Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War
HISTORY AND WARFARE Arthcr Fcrrill, Series Editor
SOL.DIERS, CITIZENS, AND THE SYMBOLS OF WAR: From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-167 K.C. Allto1110 Sdntosiios\o THE ORIGINS OF WAR: From the Srone Age to Alexander the Great Artlier Fcrriil A HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY: From the Revolutionary War to the Present Jerry K. Sweeney, edltor THE hllLlTARY REVOLUTION DEBATE: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe Clifford j. Rogers, cdrtor SUN I"1N: MILITARY METHODS Kalph l). Sawyer, tmizslator
THE GENERAL'S GENERAL: The Life and Times of Arthur MacArthur Keln~ethRay Youi~g
T O DIE GALLANTLY: The Battle of the Atlantic Tlrnctthy J. Kurlydn arid Jdn hi. Cttpe5, etiitors GOOD NIGHT OFFICIALLY: The Pacific War Letters of a Destroyer Sailor W ~ l l ~ aM. m I\/lcBr~cle SUN-TZU: ART OF WAR lialph I). Sawyer, trarzslator FEEDING MARS: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present Joh11 I ynn, etirtor THE SEVEN MILITARY CLASSICS O F ANCIENT CHINA Kalph 1). Sawycr, tr~?7zslator
Soldiers, Citizens, and the Symbols of War From Classical Greece to Republican Rome, 500-1 67 B.C.
Antonio Santosuosso 71he Urzittersity of Western O?ztario
I
CJXiesyiqy
.
A Meil~berof the I'erseus Boolis C;roup
For Alma with love
History nizd Warfnrc.
All rights rtscrved. Printed in the United States of America. N o part of this publication may be rcproduccci or trailsnlitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, incluciing photocopy, recording, o r any information storage and rctrieval system, without pcrnlission in writing from the publishcr. Copyright O 1997 by Westview I'ress, A hlember of I'erscus Books C;roup Publi\hcd In 1997 111 the Un~tcdstates of Amer~cdby Wcstv~ewPress, 5500 (:cntrdl ilvvcnue, Boulcter, (,olorado 80301-2877, , ~ n dIn the Un~tcdK~ngdomby W \ t v ~ e w I'rcss, 12 I-Ird's Lopre Roaci, <,urnnor 11111,Oxford O X 2 9 J]
I ~brdryof Cotlgrcw C'dt.~log~ng-in-I'ul~l~~dt~o~i Data {antosuosso, Anron~o. Sold~ers,crt~/ens,dncl the svmbols of war : froin clarc~calGreece to repul>l~canliome, 500-1 6 7 l3.c . / Xntonro $antoworso. p. cm.-(H15torv and w'trfarc ser~cs) Inclucle\ b ~ b l ~ o g r a p h ~references cal and mctex. ISI3N 0-8133-3276-1 (hc).-ISBN 0-81 31-3277-X (pb) 1. *Il~litaryhistory-Anc~ent. 2. C,~vrl-n~~litary relatronsHistory. 1. Tttlc. 11. 5er1cs: H~storvand warf;tre. ULY.525 1997 155'.0092-d~LI
97-7294 C11'
The paper used In thir publrcation mcct5 the requirements of the Amcr1cd11N'1t1onal StG1~lclard for I'ermanence of I'apcr for I'rlntccl I ~ b r a r yi\iater~alsZ39.48-1984.
PERSEUS P DEMAND o D ON
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Contents
l i s t of Figures Acknowledgme~zts Introduction 1
Close Array and Pointed Spears: The Ways of the Greek Phalanx War Alnong the Greeks, 7 Weapons and A r r ~ ~ of o r the lloplite, 9 The Hoplite in Battle, 12
2
First Blood on the I'lain of Marathon I'rologi~e, 24 The Eattle, 30
.?I Greeks, I'crsians, and the Syrrtbols of War
A New Invasion, 39 Thermopylae, 42 Salamis, 50 I'lataea, 58 The Persian Arm): 66 Why the Persialls I,ost, 7 2 'I'he Symhols of the Victorious, 74 4
Rich, Poor, and the Wages of War at the End of the Classical Period Sailors and Social Status, 82 Spartan Society, 84 The Mercenary Sy$tem, 88 Hoplites and Light Infantrymen, 93 Thebes's Challenge of Spartan Supremacy, 102
5
Footmen, Horsemen, and the Syinbols of Military Might The Macedonian Army, 110 The Ways of Alexander: Granicus, lssus, and Gaugamela, 120 The Keys of Alexander's Success, 136 Religion, Warfare, and Political Power, 14.3
6
A I'halanx with Joints: The Rornar~sand the Heirs of Alexander Warfare After Alexander, 148 The Roman Military System, 150
War as a Soaal Organ~srn,158 The Leg~onVersus the Phalanx, 160 Hann~balas Alexander's Hew, 168 Hannihal's I'upzl: Scip~oAfricanus, 184 The Deification of the Mllltary Le,ader, 198 Conclusion
Glossary List of Abbreviations Notes Selected Bil>liography About the Book a i d Author Index
110
Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Ancient Greece Marathon, 490 R.C. Marathon, 490 IS.(,.: The Init~alClash t Marathon, 490 B.c.: The L ~ sStq,e
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
Greece, 490-479 IS.(:. Thermopylr~e,480 B.C:. Salamis, 480 R.C.. Plataea, 479 B.(:.
4.1 4.2
Sphacteria, 425 R.C.. Leuctra, 371 1S.C.
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4
Alexander's Route Granicus, 334 IS.(:. Issus, 333 B.C. Gaugarnela, 331 B.(:.
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.1 1 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.1.5 6.16
Cytloscephalae, 197 B.C. Pydna, 168 R.('. Second Punic War Trebi,a, 21 8 l$.<,.:The Rornans Cross the Treb~aRiver Trebia, 2 1 8 R.(:.: The End of the Rattle Cannae, 21 6 1S.C.: 'X'he Inltlal Deploylnerlt Cannde, 216 &.C.: The Defeat of the Roman Cav~llry Cannae, 2 16 R.C..: The Trap Closes Ilipa, 206 IS.(,.: The Init~alStage Ilipa, 206 11.C.: The Ldst Stdge Burning of the Camps, 203 B.(:. Great I'lains, 203 13.c.:The Initial Clash Great Pla~ns,203 l$.<,.:Tlle Last Stage Zarna Campaign, 202 R.C. Zarna, 202 1S.c.: The In~tialDeployment Zam'~, 202 B.C.: The End of H'111nlbal
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Acknowledgments From rrty earltest days, I breathed ancient history. Born in an ancient h~lltown that WAS once llorne to the fiercest enelnies of Rome, the S,~mn~tes, I was surrounded by liv~ngrelnains of the past. Nine ferocious years of 1,atin and five years of Greek at the Liceo Ciassico and later at the university strengthened my interest In ,111tiqu1ty. The ~ ~ n ~ n e dreason ~ d t e for ~ n yretwn to ancient Greece and Italy, after years of t e a c l ~ ~ nand g wrltlng on the Renaissance and rrloderrt Italy, was a very popular course on ancient wartare t h a I ~nrroducedat the Univers~tyof Western Ontario. T h ~ sbook has grown out of that course. It IS intended to enrich the educatson of my students and to appeal to the knowledgeable gcrleral reader with an interest in anclent or ~ n i l l t ~ ~history. ry The cl'assic~sttoo, I hope, n u y find my work of value, for I believe tt offers a fresh look at ltey moments in the rrtilitary history of- the ancient world. Moreover, I have tried to bring together themes usu,~llytre,~ted111 isolation-the mechan~csof the b~ttlefield, soctety, politics, and syrnboltsm. My main sources have been the voice of the past (as understood through the literary, art~stic,and archaeologtcal evidence of the ancient world) and secondary works of recent yeclrs ( p n n ~ ~ ~ n l y those of Engl~sh,Italian, French, Spanish, and German ~cholars).I have used the prirnary sources ruost easily available in translat~onstnce I felt that a philolog~c,~l a p p r o ~ c hwas not appropr1'1te to my ~ntendedaud~enceand to the type of synthests I have attempted to ach~eve.In my endnotes, I have ind~catedonly the rrlatn secondary sources o n which I have relied for a particular type of evidence. The reader should consult the b ~ b h o g r ~ ~ path the y end of the book for a inore extensive list of the sources consulted. I want to thank Peter Kracht, senlor ed~torat Westvtew I'ress, and prof-essor Arther Ferrill, the ed~torof Westv~ew'sHistory and Wc~rfcire Series, for their help and suggestions. Many thanks are also due to others at Westview Press who rrlade the publicatton of rny work ea5y and srnooth, spectfically Rob WiILa~ns,assistant to Peter Kr'lcht; Juha Brooks, Me1,lnie Stafford, and Elizabeth I,awrence, production editors; Joan W. Sherman, copy edltor; and Dannetre I'eterson, cover designer. I also found invaluable the corrlrrtents ofone of Westvtew's rexiers whose n a n e I do not know. In ,~ddition,1 owe a great debt to the students in my course o n anctent warfare with whom I have dtscussed, analysed, and critiozed the ~ d c a scontatned in this book. A number of colleagues hdve read d~fferentversions of my work. I would par-
ticularly like to thank C r a ~ gSimpson of the Departlnent of History at the Untversity of Western Ontarlo for readrng Chapter S and C. I,. Murtson of the Department ot Cl~sslcsfor readlng the tn~tialdraft of the whole rrtanuscript. M y fr~endand colleague T h o n ~ c ~Sea s was of great help in reviewing the entire first draft and, more recently, the lntroductton and conclusion. He also encouraged rrle to continue in ruy er~deavorfrom the very outset. David Mercer of the Cartography Sectio11of the Departlnent of Ckography at the Untversity of Wertern Ontarra drew Figures 2.1, 2.2, 3. l , 3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.3, and 6.14; I drew the rest. The J . B. Srnallrnan Publication Fund of the Social Science Faculty at the University of Western Ontario supported the cost of prepartng the maps. My two sons, Derek and Icevrn, unwrtttngly pushed me toward the corrtpletion of my work-Kevin because of his interest in ancient warfare and Derek because of his degree in hl.story and hts profession as an officer In the Canadian army. The lnernory of Iny father, a hurnble sold~erin an age of ch,aos and a veterail o t the battlefront 111 three fidrs, was probably the onginal inspiration for my interest In warfare. F~nally,I owe by far the greatert debt to Professor Alrna Colk Santosuosso of Wilfrid Laurier Universtty. Alilla supported rrle 111 those dark lnoments when creatlvlty ran dry and rnotlvatlon was low, and she was an affectionate but unbending crrtic of my wrltrng. She read and reread my work, pornting out ways t o Improve ruy etfort. I dedlcate xny book to her with gratitude and love.
Introduction T h ~ book s is '111 attempt to relate \armus aspects of the waging of war from the tifth to tlie ~ n ~ d d of l e the ~ e c o n dcentury R.( ., that is, from classtcal Greece to the Third Macedorltan War of Republican Rome. In the pages ahead, I fill1 analyze a nuinber of ~nterrelatedmatters: how the tact~caland strategic concepts of warfare changed dtlr~ngt h ~ period; s why the W e ~ t un, derstood as Greece, Macedonia, o r Rome, trtuntphed over tlie East, understood as Pers~anso r Carthaglnlans; hofi the role of warrior related to the role of c~tizen;and f~nally,how the symbols and propaganda ~ t e m m i n g trorn war expressed and promoted society's values. The hoplites dom~natedthe battlefields of class~calGreece. They were the backbone of the Great Perstan Wars (490-479 R.('.) and of the Peioponnesian War (431-404 Is.<,.). The hoplite system was the perfect expressroil of the agricultural socletlcs of the permd. Simple and effect~ve,~t placed the safety of the collective entity over that of the ~ndividual.For example, the hopl~tewas armed with a long spear and a large shield, weapons that were effect~veonly if used to protect the fihole 11ne of sold~ers.Other patterns typltied the hopl~tesystem of that age: tile long Irne in w h ~ c heach Inan stood next t o hts netghbor; the rather simple ntotlon of rnoving stra~ght ahead over flat terrain; the m~litarycanon of d l v ~ d l ~the l g ariny 111 three sectors (rtght wing, center, and left wing); the tactlc of posting strength (the right wing) against weakness (the left); the tact that ca~ualtteswere rnodest because the wamors, heakily armored and not p e r ~ n ~ t t et od leave their hne, could not pursue tlietr enelntes effectively; and the unwritten rule that one large pitched battle should decide the war. The hopllte system Inet its first great challenge 11.1 490 B.C. when the tlme came for the Greelts to fend off the Perstans, invaders from across the Yea and men who took a qillte d~fferentapproach to war. The bow arid the horse were supreme among them. The Pers~anlnvaslon was not unexpected. It was, tn part, a matter of revenge for the Pers~any,for the Athenians arid Erethr~anshad helped the Greeks on tlie western seaboard of Asia Mlnor 111 the fight against the Perstans. And ~t was also a irlatter of policy,
2
Introduction
for the Pers~anshad been d ~ r e c t ~ ntheir g attention across the Mellespont into cont~nentalEurope ever since the last two decades of the sixth century. liltirnately, all the Persian znvasion plans would erld in failure. In 492 13.C., the caprices of the weather destroyed most of the Perslan fleet while ~t was lnovlng southward from northern Greece. Two years later, a c o n ~ b ~ n a tion of strategic and tact~calrnistaltes, together with the logist~cweakness of the Pers~ansupply line, doo~nedthe e x p e d ~ r ~ oton falltire on the plains of Marathon. In 480, the Persians brought together tlie largest army the world had ever seen, but the final result, after drarnat~chighs and lows for both contestants, was the same: detcat both In the bloody waters oft S a l a n ~ and ~s on the land near Plataea. The defeat o t the Persians opened a p e r ~ o dof Athenian supremacy over the rest of Greece, but Sparta, p~tentlallyHellas's strongest military state, could not accept the situat~onindefinitely, The second half of the fifth century would see Athens and Sparta and t h e ~ rallies cont~nuouslypitted against each other, wlth the Spartans eventually triumphant. But soon atter, another contender for I~egemonyover Hellas came to the fore-Tliebes. The controntation that ensued ended with a Theban vlctory over the Spartans, who fiere defeated at Leuctra (in 371 13.c.) and a t Mantlnea (1x1 362 B.('.). The most lrnportant developinent of the century following the Great I'ers~an Wars was, however, the challenge brought to the hopltte system by an ~ncreasinguse ot nlercellarles and hy the ~ntroductionot peltdsts and l ~ g h tinfantry. Both groups tended to challenge the traditional concept of the citizen-soldler. Both mercenaries and the peltasts and light infantrymen could be essent~alutlder certain cond~tions,such as those encountered at Sphacterra In 425 R.('. and in the confrontat~onnear Corinth In 390 R.('. Yet in the end, when the outcome mattered rnost, the conservatism znherent in most ~nilltarymatters prevailed: The great battles of the per~odwould primar~lypit hoplrte agalnst hoplite. Tlie battles at Leuctra and Mant~neaalso foresliado\ved the ft~tilrein other ways. At Letictra, the cavalry played a n lnlportant role, atld at Mantlnea, Irght infantry and cavalry troops pinned the Spartan left, malung vrctory poss~ble.Moreover, tlie 'Theban general Eparriiiiondas slio\ved that the once r~gldcanon of rhe hophte system could be altered by attack~ngen echelotz, placing strength agatnst strength, and enhanc~ngthe depth of the forrnatlorl. The lessons that the two battles provided were exploited not In Greece proper but in a state lying a t the 1nargIns of Greek civ~l~irat~on, Macedonia. Macedonia was d~fterentfrorl~inost ot Greece. It had inore resources, a king, a n aristocracy, and a r u l ~ n ggroup that had developed along e t h n ~ c Irnes. Philrp 11 un~tedall rhese elements to create a great and different army. A society struct~iredalong ar~stocraticlines could support a strong cavalry, and a society based o n ethnic prllnacy could also ~naintalrla primary role for the ~nfantry.Wlth the addition of new teclinolog~caland tactical devel-
opments-a long spear (the sarzssa) abt)iit twice tlle length ot tlle hopllte spear, less armor, a subtle integrat~onof niercenarles and allies and of cavalry, heavy troops, and ltght troops-and finally, w ~ t hthe strength of n charismatic ledder like Alexander, the army that took the field for Macedonla was the strongest force that the world had ever seen. The people of Hellas becarue the aggressors and ultilnately subjtigated their Persian toes. The states that emerged after Alexdnder retained most of h ~ in~lltary s Innovattons, though tlie cavalry was much reduced. Yet the future lay not 117 the East but in the West. There, by the t111rd century ILL. and after nlrnost fibe hundred years ot reletltless and not always si~ccessfulwarrlng, Rome emerged as the most powerful regtonal player. Roman intl~taryroots must have come front Greece, whether throtlgh contact with the Greeks settled in southern Italy, Magna Graeaa, or through the Etruscans, but by tlle thud century, Rome's ~nilltaryInstitutions had changed constderably. The Roruans st~llfought In a pha1,lnx forrnat~on,b u r ~t was not the r i g ~ dphalanx of the Greeks o r of the I-Ielletllstic Successors; rather, lt M . ~ sas , EIans Delbruck wrote long ago, a phalanx with jotnts.' The armor, weapon?, and deploynrent were dlfterent as well. Moreover, Rornan soczety was able to recruit large n ~ u n b e r sof soldiers, and because the soclety could absorb enormous casualty ratec;, a stngle encounter would not necessarily decrde a war, as had norrnally been the case In tlie past. The Rorn'ul controntat~ollwlth the heirs of Alexander was ~nebltable. After defeating the vartorIs phalanxes in the second century fairly easily, Rome could clainl that the future belonged not to the army of 12lexander but to the Roman legion. But 111story would s h o ~ that . the true helr ot Alexander was not Pl1111p V, who fought a t Cynoscephalae in 197 R.('., or I'erseus, who fought at Pydna In 168 11.C.. (both were routed by the RoI I ~ ~ I ~ biit S ) , the Carthagi~llangeneral Mannlbal. HIS lnvaslon of Italy during the Second P ~ I I ~War I C (218-201 R.< .) showed that he had mastered the lessons of Alexander. 'The Carthagtn~arlarmy was mobile, with 5 foot soldlers to every horseman by the tilne Hanntbdi arrived on the y l a ~ n sof nortl-iern Italy. He also commanded a large variety of troop types-heavy, light, and, I ~ k eAlexander, a few lnisslle untts as well. Rome was brought to the brmk ot dls'aster with inon~entousdefeats at the Trebta Rtver, Trastmene Lake, and Cannae, leaving thousands of soldiers on the battlefield. But it is a test~nlonialto Rornan res~l~ency that the three great defeats dld not force the Romans t o surrender. In fact, as the war cont~nued, the momentum began to shtft to the Roman side-tn part because of the structure of Rolnnn soclety, iri part hecause of I-lannibal's strategic weakness, and ln part because of the Ron1'1n dttltude to war. In the end, haking learned by bitter experience tlie l e s s o ~ ~given s by Hann~balon the battlefield, the great general Sclpio \vould bring victor) to the Romans. Indeed, he would ult~rn~~tely rout hls unwlttlng tutor Hallnlbal and, In a sense, the Hellenistic system of warfare on the field of Zama In 202 R.('.
4
Introduction
War was ~nextric~~bly t ~ e dto the soci,al structure of classical Greece, the Hellenist~ck~ngdoms,and Republ~canRome. Hopi~tewarfare reflected the classes who owned the state both socially and politrcally. The poor were excluded from servlce, ,111d the role played by the rich was reduced. Inste'd, the crtizen was glorttied. Fore~gnersor ~netnbersof the lower class were enlisted only in emergencies, tor a l l n ~ ~ t eper~od, d and usually In rather "menlal" roles. But wlth the Peloponnes~anWar, 1'11 thls began to ch'111ge. As the battlefield moved to distant theaters, as the terms of servlce grew longer, and as sold~ersfaced the challenges o t ~ ~ n u s uterrain, al a new breed of coinhaunts arr~vedon the scene: the mercen'lry or noncltlzen sold~erand the light ~nfantry~nnn or nonhoplrte. Although the people who owned the state-the hoplites-decided the great controntat~onsof the age tollowing the Peloponnese co~~flicc, nebertheless the b~trlesof Leuctra and Mant111ea marked the end of the citlzen-warrior. The Macedonians also assumed that those who owned the state would man'lge, stage, and light its wars. But the Macedon~anwar n1,achlne was Inore complex than that of tts predecessors. It is best v~sual~zed as a pyra~ n t d In , \vhicli the parameters of differentiation were class and ethn~cbackground. At the top of the pyr,~mldwas the ~'~valry, the Macedonian anstocracy. Just beneath were tlie Macedorilan hoplrtes-the phalangttes. Armed wlth snvzssne and clad in less arrnor than t h e ~ rforerunners, the tootnnen were stlll a crucial part ot the 'Irmy. But the eg,llit,~r~,~~l~sln of the o r l g ~ n ~ l hopl~tephalanx had d~sappearedby tlits tlme. The presence of an authorltarian ruler-the k~ng-fostered a systern ot ru~litarydifterentiation even among the e t h n ~ cMacedon~ans.All ot then1 owned the state after the kmg, but the m~ddlrngelements owned much less than the portlon possessed by tlie aristocracy. The lower levels of the pyramid were o c c ~ ~ p i eby d three other d~stlnctgroups-rnercetl~r~es, light ~nf~~rttrymen, and subject people who fought es~entrallyfor financtal rewards, rather than for the defense of thetr polls, their land, and t h e ~ rfarniltes. The close connectloll between soclal status ,111d md~taryrole was '11s~)the lnaln feature of the army of Republican Rome. Roman soclety was not dominated by the rrt~ddleclasses, like the Greek polezs, or by one clllss, the aristocracy, like Macedonia. Eventually, the R ~ I I I ~ Iaristocracy II had to share power with the commoners. The result was the legion, wh~cliany cttiaen o\vnlng a certatn arnount o t property could join. No\v, the footrrtan was ag'un k ~ n gof the battlefield, but the ,~ristocr,~ts fiho prov~dedleadership fought next to h~ni.(People wtth less than a certatn amount of property were excluded from the legion.) Both comrnon soldiers and tlie~rleaders sh'wed sim~ldrgoals-material rewards, honors (permc~nent among the leadersh~pand temporary among the commoner), and a socially approved opportunity to express the brutal~tythat seemed to typ~tyRoman society at the t1rne.l
There 1s n o better exa~npleot w,Ir as ,I soci'al organism than the war waged by anctent Romans. For them, war not only reflected their lnaln soc ~ a lvalues bur also served as a means to secure prosperity and peace. War fulfilled a psycholog~calneed to use v~olenceatld brut'111ty 111 ,I leg~ti~n'~te way, and at the same tttne, ~tallowed the Romans to attain enr~ch~nent and power. Over time, success on the battlefields \vould w ~ d e nthe gap between mhles and commoners In Roman society, stral~ungthe socl'd fabric. Yet at least lnitlally, war also rel~evedsocleta1 tensions. T h ~ was, s In part, because the arlny was an agent of social ~nobiltty(the person who rose to the rank of cetltw~oncould hope for better s o c i ~status l for h~mselfand h ~ fax1111y). s Furtliermore, the foundrng of new colonles in conquered territories allevlated tile poverty of many Roman cltlr,ens, who were granted lands In the conquered a r e a . T h ~ sprocess prov~deda double benefit: It rnoved to the gerlphery people wlio lnay have played a stlbvers~verole had they stayed near Rome, and ~t rnade the lo\ver classes partners w~tlithe aristocracy in s h , ~ r ~ nthe g spo~lsof war. War also enabled Rome to keep the newly conquered ltalrc people 111 Ilne. The Romans usually srrpported the prllnacy of the natlve aristocracy in the newly conquered states, b t ~ at t the same time, they brought members ot other sectors of the subject populat~on~ n t othe 1' 1ways ongolng confl~ctw ~ t hnewfc)und enelntes of the republtc. In t h ~ smanner, the Ital~cpeople, just I~lzeRoman cltltens themselves, reaped the economlc benefits of a v~ctor~ous and powerful state.' War reflected all the ~najorvalttes of soclety 111 a co~nplexset of symbols. There IS probably no better exaruple of t h ~ sthan the way the victories over the Persians fiere x n ~ ~ r s h ~ in ~ l eclCass~cc~l d Greece both to support the supremacy of Athens over the rest of Greece and to lust~fygortrayiiig the Persians as ~nfer~or. Marathon becarue the symbol of Athens's fight for the treedoln of Hellas as a whole. The Pers~atlswere dep~ctedfiith all the derogatory character~st~cs of a "lower" race. Although the Persians Inay well have been handsome, big, and well proportioned, as I-llppocrates clmned," the Athenl'xns descr~bedthem '1s weak, deb<~uched, corrupted, and corrupting; they were satd to be ready to accept g o l ~ t ~ c a subjection l and \yere crlt~c~zed for usmg an infertor weapon like the bo\v and be~ngunable to fight as a collect~veentity. In a stnl~larmclnner, v~ctor~ous R o ~ n ~ awo~ild ~ls dep~ctthe people of Carthage, an eastern power settled tn North Afr~ca,as perfidious, treacherous, rnorally flawed, and zn~pious.It did not ruatter that Ronle fioiild make use of the Fame ruses for w h ~ c hthe Carthdg~ni~ans were desp~sedand feared. The fact remained that the wlnners-ln this case, the Rornans-were said to have kept their sense of tair play and justice, and the defeated were attacked for f'111ing to obey the laws of wdr. As Edward S a d says of Aeschyius's view of the battle of Salarn~sIn the play Pcrsae, "As~aspeaks throtlgli and by vlrtue of the European ~rnaginatlon, w h ~ c hIS dep~ctedas v~ctor~ous over Aua, that hostlle 'other' fiorld
6
Introduction
across the sea."F In other words, Greece would set the negatrve pattern thdt would become part of Western tradition. It 1s no surprise tliat, as Edith Hall says, the gender o p p o s ~ t ~ othat n posited Greeks as rrtale and Easterners as female was ;I p r e d o ~ n l ~ l fe'lture ~ ~ n t of the East-West c o n f r o n t a t ~ o nAnd . ~ ~t IS not surpnstng that Rome would inherit t h ~ satt~tude,casting Cartliage (Dido) In a terriale role and Rorne (Aeneas) in a rrtale role. The West stood as the symbol of wh,~teverwas r~ght,just, sme, strong, and frug'd; the East, by contrast, was seen as perfidious, sexually dangerous, and ready to sublntt to rape by the West. The neg'ltlve syrnl>ol~smcould, of course, be dpplled to any enemy, domestic or foreign. Consider Epam~nondas'sclever portrayal of the Spartans or] the eve ot the battle of Leuctra. When the armor ot Heracles disappeared from the temple 111 Thebes, Epa~nlllolldasdeclared this was not 1' bad omen. Rather, lie said, Heracles h~rnselfhad talten his armor to use in h ~ struggle s against the impious, sacrilegious Sparcans. The Spartans were golng to fight, Ep'~m~nondas told his men, o n I m d that was cursed for tlle~n because they had raped two Theban virgins on tliat very battlefield.7 Consequently, victory could not but be w ~ t hthe pI'hebans-the people who respected the gods, whom the gods loved ln turn, and for whom the gods fouglit. Success in war also brought fundamental changes in the nature ot kingship. A victorious conqueror w,~scons~dereda favorite of the gods; he was not just a hero but a person endowed w ~ t l id m n e cliaracter~stics-a semigod or even a god himself. This was the message that Alexander tried to force upon his Macedonians 111 the aftermath of the Pers~anEmpire's conquest. The Macedon~ansopposed the transttlon of their krng from hero to god,"but it marked the beginning of a trend that rrlost of Alexander's Successors were able to enforce. The Romans too adopted this belief, but for them, ~t was accomganled by other Important changes," For example, they colnbined a tundaruental concept of rule in Roman society-that the gods favored a just, obed~entcorninonwealth and ~ t n~~~glstrates-wlth s the ~ d e a that great ktngs and heroes beco~negods after death, an ~ d e afirst artrculaced by the early-third-century Greek writer Euhernerus. For the Romans, an e x c e p t ~ o n n~ ~ l~ ~ g i s t11ke r ~ ~Scip~o t e Afr~canusbecame a spokesman of the gods during h ~ tenure s in office and throughout his Itfetirne. The outgrowth ot this was the concept of the imperator, a title first granted t o Scipio by h ~ s soldiers in Spa~n.The title at the tlnte had 1' religious s ~ g n ~ f i c ~ ~Itn was c e . belreved t o b r ~ n gthe tltle-holder closer to the father of the gods, Juptter. Eventually, thls concept would he exploited first by M a r i ~ and ~ s Sulla, and then by Caesar, Augustus, and the later emperors.
Chapter One
Close Array and Pointed Spears The Ways of the Greek Phalanx L)tiecvz:
l ) o c ~t h c ~ rIthe C;rceks'] prowess \ROW 1t5elf I11 arcl~ercombat, us~ngbows? (;horcrs: Not at all. They \tand dnd tight In close array wlth sh~cldand \pear.
War Among the Greeks According to J. Harm,md, at least five dltferelit types of ariiled confllct characteri~edthe ancient world: invaslolir of a lnore clvili~edstate by a prilnztive opponent; raids by srnall groups of arrned ~ndividualsagainst triore advanced nelghbors; fidrs betweell states belongitlg to the s a n e ethnic group; clv~lwars, that is, conflicts between people helonging to the same state; and inlperialistic wars (usuaI1y the ilrtperzal~sticpower was at the same level or h~gherthan the opponents 111 terrns of c ~ v d ~ z a t ~ o n ) . ~ The pattern of conflict dlrrtng the Greek classtcal gerlod (c. 500-338 13.c .) fits Iiarrnand's model. At tirnes, ilrtperial~sticcorltrontat~onstool< center stage, such as the Persi,a11 iilvasion 111 the early part of the fifth century R.C. Rut at least as Important were the wars that pltted one Greelc state agalnst another-Athens agamst 'Thebes or Spdrca, for example, or Sparta against Athens and then agdlrlst Thebes. To be sure, the threat of ii~v,~sio~i
8
Close Arrrry nvzd Pointed Specrrs
by less c~v~llzed people and ralds on Greece's northern front~erpers~sted, and civil conflict did occur. However, such conflicts never matched the intensity ot the confrontations waged e ~ t h e rtor political survival against an irnperialist~cpower o r 111 a n atternpt t o avoid e x p l o ~ t a t ~ oby n a strong neighbor who spoke the same tongue and boasted of s i ~ n ~ l ethnic ar origlns. H o w Inany indiv~dualsa soclety can spare for its wars IS always dcpendent on the productiv~tyof ~ t people. s In general, tlle tendency has been t o keep a t I ~ o m ethose who work and to send to tlie battlefield those who d o not pertorrn s~gn~ficant duties w~tliinthe state's economy. 'l'his d ~ not d necessarlly mean that the soldier was utle~nployedo r unemployable. In fact, In ancient Greece and tlie rest of the ancient world, tlie warrior was nt~rmally either a person who explo~tedthe labor of the rest of society or an individual who rel~edon his own Ineans for econorn~csurv~val.Low product~v~ty methods and tlie assumption that war was the privrlege of the property owner meant that the "rn~litarysociety" of each cornntunity liad "carefully defined I~m~ts."'In anclellt Greece, where the population of each state was irm~ted,'tli~stranslated into small armies. Thus, for example, In an Iiour of extreme ernerger~cyat Marathon in 490 Is.<,., the Athenians and Plataear~s were able to muster only sorne 10,000 m e t ~ At . ~ Leuctra in 371 l$.(:., the Spartans and Tliebans deploj~edarlnles of 7,000 to 8,000 and 6,000, respectively.' And at Chaeronea in 338 l~.~.-tIie battle that dec~dedthe independe~lceof the Greek states-the Greeks could deploy, 11.1 a ~nornetltof great collective peril, an army of just 35,000 men against the 32,000 soldiers of Philip of Macedon." The srrlall slze of these arnxes IS expla~nedonly 11.1 part by the l ~ n l ~ t e d populat~on,A more important factor was that "power lin the ancient world] was . . . derived trom the use of force and could be ruainta~nedonly by force."' Thls meant that the practltlorlers of extreme violence, the soldiers, had to come either from the r u l ~ n gclasses or from groups that the ruling classes could easily control. In other words, war was tlie privilege of those whom the state could trust. Usually, t h ~ sIneatlt rnarried landowners-men witli ~mmovableassets that could not be taken witli them In the face of. an advanc~ngenemy and men who liad t o defend tlie chastity of tlie~rwornell atld the freedom of thelr c h ~ l d r e n . ~ Actually, the anctent Greeks were even more spec~ficon what the correlation between wealth and warnor status entailed. H o w much a rnan's property was worth had a direct bearing on the armametlt he was supposed t o wear, on h ~ pos~tion s In the battle I~ne,and on the type of function lie was expected to perform when face t o face with the enemy. In f~tth-century Athens, for Instance, tlle rrlell with the greatest amount of property (those in the first class in the census) were responsible for manning the fleet. Members of the second class served in the cavalry, those in the third class were the hoplites, and men In the fourth class forrned the light infantry."
Close Away and Pointed Spears
L)
Ar~stoph~anes br~llia~ltly depicts the war-wearir~essof Athen~ansociety in h13 dramas-froni the tnan in Acharnzans wlio makes a prtvate peace wttli the enemy to the ambassador tn Pcace who appeals dtrectly to the gods to stop war t o the women in Lysistmta who refuse sex to their hushands u t ~ t ~ l the men put down thetr weapons. Yet betng a soldier was a duty that no man of property cotlld shtrk, for it strengthened his soctal status and confirmed that the state belonged t o h ~ m as , will be d~scussedin Chapter 4. The hoplite phalanx, the battle formatton cliaracrertsttc of the classical period, was the perfect expression o t Greek society in that era. Unltke Mesopotamian atld Egyptian forces, the Greek armies were not centered on light infantry or chariotry. Altl~oughHomer's heroes arrtved on chartots to meet the Trojans o n the otltsk~rtsof 'Troy, the Greeks ord~narilydid not use ch'?riots In the manner of the ancient Middle East warnor. OhLariots were not no bile platforms for archers or shock vehtcles for spearmen; they srmply tool< the warriors t o and from the battlefield.1° Moreover, by the fifth century is.<,., they hdd been releg'lted to use In athletic games. C a v ~ l r ytoo was used sparingly, for a number of reasons." In the ftrst glace, Greelc horses had n o proper saddles and no horseshoes. Also, the stirrup had not been invented yet. Consequetltly, the cavalry could not be fully effective, especrally since the terratn in most of Greece was h~llyor a t least rocky. Eve13 tn the best of phys~cals i t ~ ~ a t ~ oas n stn, flat Thessaly, another serious constderation l~rnitedthe use of horsemen-the cost of the mount and its upkeep. F~nally,In most Greek states, a reliance on cavalry would have meant a return of the supremacy of the richest members in society, the very group that the rn~ddlingclasses of classic,~lGreece had d~spossessedin t h e ~ rrise t o power. I ~ g h infantry t too, a t least in the intt~alstages of the Perstan Wars, was d~sregardedfor reasons that were partly tactical and partly social. Thts opened the way for the type of sold~erthdt fiould d o m ~ t l ~the ~ t ebattlefields of classtcal Greece-the heavy infantryman, who averaged around 1.68 rueters In height and between 63 and 67.5 kilograms In weight."
Weapons and Armor of the Hoplite The Greek he,avy ~ n t a n t r y r n ~was ~ n known as a hophte. The name was dertved from the word hoplon, a term equivalent to weapon but grimar~ly used to identtfy a pzece of arinor that had a particillar tactical and syrnbolical meaning for the Greeks-the sh~eld.Spartm rnothers told their sons to come back from battle ettlier wtth thew shtelds or on them;' as every sold ~ e knew, r there was no greater disgrace than leaving the shreld behind. De~ n ~ ~ r aoft ~Sydrtd ts could excuse those who threw away t h e ~ rhelrnets and breastplates because "they [wore] those for thetr own sakes," bttt I1e could not excuse those who discarded their shields, for they carried sh~elds"tor the sake of the whole l ~ t l e . " ' ~
10
Close Arrrry nvzd Pointed Specrrs
L ~ k ethe spears, sh~eldswere uniform 11.1 des~gnbut riot ~lecessdrily~dentlcal tn s17e. Accord~ngto V, D. Hanson, thls may have depended on the wearer's height or arrn length, it he had bought tlie shleld recently, or on the slze of hrs ,111cestor who h,ad first owned 1t.lFThe norm'11 dldmeter of the shield used In the fifth and fourth cet1turles R.c'. was about 91 centltneters. 'The sh~eldprotected the holder fro111 kr~eeto chlnlh 'lr~dwas rnade of hardwood (such as o,ak) and covered wrth bronze or o x hrde. The surface was first painted wlth ~ndlvldualsyrnbols and later embellished wttli ptctures ider~titytngthe holder's city-the letter larnbda for Sparca, the club of Heracles for Thebes, and so on." But the rnost lnlportant fe'ature of tlle shreld was the way In which tt was held. It had two brackets on the back-one (the porpax) In the center for the forearm and the other (the antzlnbc) near tlle rlrn to allow the hopl~tc'sh'md t o hold the shleld firmly in pl'lce. Moreover, the shteld was made In sucli a way that tlie sold~ercould rest it on 111s shoulder whtie advanc~ng-an especially Inlportant feature since the shield we~ghedabout 8 k i l o g r ~ m s . ' ~ The covertng worn over other clothes added between 3.5 and 6 lcilogram.; of welght to the equipment of the hoplite-6 ~f he wore a b r o n ~ e culrass dnd 3.5 ~f he hdd 1' corselet rrlade of l~rlerlo r canbas." Compared t o the heavy and expensive bronze culrass, the line11 corselet must Iiave been the rrtost popular arinor of the time, given its pliability (tt was about 0.5 centmeters thlck2(')and modest cost. Moreover, ~ t sdefensive c a p C ~ b ~ l i t ~ e s could be strengthened by adding metal plates or scales. For the groln area, protection was prov~dedby leather strlps so that movement M.JS as easy 'IS possible. The legs were protected by very thln b r o t i ~ egreaves, padded wrth Irnen, that could be elther snapped or strapped in place. The w ~ d e s p r e ~use ~ dof the culrass or corselet and the I'lrge, round shreld (and espectally the way it was held) set the Greek hoplite apart from the typtcal warrlor of the arlclerlt Near Ea.;t. In a d d l t ~ o r the ~ , fact that the hopl ~ t eroutrtlely wore a helrnet and the kery shape of the helrnet Itself heightened the dlsslrn~lar~ty even further. 111 tlie fifth century, the most common helrnets were the Illyrian verslon, which was open in the front, a r ~ dthe Corinthi,an verslon, w h ~ c hhad a nose guard. Both were made of bronze and usually had crests of horsehair on top and padd~ngIn the tnterlor to soften the impact of blows. 'The Cortnthtan helrnet, styltsttcally very handsome, was rnitrally the rnore popular of the two. Before the battle, it could be worn In a ralsed position, as show11 111 a famous bust of Pericles; when the fighting began, ~tgave exceller~tprotectlorl Imt made hear~ngpractically imt.x)ss~bleand severely 111n1ted\lslbil~ty.The Illyrlan helmet, by contrast, allowed good vlsibtllty and was less of a n obstacle to proper hear~ng,but it provlded less protecttoil to ~ t wearer. s The offetls~ceweaporls of the hoplrte were the sword and the spear. There were two types of swords, both worn o n the left: The straight sword (about
Close Away and Pointed Spears
11
60 centlrneters long or more) was used both for cuttlt~gand thrust~ng,and the si~ghtlycurved sword, w ~ t ha srngle edge, was used for slashing." The sword, however, was a secondary weapon for the hoplite. His Innin weapon was the spear. Just as the shteld defined h ~ r ndef-enstvely, the spear defined the hopltte's offenstve c a p a b ~ l ~ t ~In e s ,Aeschylus's Persrre, members of the chorus descr~bethe lioplttes as "men farned tor the spear,"" and they long to know "whether Perslans have won by drawing t h e ~ rbowslor the strength of the Greelts'lpotnted spears has pre~ailed."'~ Unl~l<ethe short, javelin-ltke spear used by the Egyptians and Assyrrans, the Greek spear M.JS falrly lo11g (between 2.1 and 2.4 meters'". And wlth an iron head and an iron butt, it was also qulte heavy (1.0'34 kilograms for a 2.2-meter spear?'). The Near Eastern spear was probably used both for throw~ngand thrusting, but because of ~r-slertgth dnd wetght, the hopllte spear was sultable only for tlirustlng,"" etther In an underarm or, more likely, an overarm fash~on.'" Why and when the hopl~tesystem becdlne established 111 anaent Greece has been a Inarter of debate. Although a few scholars st~llmalntalrl that the process began In the Dark Ages, ruost now agree that the system was introduced 111 the later hall of the e ~ g h t hcentury or by the nl~ddleof the seventh century R.('. The ~ s s u eof why the system was establ~sliedIS much more controversral. Two main schools ot thought have emerged. The gradilaltsts ma~ntainthat the typical fieapons of the hopl~te,the sh~eldatld the heavy armor, developed over a falrly lengthy p e r ~ o dand were not the result of a new class, the ~ntddlingelements, comtng to the fore." S~oclalhistorians argue ~ n s t e a dthat when the t r l ~ d d l ~ nclasses g took power 111 the Greek crties, they forged the new weaponry to emphast~etheir cohesrveness and to dlfferenttate themselves from the aristocrat~cgroups tliat had been the do~nltlantp o l ~ t ~ c ele~nent al In the past.'" Lately, two h~storlanshave trled to strlke a rntddle ground. Hans Van Wees, starting froru the gradual~stposition, has argued that the evolutron ot the hopl~tesystem took Inore than two gerteratlons and that it was "~ulderway but stlll ~ncomplete"around 650 & . C . Accord~ngto Van Wees, the process was tnarked by tour dtst~nctdevelop~nents:The spear drsplaced the sword as the malt1 weapon of combat; charlots gradually disappeared; heavy Infantry became differentiated from light Infantry (that IS, mrscile ttnlts); and cooperatron, coord~nat~on, and central leaderslitp defined the battle I~ne.'~' Vlctor D a v ~ sI-Ianson has presented a varldtlotl on the soclal history mterpretatlon. h'ot~ngthat both graduallsts and soctal histor~ans1nairltatn tliat the "new battle tactlcs . . . follou~ed the adopt~onof novel equ~prnent,"~' I-fanson points out that, in fact, the reverse was true: The tactics of the hopllte phalanx were developed before the complete liopl~tepanoply. Indeed, the various elements of the panoply, especially the concave sh~eld,would have been awkward or even useless 111 sttuat~onsthat e~nphastzedthe ~ndtv~dual, not the group. Accordrng to Hanson's theory, liopl~tewarfare was the prod-
12
Close Arrrry nvzd Pointed Specrrs
uct of the radical changes that occurred In Greek c~gr~culture after the first millennium, As small landhold~ngsreplaced tlie large farms owned by a few aristocratic families, a new class composed of slnall farmers emerged. i\nd hopl~tewarfare was a n outgrowth of the values of this new r~illrlgclass of small farmers. It einplias~zedand expressed their ~deals.'~
The Hoplite in Battle Once the soldiers had been recru~tedand arrried, tlie first Important job for the Greek commander was t o choose a n area s u ~ t ~ ~for b l ebattle. Terrain was a c r ~ t ~ c varlable al for warfare In the ancient world. Indeed, Polybius goes so far as to clairii that a sk~llfuladaptat~onof one's army to the terrain usuc~llyme,lnt vlctory In battle,'";Itld rhe Theban genercll Epa~n~rlondas would never attack an enemy who commanded a better Although the prospect of action agalnst an opponent holding the high ground was not always ;I deterrent, ~t is clear that "even a slight elevation in ground was advantageous in hu~ldingup momentum." 3' But if holding the h ~ g hground was a desirable option in that regard, the rnost slutable type of terr'un for hopllte w,~rf'~rewas flat. Thls was because the phalanx was most effective when rnovlng straight ahead. Any deviation was fa~rlyditficult; the fording of even a small stream, according to Ar~stocould easlly break the line and thus endanger the safety of the whole. T l i ~ swas one of the reasons why, ~f the attacker dld not comply by pressing an enemy enjoying a better position, tlie opposing generals usually agreed to meet 011 flat terrain. "When they [the Greeks1 have declared war against each other \says Mardonitis to the Persian king Xerxesl they come down to the fairest and inost level ground that they can find and there they fight."35 It should be noted, however, that the "flat" terr,~lnof ancient battles was often strewn with rocks, bushes, and even trees.ix After choos~ngthe terrain, the next task for the military commander was to deploy h ~ arrny s In the proper battle formation. The chorus's words In Persue gtve a clear image of the hoplites In batrle line. They srood, Aescl~yIUS'S chorus says, in "close array with shield and spear."'" The b a s ~ cunlt-whether Thucydides' enomotia (the srrlallest ract~calu n ~ t of the Spartan army) of 24 hoplites In 4 files, 6 lnen deep,4o or Xenophon's enomotia of 36 hoplites in 3 files, 12 men deep4'-was essentially a s~riall column. But once In battle arr,1y, with each enomotla next to another, the phalanx was essent~ally"a l ~ n eformat~onwith a width constderabiy greater than its depth."42 The ph,alanx followed a more or less establ~shedprotocol 111 terrns of its depth and lengtli. John Warry suggests that in the fifth century, ~t was the norin to deploy in 4 ranks.43 The evidence, however, does not support h ~ s conclusion: Only two of twelve known c ~ s e sl ~ s tthls depth.44 As W. K.
Close A w a y and Pointed Spears
13
Pr~tchett~naint~ains, "A depth of IS men, desp~tenumerous 'exceptions' represented the Urtlefe of the Creek phalanx not only in the fifth and early fourth centuries IS.<,., but also in the army of Alexar~der."~'A traditional pattern was i11s0 followed in the length of the phalanx, w h ~ c hwas divided tact~callyInto three n ~ a i nsegrnents-right, center, and left.4h It was customary, at least until Eparn~nondasturned the tables at Leuctra in 371 IS.<,.,for the right wing to be the posltlon of honor slnce the aim was for the right to defeat the enemy's left wlng. Consequently, the r~glitwlng was where the general fought arid where tlie best troops were placed. At Marathon, the r ~ g h twas ass~gnedt o Atheni,m troops;47 at Pldtaea, it went to the Spart a n ~The . ~ second ~ most prestigious positlon was not the center but the left. After all, the troops on tlie left had t o hold the enemy's right u n t ~ their l own r ~ g h twing had burst through the enemy's line. At Marathon, the left was entrusted to the Plataean~,4~ and at Plataea, the Athenians formed the left wrng and thus were second in prestige to the S p a r t a i ~ s . ~ ~ Two factors influenang the effect~venessof the phalanx were the bravery and skill of the front line and the support prov~dedby the other ranks. The edge of the crisls was always at the front or the back. Therefore, the weakest troops were pl,~cedin the n ~ ~ d d l"for e , in war one must put the best men In the van and the rear, and the worst In tlie center, so that they [nay be led by the van and driven forward by the rearguard."" 12 comruander could not atford t o place xnetl of uncertain morale in the front becC~usea rout, once begun, was almost lrngoss~bleto stop. A sirntlar logic applied to the rear raril<s, who were as crucial as the first. Soldiers in the rear had to push the xnen in the xniddle to Inove forw,~rdto the edge of the crlsis whet1 the front ranlcs fell, and they had to act as a barrler to prevent reluctant solh e r s from fleeing altogether." 111 the first great conflict of the class~calperiod, the encounter of Marathon in 490 R,(:. In whlcli the Athenians and Plataeans fought the Persians, our ruain source, Herodotus, rrtakes no rnentiori of Greek light Infantry. Yet P~ILIS~~III~S'S statenlent that "sla\es fought then lat Marathon1 for the first tlrne by the side of their masters"" suggests that slaves too had sorile ruilltary function. 'The rrlear~ingof Pausan~as'sstatement is uncertain. As I will show in the next chapter, the encounter between the Greeks and Perslans at Marathon was not preceded by the normal set piece of battles 111 the classical period-the clash of light lntarttry, which could have ottered a minor role appropriate to slaves. Normally, crowds of slcirln~shersopened the battles, whlle the heavy Infantry stood by as spectators. But in s p ~ t eot their great nuri~bers(sornetiines there were as nlany '1s 10,000), the l ~ g h infantrymen t had no perceptible effect upon the outcome of the battle."'l They usually lust chased one another around the field u n t ~ lsorrte signal, such as tlie sound of a trumpet, recalled them. Even more remarkable is the fact that the sacr~ficesto tlie
14
Close Arrrry nvzd Pointed Specrrs
gods were rnade after the sk~rm~shers' recall, not before they were sent to engage their enemy counterparts; thus, ~f tlie sacr~ficeswere unfavorable, there would be no battle." Arrian's account of the use of sk~rrnishersseerns to m,~kesense, although ~t was not appl~cableto all sltuatlons. EIe states that they were deployed e~therto ~ c o n the t terrain before the phalanx advanced or to report on the arrnarnent ot the er~erny.'~ After choos~ngsu~tableterrL~in, deploying t h e ~ rtroops, and recelvlng the information brought ~nby tlie skinn~shers,the generals made their sacrifices to the gods and ordered a general advance. Their forward rnarch, it seems, did not follow a str'1ight 1111e.Sltlce the sh~eldwas held on the left, the right s ~ d of e t l ~ ehoplite was tlie most vulnerable part of liis body. As a result, all armle\ [wrltc\ Thu~ydlcle\jare apt, o n Lomlng together, to tllru\t o u r their
rsght wlng toct much; and both sides extend w~tlttheir right beyond tltcrr opponents' left wing, bcwu\e sn thclr fear each man brlngs hls uncovered side as close ar poss~bleto the sh~eldof the man stationed o n h ~ r~ght, s thlnkrng that thc closer tile shields arc locked togethcr the better 15 the protectloll. And it 1s tltc first man on the r~ghtwing who 1s prlmarlly responstblc for tlt~s,sln~ehe ~lwav\wdnt5 to ~rthdrawfrom the encmy h15 own uncovcrcd \~dc,dnd the rest, from a 11hcfear, follow llrc, example." 'The line, then, was never straight. It \vould proceed on an incline, with the r ~ g hw t ~ n gthe farthest ahead and the left wlng the fi~rtllestbehind. 'The n~arcli~tselfgathered momentum as the line moved forward, proceed~ngslowly at first, then increas~ngits pace as it approached tlie enemy. Fin,~lly,after shoiitlng out a war cry, the sold~erscharged forward on the run to ~naltecontact with the enemy. Accordtng to Herodotus, tliis tactlc was first introduced by tlie Athenians at the battle o t Marathon: "Tl~eir b'~ttle b e ~ n garr'lyed and the omens of sacr~ficefavor~ng,straightway the Athen~answere let go and cliarged the Pers~ansat a run . . . they were tlie first Greeks within ruy Itnowledge, who cliarged the enemies at a run."jx The Sp'lrtans seem to have been the only exception to this rule; app'lrently, they marched slowly toward the enemy, In step with the music of flutes,')' until they clashed into tlie opposlng phalanx--each Inan planting hiniselt "stoutly," "both feet fir~nly. . . upon the grout~d,"111s belly covered w ~ t h " h ~ sbroad ~Iiield"and "liis mighty spear" in Iiand."' Wllat actixally happened once the two phalanxes clashed has beer1 a matter of consider,~ble debate. Tradit~on~dly, there have beet1 two schools of thorlglit on tliis. One group of scholars has ~nai~itained that hoplite confrontations were ruainly a matter of uslng weapons (first tlie spear, then the sword) agdinst s ~ ~ n ~ l awell-armored rly o p p o n e ~ l t s . ~The ' other group of ~cholarsIias argued that the key for succesr was actually a ~ h o v i n gmatch (othismos), in which the front-line hoplites were somehow pushed to exert pressure on the opposing line u n t ~ lthe enemy broke. The shov~ngmatch
Close A w a y and Pointed Spears
15
has been described in various w ~ y s :a rugby "scrum," as John Warry claims, "actual lean~nginto the man ahead," as Victor D a v ~ sWailson argues, or a "mass-shove," in the words of Robert D. L ~ g i n b i l l . ~ "is~ likely any commander's first rrlove was t o try t o break through enemy lines, w h ~ c hmeant that greater w e ~ g h tand thus some pressure from the rear ranlts was essential in the opening clash. But it is also clear that, ~f the shock of first cont,~ctfaded, the next stage must have lnvolved a cornb~n~qtion of shield pressure, spear, and sword. 'I'he spear was used to find arid explo~tan opening In the enemy's protection, such '1s his throat, and for this re'lson, ~t was held above the shoulder, pointing downward. The sword, says Prttchett, was best used In a tlirust~ng g e s t ~ r e . "This ~ hypothes~sis arguable. The norrnal curved shape of the Greek sword (except for the stra~ghtSpartan sword) made it nla~nlysuitable for slash~ng,and of course, most g~ctorialrepresentations depict the sla?hlng, not the thrusting, position (although this could have been an artistic convent~on).In ally event, the Greeks clearly used the sword often. Many spears must have broken after the first contact, which meant that the spears' butt spikes and the swords ntust have been e~nployedat close range. But the end of the battle must habe corne w ~ t hthe shoving n~atch,a vlew supported by most of the I~terarysources." Some scholars Inay claim that a shov~ngmatch was ~mpossiblebecause it would have endangered the stabillty of the whole line by xn~~king the sold~erstumble to the ground. And there IS no doubt that pressure on the back would have resulted in a fall for ruost troops on the 11ne.Yet, ~fthe sold~ersl ~ n e dup sideways with their left fret and left shoulders ahead and ~f t h e ~ comy,lnloIls r In the rear r'111ks lined tip in the same manner, then pressure would be exerted not on the center of a rnan's back but only on his shoulder. In other words, the line cotlld retain ~ t stalxlity s because of the posltio11 of the men's bod~esatld the feet 111 particular. And a t the same tttne, the ltne could contrnue to exert force against the enemy. Furthermore, it there was no rnass-shove, why was the Theban line 50 nlen deep at Leuctrd and 2.5 men deep a t Deli~un?After 311, ~f such deep phalanxes were sacrificing width for depth, w ~ t hthe danger of havtng their flank9 turned, depth must have provided a significant benefit." The logicC1lexplclnat~o~l seems to be that a deeper ph'2la11x could use ~ t greater s weight In a shov~ngmatch. It the first shock was successful or if hand-to-hand cornbat In cornbination w ~ t hstrong sh~eldpressure allowed one s ~ d eto break the opponent's I~ne,then it would be posstble to encircle the enemy's line-the outcome that Greelc cornntanders feared rnost. Encirclement could result in two s ~ t u ations-one belng the actlon just described, the other occurring when a llne was longer than the enemy's and thus able to envelop the wlng of its foe."" This meant that, in rnost cases, a general was forced to ruatch the length ot the enemy's line to ensure the s,~fetyof 111s ow11 troops. The Greeks at
I6
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Marathon, for example, deployed 1' thin center to cover the 1,500-yard frontage of t h e ~ rtroops." If it was ~mposstbleto n~atchthe enen~y'sline in length, as it was for Alexander at Gaugarnela," then a general had two cho~ces:H e could e ~ t h e rdeploy a second line to s,~feguardthe flanks of the first, or he could brtng his lrne ~ n t ocontact w ~ t htlie opponent as soon as possible and hope t o defeat him before an encirclement action could be cotnpleted. If an enemy force was defeated w~tlioutb e ~ n gencircled, there was a strong poss~bll~ty that it would escape with only a few casualties. The hopl~teswere at 3 dis,1d\ant,1ge in this regard when fighting 1' nonhopl~teforce. They could not (or a t least they were not supposed to) abandon tlierr line or drop their shtelds, and thelr arrnor ruade them slow. Thi~s,~f the enemy c ~ b a ~ ~ d o tnheed~ rsh~eldsand ran, it was pr'~ct~callyimposs~blefor the hoplites to catch them unless tliey had l~glit~nfantryor cavalry a t their disposal. And at least In the early fifth century, it seerrts that no such backup was c~va~lc~l>le. In the event the pursulng hoplites forgot their lin~~tatlons and engaged In recklesc gtrrsutt, they could pay bitterly for their m~stakes.T h ~ aps parently happened in the last stages o t the battle o f Marathon when, Herodotus tells us, the hopl~tes"followed after the Persi,lns in t h e ~ rfl~ght, hewing them down, till they came to the sea. There tliey called for fire and laid hands on tlie ships."") Herodotus suggests that the Greeks abandoned the safety of the line and p r o l ~ b l ydropped t h e ~ rsh~eldso n the b e ~ c h They . were to gay a heavy prlce: "In t h ~ work s [trying to lc~llthe enemles running for the ships or already on the ships] was slain Callrruacht~sthe polerrtarch, after domg doughty deeds; there too d ~ e done of the gener'lls, Stesilaus son of Thrasylaus; moreover, Cyneg~rus[brother of the playwright Aescliylus and] son of Euphorion fell there, his hand smitten ott by an axe as he laid hold of a shlp's poop, and nlany other f,~mousA t h e n i ~ ~ n ~ . " ~ " Ilsually, the losses suffered by tlie defeated army in a Greek-Persian confrontation were quite disproportionate: For ilistance, only 192 Greeks died at Marathon, c<)lnpared t o about 6,400 Persi,~~ls.~' But when hophtes confronted other hopl~tes,the losses were normally more even. There were, however, a few excepttons to tli~srule. For example, a t Alnpliipolis In 422 13.C., the Spartans lost 7 men, but the Atheni:tns lost 600; at the "TeL1rless Rattle" of 367 R.(:., there were large casrralt~esamong the Arcadians but none among the Spartar~s.'~Generally, however, the l~nt~tations on pursuit rne,lnt that if the battle followed a "normal" course, casunlt~eswere typically low and relatively proportionate. Peter Krent7 malntalns that the losses for the defeated troops in battles pitt~nghoplite agalnst hoplite were usually 111 the range of 14 percent, with a rnaxlnluln rarely exceed~ng2 0 percent and a minimum of 10 percent. The average losses for the wlnlilng side were around 5 percent and rarely over 10 percent; sornetlrues, they were as low as 3 percent. 111 other words, the vanqu~shedlost about two t o
Close A w a y and Pointed Spears
17
three tlmes as many nlen '1s the w ~ n n e r s Yet . ~ ~even a loss of 5 percent was a bad busmess for all. In the relat~velysmall Greek states, the slaughter of a few cltrzerls ~itusthave been a matter ot great distress, espectally slnce the casualties llecessar~lyIncluded some of the le,~dersof the co~nmun~ty. Polybius is probably correct tn saytng that during his era, the second century IS.(,., battles in Greece lasted only a short but t h ~ was s not necessar~lyrrue for rhe earher per~od.The p'tttern that elnerges out of the 38 land and 13 sea battles studled by Pr~tchettshows that the fight~ngusually pers~stedur~tllevening, " d u r ~ n gwhtch tirne one ~ntersthat because of tatlgue and the weight of the armor, Inet1 found sorne xneans of chang~ng place In the f~les."'~This does not mean, however, that a I ~ o p l ~ battle te could be stopped and then lotned agaln In an orderly or at least an effectwe 1nc1nner, '1s occurred, for Instance, between the R o ~ n ~ and ~ n sCarthag~n~atls at Zama in 202 n.c .76 111a liopllte-versus-hoplite battle, changtng places, probably d u r ~ n gpauses In the shov~ngrnatch, rnighr have been feas~ble; stopping the a c t ~ o n ,however, as the R o r n ~ n sand Cc~rtll,~gln~ans did at Zama, would have been practically ~mgossible.The battle could end only in retreat or, more otten, In fllght. T h ~ sltu'mon, s coupled w ~ t kthe fact that the Greeks rarely used reserves, brought a number of ltmltattons to the hopl~teleader's role. He had to tend to the rnatcr~alneeds of- his arrny ("ftlrnishing rn~litaryeqii~prnentand provlding suypl~esfor his he had to look after t h e ~ rsafety ("a general must see that h ~ men s are safe"7x);he had to be wlse In choosing the proper "disposlt~onof an army" and in judging "where and how to use each format~on;'"" he had t o prepare 111s warrlors psychologic,~lly so that they might belleve that "victory over the enemy may add to their happ~ness,"~" \vhether s p ~ r ~ t uor a l rnater~al,because "all men fight in order that they rnay get the best life poss~ble;"~' , ~ n dhe had to possess $1number of other qualities, from b e ~ n g"resourceful" and "quick-w~tted" to b e ~ n g"both gentle and hrural, at once stra~ghtforwardand des~gnlng,capable of both caut~ori and surprise, 1'1vish and rapacious, generous atld me,an, s k l l f ~ 111 ~ l defence and a t t a c l ~ . "In~ other ~ words, he had to know how to deploy 111smen Into battle I~ne;he had to insp~rehis soldiers w ~ t ha speech before plunging them Into cont'tct w ~ t hthe enemy; and he h ~ to d be br,~veand fight o n the l ~ n e with the rest of hts men-but In the most gresttglous g o s ~ t t o n ,At ~~ Cliaeronea, for instance, P h ~ l i pof Macedon toolc the r ~ g h twing while Alexander, his son, fought on the left.84 [inlike the Macedon~anarmy or any army w ~ t han authoritartan structure, the hoplite arrnles of the classical pertod would tolerate no masters. As a result, the pofier inbested 111 their generdls l~rnited,and the cha111 of command was rudimentary. T h ~ was s a matter not only of tight~ngstyle but also of class egal~tar~anism: Why should an Athentan clttterl obey the commands of a n equal? Anlong the hopl~tes,officers were ~nerelytoler~ted,
18
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m d the common hopl~tewould talk back to the officers at w~ll.Thus, the soldters of Xenophon'~Cyropiredza, confused by tile drill the officers were teaching them, "got angry and satd, 'Which of them [the officers] are we to obey? One of then1 tells us to ddvance and noth her forb~dsus!"'Xi Regrrlar army assemblies tended to emphasize that the leader was just a temporary figure. The c~ttten-soldiershad elected him, and they could repl'xce h ~ m, ~ w t ~ l l The . Athen~anstrategoi (generals) fiere chosen froin the wealthiest class of cttizens and usually were restricted by a series of sanct ~ o n s'I'he . ~ ~situation In an arrny of rnercenartes was even rnore treewheeling, w ~ t hdemocr,~cyruhng dt the expense of effic~ency.~'At the s,me trme, the 12oplites' lack of tolerance for strong leadership was tempered wtth a deep sense o f dttty. Once in the ariny, the hoplite knew he was on a short leash. Deserting the b'lttlefront was ut~th~nk~~ble-an action that was percetved not so much as a sign of a cowardly s p ~ r i tbut as a betrayal of the whole group. The expertence ot three Spartans at 'Therrnopylae was ~llustrattve. Two of them, Eurytus Ar~stodemus,could ha\e s,~\edtheir own lives In the midst of battle, for they were lytilg away from the battlefield "very s~clcof ophthalmia."" The third, I'antites, had been sent to 7'hessaly filth d xnessage. When the fi11,1l controntatron came, Eurytus, ~n spite of his poor stght, put on his arnior and asked his servant to lead litm ~ n t obattle, where lie was slaughtered l ~ k ethe rest of the Spartans. But "Aristodemus' h e x t l ~ ~ l s t e ~falied ~ d l h ~ m ,and he stdyed b e h ~ n d . "When ~ ~ the survlvor went back to Sparta, "he was disgraced and d~slionoured. . . no Spartan would gtve hnn fire, nor speak wtth hirn; and they called h t n ~tor dtsgrace, Ar~stodemusthe coward.""' The sclme tre,~tmentgreeted the poor P,tnt~tes, whose only fault had been to del~vera message to l'hessaly that was probably issued by 111s own contrndnder (tt is not clear from Herodotus why he fient to Thess,xly). Ar~stodernussurv~ved f o ~ ~ g~t h tPlataea, but Pc~ntites could not stand the ostracism and "hanged h~rnself."~' One ru~ghtbe tempted t o d~smissthis example because, after all, the three soldiers were from Spart,~,a c ~ t yt h a was r ~ g ~indits Interpretatlon of the d u t ~ e sof the cttlzen-soldter. However, even Herodotus, who was not particularly fond of the Spartans, sees nothii~gwrong tn all thts. Euryttls's ophth'~lrn~,~ must hdve been quite severe: FIerodotus tells us that he "'b,tde his helot lead h1111 Into tile battle,"92 whtch nnpltes that he either could not see at all well or was unable t o stand on his own two feet. And if Aristodernus was 111 a s ~ l n ~ l cd or n d ~ t ~ o there n, should hdve been no dlsgrdce 111 remaining away from the battlefield. Yet Herodotus is as severe on Aristodernus as hts tellow Spartans were: "Artstodentus' heart failed him, and he stayed behind.""' Thus, for Herodotus too, the behnv~orof these sold~ers was ilot only a matter of personal cowardice but also of soctal loyalty. Even a sick man cotlld not s h ~ r khis soadl duties, espec~allywhen (as Herodotus makes clearv4) nothe her person, slnlilarly s ~ c k ,had left 111s bed only to be slam next to h ~ comrades. s
Close Away and Pointed Spears
1 L)
Wclr fids the 111o110poly of the hoplites. Other clGassescould be tolerated only In emergencies but no more. This ~ d e awas first formulated In the fifth century as a rnoral principle-the golder1 means-and later developed as a p o l ~ t ~ and c ~ l social co~lcept." Many authors, from Herodotus t o the Pseudo-Xenophon of the Constrtutzolz of Athens to Thucydldes, have argued that the opposition between the rich and the poor was detrtrnental to the state: The struggle between the r ~ c h the , great, the powerful, the good, tiie few against the poor, the weak, the people, the worthless, tiie mass-as the Greeks defined the two groups-was regarded as a primary cause of d~sorderdtld h ~ v o In c the c~ty.In fact, thls is one of the core i d e s expressed by Tl~ucyd~des 111 discuscing tlie lnala~seof Athens In his account of the Peloponnesian War.Y6 The l o g ~ coutcome ~~l of this a t t ~ t ~ t dwas e the bel~efthat the ~niddlecl,~sses had adopted the most appropriate form of liv~ng,tlie golden means. Consequently, they were regarded as an elernent of balance, reason, and justice between the two extremes of- poverty and fiealtll. O11e of the cle,~restexpressions of this concept is found In the work of the fifth-century Athen~an playwr~ghtEi~rip~des.""In fact there are three categories of cltitens," Eur ~ p ~ d es'asys 111 hls Supplzces, "the r ~ c h ,useless c ~ t ~ z e nwho s , always desire more; the lnen w ~ t h o u property t who, deprived of the means of Ilv~ng,are dangerous because, tnoved rnainly by lealousy and exctted by the words of evll le'lders, shoot out t h e ~ rfe,~rfulbarbs against the property ofiners. Of the three groups, the one In the inlddle preserves llnstead] the wellbe~ngof the cities detendlng the system establtshed by the state."98 The hopl~tessepar,~tedthemselves from the rest of soclety 11-1 a karlety of ways. For example, tlie warriors had to buy t h e ~ own r equipment, an expenslve proposition even when the linen corselet was subsrltuted for the costly bronze culrass (as ~t usu'dly was).'+V4opl1tesalso d~st,lncedthe~nselvesfrom those who clalnied an artstocratic background. As Hanson argues, the mlddling hoplttes pushed "rich and poor Greeks . . . to the stdes and rear of tlie phalanx, t o the physlc'al ,111d ~ d e o l o g i c ~m,lrgins ~l of the battlef~eld."'~'~' Homerlc warfare Iiad involved arlstocratlc, chariot-rid~ngwarriors. But horse soldters, whether in chanots or on horseback, played an increasingly seco~ldaryrole in the hophte era. The Athe~li~a~ls, tor example, had no cavalry at all at Marathon. This was partly because Izeep~nghorses was an expensive propositiorl, because horses were unsuitable tor most terrains in Greece, ,111d bec'luse c'lvalry WAS only modestly effect~ves ~ n c eno proper saddles, horseshoes, and stlrrups were ava~ldble.Rut the d i m ~ n ~ s h erole d of the cavalry also reflected the rnore egalttartan social pr~nciplesot rlie l~opllte era. First, '1s ment~oned,only the kery rich could buy ,111d keep horses. Second, the cavalry could receive the glum job of all the fighting by elilnlnating the fleeing enemy or by a flank or rear action. For t h ~ to s be acceptable, not only ~ n i l ~ t a rthlnk~ng y but also S O C I ~~I S S U I ~ ~ ~ I hdd O I I Sto c11'1nge. T h ~ h'lps pened with the Macedonlans of Philtp 11, a king surrounded by his arlsto-
20
Close Arrrry nvzd Pointed Specrrs
cratlc Companions. It was only then that cavalry finally c a n e to perforrn 1' crucial function on the battlefield of ancient Greece. The hoplttes did not d~scardall artstocratlc notions of wartare. 'They, ltke the FIomer~cheroes, bel~evedthat cornbat was an a g o n ~ s t ~ende'3vor c and an expresston of personal bravery and play."" But above all, the hopl~te army was the arrny of the nvddle strata o t Greek soczety. Although t h e ~ ~ r nfenors could be recruited In etnergellcles atld thew superiors could play 1' role, individually or as a group, at the edges of the battletield, hoplrtes were the core, heart, and bra~nsof warfare. The conduct of war and the act~onsof the warriors on the battlefield reflected and re~nforcedthe values of the ruling class, in most cases the mrdd l ~ n gfari~~ers.~"\i\rtstides, an eloquent orator who lived when Greece was under Roman control, clauned that 111 the Persi,m Wars, Athens had fought not only for the trtumpli of c1vtlt7at1onover barbarism but al$o for the freedom ot all Greece.'03 Indeed, wrtters and orators \vho 11vedduring the I'ersl,ln Wars often just~fiedwar as a defense of freedom. "Who 1s set as shepherd or as lord to oversee the hoqt [of the Greeks]?" asks Xerxes' mother tn a work by Aeschylus; "slaves ot no one [answers the chorus] are they called, nor 111 subjection to any man." Io4 A11d when Arlstogoras, the despot of Mlletus, went to Sparta to ask for help against the Pers~ans,he pleaded wtth the Spartans as "leaders of Hellas" to "save your Ionian ktnsnten from ~la\ery.""'~Freedom ~nthe sense used by the Greeks must be understood In both polittcal and social term$. Freedom preserved the structure of the state and also the property and physical l~bertyot the free cittLetl. Aparr from pol~t~cal freedom, the most powerful b ~ t l d ~ nagents g in 1' Greek society engaged In war (espectally against ~ t snelghborq) were the sense of property and greed-that IS, detendirlg what belorlgs to you and acqiiirlng what belongs to others-and the sense of rel~glon. Hanwn downplays the role of greed and expla~nsthe Greeks' war n~otlvation In terins of detendtng thezr agrtcultural property value system against the real or perceived threat posed by ne~ghbors."'~ Pr~tchettlnit~ally seenis to volce a stmllar opinion: "'Economtcs played a part; but people d ~ d not think of war In terins of trnruedlate econorntc profit."'"' Yet his rrtost recent work suggests that though the Greeks rat~on~llized t k e ~ n1111tdry r confrontattons on htgl~ergrounds, as ttme went by t h e ~ reconomtc goals became ~ncreas~ngly cruc~al.~~W becarue ar a "rnechanlsrn for nat~onalInt r o n states' come," ,111d "the haphazard practice lthe c ~ c q ~ ~ ~of~ other property] of the stxth and fifth centurres becomes sanct~onedas commonplace, aln~ostcasual, 111 the fourth and thi~d."'~" Pract~c~~lly all dspects of f i ~ r f a r ewere linked w ~ t hr e l ~ g ~ o upr~nciples, s probably because the antliropon~orphlcgods of the Greeks could ~llriserate and strengthen the social values of the comrnuntty better than any otlier form of relig~ousexpresaon. "The Greek c~ty,"a Ger~nanscholar states,
21
Close A w a y and Pointed Spears
"was . . . unth~nkahlewithout tlle Greek gods."'"' The decis~onto declare war was made a t the highest level of the citizen body, yet all declarations or responses in war were int~n~ately tied to exant~nationsof portents or statements that the people attr~hutedt o the gods-even ~fit w,~ss o ~ n e t ~ ~netnes essary to force a certain interpretatton from them! When Xerxes invaded Greece, for example, the Athenians as usual asked advice froin the Delphic oracle. But tlle response d ~ s ~ n n y ethem, d for the oracle adv~sedttlenl t o "flee to tlie ends of the earth from the circle embatrled of Athens!"' The despairing Athenians could not accept this adv~ce,and they aslted the oracle for a new ~nterpretation.The priestess ohl~gedand t h ~ stune re,~ssured them: They sliouid, she said, wltl~drawa t tlie coming of the enemy "turning thy back to the foe; thou yet shalt rrteet him in battle." Near the island of Salamis, she cont~nued,'"tis writ that ch~ldrenof womenIThoii shalt destroy one day, 117 the season of seedtrtne or liarvest."'" At other tirnes, the observance of religious custorns presented serious ohstacles to entry ~ n t oa war. For Instance, when the A t h e n ~ a ~ had l s confronted Xerxes' father, Darius, earlier in tlie Perstan Wars, Athens had aslzed the Spartans for help. Although wllling to help, the Spartans could not co~nplyirnrned~atelyw ~ t hthe request, for they were In the m d s t of 1' fest~valdedicated to Apollo: "It was the ninth day of the first part of the ruonth, and they would rnake no expedition (they said) on the ninth day, when the moon was not full. So they w , ~ ~ t efor d the full moon.""' Consequently, tile Athenians were forced to face the Persians at Marathon w ~ t h only srnall help front the I'lataeans. Once the decisio11 to enter Into war was made, the news was conveyed to the opponent through a complex r~tual.Heralds-men entrr~stedwith oral ruessages-or ambassadors were sent to the enemy. If a peaceful agreement could not be re,~ched,1' l L ~ ~ would n l > he let loose across enelny territory-a symbolic gesture indicating that the army would wage war w ~ t h o u quarter, t ravaging the land and turning tile opponent's orchards and fertile fields into ground s u ~ t ~ ~only l d e for I ~ e , l s t s . ' ~ ~ The decis~onto beg111 a battle was ~nextr~cably t ~ e dto the will of tlie gods as well. At Plataea in 479 H.( ., the Spartan general Pausanias restra~nedhis ~ n e nunt11 the sacrifices to the gods "grew to be favorable"; only then would the Spartans "[charge] the Persians."li' At 1,euctra in 371 R.(:., Epaminondas and the Theban leaders seemed t o have used a variety of ruearts connected w ~ t krelig~onto r a s e tlle spir~tsof the Thebans and t o discourage the Spartans. The Tiiebans were told they were going to fight on a terrain that had been desecrated by the Spartans, who had raped two Theban virgins there; they were illso told t o place g,~rl,~nds on the monument commemorating the Spartans' evil deed. Other important news came from Thebes: The sold~ersheard that the doors of the temples were opening of t h e ~ rown accord-& sure sign of v~ctory-'11v.I t11'1t the artns of EIer~lcles,the greatest
''
22
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T h e b ~ nof c~ll,had d~s,~ppe,~red frotn h ~ temple. s Could it be that Mer,~cles htmself would take part In the battle on tlie side of the T I i e b a n ~ ? ' ~ ~ 'The end of battle, the escape trorn rrlortal danger, arld the temporary or pern1,ailent suspensloll of hosttlit~eswere also infused with religious signlficance. The vlctortorls general would erect a trophy on the battlefield and rnake sure that a share of the booty, usually a tenth, would go t o the gods."" soldier fiho sought refuge 111 a temple and asked the protection of the gods lnrght be spared unlesr h ~ enemy s intended to defy the d ~ v ~ n e and ~nvokeall the negative consequences that such a challer~gezrnpIied.ll8 At other tlmes, religious festivals l11te the O l y ~ n p ~ ccould s b r ~ n ghost~lities to a halt. And the gods tliernrelves were called to wrtness agreerneiits reached by warring parcles at all stages of negotiattons."" The fact is that rehgion was the most powertul incentive to keep good f a ~ t hIn the agreements and treattes resulting from war. Promtses to men could be broken, but oaths to the god5 could not because vtctory went to those whont the gods fa\ored.lX) T h ~ sassun~ptioi~ undcrp~illledthe Greek's hc3tldl~ngof 1'11 legal aspects of warfare. As Yvon Garlai~states, thew r~tualswere not so rnuch destgrled tor human consumption as to keep the good w ~ lof l the gods on thelr s~de.'" To pardghrdse Franco Forn,~rl on the p s y c h o a t ~ ~ ~ l yofs ~ s modern war, rttuals were also a way of endowing "the process of killrng with the tunct~onof. dectd~ngwhich of the t\vo groups I S 'right,' prec~selyas ~f the process of r , ~ t ~ o n aver~fication l fiere replaced by k~llttlgas a criterion of truth, in a massive sadtsttc transtormatlon of the validation process.""" And finally, rttuals served as a testarrlerlt to the beltet that war and tlie rnalcers of war embodied the hlghest values of the community. Cons~der,for Instance, the funeral honors accorded men who had fallen on the battlefield. In fifth-century Athens, the eulogy was performed in front ot terl cypress sarcophag~,represetltlrlg the ten tr~besof the clty-state. And the eulogy ~ t self was ~ntendednot to ralse the indtvidual but to si~nultaneouslyg r a m and mourn for the soc~albody. 14s Marcel D e t ~ e n r ~eloquently e says, when the city del~veredthe eulogy for the fallen, ~t praised ~ t glory, s the only form of glory that ~t could t01erate.l~~ The glory for the fallen was forever. In Athens, the state and each tribe w~tliin~t kept a record ot tlie dead and rn~sstng,open to anyotle to consult-someth~llg like the V~ettldrnMemor~al ante lrtternm. And in Sparta, only those fallen In war had the honor of havIng their name ~ n s c r ~ b eodn their t~rnbstones."~ I11 "The Profess~orlof Arms," an ep~sodeIn h ~ s1984 serles War, presented by the Canadlan Broadcast~ngCorporation, Gwynne Dyer asked a V ~ e t n a ~veteran, n "I-Iow would you tee1 to go into cornhat a g a ~ n ? "Lt. Col. M~chdelPetty of the U~lltedStates Ariny answered: I cio not want to go. I ~tdrtto u y , I thlnk 'lnyone would be a fool to want to go. I d o not want to say that. I \vould go becaux I JIII a profes\lonal soldier ali~lI take great pridc in thc fact that I arn a p r ~ f e \ \ ~ ~oo~l d~ ~~e1lrtralrted . t o he
Close A w a y and Pointed Spears
2.3
soldlcr, and I ~ a n ' th~nk t of anything more honorahle for me per\onally t h m to be a \oldler dncl ~ t mv t joh ~f tnv country arks me to go and fight. I would do t h d t for myself, for my farii~lv,for my cou~~tr)~-a~i~l for niy (rod. l3ut I d o not want to liave to clo that, but 1 am \vlll~ngto if rt cornea along.'L' 'I
I'etty's elnphas~son the tact that his duty was tied to h ~ role s as a protess1ona1 soldler is ~ n d l c a t ~ vofe the separdtlon that exlsts today between the people who fight and soctety as a whole. Rut the rest of the statement by the U.S. soldler (that h ~ servrce s o n the battlefield was "for ruyself, for rny famdy, for rrly country" and, afier a pause, "for n ~ yGod") expressed a belref that the free cttlzens of the anctent Greek state would have shared. Not even E~~rlpides, an intellectual who usually shled away trorn the norinal warl~keobhgat~onsof c ~ t l z e n s h l p ,would ' ~ ~ h,ave been a n exception to tlle rule In t h ~ sregard. The assrrrnptlon that tt was a crti~en'sduty to give h15 life for the state was unchallenged ~n anclent Greece. In the word5 of one oftheir enemles, tlie "only hol~day[of the Atlletl~ansl1s to d o thelr duty": "They regard untronbled peace as a far greater calarntty than laborious act~\it)i."'" The key phrase here, as in Lt. Col. I'etty's staterrtent, 1s "to d o their duty," The rultng class of Athens enforced the concept of doing one's duty w ~ t h all the people-whether they were hoplttes or not and whether they benefited fro111 war or were hurt by ~ t War . waged by the few was perce~vedto be in the Interest of the many, 'This belief cliaractert7ed the most dratnat~c p e r ~ o dot Greek warfare-the confrontation early in the class~calage that p~ttedthe tiny Greek states agalnst the mighty Perslan Emplre.
Chapter Two
First Blood on the Plain of Marathon l'he Athc~rzrans,ilos~?zgall togrther irlrtb t l ~ l'erslans, p Jorrght ~ r mrmoz r'7bic fashloiz; for t h ~ yroc2re thr first Greeks, withrrz nzy knowle~fge, Z L J ~ibarged O therr erremws at a rrttr, a ~ tlie ~ dfirs1 zvho e~ldltredthe szgbt of Mcdlalz garnzurzts nizd nzen clirii th(sret~z;tlll tbe~z,the (;reeks ruere affr~ghteci11y t h vt'ry ~ ~ z a n zof~ N (!(!VS. -Herodotus
VI.112
Prologue It was probably in tlie first halt of the second century ?\.D. that a Greek traveler by the lldnle of Pausan~asvislted Maratho11. About 640 years had passed since the day of tlie great battle of Marathon, bttt on the plain, lie could still find rentinders of- the conflict-the burial mound of tlie Atheni'111s ' ' L I ~ O I~t~ [the! slabs of the killed accordl~lgto t h e ~ rtr~bes"and the burial ground of the Roeotian Plataeans and of their slaves, "'for slaves fought then for the first time by the side ot their masters." Pausantas was an honest rnan, very proud of h ~ Greek s ancestry, hut not one prone to easy enthi1s1asms. Yet his imagination, haunted by the ~ n e ~ n o r i of e s tlie past, could not refrain from a touch of roinant~cfantasy. When the sun tell across the western sky and the 11ght of the day died away, he wrote, Greek hopl~tesand Persian fighters restaged their ancient battle again and again: "At Marathon every night you can hear horses neighing and iiten fighting."l In v~sitingthe battleground, Pausanias was follow~nga tradit~onbegun soon after the great confrontation, a tradition sanctified by Athens during tlie early stages of the Peloponnesian War.2 l'he Spartans, whose 2,000 warriors had arr~vedtoo late t o fight the Persians, d ~ d not return 1r111ned1ately to their city after tlie battle ended. Instead, they rnarched another 45 kilometers t o lool< a t the battletield because "they decxded to see the Medes," those whose g'~rmenu alone had been a source of fear for the
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
25
whole of Hellas: "Tt11 then, the Greeks were affrtghted by the very Ilame of the Medes."; After the battle, contrary to custom, the Athentans dectded to build a tomb o n the spot for the nlen who had died there slnce they considered their valor o ~ i t s t a n d i n g .And ~ the composer of Aeschylus's epitaph chose to remember hiin not for his plays or for 111s role at Salamis but for h ~ participat~on s at Marathon.' Even Aristophanes, who was born 11.1 450 1 3 . L about 40 ye'trs after the great battle, and who seems to have been one of the few tntellectuals uneasy about the warlike tendencies of- his society, could not help but express the same sense of wo~lderwhen dealing wlth Maratho11. The veterans "who a t Marathon fought with the Medes, for Athens and Hellas contetid~ng,/ and won the great battle . . . left us a theine for our songs and speeches unending.""'At Marathon arrayed [say the veteransl, to the battle-shock we ran,/and our mettle we dtsplayed, foot to foot, tnan to tnan,/and our name and our farne shall not die."' The nl'tln hetrs of the Assyrtan Empire tn the Mlddle East had been the Pers~ans.From the accesston of thetr lung Cyrt~sthe Great In 549 B.(:. to the early part of- the fifth century, they had conquered a territor) that stretched from the Caucasus, the Caspian Se't, and the Aral Sea in the north to the Perslan Gulf and the Indian Ocean In the south and from the Indus River in the east to Egypt, Asia lMinor, and the 't-lellespor~tIn the \vest.x 111 Asia Mtnor, the Perslans h,ad come 111to contitct wlth Greek culture, for Greek colonists had founded inost of the crties of Ionia, the name given to a region on the western shores of modern 'Turkey. Probably 11.1 the late summer or early fall of 499, the Greek colonies, subjects of the Persian Emp~re,liad revolted, They had asked t h e ~ rhomeland for help, hut only two cities had responded to the plea for military supyort-the ctty of Eretr~aon the island of E u l ~ o e just ~ ~ , i ~ o r t hof Athens, and Athens ~tself.Sparta had constdered the offer to participate but dccl~ned. The conquest of Susa "where lives the great [Persian] kl~ig,and [where] there are the storehouses of his we,tlth"%nust have a p p e ~ l e dto the Spartans, for they had w a ~ t e dthree days before giv~ngtheir answer to the lonian envoy. Yet when he heard that Susa was "a three rnonths' journey Inland," the Spartan king had "cut short a11 the rest" and bade the envoy of the rebels "depart froin Sparta before sunset." A journey three months from the sea? Never.Io The Greek rebels had had sorrle t~ltttalsuccess, and the Io~ltallsand Athenlans had even sacked the ~rngertalcity of Sardis, but eventually, the Persians liad crushed thern. When the Ionian cities fell one after the other, the Athen~ansknew that they too had to confront the mighty Pers~anEmptre. It was just a inatter of tlme. Dar~us,the Persian krtig, had no cliolce but to punish the sl~glitthat the Greeks of the lnainlarld had inflicted on h m . )Its hold on the 1oni,a11 clttes of Asi'a Mlnor would never be secure unless he
26
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathot2
forced Greece to recognize his sovereignty. Moreover, the k~ng's~rnper~alist ~ goals c strengthened the nlotlves of revenge. The Perstans had engaged in a policy of expansion into Europe since 520 B.<,. 'l'hetr goals were clear: first Thrace, then Macedon~a,and fin,~llythe Greek st'ttes. By 492 I J . ~ . , Daritrs felt that he could strengthen his rule over Thrace and ,Macedonla and then "pillage, burn, and enslave Athens." The I'ers~an lnvaslon came from the north. In~t~ally, Pers~~l's fordy ~ i l t oEurope fids successf~~l. The Persians strengthened thetr control over Tiirace and integrated Macedon~a ftllly Into the Persian Ernpire. But then t h e ~ rexpedit~ontnet with disaster. Half the fleet s m k while round~ngtlle promontory otf Mount Athos 111 the northern part of the Greek gen~nsula;the army was defeated by a Tlirac~an army, and Mardonius, the I'ers~an colnruander, was wounded.'' Two years later, D n r ~ u ssent another fleet under the command of D n t ~ s and Artaphrenes (Figure 2.1). This ti~i-re,the ships d ~ not d travel the treacherous waters around Mount Athos but cut directly across the southern edges of the Aegem Se'1, h o p p ~ n gfrom ~ s l a ~ tl od ~ s l ~ l n~intil d they I'tnded near Eretr~a,one of the two major offendtng citles. The Perstan cornmanders rrlust have planned t h e ~ rexpedition In three stages: first to reestabl~sh fir111 control over the Cyclades ~sl,lnds,then to conquer Eretr~a,and fin'11ly to brlng Athens to its knees either through mil~taryaction or through psycholog~calpressure." They relied o n a t least three factors to break Athens's fill1 to res~st-firm control of the 1sl~1ndsbetween the shores of A s ~ aM ~ n o r and Attlca, the reglon in which Athens IS situated; tlie sight of the Eretr~an c ~ t i ~ e led n s to Persia In cha~ns;and ~nternalpolit~caldiscord In Athens herself. The c ~ t yfias d~v~cied between the ruling party, which was 1~1sedo11 the mtddle classes of the populatton and w h ~ c hhad adopted a warltke attitude, and the aristocrat~cparry, which leaned toward reach~nga contprorntse filth the Pers~ans.Hippi,as, who had ruled Athens before his expulsion In 510 B.('. and who had friends among the aristocratic fact~on,was among the participants In the I'ers~an exped~tion.~" The Eretria~lswere struck w ~ t hterror at the arrival o t the Pers~tlnfleet. They put all their hopes in a slege. For six days, they reprrlsed tlie attacks of thetr enemies, b i ~ Ot ~ the I seventh, "two Eretrians of repute. . . betrayed tlie city t o tlle Persi,a~ls." The vlctors were pit~less:They plundered atld burnt the temples and led tlie populat~onaway 111 chains.I4 It was now tlrne to punish Athens. The I'ers~ans, however, shied away from $1 d~rectc~pproc~ch. Although the most obv~ouslaildlng place would have been the Phalerum near Athens, they landed instead a t Marathon, about 45 k~lorrretersfrom their goal ( F ~ g u r e2.2).IF N.C.L. llarurnond agrees w ~ t hthe c l ~ o i c e . ~ ~ M a r ~ stood ~ t h o nnear the supply l ~ n e sof tlle Persian army; it had an anchorage well su~tedfor tlie fleet; and it was tlie fittest part of Attica for the I'ers~an cavalry. (Thts 1s one of the two reasons also cited by Herodotus, the other being iMarathot13snearness to tlle new supply
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
27
base of Eretrta.)" Moreover, the location tavored the I'erstan cavalry: It the A t h e ~ l sold~ers ~ ~ ~ ~ l relna~ned111 Athens, the Pers~anscould advailce over ground well suited to thetr horsemen; if, however, the Athentans came to rueet them on the Marathon plain, the I'ersian cavalry again would have fought on fC~vorable terraln. The Pers~ans'Greek puppet H ~ p p i ~ ahad s apparently also suggested lalidtng theret"a fact that h ~ n t sa t the gossib~lity that at this stage, the I'ers~ar~s still tho~iglitthey could si~bjugateAthens hy ~ntern~al treachery; the p x t y fC~vorable to H ~ p p i ~ would as del~verthe clty to them wtthout the necessity of sheddrng Perstan blood. It also made senye because any ldnd~rlgclose t o Athens, even it phystcally possible, would have beet1 rr~uchmore d~fficultto dchleve becduse ot the proxlmlty of the Athen~anarmy. F~nally,it was Itkely that Htpptas expected some local support. It was at Marathon that h ~ tather s I'etststratus had landed in 546 in hls successful attempt t o gal11 po11t1c~~l power 111 Athens. Also, M~pp~:ts's famtly came from that area. 'The easy capture of 12thens rrlust have su~tedthe old I-ltppias, who had had a d r e a n tllat seerned to confirm the success o t the exped~tlon.He h,ad
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
29
dre,lmed, 111 a inanner rem~n~scetlt of Sophocles' Oed~pus,that he had l a ~ n w ~ t hh ~ mother. s It was a stgn, lie s a ~ dafterward, that he would "return to Athens and recover his power." I-lowever, his lnterpretatlon wotlld sooil change. As he touched the shore of the Marathon pl'tin, he was se~zedby a cougl~ingand snee71ng fit so violent that one of his old teeth fell to the grotlnd. Frantically, he tried to recover hrs tooth but he fa~led."'Th~sland [he finally excl.t~medl IS none of ours, nor shall we av'xil to subdue ~ t my ; tooth has all tlie share of ~t that was for me.""" It is dotlbtful that the Persiari leaders belreved I-l~ppras'swords, evert if we accept the story of his dre'ln~ ;IS red1 and not as a creC1tionof I.Ierociotus's dramatic ~lnaglnation.The Perctan generals Datis and Artaphrenes had landed a considerable force In Greece, although not in the 600 trirenles suggested by Herodotus and certcl~~lly not w ~ t hthe 200,000 ~nhntrymenand 20,000 cavalrymen listed by Cornellus Nepo~.~O Rut ~twas stlll a very large arrny-77,000 according to Harnntond, alrl-rough only about 25,000 of those were ;I figllt~ngforce; the rest were merely support troops." The Persian? could also count to t h e ~ radvantage the fact that they had normally beater) the Greeks they had met earl~erin Egypt and Asia Minor. Herodotus l~stsseventeen types of 'lrinalnents when descr~b~ng the Pers~ans'equipnient.12 On the basrs of that, the Persran sold~erscan be d~vided into at least four categories: light infantry trorn Asia M~nor,armed \vrth javel~nsand smC~ll round txgets; heavy ~ n f ~ ~ nfrom t r y As13 M~nor,carrylng the usual panoply for this type of soldter-helmets, large shields, some form of cuirass, spears, arid swords or daggers; infantry and I~ghtcavalry from Bactri'q atld the Irdn~anpla~ns,equ~ppedw ~ t hshort spexs or axes and daggers but n o armor; and l ~ g h infantry t and cavalry from Medla and Persia, armed with wiclcer shields, sornetinles corslets, bows, spears, and daggers." Pride of pl'tce, as both Aeschylus and Herodotus confirm, w~thout doubt belonged to tlie bow and the cavalry.14 The comyosrte bow seems to have been very etfective, although it was ditterent from the type used b y the most fG~irlousarchers of this p e r ~ o dof ant~quity-the Indo-European Scytliians of the plains of southern Russia.15 'The Persiari army was q u ~ t edifterent frorn that o f the Greek hoplites. T h ~ was s not only because ~ t backbo~le s was mounted nlen and archers but also because while the Creek hopl~teswere homogeneous both in ethnic and in pol~ticalterms, the I'ersiaris were a cosmopolltan army drawrng t h e ~ r recruits from a11 corners of As~a-not only froin Pers~aand Media but also from Ind~a,Ractr~a,Assyria, and Asia Minor. There must have been some obvious weaknesses in this arrangement, for a nurnber of reasons-d~fterent latlguages, d~fferentstyles of armament, d~fferentways of fighting-but the most obvious weakness in modern eyes, the lack of ethn~csol~darity, was much less scriotls thctn it rrtlght at first seem. People of the time did not fight In the name of common blood bonds unless limited to the confines of
S0
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathot?
The key for the111 was plutlder, m d the se'2rch for plunder united all Perstans, just as ~t would later unite the diverse army of Alexander the Great. Actually, if we look at the problem fro~rtthis angle, the Greeks were at 3 disadvantage, not tlle Perslans. The invaders were men who made war thetr profersion; the Greeks, by contrast, fought for the freedom of their cities and thus had a greater urgency t o survive than their opponents, hut they were theoret~callya group of amateurs 111 cornpanson to same of the best untts of the Pers~ana r ~ n y . ~ " The difference between the I'ersiar~s and the Greek hoplites is even nlore str~kingwhen we compare thelr methods of waglng war. The linltted arlnor and the use of light troops and cavairy~nengave a great deal of nobility to the I'ers~an arrny. In other words, their soldiers were well su~tedto an emplre that stretched froin the shores of the Indus R ~ v e rto the borders of Europe, even ~f t h e ~ rmobility must have bee11 hampered by the problem of rnovlng such large bod~esof men. On the battlefield, the Persian army rel~ed on speed i ~ n dnumbers to overwhelm the enerny, just tlle opposlte of the hoplites whose strength was based o n Inass and power. Now, w ~ t l ithe invaders a few hours from Athens on the shores of Marathon, the time had come to test the v a l ~ d ~ tofy the two methods designed to bring vlctory t o one side and destruct~onto the other.
1 ' CRY.
The Battle 'The army that the Athenians sent to Marathon was led by a commander in chief (the p o l e ~ n ~ ~ rnamed c h ) Oallimachus m d ten gener~ls(the strL~tego~).17 Qne of the geiierals was a Greek of artstocratic b~rtllnamed M ~ l t ~ a d e s , whose ta~rtilyhad establtshed a kind of- personal k~ngdornat tlie border of the P e r s ~ mEmp~re.Me himself had fought against the Perslans, but now back in the crty of 111s ancestors, he had become ~dentlfiedw ~ t hone of the parcles that was divid~rigAthens at the tlme. Milt~adessupported the war f'1ct1011 dnd the continuat~onof 1' constitut~onbased on pr~nciplesacceptable to the rn~ddleclasses and thus to tile Iioplttes. 'I'he Athen~anarrny Ii,xd between 9,000 and 10,000 hopltter." There were no b o ~ . m e nno , horsernetl, and probably no l ~ g h ~nf~~ntrymetl, t at least at the rnornent of the battle. When tlie Perslanr landed a t Marathon, the Athenians had qu~cklyasked Sparta for help. The Spartans would be coming but only In due tlme. They could not offer ~ m n ~ e d i a assistance, te for they fiere in the rn~dstof a sacred festival, probably the Karnela In Iionor of Apollo. The only Greeks who sent a contirigenr to help Athens were the Plataems. Between 600 and 1,000 of t h e ~ hophtes r had come to share victory or destri~ction.~' It must have taken about two days for Callrmachus's soldters to marcli the 45 kilometers trorn Athens to M a r a t I i ~ n They . ~ ~ approached the site from the rugged terraln at the south of the bay, and they must have looked
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
3l
down w ~ t ha sense of fedr and excltelnent at the ~nlghtyarrny of t h e ~ renemies arrayed on the platn and at the s h ~ n yfleet ancliored to the north near the cape of. Kynosura. They did not attack but stayed on the h~llsnear a precinct sacred t o a god dedr to the people of the deme (\Illage) of Marathon, Heracles. Besides t\vo ep~taphsand tour other inscriptions, the three ruost important sources on the b ~ t t l eare FIerodotus (who wrote when the veterans of the great battle were still alive), the Roman Cornellus Nepos ( ~ the n first century KC.), arid the Greek Pausan~as(who was active in the first halt o f the second century A.D.). Herodotus and P a ~ ~ s a n ~b;~sically as agree, but Cornel~usNepos presents a picture that at tlines is sharply d~fferent.In spite of sorne o t its obscurities and contradict~ons,I take Herodotus's account as be~ngfundamentally correct.;' The first great historian of Western c ~ v l i ~ z a t ~glctures on the Greelc host 111 emotional and tactical disarray at the sight of the enerny. It is clear that the council of war, ten generals and the co~n~nander in chlef Callimc~chus,was dlvided on what to do: "Some advised that they s17~)uldnot fight, thinlz~ng that they were too few t o do battle with the Median arrny, and some one of whom was Mlltlades, that they ~ h o u l d . " 'The ~ reluctance to engage ln battle must have reflected not only physical fear of the enenly but also the Internal struggles of the city. Were the war parry defeated, Athens wotlld be forced to accept the Perslans as overlords, and the old t y r ~ ~ n n party ~c~~l would triumph over the dernocrattc values of the rntddle classes of soctety and thus of the hoplites. The counc~lseems to have beer1 equally divided on t h ~ ~ssue, s so the vote ot the polem,~rchcould have Ineant victory e~therfor those who wanted to srt and walt or for the others who recogni~edthat confrontat~onwas ~nevitable,either sooner or later. For some like ~Miltiades, fighting now seemed a necessity that they could not avo~d.The deciston rested w ~ t hCalilmachus. Milt~adestook the polerrtarch aside. In an ernot~onalconversation, he outlined the optlons open to them. It w,~sI' ~ n ~ ~ toft efreedom r or sldvery for their city, he said, "to bow t h e ~ necks" r to the Persians or to take matters 111 their own harids and lay a claim "to be the first of Greelz cities." Battle could not be delayed. It was lnlperative betore Athens was "infected by corruption": "Let heaven but deal fairly w ~ t hus, and we lnay well wln in thls fight."3' IIerodotus reports no other str'xteglc c ~ r g ~ ~ ~ nexcept e n t s those posed by the ~ ~ i t e r ~pioall~ t ~ c asituatton l in Athens. The Athen~anshad to fight, as Miltlades said, before corruption (that IS, betrayal) seeped in; otherwise, the Perslan p1.t11 of subjug,~t~ng the clty w~thoutbloodshed would come to fru~tion.In any case, M ~ l t ~ a d ewas s able to convince Call~inaclius,and the decis~onwas rnade to wage battle. Herodotus, ho\vever, says that Miltiades decided to wait a few more days u n t ~ lit w,~sh ~ sturn to lead the army.
32
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathot2
Herodotus must h,ave been wrong here. He apparently telescoped a c h a r x ter~sticof hrs own t~mes-the dally turnover of leadership among the stratego]-to the period of the Persian Wars. The visual representation of the b'~ttlein the Painting Colonnade at Athens, described by P ~ ~ u s ~ ~clearly n~as, shows a different arrangement in the command structure: "Qf the fighters the ruost conspicuous figures in the palntlng are Callirnachus, who had been elected commander-in-chief by the Athen~ans,Mlltlades, one of the generals, and a hero called E ~ h e t l u s . " ~ ~ There were a nurrtber o f strategic and tactical reasons for the delay. Attacking the whole Persian army in a plain that, as Herodotus says, was the most su~tableof Attica for riding" would have bee13 both stupid and surcrdal. Meanwhile, time was working in the Athenrans' tavor: If they waited long enough, the Spartans would send help. Moreover, the Athen~anshad n o worrles about their supply line, and finally, as long as they r e ~ n a ~ n eon d the rugged terraln south of the hay, they offered a difficult target tor the Persian c'~v'~lry.But Mllti'ades w,~scorrect that ' ~ t t ~ ~w,~s c k inev~table,not only for the strategxc reasons dictated by internal polltics but also because, even ~f they had wanted to, their withdrawal toward Athens ruay have been tact~callyimyosslblc. Once they left the s,~fetyof t h e ~ rugged r terrain to return to Athens, they would have become grey to the more moblie Pers~ans. The Persians too could not wait forever. Their supply I~ne,even after the co~lquestof the nearby ~ s l ~ nofd Euboe'~, must 11'1\e been tenuous for an army o f that srze. The control of the sea-lanes between Asia Minor and the Greek perlinsula was subject t o the caprices of weather and the problem posed by rel,~tively long di~tances.'~ Moreover, ~f the Persians w'11ted too long and a revolution In Athens did not hand them the city, the eneiny force would have grown, as the Sparrans joined the Athenians and I'lataeans.3' However, ;IS long as the Athetl~answere etlc,~mpedon the high, rugged ground, it would have been to the Persians' tactlcal disadvantage to attack. After waiting a few days and notlong that the Athenians had n o ir~tent~on of abandon~ngthe h ~ g hground, the Pers~ansrnust h m e decided to force the issue in a golttical rather than a ~nrl~tary sense. There 1s n o direct evidence t o support this conclus~on,but Herodotus's c~ccou~lt of the b'1tt1e ~ n l y l ~ ethat s the whole Perslan arrny was not present. T h ~ smight mean erther that some of the Persians had embarked on their ships at night or that they were in the process of doing so at the ruorrtent of the Greeks' attack. The Pers~answere not cailght ~ t l p r e p ~ ~ rfor e d ,they were in line ready to receive the Creeks,'%ut t h e ~ rcavalry was clearly not present or present only In very s~rtallnurnbers. I-lerodotus, who has rrtent~oned three tirnes before that the Perslan arrny included cav'xlry,'" never refers to it in his account of the battle. The Byzantine encycloped~aof the tenth century A.l)., the Stkda, says that at the rnornent o f attack, the Pers~ans'horses were "apart (or far away)," w h ~ c hInay suggest that the cavalry was in the
First Rlood on the Plain of Marathon
3.3
neighborhood gather~ngsupplies. Such a n activity is unhkely, however, because it IS clear that the Persian 11newas ready for tlie Greek hoplttes, and if they expected an attaclc, they would have made every ettort to deploy the most powertul conlponent of their battle osder ~f it M.JS nearby. The v~sual sources for the battle, the Stoa palnttng of around 460 &.c. and two dertved sources, show that some horses were present: A fragment of- tlie Bresc~asarcophagus dlsplays 1' horse In the nlidst ot a struggle 111 front of two sh~ps' sterns, and a fr~ezeof the Nlke temple o n the Athens acropolts portrays a horseinan taken down by a Greek.40 j.11.S. Evar~shas argued, partly on the b'lsis of this ev~dence,that the horses prob,ably were present at the battle. Rut he m a ~ n t a ~ that n s the cavalry contrngent of tlie Perstan host was much s~nallerthan ortgt~iallythought-only about 200 Iner). At the moment ofattack, some of them h ~ been d sent forward tow,~rdAthens t o secure the road since the Perstans had dec~dedto move by land toward the crty. Thus, only a few, left near the sh~ps,played a role.4' Evans's interpretat~on1s less convinc~ngthdn the traditiotl~largument th'tt the horses co~lst~tuted a cons~derahleportion of tlie enemy army and that they were a t the moment of attaclc already on the shtps or at the point of eriibarkat~on,as llerodotns, the Suda, atld even the kisual sources seem to suggest. Embarking horses on the unstabie platforms of tlie anc~etitshtps must have been a labor~ous process, and no arrny could leave this task tor tlie last riiolnent wttli the eneiny close a t hand. Lo,adlng the horses would instead hdve been the first tli~ngto d o in tile mind of a general who was ready to leave. The P e r s ~ a plan r ~ riiust have been to ernbarlc litost of-the arrny on the s h ~ p s atld to la11d lt close to Athens, at the Phalerum, n e x the gates of the c~ty. W ~ t hthe Pers~anhost there, it would have been much easier to convlnce the Athenians to glve in to the party that favored accepttng the I'ersian yoke. The Pers~ailsuccess, of course, relted on the ln'lctlvity of the Athen~anarrny a t Marathon-an expectarkon that, o n payer, seemed reasonable enough. 'I'he Athen~anarrny could not turn back and proceed toward the I'haleru~n to preveilt the land~tlg.If they d ~ d they , would have ventured on terrdill where tile Pers~ans(who had rema~nedon tlie beach and were stlll more numerous and litobtle than the Greeks) could have harassed them ever1 if they had no horsemen at all. If the Greeks retnalned in thew p o s ~ t ~ oon n the rugged ground, the Persia~lfleet would have landed near Athens w~tliout protection trout its sold~ers.If tlie Greeks attacked, the Persians rriust have beet1 confident of illfl~ctirlgInany casuaities if not dete'xt, so that the final confrontatton w ~ t l iAthens would s t ~ l lhave favored the Perstan host. Clearly, In splte of- tlie Persians already on the s h ~ p sor in the process ofbo'wd~ngthern, the position of the Athetl~~a~ls w,~sstill precarious. The Greek battle plan, as Herodotus's and Cornel~usNepos's accounts rnainta~n,rnust have been Mlltiades', desp~tethe fact that the overall le'~de r s h ~ pposition was held by Callirnachus, for ~t M.JS the polem,arch ~ . h o
34
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathot?
took the posit~onof honor o n the r ~ g h w~t~g.~"lle t first problem M ~ l t ~ : ~ d e s had to face was to ensure the safety of hts line. He could d o so only by depleting the center-wh1c1-1 was only "a few ranks deep, and [where] tlie Itne w,~swe'lkest, edch wlng being strong 111 n~imbers."~' J u d g ~ n gby the length of the battlefield (about 1,500 meters, whether the Greeks were arranged along a roughly south-north or an east-west a x ~ s ) " h n dby the nurnber of Greek sold~ers(10,000, ~ncludlngthe Platae~ns),the line must h,ave been evenly d~videdInto three sectors: the r ~ g hw t ~ t h4,000 men, 8 me11 deep; the center with 2,000 men, 4 rrlerl deep; and the left with another 4,000 men, '11so 8 men deep.4' As the battle would show, tlie Greek plan called for containment, ~f possihle, of the enemy center, victory at the wings, and then a plncer ruovelnent of the w ~ t ~ gagatlst s the Pers~ancenter. Milt~ddesmust have had t h ~ sIn mind from the very begtnnlng. It would have been i~nposs~bie to coordinate a prncer movement or] the spot, g~venthe llnt~tedcornruunications of hoplite warf,~re. Moreover, even ~f communlcatlons were poss~ble,~t would have been hard to restrain tlie Creeks from pursuing tlie flee~ngPersians and to convince then], or] tlie spur ot the ruorrtent, that they should d~rect t h e ~ rwlngs to assail the enerny center. The greatest d~sadvantageof the hoplites was tlie~rslowness. Facing an army composed ot light ~nfantryrlienwho relied primarily on missiles, they would have been easy targets as long as they remalned at a dist'~nce.The effect~veor lc~ll~ng range of the Persian bow was probably about 17.5 meters, ~f we accept W. McLeod's estimate, or 150 meters, if we agree with Hant~ n o n d A. ~hoplite ~ could probably cover the k ~ l l i ~ zone l g of 17.5 meters, the last few meters a t a rush, In about 60 seconds. If we assume that the Perstans could release 1 arrow every 10 seconds, theoretically then they could shoot 5 or 6 arrows before the 1111es clashed. This reasolllng assumes, however, that the Persia11 archers would stand there ~mpassivelyshoot~ngwhile tlie Greeks charged them. If they cared for their 11vesat all (and we ruust assume that they did), t h e ~ rbehav~orwould hdve been qulte different. More I~kely, they would have shot no Inore than 4 arrows at tlie lc~llingrange and then would have switched to spear or sword or run tor safety to the rear ot speararnled troops. The other altern,atlve-shoor~ng from beh~ndblocks of spearartned infantry-would have certa~nlyweakened the in~pactof their arrows. All this suggests that it would have benefited the I'ersians to contain the Greeks at a distmce as far as poss~bie,while ~t was in the Interest of the Creeks t o join hand-to-hand battle immediately. M ~ l t ~ a d e choice s' was fla\vless: "Straightaway the Atherlidns were let go and charged the I'ersians at 3 run"; "they were the first Greeks, with111 xny knowledge, who charged thetr enemtes a t a We have to d~scard,however, Herodorus's ~mglication that the run lasted n o less than 8 stades (about 1,460 rrteters)." A sold~erwhose average he~ghtwas about 1.68 meters, carrying a load of
.?.5
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
Greeks
Ttlc lri~t~al Clas11
FIGURE 2.3 a r ~ n sm d armor about half h ~ body s we~ght,could harcily run more than a few meters ~f lie wanted to contact the enemy with any semblance of physical vigor. 'This ruust have rneant that the hopl~tesrushed the enemy only in the I'tst 20 to 30 meters or so of the k ~ l l ~ nrange g of the bow. The Persians must have looked In wonder at these crazy men running toward them: "When the Persians saw them come running they prepared to recelve them, deenl~ngthe Athetl~ansfrerlzieci t o their utter destruct~on, who b e ~ n g(as they saw) so few were charg~ngthem at speed, albe~tthey had no horsernen nor archers."4Y This assessment rrtust have been strengthened when the Perslan center, w h ~ c hhad the besr troops ("the Persians themselves and the Sacae""')"prevailed and broke the Greeks, prrrsuing them inland" (Figure 2.3).ji Under ~ l o r m circumstances, ~~l t h ~ would s have meant the end of any other army, but Miltrades' plan must have taken into account that h13center mtght run Into grave difficulties and that everyth~ngwotlld depend on tint~ng.He 11'1d to defe'lt the enemy wings before the stt~iationof 111s center becatne irreversible. Tlln7gs worked In his favoe The Athenians and Plataeans, respectively at the r ~ g h tand lett wlngs, prevailed, b ~ they ~ t "suffered their enemies to fly" and then "drew t h e ~ rwlngs together to fight dga~nstthose who h,ad
S6
i
First Rlood on the Plain of Marathot?
I
FIGURE 2.4 brolten the middle of- their Irne; and here the Athenians had the vlctory" (F~gure2.4).'l We d o not ltnow what the defeated Persian wings did, but it IS l~kelythat rnost of tl~ernsought retuge on the ships. For the Persian center, it was a different nutter. Some must have sought refuge on the shlps, and others must have run toward the northern part of the battlefield. It was then, when the enemy was on tlie run, that tlie pitiless business ot slaughter began. 'l'he Greeks even pursued those seeklng refuge OII thelr sh~ps.It was probclbly an ill-advlsed move, for they won seveli enemy ships but pald dearly for them: Some of thelr leaders were Itilled, alrtorlg then1 the comlnander in chref Call ~ r n ~ ~ c who, h u s artlled wlth M ~ l t ~ a d eplan, s' had so ably led tl~enlInto battle.'$ A number of Persian? must have been killed there In the shallow waters of the bay as well, but their biggest casualties were elsewhere. The ruajorlty of the fleelng Persla~lsran, "push~ngone another illto the "There
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathon
37
IS a t Maratho~la lake whlch for tlle most part 1s marshy. Into t h ~ s Ignorance of the road? made the fore~gnersfall in t h e ~ rfl~ght,and ~tIS s a ~ dthat this acctdent was the cause of thetr great l o s s e ~ . " ~Perstan ' cas~~alties riurnbered about 6,400 men. The Atheman cc~sua1t~es, as was typ~calfor the victors ot most anctent battles, were very small-only 192 men.'" Cornellus Nepos estirrtates that the I'erstan force at the battle tncluded 100,000 ~nfnntryrnenand 10,000 cavalrymen." The bel~efthat the Persta~ls enjoyed a nu~nerrcalsuperiority went unchallenged untrl German I~~stortan llarts Delbruck rnade a shocking statement, asserting that the Persians were e~therequal or ~ n t e r ~ o11.r1 number to the Greeks.jx Getlerally, historians have not accepted Delbruck's thes~s,although most have drast~callpaltered their estlrnates on the number of I'erstans present at Marathon and In the whole ~ ~ ~ m p ~If~we g nassunle . ~ " ( l )that the Pers~dncenter M.JS wiped out when caught In the plncer movement and then In the ywarnp and that the casualt~esof the two wings rnust have been limited (after all, the Greel<s "suffered thelr ene~niesto fly") and (2) that the Pers~an11ne was evenly dlv~dedinto three equal contingents of men, then we arrtve at a figure between 15,000 and 18,000. If this assurnptior~is correct, the rrlore ltghtly armed Persltlns, each occupying a space of about 1.5 syudre meters, must have lrned up In blocks that were 1 5 to 18 ranks deep. The total figure could be closer to 15,000 t f we contend that (unlike the situat~or~ In warfare between hopl~tes)the l~ghtlyarmed Perslans could have suffered a fa~rly large number of casualt~eseven when fight~ngon the wlngs. If we assume that the casualt~eswould have been about 1,000 on the wings, we still arrlve at a force of 5,000 111 the cetlter. And ~fwe agree that most ot the center troops were ktlled, then we have a figure of about 5,000 for each of the three sectors of the I'ersian line and a total force o t a b o ~ i t15,000 Pers~ans at tlle moinent of confront'tt~otl. The Pers~anshad lost the battle. Rut they could still wln the war. Thetr fleet, wtth the remnants of their troops aboard, picked up thetr Eretrian prisoners from the nearby ~slandof Euboea and set s'111 toward Athens, "liop~ngto wln the ctty before the Atlien~ans'co~nrng.""W~ittadesqu~ckly realiaed the gravity of the situation arid recalled h ~ srneri: "The Athentans ~n~trched back w ~ t hall speed to defend rhe~rcity, and outstripped the foreigner In t h e ~ rcoming." In 111s own ~n~mttable dramattc style, Herodotus tersely adds, "'I'hey carne trorn one prectnct of Heracles at Marathon, and encamped in another at Cynosarges." The syrnbol of Greek power, Herdcles, seemed to have been w ~ t hthe Athenlans from begrnn~ngto end. And the end, Indeed, had corne, tor the Persian fleet "lay a \vh~leoff I'haleruln . . . there they anchored, atld thence salled away back to As~a.""' M~ltrades'plan had been flawless. He had realwed that the Athen~ans had no option but t o fight in order to prevent a det-eat spawned by ~nterrtal polit~cald ~ v ~ s ~ oOnce n s . on the battlefield, he hdd delayed tlle attack utltll
S8
First Rlood on the Plain o f Marathot2
the last and most favorable ~noinentfor the Greek army. H e must have planned the plncer movement with a d a r ~ n gtact~calImprovlsatlon. He had rnade sure that hss heavily arrrted sold~erswould come to grlps with the enerny qu~cklyby rush~ngthe111 as fast as possible across the last rrleters of the k ~ l l ~ nzone. g Ftnally, h ~ forced s march toward Athens had left the enemy w~tlino opt~oribut to accept defeat. The Pers~ans~ n a d ean ~ n i t ~ Ftrateglc al ~nistakeby abandoning Mardon~us'sInvasion plan of 492, which called for a methodical advance from the north. 'Sliis would have secured a rrlore stable supply line and supported a larger expedit~on.But the rest of t h e ~ rchoices had 11ot necessarily been wrong In ezther a strategic or a tact~calsense. Attacklug Eretrra before Athens and sacking Eretria ruade sense ~f we assurue that a great part o f the Persian plan rel~edo n psychological pressure. Land~ngon the Marathon p l a ~ nwas also not necessar~lya mistake. It was an Important spot on tlie~r supply I~ne,and their presence there left them with a nurnber of hasically sound mil~taryoptions. True, they had s p l ~ ttheir arlny at the moment of the Greelc attack, bttt they had very few optlons a t that tlme, and land~ng d~rectlynear Athens seemed a rnust when they realiaed that tirrle and t h e ~ r own log~st~cnl proble~nswere w o r k ~ n gIn the Athen~ans'favor. F~nally,they could Iiave won the war ~f they had reached Athens before M~lt~ades. They rnay well have been rn~stakenin not attack~ngthe Greelc host at Marathon from the very beg~nning.Although the positlon of the hoplltes was very strong, tile Perstalls could liave relied on thelr owl1 numbers and on the mobllity of t h e ~ rd~srnountedtroops to overwl~clrnthe Greeks. Acttlally, accordlng to Cor~leliusNepos,"%r was the Perstals who, co~lfidentof t h e ~ r numerical supertorlty, attacked and not tile Greeks, bttt t h ~ sI S an assessment that rnost liistorsans have not accepted." IJltiniately, the Persians lost 11ot because then cho~ceshad been wrong but because the strategic and t ~ c ttcal choices of Miltiades had all worked 117 his favot; almost ~nagtcallp.The I'erslans rnay have erred In choos~ngto strike across the Aegean, not trom the north, and 111 fail~rlgt o deploy a larger force. More sold~ersand triremes could liave won the day. The Persians wotlld not make the same rrt~stakesIn their next expedition, which came ten years later a ~ l dM.JS led dlrectly by Dar~us'sson, the new King Xerxes. Clearly, a great emplre could not let small, insign~ficantHellas defy ~ t Athens . had to be crushed.
Chapter Three
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War I:tcropeaits are nzorc. warltke Itban Astattcs because of iftffir~tzcesrn cl!motel, arzd also beiause of thelr trzstrtutto~zs,trot hetrlg urtder kutgs as are Aszatr~.~.For . . . z~/?erethere are kttzgj, t h e mtdst be th17 greatest cowards. For r ? z ~ i z sozils i are eizsla~/(~d, and refiise t o nifz rtsks readily and recklessly t o rrzrreasc' thp pourcr o f someDo(iy else. But ~~zdej)erzderzt people, takrrzg rrsks o~zthcrr owrz /~elralfatzii rtot or1 behalf of others arc rutl~trzgartci eager t o g o rrtto dirrzgvv, for tiwy themsehics ertloy the 11rfze o f victory. S o z~zstittit~~izs co?ztrtbrite a grcat deal t o the formattoiz o/ courag('ozcsizess. -E iippocrates, Airs, \Vater.<,PJaces, XXIII
A New Invasion An ernpire that stretched from the mists of the H~lnalayasto the green forests of Thrace could not let those "Iortrans that dwell rn Europe to make a mock of us."' Indeed, the I'ers~~rlshad coritlnued to prepare for a new pun~tiveexp e d ~ t ~ o By n . 489 B.(,., D'I~IUSsent herdlds throughout h15 la~ldsto announce new taxes and to ratse new armles. Tlte greparatlons went on for three years, but then in the fourth year, in 486 1 3 . ~ . , they were stalled by three events: Tlie rich s'ltr'lpy of Egypt rose In rebell~on,Judah followed slut, and the Great Mrng dred. Hts sort and lierr, Xerxes, reestabl~shedPersran rule in Egypt and Judalt, but serrous preparations for invading Greece did not begirl agarn until 484. By 481, Xerxes was ready to act. He sent her'11ds to Greece to ask the usual terrns of subtn~ssron-earth and water-and to prepare supply depots of food 3 r d water tor his arrny. Orlly ~Ztherlsand Spartd were not asked to subm~t.The new Great K I I I wallred ~ to c ~ c c o ~ ~ ~what p l ~his s h f'lther h ~ f'1d11ed to do--to destroy Sparta and Athens. A few months later, he was ready to march agarnst tliern."en years had passed, but the Pers~answere agaln In rnot~onw ~ t h"the rrl~ghtof I' gredt n l i ~ l t ~ r i ~ d e . " ~
40
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
The final decls~onto proceed w ~ t hthe ~ n v a s ~ o accorci~ng n, to Herodotus, had come only after a great deal of soulsearcli~ng.Xerxes, ttnirke his father, Dar~us,seems to have had many rnore doubts about the feas~b~lity of the e x p e d ~ t ~ o Yet n . t h ~ n g sprogressed w ~ t hthe ~nevlrabtl~ty of $1Greek tragedy. A dream first d~ssuadedXerxes from 111smlssion, and then a new one made h ~ n tchange his r n ~ n d Whether .~ inlagirlary or not, the use ot d~sturbtng dreams by Herodotus is perfectly credible frorn a psychological v ~ e w p o ~ n t . It ts beltevable that the Inemory of the Persians slaughtered at Marathon, his father D a r ~ t ~ s desire 's to avenge them, and his duttes as a sovereign irl~ghthake haunted Xerxes w ~ t hsleepless nights and nightm,ares. It is easy, after centuries of h~stortcaldistort~on,to see the Persia~isas barbar~ansand tlie Greeks as civrlized, the torrner with only numbers on t h e ~ rslde, the latter blessed w ~ t hsophlsticat~on,intell~gence,and bravery. In realrty, the core of the Perstan army liad more In common wrth the Greeks, at least linguist~callysince both were Indo-European, than, tor Instance, the Carthaglnlans later h ~ wd ~ t hthe Romans. Moreover, Herodotus and others leave n o doubt about the bravery of the ~nvaders-those "mandestroying liorsc~nenof Pers~a,"as a contemporary of the Great Wars, SIinonldes of Ceos, would remember.' Nor was the e x p e d ~ t ~ oprepared n carelessly. Xerxes welit back to Mardon~us's492 plan-to ~ n v a d efrom the north in a gradual, rnethod~calway. H e spent some three years d ~ g g ~ na g canal at the Akte p e n ~ n s u hso that the sect d~sasterof 492 fiould not be repeated. Moreover, he spent about five years assembltng 111sarniy and navy. Antiquity liad never seen anyth~ngltke it-not even the great carnpatgns of the Egypti,a11 ph'araohs or of the ~ n ~ g hAssyri'ans. ty The Great Wars were cructal 111 the h~storyof Western c~vilrzat~on for a number of reasons. In ~ n ~ l i t a rterms, ) they restated old probletns and brought to 11gkt new ~ssues-the Importance of terrain, the need for careful logtst~cs,the confrontat~onbetween speed and power and between m~ssile and Impact, the Importance of the sea, and the necessity and difficulty of combin~rlgoperdtrons between various sectors of the '1riny and between the army and the navy. In tdeologtcai terms, the Great Wars became a symbol of tlie stri~gglebetween slavery and freedom, dernocracy and author~tarianIsm, and the West and the East. Thus, they $et $1t r a d ~ t ~ othat n f i ~ ) u l dboth enl~glitenand curse Western c~vlitzat~on. And they provided the most important scenarlo tor one ot the great boolcs of our collect~veIlteratureI.lerodotus's tiistories. The multttude of the advanctng Persian arniy on the move to Greece was very much like the swarrn of grasshoppers of the enernles ot the Egypt~ar~s at Kddesh. The suggestion that they numbered ~n the xn~ll~ons (2,100,000 for the army, 541,610 for the navy, and about double t h ~ samount for the carnp followers6) has t o be drscarded. It is more realist~cto assume that the Pers~anarmy cons~stedof about 200,000 ~nfantrymenand 75,000 horse-
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
41
~ ~ l t h o u gJ.h M. Balcer hds recently claimed that "the Pers~anforces were not vastly superior in number . . . but about equal to those of the G r e e k ~ . "The ~ number of sailors on the 1,207 shrpsYis rrtore acceptable. But even ~n these reduced numbers, the Perslans were stdl without doubt the largest army the anctent world had ever seen. The soldiers of tile Persian Empire carne trorn all corners of the land-Ind~ans trorn the southeastern parts, Bactrians from the northeast, Egypttans and Ethiopians from Afr~ca,Sacae from the Russian steppes, Medes and Persians from the Iranian lands, and even Greeks from Ionla. lrldeed, according to llerodotus, there were 46 different ethnic u~l~ts."' Herodotus presents tlie marcli of the mighty Persian army like a crescendo that strikes ir~creas~ng terror as ~t I S first conceived, then organtzed, and lirt'11ly beglns its advallce tow'1rd the northern border of Hellas. Even before h ~ sold~ers s began moving, Xerxes ordered the Hellespont to be bridged from the shores ot Asia iCT~norto the shores of Thrace. When a storm destroyed the construction, he corrl~nallded that the waters be scourged wtth three hundred lashes and fetters thrown into the sea." Soon atter, two new br~dges,made up o f ships tied together (cerralnly a technologicC1l~ n ~ ~ r of v ethe l allcletlt world), were butlt to '~llowXerxes alld 111s men to cross the Heilespont Into Europe." If the satety of- his arrny was uppermost In Xerxes' ruind at the Hellespo~lt,whdt worrted h m most at the Akte peninsula, where Mount Athos stands, was the safety of 111snavy. For ~twas there that, In 492, the first fleet sent by his father, Darius, had been destroyed by a storm. Conseqiiently, Instead of trustlng the treacherous w'lters droutld the penlr~sula,Xerxes ordered a canal to be cut across tlle land.'' He spent about three years d o ~ n g this: This invader was clearly not In a hurry. Every stage of his progress seemed to follow a rational course, des~gtledto keep his ttlvad~ngforce ~ n tact and to s t r ~ k eterror into tlie hearts of 111senemies (Flgure 2.1 ). Nothing could dlssuade hrrn frorn his rrtission. On tlie way froril Sardis in As13 Mlnor to Abydos near the br~dgeso n the I-lellespont, something terrifying happened: "The sun left h ~ place s in heave11 and was ttnseeli . . . and the day was turned into night"; yet the I'ersiail lnagicidtls interpreted the vis ~ o n;IS "the gods . . . showing to tlle Greeks the desolatron of thelr aties."14 When Xerxes first met one of h ~ many s hosts, Pythius the I,ydlan, he was magnanlrnous, but when Pythius tried to play on the king's generosity to exelnpt the eldest of hls five sons from servltlg tn the Persi'a11 army, Xerxes became very angry. He gave orders to find the oldest of Pytlilus's sons, to "cut liirn asundel; then having so done to set the one half of his body or1 the rlght bald of the road m d the other on the left, th,at the army xn~ghtpass this way between them."" It was a drarnat~crestatement of the message that the Persian's mission was ~neluctahle-both a signal tor his own soldlers dnd a warning for Mellas.
42
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
"The professed Intent of the k~ng's xnarch was to c ~ t r c ~Athens," ck Herodotus tells tts, "but in truth all Hellas was 111satm." Yet not all Greeks "regarded the ruatter alike."'b Some merilzcd, that is, they subrrt~ttedto the Pers~atlsand p a d the usual symbols of subrn~ss~on, "e'~rth and w , ~ t e r " ; ' ~ others sat on the fence. But the two main powers and the Great Mlng's primary targets-Athens and Sparta-had no choice: They were not offered a ch,ance to submit. As I' result, Atlletls ,~tldSparta began to take steps to oppose the invaders, as a host of slnaller clties would do in tlielr turn. Ftrst, they sent 10,000 hoplites to the Tempe gorge in 'I'hessaly, in the northern part of Greece. These troops were qi~icklywithdrawn, howecer, after the Greeks were warned that their gositton at Tempe could be outflanked through the hills and by the sea.I8 Then the Greelc allies gathered together in consuit,~tionat Cor~nthand decided to concede the north and to concentrate their forces at Therlnopylae rn order to defend central Greece (Ftgure 3.1).19 For the rrtost part, that decision was wrse both strategically and tact~cally.If the Greeks had beet1 defeated at Tempe, the result would have been annthilation in the open plains at the back of the gorge. Moreover, the key to the whole war-deteat~ng the ntore rlurnerous Persian fleet-would have been ~mpossible111 the open waters of the northern Aegem on Tenlpe's right flank. Taktng a stand at Therlnopylae instead made much more sense. 'The only problern was that this decrsion, however wise, would be carried out 111 a careless and thoughtless 111~1nner.l~)
Thermopylae Qn paper, there could not have been a better choice for a battlefront than 'Therrnopylae. Symbolically, the pass there represented the gateway into Greece proper ("the forelgtlers' passage lnto M e l l a ~ " ~ 'Logistically, ). Therrnopylae was near the core of the Greek heartland. T~ctlcally,~tprovided the rlght advantage t o troops vastly otltnurnbered by their enemy. And strategically, lr was Ideal for cooperation between land and sea forces. The Greek fleet had golsed itself o n the northern trp of the Island of Etiboea, near the mainland and not far troln 'Therrnopylae and thus on the tlanl< of the er~ert~y shlps. It posed a danger that the P e r s ~ a ~ fleet l could ne~therbypass nor ~ g nore. Moreover, the pass was a land route that Xerxes corlld not avold unless he was prepared to follow the road around the city of pIrachis, which would have been even Inore difficult and which lay farther from the supply line provrded by h ~ ssh~ps.The problem, however, was that the delegates gathered at Corinth who had reached the decision to stand at Therrnopylae were, according to Herodotus, un,aware th,at the pass could be outflanked." It was August 18, 480 R.(:., when Xerxes arrtved on the beaches of the Mallan Gulf near the entrance of- the pass." By then, the corrtntarlder o f the Greek forces, the Sp,lrtan king Leonidas, had already arrived, probC~bly on
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
4.3
FIGURE 3.1 August 16, and placed his army at the Middle Gate, one of three possible pos~tlor~s. It was a good cholce. The West Gate , ~ the t elltrance of the pass was very sinall, bttt the flanlc~ng1i111s could have been easily scaled. The same was true o f the East Gate, near the village of Alpeni. 'l'he Middle Gate lnstedd WAS sltuated wlth an ~n,~ccessihle rnat~nt~xin, the Zastamo, on the left of the Greelc host and the sea o n the nght. Moreover, the advance of the hostile army could also he retarded by the presence of- a wall that the PhoCICI~IShad built In the y ~ s as t a defertse aganst the Mallans, thelr r r ' ~ d l t l o ~ l ~ ~ l enemies (Figure 3.2). The wall was 111 disrepa~r,but 1,eonidas ~ o o nset hts men t o repairing it. The Pers~anking walted four d ~ y before s lLaunchlnghis first attack, "ever expecting that the Greelts would talce to flight."L4 That Xerxes expected thern to d o so seeins understandable, but the delay was prot~ablydue to other factors as &ell. It likely took 3' day or two for the rest of hls '1d\anc-
FIGURE 3.2
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
4.5
Ing colunln to arrlve alld to rest before battle. Also, he rn~ghthave felt vulnerable w ~ t h o u tsupport on 111s left since the Persian fleet was still farther north, detained there by a ternpest that apparently began one day before Xerxes' arr~vdland would contlnue for two more. Fm'~lly, if there was a storm on the sea nearby, it is likely that the weather ashore was also bad, rnakrng an early attack ~ r n p o s s ~ l ~ l e . ~ ~ Xerxes' army, even when we scale down Herodotus's figures to less t h m 300,000, was st~llvery large and vastly supertor to the opposrng Greelc forces. Initially, there were about 7,000 Greeks, aln~ostevenly divrded in terms of geograph~calongin: 3,100 froln central Greece (700 Thesp~ans, 400 Thebans, 1,000 I,ocrtans, and 1,000 Phocians) and between 3,800 and 4,000 I'elopounes~ans (1,000 Spartans, 500 Tegeans, 500 Mantineans, 120 from Orchomenus, 1,000 from Arcadia, 400 Cor~nth~ans, 200 from Phl~us, and 80 My~enaeans).~" Herodotus gives contrad~ctoryevidence or] the size ot the Spartan contlngent. He says that at Thermopylae, there were or~gin'llly 3,100 Peloponnesians and that 300 of those were spar tan^.'^ However, the tnscrrptlon of Sirnon~desof Ceos, quoted by llerodotns, mentions 4,000 Pelopor~nesrans, leaving another 700 to 900 nlen un,accounted fort2" As Herodotus's narrative suggests, the 300 men that tradit~onsanctified were Spartiates, that IS, tull crtlzerls of the state-probably sonre of thern belonging to the hippeis, the t r G ~ d ~ t ~ obodygitdrd lldl of the king, alld half from other segments of the Spartlate crtizenry." However, tf the Spartan tradlt~onchose to ignore the other 700 and to leave their names out of the monument that they later erected at Sparta for t h e ~ r300,;" ~t must hdve been because they drd not tit Into their state soctally. In other words, the 700 ruust have been perioecz, rnernbers of the sccor~dlevel of the soc~al structure of the Spartan state. The permecl, unlike those In the third level, the helots, were free me11 but not ctt17ens and were increastngly used in Sparta's military enterprises. 'That the Spartan traditior~forgot then1 and th,at Herodotus followed suit by not n~entlon~ng them 1s no suryrlse. People who did not share the same rlghts as the owners of power would not be given the honor and prestige of their "n~asters." O n August 22, the morning of the fifth day after h ~ si ~ r r ~ vXerxes, ~~l, deern~ngthat the Greeltc a t Thermopylae were showing n o t h ~ n gbut "sharnelessness" and "tolly," was "angered" and dispatched two of h ~ best s troops, the Medes i ~ n dC I S S ~ ~to X the ~ S ,'~ttack.~' 111 r e ~ l ~ tity ,IS likely that by then, his full army had arr~vedand rested, the weather had improved, and h ~ sfleet had already been engaged once on his lett flanl< otf the island of Euboe,~. The Medes and C~sstanccould make no headway, so Xerxes ordered the advance of hrs very best troops, the Irnruortals, so called because, regardless of casualties, new recruits would always keep t h e ~ rnumber to 10,000 sol-
46
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
dlers. Xerxes envisaged "short and easy work of the Greeks," but he was disappointed: Tlie Inimortals "fared ne~therbetter nor worse than tlie Med ~ a nsold~ery."~" "Thls battle I'xsted all day," z i yet when the August sun disappeared from the stnnlner sky, n o t h ~ n ghad bee13 accompl~sliedfor the Perstall king. The next rnorning, he agaln sent his troops to attack, hiit the story of the previous day repeated ~tself.In tlle restricted c o n d ~ t ~ oof ~ l stlle pass, numbers yeemed to lnatter I~ttle.Tlie Greeks, 6,000 In number (for 1,000 had been d~spatchedto guard an outfl:tr~l<~ng path In the rnounta~ns),were able to send one group atter d~lotherto relleve the pressure and the fatigue of those fighting o n the first line. Moreover, although it would probably be unwlse to accept I-lerodotils's d e f i n ~ t ~ oofn the Greeks as "sk~lled"warriors fighting aga111st the "unsk~lled" P e r s ~ a n s ,~t~ certairlly ~ makes sense t o concede Herodotus's argument on Greek superiority in hand-to-hand batrle. The Persians were probably unable t o effectively use t h e ~ rlong-range weapons, bows and javelins, because of the ll~nitedspace for maneuveritlg and the excellent grotectlon worn by the Greelc troops (armor, helmet, large shield, and so on). This rrlearlt that they were co~npelledto meet the Greeks face t o face. In such 1' s i t i ~ ~ ~ t l othey t l , could not but lose. "Thelr shorter ~ p e ~ ~ r s " ~ ' and w ~ d e rfiles In ~ f f e n s e and ' ~ tlietr "small round or irregularly shaped shields"37 In defense could ruake no headway agairlst the longer spears of the closely arrayed Greeks, "thelr entire bodles protected by 1'1rge yhield~."'~ The Pers~anycould have had the "advantage in open fields, since they were . . . erlabled t o move more easily," but not "in narrow space" against etlelnles "formed 111 close ranks." Yet there was a storm brew~ngon the Greeks' horizon. The leaders who Inet at Corinth and chose Ther~nopylaeas their battlefront apparently were un'aware of the existence of an o u t f l a n k ~ r ~path. g Once o n the spot, Leonidas became aware of the sitt~ationand sent 1,000 men-the Phocians who were native t o the area-to guard the route. But it seems that a local Greek n'lmed Ephlttltes (son of Eurydemus, a Mallall and thus a tr,~dltlon~I enemy of the Phocians) gave thls informat1013 to Xerxes too. In response, the Persian k ~ n gsent the Im~nortalsunder llydarnes "forthw~tli,"~~) whrcli prob,~blym e m t towarc! the end of the seco~ldday of battle. The last stage of tlie fight had begun. At dawn of the next day, the Ini~nortalsarrived o n the surnruit of the pass. There, they suddenly came face to face with the Phoc~ans.Both s ~ d e s were surprised, but the Phocians tn~sreadthe yttuatlon completely and w~thdrewto the top of the mountain: They thought that Hydarnes' ruen had corne speclfic,~llyfor thern, not to outflank the Greeks at the pass. It was a terrible m~stake.When the Plioctans w~thdrew,Hydarnes recalled his Iner1 who were pulsed tor an attack and sent them instead again along the path. The I ~ s obstacle t to the success of Xerxes' nlen had been overcome.
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
47
L e o n ~ d ~was ~ s glven three warnings of the approach~ngImmortals: first by a seer, Megrsttas, then dtlr~ngthe ntght by deserters from the Persian carup, and finally by "watchers runr~ingdown from the he~ghtswhen day w,~s. . . d'iwn~ng."" The Greeks held n o counc~lof war u n t ~ the l last warning was rece~ved.Then they dectded, either by consensus or because of Leonidas's Insistence, t11,lt most of the 6,000 troops would rettlrrl to t h e ~ r cities before enclrclemetlt occurred. The only ones relnalnlng behlnd would have been the Spartan?, the Thespians, and the 'Thebans, origtnally 2,100 men, although we do not know how rrlarly had been killed after two days of fight~ng. Two questtons spring ~mmed~ately to mind. Why was the corlncil of war held so late? And why did not all the troops leave? Leorildas had beer1 inforined of the ~nlpetldingenclrclernent during the n ~ g h and t cert,~inlycould have called the counctl earlier, but we must assume, in spite of what Megistias and the deserters s a d , that he did not believe the deserters or that he hoped the Phocians could stop the Immortals. In e~thercase, he erred. A wlse general would have spared a t least a few troops to bolster the Phocians. Leon~das's dectsion t o renraln arid fight would later be explained in a number of ways: He could not defy the laws of Sparta that had sent h1111to defend the pass;42 the Delphic oracle had told h t n ~that his state could be saved only if he gave up h ~ lite s fighting for it;" he had intended from the very beginning "to d ~ for e the freedom of and he wanted to preserve the glory only for I~i~nseif and the spar tan^.^^ But the truth is that there were n o laws at Sparta that decreed a rrlarl should uselessly sacrifice his life." And the Delphic oracle was cle'~rly a umtzcznzum post euentum (prediction n ~ a d eafter the event), created to enhance Delphi's c r e d i l ~ l i t yThe . ~ ~ fight for freedom was a strong ethic aruong the Greeks during the Great Wars, but why should one sacrifice one's l ~ f e rather than live and fight another day? In suggesting that 1,eonidas wanted to keep the glory tor hirnself and the Spartans, l-lerodotns has let his antiSpartan feelings surface. F~nally,the assumpt~onthat Leon~dasremallled because Therrnopylae and the battle at sea near Arternis~umwere inextrtcably t ~ e dis only partially ~orrect.~"twas so only as lor~gas Leonidas had a fair chance of wlnnlng, but after the et~c~rclemetlt, with 2,100 or fewer men at 111sdisposal, it would have been only a [natter of hours before the beach fell into Persian hands. Yet Leon~d'xs had 11o c h o ~ c ebut to rem'~in. He had cc~lledh ~ ~neeting s too late, and any wttl1drawal of the whole army dunng the day would have been in~possrhle.The Greeks could easlly have fallen prey to the more 1110bile Perstans, and the whole affalr would h'ne ended 111 rn'~ss,~crefor everybody. Even ~f he stlrvtved, Leonidas would have found nothing but dishonor a t SpartaG4'A Spartan general could certainly withdraw from a d~fficultposition ( P a i i ~ ~ ~ would n ~ a s d o tllis, for instance, a year later at
48
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
Pldt,~e,~) but only if he kept h ~ arlny s intact. Withdrawal ln the face of the Persians could have resulted in nothing but slaughter a t Therniopylae. In other words, this man Leonidas, who so far had made a number of bad decislons, finally chose the r ~ g h one: t Me stayed behind to protect the greater part of his forces. 'The battle of the third day opened in the morning after Xerxes offered libations to the sunrise. This tlrne, however, L e o ~ l ~ dld d ~ ~not s keep his lnen within the confi~iesof the protecting wall but advanced them to where the pass widens in order to Itill as rnany enemies as poss~hle.Leonidas fell, and a brutal fight took place over 111s body. The Greeks had to chdse the Perslalls away four times before they were able to retrteve their commander's body. The Iinmortals rnust have reached the beach by the afternoon, but just before that, the remaining Spartlates, penoecl, and Thesp~allsdec~dedt o withdraw to a small Iiillock for their last stand. The Thebans did not follow the111 o u t and apparently surrendcred, although we probably sliotlld not accept I3erodotus's Interpretatton of t h e ~ rdeclslo~~."' The remaining Greelts were quickly surrounded on the hillock. T h e ~ r spears by now all broken, they deferlded themselves with tholr swords and even w ~ t ht h e ~ rfists and teeth u n t ~ l"the forelgners overwhelmed then1 w ~ t h rntss~leweapons, some attack~ngthem in front artd throwing down the wall of defence, and others starld~ngaround in a r ~ n g . " ~ ' Halls Delbruck claims th,at the Greeks a t Thern~opylaerrlade two serlous mtstakes: They chose the wrong spot to face the Pers~anarmy ( ~ would t have been better, he says, to wait for them a t the exit of the pass where the whole Persldn host, llot just a few men, could hdve been destroyed), and they sent too few soldlers.j2 The controversy over the nu~nberof men is also tied to Sparta's resporlsibillty in cornru~tttngso few of her soldiers to stop the invaders. Schol,~rshave advanced 1' lumber of e ~ p l a t l ~ ~ t i ofor ns this-lack of leadersh~p;faulty organizatton; reluctance on the part of the I'eloponnesians to leave their fields In the midst of sumrner, with the harvest c~pj>rc>ach~ng; a prohibltlon ag,unst w,~gingwar ln 1' yenod of fest~vals,such as the Karneiaii at Sparta and the Olympic elsewhere; and possibly a deliberate plan by the Peloponnesians, who, being from southerri Greece, ruay have had no intetlt~oilof stopp~ngthe Persldns at Thermopylae, preferring instead to preserve tlietr best effort for the Istl~musof C : o r ~ n t h . ~ ~ It is appealing to regard Therrnopylae as secondary in the Greek strategic pl'xn. After all, the r e d fight occurred at se,l, not on land. N o Athetli,a~ls fought at Thermopyiae; they, of course, were all wlth the fleet, where their city, Athens, had invested a large nuruber of ships and ruen.j4 It 1s llkely that the Greek host as a whole regarded the fleet as the most llnportant part of its effort a t that stage. Victory on land would not have ended the I'ersian threat, bur victory at sea could have rendered Xerxes' army helpless. With h ~ siipply s l ~ n eshattered, he would have been left In the
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
49
middle of 1' hostile country and In a lLa~ldscape often barren and barely fertile enough to support the local inhabitants. Yet rt IS clear that the fight at 'I'herrnopylae had a partictllar srgnrficance for the Greeks. It was a matter o t psychology and emot~on,rnore than of ~ t r ~ ~ t e No g y . fleet could relnaln long at sea wrthout beaclilng." Moreover, a land vlctory for the Perstan? w o ~ ~ lhave d left the lands, citres, homes, wornen, and children of central Greece , ~ the t nlercy of the invaders. It is no surprlse then that &hen the Greek fleet heard of the outcome at Tliermopylae and wrth t h e ~ rfight at sea e n d ~ n grnore or less In a draw, they wisely decrded to set the prow of t h e ~ r s h ~ p toward s more southern shores.'"ut ]fall thls 1s correct, why then d ~ d the Greelc states and especially Sparta send so few men? Herodotus ment~ons,ainong other explanations, the festival?.'- However, this excuse I S suspect. It 1s true that hostil~t~es 111rght stop durrng fest~vals;after all, a religlorls festival, agatn probably the Karneia, had already prevented the Spartans from sending therr troops In tlnie to face the Persians at M a r a t l ~ o n . ' ~ But the urgency of the sltu'ation and the fear of an ~mplousenerny should certa~nlyhave forced the Spartan? to give up their rel~g~olrs objections, espectally since they had already rnade an exception by sending 1,000 men.'" It 1s not that rel~giousrnot1vat1011should be taken I~ghtly,as Delbrilck suggests,""'lbut only that In thts case, the relrg~ottsmottvatlon for not sending enough troops I S at least suspect. We should also be careful not to accept wlthout question the explanatlor~ given by A. Daslcalaltrs." Sparta, he says, sent a token force del~beratelybecause its leaders, like rnost Peloponneslans, were worrled that after an inrt i d defedt, there woulci 11ot have been enough forces to fight on. I11 any case, Sparta rnay have felt that ~twas better to put most of its forces closer to horne at the Isthlntls of Corinth. It IS, of course, unlrkely that Sparta would have sent ,111 of ~ t forces s to fight so f'lr away from home at t h ~ stage s stlice the defen?e of the ~sthnluswas clearly more apyeal~ng.Rut ~t is unlikely that Sparta acted in had farth. As coIlsumn1,ate practitioners of fix, the Spartans must have been well aware that an early defeat could delrver a crushing blow to the whole enterprtse. Moreover, the Greek state and especially Sparca could not afford to lose 300 Sparti,ates, some o t the111 alnong the 111ost respected of t h e ~ rstate, and 700 gerioeci. Ftnally, there was st~llthe poss~bil~ty that any ev~denceof bad fa~tlion the part of the Spartans rrtlght have conv~ncedruore Greelc crties to submit to the Pers~ans."~ There 1s 110 reclson to doubt thdt Spart,~ was ser~ousabout the ilnyortance of the fight. Thus, rts rellrctance to send a larger force had to be due t o other factors: the pressure of agricultural needs In a crtrc~alpart of the summer, a lack of proper m ~ ~ n ~ l g e mof e n~t t s force?, even the excuse of the Karne~anfestival to re~nforce~ t decision s psycholog~cally,and probably rrlost cor~tpellir~g of all the belief that the rnen sent (4,000 wrth the other Peloponnes~,lns)plus the over 3,000 from ce~ltral
50
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
Greece fiould have beet1 enough to stop the Pers~ans.This p o ~ n tis ~ n a d e clear in Herodotus, for instance." The problem was not that there were not enotlgh men at Leonidas's d~sposal.It was that, once he becalrte aware of the exlsrence of the outly~ngpath, he d ~ not d place enough soldiers to guard it. The dec~sionto use the Phocians for this job was excellent because they lived In the area, but he also could have reinforced them w ~ t ha contingent of h ~ best s troops-Spart~ates, permecl, or even other Peloponnes~ans.That the Spartans, who were used to fighting 111 close ranks, corlld have found theniselves ~ncapableof perforlrttng well In the brolcen terraln of the path I S not a v ~ l ~excilse. d Any sold~erswho were able to "turn their backs and fergn fl~ght"at the pass and then turn upon the foreigners when they were overtaken," as the Spartans did, could very well have faced the Irnrnorcals ~n any terrml. Moreover, thelr presence would have g i ~ a r ~ ~ n t1'e emore d approprlate response when the Pliocians firrally came face to face with Hydarnes' rnen. The t h ~ r dday of battle at Thermopylae c o ~ n c ~ d ewd ~ t h1' sea battle nearby Artem~~iurn, off the island of Euboea. Ilnl~kethe land forces, the Greek fleet not only survived but, helped by the ravages of a sea storrn durlrlg the prevlous day, also came out w ~ t he~ther1' narrow kictory or at least a draw In the confrontat~on.Yet the Perstan fleet was still superlor tn nnmher; therefore, with the beaches now in enerny hands and with the enemy army near the gates of Athens, the Greeks dec~dedto withdraw." The sltuatton seemed desperate. Yet most of the Greek land forces were Intact, and the fleet soon would be able to wage the fight agaln. Less than one riionth later, the two s~deswould meet at Salam~s.This time, the battle would be waged only at sea.
Athens, one of the t\vo main targets of Xerxes' wrath agalnst w111ch "all Asia's strengtWI-Ias gone off beh~nd~ t young s master,"" had not a slngle soldier at Thermopylae. Herodotus l~npliesthat the Athentans believed froin the beginr~irlgthat the war would he declded at sea. Although the hlstor~an'sc ~ c c ~ )is~ latt ~tllnes t confused and ~llog~cal,"there 1s l~ttlereason to doubt that the Athei~ransheld to t h ~ spolrcy from the beginning. A year or so before the war, Themistocles had cortvlnced the Athen~ansto Invest the fi~ncifallthey obt'11ned from the exp1oir:ition of the LC~iir~urn s~lverlnlnes in the construction of a large fleet." And Indeed, the Athenians would provlde alntost two-thirds of the 400 Greelc ships present at Salarn~s.~" When the Pers~anarmy had crossed the Mellespont on its way towdrd Greece, ~t 1s true that the Greelcs at Ternpe ~ ~ ~ ~ t had i a l laynumber of Athenians arnong It is also true, however, that the general plan of the Greeks was unclear at this point because the Te~npeposltlon coulci be eas~ly
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
51
outflanked by l a ~ l dor by sea and because there was no posstbihty for the much smaller Greelc fleet to pose a ser~ousthreat to the Pers~annavy In the open waters off the 'Ternpe coast. After Te~npe,the Athen~ans'pol~cywas consistent. They h,ad concentrated about half of their naval strength at the battle of Artenits~um,~' they had abandoned Athens to the Persians after 'I'her~nopylae~nsteadof facing the111 on land, and they would desperately insist on keep~ngthe s h ~ p sat Salarnrs for a confrontation wrth the Persians. T h e ~ plan r was correct. Wagzng a p~tcliedbattle that, lrke Marathon ten years earlrer, wotlld end the Persian invas~ollwas a n unrealistic goal at this stage. The Pers~anforces of 490 B.(-. were, wrthout doubt, infinrtely infertor to Xerxes' expedrt~oneven it we disn~tsslIerodotns's c l a ~ mthat there were ~ n ~ l l t o of n s Pers~ansand ass u ~ n einstead that the ~nvadingforce ~lumhered200,000 to 300,000. N o land success could have lastrrig value as long as the u~nbilrcalcord tying the army to its I~felrneat sea was untouched. A large army could not survrve long In ,I hostlle, largely irlfertlle territory once the food supply prov~dedhy tlie fleet was d~srupted.It would then have been necessary to reduce the stze of the army, and, i l l turn, t h ~ sreduction would ruake posslble a definitlve Greek vlctory on land. Such a sttuation had been on the Persran ~ n ~ nfrom d the very begrnning: "If they attack in their ships and prevail in a sea-fight," argued Xerxes' uncle, Artabanus, in 111s efforts to d~scouragethe expedition, "and then sail to tlie Hellespont and thereafter break your bridge, that, 0 k ~ n gI S the hour of Even zt we dtsrniss Artabanus's argument as a clever inventroil on the part of Herodotus, ~t IS clear that Xerxes was aware from the very b e g ~ n n ~ nthat g h ~ large s army could survive only as long as h ~ sfleet controlled the sea. T'herefore, he took many precautions to assure the safety of both h ~ navy s and h ~ army. s For the II'IV); he had cut a C ~ I ~ Iacross A~ the Akte peninsrrla off Mount Atlios so ~tcould avoid venturrng into the treacherous waters around the cape. For the army, he had built a br~clgeacross the Hellespont. Among the reasons why he delayed his attack a t Thermopylae could also have been h ~ awareness s that 111s fleet was st~lltoo far away to provide support t o the left flank. F~nally,after Xerxes was defeated at S ' ~ l a n ~there ~ s , 1s little reason to doubt that one of the reasons for h ~ speedy s departure for A ~ r awas exactly what Herodotus suggests: "He feared lest the Greeks (by Ionlan c o ~ ~ n sor e l t h e ~ rown devising) rrttght sal1 to the Hellespont to break h ~ bridges, s and he ~ n ~ g be h t cut off in Europe and in per11 of 111sI~fe;and so he planned flight."73 The Greek dects~onto make a stand at Sal'~ruiswas a superb chorce (Figure 3.3).74After Thermopylae and Artern~s~um and the Persian advance Into central Greece, the Greek land army, w~tlidesperatton in their hearts, prepared for a last stand at tlie bottleneck of the Isthn~usof Corinth. 'l'hey encarrtped there, broke the road le,ad~nginto it, and decided to build I' defe~lsivewall
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War --
5.7'
across the isthmus." iMe'lnwh~le, the Greek fleet stood about 52 k~lo~neters farther east o n the Island of Salamts in a flanking gosltron that the Persians could not ~ g n o r e . -Salamis ~ su~tedthe Greek designs well. If a battle were waged, it fiould have been o n thelr own terms-~n narrow waters where their ~nferior~ty In numbers wotlld not have been a handicap, regardlers of \vhether the battle itselt was manly a boarding or a rarnlnlng aftalr. Persi'an options were few and l~rn~ted."They could Ignore the Greeks' threat by land~ngnear Argos, Sparta's old enemy, not far away from the Isth~nusof- Cortnth, at the same tune that thetr army advanced on land. T h ~ sposs~b~lity m,ay 11'1\e conv~tlcedthe Arg~vesto s ~ d ewlth the Perslans, thereby placing the Greek army near C o r ~ n t hand Sparta itself In great jeopardy. However, such a plan would have been dangerous for the I'ersian supply line since the Greeks could habe hdrdssed the enemy fleet from flank and rear. Another option would have been to bottle up the Greelis on Salarn~sby guard~ngthe exlts and to move the rest ot the I'ers~an fleet to the Peloponnese. Aga~n,this move would have beet1 unwlse because the Persians would have spilt their sea forces in three (one portion moved to the I'eloponnese and the rest drv~dedbetween the two exits); they would thus have opened the~nseivesto be defe,ated p~ecemenl.The pl'111 poss~blycould have worked when therr fleet was at full strength before Artemtsium, bttt it seemed urifeas~bleatter the losses suffered ~ r sea i battles and d u r ~ n gthe storm. The relnalnlclg o p t ~ o n swere e ~ t h e to r atrC1cko r to d o nothing. Del'ly could have worked rn the Persians' favor. It was l~kelythat, in time, the fra~l unity of the Greek host would shatter. Yet in the end, Xerxes was lett only w ~ t hthe optlon of ' ~ t t ~ ~ c k i nTune g . WAS worklng In the Creeks' favor because by September, the campaign~ngseason was drawing to a close and hecause Xerxes' supply line was ~ncreasinglyfrag~le.'" Although ~ n ~ ~ k l1' i lstand g at Sal,~n~is was ~de'xl for the Greeks, the decis ~ o nto reman? and fight there was never a foregone concllrslon. The Peloponneslarl contingent, whlch ~ncludedthe Greeks from cttles free of- Persian control, strongly urged fi~thdrawal.F ~ r s of t all, there was the matter of the Pers~ans'overwhelrn~ngnumbers, even i f we d o not accept the trad~tlonal count of over 1,200 fight~ngs h ~ p for s the Pers~ansagainst the less than 400 for the Greek." Moreoker, there were other fears a11d concerns III the minds of the P e l o p o n n e s ~ a n s . ~ T h ewere y afraid of being besieged o n a s~nallisland ~f the Perslans succeeded In blocking the exits. They also had no des~reto defend 1' Imd, A~CIC'I,that had already fallen under P e r s ~ ~ ~ ~ control. They wanted to wage battle near the isthmus; therr troops were deployed to stop the I'ersran invaders there, and a I'ersian attack could hardly succeed o n t h ~ small t strlp of 1;tnd slnce the road there h,ad been broken and a defensive wall was being built. It was at tli~sstage that Themistocles, like Milt~adesa t Marathon, emerged as the person whose foresight and cunnlng would make poss~blewhat seemed unC~tta~nLable by n o r ~ n arne,~ns. l
54
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
Thenl~stocleswas probC~bly 44 years ot age in 480 13.C." The son ot a n aristocrat and probably of a non-Athen~anmother, he seemed to have risen t o a posltion of prestige in the Athenian colnruurilty only on the eve of Xerxes' ~nv~tsion. Thucyd~desh,ad no doubts ,tbout the genius of the man: Themistocles, he says, was able to grasp an emergency slttlation "at the shortest not~ce";he had "shrewd judgelnerlt"; he could assess "the advant'xges and d~sadvant~tges of a course 111 the still uncertan future"; 111 sum, Tliucyd~destells us, "by nat~tralpower and speed In reflect~on,lie was the best of all men at determining promptly what had to be d o r ~ e . " ~ ~ That Thernlstocles fi~l'ally reached h ~ sgoal-to stand ,111d fight a t Salam15-was the result of personal energy, gsychologrcal endurance, and trickery, a typical cornhlnation of the traits of this complex rnan. But even at the last nloment, tt was not certain thdt the Peloponneslans would rematn and fight. Faced w ~ t hthe gossihil~tyof thetr desertion, Themistocles resorted to a clever stratagem: I-Te had to convince the Perstar~sto attack betore the Peloponnes~,~ns left h ~ m H . e therefore sent "a m,m in $1boat" t o the Perstan fleet, warnlng them that the Creeks had decided to w ~ t h d r a w because they "have lost heart."" C. Iltgnett has doubts about tlie veractty ot the a c c t ) ~ t n t ,but ~ ~ there IS re'tlly very llttle reason t o discount Herodotus's words on t h ~ s ,especially since they are confirmed In Aeschy111s. 'l'he playwright, who was present a t the battle, also rnentlorls that a Greek from the Athenim c'unp warned Xerxes that "o~lcethe darkness and the black of night should come,/tlie Greeks would not remaln, but to thew rowers' seats/would leap in disarray, each Inan for h~mself,/andrun away in secret fllght to s,l\e t h e ~ lives." r To catch this fleet "in disarray" and destroy it, Xerxes decided to claw all the e x ~ t s . ~ ' The sequence of events is unclear in both Aeschylus, who tnay have fought 011 a11 Athenian s h ~ p and , In Herodotus, who, 1' small c h ~ l dof about 4 at the ttme of the battle, probably wrote when some of the veterans of the fight were still al~ve.But rt seems reasonable to assume that once Xerxes accepted the veracity of Them~stocles'message, he ordered '111 att'tck. Flrst, his sa~lorshad supper, and then, under the cover of night, his fleet, dlvlded into three groups, was sent to close the ex~ts."~Althoughour other source, D~odorusS ~ c u l ~IS~ cle'~rly s, a synthesis ot the works of other wrlters (especially the Iitstor~anE p l ~ o r n s ~~t~seems ), prudent to agree wltli hini that the Egyptian conttngent of the Persian tleet, which had fought so well a t Arten~lsium,rnust have been sent 'tround the lsland of Sala~nlsto block the western exit. The other contingents, Phoenician, Cyprlot, and lonlan, must have entered the stralts front the two exit? oft tlie ~slaridof I'syttaleia, f i h ~ c hspl~tsSc~l'~~ilis from the nlc~inlandat the e,astern s ~ d e .As Aeschylus says, "All night long the Inasters of the ships tnatnta~ned/thes a ~ l ~ nback g and forth by all the naval h~st."~"hey w a ~ t e dfor the Creek ships to break through t h e ~ r11ne. Antlclpatttlg that most of rhe sLa~lors of wrecked enemy
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
S.$
s h ~ p swould ha\e t r ~ e dto escape o n the shores of Psytt,~lei,a, Xerxes had a colitingent of Persian troops land 400 men according to Pattsan~as,')~ to save any Persrans who escaped drowning and t o slay any Greeks who escaped from h ~ metl."' s But the night wore on, and no Greek s h ~ pappeared in the dark. By then, the Persian fleet must have ~tretcliedfrom the shores of- Salarnis t o those of Attica. The Greeks were aware of the nocturnal maneuvers of the Pers~annavy, but ~ttook Tliemtstocles a long tirne to convince the others that there was a I'ersian attack In the offing." According t o Herodotus, he spoke t o the sailors before they boarded t h e ~ rsh~ps." It 1s an u~ll~kely story both because of the pressure of time and because the obvlous person to del~vera speech would have beer1 the Sparran adlniral Eurybiades, not pI'heinistocles. But in any case, by the tlnle dawn broke on a day some three weeks after the end of tlie battles of Thermopylae and A r t e m ~ ~ i u m the , Greeks too were ready on their ships. Their line rr~usthave stretched rotighly parallel t o and been as long ;IS thdt of the Pers~ans,although not as deep. The only Greeks ~nttialiymiss~ngfrom the line were tlie Corinthlans, who probably had been sent to guard the rear.Y4Soon, ho\vever, when the Egyptian attack did not take place (and it could not slnce Xerxes' order had been to close the exlt, not to attack), the Cor~ntli~ans too must have joined the battle."' 'I'he sea must have beer1 shrouded in rnlst when "the wh~te-horsedchariots of dawn appe~redlandlilled the entire earth w ~ t hradiance to l>ehold"'~" because the Persians did not Yee the Creek slitps. Rut they received a sure signal that their enernies were lined up for battle wherl they heard the Greek war song, the paean-"a sou~ld,shouting from the Greeks,/a joyful song, and to it makrng shrill response,/from the ~slandrocks about there carue an antiphony of echoes."" Soon after the paean, the Greek fleet appe,ared before the Persian eyes: "(2uickly all of then1 were \ l s ~ b l et o ~ i g l i t . " "The ~ Greek3 had the element of surprise on their side. The Athenian ships ruanr~edthe left and left cerlter of tlie line, and the 30 A ~ g l ~ l e t ,shlps ~ n had the extreme r ~ g h twlth 20 M e g m a n atld 16 Sp'artan sli~psnext to them. The Persian fleet had the Plioenician ships on the right, the Cypriots, I'arnpliylians, and Lycians next t o them, and tlie Ionian and other Greek s h ~ p on s the left."" At the beg~nning,the Greelc fleet started to retreat, and tlie ~nvaders rushed upon them in pursuit. At a certain point, however, as I-lerodotus Indlcates, a sltlgle A t h e l l ~ a ~s lh ~ pstopped retreating, reversed oars, and rammed an enemy ship. Others soon followed s u ~ t . ~ "Aescliylus " has a d ~ f ferent story: It was the right wing and thus by lmpllcatior~the Alginetans who were the first to attack, he says.l0I One ~nlghtargue that Herodotus and Aescliylus descr~bethe same action but from different v~ewpointsr ~ g h t from the Greek side (Aeschylus), lett from the I'ersian s ~ d e (Iderodotus) as J. S. M o r r ~ s o ns~ggests."'~ However, t h ~ swould stlll create
56
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
problems on the Issue of whlch was the first Greek ship to attack. It seerns more reasonable t o accept another tradition that Herodotus also mentions,lo7 namely, that an higinetan ship began the attack. The two prlnc~pal neth hods of f~ghtlrlgsea battles in antlqulty were boarding or rammlng. Boarding represented an attempt to re-create a land battle on the decks ot ships. Thucydides gives a s p l e r ~ d ~descrlptior~ d of- such an encounter a t the battle of S y b o t ~in 432 B.C. between the fleets of Corinth and Corcyra. "When the standards were ratsed on e~thers~de,"he wrltes, "they [the ships] joined battle, both h a v ~ n ghoplites on the decks as well as n1'111y archers i ~ n dthe javelin-meil, for they were st~llrather rudely fighting in the ancient fashton. And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so rnuch by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on I~ild."The re,~sonbehlrld this system of fightrt~gwas that the contestants "trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks who stood and fought while the s h ~ p srernained notionl less." It was a rrlatter of "brtite strength rather than . . . sk111."'~'~RC1nln1l~lg, whlch ~nvolvedusing a bro~lzeprow In the shape of a swordfish, was designed to disable enemy shtps by breaking thetr oars or to sink them by teanng a hole In t h e ~ rhulls. 01 the two methods, ralntni~lgwas Inore suitable to the Greek s h ~ p sat Salam~s.They were lower In the water and probably smaller and sturdier than their opponent^'.'^' Moreover, in the restricted waters of the narrows, the Phoetlicians' superlor se'3faring skill c a n e to naught, i ~ n dthe Pers~an fleet's nrirnerical superiority dtd not mean much when one could deploy a t best only 80 trireines in line-abreast forination in the 1,200 meters of- the c h , a ~ l n e l . ~Finally, ~ ' ~ the fresh crews of the Greek shlps were able ro null~fy the potentially faster ships of the enenly, w h ~ c hhad been a t sea for many hours by the tirue of the c o n f r ~ n t a t i o n By . ~ contrast, hoarding su~tedthe Pers~ans.If the opposlng ships were comp,lred on the l ~ s i of s t h e ~ rfight~ng gotentral, a Persian boat would have a numerical advantage of almost 2 to l over a Greelc tnrerne. T h ~ swas because the nu~nberof fighting Iner1 on Greek ships was, apart from except~on'llcircumstances, between 14 atld 18 (4 archers and 10 or 14 spearmen or javelinmen),lm wh~le,as Herodotus mentions, on each I'ersian boat, "there were tli~rtyfight~ngmen of the Pers a n s and Medes and SC3cae.""'" The Greek fleet's sudden movement forward caught the enenly by surprise. "l~nrned~ately s h ~ pstruck its brazen-plate beak/on ship." At the beglnnlng, "the Persian force withstood the shocks,"'"' but soon "the shores of S a l a ~ n and ~ s all the coast around" would be "full of corpses of men most miserably destroyed," "bodies . . . sea drenched and swlrling,/bobbing in t h e ~ rrobes.""' Plutarch also mentions that a breeze caused a swell In the water, a d d ~ n g to the confusion and dtsorder of the I'ersian fleet.Il2 I'lutarch 1s not the most r e l ~ ~ ~ of b l eancient sources, and G. Smets and A. Dorsinfa~lg-Srnets
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
57
clam1 that his statement 1s not ev~ciencefrom a tradit~onalearly source but a conclusion reached by h13 knowledge of the battle locatton.' Yet, espectally stnce it is a conclusion that the clinnate could support, tt seems reasonable to belleve that the swell d ~ doccur, as N.G.L. Hammond does.t14 Also, as A. R. Burn argues, there ts ev~dencetn Herodotus suggesting the presence ot wlnd durtng the battle. For instance, In his discussion ot the role of the Oor~nth~ans, Elerodotus says that they ho~stedt h e ~ rsails &he11 they departed from the Greek l ~ n e . ~ ' ~ 'I'he battle lasted a long time. It began at the break of dawn;'16 11ended ~n "the eye of black night.""' Thls 11np11esthat ~t was hard fought, not the ktnd of qulck affair that a cursory readrng of both Herodotus and Aeschylus suggests. Aeschylus remarks that, after the first sudden attack, the Per~1311sfoi~ght~allantly.'lX Later, when the first l ~ n eof ships was routed and the other l~nesvalnly trted to gush forward so that "they too might d~splay their valour,""" the situatton becarne cr~ticalfor the I'erslans: Thetr ships, disabled by rarnmlng and w ~ t ht h e ~ roars soxneti~nessheLared off by t h e ~ r own shtps once they had lost control, t~npededeach other and made Impossible the reliet of the front line.'" Meanwhile, wrttes Aeschylus, the Creek s h ~ p sattacked " w ~ r hperfect p l a ~ land ~ ~ r d e r " they ; ' ~ ~"fought orderly and In array," says H e r o d ~ t u s . " ~ 'I'he two opposlng lines had begun the battle roughly parallel to each other, stretch~ngalong a north-south ax~s.'" At the lirst contact, the Greek l ~ n eprobably had become roughly a semtc~rcle117 shape, wtth the Atginetans on the r ~ g h enlbraclng t the shores of Salarnts and closer to the enemy and the Athen~ansfarther west near the Atr~cdcoast. T ~ Iposltlon S seems to have been ina~ntainedfor most of the ftght. The breakthrough resulted from a colnbtnation of two tlitngs: Flrst the A~gtnetar~s defeated t h e ~ ropponents on the r ~ g h of t the Greek 11ne and probably pursiied them well Into the straits farther east; second, the Athen~ansmust have eventually routed their opponents on the left. When the etlemy left was also routed, the A~ginetans,who by now had dtsposed of eherr enemtes, closed the trap: "All that escaped from the Athenians fell In t h e ~ rcourse antong the Aeginetans."lN At that p o ~ n t ,the Greek 11ne p r o b ~ b l yresembled a c ~ r c l e . " It ~ was also then that the surface of the sea became covered wtth the stght of overturned sl~tps,"filled as it was with shipwrecks and the slaughter of ~nen."~""'Ihe beaches and the reefs around "were filled filth corpse^,"'^' all was 11.1 d~sarray,"~and the Greeks, says the messenger to the Perstall queen In Aeschylus's Persae, "kept striktng us, ltke tnnnics/or a catch of fish, with broken fragments ot oars, or b~ts/offlot~axnfrom the wrecks."'?" When the Pers~anships turned to flee, "tmost of them were destroyed." l0 But the last act ot the drarua had yet not been played. The Persians, stranded on Psyttalela, still rema~ned.One of the Athen~angenerals, Ans-
'
58
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
tides, gathered some of the hoplites and other infantryine~lwho had remained on the shores of Salamrs. Covering "tlie~rbodres w ~ t hweli-made arins of b r o r l ~ e , "they ~ ~ ~surrotlnded the island, pumrneled their enemies with rocks and arrows, and finally went in for the kill, si~ughteringtllein one by one-Pers~ans "at their peak of pliystcal cond~tion,/stoutestof heart and of outstanding lineage,/and always in rhe first the Lord [Xerxesl could trust." ' ;" Tlie Greeks sank inore than 200 eneniy ships, "not ~ n c l u d ~ nthose g captured together with t h e ~ crews."'33 r They lost only 40 ships thentselves, and their casualties too inust have been low bec'luse the shipwrecked Greeks could swim across to S a l a r n i ~ . Tlie ' ~ ~ Perstans whose sli~pswere stink, however, were drowned in tlie sea e ~ t h e rb e c a ~ ~ sthey e could not swiru, as Herodotus write^,"^ or becC1usethey could 11ot find safety on the southern shores that lay in the hands of the enemy. Yet the Creeks seemed to have been unaware of the extent of their victory, for they litade themselves ready for another assault. T h ~ s'~lsosuggests that Xerxes still 11~da consider,~ble number of s h ~ p that s had not been engaged.' 36 But the Greeks were wrong: Xerxes had, in tact, come to the end of his road for the litoment. 111sarmy's safety and efficiency were tied to his navy. As Barry S. Strauss and J o s ~ a h Qber wrtte, the two were "mutually supporttve and could not operate independently o f each other. The army needed the food carried b y the literchant Inarine, the merchant rrlarine needed the protection of the battle fleet, and the battle fleet needed tlie secure beachhead establ~shedby the army."' '7 Xerxes sent his fleet back to the coast of Asia Minor to avoid the peril of another c o n f r o ~ ~ t ~ ~with t i o t lthe enemy d11d t o secure supplles and grain for the troops r e ~ n a t n ~ nIng Greece. His general Mardonius witlidrew to Thessaly to sperld the winter there with a parr ot the arrny, a relatively s~rtall host that illcluded Xerxes' best troops-the I m ~ n o r t ~ ~Medes, ls, Persi,a~ls, Saca, Bactrians, and Ind~ans.The Great King litinself hurr~edback to Sard~s in A s ~ aMinor b y the land route across the I-Iellespont, probably accornpanied by one-third of the army. Hts other general, ilrtabc~zos,escorted hirn to the Hellespont, then started to retrace his steps w ~ t h60,000 men, says I-lerodotus, to join Mardonius in T h e s ~ a 1 y . lBut ~ ~ ttrne would pass before the two gener'lls combined their forces since, en route, Artabazos decided to attack a city that had left the Perstan fold.13'
Plataea Salrt~niswas without doubt the turning point of the war, but it clearly did not mean certain victory for the Greeks in their struggle agatnst the Persian Ernp~re.The Greeks had shut the Persians otf from the Peloponnese, hut the large arrny of the invaders still co~ltrollednorthern a ~ l dmost of central
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
S9
Greece. The Greeks had cut t h e ~ renemy's sect Ilnk, but the Persians' land supply l ~ n ethrough the Hellespont was sell1 intact and they still could rely on the cooperation, voluntary or coerced, o t some i~nportantGreeks, such as the M d c e d o i ~ i ~ ~and n s most of a11 the Thebans. The battle of Platdea, fought 111 479 R.C.., one year after Salamis, was as crucial as Marathon had been eleven years earl~er.Defeat at Plataea would have meant the end of Greek hopes for success. It would not have been just another stage In the struggle against the Perstans, as had been the case w ~ t hThermopylae. At the l'herrnopylae pass, only a relatively srnall number of Greelc forces had been present at tlie beglnnlng of battle, and a11 even srnaller group hdd been ~nvolvedIn the final confrontation. At Plataea, by contrast, more than half the Spartan state was present, with 5,000 hoplites and 35,000 helots;lJO most of the force that Athens could master In a moment of d ~ r eemergency-8,000 men'4' (compare t h ~ sto the 9,000 troops present at Marathon)-was there as well. A Persian victory could only n ~ e a annihilar~ tion for the Greek army. Moreover, there would have been no new troops to replenish the vanquished ranks, as the Romans would have after Cannae. Sparta and Athens had ruustered everything they could at the foothills of Mount C1th~tero11 and Mount Pastr,~.Thar is why the confrontation at Plataea--confused as it was and less herorc than Marathon, Thermopylae, or Salant~s-is at least as Inlportant as the Athenian victory of 490 B.<,. or the d r c ~ m , ~sea t ~ cbattle waged between the beaches of Salarrlis and the coast of Attlca in 480 R.C. I'lataea I S fraught with difficulty for the h~storianin splte of the fact that there 1s 110 dearth of deta~lson the confltct in H e r o d o t ~ s . ' ~For ' instance, the Greelc htstorlan provldes a wealth of ~nforniationon the terrain, but when modern scholars try to make sense of it, doubts begin to outweigh the ~ert'tinties.'~? The same applles to the sequence of events once the two armies faced each other on the oppostte s~desof the Asopos R~ver.Numbers, strangely enough, are less o t a problern. We can probably accept FIerodotus's computation for the Greeks (38,700 hoplites and 69,500 light ~nfantry'~"); we must reject his count of 300,000 barbarians and 50,000 Mediz~ngGreeks plus cavalry tor the Pers~ans."' A recent estimate puts the strength of Mardonlus's host at 60,000 ~nf,*ntryrnenand 30,000 cavalrymen,\"> which seems a reasonable assumption even uslng Herodotus's owl1 evidence. For instance, Herodotus mentions that of the three battle groups, the cetlter, led by Artabdzos, had 40,000 soldiers.'" If we a s s ~ i ~ na esun~lar number on tlie left wing (Perstans, according to Herodotus) and a smaller contingent o n the rlght (rnalnly Theban cavalry and ~Medi~ing GreekstJ8), we have dbo~lt100,000 combc~tants.We should add the varlous servants and camp followers, but they probably relna~nedIn the Persran camp, unlike some of the Spartan follo\vers who, Herodotus suggests, played a role 111 the final confrontdtlon on the r ~ g h wlng t of the Greek Iitle.'4''
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Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
Yet ~f our understanding ot the details of both terran and some aspects of the battle I S clouded, the main orrtl~neof the encounter is clear, Actually, the whole campaign is better understood if it IS d ~ v ~ d cinto d seven stages. In the first stage, Mardon~us,stlll In Athens, trled to wit1 the war without resorting to force by using brlbery and psychological dev~ces.His pollcy was sirriple and alrrrost eftective: divide and conquer. He first trted to seduce Athens out ot ~ t ,1111~lnce s wlth the other Greek cities. When this failed, he shifted his attenttons to Aigina, and when tills approach too dlct not work, he went baclt to tlie Athen~ans. The second stage beg'ln when Mardonlus re'11lzed that the Athellia~ls could not be convinced to break thelr alliance and that he had to face all the reinairnng opponents in the open field. At thls point, he wlthdrew to Boeotla, for a nullher ot re,asoIls. It was closer to an esc'lye route in c'lse of d~sasteron the battlefield, after which his troopr could either take refuge behtnd the walls of friendly Thebes or advance through Phocis on the way to the Hellespont.'"' The nearlless to Thebes also assuaged 1119 worries In terms of supyl~es,brit probably the most important reason for Mardonlus's dec~siont o wlthdraw to Boeotia was that the pla~nsthere provided him filth terrain suited to the prlde of hls ariny, the cclvalry. The opening of the thlrd stage was similar to the first round of a cautlous box~ngrnatch. The Greelts who had followed Mardon~usto Boeotia and the Persl'lns cC~utlously probed for each other's we'1knesses and strengths. W ~ t hthe Creelc army deployed III the foothills of M o ~ l n Cithaeron, t grobably in soriie disarray, Mardon~usI'lunched hls cavalry against one o f the enerny contingents, t11,at ot the Megari,a~ls.'F ' The Greeks fought valiantly, but t h e ~ rdistress must have increased wlth the passage of time, exposed as they were to the assault of the I'ersi,ln horsemen. The I'ers~an cavalry attacked in an orderly, ~ n e t h o d i cfashio11, ~~l ch'lrglng by ~quadro11sand reledsing their arrows and lavel~nsbefore movlng away."l The distress of the Meganans (there were probably 3,000 o f them presentIF" lnust have been Intense, and when they thre'ltened to f i i t h d r ' ~to~ ward safer terraln i f they were not relieved, the Athenians came to t h e ~ rassistance with 8,000 rnen,' F4 includ~nga nurnber of archers-800, according to Hlgnett.Iii "For a lollg time they fought," but the decislve moment c a n e whe11 an Athenian archer knocked the leader of the Persian cavalry, Masistlus, off h ~ horse. s While ~Masistluslay or] the ground, the Greeks stabbed him but at first could not kill hiin bec'ause h ~ chest s was covered wlth armor underneath his srrrcoat. Finally, someone stabbed Mastst~usin the eye."" 'The encounter ended with tlie I'ersians va~nlyattempting to recover thelr commander's body by chxglng en ~ n ~ ~ s s e . ' ' ~ The battle, which ~nvolvedabout one-thlrd of the Greek army (1,000 Megarians and 8,000 Athen~ans)and probably most of the Persian cavalry (perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 men), taught both co~lte~lders valu,~blelessons.
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
61
O n terrain where there M.JS 110 p~ss~billty of belng outflanked, a body of heavy ~nfantrymen,espectally ~f srrpported by a few ~niss~le unlts, could be practically unbeatable. Now, the proble~rtfor Mardontus was how to erltlce the Greeks to attack 111 a terrdln Inore favorable to the Persl'ln army; for the Spartan general Pausanras, the problem was how to glace h ~ men s In a posit ~ o rthat ~ wotlld enhance their charactenstlcs. These concerns were at the core of the plans both coininatlders m,~dein the fourth stage of the battle. The fottrth stage opened with a serles of movements by the Greelc host, soon followed by countermoves from the I'ers~ans. The rrlatn Idea tor both sides was to provoke the enemy to att'xck. Actucally, ~t is renlarkable how the whole battle seems to have been conducted rn the manner of a chess game for a while, rnuch lrke the intrtcate lnaneuvers of the condotrlen in fifteenth-century Italy-moves dnd countermoves, probing attacks dnd counterattacks, sw~tchesof lnxtrattve from one side to the other, traps set and d~scovered.'The d~tferenceis that, unlike the set battles of early Renaissance Italy, the fin,~lco~lfront~xtlon at Plataea was a bloodbath where no surrender was possible or even contemplated. For a tirne, both cornruanders thought defens~vely.I'ausan~as ruoved h ~ s troops from the security of the footh~llsbec'x~isehe felt confident of Greek suyertorlty after tlie fight agalnst the cavalry and because he w~shedto be close to a better watering place, wtth the Asopos R~verand the Gargaphian spring ne,arby. ' j XIn reality, he 'xlso was trylng to entice Mardonlus to att'xck across the Asopus River,"' a gosltlon on top of a r~dgew ~ t ha slrght InclinelhOthat was well suited to a hoplite force, at lea.;t for the right wing th,at the Spdrtdns and the Tegeans n ~ ~ ~ n nMardonius ed. refused to t'xke the bait. As 111stnactlvrty for the next eight days suggesrs, he too took a defensive stand, expecting the Greeks to attack across the Asopos and thus rnove into territory sultable to 111s cav'xlry and IS siiperior forces. Both contestants, at least ~nrttally,thonght that they could walt. Pausan~as'sarrny telt confident and safe In the land of t h e ~ rfathers. And the Persi;111s were close to t h e ~ rsupply line in Thebes, and, being dn driny of professionals, they felt sure they could rematll there as long as they were fed and pa~d.'" In realtty, however, there were Ilniits to the staylng power ot both contestants. The Greek 'xrmy could not stdy indefin~tely,co~nposed'1s ~t was of amateur sold~erswho had other obl~gatlonsand dut~esat home. Also, t h e ~ supply r line had become tenuous once they abandoned the safety of the hills. Moreover, the leaders inust have been concerned that the 1' 1lrance of the last retnarntng defenders of Greek freedom m ~ g h succlrmb t to Interstate r~valr~es or the lure ot I'ersiari gold. For the I'ers~ans, the need tor at1 ~mmediateconfront,xtion was even gre,xter. They could not let another year go by w ~ t h o u at declsron, espec~aliysrnce tlie Greelc fleet had cut thetr supply I~neat ~ea.'~"lso, how long could they rely on the abtlity of t h e ~ r Greek ally, Tliebes, to feed such d large , ~ r m y ? ' Fltl~lly, ~' there was a more
62
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
i ~ n ~ n e d i aconcern te 111 the m111d of Mardonrus. Me saw the Greek army increasing in number w ~ t hthe gasslng of the days and Itnew that other levtes rnight join Pausanias's rnen as The fifth stage commenced on the 111ght of the e ~ g h t hday, with the Perylan decis~onthat the tlme had arrlved for acoon. A body of Persran horsemen was sent t o cut the supply 11neof the Greeks at the pass over Mount Cithaeron. There, they caught S00 beasts of burden and slaughtered them together with t h e ~ r11andlers.'~~ Two rnore days passed without further acttoil. On the eleventh day, Mardonius called a war counc~l,w h ~ c hdec~dedon a general attack the next day. Rut on the twelfth, accordtng to Herodotus, tlie Greelts, informed about the I'ers~an plan, t r ~ e da r~urnberof rnaneuvers to change their line. The Spartans at the right wing inoved to the left, while the Athenians went to the right. The Intent was to post the Athenians against tlie Perstalls since they had had experience against them at Marathon. Mardonius responded by Inovlng h ~ left s w ~ n gto the right. When t h ~ happened, s the Spartans and Athen~ansagain exchanged places, w111ch was followed by a countermove by 1Mardon1us, who wanted his hest troops, the Persians, to t ~ g h tthe Greeks' best troops, the Spartans.'" We d o 11ot have t o accept Herodotus's account here. It seems unlikely that the Greelts could carry out those cumbersome lnarleuvers In the face of a rrtore numerous and more rrtobile eneiny, even with the Asopos R ~ v e rbetween them. However, we d o not necessarily need to d~scardall of Herodotus's story. Pausantas might have intended to carry out the ruaneuvers initially and then rejected them when he saw a countermove or possibly a threaten~nggesture on the part of Mardonius. However, t h ~ sstill does not explain why Mardonius did not attack once he had decided t o d o so and once he had recognised the disarray o r at least the ~lldecislon111 the Greek camp. The l~kelyexplanatton 1s that he wanted to place the Greeks at an even greater d~sadvantagebefore the final confrontat~on.'l'he Greeks' food supply had been cut, and Mardon~usnow tried to d o the same w ~ t ht h e ~ rwater supply. H e po~sonedthe Gargayh~an yprlng near the Spartans' e n c a ~ n p m e n t ,and ' ~ ~ a t the same time, he barred the rest ot the Greek army tram the waters ot the Asopos River by "reason of the [Persian] horsemen and the arrows." 16x All this put the Greelts In a quandary. On the night of the twelfth, Pansanlas held a counc~lof war. 'The council decided to withdraw the army to safer grounds that very nlght, ~n the dark, for fear that at dayhght, "the horsemen [might] press after them and d~sordertheir array."'"" A number of qiiestionable details in this regard are found In Herodotus's account. IIe suggests that the Greek center, made up of Corinthians, Megarians, and Phl~asrans,abandoned the Athenlans o n the left wing and the Spartans and the *I'egeans on the r ~ g h t o face the enemy alone. They w~thdrew111 pan~c,he says, a t double the dista~lcethat they had agreed
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
63
upon dur~rlgthe council of fix-20 stades (3.6 kllometers) instead of 10 stades (1.8 l<~lometers)."" It is debatable, however, that the center's wrtlidrawal was due to co\vard~ce.A rnore likely explanat~onis tliat ~t lost ~ t s way '1s ~t retreated In the dark. Aga~n,fear was probably not the reason why it partlc~patedonly In the concltldrng stage of the battle on the next day. More Irkely, it was because the corresponding center of the enemy decldeci to run away from the battlefield lnste'xi of colnlng t o blows w ~ t hthe Greeks once the troops real17ed that the Pers~anleft, Mardonrus's wlng, had been vanqu~shed.l'' The Spartans and the Athenians dtd not start t h e ~ rwithdrawal unt11 dawn-the Spartans because they were unable to convlnce one of their leaders t o retreat and the Athenlans because they were waiting tor the Spartans to ~ n ~ t i a the t e rnove."WWtever the reason, the truth 1s that rhe Greek army seems to have been rn a state of disarray just a t tlie eve of the battle. It was at this potnt tliat the s ~ x r hstage began. Mardonius trlisiinderstood the ~ n t e n t ~ ootn the Greek ,jrmy. He thought that they were rn flight, and so he, In a rush, commanded the I'ersran left to advance, soon followed by the Medmng Greeks (Figure 3.4).17; Each of Mardonlus's i ~ l l ~moved ts at top speed, "no batr'111on hdking order In ~ t s ranks nor glace assigned to the I ~ n e . " It' ~was ~ a serious mistake. He caught up wlth what he regarded as his ntarn prey-the Spartans and tlie Tegeans of the Greeks' r ~ g h wlng, t and his cavalry was able to pin tlletn down and watt for h ~ s~nfantryto arrive to fintsli off the Greeks. But tlie d~sordered pursuit and piecemeal arrival of the Persian unlts rnust have lessened the ltnpact of the 1nlt1'11 blow ag,jlnst ,111 army In retreat '~tldp r ~ b ~ ~ 111 b ld~sdry ray. Nonetheless, the init~aishoclc that tlie Greek r ~ g h twlng experrenced ruust strll have been fonnidahle. Although it seems that they were already trlov~ngon terralll not fully su~tedt o cavalry charges, the condltlon of the Spartans was cntlcal. Accordrng to Herodotus, they sent a messenger to the left wing a s k ~ n gthe Athen~anstor help, hut the Athemans too were being attacked and could spare n o men, especially not the archers whom the Spartans had part~cularlyrequested. "' Thus, tlie Spartans and 'regeans stood alone-Iioplites and ltght Infantrylnen ,111d servcmts.'76 When the Persian ~lltalltryarrived and rellcved the cavalry, they set their large sli~elds,a form of pirvise (a large oblong sli~eld), on tlie ground and unleashed their arrows at the Greeks. At the beginning, the Greeks, havmg 110 ~ n l s s ~ troops, le dld not answer In the only way they could-w~th a f ~ g h ta t close quarter. The reason was, accord~ng to llerodotus, that the ausptces were unfavorable. G. De Sanct~stlilnks Instead that P ~ L ~ s ~delayed I ~ I ~hls I ~'~ttackbec'~use he first w,~ntedto rrlake sure that hrs lrne was safe from any outflanking a c t ~ o n . " I~ would add, however, that since tlie Greeks had been caught while on the rnove, they, l ~ k ethe pursumg Persians, must have been in a state of d ~ s ~ ~ rand r a y thus 111
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
64
-\ \
l
I'crsran camp
I
I'hl~ns~ans, .Megar~ans,and ( 'oc~ntl~rans I'lataca, 479 n.c.
FIGURE 3.4 need of tllne to reorg,lnlze thelr ranks. Finally, although the Idea of delaying attack in sucli a crucial moment because of unfavorable auspices seems irrational to rrloderr~people, we should not discount the reltgious explanntlon completely. The Greeks were not ~ l e c e s s ~ ~afrd~d r ~ l y of ~ n ~ ~ n ~ p u lthe at~ng auspices, as, for instance, Pausanias seeined to have done in the end when he alrnost ordered the deit~esto corne to his support through favorable s ~ g n s . "But ~ on the &hole, auspices were tc2ken very seriously. The Tegeans, regardless of what the ausptces were saying, could n o longer stand still. They surged forward and attacked the Persians and were soon followed by the Spartans, who, after Pausanlas's ple'l ~ n the d Tegedns' action, had finally received favorable auspices. At close quarters, the issue could only end in favor of arrnored rnen fightlng In close ranks against unarlnored sold~erswho were p r o l ~ b l yarrayed more loosely. But the Persi,ans
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
65
dld 11ot ref~isethe fight. They threw away tlle~rbows, l~kelyfightlng wlth spears and swords instead, and met the Greeks with courage. Actually, as long as Mardonius was allve, surrounded by a guard of 1,000 men, the outcome r e n ~ ~ ~ i in ~ l doubt. ed But when he was k~lledand his guard was destroyed, the Perstans gave way and withdrew In flight.'7" 'I'he role of the Persian cavalry at this stage I S hard to assess. We ruust assume t h ~ once t ~t had c~ccon~plished ~ t srole In plrllllrlg the retre'ltlng Greeks, it must have withdrawn, e~tlierbecause cavalry could not d o much else on brolcen terrain or because it was enormously difficult In those times to coordinate the operations of d~fferenttypes of arms. What role the cavalry played later, wl~eiiMardonius's soldiers were routed, is unclear. Did the Persians, like the 'Thebans, screen their flee~nginfantry?'"' The sixth stage of the battle could be descr~bedas a triptych. The most lmportant panel was on the right, featuring the confrontation of the Spartans and Tegeans agalnst Mardonius and his Persians, b ~ the ~ other t two panels ofthe tr~ptychalso dep~ctedactlon. The Greek troops ot the center were not engaged at all. Artabazos, co~nmanderof tlie Perstalls opposite them, once he realized that the left wing had been defeated, withdrew In the direction ofPhoc~son h ~ way s to the bridge across the M e l l e s p o ~ ~ tIt. ' was ~ then that the Greek center divided itself ~ n t otwo columns, tlie Cor~nthiansmoving through foothills toward the Spartans on the right wing and the Megarians and Phlusl,~t~s heading across the pialtl toward the Athenians on the left.IX1 The Athenians meanwhile were caught In the open, but they fought well and defeated the Medi~ingGreelcs, \v110 w~thdrewIn good order, screened by thelr cavalry.lx' Acti~~ally, whlle In retreat, the Theban horsen~enfound easy prey In the adva~ic~ng Megarians and Phl~astans,ktlling 600 of 'I'he seventh and final stage of the battle was a mopping up operation. The Spartans a11d then the Athen~ansattacked the Persian camp and slaughtered the soldiers who had sought refuge there, but they were less successtul agalnst the Medizing Greelcs, who escaped. According to Elerodotus, the cc~sualt~es among the Greeks were fairly low, except for the 600 Megarians and Phirasians of the c ~ n t e r . ' ~For ' the rest, the Spartans suffered 91 casualties, the T'egeans 17, and the Athenians 52.'" But Ptutarch puts Greek casualt~esat I' higher f1g~1re-l,360.~~' Herodotus cla~nisthat, except for Artaba~os's 40,000 men, only a scarce 3,000 were lett o t the Persian army that began with 300,000.'" No doubt, FIerodotus Inflates h ~ assessment s enormously. If we assume that the Medizing Greelts nrr~nberedaborit 20,000 and that they sriffered orily 300 casrialtres,'" that they were able to escape because t h e ~ cavalry r protected their retre,~t,"" and that Artabazos's men wlthdrew to the safety of Pkocis, this would mean the casrialt~esmust have come matnly from the left-40,000 men if-we assurne that the I'ers~ans' lett was ~derlt~cal to their center In terms of nu~ner~cal strength. We do not know, however, how many camp
66
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
followers and servants were c'lught 111 the fight and In the cC1mpass,~ultor how lnaiiy of tlleni were slain. St~ll,even tlie h~gliestfigure possible would be rrtucli lower than the r~urnberHerodotus suggests. The Gre,lt Perslan W x s had come to a close on the sod of Greece, although they would continue for a tlme on the shores of Asia M~nor.Men "famed tor t h e ~ rspear"'" had once again defeated "archers and horsei n e ~ d f e ~ ~ rto f n behold, l dreadful ln battle."'"2 It 1s easy to d~sinissthe vanquished as inept and thelr system of combat as weak. In real~ty,the Perslan war rrtachine was still for~nidabie,and in the r ~ g h ct o n d ~ t ~ oand r ~ s under approprlate le,~dersh~p, ~tcould st~llbe dangerous. After all, t h ~ was s the '~rrny that had conquered most of eastern Asta, that would hold a large einptre tor another century and a halt, and that had corne very close to subduing even the stubborn irlen of EIellas. The Persians had lost the battle for two grtlnary reasons. In the last analys~s,their cavalry, whlcli had functioned so well until it had pinned tlie retre,ltlng Greek r ~ g h twing, seenls to have played no relevant role afterward. Even more important, however, was the Perstans' inability to combine the actions of their three divisions. In the mistaken bel~efthat the Greeks were flee~ng,the whole battle had been fought on the spur of the moment. The left wing had come to grips with their opponents, the Spartans and Tegeans, bur (at least at the begirlning) only in a piecerrteal fash~on that must have decre'tsed the p o s s ~ b ~ l of ~ t yvlctory. The Pers~artcenter had never been engaged and had fled before any blow was struck. Their r ~ g h t wing liad done a l ~ t t l ebetter, and probably the 'I'hebans liad fought val~antly,but taking lnto cons~deratronthat the r ~ g h twlng was composed of Med~zingGreelts, the lackluster perfor~nanceshould have been expected. Once agaln, the Persians had beer) defeated tact~callyby char prime enemy, the heavy ~nfalltrymen.In a battle that depended on front,~lattack, hoplites were clearly better sold~ers.
The Persian Army Unlike the Greek host, w h ~ c hwas united by cornmon I'lnguage, etlinlc ortgin, and soinet~mestrad~tion,the Persldn '1rrny was $1 polyglot and cosmopol~tanforce. The core was composed of Perstans and Medes, ~dentlt~es that Greek authors used interchangeably. In reallty, Medes and Persians fiere d~fferentpeople. Both groups had ongln'1lly been cattle herders who had moved Into Iran from central As~a.Tlie~rlanguage as well as t h e ~ rcostumes were sirn~lar(Indo-European in origir~),but once In Iran, the Medcs had settled in the ,1rea of the Zagros inount,11ns and the Perslans in Fars, near the k ~ n g d o ~ofn Elam. Eventually, the Pers~ansconquered the Medes, who were regarded as one of the two core populat~onsot their empire."' Apart froin the Medes and Persi'ans, the rest of Xerxes' army ~ncludedmer-
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
67
cenar~esand subject people."4 An ~tlscriptiollon the south retal~ungw1' 11 of Dar~us'spalace at Persepol~slists twenty-three subject geople.19"T'he ethn~c variety was rrtatched by varlety in weapons and types of sold~ers:bowmen, javel~nmen,sllngers, spearmen, horsemen, char~oteers,even people fighting w ~ t hlassoes. Yet bowmen and horsemen took first place: References in the literature speak of "an Ares who fights with the bow,""6 "the furious cavalry charge" agdlIlSt which cltles fall," "all the horse-driv~ngrnass of menland the tramping troops of me11 on foot,/l~kea swarm of bees have gone awaylstrearning after the lord ot troops,/have crossed the bridge that yokeslboth necks of landlone to another."'"x The spear, too, was well represented. Sorne of the units of bowmen, for Instance, the Pers~ans,Medes, and a host of other nationalities, combined the bow with the spear, although it seerns that ~n 1'11 c a e s ( w ~ t hthe probable exception of sotrle recrults from Asia Minor), tlie~rspears were shorter than those that the Creelis used.199 Sorne units of Xerxes' arrny wore arrnor. The I'ersians had "sleeved turl~csof divers colours, w ~ t hsc'11es iron like in appe'trance to the scales of ftsh.""" The Assyr~ansseemed to have worn bronze I1elmets and linen breastplates.'" The I'erslan cornruanders certalnly rnust have worn arrrior as well. When Mas~stius,the leader of the cavalry, fell to the ground 11.1 the fight at the footl~~lls of Mount Cithaeron, lie ~nitiallyescaped injury from the stabbing Greeks because he wore "a purple tunic over a cuirass of goldell scales."202Yet ~ n o s of t them were e~therl~ghtlyarmored or not arnlored at all. Herodotus's words ~mplyonly a certain amount of armor was worn even by the I'ersians and Medes ruent~onedearher, not the complex culrass, whether bronze or linen, of the Greeks. They also did not wear helmets but ~nstead"loose caps called tiaras."20i There is, tinally, 110 doubt that rrlost of- the other etlin~cgroups used either an elernentary tort11 of protection or nothing at all. The problem of lack of grotectlon for bodies and heads was compounded by the use of- inadequate shields or a total lack of- them. Here too there are same exceptions, such as the 1oni,a11Greeks, who rnust have worn the hopl~tearmor, and the Assyrians, who used large sli~eldsin the Egyptla~i fashion."" 'I'his rueans that ~f the Assyrian shields were similar to those used In the later stages of the Egyptr'tll Empire, they were cumbersome but certainly large and an excellent form of protecnon. On the whole, most of the shields were ruade of wicker, such as those ot the I'ersians and Mede~,"'~ although sorrle u n ~ t scertalnly carr~edor had servants carry for them larger shields as well: Their sn~allsh~eldswould have been madequate to set up the shield wall from behind wh~clithey shot thelr arro\~s.'"~Of the varlous infantry types that followed Xerxes into Greece, only 15 out of the 46 ethnic groups mentioned in Herodotus carr~edshields.207 'I'he relat~vepresence or absence of armor plus shtelds or the lack thereof me'tnt that the Pers~anarrny s,tcr~ficedst'lying power to mobility. This as-
6S
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
sesslnent IS v a l ~ d ~ t ebyd the fact that the cavalry const~tuteda large part of the army, In the campalgn that led to Marathon, Hammond estttnates that there probably were 1,000 horsemen out of about 25,000 fighting troops."" A recent work suggests there were 30,000 horsemen against 60,000 infantry at Plataea.Lo" H ~ g n e t t h ~ n k sthat the ratio between Infantry and cavalry was about 7 to 1 That the Persian army was made up of profess~onalsIS w~thoutdoubt d the term refers to men who chose a military career as their main activlty in life. Yet whether this professional status made them better than the Greeks on the battlefield is debatable. The Pers~answere superior In the sense that they could carry war outside their borders for a long time while the Greeks could not because they had other obligations In prlvate and publ~clife. In other words, the Pers~a~ls could b u ~ l demplres, but the Greeks could not on a strn~larlylarge scale-or at least they were unable to d o so before a new governmental systern became acceptable under the Macedonians. Yet this d ~ dnot make the Pers~tl~ls more for~n~ddbie than the Greeks once on the battlefield, as, for instance, Delbriick has r n a ~ n t a ~ n e d . The ~ " system of hoplite fighting was rather elementary-each Inan was t o keep the ranks, protect h~rnselfand the person at tus s ~ d e ,anchor the h e ' s flanks, atld move forward. In the right condtt~onsand if the enemy had no other alternative but to meet thein face to face, Greek hoplites wotlld inev~tablydefeat tlle~rlighter oppo~lent.T h ~ was s the case at Marathon, at Pl,~tae,~, and even at Thermopylae as long as the Immortais did not outflank 1,eonldas's men. The varlous unlts of the I'ers~an ariny seem to have been based on the decimal system, starting from a rnlnlmum unlt of 10 soldiers and rnovlng to 100, 1,000, and 10,000."2 Moreover, as was customary In the ancient world, the various people in the Persian army were grouped according to t h e ~ rethn~cbackgrounds. For Instance, Medes and Ciss~anslaunched the in~tialattack at T l i e r ~ n o p y l a e .The ~ ' ~ situatron at Plataea also gives the Empressior~that the Persians terlded to d~videt h e ~ rvarious ethnic groups into different d~v~sions. Thus, the M e d ~ z ~ nGreeks g were grouped on the r~ght, the Pers~ansand Medes on the left, and tlie rest of the ethn~cgroups in tlie center.""heir generals, however, like their fleet commanders, tended to be Pers~atls,and t h e ~ rchief marsh~~ls were mostly relatives of the roy'11 house, as was customary in the anclent Kear East."' The Persian method of attack followed four stages tinder deal battlefield c o ~ ~ d l t ~ oItn sbegm . with the operations of the cavalry, continued w ~ t hthe foot bowmen coming Into action, and concluded w ~ t hclose combat e~ther by bowrnen switch~ngto the spear or by proper close-fighting unlts. If the enerny w,~srouted, there would be ,I fourth stage, during w h ~ c hthe cavalry would become predom~nantin pursutt. The Persians brought the cavalry to the highest form of soph~stication after ~ t fledgling s start under the Assyr~ans.Only Alexander's M'lcedonia~ls would be able to go beyond the fine arrangement that Perstans and Medes
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
6 L)
were able to ach~eve.The Persldns used t h e ~ c,~valry r 11.1 a lumber of waysto cut enemy supply Itnes, to pursue a flee~ngarmy, to harass ~ t I~nes, s to engage opponents In hand-to-hand combat, to destroy them by fighting from a d~stance,and to cover any retreat of thelr troops. The Gre'xt Wars glve httie evidence, except for the ratd agallist the supply train,lIh for an abillty to ruove large corttiriger~tsof sold~ersquickly and nothing at all on the cavalry's s k ~ l In l turnlng the flmk o t an outnumbered m d horseless enemy. I11 the first case, however, both the rocky terratn and the s17e of the P e r s ~ a ~ i ariny might have Itniited the qu~ckriessof therr operatlorts durtng the Great Wars. 111the second case, if we exdnltne the three encounters of the confl~ct, the cavalry was j,robably absent at Marathon, ~tcould not be used at Tliermopylae, and it seeriis that at Plataea, the way In wli~chthe Greeks anchored t h e ~ rl ~ n eprevented ,111y senous outflanking m'1neuvers by 1' s~zable number of horsemen. The battle of Plataea, however, grov~dedclass~cexamples ot the cavalry's other funct~ons.Besides cutting the flow of food provlstons, they also prevented the Greeks from g,~in~ng access to the water supply, hot11 by poisoning "the Gargagli~a~i sprlng, whence all the army of the Greelzs drew 11s water" and by preverltlng tlietr opponents frorn drawing w'tter from the Asopos R ~ c e r . Another ~'~ action In whlch the Pers1~111 cavalry was often engaged was general harassment of the enemy lines betore the rrlaln stage of the hattle took place, a rnethod designed to d~sorder the eneiny phys~c~lly and d~sruptits emotlonal stabtllty. Cle'lrly, they were very successful In doing so d u r ~ n gthe stages of the carngalgn of Plataea: 'I'he Persian horse cont~nuallybeset and troubled the G r e e k ~ ; " they ~ disordered them;"" and they c,~usedthein "unendl~lghardship."220 Cutt~ngsupply I~nes,go~soningwater sources, greventlng enemy access to the water, or harass~ngthe soldiers deployed for battle to jeopardl~et h e ~ r physlcal and e m o t ~ o n ~~tltegr~ty-'111 d these tactlcs were e~nployedbefore the p r ~ n c ~ pengagement al took glace. The cavalry was even more important In the first stage of a pitched battle, ~ I i ~ chorsemen, li in corrlbinatlon ~ ~ t h foot archers, cdrr~edout if the enemy h ~ few d or no nltsslle unlts. When they vastly outnu~nberedtheir opponents, as was the case w ~ t ha Phoctan contingent tn the early stages of the carnpalgn of Plataea,"' the horsernen encircled and kept shooting at t h e ~ renemy, lnovitlg away when the opponents t r ~ e dto close with them. If their grey was of a slzable number, as the Megarians and the Athemans were ( w ~ t habout 11,000 rrleri In all), then they rode In order by squadro~ls,e x h rele,~s~ng its m~ssiles,fiheel~ngaway, and letting another squadron move forward.li2 It was a method perfectly suited agalnst tootrnen encuinbered by heavy arntor, who were very dangerous In close cornbar but u11'1ble to close on 1' n~mbleetlemy: The Persians, says Herodotus, "were mounted archers and 111 to close w~tli."~" The actxons of the horscinen in the ~rtitialstages ot the battle were des~gnedto ,~ccornpLsh1' number of thlngs. The cclvalry troops could destroy their opponents ~f they outnumbered them, as seems to have bee13 the case
70
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
in t h e ~ rattack against the M e g ~ r l a n sbefore the Athenl~lnsIntervened or In thetr mock battle w ~ t htile Phocians. More often, however, they trted to ach~eveother airns-to disorganize their foes, to force the infantry to assurne a stdttc posit~on,or to p111 the enerny down untll the arrival of the rest of tlie force. This techn~quewas used a t Plataea. For Instance, Pausanias decided to inove his arrny a t night because he was afraid that "the horserlien Iwouldl press after t11er.n i ~ n ddisorder t h e ~ rarray."L24 When the Spastalls began thetr retreat on the dawn of the thirteenth day, it was the Pers~an cavalry that launched the pursuit and pinned the er~elriybefore the arrival of the bowmet1 and the rest of the Perslan left w i t ~ g . ~Once ~ ' tlle Pers~an horsemen came into contact with the Phocians, tlie Greelcs seem to have had no alternative but to stay still, "drawing their ranks to the best of t h e ~ r power."12" Although our ~ n ~ ~source, i t l Herodotus, is not cleclr o n thls, ~t seems that the Spartans and Tegeans were also compelled to assume a statlc p o s i t ~ o rwhen ~ under attaclc frorn cavalry and that they inoved offens~vely only when the horsemen w~thdrcwto '~llowthe bowmen III for what they thor~glitwould be the final defeat of the GreeksSLL7 Although r ~ d i n gto tlie enerny, shoot~ng,and then r ~ d ~ nback g seem to have beet1 the favor~temaneuvers of the cavalry on the battlefield, Persian horsemen were also, if necessary, able to engage the enemy in close combat by charging them with their swords or with their javelirls used as spears. For example, when they re,~lizedthat tlle~rc o r n t ~ ~ ~ ~ nMasistius, der, had been Icilled, the Persian horsemen rode all together and engaged the Megarialis and Athenians ~n hand-to-hand ~ o r n b a t . " ~ Otlce the enelny had beet1 pltlned down atld ~ t array s disordered by the horsemen, bowmen came Into play, and tlie second stage of the battle began. The Persian infantry would move forward, ''set up t h e ~ shields r for a fence," atld then shoot "showers of arrows ~nnumerable"froin the safety of the barr~cade."' This apparently was a common technique. At Mycale too, also fotlght in 479 I$.(,. but on the shores of A s ~ aMinor, the Persian 1r1fantry 111'1de 1rs preparatloll for batrle by ilnplatltlng the shields "close t o make a barr~cade.""~' The shields, which inust have been fairly large (like tlie pavises that protected the xned~evalcrossbowmen), were not just I' harr~erto ensure the protectlon of the bowme11 from the threat of mtss~les.At Plataea, they were set against the Spartans and the Tegeans who apparently had n o in~ssile units, which llnpl~esthat they were also a form of protectlon for hand-tohand combat. When Spartans and Tegeans rushed the Persians at Plataea, the bowrrten fought valiar~tlyfor the terlce of ~Iiields,"~wh~cliprobably means that they fought from behlnci tlle sh~eld~'111. That sh~eldswere used In t h ~ sway was even clearer at Mycale: "While the Persians' shtelds srood upright, they defended themselves and held their own In battle." Actually, they stood thelr ground for "a long time" even after the Greeks were able to brealc the sh~eldb a r r ~ e r . ? ~ ~
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71
How the sh~eldwall was set up 1s uncertain. It does not seem, however, that the Pers~anbow untts ~nciudedsl~~eld-holders, as the Assyr~ansd ~ d Ac. tually, as events of the battle ot I'lataea suggest ("the Persrans inet them [the Spartans rush~ngtlle~rsh~eldwall1 by throwlng away t h e ~ rb ~ w s " ~ " )tlle , bowmen, who were also arined with spears, were apparently the only ones fight~ngt r o ~ nthe safety of the sh~eldsand ready to sw~tchtheir role from bowmen to spearmen. The third stage of the battle, ~fnecessary, ~nvolvedhand-to-hand combat. As the Great Wars show, ~t was here that tlie I'ers~ans were at t h e ~ rwealtest. But by that p o ~ n t ,under nortnal c1rcunlstances, the enemy, haklng endured a long ~ n ~ s s i onslaught, le wonld have been d~sorderedand ready to break and run. 'Sl~ePers~ansengaged in hand-to-hand melee In various clrcurnstances-when their arrows had been used up; when the tune had corrle to fin~slioff thetr opponents and the man-on-man fighting could be used 117 cornblnat~onw ~ t h~n~ssiles, such as durtrig the last stand ot tlie Greeks a t T h e r m o p y l , ~ e ;or~ ~when ~ no other alternat~veseemed possible, as at tlle beginning of the battle of Thermopylae. In a case 11ke Thermopylae, where the cavalry cotild not be used and archers were probably ~netfective,"' the Persians were also prepared to engage 111 hand-to-hand combat fronl tlle very begtnntng. 'She cavalry, abscrlt from the second and t h ~ r dstages of the battle, rrlust have reappeared when the enemy broke and ran. T h ~ would s hake been the fourth and final stage of a successf~ilencounter. Events a t Thermopylae, Maratl~on,and Plataea give ltttle dtrect evidence on the action ot the Per~1311 cakalry III case of victory; at ThermopyLe, the defeated Greeks dld not flee, and a t Marathon and Plataea, the Greeks tr~umphed.Yet some conclufrom the facts available. It I S clear, tor sions can be d r a w i ~by ~inpl~cation Instance, that one of Pausanlas's rrlaln concerns, once he had declded to w~thdraw,was the presence of the Perstan cavalry. He dec~dedto move a t night for fear that those horsemen would pursue his troops and cause h a ~ o c . ~ ' W n cthey e were o n the move, the Spartans and the T e g e ~ n sclung "to brolten ground and the lower slopes of C~thaeron,to escape from the Persian Moreover, one ot the reasons why Leorl~dasd ~ not d retreat at Thernlopylae was without doubt because he knew h ~ army s could have been easy prey for the Pers~anhorsemen. 'I'he Pers~anrnethod of attack seems f l a w l e ~ s , " ~and their choices o t funct~onfor the vanoils unlts appear ~ m p e c c ~ ~ batl eleast , for the horsemen. Ides$sat~sfacrorywas t h e ~ rc o ~ n b ~ n a t i oofn the bow and spear for the salne ~ n d ~ v ~ d u aAnd l s . even rnore serious was their inab~lityto coord~natethe action of thelr cavalry wltk t h a of the ~nfantry."" It IS qulte clear that t h ~ s was one of the reasons for thew fa~lurea t Plataea agalnst the Spartans and the Tegeans. The Persian ~nfantryapparently caused l~ttleworry to the Greeks. Even the Persian spearmen, S~ICII a$ the Medes, the C~sstans,and the Immortals,
72
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
seem 11or to have been a serlous threat to the Greek hoplite."O The foot archers made the lioplites more vulnerable because they could engage them frorn a relatively long range, but t h e ~ rrole too rnust have beer1 ruore a matter of provok~ngpsychologic'd disarr'ly than posing a r e d threat of phys~cal danger.241 However, there IS no doubt that the Greeks feared the action of the cavalry.'42 They had good reason for this. It was the I'ersian horsemen who almost w ~ p e dout the Megar~ans,who cut the Greeks' flow of yrovls~ons,wlio cliolted their sprtng, and who prevented them from gettlng water frorn the i2sopos River. It was both t o find another source of water and t o escape tlle hc~rassinentof the cavalry that Pausall~asdec~dedto move. It was the cavalry that pinned the retreating Spartans and Tegeans III battle. And ~t was in deference to the power and threat o f the Persian horsemen that I'aus'lnlas decided In the lirst instance to move h ~ army s d u r ~ n gthe night.
Why the Persians Lost Tlie Greeks would clalrn that their vlctory In both wars reflected tlie superior features of their civilization: the way they fought; the system of governrrlent that they defended; rhe ~ n s p l r ~ nexa~nple g provided by Sparta and especially by Athens; the type of people that the East produced; and, in contrast, the leadersh~pof a few outstand~ngGreeks such as Mtlciades at Marathon, Thein~stoclesat Sc%l'~mis, and P,~us,~nl,ls, ~ Plntae,~. t There inay be a kernel of truth In stlch asserttons. Certainly, as I attempted to express earlier, Greek hoplttes were almost unbeatable 111 face-to-face confrontation &he11 t h e ~ rflanks co~lldnor be turned. F~ghtlilgfor their home, oftet1 on terrltortes belong~ngto therr polls, must have given an added impetus to thetr et tort^."^ Yet the Persians could st~llhave won. Marathon could have ended ln disaster for the Greeks if the P e r s ~ ~wings ~ n had lasted a l~rtle longer against the Greek right and left. A lrttle more ttme would have allowed the I'ersian center to d~spatcht h e ~ renemy counterpart. 'Then ~tcould have relleved the pressure on the wlngs by attacking the Greek rlght and left from tlie rear. Simtlarly, the outcome at Plataea was In doubt for a long tlnie. Or~lyMardontus's death and Artabazos's behavior turned the tables in the Greek army's f'1vor. The Perstms lnay have beet1 able t o s ~ l \ , , ~ geven e the defeat at Sdlamls ~f they had been more w~llingto gamble. After all, a t Sdlarn~s,the Greeks were expecting another attack, w h ~ c hsuggests that tlle~rvictory d ~ dnot seem at the tune '1s o~erwhelmingas ~t would a few days later. Moreover, one-third of the Persran fleet, composed of tlie Egyptians, was fresh, having taken no part In the clash. But Xerxes corrlb~ned tlle setback a t se,a wlth 1' cruc~tllrn~st,~ke of h ~ own: s H e executed some of h1s Plioeti~c~an captains, 111sbest seamen, for cowardice.244 If there was, In tact, anyone to blan~e,it would have been inore accurate to polnt the f i ~ ~ g e r at hl~nselffor falling Into Themlstocles' trap.
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73
At first s~ght,the in~tialpla~lsof both Dt~riusand Xerxes seemed excellent. Rut in the father's case, the origrnal Idea of attack~ngfrom the north had failed mainly because of the caprlces ot the weather, whlch had brought ha\oc to h ~ sfleet while ~t was roundmg the Akte pen~nsulanear Morrnt Athos. The next exped~tion,the attack across the Aegean, was a mistake-too few rnen and a fraglle supply Ilne. Xerxes' in~tralplans could not be blamed. He secured peace in h ~ empire; s he fient back to the o r ~ g i n ~ ~ l plan of attacking froin the north; and he establ~shedthe safety of h ~ ssoldiers in a nurnber of ways. Hc bu~lta br~dgeacross the Hellespont, cut a canal across the Akte peninsula, rnade h ~ sarmy and navy ~ n u t u ~ ~suplly port~veby advancing In a parallel manner, established supply depots In Hellas, and focused h ~ sattack on Athens and Sparta In hopes that the other clties would accept h ~ rule. s Yet $1 good initik?l~ d e awas in the end cdrr~ed out poorly because of rdeolog~calf,lctors, fl'tws 111 the o r ~ g ~ n plan, al and ru~stakesin the field. Strauss and Ober have stressed thdt three ideolog~c,~l factors were central to Xerxes' expedtt~on:"fam~ly,~nrlitaryprowess, and Truth w o r s h ~ p . " ~ ~ ' Xerxes, like his father, Dar~us,before hint, had no blood clatril to the throne that Cprus had established by SS0 13.C. It is true that his clalnl to the throne was stronger than h ~ sfather's (hi9 mother, Atossa, was Cyrus's daughter), yet Xerxes too felt that he could l e g i t ~ n ~hi ~~erule s only ~f be emulated the high standard set by Cyrus on the 1~~2ttiefield. In other fiords, victory and conquest were an essentral part of 111ssrrrtabtltty for the tlirone. Moreover, Xerxes' view of 11fewas conditioned by 111srelig~ousbel~efsin Zarathustrlan pr~nciples.Zarathrustr,~saw l ~ f eas a struggle between the good re,lbn ot Truthl1,ife and the ev~lrealm of L~e/Darkness.The burden of botli political and ideolog~calfactors rrlearlt that Xerxes had to punish Hellas, the challenger of h ~ royal s house's dorn~n~qnce on the bC~ttlefield and the embodnnent of I,ie/I)arkness. In Greece, his father had experienced brtter defeat, and as a consequence, revolt had followed in the imperial lands. Soon after Marathon, Egypt and Judah h ~ risen d ~n rebell~onin 486, and later, 111 482, even Rabylonra had t r ~ e dto shake Persran c ~ n t r o l . ~ ~ % e r x ehad s to srrbjugate the Greeks and cor~ipletewhat his father had begun. Moreover, I-lellas, espec~allyAthens, fias the perfect symbol of Lie/Ddrkness slnce it h'2d broken a sacred commttinent. Just before the Ionran revolt of 499 &.c-., Athens had sent the token of its subjection, earth and water, to the Great Ktng. Bur soon atter, when the Ioninns seemed to be \ictor~ous~n t h e ~ rearly stages of the revolt agaliist the Perstans, Athens had reneged o n ~ t pledge. s The Athenians had even sacked the Pers~ancity ot Sardis. 'l'hus, they were perceived as liars and the embodlinent ot evil. They had to be p ~ ~ n l s h e d . ~ ~ ' Ideologicai factors, then, had a great influence on Xerxes' actlons. And he cornpounded a lack of flex~bllttywith a nuruber of mstakes. D a r ~ u shad brought too few men to Greece; Xerxes brought too m~lny.There were 46
74
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
e t h n ~ cunits In h ~ army, s most w ~ t hdlfferetlt armor a11d arms and d~fferent languages. The command structure of the Persian army must have been a n~ghtmare,with 6 generals, 30 general otficers, and countless subord~nate officers. All tkls rrlust have caused serious ditficiiltles ln commutlicat~onand a lack of consistency a t the tactical It probably would have been better to deploy a srnaller arrny, including only tlie best troops. Such an army at Plataea, for Instance, almost turned the tables In the Persians' favor. A bigger arrny than Darrus's exped~tlonwas clearly a necessity, but a vast army created all k ~ n d sof problems. The Pers~ansstarred to experience logistical d~fflculties rlght after 1nov111g from Thrace toward T l ~ e r n i o p y l a e It. ~IS~ ~likely that the land stlpply route was not adequate for such a large body of soldiers, not only because of ~ t slowness s but also because so Inany men would hake so011 depleted the land's food and fidter resources. Xerxes' decis~onat Sala1nl.s Iias to be seen as more than a nalve reaction to 'l'hem~stocles'tnck. It was also the r~aturalresponse of a rnan wllo had to just~fyh ~ throne s by a splendid vlctory and who had to pun~shthe evildoers (the representatnres of Idle agalnst Truth), and it was the reactlon ot a man pressured by serious logistical problelns. The Great Icing's react ~ o t lattcr the defeat co~lfirmsthis. Although t ~ l n i d ~ tprobably y played a part In h ~ sdecis~onnot to make another attempt a t defeating the Greelc fleet, the need for a secure supply line must have been on his rnlnd when he ordered h ~ fleet s ro As13 Mlnor and then retreated toward the Hellespo~~t, Irkely w ~ t ha large part of the land army. A slnaller army under Mardonius and Arraba~osrnade sense In terlns of supply and probably In terms of efficiency. That he lost at Plataea too was not only due to the Greeks' stubborn resistance; ~twas also due to Mardon~us'stactical 1nl.stakes In hts piecemeal attack against the Spartans and the Tegeans and to Artahazos's ambiguous it not treacherous behavlor. The Perslatls cornpounded error after error. O n the eve of Salam~s,why d ~ Xerxes d not send a few s h ~ p sand a few men to land near Argos? The actton could have conv~ncedthe clty to rlse against the Spartans, and the11 the Greek forces at the ~sthnluswould have found themselves wtth the Argives III the rear and the Persian land army In the front-the rtght scenarlo for defeat. As Thtlcyd~desargued long ago, the Pers~ans'defeat resiilteci frorn an accumulat~onof thelr own error^."^)
The Symbols of the Victorious Dramatlc as the accounts of the Perstan lnvastons are and fascinating as the interplay o t varlous weapons and systems of cornbat makes them, tlie greatest her~tageof the Great Wars was probably in the field of symbolic Imagery. It set the trend for the future. Europe and Asia, the West and tlie East, are p~cturedin terms of an "eternal war." 'The contrast is not geograph~calbut lna~tllyideological and sp~ntual.Later wrlters would expand
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
7.Y
thls ~ d e dboth for the past and for the centuries f o l l o w ~ t ~the g Great Wars. The Trojan conflict became one of the mandatory common themes of the oppos~tion.Later, it would be part of the Roman heritage, which woitld dep ~ c fianlllbal's t Carthdgln~ansor Cleopatra and Mark Anthony's Egyptrans as Eastern symbols. Actium, the battle In which Augustus defeated his enemtes in 31 Ii.c,., would be seen as another ~nstanceot this "eternal war." How the Rom,~nsbeca~nepart ot t h ~ sprocess is fasc~natingin itself. What they dtd was in the Interest of both parties, grving the Romans an ~dentity w~tlithe civ~lizedworld ot the Greelc past and gning the Greeks the opportunlty to clai~nthat the RomcuIs descended from the~n.'~' Tlie process was not a new one. The large Egypttan murals, thetr sculptures, and their ltterature are strong evidence that wars had been used In sy~nl>oL~cal terms for a long tune. The Assyrians too h'ad followed the Egyptian lead w~tlit h e ~ constructions, r v ~ ~ uexamples, al and thetr wrttlngs. Rut all the pre-I'ersian Wars propaganda had been used mainly to e n i p h a s ~ ~the e power of the ruler. The Greeks refined t h ~ concept s to elevate not ~ndlv~duals but groups of people and not only people but also absrract concepts. 'The leltmotl\ ot llerodotus's narrative, ot Aescliylus's Pcrsae, and of the works of wrlters who followed the111 (even if, like D~odorusS~culus,they also drew from other tradttions) was the contrast between Greeks and Persi,liis. The Greeks fought In untts In which a man sacrificed his individualtty for the securlty ot the whole; the Persi'a~ls attacked In waves of s1n~11lunits wttliout tliink~ngabout the security of the rest of t h e ~ rarmy. The Greelts were spearmen; the Persi,lns were bo\vrnen who, even when they fought w ~ t hspears, used shorter weapons t h m the Greeks. The Greeks were artnored and carried large shields; the Perslans for the most part were unarmored and had only small shlelds. The Greelcs were few in number bur "skilled" against "myriads" of "unskilled" Perslans. The Greeks fiere steady but relatively tmniob~le,whtle thetr adversaries were mobile but lack~ngin courage. Leonidas and his men were collected and ruethodical in their last fight, even when they knew that the Immortals would be attack~ng them from the rear at any moment. Tlie captains of the Perstarts instead had to whip their own soldiers with lashes to prevent them froin runnlng aw,~yfrom the battlefield.2'"The Greeks preferred to fight at close quarters, as a t Maratlion and Thermopylae; the Perstans tried to wear down t h e ~ r prey tront a distance, as in sorue stages of the carripalgn and battle of Plataea. The Greeks were free, plous, and c~vll~zed; the Pers~answere unfree, implous, and barbarian. Their hubrls (a hosrile act Iiarmlng a person's o r group's honorXri)brought the punishment of the gods upon The Greeks were exhorted at S a l a ~ n ~tos "bnng freedom" to thelr fatherland,?'$ and a Spartan leader by the name of Amo~npharetuswould defy the order tor withdrawal at Plataea w~tlioutfear of repr~sal;"~the Persian soldlers had to be forced to keep attacking the Spartans at Ther~nopyl,te.~~'
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Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
P a ~ s ~ ~ ndi ~~ dnot l s dare to charge w ~ t h o u tfirst consulting and receiving favorable stgns from the gods;"%he Persians cornln~ttedone sacr~legeafter another: 'They whipped the waters of the I-lellespont when a storlrt destroyed t h e ~ r first br~dge,"'" they def~led Leon~das's body a t Tllern~opylae,~"'they paid no heed to the sacrifices during the last stage of the battle of Plataea,""' and they burned the Ternple of Derneter at Eleus~s."" B L Ithen, ~ no other be11'1\1or could be expected from people who looked, dressed, and behaved differently from the Greel~s.~"They were people who, inordinately nch, had elected gold as thelr rrlaln value against the old Greek value of penzrz, or honest s c a r c ~ t y . ~They ( ' ~ were people who used t h e ~ rwealth for personal luxury. The Athentans, when they recetved the s~lverfror~itheir L a u r i ~ ~rnines, r ~ i used ~t for the good of the colnrnonwealth-to build a strong Furthermore, the Pers~answere ~ l ~ ~ t u r ~ d l y disposed to accept the rule of a despot, not tnen who organ~zedtheir Itves around the structure of the polis. In sum, they were barbarians.""" It the P e r s ~ a ~had l s accepted the rule of law l ~ k the e Athen~ansor the Spartalls had instead of the despot~cpower of a ruler (who himself was in the hands of evil eunuchs and preylng ~ o r r t e n ' ~ they ~ ) , would not have been defeated or inore l~kelythey would not have dared t o i~lv'~de the land of people who were slaves to no one.2h"lie Greeks were men, the Perstans were efferntnate. An oinochoe (vase) probably comrnentorating a Greek victory over the Persians portrays 1' Greek, erect petus In 111s hand, re,ldy t o penetrate 1' Persian bent over and offering his buttocks.'" As Ed~tliHail has recently argued, the ancient Greelzs-Aeschylus especially bur also Hippocrates and others-often represented the Europe-As~adichotomy as a gender opposltion. Asia was the land of effeminate males and was described In thelr works as "fertile, rrtaternal, seductive, raped, possessed sexually, alone, ur2ma7zned." It was "defeated, tamed, bludgeoned, d ~ s ~ ~ r ~and n e dut1nlc~nned , by the men of Athens and the rest of Hellas"-those me11 who respected "equality before the law, freedom, selt-restram, and oura age.""^ When the two s ~ d e met s at Salanl~s,the Greeks inoved to the engagement by s~ngingt h e ~ rholy paean and then shout~ngtheir famous cry for freedom; the Pers~ansanswered with their barbarian "rio~se." The Greek ships surrounded the eneiny ~n un~son;the Persian s h ~ p sd ~ not d help each other. The Greeks attacked; the Persians fled. N o individual Greek was mentioned by narue tor they were defined as a collect~vityand ruernbers of the polis; many Pers~answere ~nentlonedby IIL1me.A11d they were selfish ~nd~vidunls having n o sense of the commonwealth."' This did not rrtean that sorne Greek wrlters, especially I-lerodotus, underpl'xyed the courage or even some of the virtues of the adversary. Actually, Creek presentarkon of the relat~onsh~p between Helienes and Persians was normally based on feelings of both attraction and revtllsion."-? For instance, we are told t h a at Thertnopylae, "i11~1nyof the Medes fell, but oth-
Greeks, Persians, and the Syrnbols of War
77
ers attacked 111 turn; and though they suffered g.rievoiis defeat yet they were not dr~venoff."273 At Plataea, even when the fence of sh~eldscame down, "the battle waxed fierce and Yet Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Diodorus also couched the o p p o s i t ~ obetween ~~ Greeks iind Persians 111 terms of the famllrar against the unfamtl~ar,w ~ t hall the ~mpl~cations tliat this dichotomy suggests. The tnrnilxar was correct, fr~endly,selfless, rewardlng; the unfamiliar was wrong, hostile, sometlrnes rebolting, and always threatening. It was a concept that became one of the mainstays in the description of rnil~taryopponents frorn then on, and it still finds clear application in the modern perlod on both s ~ d e sof the fence-whether the English and Germans in World War I, the Allies and Germans in World War 11, the Aruericans and North V~etnaruese,or the Israelis and Palestinians."" The opposition between Greeks atld Persians would eventually be expressed In two dist~nctthemes, one based o n gllystcal revulsion, the other on ~deolog~cal confrontation. Hippocrates would find the Europeans brave atld w,~rLke,while seelng the Aslatlcs as "less w,~rl~ke" atld "feeblev-not only because they were ruled by lc~ngsbut also and mainly because the ttniforrn~tyof their clinlate rnade the~rtslack-a characteristic that was "food for cow,irdi~e.""~Aristotle, by contr'ist, would look at Persi,ans fro111 the viewpoint of whether war against them was lust or not. Althougl~he felt that wars should he waged only to expand peace and justlce, he also bel~evedthat the only just wars were those wdged by Hellenes c ~ g ~ i ~nonlst H e l l e n e ~ . ' ~It ~is an ~ d e atliat Aeschylus also implies: "0 sons of Greelcs," the lIellenes are exhorted before battle is waged at Salainis, "hring freedorn to your fatherland, bring freedom tolyour children, wives, and seats of your ancestral gods,/and your forebears' graves; now the struggle is for all."L78 .I he contrast between Greeks and Pers~anscontalns a number of other concepts that eventually would be powerful agents in restatrng and reinforcing the key values of Greelc society.L7qThese values were clear throughout the presentation of- the wars but nowhere better expressed than In the accounts of Marathon, Thermopylde, and Salam~s,again because of the ~deolog~cal supremacy of Athenlan culture. That Salamis was given this hor~orshould not be a surprise. 'The battle carue at a dramatic Inornent in the invdsion. The Persi;111s by then controlled north dnd central Greece and were poised for their advance into the Peloponnese. Athens liad been destroyed, and the Atheman citizerls had sought refuge elsewhere. And the enenly fleet greatly outnumbered the Greek fleet. The battle would revolve around one of the great leaders of ant~quity,Themlstocles, who combined cunning with courage instead of having courage alone, like Leonidas. That Thermopylae should have suppl,~ntedPlataea as the most meaningful symbol~cland battle of Xerxes' invaston IS a surprise. Soon after the war, it seems that the contemporaries regarded Plataea as the rrtost iniportant ldnd achieve~nentof the wdrs. Indeed, this was the oplnlon of Plilcidr
-
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Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War
'111d A e s c h y l ~ s . Thts ~ ~ ~ oplnlon, ' however, rnust have chdnged not long after, for tlie new view was already reflected rn Herodotus, who was a young boy of about fc3~1rat the t ~ m eof the two battles. 'The Ffistorirs clearly accepted the Sp'~rtdntradlt~on,w h ~ c hinlpl~esthat this had beco~nethe standard 111terpretatlon by then since Herodorus was not really a frrend of Sparta. His c h o ~ c ewas agaln no surprlsc. By then, Therrnopylae stood not only for Spdrtd's glorificat~onbiit also 'IS the embodiment of the values up011 whlch the rul~ngclasses of each polls founded the legitimacy of thetr rule. Yet the choice of Therrnopylae I S at best qi~estionablefrom the lnilltary v ~ e w p o ~ nItt . is debdtdble whether even the Greeks at the tlnle of the b,~ttle considered Therrnopylae to be crucial to their stand against Xerxes. At that stage, they could not deteat tlie Persians on land; all they could hope for was to delay the enemy's advance. The cho~ceof the location of t h e ~ rstand was poor: The pass could and eventually would be outflanked, The number of soldiers sent there was too srnall. The delay of the ertelny could have succeeded only if success o n land was matched by success at sed. In any case, the delay alone served ltttle purpose. It probably helped to put less pressure or1 the evacuatiorl of Atl~ens,but certainly it did not prevent the Creek cities 111 the path of the Pers~anadvance from rem'unlng loydl to the alltance of Athens and tlie Peloponnes~ans.The castlalties that 1.eonrdas's men inflrcted on the I'ers~ans, evert it we accept I-lerodotus's figure o t 20,000,"i were not suffic~entto alter the strength of the Persian army radlcaily, despite tlie fact that they came from the Persians' best units. In other words, there were nurnerous reasons to regard 'Therntopylae at worst as a failure, at best as a stopgap 111 the rrlil~tarypattern of the Great Wars. But In spite of that, the manner in wlirch a relatively small contingent of Greeks was deteated cotlld serve very well as art expressiort of the rrtost cherished values of the co~nrnutl~ty and even as d nledlls to credte new ones. It 1s thls purpose that Therrnopylae and also Salamis soon served. In the aftermath of the stand at the pass, the battle started to become the syrrtbol of racial v~talitydtld freedom. Anecdotes, tradit~on,and popular legend a11 served t o strengthen and convey the symbol, especially In the emphasrs o n f-reedo~~t.'~~ One of the strong trdditlons thdt cdtne out of the Gredt Wars was the belref that tlie Greeks fought for freedoin, wl~tcliwas understood as the defense of- the institutions of t h e ~ rcity-states against the rule of a monarch. This feel~ngwas expressed over and over again by the Inany co~ltestantsIn the conflrct. Srrnonides of Ceos wrrtes: "The children of tlie Athenians drove out the I'ersiart host and saved their country frorn woefttl serv~tude"; "they chose to le'we I' country green and g ~ wlth y freedom"; they fought to save the pastures of Tegea so that "tlieir dear Greece might not doff freedom from her renowned I~ead.""~Yet nowhere was the fight for freedom better symbol~zedthan at Thermopylde: The Spartans, wrltes Diodorus,
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"were more respollstble for the corntnon freed0111 of the Greeks than those who fought at a later ttme 111 the battles against X e r ~ e s . " ~ ~ ~ 'I'he Idea of the fight for freedom against subjugation was rnixed with a number of other patriotic or c<)n~munltarlan values. The benefit of the particular was elevated to the benefit of the whole community: "At Marathon the Athenians fought tor Greece," writes Sin~onidesof Ceos;"? "with our llves we s,~\edall G r e e ~ e " ; " ~Adlmantus was a person "through whose counsels Greece gut on the crown of freedom";lW '"we strove to crowii Greece w ~ t l lfreed~rn";"~"[the farne ot] these rrten's courage [shall be irnperishdblel forever. . . . For they checked, as footsoldiers l a ~ l don s w ~ f t fartng ships], all of Hellas from [witnesstng the day] of slavery," says a fragment o n an Athenian lnarble relief of the I'erslan Wars.28' When the satety of the whole comrnut~itywas at stake, even r ~ v a icltles, such as Atheny and Sparta, or bitter personal rivals, such as Themi.stocles and Aristides a t Salarni~,?'~) could cooperate wltli each other. Those who let their particular a n ~ m o s ~ t i take e s precedence over the Interests of the community, such as the Medi7ing Greeks In general and the Thebans In particular, were traitors. 'This explains, at lea.;t in part, why the Thebar~sare presented In such a poor light a t Thermoyylae."' After all, thelr c ~ t ywould join the Perstans and fight stubbornly in their support a t Plataea. The true sons of Greece acted differently, not like the Thebans. 'They were obed~ent.At Thermopylae, they kept the post tll'~t Greece had asslgiied them: 1,eonidas deemed it "'unseernly for himself and the Spartans to desert that post which they had first come to detend."'"They were also daring. When t h e ~ rspears broke on the last hillock, they fought w ~ t h swords and finally with fists and teeth.lg3 They were a small band agallist "the hundred ruyriads," they were "not equal in nurnber to even the tliousand p m of the enemy,""" and they stood "agdinst the unbel~evablemultit u d e ~ . " ~They ~ ' caused shock among their enemy: At Thermopylae, Xerxes "thrice sprang up in fear for his army trout the throne where he sat to view them."2" They put honor before d~shonor,giving up thelr own lives "bravely rather than to live sha~nefullp.""~Of the two Spartans who ~ n i tially were left behind, Eurytus, who carne back half-blind t o die with h ~ s comrades, was a hero, and Aristodemus, who rem,~lnedbehind, was a coward.""The warrtors of Thermopylae also set an example for future generations. 'The inscr~ptior~s and the rnonurnent placed at the site of the battle were re~nindersfor p o s t e r ~ t y : ~ ' ~ Four thousand warriors, flower of l'clops' land, Did here against tllrec hundred myriads stand. Herc fouglit and fell Xlegsttas, hero brave, Sla~nbv the aiedcs, who cro\\ed Spcrcheiu5' w~~vc;
Greeks, Persians, and the Symbols of War Well Itncw the seer his doom, but scor~iedto fly, And rather chose with Sparta's king to die.
Ther~nopylaewas a st~mulusfor other Greeks '"to perfor111 sinl~larcourageous e ~ p l o i t s . " ~ ~It' "could not be otherw~se,for these inen "alone of all of whon1 history records, have In defeat been accorded greater tarne than all others who have won the fairest v~ctories." T h ~ sled, in turn, to the belief that not only were the Greek warrlors an exairtple for the future but also that their behavior was greater than anything of the past: "In bravery they would surpass all men of former t~mes." Acrually, their real contest was not against barbarians; rather, they were "in competition with all whom had ever won admiration for their courage."'02 Forty years after Thermopylae, In 440 B.C., the body of Leonldas was brought back to Sparta. A statue was erected in h ~ Iionor, s and the names of the Spartiate casualties were sculpted o n the monurnent. 12 yearly festival, the Leon~dra,would also be held froin then o n In h o ~ l o rof the brave Spartan k ~ n g . ' ~ ) ~ There were also other ele~nerltsin Leon~das'ssanctification. Herodotus's account IS clertr evidence of t h ~ s Fro111 . the beginn~ng,Leon~das1s presented Inore In the manner of a tragic Greelc god than in the fashion of a hurnan being. He is the descendant o f uncornrrton blood, for the highest sy~nbolof human strength i ~ n dbravery, Ileracles, was his an~estor.;"~ FGs behavior follows a strlct moral code: He decides to give up 111s l ~ f ebecause ~t 1s the only way to save his state, or, it we accept the other tradition, he remains there because he 1s obedient to the laws of the Spartan state: "Iy
""
Go tell the Spartans, thou that passest by, That here obedient to their words we lie.
Hir; behavror is portrayed as a model in contrast w ~ t i that i of the traltor Deinaratus, a former Spartan king now in the servlce ot the invader, or of Ephi:tltes, the vile Greek who shows the Persians the oiitflank~ngpath. H e 1s k~lledfiglitrng, and over his body a fierce struggle ensues In the manner of the Honter~cstruggle over Patroclus's body In the l l ~ 0 - d . ~ ~ " It did not nlatter ~ k ,111 the process, h ~ s t o r ~ c fact a l was d~stortedatld histor~calfictron came to the fore. What was ilnportant was to make I,eon~das, a nlan responsible tor an almost stupid strategic and tactlcal dec~ston,into I' hero. It was a celebr~tlonof those killed fight~ngfor their own country, an idea that was strikingly new a t the time and that would later become a mainstay of the Western patriotic henrage. Egyptratls atld Assyrians too had celebrated their battles but with enormous differences. They had glorified therr victories, not both thetr vlctorles and thetr defe<~ts,as the Greelts did; they had elevated their leaders, not t h e ~ rcommun~ty;they h,ad e~nphas~zed the v~sionof the etlemies tra~nyled
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under ttle~rfeet, not the sa~lctlfic~lt~on of t h e ~ rown dead. But w ~ t hthe Greeks came a new patriot~cethic. W~nntng,of course, remained Important, but even more important, one could say, was the idea that tlie soldier performed his d ~ t t yfor the fatherl,~nd.Ile hdd to be glor~ficdand honored to convlnce hirn to d o t h ~ s .He had to accept tlie notion that his blood and h ~ mind s d ~ not d belong to hirn as an individual but to the state. Such a concept is well su~tedto the ruhng classes of m y state, i ~ n d~tis no surprise that ~t would survrve pract~cailyunchallenged untrl World War 1, when class awareness finally becaine w~despreadenough tor the challenge to exlst and survlve. It 1s also no surprise t h ~ the t collect~verecollect~onsof the Spartan state and of the Iiistorians who followed its tradition were [narked by selective memory. Three groups were to be excli~dedfrom these recollections: the people who had been cowards 111 front of a common enemy, the polit~caltraltor7, and those wlio d ~ dnot belong socially. The exclusion of people who behaved d~~brously or1 the battlefield, such as the Megarians and Phllastans at PlatC3ea,or of p o l i t ~ c ~diss~dents, ~l such as the Thebans, could only be temporary; a later writer, Plutarch, would see that tlie accttsations against the Corinthiaris at Salamis and other Greeks at I'lataea would not relnaltl u t ~ c h ~ ~ l l e t l g eThe d . ~ ~exclus~on '~ of people for soclai reasons, such as the inferior perioeci, Spartans without citizenship, and the very ~ n f e r ~ o r helots, who were alrnost slaves of the Spartan cornrrtunit), would be final. Their ~ n c l u s ~ owould n hake lneallt that the SpdrtG3nstdte belonged to them too. For this reason, the names placed on the monnment a t Sparta were only those of the 300 Sp,xrtrates, the "true" heroes of Tl-ter~nopylae. Yet, although the Gre,~tPers~anWars served to define the values of the Helienes v~s-a-visthe rest of the world, they d ~ not d strengthen the political tles between the various c~ties.Actually, the leaders of tlie Great Wars, Athens i ~ n dSpixrta, woiild soon be a t each other's throat. Ag'lin, however, their wars would be the arena of the people who owned the state. The rest ot the population either would be spectators or would particrpate only under the most stringent condlt~onsand for 1' temporary per~od.
Chapter Four
Rich, Poor, and the Wages of War at the End of the Classical Period "Yoli z f ~ chridless, e Fparnrr~oird~~s," t l ~ r ycrred biirsttrlg ruto tears. To ti~rs he re[~lrni," N o , b y Zmts, or2 the corztrcrry 1 leazle hek~z~rti two dailghtcrs, I,cuctm nrzd Ma~ztnz~la, nzy i/rctones." l%en when the spear was u~rtl7drau~ir/fi.onz 171s chest1 zvrtk~outconzniotrorz hc brc.at/~rdjils last. -Diodoru~ SicuIuc XV.87.5-6
Sailors and Social Status The great confrontation with the Persian Elngtre should have taught the Greeks the crucial ilrtportarlce ot sea power and the wisdorn of including light 111fantry 111 the right co~ldit~ons. After 1' 11, Sa1,trrtis had beet] the key turning point of the Great Wars, and o n a t least one occasion, when the Athen~anhoplites had relieved the besieged Megariar~sat Placaea, archers had shown how useful light infd11try could be 1t1 the right situation. Yet for the remainder of the fifth century R.C. and for most of the fourth, warfare o n Greek so11 rentained the privileged dornain o f the heavy infantryman. It was not only 1' matter of the conserv,1tism typical of '211 m i l ~ t ~ dristocrd~ry cies but also the natural outcome of a societal arrangement in whtch prestige in the army was equated with proinirler~ceIn public 11fe.That ~t was so was shown, for iIlstallce, by the contempt that the Greeks had even for 1' branch of t h e ~ rown military power, the navy, that had been cructai against the Persians. Neverrheless, the navy wotlld ensure Athens's dominance during the early stages of the Pelopo~lneslanWar.
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8.3
It could be '~rguedthdt the c o ~ ~ d ~oft csea t warfare etlt'111ed great prC%ctical difficulttes. Tlie elegantly slender Greek warslilp, the trlrerne, could be eas~ly and quickly constructed. In a per~odof probably less than two years, between 483-482 and September 480 B.C., the Athenians built about 200 trtrenies. In 260 R.( ., the Roman Du~ltuswas able to larrnch 160 ships 117 30 days. SIXyears later, the Romans built another 220 warships In 3 rnonths.' Yet the structure of the tr~remes, no re than the hurry ln whlch they were bu~lt,nieant that they were In constant need of repair.' For Instance, the trirernes of the Athentan Nic~ashad become useless as a weapon of attack by the f'tll of 414, a year after t h e ~ rdep'lrture from Athetls to Syr,tci~se.~ Trirenies were light and quick, and tinder the right cond~tions,tlie~rrams could eas~lyd~spatchan erlerny slilp t o the bottom of the sea. Yet this function ,~lsoput the safety of the '~ttacklngshlp into ~ e o p ~ ~ r Of d y .274 ships lrsted tn the Athenian Inventortes from 377-376 R.(. to 323-322 R.( ., 15 trtreines had surlk due to the vagartes of- the weather, 115 had t o be refitted, and only 19 were 111 proper condltlotl to take the s e ~ Moreover, . ~ trirelnes were usually too crowded, wtth about 200 people, mostly rowers, In a boat about 40 meters long and between 3 and 6 rueters wides Thelr structure and crowded cond~tionslneCmtthdt the warshlps h'td to hug the coastl~neand that tliey needed the land as much as the water. Crews had to beach t h e ~ rboats at n ~ g h tIn order to cook their meals or to escape froin the tenslon of their close quarters. Those who crafted the ndval po11cy of the major sea power of Hellas, Athens, clearly recogni~edt111s need when they estahl~shedcontrol over a string ot tlases, one next t o the other, to sateguard the co~n~nunication llfellne during the Peloponnes~anW x h It IS reasonable to asstime that, i f the fleet planned to use boarding as the ruain ruodc of attack, the number of- marines aboard each ship could easily h'tve been i i ~ c r e ~ ~ sfrom e d the tradit~onallyaccepted 10 to 14 plus 2 to 4 archet-s.~In unusual circumstances, the number of combatants could even reach aboiit 45 hoplttes, 1 0 archers, and 10 peltasts it tile goal was not bo,qrding but to outflank a land Yet this irlust have been rare. So many marines must have meant fewer rowers, w h ~ c hprobably made a sli~p unstahle and less rnaneuverable and thus an easter prey. When the Greeks used their crews in lLandoperdtlons, the usual p'tttern was to move the irlen In small parties, close to t h e ~ rboats, and they were unwillrng and unable to tackle large land forces." I-fowever, there I S no doubt that the navy could stlll play crucial roles in the waglng of &,IS in antiqu~ty.The ebents , ~ t Plataea are ~ncnnce~vable, for ~nstance,w ~ t h o u tthe success a t Salam~s. Sornet~mes,the Greeks too recognl~edthe Importance of t h e ~ rsea power. When Pencles' Athens bec,~melocked in the c o ~ l f r o n t a t i oag'11nst ~ ~ the Sp'trtans, for example, Athenian leaders consciously akandoned any plan to face t h e ~ renemy or] l m d and relled instead on control of the sea, not only for survival but also for v~ctory.They were e~entuallydefeated only when,
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c ~ m o i other ~ g things, Athenlail sea power had beell crushed-pdrtly as I' long-term restilt of an 111-advised expeditton to Sic~lyand partly because Athens itself finally rnet defeat on the seas, at the liarlds of the landlocked Spdrtdns, w ~ t hPersian help. Yet even ainong the Athenians, any recognition of tlie lrnportance of tlie sea was short-llved. Actually, tlie ancrents (Plato and Aristotle, for tnstar~ce)saw Athens's reliance on the sea not as a slgn of its strength but as evidence of ~ t xnor'd s and political disintegration.'" Fundamentally, the problem was not the role played by tlie navy but the way In which the ships were manned. The triremes i11w~1yscotltdi~le~i a few nleinbers of the rullng groups among the officer$.[' In emergencies, even I~oplitescould be enllsted in the humble role of rowers. Certainly, this could liave beer) the case during the Second Persian War. Otherwise, why were there no Athenians at Thermopylae? Also, III 428 R.(:., 1,000 Athenran hoplites rowed thetr ships to Mytilene.'"r~d of course, all of the ruarines, but not the archers,'? belonged to the s a n e class as the hophtes.I4 Yet the 170 rowers or so out of the 200 lnen in each s l i ~ pwere Atlien~anc1t17ensof the lower classes (at least in the years following the I'ers~an Wars), metzcs (that is, alien residents w ~ t hlimited civic rlghts), or slaves (as was incre,~slnglycorrlinon by the fourth ~ e n t u r y ) .Rtit ' ~ in all cases, the state could not let the humble rowers have their share of military glory. There was always the danger that they could translate such glory into civil prominence. If that happened, they, the landless people, could liave become a threat to those who considered land ownership as tile greatest goal of any citi~enand war as the prlvilege of tlle~rclass. L ~ k emost Western soclctles until recent tlmes,'%ncient Greece regarded land property as tlie h~ghestform of social status.
Spartan Society Athens a r ~ dits arub~guousatt~tudetoward the navy are zniportant In terrns of pointing out the mo~lopolyof the nleLlilsof warfare that was exercised by lnen of property. Rut there 1s no better example of tlie supremacy of tlie heavy hoplite durllig the fifth and ruost of the fourth century B.O. than in the soci'11 and lnilltary arrangelnent of Spart'xn society. 1,acedaemonian soclety was d~vrded~ n t othree matn levels: the free citlLens or Spartlates; the perioeci, ~nhabitantsof the si~rrourldingterritortes (I.e., free subjects who lacked the prlvilege of citizenship); and the helots, whose status was s ~ t n ~ lto a r that of the med~evalserf-that IS, they were not quite slaves but were tied t o the land they worked and possessed very few r~ghts.Spdrta '11so ~ncluded,111other group of people whose social status remains unclear-persons of Spartiate orgin who had lost their ctt~zensliip elther l~ecausethey d ~ not d o\vn a particular estate (kleros) or because they were unable to contribute t h e ~ rshare of food to the communal mess (syssz-
Rich, Poor, and tC~eWages of War
8.F
tza or phiditra). Both the kleros ,111d the s y s s l t ~were ~ essellt~alelements of Spartan clt17enshlp. All Sparrlates followed a rlgorous life pattern that began at b ~ r t hand was des~gnedt o cre,ate good c~t~zens."At b ~ r t h ,the c h ~ l dwas taken by 111s father to the lnagrstrates of the state, the ephors. If tlie c h ~ l dwas thought to be unhealthy, the ephors left htm to d ~ e If . the cli~ldwas deemed healthy, the state fiould remove h ~ mfroin his family at the age of seven and take over h ~ seducatron u n t ~ lthe age of th~rty.At twenty, he was allowed to marry, but the state st~llrequired hlm to ltve not with h ~ wrte s but In barracks w ~ t h ~ male s fr~eads.By then, he had also reached the age for being a sold~ecAt th~rty,he became a free cttlzen and could ltve at home, b r ~ the sttll had to eat his meals wlth h ~ ruale s fr~erldsIn publ~cmesses, to which he contributed $1 1no11thly share of barley, cheese, figs, and filne. Thls system had two alms-to drstlnguish the Sparttate from the rest of soclety and to foster In htm those physical and emotional cliaractertst~cstypical ot a good sold~cr-a strong body, a fidrhke sp~rit,a sense of camaradene, ,111d the h a b ~ of t obedience. N o Spartlate had to worry about hls Ilvel~hood,tor each was the hetr of the kleros that had previo~~sly been allotted to one of 111s ancestors. The kleros, w h ~ c hcould not be sold, passed from father to son and could be divided or, In some cases, given away, probably ~t the o\vner had n o he~r. Also, all attelnpts were n u d e to shelter the Spartrate from the temptat~ons of matertal acqulsltlon. h'elther stlver nor gold colnage was allowed In the state. Instead, old and heavy Iron colns were used as rnoney.IXBut the state went further than p r o h ~ b ~ t ~the n glnlntrtlg of s~lverand gold, for the Spartlate could not own any precious metal coins even from other states, althotlgh the proh~bitionltkely dtd not extend to the posscss~onof s~lverand gold objects. Moreoker, the Sparti,ate cltlzen fids forb~ddento engage 111 trade or commerce, the prtv~legeof the perroecr.'" All this meant that, stnce helots worked his land, the Spartlate could dedicate his letsiire t l n ~ eto gymnastlcs In order to strengthen hls body and to the dr~llsof the warrior. The state's goal was to temper the body and toughen the ~ n l n dof the Spartlate frorri h ~ searllest age. The chtld ot sever) was allowed only one gamment 111 all seasolls of the year; he had to sleep on a bed of straw; 111s food was the s~rnplestgossrble and just enough to sustaln h ~ m and ; he had to show rnoderat~onin drtnking when wine was allowed later on In 11te.At the saIne time, he was s ~ ~ b j eto c t complete subord~n~atron to sotrleone else at all stages In life-when a c l ~ ~ l to d , 111s tutor; when a young man, to h ~ ses ruors; when a mature ruan, to the rrlag~strates.~~ As ~t can be eas~lyd~scernedIn any group assoclarkon from the playground of preschool ch~ldrento the football and soccer fields, tlie sen5e of caruaraderte IS a powerful agent In the rnilltary perforr~ianceof a n ~ n d l v ~ d uai. And c a ~ n a r a d e r ~was e 1' constant feature of the Spartan state-from the
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open o r Idtent homosexual tles, whlch seern to hdve developed between children and their peers or tutors, to the Spart~ates'beliavior a t every level ot I~fe.They ate in public messes;" they could disciplrne another parent's chrldre11;~~ they sh'tred t h e ~ rhorses and hunt~rrgdogs and t h e ~ rc ~ t c hfrom the and they used eacli other's slaves." Jt was a pattern re~nforced b y both negative and positive sanctions. 'The coward who did not follow the group would be pun~shedin the ~ n o s tcruel method of all-by beltlg shunned by the rest of society. No one wanted to be seen with a man who had been ostracized or to eat with him or to play with him. It t e a m were rnade, he was the odd man out; he had to abandon hls seat ln favor even of a junior; In the streets, he had to give way to others; and at home, he was forced to live a lonely life withour a wite, hss sister w ~ t h o u at husband." H e could 11ot hold office, hls metnbershiy to the corntnunal rrless was ended, he was forced to wear a cloak of distinctive pattern with coiored patches, and he had to shave one side of his beard." Even when he redeemed himself, as d ~ Ar~stodemus d who had not fought at Thermopylae bec~tiiseof a n eye 311ment but who fought w ~ t l courage i at Plaraea, he still would not receive the praise that his action deserved." By contrast, the people who conformed to socleta1 rules recerved the prarse and the esteem of peers and of the state, l ~ k ethe Thermopylae warriors. Moreover, tlie~rbeliavior was a source of inspiration for the rest, and they recesved the trappings that all castes try t o glve t o thelr members, fro111 the generals' uniforms and t ~ t l e sof the Napoleonic armies to the uniforms of the Itairan Fascist youth groups to the typical Spartiate attire-a red cloak (a garment with the "least resentblance to women's clothrng and [the] most surtable for w,1r"), a bronze shield (it would pol~shqu~cklyand tarn~slislowly), and long hair ( " ~would t make then1 look taller, rnore dignified and ruore t e r r i f y ~ n g " ) . ~ ~ The Spartrates were even wlllirlg to rewrite the most tr,~ditlon,ll soc~etdl and farntl~alarrangements rn their attempt to create and sustaln the perfect citizen-sold~er.For exaruple, steal~ngfood, a harshly punished crime In 111ost tradltrorlal socletles, w,~sencour,~gedarnong the young to he~ghten thetr warllke spirit. They were punished only ~f they were cauglit because it rneant that they had not beer) clever enough."' The acqiiisition of money and the conducting of business, w h ~ c heven a rnost aristocr,~trcsociety such as feudal Europe had to accept, were forbtddei~to all Spart~atesso that the 1~1reof rnoney and the luxuries that gold could provide would not polson therr x n ~ n d s .The ~ ~ ) re'trlng of children, usually one of the most cherished, d difficult, pr~vilegesof family liv~ng,was talten up by the state. Their education was left to older members of the Spartiate class, not to tutors as in other Greek citres." In a land where a womC~n'sfidellty was sacred and where the greatest injury would be suspicions about one's own paternal roots, the ties between husband and wife were tenuous since the mail's whole llfe was geared toward clllegrance to h ~ rnale s peers; It was also
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proper for a xnan to ask soineone else's w ~ f eto bear his own chlld, wit11 her husband's consent.32 If a relative survived a 1n111tarydtsaster, there was no joy but great d~stressantong the relatibes left at horne. It was a dlfkerent natter for those whose sons, father, or brothers "had fallell where they stood."They "went about ltke victors, wtth shtning countenances and full of exultatton In their own i n ~ s f o r t u n e . "111 ~ ~a land that would be the foundatioil of Western civihz'~tion,Sparta, once the birthplace of the great lyrical poet Tyrtaeus, became barren of culture, limiting ~ t contribut~ons s to festivals, contests, and Olylnprc Ltke rnentbers of all socteties wlth their ~nirldsset on the pursuit of a single, o~erwhelminggoal (for illstance, sixteenth-century Anabapt~stsor the people in some of the post-Leri~n stages ot Col~~lnunist Russia), the Spart~atesfollowed a cor~sciouspol~cyot ai1t1-~ntellectu~~l~s~n. The Spart~ates,who called the~nselveshomozoi (that is, peers or equals) in appearance were theoret~callya harnton~oussociety, In realrry, however, as M. I. Finley has a r g ~ ~ e dterlsions ,~' aild anornle (a breakdowi~of conl~notilyaccepted soc~alnorms and values) upset t h e ~ rsoctety. The soclety of equals actually had a butlt-tn system for creating ~nequal~ties. Two of tts members were unequal at birth because they would becorne kings; others were more powerful than the rest because of their age (the gerousza, the council of 28 elders, was open only to people over the age of 60); sorrte would be unequal because of t h e ~ rgreater wealth; ,111d others would perform better in their role as c i t ~ ~ e t i - s o l d i e r ~ . ~ W o r e oboth v e r , external and internal factors created a nulnber of tensions. Take, tor Instance, the prohibition against owning gold and silver coins. It was extremely hard for any anctent arrny to d~sregardthe lure of booty, and the Spartiares were n o exception." And I T is rather ironic that the same soclety that forbade the ownersh~pof gold and silver coins should acqilirc a reputation for avdrlce and greed in the rest of G r e e ~ e . 'Moreover, ~ Sparta's vlctory in the Peloponnesian War brought untold riches to the city tn 404 ~r.(,.,'~ whtch likely created new strains between rich and poor. Finally, the Sp'trtiates were a snlc~ll minortty in thelr own state: 1,000 hoplttes in a land that could sustaln 1,500 horsemen and 3,000 heavy ~ntantrymen,accord~ngto A r ~ s t o t l e . ~ ~ ' And even if we d~scountthese figures, fihich referred to Sparta's decline 111 the later part of the fourth century, and move back to the fifth century, sell1 the largest force that the Spartans could ratse d u r ~ n gthe tintes ot sertous per11 in the Great Persian Wars totaled 8,000 hoplites in 480, reduced to 5,000 the year after at Plataea.4' At Leuctra, the battle that ended Sparta's hegemony over Greece, there were only 700 Spartiates,4hthe same number present Inore than a century later, in 243.4' This development was Inevitable since the d y n a ~ n ~ of c s Spartan soctety worked agalnst the renewal of the clttLen The divlsion of the kleros alnong all descendants, including f e n ~ ~ ~ lxneant e s , than in the longer run,
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fewer dtld fewer people could contr~buteto the communal rness, resulting in loss of therr cttlzenshtp status. The sittlat~onbecame very serious because Spartan policy did not change wrtli tlie passrng of tlnte. Instead, Sparta tended to make the conserv'ulve I ~ w sestabl~shedIn the d ~ s t a n tpdst even more strtngent. Mllitary success became a curse because of the destabrlizrng ~nfluxof new money and the corrupting ~nflllerlceof contacts with the ours ~ d eA . case In p a n t IS Pc~usG~~lsds, who, dfter h15 victory at Pldtaed, e~ljoyed a lrfestyle of personal self-glor~ficationand hrgh Irving, qurte different from the sober I~festyleof- a Spartan in his own ~ t a t e . ~The ' s~tuationforced Spdrtd to ddopt two approaches-on one hand, t o resort t o the nonc~tizen perloecl and at times to the d~spossessedhelots to meet ~ t n1111tary s needs and, on the other, to be in a continual state of- tnternal v~gilanceagainst the same groups of people, especially the helots. Thls also xneant that fihdt was potentrally the most warl~lzesoctety of ancient Greece showed ent~rmousreluctance to wage war. 'l'he erlelrty wzthin, whether In the torn] o f the helots or of the permecl, was Inore feared thdn the enemy w~thoiit.And the fedr was often warranted, as the revolts of the helots of mid-460 and 370 would prove.4h At tintes, the fear assurned paranoid proportions, as seen In the rn'lssxre of 2,000 helots d u r ~ n gd dangerous stage of the Peloponnesi,ln War. The Spartans had prom~sedc ~ t ~ z e n s hto~ pall those lielots who had served bravely In the war, and two thousand of them stepped torward to c1d11n the reward. In d mock ceremony, probably to cairn t h e ~ rfedrs, gdrlands were placed on their heads. Then the helots were taken away and secretly executed. The Spartan goal must have been t o eltrn~natethe rnost amblt~oiisand r r l ~ l ~ t a r ~d'lngerous ly subjects ln thelr midst 111 ,I mornent of external danger for the state.47 The ~nequalrtzesand tenszons that beset Spartan soclety clearly show that the ruling classes' ~nonopolyof w'lrfare was jealously g u ~ r d e d even , when more prudent considerations should have dlctated an open gol~cyon the parr of the Spartiates both to lesser) tlie potential o t ~nternaldisorder and t o incre'tse their power 111 de'11ings abrodd. Yet by the begi~lnrngof the fourth century, there were forces afoot In Greece that would wealten the relationship between soc~alstatus and rrirlztary role, result~ngin new arrangements by the end of the century.
The Mercenary System Mercenarres were not a new pilenormenon in Greek society. The tyrants of the archaic period, before the Great Persian Wars, had often used them, especially as their personal guard. Mercen'lries, however, had played n o role in tlie Greek armies during the great confrontations against D a r ~ u sand Xerxes. It was in the dramatic conflict of the I'eloponnesian War, when Greek cities eng'lged in mutual slaughter from 431 to 404 l$.(:., that the
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~ n e r c e ~ l ~ ~appeared ries In i~~creas~ngly grexer ~lumbers.~TThey were at least 20,000 111 the eastern ,Mediterranean alone by the ni~ddleof the fourth century and about 50,000 In the arlny of Alexarlder the Great in 329.4YEventually, they would const~tutethe core of tlie I i e l l e ~ l ~ s ,~rmies."' t~c Th~s would have Important repercussions not only In the relatkonsh~pbetweeti the military and soclety but also in the act~ialconduct on the battlefield. A lnercellarp &'IS a d~fferentspecles from the c~t~zen-soldier of the Perstan Wars, He had no stake In the land that htred htm. The land, tlie houses, the women and ch~ldrendld not belong to hint. Whatever he o\vrted followed h ~ r non the bc~ttlefield-his woman or h ~ n1' s 1le lober, h ~ possess stons, h ~ money. s HISallegiance as a cltlzen, if lie st~llwas one or if lie st~ll telt any attachment to hts homeland, was usually d~rectedtoward a state far aw.~y. C~tizen-soldiers(or at least some of them) ,~lsofought for the profits that war mtght brtng them, yet their main concern must always have been defending thetr freedolrt and the freedom of t h e ~ relatives. r The mercenary had 110 deals of t k ~ sL ~ n d :Me fought for h ~ wages s and for the prospect that the enemy's defeat would result In the acqu~sttionof booty. 'The rrtilitary duties of the citizen-soldier who fought as hoplrte were rather s~mple.Of course, the sclme was true of the lnercetldry who 11'1d the role of hoplite. More Itkely, however, he was a spectaltst. HIS trade was to make war, and he usually cor~cer~trated on activ~ticsthat either requ~reda great de'll of train~ng,such '1s w~eld~rlg the sling or the bow, or were assoc~ated with low soctal prestlge on tlie battlefield.5' Mercenartes came frot~lall parts of the Medtterranear~bastn (Crete, Rhodes, S~c~ly, the BL~le,lricIslands, S o r t h Africa), from n1~11nl~1nd Greece (Acarnan~a,Achaea, Sparta), or from areas farther inland (tlie Russian steppes or the lands of the Persian Empire). As G. 7: Cr~ffithargues, at least three c o ~ ~ d ~ t ~must o t l sexlst for the ernergence of mercen,lries: war or the prospect of war, conimunit~esw~llrngto pay for the servlces of Illred practit ~ o r ~ e of r s vrolence, and ind~viduals\villing to k11I for causes that are not ~deologicallytlle~rs.~Qllthree condit~onsex~sted111 the Creek world of the later part of the fifth century and the eariter part of the fourth. The defeat of the I'ersian host at I'lataea in 479 IS.<,. brought tour decades of peace to the Greek states, but from 431 onfidrd, pr'~ctlcdlly no year passed without a tnajor confront at lot^ on the Greek mainland, o n the seas surround~ngit, or in the distant colonies of southern Italy. At first, the nlajor contestants were Athens and Spdrta, w ~ t hthe latter end~ngas the winner by 404. Soon after, a new clty emerged to challenge Spartan hegemony over Greelc soctety. Frorn 395 15.0. to 362 IS.(., Thebes Inet Sparta over and over again on the battlefield, ending surpr~s~ngly w ~ t ha Theban victory In t\vo great battles-1,euctra In 371 &.C. and Mantlnea nlne years later. War alone did not r~ecessartlyinvolve the use of mercenaries. Armed confl~cthad been e~ldernicto Creek soclety froin the very beg~nn~ng, whether
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there WAS an outs~deenetny or 11ot. Why, then, d ~ d~t now become open t o outsiders? Tlie wars waged before the armed confltct between Atliens and Sparta had usually followed a pattern that brought a rrtininturn of d~sruptlon to peoples' llves. Wars had beet1 const,~nt,but they typ~callyhad been waged a short dlstance from the clty-state, during the gerlod In which the cititer~could combine o r at least juggle without 111 effects his duties as a sold ~ e with r h ~ ecollomlc s and fam~lyroles. Moreover, although wars had been constant, they had not lasted for long periods of time. For Instance, the first Great Persian War had ended with one battle at Maratlion. The Second Persian War h ~ lasted d 1 ' llttle less than two ye'lrs, at least as fought on Creek soli. The theater of war betwee11 Athens and Sparta encompassed rnost of tlie Mediterranean and lasted twenty-seven years. It was one thing to fight br~eflya few k~lo~neters from one's land and qulre another to be away from one's family for years, at d~stancesthat must have seemed Emrnense in the ancient world. Moreover, ~t was one thing to fight next to the city walls on flat land that emphas~zedand strengthened the chC~racter~stlcs of the heavy infantryman and quite another to confront the enemy o n terrain unsuited to an arrnored sold~erholding a spear. More men were needed than the sm,~llGreek states could posslbly provide, as well as people able and willrng to fight in a manner different f r o ~ nthat of clashing phalanxes. Still another factor was necessary tor the emergence of a mercenary system on a large scale-the ava11,lblhty of nlen will~tlgto leave thelr homelands for the sake of profits as gractit~onersof organ~zedviolence. The career ot arins has always prov~dedtascination tor sorne groups of people, from Xenophon's Ten Thous'~nd,figktmg In the heartland of the Perslali Empire, to the superficially ro~nanticFrench Fore~gn1.eglon. Occas~onally, the profess~onattracted adventurers and members of the upper classes, such as Xenophon. Yet, according to Gnffith, advertturers who "m~ghtoccaslonally prefer to do sometliing dangerous ratlier than d o nothtng at all"" were rather rare in Greece, although thrs was not necessarily true In lands outs~dethe perlnteter ot Creek pol~tlcaland c~~ltilral co~ltrol,such as the Ralear~cIslands, Thrace, and Nortli Africa. There were a number of pol~ttcal exiles among Xenophon's Ten 'Thousand, but again, political reasons seem not to have been the n ~ o s powerful t st~mulusfor the creation of a mercetlary f ~ r c e . Econom~c '~ pressure or financial greed, coupled with the availabrl~tj~ of an expanding rnarltet In the protession ot arins, was prohahly the rrtost Irnportant factor in providing a steadlly lncre'lslng supply of Inercelldry forces. At least In Att~ca,the fourth century brought economlc displacement and pressure.'? 14t the beginning of the Peloponnesian W r , I'ericles had reali~ed that the only way Athens could rrlatch Sp'lrta's rn~l~tar-y prowess was by conceding the control of Athen~anland to tlie enemy, while keeping control of the seas. Such an approach liad worked well tor rnany urban Athen~ansslnce, unl~kethe Spartans, they could still galn great wealth froin trade cl~ldfrom
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the profits of imperial control. But others, especi,llly the sinallest la~ldowners among the agricultural~sts,would reap no such benefits. V~ctorDavis Hansor~has strongly argued that the impact of crop devastdtlon was less harsh theail o r ~ g i ~ l ~tllo~ight, ~lly at least In terrns ot last~ng darnage.'VCrain could be burned only In early summer; otherw~se,it had to be CLIC down, whlch ~rnplieda long, labonous process-a taslc not always easy to acco~nplishfor ~ n o s armies. t Olive trees could be destroyed only if uprooted; otlierw~se,they would resume production w i t h ~ nsix or seven years. And gnen the obstacles that nature prov~dedor man b u ~ l to t halrtper the destructive c ~ ~ tot~ ellenly o i ~ armies, crop d'lmdge must normally have been more lrrn~tedthan ortginaliy thought. Farming in Attica, for instance, resumed soon after or ever1 before the end of host~l~ties." I wonder whether Hdnson's argument might ~ p p l ynot only to the large or med~urn-wedfariner but also to the small landowner, for whom even the loss of few vrnes and a few o11ve trees must have been a serlous matter. F ~ r s of t all, as Manson s,~ys,the psychologicdl d ' ~ m ~ ~must g e have been profound. One solut~onwould have been to find some cap~tal,replant the olive trees and vines that had been damaged, and watt for the rnornent when the output ot these cash crops coiild ag'un glve the small l,~ndowner$1modest Irving. The problem, however, was that t h ~ sapproach needed cap~talInvestruent and a long tirne-factors that prevented any positive solution at least 111 the short run. A six- or seven-yex del'ly before resurnlng production for the vines and olive trees would be an economlc eternity in most socletles, especially in a p r e i r l d ~ ~ s t r ~environruent al where resources were scarce. Moreover, it 1s likely that the f'lrnler of the tlrne was also faced by other changes beh~ndhis control. Cereals, w h ~ c could l~ sttll be grown whtie he w a ~ t e dfor the vlnes and o11ve trees to grow, were ~mportedcheaply trom non-Greek l'tnds. Another alterndt~vefiould hdve beet1 to forget h ~ land s and to turn 111sattention to trade and industry, but here again, probably I I ~ part because of cultural reasons, the trarlsxttorl must have been much harder thdn ~t seems. Thus, for many, the career of arms fids p r ~ b d b l ythe best solut~on.They could learn as they proceeded. Moreover, there were ~nunediategains. T h ~ spattern was repeated over and over again In rrlost poor warlike societies, from antlqu~tyto at least the Ren,a~ssanceperiod. That mercenary gay was not h~gherthan the lowest pay In c ~ v l i ~ aI n~ f ewas not an F ~ r s tof all, even the lnost rnental occupations rrlust have beet1 rather scarce 111 an economy ravaged by war. Second, the most prosperous economy of all gre~ndustr~al states could provlde only a few jobs. l ' h ~ r d ,pay was just a part of the lnercenar~es'ecorlorrlic gains since they would also receive prizes it they d~stlng~ushed thenlselves on the bilttlefield and a share of the booty.j9 'I'he ~nclusionof paid sold~ers,who were not fight~ngtor ideals and had no stdke 111 the state that they were serviilg except tor monetary gm1, tended
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to erode the jealously guarded pr~vilegethat hdd made tlle role of warrior an extension of the role of c t t ~ z e n .The ~ ~ ' full Impact of this development would occur later, yet 11was felt by the early fourth century in tlie increasing tendency of cttlzens to regard t h e ~ rxn111tdry servlce ds a11economic, not a a v ~ c , functton. For Instance, In 383, Sparta paid as a matter of course the soldiers of the confederacy that tt headed.6' But tt was not only a ruatter ot pay slnce sold~ers,even betore the fourth century, had recelved some fin,~nc~'~l compensation for thetr service. The use of merceiiaries on a grand scale also meant that tlie occasional generals of the fifth century tended to becorrle permanent. T h ~ must s have seemed ,I welcome lnnovatlon in the ' ~ t f a ~ of r s war. Tlie quick trirnover of elected generals, whtch had been the case everywhere except in Sparta where the kings were usually the generals, otten meant that tlle leadersh~pwas inadeyu~te.People such '1s M ~ l t ~ a d ert11d s Them~stocles had been the exception, not the rule. Tlie mercenary leaders of the fourth century would show that the extended leadership o t one Inan could be more effect~veIn waging &Jr. Effic~encym d the ~dedlsot democracy often d ~ not d mix. Granttng ~ n t l ~ t a rleadersli~p y to a person for a long tlrne eroded tlie concept of both democratic and oligarchtc government in tavor of some form of 'Iutocr'Icy. The etllergetlce of states w ~ t hone-n~~~n-rule systems, such as the Macedonia of Phlltp and 111s son Alexander the Great, must be seen both as a reflection ot the abiltty of strong rulers and as the logtcal outcome of a process begun by tlle co~ldott~eri of the fourth century."" Tactically too the ~nclustonof mercenaries opened new goss~btlit~es for the business of waging war. 'The actions ot some ot these pald warrtors violated the main rules of hoplite wartare. The rrlercenarles preferred mob111ty to mass, broken terrali? 117steadof the open fields next to city walls, and self-reliance ruore than the trust ot cornruunity spirit. It I S not a surprtse that before the fourth centur); most Greek battles were rather str'ughtforward encounters, In whtch one army type, the heavy ~nf,lntryman,was preernlnent. Ever1 ~f ava~lable,other arrny types could be ne~tliercontrolled nor eds~ly~ntegratedInto the bCattleplan. But rnercenanes, being mostly hghter soldiers, had less need to rely o n a system In wlilch the whole was paramount and the unit unimportant. This made possible a more irnaglnatne use of ditferent utiits and weapons m d probably ~ n d ~ c a t ethe d road to follow to the great Theban general Epaminondas and most of all to Ph~lipand especially Ale~ander.~' The trurh is that the daring possibil~tiesopened by the ~nclusionot mercellarles remained unt'tpped for rrlost ot the first half of the fourth century. It was very hard for citrzen-soldiers to accept a system that qilestroned their ownership of the state and could also spell the end t o t h e ~ rright to wage and profit from war. Yet the d r ' ~ r n ~ collapse ~ t ~ c ot the Invtnc~bleSpartans o n the island of Sphacrer~aIn 425 R.('. had clearly shown that, In certain condittons, light tntantry could be ernployed not only tor specialist actlvltles but also to defeat the heavy hopl~te.
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Hoplites and Light Illfantrymen The engagement that p ~ t t e dAthenians and Spartans in 425 ILL. on the coast of Messenra, on the western side of the Peloponnese penrnsula, h,ad begun like a cat-and-mouse game. The Atlien~anshad been the prey a t the beginning, but after deteat~ngthe Spartan navy, they had turned into the hunter. The Spartan hoplites and helots, who had l'xnded on the rs1,tnd of Sphacter~ato cut down any Athenian who t r ~ e dto escape the Spartan navy from the neighboring coast, were now trapped. The Spartan plan, like the Persians' landlng a t Psyttaleia during the battle of Salamls, had gone awry, but the Athenians of the Peloponnesian War thought twlce before repeating the action that had brought the destruct~or~ of tlie I'crsians on the small Greek island 111 480 1 3 . L For one thing, Sph'lcteri'a was blgger than Psyttaieia, and the terrain was more rugged and covered by trees and shrubs that seemed to provsde opportunity tor innumerable arubushes; for another, SpC1rtc1nswere of 1' different mettle t h m the rnore lightly armed Pcr~lans.~" For the moment, the Athenians decided to blockade the island and starve the Spartans into subrniss~onsince it was known that the island had no source of food i ~ n dthat even the water was "'brack~sh."" The blockade would last 7 2 days,""roken by a 20-day truce. During the truce, the Spartans d~spatcheda rnrssion to Athens suing for peace, and the Athenians let In a llmrted amount of food (b'lrley, flour, wine, and some med") for the starving Spartans on tlie island. The request for peace went nowhere, and the Athenians tightened t h e ~ rblocl
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rnade any landlng clulte d~fficultslnce cl~ffsand rugged terrain lunlted possible landing spots for the A t h e i i ~ a n s . ~ ~ Two things helped the Athenians. First, a fire destroyed rrlost ot the cover on the ~sland,remoblng the Athenl'xns' fedr of an ambush.'' Second, when the Athenians landed a irttle before dawn, they caught the southeni guard post unprepared to face the attack.75 'The Spartans rnanrling the post had taken 110 precautions when the Athetllan ships approached the codst the night before. They Iiad failed to reallze that the landing was the prelude to an invasmn, not the usual night heachrng t o escape the dangers of an open sea.-" The Athenian hopl~tes,who e'1s11y overran the guard post and slaughtered the Spartans while strll In thew beds, qu~cklysecured a beachhead for the rest of t h e ~ forces. r There had been about 800 hopl~tesa t first I a r ~ d i n g . ~ ~ They were followed by some Messetllall re~nforcernents,800 bowmen, as many javelinmen, and tile crews of 70 Athenian ships (at least 7,000 armed as well as they could ~nanage.~" Demosthenes, the Athenian general, dlv~dedh ~ troops s illto groups of 200 atld advanced to galn the high ground and thus surround the main Spartan force In the center of the island.x0 It wa5 a deployinent ainted a t total destruction, and it ruaximi~edthe qualities of the Athenian host w ~ t h its 1,600 mlss~lemen ( h d f bowmen atld half javelinmen) and a large number of people who could use slings and stones wlieri standing on higher ground than the erle1n1~.~~ The Spartan hoplites chose the usual way of deallng with the sltuatlon from their repertotre of liopl~tewarfare. They went for the Atheii~anconnterpart to engage them in a hand-to-hand battle. But Delnostlienes had changed the rules: There w,~ssometh~ngnew 111 store for Ep~tadasand his Spartan soldiers. The A t h e ~ ~ i ahoplites n stood still to recelve the charge, but at the same time, their l ~ g h ttroops pressured the enemy on the flanks and r e x (presumably from h~gherground) ut~tllthe Spartans, f x e d by etlemles from ail sides, reali~edthat they could not come to grips wrtli the Atlien~an h o p l ~ t e sThe . ~ ~ lighter troops torinented the Spartarls wrth arrows and came '3s close as poss~bleto them while launch~ngtheir javelins; when the Spartans charged them, they retreated quickly, wheeirng back again orice the hoplites had stopped their rush. The tactic was well suited to rnen "lightly equ~pped"who fou~ld~teasy "to take to flight In gooci time slllce the ground was difficult and . . . natr~rallprough." The I,acedaemonians, who were in heavy arrnor, were unable to pursue them over S L I C ~a t e r r a ~ n . ~But ' even it they could have done so, the Spartans would hardly have wanted to pursue their tormentor$, for ~f they caught up wrth the lrght troops, they would open themselves up to an attack trorn the Athenian hoplites. The counterattacks of the Spartans beca~nesluggish wlth the passage of ttme, w h ~ i ethe Athenians and their supporters, who had once been afraid to join battle with the Lacedaeinonians, becarne ruore and rrlore conternptuous of them, "hurl~ngat them stones, arrows, or javel~tls,whichever e x h
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FIGURE 4.1 Inan had to hand."84 The sitliatton became desperate for Epitadas's men, \vho were almost surrotlnded hy the enemy and unable to counter their attacks. They chose the only way out: They closed therr ranks and retreated to their fort on the northern tip of the island, tormented in their w ~ t h drawal by the Athenian light troops, who again caused rnore casual tie^.^' The fort gave the outnumbered Spartans a certdrn securlty i~rldi11so changed the tone o f the battle. Its gositloll apparently made an encircl~ng action impossible, and the encounter returned to the norri~alpattern of hoplites ag'lrnst hoplltes. The only way to dislodge the Spc~rtanswas t o attack them frontally, which meant usrng no light troops but only heavy Infar~tryntenagalnst their enemy counterparts.""7he Athenian Iioplites advanced i n battle array but rnade no gains aganst the stubborn Spartans now enjoying the advantage of higlier g r o ~ n d . ~ ' 'I'he deadlock was broken when the commander of the Messeniar~swent over and asked for sonle archers atld lrght troops. H e planned to cllnlb one
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side of the fort, whtch seerned unapproachable, and to ' ~ t t ~ ~the c kSparta~ls from the higher ground and thus re-create tlie siruatton that tlie enemy had to face in the central part of the island. The daring action succeeded: "With great d~fficultyhe barely succeeded 11.1 getttrlg round unobserved m d suddenly appeared on tlie high ground in the enemy's rear."R8 'Thucydtdes cornpares the situation o t the Spartans to t h e ~ rlast stand at T h e r ~ n o p y l ~ "The ~ e . L , ~ c e d ~ ~ e n ~ o nwere ~ a nnow s assatled on both sides," he wrttes, "and-to compare a small a f f a ~ w r ~ t ha great one-were In the same evil case as they had been at 7'hert~topyIae."~'After a while, weak in body for the lack of food and dfter some negotiations, they surrendered. Of the 420 or~ginalhopl~tes,only 292 remained. We d o not know how Inany of the or~ginalhopl~teswere Spartan citi~ens,but arnong the prisoners, only 120 were Spc~rti~tes."O Nothtng IS s'ud, '1s usual, about the helots. "Of all tlie events of t h ~ war," s says Thucydtdes, " t h ~ scame as the greatest surprise to the Hellenic world."" 'The rnyth o f 'l'herrnopylae had so condlttoned the Greek 1111nd that "men could not conceive that the I,acedaemon~answould ever be ~nducedby hunger or any other compulsion to give up t h e ~ rarms, but t h o ~ ~ g that h t they would keep fighting as long as they were able.""2 A1no11gthe Creeks, there was alrnost a feeling of d ~ s t n ~ ~ y that Sphacterta had endangered tlie lesson of Thermopylae. But Spliacter~a could teach something rrtuch more Important about the conduct of war. The answer that one of the survivors gave whet1 confronted by the tt~sulting remark of a captot; an Athenian ally, IS illustrative. The Athen~anally had needled him by asking whether tlie Lacedaernon~answho had fallen were "brave men and true," that IS, implying that the surv~vorswere cow,~rds. Tlie Spartan answered "tliat tlie shaft, meaning tlie arrow, would be wortli a great deal it it could distingu~shthe brave, intiruat~ngthat it was a mere rrlatter of chance who was hit and k~lledby stones and bow shot^."'^ Ells answer was not only the personal defense of a man who had endured 72 days of blockade and who, at the last moment, had been caught in a hopeless situdt~on,it WAS also a n adrn~sslonthat the hoplite w,~snot invincible against other types of troops In certain condit~ons.However, Greece stubbornly retused to accept t h ~ slesson. Regardless of ~ t usefulness, s some histor~ans the l ~ g h ~tsfdntry t had t o be disregarded 11.1 favor of retatnlng the old system In wli~clithe sold~erwas also a cit17en who a t least had tlie fi~ianc~al ability to buy his own arrnor and who embodied the vali~esot the ruling class. Tlie historians who favor tlie idea that the Greelc states retained the concept of hoplite warfare because it was also the rrtost etficient systern-A. J. Holladay, for ~nst~~nce-approachthe problem from two angles. O n one hand, they present "negat~ve"arguments, tliat is, they expla~nwhy Irght infantry would have been tneffect~ve;o n the other, they advance "posit~ve" points, n1~1tntatningthat the clash of heavy ~nfatltrytnenagainst e x h other
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w,~sthe most effcct~veforin of tnillt,~ryengagement. It is clear, they say, that light infantry troops were ~neffect~ve. The battle of Plataea in 479 R.C.., for instance, is a~rtpleproof that the Persian lighter sold~erswere inferior to hoplites."' If 11ght illfantry~nenwere effective, i r is illconceivable why tlle Greek states would not have used them at least In times of great peril."" And it is not accurate to maintain that the Greek r u l ~ n gclasses were afraid of using the poor or tlle people who were 11ot recognized '1s atizens. The Spartans are a case in point. They normally integrated the noncttlzen perioect and the seinislave helots into their n~ilitaryrrtachirie not only as servants but illso as heavy ~nfantryrnen."' But it is also clear that hoplite warfare was the best method of all. Otherwise, why would the hoplites have been hired as mercenaries elsewhere, from Egypt to Persia!'"l'rue, light troops were most effective In broken terrain i ~ n dI ~ L Lin S hold~ngone of the many passes of the Greek landscape. However, with a few exceptions, Greek passes could be easily turned etther by arnpliibious landing or, as in the confrontation between Thebes i ~ n dSpartd, by lalld operatrons."" Most of the gotnts that Holladay puts forward in support of his vlew that hoplite warfare was the only systern that made sense are at least debatable. It seems reaso11'1ble to assume that the Pers~anlight infantry nay have bee11 n o march for tlie Greelc hoplttes in a frontal confrontation. Yet at Plataea, for instance, even the modest light infantr) of the Greeks, the Athenlan archers, could perform a crucial role during the Persian assault against tlie Megarians, Moreover, when the retreating Spartans were caught up by the pursulng Persian cavalry, I-lerodotus clearly states that heavy infantrym,~nand l ~ g h inf'~ntryinatl t stood next to each other.""' It IS not surprising that he ignores them afterward, except in the dtscusston of the booty,'0' and that he does not spec~fvwhat t h e ~ rrole was in tlie fight aganst the Persians o n the lefr wlng: After 1' 11, the battle had to relnan the private d o ~ n a ~ofn tile hoplite. Even Tliucyd~des'presentation of thetr actions at Sphacteria ends up with a list of the ca5ualt1es of- the hoplites, but no xnentlotl 1s made of the light infalltry on both sides."" linacceptable also is the argument that the Greelcs would have developed light intantry in time ot peril if they had thought them to be effective. Efiective Ilghr infa~ltrymen,whose tr'1lnlng was 1' long and extensive process, could not be created overnight. Moreover, their ~nclustonwould have rueant rethinking the whole tactical approach to the battlefield. In other worcis, one needed to plan long before the time of need and 11.1 a situation in which there was no peril present and thus no urgency to change the established patterns. W ~ t h o u tdoubt, the Spartans used perioeci and helots as hoplites. But the whole approach of the inost rnditaristlc Greek state shows that the need to use the disenfranchised limited the state's ability to carry an effective warlike pol~cyabroad. Moreover, when confronted w ~ t hthe exterminntron of even relr~tivelyfew Spartiates, as happened at Sph,acteria,
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Spdrtd WAS ready to compromise ,111d sue for peace.'"' Arln~ngperloecl and lielots as hoplites also meant that only a relat~vefew of the d~senfrancli~sed would actually wage war, for only a few, at least among the helots, could l~kelyafford to buy t h e ~ armor. r If the state fiere t o buy t h e ~ rarmor, one of the fundamental n o t ~ o n sof the citl7eli-warrior-ow1iersh1p of 111s own armor-ould be placed in jeopardy.lo4 F ~ n ~ ~ ltralnlng ly, the helots as light lrlfantrylnen would have ~rnplledthat pr'1ct1~~1llyall able n1'1les In soc~ety's midst could become foes of the regtme. It I S no surprise, then, that when they needed ltght ~ntantryd u r ~ n gthe Peloponnesiar~War, the Spartans usually lured or rel~ed011 outsiders, lnercenarles or all~es,who could be used and the11 sent home wl1e11 tlie sittiatlon de~nanded."'~ The pos~riveargurrtent also has its weak spots. 'The popularity o f the hopllte as nlercenary abroad does not ~lecess~~rily imply th,~the was cons~dered the most efficient pract~tionerof warfare. If we judge effect~venesso n tlie basis o f popi~larttyalone, then we could argue, tor Instance, that the popul'lr crossbow~n~in, probably the most h ~ r e dInercendry of the High M ~ d d i eAges, was also the inost effect~vepractltloner of war o n the European battlefields of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In realtty, it would have been hard to r a s e a n effectlve heavy lnfallrry force 11-1 most parts of the Persian Empire. To attempt to do so would mean runnlng afoul of the n~ilitarytrad~tionsof rnost of the subjects, except for people such as the Ionian Greeks. Moreover, such a force could not succeed In an etlvlrolnnellt where autocr'ltlc dttltudes ruled clty I~fe.Hoplrter could still become an ilnportant part of the Pers~an rnilttary machine-hut always as a u x ~ l ~ a r ~not e s , as the determining factor. The horse and bow relndi~ledsupreme a n o n g the Pers~ans.FIII'IIIY, the polnt that guard~ngthe passes would be useless because passes in Greece could nor~nallybe turned IS at lea.;t questionable. True, passes had been eas~ly turned slnce at least the sebenth century is.(,., as P. O'irtledge s'lys, but, of course, th13 was n ~ a ~ n because ly no Greek state seems to have had the manpower to rnan all the passes. Cartledge argues that they could have done so by tr,~lningthe poorer classes to act as c a n p servants and as l ~ g h i~lfd~ltryt men t ~ o . ' Certainly, "~ one of the str~krngd~fferencesbetween Roine and the Greek cities was the ab111ryo n the part of Roriie to tield rrtuch larger arrnles than ,my Greek state. However, ~t 1s hard to deter~nltlewhether thts was the result of a larger territory or a higher birthrate or simply an extens~onof the role of warrior to larger strata of the populat~on. The other xnethod of tur11111g the passes, the use of amph~blousoperatlons, would Iiave been very d~fficultto carry out agatnst a well-prepared enemy. For exainple, in tlie first stages of the Sphacter~dcainpatgn, the Athen~anshad been the prey and had feared a Sp,1rta11 Lndlng on t h e ~ rfort~fiedgos~ttoiion the ~natnlandfacrng the ~slandof Sphacterla. Recattse of this, Dernosthenes had selected 60 hoplites and a few archers for "the p o ~ n t fihere he thought ~t nlost l~kelytll,~tthe Lacedalmo~l~ans would try t o
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land." It is true that the area was also "rough" and "rocky,""" but the fact that sucli a small number of men could prevent the enemy from landrng shows how difficult the task rnust have beer) In the face of a determined adversary. Besldes t h ~ s any , land~tlgin enelny territory would hdve ~lecessarily ~ m p l ~ ea dnumber of logrst~calproblems-a most important restra~ningfactor, tor instance, for the Persian fleet drlr~ngthe Great Wars. Yet Holladay IS correct when he xnaltltalns that in certain cond~tions,us111g the hoplite In a phalanx formation was, at least before Alexander's p~kernen, the rrlost awesome forrn of waging war.'OVt was control of-the pla~ns,rlot ofthe passes, that mattered in ancient Greece because the p b ~ n housed s srlost ot the wealth of the ancrent world. N o army could be satisfied w ~ t hcontrol of the mountains or of the hrlls wh~leenerrty armies ravaged the territory from w h ~ c hit took ~ t hving. s Soo~leror l,lter, it had to corrle to the pla~ilsto face its enemy, and once there, light infantry could not really compete againsr the riiass and power of a lioplite phalanx. T'lie only exceptron to this rule was Athens dur111g the Pelopo~lnes~,ul War-not because Athens did not treasure the land but because, unable to meet Spartan might on land, rt could survive by control of- the seas. 'l'he situation rn ancient Greece was sirnilar, as E. N. Luttwak has argued,l0>to the control that the Romans exercised on their subject people who lived In large towns. The Romans could not come to grips with the dispersed Gerlnans, but they c o ~ ~certainly ld bring the Gauls to their knees because Gauls cetltered thelr lives around url>an cetlters. The same applred to the Greeks. Thew wealth was in the plains, next to t h e ~ clty r walls. They could teriiporarily run to the hills, but eventually, they had to corne dowtl to defend their fields and thelr cit~es'gates. Once there, h ~ city's s walls behind Iiim, the heavy hopl~tewas tlie krng. Yet the problem of hoplrte versus light ~ntantry,looked at frorii this angle, gives a d~stortedklew of the sltuatron. Accordl~lgto this kiew, the I~ghtersoldier was more effective in brolcen terratn, the hopllte was clearly superior In the plains, and ~t was o n the plains that most battles were fought in the ancient world. But there is another way of looking at the problem. Hoplites, supported by light infantry, could have been more effective than they already were o n tlat terrain. It is clear that at Sphacteria, it was a cosnblnat~onof hoplltes atld light infantry that brought down the Spartans. Rut at Sphacteria, one could argue, tlie terrain was rugged, and thus the exarrlple cannot be applied to the norinal hoplrte encounters on tlat terrain. For this, the best indlcat~otlcomes ~nsteadfrorn another ep~sodetlie destruct~onof a Spartan morn (battle group) near the wails of Corinth in 390 B.<,. The most popular form of light infa~ltrymanto einerge out of the Peloponnesran War was the peltast.' Orrg~nallyfrom Thrace, this type of soidier soon spread throughout Greece. 1-5s narne cariie or~ginallyfront the word pelte, a shield shaped like a crescent. Arsned with Inore than one
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javel~n,usually longer than most, h ~ favorite s t , ~ c t ~hdd c been cle'1rly shown at Spliacteria: to run against the enemy, throw a javelin, wheel back ~f attacked, and return again to torinerlt the aggressor who had stopped the rush. Moreover, protected by 1' h e n corselet and a I~ghtershield and armed with a longer sword and apparently a longer and stronger javelin, he could be a rnuch rriore forri~idableadversary for hopl~tes,espec~allyIn broken terr a n . The eng'lgelnent Ile'lr the C o r ~ n t h ~ awalls n clearly showed the usefulness of this type of soldier. In the spring of 390 l%.('., a group of Arnyclians rnanned the walls of Lechaeum w ~ t hSpartan soldsers.'" It was their custom at that tlme of the yex, even when they were on camyagns, to return Iiome for the fest~valof Hyacinth~a.The problem, Iiowever, was that t h e ~ r route to Arnyclae passed near the walls of enemy Cor~nth,where a r~urnber of Athetli,a11 hoplites under the command of Calllas and peltasts under the command of Iphtcrates were sratloned. The Spartan commander of tile garrison decided to allow the Arnyclians to go hiit with the escort of a Spartan rnora (about 600 hoyl~tes'' l )and a number of cavalrymen. The Athenrans offered no challenge to the passtng Amycllans and their Spartan escort when they reached the walls of Corinth. At a d~stanceof 5 to 7 k~lometersfroin the c ~ t yof S~cyon,the Spartan commander utlw~selyseparated his hoplrtes from the rest. He ordered h ~ cavalrymen s to accompany the Arnyclians up to S~cyonand then to join h ~ mand the hoplites on their way back. It was a m~stakefor w h ~ c khe would pay dearly. When lie a g a n passed near the C o r ~ n t h ~ awalls, n Cailias and Iphicrates reallzed that now the Spartan rnora, \vitliout support from its own cavalry and the Amyclians, could be ch'11lenged and dcfe'lted. The hoplites l~nedup ~n battle formation wlirle Iphicrates and 111speltasts approached wrth~njavel~ndistance (prot>al>ly30 meters or so) and launched char weapons. When the younger Sp~rt~~ns-the 20- to 30-yex-olds" '-were told to pursue them, the peltasts easily outran the heavier opponents. The moment the Spartans gave up their pursuit, Iphicrates' rneri wheeled back and attacked again. T h ~ s tune, the Spartans of 20 to 35 years of age were ordered to pursue t h e ~ torr mentors but agaln to no avail."4 Actuaily, when they t ~ ~ r n eback, d the Spartans suffered even rnore casualt~es.Some relief, however, seemed finally on the w ~ ywhen tllelr cavalry, whlch had escorted the Amycl~ansup to Stcyon, finally returned. This time, both hoplites and cavalrymen pursued the peltasts, but again they tailed to come to grips with them. Xenophon c~scr~bes t h e ~ failure r to the action of the horsemen, who ~ n s t e ~of~catching d up wtth the fleeing peltasts, kept in line with their own slow-movtng hopl i t e ~ . "But ~ A. J. Andersori r~ghtlyargues that the horsemen had little cho~cebut to stop.""f they had cont~nuedt h e ~ rchdrge w~thoutthe support of their own hopl~tes,they would have had to deal wttli the Athenran hoplites, who had assumed a battle forination. By themselves, there was really l~ttlethat they could do.
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While their casudlties mounted and their enernies became increasingly bold, the Spartans retreated to a small h111, less than 7.50 meters from the sea and over 3.5 kilorneters trorn Lechaeuln. The garrison In Lechaeurn, aw'ue of the plight of the Sp'>rtG>ns,sent thein sorrle boats so t h a the besieged Spartans could finally escape from their attackers, but when the Spartans dld so, it was In a manner that dishonored their reputation. 'l'he Athenian hoplites had just decided to play a rnore active role by moving directly agallist the Spartans on the hill. It was too much for the Spartans, who broke and fled, some plunging into the sea and some escaping w ~ r h their cakalry. Of the originL1l600, about 2.50 were killed on the field."' The lesso~iof the destruction of the Spartall mora was not that the best peltasts could defeat the best hoplites on level grourld but, as Andersoil s a p , that even the best hoplites could be defeated by "a skillful cornbin,qtton of heavy and light ~nfantryunless they were themselves adequately supported by other arrns.""Vhis example and a number ot others that Anderson discusses in his book also r'lise another question."" The key issue of the debate about Iioplires versus I~glituifantry IS not that the light Infantry could ever have beaten the hoplites o n level ground but that the hoplites would have been m ~ i c hinore effective if, as Alexander would find out, they had been supported by other arms. True, there was a sound, pract~cal reason why the Greek states were reluctant t o develop light Intantry. 'l'he hoplite needed practically n o training. FIls social habit of attending the gymnasium, at least for the well-to-do hoplite, or w o r k ~ n gon the land assured that he would be In good physical condition \vithout special training. Fight~ngin line with a linlited number of maneuvers o n the battlefield, except for the Spartans, also meant that what lie needed was not formal tratning but a strong sense of soc~alduty that wotlld prevent him from abandoning the line, thereby betray~nghis comrades. Peltasts, for instance, needed much more train~ngthan the h ~ p l i t e . ' ~Well-trained O peltasts, such as Iph~crates' men near Corinth's walls, could perform br~lliantly.B L Ieven ~ Iphicrates, probably the gre'ltest general of l ~ g h ttroops of the ancient world, could not perfor~nm~racles.When In charge of a less well-drilled force (at Corcyra, for example), his carupaign rn~ghtbe successful in other ways, but he could not defedt hoplites."' But extetlstve training, of course, would have meant iteeptng men under arms and thus under gay even during periods of peace. IJI other words, badly trained light troops were ~neffcct~ve; well-trained light troops were effective but expensive. I11 the long run, hoplrtes were probably cheaper and more cost effective. As Hanson argues, hoplite warfare was "economically t r ~ ~ g a l . " ' ~ ~ Yet even this explan,ltion does not tell the whole story. There were other powerful reasons not to develop light troops. As W. H. McNeill hac argued for the military of most periods,12? there must have been a reluctance to c11~1ngein the ancient period. The introductio~~ of the peltasts on a brge scale
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would have lnednt reth~nkingthe whole approach to the battlefield. It would have Implied a new etiquette for the conduct of war. It would have meant, for instance, the possibility of surprise attacks on enemy cantps, night encounters, and ;~xnl~~~shes-~all things that were extremely unusu,~l111 the Greek world, as Pr~tchetthas shown. Iphtcrates did conduct ambushes at Abydos and elsewhere, and the other famous general of I~ghttroops, Ue~nosthenes, again did conduct a nlght attack, but both cases ( ~ we f exclude the ' ~ c t ~ o nofs barbar~anThracians) remained odd~tiesIn which gelrasts, not hoplites, were involved.'" It is also indicative of- the whole attltude to war that there is no word for surprise attack in the Greek dict1011'1ry.'~' The acqulsrtlon of property belonging to other people always played an important role in arlclerlt warfare. A rrlarl fought not only because the role of w'xrrlor was a n extenston of his role as a cit~zenbut ;11so because successful war brought him economic gains. To lncltide other people, such as the poorer classes, \vould have meant sharing the booty. We do not know how i~llporrantgreed was 11.1 terms of exclud~ngothers from shar~ngthe wages of vtolence, but ~tmtlst have been a powerful incentive for lteeptng other people front waging war. F~nally,as long as the ruilitary role was an extenston of the CIVIC role, the inclus~onof other classes would have ~lecessar~ly rne,lnt a revolut~onin the soc~alarrangement-agatn, an unpalatable and unlikely shift, considering the natural reluctance t o soczal change. Lower classes could be admitted into the nlil~tarystructure only when the I'trge-scale admtsston of mercenaries and the sh~ftrngof decis~onnialcrngfrom the cttlzenry to one man or a small group of tnen had cortie to separate the rn~litarp role from the socid f u t ~ c t ~ oBut t ~ . t h ~ swas t o happen only when the Macedon~anscrushed the ~ndependenceof the Greek states and when onernan rule replaced the clties' oligarchies or democracies. It is natural, then, that the gre'lt battles that closed the c1'1ss1cal era of warfdre would again be the prtvate domain of the hopllte, not of the peltast. T l ~ e b e s ' sChallenge of S p a r t a n S u p r e m a c y When Sparta became embroiled In conflicts against 'l'hebes In the first halt of the fourth century, it seemed at first a n uneven struggle-pitting the most warlike of the Greek states against a city that, at least until 42.5 R.('., had been regularly beaten by an adversary, Athens, that the Spartans had already ~'~nyuished. Inste'ld, the etld product of these wars would shock the whole of Greece. At Leuctra 117 371 R.(:. and a t Mant~neanine years later, in 362 B.<:., the Thebans, under the cornrrtand of Epantinondas, the most brill i a ~ l tGreek general before Alexander, decisively beat the Spartans and ended their hegemony over the rest of Greece. Epaminondas's victories were, on the one hand, a syrnhol of the greatest sophistication that hoplite
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w'lrfare ever reached; on the other hand, they indicdted the road that future generattons of warriors would have to follou~. The success of the 'Thebaris was not an overn~ghtcreatlorl lmt had beer) In the offing for about half a century. It had begun 111 424 I J . ~ . when , the Thebans liad rather unexpectedly defeated the Athenians in a gttclied battle at Deliu~n.The Theban ace in that battle seems t o have beer) the presentation of an unusual phalanx formdtion, much deeper t h d ~ the l usual 8 or 12 men."& The next stage In the experiment came In two other battles, fottglit thircy-one years later, in 394 I<.<,., at Nemea and at Cororiea. Iri both battles, the Spartans would defedt 1' combirldtion of allies, among whom the Thebans were to play an Important role. At Nemea too, the Thebans made their phalanx "exceedingly deep" and then proceeded by inclin~ngto the right to envelop the Sp,lrta~lallies of the left wing."' The Thebdns successfully routed their opponents, but thelr army lost the battle, wli~chwas decided on their left. 'There, the Spartan right wing liad first routed tlie Athenians, then tt hdd wheeled left, h1tt111gthe eneln~eso n the flmk and mowing them down as they advdnced from tlie right to the left. Actually, tlie~radvance across the battlefield even reached some of the Thebans, who were s1,tughtered while returning from thelr pursuit of the Spartan a l l ~ e s . ' ~ ~ At Nemea, the deep Theban phalanx had shown that it could defeat a shallower line, although it had been used in a manner that indicates its potential WJS still not clear 111 the Thebans' mltld. Xenophon's text shows that thelr alrn had not bee11 to crush through the enemy llne and thus maximize the ruass and power of a very deep 11ne(or should we call it a colurnn?) against a thinner formatlo~~; rather, the i~iinwas to o ~ t f l ~ the ~ n kl ~ n ein the ~ n a ~ l nof e r 7' much more agile and presumably shallow unit: "Tliey [the Thebansl veered to the r~glitIn leading the advdnce, in order to otltflarik the enemy with their wing."I2' It 1s ;I xnist'~kethat they seein not to have repedted at the battle of Coronea, which was fought In the same year as Nemea. Xenophon does not specify whether the 'Thebans adopted a deeper line or whether they crushed, instead of tryirlg dg'lin to envelop, the Spartan allies of the left wing."" Yet the development of tlie encounter srrggeqts just this. Moreover, the end result does point out a h~ghersense of discipline and toughness dmong the Thebdns. Inste'ld of escaping the battlefield in disorder as they had done at Nernea, tlils tune they changed front completely and squarely faced the Spartans, \vho had also vanquished the erlerny left wing and had now reversed front to fight the Thebans returning fro111 pillaging tlie Spartan camp. "Settnig slileld agatnst sh~eldthey [the Tliebans and Spartaris] shoved, fought, killed, and were l
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The Thebans had shown t11'1t they could overrun therr opponents and that t h e ~ rnerve could make them tlie match of the Spartans. Tlieir problem was, however, that they had chosen the wrong opporlertt with w h ~ c hto start. At Coronea, they had come to grlps w ~ t ha n enemy (the Spartan alI~es)whose defeat could not dec~dethe battle, but later, they had to face a toe (the Spartans) whose spirits were high after rotlting an opporlerlt w ~ t h out s t r ~ k ~ na gblow: "The Arglves did not await tlle attack of the forces of Agestlaus [the Spartan lt~ng]but fled to Mount Helicon."'" The solution was to keep the ruassive attaclc of a deeper I~ne,to concentrate initially on the Sp,~rtans,and to prevent the rest of the Theban line from comlng t o grtps with the enenly so that there would be n o danger of a reversal of front w ~ t hthe enemy appearing on the tlanlc. It was the lesson that Epaminondas would put to the test at Leuctra, but four years before the great battle, there had been a dress rehearsal In a small engagement a t Tegyra under the leadership of Eparninondas's f r ~ e r ~Pelop~das, d the dashing comlnander of the S x r e d B'lnd. The Sacred Rand was an e11te untt of 300 warrtors, founded In the afterrnath of a struggle in 'Thebes between pro- and anti-Spartan forces. There was llot11111g new in the existence of a special u n ~ alnong t Greeks and nonCreeks. We ltnow that there were such units a t Syracuse, Argos, Arkadia, Elis, Boeotia, and Sparta and antong the Persians and the Carth,~ginians.~ 14 But the Sacred Band distingu~shedItself for a number of character~st~cs. Its members had no econo~nicworries slnce the state provided for their upkeep; tratnlng stressed wrestling instead of dancing; strong patriotic pnnctples were part of the lndoctr~n'~tlonprocess; members n~lghthave speclali7ed in attaclting the heart of the enenly line, where the commander in ch~ef stood; and finally, the unit was cornposed (as I'lutarch, our rrtaln source for the S'~credBand, says) of homosexual palrs, except for their leader Pelopld a ~ . " Plutarch's ~ contentton is not surprlslng in a society like ancient Greece, where hornoeroticis~nwas not unusual and where, as Dar~ielQgden argues, it l n ~ g h thave been assocrated a t times wrth the elrte of the armythe Sacred Rand at Thebes, tlie Royal Pages In Macedon~a,and probably the h ~ p p e ~ats Sparra.I3" A number of Greek intellectuals supported the notron that hoinoerotlcls~nwas appropriate w ~ t h l ntlle rrlilrtary occupat~on. For Instance, both Plato and Plutarch believed that the palring of homosexual lovers brought a new dimension to the s p ~ r i of t caruarader~ethat is at tlle heart of ,111 n l i l ~ t ~ ~un~ts: r y Now the w,~rriorhad to keep his face vls-2v ~ not s only h15 neighbor but also h ~ lover.' s This belief was also reflected in Xenopl~on,who argued that hornoerotic relationships "rrtight well be honourable, and lnotlvate men to valour In battle."';* Yet Xenophon, l ~ k e the rest of the Greeks, remained amb~valentabout the gosrtive aspects of homosexuality. H e seemed t o associate passlon with danger. This meant
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t h a one of the prominent chardcterlst~csof a md~taryleader was h ~ asl ~ l i t y to resist erotlc attraction toward other men while on campa~gns.'" Initially, the inembers of the Sacred Band had been deployed w ~ t hthe other warriors of the phalanx, but at Leuctra, they would fight as a separate u n ~ t . They had also operated as a separate tinit when they iner a Spartan contingent at 'Iegyra in 375 KC. IJelopldas was caught during the return from a rel~efexped~tionwhlle crossing an area bounded by 11111s on h ~ left s and a swamp on h ~ right."O s He had 300 hoplites and some cavalry under h ~ coms mand. When 111s inen spotted 2 Spartan rnorai (a rnininturrt of 1,000 to a lnaxlnliitn of 1,900 soldiers141),they ran to 111m 111 great distress. "We have fallen Into enemy's hands," they cried. "Why not they Into ours?" retorred Pelopidas. Then he ordered h ~ cavalry s to charge stra~ghtat the Spartan phalanx while h ~ lloplites s closed t h e ~ rranks and followed the horsemen. The two lines clashed, w ~ t hthe Thebans strtk~ngdtrecrly where the Spartan leaders stood. I'robably when the Spartans reali~edthat it would be hard to defeat the Thebans, they opened t h e ~ rranks t o let the enemy escape. Pelopidas did not accept tlie niv~tationbut cut 111sway into the middle of the enemy phalanx until the Spartans broke and fled, their two leaders dead o n the spot. It was a battle that "first proved to the rest of ('~reece that ~t was not only the Eurotas [the prlnc~palrlver of Sparta], nor the country between Babyce and Cnacion [the Eurotas's tr~butaries]W ~ I C I I bred brave and warllke soldier^."'^^ Thus, Tegyra was a showcase for the bravery of the Thebans, and ~t also taught some new lessons-how hoplites could profit in attack~nga phalanx first disordered by the cavalry, how the best s t r ~ k ewas t o the core of the enemy's forinatlon where the leaders stood, and why breaking through the enemy was not enough, especially when the opponent was as sk~lledas the Spartans. At Nemea too, the Spart;tt~shad let some of t h e ~ ropponents break throrrgh by opening t h e ~ rranks to srr~ltethem from the sliieldless side. Pelopidas's soli~tionhad been 1nucl1 ruore daring. Instead of trying to escape and sdve his I~fe,he had gone for the k~lllrlgpunch: He had 111filtrated the enemy ranlts and cut them down where tlie~rsupertor nu~nbers were not necessar~lyan advantage. 'These were all lessons that did not escape the brlll~ant1n11ldof Epaminondas. llnlrke h ~ fr~end s Pelopidas, who Irked to cult~vateh ~ body, s Epamniondas spent rnost of his time read~ngand discussing ph~losophy."~We d o not know ir~ucha b o ~ i him. t Plutarch's Life has not survived. Xenophon seems to ignore him at least u n t ~ lMantinea, In the account of which he clearly ruarvels at tlie ruan's cleverness. But ~t seems that the defeat of the Spartans was ;I constant preoccupation for Epain~nondas.Peace for the Thebans could be possible only on terms of just~ceand equal~ty-an option unacceptable to the spar tan^.'^^ It is also clear, as h ~ deployrnents s at Leuctra
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m d later at Mant~neashow, t h a he had stud~edthe Spartatls at war and had learned well the lessons of Nemea, Coronea, and especially Tegyra. At the beginning, LeuctraL4jseemed not t o bode well tor Eparuinondas. H e had n o c ~ l t e r n c ~ tbut ~ v eto fight because refirsal to engdge the Spartans would have lneant rebellton of the smaller cit~esaga~nstThebes and eventually submission of h ~ own s c ~ t yto Sparta; h ~ own s ltfe would likely have been endangered as well. H e had lett Thebes preceded by omens that seemed to ~ndlcateh ~ struggle s against the Spartans would end III disaster. I-le had with him a number ot allies whose loyalty was suspect and whose lack of enthus~tlsrnIn combat was fa~rlycertaln. He w,~salso outnumbered, probably by a facror of 3 to 2, by the Spartan l~ost.'~"ut the Spartans too had their problems. Their king, Cleornbrotns, had never comruanded an army In 1' ~ n a j o rp~tchedencoutlter.'4' Yet he felt compelled to d o battle because he had been accused of coward~ceand treason for not br~ngtngthe 'Thebans to battle during a previous e x p e d ~ t ~ o nHe . ' ~had ~ more rnen than the T l ~ e b ~ ~6,000, n s ' but ~ n o s tof them were allies whose loy,~ltywas even more suspect than was that of the Theban allies. H I Tcontrngent of 1.acedaernonians, the heart of his troops, probably d ~ not d nurnher more than the Theba~ls.'~'Moreover, only 700 of them were Spartlates,IF" the rest concetva bly perioecr. Eparninondas's preparations for battle were a rrlasterpiece in the psycholog~calbatter~ngof the enemy. Before leaking Thebes, he had ~nterpreted the unfavorable omens In a p o s ~ t ~ vI~ght, e predicting a victory for h ~ s arrnY."l Now on the field, he first overcarne the reluctance o f a nuruber of generals on h ~ side. s In the ~natlnerof the Athen~~lns at Marathon, the Theban leaders too ( 6 generals in all) were undectded on the course to take. They all shared the opinion that the Spartans had t o be opposed, but 3 of the111 were for wlthdraw~ngt o Thebes and stalld~llga slege, atld 3 others (Epam~nondasamong them) were convinced that the time had c o ~ n et o confront the enemy on the battlefield. The deadlock was brolcen in favor of ~ ~ n ~ n e d i conflict ate when 1' seventh general, a r r i v ~ n glate, slded w ~ t h Eparninonda~.'~~ In the meantime, Eparn~nondashad proceeded to strengthen the confidence of his men i ~ n dt o erode that of h ~ enernles. s Vo~cesspre&~d the news that Heracles' arlns had d~sappearedfrom 111stemple In Thebes and that the god hinlself would come to the battlefield in support of the the ban^.'^^ The Spdrtdns could not win at Leuctra 11ot only because of Her,~clesbut also because, III the past, Spartan soldters had raped on that very field two Theban virgins, who had then taker1 their own l i ~ e srather than live with the rnelnory of the v~olence."~The Thebans also d ~ dnot have to worry about the enemy's numertcal supertortty, Epaniinondas sald. He compared the small nurnher ot Spartiates to the head of a snake that he had caught. H e showed the an~tnalto his troop and then crushed ~ t head.Iii s HIS mess~gewas cle,~r:
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Let us destroy the Spart~ates,for then the enemy '~rrnywould be left without Itfe. 'I'he Spartans deployed In a thln line 12 rnen deepiT6and about 750 rneters long o11 the flat battlefield (Figure 4.2).'" Cleombrotus and 111s Spartans were, as usual, on the rlght of the gl~alatix.Epamtnondas's line extended only for about 405 rneters.lT8The Thebans themselves o c c ~ ~ p i ethe d left w ~ n g ,grouped In a formation thdt was at le,~st50 men deepi" wlth a front of 75 to 80 1nen.l"' Both sides gave an unusual posttion to the cavalry. 'I'he first to do so were the Spartans, who deployed tt in front ot thetr right w111g. The Thebans followed wlth I' countermove by plac~ngtheir own cavalry In front of t h e ~ rleft, that is, oppostte the Spartan h o r s e ~ n e n . ~ ~ ' As I'lutarch's text Cleombrotns's decision to deploy h ~ cavs alry In front of h ~ sSpdrtans must have followed Epaminondas's deployment of most of his troops in a very deep line oppostte the Spartan troops. As the experterice of the previous battles of Nemea and Coronea had shown, ;I deeper line, glven tlme, would eventually overcome the resistance of a th~niierphalanx. Rut a ltne that sacrificed lengrh in favor of depth was also open to an outflanking rrtovernent. 111 other words, Cleombrotus must have thought that, if his 11necontamed the i111t131 onslaught of the Thebans, he could encircle the Thebans and bring thein to their doom.'" To carry out his plan, he needed to screen h ~ maneuver s with his cavalry. Cleornbrotus's plan never came to fru~tion.E p c ~ ~ n ~ n o nrrlust d a s hdke suspected srrch a maneuves, espec~allyon the basis of studying the bartle of Nemea or the engagement at Coronea. But ir could also be that the Theban cav'1lrymet1, hclrs of 3 proud tr'td~tion,were cle,~rlysuperior t o the Spdrtdn h o r ~ e r n e n ' "and, ~ remembering thetr exploit at Tegyra, may have decided on t h e ~ rown to press their enemy counterpart. 'She result was that the Spdrt,~ncdvalry was defeated dnd routed. Kow disaster struck the Spdrtdn Irne. Thetr horsemen 111 flight crashed into their owl1 me11,~~'dlsordertng the hoplites while they were in the dtfficult process of extending their line in order to encircle the adv,~ncingThebans. Epaniinondas had advanced a t an oblique angle, with his wtiig juttlng 111 front and the rest of the line r e f ~ 1 s e d . l1-11s ~ ~ Intention was to crush the head of the snake, the Spartan w ~ n g as , Polyaenus so colorfully puts 1t.l" Moreover, althorrgh the interpretattort here is fraught with difficulties, he probably stattoned I'elopidas and the Sacred Band as the spearhead ot his w111g.'" When Pelop~dassaw the dlsorder of the Spartan I~ne,he struck f o r ~ a r d . ' "As~ at Tegyra, 111s pollit of contact was where the leader, in thls case Cieolnbrotus, ~ t o o d . " At ~ the beginning, I'elopidas's action must have succeeded just In plnnlng the ene~nydnd no more, for, ds Xenophon remarks, when Cleombrotus fell, his men were able to withdraw h ~ sbody while he was still alive-an unlikely feat if their line was In great d~fficulty.'" But it was st~nplyd matter of tlnle now. The deeper Theban
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Tbrl.>ancavalry
47 Spartan cavalry
l
Spartan allies
Spartans
l
phalanx could exert much greater pressure. In the end, it crashed the Spartan right wing. Broken, therr king Itilied, the Spartans wrthdrew to the safety of thelr camp, leaving about 1,000 of tlieir men on the field. Many of them were Spartiates. There had been 700 Spart~atesbefore the fight; now only 300 were Consider~ngthat only a small part of the two armies, the right wing of the Spartans and the left of the 'I'hebans, were engaged in b'~ttleand that the Spartalls were kllled durltlg the fight and not 11.1 rout, the high casualties suggest again that Epaminondas must have studled the previous battles, especially legyra. Whe~1they broke the Itne, his ruen rrtust have infiltrated the enemy ranks for a harsh, pltiless struggle. In the meantlrne, the relnarnder of the Spartan Irne, the allies, stood idle. They could not d o otherwise. I f they advanced to meet the rest of the 'Theban line, they would have found the~nselvesIn danger of belng encircled had the Lacedae-
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lnonlan r ~ g h tfilng been defeated before the conclus~onof t h e ~ rengagement. If the I.acedaenion~anskept the Theban left long a t bay so that the Spartan allies could attack the Theban juggernaut on the flank, the alltes too would expose t h e ~ own r s ~ d teo the refused wing of the Theban Ilne. Xenophon, wlio st~llrernatns our most rel~ablesource In this matter, gives a cryptic, b~tteraccount of the battle. His main Interest I S to explaln why his pol1t1~,11pdtrons, the SpC1rtc~ns, lost. IIe says thdt Cleombrotus never wanted to give battle,'73 that the Spartan leaders made the d e c ~ s ~ oton deploy after drinking too inuch wine,L74that the Spartari soldiers had begun under the p~ychologic~al hdnd~capcaused by the story of Her'tcles and the c ~ c c o u tot ~t the raped v ~ r g i n s , 'that ~ ~ thelr cavalry was untra~ned,l~Qhattheir all~es were unrel~able,'" that t h e ~ rphal'lnx was too hallow,"^ and that the fleeing cav,~lryhad disordered t h e ~ rl~ne.'~Vf.Iowever, ~ n o s of t t h ~ swas nothing new. Such cond~tionshad extsted before-their Inferior cavalry, unrel~able allies, shallo\v phalanx, even the reluctance to engage in battle as, for inst'tnce, w ~ t hP'~usan1'1s at Plat'tea. Yet ~n the past, the Sp,~rt,~ns hdd st~llwon. The truth was that at Leuctra, they had found t h e ~ rmasters. The Thebans' victory over the Spartans had been brewing for about a quarter of a century, slnce Nenled at ledst. The d~fferentpleces of rhe puzzle of how to bredk the Spartans at last were there. It was Epam~liondas'sgentus to have put them together. In the process, he not only deteated h ~ enemies s but also brought the art of hopl~tew,~rtareto its highest s o p h ~ s t ~ c a t ~However, on. , ~ his t next great vlctory, Manttnea In 362 R.('., a spear brought 111slrfe to an end. As he lay o n the field, he first sulrtrrioned his shield-bearer to ask h1n1 ~f he had sdved h ~ ssh~eld.When he was assured of thls, he asked then d they had won. Yes, was the reply. As he heard t h ~ s ,he turned to the people around hirn and asked his fr~endsto wlthdraw the spearpoint frorii his body. "It is tune to die," he S'II~.But the f r ~ e n d srd~sed t h e ~ rvolces ~n protest: Eparn~nondashad already been warned that if they w~thdrewthe spear, he would die. "You die childless, Eparulnondas," they c r ~ e dbursting Into tears. "To t h ~ she rephed, 'No, by Zeus, on the contr'1ry I leave beh~ndtwo daughters. 1,euctra and Mantrneia, my vtctor~es.'Then when the spear gotnt was \vrthdrawri, w~thoutcornruotiori he breathed his last."'8o Epaminondas was right. HIS kictones not only closed an era but po~nted the way to the future. HIS oblique format~onand his rel~anceon surprise would become the irta~nstayof Inany a great general. But as befitted a cornplex xn,m l ~ k eEp'~m~nond'~s, he also left, e s p e c ~ ~ ~atl l yMantlnea, utlfirl~shed but tantalrzing bits of lessons o n the use of other arms besides the heavy 111fantryinan. However, these were lessons that the Greek city-states of h ~ s time were un,able and unw~lllngto accept. It was people a t the nldrglns ot the Greelc world, men such as Phll~pl1 of Macedon~aand his son Alexander, wlio would take these lessons to heart.
Chapter Five
Footmen, Horsemen, and the Symbols of Military Might il?iaxarchus hcgarz the sublect, sayttzg that rt roozild he far more lust to reckort Aiexatrder a god t11arz Dioftysl4s a~rdHerncler, not so mricl? be~aziseof the wtalzy aih~evmmerzisof Alexantier, hut also because Iliotrysrds urnsa l%~Garz, aizd harf izo conrzectlon wtth Nacecion, a~iclNerailes nrz Arglz~e,also ~~r?corrrtected wtth Maccdorz, saue by Alcxan~ier'sdcsietrt, for he uias a sort of Herailes: bztt that Matt~ciottransuJeremore ~wtrfied112 hoizo~ri~zg tl?elr OIUIZ Kttzg L V Z Idrr~ilze ~ i~oizours.EOT 171 any case tiwre was rzo iiortlzt that rohelz Alexattder had passed a~clayfronz nietz tl~cywould l~o~rotrr hlni as n god; I?ow nitdc11 nzore is^, the~l,that they ~ h o r l lh~ol t l o ~him zn life rirtl~ertC~anwheit Jrw~l,tuC~r*rz the honottr u~ouldprofit hrm izotbz.'~~zg.
The Macedonian Army 'Twenty-three years after Mantinea, in 338 IS.(,. on the fields of Chaeronea, the armed forces of a number of the Greek city-states Inet a new foe to rheir ~ndependence-the yoidiers of the upstart king of Macedonia, Philip 11. At Chaeronea, holvever, there would be no ru~raclelike Marathon or I'lataea, nor would the win~lersbe ephemeral conyuerors like the Thehans at Leuctra and Manttnea. The Macedonians had come to stay. Four years later, in 334 Is.<,., the combined forces of Macedonians, allled Greeks, and ~nercenariescrossed the Hellespont and brought war to an empire where "everybody. . . yave one person [the king] has trained himself to servitude rather than prowess."' Witl~inail eight-year period, Greek-speakin8 people would rule from the shores of the Indian Hydaspes to the rocky
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
11 1
Balkan beaches of the Adr~aticand from the savage moutltcxns of Bdctr~ato the golden sands of the Sahara. The conqueror, Alexander of Macedon, was the son of. the wlnner of Chaeronea, Philip; his main tool of conquest w,~shls fellow Macedon~ans-the backbone of the greatest arrny ever seen. Macedonia was a region geograph~callyand culturally at the margins of Hellas, the Greekness of her rnhabltants only grudgingly recognized by some '11ld often chclllenged by others2 Also, the Macedo~l~alls could cl'1i1n neither the cultural achieverne~~ts of their Greek corlstns to the south nor the rnerrtory of their rrtilitary glorles against the I'erslans. i2ctually, on the eve of Alexander's Invasion of the P e r s i , ~Emp~re, ~~ "the Greekness of tlle Macedonians, long a matter of doubt, had become a subject of renewed argument and propaganda."' This anti-Macedor~larcampargn was rrlairlly the work of Athelllans who, In the words of Demosthenes, had s,~vedthe freedom of Greece. The Macedontans instead had been subservient to the Persian Errtpire and had even ridden with Xerxes d~lringthe Great Wars, albelt rather unw~llingly,at le'lst accord~ngto H e r o d o t ~ ~FIowever, s.~ there 1s l~ttledoubt that they were related to the Greeks. They spoke a Greek dlalect, they probably orig~natedtrorn a sinlilar racial background, and fin~lly,they would adopt most of the aspects of tlle c ~ v i l ~ z a t ~ofo nthe clties on thetr southern border. Moreover, ~f less flamboyant and sopliisticated than their Greek cousins, the Macedonians had beer) ruore successful polit~callyIn the long run. Although they were a racial mlnorlty 11.1 t h e ~ rown state, they had firmly subjugated the other inhabrtants of the regton, translating their role as political masters Into a racial rrtonopoly of the milltary ~ n ~ ~ c h ~Also, n e . ' their ~laturdlresources gave then? a potent1:11 for growth that no Greek ctty could match. The Macedon~anland was rich tn the type of tirnber crucial to the ruaritilne economy of r ~ ~ oGreek st states, their rocks stored good suppl~esof gold and silver, and thelr agricultural so11 was relatively rich when compared to the barren land of most Greek c i t ~ e s Fur.~ therrnore, the Macedonian character had tor decades been forged in the school of dally danger. If mutually destruct~vewarfare held been the key feature of the Greek ctty-states, external threat had normally marked the daily life of the Macedonians, with the t~suallyhostile Illyrians lying to the west i ~ n dllorth, the fearsome Thr'lc~ans to the north and e x t , the Greek Thessal~anson the south, and the occasronal advance of the Persians from across the Hellespont. 'I'he experience and rrternory gained frorn those encounters would be key elements In help~ngPh~lip11, Alexander's father, to shape men who had fought for survlval into conquerors of the world. 'I'he army that Alexander inherited from I'hilip was the product of a number of tr'~d~t~ons; the tmportance of edch cotnponetlt IS d~fficultto ass e s ~The . ~ heavy infantry was at least in~tiallyan outgrowth of the Greek tradit~on,but daily contact with the plains of their southerly neighbors, the Thessal~ans,had etlh'111ced the M,~cedoni,a~ls'tendency to develop and rely
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on cavalry '1s well. The thre&~t coming fro111 their mountain foes on the west, north, and east must have tattght them the usefulness of llght and mob ~ l etroops in rugged terrain. The Thracians-the fiercest warriors imaginable, who, accord~ngto Herodotus, could have formed the grexest state on earth if they had only stopped quarreling among tl~emselvesx-must have set an espectally cornpell~ngexaruple on the importance of- surprlse and of dev~ancegenerally from the established norrns of hopl~tewarfare, a trend that Ph~lip'scontact w ~ t hthe Thebans between 369 and 367 m ~ g h have t enhanced.' I'h~lip was just l 3 or 14 when he arrived as a hostage at Thebes two years after Leuctra i111d eight before Mant~nea,and it is conce~vable that he learned sorneth~ngfrom contact with Eparntnondas's new ~ d e a s about warfare. If this is correct, it is rather ironic that Eparninondas's "d,~ughters," Leuctra i111d M a n t ~ n e , ~left , as h ~ ~s n h e r ~ t a n ctoe the Greek world, would find a home not a t Athens, Sparta, or Thebes but 117 Phrl~p's half-barbarous land on the border of the Greek world. Ph~lipI1 would integrate into 1' new and revolut~onary~ n o l dwhdt for E p C ~ m ~ n o ~ lhad d a sbeen expertrnents and varlatlons on the establ~shedcanon of hoplite warfare. The key of the Macedon~anarmy would eventually be the delicate balance between the d~fferenttypes of soldiers and espeaally the fine cornplement of cavalry and heavy ~nfantry.Yet though the emphasts on horsemen had been a constant of- Macedonian hlstory, the same apparently could not be s a ~ dof the heC~vy infantry before Phil~p11. Macedoni,als soc~alb a s ~ sprevented the format~onof an army along the l~nesof t11e Greek polls. Macedonia had a very wealthy landowning class but only a small rn~ddleclass. In other words, the country lacked the essenti,~ii~lgredientof hopl~tec~r~nies: 1 ' middle class monopolizing polit~calpower. If the middle clacs was too small, the rest of the ethnic Macedonians were too poor to provide the connection between arms ownership, c~tizenship,and warrlor status. P h ~ l i p solved the problem by revolutionizing the armor of the heavy ~nfantry. Gone were the rnosr expensive Items of the hoplite panoply-the large Ilelmet, shield, and culrass-to be replaced by a s~mplerand lighter helmet, 1' smaller shield, and no cuirass or a more lirn~tedcllest protection. Gone too were the spear of about 2 to 2.5 meters, held with one hand, replaced by a p ~ k e(the s'ariss'a) i~bout5 meters in length and held with two hands. Gone as well was the assoclation of the heavy ~nfantrywith the ruling classes of the state, replaced by an opening ot the ranks to all ethnic Macedonians, who were probably also prok~dedwith free weapons and equ~pment."'Furthermore, the ritual of seasonal engagement w ~ t hthe same enemy year after year had ended; now the country was constantly under arins. The a d o p t ~ o nof the sarlssa allowed a Inore effective forrnat~onth'an the hoplite system. The Macedonian phalang~tescould project up to five spearpoints ahead of each rnan. Moreover, the pike's long head (about 27 inches) meant that the ~netdlof the he,~dand of the foresh,lftgu,~rd protected the
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
113
pkes of the followlilg rows, creating "a literal hedgewall of steel."" Tlle rest of tlie plialang~tes,from the sixth to the etght row, and sometimes those deployed as deep as slxteen rows held their sarlssa sloping upward at ail angle and thus cre'lted a b ~ r r l e rdgdinst arrows and other mlsslies." Pti~l~p's new heavy ~nfantrywas not an overn~ghtsensatton but the recult of a long retgn (of 24 years) durtng w h ~ c hMacedoni'l was alrnost contlnuously at war. Also, the phalangite format~onwould 11ot have been so successful w~thoutotlier reforms. lipper Macedonia and the region between the rtvers Stryrnon and Nestos were annexed to the ltingdo~n;soaal and ecollomlc conditions were ~myroved;and urb'an civ111~atioilspre'ld. All this resulted in a greater recru~trnentpool ( P l i ~ l ~do~jbled p tlie number of clt1zel.l troopsI3) and eventually in an ir~creaseIn the birthrate. Yet this would not have been etlough without more changes: tra111111gand drilling the new phalangites, us~tlgthem In ~ncreaslnglyd~fficulttasks, boosttng the ~lurnertcal strength of- the cavalry by alrnost 500 percent (600 In 358, 2,800 in 3.34 15.(,.'~), establ~shing$1 11uml)er of ellte u~llts,experlnlenting in devi,~tionsto the well-known canon of hopl~tewarfare, understand~ngsrrccess on tlie battlefield In t e r m of total arln~hilationof rhe enemy, and the establtshrrler~tofa siege tr,am." By the time the Macedoni,a~lswere r e d y to m'1rch illto Asla, about 1 lnan In 10 of all Macedonian cittzens was serving in the army." These were the sold~ersthat I'hilip bey ueathed to his son Alexander. Tlle army that Alexa~ldermustered in 334 u.C. ag'1inst the Persl'an Elnpire numbered around 90,000 lnen (Ftgure 5.1)." About 36,000 of those were employed o n 182 warsli~ps,and 9,000 more were In charge of supply vessels and the slege tram. This rne,111t th'at Alexailder had at his dispos'11 about 45,000 troops, of wl~icli8,000, probably Greek lnercenartes and Macedon~dns,were deployed on tlie west coast of- As~aM ~ n o and r not w~tli the iliicleiis ot ,about 37,100 lneil with whoin Alexander crossed the Hellesl70llt.l X 'I'he sources of recruitment tor this nuclei~sof 37,100 rnen were varied.'" The Mcacedo~li,~ns co~ltributedabout 12,000 he'lvy illfailtry 111 1'11 (phal'1ngttec and Iijrpasptsts), that IS, about 37.3 percent of the f o o t n i e ~ i , ~and ~) 1,800 heavy horsemen," ahout 35.2 percent of the cavalryrrten. Also recrulted from withln the borders of the M a c e d o ~ l i ~kingdom ~n but not of Macedon~anancestry were about 900 11ghtcavalry. About 600 of them, the so-called prodrorno~(the scotlts or lancers), were of r111xed ortgui; tlie other 300 were equally dlv~dedbetween P,teoni'lns and Thr,~cians.Some of the 500 or so archers also were inhabitants of Macedonra, altliougli most of them seemed to have come from varlous other places, ~ n c l u d ~ nCrete.22 g Tlle next source ot M a c e d o ~ l ~recruitment ~ln was 11.1 the territories of thelr netglibors-co~npr~s~ngabout 7,500 light infantry (500 of them were Agrianians, and tlie rest were Odrysians, Triball~ails,and Illyrlans)." 'I'hese people were all from the upper p'art ot the Bdlka~lpeninsula. On the south,
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
115
another n e ~ g h b o r ~ nstate, g Greek Thessaly, prov~ded1,800 cavalrymen, that IS, half of the heavy cavalry and about a th~rd,or 3.5.2 percent, of the total nuinber of horsernen.'"*IIie t h ~ r dsource of recruitment was in the Greek allied states-wh~ch contr~buted7,000 heavy inf'tntry (about 21.8 percent of the nucleus's footmen) and probably 600 light cavalry (about 11.7 percent of the horsemen)." The fourth source of si~pplywas nlercenarres. F ~ v ethousand of thetn, likely peltasts (about 15.6 percent of the 111fantry), canie from Greece.''I It is likely that at least a part of the Balkan contingent also served under Alexander as mercenaries, not as members ofstates that had to prov~dexnrlitary support because they were e~therunder the control of the Macedonians or w ~ t h ~t hne ~ rsphere of rnfluence. Only 4 out of every l 0 people of the rrlaln nucleus, the 37,100 rnen under Alexander's comrnand, were Macedonians tlletl; the rest came from other sources-2 canie froln allied Greece, a little less than 2 were Greelc mercenaries, and a llttle inore than 2 were frorn the nelghboring states of the B ~ l k a npen~nsula.These proportrons would change co~lsiderablyrf we also include the advance party of 8,000 dispatched along the coast of Asia Minor and if \ye accept that many rrlernbers of the Balkan contingent were also mercetlarles, not alhes. Yet the most i ~ n p o r t a ~aspects lt of this st'ttistical profile are that, on one hand, the Macedonians const~tutedless than half of h e i r own army (13,800 in all out of 37,100) and that, on the other hand, they also occupred the rnost cruc~alpornts of tact~c'll deploymentall of their infantry and cavalry was heavy. Moreover, within these spec~alties, they had a clear ruajority in heavy infantry (12,000 Macedonians against 7,000 allred Greeks) and were the equals 111 the heavy ca\alry (1,800 Macedonians agatnst 1,800 Thessalrans). Unlike the armies of the perlod of- hopltte warfare, Alexander's army presented a finely balanced arrLIyof drfferent troops. There was 1 ca\alryman for every 6 footmen, which was a necessity for an army on the way to conquer a vast ernpire. About 59 out of every 100 infantrymen were heavy troops, at least 15 were peltasts, 2 3 were l ~ g hinfantrymen t (javel~nrnenand probably also geltasts), and less than 2 were archers. I'he preponderance of the heavy types is even clearer in the cavalry, where they rnonopol~zedinore than two-th~rdsof the contrngent; to t h ~ s we , should probably add the 600 prodromo~,or about I 0 percent of the cavalry. The prodromoi were armed w ~ t hthe sarissa, but it was shorter than the one used by the infantry." This suggests the possib~lrtythat they too were trained to fight as heavy cavalry. Rut the land army under Alexander tells only part of the story when we consider that abotlt l 0 percent of the 90,000 men at Alexander's disposal were deployed 111 supply or s~egeroles, that another 8.8 percent were used to establish and probably control the eastern part of Asia Minor; and that 40 percent (about 36,000 rnen) manned the 182 warships. If mobil~tyi ~ n dtroop divers~ficationwere key features of the M'1cedonran army, another str~lcingelement was the tendency toward el~tismwithin the
I16
Footmen, Horsernett, a d Military Might
ranks. Although all the Macedollla~lscould probably clatm a higher poslt ~ o nthan the rest of the force, there were also gradations of presttge w i t h ~ n the ranks of the Macedontan troops. The army was built like '1 pyrain~d, filth the ktng at the top, followed by Macedon~ansand then Greeks, allled troops, and mercenaries; gresttge decreased from the top of the pyrarn~dto its bottom. For example, the Macedolllall heavy cakalry, or Co~rlpallioncavalry, as ~t was called, was dtvtded Into fourteen squadrons of 200 to 225 men each, 8 ot which accompan~edAlexander in h ~ invasion s of Asra. Ahotlt half of- the 14 squadro~lsserved as h ~ spersonal bodyguard, and 1 squadron among them, the Royal Squadron or agema, fought d~rectlynext to its king. This. pattern was closely followed in the Macedonian heavy intantry, which tncluded three masn groups: Foot Cornpanions or rrlell from lower Macedonta, Towns~neiiCompanions or men from Macedon~antowns, and the hypa5pists. 'The Co~npanionswere d~videdinto 14 hr~gades,each ot abotlt 1,500 men, for a total of about 21,000. A ltttle less than half of them ( 3 br~gadesof Foot and 3 of Townsmen Cornpantons, for a total of 9,000 rnen) went w ~ t hAlexander. Their structure too followed a pattern of elitism. For tnstance, there was a spec131 group of Foot C o ~ n p a n ~ o nwho s followed the king on spectal ceremonies and who fought next to htm in battle.'8 Bilr the hlghest positior~of- prestige w~thinthe intantry structure seerns to have been glvcll to the 3,000 hypasp~stsor shield-bearers. They were, N.G,I,. Hammond matntatns, the I<~ng'sown infantry. All of them went with Alexander when he invaded The ~nclustonof different army units and the credtlon of elite groups within them was not a new phenomenon in warfare. Consider, for example, the Spartan h~ppetsor the l'heban Sacred Band or Xerxes' Im~nortals.I11 terms of different troop types, the Persltlns again provide a splendtd example w ~ t ht h e ~ rheavy and I~glitarchers, heavy and i ~ g h spearmen, t and the t7ewilder1iig v a r ~ e t ~ eofs cavalry. And if the I'ersians seemed not t o have been able to tntegrate the varloiis unlts 111to a hdrn~onsouswhole, consider the Theban Epaminondas who combined hoplites, light infantry, and cavalry in a very good balance at Mant~nea.Yet Eparrt~nondasrernatned the great exception of hts age. N o other c o ~ n r n ~ ~ nbefore d e r Philip and Alexander was able to g r o ~ n p every t element of h ~ army s to play its role on cue tn the midst of the battlefield's mayhein. This was because both I'hil~p and Alexander sutted thelr requests to the ddkantages and hrnltat~o~ls of the d ~ f ferent army types. The Macedonian heavy infantry was clearly Inspired by the Greelc hopI~tes.It deployed ~n a phalanx format~on(which was longer th,m it was deep); tt relied on serrted ranks; and it treasured rts esprit de corps more than indivtdual bravery, thus measunng its effic~encyas a collective entity, not 111 personal terms. Yet, as d~scussedearlter, there were cruc~aldifferences between phalangttes and hopl~tes:the weapons (sartssa against
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
117
the armor (lrttle or n o arlnor agalnst heavy a r ~ n o r ) the , shield (0.62 meters against 0.91 4 meters3'), the tact~caldeployment (5 spearheads agalnst 1 or, at the most, 2z'), the pha1,lngite's soc~alstatus (the phalanglte w,~ssuperlor to non-Macedon~ancornb,~tmts,but he was not part of the rulrng class of the state-a role reserved to the aristocracy). Althor~gliit IS nonsense to Imagine Alexander's phalar~g~tes to be a ruatch, tor instance, for the Roman leglon~riesIn terrns of flexllxlity, 1' readirlg of Arrian clearly conveys the image of a phalanx able to engage in maneuvers unknown to classtcal Greece, with the poss~bleexception of the S p a r t a n ~ . ~The ' Macedonic~nphalanx could fight not only in the t y p i c ~ long l line nude farnous by the Athen~ansat Marathon but also in a varlety of format~ons.It could beconle a colutnn for greater penetration (much like the Thebans at Leuctra), either its front unbroken or in an obl~questand filth one of the two flanks refused; it could assume the form of a square as protection against horsemen; or ~tcould forln a wedge and, ltke a sh~p'sram, batter the llne of its opponents in prep'1ratlon for the fi11'11 blow. z4 The reasons for the molxl~tyof the Macedon~anphalanx are varled. The ph'llangites carried less arrnor than the hopl~tes,and their shtelds, now hung froin neck str'lps, 110 longer required rhe rigid posit~onof rhe hoplite phdlanx. Yet in spite of its rnob~llty,the ,Macedonian phalanx st~llremalned a rather cumbersome formation, at ~ t best s only on flat or relatively flat terrain and st~llvulnemble on the flanks and rear. I-Iowever, Alexander's phal'lnx could eltller transform some of its members into lighter sold~ersor it could rely on a relat~velyvast array ot lrght intantry to protect its flanl<s. In the first case, I assume, as HL4~nn1ondInaltlt'xns, that the h y p , ~ s p ~ ~ s tl~o r t n ~ ~ l l y fought in a phalanx formation and thus w ~ t ha sartssa bttt that, on occasion, they cotlld also operate In a rnore open role with a different weapon and in lighter artnor. Or, as Markle argues, it n u y be that the h y ~ ~ ~ s p lfiere s t s always armed with the more manageable hopl~te If either scenarlo IS correct, then ~tmeant that 3,000 ruen out ot 19,000 Macedonian and Greelc he,~vysoldiers (to use the number of Alexander's effectlves at the crossing of the Hellespont) could eltller operate on the flanks of their phalanx or engage In ~ndividualoperations in areas where the heavy, closely serr~edsoldier was at a disadv.~ntage. Also, one-th~rdof Alexander's infantry at the Hellespont, 12,500 men in all, was made up of lighter soldiers who could fight at thetr best in broken terrain. The only shortcoming his army had was in longrdnge firepower since only 500 of the 32,100 footmen seeined to have been archers. Rut probably this was not a bad arrangement because mtssile units, except at Granicus, apparently played a ruinor role in all ruajor battles. Yet in spite of the continued i ~ n p o r t ~ ~ of n cthe e phal'~ngite,one of the other keys to Macedon~ansuccess was the cavalry. When the Thebans had met the Spartans at Leuctra, the pertorrnance ot their cakalry had been an essetltlal element In bring~ngthe Spartdns to their
l l8
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
knees. But Leuctra r e ~ n a ~ n ean d o d d ~ t y11.1 t h ~ srespect when compared t o what had happei~edbefore o n Greelc battlefields.'Woreover; the Theban cavalry probably had been ennteshed In the lnainstrea~not the battle by ch,ance rrlore that1 by deliberate plC1n. It would not be so wlth Alexander, whose battle plans were usually centered on the crucial role that h ~ heavy s horsc~nencould play. Nonetheless, the Macedontan cavalryntert, like all horsemen of the ancient world, operated In the midst of great difficult~es. Their mounts had no horseshoes, which meant that their use o n hard terrain In particular and their endurance on any surface In general were quite lim~ted.The riders the~nselvesused prllnltlve spurs and had 1x0 proper saddles, wli~chwere introduced only in the t h ~ r dand fourth centuries An.--a problert~that cornpelled the r ~ d e rto place most of his weight on the back, not on the flanks, of the horse, w h ~ c hgre'ttly d ~ n ~ i t ~ r s h e~dperfortnance s as a warnor. But the most Important I~andicapwas certainly the lack of stirrups, which were apparently introdt~cedonly in the sixth century A.1). l'he absence of stirrups lnlpl~edlittle stability, forc~ngthe horseman to use otdy the strength of his body to del~verattacks either by spear or by sword. Moreover, horses were expensive, hard to rnalntain, and a sertous logtstical problem because of the amount of food atld water that they consumed.+' F~tially,even if all these problems were solved, there were added complications: Once on the battlefield, horses were hard to control and apparently of little use as shock units aga~nstdetermined, spear-ar~ned~nfantrymen since the moment the r ~ d e rdecided to exchange speargotnts with the opposing footinan, his horse and thus hls security became vulnerable. If all thls ir~lpliedthdt the h o r s e ~ n ~ ~role n ' s seemed to be confined to supportlng other units, ~t d ~ dnot necessarily mean that he was tinimportant. Riders could be used for reconnaissance, although this was not one of the best practlced arts of ancient peoples; they could defend the flanks and rear of the line; they could even attack a disordered phalanx; and they were certainly deadly in pursuit. The greatness of the Macedonian ~nnovationwas, however, a n extens~onof the roles of both infantry and cavalry. The Macedonlari solution to the problein was a combmation of personal skill, irnproved weapons, and, rrtost ot all, cooperation between dtfferent army unlts. Unlike most Greeks, except the Thess'111ans and p~rtr'dly the Thebans, the Macedon~anshad always inatnta~nedthe tradit~onof a strong cavalry. 'The highest level ot tnilitary prestige within the Macedon~anarmy belonged to members of the heC1vycavalry, a role for which xnen of the upper level of Macedon~ansoclety lntist have prepared themselves since their youth. For instance, at the age of 14, the royal pages were already cap'11de of serv~ngas companions of the king during the hunt.'x Although horsemanship played an Important role in t h e ~ rupbrtnging, the Macedonians also adopted a type of spear that, a t least against the Persians, seeitled to have glven them a gre'tt adkanrage: At the l ~ t t l eof the Granlcus Rlver,
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
I19
"Alexander and his g~ldrdswere gettlng the best of ~t lthe fightl, not only through tlie~rforcefulness and their drsctpl~ne,but because they were fighting wtth stout corrtel-wood lances against short javel~ns."~" If there was a problem, it was that even the strong cornel-wood spear would bre,ak at first Impact, as happened a t the Granicus River ("In the ~nellayAlexander's lance was b r o k e ~ i " ~ This ~ ) . contpelled the rtder e ~ t h e rto call tor a new spear, as Alexander dld though ~llltlallywltho~itsuccess (his royal aide Aretas "had also broken hts lance""), or to lceep stabbrng hrs opponent w ~ t h what was left o f the spear, as Aretas was dotng, "putt~ngup a brave fight wlth the h d f of 111s broken fieapo11."~' Allother so1utio11-probably the most common-was to drop the broken weapon and to use the slaslirng sword: When the I'erslan Spithrtdates was o n the point of k~lltngAlexander at the C;ranlcus River, Cle~tus,son of Dropldes, "drove at Spithridates' shoulder wttli hts cleaver and shore rt off."43 The cornel-wood spear does not explain, however, how the Macedonian heavy cakalry could iulfill a f~ulct~on-shock-t1lI-tt h,ad been denled t o other horsemen. The Tliessalian heavy cavalry, for Instance, also behaved spler~d~dlya t Issus ( " w ~ t h great slaughter [they] overthrew the b a r b a r ~ a t l s " ~and ~ ) at Gaugamela (" ltheyj fought glor~ously"~'),although fightrng again In a more orthodox manner-using two spears, one t1irow11 as javeltn, the other used for Macedonian horserrtansh~pcannot be a n alternative expla~ldtionon the basis thdt rhelr ridlng ab~lityallowed the Macedonians to use two hands to handle the cornel-wood spear and strll keep thetr balance on horsebacl<. What can be expiairled by weapons, horsemansh~p,or good protective arnlor (whlch it seems they had) 1s only why the Macedonian cavalry was supenor to a secrton ot the Pers~ancavalry but lrttle else. The pro1)lerrt In ruost cases was not t o defeat the enerny horsemen alone but to b r ~ n gthelr ~nfantryat bay. It 1s here that the heavy Infantry of the Macedonian army played rts decrsive role. 'I'he torrnat~onsthat both the Macedontan and the 'Thessal~dnheavy cavalry assumed clearly convey the ~rnpresslo~l rhat the horsemen o p e r ~ t e dln an offenytve role. At the battle of Gaugarnela, the Greek allled lrght cavalry deployed In tts r~orrnalrectangular formation, with a frontage of 16 rnen and a depth of 8, for a total of 128 l~orsemen.~'It fids cledrly a deployment that was useful either for l~arasstngenemy Irnes, w ~ t hone ranlc after the other rrloving forward and then turning back after launching thetr javeltns, or, more likely, for defending the flanks of a friendly untt. The story 1s clulte drfferent witli both the Macedon~ansand the Tliessalians. The Macedonian squadrons deployed In tr~angulartorlnations, and the 'Thessal~ansquadrons allgned thelnselves ln thelr custorrlary rhomboid Both were shock formatrons-more clearly so tn the case of the arrow-shaped Macedonians, a ltttle less so wrth the diantond-shaped 'Thessal~ans,where shock and eaye of maneuver a t every corner of the rhombus were combined. Yet In spite of
120
Footmen, Horsernett, a d Military Might
the offetls~ve~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ ot b ithe l ~ fto~r ne~s~ a t ~even o n , Alexander's cc~v,ilrycould not defeat an enemy ~nfantrystand~ng~ t ground s w~tlilong spears protruding against the breasts of the horses and the hod~esot t h e ~ rriders. It was here that the heavy 111f'mtry would enter the scene, operating in 1' number of ways but usrrally in close cooperatton wtth their heavy cavalry. As will be shown later, tlie Macedontan phalang~tescould begtn a clash w ~ t hthe oppos111g ~ntantry,plann~ilge ~ t h e rto defeat them on t h e ~ rown or, if t111s proved to be d~fficult,to open the ranks of tlie enemy so tliat thetr cavalry could pierce the ltne and del~verthe decisive blow either on the flanks or rear. They could also s~nlplyp111 thelr enemy counterparts w h ~ l ethe horseme11 cut them to pleces agaln at flanks or rear. Of course, all t h ~ sassumes that tlie Macedon~anhorsexnen would dispose of the enerny cavalry, whtcli was, '1s I will show, often the case. Otherwise, the infantry would h,ave to play a delicate role In the tlmrng of tlie attack-hold~ng tlie footmen at bay while the enenty horserrren went down to defeat. Moreover, at the same tune, the Macedon~anl~ghtersold~ersalso would enter the actlon, e~therIn support of tlie~rhorsemen (as w ~ l be l shown for the battle of the Grantcus h e r ) or t o make sure tliat no threat carne to the flanks of thetr lrne (as they d ~ at d Issus). It a p'lttern repeated In 1' number of varlatlons in the three major battles leadtng to the conquest of the Pers~anEmgtre.
The Ways of Alexander: Granicus, Issus, and Gaugarnela When Alexander crossed the Hellespont, 32,000 footmen and about 5,100 cavalryrrten accoriipan~edhirn, but he had less than half his infantry at h ~ s first major battle at the "Aslan Gates" on the shores of the Gran~cusR~ver (Ftgure .5.2).4"There, 111sforce of 18,100 men faced the Perslan army corn~nandingthe road to the satrapal cities of Sardis and Daskyleiort and th~is control of Asi,a Mlnor. O w n ~ o s timportant source, Arr~an,describes the Persian battle order as having 20,000 horsemen lined up on the opposlng s ~ d eof the river, backed up by another 20,000 Greelc rriercenary hoplites on the ground thdt gently rose f,~trlyclose to the r~ver'sedge.$" A. M. Devine curs these numbers drasrically, assign~ngno more than 10,000 Persian horsexnen and 5,000 to 6,000 footinen." Also, riiodern research seerns t o downplay the d~fficultyof the obstacle presented by the rlver. The Granicus is generally descr~bedas be~ngwtde but not deep, wtth banks that are fairly easy to navigate.?' The encounter, says Dev~rte,was furious but short, and the casualties infl~ctedto the enemy were vastly inflated: "Granlcus . . . was a relat~velyperygheral battle, ~nvoivingcotnparat~velysmall forces and, from the tact~calpoint of view, sirnple and straiglitf~rward."~~ Dev~ne'sinterpretdtioll 1s entlang, yet to accept h ~ battle s order also lneans disc,~rding
121
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
(;reek mcrccnary hoplites 1
1
I
1
J 1 , 1 ) \ l ,
I
I'crsian cavalry
Thessalians, Allied Greeks, Thracians
Plialangitcs
;ranicus, 3.34 B.<:. l
1
2
3
4
S
(:ompanions
l I1 ypaspists 2 I1rociromoi 3 I'aeonians
4 Socrates' (:ompanions S Alrxandcr's Royal Squadron h Agrianians and arclzers I
FIGURE 5.2 the figures from our n ~ o srellable t source, Arnan. Moreover, even d we scale down the Persian nr~rnericalsupertortty, Alexander's task still seems to have been forb~dd~itg-to attack an ertelity rn a strong r~atilralposttlon. Moreover (and o n t h ~ sDevine would probably agree), Gr~llrcusWAS Important because lt was "the foundatton stone of Alexander's owl1 world-k~ngdo~n."'~ The wlsc Greek mercenary leader Memnon had strortgly discouraged the Pers~ansdtraps fro111taklng ,I stand at the "As~tlnGates." The M'xcedon~an infantry, he had argued, was superior to his own. Thus, it would be wise to avold a pitched battle. Artr~tionwould be the key to their success. Let us b w t ~our crops, fodder, and towns belilnd us, he urged, and let Alexander advance into a scorched land with n o means of sustenance In the lorig r ~ ~ nIt. ~would ' have been a wise dec~slonbecause, ~f we accept Plutarch's words, Alexa~lderwas alre,ldy 200 t'xlents in debt ,lt t h ~ sstage, the Macedon~anarmy's coffers contatned only 70 talents, and the extrttng provtsion? for the arrny could not last ruore than thirty But the I'ersi,lrt generals who would have to ~ ' ~ c r ~ fthe i c ela11ds under thelr own rule to follow Mem-
122
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
non's adv~cedecided otherw~se.The nC~tur,1lobstacle offered by the Gra111cus R~verwould, they believed, give them vlctory. The odds seemed t o be with the Persians. In the end, however, this proved to be the only thing in their favor. They begm w ~ t h3 faulty decision, they contrnued bemg outtliought and outfought wlie11 tlie two armies carne into direct contact, and they erlded in bitter defeat. But it had not been easy for Alexander. For a moment, even his own life had been 111 linmediate danger. At the outset, the problem had been how to meet the cavalrymen 11ning up the opposite side of the rlver. Behind them on the ridge, in another Ime, the Greek lnercetldries cut the d~stdnthor~zon." Yet the enemy's strange position-cavalry on the edge of tlie rlver with no infantry support and heavy infantry at the back without cavalry support-meC1nt that Alexander's 18,100 inell had to face only a n almost eqilal number a t the outyet, if we accept Arrian, or even enloyed nu~nericalsuperiority, i t we agree with Dev~ne'sthesis. Moreover, the odds In this case seerned to favor Alexander, who could combine cavalry, both light and heavy, w ~ t hh ~ sbest infantry and about 500 archers and 500 Agrrantan javelinmen. The tact wa5 that Alexander had his best troops with h ~ mat the Gran~cus-all of h ~ M'~cedon~:ln s heavy infantry, all of the c'~valry,and seem~nglythe elite of his lrght infantry, that IS, the archers and Abrria~i~ans. Moreover, the opposlng cavalry was probably deployed in the worst or the least ~magirt,~tive way poss~ble,like a line of infantry-it would be "a cdvalry struggle, though o n infantry line~."~"lie reason for the faulty deployment rrlight have been the need to give the Persian cavalry the pride of pl'xce, '1s IIdns Delbruck argue^.^' Or, Inore likely, it inay hdve been 1' lack of confidence in the Greek merceliary hoplites' dbil~tyto matcli the Macedonian phalang~tesor] the basis of Meinnon's adv~ceor even as a way to show Memnon that the rulers of the ernpire, the Persians, could perform 1' better function than their Greelc mercenariel;. Of course, another more logical reason could have been the intention to subject tlie Macedonians crossing the river to a n u n ~ ~ n s w e r ~ shower ~ b l e of javel~ns-a function t11,lt the hoplites could certainly ~ i operform. t The correcr solut~oneven in th17 case, however, \vould have been to line up blocks o f heavy infantry between the javelin-armed cav'dry. There were other problems worrying Alexander-how to cross the river in an unbroken line, where to strilte, what procedure to adopt in the strike, how to acqiure local superlonty, and how to proceed once this goal had been reached. The first thing that Alexander was forced to d o was to match the length of the enemy deployment. If we accept the trad~cional20,000 men for the cc~valry,t h ~ xneant s that h ~ ls~ n was, e in p ~ r t sh'11lower , than h ~ s enemy's, his cavalry at the wings 1 0 deep and 111s infantry in the center 8 deep."' The river's bottom and, in places, its current were obstacles to the uniforin~tyof the Macedon~:ln deployment. Alexander solved the problem '
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
12.3
by ddvallclng obliquely. It must have been a slow process, and as the Macedoiilans drew near to tlie oppostte shore, they must have been the target of the unar~swerableshowers o t Persian javelins. B L IAlexander's ~ plan was not s~mplyt o r e x h the other s ~ d eof the rlver wlth h ~ soldiers s closely p'lcked and in as ordered a l ~ n eas posstble in the waters of the Granicus River. 'She Macedonian right wing attacked the enerliy left. There, the long s p e ~ r of s the iM'tcedon~anheavy horsemen, together with the ~n~sslles of the javelinmen and probably the archers (who had advanced with the horsemen), tortured the Persians with a deadly cor~ibiilationof weapon^.^' But the decis~onof the battle would not conle from the confrontat~onon tlle r ~ g hwlng. t (We Itnow little about the actlolls on the center left or left wing, especially if we consider unreliable Diodorus, who ruentlons a great effort on the part of tlie Tl~essL~l~ans.hL) The Issue would be resolved ,qt the center left of the enemy line, where Memnon, h ~ son, s and tlie Persian commanders stood." It was here that the Macedon~ansfirst strucl<-with a unlt of heavy i~lfarltry(probably the 3,000 hypaspists) and three unlts of cC1valry,a squadron of Companion cavalry, 600 prodromoi, and tlie P a e o i ~ ~ a nAcs.~~ cording to Uevine, this was a feint designed t o draw the Persian cavalry oft the rlver edge and thus open them up to a Macedonl'in c o i ~ n t e r a t t a c k , ~ ~ The presence of tlie Iieavy l~lfantrysuggests, however, that Alexander hoped to pin the eneiny center; then, in his sub5eqiient attack, lie would lead tlle Royal Squadron and ~nflictdntnC1geat the most vulnerable p o ~ n of t tlie line. Things did not work out qulte that way, for the leading contingent of the Macedonian tirst strike cotlld not hold its own and had to withdraw In d~sorder.But the struggle had still achieved someth~ngfor Alexander, wlio struck quickly Into the elienly line after rally~ngsome members of the retreating tirst wave." A desperate conflrct ensued. For a rnoment, Alexander's own l ~ f eWAS in d'lnger: After defeating the c'~valry that w,~slined up on the r~ver's shore and already battered by tlie first Macedori~ancontingent, he was counterattacked by tlie son-in-law of K ~ n gD a r i u ~ ,Mitliridates, who rode at the head of a group of horselnen arranged In a wedge shape. In the end, here too Alexander survived by gallling control of the enemy center left."' The breakthrough came, accord~ngto Plut'1rc11 and Polyaetlus, when tlle Macedonian gha1'1nx crosced the river in support of the Macedonian horseruen." 'The Persian cavalry broke and fled before their Greek mercenary hoplites, 11ned up on the ridge, could ~ntervene.Now, the hophtes would have thelr turn. They t r ~ e dto surrender, but Alexander gave them n o quarter. They were traitors fighting against their own race in support of the Pers13n c a ~ ~ s eThe . " ~ Macedonl'm ~nfantryadkanced to p111 the Greek mercenarles; the cavalry massacred tliem from tlie flanks and rear. Except for the few left for dead on the battlefield, Arrian says, only 2,000 of tlie 20,000 Greek mercen,lries surv~ved.Alex'ander sent them 11.1 chalns to Greece to
124
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
h x d labor."' Devine's Inore sober accounts o t the enerny losses ass~gns 1,000 casualttec to the Perstan cavalry and probably 2,000 to 3,000 to the Greek mercenaries." The battle o t the Granlcus River (F~gure5.2) is a splendld example of the sophtsticatton of tlie Macedon~anarniy. Strategrcally, tt showcased Alexander's abllity to grasp the rnitlatrve and to deliver a krlling punch. Tactically, tt fie agree with Devine, it fias a s~iperI>d~splayof a clever stratagen~--the feint of the rnttral attack-to draw the eneiny out of p o s t t ~ o nBut . ~ ~the rnost crucial aspect of the encounter was the subtle cornllinatlon o t the roles played by the various unlts. The act1011 on the r ~ g h twing had been a clever cornbtnatron of tlie Con~pantoncavalry wttli the archers and the javel~nmen. At the center, the first atte~iiptto use heavy rnfantry and heavy and light cavalry together had apparently faded but not so much from lack of cooperat~otiamong the vartous arms as from the strength and bravery of tlie enemy. Yet the cornbtned attack had still s~noothedthe way tor the prerctng blow on the part ot Alexander a11d the Royal Squadron. Here, the role seems to have been reversed-the cavalry p ~ n n e dthe foe and the rnfantry dellvered the decrsrve blow, tt we accept Harurnond's interpretatton that tlie real breakthrough at the center came only when the phalang~tescrossed the rlver and caused the sttll tighttng Perstan cavalry to flee.7i Rut even t f we d o not accept Hantmond's view, the phalangrtes reappeared trt a more customary role when they brought the Greek lnercenarles to bay. They pinned t h e ~ ropponents whtle the cavalry destroyed them. Thrs pattern of cooperatton between the various army units was again the ltey of Alexander's approach at Issus, $1year later, on the banks ot the Plnarus Rlver (F~gure5.3). There IS no doubt that the tnaneuvers of the Perstan king Darrus before the battle of Issus were clever. He cut Alexander frorii his supply base, captured and slaughtered h ~ swounded and s ~ c k ,and marched In an area 1x1 wlitch Alexander's arniy Iiad to face a much larger h ~ s t . ~ W o w e v e he r , has been harshly crrtlctzed tor hts chorce of the battlefield, whlch was clearly unsutted to the character~st~cs and lumbers of h ~ sold~ers. s C. L. Murlson dtsagrees wtth this view, clatin~ngthat Ddrtus's tntention Iiad been dtfferent and that he wa.; compelled to f ~ g h twhere he had not intended. D a r ~ u s fianted to cut the Macedonmn army 11.1 tkvo and defeat ~t111 detail. He falled because of ttintng. In spite of thrs, hts plan had been "extremely sound," and he could strll teach much to Alexander "about the inlportance of sound strategy and thorough and caref~rlrec~nna~ssance.'"~ Dev~neagrees on the effectiveness of Darrus's strategtc surprrce, but he does not accept Murison's view that Dartus intended t o defeat the Macedonians rri d e t a 1 1 . ~ ~ The Great King certa~nlyo u t s n ~ ~ ~ rAlexander ted in the 1111tia1stages of the campargn of Issus, and it was only sheer determinatron against seetntngly rlnposstble odds that allowed Alexander t o reverse tlie s~ruation.Yet when the two armies Inet near the P ~ n a r u sRlver, now dentifled as the Payas
126
Footmen, Horsernett, a d Military Might
R~ver,'; Alexander's 5,300 cakalry and 26,000 infantry troops stlll faced 1' much larger enemy, although we must reject the 600,000 men that unspeclfied historians, Arrian says, attnbilte to the P e r s ~ a n s Numbers, .~~ however, were 11ot the r e d problem f'lc~ngAlexander. The 111n1tedextent of the battlefield forced the Perstans to deploy their men to "an unserviceable depth."79 'Th~sdeployment would dirn~nishthe odds against Alexander it the battle did not last long enough to allow the format~onw ~ t hgreater depth to overcome a thinner Izne. The nature of the terrain d ~ dnot appear to be a h a n d ~ cap for Alexander's forces. Actually, the presence of the Mediterranean Sea on the left allowed h ~ l nto anchor h ~ llne s t o an unflankable spot. Also, the h~llson h13 r ~ g h eventually t gave sin~ilarsafety to his flank. Yet some problems developed In t h ~ sdirection before the battle because Danus had dispatched 20,000 l ~ g h soldiers t o n the left. Although some of them would remain o n that wing for the forthcoming battle, others had the task of clintbzng the hills and thus outflank~ngthe Macedonian right \~rng.~O It was 1 ' threat that Alexander had to meet before clL~shing w ~ t hthe enemy. After making rather elaborate preparatzons to meet the ~ h a l l e n g e , he ~ ' finally let his Agrianian javel~nrnenand a few archers rrtove agalnst the enerny on the helghts, e'ls~ly dislodgng the Persl'ln llght ~nfantryfrom their outfl'mk~ng position and forcing them to flee to the srr~nznitof the h ~ l I s . ~ the ~ u main t problern lay elsewhere. The waters ot the Pinarus R~verseem to have presented no d~fficulty,but the bC~nks, e~peci~ally along the enetlly center, were "zn nlany places prec~pitons,"and where "they appeared more accessible," they in tact had been made d~kficultto negotiate through the stockades b u ~ l t by the Pers~ans.~' Darius's plan relied on the ab~lityof h ~ sCreek mercenary ~nfantry,deployed in the center and supported on the left by the heavy Aslar~infantry of the Oardaces, to contaln the Macedon~anphal,lngites, who h,~dt o overcome not only the enemy spears but also the very d~fficultterraln. The Persian left was to harass the M a c e d o n ~ a r ~ g h tand, it the troops sent to the h~llssucceeded ~n outflanking t h e ~ renemy, to envelop ~ t But . the most 1111portant role was gtven to the Persian right, where the best cavalry was massed, its alm to roll the Macedonian left and, whrle the opposing cerlters were pinned, to attack the phal,lng~tes'flank or rear. Alexander, who had been outscouted and outsmarted 117 the 1171tzalstages of the campaign, reversed the sztuation on the battlefield. l l e was able to deploy and then to reshuffle h ~ sIlne, rely~nglnainly on the nature of the ground or the screening actlon of his other troops. When he saw that his left was in great danger, he kept the Cornpan~onswith h l n ~but transferred the Thessalian cavalry o n h ~ left s near the Creek allled horsemen and the Cretan archers and Thrac~anjavelinmen. The Thessal~answere ~nstructed to deploy b e h ~ n dthe front line.8VCleay, Alexander's ~ntentionwas to use
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
127
h ~ Greek s cavalry on the left as a smokescreen to entice the Perstall c'~valry to attack and then counterattack the Persians in d ~ s o r d e r . ~ ~ 'I'he erlertly lef.t, where he would launch his rnain attack, preserlted problems for Alexander. The terrain, as the i~utialdevelopment of the battle would show, was unsu~tablefor a cavalry attack. Clearly, t h ~ had s also bee13 on Daritls's mind. Instead of following the usual I'ersian pattern of attempt~ n g;I double etlvelopment, the Gre,~tKulg had, ~n the end, concentrated n ~ o s of t his horsemen on the rtght, choos~ngenvelopment on a single flank. 'I'he problem for Alexander was, however, that the Persian left still reln'1111ed rel,tt~velystronger slrlce ~t was l ~ n e dup w ~ t hthe Carciaces ( A r r ~ a n calls them " l ~ o p l i t e s " xand ~ varlous units of cavalry, supported by the rest of the 20,000 l ~ g h infantrymen t who had been sent toward the hills to outflank Alexander's r ~ g h t .L,lunch~nga cavalry attack on the Pers~anleft would have been su~cidal.The rocky course of the rtver allowed only careful, slow rrlovertlent for rnen on horseback. 1\11 this wotlld have taker~place while they were an easy target for the l ~ g h t~tlf~lntry. Finally, those horses who survived the crossing would have to face the spears of the card ace^.^^ Nonetheless, Alexander's cho~ceswere l~mited.HIS center could still glve him kictory, and his left could corrlplete a holding action and, with h ~ Thess sal~ans,del~vera nasty surprise, but his best option was still to attack where the enenty was weakest. And that was the Persian lett. But first, he rrtade sure that 111s r ~ g h tflank was secure. H e posted two squadrons of Companions with a few javelinmen and Macedonian archers a t a r ~ g h tangle facing the hills to contain any threat, in case the Persians who were on the summit dec ~ d e dto descend on the Macedon~anline." In front, he deployed hls hypaspists, the rest of his Cornpanloll cavalry, and 111sl~ghtcavalry, prodrorno~, and Paeonians. The rest of his Agrianians (the javelinmen) and archers tool< posltlon at the extreme rlght. The hypaspists, led by Alexander on foot, charged on tlie double, both to surprlse the Persians w ~ t hthe suddenness of their attack and "to receive the less hariri from the Persian archers."" It was the beginning of a n encounter th,~twould soon develop Into full-scale action, with the cavalry join~ngthe fray after the infantry and likely w ~ t hthe Agr~anians and Macedonian archers puntrneling the Cardaces and Persian cavalry from the flank. It ended with the defeat of the Persian left and with the kictorioris Macedon~ansdriving toward the center, where Dar~rlsstood."" The Macedonian breakthrough had corne just at the right rnornent because the sltuatlon was growing increas~nglyd~fficultIn the center. The phal'tng~tes had attacked tlie Greek mercenaries with great bravery, but the stubbornness of their opponents, the d~tficultterrain, and the presence of palisades rendered the Macedon~antask kery h'~rci. Actu,~lly, at one p o ~ n t ,due to the steepness of the banks, a gag opened In tlie Macedon~ans' own I~ne.Although the historical sotlrce is not very clear here, it scents that the Pers~ans'
128
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
Greek ~nercetl~~ries counteratt'~cked just where the g , ~ pappe'?red. The Macedontans fought back vallantiy; after all, they were named "invtncible." Moreover, the great ethnic rivalry with the Greeks gave the111an added incentlve to fight ;IS hard as possible." But the key lnolnellt in t h e ~ rfavor carne when the men on the Macedon~anrtght, seeing the~rown center In difficulty, turned left and, "overlapp~ngthe now broken Persian left, by an obltqiie move, attacked and were in a t h r ~ c e cuttlng down the [Greek1 tnercenartec."" It was a simple, most effective maneuver-the phalangxtes ptnned tlie erletity tootr~ienwh~lethe cavalry and possibly tlie liypaspists crushed then1 from flank and rear. It had bee11stnlllar to thrs OII the rrdge at the battle of the Cranicus River, but there, the move had bee11 much easier tliarl here on the bitterly bloodled banks of the Pinarus River near the Med~terrslleanSed. The sttuation on the left of the Macedonian Itne had also developed tn the Macedonians' favor. There IS no reason to reject Dev~ne'sinterpretation of the action in t h ~ ssector, even if we d~sagreewrth h ~ r nthat here, 11ot on the right, was tlie Macedonian lnatn strike. According to Devlne, the Persian rtght, which included tlie heaviest cavalry, ~itusthave eastly d~spatched Alexa~lder'sGreek allled csvalrp but had been unable to turn o n the M'tcedonian phalangltes' flank and rear. The Persians had found the Thessal~an cavalry lying in wa~t-had not Alexander told them to deploy on the rear of the front lrrle and thus to rernai~lh ~ d d e nfrom the etlemy? The Thessaltans, probably supported by the Cretan archers and the Thracia~ijavelinrnen, had engaged tlie Perstans, now in disorder, and forced thein to retreat after I' harsh struggle and fi11~11lyto abandon the battlefield once they reali7ed that Darius had fled.9i It was a great victory and brought a large boot): to Alexander (money, women, and even D,Irrus's rnother and wrfrq4),but the grexest prlze of all, Daritrs himself, escaped in spite of a chase o n the part of Alexander that lasted as long as dayltght held.'$ There has been a tendency to rehc?bil~t,lteDarrus's role at Issus. After the death of hts best general, Memnon, a few months before tlie battle, Darius took personal direction of his arined forces. Certainly, he d ~ dwell in the strategic i~pprodchto ISSUS,l ~ u Devine t also argues that D,~rtusshould not be faulted for the disposit~onof 1117 army. He had chosen a strong defensive positior~for his center, and he had concetved a concerted acttoil of cavalry and rnfantry (especially the Greek mercenar~es)to give h ~ r nvictory. He farled because his heavy cavalry on tlie r ~ g h twas taken In by the trap laid by the Greek allied horserrten and because the experience and the battle disciplrrle of i\lex'~nder's army fo~ledother aspects of his pl'tn, such as the light infantry's threat on the Macedontan right. "Wlitle Dartus' plan was sound," says Devine, "his for~itationswere lacking in battle-discipl~neand
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
129
experience of large-scale tactlcal m'moeuvres, and so were unable to tr,Inslate their k~ng'sprojects into effect~veaction."9h Yet it seems to me that there was also a fa~lureof leadership. As leader of h ~ army, s Dari~lsshould have re,llized that the structure of his host gunr'lnteed the collapse of ally elaborate plan, The shortcomings of the Persians in the Great Wars against llellas could he seer) at Issi~stoo: too ~nanytinits, too Inany ethnic groups, a co~lfusedc h a ~ nof command, and a wrong deployment (it was too deep to be effective). Con~plexplans are often the culprits in battlefield d~sasters. Moreover, even it we revise our assessment of Darius's tactical skill, his leadership was still vastly inferior to Alexander's. Alexander led the first charge agatnst the eiiemy; Darius posttioned h~mselfin tlie center in the trad ~ t ~ o n post a l of the Persian leader yet away from the thick ot the battle. Alexander kept fighting at the head of h ~ troops; s D a r ~ u sfled. But the vietory at lsstls was not only a matter of a great general against a ~ n e d ~ o c r e leader. It was rrla~nlythe tr~umphof combined arins against troops used in lsolat~o~l from each other. Each component of the M~cedoni~a11 llne was given a specific task-the I~ghtinfantry to clear the threat from the right tlar~l<s;tlie hypaspists to lead the frrsc charge against the enemy, soon backed by the cavalry and the l ~ g h ttroops; the phalangites to break or at least to p111tile enemy center; tlie cavalry on the left to delay as long as passible the enemy's rrlaln blow and then to entlce the Persians into a trap. What is remarkable is that all this was est~bllshedbefore the batrle began, as Arr~an~mplles;"~ Alexander, in the role of all ancient generals, did not reruain o n reserve to direct his troops but engaged in combat from the very beginn~i~g, pre\enting or at le,~st h ~ n d e r ~ nany g chdnge in plans. This smooth comb~nationof the various arms reached its highest degree of sophistlcation two years later, i r ~331 H.c., at Gaugarnela (121gure5.4), the battle that dec~dedthe mastery of A s i ~ . The magnltude of the task that Alexander faced at Gnttgarnela grew w ~ t h the p a m g e of About five hundred years later, In the second century AI)., the t ~ n l ewhen Arrian wrote, estimates of the number of Darius's forces on tlie treeless pla~nof Gaugarnela had grown to 40,000 horserneii, I million footmen, 200 scythed chariots, and about 15 elephants.'" In our time, more sober accounts have appeared. E. W. Marsden, for example, has cut these nrr~nbersdrastically-arriving at 34,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry, to wh1c1-1,however, an undeterrn~nednumber o t other foot~nen,Uxians, B,~bylon~:lns,Red Se,I rnen, and Sitacenidns inust be added.100Dev~ne calculates even fewer horserneii (about 25,000) and a few more infantryruen (50,000).'0rIt we accept Marsden, Alexander's forces would then have been either comp,~rableto or even greater thdn D'I~ILIs's-~~~ i~ssun~pt~on that the develop~nentof the battle does not justify. It is clear that the Persians vastly outnurnbered the Macedonian host, which had, according to
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
l31
Arrian, 7,000 cav'dry and 40,000 infantry troops, nutnbers that are accepted by Devine'OL and sl~ghtlyrevlsed by Marsden at about 7,250 horsemen and 4 3,700 tootrnen. 1°' The Persta~ln u i n e r i ~ ~ superiority ~l was cert'tlnly c l e x in cav,~lry,where they had an advantage of 5 to I , if we follow Marsden, or 3.5 to 1, accordzng t o Dev~ne.Some of the Persian horsemen, ltke the Scythians, "riders and horses ,111ke, were betrer protected by defensive armour [than the M a c e d o n i a n ~ J . " 'It~ )rs~ also apparent 111 Arrlan's assessment, even when we discount his "n~~llton,"that Darlus enjoyed superiority in tootinen. Here, however, it was a matter o t large nurnbers trying to make up for poor quai~ty.Except for the 2,000 Greek lnercenarles and the 1,000 guardsmen (called apple-bearers because the shatts of their spears were fitted w~tli golden ,~pples""), these inen were clearly no n1'1tch for the 12,000 Macedon~anplialangttes. Ddrius's deployntent showed that he was aware ot t h ~ sweakness. On the left wing, he Ilned up 1' vast array of cavalry. O n the right, he deployed a for~nidablenrr~nberof horsemen together w ~ t hSyr~ans,Medes, and Albanian footrrten.lOWis3-line tormatlon 111 the center had 15 elephants and 50 char~otsin the first line. In the second line, ~ n o v i ~from l g the right, Darius posted Mardtan archers and Carian and Ind~ancavalrymen, then a unlt of Greek mercenaries, the I'ersiait ~ntantryguards called the apple-bearers, the klng hiinself with his gu,~rdc,~v'~lry,atld finally another unit of Greek mercenarles. The rest of the infantry, in deep format~on,was deployed 111 the third 11ne.l~''The Persian cerlter was clearly In a detenslve posture, tor 11 would be faclng Alexander's ph'~l,~ngites.Yet the presence of the c'~valry and especially the deployment of the elephants and chartots In front suggest a certaln offensive potent~alzt we also take Into cons~derationthe role that D , ~ r ~ uh,ad s in nl~ncifor his c11'1r1ots and h15 assunlptlons about the Macedonlans' limited cho~cesof actlon. Dartus's plan, o n the surface, was neither ~~nreasonable nor s ~ m p l ~ s t ~ c . The d~sposit~on of the center neg'lted the core of the pofier of Alexander's army 0 1 1 the field-111s superlorlty In Iieavy Infantry; the strong wrngs opened a great poss~bilttyof success for the usual I'erslan plan ot double envelopment. If the Macedoni:~nsadvanced with their footmen, they would have to go through the elephants and chariors of the first ltne and then face an array ot cavalry, heavy infantry, and archers around the king. If the Macedonians '~ttackedwlth tllelr horsemen, they fiould confront ,I vastly supertor host, orltnu~nberlngthem 5 to I. If they re~nalnedIn a defensive posture, then the chariots and the enc~rclingcavalry would have brought then] to defc'~t.The problem for D,Ir~us,however, was that in the end, his plan was full of Iooplioles, not so much because his cliariots came to an Inglor~ousend t ) ~ t rbecause he contrn~rtedh~mselfto a static posture that we'lkened his plan once he t r ~ e dto adapt it to ch,anglng c~rcumstances.He
l32
Footmen, Horsemetz, a d Military Might
'~llowed,I sk~lltulgeneral llke Alexander to r e t a n the lnltl,ltlve at I' key 1110ment of tlie battle, so that tlie Macedonta~icould erther reduce the odds agalrlst li~rnseltor achieve local superiority tri splte of being outnumbered. Alexander's deploy~nentseemed to follow the usud pattern of cakalry at the wtngs, supported by light tnfantry, and heavy infantry at tlie center. Yet he introduced a nutnber ot novel sophistications into this arrangernent. He adopted a deployrrlent that Dev~ne"loosely" descr~besas a "tact~cal ~quare." The Thractans constttuted the rear of the square, tlielr task betng "to wheel around and receive the Perslan attack" if they should see thetr front line surrounded by the etlemy."" The tkvo flatlks were arranged In an unusual triangular deployment. The untts there adopted an organmation In echelon in three ltnes that had hoth a detensive and an attacking potential (see F~gure5.4). For Instance, on the r~ght,Men~das'smercen,Iry cav,llry constituted tlie first I~ne,the Paeontan and the prodromot horsemen tnade up the second, and the Agrianian javellnrnen and archers formed the third 11ne. Then p ~ r t l ~ ~on l l ythe outside, there was a flanktng gudrd prov~ciedby the old mercenary tnfantry under Cleandee The interior ltne of tlirs irregular triangular torrnation was protected by the strong Coriipanion cavalry, screetled on the front by a number ot other llght intantrymen, ~ncludmg more Agrian~anyand archers, and then the hypasptsts next to them. Thts pattern was repeated on the left side of the "tactical square": cavalry o n tlie first and second l~nes,javel~tlsand archers after, and the Ach'xe'm rnercen,Iry infantry as a flanking guard.'"' The tnternal itne here was protected by tlie 'Thessal~anand allied Greek horserner), deployed on the left of the heavy infantry hne. The two extreme phal'tng~teunits were led by Cr'~terusand Slmmlas. It IS clear tliat the heavy infantry at the ends of the plialangtte Itne, tlie hypasplst5 o n the rrght, and the brtgades leci by Sirnintas and Craterus on tlie left had to support the '~ct~otl of t h e ~ cavalry r at the wing. Alexander must have realtzed that, In spite of tlie sophisttcation of hts deployrrtent, cornrrtltting a11 his forces at the sarue tirne or rernaintng In a static, defe~ls~ve posture was su~adal.However, 111s options were qulte lim~ted,for the moment at least. We decided to assume a defenstve stance, but it was a decistori fraught wtth surprises tor Darius. First, Alexander gave orders t o his army to advd~lcestra~ghttoward the center of the Persl'ttl arnly and thus glve the impressrol~that hts own recklessness would s~~iipltfy Dartus's task. At a certatn inoruent, however, he veered to the right,'ll adopting the oblique forrrlatlon that Eparnmond,~shdd used agalrlst the Spartdns at Leuctrd. Alexander's change of dtrect~otiendangered the Pers~anking's plan. He ordered 111srnen o n the lett to extend their ltrle too, so that they \vould still be able to enc~rclethe M a c e d ~ n l a n s . " Yet ~ the problem had not been ~olved.If Alexander's forces reached tlie broken terrain at tlie stde, Darius's chartots, whtch needed a flat, unbrol<en surtace, would have been useless. To prevent thls, D a r ~ u sordered h ~ troops s on the left to '~dvance, ~ n dencir-
'"
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
13.3
cle the Macedonia~~ r~ght,so that the Macedon~ansveerlng tofidrd the 1x0ken ground could be halted. It is at this stage that the first contact of the battle took place, tor Alexander ordered hts mercenary cavalry under Men~dasto advance and charge the Scyth~ancavalry, fihlch had been r~dlng parallel to the Greelc rtg1it.l' 'I'he cavalry battle started badly tor Alexander. Mentdas was beater) back, and the Macedonlall k ~ n gwas forced to order the prodromoi and the Paeonians to enter the fray. The Pers~anscaused great castlaltiec among the Greeks, but tn the end, they were forced to fiee.Ii4 The pattern had been set for the rest of the battle. Alexander's move would force D , ~ r ~ uInto s a n offensive response that Alexander counterattacked ttnmed~ately,gaintng local tactical superiority. Dar~us'sorder of enc~rclementwas aiined at plnnlng the Macedon~an army to the plain so that he could unleash his chariots. While 111sScythtans and Bactrtans were g a n g down to defeat, he d ~ just d that. 7 he attaclc ot the scythed chdr~otswas ,I pathet~cfailure. It was here that the Agrranlalls who had been screening the Companion cavalry would play their assigned role. The) first Inet the chartots wtth a shower of javelins at a distance; then, when the charlots fiere d r a w ~ n gnearer, the Agr~anrans"st~atchedat the reins, pulled down the drivers, and crowding round the horses cut them d ~ w n . " " The ~ few charlots that reached and passed through the Grecl< lrnes Inet a s ~ n ~ l lend. a r The phdlang~tess~nartlyopened tlle~rranks so that the chariots' blades caused them no harm, and then the men of the second h e , helped by a few hypasplsts, rrlassacred the enemy on the Dar~us'ssecolld attack also had fa~led,thls time rn~serably,but tlie battle had not been decided yet. The Persian k ~ n gstrll enjoyed numerical supertority. He could still win, he thought, i f only he could encircle the Macedonian Ime. So h ~ whole s left extended ~tselfand advanced a g ~ l nill an attempt to surround tlie enemy, prompting a quick response from Alexander. He sent the prodromoi under Aretes to rneet the challenge, while he kept the rest of the Companlo11 cavalry, backed by the h y p ~ s p ~ s ttinder s, h ~ command. s It 1s at this polnt, Arrian says, that a gap opened in the Persian Irne because of the attaclc of the Macedontan horseinen or, inore Itkely, because Dartus might have overexterlded h ~ 11ne s In an attempt to enclrcle the enemy. In any case, ~twas the moment for wli~cliAlexander had been waitlng. He deployed h ~ sCornpantons tn wedge forrnatton and, followed by the hypasp~sts,promptly went through the gap and stra~ghtat Dar~us.For a 1110iment, a harsh fight developed, but the Macedonian r~ders,supported by the hypa?pists, again had the best ot 11. The crucial niornent carrle when Dari~is, "tlervoiis as he had been ,111 along lalld see~ng]nothing but terrors all around,""' fled. 'I'he third attaclc also had opened with a forward movement of the Perslans, Inet a g a ~ nby a Macedonran coilnterattack. But t h t ~ m~e ~t , had been
'
l34
Footmen, Horsernett, a d Military Might
matter not only of checksrlg the offens~veposture of the enemy and then of counterattack~ngbut also of going for the letlial punch once tlie gossilxliry of s t r ~ k i n ga t the king hirnselt calne. As a t Issus, Alexander a t Gauganela had reallzed that the key to conquering both the bclttlefield and the empire was I i i ~apprehens~onof Darlus. Yet even after Darius fled tlie battlefield (eventually hts own bodyguard I
1 '
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
I3.S
by Alexander, who had alre,ldy left the battlefield ln pursiut of Dzlrius. Par~neniowas finally stlccesrful, thanks to the Tliessal~ancavalry's bravery. 'I'he 60 casualties suffered by the Cornpanlons; took place when Alexander finally stopped 111s pursiut of Darius. They were the result of a clash wlth the retreating Pers~anhorcernen during Alexander's jouniey back to the battlefieId.l2' Alexander's vlctory was the result of a number of factors, but ~ e r t ~ ~ i l l l y one of the mort llnportant was his ability to integrate the varlous elements o f his army and to ask thern to perforlrt what their tactical character~stics allowed them to do best-h~s heavy cavalry to act In a shock ftinctlon, 111s I~ghtinfantry to screen his valuable troops and do away w~tlithe scythed charlots or deal with any erlelrty breaking through the Macedonian line, atld his heavy infantry to support the ' ~ c t l o of ~ l the cL%vCxlry. The decis~vetactical moment of the battle occurred when the hypaspists fought side by side wltli the Colnpanions in their action agalnst the Persian left and then the center left. Dzlrtus had failed not so much because of faults In his plan but because he was unable to coordinate units of h17 army w ~ t hany semblance o f eftectibeness. The prlce paid by the Macedo~ltatlsIn hurnan lives seems not to hdve been too high if we restrict our view to the three battles: 115 at Gran~cus (85 cavalrymen, 30 infantrymen), 452 at Irsus (150 cavalrynten and 302 Infantrymetl), and 300 to 500 at Gaugatnela (of these, at least 60 were Companion ~avalrynien).~'"In sum, then, about 1,000 Macedonians d ~ e don these three battlefields. However, the situation looks different if seen froin atlother angle. A. B. Bosworth argues that Alexander might hdve conquered the world but that he damaged his own country terribly. "For Macedonia proper the generation ot Alexander was literally a dead generation." He took wit11 h1n1 1' 11 the yout~gMacedon~anxnen of marrtageable age, and most never returned: They elther died or settled In fore~gnlands. Macedonla, the strongest country before the conquest o f the I'ersian E n ~ p ~ rwould e, never recover. It "was set on I' path of decline t h ~ proved t ~rreverstble."'" Rut ~f the damage to Macedonia lay mainly in the future, there was certainly an ilrtrrlediate and horrible destruction for the Persians. If we follow the anc~entsources, such as Arridll, then we would have Pers~anlosses of 1,000 cavalrymen and 18,000 ~nfantrylnenat Granlctrs, about 100,000 (mcluding over 10,000 cavalry troops) at Issus, and about 300,000 a t GG~ugamelka.'Lx There IS 110 reason to doubt that the losers' losses were disproportionate to the w~nners'.After all, mort of the casualt~eshappened during the rout, especially agalnst the Macedonians, whose cavalry was known for its ruthless p u r s ~ i t . ' ~Arnan's " figures are clearly fant'lsy, but even much more sober estllnates (Dev~ne's,for instance) count the casualties aruong Darius's rrlerl in the thousands: 1,000 I'ersian cavalryrnen and
l36
Footmen, Horsernett, a d Military Might
2,000 to 3,000 Greek mercenaries at Granicus, about 15,000 a t Issus, and "a few thousands" at G a ~ g a r n e l a . " ~
The Keys of Alexander's Success Granicus, Issus, and Gdilga~nelashow a much more coinplex function for all unlts than the silnple notton that tlie heavy tnfantry played a ptnning role and the cavalry delivered a decis~veblow. It IS true that the heavy tootnlan was 110 longer the utldisputed k ~ n gof the battlefield as in class~calwarfare, but to say that lie was dispossessed by the heavy cavalryman is to stretch the argument to a degree unwarranted by the ev~dence.'The heavy ~rlfantry~nan stdl remained a key to victory, only this tune he had to share his glory w ~ t hthe cavalryman. T h ~ sis tlie case in all three major battles of the conquest of the l'ers~an Empire. Gran~cusapparently was '111 engagement of horsemen in w h ~ c hinfantrymen made an appearance only when tlie Perstan cavalry had fled tlie battlefield. 'They d ~ pzn d the Greelc mercenary hoplites, allow~ngtheir own horsenlen to destroy them, but by then, it could be argued, victory had already been won. Closer exarnlnatlon of the ev~dence,however, reveals a different picture. llypaspists together with heavy and I~ghtcavalry~riendellbered the first blo& to the Persian center. They faded, but their fa~lurewas not total because Alexander and his Companion? came rlght after them, gatlier~ng sorne of the fleeing hypasp~stsand cavalry in the process and redirecting them against the presumably wearied Persian center. In addit~on,it is also probable that the defin~tivecrushing of the center came, if we follow l'lutarch and I'olyaenus, not only as a result o f Alexander's harsh fighting but also because of the support that the heavy Infantry gave to the cavalry. Issus presents a srmilar story. On the banks of the P~narllsRtver, tlie lenders of the first attempt to break the enemy line were actually the hypaspists without cavalry support, led by Alexander himself on foot. But the main sectlon of the phalanx at the center, it could be argued, played the lrmrted role of ginning the enemy and wa~tingfor the victorious r ~ g h twlng ot cavalry and infantry to arrive for the declsive blow. Yet even at Issus, the irlain section of the phalanx seems to have been gtveli a d~fferetitatln tn~tially-to crush tlie enemy center-to which their bitter head-to-head encounter test~fies.If they faded, it was not beca~isethey had been told lusr to p111the enemy line but because a cornbrnation of d~fticultterratn and hitter resistance on the part of the Greek ntercenary hoplites frustrated t h e ~ refforts. Moreover, even ~t we stretch the evldeilce and argue that, reg'2rdtess of the way the fight at the center went, the matn goal was simply to pin the enemy, we would still be forced to distingu~shbetween a sectlon of the heavy ~nfantry,the center, directed t o fix the opponents, and another section, the hypasp~stsof the right wltlg, first
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
l37
to spedrhedd the ass'a~~ltand then to join the '~ttackagalllst the enerny phdlanx In the flanlc and rear, together w ~ t hthe cavalry. At Gauga~nela,the story IS still more complex because we really are not sure about what the ce~ltralp m of Alexander's phL~lLatlx did; at best, we c'111 assume that ~ t br~stling s plkes tmmobil17ed the enemy center. Yet the functlor~of- the hypasp~stson the r ~ g h wlng t and of the br~gadesot Sirnru~asand Craterus on the left suggests a g d ~ nthat tlle heavy intantryrnetl played a cornglex and 1nlportant role. Alexander's Comyan~oncavalry, followed by the hypasp~sts,entered the gap in the Persian l~ne,which eventually led to the collapse of Darius's army. It M.JS thus a c o m b ~ n ~ ~ of t ~ the o n horsen~~an and heavy footman altlte that assured the victory for the Macedon~ans. Meanwhile, on the left wing, the presence of Craterus and Sintrrlias rrlust have contr~butedto the defense of their beleaguered cakalry ,111d finally 1' 1lowed or made inore easy the Thessalian cavalry's counterattack. 'I'he role of the heavy rnfar~tryin an army like Alexander's, which had an astonishing proportion ot 1 cav,ilrymc~nto 6 footnlen, '11so expla~nswhy the heavy infantryman continued to perforin a key functlon even after Alexander. Yet tt is also true that the cavalry pl'lyed an unprecedented role In the coll.~pseof tlle enemy army. First of all, the totcdity of the Pers~atldefeat at the Granicus River or lssus or Caugamela would have been Inconceivable without the presence of the horsemen. Nonetheless, the action ot the mounted Inet1 should not be seen in ~ s o l ~ i t ~fro111 o n the rest of the battlefield. Whether they carr~eda javellli l ~ k ethe Thessal~ansor the sartssa like the Cornpan~onsand the prodrornoi, anclent horsernen could not deh e r I' d e c ~ s ~ vblow e to steady ~nf~intry. They could do so only d other '~rrns supported then^. If the heavy ~nf,lntrywas a key element of this function, the I~ght~nf-antrytoo was Integrated rn harmony w ~ t hthe actlorl ot the horsemen and the phalangites. At G~'~IIICLIS, for instance, archers and Agnantan javelrnrnel~ had supported the action on the right and rained tlie~r javel~nsand arrows on the Pers~anleft when the Macedonian cavalry came to blows w ~ t hthe enerny. At Issus, the I~ghterinfantrymen had taken c x e of the threat froin the l-trll. They had operated together w ~ t htlie attack~tig hypasp~stsand cavalry o n the r~ght.And they had probably played 1' defens~ve-offensiverole on the left, ,IS suggested by the d ~ s p o s ~ t ~ofo the n Cretan archers and Thractan javei~nmen next to the Greelc allred horsemen and close to the Thessal~ans."' At Gauga~nela,they had been deployed In a co~nplexarrangemetlt on tlle right to screen the C o ~ n p ~ a n ~ oInnthe s edrlier stages of the battle. ,Moreover, Alexander used tlie I~gl~ter sold~ersIn other spec~ficfunctior~sto enhance the security of- the rest of h ~ rnen s or] the battlefield. Both at Issus and at Gaugamela, Inany of them, possibly peltc2sts, were deployed In a second I~ne,not as a reserve wattlng to relteve t h e ~ r tront-11ne cornrades but to prevent envelopinent and to tap any break in the Macecion~anline. Furthermore, Alexander usuc~llyass~gnedspec~fic
l38
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
f~rllctionsto llghter sold~ers,asslgrllneilts in f i h ~ c ht h e ~ rlrghtness of foot was essent~al,such as clear~ngthe hetghts at Issus from the rrght of the Macedor~iandeployment or dealing wlth the scytlied charlots at Gaugarnela. Gran~cus,Issus, and Gaugainela all show that a w ~ d egulf separated the flexible Macedoniclns frorn the powerful, ponderous army of the Greek city-states. But the X ~ , I I Idlfferetlce I between hoplites and Macedoni:tns was more than a [natter of weapons, manpower, or tactlcs. Rather, ~t~nvolveda d~fferentapproach to the whole relatlonsh~pbetween wartare and soaety. The ~nclusionof so many arlny types was in~poss~ble 111 the class~c,~l Greek states for the obvious reason that the military role of the lndlvrdual was the other face of hls soclal status. 12 reversal of this situatiorl could be possible only 111 mother type of env~ronment-for instance, one ~n fihlch the government was based on a u t h o r ~ t a r ~ aprinciples n (as In the anctent Near East or In a ktngdorn such as Macedonia, where autocratic rule followed the almost democrat~celect~onof the king) or 111 truly democratic soclctles (as In modern times). The truth is that no typrcal Greek state, not even the democratic ones, fulfilled any ot these condrtions because, at best, the Greek brand of dernocr,~cyput a certaln number of citizens at the sdIne level but excluded another large part and restr~ctedor ellinmated the aristocratic element. The cavalry provides a good exarnple. There were good and practical reasons for ~ t minimal s use ~n Greece-rocky terraln, cost of the mount, and problems w ~ t hthe upkeep ( 1 groom was needed for each horse against 1 servant tor every 10 footlnen, even In the Macedonian arnly132).The lnaln handlcap was the polls's socral structure. Only 2 few men could support the expenses connected with the cavalry-horses, equipment, grooms, and so on-whrch rueant either that lnilltary scrvlce would be the privilege of a restricted group of people, such as a n aristocracy, or lllnited to the rlcliest men In the community. In the first case, tills became ~ncreas~ngly Empossible as the artstocracies tended to d~sappearIn ~itostGreek states. The aristocrats were e~tllerforced to flee or to integrate fiith the n ~ ~ d d l l neleg ments of therr society. In the other case, singl~ngout a group of cit~zensand eventually ruaking them part of the ruost prestigrous arm of the lnilltary forces would run contrary to ,I pol~ticale t h ~ cthat tended to level people rather than sanctify certain groups of citt~ensover the rest and thus, In the long run, restore an aristocratic class. 'The solut~onwas to leave the people &h<)d ~ not d quire fit the values of the ruhng rnlddl~ngclass a t the lnargln of the battlefield-the ar~stocraticmembers with tlietr horses, when present, a t the wings, the poor with thelr lavelins in front, and only in the prologue of the battle. The sittlat~otiwas d~fferentIn Macedonia, where the trad~tlotiof the cavalry ren~alnedstrong even in the bleak years of Macedonian ir~dependence during the Great Persian Wars. Thrs was, 111 p x t , because of trddltlon and
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
I39
the exa~nplethat tlle ThessC1hc~ns prov~dedto t h e ~ rsouth and also because the Macedonians, a m~norltyIn thetr own state, could and d ~ maintain d the idea of a small elite on the top of the social pyrarnld. It was an ~ d e athat the presence of a k ~ n gwith fairly a u t h o r ~ t a r i ~powers a ~ ~ tended to re~nforce. Moreover, the fact that the Macedonlans apparently were a lnlnorlty In t h e ~ rown terrltorles was another element that strengthened the gradation o t status In f i h ~ c hMacedonian horsemet1 were uppermost and M,lcedon~an footmen ranked yecond. The revolution that Alexander and hls father, I'hiltp, brought in this regard was to extend service as cavalry C o ~ n p a n ~ o n s to ~ n d ~ v ~ d ufiho a l s fiere not Macedon~allsby b1rth.l :i But t h ~ sdoes not come as a surprl';e, for two reason?: first, because the connection between soc~alstatus and l n ~ l ~ t a role r y had been eroded, and second, because the Inclus~onof what was app'trently only a few ~ n d ~ v ~ dcould u ~ ~ shake ls but not break the Yystem. F~nally,the rel~anceon relative outs~derssuch as the 'I'hessallans or the allled Greek7 rrlust be seen from two perspectnes. The Macedon~anarmy was, 111 the first place, becom~ng~ncreaslnglymore cosmopolitan and less and less dependent on the srra~ghtforwardreiationsh~p of the ~ l ~ l s s ~Greek c a l state. Furthermore, l ~ k ea grandfather who can play w ~ t hh ~ gr,1ndchddren s but can also send the111 home to t h e ~ pr x e n t s if he 1s tired of them or ~fthey misbehave, the Macedon~anscould always "return" any non-Macedon~anunit that they employed. T h ~ situ,~t~otl s 1s also par'dleled 111 the inclus~onof so In'Iny l ~ g h ~nfantry t troops-about 30 percent of the footmen who crossed the Hellespont in the company of. Alexander. To rualntaln large nurrlbers of l~ght~ntantryrnenor t o glve them a meaningful role on tlle b~ttlefieldfiould h,ave been very hard, ~f not imposstbie, In the classical Greek state. Among other reasons, uppermost ruust have been the fear of enlarging the structure o n w h ~ c hthe state h,~dto rely for ~ t strength, s or, to put 1t d~fferetltly,to weaken the position of the people who owned the state by ~ n c l u d ~ nthe g poorer strata of the populat~on.In the case of Macedonia, there 1s again a reversal of the sltua~ I C ) I Ibecause many l ~ g h ~nf,mtryrnen t fiere rrlercenarles , ~ n dalso because the poyt of c~ttzen-soldierwas ~nrt~ally reserved, as the Astan campaign shows, only to those ~nembersof the arrny who could claim Macedon~anancestry o r who had been accepted anlotlg the horse o r foot Companions and among the hypaspisrs. All these elements tended to rrlalte Alexander's anny unbeatable, to use the term the ph'11allgites llked In referring to then~selves.~ i4 Yet the awesome power that the Macedonrans were able to unleash agatnst the Pers~an Einp~reIS still not fully comprehens~bleit- we minirni~ethe key contrtbutions that I' new sense of l o g ~ s t ~ and c s le'~c.dersh~p rrlade to t h e ~ r1n111taryeffictency. Donald W Engels has convtnc~nglyargued that, contrary to appearances, "supply was . . . the b a s ~ sof Alexander's strategy" and that Alexander's strdteglc decisions could be ch'lrted by assessing "the chmate,
140
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
h u m c ~ n, ~ n dphysical geography, ava~l~able methods of transport, and the agr~cultttralcalendar of a given region."'3' Alexander tnhertted tror~ih ~ sfather an army organl~edto beco~nethe rnost m o b ~ l eof ~ t tline s by far. A cruc1~11development was the reductlo~lIn the number of noncombatants following the army. Phtl~phad corngelled 111s soldiers to carry ruost of thetr equipment, he had elitrtinated wagons, and he had reduced the lumber of servants to 1 for every 10 inf'lntrymen and 1 for each ~avalryman.'~"f we apply the same proportlotis to the Invasion army of 37,100 and ~f we exclude the people involved tn other actlvlttes (such as phys~ciansdnd members of the siege train), there were, then, 8,300 camp followers-less than a fourth of what would Iiave been customary In prevlous Greek The reduct~or~ In tlie nurrtber ot servants, wlves, '11ld children and the abollt~onof the slow-moving wagons radlcdlly Increased tlie l n o b ~ l ~ tofy the Macedontan army. Nonetheless, Alexander's Inert could not ruarch on regardless ot other cond~ttons.In fact, since tewer people and J I I I ~ I ~were ~ S lnbolved III c'1rrying food and water, greater attentton had to be devoted to lnarters of supply, and the landscape of the Persian Ernpire draruatlcally heightened the urgency of these problerns because the terrdin was often arid and the so11 unfruitful. Alexander usu'1l1y adopted two solutions to these problems. Where possible, he made arrangements wlth the local officials so that they \vould look after his army's needs. If the reglon to be illvdded was hostile to him, then he 1nC1desure thdt the ~nvadedterritories had to accede to 111s wtslies by securing a nrr~nberof hostages before advancing further. If netther ot the two solutions were posslble, he cautiously ~novedInto enemy territory, remaining near rlvers so that there would be no problem w ~ t hhis water supply. Moreover, before crosslng into enemy land, he would reconnolter the area and then send in a small strik~rlgforce. At the same time, the rest of 111s drlny would also be dlvlded into smaller unlts, each w ~ t ha source of supply wltliin a r a d ~ u sof 60 to 80 rnlles and never so far apart that tlie whole army cotlld not be ea.;tly dsselnbled if there fiere any danger of attack. Frndlly, he would never relnatn stationary for a long time ~f that would mean outstrlpptng the local supplies, and he \vould not enter any area during a season In whtcli there was ,I 111ll1tedp o s ~ ~ b ~ lofi tfitldlng y food; ln most cases, t h ~ IneaIlt s never before the winter harvest of wheat and barley.liX This was a g o l ~ c ythat Alexander followed strtctly. 'The only tiirte when he failed to adopt IC (in crossillg the Gedrosi,an desert), he pdtd dearly for 111s lack of cdutlon. Alexander's attention to log15tics mtght help to explain tlie rationale behind some ot his strategic dectstons. Yet lt does not give the whole story of the nldstery that he exerclsed on the b'~ttlefield, for the ren1,alnlng key element of h ~ wlnning s formula was h ~ leadership.'" s Alexander had all tlie charactertstics that, accordtng to clause wit^,^") ~riakea great general: liigh Intelligence, p h y s ~ c ~atld ~ l 1 n o r ~ courdge, 1 coup d'oe~lor lntu~tion,and de-
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141
terminatton or a blend ot ~ntelligenceand ~noralcourage. His actlons both as a strategist and as a tactlclaii demonstrated t h ~ sto a high degree. Alexander's approach to the conquest of the I'erslan Ernplre is a clear exatnple of how h ~ s1ni11d reduced difficult problerns to their essentials. Me and the people around hlm were able to ratronalize h ~ sattack agalnst the I'ers~an Ernplre in terms that strengthened the war effort of his army wh~le weakening the resistatlce of the enemy. He presented htinself as the heir of a long tradition of Greek herols~nby tying his name to the warrtors agaliist 'I'roy or to gods like Zeus. The war agatnst Dartus became the platfc3rrn for the revenge ot the Greeks against the horrors of the G r e x Perstan Wars ot the f~ftlicentury. And In the process, it restated the "Greeltness" of the avengers' sword, that is, of- the Macedonlans. The conquest of- the enenty's e~nptrewas construed, on one h'md, as annrhtlatio~~ o t the ruling house; on the other, ~t was seen as the acqulsrtlon of a wealth that Alexander was more than willing t o share w1t1-1his f~)Ilc)wers.'~' Ltke Jason of Pherde before h ~ m the , great Macedonian leader realized that the key to tile conquest was "one person"-Darius. Rut it is certalii that Alexarlder d ~ not d share the other part ot Jason's assertron that "everybody there [in the Pers~anEtnpirel has trained htmself to servitude rather tliaii prowess."'4L Alexander warned 111ssoidlers that "they ought to spare t h e ~ rown property, and not destroy what they carne to possess" because defeat~ngthe k ~ n g1ned11t tnaking another people's emptre thelr own.I4" J.F.C. Fuller interprets this stateinent as meaning both the total destruct~oii of the erlelity torces and the safeguard~ngand acquisition of their ~ e a l t h . ' ~ " Clearly, Alexander gake no qudrter to his enemy, as den~onstratedat Granictts, where 11e showed no gity for the Greek mercenartes, or at Tyre, where he had no titercy for the lnhabltants, who had long thwarted his attempts at a short, successful siege. Yet the Greek mercenartes and the ciry of Tyre were particular cases, the first d~ctatedby Alexander's conteinpt for people of his blood figlit~ngtor the Pers~ansand the second a logical result of- the way the ancietlts u~lderstoodthe puntsh~nentof a c ~ t yunder siege: If residents resisted too long, then the besiegers would show them no gity. In real~ty,~t seems that Alexarlder's slaughter of the I'ersiart forces was titore a result of the vagarles of the actlons on the b~ttlefieldt h a ~a deltber~te ~ pol~cy.Those soidlers were, I ~ k ethe Persian gold, part of the treasure he had come t o conquer artd not to destroy. His alrn at ISSUSand Gaugarrlela was Ddrius's person. Consecjuently, Alexa~ldergarnered all his xn~ght111 his quest to kill Iitrn, sometimes eve11 becomrng distracted from other acnons on the battlefield ~f ~t I S true that, while h ~ left s wing was on the verge of crumbltng at Ca~igamela,he pursued Dzlr~us. His careful, logistic approach to the conquest I S another splendld strategic example o t the br~llianceo t Alexander's rn~nd.After Issus, for Instance, he held his impulsive nature patiently tn check because he realtzed that he
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had to conquer the Phoenician coast to ensure the safety of h ~ army s before m a k ~ n gthe final plunge ~ n t othe heart of the Persian Emptre. Alexander on the battlefield showed two faces. Before the actton began, he confronted the problem of batrle with rational coldness (both Issus and Gaiigamela are examples of tills approach). The enemy was 11kea quarry that had to be lured into a trap betore being destroyed. However, once tlie action had hegun, Alexander became a ~ n a npossessed by frenz>; as he was at Granlcus. There are no more splend~dexamples of Alexander3 exercise of tntellxgence at tlie tactical level than his plans at Issus and Gauga~nela,although historians hdve probably underrated Parmenio's contr~butionin both batt l e ~ . ' ?If~the development of the battle of tlie Gran~cusRiver may be seen as the result of i~rtprovisationrather than dellberate plann~ng,t h ~ Interpres tation could never apply to the other two inajor encounters. The deployment of the Macedontan troops and t h e ~ rfunction on the battlefield, especlally that of tlie r ~ g h wzng t In the other two battles, showed that Alexander had mastered not only the capabilities of his own units but also the weaknesses of the enemy; he could tnalte 111splan work, almost w ~ t hthe regular~ t yand prec~sionot a \vatcli, in the l n ~ d s of t the confusion of the battlefield. L ~ k eClausew~tz'sideal general, Alexander followed up his plan of battle w ~ t ha v~rtuallyttnsliakable determlnat~on.At Granicus, for Instance, Parinento discouraged h11r1trolrt launchrng his attack, saylng that "we cannot take 1' 11 army across a rlver on a filde front" while "we cat1 easily cross at dawn" when tlie enemy would not expect ~ t . ' ~ V l e x a n d ehung r on to his plan despite this seern~ngly sen.;ible advice. It was agaln Parrnen~owho, a t Gaugamela, urged Alexander to attack the Persians at night, for this would have grven the Macedon~ansthe best chance for vtctory agarnst a more nurnerous enemy; Alexander "would . . . tall upon therri [the I'ers~arls] urlready and confused and more open to pan~c.""~But here again, for a number of good reasons (such as the uncertatnty of a fight tn the dark),'" Alexander stood firin In h ~ decislon s to wazt tor rnornlng to rrtatch strerlgch with Dar~us. It is always hard to reinam determined, espec~allywhen other options are posstble and, on the surface at least, r a t ~ o n a l ,This dtd not mean that Alexander followed 111s scrtpt rel~g~ously once it had been set. H e could never anticipate all the develop~nentsof the b~ttlefield.For t h ~ s ,he had t o rely on his coup d'oerl, which inev~tablyallowed him to choose the r ~ g h t Inornent to strike the dectsive blow. The account of h ~ ruajor s battles clearly points out h15 spletldid tlnllrlg in delivering the kllling punch-whether he followed tlie first wave of attack a t Granlcus or dectded that the moment had come to direct his threat agalnst D a r l ~ ~h~ntself s at Issus or espectally fihen he entered the gap 111 the Persian line at C;aug,~n~ela, aiming his thrust d~rectlyat Dartus. The fact was that Alexander coupled h ~ ~ntelllgence, s deterrnlnation, and coup d'oe~lw ~ t han open display of phys~calarid moral courage. H e taught by example-and he was a splendid comb~nationof
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
14.3
c o ~ n x n ~ ~ n ,111d d e r warrior.I4' We know that more ~ a l c i i l ~ dnd ~ t ~more ~~g coldly logtcal men, lrke S c ~ p ~Afrtcanus, o would carefully protect the safety of t h e ~ rperson when near to the dangers of the actton on the first line."" And before Ale~~ander's trme, Xenophon h'~d siiggested that a general h'td to be brave but not risk 111slife In the search for glory."' Xenophon's sensible suggestion titust have seemed an oddity in the ancient world, and, for h ~ pnrt, s Sclpio re,~llyrepresented the values ot a d~fferetltpermd. Alexander, in the manner of ail generals of his tlme, had to take his pos~tionon the front Itne once he had h ~ sold~ers s lined up and had given them their orders. What d~stlng~ushed Alexander from the rest, however, w,~s111s wisdom In troop deployment and the Clan w ~ t hw h ~ c hhe fulfilled h ~ role s as a warrtor. He was there not only to fight but also to insplre. At Gran~cus,he risked h ~ s l ~ f ewhen a Persian sword "smote him on the head," she,~ringoff part of 111s helmet.''2 At Isstls, "once withrn [Perstan] range, first Alexander's suite and hsn~selftoo, In hss post or1 the right wlng, took the rlver at the double," clash~ng~ n t othe Perslat1 litle."; At G a u g , ~ m e l ~"the ~ , cclvalry w ~ t hAlexander, and Alexander himself, stoutly fell on the enem~r.""~Rut Alexander's greatest show ot physical courage was h ~ action s against the Malsans, "said to be the most warl~keof all I n d ~ a npeople.""' In the assault on one ot their crties, he was the first to scale a ladder bttt then found hiinself w ~ t h only a few rnen on the wall when the ladder was smashed. F ~ r s t ,he crouched, trying to escape the 'Irrows, then in a frenzy, he jumped among h ~ senenlles gatlier~nga t the foot of the wall, driv~ngthem away w ~ t l i111s sword. At first, they fled but then returned, raining all Iunds of blows on h ~ n and l finally 111tt1ng111m on the chest w ~ t han arrow. The impact was so great that Alexander fell to tlie ground and was saved only by tlie actlon of t\vo Macedon~ans.But then he stood up again and kept fighting even when, struck by a club on the neck, he w,~sforced to le,~naganst the wall. Only the tnterventton of other Macedoti~answho had finally e~therclimbed the walls or broken through a gate ot the cstadel saved h ~ life.Iib s Instances of moral courage are more d ~ f f ~ c u to l t assess, not bec,~use Alexander did not show it but because orrr modern values lnfringe on our understandirlg of the titearltng ot ruoral courage in ant~quity.certainly, however, there are a number of actlons In w h ~ c hsound ~nordlstrength went hdnd In Iiai~dwltji long-term decis~ons:Alexander's refusal to share power w ~ t h D a r s ~ ~after s I s s ~ ~ s ;his " ~ decision to go to the lirnits ot the Persian Ernptre, both to conquer and to enswe t11'1t the borders of h ~ dom~nlotl s were s ~ f ehis ; refusal at times to accept the suggesttons of his seniors, such as Parmenio's adv~ceat Granicus and at Gaugaruela; his introductton of solne of his new subjects' custorns, agaitlst the strong opposltlon of the M,~cedonl,~ns;or, finally, 111swork toward blend~ngthe conquermg race w~tlithe conquered.""
Religion, Warfare, ancl Political Power
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Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
A. B. Bosworth 11'1s launched a harsh 'Ittack 11.1 the last few years on Alexander's herttage. In his view, Alexander 1s nelther J . G. Droysen's charmpion and propagandist of Greek culture nor W. W. Tarn's vis~or~ary figure tosterlrlg the brotherhood of mankind. I-ie IS, ~nstead,the lnL1nwho begm the decline of Macedonra, a savage warrtor, a destroyer of thousands of lives In pursuit of hrs dream of grandeur, and the founder of '1r1 ephelneral el~lpii-e gone to rmn soon after his d e a t h . l i V e t ~t fiould be hard to deny that Alexander's conquest was a turning po~ritin the hlstory of Western ctvilizatron. H e ir~trod~lced Hellen~cculture to western Asra on a large scale. H e represented 1' s h ~ f from t p'arochlal to l ~ l t e r n ~ ~ t lcollcerIls o ~ l ~ l on the part of Creek culture. And he accelerated the process of drslntegratlon of the polls In favor of larger entrtles. But Alexander's most endur~ngcor~tributionwas probdbly In the area of myth-mak~ngand in the relationship between relrgrori and a certatn type of rule In the West. Ltke his father, I'hillp, Alexar~derwas keenly aware of- the value o t p,Ige,lntry as a key to puhlrc recognition and polltlcal power. At B'abylon, for instance, In 323 R.('., representatives of rhe Greek state5 came to honor hlm wttli gold crown atter gold crown, which he hlmself had Such a demand c'1nnot be reg'lrded as unusu'd 111 the context of Macedonian kingship, for the klng, although chosen by the assembly of Macedonlans trom rnernhers of-the royal house, comblned very extenstve powers in his own hands. EIe w ~ the s absolute ruler ln secul,~rmatters, the sole arbiter in foretgn policy, and the owner of all niajor resources, and the government was ernbodled in his person. But he also pertorrned reltgious functtons in the absence of 1' profession'11 priesthood 111 the kingdom.'" EELS role ,IS h ~ g h priest would have condit~onedAlexander to appreciate the value of symt~olrsn~~. Consequently, ~t is no silrprtse that he was the hero who cl'l~med ancestry from Heracles and Achilles; fiho trled consc~ouslyto follow in the footsteps of his great ancestors; wlio competed with the past as lie trted to surpass and not just elnulate the ruytliical heroes; who kept I-Iorner's Iliad filth him; and who, when asked fihy he w,~ssad whlle kisrring the tomb of Acliilles at Troy, answered that, unlilte Ach~lles,he had no Homer to srng hts deeds.'" Alexander was also a man who tnterpreted his struggle wttli D x i u s not as the attelnpt of a powerful nlcln trying t o trample down and a c q u ~ the e riches of another potentate but as the rrghting of old wrongs. It was revenge agalnst the ancient irlvasions and thus a mtssion sacred both to Macedonrans , ~ n dto the rest of the Greeks who hdd suffered so much In the Great Wars.'" Yet what dlstrngu~sliedAlexander most of all was his atterrtpt to introduce vali~esuril<nown to the West. 111splan was not so much to FIellenize the East 'IS to strengthen the power of the klng by incorpor,~ting eastern elements.'64 Alexander's plan of actlon revolved around two matn goals. On one hand, he requested honors that, although common in the Enst, the Greeks
Footmen, Horsemen, and Military Might
14.5
reserved exclusively for gods, and on the other hand, he wanted to be recogn~zedas a 11vtnggod.'h' The lnarn external characteristic of the first request was proskyneszs, or obetsance. 'l'he Perslar~sliissed equals on thetr llps as a forrn of greeting, gave those who were sl~ghtlyt h e ~ rsuperiors a krss on the cheek, and prostrated themselves and probably krssed the ground or blew a ktss to their superiors, espectally the king. This gesture, which the Greeks called proskynesis, was, however, considered "com~c,humilrattng, and blasplien~ous"by the Creeks, for tt rnvolved a gesture tliat the Greek world reserved only for thetr gods. Addressed to another human belng, it was a gesture associtlted with the servile people that they had just conquered, certarnly not w ~ t hCreeks tliemsel~es.'~" It seems that Alexander's request that h ~ srrtert adopt the practtce of proskyilesis like his Perstall sublects was ~nltiallyres~stedharshly and In the end defeated, around 327 R.< .'" Yet this was only the first stage. Although there are a number of cor~troverstalaspects to the story,'" the bastc potnt seems to be ~r~co~ltro\ertlble, that is, that a concerted drive toward bestowIng the attr~butesof a livrng god on Alexander conttnued later. It was an Issue that created all kinds of problerns and arnblgu~t~es withtn the Greeli world. There had been humans elevated to the status of gods as a testlrnonlal o f thelr great deeds, such as Alexander's own ancestor, Heracles. Apparently, there had also been instances of rnen worsh~ppedas gods during their l~fetlmes,probably including the Spartan Lysander.'" But especially in the latter case, even if we accept ~ t autlienttctty, s such ~nstanceswere dtstlnct exceptiorls to the rule tliat a hurnai1 bang, whtle aruong other people, should never be elevated to the stdtus of god. The cult involved, ainong other things, a number of practical con~plexrties.One had to burld a tetnple wtt1-1a statue of the newly crowned god In ~ t I'eople . had to ofter sacrtfices to the stdtue, establish gdlnes in the god's honor, and sing a paean In w h ~ c h the lrvtng Inan was assocrated with the other gods."" Yet when the drive toward deihcatlon caine to ITS log~calconclusion around 324 Is.( .,"' the process had been 111 the offing for 2 long tlrne. The long of the Macedontans was not only the htgh grrect of his state but also a Inan who cla~rnedorlgzns frorn a hero like Achtlles and a god llke Heracles. In the case of Alexander, other factors conlpllcated rnatters. Me was never really sure that Philip was 111s natural father, for 111s mother, OIyinp~as,seerns to have nurtured In him the belief that his real father was Zeus hi~nseif."~It was a belief strengthened by his own career and by the wrrters at 111scourt. A crtt~calstage had heel1 his conquest of Egypt, w h ~ c h had made hlm the pharaoh, king, and god at the sarue tttrte, "~rlcarnattorl and son of R'? and Osir~s. . . Norus the Golden One, the mighty prlnce, beloved of Amun, Krng of Upper and 1,ower H1s vtsit to the temple of Siwah in Egypt had only strerlgtherled this beltef. After his crowning as 1' phard~)h,Alexander dec~dedto collsult the oracle at S ~ w a hin the midst
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of the desert. It had been a per~lousjourney, during w h ~ c hhe and h ~ escort s lost their way and almost dtsappeared in the mtdst of the sands. F~nally, they were saved by follow~nga flock of b ~ r d sthat dlrected them to the oasis &here the temple stood. Alexander never confessed to anyone wh'at transpired at Slwali, but, as he wrote hts mother Olynipias, "he had bee13 told what 111s heart desired."'-"et even ~f we cannot be sure whether thts rne,lnt that the prlests at S~wdhtold h ~ r nhe was the son of Zeus, the outcome of the vts~twas that hts courtters, especially 111soffic~allitstortan CalIisthenes, were then able to spread the story that Alexander was ~ndeedthe son of Z e ~ s . ~ ~ % l t h o u g~ h~ n p o r t bec'1use ~ ~ n t the llotlon of Alexa~lder'sdlvtntty could now eastly circulate rn public, the confirmation of his relation to Zeus had not rnade Alexander a god h i r r t ~ e l f . 'I'he ' ~ final elernent that was still needed was h ~ concluest s of the whole Pers~dnEmp~re. Perstan kings dtct not claim to be lrvtng gods ltke the pharaohs, but practices l ~ k eprosl
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number of Rorn,~nleaders of the r e p i ~ b l i c ~and ~ n I'lter ~ t n p e r ~ perlods al to tlie mytliology surrounding Napoleon and, closer to our own tlme, CIiarles De G a ~ l l e . ' ~ ' When the M'xcedon~an peasant 1s asked t o d ~ y ,"P11 Ine o Meg,~lPxandros" (Where 1s tlie Great Alexander?), and he answers, ''0 Megallxandros ZI ke vas~ltvr"(The Great Alexander lives and r e ~ g n s ) ,lie ' ~ is ~ just restating In a slmple ~ . d the y notion that, ,~lthoughAlexander as a lnilltdry leader d~sappearedrn tlie later part of the fourth century R.('., he left a herztage ot ideas and syrnhols that the conqiierors of the future would use and ~ n ~ ~ ~ l ~ for p u lcelltur~es ate to come. F~rstamong these new conquerors would be the Romans.
Chapter Six
A Phalanx with Joints The Romans and the Heirs of Alexander Noth~rzgcart wrthstrrrzJ the charge of the jjllacedorzrurr] /~hmlrirzxas lorrg as rt preseriles tts charac-trrzstrc fttirctrolz mzci JOYCL,. W h a t tl~erzzs the reasorz o f thc Ronzafz st.rrccss, arzd zul)nt ts Ir that defeats the purpose of t / 9 0 s ~I L J ~ Ozased the phnlaflx? It rs becaztsc rn war the time and plrrcr of actlolz 1s zt;zcertal;z aitci the pl~nlirrzxIjas o l ~ l y0 1 2 t~ ~ z and e orze place trz rohtch tt cart perforrrt rts pecrtlzar srrtJrce. -Polybius
XVIII.30.11,31.1-2
Warfare After Alexander The eastern w ~ n d shad hardly erased Alexander the Great's footsteps from the sands of the Near East when his generals tell to quarrelirlg ainong themselves. Soon, his vast empire would be divided five ways, with the Seleucids in the East and the Ptolelnaic dynasty in Egypt emerging as the most powerful. Alexander's Successors tell prey to the old Greek habit of fight~ng each other more than the enerny thre,~ten~ng their borders. Especitllly in the northern parts of their kingdoms, new ~nvadersloomed on the horizon In the shape ot the w ~ l dGalatiai~s,their lirned hair st~ckingout llke a porcupine coat. It was, however, more the threat colnirlg from people of thelr own ancestry than the fury of the Celtlc tribes that coinpelled the newly crowned I-lellenist~cdynasties t o experir~lentwith new forrns in the rnanagernent of war. The number of orlglnal warrior-conquerors, barely adequate under Alexander, dwindled when the torce was split between the various k~ngdoins, and although the number of Macedonl'111s held s t e ~ d yoverall, the
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number of Greeks drd not.' The problem w'ts p'trtrally solved by the permanent or at ttmes ad hoc tnclusion of natlves in the armtes, stlcli as the Egypttan units that Ptolerny used agalnst Seleucus at the battle of Rapliia in 216 I J . C . ~J ~ l s tbefore Alexander's death, Arrian descr~besa phalanx of 6,700 Macedontans and 20,000 Persians, each file composed of 4 Macedonlans and 12 Persians.' A Inore comrnon solution was to resort to mercerimes, who now becane the norm.4 The Ptolema~cdynasty 11.1 Egypt also pioneered another system that the West would adopt in a revised form centurles later in the Middle Ages. I'rotessional warrtors, called clpruchs, were grmted pleces of la11d wrth the understand~ngt h ~they t fiould perform military service at their lc~ng'srequest. Inltlally, land titles would revert to the r ~ ~ lonce e r the soldter dled, but eventually, they becarrte hereditary.' T h ~ s"m~xed"use of Macedo~lr~lns, Greeks, ~ ~ ~ ~ tand ~ v cashe s , or landbased lnercenartes allowed the I-iellentstic monarchs to ralse armies whose numbers wotlld have been unthinkable alrtorlg the city-states ot Greece and 111 the Macedo111,tn k~ngdomof P h ~ l ~ 11.pAt Rdph~a,for instance, the Seleucids deployed 62,000 footmen and 6,000 horsetneii, and at Magnesia, they had 60,000 and 12,000, re~pectively.~ The use ot so many outs~derscornpleted the dls~ntegrationof the orrginLtltles between CIVIC and milit,try life. War became the busrness of ktngs, not of the p e ~ p l eThis . ~ IS not to say tliat the king deployed his arntles for the benefit of r ~ c hand poor altke-on the contrary, war ren~~trned a benefit of the well-to-do, d~rectlyor ~nd~rectly. Rut now the Icing became the sole reyosttory of the main decistons and rewards of organl~edv~olence.The ruost treasured value ot tlie Hellentstic ~non'trch ctllegedly was to keep pe'tce w ~ t h ~h n~ sdomarn. I11 re'tl~ty, however, 111s quest for tranquilltty eastiy assumed a warlike guise, for he felt that lr~terrlalpeace could be achleved only through exterr~alconqiiest. The need was d~ctatedby the deln,tnds of establ~shlngone's own author1tys more than by any schrzophrenic tendency. 'I'he experience of the Romans in their vartous confror~tationswith the FIellenist~ckingdoms, such as the Macedonrans ,tt Cy~loscephalaeor the Seleucids at Magnesra, shows clearly that there was enough diverstty In the business of waglng war antong the vartous Hellenlstlc Itingdorns. Yet on the whole, the phaiallx of ke'tvy soldiers fight~rlgw ~ t hp~kesr e ~ n a ~ n ethe d core of the armles of the Successors. The cavalry, as tinder Alexander, contrnued to play an Important role but never fully developed along the ltnes suggested by Ale~~tnder's c'tmpaigns. The experience w ~ t hthe East prompted the generals to adopt more heavily armed rtders, while it is probable that contacts with southern Italy resulted in tlie horsemen carrylng sirtall round sh~elds'1s well. The Gal'tt~an influence w'ts m,trnly felt through the 'tdoptioti of an oval-shaped sh~eldby some foot uiitts, while the Perstans and Indtans left their mark bp tntroducxng elephants among the weapons of war.' O\erL311,however, 11o crua'tl changes took place either in we,tpons or 111 the
actilal co~lductof war 011 the battlefield. The Hellen~st~c k~ngdomsshowed instead more creativrty In sreges and naval warfare."' One could correctly say that the art ot wartare, as long as we rernatn with~nthe sphere of the Greek-speak~ngMellen~st~c k~ngs,d ~ dnot advance after Alexander the Great. We have to move elsewhere to a sornewhat different Iieir of the Macedonran, the Carthagtnran Hann~bal,to see the drrectton rn whtch an Alexander-type army could logically develop.
The Roman military System Tlie primacy of tlie Hellenistic krngdoms withtn tlie Mediterranean lasted a long tirne. For instance, Ptolernaic Egypt did not fall under Roman corltrol until the second half of the first century B.C. Yet ~t was clear wlth~na century of tlie establi~hmentof the Hellenrstic kingdoms that mastery of the buslness of waging war had rrtoved elsewhere and that the eventual overlords of the Mediterranean would come from the western part, e~therfrom Rotne or Carthage. 'This would also mean confrontatron wrth a different system of understandrng and wagtng war and eventually the end of the hegemony of Greek arms and 1nen w ~ t h ~the n Med~terranean. The Roman mrlrtary system, even on tlie eve of the Second Punrc Wat; seems to have been In the rnainstrearn of the type of warfare that had cliaracter~zedthe Med~terraneanfor centuries. The s ~ n l ~ l a r ~wt ~~ et hsthe Greeks are strrkrng. The core of the arnires tn both Rotne and Greece was the heavily arrned footman, and, as In Greece, the milttary function of the soldier remained a11 extension of h ~ socl'd s funct~on.In Rome too, servlce was the rrglit and the duty of the property owner. 011the eve of the Punrc Wars, only those people with a worth of at least 1 1,000 asses (orcular Roman colns made of bronze) were usually c'11led up to arms." Moreover, wealth dictated the type of equipment that the soldrer was requtred to carry and thus h ~ sfunction or] the battlefield. Of the frve classes that rrlar~r~ed the Roman arlnles of the Republican perlod before the Second P u n ~ cWar, the three highest In wealth wore heavy arnior, and the rernarning two fouglit rn light armor." T'hls drd not necessarrly imply that other members of Rornan society were excluded froin the ~'111to arms. Between the ages of 17 i111d 46, Roman crttze~~s were oblrged to serve I6 campaigns as soldiers. I f need arose, the upper age liintt could be exterlded to 60. Although normally thrs aypl~edonly to members of the fibe census classes, the Romans had recourse to a levte en masse (tztmz~ltzis)In trrnes of emergeticy, during whrcli all tlie crty's ruen could be requrred to serve as soldier^.'^ There was a time d u r ~ n gthe Second Punic War when even slaves were recru~ted.' The lure of riches, whrch Aiexatlder tlie Great told hts followers would be theirs if they conqilered the Persian Empire, also loomed large arnong the Roman lnotlves for waging war." As W. V. H d r r ~ swrites, plutlder~ng +
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"a normal p m of RomCulwarf,1re."'" Between 2 9 7 and 293 B.C., at a time wlien the Roman gopulat~onnumbered about 200,000 adult males, the Romans enslaved 60,000 people f-rorrt the conquered Sainn~tes." Rome, which at the end of the fifth centmy is.<,. ruled oker 948 square k~lon~eters, had expropriated land totalrng about 9,000 square kilometers by the eve of the Second P u n ~ cWar.'" Or~gin~llly, the CIVIC connect~ons,the forms of recrtutment, and even tlle reasons for waging war did not make Roina~iwar dissimilar from that of an anclent Greek state; yet w ~ t hthe passage of time, the Roman military systern tended to assume qulte different c k a r ~ ~ c t e r ~ s tIn ~ cGreece, s. the arrny eventually became a combination of crtizens and mercenaries; In Rome, the army kept its national characteristics. It remained, in other words, a citizen army, half R o ~ n , ~and n half allied. The tetldency was not toward the ~ n t e gratlon of outsiders but eventually, d u r ~ n gthe second and finally the first century IS.<,., to\vard profess~or~al~~ation." In Greece, except for the mercenarles, the cltlzen re~na~nect '111 amateur soldier who fought when h ~ state s requ~redit and then went home wlien peace was strt~ckor victory achieved. In the various Hellenistic kingdoms, there was also a tendency toward prof e s s i o n ~ ~ l ~ z of ~ ~the t ~ oarmy, n as w ~ t htlle cleruchs 111 Egypt, but ~rwas clulte different from what developed In Rome, for it was a professtonalrzatio~~ based on inheritance more than or] dellberate choice of the individual at a certaln stage of 111s llfe. In Rome, the cirlzen eventu6111y tended l~lsteddto become a professional, and t h ~ swas both because war was a permanent feature of everybody's lite and because o t the pauper~tationof rrlarly small landowners by t h end of the second century 1s.C. Thls led t o an lncreaslng tendency toward the abol~tionof the census qualification and ~ I I L I S the openlng of- army service to all citizens, regardless of their wealth. For most, a career In tlle army WAS probably the only alrernat~veto poverty."' The needs of an expand~ng~ m g e r ~power ai also resulted in the crtizen-sold~erInevitably serv~ngmore than one campaign. During the period of the Second Punlc War, a tirne of great peril, ;I stmt of 16 o r 2 0 catnpdlgns was not unusual for footmen, w17~1ecavalrymen could serve for I 0 ca~npalgns.~' 'I'hus, longer terms rrtust have been a good economic incentive for people at the bottom of rhe social scale, and they also must hake served well the interests and valttes of the upper levels of Roman society. This meant that "at Rorne, as elsewhere, the comfortably well otf and the old were largely responsible for setldlng the poor and the youtlg into b,~ttle."" In fa~rnessto the ruling class and the fathers of Roman soclety, it was not just a consplracy that sent the poor and the young to battle but also a deep commitment to what they regarded as the beneficial effects of warfare. As already mentioned, greed, as elsewhere in the anctent world, played an important role in the rrtotivation tor war aruong the Romans, hut it would be t o overlook a cruc~alaspect of the Roman psyche to disnliss their warmongering qi~allties WAS
only ~n terms of acyu~s~tion of slkaves,land, or gold. Serv~ceIn the army was a necessary stage for any aristocrat ~nterestedin a pol~ticalcareer. Someth~ng 11ke ten years in the rn~litarywere required for a person to aim at the top of the p o l ~ t i c ~ ~t rlu c t i l r e .Moreover, ~~ war represented the h~ghesti ~ n dxnost perfect fulfillment of the key values of the community. It was in war that a citizen could display his vzrtus, or manly courage. It was in the bloody confrontat~onsw ~ t hthe enemies of the state that he could stake a cla~nlfor glon a and laus-aclirevements that, once gained, became the common heritage of the farnily for generations and distinguished the aristocrat from the rest.14 F~tl~lly, war was the ~ n o s tperfect aretld in w h ~ c hthe R O I I I ~soldier, I ~ ~ poor and rtcli al~ke,could gtve vent to his bia, as Polybius says, that is, h ~ desire s to use v~olentforce without provoking tear but instead obtaining praise from 111s coininiin~ty." When he took the hes~egedNova Carth'tgo 111 209 R.(:., Scipio Africanus instructed h17 soldiers "to kill everyone they Inet and to spare no one, and riot to start loot~nguntll they rece~vedthe order." In captured cit~es,they sliced dogs In two.'"cap~o Aernillatlius cut off the hands of 400 Span~shyouths to punlsli tlie citlzens of 1.ut1a for their rebellion in the second century I$.<,.'~ Even the war-hardened Macedonians of 199 B.C. becane frlghrened at the outset of a battle c ~ g ' ~ sthe ~ l ~Romans t when they saw the mutilations carried out by Romans wielding the gladrus (sword) aga~nstother Macedon~ansduring a previous e n g a g c ~ n e n t . ~ ~ The M a c e d o t ~ i ~frlght a ~ ~ of 199 B.<,. brings out another inajor differerlce between Roman and Creek and Macedonian warfare. The sword, not the spear, was the ruost important weapon o f the Roman soldier. The gladi~is was a short, double-edged sword, c'trried on the r~ght.It could he used not only to cut but also to thrust-a funct~ontliat made ~ta most deadly ~mplernent ot war. For the Roman spear or pilzrrn was not used for thrust~nglike the Greek s p e x or the Macedonsan p~ke.In re'tlity, the piluln w,~sa heavy javelin more than a spear, thrown just before tlie Roman sold~erattacked at close quarters with his gladius. The shield (scutum)too was qulte d~fferent fro111 the Greek or Macedonian sh~eld.Its shape was oval, not round. Moreover, the handle of the scutum drd not compel tlie wearer, as In the case of the hoplite's shield, t o assulne a rigid pos~t~on-excellent as a form of protectlot1 but less effect~vein attack. The scuturn's reldtive xn,tneiiverability and probably ~ t strong s boss made ~t also an Instrument of aggression, while ~ t size s (apparently 1 meter long In the third century B.<,.) gave good protection to the user.19 The emphas~son tlie sword, a spear thrown lrke a javelin, and a large shield for attack, not just for defense, suggests that the Roman deploy~nerlt too must hake been not just another long, shallow l ~ n ein I ~ I I I ~ ~ I ~ Iof OII Creek and Macedonian warfare. By tlie Second P u n ~ cWar, the Roman legion numbered abour 4,500 rnen (4,800 in the case of the allied legion, tor they prok~deddouble the number of horsemen). Three hundred of them
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were horsemen, and the rest were ,111 foot sold~ers,dlvlded Into four groups, each wtth specific funct~ons.'"One of these groups, the velztes, provided the slztrinishing screen for the rest. They numbered about 1,200, ar~rtedwtth round sh~eldsthree feet in diameter, swords, javelins, and plain helmets, often covered w ~ t hwolf's sk~n.?'The first ltne of heavtly armed troops, the hastart, also numbered 1,200 1ner1.j' 'l'he~rshield was the oval scutilln, ~ n a d eof two layers of wood held together by bull's-h~deglue and covered first w ~ t hcanvas and then w ~ t hcalfslc~n,wtth the top and bottom edges protected b y an iron rtni and an iron boss in the center.j3 Apparently, tt was a very he,avy shleld o t about 10 k~lograms,according to a nod ern reconstruction, and thus about 3 k~logratnsheavier than a typical hopltte s h ~ e l d It. ~~neasured, ~ says Polybius, 2.5 feet in width and 4 In In addlt~on,says PoIyb~iis,the has tat^ also carr~edbody protection In the form of greaves, plumed helmets, and breastplates. T h e ~ rweapons included the already mentioned Spanish sword or gladius on the rtght, which cotlld deal an effect~veblow w ~ t he ~ t h e redge slnce the blade was "'cery strong" and "firm," and two prlu, one heavrer than the other, w ~ t htlie slender p ~ l u m probably thrown from a greater distance than the thicker one.3" The attlre of the has tat^, who ~ncludedthe youngest of the heakily armed footmen, was the prototype for tlie other two types of heavy ~nfantry-the prznczpes (also 1,200 in number), \vho were the senior tn age to the hastati, and the triarri (600 men), the veterms. The only d~fferencelay 11.1 the fact that the t r ~ a r carrted i~ a long thrusting spear (hustu) ~nsteadof the p i l u n ~ . ~ ' The hasta of the tr~arirand the narue o f the hastati suggest that probably the whole Roman army 1111tld1lycarried and fought w ~ t hweapons in a manner si~ntlarto that of the Greek phalanx but that over tllme the Romans developed along drfferent I~nes.They had dropped the round shields (clzpei) in favor of the s c u t u ~ n , and ; ~ all but the t r ~ d r had i ~ exchanged the long thrusting hasta for the heavy gtlum. Each Itne of the legtoil's heavy tootrrien was dtwded Into 20 cerlturles (60 Inen each for hdstatl and princlpes and 30 each for trlar~l).But the century was just the leftover of an older system by the eve of tlie Second P u n ~ cWar. The srnallest tact~calunit seems by then to have been the ruaniple ( 2 centuries and thus 120 men for the hastat1 and p r ~ n c ~ p and e s 60 for the triaril), w h ~ c hmeant that each of the l~nesof heavy sold~erswas drvided ~ n t o1 0 ruaniples. Alexander's co~nplexllnear arrangement on the r ~ g h twing at Issus and on both wings a t Gnttgamela had been the exceptton, for Greek, Macedontan, and Hellenistic warfare remained wedded to the concept of the single hne, stretched as far as possible, even ln detriment t o ~ t depth, s ln order to n~atchtlie length of the enemy line. Probably thts also suggests that the p~tchedbattle was uriderstood as a continuous process to be resolved tn the br~efesttlme possible.40 The Romans thought otherwise. They deployed
their he,avy soldlers in three Ilnes, the h'~st,tt~in the first, followed by the princtpes In the second, and the triarli in the thlrd. In~tially,the lines were also set in a checkerboard fashion, each unit (rnaniple) separated from the ~ n ~ ~ n i next p l e t o it by a gap, whlle the second line (for Iilstance, the princtpes in relatton to the hastat1 and the triarli In relat~ont o the pr~ncipes)\vould also deploy in a similar manner, each rrianiple at '1 certain dlst'trtce from the other, plugglng the g,~psof the preceding line.41The reclson for this deployment ~ n ~ g well h t have bee13 to allow the velites to w~tlidraw lnore eavly atter the openlng s k ~ r r i ~and ~ s l ~later to sirnpllfy both the he,avy infantry lines' w~tkdraw,~l or ,~dvancein their turn on the f r o ~ l hne. t It is also log~cal,however, that at the moment of hand-to-hand combat with the enemy, every 11newould hnve assurned a url~torlnfront without gaps. The deployment of the m,~nlplesIn an lildependent fashion, yet dynainlcaily related both to t l ~ e ~l ~r n eand to the l ~ n etliat supported them, must have glverl the Romans a 1nob111tyunknown to the Greek phalanx. The strength of the phal'lngites was in thelr close ranks and unlforrn Ilne. These requirements, whtch made them the n-iasters o n Inany occas~ons,also made them slaves in others where the terrain was unsuitable or d ~ not d allo\v the keep~ilgof stra~ghtrmks. For the Rolnan sold~ertoo, ,I uniform llne must have been ideal, but stnce h ~ smain weapon was the sword and stnce h ~ s baslc tactical unit was rather small (120 men or even 60 in the case of the tri,arli), he must have had llbertres that the phcIlangite could take only by putting 111s owl? and other people's l~vesIn danger. The Romans, as Hans Delbrt~clcwrites, had adopted '1 phalanx, that IS, a long thin I~ne,wit11 "joi11ts."~~ In other words, the heavy f o o t ~ n ~h'a~dn retained his formidable stance both In attack and In defense, but In a d d ~ t ~ o he n , had been gtven a flexibility unava~lableto the phalar~g~te without the integration of d~tferent units, 'IS Alexcallder the Great had done. The Rolnans went even further. llnlrlte the Greeks, the R o n ~ a n understood s the battle not as a cont~nuous process In which the first clash was declsive but as a staggered encounter, in which there could be deldy between e,~chstage. T h ~ iinpl~ed s that the inaln component of each stage had to be geared to stlpport the preceding stage of cornbat, tor each component of the Roman l e g ~ o rhad ~ a particular role to fulfill. The velites, who opened the b ~ t t l e ,were entrusted wlth d ~ s o r g a n ~ z Ing the enemy by shower~ngthem w ~ t hjavelins. The gap behind them, In the supporr~ngl ~ n eo t the hastati, allowed the vel~tesgreater freedom than the correspond~ngIlghter ~ntantryof the Melleilistic armies, who rnust have found ~t erther impossible or very dangerous for the ~ntegrityof the l ~ n eto w ~ t h d r a wthrough the serried ranks of the phalanx. A case In point would be the battle of Cynoscephalae, discussed I'xter. The hastat~,now forming a un~formI ~ n ew ~ t h o u gaps, t would follow tip the action of t l ~ evel~teshy surglng forward and launching their p ~ l a ,first the llghter one and then, at I' shorter d~stance,their heav~erone, before en-
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g~g111gthe enerny 111 hand-to-hand combat filth thetr swords. The purpose of the liastat~was to defeat the enemy there and then or at least to wear ~t down w ~ t hthew attacks. If they did not succeed in pi~ttir~g ~t to fl~ght,the pnnclpes fiould adbance and the hast,ttt would withdraw behtnci the trtartl. The purpose of the grlnclpes was to break the enemy down, but, ~f t h ~ s ta~led,they too w~thdrewbeli~ndthe tr~arii,who had been standing b e h ~ n d them, kneeltng wlth t h e ~ rleft feet forward, sh~eldsle,atltng ag'11t1st thelr shoulders and t h e ~ rlong spears thrust ~ i i t othe ground, thereby g r o v ~ d ~ na g "bristling pal~sade"" for the velites and the hastat1 and now the prtncipes who had sought refuge behlnd them. It 1s clear that i f the prlnclpes also w~thdreu; the battle had probably been lost, b i ~ the t presence of the long spears of the tr~ariiallowed the arrny a retreat less fraught w ~ t hddnger, usually to the s'afety of the camp. For here too, the Romans d~fferedgreatly from the Creeks.44 The Greek camp was struck on the best avatlable position near t h e ~ rrnarch~ngI~ne;the Ro~ n a n s 'Inaln concern was to inake a c a ~ n pthat was perfectly defens~ble everywhere. Since f a ~ n ~ l ~ a rbrrngs l t y sectrriry, they would always encamp uszng a s~rrt~lar pattern-the sarue roads, the sarne deployrrtent, the salrte g'3tes-so that 111 case of dmger, they could ltne up for battle '1s speedlly '1s poss~bleand In case of defeat, they corlld seek refuge In a fam~lrarand welldeteiidcd place.4'The use of a second and tlllrd llne and thus of a shorter deployment made the Romans more open to a flank attack agalnst a longer I~ne,especlally ~f che~rcavalr) was Intertor to the enemy's, tor the tunct~onof Roman horsemen seenls largely to have been to defend the flanks of the foot soldier or to pursue a defeated enemy. Yet the flexrb~l~ty of the deployment of hastat1 and prir~c~pes made then], even In the absence ot a long spear, also capable of n1,aneuvertng clutckly and tlliis of havlng a better chance t o meet any attempt to outflartk them. In add~tion,the presence of a second and third line ~ntroduceda new dunension to tactical controntat~on,tor even if the hastat1 were utterly defeated, a buoy,tnt but probc~blyd ~ s o r g ~ ~ n i zand ed depleted enemy sttll had to face a Irne of fresh soldrers, the prlnclpes, and then yet another l ~ n e the , trlaril, who had taken no parr at all In the b'lttle so far. Finally, the use of more than one l ~ n ereshaped the concept ~ n role d of leadersh~p.lJnIll<e the great leaders of the Creek and Hellenlst~cper~od, the Roman general d ~ not d have to nsl< his 11feon the front l ~ n ebecause the nature of the deploy~netltof 111s sold~ersand the staggered shape of the encounter requrred a contrnuous flow of decrslons, not just the inlt~alones. A corn~nander'slife was too valuable to be risked In a r r ~ drush agalnst the enemy, '1s had been the case w ~ t hAlexander a t Gran~cus,Issus, and Gaugarnela. The Roman system, however, could only operate ~f there was an etfectl~ec h a ~ not comrnand at the rank-and-file level and ~fthere was a good method of ~ d e n t ~ f i c ~ for ~ t ~the o n karlous u n ~ t sas $1 rallytng polnt for
the sold~ersand '1s a point of direction in cdse of ddv,~nceo r witkdr,?w,~l d u r ~ n gthe battle. Tlie Romans were successful in both cases. Tlie centurlons, who were the leaders of the rnanlple (2 in the front rank, w ~ t h2 other r e d r g ~ ~ a officers, rd optlon~s,for each mdniple4", were the true bC~ckhone of the Roman army. In addition, the use of standards for each tinit served as an effective point of orientation for the sold~er.~' The centurions were clearly a key to the system, but their success was made possible only because of the horrible gtlnishments and magnificent rewards that the co~nrrlar~d could mete out, for "Mail [says A. du I'icqj I S flesh d11d blood; he 1s body and soul. And, strong as the soul often is, it can not dominate the body to the potnt where there will not be a revolt of tlie flesh and xnental perti~rbationin the face of destruct~or~."~"~"he rnan in battle 1s not "the calm, settled, unf,itigued, attent~ve,obedient sold~er"of the maneuver field; he is ~nstead"the nervous, eastly swayed, moved, troubled, d~strait,excited, restless being, not even under self cor~trol. . . trorli the general to tlle p r i ~ a t e . " ~ " As du P ~ c qwrites, the Roman general he~ghtenedthe sold~ers'morale "not by enthus~asrnb t ~ by t anger." He ruade t h e ~ rlife "miserable by excesslve work and privatiot~,"~" SO that they would look forward to tlle l ~ t t l e to release tlie~ranger and frustrat~on.The system worked well because those who threatened the security of the whole by acting in a treacherous, cow,~rdly,or ever1 careless Indnner would surely ~ n e e tthe rnost fe,~rson~e punishments conceivable. It was not a matter of a military code of regulations because such a code did not exist; ~t involved a body of custolns that set mllitary discipl~neat a level different froin private or public ldw." The gun~shableinfracr~onswere varied. There were those that related to tlie satety of the \vhole arrrty, s~lchas falling asleep during the watch dut~es, dbandonitlg one's post in d cokering force, or throwing dw,~yone's we,IpoIls during a battle;" there were others that referred to dlsobedrence of a specific order, such as engaging tlie enemy w h ~ l eone was supposed t o sirnply reconnoiter their forces;$' there were offetlses that related to the assessinent of one's own behavlor on the battlefield ( ~was t forbidden to make a false report of bravery to galn distinctioni4); and finally, there were infract~ons that were considered a danger to the kalues or harmonious working of a community of soidiers-stealing from the camp, giving false wltness, committing hornosexual acts, or b e ~ n gfound gu~ltyof the same oftense tor the third rime.$' The punishments could ~ncltldefines, confiscation of goods, and floggtng, ~ L I C fron1 Polyb~us'sa c c o u ~ ~ t death , \ - ~ seems to have been meted out for rnost of the offcnses. The t r ~ b u ~ l court-tndrti:~led es the accused on the spot. If a t the conclus1017of the evidence, a tnbune touclied the accused lightly w ~ t ha cudgel, ~t was a signal for the rest of the soldiers that he was guilty. They would then ddvdtlce and pummel the accused w ~ t hstones i111d cliibs
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u n t ~ lhe was dead. But even if he surv~ved,what life w,~sleft for him, s,~ys Polyb~us?He could not return to his home, and his farntly would not dare to receive hirn-he was " ~ ~ t t e r lryu ~ n e d . " ' ~ If the guilty were 11ot single sold~ersbut entlre groups, such as nlan~ples abandoning t h e ~ rpost In a ~ n o ~ n e of n t danger, then the pun~shmentwas rueted out by decimation. A tenth of those guilty were executed publicly, and the rest were put on ratiotls of barley instead of w h e a and co~npelled to establ~sht h e ~ rquarters outsrde the gerlmeter of their fortifled camp, ruaking thern easy prey for a rnaraud~ngenerny.j8 But there is probably no better exa~npleof the ruthlessness of Rorn'~:~ disciplltle than the punishment that the consul Tttus Manlrus meted out to his son during the 340 B.(. campaign against the Latins." When the son returned to h ~ sfather and proudly showed him the spoils ganed by accepting a duel w ~ t hthe enemy, Titus M a n l ~ u s"stratghtaway" turned froin h ~ r nw ~ t h o u at word and "comruanded a trumpet t o sound the assembly."" There, the consul accused 121s son of having "'broken ~ n i l l t ~ ~disc~pline" ry by etlgdging in a fight while he had been sent only to reconnottec His son's behavior had shown that he held "in reverence neither consular dign~tynor a father's dignity." I-lis pun~ s h ~ n e had n t to be de,~thas '''3 stern example, but a salutary one, for the young men of the future."" It was a brutal actlon that had its rewards I I ~ ruaking the sold~ers"more obedient to their general; and not only were guard-dut~es,watches, and the ordering of outposts, everywhere more cdrefr~llyobserved, but in the final struggle, as well, when the troops had gone into battle, that stern act d ~ ruuch d g~od."~~ The systeln worked because punishment was not just the prerogative of the officers and thus of the better off. Just as the rank and file were a n w e r able to the tribunes, the tribunes were answerable to the consuls," and, in the last analysis, the consuls were answerable to the sendte and the Ronlc~n people. Moreover, the arm of disc~plrnewas not simply to puntsh those who broke the body of inilitary customs but also to ernphasi~eone's "devotion" and " C c o ~ r a g e , "for ~ ~ ~t is cle,~rfroin Polyb~usthat the reverse s ~ d eof tlle coln was the gifts, rewards, and decorations that went to those who drstinguished themselves o n the battlefield." These were awards the wrnner would cher~shforever, placed 11.1 the n ~ o s tconsp~cuoiisplace ~n his own household and worn durrng relrglous p r o c e s s ~ o n ? . ~ ~ 'I'he Romans seemed to have had a realistic grasp of the psychology o f front-line fighting. The deployment of their llnes suggests that they had refined to the utmost the second most llnportant p a n t of a soidrer's efficiency in the heat of confrontation. On one hand, they forced hirn to obey hy stern disapline, easy recognition of 111s own unit, and an excellent ch'm of command a t the lower level; on the other, they provided hrm w ~ t has much mental security as possible so that he wotild not breal< and run." As du 1'1cq says, "The number of ranks 16 for the hastati and principes and 3 for tlle
triarii, per De1br~ck"~I was calc~~lated according to the moral pressure that the last ranlcs could srrstain."" The Greeks too must have talten this into account, first by l n a k ~ n gthe norrnal depth of their phalanx only 8 men deep and secoild by cushio~lingthe weaker menlbers of the line between the front-ranlcers and the veterans in the back.70 Yet du P ~ c qis certatnly correct that the Greek system of mental security did not work well when they moved from 8 to 16 or 32 men, which seerns t o hake beco~neincreasingly common after 1,euctra and Mc~rttinea.71Rut there is n o doubt that the Roinan deployment allowed the soldiers of each line t o feel the exclteinerlt of the confrontat~onwithout the disheartening effect of being too close or too removed from the battle. In other words, the second Irne, the pr~ncipes, and the t h ~ r dline, the tr~arii,were far enough not t o be greatly disheartened by an unfavorable turn yet close enough t o intervene if things d ~ dnot proceed well for their army.
War as a Social Organism What made the Romans qii~tedifterent frorn the Greeks and the Macedonlans and any of t h e ~ radversar~eswas also t h e ~ rmore deliberdte use of war as the lifel~~ie of t h e ~ rsoc~alorganism. There is no doubt that there were a number of reasons rnotivat~ngboth the rul~rtgclasses and the commoners to support and wage war-the des~refor profit, fear of a powerful nelghbor, tlie stride toward fame and glory, or the sense of coliecr~vebrutal~ty that I'olybius calls bid. Yet the most powerful ~ncentzveruust have been the fact that war defined the Roman commun~tyand thus was a necessary element for the social balance of tlie state. The state would deteriorate, torn by ~nternal~llnesses,and die ~f the corn~nunitywas away trorn the battlefield. It is a message that is at least partly conveyed 111 Livy's description of a military engagement 117 the year 303, whtch was pass~ngby without any war: "Lest, however, they [the Rornansl should pass the whole year ent~rely f i ~ t h o i ~fighting, t the coilsuls made a small sortie into Umbr~a,because it was reported that armed men were malcing plunder~ngraids on the countryside from a cave."72 War did not level Rorna11 society. It is likely that ~nllitarysuccess Increased, on one hand, the economtc and social diqpar~t~es of the citr~en body. But, on the other hand and in a strange rrtanner, it also attenuated, at ledst until the rrl~ddleof the second century B.c., the ~nevitableconfl~cts arlstng between the "haves" and the lncreasrng number of "have-nots" In the countrys~deand In the c~ty,As the Rorrlarl dornlnion grew, ruore ruen fiere needed to defend or expand the domln~on.Yet ~t was also apparent that, while Roman armies triumphed, syrnptorns of soc~alrnstabil~ty~ n ~ g h t have increased aruong the lower levels of Rorndn society. A case 111 point I S the cr~siscaused by i~ldebtednessin the fourth century B.C. among the city's
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plebeians." The sltudtion becane more serious as the rnanpower pool avatlable to the r~clierRorna~isincreased w ~ t hthe enslav~ngof Inany of the deteated people. For Instance, In 262, durzng the Ftrst Punic War, L~vysays t h a the Rom'1ns took 25,000 people In captivity after the fall of Agrigent111nIn S~ctly.~"n other words, the success In war strengthe~iedthe upper classes' econoimc hold over Rornan soclety hy providing thern with cheaper and c ~ b ~ i n d amanpower nt and with xnore land taken from the defeated enenly. The ager Romnnus (the terrttory of the Roman state) grew from 822 square k~lornetersin 5 10 t o 23,226 in 264." Yet war might have alienated other sectors of the p o p u l , ~ t i ofrom ~ ~ the rest of society by worsening their status. In reality, tlie harshest elements of this deveioprnent would appear only during the latter part of the second and In the first century B.( . For the moment, they were kept with111 careful linl~rssince war dcted not only as an agent of wealth for tlie powerful but also as an agent of Internal peace and order for the rest of the population. War could provide benefits to all. The str,1111c'lused by the ~n~pover~shrnent o t city dwellers , ~ n dof the sznall farmers was rel~evedwrth the creatlon of colon~es.S~xteennew colonies were founded between 334 and 263,7%s were 15 Roman colonles and 4 Latin colon~esbetween 200 and 177 l$.(,." Although there were variations from colonj~to colony, the amount of land granted to tlie settlers could be quite substant~al,ruaking the colonltatiorl very attracttve espec1~11lyamong the poorer elen~enuof the Roman popul,~tion.'~ The process had a double impact o n ~nternalorder. It conv~ncedsome of the alienated to conszder the state agaln as thelr own, changing their status of poverty to self-sufficiency and sorrletinles even to affluence. And it removed elernents of gotentlal g o l ~ t ~ c ad~sturbance l from the clty and the countrys~de.'The colontsts, if they were Rornarl cztizens, still kept t h e ~ rcltizenship; yet away fro111 Rome, thelr thre,~tto the p o l ~ t ~ corder a l was reduced to a mlntmum. Moreover, colon17atlon was, as Em~lloGabba matntains, a constant restatement of the ideal social rnalte-up of the Roman Republic: The good c~tizen1s a sm'1ll farmer, the small farmer 1s a sold~er.T h ~ s~ d e is ,~ powerfully conveyed In C a t o ' ~pmefiztio to his De agrz cult~ira.~" The army as a vehzcle of soc~al~ n o b ~ l l~ecarne ~ty refined during the zniper ~ d lper~od,&hen war benefited sold~ersIII several ways. Some of the colonies were founded with veterans; some sold~ersreceived grants of lands on d~scharge;and s a n e who had risen to the rank of centurion were assured that they and t h e ~ rfamilies could asp~reto a certaln amount of upward rnobilrty. These processes seem to have been rarer d u r ~ n gtlie Republican period, ~ L I lzke C , rhe colon~es'settlements, they inust have been present to a certdlll degree even then. It was a nlechan~snlthat fiould tie the poorer elements of the Roman state to a warlike p o l ~ c y . ~ ~ ' 'I'he beneficial aspect of war as the lifeline of the soc~alorgarlzsln was also reflected In the method~cal,clever way of integrating nlcIny of the subject
It,~licpeople into Rome's indit'~ry systein and society. Colonies fiere 'llso founded w ~ t hall~es.Unlilte tlie Roman citizens, the settlers of Latin colon~eslost t h e ~ rRoman c ~ t i t e n s l i ~ pbut , ~ ' their financial gatns were slrnilar In terrns of I m d grdnts to those dllocdted to the Rorn,~ns.There w,~s'llso another important way In wIiic11 they made war an agent of golit~calcohesion for tlie noncit~tens.The Romans rejected the parasit~cnotion of Greek warfare, whlch treated the conquered as elelnents to be exploited and kept a t the margins of the state.x1 Except In a few cases, especially if the enemy was cons~deredtoo dangerous or u r ~ t r ~ ~ s t w o r r(rhe h y case that cornes to lnlnd is the c ~ t yof Capua, whlch sided with the Carth'~glniansduring the Second Pttn~cWar), Rome t r ~ e dto integrate the defeated into its mtl~tary system. As V. Ilari has sho\vn," tlie Roman armies were Italtan armies in the sense that norinally SO percent of the m'lnpower fids provlded by c~ll~es. This policy gave the defeated a reason to be loyal to t h e ~ conquerors, r bttt ~t was also a way to keep soctal disorder to a rulnlmurrt. Unlike the Spartans who sdw war as an element o t social disruption, m,~klngthern shy away as much as goss~hlefrom confrontat~onswith the outside, tlie Romans needed war to keep the newly subjugated people front cor~sp~rirtg agalnst the state. M a ~ n t ~ ~ l nthem l t ~ ga t war with newfound enetnles , ~ n dthus holding out the prospecr of pracr~caland psychologtcal gallis usually meant that tlie subjects had ltttle tlrne and reason to revolr agdlnst the R o r n d ~ t s*'The . ~ ~ system dld not always fiork, 11ot only w ~ t hthe Samtlites especially in the excegt~onalcircumstances of tlie Second Punic War but sometimes even with the Latlns. Yet on the whole, ~t was reinarkably successf-ul for rrtost of the Republican period untll the second century B.C. It is no wonder that the Romans Ilved and breathed wars the way no people of antiquity had before them, w ~ t hthe probable exception of the Assyr~ans.Beginrtlng with the edrly days o t the Republic, the Romans, schooled 111 the everyday ex~stence of real or perceived dangers from outstde t h e ~ rborders and by their economic, social, and psychologzcal needs, "inolded an ethos that raised the cap,~c~ty for violence to the status of v ~ r t u e . " ~It' 1s no surpr~sethat they would be highly successful agatnst the h e ~ r sof Alexander.
The Legion Versus the Plialanx F. W. Walbank is typical of a number ot scholars in terrns of his cornpanson of the efficacy ot the Hellenlst~c~nilltarysystem and the Roman war innchine. The phalanx of the army of Phil~pV, which went down to defeat at Cynoscepha1,te In 197 B.c., was too r~gidand specialised-"parts in a rnachlne rather than sepdrate fighting men," 1' form'1tio11 "especially llable to break up on rough ground" and "almost unprotected on the flanks."86 Walbank is correct, if we understand his words to rnean that the legion was superior to the phal,~rlx,for, as Polyblus s q s , on the battlefield, "the Rom,~ns
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Macedonians
m Cynosccphalae, 97 n.c.
have always carr~edoff the palm."x7 Tilts was the lesson that came out of the defeat of the Macedori~anphalangites under Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 13.c.and iltlder Perseus at Pydn,q alrnost thlrty yexs later, in 168 13.C. At Cynosceplialae (Ftgure 6.1) the two oppoqtng armles were almost equal in rlurnher. 'The Romans had 26,000 soldiers, of w h ~ c h8,000 were alLed Greeks. Of these, a little rnore than 2,000 were ca\alry. Moreover, they also had a number of elephants. The Macedon~anymustered an army of 25,500 ruen and 2,000 horsemen. About 16,000 of the footmen were Macedon~anphalangites; the rest were rnostly inercetldries or a l l i e ~ . ~ " Many anctent battles have the characteristics of a stage play, where ~n spite of the brilltance of the actors or the iniportance of the subject matter, the various scenes follow I' well-known script and dev~dtiotlsare few or mpossible. But t h ~ swas not so at Cynoscephalae. On the day of the battle, the two armies were seeking each other, but neither was prepared for battle. At the dawn of thdt particular day, owing to a violent 11lght thutlderstor~n,
t h ~ c krrl~stcovered the rough and broken terrain, so that "one could not see even people who were close a t end."x" The eventual battle \vould be played in six stages. In the first, a covering force that Phdrp sent to occupy the siiintn~tsdlvid~ngthe two '1rmles and 1 0 Roman squadron? and 1,000 I~glit~nfantrygushing forward 111 reconnaissance siirpr~sedeach other In the rii~st."~ When the skirrn~shstarted to go b'1d1y for the Rorn'11l forces, the secotld stage beg,~n,filth re~nforce~nents being fed from the camp of the Roman general Titus Flanlin~nusIn the forrri of S00 horsexnen and 2,000 foot soldiers under the leadership of- 2 trtbut~es.The arriv'11 of the re~rlforcementsturned the trde In favor of the Rom a n ~ . The ~ ' third stage was set when P h ~ l ~ in p , a countermove, poured 111s Thessallan and Macedon~ar~ horsexnen and all h ~ mercenaries, s except the Thrac~ans,into the fray. The actlon brought a cle,~ra d v a ~ l t ~ to ~ gthe e Macedonians over the Roman force?, which probably would have been routed i f not for the harsh resistarlce put up by the allied Aetolian cavalry.')' By now, the ~nrti~al skirmishes had begut1 to mushroorn Into $1 full-sc'11e encounter, first realbed, as would have been normal, by Flamrn~nus,for a t this stage, h ~ forces s were on the losrng end of thlngs. As a result, he drew up the rest of h ~ 1net1 s 111 order of bc~ttle.'"t was the beg~nningof the fourth stage, w171ch Ph~ltpcont~nued,part~allyas a reactton to Flam~nlnusbut rnore because of the glowing reports thar some of- h ~ soldlers s were g~ving h ~ r nof the battle taking pl'1ce for the control of the summits."' The Macedonian ktng made a poor decic~onbecause the ground was very rough and uriever~'~ and as siich hardly suitahle to his phalanx and because apparently he d ~ not d ~nusterhls full complement of soldlers: A "f'3ir lumber of men" had bee11 sent away f r o ~ nh ~ camp s to forage."" Moreover, ~t 1s also clear from the development ot the battle that, though I'h~lipwas able t o bring h ~ s r ~ g h wing t into speedy contact with the Ron~c~tl leg~onsof the Left, 111s own left, o w t ~ i gerther to the difficulty of the ground or to the d~stanceto cover or to t h e ~ runready state to start w ~ t h was , unable to close In tirne w ~ t hthe rest o t the Rom,~narmy.'7 P h ~ l ~quickly p marched his r ~ g h wlng t toward the stlmmlt. On reacli~ng 11, he wheeled to the lefr so that he could llne up h ~ ruen s In order of battle and rejolced at the ,lppclrent success that h ~ advance s g~idrdwas still hdvrtlg against the R o n ~ a n s . "But ~ the success d ~ dnot last long, for now Flatmintnus, who had already deployed h ~ men, s pushed ahead h15 legionaries against the M a c e d o n i : ~sk~rm~shers, ~~ changmg the Roman retreat into an advance. Thus Phil~p,who had hoped to follow In h13 sk~rrn~shers' footsteps, was ~nsteadforced to recelve h ~ retreating s ruen by lining them to the rrght of the phalanx, the11to double the depth of phc~lL~ngrtes to sixteen, and finally to attack to turn the scales tn his f a v ~ r . ~ ~ The fltth stage of the battle began wlth the clash of I'hllip's prltemen against the R o ~ n a nlegrondr~esof the left, a fight thdt soon turned In f'lvor
1 '
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of the Macedon~:lns.""' It was at t h ~ sstage that Flamin~nus,aware that 111s left was on the b r i ~ ~of l c defeat, decided that the battle could still be won by success o n the right.'"' There, the Roman victory came easily, tor the Macedolllall left, hcl~nperedby the terrain and " h ~ v ~ 110 t ~ one g to glve them orders,= I O was ~ stlll srrearnl~nedin order of march, and it gave way easily when the Roman elephants rnoved forward to attack.Io3 The fifth stage closed, then, w ~ t hthe two r ~ g h wlrlgs t victorlotis, 1' sltuntion that tinder normal hoplite and Hellen~sticwarfare could have ended either in a draw o r rrtore likely in a confrontation between the two wlt~ners."'~111 real~ty,t h ~ n g sturned out differently for Ph~lip.Although some of the Romans (probably the first line of the hastati) put the defeated enemy left wing to the sword,'0i a tribune whose name is unknown, says Polybius, aware that the Rornc1ns of the left were under greklt difficulty, wheeled 20 man~ples,likely from the second line (the prlnc~pes)and the third line (the trlarii) ot the victorious Roman right,'o6 and fell upon the rear of the mace don^:^^^ phalanx. Ph~hp'sphalangites were thus caught between two fires, the newly arrived inan~pleson their rear and the Romans whoi~tthey had been fight~ngon their t r o ~ ~ t It . " was ~ a s~tuationthat calrte as a surprlse even to Phil~p.S111ce he had been fight1118 on the r~ght,he was unaware of the events o n his left, and he had thonght that he had won the day u n t ~ lhe saw the rear ranks of his apparently v~ctoriousright wing throw away t h e ~ rshields after the arr~valof the 2 0 n1~1111ples.~'~ The king w~thdrewand saved h ~ life;'"" s h ~ men s d ~ not. d 'I'he sixth stage o t the battle ended in a bitter, confused, and bloody scene. Whetl the Macedonian ph,al,~ngltes realized that they could not ~ I I I the day and that they were surrounded, they heid up the ptkes, the normal Macedoman slgn either of surrender or of rrloving over to the enemy side. F l C ~ n ~ ~ n ~who n u s understood , the lnednlng of the gesture, was undec~ded whether to spare the beaten force, but some of the Roman soldiers, probably unaware thar the gesture meant surrender, fell upon the Macedonians, c u t t ~ t ~them g down. "Most of the111 penshed, a very few of them escaping after throwing away their The two armies had hegun the encounter allnost equal in nurrtber26,000 RomC1nsand 25,500 M,~cedon~:lns.Now on the battlefield lay 700 Rolnans and 8,000 enemies lcllled." ' Cynoscephalae 1s a clear example of the awesorrle power of the phalanx in spite of its deteat. The terrain (the h~ghergroutld), the depth of the formation (16 ranks), and the sarlssa (the ptke agatnst the sword) gave Philip's right wlng "a decided advantage": The phalangites "acquitted thernsel\es splendidly in the battle.""2 It could not have been otherw~se,for " ~ ~ o t h ~c'111 n gw~thstdndthe charge of the phalanx as long as ~t preserves its character~sticformat1011and f o r ~ e . " " It ~ was an experierlce that the Romans \vould relive In an even rnore hitrer torrn soine twenty-nlne y e x s later at Pydna.
The opponent a t Pydllc~ (Figure 6.2) was the Macedonian 'lrrny of Perseus, tlie son of Phtl~pV and the new lc~ngof Macedonta. The Roman army numbered about 38,000 (33,400 ~nfantry,4,200 horserrten, and 22 elepl~~ants); the Macedolllans h,ad about 44,000 men, dlv~dedinto 4,000 cavalry, 1 9,000 Irght troops, and 21,000 phalangites (3,000 of whom were elite troops).""The terrairl at I'ydna was uneven at the foothills, where the Rom,~nsof consul Aer111lrus Paulus had establrshed therr camp. But the 1111t ~ a stage l of the battle took place in tlie plain below, w h ~ c hwas well su~ted for the Macedon~anplialang~tes.'l ' The Macedon~ansfiere the first t o attack on the left and left-center of thetr I~ne,where 6 Roman allled cohorts stood. It began very badly for the Roi~tans.Aern~liusI'aulus was d~srnayedto find that the Macedonians "had dlre,~dyplanted the trps of their long spears 11.1 the shrelds ot the R o n ~ ~ ~ n s , who were thus prevented from reaching them w ~ t hthetr swords.""Vt was a losing proposlclon for h ~ sbrave sold~ers.As Polyb~ussays, a Roman needed 6 feet t o operdte well filth his sword, but srnce the phalangite used only 3 feet to deploy and stnce he had in front of hitn a t least 4 more spear points, the phaI,~rtxcould present at least 8 and probably 10 spears in a frontage of 6 feet. In other words, there would be between 8 , ~ n d10 phdlatig~tesagainst 1 leg~oiiary."~ Patllus would confess later in hts I~fethat he "had never seen a s ~ g h truore fearful," so i~tuchso that even ruany years later, he could not hrde 111s er.notron 111 recounting ~ t .I 'X The s~lrlssdeprovided a barr~erthat netther device nor courage seemed able to overcome. The leader of a group of sold~ersIn an allled Roman cohort even threw h ~ s men's standard Into the ranks ot the enemy, hoping that the deslre to retrieve ~t would spur his sold~ersto even greater feats, for ~twas "an ttnnatural and flagrant thing to abandon a star~dard.'"'~'Th~stactic had been used filth great success rn mother battle, dgarnst the Celts In the 190s In Italy.12" Yet a t Pydna, 1 1 0 desire to retrieve the standard, no attempt t o thrust aside the sarlssae o f thelr enemzes, no clashing of shzelds against them, and not even the d e s p e r ~ t eserzlng ot spe,lrpolnts wlth one's own hands succeeded.'" The 6 allled cohorts were beaten back, and when the 2 legions of the center entered the fray, they too were forced to retreat."" Yet both a t Cynoscephal'le and ,1t P y d n ~ the , ph'11anx was ult~~nately cut to pieces, for this type of f o r n ~ a t ~ ohad n a serlous shortcom~ng,at least visi-vts the legion: 'There was "only one tinie artd one place in which it [could] perform ~ t peculiar s ~ e r v i c e . " ' ~"Level ; and clear ground with no obstacles" was requ~redfor the phalanx to perform well, but such suitable terrain was rarely e r ~ c o u n t e r e d . Apparently, '~~ terratn of this type was available both , ~ Pydna t and at Cyno~ceph~Ilae, for fie know that Perseus found a "'plain for his phalanx" w ~ t h"firm standing and smooth g r o ~ i i d , " ' ~and ' prohably at lea5t I'h~lip's r ~ g h twing a t Cynoscephalae rrlust have found a suitable terraln t o delrver its sh,atter~ngcharge against the Roman left. Yet
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lioman
I
Allred cohorts
liomnn lcgltrns
165
Allled cohorts
/
cavdlr)~
I
Macedonian cavalry
Iloman
cavalry
,
~nfantry
infantry A. Guard unit U. Sacred squadron (l'crscu5) (1. Odry5ran cnv'11ry
in both cases, t h ~ advantage s was not enough. At Cynoscephalae, the Macedonian left never had the time to deploy properly, "the difficulty of the ground" being one of the reasons."" At Pydna, the phalanx yeems to have pursued the retreating Ronlans, but as it ntoved toward the foothills, the ground became uneven, whlch meant that ~tcould not keep its line and as a result showed "many Intervals and clefts In it." It was the opeliing for which I'aulus was waiting. H e divided his cohorts into srnaller groups o f ~ n e ndnd ordered them to plunge 1nto the "~nterstlces"dnd "empty spC1ces" of the phalanx, "not fighting a s~nglebattle against them all, but many separate and successive t ) a t t I e ~ . " ' ~ ~ Paulus's orders proceeded smoothly from him to his officers and from the officers to the rank and tile. The Romans plunged into the spaces of the phalanx and turned the large battle into separate encounters, where they held 1' definite edge. What could the poor M a c e d o t ~ i ~soldier, a ~ ~ with his Inferior sword and smaller shleld, d o agalnst the Roman g l a d ~ u sand the Ronlan scuturn? The situation became tragic for the Macedonians when the R o ~ n a r~~l g h t ,which had been beaten back in the ~nitlalc l ~ s h ,begm a counterattack In coordrnatlon w ~ t l ithe leg~ollariesof the center. The elephants and the Roman cavalry, stat~or~ed a t the end of the right wrng, assaulted tile Macedonian left. The etlelny cak'xlry, terrified by the
elephants,'Lx withdrew toward their rlght, leavlrlg the left flank of thelr line unprotected. Tlie phalanx-disordered by the legionar~es,penetrated 111 its gaps, and attacked by tlie elephants and liorsc~rtenon the flar~lcand rear"was broken up"; t h e ~ reffic~encylost, the Macedon~ansoldiers "made a poor resistance and a t last were routed."i2" The only exception was the e l ~ t egroup of 3,000 Macedon~answho fought to the last The battle, begun 11.1 the afternoon, lasted about an hour. Dead o n the battlefield lay 20,000 Macedonrans; 10,000 were taken prisoners. The Romans lost or~ly80 to 100 ruen.13' Like t h e ~ rcornrades at Cynoscephalae, the pIial,~ngltes at Pydl~ncould, in the end, d o l~ttleaga~nstthe legion. Tlie final attack of Paulus's men revealed a number of the phalanx's shortcomings: The Romans had d~videdthetr cohorts, but the phalang~tescould 11ot; the Romans had plunged into the Interstices, but tlle plke~nenhad no alternat~vebut to matntaln therr Irne; the Romans had engaged tn ind~v~dual fights, hut, by necessity, the Macedonians had had to fight as a whole. FI~lally,the Ron1'1ns hG1dused t h e ~ stronger r swords a ~ l dshields wlth deadly effect, and most of all, they had ~ l i o w na ~ophtstlcatedchain of command that could easlly transfer orders along the ltne. All t h ~ ssuggests that the legion was clearly superlor to the p h a l ~ n x111 terms of flex~bllity,rnob~hty,deployment, and chair? of command. It was a lesson that had been repeated over and over agaln d ~ ~ r the ~ n course g of the two battles. At Cynoscephalae, troops o n the Macedonian rlght could absorb their retreat~ngadvance unlts only o n their flank,'" but Flamrninus "received his advanced force into the gaps between the r n a n ~ p l e s . " 'The ~ ~ deteat of tlie Roman left was not tollowed up by ,I rout,""as would have been 11ormal it the phalanx had been forced to retreat. Moreover, even In victory, the phalanx always ran the risk of breaking up if ~tp~lrsuedthe enerny.13j I'olybi~ls IS explicit on this: "Every Ro~nallsold~er,once he IS armed and sets about h ~ bus~rless, s can adapt h ~ m elf equally well to every place and time and can meet attack from every quarter."'36 Moreover, although In small detachments the phalangite is "at tllnes o t l ~ t t l euse and a t tllues of no use a t all," the Roman s o l d ~ e r1s "equally prepared and equally In cond~tronwhether he has to fight together w ~ t hthe whole army or with a part of it or In lnaniples or s~ngly."'~' The advantages of the leg~onare even greater we consider ~ t deploys ment and cliarn of command. Its deployment allowed the legion a flex~billty that the phalanx, at least tt not led by an Alexander, could never have. It tlle first 11ne M.JS victor~oiis,then the second and thlrd lines could wheel toward some other direction on tlie battletield, as happened a t Cynoscephalae.lZ8If ~t was defeated or beaten back, as at P)dna,I3' the second or third 11ne could s t ~ l lturn the battle 11.1 tllelr favor. Of course, all t h ~ sinvolved changes of attn that were not always poss~bleon every occasio~ibut were cerra~nlyprobable for the legion, thoi~ghoitt ot reach for the phalanx. For instance, a t Cynoscephalae, Ph111p d ~ d11ot becorne aware of the turn of
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events until ~t was too late. I11 fact, he thought that he had At Pydna, the r ~ g h twlng, where Perseus stood, apparently never came to blows with the Rontans. I'erseus lost control of his rrlerl soon after their deployment, and when the battle started t o g o badly for h ~ sold~ers, s he fled.14' T h ~ sIS in sharp contrast to the abilrty to scan the battlefield that was demonstrated by both Paulus at I'ydna and Flaruininus at CynoscephaIde. Paulus kept continuous control of the battle flow. H e ordered the first attack of the center legions, he agaln decided to send his men in small groups into the gaps ot the phalanx, and he ir~str~lcted his r ~ g h tto counterattack the Macedon~anleft. Flam~ninus,when he saw that the battle hLad been lost on the left, quickly reallzed that he could still triumph by concentrating or1 the right.'4%oreover, it is likely, ~f we agree w ~ t hF. W. %lbank, thdt Polybius's unknown t r ~ b u ~who l e wheeled the 2 0 m,~n~ples 111to the Macedonian right was acting under Flam~ninus'sorders.'" Finally, the shortcorn~ngso f the phalanx are even ruore apparent if, following Polybius, one shifts the focus to the strategic pl'xne. The phaldng~teswould be unable to challenge the enemy on any but flat terrain even i f the enemy would devastate thelr cmes and and they could d o little it the erlelrty c ~ thelr ~ t supply 11ne.I" In other words, their optrons would always be l~nlitedwhen they were forced by the chang~ngcondit~onsof strategic warfare to move quickly trorn one area to The evidence pointing out the inferiority of the phalanx by Phillp V's time is incontrovert~ble,but Walbank's argument goes further, for he mp l ~ e sthat the situation would have beer1 different under Alexarider. The sar~ssawould have been shorter, the arrnor of the ph,al,~ng~teswould have been lighter; and the soldiers the~nselveswould have been less rlg~d,l e ~ s specialized, and more protected o n the f l a r ~ l < s . ' ~ ~ The argument could be d~sm~sseci o n the basis that any comparison would be unhtstor~calstnce one would be evaluating systerns of dtfferent perlods. Nor can we draw valuable indications from the chronologicdlly acceptable confrontation in the edrly fowth century B.C. between Pyrrhus, who was active only a few years after Alexander, and the Romans. F ~ r s of t all, the war against Pyrrhus ended in stalemate between his s~~periority on the battlefield dnd Romdn obst~n~acy; second, Pyrrhus's army was a comhination of both Creek and Itallan f o r ~ e s ; ' ~ % n finally d and even more i ~ n portant is the fact that it is ditticulr to ascertain whether the Rolrtan rrt~litdry system differed rnuch from that of the Greeks at that tune in terms of both weapons and deployment. In fairness t o Walbank, his argument also seems to rest on the assuri~ptiori that Alexander's army was not just ;I matter of phalangltes but also of horsemen-the proportion of foot soldiers to Iiorsemen In 334 R.(:. was 6 to 1. But In two battles between the Hellen~stickingdorrls and the Romans, there were only 1,200 horse met^ dgdinst 27,600 footmen at Sellas~aand only
2,000 horsemen out of a total of 25,500 troops at Cynoscephalae.'"" Yet there too, the argument rests o n shaky ground because it assumes that the invading arlity of Alexander was the norin. The high proportion of horsemen at the crossing of the E.iellespont was a must for a force embarking on the conquest of a large einplre. In more normal circuinstances, tlie proportion was much more ~itodest-16 to 1 in the arrny of I'h~lip I1 against the 11lyrians and 30 to 1 at ChG3erone,1.1F0It seerns re,~son'~ble,however, t o asstlrne that Alexander's success indicated that the road to follow was to concentrate on a fine balance between foot and horse soldiers. In this sense, the true heir of Alexander was not any one of the various Successor kings but the great Cartliaginian general Hannihal.
Hannibal as Alexander's Heir When FIann~bdldec~dedto march to Italy 111 the spring of 218 13.t:. (Figure 4;.3),lr1one of 111s friends warned that there was only one way to reach Italy: Hannibal "rnust teach h ~ stroops t o eat human flesh and accustom them to thls.""' Carthag~niantroops never c a n e t o that, but they would pay dearly for t l w r trek froin Spain through the southern lands of the Gauls and fillally across the snow-capped Alps. Yet by rn~dsumrnerof- the y e a 21 8 B.C., the tlme had come for H a n n ~ b a to l ft~lfill111s boyhood oath to h ~ father-never s to become a fr~endof the Romans.' 5 3 It was, however, not just a matter of an oath. Slowly but relentlessly, Rorne liad been edging Carthage out of ~ t do~ninance s of the western M e d ~ t e r r a n e , ~F~~~r s. tSlcily, then Sard~ntaafter a bitter dtspute, and then Corslca had been added to the Roiitan E~npire.Now, the niost recent Issue involved Spain, where the two imper~alpowers had '~gd~rl come Into bitter contact, specifically oker the city of Saguntuin and generally over the control of a land rich in mineral deposits. It was the spark that would unleash sixteen years of destruction in the western Mediterranean.""~~ real~ty,the conflict had been i n e v ~ t ~ ~beble cause of the way the F ~ r s tP u n ~ cWar (264-241 B.(:.) had ended. The Roiitan terms of peace had been harsh and unbearable. I'eace could have prospered only lf the Rom,~nshad destroyed Carthage's ab111ty t o recoker, but tliey had not done so. Consequently, it was inevttable that Cartliage would have to strike again.15' The Second P u n ~ cWar (218-20 1 B.C.) would be the most senous challenge of Rome's long history. The conflict would also show that even the most perfect Hellen~st~c military rnacliine could not stand in the long run against the ~ n ~ g of h tthe Rorrlan state. It was the end of one er,I and the begtnnlng of a new one. 'T'he drama would be played on tlie pale green terraln o t Italy, o n the yellow ochres ot the southern Iberian peninsula, and finally, on the golden so11 of North Afrlca.
H a n n ~ b ~ ~plan l ' s had first c'1lled for elltlcing the Ronlans to Spd~n,defe'ltIng them there, and the11 marching to Italy,'5" The Romans' plan too had been d~ffererttat tlie beginning, for they had ~ntendedto attaclc on two fronts, sendlrlg two '1rrnles out of Italy-one to Spain, the other to Carthage's Iiome sod, North Afr~ca."'" Both strategies, however, had to be rev~sed.12 revolt In the northern part of Italy, Gallia C~salplna,delayed the army of Spas11on the west s ~ d eof- the Alps, forcing Hannsb,d to move before the Roman army had reached the Iber~angenrnsula. By the end of July 21 8 he Carthaglniart host had crossed the Pyrenees on its way to I t ~ l y .Hannlbal led a l~ttleless th'xn 60,000 men-50,000 foot sold~ers, 9,000 horsemen, and 37 elephant^.“)^ After a lo~igjourney and the b~tter crosslng of the Alps, snow and ice already on the ground of tlie rnountain passes, his army h'xd shrunk to less thdn half ~ t or~ginal s sue, dec~nldtedby desertron, tlie harshness of the weather, and the enmity of some of the trlbes \vhosc lands the Carrhag~n~arts had violated in their trek to Italy. Hdnn~balnow had 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cav'xlry trtlops. Only the elephants, s t ~ l l37 In number, had survived the crosslng u n s c a t l ~ e d . ' ~ ~ ' Nonetheless, h ~ sarmy was still forntidable. Lllce tlie llellenistic military form,~t~ons of the penoci, the Carthagi~llallarmy M.JS a conlb~ndt~on of d ~ f ferent groups: Carthag~niancltlzens, few in numbers and usually officers since their ctty's main activity was cornruerce and trade; people froin t h e ~ r conquered terntones such as Afrlcdns and Spaniards; all~essuch '1s the African Nuin~d~ans; and many Iberians, Gattls, and, later on, Italic people who served as ruercenar~es.~"It was the Carthaginian verslorl of Alexander's Macedon~~xns, ThessC~hc~ns, A g r ~ ~ l n ~ ~allled l n s , Greeks, and Thrac~ans. The s~milarit~es are even Inore srr~kingif one looks at the corngositlon of tlie varlous elements of the arrny. Like f~lexarlderat the crossing of the Hellespont, when Hann~bnlcrossed the Pyrenees, he M.JS at the head of I' force In which the groportio~iof horsemen to footmen was very h~gh-l horseman to 6 ~nfantryrnentor Alexander, l to 5 for the Carthaginlarl general. L'tter, afier the attrltlon of the voyage, the proportron of horse sold~ers was even htgher-l to 4. Moreover, l ~ k ethe army of the great Macedon~an, I-lannibal rel~edon a vanety of light troops-8,000 out of 20,000 footrnen &hen he drrlved 11.1 ItL~ly.laAnd l ~ k eAlexander's men, n ~ o s tof these were javelln-armed soldiers, not long-range m~sstieunlts, of w h ~ c hHannibal seetits to have had only some Balearlc sli~lgers.163 The close c o ~ p e r ~ ~ tof i o the n phalanx with the c'avalry and the ad hoc use of the Ilghter unlts had made Alexander's army ~nv~ncible. It was a lesson that I-lannibal understood well, as he wotlld sho\v against the Romans. Yet the Carthag~nl'xngeneral ~ . o i i l dbr~ngsome refinements to the successful formula of the Macedonran k~ng,for the tactical strength of Hannibal's army lay In an even rnore s ~ ~ b tcooperation le between the var~ousunlts. Actually, al-
A Phalanx with Joints
171
though the Macedonian line infantry, the phalanx, rerna~nedone of the two keys of Alexander's success, Hannibal tended to downplay tlie role of h19 own phalanx. Its function was sirnply to pin the enerny so that the cavalry, after putt~ngthe opposing horsemen to flight, could veer on the flank or on the rear of the enemy footmen and destroy them. The con~plexlnaneuvers of Alexander's cavalrymen were desrgned not so rnucli to defeat the enemy horsen~en'IS to find 3 weakness In the enemy llrle and then exploit ~t ln coinbination with some of the heavy infantry, so that the whole battle line would eventually collapse. Hannlbal's tact~caluse of h ~ cavalry, s by contrast, was lnuch Inore direct. His formula was dlctated not just by persorlal choice but also by the characteristics of 111senemy, the Romans. For the Macedonians, a one-to-one struggle against the Persian horsemen before crushing the enerny infailtry would hake lowered thelr odds of winning the day because the enemy was supertor, at least In number if not quality. All this meant that Alexander had to find another way to deteat the adversary without letting all the horseinell Into the decisive stages of the confrollration. Hannlb'11's task in regard to tlie Rornan cavalry was simpler, for hts enemy was ~nferiorIn number and probably in quality too. But the horsemen's task against the Roman foot soldiers w'1s lnfinltely more difficult th'111 that of the Macedonians against most Pers~antnfarttrj~men.Hannlbal Itltely made a virtue of a relatively poor line infantry tor, unlike the Macedonian arrnles of Alexander, his line footmetl were normally a c o r n b i t ~ ~ ~ tof~ osoldlers n Inferior to the Romans. The best were probably 111s Africans, who would distingu~shtliemselves at Cannae, and his steady, disciplined Spaniards. Yet ne~thergroup was a ~ n ~ ~for t c the h Romans In rlorindl clrcumst'lnces, as even the battle of Trebi,~ would show. Furthermore, Hann~balcould not trust h ~ Celts s to any great degree; their first rush was justly famous in antiqu~ty,but they lacked the staying power of a good lrne infantry.'" 111 other words, Hannibal's infantry could pln and delay the Romans, but tlie vlctory had to come from other elements-the heavy cavalry and the light horsenten and ~nfantrylnen. The Carthaginlan proportion of Ilgkter footinell vis-h-vis thelr lrne 11.1fantry was 2 to 3; In other words, they were fairly close t o half tlie Carthagintan contingent. Moreover, a highly etficient part of the cavalry was the Numldian light cc~valry.'" The Carthagirllall Ilghter unlts ilot only performed the duties of opentng the battle, covering the flanlts, and engaging in the pursuit of a defeated ertelrty but also, through the Nurnidlan horsemen, they often played a key role ill the success of the army. Arrned w~tlijavel~nsand sinall bucklers, tlie Numid~ansprovtded the vanguard for their army on the rnarch, harassed enerny troops day and night, and caused thern serious problems by cutting thelr food i ~ n dwater supplies and by attacking foraging garttes. D u r ~ n gthe battle, they would cont~nuallychallenge the enemy Ilrte, trylng t o break ~t by throwing javel~nsat close range
and then gallop~ngback if c11'1llenged by the enerny. Moreover, ~f t h e ~ ropponents broke, they were rurlilessly efficient 117 pursu~t."~ The cornplex use of the light cavalry clearly differentiated llannibal's rrlen from the ar~nlesof Alexander and his Successors. Yet the b~ggestd ~ f ference was the shrewd rnantpulat~onof certain elements, discouraged by the Macedonians and certainly despised by the Rornans at least in the early stages of the P u n ~ cWars. Hdnn~balwas ;I Illaster not just In the careful reconnatysance of the terrain of battle but also In ruses, ambush, and sk~ilful e x p l o ~ t a t ~ oo nf the character of- the erlelrty leader. 'The controntations at the Trebtd R~ver,at Ldke Traslmene, and , ~ tCannae are clear exa~nplesof the tactical sltiil and of tlie Innovations of the great Carthagtnian general. Romans and Carthaginians found themselves facing each other not long after Hann~bal'scrosslng of the Alps. In e,~rlyOctober 2 18 B.c.,'" the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, who had t r ~ e dto lntercepr tlie enemy In southern France in valn, quicltly retraced h ~ steps s and t r ~ e dto stop Hannlbal on the p1'11ns of northern Italy n e x the Ticlnus R~ver.The encounter w,~sllln~ted to the cavalry of the two forces and resulted more frorn the danger of reconnoitering too close to the enemy rather than frorn deliberate c l ~ o i c e . ' ~ " Yet once the enelnles recogn~zedeach other III the xnidst of the clouds of dust ra~sedby the hooves of their horses, they quickly lined up for battie. I-lannibal deployed his heavier horserlien in the center and his nirnble Nurrl~diansat the w~ngs. As would become the norm in most of the war, the Rornan center performed well and kept the enerny at bay. 'The resolution of the battle would come from the wings. Mere the Cartllagln~ans,who prob,~bly oiimun~bered the Ro~nans3 to l,lh9 outflanked the Roman l ~ n eso that the Nurnidians, who were at the wlngs, could fall tipon the Roman rear. P ~ ~ b l i uCso r n e l i ~ ~ s S c ~ p ~ who o , had led hls horsemen, was wounded and would have been killed had ~t not been for the bravery of 111sown son the young Sctpio, who one day wotlld conquer Hannibal and Carthage and be rewarded w ~ t hthe name of A f r i c a n u ~ . ' ~ ~ ' The battle of Tic~nusR~verset up the normal pattern for the encounters between the two armies. The Romans t r ~ e dto defeat the erleriiy by conqiiering the center of the battlefield; H,innrbal instead used h ~ center s to 11111110bilize the enemy. The resolution was prov~dedby the wings, where the ability to del~vera heavy punch, as in Alexander's arriry, was sacrificed in tavor of mobility; Mann~baldeployed 111s most nimble horsemen there. The battle of Tic~nusR ~ v e also r taught the Romans that the enemy's cavalry was superior to theirs.'" Yet this was apparently not an ~nsoliibleproblern for them because they had not trusted in t h e ~ rhorsemen to resolve the war. It was up to t h e ~ rheavy ~nfaiitrylnento carry the day and show the ~niglitof Rorne. This was the thought of the senate In Rome and apparently of the other consul, Tlber~usSempron~usLongus, when he finally joined the wounded
A Phalanx with Joints
1 73
Scipio. In the ineclntlme, Scipio hdd withdr'xwn to a position more suitL~ble to h ~ ~nfantry s near the Treb~aR~ver,again 111the plalns of northern Italy.'72 'I'he battle of Trebia R~verwas a rrtasterly d~splayof the Carthagrnian generdl's cunning and tactlcal sk~ll.'" fdannibal played on the psychological weaknesses of h ~ opponent, s I,ongus, who was give11 more or less a free hand while Sc~plowas recuperating fro111 his wourids. Moreover, In the ~ n a n n e rof a great tdcttcian, Hann~b'xl adapted his strengths and the enemy's wealtnesses to the terratn. F~rst,whether by plan or development, he gave the lrnpressiori to Longus that the Rornans could eas~lybeat the Carthdgl~lianhost.i74 Then &hen the time c'line, he carefully staged the battle. F~rst,he chose a spot that appeared unsrr~tabiefor an ambush, without trees arid allnost flat. Yet the 'I'rebia R~ver,with ~ t thorny s bushes arid overh'mging fol~age,split the terrain in two, ~ n a k i l ~itg edsy for a sizable force to h ~ d enear the gotentlal slte of confrontatron between the two arinies.'75 Hannlbal made the most of. this. The night before the attack, he sent his brother M'3go filth a select force of 1,000 footmen aild 1,000 cavalry troops to hide near 111sc a ~ n p . " The ~ moriitng after, he insisted that h ~ s ruen take hrealdast arid get their horses and arrns ready, and then he ordered his K u n ~ i d ~ acav'xlry n to adv'lnce tow,~rdthe RonlC1ncamp and to provoke the Ro~nansInto actlon before they had had tlrne to eat or to make any preparation for the battle.'77 An essential elerrlent of Hannibal's pl'ltl w'is his underst'mding of the character of h's opponent L,ongus, who felt sure of vlctory. The Carthag~nian's plan worked smootl~ly.Longus obliged hiru, first by rashly serlding hts whole cavalry against the Nuinidians. When his horsemell were unable to come to grips w ~ t hthe enemy, L,ongus dispatched some 6,000 l~ghtertroops and fincllly h ~ whole s army-all before h ~ sold~ers s had tii~teto prepare tor the fiintry day aild have t h e ~ rmorning meal, app'aretltly ,111 lmport'tnt p'xrt of the Roman dally diet.lp8 The battle probably took glace 111 December 218 IS.( .'" after a n ~ g h tof heavy rain that had swelled the normally shal10- river to bre~st-high But the icy w ~ t e r sof the Trebla d ~ dnot deter the Romans f r o ~ nthelr pursult. They crossed the rrver and l~nedup for battle In front ot the Carthagin~anpositions (Figure 6.4). Hanri~bal's ~ n e napp'aretltly took thelr tlnle to meet them III a pitched battle. They spent their ttme instead eatlng and drtnk~ng,groornlng thew horses, and anolntzng thelr bodies with oil as a protection agalnst the cold'"-all thlngs that the R o n ~ ~ a ~needled ls, by the Nurnid~ansand by the impatience ot thelr commander, had been unable to do. But there were even worse th~ngsIn store for Longus's rnen. The Romans, &h<)h'xd 36,000 foot soldiers at t h e ~ rdisposcal (20,000 ot them were, however, allres), deployed In thelr usual pattern with the 4,000 cavalry divided at the \ ~ r n g s . ' ~ q T hCarthag~n~ans e were clearly inferior in infantry ( 1 9,000) but superior in cc~vGilry (9,000, includ~tlgthe Celtic allies);
The 1it)rnans Cros, the Trebr~Krvcr
l
&
Elepl~ants
Mago
1
FIGURE 6.4 that IS, they had rnore than a 2 to 1 advant'1ge over the Rox~t,~ns.'"iMoreover, Hann~bal's brother, Mago, had another 1,000 horsemen and 1,000 tootrrten lying in ambus11 somewhere near the banl<s of the Trebia. Hannibal's deployrrlellt dupl~catedthe Romans'-hls ~nfantryIn the center, h ~ s cavalry at the w~ngs-but as an added sophl~tication,besides the ambttshing party, he also set his 37 elephants at both ends of his infantry, just in front of the ph,al,tnx. l X" The battle opened w ~ t hthe usual pattern of light troop5 engaging bttt with the R o r ~ ~ a having r ~ s the worst of i t since they now had fewer javelininen. Some h ~ been d used agalrlst the N~irnidlansin the early attack of the R011lan camp; the rest had been rendered less effective by the nver's icy waters.'xs 'These problems also plagued the Roruan cavalry's javelins. Besldes, they were outnumbered by the Carthaglnian horsemen. The result at the wings was 110
A Phalanx with Joints
l
17.Y
I
FIGURE 6.5 surprise. 'The tired Rornan horsemen were no 1natc1-i tor the Carthagtniarl cakalry. They withdrew, le'~v~tlg the flanks of t h e ~ rfoot sold~ersexposed to the attacks of the Carthaginian and the Kumidiari cavalry.186 With their cavalry tleelng oft the battlefield, the Romans were now edged on two sldes-the enemy l ~ n e111falltryand the elephants on t h e ~ front, r the Carthaginian and Nuniidian horse troops on t h e ~ rflank.lx7Tlierr srtuatro~i became desperate when Mago carue out of his h~dirlgplace and hit them in the re,~r.'~"oon after, the ~nfarltryIme, except for the cetlter, g,jve way to to the strength and tlie onslaught of tlie Yet ~t is a testin~on~al dlsciplirie of the Roman fi)otman that the center continued the battle and actually y~ercedthe Carthaglni,~~~. 11ne (Figure 6.5). Once the Roma~lsdid so, they d ~ dnot wheel and attack the enemy tn the rear. They reallzed that the battle had been lost and that the rest of their llne had either been butchered or was fleeing from tlle battlefield. Moreover, the whole situation was worsening because tlie weather condrtron? had become ~ncreasingly ruore difficult, with heavy r a ~ nno\v falling on the cornhatants. Becnuse of thls, the RomCulsmarched off tlle b,~ttlefield to seek refuge in the c ~ t yof Placentta. They were reduced to about 10,000 n i e ~ i . The ' ~ ~ rest of the Roman troops were elther ktlled or taken prisoner.'Y' For the Carthaginians, the lnaln losses were in the elephants. All but one of them dled but
inore as a result of the weather than of the battle. The rest of the CL~rthaglnian casualties were among tlie Celts, and losses alnong the soldiers that counted, the Cartliaginians and Spaniards and, one suspects, the Numidi~ I I Swere , stnc~ll.'L~' Trebra Iiad reconfirmed the C a r t h a g m m pattern set at tlie Ticinus Rlver w ~ t l ithe use of an expendable cerlter and strong wings, but it also introduced new elements ~ n t othe confront,~t~on. H'annibal c'~ref~illy scrutinized the area before the battle, used the rashness of the consul 1,ongus to h ~ ads vantage, coinpelled the Rornans to attack on ground of his own choosing (he "took the view th,at ;I decislke eng'lgelnent should never be undertaken on any chance pretext and without a defin~tep u r p o ~ e " ' ~used ~ ) , every device to c~lrtailthe Roman chances and enharlce his own (breaktast, icy waters, dnolntlng, the arnbush), and fin'dly caused 1,trge casualties anlong the enemy. It was a pattern repeated in an even more dramatic form a t tlie battle of Lake Trasilnene, where he adapted his strengths to both tlie psychology of the enemy dnd the character~st~cs of the terr,~in.He first surprised the Roman army located 117 the region by advanc~ngthrough an unexpected path; Indeed, Hannibal "was always inclined to such expedtents."'" Then he ent~cedthe Ronlan co~lsulGaius Flam~nlusto follow him into 1' bottleneck before the arrival of tlie other Roman army, wli~clihad deployed on the opposlte slde of the peninsula on the Adriatic coastline. l-lai~i~lbal p~nnedthe enelny with the lake at one side dnd the Carthaglnlan troops controlling the hills and the exit of the bottleneck. And again he butchered an entlre Roman arrny, killing sorue 15,000 and t a k ~ n gabout another 15,000 prisoners.'"' Any other state would have succumbed after t h ~ defeat, s but the Romans continued the war. Approximately a year later, they had to face the greatest defeat of t h e ~ rh~storyon the fields of Canme. As at Trebi;~,there was disagreement on the course of action between the two Romarl consuls a t Cannae: As L. Aerliilius I'aulus urged caution a r d refused to accept acttor1 on a terrain better su~tedto f.Iannlbc~l'sc'~\alry, tlie inexperienced 'xnd boastful Gaitis 'Terentius Varro assumed that Roman arrns would wrn the day this t i n ~ e . ' "llis ~ confidence was boosted by the remarkable array of force at h ~ s disposdl- 16 leg~otls,X of w h ~ c hwere R o ~ n , ~dnd n 8 dllied, for an unprecedented total of about 80,000 footmen and 6,000 h o r s e ~ n e r i ,Hannihal, '~~ In coinparison, could not master rnore than half the Roinan strength in terrns of footmen, being disadvantaged there 2 to 1, but he again h,ad cle'tr superlority in cavalry, 10,000 men against tlie enemy's 6,000.1q8 W ~ t hboth cor~sulspresent, the Roman command alterrlated between them. On one of the days In whlch Varro held the supreme commdnd, he decided to lead the Romarl army to battle, one wlng posted o n the Aufidus River and the rest of the army on the plain (Figure 6.6). His legionaries were all posted 111 the center In an unusual f o r m , ~ t ~ oInore n like columns
177
A Phalanx with Joints l
I
l
1 Roman allies
;eltic and Sp;tnish infantry
African spcarrncn
African spearrncn
The 1nrt1alI)cployment
( s ~ n c etlie~rdepth had been doubled) as opposed t o rather thin lines o f about 8, 6, or 3 ranks each. At the r ~ g h w t i t ~ gwas the Rornan ~ ' ~ v a l r yat, the left the ailied.'""t 1s clear that Varro inttst have kept the les~oliof 7iebia in inind. Althotlgh the Romans had, in the end, been routed there, Trebla had also shown the power of the Rorndn legton vis-$-\IS the Carthaglnlan Irne infantry. The Ro~nanshad pierced it even In a losing cause. Varro's aint was clear: His cavalry \vings had tct hold the er~esrtyat bay; his center, superior in qual~tyand number, w,~sgiven the role of shattering the enerny center. If rhe Romans could reach their goal before their wings gave away, they would certa~nlycrusli the erlesrty this tirne. H a n n ~ b a also l must h,ave had the battle of Trebl:~River on h ~ rrllnd s for, although h ~ deployment s duplicated the enemy's, he added another refinement. Tlie Celts and Spaniards in the center were flanked on both sides by the Afrlca11 heavy ~ n f ~ n t r yCL~rth,agln~a~1s , and Llbyans, w h ~ l ethe heavy cavalry of Celts and Iberians were posted against the Ronlan cavalry and against the Roirtan allied horse~rten.~"' Hartnibal had other the Nu~~tidiarts things 11.1 n ~ ~ n too. d , Although the scen'lrio is not completely c l e x in Po-
l
African
spcarn~cn
, African spcarlncl
<:cltic and Spanish infaritrv
Thc 1)efcat of tlw Rom:~nCavalry
(:~IIII;~C,
21 h
K.(..
lyhius,"' Hannibal apparer~tlygave orders to the cavalry on both wings m d t o the center of Celts and Iberians to advance to CC)IIC'IC~ so thdt ;I[ the rnolnent of iri~pactw ~ t htlie Roman line, hts rnfantry ltne rntlst Iiave loolted like a crescent, with the round end pointing at the enerny host. The two African heaby infantry ut~ltswere deployed like the sharp ends of the shdpe, in a refused posture and probably in a column format~on.Hannibal too wanted t o repeat Trebia-but without any piercing of his own center. Should that hake happened, I' number of h ~ enetnles s would have escaped In the best case, or in the worst case, he would have lose the battle. HIScenter was there to hold the enerny and delay ~ t advance s as long as possible, gibing his c'~\alrytlme for d plncer movement. I lie battle proceeded as H a n n ~ b a lhoped. The Roman cavalry fought valiantly, but in the end, it was inexorably pushed back and exterminated by lts larger enemy."'? O n the Roman left, things were not golng as smoothly for the Carthagtnians. The Nurntdtan tactics of htt and run were rnuch slower in keeping the Rorrlarl allies at bay."" Yet the allies too were routed in the end when the \ictorious Celtic i ~ n dS p a t ~ ~ horsemen sh of the
A Phalanx with Joints
African cpenr~nen
179
I
J
L
1
African
The Trdp (:loses
FIGURE 6.8 left veered into the rear of the allied cavalry after eliminating the Roman horse troops (1:rgure 6.7). Their morale in shambles, the Rorrtan allies were routed and then pursued by the Kum~diansalone, troops who were at t h e ~ r most effic~entIn thts role."'4 In the center, the trghting was hard, but for the rnontent, no Rolnarl bre,~kthroughhad taken place. Yet elther by design or development of the act~on,the Roman footmen had pushed tlie Celts and Spaniards of tlie opposing center until the crescent had changed in direction, rts extreme po117t m w at the back of the Carth'?glnl:111 hne. Although a g a n Polyl>ius is unclear on this golnt, ~tseems that the Romans were on the verge of pierc~ng the line when help for the Carthag~nianscame in the shape of the Africans, who now were able to attack the c ~ d v L ~ nRornans c ~ ~ ~ gon thelr f l a ~ ~ k s . ~ ~ ' ~ Any other army probably would have collapsed at that stage. Certainly, the Rorrtan footmen were havirlg great ditficulry, but it I S a testirrtor~ialto thelr flex~bllltythat their collapse c a n e only when the v~ctoriousCeltic and Spanish cavalry attacked thern f r o n ~the rear (Figure 6.8). The Romans, completely surrounded now, defertded themselves well, but in the end they were cut down to ;I n ~ ~ ~ n . ~ ~ ' W l t i ~ thelr n a t e large l y , numbers and the closed
180
A Phnliznx with Joints
space In whlch they were forced to fight prevented them frorn uslng even the most elementary aspects of their battle system-they could not replace their wounded and dead, and they had too little room for proper ~noverrtent.~~'~ At the end of the day, accordlr~gto Polylxus, 70,000 Romans lay dead on the field, and 10,000 more had f a l l e ~prisoner. ~ Of the orig~nal6,000 Iiorwmen, only 70 Rornans and 300 allied troops had survived. The Carthaginians left 4,000 Celtic and 1,500 Spanish m d African casunlties, i ~ n dthey lost about 200 cavalrymen. Gaetano De Sanct~s,however, cuts those figures drastically, putting Roman casualties at 20,000 to 25,00O.")"et even if one accepts De S'anctis's calcul'atlons, the carn,qge was stlll etlormous. For the third time in a period of not much Inore than a year, the Roman rnilttary rrtachtne had been shattered. It seemed as t f Rome now lay at I-lannlbal's rnercy. Reality would, however, prove otherwise. As Polyblus had s a d after Trebia, "The Rornans both In g u b l ~ cand prlvate are most to be feared when they stand tn real danger.""" l'he truth is that though llannibC1lthe tactician was faultless and Wannlbal the str'lteglst was clever, Hannibal the gr~rndstrategist was not quite so brilliant, etther because of matters of his own choosing o r because of the particular structure of the Carthagllllall state and the correspolldl~lgnature of the Rorrlan state. It seems that Hannihal never tlto~lght~t would be possible to destroy the Romans. What he had in ruind was to hurrtiliate Rome, to keep control of the I b e r ~ mpeninsula, and to regal11 for C'xrth'ige what ~t had lost during and after the Ftrst P u n ~ cWar-Sictiy, Sardinia, and Corstca. In other words, he believed that what was at stake was the dorn~nationof the western Medlterra~le~ln. In the quest for hls goal, Ha11111bal's plan had been rather stmple: first, to draw the R o n ~ a n sto S p a ~ nand defeat thein there and then t o ruarch to Italy. But when the Roinans were detained by a revolt in ~lorthernI t ~ l y ,he had declded to proceed for It'aly ~mmedl~~tely. His plan had not bee13 lightly conce~ved.He had prepared his troops well before the march; he had selected only rhe best ruen possible; he had left enough soldlers to man the C a r t h a g ~ n i ~lllterests a ~ ~ in both Spdln atld Africa; he had organ~zedan army in the typical pattern of a conquering host (that IS, with great ruohility and a variety o f troop types); and, like Alexander, he had tried to secure a proper base of operations before advancing Into enemy territory. However, some of the assuingtions u n d e r p ~ n n ~ nhis g prepasattons would prove to be false-specifically, the beltef that the Gauls of northern Italy would tnake colnlnon c'liise wlth the Carthaginlans against the hated Romans and that, if he defeated the Rornans 117 a great pitched battle, most of the Italian allies would defect horn Rort~eto Carthage. 'l"l1e Rornans would then sue for peace and dccept the terms that w o ~ ~ lgive d the Carthagintans control of the western Mediterranean. Hanntbal's journey through the lands of the southern Gauls and his crossing of the ~ c yAlps ln the nlldst of locc~lopposition are the stuff of leg-
A Phalanx with Joints
182
ends. But ~n reallty, h ~ journey s could also be Interpreted '1s d~sastrousbecause half of h ~ arrny s had melted away by the time the piallis of northern Italy were w~tliinhis soldiers' reach. When he arrived there, h ~ arrny s was restless ,111d t~red.And ~f a Inore careful lnan t h ~ nLongi~shad been 111 charge of the Romans at Trekia, ~t IS likely that Hann~bal'sItairan adventure would have ended In the ~ c ywaters ot the river on that cold day In December 21 8 B.C. Moreover, by journeying to Italy before the Carthag~ll~atls could have any hope of regain~ngcontrol of tlie sea-lanes of tlie Medlterranearl, he had cons;ctously truncated his own supply llnes. It was not a lnatter of food atld water (for h ~ victor~ous s army had no problems securing these colnmodlt~esIn Italy) but of findtng more men to replen~sh or strengthen the ranks of his original arrny. The land connect~onto Spa~nwas long and dangerous. The Carthagill~atlsbroke through once, only ro fall prey to their enenly In Italy, when at the Metaurus Rtver in 207 RC'., alruost a decade after Cannae, the Romans defeated the Cartliag~nianreliefarmy under the co~n~natld of Mann~bal'sbrother Masdrub,~l.~"'There were only two other Instances III wh~clithe Carthag~nianssucceeded In break~lig the Roman stranglehold, and both of them were by sea-ln 2 1.5 when they landed 4,000 Nunl~dtatlsand 40 elephatlts at Locr~in southern Italy and 111 20.5 when 12,000 footmen and 2,000 horsemen reached the shores of 1,igurta. In the latter Instance, the soldiers were never able t o Ictln up w ~ t hllannlb,~l,who by then M.JS bottled up 111 Italy's southern reg~ons." ' H ~ n n r b a lhad gambled tliat he would receive support from the d~saffected people of the Italian pen~nsula,but here agaln, he was only partially correct in assessing the situation. The Celts were eager to fight on t h e ~ rterrltorles but u n w ~ l l ~ ntog leave them, and the central and southern Italians, w ~ t htlie exception of those In the rnajor city of-Capua, never sw~tchedsides In great numbers or for ,I long stretch of tlme. In r e ~ l ~ t Manll~bal y, could hardly hope otherw~se.It IS true that both after Trebra and Trasimene, he had t r ~ e dto sho\v tliat hls quarrel was only with Rome and that, as a tol<en of his fr~endshipwlth the rest of the Itdl~cpeople subject to Rome, he freed their soldrers who had been taken prtsoner durrng the great battles."' Yet this gesture did not work in the long run. Manr~tbaltended to act as a conqueror of the I t a l ~ ~citles ~ n that he took 'IW'I~ from the Romans, and he felt ~ncreasrnglycompelled to use, ineptly i t would grove, diplolnat~cs k ~ l l agalnst them when the Romans' supertor sk~llIn s~egewarfare allowed the111 to reconquer these cit~eseas~lyonce l-Ia~lnlbc~l's troops had dep'lrted. Moreover, H ~ n n ~ bdld a l not have enough men to grov~deproper garri9ons; tor the cities that had come over to h ~ s~de. s 'l'his rrlearlt that they were open to Roman reconquest and revenge and thus less prone to follow the Carthaginian leader's In fairness, the fault was not w ~ t hHannibal alone. H I S status as a strategos, rather than the overall leader of the Carthagill~anstate,'I4 c~llowedh1111only a certain amount of freedom of X-
tlon, and it was the pol~tlcalleaders In Carthage, not Hannrbal, who fashioned solne of the lnajor dec~slons.I-lannihalS adventure would likely have been lnucb more successful it- the Carthag~nlanstate had concentrated on one goal at 1' t~nle-Italy and Rome alone, 11ot Italy, Rome, S~aly,Sard~nl'l, and Spaln all a t the same tlme. Yet any change In the acttons of tlie Carthagrnlan leaders would be based o n the dssurnptlon that the Romans fiould cooperdte. Furthermore, Roman strategy fro111 the very begi~lnlng had bee11 much more coherent than e~tlierHanntbal's or h ~ state's s grand strategy. The Rontans had clearly anticipated that the Issue of- the war could be resolved In Afr~cdand Spain, and before FIann~bal'scrosslng of the Alps, thelr two armies had planned to do just that. Hann~bal'sd a r ~ n g and successful strike Into Italy had lorced the Rorrlarls to revlse t h e ~ rplan for a whlle, but even in the darkest days of the war, sorrle of their leaders (such as the Scipios) never abandoned the Idea that the C a r t h a g ~ n ~ a n s would be brought t o bay by defeating thern first In Spaln and then on t h e ~ r own land, Africa. In the end, the Rolnans would be proveli right. Rut after Cannae, all this seerlied just a d~stantdrearn. In the nightrriare of the ruorrtent, three Rolnan arnlles had been p~tllessiydestroyed w ~ t h ~the n span of less than two years. Even more dlsheartenrng was the fact that an ~nferlorRoman army, manned by spirited c~tizensand led by druateur cornruanders, was no rnatch for superior leader with a soph~strcatedmastery of the techn~quesof war and a professional army at his disposal. It was a reclpe for d~saster,as had been tlie case at T'rebia, Tras~mene,and Cannae. I-lowever, Ro~rtewas sirrlply not slrnilar to a Greek city of the past or to at1y Melletl~st~c state of the moment. Hannlbai had been wrong In bel~eving,III the great tradlt~onof Creek and I-lellenist~cwartare, that one lxg v~ctoryin the field would have brought the Romans to accept h ~ speace terms. The Romans were unw~lli~lg to dlscuss them even when, after Cannae and for tlie third tune In a row, therr arms had been vanqiilshed and at least 20,000 to 25,000 men had been etther butchered or k~lled,and mculy more had been taken prisoner."'There was no peace for the Romans. It appeared that their soldiers and tlielr clty would end elther in trturnph or by be~ngobliterated froin the face of the earth. It fias not just a natter of the advantages of a large populat~onpool but of sheer determlnatlo~iand a will not to be defeated at any cost. The rnagri~tudeof the Roriian war ettort in terlris ot recruitment 1s comparable only to the casualt~essuffered by the European nations durlng World War The free populat~onof Rolnan Italy in 225 R.('. was about 2,752,000. Around 923,000 of those were Roriian cit~tensand ~nernbersof thelr fam~hes,wh~chnleant that about 300,000 were adult rnnles, that is, people ellg~hlefor recruitment. More than a t h ~ r dof these, 108,000 or a total of dbo~it35 percent, were recrulted in the first stages of- the Second P u n ~ cWar untlf 215 B.(,. At least 50,000 of those recrulted were k~lledby
A Phalanx with Joints
18.3
that year, a casi~altyrate of about 10 to 12 percent of the total p ~ p i i l a t ~ o n and Inore than 16 percent of all adult ma1es."l7 And this represented only a part of the Roman war ef.tort In terms o t ruanpower, for around 21 5 B.c.., the census yu~hficat~ons for 1n111taryservlce were lowered from 11,000 to 4,000 asses, and early In 214, even 8,000 slaves were allowed to joln the a r ~ n y . " ~All thls rneant that the total nurnber of leg~onariesIn 214 Is.<,. increased to 75,000, and bout two years later, the figure grew to 80,000""that IS, aborrt dorrble the number of Roman cltlzens ava~lablea t Cannae. If the free population of the Italtan all~esand colorlies is also ~ncluded,the number of soldlers IS doubled since the popu1,ttion of these terrltones In 225 n.c. was about 1 ,840,000.'20 This explain? why, In ypite of having another 75,000 men killed between 214 and 203 ~s.<,.,"" Rome cotlld survlve and 6~ldllydefeat the Carthagin~ans. The abtl~tyto recrult so many sold~erstells only part of tlie story. The h~ghestdegree of obedience and the sense of sacr~fice~nstilledin the Roman character were also c r l t ~ c ~The ~ l . source of t h ~ stoughening of l n ~ n dand body was not only the fear of punishment or the lure of rewards but also the type ot s;octety 1r1 which the Roman sold~ersgrew up. The state acted as an extensloll of the family, wlth the head of the f a ~ n ~ hl y, ~ \ i ~ labsoli~te g ailtliority over tlie rest of the fam~ly.The consrrl and the senators were "a puhl~canalogue" of the talnily's apparat~s,'~"nd the fathers of the clty (the aristocracy) also totally shared 111 the s,~crlficesthat they delnanded from the rest of the population. D u r ~ n gthe Second Punlc Wat; 12 out of 20 consuls d ~ e dIn battle over a p e r ~ o dof ten years. Moreover, In a typical battle, ~t was likely that 3 out of 1 2 tr~buneswould lose t h e ~ 11fe.~'~ r Hannibal could b r ~ n gthe Roman? to thelr knees only by concluering the c ~ t yot Rorne. But unl~kethe ~rnpressivesiege ruach~neryand skill that h ~ s Inaster Alexander h,~ddisplayed at Tyre, Mann~b,~l had 110 slege tr'1111, whlch 1s again evldence of h15 bellef that Rome could only be conquered In a pitched battle. After Cannae, )lanrlibal gave the impression that he would also reduce Rome to rubble, and he adv,~ncedw ~ t h111s ,Irmy Into the proxllnrty of the city. It was an empty gesture, critrc~zedby many who th1nlz that Rorne could have been besieged successfully. But the defenses of- the city and f.Iannrh~l'sown llnlited manpower gu,~ranteedfalltire, not success, for 111s a r ~ n s . " ~Rut there 1s still more to the story of Hannibal's ultimate fallure. One could elnphas~tethat Ro~ne'sgreat strength lay In a number of factors-lts refusal to follow the rules of Hellen~st~c warfare, ~ t control s of the sea, ~ t plentiful s manpower, ~ t abil~ty s to absorb h ~ g hcastralty rates, and ~ t s ruore effect~vestrategy. Yet the inost ilrtportarit reason was Rome's ability to learn fro111 ~ t m~stakes s and a w~ll~ngness to copy what gave strength to otllers. As Polyb~ussays, "No people are more willtng [than the Ro~nans] to adopt new customs and to emulate what they see IS better done by 0the r s . ' > After ~ ~ ~ Cannae, the courageous but rather fool~shRomans s h ~ e d
froin engaging In a fourth p~tchedbattle, which could have fin'1lly brought them to their knees, and doggedly prepared for the moment of revenge. I lie policy of Q. Fabrus M a x ~ n ~ the u s Delayer-to harass tlie enemy reful fully traiil new recruits-now beca~nethe rule. And 111 the long run, time was rn Rome's favor. Tlirs would lead to the for~natlonof an army that could titatch tlie sophistication of the enemy soldiers and to the ernergence of 3 le'lder, L. Cornel~usScip~othe Younger (later Afr~canus).NWtured in the bttter school of Hanntbal's v~ctoriec,Sctpio would ultimately be victorious over the titan he liad grown not only to fear but also to ii~ittate. 'IW'I~
p ,
Hannibal's Pupil: Scipio Africanus Scip~ohad experietlced the b~tternessof the first Roman defeat at the hands of Hannrbal, for as a youtig tnan he had fought at Ttcinus and probably saved his own father, the Roman coriirnander. Later, he Inay have fought at Trebla. He had also w~tnessedthe gre'tt slaughter of R o ~ n ~arms ~ n at Canme."'" Yet Itkely because of the memory of these encounters, he would become the best Irnltator, student, and, In the end, rnaster o f tlie great Carthag~n~an gener~l'sart of war. The career of arms was a Sctp~ofam~lytrad~tion.HISfather and uncle liad served as generals in Spa~nbetween 21 8 and 21 1, both falling o n the battlefield. S c ~ y ~h~rnself o hdd clu~cklyrlsell to the summit of the Rornan mil~rary structure. In 21 0 l%.('. at the very young age of 26, he had been chosen comrnander of the army of Spatn. I-le had been only 18 when the Great VVjr had begun, but by low, he was I' veterdn with ten yexs of experience and the T ~ c ~ n uTrebia, s, and Cannae battles rniprtnted In hts memory. Scipto's final conf.rontation with Hannrbal followed a logtcal and clear path, e'xh step more cornylex than the previous one ,111d each one d~rected toward a more subtle mastery of the art of war that had defeated the Romans over arid over agatn. 'T'lie key to final vlctory turned out t o be a restatemetlt of the ~ilitl'dRoman strategy-on one hand, to hold kiannib~lin checlt In Italy and, on the other, to decrde the war first by a vtctory In Spa~n and rherl by threatening llanntbal's home so~l,Afrtca. Within four years of h ~ arriv'11 s 11.1 Spa~n,Sctpio had v ~ r t u ~ ~subjugated lly most of the pen~nsulato Roman control. He had begun by depr~vrngtlie Cartliag~ntansof thetr titain deepwater port in this part o f the Medrterrane'm fihen he concluered Nova Carthago after a d'1r1ng slege 111 209 13.c. A year later, he would defeat the Carthagrnians In a d~fficultbdttie at Raecula, where tlie Romans had a slight numerical advantage but tlie Carthag~n~dns co~nrn~anded a strong posit~onin terms o t terr~~n."TThe tnost Important encounter was a p~tcliedbattle at Il~patwo years later, In 206 ~ . < , . " V h e battle would not only spell the end o f Carthag~niancor~trol in 5p'ain but also shofi, in the most dr'm,at~c fidy, how I I I U C ~ the Inelnory
A Phalanx with Joints
18.F
Elephants
l,ight infantry
Llz2zzl Cavalry
1,ight infantry
Z'hc In~tralStage
FIGURE 6.9
of the past influenced Scipio's actions o n the battlefield. It is probable that the Carthagln~ancommander at Ilipa, Masdrub'll, sot1 of Glsgo, had about 10,000 more men than the Romans and 32 e1epha11ts.l~~In both arnites, there were substantial groups of Span~ards. For a number of ddys, the Carthaglnlans were the first t o leake their camp and deploy In battle Irnes, always 117 the same order-w~th the Spanish infantry arid cavalry on the wlngs, the elephants in front of the right, and the best llne troops, the Carth'~g~nlans and hfrlcans, in tlle center. The response of the Romans was also identical. They would come onto the bartlefield after the Carthag~niansand lrne up in the same order-the~r Spanish infantry dt tlle wlngs, flanked by the c,~valry,dnd the R o m c ~ footlnen n ln the c e ~ ~ t e rThe . ~ ?deployment ~ and counterdeployment became a kind of r~tual until Scipio decided that the time had corne t o attack and to make the eIlenly swallow the s'3111e b ~ t t e rpill thdt the Romans had been forced to take at Trebia. The n ~ g h tbefore the clash, lie ordered 111scavalry to leave their horses bridled and saddled and thus ready tor a c t ~ o n . ~Then ~ ' early the next mornlng, he had h ~ lnen s take breakfast and sent h ~ horsemen s and Irght troops forward to harass the enemy camp before the Carthag~nian~ o l dlers had eaten their morning ~neal."' Llke Sempron~~ls Longus at Trebia, the Carthag~ni~an commander, Hasdrubal, obl~gedby le,~vltlghis camp be-
;lrcll~g~nians Spaniard\
Afrr~~n5
SpC~nrL1rJ5
,
Roman heavy rrifantry
I I ~lioman Spanish alllc5
hcavy lnfantrv
I. Koman cavalry 2. Roman llght infantry Thc Last Stagc
FIGURE 6.10 fore breakfast. Me lined up h ~ army s ln the order that had been used In the preced~ngdays. But Sc~plohad reversed h ~ sbattle order by placing the Spanish Infantry In the center and his Rornan foot troops at the wings (Figure 6.9)."' The Roman coininander was 111 ilo hurry. He would wait uiitil the sun was 111gl1In the slzy and the heat of tile day had started to talze 11s toll on the weary and talnislied C a r t h a g ~ n ~ asoldiers, n who had neltlier drunk nor e,aten before deploying."'" Sc~piowas paying the Carthagini,ails back for tlie torment that the R o ~ n a n shad experienced 111 the free~tngcond~tionsat Trebia. K o w it was a sunliner day, and the heat would be as debllitntlng as the cold of that Decernber day of 21 8 13.C. When the time finally arrived for the n ~ a i nconfrontation, Sclpio recalled hrs cavalry and light Intantry, wh~cli,filtering through the open ranks of the line Infantry, regrouped ln the back."' A generdl advallce followed, but about 700 meters from tlie enemy Irnes, Scrplo ordered the Span~ardsof the center to advance slowly and the Rornans ot the rlght wing, w ~ t htheir supportlng velltes and cavalry, to turn away from the battle line and then advance In a column formatlon. The next maneuver, w h ~ l ethe center moved slowly In a refused gesture, was for the Infantry t o wheel lett until they fiere again opposlte the Span~shlnfailtry and for the Roman cavalry t o wheel r ~ g h tuntil they were In a g o ~ r t ~ oto r i attack the enemy on t h e ~ rflanlc (Figure 6.1 'l'his ruaneuver was repeated on the Rornan lett. The battle was declded there at the wings. The only elelnent of discord In Sc~pio'smasterful plan was the behavror of the Carthag~nianelephants. 'They becarue frlglitened by the r ~ o ~ of s e the battle and scantpeded, causing casualt~esamong both the Rornc~nsand the C , ~ r t h ~ ~ g i n i n n sThe . ' ~ ~battle
A Phalanx with Joints
187
ended with a complete vlctory for the R O ~ I ~army I I I a t the wings; the opposing centers never engaged each other. Hasdrubal, who had begun wrth a force of over 50,000, escaped with only 6,000 At Baecuh, two years before, S a p ~ had o experimented filth the saine formula, a weak center and two strong wlngs, In the manner of the great Wannlbalic victories of Treb~aand Cannae. Like the Romans In 2 18 and 2 16, tlie best Carthdg~nianforces would be p~nnedby a fieak center at Ilipa in 206; actuallj: they were never able to come to blows w ~ t ht h e ~ renerny In Spa~n. Like llann~balat Treb~a,Scrp~ohad used a stratagem. His army liad heen well rested and was fed wh~leh ~ cavalry s forced the enemy to line up for battle before they had tlrne to Iiave the~rbreakfast. At Trebra, Hannrbal had Induced the enemy to cross tlie icy rlver and to stand In the open under treeaing conditions w~thoutany protection. At Ilipa, Sc~piowould use the hedt of the day to cause a srm~lardiscomfort to the Carthaginran Irne. Yet, as H. H. Scullard argues, there were weaknesses in Sc~pio'splan. The Romans' elabordte maneuver at the wings must have given the C a r t h a g ~ n ~ acavalry n a nnmber of opportunltles to attack.239It is easler to understand the beliav~or of the Carthagrnlan cenrer. If they had advanced and engaged the Roman center, rrla~lnedby Spaniards, they could probably have pierced it and then could have turned on the Roman wings before therr owl1 wlngs were routed. But any rnovernent of the Carthag~n~an center to engage the refused cerlter of the Romans could have exposed the flanks. The deployment of the Romans 117 a column fortnat~oliat the wings gave them two opt~ons-ertlier to push forward and meet the opposlng wings, as they dld, or, zf the Carthaginian center advanced, to turn part of the column against the flank of the enemy center, while the rest either rema~nedIn a refused gerture or engaged the erielrty wings. Also, the unsettl~ngeffect caused b y the heat and the dust of the battlefield on a surnlner day should not be forgotten. Those elenlellts may have added further confuston to the battle scene and thus prevented the Cartliaginians frorn becorriing fully aware o t Scipio's plan at tlie wlngs. Sap~o'svlctory in Spain was 011ly a step toward total victory. Back in Rome after h ~ Spanrsh s succesres, lie finally convrnced the Roman senate to carry the war to Africa. In 204, he salled toward Carthagin~anshores. He had 26,000 rrlell with h~rn,nlany of thern veterans of the d ~ s ~ s t at e r Cannae. linder normal c o n d ~ t ~ o n they s , would have been dlslntssed by that tlrne, but as a punishment tor t h e ~ defeat, r Rorne had left thern under arnts, stationed for years In Sialy. The Inet1 must have been seething filth resentment and bent on revenge. Moreover, In Afrlca, Sctplo could count on the aid of a friend, the Numidian prlnce Massrn~ssa.At the time, Massln15sa led only ,I few of his countrymetl, but he would eventually play a key role in Sc~plo'sfinal vlctory. Once In Africa, Sciplo further refined tlie skills that h ~ master, s whom he hoped to defeat one day, had shown at the expense of Sc~p~o's father and
his people in Italy.24" The ,~mlxrsh,the use of str,~tagems,the exploitation of the psychological character of the adversary-all these became part of Sctpio's portfolto o t war. At the To\ver of Agathocles rn 204 B.<,. and at the Burnlng of the Cainps 111 203, he once agatn repaid the Carthdgin~~lns for the atnbttshes at Treb~aand Trastmene. At tlie 'lhwer of Agathocles, Sctp~oused to the Rorrtans' advantage the skill of the saine Nuinidia~lswho had brought the Romans to thelr doom so many tunes tn Italy. Sc~pro'sally Massrnlssa was ordered to attack a Nurn~diantorce serving tlie Cartliagir~ians.He was also told, however, to flee after the first skirmishes and to entlce the opponents across the place In whtch Scipto's cavalry was Iirdrng. The plan worked perfectly, and the Nulntdiarl foe, surprised by the unexpected attack of the Rornans lying 1r1 antbush, gave way, leaving about 1,000 deaci on the spot and 2,000 Inore krlled or taken prtsoner during thetr f11gIit.~~' The pattern was repeated a year later whet1 the Roman army, beslegtng the Carthaginlar~c ~ t yof Ut~ca, fias threatened in lts turn by the arr~valof a relref army of 30,000 111fantry and 3,000 to 5,000 cavalry led by the Cartliagtnran Hasdrubal and the Nurn~dtanking Sypbax, an enerny of Mass~nissa.'~~ The Carthaginiarls were cainyed about 60 stades ( 10.8 klloineters) frorn Sc~pio111 t\vo cainps posittoned some 1 0 stades (1.80 ktlometers) apart. D u r ~ n gtlie halt in action caused by the short North Afrlcarl winter, Sctpio began peace r~egotiattons filth Hasdrubal. Ells intent, however, was to find out as much as posslble about the layout of the enemy's camps. When he was sattsfied that he knew enough, he broke oft the r~egotiationsand began the slege of Ut~caagatn. That kery night, he attacked Masdrubal's camp, and at the s a n e time, Mc~sstnrssaand the Roman 1,aeltnr coordtnated an assault o n Syphax's carnp. The actton was a complete success (Ftgure 6.1 l ). But tt was a battle fought shortly after at the Great Plarl~sthat showed that Sclplo, llke his involuntary mentor who was strll rn Italy, had become a master of the art of wdr. There was probably no need for FIasdrubaI ,111d Syphax to joitl battle wtth Sctpto at the Great Platns. Hasdrubal inrght have achreved succesr slrnply by isolating the Romans who had ventured Into the intenor of the Korth African penl11sul~1.Yet the Carthag1n1,111 superlorlty 111 forces20,000 agarnst the 12,000 to 15,000 Ro117ans"~-n1ust have gtven hrm a sense of confidence. The two arinles Illled up in therr usual patterns, cavalry at the fiings, infantry In tlie center, the Cartliagrntans in one long line typrcal of the phalanx, and the Ror~iansIn the three lines o f hastati, prtncipes, and trJartr (Frgure 6.12). Scipio's plail was beautifully sir~lyle.HIS cav,~lryrouted the enemy horsemen, whom they pursued; the hastatt prnned the enetny Irne; and the prlnctpes and trtarlt turned into columns at the sldes of the ptnned enernles before attacking tllerr flanks and destroying thern (Flgure 6.13).
A Phalanx with Joints
189
i\.lcdircrranean Sca
lltica
Rurili~lgof the C:amps, 203 M:.
Syphax's camp Hasdrubal's cainp
FIGURE 6.1 l At 111p.1, the Roman center would theoretically hdve been in ddnger if the Carthaginian center had advanced to engage it. Moreover, although their maneuver had been very elaborate a t Il~pa,the hastati, princ~pes,and triarii had fought In the norrnal pattern of each llne supporting the one to its front. At the Great Pla~ns,by contrast, not o17ly had the eneiny been rigidly pinned, but also, probably for the first time in Rome's military history, the pnnclpes and trlarli had acted as a reserve w ~ t han offensive function, that IS, they were not tied to the needs of the first line.14Vhe battle of the Great I'lains was also Important because it brought t o an end the alliance between Cdrthage and 1110st of the Numidians. Syphax was captured, and Massinissa soon after was able to establish control over his countrymen. From then on, most of the nimble srnall horses of the N u ~ n i d i ~ ~and n s their riders' fearless ddsh would be at the Romans' disposal. And after the Great
Thc Initial Clash
FIGURE 6.12 Pldins bC1ttle,Carthage, now under direct thre,~tfrom Roman arms, recalled Hannibal from Italy. Hannibal landed at Hadrumeturrt, oil the eastern s ~ d eof the North African peninsula. At the news of h ~ arrrval, s S c ~ y ~who o , was on the northern stde, lnoved toward the Interior (Flgure 6.14). The tno~neiitfor the great confrontation had tirially arrived, but Sciplo was not yet ready to rneet h ~ sm'?ster. He was short of cakalry because hls ally Mass~nissdwas not there. Brit it was clear that he, llke Hannibal, was eager for battle, for Sciplo lett a path ot destruct~onin a sector of the North i\trlcan perllnsula thdt W'IS kery rrnportant econolnically for CL1rthLxge.Consequently, the Carthagtntan leaders felt that Hannlbal had to give Scip~obattle.'" Hmnntbal oheyed b y advancing to Intercept the Roman forces. Scipio, rnovlnb7 SJI ' a southwestern directro11, and EIannsbal, proceeding in I' stra~ghtwesterly di-
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191
C;~rthnginians t;:eltibcrians
Triarii Romans
The Last Stage
FIGURE 6.13 rection, firlally approached one another. At about the same time, the Ro1nLmsalso captured three Oarthagini'm s p ~ e swhom Hannibal had sent to find out about the Roman forces, The customary gtrnishrne~~t would have been execution, but Scipio instead gave the spies a gulded tour of the RO~I'IIIc'1111p and then set then1 free.'4The battle between the two forces, ~t could be said, yearred on that day. 1,ettlng the sples go was not lust an example of Scipio's ~nagnan~mity, as Polyb~us suggest^,"^ but also a way to show the enemy that he had little c'~valryand that he did not fear Hannibai. In reply, the Carthagin~anleader asked for a personal meeting. Scip~o agreed, but, like a rrlarl In control of the sitt~atior~, he said that he would set the d'lte atld place for the e n c o u t ~ t e r t. i~e~then ~ w'uted until Mass~n~ssa finally jo~nedhim with 4,000 horsemen and 6,000 foot soldier^."^ Scip~o could now wage battle against Hann~balIn the open. His force was probably slightly infenor 111 infantry (he had about 34,000 footmetl, c o u t ~ t ~ nthe g Num~dlaninfantry, agalnse 36,000 Carthagtn~ans"~,but it was finally srrpenor In cavalry (with a lltrle more than 6,000 troops against the enenty's 4,000 horsemen atld 80 elephcants).
FIGURE 6.14
A Phalanx with Joints
1 (;arthagininns
19.3
lralian vctcrnns
Africans ans
Romans
I
FIGURE 6.1 5 The two leaders rode across the field separating thelr arrmes and spoke through an interpretec2" The old master way now 45, blinded in one eye from ~voundsreceived In the Italian wars, and his pup11 was l I years his junior. FIantlibal offered peace, but the terrns he proposed were unacceptable to S c t p ~ o . 'The ~ ' ~ final confrontation finally began o11 a day In October of the year 202 U.C,."~ (Figure 6.1 S) alrrtost exactly sixteen years after the October encounter a t Tlclnus between the lnvad~ngHannlbal and Sap~o'sown father. Scipio's speecl~to h ~ troops s was b r ~ e f He . ~ rern~nded ~~ the111of their past battles, that defeat wotlld mean "rrtisery" and "disgrace" at h o ~ or ~ ~worse e d they fell 111to the hands of the Carthaglr~rans,and that they were to light not only to become "the ttnquestloned masters of Afr~ca"but also for "the undisputed command and sovere~gntyof the rest of the world." They had only two object~vesbefore them: "vvlctory or death."2i5 If we accept PO-
lybius's presentation as accurdte, Sc~pionever mentioned revenge to those who, l ~ k ehim, were the sons of the defeated sold~ersof Ttctnus, Trebia, Trastmene, and Canrlae, or \vho were the legionaries stat~onedIn Slcily and the relnllallt of the defeated legions of Cannae. He d ~ dnot have to suggest revenge, both because the memory of the past could have hardly been erased from thetr minds and because it rrltght well have been counterproduct~vet o mentlon the failures of the past to men whose confidence must a t last have been buoyed by thetr string of successes in Africa. Meanwhile, in the opposing carnp, I-lann~balinstead tried ro keep the rneinory of the battles of- years gone by a l ~ v eIn his soldiers' m~nds.H e reminded h ~ Inet1 s that the father of their enemtes' present general was the lnan they had defeated a t Trebia,15" and he told the Carthaginian soldiers that they should remernber thew v~ctorles at Trasiine~leand at C a n n ~ e . ~They ~ ' were lnen whose "strength was unbroken" and who "had never suffered defeat," he satd, accord~ngto Polybtus, bur some of che~rfoes were "the children" of those who had been defeated 111 the past and some "the firetched remnant of the legions he had so often vanqutshed and put to flrght in Italy." Moreover, they could clearly see by scarinlrlg the battle line that the Rornans were fewer in number, "just a fract~on"of what the C;,~rthagin~,~~ls h'1d faced 111 the Hann~bal's plan was a subtle arttcuiattoil of his underly~ngp r ~ n c ~ p of le adapt~righ ~ forces s to the enemy's strengths. The elephants of- the first ltne were "to throw the enenly Into confus1o11and break his r~nks.""Vhe mercenaries of the first infantry ltne (I.~gurians,Celts, Raleartc Islanders, and Afrtcans) were to perform a task stnltlar t o that of- the Roman hastatl-to engage the enemy so that the Romans might be "fat~guedby their exertions . . . and thelr swords mtght also lose tllelr edge owlng to the great slat~ghter."~"' According to Polybius, the f-unction of the lnercerlarles was also to h e ~ nthe untrustworthy seco~ldline, cor~lposedof C'1rth~3gilnalsand L~byans,between themselves and the veterans of the third line so that they would be compelled to fight."'However, if Hanntbal was inlttating the Rornan battle order, the second 11ne must also hake had 1' task s11n11ar t o that of t h e ~ rfoes, the prtncipes; that IS, they would have to Intervene ~f the firsr line gave way before the onslaught of- the enemy. But tt is clear that llannibal placed most of his trust on the t h ~ r dline, "the troops he had brought over from I t ~ l y , " ~ ~ ~ who were "the most efficrent and stead~est"of his soldters; "antictpating and witrlesslng from atar what toolz place, they might with undirnintshed strength and spirit n u k e use of t h e ~ rqi~alltlesat the proper t ~ m e . " ~ "Polyb~usdoes not elaborate, but it is reasonable to assume that the task of the thtrd line was e~tllerto del~vera final blow if the Rornans fought along tradit~or~al lines or to counter any outflank~ngmaneuver if Sclp~ochose to repeat the tact~csused at the battle of the Great Pla~ns. I'olybius is correct in saying that llann~bal'splan was the best that he could devise with the forces akaildble to h i n ~But . ~ the ~ ~battle of Z'ima lacked the
A Phalanx with Joints
195
tactic.11 linesse of T r e h ~ ,and ~ Cann'le or of 111p,1 and the Gre'lt Pla~tls.It was more like a slugfest punctuated here and there by brilliant moves, Rut it could not be otherwise, for here the adversaries were riot Longus or Varro or Hasdrubal, son of G~sgo.Rather, they were Mannib,~l,st~lla xnaster of the art of war, and 111syounger ~nadvertentpup11Sc~pio,who was facing h11nw ~ t ha certitude spurred by tlie memory of past defeats and great victories and with tlie daring of a younger Inan agalnst a n agmg opponent. Hannihal's plan put Scip~o'sarmy at a disadvantage, espec~allystnce the Carthaginiaris could wln tlie day In a slugfest it, as lrnplied in 13ann1bal's speech to hls troops, they had a greater lumber of rnen. Moreover, ~f S c ~ p ~ o d ~ dnot become aware of Hannibal's intentions and if he engaged In the usual rnaneuver of outflaril
With the eleph'111ts gone and the cc~valryaway, ~t now tlnle for the hastat1 and the Cartl-iagrn~anmercenaries of the first Irne to move forward. The secor~dlines of borh armies also pushed ahead, while the veterans of Italy and presum,~bly the Roman trlarii rcrnai~ledwell beh~nd.~"'The famous first rush of the mercenaries, most of then? of Celtic orig~n,was displayed at Zarna too because they initially seemed t o have had a certain advantage, but soon the h'?stat~c o u ~ l t e r ~ ~ t t ~ ~forcing c k e d , the lnercenarles t o retreat and seek refuge among the ranks of therr second ltne.270 Polybius calls the men of the second line cowards because they dtd not advance to support the fleelng first line."' In fr~ct,they even closed t h e ~ r ranks, forcing the mercenaries either to flee from the flanks of the 11ne (which would have beer1 ditfict~ltwith the Rornans at their back) o r to forcef~~lly cut thelr w,~ythrough the ranks of their own rnen. It is llkely thdt here, too, Polybius is not qtilte correct. It 1s more lilcely that the second ltne rernairied inactive either because of inexperience or because they thoi~ght the mercen,lrles should have held a little longer against the hastatl. (That the second I ~ n etroops were not cowards was proven by the way they fought later.'-5) The battle soon developed Into a free-for-all. First, the rnercenar~esand Oarthagi~llrlntroops cut e x h other down, and thetl, when the princtpes also came up to reinforce the has tat^, there was a harsh struggle between the Romans and the secor~dline of the C a r t h a g ~ n i a n s . ' ~ ~ It appears that the Ronlans won this stage of the llartle, for the survivors of the Carthagtn~ansecond I ~ n eretreated toward the tli~rd.At that gotlit, I-lannibal ordered the veterans to level their spears to prevent the second line from filtermg through the ranks of the third, etther to prevent dlsruptton of the close ranks or to colnpel the second line to fight a little longer.274 When the frght was renewed, the forces were rnore o r less ever~ly ~natched,~'~ The struggle stopped ~nornentartlybecause the condit~onof the battlefield, covered w ~ t h"blood, slaughter, and dead bodies," made tr i~npossibletor the Rolndlls to pursue the enemy."7 When the two sldes cdIne to gips w ~ t hedch other agaln, they had reconstituted their l~nesinto srngle formations, the triarii along with the hastat1 and the pr~ncipesfor the Rolnans, the Iralrar~veterans and probably the remnant ot the other two l~nesfor kiann~bal."' The Romans advanced over the slaughtered men on the battlefield and clashed with the Carthagin~ans.For a whlle, the outcorne of the battle was ln doubt, but 111 the end, the S u m ~ d ~ acavalry n i ~ n dthe Rotnan horsemen returned, fall~ngupon the rear of Hann~bal'stroops (Figure 6.16). The end came swtftly tor the Carthaginian~."~The Rornans lost 1,500 men, the C a r t h a g ~ ~ l ~had a ~ l 20,000 s dead and about the s a n e number taken prisoners, but Hanntbal escaped.279He would Itve another 20 years, relentlessly pursued by the Romans, until he killed hinlselt while tn Bythir~iat o escape capture by the Ron1~111s.
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197
lloman cavalry
FIGURE 6.1 6 At last, the Rornans and Scip~ohad p a ~ dHann~balback for Cannae. There on the battlefield in the 1'11ld ot Africa carne the end ot the Gredt Wars and of the greatest danger Rome faced until the end of ~ t empire. s The battle at Zarna was also a crucial defeat for the Hellenistic systerrt of warfare. If FIannlbaI had synthesized the sophistication dnd the logical development of the art of war as expressed by Alexander, Scipio had certainly heralded the comlng ot a different system. I-le had colnb~nedthe finesse of Hellenistic tactical skills with Roman toughness, resilience, dnd irnltatioIl without a sense of inferlorrty and w ~ t h o u ttlie shackles of tradrt~onthat must have hampered rn111c;lrydevelop~rtentin the past, especially in the ancient Greek state. Moreover, the Romans' ability to recrult and ~nasterlarge numbers of people and thelr tendency to translate therr conquests and thelr rullitary achievements Into laws that were ulttmately acceptable to both conqueror and conquered ushered in a new period of rnditary h~story.AIthough the Romans would have many confrontatrons In the future against the Hellen~st~c kingdoms, the military cycle that began In the 1,lnds of Classical Greece had finally corrle to ,I close at Zaind. Roinan successes, with their emphasis o n the heavy ~nfantry,might seem a tlirowbaclt to tlie Greeks betore the Macedonians. But In reality, they were not, for a number of reasons, including the innovatton of the three lines, the flexibrllty ot the manrpular system, the established chain of command, and even the role of the 11ght ~ntantry?w h ~ c hat Baecula and at Zaina, for instance, were particularly important. Except tor the use of light infantry, these features also dif-
feretlt~atedthe R o ~ n a ntact~calsystem from the Macedonrans' and the Successors' art of war. And the grofess~onalismthat the Roman army would eventually accept was also alien to the other civilizations. 7'0 he sure, professton,d soldiers had ex~stedbefore (most of Mann~bal'sarrny was made up of professionals) and would exist in the Hellenistic Itingdorns, but the Roman professionals were also Roman citi~ens,not mercenaries. The fact was that Rome could draw on a pool of solci~ersunava~lableelsewhere. O t l ~ e rsociet~eswere never able to induce so many of therr adult Inales t o engage in war, sornetlmes serving in distant lands for litany years. Roman men were encouraged to serve not only for demograph~creasons but also because of the peculiarities of tlietr soctal arrangements. 'The Romans were also equ~ppedto dominate the world because they had an uncanny ability t o integrate s~ibjectpeoples into their p o l ~ t ~ c asystem. l The pattern, of course, had emerged In the anctent Near East, but no people would be more enduring than the Romans in their conquests and In their ability to shape the rest of the world In t h e ~ own r Image. NOW,the tune had come for war to assume the gutse of eternal trnger~alpower.
The Deification of the Military Leader It In tactical terins the Second I'untc War was a waterslied between the Roman and the Greek and H e l l e ~ l ~ smethods t~c ot waging war, In symbo11cat terms the cotifl~ctbrought a new role to the ~nrlitaryleader by merging Roman and Greek ~deas.Alexander's Successors had strengthened the concept of d ~ v ~ nk ~e n g s h ~ And p . in the concept of the Imperator, S c ~ g ~como b ~ n e dthe ~ d e aof the nirlltary leader and the favorlte of the gods w ~ t hthe Roman nottons of religion. It was a concept that was used later by Marlus and even Inore so by Sulla atld Caesar before becom~nga perm~mentsymbol of tlie Inalesty of the Roman rulers during the lrnpertal p e r ~ o d . ~ ~ ~ ' It I S no surprlsc that Rome should prove a fertile breeding ground for such a c<)11ceptd u r ~ n gthe Second P u n ~ cWar. Carthage's defeat and Macedonta's collapse 111 the followtng century meant that the Mediterranean would fall under Roman control. It IS also n o surprise that Sctpxo would ernerge as the archetype of the favor~teof the gods. PIOUSand honest, he was the man who mtraculously had saved Rome from d~saster;he was the Inan who had finally defeated Hann~bal. Co~~sciously and rather cyn~cdlly,accord~ngt o Polyblus and Theodore Mommsen, or unconsctously and honestly, according to Roger Segrt~nand also In part L i ~ y , , "S~ 'c ~ p ~had o been closely connected with the divine stnce h ~ sbirth. When Sc~piowas an infant, the legend goes, people had seen 1' snalte cotled around I i r ? body. Sctpio had not ktlled ~ t as , Heracles had done when he found two srlalces In his c r ~ htor , Sclp~o'ssnake, ltke the snake present at Alexander's b~rth,was a ben~gtxsymbol. It M.JS an expression of the
A Phalanx with Joints
199
favor of Jupiter, the father of the gods. Sctpio's c o ~ ~ n e c t ~with o n Jupiter became closer and closer In the eyes of the Romans as time went by. They would marvel, for Instance, at the fact that the guard dogs of the 'Temple of Jupiter on the Caprtol would not bark during Scipio's frequent nightly walks to the Sctp~oseems to have encouraged people to think that he was the spokesman of the gods, especially Jupiter. H e attributed h ~ sfrecluent dreams foretelltng the future to dtvine inspiration. Neptune, for example, showed htin the way to conquer sontething that seemed t~n~~ssallableNova C ~ r t h d g oill 209 B.C. When he landed in Afrrca Ile'lr the promontoriznm Pulchrz, Sctpio thanlced Apollo, normally tdentified with the adjecttve Pulcher, for the good onten. And after the Burntng o t the Two Camps, he addressed his thanks to V ~ i l c a n But . ~ ~he ~ n o r ~ n ~ ~s'aved l l y his greatest apprectation for Juptter. Wlie~iRome was tn the midst of the deepest despa~r after Canrlae, ~twas the young Sctpio (he was 20 at the t~rne)who stood up atld forcefully swore his ,111egiance to the city. The god that he called to wrtness his cornrnltrnent was none other than Jupiter: "I shall not desert the republ~cof rlie Roman people, so l~kewtseshall I suffer n o other Roman ctttzen to do so; if I fiittlngly spe'tk false, 1n'xy J u p ~ t e rOptimus Maximus utterly destroy me, my house, my family, my estate."28"hen he was consul in 205, Sc~ptosacrificed 100 oxen at the Cap~tolt o fulfil1 a vow made in Spcxin, an action that strengthened h ~ relatronship s to Jup~ter.~"The s'a111e year, the Saguiitr~rnambassadors begged the senate to allow them to thank the father of the gods and to ofter htm a gold cro\vn o n the Cap~tol."~ Their action somehow suggested that Sclpio's fe,~tof arms rn Sp'11n h ~ d been the fulfillment of the wishes of the god. Although Sc~p~o's l ~ f ewas probably always surrounded by mystery, h ~ s popiilar deific'~t~o~l beg'111 with his c'xpture of Nobs Cdrthago in 209. The crty, srrrronnded by water, seemed trnposstble to talte, but a local fisherman informed Scipto that a tongue of terrain linked the ctt) to the coast durtng low tide. Scipio l'tunched his ass'ault on the basis of this inform,ation and took Nova Carthago by surprtse. What was remarkable was Sc~pto'sexplanation of h15 success. Neptune htn~self,he s a ~ d to hts troops, had shown him how to capture the sty."' After h ~ victory s at B,lecula in 208, he forg'lve the Spantards who had fought at the ~ t d eof the Carthagtnians, and as a token of t h e ~ rgratitude, tlie Spaniards otfered hint the t ~ t l eof Icing since he was a young I I I C I ~with ~ divine char,~cterist~cs. Sapm refused the honor, preferriilg, he said, the tttle of imperator glven to htrn by 111ss o l d ~ e r s The . ~ ~ reason ~ IS s~mple.At that tlme, tlie concept of the imperator had a reltgt~uscor~r~otation and was tied to the worship of Jupiter.2Kx" It also was believed to have a religious aura that extended not lust to Scipto but to his whole family. Sctp~o \vould use this for pollttcal ends with the help of the cornruoners, sornetlmes against the opposition of the sen'lte. When the orie~ltdigoddess Cybele w,~s
brought to Rome before Sc~p~o's departure for A f r m , the people pressed the senate to clloose a member of Scip~o'sfamtly, h ~ cousin s P. Cornellus Scipio (Nas~ca),to greet the goddess. Apparently, it was also publ~cpressure that conv~ncedthe senate to grdnt S C I ~ I perxnlsslon O to l a ~ l ~ l ca11 h attack in Africa. And when S c ~ p ~departed o for Africa, the commoners performed the stipplzcarzo, a ritual processron to the Rornan te~nples,to ask the blessing of the gods for the departrng soldters. And a g a ~ nafter Zama, the people pressured the city's fathers to allow S c ~ p ~tooconduct the peace negot~ations.~'~ The long history of Rome has rrlore than one example ot puhl~cpressure forc~ngthe senate to adopt part~cularmeasures. In t h ~ ssense, the people's support of Sc~piowas uncommon but not unusual. It was also not uncommon for a great leader to be gnen the status of hero. Among the exarrlples that come t o rrl~ndare Cam~llusIn the fourth century is.<,. and later Caesar and Attgt~stusIn the first century R.C. It was also not uncommon to tle a magistrate of the c ~ t ywith the gods. The Romans bellevecl that the gods looked benevolently upon the city ~f the laws were obeyed and the gods were worshrpped. By extenston, tlie h~ghestd ~ v ~ nfavor e was glven to the officers representing the state. What was differerlt w ~ t hScip~owas that he was not only regarded '1s a hero but he was also to d certain extent de~fied by being granted the tttle of Imperator. Moreover, what had bee11 temporary with other consuls became perinanent with Scip~o:I-lis sern~drvinestatus d ~ dnot end wlth the Second P u n ~ cWar but cont~rtuedthroughout h ~ s Irfetime and served as an example to future leaders to unite success In war with d~vinestatus In the tltle o f imperator. There are d few explanat~onsfor thls development-the desperate ndture of Roman l ~ f ea t the tlnie of the Second Punic War, Scipto's great vlctory tn Spa~n,h ~ defeat s ot the rrtost deadly enemy that Rome had ever known, the connect~onthat the Romans ~ n a d ebetween polit~callrfe and d ~ v ~ nIntere vention, and the piety and honesty of S c ~ p ~himself. o Rut probably what rnade a temporary attitude perinanent was the confh~erlceof two p h ~ l o soph~calexpla~lat~orls of the role of the d ~ v ~ n i In t y human affairs. One was the Roman trad~tronnient~onedearl~er;the other must have come from contact with the I-lellenistic c~vtlrzationand the work of the Greek Euhernerus, author of a fantasy ~lovelcalled Sacred Scripture, written around 300 &.c.Euhemerus clalined that great conquerors and kings became gods at tlie~rdeath. Not surpr~singly,the Latin translator of Euhemerus's work was (2u1ntus E n n ~ u s(239-169 B.<,.), the first poet of the t11ne to metltlon the apotheosis of S c i p ~ o . L,ilte ~ ~ ' tlie way of arms, the divine symbol~smof ln~l~cary leadersh~ppointed firmly to the t ~ ~ t u r And e . as In many other practrcal and ~ntellectualavenues, Rome had heconle not only the trans1;ttor of things Greek but also an Innovator by bringing srrbtle changes to the origtr~al~deas.It was a trerld that later leaders explotted u n t ~ l~t hecame a perlnanetlt feature of pollticc~land ideolog~calpower under the emperors.
Conclusion The hopl~tesystern was an lnstltut~or~ perfectly suited to the poleis of anclent Greece. The r u l ~ n gclasses, which were norrnally the ~ n ~ d d l ~cl,~sses, ng staged, managed, and fought therr own wars. T'lius, the people who stood on the battle line also owned the land and collecttvely represented most ofthe wealth of thelr states. The ~ d e n t ~ ot t y the cltlzen was ~nextr~cably Imked to the ~dentrtyof the soldler In t h ~ ssoclety, and the person who had the prtvilege of- being a citi~eno t the polls also had the duty to detend or to advatlce the power of 111s aty. As Hanson has suggested, the hopllte clashes reflected the s~mglrc~ty of agr~culturalI~fe.They were short, lasting a t most a day. 'They were perlodlcal l ~ k ethe s e ~ ~ s o noccmnng s, before or after the hxvest. And they were economtcal, wltli one major battle deciding the Issue a t hand; next year, the cttl~en-soldierwotild again bear arnts, but for the Inornent, the contested Issue was resolved. The stlnpl~c~ty ot the confl~ctwas also reflected 11.1 tlle warrior Ii~mselfand In the development of the battle. The sold~erhad lrttle t o learn before 11n1n.gup for combat. He did not have to spend erldless hours mastering the complex~tyof bow or shng, train~ngfor tlle fits and starts of javelrn-throwing, or r ~ d ~ na ghorse. All he needed was a strong constttutlorl ( w h ~ c hrnost people \vhose rrlaln activity was agrtculture already possessed) and most of ,111 courage and a sense of duty, But there could be sliortcuts talten even 111 the matter of phys~calstrength. After all, as Hippocrates notes, the ea.;terners that both Greeks and Macedorlians defedred were known to be tall and h,ave powertul bodles. But the hopl~te's lnaln asset was that he fought as a member of a unit, wli~le111sadversary fought as an ~nd~vidual. The hophre's satety and power were tled t o the safety and power of the line. T h ~ sexplains h ~ enormous s sh~eld,held r~g~dly, the thoroughness of hls armor, and the s ~ m g l ~ cof ~ t hy ~ weaponss the spear or, at tlmes, the sword. Battle itself followed an uncon~phc'?ted,r ~ g i dcmon, w h ~ c hnormally d ~ d not e n t a ~ lcomplex lnaneuvers o r traintng unless, like the Spartans, one lnade a corltlnuous bus~nessof war. 'The two arinles strnply rnarclied a g ~ l n set x h other, wlth the aggressor t , ~ u n t ~ nthe g enemy by thre'tten~ngto devastate 111s land. Light ~nfaritryopened the clash and then disappeared; the cavalry, ~f present, was kept at the Inargln of the battle to protect the flanks. Wh'lt declded the conflict was tlle phalanx-hopl~tes l ~ n e dup In
long, co11tinuous hnes, ilormally th~illyspread 11.1 depth, with 4 t o 12 ranks. The opposing phalanxes would n~archslowly agatnst each other and then, shout~ngtheir war cry, run the last few meters and cla5h sh~eldto shreld, the spear seektrlg the throat or the shoulders or the groln o t the opponent. Shov~ngand slattghtering cont~ntted~11it11 one side gave up; then the dark task of killing those lett behind or caught In the rear began. Afterward, the grim business of strlpplilg the dead of t h e ~ rpossessions continued u n t ~ the l vtctorious army went back to its polls to prepare for the harvest and for the inevitable busrness ot war next year. The Great Pers~anWars lnust have strengthetled tlle bel~efthat t h ~ ssystem of war-mak~ngwas Ideal. After all, had not the hoplires defeated the soidlers of the greatest empire the world had known? 'The Peloponnesian War, hofiever, began to underrn~nethis behef. In t h ~ sconflict, the hopllte system was cliallenged both tact~callyand socially. The fields of battle were no longer a few k~lornetersfrom the crty walls; no longer d ~ dall soldiers have ,I personal stake ~n the surv~valof the sty; and the opposing sldes d ~ d not nece5sarily fight on the level ground suited to the hoplrte and were not liin1ted to the use ot spear, sword, and large shield rn their clashes. The Int r o d i ~ c t i oof~ ~inercendrles 111 an ~ncreaslnglylarger scale also shook the foundation of the hopl~tesystem, whether the lnercenarles jousted as hoplites or as Irght sold~ers.'l'he~rbackground and sometimes t h e ~ rstyle ot fighting defied many of the conventions upon w h ~ c htlie hopl~tesystem was based. They had n o property or women or ch~ldrento defend and thus n o stake in the soclety for whrch they were fighting. What was in jeopardy was tlle~rpay a ~ l dtheir I~ves.Desp~tethe fact that they were essent~al111 fight~ng wars away from the polls or that they were more efficient than hopl~tesIn different terralns (as at Sphacteria) or In combnlatior~wrth Iioplites (as agdirlst tlle Spartan rnora) near C o r ~ n t h ,the r u l ~ n gclasses of the Greek pole~sdld not relent In t h e ~ rc o n v ~ c r ~ othat n they had st~llto rely on a systent where the sold~erwas also the citizen. Thrs belief was not reltnqurshed even 111 Athens during the Pelopoilnes~anWar, In spite of ~ t reluctance s to meet Sparta in pitched battles, as had been customary in the past. Actually, tlie reliance of Athens on the navy was considered not a strength but a sympto~nof decay. It 1s 110 surprise, then, t h a toward the end of the cl,tss~cal age, Greece would still settle ~ t saccount on the battlefield w ~ t htwo great hoplite encounters-Leuctra rn 371 and Mantinea in 362 B.( . Leuctra and Manti~leareflected the past and, at the same tune, pointed to the future. At I,euctra, the cavalry also played an important role; at Mantlnea, Epaminondas exper~mentedwith the use of cornh~nedarms. Moreover, he brought forth the flrst rddlcal ~ n n o v a t ~ ot ot ~the hoplite system. H e sw~tchedthe edge of attack from the r ~ g h tto the left wlng, gtttrng strength agalnst strength and deployed in that type of forinat~on,the oblique, that
Conclusion
20 3
would becorrle very popiilar on Inany future battlefields. It 1s also n o surprise that Epamlnondas's I~elrswere not from Hellas but from a state at the periphery, Macedon~a.Eparninondas's ideas required a new social structure to be implemented, for the ~dentityof the cit~zen-sold~er had been eroded but not colnpletely destroyed 111 the rest of Greece. Macedonia was d~fferent in ruany ways-having rrtore resources, an appreclatlon of the use ofvar~oustypes of soldiers, a strong aristocracy and a kmg, i ~ n dcontlnuoiis warfare w ~ t hnelghbors who fotight In ways d~fferentfrom the liopl~tes. Moreover, the rest of the ethnic Macedon~ans,even trorn the lower classes, cont~rtuedto reap some of the rewards of nlllitary power. A state like Macedonia, ruled by a lung srrpported by the aristocracy, was a necessity for the supremacy of the cavalry, which had been relegated to minor roles In other Greek states. War became the business not of the middling classes only but also of the krng and his arntocracy. The Nacedon~an? parceled the onus and the benefits ot warfare first according to class, then e t h n ~ cgroup, i ~ n dfinally the type of alliance or terins of service. The army and tlie battlefield were revolutionized. The soldless who went with Alexander to conquer the Persian Empire were of a different breed than those of the hopl~tearmies-not just heavy infantry but a c o ~ n b i n a t ~ oofn all troop types. Even more important than t11i~was the fact that the cavalry took pride of place on the battleiield. It 1s wrong, however, to look a t Alexander's victories as triumphs of the horsemen with the footmen playi~lg only an ancillary role. In reality, Alexander won because of the subtle interplay of horseman and plialang~teand a rewrltlng of the role of light Infantry. Mls greatest asset was his abil~tyt o conlb~nearrns In a manner that probably n o other commander was able to d o untrl tlie eighteenth century. Moreover, the streamlining of the logistical apparatus meant that sold~ers could 111~1rchmore qu~cklythan ever before. The army that Alexalider took to As~ad ~ dnot become the norm. The proportion of 1 horseman to every 6 foot soldiers was an oddity, demanded by the special need of enhallced mob~lityatld the specific go,d of conquering a large empire. The Successor states could field armies mucli larger than hoplite Greece, yet they could not or would not keep so ruany horsemen. The cavalry kept its Importance, but its proportion in relation to the 11.1fantry was rnucl~more modest-for example, probably about 2 horseme11 to 23 footrrten a t Cynoscephalae In 197 I$.(,. The arlny of Republican Rome In the t h ~ r dcentury through most of the second century B.('. was qutte different from both classtcal Greece and the llellenist~cstates of- the Successors o t Alexander. Although originally probably quite s ~ r n ~ l to a r Greek hoplite armies, ~t h,ad become unl~kethein by the time of the Second Punic War. But Rome had not been an overn~ghtsensation. From her fc>undatlon around the middle of the eighth century H.c.,
c ~ c c o r d i ~to~trad~tlon, g it took the Ron~~ans about five hundred y e ~ r s ,unttl the end of the t h ~ r dcentury, to acqulre supremacy III Italy and the western Med~terranean. The Roman armies too fiere xnade up of atizens, whose role on the battlef~eldwas based on t h e ~ reconomlc status. The poor or the noncltlzen were excluded except In emergenctes. But the aristocracy was not pushed t o the srlargln of the battlefield '1s tt fids 111 c l a s s ~ c ~Greece; ~l tt kept play~ng1' leadrng role, although not l ~ k ethat of tlie cavalry of Macedon~aand grobably rrtost of the Successor states. If the Roman aristocrats declared, rnanaged, and led the wars, on the battlefield they fought side by stde filth the footmen, for the footmen relna~nedtlie core of the Roman army. It could not he otherw~se.War was an esserltial element of Roman soclety at all levels: It was an akenue to polittcal, soc~al,and economic success for the 'Iristocracy; rt was a road to economtc galn and possibly soc~alinob~lrtyfor the colnrnorlers; and zt was the psychological safety valve of ~ n s t ~ t u t i o n a l ~ ~ e d brutnltty. There was no ~nternalor external section of the Roman state where war drd not play a crucial role. The Rorrlarl quest for war IS better seen as a social orgatl~s~n w ~ t ha llfe ot tts own. It fids part and parcel of patrici,an and commoner I~fe,as nientroned above; ~t retterated the values of the conimunity; it was probably the agent that tied the rest of the ltallc people to Rome. While assur~ngthe corltlnued hegemo~lyof the aristocracy of each conquered ltdlrc state, Rome garnered the support of the other sectors of Italtc people by ruaklng them partners in the conquest of the st~ll~ndcpendent states. T h ~ smeant th,at the R e p u b l ~ c ~arrnses n of the thtrd century were only partially Roman. Usually, alltes grov~dedabout 50 percent of the manpower. Rome founded new colonies both for the all~esand for the poorer Ronlan cltlzens tn the newly conquered terrltortes. It was 1' clever dev~cethat relteved the stress of the acquisrt~onof new terrrtorles and slaves by the upper classes and thus the ~mpover~slirnent of both the Roman and tlle allled agr~culturalclasses. Potent1'11 rroublern,~kers were appeased by settlrng them in colon~esfar from the center. The di~tancealso considerably lessened the pol~t~cal threat agalnst the aristocracy, which reaped rrlost of tlle ecotlolnlc advatltdges from warfare. War in Rome was not just d~sstmilarIn its ~nternalstructure from Greelc and ,Macedonlan war hut also quite different on the battlefield. In appearance, tt seemed ltke another phCal,1nx, but a phC~lL1nx with joints, as Delbrr~cksard long ago. The weapons and deployment of the legron were qulte unlike those that had ex~stedbefore and those st~llused elsewhere In the Med~terrdnea~l and the East at the tune. The Rosn,~nbattlefield seemed a reflect~onof the legal apparatus of Roman life. There were four lines ~nstead of one. The light ~ntantry,velites, screened the rest and fought like Itglit infantry should have done 111 classtc~lGreece. Then there were three llrles of
Conclusion
20.9
heavy soldiers: the first, tlle has tat^, w ~ t htlle task of disorder~ngthe enerny Itne; the second, the prtncipes, w ~ t hthe goal of breaking the enemy; and the third, the triarii, there to protect the rest it the er~elnyremained unbeaten or gained the upper hand. At the same time, cavalry, n o r ~ n ~ ~nlore l l y numerous than in classical Greece and apparently comparable 117 strength to Hellenlstic armies such as those at Cynoscephalae, protected the tlanlts. It was not just ;I lnatter of deployment; even more Important were the weapons. The shield, sell1 large and probably heavier than the Iiopl~teshteld but oval Instead of round, was a weapon of- oftense, not just defense. * f i e spears, except for those of the t r ~ a r i had ~ , becorrle javel~ns,thrown just before contact. The hand-to-hand battle was fought with a terr~fyingnew weapon, a short, pointed sword \vhose function was not just to cut but also to stab and thus kill or ~ I C I wI ~ ~ th one hit only. The Romans also brought another novelty to the unwritten laws of war. It had been the custont of classical Greece t o dec~dethe war with one rnajor battle, a prdctlce part~allyadopted by the Hellenist~cstates. Rome turned tills unwritten h a b ~ tinside out. Not one, not two, not even three major defeats could bring Rorne t o bay during the Second Punic War. It was not just th,at Rorrle was able to recruit a seemingly endless supply of young men for the grim task of tlie battlefield; it was also a lnatter of a ruthless new mental outlook, In a state that was able t o absorb 16 percent casualties aruong ~ t adult s nlales and st~llkeep fight~ng.The real strength of tlle Ronlan Republtc was there-the ab~lityto relnaln at war u n t ~ lthe enemy was exhausted, aslzed for a Ilurn~ltatlngpeace, or was utterly destroyed. This book has dwelled to a great extent on tlle West-East confront,~t~on, whether between Greelts or Macedon~ansagainst Pers~aor Rome against Carthage. In h~ndsight,the victory of the West seems znev~table,but insist~ n on g its certainty would be ~ n ~ c c u r a tThe e . victory of the West was never a certainty, even w ~ t hAlexander. Qne defeat would have bee11 enough to destroy the Macedonian war effort, If the wings of the Persian I ~ n ehad lasted a l~ttlelonger at Marathon, both the Atheni,ans ; ~ n dtlle P1;ltaeans would have been destroyed. Another attack at Sala1n1.i probably would have ended the threat of the Greek navy. A more log~calstrategic approach could have brought Rome to ~ t knees s d u r ~ n gthe Second Punic War. Yet the question strll remains: Why d ~ tlie d West win? In the case of the Great Pers i a ~Wars, ~ a conlbinat~onof strategxc and tactical rrtistakes and the Greeks' desperate defcnse of t h e ~ rhomeland xnay have been a1no11g tlle cruc~alfactors. In the case of Alexander, certainly the tnabtl~tyof Dar111sand h ~ gens erals to provide a solution to the Macedonian rnanipulat~onof the battlefield rnay explain part of Alexander's success. Yet, at least In that c a e , one should not disni~ssthe soltdartty of the Macedon~anarmy agalnst a vast but obviously \veal< ernplre with l~ttlesense of loyalty to Uarius and h ~ farrr~ly. s Rome, on the other hand, had no alternat~veonce Hann~balarr~ved111 Italy.
Defeat xneant h u n n ~ l ~ ~ ~and t r o nservitude. Carthage also lost because her successful comrnerc~alempire was unable to sustatn a very long war effort agalnst a frugal, vlolent, and confident society that, startlng from the poor h~llsot Rome, had slowly but steadrly expanded rts terrltorles and ~ncredsed its wealth. The partners of success In the Roman Republ~c~ncludedeverybody-aristocrats, cornrnoners, even non-Romans-except for people wlth long-standi~lggrrevances agaulst the state, such as the Samn~tes. It was inevitable that war should reflect all the main values of the warring societ~esIn its sy~nbolts~n and propaganda. W11at IS remarkable at least to rnodern eyes, which look at armed confl~ctsas a dev~arltbehav~or,is that war was not just a normal feature of anclent lrfe but also the element that best defined society. Greeks couched tlletr fight agalrlst I'ersla In terins that restated therr most cher~shedvalue-treedoin. They went to the fields of Marathon, they stood at T'lier~nopylae,and they w a ~ t e dw ~ t hconfidence In their hearts at Salarms because they had to preserve thew freedom-and not just the freedom of a srr~glepolls, Athens or Sparta, but the freedom of the whole of Hellas against the oppressor5 from across the sea. The Creelcs were men used to sacrifice, to a frugal Itte, t o ol,edtence to the gods, to the collect~vity;the Pers~tlns,the Greeks rna~nta~ned, fiere people rendered soft by wealth, debauchery, and serv~tude;they d ~ dnot obey the gods; when they fought, they sought their irld~vidualsurvival, not the safety of the group. The Creeks were servants to no one; in P c ~ s I ; even ~ , the Great Krng was In the hands of sinister eunuchs and greying women. The Greeks were strong, powerful, unbeatable, and male; the Persians were weak, entictng, aild female, aild t h e ~ rland and riches were t o be raken and raped by the Creeks. This was a message that Alexander too would convey to hts troops during h ~ exped~tlon: s We must kill Darius, but we must keep h ~ land s and the people unscathed because thew wealth w ~ l lbecome ours. The Romans were portrayed as honest, stra~ghtforwardsouls w h o worked the land, cherished stnlple values; they were lust and pious, espectally in the figures of Q u ~ n t u sMaxrnlus and S c ~ p ~ the o ; Carthagrn~ans,by contrast, fiere dep ~ c t e das devious and untrustworthy, worshipping a c a n n ~ b a l ~ s t tgod, c rnaking a hving out of commerce and not out ot the land, and h ~ r ~ Inerceng naries to fight t h e ~ rown fidrs. D~sparagementof the losers and heroizatron of the wlnners d ~ not d only occur among people who were ethnically d~fferent,such as Greeks and I'ersians or R o n ~ ~ a nand s Carthdgin~ans.The ~nherentsymbol~sinfound appllcation between the same ethnic groups or w i t h ~ nthe same polls as well. Even when war was profitable because of elements other than the hoplttes, such as the Atllen~annavy a t Sdlam~so r d u r ~ n gthe Peloponnes~anWar, the hoplite sell1 reflected the lnatn values of the soclety, and the navy was regarded w ~ t ha certaln embarrassment or even as an element of decay. At Leuctra, the Thebans were bel~evedto be the favor~teot the gods, wrth even
Conclusion
207
Heracles fight~ngon t h e ~ rs ~ d e ;the Spartans would lose because some of their soldlers had desecrated the battlefield. 'I'he conquest of the East brought forth a new notion of. klngslilp, first exper~rnetltedw ~ t h albe~t , wlthout much success, by Alexander, then adopted by some of his Successors, and finally embraced by the Romans dilrlng the Second I'unlc War. 'The notlon ~rnpllednot only that the ruler was a tavorite of the gods but also that he becdnle divlne d u r ~ n g111s tenure In otflce. Alexander's Macedonians resisted the tendency to give d ~ v ~ nhonors e to their leader, and even later the most in~portantWestern thinlzer on the subject, Euhemerus, extended the notlon only to kings and great heroes once they had dled. What makes Scrpio different IS that he combined two trends lnto the concept of ~rnperator,whlch at that time had a rel~glousrrteaning. RonlCularcha~cr e l ~ g ~ o~nn ~ ~ i n t a l nthat e d the republ~cand ~ t h~ghest s n~ag~strates during therr tenure In office were blessed by the gods ~f tile state reruained just and pious. Wherl Scip~orecelved the t ~ t l eot Imperator trorn h ~ s soldlers 111 Spa~n,he un~tedIn ,I Ilv~ngh u ~ n a nb e ~ n gboth the temporary concept of divinity embodied in 111srole as a 111ghrepublican magistrate and also Euhemerus's permanent n o t ~ o nof the divine nature ot leadership. Scipm's apotheos~sset the trend for the future, f i h ~ c hwoilld be developed first wlth Marlus and espectaliy Stilla and then w ~ t hJullus Caesar, Augustus, and the later emperors.
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Glossary Dia. A Crreek term mcanlng v~olcntforce. It reters to the brutal~tyusccl hy the Konian'\ to s t r ~ k cterror In t h c ~ rencni~es'hearts. centun'on. Junior officer o f the Ronian arniv. There were 2 centurlons per man~ple, the ha5ic tactical unlt of the Ieglort. kach rnan~plcalso had 2 rear c o m ~ n ~ ~ n d c r s (optro7zes).
clerucl?.Pc~sant-soldrcrof Egypt under thc 5uccessor d ~ ~ i aofs tthe ~ Ptoloni~cs.The cleruch was g l e n a plot of iarid for his rn~l~tdrv stv-I Ice. The grant var~eiifrom sold ~ e to r soldrcr: 5 to 20 orourill ( l nroum was cclu~valentto about two-thtrds of an '~cre)for I I ~ ~ I V Lgypt~ans C 1' 11d 20 to 100 a r o u r a for Greek merccnarv rold~ers. deme. Vlllagc. There were 140 deines In Att~ca. enomotia. 12avc tacttcal unlt of the Spartan army. equites. llonlan cavalrymen. hastati. Heavy 1nfantryn1e1-iot the first of three I~ncsof the Roman Icg~on.T b e ~ r rtanle derlses from hasta (a thrusring spear), but they abandoned rhe spear In iavor of lavchns (pzln)ancl sword5 by the tnne o f the Second I'LIIIIL War. helot. Spartan serf, urcd o n rare ocwrtons as a soldier. hippeis. Normally, a term referring to ca\ialry but alsi) u5ecl to refer to the ehte ~ n fantry unit of the Spartari arniy. hortzoioi. Spartan a t i ~ c n s L. ~terallv,the tern1 means "ccluals." hoplite. Heavy ~nfalitrysold~cr,the core of the Greek drmlcs of the c l a s s ~ c pcrlod. ~l hoplon. Weapon. U~ually,the tern1 refers to the hopl~tc'sround, concave sh~eld. hypuspist. A type of ~nfantrymano f the hlaccdonrsn army. It 15 thought that hi* W J ~ more niob~lethan the phalang~te\and that he fought w ~ t ha shorter p ~ k co r 1' spear. Hypasp~stsprollahly lncldc up one of the ehte unrt5 ok the arm). impel*atou.A t ~ t l egr'intcd to a v ~ ~ t o r l o uKs~ r n a ncomntdnder. Or~g~nally, rhe t ~ t l r had a r e l ~ p o u smeanrng. S L I ~ I Africani~s C) was granted the t ~ t l ed ~ r l n gh ~ cams p~lign111 Spa1111n the later stager of the Scconct I'unic War. muniple. I5asic fight~ngu n ~ tof the Ronian leg~on.There were 30 man~plesper leglt)n. The rnan~pleso f the hastart and prlnclpes ln~ludcdL20 men, and the nlanrples of the tn'lnl had 60 men. kach nlaniplc was composccl of 2 ccnturles. Medizing Greeks. <;reeks who s ~ d e dwith the Pcrs1'11isd u r ~ n gthe Great Wars. morrt. The largest untt of the Spartan army. othist~tos.A tcrrii thnr rc.ier5 rv the pu\hlr.rg act1011of the hophtcs during a battlc. peltust. L.tght troops. T h e ~ rndinc dcrlvcs from pelte, the nanie of t h c ~ shlcld. r perioeci. Inhab~tantsof the Spartan m t e ~ 1 1 0had no r ~ g h t sof c ~ t ~ ~ e n s They h~p. were uscd rn emergcncles as sold~ei-5. phalnttgite. Heavv ~nfantrymano t the A l a ~ c d o n ~ aphalanx n who uscd a p ~ k e (snrtssa)as h ~ m s a n weapon. pilum. Jdvel~rlused by the Roinan hastat1 and prrticlpes.
2 10
Glossary
polemarch. Senlor commander of a Greek army. polis. Greek cltv-\taw. principes. Heavy ~nfnntryrneriof the sccond Iitic of thc lictrnan legion. pmdrornoi. hlaccclonian ca\alrymcn, also called scouts or lane-crs. sarissa. P ~ k cot the Alacedon~anphalanglte5. sfrafegos.General, a comnlander 111 a Greek army. triarii. Heavy ininntrymull o f the t h ~ r dllnc of thc lioman Icgioti. CJnllhc tllc hdstatt anci the prinupe\, who wcrc armect wlth ja\clln$ ( p ~ l n )the , trlarll ret'~lncd the s p e a r ( hastn) as tlieir mazn weapon. frirenze. War\h~p. vcdifes. Light Infantry ot tlic Rolllan legion.
Abbreviations Aesch ylu5 Arrian
I'lutarch I'olyh~us Thucydrdcs Xcnophon, (:o?rstttutzott
Xcnophon, (:yi.opaedm Xenophon, Hcllctrrca Xcnophon, Mcnzorabzlnr
Aeschvlus. I'ersac, tram. A. J. I'ocllecl\~ (tnglewoocl C:l~lf.s,N.J., 1970) Arr~art.A~tabastsAlexafzcirt, rr;tns. P. Rrunt (Vol. I ) ancl E . I. Robmn (Vol. 2 ) (l oeb C'la~srcalI ~brarv, 1954) I>~otIorus~ I L L I I U S . 1 zhmry of History, trans. C.. W. Oldfather (L oeb Class~calI,~brary,l946), Vol. 4 lierodotur, trans. A. D. Ciodley (Locb C:lC~,siialLIbrary, 1946-1 95O), Vols. 3. 4 hvv, trans. B. 0. Foster, I-. C;. Xloore, R. XI. I-eer (Loch (,lasr~wl1.1brarjj 1979-1 9 59) l yra (;meto, trdns. 1. M. I'dmoncls ( I ocb C Iasslcal Library, 1958) I'au,anlar. 1)esirzptiorz of C;rcece, trans. W.1 I.S. J o n c ~and H. A. Ormcrod ( I ocb ( lasslcal I ~brarv, 19 3 1-1 960) I'lutarch. LII/L>S, tr'lnr. B. I'crr~n (Loch C,las%~~al LIbrary, l 9' 14- l9 54) I'olvhru5. 'Tl~eHISIOT~PS, trail\. W. R. 1"iton (i.oeh C:lars~~al I lbrarv, 1920-1 927) r l ~ u ~ y d ~ d Hi9tory cs. o/ t l ~ el'elopo?zizesiarz War, trans. C. E. S n ~ t h(1,oeh Class~calI ibrarv, 1920) Xenophon. 5crrpta nztrzora, " ( , o n s t ~ t u t ~ o nof thc I aicdacmol~~ans,'\rans. C;. W R o ~ . e r , o ~ (kl ocb Class~calI rbrary, 1946) Xcnophon. (:yropaeclza, tranr. W! Rl~ller(Locb C:Ia\s ~ ~ I dibrctry, l 19 14) Xcnophon. Hcllpnrca, trans. C. l,. Brownson ( I oeh C,lars~~al I lbrarv, 1921) Xcnophon. Menzombzlra a d Oeco?zourzzclcs, trans. E,. C. Xfarchant (l oeb C'lass~calI.lbrary, 1965)
Notes
Introduction I . W. I~clbruck,Htstory of the Art of War Wltilthrrz t l ~ eFranzework o f Polrttcal Nrstory. Vol. 1: Aittrq111ty,rranr. W. 1. Iienfroe Jr. (We\tport, Oonn., 1975), p. 275. 2. U/. H. Harrrs, \%r aizd lnzp~rmlzsnzzrz Rapubl~caizKonze 327-70 R.(,. (Oxford, 1979). 3. F,. C,abb'~, "Rrfler\ione sulia societi rornaua fra 11 III r 11 I1 \ecolo a.< .," AtGetzaeunz, 11.5. 64 ( 1 986): 472-474; S. Oakley, "The liomali ('onquot of Italv," 1x1 I. I i ~ c hand G. Sli~plcy,cds,, War nizd Soczcty zrz the Roman WorM (1,oncIon nncl New York, 1993), pp. 9-37; J. Patterson, ";CI~lrtaryOrgdr117'it1or1 a S L I ~ I one I'hfr~cano,I ( ; I L I ~ I C:esare," ~ /lthetzaeum, 11.5. 6 3 (198 S): 28 5-295; Iioger SC~LIII-I, "I a rcllgror-~de Sc~plonI'Afr~ca~n,"1,ntonztds 11 ( 1 974): 3-2 1; Ciabba, "P. Corrtello Sc~p~olie Afr~eanoe 1,1 Icggenda," Athe~zaecrm,n.5. 5 1 ( 1975j: 3-1 7.
Chapter Onc 1. I he catcgorrt,atton of the wars 1s ma~xilvfrom I. Ilarn~and,La guerre aiztrqzie de Sitnrer a Rome (Vend6me, 1973), pp. 11-38. Cf. V. Ilar~,Gz~errac dtntto ~zel moirdo nprtlco, pt. 1, Ciucrra e dlrttto nel molldo grcc o-elhizrst~co$720 irl I I I sec010 (hlrlan, 19801, pp. 46-48, who argues for a d~ffcrentcategori/ation arid l~sts,S I X tvpes of war. He agrees \v~thHarmand on r a ~ d \(he calls them "seasonal war") and 011 clvll, tn-Ipcrlal~rtic, a17d cthnrc w'trr but add$ agonlsrrc war\, conflrctr dccldcd bv duel$, and rrtual coiifr~iit~it~onr \uch a\ the "pogrom\" ( I l a r ~dofinltlon) i waged bp voung 'rp~rtan\agalri\t the hclot\. 2. Y. C;arlan, War 1tz the ilrtcieitt World: /l S o i t ~ kitstory, ~l trans. J.I.loyd (London, 1975; 1st trench ed. 1972), p. 78. 2. Artlea Iiad a populat~oiiof about 120,000 people 111 4 12 H.< . The I'elopctnne\i. of the flfth ccntiiry numbered about 900,000, but wme 31)0,000 to ,350,000 of
Notes
213
them were helotr. that 15, nontree ~nd~\~ctual\. See K. J.Ecloch, Die Bevollzer~irzgdcr grtecl)rsh-romrscheti Welt (I,e~p/lg,188h), as reported In C'. Nrcolet et al., K o m ~et la coilgzcdte d u nzotztle nzedrterraizketz 264-27 auaizt d.-C., vol. I, 1 es strtictzlres lie I'ltalle ronzartzc, 2cl ed. (Par~s.1979; 1st etl. 1977), p. 84. 4. A. I. Dcspotopoulos, In C;. I'hylacropoulo\, ed., Hlsrory of t l ~ eHelletzlc World, vol. 2, The A v ~ h a t cl'er~od(Athen\, 197i; I ecl. 1971j, p. 114. 5. 1. Rucklcr, The T1)ebaiz Hegenzoily 371-.?h2 13.( . (C'ambrrdge, 1980). 4. N.G.L. I iammond. A iitstcrvy of C;reec-c' t o 322 1i.C. (Oxtorci, 1982; 1st eci. 1959), pp. 768-569. 7. Garla11, WCIYtir the A i t ~ t e ~World, tt p. 78. 8. Ib~ci.,pp. 86-93. 9. Ibid. 10. See the d~scuss~ons on "the chdr~ot111 Horner" and "the geometric per~od"In l?A.I . (~reenhnlgh,1-arly Greek Warfire: Horsenzen arzd C,harrots 171 the Honzenc a ~ r dilrcl~nlcAgC ((,an~bridge,1973), pp. 7-39. Cf. Ifans Van Wee$, "The liomer~c Way of War: T h e Iliad dnd the Hoplrte P h ~ l a n ~ , Greece '' ami Rovze 41 (1994): 9-14. 11. 011tli~s,see V. 1). Hanson, T h e O t l ~ e rGreeks: i h e f.unzt/y t.arnz arzd thp ilgranilit iloots of Westen7 (Jzv~lzz~7fiott (New York, 199 5), pp. 234-237. Ke~entlv, several scliolarr have attempteci to reasses the role of the cavalrv: I,. J. Worlev, Htpper~:The Cavalry of Rrzczerzt (;rrere (liouldcr, 1994); 1. C;. Spence, T/7e C,avaEry of Class~calG r e e c ~ A : Soaal and Mzl~taryHzstory wrtl~I'arttszrlar K~fc~rcrzce to A t l ~ m s(Oxford, 199 3); C;. R. Kugh, T h e Hovsenrei.~o f Athcrrs (Prtnccton, 1988). See aI\o (Greenhalgh, burly Grcelz Warfare, pp. 84-19?; 1. K. A~lder\on,A i z t ~ ~ r z t Greek Horscwzarzshrp (Iierkclcy, 1979; 1 st cJ. 196 i ). 12. Ilanson, The O t l ~ e rGrec.ks, p. 223. 13. Plutarch, Mor~zlia242.16. 14. Ib~d.,220.a. l . 15. Hansctn, 7 % Otl7er ~ Greeks, pp. 297-299. 16. W K. Prrtchctt, The Greek Stirte a t War, pt. 1 (Berkcley, 1971), p. 1 50. See also 1'. H. Elvtli, "The Structure of a Hophte Sh~eldin the Xfuileo Gregorrano Etrurco," Nolletlzrzo lie1 mz4sc.z e gallerre potzttficre i( 1982): 5-2 1. 17, J. K. Andcr\on, Mllrtc7ry Tl?eory and I'raitrcc. rrt t l ~ Age c of Xe~zophoft(BerkeIcy, 1970),pp. 14-20. 18. J. Warry, Warfare In the (,lasszeal World (New York, 1980),p. 15. 19. 1.' Connolly, Greece nrzd Ronzp nt War (k,nglcwooJ C:l~fts,N . 1.. 198 I ) , p. 58. 20. Ibld. 21. Anderson, Mllitary T i ? t ~ ) rand y Prrrctrcc ttz the Age of Xcrzophon, p. 37. 22. i-lc\chylus, Pevsae 85 (hcri.atrcr Ae\chylit\). 23. Jb~d.,147-149. 24. Anderson, Mrl~taiyT/)eory and 1'~mctrcc1t.1 t / ~ Age c of Xetzoplrorr, p. 37. 25. hi. XI. Markle, "hlacedonran Arni\ and Tact~~c. Under Alexaridcr the Crr~at,'' In 11. liarr-Sharrar 2nd 1'. N. Ror/a, c&., Macetio~lraand C;reec.e 111 I ntc (;lasszcnl atzii I,arly t-iellemstri Trwzes (Vlhshington, L>.C:., 19821, p. 92. 26. Anderson, Mllttrrry Tl.u.ory and I'ractrec m the Age of Xetzopl~o?i,p. 37, ravs vl'rtlal C V I J C rnd~~ate', ~ L ~ that rt could al\o be throw11 rf the liopl~tewa\ at a 211ght.r level than 111starget.
214
Notes
27. One of the ltey rcprcse~lt~~t~onr of thc hophtc 15 on the ( : h ~ gVarc, ~ found 111 T U ~ L and ~ I Inow ~ located In the Etruscan kluseun~at Vdla C;iul~a In Ro~ne.The v;tsiksIio\~5the spc,~rheld rn both ail ovcr~trmand ,In underarm povrlon; the underarnl posrtron secnlr to hnve been used only whcii tltc hopl~tewa\ advancing, not when he wds 111 c o ~ l t ~U~lth c t the enemy. 28. Cf. A. hi. <nodgrars, "The Hopl~telieform and H~\torv,"/orimu/ of !-fe/(e~ztc Studrrs X5 (1965): 110-122; i-l. M. Snodgrass, Amzs arrtr' Amzotlr of the (;reeks (Ith'1~~1, 19671, pp. 48-88; <;rceilhalgh, I:arly C ; r ~ kWarfare, pp. 71-74, 151-1 55. 29. Cf. H. I . Z,orlrner, " The Hopllte I'halanw wltll Special Iieference to the I'oemr of Archilochu\ and Tyrrat.tl\," Arzrz~illof the Rrtttsl~S ~ h o o at l Atlictzs 42 ( 1 947): 76-138; X I . I>etlcnnc, "La phalangc: 1'rohli.mcs et controverses," In I. 1.' Vernant, ed., Probf6mes ~ i c ?/a gzrerrc ctz ( ; Y ? c ~atzc~efzrze(PATIF, 1968), pp, i 19-1 42; P. Cartledge, "Hoplltec and Heroe\: Sparta's Contr~butlonto the Technique of Anc~ent Warfare," joilrrral of Nelleizrc S ~ L I ~97 ~ I (E1977): S 1 1-28. 10. Van Wcer, "The I l o m e r ~L~v ~ yot War: T h e Iliad and the IIopl~tcI'halanx," p. 148. Cf. Van Wces wrth J. I,dtac/, Kanlpff))nrancsc, liilnzpfdmrstcllz1r2g r4nd Kawt~fwwklr~htert rrz der Illus, her Kallznos trizd Qrfitaros ( ~ I U I I I1977). C~, 31. I-lansoi~,T!7c Other CIrc,eks, p. 229 (t'ianson's ~talics). 12. Ib~d..pp. 221-244. (,f. 1-1'. Vernant's '~rt~cle "The <,larr Struggle," 111 h ~ r ~Myiha ~ r dSoczcty rrt rlrl~zentCrrcc'cc, trans. Janet I loyd (New York, 1988), pp. 11-28. The krench vcrslon of thc article was f ~ r s tpuhl~shetlin ktrerre, 5tudia CIraeca et 1,ntr~za4 (1965): 5-19. 3 3 . Polvb~ur1121.6. 24. Xenopho~l,Hrlleltria VII.5.8. 35. W K. Pritchett, T h e Greek \tale at War, pt. 4 (lierkelcy, 19X5), p. 92. 16. Ar~stotlc,l-'ol/tzc-aV.2.12. 37. Herodotus V11.9. 28. l'r~tchctt, The Greek Stute at War, pt. 4, pp. 84-85, 39. hes~hylu\240. 40. Thucyd~dcrV.68. 41. Xenophon, Kespz~bltcnI a~edacmonorri4mX1.4. 42. Prlrchett, T ~ I Greek P Stnte a1 War, pt. I , p. 1 ;4. 43. Warry, \'Virrfart. rrt the C:lass~calWorld, p. 37. 44. Pntchctr, T h e Greek Stmtc at War, pt. l, pp. i 35-1 37. 45. Ilxd., p. 137. 46. W. K. I'ritcltett, T h e Crrek .\tat(> nt War, pt. 2 (Ucrkeley, 1974), pp. 190-207. 47. I-IerociotusVI. l l l . 48. Ihld., IX.58-65. 49. lh~d.,VI. l l l . 50. lb~d.,IX.58-65. 5 1. Xcnophon, MenzoraAtlra 111.1.8. Cf. Anderron, illllttary Theory a?rd Practlce rrt the Age of Xerzo/)hon, pp. 95-06. 52. Prltchett, The Greek State a1 War, pt. 4, p. 59. 53. l'ausan~as 1.32.3. 54. I'rttchett, T h e Greek Strrt~at Kkr, pt. 4, p. 51. 55. Ilxd., pp. 51-54. 56. hrnan, lhctrca 111.1.
Notes 57. Thucydldcs V.7 1.1. 58. Herodotus V1.112. 59. Han\on, The Cltl~er(;re(/ks, p. 275. 60. Iyrtacus 11, lines 21-25, in X I . I>~llon and I,. barland, ccls. and trans., Aizcrmzt Grerce: Socral arrd H~srorrcalI>orr4mentsfrom Archarc T~rnesto the neat17 of Soc rcltes L. 800- 309 l$.( . (I ondon, 1 994), p. 1 5 1. 61. 0 1 1 this, sec C;. I . C awkv\(cll,"Orthoctoxy and Hoplite\," (,lasstcnl Qz4arterly 39 (1989): 175-389; !I Krcntz, "The Naturc of IIoplltc Battle," Classtcal i l ~ t t l q ~ t ~ t y 4 (1985): 50-61; 1). Krentf, "Casualt~esIn Hopllte Battles," Greck, Roman, and Uyzulztt?zeStudtes 26 ( l 9 8 5): 17-20. 62. Warr): Warfare in the Classical World, p. 37; Hanwn, I h e Othcr Cireeks, p. 262; K. D. I,ug~nbill,"Othlsnlos: The J~iiportdnccof the Xiass-Shove 111 Wopl~tck Warfare," I'boeilrx 48 (1994): 51-61; A. J. Holladay, "Hoplrtec and Heres~es," Iozrnzal of Wellerzr~.Stztr-lies 102 ( 1 982): 94-1 03; J. K. Antlcr\on, "Hoplires and Ilcrcsics: iS, Note," /o~trrzalof klellcnic Stud~es104 (1984): 152; 1. Uucklcr, "Eparnc~nond~~s and the EMBOI OK,"Phne?rlx 39 (1985): 1 34-14 3; J. F. I,a;lenby, "The K~llingZo~ie,"in V. 1). Hail\on, cd., Hoplrtes: The Clussrial Greek Battle bxpertcrlce (l ondon, 199I), pp. 87-109; I'r~t~hett,I h c C;rec.k Jtate a t \&'or, pt. 4, pp. 6 5-73. 6 % .Pritchett, The Grecl: State at Wcar, pt. 4, pp. 55ff. 64. Cf. I ugirib~ll,"Oth~snzos:The lrnport'm~e o f tllc klass-jhove in lioplite Warfare," pp. S 1-52. 65. Ibid., pp. 59-6 I . 66. J'rit~hctt, The Greek State mt Wrrr, pt. 4, pp. 74-76. 67. W. K. I'r~tchctt, Stztd1c.s 111 Afzcie?ztCrr(>ekTopography, pt. 1 (I3erkclcy, l 965), p. 145. 68. O n this, see Chapter 5. 69. Herodotus VI. 1l 3 . 70. lbld., V1.114. 7 1. Ibid., VI. i l 7. 72. N.CT.1,. Haniinond, "'C~~sualtles and Re~nforcenientsof Cltlren Solcirers ~n (~reeccand i\/racctlon~a,"/ounzal of Hc~llelzjc-\tmtr'~cs109 ( 1989): 59-60. 73. Krcntz, "(,asualtics in FIopllte B'lttlcs," pp. 19-20. 74. Polyb~usXXXV. 1.2. 75. I'rrt~l~ctt, The Greek State mt Wrrr, pt. 4, p. 92. 76. C)n this, sec Chapter 6. 77. Xcnophon, iWcnzcirabrlra 3.1.6. 78. lh~d.,1.2.1. 79. Ibid., 3.1 .l 1. 80. lbld., 3.2.1. 8 1. Ibid., 3.2.3. 82. Ibid., 3.1.6. 83. Garlan, \Var in the Alzcreizt kBorlti, pp. 145-1 50, 84. Warry, Warfare EIZt l ~ e(:lass~cal World, p. 69. 8.5. Xenoplioii, Cyropaedrn 11.6-9. Cf. Andercon, Mrlrta~y Tl,coy and I'racti~e~ v r the Age of Xeno/>hon, p. 99. 86. kor tlic Athenian strategol, see Garlnn, War rtz the Aizrtc~iztWorld, pp. 154-155.
276
Notes
87. For an example of the situation, see Xenophon, A7zal~asis111.1.1.46. 88. Herodotus VIT.229. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., V11.231. 9 l . Ib~d.,VII.232. 92. Ibid., VII.229. 93. lbrd. 94. Hcrodotus seems to condemn Aristodemus bccause, in his opinion, Aristodemus should have acted as Eurytus did. He also offers a different explanation of Ar~stodemu\'sactlon; see I-lerodotus \III.2.30. 95. J. dr. Romilly, "La notion dc 'cla,ses moyennes' dans I'Athknes du Vc 5. av. J. C.," RPVUCdes 6tzides grecqtres 100 (1987): 1-1 7. 96. Ihid., pp. 7-8. 97. Ibrd., p. 15. 98. Euripides, Supplices, lines 238-24.5 (my translation). 99. C;recnhalgh, Early Greek Warfare, pp. 74-75. 100. Hanson, Tl7e Other Greeks, p. 233. 101. Llct~enne,"La phalange: Probli.nies et controversrs," pp. 123-1 24. 102. On this, see Hanson, Tht Otl7er Grceks. This intcrprctation, however, probably does not apply to the Spartan state. L0.3. T h ~ is s Arist~des'vicwpoint, exprcsscd in h ~ Panatl~enaic14s. s Sec A. Santosuosso, "Leonardo Bruni Revisited: Hans Baron's Thesis on thc Influence of the Classics In the La~datzoFloretztirrae Urbis," in J. C;. Rowe, ed., Aspects of Late Medieval Governmeizt and Society: Fssays Prese~ztedto ]. K. 1.andrr (Toronto, 1986), p. 41. 104. Aeschylus 241-242. 105. Herodotus V.49. 106. Hanson, Tiw Other Greelcs, espec~allypp. 291-.32.3. 107. I'ritchctt, T/7e Greek State at War, pt. 1, p. 28. 108. Pritchett, T l ~ Greek e .State at War, pt. S, pp. 5.3-100. 109. V. D. Hanson, "Rev~ewof W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part I-V," Classical i'hilology 8 7 ( 1 992): 256. 110. See W. K. I'ritchett, The Creek State at War, pt. 3 (Uerkelcy, 1979),p. 8, regarding Wilaniowitz's vicwpoint. l l l. Hcrodotus VII. 140. 112. Ibid., VlI.141. 113. Ibid., VI.106-107. 114. Garlan, War in the A?zczmt World, p. 48. 1 1 S. Herodotus TX.62. 116. Xcnophon (Helle~ztcaVI.4.7-8) suggests that "a11 these things were but devices of the leaders." 117. For the trophy, we I'r~tchett, The Greek State at War, pt. 2, pp. 246-276; for the sharc of the booty given to the gods, set, pt. I , pp. 93-100. 118. In the fifth c e n t ~ ~howcvcr, v, .I numbcr of intellectual\ questioned this practlce; see M. Ciccici, "Guerre, stdsels e dsttlia nella Grecia del V secolo a.C:.," in hlarta Sord~,ed., l santnarj e la guerrn trel rnondo classrco ( M ~ l a n ,1984), pp. 132-141.
119. See C;arlan, War 112 t l z 11iicie~ztWorld, pp. 4 1-57. 120. t. Rodriguer Adrados, Il14s~mitcit131 politi~aen la Grecm ~ldszza(kladrrd, 1966), pp. 121-133, argue, that thc Greeks corlsrdered rho favor of thc gocls rsscntral to tlterr defeat of the i'crsr,lns. 121. Cf. Garlan, Wur iiz tlw Atzcl~ntIYiorld, p. 55. 122. t. bornart, The l'sychoaizillysts of War, trans. A. l'fe~fcr ( ( ~ ~ i r d rCrty, n N.Y., 1974; 1st Italian 19h6), p. 147. 12.3. l)ettenne, "1,a phalange: l'roblkrne5 et controverses," p. 128. 124. Harnmcmd, "'C'~s~~altles and Rernforcen~entsof Crtireii Soldress In Greece and hlacedoiiia," pp. 76-57. 125. " T' he l'rofession o f Arms," War, a t e l e ~ ~ i b\cries ~ ~ nwritten by GWYIIIIC1)yei-, (:anad~an Kroddcastrng (:orporation, June 1984. 126. I'rrtchett, T l ~ Greel: e State at War, pt. 1, p. 27, n. 107. 127. Thucydtdes 1.70.8.
Chapter Two 1 . l'ausanras 1.32.4. 2. I.A.S. l,van,, 'TIerodotus ancl the 13'1ttlc of hlarathon." llistorta 42 (199.3):306. 3. Herodotus V1.112. 4. Tl~ucyd~di-, 11.34.5. 5. See h ~ epitaph s in XI. I)~llonand l,. Garland, eds. and trails., Arzc~ri~t Cireece: Soc-ral all& Ffrstorrzal 1)onrnznzts from Arcl~atcTtnzes t o the Death of Socrates c. 800- 399 N.( . (l oridorl, 1994), p. 189. 6. i-lrtstc)phanc.s, f'qzlit~s78 l ff. 7. Ar~stctphanes,Achantcrzs~~s 697ff. 8. t o r an introduct~onto the I'crsran trnpire, see chap. l 3 ("The Achdemcnrcl P,nlpire c. 5 5 0 - 3 30") arid relevant brblrograpllv (pp. 756-762) rn An16lie Kulirt, I he A~lcieiztR'c~arkast c. 3000-J JO B.('., vol. 2 (l,ondon, 199.5). 9. Herodotus V.49. 10. Ihld., V.50. I I . 1. M. lialcer, " T l ~ el'ers~an Wars i-lgarn5t (;recce: i-l IZi~~lsscssment," Hlstorln 38 (1989): 127-129. 12. On the Per\lC~ii ~ 7 ' plar~, 1 ~ see ~bld.;A. K. Burn, Persin atld tile Greeks: The Defelrse of the West, L . 746-478 N.(. (I ondon, 1962). pp. 236-237; and J.A.R. Xlunro, "Somc Ohservatrons oil the l'et-s~anWars," jozirtzal o f f - f c l l ~ t ~Jturites zc l9 (1899): 196; 11. Btngtson, eci.. T j ~ eGYL'LJ~S a ~ r dthe I'ersta~zs: I rom t h Szxtl~ ~ ~ to t l ~ ekozirth Ccnt~~rtes, trans. J . Conway (Nem York, 1968; 1st C~crrnaned. 1960, pp. 37-46. I i.I(urr1, Persia and the (;reeks. pp. 238-2 19. 14. Iierodotus VI.lO1. l 5. The distance wds 23 i~iiles,according to hl.0.B. Caspar~,"Stray Notes on the l'ersiari W'irs," Iciti~.rtmlof Hclleltti {tz~dzes3 1 ( 1 9 I 1): 104; he also mentions a return r n a r ~ hFrom hlarathc)~lto Athcns of no morc r h ~ nX hours. N.(;.I . Harnrnond, " T l ~ e(:an~pa~gn'lnd the Battle of Marathon," 111 h15 Stctd~esrrz Greek l l i s t o r ~ /l~ : Comparztofz 'irolzlme t o n Htstory of C;ret>cet o 322 1j.c . (Oxford, 1971), p. 21 0, put\ the d1stancc at 26 ~rirlcs,tllat 15,a n X- or 9-hour march. 16. Hammond, "I he C alllpalgn arid the Battle of Xlarathon," pp. 202-204.
2 13
Notes
17. licrodotus VI.102. J. l. L,~~cnby, T/?r 1)efelzcc. of C ~ C C C 490-479 LT, t3.C. (Warn~~nstel; t,ngland, 2991), p. 48, argues that "the plarn rout11 of Athens itself would have been at Ica\t as suttablc for cav;tlrv." 1X. Herodoti~sV1.102, 107. 1% IIbld., VI. 107. 20. Cttrnel~usNepos, Mzltm~les4.1, 111 ( ornehu\ Nepos, 1)e vrrts 1llz~stnhz4s.Half of thc 200,000 infantr)/rncn, says, h'epos, wcrr prescnt at the battle. 21. Ilammond, "The C:an~pa~gnd ~ l t lthe Battle of blarathon," p. 203, adopt5 25,000 as a mrvrzmum figure for tlie fight~ngtroops. Accord~nj;:to Haniniond (p. 20?), the I'ers,~a~i fleet 111cludedat least 200 trlrernes, and 400 nlrrchant sh~ps,.In adclit~onto the 25,000 solchcrs, 52,000 sarlors were transported by tht fleet. 22. \V. W. WOW, "Arnis, Tact~csand Strsitegy In the Pcrs~~ln Wars," Jouri7al of Hellerrr~Studtes 4 1 ( 1 923): 12 1. See also W. K. I'r~tcliett, "'1CIaratho11,'' Unrr~erszty of (:alzfor7zza Pz~blrmtrorzs r7z C,lasszcal Arc.hacsology 4 ( 1960): 174-1 75; h'. Seltuntla, "The l'crslan5," 111 1. l. IIackett, ed., A lizstory of Wnr r l z the il?rcrefzt World (New York, 1989), pp. 82-10?. 0 1 1 the Pcrs~ansand Greeks, see I.a7enby, The J ) ~ / C W C C of Greece, pp. 17-44. c s Strategy In the I'crs~an Wars," p. 123. 23. How, "Arms, I a ~ t ~ ancl 24. On the prinlacy of the bow among the I'ers~anl, see A. l;. Wardman's rcmarkr In " Tact~csand tlie I'radtt~onof the Per\ran Wars," Hzstona 8 (1959): 53. 25. W. hlcl cod, "The liangc of the Ancient Iiow," I'hoerrts 1 9 ( 1 965): 3. 26. How, "Arms, I a c t ~ a11d ~ s Strategy In the I'crslan Wars," p. 120. Ilelbru~kargucs that the Pcrs~anprofessional troops uere superlor to the Athen~a~i\; see h ~ s Hzstory of the Art of War, vol. 1 , p. 69. 27. C t. l? Ii~iknell,"Thr (:ornrn'~nd Structtlrc and C;e~~er'~ls of the hlarathon <,anipa~gn,"L'arztlquitk ilasszque 39 (1970): 427-442. 28. Harnmond ("The C'inipalgn and tlie Battle of Marathon," p. 206) accepts "10,000 as the irilntmun1 figt~rc."Pritchett ("h1.trathon," P. 145) scerns to prefer a force estimate of about 9,000. Burn (Pcrsra aizci the Greeks, p. 249) also nlcntlons 9,000 troops (or 10,000, ~f the Plataedns are 11-ic1uded).Of the anacnt soLIrcc5, Clorn e l ~ t Nepor ~s (Mrltrndes 5.1) gives figures of 10,000 Athen~ansand 1,000 Plataeans, and Pai~san~as (JV.25.5 and X.20.2) says thcrc were herwcen 9,000 ancl 10,000 Athemans, ~ n c l u d ~ nolci g people ,111tl sl'tve5. 29. Ilurn (Persra a7zd the Greeks, p. 243) niertt~ons"perhaps 600 men"; niost other source\ \peal< of 1,000. 30. For the locatlon of the battlefield and on the battle ~tsclt.see W. K. I'r~tchett, Studlc'~112 flitcze~zrGreek Topography, pt. 2, Battlefields (Berkclcy, 1969), pp. 1-1 1, and pt. 1, pp. 83-93; Pr~tcliert,"Marathon," pp. 137-190; J.A.Cr. Van del Veer, "The liattlc of Marathon: A r o p o g r a p h ~ ~ aSur~ey," l M7zentosylze 15 (1982): 290-321; I,a~enby,7 % 1)ef~~lzce ~ of Greece, pp. 45-80; C . IH~gnett,Xcrxes' 1)tuasro~z of Greece (Oxford, 1963),pp. 55-74; E. Vanderpool, "The I'lcrnc ot hlarathon and the Hcrakle~on,"Atncrr~n~z Jottrnal of Archaeology 77 (1966): 119-12 3 ; P,. Vanderpool, "A Monument of the IZattlr o f klaratlion," I-lc.sperru 35 ( 1 966): 93-1 06; Burn, I'ersra a i d the Greeks, chdp. 12. 31. O n the sources, see I'r~tchett, "Xfarathon," pp. 160-172; Haminond, "The Carnpatgn and the ISatrle of Xl~~-athon," pp. 227-245; A. W. Crommr, "Herodotus, and hlarathon," T h e I'I7o~rzrs 6 (1952): 77-8.1; kvnns, "Herodotus and the I5attle
Notes
2 1 L)
of blarathon," pp. 279-307; W. W! IIow, "(:ornel~ur Ncpo\ o n blarathon and I'aror," \ourrrnl of Helle~zt~ St14dzt's 39 (1 91 9): 48-6 1. i2. Hcrodotus VI. 109. 33. lbld. 34. Pauran~asI. 1 5.3. 3 5. Hcrodotus VI. 102. i6. 0 1 1 th~s,sce Baleer, "The I'eruan Wars i-lga~nstC~rccce,"pp. L3 1-132. 37. T h ~ rwas one of two arguments that, according to ( , o r n e l i ~Nepos ~~ (Mtltzatfes 5.4), convrnced the I'ers~ans to attack the Greeks. 7 he other argument strestccl tlie \uperlorlty of their iiunlbcrs. 38. I-icrodotus VI.111. 39. Ibld., VI.95, 10 1 , 102. O n the controversy about tllc Pcr\la11 cavalry, seck Hamrnond, "The Canlp'irgn and the Battle of ILlarathon," espec~allypp. 246-248; Prttehctt, S~ritlres112 A?zcreiit (;reek Topography, pt. 1, pp. 92-93, and pt. 2, pp. 8-9. Among the supporters of the cavC1lry'ire: I.van5, "l Ierodotur 'incl the Battle of Xfarathon," pp. 293-299; C;. Slirimpto~~, "The Pcrsrdn C:dvalry ' ~ tXlarathon," l'boerzlx 34 (1980): 20-37; and I afenhv, Thc~1)efe~r~e of Greece, pp. 79-61. 40. kvaiis, "tierodvtus ancl the Battlc of Xfarathon," pp. 293-299. 41. Ibld. 42. Herodotus V1.lll. 4 i. Ib~d.,VI. I I l . 44. h rouglilv north-south povtlon (from the \outhcastci-n cncl of Xlo~intKotron~ to the lower s ~ d cof klount Agricl~k~) would hc about 1,500 meters; \ec Prlrchctr, "Xlardtllon," p. 144. According t o ISurn (f'ersln i r l z J the Grceks, p. 244), the r n ~ t ~ a l front o f the Clreek I~nccctvcrcd 1,250 yards 111 a pct\~t~on s ~ m ~ ltaorthc one I'r~tcl~ert suggc\ts. I iammond ("The (:ampaign and the Battle of blaratl-ton," pp. 178-179) accepts a frontage of 1,600 meters, but he believet the armieh were deploycc1 d~tfercntly: the Grreks wttll hlctunt Kotroii~helirnd them and tlie I'crs~an\ w ~ t hthe sea at their backs. Sir I.rcdcr~ckXlaur~cc( " l h c Campaign of Xfaratlion," [onr~qalof Nalleizic- Strfdics 52 [ l 9321: 20) mcntlons frontdge of 2,300 vards. I h'ivc followed I'r~tcl~ett. 45. I'r~tchctt, "blarathon," p. 147. I-or the battle order of both the (;reeks and the I'crs~anr, cf. I\ia~tricc,"The (,ampalgn of Marathon," pp. 13-24. Sec I.c~zc~~by, The Defetrce of Crcccc, p. 64, who drgucs t l ~ ~~f~we t , a5sume the <;reeks hdd 10,000 Irlen and that e ~ c hman occup~ed90 centrmeter5, the frontagr.5 would 21ave hcen 300 for tltc right, 1,000 tor the center, aiid 31.5 for the left-a total of ahout 1,615 Inetcrs. 46. XlcI eod, "The Iiange of: the Anc~entBow," p. 8; Hanlmond, " The C'~rnp'~~gn and the Battle o f hlarathot~,"p. 177. 13ut 111 a later article, blcl cod has rc5t;tted that the inaxlinum c f f e ~ t ~ vrangc e wa\ 175 meters; \cc " I he 1Zowshot and ,Clarathoii," Joun7alof Hel1cnlc Srtm"cs 90 ( 1970): 197-1 98. 47. Hcrodotus VI. 112. 48. Ib~d. 49. Ibld. 50. ll>ld., Vl. 11 3. F l . Ilxd. 52. lbld.
Notes 53. Ibid., VI.114-115. 54. I'auranlas 1.14.3. 55. lhld., 1.32.7. 56. Herodotus Vi. 117. 57. (:orrrelrus Nepos, iM11tlndcs 5.4. 58. L>clbruck, Hzstory of fhc. Art of Wcrr, vol. 1, p. 72. 59. Iiamrnond, "The C ampdrgn and the Iiattlc of ~Iaratlion,"p. 203, estnndtcs the I'crs~anarmy had a m ~ n ~ m uofm25,000 rnen for the campatgn, but he does not give an estlnlate for the battle. 60. E-lcrodotusVI.l 15. 61. Ibid., V1.116. 62. (:orrrelius h'cpos, iM11tlndcs 5.4. 6 3. But on thls, see also f.,vans's argument 111 " H e r o d o t ~ ~and s the Battle of Marathon," pp. 300-302.
Chapter Three 1. Herodot~lsV11.9. 2. Balcer, "Thc I'crsian Wars Aga~nst(;recce: h Kcassc~rn~ent," pp. 112-1 35. 3. Herodotu5 VI1.20. 4. I ~ I J .~11.12-I , X. 5. Simonidc\, fragment 172, In I yra Graeca, ccl. and trans. I. 11. tclinonds, vol. 2 (C:anibr~dgc,1958). 6. E-lerodotu\ VII. 184. 7, O n the sl/c of the Ikrs~anarmy, sce A. It. Rurn, I'crsza ami II)P C;rrek~: The DPfeusr of the West, c. F46-478 D.C. (Idondon,1962), pp. 326-330; Sir f' hlaurrcc, "Tile Sue of the Xrtnv of Xcrxes," jourrzal of Helle~ircSt~rdr~*s 50 (1 930): 21 0-235. 8. I'talcer, "The I'crsidn vfar\ hgdln'.t (rrerce: h ~ieds\rssnicnt,"p. 127. 9. Sec llcroclutus V11.184. 10. Ibld., VII.6 1-99. l l. Il71d., V11.34. 12. lhld., VII. 36. 11. Ibid., VII.22. 14. Ibld., V11.37. 1 5. Ilxd., VII.39. 16. Ibid., VII.138. g see D. C;11115, (;ollahoratzorz wrth the l'ersza~zs 17. On the b l e c l t ~ ~ n(;reeks, (W~eshaden,1979). L 8.1icrc)dorus V11.172- 1 74. 19. Ibid., V11.175. 20. Cf. P. R. Ckorges's dccount of Greek pollcy before L ~ l a ~ i i In ~ s "Sav~ng , Hcrodotu\'s I'lienomena: The Oracle\ and the kvents of 480 K.< .," (,lasstccrl Arztzqnlty 5 ( 1 986): 14-59. 21. Ilcrodotus VII. 17 5. 22. Ihrd. 23. 1 an1 followtng A. I>a\kalak~s,ProhlPmes hzstonques acttortr cic la butarllr tios Thernzopyles (l'arrs, 1962), pp. 185-187, for the ~hronologv.hly account of the
Notes
22 1
1~1ttlc15 ba\ed m,llnly on I icrodotu\'r ~ ~ c c o u(VII.198-234), nt with some added det'iils from I ) ~ i ~ d o r SicuIus l~s (X1.4-12). 24. Herodoeus V11.2 10. 25. 1. l,. Myrrs, Herodutzts, buther of History (Oxford. 19-56),p. 252. 26. Sec Dask'llak~s,Prohiernes hrstortqt~es,pp. 9-28. Hc follo\w Hcrodotu5's list (V11.202), except rn regard to tile number of Spartans. I arcnhy, The I>eferlie of Crrcece, pp. 134-135, calculates rhc overall (rrcck force at 11omore than 8,000. 27. I Icrodotus VII.202. 28. Sirnolildes of Ceos's ~nscriptrori15 In ~brd.,VII.228. 1)rodorur Sicul~~c, (X1.4.S) and I\ocrate\ (l'anegyrz~90) list 1,000 Spdrt,ln\. 29. U. Co~coli,Pruprreta foizdrarra ed eserirto rzelio stnto spartn~zo&l17cta ilassrca (Rome, 1979), pp. 92-95, thinla\halak~s,1'robli.vzrs hzstorrqrres, pp. 64-68. 47. Ib~d.,pp. 68-71. 48. Hrgnctt, Xerxes' I~iunsrotzof Grerce, p. 1 19. 49. i)a\halakrs, 1'rohlt.mes histortqtres, pp. 76-77. 50. Herodotus accused them of ~owarclice;for a \trong defcnse of the llwban\ and convincing arguments 111 thelr \upport, 5ce l'lutarch, De Iierodott maligrzttirte. S 1. Herodotus V11.225. 52. I>elhruck, History of the Art of War, vol. I , pp. 9 1-96. 53. For a summary of the reasons, \cc G. 1)e S a ~ ~ ~ t"Note i s , cr~tlchcsulla storia nlilrtarc dclle guerre pcrslanc," in h15Sirrttr rnlrron, vol. I (Rome, 1966), pp. 71-78. 54. The Athcnrari\, with 3onir help from the I'Idtdeati\, 11ia111ird127 ship5 of the 27 1 trrremc.\ etlgagecl 111 the first battlr of A r t c ~ i ~ l s i(1lcrc)tiotus u~~~ Vlll. 11. Fiftythree A t t i ~trirciner joined the <;reek fleet before the second b'lttlc began bid., VIII.14). 5 5. Eor the oper~tt")ridlIr~tlitdt~oii\ of Crreeh fleets, we I: I,. Adcock, The Crrcek arzd Macedo~zlaizArt of War (Ucrkrley, 1957), capcc~allypp. 37-39.
Notes 56. IIerodotus VIII.l-23. 57. Ihrd., V11.206. 58. lh~d.,VI. 106. 59. 011th~s,see l>nskalakrs, I'roblenws hrstorzqzies, especially pp. 40-50. 60. On I>elbruck's 5t'111d and on the role of rel~glon,see Prrtchert, T h e Greek {tate at War, pc. 3 , especrally pp. 1-10. 6 l . I)askalakrs, Prol~l~nzes h l s t o r l c i ~ epp. ~ , 29-SO. 62. On thl\, see Dc S~nctls,"Note crltrche sulla storla mrlrtarc dellc gucrre persrane," pp. 78-79. A?. E-ltgnett, Xcrxes' lrzt~astorzof Crrce~e,pp. 118-139. 64. Herodotus VII.21 I. 65. On the sea c o l ~ f r o n t ~ ~off t ~ oArtem~\rum, n see ~ h ~ dVIII. . , 1-23. 66. Aescliylus 1 1-12. 67. C;. Smets and A. I)or\~~~fat~g-Smccs, "I a bata~llcde Salarn~nc:1 c5 ~ ~ L I ~ c,411c'~," izua~rc.de l'itzst~trrtde I'htlologle et d'fftstotre Onerztalc~set Slavcs 12 ( 19-52):4 15. 68. Hcrodotu5 (V11.144) 5avs that 200 \ h ~ p swere bu~ltwrth the money. Ar~stotlc ( P o l l t z ~ a22.7) rmentloris 100 trlremcs, but Thcnii\tocle\' decree \upport\ Hcrodotur's csttmate; sec I>lllon and Crarland, Afzcre71t G r ~ e c e p. , 201. Cf. K. I. I,enardon, T l ~ Saga e o f Thenztsto~les(Lolldo~l,l978), pp. 51-56; V. C;ahrlclsen, kv?iaiiLtizgtlie Athe~rrnitF1ec.t: I'irblrc Ezxatlorz a d SoLzol K~Iatio/zs(Baltrmore, 1994), pp. 25-37, 69. I hucyd~des1.74.1. 70. Wcrodoru5 VII. 173. The Arhenlans are not 51nglcd out In term5 of tllcrr col?tr~butlorito the 10,000 men guard~ngthe pass, bur clcarlv they were aniolig them bcc.tuse onr of tlic generals was the Athcn~anrhcrnr\toclcs. 71. The rest had becl1 left at Athein, probably to prevent 1' I'erslan lalltllng there or to protect the c ~ t vagdrlirt an attack by another Greek communlth Aeglna, with whom rliey were at war; \catL J. S. Mttrr~so~i, "The Crrt,ek ihrps at ialani~sarid rhe L)rc~kplvus," /ozrriial of ffelle?zrc Studrc~s1 I 1 (1991): 197. 72. Hcrodotu5 VII. 10. 73. Ihld., V111.97. 74. For (I-reek polrcy at this st;tge, cf. N. IZobcrt\on, "The True Xlc,lnrng o f the 'Wooden Wall,'" (:lusstcal l'hrlology 82 (1987): 1-20. l or the battle, cf. I.azcnby, T h e 1)ef~~rzce of Greece, pp. I F 1-2 16. 75. Herodotus V111.71. 76. 1he positlon war srnlllar to the one taken at Arternls~t~nl. 77. The following dl\cu\slon 1s p'lrtlally basecl on K. (,ustancc, War at Sea: Modertz 'Tljeory mrd A?icleirt I'mctlce (London, 1970; l st ecl. 19181, pp. 1 ?-30. 78. On th~s,cf. Balccr, "Thc Perslan Wars Aga~nstC;reccc," pp. 136-1 39. 79. Ho\vcvcr, the I'ers~an fleet strll outnumbered the Greek fleet at Salamls1,207 5h1ps agaln5t 310, accordrng to A e ~ h y l u s(Irnc5 339-343); also, Werodorus VI11.48 put\ the C;reel< 5trength at 380 ship. Iiut oli th~s,\cae Udrnmond, Sttrdres tiz Greek History, pp. 268-270. In T k Atl~ertzaiz Trrrenze: T h e History aizr-l Kecorzstruct~orzof arz il?rcrcvzt Greek Warship (C,ambr~clge,19861, 1. S. blorrrson ~ n J. d f; Coates accept the fig~~res of about 977 for the Perrians and 380 for the Greeks. 80. Cf. the short but cogenr suniniary of thew rea\olis In irnets and 1)orsinfangSmcts, "La hata~lledc Salamrne," p. 417.
81. I,enarcion, The Saga of Tl7enl1storles, p. 25. 82. l h u c y d ~ d e s1.1 38. 83. Heroclotu\ V111.75. 84. I-lrgnctt, Xcrxc~s'i n v n s ~ u ~ofz Greece, p. 208. 8 5. Acschylus 157-360. 86. Ibrd., 361-371. 87. 0 1 1 th15, sec, the brref ~ornr11~nt5 In Srli~tsand I)orsr~lfa~~g-Sr~~i-tr, ''1 a b~ta111e de Sal'~mine," pp. 409-411. The authors reject D ~ o d o r u sSi~ulus's statement (X1.17.2), which I accept as credtble. K. K ~ k o l a o ustrongly supports the rel~abilrty of I)~odoru\'saccount; siae I l l \ "I a t)atd~llede Salarnrne d'dpres 1)rodorc de S ~ c ~ l e , " Roi>lte&.S etudes greiqcles 95 (1982): 145-156. 88. Acschylus (382-383) seems to 111~pl.v that the Persran shrpi pdtrolled the cxrts, sweeprng haclc and forth rather than proceedlog ~ n t othe strarts. 89. I rdent~fy the rnodcrn rs1'1nd of I ~ p s o k o u t a la~i Herodotus's l'syttalcra (VI11.76; sec alro Aeschvlus 447-464). 011 t h ~ s ,see I'r~tchett, Studies 117 il~ronrt Greek Topography, pt. l , pp. 94-1 02. Wammond (Stltdies trz Greek Hzstory, pp. 253-265) thinlti that l'syttdlela 15 rnstead the modern i\land of Avlo5 Yervos, whrch IS In the mrdcile of the straits, west of the u t v of Salnmrs. 90. I'ausan~asI. 36.2. 91. Aeschylus 450-454; Herodotus Vl11.76. 92. Herodotus VI11.78-8 3. 9.3. I b ~ d .V111.83. , 94. Burr-i, C;ITCX'S atzd Persmns, p. 458. 9 5. i-lerctdotu\'5 malicrou\ g05c.1~ a h o i ~ the t Cor~nrhran\fleerng 111 panic \IioulJ be Jrsregarclcd. I l e says at the e t ~ of i the \tor)/ that "all Wcllas" accepts rhc C ctr~ntliran version, t h ~ 15, t that therr s h ~ p were s "'lmong the foremost rn the bdttle" (I Ierodotus V111.94). l l i e epitaph 117 lionor o f the Corrnth~answ11o Jled at Sal.~ni~s reniind\ the reader, " [ Ofrrend! In the wrll w,itcredl crty of C'or~nthwc onLe Irvcd. llSut riow wc lie 111 hrals' [lslalld of 5aIamrr. Here we ~ a p t u r e dI'hoeniclan ships and I'ers~an, and we saved holv Greece from thc Xledci]," 111 C. W. bornara, cd. c1~7dtrani., Archaic Tunes to the Etrd of the Pclo[~ouuasranWar ( C ' I I U ~ ~ I 198.3), C ~ ~ Cp., 25. 96. i-lcschylus 386-387. 97. Ibid., 389-190. 98. Ibrd., 198. 99. I am followrrig I Ianirnoncl'\ recon\tructron of the lines; we 1115 Stztdles rn Greek H~story,p. 283. 100. I Icrociotus VIII.84. 101. Aeschylus 199. 102. Morr~soti,"The (;reek jhrps at Salan~rsand the Z>rekplo14s,"p. 199. 103. Herodotus V111.84. 104. Thucvdidcs 1.49.1-2, 1. 1 OS. Hammctnd, itz~dles172 (;reel{ l i l s t o ~ yp. , 296. 106. Morr~sotiarid Coatcs, Tlje Athenza~zTnren~e,p. 58. 107. Ib~d.,pp. 55-60. 108. Plutarch, 'Tljemlsto~les14.1, 117 Vztac. Then~ritocles'decree 5 . ~ ~that 5 "they \llctuld also ch0oc.e [tlen rna[r]~nes[for eacjh ship from those between twenty land t h ~ j r t vvears of age and four r l r ~ h ~ r s ree " ; 1)1llo11and Crarland, Alzczcrzt G r ~ e c e ,
224
Notes
P. 201. An cwccption,ll ctrc~u~~lstance is rctlected 111 the decree of 430 13.<,. The fighting potent~alo f a fleet of 30 ships tncluded 5 volunteer ~>plbatnt (sj~ec~dl hopl~tes), 40 actdtt~ortalhoplltcs, L0 archers, atltl 10 pcltasta for each bo'lt. T l ~ cair11 of thc expedrtlon was to collect trtbiite or to card the I'cloponncse (Gabrrelsen, t.~narza~tg the Atl~cnmrrFlcet, pp. 106-1 07). 109. E-lcrodotusV11.184. L 10. Ae\chylus 408-409,41. l . 111. Il-t~d..272-273,275-277. 1 12. I'ltttarch, Ti)emzstocles 14.2. 11 3. 5rnets and I>orunfarlg-
Notes
225
pt. 1, pp. 103-121; I-Ilgnett, Xerxes' I~zvaslono f Greece, chap. 7 and apps. 10-12; Burn, Persia and the Greel:~,pp. 289-344; Lazenby, The Defetzce of Greece, pp. 21 7-247. 143. l)e Sunctis, "Note critichc sulla storla militarc delle guerre persiane." p. 93; R. Nvland, "Hcrodotos' So~lrcesfor rhc Platalal Campaign," L'antiquiti classique h1 (1992): XO-97. 144. Heroclotus IX.28-30. 14.5. Ibid., IX.33. 146. J. M. Cook, The Persian Empzre (I,ondon, 1983), p. 123. Cf. Hignett, Xel-xes' Irzvdsir~tzof Greece, pp. 267, 3.54-355,4.18. 147. Herodotus JX.66. 148. For hfardonius's order of battle, sec ibid., IX.31. 149. Ibid., IX.61. 150. When Arrabal.os, thr general of the ccnter of the Prrslan line, withdrcw at the cnd of the battle of Plataca, he chose a line of retreat through I'hocis; sec Herodotus IX.66. 1.51. Ib~d.,IX.20-2.5. 152. lbid., 1X.20, 22. 153. Ibld., IX.28. 1.54. Ibid. 155. H~gnctt,Xerxss' I~zvasiorrof Greece, p. 49. Cf. Herodotus IX.22. 156. Herodotus JX.22. 1.57. Ibid., IX.22-23. 1.58. Ibld., IX.2.5. 159. Cf. Hlgnett, Xsrxes' Iirvasiorr of Greece, pp. 3 0 X - 3 1 1. 160. M.O.U. Caspari, "Stray Notes 011 the Pcrsian Wars," Jozrrrzal o f liellerzic Strrdres 31 (1911): 109. 161. l>e Sanct~s,"Note crltlche sulla m r i a rn~litaredelle guerre peniane," p. 94. 162. lbid. 163. Hignctt, Xerxes' Ivvasion of C;rcece, pp. 3 18-31 9. 164. Herodotus TX.41. 16.5. Ibid., IX.39. 166. Ibid., IX.41-47. 167. Ibid., TX.49. 168. Ibld. 169. lbid., 1 x 5 1 . 170. Ibid., IX.52-53. 171. See Nyl~nd'sargument in "Herodotos' Sources for the Plataial Campaign," pp. 80-97. 172. Herodotus IX.53-54. 173. Ibid., IX.58-65. 174. Ih~d.,IX.59. 175. lbid., lX.61. 176. Ibid. 177. De Sanctis, "Note critiche sulla storia ~t~ilitare delle guerre persiane," p. 97. 178. Herodotus IX.6 1. 179. lbid., 1X.63.
Notes 180. Ibld.. IX.68. 181. Ihid., IX.66. 182. Ihld., IX.69. 183. Ibid., IX.68. 184. Ibld., IX.69. 185. Ihid. 186. Ih~d.,IX.70. 187. I ' l ~ t ~ ~ r cilristldes h, 19, ~n V ~ t a l ~ . 188. Herodotus IX.70. 189. Ihid., IX.67. 190. Ibid., IX.68. I9 l. Ac5chyluc 8.5. 192. Ibld., 25-26. 193. Sec Kuhrt's Jisct1s5ion of the problcm In T h e A~z~terzt Near East, vol. 2 , pp. 6 52-6 56. 194. Hcrodotus VII.61-99. 195. Thr early-s~xtll-century~n\criptrondoe\ not corrc~spondr o Heroclotu\'\ Il\t (1II.YBff). probably because 1)artus l~stspeople and Hcrodotus lists satraplcs (Prruan c~dm~n~str,lt~ve prov~nces);see I.ornara, ed. anct trans., Archarc- T1nzcs t o the F~rdof the I'clopo~tnesra~zW m , p. 36. Cf. Kuhrt, Thtz A I Z L I L Neclr V I ~ Fast, vol. 2, pp. 676-677. 196. h e s ~ h y l i ~86. s 197. Ibid., 104-105. 198. Ihid., 126-1 32. 199. 1icrc)ctotusVII.6 1. 200. Ihld. 201. Ibid., V1l.h 3. 202. Ihid., 1 x 2 2 . 203. Ibid., V11.6 1. 204. Ibld., VII.6 3. 205. Ihid., VIl.61. 206. Ih~d.,IX.99. t not ~neludethe Ion~an<;rccl<s. 207. Il-t~d..VII.61-6 3, 72-76, 78-80. The l ~ sdoes 208. W~mnlond,Strriires 1r1 <;reek Hfstory, p. 222. 209. Cook, The l'erszurz Enz/~rre,p. 123. z p. 355. He estimates a total of 79,000, 210. llignett, Xc~rxes'l ~ t u a s ~ o ~f Greece, 9,000 of whoin were horsemen. IIc cloer not ~ncludethe Thrac1an5 anct the hlacedotiians In the totdl. 2 1 1 . I)elbruck, Wutory of the Art of War, vol. L , pp. 67-7 1. 212. Herodotus V11.8 1; but sec also Hig~lctt,Xcrxes' 1)tuasro~zo f G r e c v , p. 42. 2 1 3. Hcrodot\~sVII.2 10. 214. Ibid., IX. 31-12. 2 1.5. ISurn, ( ; r e ~ c ea d Persia, pp. 323-326. 216. 1Icroctotu, IX.39. 217. Ihid., 1X.49. See also 1X.50, where H e r o d o t ~ expltcltly ~s say5 that the Cireekc were cut o f f from the water. 218. Ibid., IX.39.
Notes 219. Ibid., IX.50. 220. Ibid., 1 x 3 2 . 221. Ibid., IX.18. 222. Ibid., IX.20, 22. 223. Ibid., IX.49. 224. Ibid., IX..51. 225. Ibid., 1x57-60. 226. Ibid., IX.18. 227. Ibid., IX.60-62. 228. Ibid., 1X.22-23. O n the tactical role of the I'ersian cavalry, see also Harnmond, Studies in Greek History, pp. 207-208. 229. Hcrodotus IX.61. 230. Ibid., IX.99. 231. Ibid., IX.62. 232. Ibid., IX.102. 233. Ibid., IX.62. 2.74. That the Persians engaged in some form o f hand-to-hand combat even after surrounding the Greeks at Thermopylae is implied by Herodotus's statement (V11.225)that the Greeks also fought with fists and teeth. 235. Archers and missile units in general are not mentioned at all at Tllermopylae exccpt during the last stage of the battle (ibid.). Herodotus suggests that the first two days of the battlt. were mainly a hand-to-hand affair. 2.36. Ibid., IX.51. 2.77. Ibid., IX..56. 2.38. Cf. W. W. How, "Arms, Tactics arid Strategy in the Pcrsian Wars," Juitr7zal of llelli~~zic Studies 43 (1923): 117-1 32. 239. Hatnmond, "The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon," p. 208. 240. The confrontations at Marathon and especially Ther~nopylaeconvey this impression. 241. The Tcgcans and Spartans wcre sorely tested at PIataca. Rut their casualties (91 Spartans and 17 Tegeans)--even if we assume that all were incurred against the l'ersian left wing and not in thr siege of the I'ersian c a m p 4 0 not seem to be high considering that the Tegeans and Spartans had been subjected first to the action of the cavalry and then to the Pcrsian infantry. 242. The argument on the efficacy of the Persian horsemen and on the fear that they inspired in the Greeks is cleveloped in A. E. Wardman, "'Tactics and Tradition of the Persian Wars," Nistoria 8 (19.59):49-60. Wardman also suggests (p. 55) that thc Greeks had a healthy respect for the power of the Persian bow~nenand that it was for this reason that the Athenians had a number of archers with them at Plataea. 243. For instance, Hanson (The Other Creeks, pp. 271-287) argues that the honlc advantage was crucial in dctcr~niningvictory in conft.ontations bctwcen hoplites. For a short military analysis of the wars, see A. Ferrill, The Origivs of War (I.ondon, IYXS), pp. 107-123. 244. klerodotus VI11.90. 24.5. Strauss and Ober, Tbe Anatomy of Error, p. 23. 246. Balcer, "The Persian Wars Against Greece," pp. 132-136. 247. Strauss and Ober, The Aizatonzy of lirror, p. 26.
228
Notes
248. Ibld.. p. 32. 249. O n tl~ts,see Ralcer, "The I'ers~an Ware Agarnst Crreecc," p. 135. h~ Wars i-lga~nst(kccce," p. 129. 250. Thucvdrdcs 1.69.5. C f. RaIccr, L L T I'crsran 25 1. 011thrs, see C;. Ccau~caet~, "Un topos J e la Ilttt.ratt~rcanttque: L'Ctcrnelle gucrrc enrre I'Europc et I'Acic," I.atomms 50 (1 99 1): 326-34 1. 2C2. Herodotus V11.221. 253. C f. N.R.F. Ftsher, Hyhris: R Siit~t'yriz the Values v / W o i l o ~ rand Shanzc~riz ilrzc-rettt Greece (Warmtnstel; I:nglanci, 1992). 254. S. Goldl~~ll, "Battle Narrattve ancl I'olittcs 111 Xcschvli~s'I'ersae," /oz~nzizlo/ H e l l e i z ~5tziJies ~ 108 ( 1988): 189. 255. Ae\chylus 403. 256. Hcrodotus IX. 53-57. 257. Ib~d.,Vll.223. 258. Ih~d.,IX.62. 259. Ib~d..VII.35. 260. Ibid., VII.238. 26 1. Ibid., IX.41. 262. Ibld., IX.65. 263. f-Ierociotur ~mplles, ~ various t placer that the I'crrlanr were different from the (:reeks. See, for Instance, hrs coruments on the Spartans' curtosrty about the people killed at blarathon (VI. L 12), the remarks about Ma~trttus,the leacler of the cavalrv at I'lataca (1X.221, or tbc discussion of thc prcbentatron of Xcrxcs' army (VII.6 1-99). 264. Cr. I'ugl~ese Odrratellr, '9 c guerre ~riedichee 11 rorgere della rolrd,~r~cti elIerii~d," In Accadernra Nutcinale der I lncer, ed., l a Perstil e rl nzoizdo grecoromafzo, Koma 11-14 aprlle 1965 (1
Notes
229
277. 1.. 11. Ku\\ell, T/7c lust War rn the Middle Agrs (Cambr~dge,1975), pp. 1-4. 278. Aeschylus 402-405. 279. 0 1 1 tli~s,sec, also I'i~gI~e\eC:1rrdtcIl~, "1 C guerre tncd~chcc 11 sorgcrc dclla sctlrdar~ethcllenr~a,"pp. 147-156. 280. F. N. T~ger\tedt,T l ~ e1.cgenci of Sparta rrz Classfc-a1Antrclicrty (Stockholni, 1 96 5), p. 40 5, n. 824. 28 1 . HcrocIc)tit\ V111.24. 282. l>a5kalakls, l'robii~nzeshrstonques, p. 5. 283. Si~non~des, fragments 128, 129, and 130, In I yra G m c ~ ard. , and trans. J. XI. E,drnoiids, vol. 2. I,egc,?zci of Sparto ztz Clas284. I)lodorus Srculus X1.11.5. Sec also I'rgerstedt, l%<> f t y ,2 17, 2 1 X. sical A ~ z t t ~ ~ z tpp. 285. S~mon~des, fragment 117, In I,y).rr Grrreca, ed. and tram J. Xi. t,dmonds, vol. 2. 286. Ibid., fragmctlt 124. 287. Ibicl., fragment 125. 288. Ib~d.,fr,lgnicnt 127. 289. Eornara, A r i h m f ~Trmes to the I-m1 of tile 1'~lo/~ortrteszaitWar, p. 5 1 . I have cltailged the order of Eornara's translatron slightly, I'here l \ debate about whetlicr the frag~llelltrefer\ to 490 or 480 B.C. 290. Arirtrdes, a per\onal enelnv of I herntstocle\, put arrde hlr hatred of the man to w'lrn hlni of the ~mpcndrngattack by the I'crsr~nfleet; scc Herodotu\ V111.79-8 1 . 291. Another reason for llerodotus's hostlllty toward the 1hebans wa\ the tact that they u c r c tradrt~onaleiicnllcs of the Athenldns. 292. Hcrodotu\ V11.220. 293. 111odorusS~culusXI. 1 1.2. 294. Ibid., XI. 11.3. 295. I b ~ d . 296. Herodotu\ V11.2 12. 297. I)rodorus Sicillus X1.1 1.1. 298. Hcrodotu\ VII. 129-23 1 . 299. Ib~d.,V11.228. iO0. 111ociorusS~culusXI. 1 1 .S. 30 1. Ibid., XI. 1 1.2. 302. 11>1d.,XI. l l.3. 71)3. Ttgcr\tedt, T ! J 1~egmd of .Tpmrta tir C ~ U S SArztrqzttty, ~ L ~ / pp. 106, 107. 304. t-lerodotus V11.204. 305. Ibid., VII.228. Sl~nonlde\of C:co5 wa\ the author of thc inscr~pt~on. 306. H. R. Imlnerwdhr, Form and T/3(121& f f z Herodotus ((.leveland, 1966), pp. 262-263, 307. l'lutarch, l ) c Herodott malzg/zrtatr 3Y-42, and Artstrcks 19, In Vttarj. Cf. Nylc~nd,"Herodoto\' S O L I ~ Cfor C \the P1atd1~1 ( : d ~ ~ l p a ~ g ~pp. i , "82-8 3.
Chapter Four 1 . J. Talllardat, '9 a rr~iareathenlenne et la guerrr 5ur la mer auu V' et IV' 516clcs," in J.-I! Vcmant, ecl., 1'robli.mrs (ie /a grterre eiz C ; r t r ~anctetztzr (l'arlr, 1Y68), pp. 184-185.
Notes 2. IblCl., 185. 3. Ihrd.; T h u c y d ~ d eV11.12.3. ~ 4. 11. Jordan, The At/~e~zrnrz Ntrvy 171 the (.lassrcal Perzod: A S & t d y o f the Atherztnn Naual Alinzr~zrstratzorz rrz thc brfth a?zd kourth Cer~tmrr~s B.('. (lierkelcv, 197C), pp. 186-1 87. C. Tarlldrdat, "I a trrGrc~athe~lre~l~le et la guerre sur Ia nler dux V' et IVf s~l.cles," p. 20 1 . 6. 11~1~1. 7. Jordan, Tbr Atlierrrrr~rNavy r ~ the r Classr~alPerrod, pp. 91, 210. 8. V. Crabrrcl\i.~l,hzna~zcrrzgthe Atherzlan Ple~t:Pzthlz~ Taxatrort m?rd Soclal Kelutrorzs (Kaltrmorc, 1994), pp. 106-1 07. 9. T'~rllardat, " 1 , ~rr15re c~thcnicnr-ie et la guerrc \ur Id lner dux V" ct IV' s15cle5," 17. 202. 10. (;ilrlan, War zrz &beAizcre?zt \Vorld, p. 132. 11. Iorcian, The iltherzralt Nazly rtt the (:lassrcal I'errod, pp. 210-264; Rlorrtson dnd Codre$, The Athe7rin~zTrfremc, pp. 108-1 09. 12. Thucyd~tfesIlI.18.3-4. 13. lorclan, Ihe Atl7cjrzrar1N a z ~ y171 tlw Classrcal IJenod,pp. 20.5-206. 14. Ib~ct.,p. 195. Th15wa5 true not onlv of Athens but al\o of other states (p. 200). 1F. Ihrd., pp. 21 0-264. 16. For rnstancc, protige was b;lsect on lailcl owncrshrp eccn 111 a rnarltrme stare such as Kenn~ss~~ncc Vcnlcc; sec &l. Ventura, Nob~ltae popolo izrlla soacJta z,e~zeta del '400 e 'F00 (Rar~.1974). 17. F o r the follow~ngc ~ ~ i a l vo~f i Spartan s soc~ety,sec Xenophon, liesi~rrhlrcn I acedaenzorrosrr~nz:U . C o//olr, "I o staro spart,tno del V ~ c ~ o l o ,111 " I<. 131arich1 Bc~nd~nell~, cd., 1.a Greiru rzell'ctir dz I'erzclc~: Storza, letteratura, fi/osofim (Xl~lan, 1979), pp. 93-1 18; E. I>avid, Spartrr Retweetz L~npzrea d Re~lolzjtron(404-243 I$.( .): Irrterrzul I'rohlems a7zd Tljerr Impact orr C.onten?/)orary (,reek C:orrsiroztsrrfis (New York, ] % l ) ,esprciallv chaps. 1-2; 1. T. Ilooker, 7 %Aizcze~zt ~ Spastnrzs (London, 1 980), pp. 1 16-1 19. 1X. Xenophon, Kcspz~blrcnI a~edncmonort14mVII. C-6. 19. lhld., VI1.1-2. 11.10-11. 20. On th~s,5ce ~bld.,11-111, espec~~~llv 2 l . Ibld., IV.2. 22. Ib~d.,V1.2. 23. Ib~d.,V1.3-4. 24. Ilxd., VI.3. 25. Ihrd., IX.3-6. 26. 1)lllon ancl Garla~lcl,Arrcreizl Greece, p. 52. 27. Heroclotus IX.73. 28. Xcnophon, Resprdblrci2 7.ucedacmnrronr~rnX1.3. 29. Ib~d.,11.7-9. 30. lh~d.,V11. 31. Ib~d.,11.1-2. 32. Ihrd., 1.8. 3 2. Xenopho~l,Helle7trin IV. C. 10. 34. Sec 1)111011 and Crarland's conlnlentb on Sparta's fcst~valand their translatecl pdssdge from Aclldn, Vanu N~stonrr12.50, 111 Aircre~ztGreece, pp. 179-1 80.
3.5. RI. I. l-iillcy, "Sp'~rta," in ].-I? Verilant, ed., I'rcibicfires de Ia gucrre lJiz Gri.ce a??c-teizne(I'aris, 1968), pp. 143-160. 36. Ibid., pp. 146-147. ~ c , the battle of l'lataea, the Sp,lrtari l'au5an1'1s rc~civcd"ten 37. I or i n s t ~ ~ nafter of evcrythii~g-wo~ncn, horses, wmels, G ~ ~everything itl else" (I Ierodot~rsIX.8 3 j. 38. J. IS. 13ury ,~ndKu~sellRlciggs, il lltstory of C ; ~ P B C P to the Lkath of illexavdrzder t l ~ cC;rP67t (London, 1982), p. 98. 39. I'oseidonios K k 1 87 1 4 8 ~in, L>illon and C;arland, ilizcrent C;rceie, p. 171. 40. Aristotle, Polittca 11.9, 16. <,f. <,or.coli, l'ropnc~tirforzdzarra 1d. eserato vdrzello stato sf~artnrzod
232
Notes
61. I'r~tchett, The Greek Stntt a t Wnr, pt. 1, p. 28. 62. O n the Greelc r o ~ ~ d o t t ~ esee r r ,~bld.,pt. 2, pp. 51-1 16. 6.3. Parke, C;rcek Mcrce?znqv 5oldte~5,pp. 23.5-2 36. 64. 1hucyd~cicsIV.29.3. 65. Ibld., IV.26.4. 66. fh~d.,IV.79. l . 67. Ibid., IV. 16.1. 68. Ilxd., IV.23. 69. Ilxd., IV.2.26.F 70. Ib~d.,IV.27-10. 71. Ibld., IV.8.9. 72. Ibld., IV.31.2 7 3. Cf. I'rrtchett, Stzddles r?z A?rcletzt Grecl: 'Tol,ograll?y, pt. 1, pp. 6-29. 74. Thucvd~tfesIV.SO.2. 75. Ilxd., IV.31. 76. Ibld., IV. 32.1. 77. llxd. 78. I hat 15, at least 100 IIICI~ per sltlp. 011board were left onlv the thalam~tcs, probablv the lowest rank among the rowers; sec ~ b ~ dIV.32.2. ., 79. I b ~ d . 80. lhtd., ICr. 32.3 81. Ib~d.,lV.32.3.4. 82. Ibld., IV. 33. L. 81. I l ~ d . ,IV. 3 2.2. 0 1 1 the $).\tern of attack of l ~ g h ttroops, see also IV.2.32: 'T13cse troops [the Ilght ~t~fantry] were thc 1 aceJ,iernot~~an\'n~ostdlfficult opponents, slncc thev coulcl fight cffcct~vcly a cl~stanccwlth 'Irrows, la.~el~ns, stones and slings. The I,,icedc~elnoii~ans would not eve11 get near the~u:the troops would overcome them by runnrng away and the11 agaln bv harrying tlie I acedaemon~an\ when they retreated In t h e ~ rturn." 84. Ibld., IV. 34.2. 85. Ih~d.,IV. 35.1-2. 86. Ibid., IV.35.3. 87. Ibid., IV. 36.3. 88. Ibld., IV.36.2. 89. Ib~d.,IV.77.3. 90. Ibld., IV.38. 9 1. Ilxd., IV.40.1. 92. Ih~d. 93. fh~d.,ICr.40.2. 94. For a n mtroduct~onto tltc debate, we llolladny, "'lliopl~tc~ nlld llcrcalcs," pp. 94- 10 3 . 95. 1171ci., p. 100. 96. Ibid., p. 10 1. 97. I b ~ t . 98. Ih~d.,p. 100. 99. Ib~d.,p. 99. 100. Heroclotus IX.61.
Notes 10 L. Ib~d.,IX.79. 102. Th~~cydides, IV.3X.h. I0 3. Ib~d.,IV. 16ff. 104. At tlmcs, the state m~glitprovrclc armor for tltc mcrccnarses. 011th~s,\et' the contrdstlng v~cvr of P. i\lcKcchr~re,"(;reek ;Clerccnc~rvTroops and Thelr Fquiprner~r,"lizstovza 47 (1994): 297-705, and I). Wh~tchea~l, "Who Equ~ppedAlcrcenary Troops 111 (:la!,s~cal (;rcccc?'' Hrstorrn 40 ( 1 99 I ) : 105-1 1 3. 105. I'arkc, Greek Mercewary Soldrers, pp. 83-90. 106. Cadedge, "Hoplltes and Heroes: Spdrta'i Contrrbution to the Technlclue o f Ancient Warfare," p. 24. 107. I'l~ucydldesIV.2.9. 108. Holladdy, 'cHoj?l~re\ and Heresies," p. l 0 1. 109. F.. N. I.uttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Embzre fronz tlic Frrst (,rrztziry A.!>. t o the TC~trd(Halt~riiorc,1976). ~n sec J.G.1'. Bert, Tl?racralz l'eltasts and Tl7etr Irrtlu110. On the T l ~ r a c i ~peltast, erzcc or1 Greek Warfare (Gronlngen, 1969). 1 11. X3y account I \ based o n Xenophon, Hellenrca IV.5.11-IX. 1 12. Ibld., lV.S. l 1-1 2. 113. Ibld., IV.i.14. 114. Il~id.,IV.S.16. I I S. Ibid. 1 16. Anderson, Mrl~tary7%(,ory arzd I'rac-trrt rrz the Agr of Xerzof~l~orz, p. 125. l l 7. Xcnol?hon, Hclletlrcu IV. 5. 18. 1 18. hiiderson, Mzlztavy Pl~coryaztti 1'rut t r c ~trr the Age of Xeno/>hon, p. 125. 1 19. Ihid., pp. 1 1 1-140. 120. I'ritchett, Tl7c~Crci4 5tate of War, pt. 2, pp. 124-125. 121. Ibrd., p. 125. 122. Han\on, The Other Grceks, p. 322. The author dr\cus\e\ the economy of hoplitc warfare at great length on pp. 291-323. 123. W. W. XfcNc~ll,T17e Prtrszltt of Pozurr: Tccb~zology,Armrd Force, arid Socrtzty Yrizce A.1). 1000 (Ch~cago,1982). 124. I'ritchctt, T l ~ eGreek State at War, pt. 2, pp. 157-186. (.f. J. IZolsr~ial~. Tl~e C;e?zfrml l)cr?zostl)encs mtzd fits Use. of ~WilrtarySurprise (Stuttg'lrt, 1993). 127. Pntchctt, T17r Greek Stntc a t Wor, pt. 2, p. 156. 126. Thucvdtdes IV.94. 127. Xcnophon, Hellctzrc-n IV.2.18. I-or the whole hattle, see Anclcl-son, Nllztary Tbc~or)~ nrzd l'mctrcc 117 the Age of Xcrzophori, pp. 142- 1 50, snaps on pp. 398-399. For the Spartan approach to battle, see ( artledge, "Hopl~tesand Heroes: Sparta's (.ontl.ibutron to the Technicluc of rlncict~tWcxrFarc," pp. 11-2.3. 128. Xenophon, Nellrrzica IV.2.18-23. 129. Itxd., IV.2.18. 1 30. O n the hattle, see ~hrd.,IV.7.I 5-21; also setLthe perceptive an'jlvs~sIn Ariderson, Mzlitary Tlwory nrzd I'mcttte 111 the Age of Xerzophorz, pp. L 50- 154. 1 31. Xenophon, IIcllenrca IV. 3.19. 132. Ib~d.,IV.3.l h. l 3 3 . ll?ld., IV. 3.18. 134. 1. G. OeVoto, I he I'hcban Sacred Band," Arzczeizt Worlci 23 (1992): 5-6. "
234
Notes
115. Sec lbld. for the ~ h ~ ~ r ~ ~ c t of e r the ~ r t Sacred ~ c \ Band; l'liitarch, I'eloprdas 18-1 9, 111 Vltae. 136. I). Ogdcn, "l-iornoscxual~tyand Warfarc In Anclent (h-cece," 111 A. R. 1 lovd, cd., Battle 171 itrzttqlrrty (Ch~ppenhnm,W~ltshrre,tngland, 1996), pp. 107-168. Sec also P. C:artledge, "The P o l ~ t ~ cofs Sp'1rt~111l'edera\ty," PC:PS ( 1 98 1): 2 1; K. J. I)over, C h e k Hornosexixlicrlrty ( I ondon, 1978); I). hi. Halper~n,O ~ z Hztntfrcd e Yeclrs o f Nonzosexltnitty artci ( )tI~erEssays oit (;re(?k 1,ove (New York, 19 90). 117. I'lato, Synzposizani 178c-17%; I'l~itarch, P ~ l o ~ ~ 18, d a sIn V~tiie. 118. C. H~ndlev," k r o s and k l ~ l ~ t a rCornmand y In Xenophon," C.lirssrca1 @tarterly 44 ( 1994): 16 5. and Wdrtnrc 111 hiic~ent 139. Ib~d.,pp. 365-367. Ogdcn ("fiotnoseui~ol~ty Greece," pp. 107-168) agrees that LIIC <;reek\ I>eI~~vcd 11ia11vIicg~lrIvethlilg~dbout Jiomoseuual~tv. 140. On t l ~ cencounter, scc Plutarch, l'eloprdas 17, ~n Vtlae; Antlerson, Military Tl?eory attd I'ractrcc in thc /Igc of Xcrtopho?l, pp. 163-164. I4 1. Plutarcli, Pelopldas 17, 111 Vttar. 142. Ih~d. 143. Ibid., 4. 144. I'lutc~rch,ilgestlaus 27-28, 111 Vztae. 145. Xfy maln anclrnt sources for the battle have been Xenophon, Helleitr~a V1.4. ?-IS, and Plutarch, I'elopl(irrs 20-23, 111 Vttac. My undcrstandii~ghas also been sharpened by rending a nuinber of moderil accounts, tltc most useful of wlirch h'1ve bcen Andcrson, Mtlrraq T!?eory a??'$ Practtce rrl the Aye of Xetzopho~z,pp. 192-220; ISucklcr, T h e Thehart Hegemony, pp. 46-69; (1. 1 . Cawkwcll, "kp~~rnrnondas d n ~ Thebe\," l (;lassz~nlQzoliarterly 22 (1972): 254-278; LT. 1). 11311ro11, "Cpan1anonda5, the Battle of L.cuktra (37 l kc.1 ,lnd thc 'Kevolutlon' 111 C;reel< I3attlc Tact~c\,"Classr~alAittr~~rdlty 7 (1988): 190-207; C. D. Halullton, Agrsrlatts irrrJ the Eazlz4re of Spmrtan Hrgcmolry (Ithaca, 199 1), pp. 204-2 1 1; Ecrr~ll,T h e O n g m o f War, pp. 166-170. 146. Anderson, Mdtrary T / w o r y a??'$ Pructicr rn t i ~ cAge of Xeilophon, p. 198. 147. Han11lt011,Agrstlar.~~ and t l ~ eFirtlidre o / Spartan I-Jtgenzo,zy, p. 207. 148. Xenophon, Hellerzrca V1.4.5. ~ and I'ractzce itt the Age o f Xerzophorl, p. 198. 149. Anderron, M i l l t ~ 7 rThc~ory I 50. Xcnophon, Hcllet?r~-~i V1.4.1 7. 1 C 1. I>~odoru\Ciculu\ XV. 52. V1.4.6.; l'lutarcli, L'rloprcias 20.2, 1x1 lrltae; I'ausanlas 152. Xcnophon, f-fc~ll~rzrca IX.13.6-7; L)lodorus Slculus XV. 5 3. 1. 153. Xenophon, Hellcnrtu VI.4.7. Xenophon helieves that Eparulnondas's accus m o n was false. 154. Ibid. 155. Polydcnu\ 11.3.15. 156. Ibid., V1.4.12. 157. Buckler, T h e Tliabart Hegmzo?zy, p. 6.1. 158. Ibid. 159. Xenophon, Helltvtr~rrV1.4.12. 160. Buckler, T h e TIwhnn Hegernolry, p. 6 3. 161. Xcnophon, Hell~~nzca V1.4. 10.
162. I'l~t'~rch,l'elopfdas 23, In Vrtae. 163. Ibld. 164. Xcnophon, Helle~zrcnV1.4.10-1 l . 165. l b ~ d . V1.4. , l .i. 166. Plut,~rch, Pelopcdas 23, 11.1 Vrtae. However, cotnpare ~t with Hanson, "tparne~nond'~s, the Rattle of I euktra (371 l%.(.) and the 'IKevolut~oi~' In C;rc~eldn phalanx, or In the first 4 to F rows. I-or the cichate, s1.c the surnnlary In I>eVoto, "The Theban Sacred IZand," pp. 12-13. 169. I'l~t'~rch,l'elopfdas 23, In Vrtae. 170. Xcnopho~i,Helletzrca VI.4.13. 171. l b ~ d . 172. l b ~ d . V1.4.15. , 173. Ib~d.,VI.4-5. 174. Ib~d.,V1.4.8. 175. Ihrd., V1.4.7-8, 176. l b ~ d . V1.4.10-11. , l 77. Ibld., VI.4.1 F. 178. Ihd., V1.4.12. 179. Ibid., V1.4.13. 180. D~odorusS~culusXV.87.S-6.
Chaptcr Fivc l . Xcnopho~i,Nellcnrcn VI. 1.12. Xcnophon wds rcportlrlg the words ot Jdsoi-i, tyrant of I'herae 111 Thess'ilp. 2. On the cotitrovcrsy, see the \urnmdry In I . Xlorett~,"Yasclta r struttiira cicllo stato m,~~edone," 111 ihanchl Il,indtnell~,ed., Storla e itt/zIta del C;rc.ct, vol. 5, La crrsz zfelln polls: Stona, lctterati4rm, filosofin (hlllan, 1 979), pp. 75-80. Herodotus (V.22), however, had no doubt5 about the "(rreeltness" of the Macedonlan5. 3 . C)n this, \cc the summnry in M.t i i ~ s t ~ i"AIex~lldcr i, and the hlacedonian lnvas ~ o nof A w : Aspects of the l i ~ s t o r ~ o g r a p hofv W'lr and I,mplrc 111 Antlyu~ty," 111 J. R ~ c hand G. Sh~plev,rdc., W a f n7id So~retyI?? the Greek World ( I ondon, 199 i), pp. 200-201. 4. Xforctt~," N a s ~ ~ ct a\truttura del10 \tat0 innccclonc," p. 79. 5. 0 1 1 the procesc ot cmplre bu~ldrngb p the XIL~cedon~cin~, see X.G.1,. Hanimond, Alexazzder the (Treat: Kzrrg, (,otnmarrJrr a7zd (tatestnm7z (Park l i ~ d g r ,N.J., 1980), e s p c ~ ~ a l lpp. y 7-2 1. 6. See l,. N. 13orra. "The Natural Resources of Earlv I\iacedonla," In W. I.. Acian~tand F,. N. Bor/a, eds., Pl~rlrp11, Alexaritier the Great and the Ma~t~do~rran lierrtage (Wash~ngtoi~, 1>.C:., l982), pp. 1-20. 7. Xlorctt~," N a s ~ ~ ct a\truttura dello \tat0 innccclonc," p. 9 1.
236
Notes
8. IIcrodotus V. 3. 9. Kot all share tli~smew. For ~nstance,J. R. t,llis does not bclrere In the IniportanLe of thc Thebari corit~~ct; scc I'hrllp 11 a d Mucet-lo?ztarzInzpenaltsnz (I,ondori, 1976), pp. 43-44. 10. For most o f tllc follou lng drscuss~on,cf. K. A. Rillowr, Kings anlz1i C:olclizlsts: Asprcts of Mn~erfoit~art Iml)er~altsm( 1 ciden, The Netherland\, 1995), pp. 1 1-20, su~nrn'~r~ring the works of othcr author\, ~niluclrng:G. T. Gr~ffith,"I'htlip as a General 'ind the M,~cedon~an Army," 111 &l. llatzopoulos and I,. I o~~kopoulos, cc{,., 1'1?rltp o/ Macedolt (Athens, 1980), pp. 58-77; Clr~ffith,'%ll.fakcdon~lca:h'otes on the hlacedonlan5 of l'hil~p and Alexander," I'roceedlngs of tile Camhrttlgige I'h~losophrcal Socrcjty 4 (1956-I 957): 3-10; I.crrrl1, l%(. Orzgrns o f War, pp. 175-186; Ellt\, Phrllp 11 alld Macedorzrarr lrt~pcrmlni~z; It. D. Xlilns, "The Arniy ot Alexander the Great," Ftztrctrens Hardt 22 (1975): 87-129; M. XI. Xlarlcle, "The Xlacedon~an Sar~ssa,Spear, and lieldtcd i-jrmor," Anter~ca?zJounial o f Arcl~aeologyX 1 ( 1977): 323-339; Rlarkle, "Use of the Sar~ssabv l'h~lipG i ~Alexander ~tl of &iaccclon," ilntertcun Joilrznl of Archaeology 82 ( 1978): 483-497; Hanimond, Alexuircicr tile Ckcut, pp. 24-34. 11. 1.' Xlnntt, " I lie Sanssa of the Xfa~cdonianInfantry," The Ancterzt Worlci 23 (1992): 39. 12. B~llows,Kings aiid C ~ l o i z ~ s ip.s , 1 3. 13. liamrnond, "C a\ualtics and Rc~nforicmcnt\of C,~tlrcnjoltflcrs rn Greece aricl Xfa~cdon~a," p. 63. 14. Ibrd. 15. lS1llow5,A'zrzgs arttl (,O/O%t.$tS, pp. 14-1 5. 16. liamrnond, "C asualtics and Iicrnforcc~ncnt\of C,~tlrcnjoltflcrs rn Greece aricl hlacedonla," p. 63. 17. Hdnliuond, Alcxa~rderthe Great, p. 67. 18. Ibid., pp. 66-67. Cf. A. IS. lSo\worth, "Alexander the Crreat arid the I>ccl~ne of Atacedon," /otrrrzal of Hell~~zrc Stz4cires 106 (1986):2-3. 19. For niy st'ltrstlcal a n a l y s ~of~ the recruitment, I Ii,~vcused the fig~lresg ~ v c In ~i Ham~uond,Alexander the?C h a t , pp. 26-30, 66-47. 20. AlCxanJer dpparcritly left another 12,000 rnfdntrvmcn 111 Maccdorira: sec hid.. pp. 27, 66-67. 2 l . Ibid., pp. 26, 66-67. 22. Ibid., p. 28. 23. Ibid., p. 66. 24. Ibid., pp. 66-67. 25. Ihid. 26. l h ~ d . 27. h. I)evixic, "Alexander the Crreat," in lohn Hackett, ed., Warfare riz the Arzc~ctltIVorlii (New York, 1 989), p. 107. 28. E-laninlond,Alr~xu7zdertCw <;rcut, p. 27. 29. lh~d.,p. 28. 30. hlarkle, "&iacctlon~anArm5 and TCictlc5Under Alexander the C;rcat," 111 13. I%arr-Sh<~rrar and F,. N. Bor/a, edr., Mn~eliorrrnand G r ~ e c epp. , 88-92. 2 1 . Ibid., pp. 92-94, o ~ the i Xlacedon~ansh~cldand p. 94 011 the lack of armor. See I'rltchett, 1 ' 1 ~(;reel<Statc~at War, pt. 1, pp. 150-15 I, on the hopl~tcsllicld.
32. I Iammond, /lk~xar?derthe Great, p. 32, mentions three or fo~rrspear po~nts; I'olvb~us VIf1.29.5-7, spcak~ngof Hellen~sr~c artnrcs that apparently ~rrecla longer \ar~\s.x,rncntlon\ five \pear polrtts; ~ I a r k l c "h1a~c~donran , Arm, and Tacttcs Uticlcr tileuander thc Grcat," p. 99, agrees with Polybrus. 33. Cf. Arrrali 1.6. 011 Spclrtdli dr~ll,seckAnderson, M~lrtaryTheory arzd Practice t7z the Age of X'e7zo[,~ho?r, pp. 94-1 10. i4. 0 1 1 the ah~litvto a\,umc d~ffcreritformat~ons,sec Alexander's ISalkdtl campalgn 111 Arrt,ln, e\pcc~ally1.6. Cf. I Ianimonci, illexarzder t l ~ cGreat, pp. 12,45-57; Warry, Kkrfare rrz the Cl~~ssrcal K70rld, pp. 72-73. 35. Hammond, Alexarzdcr the Great, pp. 28, 32-3 3; Xlarkle, "hlacedon~anArm5 and Zactlcs Under Alexancicr thc Great," pp. 98-99. 36. I.. J. Worlcv 1s of d~ffcre~it optnion. We argue5 tli,lt the cavalry played an ~mportantrole 117 anclent warfare. See 111sHippers: T b e Caualry of Aric rent Greece. i7. On the food a ~ i dwater rt.quircmelit\ of horses, sec I>. W. l-ngels, Alrxarztier the G r m t attd t ! ~ rl.o,qrstrcs of the Maccdorzmn ilrniy (Berkelcy, 197X), pp. 126-1 30. 38. Hammond, Alexurrder tile Great, p. 25. 39. Arrtan 1.15.5. 40. l h ~ d . 41. I b ~ d . 42. l h ~ d . 4 i. Ib~d.,I. 1 5.8. 44. Curtlus 111.11.13-15 on 1,sus. 45. Arr~an111. 15. 3. 46. Hammond, Alexolzder the Grcirt, pp. 31-32. 47. b.. W. Xlar\detl, Ti7e (irmpnrgrz of C;auganzc~la( I ~vcrpool,1964), pp. 70-71. 48. Ib~d.,pp. 69-70. 49. On C;ranicus, see N.Cr.1,. Hamtiiond, "The Battle of the R~ver( r r d l l l ~ ~ l ~ , " lozirnal of ffellerztc StzrJ~es100 (1980): 73-88; Hammond, Alexarzder the C;~.rat,pp. 68-76; ti. I)cvinc, "l)rmvthologlc,ing the Battle of the Gran~cus,"l'hoeiztx 41) (1986); Dcvrnc, "A Pawn-Sacr~fice~t the Bdttle of the (;T~IIICLI\: The Orlgtns of 4 Favorlte Ctratagclu of Alexander the Great," f i e A ~ Z L W World Z ~ 18 (1988): 1-20; t,. B a d ~ ~ "Thc n, Rattle of (;rantcuj: A New l ook," A ~ ? c z oMacedo?zia ~z~ 2 (1977): 271-293; C;. Foss, "The Battle of C;ran~cus:A New I.ook," A7zczerzt Macedorzta 2 (1977): 495-502; Fcrr~ll,The Origins of War, pp. 194-1 99; A. R. Bosworth, Coizcl14e" tzrzcl t.ml)zrc: The Ketgrt of Alaarrdeu tbe CTrcat((,ambrr~lge, 1988); lSo\worth, A Historrcal (;omnzerztary oil Arrrarz's H ~ s t o r yof Alexarz(icr (Oxford, 1980), pp. 114-125; N. T. N ~ k o l ~ t sTl?e ~ s , Battle of t l ~ eC;ratttcus (Stockholm, 1974). SO. Arr~anI. 14.4. 5 l . I>evlnc, "A l',lwn-Sa~r~fi~e at the Rattle of thc ( ~ r a n ~ c uThe s : Or~gitisof 1' k'ivorrtc Stratagem of iilcuander the Great," 7%eArziterzt World 18: 7. I h ~ article s 1s a varldtron of I>cvlne's "Dcniytliologlr~ngthe Rattle of the <;ran~cu\,"pp. 265-278. 52. N ~ h o l ~ t % Tile ~ \ ,Battle of the Gru7zrctrs, p. 10. 5 i. I>evlne, "A I'awn-Sacr~hcc at thc liattlc of the C;r,lnr~\~\," p. 3. 54. I>evlnc, "l>cn~ytholog~z~np the Battle of the (kanlcus," p. 277. SS. Arr~arlI. 12.9-10. 56. I'lutar~h, Akxartder 1 5, In Vitae. 57. h r r ~ a n1.14.4; cf. Hammond, AIcxarzcirr tl7e Great, p. 73.
58. Arr~an1.1 5.4. 59. J.F.C. Fuller, The Genernls1)rp o f Alh-nrrder he Great (I,ondon, 1958), p. 149. 60. Han~mond,Alcxnnticr the (;rent, p. 73. 61. Arna11 1.16.1. 62. Diodorus SICLIL~\ XVII. 19.6. 6 3. Arr~anI. 15.2-7. 64. lbld., 1.14.6. 65. Dcvine, "11 I'awn-Sa~r~ficc , ~ the t Eattlc of the C;r,~nlcus," pp. 10-1 3. 66. Arr1a111.1 5.3. 67.Ibid.,I.lC.3, 16.1. 68. l'iutarcli, Akexarzder 16.12; I'olyatnus IV. 3.16. 69. Plutarch, Alexarzcier i6. 70. Arr1a111.16.2.6. 7 1. I>ev~nc., "I~cmytholog~/~ng thc Rattle of the C;r,lni~us,"p. 276. 72. Ilxd., pp. 277-278. 73. Wamnlond, Aloxirn~ierthe <;reat,p. 76. 74. Arr~an11.7.1-2. 75. C. l.. 11~1-lson, "l)arlus I11 and the lZattlc of Issus," f-fzstorm 21 (1972): 422-423. 76. A. Dev~ne,"The Strateg~esof Alevancler the Great and D'lrius 111 ~n the Issus C a111paign ( 3 33 8.C .)," T l ~ Aizcie~it e World 12 ( l 98.7): 27-37. 77. C t. I-iammoncl, A/mnnder the C;rcat, pp. 99-101; A. l>evrnc, "Grand ract~cs the Rattle of Issus," T ~ Atzcfetzt C \YIorliI 12 ( 198 F): 45-46. 78. Arrlan 11.8.8. O n the battle, see Hammond, Alexnrrtier the <;rent, pp. 98-1 02; Hrunmond, " A l c ~ ~ ~ n d e(:barge r's at the Rattle o f I\su\ In 333 8.c .," Histona 41 (1992): 394-406; I)evlnc, "CC;c~ncltact^^\ the Eattlc of I\su\," pp. 39-55); Devlne, "The 1,ocatlon of the Battlefield o f Iss~ls,"I tvcrpool Cl~rsst~rrl Mo~zti~ly C (1980): 7-10; lSosworth, A lirstonccll Cowtmerrtary, PP. 198-219; J ..;t Atk~n\on,A (;omnzerztary oil Q. Ct~rtrz~s Kufids' Ht~tO~ldt' Alt'~a?z(ir~ Magr?r: IJooks 3 nrzd 4 (Am\terdaii~,i980), pp. 20 1-24 C, 470-476, 480-48 1 ; Ferrill, T l ~ eOngrns of War, pp. 199-201. 79. Arr~aril1.X.X. 80. Ib~d.,11.8.7. 8 1 . Ibid., 11.9.2. 82. Ibid., 11.9.4. 83. Ibrtl., 11.10.1. Recent scliolarsli~phas ~dclit~fiecl the I'inarus with the I'ayas Kncr. 01111%Cour\e, WC the confl~~ting views of Hammond, illexa~zderthe Grc~at,p. 102, and llevine, "Great ract~csat the Battle of Issu~,"pp. 58-59. 84. lhtd., 11.9.1. 85. l)cvlnc, "C~reatractlcs at the llattlc of Issus," pp. 49-50. 86. Arrlali 11.8.6. 87. f--lamnlond,"Alexander'., Ohilrge at the 1Sattle of I\%u\in 3 3 3 h.< .," p. 403. 88. Arr~anll.X.9-9.1-2. 89. Ihgd., 11.10.3. 90. Ihld., II. 1 1.1. 91. Ibid., 11.10.4-7. 92. Ibld., 11.1 1.1.
93. 1)evlne ("Cireat T,ictics , ~ tthe Battle of Issus," pp. 51-52) bases h ~ rccons striictioii rnarnlv on Curtius (111.11.1), wllom he constders Inore relrable that1 Arrian (11.1 1 .L-3). I)cv~rlc's recorlstructlon o f the actlon 011 the left secrlis reason<~hlc. Ilowever, he also argues that the actloll on the right was a "tame affalr" (p. 52) and that the batrlc was on the left. Accordirlg to Dcvrnc, at Issus, as at <;ran~cw, Alexander used a 5tratagcrn ro force the I'crmn eavdlrv ro attack rhe Crreelc allreif cav'llry rn rnas5. 94. h r r ~ a n11.11.9- 10. 95. Ih~d.,11.1 1.h-7. 96. I)e\riie, ""Creat Tact~csat the lSattle o f Is\us," p. 56. 97. h r r ~ a n11.8.3-4. 98. 011C;augamelu, see A. I'lcvine, "The Battle of C;augamcla: A Tactical and So~~rce-Crrtrcal Study," The Atz~zentWorld l 3 ( 1 986): 87-1 1 5; Harnmc)nd, Alt.xa~&r tbr Great. pp. 1 37-149; Iio\\+ortli, (;oftijt4estand l-nzpzre, pp. 74-85; klarsdcll, The (:ampag?t of Gaugamela; C;. T. Gr~ffith,"Ale~~i~icler's C;el1errilsh~p'it Gauganlcla," [o~rrtzalof Nellerzlc Sttcdtcs 67 ( 1 947): 77-89; Fcrrrll, The Orrgtus of War, pp. 206-211; h. I<. lSurri, "Note\ on Alexander'\ (:an~pargii, 332-3 30," Jottrnal of Helk~?zrcStzrdzes 72 (1952): 81-91; t ullcr, T h e C ~ ~ t ~ r n l sof h lAlt'xan~ler p the Great, pp. 16 1-1 80. 99. Arrran 111.8.6. 100. Marsdcn, The C,anzpa~giz~{Gauganzelrr,d~agr~trn II arlil pp. 24-39. 101. I)evrne, "Thc I5attle of Gaugamcla: A lactrcal arid Source-C;rrt~calStudy," pp. 100- i0 3. 102. Arrian 111.12.5. ( f. L)evlne, "The lSattle of Crauganlela: A Tact~caland Source-(:r~t~cal kudy." p. 99. 103. Marsden, The Canzpazglt of Gaugamela, p. 38. 104. Arrran 111.1 3.4. 105. Ihld., 111.11.5. 106. Ibid., 111.11.3. 107. Ibrd., 111. l l . 5-6. 108. I'levlne, "The Battle of Gaugameld: A Tactical and So~~rce-Cr~t~cal Ct~~dy," p. 96. 109. Arrla11111.12.l. l 10. Dcvrnc, "The Rattle of (;aug'~mcla: A Tclct~c'~l and Source-(:r~tical Study," pp. 96-99, and hr\ fig. 1 at p. 112. 11 1. Arrlan 111.13.1. 112. Ibid., 111.13.2. 11 3. Ibrd., 111.13.2-4. 1 14. Ib~d. 115. Ibid., 111.13.5. l l h. Ib~d.,111.1 3.6. 117. Ibid., 111.14.3. I I 8. Arrr,~n(111.14.5) r~icntron\only Srtnri~ras'sh r ~ g ~ ~bduet , since r;ttcrus was deployed to the left ot S~mmtas(111.11.9-10), lt must have lncluded h15 brigade too. 119. Ibrd., I11.14.F. 120. Ihrd., 111.14.6. 121. Ibid., 111.15.1.
240
Notes
122. IIammond, /lkcxarzder tl7e Great, p. 146. C,f. ilrr~an111.1 5.2. 121. Arrian 111.1 5.3. 124. Ibld., 111.1.5.5. 125. Dcvrnc, '"Tltc Iiattlc of Craugan~ela:A ractrcal and Source-C,r~trcalStudv," pp. 105-1 06. 126. Ilev~ne,'&Il)emytholog~z~ng the ISattle of the C~rnni~u\," p. 26; llev~rle, "Great Tacttcs at tlic Rattle of I5su5," p. 55; Ilevinc, "Tlw Battle of (~aug,irncld,"p. 107. C,f. IIammond, "C;a%~talt~c\ and Kclnforccment5 of C,lt~/cnSolcl~er\111 Greece anci Macedon~a," pp. 57-58; Arriail 1.16.4, 11.10.7, 111.15.6; l)rodorus SICLIILIS XVII. 36.6, XVll.61.31; Curflu\ Ilid the Xfaccdon~an1siva\1011of Al~a,"pp. 197-223. 142. Xenopllosi, Hcllenzia 6. 12. of Alanrzder the Great, p. 285. 143. Justrn, as quoted 111 tullcr, 'The C~c~zcrabhrp 144. Fuller, TI7c C;e?tfrmlshtp of ~?lc>xc7rtder the Cueat, p. 285. 145. O n t h ~ s see , Dev~rie'sconuuent\ In "Great Tact~csat the IL~ttleof Issus," pp. 50-53; I)rv~nc,"The ISattlr of (~augamt~la: A Tact~caland Source-C.rrtrca1 Study," pp. 106-107. 146. Arrian 1.1 3.1, 4. 147. Ibid., 111.10.1-2. 148. Ibld., 111.10.3. 149.l)elbruck, fitstory of t l ~ Art c of War, vol. 1, p. 232. 150. I'olyb~u\ X.13.1-F. l 5 1. Garlari, War 171 the Artirerrt World, p. 146. 152. Arr~an1.15.7. 153. Ibld., 11.10.3.
Notes 154. Ib~d.,111.14.3. 1 55. Piutarch, Alexatztler 6 3. I 56. Ibid.; Arr~dilVI. 10.4. 157. Arr~an11.14. l 58. P. (keen, Alcxatzdcr of Macedon, 3 76-32? &C. (Harti~ondsworth,Englar~d 1974), pp. 313-136. 1 59. See, Tor rn\tanctk,Rosworth's remarks rn C,o11qi4est aizd ).nzptre, p. I 8 1 , and In "Alexzlnclcr the C~reatand the 1)cclrnc of Rl~ecdonia,"cspeclally pp. 1-2, 12. I6O. Halnmoncf, Altwarzder the Great, p. 253. 161. Ib~d.,pp. 14-1 5. 162. Ib~d.,pp. 67-68, 281-282; hurran 1.12.1. l 63. Green, Alexarzder of Maccdorz, pp. 1 52-1 81. 164. 1.' C~oukowsky,Fssat stir les ortguzes d ~ mythe r d'Alexatztlre (3 36-270 av. 1.C'.), vol. 1 (Nancy, Erance l97X), p. 6 9 . 165. I I,~n~rnond, illexa~zdcrthp Great, pp. 278-290; E. Bad~an,The l)elficatzotz ofAlexarz~+eler the C;rent: Protocol of t l ~ efirst C;ollorlzt% The (:enter of Hermencutr~ a 5tudies l rn flellenlctre and Alodcrn Culture (Berhelej, 1976). pp. 1-1 7. Eor an argunlent that hlcvandcr had no dcsirc to be deified, sec G. 1,. (,awkwell. " I he I k ~ f i catlon of Alexander the (;reat: h Note," 111 I. \Vorth~ngton,ed., Velztz~r~s iizti) Greek History (Oxford, 1994), pp. 293- 306. 166. C~rccn,Alexaizder of Macedoll, pp. 372-373. 167. 15aldso11, " 1'11e 'l>lvlnlty' of Alcxanclcl;" pp. 371-382. 168. Ibld., pp. 371-372. 169. Badran, 'The I>c~ficatronof Alexander the Clreat," pp. 1-5. 170. Raldson, ''The 'l)tv~nity' of i-~1cxaric~cr," p. 364. 171. Ib~d.,pp. 383-388. 172. I'lutarch, Alcxatztlcr 2- 3 . 17 3. Clrecn, Alexarzcfer of Maierlorz, p. 269. 174. (2uotcd In ~bici.,p. 274. 175. Radldn, ''The 1)clficacron of Alexd~idcrthe (;rear," pp. 10-1 1. 176. Ibid., p. l l . 177. Hamrnond, Alexarztier the C;rent, p. 287. 178. C;oitkowsky, kssar szav les orzgrnc.s du mytl~ed'illexarzdre, vol. I, pp. 69-70. l 79. Radldn, "The I'lclficaeron of Alexd~idcrtile (;reat," p. 3. 180. Crouki)w5ky, t.ssar sur les ongrnes titt mythe d'AlexcrlrJre, vol. l , p. 70. 181. Ibid. 182. Ibld., p. 4. 183. Ibid. 184. licportcd I I I 1'. h'. ISor/zl, "Srgnific,~topolrtrcc), rcorioni~~o c socrdlc dell'rtnprcsn dr Alessancll-o," in K. 15ianchr Band~ncllr,ecl., Storla e crvzlta dcr C;rpil, vol. 5 (hlllcin, IC)79),13. 167.
Chapter Six 1. P. I eveque, "1 a guerre i1'6pocjue hellen~stlclue," In J.-P. Vernant, rd., I'robliomes J e la gzterre er2 Gr2t e arrLlcnrze (I'arr5, 1968), pp. 26 5-266; Kosworch, "Alexander the Great and the 1)ccllnc of hlacedonla," pp. 1-12. 2. l'olybrus V.82.6.
242
Notes
3 . Arrrarl VII.23.3-4. <,f. Bosworth, "AAx'~ndcr the C;re'~t and the llcdule of M~cedonra,"pp. 1-4. 4. C f . Parke, Greek Merteriagv Soldiers; Grrffirh, The Mercctzartes of HrlI[~rzrsticWorld. 5. I,ev6qile, "La guerre 2 I'bpoque hclienrst~que,"pp. 265-266. 6. IblJ., 17. 270. 7, lh~d.,p. 274. 8. Ibrcl., pp. 276-279. 9. Ihrd., pp. 266-274. 10. Ibid., pp. 271-274. 11. t. Gabba, Kepzthlzian IpuDlrta?zKonze, p. 47. 23. Ib~d.,pp. 12-17. 24. Ihld., pp. 17-20. 25. Ibrd., pp. 50-5 3. 26. Ibid., p. 51. 27. A. H. Ilcri~stern,"The Stratcg:, of J W~rrlor-Stdte:Rome and the Wars Agartist C,artlldgc, 264-201 13.c .," In W. klurrav, M. Know, and A. H. Bernste~n, cd5., The Makrlzg ofStra1~gy:Rulers, Stales, (<.ambrrdgc, 1994j, p. h 3. 28. 1IC1rrts,War alzd Irnperialisni 111 Re[)zthbcml?Rome, p. F L. 29. There 1s I I dgrcemcnt ~ on the spcclfics ot Ronlari arms arid armor ar thrr stagc of lir\tory. hly rntcrprcLcatronoffer\ a general new. 30. My descriptron of thc legion 1s based 011 the assumptron that Polvhrus's clcplctron of thc legon In the rnrcldle of the seconcl century u.c. mrrrored concirtrons '~lrcady exlsttng on the eve of the Second I'u111cWar. On th15, setTI'olvbrus V1.19-27. For a descriptrot1 of an carlrcr stage rn the dcvriop~~~erit of the legloll, \cc I i v y V111.8. i-14. 31. I'olybrus VI.22. 32. Ibld., V1.21.9. 2 2. Ibrd., V1.2 2. F. 34. P. C o t ~ ~ ~ o lC;rcete ly, and Konze at War (Fnglc\krtod C Itffc. N.)., 198 1 ), pp. 53, 131. 35. I'olyb~usV1.23.2. 26. I'olyb~us V1.2 3 . 37. I'olyblus V1.23.16. 38. 1,lvv VIII.8.3.
39. I'olyhiu\ VI.24. 40. W. K. I'r~tcl~ett,7 % ~(;rcok . State at War, pt. 4, pp. 46-5 1 . 41. 011the deploylnent of Ilnes, see I-. E. Adcocl\, Tbe Romn?r Art of Kkr Utztler the Kepzdblt~(C ambridge, 1 98 1 ; l st cd. I 940). pp. 8- l i. 42. Delhruck, History of the Art of War, vol. 1, p. 275. 43. 1,lry VIII.8.10. 44. l'oly b ~ u V1.42. \ 45. Ihld., VT.27-42. 46. Ibid., VI.24.1-2. 47. Ibid., V1.24.h. 48. A. du I'rcq, Rnttle Slud~es:Arrc Icrlt a?rd Moderr? Rnttle, trans. J. N . Crre~lvancl IZ. C.. C'otton (Harr~sburg,1',1., 19581, p. i9. 49. Ibld., pp. 40-41. 50. Ibid., p. 51. . of the (:rttze?z rrz Kcpublrcaiz Rome, p. 1 Oh. 5 l . N~colct,7 % ~World 52. Polyhius VI. 16- 37. 5 3. 1,lry VI11.6-8. 54. l'olyb~u\ V1.37. SS. lhld. 56. Ibld., except for the 111fractlon 111 the case of Improper scouting, which 15 take11from VII1.6-8. 57. I'olybiu\ VI.17.4. 58. Ibid., VI. i8. $9. I ~ v yVI1I.h-7. 40. Ibid., VIII.7.14. 6 l . Ibid., V111.7.17. 62. Ihld., V111.8.1. 63. Polvbi~tsVI. i7. 5ce also N~coler,The \Yforlil of tile (;ttrzerz rn Rcp~blrcarl Rome, p. 109. Komc, p. 106. 44. Nlcolet, The World of tl7e (:ltrrelz r i z l<epr~blzcn?r 65. l'olyb~u\ V1.39. 66. Ihld., V1. 39.1-1 1. 47. du I'IL~,Bottle Studzes, p. 51. 68. I>elbruck, History o f the Art of War, vol. I , p. 273. 69. d u I'icq, Rnttle Studrt.~,p. 54. ~, 1.1.8. 70. X c n o p h a ~Mmzorabilm 71. du I'lcil, Battle Jtzdtes, pp. 50-5.5. 72. 111) X. l .4., 111 Stephcn Oaklry, "The liorrian Cttnclue\t of Italy," 111 J.R I L ~ and C;, Slirplcy, cc{\., \Vnr alzti 5o~tety~ r t1)c i Konza~zWorltl ( I cmdon, 19931, p. 16. 73. Ih~d.,pp. 18-22. 74. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 01s Z U M Z Hc~gr?z?zder 75. Ibid., p. 12, b a d 011 Iicloch, Kornrscl~e(;esci~zck~tc /)ztizrscherz Krzegc, pp. 420-621. 76. Ibid., p. 19. Organ~/at~on and Social Change ln the Later lioman 77. J. I'atterson, "hfilit~~ry IZcpnhl~c,"1r1 1. R ~ c hancl C;. Sliiplcy, c&., War arzti Soczely rrz the Konzan World (L.ondon, 1993). p. 100.
Notes
244
78. Ibid., pp. 100-10 1: At the 1.at1n colony ot Ilononia (189 D.C .j, the eyu~tesrccerved 70 lugera, and the other ranks received '70. At Thur~rIn 191 1i.c ., the grants wtare40 lugcrd for equltcs drld 20 lugera for pcd~te\. 79. k. Gabba, "'Klflessronc sulla soclet& romana tra 11 111 e 11 Ii \ecolo a.C'.," Atl)enaez.inl, n.s. 64 ( I 986): 472-473. 80. l'atterson, '%1111taryOrj;an~/atiot~ and Soe1~1l Change 111 the I ater Roman Icepublic," pp. 97-99. 81. Ibid., p. 101. 82. T. h a n k , K o n ~ t ~I ~mzp ~ r t n l ~ s(Neu n ~ Yorlc, 1914), pp. 33-34. Cf. Oalcley, "Ttle Rctrnarl Cotlc1ut.s~of Italy," p. 32. 83. V. Ilar~,(;It rtalrct izrl11,strritture mrlrtnrr ronznizc (hlrlan, 1974), pp. 146-185. 84. On thls, scc the d1sctts51011In O a k l e ~ ,"The Korn'lrt ( : o ~ ~ q ~ i cofs t Italy," pp. 14-1 X. 85. liernstc~n,"The Strategy oi a W'arr~or-Statc: IZomc and thc War5 Ag'i~nst (;arth,lge, 264-20 1 i3.C p. 57. 86. E. W. Walba~~k, Phzltp V of Macezfotz (<:'~mbridge, i940), pp. 289-290. 87. 1'oIyb1~1\ XV111.28.4. 88. Eor the figures on the two arm~cs,see 1.lvy XXXIII.4.6 and the dlscuss~onIn I: W! WalbC~nk, A Nistoncnl (:om~vte?rtilryorz Poly1?tus, ~ o l I. (Oxforci, 19671, pp. 584-58 F. On the battle's 1ocat~oi1,see W. K. I'rrt~liett, St~dlesI!? A n ~ z ~ iGrcel: lt 7bpogrnphy (llcrkelc!~, 1965-1 993), pt. L, pp. l .;i-144. On the hattlc, we N.Ci.1 . Hamm o d , " l he Campaigli and the l3attle of C,ynoscephalac 111 197 &C.," pp. 60-82. 89. Sec Polyb~usXVIII.20.7 011the mr\t and 22.9 on the terrarn. 90. Ilxd., XVIII.21.1-3. 9 1 . Ibid., XV111.2 1.4-8. 92. Ihld., XVIII.22.1-4. 9 3. Ihld., XV111.22.7. 94. Ib~d.,XVI11.22.8-10. 95. Ibld., XV111.22.9-10. 96. Ibld., XVI11.22.1. 97. Ihld., XVIIl.24.1 and XVIIl.25-26. 98. lh~d.,XV111.24.6. 99. Ihld., XVIII.24. 100. Ibrd., XVIII.2F.I-3. 101. Ibid., XV111.24.4-F. 102. Ihid., XV111.24.6. 103. Ib~d..XVIII.24.7. romarri, bo1. 4, pt. 1, I a to?/104. O n t h ~ s ,see also G. l>e Sanctrs, Storta ~hzlruzetlell'~i?zpeuo(Elorence, 19681, pp. 80-8 1 . 105. I'olvblus XVllI.26.1-3. 106. P O ~ F ~ I( L ~ bI \~ ddoes . ) not sj'ec~fy tl~drthe rcl~evirigforce came from rhe princlpes and the trrarll, hut ~t rc, l~kelythat rhev did, rf oile coil\~dersrile Iionidns' clcplovment and the onteornc of the fight on thetr r~ght;cf. Walbank, R Hlstol,i~al Com~vterrtaq~ orz l'olyh~us,vol. 2, p. 584. 107. Polyblu\ XVl11.26.4-F. 108. Ibld., XV111.26.7. 109. Ibtd., XV111.26.6-8.
.."
110. Ib~d.,XVI11.26.9-12. 111. L~vyXXXII1.10.8. 1 12. Ib~d.,XV111.25.2. 1 13. Ibid., XV111.30.11. A~zclerzt Greek Topogmpi~y,pt. 2, pp. 158, 162; 114. Pr~tchctt,Srcddles l'lutdnh, Acmllrr4s l'aulzis 1 3.5, In Vrtae; and N.G.I. P.Idrrimond, 'The 1Sattle of PyJna," lo~wtzalo f Welleizrc Ct~dlrs104 ( 1984): 39-40, on the hlaccdotir~n\. 11 5. P l ~ t t ~ i rilenzll11ts ~h, l'az~lzas 16.5. On the tcrraln, ~ f tlie . contrasting views of I'rrtcliett, Ytzidres I P Z A~zclentCrrt>~kTbpograpl~y,pt. 2, pp. 145-163, and Hamrrioiid, " T ~ ISattle I ~ of I'ydna," pp. 31-47. A1y recori\tructlon of the battle follows L ivy and I'lutarch as reflected generally In 1Iammond. l 16. PI~tt~irc1-1, Aenlrllus Pat4ltrs 19.1. 117. I'olvb~us (XVI11.30. 5-1 0) says there were 10 phalang~tesagatnst 1 IXoinan. I I 8. I'lt~tar~li, Aewzzlru~Parrlus 19.2. 119. Ib~d.,20.1. 120. I.lvy XXXIV.46.10-1 3. Cf. A. D. I.ec, "hfordlc and the I i o t ~ i Experroiicc ~t~ of lSattle," In A. 13. Ilovd, ed., Rattle lit A~ttrqlttty (<.h~ppenham,1996), pp. 208-209. 1 2 1. P l ~ t ' i r ~ h/1~~?2111zts , I'a~tlz~s20.2. 122. Ib~d.,20.3; Hsrn~uond,"The Battle of I'ydna," p. 46. 12 3. I'olybt~sXV111.3 1.2. 124. Ibid., XVllI.3 1.6-7. 125. Plut~irc1-1, Aenlrlrtls l'at4l~ls 16. 5. 126. The other rrason\, nienttoned by I'olylxu~(XVII.25.5), were the lack of order\ and thc order of march. 127. l b ~ d . 128. The coordiriated attaclc of the lioluan elephant\ and cavslrv sugge\ts that tlie liorrian horse\ h ~ txen d traitled to attack rn coopc-ratron wtth elephants. Normnllv, the prebencc of elephants \vould ter-rrfv horses. 129. P\ut'~rch,Acnzllrtls I'aulzls 20.4-5. 130. tla~nmond,"The Battle of I'ydna," p. 46. l il . Ibrd., pp. 3 9 , 4 1 , 4 6 4 7 . 132. I'olvh~us XVIII.24.9. l 33. Ib~d.,XVII1.24.10. 134. Ih~d.,XV111.25.4. 13.5. Ibid., XVIII. 32.4. 136. Ibld., XVIII.32.10. 1 37. Ib~d.,XVIII. 32.9-1 1. 138. Ib~d.,XV111.26. 139. f'lutarclt, Aenzzlrus IJatrlzts20. 140. I'olybrus XVIII.26.6-7. 14 1. 1. farnrnond, "The 1S~ttleof l'vdn~," p. 47. 142. Ib~d.,XV111.25.4. 143. Walbank, A H~stor~cal (;onrnze~zrur?fou Polybrus, vol. 2, p. 584. Cf. I'olyhiur XVI11.26.2. 144. I'olylxu~XVIII. 3 1.8. 145. Ibid., XVI11.3I.10.
246
Notes
146. Il-tld.. XVII1.ll-32. 147. Walbank, I'hrlrp V. pp. 289-290. 148. Polyhlus XVII1.28.10-I 1 . 149. Walbank, I'hilip V, p. 289. 1.50. Aloretti, " N a i c ~ t a e strLlttura dcllo stato m,~ccdone," In R. R ~ ~ ~ l i c h i ISar~d~nello, ed., Storm e c-lvrltrl clet Grecz, vol. 5 (billan, 1979), p. 9 1. 151. C;. I)c Sancti\, Ctorrn del ronzarzt, vol. 3, pt. 2, l 'etn delle gzterre p~uzici~e (I'lorcncc, 1968), pp. 9-10. 152. I'olyblu\ 1X.24.6. 1 5 3. Ibid., 111.1 1. 154. 011the causes of and resp~nslb~lsty for the outbi-eak of thc war, sec Kngan's d~scussroii111 0 1 1 the O Y I ~ M of Sthe W~7ratzci the Preser~~ntro~z of Peace, pp. 232-280. 155. Ib~d.,p. 255. 1 56. A. I I. Bcrrlrtcrll thlnks othcrwlsc. A~corcilngto Ecrllstcin, 1Iannrbal drd not intend to be on the defeniive ~n Sp'1rn or Africa. From the bcgii~n~ng, he pl'111ncd to attack Ie Sanctrs, Storrrz dcz rornalrr, vol. 3 , pt. 2, p. 66 3. 168. My hattlr acconnt I \ based otl I'czlybii~s111.65, 2nd 1 ivy XX1.45-47. 169. I a n a\sumlnp that the C:arthaglnran\ cleploycd the full contingent of 6,000 horsemen, uhicli the> h'id after croislng the Alps (PoI~blusIII.56), < ~ n thdr d the Roman contingent represented about half of all the horsemen available at the battle 111.72).At T I C I I ~the U ~army , at Scipro's ~t~sposal was aboiit of Irebla Klver (I'olvb~i~s half what rt wo~tlcibc ' ~ tTrebta. 170. I'olyblu\ X.3; 1,lvy XX1.46. 171. Polyb~us111.68.9-1 l; I I V Y XX1.47. 172. I'olyblus 111.68. 173. For Trcbla, I h n e followed PoIybi~is111.69-76. For i ~ n l p l cof the secoildarv hteracure, see L>e Sanctl5, Stonn del rornm7zr, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 30-32, 90-96; 1. b. I a/enby, Wrr~z?riOaE'sWar: A ~VfzlztalyNzstory o/ t l ~ eSecorzd l'z~rzzc Wur (\V'~rm~n~ter, I:ngland, 1978), pp. 5 5-58. 174. Polyb1u\,III.h9-70. 175. Ibid., 111.71.6-9. 176. Ibid.
Notes
247
177. Ibrcl., 111.71.10-1 l. 178. Ibld., 111.72.3. On the Roman &et, see 1. Go/rln~G~acosa,A p f i 7 s t ~of ,412cleizt Konzc~,trms. A. Herlc Sdnct15,Stor~adei ronznrzi, vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 664. 180. I'olyhius 111.72.4. 181. Ibld., 111.71.11, 72.5-6. 182. Ibrd., 111.72.12-1 1. 183. Ibld., 111.72.8-9. i84. Ibld., 111.72.9. 185. Ibld., 111.73.1-3. 186. Ihrd., 111.73.4-7. 187. Ibld., 111.71.7. i88. Ib~d.,111.74.1. 189. Ih~d.,111.74.2. 190. Ibld., 111.74.3-6. 191. Ibld., 111.74.7-8. 192. Ibld., 111.74.9-1 1. 193. Ibrd., 111.69.12. 194. lb~d.,111.78.7. i9.5. Ibld., 111.84.7. Ct. WalbL~nl<, A H ~ s t o r Conznlet~t~zry ~~l on POIJ)OIIAS, vol. 1, pp. 219-220. 196. I'olybrus 111. l l Off. 197. Ibld., 111.1 13.5. 198. Ibld., 111.114.5. 199. Ibrd., 111.11 2.1-5. XIy recoli\truction of the battle 15 based ~narnlyon I'olybtus. tis an tntroductton to tltc vast secondary htcraturc, \er I)c Sanctzs, Storm clet mnmizt, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 60-63, 126-159; J. F. I.ucnby, Harzrz~bal'sWar, pp. 75-85. 200. Ibid., 111.1 1.3.6-9. 201. Ibid., 111.1 13.6-9; l 14. 202. Ibrcl., 111.115.2-4. 203. Ibld., 111. l 16.5. 204. Ihrd., 111.136.6-7. 20.5. Ibid., 111.1 15. 206. Ibid., 111.116.7-1 l. 207. De Sanct~r,Srortn der romnru, vol. 3, pt. 2, p. 62. 208, I'olpb~us 111.1 17; I)e Sanctt5, Slorra del vornnni, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 62-6;, 126-1 30. 209. Polyb~us111.75.8. 210. Ih~d.,XI.1-3. 2 1 1. C;. C;ianncll~, llonzn ~zell' eta dellc gzccrre pzc~zrcl~e(Holognh l 9 381, pp. 214,25 1. 212. I'olybrus 111.8 5.4. 2 1 3. I'or most of the argunlrnts clred in the text o n 1Iannrhal'5 \trategP, \ee J. !I Ilnsson, "Les mutntrons de la dcuv~en~c gucrrc purl~que,"In ]+I?Ur~sson,cd., l'rob-
Notes
248
lentes de ka gzterrr a Roine (I'ar15, 1969), pp. 31-60. Cf. Bernstern, "The Strategv of a Warr~or-State:Rome and the Wars Xgalnct Carthage, 264-201 l5.c .," pp. 56-84. 214. C.. N~colct,"I c\ giicrrcs pun~clucs," rn Nlcolct et al., Konze et kir coizqzit;te ciir nzo~zcienzcclrterrarzkcrz 264-27 at~atztd.-C., vol. 2 (I'arrs, 1978), pp. 6 12-61 3. 2 1 5. I'olvb~u\ 111.1 17. 21 h. N~colet,The World of thr~Orttzcn rlt Re[)2thlzca?rKorne, p. 1 1 1. 21 7. lbld. Tlic abrlrtv t o absorb large ed\ualtlcs wa\ one of the f,lctor\ ~n Iratzd Polrttctatz (Ithac't, I C)70),pp. 1 1-38. 227. See I'olybru\ X.h.16 or1 New Carthagc and X. 38.40 o n ISaecula. 228. For l l ~ p , ~I ,have followcd I ~ v yXXVIlI. l i - 1 5 ,is ~nterprcteclby jcullnrd, Scrpro ilfizcca?rtrs:Soldier nrzd I'olttfcran, pp. 86-9 5. 229. Sc~~llard, SLIIJZOA~YILCIIIZIS: Solcirer a~rdPolznc~ari,pp. 88-89. 230. 1,r~yXXVII1.14.1-h. 231. Ibid., XXVII1.14.7. 232. Ibid., XXVIII. 14.7.8, i 5.2. 23 3. Ibld., XXV111.14.8-9. 234. Ib~d.,XXVIII. 15.3-4. 235. Ibid.. XXVIII.14.13. 236. Jbld., XXVIII. 14-20. 2 27. Scullard, {ir/)roAfrr~aizrrs:Soldrer i r ~ dPolrtr~tart,pp. 92-91. 238. Ibid., p. 95. 239. Il-t~d..pp. 94-95. 240. I-or Ccip~o's Afr~cancampaign, see De Sanctrs, Slorra del romartr, vol. 3, pt. L, pp. 502-544, 562-572. 241. Livy XX1X.34. 242. Cf. Scullard, Srtplo Afrrc-atzr4s: Soldter alld Polrtraarr, pp. 123- 127. 243. Ibrd., pp. 128-1 32; al\o la/erlby, Harzrz~/>al's War, pp. 209-21 1 . 244. Scullard, Sirpio Africaizz~s:Solrizer arzd l'olrtrr-rarz, pp. 130-1 3 1. 245. I'olyb~us XV.5.1. 246. Ib~d.,XV.5.4-7. 247. Ibrd., XV.5.8. 248. Ihld., XV.5.8-10.
.."
Notes
249
249. Ib~cl.,XV. 5.12-1 1. 250. 1 aln accepttilg I>e Sanctrs's calculattons In Storia del romanl, vol. 3, pt. 2, pp. 579-582. 25 1. I'olybius., XV.6.3. 252. Ibld., XV.6.4-8.14. 25 3. I)e Canct15, {tovra L ~ rowta7zz, I vol. 3 , pt. 2; 1). 871. 011the battle, we ibrd., pp. 536-549, 572-598; I alenby, Harzrzrbuli War, pp. 21 9-225; .'L hianfredl, "Aspctt~della tracl~z~one st~riogr~~fica sulla batt'1g11~1d~ Naraggara," 111 Xlarta Sorcll, ed., Storiografia e propaganda (Mrlan, 1975). pp. 82-94. 2 54. I'olybruc. XV. 10. l . 255. Ibld., XV.10.2-7. Sapio's speech, like I~ai~nibal's speech, sltould not bc understood '1s just rhetorrcal dev~ccemploved by Polyhius. Ccrtalnly, ~t would helve been irnpo\stblc for a general to altdrets 40,000 troops, but tt 15 conceivable that he could spcak to a gathcrrng of the maln and SCLOIIC~JT)/ Icaders of the arm?). 256. Ib~d.,XV.11.8. 257. Ibrd., XV. 1 1.8-9. 258. Ibid., XV.l 1.9-12. 259. Ibld., XV.ll.l, 16.1. 260. Ib~cl.,XV.11.2, 16.3. 261. Ibid. 262. Ihrd., XV. l 1.2. 263. Ibld., XV.16.4. 264. Ibld., XV. 16. 265. Ihrd., XV. 12. 266. Ibrd., 111.114.1-3. 267. Ib~d.,XV.14. 268. Ib~d.,XV.9.9-10, 12.1-7. 269. I'olyl>ru\ (XV.12.7) nlrlitton\ that oiily the (:arthag~nranthird Irne re~narncd bch~nd,hut the subscqutnt caul-se ot the bnttlc suggests thnt the Roman triaril s t ~ y c dbchlnd as ucll. 270. Ibid., XV. 13.1-2. 27 1. Ihrd., XV. 13.3. 272. Ib~d. 273. Ibrd., XV. l 3.7-8. 274. Ib~d.,XV. 17.9-10. 275. Ib~d.,XV.14.6. 276. Ib~d.,XV.14.1-2. 277. Ibid., XV.14.3-5. 278. Ihrd., XV. 14.6-8. 270. Ib~d.,XV.14.9. 280. T,1c7.inowska, "1.2 gc11es1rcpubbl~cdnadel culto ~nipcr~alc," pp. 285-295. 28 1. Seguln, "La rel~gtondr Ccrpron I'Afrlcarn," pp. 7-21. 282. Beside5 'wgiirn's artrcle, see also Gabba, ornrlto Sctpronc Afrtcano e la IcggcntL," pp. 3-17. 283. Scg~tin,"1.a relrg~onde Sclpton I'Afrrcaln," p. 7. 284. 111) XX11.53.l l . 28.5. Ib~d.,XXVIII.iX.8.
250
Notes
286. Ibid.. XXVIII.39.15. 287. Cf. I'olyb~us's verslon (X.9-l h ) with I IVY'S account (XXV1.42-48). 288. 1 I V Y XXVII. 19.4. 289. Inc~ynowska,"I a genes1 repubbllcnna del culto ~mpcr~alc," p. 287. 290. Scg~lln,"I a rellgroi~de Sclplon I'Afr~c~~ln," PP. 1 1 - 12. 291. 011th15, \lac ~ h ~ dpp. . , 17-18; Gabba, "1'. (.ornello Llptone Afrr~anoc Id legge~ld~~," p. I I; Jac/ynowska, "I J gcriclr r c p u h b l ~ c a ndel ~ ~ t ~ l ~t ~o i ~ p e r ~ ~pp. rle,'' 289-290.
Selected Bibliography
Primary Sources Acllcaa Zacticus. I)< obsatizone tolerarzda con~mciatarrus. Aeschylus. Persae. .S~~?P~~LCS. Aristophdnc\. A t hnrrzc.izses. . kqultes. . T,ysfstrr?ta. . l'ax. hulrtotlc. Athrrzatorz IJolrtc~ta. . Polrtlia. Arridli. A?~ahaszsAlexaridfr. . T~zcttta. tiscleprudotiis. l)c tacttcts. (:urtiur Ruf~15, Q u t l i t ~ ~1)e r . Gestrs Alrx~zndnMngtz~. L>~oJoru\Srculu\. liahlaothc~ahzstorz~a. Frot~t~nus. Stratcgenznla. iielle?zzca Clxyrby~rchla. HeroJot~is.Hzstonu. E-l~pjx)crate\.0 7 2 IIETS,Waters, l'lu~es. Homer. ilznd. . O~J3'~se)l. Isocrates. Pnnegyrzt . I IVV. A trrbe ~o?zdlrabhrl. Ncpo5, (,orncl~us. Dc z)zrts tlhrstnbrts. O~iiisdndecStmteglk6s. I',xu\anid\. Gruectcre d ~ s c n p t t o . Plato. Kespu6l~ca. I'lutarch. L3e llcrodotz malig~t~tute. . Mor~zlm. . Cynlposiul.?1. . vrtac,. Poly'~enu\. Stvategenzata. l'olj Ixu\. Hzstorza. Thucydidc\. l)? Dcllo I'elopoizrzesmc(,. Vcgctiu~,kpitonza de re1 mzlitarrs. Xenophon. A ~ z n l ~ s r s .
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Warcin~~in, A. 1:. 1959. " T c i ~ t i1'~11d% the T r ' ~ d ~ t ~ofo nthe I'ersian War,." lltstorm 8: 49-60. Warr!~, 1. 1980. Wclrfizre in the (,lasszcirl \Vorld. Nrw York. Wclwci, I<. W. 1974. lhzfreze mz arztrkerz Krie'q~lletzst.Vol. 1. W~cabaden. Wf(,st, W. (1. 1969. "The Trophle5 ot the I'crs~art Wa-5." C:lassical Philology 64: 7-19. W'cstcrman, W. 1 . 1928. "On Inland Trdn\pc)rtatio~iarid Cot~itnui~icdt~o~i I I I Ant~qulty." Polttlsr~IScrelzce Quarterly 43: 764-387. Whatlcy, N. 1964. "011 the I'otsrbrlrty of liecoristr~~ct~llg Xlarathori and Other Anclerit ISdrtles." /ortrriul of Hellerzrr Fturlies 84: 1 19-1 39. Wheelcl; t. 1,. 1979. " Ihc 1,cgion as Phalanx." Chrrorz 9: 303-318. Wh~tcliedd,11. 1986. T l ~ eDenzes of Attrca F08/7-CO.2 Y 0 R.C.: A Polrtical a?rd Sor ral 5tudy. I'rrnceton. . 1991. " W t ~ oF;qu~ppedMercenary Troops rn (.ldss~~al ( ~ r c e ~ c ?Ntstortn " 40: 105-1 13. Wh~teliedd,I. 1987. "Thc Pcr~plour."C;recce nnci Rome 14: 178-185. W~nkler,J . 1989. The C,ortslrarrtts of llestre: T h e Anihro/rology of Sex arzti C~erirler in Afzclerzt Cir~ece.Nccv York. Woodhouse, W. 1. 1978. k'r~tgilgrs of Sparta alzd lirs Carnpaiglz in Arkadtiz in 4 18 !$.c,.: A C:hnptrr In the History of thp Art o f War Anzotig the Greeks. New Yorlc. Worlcy, I . J. 1994. Wzppers: T h e C avalry o f Afzcinzt C;reece. Rouldcr.
About the Book and Author In t h ~ scomprehensive ovci-krew of ancrcilt warfare, h n t o n ~ oSantosuossct explores hou rhe racr~cdland str'ltegrc conccpts ot warfare cli~l~iged berwccri the beginn~iig of the fifth century I:.<. and the mrddle of the second century L<.<,.and w h v the West-(lrcece, X l a ~ e d o n ~ n dnd , l i o r n e - t r u p h e over the F~~t-uricIc~~stoc,d gectgraphlwlly 1' s I'err1~1or rcleolog~~ally as Clarthagc. I ic also showr how the role of u ~ ~ r r i orclated r ro thc role of cltrlcn and how the \ymbol$ and prop'~ga~lda stenimlng from war en~plias~lcd arid promoted rlie values of Western s o c ~ e t ~ c \ . h n t o n ~ oSantosuosro is protcssor of h15torv dt the U1111 erslty of Wester11 O~ltario. He 1s a w ~ n n c rof the 1997 Pvlonc'ldo Prue for his art~cle"Kadesh Revrs~ted:ReconStruLtlOll Of the ISdttll' Rctwcct~tllc kgvptld114 d l l ~ fthe Hlttlt~i,'' ~ ! l l ~ dpped~ed f l 111 The \ouv?znl of hfzlnt~ryf-frstory.
Index tibydos, l 0 2 Achlllct, 144, 145 Actruln, battle of, 75 Aclrmantus, 79 nei1ea5, 6 Aeschrlus, F, l l , 12, i6,20, 54, 5 F, 57, 75, 77, 78,222(n79), 223(n88) Agcr rolvralzus, 1 59 Agr~an~dns, 113, 114, 122, 126, 127, 1\32, l 33, 137, 170 Agrrculture, effects up011 \varfave, 12, 90-9 1 Akte l'cn~n\uld, 26, 40,41, 51 Alcxandcr, k ~ n gof Macedoli~a,3 , 13, 16, 17, 10, 68, 89, 92, 101. 102, 109, 110-147, 149, 1 7 0 , 153, 155, 160, 166, 180, 187, 196, 198,203,205,206,207 causes of succc5t ot, 1 36-1 4 3, 239(n93) eornhrned arms and, 136-1 39 crtt1clsm of, 135, 143-144 Ddrlus 111comparcd to, 124-1 2.5, 129 delfic~tronof, 144-147 hopllte armv comparecl to army of, 118-139 leacferth~p,140-1 43 Iogrstlcs, I $9- 140 map ot conquests of, l 14 nivrh 'llid, 140-14 1 See also C;augamela; (rran~cut;Istus; hfaceclo~i~s, army Amompharctus, 7 5 Alnon, 146 Amph~pol~t, battle of, 16 tinderson, I. K., 100, 101, 213(n26) Apcllc\, 146 Apple-bearers, 131
Arctes, Icaclcr of the pro~lronzoz,1.13 Arlstldcs, Athen~anorator, 20, 21 6(n103) i-lrtsttdcs, Athcman statcsrliall a r ~ d general ( L . 520-467 B.c.),79, 229(11290) Ar15todemut, 18, 79, 86, 216(n94) i-lrtstogoras, despot of hl~lctns,20 Arlstctphaner, 9, 2 5 Aristotle, 12, $7, 77, 87 Armv. See Hopl~tcs;I eglon; Xlacedvn~a,nrmv; l'ersla; I'halanu; Komc Arrlan, 14, 110, 117, 120, 122, 121, 126, 127, 129, 133, 134, 149, 239(nn 93, 118) Artdbai-iut, 111ic1cof X C ~ X CFSI , Artabazo5, l'crs~angeneral, 58, 59, 65, 72,74,225(11150) Artaphrcnes, 26, 29 Arteniis, 146 i-lrtcrn~slur~i (480 B.<.), battlc of, 47, 50,51, 53,54, 221(n54) Greek b,~ttlcordcr,22 i (1154) Athen5 soclety atltl war. See Hopllto status of tdllors, 82-84 war agaznst I)artus I, 24-38 war against Spartd. Sre Cor~nrli; I'cloponnes~an War; Spha~tena wdr dgd~i-itrXcrxcs, 39-8 1 Atossa, mother of Xerxes, 7 1 i-lugustu\ ((ia~usJul~rtsC aesar Oeta\~anur),6, 7.5, 200, 207 lSadran, t;., 146 Baecuia (208 ri.c.), battle of, 184, 196, 199 Balcer, 1. kl., 41
13atrle, 12-17 advance to, 14 deployment ~ n .12-1 i length of, 17,57 reserve5 111, 17, 188- 189 sacrifices before, 13-14, 63-64 tcrraln surtablr for, l L Sec. mlso I Ioplrtc; 1,egron; I'halanx; \VG~r;~ n d z t ~ i d r battles ~al lSernstetn, A. H., 246(nl56) Hia, 152, 20Y Bos\.iortli, A. K., 13F, 14.3 Ikm, lc~ll~ng range, 34 liowlllctl, 82 rn I\/l~ccclon~an army, 113, 11 5, 122, 133 5ecctnd l'ersid~iVfar, 29, 24-35, 42-50,58-65,66-72, Y3-96 on triremer, 83 I%retc~=\ sarcophagus, 32 Iiiirn, A. R., 57, 21 8(1i291,21 Y(r144) Burning of the (;amps, 188, 199 mdp, 189 C ae\ar, (;il~usJuI~us,6, 200, 207 (:all~ar, Athenran commancicr, 100 C ~ ~ l l ~ t n a c h1ih,~ s30, , 31, 32, 3 3 , 36 Cam~llu\,200 Camp, army, 1S F C:dmpr Xlagn~,h;lrtlc of. Sec Ckwt l'la117$,battle of Call~i~ (216 ~ c R.c.), battlc of, 3, 59, 171, 172, 176-180, 183, 184, 187, 194, 195, 197, 199 battleorders, 176 Carthaglnian plan, 177-1 78 ~as~ialtles, 180 maps, 177, 178, 179 lic)rn'~nplan, 177 Carcfa~es,126, 127 C:drthage Elrst I'unrc War, 159, 168 Secoiid l'unic War, L 68-1 98 Sec. mlso C:annae; Cireat I'lcl~ns; I-lannlbal; Il~pa;"Irds~rnene; Trebla; Zarna Cartledgc, I?, Y8, 231(n46)
C:aqm-r, M.O.U., 21 -i(nl5) Carualtles, 16-1 7, 182 rn Alrxandcr's ~o11qt1cst5. 1.35 at Cannnc, 180 at (lor~nth,l 0 I d t (.yilctscephdlae, 163 at C;augamcla, 135 ~t (;rL~nr~us, 123-124 at Il~pd,187 d t I\\U\, 1 35 at hlarathon, 37 at Plcltdea, 6 5-66 at I'yd~la, 166 Roman casualtrc\ corlipared to World W,lr I, 182-1 8 3 at Salamis, F8 at Cphdeter~a,96 at Z hcrmopylac, 49-50 ~t Towcr of Agathoclc\, 188 at rt a\lrtleile, 176 at Trebt;;, 175-1 76 (,ate, X l a r ~ uPorcius, ~ 159 C:avalr), 9, 19-20, 32- 3 3, 60-6 1, 6F, 66,67-68,69-72, 11 3, 115-120, l 30-1 i l , 136-1 39. 149, 152, 167-168, 172,237(n36), 245(11128) battle f(trniatri)ns of eavalrv 111 Alexander's army, 1 19-120 ratro of ~ a v a l r yto infantry? 11.5, 137, 167-1 68, 170, 203 Sec also C'ornp'xnlon\, Macc.dc)ninri La\ alry C:clts, 164, 171, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 194, 196. .%c. also (rat~ls C enturles. S ~ IPegroti C:cnturtor15, 156, 204 Cllaerotiea (338 H . ( .), battle of, 17, 110. 119, 168 (,harlots, 9, 19, 131, 133 C:hrgt V ~ s e2, 14(n27) Cicc~h,216(n118) C ~tr~~-soldrer dut~csof, 18-1 9 rnipact 01. nierccnarIe5 011, 9 1-92 rn hlacedoiila, 138-1 39 navy, 81-83
Index In Rome, 1 50-1 5 1, 1 58-1 60,204 zoc~alloyalty, 18 In Sparta, 84-88 Class conflict 111 5pdrta11\oc~cty,84-88, 2 1 l(n4h) deb;lte on l~ghtlnfmtry versus hopl~tcs,96-1 02 golden meanc, 19 Alaccdon~a,112, 118-1 39 mercenarrcs, 89 oppoi~tronbetween clasw5, l 9, 8 1 Rome, 1 50-1 52,158-160 sa1lor5, 84 C,iau\ew~ti.,Karl hlarla \on, 140 Clc,tndcr, mercendry lnfantr! leader at Craugamela, 112 Clcrtus, 119 Calco~nbrotus,Spartan commander at Leuctra, 106-1 07, 109 Clcopdtr~,75 C:lemcl?s, 149, 209 Coate\, J. E, 222(1179) Cohorts, 164-1 6 5 Colonre\, I
269
(;y~legirus, \on o f f,uphorlon, 16 Cvno5cephalae ( 197 is.( .), battle of, 3, 149, 154, 160-1 63, 164, 166-168, 20.3, 20.5 bcittlcorder\, l61 wsualt~es,16 3 map, I h l stages ot battle, 162-16 1 Cvrus the Great, 25, 7 1 Ilarlus I, fatltcr of Xcrues, 21, 2-5-26, 38, 39,40,41, 67, 73, 74 Darr~~c, 111, K ~ n gof I'ersla, 88, 123, 124-1 35, 141, 142, 143, 20.5, 206 comp'1rIsoIi wlrh Alexd~~dcr, 124-125, 129 Icadcrsh~p,128-1 29 l>askalak~s,h.. 49 Dat~s,26, 29 1)ecrmatron. Sec I cgton, pun~shrncrit and rewards DC Ciaullc, C:h'~rles, 146 De~ficatlonof mil~taryleader., Alcxandcr thc (rre'lt, 6, 143-147, 207 S c ~ p ~Atr~canur, o 6, 198-200, 207 I>elhruck, H., 3 , 37,48-49.68, 122, 154, 158 l~elr~irn (424 s.c .), b'1tt1c ol, 1 5 Deruarat~~s, 9, 80 I>eme, 209 Ilemo,thcncs, Athe~nari~orllma~ldcr at Sph'~cter~a, 94, 98, l 02 I>emo\thenr\, Atheri~,inorator and \tate\rnan, 1 1 1 1)c Sanct~s,G., 6 1 Detlenne, hfarcel, 22 I>e\lnc, A. XI., 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 1 35, 238(n83), 239jn93) Dtdo, 6 1)loriorus S1culu5, 54, 75, 77, 78, 82, 123,22.3(1-187),224(n133) Droy\eil, J. C;., 143 I>UI~IU C ~\J,I U \ , Kor~idrlC O I I ~ U I durrng Elrst l'un~c War, 83
l l u l'icq, A., 1.56, 1.57, IS8 Dyer, Gwynne, 22
l,chlctlus, 32 Econom!, cau\ia for war, 20, 29-70, 150-1 5 1, 1.58-159 warr~ors'contr~hut~on to, 8 klephants, 129, 131,16l,163,164, 165, 174, 175, 181, 185, 186, 191, 195, 24S(n128) Enclrclelnent, 1 F- l 6 t,no~not~a, 12, 209 kpamrnondns, 2,6, 12, 1 3, 89, 92, 102, 105-109, 112, 116, 132, 202-203 Ephlalte\, 46, 80 f+,f~hors, 85 kphorus, 54 I:p~ciat~~s, Spartan commaniter at Spliacter~a,9'3, 94, 95 I-qrutes, 204, L44(n78) kretr~a,coniluebt of, 25-26 Euhcmeru\, 6, 200, 207 k,ur~p~des, 19 kurvb~adi-5,Spartan commander at Salam~s,55 turytus, 18, 79,22h(n94) k,van\, J.A.S., 7 7, Fab~us;Clau~rnil\\Icrruco\i~\, Qulntt~r, 184,206 best~val\,48-44 Karnc~an,48 Olylnplc\, 22, 48 E~nlev,A$. I., 87 t l a m ~ n ~ n u 1-~tus, s, Iioman leader at C:ynoscephalae, 162, 163, 166 t l a m ~ n ~ uCra~uc, s, lioman consul at Tr,~sr~nt~nc, l76 ti~ller,J.t.C,., 141 Ful~cralhonor\, 22 Gabbd, k., 1-59 C;arl'lll, Y., 22 C;aitganiela (331 15.c .), battle of, 16, 1 19,129-1 25, 1 76-1 27, 141-143, 153,1 SS, 195
b'~ttlcorclers, 129-1 30 casualt~es,l 35 hlaecclonrsn plan, 132 map, 130 Pcrmn pld17. 1 32 Crat~l\,99, 170. SLJCa150 Ct'lt\ (;cncrals. \et> 1 cader\ C;c~rozis~a,87 G~acosa,1. C;ornnr, 247(11178) Gllid~lrs,I 52, I h 5 C~ranrcus(334 B.c.), battle of, 117, 1 18, 1 19, 120-124, 128, i3.5, 1 36-1 37, 142-143, 1 55 battleordcr\, 120 casualt~e~, 123-124 XIL~cedor~ran plm, 122-1 2 % map, 121 I'cr\lan plan, 121- 122 C;rcat I'la~nr (203 B.( .).battle of hattleorders, 188 Illdps, 190, I 9 I Crreecc mdps, 27,4 3 war and \oc~alwucture, 4, 8-53 war and rymbol~s~n, 5-6 See rdso Hopl~tcs;War\ Crrcenhalgii, I'.A.L .,2 1 3(nlO) cJntftt1l, C;. r., 89, 90 Hall, Ecilth, h, 76 liaiiirnond, N.(;.I,., 26, 29, 34, 57, 68, 117, 124, 134,217(1115), 2 18(111121, 28), 21 9(n44), 220(n59), 222(n89), 227(n 22), L38(rl8.3) I-Iann~bal,son of II'~rn~lcar Barw, 3, 75,168-198,205 army for the journey r o Italv, 170 lrnltates Alcxandcr, 150- 184 mdp of Hannlbal's routt, 169 \trategical plan, 168, 170, 180-182, L4h(n 156) t'1ctica1 approach to battle, 170-1 72, 1 76
I1armGlntl,l., 7, 2121nl) Harrrs, W. V., 150 W'~sdrubal,so11of C~~sgo, 185, 195 Ilasclrubal, \on of tlamllcar llarca and brother of Hanl-irbal, 18 1 Hastatr, 153, 154, 155, 157, 161, 188, 189, 195. Sec) also 1 cg1011 lfe/ots,45, 59, 81, 84, 85, 88, 93, 96, 97,98,209, 231 (1146) E-leracle\, 6, 10, 21, 22, 11, 37, 80, 106, 107, 144, 145, 198,207 Hernics, 146 Herodot~is,14, 16, 18,40, 67,69, 70, 7.5, 76, 77, 78, 80, l l l , l 12, 2 k6(1194),221 (nn 50, 54), 222(11r-i 68, 70, 79), 223(1195), 226(nn 195, 217), 229(n291)
on I'lataea, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66 on Salarn15,50, 5 1 , 54, i F, 57 on I ltcrmopylae, 4 5-50 H~gnctt,C., 54, 59, 226 (n2 10) Hrf~/~els(lxodvguard o f 'ipartari k~ngs), 45, l 16,209 I Ilppla,, 26-29 Hlppocrate~,5, 39, 76, 77 I Iolladay, A. I., 96. 97, 99 Ilomcr, 9 , 80, 144 Hoti1ocrot1~1~111 eltte Llnlts and, 104 Sacred ISancI and, 1 04- 105 Sparta, 8 5-86 wdrfdrc dnd, 104-1 06 Homotor, 87, 209. See mlso Spartlatcs I-Iopl~tcr,7-2 3, 20 1-203 117 bdttle, 12-17 L ~ S U ~ ~16C 17 I~S, cornparrson wlth I'crslan army, 29-30, 40 cuIra$$, 10 deb<~tc ovtLrhopl~tev e r ~ Ilght s ~ n f a n t r9~3-102 , depth of phalanx, 12-1 1, 1F general, role of, 17-1 8 hand to hand fight, 14-15
height and wclght of hoplltc, 9 helmet, 10 length oi battle, 17 motlvatron In, 17-20 rccruttmcnt, 8 re\olutlori, 1 1-1 2 5ellX' Of duty, 1 8- 1 v shleld, 9-10 shovtt~gmatch (otbrsmos), 14-1 5 $pear, 10- 1 1 sword, 10- 1 1 on trlremes, 56, 8 3 wealth and warfare, 8-9 wwpo~tsand armor, 9-1 2 See al5o C,orinth; C;augamela; C;ran~c~rs; Issu5; I.c~tctr'~; blaratlion; l'lataea; S,llanl~s; Sphactcna; Fegyra; 1 hcrrnopylac t-io/)lo~t, 209 Hydarnes, Persran com~uanderof the Imriiortals at Thcrmopvlae, 46 Ifdr~,V., 160, 2 12(n l ) Ilrpa (206 15.c .), battle of, 184-1 87, 195 battlcordor\, 185-1 X6 wsu,dt1e5, 187 cornp'~rcdto Trebia, 185-1 87 Roman plan, 187 Immortals (I'crsran clltc troops), 4-5-48, 58,68, 71, 1 16 Imperator, 6, 199, 207, 209 Infanrry, heavy, 8-9, I 9-20, 60-6 l . See also Ilopl~teb;L C ~ ~ OI'hC~lal~x; II; ~izdrurduulbattles Infantry, Irght. See I ~ g h ~nfantry; t l'clta5tr; Velrtc~s Ionla, 25, 39 Iphrcrates, peltast commander near C'orlnth, 100, 102 1,sus (3.13 ri.c.), battle ot, 1 19, 124-129, i 34, 135, 1 36-1 37, 141-143,153, 155 battlcorclcrs, 126 c'ls~l'lItle5, l 3 5 Xfacedon~~~n plCi1-i.126- 127 map, 125 I'crs~an plan, 124-126
,Jason of I'herac, 141 Jupiter. See Zeus
Lcon~d'zs,Klng ot Sparta, 42-50, 68, 75,76, 78,79-80 1 cuctra (37 1 R.( .), battle of. 2, 6, 13, Kadesh, battle of, 4 0 15,21, 82, 87, 89, 102, 104, Kleros, 84, 85, 8 7 105-109, 110, 112, 117, 118, Krentz, I'etcr, 16 132,202,206 battlcordcr\, 106, l 0 7 I,acl~us,Roman comm,lnder at Burn~ng c a \ u a l t ~ c ~108 , of the Camp\, 1 88 causes of Spartan defeat, 109 I a/eriby, J. F., 21 8(n17), 219jn45) ohlrque atlgle, 107-1 09 1,eadcrs Sacred Band at, 107-108 Alexander, 140-1 4 3 I ~ g h ~t n f d n r r ~1 3-14, , 171-1 77, 181, class, 18 2 12(1183). See also C~augamela; cornparrsc)li h c t n ~ c i ~Alexander ~i and C;r,lnrcu\; 1~x1s;I'cltasts; Velries: S L I ~ I O142-143 , Zama dcb'~teon leader's poirtlon or1 the I,rvv, 1 58, 1 59, 198 l>atclcline, 142-14 3 I oprstris, 1 79-140, 18 1 kpaminondas. 10.5-109 Longus, I ther~us Sempron~us,Roman I I a n ~ ~ r b a180-183 l, consul ,lt Trebla, 172, 173, 176, Hannrbal as Aleuarider's herr, 181,195 170-1 72, 180, 183 1 ugrnbrll, I i . l)., l 5 lack of tolerance fol; 18 Luttwak, E. N., 99 Leort~d~li, 47-48 hlllt~'~de\, 3 1-32, 37-38 Xlacedonla ndvy, 84 relatron\hip to C~rcecc.,L 1 1 power of, 17-1 8 socictv and wcu-,4, 1 1 1, 112, relrgloli ancl, 143-1 47, 198-200 2 36(n20) role of, 17 ~vnzbolr~ni and war, 6 Scipio Afr~canus,184-1 Y 8 warfare, 2-3 t ~ p a r ~ l t cfrom d iocrcrp, 19 Spe aiso Alexallcitr; Rlacecloll~a, Thcn~~stocles, 50, 53-55 army; I'crseur; I'halarix; I'liri~p 11; I egton, 152-1 56 I'hll~p V ~ha111 of c ~ n ~ ~ l l ~15l 5, ~ l1d57 , Alaccdonta, army coniparcd to (;reel< dnd h l a c c d o r ~ r ~ n Alcxander'r 'Irmy, 1 1 3-1 2 0 1,arilc formdcrori\, 15 3-1 5 5, drvcr\rficacrori, 11 3-1 15 160-168 clrt~sm,11 5-1 1 6 morale, 156-1 58 I o g ~ \ t ~ c1\ ,39-140 pumiilunent and rewards, mohrlrty, l l 3-1 1 5, 117-1 19 156-1.57 I'hrlrp If'% drnly, 111-1 12 \pace neccs5ary to legto~larvin battle, Sce also hlcuandcr; hlacedonra; l 64 Perscus; Ph'xlanu; Ph~llp11; Phil~pV tvpr5 of 5oldier5, 152-1 5 3 Xlagnesra ( 1 90 H.( .), battle of, 149 \vcapoils, 1.52 blagc), soli of Harn~lcarISarca and Sei~mlso Cknnae; C,yno$cephalae; brother of I-Iann~bal,172, 174, Fyzrltes; Great I'la~lzs; Il~pa;Pvdna; 175 I'rrnt r p a ; Iiorne; Trebta; rrtant; Alanrple. .%c. 1egion Velltcs; Zailla Xlnnl~ii\,TI~LIS, 157
Rlant~nea(362 B.c.), battle of, 2, 88. 89, 102, 105, 109, 110, 112, 116, 202 Xtnrathon,2, 5, 13, 14, 16, 19,21, 24-38,40, 5 1, 53, 59, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 90, 110, 117, 205, 207 advdnce to contact, 34-35 battle, 30-38 battlcorders, 30, 14, 37 casualt~es,37 ~avalrvat, 32-33 Greelc pl'ln, 34-3.5, 37-38 locat~onof, 26-27 rn,ips, 28 (Iocat~on),3.5 (the in1t1~1 ~ l a \ h )36 , (the la\t s t ~ g c ) Pcrsran plan, 3.3, 37 blardonrus, I'ers~an general, 12,40, 58-63,72,74 Rlar1~15, Galus, Roman general, 6, 198, 207 Mdrk A~ithori~, 77 Xtnrklc, X I . XI., 1 17 Alarsdcn, E. W., 129, 13 1 blas~strus,60, 67, h9 Mdssrn~ss'l,187-1 88, 189, 190, 19 1 , 195 klaurlce, Sir hederrck, 219(n44) bIcl.eod, W., 24, 2 19(n46) XtcNelll, W. H., 101 Aledrnng Greeks, 42, 59, 6.3, 67, 66, 68, 79,209 Meg15ttd5,47, 79 Rlcmnon, Greek mercenary leader, 121-123, 128 blcn~drs,mercenary cavalry leacler w ~ t h Alexander, 132, 133 Rlcrccnar~cs,88-93, 16 1, 23 3(11104) Aleuancler's arrny and, 11 5, 116, 132, l 39 C arthagln~anarmy and, 170, 193, 196 causes of cmcrgence ot mcrcenarles rn (rreek world, 89-91 I>arrus Ill's arrny and, 120, 12 1, 123-124, 126,127-128.13 1, 136, 141 economic pressure and the rist, of, 90-9 1
~ d e ~of, ~ l89, \ 91-92 1111p'1ctOII c1tl/en-5oldrer,91-92 nurnhcr of, 89 orrgn of, 89 Pe~oponne\ranWanlcl, 104 Olymp~as,mother of Alcxandcr, 145, 146 C )ptzowes, I 56 Othrsnzos. Sce lrJopl~te\,sliov~ngm a t ~ h
l'aulus, Aelnlllus l?, Korn'ln consul at Canriae, 176 I'nusai~ta\, I S, 24, 3 1 , 32, 5.5 Pausanlas, Spartan coinmandcr at Plataca, 47, 61, 62, 64, 71, 72, 76, 211(1137) I'nyas R~vrr.See I'~naru\ Rlvcr l'cl~l$tr'~t~ts, 27 I'elop~das, le'1cIer of the rl~ebatlSacred ISand, 104-105, 107 Pcloponncslan War, 19, 24, 82, 83, 87, 88, 90, 93, 98, 99, 202, 206 I'elrasts, 8 3, 99-102, 11 F, 209 I'cr~clcs (c.49.5-429 R.L.), 83, 90 I'enoeii, 45,4'9, 81, 84, 8.5, 88, 97, 98, 209 I'er\eu\, IGng of ilIacedi)n~,iat l'ydnd, 3, Lhl, 164, 167 I'er\ta 492 l < . ( . e x p ~ c l ~ t ~tooGreece, n 2, 2\5-26 490 B.C. cxpedltlon to Greece, 2, 25-38, 90, 202, 202 480-479 I<.( . expcd~tionto Crrcece, 39-8 1 causo of I'ers~ans' cletcat 111 their Invasloll of Greece, 72-74 causia\of I'er\~arls' Jefcat against Alexnndcr. See Gaugamcla; I\SLIS; C;rcl~~tcus courage of I'ersrans, 76 1)arius 1'5 arrliy In 490 R.<., 29-30 l)ariu\ 1's plan 111 490 B.c., 26 cxpans~on~\r pol~cy,25-26 111frrior1tyof l'cr\ians, 74-77 method of attack, 68-72 nav'll stratcgv 111 480 K.c., 51 Per\ran \old~erscomp'~red to hopl~tcs,7 1-72 Xcrxcsi army, 66-72 Petty, ;CIichcleI,22-23 I'halarlu, iClacedo111a compared t o (rreek ph,llan.c, 116-117 comp'~rtxdto Roman leg~on,160-1 h8 cooperation wtth wvalry, 1 76-1 77 depth of, 112-1 13
C;reck ph,llanx. See I Ioplltcr moh~l~tv, 1 1 1-1 1 5, 117-1 19 phalangites, 1 12-1 1 3. l 16-1 17 recru~tmcnt,1 13-1 15 See ~ l s C:~noscephalae; o C;aug'~mela; ( ; ~ J I I I C U ' ~ ; Issus; I'ydria I)hilrp 11, K ~ n gof R4accdon1~1, 2, 17, 19, 92, 109, 110, 111, 116, 139, 149, 168 shapes a new blaceditn~arl~Iririy, 111-113 Phil~pV, King of 12lL~ccdonra, 3, 160-163, 166, 167 I)!1ocians at Thcri~~opylae, 46 I'ln'xrur Iilvcr, 124, 126. 238(1183) P~ndar,77 I'la~ent~a, 175 I'lataea (47'9 B.C. j, battle of, 13, 18,21, 48, 58-69,70.71,72,74,75,76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 8 1, 86, 88, 89, 97, 102, L 10 hattlcorders, 57 casualties, 6 F-66,227(n24 1 ) Greek plan, 6 1, 62 map, 64 I'cr\lan c a ~ a l r yagalnrt the Mcgar~a~is '11, 60-6 I I'lato, 104 I'lutarch, 56, 65, 81, 104, 105, 107, 121, 123, 221(n50) I'olemarch, 31-12, 3 1-34, 21 0. TPC also C allirnachu\ I'olyncnus, 107, 123 Polvb~us,12, 17, 1 56, 1 58, 160, 164, 166, 167, 178, 180, 1 8 3 , 191, 193, 1'94, 195, 196, 237(1132), 242(1130),244(11106),248(n225), 249(nn 2 F F, 269) I'opulatlo11 In proportion to S I L ~of armlcs, 8, 2 12(n.3) Pvr~r~rpes, 153, 154, 155, 158, 167, 188, IX9,209, 244(n 106) I'rlt~hett,W. K., 13, 15, 17, 102, 21 8(n28), 21 9(n45) I'rodromot, 11 3 , 11 5. 123, 127, 177, 209
I'rop
~ a c r c dIiantl, 104- 105, 107, 1 16, 265(n168) Sacr~ficc\to the gods, 1 3- 14,2 1 . Spc also I<el~gro~i; Svrnbolr\tn ' q t r i ~ t t ~ r n168, , I99 Sad, I:dward, 5 Salamrs (480 1r.c .), battle of, 21, 25, 50-59,72,74,75,76,77,78, 82, 83,93,205,206
httleorder\, 5.3, 54. 5 5 casualties, 58 (,reek plan, 50-53 Greek stratngcm, 54 lllap, 52 I'ers~anplan, 5 3 Sanin~te\,15 1, 160, 20.5 Santosuor\o, A.. 4 3(n103) Sarrssa, 3, 112-1 l 1, 116,209,210, 2 37(n 32). See alsci l'llalanx Scr].?iohcmiiranus, IS2 Scrlxo Afrrcanus Xfajor, Publrus C:ornelrus, 3, 6, 142, l 4 1, 172, 184-200,206, 207 wrries war to Afr~ca,187-1 98 derficatron of, 198-200 fight\ 111 Spain, 184-1 87 lmrtates Ilnnnibal, 184-1 88 SLIF)IO Nasicci, I? C,ornelius, coi151nof Setpro Africanus, 200 Scullarc!, H. H., 186 Scutum, 152, 1.53, 165. See also Lcglon Secl ~ d r f ~ i8r1-84. ~ , See nbo Sdlam~r Second Punic War, 3, 150, 1 5 1, 1 52, 160, 168-1 98, 290, 203, 20.5, 207 C:artliagin~anweaknesses, 180- 184 caurcr of Romc'r \~irvrval,1 80- 1 84 Hannrhal's \trateg~calplan, 168, 170, 180-1 82 map, 169 Ron~e'sstrategrcal plan, 170, l 8 4 stand of ltalran C'clrs, 180-1 8 1 stand of Jtalic people, 181 Sec also Carthdgc; Han~irb~il Seguin, I
Sk~rm~shers, in battle, 13-14 Slakes, 13, 24, 1 50 Smers, C;, a n ~ I)orsl~lfang-Srilc~s, l A., 56,223(n87) Soldlcc See C:it~ren-soldrcr;Uoplltcs; I eplon; blacedoli~a;I'ers~a; I'hdlanu; Izornc Sophocles, 27 Spdn~drds,170, 17 l , 176, 177, 178, 179,185, 186,187 5parta artjrc of eit17~11-sold1ers, 86 society, 84-88 tensions IT>, 87-88 traliltng of c~tizen-sold~er, 84-87 u ar ag'unjt Athens, 82-1 02 w,lr agarnst Ilarlus aiid, 24-25, 30, 32 war against I'hcbcs, 102- 109 war ,lgaln\t Xerxcs c ~ ~ ~ 19-8 c i ,1 Spdrtlates, 49, 80, 8 1. See also I.euctra; Sparta Sphacta-13(425 E.c.), battle of, 92, 93-96, 97, 98, 99, 202 bdttleorders, 93, 94 ~dsudlt1~5, 96 map, 9 5 Sp~tlirrdates,1 19 Ctedau\, \on of Thrasvlaus, 16 5toa P a ~ n t ~ n g32, Stmtegos. See Moplltc; 1,eaders Strauss, R. C., 58, 71 Succc\sor krtig,, 148- 1 50, 160-1 68, 172,198,201 Suds (I%wanti~-ie encyclopacdra), 32, 3 1 Culla, 1uc~usC:ornel~u\,6, 198, 207 5ybota (432 B.c.), battle of, 56 Symboli\m Alexander as mvtfi, 141, 143-147 l-.ast-West contrast, 40, 74-77, 144-145,205-206, 228(n263) I.eonidG~s'sglor~fi cation, 79-80 man~pulat~on of rellgtctn In warfare, 106-1 07 I'ersian War\, 74-8 1 Ther~noj'ylams a myth, 77-78, 79-8 1 Syphax, Num~dtanking, 188-189
Syssltm, 84 Sywah, 145-146 Iarn, W. W., 143 Tearless Rattle, 16 Tegyra (175 1s.c .), hattle of, 104, 105, l Oh, 107, 108 Te111pe Ciorgc, 42 Thebes, 2, 6,21-22,45-48, 58-66, 79, 8I at Plataca, 58-66 at Thernioyplae, 45-48 \olv~ngthe pu/rle of Sparta's bartlcfield ~uprcmacy,103-1 09 war agalnst Sparta, 102-109 Them~stocles,50, 53, 54, 55, 72, 77, 79,22?(nlOX) Ihcrmopylac (480 B.c.), battle of, 18, 42-50, 51, 55, 59,68, 71, 74, 75, 77-78, 79-81, 8 3 , 86, 96 battlcorders, 45, 46, 49-50 ~asualtics,49-50 Greek strategic pld11, 48-50 location, 42-4 1 mdp, 44 symbolical rnea111ngof, 77-78. 79-81 at (Greeks and Pcrs~anr),46 Thrssallans, cavalry In XIacedon~an army, 115, 119, 123, 126, 132, 1 34, 170 Thucydtdes, 12, 14, 19, 54, 56,74,96, 97 Iicinils (218 ri.c.),battlc of, 172, 176, 181, 194 battleorders, 172, 246(n 169) Towcr o f Ag,~thoclo(204 E.! .), battle ot. 188 hattleorciers, 171-1 74 ~ d \ ~ d l ~ l188 e\, map, 189 Trasimene I A e (2 17 B.( .), bdttlc of, 3, 172, 176, 181, 194 casualt~es,176 Trebta (218 B.c.), battle of, 1, 172, 173-176, 178, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 194, 195 battlcorders, 173-1 74
Index
2 77
(:arthaglnlan plan. 173, 176, 180 casualties, 175-1 76 rn,ip, 17.5 Irmrrr, 153, 154, 155, 188, 189, 195, 2 10, 244(n 106), 249111269).See also I egion Trircmt>\,83-84, 2 i 0, 22 i-224(n I O X ) . S L . also ~ Salanus Troy, 141, 144 Tyre, 141, 183 Iyrtaeus, 87
motlvatlon for, 18-1 9, 20, 30, 1 50-1 51, 158-1 59 rccruttment, 8 rel~pon,20-23 a\ S O C I ~ I orgdntsnl, I 58-1 60 5oclety and war, 118-1 39 usc of rc\ikrve, 189 vchlclc of s o ~ l anl ~ o b ~ l ~159-360 ty, Wardman, A. F,., 227111 242) Warry, I., 12 Worlcy, 1.. l., 237(n36)
Van der Veer, J.A.G., 66(n30) \'an Wco, Hall\, l 1 Varro, Cialus, Tercnt~u\,Roman consul at C:aiinae, 176, 1'77, 195 Velztes, 1 F 3, 2 10. Sec LIISO 1.eg1oii Vulcan, 199
Xcnophoii, 18, 90, 100, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 141-143 Xcrxc\, 12,20,21, 38-58, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 77, 79, 88, 1 1 1, 1l 6 489-480 IS.( . c ~ p e d i t i oto~ Cireece, ~ 39-81 army of, 66-72 plan, 42 svc of I)ers~anIncaslon force, 40-4 1
Walbarik, F. W., 160, 1h7 Wa r arinv commanclers (Grcccc), 17-1 8 arniv SIW, 8, 149, 160. SPPalso Slfe o f armlt.5; 51~eo f 11avte5; I F I ~ I I U Z ~ Mbattles RI categories of, 7, 212 ( n l ) classes and war (Greece), 19-20 declarat~oiiof, 2 1 lnlpact on soclety, 158-160
Zalna (202 12.c .), battle of, 3 , 17, 190-198,200 battlcorders, 192, 193, 197 C:arthagin~anplan, 194-195 casualt~es,196 Z~rathrustra,73 Zeus, 6, 141, 145, 146, 199
