the analysis were only those occurring or expressed (a) between the date in which the decision to go to war was implemented (whether that decision is concurrent with or subsequent to the onset of the crisis) and the date in which the crisis terminated, and (b) referring directly to the crisis itself.26 Additionally, this analysis focuses exclusively on speech-acts rendered by the President of the United States.27 The justification for this decision stems from a variety of factors relevant to this analysis. First and foremost is the fact that, with respect to the conduct of US foreign policy since World War II, the President has enjoyed an unparalleled ‘bully pulpit’ to advance and shape policy decisions (Holsti, 2004; Haass, 2000; Sorensen, 1994). The pre-eminence associated with this ‘bully pulpit’ is highly significant from the standpoint of framing analysis, in that as a function of the sheer avenues and opportunities available to address targeted audiences, the President has no rival with respect to the authorship and transmission of foreign policy and war-decision frames (Feldmann, 2004).28 Furthermore, as Bennett’s concept and empirical evaluation of ‘indexing’ over two decades has shown (Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al., 2006), the bulk of media coverage is implicitly ‘indexed’ to the range and dynamics of governmental debate—further underscoring the need to focus on the primary author and articulator of the ‘just war frame’.

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such as audience type and the chronology and evolution of the crisis on the various dimensions of the frame (see Figure 4.1). This approach allows for the generation of descriptive and inferential statistical data useful for grounding and contextualizing the analysis of frame application. The evaluation of the application of the just war frame in these three instances of US military intervention drawn from over 400 speech-acts will also allow for conclusions concerning the utility of the just war frame, and by extension the importance of the just war tradition, in and for contemporary American foreign policy and society.

5 The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

Crisis summary The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was the first major foreign policy crisis of the post-Cold War era for the United States (see Table 5.1). Largely catching the White House unaware, the Iraqi Table 5.1

Crisis profile: Gulf War Pre-crisis/Crisis

Crisis trigger date

10/30/1990

Initiation of US military engagement

11/8/1990

Crisis termination date

4/12/1991

Elapsed time between perception of trigger and termination (in days)

165

Duration of US military engagement during crisis (in days)

155

Gravity of threat (to US)

Threat to influence in international system or regional subsystem

Triggering entity

Iraq

Trigger to foreign policy crisis

Violent act Post-crisis

Content of crisis outcome

Victory

Form of outcome

Imposed (by US)

Escalating or reduction of tension

Tension escalation

Extent of satisfaction about outcome

Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied

99

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invasion was less of a surprise to regional experts or intelligence analysts within the Administration (Little, 2002; Freedman, 1993; Miller and Mylorie, 1990). The attack came on the heels of months of verbal provocations directed at Kuwait and the other Gulf states by Saddam Hussein (most notably at the Arab League summit in May 1990), including accusations of ‘economic warfare’ through the overproduction of oil (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001). The tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were particularly acute, and prompted by longstanding discord between the two states concerning territorial claims, allegations of ‘horizontal drilling’ in the Rumaila oil fields by Kuwait, and the terms and conditions surrounding the repayment of loans extended by Kuwait to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war (Diamond, 1996). The Iraqi assault, launched the day after Kuwait’s rejection of Iraqi demands for transfer of the Bubiyan and Warba islands, followed a mass mobilization of forces on 23 July and culminated in the occupation of the emirate within six hours (ibid.). The invasion sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East, eliciting concern from other states in the region (most notably Saudi Arabia) while also prompting a flurry of diplomatic activity. That same day, the Bush Administration reacted with condemnation of Iraq’s invasion as well as a demand for immediate and unconditional withdrawal and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. These conditions were echoed in UNSC Resolution 660 (the first of 15 issued during the crisis) as well as an Arab League condemnation, both issued on 2 August (Freedman and Karsh, 1995). When Iraqi forces moved en masse to the Saudi border the next day, the Council of Europe and the UN Security Council responded with wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq (ibid.). On 7 August 1990 the Bush Administration announced its intentions to bolster the US military presence in the Gulf region—eliciting an Iraqi announcement that same day of a ‘comprehensive, eternal, and inseparable merger’ of Iraq and its ‘19th province’. Further complicating matters was the detention of thousands of largely Western hostages by Iraqi forces, and Saddam’s continuing fulminations concerning a looming ‘mother of all battles’, largely interpreted in the US as an attack on Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 1991). After vigorous internal debate (oriented around the competing positions of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell), these factors prompted President Bush to covertly approve the basic parameters of the military deployment that would become Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm on 30 October 1990 (Baker, 1995). The escalation of the situation to crisis status for the US at this point became clear with the

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announced deployment of up to 200,000 additional US troops to the Gulf region under the auspices of Operation Desert Shield by the President on 8 November 1990 (Diamond, 1996). Apart from a retaliatory deployment of about a quarter-million additional Iraqi forces to Kuwait and southern Iraq, the onset of a major commitment of US military force via Operation Desert Shield on 8 November 1990 ushered in a period of stalemate. This stasis was broken with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 678 on 29 November, granting UN memberstates authority (under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to use ‘all necessary means’ to secure the mandated immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq and total restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty by a deadline of 15 January 1991.1 With the Bush Administration spearheading the process of building an unprecedented coalition (including major and visible contributions from, among others, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria) in preparation for military engagement, a series of diplomatic overtures between the US and Iraq (and in particular Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz), culminating in a direct meeting between Aziz and US Secretary of State James Baker on 9 January 1991 in Geneva, proved fruitless. Coalition forces launched Operation Desert Storm, commencing with a massive aerial bombardment of Iraq, on 17 January 1991. Near-total superiority in relative capabilities and strategy provided for saturation bombing of Iraqi targets for 38 days, with the most effective Iraqi military response being the launching of Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel (Biddle, 1996). Plans for a direct ground offensive came to fruition with a combined aerial, naval, and land assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq beginning on 24 February 1991. Within 100 hours Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait, withdrawing deep into Iraqi territory while the US declared a ‘unilateral suspension of offensive combat operations’ on 27 February 1991 (Gordon and Trainor, 1995). Following the decision to suspend hostilities (a major point of contention within the Bush Administration), the terms for an interim cease-fire were codified in UNSC Resolution 686 (passed 2 March 1991), followed by a subsequent long-term cease-fire outlined in UNSC Resolution 687 (passed 3 April 1991). In the midst of ‘victory’, Iraq descended into chaos as the Shiite population in the south and the Kurds concentrated in the north initiated mass uprisings against Saddam’s government. These uprisings were summarily suppressed by the Iraqi regime through brutal applications of violence including mass detentions, executions, and the deployment of poison gas against civilians. Nonetheless, the draw-down of US forces beginning on 8 April 1991, the authorization of UNIKOM

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(UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission) through UNSC Resolution 689 on 9 April, and the implementation of the conditions of the long-term ceasefire stipulated in UNSC Resolution 687 on 12 April 1991 marked the termination of the immediate foreign policy crisis for the United States.

Presidential rhetoric: A snapshot As noted above, evident signs of tension between Iraq and Kuwait were either missed or ignored by the Bush Administration prior to the crisis, likely as a result of prevailing assumptions in the Administration concerning the prospects of continuing accommodation with Saddam (Hess, 2009). Indeed, 1990 began with the President’s hailing of the inclusion of Iraq in the newly formed Arab Cooperation Council in a joint appearance with President Ali Abdullah Salih of Yemen on 24 January. Even Saddam’s oblique threat of a chemical weapons attack on Israel in April inspired only a dismissal by the President and top aides (Smith, 1992). As one would expect, the larger narrative surrounding events in the Gulf changed significantly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. How did the Bush Administration interpret those events, and more importantly project their interpretations, through Presidential rhetoric? Pre-crisis The first official public reaction to the Iraqi invasion from the President on the day of the attack was muted (Smith, 1992). Channeling the pragmatism of realpolitik, Bush noted that the Administration ‘…view[ed] the situation with the utmost gravity…and remain[s] committed to take steps necessary to defend our longstanding, vital interests in the Gulf’, while quickly shifting the focus to the recent release of an American hostage in the Philippines (Bush, 1990a). Pressed by UPI’s Helen Thomas, Bush seemed to dismiss the prospects of military action: We’re not discussing intervention. I would not discuss any military options even if we’d agreed upon them. But one of the things I want to do at this meeting is hear from our Secretary of Defense, our Chairman, and others. But I’m not contemplating such action (ibid.). Later that same day, in a joint appearance with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at the Aspen Institute, Bush remained tempered in response to a leading question from a reporter concerning Saddam Hussein: Reporter. Mr. President, isn’t Saddam Hussein at the root of this problem? Hasn’t he replaced Qadhafi as sort of the bad boy of the

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region? Would you like to see him removed? And what can you do about him? Mr. President, Saddam Hussein has been the source of the most recent mischief in the region––nuclear triggers, missiles, the big gun––as Prime Minister Thatcher knows about. Is he going to be a constant source of problems there in that region? The President. If he behaves this way, he’s going to be a constant source. We find his behavior intolerable in this instance, and so do the rest of the United Nations countries that met last night. And reaction from around the world is unanimous in being condemnatory. So, that speaks for itself (Bush, 1990b; emphasis added). These and other remarks by the President, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, and other top aides during the first week after the Iraqi invasion repeatedly referred to that invasion as a ‘naked’ and ‘unacceptable’ aggression constituting a ‘flagrant violation of international law’ while continually restating the conditions of an immediate and complete withdrawal. All the while, the Administration steadfastly avoided any intimation of war (‘just’ or otherwise), instead focusing on procedural matters such as implementing sanctions, notifying Congress of the ‘national emergency’, and engaging in coalition diplomacy.2 The discursive environment changed dramatically with the 8 August 1990 announcement of an initial deployment of over 50,000 US forces in a defensive posture to Saudi Arabia. Bush opened that nationally televised address with a claim of profoundly (and to that point in the crisis unprecedented) moral dimensions, explaining his decision to commit military forces at that early stage as a simple matter of right and wrong: In the life of a nation, we’re called upon to define who we are and what we believe…today as President, I ask for your support in a decision I’ve made to stand up for what’s right and condemn what’s wrong (Bush, 1990c; emphasis added). The President then sought to drive this point home through invoking historical analogy, likening the events in the Gulf to the concepts of ‘blitzkrieg’ and ‘appeasement’ on two occasions in that same address as a means of justifying the commitment of American military force to the defense of Saudi Arabia: Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi Armed Forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait. Facing negligible resistance from its much smaller neighbor,

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Iraq’s tanks stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours… –– We succeeded in the struggle for freedom in Europe because we and our allies remain stalwart. Keeping the peace in the Middle East will require no less…But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors (ibid.). Analogous reasoning was employed repeatedly in Presidential statements following the announced deployment to Saudi Arabia, particularly in statements targeting what might be considered audiences of ‘friendly’ or sympathetic opinion-leaders.3 For example, in addressing an audience of military officials and civilian employees at the Pentagon on 15 August 1990, Bush linked the need to respond with resolve in the Gulf not only to the specter of Nazi aggression in World War II but to the defense of the freedom and prosperity of America and its allies: …our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world are at stake…no one should doubt our staying power or determination…a half century ago, our nation and the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who should, and could, have been stopped. We are not going to make the same mistake again (Bush, 1990d). Similar grandiose themes were sounded in remarks delivered at the annual conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in Baltimore five days later: Throughout history, we have learned that we must stand up to evil. It’s a truth which the past 18 days have reaffirmed, and its lessons speak to America and to the world… Think back with me to World War II, when together allies confronted a horror which embodied hell on Earth, or Korea, where United Nations forces opposed totalitarianism… We must not delude ourselves: Iraq’s invasion was more than a military attack on tiny Kuwait; it was a ruthless assault on the very essence of international order and civilized ideals (Bush, 1990e). Having announced the commitment of US military force to the Gulf on the basis of its inherent virtue as well as in order to avoid a

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replay of Munich and its consequences, Presidential rhetoric concerning the crisis quickly found its footing in the language of the ‘just war’ (Hallett, 1991; Russett and Starr, 1992).4 To wit, the President went to great lengths not only to outline the moral basis for commitment of military forces to the Gulf, but also to defining that action as a ‘last resort’ (again to a ‘safe’ audience, at a GOP fundraiser in Rhode Island): No sane person likes the specter of confrontations, and yet as we try to chart the course of our existence, we must be guided by the imperatives of a strong moral compass… It was not with passionate haste but really with a heavy heart that I had to commit our troops to Saudi Arabia. I took this action not out of some national hunger for conflict but out of the moral responsibility, shared by so many committed nations around the world, to protect our world from fundamental evil. We cannot remain silent, for peace is more than just the absence of war. And its preservation really exacts on great countries like ours a certain obligation (Bush, 1990f; emphasis added). A broader and more specific elaboration of these themes was articulated to a military audience at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii: Well, today in the Persian Gulf, the world is once again faced with the challenge of perfect clarity. Saddam Hussein has given us a whole plateful of clarity, because today, in the Persian Gulf, what we are looking at is good and evil, right and wrong. And day after day, shocking new horrors reveal the true nature of the reign of terror in Kuwait. In one hospital, dialysis patients were ripped from their machines and the machines shipped from Kuwait to Baghdad. Iraq soldiers pulled the plug on incubators supporting 22 premature babies. All 22 died. The hospital employees were shot and the plundered machines were shipped off to Baghdad. But you cannot pull the plug on a nation. The invasion of Kuwait was without provocation. The invasion of Kuwait was without excuse. And the invasion of Kuwait will not stand. Iraq’s invasion marks an outrageous breach of the peace, a broadfaced violation of the United Nations Charter. And by its actions, the Iraqi regime has shown its contempt for the very principles on which the United Nations was founded. Saddam Hussein will be held accountable. Iraq has waged a war of aggression, plundered a peaceful neighbor, held innocents hostage, and gassed its own people. And all four of those crimes are punishable under the

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principles adopted by the allies in 1945 and unanimously reaffirmed by the United Nations in 1950. Two weeks ago I made mention of the Nuremberg trials. Saddam Hussein must know the stakes are high, the cause is just and, today more than ever, the determination is real (Bush, 1990g; emphasis added).5 Though hardly a systematic analysis, this cursory look at Presidential rhetoric in the ‘pre-crisis’ stage (e.g., the interim between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the onset of a foreign policy crisis for the United States with the announced deployment of Operation Desert Shield on 8 November 1990) reflects palpable reliance on the moralistic language as well as the definitive concepts of the ‘just war’. Borne of explicit analogies to Munich and World War II, such language was used selectively in conjunction with ‘friendly’ audiences prior to the public announcement of a massive military deployment in the Gulf—representing something of a ‘trial balloon’ for the use of the just war frame as a legitimating device for war during the crisis. Crisis The first major departure from this ‘trial balloon’ approach came in the release of a Presidential Proclamation (6221) calling for a ‘National Day of Prayer’ concerning the situation in the Gulf on 2 November 1990. Issued in the interim between the Administration’s final decision to increase troop strength to nearly 250,000 (a figure that would ultimately reach over 500,000) for an offensive operation on 31 October and the actual public announcement of that decision on 8 November, that Proclamation represents a transition point in which the siren call of the ‘just war’ waged to defend the moral and legal standards of the civilized world was sounded loudly for public consumption: Today the United States and, indeed, all civilized countries are being challenged by a dictator who would brazenly deny the sovereignty of other nations… Iraqi forces continue to occupy neighboring Kuwait, terrorizing that nation’s citizens in an affront to international law and fundamental standards of morality. Scores of U.S. civilians and citizens of other nations continue to be held hostage under inhuman conditions in both Kuwait and Iraq. Thousands have been made refugees fleeing from aggression in Kuwait and brutality in Iraq. To deter further aggression, thousands of American service men and women have been deployed and remain on duty in the demanding climate of the Persian Gulf region… Let us pray for peace in the Persian Gulf, and let us ask the Lord to protect all those Americans and

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 107

citizens of other nations, who are working to uphold the universal cause of freedom and justice half a world away from home (Bush, 1990h; emphasis added). The actual announcement of the deployment on 8 November 1990, followed by a lengthy Q&A with the press, offered further evidence to this effect, with the President focusing in particular on just causes such as ‘Iraq’s brutality, aggression, and violations of international law’ and the ‘systematic brutality that is exercised against the citizens of Kuwait’ while emphasizing authorization for military action stemming from ‘the strong international solidarity and determination to ensure that Iraq’s aggres-sion does not stand’ (Bush, 1990i). Throughout much of November and December, numerous Presidential statements touched in particular on various ‘just causes’ for military action. For example, when a reporter posited in Bush’s joint press conference with Margaret Thatcher at the CSCE summit in Paris on 19 November 1990 that the stalemated end of the Iran–Iraq War would make it difficult for Saddam to back down in Kuwait, Bush reiterated the transgressions associated with Iraq’s invasion and the unshakeable rationale for redress they provided6: …But that doesn’t make the rationale, the moral underpinning, any less compelling. That rationale is there. You do not brutalize a neighbor. You do not kill and torture. You do not hold innocent civilians. You do not beleaguer an embassy and try to starve its people out in direct contravention of U.N. resolutions. And that’s exactly what he’s doing (Bush, 1990j; emphasis added). As exemplified in Presidential Proclamation 6221, an impending change in the US response to the situation in the Gulf (in this case, commencement of offensive military hostilities on 16 January 1991) prompted a renewed and expanded use of just war language for an even wider audience. In paving the way for a paradigm shift in the US military engagement, a mass appeal drawing upon just war themes was advanced through an open letter from the President to college students on 9 January 1991.7 The pervasiveness of both the language and logic of just war theory (along with the end of moral reductionism to which it was employed) in this missive was striking: There is much in the modern world that is subject to doubts or questions––washed in shades of gray. But not the brutal aggression of Saddam Hussein against a peaceful, sovereign nation and its

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people. It’s black and white. The facts are clear. The choice is unambiguous––right vs. wrong. The terror Saddam Hussein has imposed upon Kuwait violates every principle of human decency. Listen to what Amnesty International has documented. ‘Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi forces…arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands…widespread torture…imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children.’ Including children––there’s no horror that could make this a more obvious conflict of good vs. evil. The man who used chemical warfare on his own people–– once again including children––now oversees public hangings of dissenters. And daily his troops commit atrocities against Kuwaiti citizens. This brutality has reverberated throughout the entire world. If we do not follow the dictates of our inner moral compass and stand up for human life, then his lawlessness will threaten the peace and democracy of the emerging new world order we now see: this long dreamed-of vision we’ve all worked toward for so long (Bush, 1991a; emphasis added). As was noted in both academic analysis and opinion polls at the time, the offensive phase of the military engagement afforded the Administration a prime opportunity to describe the unfolding of the Gulf War through just war rhetoric to the domestic audience (Gallup, 1991; Russett and Starr, 1992). Repeated allusions to various just causes for the war, the existence of competent (global/UN) authority, and the necessity of acting as a last resort in the televised national address announcing Operation Desert Storm on 16 January 1991 bear this out: This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait––a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations––was crushed; its people, brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined. Some may ask: Why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The world could wait no longer… While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged, and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeak-

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 109

able atrocities––maimed and murdered, innocent children (Bush, 1991b; emphasis added). Similar references in yet another Presidential Proclamation (6243) calling for a ‘National Day of Prayer’ for Operation Desert Storm and especially in a public appearance by the President at Fort Stewart (Georgia) abounded: Today the United States is engaged in a great struggle to uphold the principles of national sovereignty and international order and to defend the lives and liberty of innocent people. It is an armed struggle we made every possible effort to avoid through extraordinary diplomatic efforts to resolve the matter peacefully, yet––given no choice by a ruthless dictator who would wield political and economic hegemony over other nations through force and terror––it is a struggle we wage with conviction and resolve. Our cause is moral and just (Bush, 1991c). It began with Kuwait, but that wouldn’t have been the end. What we’ve witnessed these last few weeks removed any last shred of doubt about the adversary that we face: the terror bombing, without military value––the terror bombing of innocent civilians with those Scud missiles; the brutal treatment––that brutal, inhumane treatment of our POW’s; the endless appetite for evil that would lead a man to make war on the world’s environment. All of us know what we’re up against. All of you know why we’re there. We are there because we are Americans, part of something that’s larger than ourselves. Our cause is right. Our cause is just. And because it is just, that world’s cause will prevail (Bush, 1991d; emphasis added). And, finally, in announcing the suspension of offensive combat operations in a broadcast to the nation on 27 February, Bush ticked off in various and sundry ways how the military campaign met and satisfied the conditions of a ‘just war’: Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal. Tonight the Kuwaiti flag once again flies above the capital of a free and sovereign nation. And the American flag flies above our Embassy….

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Seven months ago, America and the world drew a line in the sand. We declared that the aggression against Kuwait would not stand. And tonight, America and the world have kept their word. This is not a time of euphoria, certainly not a time to gloat. But it is a time of pride: pride in our troops; pride in the friends who stood with us in the crisis; pride in our nation and the people whose strength and resolve made victory quick, decisive, and just. And soon we will open wide our arms to welcome back home to America our magnificent fighting forces. No one country can claim this victory as its own. It was not only a victory for Kuwait but a victory for all the coalition partners. This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, for the rule of law, and for what is right. Coalition forces fought this war only as a last resort… (Bush, 1991e). Though representative, the preceding examples of Presidential rhetoric of course constitute neither a random sample nor a full population. At the same time, what these few if telling illustrations of the language and themes of the just war exhibited in Presidential rhetoric during the Gulf War crisis do provide is a degree of context and insight into the Presidential narrative before and during the crisis. This context, in turn, is sufficient enough to merit the consideration, in a more systematic and comprehensive way, of how the just war frame was employed by the President in conjunction with the military intervention decision.

Frame application: Results As shown above, the expressed reaction of the George H.W. Bush Administration to the sudden and unexpected invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in the summer of 1990 clearly betrays a heavy reliance on the language of just war theory. Still, short of a more systematic analysis, the question of whether these allusions to the defining notions of a ‘just war’ in the aftermath of Iraqi aggression in the Gulf were ‘rhetorical chatter’ or the manifestation of the application of the just war frame remains an open one. The remainder of this chapter seeks to address this question by analyzing the 137 Presidential speech-acts directly referencing the US military engagement in the Persian Gulf, beginning with the announcement of a major deployment of air, land, and naval forces to the Gulf on 8 November 1990 and the termination of the crisis for the United States on 11 April 1991.8 As the following analysis demonstrates in detail, one of the most significant aspects of the framing of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert

11 /8 11 /19 /1 90 2 11 /19 /1 90 6 11 /19 /2 90 11 0/19 /2 90 4 11 /19 /2 90 8/ 12 199 /2 0 / 12 199 /6 0 12 /19 /1 90 0 12 /19 /1 90 4 12 /19 /1 90 8 12 /19 /2 90 12 2/19 /2 90 6 12 /19 /3 90 0/ 1 1/ 990 3/ 19 1/ 91 7/ 1/ 199 11 1 / 1/ 199 15 1 / 1/ 199 19 1 / 1/ 199 23 1 1/ /199 27 1 / 1/ 199 31 1 /1 2/ 991 4/ 1 2/ 991 8 2/ /199 12 1 / 2/ 199 16 1 / 2/ 199 20 1 / 2/ 199 24 1 2/ /199 28 1 /1 3/ 991 4/ 1 3/ 991 8/ 3/ 199 12 1 / 3/ 199 16 1 / 3/ 199 20 1 / 3/ 199 24 1 / 3/ 199 28 1 /1 4/ 991 1/ 1 4/ 991 5/ 1 4/ 991 9/ 19 91

# / day

Figure 5.1 Speech-acts referencing ‘Iraq/Gulf War’—POTUS November 8, 1990–April 11, 1991 4.5

4

3.5

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

date

111

112 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Storm by President George H.W. Bush was the unevenness with which the just war frame was employed throughout the crisis. This is conveyed in a basic way through Figure 5.1, which indicates a surprising fact about the President’s discursive treatment of the crisis—namely, that throughout the 155-day period between the commitment of US military forces to the Persian Gulf and the termination of the crisis for the United States, only 85 days (54 per cent) featured speech-acts by the President concerning the Gulf crisis. Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that within the realm of Presidential speech the crisis in the Gulf was of little consequence. Whereas scarcely more than one-half of all days during the crisis featured one or more Presidential speech-act(s) referencing events in the Gulf, the variance and magnitude of such references when they did occur was notable. Indeed, on the 85 days during the crisis that did feature at least one Presidential speech-act referencing the Gulf situation, the number of relevant speech-acts ranged from a minimum of one to a maximum of four per day. While it is clear events in the Gulf featured prominently in Presidential rhetoric throughout the crisis (as one would intuit), the pattern was exceedingly variable. As Figure 5.1 also conveys, there were several prominent peaks in Presidential speech-acts which largely corresponded with major events, including those undertaken by the President (e.g., Thanksgiving visit to the troops stationed in Saudi Arabia; State of the Union address in late January 1991) as well as those outside the President’s direct control (e.g., passage of UNSC Resolution 678 in late November 1990; Shia and Kurdish uprisings in mid-April 1991). Frame content The topic of concern is not the occurrence of speech-acts per se, but the application of the just war frame through them. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the set of speech-acts identified for analysis were coded on a dichotomous basis for the presence or absence of 15 just war indicators indicative of the just war frame, with those indicators reflecting the three basic criteria of the jus ad bellum component of just war theory.9 In establishing a referential baseline, it is important to note that 26 per cent (529/ 2055) of all possible values of the 15 just war frame variables across these 137 cases of ‘speechacts’ were positive (meaning they did feature a reference to the just war indicator in question). In examining the just war frame relative to 137 individual ‘cases’ (e.g., speech-acts), 78 per cent (107/137) of the total Presidential speech-acts pertaining to the crisis in the Gulf featured two or more positive values, 34 per cent (46/137) featured positive values in over a third (five or more) of all possible just war indicators, and 19 per cent (26/137) featured a majority (seven or more) of positive values across all 15 indicators.10

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As these basic descriptive statistics suggest, the vast majority of speech-acts referencing events in the Gulf featured elements of the just war frame, with over half of those speech-acts defined by extensive reference to multiple just war signifiers (often drawn from different criteria, as will be discussed below). Further compelling is the finding that the average daily number of just war significations in Presidential speech-acts throughout the 155-day crisis was 3.4, a figure that nearly doubles if one includes only those days featuring speech-acts explicitly referencing the crisis.11 The maximum number of just war signifiers contained in any one speech-act was 13 (in the President’s 1 March 1991 news conference, the day following the announced ‘liberation’ of Kuwait), with the minimum (no reference to any of the 15 frame signifiers) occurring on 17 occasions.12 In looking more closely at these 15 indicators in conjunction with the three major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority, right intention) from which they are derived, it is evident that the just cause criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced here) far surpasses the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage of all just war frame significations observed in the speech-acts analyzed; 51 per cent (270/529) of all just war significations corresponded with ‘just cause’ considerations, compared to 25 per cent (133/529) for ‘competent authority’ and 24 per cent (126/529) for ‘right intention’.13 In considering the most frequently employed just war signifiers (of the 15 considered here) in more detail, a somewhat mixed picture is evident. Of the four just war indicators which exceeded the average number of significations per signifier (35.3), two reflect just cause considerations in framing the US military action as a legitimate response to (a) the illegal seizure of territory in 49 per cent of the cases (67/137), and (b) to evil acts perpetrated against innocents in 44.5 per cent of the cases (61/137).14 However, it should be noted that far and away the most common just war signification employed was reference to the ‘competent authority’ consideration of the existence of global authorization for just such an action, a signification reflected in 66.4 per cent of the 137 speech-acts referring to the crisis in the Persian Gulf (91/137). Last among the four most common just war signifiers was the ‘right intention’ consideration of formality of outcome, in which case the use of force by the US was characterized as intending to promote a formal and acceptable outcome to the crisis in roughly 33 per cent of all crisisreferencing speech-acts (45/137). On the other side of the coin, the least frequently utilized just war frame significations included two post-hoc ‘right intention’ considerations, the first alluding to the US military action as reducing tension

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among crisis actors and the second representing other crisis actors as satisfied with the US military action. The former signification was featured in only 8.7 per cent (12/137) of the speech-acts analyzed, the latter 11 per cent (15/137). Together the relative infrequency of employment of these two signifiers speak to the largely indeterminate ending to the crisis, which came in mid-April 1991 amidst the Shia and Kurdish uprisings and Saddam’s bloody reprisals to them; such developments likely mitigated against advancing claims of reduced tension and satisfaction in the aftermath of the US military action. The other two least frequent significations stemmed from ‘just cause’ considerations rendering the military action as an act of self-defense and as a corrective for a significant power discrepancy between original crisis actors. The former was attempted in only 9.5 per cent (13/137) of relevant Presidential speech-acts, the latter 11 per cent (15/137). While it seems clear that in Presidential speech-acts concerned with the crisis in the Persian Gulf in 1990–91 ‘just cause’ themes were the most frequently employed component of the just war frame, the data also suggests that the frame’s application exhibited ‘breadth’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from two different criteria in any single speech-act) and to a lesser degree ‘totality’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from all three criteria in any single speech-act). On the former score, 96 of 137 (70 per cent) of speechacts contained significations of the just war drawn from two of the three ad bellum criteria, while 49 of 137 (36 per cent) reflected the ad bellum criteria in totality (see Table 5.2). The fact that the large majority of cases featured multiple translations of just war significations drawn from different components of the ad bellum criteria suggests an interactive and mutually reinforcing relationship between and among signifiers from the three different categories of jus ad bellum criteria—albeit with ‘just cause’ considerations providing a central point of orientation for these interactions. Table 5.2

Mono-applications and interactions (n = 137)* Single criterion

Just cause

Interactions 16

JC * CA

31

Competent authority

7

JC * RI

8

Right intention

1

CA * RI

8

JC * CA * RI *17 cases featured no Just War indicators

49

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 115

Audience Taking the full measure of the just war frame requires going beyond merely looking at the frame in the abstract, requiring instead a consideration of the interplay between the frame and the audience(s) to which it was directed throughout the crisis. Before turning to consideration of the interface between the just war frame and the various audiences of concern (opinion-leaders, the media, the mass public), the highly skewed distribution of Presidential speech-acts by primary audience during the crisis must be emphasized.15 As depicted in Table 5.3, over half (53 per cent, or 72/137) of all speech-acts concerning the crisis were primarily directed at the press, a clear outlier. In concert with the second most commonly targeted audience—opinion-leaders, the primary audience in 23 per cent (32/137) of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis—a picture emerges whereby the vast majority (over three-fourths) of all Presidential speech-acts targeting a discernable domestic audience were not directed at the mass public. Having established a general sense of the target audience for Presidential speech-acts concerning the affirmative war-decision in the Gulf War crisis, it is worth turning to the interface between the just war frame (as advanced through said speech-acts) and the domestic audience(s). Doing so allows not only for a fuller appraisal of the application of the just war frame during the crisis, but also for assessment of whether the Administration’s favored strategy of targeting its message primarily at the press holds up (and to what degree and in what way) when the content of that message is the prevailing notion of the ‘just war’. In looking at the broad groupings of frame indicators according to the three basic criteria of jus ad bellum, in terms of the extensity (frequency of employment across all audiences) of just war significations, ‘just causes’ are far and away the most commonly employed, utilized more

Table 5.3

Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience (n = 137)

Primary audience

Presidential speech-acts

Mass public

17

Press

72

Opinion-leaders

32

Foreign

9

Multiple

7

Mean = 27.4; Standard deviation = 26.8

116 Selling a ‘Just’ War Figure 5.2

Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria)

120

Just cause 109

Comp authority Right intention

100

# of significations

84 79

80 68 60 44 40

33 21

20

18

18

19 14 7

5

4

6

0 Mass public

Press

Opinion-leaders

Foreign

Multiple

primary audience

than twice as often as signifiers associated with the competent authority or right intention criteria (see Figure 5.2). From the standpoint of intensity (the proportional employment of just war significations relative to audience type), the greatest prevalence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in conjunction with speechacts directed at the press, which is not surprising given the large volume of Presidential speech-acts aimed at that audience. All told, 48 per cent of all just war significations (regardless of categorical type) advanced during the crisis were directed at the press (256/529), with 43 per cent of those significations reflecting just cause considerations (109/256). Further, just cause significations were less intensively employed in speechacts directed at the press than at those directed at the mass public (44 of 83, or 53 per cent, of all speech-acts primarily targeting the mass public featured ‘just cause’ significations) or opinion-leaders (84 of 135, or 62 per cent). Conversely, while the extensive employment of the ‘right intention’ criterion was decidedly lower than that of ‘just cause’, right intention signifiers were employed more intensively as a proportion of the total number of just war significations directed at the press (accounting for 31 per cent of the 256 total just war significations in speech-acts targeting the press) than as a proportion of the total just war significations directed at the public (22 per cent, or 18 of 83) and especially those

118 Selling a ‘Just’ War

‘territory seized’ signifier, which accounted for roughly 25 per cent (67/270) of the aggregate total of just cause significations—meaning that, of all possible ‘just causes’ associated with the affirmative war-decision by the Bush Administration through Presidential speech-acts, it was the seizure of Kuwaiti territory by Iraq which proved the most commonly cited. A close runner-up in this regard accounting for 22 per cent (61/270) of all just cause significations was the denotation of the US military engagement as a response to, or corrective for, fundamentally ‘evil’ acts—often (though not exclusively) referring to the mistreatment of civilians and prisoners by Iraqi forces under the alleged orders of Saddam Hussein. In terms of extensity of employment, the two aforementioned considerations outweigh in importance the seizure of (US/coalition) property or persons (19 per cent, 51/270), and easily surpass considerations such as the precipitation of the crisis by an act of direct violence (12 per cent, 33/270), the responsibility of an authoritarian regime for the crisis (11 per cent, 30/270), and the power discrepancy (6 per cent, 15/270) and selfdefense (5 per cent, 13/270) conditions. The relative lack of emphasis in some of these areas compared to the ‘just causes’ of the abrogation of territorial sovereignty and the perpetration of ‘evil’ acts is somewhat surprising, especially considering the extent to which the dynamics of the crisis would seemingly support a frame emphasizing the unprovoked initial violence by Iraq, the culpability of Saddam’s authoritarian regime for the crisis, and the clear ‘bullying’ scenario involving Iraq and Kuwait. In looking at the intensity of signification by audience type, the seven just cause significations depart in interesting ways from their general rate of use. The major discontinuities are concentrated in five of the seven just cause significations: ‘self-defense’, ‘direct violent crisis trigger’, ‘(US/ coalition) property/persons seized’, ‘authoritarian/military regime involvement’, and ‘response to/punishment of evil’. The infrequent reliance on the ‘self-defense’ claim (explained above as a function of the somewhat abstract link between national interest and defense and collective security) in general is an important qualifier on the importance of any evident difference.16 Still, it is interesting to note the intensity of the ‘self-defense’ significations directed at opinion-leaders, which accounted for almost 70 per cent of the (few) occasions in which ‘self-defense’ was invoked in Presidential speech-acts throughout the crisis. And, in proportional terms, ‘self-defense’ was invoked at more than twice the expected rate in speechacts directed at opinion-leaders, accounting for 11 per cent of the 84 total ‘just cause’ significations directed at that audience, as compared to an expected value for ‘self-defense’ as a proportion of all just cause significations across all audiences of 5 per cent.17 In allusions to the ‘direct

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 119

violent trigger’ to the crisis (e.g., the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990), an almost perfectly inverted outcome relative to the proportional use of this signification in speech-acts directed at the press (where it was used less frequently than expected, 8 per cent compared to 12 per cent) and those directed at opinion-leaders (where it was used more often, 17 per cent compared to 12 per cent) exists. With respect to the two audiences most commonly subjected to the just war frame through Presidential speech-acts, there was clearly greater emphasis on ‘just causes’ of a more traditional national security orientation in the framing efforts directed at opinion-leaders than those targeting the press. The emphasis on the discrepancy in power between Kuwait and Iraq (curiously, one of the least often employed ‘just cause’ significations) and the territorial dimensions of the crisis (the most often employed ‘just cause’) occurred in almost exact proportion by audience as they did across audience. This was decidedly not the case for references to the seizure of property/persons (evident in references to detained US embassy personnel in Kuwait), the responsibility of Saddam’s authoritarian regime for the crisis, and especially the ‘evil’ acts perpetrated by Iraqi forces (including documented mistreatment of civilians and coalition prisoners in occupied Kuwait). The issue of seized and detained US and coalition property and persons (especially embassy staffers) was a frequent theme in speech-acts directed at the press, a target audience for roughly half of all such significations (occurring at a slightly higher than expected proportional rate, 22 per cent v. 19 per cent), and was by contrast downplayed as a theme in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (appearing in only 14 per cent of cases, again compared to the baseline rate of 19 per cent).18 A bit more curious is the lower-than-expected reliance on the ‘authoritarian regime as responsible’ meme in speech-acts directed at the public (occurring in only 7 per cent of 44 such speech-acts). This stands in contrast to the greater reliance on this frame element in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (15 per cent, compared to the average incidence rate of 11 per cent). This difference can undoubtedly be explained statistically by the comparatively lower aggregate total of speech-acts directed at the mass public (n=44) than those directed at opinion-leaders (n=84). Nonetheless, the finding that the clear ‘just cause’ represented by the provocation of the crisis by an inarguably authoritarian and highly repressive regime was rarely employed to ‘sell’ the affirmative wardecision, and furthermore that this also did not serve as the basis for a more extensive and frequent use of the just war frame for consumption by the mass public, is striking. So too is the further confounding finding

120 Selling a ‘Just’ War

that the closely related ‘response to/punishment for evil’ representation was by contrast employed in greater than expected proportion (as a function of its incidence across all audiences) in speech-acts directed at the mass public (27 per cent, compared to the baseline incidence of 22 per cent) and the press (29 per cent v. 22 per cent), and was used sparingly in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (12 per cent v. 22 per cent). The distribution of just war significations by audience type according to the ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are somewhat more difficult to interpret, in part because of the less frequent reliance on these two components of the jus ad bellum in Presidential speech-acts pertaining to the Gulf crisis. With respect to extensity, it is important to note that the single most frequently employed of all 15 significations subsumed within the just war frame was the claim of ‘competent authority’ emanating from the existence of global (UN) authorization for the US military engagement. Typically these significations, which accounted for 17 per cent (91/529) of the aggregate total of just war significations, were associated in Presidential speechacts with a series of UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing redress by the international community for acts of Iraqi aggression constituting violations of international law and a breach of international peace and security. Again relative to extensity, it is generally the case that apart from ‘global authority’ the remaining two competent authority significations and the five distinct translations of ‘right intention’ were each for their part employed relatively infrequently. Of these seven significations, one (‘formality of outcome’) registered in aggregate terms on the order of the values associated with several of the ‘just cause’ signifiers, with nearly 9 per cent (45/529) of all just war significations advancing the claim of an acceptable formal outcome as the (rightful or ‘just’) intention of the military engagement. In looking first at the intensity of the competent authority significations, the signification of greatest aggregate importance across all three jus ad bellum categories (global authority) not surprisingly predominates in application regardless of audience type. Furthermore, the distribution of the three competent authority significations by audience type is roughly equivalent to the general distribution, with a few small but notable exceptions (see Figure 5.4). With respect to competent authority significations directed at the press (the most commonly targeted audience for Presidential speech-acts during the crisis), there was a slight diminution in emphasis on global authority, and an accompanying increase in emphasis on the receipt of ‘target state authority’ for military action

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 121 Figure 5.4

Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion)

50 CA1 45

43

CA2

40

CA3

# significations

35 30 26 25 20 15

14

14 11

10 5

5

5

4 2

2

4 2

0 Mass public

Press

Opinion-leaders

Foreign

1

0

0

Multiple

primary audience

(from Kuwait). While 63 per cent (43/68) of all competent authority significations advanced through speech-acts targeting the press referred to the existence of global (UN) authorization for US military action, this was slightly below the expected ‘baseline’ across audience type of 68 per cent. Conversely, 16 per cent (11/68) of such representations were derived from reference to target state authority, a proportion within speech-acts directed at the press that was slightly higher than expected based on the aggregate total (12 per cent of all competent authority significations referenced target state authority). Even more telling in that regard is that nearly 70 per cent (11/16) of all references to the extension of ‘target state’ authority from Kuwait during the crisis came in speech-acts directed at the press. This slight shift within speech-acts directed at the press was more than countered in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders. Nearly 80 per cent (26/33) of all competent authority significations solely emphasized the existence of UN authorization for US military action, with a corresponding lower-than-expected reliance on the ‘regional authority’ and ‘target state authority’ significations. Finally, within the realm of competent authority, there was a slight increase in emphasis above the expected baseline on the authorization for the affirmative war-decision stemming from regional authorities such as the Arab League and the Gulf

122 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Cooperation Council in speech-acts directed at the mass public (24 per cent of which featured explicit reference to regional authorization for a military response to Iraqi aggression, compared to 20 per cent on average across all audiences). Unlike the slight differences in intensity (by audience) exhibited with translations of competent authority, the five significations associated with the ‘right intention’ criteria (accounting for roughly one-fourth of all just war significations) varied to a much greater extent when indexed to target audience (see Figure 5.5). For instance, the claim that the US military engagement in the Gulf constituted a ‘last resort’ was decidedly over-represented (in comparison to the baseline proportion of 19 per cent of all ‘right intention’ significations) in Presidential speech-acts geared at the mass public (making up 33 per cent of all the ‘right intention’ significations aimed at that audience) and especially opinion-leaders (accounting for 61 per cent of all the ‘right intention’ significations aimed at that audience). This signification concomitantly occurred on a less-thanexpected basis in statements targeting the press (comprising only 10 per cent of the right intention significations directed at that audience). From a statistical standpoint, this significance of this disparity is greater with respect to de-emphasizing the ‘last resort’ claim to the press, given the relatively large proportion of all right intention significations Figure 5.5

Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion)

30 28 RI1 RI2

25

RI3

# significations

RI4 20

RI5

19

15 13 11

11

10 8 7 6

6 5

5

2 2 1 0

0 0

0 0 Mass public

Press

Opinion-leaders primary audience

2 2

1 0

1 1 0

Foreign

0 Multiple

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 123

(63 per cent, or 79/126) that were directed at the press.19 Still, the finding that nearly seven in ten of all allusions to the affirmative wardecision as a ‘last resort’ were directed at the mass public and opinionleaders, and that such allusions were accordingly far less frequent in communications with the press, seems theoretically significant. The other major disparity stemming from analysis of the intensity of the right intention variables comes with regard to claims concerning the (affirmative) contribution of the US military engagement to the abatement of the crisis. The aforementioned (skewed) nature of the distribution of the population of ‘right intention’ significations notwithstanding, the claim that the use of force contributed positively to crisis abatement was advanced on only one occasion to opinion-leaders, accounting for only 6 per cent of all ‘right intention’ significations directed at that audience. This is all the more striking when compared to a baseline rate of 23 per cent, and to the 28 per cent of all right intention significations directed at the mass public reflecting this claim. Temporal dynamics In seeking to evaluate whether there was a substantive evolution in the attempt to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-decision as the crisis unfolded, the last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account the temporal dimension of the just war frame’s application. To the extent that the 155 day period between the commitment of US military force to the Persian Gulf and the termination of the crisis for the US was a dynamic rather than static phenomenon, it seems worth considering whether (and if so, how) the application of the just war frame to ‘sell’ the war-decision changed in conjunction with extant changes in the crisis (and the US military engagement) itself. Two primary and related factors were taken into account as a means of assessing this relationship: first, whether and to what extent any ‘chronological clusters’ (defined here as the occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) emerge in the body of speech-acts issued over the duration of the crisis, and second, whether these clusters (if they occur) can be explained by, or at least understood in relation to, the evolution of the crisis and the emergence of any major developments in it.20 In other words, this component of the analysis seeks to determine whether the just war frame was especially prominent at any temporally bound juncture(s) of the crisis, as well as (potentially) why.21 The general assessment of the just war significations by time is broken down in monthly increments, as depicted in Figure 5.6. In examining

124 Selling a ‘Just’ War

the entire period of the US military engagement in the Gulf War crisis (spanning from 8 November 1999 through 11 April 1991), roughly 21 per cent (112/529) of all just war significations rendered in Presidential speech-acts occurred in November 1990, 9 per cent (48/529) in December 1990, 25 per cent (132/529) in January 1991, 20 per cent (106/529) in February 1991, 17 per cent (88/529) in March 1991, and 8 per cent (43/529) in April 1991. If one employs the daily average of 3.4 significations per day as a benchmark, the total number of just war significations consistently exceeded expectations in four months of the crisis, with two notable exceptions in December 1990 and March 1991. December featured an especially low number of significations, accounting for fewer than half (46 per cent) of the expected value for that month (based on the average daily rate for the entire crisis).22 As Figure 5.6 also indicates, the conditions used to define a ‘chronological cluster’ outlined above (occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) were fully satisfied on three occasions in the Gulf War crisis: 21–23 November 1990; 25 February–2 March 1991; and 5–7 April 1991. These 12 days accounted for 24 per cent (128/529) of all the just war significations advanced through Presidential speech-acts during the entire 155-day period. In terms of total significations, the first cluster (21–23 November) proved the largest, with 60 just war significations occurring in nine separate speech-acts over a period of just three days (accounting for 11 per cent of the total number of significations advanced throughout the crisis). The large number of significations populating the 21–23 November 1990 ‘cluster’ were transmitted in a series of relatively open exchanges with the press scattered throughout the President’s trip abroad to cultivate allied support (which included a stop at the CSCE summit in Paris, a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, and with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad in Geneva) and especially in three Thanksgiving Day (22 November) addresses to US military forces stationed in Saudi Arabia. The emergence of this ‘cluster’ of just war significations dovetails with the actual implementation of the announced decision (approximately two weeks prior, on 8 November) of a massive military deployment to the Gulf, as well as with the need to begin the process of ‘summit diplomacy’ that proved pivotal to the operation. This cluster suggests that the case for the legitimacy of a looming military confrontation with Iraq was considered a crucial part of coalition building from an early juncture of the US intervention in the crisis.

Figure 5.6

Chronological effects, by month (# JW significations—all criteria)

/

/

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

4

/3 /3

/2 /2 /2 /2

/2 /2 /2 /2

/ /

/2 /2

/ /

/ /

/ /

/ /

3 3

3 3

3 3

3

3 3

125

126 Selling a ‘Just’ War

The second cluster, consisting of fewer overall significations (50) than the first, nonetheless stands out for its duration with nine Presidential speech-acts producing five or more just war significations on each of six consecutive days (25 February–2 March 1991). The key events corresponding with this period are the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait beginning on 26 February, the suspension of Allied offensive ground actions (and announcement of this in a nationally televised address to the public) the following day, and broader ruminations on the ‘victory’ and its larger significance by the President in the ensuing days. Such ruminations occurred in exchanges with the press following meetings with the Kuwaiti and Saudi ambassadors on 28 February, and then in a strikingly expansive news conference on 1 March. That news conference represents the first (and most prominent) example of the President’s attempts to underscore the legitimacy and justice of the rapidly concluding military campaign in the Gulf by characterizing it (as a result of the high degree of post-hoc actor satisfaction and reduced tensions that it was alleged to have) as creating a window of opportunity in which ‘the conditions were better than ever’ (as Bush stated in responding to a reporter’s query) for a new and broader approach to peace in the Middle East.23 Beyond the three ‘chronological clusters’, the most significant feature of the aggregate distribution of just war significations during the course of the Gulf War crisis is the unevenness of that distribution, reflecting the inconsistency and volatility inherent in the use of the just war frame throughout the crisis. Fully half of the days within the period studied here (78 days in total) did not feature just war significations expressed through Presidential speech-acts (see Figure 5.6). The flipside of this, of course, is that the 529 just war significations advanced during the crisis were advanced in a highly compressed fashion, being transmitted in only half (77) of the days between the commitment of US military force to the Gulf and the end of the crisis for the US. Quite apart from a concern with the temporal distribution of speechacts and the application of the just war frame within those chronological clusters, it is also worth considering the application of the various component parts of the just war frame (‘just cause’, ‘competent authority’, ‘right intention’) and the significations associated with these jus ad bellum categories over the evolution of the crisis (see Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11). To that end, three distinct but overlapping ways of assessing the dynamic aspects of frame application are considered here, each corresponding to a different denominator. The first is on a discrete basis, in which the total number of all just war significations advanced in a given month of the crisis provides the basis for assessment.

/1 12 /19 /2 9 12 /19 0 /3 9 12 /19 0 /4 9 12 /19 0 /5 9 12 /19 0 / 9 12 6/1 0 /7 99 12 /19 0 /8 9 12 /19 0 12 /9/1 90 /1 9 12 0/1 90 /1 9 12 1/1 90 /1 9 12 2/1 90 /1 99 12 3/1 0 / 9 12 14/ 90 /1 19 12 5/1 90 /1 9 12 6/1 90 /1 9 12 7/1 90 / 9 12 18/ 90 /1 19 12 9/1 90 /2 9 12 0/1 90 /2 9 12 1/1 90 /2 99 12 2/1 0 / 9 12 23/ 90 /2 19 12 4/1 90 /2 99 12 5/1 0 / 9 12 26/ 90 /2 19 12 7/1 90 /2 9 12 8/1 90 /2 9 12 9/1 90 /3 99 12 0/1 0 /3 99 1/ 0 19 90

12 /8 / 11 199 /9 0 11 /19 /1 90 0 11 /19 /1 90 1 11 /19 /1 90 2 11 /19 /1 90 3 11 /19 /1 90 4 11 /19 /1 90 5 11 /19 /1 90 6 11 /19 /1 90 7 11 /19 /1 90 8 11 /19 /1 90 9 11 /19 /2 90 0 11 /19 /2 90 1 11 /19 /2 90 2 11 /19 /2 90 3/ 11 199 /2 0 4 11 /19 /2 90 5 11 /19 /2 90 6 11 /19 /2 90 7 11 /19 /2 90 8 11 /19 /2 90 9 11 /19 /3 90 0/ 19 90

11

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 127

Figure 5.7

Figure 5.8 Just war significations by precept—November 1990 right intention competent authority

just cause

Just war significations by precept—December 1990

right intention competent authority just cause

This approach permits consideration of the distribution of just war significations in each of the three months of the crisis by three jus ad bellum criteria (just cause, competent authority, right intention). The second is on a distributive basis, in which the total number of all just war significations grouped within each jus ad bellum criterion (just

128 Selling a ‘Just’ War Figure 5.9

Just war significations by precept—January 1991

0

1/

31

/1

99

0

0

99 /1 29

1/

27 1/

25 1/

/1

99 /1

/1 23 1/

99

0

0

0

99

0 1/

21

/1

99

0

99 /1

1/

19

/1 1/

17

/1 15 1/

99

0

0

99

99

0 13 1/

11 1/

/1

99

90

/1

19

90 1/

1/

9/

19

90

Figure 5.10

7/

19

90 1/

5/

19 3/ 1/

1/

1/

19

90

right intention competent authority just cause

Just war significations by precept—February 1991

1 27

/1

99

1 2/

2/

25

/1

99

1 99

1 2/

23

/1

99

1 2/

21

/1

99

1 2/

19

/1

99

1 /1 17 2/

/1 15 2/

/1 13 2/

99

1 99

91

2/

11

/1 9

91 19 9/ 2/

91 19

2/

7/

91 19 5/

19

91 2/

3/ 2/

2/

1/

19

91

right intention competent authority just cause

cause, competent authority, right intention) provides the basis for assessment. This approach permits consideration of the monthly distribution of the total number of ‘just cause’, ‘competent authority’, and ‘right intention’ significations (respectively), and allows for greater pur-

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 129 Figure 5.11

Just war significations by precept—March 1991 right intention competent authority just cause

1

3/

31

/1

99

1

1 3/

29

/1

99

1 3/

27

/1

99

1 3/

25

/1

99

1

99 /1 23

3/

3/

21

/1

99

1

1

99 /1 19

3/

3/

17

/1

99

1

1 3/

15

/1

99

1

99 13

3/

11 3/

/1

99

91

/1

19

91 9/ 3/

91

19 3/

19

Figure 5.12

7/

91 3/

5/

19 3/ 3/

3/

1/

19

91

0

Just war significations by precept—April 1991

right intention competent authority just cause

1 /1 11 4/

/1 10 4/

99

1 99

91 19 9/ 4/

91 19 8/ 4/

91 19 7/ 4/

91 19 6/ 4/

91 19 5/ 4/

91

91

19 4/ 4/

19 3/ 4/

91 19 2/ 4/

4/

1/

19

91

0

chase on the proportional employment of each of the three criteria by month, irrespective of their overall prevalence as signifiers. The third is on an aggregate basis, in which the total number of all just war significations (regardless of criteria) throughout the duration of the crisis provides the basis for assessment. This approach combines the

130 Selling a ‘Just’ War

concerns of the two previous forms of assessment, allowing for consideration of the interactive effects between the temporal (by month) and substantive (by criteria) dimensions of frame application over the duration of the crisis. Given the higher occurrence of ‘just cause’ significations in general, it is not surprising that the discrete assessment of frame application on a monthly basis shows that the seven translations of ‘just cause’ analyzed here were the most consistently and frequently invoked of the just war frame indicators in each of the six months of the crisis. Indeed, speech-acts containing explicit references to ‘just causes’ accounted for 50 per cent or more of the total just war significations on a monthly basis in each of the first four months of the crisis—ranging from 61 per cent of all such significations in December 1990 to exactly 50 per cent in January 1991 (as a reminder, the ‘baseline’ of just cause significations as a percent of all significations for the entire crisis was 51 per cent). While still the largest proportion of just war significations in the last two months of the crisis (March and April 1991), as a proportion of all just war significations in those two months the ‘just cause’ considerations became less frequent (to 40 per cent and 44 per cent, respectively). Again in light of patterns in the overall data, the monthly distribution of ‘competent authority’ significations is fairly consistent with the aggregate baseline of 25 per cent, with slightly higher rates of occurrence earlier in the crisis (December 1990, 29 per cent; January 1991, 30 per cent) and below-expected occurrence later in the crisis (February 1991, 22 per cent; March 1991, 24 per cent; April 1991, 19 per cent)—figures which suggest a slight and logical tilt in emphasis on the existence of authorization for military action (especially, as we have seen above, from the UN) toward the earlier stages of the crisis. Somewhat more telling with respect to the temporal dimension of the frame application is the notable increase in the prevalence of ‘right intention’ significations as the crisis unfolded. Whereas ‘right intention’ indicators were invoked at a rate below the baseline (24 per cent) in each of the first four months of the crisis (bottoming out at 10 per cent in December 1990), they accounted for more than a third of all just war significations advanced in March and April 1991 (36 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively). This far surpasses the rate at which competent authority significations were utilized, and approaches the rate of just cause representations in each of those two months. The bulk of these significations in the latter stage of the crisis were, not surprisingly, assertions of the relationship between the affirmative war-decision and the ‘right intentions’ of crisis abatement and the securing of a formal outcome to the crisis.

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 131

Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics of the data suggests other important temporal dimensions in the application of the just war frame. In a general sense, as is to be expected, all three categories of significations (just cause, competent authority, right intention) vary in rough proportion to the number of just war significations and speech-acts each month, declining at junctures in the crisis (e.g., December 1990, March 1991) where these were at low ebb and rising in particularly ‘active’ months (e.g., November 1990, January 1991). Such patterning is especially evident with respect to the monthly distribution of just cause significations and, to a lesser extent, right intention significations.24 And, as with the discrete assessment above, from a distributive standpoint it is evident that the importance of competent authority as a dimension of the frame application declined over time; while 29 per cent of all competent authority significations occurred in January 1991 (the highest percentage for any single month), such significations dropped significantly over the last three months of the crisis (February 1991: 17 per cent; March 1991: 16 per cent; April 1991: 6 per cent). Finally, with respect to aggregate assessment, the monthly breakdown of just war significations (holding constant groupings by ad bellum criteria) advanced throughout the entire crisis once again betrays little variance from expectations based on the monthly trajectory of speechacts. The interactions of time and substantive emphasis evident within the application of the frame provide further reaffirmation of these general patterns (see Table 5.4). And, when taking criteria into account, it is clear that the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision in the Gulf War crisis featured a strong emphasis on the ‘just causes’ precipitating the use of force from the very outset of the crisis (an emphasis which was sustained throughout the crisis). This is evident in the emphasis on (especially global and target state) authority for the military action during the early coalition-building phase (November 1990) and especially when the shift to an offensive posture occurred (January 1991), as well as a perceptible increase in the emphasis placed on the ‘right intentions’ associated with the US military intervention as the military engagement drew to a close while the crisis (within Iraq) intensified.

Frame application: Analysis The preceding results shed significant light on how the just war frame was employed in a concerted effort to ‘sell’ the Gulf War within a domestic context. This was especially evident in the attempt to focus the

132

Table 5.4

Distribution of just war significations by month* and criteria

Just cause

November 1990

December 1990

January 1991

February 1991

March 1991

April 1991

11.5%

5.5%

12.5%

11.3%

6.6%

3.6%

Competent authority

5.4%

2.6%

7.4%

4.3%

4.0%

1.5%

Right intention

4.3%

0.9%

5.1%

4.3%

6.1%

3.1%

*November 1990 = 23 days; December 1990 = 31 days; January 1991 = 31 days; February 1991 = 28 days; March 1991 = 31 days; April 1991 = 11 days

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm 133

attention of various audiences (particularly the press) on the fact that the decision to go to war was ‘just’ in light of its authorization by the United Nations (as emphasized in more than two-thirds of all Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis). The overriding emphasis on UN authority was supplemented by recurring references to the existence of several ‘just causes’ for war, notably Iraq’s abrogation of Kuwait’s territorial sovereignty as well as perpetration of ‘evil’ acts during the occupation of Kuwait (representations which appeared in nearly half of all Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis). The answer to the question of whether the just war language represented something more than mere ‘rhetorical chatter’ in the discursive environment surrounding the dispatch of American military forces to the Gulf is a resounding ‘yes’. Almost 80 per cent of the Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis featured multiple (two or more) references to essential notions of a ‘just war’, while over one-third (34 per cent) of those same speech-acts could be understood as primarily oriented around advancing the legitimacy of the affirmative war-decision, featuring extensive (five or more) references to that end. The extensive ‘breadth’ and occasional ‘totality’ exhibited in the just war frame’s application (70 per cent of Presidential speech-acts reflecting just war considerations drew upon at least two of the three jus ad bellum criteria, while 36 per cent drew from all three criteria) indicate a clear element of intent sufficient to distinguish a purposive effort to frame the decision to employ military force in the Persian Gulf crisis in ways consistent with, and reflective of, the ‘war-decision law’ provided by just war theory. The following quote is tellingly representative: Saddam tried to cast this conflict as a religious war, but it has nothing to do with religion per se. It has, on the other hand, everything to do with what religion embodies: good versus evil, right versus wrong, human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression. The war in the Gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Muslim war; it is a just war (Bush, 1991g). At the same time, the results of the just war frame’s application also reveal that even the most central and recurrent significations embedded within the just war frame (not to mention less salient elements of the frame) were advanced in a highly variable, inconsistent, and even inchoate fashion by the White House. As was noted above, only slightly more than half of the entire 155-day period between the dispatch of US forces to the Gulf in November 1990 and the termination

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of the crisis in April 1991 featured speech-acts referencing the crisis, and the reliance on the just war frame reflected across those speechacts was exceedingly variable. It was not at all uncommon for either ‘chronological clusters’ or ‘peak days’ (single days with ten or more just war significations) to be immediately preceded and/or followed by one or more days with no significations or even crisis-related speech-acts. It would seem that the just war frame was invoked on a sporadic and inconsistent basis throughout the crisis—but at the same time, on days in which it was invoked, it was utilized extensively (to the tune of almost seven invocations per day). Particular features of the just war frame’s use in the Gulf War crisis reveal irregular and even problematic aspects in the frame’s application. These can be grouped into three broad categories: one, emphasizing aspects of the frame in ways which were either logically inconsistent or mismatched with the primary audience(s) of concern; two, failing to emphasize aspects of the frame in light of primary audience(s) of concern; and three, applying significations within the just war frame at a disjuncture with prominent developments occurring in the crisis at the time. On the former score, there was a striking departure in the degree of emphasis placed on two of the more prominently featured translations of just cause (‘authoritarian regime responsibility for crisis’ and response to/punishment of ‘evil’) relative to audience type. While these two significations would seem highly correlated within the context of this particular crisis, in fact Presidential speech-acts tended to emphasize the former to opinion-leaders and the latter to the public, while de-emphasizing them to the other audience. The findings here present a scenario wherein military, business, and religious leaders were likely to be reminded (repeatedly) of Saddam’s authoritarian rule and culpability for the crisis while the well-documented ethical and legal transgressions of Iraqi forces in Kuwait were relatively downplayed – with those two scripts reversed in the framing of the war-decision for consumption by the general public. The disaggregation of logically related (and mutually reinforcing) significations evident in the actual application of the just war frame almost certainly reflects a misapplication of the frame. An additional (if more speculative) example in this vein might be the Administration’s overriding emphasis on the existence of ‘global authority’ (translated here as UN authorization) as the primary embodiment of the ‘just’ nature of the affirmative war-decision. While the extensive reliance on this claim above all others and across all audiences certainly seems to serve the effort to articulate a vision of a ‘new world order’ (see below),

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whether or not it represented an effective method of framing the wardecision in order to secure an enduring ‘buy-in’ from domestic audiences remains less clear (Nye, 1992; Tucker and Hendrickson, 1992). With respect to the other side of the same coin (e.g., the failure to seize upon seemingly important, and therefore likely resonant, aspects of the just war frame), examples abound. The aversion to any references to ‘self-defense’ in speech-acts directed at the mass public or press might be understood as stemming from the nature of the crisis and the abstract link between the national interest and collective security (Mearsheimer, 1994). This level of abstraction might have led such a claim to be perceived by the Administration as both difficult to ‘sell’ to the mass public, and likely to invite challenges from the (skeptical) press. However, the failure to emphasize the ‘bullying scenario’ reflected in the power discrepancy between Iraq and Kuwait, particularly in speech-acts directed at the mass public is less comprehensible given the close resemblance of the catalyst for the actual crisis (the invasion of Kuwait by the far more powerful Iraq) to that scenario. On a broader plane, the calibration of speech-acts in general and the just war significations contained within them in particular by audience type was certainly noteworthy, perhaps even problematic. With the majority of all crisis-related speech-acts (53 per cent) along with a nearmajority of all frame applications within those speech-acts (48 per cent) directed at the press, in contrast to the small proportions of each relative to the mass public (12 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively), it can be safely concluded that the use of the just war frame in this case reflected the ‘cascade model’ introduced by Entman (2004). This approach to framing the Gulf War likely arose from the Administration’s stated desire to ‘kick the Vietnam syndrome’ in light of the perceived importance of a critical press in fueling that syndrome, but from the standpoint of ‘selling’ both the war-decision and the agent making such an approach seems decidedly risky. The third major irregularity revealed in the preceding analysis of the frame’s application stems from discrepancies between the content of the frame and contemporaneous developments in the crisis. This disjuncture is most prominent in (though not restricted to) the employment of translations of the ‘right intention’ criterion reflected in the speech-acts analyzed. As was discussed above, the most often employed ‘right intention’ signification was that of ‘formal outcome’; indeed, as a reference point in fully one-third of all Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis, this was one of the four most common significations irrespective of associated criteria or audience type.

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Still, it must be noted that the continued emphasis on the predication of the decision to go to war on securing a formal outcome became increasingly untenable in the latter stages of the crisis. From the standpoint of the objectives for the operation outlined in UNSC Resolution 687 the US military engagement extensively contributed to the ‘formal outcome(s)’ stipulated in that resolution (in particular the reversal of Iraqi aggression and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty). Yet from the standpoint of what constitutes a ‘just war’ predicated on a formal outcome, ongoing developments after the cessation of major hostilities between Iraqi and coalition forces pointed to an indeterminate and ambiguous outcome. With the last month of the crisis (for the US) defined by Saddam’s crackdown on the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings and the massive and destabilizing refugee outflows and humanitarian crisis that resulted (as well as the Bush Administration’s lukewarm response to each), events ‘on the ground’ clearly did not correspond with the persistent representations advanced through Presidential speech-acts of the ‘formal outcome’ to which the war had been dedicated, and which therefore purportedly made it legitimate. In concert with the sustained emphasis on ‘formal outcome’ in spite of contradictory developments in the crisis, the dearth of other post-hoc ‘right intention’ significations (e.g., ‘post-hoc satisfaction of other involved actors’ and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’) during the last four weeks of the crisis provide further confirmation of this discrepancy between frame application and empirical realities. Two observations stemming from the just war frame’s application in this case also deserve mention in light of the additional context for the aforementioned findings they provide. First, and most notable, was the recurring appearance of three distinct memes throughout the speechacts issued during the crisis throughout the collection of Presidential speech-acts pertaining to the Gulf crisis. The appearance of these three memes (‘reversing aggression’, ‘kicking the Vietnam syndrome’, and ‘establishing New World Order’) in Presidential rhetoric during the Gulf War is well-documented (Entman, 2004).25 So too is the extent to which each were steeped in historical analogy (through emphasis on avoiding the ‘appeasement’ of Munich or on decisively restoring perceptions of American credibility and military efficacy on the world stage after the Vietnam debacle) and cultural tropes. Yet what is important about these memes from the standpoint of this analysis is that none of them were in fact directly related to or reflective of any of the 15 just war significations analyzed here. Through their existence and recurrence in Presidential speech-acts during the crisis these competing memes seem at least partially respons-

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ible for the inconsistent and inchoate application of the just war frame. Certainly the mixed efficacy of the just war frame’s application in the Gulf War cannot be attributed solely to the recurrence of ideational and rhetorical themes deviating from the just war frame and the ideational and rhetorical themes at its core. Nor can it be said that there is no overlap between representations of the Gulf War as ‘just’ in light of just war theory and these competing memes. At times the speech-acts reflected attempts to fashion that link, such as in the case of the ‘new world order’: So, part of this new world order has been moved forward by a United Nations that functioned. We might have still been able to stand up and come to the assistance of Kuwait––the United States. I might have said, ‘To hell with them. It’s right and wrong. It’s good and evil. He’s evil; our cause is right,’ and, without the United Nations, sent a considerable force to help. But it was an enhanced––it is far better to have this collective action where the world, not just the Security Council but the whole General Assembly, stood up and condemned it. So, part of it is these more viable international organizations. And that is where we are now (Bush, 1991f). At the same time, it stands to reason that the high degree of variability characterizing Presidential speech-acts during the crisis, in concert with the reliance on themes which distracted from the just war significations, would certainly have an inhibiting and limiting impact on the effectiveness of attempts to ‘sell’ the military engagement in the Gulf as a ‘just war’, rather than as a war to demonstrate resolve against a dictator, to exorcise the demons of Vietnam, or to realize the foreign policy destiny of American exceptionalism. Another observation stemming from the preceding analysis relates to the manner in which efforts to ‘frame’ the Gulf War as a just war transpired in practical and procedural terms. In yet another manifestation of the resonance of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, the Administration placed a great emphasis (mostly through multiple Presidential letters) on formally and routinely informing Congress of developments in the Gulf as the US military engagement commenced and deepened throughout November and December 1990. This effort can clearly be interpreted as an attempt to head off any potential opposition from the legislative branch (which proved problematic in the latter stages of the Vietnam era) by framing the war for a particularly important group of opinionleaders using the just war frame (and in particular the signification of the war-decision as a ‘last resort’) through a means which also signaled an

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interest in recognizing the Constitutionally-stipulated role of Congress concerning the use of force (Hess, 2009; Smith, 1992).

Conclusion In the end, the analysis of the framing of the decision to go to war in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 affirms a central tenet of frame analysis—the difference between purposive and effective framing (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The analysis above provides clear evidence in support of the former characterization, as does the highly systematic nature of the frame application reflected in the data. For instance, ‘just causes’ were emphasized early but declined both in extensity and intensity of use as the crisis wore on. ‘Competent authority’ grew in importance in conjunction with the promulgation of UNSC Resolution 678 (29 November 1990) and again when offensive action was undertaken in mid-January. Even some translations of ‘right intention’ (such as formality of outcome, and to a lesser extent crisis abatement) increased in application as direct engagements with Iraqi forces drew to a close and the war was linked to broader goals of Middle East peace talks and ‘new world order’. The just war frame exhibited the hallmarks of salience (central to prevailing ideas, commensurate with experiences, and faithful to the larger cultural narratives) and, to a lesser degree dynamism in its application in the Gulf War case. Yet, as the preceding analysis and discussion reveals, the inconsistency in message and variability in application had significant negative ramifications on the credibility both of the frame’s message and its articulators (here, the President). This inconsistency is borne out retrospectively in the comments of the CENTCOM Commander Norman Schwarzkopf, who admitted the degree to which he and thenChairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell were at times surprised by and uncomfortable with the disconnect between the President’s public rhetoric and the military command’s own understanding of the operation and mission (PBS, 2011a). The most accurate characterization of the application of the just war frame in the Gulf War crisis, then, is of a frame that is undoubtedly employed with intent but incoherently. There are two primary dimensions of this incoherence: inconsistency in actual application, as well as substantive message. On the former score, the volatility and ‘peaks and valleys’ evident in the distribution of the data over the course of the crisis speak to an inattentiveness to the framing of the crisis, with major gaps in transmitting the ‘message’ at crucial junctures of the crisis when the initial flush of

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support for the military engagement naturally waned (December 1990) and when major hostilities ceased yet the situation in the region remained uncertain and unstable (March 1991). By way of example, one can look to a span of days in which a number of speech-acts thoroughly permeated with multiple translations of the just war frame (such as the stretch of 28–31 January 1991 which included the President’s State of the Union Address, a speech to the National Religious Broadcasters convention, and an address at the National Prayer Breakfast) was immediately followed by a series of underwhelming speeches to military families including those at Cherry Point (North Carolina) Marine Corps Air Station, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (Goldsboro, North Carolina) and Fort Stewart (Georgia) in which the just war frame was underutilized. What this acute example speaks to in a broader sense is, again, the inconsistent application of the just war frame in the crisis—an inconsistency which is surprising given the many aspects of the crisis which seemingly matched up well with the translations of a ‘just war’ contained within the just war frame. On the latter front, the analysis here reveals that the inconsistency entailing with respect to application also carried over into the substantive domain. While the President was intent on ‘selling’ the merits of the affirmative war-decision using the just war frame, he was also intent on ‘selling’ other significations of the war that were, at best, tangentially related. Close scrutiny of some of the speech-acts analyzed here suggest a compatibility in the President’s view between the ‘just’ nature of the war and its contributions to objectives such as ‘kicking the Vietnam syndrome’, advancing New World Order, or jumpstarting a new round of peace talks in the Middle East. Nonetheless, none of these considerations can be seen as central to just war theory or the just war tradition, and thus are neither subsumed within the ‘just war frame’ nor reflective of its central concerns. As such, one is left to conclude that with respect to the Gulf War as a just war, the Administration clearly strayed off message—making it difficult to discern what, in the end, the President was selling. Although neither the data analyzed here nor the research question at the heart of this analysis allow for or are concerned with any distinct assertions along these lines, the inconsistency in the use of the just war frame in the Gulf War may very well have had bigger ramifications for the Bush Presidency, beyond this particular and discrete military engagement itself. The precipitous decline in the President’s approval ratings, which peaked at 89 per cent immediately after the cessation of offensive hostilities on 28 February 1991 but fell below 50 per cent within

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six months, are well-documented (Peters, 2011a). For the most part this dramatic erosion of popular support for the President has been attributed to domestic factors, including a persistent economic recession, perceptions of the Administration’s insufficient policy responses to it, and the involvement of a prominent self-funded third-party candidate (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995). The evidence here, in light of the prevailing view that foreign policy issues of all types generally exhibit lower overall salience than domestic issues (Holsti, 2004), hardly permits challenge to this prevailing consensus concerning Bush’s electoral defeat in 1992. Yet what it does indicate is that the efforts to frame the Gulf War for domestic consumption using the just war frame were inconsistent both in terms of application and substance, and were directed at the press rather than the public at-large. These two factors taken together almost certainly explain to some degree the fleeting afterglow of the war for the President, if not his electoral fortunes 18 months later.

6 Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil1

Crisis summary One of the last and most dramatic acts in the saga of Yugoslavia’s disintegration took place in Kosovo at the end of the 1990s. By that time, the historical and cultural significance of Kosovo for Serbs (stemming from the highly mythologized Battle of Kosovo in 1389) was clearly at odds with the province’s ethnic composition; as of 1991, the population was 90 per cent ethnic Albanian (Judah, 2000). In many ways Kosovo was both a microcosm and exemplar of the tense dynamics permeating political life during the latter days of the Yugoslav federation. Whereas the 1974 constitutional reform extending ‘autonomous province’ status to Kosovo mollified the aspirations of some of the Albanian majority, still others sought full republican status or even secession and incorporation into a greater-Albanian federation (MccGwire, 2000). Such tensions played out against the backdrop of economic collapse and mounting ethno-nationalist sentiment across Yugoslavia’s major ethnic groups, including the Serb population, in the 1980s (Ramet, 2002). With the death of Tito in 1980, Kosovo was gripped in a seemingly endless cycle of protests, riots, and martial law—with the Albanian majority agitating for greater autonomy within or independence from the Yugoslav federation, and the sizeable and vocal minority of 200,000 ethnic Serbs protesting subordinate status within Kosovo (ibid.). The importance of Kosovo amidst a rising tide of Serbian nationalism in the late 1980s provided a crucial window of opportunity for the consolidation of power by Slobodan Milosevic (Bowman, 2003; Judah, 2000).2 Milosevic’s skillful use of the ethno-nationalist ‘trump card’ beginning notably with his infamous April 1987 Kosovo Polje speech facilitated his rise from the ranks of middling Communist Party functionary to 141

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President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (1989–1997) and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997–2000). It was from this position of consolidated power that Milosevic and his nationalist supporters were able to hammer through a constitutional amendment revoking Kosovo’s autonomy in September 1990 (MccGwire, 2000). This act was abruptly followed by a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians and the construction of a ‘shadow state’ comprising various institutions, elected officers (including Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo, as President), and even a militia (the Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA). A devotee of non-violence, Rugova prevailed over the unstable situation in Kosovo by insisting upon a strategy of passive resistance. This strategy became less tenable upon completion of the Dayton Accords in December 1995. By underwriting a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines and on a territorial basis established primarily through violent campaigns of ‘ethnic cleansing’, the Dayton agreement (brokered by the US) effectively rewarded the militarily stronger Bosnian Serb and Croat elements. Not surprisingly, this outcome elicited a shift among Kosovar Albanians toward support for a guerrilla war waged through the KLA (Crawford, 2001). This shift in turn led to further intensification of the ethnic and political polarization and spilled over into armed conflict throughout the province beginning in earnest in early 1998 in and around Drenica (Zenko, 2001). In response, a UN Contact Group (comprising delegations from the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) was formed to promote a negotiated settlement; responding to the deteriorating situation, the Contact Group condemned the ‘unacceptable use of force’ by Serb security forces and the ‘terrorist actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army’ (quoted in Bromley, 2007: 3). On 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 imposing an arms embargo on the FRY in a failed attempt to halt the violence (ibid.). As of July 1998, the KLA held approximately 30 per cent of the province in its control; with the situation unsettled, NATO began contingency planning in anticipation of a military response to Kosovo (Bowman, 2003). Successes on the battlefield created the conditions for the KLA to introduce an expansive new political agenda which included calls for unification with Albania and the abrogation of civil liberties for Serbs and other minorities (MccGwire, 2000). The result was a major Serbian counter-offensive in the summer of 1998 led by troops dispatched by Milosevic. This counteroffensive reversed many of the KLA’s gains and resulted in approximately 800 deaths and the displacement of over 200,000 Kosovars, as well as a protracted siege of Drenica (Zenko, 2001).

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Prior to the so-called ‘Summer Offensive’, there was little consensus within the US government and throughout NATO about the desirability or utility of using military force. As early as March 1998, hardcore liberal internationalists (including the so-called ‘Albright camp’, as well as much of Tony Blair’s Foreign Office) favored the strategy of binding political efforts to a credible threat or use of force (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000). Indeed, after the siege of Drenica, the State Department boldly and unilaterally withdrew diplomatic concessions to Belgrade instituted after Dayton (ibid.). Yet aside from Albright’s immediate cadre of insiders, other top-ranking Administration officials (such as National Security Advisor Berger and Secretary of Defense Cohen, as well as the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs) were hesitant to plunge headlong into intervention. Ambivalence over the proper course of action persisted even as NATO deployed ground forces to the Balkans in anticipation of massive refugee outflows, and engaged in a major over-flight exercise involving 80 aircraft from 13 NATO nations, dubbed ‘Operation Determined Falcon’, in June 1998 (Bowman, 2003; Shattuck, 2003). The decision to escalate the level of violence in Kosovo in July 1998 was Milosevic’s ‘most crucial mistake’, by virtue of galvanizing the court of world opinion and making the case for a forceful response by the US and NATO more appealing (IICK, 2000: 89). Also instrumental in this regard was the fact-finding mission led by Julia Taft (US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration) in the wake of the Summer Offensive, which described Kosovo as an ‘eerie landscape’ teetering on the brink of genocide (Zenko, 2001: 3).3 The mission’s subsequent report, featuring a 15 October 1998 deadline for the FRY to cease and desist from all violence (while remaining largely silent on the KLA’s role), served as a powerful catalyst for what was becoming the predominant strain of thinking within the Clinton Administration as to the merits of the threat and/or employment of military force. Further to that point, on 24 September 1998 NATO defense ministers issued an ‘activation warning’ for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. This act sparked a cycle of escalation, including the 30 September 1998 massacre at Obrinje and, in response, the 12 October 1998 ‘activation order’ by defense ministers placing necessary forces for a major operation under NATO command (Bowman, 2003). The following day, US envoy Richard Holbrooke struck an agreement with Milosevic in Belgrade postponing airstrikes in return for the satisfaction of four conditions: the reduction of Serb forces in Kosovo to ‘pre-crisis’ levels; the granting of full entrée to NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; the acceptance of an international force of 2000

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unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the cease-fire; and the commencement of meaningful negotiations towards Kosovo’s autonomy (ibid.). Despite the prospects associated with the so-called ‘October agreement’, reports of episodic outbreaks of violence and atrocities continued—most notably the death of over 40 Albanians on 15 January ∨ 1999 at Racak in what was characterized by OSCE monitors at the time ∨ as a ‘massacre of civilians’ by Serb forces (Krieger, 2001). The Racak incident ultimately triggered the Contact Group to summon the parties to the Chateau de Rambouillet near Paris with the charge to reach an agreement in three weeks (BBC, 2000). This ultimatum was simultaneously linked to an authorization from member-states to NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier Solana to launch airstrikes if that agreement did not materialize by 20 February 1999. While the deadline for an agreement was extended to accommodate a new round of talks (held 15–18 March 1999) in Paris as well as a last ditch overture by Holbrooke to Milosevic on 22 March, the conditions serving as the basis of the talks remained fundamentally unchanged. These conditions, including the restoration of the pre-1990 status quo ante in Kosovo and the free movement of NATO forces within Yugoslavia were untenable for the Serbs, leading some to view Rambouillet as little more than a ruse on the path to war (MccGwire, 2000). It was against this backdrop of intransigence and failed diplomacy that Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces moved out of garrisons within Kosovo, while about 20,000 additional Serb troops amassed at the northern Kosovo border, both in blatant violation of the October agreement (Bowman, 2003). With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating, on 24 March 1999 NATO launched airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo; Operation Allied Force had begun (see Table 6.1).

Presidential rhetoric: A snapshot Pre-crisis While direct clashes between the KLA and Serb forces were commonplace in the first half of 1998 and escalated dramatically throughout the summer, the Clinton Administration remained disengaged from public pronouncements concerning events in Kosovo throughout much of the year. Kosovo was not mentioned in a public statement by the White House until 4 March 1998. Throughout the remainder of the spring, public statements by the President and top-level advisors designated Kosovo as an internal matter, offering little besides support for direct negotiations between Milosevic and Rugova (Clinton, 1998a).

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 145 Table 6.1

Crisis profile: Kosovo Pre-crisis/Crisis

Crisis trigger date

2/20/1999

Initiation of US military engagement

3/24/1999

Crisis termination date

6/10/1999

Elapsed time between perception of trigger and termination (in days)

109

Duration of US military engagement during crisis (in days)

78

Gravity of threat

Threat to influence in international system or regional subsystem

Triggering entity

Yugoslavia (Serbia)

Trigger to foreign policy crisis

Political act Post-crisis

Content of crisis outcome

Victory

Form of outcome

Formal agreement—voluntary

Escalating or reduction of tension

Tension reduction

Extent of satisfaction about outcome

Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied

Throughout much of 1998, Kosovo was referred to in numerous public statements by the Administration, but only as one in a litany of challenges facing an international community in transition; while it was deemed important, Kosovo was not seen as deserving of any concerted attention or direct intervention (Clinton, 1998b, 1998c). As the so-called ‘summer offensive’ by the Serb forces in and around Drenica intensified, reversing most of the KLA’s territorial gains and signaling the potential for a protracted conflict, the Administration undertook significant policy actions against the rump Yugoslavia that belied this seeming lack of rhetorical urgency. The imposition of economic sanctions on 9 June 1998 was followed by an announced deployment of a small contingent of US ground and air forces in support of the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia on 19 June 1998. These actions were among the clearest indicators that the situation of Kosovo was becoming one of heightened concern to the Administration. Still, statements about Kosovo from the White House were infrequent prior to the President’s early September summit in Moscow with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. In a joint statement with Yeltsin, President

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Clinton took the opportunity to highlight the massive displacement of civilians and to single out Milosevic in attributing responsibility for a looming ‘humanitarian catastrophe’—introducing for the first time in a prominent way allusions to the ‘injustices’ inherent in the conflict: The escalation of tension in Kosovo inflicts heavy suffering on innocent civilians. Over 200,000 people were forced to leave their homes as the result of armed clashes. The situation is aggravated by large-scale destruction of houses, food shortages, and the risk of epidemic disease. The threat of humanitarian catastrophe is becoming ever more real. Slobodan Milosevic, as President of the FRY, must order a halt to all repressive actions against the civilian population in Kosovo… (Clinton, 1998d). In many ways Clinton’s joint statement of 2 September 1998 represented a turning point in the Administration’s policy stance and in its discursive treatment of the Kosovo matter. On both fronts, a heightened sense of urgency accompanied the shift from summer to autumn, reflected in the release of $20 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to assist Kosovar Albanians (Presidential Determination No. 98-34; 9 September 1998) and in the Administration’s successful lobbying for a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSC Resolution 1199, passed 23 September 1998) invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In his statement on the passage of that Resolution, which advanced a call for a complete and total cease-fire while characterizing the situation in Kosovo as a ‘threat to regional peace and security’, the President again made clear his perception of Milosevic’s culpability for the situation in Kosovo: Today’s U.N. Security Council resolution makes absolutely clear that the international community is determined to see an end to the violence and repression in Kosovo. The resolution places responsibility squarely on President Milosevic to take the concrete steps necessary to prevent a major humanitarian disaster and restore peace in the region. I am particularly encouraged that the resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, makes clear that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to regional peace and security. The United States and its allies are moving NATO activities from the planning stage to readiness to act. With more than 250,000 Kosovars displaced from

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their homes and cold weather coming, Milosevic must act immediately to heed the will of the international community (Clinton, 1998e). These inter-related points of emphasis (e.g., Kosovo as a humanitarian disaster largely of Milosevic’s making) were repeatedly woven through Clinton’s public statements throughout the fall of 1998. At a 12 October fundraiser for Senatorial Candidate Charles E. Schumer in New York City, they served as springboards to the announcement of the NATO ‘activation order’, an act on the path to war accompanied by clear allusions to a host of ‘just causes’ necessitating it, legitimate authority sustaining it, and ‘right intentions’ defining it: Last month the United Nations Security Council, through Resolution 1199, demanded that President Milosevic implement a cease-fire, withdraw the forces he has recently sent to Kosovo and garrison the rest, allow refugees to return to their villages, give immediate access to humanitarian relief agencies, and agree to a timetable for autonomy negotiations with the Kosovar Albanians. President Milosevic has not yet complied with the international community’s demands. Given his intransigence, the 16 members of NATO have just voted to give our military commanders the authority to carry out airstrikes against Serbia. This is only the second time in NATO’s history that it has authorized the use of force—and the first time in the case of a country brutally repressing its own people… …All along our objectives have been clear: to end the violence in Kosovo which threatens to spill over into neighboring countries and to spark instability in the heart of Europe; to reverse a humanitarian catastrophe in the making as tens of thousands of homeless refugees risk freezing or starving to death in the winter; and to seek a negotiated peace. But let me be very clear: Commitments are not compliance. Balkan graveyards are filled with President Milosevic’s broken promises. In the days ahead, we will focus not only on what President Milosevic says but on what we see that he does… (Clinton, 1998f). Such rhetoric continued apace into early 1999, with the President drawing upon prominent installments of the deteriorating situation ∨ in Kosovo (such as the Racak incident) in enhancing the case for the

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legitimacy of action against the Serbs and of the cause of the Kosovar Albanians: I condemn in the strongest possible terms the massacre of civilians by Serb security forces that took place last night in the village of ∨ Racak in Kosovo. This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo. It is a clear violation of the commitments Serbian authorities have made to NATO. There can be no justification for it. The perpetrators must be brought to justice. The Serb authorities must act immediately to identify those responsible. They must cooperate with the Kosovo Verification Mission and the International War Crimes Tribunal. They must withdraw security forces, carry out all the commitments they have made to NATO, and cease their repression…It is urgent that these murders not trigger a spiral of reprisals. Both sides have a responsibility to work towards a peaceful resolution of this crisis and for a settlement that allows the people of Kosovo the selfgovernment they so clearly deserve (Clinton, 1999a).

Crisis The Rambouillet talks provided the last opportunity for any public articulation by the Administration that military action in Kosovo could be avoided. With the outcome of the negotiations linked to the threat of NATO action through a de facto ultimatum to Milosevic, even at that point the prospects seemed fleeting. The likelihood of military action as well as assertions of Serbia’s sole responsibility for that outcome were central to the President’s statement of 23 February 1999, issued jointly with French President Jacques Chirac: The Kosovo Albanians have shown courage in moving forward the peace accord that we…have proposed. Serbia’s leaders now have a choice to make: They can join an agreement that meets their legitimate concerns and gives them a chance to show that an autonomous Kosovo can thrive as part of their country, or they can stonewall. But if they do that, they will be held accountable…If there is an effective peace agreement NATO stands ready to help implement it. We also stand united in our determination to use force if Serbia fails to meet its previous commitment to withdraw forces from Kosovo and if it fails to accept the peace

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 149

agreement. I have ordered our aircraft to be ready, to act as part of a NATO operation… (Clinton, 1999b). The failure of Serb representatives to agree to the conditions presented by the Contact Group at Rambouillet in late February 1999 initiated a crisis for the US and its NATO allies. From the onset of the crisis, the Clinton Administration repeatedly referred to the terms of the Rambouillet proposal as the eminently fair by-product of a set of negotiations genuinely aimed at non-violent resolution of the conflict—talks that featured sincere ‘buy-in’ from the ‘aggrieved victims’ (the Albanians) but intransigence from the alleged ‘aggressors’ (the Serbs). As such, Rambouillet was characterized as a last-ditch effort by the West to avoid the use of force, a characterization that in turn paved the way for the use of force by NATO to be seen as a ‘last resort’ in defense of the ‘innocent’: The peace talks in Rambouillet, France, are a significant step forward in the search for a fair and lasting peace in Kosovo. In the last three weeks, the negotiations have produced more progress than we have seen in the decade since Kosovo’s autonomy was stripped away by the Government in Belgrade. By agreeing in principle to a strong plan that would provide substantial self-government for the people of Kosovo, the negotiators on the Albanian side have shown courage and leadership…The Serbs should be prepared to return to the negotiations on March 15 with a commitment to sign the full agreement—including the indispensable provisions on the withdrawal of most Serb security forces from Kosovo and the deployment of a NATO-led peace implementation force…NATO Secretary General Javier Solana retains the authority given to him by the NATO Council to act if necessary (Clinton, 1999c). This ‘last resort’ meme was only enhanced by the President’s reaction after the collapse of the eleventh-hour talks in Paris on 18 March 1999: …we have been involved in an intensive effort to end the conflict in Kosovo for many weeks now…we proposed a peace agreement to stop the killing and give the people of Kosovo the self-determination and government they need and to which they are entitled under the constitution of their government. Yesterday the Kosovar Albanians signed that agreement. Even though they have not obtained all they seek, even as their people remain under attack, they’ve had the

150 Selling a ‘Just’ War

vision to see that a just peace is better than an unwinnable war. Now only President Milosevic stands in the way of peace. Today the peace talks were adjourned because the Serbian negotiators refused even to discuss key elements of the peace plan. NATO has warned President Milosevic to end his intransigence and repression or face military action (Clinton, 1999d). In the month between end of the Rambouillet talks and the commencement of NATO air sorties, the central theme of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis remained that of Kosovo as a humanitarian disaster of Serbia’s making (Clinton, 1999e).4 What did change in the acceleration toward war was the additional emphasis placed on the moral imperative for such action: …we were facing a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo last summer [1998]. We came in with the threat of force, and it worked, and we averted it…Were there violations of the cease-fire? Yes, but they were violations from both sides. And there were problems there. But that’s why we started this new process with the new NATO action order. It became clear we had to do more because of the terrible killings in one village in Kosovo, that were precipitated by the Serbs. Now, I do not believe that, at least at the present point, Mr. Milosevic could be under any illusion, based on what happened in Bosnia that—from the point of the view of the United States, anyway, and what NATO has said—that we will keep our word… (Clinton, 1999f). In the days preceding the commencement of NATO air strikes on 24 March, such themes continued to permeate what became a more frequent and more pointed array of Presidential speech-acts. One of the most extensive elaborations of the case for war relying on various components of the just war frame was the President’s 19 March 1999 news conference after the breakdown of negotiations: …we need to remember the lessons learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children, the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done…We should remember the thousands of people facing cold and hunger in the hills of Kosovo last fall. Firmness ended that as well. We should ∨ remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January—

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 151

innocent men, women, and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire, not because of anything they had done but because of who they were. Now, roughly 40,000 Serbian troops and police are massing in and around Kosovo. Our firmness is the only thing standing between ∨ them and countless more villages like Racak, full of people without protection, even though they have now chosen peace. Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill…I will say again to Mr. Milosevic, as I did in Bosnia: I do not want to put a single American pilot into the air. I do not want anyone else to die in the Balkans. I do not want a conflict. I would give anything to be here talking about something else today. But a part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my successors and to our country in the 21st century an environment in Europe that is stable, humane, and secure (Clinton, 1999d). The President continued to sound just war themes while also linking them to narrower (realist) conceptions of the national interest as violence in Kosovo persisted (Clinton, 1999g). Perhaps the culmination of Presidential speech-making in advancing the case for war through just war language and concepts came in two separate public statements announcing the launch of airstrikes on 24 March 1999: We and our NATO Allies have taken this action only after extensive and repeated efforts to obtain a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo. But President Milosevic, who over the past decade started the terrible wars against Croatia and Bosnia, has again chosen aggression over peace…He has rejected the balanced and fair peace accords that our allies and partners proposed last month, a peace agreement that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians courageously accepted. Instead, his forces have intensified their attacks, burning down Kosovar Albanian villages and murdering civilians…Kosovo’s crisis now is full-blown, and if we do not act, it will get even worse. Only firmness now can prevent greater catastrophe later… At the end of the 20th century, after two World Wars and a cold war, we and our allies have a chance to leave our children a Europe that is free, peaceful, and stable. But we must act now to do that, because if the Balkans once again become a place of brutal killing

152 Selling a ‘Just’ War

and massive refugee flights, it will be impossible to achieve. With our allies, we used diplomacy and force to end the war in Bosnia. Now trouble next door in Kosovo puts the region’s people at risk again. Our NATO Allies unanimously support this action. The United States must stand with them and stand against ethnic violence and atrocity (Clinton, 1999h). –– We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century…By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace. As the Kosovars were saying yes to peace, Serbia stationed 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo in preparation for a major offensive—and in clear violation of the commitments they had made. Now they’ve started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their houses. We’ve seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have agreed to peace. Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative… Over the last few months we have done everything we possibly could to solve this problem peacefully…Today we and our 18 NATO Allies agreed to do what we said we would, what we must do to restore the peace…if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war (Clinton, 1999i). The characterization of a victimized Kosovar Albanian population looking to NATO for ‘help and hope’ in the face of an ‘organized campaign of violence and destruction’ led by Milosevic and intended to ‘keep Kosovo’s land while ridding it of its people’ continued apace in the weeks following NATO’s initial aerial bombardment (Clinton, 1999j). As the military campaign persisted with little operational success (instead bringing about an escalation in attacks against civilians within Kosovo), the singular focus on Milosevic as evil personified as well as the dichotomy of Albanian victim/Serb aggressor grew more

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 153

intense.5 In an exchange with reporters in early April, Clinton underscored these themes: We’re striking hard at Serbia’s machinery of repression, while making a deliberate effort to minimize harm to innocent people. Serbian forces, on the other hand, continue their deliberate, systematic attacks against civilians, who are guilty of nothing more than being ethnic Albanians. Mr. Milosevic has created a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. He can end it today by stopping the killing. He could end the bombing. He could end the suffering of the refugees by withdrawing from Kosovo his military police and paramilitary forces, by accepting the deployment of an international security force, and making it possible for all refugees to return…If Mr. Milosevic does not do what is necessary, NATO will continue an air campaign. It will be undiminished, unceasing, and unrelenting… We know we are up against a dictator who has shown time and again that he would rather rule over rubble than not rule at all, someone who recognized no limits on his behavior except those imposed by others. We have seen this kind of evil conduct before in this century, but rarely has the world stood up to it as rapidly and with such unity and resolve as we see today with NATO’s coalition… (Clinton, 1999k). A few weeks later, in an address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) at Fort McNair (Maryland), President Clinton continued with these characterizations of the crisis and of Milosevic’s role in it, attempting to weave the dynamics of Serb aggression in Kosovo into a larger historical narrative in the process: Though his ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic extermination of the Holocaust, the two are related, both vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic hatred. This campaign to drive the Kosovars from their land and to, indeed, erase their very identity is an affront to humanity and an attack not only on a people but on the dignity of all people. Nine of every ten Kosovar Albanians now has been driven from their homes, thousands murdered, at least 100,000 missing, many young men led away in front of their families; over 500 cities, towns, and villages torched. All this has been carried out, you must understand, according to a plan carefully designed months earlier in Belgrade…

154 Selling a ‘Just’ War

…There are those who say Europe and its North American allies have no business intervening in the ethnic conflicts of the Balkans. They are the inevitable result, these conflicts, according to some, of centuries-old animosities…The truth is that for centuries these people have lived together in the Balkans and southeastern Europe… without anything approaching the intolerable conditions and conflicts that exist today. And we do no favors to ourselves or to the rest of the world when we justify looking away from this kind of slaughter…there is a huge difference between people who can’t resolve their problems peacefully and fight about it and people who resort to systematic ethnic cleansing and slaughter of people because of their religious or ethnic background…And that is the difference that NATO—that our Allies have tried to recognize and act on. Bringing the Kosovars home is a moral issue (Clinton, 1999l). This attempt at historical contextualization was even more pronounced in the President’s remarks at a Memorial Day ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery on 31 May 1999. Evan as the prospects for Serb capitulation were mounting, Clinton drew a direct parallel between the violence in Kosovo to that in Bosnia, while characterizing the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s as links in an unbroken chain extending back to the two World Wars (Clinton, 1999m). In doing so, the President pointed chiefly to the ‘fundamental interest in building a lasting peace in an undivided and free Europe’ that ran through all three conflicts—a peaceful and prosperous order against which Milosevic represented the ‘last holdout’ in a scenario in which Serbia was likened to Nazi Germany (ibid.). In response to domestic concerns about the US involvement in Kosovo, Clinton was unequivocal: …Our objectives in Kosovo are clear and consistent with the moral imperative of reversing ethnic cleansing and killing…many Americans believe that this is not our fight. But remember why many of the people are laying in these graves out here— because of what happened in Europe and because of what was allowed to go on too long before people intervened. What we are doing today will save lives, including American lives, in the future. And it will give our children a better, safer world to live in (ibid.). This slight but perceptible shift toward a focus on ‘right intention’ considerations and in particular the US and NATO plan for Serbia after the cessation of hostilities was again evident in the President’s Commencement Address to the US Air Force Academy on 2 June 1999.

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 155

In again seeking to connect the Kosovo campaign to a larger historical narrative (that of America’s interest in ensuring an ‘undivided and free Europe’) as the crisis drew towards its termination, the President decried the notion that atrocities against Kosovars were linked to or increased by the NATO bombing campaign (Clinton, 1999n). Instead, his address pointed to the ICTY indictment and Milosevic’s culpability for war crimes in Bosnia while articulating a moral rationale for Operation Allied Force: Our reasons are both moral and strategic. There is a moral imperative because what we’re facing in Kosovo is not just ethnic and religious hatred, discrimination and conflict…America and NATO’s military power cannot be deployed just because people don’t like each other or even because they fight each other. What is going on in Kosovo is something much worse and, thankfully, more rare: an effort by a political leader to systematically destroy or displace an entire people because of their ethnicity and their religious faith; an effort to erase the culture and history and presence of a people from their land. Where we have the ability to do so, we as a nation and our democratic allies must take a stand against this. We do have the ability to do so at NATO’s doorstep in Europe (ibid.). Finally, in announcing the Military Technical Agreement which represented the formal end to the NATO operation and the suspension of offensive military hostilities, the President reported that: …we have achieved a victory for a safer world, for our democratic values, and for a stronger America. Aggression against an innocent people has been contained and is being turned back. When I ordered our Armed Forces into combat, we had three clear goals: to enable the Kosovar people, the victims of some of the most vicious atrocities in Europe since the Second World War, to return to their homes with safety and self-government; to require Serbian forces responsible for those atrocities to leave Kosovo; and to deploy an international security force, with NATO at its core, to protect all the people of that troubled land, Serbs and Albanians, alike. Those goals will be achieved. A necessary conflict has been brought to a just and honorable conclusion (Clinton, 1999o). Though representative of both the pre-crisis and crisis stages, the preceding examples of rhetoric constitute neither a random sample nor a full population of Presidential speech-making concerning Kosovo. What these few (if telling) illustrations of the language and themes of

156 Selling a ‘Just’ War

the just war as exhibited in Presidential rhetoric do provide is a degree of context and insight into the Presidential narrative before and during the crisis. This context, in turn, is sufficient enough to merit the consideration, in a more structured and comprehensive way, of whether these statements serve as exemplars of a systematic, purposive, and intentional application of the just war frame to the decision to intervene with force in Kosovo.

Frame application: Results As with the preceding examination of the Gulf War, a subset of public statements is hardly sufficient to adequately address the question of how, specifically, the Clinton Administration employed just war theory to ‘sell’ a military action in Kosovo to the American public. As such, this chapter will examine that question by analyzing 167 cases of Presidential speech-acts directly referencing the military engagement in Kosovo, beginning with the commencement of air strikes on 24 March 1999 and continuing through termination of the crisis for the United States on 10 June 1999.6 One of the more immediate (if impressionistic) findings emerging from this analysis relates to President Clinton’s discursive treatment of the crisis, which was consistent—and with regard to the just war frame, consistently muted. These qualities are conveyed in a basic way through Figure 6.1; 68 of the 78 days (87 per cent) of the crisis featured at least one speech-act concerning the crisis by the President, with the Figure 6.1

Speech-acts referencing ‘Kosovo’—POTUS March 24, 1999–June 10, 1999

7 6

#/day

5 4 3 2 1 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 99 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 /199 1 / 8 4/1 4/5 4/9 /13 /17 /21 /25 /29 5/3 5/7 /11 /15 /19 /23 /27 /31 6/4 6/9 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 3/2 3/2 date

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 157

number of relevant speech-acts on those 68 days ranging from a minimum of one (multiple occasions) to a maximum of six (23 April) per day. With respect to the just war frame more specifically, 59 of those 68 days (87 per cent) featured Presidential speech-acts containing at least one just war signification. As Figure 6.1 also conveys, there were several prominent peaks in Presidential speech-acts corresponding with major events, including (but not limited to) an early proposal for a cease-fire from Milosevic, a ‘preventative deployment’ of 2500 US soldiers and aviators to Albania and Macedonia, the start of NATO’s 50th anniversary summit, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the ICTY indictment of Milosevic. Frame content The topic of concern here, of course, is not Presidential speech-making per se, but the use of the just war frame through Presidential speechacts. To establish a referential baseline, it is important to note that only 7.5 per cent (190/2505) of all possible values of the 15 just war frame variables distributed across 167 cases of Presidential speech-acts did in fact feature a reference to the just war indicator in question. In examining the just war frame relative to these 167 Presidential speech-acts, approximately 34 per cent (56/167) featured two or more just war significations, with no Presidential speech-act featuring positive values in even as many as a third (five or more) of all possible just war indicators. These general findings indicate the limited nature of the just war frame’s application by the Clinton Administration in the Kosovo crisis.7 Further to this point is the finding that the average daily number of just war significations in Presidential speech-acts throughout the 78-day crisis was 2.4, a figure that does not change much if one includes only those days featuring speech-acts explicitly referencing the crisis.8 The maximum number of just war signifiers contained within any one speech-act was four (which occurred on several occasions, though not in conjunction with any especially noteworthy crisis event), with the minimum (no reference to any of the 15 frame signifiers) occurring in 55 distinct speech-acts.9 In looking at the use of the just war frame only through the lens of the three major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority, right intention) from which they are derived, the just cause criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced here) clearly outstrips the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage of all observed just war frame significations. All told, 62 per cent (118/190) of all just war significations corresponded with ‘just cause’ considerations,

158 Selling a ‘Just’ War

compared to 26 per cent (50/190) for ‘competent authority’ and approximately 12 per cent (22/190) for ‘right intention’.10 However, a closer examination of the 15 variables comprising the just war frame provides a somewhat more mixed picture. Only four of the 15 just war indicators exceed the average number of significations per variable (12.7). Two of these four most common just war signifiers were ‘just causes’, reflecting the attempt to frame the use of force as a legitimate response to: (a) a violent crisis trigger in 10 per cent (17/167) of the cases and (b) to evil acts perpetrated against innocents in 49 per cent (81/167); the latter proved the single most common just war signification advanced through Presidential speech-acts during the crisis.11 The second most commonly employed signifier came through reference to the ‘competent authority’ provided by regional authorization for military action, via NATO and, secondarily, the European Council. This signification was reflected in 29 per cent (48/167) of the Presidential speech-acts referring to the crisis.12 Among the four most common just war signifiers, the weakest in terms of frequency of use was the ‘right intention’ consideration of pace of abatement, in which the use of force was associated with the intention to accelerate crisis abatement. This signification appeared in 7 per cent of all crisis-referencing speech-acts (13/190). The highly stratified nature of the findings precludes discussing the least frequent just war indicators at length, as all but three (discussed above) turned up in fewer than 10 per cent of the speech-acts. At a minimum, it bears noting that four just war signifiers were never invoked—the ‘just causes’ of self-defense, the seizure of territory, and the seizure of (US) property and/or persons, as well as the competent authority consideration of target state authority. None of these nonfindings should be particularly surprising, in that they all reflect the objective conditions of the crisis (and, by extension, a more-or-less faithful rendering of the just war frame through Presidential speechacts). As the case for war rested entirely on the responsibility to act as a third party on behalf of the threatened Kosovar Albanians, there were clearly no plausible grounds for self-defense from the American perspective, nor was there a direct threat to American property or persons prior to the commitment of US military force. Similarly, territory was not a relevant factor, in that territorial gain was incidental to ‘ethnic cleansing’ and that the crisis played out entirely within the (then) recognized boundaries of the sovereign Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; this latter fact also obviated any claims to target state authority. While Presidential speech-acts concerned with the Kosovo crisis were most likely to advance ‘just cause’ themes, the data also suggests that the frame application exhibited a modicum of ‘breadth’ (defined as con-

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 159 Table 6.2

Mono-applications and interactions (n = 167)* Single criterion

Interactions

Just cause

51

JC * CA

26

Competent authority

14

JC * RI

7

4

CA * RI

3

JC * CA * RI

7

Right intention

*55 speech-acts featured no Just War indicators

taining at least one just war signifier drawn from two different criteria in any single speech-act), though clearly nothing remotely approaching ‘totality’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from all three criteria in any single speech-act). On the former score, 43 of 167 (26 per cent) of speech-acts contained significations of the just war drawn from two of the three ad bellum criteria, while only seven of 167 (4 per cent) reflected the ad bellum criteria in totality (see Table 6.2). The relatively slight degree of breadth and near-absence of totality are clearly functions of a disproportionate focus on relatively few translations of the just war frame, at the exclusion of the vast majority of the indicators contained within that frame. While this does not necessarily indicate that the frame was weakly or ineffectively employed, it is clear that application was highly selective. Audience Before considering the interface between the just war frame and the main audiences of concern to this research (opinion-leaders, the media, the mass public), the distribution of Presidential speech-acts according to primary audience is worth noting.13 As Table 6.3 shows, over twothirds of all Presidential speech-acts during the crisis were directed at the press and opinion-leaders. These speech-acts were distributed in almost Table 6.3

Presidential speech-acts, by primary audience (n = 167)

Primary audience

Presidential speech-acts

Mass public

24

Press

59

Opinion-leaders

58

Foreign

4

Multiple

22

Mean = 33.4; Standard deviation = 24.2

160 Selling a ‘Just’ War

identical proportion, with 36 per cent (59/167) targeting the press and 35 per cent (58/167) opinion-leaders. And, as was also the case in the preceding analysis of the Gulf War crisis, only a small minority of speechacts (14 per cent, or 24/167) were chiefly directed at the mass public. In turning to the interface between the just war frame and the domestic audience(s) through Presidential speech-acts, the extensity (frequency of employment across all audiences) of just war significations shows that ‘just causes’ were far and away the most commonly employed of the three jus ad bellum categories. They were utilized more than twice as often as signifiers associated with competent authority, and more than five times as often as those associated with the right intention criteria (see Figure 6.2). And, from the standpoint of intensity (the proportional employment of just war significations relative to audience type), the greatest prevalence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in conjunction with speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders. All told, 37 per cent of all just war significations (regardless of categorical type) advanced during the crisis were directed at opinion-leaders (71/190), with 78 per cent of those significations reflecting ‘just causes’ (55/71). By contrast, just cause significations were less intensively employed in speech-acts directed at the press (35 of 65, or 54 per cent, of all speech-

Figure 6.2

Speech-acts—primary audience (all JW criteria)

60 55 Just cause

50

Comp authority Right intention

# of significations

40 35 30 21 20

17 13 11 9

10 4

8 3

3

2

3

5

1

0 Mass public

Press

Opinion-leaders primary audience

Foreign

Multiple

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 161

acts primarily targeting the press featured ‘just cause’ significations). The significance of this finding is compounded when one considers that the aggregate number of speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders and the press were almost identical. This suggests a far more intensive emphasis on framing using ‘just causes’ in those Presidential speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders than in those aimed at the press.14 Conversely, appeals to ‘competent authority’ of any type were relied on much more intensively in speech-acts directed at the press (32 per cent, or 21/65) and mass public (34 per cent, or 11/32) and less so in those aimed at opinion-leaders (18 per cent, or 13/71).15 In relational terms, a roughly inverse relationship in emphasis by the ‘just cause’ and ‘competent authority’ criteria is apparent, with the former receiving greater emphasis in communications with business, military, religious, and professional elites and the latter greater emphasis in the media and mass public. Finally, only 12 per cent (22/190) of all just war significations evident in Presidential speech-acts advanced during the crisis stemmed from the five translations of ‘right intention’ advanced here. The single most common audience to which these significations were directed was the press, with right intention considerations accounting for 14 per cent (9/65) of all just war significations targeting the press— a total three times as high as those employed in speech-acts targeting opinion-leaders. Considerations of aggregate extensity and intensity beg the question of which specific just war significations register most frequently within the body of Presidential speech-acts concerning the commitment of US military force to the NATO operation in Kosovo. Again, the concepts of extensity and intensity allow for distinguishing these effects. With respect to the extensity of the seven distinct translations of ‘just causes’ considered in this inquiry, Figure 6.3 conveys the degree to which the emphasis on just causes was almost entirely propelled by significations of the US military engagement as a ‘response to/punishment of evil’. Fully 69 per cent (81/118) of the just cause significations identified in the data were of this type. This means that of all ‘just causes’ associated with the affirmative war-decision by the Clinton Administration through Presidential speech-acts, the ‘evils’ associated with ethnic cleansing (typically linked to the alleged ‘Operation Horseshoe’ plan) were easily the most commonly cited. In light of this clear outlier, it is not surprising that the only other ‘just causes’ evident within the speech-acts analyzed appeared infrequently. To that end, 14 per cent (17/118) of the aggregate total of just cause significations referenced the existence of a direct violent act as

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 163

nearly three-fourths (73 per cent, or 40/55) referenced the response to/punishment of ‘evil’ (exceeding the expected or ‘baseline’ rate across all audiences of 69 per cent). Yet while a response to or punishment of ‘evil’ is the most important translation of ‘just cause’ in relation to all audiences, the intensity of the reliance on that signifier in speech-acts directed at audiences other than opinion-leaders is not all that significant. For example, of all just cause significations directed at the press, 63 per cent (22/35) referenced the response to/punishment of ‘evil’ motive, with 53 per cent (9/17) of total just cause significations directed at the mass public reflecting this consideration (again in comparison to the ‘baseline’ value of 69 per cent). Indeed, in terms of intensity of employment, other variables rank higher in speech-acts directed at the press and mass public; for example, the involvement/responsibility of an authoritarian regime (accounting for 23 per cent of the just cause significations directed at the press, compared to an expected value across all audiences of 10 per cent) or the existence of a direct violent crisis trigger (accounting for 23 per cent of the just cause significations directed at the mass public, compared to an expected value of 14 per cent).17 Such findings suggest a clear pattern in the data, in which a greater emphasis on just cause considerations in communications with opinionleaders is, in turn, linked to and accounted for by a disproportionate emphasis on framing the military engagement as a response to or punishment of acts of ‘evil’. This point of emphasis persists in application of the frame to other audiences, but to a lesser degree––with the difference largely made up by slightly higher than expected use of other significations, chiefly those related to the direct violent act triggering the crisis, the power disparity between crisis actors (in speech-acts directed at the mass public), and the responsibility of an authoritarian regime for the crisis (in speech-acts directed at the press). The distribution of just war significations by audience type according to the ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are somewhat more difficult to interpret due to less frequent use. With respect to extensity, the second most frequently employed of all 15 significations subsumed within the just war frame was the claim of ‘competent authority’ emanating from the existence of regional authority (extended from NATO and various European institutions including the Council of Europe, OSCE, and EU) for the military engagement. Accounting for 25 per cent (48/190) of the aggregate total of just war significations, these significations were typically advanced in Presidential speech-acts stressing the collective security dimensions of the operation (advanced under NATO auspices) and their legal and institutional underpinning. As will be

164 Selling a ‘Just’ War

discussed at length below, this finding is particularly instructive in light of the absence of UN Security Council authorization for the operation. Again in terms of extensity, apart from this singular variable the remaining two competent authority significations and the five distinct translations of ‘right intention’ were employed infrequently and to little effect. In considering the intensity of the competent authority significations, the signification of greatest aggregate importance across all three jus ad bellum categories (regional authority) not surprisingly predominates in application by audience type (see Figure 6.4). Overall, competent authority significations directed at the press were more common than those directed at opinion-leaders, as is reflected in a concomitant and proportional increase in the value of regional authority significations. The only slight deviation relative to competent authority significations in general stems from President Clinton’s vague allusion to UN support for the operation in his televised address to the public of 10 June 1999 announcing the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, an announcement marking termination of the crisis for the United States. This single attempt at signifying global authorization resulted in a slightly lower than expected rate of application of the regional authorization signification in speech-

Figure 6.4

Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion)

25

21 20 CA1

# of significations

CA2 15 CA3

13 10

10

5 2

2 1

1 0

0 Mass public

0

0 Press

0

0

Opinion-leaders primary audience

0

0 Foreign

0 Multiple

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 165

acts directed at the mass public (91 per cent, compared to a baseline rate of 96 per cent). The most infrequently employed of the three jus ad bellum criteria in framing the case for war in Kosovo was right intention, which accounted for roughly 12 per cent of all just war significations (see Figure 6.5). To the extent that any of the five significations associated with the ‘right intention’ criteria registered in the framing of the war-decision through Presidential speech-acts, the key outlier came in references to the intention of positively contributing to crisis abatement. In the aggregate, significations to this effect comprised nearly 60 per cent of all right intention significations. From the standpoint of intensity of application, the majority of these framing efforts were directed towards the press, in fact accounting for 78 per cent of all right intention significations targeting that audience (compared to a ‘baseline’ or expected value of 59 per cent). Temporal dynamics The last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account the temporal dimension of the just war frame’s application. The dynamic context of the 78-day period between the commitment of US military force to Operation Noble Anvil and the termination of the crisis for the US

Figure 6.5

Speech-acts—primary audience (right intention criterion)

8 7

7

RI1 RI2 RI3

6

# of significations

RI4 RI5

5 4 3

3

2

2 1

1 0

0

1 0 0

Mass public

1 0

1 0

Press

0 0

2

1 0

Opinion-leaders primary audience

1 1 0 0 0 0 Foreign

0 Multiple

1

166 Selling a ‘Just’ War

requires assessment of whether the manner by which the just war frame was used to ‘sell’ the war-decision changed in conjunction with extant changes in the crisis (and the US military engagement) itself. As in the preceding chapter, two primary and related factors were taken into account: first, whether and to what extent any ‘chronological clusters’ (defined as the occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) emerge in the body of speech-acts issued over the duration of the crisis, and second, whether these clusters (if they occur) can be explained by, or at least understood in relation to, the evolution of the crisis and the emergence of any major developments in it.18 In other words, this component of the analysis seeks to determine whether the just war frame was especially prominent at any temporally bound juncture(s) of the crisis, and if so, why.19 The temporal pattern of just war significations is depicted on a monthly basis in Figure 6.6. In examining the entire period of the US military engagement in the Kosovo crisis (spanning from 24 March through 10 June 1999), roughly 18 per cent (34/190) of all just war significations advanced in Presidential speech-acts occurred in March 1999, 41 per cent (78/190) in April 1999, 30 per cent (57/190) in May 1999, and 11 per cent (21/190) in June 1999. If one employs the daily average of 2.4 significations per day as a benchmark, a sharp dichotomy emerges, in which the first two months of the crisis (March and April 1999) featured just war significations at a rate exceeding expectations, while the last two months (May and June 1999) exhibited use of the just war frame at a rate slightly below expectations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the use of the frame was greatest proportionally in the initial (partial) month of March, in which the incidence of just war significations was almost twice as high as expected (with 34 significations, compared to the baseline value of 19.5 as derived from the average daily rate for the entire crisis). This pattern continued into April, in which actual significations exceeded the baseline rate, albeit to a diminished degree (with 78 significations in total for the month, compared to an expected value of 73.2). However, May 1999 marked the beginning of a bifurcation in the data along temporal lines, with a significant drop-off to the tune of 57 total significations accounting for approximately three-fourths of the expected value of 75.6. This trend continued in the final (and partial) month of the crisis, June 1999, in which total just war significations fell slightly below expected values (21 v. 24.4). As Figure 6.6 also indicates, the conditions used to define a ‘chronological cluster’ (occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) were fully satisfied

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 171

significations advanced in each month of the crisis. The monthly distribution of ‘competent authority’ significations as a percentage of all just war significations varies inversely, with lower than expected occurrence relative to the aggregate baseline of 26 per cent at the outset of the crisis (17.5 per cent in March 1999), average rates of application in the middle two months of the crisis (26 per cent in April 1999; 24.5 per cent in May 1999), and a significantly higher than expected rate of use in June 1999 (47.6 per cent). Finally, as the low aggregate total evident throughout the data indicates, ‘right intentions’ were minimally important to the frame application—ranging from a high of 17.5 per cent of all just war significations in March and 17 per cent in April (compared to an aggregate baseline of 12 per cent), and declining to minimal percentages in May and June (3.5 per cent and 4.8 per cent, respectively). In comparing these three components of the jus ad bellum solely on a discrete basis, it is clear that while just causes were in aggregate terms the most consistently important elements of the frame’s application (and ‘right intentions’ fairly inconsequential), the relative importance of the authority criterion increased later in the crisis, even as the overall use of the frame declined. Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics of the data reveals other, and somewhat conflicting, temporal dimensions in the application of the just war frame. All three categories of significations (just cause, competent authority, right intention) vary in rough proportion to the number of just war significations and speech-acts each month, occurring less frequently in the ‘partial’ bookend months of March and June, and more frequently in April and May. Moreover, as is borne out in aggregate terms, the use of ‘just causes’ in applications of the frame was consistent, and consistently robust, throughout all four months of the crisis. However, the ‘full’ months of the crisis reveal some greater than expected variability, especially May 1999. Whereas this month featured the second largest number of just war significations as well as crisis-related Presidential speech-acts, it also featured the lowest overall ratio of significations to number of speech-acts for both the competent authority and right intention criteria. Thus, while Presidential speechmaking (and, indeed, the crisis itself) was at its apex, attempts to frame the war-decision in light of authority and intention were at their lowest ebb. From a distributive standpoint there is again evidence of a relative increase in the importance of competent authority as a dimension of the frame application (and in comparison to just cause) over time. Remembering that as a percentage of monthly frame significations June 1999

172 Selling a ‘Just’ War

proved to be the highpoint for references to competent authority (as noted above, almost entirely derived from regional institutions such as NATO), that month also accounted for 20 per cent of all competent authority significations (compared to 12 per cent in March, 40 per cent in April, and 28 per cent in May). This figure takes on added significance when one recalls that the crisis terminated for the US only ten days into the month of June. Again, as noted above, allusions to the authority for the use of force from a legitimate or competent source grew in relative importance late in the crisis, even as the number of Presidential speechacts concerning the crisis, and the overall reliance on the frame as a function of those relatively few speech-acts, declined. Finally, with respect to aggregate assessment (see Table 6.4), the monthly breakdown of just war significations (irrespective of criteria) advanced throughout the entire crisis betrays little variance from expectations based on the monthly distribution of speech-acts. The interactions of time and substantive emphasis evident within the application of the frame provide further reaffirmation of the general patterns noted above. The aggregate view conveys a consistent general emphasis on ‘just causes’ throughout the crisis (the three highest monthly percentages of frame significations are ‘just causes’ in March, April, and May), a greater emphasis on ‘just causes’ relative to ‘competent authority’ significations earlier in the crisis, and finally, an inversion of that relationship in the last (partial) month of June 1999.

Frame application: Analysis The preceding results provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the just war frame was employed on a very limited and narrow basis in conjunction with the US military engagement in Kosovo in 1999. There is consistent evidence that various translations of the just war frame were applied throughout the crisis, but the magnitude of that Table 6.4

Distribution of just war significations by month* and criteria March 1999

Just cause

11.6%

April 1999

May 1999

24%

June 1999

21.6%

5%

Competent authority

3.2%

10.5%

7.3%

5%

Right intention

3.2%

6.8%

1.0%

0.5%

*March 1999 = 8 days; April 1999 = 30 days; May 1999 = 31 days; June 1999 = 10 days

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 173

application was extremely low. For instance, although slightly more than one-third (34 per cent) percent of the Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis featured multiple (two or more) references to essential notions of a ‘just war’, none exhibited a sufficient level of references to that end (five or more) to be considered as primarily oriented around the just war frame; a third of those speech-acts featured no reference to any of the 15 signifiers at all. Whether one considers the aggregate total of just war significations advanced during the 78-day crisis, the average daily rate of just war significations, or the lack (with one exception) of any chronological ‘clustering’, it is safe to conclude that the application of the just war frame through Presidential speech-acts in the Kosovo case was generally weak.21 The primary exception to this characterization was the concentrated emphasis of the Clinton Administration on framing the affirmative wardecision as legitimate through Presidential speech-acts coupling the use of force with (a) the ‘just cause’ of responding to/punishing ‘evil’ and (b) the ‘competent’ authority derived from the operation’s association with NATO and support received from various regional (European) institutions. Together, these two signifiers appeared in more than threefourths of all crisis-related speech-acts (49 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively), and accounted for over two-thirds of all just war significations advanced in Presidential speech-acts throughout the duration of the crisis (43 per cent for ‘response to/punishment of evil’; 25 per cent for ‘regional authority’). At the same time, it bears noting that this concentrated effort in terms of frame emphasis was not matched by any similarly concentrated focus on target audience, with 36 per cent of all speech-acts directed at the press, 35 per cent at opinion-leaders, and the remaining 29 per cent split amongst the mass public, foreign audiences, and mixed/multiple audiences. Finally, the relative lack of attention paid at ‘framing’ the war-decision for the mass public, which was the target of only 12 per cent of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis, as in the Gulf War crisis seems in many ways to affirm the ‘cascade model’ of framing introduced by Entman (2004)—in which the presumption holds that the frame representation(s) can and do effectively ‘trickle down’ from elite constituencies to the public at-large. In appraising the application of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis in comparison to the preceding analysis of the Gulf War, important dissimilarities appear. The first is the much lower overall volume of just war frame significations featured in Presidential speech-acts. This is made all the more noteworthy when taking into account that the total number of Presidential speech-acts concerning the Kosovo

174 Selling a ‘Just’ War

crisis exceeded those in the Gulf crisis. These findings together clearly support the characterization of a diminished overall reliance on the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis. There was also a near perfect inversion of target audience, with the Clinton Administration in the Kosovo crisis directing far more of its efforts at framing the war-decision toward opinion-leaders (35 per cent, compared to 23 per cent) and relatively less towards the press (36 per cent, compared to 53 per cent) than was the case with its predecessor. Also worth pointing out is the difference in proportional emphasis by jus ad bellum criterion; whereas in the Gulf War ‘just causes’ accounted for about half of all frame applications, with ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ almost evenly splitting the other half, there is a decided tilt toward ‘just causes’ (62 per cent) in the Kosovo crisis, almost entirely at the expense of ‘right intention’ (12 per cent); ‘competent authority’ significations accounted for 26 per cent of all frame applications (roughly the same proportion as in the Gulf War case). The diminished emphasis on ‘right intention’ considerations in the framing of the war-decision in the Kosovo crisis is curious to say the least, given the extent to which (as discussed above) Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil was publicly framed as a corrective to the ‘evil’ acts of ethnic cleansing perpetrated upon the Kosovar Albanian population by the Milosevic regime. Outside the narrower bounds of the just war frame, the efforts of the Administration (and in particular Secretary of State Madeleiene Albright) to draw upon historical parallels to the Holocaust as a means of legitimizing the operation further underscores the confounding and seemingly counter-productive lack of attention paid to making the case that the US and NATO action was intended to leave Kosovo, and by extension the Balkans, a better place (Smith, 1998; Zenko, 2001). It seems hard to imagine that this lack of emphasis on ‘right intentions’ in the Presidential rhetoric translates into a true lack of concern among US and European decision-makers with the fate of Kosovo after the operation, especially in light of the continuing NATO and UN presence there. Yet from the standpoint of frame application, it is apparent that the Clinton Administration did not view communicating the merits of the intentions driving the act of war as vital, or even necessary, in ‘selling’ the case for war to domestic audiences. One possible explanation for the differential points of emphasis evident in the use of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis compared to the Gulf War is the close approximation of the ideal type of the ‘new war’ (Kaldor, 2007) that the former embodied. Whereas self-defense, the seizure of territory, and the seizure of (US) property and/or persons were rele-

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 175

vant to the crisis in the Persian Gulf and as such were frequently employed features of the framing of Operation Desert Shield/ Storm, the realities of Kosovo—an intra-state conflict catalyzed by identity and involving irregular forces and third party intervention (by the US/ NATO)—were in fact much different. Accordingly, the appeal and utility of the more traditional (i.e., statist) aspects and features of the just war frame were obviated, explaining their irrelevance and, accordingly, absence from efforts to frame the intervention in Kosovo as legitimate. A final point of departure in appraising the use of the just war frame in Kosovo as compared to the Gulf War concerns the temporal dimension of the crisis. Whereas the Gulf crisis featured an uneven rate of just war significations by month and an evident disjuncture between the use of the just war frame and developments in the crisis that seemingly would (or would not) merit the frame’s use, the Kosovo crisis embodied a more steady and even ‘normal’ (in population distribution terminology) trajectory. As was shown above, the use of the frame on a monthly basis gradually ramped up as the crisis unfolded, peaking at the height of military hostilities (in April 1999), and declining steadily after that, as the crisis began to stabilize and later drawn toward termination. Certainly this trajectory can be explained at least in part by the lower overall rate of application of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis, and beyond that by the relative de-emphasis on ‘just causes’ (which, logically, are of greater concern and thus likely to have greater traction earlier in the military engagement). In seeking to draw a broad and general conclusion concerning the application of the just war frame in this case on the basis of the results generated here, the efforts of the Clinton Administration to ‘frame’ the decision to employ military force in response to the crisis in Kosovo through Presidential speech-acts revolved chiefly around a fusion of the various ‘evils’ perpetrated by the Milosoevic regime and the authority accruing to the United States via NATO and other region-specific institutions to correct those ‘evils’. This fed into a concentrated and narrow framing effort—with the former point of emphasis (just causes) disproportionately directed at opinion-leaders, and the latter (competent authority) to the press. Whereas these two aspects of the frame were the clear outliers in terms of application, there was a clear tilt in emphasis on the morally reprehensible aspects of the ethnic cleansing campaign in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders (accounting for 49 per cent of all allusions to ‘evil’ advanced during the crisis), and conversely on the authorization for a military response in those directed at the press (accounting for 44 per cent of all such significations).

176 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Conclusion In all, NATO aircraft flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air campaign; at the end of the campaign about 1100 aircraft were participating, with the United States contributing about 725 (Bowman, 2003). Of the total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft, with the US accounting for 323 of that total; the only NATO fatalities associated with Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil were two US Apache helicopter pilots killed in a training accident in Albania (ibid.). The results of the preceding analysis do nothing to challenge the conclusion that the use of the just war frame by the Clinton Administration in relation to that force deployment and the decision that produced it was weak in the aggregate, and where it did occur, highly concentrated. However, they do lend needed context, underscoring an important if nuanced element in the relationship between the weak and limited application of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis on the one hand, and the restrained and limited discursive handling of the crisis by the President on the other. In light of that relationship—and in relation to the Gulf War case in particular—it would seem that the muted and concentrated use of the just war frame in the Kosovo crisis suggests a greater sense of intentionality, prudence, and careful manipulation on the part of the Clinton Administration in terms of frame emphasis and application than was true of the George H.W. Bush Administration. Whereas one of the take-away conclusions of the analysis of Presidential rhetoric and the use of the just war frame in the Gulf War in the preceding chapter was the volatile and incoherent nature of both the frame application and Presidential speech-acts more generally, the same cannot be said of the Clinton Administration’s treatment of the Kosovo crisis. In terms of Presidential speech-acts, much more was being said about the Kosovo crisis (2.1 speech-acts per day) on a more consistent basis (only ten days lacked a speech-act) and in much less time (78 days) than was true of the Gulf War (0.88 speech-acts per day; 70 days lacking a speech-act in a 155-day crisis). Yet all of the measures of frame application introduced here—whether related to content, audience, or timing— indicate that the just war frame was employed consistently less often (as evinced by the appearance of just one ‘chronological cluster’) and in a much more limited and targeted way. Similarly, whereas the framing of the war-decision in the Gulf War featured not only a volatility and incoherence in the use of the just war frame but also the emergence of tangentially related but also competing memes (Munich; Vietnam syndrome; ‘New World Order’) within Presidential rhetoric, there was no such deviating from message in the Kosovo crisis.

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 177

Taking the disparity in Presidential speech-making versus that of frame application into account in the two cases, we can safely infer a greater degree of intentionality and control was evident in the framing of the war-decision relative to the crisis in Kosovo than was the case in the Gulf War. This overriding characteristic of the framing of the affirmative war-decision in the Kosovo crisis can in turn be explained at least in part by the political and policy context prevailing at the time—a context that made a controlled and intentional framing of that decision particularly imperative. One example of such a factor at the domestic level of analysis was the looming specter of the Lewinsky scandal and the impeachment hearings involving President Clinton, which immediately preceded the initiation of the crisis and overlapped with internal Administration debates concerning the possibility of military action in response to it.22 While much has been made of the so-called ‘wag the dog’ syndrome associated with Operation Infinite Reach (the cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan following the 7 August 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania), some observers have pointed to similar dynamics in conjunction with the Administration’s hard-line response to Kosovo (Rozell and Wilcox, 2000). While such charges are essentially impossible to prove, it is incontrovertible that President Clinton’s approval rating and the overall stature of his Presidency were under fire in early spring 1999 (Peters, 2011b). Many of Clinton’s detractors at the time pointed to the President’s personal conduct and his repeated and vehement denials of an inappropriate relationship (which DNA evidence later forced him to recant) as evidence of his lack of character and moral ‘fitness’ (Miller, 1999). Such accusations were being lobbed at the President publicly at the very same time that he confronted a decision always fraught with moral peril (e.g., the use of military force) in response to an expanding crisis in Kosovo in which moral and humanitarian considerations themselves (in conjunction with charges of a Serbian ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaign) were especially prominent. In light of all this, it is not hard to see how domestic political considerations, always a factor shaping foreign policy decisions, intensified the need for the President to effectively (and prudently) ‘sell’ the war-decision to the domestic audience. That he and his Administration did so through a set of speech-acts that chose to place an overriding emphasis on the immorality and ‘evil’ of the Milosevic regime and its plan for ethnic cleansing of Albanians through ‘Operation Horseshoe’ at a minimum reflects a prevailing view that doing so would be the most appealing basis on which to present the war-decision as legitimate and necessary. This point

178 Selling a ‘Just’ War

of emphasis also suggests a possible ancillary benefit, in salvaging the President’s own character and moral ‘fitness’ by juxtaposing him against a ‘vicious, bloodthirsty tyrant’ (albeit one the US had recently concluded negotiations with at Dayton) in the form of Milosevic. Such a consideration would hardly be the only factor explaining the prevalence of this point of emphasis in the frame application. Mounting influence in the latter phase of the Administration exercised by liberal internationalists such as Albright, Strobe Talbott, Ronald Asmus, and Jamie Rubin (among others)—complemented by the similar foreign policy orientation of the Blair government in the UK—played a catalytic role in staking out a hard line in the crisis as a means of reviving the ‘assertive multilateralism’ of the early 1990s (Boyer and Butler, 2005; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000). Pressure from the Administration to avoid repeating the mistake of an active campaign for non-intervention as in the Rwandan genocide only compounded this changed orientation (Peroni, 2009; Weiss and Hubert, 2001). These factors were influential not only in terms of the excessive reliance on framing the war-decision as stemming from a ‘just cause’ or responding to/punishing evil, but also with respect to the second most common point of emphasis—that being associating the decision with a ‘competent authority’ stemming from NATO and other relevant regional institutions. Indeed, within the contemporaneous efforts of the Blair government to promote an explicitly ‘moral’ foreign policy in the late 1990s—efforts which proved greatly influential on the Clinton Administration—a multilateral campaign to stop and punish acts of evil were considered the lodestar (Blair, 1999). The final and most direct feature of the prevailing political and policy context which made an intentional, precise, and ultimately effective framing of the decision to employ military force in response to the crisis in Kosovo a critical imperative was the reality that the Clinton Administration wished to avoid a ground war at all costs (Ignatieff, 2001; Zenko, 2001). If the Lewinsky scandal and the return of assertive multilateralism help to explain, at least in part, the two elements of the just war frame that were far and away the most frequently applied, it is the Clinton Administration’s desire to avoid introducing ground troops in an offensive posture in the former Yugoslavia in response to the Kosovo crisis (over the objections of the Blair government) that best explains the muted and generally weak use of the frame in its totality (Bowman, 2003). Whereas selected elements of the just war frame were deemed effective and necessary to ‘sell’ the war and its legitimacy to the domestic

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil 179

audience in order to ensure some measure of operational success in bringing an end to ethnic cleansing (and potentially to restore the President’s own political legitimacy at home), that war was from the outset intended to be restricted to an air war of limited scope and duration (Lambeth, 2001; Byman and Waxman, 2000). Thus one could intuit from the restricted application of the just war frame revealed in the analysis above a prudent and strategic use of the frame intended to general support for a limited war, without ‘fanning the flames’ for war to the point that the Administration found itself obligated to expand the scope of the operation. Framing is best understood as a vital tool to organize collective experiences and guide or even motivate collective action (Gamson, 1995; Benford and Snow, 2000). As such, evidence of an overriding consistency in frame application such as in the Kosovo crisis is a key component for an effective exercise in framing, irrespective of the breadth of that application. Though, as the preceding analysis of Presidential speech-acts conveys, the content of the just war frame that was employed in advancing a case for the ‘legitimate’ use of force in Kosovo was clearly limited, it was likewise clear that there were particular aspects of the frame (response to/punishment of ‘evil’; competent authority) which framing agents intentionally sought to emphasize repeatedly and consistency to maximum effect. The narrow basis on which the Clinton Administration ‘sold’ the use of force in Kosovo as ‘legitimate’ for domestic consumption was decidedly and purposefully advanced, and was designed to foster support for a limited air war. In light of this, the distinction between purposive and effective framing as discussed in the framing literature is once again instructive (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). In the end, the analysis of Presidential framing of the war-decision in the Kosovo crisis reveals an important, if on its face seemingly paradoxical, truth. With respect to the effectiveness of framing, while more applications (defined in terms of frequency and breadth of significations employed) certainly reflect a more extensive use of the frame at hand, it does not always or necessarily reflect a more effective one.

7 Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice

Crisis summary To say that the 9/11 attacks dramatically reshaped US foreign policy would be to patently state the obvious. Indeed, in the view of many, 9/11 remains a transformational event that has significantly reconfigured American society, US foreign policy, and the international system (Kellner, 2003). From the standpoint of this research, the chief importance of 9/11 stems not from the allegedly transformative effects of the 9/11 attacks on American foreign policy and society, but rather in its function as a catalyst for a major foreign policy crisis for the United States and for the overarching policy legacy of the George W. Bush Administration, a ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (Dolan, 2005). The primary response to the foreign policy crisis inspired by 9/11 by the US was Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (see Table 7.1). In a televised address to the nation on the night of 11 September 2001, President Bush pledged to take action against all states harboring or supporting terrorist activities, putting the country on a war footing by noting that ‘America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism’ (Bush, 2001a). While leading figures in the Taliban regime (including Mullah Muhammad Omar) denied support for the al-Qaeda network, in the ensuing days after 9/11 all major foreign policy principals in the Bush Administration (most notably the President himself, in an Address to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001) trained the sights for a potential military response on Afghanistan, which had provided sanctuary to al-Qaeda leadership since 1996. After an extensive military deployment, US (and UK) forces commenced military operations in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, consisting initially 180

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 181 Table 7.1

Crisis profile: Afghanistan–USA Pre-crisis/Crisis

Crisis trigger date

9/11/2001

Initiation of US military engagement

10/7/2001

Crisis termination date

12/7/2001

Elapsed time between perception of trigger and termination (in days)

88

Duration of US military engagement during crisis (in days)

62

Gravity of threat (to US)

Threat of grave damage

Triggering entity

Non-state actor

Trigger to foreign policy crisis

Violent act Post-crisis

Content of crisis outcome

Victory

Form of outcome

Imposed (by US)

Escalating or reduction of tension

Tension reduction

Extent of satisfaction about outcome

Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied

of cruise missile attacks and bombing sorties and later supplemented by Apache helicopter gunships. Throughout the crisis, the primary application of force by the US came through aerial bombardment, though major strategic and tactical gains were made through the deployment of special forces drawn from the CIA’s Special Activities Division (SAD), the US Army Special Forces from the 5th Special Forces Group, and other contingents drawn from the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These units all worked in collaboration with Northern Alliance forces as well as small British and Australian contingents (Woodward, 2002). The skillful and effective coordination of this twopronged operational effort prompted early observers to dub the campaign a ‘masterpiece of military creativity and finesse’ representing, potentially, ‘one of the most notable US military successes since World War II’ (O’Hanlon, 2002) while sounding the alarm that it would leave the US ‘dizzy with success’ (Cox, 2002). Such an alarm was hardly unfounded given the brimming optimism engendered by the swift capture of Mazar-i-Sharif on 9 November and Kabul on 13 November. On the political side of the equation, similarly rapid inroads were made, notably due to the skillful mediation efforts of UN Special Envoy

182 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Lakhdar Brahimi. With explicit US support, Brahimi employed shuttle diplomacy throughout the fall of 2001 to convince the relevant ethnic and tribal factions in Afghanistan as well as interested external parties (including Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, and Russia) to support the formation of an interim government. Fashioned at the UN-brokered International Conference on Afghanistan (27 November–5 December 2001) and chartered in the Bonn Agreement, that provisional government was established under the leadership of US backed Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai (who was subsequently granted a two year extension as head of the transitional government by a traditional Afghan loya jurga council in June 2002, and was elected President of Afghanistan in 2004). The case of Afghanistan illustrates a basic truth: namely, that the response(s) to a crisis, and the outcomes they engender, always outlast (and oftentimes dwarf in importance) the actual crisis itself. This statement is borne out by the reality that in relation to the prevailing conditions defining a foreign policy crisis (a threat to one or more basic values; awareness of a finite time for response; heightened probability of military hostilities) the crisis for the US triggered by the events of 11 September 2001 drew to a close with the collapse of the final Taliban stronghold in Kandahar on 7 December 2001 (CICDM, 2010).1 In light of the evident links between the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the 9/11 attacks (and by extension the crisis), the overthrow of the Taliban regime and disruption and displacement of the al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan through a joint military and intelligence effort, in conjunction with the formation of an interim government, terminated the conditions of crisis for the US—if not the larger importance of Afghanistan for US foreign policy and national security.

Presidential rhetoric: A snapshot The decision to employ military force in Afghanistan was the first major volley in the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWOT) by the Bush Administration. The nature of the Afghanistan crisis, which lacked any perceptible buildup and was triggered suddenly and without provocation by the 9/11 attacks (continuing from that date through the perceived expulsion of the Taliban from Afghanistan in mid-December 2001) makes it impossible to consider Presidential rhetoric in ‘pre-crisis’ and ‘crisis’ components (as in the two preceding case studies). Instead, the primary intent here lies in providing and appraising samples of Presidential rhetoric concerning the GWOT leading up to the military engagement in Afghanistan in

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 183

order to take into account the larger narrative context in which the US military intervention in Afghanistan was embedded. In his televised address to the public on the evening of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush quoted Psalm 23 in his first concrete reaction to the attacks. In doing so, he gave early voice to the theme of ‘good versus evil’ that would become the centerpiece of the GWOT in the months (and years) to come: …America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature (Bush, 2001a; emphasis added). Bush followed this address with an admonition to the American public on 16 September 2001 to return to their daily routines, while also vowing to ‘rid the world of evil-doers’ and warning Americans that ‘this crusade, this war on terrorism, is gonna take awhile’ (CNN.com, 2001a). The conversion to the war metaphor even at this earliest stage was far from incidental. While Bush initially characterized the 9/11 attacks as ‘despicable acts of terror’, the term ‘acts of war’ was introduced as early as 14 September 2001 in order to engender broad popular support for a military response to the 9/11 attacks through comparison to, and conflation with, previous ‘good wars’ such as World War II (Jackson, 2005). A Lexis-Nexis search of transcripts associated with public statements by President Bush during the period between 11 September and 7 October 2001 (the date of commencement of air strikes in Afghanistan) returned over 50 occasions where ‘war’ and ‘terrorism’ were used together.2 The employment of a relatively simplistic dichotomous prism of ‘good versus evil’ facilitates the crucial claim that the essential nature of the terrorists precedes their actions. This in turn furthers the notion that the attacks of 9/11 were the natural acts of the inhuman and irredeemably evil, not the instrumental acts of radically disaffected yet rational individuals (Murphy, 2003). In presenting the American public with a depiction of the US as locked in a Manichean struggle between good and evil, the necessity for retaliation and the exercise of retributive justice was clearly evident in a series of subsequent speech acts by the President: Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution.

184 Selling a ‘Just’ War

Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done (Bush, 2001d; emphasis added). I see things this way: The people who did this act on America are evil people. As a nation of good folk, we’re going to hunt them down…and we will bring them to justice (Bush, 2003; emphasis added). At the same time, a fully compelling rendering of the GWOT required not only the designation of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks as ‘evil’, but also reaffirmation that Americans and America were inherently good—the polar opposite of the inherent evil that required (nee, demanded) redress through the use of military force. Such reaffirmation received its first prominent public expression at the Prayer and Remembrance Day service on 14 September 2001, at which Bush remarked: In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice. […] In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep commitment to one another, and an abiding love for our country. Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity. This is a unity of every faith, and every background (Bush, 2001b).3 Statements such as these can be very easily understood as the natural reactions of a wounded nation; further, they reflect the expected reaction of a nation’s political leadership when attempting to pay homage to the victims of egregious violence. However, from the standpoint of a critical inquiry into the launching of the GWOT, as Jackson (2005) reminds us, the public representation of Americans and America as inherently good, virtuous, peace loving, and heroic is essential to making the case for war. The essential juxtaposition between the virtue embedded within American society and the evil inhumanity typifying the terrorist ‘other’ reflects the process of ‘moral disengagement’ critical to the effective prosecution of war (Bandura, 1999). In this sense it is telling that Bush’s first extended remarks on the morning of 9/11, from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, featured the missive that ‘Freedom itself was attacked this morning

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 185

by a faceless coward…’ (CNN.com, 2001b). Within days, Bush had described terrorism as a ‘curse…upon the face of the earth’ (Bush, 2001c), while later referring to terrorists as ‘parasites who threaten their countries and our own’ (Bush, 2002).4 Accordingly, the expression of ethical objections or opposition to war, or even the resort to ethical deliberation concerning the GWOT or the grounds on which it was being advanced, proved extremely difficult (Williams, 2006). The coup de grace was the repeated depiction of the GWOT as the latest chapter in a broad and long-running existential struggle between ‘civilization’ and ‘barbarism’ or between lawful peoples and those ‘beyond the pale of the law’ and undeserving of legal or moral consideration (Salter, 2002; Hurrell, 2002): This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civil ization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom (Bush, 2001d; emphasis added). Appeals to caution or expressions of dissent proved untenable when those representations were overlain with public characterizations of the 9/11 attacks as drawing a line between the ‘the civil and the savage’ (Ashcroft, 2001b). Moreover, as those who ‘live on the hunted margins of mankind’ (Bush, 2001f) and reject the ‘values that separate us from animals; compassion, tolerance, mercy’ (Baker, 2001), terrorists and their supporters were easily cast as ‘the new barbarians’, serving as the epitome of savagery (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996: 156). To that end, their defeat by means of war (beginning in Afghanistan with the aptly-named Operation Enduring Freedom) was a transcendent imperative, limited neither by national borders nor national interests by virtue of the fact that it reflected a common threat to all humanity. Presenting the grounds for a ‘global war on terrorism’ in such a fashion obviated any true debate about its legitimacy or authorization. Since all residing under the umbrella of ‘civility’ were targets, typically relevant distinctions between the US, other sovereign states, and the central source of authority for the use of collective force (i.e., the UN) were rendered irrelevant; authority to act was conveyed by virtue of an actor’s proximity to the norms, values, and practices associated with ‘civility’.5 From a legalist standpoint, the ‘civilization v. barbarism’ overlay had the additional utility of permitting the Bush Administration to paint the GWOT as at its base an act of collective as well as individual selfdefense—the primary accepted justification for the use of military force

186 Selling a ‘Just’ War

in the contemporary international system. Whereas international law designates wars of aggression as illegal (see Article 2(4) of the UN Charter), Article 51 of the UN Charter expressly provides for the legitimate use of force for individual or collective self-defense, a proposition with deep roots in both customary and treaty law (Arend and Beck, 1993).6 The grounds for a ‘global war on terrorism’ were thus underscored by virtue of it representing an act of self-defense.7 Similarly, this ‘war on terrorism’ associated with the defense of civilization itself was presented not as a last resort, but in actuality as the only resort, given the stakes associated with a war waged in defense of civilization and its basic core values (Jackson, 2005). This is borne out in several statements by Bush in fall 2001: the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows (Bush, 2001d). …In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it (Bush, 2001e). Those who hate all civilization and culture and progress, those who embrace death to cause the death of the innocent, cannot be ignored, cannot be appeased. They must be fought (Bush, 2001f). In light of these characterizations of the ‘global war on terrorism’, as well as the obvious connections between the GWOT and the US military intervention in Afghanistan, it is not surprising that similar themes were expounded within Presidential rhetoric concerning the decision to employ military force in Afghanistan. In announcing the commencement of airstrikes on 7 October 2001, the President returned to the stark moral dichotomy employed after 9/11: Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves (Bush, 2001g). At an event sponsored by the March of Dimes, the President expounded further on the ubiquitous ‘evil’ that not only prompted the 9/11 attacks but which also defined Taliban rule in Afghanistan, accordingly

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 187

making the then five-days old US-led military action a moral imperative: Ours is a war against terrorism and evil, not against Islam…Those who hijacked four airliners on September the 11th are also trying to hijack Islam. But the mass killing of innocent people clearly violates Islam, and countries and clerics throughout the Islamic world have rejected these acts. Nor is our war against global terrorism a war against the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan people are victims of oppression and misrule of the Taliban regime. There are few places on Earth that face greater misery. One out of every four children dies before the age of 5 in Afghanistan. It is estimated that one in every three children in Afghanistan is an orphan. Almost half suffer from chronic malnutrition; millions face the threat of starvation. The situation is so bad, so bad, that we read about 3-year-old children in Afghanistan who weigh less than the average newborn in America. We’re trying to get food to starving Afghans. In contrast, the Taliban regime, those who house the evildoers, has harnessed international aid— harassed international aid workers and chased them out of their country. The people of Afghanistan have suffered too long under Taliban rule. That suffering provides us with a task (Bush, 2001h). This continuing theme was taken up in explicit just war terms emphasizing both the ‘just cause’ of responding to evil and the ‘last resort’ nature of that response in mid-October addresses to business leaders in Sacramento, CA and workers at the Dixie Printing and Packaging Corporation in Glen Burnie, MD: We are fighting for the security of our people, for the success of our ideals, and for stability in large parts of the world. We fight evil people who are distorting and betraying a great religion to justify their murder. Our cause is just. We will not tire. We will not falter, and my fellow Americans, we will not fail (Bush, 2001i; emphasis added). I gave the Afghan Government, the Taliban Government, plenty of time to respond to the demands of the United States. I said, ‘You

188 Selling a ‘Just’ War

must hand over the Al Qaeda leadership which hides in your country.’ I said, ‘You must free those who you illegally detain in your country.’ And I said, ‘You must destroy the camps that have been used to train the terrorists.’ And they had time to respond, and they didn’t respond positively, and therefore, they’re paying a price….Our military is conducting a campaign to bring the terrorists to justice, not to harm the Afghan people. While we are holding the Taliban Government accountable, we’re also feeding Afghan people. You need to be proud of the United States military. It’s doing its job. It is slowly but surely encircling the terrorists so that we’ll bring them to justice…justice will be done (Bush, 2001j; emphasis added). As a signifier deeply embedded in American political rhetoric and religious life, the language of good and evil proved an effective means for distilling the perpetrators of 9/11 and their supporters and sympathizers as irredeemable ‘evildoers’ (Butler, 2007). From the standpoint of an analysis of the framing of the decision to go to war in Afghanistan, the importance of the dominant discourse surrounding the GWOT in its earliest incarnation stems largely from the fact that it was purposefully advanced as a classic ‘good war’ reflective of basic elements of just war theory rather than merely a counter-terrorist policy or strategy (Dexter, 2008; Jackson, 2005; Lawler, 2002). As such, the demonizing of terrorists (and their supporters and sympathizers) was crucial to the discursive context of the nascent GWOT and the impending military engagement in Afghanistan.

Frame application: Results The importance of the discursive environment surrounding US foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 notwithstanding, short of more focused empirical scrutiny the question of concern here (how, specifically, was the just war frame used to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war in Afghanistan?) remains unanswered. Once again, one means of addressing this question can be found in a systematic analysis of Presidential speechacts during the crisis—in this case, of the 87 Presidential speech-acts directly referencing the US military engagement in Afghanistan between the initiation of military hostilities on 7 October 2001 and the termination of the crisis on 7 December 2001.8 As Figure 7.1 indicates, there was great variability in the promulgation of such speech-acts during the 62-day duration of the crisis. During that 62-day period, 48 days featured at least one Presidential

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 189 Figure 7.1

Speech-acts referencing ‘Afghanistan’—POTUS October 7, 2001–December 7, 2001

6

5

#/day

4

3

2

1

0 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 /20 0/20 3/20 6/20 9/20 2/20 5/20 8/20 1/20 /3/20 /6/20 /9/20 2/20 5/2018/20 1/20 4/20 7/2030/20 /3/20 /6/20 7 / 12 12 10 10/1 10/1 10/1 10/1 10/2 10/2 10/2 10/3 11 11 11 11/1 11/1 11/ 11/2 11/2 11/2 11/ date

speech-act referencing Afghanistan, with the number of speech-acts per day ranging from a minimum of one to a maximum of five. The intensity of Presidential speech-acts referencing Afghanistan also vacillated greatly over the period of concern (even on a day-to-day basis). While it is clear that Afghanistan featured prominently in Presidential rhetoric throughout the crisis (as one would intuit), there was no discernable pattern. As Figure 7.1 also conveys, there was one disproportionately prominent peak in Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan, centered around the President’s 10 November 2001 address to the UN General Assembly. With the exception of that run-up to and aftermath of that address, there is sufficient evidence of a consistent and stable distribution of Presidential speech-acts regarding Afghanistan during the crisis—an important finding in that it also suggests the validity of any potential patterns that may emerge from that analysis. Frame content As in the preceding two case studies, the topic of concern here is not the speech-acts themselves but rather how the just war frame was employed through them. The set of speech-acts identified for analysis here were coded on a dichotomous basis for the presence or absence of 15 just war indicators indicative of the just war frame, with those indicators reflecting the three basic criteria of the jus ad bellum component of just war theory.9 In establishing a referential baseline, it is important

190 Selling a ‘Just’ War

to note that 22 per cent (290/1305) of all possible values of the 15 just war frame variables across these 87 cases of ‘speech-acts’ were positive (meaning they did feature reference to the indicator in question). In examining the just war frame relative to individual ‘cases’ (e.g., each speech-act), 83 per cent (72/87) of the speech-acts related to Afghanistan issued by the President during the duration of the US military engagement featured two or more positive values, 24 per cent (21/87) featured positive values in over a third (5 or more) of all just war indicators, and 4.5 per cent (4/87) featured a majority (7 or more) of positive values across all 15 indicators.10 Further compelling is the finding that the average daily number of just war significations in Presidential speech-acts throughout the 62-day crisis was 4.7.11 The maximum number of just war signifiers contained within one speechact was 11 (the President’s 10 November 2001 address to the UN General Assembly in New York), with the minimum (no reference to any of the 15 frame signifiers) occurring in eight cases.12 In scrutinizing these 15 indicators in conjunction with the three major criteria of the jus ad bellum (just cause, competent authority, right intention) from which they are derived, it is evident that the just cause criterion (and the seven translations of it advanced here) significantly outstrips the other two ad bellum criteria as a percentage of all just war frame significations observed in the speech-acts analyzed here. Fully 60 per cent (173/290) of all just war significations corresponded with ‘just cause’ considerations, compared to 12 per cent (36/290) for ‘competent authority’ and 28 per cent (81/290) for ‘right intention’.13 To that end, three of the four most frequently employed frame signifiers (of the 15 considered) reflected just cause considerations in framing the US military action respectively as: a response to the involvement of an authoritarian regime in the crisis in 55 per cent of the cases (48/87); a response to or punishment of ‘evil’ in 45 per cent of the cases (39/87); and a response dictated by the fact that the crisis was triggered by an act of violence (the 9/11 attacks) in 39 per cent of the cases (34/87). The only exception among the most frequent frame signifiers were allusions to the US military engagement as reflecting a ‘right intention’ by contributing positively to the ‘pace of abatement’ of the crisis, which occurred in 41 per cent of the speech-acts analyzed (36/87). Similarly, the signification of the use of force as reflecting a ‘right intention’ by positively contributing to a formal outcome with which all parties were satisfied was also relatively frequent, appearing in 33 per cent of all speech-acts (29/87).14 With respect to the competent authority criterion, allusions to global authority for the US

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 191

military action appeared in approximately 27 per cent of the speechacts collected (24/87), with regional and target-state authority barely registering appearances in the application of the frame across these speech-acts.15 Clearly, in Presidential speech-acts concerned with the crisis in Afghanistan the just cause criterion was by far the most frequently employed component of the just war frame. At the same time, the data also points to ‘breadth’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from two different criteria in any single speech-act) and ‘totality’ (defined as containing at least one just war signifier drawn from all three criteria in any single speech-act) in the frame’s application. On the former score, 57 of 87 (66 per cent) of speech-acts contained significations of the just war drawn from two of the three ad bellum criteria, while 21 of 87 (24 per cent) reflected the ad bellum criteria in totality. And, as Table 7.2 reflects, nearly two-thirds (64 per cent, 56/87) of the speech-acts included in the analysis featured some combination of just cause, competent authority, and right intention significations (with just cause considerations, either in concert with one or both of the other criterion categories, reflected in all but one of these cases). The fact that this sizeable majority of cases featured multiple translations of just war significations drawn from different components of the ad bellum criteria suggests a degree of symbiotic reinforcement between and among the three categories of signifiers—albeit with ‘just cause’ considerations the clear catalyst and lynchpin for these interactions. Table 7.2

Mono-applications and interactions (n = 87)* Single criterion

Just cause

Interactions 18

JC * CA

11

Competent authority

1

JC * RI

23

Right intention

4

CA * RI

1

JC * CA * RI

21

*8 cases featured no Just War indicators

Audience Apart from analyzing the content of the just war frame in application, it is important to again take into account the audience(s) to which that frame application was directed. Before turning to the interface between the just war frame and the various audiences of concern in this research

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 193

shows, ‘just causes’ are the most frequently employed regardless of audience—with the sole exception being speech-acts directed at multiple audiences. The greatest prevalence of ‘just cause’ significations comes in conjunction with speech-acts directed at the press (which is to be expected, by virtue of the press being the most common target audience). However, it is also worth noting that in terms of concentrated intensity ‘just causes’ make up a significantly greater proportion of all just war significations advanced in speech-acts directed at the mass public and opinionleaders. Whereas allusions to ‘just causes’ in some form occurred in 57 per cent (65/114) of all Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan and directed at the press during the crisis, similar allusions occurred in 73 per cent (43/59) of all Presidential speech-acts directed at the mass public, and 77 per cent (27/35) of all speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders. It would appear that while the press was the primary target for Presidential speechacts, and appeals to ‘just causes’ were commonplace within those speechacts, the relative degree of emphasis on the ‘just’ cause(s) for the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan was much greater in speech-acts directed at the public and opinion-leaders. Conversely, whereas overall significations linked to the ‘right intention’ criterion were relatively fewer than those associated with ‘just cause’, they appeared most frequently (30 per cent, or 34/114) in speech-acts directed at the press, and less so in those directed at the public (22 per cent, or 13/59) and opinionleaders (17 per cent, or 6/35). Finally, appeals to ‘competent authority’ were exceedingly rare irrespective of target audience, occurring in 13 per cent (15/114) of the speech-acts targeting the press, and far fewer in the other two instances.17 Such considerations raise the question of which specific just war significations were employed most often within Presidential speech-acts concerning the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan. Figure 7.3 depicts a number of important findings with respect to the various translations of ‘just causes’ considered here. The first finding of note is that the classic condition of a ‘significant power discrepancy’ between the target and trigger of a crisis is invalidated here; it is never invoked during the crisis, no doubt as a result of the fact that the crisis was triggered by an act of asymmetric warfare (the 9/11 attacks) in which relative power runs counter to the classic ‘bullying scenario’, thereby rendering such a signification irrelevant and illogical. Power discrepancy aside, there is a great degree of variability in the deployment of the ‘just cause’ significations by audience type, both in terms of extensity (frequency of use across all audiences) and intensity (proportionality of use by audience).

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 195

Allusions to the ‘direct violent crisis trigger’ (the 9/11 attacks) proved to be slightly more frequent in speech-acts directed at the press than other audiences (25 per cent, as compared to an average of 20 per cent). Conversely, efforts to link the affirmative war-decision to acts of ‘evil’ were less common in speech-acts directed at the press (15 per cent, as compared to 23 per cent on average). In speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders, other discontinuities appear; references to the affirmative war-decision as an act of ‘self-defense’ and as a response to the ‘direct violent crisis trigger’ of 9/11 fell below the average (occurring only in 7 per cent of all speech-acts in which at least one ‘just cause’ was invoked), whereas reference to the appropriation of US property and persons was greatest (in 22 per cent of speech-acts, versus the average across all audiences of 14 per cent).19 Just war significations by audience type according to the ‘competent authority’ and ‘right intention’ criteria are more difficult to interpret. This is especially true with respect to the three ‘competent authority’ significations, which as noted previously were individually and collectively the least frequently observed in the data by a wide margin (accounting for only 12 per cent of all just war significations). That caveat notwithstanding, it is clear that competent authority significations clustered on two audiences (press and foreign), with the claim to global authority for the affirmative war-decision by far the most common and almost exclusively directed at those two audiences (see Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4

Speech-acts—primary audience (competent authority criterion)

10 9

9 8

8

CA1 CA2

# significations

7

CA3

6 5 4

4

2 1 0

3

3

3

2

2

2

1

1 0

Mass public

0 Press

0

Opinion leaders primary audience

0 Foreign

Multiple

1

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 197

cent). Whereas the frequency of ‘formality of outcome’ significations held true to form, speech-acts directed at the press also featured somewhat greater emphasis on the other-directed significations of ‘post-hoc satisfaction’ (9 per cent, v. 4 per cent) and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’ (15 per cent, v. 7.5 per cent). In other words, the case that the affirmative wardecision was ‘just’ because other actors were satisfied with the US action and because tension among other crisis actors was reduced by the US action (respectively) occurred twice as often in speech-acts directed at the press as one would expect based on the overall employment of these significations across audiences (indeed, all ‘post-hoc satisfaction’ significations were targeted at the press, as was true of all but one of the ‘posthoc tension reduction’ significations). The patterns which emerge in terms of extensity and intensity are particularly significant when one takes into account that the press was the single most commonly targeted audience (44 per cent or 38/87) for Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan during the crisis. Temporal dynamics The last of the three main components of this analysis takes into account the temporal dimension of framing, in seeking to evaluate whether there was a substantive evolution in the effort to ‘sell’ the affirmative wardecision as the crisis unfolded. As in the preceding chapters, two features of the frame’s application were taken into account: first, whether and to what extent any ‘chronological clusters’ (the occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) can be discerned over the duration of the crisis, and second, whether these clusters (if they occur) relate in any way to the temporal evolution of the crisis and the occurrence of any major developments throughout it.21 Once again, this component of the analysis seeks to determine whether the just war frame was especially prominent at any particular time(s) of the crisis—and if so, why.22 The general assessment of the just war significations in their totality by time is depicted on a monthly basis in Figure 7.6. In the aggregate, during the entire period of the crisis roughly 43 per cent (124/290) of all just war significations rendered in Presidential speech-acts were articulated in October, 50 per cent (144/290) in November, and 7 per cent (22/290) in December. In large part these figures reflect the distributional pattern of the 62 days of the crisis, which began a full week into October and terminated in the first week of December. Still, if one uses the 4.7 daily average of just war significations as a benchmark, the total number of just war significations occurring in October and November exceeded

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 199

expectations for each month (117 and 141, respectively) while the total number of just war significations occurring in December fell well short of the projected total (33). As Figure 7.6 also indicates, the conditions used to define a ‘chronological cluster’ as outlined above (occurrence of five or more just war significations per day for a period of three or more consecutive days) were fully satisfied on three occasions, each occurring within the first 30 days of the crisis—from 7–12 October, 19–21 October, and finally from 30 October–1 November. These 12 days accounted for 30 per cent (88/290) of all the just war significations advanced through Presidential speechacts during the entire 62-day crisis, with 17 per cent of all just war significations advanced during the crisis (48/290) occurred during the initial ‘cluster’ of 7–12 October. That ‘cluster’ was typified by a range of speechacts issued directly by the President including (but not limited to) primetime news conferences, public appearances with foreign leaders such as Chancellor Schröeder and Lord Robertson, and a memorial service at the Pentagon. This ‘cluster’ of just war significations advanced in conjunction with the initial commitment of the US to war is clearly suggestive of the launching of a multi-pronged rhetorical offensive through application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision.23 Other notable peaks that fell just short of the conditions established for a ‘chronological cluster’ include the profound spike in just war significations (40 in total, accounting for 14 per cent of all such significations during the crisis) on 9–10 November centered around the President’s address to the UN General Assembly, and a peak (14 significations, spread across 3 speech-acts) on 19 November 2001 corresponding with the beginning of Ramadan. Other near-clusters occurred from 26–29 November 2001 attributable in part to a large number of speech-acts concerning the rescue of American aid workers in Afghanistan as well as the first reported battlefield casualty) and from 4–6 December 2001, as the US-led military engagement approached the apparent completion of its appointed task of defeating the Taliban. In returning to the categorical schema of the jus ad bellum by which the significations of the ‘just war frame’ are organized, other interesting patterns emerge with respect to the application of the frame over the duration of the crisis (see Figures 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9). Aside from a concern with the chronological clustering of speech-acts and the apportionment of the just war frame within those clusters, it is also worth considering the evolution of the frame’s application in broad relief. This is again captured in three distinct but overlapping ways: on a discrete basis, in which the total number of all just war significations advanced in a given month of the

202 Selling a ‘Just’ War

crisis), 12 per cent of all significations in November, and a scant 4.5 per cent of all significations advanced in December. Somewhat more telling with respect to the temporal dimension of the frame application is the significant and persistent increase in the prevalence of ‘right intention’ significations as the crisis unfolded. Whereas the ‘right intention’ indicators were invoked sparingly (and on par with the ‘competent authority’ indicators) in October, accounting for 19 per cent of all just war significations in the first three-plus weeks of the crisis, they were nearly twice as common as the crisis persisted into November (34 per cent) and December (36 per cent). Shifting to a focus on the distributive characteristics evident within the data underscores these apparent patterns in the temporal dynamics of the frame’s application, while also suggesting others. The termination of the crisis for the US on 7 December 2001 makes characterizations of that month difficult. Still, the general pattern suggested above—in which just cause significations are consistent (and consistently prevalent) throughout the crisis and right intention significations increased in importance as the crisis wore on—both hold true. With respect to the total number of ‘just cause’ significations advanced throughout the entire crisis, 47 per cent occurred in October, 45 per cent in November, and 8 per cent in December; the equivalent percentages by month for ‘right intention’ significations are 30 per cent in October, 60 per cent in November, and 10 per cent in December. The main point of departure from the discrete assessment above, however, comes with respect to the ‘competent authority’ criteria. The much less frequent invocation of ‘competent authority’ significations (viz. just cause or right intention) notwithstanding, it is important to note that there is almost no distinguishable pattern in the total number of those significations, which are split almost evenly by month (50 per cent in October, 47 per cent in November, 3 per cent in December). If anything, there is a slight frontward tilt towards the early phase of the crisis, in that half of all ‘competent authority’ significations during the crisis occurred in the (25 days) of October. The interactions of time and substantive emphasis evident within the application of the frame provide further reaffirmation of these general patterns (see Table 7.4). Taking both time and criteria into account, it is clear that the application of the just war frame to the affirmative wardecision in the Afghanistan crisis in the fall of 2001 featured a strong emphasis on the ‘just causes’ precipitating the use of force from the very outset of the crisis (an emphasis which was sustained throughout the crisis), little concern with significations of competent authority for the military action, and a gradual but perceptible increase in the emphasis

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice 203 Table 7.4

Distribution of just war significations by month* and criteria

Just cause

October 2001

November 2001

28%

27%

4.5%

6%

0.3%

17%

2.9%

Competent authority

6.3%

Right intention

8%

December 2001

*October = 25 days; November = 30 days; December = 7 days

placed on the ‘right intentions’ typifying the US military intervention as the crisis unfolded and the military engagement persisted and intensified.

Frame application: Analysis The empirical results presented above provide compelling evidence that the just war frame was applied to the affirmative war-decision through Presidential rhetoric in a consistent and compelling way. As such, it is clear that the ‘discursive environment’ in which the GWOT was launched, steeped in just war language, provided the conditions by which 9/11 and a military engagement in Afghanistan could be fused together in the public consciousness—thereby providing an entrée for the decision to go to war in Afghanistan. Over 80 per cent of the Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan during the crisis featured multiple (two or more) references to the signifiers of just war theory featured in this analysis, while over 25 per cent of Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan could be understood as primarily vehicles for the delivery of just war significations, in that they featured extensive (five or more) references to those signifiers. In light of the extensive ‘breadth’ in the just war frame’s application in these speech-acts (90 per cent of which included significations reflecting translations of at least two of the three jus ad bellum criteria), these findings indicate the requisite degree of intent and comprehensiveness which distinguishes a purposive effort to frame the affirmative war-decision. However, the empirical analysis of the 15 just war signifiers which together make up the ‘just war frame’ reveal a nuanced and in some cases surprising depiction of how just war language can be (and was) assembled and deployed in this concerted effort to ‘sell’ the wardecision. Of the three jus ad bellum criteria, it is clear that Presidential rhetoric was most prominently concerned with advancing the notion that the US military intervention in Afghanistan was predicated on

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a panoply of ‘just causes’. As the results presented above indicate, this is a finding that holds up even when taking into account other factors crucial in assessing frame application such as the target audience or the relationship between the frame and the evolution of the decision-event to which the frame application is tied; overall, just causes were the most common frame signifiers across all audiences and throughout the entire 62 duration of the crisis. This finding is in some ways expected given the degree to which establishing a plausibly legitimate casus belli is often times conflated with the broader legitimacy of the decision to go to war (Walzer, 1977). However, the empirical confirmation of this presumption with respect to the framing of the affirmative war-decision that marked the opening salvo in the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ shows that this long-standing bias in the inclinations of US foreign policy decision-makers remains evident even amidst discussions of a post-9/11 ‘new security environment’ for the US populated by ‘Protean enemies’ and oriented around pre-emptive strikes and asymmetric warfare (O’Driscoll, 2008). Another evident pattern in the data which also held up even when considerations of time and target audience were introduced was the emphasis on right intention in the application of the frame. This was most notable with respect to allusions that the use of force contributed positively to the abatement of the crisis in Afghanistan, allusions that grew more frequent as the military engagement persisted. Finally, and tellingly in light of prevailing characterizations of the unilateralist bent of the Bush Administration foreign policy, ‘competent authority’ significations were easily the least common and important in the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision. Numerous expressions of support for the US military engagement from the international community (including critical regional actors) had little bearing on the framing of the war. Likewise, references to obtaining or securing authorization for the military action were few and far between, apart from occasional vague allusions to an unspecified authority derived from a self-appointed role as guardian of abstract principles rather than any formal institutional or legal sources. As the results reported above also make abundantly plain, this comprehensive and intentional effort at ‘selling’ the affirmative war-decision through use of the just war frame by the Bush Administration was at its most comprehensive and intentional relative to the press, which was the primary target audience of Presidential speech-acts during the crisis. This finding is consistent with many of the more prominent and recent analyses of framing in US foreign policy, which have determined a decided trend in this direction (e.g., media as primary target audience) driven at

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least in part by the proliferation of media sources and the emergence of a 24-hour news cycle (Nacos, 2007; Carruthers, 2000; Mermin, 1999). It is also broadly consistent with the savvy (if somewhat heavy-handed) efforts of the Bush Administration to cultivate media support for the war in Afghanistan (and, later, Iraq) embodied in the strategic employment of ‘embedded reporting’ and intentional ‘leaks’ to sympathetic reporters and outlets (Klopfenstein, 2006; Hess and Kalb, 2003). It is also clear from the empirical results presented above that the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan was ‘front-loaded’, with nearly a third of all allusions to just war considerations in Presidential speech-acts during the crisis coming in three ‘chronological clusters’, each occurring within the first 25 days of the crisis. This suggests not only an intensity of application but also provides further evidence of the purposive and intentional efforts of the Administration, through Presidential speech-acts, to get out in front of the issues so as to ensure procurement of the requisite level of domestic support for an effective military campaign in a complex theater of operations in which the potential for a protracted war was great. Assessing the temporal dimension more broadly provides further confirmation of this purposive intent. While speech-acts concerning Afghanistan were issued consistently throughout the crisis, there was clear evidence of undulating ‘peaks’ and ‘valleys’ in the application of the just war frame within those speech-acts. Looking at the overall trajectory of the frame application in conjunction with the unfolding of the crisis provides a sense of a clear ‘beginning’ (in the first three weeks of the crisis), ‘middle’ (surrounding the President’s address to the UN General Assembly), and ‘end’ (the battle of Tora Bora) in terms of the prevalence of just war significations suggestive of a concerted and mechanistic effort to frame the affirmative war-decision as legitimate and ‘just’. The preceding characterizations provide an overarching depiction of the substantive emphasis, target audience, and temporal evolution of the just war frame in application to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan. Of course, looking in greater detail at each of these three dimensions and their inter-relationships provides a more evocative and telling portrayal of the manner in which the just war frame was employed, as well as what that employment tells us about the Bush Administration’s view on the decision to go to war itself. Whatever else may have changed with respect to the use of force in the American context, the predisposition of decision-makers to disproportionately emphasize ‘just causes’ when attempting to ‘sell’ the decision to employ said use of force to domestic audiences endures. Curiously, however, while ‘just causes’ were the most

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commonly employed type of just war significations regardless of audience, they were employed in significantly greater proportions in the relatively fewer Presidential speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders and the mass public than in the more frequent speech-acts directed at the media. In part that persistence might be explained by a perception on the part of the Administration that the more visceral element of ‘just causes’ (in contrast to comparatively more abstract notions of ‘right intention’ or the more legalist consideration of ‘competent authority’) provide for a more compelling ‘politics of signification’ relative to the American public and/or key opinion-leaders, and are comparatively less likely to resonate (or be accepted as sufficient) by the media. Though the scope of this analysis mitigates against sweeping conclusions, the fact that the Bush Administration clearly targeted the press more than other domestic audiences in its speech-acts provides compelling evidence for the interpretation that varying degrees of emphasis within, and across, the just war significations assessed here were not coincidental nor accidental. As such, the reality that ‘just causes’ were de-emphasized in speech-acts directed at the press (compared to other audiences), and conversely ‘right intention’ significations received greater emphasis in speech-acts directed at that audience (again, in comparison to other audiences) further illuminates the view of the Administration in terms of which aspects of the just war frame were seen as more likely to persuade the media of the legitimacy of the affirmative war-decision. The same sophisticated calibration in frame application is evident in the fact that while in an aggregate sense the involvement of an authoritarian regime (the Taliban) in the crisis and the characterization of the US military engagement in Afghanistan as a response to ‘evil’ were the most commonly employed significations of ‘just cause’ (and, by extension, of just war considerations in general), these two translations of ‘just cause’ were less often used in speech-acts directed at the press. The markedly greater emphasis on these two ‘just causes’ in an aggregate sense is attributable to their disproportionate appearance in speech-acts directed at the public; conversely, the existence of a violent crisis trigger in the form of the 9/11 attacks was the most frequently employed translation of ‘just cause’ considerations in speech-acts directed at the press. Again, an inference can be drawn here that the Bush Administration perceived appeals to democracy expansion and public moralizing would be less well-received in the press than would connecting the affirmative war-decision to the 9/11 attacks. These findings speak not only to the inclinations of the Bush Administration in terms of

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efforts to ‘sell’ the war in Afghanistan, but also to the profound and variable effects of audience type on the application of frames and the politics of signification.

Conclusion In declaring that the US invasion of Afghanistan was an unequivocally just war, Jean Bethke Elshtain based her argument on the non-controversial claim that governments have a singular responsibility to maintain civic peace (2003: 46–54). It was this tranquillitas ordinis that was shattered by the fear, violence, and destruction wrought by the 9/11 attacks. However, in assessing the empirical analysis of the just war frame’s application to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan, it would seem that such a concern was of minimal importance to the Bush Administration, at least if one takes the rhetoric employed by the President in framing the decision to invade Afghanistan at face value. As the preceding analysis of the use of the just war frame in this case illustrates, the 9/11 attacks and the violent destruction of property and persons they caused were not the primary basis on which the decision to go to war in Afghanistan was sold to the domestic audience. Nor was the long-standing just war tenet of self-defense—a notion vital enough to trigger collective response by NATO under the aegis of Article V of the Washington Treaty, but hardly featured in the Bush Administration’s efforts to ‘sell’ the invasion at home. In point of fact, the two translations of ‘just cause’ which were the centerpieces of the just war frame’s application by the Bush Administration had little to do with Elshtain’s starting point for what made the war ‘just’. In terms of frequency of use, the most important components of the Bush Administration’s attempts to sell the war in Afghanistan were the involvement of an authoritarian/military regime (e.g., the Taliban) in the crisis and the notion that the use of force was a response to/punishment of a fundamentally ‘evil’ act. These two highly subjective and value-laden significations outstripped even the incontrovertible ‘just cause’ of the gross and violent injustice triggering the crisis. While it may very well have been a ‘dereliction of duty’ (Elshtain, 2003: 59) for the Bush Administration not to have responded to the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan, it does not seem that this ‘ethic of responsibility’ to restore the tranquility of order was seen as a compelling basis for war by the Administration itself. The fact that representations of the decision to go to war in Afghanistan as a response to/punishment of ‘evil’ actions wrought by the Taliban varied greatly by audience provides further empirical confirmation, while

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also underscoring the instrumental nature of the frequent allusions to it. Either the Administration viewed ‘evil’ as a mutable concept, or rather (as seems more likely) as a concept that ‘plays in Peoria’ but not in New York or Washington. Such an outcome can be explained through reference to Mearsheimer’s (2011) recent work on lying in international politics. Here, the impulse to reconcile the application of military force and liberal norms, values, and institutions (which he dubbed ‘liberal lies’) took a backseat to the interests of the Bush Administration in ‘fearmongering’—a wholly different strategy of deception designed to inflate threats in order to launch or shore up support for wars of choice (or what Walzer refers to as ‘anticipations’) fought against distant and unfamiliar enemies. These main points of emphasis within the Bush Administration’s application of the just war frame to the decision to invade Afghanistan tell us much about the foreign policy inclinations and worldview of the Administration itself. Presidential speech-acts during the crisis placed relatively greater emphasis on the regime type of the primary crisis protagonist and on characterizations of the military engagement in Afghanistan as a critical chapter in a larger ‘cosmic war’ (Aslan, 2009; Jeurgensmeyer, 2003). Objective and material realities—such as the fact that the crisis was provoked by the deadliest attack on American soil in history and resulted in an extensive loss of life and property, and was therefore consistent with the long-standing ‘just cause’ of self-defense—received relatively less emphasis than did the effort to cast the Taliban and al-Qaeda as posing an existential threat to the United States. The results of the frame analysis here also illustrate that the credibility of the frame (with respect to the consistency of message) as employed in this case was somewhat uneven. While the overriding memes evident in the discursive environment enveloping the GWOT (a struggle of ‘good versus evil’, and ‘civilization versus barbarism’) were certainly borne out in the more prominently emphasized significations depicting the war in Afghanistan as ‘just’ (especially ‘response to/punishment of evil’), characterizations of the GWOT as a tool of self-defense and a last resort were largely excluded from the framing of the decision to go to war. A similar disjuncture comes in assessing the dynamism of the frame application. While the varying emphasis placed on different aspects of the frame according to target audience reflects a flexible application, this variability (in conjunction with the variability of the application of the frame in general over time) also points toward negative consequences in terms of inclusivity. There were, in actuality, multiple ‘sub-framings’ and associated narratives embedded within the application of the just war frame to

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the war-decision in Afghanistan, varying by audience and constituency. Such incongruities in the application of the just war frame to the decision to go to war in Afghanistan were dwarfed in importance by the looming specter of the 9/11 attacks and the GWOT. Under those circumstances, a somewhat clumsy and inconsistent frame application proved less problematic in terms of affirmation and implementation of the war-decision than it might have been in other contexts. In the end, the empirical record of the framing of the affirmative wardecision in Afghanistan provides support to characterizations of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy as ‘hyper-moralistic’. It also reveals a disjuncture between that policy’s neo-conservative underpinnings and the assumptions at the heart of what had previously constituted ‘mainstream’ US foreign policy. Front-and-center here is the extent to which democracy promotion, already a centerpiece of post-Cold War US foreign policy, came to be the very raison d’être for the invasion of Afghanistan and the GWOT (Steele, 2007). The reality that the existence of an authoritarian regime in Afghanistan (one lacking in military capacity, external support, and even full sovereignty over its own territory and population) proved to be the single most emphasized ‘just’ cause for war by the Bush Administration, as well as the evident fact that any form of ‘competent authority’ for war scarcely registered in the empirical record, seems a significant departure not only from Kant or Mill’s admonitions against spreading democracy at the point of the bayonet but even from the Bush Administration’s immediate predecessors (Smith, 2007; Peceny, 1999a). Perhaps even more telling in terms of the aforementioned disjuncture evident in the Bush Administration’s foreign policy (especially during the Administration’s first term) comes in relation to realism. This is of course a well-chronicled phenomenon, highlighted not only in the pages of scholarly journals but in the ‘Weberian activism’ of the ad-hoc ‘Coalition for a Realist Foreign Policy’ and, later, the ‘Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy’ group (Jackson and Kaufman, 2007). This empirical assessment of Presidential speech-acts highlights the extent of the divergence of the Bush foreign policy from realist logic. That material threats to US national interests and security represented by transnational terrorism and the 9/11 attacks, not to mention the associated loss of property and persons (all satisfying long-standing and widely accepted translations of ‘just cause’), received significantly less emphasis in the efforts of the Administration to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan than did the notion that the use of force by the United States was primarily justifiable as a response to ‘evil’ both reveals and contextualizes the Bush

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Administration’s tendency to fold foreign policy threats neatly, and erroneously, into an overarching Manichean worldview. The fact that the Bush Administration elected to place greater emphasis on such subjective and ideational signifiers in making the case for a war which had such obvious and incontrovertible ‘just causes’ (including the singular event of the 9/11 attacks) at a minimum suggests either a new point of departure for the just war frame, or its breaking point. In either case, we are left to wonder whether ‘meaning-making’ with respect to war has undertaken something of a post-modernist turn, in which foreign policy-makers in liberal societies no longer privilege material conditions, but instead view ideational casus belli as more appealing signifiers for domestic consumption—and therefore better tools for coping with the latent ambivalence to the use of war as a policy tool.

Conclusion: Selling a Just War

The preceding analysis provides an exploratory assessment intended to push beyond the anecdotal impression that just war theory matters in US foreign policy, in order to address the more compelling question of how it does. While it is possible for even a casual observer to find copious evidence of the saturation of the prevailing American wardiscourse in the rhetoric of just war theory, the manner in which the concepts embedded within that centuries old ‘decision-law’ concerning war are actually related to the decision to employ military force within the context of contemporary US foreign policy is less clear. The central question advanced here (e.g., how just war theory is employed to sell the decision to go to war as legitimate to domestic audiences by those responsible for that decision) is a direct by-product of that concern. By systematically analyzing the application of the just war frame (derived from the jus ad bellum criteria of just cause, competent authority, and right intention) in three prominent cases of US military intervention in crisis since the end of the Cold War, a more definitive picture of how the case for the legitimacy of the decision to go to war is made by the Commander-in-Chief emerges. This picture is brought into even greater relief in considering not only what distinct components of a ‘just war’ were utilized (or not utilized) in ‘selling’ affirmative war-decisions in these three cases, but also the manner by which the frame (and its components) were employed in relation to different audiences (the mass public, the media, and opinion-leaders) and in relation to changing developments in the crisis itself. It is to some concluding observations and insights stemming from this application of the just war frame that I now turn.

Assessing the just war frame The preceding analysis of the just war frame’s application in the Persian Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led invasion of 211

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Afghanistan reveals both commonalities and discrepancies in the manner in which the just war frame has been employed. The temporal and substantive span of the three case studies as well as my interest in addressing the question of how the just war frame is employed by decision-makers to ensure the continued appeal of military force in American foreign policy and society requires a comparative and synthetic assessment of the preceding empirical investigations. Whereas the case studies themselves permit in-depth consideration of the use and utility of the just war frame in each discrete application, here I will attempt to tease out broader and more general insights about the frame’s overall significance within the larger context of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. These ‘lessons learned’ speak to points of substantive emphasis (or de-emphasis) within the just war frame as well as to characteristics of the frame’s transmission and delivery. In drawing together the most significant empirical and theoretical findings gleaned from the individual case studies, this concluding chapter provides an opportunity to evaluate the just war frame in totality. Doing so allows for reflection on the overarching questions and propositions concerning the utility and appeal of military force in contemporary US foreign policy that were the catalysts for this investigation. Of particular importance in this regard, as was discussed at length in Chapter 3, is the need to take into account the frame’s credibility, salience, and dynamism as reflected in its application across the three cases examined here. Taking such an account in turn requires consideration of the following themes and questions: • Credibility: Were the elements of the message emphasized by the framers logically consistent and empirically verifiable, and were the framers themselves credible? • Salience: Was the message articulated within the frame central to, commensurate with, and faithful to the experience of members of the intended audience or audiences? • Dynamism: Did the frame articulation evolve over time and/or in conjunction with a changing context to incorporate new elements? These three components, depicted schematically in Figure C.1, provide the guiding parameters for meta-analysis of the just war frame. If nothing else, this inquiry of the just war frame reminds us that the act of making war and the art of selling it to the public are two sides of the same coin. In light of the previously discussed ‘liberal contradiction’ concerning war, if the use of force cannot be utilized effectively for any

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This brief return to the notion of frame credibility provides an entrée for reflection on the substantive consistency evident (or not evident) in the just war frame’s application to the three war-decisions examined here. If at base frames ‘help to render events or occurrences meaningful’ amidst a politics born of dueling discourses and public contestation (Benford and Snow, 2000; Hall, 1997), effective application of a frame is at least in part contingent on the ability of the framer(s) to stay ‘on message’; e.g., to rely wholly and consistently on the frame in question amidst the process of meaning-making, and to avoid incorporating divergent (and potentially competing) frames. Adopting this tack is crucial to the consistency of frame application which, in turn, enhances the credibility of the message (and the messenger). This is a ‘lesson’ most clearly evident in the recurring encroachment of sometimes related and sometimes competing memes by President George H.W. Bush in the Persian Gulf War (see Chapter 5). The recurrence of these memes (‘reversing aggression’, ‘kicking the Vietnam syndrome’, and ‘establishing New World Order’) in Presidential rhetoric during the Gulf War clearly contributed to the inconsistent and inchoate application of the just war frame, undermining the credibility of the ‘message’ that the Gulf War was a ‘just war’ in line with the reasons specified. This inconsistent application of the just war frame also had evidently and profoundly damaging consequences beyond the attempt to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in the Gulf, by undermining the perceived credibility of the messenger as well. These consequences were chiefly manifested in the prevailing confusion within American society concerning the war’s causes and especially objectives as the crisis wore on, as well as in the fleeting support for the war and the President who waged it in the aftermath. This problem of frame inconsistency was decidedly not evident in the analysis of the just war frame’s application to affirmative war-decisions in Kosovo and Afghanistan (see Chapters 6 and 7). Certainly there is no hard evidence to suggest that Presidents Clinton and (George W.) Bush (or their advisors) drew from the mis-steps of their predecessor’s attempt at ‘selling’ a similar decision in the Gulf War, and probably no feasible way to systematically investigate that claim. Yet the evidence presented here suffices to support the assertion that in each of those cases Presidential speech-acts remained steadfastly ‘on message’ in seeking to frame the US military engagements in Kosovo and Afghanistan as necessary, legitimate, and ‘just’ through reliance on the just war frame. While the specific applications of the frame to those two war-decisions certainly differed— particularly when considerations of audience and time were introduced

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into the analysis—what held constant in both cases was the lack of any semblance of other potentially competing frames. As such, the credibility of the frame itself as well as that of its chief articulators was enhanced in the process. Salience: Evil, ‘boogeymen’, and frontier justice The closer the central frame message is to the existence and experiences of the audience, their own core belief system, and the prevailing cultural narrative of the society in question, the more likely it is that the message will ‘stick’ (Benford and Snow, 2000). Those frames that are most salient are those that reflect high levels of consistency, commensurability, and fidelity with the individual and collective experiences and beliefs of an audience or audiences—and with the dominant narratives at work within those audiences. Indeed, high levels of consistency, commensurability, and fidelity can even lead to the frame’s absorption into the general ‘cultural stock’—thereby subverting and even transcending the distinction between the frame and the culture in which it is employed (Zald, 1996).1 In turning to the substantive aspect of the just war frame’s application in the three cases examined (the Persian Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan), there is a consistently prominent emphasis on the ‘just cause’ component of the jus ad bellum decision-law. In many ways the fact that the presence of legitimating causes for war (rather than the securing of competent authority, or the articulation of the intentions of the war prior to engaging in it) resonates most powerfully in the efforts of US Presidents to frame their decisions to go to war as necessary, just, and therefore legitimate is to be expected. What might be more telling is which ‘just causes’ are utilized most frequently and to greatest effect in the application of the just war frame to affirmative war-decisions. In that vein, two signifiers of ‘just causes’ were the most frequently and consistently employed: the need for a response to or punishment of acts of ‘evil’, and the involvement in and responsibility for the crisis by an authoritarian regime. The preceding empirical analysis of the framing of affirmative wardecisions reveals a set of clear and consistent translations of acts of ‘evil’ which are strongly correlated with efforts to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in crisis situations. These primarily include, but are not limited to: the targeting of non-combatants, hostage taking, willful destruction of the natural environment, and most prominently systematic campaigns of human rights abuses and the perpetration of crimes against humanity. The inherent subjectivity of the notion of ‘evil’ in

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foreign policy terms notwithstanding, this analysis conveys the degree to which such acts occupy a position of central importance in the efforts of recent Presidents to make the case for military intervention to the domestic audience—especially when perpetrated by authoritarian leaders and regimes in crises they inspired or provoked. Above and beyond other potential translations of justice that might be associated with a legitimate use of America’s military might in responding to crisis situations, this analysis shows us that military force is most likely to be advanced for public consumption as a legitimate corrective for ‘evil’ actions carried out by ‘bad’ leaders; e.g., as an implement of retributive justice (Lu, 2002). Such a finding is telling, suggesting a common representation (if not understanding) not only of what constitutes ‘evil’ but also what is considered to be the chief source of evil in the international arena—one that has held constant across three successive Presidential Administrations. It also indicates a clear commitment by those three Administrations to publicly link the use of military might with the need to punish or correct such ‘evil’ acts and their perpetrators, in a rough approximation of ‘frontier justice’ within an anarchical international system in which the US assumes the role of sheriff, reluctant or otherwise (Tirman, 2010; Haass, 1998). Furthermore, the recurrent reliance on this signifier across all three cases analyzed suggests a significant and continuing degree of utility and effectiveness. Indeed, one might reasonably conclude from the repeated and consistent efforts of three consecutive Presidents to ‘sell’ the legitimacy of war on the basis of these ‘just causes’ that domestic audience(s) are at some level ‘buying’ it. The continuing tendency of US decision-makers to advance American military might as a useful corrective for punishing the evil actions of ‘boogeymen’ such as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, or Mullah Muhammad Omar and his Taliban brethren points to a sobering conclusion concerning the future of US military intervention. Sophisticated and pragmatic estimates of America’s declining military capabilities and changing interests aside (Nye and Armitage, 2007), if Presidents continue to rest their case for military intervention on the utility of military force as a tool to punish acts of evil and their perpetrators, it seems extremely likely that US military intervention will remain a frequent and costly endeavor. This is due in no small part to the tendency of such representations to take on a life of their own, such that those advancing them come to supplant the pursuit of the national interest with the quest to live up to their own rhetoric (Kennan, 1951). Of course, all of this is not to say that a recurring scenario of US interventionism driven by retributive impulses is inevitable. But on the basis of this frequently

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employed signification, one would expect military intervention to remain a centerpiece of US foreign policy unless one or more of the following (in declining order of likelihood) were to entail: a significant segment of the domestic audience begins to reject the connection between the use of force and retributive justice; future Presidents rely less on this signification; international normative and legal standards change significantly, such that crimes against humanity are no longer seen as ‘actionable offenses’; or (impossibly) evil is eliminated from our world. Dynamism: Fitting ‘new wars’ in an old bottle The extent to which a frame proves adaptable to a changing contextual environment without losing the essence of what its articulators wish to signify about the event, decision, or problem of concern is a crucial measure of frame utility. As Swart (1995) suggests, such dynamism is intricately linked to the credibility and especially salience of a frame. It stands to reason that the more adaptive the frame is in application, the greater the likelihood that more members of a target audience (or audiences) will identify consistencies and continuities between their own beliefs and experiences and those highlighted by the frame. The sustained commensurability with beliefs and experiences even in the face of an evolving context that typifies a dynamic frame is likely to broaden the frame’s appeal, with the result a frame that is perceived as credible to a larger and more diverse range of individuals and an increased overall resonance. The preceding analysis of the just war frame highlights not only the specifics of how the frame was used in three prominent cases of US military intervention since the end of the Cold War, but also the degree to which the frame continued to be employed through Presidential speechacts in all three cases in spite of the significant differences between and among those cases. While these three cases of foreign policy crisis were similar enough to satisfy the primary and secondary criteria employed in the case selection process, it is indisputable that the particularities of the Persian Gulf War, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (whether in terms of happenings ‘on the ground’ or the domestic response to them) varied greatly. So too did the larger geopolitical context in which these crises were embedded, spanning the decade-plus period extending from the very dawn of the post-Cold War era to the inception of the ‘global war on terrorism’. One of the most significant contextual shifts concerns the very nature of warfare itself. While the Persian Gulf War is often characterized as marking the dawn of the post-Cold War era, from the standpoint of

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armed conflict it can be viewed as something of an anachronism. The archetype of the Clausewitzian ‘old’ war held that wars were the product of rational and strategic calculation. Political leaders utilized the tools of the state over which they presided (professional standing armies and national economies of scale) to deploy overwhelming force against similarly organized opponents in a contest over some discernable national interest (Butler, 2009). Typified by a clear breach of international law exemplified in the violent abrogation of the territorial sovereignty of one nation-state (Kuwait) by another (Iraq) using an organized standing military force commanded directly by a head-of-state (Saddam Hussein), the inception of the Gulf War as well as the international community’s response to it in many ways embodied that Clausewitzian ideal. The same cannot be said of the other two cases examined here. Indeed, each bears more than passing resemblance to the ‘new wars’ described by scholars such as Azar (1990), Shaw (1999), Kaldor (1999), and Münkler (2004). In this view, contemporary armed conflict is largely intra-state in nature, fuelled by clashing identities and economic and political dislocation, waged by a range of official and irregular combatants, and sustained by remittances, organized crime, and transnational networks moving money, arms, and people. With the unraveling of the key distinctions around which the ‘modern’ state is organized, armed conflict is prosecuted without much regard for separation between internal and external political and social realms, public and private goods and activities, civilian and military authority, or even between states of ‘war’ and ‘peace’. The NATO operation in Kosovo was primarily advanced to thwart a campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as well as a humanitarian crisis stemming from intra-state conflict. The US-led assault on Afghanistan proved the initial military salvo in a broader counter-terrorism offensive against a non-state transnational terrorist group (al-Qaeda) and the largely unrecognized political authority granting that group safe haven (the Afghan Taliban). Differences between the two notwithstanding, each of these cases featured a US military intervention prompted by a void of statehood and violently clashing identity groups—with each representing drastic departures from the Gulf War in terms of the ‘ideal type’ of warfare they best reflect. From the standpoint of the primary concern of this research (e.g., how the just war frame was used to sell the decision to go to war), what is most telling is the degree to which the just war frame proved adaptable to the aforementioned changes in the nature of the armed conflicts precipitating US intervention. In the Gulf War, points of emphasis within the framing of the affirmative war-decision included self-defense, the seizure

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of territory, and the seizure of (US) property and/or persons as legitimating ‘just causes’ for Operation Desert Shield/Storm. With such traditional themes common to inter-state warfare rendered largely irrelevant to the ‘new wars’ unfolding in Kosovo and Afghanistan, these elements of the frame dropped out. In their place, the framing effort relied chiefly on ‘just causes’ such as response to/punishment of ‘evil’ and the involvement/ responsibility of authoritarian leaders for the crisis, as well as allusions to authorization by the international community. This heightened emphasis on just causes at the expense of authority and especially intention considerations is clearly indicative of the process of threat inflation necessary to justify the ‘wars of choice’ that typify the post-Cold War era. This is not a process without negative consequences, including the blowback which is often linked to ‘fearmongering’ (Mearsheimer, 2011); in this we are reminded of Robespierre’s famous dictum that ‘no one loves armed missionaries’. What these points of departure in the just war frame’s application within and across the three cases analyzed here reflect in the aggregate is the adaptability and commensurability of the just war frame to profoundly changing circumstances concerning the dynamics of contemporary armed conflict, including those involving non-state actors (Heinze and Steele, 2009). Indeed, the fact that the frame was used by the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations in a more targeted, intensive, consistent, and purposeful way in situations more closely approximating the ‘new war’ dynamic suggests that the utility of the just war frame, or at least select elements of it, might not only be retained but even enhanced when seeking to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in response to these ‘wars of a third kind’ (Rice, 1988).

Frame transmission Reaffirming the ‘cascade’ Meta-analytical reflection on the ‘lessons learned’ from this inquiry can extend beyond the substantive emphasis of the just war frame to include the manner in which the frame was applied. In other words, in looking across the three case studies, it is possible to observe clear and consistent attributes of the just war frame’s transmission. The first and arguably most important concerns Entman’s (2004) ‘cascade model’ (previously discussed in Chapter 3). In this model, while the signal message of a frame may be activated by the frame’s architects, its overall salience, effectiveness, and ultimately impact is determined by the degree to which that message reverberates and is (re)transmitted through other

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key elites including, but not limited to, the media (ibid.). The cascade effect refers to the process by which the frame’s content is received, filtered, and reproduced for mass consumption by elite audiences—as well as the reverberation of the frame back to the ‘top’ in a series of feedback loops. At the heart of the cascade model is the insight that effective frames are, and must be, culturally sustained and reinforced. This is a condition that requires adjustment of the frame when needed, and beyond that necessitates the constitutive involvement of opinion-leaders other than the frame’s primary architects. The use of the just war frame to ‘sell’ the decision to employ military force in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan for the most part confirms the ‘cascade model’ of framing, though to a diminished degree over the span of the three cases. In terms of transmission, perhaps the overriding and most compelling feature of the just war frame’s application in the Persian Gulf War and in Kosovo was the degree to which the mass public was bypassed in favor of the media and, to a lesser extent, other opinion-leaders (business leaders, religious authorities, military officers). In both cases, a sizable majority of speech-acts concerning the crisis as well as speech-acts employing the just war frame targeted these audiences, with the public at-large much less likely to be the primary target for Presidential speechacts concerning the crisis, or for efforts at ‘selling’ the affirmative wardecision via the just war frame. From the standpoint of frame transmission, such findings can clearly be interpreted as supporting Entman’s cascade model. However, this pattern was not replicated in the Afghanistan case, in which the ratio of both Presidential speech-acts and just war frame significations by audience type tilted to a greater degree in the direction of the mass public. In making the case for a US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the George W. Bush Administration (unlike its predecessors) relied much more heavily on direct appeals to the public at-large, while placing relatively less emphasis on speech-making and frame transmission aimed at the media and other opinion-leaders. While the exploratory nature of this analysis does not allow for any compelling conclusion or interpretation of this finding relative to Entman’s cascade model, it is clear that within the bounds of this study, the Afghanistan case stands as an outlier in terms of frame transmission and target audience. Whether that outlier status is a simple outgrowth of the mass public trauma gripping American society in the aftermath of 9/11, or rather is indicative of a broader shift away from the cascade effect in framing within the context of US foreign policy would seem a question worthy of further and more finely calibrated analysis.

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Intention and intensity As stated earlier, this empirical investigation of the application of the just war frame to the legitimization of US military intervention decisions indicates that the importance of just war theory to contemporary US foreign policy goes far beyond that of providing the odd rhetorical flourish. Rather, it seems safe to say that the language and concepts of just war theory, and in particular the jus ad bellum, together constitute an important tool used purposefully by US Presidents amidst the tumultuous and contested process that is the ‘politics of signification’. While it is impossible within the confines of this particular study to speak to whether or not other frames might also serve this function with respect to the task of ‘selling’ the decision to go to war to the domestic audience, it seems fairly certain that the just war frame spawned by the just war ‘conversation’ does. The evidence in support of this assertion of purposive intent is fairly compelling, particularly in the calibration of the frame to empirical events and ‘facts’ evident within the cases themselves. To be sure, different components of the just war frame were employed to greater or lesser extent (and effect) in the three cases. Yet it is also instructive to take note of the components of the frame that were not employed, and the circumstances associated with those ‘non-significations’. To that end, there is very little evidence of wholly baseless framings; plausibility reigns across all three cases. By way of example, there is but only one instance of an attempt at a ‘global authority’ signification in the Kosovo case—a clear reflection of the Clinton Administration’s acknowledgement that the well-documented absence of UN authorization for military action would make such a signification implausible (potentially undermining the effort to frame the war as legitimate in the process). Similarly, self-defense is minimally invoked in the Persian Gulf War (and only through a highly circuitous logical connection to the notion of collective security), and drops out altogether in the Kosovo and Afghanistan cases. Such ‘non-significations’ underscore the extent to which the three case studies reveal systematic transmission and application of the just war frame. Beyond these and other examples of Presidents refraining from attaching one or more just war significations to events and ‘facts’ that would strain credulity, the degree of purposive intent employed in the use of the frame can also be seen in the temporal dimension of the analysis. One compelling example of this phenomenon, again drawn from the Persian Gulf War case, is the notable absence of references to ‘right intentions’ such as crisis abatement until after termination of the 100 hours of ‘official hostilities’. This is a dimension of the frame’s

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application (or, more accurately, non-application) which again speaks to an awareness of, and concern with, the need to apply the frame in as plausible a fashion as possible. Such fine calibration in the transmission of the just war ‘message’ can also be seen in the impact of domestic politics. As was highlighted in the case studies themselves, there were clearly unique and differential points of emphasis in the frame’s application in the three cases which correspond to domestic political considerations such as Bush (41) seeking to overcome the ‘wimp factor’, Clinton seeking to reaffirm his character and ‘fitness’ for the job of President, or Bush (43) seeking to exact revenge amidst a period of national mourning and outrage. Corresponding with and reaffirming the clear degree of intent and care evident in the use of the just war frame in these three cases is the degree of intensity in the transmission of that frame’s central message. While the points of emphasis in the three applications of the frame vary in major and important ways, another thing that runs constant across the effort to ‘sell’ the legitimacy of the affirmative war-decision in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, and Afghanistan is the degree to which the just war significations that were emphasized were strongly emphasized, while those that were not employed were highly marginalized. Whether or not Presidents and top-ranking foreign policy decisionmakers view justice in ‘black and white’ terms, it seems clear that they have a strong sense of what they think will resonate with the public when making the case for war—and what won’t—and advance their efforts to frame the war-decision accordingly.

Postscript, Libya: Plus ça change? As this book was completed in the summer of 2011, the US was involved in yet another military intervention in response to a crisis, as part of a NATO operation (‘Operation Unified Protector’) contributing to the end of Moammar Gaddafi’s four decades of autocratic rule in Libya. And yet again a sitting US President has turned to the language of moral obligation and the concepts of just war theory as a means of framing the decision to use military force. Announcing the beginning of Allied air sorties over Libya on 18 March 2011, the President outlined the rationale driving the decision: Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qadhafi chose the path of brutal suppression. Innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in some cases killed. Peaceful protests were forcefully put

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down. Hospitals were attacked and patients disappeared. A campaign of intimidation and repression began…In the face of this injustice, the United States and the international community moved swiftly… …For decades, he’s demonstrated a willingness to use brute force through his sponsorship of terrorism against the American people as well as others and through the killings that he has carried out within his own borders… Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qadhafi would commit atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue…And that’s why the United States has worked with our allies and partners to shape a strong international response at the United Nations… Now, the United States did not seek this outcome. Our decisions have been driven by Qadhafi’s refusal to respect the rights of his people and the potential for mass murder of innocent civilians…So I’ve taken this decision with the confidence that action is necessary and that we will not be acting alone. Our goal is focused, our cause is just, and our coalition is strong (Obama, 2011a). As the operation intensified and expanded including a greater role for the US and other NATO allies aside from the UK, France, and Italy in conjunction with a strong supporting resolution (1973) from the UN Security Council, the President articulated the logic of his decision to intervene with military force to the American public in a nationally televised address: It’s true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for never acting on behalf of what’s right. In this particular country, Libya, at this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves. We also had the ability to stop Qadhafi’s forces…without putting American troops on the ground. To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader, and more profoundly, our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such

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circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different. And as President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action (Obama, 2011b). And, as the operation continued into the spring without profoundly altering the dynamics of the situation on the ground and domestic opposition in the US grew, the President responded by drawing a direct parallel between the necessity to act in Libya, and the failure to do so 17 years earlier in Rwanda: Today we also reflect on Rwanda’s progress…Rwanda reminds us of our obligations to each other as fellow human beings and our shared responsibility to prevent attacks on innocent civilians, as the international community is doing in Libya (Obama, 2011c). The evolving situation in Libya represents the latest installment in the unfolding trajectory of US military intervention since the Cold War. Indeed, it exhibits many of the characteristics and quandaries evident in other prominent cases of US military intervention, including (but not limited to) those studied here: the central involvement of an authoritarian regime; allegations and/or proof of unrestrained violence and atrocities against civilians; repeated assertions of the unified support of the international community for the use of force as well as that use of force as a ‘last resort’; and explicit connections between the use of force and a more prosperous, humane, and just aftermath in the target state, society, and/or region. The relevance of the intervention in Libya to this study is evident not only in these similarities or in the reliance of the Obama Administration (like its immediate predecessors) on just war language to ‘sell’ the affirmative war-decision, but also in the repeated charges by critics of that decision that the current Administration (again like its immediate predecessors) lacked a discernable framework or set of criteria by which it advances, explains, and justifies such decisions. One prominent expression of this viewpoint was articulated by former US Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) in an interview with PBS’ Jim Lehrer after Operation Unified Protector began: What strikes me about this operation is how much it is part of a pattern over the past 20 years, since the end of the Cold War. If you

Conclusion: Selling a Just War 225

look over the past four administrations, what has been remarkable, in addition to the two wars, long wars, that we’re involved in, are how many of these brushfire operations we have either gotten into or not gotten into. We did not in Rwanda. President Clinton said that was a mistake. We have in Libya. What is lacking here is any kind of framework for deciding when American military force will be used. We have gone through four administrations—we’re in the middle of the fourth administration—since the end of the Cold War. And what I think is needed right now is what I would call an Obama doctrine, which lays out a framework for intervention or nonintervention. And that would help the American people, certainly people like myself, understand why we get involved, when we get involved and how much we will get involved. And that kind of context has been lacking for the better part of 20 years (PBS, 2011b). Hart’s comment reflects not merely dissatisfaction with the Obama Administration’s handling of the Libyan situation, but rather a broader view that US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been and remains inchoate with respect to military intervention, and lacks a consistent and publicly articulated guiding framework. This is a perspective that is hardly original or unique to the former senator; in recent years countless voices within the mainstream US foreign policy community have raised similar concerns (Kissinger and Baker, 2011; Robinson, 2011; Gates, 2010; Kagan, 2008; Krauthammer, 2002; Kristof, 2002; Glennon, 1999; Haass, 1999; Campbell, 1998; Crocker, 1996; The Aspen Institute, 1996; Luttwak, 1995). Yet it is my contention that the preceding study of framing, and in particular the manner in which the just war frame has been applied to US military intervention decisions since the end of the Cold War, poses a direct challenge to this characterization—at least with respect to how that decision is presented to domestic audiences. In viewing the connection between just war theory and the use of force in US foreign policy through the prism of the just war frame, this analysis indicates that in at least these three recent and prominent examples of US military intervention policy-makers have employed a definite and clear framework when presenting the decision to use military force in response to foreign policy crises to the public, the press, and various opinionleaders. To be sure, as this analysis also indicates, the application of the just war frame has varied by situation and circumstance. Different elements have been emphasized and de-emphasized, and the frame in its totality has been used to varying extent and with varying degrees of

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success. Still, I would contend that the preceding empirical analysis, advanced primarily to address the question of how just war theory is used to ‘sell’ the decision to go to war by US foreign policy decision-makers, sheds ample light on the ways in which the just war frame has encompassed and propelled that decision in three critical instances of post-Cold War intervention spanning over a decade. While again it may not be the only framework advanced in conjunction with the decision to intervene with force, or even the best, this analysis shows us not only that the just war frame is very much in evidence as a means of ‘selling’ the affirmative war-decision, but how. In the process, this inquiry seemingly puts the lie to the claim that US military intervention decisions are random events advanced without regard to any consistent, overarching framework. This is not to say that US military intervention decisions are in any real sense ‘just’, nor that they are rendered in an effort to satisfy the particular translations of justice associated with the age-old conditions of just war theory and in particular the jus ad bellum criteria. Though impossible to ‘prove’ in any scientific sense of the term, it seems highly unlikely that the US (or any other nation-state, for that matter) uses its military primarily, or even secondarily, as an instrument to promote justice and virtue. Instead, what this research does allow us to say with some conviction is that such decisions are systematically presented to the domestic audience(s) in that light. So while the claim that contemporary US foreign policy lacks any decision-making framework with regard to the use of force may be true, we should be careful to conclude that the same is true of how those decisions are presented for public consumption—or that in a socially constituted endeavor such as war, the latter has no bearing on the former. The Libya case will undoubtedly prove instructive for years to come, particularly as the record of the Obama Administration’s decisionmaking becomes public and illuminates the latest of America’s many post-Cold War military adventures. It will also likely prove instructive in allowing us to once again see definitive evidence of the overlap and synthesis of Presidential rhetoric surrounding an affirmative war-decision and the actual decision itself. This overlap and synthesis is clearly evident in the three cases of US military intervention decisions analyzed here—a finding that, in turn, points to an important conclusion underscored (though hardly unearthed) by this research. Both historical and contemporary scholars of war agree that the act of war and the decision to undertake that act are fundamentally and profoundly social in nature, concerning not just the political leaders that make the determination or advance the orders, but indeed subsuming the entire society in question.

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Yet in the same way that we can and should think of the decision to go to war as one that impacts all of society, in the process rejecting the splendid isolation of decisions rendered for raison d’état by monarchs and liberals alike, so too does this study of the framing of that decision suggest that we would also reject the notion that the decision to go to war and the ‘selling’ of that decision are wholly distinct entities. Of course the effort to frame a decision to go to war by America’s political leadership as ‘just’ hardly makes it so. But the collision between a deeply embedded social behavior such as war and a fundamentally socially constructed concept such as legitimacy does provide decisionmakers with the opportunity to frame it as such—an appealing prospect to those responsible for such a high stakes decision. Indeed, if the effort to frame the decision to go to war is effective enough, that decision (and the war that ensues) is likely to be perceived and received as legitimate by a substantial segment of the society in question—including, quite possibly, those making it. This construction of legitimacy makes successful conduct of the war infinitely more likely by enhancing both the appeal of the decision and those responsible for it. This was undoubtedly the ‘endgame’ sought by the three Presidential Administrations (George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush) in their employment of the just war frame to advance the three major military intervention decisions analyzed here. And, irrespective of the effectiveness of their efforts, the extensive and intensive employment of the just war frame to ‘sell’ the legitimacy of decisions to employ military force in responding to foreign policy crisis suggests that the framing of that decision and the decision itself are inextricably linked in ways that are likely to remain important for many years to come.

Notes Chapter 1

Introduction

1 Armed conflict of all types increased by a factor of three during the period 1960–1992 (Human Security Centre, 2010). 2 See, among others, Pearson (1973), Small and Singer (1982), Levy (1983), Tillema (1991), Pearson and Baumann (1993–1994), Bercovitch and Jackson (1997), Huth (1998), Regan (2002), Hegre (2004), Lacina (2004), and SIPRI (2010) for a sampling of such empirical research. 3 Not inconsequential here is the article of faith at the heart of liberal thought that human rationality can be directed toward the mutually reinforcing ends of personal and social progress, a belief that resonates to varying degree within all liberal societies. On the question of war, this faith in rationality is especially crucial, in that it underpins the allegedly transformative effects of Kant’s ‘asocial sociability’ upon the domestic and eventually international arena—as well as the associated supposition that the rule of law and the development of non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution can supplant the ‘war of all against all’ that typifies an anarchical international system (Doyle, 1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett and Oneal, 2001). 4 Indeed, since the end of World War II the United States has inarguably occupied a unique geopolitical position as the sole enduring military superpower as well as the leader and guarantor of liberalism and self-appointed champion of the ‘free world’, in essence rendering US foreign policy during this period an effort to consummate what Wittkopf et al. (2003), Jentleson (2010), and others have famously referred to as a marriage of ‘power and principle’. 5 From this perspective, resorting to war is understood to constitute a breakdown in the implicit code of conduct presumed to govern relations between nations, and as such an undesirable outcome that violates common and shared standards of humanity. One can discern strains of this view and the universalism that underpins it in such disparate sources as Hammurabi’s Code, Kant’s three Definitive Articles, or Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’. 6 Narrowly, the resort to war may obviate or liquidate the war’s objectives before they can be secured. From a wider vantage point, the resort to war may create additional enemies, weaken material capacity and capabilities, or undermine the ideals and values of the society in question (or some combination of the three). On the merits of constraining war on account of the material benefits associated with doing so, the contribution of classical utilitarians like Bentham (1798) and Mill (1859) are especially noteworthy.

Chapter 2

Entering the Just War Conversation

1 Just war theory and the ‘tradition’ it has spawned each have much to offer relative to consideration of the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct during war (the jus in bello criteria) as well as the conditions denot228

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3

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ing a just order after the war’s conclusion (the jus post bellum precept). However, as neither speaks directly to the war-decision and the ex ante rationalization of that decision, these components of the theory and tradition largely fall outside the bounds of this research and are not systematically examined or discussed. Roman proscriptions on war, advanced in accordance with fetial law (jus fetiale), were important early sources of just war thinking. In this respect, the efforts of Cicero to harness war solely to the purpose of defense of empire should not be overlooked. Cicero was especially instrumental in sustaining the earliest antecedents of the just war tradition, particularly as concerns the feasibility and merits of a universal standard of conduct in war (see Bellamy, 2006). At the same time, relative to social practice, Roman contributions to the just war ‘conversation’ had significantly less impact on the war-decision than did those of Hebrew and Greek civilizations. Furthermore, the contributions of imperial Roman society to this ‘conversation’ have not translated to modern liberal societies to a similar degree (no doubt due to liberal sensibilities concerning overt imperial dominion and conquest); hence, the diminished emphasis here. Other pretexts, such as to take vengeance, to gain advantages for the polis, or to maintain authority over those unfit to rule themselves, stemmed from the Platonic conception of a natural social order and the duties of the philosopher-king to preserve or restore them (see Hamburger, 1951). Even such a critical empiricist and utilitarian as Hume—while certainly at odds with, say, Locke with regard to the presumed primacy of natural law and associated notions of justice over human relations—asserted that the central importance of justice to society is so unquestioned that undertaking to prove it would be an utterly superfluous activity (Aiken, 1970). This is reflected thematically in the intellectual labors of the neo-scholastics (especially Vitoria) to define and extend standards concerning the treatment of the indigenous peoples in the conquest of the ‘New World’, as well as those within the African diaspora swept up in the brutal and inhumane practice of slavery, and to hold sovereigns as well as conquistadors to account for their conduct relative to those standards (Ballis, 1937; Vitoria, 1991). It is important here to acknowledge the role of the Crusades relative to the just war tradition and ‘conversation’. Clearly the Christian holy wars launched in order to reunify the Western and Eastern Christians and ‘liberate’ Jerusalem (and, earlier, Moorish Spain) reflect the fundamental just war precept of ‘legitimate authority’ to the extent that they were defined (and perceived by their protagonists) as directly commanded by God, through the papacy. At the same time, other ad bellum precepts (such as just cause) received relatively less emphasis, while the brutal atrocities committed exposed the lack of any concern with just conduct in relations with non-Christians, bearing little resemblance to any form of in bello restraint associated with the just war theory or the larger just war tradition surrounding it. Whereas Walters (1973) is correct in identifying that, by virtue of reflecting the potential for the abuse of just war precepts, the holy war doctrine underpinning the Crusades was part of (rather than antithetical to) the just war tradition, it is also clear that the era of the Crusades themselves contributed little to the ‘conversation’ of what

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constitutes a ‘just’ war, beyond papal authority. As such, while the nexus of just war theory and the Crusades is a hugely significant and important one, it falls largely outside the particular bounds of this research. As Johnson (1975) suggests, these attempts at clarification were certainly influenced by the unsatisfactory results of the Crusades and by prompting of the neo-scholastics’ religious benefactors who wished to consolidate the authority of Church after those disastrous campaigns. In light of this objective, the medieval theorists confronted a difficult challenge; namely, that of seeking to harmonize religious authority with the rise of a class of professional statesmen with little interest in adhering to the will of the church or doing its bidding. As direct appeals to divine sanction or formative theological teaching were no longer effective, medieval just war theorists instead appealed to a common moral standard rooted in the essence of humanity (Boyle, 1992). For example, Vitoria repeatedly and explicitly exhorted political authorities to abide by a jus gentium, while Suárez took a similar tack, insisting that ‘…a ruler’s right to make war must have at least some relation to natural law’ (Vitoria, 1991; Suárez, quoted in Taylor, 1979: 248). With the decision to wage war left to the devices of statesmen, to the extent that the just war tradition retained any credence within the ‘second’ law of nations, it was due to its incorporation of the jus in bello criteria in the effort to regulate war’s conduct. The amenability of particular interpretations of the in bello precepts of proportionality (of means) and discrimination to the promotion of a state-based system in the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the positive law doctrine which supported that system, is evident in the codification of in bello principles into formal laws of war such as the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg (Reichberg, 2002). Internally, such a monopoly underwrote the very authority of the state, as violence could be (and was) used to thwart potential internal challenges to ruling elites, while simultaneously allowing for any such challenges to be framed by agents of the state as inherently illegitimate—allowing for the consolidation of state power. At the same time, the ‘Weberian monopoly’ also allowed, and indeed encouraged, ‘the state’ to employ violence to defend national interests and advance national objectives relative to other states, or even to divert attention from domestic problems by initiating armed conflict with ‘enemies’. The durability of the ancien regime in French political life, continuing nationalist and revolutionary sentiment in France, rapid industrial transformation, and the specter of eclipse by a unified Germany after defeat in the France-Prussian War all combined to make social cohesion the Third Republic’s primary concern (Shirer, 1969). It was in this context that Adolphe Thiers, the first president of the Third Republic, called republicanism the form of government that divides France the least. France had, of course, played a pivotal role as progenitor of the idea of popular revolution, an idea culminating in the Revolutions of 1848 that had engulfed the Continent. Yet France also had been the object of revolutionary scorn after backsliding into the Second Empire (1851–1870). France differed from Britain or the United States in that liberalism faced more entrenched internal challenges and did not enjoy the relative unbroken upward trajectory it did in British or American society (Bernard and Dubief, 1985). This made advocating the export of liberal ideals through

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force—which the Jacobins had argued for a century earlier—a far less natural proposition for the Third Republic, a regime attempting to govern a moribund society that largely desired a return to monarchy (ibid.). Whereas France too boasted an expansionist agenda during the late 19th and early 20th century in places such as Indochina and North Africa, for these reasons and others the war-decision was chiefly legitimated through appeals to national glory and mission civilisatrice rather than liberal ideology (Logue, 1983). This radical liberal internationalism, which was frequently translated into wars of ‘national liberation’ encouraged from without rather than organically generated from within, speaks of a return to an earlier proactive strain in the just war tradition which envisioned the articulation of the prudential criteria as little more than a means to advance a foreordained social order through military force. Beveridge’s ‘March of the Flag’ speech singularly captures the degree to which moral legitimization was applied to the burgeoning project of American empire, and the war-decision in general: ‘Shall the American people continue their resistless march toward the commercial supremacy of the world? Shall free institutions broaden their blessed reign as the children of liberty wax in strength until the empire of our principles is established over the hearts of all mankind? Have we no mission to perform—no duty to discharge to our fellow man? Has the Almighty Father endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts, and marked us as the people of His peculiar favor, merely to rot in our own selfishness, as men and nations must who take cowardice for their companion and self for their deity…shall we be as the man who had one talent and hid it, or as he who had ten talents and used them until they grew to riches. And shall we reap the reward that waits on the discharge of our high duty as the sovereign power of earth?’ (ibid.) Indeed, perhaps the ultimate incongruity of post-Enlightenment modernity is the reality that it is an age at once defined by the rational pursuit of ‘progress’ as well as by wars of striking frequency and increasing destructiveness, drawing upon the full resource endowments of the nation and the state and prompted and sustained by competing ideologies that countenance war in all-or-nothing terms (Kaldor, 1999). The Popular Front in France, led by Leon Blum, was instrumental in this regard, arguing against non-interventionism despite significant internal challenges from the Right and external opposition by the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments in Britain. At the same time, this exceedingly convincing case does not change the fact that the conduct of the war by the Allies as well as the Axis powers was morally repugnant. The explicit policy of the Royal Air Force to target civilian population centers in Germany (adopted in 1942 and persisting for the remainder of the war), the fire-bombing of Dresden, and the twin detonations of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki come to mind as ready examples confirming the unjust nature of the prosecution of the war (relative to the just war criteria) from the Allied side. Because this research is focused on the war-decision relative to the just war tradition, it is possible to limit consideration here to the jus ad bellum considerations alone. However, I openly acknowledge that in the same way that such a narrowed focus impedes the ability of decision-makers and the public

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at-large to appraise the ‘justice’ of any war, so too does it limit the ability to draw broader conclusions about the behavior of states relative to the just war theory or the standards of ‘legitimacy’ relative to the prosecution of war that it seeks to advance. The allowance for self-defense is codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which stipulates the ‘…inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs…until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’. The privileged moral position extended to self-defense within the just war tradition dates at least as far back as Augustine, at least in the case of response to armed attack. Attempts at more expansive articulations of the self-defense exception (i.e., where armed attack does not occur, but appeals to ‘self-defense’ are made—see the British and French justification of the use of force during the Suez crisis, various Israeli military forays into neighboring Arab states, or the US attack of Iraq in 2003) have been met with mixed reviews by just war theorists. The full text of the Charter can be found at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/ charter/. While the explicit attempt by the UN’s framers to confer competent authority on the Security Council diverges from the traditionally statist orientation of just war theory, the logic is the same. Since the international agreement establishing the United Nations Organization had recognized legal status, and since the principles espoused by the UN Charter concerning the use of force, while imperfect, were not manifestly unjust, than in just war terms that body possessed (and possesses) the right to serve as a legitimately recognized authority able to sanction acceptable uses of force and prohibit unacceptable ones as it saw fit. Though in other respects, such as his contention the traditional basis of just war theory in the universality of natural law should be replaced by a robust emphasis on advancing and defining individual rights, Walzer’s take is decidedly less orthodox.

Chapter 3

Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars

1 These four traditions are loosely oriented around culture (Geertz, 1973; Skocpol, 1985; McAdam, 1994); cognition (Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1995); dramatistic and rhetorical analysis (Edelman, 1988; Burke, 1989; Gusfield, 1989); and repertoires of contention and action (Tilly, 1993, 1995; Tarrow, 1993). 2 See, for example, Benford (1992) on the complex interactions between the vocabularies of motive associated with the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s and the original diagnostic frame that movement leaders generated. 3 The harmony or disharmony of these frames at the elite level, and the interface of ‘official’ (governmental) and public frames, each represent junctures for the generation of feedback to be circulated back to the relevant decisionmakers (as well as other opinion-leaders). See Entman (2004: 4–17). 4 As Druckman (2001: 1045) notes: ‘Instead of viewing framing effects as evidence of unilateral elite manipulation, I suggest that framing effects may occur because citizens delegate to ostensibly credible elites to help them sort

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through many possible frames. In this portrayal, people turn to elites for guidance and they are thus selective about which frames they believe—they only believe frames that come from sources they perceive to be credible.’ Among some notable examples of frames interpreted as sufficiently representative of this ‘master frame’ status in the view of those who most closely study framing are the rights frame (Williams and Williams, 1995; Valocchi, 1996), the injustice frame (Gamson et al., 1982; Carroll and Ratner, 1996), and the hegemonic frame (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993). The advancement of such a decidedly constructivist interpretation of what constitutes a ‘just war’ should not be interpreted as a rebuke of the concrete and measurable concepts and propositions at the heart of just war theory or the tradition subsuming it. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. With respect to the central focus of this research (the war-decision) as well as the conduct and termination of war, the just war tradition has clearly promulgated and sustained a set of enduring moral and ethical standards. From the necessary (but not sufficient) catalytic criterion of ‘just cause’ through concerns with proportionality and discrimination on the battlefield and the proper dispatch of the vanquished after the war’s cessation, those standards have remained consistent and coherent even amidst centuries of efforts to apply them in a social context; there is, in fact, a ‘there’ there. Yet it is the applied dimension of the entire just war enterprise, and the mutability that defines that application, which makes just war theory and the narrative tradition enveloping it particularly useful for this analysis. Setting the tone for centuries of American foreign policy to come, Paine argued that the otherwise vile institution of war provided a legitimate means to advance the cause of national liberation—including, of course, the revolution against imperial Britain to which he was committed. Paine contended that the liberation of society from the domination of oppressive and illegitimate state power was a moral duty. Drawing upon an expanded notion of self-defense and making an explicit appeal to natural law (both prominent features of the just war narrative before and since), he argued that it was in the common interest of humanity, and in the particular interests of liberal society, to aid threatened nations in repelling invasion and throwing off the yoke of colonial rule (Keane, 1995). Modelski defines the sphere of influence as ‘an area in which one great power assumes exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of peace…it denotes a situation in which one power has acquired a monopoly or near-monopoly for its services to that area’ (1972: 156).

Chapter 4

Analyzing the Just War Frame

1 Though both the Augustinian and scholastic traditions did in fact contribute to the development of the jus in bello convention, the concern with conduct in war remained a matter of secondary importance in both the classical and medieval chapters of the just war tradition since, if the criteria at the heart of the jus ad bellum convention were followed, only divinely sanctioned wars (which on the basis of their sanction required little constraint) would be prosecuted in the first place.

234 Notes 2 Reichberg (2002) contends, with appeals to Kant, that Johnson’s ‘basic’ criteria are what really differentiate the just war tradition from cosmopolitanism. I would extend this characterization of the basic category further, in contending that they also distinguish the just war tradition from the idealism of the ‘just peace’ view as well. 3 Doing so would require unfettered access to a small handful of powerful individuals who are not only nearly impossible to interview, but who are highly likely (for a variety of reasons) to have difficulty accurately recalling their thought processes relative to such considerations, and (again, for a variety of reasons) may even in some cases intentionally obfuscate their logic and reasoning should they be able to recall it accurately. Distortion and/or deception concerning the decision and the event precipitating it is always possible; in few (if any cases) is one individual the only actor with significant impact on major decisions such as overseas military deployments; such events are rare and beyond the reach of most researchers, and even when they occur within the ‘fog of war’ usually leave one with as many questions as answers. Added to these logistical obstacles is the more fundamental problem that even if the interested researcher were to gain access in order to attempt to evaluate the presence, absence, and relative weight of such criteria, because these criteria turn on assessing the resonance of moral considerations within the perception and cognition of individual decision-makers contemplating war, any findings they produce are necessarily idiosyncratic to the individual concerned and the cognitive and psychological processes by which they operate. As such, any broader generalizations (such as I seek here) would be difficult if not impossible to draw. 4 Walzer, for example, contends that the ‘self-help’ principle has historically been considered the paramount example of a legitimate use of force; even Mill’s entrenched opposition to external interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation explicitly leaves a place for self-defense and self-determination (Walzer, 1977: 87–88; Mill, 1859). 5 As Walzer (1977: 53–55) notes, the right of states to territorial integrity and political sovereignty are derived from the rights of individuals to build a common life and depend on the consent of their members. To the extent that a state seeks to and/or succeeds at protecting the lives and interests of its individual constituents, it should remain beyond (aggressive) challenge by any other state or states. 6 For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical assault (e.g., a violation of territory), but could plausibly be extended to include aggressive verbal overtures (e.g., the impugning of national honor or threats to national sovereignty), trade embargoes and sanctions (acts of aggression against economic activity), and other less direct provocations (Regan, 1996). 7 Far less consensus exists with respect to those revisions to the strict legalist translation of ‘just cause’ introducing the prospects of a just use of military force in anticipation of probable acts of aggression, as a mechanism of counterintervention, and as a means of assistance in the cause of national liberation. While Walzer’s attempt to chronicle such revisions proved vital to the postVietnam War effort at revising just war criteria to fit contemporary dilemmas, the extent of disagreement within the just war tradition over the specification

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of ‘just causes’ necessitates their exclusion from the operationalization of the just war frame introduced here. The authority criterion by definition renders the sovereign the sole legitimate conduit for the use of organized violence, thereby reifying the prevailing structure and source of political authority and depriving potential rivals to that authority of any moral basis for forcibly challenging the status quo. As such, the competent authority criterion has proven an invaluable impetus for the consolidation of a Weberian monopoly on coercion critical to the emergence and centrality of the modern state in the prevailing Westphalian arrangement (Johnson, 1981; Phillips, 1984). The degree to which legal instruments such as the UN Charter (see Chapter I, Article 2 and Chapter VII, Articles 39, 42, and 51)—as well as the NATO Charter (Article 2)—betray the influence of the just war tradition is striking. These two instruments articulate a vision of collective security which, like the just war tradition, seeks to maintain the self-help focus consonant with the predominant legalist paradigm, while also affirming the possibility for extenuating circumstances in which the resort to war is permissible beyond immediate self-defense. Accordingly, both charter documents take great care to address the conditions under which such a use of force may be legitimate, thereby not only affirming but essentially claiming competent authority by presenting a hortatory declaration relative to the use of force directed at their constituent member-states (Arend and Beck, 1993). Common examples raised by contemporary just war theorists include the use of military force in response to humanitarian suffering (Walzer, 1977) or as part of a major collective security operation such as the Persian Gulf War (Johnson, 1999). This is not to say that the demonstrated commission of such acts—e.g., the extensive targeting of civilians in wartime, systematic violent discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, age, or other demographic characteristics, forced imprisonment and torture, etc.—are ‘evil’ in an epistemological sense (which is a philosophical concern outside the bounds of this research), but rather that they are likely to be understood and more importantly represented as such by the decision-makers of concern in this analysis. This translation of competent authority refers to authority imparted by a sovereign state that is itself a target of ‘wrongful attack’. For the purposes of this analysis, target state authorization is sufficiently represented either in the form of a direct invitation or request for military response from the US, or through an indirect invitation or request extended through a legitimate intermediary (an IGO, RGO, or another sovereign state). As Miles and Huberman (1994: 25) note, qualitative case study analysis by definition attempts to explain a ‘phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context’ (emphasis added). Thus it is crucial to establish that phenomenon by denoting what falls outside that ‘bounded context’. For a related rationale in a similar analytical domain, see Western (2005). One can point to recent operational designations such as Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq), Operation Restore Freedom (Afghanistan), Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) or to allegorical flourishes proclaiming the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ in the world for telling (if anecdotal) evidence to that effect.

236 Notes 16 This definition, which builds upon preceding analyses of international and foreign policy crises by Hermann (1969), Snyder and Diesing (1977), Lebow (1981), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), and others provides the best and most parsimonious elaboration of the phenomenon. 17 As such it is clear that resulting analysis must be singly concerned with the framing of the affirmative war-decision for the duration of the crisis, in order to ensure both the internal and external validity as well as reliability of this inquiry and its findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Mintz et al., 2006; Hudson and Butler, 2010). 18 Though these basic limitations do not limit the possibility that the findings of this study may prove applicable to other liberal societies, and/or to other historical time periods. 19 However, application of this criterion does not itself narrow the scope of the population too greatly, in that the use of military force in response to foreign policy crisis is a rather frequent practice by the US (Huth, 1998; Meernik, 1996; Regan, 1996). Indeed, in consulting the latest (v.10.0) iteration of the ICB dataset, over 20 per cent of all crises occurring since 1945 have featured some direct application of military force by the US (CICDM, 2010). 20 The start date of 9 November1989 was utilized as a proximate date for the start of the post-Cold War era; that date representing the date of record with respect to the breaching, en masse, of the Berlin Wall. It is also important to mention here that the satisfaction of the three necessary and sufficient conditions for a foreign policy crisis for the US does not exclude other states from experiencing a foreign policy crisis in relation to the same crisis event, either simultaneously or at some other juncture still within the defined temporal bounds affixed to the crisis (e.g., the first foreign policy crisis experienced by the US after 9 November 1989, over Panama, was also a crisis for Panama). 21 Since 1989, there were two cases in which the US employed an overt direct use of military force, but was not itself a direct crisis actor (hence requiring exclusion of these cases from the population of concern here): YUGOSLAVIA II: BOSNIA (1992), and IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE (1992). 22 Employing crisis variables such as this one as sorting devices has the additional benefit of allowing for some consideration of the relationship between the just war frame and manifest features of the crises (such as the object of the gravest threat within the crisis) featured within the crises selected for analysis. 23 While to some degree this selection criterion seemingly overlaps with the main selection criteria (US direct crisis actor and US overt direct military force), applying this condition does help further delimit prominent cases of crisis while also distinguishing (at least to a degree) between crises in which the US was bound and determined to render an affirmative war-decision from the outset regardless of the gravity or severity of the crisis and those in which the affirmative war-decision was somewhat more of a response to crisis events. To that effect, two cases satisfy these two main selection criteria, but do not feature a sufficiently ‘grave’ threat as the trigger to the crisis, and are thus excluded from the analysis: US EMBASSY BOMBINGS (1998), and UNSCOM IIOPERATION DESERT FOX (1998). 24 This crisis would seem, at least anecdotally, suitable for examination in light of the just war frame, given the extensive and elaborate (and sometimes internally contradictory) rationale advanced by the Bush Administration in justify-

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ing a resort to war (Butler, 2007). However, the extent to which the resort to war was a fait accompli—as reflected in the reality that the crisis itself was precipitated by the US—renders the case too idiosyncratic for inclusion in a comparative, multi-case study research design. There is a clear and not insignificant ‘gap’ between the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Kosovo (1999) cases. I attribute this inter-regnum to two factors: one, the disproportionate effect of the Somalia debacle and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25 in 1994, which expressly limited US military intervention during the middle years of the Clinton presidency; and two, the limitations associated with the self-imposed requirement of variance in party in power, which require selection of a case occurring during the Clinton years which also satisfies the other primary and secondary selection criteria. ‘Speech-acts’ were readily available from a variety of sources, including (but not limited to) official government websites associated with the Office of the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and so forth, including both current and archived sites (maintained both by the agencies themselves, as in the case of the Department of State, or through use of the Internet Archive search tool). Particularly valuable were the extensive web-based collections maintained by NARA (archives.gov), DOD (DefenseLINK), and the Department of State (Office of the Historian, as well as the Foreign Relations of the United States, or FRUS, archive housed by the University of Wisconsin) and the FOIA Electronic Reading Room maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Several academic and other non-governmental collections were invaluable as well, again including (but not limited to): the database maintained by the American Presidency Project at the University of California-Santa Barbara, and in particular the ‘Papers of the Presidents’ archive; the holdings of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia; the National Security Archive, maintained at George Washington University; the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and the various national security-related documents and statements available at the Federation of American Scientists website. For less readily available ‘speech-acts’, archival research was utilized requiring multiple inperson visits to the National Archives I and II (Washington, D.C. and College Park, MD, respectively), the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.) and the Pentagon Library (Arlington, VA). Speech-acts attributed to the White House Press Secretary, as a constituent of the Executive Office of the President and a direct public outlet of the President, were also considered relevant for inclusion. Secondary concerns include the need for parsimony as well as consistency in the analysis. On the former score, the already extensive array of indicators within the just war frame lend a significant degree of breadth and potential variability to the analysis; seeking to conduct that analysis for multiple foreign policy principals (such as the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser) would be unwieldy, at least within the bounds of a single inquiry. On the latter, the significant variability in the cases selected with respect to the decision-making authority and more importantly (for this analysis) public profile of these foreign policy principals has the potential to undermine the analysis; for instance, the role of Vice President Cheney in

238 Notes framing the US military engagement in Afghanistan was extensive, whereas Vice President Quayle issued no public statements of importance concerning the Persian Gulf crisis. This is a degree of variability which of course does not entail with respect to the President, lending needed consistency to the empirical analysis. 29 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indicators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).

Chapter 5

The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

1 Similar support was extended to these goals and the multinational coalition assembled in pursuit of it through a resolution by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) following its summit of 22 December 1990. 2 This is reflected in a statement issued by Secretary of State James A. Baker III jointly with his Soviet counterpart (Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze), ‘…today, we take the unusual step of jointly calling upon the rest of the international community to join us in an international cutoff of all arms supplies to Iraq…as for military intervention…the United States has no such plans at this time’ (Los Angeles Times, 1990). 3 Throughout this period, the President made repeated mention of the fact that he was engrossed in Martin Gilbert’s popular history of World War II, The Second World War, as well as what he considered to be ‘uncanny parallels’ between Gilbert’s chronicling of the run-up to WWII and events in the Gulf. 4 The embeddedness of Presidential rhetoric in the language of the ‘just war’—as exemplified in the statements noted here, and more systematically in the analysis that follows—is significant not only for its own sake, but in light of the President’s well-chronicled (and self-acknowledged) struggles with the ‘vision thing’. As Smith (1992) contends, the crisis was perceived by many of the President’s top advisors and to some degree by the President himself as affording an opportunity to address that problem, thereby making the use of just war language and, potentially, the ‘just war frame’ doubly significant. 5 The Munich analogy remained central as well, as is evident later in the same address: ‘…You know, if you look into history, America never went looking for a war. But in World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been stopped. Appeasement leads only to further aggression, and ultimately to war. And we are not going to make the mistake of appeasement again’ (ibid.). 6 This statement was representative of several advanced during Bush’s diplomatic foray through Europe and in particular his Thanksgiving holiday visits to troops stationed in the Gulf, all marked by extensive allusions to various aspects of just war theory, including examples both of just causes and competent authority. 7 The somewhat unusual decision to single out students is comprehensible in light of the looming specter of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, and the desire by the White House to attempt to cultivate support (or at least blunt criticism) from

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populations such as college students and the press that had proven crucial sources of opposition to the war effort a generation hence. For a description of how relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States were collected for this case, see Chapter 4, note 26. A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indicators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, intercoder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). In total, 88 per cent (120/137) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of minimal significance for the frame. Indeed, if one eliminates the 70 days in which no Presidential speech-acts concerning Iraq and the Gulf occurred, the average number of just war significations per day exceeds six (6.22). The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 3.86, with a standard deviation of 3.04. This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the competent authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five respectively). The magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signifiers (23.32) can largely be accounted for by the prominent outlier of the ‘global authority’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers (independent variables) is not significant. These 137 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audience’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refer to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audience; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary and secondary audience(s). Additional speech-acts directed at foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences were also accounted for in the data, though for the most part they reside outside the bounds of this research and provide only minimal contextual information. In this case (Gulf War) in particular they are relatively inconsequential, accounting (combined) for approximately 10 per cent of all 270 just war significations in Presidential speech-acts. Apart from their infrequency, it is also worth noting that the seven ‘just cause’ considerations were in rough proportion to the average across all audiences both for speech-acts directed at a foreign audience and those in which the primary audience was indeterminate.

240 Notes 17 It is also worth noting the finding that claims of ‘self defense’ occurred in a far lower than expected proportion in speech-acts directed at the press—the most commonly targeted domestic audience—thereby providing further evidence of the claim that its abstract quality rendered it of seemingly little use to the Administration, particularly relative to its most frequently targeted audience. 18 Interestingly, the degree of reduced emphasis relative to the general baseline in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders was, in proportional terms, even greater than the enhanced emphasis evident in those directed at the press; the marginal difference was made up by a slightly greater than expected resonance in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign audience—a difference perhaps explained by the Administration’s perception of the likely sensitivity of foreign audiences to a perceived violation of diplomatic custom and norms of diplomatic immunity. 19 The relatively small number directed at the other two audiences (14 per cent, or 18/126, in each instance) requires conditioning any strong conclusions about an enhanced emphasis in either case. 20 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should be pointed out that the average daily number of just war significations contained in Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis was 3.4; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 21 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame. 22 While the actual number of just war significations advanced in March 1991 fell short of the expected value of 105, the total number actually advanced that month (88) equates to about 84 per cent of the expected figure—making the shortfall in December 1990 all the more striking. 23 The third cluster, occurring from 5–7 April 1991, minimally exceeds the threshold both in terms of duration and significations per day. Featuring 18 total significations distributed over five total speech-acts, the essence of this ‘cluster’ was a public effort by the White House to disavow any responsibility for encouraging the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings which engendered brutal reprisals by Saddam’s regime—as reflected in the emphasis on ‘response to/punishment of evil’ and various right intention significations within this cluster. 24 In proportional terms (by month), the distribution of right intention significations hews closely to the larger fluctuations in speech-acts and total significations, with one major exception—March 1991. That month, which featured a relatively low number of speech-acts and just war significations, at the same time accounted for the single largest percentage of right intention significations (25 per cent of all right intention significations advanced during the crisis were advanced in March 1991). This outcome was undoubtedly a function of the impending termination of the crisis and in particular the successful expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, events which triggered repeated significations in Presidential speech-acts affirming the association between the decision to use military force and the pursuit of ‘right intentions’ such as a formal outcome and crisis abatement.

Notes 241 25 This point was stated explicitly by others in the Administration as well; see, for example, NSA Brent Scowcroft’s September 1990 assertion that ‘This [the crisis] represents the first test of our ability to maintain global or regional stability in the post-Cold War era’ (Drew, 1990).

Chapter 6

Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil

1 These two operational monikers refer to the NATO action and the US contingent attached to it (respectively). 2 This was a site to which he returned to celebrate the 500-year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989. 3 The State Department’s dispatch of Taft, given her title and position, hardly seems incidental, especially given the credence that a report issued by a high-ranking official specifically concerned with refugees and displacement would lend to Albright’s public assertions that the situation was devolving toward genocide and therefore justified military intervention. The high-profile mission led by self-described ‘human rights hawk’ (and then Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) John Shattuck to southern Serbia, following closely on the heels of Taft’s mission, can be thought of in a similar vein (Shattuck, 2003). 4 ‘…Does the United States have an immediate, selfish interest in what happens on some lonely road in Kosovo to some poor farm family driving a wagon, with horses that are underfed because they haven’t been able to get food? No. We have…I would argue we have a humanitarian interest’ (Clinton, 1999e). 5 These characterizations were greatly facilitated by the ICTY indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity issued against Milosevic on 27 May 1999. 6 For explication of data collection methods employed in identifying relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States employed in this analysis see Chapter 4, note 26. 7 In total, 67 per cent (112/167) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the analysis the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of frame application. 8 Even in eliminating the ten days in which no Presidential speech-acts concerning Kosovo occurred, the average number of just war significations per day of the crisis increases only slightly, to 2.8/day. 9 The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 1.14, with a standard deviation of 1.05. 10 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the competent authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five respectively). 11 Indeed, the magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signifiers (22.6) can largely be accounted for by the outlier status of the ‘response to/punishment of evil’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers (independent variables) is not significant.

242 Notes 12 See ‘Statement by the European Council concerning Kosovo’, Berlin European Council, 24–25 March 1999; available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html. 13 These 167 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audience’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audience; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary audience. 14 Though a much smaller population of speech-acts, the appearance of ‘just causes’ in speech-acts targeting the mass public (53 per cent, or 17 of 32) was nearly identical in proportional terms to that evident in speech-acts directed at the press, thereby further underscoring the intensive emphasis on these significations relative to speech-acts targeting opinion-leaders. 15 It bears noting here that the relationship of the crisis actors to one another—and in particular the reality of Kosovo as a province within the sovereign borders of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—makes ‘target state authority’ impossible to attain except by the FRY, which of course defies logic in this instance; as such, all allusions to ‘competent authority’ in the speech-acts collected and coded were either global or regional in nature. 16 This increased emphasis bears up in spite of the fact that all else being equal, as was discussed above, ‘just causes’ are more likely to be invoked in speechacts directed at opinion-leaders. 17 Though not audiences of particular concern here—and representing less than 10 per cent of the entire population of Presidential speech-acts advanced during the Kosovo crisis—it is interesting to note that the overriding if not monolithic emphasis on the response to/punishment of evil signification, while not evident in other domestic audiences, is also reflected in speech-acts directed primarily at foreign (non-US) audiences as well as those in which a single target audience was not discernable. 18 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations contained in Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis was 2.4; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 19 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame.

Notes 243 20 Also relevant here are the relatively high number of speech-acts (eight) featuring one or more frame significations during this three day period. 21 One key qualifier here is the muted overall response to the crisis by the President, irrespective of the frame. It is worth recalling here that the total number of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis (167) translates to an average of slightly more than 2 speech-acts per day; further, ten of the 78 days during the crisis featured no Presidential speech-act concerning the crisis at all. 22 Impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives concluded 19 December 1998, while those in the Senate drew to a close on 12 February 1999.

Chapter 7 Justice

Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite

1 It should be noted that the ICB dataset also considers the AFGHANISTAN–USA crisis to satisfy the conditions for a foreign policy crisis for the UK (which immediately pledged support in finding the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks), Afghanistan (where the ruling Taliban regime, playing host to al-Qaeda leadership, was immediately identified as a facilitator of the attacks) and Pakistan (for whom the stakes of any direct action in Afghanistan had direct ramifications, given the country’s geographic and political proximity to Afghanistan and the Taliban, respectively). 2 Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism remains the most complete treatment of the dominant discourse advancing the GWOT. Thus the author’s contention that ‘in examination of over 300 pages of speeches by dozens of different speakers, from the president to ambassadors, and covering more than two years, I found virtually no instances of deviation from the primary narratives…’ (2005: 154) is especially telling in this regard. 3 The use of such moralistic appeals to define 9/11 as a pivotal event in a larger struggle of good versus evil (e.g., the first volley in a ‘just’ if metaphorical war) was hardly limited to the President. In addressing those assembled at a memorial service to the Pentagon victims a month after the 9/11 attacks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld underscored not only the heroic nature of the victims, but by extension the virtuous nature of the American character and spirit more broadly: ‘We remember them as heroes. And we are right to do so. […] “He was a hero long before the eleventh of September,” said a friend of one of those we have lost—“a hero every single day, a hero to his family, to his friends and to his professional peers.” […] About him and those who served with him, his wife said: “It’s not just when a plane hits their building. They are heroes every day.” Heroes every day…we are here to affirm that’ (Rumsfeld, 11 October, 2001b). 4 In a similar vein, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to terrorism as a ‘scourge’ (Powell, 2001), while Secretary Rumsfeld characterized terrorism as ‘a cancer on the human condition’ (Rumsfeld, 2001a). In emphasizing this ‘otherness’, Attorney General John Ashcroft characterized terrorists and their supporters as ‘alien’ ‘…Today I’m announcing several steps that we’re taking to enhance our ability to protect the United States from the threat of terrorist aliens…The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force…will ensure that federal

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12 13

14

agencies coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States all aliens who meet any of the following criteria: aliens who are representatives, members or supporters of terrorist organizations; aliens who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity; or aliens who provide material support to terrorist activity (Ashcroft, 2001a). In a wide-ranging interview with Tim Russert of NBC News, Vice President Dick Cheney unequivocally situated the 9/11 attacks relative to this struggle between civilization and barbarism: ‘I think the world increasingly will understand what we have here are a group of barbarians, that they threaten all of us, that the US is the target at the moment, but one of the things to remember is if you look at the roster of countries who lost people in the bombing in New York, over 40 countries have had someone killed or have significant numbers missing…so it’s an attack not just upon the United States but upon, you know, civilized society’ (Cheney, 2001). The fact that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (a.k.a., the NATO Charter) was invoked in support of the first out-of-area offensive deployment in NATO’s history in Afghanistan further underscores both the wide appeal of self-defense as a legitimate grounds for war as well as the degree to which 9/11 and the GWOT were understood in that light. A representative sampling of this rationale was provided by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, ‘I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was passed on the 12th of September, offers all of the legal basis and requirement that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which is the right of self-defense. And we believe the United States was attacked on the 11th of September and that we have a right of self-defense in this regard’ (Grossman, 2001). See Chapter 4, note 26 for an accounting of data collection procedures employed in identifying and obtaining relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States employed in this analysis. A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indicators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). An even more robust 91 per cent (79/87) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of conservatism in analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of minimal significance for the frame. Furthermore, if one rules out the 14 days in which no Presidential speechacts concerning Afghanistan occurred, then the average number of just war significations in days in which Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan were rendered was just over 6 (6.04). The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 3.3, with a standard deviation of 2.0. This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations than the competent authority and right intention criteria. The mean value for all 15 indicators of the just war frame was 19.3, with a standard deviation of 15.2. There was one prominent outlier in the data that

Notes 245

15

16

17

18

accounts for the magnitude of the standard deviation estimate; namely, the just cause signifier ‘Significant power discrepancy between trigger and target’. This long-standing translation of just cause within just war theory intended to reflect the classic ‘bullying scenario’ in which a resort to war would be justifiable to defend a weaker party from a stronger belligerent was never invoked. Its total lack of appearance within the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan is seemingly a by-product of two factors, one logical and the other political. On the former score, the clear asymmetry in power in favor of the US in the crisis makes painting a scenario in which the ‘victim’ was weaker implausible. On the latter score, the Bush Administration’s perception of the gains to be had in portraying the Taliban regime as illegitimate and lacking a base of support within Afghan society (and al-Qaeda as uninvited and unwelcome intruders in Afghanistan) mitigated against such a portrayal. ‘Target state authority’ was completely absent from the data in the early stages of the crisis; as the military campaign progressed (and cooperation between US special forces and Northern Alliance forces increased), the Northern Alliance received occasional acknowledgements in Presidential speech-acts as the rightful and legitimate political authority within Afghanistan. These 87 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audience’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audience; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary and secondary audience(s). However, it should be noted that appeals to ‘competent authority’ were somewhat more frequent in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign audience, appearing in 21 per cent (11/53) of all such speech-acts—though at the same time remaining the least cited of the three jus ad bellum criteria even in speech-acts intended for consumption by non-US audiences. The employment of the ‘property/persons seized’ signification can be explained largely by allusions to the loss of life and property associated with the 9/11 attacks, as well as to a high profile episode involving the detainment of two young American relief workers by the Taliban during the crisis. Apart from the ‘power discrepancy’ translation of ‘just cause’ which (as mentioned above) was never employed, the ‘territory seized’ translation was also very sparingly used, on only three occasions—all early in the crisis, in conjunction with Presidential speech-acts portraying the 9/11 attacks as attacks on the territorial integrity of the United States. Clearly this signification was rendered irrelevant as the military engagement in Afghanistan proceeded.

246 Notes 19 It is important to note that these figures also include speech-acts directed at foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences; whereas the various just cause significations directed at foreign audiences were in rough proportion with the average across all audiences, sizable divergences from the average (towards ‘response to/punishment of evil’, and away from ‘direct violent crisis trigger’) emerged in speech-acts directed at multiple audiences—with the important caveat that this was by far the audience category with the lowest number of observations. 20 In relation to speech-acts directed at the public, some of the ‘slack’ from the diminished use of the ‘formality of outcome’ signification, as well as the complete absence of the two significations related to the perception of the effects of the affirmative war-decision by other actors (namely, ‘post-hoc satisfaction’ and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’), was taken up by the fundamental competent authority claim of ‘last resort’, which was employed almost twice as often (15 per cent, v. 8.6 per cent) in speech-acts directed at the mass public as was true on average across all audiences. 21 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations contained in Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan was 4.7; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 22 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible effects on the just war frame, the unit of analysis was days. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated, as were the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame coded here. 23 The second ‘cluster’, consisting of 21 total just war significations advanced during the period 19–21 October, also could be readily explained by empirical events—in this case, the use of the just war frame came largely (though not exclusively) in speech-acts directed at a foreign (non-US) audience, in conjunction with efforts to attract diplomatic support from foreign leaders at APEC’s ‘Shanghai summit’.

Conclusion 1 Of course, this ‘subversion’ can prove dangerous if it leads to the fetishization of the frame itself. As Chong and Druckman (2007) point out, strong and culturally embedded frames may draw their effectiveness from the heuristic function they provide rather than direct information about a problem, event, or decision. In such cases, the rationale for a policy comes to be associated with and advanced through a particular frame only because that frame is known to resonate with one or more audiences of concern, not because the frame conveys useful or relevant knowledge.

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Index ad bellum conventions see jus ad bellum conventions adversarial/boundary frames, 50–1 affirmative war decisions, 85–7, 211, 236n17 see also the war-decision Afghanistan as al-Qaeda sanctuary, 180 crisis profile of, 181t, 243n1 Karzai’s government in, 182 NATO’s deployment in, 244n6 as new war, 218–19 Northern Alliance of, 181, 245n15 public opinion on, 7 summary of, 180–2 Taliban government of, 180–2, 187–8, 206, 208, 245n18 Afghanistan’s just war frame analysis of, 203–7 chronological clusters in, 197, 199, 205, 246n21, 246n23 consistency in use of, 203, 206–8, 214–15 democracy promotion in, 209 focus on ‘evil’ in, 209–10, 243–4nn3–5 just war frame signifiers in, 188–91, 244–5nn10–15 multiple sub-framing of, 208–11 Presidential rhetoric in, 182–8 selection for study of, 92t, 94 speech acts in, 188–9, 199 target audiences in, 191–7, 204–6, 208–9, 220, 245–6nn16–20 temporal dynamics of, 197–203, 205, 246nn21–2 agency, 63 agenda-setting, 50 Albania, 157, 168 see also Kosovo Albright, Madeleine Holocaust parallels for Kosovo of, 174, 241n3 liberal internationalism of, 143, 178

al-Qaeda, 180, 182, 208 American exceptionalism, 67 see also US foreign policy Amos, 20 analysis of the just war frame, 211–22, 225–7 affirmative war-decisions in, 86–7, 211, 236n17 cascade models in, 54, 135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 case selection criteria in, 90–4, 236–7nn19–25 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15, 232n4 data analysis in, 94–8, 237–8nn26–9 dynamism in, 57–8, 212, 213t, 217–19 ex-post facto conditions in, 90 foreign policy crisis settings in, 89–90, 236n16 geographic considerations in, 92 gravity of crisis in, 93, 236n23 jus ad bellum conventions in, 73–9, 80t, 234–5nn2–10 multicase design of, 94–5 operational signifiers of, 16, 79–85 parameters of, 85–90 political party contexts in, 92–3 practical considerations (praxis) in, 71–2, 87 Presidential speech acts in, 96–8, 237nn26–8 salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17 single-frame focus of, 87 triggering entity in, 93–4 US contexts of, 87–9, 236n19 ancient criteria for just war, 19–22 anticipatory self-defense, 76, 234n7 Aquinas see Thomas Aquinas Arab League, 100, 121 Aristotle on justice and just war, 21, 71–2 on social practice (praxis) of war, 71–2, 87

271

272 Index Ashcroft, John, 243n4 Asmus, Ronald, 178 al-Assad, Hafiz, 124 asymmetry in power see power discrepancy atomic weapons, 231n16 attributional frames, 50–1 audience for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 204–6, 208–9, 220, 245–6nn16–20 for Gulf War speech acts, 115–23, 134, 135, 239–40nn15–19 for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 173–4, 242nn13–17 Augustine of Hippo, 19 just war criteria of, 22–3, 26, 73–4 on right intent, 78–9 ‘Two Cities’ notion of, 23 authoritarian regimes, 80t, 82–3, 215–16 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 194, 207, 209, 219 in Gulf War speech acts, 119–20, 134 in Kosovo speech acts, 162, 219 in Libya speech acts, 224 authority see competent authority signifiers Azar, Edward, 218 Aziz, Tariq, 101 Baker, James, 101, 238n2 Bartholomew, Amy, 64 Battle of Kosovo, 141, 241n2 Benford, Robert D. on agency in framing, 63 on frame functions, 52, 232n2 on master frames, 58 Bennett, W. Lance, 96 Bentham, Jeremy, 35, 228n6 Beveridge, Albert, 35, 231n13 Blair, Tony, 143, 178 Blum, Leon, 231n15 Boer War, 35 Bosnia-Herzegovina Dayton Accords on, 142 ethnic cleansing in, 153–5 Boulding, Kenneth, 47

Boxer Rebellion, 35 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 182 Brailsford, H.N., 35 Brecher, Michael, 89, 93, 236n16 Britain, 34, 231nn15–16 Bulgaria, 35 Bull, Hedley, 69 Bush, George H.W., administration credibility problems of, 214 electoral defeat of 1992 of, 139–40 foreign policy crises of, 92t Gulf War rhetoric of, 102–10, 134–8, 238nn2–7 New World Order paradigm of, 107, 134, 136–7, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25 political considerations of, 222 pragmatic policies of, 102 speech acts of, 110–12, 214 see also Gulf War Bush, George W., administration democracy promotion of, 209 focus on ‘evil’ by, 209–10 foreign policy crises of, 92t Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) of, 180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9, 243–4nn2–6 Iraq regime crisis of, 8, 44, 76, 92t, 94, 236n24 political considerations of, 222 Presidential rhetoric of, 13, 182–8 September 11, 2001, attacks, 180, 182, 207, 243n3 speech acts of, 188–9, 199, 214–15, 219, 220 world view of, 208–20 see also Afghanistan canon law, 28 cascade model of frames, 54, 135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 the case for war see the just war frame case studies, 16–17, 90–6 the categorical imperative in early Christian tradition, 22 in Kantian thought, 10, 228n5 centrality of frames, 57 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (NCCB), 43

Index 273 Cheney, Richard, 100, 244n5 Chirac, Jacques, 148–9 Chong, Dennis, 55, 246n1 Christian tradition Aquinas’s exploration of intent and consequences in, 23–5, 26 Augustine’s criteria for war in, 22–3, 26 Crusades in, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 neo-scholastic pragmatism in, 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 in secularized law of nations, 27–30 chronological clusters in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, 199, 205, 246n21, 246n23 in Gulf War speech acts, 123, 240n20 in Kosovo speech acts, 166–8, 242n18 Cicero, 229n2 Clausewitz, Carl von on public opinion, 9, 12–13 on warfare, 3–4, 32–3, 218 Clinton, Bill, administration, 237n25 foreign policy crises of, 92t impeachment of, 177, 243n22 Kosovo rhetoric of, 144–56, 175, 241n4 liberal internationalism under, 143, 178 political considerations of, 222 Rwandan policies of, 178, 225 speech acts of, 156–9, 214–15, 219, 221 US embassy bombings crisis, 92t, 177, 236n23 see also Kosovo Coalition for a Realist Foreign Policy, 209–10 Cobden, Richard, 35 Cohen, Marshall, 43 Cohen, William, 143 Cold War era, 40–4 collective security in, 77–8, 235n9 proliferation of armed conflict following, 2 restraint orientation of just war tradition in, 40–1, 44–5 UN Charter in, 41, 232nn18–20

Walzer’s theory of aggression in, 42–3, 232n21 see also post-Cold War era competent authority signifiers, 74, 76–8, 80t, 83, 235nn8–10, 235n12 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 193, 195, 201–2, 204, 245n17, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 116–18, 120–2, 130–3, 138 in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8, 161, 163–4, 170–2, 173, 175, 178 consequences, 24 contemporary era see post-Cold War era contested nature of frames, 53–4 Council of Europe on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 100 Kosovo policies of, 158, 163 credibility in frame evaluation, 55–6, 232n4 of the just war frame, 212–15 crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5 in Gulf War speech acts, 221–2 in Kosovo speech acts, 165 Crusades, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 Dayton Accords, 142 decision-making see frames/framing Declaration of St. Petersburg, 230n9 defensive war, 25–7 see also self-defense De Indis et De Jure Belli (Vitoria), 25–6 De Jure Belli (Gentili), 29 destruction of property see persons/property seized Deuteronomy, 20 diagnostic frames, 50–1 Diesing, Paul, 236n16 direct violent trigger, 80t, 81 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 195, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 118–19 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–2 in Libya speech acts, 224 discordant frames, 59 discrepancies in power see power discrepancy

274 Index Downs, Anthony, 55 Doyle, Michael, 11, 43 Druckman, James N., 55, 232n4, 246n1 dynamism in frame evaluation, 57–8 of the just war frame, 212, 213t, 217–19 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 67 Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 43, 207 empirical credibility, 56, 213 see also credibility Entman, Robert M., 49 cascade model of frames of, 54, 135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 on cultural resonance of frames, 57 on foreign policy framing, 64 evil action, 80t, 82–3, 215–17, 235n11 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 194, 207–8, 219, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 118, 119–20, 134 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–3, 173–5, 177–8, 219, 242nn16–17 subjectivity of ‘evil’ in, 215–16 exclusivity of frames, 58 experiential commensurability of frames, 57 extensity of just war significations in Afghanistan speech acts, 193–4, 197 in Gulf War speech acts, 115–20, 138 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–4 fascism of the 1930s, 37–8 fearmongering, 208, 219 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia see Yugoslav wars ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ (Mill), 4 Fiss, Peer C., 63 Fitzwater, Marlin, 103 flexibility of frames, 58 foreign audiences for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 245nn16–17, 246n19

for Gulf War speech acts, 115t, 239n16, 240n18 for Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t, 173, 242n13, 242n17 foreign policy crisis settings, 89–90, 236n16 foreign policy decisions, 60–3 high stakes and low salience in, 60–1 political opportunity structure in, 62 public rationale of, 61 see also US foreign policy formal outcomes, 80t, 84–5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 196–7, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 120, 135–6 frames/framing, 16 analytical uses of, 48–9 broad social context of, 50 cascade model of, 54, 135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 consistency in, 56 contestation and signification in, 53–4 core functions of, 51–2 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15, 232n4 criteria for evaluation of, 54–60 cross-disciplinary use of, 46–9, 232n1 cultural factors in, 62–3 dynamism of, 57–8, 212, 213t, 217–19 failures of, 59–60 in foreign policy decisions, 60–3 impact of ideology on, 62–3 individual agency in, 63 master frame status of, 58–9, 233n5 potential subversiveness of, 215, 246n1 process of, 52–4 production of meaning in, 51 purposive vs. effective use of, 138, 221–2 salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17 terminology used in, 50 valence issues in, 53

Index 275 vs. agenda-setting, 50 vs. priming, 49–50 vs. schema, 49 see also the just war frame France, 230n11, 231nn15–16 Franco-Prussian War, 230n11 function(s) of frames, 50 Gaddafi, Moammar, 2, 222–7 Gamson, William A., 50, 62 Geneva Convention, 30 Gentili, Alberico, 27–30 George, David Lloyd, 35 Gilbert, Martin, 238n3 Gladstone, William, 34–5 global authority, 80t, 83 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 195, 219 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 120–1, 134–5 in Kosovo speech acts, 221 ‘Global Views’ survey, 7–8 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9, 243–4nn2–6 Goffman, Erving, 47, 53 gravity of crises, 93, 236n23 Greek traditions of just war, 19–22, 73–8, 229n3, 233n1 Green, T.H., 35 Gregory VII, Pope, 28 Grossman, Marc, 244n7 Grotius, Hugo, 27–30 Gulf Cooperation Council, 102, 121–2 Gulf War, 237n25 as anachronistic, 217–18 crisis profile of, 99t Iraqi transgressions in Kuwait during, 134 multinational coalition in, 101, 238n1 Saddam’s post-war reprisals in, 114, 136, 240n23 summary of, 99–102 Gulf War’s just war frame analysis of, 131–8 chronological clusters in, 123, 240n20

inconsistency and incoherence of, 138–40, 176, 214 just war frame signifiers in, 112–14 Presidential rhetoric in, 102–10, 134–8, 238nn2–7 selection for study of, 92t, 94 speech acts in, 110–12, 221, 239nn8–14 target audiences in, 115–23, 134, 239–40nn15–19 temporal dynamics of, 123–31, 134–5, 240nn20–4 Hague Convention, 30 Haiti invasion, 92t Hammurabi’s Code, 228n5 Hart, Gary, 224–5 Hebraic traditions of just war, 19–22 hegemonic power frame, 34–6, 233n5, 233n8 Henkin, Louis, 40 Herman, Charles F., 236n16 Hezbollah, 76 Hirsch, Paul M., 63 history of just war theory, 15–16 in the Cold War era in, 41–5, 232nn18–21 in early Christian tradition, 22–5 in Hebrew and Greek traditions, 19–22, 73–8, 229n3, 233n1 law of nations and nature in, 27–31 the liberal contradiction in, 34–6, 230–1nn11–14 in medieval neo-scholasticism, 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 in the modern era, 33–9, 231n13 positivist legal framework of, 30–3, 37, 230n9 in the post-Cold War era, 43–5, 68, 71–2 raison d’état doctrine in, 31–3, 37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 in Roman tradition, 21, 229n2 as social narrative, 18, 228–9n1 in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71, 221–2, 233n7 in the world war era, 36–9, 44, 231nn15–16

276 Index Hobbes, Thomas, 33 Hobson, J.A., 35 Holbrooke, Richard, 143–4 Holy Roman Empire, 26–7 Hosea, 20 Howard, Michael, 38, 64 Huberman, A. Michael, 235n13 Hume, David, 229n4 Hurd, Ian, 6 Hussein, Saddam, 100–1, 102, 114, 136, 216, 240n23 see also Gulf War the ideological conflict frame, 68, 69 ideology, 62–3 implementation of war, 9 in bello concerns see jus in bello conventions inclusivity of frames, 58 inducing frames, 59 the injustice frame, 233n5 injustice frames, 50 intensity of just war significations, 221–2 in Afghanistan speech acts, 194–7, 205 in Gulf War speech acts, 116–23, 138 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–5 intent see right intention signifiers internal harmony of claims, 56, 213 International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, 91 on Afghanistan crisis, 243n1 on gravity of crises, 93 on US uses of military force, 236n19 international public law, 27–31 intra-state wars, 218–19 Iran-Iraq war, 100, 107 Iraq Kuwait invasion by, 99–102 no-fly zone crisis in (1992), 236n21 regime crisis in (2002), 8, 44, 76, 92t, 94, 236n24 Saddam’s post-Gulf-War reprisals in, 114, 136, 240n23 war with Iran of, 100, 107 see also Gulf War

Isaiah, 20 Israel, 76 Jackson, Richard, 184, 243n2 Jasper, James M., 62 Jentleson, Bruce W., 228n4 Johnson, James Turner, 229n6 on just cause for war, 76, 234n2 on just war tradition, 15–16 jus ad bellum conventions, 19, 39, 65, 73–5 basic criteria of, 234n2 competent authority in, 74, 76–8, 80t, 83, 235nn8–10, 235n12 historical articulation of, 73–4, 233n1 hope for success in, 74–5 just cause in, 74, 75–6, 80t, 81–3, 234nn4–7 in just war frames see the just war frame liberal thought on, 38–44 neo-scholastics on, 25 in positivist raison d’état thought, 32–3 proportionality of ends desired in, 74–5 prudential criteria in, 234n3 right intention in, 74, 78–9, 80t jus in bello conventions, 19, 20, 39–41, 65, 230n9, 233n1 Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer), 41–3 just cause signifiers, 74, 75–6, 80t, 81–3, 215–17, 234nn4–7 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–7, 201, 202, 204–6, 219, 245n18, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 114, 116–18, 130–4, 138, 218–19, 239n16 in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8, 161–5, 170–5, 219, 242n14 the just war frame, x, 11–15, 63–70, 211–22, 225–7 in Afghanistan see Afghanistan’s just war frame analysis of see analysis of the just war frame case studies using, 16–17, 90–4

Index 277 contradictions in see the liberal contradiction defining parameters of, 72–9 fearmongering in, 208, 219 function of, 71–2 in the Gulf War see Gulf War’s just war frame hegemonic power alternative in, 68–9, 233n8 ideological conflict alternative in, 68, 69 importance of, 71 intent and consequences in, 24, 221–2 in Kosovo see Kosovo’s just war frame legitimacy considerations in see legitimacy moral language in, 13–14 non-signification in, 221–2 operational signifiers of, 16, 79–85 in politics of signification, 18 role of tradition in, 15–16, 18 in selling of war, x–xi, 85–6 as a social construct, 14–18, 64–6, 68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 structural realist alternative in, 68 underlying assumptions in, 12–13 use of frames/framing in see frames/framing US use of, 13–14, 66–71, 79, 211–22 just war theory ad bellum criteria in, 19, 65 in bello criteria in, 19, 65 historical overview of see history of just war theory importance in the US of, x, 13–16, 71 jus ad bellum criteria in, 73–9 language and rhetoric of, 13–14 post bellum criteria in, 44, 65 in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71, 221–2, 233n7 war-decision law in, 5–6, 15–16, 133, 211 just war tradition see history of just war theory; the just war frame

Kahneman, Daniel, 47–8 Kaldor, Mary, 218 Kant, Immanuel on asocial sociability, 228n3 the categorical imperative of, 10, 228n5 on war and peace, 3–4, 34, 234n2 Karzai, Hamid, 182 Kellogg-Briand pact, 37 Kennedy, John F., 67 kidnapping see persons/property seized Kinder, Donald R., 50 Klandermans, Bert, 49 Kosovo, 237n25 crisis profile of, 145t ethnic cleansing in, 144, 147–8, 177–9 ethnic makeup of, 141 Military Technical Agreement on, 155, 164 as new/intrastate war, 174–5, 218–19 parallels with Holocaust of, 174–5 Rambouillet talks on, 144, 148–9 summary of, 141–4 Kosovo’s just war frame analysis of, 172–5 chronological clusters in, 166–8, 242n18 just war frame signifiers in, 157–9 limited, prudent, and effective use of, 176–9, 214–15, 243n21 muted and limited application of, 173–6 Presidential rhetoric in, 144–56, 241n4 selection for study of, 92t, 94 speech acts in, 156–7, 173–4, 221, 241nn7–11, 243n21 target audiences in, 159–65, 173–4, 242nn13–17 temporal dynamics of, 165–72, 175, 242–3nn18–20 Kuwait see Gulf War

278 Index language of just war theory, 13–14 last resort, 80t, 83–4 in Afghanistan speech acts, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 122–3, 240n19 in Kosovo speech acts, 149–50 in Libya speech acts, 224 law of nations, 27–30 positivist framework of, 30–3, 37 rise of nation-states in, 30–1, 230nn9–10 ‘The Law of War and Peace’ (Grotius), 29 laws of war, 40–1, 230n9 League of Nations, 36–7, 40 Lebow, Richard Ned, 236n16 Le Droit des Gens (Vattel), 30–1 legitimacy, 5–6, 211 impact on military outcomes of, 9 in just war tradition, 15–16, 34–6, 215, 230–1nn11–12 of organized violence of nationstates, 32–3, 230n10 role of public opinion in, 6–9, 212–13 as social construct, 9–11, 227, 228nn5–6 see also the just war frame Lehrer, Jim, 224–5 Leurdijk, J. Henk, 69 Lewinsky, Monida, 177, 178 the liberal contradiction, x–xi, 3–4, 34–6, 228n4 in France’s Third Republic, 230n11 frequency of war under, 231n14 just war frames in, 11–15 popular support due in, 6–9, 212–13 in radical liberal internationalism, 35–6, 44, 231nn12–13 in US war decisions, 5–6, 10, 88–9, 231n13 the liberal tradition justification of war in, 11–15 Kant’s categorical imperative in, 10, 228n5 peace as normative in, 3–4, 6, 228n3 US reliance on, 66

utilitarianism in, 10, 228n6 in Western nation-states see nation-states Libya’s just war frame, 2, 222–7 Locke, John, 229n4 Luard, Evan, 68–9 Lupia, Arthur, 56 lying/deception, 12, 208 Macedonia, 145, 157, 168 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 29 mass public audiences of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 206, 220, 246n20 of Gulf War speech, 115–23, 135, 240n19 of Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 173, 242n14 master frames, 58–9, 63, 233n5 Mayer, Margit, 64 McKinley, William, 35 Mearsheimer, John J., 67, 208 media see press audiences Meyer, David S., 62 Miles, Matthew B., 235n13 military regimes, 80t, 82–3 Mill, John Stuart, 4, 35, 228n6, 234n4 Milosevic, Slobodan, 216 celebration of the Battle of Kosovo by, 141–2, 241n2 indictment for war crimes of, 155, 241n5 see also Kosovo Modelski, George, 68, 233n8 modern era collective security systems of, 36–7, 40, 77–8, 235n9 liberal contradictions in, 34–6, 230n11 liberal internationalism in, 35–6, 44, 231nn12–13 liberal interventionism under, 36–7, 38 self-determination and anarchy of, 33–7 world wars of, 36–69, 231nn15–16 see also Cold War era Modigliani, Andre, 50 Monroe Doctrine, 67

Index 279 Montesquieu, 64 Morgenthau, Hans J., 4, 15, 69 motivational frames, 52 Mubarak, Hosni, 124 Mueller, John E., 6 multiple audiences of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 245n16 of Gulf War speech acts, 115t, 239n16 of Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t, 173, 242n13 Münkler, Herfried, 218

primacy of justice in, 229n4 of UN Charter’s non-intervention doctrine, 41, 232n18 Nazism, 38–9 neo-scholastic parameters of just war, 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 New Whiggery, 35–6 New World Order, 107, 134, 136–7, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25 The Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 72 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 4 non-intervention doctrine, 3, 40–1, 232n18

narrative fidelity of frames, 57 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 43 national interest see social practice of war national liberation wars, 231n12 nation-states affirmation of sovereign power in, 31, 33, 37, 77 inter-state wars among, 36–9, 218 laws of war among, 40–1, 230n9 legitimate organized violence of, 32–3, 230n10 the liberal contradiction of just war in, 34–6, 230–1nn11–14 natural law of, 27–31 raison d’état doctrine of, 31–3, 37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 self-determination and anarchy of, 33–4, 37 the social contract in, 34–5, 77 Treaty of Westphalia of, 31–2, 34 NATO collective security focus of, 163–4, 244n6 Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil of, 143–4, 151–5, 158, 163, 174, 176 Operation Unified Protector of, 2, 222–7 natural law nation-states under, 27–31, 230n9 Paine’s evocation of, 233n7

Obama, Barack, administration Libya operation of, 2, 222–7 obsolescence of war notions, 1–2, 228n1 offensive wars, 25–7 Omar, Mullah Muhammad, 180, 216 operationalizing of the just war frame, 16, 79–85 Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil, 141, 151–5, 174, 241n1 see also Kosovo Operation Desert Fox, 92t, 236n23 Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 100–1 see also Gulf War Operation Desert Strike, 92t Operation Determined Falcon, 143–4 Operation Enduring Freedom/Infinite Justice, 180 see also Afghanistan Operation Infinite Reach, 177 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 235n15 Operation Just Cause, 235n15 Operation Noble Anvil, 165 Operation Restore Freedom, 235n15 Operation Restore Hope, 235n15 Operation Unified Protector, 2, 222–7 opinion-leader audiences for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 206, 245n16 for Gulf War speech, 115–23, 240nn18–19 for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 161, 173–4, 175, 242n13, 242n16

280 Index opposition to war decisions see public opinion outcomes see formal outcomes pace of crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 196–7 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 Paine, Thomas, 66–7, 233n7 Panama invasion, 92t peace as normative in the liberal tradition, 3–4, 6, 228n3 in notions on the obsolescence of war, 1–2, 228n1 Peace of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 Persian Gulf War see Gulf War’s just war frame persons/property seized, 80t, 81–2 in Afghanistan speech acts, 207, 245n18 in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 119, 218–19 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 Petersen, J.H., 68–9 Plato, 21–2, 71–2, 229n3 political opportunity structure, 62 political parties, 92–3, 237n25 political science scholarship see frames/framing Polk, James K., 67 positivism, 30–3 affirmation of sovereign power under, 31, 33, 37, 77 raison d’état doctrine under, 31–3, 37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 post bellum criteria, 44, 65 post-Cold War era armed conflict of, 2 the just war conversation in, 43–5, 68, 71–2, 212–22 the liberal contradiction in, 5–10, 88–9, 212–13, 231n13 liberal internationalism in, 143, 178 new war dynamics of, 174–5, 218–19 US use of force in, 87–9 see also the just war frame

post-hoc satisfaction, 80t, 83–5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14, 126 in Kosovo speech acts, 174 Powell, Colin, 100, 138, 243n4 power discrepancy, 80t, 81 in Afghanistan speech acts, 193, 244n14, 245n18 in Gulf War speech acts, 114, 118–19, 135 praxis, 21, 71–2, 87 pre-emptive wars as anticipatory self-defense, 76 Crusades as, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 presidential power, 6 Presidential speech acts, 96–8, 237nn26–8 of Barack Obama, 222–4 of Bill Clinton, 156–9, 214–15, 219, 221 of George H.W. Bush, 110–12, 214 of George W. Bush, 188–9, 199, 214–15, 219, 220 press audiences, 135 for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 204–6 for Gulf War speech acts directed towards, 115–23, 135, 240n17, 240n19 for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 173–4, 175 priming, 49–50 process models, 49–50, 52–4 prognostic frames, 52 property seizure see persons/property seized prospect theory, 47–8 Psalms, 20 psychology scholarship, 47–8 public opinion opposition to war-making in, 6–9 role in military success of, 9–11, 12–13, 212–13 role of frames in, 61 selling of war in see selling of war see also legitimacy

Index 281 Pufendorf, Samuel, 31 punishment for evil see evil action raison d’état doctrine, 31–3, 37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 Rawls, John, 228n5 Reagan, Ronald, 67 Reagan Doctrine, 69 reduction of tension see tension reduction refugees from post-Cold War wars, 2 regional authority, 80t, 83 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 219 in Gulf War speech acts, 121–2 in Kosovo speech acts, 163–4, 173, 175, 219 in Libya speech acts, 224 Reichberg, Gregory, 234n2 The Republic (Plato), 22 research methodology see analysis of the just war frame response to evil see evil action rhetoric of just war theory, 13–14 right intention signifiers, 74, 78–9, 80t, 83–5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 193, 196–7, 202–3, 204, 206 Aquinas’s introduction of, 24 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14, 116–18, 120, 122–3, 130–1, 132t, 135–6, 138, 221–2, 240n24 in Kosovo speech acts, 158–9, 163, 165, 171, 174 the rights frame, 233n5 rigidity of frames, 58 Robertson, George, 199 Robespierre, 219 Roman church, 19 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 67 Roosevelt, Theodore, 67 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 64 Rubin, Jamie, 178 Rugova, Ibrahim, 141–2, 144 Rumsfeld, Donald, 243n3 Rwandan genocide, 178, 225

salience in foreign policy decisions, 60–1 in frame evaluation, 56–7 of the just war frame, 212, 213t, 215–17 Salih, Ali Abdullah, 102 Sanders, Lynn M., 50 schema, 49 Scheufele, Dietram A., 50, 52 Schröeder, Gerhard, 199 Schwartzkopf, Norman, 138 Scott, Andrew M., 68 Scowcroft, Brent, 241n25 The Second World War (Gilbert), 238n3 Security Council of the UN see United Nations Security Council Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy group, 209–10 seizure of territory, 80t, 81–2 in Afghanistan speech acts, 245n18 in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 113, 118, 218–19 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 self-defense, 25–7 in Afghanistan speech acts, 195, 207 anticipatory forms of, 76, 208, 234n7 Cicero’s views on, 229n2 in Gulf War speech acts, 118, 135, 218, 221, 240n17 in the just war frame, 75–6, 80t, 81, 234nn4–5 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 Paine’s evocation of, 233n7 standard for aggression in, 75, 234n6 UN Charter on, 40–1, 186, 232n18, 244n7 in Walzer’s theory of aggression, 42–3, 232n21 self-determination, 34–7, 231n12 self-help principle, 234n4 selling of war, x–xi, 9–16, 85–6, 211 lying and deception in, 12, 208 moral and utilitarian frameworks for, 10, 228nn5–6

282 Index selling of war – continued political cost considerations in, 12–13 Presidential speech acts in, 6, 96–8, 237nn26–8 as social practice/appeals to national interest in, 9–11, 226–7 see also frames/framing September 11, 2001, attacks, 180, 182, 207, 243n3 Serbia Dayton Accords, 142 independence from Ottomans of, 35 NATO bombing of Belgrade, 157 war in Kosovo of, 141–4, 242n15 Seward, William, 67 Shattuck, John, 241n3 Shaw, Martin, 218 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 238n2 significant power discrepancy see power discrepancy Six Day War, 76 Smith, Jean Edward, 238n3 Snow, David A., 52, 58, 63 Snyder, Glenn H., 236n16 the social contract, 34–5 social practice of war, 226–7 the just war frame in, 14–18, 64–6, 68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 legitimacy considerations in, 9–11, 27, 228nn5–6 sociology scholarship, 47 Solana, Javier, 144 Solomon, Norman, 21 sovereign power, 28–31, 74 as competent authority in war-decisions, 76–8, 80t, 235nn8–10, 235n12 positivist affirmation of, 30–1, 33, 37 of the UN Security Council, 40–1, 77–8, 232n20, 235n10 Spanish-American War, 35 speech acts, 96–8, 237nn26–8 in Afghanistan’s just war frame, 188–9, 199 coding of, 239n9, 239n15, 244n9

in the Gulf War’s just war frame, 110–15, 239nn8–14 in Kosovo’s just war frame, 156–9, 241–2nn7–12 spheres of influence, 233n8 Stake, Robert E., 95 the structural realist frame, 68 Suarez, Francisco, 25–7 Summa Theologica (Aquinas), 23–5 Swart, William James, 58, 217 Taft, Julia, 143, 241n3 Talbott, Strobe, 178 Taliban, 180–2, 187–8, 206, 208, 216, 245n18 see also Afghanistan the Talmud, 19–22 target-state authority, 80t, 83, 235n12 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 245n15 in Kosovo speech acts, 158, 242n14 in Libya speech acts, 224 temporal dynamics of Afghanistan speech acts, 197–203, 205, 246nn21–2 of Gulf War speech acts, 123–31, 134–5, 240nn20–4 of Kosovo speech acts, 165–72, 175, 242–3nn18–20 tension reduction, 80t, 84–5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14 territory seizure see seizure of territory Tewksbury, David, 50 Thatcher, Margaret, 102, 107 theory of aggression, 42–3, 232n21 Thiers, Adolphe, 230n11 Thomas, Helen, 102 Thomas Aquinas on authorization for war, 76 on consequences, 24–6 criteria for just war of, 22–5, 73–4, 75, 78 Tillema, Herbert K., 68 Tito, Josip Broz, 141

Index 283 Tjalve, Vibeke Schou, 4 tradition see history of just war theory Treaty of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 triggering entities, 93–4 Truman Doctrine, 69 Tversky, Amos, 47–8 UNIKOM (UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission), 101–2 United Nations collective security under, 40, 77–8, 235n9 Contact Group on Kosovo of, 142, 144 United Nations Charter just war tradition influence in, 235n9 on non-intervention, 40–1 on self-defense, 40, 186, 232n18, 244n7 United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait of, 100, 101–2, 120, 121, 136, 238n1 resolutions on Kosovo of, 142, 146–7, 164–5 sovereign authority of, 40–1, 77–8, 232n20, 235n10 UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox (1998), 92t, 236n23 US embassy bombings (1998), 92t, 177, 236n23 US foreign policy, 87–9 American exceptionalism in, 67 attribution of ‘evil’ in, 215–17 case studies of, 16–17, 90–6 crisis of legitimacy of the wardecision in, 5–6 expansionist focus of, 67 fundamental liberal contradiction in, 3–4, 228n4 the just war frame in, 13–14, 66–71, 79, 211–22, 233n7 the liberal contradiction in, 212–13 liberal internationalism in, 35–6, 44, 143, 178, 231n13 in Libya, 2, 222–7

role of political parties in, 92–3 uses of military force in, 2–3, 46, 91–2, 235n15, 236nn18–19 wars of choice in, 12 see also Afghanistan; Gulf War; the just war frame; Kosovo utilitarian reasons for military force, 10, 228n6, 229n4 Van Wingen, John R., 68 Vattel, Emerich de, 27–8, 30–1 Veblen, Thorstein, 39 Vietnam syndrome, 135, 136–8, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25 Vietnam War, 41–2, 43, 44 Vitoria, Francisco de, 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 ‘wag the dog’ syndrome, 177 Walters, LeRoy, 229n6 Walzer, Michael, 33, 41–3 on anticipatory self-defense, 208 on self-defense, 234n7, 234nn4–5 theory of aggression of, 42–3, 232n21 the war-decision affirmative war decisions, 85–7, 211, 236n17 crisis of legitimacy in, 4–5 presidential power in, 6 public opposition in, 6–9, 212–13 as social practice, 9–11, 226–7 The War on Terrorism (Jackson), 243n2 war-related deaths, 2 warrior’s code, 19 wars of choice, 12 Weber, Max, 32, 230n10, 235n8 Wilkensfield, Jonathan, 89, 93, 236n16 Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 36–7, 67 Wittkopf, Eugene R. et al., 228n4 Wolff, Christian, 31 world wars of the twentieth century, 36–9, 231nn15–16 World War I, 36, 38, 39 World War II, 38–9, 44, 231n16

284 Index Yeltsin, Boris, 145–6 Yin, Robert K., 95 Yugoslav wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 142, 236n21

in Kosovo, 141–4, 145t, 242n15 see also Kosovo Zald, Mayer, 47 zones of peace, 3